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 OF 1863; 
 
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 EMBRACING AN ACCOUNT OF 
 
 The Strength and Organization of the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia; Thole 
 
 Daily MareheB with the Routes of Travel, and General Orders Issued ; The Three 
 
 Days of Battle j The Betreat of the Confederates and Pursuit by the 
 
 Federals ; Analytical Index, Maps, Portraits, and a large 
 
 number of Illustrations of the Battle-field. 
 
 flPttlj an ^ppsnbte 
 
 Containing an Account of the Burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, A Statement of th» 
 General Sickles Controversy, and other Valuable Historic Papers. 
 
 BY 
 
 JACOB HOKE. 
 
 DAYTON, OHIO: 
 
 W. J. SHUEY, PUBLISHER. 
 
 1887. 
 
• 
 
 s 
 
 81 
 
 Copyright, 1887: 
 By Rev. W. J. Shuey. 
 
*1 
 
 TO THE 
 
 STTRVTVING MEMBERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 
 
 AND TO THE 
 
 MEMORY OF THOSE WHO HAVE DEPARTED, 
 
 AS WELL AS 
 
 TO ALL THE HEROIC MEN, BOTH LIVING AND DEAD, WHO 
 
 HASTENED TO THE RESCUE OF THEIR IMPERILED 
 
 COUNTRY IN THE HOUR OF HER NEED, 
 
 THIS VOLUME, 
 
 "WHICH RECORDS THE EVENTS OF ONE OF THE GREATEST AND MOST 
 
 DECISIVE CAMPAIGNS OF THE WAR OF THE REBELLION, 
 
 IS MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED 
 
 BY THE AUTHOR. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 The Armies of the Potomac, and of Northern Virginia. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Number of the Army of the Potomac — Testimony of General George 
 G. Meade — Strength of the Army of Northern Virginia — State- 
 ment of Hon. Edward Everett, General James Longstreet, Colonel 
 W. H. Taylor, and the Count of Paris — Confirmatory Testimony of 
 Eye -Witnesses — Organization of the Army of the Potomac — Of 
 the Army of Northern Virginia — Purposes and Objects of the Inva- 
 sion — Statement of Generals A. L,. Long, James Longstreet, and 
 Abner Doubleday — Jefferson Davis' Confidence in Lee's success in 
 Pennsylvania — Hon. A. H. Stephens sent to Washington to propose 
 Peace upon the Recognition of the Southern Confederacy — Copy 
 of Davis' Letter of Instructions to Stephens — Turned back at Fort- 
 ress Monroe — The Victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg Interfere 
 with Davis' Plans — Lee's Strategical Plans and Purposes — Arrival 
 of Longstreet's Scout and Change of Plan and Purposes — Harmon- 
 izing the Contradictory Statements as to the Time of this Scout's 
 Arrival — Confidence of the Confederates — Lee's Plans and Strat- 
 egy Foiled by General Hooker — Stuart's Forced March around the 
 Federal Army — Lee's Ignoijance of Hooker's Movements — Depar- 
 ture of the Confederate Commmander from a "Strategical Offensive 
 but Tactical Defensive " — Longstreet's Objections to this Change — 
 Opposed to an Attack upon the Federal Position at Gettysburg — 
 Counsels a Flank Movement — Remarks of the Count of Paris upon 
 Lee's alternatives 3$ 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Armies in Motion; Rout of General Milroy at Winchester. 
 
 Positions Occupied by the Federal and Confederate Armies — Indica- 
 tions of an Aggressive Movement by the Confederates — General 
 Hooker wide awake to the Emergency — Informs the Government 
 of the Threatened Invasion — Withdrawal of Lee's Army from 
 
 xiii 
 
Xiv CONTENTS. 
 
 Ftfgcs. 
 
 Fredericksburg and Concentration at Culpeper — Reconnoissance 
 in force by the Federal Cavalry under General Pleasanton — Desper- 
 ate Engagement at Beverly Ford or Brandy Station — Capture of 
 General Stuart's Head -quarter's Chest containing Lee's Plans — 
 Prompt Measures by General Hooker to Defeat Dee's Purposes — 
 Dee Forced to the Shenandoah Valley instead of moving North- 
 ward and East of the Mountain as he Intended — Daily Marches of 
 the Two Armies — Exposed Condition of General Milroy at Win- , 
 Chester — Warned of his Danger he Declares his Ability to Main- 
 tain his Position — Reconnoissances made and Skirmishes with the 
 Advancing Enemy — Arrival of Early's and Johnson's Divisions 
 before Winchester — Rodes' Division drives Colonel McReynolds 
 from Berryville — His Wagon -train Flees to the Potomac at Wil- 
 liamsport — Pursued by Jenkins' Cavalry — Capture of Martinsburg 
 by General Rodes — Severe Fighting at Winchester — Milroy aban- 
 dons Winchester in the night and flees toward Harper's Ferry — 
 Intercepted by the Confederates — His Forces Defeated and many 
 Slain and Captured — Escape of part of his Force to Maryland 
 Heights, and others to Everett or Bloody Run in Southern Pennsyl- 
 vania — Jenkins crosses the Potomac at Williamsport 66 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Preparations for the Reception of the Enemy. Advance of General Jenkins. 
 
 Description of Southern Pennsylvania — Preparations made to Repel 
 the Threatened Invasion — Departments of the Monongahela and 
 Susquehanna ordered — The Militia called out — Intense Excite- 
 ment along the Southern Border — Graphic Description by Rev. 
 Dr. Philip Schaff — Excitement in Chambersburg, and the contents 
 of the Bank, stores, and Court House secreted or sent away — Flight 
 of the Farmers with their Horses and Cattle — McReynolds' Wagon- 
 train Flees down the Valley — Tremendous Panic of the Teamsters 
 — Dashes through Chambersburg — Jenkins' Cavalry in Pursuit 
 enters Chambersburg — Capture of Lieutenant Smith and George 
 Hawkins in the Public Square — Perilous Escape of their Captors — 
 Desperate Strait of Mr. J. S. Brand — Reprisals made upon the 
 Town for Captured Horses and Accouterments — Shirk's Hill occu- 
 pied — Scouring the Country for Plunder — Horses and Negroes 
 taken — Narrow Escape of Hon. Thaddeus Stevens — Jenkins orders 
 the Stores and Shops to be Opened — Alarm of the Confederates 
 and Hasty Falling Back — Jenkins Plunders the Southern part of 
 Franklin County — Fulton and Adams County Visited and Plun- 
 dered 8* 
 
CONTENTS. XT 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The Invasion. 
 
 Stuart's Cavalry leaves its Encampment on the South bank of the Rap- 
 pahannock and moves Northward — Precautionary Movements of 
 the Federal Army — The Safety of the National Capital, General 
 Hooker's Paramount Object — Magnificent Strategy, and the Ap- 
 proaches to Washington all Covered — Cavalry Engagement at Aldie 
 and Upperville — General Stuart Sealed Up in the Valley— Advance 
 of General Knipe from Harrisburg — General Lee issues a General 
 Order at Berryville Relating to the Conduct of his Troops, and the 
 taking of Supplies— New York Militia in Camp a mile South of 
 Chambersburg — A Suspicious Person visits the Camp — Rodes' 
 Division Advances from Williamsport — Jenkins' cavalry Advance 
 to Marion — Surprised and Fall Back, Pursued by a Company of 
 Federal Cavalry — First Battle of the War upon Pennsylvania Soil 
 — Observations from a Tree Top, and the Confederate Advance Re- 
 ported to General Knipe — Panic Among the New York Militia-men 
 Cowardly Flight — A Federal Officer Shoots his Horse — Slander- 
 ous Stories told by these Panic-stricken Men — General Order issued 
 by Lieutenant General Ewell— Johnson and Early cross the Poto- 
 mac and Advance to Hagerstown — Early Deflects to the East and 
 passes down the Valley by way of Waynesborough, Quincy, and 
 Funkstown to Greenwood— Jenkins Re-enters Chambersburg — 
 Requisition made for Supplies — Requisitions upon Greencastle by 
 General Ewell — Rodes' Division Enters and Passes Through Cham- 
 bersburg — Arrival of General Ewell — General Order Relating to 
 the Disposition of Liquor — Requisition upon Chambersburg for 
 Supplies — Examination of Stores — Immense Losses of the Citizens 
 of Chambersburg — Printing done for the Confederates — Shrewd 
 Financiering — Occupation of Shirk's Hill and Cannon Planted — 
 Stewart's Brigade of Infantry marches from Greencastle to McCon- 
 nellsburg— Battle of North Mountain— Undue Importance Attached 
 to this Affair— Hill's and Longstreet's Corps cross the Potomac 
 and Advance down the Valley — Confederate Court-Martial — Addi- 
 tional Requisitions for Supplies — Passage of Johnson's Division — 
 General Early visits Ewell near Chambersburg— Method of Send- 
 ing Information to the Authorities at Harrisburg — Perilous Escape 
 of some of our Dispatch Bearers — Arrival of Hill's Corps — De- 
 scription of General Hill — Lee and his Staff in the Public Square 
 — Council between Lee and Hill — Immense Importance of this 
 Council — A Historic Scene — Eagerness to see which way the Con- 
 federate Commander and his Staff would take — Turns Eastward — 
 
 Page. 
 
*▼! CONTENTS. 
 
 Immediate Dispatch of this Fadt to Harrisburg — Benjamin S. 
 Huber, the Heroic Dispatch Bearer — Interesting Account of his 
 Trip — Closeted with the Governor of Pennsylvania and the Mili- 
 tary Authorities — Lee's whereabouts known at Washington early 
 in the day following his Entrance into Chambersburg — Descrip- 
 tion of General Lee and his Brilliant Staff — British Officers with 
 the Grand Cavalcade — Lee makes his Head-Quarters upon the 
 Eastern Outskirts of Chambersburg — Destruction of Hon. Thad- 
 deus Stevens' Iron Works by General Early — Early crosses the 
 South Mountain and marches upon Gettysburg — Requisitions upon 
 Gettysburg — General Imboden crosses the Potomac and Enters 
 Pennsylvania — Plundering by the Way — Jenkins' Cavalry pass 
 through Carlisle — Falling Back of the Federal Troops under Gen- 
 eral Knipe — Arrival of Longstreet's Corps — General Order by Lee 
 
 — Humanity of the Confederate Chieftain — Commendable Behavior 
 of the Confederates — Lee's Orders generally Observed — A few 
 Outrages only by Stragglers — Citizens Caught in out of the way 
 places Robbed — Hats, Boots, and Watches taken — Mr. Strite Mur- 
 dered and his body Secreted — Scouring the Country for Supplies 
 
 — Precautionary Measures in some Localities — Mountain Passes 
 Fortified by the Farmers to Secure their Horses — Brilliant Dash 
 by Captain Dahlgreen upon the Confederate Communications at 
 Greencastle — Prisoners and Confederate Mail Captured and Hur- 
 ried Across the Mountain to the Union Head-Quarters — Rodes' In- 
 fantry passes through Carlisle — Requisitions upon Mechanicsburg 
 by General Jenkins — Early's Division Enters York — Requisitions 
 made upon the Town — A ransom of One Hundred Thousand Dol- 
 lars Demanded — Part of this Amount Paid Over — Insolent Order, 
 or Address to the People — General Gordon with his Brigade Ad- 
 vances to Wrightsville on the Susquehanna — Objedl of this Move- 
 ment — Immense Importance of Preventing the Confederates from 
 Seizing the Columbia Bridge crossing the River at that place — 
 Hurried Concentration of Militia under Colonel Frick — Breast- 
 works thrown up on the Western Bank of the River — Resistance 
 made at this Place — Threatened to be out-flanked, the small Federal 
 force Recrosses the River to Columbia, — Order from General Couch 
 to Destroy the Bridge when it could no longer be held — The Torch 
 Applied — Official Account by Colonel Frick — An Unusual Sun- 
 day's Occurrence in Chambersburg— Breaking Open of Stores and 
 Cellars — Colonel Freemantle's Account of this Day's Work — 
 Disposition of Confederate Scrip — Another Clerical Financier — 
 Visit to General Lee in his Camp by Mrs. Ellen McClellan — Inter- 
 esting Account of the Interview — Skirmish at Oyster's Point — 
 
 Paz*. 
 
CONTENTS. XV11 
 
 Page. 
 Collision between Federal Cavalry and part of Imboden's force 
 
 upon the North Mountain — Defeat of Confederate Cavalry in Mc- 
 Connellsburg by Captain Jones — Ignominious Flight of Pennsyl- 
 vania Militia — Heth's Division of Hill's Corps crosses the South 
 Mountain and Encamps about Cashtown — Advance of the Divis- 
 ions of Generals Hood and McLaws — Pickett's Division Remains 
 near Chambersburg and Destroys the Railroad — Visit of Dr. J. L. 
 Suesserott to General Lee's Head-Quarters — Lee's Nervousness — 
 Description of the Confederate Army — Manner of Marching — Per- 
 fect Discipline — Behavior of the Men — Laughable Occurrences — 
 Depression and Discouragement of Some — Cases of Desertion — 
 Surprise at our Magnificent Country — Ignorance of what was going 
 on while under Confederate Rule — Richmond Papers our only 
 Source of Information — Depressing Stories of Confederate Victories 
 told us — Patriotic Feelings and Expressions of our People — Im- 
 menseness of Lee's Army — Its Probable Length — Observations 
 from a Church Steeple — Return of Ewell's Great Wagon Train and 
 its Rapid Passage Eastward — Significance of this Movement and 
 Report of the same sent to Harrisburg — Perilous Adventures of 
 Rev. S. W. Pomeroy while bearing this Dispatch — Information of 
 this Concentration Forwarded to the Head-Quarters of the Army 
 of the Potomac, and General Meade put in Possession of it Before 
 Daylight — Cause of this Concentration — Arrival of General Long- 
 street's Scout — The Federal Army heard from — The Order to 
 Attack Harrisburg Countermanded, and a Concentration about Cash- 
 town Ordered — Places Occupied by the Different Corps and Divis- 
 iens of Lee's Army when this Order for Concentration was issued — 
 Routes taken by each — Early marches from York by way of East 
 Berlin, and passes the night near Heidlersburg — Rodes marches 
 from the Vicinity of Carlisle, and crosses the South Mountain by 
 Mt. Holly Gap, and unites with Early — Longstreet and Lee ride 
 together from the vicinity of Chambersburg and Encamp together 
 over night at Greenwood — Pender's and Anderson's Divisions of 
 Hill's Corps march from Fayetteville and Greenwood and join 
 Heth at Cashtown — Johnson's Division of Ewell's Corps Retraces 
 its Steps from the Vicinity of Shippensburg to Greenvillage, and 
 passes directly across to Greenwood by way of Scotland, where it 
 remains over night — Jenkins' Cavalry crosses the South Mountain 
 by Mt. Holly Gap, and enters into and Plunders Petersburg — Re- 
 ceives Dispatches and hurries on to Gettysburg — The Cavalry Bri- 
 gades of Generals Beverly Robertson and William E. Jones cover 
 the Withdrawal of Rodes from the Valley — Imboden's Cavalry 
 Occupies Chambersburg — Ordered by Lee they Advance to Green- 
 
XV111 CONTENTS. 
 
 fug* 
 
 wood to Prevent his Communications from being Interrupted by 
 
 any Federal Advance by way of the Pine Grove Road — The Cav- 
 alry Brigades of Robertson and Jones Return from down the Valley 
 and passing through Chambersburg go on to Gettysburg — Con- 
 federate Advance from Cashtown under General Pettigrew upon a 
 Reconnoissance to near Gettysburg — They Fall Back to Marsh 
 Creek, where they Remain over night — Arrival of the Divisions of 
 Hood and McLaws at Marsh Creek — Location of each Corps and 
 Division of the Confederate Army during the Night Before the 
 First Day's Engagement 114 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 T/ie Advance of the Federal A rmy. 
 
 General Hooker, advised of the whereabouts of the Confederate Army, 
 crosses the Potomac and marches Northward — Daily Movements 
 of each Corps of the Federal Army — Left Wing thrown across the 
 Potomac — Crampton's and Turner's Passes Covered — Thorough- 
 fare Gap Uncovered and Stuart emerges from the Valley — Com- 
 pelled to pass around to the East of the Federal Army — Right 
 Wing crosses the Potomac — The Twelfth Corps moves to the Point 
 of Rocks to unite with General French at Maryland Heights with 
 the view to fall upon Lee's rear — Disagreement of General Halleck 
 with this Plan — Correspondence between Generals Halleck and 
 Hooker — Hooker Resigns the Command and General Meade put 
 in his place — A Dark Sabbath-day in the Nation's History — Com- 
 munications with Washington cut by Stuart — His Cavalry ad- 
 vance Creates Intense Excitement in Baltimore and Washington — 
 Supreme Patriotism of the Army and Willing Acceptance of the 
 Change of Commanders — Meade and Reynolds in Council — Gen- 
 eral Kilpatrick Supersedes General Stahl in Command of his 
 Cavalry Division — Custer, Merritt, and Farnsworth made Brigadier 
 Generals of Cavalry — The Army passes through Frederick City — 
 That place its point of divergence — Erratic Movements of General 
 Stuart — Intercepted by Kilpatrick at Hanover, a Severe Engagement 
 is the Result — Ignorant of Early's Departure from York, Stuart 
 continues on toward that place — Crosses Early's and White's routes, 
 but ignorant of the course they went — Deceived by a False Report 
 he crosses over to Carlisle — Steady and Cautious Advance of the 
 Federal Army — Explorations of the Country made, and the Line 
 of Pipe Creek chosen for the expected Battle — Instructions Issued 
 to the Corps Commanders, and an Order or Address to the Army — 
 Reynolds sent byway of Pimmittsburg toward Gettysburg — Buford's 
 Cavalry passes through Gettysburg, and encamps over night two 
 
CONTENTS. XIX 
 
 miles west of the town — Positions occupied by the various Corps 
 of the Army during the night before the Opening Engagement— 
 The Two Armies almost Face to Face — The Distance of each Corps 
 and Division of each Army from the Field of Strife 234 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 The First Day's Engagement. 
 
 Buford's Cavalry engages Heth's Division of Hill's Corps — Buford 
 sends word of the Presence of the Enemy to Reynolds — Reynolds 
 leaves Doubleday to bring up the balance of his Corps and presses 
 forward with Wadsworth's Division — Reynolds in advance of his 
 men dashes into and through Gettysburg — Forms his Dines and is 
 Killed by a Sharp-shooter — Desperate Fighting — Howard reaches 
 the Field and takes Observations from the College Cupola — 
 Cemetery Hill Chosen as the Place to make a Stand, and Stein- 
 wehr's Division Ordered into Position there — Contradictory Claims 
 to the Discovery and Selection of Cemetery Hill — The Body of 
 Reynolds borne from the Field and sent to Lancaster, Pennsyl- 
 vania — Capture of Archer's Brigade — Arrival of Howard's Corps 
 and the Federal Dine extended to the Right — Arrival of Rodes' 
 and Early's Divisions from Heidlersburg — Slocum, who was at 
 Two Taverns, but Five Miles away, repeatedly Solicited to come 
 to the Rescue, but Refuses — Meade's Order to Concentrate at Pipe 
 Creek in the way — Sickles receives Howard's Dispatch, and with 
 part of his Corps rushes to the Rescue — Buford's Dispatch to Gen- 
 eral Meade — General Hancock sent to take Command and report 
 as to the Advisability of making a stand at Gettysburg — Reaches 
 Cemetery Hill just as the Eroken Ranks of the Federals reach 
 it — Perceives the Value of the Position and Assists in Rallying 
 and Placing the Troops — Arrival of Slocum and Sickles — Han- 
 cock leaves Slocum in Command and hurries to Taneytown to 
 Report to General Meade — The order to concentrate at Pipe Creek 
 rescinded, and instructions sent to all the Corps Commanders to 
 move to Gettysburg — Arrival of the Commander-in-Chief — The 
 night spent in Preparations for a Renewal of the Battle — Failure 
 of the Confederates to follow up the advantages of the First Day's 
 Engagement by seizing Cemetery Hill — Reasons assigned by 
 Southern Writers — Advance of General Smith from Harrisburg 
 to Carlisle — Stuart's Cavalry comes upon the scene at the latter 
 place — Demand upon Smith to Surrender — Demand refused, and 
 Carlisle shelled and the United States Barracks burned — Stuart 
 falls back toward Gettysburg 259 
 
■XX CONTENTS. 
 
 / 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 The Second Day's Engagement. 
 
 The Position taken oy the Federals — Position of the Confederates—* 
 Superiority of the former — Arrival of Troops, and their Positions 
 assigned them — Contemplated Attack upon the Confederate Left — 
 Generals Slocum and Warren oppose it and the purpose abandoned, 
 and a defensive attitude determined upon — Both sides Preparing 
 for a Renewal of the Conflict — Silence along the Lines — Confed- 
 erates Less Sanguine and Boastful — Providential Inactivity of the 
 Confederates — Their Failure to make an Early Attack gives Time 
 for all the Federal Troops to Arrive — Lee Confronted by Difficul- 
 ties, abandons his Purpose of a Tactical Defensive, and resolves to 
 attack Meade — Reconnoitering the Federal Position and Consult- 
 ing with his Generals — A Simultaneous Attack upon both Flanks 
 determined upon, and Orders Issued accordingly — Inexplicable 
 Delay of General Longstreet in Opening the Battle — Expected to 
 make an Earlier Attack — Statements of several distinguished 
 Southern Officers — Advanced and Exposed Position taken by Gen- 
 eral Sickles — Furious Attack upon him by Longstreet — Meade, 
 seeing that Sickles could not hold his Position, posts the Fifth 
 Corps upon the Line originally intended — Desperate Fighting and 
 Fearful Slaughter — The Historic Peach Orchard and the Wheat 
 Field — Sickles' Line Broken at the Angle and Driven Back — Hum- 
 phreys Driven and the Federal main Line Pierced — Failure of Hill 
 to Support this Charge and Hold the Position Gained — Large Cap- 
 tures of Federal Artillery — Stannard's Vermont Brigade to the 
 Rescue — The Enemy Driven Back and Guns Recaptured — Efforts 
 of the Enemy to Out-flank Sickles' Left and Seize Little Round 
 Top — Strange Oversight of the Federals in failing to perceive the 
 Importance of this Key to the whole Field — Its Value accidentally 
 Discovered — Troops and Cannon rushed up to its Summit, and a 
 Determination to Hold it at all Hazards — Terrific Fighting and 
 Great Slaughter — Eminent and Distinguished Officers Slain — De- 
 scription of the Terrific Struggle, by a Confederate Participant — 
 Brilliant Charge by Barnes' Division and by the Regulars under 
 Ayers in Front of Round Top — The Ground in front a Seething 
 Whirlpool of Blood and Fire — The Enemy Penetrates between Big 
 and Little Round Top and Attacks the Federal Rear — Heroic Re- 
 sistance by the Twentieth Maine under Colonel Chamberlain — 
 Reinforcements from the Sixth and Twelfth Corps Ordered — Gal- 
 lant Charge by the Pennsylvania Reserves and Repulse of the 
 Enemy — Longstreet seeing part of the Sixth Corps in Line, be- 
 
 Pag* 
 
CONTENTS. XXI 
 
 Page. 
 
 comes Discouraged and Withdraws his Men — Numbers Engaged 
 
 upon the Federal)side — Confederate Estimates Considered — At- 
 tack of Early upon the Confederate Center — Terrific Hand to Hand 
 Fighting — Temporary Success of the Confederates — Their final 
 Repulse with Great Slaughter — The Louisiana Tigers meet their 
 Match — Great Numbers of them Slain — Attack of Johnson's Di- 
 vision upon the Federal Right — The Line having been Weakened 
 to Reinforce the Sorely-pressed Left, is Pierced and Occupied dur- 
 ing the Night — Ignorant of the Importance of the Position gained, 
 the Confederates fail to take Advantage of it — Results of this 
 Day's Engagements — Positions of the Respective Armies at the 
 Close of this Day — Errors of the Confederates — Errors of the 
 Federals — Scene in General Meade's Head-Quarters — A Council 
 of War Held — Decided to Remain and Fight the Battle Here — 
 Scene in General Lee's Head-Quarters 295 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The Third Day's Engagetnenl. 
 
 Readjustments of the Lines during the Night — Pickett's Division, 
 which had only Reached the Field during the Afternoon before, 
 Placed in Position — The Twelfth Corps Returned to its Position, 
 and Preparations made to drive Johnson from the Position within 
 the Federal Line he had gained — Shaler's and Wheaton's Brigades 
 of the Sixth Corps and Lockwood's Maryland Brigade sent to As- 
 sist Slocum — Johnson Reinforced by Daniels' and O'Neill's Bri- 
 gades of Rodes' Division — Opening of the Engagement at Early 
 Dawn — Terrific Fighting and Fearful Slaughter — The Enemy 
 finally driven out and the Federal Line Re-established after six 
 hours' Desperate Fighting — Lee's Plans again Defeated — The At- 
 tack upon the Federal Left Center to have been Simultaneous with 
 the Attack upon the Right — Longstreet again not Ready — Ominous 
 Silence Reigns for Two Hours — Both sides Preparing for the Last 
 Desperate Effort — Renewal of the Fight — Terrific Artillery Prelude 
 — Great Destruction of Life in both Armies — Graphic Descriptions 
 by both Federals and Confederates — Cessation of the Firing — The 
 Assaulting Columns Appear — Imposing Appearance and Admira- 
 tion of the Federals — Statement by a Confederate Officer as to the 
 Length and Depth of this Great Assaulting Column, and the Distance 
 by Adtual Measurement it had to Traverse to reach the Federal 
 Line — Opening of the Federal Artillery upon the Advancing Troops 
 — Their Lines Ploughed Through and Through — Still Pressing 
 Forward until within Reach when the Infantry Fire upon Them — 
 The Federal Lines a Sheet of Flame — Their Line Pierced — Des- 
 
XX11 CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 perate Fighting- — Stannard's Vermonters again to the Front — 
 
 Deeds of Heroism — The Attack Repulsed — Large Captures of 
 Prisoners — Retreat of a Few Survivors — Graphic Description of 
 the Memorable Assault by Eye-witnesses and Participants, Feder- 
 als and Confederates — Stuart's Attempt to get into the Federal 
 Rear — Great Cavalry Engagement Simultaneously with the Assault 
 in Front — Graphic and Thrilling Account by Colonel William 
 Brooke Rawle — Repulse of Stuart — Numbers Engaged in this 
 Cavalry Fight — Estimate by the Count of Paris — Cavalry Engage- 
 ment upon the Federal Left — The Fall of General Farnsworth — 
 Brilliant Charge of the Pennsylvania Reserves and close of the 
 Battle of Gettysburg — Failures of the Confederates this Day — 
 Lee's Plans not Carried Out — Somebody to Blame — Remarks of 
 Colonel Taylor, Lee's Chief of Staff — Longstreet's Defense and 
 Reply to Colonel Taylor — Longstreet Expresses his Disapproval of 
 the Plans of Lee and his Reluctance in Executing Them — Import- 
 ant Historical Papers Relating to this Subject — Condition of 
 things within the Confederate Lines after the Failure of Pickett's 
 Great Assault — Descriptions by Colonel Freemantle of the British 
 Army and Captain Owen of the Confederate — Should General 
 Meade have followed up Pickett's Repulse by a Grand Counter 
 Charge — Opinions of Distinguished Confederate and Federal Offi- 
 cers — The Rebellion receives its most Damaging Blows in the East 
 and West at the same time, for about the time Lee received his 
 Crushing Defeat at Gettysburg, General Pemberton was negotiating 
 with Grant at Vicksburg for the Surrender of his Army — Federal 
 and Confederate Losses during the Three Days of Battle 357 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Retreat of the Confederate A rmy. 
 
 Relative Strength of the two Armies after the Battle — Federal Troops 
 Available and within Reacli — Combinations that could have been 
 made — Why was it not Done — Strange Dereliction of those in Au- 
 thority — Failure to Pursue and Attack the Retreating Confederates 
 Emboldens Confederate writers to Question the Victory Won — 
 Statement of Colonel Taylor — Dispositions made by Lee after night 
 closed upon the Scene — Troops Withdrawn and placed behind 
 Seminary Ridge —Breast-works thrown up — An Immediate Retreat 
 to Virginia Decided on — The Wounded placed in Wagons and sent 
 on their way — Large Numbers Unable to be Moved and Left Be- 
 hind — Withdrawal of the Army — Discovery of the Flight of the 
 Enemy by General Birney and his Desire to Attack — Is Forbidden 
 
CONTENTS. XX111 
 
 Page, 
 by General Meade — The Sixth Corps, Accompanied by Cavalry, in 
 
 Pursuit — Overtakes the Confederate Rear at Fairfield, but is For- 
 bidden to Attack — General Howe's Statement — Independent Move- 
 ments Elsewhere and Excellent Results Gained — Turner's Pass of 
 the South South Mountain Seized, and Confederate Pontoon over 
 the Potomac at Falling Waters Destroyed by General French — 
 Daring Dash by Kilpatrick upon the Enemy in the Mountain, and 
 Terrific Night Assault — A Perilous Ride — Description by a Partici- 
 pant — The Pursuit of Lee Slowly Conducted by way of Emmitts- 
 burg, Frederick, Middletown, and Turner's Pass — Daily and 
 Leisurely Movements of the Federals — Lee reaches Hagerstown 
 in Two Days — Incessant Rains cause the Potomac to Rise — Line 
 of Battle Selected and Breast-works thrown up — Advance of Militia 
 under Generals Dana and Smith — General Couch Removes his 
 Head-quarters to Chambersburg — After an Eight Day's March the 
 Federals reach the Confederate Line — Commanders Anxious to 
 take Advantage of Favorable Opportunities for Assaulting the Foe 
 Forbidden, as a General Engagement was not Desired — Statement 
 by General Howe — Meade calls together his Corps Commanders 
 and Considers the Question of Attacking Lee in the Strong Posi- 
 tion he had taken and Fortified — The Majority Opposed to an 
 Attack — Too Late, the Opportunity Lost — Urged by President 
 Lincoln, Meade, on the following Evening, issues Orders for an 
 Attack the next Morning — Daylight appears, but the Enemy Gone 
 — Pursuit by Kilpatrick — Comes up with the Confederate rear at 
 Falling Waters, and after a Severe Engagement, the Enemy Suc- 
 ceeds in Escaping after the Loss of General Pettigrew and many 
 others Killed and Wounded, and a large number of Prisoners — 
 Should General Meade have Ordered an Attack — Hampered with 
 Instructions as to the Safety of Washington — Dispatch from General 
 Halleck — Testimony of General Meade before the Congressional 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War — Opinions of Thomas 
 Robins, jr., and General McLaws 446 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 The Great Wagon Train of Wounded. 
 
 Departure of the Great Wagon Train with Wounded — The Train not 
 less than Twenty-five or Thirty Miles Long— Over Ten Thousand 
 Wounded Men With and In It — Unparalled Scenes of Suffering — 
 Description by General Imboden who had it in Charge — Graphic 
 Descriptions by Eye-witnesses who Resided Along its Route — 
 Statements of Jacob C. Snyder, Rev. J. Milton Snyder, Rev. J. C. 
 Smith, and Mr. David Z. Shook — Losing their Way in the Night 
 
XXIV CONTENTS. 
 
 Pag* 
 
 a Small Part of this Tram enters Chambeisburg — Scenes of Suffer- 
 ing — Provisions made for Sufferers — Captain Jones with Two 
 Hundred Cavalry Dash upon this Train at Cearfoss' Cross-Roads — ■ 
 One Hundred Wagons and One Thousand Wounded Prisoners 
 Taken — Pursuit by General Gregg and Captures made at the Con- 
 federate Rear 477 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Phenomena of Battle Sound. 
 
 The Sound of the Cannonade Heard at a Distance of One Hundred, 
 One Hundred and Twenty, One Hundred and Forty, One Hundred 
 and Fifty, and Two Hundred Miles from the Field — Certificates by 
 Rev. C. Cort, Rev. Dr. C. R. Lane, Rev. Bishop J. J. Glossbrenner, 
 Hon. F. M. Kimmell, and Rev. L. W. Stahl, — Explanatory and 
 Philosophical Papers by Professors Spencer F. Baird of the Smith- 
 sonian Institute at Washington and A. B. Johnson of the United 
 States Light House Board — Extracts from the Writings of Pro- 
 fessor Henry 508 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Gettysburg — The Nation's Shrine. 
 
 The Condition of the Slain after the Battle — Purchase of Ground for 
 the Soldier's National Cemetery — Dedication of the Cemetery — 
 Solemn and Impressive Exercises — Eloquent Prayer by Dr. Stock- 
 ton — Memorable Dedicatory Address of President Lincoln — Affec- 
 tion of the People for Mr. Lincoln — Burial of the Dead — Beauti- 
 fying of the Grounds — Memorial Tablets and Monuments — Tribute 
 to the Heroic Dead — Gettysburg, Holy Ground 520 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 A Guide to the Field of Battle 536 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Page. 
 Portrait of Major -General George G. Meade. Frontispiece. 
 
 Portrait of General Robert E. Lee 3a 
 
 Portrait of Major- General Joseph Hooker 233 
 
 Pen Sketch of Major-General George G. Meade 241 
 
 Portrait of Major-General W. S. Hancock 357 
 
 Map of Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania, from the Potomac to the 
 
 Susquehanna 91 
 
 Map of the Battle Field of Gettysburg. Front. 
 
 General Lee and Staff in the Public Square of Chambersburg, Pennsyl- 
 vania 163 
 
 Portrait of the Scout, Benjamin S. Huber 166 
 
 Portrait of the Scout, Rev. S. W. Pomeroy 225 
 
 View from Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg, showing the scene of the 
 
 first day's battle 260 
 
 The tree under which General Reynolds fell 264 
 
 East Cemetery Hill, upon which the Union forces were rallied 278 
 
 Culp's Hill, from Evergreen Cemetery and the Baltimore Pike 280 
 
 Little and Big Round Top, from the North-west 282 
 
 General Lee's Head - Quarters 291 
 
 View from the Cupola of the Theological Seminary, looking East and 
 
 South-east, showing East Cemetery Hill and Ridge 296 
 
 View from the Soldier's National Monument, looking West, showing 
 
 Seminary Ridge , 298 
 
 Federal Breast-works upon Culp's Hill 302 
 
 Entrance to the Devil's Den 320 
 
 Inside the Devil's Den 322 
 
 The Valley of Death 325 
 
 The Wheat Field, or the Scene of the Whirlpool of the Battle 327 
 
 The Assault upon East Cemetery Hill 340 
 
 General Meade's Head - quarters „ .... 353 
 
 XXV 
 
XXvi LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Page. 
 The High - Water Mark of the Rebellion, or the Place where it Re- 
 ceived its Death Wound 37° 
 
 Codori's House and the Emmittsburg Road — Scene of Pickett's Great 
 
 Charge 374 
 
 Pickett's Great Assault 3 8 * 
 
 Cavalry Shaft, marking the Place where the Great Cavalry Engage- 
 ment behind the Federal Right took Place, July 3d, 1863 410 
 
 Soldier's National Cemetery 5 22 
 
 General Reynold's Monument 5 2 4 
 
 Soldier's National Monument 5 2 7 
 
 Observatory upon East Cemetery Hill 53^ 
 
 View from Little Round Top, looking North-east 543 
 
 View from Little Round Top, looking West and North-west 545 
 
 After the Fire, a View of the Ruins of part of Chambersburg, Penn- 
 sylvania, after its Destruction by the Confederates, July 30th, 1864.. 588 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 A. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Extradl from Hon. A. H. Stephens' celebrated "Corner Stone Address." 553 
 
 B. 
 Poem. Advice to the South, by Maurice Thompson 556 
 
 C. 
 
 Consideration of the Charge against General Sickles, that he Disre- 
 garded an Order from General Reynolds, July 1st, 1863 558 
 
 D. 
 
 Did General Sickles Disobey an Order from General Meade, July 2d, 
 
 1863 570 
 
 E. 
 
 The Burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, by the Confederates, 
 
 July 30th, 1S64 -. 580 
 
 xxvii 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 No battle field on earth is so well preserved and marked as is tl»*t of 
 Gettysburg. Little and Big Round Top, East Cemetery Hill and RMge, 
 Culp's and Wolff Hill, Seminary and Oak Ridge, have become immortal, 
 and will endure while time itself lasts. The lines of the two great armies, 
 the positions occupied by the various corps, divisions, brigades, and regi- 
 ments, and the places where heroic deeds were performed and where 
 distinguished men fell, are being marked by tablets and monuments of 
 enduring marble and granite. In this commendable work, it affords us 
 pleasure to state, Confederates as well as Federal- are engaged. The stone 
 fences and huge boulders, used as defenses, and many of the breast-works 
 thrown up at the time, also remain, and will be preserved as long as time 
 and the elements of nature will permit. The various states whose troops 
 participated in the memorable battle which occurred there, as well as bri- 
 gades, regiments, and companies, are vying with each other, not only to 
 mark for future ages where gallant men fought and where patriots died, 
 but to make as beautiful as possible the entire field where the life of our 
 great Government was assured. It is eminently proper, then, that every 
 fact of historic value connected with the great episode which culminated 
 upon that field should not only be preserved but placed upon record in 
 its proper connection. This the survivors of the period of those stirring 
 events owe to the generations who are yet to come. 
 
 The author of this work has attempted to discharge, in a measure, the 
 duty indicated in the foregoing. His qualifications for the task he has 
 
 xxix 
 
XXX INTRODUCTION. 
 
 undertaken may be stated thus: he resided in Chambersburg, Pennsyl- 
 vania, during the entire period of the War of the Rebellion, and for a 
 score of years previous and ever since; he not only witnessed all the 
 armed hosts, Federal and Confederate, which passed through that place, 
 but had access to their camps and hospitals; he preserved important pa- 
 pers, and kept an account of events with the dates of their occurrence; 
 he visited the field of battle and noted facts and incidents; he has corre- 
 sponded with others, both Federals and Confederates, competent to impart 
 important information; and he has made it a point to read and preserve 
 everything relating to the subject, which has come under his notice. The 
 material thus carefully gathered he has compared, classified, and placed 
 upon record in the following pages. He has been especially careful to be 
 exact in the facts stated, and in the dates given. Errors may have crept 
 into this record, but every precaution has been taken to secure entire 
 accuracy. If he has not succeeded in giving the public such a history of 
 the subject as its importance demands, he has at least rescued from ob- 
 livion much valuable historical matter, which, without this humble effort, 
 would have been forever lost. 
 
 It will be seen in the perusal of this work that the published statements 
 of both Federal and Confederate writers, relating to the invasion of Penn- 
 sylvania and the battle of Gettysburg, have been used. This has been 
 done that the fullest and fairest history of the whole may be secured, for 
 both sides are equally entitled to a hearing. Besides this, events which 
 transpired within the Confederate lines, and which Confederates only could 
 detail, are of equal importance in an impartial and reliable history with 
 those which occurred within the Federal lines, and which Federals only 
 could narrate. For the reasons thus stated, as well as to preserve in a per- 
 manent form some of the many excellent and interesting articles, written 
 for the newspapers and magazines, by eye-witnesses and participants, I 
 have drawn largely upon this class of writers. 
 
 In matters of dispute, or where differences of opinion have prevailed, I 
 have endeavored to be impartial; and in every case, where it was at all 
 possible, both sides have been accorded a hearing. 
 
 The writer has not only sought to be impartial, but also unpartisan. 
 
INTRODUCTION. xxxi 
 
 He could not, however, conceal the fact that he wrote from the stand- 
 point of a Unionist, and that his sympathies were, and ever must be, with 
 those who stood for the maintenance of the Government. For those who 
 arrayed themselves upon the opposite side, he has but feelings of kind- 
 ness. The time has come for all ill feeling to be entirely laid aside and 
 forgotten. In this spirit this history has been written; and its author dis- 
 claims any other reason for the task he has undertaken, than to place 
 upon record a fair and truthful account of events in which both the late 
 contestants have an equal interest. If, then, in the following pages, any 
 injustice has been done, or if a feeling or expression inconsistent with an 
 impartial history, intended for the whole country, and for all time to 
 come, has found place, the reader will kindly attribute it to inadvertence 
 rather than to any disposition to perpetuate the bitterness and estrange- 
 ment of the past. 
 
 J. Hoke. 
 
 Chambersburg, Pennsylvania^ 
 
THE GREAT INVASION; 
 
 OR, 
 
 General Lee in Pennsylvania. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE ARMIES OF THE POTOMAC AND OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 >T is conceded by the highest military authorities 
 that the skill displayed in the Pennsylvania cam- 
 paign in the year 1863, by both the commander of 
 *jjy the Army of Northern Virginia and the general in 
 T command of the Army of the Potomac, has never 
 been surpassed in any other campaign in the annals of 
 military history; and it may as truthfully be said that 
 no other great military movement involved consequences 
 so momentous and far-reaching as did that one. With 
 the view, then, to give the reader a clear understand- 
 ing of this great crisis in the terrible struggle in which 
 not only the destiny of the government was at stake, 
 but the higher and greater problem whether a "Govern- 
 ment of the people, by the people, and for the people" 
 was at all practicable, I will place upon record in these 
 pages facts and incidents that occurred during this in- 
 
 33 
 
34 ' THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 vasion, that will greatly aid him, as I believe, in his 
 comprehension of that event. Before proceeding, how- 
 ever, to the narration of these events, it will be neces- 
 sary to have a correct understanding of the organization 
 and strength of the two armies, the designs and pur- 
 poses of the invasion, and the relative positions which 
 they occupied when the great movement began. These 
 may be stated thus: 
 
 I. The number of the forces on each side in the 
 Pennsylvania campaign. 
 
 (1.) The Army of the Potomac. 
 
 There has been a disposition by nearly all historians 
 upon both sides in the great struggle, to magnify the 
 strength of the opposing army, as well as to understate 
 their own. Historical accuracy as well as fairness to both 
 sides requires that the truth only should be told. 
 
 General Meade, in his testimony before the committee 
 of Congress on the Conduct of the War (page 337), states 
 the strength of his army as " a little under one hundred 
 thousand men — probably ninety -five thousand men." 
 This being reliable is of course decisive, and establishes 
 the number of men in the Army of the Potomac in the 
 Pennsylvania campaign. This army was organized as 
 follows : 
 Major-general GEORGE G. MEADE, Commander-in-Chief.* 
 
 STAFF. 
 
 Major - General Daniel Butterfikld, Chief of Staff. 
 Brigadier- General M. R. Patrice, Provost - Marshal - General. 
 Brigadier -General Seth Williams, Adjutant -General. 
 
 * Major- General Joseph Hooker was in command of the Army of the Po- 
 tomac up to Sunday, June 28th, 1863, and on this day, for causes which will 
 hereafter be stated, resigned that position while on the march to Gettysburg, 
 and was succeeded by Major -General Meade. 
 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 35 
 
 Brigadier- General Edmund Schriver, Inspector- General. 
 Brigadier- General Rufus Ingalls, Quartermaster- General. 
 Colonel Henry F. Clarke, Chief of Commissary of Subsistence. 
 Major Jonathan Letterman, Surgeon, Chief of Medical Department. 
 Brigadier -General G. K. Warren, Chief Engineer. 
 Major D. W. Flagler, Chief Ordnance Officer. 
 Major -General Alfred Pleasanton, Chief of Cavalry. 
 Brigadier- General Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery. 
 Captain L. B. Norton, Chief Signal Officer. 
 
 The infantry force of the army was divided into seven 
 corps, as follows: 
 
 First Corps. — Maj'or- General John Fulton Reynolds, Commander. His 
 division commanders were — Brigadier -General James S. Wadsworth, ist di- 
 vision; Brigadier - General John C. Robinson, 2d division; Major- General 
 Abner Doubleday, 3d division. The brigades were commanded respectively 
 by Brigadier -General Solomon Meredith, Brigadier-General Eysander Cutler, 
 Brigadier - General Gabriel R. Paul, Brigadier -General Henry Baxter, Briga- 
 dier-General Thomas A. Rowley, Colonel Roy Stone, and Brigadier -General 
 George J. Stannard. The first two belonged to the ist division, the next two 
 to the 2d, and the last three to the 3d. The artillery brigade attached to this 
 corps was under the command of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright. 
 
 Second Corps. — Major -General Winfield Scott Hancock, Commander.® 
 The division commanders were — Brigadier- General John C. Caldwell, ist 
 division; Brigadier- General John Gibbon, 2d division; Brigadier -General 
 Alexander Hays, 3d division. The brigades were commanded by Colonel 
 Edward E. Cross, Colonel Patrick Kelly, Brigadier- General S. K. Zook, 
 Colonel John R. Brooke, Brigadier -General William Harrow, Brigadier-Gen- 
 eral Alexander S. Webb, Colonel Norman J. Hall, Colonel Samuel S. Carroll, 
 Colonel Thomas A. Smyth, and Colonel George E. Willard. The first four 
 named belonged to the ist division, the succeeding three to the 2d, and the 
 last three to the 3d. The artillery brigade was commanded by Captain J. G. 
 Hazard. 
 
 Third Corps. — Major-General Daniel E. Sickles, Commander.f The 
 
 s The second corps was commanded by Major -General D. N. Couch until 
 June 9th, 1S63, when, in order to prepare for the reception of the threatened 
 invasion of Pennsylvania, he was placed in command of the Department of 
 the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Harrisburg, and Major -General 
 W. S. Hancock succeeded to the command of this corps. 
 
 f At the commencement of the Pennsylvania campaign Major- General Bir- 
 ney was temporarily in command of the third corps, but General Sickles re- 
 sumed command on Sunday, June 28th. 
 
36 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 division commanders were — Major- General David B. Birney and Brigadier- 
 General Andrew A. Humphreys. The brigades were commanded respectively 
 by Brigadier -General C. K. Graham, Brigadier -General J. H. Ward, Colonel 
 Philip R. De Trobriand, Brigadier- General Joseph B. Carr, Colonel William 
 R. Brewster, and Colonel George C. Burtling. The first three belonged to the 
 ist division, and the last three to the 2d. The artillery brigade of this corps 
 was under the command of Captain George E. Randolph. 
 
 Fifth Corps. — Major- General George Sykes, Commander.* The division 
 commanders were — Brigadier -General James Barnes, ist division; Brigadier- 
 General Romayn B. Ayres, 2d division, and Brigadier -General S. Wiley 
 Crawford, 3d division. The brigades were commanded respectively by Col- 
 onel W. S. Tilton, Colonel S. B. Sweitzer, Colonel Strong Vincent, Colonel 
 Hannibal Day, Colonel Sidney Burbank, Brigadier- General S. H. Weed, 
 Colonel William McCandless, and Colonel Joseph W. Fisher. The three first 
 named belonged to the ist division, the next three to the 2d, and the remain- 
 ing two to the 3d. Captain A. P. Martin commanded the artillery brigade 0* 
 this corps. The first and second brigades of the second division of this corps 
 were composed of United States Regulars, and the two brigades of the third 
 division were composed of Pennsylvania Reserves. 
 
 Sixth Corps. — Major- General John Sedgwick, Commander. The di- 
 vision commanders were Brigadier -General H. G. Wright, ist division; Brig- 
 adier-General A. P. Howe, 2d division; and Brigadier- General Frank 
 Wheaton, 3d division. The brigades were commanded by Brigadier- General 
 A. T. A. Torbert, Brigadier - General J. J. Bartlett, Brigadier- General D. A. 
 Russell, Colonel L. A. Grant, Brigadier- General T. A. Neiil, Brigadier- Gen- 
 eral Alexander Shaler, Colonel H. L. Fustis, and Colonel David I. Nevin. 
 The first three named belonged to the ist division, the next two to the 2d 
 and the remaining three to the 3d. The artillery brigade was commanded by 
 Colonel C. H. Tompkins. 
 
 Eleventh Corps. — Major- General Oliver O. Howard, Commander. The 
 division commanders were — Brigadier -General Francis C. Barlow, ist di- 
 vision; Brigadier- General A. Von Steinwehr, 2d division; and Major-General 
 Carl Schurz, 3d division. The brigades were commanded respectively by 
 Colonel Leopold Von Gilsa, Brigadier - General Adelbert Ames, Colonel 
 Charles R. Coster, Colonel Orlando Smith, Brigadier -General A. Von Schim- 
 melpfenning, and Colonel William Kryzanowski. Thd first two belonged to 
 the ist division, the following two to the 2d, and the remaining two to the 
 3d. The artillery brigade was commanded by Major Thomas W. Osborn. 
 
 * General Meade was in command of the fifth corps until Sunday, June 28th f 
 when he was made Commander in Chief, and the command of his corps was 
 given to General Sykes. 
 
THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 37 
 
 Twelfth Corps. — Major- General Henry W. Slocum, Commander.* The 
 division commanders were — Brigadier - General Thomas H. Ruger, 1st di- 
 vision, and Brigadier-General John W. Geary, 2d division. The brigades 
 were respectively commanded by Colonel A"chibald L,. McDougall, Brigadier- 
 General Henry H. L,ockwood, Colonel Silas Colgrove, Colonel Charles Candy, 
 Colonel George A. Cobhani, and Brigadier - General George S. Greene. The 
 first three named belonged to the ist division, and the others to the 2d. 
 The artillery brigade was commanded by Lieutenant Edward D. Muhlenberg. 
 
 The cavalry corps was commanded by Major -General 
 Pleasanton. 
 
 It was composed of three divisions, commanded respectively by Brigadier- 
 General John Buford, 1st division; Brigadier - General D. McM. Gregg, 2d 
 division; and Brigadier - General Judson Kilpatrick, 3d division. The first, 
 second, and reserve brigades of the first division were commanded respect- 
 ively by Colonel William Gamble, Colonel Thomas C. Devin, and Brigadier- 
 General Wesley Merritt. The three brigades of the second division were 
 commanded by Colonel J. B. Mcintosh, Colonel Pennock Huey, and Colonel 
 J. L. Gregg; and the two brigades of the third division were commanded 
 respectively by Brigadier - General E. J. Farnsworth and Brigadier -General 
 George A. Custer. The reserve artillery, of which there were five brigades, 
 Vas under the command of Brigadier - General R. O. Tyler. 
 
 (2.) The Array of Northern Virginia. 
 
 Hon. Edward Everett, in his address at the- dedication 
 of the Soldiers' National Cemetery at Gettysburg, Novem- 
 ber 19th, 1863, estimated the Confederate force at ninety 
 thousand infantry, upwards of ten thousand cavalry, and 
 four or live thousand artillery — a total of one hundred 
 and five thousand men of all arms. This estimate, made 
 eo soon after the great battle, and professedly drawn from 
 official sources, has been generally accepted by northern 
 writers. That the number is entirely too high will ap- 
 pear in the following statements: 
 
 * General Slocum commanded the right wing of the army on July 2d and 
 July 3d His corps, during that time, was under the command of Brigadier- 
 General Alpheus S. Williams. In like manner and at the same time General 
 Hancock commanded the left center, and General Reynolds, up to July ist, 
 commanded the first, third, and eleventh corps, which composed the left 
 wing of the Union Army. 
 
38 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 General Longstreet, in an article contributed by him to 
 the Philadelphia Weekly Times, and since published in a 
 book entitled " Annals of the War," says that General Lee 
 informed him at Chambersburg that on the 30th of June 
 his infantry consisted of about fifty -two thousand bayo- 
 nets, and his whole force, including the detachments which 
 would join him on^the march, amounted to a trifle over 
 seventy thousand. (Annals of the War, page 621.) 
 
 Colonel W. H. Taylor, Lee's Adjutant General, in an 
 article contributed to the same paper, says on page 318 of 
 the same book, that the whole strength of their army 
 during the invasion consisted of sixty -seven thousand 
 men of all arms — fifty -three thousand and five hundred 
 infantry, nine thousand cavalry, and four thousand five 
 hundred artillery. The discrepancy between the number 
 stated by General Lee and Colonel Taylor would be ac- 
 counted for in the supposition that General Imboden's 
 cavalry, which consisted of over three thousand men, and 
 which did not really belong to the army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia, but acted in an independent capacity — subject, how- 
 ever, at all times to Lee's orders — was not included in the 
 latter's estimate. This force, with probably others, was 
 referred to by General Lee as some of the commands that 
 were to join him on his march. 
 
 The foregoing numbers from Confederate sources are 
 verified by the following authorities : The Count of Paris,, 
 whose impartiality and accuracy are generally admitted, in 
 his recently published history of the American conflict, 
 states the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia at 
 seventy - three thousand five hundred. That part of this 
 army which passed through Chambersburg was carefully 
 
THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 39 
 
 estimated by competent persons both there and in Green- 
 castle, with the following concurrent results: Mr. W. A. 
 Reid, of Greencastle, in an article contributed to the Pilot 
 of that place, in its issue of July 28th, 1863, says that 
 the Confederate force which passed through that place 
 amounted to about fifty thousand men. The Franklin Re- 
 pository of Chambersburg, in its issue of July 8th, 1863, 
 while the matter was fresh in the minds of the people, and 
 taking its figures from the several estimates made by citi- 
 zens as the army marched through there, states the number 
 at forty - seven thousand. Mr. John F. Glosser, at the time 
 of the war a clerk in the office of the prothonotary of the 
 county, quoting from his diary kept at that time, says: 
 " The Confederate army which passed through Chambers- 
 burg was as follows : Ewell's corps, fifteen thousand men, 
 infantry, artillery, and cavalry, with sixty pieces of artil- 
 lery, and over one thousand wagons; A. P. Hill's corps, 
 the same; Longstreet's corps, twenty thousand men, eighty 
 pieces of artillery, and over one thousand wagons. The 
 entire army did not number over forty -eight thousand 
 or fifty thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery." 
 This is an estimate made by an entirely competent person, 
 from his own actual observation, the result being noted 
 at the time. Now, taking fifty thousand — the numbers 
 generally fixed upon by all who estimated them — that 
 passed through Chambersburg, and add to them Early's 
 division, which passed by way of Waynesborough, Quincy, 
 Funkstown, and Greenwood, and Stuart's cavalry, which 
 passed around east of the Federal army, and we have 
 about seventy thousand to seventy - five thousand men. It 
 may safely be assumed that the entire strength of the in- 
 vading army did not exceed that number. 
 
40 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 The Army of Northern Virginia was organized as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 General ROBERT E. LEE, Commander. 
 
 STAFF. 
 
 Colonel W. H. Taylor, Adjutant -General. 
 
 Colonel C. S. Venable, Aid -de -Camp. 
 
 Colonel Charles Marshall, Aid -de -Camp. * 
 
 Colonel James E. Corlev, Chief Quartermaster. 
 
 Colonel R. G. Cole, Chief Commissary. 
 
 Colonel B. G. Baldwin, Chief of Ordnance. 
 
 Colonel H. E. Peyton, Assistant Inspector- General. 
 
 General W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery. 
 
 Doctor E. Guild, Medical Director. 
 
 Colonel W. Proctor Smith, Chief Engineer. 
 
 Major H. E. Young, Assistant Adjutant -General. 
 
 Major G. B. Cook, Assistant Inspector- General. 
 
 The army was composed of three corps, as follows : * 
 
 First Corps. — Eieutenant- General James Eongstreet, Commander. The 
 division commanders were — Major-General L. McLaws, Major-General 
 George E. Pickett, and Major-General J. B. Hood. The hrigade commanders 
 were — Kershaw, Benuing, Barksdale, Wofford, Garnett, Armistead, Kemper, 
 Toombs, Corse, Robertson, Eaws, Anderson, and Jenkins. The four first 
 named belonged to McLaws' division; the succeeding five to Pickett's; and 
 the four last named to Hood's. The artillery belonging to this corps was wnder 
 the command of Colonel J. B. Walton, and consisted of eighty-three pieces. 
 
 Second Corps. — Lieutenant -General R. S. Ewell, Commander. The di- 
 vision commanders were — Major-General J. A. Early, Major-General R. E. 
 Rodes, and Major-General Edward Johnson. The brigade commanders were 
 — Hays, Gordon, Smith, Hoke, Daniels, Dole, Iverson, Ramseur, Rodes, 
 Stewart, Walker, Jones, and Nichols. Four of these belonged to Early's di- 
 vision, five to Rodes', and the remaining four to Johnson's. The artillery of 
 this corps consisted of eighty -two pieces, and was under the command of 
 Colonel S. Crutchfield. 
 
 *The Army of Northern Virginia was divided into three corps, while the 
 Army of the Potomac was divided into seven. Each of the three Confed- 
 erate corps, however, represented a third of its whole force, while each of 
 the seven Federal corps represented a seventh of its whole. The same ratio 
 extended to divisions and brigades. 
 
THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 41 
 
 Third Corps. — Lieutenant -General A. P. Hill, Commander. The division 
 commanders were — Major -Generals R. H. Anderson, Heth, and Pender. 
 The brigade commanders were — Wilcox, Mahone, Posey, Wright, Perry, Petti- 
 grew, Field, Archer, Cook, McGowan, L,ane, Thomas, and Scale's old brigade. 
 The first five belonged to Anderson's division; the succeeding four to Heth's, 
 and the remaining four to Pender's. The artillery of this corps consisted of 
 eighty -three pieces, and was under command of Colonel R. Lindsey Walker. 
 
 The cavalry corps was under the command of Lieutent- General J. F. B. 
 Stuart. His brigade commanders were Generals Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh 
 I,ee, W. H. F. I.ee, B. H. Robertson, W. F. Jones, J. D. Imboden, A. G. Jen- 
 kins, and Baker. 
 
 It will have been perceived from the estimates which 
 have been given of the numerical strength of the two 
 great armies, which were about to enter upon the great 
 and decisive campaign, that the Federal army exceeded 
 the Confederate some twenty thousand or twenty -five 
 thousand men. This disparity in numbers, however, was 
 in part offset by the prestige which the victories gained at 
 Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville had given the Con- 
 federates. That these victories had a great effect in elating 
 the spirits of the invading army was evident in the confi- 
 dence which they seemed to have in the success of their 
 aggressive movement, — a confidence which seemed to be 
 universal, with the exception of a few of the officers, who 
 quietly expressed to some of the people, as they passed 
 through Chambersburg, their apprehension that they had 
 gotten into a trap from which they feared it would be diffi- 
 cult to escape. 
 
 Colonel Freemantle, of the British army, who, with an- 
 other British officer, accompanied the invading army, and 
 whose sympathies for the Confederates was open and un- 
 disguised, as appears in his writings, in an article con- 
 tributed by him to Blackwood 's Magazine on the great 
 
42 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 invasion, says: "The staff officers spoke of the coming 
 battle as a certainty, and the universal feeling was one of 
 contempt for an enemy whom they had beaten so con- 
 stantly, and under so many disadvantages." That this- 
 contempt for the Federals, and undue confidence in them- 
 selves, was shared by General Lee himself, is made clear 
 from a statement made by General Fitzhugh Lee, who 
 said that General Lee " was controlled too far by the great 
 confidence he had in the fighting qualities of his troops, 
 who begged only to be turned loose upon the Federals." 
 "This confidence," said the general, "was equally shared 
 by the officers high in command." (Annals of the War, 
 pages 421, 422.) Mr. Edward A. Pollard, in his "Lost 
 Cause," page 407, says: "The Army of Northern Virginia 
 was in an extraordinary state of efficiency; it was flushed 
 with victory; it had accomplished so many wonders in 
 the past that it was supposed to be equal to anything short 
 of a miracle; and when, on the morning of the 2d, 
 General Lee reconnoitered the field, and scanned the 
 heights which looked upon him through brows of brass 
 and iron, he was noticed to rise in his stirrups and mut- 
 ter an expression of confidence, and he decided to at- 
 tack." 
 
 II. The purpose and object or General Lee in the 
 invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. 
 
 That the deliverance of the Confederate Capital from a 
 probable transfer of the Federal army from the Rappahan- 
 nock to the James and York rivers and the Peninsula, as 
 well as a diversion for the relief of the Confederate forces 
 then sorely pressed in Yicksburg, was among the reasons 
 wbich induced General Lee to abandon the defensive policy 
 
THE OBJECT OF THE INVASION. 43 
 
 which he had so long pursued, and to adopt an aggressive 
 one, will appear in the following authorities: General 
 A. L. Long, whose intimacy with General Lee as his chief 
 military secretary enabled him to speak understandingly 
 upon this subject, in an article contributed by him to 
 the Philadelphia Weekly Times of November, 1884, says: 
 " Since the battle of Chancellorsville, although the Federal 
 army had been reinforced to its former dimensions, it still 
 retained a spiritless attitude. As yet no future plan of 
 operations had been developed. It was just to conclude 
 that General Hooker would not again advance on his 
 present line, and that a change of base was in contempla- 
 tion; and as the James and York presented the most pro- 
 pitious lines, it is probable that the Army of the Potomac, 
 if left uninterrupted, would move in that direction. * * * 
 The object of the campaign (upon the part of General Lee) 
 being the defense of Richmond, General Lee could either 
 continue on the defensive and oppose the Federal advance 
 as he had recently done, or he might assume the offensive, 
 and by bold maneuvering oblige the Federal army to re- 
 cede from its present line of operations to protect its capi- 
 tal, or oppose the invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. 
 The advance upon Richmond would thus be frustrated, 
 and the attack upon that city delayed at least for a time. 
 The dispirited condition of the Federal army since its late 
 defeat, and the high tone of that of the Confederates, in- 
 duced the adoption of the latter plan. * * * If suc- 
 cessful (in the invasion), the defeat of the Federal army 
 would be followed by the possession of Maryland and 
 Southern Pennsylvania, and the fall of Washington City. 
 Moreover, an important diverson would be made in favor 
 
44 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 of the western department, -where the affairs of the Con- 
 federacy were on the decline. "With this alluring concep- 
 tion the hazard of an invasion would he fully warranted." 
 General Longstreet, who was opposed to the invasion 
 of the North, and only consented to it upon a condition 
 which will appear further on, gives the following facts in 
 an article contributed to the Philadelphia Weekly Times, 
 and which will be found upon pages 416 and 417 of the 
 Annals of the War. General Longstreet says that whi!e 
 in Richmond early in May, 1863, Mr. Seddon, Confederate 
 Secretary of "War, called his attention to the critical con- 
 dition of General Pemberton's army at Vicksburg, around 
 which General Grant was then decisively drawing his lines, 
 and informed him that he had under consideration a plan 
 for relieving him by concentrating a succoring army at 
 Jackson, Mississippi, under the command of General John- 
 ston, with a view to drive Grant from before Vicksburg 
 by a direct issue at arms. Mr. Seddon also intimated to 
 General Longstreet that in the execution of this purpose, 
 it might be necessary to send his (Longstreet's) corps 
 there. General Longstreet suggested to Mr. Seddon that, 
 in his judgment, a better plan for relieving General Pem- 
 berton was to have the army then concentrating at Jack- 
 son move swiftly to Tullahoma, where General Bragg was 
 then located with a fine army, confronting an army of 
 about equal strength under General Rosecrans, and that 
 at the same time two divisions of his corps (Longstreet's) 
 be hurried forward to the same point. "With this force it 
 was expected that Rosecrans could be crushed, after which 
 the whole force should move northward through Tennes- 
 see and Kentucky, and threaten the invasion of Ohio. 
 
THE OBJECT OF THE INVASION. 45 
 
 General Longstreet's opinion was that, in the proposed 
 inarch through these states, no organized obstruction would 
 be encountered, and that the invading army could obtain 
 liberal supplies of provisions, and even reinforcements by 
 those friendly to their cause, and that General Grant's 
 army would be surely drawn away from around Vicks- 
 burg to look after and protect its own territory. Mr. 
 Sedclon did not look with much favor upon General Long- 
 street's proposition, because of the difficulty and danger 
 of withdrawing so large a force, at that time, from General 
 Lee. This plan General Longstreet subsequently laid be- 
 fore Lee himself, and after a free interchange of opinions 
 touching it, was overruled by the commander-in-chief, 
 his principal reason against it being his unwillingness to 
 divide his army. General Longstreet says that in this 
 conference with Lee, no room was left to doubt that he 
 entertained the idea of an offensive campaign, and he at 
 length asked him if he did not think an invasion of Mary- 
 land and Pennsylvania by his own army would not accom- 
 plish the same result as the proposed threatening of Ohio? 
 To this Longstreet replied that he could not see how it 
 could, that the movement would be too hazardous, and 
 a campaign in thoroughly Union states would require 
 more time and greater preparation than the one proposed 
 through Tennessee and Kentucky. 
 
 "I soon discovered," says General Longstreet, "that he 
 had determined that he would make some forward move- 
 ment, and I finally assented that the Pennsylvania cam- 
 paign might be brought to a successful issue if he could 
 make it offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics. This 
 point was urged with great persistency. I suggested that, 
 
46 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 after piercing Pennsylvania and menacing "Washington, 
 we should choose a strong position, and force the Federals 
 to attack us, observing that the popular clamor throughout 
 the North would speedily force the Federal general to at- 
 tempt to drive us out. I recalled to him the battle of 
 Fredericksburg as an instance of a defensive battle, when, 
 with a few thousand men, we hurled the whole Federal 
 army back, crippling and demoralizing it, with trifling loss 
 to our own troops; and Chancellorsville as an instance of 
 offensive battle, where we dislodged the Federals, it is true, 
 but at such a terrible sacrifice that half a dozen such vic- 
 tories would have ruined us. It will be remembered that 
 Stonewall Jackson once said that 'we sometimes fail to 
 drive the enemy from a position; they always fail to drive 
 us/ I reminded him, too, of Napoleon's advice to Mar- 
 mont, to whom he said, when putting him at the head of 
 an invading army, 'Select your ground, and make your 
 enemy attack you.' I recall these points simply because 
 I desire to have it understood that, while I first suggested 
 to General Lee the idea of an offensive campaign, I was 
 never persuaded to yield my argument against the Gettys- 
 burg campaign, except with the understanding that we' 
 were not to deliver an offensive battle, but to so maneuver 
 that the enemy should be forced to attack us — or, to re- 
 peat, that our campaign should be one of offensive strategy, 
 but defensive tactics. Upon this understanding my assent 
 was given, and General Lee, who had been kind enough 
 to discuss the matter with me patiently, gave the order of 
 march." , 
 
 It will be perceived further on in this record of the in- 
 vasion, that General Lee failed to adhere to what General 
 
THE OBJECT OF THE INVASION. 47 
 
 Longstreet claims was an agreement between them as to \ 
 the policy stated, and to this departure General Longstreet 
 at the time it was made objected, and to it attributes in 
 part their defeat at Gettysburg. 
 
 As intimated by General Long in the article already 
 quoted, the discouragement and demoralization which 
 always follow defeat, prevailed extensively throughout 
 the ISTorth, and to a considerable extent in the Army of 
 the Potomac. Then, during the month of May, quite a 
 depletion of the rank and hie of this army took place by 
 the mustering out of large numbers of three months' and 
 three years' men.* And such had been the depressing 
 influence of the defeat of Chancellorsville upon the coun- 
 try, that the places of these men were not easily filled. 
 These facts were not only known to the military authori- 
 ties upon the Federal side, causing much alarm and anx- 
 iety, but they were equally known to the Confederate 
 leaders, and afforded them opportunities for bold and 
 aggressive schemes. Then, too, a draft was ordered to 
 replenish the Federal ranks, and it was exceedingly un- 
 popular in some places, and resistance was expected, 
 especially if the Confederate army should obtain a foot- 
 hold upon northern soil. The probable defeat of Hooker, 
 the capture of Washington, the securing of supplies and 
 perhaps recruits for his army, and foreign recognition 
 and armed intervention, were factors in inducing Lee to 
 give his reluctant consent to the forward movement. 
 That General Lee expected to reap these results, — at 
 
 * The Army of the Potomac was reduced during the month of May by the 
 expiration of the term of enlistment, to the extent of about twenty- five to 
 thirty thousand men. 
 
48 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 least that lie would find a divided North and a revolution 
 in his favor, with foreign recognition in case he succeeded 
 in capturing the National Capital, is obscurely hinted at 
 in the opening of his report on the Pennsylvania cam- 
 paign. After stating the military reasons for his move- 
 ment, he adds, "In addition to these results, it was hoped 
 that other valuable results might be attained by military 
 success." General Doubleday, on pages 76-78 of his 
 book entitled " Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," thus 
 summarizes the reasons for the invasion: "The rebels had 
 obtained a triumph, rather than a substantial victory, at 
 Chancellorsville. It was gained, too, at a ruinous expense 
 of life, and when the battle was over they found them- 
 selves too weak to follow up our retreating forces. While* 
 the whole South was exulting, their great commander, 
 General Lee, was profoundly depressed. The resources 
 of the Davis Government in men and means were limited, 
 and it was evident that without a foreign alliance, pro- 
 longed defensive warfare by an army so far from its base, 
 would ultimately exhaust the seceding states without ac- 
 complishing their independence. It became necessary, 
 therefore, for General Lee to choose one of two plans of 
 campaign : either to fall back on the center of his supplies 
 at Richmond, and stand a siege there, or to invade the 
 North. By retiring on Richmond he would save the great 
 labor of transporting food and war material to the fron- 
 tier, and would remove the northern army still further 
 from its sources of supply and its principal depots. One 
 circumstance, however, would probably in any event have 
 impelled him to take the bolder course. The situation in 
 Vicksburg was becoming alarming. It was evident that 
 
THE OBJECT OF THE INVASION. 49 
 
 the town must fall, and with its surrender the Federal 
 fleet would soon regain possession of the Mississippi. The 
 fall of Vicksburg, supplemented by the retreat of Lee's 
 army on Richmond, would dishearten the sourthern peo- 
 ple, and stimulate the North to renewed efforts. It was 
 essential, therefore, to counterbalance the impending dis- 
 aster in the West by some brilliant exploit in the East. 
 
 There was, perhaps, another reason for this great for- 
 ward movement, founded on the relation of the Con- 
 federacy to the principal European powers. England still 
 made a pretense of neutrality, but the aristocracy and 
 ruling classes sided with the South, and a large association 
 of their most influential men was established at Manchester 
 to aid the southern cause. The Confederates were fight- 
 ing us with English guns and war material, furnished 
 by blockade runners; while English Shenandoahs and Ala- 
 bamas, manned by British seamen, under the Confederate 
 flag, burned our merchant vessels and swept our commer- 
 cial marine from the ocean. The French Government was 
 equally hostile to us, and there was hardly a kingdom in 
 Europe which did not sympathize with the South, allied 
 as they were by their feudal customs to the deplorable sys- 
 tem of southern slavery. Russia alone favored our cause, 
 and stood ready, if need be, to assist us with her fleet; 
 probably more from antagonism to England and France 
 than from any other motive. The agents of the Con- 
 federate Government stated in their official dispatches 
 that if General Lee could establish his army firmly on 
 northern soil, England would at once acknowledge the 
 independence of the South; in which case ample loans 
 could not only be obtained on Southern securities, but a 
 
 4 
 
50 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 foreign alliance might be formed, and perhaps a fleet fur- 
 nished to re-open the Southern ports. 
 
 While thus elated by hopes of foreign intervention, the 
 Confederate spies and sympathizers who thronged the 
 North greatly encouraged the Davis government by their 
 glowing accounts of the disaffection there, in consequence 
 of the heavy taxation, rendered necessary by the war, and 
 by the unpopularity of the draft, which would soon have 
 to be enforced as a defensive measure. They overrated 
 the influence of the anti-war party, and prophesied that 
 an invasion would be followed by outbreaks in the prin- 
 cipal cities, which would paralyze every effort to reinforce 
 the Federal forces in the field. 
 
 These reasons would have been quite sufficient of them- 
 selves to induce Lee to make the movement, but he him- 
 self gives an additional one. He hoped by this advance 
 to draw Hooker out where he could strike him a decisive 
 blow, and thus insure the permanent triumph of the Con- 
 federacy. He was weary of all this marching, campaign- 
 ing, and bloodshed, and was strongly desirous of settling 
 the whole matter at once. Having been reinforced after 
 the battle of Chancellorsville by Longstreet's two divisions, 
 and a large body of conscripts, he determined to advance. 
 
 On May 31st his force, according to Southern state- 
 ments, amounted to eighty -eight thousand seven hundred 
 and fifty -four, of which sixty -eight thousand three hun- 
 dred and fifty -two were ready for duty. Recruits, too, 
 were constantly coming in from the draft, which was 
 rigidly enforced in the Southern states. 
 
 The various reasons thus stated no doubt entered into 
 the consideration which induced the invasion. The princi- 
 
THE OBJECT OF THE INVASION. 51 
 
 pal reason, however, was the confidence which Jeft'erson 
 Davis felt in the success of the movement. Indeed, while 
 yet in the United States Senate he declared that in the 
 event of war the battles would be fought on the soil of 
 Pennsylvania, and on its wheat -fields the contest would 
 be decided. Mr. Pollard says that in confident anticipa- 
 tion and assurance of a decisive victory in Pennsylvania, 
 Jefferson Davis, about the time the Confederate army 
 crossed the Potomac into Maryland, ordered Alexander II. 
 Stephens, vice-president of the Confederacy, to proceed to 
 Washington with the view to take advantage of the vic- 
 tory and propose a peace upon the condition of the recog- 
 nition of the Confederate Government. And with a view 
 to mask his real intentions, which were unwritten and 
 were to be presented verbally, the following letter was 
 
 given him: 
 
 "Richmond, 2nd July, 1S63. 
 "Hon. Alex. H. Stephens, Richmond, Virginia: 
 
 "Sir — Having accepted your patriotic offer to proceed as a military com- 
 missioner, under flag of truce, to Washington, 3-ou will herewith receive your 
 letter of authority to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
 United States. 
 
 "This letter is signed by me as Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate 
 I,and and Naval Forces. 
 
 "You will perceive, from the terms of the letter, that it is so worded as to 
 avoid any political difficulties in its reception. Intended exclusively as one 
 of those communications between belligerents which public law recognizes as 
 necessary and proper between hostile forces, care has been taken to give no 
 pretext for refusing to receive it on the ground that it would involve a tacit 
 recognition of the independence of the Confederacy. 
 
 "Your mission is simply one of humanity, and has no political aspect. 
 
 " If objection is made to receiving your letter on the ground that it is not 
 addressed to Abraham Lincoln as President instead of Commander-in-Chief, 
 etc., then you will present the duplicate letter, which is addressed to him as 
 President, and signed by me as President. To this letter objection may be 
 made on the ground that I am not recognized to be President of the Con- 1 
 
52 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 federacy. In this event, you will decline any further attempt to confer on the 
 subject of your mission, as such conference is admissable only on a footing 
 of perfect equality. 
 
 My recent interviews with you have put you so fully in possession of my 
 views that it is scarcely necessary to give you any detailed instructions, even 
 were I at this moment well enough to attempt it. 
 
 My whole purpose is, in one word, to place this war on the footing of such 
 as are waged by civilized people in modern times, and to divest it of the sav- 
 age character which has been impressed on it by our enemies, in spite of all 
 our efforts and protests. War is full enough of unavoidable horrors, under all 
 aspects, to justify, and even to demand of, any Christian ruler who may be 
 unhappily engaged in carrying it on, to seek to restrict its calamities, and to 
 divest it of all unnecessary severities. You will endeavor to establish the 
 cartel for the exchange of prisoners on such a basis as to avoid the constant 
 difficulties and complaints which arise, and to prevent for the future what we 
 deem the unfair conduct of our enemies, in evading the delivery of prisoners 
 who fall into their hands, in retarding it by sending them in circuitous routes, 
 and by detaining them sometimes for months in camps and prisons, and in 
 persisting in taking captive non-combatants. 
 
 Your attention is also called to the unheard-of conduct of Federal officers 
 in driving from their homes entire communities of women and children, as 
 well as of men, whom they find in districts occupied by their troops, for no 
 other reason than because these unfortunates are faithful to the allegiance 
 due to their States, and refuse to take an oath of fidelity to their enemies. 
 
 The putting to death of unarmed prisoners has been a ground of just 
 complaint in more than one instance, and the recent execution of officers 
 of our army in Kentucky, for the sole cause that they were engaged in re- 
 cruiting-service in a state which is claimed as still one of the United States, 
 but is also claimed by us as one of the Confederate States, must be repressed 
 by retaliation if not unconditionally abandoned, because it would justify the 
 like execution in every other state of the Confederacy, and the practice is 
 barbarous, uselessly cruel, and can only lead to the slaughter of prisoners on 
 both sides, a result too horrible to contemplate without making every effort 
 to avoid it. 
 
 On these and all kindred subjects you will consider your authority full 
 and ample to make such arrangements as will temper the present cruel char- 
 acter of the contest, and full confidence is placed in your judgment, patriot- 
 ism, and discretion that, while carrying out the objects of your mission, you 
 will take care that the equal rights of the Confederacy be always preserved. 
 Very respectfully, Jefferson Davis. 
 
THE OBJECT OP THE INVASION. 53> 
 
 Mr. Pollard says, " Mr. Stephens proceeded only as far 
 as Fortress Monroe, where lie was intercepted by a dis- 
 patch peremptorily forbidding his access to the Federal 
 Capital. Whether the authorities there were aware or not 
 of the real nature of his mission it is since ascertained 
 that, apart from the written text which he bore, he was to 
 sound the Washington Government on the question of 
 peace. There could be no other proper conclusion, judg- 
 ing from the importance of the emissary, and the absurd 
 futility of his going to Washington merely to protest 
 against the enemy's cruelties in conducting the war. 
 
 "The whole explanation of the affair is that Mr. 
 Stephens was fully empowered, in certain contingencies, 
 to propose peace; that President Davis had sent him on 
 this extraordinary visit to Washington, anticipating a 
 great victory of Lee's army in Pennsylvania; that the 
 real design of the mission was disconcerted by the fatal 
 day of Gettysburg, which occurred when Mr. Stephens 
 was near Fortress Monroe; and that it was in the insolent 
 moments of this Federal success that he was sharply re- 
 buffed by the Washington authorities. Considering the 
 conjuncture of the occasion and the circumstances in 
 which the President of the Southern Confederacy sought 
 to signalize what he supposed would be a great victory 
 of his armies, by a distinct and formal proposition of 
 peace at Washington, it may be said that, notwithstand- 
 ing the disappointment of the event, and the jeer of the 
 enemy, Mr. Davis occupied a proud position in this mat- 
 ter, and one that merited the applause of the Christian 
 world." 
 
 The particular merit attaching to Mr. Davis for this 
 
54 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 mission to Washington, which, as Mr. Pollard says, 
 placed him in a "proud position," and "merited the ap- 
 plause of the Christian world," is indeed hard to see. 
 The time certainly was inopportune, and the overwhelm- 
 ing Federal victories of Vicksburg and Gettysburg sadly 
 interfered with his calculations. 
 
 III. General Lee's strategical purposes. 
 
 In his address at Gettysburg, November 19th, 1863, 
 Hon. Edward Everett, whose information was drawn from 
 the archives of the War Department, stated Lee's stra- 
 tegical purposes as follows: 
 
 1. Ly rapid movements northward, and by maneuvering 
 with a portion of his army on the east side of the Blue 
 Ridge, he sought to tempt General Hooker from his base of 
 operations and thus uncover the approaches to Washing- 
 ton, and to throw it open to a raid by Stuart's cavalry, and 
 at the same time to enable Lee himself to cross the Po- 
 tomac at Poolsville and fall upon the Capital from the 
 north. This design of the confederate o-eneral was 
 promptly discovered by General Hooker, who moved 
 with great rapidity from his encampments on the north 
 bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, and 
 preserved unbroken his inner line, and stationed the vari- 
 ous corps of his army at all the points protecting the 
 approaches to the Capital, from Centreville up to Lees- 
 burg. In the mean time, by the vigorous operations of 
 Pleasanton's cavalry, the cavalry of General Stuart was so 
 crippled as to be unable to perform the part assigned to it 
 in the campaign. In this manner Lee's first object, the 
 defeat of Hooker on the south of the Potomac and a 
 direct march upon Washington, was baffled. 
 
GENERAL LEE S STRATEGICAL PURPOSES. 55 
 
 2. A second part of the Confederate plan was to turn 
 the demonstration northward into a real invasion of 
 Maryland and Pennsylvania, in the hope that, in this way, 
 General Hooker would be drawn to a distance from the 
 Capital, and that some opportunity would occur to take 
 him at a disadvantage, and after eluding or defeating his 
 army, to make a descent upon Baltimore and "Washing- 
 ton. This was substantially the repetition of the plan of 
 the invasion of Maryland in 1862; and as the latter was 
 defeated at Antietam, so was the former at Gettysburg. 
 
 Another plan which, though not stated by Mr. Everett, 
 was forced upon the Confederate commander by the 
 •excellent strategy of General Hooker, was this: to ad- 
 vance by way of the Shenandoah and Cumberland val- 
 leys upon Harrisburg. That Lee's original purpose was 
 to advance east of the Blue Ridge and its continuation 
 north of the Potomac, the South Mountain, seems to 
 be verified by General Long in the published statement 
 previously referred to. General Long says: "Before 
 entering upon the execution of his plans, General Lee 
 had marked out his line of operations, which was to 
 advance into Pennsylvania, with Gettysburg or York 
 for his objective point, as circumstances might dictate. 
 It was his determination to give battle at one or the 
 other of these places." It will be perceived that Harris- 
 burg was not mentioned by General Long as one of the 
 places where a battle might be fought, and yet an attack 
 upon that place was planned by Lee, not before he set out 
 upon his expedition northward, nor before he crossed the 
 Potomac, but at Chambersburg, after he was forced to 
 cross the river west of the Blue Iiidge instead of east of it, 
 as originally intended. 
 
56 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 That an attack upon Harrisburg was arranged by Lee 
 at this place, and that he held to that purpose up to the 
 night of Monday, June 29th, will clearly appear in the 
 following, as found in General Longstreet's own published 
 account in the Annals of the War, pages 418, 419. It was 
 on that night that General Longstreet's scout brought him 
 the information at his headquarters near Chambersburg y 
 that the Federal army was no longer south of the Poto- 
 mac guarding the approaches to Washington as Lee sup- 
 posed, but had crossed the river and was marching 
 northward, parallel with him, to the east of the moun- 
 tain; and this information caused him to change his plan 
 and march eastward across the South Mountain. The 
 statement is as follows: 
 
 " While at Culpeper, I sent a trusty scout (who had been sent to me by- 
 Secretary Seddons, while I was in Suffolk, ) with instructions to go into the 
 Federal lines, discover his policy, and bring me all the information he could 
 possibly pick up. When this scout asked me, very significantly, where he 
 should report, I replied, ' Find me, wherever I am, when you have the de- 
 sired information.' I did this because I feared to trust him with a knowledge 
 of our future movements. I supplied him with all the gold he needed, and 
 instructed him to spare neither pains nor money to obtain full and accurate 
 information. The information gathered by this scout led to the most tre- 
 mendous results, as will be seen. * * * I reached Chambersburg on the 
 evening of the 27th (Saturday). At this point, on the night of the 29th (Mon- 
 day), information was received by which the whole plan of the campaign was- 
 changed. We had not heard from the enemy for several days, and General 
 I^ee was in doubt as to where he was; indeed, we did not know that he had 
 yet left Virginia. At about ten o'clock that night, Colonel Sorrell, my chief 
 of staff, was waked by an orderly, who reported that a suspicious person had 
 just been arrested by the provost -marshal. Upon investigation, Sorrell dis- 
 covered that the suspicious person was the scout, Harrison, that I had sent 
 out at Culpeper. He was dirt -stained, travel -worn, and very much broken 
 down. After questioning him sufficiently to find that he brought very im- 
 portant information, Colonel Sorrell brought him to my headquarters and 
 awoke me. He gave the information that the enemy had crossed the Po- 
 
GENERAL LEE'S STRATEGICAL PURPOSES. 57 
 
 tomac, inarched northwest, and that the head of his column was at Frederick 
 City on our right. I felt that this information was exceedingly important, 
 and might involve a change in the direction of our march. General Lee had 
 already issued orders that we were to advance toward Harrisburg. I at once 
 sent the scout to General Lee's headquarters, and followed him myself early 
 in the morning. I found General Lee up, and asked him if the information 
 brought by the scout might not involve a change of direction of the head of 
 our column to the right. He immediately acquiesced in the suggestion, pos- 
 sibly saying that he had already given orders to that effect. The movement 
 toward the enemy was begun at once." * 
 
 * General Longstreet, in a second article contributed to the Annals of the 
 War, page 632, says that he erred in his first statement that this scout re- 
 ported to him on the night of Monday, June 29th, and that it occurred on the 
 night of Sunday, June 2Sth. That he was right in his first statement will ap- 
 pear in the following considerations: 
 
 1. According to General Longstreet's own statement, as well as the official 
 declaration of General Lee, the order countermanding the attack upon Har- 
 risburg, and a rapid concentration of the scattered Confederate forces in the 
 vicinity of Gettysburg, was issued immediately upon the receipt of the in- 
 formation brought by that scout, and the concentration was at once begun. 
 If the scout reported on the evening of Sunday, 28th, then the concentration 
 must have taken place on Monday, whereas the fact is placed beyond all ques- 
 tion that it occurred on Tuesday. This will unmistakably appear in the state- 
 ments yet to follow. 
 
 2. General Longstreet says that early the next morning after the arrival of 
 the scout, he went to Lee's headquarters, and, finding him up, inquired of him. 
 if the information brought would not necessitate a change in the direction of 
 the head of the column, to which Lee replied that it would, and that orders 
 to that effecl had already been issued. He further says that Lee and himself 
 then rode together to Greenwood, where they remained over night; and the 
 next day, after riding together some three or four miles toward Gettysburg, 
 the sound of guns was heard, at which Lee rode rapidly forward to ascertain 
 the cause, leaving him to see after hurrying forward the troops. (Annals of 
 the War, pages 419, 420.) The cannonading heard was that of the first day's 
 battle, Wednesday, July 1st, as Longstreet himself admits. This fact alone 
 fixes Tuesday morning as the time Lee and Longstreet left Chambersburg for 
 Greenwood, and, as a consequence, Monday night, the 29th, as the time of the 
 scout's arrival. 
 
 3. General Lee officially declares that it was upon the night of June 29th 
 that the scout reported to him (Annals of the War, page 420). This official 
 declaration is more likely to be correct than General Longstreet's memory, 
 upon which, it is evident, he relies. 
 
 4. There is another way of harmonizing the discrepancy in the dates given 
 by General Longstreet, which is that the scout reported on the evening of 
 Sunday, 28th, and the orders for the concentration of the troops were imme- 
 
58 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 General Lee himself in his official report says: "Prepa- 
 ration had been made to advance upon Harrisburg, but, 
 on the night of the 29th, information was received from a 
 scout that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, and was 
 advancing northward, and that the head of his column 
 had already reached South Mountain. As our communi- 
 cations with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was 
 
 diately issued and sent to their respective destinations, but the concentration 
 itself did not commence until Tuesday, 30th. This seems to be sustained by 
 an account of this affair given by Dr. Cullen, Medical Director of Dongstreet's 
 corps, in Annals of the War, page 439. Dr. Cullen says: "J distinctly re- 
 member the appearance in our headquarters of the scout who brought from 
 Frederick the first account that General Lee had of the definite whereabouts of 
 the enemy; of the excitement at General Dee's headquarters among couriers, 
 quartermasters, commissaries, etc., all betokening some early movement of 
 the commands dependent upon the news brought by the scout. That after- 
 noon General Dee was walking with some of us in the road in front of his 
 headquarters, and said, 'Gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg as we 
 expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade is after.' 
 Orders had been issued to the corps to move at sunrise on the morning of the 
 next day, and promptly at the time the corps was put on the road." If Dr. 
 Cullen is not mistaken in the statement he makes, then the scout reported on 
 the evening of Sunday, and the conversation between Dee and his staff oc- 
 curred on Monday, and the concentration began on Tuesday morning. This 
 view is further sustained by General Doubleday's assertion, on page 119 of his 
 " Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, ' ' that General Early received at York, where 
 his division was encamped, in Ihe afternoon of Monday, 29th, Dee's order to 
 return to Gettysburg, and that recalling Gordon's brigade from Wrightsville, 
 whither it had gone, he made preparations to start the next morning. The 
 chief difficulty to this last explanation is this, how could that scout report to 
 General Lee at Chambersburg on Sunday evening that the head of the Army 
 of the Potomac had reached Frederick, and that General Meade had been 
 put in command, when the army only reached that city that same day, and 
 the change of commanders only took place that morning? Could he have 
 made his way from Frederick to this place — a distance of about fifty miles — 
 in six or eight hours? Then the fact of General Dee's official declaration fix- 
 ing Monday evening, the 29th, and Dee's and Longstreet's movements on 
 Tuesday and Wednesday, as previously referred to, seem to be insuperable 
 difficulties in accepting General Longstreet's last statement as to Sunday, the 
 28th. I have presented both the dates, with the reasons for accepting the first 
 given, leaving the reader to accept whichever he pleases. The fact, however, 
 of the commencement of the concentration is fixed beyond dispute as Tues- 
 day morning, June 30th, and this date is not affected by the adoption of either 
 Sunday evening or Monday evening for the scout's arrival. 
 
PLAN OF THE UNION GENERALS. 59 
 
 resolved to prevent its further progress in that direction 
 by concentrating our army ou the east side of the moun- 
 tain." (Annals of the War, page 420.) 
 
 IV. What was the plan of the commander of the 
 Army of the Potomac ? 
 
 During a period of three weeks — from June 2nd, when 
 General Lee broke up his encampment about Fredericks- 
 burg, — to the 24th, when the main part of his army 
 crossed the Potomac into Maryland, the Confederate com- 
 mander so maneuvered his army as, if possible, to outwit 
 and entrap General Hooker; but in every case he utterly 
 failed. So readily did the latter detect his antagonist's 
 strategy, and so successfully did he handle his forces, that 
 he not only defeated Lee's purposes to lure him into some 
 error, but compelled him to cross the Potomac at Shep- 
 herdstown and Williamsport west of the mountain, instead 
 of at Pools ville or Edward's Ferry to the east, as intended, 
 thus damaging his entire plan of campaign north of the 
 river as he had defeated it to the south of it. Owing 
 to the severe handling which General Pleasanton adminis- 
 tered to the Confederate cavalry at Beverly Ford, Aldie, 
 and Upperville, it was unable to perform the part assigned 
 it, and was forced to cross the river to the east of the Fed- 
 erals, thus being detached from its proper connection 
 with Lee's army, and compelled to make an entire circuit 
 of the Federal forces, only reaching the Confederate lines 
 on the evening of Thursday, July 2nd. General Stuart's 
 proper course, and the one he should have taken — 
 at least the one Lee expected him to take — had he not 
 been forced to do otherwise, after Lee's forced route up 
 the Cumberland Valley, would have been somewhere near 
 
60 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 the Confederate right, either to the west or east of the 
 mountain, guarding its passes, masking Lee's movements, 
 protecting his communications, reporting information of 
 the Union forces, and harassing whatever of those forces 
 he might come in contact with. All these advantages 
 which Lee expected of Stuart were lost to him by the cir- 
 cuitous route which the great cavalry commander was 
 compelled to take. Of this loss not only General Lee, but 
 General Longstreet and other subordinate officers have 
 greatly complained. Lee, in his report of the Pennsyl- 
 vania campaign, says: "No report had been received 
 (Saturday, 27th June,) that the enemy had crossed the Po- 
 tomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossi- 
 ble to obtain accurate information." General Longstreet 
 says: "The army moved forward as a man might walk 
 over strange ground with his eyes shut." Colonel "W". H. 
 Taylor, of Lee's staff, says : " On the 27th of June (Satur- 
 day) General Lee was near Chambersburg, (his headquar- 
 ters were in a grove near the eastern suburbs of the town,) 
 with the first and third corps, the second being still in ad- 
 vance, but within supporting distance. With the exception 
 of the cavalry the army was well in hand. The absence 
 of that indispensable arm of the service was mosc seriously 
 felt by General Lee. He had directed General Stuart to 
 use his discretion as to where and when to cross the river 
 — that is, he was to cross east of the mountains, or retire 
 through the mountain passes into the valley and cross in 
 the immediate rear of the infantry, as the movements of 
 the enemy and his own judgment should determine; but 
 he was expected to maintain communication with the main 
 column, and especially directed to keep the commanding 
 
PLAN OF THE UNION GENERALS. 61 
 
 general informed of the movements of the Federal army." 
 (Annals of the War, pages 306, 307.) 
 
 It is altogether probable that if Stuart's cavalry had 
 maintained communication with the Confederate com- 
 mander, the great battle would not have been fought at 
 Gettysburg. The advance of the Federal army would 
 have been reported, and another field less favorable to the 
 Federals would have been forced upon them. And it is 
 further probable that the departure from the policy agreed 
 upon before entering upon the campaign, namely, to take 
 a strong position of its own choosing, and compel the Fed- 
 erals to become the attacking party, and in no case to at- 
 tack them in any position they might choose, was owing 
 to the absence of the knowledge of the whereabouts of 
 the foe, and the strength of the position he had taken, 
 which knowledge would have been promptly communi- 
 cated had Stuart been within communicating distance of 
 his chief. 
 
 Although General Lee had been apprised on Monday 
 evening, the 29th, that the Federal army was marching 
 northward, and that its advance had reached Frederick, 
 he was nevertheless surprised to meet it in force at Gettys- 
 burg. This will appear in statements yet to follow. That 
 he met this army there in a position of its own choosing, 
 and was compelled to depart from the purpose he had 
 agreed to pursue before leaving Virginia — "a strategical 
 offensive but tactical defensive" — was owing to the excel- 
 lent generalship of both Hooker and Meade. Having 
 then advanced into the plain beyond the fastnesses of the 
 South Mountain, and having found unexpectedly the foe 
 confronting him, he was no longer able to order the situa- 
 
62 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 tion to his own choosing, but must make the most out of 
 that which was thrust upon him. 
 
 In the emergency threatening Lee .when confronted by 
 the Federal army at Gettysburg, the following four alter- 
 natives were presented to him, one of which he was com- 
 pelled to choose: to retire into the gaps of the South 
 Mountain, and compel General Meade to leave the posi- 
 tion he had taken and attack him; or wait steadily in the 
 position he had taken to be attacked there; or to maneuver 
 so as to dislodge his foe from the position he occupied by 
 menacing his communications by the right or left; or to 
 attack the strong position the Federals had taken, in the 
 hope of carrying it by main force. The Count of Paris, 
 in his recently published work on the War of the Rebel- 
 lion, in considering these alternatives, says that " the best 
 plan would undoubtedly have been the first, because by 
 pursuing the strategic offensive, Lee would thus secure all 
 the advantages of the tactical defensive." Referring to these 
 four alternatives, as stated by the Count, with his strong 
 endorsement of the first named, General Long, in the arti- 
 cle previously referred to, says: 
 
 "This view of the Count suggests the remark that, though he may possess a 
 profound theoretical knowledge of war, he lacks the practical experience that 
 teaches the correct application of rules and principles. Could the French- 
 man have seen the actual field of operation and have known the circumstances 
 that governed General I«ee, he would have probably taken a different view of 
 his actions. * * • • 
 
 " I will here add that Gettysburg affords a good example of the difficulties 
 to be encountered and the uncertainty of being able to harmonize the various 
 elements of armies when the field of operations is extensive. This battle 
 was precipitated by the absence of information which could only be obtained 
 by the active cavalry force. General I,ee had previously selected the neigh, 
 borhood of Gettysburg for his field of battle, but the time and position were 
 
PLAN OF THE UNION GENERALS. 63 
 
 to have been of his own selection. This could have been easily effected had 
 not the cavalry been severed from its proper place with the army. * * * 
 
 "During the evening General Lee decided on his plan of operations. 
 Knowing the prostrate condition of two Federal corps, and being convinced 
 that General Meade could not complete the concentration of his forces before 
 the following afternoon, he determined to risk the fate of the campaign on 
 the chance of an immediate battle. * - s ~ ;;: " 
 
 " It must be borne in mind that on entering Pennsylvania without his cav- 
 alry General Lee was unable to accumulate supplies. In fact, the subsistence 
 of his army mainly depended on the provisions that could be collected in the 
 vicinity of his line of march by detachments of infantry mounted on artillery 
 and wagon horses. Therefore, if General Lee had adopted the Count's favor- 
 ite plan of operation and occupied one of the passes of South Mountain, he 
 would have placed his army in a trap that would have, in the absence of a 
 miracle, resulted in its destruction ; for Meade, with his superior forces, would 
 have enclosed him without supplies or the means of obtaining them. Gen- 
 eral Lee would thus have been reduced to the alternative of laying down his 
 arms or of cutting his way out with great sacrifice of life and the loss of his- 
 artillery and transportation. * * * * 
 
 "The above objection is also applicable to the Count's second plan, with 
 the addition that General Lee's line was too much extended to admit of a suc- 
 cessful defense against General Meade's superior force. In answer to the 
 Count's third plan it is only necessary to say that the proximity of the two 
 armies and the absence of cavalry on the part of the Confederates rendered 
 maneuvering impracticable. The fourth, the plan least approved of by the 
 Count, is the only one that admitted of the hope of success and was the one 
 adopted by General Lee." 
 
 General Longstreet urgently pressed upon Lee to move 
 around by the left of the Federal position, along the line 
 of the Emmittsburg road> and place his army between 
 General Meade and Washington, hoping by thus threaten- 
 ing the Union general's left and rear to force him to leave 
 the position he had taken and to attack the Confederates 
 in such a position as Lee himself might select. This plan, 
 though held by General Longstreet as entirely practicable, 
 would most likely have resulted, if undertaken, in complete 
 failure. General Pleasanton says of it: "As to General 
 
64 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Lee maneuvering to our left, the supposition shows the 
 ignorance existing of our position and the nature of the 
 country. I had two divisions of cavalry, one in the rear 
 of our position, and one on Lee's right flank. This cav- 
 alry would have held Lee in check in any such movement, 
 while the Army of the Potomac from Cemetery Hill would 
 have swept down and turned Gettysburg into an Auster- 
 litz." (Annals of the War, page 457.) General Lee had 
 the four alternatives before him when unexpectedly con- 
 fronted by the Federal army, and he chose the one of a 
 direct assault. Probably a worse fate would have befallen 
 him had he adopted either of the others. 
 
 On Thursday, June 25th, the day after the last of the 
 Confederate infantry had crossed the Potomac into Mary- 
 land, the Federal army also crossed at Edward's Ferry, 
 and by Sunday, the 28th, it lay between Harper's Ferry 
 and Frederick City, in a position to protect Baltimore 
 and Washington from any flank movement by Lee, to 
 fall upon his communications, or to march to any point 
 where he might show himself. The strategy of General 
 Hooker was as faultless as it was successful, but he was 
 not destined to fight the great battle so near at hand. To 
 another that honor was accorded, as will be shown here- 
 after in its appropriate place. 
 
 Having given the strength, position, purposes, and tac- 
 tics of the two great opposing armies, I will now proceed 
 to give the reader a view of the movements and occur- 
 rences of each successive day until the final conflict upon 
 the decisive field of Gettysburg. And that these import- 
 ant events may be given in their proper connection, and 
 in comparison with other events transpiring elsewhere 
 
SUMMARY. 65 
 
 ^within the lines of the two great armies, I will detail the 
 events of each day in daily summaries. Let the reader 
 follow me closely through these details and mark well 
 each occurrence and movement, with Harrisburg as Lee's 
 objective up to the night of Monday, June 29th, and after 
 that night, some position about Cashtown, east of the 
 South Mountain, and he will be amazed at the genius and 
 skill displayed by the one man who planned and directed 
 and controlled the whole. I will also detail the move- 
 ments of the Army of the Potomac, that the equal sagacity 
 and skill of its commander may also be seen. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE ARMIES IN MOTION — ROUT OF GENERAL MILROY AT 
 
 WINCHESTER. 
 
 six 
 A EFORE proceeding to detail the movements of the 
 
 two great contending armies, it will be well to in- 
 ^ : 3 form the reader where they were encamped at the 
 I time the movement northward began. The Army 
 of Northern Virginia was in camp on the south bank of 
 the Rappahannock River, about the city of Fredericks- 
 burg, and the Army of the Potomac was posted on the 
 north bank of the same river, among the Stafford hills, 
 and opposite to that city. Its various corps and divisions 
 were placed in the following order: The First Corps, un- 
 der General Reynolds, was encamped in the vicinity of 
 White Oak Church; the Second (Couch's, afterward Han- 
 cock's,) near Falmouth; the Third (Birney's, afterward 
 Sickles',) at Boscobel, near Falmouth; the Fifth (Meade's, 
 afterward Sykes',) in the vicinity of Banks', United States, 
 and adjacent fords on the Rappahannock; the Sixth (Sedg- 
 wick's) near White Oak Church, with the Second Division 
 (Howe's) thrown forward to Franklin's Crossing, a little be- 
 low Fredericksburg, near the mouth of Deep Run; the 
 Eleventh (Howard's) near Brooke's Station, on the Aquia 
 Creek Railroad; and the Twelfth (Slocum's) near Stafford 
 Court House and Aquia Landing. The Cavalry Corps, un- 
 der General Pleasanton, had two divisions in the vieinity 
 
 66 
 
THE BEGINNING OF THE MOVEMENT. 67 
 
 ■of "Warrenton Junction, and one division in the neighbor- 
 hood of Brooke's Station. Such was the disposition of 
 General Hooker's army on June 5th, and such, with a few 
 unimportant changes in some divisions and brigades, it 
 remained up to June 11th, when the movement northward 
 began.* 
 
 During the latter part of May General Hooker learned 
 from sources which he deemed reliable that an invasion of 
 the North was under contemplation. Indeed such was the 
 confidence of the Confederate leaders in the success of the 
 movement that they did not try to conceal their purpose. 
 For days, and even weeks, before it began some of the 
 leading papers in the South discussed the question of an 
 invasion, the comparative advantages of the different routes 
 by which their army might reach its destination, and the 
 great and glorious results they expected to secure. At 
 length the evidences of the intention of the enemy became 
 so convincing to the Federal commander that, on May 
 28th, he wrote to the President that an invasion was in- 
 evitable, and measures to meet it were proposed. Finally 
 on the 2nd of June the withdrawal of the Confederates 
 from their lines about Fredericksburg, and their concen- 
 tration about Culpepcr Court House, upon General 
 Hooker's right, was begun. On that day Ewell's corps, 
 
 *For the information relating to the encampments of the various corps of 
 the Federal army prior to the movement northward, as also the daily move- 
 ments and places of encampment of the same up to the time of the great 
 collision at Gettysburg and afterward until they re -crossed the Potomac in 
 pursuit of the discomfited and retreating foe, I am indebted to a pamphlet 
 kindly furnished me from the Adjutant -General's office, War Department, 
 Washington, D. C, entitled "Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac, in 
 the Gettysburg Campaign, June and July, iS6j, compiled under the juris- 
 diction of Brigadier-General Richard C. Drum, Adjutant -General, U. S. 
 Army, by Joseph W. Kirkley, of the Adjutant - General ' s of^ce." 
 
68 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 preceded by the cavalry, left its encampment and moved 
 to the place stated. On the following day, June 3d, Long- 
 street's corps, accompanied by General Lee, followed, while 
 Hill was left to observe the movements of General Hooker. 
 By the 8th of June the whole of the Confederate army, 
 with the exception of the last named corps, was concen- 
 trated about Culpeper Court House. The departure of 
 these troops was soon detected by the Union commander, 
 who promptly directed General Sedgwick to cross the river 
 by his bridges three miles below Fredericksburg, and as- 
 certain by a reconnoissance if the main body of the enemy 
 had not gone. On the 5th of June Howe's division of the 
 Sixth Corps was sent across the river, and the divisions of 
 Wright and Newton — the First and Third — were moved 
 from their encampment at "White Oak Church and placed 
 upon the north bank ready to support him. Upon the 
 appearance of Howe upon the south bank of the river, 
 Hill's corps left their intrenchments to meet him. On the 
 7th, "Wright's division relieved Howe, who returned to the 
 north bank. Some desultory skirmishing took place be- 
 tween these troops and Hill's men, but Sedgwick reported, 
 as his opinion, that the greater part of the Confederate 
 force still held their old position. General Hooker, not 
 satisfied with this statement, determined to ascertain the 
 enemy's whereabouts more fully, and on June 7th ordered 
 General Pleasanton to cross the river with all his available 
 cavalry and make a reconnoissance toward Culpeper for 
 the purpose of ascertaining whether the Confederates 
 were concentrating there. In obedience to this order the 
 cavalry corps consisting of the First Division under Gen- 
 eral Buford, the Second under General Duffic, the Third 
 
BATTLE OF BEVERLY FORD. 69 
 
 under General D. McM. Gregg, and the Regular Reserve 
 Brigade, supported by detachments of infantry under 
 Generals Adelbert Ames and Daniel A. Russell, moved 
 to Kelly's and Beverly fords, preparatory to crossing the 
 Rappahannock on the following day. 
 
 On the same day that the Federal cavalry were prepar- 
 ing for the reconnoisance south of the Rappahannock, — 
 Monday, June 8th, — General Lee reviewed his cavalry, 
 preparatory to their expected departure the next day upon 
 a raid northward for the purpose of interposing between 
 Hooker and Washington, and destroying the railroad to 
 Alexandria, thereby delaying the Federal army in its move- 
 ments for the relief of the Capital, while Lee himself was 
 to move by rapid marches along the eastern base of the 
 Blue Ridge, cross the Potomac in the neighborhood of 
 Poolsville and the Monocacy, and come down upon it 
 from the north. These purposes were ascertained from 
 papers captured from General Stuart's head - quarters the 
 next day. After the review of the Confederate cavalry 
 by Lee, the four batteries of Jones' cavalry brigade moved 
 down toward the river near Beverly Ford to cover the 
 proposed crossing. The remainder of Stuart's command 
 was not posted within easy supporting distance of these 
 batteries. So unsuspicious were the Confederates of the 
 Federal approach that they did not seem to use the usual 
 precautions against a surprise, for a thin line of pickets 
 only lay between these batteries and the river. During 
 that night Pleasanton's cavalry, backed by the two brig- 
 ades of infantry, stole down to the fords and lay there 
 during the night without fires, ready at the first appear- 
 ance of day to cross. Buford's cavalry and Ames' brigade 
 
70 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 of infantry lay near Beverly Ford, and Duffle's and 
 Gregg's, supported by Russet's infantry, lay opposite 
 Kelly's Ford. In the early morning of Tuesday, June 9th, 
 under cover of a heavy fog, which completely shrouded 
 his movements, Pleasanton crossed at the two fords 
 named. These fords are about eight miles apart, and 
 Brandy Station, which is about three miles from the river 
 and nearly in the apex of the triangle, and a good position 
 from which to operate on Culpeper in case it became 
 necessary to move in that direction, was chosen as the 
 point of concentration of the two forces. To the surprise 
 of the Federal commander he encountered no Confederate 
 pickets on the north bank of the river, and after crossing' 
 unobserved the enemy were met, and were taken com- 
 pletely by surprise. Soon the conflict became general and 
 desperate, and the Confederates were driven back. Gen- 
 eral Stuart's headquarters were not more than a quarter 
 of a mile from the ford, and were soon captured with a 
 copy of Lee's orders, and other important papers, which 
 revealed the Confederate plans.* After the battle had 
 raged for several hours, during which the advantages 
 were clearly on the side of the Federals, Confederate 
 infantry began to arrive by hurried trains from Culpeper, 
 when General Pleasanton, having fully accomplished 
 all he was expected to, and not deeming it proper to 
 
 *The foregoing is General Pleasanton's account of the capture of General 
 Stuart's headquarters, and is found in Annals of the War, page 449. Major 
 H. B. McClellan, of the Confederate service, says on page 396 of the same 
 book: "No serious loss occurred save that Major Beckham's desk, in which 
 he had placed the orders to inarch received by him the previous night, was 
 jostled out of the wagon in its hasty retreat, and fell into the enemy's hands, 
 thus revealing authoritatively part of the information which he had come to 
 obtain." 
 
BATTLE OF BEVERLY FORD. 71 
 
 tarry longer and fight nearly the whole of Lee's army, 
 withdrew his forces and returned to the north bank of 
 the river at Rappahannock Station and Beverly Ford. 
 On the following day the cavalry took position in the 
 neighborhood of "VVarrenton Junction. Its infantry sup- 
 ports of the day previous rejoined their respective com- 
 mands. 
 
 The battle of Beverly Ford, or the battle of Fleetwood, 
 or Brandy Station, as it is sometimes called, is claimed 
 by the Confederates as a victory for them, because the 
 Federals withdrew and left the field to them. General 
 Lee says of this engagement: "On the 9th, a large force 
 of Federal cavalry, strongly supported by infantry, crossed 
 the Rappahannock at Beverly's Ford, and attacked Gen- 
 eral Stuart. A severe engagement ensued, continuing from 
 early in the morning until late in the afternoon, when the 
 enemy was forced to recross the river with heavy loss, 
 leaving four hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery, 
 and several colors in our hands." General Longstreet, in 
 referring to this engagement, also claims victory for the 
 Confederates, and says: "The failure of General Lee to 
 follow up his advantage by pouring the heavy force con- 
 centrated at Culpeper Court -House upon this detachment 
 of Federals, confirmed my convictions that he (Lee) had 
 determined to make a defensive battle, and would not 
 allow any casual advantage to precipitate a general engage- 
 ment. If he had any idea of abandoning tne original plan 
 of a tactical defensive, then, in my judgment, was the time 
 to have done so." (Annals of the War, page 418.) Does 
 General Longstreet suppose that in his zeal to establish 
 his favorite idea of a "strategical offensive but tactical 
 
72 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 defensive," the departure from which by Lee at Gettys- 
 burg, as he alleges, caused their defeat,- — he can cover the 
 fact that in this very battle that plan was departed from? 
 Did not Lee put forth every possible effort to crush the 
 Federal force across the river by hurrying forward troops 
 from Culpeper as fast as the trains at his disposal could 
 carry them? Or did he suppose that the ten or twelve 
 thousand men, after they had succeeded in all that they 
 had been sent to accomplish, would quietly sit down and 
 wait for the whole of Lee's infantry to fall upon them? 
 Or, perhaps, he meant that after the withdrawal of these 
 men, Lee should have pursued them, crossing with his 
 whole army to the north bank of the river, and fallen upon 
 Hooker in his impregnable works. General Hooker would 
 have liked nothing better than this, and General Lee was 
 too shrewd to attempt such folly. 
 
 That Lee did hurry forward infantry in support of his 
 cavalry in this fight is clear from the following. In an 
 article referred to in the previous chapter, General Long- 
 says: "Early in the morning of the 9th, Pleasanton's 
 cavalry crossed the Rappahannock and attacked Stuart 
 in his position south of that river. A fierce engagement 
 ensued in which the Confederate cavalry was roughly 
 handled, but finally with the assistance of Modes' division 
 of infantry the Federals were repulsed and forced to recro-ss 
 the Rappahannock." Other writers say that while the 
 battle was in progress the running of the trains could be 
 heard bringing infantry from Culpeper. * 
 
 In determining the question as to whether the Federals 
 or Confederates were victorious at the battle of Beverly 
 
 * See Annals of the War, page 450. 
 
BATTLE OF BEVERLY FORD. 73 
 
 Ford, or Brandy Station, or whatever name it may be 
 called, .it should be borne in mind that General Pleasan- 
 ton's crossing to the south side of the Rappahannock was 
 simply a reconnoissance in force to gain important inform- 
 ation. His instructions were to proceed in the direction 
 of Culpeper Court -House, attack the enemy, if necessary, 
 and force him to display his infantry in case any were 
 there, and not to return without positive information of 
 Lee's whereabouts. Now did he accomplish any or all of 
 these results; or was he prevented by the enemy? If he 
 did attain the object he went for, then he undoubtedly had 
 all the advantages he expected and the victory was his. 
 If he was forced to retire before his object was gained, or 
 if he went across the river to defeat the whole Confederate 
 army, or whatever part of it might be brought against 
 him, and hold the position he gained, then his purposes 
 were frustrated and victory was with the enemy. That he 
 did succeed in every object he sought to accomplish in the 
 reconnoissance, is undeniable. The victory, then, was his. 
 General Pleasanton, in summing up the results gained by 
 his reconnoissance, states them thus: First, the fact was 
 established that Lee was at Culpeper Court -House in 
 force; second, that he intended to invade the North; third, 
 that he was forced to change the direction of his march 
 toward the Shenandoah Valley instead of attempting to 
 move along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge and cross 
 the Potomac near "Washington, thereby compelling him to 
 operate on an exterior instead of an interior line; fourth, 
 the Army of the Potomac was enabled to take the initia- 
 tive, based upon the knowledge they had gained of Lee's 
 intentions ; and fifth, the Confederate cavalry was so much 
 
74 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 crippled by the severe handling it received that it could 
 
 not carry out the plan assigned to it. These results were 
 
 undoubtedly secured, and if they were not fully up to the 
 
 expectations of both Generals Hooker and Pleasanton, 
 
 then, and then only, the Confederates may have some show 
 
 of right in claiming the victory in the great cavalry 
 
 .•engagement of Beverly Ford. * 
 
 Possessed of positive information of Lee's plans and 
 k , 
 
 purposes, as results of the reconnoissance by General 
 
 Pleasanton, and the capture of important papers in Stuart's 
 headquarters, it became imperative upon the Federal com- 
 mander to take immediate measures to meet them. His 
 army was accordingly put in motion, and day after day 
 the various corps and divisions were moved from place to 
 place as the exegencies demanded. And that the splendid 
 strategy of General Hooker may be seen, I will place upon 
 record here for the reader's guidance, the movements each 
 day made, as shown by the statement furnished from the 
 Adjutant General's office referred to in the opening of this 
 chapter : 
 
 Wednesday, June 10. In order to prevent the threatened 
 crossing of the Rappahannock by General Stuart, and his 
 
 *The number of men on each side in the battle of Brandy Station was about 
 as follows: General Pleasanton claims that the Confederates had about twelve 
 thousand cavalry and twelve guns. Major McClellan, of Stuart's staff, puts 
 the number at nine thousand, three hundred and thirty-five on the roll, and 
 twenty guns. He also claims that nearly three thousand of these were absent 
 and not in the fight. The Union cavalry, according to General Gregg, 
 amounted to about nine thousand men and six batteries. One third of this 
 force was detached in the direction of Stevensburg, and their operations 
 had but little effedl on the general result. The batteries were not brought 
 forward in time to be of much service, and the infanty were only used to 
 keep open communications with the river. The numbers on each side, it 
 will be seen, were about equal. The arrival of Rodes' infantry, however, 
 gave the preponderance eventually to the Confederates. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE ROUTE. 75 
 
 raid northward, which the papers captured the day before 
 showed was to have begun this day, the cavalry corps took 
 a position in the neighborhood of Warrenton Junction, 
 guarding the fords of the river, and remained there until 
 Monday, June 15th. Stuart, however, made no attempt 
 to carry out the part assigned him, and Lee's purpose to 
 make an effort to turn Hooker's right by rapid move- 
 ments along the eastern base of the mountain and inter- 
 pose between him and Washington was also abandoned 
 and the valley route was taken. This route, while not 
 the one chosen by the Confederate commander, had some 
 advantages over the other. The mountain wall, which 
 intervened between the two armies, was a sure defense 
 against any attack the Federals might make, for its gaps 
 could easily have been fortified and held against any 
 possible force. It was evidently expected and desired by 
 Lee that Hooker would attempt to assail him by one of 
 these passes, in which event one corps could have held 
 him in check, while the other two captured Washington.* 
 General Long, in speaking of this route taken by the 
 Confederate army, says that the purpose was to "expel 
 from that section (the valley) a considerable Federal force 
 and to create an impression of a flank movement, with 
 the view of interrupting Hooker's communications." He 
 also says that Lee "by a series of bold, strategic move- 
 ments (reaching the valley with his army,) removed the 
 enemy from his path and accomplished the most difficult 
 step in his plan of operations without opposition." Lee 
 simply passed through a gap of the mountain and pro- 
 ceeded northward by way of the valley. Does it not seem 
 
 * General Doubleday's Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, page 88. 
 
76 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 that instead of removing the enemy from his path, he 
 removed himself from the enemy? As for the danger and 
 difficulty of the movement, it must be confessed that we 
 fail to perceive them. And if, in his taking the valley 
 route, crossing the Potomac west of the Blue Kidge, and 
 marching up the Cumberland Valley, Lee was executing 
 the plans he had originally determined upon, then his 
 strategy was successful; but if in this course he departed 
 from his original plans because of his enemy's possessing 
 his secrets, and taking measures to defeat them, then his 
 strategy was not successful, and General Long's effort to 
 divert attention from this fact is more ingenious than 
 commendable. 
 
 Compelled to abandon the route originally chosen by 
 the eastern base of the mountain, General Lee, on this day 
 (Wednesday, June 10th,) put his army in motion, and 
 General Ewell with his corps left Culpeper Court -House, 
 passing through Gaines' Cross Roads, and halted near 
 Flint Hill on his way to Chester Gap and Front Royal. 
 
 Thursday, June 11. Learning of the withdrawal of 
 Ewell's corps from Culpeper, General Hooker, on this 
 day, ordered the Third Corps to leave its encampment at 
 Boscobel, near Falmouth, and march to Hartwood Church, 
 to prevent any crossing in that vicinity, and confine the 
 enemy to the valley route. 
 
 Friday, Jane 12. The First Corps marched from its 
 encampment at Fitzhugh's plantation and White Oak 
 Church to Deep Run ; the Third Corps went from Hart- 
 wood Church, which it had reached the previous evening, 
 to Bealeton, and with the Third division under General 
 Humphreys advanced to the Rappahannock; and the. 
 
THE FEDERAL ROUTE. 77 
 
 Eleventh Corps, from the vicinity of Brooke's Station, 
 marched to Ilartwood Church, from which the Third 
 Corps had departed that morning. The positions occu- 
 pied by these three corps, as will be seen by a glance at 
 the map, were intended to prevent Lee from crossing the 
 river east of the mountain, compelling him to pass into 
 the valley. 
 
 Saturday, June 13. The First Corps marched from Deep 
 Hun to Bealeton, uniting there with the Third, which had 
 reached that place the evening previous; the Fifth Corps 
 left its encampment in the vicinity of Banks' Ford and 
 marched by Grove Church toward Morrisville; Wright's 
 and Newton's divisions (first and third) of the Sixth Corps 
 marched from Franklin's Crossing to Potomac Creek; the 
 Eleventh Corps marched from Hartwood Church, where it 
 had remained over night, to Catlett's Station; and the 
 Twelfth Corps, which up to that time had remained in its 
 encampment near Stafford Court House and Aquia Land- 
 ing, started en route to Dumfries. The Artillery Reserve 
 moved from near Falmouth to Stafford Court House. 
 
 General Hill, who had been left at Fredericksburg to 
 watch the Federals, as soon as he saw them leave their 
 encampment and march northward, also left his position 
 and proceeded to Culpeper Court House. 
 
 There appears to be some discrepancy in the statements 
 in regard to the precise time when Longstreet and Hill 
 left Culpeper. General Longstreet, on page 418 of An- 
 nals of the War, says: "General A. P. Hill having left 
 Fredericksburg as soon as the enemy retired from his 
 front, was sent to follow Ewell, who had marched up the 
 valley and cleaned it out of the Federals. My corps left 
 
78 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Culpeper on the 15th, and with a view of covering the 
 march of Hill and Ewell through the valley, moved along 
 the east of the Blue Ridge, and occupied Snicker's and 
 Ashby's gaps, and the line of the Blue Ridge." General 
 Long differs from Longstreet, as will be seen in his state- 
 ment, which is as follows : " Hill, as soon as the enemy 
 disappeared from his front, withdrew from Fredericksburg 
 and proceeded to close upon the main body of the army. 
 On the 15th, Longstreet was put in motion for the valley, 
 and Hill was directed to follow a day later." Whether or 
 not Hill preceded Longstreet is not material, but it would 
 seem that from the route the latter took, and the duty 
 assigned him of covering the other two corps in the valley, 
 he must have been the last to leave Culpeper. At all 
 events, by the 16th, both of these corps had left — Hill 
 following Ewell into the valley, and Longstreet moving 
 northward along the eastern base of the mountain. 
 
 Information of the purpose of General Lee to invade 
 the North, as revealed by the papers captured from General 
 Stuart's head - quarters, as well as the fact of the depart- 
 ure of Ewell's Corps from Culpeper for the Shenandoah 
 Valley, was promptly communicated to the authorities at 
 Washington, and the necessary preparations to meet the 
 emergency were discussed. One of the first of the Federal 
 posts that would most likely be assailed by the advancing 
 foe, was Winchester, in the valley of Virginia. At that 
 place General Milroy was stationed with about ten thou- 
 sand men, of whom about seven thousand only were 
 effective. These were not enough to insure safety in the 
 threatened advance of Lee's entire army, yet too many to 
 lose. The exposed condition of these men was foreseen, 
 
MOVEMENTS ABOUT WINCHESTER. 79 
 
 and it was deemed best to withdraw the military stores 
 and ammunition from Winchester, and hold the place 
 merely as a look-out, to give warning of the enemy's 
 approach. Accordingly on the 11th, probably before the 
 authorities at Washington knew that Ewell's corps had 
 left Culpeper for the valley, General Milroy received 
 orders through General Schenck, his department com- 
 mander, whose head - quarters were at Baltimore, to send 
 his armament and supplies to Harper's Ferry. General 
 Milroy, informed only of the expected raid by Stuart, and 
 ignorant of the approach of the Confederate army, remon- 
 strated against the withdrawal, declaring that he could 
 hold the place against any force that might come against 
 him. In reply to this remonstrance General Schenck tele- 
 graphed him that he might remain, but must be in readi- 
 ness to fall back whenever circumstances made it necessary. 
 Milroy replied to this that he could be ready to move in 
 six hours. General Milroy then sent a brigade under 
 Colonel A. T. McReynolds out upon his right to Berryville, 
 to observe the adjacent passes of the Blue Ridge and the 
 fords of the Shenandoah river; at the same time his cavalry 
 scouts patrolled the valley as far as Front Royal and Stras- 
 burg. On Friday the 12th, he sent out a strong reconnois- 
 sance on each road to ascertain if the enemy were in 
 sight. That on the Strasburg road went nearly to Middle- 
 town, where its troopers decoyed a Confederate cavalry 
 patrol into an ambush, and routed it with a loss of fifty 
 killed and wounded, and thirty -seven prisoners. Colonel 
 Shawl who was in command of this reconnoitering party, 
 returned to Winchester and reported no force on the road 
 which had not been there for several mouths. On the 
 
80 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Front Royal road the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry, 
 Lieutenant - Colonel Moss commanding, with about four 
 hundred men, went only to Cedarville, twelve miles dis- 
 tant, and returned, reporting that they had been stopped 
 by a large Rebel force. This account General Milroy re- 
 fused to credit, insisting that they had been too easily 
 frightened, and that if any such force could be there, he 
 should have heard of its approach from either General 
 Hooker, Halleck, or Schenck. He could not believe that 
 an entire Confederate corps was near him, for he supposed 
 Lee's army was still at Fredericksburg. His superiors had 
 failed to inform him, as they should have done by tele- 
 graph, that a large part of it had moved to Culpeper. 
 And he further supposed, that if Lee had left Hooker's 
 front at Fredericksburg, the Army of the Potomac would 
 have followed and he would have received full information 
 thereof. 'Not entirely oblivious of his danger he tele- 
 graphed to General Schenck late that night for specific 
 orders, whether to hold on to his post or to retreat to 
 Harper's Ferry, stating that there appeared to be a consid- 
 erable force in front of him. As the enemy soon after cut 
 the wires, he received no reply to his message.* Upon 
 the following morning, (Saturday, 13th,) his patrols on 
 the Front Royal road reported the enemy advancing in 
 force; whereupon he signaled Colonel McReynolds to 
 leave Berryville and rejoin him, while he sent out a consid- 
 erable force to learn what was impending. These had not 
 far to go, for Colonel Ely, on the Front Royal road, was 
 stopped barely a mile from "Winchester by a Confederate 
 
 * For many of the details of the affair at Winchester, I am indebted to Mr. 
 Greeley's history, and to General Doubleday's " Chancellorsville and Gettys- 
 burg." 
 
MILROY'S BOUT AT WINCHESTER. 81 
 
 battery, when he fell back after a slight skirmish. Gen- 
 eral Elliott, on the Strasburg road, advanced a little 
 further, and was halted by observing the enemy in force 
 on his left; that is, on the Front Royal road. Here some 
 cannon balls were exchanged, when the Union forces fell 
 back to Apple -Pie Ridge, next to the city. Skirmishing 
 continued throughout the balance of the day until dark, 
 when a prisoner was taken who rather astonished General 
 Milroy by the information that he belonged to Swell's — ■ 
 formerly Stonewall Jackson's — corps. 
 
 On this same day (Saturday, 13th) " General Ewell, who 
 had left Culpeper on "Wednesday, June 10th, marched 
 with Early's and Johnson's divisions directly upon "Win- 
 chester, while he sent his remaining division, Rodes', to 
 Berry ville. Owing to the timely warning Colonel McRey- 
 nolds' had received, his brigade had gotten off in time, his 
 rear being covered by Alexander's battery and the Sixth 
 Maryland cavalry. These detained the enemy two hours, 
 and then caught up with the main body. Jenkins' cavalry 
 came upon the retreating force at Opequan Creek, where 
 he made an attack, which was promptly repulsed by the 
 artillery with canister. After this there was no further 
 molestation, and McReynolds' command reached "Win- 
 chester at 10:00 p. m. after a march of thirty miles. 
 Rodes' division, after taking Berryville, kept on toward 
 Martinsburg, and bivouacked at a place called Summit 
 Point." — Doubleday. 
 
 General Milroy's course obviously should have been to 
 fall back to Harper's Ferry at once, when he found him- 
 self so pressed by the enemy. But he was confronted by 
 this difficulty: McReynolds' brigade, which had just 
 
82 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 arrived, was so much exhausted by its long march of that 
 day that it could go no further that night. To move with- 
 out it would be to sacrifice it. This Milroy was unwilling 
 to do. Besides, he still hoped that Hooker's army was 
 following up Lee, and would come to his relief. 
 
 Sunday, June 14. On this day General Hooker moved 
 his head - quarters from Falmouth, and started northward, 
 encamping that night at Dumfries. General Reynolds 
 was put in command of the left wing of the army, which 
 consisted of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps. Gen- 
 eral Hooker himself accompanied the right wing, which 
 consisted of the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth corps. 
 The movements this day were as follows: the First and 
 Third corps marched from Bealetou to Manassas Junction; 
 the Fifth Corps arrived at Morrisville and proceeded 
 thence via Bristereburg to Catlett's Station; Wright's 
 (first) and Newton's (third) divisions of the Sixth Corps, 
 moved from Potomac Creek to Stafford Court -House; 
 the Eleventh Corps from Catlett's Station to Manassas 
 Junction, and thence toward Centreville; the Twelfth 
 Corps reached Dumfries, and the Artillery Reserve moved 
 from Stafford Court -House to "Wolf Run Shoals. 
 
 During the early part of this day, an ominous silence 
 prevailed about Winchester. The Confederates were push- 
 ins: forward and workins; around so as to cut off the retreat 
 of the Federal troops. Early in the morning Milroy sent 
 out a reconnoitering force to ascertain if the enemy had 
 established themselves on the Pughtown or Romney roads. 
 The party returned about 2 o'clock p. M. and reported the 
 roads clear, but soon after the Confederates came in great 
 force from that direction. This completely cut off escape 
 
MILROY'S ROUT AT WINCHESTER. 83 
 
 by that route. At 4 o'clock p. m. a charge was made up 
 the Front Royal road to the edge of the town, but the 
 enemy were repulsed. Milroy then ordered a counter 
 charge, which revealed the Confederates in great force 
 just out of range of his works. Shortly after this, fire 
 was opened from two eight -gun batteries on the north- 
 west, scarcely a mile from the town; while at the same 
 time the infantry swept up to and over the Federal breast- 
 works, disregarding the fire of their guns, driving out the 
 110th Ohio regiment under Colonel Keifer with heavy loss 
 and planting their colors in the defenses. This attack was 
 made by Early's division, — Johnson operating on the 
 eastern side of the town. The garrison retreated success- 
 fully, under cover of the guns from the main works above, 
 which were held by Elliott's and McReynolds' brigades. 
 An artillery duel ensued, which was kept up without any 
 marked results until 8 o'clock in the evening-. 
 
 When night closed upon the scene of this day's eventful 
 struggle, General Johnson, leaving one brigade to cut off 
 Milroy 's escape toward the east, went off with the remain- 
 der of his division to form across the Martinsburg pike, 
 about three miles north of Winchester, to intercept him 
 in that direction. 
 
 General Milroy, at this juncture, found himself to be in 
 a perilous position, and shortly after midnight held a 
 council to decide upon what course to pursue. His cannon 
 ammunition was nearly exhausted, and he had but one day's 
 rations for his men. The foe in overwhelming numbers 
 pressed upon him at every side, and all further attempts 
 to hold his position were abandoned. It was resolved to 
 leave the wagon - train and artillery, and attempt to force 
 
84 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 their way out through the hostile lines that night. His 
 guns were accordingly spiked and the ammunition thrown 
 into cisterns. Leaving behind him his sick and wounded, 
 at 1 o'clock a. m., he silently moved out through a ravine 
 and was not molested until he reached the road leading to 
 Martinsburg, about four miles from the town. At this 
 point the enemy were met in force, barring all retreat in 
 that direction. But one thing could be done, — make an 
 effort to break through this line. For over one hour, 
 amidst the darkness of the night, the heroic defenders of 
 the Union engaged in a desperate encounter with the over- 
 whelming numbers of the foe, who were strongly posted, 
 but could not succeed in forcing their line. To add to 
 their seemingly hopeless condition, a signal gun fired at 
 Winchester, showed that the enemy there were aware of 
 their flight, and were in pursuit. At this critical juncture 
 General Milroy determined to try another expedient: he 
 ordered his troops to fall back a short distance and turn 
 to the right. In the darkness and confusion some mis- 
 understanding occurred, and some of the men escaped in 
 the way directed, while the greater number filed to the left 
 and took the road to Bath. It was impossible to reunite 
 the two columns, and that portion which took to the east, 
 and were not pursued, reached Harper's Ferry by way of 
 Smithfield late in the afternoon. Those who moved west- 
 wardly on the Bath road, also made good their escape, and 
 crossed the Potomac at Hancock, rallying at Bloody Run. 
 General Milroy claims that about five thousand of his 
 command reported at the two places, and that the two 
 thousand paroled by General Early consisted principally 
 of the sick and wounded. General Lee claims as the 
 
THE DISASTER OF MILROY. 85 
 
 capture from Milroy over four thousand prisoners, twenty- 
 nine guns, two hundred and seventy - seven wagons, and 
 four hundred horses. 
 
 The disaster to General Milroy's command was a severe 
 one to the national cause. The General himself was a 
 good soldier, and can hardly be blamed for his mishap. 
 He relied upon his department commander and the author- 
 ities at Washington, to inform him of the approach of the 
 enemy in overwhelming force. The latest moment that a 
 communication from either could have reached him, was 
 on Saturday evening, the 13th, when the telegraph wires 
 were cut by the enemy. And as EwelPs corps only left 
 Culpeper for the valley on "Wednesday, the 10th, it may 
 be that his moving in that direction was not known in 
 Washington in time to inform Milroy of his approach. If 
 the fact of his going in that direction was known there at 
 any time up to Saturday evening, then the fault was in not 
 forwarding at once this information, and withdrawing him 
 from his perilous position.* General Milroy evidently 
 held on one day too long. Had he fallen back to the 
 Potomac on Saturday night, instead of delaying until 
 Sunday night, he might have escaped with comparatively 
 little loss. But he was deterred from doing this by his 
 
 * Captain James H. Stephenson, in an article found in "Annals of the 
 War," pages 634-641, entitled "The First Cavalry," relates the following: 
 "When Milroy found he was surrounded by Lee's army, he sent for a bold 
 officer and fifty inen to carry a despatch to Martinsburg, and Major Boyd was 
 detailed with his old company. They knew every cow-path in the valley, 
 and succeeded in flanking the rebel force then between Winchester and Mar- 
 tinsburg, and sent the first intelligence to Baltimore and Washington that 
 Lee's army was at Winchester. That night a despatch arrived at Martins- 
 burg for Milroy, and three men of Boyd's company volunteered to take it 
 through. Their names were Oliver Humphries, John V. Harvey, and George 
 J. Pitman, all sergeants. After several hair-breadth escapes, they arrived in 
 the beleagured town at midnight, and Milroy called a council of war." The 
 
86 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 expectation of receiving orders from Washington, or 
 assistance from General Hooker. Then too he could only 
 have retreated on Saturday night with the loss of McRey- 
 nolds' brigade, which, after their march of thirty miles 
 from Berryville, were too much fatigued to go any fur- 
 ther that night. Had Milroy been advised of the approach 
 of Ewell twenty - four hours earlier, and McReynolds been 
 ordered to fall back upon Harper's Ferry, and he himself 
 had gone to the same place, the disaster of "Winchester 
 would have been avoided. This disaster, however, was 
 not without some compensation. The appearance of the 
 enemy there in force, and their detention for a day or two, 
 sent a note of warning throughout the entire North, and 
 afforded time to raise troops and organize them for effec- 
 tive resistance. 
 
 As previously stated, while Early's and Johnson's divis- 
 ions were attacking Milroy at Winchester, Rodes marched 
 upon Berryville. After pursuing for awhile McReynolds, 
 who had received timely notice and had been ordered 
 to proceed to Winchester, Rodes, preceded by Jenkins' 
 
 cavalry referred to were part of the first cavalry regiment of the war. It was 
 known as "The First New York;" and also, "The Lincoln Cavalry." It 
 was this same company under Captain Boyd that covered the retreat of 
 McReynolds' wagon-train, as related in the ensuing chapter, and which en- 
 gaged Jenkins and the advance of Rodes near Greencastle, Monday, June 
 22d, in what is known as the first battle of the rebellion upon Pennsylvania 
 soil. And it was another company of this same regiment under the heroic 
 and dauntless Captain Jones, that fought and defeated twice their number 
 of Imboden's men in McConnellsburg, Monday, June 29th, capturing as 
 many of the enemy as there were of their own number, besides killing two 
 and wounding one, and putting the balance to flight. Captain Jones and his 
 brave command figured again in a dash upon the great wagon -train in its 
 retreat from Gettysburg, which will be related in its appropriate place. This 
 regiment was one of the most heroic and gallant in the Federal service, and 
 its achievements as related by Captain Stephenson, will be read with great 
 interest. 
 
THE DISASTER OF MILROY. 87 
 
 cavalry, followed McReynolds' wagon -train, which had 
 headed for Martinsburg instead of following on to "Win- 
 chester, arriving at the former place late in the afternoon 
 of Sunday, June 14th. This place was held by a small 
 detachment under Colonel Tyler, who formed his men in 
 line outside of the place and resisted Rodes' attack until 
 darkness set in, when his infantry escaped to Shepherds- 
 town, and his artillery and cavalry to Williamsport. The 
 whole force, after suffering the loss of five guns and five 
 caissons rejoined the main body at Harper's Ferry. All 
 the troops now at that place, because of its indefensible 
 position, moved across the river to Maryland Heights, 
 which was strongly fortified. 
 
 Immediately upon the defeat of Milroy at Winchester, 
 General Ewell advanced the divisions of Early and John- 
 son to the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, be- 
 tween Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, where they re- 
 mained a few days before they crossed the Potomac into 
 Maryland. Jenkins' cavalry continued the pursuit of 
 McReynolds' wagon - train, which crossed the river at 
 Williamsport, and made its way down the valley through 
 Chambersburg. Jenkins' force crossed at Williamsport 
 on the evening of Sunday, June 14th. On the following 
 day (Monday, 15th) the brigades of Ramseur, Iverson and 
 Dole, with three batteries of artillery, also crossed at the 
 same place; and on the following days, the 16th, 17th, and 
 18th, the balance of the division crossed and all encamped 
 near the town, remaining there until the following week 
 when the advance down the Cumberland Valley com- 
 menced. Leaving these troops at the places named, with 
 Hill's corps en route for the valley, and Longstreet and 
 
88 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Stuart yet at Culpeper, and with the Army of the 
 Potomac on the march northward east of the Blue Ridge, 
 we next turn our attention to important events transpiring 
 in the loyal states, and also to the advance of Jenkins' 
 cavalry. » 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 preparations for the reception of the enemy — advance 
 of jenkins' cavalry. 
 
 )■ A 
 
 %P 
 
 HE stirring events about to be related will be better 
 '£L2^ understood if the reader is familiar with the geo- 
 ;; graphical features of the country to which the action 
 J\T of the campaign is now to be transferred. In order 
 T to supply this knowledge, I will state it thus : Com- 
 mencing at the Susquehanna River at Harrisburg, and 
 extending down to the southern border of the State and 
 through the States of Maryland, Virginia and North 
 Carolina into Tennessee, is a large and beautiful valley^ 
 ranging in width from fifteen to twenty - five miles. It is 
 bounded on the west by a range of mountains, known 
 as the North Mountain; and on the east, by the South 
 Mountain, down to the Potomac, and from thence down 
 through Virginia, by the same general range, called the 
 Blue Ridge. From the Susquehanna to the Potomac 
 this valley is called the Cumberland Valley; and from the 
 last named river down through Virginia, it is known as 
 the Shenandoah Valley. The principal towns through 
 this valley are Harrisburg, fifty -two miles from Cham- 
 bersburg; Mechanicsburg, forty -three miles; Carlisle, 
 thirty -one miles; Newville, twenty - two miles, and Ship- 
 pensburg, eleven miles. South of the town are Marion, 
 six miles; Greencastle, eleven miles; Hagerstown, twenty- 
 
 89 
 
90 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 two miles, and Martmsburg, forty -two miles. At the 
 time of the war the Cumberland Valley Railroad, com- 
 mencing at Ilarrisburg, passed down through this valley 
 to Hagerstown, touching at all the places named, except 
 Martmsburg. It has since been extended to that place. 
 There is also a turnpike road from Ilarrisburg down 
 through this valley, passing through nearly all the places 
 named. Williamsport, one of the principal fords of the 
 Potomac, is distant from Hagerstown in a south - westerly 
 direction six miles. A good road runs direct from Green- 
 castle to that place, and is some three miles nearer than 
 by way of Hagerstown, — the distance being fourteen 
 miles, and by way of Hagerstown, seventeen miles. 
 
 The valley between the Susquehanna and Potomac is 
 crossed by several good roads or turnpikes, the principal 
 of which are, the National Pike, which extends from Bal- 
 timore to Wheeling, crossing the South Mountain by Tur- 
 ner's Pass, and passing through Frederick, Boonsborough, 
 Hagerstown, Clearspring, and other places; the road by 
 Monterey Pass above Waynesborough, from which, on the 
 eastern side of the mountain, roads diverge to Frederick, 
 Emmittsburg, and Gettysburg; the pike running from 
 Baltimore to Pittsburg, crossing the mountain by New- 
 man's Pass, and passing through Westminster, Gettysburg, 
 Cash town, Greenwood, and Chambersburg; and the pike 
 which runs from points east of the mountain to Carlisle 
 and crosses by Mount Holly. 
 
 In the public square of Chambersburg the Pittsburg 
 and Baltimore pike crosses the road from Ilarrisburg to 
 Winchester at right -angles — the former running almost 
 directly east and west. Now taking a stand here and 
 
SCALE OF MILES 
 
 MARYLAND AND SOUTHERN PENNSYLVANIA, FROM THE POTOMAC TO 
 
 THE SUSQUEHANNA. 
 
 [9iJ 
 
92 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 facing east, we have Fayetteville, six miles distant, Green- 
 wood — a place of but few houses — eight miles, Cashtown 
 on the east of the mountain, sixteen miles, and Gettys- 
 burg, twenty -four miles. A road which runs from Car- 
 lisle by Mount Holly and Pine Grove along the South 
 Mountain, comes out into the Baltimore Pike, near the 
 top of the mountain; and roads from both north and south 
 of the pike enter into it at Greenwood. It is these roads 
 that gave this little place, situated at the western base 
 of the mountain, its importance during the invasion. 
 Cashtown on the eastern base of the mountain, like 
 Greenwood on the western, is of value only because of 
 the several roads which radiate from it. 
 
 Gettysburg, as already stated, is twenty - four miles dis- 
 tant from Chambersburg. It is the county seat of Adams 
 County, and contains about five thousand inhabitants. A 
 theological seminary and college, belonging to the Evan- 
 gelical Lutheran Church, are located there. Between two- 
 ranges of hills, the Catoctin on the east, and the South 
 Mountain on the west, is a narrow valley which, like the 
 Cumberland, west of the mountain, has always been noted 
 for its beauty and fertility. At the head of this valley, on 
 a gentle western slope, and forming a focal center for 
 roads running north, south, east, and west, lies the town 
 of Gettysburg. A mile to the east runs Rock Creek, the 
 chief of the head -waters of the Monocacy. 
 
 Taking a position now in the historic town of Gettys- 
 burg, and looking to the north-east, we have the town 
 of York, distant twenty -eight miles; a little further to 
 the left is Harrisburg, thirty -five miles; and across the 
 South Mountain, in a northwesterly direction, is Carlisle,. 
 
GENERAL LEE'S STRATEGICAL PURPOSES. 93 
 
 twenty - eight miles. South of Gettysburg, thirty -two 
 miles, is Frederick; Baltimore, southeast, fifty -two miles; 
 and Washington, nearly due south, sixty -four miles. 
 Hagerstown, by way of Fairfield and Monterey Pass, is 
 thirty -two miles distant in a southwesterly direction. 
 Thus it will be seen that Hagerstown, Chambersburg, and 
 Gettysburg form the three angles of a triangle, the South 
 Mountain passing directly through it, and separating the 
 latter from the former. 
 
 As soon as it was apparent that General Lee contem- 
 plated a movement northward, the authorities of our State 
 were notified of the fact, and were assured that the condi- 
 tion was such that the Army of the Potomac could not be 
 divided, and Pennsylvania must furnish her own men for 
 her defense. On the 9th of June two new departments 
 were created: that of the Monongahela, with headquarters 
 at Pittsburg, was assigned to Major -General W. T. H. 
 Brooks; and that of the Susquehanna, with headquarters 
 at Harrisburg, was given to Major -General I). N". Couch. 
 On the 12th, Governor A. G. Curtin issued a proclamation, 
 addressed to the people of the State, telling them of the 
 danger which threatened them, and calling for volunteers 
 to meet the emergency. On the same day General Couch, 
 on assuming command of the department, also issued an 
 address, reiterating what Governor Curtin had said, and 
 calling for a general and speedy enlistment. The responses 
 to these calls not being as general and prompt as desired, 
 the President, on the 15th, specifically called upon the 
 State of Pennsylvania and the States nearest, for the fol- 
 lowing militia: Pennsylvania, fifty thousand; Maryland, 
 ten thousand; New York, twenty thousand; Ohio, thirty 
 
94 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 thousand, and West Virginia, ten thousand, — a total of 
 one hundred and twenty thousand men. The governors 
 of these States re-echoed the call, but still the responses 
 were weak. The uniformed and disciplined regiments of 
 New York City generally responded and proceeded to 
 Harrisburg, but the number from the other States, includ- 
 ing Pennsylvania, who went to meet the foe was but com- 
 paratively small. A liberal estimate of the number who 
 responded was about as follows: Pennsylvania, twenty- 
 five thousand; New York, fifteen thousand; New Jersey, 
 three thousand; Maryland, five thousand; Delaware, two 
 thousand, — a total of fifty thousand. Those of the num- 
 ber who reported at Harrisburg were organized into two 
 divisions, one under General "W". F. Smith, and the other 
 under General Dana. On the same day that the President 
 called for troops, the construction of breast - works and 
 the digging of rifle-pits along the river front, and on the 
 opposite bank of the river, were commenced and carried 
 forward from day to day. At the same time these prepar- 
 ations were being made at Harrisburg, similar activity was 
 manifested at Pittsburg. Thus while the work of prepara- 
 tion for the reception of the enemy was going on, he was 
 pressing toward our border, and soon, as we will show, 
 made his appearance in our midst. 
 
 The people who lived along the southern border dur- 
 ing the war were kept in an almost continuous state of 
 anxiety. The booming of cannon was frequently heard, 
 and the rumors of approaching foes at times threw the 
 whole community into a state of intense excitement. Dr. 
 Philip Sch aft", in his notes on Matthew xxiv. 6, as pub- 
 lished in Lange's commentary, in a lucid and graphic 
 
TIIE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 95 
 
 manner describes the excitement which prevailed along 
 the border during the week preceding the appearance of 
 the invading army. The doctor, whose ability as a scholar 
 and writer is widely known, resided in Mercersburg, 
 Franklin county, at the time of the war, and the scripture 
 upon which his comments are based is as follows: — "And 
 yc shall hear of roars and rumors of wars." The doctor 
 says: "I beg leave to quote a passage from my diary 
 during the famous Southern invasion of Pennsylvania 
 under General Lee, in June and July, 1863, which may 
 throw some light on this passage (Matthew xxiv:6.) in 
 its wider application to different periods of repeated ful- 
 fillment : 
 
 'Mercersburg, Pa., June iS/k, iS6j. — It seems tome that I now under- 
 stand better than ever before some passages in the prophetic discourses of 
 our Savior, especially the difference between rvars and rumors of wars , 
 and especially the force of the command to 'flee io tlie mountains' 1 (v. 16) 
 which I hear again and again in these days from the mouth of the poor 
 negroes and other fugitives. Rumors of wars, as distinct from wars are 
 not, as usually understood, reports of wars in foreign or distant countries, 
 for these may be read or heard of with perfect composure and unconcern, 
 but the conflicting, confused, exaggerated and frightful rumors which pre- 
 cede the approach of war to our own homes and firesides, especially by the 
 advance of an invading army and the consequent panic and commotion of 
 the people, the suspension of business, the confusion of families, the appre- 
 hensions of women and children, the preparations for flight, the fear of 
 plunder, capture and the worst outrages which the unbridled passions of 
 brute soldiers are thought capable of committing upon an unarmed com- 
 munity. Such rumors of wars are actually often worse than war itself, and 
 hence they are mentioned after the wars by way of climax. The present 
 state of things in this community is certainly worse than the rebel raid of 
 General Stuart's cavaln- in October last, when they suddenly at Mercers- 
 burg, at noon -day, seized a large number of horses, shoes and store goods, 
 and twelve innocent citizens as candidates for L,ibby prison, but did no 
 further harm and left after a few hours for Chambersburg. But now the 
 whole veteran army of Iyee, the military strength and flower of the South- 
 
96 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 era rebellion is said to be crossing the Potomac and marching into Penn- 
 sylvania. We are cut off from all mail communication and dependent on 
 the flying and contradictory rumors of passengers, straggling soldiers, run- 
 away negroes and spies. All the schools and stores are closed ; goods are 
 being hid or removed to the country, valuables buried in cellars or gardens 
 and other places of concealment ; the poor negroes, the innocent cause of 
 the war, are trembling like leaves and flying with their little bundles 'to 
 the mountains', especially, the numerous run -away slaves from Virginia, 
 from fear of being captured as ' contrabands ' and sold to the South ; politi- 
 cal passions run high ; confidence is destroyed ; innocent persons are siezed 
 as spies ; the neighbor looks upon his neighbor with suspicion, and even 
 sensible ladies have their imagination excited with pictures of horrors far 
 worse than death. This is a most intolerable state of things, and it would 
 be a positive relief of the most painful suspense if the rebel army would 
 march into town.' 
 
 " Shortly after the above was written," adds Dr. Schafl", 
 "various detachments of Lee's army took and kept pos- 
 session of Mercersburg till the terrible battles at Gettys- 
 burg on the first three days of July, and although public 
 and private houses were ransacked, horses, cows, sheep, 
 and provisions stolen day by day without mercy, negroes 
 captured and carried back into slavery, (even such as I 
 know to have been born and raised on free soil,) and many 
 other outrages committed by the lawless guerrilla bands 
 of McNeil, Imboden, Mosby, etc., yet the actual reign of 
 terror, bad as it was, did not after all come up to the pre- 
 vious apprehensions created by the * wars and rumors of 
 wars', and the community became more calm and com- 
 posed, brave and unmindful of danger." 
 
 Humors of the threatened invasion of our border became 
 prevalent in Chambersburg toward the latter part of the 
 week previous to the actual appearance of the enemy. 
 On the evening of Saturday, June 13th, the town was 
 thrown into a state of great excitement by a rumor that 
 
THE OBJECT OF THE INVASION. 97 
 
 the foe was approaching; and towards evening of the fol- 
 lowing day (Sunday, 14th), the report was in circulation 
 that disaster had fallen upon the Federal forces about 
 "Winchester, and the enemy were approaching in force. 
 Immediately, as upon former occasions, when news of the 
 approach of the Confederates was received, great excite- 
 ment and confusion ensued. The usual work of secreting, 
 or packing and sending away, merchandise and other 
 valuables was commenced. The stores and shops were 
 opened, and all was activity in removing their contents. 
 The firm, of which the writer was a member, boxed and 
 shipped part of its stock of dry goods to Philadelphia, 
 some to the country to be hid in farm-houses, and the 
 larger part was secreted in a fire -proof beer vault under 
 an adjoining building. The officers of the bank removed 
 their valuables, and the officials of the court -house packed 
 and sent away the records and other valuable papers be- 
 longing to the county. The railroad men were also prompt 
 to meet the emergency, and by noon of the ensuing day, 
 Monday, 15th, had all their portable property loaded on 
 cars and ready for shipment. 
 
 As events of stirring interest are now to be narrated, I 
 will resume the daily summary style, and will commence 
 with — 
 
 Monday, June 15. On this day we witnessed the great- 
 est excitement which had occurred up to that time during 
 all the history of the war. Early in the morning farmers 
 residing in the southern portion of our county, began to 
 pass through the town and on down the Harrisburg pike 
 with their stock and valuables. The road was crowded 
 with wagons, horses and cattle. Then came large numbers 
 
 7 
 
98 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 of colored persons, men, women, and children, bearing 
 with them huge bundles of clothing, bedding, and articles 
 of house-keeping. Many of these had come from the val- 
 ley of Virginia, while a few were residents of our own 
 county and the neighboring county of Washington, in 
 Maryland. About ten o'clock forty or fifty wagons, drawn 
 by horses and mules, came dashing down Main street. 
 They were attended by a few cavalry, and the affrighted 
 drivers were lashing the poor jaded brutes attached to the 
 wagons. They declared that the enemy were in close pur- 
 suit; that a large part of the train had been captured, and 
 that the dreaded foe was about to enter Chambersburo:. 
 These wagons were a part of Colonel Mclieynolds' train, 
 which Jenkins' cavalry had pursued from Berry ville, and 
 across the Potomac at Williamsport the afternoon before. 
 As they came dashing down our street, drivers alternately 
 lashing the poor animals and looking back to see if the 
 enemy were in sight, the scenes of terror and confusion 
 were perfectly terrific. Near the corner of Main and 
 Queen streets one of the horses dropped dead from ex- 
 haustion. It was said that all along the road from the 
 Potomac to this place wrecked wagons and broken down 
 horses and mules were left by the way. When passing 
 through the public square of this place at head -long 
 speed, Lieutenant Palmer, on provost duty here, observing 
 the needless panic, drew his revolver and ordered the 
 teamsters to halt. His order was obeyed, and from Cham- 
 bersburg down to Carlisle (he teams were driven at a 
 moderate pace. At that place they were taken in hand by 
 the military authorities, and subsequently removed beyond 
 the Susquehanna. This panic, after the teams had passed 
 
JENKINS' TROOPS IN CHAMBERSBURG. 99 
 
 through Hagerstown, was wholly unnecessary, as the in- 
 vaders were not within twenty miles of them, for about the 
 time they reached this place Jenkins entered Hagerstown. 
 Between this force of the enemy and the wagon - train was 
 Company C, First New York Cavalry, under Captain 
 Boyd. This gallant command of about forty men became 
 separated from its regiment, part of which escaped west- 
 wardly with part of General Milroy's forces, and crossed 
 the Potomac at Hancock and concentrated at Bloody Run 
 — sometimes called Everett. These troops afterward did 
 good service upon the enemy's flank during the invasion, 
 and this company under Captain Boyd, as well as com- 
 pany A under Captain Jones, will be heard from hereaf- 
 ter in this narrative. 
 
 The arrival of this train and the information it brought 
 of the approach of the foe, naturally gave a fresh impetus 
 to the citizens of Chambersburg, and the rush from the 
 town in the direction of Harrisburg assumed larger pro- 
 portions, while those who remained at their homes — by 
 much the larger number — waited in much suspense for 
 the arrival of the enemy. 
 
 At an early hour in the evening of this day, information 
 was received of the approach of Jenkins' troops, and about 
 eleven o'clock at night they reached the southern end of 
 the town. Some six or eight were sent forward into the 
 town to reconnoiter, and about two hundred more were 
 detailed to make a rapid charge after this small force, and 
 these were soon followed by the balance of the command 
 — about two thousand in all. 
 
 Seated at an open window in the second story of my resi- 
 dence, overlooking the public square, and listening for the 
 
100 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 approaching enemy, I at length heard the clatter of horses* 
 feet coming rapidly down Main Street. "When opposite 
 the residence of Mr. H. M. "White — but a short distance 
 from the public square — the report of a gun was heard. 
 Almost simultaneously with the report of this gun, some 
 four or live cavalrymen rode into the square. In the 
 darkness — the gas in front of the bank building only 
 having been left burning — they became separated, and 
 one of them, evidently the officer in command of the 
 squad, who had ridden over near the bank, called out in a 
 peculiarly southern tone, "Hawkins! Hawkins 1 1 I say, 
 
 Hawkins, whar in the are you? " If Lieutenant Smith 
 
 — for such was his name, as will appear shortly — had 
 called upon two of our gallant young men, John A. 
 Seiders and T. M. Mahon, instead of his Satanic majesty, 
 he might have received the information he so earnestly 
 desired, for they were having a little matter of business 
 with his friend "Hawkins" across the square and near the 
 court-house at that time. But Lieutenant Smith's anxiety 
 for his friend was soon relieved, for on his going across the 
 square to ascertain what had become of him, he fell into 
 the hands of Seiders, and soon thereafter joined the object 
 of his solicitude, both of them, however, dismounted and 
 disarmed. Following this call for his absent comrade, the 
 officer again called out, " Whar's the may aw of this town? 
 I say, whar's the may aw of this town? If the mayau; 
 does not come here in five minutes we will burn the 
 town!" The "May aw" not responding to this urgent 
 call, the officer rode across the square to the front of the 
 court-house, where he was captured by Seiders. In a 
 short time after the capture of Lieutenant Smith, the two 
 
MR. BRAND'S ESCAPE. 101 
 
 hundred detailed to follow the reconnoitering party, came 
 thundering down the street, followed after a short interval 
 by the remainder of the command. Some few remained 
 in the town, but the larger part passed on down and out 
 by the Harrisburg pike, and after picketing the various 
 roads, encamped about one mile out. General Jenkins, 
 with his staff, went to the residence of Colonel A. K. 
 McClure, which stood upon the place where "Wilson Fe- 
 male College now stands, — the fine building which stood 
 there at that time having been burned in the destruction 
 of our town by McCausland a year afterward. After par- 
 taking of a bountiful supper prepared for them, the honors 
 of the table being royally done by the colonel's accom- 
 plished wife — the colonel himself being prudently absent 
 — lay down to rest for the night. Leaving Jenkins and 
 his staff so comfortably quartered for the night in Mr. 
 McClure's mansion, and their horses picketed in his clover 
 fields, we will return to town and detail what occurred 
 there during the entrance of the reconnoitering party. 
 
 As the scouts came galloping down Main street, with 
 their carbines cocked and levelled, the darkness prevented 
 them from seeing a mortar -bed and some piles of stone 
 and sand in front of Mr. II. M. White's residence, then in 
 process of building, and one of the horses stumbled and 
 fell, throwing its rider headlong into the mortar -bed. The 
 fall caused his carbine to go off, and he, as well as his 
 comrades, supposed that a citizen had fired upon them. 
 Simultaneously with the report of the carbine, Mr. J. S. 
 Brand, then residing in a house near by, threw open the 
 shutters of a second story window in his house to see 
 what was transpiring in the street. A cavalryman, then 
 
102 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 opposite this house, hearing the report of the gun and 
 the opening of the shutters, cried out that the shot came 
 from that window. In a short time, after the arrival of 
 the other cavalrymen, a number of them, piloted by the 
 one who averred that the shot came from Mr. Brand's 
 house, went to the place and knocked at the door demand- 
 ing admittance, and declaring the purpose of hanging the 
 man that tired the shot. Mrs. Brand, becoming greatly 
 alarmed for her husband's safety, urged him to go up into 
 the attic and hide himself. At length, to gratify his wife, 
 Mr. Brand complied, but finding his hiding-place under 
 the roof to be very warm, and concluding that if the house 
 was searched and he was found secreted, their suspicions 
 would be confirmed, he came forth determined to face the 
 issue. But as the cavalrymen were } T et at the door clam- 
 oring for entrance and threatening to break it in, he at 
 length at the urgent solicitude of his wife, went into his 
 back yard and crept into a bake -oven and drew to its iron 
 door. But if the attic was warm, the oven was hot, for it 
 had been used that same day to bake bread. After shift- 
 ing himself from one hand and knee to the other until he 
 could endure it no longer, he once more came forth to 
 brave the foe. Before it was quite daylight a member of 
 Mr. John Jeffries' family, who lived adjoining, came over 
 to Mr. Brand's and said that the rebels were all about the 
 house waiting for daylight, and declaring their purpose to 
 search it and hang the person found in it. These ladies, 
 Mrs. Brand and Miss Jeffries, then hit upon the expedient 
 of disguising Mr. Brand and having him leave the house. 
 Accordingly, they arrayed him in one of Mrs. Brand's 
 dresses, and a large flowing sun -bonnet was put on his 
 
CAPTURE OF TWO SCOUTS. 103 
 
 liead to hide his beard. In this disguise Mr. Brand went 
 out of his back door, passed up his lot in the presence 
 of the enemy, and crossed over to the residence of Mr. 
 Jeffries where he was disrobed and where lie had no 
 further trouble with the enemy. The situation of Mr. 
 Brand was an alarming one, and he availed himself of the 
 only means of escape which presented itself; and for this 
 he was indebted to the ingenuity of women. 
 
 Shortly after the entrance of the advance guard into the 
 public square, one of the cavalry - men rode up to John A. 
 Seiders and T. M. Mahon, as they stood upon the court- 
 house pavement, and inquired of them in what direction 
 the remainder of the squad had gone? These two men had 
 just returned home from service in the army, and they 
 determined to try their hands on that fellow. Neither of 
 them were armed, but Mahon, using a piece of a plaster- 
 ing lath which he held in his hand as a sword, seized hold 
 of one of the reins of the bridle, and Seiders the other, 
 and quietly demanded his surrender. He at once dis- 
 mounted, and his sabre and pistol — the other being taken 
 by Seiders — were at once taken by Mahon, who quickly 
 mounted the horse and rode rapidly out Market street to 
 Third, up Third to Queen, and down Queen to the market- 
 house, into which he entered. While there a party of cav- 
 alry-men rode down Second street toward Market, and 
 Mahon, as soon as they had passed, started out east Queen 
 at a rapid gait. Near the eastern point, at the junction of 
 Queen and Washington streets, he encountered a squad 
 who called upon him to halt, but he fled on out the 
 Gettysburg pike towards Fayetteville. At Downney's, 
 some four miles distant, he turned from the pike and pro- 
 
104 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 ceeded to Scotland, where, on the next day, he gave the 
 horse into the care of a friend, and after witnessing the 
 destruction of the railroad - bridge at that place, he eluded 
 the pickets and returned on foot to Chambersburg and 
 reported the destruction of the bridge to the railroad 
 officials. Finding, however, that the Confederates had 
 secured his name, and were on the hunt of him, he, after 
 having been for some time hid in the house of his law 
 preceptor, "William McClellan, Esq., left and sought refuge 
 in safer quarters. Mr. Mahon, to whom I am indebted for 
 this account, ^desires to present his compliments to Mr. 
 George Hawkins, should he be yet living and see this 
 statement, and to assure him that the saddle, carbine, and 
 case of medicines, borrowed of him under such pressing 
 circumstances, have been safely kept, and he will be happy 
 to return them to him now that " this cruel war is over." 
 Immediately after the departure of Mahon with his prize 
 — the Confederate having been handed over to several 
 other persons who came upon the scene, and who started 
 to conduct him to the jail, but released him when they 
 found that they were likely to be caught, — another cav- 
 alry-man rode up to where Seiders was standing, and 
 inquired what had become of his comrade, Hawkins. 
 Seiders now being armed with one of the captured pistols, 
 presented it and demanded his surrender. To this demand 
 he at once complied ( and dismounted. Seiders quickly 
 disarmed him, and taking his sabre, pistols, and spurs y 
 mounted his horse and rode rapidly out east Market street. 
 At Market and Second streets he encountered the head of 
 the column which had passed the market - house while 
 Mahon was in it. To their command to halt he paid no 
 
INCIDENTS IN CHAMBERSBURG. 105 
 
 attention, but put his captured animal upon its speed and 
 galloped out to Fayetteville. Arriving at that place he 
 took an inventory of his capture, and it was found to be 
 as follows : A valuable horse, saddle, bridle, four blankets 
 rolled up and fastened behind the saddle, two fine pistols, 
 sabre and belt, and a pair of saddle-bags, containing a 
 dress coat, two shirts, a Testament, a pack of cards, a 
 package of love letters, some smoking tobacco and other 
 articles. Mr. Seiders also desires to present his compli- 
 ments to Lieutenant Smith, and to assure him that he 
 would be delighted once more to meet him, and return to 
 him whatever of these articles he has preserved. From 
 Fayetteville Mr. Seiders proceeded down through Cum- 
 berland county to Harrisburg, and dressed in the captured 
 Confederate uniform, and mounted upon his captured horse, 
 he did excellent scouting service during the invasion. 
 
 I return now from this extended but interesting digres- 
 sion to our main narrative, and will detail the events of — 
 
 Tuesday, June 16. Early this morning the Confederates 
 took possession of what is known as Shirk's or Gelsinger's 
 hill. This is a commanding eminence about four miles, 
 north of Chambersburg, and on the road leading to Har- 
 risburg. A line of battle was formed along the brow of 
 this hill by a part of the Confederate force, while detach- 
 ments were sent out in all directions for the purpose of 
 plundering. General Jenkins and staff, after spending the 
 night under the hospitable roof of Colonel McClure, came 
 early in the day into Chambersburg and established his 
 head - quarters at the Montgomery House. One of his 
 first acts was to summon the burgess and town - council to 
 his head - quarters, when he made a demand for the return 
 
106 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 of tlie two horses and equipments taken, and in case of 
 their not being returned, payment for them, and in default 
 of either, he threatened the destruction of the town. As 
 the captured property was beyond the reach of the coun- 
 cil, the matter was adjusted by the payment of $900, and 
 the handing over to him of the same number of pistols 
 taken. For these he would not receive compensation in 
 money, as he said pistols were of more value to them 
 than money. After a little search the council secured by 
 purchase from some of our citizens the number of pistols 
 wanted, and the $900 were paid over to him in Confederate 
 scrip. Doubtless he expected to receive United States 
 currency; but as his soldiers had flooded the town with 
 their worthless currency, pronouncing it better than green- 
 backs, the city fathers took him at his word and paid him 
 in his own money. This was bought up of our business 
 men at about five cents on the dollar. Seiders afterward 
 sold the horse for $175, and the saddle for $35. Out of 
 this amount he refunded what the transaction cost the 
 council ($75), and he had $135 left. 
 
 General Jenkins also issued an order requiring all arms 
 in possession of our citizens, whether public or private, to 
 be brought to the front of the court-house within two 
 hours; and in case of disobedience all houses were to be 
 searched, and those in which arms were found should be 
 lawful objects of plunder. The pretext for this humili- 
 ating order was that his troops had been fired on by a 
 citizen the night before. Many complied with this requisi- 
 tion, and a considerable number of guns, good, bad, and 
 indifferent, were carried to the appointed place, where a 
 committee of our people were ordered to take down the 
 
CITIZENS DISARMED. 107 
 
 name of each person who brought a gun. This was to 
 secure the houses of all who complied with the order from 
 the threatened search. Some, of course, did not comply, 
 but enough did to satisfy the enemy, and a general search 
 was avoided. Captain Fitzhugh, Jenkins' chief of staff', 
 an ill-natured man — the same person who figured so 
 largely in the burning of the town a year afterward — as- 
 sorted the guns as they were brought in, retaining those 
 that could be used by their men, and twisting out of shape, 
 or breaking over the stone steps of the court-house, such 
 as were unfit for service. 
 
 During the whole of this day foraging parties were sent 
 out to all parts of the surrounding country, gathering 
 horses and cattle, of which large numbers were taken and 
 sent south to Williamsport and handed over to Rodes' 
 infantry. One of these plundering parties on this day 
 visited the Cabdonia Iron Works, situated about ten 
 miles east of Chambersburg, at the foot of the South 
 Mountain, and belonging to Hon. Thaddeus Stevens. 
 Under the promise that if all the horses and mules belong- 
 ing to the establishment were delivered to them the iron 
 works would not be burned, about forty valuable animals 
 with harness, etc., were carried away. Mr. Stevens came 
 near being captured by this party. He was on a visit to 
 that place, and upon the rumored approach of the Con- 
 federates, was hurried away to Shippensburg by a by- 
 road, much against his will and earnest protest. A week 
 later, as will be shown in its appropriate place, these iron 
 works were fired by the enemy and wholly consumed. 
 
 One of the revolting features of this day was the scour- 
 ing of the fields about the town and searching of houses 
 
108 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 in portions of the place for negroes. These poor creatures 
 — those of them who had not fled upon the approach of 
 the foe — sought concealment in the growing wheat fields 
 about the town. Into these the cavalrymen rode in search 
 of their prey, and many were caught — some after a desper- 
 ate chase and being fired at. In two cases, through the 
 intercession of a friend who had influence with Jenkins, I 
 succeeded in effecting the release of the captured persons. 
 That this practice of the raid was not confined to the 
 vicinity of Chambersburg alone, but was practiced else- 
 where, is proven by the quotation from Rev. Dr. Schaff's 
 diary previously given in which he said that colored per- 
 sons were taken and sent into southern slavery, even 
 "such as I [he] knew to have been born and raised on 
 free soil." In some cases these negroes were rescued from 
 the guards, who were conducting them South, by the indig- 
 nant people. A case of this kind occurred in Greencastle r 
 in which a few determined men, armed with revolvers, 
 captured a squad which had in charge a number of these 
 poor frightened creatures, and released them from the un- 
 happy fate which threatened them. This feature of the 
 war indicated the object for which it was waged, to estab- 
 lish a government founded upon human slavery. Thank 
 God, the effort, as well as the iniquitous cause which in- 
 spired it, not only failed, but went down never again to be 
 attempted in this age or country. That slavery was the 
 corner-stone upon which the government, sought to be 
 established by the South, was to rest, is proved by the 
 admission of one of the principal persons in the effort.* 
 
 *Hon. A. H. Stephens, in what is called his "Corner Stone" address, 
 delivered at Savannah, Georgia, March 21, 1861. That part of this addresa 
 which relates to slavery will be found in Appendix A. 
 
CAPTURE OF NEGROES. 109 
 
 But that all who participated in the war against the 
 Federal government, either did not entertain the same 
 view as that held by the leaders in the movement, or else 
 changed their minds during the progress of the war, is 
 evident in the following thrilling sentiment, uttered by 
 Mr. Maurice Thompson, a Southern man.* 
 
 "I am a Southerner; 
 I love the South; I dared for her 
 To fight from Lookout to the sea, 
 With her proud banner over me: 
 But from my lips thanksgiving broke, 
 As God in battle thunder spoke, 
 And that Black Idol, breeding drouth 
 And dearth of human sympathy 
 Throughout the sweet and sensuous South 
 Was, with its chains and human yoke, 
 Blown hellward from the cannon's mouth, 
 While Freedom cheered behind the smoke." 
 
 Wednesday, June 17. About eight o'clock this morning 
 General Jenkins ordered the stores and shops to be opened 
 for two hours, and that his men should be permitted to 
 purchase such articles as they personally needed, but in all 
 cases must pay for what they got. Business accordingly 
 went on very briskly for awhile with those who had not 
 removed or secreted their entire stock. Fortunately for 
 us and many others, but little was found in our stores; but 
 what little we had which the soldiers could buy under the 
 order was quickly bought up and paid for in all imagina- 
 ble kinds of scrip. Not only Confederate notes were paid 
 us, but shin - plasters issued by the city of Richmond and 
 other southern corporations. While this traffic was in 
 operation a Confederate soldier seized a number of rem- 
 nants of ladies' dress goods, which we had left lie on the 
 
 *This beautiful poem will be found in Appendix B. 
 
110 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 counter, not thinking them worth hiding, and putting 
 them under his arm walked out and down past Jenkins* 
 head - quarters. The General came quickly out and caught 
 the fellow by the back of the neck and ran him back into 
 the store on the double-quick, saying to us as he rushed 
 him up to the counter, " Did this man get these here? and 
 did he pay for them?" Upon being told that he had taken 
 them and had not paid for them, the General drew his 
 sword, and flourishing it above the man's head and swear- 
 ing terribly, said, " I've a mind to cut your head off." 
 Then turning to us he said, " Sell my men all the goods 
 they want; but if any one attempts to take anything with- 
 out paying for it, report to me at my head - quarters. We 
 are not thieves." Some of the officers visited the drug 
 stores of the town and made liberal purchases, telling the 
 proprietors to make out their bills, or if they had not time 
 to do so to guess at the amount and it would be paid. 
 
 About nine o'clock, while we were doing a lively busi- 
 ness, a soldier came riding at great speed from where the 
 main body were stationed out on the Harrisburg pike, and 
 reported to Jenkins that the Yankees were coming. The 
 general came out in great haste, and mounting his horse, 
 and in a voice of great power, ordered the men to the front. 
 A rush was made out the Harrisburg pike, and soon the 
 town was free from the enemy, when we at once closed our 
 places of business. In the course of an hour a number of 
 men returned leading the horses, and went on down the 
 road leading to Greencastle to the outskirts of the town 
 and there waited. Jenkins had dismounted his men and 
 was prepared to fight the expected Yankees as infantry. 
 They were armed with Enfield rifles as well as sabres. In 
 the course of about an hour afterward, these dismounted 
 
MOVEMENTS OF THE CONFEDERATES. Ill 
 
 men fell back and marched through the town and out to 
 where their horses were, and, after remounting, continued 
 to fall back to the vicinity of Greencastle. The news of 
 the occupation of our town by the Confederates was known 
 all over the country, and great numbers of people, as well 
 as some Federal scouts, moved by curiosity, or a desire to 
 ascertain precisely where the enemy were, had come within 
 sight of the men in line of battle on Shirk's Hill. Seeing 
 these, and hearing of the gathering of troops at Harris- 
 burg, and that a large body was advancing, they were 
 alarmed, and, supposing themselves to be in danger of being 
 attacked in overwhelming numbers, or flanked and cut off, 
 they fell back within supporting distance of the Confed- 
 erate infantry at Williamsport. As Jenkins and his staff 
 rode up street after the dismounted men had all passed 
 nearly out of sight, a number of our citizens were standing 
 upon the pavement in front of the court-house. Suppos- 
 ing that they might be armed and intended to fire upon 
 them, the general and his staff drew their pistols and rode 
 toward the citizens. A stampede, of course, ensued. As 
 the last of the soldiers was leaving the northern end of 
 the town, they set fire to a large frame warehouse then 
 belonging to Messrs. Oaks & Linn, but it was speedily 
 extinguished by the citizens in that vicinity. The firing 
 of that warehouse, and the destruction of the Scotland 
 railroad bridge, were the only acts of real destruction 
 attempted. True, many horses, cattle, and other things 
 were taken, but all was within the rules of war, except the 
 carrying away of free negroes. 
 
 After Jenkins withdrew his force to the vicinity of 
 Greencastle, he sent out foraging parties in all directions 
 
112 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 in search of additional plunder. One detachment consist- 
 ing of about two hundred and fifty men under the com- 
 mand of Colonel Ferguson crossed the Cove Mountain by 
 way of Mercersburg, reaching McConnellsburg, the county 
 seat of Fulton County, shortly after daylight on Thurs- 
 day. This was the first appearance of the Confederates in 
 that place and the inhabitants were terribly alarmed as 
 they arose from their beds to find the town in possession 
 of the dreaded enemy. A vigorous search was at once 
 instituted for horses, of which a large number was taken. 
 The stores and shops were also visited, and although the 
 alarm had extended there and stocks were nearly all re- 
 moved or concealed, a considerable amount of valuable 
 articles was taken. In some cases these were paid for in 
 Confederate scrip. The streets, after their departure, were 
 lined with old shoes, boots, and hats which had been 
 thrown aside for better ones. About one mile north of the 
 town a drove of fat cattle, valued at about six thousand 
 dollars, belonging to Ex - Sheriff J. "W. Taylor of this 
 place, was grazing. These were taken, and together with 
 the horses which had been captured, were driven with 
 them and handed over to Podes' infantry at Williamsport. 
 On the following Sunday this same body of the enemy 
 plundered the stores and shops of Greencastle. Had it 
 not been that the business men there as elsewhere had 
 removed their stocks, the losses would have been much 
 greater. Another detachment was sent east, and after 
 plundering the rich country about Waynesborough, crossed 
 the south-eastern flank of the South Mountain, where, 
 at the Monterey Pass, on Sunday, the 21st, the Philadel- 
 phia City troop and Bell's cavalry of Gettysburg, encoun- 
 
VALUE OF PROPERTY TAKEN. 113 
 
 tered their pickets. In the evening of the same day about 
 one hundred and twenty of them entered Fairfield, and 
 returned again by the Furnace road, taking with them all 
 the good horses they could find. 
 
 From the time that these cavalrymen fell back from this 
 place to below Greencastle — Wednesday, the 17th — until 
 Monday morning, the 22d, the whole southern portion of 
 Franklin county was plundered by these men, and the cap- 
 tures made were transferred to Rodes' division at Wil- 
 liamsport. It would be difficult to estimate the' value of 
 the property taken by this raid, but it certainly amounted 
 to not less than one hundred thousand dollars. Then its 
 coming in the season of the year when the farming inter- 
 ests required the use of the horses, and followed a few 
 days afterward by Lee's vast army, which added vastly to 
 the amount taken, increased immensely its inconvenience 
 and loss. Many croppers who had little else than their 
 stock, were bankrupted. The effect of this raid, however, 
 was to arouse the people of Pennsylvania and the whole 
 North, and volunteers for the defense of the border hur- 
 ried to Harrisburg. 
 
 By Monday morning, the 22d, the various detachments 
 of Jenkins' command had all rejoined the main body be- 
 tween Greencastle and Hagerstown, where, on that day, 
 they were joined by Rodes' division of infantry, when the 
 real invasion of the State was begun. 
 
e; 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE INVASION. 
 
 ^vITRLrJGr the week while Jenkins was raiding the 
 
 , southern border of Pennsylvania, the corps of Hill 
 
 I and Longstreet were on the march to the Potomac, 
 
 A while the Federal army was moving parallel to 
 ' them on the east of the Blue Ridge. Resuming 
 our narrative of the daily movements of these two armies 
 where we left off in a previous chapter to detail the dis- 
 astrous affair at Winchester, and the raid of Jenkins, we 
 commence with: 
 
 Monday, June 15. The head -quarters of the Army of 
 the Potomac were this day moved from Dumfries to Fair- 
 fax Station; the Second Corps moved from Falmouth to 
 near Aquia; the Fifth Corps from Catlett's Station via 
 Bristoe Station to Manassas Junction; the Sixth Corps 
 from Aquia Creek and Stafford Court -House to Dum- 
 fries; the Twelfth Corps from Dumfries to Fairfax Court- 
 House; the Cavalry Corps guarding the left flank of the 
 army left Warrentown Junction and moved to Union 
 Mills and Bristoe Station; the Artillery Reserve moved 
 from Wolf Run Shoals to Fairfax Court- House; and the 
 Eleventh Corps, after marching all the previous night 
 arrived at Centreville. 
 
 Tuesday, 16. This day the Second Corps marched from 
 near Aquia via Dumfries to Wolf Run Shoals, on the 
 
 114 
 
MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMIES. 115 
 
 Occoquan; the Sixth Corps from Dumfries to Fairfax Sta- 
 tion; and the Cavalry Corps from Union Mills and Bristoe 
 Station to Manassas Junction and Bull Run. 
 
 General Longstreet, after leaving Culpeper Court- 
 House, marched directly across the count}'' east of the 
 Bine Ridge. His object was to cover Ewell and Hill in 
 the Shenandoah Valley. Stuart's cavalry, on this da}', left. 
 its encampment on the south bank of the Rappahannock 
 and moved along Longstreet's right flank. Longstreet 
 hoped that Hooker might be tempted to turn about and 
 attack either himself, or Hill and Ewell through one of the 
 gaps of the mountain, in which case Stuart was to take 
 advantage of any opportunity which might offer and in- 
 terpose between the Federals and Washington. General 
 Hooker, however, understood Ids antagonist's designs, and 
 adhered to his main purpose to make the safety of the 
 National Capital the paramount consideration. Accord- 
 ingly, he directed the daily movements of his army so 
 as to insure this object, until that army was posted about 
 Centreville, Manassas, and Fairfax Court -House, entirely 
 covering all the approaches to Washington. 
 
 About this time while the whole ISTorth was in a state 
 of commotion and excitement consequent upon the ap- 
 proach of the foe, the Confederate Capital was also thrown 
 into a state of consternation by the approach of Federal 
 troops from the Peninsula. General Hix, who commanded 
 at Fortress Monroe, received orders from Washington to 
 advance upon Richmond, which, it was believed, was 
 weakly defended at that time. Troops were accordingly 
 sent by water and landed at Yorktown. General Getty, in 
 command of one column of about seven thousand men, 
 
116 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 moved as far as Hanover Junction to destroy the bridges 
 over the North and South Anna. At the same time Gen- 
 eral Keys, with another column of about five thousand 
 men, moved from the White House to secure Bottom's 
 Bridge, on the Chickahominy, and thus leave a clear road 
 for General Getty's column to advance on the city. The 
 consternation in the Confederate Capital was so great that 
 it was in contemplation at one time to recall Lee's forces. 
 Troops were, however, hurriedly brought from the gar- 
 risons of South Carolina and other places, which, with the 
 militia that was called out, were sufficient to defend the 
 place. 
 
 Wednesday, 17. The First Corps marched from Man- 
 assas Junction to Herndon Station; the Second Corps 
 from Wolf Run Shoals to Sangster's Station; the Third 
 Corps from Manassas Junction to Centreville; the Fifth 
 Corps from Manassas Junction to Gum Springs; the 
 Eleventh Corps from Centreville to Cow -Horn Ford, or 
 Trappe Rock, on Goose Creek; and the Twelfth Corps 
 from Fairfax Court - House to near Dranesville. 
 
 The Cavalry Corps, on this day, left its encampment at 
 Manassas Junction and Bull Run, and moved to Aldie, 
 where, after a sanguinary contest with part of Stuart's 
 force under General Fitz Hugh Lee, which had reached 
 that place by a forced march to anticipate our troops in 
 holding that gap, the enemy were put to flight, and that 
 important pass was taken and held by the Union forces. 
 
 Thursday, 18. The head -quarters of the Army of the 
 Potomac were this day moved from Fairfax Station to 
 Fairfax Court -House; the Sixth Corps moved from Fair- 
 fax Station to Germantown; and the Twelfth Corps from 
 
MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMIES. 117 
 
 near Dranesville to Leesburg. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brig- 
 ade advanced from Aldie to Middleburg, and returned to a 
 point midway between the two places. 
 
 Sanguinary engagements occurred between the cavalry 
 of the two armies, with continued success for the Union 
 forces. 
 
 General Lee with Longstreet's corps arrived this day at 
 Berryville, where he remained several days, perfecting his 
 preparations for the invasion of Maryland and Pennsyl- 
 vania. 
 
 Friday, 19. The First Corps marched from Herndon 
 Station to Guilford Station; the Third Corps from Cen- 
 treville to Gum Springs; and the Fifth Corps from Gum 
 Springs to Aldie. The cavalry engagements of the two 
 preceding days were renewed on this day and the enemy 
 were again worsted. General Pleasanton succeeded in 
 taking the two important passes of the mountain, Aldie 
 and Thoroughfare gaps, through which the enemy must 
 pass if he would cross the Potomac east of the mountain, 
 or if he would obtain information of the movements of the 
 Federal army. Pleasanton, therefore, asked for infantry 
 supports in order to secure them against re -capture. 
 Accordingly the Fifth Corps reached Aldie this day. 
 
 Saturday, 20. The Second Corps, in accordance with 
 General Pleasanton's request, moved from Sangster's Sta- 
 tion to Centerville, and thence toward Thoroughfare Gap; 
 the second division (Howe's) of the Sixth Corps advanced 
 from Germantown to Bristoe Station. 
 
 Sunday, 21. The Second Corps arrived at Thoroughfare 
 Gap. It will thus be seen that these two important places 
 — Aldie and Thoroughfare — were now strongly held by 
 
118 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Federal infantry, the former by the Fifth Corps and the 
 latter by the Second. Apprehending, however, that Stuart 
 would throw his whole force upon Gregg's division at Up- 
 perville, Pleasanton went forward with his entire command 
 supported by Barnes' (first) division of the Fifth Corps, to 
 support it. After a series of brilliant engagements, Stuart 
 was driven steadily back into Ashby's, where he took 
 refuge behind a portion of Long-street's corps, which had 
 come to his support. This day Stahl's division of cavalry, 
 from the defenses of Washington, moved out from Fairfax 
 Court -House via Centerville and Gainesville to Buckland 
 Mills. 
 
 The situation now may be stated thus: General Hooker 
 had the various corps of Ids army so placed that every 
 approach to Washington, south of the Potomac, was 
 effectually guarded. In addition to this he had Lee hope- 
 lessly enclosed in the Shenandoah \ r alley, unable either to 
 pass to the east of the mountain and eross the Potomac 
 at the places intended, or to obtain information of the 
 movements of the Federal army. General Pleasanton, 
 in the Annals of the War, page 451, in summing up the 
 results of the series of cavalry engagements of the four 
 preceding days, resulting in the capture and holding of 
 Aldie and Thoroughfare gaps, states them thus: "On 
 the evening of the 16th of June, the Cavalry Corps 
 encamped near Manassas, the Army of the Potomac 
 occupying positions between that point and Fairfax 
 Court- House. After consulting with General Hooker 
 it was decided that I should proceed b} r the way of Aldie, 
 through the Bull Run Mountains, into Loudon Valley, to 
 ascertain if Lee's army, or any portion of it, were in that 
 
MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMIES. 119 
 
 Vicinity. I started early on the 17th, made a long march 
 of twenty -five miles, and about five o'elock in the after- 
 noon, shortly after we had entered the pass, met the 
 enemy's cavalry coming- through. After a hard fight for 
 several hours, we drove them hack to the west side of the 
 mountains. On the 18th and 19th we were again engaged, 
 and forced them beyond Middleburg, about nine miles 
 from Aldie, and on the 21st, advancing with Buford on 
 the road to Union, and Gregg on the Upperville road, we 
 swept the Loudon Valley to the base of the Blue Ridge, 
 fighting our way the whole distance. Near Upperville 
 the fighting was severe, several brigades, on each side. 
 being engaged in charging each other; but such was the 
 dash and spirit of our cavalry that the enemy could not 
 withstand it, and retreated through Ashby's gap badly 
 Worsted. General Buford, on the right, sent some parties 
 to the top of the Blue Ridge, and they reported large 
 masses of infantry and camps in the Shenandoah Valley 
 toward Winchester. There being no infantry in the Lou- 
 don Valley, it was evident General Lee did not intend 
 to cross the Potomac lower down than Shepherdstown. 
 These facts were reported to General Hooker on the night 
 of the 21st of June, and he shortly after set the army 
 in motion for the vicinity of Frederick City, Maryland, 
 Buford's division of cavalry taking up a position at Mid- 
 dletown, to the west of Frederick City." 
 
 General Doubleday, in his " Chancellorsville and Gettys- 
 burg," on pages 101 and 102, in stating these results, says: 
 *' It is very certain that the loss of the pass at Aldie was 
 a serious blow to the Confederate cause. This, supple- 
 mented by Colonel Duffle's operations, gave Hooker pos- 
 
120 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 session of Loudon County, and threw the invading column 
 far to the west. If the enemy had succeeded in posting 
 forces in the gaps of the Bull Run range of mountains,, 
 and in occupying the wooded country between Thorough- 
 fare Gap and Leesburg, they would not only have hidden 
 their own movements from view, but would have had 
 command of the Potomac from Harper's Ferry to within 
 thirty miles of "Washington, so that they could have- 
 operated on either side of the river." 
 
 Having posted his army so as to cover completely the 
 National Capital, as well as confine his antagonist to the 
 valley west of the mountain, General Hooker wisely con- 
 cluded to wait for further developments. ' He found it 
 difficult to believe that Lee would still further lengthen out 
 his long line from Richmond, and endanger his communi- 
 cations by continuing his course northward, and accord- 
 ingly determined to hold himself in readiness to meet any 
 exigency which the further movements cf his adversary 
 might render necessary. Leaving General Hooker we- 
 turn our attention in another direction and note what was 
 transpiring there. 
 
 On Saturday, 20, General Knipe was sent from Harris- 
 burg, Pennsylvania, up the valley with parts of two regi- 
 ments of New York militia, numbering about eight 
 hundred men. These were the first to reach the State- 
 Capital in response to the call of Governor Curtin. The- 
 object of these troops was, to assist in rebuilding the rail- 
 road bridge at Scotland, a station on the Cumberland 
 Valley Railroad about four miles north-east of Cham- 
 bersburg, which was destroyed by Jenkins on Tuesday 
 preceding, and then to proceed to the latter place. On the 
 
GENERAL LEE'S ORDERS. 121 
 
 following day — Sunday, 21, — after completing their task 
 at Scotland, to which, place they had come by rail, they 
 came on to Ohambersburg and encamped in a grove about 
 one mile south of the town, alongside of the road leading 
 to Greencastle and llagerstown, where for the present we 
 may leave them. 
 
 On this day, Sunday, 21, General Lee, then at Berry- 
 ville, south of the Potomac, issued the following general 
 
 order : 
 
 Head -Quarters Army of Northern Virginia. 
 
 June 21st, 1863. 
 General Orders No. 72. 
 
 While in the enemy's country, the following regulations for procuring 
 
 supplies will be strictly observed, and any violation of them promptly and 
 
 vigorously punished: 
 
 I. No private property shall be injured or destroyed by any person belong- 
 ing to or connected with the army, or taken, except by the officer hereinafter 
 designated. 
 
 II. The chiefs of the commissary, quartermaster, ordnance and medical 
 departments of the army will make requisitions upon the local authorities or 
 inhabitants for the necessary supplies for their respective departments, desig- 
 nating the places and times of delivery. All persons complying with such 
 requisitions shall be paid the market price for the articles furnished, if they 
 so desire, and the officer making such payment shall make duplicate receipts 
 for the same, specifying the name of the person paid, and the quantity, kind, 
 and price of the property, one of which receipts shall be at once forwarded 
 to the chief of the department to which such officer is attached. 
 
 III. Should the authorities or inhabitants neglect or refuse to comply with 
 such requisition, the supplies required shall be taken from the nearest in- 
 habitants so refusing, by the orders and under the directions of the respective 
 chiefs of the departments named. 
 
 IV. When any command is detached from the main body, the chiefs of the 
 several departments of such command will procure supplies for the same, and 
 such other stores as they may be ordered to provide, in the manner and 
 subject to the provisions herein prescribed, reporting their action to the 
 heads of their respective departments, to which they will forward duplicates 
 of all vouchers given or received. 
 
 V. All persons who shall decline to receive payment for property fur- 
 nished on requisitions, and all from whom it shall be necessary to take stores 
 
122 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 or supplies, shall be furnished by the officers receiving or taking the same 
 
 with a receipt specifying the kind and quantity of the property received or 
 
 taken, as the case may be, the name of the person from whom it was received 
 
 or taken, the command for the use of which it is intended, and the market 
 
 price. A duplicate of said receipt shall be at once forwarded to the chief of 
 
 the department to which the officer by whom it is executed is attached. 
 
 VI. If any person shall remove or conceal property necessary for the use 
 
 of the army, or attempt to do so, the officers hereinbefore mentioned will 
 
 cause such property and all other property belonging to such persons that 
 
 may be required by the army, to be seized, and the officer seizing the same 
 
 Will forthwith report to the chief of his department the kind, quantity and 
 
 market price of the property so seized, and the name of the owner. 
 
 By command of General R. E. Lle. 
 
 R. H. Chilton, A. A. and I. G. 
 
 "Whether or not this order was printed before the army 
 reached Chambersburg I can not say, but on Wednesday 
 following, along with an order issued by Lieutenant - Gen- 
 eral Ewell, which, with other papers, was printed at one 
 of the printing establishments in Chambersburg, it was 
 freely distributed upon slips among the people. Its object 
 was, as will be scon by its perusal, to define the general 
 plan of operations of his army while in our State in pro- 
 curing supplies. This plan, to the credit of General Lee 
 be it said, was designed to confine the demands of his 
 army, and the methods employed in securing them, within 
 the limits of civilized warfare. The execution of these 
 demands, however, would bear heavily upon the people 
 where his army would march, but the humane regulations 
 established would and did prevent entering private houses, 
 and the indiscriminate plunder of private property. 
 
 Monday, 22. On the morning of this day two compa- 
 nies of home guards, composed of citizens of Chambers- 
 burg, went out and joined the New York militia -men. 
 The home guards were mostly sent out on the Greencastle 
 
MOVEMENTS ABOUT CHAMBERSBURG. 123 
 
 road to do picket duty, while the militia -men spent much 
 of their time in drill exercise with two beautiful brass 
 howitzers which they had brought with them. These 
 guns they had placed upon a hill adjoining their camp, 
 which commanded the Greencastle road. Sometime in 
 the afternoon a person supposed to be a woman came into 
 the camp. She was attired in mourning apparel, with her 
 face almost concealed in a black bonnet of somewhat anti- 
 quated style. She went about the camp pretending to be 
 silly, and inquired where a certain farmer lived whom no 
 one knew. Some of the home guard suspected that the 
 mysterious person was a man in disguise, and advised 
 the colonel in command to arrest her. He replied that 
 she was only a silly woman, and must not be disturbed. 
 At length she left the camp, and when last seen was mak- 
 ing her way at a brisk pace southward on the railroad. 
 That this pretended woman was a Confederate scout, sent 
 by Jenkins in advance to ascertain what force and prepa- 
 rations were here for their reception, is clear. This sus- 
 picion is strengthened by the fact that previous to every 
 Confederate advance, scouts preceded the main body and 
 mingled with our people. A few days before Jenkins' first 
 advance, two strange men came to Greencastle and re- 
 mained at a hotel there until the cavalry of this general 
 entered that place, when they threw off their disguise by 
 uniting with the Confederates and telling the landlord to 
 charge their bills to the Southern Confederacy. 
 
 At an early hour in the morning of this day, Rodes' 
 division of Ewell's corps, which was encamped about Wil- 
 liamsport for a week, advanced down the valley by the road 
 leading directly to Greencastle, at which place the head 
 
124 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 of the column, about 10 o'clock A. m., came up to Jenkins* 
 cavalry. About tlie time of the arrival of the infantry, 
 Jenkins sent a detachment of cavalry in the direction of 
 Chambersburg for the purpose of reconnoitering. At 
 Marion — six miles south of that place — this force came 
 unexpectedly upon Mr. D. K. Appenzcllar, then a young 
 man and a resident of Greencastle, who was on his 
 way to Chambersburg to enter the military service. Hav- 
 ing captured him and the fine horse upon which he was 
 riding, and which he was having shod when the force 
 came suddenly upon him, they plied him with questions as 
 to what was the latest news, and where troops were col- 
 lecting, and how many Avere in Chambersburg, To their 
 inquiries he said that he had been in Chambersburg the 
 day before and was told there that General McClellan was 
 on the way from llarrisburg with forty thousand men. 
 This was the usual stereotyped story which was always 
 floating around when we were threatened with a raid. 
 The cavalrymen seemed to credit Mr. Appenzcllar' s state- 
 ment and were inclined to retrace their steps. Just at this 
 juncture Captain Boyd, with his bold and dashing com- 
 pany of the First Xew York Cavalry, who had covered 
 the wagon train in its rapid flight the Monday before,, 
 as related in the previous chapter, came in sight and 
 dashed toward the enemy. Remembering Mr. Appenzel- 
 lar's story of General McClellan with his forty thousand 
 men, and perhaps supposing that these dashing horsemen 
 were the advance of this force, the Confederates fled 
 back toward Greencastle, taking Mr. Appenzcllar with 
 them. When within about half a mile of the town the 
 main body of Jenkins' force, with the advance of Ilodet;' 
 
FIRST BATTLE IN PENNSYLVANIA. 125 
 
 infantry, were met, and seeing the scouting party re- 
 treating pursued by Captain Boyd and his troopers, and 
 unaware of the number of Federals who might be near at 
 hand and upon them, a line of battle was hastily formed. 
 Fences were torn down to the right and left of the road, 
 and Rodes' infantry took a position upon the high ground 
 of Mr. John Kissecker's farm. ' Jenkins threw his cavalry 
 forward and formed a skirmish line upon the land of Mr. 
 William Flcmming, about a quarter of a mile in advance 
 of the infantry. **" Jenkins established his headquarters in 
 Mr. Flemming's house. As soon as the Union cavalry 
 came within range of their guns, fire was opened upon 
 them, and for a time the noise and clatter were quite 
 lively. A sister of Mr. Flemming, going to the window 
 to look out, barely escaped a ball which came crashing in 
 through the glass close by her head. , As soon as the dash 
 and curiosity of these bold riders were satisfied they with- 
 drew out of range, and were pursued by part of Jenkins 
 force. Mr. Appenzellar, who was a witness of this engage- 
 ment, says that of all the bold and fearless soldiers he ever 
 saw — and he saw many and had a large experience during 
 the war — these Kew York cavalrymen exceeded any in 
 these qualities. And had they gone but a short distance 
 further they would have come into a cross fire which 
 would have swept them nearly all away. Their foresight, 
 however, was equal to their courage, and they knew when 
 to stop. 
 
 The result of this fight was one man killed and one 
 wounded upon the Federal side. The killed was Corporal 
 Hihl. He was shot through the upper lip, the ball passing 
 through his head, his blood bespattering the paling fence 
 
126 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 in front of Mr. Fleming's dwelling. The wounded was 
 Sergeant Cafferty, who was shot through the leg. A 
 correspondent of the Greencastle Pilot, in its issue of July 
 28th, 1863 says, that the Confederates lost two nien killed. 
 This account, however, has not been confirmed by any 
 other authority. Sergeant Rihl was buried by the Con- 
 federates in a shallow grave, but the citizens of Green- 
 castle, a few days afterward, disinterred his body and 
 placing it in a coffin, reburied it in the Lutheran grave- 
 yard of that place. Sergeant Cafi'erty was taken in charge 
 and cared for in Greencastle, where, attended by one of 
 the physicians of that place, he recovered. Rihl Post of 
 the Grand Army of the Republic of Greencastle was named 
 after this brave soldier who fell in that engagement. 
 
 This battle — if such it may be called — was the first to 
 occur upon Pennsylvania soil during the rebellion, and 
 Sergeant Rihl was the first to lose his life.* 
 
 As an introduction to the next scene in the interesting 
 chain of events under consideration, I give the following 
 statement by Mr. A. J. Schaff, who was an eye - witness of 
 what he relates : 
 
 " On the 22d of June, 1863, I was in Marion with many 
 others for the purpose of obtaining such information as I 
 could in regard to the movements of the Confederates. 
 When on my way home, which was about two miles 
 
 *On June 22d, 18S6, the twenty- third anniversary of this battle, Rihl Post, 
 Grand Army of the Republic of Greencastle, assisted by several other posts 
 from abroad, and an immense gathering of people, again exhumed the re- 
 mains of this first martyr to the cause of the Union upon Penns)dvania soil, 
 and reinterred them near the place where he fell. A beautiful monument is 
 to be erected over his grave, and the place will henceforth be held as one 
 of the sacred shrines of our country. 
 
THE FEDERALS ABOUT CHAMBERSBURG. 127 
 
 south-east of the town, I heard the discharge of guns, 
 and upon looking in the direction of the road leading 
 from Greencastle to Chambcrsburg, I saw Confederate and 
 Union cavalry approaching each other. The Union troops 
 were moving out from the southern part of Marion, and 
 the Confederates Avere moving toward them, and were 
 about a quarter of a mile south of them on the Chambers- 
 burg road. These were part of Jenkins' force. A few 
 shots from the Union cavalry drove the Confederates back 
 to near Greencastle, where a short engagement took place. 
 The Union cavalry were driven back, and were followed 
 by the Confederates to near Marion, where the latter went 
 into camp upon the land of Michael Slotheur, two miles 
 south of the town. "While these troops were going into 
 camp, I climbed up into a tree, about a quarter of a mile 
 to the east of them, for the purpose of estimating their 
 numbers, so that I could report the same to the military 
 who were near Chambcrsburg. Having been in the army, 
 I could make a tolerably fair estimate of their number. 
 After remaining in the tree until I was satisfied as to my 
 estimate, which was that there were not less than one 
 thousand of them, and that all were not then in camp, I 
 descended and started at once for Chambersburg, taking 
 to the fields lest I might be intercepted by the Confeder- 
 ates. When I came to that point where the Gabby road 
 intersects the road to Chambersburg, I encountered a 
 Federal cavalry picket. He asked me what I knew of 
 the Confederates, when I told him they were in force 
 below Marion, and that he had better keep a sharp look- 
 out in all directions. After leaving this picket, I con- 
 tinued on in the direction of Chambersburg, and at a 
 
128 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 point about three miles and a half south of the town, 
 I came up to General Knipe and his staff. They were on 
 the Greencastle road, were mounted, but standing still. 
 When I came up to them, General Knipe asked me if 
 I knew anything of the movements of the Confederates. 
 I told him what I had seen, when he inquired of me if 
 there were any roads running parallel with the one he 
 Was on, by which the Confederates could get in his rear. 
 I told him that they could by the AVarm Spring road, 
 and by the road to the east of the one he was on. Turn- 
 ing to his staff, the general said: 'Men, we can not hold 
 a point this far out.' Leaving the general and his staff, 
 I proceeded toward Chambersburg, and about a mile 
 south of the town came into the camp of the JSTew York 
 soldiers. The officers and men immediately gathered 
 about me, and asked, 'How near are the rebels?' When 
 I informed them that they were in force about six or 
 seven miles south of them, they at once proposed to set 
 fire to their tents and leave. I assured them that by a 
 proper effort they could take their tents and camp equi- 
 page with them. This was well on toward evening, and I 
 assisted in loading one wagon and pulling it to Chambers- 
 burg, as they had no horses to draw it. I do not know if 
 the remainder of their tents were taken away or permitted 
 to remain, as I started the next morning for Ilarrisburg." 
 
 Such is Mr. SchafPs statement. I give the following 
 account of the further conduct of these men, condensed 
 from the written statements of several of the citizens of 
 Chambersburg, who were witnesses of what they relate: 
 
 About five o'clock in the afternoon, a great commotion 
 was observed all over the camp. The officers were run- 
 
A COWARDLY FLIGHT. 129 
 
 ning around and in an excited manner giving commands. 
 The soldiers at the guns hastily abandoned them, and the 
 whole command hurriedly left and marched to the town, 
 leaving guns, tents, and other camp equipage standing. 
 Arriving at Chambersburg, they took passage upon a 
 train of cars and left in the direction of Harrisbnrg. One 
 of the officers of this regiment — whether the colonel or 
 some other officer, my informants do not know — came in 
 by the rail -road, and instead of turning off at the Waynes- 
 borough crossing and coming in by Second street, kept on 
 along the rail -road. Passing along the track, his horse 
 fell into a cattle - guard, and because of his inability to get 
 him out, and fear of the Confederates, his owner drew 
 his pistol and shot him through the head. Whether 
 he stopped long enough to take off the saddle and 
 bridle, is not known, but it is altogether likely some one 
 got those articles very cheaply. The officer then ran on 
 into the town and took the train with his companions. 
 Two of the men took nervous spasms, one of whom was 
 unable to proceed with his comrades, and was concealed 
 in a house on East Market street during all the period 
 of the invasion, and until the Confederates had retreated 
 after the battle of Gettysburg. The Home Guard, after 
 the cowardly flight of these men, hauled the two aban- 
 doned howitzers into Chambersburg and placed them on 
 the cars, and they were taken along down the road. 
 Meanwhile, many persons went to the abandoned camp 
 and helped themselves to what they pleased of clothing 
 and other articles. The next morning some of the citizens 
 went out to the camp and brought in tents and other 
 things which yet remained, among which were sardines 
 
130 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and other delicacies rather suited to a sociable picnic 
 than the stern realities of war. One of the citizens of 
 Chambersburg — Mr. Abram Metz — in the goodness of 
 his heart, loaded a one-horse wagon full of pantaloons, 
 blouses, blankets, buckets, camp - kettles, pistols, etc., 
 which he hauled down to Shippensburg, where the train 
 was lying over, and delivered them to their panic-stricken 
 owners. Upon returning to Chambersburg, he encoun- 
 tered the advance of the Confederates, who relieved him 
 of his horse. 
 
 "Whether or not General Knipe had returned to camp 
 and given the order for this retreat, I am unable to say. 
 The probability is that he did not, for had he been there 
 the panic and loss of valuable property would not have 
 taken place. 
 
 These same New York soldiers, doubtless to cover their 
 own cowardly conduct, returned home and reported that 
 they had been badly treated by the people of Chambers- 
 burg — that they were even charged with the water they 
 used. This foul slander is yet held and published by re- 
 spectable papers. It is untrue, and a base slander upon a 
 people who were profuse in their hospitality to these men 
 when they halted in the town for an hour or two on the 
 previous Sabbath. The facts stated, however humiliating 
 to those concerned therein, are entirely reliable, and can 
 be attested by dozens of living witnesses of undoubted 
 respectability and veracity.* 
 
 * In a matter involving so serious a charge as the one stated, the writer, in 
 order to state the affair correctly and do no injustice to the parties concerned, 
 had several eye-witnesses of undoubted veracity write out their own state- 
 ments, from which this account has been condensed. 
 
GENERAL EWELb's ORDER. 131 
 
 The division of General Rodes, having reached Green- 
 castle this day, encamped about the town, the principal 
 encampment being upon the farm of Rev. J. Loose. 
 Shortly after their arrival, Colonel Willis of the Twelfth 
 Georgia Regiment was appointed provost -marshal. As- 
 sisted by Captain Carson and the adjutant, with a detail 
 of men, the colonel maintained excellent order throughout 
 the town. Either while in Greencastle or before leaving 
 camp near AVilliamsport, General Ewell, on this day, is- 
 sued the following general order : 
 
 Head - Quarters Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 June 22d, 1863. 
 General Orders, No. 49. 
 
 In moving in the enemy's country the utmost circumspection and vigilance 
 are necessary for the safety of the army and the success of the great object 
 it has to accomplish depends upon the observance of the most rigid disci- 
 pline. The lieutenant-general commanding, therefore, most earnestly ap- 
 peals to the officers and men of his command, who have attested their bravery 
 and devotion to the cause of their country on so many battle fields, to yield 
 a ready acquiescence in the rules required by the exigencies of the case. 
 
 All straggling and marauding from the ranks, and all marauding and plun- 
 dering by individuals are prohibited, upon pain of the severest penalties 
 known to the service. 
 
 What is required for the use of the army will be taken under regulations to 
 be established by the commanding-general, according to the rules of civ- 
 ilized warfare. 
 
 Citizens of the country through which the army may pass, who are not in 
 the military service, are admonished to abstain from all adls of hostility, 
 upon the penalty of being dealt with in a summary manner. A ready ac- 
 quiescence to the demands of the military authorities will serve greatly to 
 lessen the rigors of war. 
 
 By command of Lieutenant -General R. S. Ewell. 
 
 A. L> Pendleton, A. A. General. 
 
 This order was evidently issued by General Ewell in 
 ignorance of the one issued by General Lee the day be- 
 fore. This may be accounted for from the fact that Ewell 
 
132 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 was not with Lee, but in advance with his corps. During'' 
 this day the divisions of Generals Early and Johnson 
 crossed the Potomac — one at Williamsport and the other 
 at Shepherdstown — ton miles south-east in the direction 
 of Harper's Ferry. Those two divisions formed a junc- 
 tion at Hagerstown. 
 
 Tuesday, 23. About ten o'clock in the forenoon of this 
 day, Jenkins' cavalry again entered Chambersburg. Un- 
 like his former entrance, which was made in the night 
 and under evident alarm, and with a wild rush down the 
 streets, he this time came in slowly and confidently. The 
 larger part of the force proceeded on down the Harris- 
 burg pike to Shirk's Hill, which they had occupied for a 
 few days the previous week, and there formed in line. 
 Others remained in town. Shortly after the arrival of 
 these men, Jenkins, through his chief of staff, Captain. 
 Fitzhugh, made a requisition upon the citizens of Cham- 
 bersburg for a large amount of provisions for his command, 
 which were to be brought to thetcourt- house pavement 
 within a stipulated time. He also declared that if this 
 demand was not complied with a general search of the 
 houses would be made, and all provisions found taken. 
 Of course the citizens had to comply with this order, and, 
 like the citizens of Greencastle, who, in response to a 
 similar demand made upon them, brought plentifully of 
 onions, the citizens of Chambersburg also seemed to be 
 moved by a similar common impulse and brought bacon. 
 And as flitch after flitch, and jowl after jowl, with a 
 sprinkling of bread, cakes, and pies, were deposited upon 
 the pile, in front of the court-house, the name of the 
 unwilling contributor to the stomach of the Southern 
 
CONFEDERATES OBTAIN SUPPLIES. 133 
 
 Confederacy was taken down, by which his residence 
 would be exempted from search in case enough was not 
 voluntarily brought in. It is said that when the officer 
 in charge saw the people of our sister town coming from 
 all directions with baskets full of the delicious antiscorbu- 
 tics, he asked in amazement whether the people there 
 lived upon onions; so he might have supposed that we 
 here luxuriated upon the greasy product of the hog. We 
 only took advantage of the occasion to clean out our 
 stock, and our visitors did not object to what we brought. 
 It would be an interesting item to sec the list of names 
 taken that day, and know who all were in the bacon busi- 
 ness, but that paper unfortunately has not been preserved. 
 During the afternoon of this day, a raid of a most 
 shameful and yet ludicrous character occurred in the 
 neighborhood of where the new depot now stands. Upon 
 the site of this depot stood a largo frame building, once 
 used as a forwarding or railroad freight warehouse. In 
 this building were stored a large amount of government 
 stores, such as crackers, beans, bacon, etc. The Con- 
 federates had not yet found these stores, and some of 
 our people — mostly those who resided in the eastern out- 
 skirts of the town, and had no scruples against taking 
 anything from Uncle Sam, rather than have the Con- 
 federates take it — made a raid upon these stores and in 
 a short time cleaned out the whole stock. Men, women, 
 and children came running in crowds, and a general scram- 
 ble took place, and upon every street and alley leading 
 from the warehouse persons were seen carrying bacon and 
 rolling barrels of crackers and beans. In the general 
 melee some came in contact with others, when scolding, 
 
134 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 kicking, and fighting ensued. One woman in rolling 
 away a barrel of crackers came in contact with another 
 rolling away a similar prize, and, crowding her too much 
 one turned around and kicked at the other, but not being 
 acquainted with the laws of gravitation and momentum, 
 missed her aim and went sprawling backward over her 
 own barrel. By the time she had gathered herself up 
 some one had rolled away her prize, at which a general 
 fight set in. A reliable witness to whom I am indebted 
 for this description of this shameful and ludicrous occur- 
 rence, assures me of its correctness, and says that he saw 
 one man roll away four barrels and put them in his cellar. 
 Transferring our observations further south, we find 
 that on this day the following requisitions were made 
 upon the authorities of Greencastle by the commissary 
 and quartermaster of Rodes' division: 
 
 Headquarters Second Army Corps, 
 
 June 23d, 1863. 
 To I he Authorities of Greencastle : 
 
 By direction of Lieutenant- General R. S. Ewell, I make requisition for the 
 
 following articles: 100 saddles and bridles; 12 pistols. These articles are to 
 
 be furnished at two o'clock p. M. J. A. Harmon, 
 
 Maj. and Q. M. Second Corps de Armie. 
 
 Following this requisition came another for onions, 
 sauerkraut, potatoes, radishes, etc., signed by A. M. 
 Mitchell, Maj. and Oh. Com. Then another demanding — 
 
 Two thousand pounds of lead; 1,000 pounds of leather; 100 pistols; 13 
 boxes of tin; 200 curry -combs and brushes. Signed, 
 
 Wm, Allen, M. and C. 
 
 The chief of the topographical engineers also demanded 
 two maps of Franklin county. 
 
 These demands were so heavy that the council felt it 
 impossible to fill them, and no effort was accordingly 
 
GENERAL EWELL IN CHAMBERSBURG. 135 
 
 made. The Confederates, however, secured some saddles, 
 "bridles, and a considerable amount of leather. 
 
 During the afternoon of this day, part of Rodes' division 
 advanced toward Chambersburg, encamping over night 
 below Marion. Johnson's division left its encampment 
 near Hagerstown, and closed up upon Iiodes at Green- 
 castle; and Early's division deflected to the east at Hagers- 
 town, and passing down by a parallel road, encamped over 
 night near Waynesborough. 
 
 Wednesday, 24. About nine o'clock in the forenoon of 
 this day, the sound of music was heard up Main street, 
 Chambersburg. Iiodes' division of infantry, preceded by 
 a band of musicians playing " The Bonnie Blue Flag," 
 made its appearance on the brow of the hill by the Re- 
 formed Church. These were the first Confederate infantry 
 that had ever penetrated a free State. This column of 
 men passed out down through the town, and on out the 
 Harrisburg pike to Shirk's Hill, which Jenkins' cavalry 
 held. On this commanding position a line was formed 
 and a large number of cannon planted. It is said that it 
 was in contemplation to fortify this hill and make a stand 
 there against the apprehended Federal attack. Through- 
 out this entire day long columns of infantry and artillery, 
 with the usual accompaniments of immense trains of 
 wagons and droves of cattle and ambulances, streamed 
 through the streets. The trains were parked in the fields 
 and the men placed in camps between the town and the 
 hill named. According to an estimate made by one of the 
 citizens of Chambersburg, ten thousand three hundred 
 men — infantry, cavalry and artillery — passed thro*v2jh 
 the town this day. 
 
136 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 About half- past ten o'clock, a carriage drawn by two 
 horses and accompanied by several horsemen, was observed 
 coming down the street. It was stopped in front of the 
 Franklin Hotel. One of the occupants of this carriage was 
 a thin, sallow - faced man, with strongly - marked Southern 
 features, and a head and physiognomy which strongly in- 
 dicated culture, refinement and genius. When he emerged 
 from the carriage, which he did only by the assistance of 
 others, it was discovered that he had an artificial limb, and 
 used a crutch. After making his way into the hotel, he 
 at once took possession of a large front parlor, and, sur- 
 rounded by six or eight gentlemanly - looking men, he 
 was prepared for business. A flag was run out of a win- 
 dow, and head- quarters established. This intellectual- 
 looking and crippled man was Lieutenant -General R. S. 
 Ewell, the Commander of the Second Corps, Army of 
 Northern Virginia. 
 
 General Ewell was a graduate of West Point, and had 
 been for some time a civil engineer on the Columbia Rail- 
 road in Pennsylvania. He had been at one time stationed 
 at Carlisle in charge of the United States barracks at that 
 place. Soon after the commencement of the war he joined 
 the Confederate army, and rapidly rose to the position of 
 a lieutenant-general and commander of a corps in Lee's 
 army. He had lost a leg at the second Bull Run battle, 
 and, it was said, when he rode on horse -back, which he 
 seldom did except in battle, he was invariably strapped to 
 his horse. After the death of Stonewall Jackson, he 
 was made commander of that corps, and was, at the 
 time of which I am writing, in command of the advance 
 of the Army of Northern Virginia on its way to Gettys- 
 
CONFEDERATES IX CIIAMBERSBURG. 137 
 
 "burg. It is likely that lie was placed in the advance 
 because of his familiarity with the country, especially 
 about York, Columbia, and Harrisburg, where important 
 events were expected to take place. At the time of the 
 evacuation of Richmond he was the military commander 
 of that place, and gave the order for the burning of the 
 Confederate capital. On April 6th, 1865, during the re- 
 treat of the Confederate army from Petersburg, General 
 JSwell, with the greater part of his corps, was captured. 
 
 But General Ewell was a man of business as well as 
 war, and he at once proceeded to execute his purposes. 
 Among his first acts was to appoint Colonel Willis, of the 
 Twelfth Georgia regiment, provost - marshal of the town. 
 The colonel made his headquarters in the court - house, and 
 from its cupola a flag was displayed. That was the only 
 emblem of the rebellion ever put up in Chambersburg, 
 excepting the one at General Ewell's head - quarters, 
 neither of which was the regular Confederate flag. Fol- 
 lowing the appointment of the provost - marshal, came a 
 requisition upon several of the hotels for mattresses and 
 bed - clothing, which were taken to the public school build- 
 ing on King street, and a hospital was there established, 
 and a number of sick of the. command taken to it. In a 
 short time the following general order, designed to prevent 
 the soldiers from seizing the liquors in the town, was issued. 
 It is to be regretted that this order was not made perma- 
 nent, here and elsewhere, for all time. The following is 
 that order: 
 
138 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Head -quarters Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 Chambersburg, June 24th, 1863. 
 General Orders. 
 
 I. The sale of intoxicating liquors tc this command, without written per- 
 mission from a major-general, is strictly prohibited. 
 
 II. Persons having liquor in their possession are required to report the 
 fact to the provost -marshal, or the nearest general officer, stating the amount 
 and kind, that a guard may be placed over it, and the men prevented from 
 getting it. 
 
 III. Any violation of Part I. of these orders, or failure to comply with 
 Part II., will be punished by the immediate confiscation of all liquors in the 
 possession of the offending parties, besides rendering their other property 
 liable to seizure. 
 
 IV. Citizens of the country through which the army may pass, who are 
 not in the military service, are admonished to abstain from all acts of hos- 
 tility, upon the penalty of being dealt with in a summary manner. A ready 
 acquiescence to the demands of the military authorities will serve to lessen 
 the rigors of war. By command of 
 
 Lieutenant- General R. S. Ewell. 
 A. S. Pendleton, A. A. General. 
 
 I am not aware to what extent those who had liquor in 
 their possession responded to this order and reported at 
 head -quarters, but very soon after the entrance of the 
 Confederate infantry, guards were stationed at all places 
 where it was kept. If there were any cases of drunkenness 
 among the soldiers, I did not see it. But that there was 
 at least one instance, although it did not come under my 
 observation, will appear in the proceedings of a court- 
 martial shortly to be given. 
 
 Following the issue of the general order in regard to 
 liquors, came a summons to our business men to convene 
 in the parlor of the National Bank, which stood next to 
 General Ewell's head -quarters, and the few who had not 
 left at the approach of the invaders repaired to that place. 
 After assembling there three of Ewell's staff officers joined 
 
REQUISITIONS ON CHAMBERSBURG. 139 
 
 lis and opened up their business, which was to lay before 
 us the following requisitions: 
 
 To the Authorities of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania : 
 
 Head - quarters Second Army Corps, 
 
 June 24th, 1863. 
 
 By direction of Lieutenant -General R. S. Ewell, I require the following 
 
 articles: 5,000 suits of clothing, including hats, boots, and shoes; 100 good 
 
 saddles; 100 good bridles; 5,000 bushels of grain (corn or oats); 10,000 ft>s. 
 
 sole leather; 10,000 lbs. horse-shoes; 400 lbs. horse -shoe nails; also, the use 
 
 of printing office and two printers to report at once. All articles, except 
 
 grain, will be delivered at the Court- House Square, at 3:00 o'clock p. M., 
 
 to-day, and grain by 6:00 o'clock p. m. to-day. 
 
 J. A. Harmon, 
 
 Major and C. Q. M. Second Corps D'Arm. 
 
 Head - quarters Second Army Corps, 
 June 24th, 1863. 
 By the command of Lieutenant -General R. S. Ewell, the citizens of Cham- 
 bersburg will furnish the following articles by 3:00 this afternoon: 6,000 lbs. 
 lead; 10,000 lbs. harness leather; 50 boxes of tin; 1,000 curry combs and 
 brushes; 2,000 lbs. picket rope; 400 pistols; all the caps and powder in town; 
 
 also, all the Neat's foot oil. 
 
 William Allen, M. and C. 
 
 Head - quarters Second Army Corps, 
 June 24th, 1863. 
 By direction of Lieutenant -General R. S. Ewell, the following are de- 
 manded: 50,000 lbs. bread; 100 sacks salt; 30 barrels molasses; 500 barrels 
 flour; 25 barrels vinegar; 25 barrels beans; 25 barrels dried fruit; 25 barrels 
 sauerkraut; 25 barrels potatoes; 11,000 lbs. coffee; 10,000 lbs. sugar; 100,000 
 lbs. hard bread. 
 
 This last requisition, which is without signature, was 
 delivered to us by Major Hawkes, Commissary General of 
 Ewell's corps. The signature was probably omitted in 
 copying it. On the evening of Monday, 22d, about eleven 
 o'clock, some four or five of our citizens, in connection 
 with the pastors of the town — five or six in number, — 
 
140 TUE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 convened in the cashier's office of this bank to make some 
 arrangements, which were deemed necessary, to receive 
 the approaching enemy. And as the Burgess and Town 
 Council had nearly all left town, and the contingency of 
 meeting the demand for the surrender of the place, which 
 it was expected would soon be made, should be provided for, 
 it was agreed upon that the pastors should act in behalf of 
 the town authorities. The venerable Rev. B. S. Schneck, 
 D. D., was constituted president of this committee. These 
 gentlemen, instead of receiving the demand for the sur- 
 render of the town, — our southern friends simply coming 
 in and taking it without asking for it, — found that they 
 had a much greater business on their hands than they had 
 expected, and accordingly called to their assistance a num- 
 ber of our leading business men. These, with the minis- 
 ters, were now in session to hear what our visitors had to 
 say. After an introduction to the three officers by our 
 chairman, lion. I'\ M. Kinimell, who was made such by 
 common consent rather than by any formal action, these 
 papers were read, after which a considerable pause ensued. 
 Here was a chance for business on a magniheent scale, 
 but it was feared the terms would not prove satisfactory. 
 Then, too, it was somewhat out of season for sauerkraut 
 but our southern friends seemed to think that as they 
 were among the "Pennsylvania Dutch,'' that favorite dish 
 would be found the whole year round. They did not 
 know that like their -'hog and hominy,'' sauerkraut was 
 especially a home dish, and never set before strangers. 
 Taking the papers into his hand and scanning them for 
 awhile, the judge began to read, "ten thousand pounds of 
 sole leather, — ten thousand pounds of harness leather,— 
 
SAUERKRAUT REQUISITION. 141 
 
 one hundred thousand pounds of hard bread, — twenty- 
 five barrels of s-a-u-e-r-k-r-a-u-t." Throwing the papers 
 upon the table he said, "Why, gentlemen, do you wish to 
 insult us? Do you suppose we live on sauerkraut?" "Oh 
 no, dear sir, we mean no insult whatever; sauerkraut is an 
 antiscorbutic, and our men need something of the kind," 
 replied Major llawkes. "Well, gentlemen," said our 
 spokesman, "it is utterly out of our power to furnish 
 these things, and now, if you are going to burn us out 
 you will only have to do it. That's all I have to say about 
 it." The Major without any perceptible excitement said, 
 "Why gentlemen, we have not come here to burn and 
 plunder. We are not vandals. We are here to wage an 
 honorable warfare. These things we need, and we only 
 propose to have them under the acknowledged rules of 
 civilized warfare." "Well," said the judge, "we have not 
 these things in the town, and how can we comply with 
 your requisitions?" "Send out throughout the county 
 and bring them in. We know the resources of the county. 
 We have studied the census reports and we know these 
 things can be had if you send around and gather them in." 
 "How can we send out over the county," said the judge, 
 " all our horses that we have not sent off your army has 
 taken." "Well," said the Major, "it will not do for you 
 to say that you can not furnish the articles we require. 
 General Ewell will not receive such a report. You must 
 say just what you can do, and now we will give you time 
 to consult together. Let those who deal in certain articles 
 get together and make out a report in writing, saying just 
 what they can do, and we will meet you here again in one 
 hour to receive your reports." 
 
142 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 At the conclusion of the major's directions we at once 
 went to work to make out such reports as the occasion 
 demanded. The writer went around among the merchants 
 — for we all then dealt in groceries — to secure co-opera- 
 tion, hut failed to find a single one. Xearly all had fled. 
 He then returned to his store and wrote ahout thus: 
 "Gentlemen, there are in our cellar the following articles: 
 [Then followed the number of hogsheads and barrels of 
 molasses and syrup, tapped and untapped, hogsheads and 
 barrels of sugar, etc.] I have endeavored to see other 
 dealers in these articles in order to meet your requisition, 
 but have failed to find a single one. I now submit the 
 question to you as honorable gentlemen, whether it would 
 be right to take the whole of our stock, or let the burden 
 fall equally upon all?" Signing our firm name to this 
 paper, I went to the bank at the time specified and handed 
 it to Judge Kimmell, telling him of its contents. When 
 the officers returned, additional requisitions were laid be- 
 fore us for some drugs, and also for a first-class field 
 glass for the signal corps. Handing the papers to Major 
 Hawkes, Judge Kimmell said, "Here, major, is a paper 
 which you will see deserves special consideration. It is 
 Mr. Hoke's," pointing to me. "We were then directed to 
 remain together until the papers were taken to General 
 Ewell's head-quarters for examination, and in a short time 
 one of the staff returned and directed us to go to our 
 respective places of business, as the general was not satis- 
 fied with our reports, but would send around a guard to 
 examine for themselves. At this announcement we all 
 went to our respective places, and in a short time Major 
 Hawkes, riding past and observing our sign, stopped and 
 
STORES RANSACKED. 143 
 
 thus addressed me: "You are Mr. Hoke, are you not?" 
 Replying that I was, he continued, " General Ewell says 
 that you have made the only satisfactory report, and your 
 groceries shall not be disturbed. We may be under the 
 necessity of having a couple of barrels of that New Or- 
 leans molasses for our hospitals, but otherwise you shall 
 not be disturbed." As I thanked the major for this con- 
 sideration, he rode away, and in a short time squads of six 
 or eight men, under command of an officer, were seen going 
 around the town for the purpose of making the examina- 
 tion. When one of these squads came to our store, and 
 the officer in command ordered mo to unlock the door, I 
 told him what Major Hawkes had said, when he replied, 
 "That's all right, sir; I've got my orders. Open your 
 door." Opening the door the officer entered alone — the 
 soldiers crossing bayonets to prevent any one else from 
 going in — and passing to the rear and out again, he or- 
 dered me to lock it up, saying: "All right, now; you will 
 not be disturbed." He did not go into the cellar where 
 our groceries were stored. After these squads had re- 
 ported at head - quarters, our grocery, drug, hardware, 
 book and stationery, clothing, boot and shoe stores were 
 all relieved of most of their remaining contents. In this 
 work of plunder, Major Todd, a brother of the wife of 
 President Lincoln, took a prominent part, and came near 
 losing his life, for while attempting to enter the cellar of 
 Dr. Richards, the doctor's daughter flourished an axe over 
 his head, and threatened to split it open if he persevered, 
 when the miscreant ingloriously fled. 
 
 It is out of my power to give any estimate of # the value 
 of the property taken that day. But it must be recol- 
 
144 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 lected that the losses of that day, as well as the losses 
 by the Stuart and Jenkins raids, were afterward supple- 
 mented by other depredations during the continuance 
 of the invasion — on the Sunday following especially — 
 and by the destruction of the town a year afterward. 
 This much, however, can be said, that many persons who 
 had toiled and economized for years to gain an honor- 
 able support, as well as lay up something for old age, 
 were reduced to poverty. I am aware that the appropria- 
 tion of our property for the use of the invading army was 
 in accordance with the rules of war, and in conformity 
 with General Lee's order regulating the taking of sup- 
 plies, and in most cases was paid for in worthless scrip, but 
 why it is that the Government, which reimburses loyal men 
 in the South for their losses, refuses the same to loyal per- 
 sons in the North, is a problem that seems hard to solve. 
 
 On the day following that on which the depredations 
 just stated occurred, Major llawkes rode up to me when 
 standing in front of our store, and said that he was under 
 the necessity of having two barrels of our New Orleans 
 molasses for hospital purposes. These were taken and the 
 major paid me for them in Confederate scrip. After this 
 our cellar was undisturbed until the Sunday following, 
 when it was cleaned out by Longstreet's corps, as will be 
 shown hereafter. Major llawkes informed me that he 
 was born, I think, in New York, but for a number of years 
 had resided in Charlestown, "West Virginia, where he had 
 been engaged, when the war broke out, in the manufacture 
 of carriages. 
 
 Among the things demanded in the requisitions made, 
 as will have been seen, was "the use of a printing office 
 
INCIDENTS IN CHAMBERSBURG. 145 
 
 and two printers." As no response was made to this de- 
 mand, the printing fraternity were dealt with as the 
 merchants and shop-keepers, and a guard was sent to take 
 possession of the printing establishment of the lleformed 
 Church. To Rev. Samuel R. Fisher, D. D., editor and 
 "business manager of the establishment, the proposition 
 was made that if he would do the printing they wanted 
 he would be paid for it, and a guard placed over the build- 
 ing; but if he would not voluntarily do so, the establish- 
 ment would be used and neither pay nor protection given. 
 Having a considerable amount of valuable machinery and 
 stock on haud, the doctor wisely concluded to accede to 
 their demand, and for a few days he was busily engaged 
 upon their job. In addition to the general orders of Lee 
 and Ewell, some of which have been already given, and 
 other military papers, many thousands of parole papers 
 were printed. With these they doubtless intended to pa- 
 role the Army of the Potomac, the defeat and eapture of 
 which they seemed to believe would certainly be effected. 
 That it was also their intention to parole the citizens of the 
 country through which their army passed seems to be in- 
 ferred in the parole papers for citizens which they had 
 printed. The following is a copy of one of these papers, 
 which was preserved by one of the persons who was com- 
 pelled to print them. It is probably the only one now in 
 existence, and is in my possession : 
 
 Head - quarters Rodes' Drv. 
 
 186 
 
 a citizen of is hereby released on con- 
 dition that he will give no information concerning or serve in any capacity 
 whatever against the Confederate States, until regularly exchanged for a 
 
 citizen of the Confederate States. 
 
 10 
 
146 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 The execution of this work of printing took several 
 days, and when it was completed war prices were charged 
 and the bill was paid in Confederate scrip, liev. Dr. 
 Fisher, whose financial ability was unsurpassed, succeeded 
 in disposing of this worthless paper at the rate of twenty- 
 five cents on the dollar to one of our tanners, who paid it 
 to one of the commissary officers for the hides of the cattle 
 they slaughtered for their army. This was the best con- 
 ducted business transaction with the invaders that occurred 
 about here to my knowledge. I shall have another one to 
 relate further on in this narrative, which displayed similar 
 acuteness, and the actor in it was a preacher also. After 
 the presses were put to work to execute this job of print- 
 ing, our town was fiooded with printed slips containing 
 Lee's and EwelPs orders. A few of these interesting pa- 
 pers only have survived time and the ravages of fire when 
 Chambersburg was destroyed by the Confederates a year 
 later; but I was fortunate in obtaining a single one of 
 the number — General E well's order No. 1, regulating the 
 liquor traffic. The whole of the papers, however, were 
 published in the Franklin Repository of July 8th and 15th, 
 1863, from which I have taken them. As to the correct- 
 ness of the copies I have given I can clearly testify from 
 personal knowledge. 
 
 The infantry having now come up and taken a position 
 upon Shirk's Hill, Jenkins' cavalry left that place and 
 went on further down the valley. 
 
 Early's division, which encamped on the previous night 
 in the vicinity of Waynesborough, marched parallel with 
 Rodes' down the valley by way of Quincy and Eunkstown, 
 coming out into the pike leading from this place to Gettys- 
 burg at Greenwood, at which place it encamped. 
 
BATTLE OF NORTH MOUNTAIN. 147 
 
 At an early hour this morning, — Wednesday 24th, — 
 Stewart's brigade of infantry, numbering about twenty -five 
 hundred men, and about three hundred cavalry, left the 
 main column at Greencastle and went westwardly by way 
 of Mercersburg across the North Mountain to the village 
 of McConnellsburg, in Fulton County. These troops 
 reached Mercersburg, ten miles distant from Greencastle, 
 about the middle of the day, and at once made themselves 
 at home. Learning that a theological seminary was lo- 
 cated there, Stewart placed a guard about the property fqr 
 its protection. The soldiers were forbidden to enter either 
 the seminary or private houses under the penalty of severe 
 punishment. The stores and shops were ordered to be 
 opened, and the soldiers permitted to purchase whatever 
 they needed. To their credit it must be said that every- 
 thing was done in an orderly manner. No pillaging was 
 permitted, and whatever was taken was by officers who 
 made out bills and paid in Confederate scrip. There were 
 at this time in the vicinity of McConnellsburg the Twelfth 
 Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Lieutenant -Colonel Moss, a 
 regiment of emergency men under Colonel Zinn, and an 
 independent company of emergency men from Hunting- 
 don County under Captain W. W. "Wallace. Colonel 
 Zinn's regiment was encamped on the top of the Cove, 
 or North Mountain, on both the Chambersburg and Mer- 
 cersburg pikes, in strong natural positions, with some 
 fortifications. Colonel Moss, with his regiment, was en- 
 camped down in the valley, east of the town, and Captain 
 Wallace, with his company, was in McConnellsburg. It 
 was known that the Confederates were about Williamsport 
 and Greencastle, and Jenkins was roaming all over the 
 
148 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 southern part of Franklin County — a detachment of his 
 force having visited this same town a week before — 
 and these troops were on the lookout for them. Accord- 
 ingly it was arranged that if the Confederates approached 
 by either the Chambersburg or Mercersburg pike, Zinn 
 was to lire a small gun, when the troops down in the 
 valley were to go to his assistance. Some time in the 
 afternoon of this day the signal gun was heard on the 
 Mercersburg pike, and a scout came dashing into town 
 with the information that the enemy was approaching in 
 force. At once all was excitement. Captain Wallace 
 prepared to go with his handful of men to the top of the 
 mountain to assist Colonel Zinn, and a number — some 
 half dozen men — who resided in the village, agreed to 
 accompany him. Those who volunteered to go, armed 
 themselves with old muskets, which were formerly used 
 by a volunteer company. Before starting, Captain Wal- 
 lace sent his flag to prevent its being captured to Fort 
 Littleton in charge of a detachment of his command. It 
 was supposed, of course, that Colonel Moss would take 
 his regiment out to help dispute the passage of the moun- 
 tain by the Confederates, but for reasons best known to 
 himself he headed his men westward and marched away 
 from the foe. One of his men, however, Lieutenant 
 McDonald, declared that he was not going to run away, 
 and he accompanied Captain Wallace. As this little 
 company reached the foot of the mountain, it met 
 Colonel Zinn's regiment on the retreat. Wallace halted 
 and begged Zinn to remain with him, but his course, like 
 Colonel Moss', was westwardly,away from the approaching 
 foe. A young man by the name of Freeburn, of Lewis- 
 
BATTLE OF NORTH MOUNTAIN. 149 
 
 town, Pennsylvania, however, agreed to go with Wal- 
 lace's band, and he and Lieutenant McDonald, both well 
 mounted, consented to act as scouts, and rode forward to 
 discover the whereabouts of the enemy. When the scouts 
 first saw the enemy he was well down on the east side 
 of the mountain, so that Colonel Zinn, had he remained, 
 would have had plenty of time to have posted his men 
 strongly; and had Colonel Moss and Zinn both remained, 
 that Confederate brigade might not have crossed the moun- 
 tain that day, and there would be a page in the history 
 of the war which would record the battle of the North 
 Mountain as a twin to the battle of the South Mountain. 
 When about half way up the mountain Captain Wallace 
 divided his men into live squads and placed them about 
 sixty feet apart, and about the same distance above the 
 pike. In a short time the two scouts came dashing by, 
 pursued by the Confederates who opened lire upon them. 
 Young Freeburn was wounded, but succeeded in making 
 his escape. After several hundred of the enemy had passed 
 Captain Wallace opened fire upon them, when they called 
 a halt and demanded a surrender of the attacking party. 
 They also returned the fire, the bullets striking the bushes 
 and rocks like hail. Finally they threw out flanking par- 
 ties, which soon almost surrounded the little band, when 
 the whole command took to their heels, each man taking 
 care of himself. The party became scattered, some of 
 them being within the Confederate lines for several days. 
 All, however, finally escaped. 
 
 Colonel Moss was an efficient and brave officer, and his 
 regiment which was with Milroy at Winchester and had 
 escaped to Bloody Run, had seen considerable service and 
 
150 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 proven its bravery. He doubtless felt that be bad suf- 
 ficient reasons for avoiding a conflict with the enemy on 
 this occasion. The only place where a .successful stand 
 could have been made was upon the mountain, but what 
 could cavalry do in such a place? Had they been armed 
 with carbines and fought as infantry, they might have 
 been successful. Sabres and pistols would have been of 
 but little avail in such a place. Then, too, Colonel Moss 
 knew that but little reliance could be placed upon the raw 
 and inexperienced men of Colonel Zinn's command in a 
 battle with the tried veterans of General Stewart. As for 
 the effort made by Captain Wallace with his thirty or 
 thirty -five men, we are compelled rather to call in ques- 
 tion his judgment than to admire his courage. It was rash 
 and imprudent, and jeopardized the lives of men too brave 
 and patriotic to be unnecessarily sacrificed. 
 
 The only casualty upon the Federal side in this affair 
 was the slight wounding of Lieutenant Freeburn. It was 
 claimed that several of the Confederates were killed and a 
 number wounded. This is extremely doubtful. Indeed, 
 the Confederates afterward during their occupancy of 
 McConnellsburg spoke of the affair as of but little import- 
 ance, and without loss to them. It was also claimed that 
 the first blood shed upon the soil of Pennsylvania during* 
 the rebellion was at this engagement. This, too, is in- 
 correct. This honor belongs to the engagement which 
 occurred on the Monday previous near Greencastle. This 
 affair then, if it is worthy of the name of a battle, may be 
 called the battle of North. Mountain. 
 
 Undue importance has been given to the affair on the 
 2Torth Mountain in its relation to the intentions of the 
 
THE OBJECT OF THIS EXPEDITION. 151 
 
 enemy in this movement. It was supposed that the object 
 of this expedition across the mountain into Fulton County 
 was to advance up the valley to Mount Union and burn 
 the bridges and tear up the track of the Pennsylvania 
 Railroad at that place and about the Narrows east of Lewis- 
 town, for the purpose of preventing the moving of troops 
 and supplies over that road, and that the check received on 
 the mountain defeated that purpose. In this view of the 
 •case General Couch, who commanded the Department of 
 the Susquehanna, issued a complimentary order to the 
 company, and the directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad 
 further complimented them with a resolution of thanks. It 
 may be safely assumed that the only object the enemy had 
 in view was to look after the troops of Milroy's command, 
 which had escaped from Winchester and had crossed the 
 Potomac at the lower end of this valley. These, it would 
 be supposed, might operate upon the left Hank of the main 
 column of the invading army; and it was doubtless to 
 prevent this that this lateral movement was made. Had a 
 raid upon the railroad at Mount Union been contemplated, 
 the Confederate commanders were too shrewd to detach 
 infantry to effect that object. By the time they could 
 have traversed the thirty miles from McConnellsburg up 
 the valley, forces could have been concentrated tollefeat the 
 movement, as well as cut to pieces the whole force before 
 it could have regained the main column. If the destruc- 
 tion of the railroad was in the programme at all, Imbo- 
 den's command of cavalry would undoubtedly have been 
 chosen. They had been engaged in a similar work along 
 the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, from Cum- 
 berland to Hancock, and within a short time after the de- 
 
152 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 parture of Stewart's command, this formidable force crossed 
 the Potomac near that place into southern Pennsylvania. 
 After the short delay occasioned by the affair with Cap- 
 tain Wallace's company, just related, Stewart's command 
 resumed its march and reached McConnellsburg soon after 
 dark. When about a half mile east of the place a line of 
 battle was formed and the cavalry dashed into the town. 
 They expected to find Milroy's force there. As soon as 
 the infantry had entered the town it was placed under 
 guard and the citizens were ordered to remain in their 
 houses. A few, however, who were anxious to see what 
 was going on, ventured out into the streets, and were 
 arrested and held for awhile. The invaders disturbed 
 nothing during the night, but in the morning they entered 
 the stores and shops and helped themselves to whatever 
 they wanted, in some cases paying in Confederate scrip. 
 About one third of the cavalry went north up the val- 
 ley as far as Burnt Cabins, gathering horses from the 
 farmers along the way, and picking up others which had 
 been sent from Franklin County for safety. From Burnt 
 Cabins they re-crossed the mountain by Fannettsburg, and 
 thence on to Chambersburg, where they rejoined the main 
 column. In passing out of Horse Valley by the Strasburg 
 Pass, this force came near getting into collision with some 
 of the mountaineers who had fortified the pass, but were 
 absent from their works when these men passed out over 
 the mountain. The infantry and the remainder of the 
 cavalry remained in and about McConnellsburg until early 
 on Friday morning when they finally left, re -crossing the 
 North Mountain by the Loudon road and rejoining the 
 column at Chambersbursr. 
 
CONFEDERATE COURT MARTIAL. 153 
 
 This day the corps of Generals Hill and Longstreet 
 crossed the Potomac — the former at Shepherdstown, and 
 the latter, with the supply trains, at "Williamsport. These 
 two corps formed a junction at Hagerstown. 
 
 Thursday, 25. On the morning of this day General 
 Ewell removed his head - quarters from the Franklin Hotel 
 in Chambersburg to a Mennonite church, which stands in 
 the midst of a beautiful grove, one mile north of the town, 
 along the pike leading to Harrisburg. At this place there 
 was held on that day a court-martial for the trial of four 
 persons for breaches of discipline. The following is the 
 official order concerning that trial: 
 
 Head - Quarters Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 June 25th, '63. 
 General Order No. jr. 
 
 I. Before the military court, convened at the headquarters of the army- 
 corps of Lieutenant - General R. S. Fwell, and of which court Colonel R. H. 
 Lee is presiding judge, were arraigned and tried. (The specifications in the 
 various cases being lengthy and minute, are omitted.) 
 
 1st. Lieutenant J. B. Countiss, Twenty -first Georgia Regiment. 
 
 Charge I. Drunkenness on duty. 
 
 Charge II. Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline. 
 
 Finding: Of the specifications of first charge, guilty. 
 
 Of the first charge, guilty. 
 
 Of the specifications of the second charge, guilty. 
 
 Of the second charge, guilty. 
 
 Sentence: And the court do therefore sentence the said Lieutenant J. B. 
 Countiss, Twenty - first Georgia Regiment, to be cashiered. 
 
 2nd. Private Charles Smith, Company C, Forty -fifth North Carolina Regi- 
 ment. 
 
 Charge : Desertion. 
 
 Finding : Of the specification, guilty. 
 
 Of the charge, not guilty, but 
 
 Of absence without leave, guilty. 
 
 Sentence : And the court do therefore sentence the said private Charles 
 Smith, Company C, Forty -fifth North Carolina Regiment, to forfeit three 
 
154 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 months'pay, and to be branded on the left hip with the letter S, two inches 
 in length, in the presence of his regiment. 
 
 3d. Private Louis M. Waynock, Company B, Forty- fifth Regiment. 
 
 Charge : Desertion. 
 
 Finding : Of the specification, guilty. 
 
 Of the charge — not guilty, but 
 
 Of absence without leave, guilty. 
 
 Sentence : And the court do therefore sentence the said Louis M. Waynock, 
 Company B, Forty -fifth North Carolina Regiment, to forfeit three months' 
 pay, and to be branded on the left hip with the letter S, two inches in length, 
 in the presence of his regiment. 
 
 4th. Private Patrick Heme, Company C, Fifth Alabama Regiment. 
 
 Charge: Violation of 9th Article of War. 
 
 Finding : Of the specification, guilty. 
 
 Of the charge, guilty. 
 
 Sentence : And the court do therefore sentence the said Patrick Heme, 
 Company C, Fifth Alabama Regiment, to forfeit his pay for three months, to 
 perform extra police and fatigue duty for two months, and to be bucked two 
 hours each day, for seven days. 
 
 II. The proceedings, findings and sentence in the case of Lieutenant J. B. 
 Countiss, Twenty- first Georgia Regiment, are approved, and the sentence 
 will be carried into effect ; and Lieutenant J. B. Countiss ceases, from this 
 date, to be an officer of the Confederate States Army. He will be enrolled 
 and conscripted by his brigade commander, and will be allowed to join any 
 company in his present brigade that he may select. 
 
 The proceedings, findings and sentence in the cases of private Charles 
 Smith, Company C, Forty -fifth North Carolina Regiment, and Louis M. Way- 
 nock, Company B, Forty - fifth North Carolina Regiment, are approved, and 
 the sentences will be carried into effect, except so much of them as inflict the 
 punishment of branding, which is hereby remitted. 
 
 The proceedings, findings and sentence in the case of private Patrick 
 Heme, Company C, Fifth Alabama Regiment, are approved, and the sentence 
 will be carried into effect. 
 
 By command of Lieutenant - General R. S. Ewell. 
 
 A. S. Pendleton, A. A. General. 
 
 The superior discipline of the Southern army will be 
 seen in this, that officers in command were promptly cash- 
 iered for drunkenness, and not permitted to remain in. 
 
FURNISHING SUPPLIES. 155 
 
 positions whicn would endanger others. And when cash- 
 iered the j were not permitted to resign their commissions, 
 or leave the army and return to civil life, but were reduced 
 to the ranks and compelled to do service in that humble 
 position. If that kind of discipline had prevailed in the 
 Union army there would have been fewer disasters from 
 the use of intoxicating liquors. The penalty inflicted 
 upon others for the violations of the rules of war, as stated 
 in the charges and specifications given, requiring the for- 
 feiture of three months pay, did not amount to much, for 
 the pay of a private soldier in Confederate scrip was worth 
 only the value of the paper it was printed on. For the 
 benefit of those who do not know what "bucking" is, I 
 will state that it consisted in tying a person's hands to- 
 gether and closing his arms around his knees and passing 
 & stick through to keep him in that helpless and ludicrous 
 position. 
 
 Some time during this day two young men — officers 
 connected with the artillery — came with a requisition for 
 all the flannels and other woolen goods we had, suitable 
 for making cartridges for cannon. "We having previously 
 removed everything of value out of the store, they found 
 only a few remnants which we did not think worth secret- 
 ing. These they had me to measure for them, one of them 
 noting down the lengths. When asked the price I told him 
 I should have a dollar a yard, counting upon Confederate 
 scrip as the pay. He inquired what we sold them at, say- 
 ing they would not allow me more for them than our usual 
 price, for their money was as good as ours, and if it was 
 not they intended to make it so before leaving the State. 
 After striking an average price he wrote and gave me a 
 
156 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 paper of which the following is a correct copy, — the origi- 
 nal I yet have in my possession : 
 
 r I hereby certify that I have received of J. Hoke & Co., merchants, Cham- 
 
 bersburg, Pa., this 25th day of June, 1863, and in accordance with General 
 
 Order No. 72, Head -quarters, and have furnished duplicate vouchers, 9 (nine) 
 
 yards flannel at 63^ cents per yard, $5.90. 
 
 John M. Gregory, Jr., 
 
 First Lieut, and Ord. officer Art'y 2nd Corps. 
 
 Throughout the clay there were numerous calls made 
 upon us for tea for the hospitals, castile soap, etc., all of 
 which wore paid for in Confederate scrip. The officers 
 with whom we had dealings were in every case courteous 
 and gentlemanly. Some of the privates, however, when 
 they had access to the store were the reverse, and unlike 
 the officers, who invariably asked for what they desired 
 to purchase, went searching through the store, opening 
 drawers, and looking for concealed goods. These always 
 examined our fire -proof safe, which, to prevent its being- 
 broken open, was unlocked and its contents removed. 
 Frecmcntly when articles were asked for, which we had 
 secreted or sent away, the almost universal remark was, 
 " Well, we will get these things when we get to Philadel- 
 phia, or Baltimore, or Washington." Some would inquire, 
 "Do you think the merchants of Harrisburg have sent 
 off their goods, too?" Occasionally efforts were made, as 
 we believed, to ascertain whether we had actually sent our 
 goods away, or had hidden them. A citizen would come 
 to us and say that colonel, or major, or captain so-and-so- 
 had desired him to procure for him a web of shirting, or 
 something of the kind, for his own family use, and if we 
 would furnish it he would pay for it in gold. Our reply 
 always was, "We have these things hidden away in a 
 

 MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMIES. 157 
 
 beer vault and can not get at them; besides this, if we 
 would furnish these things it would reveal the fact that 
 goods are in town, and a general search might be ordered." 
 
 In the morning of this day Johnson's division com- 
 menced passing through the town, and throughout the 
 whole of it until evening, regiment after regiment, and 
 brigade after brigade of infantry, with long trains of artil- 
 lery, wagons, and ambulances passed through Chambers- 
 burg and on down the Ilarrisburg pike and encamped 
 about Shirk's Hill. 
 
 Hill's corps marched from Ilagerstown and encamped 
 / over night between Greencastle and Chambersburg. 
 
 General Early, on this day, rode from his encampment 
 at Greenwood to General Ewell's head - quarters, one mile 
 north of Chambersburg, to consult with him as to his fu- 
 ture course. He was directed to proceed on the following 
 morning by way of Gettysburg to York, break up the 
 Northern Central Railroad, seize the bridge across the 
 Susquehanna at "Wrightsville, and wait there for further 
 orders. 
 
 As soon as the Confederate forces began to pass through 
 Chambersburg, we saw the propriety of sending informa- 
 tion of their number and movements to the authorities 
 at Harrisburg. This we could do by eluding the pickets 
 north of the town, crossing the North Mountain into 
 the valley beyond, and thence passing up to about New- 
 port, on the Pennsylvania Railroad, about forty miles 
 above Harrisburg. To communicate directly with "Wash- 
 ington we could not, but as telegraphic communications 
 from the capital of our State to the National Capital were 
 uninterrupted, we knew that to send information to the 
 
158 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 former would insure its transmission where most needed. 
 In accordance with our purpose, then, to keep our authori- 
 ties well informed, a number of our citizens made careful 
 estimates of the number of troops and guns that daily 
 passed through the town. ' This information, with the 
 directions taken by the troops, was carried to Ilarris- 
 burg by a number of young men of Chambersburg and 
 Franklin County. Hon. F. M. Kimmell, at one time the 
 presiding judge of this district, and who had acted as pro- 
 vost-marshal during the time Chambersburg was nnder 
 martial law in 1862, had been directed by Governor Curtin 
 to exercise a general supervision here during the war. 
 This fact was unknown to us, yet by general consent we 
 co - operated with him in collecting and forwarding infor- 
 mation. The judge invariably wrote the dispatches. These 
 were small slips of paper about an inch or two square, and 
 simply stated the number of troops and guns that passed 
 that day, and the route they took. Messages were in some 
 cases carried verbally, and whenever anything which we 
 considered of special importance occurred, we made it a 
 point to dispatch a messenger as soon as possible. Several 
 of these special occasions, with the perilous trips of the 
 scouts, will hereafter be given. In the lapse of time since 
 the war I am unable to remember the names of all the 
 heroic young men who rendered such valuable service to 
 their country. The following were some of them : Shearer 
 Houser, Benjamin S. lluber, J. Porter Brown, Anthony 
 Hollar, Sellers Montgomery, T. J. Grimeson, Stephen "W". 
 Pomeroy, and Mr. Kinney. The archives of the Govern- 
 ment contain the names of all who rendered this service, 
 for, in addition to procuring the services of a scout when 
 
EXPERIENCES OF FEDERAL SCOUTS. 159 
 
 one was specially needed, it fell to the writer's lot to fur- 
 nish them with money to defray their traveling expenses, 
 which, with an additional sum to each one, was refunded 
 to him by General Couch when he moved his head-quarters 
 to Chambers!} urg, after the battle of Gettysburg. 
 
 Some of the scouts who made these perilous journeys 
 to Harrisburg had narrow escapes. In almost every case 
 they were either chased, fired upon, or captured in passing 
 through the Confederate lines. When capture seemed 
 inevitable they would chew and swallow their dispatch. 
 This was sometimes inserted in the end of a plug of to- 
 bacco, which could be conveniently bitten off, or in the 
 boots, or somewhere about the clothing. Various devices 
 were resorted to to throw the Confederates off their guard 
 in case of capture. A bundle with two or three dirty 
 shirts and as many pair of socks, would be carried along, 
 and the enemy were made believe that the bearer was an 
 unsophisticated country school - master going home to get 
 his clothes washed. This ruse was successfully played by 
 Mr. Kinney, the principal of the academy at Chambers- 
 burg. He and Mr. A. Hollar were caught some six or eight 
 miles from town on the morning of Sunday, June 28th, 
 while bearing a dispatch of great importance, and having 
 swallowed the small piece of paper on which it was writ- 
 ten, they affected ignorance of what was going on, and 
 said they were engaged in teaching school and were going 
 home to get some washing done. The ruse took and they 
 were allowed to proceed. Having reached the pass of the 
 mountain at Strasburg, Mr. Hollar returned to town, leav- 
 ing Mr. Kinney to proceed alone, but when passing up 
 through Perry County he was arrested by some Federal 
 

 160 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 soldiers, who refused to believe his story that he had im- 
 portant information and took him a prisoner to Harris- 
 burg, supposing him to be a spy. At the capital he 
 established his identity and delivered his message. 
 
 All of us who were engaged in this work of communi- 
 cating with our authorities were aware that according to 
 the laws of war, our lives would be forfeited in case we 
 were detected, but we were careful to do our work so as to 
 avoid suspicion. On one occasion General Couch sent us 
 this message by one of our scouts : " Tell the gentlemen 
 who are engaged in sending us this information that what 
 they are doing is of great importance, and I hope they 
 will continue it, but they must exercise the greatest cau- 
 tion, for if they are detected they will surely be executed." 
 
 Friday, 26. This day was fraught with great events, 
 and stands marked in the history of Chambersburg. This 
 will appear in the following facts: 
 
 At an early hour in the morning of this day — Hill's 
 corps being close at hand — Rodes' division left its en- 
 campment about Shirk's Hill, where it had been since the 
 "Wednesday preceding, and moved on down the Harris- 
 burg road. Throughout the whole of this day, until after 
 dark, the road was lined with soldiers, cannon, and wagon 
 trains. This division encamped that night somewhere 
 about Newville. Johnson's division, following Rodes, 
 moved but a short distance below Greenvillage. 
 
 About eight o'clock in the morning Heth's division of 
 Hill's corps entered the town, but, instead of following 
 Rodes and Johnson down the Harrisburg pike, turned east 
 in the diamond, or public square, and proceeded on out the 
 Gettysburg road and encamped near Fayetteville. About 
 
lee's entrance into chambersburg. 161 
 
 nine o'clock a. m., General A. P. Hill, the commander of 
 the Third Corps, attended by one or two of his staff, came 
 in. Dismounting in the diamond and hitching his horse 
 in front of a grocery store, the general entered into con- 
 versation with one of our citizens. As General Hill had 
 at one time been stationed at the United States Barracks 
 at Carlisle, he inquired of the citizen concerning a number 
 of persons with whom he had been acquainted at that 
 place. The citizen gave him whatever information he 
 could, and then inquired of him when he expected Gen- 
 eral Lee to arrive. Hill replied, "I am expecting him 
 every moment." Casting his eyes up Main Street, he said, 
 "There he conies, now." The citizen,— Mr. Bishop, the 
 photographer, — at once set out for his photograph gal- 
 lery, and having made everything ready to take a pic- 
 ture of the general when he should arrive, threw open 
 his window and pushed the camera out. This attracted 
 the attention of some soldiers and teamsters, who were 
 sitting along the curbstones, and they rose to their feet, 
 exclaiming, " See, we are going to have our pictures taken." 
 This unexpected occurrence prevented Mr. Bishop from 
 executing his purpose, which is deeply to be regretted, for 
 the occasion was one worthy the genius of the best artist. 
 General Hill seemed to be a man of splendid physique. 
 Of ordinary height, his figure was slight but athletic, 
 and his carriage erect. His dress was the ordinary Con- 
 federate gray, and was plain and without ornament, 
 except the stars upon the collar of his coat, which desig- 
 nated his rank. His appearance indicated a man of ro- 
 bust health, and one who cared not for the tinsel of 
 
 military trappings, or the honors of his high position. 
 11 
 
162 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 He fell upon April 2d, 1865, when General Grant broke 
 the Confederate lines about Petersburg. 
 
 Returning to the second story of my dwelling, on the 
 north -east corner of the diamond, where I hud been to 
 take a look at General Hill, I found there a number of 
 the ministers of the town. They had been in the habit 
 of meeting there to look upon the hosts of invaders, for 
 from the windows of that room an uninterrupted view 
 could be had of Main Street, from the Reformed Church 
 to the Presbyterian, at the lower end. Seeing a group of 
 about fifteen or twenty finely mounted horsemen coming 
 over the brow of the hill, opposite the Reformed Church, 
 I called the attention of the persons present to them, when 
 one of them exclaimed, " That's General Lee and his staff." 
 Snatching our hats we made rapid strides down the stairs 
 and out into the diamond to see them enter. Taking a 
 position in front of the printing establishment of the Re- 
 formed Church, then known as the Mansion House, I 
 watched the entrance of these men and the memorable 
 scenes which there transpired. Lee and his staff stopped 
 directly in front of where I stood. General Hill had, upon 
 perceiving the approach of General Lee, mounted his 
 horse, and riding slowly toward him, held his hat grace- 
 fully above his head. The two generals — Lee and Hill — 
 then rode a short distance away from the group, and held 
 a short, whispered consultation. As a large part of lleth's 
 division of Hill's corps had already passed through Cham- 
 bersburg, not following the two divisions of E well's corps 
 down the valley toward Harrisburg, but turning eastward 
 and going out on the pike leading to Gettysburg, I con- 
 cluded that if Lee followed in the same direction, Balti- 
 
164 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 more and Washington were his destination. "With this 
 impression upon my mind, I watched with intense interest 
 the result of the council then taking place, and, observing 
 Mr. Benjamin S. Iluher, who resided a few miles from 
 town, standing by my side, and remembering that he had 
 been sent a few days before with a message to Ilarrisburg, 
 and that he could be relied upon for any duty, I said to 
 him, " There, Ben, is perhaps the most important council 
 in the history of this war, and the fate of the Government 
 may depend upon it. If General Lee goes on down the 
 valley, then Ilarrisburg and Philadelphia are threatened; 
 if he turns cast, Baltimore and Washington are in danger, 
 and the Government ought to know which way he goes as 
 soon as possible." To this Huber replied, " Well, I have 
 just got back from Ilarrisburg and I am tired, but as soon 
 as he starts so that I can see which way he goes, I will be 
 off again for Ilarrisburg." In a short time the council 
 between the two generals ended, and Hill falling back and 
 Lee riding in advance, the whole cavalcade moved forward. 
 Reaching nearly the middle of the diamond, where the 
 road leading to Ilarrisburg is crossed at right angles by 
 the pike leading to Gettysburg and Baltimore, Lee drew 
 the right-hand rein and his horse turned eastward. Look- 
 ing around for Huber, I saw him elbowing his way through 
 the crowd of citizens to convey this important informa- 
 tion to Harrisburg. The following is his own account of 
 his trip: 
 
 " I struck at once across the country for Roxbury, at 
 the base of the North Mountain, and as I was acquainted 
 with every foot of the way, I had no difficulty in eluding 
 the rebel pickets. At Roxbury I secured the services of 
 
MR. HUBER REPORTS AT HARRISBURG. 165 
 
 Mr. S. L. Sentman (the same who a few days later fur- 
 nished. Mr. S. "W". Pomeroy with a horse), and under his 
 guidance — he being mounted and I on foot — we passed 
 through the gap into Dothan Valley. We had to cross 
 Trout Run several times, and as I was walking and had to 
 wade it, the water came up nearly to my knees. When 
 we reached Amberson's Valley, Mr. Sentman left me, and 
 I pursued my way alone, and passed into Perry County 
 near Germantown. Upon entering Amberson's Valley, I 
 pressed a horse, and at Germantown I had my horse fed 
 and got my supper. Here I came near being arrested as a 
 rebel spy, but I was at length allowed to proceed. About 
 eight o'clock I left Germantown for Newport, some forty- 
 two miles distant. This distance I rode in about seven 
 hours without dismounting. Arriving at Newport, on the 
 Pennsylvania Railroad, about forty miles above Harris- 
 burg, near three o'clock in the morning, I put my horse 
 at a hotel, and, a train coining along soon after, I took 
 passage for the capital. Shortly after daylight we reached 
 Harrisburg, and when I got out of the car I met Hon. 
 D. W. Rowe, then in the military service, now judge 
 of this district. I told Judge Rowe the news I brought, 
 when he at once conducted me to the capitol. Upon en- 
 tering one of the rooms I found myself in the presence of 
 a number of distinguished persons, among whom were 
 Governor Curtin, General Couch, and General Smith. 
 After telling them my statement I was put through a close 
 examination by one of the generals — General Smith, I 
 think it was. After the close of the examination the gen- 
 eral said, 'Well, gentlemen, the information this young 
 man brings is of the most vital importance, if we can rely 
 
166 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION". 
 
 upon it.' William McClellan, Esq., at that time a promi- 
 nent attorney here, with whom I was well acquainted, 
 happening to be present, said, * Gentlemen, I know this 
 young man; you can rely upon every word he says.' After 
 a short consultation between the governor and the mili- 
 tary men, dispatches were hurriedly written and the tele- 
 graph operators in the room were set to work. After a 
 
 BENJAMIN S. HTTBER, 
 
 The scout who bore to the authorities the first intelligence of the direction General 
 Lee and staff were going. (From a photograph taken during the war.) 
 
 little while I arose to leave, when the governor took me 
 by the hand, thanking me for the information I had 
 brought, and gave me a paper entitling me to return free 
 on the cars to Newport. Returning to Newport I mounted 
 my horse and rode home the way I had come, and upon 
 nearing home I again encountered Confederates, one of 
 
GENERAL LEE. 167 
 
 whom took my hat from my head. Reaching home, I 
 found it empty and deserted. While I was away the Con- 
 federates were swarming all over that part of the country, 
 and my wife becoming alarmed shut up the house and 
 went to a relative of hers. During her absence the Con- 
 federates entered the house and carried off nearly all our 
 clothing, so that I was left without a change of clothing 
 or a hat to replace the one taken from me." 
 
 The authorities at Washington were aware on Saturday, 
 the 27th, that Lee had passed through Chambersburg the 
 day previous, and had gone east. Is it not fair to suppose 
 that this important fact was made known to them by the 
 message carried by Mr. Iluber? 
 
 General Lee, as he sat on his horse that day in the pub- 
 lic square of Chambersburg, looked every inch a soldier. 
 He was at that time about fifty -two years of age, stoutly 
 built, of medium height, hair strongly mixed with gray, 
 and a rough, gray beard, lie wore the usual Confederate 
 gray, with some little ornamentation about the collar of 
 his coat. His hat was a soft black without ornament other 
 than a military cord around the crown. His whole ap- 
 pearance indicated dignity, composure, and disregard for 
 the gaudy trappings of war and the honor attaching to 
 his high station. Any one who had ever seen his picture, 
 as it is found in the various histories of the war, would 
 have had no difficult}' in singling him out in a crowd. 
 General Lee seemed to have not only the most profound 
 respect of his men — officers and privates — but their ad- 
 miration and love. With some few exceptions among the 
 officers, some of whom quietly expressed their feelings to 
 some of our citizens, and seemed to fear that they had 
 
168 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 made a mistake in coming into our State, the whole army 
 had the most unbounded confidence in their commanding 
 general, and would unhesitatingly follow him wherever 
 he would lead them. 
 
 The men composing the general's staff were a splendid 
 looking body. Finely mounted, neatly dressed, and excel- 
 lent in horsemanship, they presented an appearance which 
 those who witnessed them will be likely ever to remember. 
 
 There were with the Confederates, presumably with that 
 group, two officers of the British army and one of the 
 Prussian. Those officers were, no doubt, expecting and 
 desiring to witness the downfall of the Republic. That 
 such was the case with at least one of them — Colonel 
 Freemantle of the British service — is demonstrated in an 
 article he afterward wrote for Blackwood's Magazine, in 
 which he narrates the events of the Pennsylvania cam- 
 paign. His abuse of the people of the border, and of the 
 ladies of Chambersburg, whom he calls "viragoes," his 
 congratulations to General Longstreet upon the apparent 
 success of Pickett's great charge on the afternoon of the 
 third day's battle, and his regret at their repulse, clearly 
 show his hatred of our country and its institutions. We 
 heard at the time of the presence of these foreign officers, 
 but did not distinguish them from others. 
 
 In that group of distinguished men were the brains of 
 the vast, moving host which came swarming through our 
 borders, and while we were inclined to admire their genius, 
 we yet looked upon them as the enemies of our country, and 
 could only hope and pray that they would meet the terrible 
 overthrow which they deserved. In precisely one week 
 from the day of this imposing pageant, our hopes and 
 
GENERAL LEE AT CHAMBERSBURG. 169 
 
 prayers were realized, and the defeated hosts were thrown 
 back from the heights of Gettysburg, and with their 
 crushing defeat commenced the decline and downfall of 
 the cause for which they fought. 
 
 General Lee selected for his head -quarters a grove 
 which then stood along the pike leading to Gettysburg, 
 near the eastern edge of Chambersburg. It was once 
 known as " Shetter's Woods," but afterward as "Messer- 
 smith's "Woods," after the late George R. Messersmith, 
 Esq., who at the time referred to owned it. It was for 
 many years the place where picnics and Fourth of July 
 celebrations were held. The Centennial Anniversary of 
 American Independence, on July 4th, 1876, was held 
 there. The grove has recently been cut down, and the 
 place is now a cultivated field. It was a beautiful loca- 
 tion, and from Friday, June 26th, to Tuesday morning, 
 30th, General Lee and his staff tarried there. There 
 he held his councils of war, there he received reports 
 from the various parts of his vast army, and there he 
 planned and ordered an attack on the capital of our 
 State, and there on the night of Monday, 29th, when 
 Longstreet's scout brought information of the where- 
 abouts of the Army of the Potomac, he recalled that 
 order and decided to cross the South Mountain and tight 
 a battle upon the direct line to Baltimore and Washing- 
 ton. Other acts of importance which transpired upon 
 this historic spot during those memorable four days of 
 General Lee's residence there, will be given in their ap- 
 propriate places. 
 
 In the morning of this day — Friday, 26th, — Early's di- 
 vision left its camp at Greenwood, where it had remained 
 
170 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 over the previous day, and proceeded by the pike to Get- 
 tysburg on its way to York, according to instructions 
 given General Early by General Ewell at the visit of the 
 former to the latter's head -quarters near Chambersburg 
 the day before. While on their way across the mountain 
 they burned the Caledonia Iron Works, which belonged 
 to Hon. Thaddeus Stevens. These works were situated 
 about two miles east of Greenwood, at the base of the 
 South Mountain, and about ten miles from Chambers- 
 burg. They consisted of a large charcoal furnace, forge, 
 rolling mill, coal house, shops, stables, and other build- 
 ings. On Tuesday, June 16th, as has been said, while 
 Jenkins' cavalry occupied Chambersburg, a marauding 
 party visited these works, and upon the condition that 
 they should be spared, all the horses and mules belong- 
 ing to the premises were delivered to them. Hon. John 
 Sweeney, Mr. Stevens' business manager, says that he had 
 an interview with General Early, as he sat upon his horse 
 that day, and endeavored to dissuade him from executing 
 his threat to destroy these works. He told him that so far 
 as Mr. Stevens was concerned, he would be better off if 
 his works had been destroyed ten years before, but for 
 the sake of the many poor people who were dependent 
 upon them for support, and would be thrown out of em- 
 ployment if they were destroyed, he should spare them. 
 To this appeal General Early replied, " That is not the way 
 Yankees do business. They do not go on unless they make 
 money. Then, Mr. Stevens is an enemy of the South. 
 He is in favor of confiscating their property and arm- 
 ing the negroes. His property must be destroyed." 
 General Early then specially detailed Colonel French to 
 
EARLY AT GETTYSBURG. 171 
 
 apply the torch, and the whole was soon a mass of smoul- 
 dering ruins.* 
 
 In the afternoon of this day Early's division reached 
 Gettysburg, when a requisition was made upon the authori- 
 ties for sixty barrels of flour, seven thousand pounds of 
 pork or bacon, one thousand two hundred pounds of sugar, 
 one hundred pounds of coifee, one thousand pounds salt, 
 forty bushels onions, one thousand pairs shoes, live hundred 
 hats; or, ten thousand dollars in money. To this demand 
 the town council, through its president, Mr. D. Kendlehart, 
 made the following reply: 
 
 Gettysrurg, June 26th, 1863. 
 General Early: 
 
 Sir — The authorities of the borough of Gettysburg, in answer to the de- 
 mand made by you upon the said borough and county, say that their authority 
 extends but to the borough, and that the requisition asked for can not be 
 given, because it is utterly impossible to comply. The quantities required 
 are far beyond that in our possession. In compliance, however, to the de- 
 
 " :|: "I am indebted to Professor J. Fraise Richard, the historian, for a copy of a 
 letter from General Early to him, in response to an inquiry as to his reasons 
 for destroying Mr. Stevens' iron works. General Early says in his letter 
 from Eynchburg, Virginia, May 7th, 1886: 
 
 "No column of our troops was sent to burn the iron works of Thaddeus 
 Stevens, near Greenwood, in the campaign into Pennsylvania, in 1863. My 
 division of Swell's corps was ordered to move along the western base of 
 South Mountain until it came to the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, 
 which I did, passing through Waynesborough and one or two smaller villages. 
 I found the iron works above mentioned on the road aforesaid, where it be- 
 gins to ascend the South Mountain, and they were burned by my order, and 
 on my own responsibility. My reasons for giving the order were founded on 
 the fact that the Federal troops had invariably burned such works in the 
 South, wherever they had penetrated, and notably among them the iron 
 works of Hon. John Bell, of Tennessee, who was the Constitutional candi- 
 date for the presidency in 1860, and who was too old to take any part in the 
 war then pending. Moreover, in some speeches in congress, Mr. Stevens 
 had exhibited a most vindictive spirit toward the people of the South, as he 
 continued to do to the day of his death. This burning was simply in retalia- 
 tion for various deeds of barbarity perpetrated by Federal troops in some of 
 the Southern States, as was the subsequent burning of Chambersburg in 1S64. 
 " Respectfully yours, etc., J. A. Early." 
 
172 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 inands we will request the stores to be opened and the citizens to furnish 
 whatever they can of such provisions, etc., as may be asked. Further we 
 can not promise. 
 
 By authority of the council of the borough of Gettysburg, I hereunto, as 
 president of said Board, attach my name. D. Kendlehart. 
 
 General Early's orders required him to proceed without 
 delay to York, and as no response was made to his requi- 
 sition, it was not pressed. Leaving him en route to that 
 place, we again turn our attention to our southern border 
 and note some events transpiring there. 
 
 Previous to crossing the Potomac, General Lee had sent 
 General Imboden with his cavalry, consisting of about 
 thirty -three hundred men, to break up the Baltimore and 
 Ohio Railroad in order to prevent any forces from the 
 West from coming in from that direction upon his rear. 
 Starting in at Cumberland, Maryland, he moved east- 
 wardly along the railroad, doing considerable damage to 
 the track, bridges, and depots, as well as the canal boats 
 and locks of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, as far down 
 as Martinsburg. After the execution of this work he 
 crossed the Potomac, either on this day or the preceding 
 one, at Cherry Run Ford, a point about eight miles east 
 of Hancock. From this ford the main part of his force 
 came up into and through Little Cove, in the southern 
 part of the (Franklin) county to the Cove Gap. At the 
 Maryland line a detachment left this body, and following 
 up Licking Creek entered the Great Cove and passed up 
 to "Webster Mills, six miles south of McConnellsburg in 
 Fulton County, and thence crossed the mountain by Hun- 
 ter's Road and rejoined the main body at the gap. While 
 in the cove this force did great damage. The farmers lost 
 nearly all their stock, and Robinson's store at Big Cove 
 
MILITIA MOVEMENTS. 173 
 
 Tannery, and Patterson's at Webster Mills, were com- 
 pletely stripped of their contents. In many cases houses 
 were entered and private property taken. Promising 
 the reader that he will hear from these men again, we 
 leave them in their camps at the Cove Gap, east of the 
 North Mountain, and at Mercersburg, three miles further 
 to the east. 
 
 On the evening of this day Longstreet's corps encamped 
 about four miles south of Greencastle. Hood's division, 
 and probably one other, came directly from Williamsport 
 by the pike leading to the former place. 
 
 Saturday, 27. At about ten o'clock in the forenoon of 
 this day Jenkins' cavalry entered and passed through Car- 
 lisle, and went into camp at Kingston, thirteen miles from 
 Harrisburg. In the afternoon Iiodes' division of infantry 
 entered and took possession of the place, encamping be- 
 tween it and Kingston. 
 
 General Knipe, who commanded the advanced Federal 
 troops in the valley, steadily fell back from Shippensburg, 
 where he rallied the frightened New York militia previously 
 spoken of, to about two miles south of Carlisle, at which 
 place he intended to make a stand against the advancing 
 foe. Ritle pits were prepared, in which he was assisted 
 by citizens of the town, several hundred of whom were 
 under arms to assist in the defense of the place. But hav- 
 ing received on Wednesday night information of the ap- 
 proach of Rodes' division, he prudently fell back toward 
 Harrisburg. That Johnson's division, if it left its encamp- 
 ment about Greenvillage at all until it left for Gettysburg 
 on the Tuesday morning following, did not go much further 
 down the valley, is proved in the fact that when the con- 
 
174 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 centration commenced, it marched from its camp to Green- 
 wood in a single day. This march, which was made 
 directly across the county by the roads, which are not 
 always good, might have been made from the neighbor- 
 hood of Shippensburg, but not any further down the 
 valley. 
 
 As previously [stated, on the preceding day Heth's di- 
 / vision of Hill's corps passed through Chambersburg and 
 J on out east to Fayetteville, where it encamped. Follow- , 
 ing this division during the afternoon of the same day and ] 
 the forepart of the day following — Saturday, the 27th, — / 
 were Pender's and Anderson's divisions — Pender in ad- 
 vance. Throughout the entire afternoon of the day, and 
 x ) until late in the evening, the three divisions of Longstreet's 
 / corps passed through and went on out the Harrisburg pike, 
 / turning off at the Mennonite Church, where General Ewell 
 / had his head - quarters a few days before, and went into 
 / camp along the east bank of the Conococheague Creek. 
 Hood's division encamped on the farm of Mr. Peter Leh- 
 man, two and a half miles north-east of Chambersburg; 
 Pickett's division upon Mr. John !N". Long's farm, and 
 McLaws' still further up along the creek. 
 
 On this day General Lee at his head -quarters near 
 Chambersburg issued the following general order: 
 
 Head - quarters Army Northern Virginia, 
 
 Chambersburg, Pa., June 27th, 1863. 
 General Order, No. yj. , 
 
 The commanding- general has observed with marked satisfaction the con- 
 ducfl of the troops on the march, and confidently anticipates results com- 
 mensurate with the high spirit they have manifested. 
 
 No troops could have displayed greater fortitude, or better performed their 
 arduous marches of the past ten days. 
 
 Their conduct in other respects has, with few exceptions, been in keep- 
 
GENERAL LEE'S HUMANE ORDER. 175 
 
 ing with their character as soldiers, and entitles them to approbation and 
 praise. 
 
 There have, however, been instances of forgetfulness on the part of some 
 that they have in keeping the yet unsullied reputation of this army, and that 
 the duties exacted of us by civilization and Christianity are not less obliga- 
 tory in the country of the enemy than in our own. 
 
 The commanding general considers that no greater disgrace could befall 
 the arm}', and through it, our whole people, than the perpetration of the 
 barbarous outrages upon the unarmed and defenseless, and the wanton de- 
 struction of private property, that have marked the course of the enemy in 
 our own country. 
 
 Such proceedings not only degrade the perpetrators and all connected with 
 them, but are subversive of the discipline and efEciency of the army, and 
 destructive of the ends of our present movement. 
 
 It must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that 
 we can not take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without 
 lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by 
 the atrocities of our enemies, and offending against Him to whom vengeance 
 belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in 
 vain. 
 
 The commanding general, therefore, earnestly exhorts the troops to ab- 
 stain, with most scrupulous care, from unnecessary or wanton injury to 
 private property, and he enjoins upon all officers to arrest and bring to sum- 
 mary punishment all who shall in any way offend against orders on this sub- 
 ject. R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 This. order, unlike the former one issued on the 21st, it 
 will be scon, was written by General Lee himself, and not 
 by his adjutant. The object of the former one was, as has 
 been stated, to prevent the indiscriminate plunder of our 
 people and to confine the demands of the army, and the 
 methods to be employed in securing them, within the 
 limits of civilized warfare. Under the regulations pre- 
 scribed private property was to be respected, and in no 
 case taken except when needed by the army, and then only 
 by officers specially charged for that duty. Candor com- 
 pels me to say that in the main these humane regulations 
 
176 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 were observed. The taking of groceries, provisions, sta- 
 tionery, hardware, clothing, hats, boots and shoes, drugs, 
 horses, cattle, corn, oats, hay, etc., was clearly within the 
 rules of civilized warfare, and nothing more than the 
 Federal army did when in the enemy's country. And hav- 
 ing been recognized as belligerents in the exchange of pris- 
 oners, and in other ways, the Confederates had the right 
 while in our country to the usages accorded to armies in an 
 enemy's country. This, to their credit be it said, they ex- 
 acted of us without many acts of wanton and useless plun- 
 der. Indeed I must say that from all the conceptions I 
 had formed from history of the desolation produced by an 
 invading army — in a civil war especially, which is usually 
 attended with more rancor and bitterness than one be- 
 tween opposing nations — this invasion of our State widely 
 differed. With the exception of a few instances, where 
 stragglers from the main line committed some depreda- 
 tions, private houses were not entered with hostile intent. 
 But one person — a Mr. Strite — was killed. He resided a 
 a few miles south of Chambersburg, and some distance 
 from the main road over which the army passed. "While 
 standing in his yard, in front of his house, three stragglers 
 from Hill's corps came up to him and demanded his money, 
 which he immediately gave them. Soon afterward two 
 more stragglers came and made a similar demand, and 
 having no more to give them, they killed him and con- 
 cealed his body under the manure in the adjoining barn- 
 yard. In a few instances persons were relieved of watches, 
 pocket-books, boots, etc., by stragglers, but never in the 
 presence of an officer. But of all the adepts at appropri- 
 ating hats, some of these Confederate soldiers displayed an 
 
PLUNDER BY THE ARMY. 177 
 
 ingenuity that was indeed remarkable. As they marched 
 along the streets, sometimes close to the pavements, and 
 in a few cases upon them because of the mud, those pos- 
 sessing hats having them crushed into a shapeless mass 
 under their arms, it required but an instant to grab a 
 hat from the wondering on - looker and place it where 
 it could not be recognized by the owner. This was 
 repeatedly done in the presence of officers, who invari- 
 ably tried to have the offending person pointed out, that 
 the stolen property might be restored and the offender 
 punished, but in the similarity of the men and the necessity 
 for the column to keep moving on, not a single one was 
 detected. 
 
 But that the humane intentions of General Lee were 
 not wholly regarded, and acts of plunder were committed, 
 is clearly established by this second order from the com- 
 mander in chief, in which he refers to some acts of dis- 
 obedience and expresses his regret at the same. In further 
 proof of this fact I introduce extracts from a report of 
 the Pennsylvania campaign, written by Colonel Free- 
 mantle, one of the British officers who was with the Con- 
 federate army, and published in Blackwood's Magazine, of 
 September, 1863. Colonel Freemantle says: "So com- 
 pletely was the country through which the Confederate 
 army passed robbed and plundered, that all the cattle and 
 farm horses having been seized by General Ewell, farm 
 labor had come to a complete standstill." In another 
 place the same writer says: "Lee's retreat was encum- 
 bered by Ewell' s immense train of plunder." "Why it was 
 that General Ewell's corps gained this distinction over the 
 other two for its plundering propensities, may probably be 
 
178 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 accounted for in the fact that it always went in advance 
 and left but little for the others to take. 
 
 During the time the Confederate army occupied this 
 valley, marauding parties were sent out into all parts of 
 the country in search of horses. The mountain passes and 
 gaps were especially visited, and every nook and corner 
 from Merccrsburg to Newburg was searched, and many 
 valuable animals were captured and taken away. In two 
 cases armed resistance was made to these marauders. One 
 of these was at what is known as Keefer's Gap. At this 
 place an old path crosses the mountain into Horse Valley. 
 The farmers in the neighborhood of this gap to the num- 
 ber of about twenty or twenty - five formed a camp at this 
 place, erecting several tents, and laying in a stock of pro- 
 visions and food for their horses. They then brought to 
 the place from one hundred to one hundred and twenty- 
 five horses. The men in charge were all well armed and 
 determined to protect their property. Some fifteen or 
 twenty were kept continually on duty while the rest at- 
 tended to the horses and brought in needed supplies. The 
 roads and paths were well guarded, and when a suspicious 
 person would come along, two of the guards would take 
 him in charge and conduct him to the top of the moun- 
 tain, and with orders not to be seen around there any 
 more would let him go. At intervals of about five min- 
 utes a gun was discharged, and in this way a continuous 
 booming was kept up. This deterred the enemy from 
 approaching the place, and while every other gap in the 
 mountain was visited and horses taken, not a visit was 
 made to this place. 
 
 The other instance of armed resistance was at the Stras- 
 
ARMED RESISTANCE. 179 
 
 "burg Pass leading into m Horse Valley. This valley is very 
 narrow and of considerable length, and being surrounded 
 by mountains which are passable only at a few places, 
 resistance seemed to be practicable. Mr. Stephen Keefer, 
 the supervisor of the township, summoned his neighbors, 
 who like himself were all hardy mountaineers, and by 
 felling trees across the road which enters the valley from 
 Loudon at its southern end, effectually closed it against 
 all intruders in that direction. On the top of the moun- 
 tain, covering the approach by the Strasburg road, breast- 
 works of logs and stones, masked by bushes, were erected, 
 and about thirty of the hardy mountaineers with their 
 trusted rifles stood guard. At the upper end of the valley, 
 which was closed by the obstructions already referred to, 
 several hundred valuable horses belonging to the farmers 
 residing there, and to persons east of the mountain, who 
 had sent them there for concealment, were placed. One 
 day the guard was withdrawn for a time, when the de- 
 tachment of about one hundred cavalry, which had left 
 General Stewart's brigade at McConnellsbnrg and proceeded 
 up the valley as far as Burnt Cabins, and recrossed the 
 mountain by Fannettsburg and Horse Valley, and out 
 into the plains to the east by this pass, came along, but 
 found the breastworks empty. Had the mountaineers 
 been at their post a battle would most certainly have 
 taken place, but to the serious loss of those brave de- 
 fenders of their property, for the enemy came upon their 
 entrenchments to the rear. Or had these marauders gone 
 up the valley some six or eight miles, they would have 
 augmented their captures by some two or three hundred 
 horses. The reader might inquire, how did" these invaders, 
 
180 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 unacquainted with these mountain roads, find their way 
 into and out of these intricate places? They had pro- 
 cured maps of our county which they had studied well. 
 And that they were guided by some sympathizer in their 
 cause, of which there were some among us, seems clear 
 from the fact that a man rode with them having his face 
 covered with a handkerchief. That traitorous guide, not- 
 withstanding his disguise, was recognized by some, but fear- 
 ing that they might be mistaken and an innocent person 
 be consigned to eternal infamy, his name was not given. 
 
 In addition to the instances of resistance just given, 
 there were several gallant dashes made upon the Confeder- 
 ate communications by squads of Federal cavalry, which 
 deserve mention. After the main body of the Confederate 
 army had passed, the communications with Virginia were 
 kept open by detachments of cavalry. Ignorant of Lee's 
 destination, and discouraged by the hosts of defiant and 
 boastful Confederates who had passed along, the sur- 
 prise and joy of the people of Greencastle knew no bounds 
 when, on Thursday, July 2d, a company of Union cavalry 
 dashed into that place. These men were under the com- 
 mand of Captain Uhlrick Dahlgreen, who was afterward 
 killed near Richmond. They had come across the mountain 
 from the Federal column by Monterey Pass. If a band 
 of angels had come down into the town they could not 
 have been more unexpected or welcome. It required only 
 a few minutes to apprise the people of their presence, 
 when all Greencastle seemed to be in the 'street. Hats 
 flew into the air and cheer followed cheer. Even the old 
 and staid ministers forgot the proprieties and many wept 
 for joy. Their leader, the gallant Dahlgreen, though a 
 
CAPTAIN DAHLGREN'S EXPLOIT. 181 
 
 mere youth, had the entire confidence of his men, and he 
 seemed to handle them with perfect ease and skill. Cap- 
 tain Dahlgren immediately ordered all the citizens off the 
 streets, and, after hiding his men behind the recesses of 
 the public square, went up into the steeple of the Reformed 
 Church, where, with his glass, he scanned the country for 
 miles around. Perceiving a company of Confederate cav- 
 alry coming from the south, and hurriedly estimating their 
 number, he rapidly descended, and declared his determi- 
 nation to give battle, notwithstanding their number was 
 double that of his own. He hastily placed his men so 
 that the advancing enemy could not see them until they 
 would reach the square, and then, pistol in hand, and 
 leaning forward until he touched his horse's neck, with 
 every nerve strained with eagerness to meet the foe, he 
 waited until they were within a few hundred yards, when 
 the word was given, and with a wild yell, the charge 
 was made upon the astonished and panic stricken enemy. 
 Although from the superior number of the Confederates 
 it was feared that these heroic men would be annihilated, 
 yet they put the enemy to flight, capturing seventeen of 
 their number, three of whom were officers. This party 
 had in charge a mail-bag from Richmond, and in it were 
 found important papers from the Confederate President 
 for General Lee. As soon as the importance of his capture 
 was seen, Dahlgren hastily left by the way he had come. 
 Galloping out the Waynesborough road, he detailed a 
 number of men to remain and barricade it on the hill east 
 of the town to prevent pursuit and recapture. This they 
 did by piling wagons, hay -ladders and other things across 
 the road. The guard, after having erected the barricade 
 
182 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and remained there awhile to resist any pursuit that might 
 be made, at length left and went after their companions. 
 This mail, with the prisoners, was delivered to the Federal 
 army east of the mountain. 
 
 On the morning of Saturday, July 4th, Captain Dahl- 
 gren and his brave band again visited Greencastle, at 
 which time a similar engagement took place. This en- 
 gagement resulted in the capture of seventeen Confederate 
 infantry and seven cavalry, and a number wounded. In 
 both these brilliant affairs the Union soldiers escaped any 
 injury. 
 
 About noon of Wednesday, July 1st, a single Confeder- 
 ate soldier rode into Fayetteville in the direction of Cham- 
 bersburg, when he was halted by a citizen and compelled 
 to surrender, which he did by handing to his captor a small 
 pouch of letters. The courage of the citizen then un- 
 happily failed him and he allowed the soldier to return to 
 General Imboden's camp at Greenwood. The capture of 
 the letters was reported, and in a brief time a detachment 
 of cavalry under command of Captain McNeil, of Vir- 
 ginia, rode into the town and arrested six or seven of the 
 citizens and took them to Imboden's camp. That night 
 the command moved on toward Gettysburg, taking their 
 prisoners with them. After a narrow escape from being 
 hung they were, on the 3d, released and permitted to re- 
 turn to their homes. 
 
 Sunday, 28. At nine o'clock in the morning of this 
 day, the advance guard of Jenkins' cavalry reached Me- 
 chanicsburg, some eight miles from Harrisburg. Two 
 cavalrymen bearing a flag of truce dashed into the town, 
 and, halting in the public square, inquired for the civil 
 
CONFEDERATES AT MECUANICSBURG AND YORK. 183 
 
 authorities, and also demanded the flag which had been 
 floating until a short time before their entrance, which 
 was taken down at the suggestion of some of the Federal 
 cavalry -men as they withdrew from the town. The bur- 
 gess making his appearance, they demanded of him the 
 flag, under the threat that the place would be shelled 
 if their request was not immediately complied with. As 
 there was no alternative the flag was surrendered, and 
 the citizens had the mortification to see one of the Con- 
 federates riding away seated upon it. After satisfying 
 themselves that the town would be surrendered without 
 resistance, the entire Confederate force of cavalry and 
 mounted infantry under General Jenkins, with four pieces 
 of artillery, made their appearance, and passing through 
 the town encamped about one mile out. After seeing his 
 men encamped, Jenkins returned to the town and took up 
 his head -quarters at the Ashland House. Soon after his 
 return he issued a requisition upon the place for fifteen 
 hundred rations to be delivered at the Town Hall within 
 an hour and a half. About two o'clock the general and 
 his staff left town and proceeded to his camp. 
 
 In the morning of this day Early's division, which had 
 left Gettysburg some time on Friday afternoon, reached 
 the town of York. This division had marched from 
 Gettysburg to the latter place by two different roads. One 
 part of the division went by way of East Berlin, while the 
 remainder passed through Hanover to the junction of the 
 Northern Central Railroad, about ten miles from York. 
 The railroad at this place was effectually broken up, thus 
 severing connection with Baltimore by that line. As the 
 division approached York, the burgess, Mr. David Small, 
 
184 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 went out several miles to meet the advancing Confederates 
 and surrender to them the town. Special immunity was 
 expected because of this voluntary surrender, but no 
 sooner were the enemy in possession of the town, than de- 
 mands were made for a large amount of supplies, among 
 which were two hundred barrels of flour, thirty thousand 
 bushels of corn, and one thousand pairs of shoes. This 
 requisition was soon followed by another, demanding the 
 sum of one hundred thousand dollars in cash. The furnish- 
 ing of this money was to be the consideration for sparing 
 the town from plunder and destruction, and notwithstand- 
 ing twenty -eight thousand dollars — all that could bo 
 obtained at the time — were paid over, General Early 
 issued the following order, or address, to the people- 
 
 To the Citizens of York: 
 
 I have abstained from burning the railroad buildings and ear shops in your 
 town, because, after examination, I am satisfied that the safety of the town- 
 would be endangered ; and, acting in the spirit of humanity, which has ever 
 characterized my government and its military authorities, I do not design to. 
 involve the innocent in the same punishment with the guilty. Had I applied 
 the torch without regard to consequences, I would have pursued a course that 
 would have been vindicated as an act of retaliation for the many authorized 
 acts of barbarity perpetrated by your own army upon our soil. But we da 
 not war upon women and children, and I trust the treatment you have met 
 with at the hands of my soldiers will open your eyes to the monstrous in- 
 iquity of the war waged by your government upon the people of the Confed- 
 erate states, and that you will make an effort to shake off the revolting 
 tyranny under which it is apparent to you all you are yourselves undergoing. 
 
 J. A. Early, Maj. Gen. C. S. A. 
 
 If this levy of money upon a defenseless town, which 
 had been surrendered, and which had evinced a meek and 
 unresisting spirit, and in default of its payment the de- 
 clared intention to destroy the place, was at all justifiable, 
 or within the rules of civilized warfare, it would be diffi- 
 
THE SUSQUEHANNA BRIDGES. 185 
 
 cult to see how many of the charges of inhumanity and 
 heartlessness made against Federal officers in the South, 
 can be sustained. Shortly after the entrance of the Con- 
 federates into York, General Gordon was sent with his 
 brigade to Wrightsville, on the west bank of the Susque- 
 hanna, twelve miles distant. The object of this expedition 
 was to seize the bridge which crossed the river from that 
 place to Columbia on the eastern bank. 
 
 As considerable importance has been attached to this 
 effort upon the part of the Confederates to seize this 
 bridge, I shall detail with some minuteness the manner of 
 its destruction. As soon as it was known at the head- 
 quarters of the Department of the Susquehanna that the 
 Confederates were entering the southern border of Penn- 
 sylvania preparations were made to hold this bridge. 
 On "Wednesday, 24th, Colonel Jacob G. Frick took com- 
 mand of the men who had been collected at Columbia. 
 These consisted of a few men from the Twentieth and 
 Twenty - seventh Regiments Pennsylvania Volunteers, the 
 Philadelphia City Troop, under command of Captain 
 Samuel J. Randall, the Patapsco Guards, and several com- 
 panies of the citizens of Columbia and adjacent places. 
 Among these was a company of colored volunteers from 
 Columbia. These were probably among the first colored 
 soldiers in the war, and they did excellent service. Colonel 
 Frick sent his men to the west side of the river, where 
 breastworks were thrown up and other preparations made 
 for the expected enemy. Orders from head - quarters were 
 issued to Colonel Frick that in the event of the approach 
 of the enemy, and his inability to hold the bridge, he 
 should destroy it, and in no case permit it to fall into the 
 
186 THE GKEAT INVASION. 
 
 enemy's possession. The following is the order of General 
 Couch, the department commander: 
 
 Harrisburg, June 2Sth, 1863. 
 
 By the Atlantic and Ohio Telegraph Lines. 
 
 To Major Haller, U. S. A. —A. D. C: 
 
 When you find it necessary to withdraw the main body of Colonel Frick's 
 command from Wrightsville, leave a proper number on the other side to de- 
 stroy the bridges, and use your own discretion in their destruction. Keep 
 them open as long as possible with prudence. D. N. COUCH. 
 
 The duty of superintending this work was laid upon Mr. 
 Robert Crane, who was assisted by Messrs. E. K. Smith, 
 "William Faesig, Isaac Real, Henry Berger, John Gilbert, 
 Frederick Bost, II. P. Moore, W. Green, Michael Libhart, 
 J. B. Bachman, Davis Murphy, W. W. Upp, Michael Shu- 
 man, Henry Duck, and I. C. Turner. These men cut the 
 roof of the bridge, removed some of the timbers, and 
 bored all the^arches, charging them with powder and at- 
 taching fuses. Four men were placed in charge of these 
 fuses, who were to apply the match when the order was 
 issued by Colonel Frick. We will now let Colonel Frick 
 tell the result in his official report to General Couch: 
 
 "Late in the evening of the same day I crossed the 
 river, assumed command and disposed of my forces for de- 
 fense. During the night my force was increased by four 
 companies from Columbia, three white and one colored, 
 numbering about one hundred and seventy -five men. 
 Early next morning, having obtained trenching tools from 
 citizens of Columbia and the Pennsylvania Railroad Com- 
 pany, my own men and the negro company (the other 
 three companies having left for their homes) began the 
 work of intrenching. During the morning a detachment 
 of convalescent soldiers from York, and the Patapsco 
 
COLONEL FRICK'S REPORT. 187 
 
 Guards, with about two hundred and fifty more men joined 
 my command, and were posted on the left of town, pro- 
 tecting the left flank of my position. These men I placed 
 under command of Lieutenant- Colonel Green. These 
 were also joined during the morning by scattered frag- 
 ments of the Twentieth Regiment Pennsylvania Volun- 
 teers, under command of Lieutenant -Colonel Sickles, 
 which I posted on the right of town as a protection to the 
 right flank. The work of intrenching was continued un- 
 til the approach and attack of the enemy, about half- past 
 four o'clock p. m.; and whilst the work was in progress I 
 selected with the assistance of Major Haller, A. D. C. to 
 the commanding general, the several points at which to 
 post my limited number of men. The main body of the 
 enemy, about twenty -five hundred strong, composed of 
 cavalry, artillery and infantry, took up their position about 
 six o'clock p. m., on the turnpike, in the immediate front 
 of my troops, and within three quarters of a mile of our 
 rifle pits. A force of cavalry and infantry moved down 
 the railroad on our left and attacked our skirmishers, who 
 after replying to their fire for a short time retired to the 
 main body, which kept up a steady fire and held the enemy 
 in check until they received orders to retire to the bridge. 
 " The Confederates succeeded in getting a battery in po- 
 sition on the elevated ground on our right and a section in 
 our immediate front. These guns were used most vigor- 
 ously against those of my command occupying the rifle 
 pits. In the meantime they sent a column of infantry 
 under cover of a high hill on our right, within a few hun- 
 dred yards of the river. None but their skirmishers ap- 
 proached within range of the guns of our men occupying 
 
188 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 the rifle pits, and those being in a grain field obscured 
 from our view, except when they would rise to lire, it was 
 difficult to do them much harm or to dislodge them. They 
 depended exclusively upon their artillery to drive us from 
 our position here. Having no artillery ourselves on that 
 side of the river with which to reply, and after retaining 
 our position for about one hour and a quarter, and dis- 
 covering that our remaining longer would enable the 
 enemy to reach the river on both my flanks, which I was 
 unable to prevent because of the small number of men 
 under my command, and thus get possession of the bridge, 
 cut off our retreat and secure a crossing of the Susque- 
 hanna, which I was instructed to prevent, I retired in good 
 order and crossed the bridge to the Lancaster County side. 
 Before the enemy had left York for the river here, I made 
 as I supposed every necessary arrangement to blow up one 
 span of the Columbia bridge. When they got within sight, 
 the gentlemen charged with the execution of that work 
 repaired promptly to the bridge and commenced sawing 
 off the arches and heavy timbers, preparatory to blowing 
 up with powder which they had arranged for that purpose. 
 After an abundance of time was allowed them, and after 
 I supposed every man of my command was ever the river, 
 and when the enemy had entered the town with his artil- 
 lery and reached the barricade at the bridge-head, I gave 
 the order to light the fuse. The explosion took place, but 
 our object in blowing up the bridge failed. It was then 
 that I felt it to be my duty, in order to prevent the enemy 
 from crossing the river and marching on Harrisburg in 
 the rear, destroying on the route, railroads and bridges, to 
 order the bridge to be set on fire." 
 
OBJECT OF WRIGHTSVILLE EXPEDITION. 189 
 
 The bridge was owned by the Columbia Bank; it was 
 five thousand six hundred and twenty feet long, and cost 
 one hundred and fifty - seven thousand three hundred dol- 
 lars. Its destruction was necessary to prevent the enemy 
 from crossing into eastern Pennsylvania. 
 
 This affair at Wrightsville, if it was of sufficient magni- 
 tude to be called a battle, was the third engagement of the 
 war in Pennsylvania. 
 
 This expedition to Wrightsville, it will be remembered, 
 was ordered by General Early, who doubtless received his 
 orders from his corps commander, General Ewell. General 
 Ewell, several years before the war, was employed as a 
 civil engineer upon the Ilarrisburg and Columbia Rail- 
 road. He was familiar with the whole country, and doubt- 
 less had other objects in view in attempting to seize this 
 bridge than plundering Columbia and breaking up railroad 
 communications with Philadelphia. It was supposed at 
 that time that it was designed to throw Early's division 
 and Hill's corps, which was then marching in that direc- 
 tion, across the Susquehanna at that place, with the pur- 
 pose of attacking Harrisburg from the east, while Rodes 
 and Johnson attacked it from the south. This movement 
 would have been exceedingly hazardous, for whatever 
 forces might have crossed, would have been separated from 
 the chief command by a river a mile wide, with neither 
 bridge nor ford between Columbia and Ilarrisburg — a 
 distance of about twenty -eight miles. 
 
 General Long, in the extract from his article in the 
 Philadelphia Times, given in our first chapter, says : " Be- 
 fore entering upon the execution of his plans, General Lee 
 had marked out his line of operations, which was to ad- 
 
190 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 vance into Pennsylvania, with Gettysburg or York for his 
 objective points, as circumstances might dictate. It was 
 his determination to give battle at one or the other of these 
 places." If a battle with the Federals in the neighbor- 
 hood of York was expected by General Lee, the possession 
 of the Columbia bridge, to prevent the approach of troops 
 from that direction, was a necessity. That either a battle 
 at that place, or crossing the river and marching upon 
 Harrisburg by its east bank, was expected, is clear from 
 the fact that up to the night of Monday, 29th, when the 
 plan of the campaign was suddenly changed, the move- 
 ments of troops were nearly altogether in the direction 
 of York.* 
 
 • i: ' Colonel W. H. Swallow, Adjutant -General to General Rodes, in a letter 
 to the writer, dated at Nashville, Tennessee, May 7th, 18S6, says: 
 
 "General Ewell, and Colonel Turner of his staff, both told me in confi- 
 dence at Berryville, before crossing the Potomac, that York, Pennsylvania, 
 or that vicinity, was to be the ground where General Eee expected to concen- 
 trate his army. I believe that if Eongstreet had not tarried so long at Cham- 
 bersburg, York would have been the point of concentration on the 30th, 
 instead of Gettysburg." 
 
 As stated elsewhere, Longstreet's corps reached Chambersburg late in the 
 afternoon of Saturday, June 27th, and went into camp near the town. On 
 Monday morning the divisions of Hood and McEaws left their encampment 
 and marched to Greenwood — some eight miles distant. At that place they 
 remained until the afternoon of Wednesday, 1st, when they proceeded across 
 the mountain and reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, before 
 1 1 o'clock the same night. This encamping over Monday night at Greenwood, 
 after but eight miles march, was, as General Eongstreet says, by Eee's order; 
 and the delay there until the following Wednesday was, he says, occasioned 
 by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, and the latter's wagon train, fourteen 
 miles in length, which had the right of way. Pickett's division was, by 
 Eee's order, left near Chambersburg to protect the rear, until early on the 
 morning of Thursday, 2d, when, summoned to the front, it by a forced march 
 reached the field about three o'clock in the afternoon. That there was con- 
 siderable delay in Longstreet's movements is true, but whether or not he was 
 responsible for it, except probably for his inactivity on Sabbath, the 28th, is 
 for the reader to judge. General McEaws, in a recently published article in 
 the Philadelphia Press, says that if Stuart's cavalry had not taken the cir- 
 cuitous route it did, and had been in communication with General Eee, it 
 
longstreet's men in chambersburg. 191 
 
 I return now to the occurrences about Chambersburg. 
 There were but few movements of troops through the 
 streets this day (Sunday, 28th). The last of Hill's forces 
 had passed through town the day previous, and were en- 
 camped about Fayetteville and Greenwood. Longstreet's 
 corps was encamped a few miles north - east of the town. 
 Religious services were held in their camps, and the men 
 were quietly resting from the fatigue of their weary march. 
 
 Notwithstanding this quiet in the camps, however, im- 
 portant events, so far as the business men of the town 
 were concerned, were transpiring. Squads of men, each 
 in charge of one or more officers, visited the town and 
 cleaned out the stores of what the troops which preceded 
 them had left. Sitting in my house connected with our 
 store about one o'clock p. M., the sound of an axe chopping 
 somewhere about the front was heard. Repairing to the 
 place I found a party of soldiers chopping away the cellar 
 door leading to where our groceries were kept, and after 
 effecting an entrance, an officer with blank book and pencil 
 noted down the contents. Having finished his inventory 
 of our stock, a guard was placed over the same until it 
 could be removed. This guard, after the departure of 
 the officer, ransacked our private or family cellar in the 
 rear of the store cellar, and carried away whatever they 
 could lay their thieving hands on. When the officer re- 
 turned to remove our groceries, I informed him of what 
 the guard had done, at which he seemed to become very 
 indignant, but one of the men showed him a can of pre- 
 served fruit, and after a few whispered words between 
 
 would have been left to protect the rear, at Chambersburg, and Longstreet's 
 whole corps would have moved at once to the front. General Longstreet, 
 then, is not to blame for his delay at Chambersburg. 
 
192 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 them, the can was placed in a wagon and the officer's 
 wrath suddenly subsided. Similar scenes were at the same 
 time being enacted all over the town, and scarcely a store 
 or shop escaped. About four o'clock in the evening a 
 number of teams were brought into town, and distributed 
 around at various places, and the contents of every 
 store, shop and cellar were taken and loaded into these 
 wagons. The dry goods men at that time dealt also in 
 groceries, and all suffered the loss of their entire stock. 
 We had in our cellar a considerable amount of molasses, 
 syrup, sugar, etc., which General Ewell had kindly spared 
 us. These we would have removed with our stock of dry 
 goods, but the cellar was deep and the hogsheads heavy, 
 and we were unable to draw them out. The Confederates, 
 however, were equal to the occasion, and when thirty or 
 forty of them took hold of the ropes, they soon had them 
 all up in front of the store. When all were up, and before 
 loading them into their wagons, an officer with a blank 
 book noted down the number of gallons in each hogshead 
 and barrel, and also the amount of sugar, etc. lie seemed 
 to be acquainted with the business of handling groceries, 
 and in deciphering the marks upon the vessels, and when 
 fixing upon the number of gallons in such as were tapped 
 he would form his estimate after several liftings, which 
 were always satisfactory to both sides in the transaction. 
 In all this process he would have me by his side to see 
 that he was acting fairly. Before giving the order to load 
 into the wagon, he directed me to select whichever of the 
 tapped vessels I wanted to retain for my own use, and 
 after designating one, he had the men put it back into 
 the cellar. This was the largest sale of groceries we 
 
longstreet's men in chambersburg. 193 
 
 had ever made in one day, and that was on the Sabbath 
 too. Our loss was heavy, but so was it with every other 
 business establishment of the town. This, be it remem- 
 bered, was but one of the instances in which we were 
 made to suffer by the enemy, and a year later, when 
 McCausland's band visited us, nearly the whole town was 
 laid in ashes. " 
 
 I was not aware on that day that a requisition had been 
 made upon us. That one, however, was made, not upon 
 the citizens, but upon the Borough officials, who failed to 
 respond because they had left town, is evident in Colonel 
 Freemantle's account of the transactions of that day, in 
 Blackwood 's Magazine. Colonel Freemantle says : 
 
 "Major Moses tells me that his orders are to open the 
 stores in Chambersburg by force, and seize all that is 
 wanted for the army in a regular and official manner, 
 giving in return its value in Confederate money or a re- 
 ceipt. The store -keepers have, doubtless, sent away their 
 most valuable goods on the approach of the Confederate 
 army. Much also has been already seized by Ewell, who 
 passed through nearly a week ago. But Moses was much 
 elated at having already discovered a large supply of ex- 
 cellent felt hats hidden away in a cellar, which he annexed 
 at once." 
 
 The hats referred to were taken from one of the enter- 
 prising dealers, and were valued at about two thousand 
 dollars. That man has never recovered from his loss on 
 that day. 
 
 Colonel Freemantle continues: "Moses proceeded into 
 town at eleven o'clock a. m. with an official requisition 
 (from General Longstreet), for three days' rations for the 
 
 13 
 
194 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 whole army in this neighborhood. These rations he is to 
 seize by force, if not voluntarily supplied. * * Neither 
 the mayor nor the corporation officers were to be found 
 anywhere, nor were the keys of the principal stores forth- 
 coming until Moses began to apply the axe. * * I re- 
 turned to the camp at six o'clock p. m. Major Moses did 
 not get back till very late, much depressed at the ill success 
 of his mission. lie had searched all day most idefatiga- 
 bly, and had endured much contumely from the Union 
 ladies, who called him a 'thievish, little rebel scoundrel,' 
 and other opprobious epithets. But this did not annoy 
 him so much as the manner in which everything he wanted 
 had been sent away or hidden in private houses, which he 
 is not allowed by General Lee's order to search. He has 
 only managed to secure a quantity of molasses, sugar, and 
 whisky." 
 
 That molasses was taken from us; the whisky from the 
 building adjoining. 
 
 The following day Major Moses, commissary -general of 
 Longstreet's corps, rode around to each place plundered 
 and paid for the things taken. When he came to settle 
 with me, he drew from his pocket a book in which the 
 articles were carefully noted down. Taking his seat at my 
 desk he wrote in a hurried and business-like manner an 
 itemized bill. lie then asked me the price at which we 
 sold each article, which he scrutinized for awhile and then 
 set down what he thought was right. Footing up the whole 
 he paid me in Confederate scrip. While writing so hur- 
 riedly I said to him, "Why, major, you write just like a 
 Philadelphia lawyer." "That's just what I am," he re- 
 plied. " I studied law on Walnut Street, Philadelphia, but 
 
longstreet's men in chambersburg. 195 
 
 some years ago I removed South, where I have resided 
 ever since." After receiving my pay in his worthless scrip, 
 I said to him, "JSTow, major, tell me what to do with this 
 money!" Straightening himself up and listening to what 
 I said, he replied, "Well, now, that is an important ques- 
 tion, and deserves the best answer I can give. My advice 
 to you is to invest this money in Confederate bonds. They 
 are at least as good as the money, and if our cause suc- 
 ceeds, as we expect it will, the bonds will be paid. If we 
 fail, then of course our bonds will be worthless, but so will 
 yonrs, for your government will be bankrupt by that 
 time." The reader may, perhaps, be curious to know 
 whether I took the major's advice, or what I did with my 
 "monev." It will be recollected that when tellina- of the 
 shrewdness of Rev. Dr. Fisher in disposing of the scrip 
 given him for printing done for the Confederates, I stated 
 that the doctor did the best in his dealings with the 
 Confederates of any man I knew, with one exception, 
 and that was a preacher also. The present is perhaps 
 the time to tell of that incident. Shortly after the re- 
 treat of the Confederates from our State, an elderly gentle- 
 man came into our store and, after purchasing a few 
 things, took me aside and proposed to leave a deposit of 
 a considerable sum of Greenbacks, for the purpose of 
 buying up all the Confederate scrip I could get. He did 
 not inform me what he wanted it for, nor where he lived, 
 but I learned afterward. He instructed me to pay from 
 four to five cents on the dollar, and because of my con- 
 senting to rid our county of this worthless trash, with 
 which it was flooded and which was considered of no value, 
 he allowed me six cents on the dollar for mine. Major 
 
196 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Moses allowed us fifty cents per gallon for molasses and 
 syrup. Six cents on the dollar for our scrip netted us just 
 three cents per gallon for what not long after we could have 
 gotten one dollar per gallon for. The reader can have 
 some idea of the profit or loss of that day's transaction, 
 when in addition to our whole stock of sugar and other 
 groceries, eight hundred gallons of molasses and syrup 
 were taken. 
 
 '*" I'liave often felt anxious to know what the Confederates 
 did with our molasses. Perhaps the solution of this ques- 
 tion is given by General Imboden in an article contributed 
 by him to the Galaxy of November, 1871. Speaking of 
 General Lee's great simplicity, and sharing the lot of his 
 soldiers, General Imboden says: "On one occasion some 
 molasses was obtained and sent to the field. One of Gen- 
 eral Lee's staff, who was caterer that week — that is, he 
 drew the rations for the head- quarters mess — set a small 
 pitcher of molasses before the general at dinner, who was 
 delighted to eat it with his hot corn bread. Seeing his 
 satisfaction the catering colonel remarked, ' General, I 
 secured five gallons for head -quarters.' '"Was there as 
 much for every mess the size of ours ?' 'Oh, no, the sup- 
 ply won't last a week.' 'Then, I direct, colonel, that you 
 immediately return every drop you have, and send an 
 order that no molasses shall be issued to officers or men 
 except the sick in hospital.' " 
 
 In a few weeks my strange friend called again, and tak- 
 ing what scrip I had procured, left another deposit. This 
 he'continued until he had gotten about all that could be 
 had. But who was the strange man who was dealing in 
 Confederate money ? The following was his history as I 
 
a minister's financiering. 197 
 
 afterward learned it: He was a Presbyterian minister, 
 and resided somewhere in the valley of Virginia, and being 
 an uncompromising Union man he thundered the terrors 
 of the law upon the heads of his Confederate congrega- 
 tion until they locked the church against him. When the 
 Confederates advanced near where he lived he would flee 
 north across the Potomac, and when the Union forces 
 would occupy the territory he would return, and, sur- 
 rounded by a guard of Union soldiers, would open his 
 church and preach again. Three of his neighbors desiring 
 to sell their property and move further down in the Con- 
 federacy, he bought their farms, payable in currency, and 
 would thus follow the w r ake of the Confederate army and 
 buy up their scrip and pay it over for the farms. He was 
 a sharp financier, and what became of him and how he 
 made out with his purchases I never heard. 
 
 While the scene of plunder just related was taking 
 place in Clmmbersburg the following interesting incident 
 took place at General Lee's head -quarters; and as the 
 sequel of it is so interesting, I will allow the principal 
 actor therein to relate her own story. The person referred 
 to is Mrs. Ellen McLellan, widow of a former citizen of 
 Chambersburg, William McLellan, Esq.: 
 
 Mr. J. Hoke : 
 
 Dear Sir — I take pleasure in complying with your request, and will give 
 you a brief account of my interview with General L,ee, as nearly as I can 
 recollect it now. The mills, provisions, and stores throughout the town and 
 surrounding country were all in the hands of the enemy, and in many fami- 
 lies supplies were running short. On the Sunday before the battle of Gettys- 
 burg (June 28th), matters had become so serious that it became necessary for 
 some one to seek an interview with the enemy and obtain flour. I sent for 
 one of the body-guards, and a captain came in response. From him I learned 
 that I could see General Lee by going to his head -quarters in Messersmith'a 
 
198 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 woods. This captain offered rue an escort, but assured me that I could go 
 alone with perfect safety, showing me a copy of General Lee's order that any 
 one who would insult a woman byword, look, or act, would be instantly shot. 
 I then decided to decline an escort, and taking my young daughter I set out 
 for the camp. I found the rules were stringently enforced, but had no diffi- 
 cult}'- in passing through the ranks. Everything was in most perfect order ; 
 even the horses were picketed so as to do no injury to the trees in the grove 
 where their tents were pitched. Reaching head-quarters I found the General 
 seated with his officers at the table. A subordinate met me and learning my 
 errand placed two camp-stools, and in a short time I found myself seated by 
 General Lee himself. I stated to him our need, and told him starvation 
 would soon be at hand upon many families unless he gave us aid. He seemed 
 startled by this announcement, and said that such destitution seemed impos- 
 sible in such a rich and beautiful grain - growing country, pointing to the 
 rich fields of grain all around his camp. I reminded him that this growing 
 grain was useless to us now, and that many of our people had no means to 
 lay in supplies ahead. He then assured me that he had turned over the sup- 
 plies of food he found, to his men to keep them from ravaging our homes. 
 He said, "God help you if I permitted them to enter your houses. Your 
 supplies depend upon the amount that is sent in to my men." He then told 
 me to send one or two of our prominent men to him. I replied that thev 
 had nearly all gone away, fearing that they would be seized and taken off. 
 (I feared to give him the names of any of our gentlemen. ) He then asked 
 me to send a miller who could give him an idea of the quantity required. 
 On leaving I asked for his autograph. He replied: " Do you want the auto- 
 graph of a rebel?" I said, "General Lee, I am a true Union woman, and 
 yet I ask for bread and your autograph." The general replied, "It is to 
 3 r our interest to be for the Union, and I hope you may be as firm in your 
 principles as I am in mine." He assured me that his autograph would be a 
 dangerous thing to possess, but at length he gave ^ c tome. Changing the 
 topic of conversation, he assured me the war was a cruel thing, and that he 
 only desired that they would let him go home and eat his bread there in 
 peace. All this time I was impressed with the strength and sadness of the 
 man. 
 
 I trust these few facts may prove of use to you. I am glad to see that you 
 are getting up these bits of unwritten history. Of course I have just given 
 you an outline of the affair and you are at liberty to use it as you see fit. 
 
 •Mrs. Ellen McLellan. 
 
 The sequel to this visit of Mrs. McLellan will appear 
 
MRS. m'lELLAN's VISIT TO LEE. 199 
 
 in the following fact. Judge Kimmell says that on the 
 same day of Mrs. McLellan's visit to General Lee's head- 
 quarters, or the day following, he can not now say which, 
 an officer of General Lee's staff came to his residence and 
 rapped at his door. Upon opening the door the officer 
 said, "Are you Judge Kimmell?" Replying in the af- 
 firmative, the officer handed him a paper, saying, " General 
 Lee sends you this." The Judge says that it had become 
 known to some that he was engaged in sending informa- 
 tion of the Confederates to the authorities at Ilarrisburg. 
 and knowing that his life would be forfeited if found out, 
 he thought as the officer handed him the paper from 
 General Lee that " the very mischief was to pay." His 
 fears, however, quickly subsided when he read the paper 
 and found that it was an order from General Lee on the 
 guard at Stoutfer's mill for a number of barrels of flour 
 for the poor of the town. Before he could use the order, 
 General Lee had left and it was of no assistance. 
 
 In the evening of this day — Sunday, 28th — the camp 
 fires of the advance of Heth's division, which had marched 
 from its camp about Fayetteville on that day, Avere seen 
 from Gettysburg on the eastern slope of the mountain 
 above Cashtown. 
 
 Monday, 29. On this day Jenkins' cavalry moved from 
 their encampment one mile east of Mechanicsburg toward 
 Shiremanstown and also toward Bridgeport on the bank 
 of the Susquehanna by the Ilarrisburg pike. When ap- 
 proaching Oyster's Point — a place on the turnpike about 
 equally distant between Mechanicsburg and Bridgeport — 
 they came in conflict with a force of infantry sent forward 
 by General Couch. The brief skirmish which ensued 
 
 
200 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 ended iu an artillery duel, the Union guns being planted 
 at the Point and those of Jenkins at the Stone Church 
 about a half mile north of Shiremanstown. There were 
 no casualties on either side. This was the fourth skirmish 
 of the war upon Pennsylvania soil. 
 
 On Sunday, 28th, a company of the Twelfth Pennsyl- 
 vania cavalry, which had escaped from Winchester at the 
 time of Milroy's rout, and retreated to Bloody Run in Bed- 
 ford County, Pennsylvania, and subsequently with others 
 of these escaped forces had advanced to McConnellsburg 
 in Fulton County, was surprised on the east side of the 
 Cove, or North Mountain, by a detachment of General 
 Imboden's force, which, it will be remembered, was en- 
 camped about the Gap and Mercersburg. In this affair a 
 number of this company were captured by the enemy. In 
 the afternoon of the same day a company of Imboden's 
 men, thought to have been the same who had the skirmish 
 in the morning with these Pennsylvanians, dashed into 
 McConnellsburg, but finding no Federal soldiers there they 
 did not dismount, but returned by the way they had come 
 — in the direction of Mercersburg. At an early hour on 
 Monday morning Company A, First New York Cavalry,, 
 commanded by Captain Jones, which had also escaped 
 from Winchester into Pennsylvania, entered McConnells- 
 burg from the direction of Bloody Run. Shortly after the 
 arrival of this small force a company of mounted militia- 
 men arrived from Mount Union, a small town thirty miles 
 up the valley on the Pennsylvania Railroad. Jones was 
 seated in a hotel, and his men were sitting about the door, 
 their horses hitched nearby. The militia -men remained 
 upon their horses in a cross street. Presently some of 
 
CAPTAIN JONES AT M'CONNELLSBURG. 201 
 
 Jones' scouts came dashing in from the mountain and 
 reported the approach of the enemy by the Mercersburg 
 road. Jones very composedly inquired the number of the 
 approaching force, and when informed that they did not 
 exceed seventy -five — nearly double the number of his 
 command, he having thirty -eight — declared his purpose 
 to fight them. lie at once ordered his men, who were 
 nearly all Irishmen, and fond of a fight, to examine their 
 arms and fall into line. The men examined their pistols 
 and then stuck them into their boots. Jones then pro- 
 posed to the captain of the militia -men that he should place 
 his men in the cross street where they would be entirely 
 unseen by the Confederates until he should have drawn 
 them down below where they were stationed, when they 
 were to make some demonstrations merely to frighten the 
 enemy by the show of their numbers, leaving whatever 
 righting was to be done to him and his command. To 
 this the captain of the militia -men consented and his men 
 were placed according to the plan agreed upon. Jones 
 then placed his little command of thirty -eight inline — 
 he taking the rear — and as the Confederates entered the 
 town from the east, he fell slowly back and thus drew 
 them on. But before the enemy had reached the cross 
 street in which the militia -men were concealed, Captain 
 Irvine, who commanded the Confederates, ordered his 
 
 men to "Charge the Yankees." But they did not 
 
 charge, for some of the militia -men, anxious to see what 
 was going on, ventured down to the corner, where they 
 were discovered. Captain Irvine, seeing these men, con- 
 cluded that a job was being put up upon him, and these 
 men were to come in on his rear. Instead then of charg- 
 
202 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 ing the Yankees, Jones, seeing tlieir apparent indecision, 
 in a voice like a clap of thunder shouted, " Right - about 
 face — charge." At this instant the militia -men took a 
 sudden notion that they had business at home, and the 
 whole command took to their heels and ingloriously fled. 
 Reports say that they did not stop until they reached 
 Burnt Cabins, twelve miles distant. Captain Jones' brave 
 command, however, were equal to the occasion, and with 
 terrific yells they dashed toward the enemy who turned 
 and fled by the way they came. Before the edge of the 
 town was reached firing began, but the whole population 
 of the place rushed into the street, and ran after the pur- 
 sued and pursuing, yelling and hallooing at the top of 
 their voices. The pursuit was continued for about a mile, 
 when all the enemy whose horses were not fleeter than 
 Captain Jones' were captured. Two of the Confederates 
 were killed and two wounded. Captain Irvine's com- 
 mand consisted of sixty -three men. Jones had thirty- 
 eight. Besides the two Confederates killed, Jones took 
 thirty - two men and thirty - three horses. He had no other 
 casualties in his command than one man wounded. "When 
 the citizens saw the party return to McConnellsburg, the 
 Confederates being about as many as Federals, they could 
 not at first know which side was victorious. Jones, wisely 
 concluding that the few who had escaped would soon re- 
 port their misfortune across the mountain, and bring a 
 heavier force against him, hurriedly left toward Bloody 
 Bun with his prisoners and captured horses. The citizens 
 went out to where the dead lay, and placing them in cof- 
 fins, interred them near where they fell. While this in- 
 terment was taking place a Confederate cavalry force 
 
MOVEMENTS OF THE CONFEDERATES. 203 
 
 came down from the direction of Mercersburg, while an- 
 other force crossed the mountain by the Hunter's road, 
 six miles down the valley, coming into McConnellsburg 
 from the west while the others entered from the east. 
 Thus the town was again in the enemy's hands, but 
 Captain Jones was not there to be caught. This Con- 
 federate force consisted of about four hundred men, and 
 they had with them three pieces of artillery, which they 
 planted upon an eminence to the east of the town. They 
 were part of Imboden's command. Expecting to find 
 Federal soldiers secreted in the town, a search was made, 
 but failing to find any, they left again about dark. The 
 citizens who were engaged in burying the Confederate 
 killed, were taken by this command, notwithstanding they 
 displayed an improvised flag of truce, consisting of a 
 white handkerchief attached to a stick. They were, how- 
 ever, speedily released when the officer in command saw 
 what they were doing and how decently they were inter- 
 ring his fallen comrades. 
 
 This is the fifth battle of the war upon Pennsylvania soil, 
 and for dash and gallantry, as well as for the magnitude 
 of its results in proportion to the numbers engaged, is per- 
 haps without a parallel in the whole struggle. 
 
 This day the balance of Ileth's division crossed the moun- 
 tain and joined the advance, which had crossed the day 
 previous. It was this addition that increased the Con- 
 federate camp fires about Cashtown, as seen from Gettys- 
 burg in the evening. (Prof. Jacob's Battle of Gettysburg, . 
 page 21.) 
 
 In the morning of this day the divisions of Generals 
 McLaws and Hood of Longstreet's corps left their encamp- / 
 
204 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 meats along the eastern bank of the Conococheague Creek, 
 two and three miles north-east of Chambersburg, and 
 proceeded directly across the fields to Fayetteville, where 
 they encamped. The Engineer Corps went before and 
 prepared the way by removing the fences. Dr. McClay, 
 of Greenvillage, who stood upon Shirk's Hill and wit- 
 nessed their march, says: "The Confederates passed 
 right across the country in a direct line for Fayetteville, 
 regardless of roads, and evidently in a hurry. From 
 Monn's Mill down to Hargleroad's they lay in immense 
 numbers. They were all moving when we looked over 
 the fields from the highest point on the hill. Drums were 
 beating, and the ear -piercing fife and the shrill notes of 
 the trumpet were all calling to arms. We gazed on the 
 scene and silently invoked the God of battles to protect our 
 army and nation from this great force of misguided men." 
 The other division of this corps — Pickett's — remained 
 behind until the morning of Thursday, July 2d, to pro- 
 tect their rear and preserve their line of communications. 
 In the meantime, during the three days it yet remained, 
 detachments were employed in destroying the railroad. 
 This they did by prying up the rails and then piling up 
 the ties and rails from the fences, with the rails upon the 
 top, and setting fire thereto. When the latter became 
 heated they were bent out of shape by their own weight, 
 and thereby became unfit for use. On Wednesday, July 
 1st, they destroyed the railroad shops. Fearing to involve 
 the surrounding buildings by setting these shops on fire, 
 the walls were battered until they fell. Ten or more men 
 would take a long iron rail, such as are used for railroad 
 purposes, and use it as a battering ram, and in this way 
 
ANOTHER VISIT TO GENERAL LEE. 205 
 
 they soon succeeded in throwing down these buildings. 
 A large lot of lumber was carried from one of these shops 
 and piled upon the turn-table and then set on fire. This 
 not only secured the destruction of the lumber, but the 
 turn-tables also. 
 
 In the early part of this day Dr. J. L. Suesserott, one of 
 the leading physicians of Chambersburg, visited General 
 Lee at his head -quarters at Messersmith's woods. The 
 object of his visit and what he saw are thus stated by the 
 doctor: 
 
 Mr. J. Hoke: 
 
 Sir— On Monday, June 29th, 1S63, I visited General Lee at his head- 
 quarters, near Chambersburg, for the purpose of having a blind mare, the 
 property of one of my neighbors, exempted from capture. All of the other 
 available horses having been either captured or removed to safe quarters, I 
 wanted to have the use of this one for the purpose o[ having my corn plowed. 
 After having stated to the general the object of my visit, and while the paper 
 was being prepared according to his order, I employed my time in watching 
 the features and movements of the great commander. Never have I seen so 
 much emotion depicted upon a human countenance. With his hand at times 
 clutching his hair, and with contracted brow, he would walk with rapid 
 strides for a few rods and then, as if he bethought himself of his actions, he 
 would with a sudden jerk produce an entire. change in his features and de- 
 meanor and cast an inquiring gaze on me, only to be followed in a moment 
 by the same contortions of face and agitation of person. The order for the 
 safety of the horse having been finished and given me, I left and made rapid 
 strides toward town, only to find that the Medical Purveyor of the Confederate 
 Army had taken the horse, and my corn, which badly needed working, had 
 to do without it and take its chance along with hundreds of acres within the 
 county in the same condition. J. L. Suesserott. 
 
 That General Lee was not entirely happy in the position 
 he then occupied, and that his mind was somewhat tinged 
 with eager anxiety, if not with sadness, is apparent in this 
 statement by Dr. Suesserott, as well as in that of Mrs. 1 
 Ellen McLellan, who was accorded an interview with him. 
 
206 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 on tlio preceding day, and whose statement has been 
 previously given. To her he said that he only desired 
 that they would let him go home and eat his bread there 
 in peace. The "strength and sadness" of the general 
 deeply impressed her. 
 
 There were special reasons for the deep anxiety and 
 sadness of General Lee on the day under consideration. 
 He was then in the great Cumberland Valley, one of the 
 most beautiful, thrifty, and productive places in all the 
 country. All of this would appear in wide contrast with 
 the war -desolated and slavery - cursed country from which 
 he came. Then, too, there was the extreme crisis which 
 he must have known was near at hand, and which would 
 result in the destruction of thousands of lives, and spread 
 desolation and grief in many of the homes he saw all 
 around him. Add to these considerations the uncertainty 
 as to his course. If, as General Longstreet says in his first 
 contribution to Annals of the War, page 419, the scout 
 Harrison, whom he had sent into the Federal lines, re- 
 ported the whereabouts of the Army of the Potomac in 
 the night of the 29th, then Lee was entirely ignorant of 
 where his opponent was, and his situation was certainly 
 embarrassing. Or if, as Longstreet says in his second 
 article, in which he corrects the statement and places the 
 return of the scout in the evening of the 28th, (Annals 
 of the War, page 632,) then orders for the concentration 
 of the army to the east of the mountain had already been 
 issued. In either case there was ground for much anxiety. 
 At all events it seems clear that General Lee had lost 
 much of his equanimity. Other instances yet to follow 
 will show a similar state of mind. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE ARMY. 207 
 
 The main body of the Confederate army having nearly 
 all passed from our midst, a brief, general description may 
 be given to assist the reader in forming his conception of 
 the appearance of such an immense host. 
 
 First, as is usually the case with armies on a march, 
 comes a brigade or two of cavalry. After an interval of 
 probably a day, the different regiments composing a bri- 
 gade, and the various brigades composing a division, 
 and the several divisions of a corps, pass, with their 
 immense trains of artillery, caissons, forges, ambulances, 
 and ammunition wagons. These wagons are each drawn 
 by four or six horses or mules, and in passing along the 
 macadamized streets they make that grinding noise which 
 indicates immense weight of freightage. In some instances 
 herds of fifty to one hundred cattle are driven along for 
 the use of the men. Scattered here and there along the 
 line at the heads of brigades, are bands of musicians. 
 "Dixie," "My Maryland," and the "Bonnie Blue Flag" 
 were the favorite pieces played. The passage of a corps 
 usually occupied from a day to a day and a half, and some- 
 times a division or a corps was so closely succeeded by 
 another that it was impossible for the uninitiated to fix 
 upon the precise time when one departed and another 
 came. Many of the wagons, horses, mules, and cannon 
 bore the inscription, " U. S.," and were either captured in 
 battle, or taken from the srovernment. Each regiment 
 and brigade had its flair, but there seemed to be no two 
 entirely alike. Some bore the insignia of the State from 
 which it came, and others some other device, and but few 
 the stars and bars of the Confederacy. This diversity of 
 flags was typical of the cause for which the Confederates 
 
208 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 fought — for a government composed of a number of inde- 
 pendent sovereignties. Not so the Federal Army. It 
 carried but one nag — the glorious stars and stripes, which 
 represents one government, one sovereign head, with many 
 members. 
 
 The Confederate infantry, as they marched through 
 Chambersburg, presented a solid front. They came in 
 close marching order, the different brigades, divisious, and 
 corps, all within supporting distance of each other. Their 
 dress consisted of nearly every imaginable color and style, 
 the butternut largely predominating. Some had blue 
 blouses, which they had doubtless stripped from the Union 
 dead. Hats, or the skeletons of what had once been hats, 
 surmounted their partly covered heads. Many were 
 ragged, shoeless, and filthy, affording unmistakable evi- 
 dence that their wardrobes sadly needed to be replenished. 
 They were, however, all well armed and under perfect 
 discipline. They seemed to move as one vast machine. 
 Laughing, talking, singing, and cheering were not indulged 
 in. Straggling was scarcely seen, but when some of them 
 did wander from the lines, and caught any of our people 
 in retired places, they did not hesitate to appropriate to 
 themselves hats, boots, watches, and pocketbooks. This 
 proves that their good behavior when under the eyes of 
 their officers was cine to discipline rather than innate hon- 
 esty and good breeding. 
 
 There was a perceptible difference in the character of the 
 cavalry -men and that of the infantry. The former, as a 
 class, were superior to the latter in all respects. This may 
 be accounted for in the fact that the cavalry -men were 
 mostly the well-to-do in the South, the educated, the 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOLDIERS. 209 
 
 aristocracy, the slave-holders, while the rank and file of 
 the infantry were the uneducated, the lower classes, many 
 of whom were conscripted into the service. Many of these 
 seemed to have no intelligent understanding of the cause of 
 the war, of what they were fighting for, or of the value 
 of the Government they were undertaking to overthrow. 
 When interrogated upon these points they would say that 
 they were fighting for their rights. What rights they had 
 which they were in danger of losing, they did not attempt 
 to tell. There was a marked difference in these men, 
 which seemed to be a peculiarity of all from the same 
 State. Those from Mississippi and Texas were more 
 vicious and defiant than those from other parts of the 
 South. Usually the discontented, those who sought op- 
 portunity to escape, were from North Carolina. Many 
 declared that when the war first broke out they were in 
 favor of the Union, but having been forced into the army, 
 they only desired that their side should win. Here and 
 there were some geniuses and lovers of fun. They sup- 
 posed that as they were in Pennsylvania they were 
 among the "Pennsylvania Dutch," that the German lan- 
 guage was mostly spoken, and that the people lived on 
 sauerkraut and lager -beer, and many and rich were the 
 jokes they got off against some of our people of Teutonic 
 form and appearance. Passing along the road in front of 
 a house, before which stood a person whose ample form 
 and stomach and rubicund face indicated good living and 
 plenty of lager, a soldier said to another by his side, "I'll 
 bet that old fellow drinks lots of beer." " ISTo, no," said 
 the man, who overheard the remark, " I never drink 
 beer." At this the soldier cried out in imitation of Penn- 
 
 14 
 
210 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 sylvania Dutch, "Och, mine countree! mine countree!" 
 Another soldier, meeting one of our citizens whose appear- 
 ance invited the question, inquired of him, " Can you tell 
 where a fellow can get a little whisky?" "ISTo, sir, I can't 
 tell; I never drink whisky," replied the man. Looking 
 him squarely in the face, and judging the truthfulness of 
 what he said by the redness and fullness of the same, the 
 soldier replied, ""Well, I guess not." 
 
 Many of the men of the army seemed specially to hate 
 President Lincoln. They had been made to believe that 
 he was responsible for the war, and that he was brutal and 
 barbarous. A report was in circulation among them that 
 he had lied from Washington to Boston, and that the 
 Army of the Potomac was yet in Virginia, and that they 
 would have only Pennsylvania militia to overcome, and 
 then Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington 
 would fall into their hands. 
 
 The officers in command of the infantry, like the men 
 composing the cavalry, were also of the high and cultivated 
 class. Many of them with whom we had business trans- 
 actions seemed to be perfect gentlemen; and while com- 
 pelled under the exigencies of the occasion to appropriate 
 our property to the use of their army, to be paid for in 
 scrip which they knew was of no value, they did it in an 
 apologizing way. Some of these men were overheard to 
 express their fears that they had run into a trap by coming 
 over here, and would not be able to get out again without 
 severe loss. In looking upon the large number of persons 
 who in some way managed to come into the town from 
 the surrounding country, the supposition of some of these 
 officers was, that they were soldiers in disguise. When 
 
INCIDENTS IN CHAMBERSBURG. 211 
 
 assured that such was not the case, and that the fighting 
 population of the North was scarcely touched yet, they 
 seemed greatly astonished. The following case will illus- 
 trate this point: A number of officers were seated one 
 morning in front of the residence of one of our citizens, 
 their horses being hitched to the shade trees. When the 
 gentleman of the house appeared at the door, one of the 
 officers thus addressed him: "How long, sir, is this war 
 going to continue?" The gentleman replied, "You can 
 answer that question better than I can." ""What do you 
 mean by that?" said the Confederate. "I mean that this 
 war will continue as long as you Southern people are able 
 to fight. If you can stand it twenty years more, then the 
 war will last twenty years yet," said the citizen. Seeing 
 that his words made some impression upon the soldiers, 
 the gentleman was emboldened to say further: "You, 
 gentlemen, must have seen for yourselves since you have 
 come North that there are any number of able-bodied 
 men yet to draw upon, and the people here have scarcely 
 yet awakened to the fact that there is a war upon their 
 hands; but this invasion will open their eyes to the fact, 
 and if it were possible for you to annihilate the whole of 
 our armies now in the field, that would only bring out 
 another and larger one to take you some morning before 
 breakfast." The officers listened respectfully to what the 
 citizen said, and one of them, who was seated upon a cellar 
 door, arose and addressing his companions, said, " There 
 is more truth than fun in what he says." This remark led 
 to considerable discussion among; them about the large 
 number of men they had seen since they had entered 
 Pennsylvania. 
 
212 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 It was a subject of frequent remark by the Confederates, 
 while here, about the magnificent country and the many 
 large and flourishing towns they had seen since coming 
 North. The dwelling houses of the farmers and the large 
 and excellent barns also excited their astonishment and 
 admiration. Letters written while in Chambersburg to be 
 sent to their friends in the South, but lost from their 
 pockets and picked up by some of the citizens, expressed 
 astonishment at the rich and beautiful country, the excel- 
 lent farming, fine houses and barns, and thrifty and flour- 
 ishing towns they had seen. The evident superiority of 
 the country north of the Potomac to that south of it, and 
 the hopelessness of their cause from the immense resources 
 of our people yet untouched, exercised a discouraging 
 effect upon the soldiers, and many stealthily disappeared 
 from the ranks. In disguising and assisting them to 
 escape, some of our eitizens lent their aid. The following 
 instance will show how this assistance was given: On the 
 evening of July 1st, a soldier called at the residence of one 
 of our citizens and declared his intention to make an effort 
 to escape from the army and remain in the North. After 
 satisfying himself that the man was sincere and not en- 
 deavoring to get him into difficulty, the citizen arranged 
 to meet him at a designated place early the next morning 
 with a suit of clothing. According to agreement he met 
 the soldier, and after putting off his Confederate uniform 
 and arraying himself in a citizen's suit, leaving his bene- 
 factor his musket, which he yet retains, the soldier leaped 
 over the fenee, exclaiming, " Farewell to Jeff Davis and 
 the Southern Confederacy." This soldier, before leaving, 
 assured his friend that many in the army were disheartened 
 
DESERTIONS FROM CONFEDERATE ARMY. 213 
 
 after seeing the North. The South, he said, had put all its 
 available force in the Held, while here in the North they 
 saw any number of able-bodied men who could yet be 
 drawn upon. The deserters from the Confederate army, 
 while in Chambersburg, were numerous, and there are 
 now several of them residing there. A number of colored 
 persons also made their escape from the army while in 
 Pennsylvania, some of whom are yet living there. Said 
 the writer to one of these soon after the war, " Where 
 were yon born, Sam?" "I was born in Georgia, sah," 
 replied my sable friend. "How did you get up here?" 
 I inquired. "I come Norf wid my young master; I was 
 his sarvant, and he was an offisser, and when he got 
 wounded at de battle of Gettysburg I just dun run away." 
 "Did the colored people of the South understand what the 
 war was about, and that the Yankees were their friends? " 
 " O, yes sah, dey all know'd dat. My master used to tell 
 us dat de Yankees would kill us and eat us up. Dey try 
 to make us believe dey got ho'ns." "Did you believe 
 these stories?' "We dun let's on we be mighty skeerd, 
 but no nigger beliebed it." These poor, downtrodden 
 creatures took advantage of their opportunity, and now, 
 thanks to the providence of God, they are free men and 
 citizens of the Republic. 
 
 £ 
 
 During the time we were under Confederate rule, we 
 were without information of what was transpiring in the 
 country outside of the lines, only as an occasional paper 
 was brought through by our scouts. The first information 
 we received of the battle of Wednesday, July 1st, and the 
 death of General Reynolds, was by one of the Philadel- 
 phia dailies, which Mr. Benjamin S. Iluber, one of our 
 
214 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 scouts, brought from Harrisburg. Our Southern visitors, 
 however, received their regular mails from Richmond, and 
 an occasional Richmond paper would be received, in which 
 glowing accounts were given of the success of the Con- 
 federate cause elsewhere. One edition of these papers re- 
 ceived announced that General Johnston had defeated 
 General Grant and raised the siege of Vicksburg. The 
 object of these false statements doubtless was to cheer and 
 encourage their army in our State. These statements, 
 however, in connection with the presence of the vast army 
 in our midst, had a fearfully depressing effect upon ns, 
 and some feared that our grand and glorious Government 
 would be overthrown. This depressed feeling we enter- 
 tained until the information came that the invaders had 
 been defeated at Gettysburg and were retreating south- 
 ward, when the revulsion from despondency to exultation 
 was so great that we had not language sufficient to ex- 
 press it. 
 
 The people of Chambersburg did not attempt to conceal 
 from the enemy their patriotic principles. And while all 
 felt the necessity of prudence in not unnecessarily obtrud- 
 ing these upon the invaders, they were nevertheless declared 
 when the exigency required it. To the credit of our ene- 
 mies, however, be it said that they expressed their respect 
 tor those who honestly held to their principles, even though 
 differing from them, but equally denounced such as at- 
 tempted to hide them, or shield themselves behind a pro- 
 fession of neutrality or sympathy. They as Southern men 
 claimed the right to adhere to what they supposed to be 
 the principles of the South, and expected that those resid- 
 ing in the North would maintain the principles supposed 
 
INCIDENTS AT CHAMBERSBURG. 215 
 
 to be peculiarly northern. Honest in their convictions, as 
 we believe the most of them were, they equally detested 
 servility and professed friendship where they had no 
 right to expect it. 
 
 It has been said by a recent southern writer* that Cham- 
 bersburg, at the time Lee's army passed through it, was a 
 town of flags, and that the national colors floated from 
 nearly every building. This is not correct. The people 
 here understood the proprieties of the occasion too well to 
 expose their flags to capture by flaunting them in the faces 
 of the invaders. The only flags exposed to view were 
 small miniature ones pinned to the bosoms of some of our 
 ladies. A\ nile not concealing their predictions, nor treat- 
 ing with unlady-like conduct the strangers who were 
 among them, they won the regard of all by their consistent 
 behavior. I stood one evening in front of a house where 
 a number of ladies were assembled and singing patriotic 
 songs, and at the conclusion of the Star Spangled Banner, 
 which was sung with good effect, a Confederate soldier, 
 who, with about a half dozen others, was standing upon 
 the pavement and listening respectfully, said: "It is the 
 prettiest flag the world ever saw." 
 
 The great preponderating impression which was made 
 upon the mind by looking upon an army like that which 
 passed through here on its way to Gettysburg was its 
 immenseness. No idea of its magnitude can be formed by 
 any description which can be given. If the whole army 
 with its appendages — Early's Division and Stuart's cav- 
 alry, which did not pass through this place, — the artillery 
 
 * Colonel R. M. Powell of the Texas brigade, Hood's division, in the Phila- 
 delphia Weekly Times of December 13th, 1884. 
 
216 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and wagon trains, ambulances, cattle, etc., had all been 
 jDlaced in a line in usual marching order, it would have 
 extended nearly from Chambersburg to Harrisburg — fifty 
 miles. This may seem incredible, but its truthfulness 
 will appear when I state that I shall have occasion here- 
 after to tell of a single wagon train fourteen miles long, 
 and of another twenty-jive miles in length. And I give it 
 as my opinion, based upon what that army did both be- 
 fore and after the invasion, that all the unorganized, 
 undisciplined, and inexperienced militia of the State could 
 not have withstood or vanquished that mighty host. It 
 required an army equal in numbers, arms, organization, 
 discipline, and experience to accomplish this. Like a huge 
 serpent, it slowly and cautiously made its way into our 
 State, turning its head now in one direction and then in 
 another, until its tail was threatened to be trodden upon 
 when it turned eastwardly and crossed the South Moun- 
 tain. But thanks be to God — ten thousand thanks, the 
 grand and glorious Army of the Potomac met it, and 
 upon the heights of Gettysburg crushed its venomous 
 head. Upon that "Altar of Sacrifice," that "Field of 
 Deliverance," that "Mount of Salvation," and amidst 
 those "Munitions of Rocks" the Rebellion received its 
 death blow, and like the tradition concerning the serpent, 
 which says that notwithstanding its deadly wounds, it yet 
 lingers in fitful life until the going down of the sun, this 
 great monster of secession dragged its slimy length along 
 until the sun of the rebellion set at Appomattox, when 
 it yielded up its life. 
 
 I now resume my narrative, and as we are upon the eve 
 of momentous events, I invite the reader's close attention 
 to what is to follow. 
 
CHANGE IN MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY. 217 
 
 In the evening of this day — Monday, June 29th, — some 
 time after dark, in company with two of our citizens, I 
 went up into the steeple of the Reformed Church to take 
 observations. From that elevated position we had an 
 uninterrupted view for miles around us. The line of the 
 railroad could be traced by the numerous fires still burn- 
 ing. The sound of the drum was heard in the direction 
 of Pickett's Camp. Along the South Mountain, for miles 
 up and down the valley, innumerable lights were seen. 
 That these lights were used as signals for communicating 
 information, we well knew, but of their occasion and import 
 we were of course ignorant. Perhaps the fact about to 
 be related will solve this problem. Some time in the after 
 part of this night, probably about one or two o'clock, I 
 was awakened by my wife who told me to come to the 
 window for some important movement was going on 
 among the Confederates. Peering cautiously through the 
 half-closed shutters we saw a continuous stream of wagons 
 driven hurriedly through our street. They were coming 
 back from the direction of Harrisburg, and turning east 
 at the Public Square, drove on out the Gettysburg pike. 
 Although these wagons were heavily loaded, as the grind- 
 ing noise they made indicated, they were sometimes driven 
 at a trot. A low, rumbling noise could be heard which 
 sounded strange in the stillness of Cthe night, as if the 
 whole valley were filled with moving trains. These wagons 
 proved to be part of EwelPs train, and their rapid passage 
 eastward was a part in the great act of the concentration 
 about Gettysburg, which will be fully described hereafter. 
 
 But what was the cause of the sudden change in Gen- 
 eral Lee's plans, and the rapid concentration of his army 
 
218 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 to the east of the mountain ? It was on the evening of 
 this day, according to General Longstreet's statement, that 
 the scout he had sent into the Federal lines came to his 
 head -quarters near Chambersburg, and reported that the 
 Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and that the head 
 of it was about Frederick City to the east of the mountain. 
 General Longstreet says that the importance of the in- 
 formation brought by this scout was such that he sent him 
 at once to General Lee's head -quarters, where he imparted 
 the startling information he brought. Owing to General 
 Stuart's course around the Federal army, Lee had been 
 deprived of all information of Hooker's movements, and 
 supposed that he was yet south of the Potomac watching 
 the approaches to Washington. The information brought 
 by this scout opened his eyes to the danger which threat- 
 ened his communications, and he was compelled at once 
 to turn about and meet his foe. That this was the first 
 information of the whereabouts of the Army of the Po- 
 tomac which Lee received after entering Pennsylvania, is 
 clear from the further statement by Longstreet in the 
 article referred to. The General says, "We had not heard 
 from the enemy for several days, and General Lee was in 
 doubt as to where he was; indeed, we did not know that 
 he had yet left Virginia." * 
 
 In the absence of the knowledge of the whereabouts of 
 the Union army, or rather upon the presumption that it 
 was yet south of the Potomac, General Lee had determined 
 to attack Harrisburg, but upon receiving the informa- 
 
 * General Longstreet's account of the sending of the scout Harrison, and 
 his return to his head -quarters near Chambersburg, is given in the first 
 chapter of this book on page 56. 
 
THE CHANGE IN MOVEMENTS. 219 
 
 tion brought by this scout, the plan was at once changed, 
 and the orders already issued countermanded. That such 
 were the facts will appear from the following additional 
 statement by General Longstreet in the article already re- 
 ferred to. That statement is as follows: "General Lee 
 had already issued orders that we were to advance toward 
 Harrisburg." Again he says that upon meeting General 
 Lee the next morning, after the arrival of Harrison, he 
 asked him " if the information brought by the scout might 
 not involve a change of direction of the head of the column 
 to the right ? " To this remark he says General Lee " im- 
 mediately acquiesced in the suggestion, possibly saying 
 that he had already given orders to that effect." He then 
 adds, " the movement toward the enemy was begun at 
 once." 
 
 Whatever uncertainty there may be as to whether Long- 
 street's scout reported to him and Lee on the evening of 
 Sunday, 28th, or of Monday, 29th, according to the first- 
 named general's contradictory statements given of this 
 affair, as previously referred to, there can be no question 
 as to the precise time when the concentration in the direc- 
 tion of Gettysburg occurred. This is placed beyond dis- 
 pute by the facts in the case yet to be related, as well as 
 by General Longstreet himself, who says that " about noon 
 (Tuesday, 30th,) the road in front of my corps was blocked 
 by Hill's corps (the two divisions which had been in camp 
 about Fayetteville and Greenwood) and EwclVs wagon 
 train, which had cut into the road above." (Annals of the 
 "War, page 420.) 
 
 As has already been shown, up to the night of Monday, 
 29th, Lee's objective was Harrisburg. " But," it may be 
 
220 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 replied, "if General Lee contemplated an attack upon 
 Harrisburg, why did he send two corps of his army to the 
 east, in the direction of Gettysburg, and but two divisions 
 of one corps — Rodes' and Johnson's — down the valley 
 upon the direct line to the capital?" This may be ac- 
 counted for as follows: A glance at the map will show 
 that Lee rested his army at that time in the form of a tri- 
 angle. The vertex of this triangle was at Chambersburg, 
 the left side extended to near Harrisburg — fifty -two miles 
 distant; the right side to York, fifty -three miles, and the 
 Susquehanna River formed the third side. The distance 
 from York to Harrisburg is twenty -eight miles; byway 
 of Columbia, and along the eastern bank of the Susque- 
 hanna, it is forty miles. Troops concentrated in the neigh- 
 borhood of York could be used upon either flank. Then, 
 too, General Lee, notwithstanding his seeming contempt 
 for the Army of the Potomac, was too wise and cautious, 
 in the absence of any knowledge of the whereabouts of 
 that army, to leave so important a pass in the mountains 
 unguarded as the one leading from Chambersburg to Get- 
 tysburg, thereby increasing the danger to his line of com- 
 munications in case of the advance of all his forces upon 
 Harrisburg by the Cumberland Valley. lie might have 
 supposed, and certainly had reason to suppose, that his 
 old antagonist would follow him up and strike him at the 
 most favorable opportunity. To prepare lor such a con- 
 tingency was but common prudence: hence the movement 
 of the larger part of his army across the South Mountain. 
 But before giving an account of the concentration of 
 the Confederate army, let us look at the situation, and see 
 where the various divisions and parts of it were on that 
 
POSITION" OF THE ARMY, JUNE 29TH. 221 
 
 Monday night, and we will be the better prepared to fol- 
 low them in their course toward the decisive field. 
 
 1. EweWs Corps. Early's division was at York; Podes' 
 division about Carlisle; Johnson's somewhere about Ship- 
 pensburg; Jenkins' cavalry about four or five miles from 
 the defenses of the capital on the west bank of the Sus- 
 quehanna. Two brigades of cavalry belonging to Stuart's 
 Corps, commanded respectively by Generals William E. 
 Jones and Beverly Robertson, which did not accompany 
 their chief in his erratic course around the Federal army, 
 but accompanied Lee's infantry up the valley, were en- 
 camped somewhere about Carlisle. 
 
 2. HilVs Corps. Ileth's division was east of the South 
 Mountain at Cashtown; Pender's and Anderson's about 
 Fayetteville and Greenwood. 
 
 3. Long street's Corps. The divisions of McLaws and 
 Hood were about Fayetteville. Pickett's division was 
 about three miles northeast of Chambersburg. 
 
 Imbodcn's Cavalry was at Mercersburg and the Gap, three 
 miles out at the mountain. 
 
 Stuart's Cavalry was at Union Mills, in Maryland, some 
 distance north of Westminster. 
 
 Imagine a vast fan with the base of its handle at Lee's 
 head -quarters near Chambersburg, and its circumference 
 extending from Mercersburg on the left, through Carlisle 
 to York, its extreme right, and you will be able to form 
 some idea of the positions occupied by the Confederate 
 army on the night of Monday, June 29th. With the ex- 
 ception of Pickett's division, which was to remain at this 
 place to protect their line of communications, and Im- 
 boden's cavalry, which was to keep the way open for the 
 
222 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 brigades of William E. Jones and Beverly Robertson, who 
 were to protect the rear of Ewell's wagon train, and then 
 themselves follow on to Gettysburg, all the scattered parts 
 of this great host, with their immense trains, were to be 
 called together at one point near their extreme right. All 
 this must be done without confusion, and upon different 
 roads; or where the same road was used by different corps 
 and divisions, the right of way must be determined, and 
 the time allotted to each declared. To each of these com- 
 mands at some of the points named couriers must have 
 been sent, while others may have been notified by signals. 
 May not the mysterious fires we saw that evening from 
 the church steeple have been the signals employed? Five 
 hours after the order for the concentration of these forces 
 was issued, a copy of it could have been carried to every 
 point, except to General Early at York, and he could have 
 been notified by courier in eight hours, allowing a rider 
 to go at the rate of seven miles an hour. * 
 
 Tuesday, 30. The hasty passage of the wagon train 
 through Chambersburg in the night of the 29th, convinced 
 us that Lee was concentrating his army, and that no time 
 should be lost in sending this all -important information 
 to the authorities at Harrisburg. Rising early in the 
 morning to see after procuring a person to convey a 
 message to the capital, I was called upon by Judge Kim- 
 mell, and after exchanging a few words upon the import- 
 ance of the fact, he left me, and in a short time procured 
 the services of Mr. Stephen "W. Pomeroy, then a young 
 
 " :i; General Doubleday says in his " Chaneellorsville and Gettysburg" that 
 General Early received I,ee's order to march to Gettysburg sometime in the 
 afternoon of Monday, 29th. If General Doubleday is correct in this state- 
 ment, then Longstreet's scout reported to him on the evening of Sunday, 28th. 
 
MR. POMEROY'S DISPATCH TO HARRISBURG. 223 
 
 man residing in the valley in the northern part of our 
 county, but now an honored minister of the Presbyterian 
 Church. Mr. Pomeroy, in the following letter to ex- 
 Governor Curtin, relates the circumstances of his trip: 
 
 Mount Union, Pennsylvania, November 13, 18S3. 
 Hon. A. G. Curtin: 
 
 Dear Sir — In compliance with your request, I send you the account of 
 how I came to send you the telegram of the concentration of the Confederate 
 army at Gettysburg during the war. After being discharged from the nine 
 months' service of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, I happened to be home, at 
 my father's — Judge Pomeroy, of Roxbury, Franklin County, — when the 
 enemy were marching down the Cumberland Valley. There was, of course, 
 great excitement, for the enemy were at our doors and taking what they 
 would. Farmers hid their horses and other stock in the mountains, as far 
 as possible. One day three hundred cavalry marched into Roxbury. When 
 we learned of their coming, ten of the men who had been out in the nine 
 months' service armed ourselves as best we could and went out to intercept 
 them; but the odds were too great, so we retired. Anxious to hear the news 
 and render what service we might to our country, a number of us walked to 
 Chambersburg, a distance of fourteen miles, reaching there in the afternoon. 
 That night the Confederates were concentrating at Gettysburg. Next morning 
 Judge F. M. Kimmell, with whom my father sat as associate judge, learned 
 that a son of Thomas Pomeroy was in town. He sent for me to come to him 
 at once. I found the judge on the street that leads to McConnellsburg, a 
 short distance from the Franklin Hotel, where the Central Presbyterian 
 Church now stands. As the town was full of Confederates and a Confederate 
 had his beat near us, the judge asked me in a low tone if I was a son of Judge 
 Pomeroy. I replied in the affirmative. With apparent unconcern he asked 
 me to follow him. I did so, and he led me into a little dark back room, and 
 told me that the Confederates were concentrating at Gettysburg and Governor 
 Curtin did not know it. He said it was of the utmost importance that the 
 governor should know it at the earliest possible moment, and asked me if I 
 would take a telegram to the nearest point on the Pennsylvania Railroad and 
 send it to him. He added: "It is of infinite importance to him and to the 
 country." I replied that I would try it. The telegram was already written, 
 so he cut a hole in the buckle strap of my pantaloons and deposited the tele- 
 gram to be sent there, and said: "Get this safely and in the shortest time 
 possible to the governor." Assuming indifference I came to the street and 
 
224 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 met the Confederate guard, who did not disturb me. Some of those who 
 came with me wishing to return to Roxbury, we set out together. 
 
 We met many at the edge of the town returning, who could not get through 
 the guard who were stationed around the town. 
 
 Coming to the forks of the Strasburg and Roxbury roads we found both 
 cavalry and infantry. On the left there was a slight hollow, also several 
 wheat fields, and beyond these there were woods. This was the only way to 
 hope for escape. At my proposal we crept along this hollow, at the end of 
 which there were some wheat fields; we kept these between us and the guard 
 till we reached the woods. When getting over the fence into the woods we 
 were seen by the enemy. They called, rode after us and leveled their muskets 
 at us, but we ran on, and as they did not fire or follow far we escaped. Still 
 fearing capture we kept to the fields. Before we reached Strasburg all had 
 fallen back but one. We must have walked about seventeen miles before we 
 got to Roxbury. As the horses were hid in the mountains I was in dread lest 
 I should not get a horse, but I met Mr. S. L. Sentman riding into town to get 
 feed for his horses in the mountains. Telling him of the message I was car- 
 rying he gave me his horse. Informing my father of my errand I set out on 
 my trip at once. It was about noon. The Amberson Valley road was, I knew 
 blockaded with trees to prevent the marauders from entering the valley to 
 steal horses. On this account I crossed the mountain into Amberson Valley 
 by a foot path, then another mountain into Path Valley. Reaching my 
 uncle's, W. R. Porneroy, at Concord, and telling him my business he got me 
 another horse. The Narrows, below Concord, were blockaded by citizens of 
 Tuscarora Valley, many of whom knew me. The report having reached 
 them that I was killed while trying to hinder the Confederates from entering 
 Roxbury, the obstacles and excitement of my friends at finding me alive 
 hindered me about ten minutes. Free from them, I hastened down the Tus- 
 carora Valley as fast as my horse could carry me. At Bealtown Mr. Beal, 
 now the Rev. D. J. Beal, speedily got me a fresh horse. When I reached 
 Silas E. Smith's I did these two things, got lunch and proved to the future 
 Mrs. Porneroy that I was not dead, as she supposed, but good for many years 
 to come. From thence I rode to my uncle's, Joseph Porneroy, at Acadcmia, 
 found them likewise mourning my supposed death, and he supplied another 
 horse, the fastest he had. That carried me to within a mile of my destina- 
 tion, when a soldier on guard called, Halt! I told the sergeant on guard my 
 mission and requested one of the guard to go with me, that I might get the 
 telegram off to Harrisburg in the shortest time possible. 
 
 Getting on the horse behind me we rode in a few minutes to the office. 
 Finding the operator, he cut the telegram out of the strap of my pantaloons 
 
MR. POMEROY S DISPATCH. 
 
 225 
 
 and sent it at once to you. The excitement and journey being over, and the 
 telegram being off to you, I began to look at the time and found it about 
 midnight. I had walked that day about seventeen miles and ridden about 
 forty -one miles. Anxious as I was about the critical state of the country, I 
 was so tired I had to seek the house of my kinsman, Major J. M. Pomeroy 
 in Perryville, now Port Royal, for rest. 
 
 The above is the history of that telegram, that, I believe, first gave you 
 notice of the concentration of the Confederate troops at Gettysburg, just be- 
 fore the famous battle in that place. 
 
 Respectfully yours, Stephen W. Pomeroy. 
 
 REV. STEPHEN W. POMEROY, 
 
 The scout who bore the first intelligence to the authorities of the concentration of 
 the Confederate Army. (From a recent photograph.) 
 
 Washington, December nth, 1883. 
 My Dear Sir: 
 
 Your dispatch was the first authentic information I received of the concen- 
 tration of the army of General I,ee on Gettysburg, and, treating it as true, 
 adted on it. Yours truly, A. G. Curtin. 
 
 Rev. S. W. Pomeroy. 
 
 It will be seen from Mr. Pomeroy's statement that he 
 
 15 
 
226 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 reached Port Royal about midnight of Tuesday, 30th. Pre- 
 suming that no time was lost in forwarding this important 
 dispatch from Port Royal, and that equal promptness 
 was made in Harrisburg in forwarding it to "Washington, 
 it is fair to suppose that the fact of Lee's concentration 
 was made known at General Meade's head- quarters some- 
 time that same night. General Meade was at that time at 
 Tancytown, thirteen miles south of Gettysburg. Is there 
 any evidence of the reception there of this information? 
 Colonel James G. Biddle, in the Annals of the War, page 
 208, says that " on the night of the SOth, after the Army of 
 the Potomac had made two days marches, (from Frederick to 
 Tancytown,) General Meade heard that Lee was concentrat- 
 ing his army to meet him." There were other ways by which 
 the knowledge of this concentration east of the South 
 Mountain might have been conveyed 'to General Meade, 
 but it is fair to suppose that the information referred to 
 by Colonel Biddle was conveyed by Mr. Pomeroy. 
 
 Early in the morning of this day — Tuesday, 30th, — 
 General Longstreet rode from his head - quarters about 
 three miles north-east of Chambersburg to Lee's head- 
 quarters in Messersmith's woods, upon the eastern sub- 
 urbs of the town, when, after a short consultation with 
 '"the latter, in which he informed him that he had coun- 
 / termanded his order for an attack on Harrisburg, and 
 had determined to cross the South Mountain and meet 
 the Army of the Potomac, in consequence of the infor- 
 mation brought by the scout Harrison, the two generals 
 proceeded together to Greenwood, where they encamped 
 and remained over that night. On the following morning 
 — Wednesday, July 1st, — they resumed their journey, and 
 
CONCENTRATION OF THE CONFEDERATES. 227 
 
 after proceeding together some three or four miles, heavy 
 firing was heard in the direction of Gettysburg, at which 
 Lee rode rapidly forward to ascertain the cause, leaving 
 Longstreet to see after the hurrying forward of the two 
 divisions of his corps, which were in camp about Fayette- 
 ville. After attending to this duty, General Longstreet 
 again went forward and rejoined Lee about five o'clock in 
 the evening in the rear of the line. (Annals of the War, 
 pages 419, 420. 
 
 The two divisions of Hill's Corps — Pender's and An- 
 derson's — left their encampments about Fayetteville and 
 Greenwood, and proceeded across the mountain and re- 
 joined Ileth at Cashtown. From that place the divisions 
 of Heth and Pender moved toward Gettysburg and en- 
 camped over night at Marsh Creek, four miles out. An- 
 derson's division remained at Cashtown. 
 
 Early's division of Ewell's Corps left York and marched 
 by way of East Berlin to Heidlersburg, where it remained 
 over night. White's battalion of cavalry of Imboden's 
 command, moved from York to Gettysburg by the turn- 
 pike, thus protecting Early's tlank and rear. 
 
 Rodes' division of the same corps left its encampment 
 below Carlisle and marched across the South Mountain by 
 the turnpike leading through Mount Holly and Peters- 
 burg (sometimes called York Springs), and thence to 
 Heidlersburg, where it rejoined Early, and with his division 
 encamped for the night. Heidlersburg is distant from 
 Carlisle twenty -two miles, from York twenty miles, and 
 from Gettysburg ten miles. The remaining division of 
 Ewell's Corps — Johnson's — retraced its steps from the 
 neighborhood of Shippensburg to Greenvillage, six miles 
 
228 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 north-east of Chambersburg, and from thence went by the 
 country road directly across through Scotland to Green- 
 wood, where it remained over night. 
 
 General Johnson's wagon train, instead of following 
 him across the country, came up to Chambersburg and, 
 turning east in the public square, proceeded toward Gettys- 
 burg. Part of Rodes' wagon train also retraced its way 
 to Chambersburg, and joining with Johnson's, passed on 
 toward the same destination. This was the train which 
 passed through Chambersburg during the night, as pre- 
 viously narrated, and these two, when united, were, ac- 
 cording to the statement of General McLaws in Annals 
 of the War, page 440, fourteen miles in length. Its im- 
 portance may be inferred from the fact that it was given 
 the precedence over Longstreet's two divisions, and it was 
 the detention caused by it that prevented these divisions 
 from reaching the field of battle as soon as was expected.* 
 
 The divisions of Generals McLaws and Hood, which 
 were unable to proceed until Ewell's wagon train had all 
 passed, were detained at their encampments about Fayette- 
 ville until the following afternoon, when by a forced march 
 the former reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettys- 
 burg, a little after dark, and the latter got within about 
 the same distance at twelve o'clock at night. The artillery 
 belonging to these two divisions did not get the road until 
 two o'clock the following morning (Thursday, July 2d.) f 
 
 ♦General I,ongstreet, General McL,aws, and Dr. Cullen, Medical Director 
 of Longstreet's corps, in Annals of the War, pages 420, 439, and 440. 
 
 f The facts stated in regard to the detention of I^ongstreet's two divisions 
 and artillery train are so important, and so much relied upon by that general 
 in vindication of his alleged tardiness in attacking the Federal left on Thurs- 
 day, July 2d, that we auote his precise words. The reader will do well to 
 
JENKINS AT MECHANICSBURG. 229 
 
 The withdrawal of General Rodes' division was covered 
 by Jenkins' cavalry, which remained below Carlisle until 
 the ensuing day — Wednesday. On Tuesday an engage- 
 ment took place between two ^ew York regiments and 
 Jenkins' men some four miles from the earthworks thrown 
 up on the high hills on the west bank of the Susquehanna. 
 On the Union side three or four were wounded, and about 
 ten on the Confederate side. This was the sixth engage- 
 ment of the war upon Pennsylvania soil. In the evening a 
 small force of this command entered Mechanicsburg, and 
 planting a battery a short distance below the town, fired a 
 few shots, after which they fell back to Carlisle. On the en- 
 suing day — "Wednesday — the whole force followed Rodes' 
 infantry by the pike across the mountain. Arriving at 
 Petersburg about the middle of the day, Jenkins made a 
 demand upon the citizens for a large amount of provisions. 
 His men at the same time instituted a search for horses, 
 and stores were broken into and robbed. The hotels and 
 restaurants were closed by an order from Jenkins, and all 
 drinking was prohibited. Mr. E. Hiteshew, a leading citi- 
 zen and merchant of that place, in order to secure protec- 
 
 keep these facts well in remembrance as they will be referred to hereafter in 
 important connections. General Long-street says: "Our march on this day 
 was greatly delayed by Johnson's division of the Second Corps, which came 
 into the road (the Gettysburg pike) from Shippensburg, and the long- wagon 
 trains that followed him. McLaws' division, however, reached Marsh Creek, 
 four miles from Gettysburg-, a little after dark, and Hood's division got within 
 nearly the same distance of the town about twelve o'clock at night." (An- 
 nals of the War, page 310.) Again, on page 420, the general says: "About 
 noon, the road in front of my corps (the two divisions of McLaws and Hood) 
 was blocked by Hill's corps (Pender's and Anderson's divisions) and Swell's 
 wagon train, which had cut into the road from above (at Chambersburg). The 
 orders were to allow these trains to precede us, and that we should go into 
 camp at Greenwood, about ten miles from Chambersburg. My infantry was 
 forced to remain in Greenwood until late in the afternoon of the 1st; my 
 artillery did not get the road until two o'clock in the morning of the 2d." 
 
280 Till-] GREAT INVASION. 
 
 tion to that part of liis stock which had not been sent 
 away upon the approach of the enemy, invited Jenkins 
 and his staff to dine with him. The invitation was ac- 
 cepted, a guard was placed about his premises, and while 
 at dinner the following conversation between Mr. Hiteshew 
 and the officers took place. Mr. Hiteshew inquired, " Gen- 
 eral, have you any recent intelligence from Vicksburg?" 
 "Oh yes,*' said Jenkins, "Grant is in a tight place. He 
 has put himself in a bad position and his army is being 
 terribly slaughtered." Then taking a piece of bread he 
 improvised a miniature representation of Vicksburg, and 
 said, "You see nature has made Vicksburg impregna- 
 ble, and Grant has shown his want of judgment in putting 
 his army where they will all be either killed or captured." 
 That conversation occurred on July 1st, and on the 4th, — 
 three clays afterward — Vicksburg was surrendered to Gen- 
 eral Grant. Mr. Hiteshew then said, "Do you expect to 
 take Baltimore and "Washington, general ?" "Most cer- 
 tainly we do; we expect to remain here all summer," 
 replied Jenkins. "But," continued Mr. Hiteshew, "don't 
 you think you will meet the Army of the Potomac some- 
 where before you reach Baltimore?" At this Captain Fitz- 
 hugh, Jenkins' chief of staff, said, "Oh, the Army of the 
 Potomac is away down in Virginia; they will most likely 
 cross the river about Shcpherdstown and advance over the 
 battle field of Antietam." "No," said Jenkins, "that is 
 too far up the river; I suspect they will cross lower down, 
 and we may meet them between this and Baltimore." Din- 
 ner over, Jenkins and Mr. Hiteshew, lighting their cigars, 
 took a stroll to the top of a hill below the town where the 
 sound of distant tiring was heard. Presently a cavalry- 
 
GENERAL IMBODEN IN CHAMBERSBURG. 231 
 
 mail clashed up and handed Jenkins an envelope. Hastily 
 opening it, he said, "Mr. Hiteshew, the Army of the Po- 
 tomac is at Gettysburg now." The order to mount was 
 quickly given, and in a short time the whole command 
 was en route for the scenes of strife, where, during that 
 same afternoon, Jenkins received a slight wound by a 
 piece of a shell grazing the top of his head. 
 
 The withdrawal of Rodcs and Johnson from the valley 
 left it open to an advance of the Emergency men, congre- 
 gated at Harrishurg, upon Lee's communications, and the 
 cavalry brigades of Generals \V\ E. Jones and Beverly 
 Robertson were left to prevent this. General Imboden 
 was also ordered from Mercersburg to Chambersburg to 
 relieve Pickett, who was to proceed to Gettysburg. About 
 four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, July 1st, 
 Imbodcn's force entered Chambersburg, and shortly after- 
 ward an official requisition was made upon the citizens for 
 a large amount of provisions, among which were five 
 thousand pounds of bacon. As the people were utterly 
 unable to comply with this new demand, the Confederates 
 became indignant and threatened to break open every 
 store and house and institute a vigorous search. The con- 
 sternation produced by these men exceeded any the people 
 had suffered up to that time during the war, and had not 
 some sudden emergency called them away scenes of vio- 
 lence would doubtless have taken place. In the midst of 
 their threats, and when squads were already going in dif- 
 ferent directions to execute them, to the people's great 
 relief they quickly withdrew from the town and proceeded 
 out toward Gettysburg. The cause of their sudden de- 
 parture has been given by General Imboden himself in 
 
2o2 TUN GREAT INVASION. 
 
 an article contributed to the Galaxy of April, 1871, which 
 is as follows: "That night (Wednesday, July 1st,) I re- 
 ceived a brief note from General Lee, expressing the 
 apprehension that we were in danger of being cut off 
 from communication with him by the Union cavalry, and 
 directing us to move next morning as far as South Moun- 
 tain on the roa<l to Gettysburg, and keep it open for 
 Generals "William E. .Jones and Beverly Robertson, whose 
 brigades of cavalry were in the direction of Shippensburg." 
 Evidently the points where danger to the communication 
 between Chambersburg and Gettysburg was apprehended, 
 were at Greenwood and Newman's Pass, near the top of 
 the mountain, where roads from down the valley inter- 
 sected the pike. At these plaees a comparatively small 
 force could have effectually prevented the passage of 
 troops, and Imboden at once moved out to these points 
 and remained there until Pickett's division passed on the 
 ensuing day — Thursday — and the cavalry brigades of 
 Jones and Robertson, just before midnight, after which he 
 followed on to Gettysburg. The two named brigades of 
 cavalry — Robertson in advance — were the last of the 
 Confederate army which passed through Chambersburg to 
 Gettysburg. 
 
 Having: given an account of the concentration of Lee's 
 army we turn our attention to the front and notice an 
 event which transpired there on this day — June 30th. 
 About half past nine o'clock in the morning a detachment 
 from Ileth's division under General Pettigrew left their 
 encampment at Cashtown and advanced upon a recon- 
 noisance to within about one mile of Gettysburg. They 
 had with them a number of wagons, and it was supposed 
 
POSITION OF THE CONFEDERATES, JUNE 30tH. 233 
 
 that they intended to enter Gettysburg and fill these 
 wagons with plunder. Approaching the town, this de- 
 tachment halted, and after a careful observation Ly the 
 officers, through their Held -glasses, they withdrew and en- 
 camped at Marsh Creek. 
 
 As we are now upon the eve of the first day's battle, it is 
 important that the reader have a correct knowledge of 
 the position of the various corps and divisions of the Con- 
 federate army at the close of this day. The following 
 statement will give this information: the divisions of 
 Ileth and Pender of Hill's corps were at Marsh Creek, 
 four miles west of Gettysburg; Anderson's division of the 
 same corps was at Cashtown, four miles further west. 
 The divisions of McLaws and Hood, of Longstreet's corps 
 were about Fayetteville and Greenwood, and Pickett of 
 the same corps, near Chambersburg. Early and Rodes 
 of Swell's corps were at Heidlersburg, ten miles north of 
 Gettysburg, and Johnson of the same corps was at Green- 
 wood, sixteen miles west of the last-named place. Jen- 
 kins' cavaly was below Carlisle; the brigades of Jones and 
 Robertson, about Shippensburg; Imboden's at Mercers- 
 burg, and Stuart was somewhere north-west of York. 
 
 Leaving these troops to rest during this eventful night, 
 we will next turn our attention to the Federal army. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE ADVANCE OF THE FEDERAL ARMY. 
 
 gK a previous chapter, the daily movements of the 
 
 ZjJ-5 Army of the Potomac from June 11th, when it left 
 
 i its encampment about Falmouth and started north- 
 
 A ward to checkmate Lee, until Sunday, 21st, when it 
 
 had reached Fairfax, Centerville, and Leesburg, were 
 given. Upon that day the different corps of that army 
 were so posted that all the approaches to Washington 
 south of the Potomac were completely covered. Besides 
 this the gaps of the Blue Ridge were so strongly held that 
 Lee was shut in the valley, and could cross the Potomac 
 only to the west of the mountain instead of to the east, 
 as originally intended. And now, having traced out the 
 lines of march of each corps and division of the Con- 
 federate army in its northward movement, up to the even- 
 ing of Tuesday, June 30th, — the night previous to the 
 first day's engagement at Gettysburg, I will resume the 
 daily record of the movements of the Federal army from 
 the point where I left off' until I shall have brought it 
 face to face with its foe. 
 
 The paramount purpose of General Hooker was to se- 
 cure the safety of the National Capital, and to effect this 
 he was not to be diverted either by the strategy of Lee 
 or the clamors of the people. In accordance with this 
 purpose he tarried in the position he had taken, covering 
 
 234 
 
GENERAL HOOKER'S PLAN. 235 
 
 "Washington, until he was certain that the point of danger 
 was further north, when he again put his army in motion. 
 
 The movements of the army during the days interven- 
 ing from June 21st to the 25th, as will be seen in the 
 statement yet to follow, were hut few compared with 
 those of the succeeding three days. This was because the 
 purpose of Lee had not yet been fully developed. On 
 Monday, 22d, Early's and Johnson's divisions of Ewell's 
 Corps had crossed the Potomac, and followed Rodes of 
 the same corps, who had crossed a week before, down the 
 valley. And on "Wednesday, 24th, Hill and Longstreet 
 had also crossed and gone in the same direction. On the 
 25th, however, it became apparent that Lee's immediate 
 objective was the Susquehanna, and General Hooker's 
 course was at once clear. Unlike Lee, who was in an 
 enemy's country, with a hostile population all about him 
 who reported to the authorities his every movement, and 
 his eyes bandaged because of the absence of his cavalry, 
 and therefore compelled to feel his way, Hooker was not 
 under the necessity of this caution, nor of guessing his 
 enemy's intentions, but could act promptly and intelli- 
 gently. The significance of this will appear in the fact 
 that the march from Fairfax to Frederick in Maryland 
 was one of the most rapid of the war. The Eleventh 
 Corps, it is said, marched fifty -four miles in two days. 
 
 The plan adopted by General Hooker was to move in a 
 parallel line with Lee on the east side of the South Moun- 
 tain and occupy its gaps and thus be prepared to meet him 
 in case he turned east toward Baltimore and Washington. 
 He also intended, in case an opportunity offered, to fall 
 upon his enemies' communications. With Washington, 
 
236 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 then, for its pivotal point, the Federal army, like a vast 
 moving fortress, with a frontage of one hundred thousand 
 glittering bayonets, stood as a wall of steel between the 
 Capital and its foes, and ready to be swung around to 
 meet whatever exigency might arise. With these pur- 
 poses in view the reader will be better prepared to under- 
 stand the details yet to be presented. 
 
 I come now to narrate the movements of the Federal 
 army, and commence where I left off in a former chapter. 
 
 Monday, June 22. The Cavalry Corps and Barnes' First 
 Division of the Fifth Corps, retired from Upperville to 
 Aldie. Stahl's Cavalry Division marched from Buckland 
 Mills via New Baltimore to Warrenton. 
 
 Tuesday, 23. Stahl's cavalry moved from Warrenton 
 via Gainesville to Fairfax Court -House. 
 
 Wednesday, 24. Newton's (Third) division of the Sixth 
 Corps moved from Germantown to Centreville, and the 
 Eleventh Corps from Cow Horn Ford, or Trappe Rock, 
 on Goose Creek, to the south bank of the Potomac at 
 Edward's Ferry. Stahl's cavalry moved from Fairfax 
 Court House to near Dranesville. 
 
 Thursday, 25. This day important movements were to 
 be made. Hooker was fully aware of his enemies' pur- 
 poses and movements, and was about to put his army 
 again in motion to meet them. The vast force was ac- 
 cordingly swung around, throwing its left wing, consist- 
 ing of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, the whole 
 under the command of Reynolds, across the Potomac at 
 Edward's Ferry. At night these three corps encamped 
 respectively at Barnesville, the mouth of the Monocacy, 
 and at Jefferson in Maryland, completely covering Cramp- 
 
THE FEDERAL ARMY CROSSES THE POTOMAC. 237 
 
 ton's and Turner's passes. The Second Corps withdrew 
 from Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville and proceeded to 
 Gum Springs. As soon as this corps left Thoroughfare 
 Gap, Stuart emerged from his forced position in the valley, 
 and set out upon his intended expedition northward, but 
 unexpectedly coming upon the Second Corps at Haymar- 
 ket, he was, after a short engagement compelled to with- 
 draw and return to Buckland and Gainesville. Howe's 
 (second) division of the Sixth Corps moved from Bristoe 
 Station to Centerville, Crawford's division (two brigades) 
 of Pennsylvania Reserves, from the defenses of Washing- 
 ton, marched from Fairfax Station and Upton's Hill to 
 Vienna. Stannard's Vermont Brigade, also from the de- 
 fenses of the Capital, left the mouth of the Occoquan en 
 route to join the Army of the Potomac, and Stahl's cavalry 
 moved from near Dranesville, Virginia, via Young's Island 
 Ford, on the Potomac, en route to Frederick City, Mary- 
 land. The Reserve Artillery moved from Fairfax Court 
 House, across the Potomac to near Poolesville. 
 
 Friday, 26. This day some changes were made in the 
 positions occupied by the left wing, with the view to the 
 more complete covering of Turner's Pass, through which 
 the National Pike passes. The First Corps marched from 
 Barnesville to Jefferson; the Third Corps from the mouth 
 of the Monocacy to Point of Rocks; and the Eleventh 
 Corps from Jefferson — the First taking its place there — 
 to Middletown. The Second Corps advanced from Gum 
 Springs to the north side of the Potomac at Edward's 
 Ferry; the Fifth Corps from Aldie via Carter's Mills, Lees- 
 burg, and Edward's Ferry, to within four miles of the 
 mouth of the Monocacy; the Sixth Corps from German- 
 
238 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 town and Centerville to Dranesville; the Twelfth Corps 
 from Leesburg via Edward's Ferry to the mouth of the 
 Monocacy; the Cavalry Corps (Buford's and Gregg's di- 
 visions) from Aldie to Leesburg; Stahl's cavalry division 
 continued on its way to Frederick City, and Crawford's 
 Pennsylvania Reserves moved from Vienna to Goose 
 Creek. The head -quarters of the army were moved from 
 Fairfax Court House via Dranesville and Edward's Ferry 
 to Poolesville. 
 
 Saturday, 27. The head -quarters were this day moved 
 from Poolesville to Frederick City; the First and Third 
 Corps were moved from their respective camps at Jeffer- 
 son and Point of Iiocks to Middletown, joining at that 
 place the Eleventh, which had reached there the day 
 previous. The left wing of the army was now all massed 
 against Turner's Pass, which rendered any advance by 
 the enemy by that route impossible. The Second Corps 
 marched from near Edward's Ferry via Poolesville to 
 Barnesville; the Fifth Corps from a point betweeii Ed- 
 ward's Ferry and the mouth of the Monocacy to Ballinger's 
 Creek, near Frederick City; the Sixth Corps from Dranes- 
 ville via Edward's Ferry to near Poolesville; the Twelfth 
 Corps from near the mouth of the Monocacy via Point of 
 Pocks to Knoxville; and Crawford's Pennsylvania He- 
 serves moved from Goose Creek by the same ferry to the 
 mouth of the Monocacy. The whole of the infantry hav- 
 ing now crossed the river into Maryland, Buford's and 
 Gregg's cavalry, which had remained at Leesburg to cover 
 this crossing from an attack by Stuart, also crossed. The 
 former proceeded to the vicinity of Jefferson, and the latter 
 in the direction of Frederick City. Stahl's cavalry on 
 this day reached the last named place. 
 
GENERAL STUART'S RAID. 239 
 
 On this day Stuart, who had been driven back by the 
 Second Corps, upon which he unexpectedly came, on the 
 25th, succeeded, after considerable difficulty, in crossing 
 the Potomac into Maryland in the vicinity of Dranesville, 
 and started on his erratic course around the Federal army. 
 Here at this point Stuart made his great mistake. Instead 
 of following in the rear of Lee where the mountain passes 
 south of the Potomac were closed against him, and taking 
 possession of Crampton's, Turner's, and Monterey passes 
 on the north of the river, thereby masking Lee's move- 
 ments, protecting his line of communications, harassing the 
 Federal forces, and reporting their presence, he departed 
 from his proper connection with the army and went upon 
 a raid to the east, and only reached his own friends in the 
 evening of Wednesday, July 2d. In consequence of this 
 course, the Confederate commander was in ignorance of the 
 whereabouts of his adversary, and only learned of him in 
 the evening of Sunday, June 28th, or Monday, 29th. 
 
 It is claimed by some Southern writers that the great 
 disaster of the Pennsylvania campaign Avas owing to the 
 course pursued by General Stuart, and by some he has 
 been severely blamed. Let us consider where the responsi- 
 bility for his course rests. General Lee says of his orders 
 to Stuart: "General Stuart was left to guard the passes of 
 the mountains and to observe the movements of the enemy, 
 whom he was instructed to harrass and impede as much as 
 possible, should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that 
 event General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, 
 crossing the Potomac on the east or west of the Blue 
 Ridge, as in his judgment should be best, and take posi- 
 tion on the right of our column as it advanced."* Gen- 
 
 * Annals of the W r ar, page 419. 
 
240 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 eral Longstreet says: " My corps left Culpeper on the 15th, 
 and with a view of covering the march of Hill and Ewell 
 through the valley, moved along the east side of the Blue 
 Ridge. General Stuart was in my front and on my flank, 
 reconnoitering the movements of the Federals. AVhen it 
 was found that Hooker did not intend to attack, I with- 
 drew to the west side, and marched to the Potomac. As 
 I was leaving the Blue Ridge, I instructed General Stuart 
 to follow me, and to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, 
 while I crossed at "Williamsport, ten miles above. In re- 
 ply to these instructions, General Stuart informed me that 
 he had discretionary powers from General Lee; whereupon 
 I withdrew. General Stuart held the gap for awhile, and 
 then hurried around beyond Hooker's army, and we saw 
 nothing more of him until the evening of the 2d of July, 
 when ho came down from York and joined us, having 
 made a complete circuit of the Federal army." * It will 
 be seen from the foregoing that if Geneal Lee is not 
 directly responsible for the course pursued by Stuart, he 
 indirectly is, for he gave him discretionary power to pursue 
 whatever course his own judgment dictated. Stuart had 
 made several circuits around the Federal army during the 
 war, and had gained some advantages and much celebrity, 
 and using the discretion given him, he chose that course 
 again. A prudent commander, unless he held his adver- 
 sary in contempt, would scarce^ have given such discre- 
 tion to a subordinate upon the eve of an invasion of his 
 territory.f 
 
 * Annals of the War, page 418. 
 
 f General Stuart has been severely blamed for the route he took around the 
 Federal army. Several Confederate officers, among them Generals Wilcox, 
 Long, and Alexander, and Colonel Walter Taylor, in papers contributed to 
 
<*fc<^ <z2ut-| *£u*J 
 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR STUART'S RAID. 241 
 
 General Lee expected of Stuart that he would " harass 
 and impede" the Federal army in case it should "attempt 
 to cross the Potomac." Did he suppose that General 
 Hooker would fail to find out that he was no longer in the 
 valley threatening Washington, but oft' upon an invasion 
 of Pennsylvania? or that, aware of these facts, he would sit 
 down in idleness and permit him to go where he pleased? 
 or that Stuart could prevent an army of a hundred thou- 
 sand brave and patriotic men from crossing the Potomac 
 for the rescue of their imperilled country? or that he could 
 detain them until he could capture Harrisburg, and per- 
 haps Philadelphia? If he did, then his credulity can only 
 
 the "Southern Historical Society," at Richmond, Virginia, attribute the 
 failure of the Pennsylvania campaign to Stuart's erratic course, and that it 
 was "a fatal blunder," and was made by Stuart "solely to gratify his ambi- 
 tion for sensational display in disobedience of the orders of General Lee." 
 These charges against General Stuart have called forth several articles in the 
 General's defense, from which I select the following : General Stuart in his 
 official report, says that in a personal interview with General Lee, on the 23d 
 of June, he first broached the subject of his circuit around the Federal army 
 and subsequently received his consent. His language is: " I submitted to 
 the commanding general a plan of leaving a brigade or so of cavalry in my 
 present front, and passing through Hopewell, or some other gap in the Bull 
 Run Mountains, attain the enemy's rear, and moving between his main body 
 and Washington, cross the Potomac into Maryland and join our army north 
 of that river." 
 
 General Lee, in his report, says : " Upon the suggestion of General Stuart 
 that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting 
 in his rear, he was authorized to do so. * * * General Stuart was directed 
 to hold the mountain passes with part of his command as long as the enemy 
 remained south of the Potomac, and with the remainder to pass into Mary- 
 land and place himself on the right of General Ewell. It was left to his dis- 
 cretion whether he should enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge ; 
 but he was instructed also to lose no time in placing himself on the right of 
 the column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward." 
 
 In all these instructions to General Stuart there is no warrant for him to 
 make a complete detour of the Federal army. The only discretion granted 
 him was as to whether he should cross the Potomac into Maryland east or 
 west of Ike Blue Ridge. He was, however, to rejoin the army somewhere in 
 Maryland. In order to get around this difficulty Major McClellan, of Stuart's 
 staff, says that " With the orders from Lee to Stuart was a letter from General 
 
242 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 be accounted for upon the adage that " "Whom the gods 
 would destroy, they first make mad." 
 
 I resume now the daily movements of the army with 
 Sunday, 28. The continued advance of the Confederates 
 into Pennsylvania calling for a further forward movement 
 of the Federal army, Crampton's and Turner's passes 
 were left in charge of Buford's division of cavalry, and 
 the infantry moved forward as follows: The First Corps 
 marched from Middletown to Frederick City; the Second 
 Corps from Barnesville to Monocacy Junction; the Third 
 Corps from Middletown to near Woodboro'; the Sixth 
 
 Lee to Stuart marked confidential. The letter discussed the plan submitted 
 during the day by Stuart, at the personal interview with Lee, of passing 
 around the enemy's rear. It informed Stuart that General Early would move 
 on York, Pennsylvania, with the right wing, and that it was desirable to place 
 his cavalry, as speedily as possible, with Early's division. The letter also sug- 
 gested that, as the roads leading northward from Shepherdstown and Williams- 
 port were already incumbered with the artillery and transportation of the 
 army, the route in that direction would consume more time than the proposed 
 one of passing to the enemy's rear. This letter also informed Stuart that he 
 could take either route his discretion might dictate, but that if he chose the 
 latter General Early would receive instructions to look out for him at York, 
 Pennsylvania. York was particularly mentioned as the point at which Stuart 
 was to look out for Early, and as the probable point of concentration." 
 
 In confirmation of the foregoing, I now quote from the official report of Gen- 
 eral Stuart, which is in the archives of the Government at Washington . General 
 Stuart says : " I was advised by General Eee that the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia would move in two columns for the Susquehanna. General Early com- 
 manded one of the divisions to the eastward, and I was directed to commun- 
 icate with him as speedily as practicable after crossing the Potomac, and 
 place my command on his right flank. It was expected that I would find him 
 at York, Pennsylvania. It is believed that had the corps of Hill and Eong- 
 street moved onward, instead of halting near Charabersburg, three or four 
 days, that York could have become the point of concentration instead of 
 Gettysburg. Moreover, considering York as the point of junction, the route 
 I took to get there was certainly as direct and far more expeditious than the 
 alternate one proposed." 
 
 It will be perceived from the foregoing that in the event of Stuart taking 
 the circuitous route around the Federal army, General Lee was to notify 
 Early to be on the look-out for him at York. No such notice was received by 
 General Early. May it not be inferred that, ignorant of Stuart's intended or 
 forced circuit, Eee did not send the order ? 
 
CHANGE OF FEDERAL COMMANDERS. 243 
 
 Corps from near Poolesville to Hyattstown; the Eleventh 
 Corps from Middletown to near Frederick; and the Twelfth 
 Corps from Knoxville to Frederick City. Gregg's cavalry 
 division reached Frederick City and marched thence to 
 ]STew Market and Ridgcvillc. Crawford's Pennsylvania 
 Reserves marched from the month of the Monocacy and 
 joined the Fifth Corps at BaHingcr's Creek. 
 
 On this day important events transpired. General 
 Hooker, who had exhibited such consummate skill in 
 handling his army, was succeeded in command by Gen- 
 eral George G. Meade. The circumstances which led to 
 this change were as follows: On Friday, 26th, General 
 French was placed in command of the garrison at Harper's 
 Ferry — supposed to be ten or eleven thousand strong, and 
 strongly posted upon Maryland Heights. On the same 
 day that General French assumed this command, General 
 Hooker sent the Twelfth Corps under General Slocum as 
 far as the mouth of the Monocacy, with the view that the 
 two corps should operate upon the enemy's line of com- 
 munication by following up his rear, capturing his couriers 
 and trains, and intercepting him in case of his defeat. He 
 therefore inquired of the authorities at Washington by 
 telegraph as follows: 
 
 "Is there any reason why Maryland Heights should not be abandoned, 
 after the public stores and property are removed? " 
 
 This dispatch was forwarded at half- past ten o'clock on 
 Saturday, 27th, and brought the following reply from Gen- 
 eral Halleck: 
 
 "Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be 
 held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I can 
 not approve of their abandonment, except in case of absolute necessity." 
 
244 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Ill response to his inquiry, General Hooker at once sent 
 the following' rejoinder: 
 
 "I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find ten 
 thousand men here in condition to take the field. Here they are of no earthly 
 account. They can not defend a ford of the river; and, so far as Harper's, 
 Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work 
 of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will 
 ever take possession of them for them. This is my opinion. All the public 
 property could have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where 
 they could have been of some service. Now, they are but a bait for the 
 rebels, should they return. I beg that this may be presented to the secretary 
 of war, and his excellency, the president. 
 
 "Joseph Hooker, Major- General."" 
 
 Before General Hooker had time to receive a reply to 
 this last communication, he sent the following additional 
 
 one: 
 
 "Sandy Hook, June 27th, 1863. 
 
 "Major- General H. W. Halleck, General in Chief: 
 
 "My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Wash- 
 ington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of 
 more than my numbers. I beg to be understood, respectfully but firmly, that 
 I am unable to comply with this condition, with the means at my disposal, 
 and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I oc- 
 cupy. Joseph Hooker, Major- General." 
 
 General Halleck had never regarded General Hooker 
 with much favor, and the relations between them were 
 not at all friendly and cordial. He therefore very naturally 
 improved his opportunity to get rid of one whom he did 
 not regard as a suitable person for the command of the 
 army, and, using his influence with President Lincoln 
 as his military adviser, induced him to accept General 
 Hooker's resignation and place General Meade, who was 
 in command of the Fifth Corps, in the chief command. In 
 accordance with this arrangement, at two o'clock in the 
 morning of the day following the interchange of messages 
 
HOOKER LEAVES THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 245 
 
 between Generals Hooker and Ilalleck — Sunday, 28th, — 
 Colonel Hardie of the War Department reached Frederick 
 with the official orders making these changes.* 
 
 General Hooker, upon receiving the official acceptance 
 of his resignation, issued the following characteristic order: 
 
 Head - quarters Army of the Potomac, 
 Frederick, Maryland, June 28, 1863. 
 In conformity with the orders of the War Department, dated June 27th, 
 1863, I relinquish the command of the Army of the Potomac. It is trans- 
 ferred to Major- General George G. Meade, a brave and accomplished officer, 
 who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of the army on many a 
 well fought field. Impressed with the belief that my usefulness as the com- 
 mander of the Army of the Potomac is impaired, I part from it, yet not with- 
 out the deepest emotions. The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so 
 many battles is relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of 
 this army will never cease nor fail; that it will yield to my successor, as it 
 has to me, a willing and hearty support. With the earnest prayer that the 
 triumph of this army may bring successes worthy of it and the nation, I bid 
 it farewell. Joseph Hooker, Major- General. 
 
 General Hooker took leave of the principal officers of 
 the army on the afternoon of the same day he relinquished 
 command. They were drawn up in line, and he passed 
 along shaking hands with each and laboring in vain to 
 stifle his emotions. The tears rolled down his cheeks. 
 The officers also were deeply affected. The scene was 
 similar to the final separation between Washington and 
 his officers at the close of the war of the revolution. 
 
 General Hooker at once set out for Baltimore according 
 to his instructions, and waited there three days for further 
 orders from the adjutant -general's office, but as none came 
 he went over to Washington, where he was forthwith 
 arrested by General Ilalleck for visiting the Capital with- 
 
 * Colonel James G. Biddle in Annals of the War, page 207. 
 
246 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 out leave, and in violation of the rule which forbade officers 
 to do so. 
 
 General Hooker was undoubtedly right in the course he 
 wished to pursue, and the general voice of history will 
 sustain him in it. He may have acted hastily in tendering 
 his resignation, but whatever faults he may have had, his 
 high position, the distinguished services he had rendered, 
 the masterly manner in which he handled his army, and 
 the hold he had in the confidence and love of that army 
 upon which the destiny of the government hung, should 
 have secured to him better treatment. It was not the first 
 time, however, that patriotism and devotion to duty have 
 been sacrificed to official jealousy and personal spite. 
 
 The order placing General Meade in command of the 
 army was a complete surprise to him. He had never 
 sought promotion, and was as modest as he was brave. 
 He had entered the war as a brigadier in the Pennsylvania 
 Reserves, and commanded a division at Antietam and at 
 Fredericksburg, and the Fifth Corps at Chancellorsville. 
 He was loved and respected by his own soldiers because 
 he was always ready to endure hardships with them. Plain 
 in dress and speech, and familiar in conversation, he was 
 accessible to all. He enjoyed in a high degree, especially 
 after the battle of Fredericksburg, the confidence of Presi- 
 dent Lincoln. General Meade was not elated by his pro- 
 motion, but on the contrary was evidently deeply impressed 
 with a sense of the great responsibility which rested upon 
 him. The destiny of the Republic was in his hands. One 
 false step now and the Union would be lost. And yet he 
 did not shrink from taking the position which, unsought 
 and unexpected, had been assigned him, and he announced 
 
GENERAL MEADE ASSUMES COMMAND. 247 
 
 to the army his acceptance of the command in the follow- 
 ing modest and appropriate words: 
 
 "Head -Quarters Army of the Potomac, 
 "June 28th, 1863. 
 "By direction of the President of the United States, I hereby assume com- 
 mand of the Army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order — an 
 order totally unexpected and unsolicited — I have no promises or pledges to 
 make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and 
 disgrace of a hostile invasion. Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be 
 called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the 
 interests involved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an 
 all- controlling Providence the decision of the contest. It is with just diffi- 
 dence that I relieve in the command of this army, an eminent and accomplished 
 soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its 
 achievements; and I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms 
 to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has 
 been confided to me. George G. Meade, 
 
 "Major- General Commatiding:" 
 
 Such a change of commanders of a great army upon the 
 eve of battle, in which the destiny, not only of the nation 
 but of republican institutions, was at stake, was a fearful 
 experiment. It reflects great honor upon the patriotism 
 of the men composing that army, that demoralization, to 
 some extent, did not result, but they cheerfully accepted 
 the fact of the change, and pressed on to meet their foe 
 without as much as an hour's delay. Can history produce 
 anything like it? 
 
 General Meade, as soon as he entered upon the command, 
 sought an interview with General Hooker, and used every 
 effort to obtain of him information concerning the strength 
 and position of the different corps of the army, and the 
 movements of the enemy. In his testimony before the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the "War, he said, " My pre- 
 decessor, General Hooker, left the camp in a very few 
 
248 THE GKEAT INVASION. 
 
 hours after I relieved him. I received from him no intima- 
 tion of any plan, or any views that he may have had up 
 to that moment, and I am not aware that he had any, but 
 was waiting for the exigencies of the occasion to govern 
 him, just as I had to do subsequentl}\" * Thrown entirely 
 upon his own resources, General Meade summoned his 
 trusted friend, General Reynolds, to his side, and the two 
 together agreed upon a plan which ended in the victory at 
 Gettysburg, f It should be stated here that what was de- 
 nied General Hooker was granted to General Meade, and 
 he was given the option to do as he pleased with the 
 men at Harper's Ferry. He, however, either did not 
 approve of Hooker's project to send these men in con- 
 junction with the Twelfth Corps to operate upon Lee's 
 line of communication, or else he supposed the time for 
 that movement had passed, and he could use these men 
 to better advantage elsewhere. lie accordingly ordered 
 General Slocum to rejoin the main army, and the bulk of 
 the garrison at Harper's Ferry, under General French, was 
 directed to take a post as a reserve at Frederick when 
 our forces moved forward. General Couch, with his 
 emergency men at Harrisburg, estimated at twenty thou- 
 sand, was also placed under his orders. 
 
 Among the first official acts of General Meade, after 
 assuming the command of the army, was to ask the assent 
 of the government at Washington to the appointment of 
 General Kilpatrick to the division of cavalry under General 
 Stahl, and the promotion of Custer, Merritt, and Farns- 
 worth, three young captains, to the command of brigades 
 
 * Colonel James G. Biddle in Annals of the War, page 207. 
 f Major Joseph G. Rosengarten in Annals of the War, page 62. 
 
COMMUNICATION WITH WASHINGTON CUT. 249 
 
 in that division. The request was at once acceded to, and 
 the subsequent career of these men attested the wisdom 
 of that change. Shortly after the dispatch from Wash- 
 ington was received, granting this request of General 
 Meade, a second message came over the wire announcing 
 that Stuart with his cavalry was making a raid near the 
 Capital; and in a short time thereafter the wire was cut and 
 telegraphic communications for a time ceased.* Stuart, 
 after crossing the Potomac on the day previous, passed 
 close to "Washington and Baltimore, creating considerable 
 excitement in those cities. At Iiockville he came upon a 
 large wagon train, filled with supplies, on its way from 
 Washington to the army at Frederick. This train, with 
 its escort, he captured and took with him to Gettysburg, 
 handing it over there to the Confederate quartermaster. 
 Colonel Walter Taylor, of General Lee's staff, in a contri- 
 bution to the Southern Historical Society papers, says that 
 the capture of this train was unfortunate for Stuart, for in 
 capturing and bringing it away he was considerably de- 
 layed. After the capture of this train, Stuart kept on his 
 way in a northerly direction through Brookville, travelling 
 all night. 
 
 Monday, 29. As the army was now approaching that 
 
 *The proximity of General Stuart to the National Capital, and the sever- 
 ing of telegraphic communications with the head - quarters of the army, pro- 
 duced deep anxiety in Washington. General Halleck, on Monday night, 
 29th, telegraphed to General Couch, in command of the Department of the 
 Susquehanna, at Harrisburg, as follows: "I have no communication with 
 General Meade. " Hon. Edgar Cowan, then in Washington, telegraphed to 
 Governor Curtin at Harrisburg : " Stanton can hear nothing from the Army 
 of the Potomac, and we all fear that it has met with some disaster." Secre- 
 tary Seward, on the night of the 29th, telegraphed to Hon. Thurlow Weed, at 
 Albany, New York, to urge Governor Seymour to send on the New York 
 militia, and that the government was in extreme peril. ' ' 
 
250 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 important pass in the mountain — Newman's Pass, where 
 the pike leading through Gettysburg to Baltimore crosses, 
 and where, if at all south of the Susquehanna, Lee would 
 concentrate for battle — it became all important to have it 
 well in hand and some well denned plan. The following 
 was therefore agreed upon: A strong cavalry force was to 
 be thrown out to the left to cover Monterey Pass, and thus 
 protect the flank and rear from an attack from that 
 quarter; and to the right, to look after Stuart, who was 
 moving around in that direction. The seven corps of in- 
 fantry were to radiate from Frederick upon seven different 
 roads, which, while diverging from that place, all tended 
 northward and converged at Gettysburg. The plan will 
 be best understood by imagining a vast fan, with the base 
 of its handle resting upon Frederick, the point of diver- 
 gence, and the seven different corps, like the sticks of the 
 fan, radiating therefrom. This immense force could be 
 pushed northward to the Susquehanna, or swung around 
 to interpose between the enemy and Philadelphia, in case 
 he should go in that direction, or be concentrated at Gettys- 
 burg or any other point, if necessary. 
 
 In accordance with the general plan nlready stated, the 
 First and Second brigades of Buford's cavalry, commanded 
 respectively by Generals Gamble and Devin, left Middle- 
 town and crossed through Turner's Pass to Boonsborough, 
 west of the South Mountain. Finding no enemy in that vi- 
 cinity, they turned north and passed through Cavetown to 
 Monterey Springs, recrossing the mountain there and en- 
 camping over night near Fairfield. This reconnoissance 
 developed the fact that the enemy were all further down 
 the valley, and that no danger was to be feared from that 
 
MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS. 251 
 
 direction either from the left flank or rear. Merritt's bri- 
 gade of the same division proceeded from Middletown to 
 Mechanicstown; Gregg's division marched from New 
 Market and Ridgeville to Westminster; and Kilpatrick's 
 division, formerly Stahl's, went from Frederick to Lit- 
 tlestown. 
 
 Stuart, after riding all the previous night, reached at 
 the dawn of day the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at 
 Sykesville. The bridge at this place was burned, and the 
 track about Hood's mill was torn up. Resting here dur- 
 ing the forepart of the day, the command some time in the 
 afternoon resumed its march, and reached Westminster 
 about five o'clock p. m. At this place a spirited engage- 
 ment took place between this force and the First Delaware 
 Cavalry, which was at length driven ofl' and pursued some 
 distance toward Baltimore, adding much to the panic 
 there. Gregg's division of the Federal cavalry, which 
 was marching in that direction to intercept Stuart, was 
 delayed by the infantry and trains, and did not reach 
 Westminster until some hours after Stuart had passed. 
 At night the head of Stuart's column rested at Union 
 Mills, half way between Westminster and Littlestown. 
 
 The movements this day were as follows: The army 
 head - quarters were moved from Frederick City to Taney- 
 town, and the artillery reserve from the first named place 
 to Bruceville. The First and Eleventh corps marched 
 from Frederick to Emmittsburg — the last named by a 
 road parallel to the Emmittsburg road leading through 
 Cregerstown; the Third and Twelfth corps moved on 
 parallel roads to Taneytown and Bruceville, where they 
 encamped; the Second Corps from Monocacy Junction via 
 
252 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Liberty and Jolinsvillo to Uniontown, still further east; 
 the Fifth from Ballinger's Creek via Frederick and Mount 
 Pleasant to Liberty; and the Sixth, following Gregg's 
 cavalry, went from Hyattstown via New Market and 
 Ridgeville, to New Windsor. The outer line of the great 
 fan, it will thus be seen, extended from Emmittsburg on 
 the left to New Windsor on the right — the First Corps 
 under Reynolds forming the left of the army, and the 
 Sixth under Sedgwick its right. This was the position 
 of the Army of the Potomac on the evening of Monday, 
 June 29th, — the night before the concentration of Lee's 
 forces began in the direction of Gettysburg. 
 
 Tuesday, 30. The First Corps on this day started from 
 Emmittsburg for Gettysburg, but hearing that the enemy 
 were reported to be upon the Fairfield road, General 
 Reynolds halted it at Marsh Creek. The Third Corps 
 marched from Taneytown in the direction of Emmittsburg, 
 and encamped at Bridgeport; the Twelfth Corps marched 
 from the same place, and rested over night at Littlestown; 
 the Fifth Corps from Liberty. via Johnsville, Union Bridge, 
 and Union to Union Mills; and the Sixth went from New 
 Windsor to Manchester. The Artillery Reserve moved 
 from Bruceville to Taneytown. Gregg's cavalry division 
 left Westminster and proceeded to Manchester, and Kil- 
 patrick's division went from Littlestown to Hanover to 
 intercept Stuart. Stuart, who had bivouacked over night 
 at Union Mills, midway between Westminster and Littles- 
 town, hearing that Kilpatriek was at the last named place 
 waiting for him, attempted to avoid an encounter by going 
 through cross roads to Hanover, but Kilpatriek, who was 
 aware of this change, anticipated him and reached that 
 
stuart's advance. 253 
 
 place first. When Stuart arrived at about ten o'clock in 
 the forenoon, a desperate engagement, which lasted four 
 hours, ensued between Kilpatrick and the Confederate 
 rear under General "Wade Hampton. Both sides claim 
 the victory in this engagement; the Confederates, how- 
 ever, were driven further northward. 
 
 When at Hanover, Stuart was but twelve miles from 
 Gettysburg, and fourteen from York. Ignorant of the 
 concentration of the Confederate army at the first named 
 place, and expecting to unite with Early at York, as he 
 says General . Lee directed, and unaware that Early was 
 then en route from that place to Gettysburg, he pressed 
 on further northward, crossing the tracks of both White's 
 battalion of cavalry and Early's whole division, and yet 
 failed to ascertain the departure of these troops, or the 
 course they had taken. Had he known of Early's de- 
 parture from York, and the direction he had taken, he 
 could have effected a junction with him before sundown 
 somewhere about East Berlin.* Or had he fallen in with 
 White's battalion, which on that day had gone by the 
 York pike toward Gettysburg, he could have joined it 
 and reached the Confederate advance at Marsh Creek 
 that same night. But he was ignorant of the move- 
 ments of these two commands, and they were equally 
 ignorant of his approach, for no notice, such as it is al- 
 leged General Lee had promised to send Early, had reached 
 him. Had Early known that Stuart had taken the cir- 
 cuitous route around the Federal army, he might have 
 been on the look-out for him, but he was also ignorant 
 
 * Colonel W. H. Swallow, in the Southern Bivouac of November, iSS5, 
 page 365. 
 
254 TIIE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 of this. Indeed at one time on that day Stuart was 
 within seven miles of Early's infantry — the latter actually 
 hearing his guns — and yet they were mutually ignorant 
 of each other's proximity. Surely the people who resided 
 in that neighborhood must have been very loyal to their 
 government, and known how to keep their own counsels, 
 or Stuart failed to interrogate them. 
 
 At a late hour this day Stuart learned that Early had left 
 York, but was misinformed as to the direction he had taken. 
 He was told that he had gone in the direction o± Shippens- 
 burg. Misled by this report, he abandoned his design upon 
 York, and turned the head of his column in the direction 
 he supposed Early had gone. Encamping over night some- 
 where west of York, he resumed his march next morning, 
 and passing through Dillsburg and Churchtown, reached 
 Carlisle in the evening. Here he was surprised to hear 
 that Itodes had marched in the direction of Gettysburg, 
 and the town was in possession of Pennsylvania and New 
 York militia -men under General Smith, who had ad- 
 vanced that day from Harrisburg. After demanding the 
 surrender of the town, and throwing a few shells into it, 
 and burning the United States barracks situated outside 
 of the place, he hastily left and hurriedly made his way to 
 Gettysburg, which he reached in the evening of the ensu- 
 ing day. And this was the bold rider who was to " harass 
 and impede" the patriot army in case it should "attempt to 
 cross the Potomac " in pursuit of the invaders of its soil, 
 and the would-be destroyers of its government. 
 
 The cavalry brigades of Gamble and Devin, under the 
 command of General Buford, which had rested over night 
 near Fairfield, after their reconnoissanco west of the raoun- 
 
FEDERAL ARMY PREPARING TO CONCENTRATE. 255 
 
 tain the previous day, marched by way of Emmittsburg to 
 Gettysburg, and proceeding westwardly on the pike lead- 
 ing to Chambersburg, encamped over night about one mile 
 and a half from the town. 
 
 Aware of the fact that indications pointed to a probable 
 collision with the Confederate army in a short time, Gen- 
 eral Meade, soon after assuming command of the army, 
 directed General Reynolds to proceed to Gettysburg and 
 report to him the character of the ground there, at the 
 same time ordering General Humphreys to examine the 
 ground in the vicinity of Emmittsburg. These precau- 
 tions were taken, not with the purpose to halt the army 
 there and wait for an attack, but to be prepared for any 
 emergency which might arise, — the army in the meantime 
 still pressing forward. On the night of Tuesday, 80th, 
 information reached head -quarters that Lee was concen- 
 trating his army east of the mountain in the vicinity of 
 Gettysburg, and General Meade, " ignorant of the nature 
 of the ground in front of him, at once instructed his 
 engineers to select some srround havine; a general refer- 
 ence to the existing position of the army, which he might 
 occupy by rapid movements of concentration, and thus 
 give battle on his own terms, in case the enemy should 
 advance across the South Mountain. The general line of 
 Pipe Creek was selected, and a preliminary order of in- 
 structions issued to the corps commanders, informing them 
 of the fact, and explaining how they might move their 
 corps and concentrate in a good position along the line." * 
 These were but ordinary precautions, which any com- 
 mander, who had any reasonable sense of the responsibili- 
 
 * Colonel James G. Biddle, in Annals of the War, pages 208, 209. 
 
256 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 ties of his position, would have taken, and yet they have 
 been made the ground of an accusation that General 
 Meade contemplated a retreat from Gettysburg to the 
 position selected at Pipe Creek. This accusation does 
 great injustice to General Meade, and the fact that he was 
 net unduly committed to that line, nor unwilling to meet 
 the enemy elsewhere, is proven by General Humphreys, 
 who says that in the instructions issued to the corps com- 
 manders relating to the line of Pipe Creek, it was expressly 
 declared that " Developments may cause the commanding 
 general to assume the offensive from his present positions." 
 A very few hours after these instructions were issued, cir- 
 cumstances did cause a change. General Meade himself 
 says: "It was my firm determination, never for an instant- 
 deviated from, to give battle wherever and as soon as I 
 could possibly find the enemy." 
 
 Simultaneously with the issuing of the instructions to 
 the corps commanders regarding Pipe Creek, General 
 Meade circulated the following timely order: 
 
 Head - quarters Army of the Potomac, 
 June 30th, 1863. 
 The commanding general requests that previous to the engagement soon 
 expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers will ad- 
 dress their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in 
 the struggle. The enemy are on our soil; the whole country now looks anx- 
 iously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe; our failure to 
 do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling millions of hearts with 
 pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier of this army. 
 Homes, firesides, and domestic altars, are involved. The army has fought 
 well heretofore; it is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely 
 than ever, if it is addressed in fitting terms. Corps and other commanders 
 are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty 
 
 this hour. By command of 
 
 Major - General Meade, 
 
 S. Williams, Assistant Adjutant -General. 
 
THE TWO ARMIES ON EVE OF BATTLE. 257 
 
 As we are now upon the eve of battle, the two great 
 armies having been brought almost face to face, it will be 
 well to recapitulate the positions occupied by each. 
 
 Positions occupied by the Confederate army on the night 
 of Tuesday, June 30th: 
 
 The divisions of Heth and Pender, of Hill's Corps, were 
 at Marsh Creek, four miles west of Gettysburg, on the 
 Chambersburg road, and Anderson's division of the same 
 corps was four miles further west on the same road, at 
 Cashtown. The divisions of McLaws and Ilood of Long- 
 street's Corps were about Fayetteville and Greenwood, six- 
 teen miles from Gettysburg, on the Chambersburg pike, 
 and Pickett's division of the same corps was in the neigh- 
 borhood of Chambersburg. Early and Rodes of Ewell's 
 Corps were at Heidlersburg, ten miles north of Gettys- 
 burg, and Johnson's division of this corps was at Green- 
 wood. Jenkins' cavalry was below Carlisle; the brigades 
 of Jones and Robertson were about Shippensburg; Im- 
 boden at Mercersburg, and Stuart somewhere north-west 
 of York. 
 
 Positions occupied by the Federal army on the night of 
 Tuesday, June 30th: 
 
 The First Corps, under General Reynolds, was at Marsh 
 Creek, between Emmittsburg and Gettysburg, and four 
 miles from the last named place; the Eleventh Corps, Gen- 
 eral Howard, was at Emmittsburg, ten miles from Gettys- . 
 burg; the Third Corps, General Sickles, was at Bridgeport, 
 twelve miles from Gettysburg; the Twelfth Corps, Gen- 
 eral Slocum, was at Littlestown, ten miles; the Second 
 Corps, General Hancock, was at Uniontown, twenty miles; 
 the Fifth Corps, General Sykes, was at Union Mills, six- 
 
258 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 teen miles; and the Sixth. Corps, General Sedgwick, was 
 at Manchester, twenty -seven miles. Gregg's cavalry di- 
 vision was at Manchester; Kilpatrick's at Hanover; and 
 the brigades of Gamble and Devin, of Buford's division,, 
 were about one mile and a half west of Gettysburg, on the 
 Chambersburg road. This vast fan was now about to be 
 closed, and as the Confederate army, in its concentration, 
 was swung to the right and closed upon its right support, 
 the Federal army was to be swung to the left, and close 
 upon its left. The point of contact between the two great 
 opposing forces was Gettysburg, and the parts which would 
 first come in contact were, Reynolds upon the Federal 
 left, and Hcth upon the Confederate right. The reader 
 will do well to watch in the coming details the times and 
 places where the various parts of these two great hosts 
 came into collision. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE FIRST DAT OF THE BATTLE AT GETTYSBURG — WEDNES- 
 DAY, JULY 1st, 1863. 
 
 §N the morning of "Wednesday, July 1st, Heth's divis- 
 ion of Hill's Corps advanced from Marsh Creek upon 
 
 4 Gettysburg. General Buford, as stated in the pre- 
 A. vious chapter, held the ridges west of the town with 
 
 » the cavalry brigades of Generals Gamble and Devin. 
 About half- past nine o'clock these men appeared in front 
 of Buford's videttes, and skirmishing commenced on the 
 farm of Hon. Edward McPherson, and thus the series of 
 battles at Gettysburg began. 
 
 The object of this advance by General Heth is thus 
 stated by Colonel "W. II. Taylor, General Lee's adju- 
 tant-general, in Annals of the War, page 307: "Instruc- 
 tions had been sent to General Heth to ascertain what 
 force was at Gettysburg, and, if he found infantry opposed 
 to him, to report the fact immediately, without forcing an 
 engagement." General Buford, however, was aware of 
 the presence of the enemy in his front, and had prepared 
 for them by dismounting a large part of his force aud 
 placing them in line. His batteries also had been planted 
 at commanding points. 
 
 259 
 
[260] 
 
 VIEW FROM PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGE. 
 From a Photograph by Tipton.) 
 
THE FIRST ENCOUNTER. 261 
 
 As soon as General Ileth found himself in the presence 
 of Buford's dismounted cavalry, he formed his men in line 
 of battle, with Archer's and Davis' brigades in front, and 
 Pettigrew's and Brockenborough's in the rear. Unaware 
 that any Federal infantry were near, Heth sent word to 
 General Hill at Cashtown that the advance of his division 
 had encountered the enemy's cavalry near Gettysburg. 
 
 At an early hour in the morning General Reynolds re- 
 ceived a dispatch from General Buford, informing him of 
 the proximity of the Confederates, at which he set out at 
 once to his assistance with the nearest division — that of 
 Wadsworth, leaving General Doubleday, his second in 
 command, to draw in the pickets, assemble the artillery 
 and the remainder of the corps, and follow after as soon as 
 possible. He also dispatched a courier to General Howard 
 at Emmittsburg, ordering him to advance to the front as 
 rapidly as he could. This order reached General Howard 
 
 Note. — Pennsylvania College, a view from which is illustrated on the 
 opposite page, fronts south, and the elevation to the right is Seminary 
 Ridge, upon which, extending about three miles south, the Confederate line 
 was placed during the second and third days' engagements. This view shows 
 where the battle of the first da}' commenced. It extended down below the 
 theological seminary, which is seen upon the ridge, and northward and east- 
 ward for about a mile and a half. Reynolds' Grove, in which that general 
 was killed, is seen near the seminary. The road leading westward, by which 
 the main body of the Confederates came — the Chambersburg road — passes 
 up over Seminary Ridge, as is shown. 
 
 There are two roads entering Gettysburg from the west — the one from 
 Chambersburg, and the other from Fairfield and Monterey Pass, which comes 
 in somewhat diagonally from the south-west. Both these roads are inter- 
 sected by ridges running north and south. That one nearest the town turns 
 somewhat toward the east, and is called Seminary Ridge, because on it a 
 Eutheran theological seminary is located. Between this ridge and another 
 one farther west, a small stream of water, called Willoughby's Run, passes. 
 The battle in the forepart of this day was fought principally upon these 
 heights on both sides of the stream. In the afternoon, when Howard's Corps 
 came up, the line was extended around north and north-east of the town. 
 
262 T11K GREAT INVASION. 
 
 at eight o'clock, and lie at once put his corps in motion — 
 Barlow's division taking the most direct route, and the 
 divisions of Generals Schurz and Steinvvehr proceeding. by 
 Horner's Mills — a distance of thirteen miles. Having thus 
 put his corps in motion, General Howard, accompanied by 
 his staff, pushed forward in advance to the scene of strife. 
 
 At about ten o'clock General Reynolds dashed into 
 Gettysburg in advance of his troops, and pushing on out by 
 the Chambersburg road to Seminary Hill, took a survey 
 of the situation. Seeing the enemy was there in force, 
 and that Buford's dismounted cavalrymen were being 
 badly pressed, he rode rapidly back again into the town 
 and out the Eimnittsburg road about a mile, and there met 
 the head of his column, which he turned directty across 
 the fields toward the seminary. The men hurriedly formed 
 in line under cover of the ridge, when the right moved to 
 the north side of the Chambersburg pike and across the 
 bed of the abandoned railroad, and the left advanced to 
 the west of the ridge near the seminary. 
 
 From the time the conflict opened, up to the arrival 
 of Wadsworth's division, Buford's men, though hotly 
 pressed, resisted the approaches of the enemy most stub- 
 bornly, and by taking advantage of every favorable point 
 to protract the struggle, succeeded in holding on until the 
 expected assistance at length came. But while the forma- 
 tion of the line was in progress, the heroic Reynolds, see- 
 ing the pressure which was made upon Buford's slender 
 lines, led Cutler's brigade forward for their relief. Hall's 
 Second Maine battery was posted in the road, and the 
 Fourteenth Brooklyn and the Ninety- fifth New York 
 were advanced a short distance on the left. General 
 
GENERAL REYNOLDS KILLED. 263 
 
 "Wads worth was also directed to place the three re- 
 maining regiments of his brigade, the One Hundred 
 and Forty-seventh New York, the Seventy - sixth New 
 York, and the Fifty -sixth Pennsylvania on the right of 
 the road. When this formation was completed, the cav- 
 alry brigade under Gamble, which had been most heavily 
 eno-asred, withdrew and formed in column on the left of 
 the infantry. Between the Fairfield and Chambersburg 
 roads was a piece of woods, which both parties were 
 contending for. Archer's brigade, preceded by a line 
 of skirmishers, was crossing Willoughby's Run to enter 
 these woods on one side as the Iron Brigade was going in 
 on the other. General Reynolds, anxious as to the result, 
 rode forward a short distance to reconnoiter, and raising 
 his field glass to his eyes he sought to take in the full 
 situation, when a ball from a sharp - shooter's musket 
 struck him on the back of the head, coming out near the 
 eye, and he fell dead. 
 
 Major Joseph G. Rosengarten, of General Reynolds' staff, 
 in an article contributed to the Annals of the War, pages 
 64, 65, thus describes the fall of his distinguished chief: 
 "In the full flush of life and health, vigorously leading on 
 the troops in hand, and energetically summoning up the 
 rest of his command, watching and even leading the at- 
 tack of a comparatively small body, a glorious picture of 
 the best type of a military leader, superbly mounted, and 
 horse and man sharing in the excitement of the battle, 
 Reynolds was, of course, a shining mark to the enemy's 
 sharp-shooters. He had taken his" troops into a. heavy 
 growth of timber on the slope of a hillside, and, under the 
 regimental and brigade commanders, the men did their 
 
■M 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 work well and promptly. Returning to the expected di- 
 vision, lie was struck by a minnie ball, fired by a sharp- 
 shooter hidden in the branches of a tree almost overhead, 
 and killed at once; his horse bore him to the little clump 
 of trees, where a cairn of stones and a rude mark on the 
 bark, now almost overgrown, still tell the fatal spot." * 
 
 
 WHERE GENERAL REYNOLDS FEEL. 
 From a Photograph by Tipton. 
 
 * Major -General John Fulton Reynolds was born in Lancaster, Pennsyl- 
 vania, in 1S20; he had served his country in Mexico and in California, as 
 well as in nearly every important action yet fought in Virginia; and now re- 
 turning to his native state to defend her from her invader, he yields up his 
 life almost in sight of his home. He was, in the estimation of those who 
 knew him well and were the best able to judge, the greatest soldier the Army 
 of the Potomac ever lost in battle. General Meade said of him, "He was 
 the noblest as well as the bravest gentleman in the army." 
 
 The body of General Reynolds was at once borne to the rear and placed 
 
CAPTURE OF GENERAL ARCHER. 265 
 
 "With the fall of General Reynolds, the command de- 
 volved upon Maj or -General Abner Doubleday, who had, 
 after executing Reynolds' orders and setting the remaining 
 two divisions of the corps in motion, pushed on ahead to the 
 field of battle. General Doubleday at once set to work to 
 meet the advancing enemy, and for another hour the work 
 of destruction went on, until the Federal line fell back to 
 Seminary Ridge. As Wadsworth fell back with his left, 
 and Archer pressed forward on his heels, the right of our 
 division was swung around in the rear of the pursuers, 
 enveloping the Confederate advance, and making prisoners 
 of General Archer and several hundred of his men.* 
 
 for awhile in a little house on the Emmittsburg road. In the heat of the 
 battle it was put into an ambulance and taken by his faithful orderly and a 
 small escort to the nearest railroad station, whence it was borne to Baltimore, 
 thence to Philadelphia, and finally to Lancaster, his former home. Here, on 
 the fourth of July, while the defeated hosts of rebellion were seeking safety 
 in flight, it was interred in the tranquil cemetery, where he lies in the midst 
 of his family, near the scenes of his childhood, and in the soil of his native 
 state. 
 
 * Colonel Swallow, in the Southern Bivouac of December, 1SS5, in an in- 
 teresting article on the first day's battle of Gettysburg, thus relates the cir- 
 cumstances of the capture of General Archer and part of his command. The 
 account is of value, not only for the details of this event, but for the circum- 
 ' stantial description of the opening of the great series of battles at this place 
 from a Confederate standpoint. His account is as follows : 
 
 "The division of General Heth, of A. P. Hill's Corps, which began the 
 battle of Gettysburg, was composed of four brigades, as follows : Archer's 
 Tennessee brigade, Davis' Mississippi brigade, Pettigrew's North Carolina 
 brigade, and Brockenborough's Virginia brigade. Archer's Tennessee brigade 
 was composed of the First, Seventh, and Fourteenth Tennessee regiments, 
 Thirteenth Alabama and Fifth Alabama battalion. In marching down the 
 Chambersburg pike on Wednesday morning to Gettysburg, Archer's Tennes- 
 see brigade was in the advance. Willoughby's Run crosses the Chambers- 
 burg pike about a mile and a half from town, and runs south toward the 
 Emmittsburg road. Now, as Archer's men were marching on toward the 
 town, nothing transpired until they came within two miles of the town, when 
 the pickets of General Buford's dismounted cavalry were first seen along the 
 road, and to the right and left of it, hy the Seventh Tennessee regiment. 
 
 "The Fifth Alabama battalion was deployed at once to the right of the 
 Chambersburg pike as skirmishers. General Archer with his brigade now 
 
266 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 At length, shortly after eleven o'clock, the two remaining" 
 divisions of Reynolds' Corps came upon the field, together 
 with Cooper's, Stewart's, Reynolds', and Stevens' batteries. 
 General Doubleday's own division, then commanded by 
 General Rowley, was at once taken to the front and placed 
 in position; the division of General Robinson was. placed 
 in reserve at the seminary. Pender's Confederate division 
 had also by this time come up from Marsh Creek, and was 
 formed in the rear of Heth. The Confederate batteries, 
 too, were posted on the ridge west of "Willoughby's Run, 
 as well as upon every other commanding position, the fire 
 from which swept the field in every direction and proved 
 terribly destructive. 
 
 At half- past eleven o'clock a. m., General Howard, in 
 
 formed in the rear of his skirmish line. At the same time Davis' Mississippi 
 brigade formed in line on the left of the pike, and, moving forward in this 
 order, Archer's men pushed in Buford's pickets for a half a mile or more, 
 when the pickets suddenly disappeared, and the advance division of Rey- 
 nolds' Corps loomed into view. 
 
 "This advance force of Reynolds were the two brigades of Wadsworth's 
 division, commanded by Cutler and Meredith. This force, when first seen 
 by Archer's men, seemed to be in some confusion, and were apparently get- 
 ting into position. General Wadsworth took three regiments of Cutler's 
 brigade, with a battery, and placed them to the Federal right of the Chani- 
 bersburg road, and between the road and an unfinished railroad cut, which 
 ran parallel with the turnpike into town. This force was diredtly in front of 
 Davis' Mississippi brigade, who held Heth's left. The remainder of Rey- 
 nolds' force, composed of the two remaining regiments of Cutler's brigade 
 and all of Meredith's brigade, was posted to the right of the Chambersburg 
 pike and almost in front of General Archer. He placed Meredith's brigade 
 on our right flank. It was protected by a strip of woods. Archer's men 
 were pushing ahead, and had advanced to near Willoughby's Run, when 
 Reynolds' force first came in sight. 
 
 "Archer now waited some moments, until his artillery came up, when the 
 first gun was fired and the battle of Gettysburg was begun. The first man 
 killed on the Confederate side was Henry Raison, Company B, Seventh Ten- 
 nessee. He fell dead on the skirmish line. The company was commanded 
 by Captain John Allen. 
 
 "It is a coincidence that Archer's Tennessee brigade, which opened the 
 battle, was the brigade that, in Heth's division, but then commanded by Pet- 
 
HOWARD ASSUMES COMMAND. 267 
 
 advance of his troops, came upon the field, and, ignorant 
 of the death of Reynolds, sent messengers in search of 
 him, and asking for instructions. While waiting the re- 
 turn of his aids, he went to the top of the college, which 
 is situated about half a mile a little north of east of 
 the theological seminary, to reconnoiter the surrounding 
 country. His aid, Major Biddle, soon came hack and 
 reported the sad intelligence of the fall of Reynolds, and 
 that the command now devolved upon himself. He at 
 once assumed the command, turning over his corps to 
 General Carl Schurz. It is claimed that while upon the 
 top of the college General Howard saw the advantages of 
 Cemetery Hill, and at once gave orders to halt Steinwehr's 
 division of his corps there, and form a strong line, sup- 
 ported by artillery, as a rallying place in case of defeat 
 
 tigrew — in what is known as Pickett's charge — burst into the Federal breast- 
 works in front of Hancock's Corps with desperate valor. It was the tattered 
 remnant of this same brigade that fought the last battle north of the Poto- 
 mac, at Falling Waters, on the line of the retreat, when General Pettigrew, 
 then in command of Heth's division, was killed, dying while defending the 
 lives of the sick and wounded of his command, whom the fortunes of war 
 had committed to his care. 
 
 "As soon as Archer's artillery opened, his command crossed Willoughby's 
 Run, driving the enemy before them — who were disputing its passage — into a 
 skirt of woods. Here they were again attacked by the Confederates, who 
 moved on rapidly, firing while advancing. General Reynolds, who had 
 placed a brigade on Archer's extreme right, concealed by a wood, seeing a 
 part of Archer's brigade on the east side of the run ordered a charge, and 
 Meredith's brigade swept down on the Confederates rapidly, and those that 
 had crossed the run were captured — probably about two hundred — including 
 General Archer. While this was going on General Reynolds, the Federal 
 commander, while brandishing his sword and issuing orders, was observed by 
 one of Heth's sharp-shooters, concealed in a tree, who instantly raised his 
 rifle and shot him dead. This took place behind the seminary and near 
 Willoughby's Run. 
 
 "After Archer and his men were captured, the remainder of his brigade 
 fell back some distance to a new position, and awaited the arrival of Pettigrew 
 and Brockenborough. Atthe same time the Fourteenth Brooklyn and Ninety- 
 fifth New York, who had contested the passage of the run, now changed 
 
268 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 upon the position they then occupied. For this act he 
 received the thanks of Congress. 
 
 The claim made for General Howard that he was the 
 first of the Union generals to perceive the advantages of 
 Cemetery Hill, is disputed by some, who give this credit to 
 General Reynolds. Reynolds' claim rests on the following 
 statement, made by General Doubleday: "Buford gave 
 way slowly, taking advantage of every accident of ground 
 to protract the struggle. After an hour's fighting he felt 
 anxious, and went up into the steeple of the theological 
 seminary, from which a wide view could be obtained, to 
 see if the First Corps was in sight. One division of it was 
 close at hand, and soon Reynolds, who had preceded it, 
 climbed up into the belfry to confer with him, and ex- 
 amine the country around. Although there is no positive 
 testimony to that effect, his attention was doubtless at- 
 tracted to Cemetery Ridge in his rear, as it was one of the 
 most prominent features of the landscape. An aid of 
 General Howard — presumably Major Hall — soon after 
 Reynolds descended from the belfry, came up to ask if he 
 had any instructions with regard to the Eleventh Corps. 
 
 front and attacked Davis' Mississippi brigade who, up to this time had been 
 driving the three regiments before them on our left. These three regiments 
 retreated down the Chambersburg pike to the eastern slope of Seminary 
 Ridge. 
 
 "When Davis found himself vigorously attacked in flank, his command 
 moved a little further to the left and rushed into an unfinished railroad cut, 
 which extended all along the Chambersburg pike into the town. Now, when 
 these three regiments, who had been driven down the Chambersburg pike by 
 Davis' command, leaving their battery behind them, discovered the position 
 he was in, they hastily returned, and joining their former associates surround- 
 ed the Mississippians in that plight and captured some six hundred of them. 
 
 "All these occurrences had taken place by twelve o'clock, or perhaps a 
 little after, and they may properly be considered as the beginning of the 
 Gettysburg conflict." 
 
SELECTION OF CEMETERY HILL. 269 
 
 Reynolds, in reply, directed that General Howard bring 
 his corps forward and form them on Cemetery Hill as a 
 reserve. General Howard has no recollection of having 
 received any such orders, but as he did get orders to come 
 forward, and as his corps was to occupy some place in the 
 rear, as a support to the First Corps, nothing is more prob- 
 able than that General Reynolds directed him to go there; 
 for its military advantages were obvious enough to any 
 experienced commander. Major Rosengarten, of General 
 Reynolds' staff, states positively that he was present and 
 heard the order given for Howard to post his troops on 
 Cemetery Ridge. The matter is of some moment, as the 
 position in question - ultimately gave us the victory, and 
 Howard received the thanks of Congress for selecting it. 
 It is not to be supposed that either Howard or Rosengarten 
 would misstate the matter. It is quite probable that Rey- 
 nolds chose the hill simply as a position upon which to 
 rally his force if driven back, and Howard selected it as a 
 suitable battle-field for the army. It has been universally 
 conceded that it was admirably adapted for that purpose." * 
 Professor Jacobs, in his Rattle of Gettysburg, page 25, 
 says: "Early in the morning the hills around Gettys- 
 burg had been carefully examined by the general and his 
 signal officers. At half past eight o'clock a. m., one of 
 these officers was on the college cupola making observa- 
 tions, when his attention was specially directed to that hill 
 by one of the officers of the college, as being of the highest 
 strategic importance, and commanding the whole country 
 around for many miles. Doubtless he had satisfied himself 
 of the pre-eminent advantages it offered as a position of 
 
 * General Doubleday's " Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, " pages 126, 127. 
 
270 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 offense and defense, and therefore determined to take and 
 hold it." Professor Jacobs does not say what general this 
 was. As the survey of the surroundings of Gettysburg 
 was made early in the morning, and the observations from 
 the college cupola occurred at half past ten o'clock a. m., 
 it could not have been either Reynolds or Howard, for the 
 former did not reach the town until nine o'clock and the 
 latter until half past eleven. The only general then in or 
 near the place was Buford, and the suggestion to hold 
 Cemetery Ridge may have been first made by him. 
 
 General Howard at once saw that the First Corps was 
 contending against large odds, and sent back for the 
 Eleventh Corps to come forward as quickly as possible. 
 He also sent a dispatch to General Meade, who was then 
 at Taneytown, thirteen miles distant, informing him of 
 the death of General Reynolds, of the large Confederate 
 force present, and the probability that Lee was concen- 
 trating his whole army at that point, as well as the favor- 
 able position there for a battle. Dispatches were also sent 
 to General Slocum, who, with the Twelfth Corps, had left 
 Littlestown early in the morning and was then resting 
 at Two Taverns, five miles south of Gettysburg, and to 
 General Sickles, who had marched from Bridgeport to Em- 
 mittsburg, informing them of the perilous position of the 
 First and Eleventh Corps, and urgently calling upon them 
 to hasten to their assistance. Owing to the direction of 
 the wind, the sound of the guns did not reach Taneytown, 
 and General Meade was not aware that a portion of his 
 army had met the enemy, and that Reynolds had fallen, 
 until one o'clock p. m., when Howard's courier arrived. 
 Upon the reception of this dispatch he sent General Han- 
 
GENERAL HANCOCK PLACED IN COMMAND. 271 
 
 cock to the front, with orders to assume command of all 
 the troops, and to report to him concerning the nature of 
 the ground there, and the practicability of fighting a suc- 
 cessful battle at that place.* General Meade has been 
 blamed for sending General Hancock to supersede officers 
 who were his superiors in rank. His justification for 
 doing this is as follows : Congress had passed an act author- 
 izing the President to put any general over any other su- 
 perior in rank if, in his judgment, the good of the service 
 demanded it, and General Meade then assumed this power 
 
 in the name of the President, believing that the exigencies 
 of the situation required it. That there was not the best 
 of feeling existing between some of the general officers 
 then at the front is painfully evident in some of their 
 actions and writings. General Buford was doubtless 
 aware of this when he penned the following dispatch to 
 General Meade: 
 
 Head - quarters First Cavalry Division, 
 July ist, 1S63, — 3:20 p. m. 
 General Reynolds was killed early this morning. In my opinion there 
 seems to be no directing person. John BuFORD.f 
 
 •*'The following is General Meade's order to Hancock, through his chief 
 of staff, General Butterfield, to proceed to the front and assume command 
 and report upon the position there for a battle: 
 
 Head -quarters Army of the Potomac, 
 
 July 1, 1:10 p. m., 1863. 
 Commanding Officer of the Second Corps (Hancock): 
 
 The Major -General Commanding has just informed me that General Rey- 
 nolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the 
 command of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, 
 and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds' death, 
 you assume command of the corps there assembled, viz. : the Eleventh, the 
 First, and the Third, at Emmittsburg. If you consider the ground and posi- 
 tion there a better one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will 
 so advise the general, and he will order all the troops up. You know the 
 general's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone 
 out to see General Reynolds. D. Butterfield, 
 
 Major- General and Chief of Staff. 
 
 f Colonel James G. Biddle, in Annals of the War, page 210. 
 
272' THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 General Slocura declined, without orders from Meade, 
 to go to the assistance of the First and Eleventh corps, 
 lie was aware of the commanding general's circular fixing 
 upon Pipe Creek for the field of battle, and he probably 
 thought it unwise to bring on a general engagement else- 
 where. Not so, however, with Sickles. He, too, had re- 
 ceived Meade's circular, and when, at two o'clock P. M., 
 Howard's dispatch calling for assistance was received, he 
 was for a time perplexed. From indications on the day 
 previous, it was feared that the enemy would attempt to 
 flank the Union line by its left by way of Fairfield and 
 Ernmittsburg, and he was under orders from the com- 
 mander-in-chief to hold the latter place at all hazards. 
 Through General Tremaine, one of his aids, he had re- 
 ceived but a short time before a suggestion from General 
 Reynolds that he had better come to the front, but no 
 positive order to that effect. And now when Howard's 
 dispatch was received he at once determined to hasten to 
 the rescue; and leaving two brigades and a battery to hold 
 Ernmittsburg, he put the balance of his corps in* motion 
 for Gettysburg, arriving there just as the broken and 
 shattered survivors of the First and Eleventh corps were 
 taking their new position upon Cemetery and Culp's hills. 
 A letter was also sent to General Meade informing him 
 of what he had done, and asking his approval of it, which 
 approval was subsequently given.* 
 
 "We turn again to the field of strife to note what was 
 transpiring there. Nearly two hours of desperate fighting 
 had taken place since the two divisions of Reynolds' Corps 
 
 *It has recently been charged that General Sickles had received, at one 
 o'clock A. M. of this day, an order from General Reynolds to proceed at day- 
 light to Gettysburg, which he deliberately disobeyed. This subject will be 
 considered at length in Appendix C. 
 
APPROACH OP RODES AND EARLY. 273 
 
 .had reached the field in aid of the first. During this time 
 hundreds were slain and many more wounded, but the 
 patriot troops were holding their own. At length, at one 
 o'clock p. M., the head of the Eleventh Corps reached Get- 
 tysburg. Schimmelpfennig's division led the way, followed 
 by that of Schurz, now temporarily commanded by Bar- 
 low, — Schurz taking command of the corps while Rey- 
 nolds commanded the field. These two divisions were 
 directed to prolong the line of the First Corps along Sem- 
 inary Ridge. The remaining division under Steinwehr, 
 with the reserve artillery under Major Osborne, were or- 
 dered to occupy Cemetery Hill, in the rear, or south of 
 Gettysburg, as a reserve. 
 
 "While these newly arrived troops were taking the posi- 
 tions assigned them, Buford's scouts reported the approach 
 of a large Confederate force from the north, directly upon 
 the right of the Federal line. It will be remembered that 
 Rodes' division from Carlisle and Early's from York had 
 reached Heidlersburg, ten miles north of Gettysburg, the 
 previous evening. These were the troops approaching. 
 Lee's orders to Ewell were to recall these two divisions 
 and have them concentrate about Cashtown. In accord- 
 ance with this order they left their encampment at Heid- 
 lersburg about ten o'clock a. m., — Early proceeding upon 
 one road and Rodes by the one diverging to the right and 
 leading by Middletown to Cashtown. While en route to 
 that place, the sound of cannonading in the direction of 
 Gettysburg was heard, and at Middletown, seven miles 
 north-west of the first named place, General Ewell, who 
 was traveling with Rodes, hearing that Hill's troops were 
 marching toward Gettysburg, in the exercise of a dis- 
 
274 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 cretion which is sometimes allowable, turned the head 
 of his column in the same direction. The increasing- 
 sound of the guns, as he approached the town, convinced 
 him that the Federals were there in force, and caused him 
 to make immediate preparation for the battle. * 
 
 At half past one o'clock p. m., a battery belonging to 
 Rodes' division reached Oak Hill, an eminence about one 
 mile north-east of the seminary, and opened fire. At the 
 same time Rodes' infantry moved forward into position. 
 They were formed across Seminary Ridge, facing south, 
 with Iverson's brigade on the right, supported by Daniels 
 and O'jSTeil in the center, and Dole on the left. Ramseur 
 was held in reserve. "While these preparations were being 
 hurriedly made by the Confederates, similar preparations 
 were being made by the newly arrived divisions of the 
 Eleventh Corps, the last of whom only reached the field at 
 forty -five minutes after one o'clock p. m. Colonel Taylor, 
 of Lee's staff, in the same article previously referred to, 
 further says: "On reaching the scene of conflict, Gen* 
 eral Rodes made his dispositions to assail the force with 
 which Hill's troops were engaged, but no sooner were his 
 lines formed than he perceived fresh troops of the enemy 
 extending their right flank, and deploying in his immedi- 
 ate front. With this force he was soon actively engaged, 
 and the contest became sharp and earnest." 
 
 "When it was known that Rodes and Early were approach- 
 ing the field, General Howard sent another urgent request 
 to General Slocum, who with his magnificent corps was 
 but five miles distant and resting in the fields, to hasten to 
 their assistance; and as these powerful accessions to the 
 
 * Colonel W. H. Taylor, of H,ce's staff, in Annals of tli 
 
SLOCUM'S REFUSAL OF AID. 275 
 
 Confederate force entered into the engagement, messenger 
 after messenger bore with tremendous speed appeals for 
 help, hut it came not. At length when Howard saw that 
 the crisis was approaching, he sent his brother, Major 
 Charles Howard, a member of his staff, to urge Slocum 
 to come iu person if he would not send his troops. To 
 this last appeal General Slocum replied that he "declined 
 to go to the front or take any responsibility, as he under- 
 stood that General Meade did not wish to bring on a 
 general engagement."* General Slocum had before this 
 proven himself to be a good soldier, and on the following j 
 two days did excellent service, as well as subsequently to 
 the close of the war. lie doubtless felt that he had suf- j 
 ficient reasons for his course that day, but history will 
 record his refusal to hasten to the relief of his imperilled 
 comrades as a grave error. His conduct contrasts widely 
 with that of Sickles. General Sickles had also received 
 Meade's circular indicating Pipe Creek as the ground 
 chosen for battle, and was at Emmittsburg on his way to 
 Middleburgh to take the position assigned him in the in- j 
 tended line, when he received at that place Howard's • 
 dispatch stating the situation at the front and urgently > 
 calling upon him for assistance. Had he, like Slocum, | 
 adhered to the letter of his instructions, which were only 
 given to provide for a possible contingency, he, too, would 
 have paid no attention to the call of his imperilled com- 
 rades; but his heroic soul responded to the appeal, and he 
 at once set his columns in motion. 
 
 After the arrival of Itodcs and the formation of his 
 
 * Charles Carleton Coffin, in "The Boys of '61," page 272. See also the 
 "History of the Pennsylvania Reserves," page 453, and Greeley's "American 
 Conflidt.," volume 2, page 373. 
 
276 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 troops, confronting those of the Eleventh Corps, which 
 had reached the field but a short time before, the battle 
 raged with varied results for over an hour, when, at 
 three o'clock p. m., Early came in upon Rodes' left and 
 struck the Union right. Almost simultaneously with 
 this, Pender's division of Hill's Corps, which had been in 
 reserve, came in upon the extreme left of the line, and 
 both flanks being turned, retreat or capture became in- 
 evitable. Rodes, observing the effect of Early's attack, 
 ordered his line forward and the Union lines were broken. 
 The right, which was considerably wearied by their hurried 
 march from Emmittsburg, and had borne the fierce 
 onslaughts of Rodes' and Early's divisions, was the first 
 to yield. It fell back steadily and in tolerable order, cov- 
 ered to some extent by Buford's cavalry, until the town 
 was reached, when it was thrown into inextricable con- 
 fusion as the men became intermingled in the various 
 cross streets, during which several thousand of them were 
 captured. In the meantime the sturdy left wing, which 
 had stood like a wall of adamant against the foe since 
 morning, was also compelled to fall back before Pender's 
 tremendous onslaught. In vain the heroic Doubleday and 
 Robinson and Wadsworth attempted to stay the tide. To 
 remain longer under such a withering fire, with their left 
 overlapped by Pender a quarter of a mile, was certain 
 death or capture. The retreat of this part of the force, 
 however, was conducted in a more orderly manner than 
 the right, the men firing and falling back and at length 
 reaching Cemetery Hill through the suburbs of the town. 
 Some idea of the losses sustained by the patriot forces that 
 day may be inferred from the fact that Wads worth's di- 
 
A DEED OF HEROISM. 277 
 
 vision entered the fight with four thousand men and came 
 out of it with but sixteen hundred. Rowley's division also 
 suffered almost as severely, and Stone reported that two 
 thirds of his brigade had fallen. Severe and terrible, how- 
 ever, as were the losses of the Union troops, the Con- 
 federates suffered as severely in killed and wounded.* In 
 prisoners taken, the Federals lost most, chieiiy in the 
 numbers taken in Gettysburg, among whom were their 
 wounded, who had been taken there from the field. 
 
 Deeds of heroism were displayed, during the engagement 
 of this day, that deserve everlasting remembrance. The 
 following only, related by Colonel Swallow, a Confederate 
 officer and eye-witness, can be given. The Colonel says: 
 
 " A little to the left of Hays' command, a tattered Federal 
 regiment faced to the right and attempted to make a stand. 
 But in a very few moments, overcome by the hopelessness, 
 if not the folly, of their position, the greater part turned 
 and fled. Just at this moment a most gallant young officer, 
 riding bravely forward, waving his hat and brandishing 
 his sword, cried out, 'Don't run, men; none but cowards 
 run.' Some of our men cried out, 'Don't shoot that 
 man; don't shoot him.' Several companies swung around 
 with the intention of capturing him and his little band 
 of heroes, when a volley fired from the right struck him, 
 and he tumbled dead from his horse, to fill up the long, sad 
 roll of the unknown. General Hays, who was near at the 
 time, expressed his deep regret when the gallant hero fell." 
 
 The broken and defeated but not demoralized patriots, 
 who had been compelled to fall back before over.whelm- 
 
 *As evidence that the Confederates also lost heavily this day, I quote from 
 General Heth's official report. The general himself was severely wounded. 
 He says: " In less than twenty-five minutes my division lost, in killed and 
 wounded, over twenty -seven hundred men." 
 
278 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 ing numbers, at length reached the Hill of Refuge, south 
 of Gettysburg, where, by the prudent forethought of that 
 Christian soldier, General Howard, a rallying place had 
 been prepared. Steinwehr's division had been formed in 
 double lines, and artillery placed so as to command every 
 approach by the north, and as our wearied men approached 
 l s,;;i;;,;,:. ^„,-, , : - ■ ■■ ■,,■ , -.,.,- ■■■■. : ■■■ ",: ■■-.■■■■■■ ■ -- 
 
 EAST CEMETERY HILL, UPON WHICH THE UNION FORCES WERE 
 
 RALLIED 
 From a Photograph by Tipton. 
 
 they were rallied and placed in position by Howard, Stein- 
 wehr, Schurz, and Hancock, who had now come up. And 
 as the pursuing Confederates pushed up through the fields to 
 the northern slope of the hill, Weidrick's battery poured 
 grape and canister upon them, compelling them to halt. 
 It was about half past four p. m. when the defeated 
 
FEDERAL TROOPS RALLY. 279 
 
 troops of the First and Eleventh corps reached Cemetery 
 Hill; and about the same time General Hancock arrived, 
 who, in obedience to Meade's order directing him to pro- 
 ceed to Gettysburg and examine the position chosen by 
 Howard, as also to take command of all the forces there, 
 had huriied to the front and arrived at this most critical 
 period. General Hancock informed Howard of his in- 
 structions, and at once s$t about rallying the men and 
 placing them in position to meet any attack the enemy 
 might make. * 
 
 General Hancock, after a brief survey of the position 
 chosen, was much pleased with it, and immediately dis- 
 patched to the commander-in-chief that it was admirably 
 adapted for lighting a defensive battle, but* liable to be 
 turned by way of Enmiittsburg, and that he would hold 
 on until he could arrive and judge for himself. This dis- 
 patch reached General Meade at half past six p. m. Be- 
 fore it arrived, however, General Meade, satisfied from the 
 reports brought by officers returning from the field, that 
 Lee was concentrating his whole army there, issued orders 
 to the Fifth and Twelfth corps to proceed to that place; 
 
 "* General Doubleday, in his "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg - , " page 151, 
 says that when General Hancock informed Howard of General Meade's order 
 superseding him, that quite a scene occurred, and that Howard for a time 
 refused to receive any orders from Hancock. Charles Carleton Coffin, in his 
 "Boys of '61," page 273, states it differently, as follows: "General Hancock 
 met General Howard and informed him of his instructions, saying-, ' General 
 Meade undoubtedly supposed that I was your senior, but you outrank me. ' 
 ' It is no time to talk about rank,' replied Howard, 'I shall most cheerfully 
 obey your instructions and do all in my power to co-operate with you.'" 
 Thus readily did General Howard waive the command, which was his by 
 right. As Mr. Coffin was much with General Howard, and enjoyed oppor- 
 tunities of ascertaining his feelings in regard to the matter at issue, and as his 
 statement is just what would be expected from a Christian and patriot, as 
 General Howard has proven himself to be, his version is more likely to be 
 accepted. 
 
280 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and when Hancock's dispatch arrived he sent out orders- 
 to all his corps commanders to move to Gettysburg-.* At 
 seven o'clock General Slocum reached the field, and, being 
 the senior officer, Hancock turned over the command to 
 him and went back to see General Meade at Taneytown 
 to inform him of the condition of affairs at the front. 
 
 CUSP'S HILI,, FROM EVERGREEN CEMETERY AND BALTIMORE PIKE. 
 From a Photograph by Tipton. 
 
 Reaching head - quarters at nine p. m., he was informed by 
 General Meade that he had decided to fight at Gettysburg, 
 and had given orders accordingly. At eleven p. m. both 
 generals, with the head - quarters staff, left Taneytown and 
 reached the front at one A. M. of the second of July. 
 
 During the brief time General Hancock was upon the 
 
 * Colonel James G. Biddle, in Annals of the War, page 211. 
 
DISPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL FORCES. 281 
 
 field — from half past four to seven P. M. — and ably as- 
 sisted by Generals Howard, Doubleday, and others, he 
 made the best disposition of the forces at his command 
 which he possibly could. "With magnificent judgment his 
 military genius took in the whole situation. Culp's Hill, 
 a commanding position about a half mile to the east, must 
 be held, and Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, or 
 rather what was left of it, was at once sent there. Round 
 Top, three miles to the south, did not escape his eagle eye, 
 and although he had not troops enough to extend the line 
 down to it, he at once sent Geary's division of the Twelfth 
 Corps, when it arrived, to take position there, one brigade 
 of which was thrown upon that eminence. The survivors 
 of the Eleventh Corps were placed in the front and right 
 center; and the remaining two divisions of the First Corps 
 joined the left of the Eleventh and extended the line 
 down on the left, toward Round Top. To this the cavalry 
 were joined. The line thus formed made a considerable 
 show of strength, but could easily have been broken, or 
 the position turned, had a determined effort been made. 
 This effort, how x ever, was not made, and Sickles' Corps 
 from Emmittsburg, and Slocum's from Two Taverns, com- 
 ing up about seven o'clock, the opportunity was lost. 
 The two Confederate divisions of Anderson and Johnson, 
 which soon after came upon the ground, again gave the 
 enemy the preponderance, but it was then too late in the 
 evening to make the attempt. 
 
 The new position chosen by the Union forces was one 
 of great strength, and had the Confederates followed up 
 the advantages gained, and stormed Cemetery Hill at once, 
 the results of the next two days fighting might have been 
 
THE CONFEDERATES LOSE AN OPPORTUNITY. 283 
 
 sadly different from what they were. Tliat this position 
 could have been carried, had an attack been promptly 
 made, is asserted by one entirely competent to judge, — 
 General Doubleday, who says, "Both Hill and Ewell had 
 received stunning blows during the day, and were disposed 
 to be cautious. They, therefore, did not press forward and 
 take the heights, as they could easily have done at this time."* 
 
 The failure of the Confederates to attack Cemetery and 
 Culp's hills in the three hours which intervened between 
 the time when the broken and shattered Federals took 
 possession, of them and the darkness of evening, was 
 fraught with consequences of such vast importance that 
 the reasons for it deserve special consideration. The fol- 
 lowing, taken from the highest and most important 
 sources, is to the point. General Doubleday, in the same 
 connection above referred to, says: 
 
 " General Lee reached the field before Hancock came, 
 and watched the retreat of the First and Eleventh corps, 
 and Hancock's movements and dispositions, through his 
 field glass. He was not deceived by the show of force, 
 and sent a recommendation — not an order — to Ewell to 
 follow us up; but Ewell, in the exercise of his discretion 
 as a corps commander, did not do so. He had lost three 
 thousand men, and both he and Hill were under orders 
 not to bring on a general engagement. In fact they 
 had had all the fighting they desired for the time being. 
 Colonel Campbell Brown, of Ewell's staff, states that the 
 latter was preparing to move forward against the height, 
 when a false report induced him to send Gordon's brigade 
 to reinforce Smith's brigade on his extreme left, to meet a 
 
 ^'General Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 152. 
 
284 THE GREAT INVASION 
 
 supposed Union advance in that direction. The absence 
 of these two brigades decided him to wait for the arrival 
 of Johnson's division before taking further action. "When 
 the latter came up, Slocum and Sickles were on the ground, 
 and the opportunity for a successful attack had passed." 
 Colonel "W. H. Taylor, Lee's adjutant -general, says: 
 "General Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through 
 Gettysburg, and up the hills beyond. He then directed me 
 to go to General Ewell, and say to him that, from the posi- 
 tion which he occupied, he could see the enemy retreating 
 over those hills, without organization, and in great confu- 
 sion ; that it was only necessary to press ' those people ' in 
 order to secure possession of the heights; and that, if 
 possible, he wished him to do this. In obedience to these 
 instructions, I proceeded immediately to General Ewell, 
 and delivered the order of General Lee; and, after receiv- 
 ing from him some message for the commanding general 
 in regard to the prisoners captured, returned to the latter,. 
 and reported that his order had been delivered. General 
 Ewell did not express any objection, or indicate the exist- 
 ence of any impediment; to the execution of the order con- 
 veyed to him, but left the impression on my mind that it 
 would be executed. In the exercise of that discretion, 
 however, which General Lee was accustomed to accord to 
 his lieutenants, and probably because of an undue regard 
 for his admonition, given early in the day, not to precipi- 
 tate a general engagement, General Ewell deemed it un- 
 wise to make the pursuit. The troops were not moved 
 forward, and the enemy proceeded to occupy and fortify the 
 position which it was designed that General Ewell should 
 seize. Major -General Edward Johnson, whose division 
 
FATAL MISTAKE OF CONFEDERATE GENERALS. 285 
 
 readied the field after the engagement, and formed on the 
 left of Earl} 7 , in a conversation had with me, since the 
 war, about this circumstance, in which I sought an expla- 
 nation ot our inaction at that time, assured me that there 
 was no hinderance to his moving forward; bat that, after 
 getting his command in line of battle, and before it be- 
 came seriously engaged, or had advanced any great dis- 
 tance, for some unexplained reason, he had received orders 
 to halt. This was after General Lee's message was de- 
 livered to General Ewell." * 
 
 General Ewell, in his official report, states his reasons 
 for not ordering the attack, which are as follows: 
 
 " The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position 
 that was known to us as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettys- 
 burg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On 
 entering the town I received a message from the com- 
 manding general to attack the hill if I could do so to ad- 
 vantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it; all the 
 troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching 
 and lighting, and I was notified that General Johnson was 
 close to the town with his division, the only one of my 
 corps that had not been engaged, Anderson's division of 
 the Third Corps having been halted to let them pass. 
 Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I de- 
 termined, with Johnson's division, to take possession of a 
 wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding 
 Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up, the Federals were 
 reported moving to our left flank — our extreme left— 
 and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that 
 direction. Before this report could be investigated by 
 
 * Colonel W. H. Taylor, in Annals of the War, pages 308, 309. 
 
286 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Lieutenant T. T. Turner of my staff and Lieutenant 
 Robert Early, sent to investigate it, and Johnson placed 
 in position, the night was far advanced." * 
 
 Napier Bartlett, Esq., in the " Military Annals of Louisi- 
 ana," speaking of the subject, says: 
 
 "General Hays had received orders, through General 
 Early, from General Ewell (though Lee's instructions were 
 subsequently the reverse), to halt at Gettysburg, and ad- 
 vance no further in case he should succeed in capturing 
 that place. But Hays now saw that the enemy were com- 
 ing around by what is known as the Baltimore road, and 
 were making for the heights — Cemetery Ridge. This 
 ridge meant life or death, and for the possession of it the 
 battles of the second and third were fought. * * * 
 Owing to the long detour the enemy was compelled to 
 make, it was obvious that he could not get his artillery in 
 position on the heights for one or two hours. The imme- 
 diate occupation of the heights by the Confederates, who 
 were in position to get there at the time referred to, was a 
 matter of vital importance. Hays recognized it as such, 
 and presently sent for Early. The latter thought as Hays, 
 but declined to disobey orders. At the urgent request of 
 General Hays, however, he sent for General Ewell. When 
 the latter arrived, many precious moments had been lost. 
 But the enemy, who did not see its value until the arrival 
 of Hancock, had not yet appeared in force." 
 
 General Longstreet, who cites the foregoing in proof 
 that the failure to follow up the advantages of the day by 
 attacking Cemetery Hill at once was one of the great mis- 
 takes at Gettysburg, further says: 
 
 * Annals of the War, page 435. 
 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONFEDERATE DELAY. 287 
 
 " General Hays told me, ten years after the battle, that 
 he could have seized the heights without the loss of ten 
 men. Here, then, we see General Early adhering to orders 
 when his own conviction told him he should not do so, 
 and refusing to allow General Hays to seize a point recog- 
 nized by him as of vast importance, because of technical 
 authority, at a moment when he admitted and knew that 
 disregard of the order would only have made more secure 
 the point at issue when the order was given." 
 
 Colonel Swallow, of the Confederate army, in the 
 Southern Bivouac of December, 1885, says: 
 
 "As there has been much acrimonious controversy on 
 the question as to why General Early did not advance and 
 occupy Gulp's Hill on "Wednesday evening, the writer, 
 who was on the spot and witnessed all that passed, will 
 relate what he knows of it. Before we met Hays, Captain 
 Hotchkiss, who saw what was going on (the efforts of the 
 Federals to occupy the hill), turned to the writer and Cap- 
 tain Brockenborough, saying, ' I will go at once and bring 
 General Early.' But when told that General Hays was 
 ahead of us, he rode up to him. The General was watch- 
 ing the Federals just then in the cemetery and trying to 
 reach the pike. Hays would have moved his brigade and 
 occupied Gulp's Hill had it not been that he and Gordon 
 had received positive orders from General Ewell, through 
 Early, not to advance beyond the town if they should suc- 
 ceed in capturing it. General Hays sent for Early and 
 pointed to him the importance of moving the whole 
 division on Culp's Hill, and occupying not only it, but the 
 Baltimore pike. General Early then said: ' I am satisfied 
 that you are right; it should be occupied on the spot, but 
 
288 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 I can not disobey orders,' and then, turning away from us a 
 few yards, said, more to himself than to Hays, ' If Jackson 
 were on the field I would act on the spot.' General Hays 
 then spoke a few animated words to Early, when the latter 
 said, 'You are right, General, you are right. I'll send to 
 Ewell for orders at once.' Early's division was now moved 
 up so as to support Hays in the occupancy of Culp's Hill 
 as soon as the orders came from Ewell. Moment after 
 moment passed away. They were restless and anxious 
 moments to us, who were watching what was going on in 
 our front. We saw the enemy drag a battery on the pike, 
 followed by a large force, and could see from their move- 
 ments their intentions. Regiment after regiment crossed 
 the pike and took a good position. They were lined up 
 in short order. Ewell arrived, but it was now too late. 
 The afternoon was far spent, and "Wadsworth's division 
 of Reynolds' Corps were on the heights before us in line of 
 battle. These were the same men who opened the battle 
 in the morning at Willoughby's Run. In this state of 
 things it was decided by General Ewell that it was not ex- 
 pedient to attack the enemy. While these things were 
 transpiring, Generals Lee and Longstreet were in the rear 
 of the line of battle. The question now is, why was not 
 Culp's Hill occupied on Wednesday evening? Where does 
 the responsibility rest for this fatal mistake, the first among 
 the reasons why Lee lost Gettysburg? Fatal as this mis- 
 take was, it was followed by others equally disastrous be- 
 fore the battle ended." * 
 
 * General Meade, in a letter to G. G. Benedict, of Burlington, Vermont, 
 dated March 16th, 1870, and published in the Philadelphia Press of August 
 nth, 1886, referring to a conversation he had with General Ewell since the 
 war upon this subject of occupying Culp's Hill, says: 
 
lee's perplexity. 289 
 
 General Lee explains his reason for not sending positive 
 orders to Ewell to attack the heights at once, as follows: 
 
 " The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's 
 force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to 
 await the arrival of the rest of the troops. Orders were 
 sent back to hasten their march, and, in the meantime, 
 every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and posi- 
 tions of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of 
 attack." 
 
 General Longstreet, in referring to some of the causes 
 of their failure in the Pennsylvania campaign, cites among 
 others General Lee's seeming loss of decision and equa- 
 nimity. The following are his words: 
 
 " There is no doubt that General Lee, during the crisis 
 
 "Lieutenant -General Ewell, in a conversation held with me shortly after 
 the war, asked what would have been the effect if, at four p. m. on the ist, 
 he had occupied Culp's Hill, and established batteries upon it. I told him 
 that, in my judgment, in the then condition of the Eleventh and First corps, 
 with their morale affected by their withdrawal to Cemetery Ridge, with the 
 loss of over half of their numbers in killed, wounded and missing (of the 
 six thousand prisoners we lost on the field, nearly all came from these corps 
 on the first day), his occupation of Culp's Hill, with batteries commanding 
 the whole of Cemetery Ridge, would have produced the evacuation of that 
 ridge and the withdrawal of the troops there, by the Baltimore pike and 
 Taneytown and Emmittsburg roads. He then informed me that at four P. M. 
 on the ist he had his corps, twenty thousand strong, in column of attack, 
 and on the point of moving on Culp's Hill, which he saw was unoccupied 
 and commanded Cemetery Ridge, when he received an order from General 
 Lee directing him to assume the defensive, and not to advance; that he sent 
 to General Lee urging to be permitted to advance with his reserves, but the 
 reply was a reiteration of the previous order. To my inquiry why Lee had 
 restrained him, he said our troops (Slocum's) were visible, and Lee was un- 
 der the impression that the greater part of my army was on the ground, and 
 deemed it prudential to await the rest of his." 
 
 Either General Meade's or Ewell's memory is at fault in the foregoing 
 statement. Johnson's division did not reach Gettysburg until about eight 
 o'clock in the evening, and at no time previous to that, nor at any time that 
 day, were the two divisions on the ground — Early's and Rodes' — in position 
 as General Ewell stated. If they were, all the authorities quoted are at fault, 
 la 
 
290 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 of that campaign, lost his matchless equipoise that usually 
 characterized him, and that whatever mistakes were made 
 were not so much matters of deliberate judgment as the 
 impulses of a great mind disturbed by unparalleled condi- 
 tions. General Lee was thrown from his balance (as is 
 shown by the statement of General Fitzhugh Lee) by too 
 great confidence in the powers of his troops, and (as is 
 shown by General Anderson's statement) by the deplorable 
 absence of General Stuart and the perplexity occasioned 
 thereby." 
 
 The statements of Generals Fitzhugh Lee and Ander- 
 son, referred to by General Longstreet in the foregoing, 
 are as follows. General Fitzhugh Lee says:' 
 
 "He (General Lee) told the father of the writer (his 
 brother) that he was controlled too far by the great confi- 
 dence he felt in the fighting qualities of his people, who 
 begged simply to be 'turned loose,' and by the assurances 
 of most of his higher officers." 
 
 General Anderson says: 
 
 "About ten o'clock in the morning (Wednesday, July 
 1st,) I received a message (at Cashtown, where I was rest- 
 ing with my division,) notifying me that General Lee de- 
 sired to see me. I found General Lee intently listening 
 to the fire of the guns, and very much depressed. At 
 length he said, more to himself than to me: 'I can not 
 think what has become of Stuart; I ought to have heard 
 from him long before now. He may have met with dis- 
 aster, but 1 hope not. In the absence of reports from him 
 I am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. 
 It may be the whole Federal army, or it may be only a 
 detachment. If it is the whole Federal force we must 
 
CLOSE OF FIRST DAY. 
 
 291 
 
 fight a battle here; if we do not gain a victory, those de- 
 files and gorges through which we passed this morning 
 will shelter us from disaster.' " * 
 
 Is it not evident that the reason why the advantages 
 gained by the first day's battle at Gettysburg were not 
 improved by an immediate attack upon Cemetery and 
 
 GENERAL LEU'S HEAD -QUARTERS. 
 From a Photograph by Beidel. 
 
 Gulp's bills, was because of doubt and confusion among 
 the leaders of the Confederate hosts? Plainly the God 
 of Nations was in it, and it was not the first time that 
 He caused confusion among the counsellors of rebellion, 
 that the nation they sought to overthrow might live, f 
 
 * Annals of the War, pages 420, 421. 
 •J" See I Samuel, xvii: 1-16. 
 
292 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 After the battle of this day, General Lee established his 
 head- quarters in a stone -house on the chambersburg 
 road, about a quarter of a mile from the Seminary, in 
 front of the division of General Ileth. The position gave 
 him a full view of Gettysburg, of his own army, and the 
 Federal line of battle. The General, during the succeed- 
 ing two days, took observations from the cupola of the 
 college. This building was occupied as a hospital, and 
 had the flag denoting that service at the time he so used it. 
 
 Having given the details of the first day's engagement, 
 as well as stated the condition existing when night fell 
 upon the scene, we next turn our attention to another 
 point and note what transpired there. As soon as it was 
 known at Harrisbu rg that the Confederates, who had been 
 threatening that place, had fallen back in the direction of 
 Gettysburg, General Smith, with several regiments of New 
 York and Pennsylvania militia, advanced to Carlisle. 
 Shortly after the arrival of these troops at that place, and 
 when the men were in the act of preparing their supper, 
 about three thousand cavalry -men of Stuart's Corps, under 
 command of General Fitzhugh Lee, advanced upon the 
 town from the direction of York. The militia- men at 
 once fled to arms, and cannon were planted to meet the 
 coming foe. Fitzhugh Lee was evidently disappointed 
 in finding that General Rodes had left the place, and 
 much disconcerted in finding himself confronted by a 
 Federal force, and at once, without any notice, opened 
 a fire of shell, round shot, and grape and canister upon the 
 town. After keeping this up for some time a flag of 
 truce was sent in, demanding the surrender of the place, 
 to which a most decided negative was given. The flag 
 
FEDERAL MOVEMENTS. 293 
 
 had hardly left when a second shelling was commenced, 
 which lasted until midnight. At ten o'clock the several 
 buildings upon the outskirts known as the United States 
 Barracks, were fired and entirely destroyed. After this 
 unwarranted act of firing into a town filled with helpless 
 women and children, without previous notice, the Con- 
 federates withdrew and again set out in search of their 
 army. Considerable damage was done by the shot and 
 shells thrown into the town, but no lives were lost. 
 
 Leaving that part of the Federal army which had 
 reached the field during this day and up to a late hour 
 in the night, actively engaged in preparation for the re- 
 newal of the conflict, we turn to those parts of it which 
 had not arrived, and note their location. The Second 
 Corps marched from Uniontown, where it had remained 
 since the evening of Monday, 29th, and passing through 
 Taneytown reached the vicinity of Gettysburg, where it 
 bivouacked until morning. The two brigades of the 
 Third Corps, which General Sickles had left to hold 
 Emmittsburg, when he marched at the call of Howard for 
 the field of battle with the remainder of his command, 
 remained at that place until an early hour in the morning; 
 the Fifth Corps marched from Union Mills by Hanover 
 and McSherrystown to Bonaughtown, five miles from 
 Gettysburg, and there encamped over night; and the Sixth 
 Corps was on its way from Manchester, marching all 
 night. Gregg's cavalry division, having left the same 
 place, encamped over night at Hanover, fourteen miles 
 from the field, while Huey's brigade returned to Man- 
 chester. Kilpatrick's division moved from Hanover by 
 Abbottsville to Berlin, sixteen miles from Gettysburg; and 
 
294 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Kenly's and Morris' brigades, of French's division, from 
 Maryland Heights, reached Frederick, where they re- 
 mained as a reserve until Saturday, July 4th, when they 
 marched to Turner's Pass in the South Mountain. 
 
 The Confederates were all in position that night except 
 the divisions of Hood and McLaws, which reached the 
 vicinity of Marsh Creek, four miles west of Gettysburg, 
 about midnight; and Pickett's division, which remained 
 about three miles above Chambersburg. Imboden's cav- 
 alry were about Greenwood; the brigades of W. E. Jones 
 and Beverly Robertson were below Shippensburg, and 
 Stuart was about Carlisle. 
 
 Thus the curtain of night fell upon the scene, hiding 
 from view the thousands of dead, wounded, and suffering 
 men of both armies, who lay scattered over the field. 
 The telegraph, meanwhile, carried the news of the sad re- 
 sults to the iial 'cause all over the loyal North, pro- 
 ducing gloom, anxiety and fear. Here we close this chap- 
 ter, proposing to resume the narrative with the incidents 
 of the morning;. 
 
CHAPTER TIT. 
 
 THE SECOND DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. — THURSDAY, 
 JULY 2D, 1863. 
 
 §jS" order to a correct understanding of the details of 
 the two days' battles which are yet to he given, it is 
 _ £ essential that the reader have an idea of the positions 
 A occupied by the two great contending- armies. They 
 i may be described as follows: Approaching- Gettys- 
 burg from the south -cast, by the Baltimore pike, we ascend 
 by a gradual slope a high ridge, which is in shape some- 
 what like a horse - shoe, with its left side or flange longer 
 than the other.* Upon this ridge, and conforming to its 
 natural outline, the Union line was established. The toe 
 of this horse -shoe reaches the southern ontskirt of the 
 town, and rests upon what is called Cemetery Hill, because 
 upon it the local cemetery of the town is situated. Its 
 right side, or flange, extends somewhat eastward and then 
 •curves sharply to the south, ending with Gulp's Hill — a 
 wooded and rocky eminence. f Rock Creek, a stream of 
 some considerable size, runs by its eastern base, and pass- 
 ing south, at length enters the Monocacy. This flank was 
 well protected by the nature of the slope, which is high 
 
 *The Federal line was somewhat in the shape of a. fish hook — its point 
 resting upon Culp's Hill; its curve, Cemetery Hill, and its heel, Round Top. 
 |A view of this place was given in the previous chapter. 
 
 295 
 
THE FEDERAL POSITION. 297 
 
 and commands the entire country around it. The distance 
 from the toe of the horse -shoe — the Federal center — to 
 the termination of the line at Rock Creek is about three 
 quarters of a mile. 
 
 The left side, or flange, which is considerably longer than 
 the right, follows the ridge in a south-westward direction, 
 and terminates at two high, well-defined, and rock -sided 
 hills, or cones, called Round Top and Big Round Top.* 
 The last named — Big Round Top — was the Federal left. 
 It is high, rocky, rugged, and exceedingly rough. Its 
 twin — Round Top, sometimes called Little Round Top, 
 because so much less than its brother by its side, and also 
 Weed's Hill, because General Weed was killed upon it 
 during the battle, — was a position of highest importance. 
 The artillery upon its summit commanded the entire 
 country around. In front of these two strangely formed 
 hills the ground is exceedingly rough, and covered here 
 and there with immense granite boulders; while the 
 western faces are but piles upon piles of the same rough 
 stones, making the scaling of them almost an impossibility. 
 Behind these hills the ground gently slopes toward the 
 east, and afforded an excellent protection to the reserves 
 and ammunition trains. From the toe of the horse -shoe 
 — the Federal center — to this, its left heel, was about 
 three miles. The ridge between the center and the ex- 
 treme left is a continuation of Cemetery Hill, and di- 
 minishes in height as it runs southward. Near the base 
 of Little Round Top it flattens out into a plain. This 
 was the weakest point in the Federal position, but it 
 was completely covered by the guns on the hill. The 
 
 *These hills are finely illustrated in the preceding chapter. 
 
SUPERIORITY OF THE FEDERAL POSITION. 290 
 
 Baltimore pike runs diagonally from the south-east 
 through the horse -shoe and comes out at its toe. The 
 Taneytown road enters from the south and crosses the 
 ridge and extends along the line, intersecting the Balti- 
 more pike a little beyond the toe. The road from Em- 
 mittshurg comes in from the south-west, and runs nearly 
 parallel with the Union line, and unites with the Baltimore 
 pike near the same place. 
 
 About three quarters of a mile west of Cemetery Hill is 
 ' Seminary Ridge, which runs nearly parallel with the left 
 of the Union position, to its center. The illustration 
 given affords a fine view of this ridge down to the right of 
 Hill's Corps; the continuation of it down to opposite Big- 
 Bound Top is sriven in the illustration, "A view from Lit- 
 tle Round Top, looking west," in chapter xni. Along the 
 wooded crest of this ridge the Confederate line was formed 
 up to a point above the town, and from thence it continued 
 upon elevated ground across the Federal center and ter- 
 minated at Wolf Hill, opposite Culp's Hill. From the ex- 
 treme right of this line, which considerably over- lapped 
 the Federal left opposite Round Top, to Wolf Hill, its ex- 
 treme left, was about four and a half or five miles. 
 
 The superiority of the Federal position will be readily 
 seen in the descriptions of the two thus given. Cemetery 
 Hill formed the apex of the triangle on which the Union 
 forces were stationed. It perfectly commanded the town, 
 and the entire country over which the Confederates must 
 pass to attack their center, as well as the right or left of 
 their line. The Federal lines gradually diverging from this 
 central tower of strength to the south-west and south - 
 oast, formed the sides of this triangle, outside of which, 
 
300 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and therefore upon a larger triangle, the enemy was com- 
 pelled to operate. This gave the Federals the incalculable 
 advantage of moving on an interior and shorter line, and 
 enabled them to throw their reserves with rapidity to any 
 place along the line, either east or west, where they might 
 be needed. Such, then, were the positions of the two 
 armies; we will now turn our attention to the prepara- 
 tions made during the night and early morning for the 
 renewal of the conflict. 
 
 At the close of the previous day the Confederate forces 
 then upon the field were posted as follows: Ewell's Corps 
 occupied Gettysburg, the line extending from Rock Creek 
 on the south-east to Seminary Ridge on the west. John- 
 son's division, which had come up by way of Greenwood 
 in advance of the great wagon train referred to in a previ- 
 ous chapter, and only reached the front about dusk, was 
 placed on the left, opposite Culp's Hill. Early joined 
 Johnson and extended the line to the Federal Center; 
 and Rodes, uniting with Early's right, and occupying 
 Middle street through the town, extended the line to 
 Seminary Ridge. Hill's Corps took position on the ridge 
 in the following order: On the left, and resting on the 
 Chambersburg road, was Ileth; next came Render, and 
 then Anderson. The latter had been halted at Cashtown, 
 which he had reached the evening before, to permit 
 Johnson to pass, and consequently did not reach the field 
 to participate in the engagement of that day. Such were 
 the positions of the Confederate forces that night, and 
 up to the time in the afternoon of the following day 
 (Thursday), when McLaws' and Hood's divisions arrived 
 from Marsh Creek, which they had reached about mid- 
 
THE FEDERALS TAKE THEIR POSITIONS. 301 
 
 night, and were placed upon the extreme right, opposite 
 Little and Big Round Top. 
 
 When General Hancock, at 4:30 P. M., reached the front, 
 in accordance with the order of General Meade, after as- 
 sisting in rallying the troops as they fell back from the 
 field west and north of Gettysburg to the new position, 
 which by General Howard's happy forethought had been 
 selected and prepared for them, he at once saw the im- 
 portance of Culp's Hill and Round Top, and, as stated in 
 the previous chapter, sent Wadsworth's division of the 
 First Corps to occupy the first named, and Geary's division 
 of the Twelfth Corps to the latter. The remainder of the 
 First Corps and the Eleventh were placed upon Ceme- 
 tery Hill, — the First Corps under General Newton, who 
 had just reached the front and had been assigned the 
 command by General Meade, on the right center; while the 
 Eleventh under Howard occupied the center. At seven 
 o'clock Sickles' Corps, with the exception of two brigades 
 which he had left to hold Enimittsburg, upon receiving 
 Howard's dispatch calling for assistance, and the Twelfth 
 Corps under Slocum, reached the field, and were assigned 
 to positions. The Third filed into line on the left of the 
 Eleventh, extending the line along the left centre, and 
 the Twelfth, with the exception of Geary's division, took 
 position on Culp's Hill. Stannard's Vermont brigade also 
 arrived and reported to the commander of the First Corps, 
 to which they were assigned, and were placed in reserve 
 behind the center. 
 
 The commander in chief, as stated in the previous chapter, 
 arrived upon the field an hour after midnight; namely, one 
 o'clock a. m. of Thursday, July 2d. In company with Howard 
 
302 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and other general officers, he rode along the line and in- 
 spected the position.'* 1 He also directed his troops to erect 
 such defensive works as were possible before the opening 
 of the expected battle; wherever, therefore, the ground 
 was sufficiently open, musketry trenches and rifle pits were 
 dug; cover for the artillery was thrown up wherever it 
 
 FEDERAL BREASTWORKS UPON CULP'S HIIX. 
 Prom a Photograph by Tiptoa, 
 
 was practicable; trees were felled, stones piled up, and 
 every possible means of proteetion was provided.* Few, 
 indeed, were the moments given to sleep throughout that 
 night by either officers or privates, although they were 
 
 -Some of these defensive works j^et remain. The breastworks upon Culp's 
 Hill are shown in the accompanying- illustration. The marks of the bullets 
 are also seen. 
 
GENERAL SEDGWICK'S ARRIVAL. 303 
 
 greatly exhausted by the marching and fighting of the 
 previous day. The full moon, veiled by thin clouds, shone 
 down upon the strange scene. The silence of the night 
 was only broken by the heavy tramp of armed men, the 
 neighing of horses, the rumbling of the artillery as it was 
 hurried into position, the click of the pick and spade, 
 and the cutting of axes. Thus hour by hour throughout 
 the entire night, and until the shock of battle again broke 
 forth towards evening of the next day, these energetic 
 citizen soldiers, under the direction of skilled engineers, 
 worked and dug and builded until the position they held 
 was made too strong to be carried by direct assault. 
 
 At six o'clock in the morning the Second Corps and the 
 Reserve Artillery came up; and an hour later — at seven 
 A. M. — the Fifth Corps, under General Sykes, and the two 
 brigades of the Third which had been left at Enimitts- 
 burg, also reached the field. The Second Corps, under 
 Hancock, was assigned the place held during the night 
 by that part of the Third which had come up — the 
 left center, — and the Third was directed to form below 
 Hancock and down to and upon Round Top. The Fifth 
 Corps was placed in reserve within supporting distance of 
 Slocum, behind the Federal right. General Sedgwick, in 
 command of the Sixth Corps, received at Manchester, 
 twenty-eight miles distant, at seven P. M. the previous 
 evening, Meade's order to move to Taneytown, and after 
 marching seven or eight miles, a second order was re- 
 ceived, requiring him to proceed at once to Gettysburg, 
 which he readied by an all night's march at two p. m. 
 General Sedgwick needed no other motive to prompt him 
 to hurry forward than the knowledge that the enemy was 
 
304 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 at Gettysburg, and that he was needed there. Promptly 
 the head of the column was changed, and encouraged 
 and urged forward by the enthusiasm of their heroic 
 leader, without bivouac, and almost without rest, these 
 veteran heroes marched throughout the entire night and 
 the greater part of the next day, and reached the field, 
 fifteen thousand four hundred strong, in time to insure 
 victory to the Union forces. Arriving upon the field a 
 short time before the fierce engagement commenced, these 
 men were placed in reserve in the rear of Round Top. 
 General Sedgwick says of his march, " I arrived at Gettys- 
 burg at about two o'clock, having marched thirty -five 
 miles from seven o'clock the previous evening. I received 
 no less than three messages by his (Meade's) aids, urging 
 me on." 
 
 General Meade in the early morning contemplated an 
 attack upon the Confederate left by throwing the Fifth 
 and Sixth corps, when they came up, in connection with 
 the Twelfth, upon Johnson and Early. Slocum and War- 
 ren, however, after a careful reconnoissance of the ground 
 in front of Culp's Hill, reported that such an attack was 
 impracticable, and it was abandoned. General Doubleday, 
 in speaking of this proposed attack, says: "It seems to me 
 that this would have been a very hazardous enterprise, and 
 I am not surprised that both Slocum and "Warren reported 
 against it. The Fifth and Sixth corps would necessarily 
 be very much fatigued after making a forced march. To 
 put them in at once, and direct them to drive a superior 
 force of Lee's veterans out of a town where every house 
 would have been loop-holed, and every street barricaded, 
 would hardly have been judicious. If we had succeeded 
 
GENERAL MEADE'S PLANS. 305 
 
 in doing so, it would simply have reversed the battle of 
 Gettysburg, for the Confederate army would have fought 
 behind Seminary Ridge, and we would have been exposed 
 in the plain below. ISTor do I think it would have been 
 wise strategy to turn their left, and drive them between us 
 and Washington, for it would have enabled them to 
 threaten the capital, strengthen and shorten their line of 
 retreat, and endanger our communications at the same 
 time." * 
 
 It has been charged that General Meade was dissatisfied 
 with the position chosen at Gettysburg, and contemplated 
 a retreat to the position selected at Pipe Creek. General 
 Butterfield, Meade's chief of staff, says that General 
 Meade directed him to make out in the morning a general 
 order of retreat from Gettysburg, prescribing the route 
 each corps should take. General Meade earnestly denied 
 that he ever intended to retreat, and that this order was 
 only a precautionary measure in case it became necessary 
 to withdraw. This seems reasonable, for a wise general, 
 while determined to maintain his position to the utmost, 
 would take all necessary preliminary measures in time for 
 any possible emergency. The hurry and confusion of de- 
 feat would not be a favorable time to attend to these 
 matters. 
 
 After the project to attack the Confederate left had been 
 abandoned, General Meade, thoroughly understanding the 
 strength and advantages of his position, and knowing that 
 Lee could not afford to remain quiet in the midst of a 
 hostile country, with his communications constantly in 
 danger of being severed, determined to act wholly on the 
 
 ♦General Doubleday's " Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 157. 
 20 
 
806 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 defensive. In accordance with tins purpose all possible 
 preparations were made to meet the enemy wherever he 
 might make the attack. 
 
 After the battle of the previous day the Confederates 
 were jubilant and boastful. They entertained the idea 
 that they could easily defeat the comparatively small num- 
 ber of men in their front, and that the remaining corps 
 and divisions coming upon the field separately, and worn 
 down by long and weary marches, would be met and cut 
 up at their pleasure. But when Thursday morning dawned, 
 and they saw that the little band upon Cemetery Hill had 
 been largely reinforced, and other troops were yet arriving, 
 and that the heights had been fortified and were bristling 
 with guns at every point, they began to give evidence that 
 their minds were undergoing a change, and that after all 
 they might have some hard and bloody work to do. Not- 
 withstanding, however, their confidence during the night, 
 the Confederates also improved their time in erecting .de- 
 fenses all along their line. 
 
 Daylight at length dawned; the hours wore away, noon 
 came, and the afternoon, and yet no attack was made. 
 The morning was pleasant, the air was calm, the sun shone 
 mildly through a smoky atmosphere, and the whole outer 
 world was quiet and peaceful. There was nothing to fore- 
 token the sanguinary struggle that was to ensue ere the 
 closing of the day. What was the cause of this delay? 
 It will be given shortly. But was not the hand of God 
 in it? Like their failure to drive the Federals from Ceme- 
 tery Hill the evening before, this delay was doubtless the 
 salvation of the Nation. Hon. Edward Everett, in his 
 address at Gettysburg, says : 
 
PROVIDENTIAL DELAY. 307 
 
 " I can not but remark on the providential inactivity of 
 the Confederate army. Had the contest been renewed by 
 it at daylight on the 2d of July, with the First and 
 Eleventh corps exhausted by the battle and retreat, the 
 Third and Twelfth weary from their forced march, and 
 the Second, Fifth, and Sixth not yet arrived, nothing but a 
 miracle could have saved the army from a great disaster. 
 Instead of this the day dawned, the sun rose, the cool 
 hours of the morning passed, the forenoon, and a con- 
 siderable part of the afternoon, wore away without the 
 slightest aggressive movement on the part of the enemy. 
 Thus time was given for half of our forces to arrive and 
 take their place in the lines, while the rest of the army 
 enjoyed a much needed half day's repose." 
 
 Evidently the delay of the Confederates in renewing the 
 battle was because of the difficulties which confronted 
 them. They had unexpectedly come upon the foe, and in 
 such position that a successful withdrawal without an en- 
 gagement was impossible. General Lee, in his official re- 
 port, says: 
 
 "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at 
 such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the 
 enemy; but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by 
 the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to with- 
 draw through the mountains with our large trains. At 
 the same time the country was unfavorable for collecting 
 supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main body, 
 as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occu- 
 pying the passes of the mountains with regular and local 
 troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. 
 Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of 
 
808 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 the first day, and in view of the valuable results that 
 would ensue from the defeat of the army of General 
 Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack." 
 
 General Longstreet relates the following: 
 
 "When I overtook General Lee, at five o'clock that 
 afternoon (Wednesday, July 1st,) he said, to my surprise, 
 that he thought of attacking General Meade upon the 
 heights the next day. I suggested that this course seemed 
 to be at variance with the plan of campaign that had been 
 agreed upon before leaving Fredericksburg. He said: 
 'If the enemy is there to-morrow, we must attack him.' 
 I replied, 'If he is there, it will be because he is anxious 
 that we should attack him — a good reason, in my judg- 
 ment, for not doing so.' I urged that we should move 
 around by our right to the left of Meade, and put our 
 army between him and Washington, threatening his left 
 and rear, and thus force him to attack us in such position 
 as we might select. I said that it seemed to me that if, 
 during our council at Fredericksburg, we had described 
 the position in which we desired to get the two armies, 
 we could not have expected to get the enemy in a better 
 position for us than the one he then occupied; that he 
 was in a strong position and would be awaiting us, which 
 was evidence that he desired that we should attack him. 
 I said, further, that his weak point seemed to be his left; 
 hence I thought that we should move around to his left, 
 that we might threaten it if we intended to maneuver, or 
 attack it if we determined upon a battle. I called his at- 
 tention to the fact that the country was admirably adapted 
 for a defensive battle, and that we should surely repulse 
 Meade with crushing loss if we would take position so as 
 
LONGSTREET OPPOSES THE ATTACK. 309 
 
 to force him to attack us ; and suggested that, even if we 
 carried the heights in front of us, and drove Meade out, 
 we should he so badly crippled that we could not reap the 
 fruits of victory ; and that the heights of Gettysburg were, 
 in themselves, of no more importance to us than the 
 ground we then occupied, and that the mere possession of 
 the ground was not worth a hundred men to us; that 
 Meade's army, not its position, was our objective. General 
 Lee was impressed with the idea that, by attacking the 
 Federals, he could whip them in detail. I reminded him 
 that if the Federals were there in the morning, it would 
 be proof that they had their forces well in hand, and that 
 with Pickett in Chambersburg, and Stuart out of reach, 
 we should be somewhat in detail. He, however, did not 
 seem to abandon the idea of attack on the next day. He 
 seemed under a subdued excitement, which occasionally 
 took possession of him when 'the hunt was up,' and 
 threatened his superb equipoise. * * * On the night 
 of the 1st I left General Lee without any orders. On the 
 morning of the 2d I went to his head - quarters at day- 
 light, and renewed my views against making an attack. 
 He seemed resolved, however, and we discussed the proba- 
 ble results. "We observed the position of the Federals, 
 and got a general idea of the nature of the ground. About 
 sunrise General Lee sent Colonel Yenable, of his staff, to 
 General Ewell's head - quarters, ordering him to make a 
 reconnoissance of the ground in his front, with a view of 
 making the main attack on his left. A short time after- 
 ward he followed Colonel Venable in person. He returned 
 at about nine o'clock and informed me that it would not 
 do to have Ewell open the attack. lie finally determined 
 
310 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 that I should make the main attack on the extreme right. 
 It was fully eleven o'clock when General Lee arrived at 
 this conclusion and ordered the movement."* 
 
 Colonel W. H. Taylor, of Lee's staff, in the same book, 
 page 309, says : " The prevailing idea with General Lee 
 was to press forward without delay; to follow up promptly 
 and vigorously the advantage already gained. Having 
 failed to reap the full fruit of the victory the night before, 
 his mind was evidently occupied with the idea of renewing 
 the assault upon the enemy's right with the dawn on the 
 second. The divisions of Major- Generals Early and 
 Rodes, of Ewell's Corps, had been actively engaged, and 
 had sustained some loss, but were still in excellent condi- 
 tion, and in full enjoyment of the prestige of success, and 
 consequent elation of spirit, in having so gallantly swept 
 the enemy from their front, through the town of Gettys- 
 burg, and compelled him to seek refuge behind the heights 
 beyond. The division of Major -General Edward John- 
 son, of the same corps, was perfectly fresh, not having 
 been engaged. Anderson's division of Hill's Corps was 
 also now up. With this force General Lee thought that 
 the enemy's position could be assailed with every prospect 
 of success; but after a conference with the corps and 
 division commanders on our left, who represented that, in 
 their judgment, it would be hazardous to attempt to 
 storm the strong position occupied by the enemy, with 
 troops somewhat fagged by the marching and fighting of 
 the first day; that the ground in their immediate front 
 furnished greater obstacles to a successful assault than ex- 
 isted at other points of the line, and that it could be 
 
 * General I^ongstreet, in Annals of the War, pages 417, 421, 422. 
 
OPINIONS OF CONFEDERATE GENERALS. 311 
 
 reasonably concluded, since they had so severely handled 
 the enemy in their front, that he would concentrate and 
 fortify with special reference to resisting a further advance 
 just there, he determined to make the main attack well on 
 the enemy's left, indulging the hope that Longstreet's 
 Corps would be up in time to begin the movement at an 
 early hour on the second. He instructed General Ewell 
 to be prepared to co-operate by a simultaneous advance by 
 his corps." 
 
 The reconnoissance made upon the Confederate left, as 
 referred to by General Lougstreet and Colonel Taylor, 
 was as follows, as reported by Colonel Swallow, in the 
 Southern Bivouac of January, 1886: 
 
 " Immediately after the interview between Generals Lee 
 and Longstreet, which took place at the head - quarters of 
 the commanding general early in the morning, Lee sent 
 Colonel Venable, of his staff, to Ewell, and followed him- 
 self soon after in order to make preparations for an im- 
 mediate attack upon the enemy. Early, Johnson, and 
 Kodes were summoned. General Hays, who was present, 
 told the writer that the General (meaning Lee) was full 
 of fight. He appeared to be deeply impressed with the 
 importance of an immediate attack. He frequently re- 
 peated the expression, ' The attack must be made at once, 
 at once' He wanted Ewell to lead an attack on the spot. 
 Ewell and all his division commanders dissented from 
 General Lee in making the attack first on his left. They 
 pointed out to the commanding general the almost im- 
 pregnable position, both of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, 
 and submitted to General Lee a plan of making the open- 
 ing attack on the Confederate extreme right, held by 
 
312 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 General Longstreet, where the Federal line was much 
 weaker and more easily broken. 
 
 " It was represented to General Lee, as the united opinion 
 of all present, that a bold and spirited attack on our right 
 by Longstreet would undoubtedly turn the left flank of the 
 enemy and gradually endanger the rear of Meade's army, 
 that the events consequent upon Longstreet's attack 
 would compel Meade to detach many troops from Ceme- 
 tery Hill and Gulp's Hill and send them to his left and 
 rear. This being done, Ewell's Corps might then, by a 
 bold and daring onset, assail the whole line on Cemetery 
 and Culp's hills, and drive the enemy from these strong- 
 holds. To this reasoning General Lee assented, with the 
 modification that just as soon as Longstreet opened on the 
 right Ewell should lose no time, and immediately attack 
 Cemetery and Culp's hills. This was the exact under- 
 standing, and General Lee, as he mounted his horse, re- 
 marked, ' I will return to head - quarters at once and issue 
 the necessary orders, so that the right and left will be un- 
 der fire by ten o'clock.' General Lee then rode back to 
 his head -quarters." 
 
 Thus it will be seen that the capture of Cemetery Hill, 
 which might have been effected the evening previous, was 
 now considered impracticable, if not impossible, and an- 
 other plan of attack upon some other part of the line had 
 to be arranged for, and this arrangement caused several 
 hours of delay. At length General Lee had his plans 
 matured, and issued his orders as follows: General Long- 
 street was directed to place the two divisions of his corps 
 then up, — McLaws' and Hood's, — upon the right of Hill, 
 extending the line down a little below Big Round Top. 
 
CAUSE OF DELAY IN ATTACK. 813 
 
 McLaws connected with Hill, and Hood held the extreme 
 right. These two divisions were to " envelop the enemy's 
 (Federal) left, and begin the attack there, following up, as 
 near as possible, the direction of the Emmittsburg road. 
 Simultaneous with the attack upon the Federal left, Ewell 
 was directed to favor this attack by an assault upon the 
 right, and Hill, who held the center, was to hold himself 
 in readiness to throw his strength where it would have the 
 greatest effect. Such was the plan of battle, and had it 
 been executed at any time prior to two o'clock, when the 
 Sixth Corps came upon the field, it might, and the proba- 
 bility is that it would, have been successful. But delay 
 occurred, and the attack was not made until near four 
 o'clock; and to this delay the failure of the Confederate 
 plan has been attributed. 
 
 It is claimed by several Southern officers who partici- 
 pated in the Pennsylvania campaign, that General Lee 
 ordered Longstreet to commence the attack at nine A. M., 
 and to his delay until a late hour in the afternoon they 
 attribute their failure. General Longstreet, in the extract 
 from his article in the Annals of the War, previously 
 quoted, says that "on the night of the 1st I left him (Lee) 
 without any orders at all," and that it was nine o'clock 
 before the General returned from the conference with the 
 corps and division commanders on the left, and eleven 
 o'clock before he had so far matured his plans as to issue 
 his orders for their execution. On the other hand, General 
 A. L. Long, in an article in the Philadelphia Weekly Times 
 of November 1st, 1884, says: 
 
 " Having been present on the occasion referred to, I can 
 speak from personal knowledge. General Lee had no 
 
314 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 sooner reached the field on the afternoon of the 1st of July 
 than he determined to pursue the advantage that had been 
 gained by Generals Ewell and Hill. Finding it, however, 
 unadvisable to renew the engagement that evening, he de- 
 termined to attack as early as practicable the next morning, 
 and so expressed himself to Generals Hill and Longstreet. 
 His visit to Ewell was to learn the condition of his troops 
 and arrange preliminaries for the intended battle. Before 
 retiring for the night, General Lee had formed his order 
 of battle based on reconnoissances made before the close of 
 the afternoon. About daylight on the morning of the 2d 
 General Longstreet received his final instructions. It had 
 always been General Lee's habit, on the eve of battle, to 
 designate the work to be done by each corps commander, 
 leaving the manner of its execution to their discretion. 
 This confidence had never been abused, and he had then 
 no reason to doubt the faithful execution of his orders." 
 
 The Count of Paris, in his recently published work on 
 the "War of the Rebellion, says: 
 
 "We have seen how important it is for him (Lee) to carry 
 out this determination without delay, yet when he returns 
 from his conference with Ewell on the evening of the 1st 
 of July he does not appear to have as yet clearly decided 
 upon his plan of battle for the following day. He, no 
 doubt, desires to wait for daylight in order to reconnoitre 
 the ground, but this uncertainty causes him to lose much 
 precious time. At daybreak of the 2d he is in the saddle; 
 he has decided to make the attack on the right, and orders 
 Longstreet to place his two divisions on that side along 
 the prolongation of Hill's line, so as to be able to begin it 
 at once. But he does not appear to have as yet determined 
 
OPINIONS REGARDING THE DELAY. 315 
 
 either upon the hour when it is to be made, the point 
 against which it is to be directed, or the number of troops 
 to take part in it. 
 
 " Accustomed to find in Jackson a lieutenant to whom 
 it was not necessary to give any precise instructions — who 
 upon a mere suggestion would adopt all necessary measures 
 for striking the point designated for his attack with the 
 greatest rapidity and with the utmost possible vigor — Lee 
 on this occasion did not take into consideration Long- 
 street's character, with whose strong and weak points, his 
 energy and tardiness, he must, however, have been well 
 acquainted. It is evident to us that from the evening of 
 the 1st of July there was a misunderstanding between 
 these two generals." 
 
 The question as to whether or not General Lee ordered 
 Longstreet to an early attack is one of recollection and 
 veracity, with the probabilities strongly against it, but 
 accepting the latter's own version, which seems to be 
 the most reasonable, that he received his orders about 
 eleven a. m., he is yet open to the charge of grave tardi- 
 ness. The whole plan, it will be seen, was dependent 
 upon the two divisions of Longstreet, which, according 
 to his own admission had reached Marsh Creek, four 
 miles west of Gettysburg, the evening previous. From 
 this place to the positions assigned them in the line was 
 not over four miles, and yet for some reason which Gen- 
 eral Longstreet has never yet satisfactorily explained, 
 these troops were not in position and ready for the part 
 assigned thm until four o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 General Longstreet states a number of causes for his 
 delay in getting his troops into position. He says that 
 
316 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Law's brigade was detached by permission of General 
 Lee for special duty elsewhere, and although ordered "to 
 move with the portion of his command that was then up," 
 he took upon himself the responsibility of postponing the 
 execution of this order of the commanding general until 
 this brigade could be recalled. He says, too, that the en- 
 gineers were endeavoring to conduct his troops into their 
 positions unobserved by the Federal Signal Station upon 
 Round Top, and this caused considerable delay. Other 
 causes, also, are assigned, but none of them seems to ex- 
 plain the delay. 
 
 Colonel W. H. Taylor, Lee's adjutant -general, says of 
 General Longstreet's tardiness: 
 
 "It is generally conceded that General Longstreet, on 
 this occasion, was fairly chargeable with tardiness, and I 
 have always thought that his conduct, in this particular, 
 was due to a lack of appreciation, on his part, of the cir- 
 cumstances which created an urgent and peculiar need for 
 the presence of his troops at the front. As soon as the 
 necessity for the concentration of the army was precipi- 
 tated by the unexpected encounter, on the 1st of July, with 
 a large force of the enemy, near Gettysburg, General Long- 
 street was urged to hasten his march; and this, perhaps, 
 should have sufficed to cause him to push his divisions on 
 toward Gettysburg, from which point be was distant but 
 four miles, early on the 2d. But I can not say that he 
 was notified, on the night of the 1st, of the attack pro- 
 posed to be made on the morning of the 2d, and the part 
 his corps was to take therein. Neither do I think it just 
 to charge that he was alone responsible for the delay in 
 attacking that ensued after his arrival on the field. I well 
 
GENERAL SICKLES' CHOICE OF POSITION. 317 
 
 remember how General Lee was chafed by the non-ap- 
 pearance of the troops, until he finallj r became restless, 
 and rode back to meet General Longstreet, and urge him 
 forward; but, then, there was considerable delay in putting 
 the troops to work after they reached the field; and much 
 time was spent in discussing what was to be done, — which, 
 perhaps, could not be avoided. At any rate, it would be 
 unreasonable to hold General Longstreet alone accountable 
 for this. Indeed, great injustice has been done him in the 
 charge that he had orders from the commanding general 
 to attack the enemy at sunrise on the second of July, and 
 that he disobeyed these orders. This would imply that 
 he was in position to attack, whereas General Lee but an- 
 ticipated his early arrival on the second, and based his 
 calculations upon it. I have shown how he was disap- 
 pointed, and I need hardly add that the delay was fatal."* 
 As already stated, upon the arrival, at six o'clock in the 
 morning, of the Second Corps, General Hancock was di- 
 rected to take the position on the left centre occupied dur- 
 ing the night by that part of the Third Corps which had 
 reached the field the evening previous, and Sickles was 
 ordered to move his corps down below Hancock's, and 
 occupy the ground where Geary's division of the Twelfth 
 Corps had been sent by Hancock the preceding evening. 
 At a later hour, when General Sickles sought more definite 
 instructions, General Meade told him that he was to join 
 his right with Hancock's left, and extend his left down to 
 and upon Round Top if practicable. General Sickles, for 
 some unaccountable reason, concluded that there was no 
 position upon Round Top, and taking advantage of the 
 
 * Annals of the War, page 311. 
 
318 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 discretion given him concerning his occupying that place, — 
 or, rather construing it liberally, so as to include his whole 
 position, — moved forward to a slight ridge about three quar- 
 ters of a mile in advance of the prolongation of Hancock's 
 line, and wholly disconnected by an intervening ravine 
 from the proper line. His reason for so doing was, that 
 the ground between the left of Hancock and Round Top 
 was considerably lower than that along the Emmittsburg 
 road, and his position, in case he occupied that ground, 
 would be untenable if the enemy was permitted to occupy 
 the higher ground in front. General Geary, when he re- 
 ceived Meade's order on the morning of the second, to re- 
 join his own corps upon Gulp's Hill, fearing that Round 
 Top, which he had occupied during the night by one of 
 his brigades, would not be occupied, sent a staff' officer to 
 General Sickles with instructions to explain the position 
 and its importance, and ask for troops to be sent to take 
 his place there. No troops, however, were sent, and no 
 officer came to inspect the position, and after waiting as 
 long as his orders permitted, he reluctantly left it.* 
 
 * General Meade, in a letter to Mr. G. G. Benedict, of Burlington, Vermont, 
 dated March 16th, 1870, and recently published, says: "When I wrote niy 
 >rt of the battle I honestly believed General Sickles did not know where 
 I wished him to go, and that his error arose from a misapprehension of my 
 orders, but I have recently learned from General Geary, who had the day be- 
 fore been sent by Hancock to hold the left, and who in doing so had seen the 
 great importance of Round Top and posted a brigade on it, that on the morn- 
 ing of the 2d, when he received my order that he would be relieved by xhe 
 Third Corps and on being relieved would rejoin his own Corps, (Twelfth,) 
 on the right, after waiting for some time to be relieved, he sent to General 
 Sickles a staff officer with instructions to explain the position and its im- 
 portance, and to ask, if troops could not be sent to relieve him, that General 
 S. would send one of his staff to see the ground, and to place troops there on 
 their arrival. He received for reply that General S. would attend to it in due 
 time. No officer or troops came, and after waiting till his patience was ex- 
 hausted General Geary withdrew and joined his corps. Now my first orders 
 
GENERAL SICKLES' POSITION. 319 
 
 General Sickles lias been blamed for the grave error lie 
 is supposed to have committed in this matter. It is duo 
 him to state that there are many strong reasons in favor of 
 the position he chose, and military men are, it is said. 
 about equally divided in opinion as to the wisdom of his 
 choice. Some claim that had he not taken the advanced 
 position he did, Hood's division, seeing the hopelessness 
 of an attack upon Round Top, would have turned the 
 Federal left and interposed between their army and 
 Washington, and thus have forced them to abandon their 
 position. Then, too, the enemy wasted his strength in 
 gaining Sickles' position, without any particular advantage 
 to him, and was not in a condition for much further 
 service, and in this way, although many valuable lives 
 were lost, the battle fought there was of immense value 
 in its effect upon the final result. It should also be stated 
 that General Sickles claims to have had the implied sanc- 
 tion of General Meade, who, at his request, sent General 
 Hunt, his chief of artillery, to assist him in locating his 
 line, j 
 
 Sickles' line, then, was as follows: The center was at 
 what has become historically known as the Peach Orchard. 
 This was nearly opposite Little Hound Top, and about one 
 
 to General Sickles were to relieve the Twelfth Corps Division (Geary's) and 
 occupy their position. Here is evidence that he knew the position occupied 
 by Geary's division, or could have known, and yet failed to occupy it. Furth- 
 ermore, when he came to my head-quarters at about noon and said he did not 
 know where to go, I answered, 'Why, j'ou were to relieve the Twelfth 
 Corps.' He said they had no position ; they were massed, awaiting events. 
 Then it was I told him his right was to be Hancock's left, his left on Round 
 Top, which I pointed out." 
 
 fTliis whole matter of General Sickles' alleged disobedience of the orders 
 of the commander in chief on this day will be considered at length in Ap- 
 pendix D. 
 
320 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 mile distant from it. It occupied the angle formed by the 
 Emmittsburg road, and a narrow road or lane coming in 
 from the east. The right wing, which was under General 
 Humphreys, extended from the Peach Orchard some dis- 
 tance northward along the Emmittsburg road; the left 
 wing, under General Birney, made a right angle at the 
 
 ENTRANCE TO THE DEVIL'S DEN. 
 From a Photograph by Tipton.) 
 
 orchard, and bent around south - eastwardly, following the 
 conformation of the ridge, or the high ground, covering 
 the front of Little Round Top at its base and resting at 
 the Devil's Den, a rocky formation of peculiar shape. This 
 line, in military parlance, was in the air, for neither of its 
 flanks was protected. About three o'clock in the after- 
 noon, General Meade, who says that he "was in doubt 
 
sickles' line withdrawn. 321 
 
 •concerning Sickles' line," rode to the left, when he dis- 
 covered the advanced position he had taken. Sending 
 at once for him, the commander in chief expressed his 
 disapproval of his position and pointed out the line he ex- 
 pected him to take. Sickles at once proposed to withdraw 
 his force to the line indicated, but Meade told him that he 
 did not think the enemy would permit him to withdraw 
 without a fight. Simultaneously almost with these words, 
 the enemy's batteries opened a furious fire, and General 
 Sickles put spurs to his h^rse aud galloped rapidly to the 
 front. General Longstreet, although unaccountably tardy, 
 had nevertheless been busily engaged in perfecting his 
 arrangements for the battle, and when they were disclosed 
 they were seen to be admirable. lie had massed nearly 
 sixty pieces of artillery to bear upon Sickles' angle at the 
 Peach Orchard, all of which rained a perfect torrent of 
 shot and shell upon that part of the line. At the same 
 time massive lines of infantry, in the shape of a crescent, 
 and about a mile and a half long, came into view as they 
 advanced against the front and left flank, and poured into 
 the patriot troops a terribly destructive fire. 
 
 General Meade at once saw that Sickles could not possi- 
 bly maintain his position, and that he must be withdrawn 
 to a new line, where he could be assisted, or else he must 
 order forward supports, abandon his strong position, and 
 fight the enemy in the open plain. He wisely decided 
 upon the former, and at once hurried the Fifth Corps, 
 which had been placed in reserve in the rear of Culp's 
 Hill, over to the left, where it was formed in line on the 
 left of Hancock and extended down to Round Top. This 
 
822 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 line, formed in the position originally intended for Sickles, 
 was to be the rallying place for the Third Corps. 
 
 The Confederate force engaged in the effort to crush 
 General Sickles, was composed of the divisions of McLaws 
 and Hood, of Longstreet's Corps, and the brigades of 
 Wilcox, Wright, and Perry, of Anderson's division of 
 
 inside; of the devil's den. 
 
 From a Photograph by Tip ton. 
 
 Hill's Corps, in all about twenty thousand men. Hood's 
 division occupied the right of this line next to Round 
 Top, with McLaws next, and the brigades of Wilcox, 
 Wright, and Perry on the left, in front of the Emmittsburg 
 road. These were all veteran soldiers, as were also those 
 of Sickles' command, and the conflict of course would be 
 terrific. 
 
STRUGGLE FOR LITTLE ROUND TOP. 323 
 
 The severe artillery fire which was opened against the 
 two sides of the angle at the center, was but the prelude 
 to a furious and determined infantry attack against the 
 left. This part of the lino was held by the brigade of 
 General J. Ilobart Ward, — his left resting on the Devil's 
 Den. The Confederate line overlapped the Federals' at 
 this point nearly a quarter of a mile, and it was against 
 Ward that the enemy made his first efforts, attempting to 
 outflank him and to seize Little Round Top. The import- 
 ance of this high and commanding position was seen by 
 the Confederates, and the task of seizing and holding it 
 was specially committed to Hood's men. The engage- 
 ment here was most determined and furious, and in a 
 short time it extended all along the line to the Peach 
 Orchard, where it became specially severe. Against the 
 angle at that place the tire of eleven batteries was con- 
 centrated, and ;it length the line was broken, the flanks 
 of both wings being exposed. This disaster was irrepara- 
 ble, and a backward movement was unavoidable. Hum- 
 phreys' division, threatened upon the flank and pressed 
 upon the front by Wilcox, Wright and Perry, fell back 
 slowly, fighting as it went. Back, back, inch by inch, 
 fighting, falling, cheering, dying, the men retired. The 
 enemy came on more furiously, halting at intervals and 
 pouring in vollies that struck down the troops in scores. 
 At length the enemy came within reach of Hancock's 
 guns, when volley after volley was sent into their ad- 
 vancing ranks. Men fell as leaves fall in autumn before 
 these terrible discharges. At length Perry's brigade, which 
 occupied the center of the Confederate line, hesitated, 
 then halted, and finally fled to the rear. Wright and 
 
324 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Wilcox pressed on, and finally the former pierced the 
 Federal line. It was a fearful crisis. The destiny of the 
 Republic hung in the balance. But reinforcements sprang 
 into the breach, and the foe was forced to relinquish his 
 hold and fall back. Humphreys at length succeeded in 
 reaching the crest of the hill and rallied his men behind 
 the line formed by the Fifth Corps. He had lost two 
 thousand men of the six thousand he had taken into the 
 action. 
 
 Birney's line, also assailed in flank and front, was like- 
 wise compelled to recede. Sickles was wounded and 
 Birney succeeded to the command. The batteries along 
 the lane poured into the advancing foe torrents of iron 
 hail, before which they quailed and faltered, but their 
 officers could be seen through the smoke galloping and 
 swinging their swords and urging their men forward. 
 Crash! crash! with discharges deafening, terrible, the fire 
 went on, and the enemy, reforming after each discharge, 
 sprang forward as if to break through the lines by mere 
 weight of numbers. Colonel McGilvery, commanding the 
 artillery of the Federal Third Corps, seeing that a further 
 backward movement was inevitable, directed the artiller- 
 ists to hold their position until lie could place a new line of 
 batteries, drawn from the reserve, in the rear as a rallying 
 place. The men stood to their guns until the enemy 
 pressed up to the very muzzles, when they were blown to 
 pieces by the terrible discharges of grape and canister. 
 Still on and on others pressed with demoniacal yells, climb- 
 ing upon the limbers and shooting the horses. At length 
 McGilvery's new line was established, and the men who 
 had succeeded in maintaining their position commenced 
 
o'26 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 to withdraw their pieces. Some guns for want of horses 
 hud to be abandoned, hut the cannoneers brought away 
 the rammers, and the pieces could not be turned upon 
 their slowly retreating owners. Others were withdrawn 
 by their own rebound. A single shell from a Federal gun 
 killed and wounded thirty Confederates out of a company 
 of thirty -seven. At length, alter the most determined 
 resistance, Birney's line was forced back to near Trestle's 
 house — about a quarter of a mile in front of Little Round 
 Top — when new actors came upon the scene. Barnes' 
 division of the Fifth Corps, composed of Sweitzer's and 
 Tilton's brigades, came to the assistance of the sorely 
 pressed troops. After a, gallant but short fight, these men 
 were forced back across what has become historic — the 
 Wheat Field. Next came Caldwell's division of the Second 
 Corps. Into the Wheat Field they plunged, and after 
 losing Gen ral Zook, Colonel Cross, and many other excel- 
 lent men, were enfiladed and Hanked and driven back. 
 Then cane Ay res of the Filth Corps with bis division of 
 Regulars. These men were the heroes of many battles. 
 They had been lying cast of Little Bound Top, and when 
 the order to advance was given, they moved upon the 
 double quick through the woods to the summit of the hill. 
 Said one: "The whole scene was before them; the tur- 
 moil and commotion in the woods below, — Barnes going ^ 
 in and the shattered regiments of the Third Corps coming 
 out. Some batteries were in retreat and others were tak- 
 ing new positions. They dashed down the hillside, be- 
 came a little disorganized in crossing Plum Bun, but formed 
 again and went up the ridge among the boulders, disap- 
 peared in the woods, stayed a few minutes, and then, like 
 
THE WHIRLPOOL OF THE BATTLE. 
 
 827 
 
 a shattered wreck upon the foaming sea, came drifting to 
 the rear." An officer of the Seventeenth Regulars, who 
 participated in this charge, says: "We went down the hill 
 upon the run; it was like going down into hell! The 
 
 THE WHEAT FIELD, OR THE SCENE OF THE WHIRLPOOL OF THE BATTLE. 
 
 this view is from the west, and shows the lane, Zook's Monument, and Round Top 
 
 beyond the Valley of Death. (From a Photograph by Tipton.) 
 
 enemy were yelling like devils. Our men were falling 
 back. It was terrible confusion: smoke, dust, the rattle 
 of musketry, the roaring of cannon, and the bursting of 
 shells." * 
 
 *Charles C. Coffin in "Boys of '61," page 285. 
 
328 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 The fighting in the Wheat Field has been called, " The 
 Whirlpool of the Battle,"' because of the confusion, the 
 surging backward and forward, the whirling round and 
 round, which prevailed. It is said that regiments from 
 three corps, and eight or ten brigad >s, were lighting there 
 promiscuously. The Confederate lines were also in con- 
 fusion. The ground in this field and in the Peach Orchard, 
 after the battle, was drenched with human gore, and cov- 
 ered with the dead and wounded. Five hundred Con- 
 federates were found dead in the Wheat Field alone. 
 With the probable exception of the Bloody Angle at 
 Spottsylvania, on no other places of equal extent upon this 
 continent has so much human blood been shed. The 
 fighting here, and throughout the whole of the engage- 
 ment of this afternoon, was not exceeded by any in all the 
 previous history of war for stubborn pertinacity and de- 
 structiveness. 
 
 At about five o'clock P. m., while this terrible conflict 
 was going on, and when the sound of the strife indicated 
 that the National troops were being driven back, General 
 Warren, Meade's Chief Engineer, rode to the signal sta- 
 tion, which had been established upon Little Round Top, 
 to get a better view of the field. Arriving there he saw at 
 once the immense importance of that elevated position, 
 and at the same time he beheld the long line of the enemy 
 approaching it. Even then the advance of Hood enveloped 
 the Union force below. They had skirted the base of the 
 hill, clambered over the rocks by the "Devil's Den," and 
 were making desperate efforts to seize the hill. Seeing 
 the danger if the heights were; taken, and knowing that 
 once in the enemy's possession the whole line would be 
 
DEATH OF VINCENT. 329 
 
 untenable under the guns that would be planted there, 
 "Warren determined at all hazards to secure the position. 
 Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps was just then going 
 forward to the charge already referred to, and "Warren 
 with the utmost speed dashed down to Barnes and de- 
 tached Vincent's brigade and hurried it up the hill. The 
 men did not take time to load their pieces, but advanced 
 with the bayonet and reached the crest in time to save it. 
 But still on came the enemy. They were specially in- 
 structed to take that hill, and had pledged their word that 
 they would do so, and were determined at all hazards to 
 keep their pledge.* The rocks around the heights were 
 swarming with the defiant enemy and the contest soon 
 became fearful. An eye-witness thus describes the scene: 
 "At the base of the hill was Barnes' division — all brave 
 men — Michigan, Maine, Pennsylvania, and New York. 
 Furiously the enemy threw themselves upon them. Bound 
 Top must be held if the battle were not to be lost. Loud, 
 even above the deadly roar of the cannon, rang out the 
 gallant Vincent's words, 'Don't yield one inch!' But, at 
 the same instant, his inspiring voice was silenced. Down, 
 from the exposed rock on which he had leaped, waving his 
 sword in the air, he fell, bleeding, in the agonies of a shat- 
 tered thigh. The whole division of Barnes stood as firm 
 
 ®If, as is alleged by Southern writers, L,ee and Longstreet had seen the 
 importance of little Round Top, and had given explicit orders to Hood to 
 take and hold it, the subordinate officers seem to have been ignorant of it, 
 as will be seen in the following statement by Colonel Swallow, who, in a 
 letter to the writer, says: 
 
 "The Fifteenth Alabama Regiment, Hood's right regiment, passed imme- 
 diately over the summit of Round Top. I had this not only from General 
 Hood many times before he died, but I was on the ground in August, 1SS0, 
 with Colonol Oats, who commanded that regiment. But its value at the 
 time was not appreciated.'''' 
 
880 THE GREAT INVASION". 
 
 us the ground they were determined to hold. The enemy 
 came on yelling and running with the fixed bayonet eharge 
 which so few troops can withstand; but the patriots did 
 not waver. It was not an attack in line, it was not a 
 charge, it was a melee, a carnival of death. Men hewed 
 each other's faces; they grappled in close, embrace, murder 
 to both ; and all through it rained shot and shell from one 
 hundred pieces of artillery along the ridge."* 
 
 Another description of this terrific scene is thus given: 
 "Before Vincent fell he sent word to Barnes that the 
 enemy were upon him in overwhelming numbers, and 
 Hazlett's regular battery, supported by the One Hundred 
 and Fortieth New York, under Colonel O'Rourke of 
 Weed's brigade, was sent as a reinforcement. The battery 
 was dragged with great labor to the crest of Little Round 
 Top, and the One Hundred and Fortieth was posted on 
 the slope on Vincent's right. They came upon the field 
 just as the enemy, after failing to penetrate the center, 
 had driven back the right. In advancing to this exposed 
 position, Colonel O'Rourke, a brilliant young officer who 
 had just graduated at the head of his class at West Point, 
 was killed, and his men thrown into some confusion, but 
 Vincent rallied the line and repulsed the assault. In doing 
 so he exposed himself very much, and was soon killed by 
 a Confederate sharp-shooter. General Weed, who was 
 on the crest with a battery, was mortally wounded in the 
 same way, and as Hazlett leaned over him to hear his last 
 message, a fatal bullet struck him also and he dropped 
 dead on the body of his chief." f 
 
 :s Abbott's "Civil War," volume n, page 407. 
 
 fGeneral Doubleday's " Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 169. 
 
CONFEDERATE ACCOUNT OP ROUND TOP. 831 
 
 It will be of interest, after having descriptions of the 
 terrific struggle for the possession of Round Top from 
 Federal witnesses, to have a statement from a participant 
 on the Confederate side. The following account is from 
 an article contributed to the Philadelphia Weekly Times, 
 of December 13th, 1884, by Colonel R. M. Powell, of the 
 Texas brigade, Hood's division : 
 
 "Captain Gorce, of Longstreet's staff, after communi- 
 cating orders to General Hood, rode down the line and 
 remarked that the possession of Little Round Top — point- 
 ing to its rugged heights — was necessary. The Texans 
 were expected to take it. 
 
 "'We'll do it!' was the reply. 
 
 "The signal was given and a sheet of flame sprang along 
 the enemy's lines, hurling defiance at the advancing Con- 
 federates. Smoke from either side rolled in billows, meet- 
 ing and writhing in conflict in the valley midway the 
 engaging armies. Soon the artillery duel ceased and 
 rattling musketry announced that the serious work had 
 begun. 
 
 " On rushed the Texans, sweeping from their path cavalry 
 which met them on the Emmittsburg pike, on through 
 the 'Devil's Den,' blazing with infernal fire, crushing and 
 destroying opposing forces at the foot of the mountain, 
 onward and upward they struggled over precipitous rocks, 
 where the enemy, lying in ambush, was surprised. The 
 ascent was so difficult as to forbid the use of arms. At 
 last, weary and almost exhausted, we reached the topmost 
 defenses of the enemy. ISTow the conflict raged with wild 
 ferocity. We were caught in a cul-de-sac or depressed 
 'basin, surrounded on three sides by projecting or shelving 
 
332 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 rocks surmounted by a stone fence. Captain Cleveland, 
 with a voice heard above the din of battle, offered a purse 
 to the first man over the works. Sergeant Ross sprang 
 forward to earn the reward when Cleveland ordered him 
 back to his post, remarking: 'File closers not included/ 
 
 "'Swing up the left, Major Rogers.' 
 
 "Til do it, colonel, by jingo.'" 
 
 "Just at the moment of these utterances there was a 
 sudden cessation of firing, and the last words, 'by jingo,' 
 were distinct and sounded so ludicrous as to excite laughter. 
 
 " The scene was strikingly like a devil's carnival. Another 
 yell and desperate charge followed, succeeded by a sudden 
 and an awful hush, just as if every one had been stricken 
 with death. I raised my head from the ground, where I 
 lay prostrated by a wound. The only moving man I saw 
 was Sergeant Ross, lie leisurely approached the enemy's 
 line and taking his ramrod, which had been left leaning 
 against a rock, he walked deliberately to the rear. I could 
 see men lying around in every direction and in all atti- 
 tudes. This desolate silence continued at least thirty 
 minutes; to me it seemed like thirty hours. The twilight 
 was fading into night before the victors came to gather 
 spoils and take charge of the wounded. To their regret 
 the wounded were the only ones avIio had crossed the 
 enemy's works." 
 
 But the contest for the possession of Round Top was 
 not yet ended. The enemy had stolen around and were 
 pressing up between Little and Big Round Top. Colonel 
 Chamberlain with the Twentieth Maine, who held the ex- 
 treme left, seeing them coming until they moved past his 
 flank, immediately extended his own left flank by forming 
 
GENERAL CRAWFORD'S CHARGE. 333 
 
 his men in single rank, and although greatly outnumbered 
 he still maintained his position. lie also called for as- 
 sistance, but before reinforcements could reach him, Hood's 
 men had gained the eastern side of the hill and were 
 pressing him from that direction. The Twentieth Maine, 
 in order to meet the enemy in this new direction, formed 
 its line in the shape of the letter U, with the yelling and 
 howling Confederates in front, on their left flank, and in 
 their rear. It was a critical moment. The crisis had 
 come. If Round Top was taken the battle was lost, and 
 the defeat of the National army assured. But it was not 
 lost. Help was at hand. The greater part of the Twelfth 
 Corps had been summoned from the right, and leaving 
 their breastworks they went upon the double-quick to 
 the assistance of the sorely -pressed troops upon the left. 
 Stannard's brigade of Vermonters, up to that time held 
 in reserve, went with a wild run to strengthen Hancock's 
 line. But the grand finale was left to the gallant sons of 
 Pennsylvania. General S. Wiley Crawford, who com- 
 manded the third division of the Fifth Corps, composed 
 of Pennsylvania Reserves, was ordered to drive back the 
 foe. General Crawford immediately directed Colonel Mc- 
 Candless, commanding the first brigade, to form his com- 
 mand and charge down the slope. McCandless formed 
 his brigade in two lines; the second massed on the first. 
 General Crawford, in a few well chosen words, called upon 
 his men to defend the soil of their native state, and then 
 seizing the colors of one of the regiments, led the way 
 against the foe. The first line, after advancing some 
 distance, delivered two well-directed volleys upon the 
 enemy, and then with terrific yells dashed upon them, and 
 
384 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 bore the whole force headlong down the slope and across 
 Plum Run. The enemy made a short resistance at a stone 
 fence some little distance in advance, but were soon driven 
 from it. This stone wall, thus gained, was held by the 
 Reserves. This gallant charge turned the fortune of the 
 day, tail it was attended with the loss of many men, among 
 whom was Colonel Frederick Taylor, commander of the 
 Bucktail Regiment. 
 
 Upon the repulse of Hood's men from Round Top, 
 General Longstreet, who had Hood's place — that general 
 having been wounded — rode forward to reconnoitre, and 
 seeing two brigades i>i' the Sixth Corps, which had been 
 called into position to meet any further efforts upon that 
 eminence, became discouraged and abandoned the contest. 
 Round Top was saved, and during the night it was forti- 
 fied and transformed into a Gibralter. Big Round Top, 
 too, although not so important as its lesser companion, 
 because artillery could not he taken to its summit, was also 
 occupied and breastworks thrown up. 
 
 An incident occurred about the closing hour of this bat- 
 tle that deserves special mention. Stannard's Vermont 
 brigade, although nearly all raw and inexperienced soldiers, 
 accomplished prodigies <'l' valor. After having success- 
 fully driven 'back Wright's brigade, it, at the instigation 
 of General Hancock, retook from the enemy a battery of 
 four guns, which had been abandoned in the neighborhood 
 of Cordori's house. After bringing these guns in, pursued 
 by tlic enemy, tin; brigade was reinforced by the Four- 
 teenth Maine regiment, when it recharged upon the pur- 
 suing Confederates, and captured two more cannon and 
 eighty-three prisoners. These were also brought into 
 
CONFEDERATE AEITHMETIO. 385 
 
 Hancock's lines amidst the cheers and congratulations of 
 his men. 
 
 A has been said before, the aumbers engaged In thin 
 battle oil both sides have been greatly exaggerated. The 
 truth of history requires that facts alone should be stated. 
 If the reader would see a specimen of ( 'onfederate arithme- 
 tic, he ha: only to refer to Genera] Long tre< »nd con- 
 tribution to i he Annals of the War, pagee r >-\ , <vil. General 
 Longstreei itates the number of his own forces engaged us 
 thirteen thousand; and in a foot note to page 626, be 
 subsequent information showed i hat he had hut, about twelve 
 thousand. The number of Federals opposed to him ho 
 places at sixty-five thousand,^ follows: The Third Corps, 
 eleven thou and eighl hundred and ninety- eight; tin-. 
 Fifth Corp . ten thou and one hundred and thirty-six; 
 Sixth Corp . fifteen thousand four hundred and eight; 
 Pennsylvania !>' lousaud live hundred; Lock- 
 wood'* Maryland brigade, two I ■! five hundred, and 
 detachments from tin- . li an*! other '•":'!•-, about 
 twenty thousand. The fallacy of th< timatewill 
 be seen in this, that the Pennsylvania [l< ■ formed part 
 of the Fifth < orps, while the Sixth and Twelfth corps did 
 not participate in the • nenl at all- Two brigades 
 of the Sixl h ( lorpa w ei awn up in any 
 further attempt to take Round Top i by the 
 Reserves, and that part of the Twelfth Corpswhich \ 
 
 t the left arrived there too late to tire a single 
 gun. Longstreet's r</n ; <; consisted of the tour brig! 
 McLaw .,1, lour of Hood's, and three of Anderson's 
 
 division of Hill's Corps. Theseeleven ' om- 
 
 posed of fifty regiments. Now if General Long 
 
336 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 mate is correct, these regiments averaged but two hundred 
 and forty men each, leaving out the artillery entirely. 
 The fallacy of the general's statement is too apparent to 
 require any further notice. The Federal forces engaged 
 were the Third and Fifth corps, and Caldwell's division 
 of the Second Corps, and probably a few others. The 
 total number did not exceed thirty thousand. The ad- 
 vantage of numbers was undoubtedly with the Federals, 
 but not to the extent that General Longstreet claims. 
 
 In this terrific engagement of about three hours, the 
 losses on both the Federal and Confederate sides were 
 very heavy. General Sickles was severely wounded, ne- 
 cessitating the amputation of one of his limbs above the 
 knee. Generals Zook, Weed, and Vincent, and Colonels 
 O'Rourke, Taylor, Cross, Ellis, and several other eminent 
 officers were killed, and many others wounded. General 
 Longstreet, in Annals of the War, page 426, admits a loss 
 of four thousand five hundred and twenty -nine in his two 
 divisions which were engaged. The losses of the three 
 brigades of Anderson's division of Hill's Corps, which were 
 also in the engagement, although not stated, were also 
 very heavy. Among the distinguished officers who suf- 
 fered upon the Confederate side, were General Barksdale, 
 of Mississippi, killed, and Generals Hood, Semmes, and 
 Ileth, wounded. 
 
 As a striking illustration of the unnatural and fratricidal 
 character of the strife, the following occurence is related: 
 In the yard attached to the house which stands in the 
 angle of the read across the lane from the Peach Orchard 
 — marked upon the maps of the battle field, "Wentz's 
 House" — stood a Confederate battery, commanded by 
 
ewell's delay. 337 
 
 Lieutenant Wentz. This officer was brought up in that 
 house, and his parents, at the time of the battle, yet resided 
 there. Some years before the outbreak of the war, he 
 went South, and now came back in command of a Con- 
 federate battery, and by a singular coincidence, his battery 
 was ordered into position in his father's yard. Before his 
 guns opened upon the patriot troops, some of whom were 
 his former neighbors and associates (in the Pennsylvania 
 Reserves were a number of men whose homes were in 
 sight of Round Top), this recreant son of Pennsylvania 
 placed his aged parents in the cellar of their house to save 
 them from the missiles of death which his guns would 
 draw upon them. 
 
 It will be recollected that Lee's plan for the battle of 
 this day contemplated a simultaneous attack upon both 
 wings of the Federal army, while Hill, who occupied the 
 Confederate center, was to throw his force in whatever 
 direction he could accomplish the most. But for reasons 
 which are as inexplicable as the delay of Longstreet in 
 opening the battle upon the left, Ewell delayed his attack 
 upon the right until Longstreet's assault had been re- 
 pulsed, and the engagement upon that part of the field was 
 over. And even when his assault was made, it was not 
 made in concert, but disjointed and consequently unsup- 
 ported. 
 
 It was nearly eight o'clock — one hour after the battle had 
 ended on the Federal left — before Ewell's troops were in 
 position to commence the attack. Previous to that time 
 there had been some sharp firing along the center and right, 
 but nothing like a general engagement had taken place. 
 General Ewell had advanced Johnson's division, which had 
 
3o8 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 been posted on the extreme left of the Confederate line r 
 and had been directed to assail the right of Culp's 
 Hill; and with the purpose of preventing reinforcements 
 from being sent from the center, Early was directed to 
 carry Cemetery Hill by assault. Rodes' division was to sup- 
 port Early in this attack. Pender's division of Hill's Corps 
 was also expected to take part in the engagement, if circum- 
 stances made it necessary. Early moved forward, Hays' 
 brigade on the right, Hoke's brigade on the left, and Gor- 
 don's in reserve. As these troops approached, .the power- 
 ful batteries upon the hill were brought to bear upon them 
 with fearful effect, and the left and center were compelled 
 to fall back. The right, however, composed of the re- 
 nowned fighters known as "The Louisiana Tigers," under 
 the shelter of the houses of the town, were enabled to ap- 
 proach the Federal line, and after driving Von Gilsa's 
 brigade, which it encountered at the foot of the hill, they 
 made a sudden and irresistible rush for the summit. Weid- 
 rick's battery was captured, and two of Eicketts' guns were 
 spiked. These captured guns were about being turned 
 upon the Federal right, when a brigade of Schurz's troops 
 fell upon the temporarily successful Tigers, and a most 
 desperate hand to hand fight ensued, which for ferocity 
 and determination had no parallel in all the war. The 
 bayonet was freely used on both sides, and brains were 
 beaten out with clubbed muskets, hand -spikes, cannon- 
 rammers, and even stones. The troops occupying this 
 hill had been addressed by their officers, and the import- 
 ance of holding it to the last had been impressed upon 
 them. At length General Hancock, seeing that no demon- 
 stration upon his lines was intended, and fearful that the 
 
DEFEAT OF THE LOUISIANA TIGERS. 339 
 
 hill would be carried and his position flanked, and thus 
 the army compelled to retreat, sent Carroll's brigade to 
 the rescue. Carroll was joined by the One Hundred and 
 Sixth Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from Schurz's 
 division. These troops went in upon the enemy with a 
 cheer, and finding that they were about to be overwhelmed, 
 with no one coming to their assistance, the Confederates 
 fell back. In their retreat they suffered fearfully from 
 the Federal batteries, which poured into them tremendous 
 discharges of grape and canister. The Louisiana Tigers 
 had met their match, and Howard's Germans redeemed 
 themselves from the reproach of Chancellorsville. This 
 whole engagement lasted but a short time, but in that 
 short space these noted fighters were sadly worsted. The 
 severity of their losses may be seen in the fact that Hays' 
 and Hoke's brigades, which were engaged in the assault, 
 lost respectively three hundred and thirteen and three 
 hundred and forty -five men. The Louisiana Tigers be- 
 longed to the former. 
 
 The failure of General Rodes to support Early in this 
 attack is accounted for as follows : General Rodes, it will 
 be remembered, occupied the town of Gettysburg from 
 Early's right to Seminary Ridge. His explanation of his 
 failure to be on hand in time is thus stated by himself: 
 
 "After I had conferred with General Early on my right 
 and General Lane upon my left, and arranged to attack 
 in concert, I proceeded at once to make the necessary 
 preparations; but as I had to draw my troops out of the 
 town by the flank, change the direction of the line of 
 battle, and then traverse a distance of twelve or fourteen 
 hundred yards, while General Early had to move only 
 
THE CONFEDERATES LOSE AN OPPORTUNITY. 341 
 
 half that distance, without change of front, it resulted 
 that, before I drove in the enemy's skirmishers, General 
 Early had attacked and been compelled to withdraw." 
 
 Johnson's division, which had been sent to attack the 
 Federal right, did not reach a position to become engaged 
 until after Early had been repulsed on the center, and con- 
 sequently he failed to receive any beneht from that attack. 
 The part of the Federal line which he assailed had been 
 weakened by the withdrawal of the greater part of the 
 Twelfth Corps to assist the left in repelling Longstreet, 
 and was held by Greene's brigade alone, and of course 
 this attack upon this weakly defended position was suc- 
 cessful. The few troops there, after a gallant resistance, 
 were driven from their intrenchments before reinforce- 
 ments could be sent to their assistance, and their works 
 were occupied by the enemy. Had Johnson been aware 
 of his exact position, and pushed on a few hundred yards 
 further, he would have taken possession of the Baltimore 
 pike, been in the rear of the Federal center, possibly cap- 
 turing General Meade's head -quarters, and the ammu- 
 nition trains, which were parked but a short distance 
 below. But he did not know the full extent of the ad- 
 vantage he had gained, and sat down and waited for the 
 morning, expecting then to push forward. How he suc- 
 ceeded in that purpose will be told in the ensuing chapter. 
 
 At about ten o'clock at night the series of battles of this 
 day closed, and the situation was as follows: The Federal 
 
 Note. — The illustration on the opposite page represents the scene upon 
 east Cemetery Hill immediately upon the repulse of the Louisiana Tigers. 
 General Meade and staff are seen to the right, upon Culp's Hill, and an officer 
 is reporting the repulse of the enemy. The poplar tree to the left, amidst 
 the smoke, stands upon the summit of the hill, near the Cemetery gate. The 
 Christian Commission is also represented ministering to the wounded. 
 
342 T1IE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 line was intact except upon the right where Johnson occu- 
 pied a portion of their works. Longstreet on the left 
 occupied the ground taken by Sickles, but the line as orig- 
 inally intended was intact and firmly held. Evidently no 
 decided advantage had been gained by either of the con- 
 testants, but the results upon the whole were favorable to 
 the Federals, and the Confederates were less exultant and 
 boastful. General Lee, in his official report of this day's 
 operations, says: 
 
 " After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in gain- 
 ing possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell 
 also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed; 
 and the result was such as to lead to the belief that lie 
 would be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle closed 
 at dark. These partial successes determined me to con- 
 tinue the assault next day." 
 
 General Longstreet, in Annals of the War, page 426, 
 says that when he ordered his troops to withdraw from 
 the contest, he " dispatched a courier to General Lee, in- 
 forming him of the day's work." Colonel Freemantle, of 
 the British army, who was with General Longstreet at the 
 battle, says in his communication to Blackwood' 's Magazine, 
 that the message Longstreet sent to Lee contained these 
 words: " We are doing well." General Hill, in referring in 
 his official report to the condition of Longstreet's right at 
 the close of the battle, says: " Hood's right was held as in 
 a vise." There seems to be a lack of unanimity among 
 these distinguished officers, and we rather think General 
 Hill was correct in his statement, for in the attack of the 
 following day, Longstreet's right was held so tightly that 
 he himself concedes that he could not use it.* 
 
 * Annals of the War, page 627. 
 
MISTAKES OF THE CONFEDERATES! 843 
 
 The mistakes made this day by the Confederates may 
 "be stated thus : 
 
 1. The delay of General Longstreet in getting his 
 troops into position and commencing the attack. 
 
 Had the attack upon the left been made early in the 
 day, when the lines were but weakly held, they would 
 most certainly have been broken. Or had it been made 
 soon after Lee decided upon his plan and issued his orders 
 — say from eleven a. m. to two p. m., when the Sixth Corps 
 arrived, — success might have been reasonably expected. 
 It seems surprisingly strange that ten hours — say from 
 six o'clock in the morning, when the divisions of McLaws 
 and Hood could have been put in motion, until four o'clock 
 in the afternoon, when the battle began — were consumed 
 in marching four miles and getting ready for action. Gen- 
 eral Longstreet will have to offer more plausible reasons 
 for this delay than any he has yet given, or history will 
 hold him accountable for the failure of this day. 
 
 2. The failure of General Hill to support Wilcox, 
 Perry, and Wright. These three brigades formed the left 
 of Longstreet's line, and, after driving Humphreys back 
 from his position along the Emmittsburg road, they not 
 only followed him up, inflicting heavy losses upon him, 
 but actually pierced the main Federal line. Perry's bri- 
 gade, which occupied the center of these pursuing forces, 
 was driven back by the fire from the main line, but Wright 
 and Wilcox pressed on, and the former actually pierced 
 the line and held it for a short time, but was compelled 
 to abandon it because he was not supported. In this affair 
 Wilcox claims to have captured twenty guns and Wright 
 eight, but they were not able to hold them or take them 
 
344 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 along in their retreat. Had these two brigades been 
 promptly supported, as Lee's orders to Hill contemplated, 
 the results to the National cause would have been disas- 
 trous indeed ; but for want of support they were compelled 
 to relinquish the hold they had gained. 
 
 A correspondent of the Richmond Inquirer, writing from 
 Hagerstown on July 8th, 1863, — a few days after the 
 battle — speaking of this failure to support Wilcox and 
 Wright, says: 
 
 "We now had 'the key' to the enemy's stronghold, and,, 
 apparently, the victory was won. McLaws and Hood had 
 pushed their line well up the slope on the right; Wilcox 
 had pierced the enemy's main line on the summit of Mc- 
 Pherson's heights, capturing his heavy batteries, thus 
 breaking the connection between the right and left wings. 
 I said that, apparently, we had won the victory. It re- 
 mains to be stated why our successes were not crowned 
 with the important results which should have followed 
 such heroic bravery. Although the order was peremptory 
 that all of Anderson's division should move into action 
 simultaneously, Brigadier -General Posey, commanding a 
 Mississippi brigade, and Brigadier- General Mahone, com- 
 manding a Virginia brigade, failed to advance. This 
 failure of these two brigades to advance is assigned, as I 
 learn upon inquiry, as the reason why Pender's division 
 of Hill's corps did not advance — the order being, that the 
 advance was to commence from the right, and be taken up 
 along the whole line. Pender's failure to advance caused 
 the division on his left — Heth's — to remain inactive. 
 Here we have two whole divisions, and two brigades of 
 another, standing idle spectators of one of the most des- 
 
FAILURE TO USE PICKETT. 345 
 
 perate and important assaults that has ever been made 
 on this continent — fifteen thousand or twenty thousand 
 men resting on their arms, in plain view of a terrible 
 battle, witnessing the mighty efforts of two little brigades 
 (Wright's and Wilcox's, for Perry had fallen back over- 
 powered,) contending with the heavy masses of Yankee 
 infantry, and subject to a most deadly fire from the enemy's 
 heavy artillery, without a single effort to aid them in the 
 assault, or to assist them when the heights were carried." 
 
 General Hill's failure to support these two brigades is 
 as inexplicable as Longstreet's tardiness. 
 
 3. The failure to send into the fight Pickett's division. 
 Pickett reached the field about three o'clock, and had his 
 division been thrown into the engagement about six 
 o'clock, when the result seemed to be so doubtful, it might 
 have enabled Longstreet to drive the Federals from their 
 position and turn their left. This would have been fatal 
 to them and insured their defeat. In the event that Pickett 
 had been thus used, the only troops that could have been 
 brought against him would have been the Sixth Corps. 
 This corps had only reached the field, after a forced march 
 of thirty-five miles, at two o'clock, and were, like Pickett's 
 men, tired and needing rest. Pickett's division, however, 
 had only marched twenty -five miles, and had not lost the 
 previous night's rest, as did Sedgwick's men, who had been 
 upon the road continuously since seven o'clock the previous 
 evening. History abounds with instances in which wearied 
 troops, after long and hard marching, have been thrown 
 immediately into action and turned the tide of battle, and, 
 in some instances, changed the course of history. Dessaix, 
 after a Ions; and forced march, from earlv morning until 
 
846 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 four o'clock in the afternoon, went immediately into action 
 and changed Napoleon's defeat into the splendid victory 
 of Marengo. Blucher reached the field of Waterloo at 
 six o'clock in the evening from a long and fatiguing 
 march, and changed the tide of battle and saved the allied 
 armies of Europe from complete overthrow. And Claudius 
 Nero, after marching day and night, went right into battle, 
 overthrew the Carthaginians and saved Home. Pickett, 
 however, was not used because of the wearied condition 
 of his men. 
 
 4. The failure of General Ewell to attack the Federal 
 center and right simultaneously with Longstreet's attack 
 upon the left. 
 
 Instead of opening his attack upon Cemetery and Culp's 
 hills at the same time that Longstreet attacked upon the 
 left (about four o'clock p. m.), General Ewell was not ready 
 for his advance until nearly dusk, or about eight p. m., when 
 the battle there was entirely over. If Longstreet is charge- 
 able with inexcusable tardiness in getting his troops into 
 position, when they had four miles to march from the 
 vicinity of Marsh Creek, where they tarried over night, 
 what must be thought of General EwelFs failure to be 
 ready to advance to the assault at the same time that the 
 former did, when his troops were resting within their 
 lines all through the day and night previous? And as in 
 the case of the former, so with the latter, the excuses and 
 causes assigned are entirely inadecmate and unsatisfactory. 
 General Longstreet, in retaliation for Ewell's complaints 
 and charges against him touching this matter of his tardi- 
 ness, says that the real cause of the latter's failure to com- 
 mence the attack at the same time he did was, that he had 
 
GENERAL EARLY'S MISTAKE. 347 
 
 broken his lines by sending off" two of Lis brigades on some 
 duty up the York road. * 
 
 5. The inexplicable folly of General Early in the post- 
 ing of his troops for the assault on Cemetery Hill. Colonel 
 Swallow, in his letter to the writer, elsewhere referred to, 
 says: 
 
 " The line, which was formed in the morning, was in the 
 following order: The right of Early's division was held 
 by Gordon, the center by Hays, and the left by Smith. 
 But this was changed in the attack that followed. Early 
 removed Gordon to a position behind the railroad running 
 to Hanover, a short distance from the York pike. Smith's 
 brigade was sent to Stuart's cavalry. This foolish move 
 on the part of Early broke our line of battle. The attack 
 was really made on Cemetery Hill, in the evening of the 
 2d, by Hays' and Hoke's brigades, while Gordon was in 
 reserve on the north side of the railroad, and Smith's bri- 
 gade was guarding the York pike for Stuart's cavalry. 
 Although upon General Rodes' staff, I had been detached 
 at Hagerstown by order of General Ewell to accompany 
 Early's division to Gettysburg and York, by reason of 
 my familiarity with the country, the roads, cross-roads, 
 and many of the people, especially in and about York. 
 In the evening, just before the attack upon Cemetery Hill 
 was ordered, I was sent by General Hays to Rodes to ask 
 him to rally on our division and assist us in the attack. I 
 found my old commander completely choked up in the 
 narrow streets of the town with his division, and conse- 
 quently he could not aid us." 
 
 General Early would do well to satisfactorily explain his 
 
 * General Longstreet, in Annals of the War, page 428. 
 
348 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 reasons for this breaking of his line at such a critical time, 
 before his criticisms of General Longstreet are admissible. 
 He knew that he was expected to assault the Federal cen- 
 ter simultaneously with Longstreet's assault on the left,, 
 and he had every reason to believe that that assault might 
 be made at any moment, and yet, notwithstanding these 
 weighty considerations, he broke his line, and was unpre- 
 pared to act simultaneously, and when he did act it was 
 not done with sufficient force. Had the line as originally 
 formed been intact, and the assault been made by four 
 brigades instead of but two, the result might have been 
 far different from what it was. If Rodes had not gotten 
 into confusion, but assisted Early in the assault, the re- 
 sults might have been still more disastrous to the Federals. 
 And had Rodes, Early, and Johnson all attacked simul- 
 taneously, when the assault was made, even though they 
 did not act in concert with Longstreet on the other flank, 
 success would have been highly probable. The whole 
 affair, it will be seen, was badly managed and sadly dis- 
 jointed. There was an utter want of co-operation and 
 harmony in the movements of the several commands, and 
 for these causes no decisive results were achieved. 
 
 6. Another very serious failure of the Confederates 
 was in not taking advantage of the position Johnson had 
 gained within the Federal lines upon their right. The 
 position won was of immense importance. Its capture 
 was an open breach in the line of defense, through which 
 troops might have been passed in force, and the strong- 
 hold on Cemetery Hill rendered untenable. General Ewell 
 certainly was not aware of the importance of this position, 
 or he undoubtedly would have passed Rodes' division 
 
GENERAL SICKLES' MISTAKE. 349 
 
 through the gap. Had he done so the consequences might 
 have been terribly disastrous to the Federals. Says an 
 eminent Southern writer, " If any man can answer truly 
 and give the reason why the position gained by Ewell's 
 Corps, under General Johnson, on Thursday night, was 
 not followed up and reinforced, he will give one of the 
 strongest reasons why Lee lost Gettysburg." 
 
 Is it not clear, then, that the confusion in the counsels 
 of the Confederate chieftains, which was so conspicuous 
 in their failure to follow up the advantages which they 
 gained in the first day's fight, by carrying and occupying 
 both Cemetery and Culp's hills, still adhered to them, and 
 caused them to blunder on until their final defeat? 
 
 But the mistakes of that day were not all upon the Con- 
 federate side. The Federal commanders committed some 
 grave errors, which might have proved fatal to the Na- 
 tional cause; and fidelity to the truth of history requires 
 that they be stated. These errors were as follows: 
 
 1. General Sickles certainly erred in posting his corps 
 upon the advanced position he ehose. Suppose that Hood, 
 Instead of attacking him upon the line he was expected 
 to take, had flanked him and passed around and below 
 Big Round Top, and threatened an attack from that di- 
 rection, or interrupted the Federal communications, was 
 not the Sixth Corps, numbering fifteen thousand men, 
 sufficiently able to have attended to him? And was not 
 that corps in precisely the right place — in reserve behind 
 Round Top — to meet such an emergency as that? And 
 suppose, too, that Longstreet had occupied the high 
 ground, which Sickles supposed would render the line 
 on the lower ground in the rear untenable, that would 
 
350 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 not have insured hurt the advantage which Sickles feared 
 its possession would give. General Longstreet occupied 
 that very --round after he drove Sickles from it, and yet 
 he could not use it to much advantage in the battle of 
 the third day. 
 
 2. General Meade should have known before three 
 o'clock in the afternoon just where Sickles' line was. 
 Especially is this true when he, as he himself says, " was 
 in doubt concerning his left." He had ample time — from 
 seven o'clock in the morning when the last of the Third 
 Corps reached the field — to have seen to this matter. It 
 would seem that a judicious commander would desire 
 personally to see after so important a matter as a flank 
 of his army in the presence of a powerful foe. 
 
 3. The failure to perceive the importance of, and 
 properly occupy Little Round Top, until it was acci- 
 dentally seen and occupied, is one of the inexplicable 
 wonders of that day. Hancock and Geary discovered its 
 immense importance and did all they could to occupy and 
 hold it, but their efforts seem not to have been seconded by 
 either General Meade or Sickles. The Confederates per- 
 ceived the importance of this hill, and explicit instructions 
 were given the men to seize and hold it at all hazards; 
 but the discovery of its importance by the Federal com- 
 manders, especially by those whose special duty it was 
 to see after such things, seems to have been entirely acci- 
 dental. Nay, worse than this: that position was rejected 
 by Sickles as of no account. It seems that General Meade 
 directed General Sickles to occupy Little Round Top "if 
 it was practicable to occupy it,*' and he reported that 
 "There is no position there." And yet that hill was, as is 
 
IMPORTANCE OF LITTLE ROUND TOP. 351 
 
 universally admitted, the key to the whole position, and 
 the issue of the battle, and probably the destiny of the 
 government depended upon its occupation. General Long- 
 street say.-: 
 
 "The importance of Hound Top as a point d'appui was 
 not appreciated until my attack. General Meade seems 
 to have alluded to it as a point to be occupied 'if practica- 
 ble,' but in such slighting manner as to show that he did 
 not deem it of great importance. So it was occupied by 
 an inadequate force. As our battle progressed, pushing 
 the Federals back from point to point, subordinate officers 
 and soldiers, seeking shelter as birds fly to cover in a tem- 
 pest, found behind the large boulders of its rock -bound 
 sides, not only protection, but rallying points. These re- 
 inforcements to the troops already there, checked our ad- 
 vance on the right, and some superior officers, arriving 
 just then, divined from effect the cause, and threw a force 
 upon Round Top that transformed it, as if by magic, into 
 a Gibraltar."* 
 
 4. It was undoubtedly an error to withdraw the Twelfth 
 Corps from so important a position as the right, thereby 
 exposing it to easy capture. Reinforcements should have 
 been called from the Sixth Corps, which was in reserve 
 within convenient distance. The weakening of the line 
 on the right cost hundreds of precious lives the follow- 
 ing day. 
 
 Such were undoubtedly some of the mistakes which 
 were made on the memorable day under consideration. 
 The God of Xations, however, overruled all, and gave 
 victory to the right. He did not intend that the Republic 
 should be overthrown. 
 
 * Annals of the War, page 425. 
 
352 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 General Meade had made his head -quarters in a small 
 frame house, sixteen by twenty feet, on the western brow 
 of Cemetery Ridge, near the center and along side the 
 Taneytown road. The situation was such that it seemed 
 to be sheltered from exposure, and from which the com- 
 mander in chief could easily communicate with all parts 
 
 GENERAE MEADE'S HEAD -QUARTERS. 
 From a Photograph by Beidel. 
 
 of his lines. In that unpretentious cottage, in the evening 
 after the close of the bloody battles of this day, the Union 
 chieftains were assembled. General Meade had called 
 them together to take into consideration the situation and 
 advise him what was best to do. The questions submitted 
 to them were : 
 
 First. Under existing circumstances is it advisable for 
 
FEDERAL COUNCIL OF WAR. 353 
 
 this army to remain in its present position, or to retire to 
 another nearer its base of supplies? 
 
 Second. It being determined to remain in its present 
 position, shall the army attack or wait the attack of the 
 •enemy ? 
 
 Third. If we wait attack, how long? 
 
 To these momentous questions the following answers 
 were given, as recorded by General Butterfield, Meade's 
 chief of staff: 
 
 General Gibbon. — First, correct the position of the 
 army, but would not retreat; second, in no condition to 
 attack the enemy; third, until the enemy moves. 
 
 General Newton. — First, correct the position of the 
 army, but would not retreat; second, by all means not at- 
 tack; third, if we wait it will give them a chance to cut 
 our line. 
 
 General Hancock. — -First, rectify position without mov- 
 ing so as to give up the field; second, not attack unless our 
 communications are cut; third, can not wait long, can not 
 be idle. 
 
 General Howard. — First, remain; second, wait attack 
 until four p. m. to-morrow; third, if the enemy do not at- 
 tack, attack them. 
 
 General Sedgwick. — First, remain ; second, wait attack; 
 third, at least one day. 
 
 General Williams. — First, stay; second, wait attack; 
 third, one day. 
 
 General Birney. — Same as General Williams. 
 
 General Sykes. — Same as General Williams. 
 
 General Slocum. — Stay and fight it out. 
 
 Of the corps commanders, two, it will be seen, were ab' 
 
354 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 sent from this meeting, licynolds was dead, and his 
 honored remains were at his former home at Lancaster, 
 Pennsylvania; and Sickles was undergoing the amputa- 
 tion of one of his legs in a neighboring hospital. 
 
 This council was held after the desperate and bloody 
 battles of the two previous days, the first of which had 
 been a disaster, and the second without material advantage 
 to the Union army. It was reasonable to assume that as 
 the results so far had been rather in favor of the Confed- 
 erates, that they would repeat their attacks the next day, 
 and that their most desperate and deadly blow was yet to 
 be delivered ! With such momentous results hanging over 
 him, with the destiny of a nation in his keeping, it was 
 but prudent and right that General Meade should call 
 together the men upon whom he would have to depend, 
 and ascertain their views and secure their counsel. And 
 it was right too that he should have every preparation 
 made to carry into immediate execution the decision they 
 arrived at. Hence he came to this council with an order 
 to retire to the line at Pipe Creek previously selected, pre- 
 pared by his chief of staff, General Butterfield, to be used 
 only in case the reports from his corps commanders made 
 evident the necessity of changing the field. This was a 
 wise precaution, but General Meade has been unjustly 
 criticised for it, and his enemies have tried to make it ap- 
 pear that he was timid and undecided. But when this 
 council was held, and the universal sentiment was to re- 
 main and meet the issue upon that field, he at once de- 
 cided to remain at Gettysburg and fight the battle there, 
 which decided the fate of the Confederacy. 
 
 Before closing this chapter it will interest the reader to 
 
AT GENERAL LEE'S HEADQUARTERS. 355 
 
 take a look into General Lee's head - quarters in the night 
 after this day's series of battles. A Southern officer, who 
 was present there, describes the scene in the Southern 
 Bivouac. He says: 
 
 "About ten o'clock at night of Thursday, July 2d, while 
 conversing with General Rodes, the writer received a note 
 from Rev. Dr. Pryor, a chaplain in EwelPs Corps, inform- 
 ing me that I was wanted at army head -quarters. These 
 were situated near the Chambersburg pike. In riding 
 through the town it was filled with Confederates, who, 
 soldier -like, were busy in preparing their meals all along 
 the streets. They appeared to be in the highest spirits. 
 On reaching army head - quarters it was crowded with 
 staff officers from all quarters of the field. All seemed 
 gratified with the results of the day: certainly nobody 
 looked gloomy or despondent. Pickett's division had ar- 
 rived from Chambersburg and was posted in line. About 
 eleven p. m. all faces were made cheerful and all hearts 
 made glad by the arrival at head- quarters of Generals 
 J. E. B. Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee. General A. P. Hill 
 came in, shaking hands with his friends, and as soon as 
 the commanding general heard the voice of General Hill 
 he moved through the crowd and, shaking Hill by the 
 hand, said, 'It is all well, General, everything is all well;' 
 and taking Hill aside spoke to him privately for nearly 
 a quarter of an hour. 
 
 "The commanding general looked well. He was all him- 
 self, and never appeared to better advantage. This was 
 the first time the writer had seen General Lee since the 
 night of the battle at Beverly's Ford, June 9th. It was 
 one o'clock before Colonel Marshall announced my name, 
 
356 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 when General Lee arose and said, 'I am expecting Gen- 
 eral Imboden in the morning, and I am desirous to send 
 to Virginia at once as many of our wounded as possible. 
 Doctor Pryor has told me that you and Captain Brocken- 
 borough are acquainted with the fords of the upper Poto- 
 mac, and I want you both to report to General Imboden 
 at ten o'clock to - morrow. Colonel Taylor will issue the 
 necessary orders.' I informed the commanding general 
 that Doctor Pryor was mistaken, that neither I nor Brock- 
 enborough knew anything of these fords, except the ones 
 at Shepherdstown and Williamsport; that we were both 
 well acquainted with the fords of the Rappahannock, but 
 not of the Potomac; that Mr. Logan, of Winchester, who 
 was in Podes' command, was well informed on the subject. 
 Turning quickly around, the commanding general said, 
 ' Hunt up Mr. Logan and send him to me at once.' He 
 was full of business, and his strong mind and intellectual 
 energies were taxed to their utmost. The fences all around 
 the head -quarters were lined with soldiers who had 
 participated in the struggle of the day, relating their 
 experiences. The writer remained with these until the 
 morning sun appeared on Friday, July 3d, when he re- 
 turned to his command." 
 
r £t^r£f-^ 
 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE THIRD DAY OP THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG — FRIDAY, 
 JULY 3RD, 1863. 
 
 URrN"G the ni^ht succeeding the terrible battles 
 
 l; 
 
 & 
 
 which have been described in the previous chapter, 
 there were some readjustments made in the lines 
 preparatory to the renewal of the conflict on the 
 succeeding day. Pickett's division of Longstreet's 
 Corps, which, it will be remembered, had been left in the 
 vicinity of Chambersburg to protect the rear, left its en- 
 campment early on Thursday morning and reached the 
 field of battle about three o'clock in the afternoon. This 
 division was placed to the left of Anderson and to the 
 right of Heth, and directly opposite to the Federal left 
 center, where the Second Corps under Hancock was sta- 
 tioned. Johnson's division, which had gained a foothold 
 within the line upon the Federal right, was reinforced with 
 Daniel's and O'Neill's brigades of Rodes' division. This 
 was done so as to be ready, by the dawn of day, to im- 
 prove the advantage gained, and, if possible, obtain com- 
 plete possession of Gulp's Hill and the Baltimore pike. 
 Thus massed, General Ewell designed to throw his whole 
 force upon the Federal right, while Longstreet with his 
 newly arrived division, assisted by large detachments from 
 Hill's Corps, was to perform a similar work upon the left 
 
 357 
 
358 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 center. Stuart's cavalry, which had only reached the field 
 from its erratic course around the Federal army about four 
 o'clock in the afternoon of the day previous, was placed 
 near the Confederate left. The Federal forces were not 
 inactive during the night. Round Top had been made 
 invulnerable, and its batteries of heavy artillery had com- 
 plete control of the field. The Federal cavalry, too, re- 
 lieved from the pursuit of Stuart, had reached the field, 
 and were judiciously posted upon the respective flanks. 
 But the point which required the first and most careful 
 attention was the right. Johnson's position there en- 
 dangered the safety of the whole army, and General Slo- 
 cum was directed to storm his intrenchments. Geary's 
 division, which had been detached the evening before to 
 assist the sorely pressed left, returned about midnight and 
 joined Green who had remained. Shaler's and Wheaton's 
 brigades of the Sixth Corps and Lockwood's Maryland 
 brigade, were sent to reinforce the Twelfth. Batteries of 
 artillery were established on all prominent points, and all 
 possible preparations were made to renew the fight at the 
 break of day. General Slocum, seconded by Geary, and 
 others, was determined to drive back the Confederates at 
 all hazards. General Ewell, too, was equally determined, 
 not only to hold the position he had gained, but to push 
 his advantage and if possible get into the rear of the 
 Federal right center. The immense importance of the oc- 
 casion was now understood by both the contending parties, 
 and both were determined to do their utmost in the ap- 
 proaching struggle. 
 
 As soon as objects could be discerned in the early day- 
 light of the morning, the Federal batteries opened upon 
 
GREEK MEETS GREEK. 359 
 
 the enemy. As Johnson, on account of the nature of the 
 ground, had not been able to bring his artillery with him, 
 he was unable to reply, and he determined at once to 
 charge in the hope of driving the Federal troops, and 
 securing a better position upon higher ground. His men 
 — the old Stonewall brigade leading — rushed forward, but 
 Avere braA^ely met by Kane's brigade of Geary's division. 
 In a few minutes the battle became general along the 
 whole of Slocum's line, and for six hours it raged most 
 furiously. The fighting at this point, like that of the 
 afternoon preceding upon the left, Avas regarded as the 
 most obstinate and deadly of the war. "With fiendish yell 
 and mad contempt of death, the enemy time and again 
 hurled his solid masses against the Federal lines, but they 
 stood like a wall of devouring fire. At length, at about 
 ten a. m., Johnson Avas compelled to fall back before a 
 charge by Geary's division. Slowly, reluctantly, inch by 
 inch, fighting, falling, dying, the Confederates were pressed 
 back out of the breast- Avorks, Avhich they had temporarily 
 occupied, and up to Rock Creek. As they retreated and 
 came under fire of the Federal batteries, they were merci- 
 lessly cut down by repeated and tremendous discharges of 
 grape and canister. Nothing during the war exceeded this 
 engagement in carnage. The slain were lying literally in 
 heaps. In front of Geary's position were more Confed- 
 erate dead than the entire list of casualties in the whole 
 of the Twelfth Corps. Human beings, mangled and torn, 
 in every manner, from a single shot through the body or 
 head to bodies torn to pieces by exploding shells, were 
 everywhere. The Stonewall Brigade, like the Louisiana 
 Tigers the evening before, had met their match. Their 
 
360 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 reputation for invincible courage was unimpeached, but 
 the stone - wall this time stood in their way, and they 
 had to yield to the inevitable. At eleven o'clock the bat- 
 tle ceased, and the Federal line was once more intact. * 
 
 General Longstreet, who, it will be remembered, did not 
 favor an attack upon the Federal position, but counseled 
 Lee to move around by the left and get between them and 
 Washington, and thereby compel General Meade to march 
 out and meet him in the plain, went at an early hour in 
 the morning to see his commander and, if possible, have 
 him adopt this plan. General Longstreet says of this in- 
 terview: " I did not see General Lee that night. On the 
 next morning he came to see me, and, fearing that he was 
 still in his disposition to attack, I tried to anticipate him 
 by saying: 'General, I have had my scouts out all night, 
 and I find that you still have an excellent opportunity to 
 move around to the right of Meade's army, and maneuver 
 him to attacking us.' He replied, pointing with his fist at 
 Cemetery Hill, ' The enemy is there, and I am going to 
 strike him.' I felt that it was my duty to express my con- 
 victions. I said: ' General, I have been a soldier all my 
 life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by 
 couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and 
 armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers 
 can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men 
 ever arrayed for battle can take that position,' pointing to 
 Cemetery Hill. General Lee, in reply to this, ordered me 
 
 *The severity of this engagement upon the Federal right may be seen in 
 the fact, that Johnson's division, which was mainly engaged, lost 1,188 in 
 killed, wounded, and missing. The Twelfth Corps, which opposed Johnson, 
 lost 1,081 men. Other troops on both sides who were also engaged, lost as 
 heavily in proportion. 
 
PREPARING TO ATTACK THE FEI/ERAL CENTER. 361 
 
 to prepare Pickett's division for the attack. I should not 
 have been so urgent had I not foreseen the hopelessness of 
 the proposed assault. I felt that I must say a word against 
 the sacrifice of my men; and then I felt that my record 
 was such that General Lee would or could not miscon- 
 strue my motives. I said no more, however, hut turned 
 away. The plan of assault was as follows: Our artillery 
 was to be massed in a wood, from which Pickett was to 
 charge, and it was to pour a continuous fire upon the 
 enemy. Under cover of this fire, and supported by it, 
 Pickett was to charge." 
 
 General Lee, having now attacked both flanks of the 
 Federal army, and failed in both, had but two alternatives, 
 — either to attack the center, or withdraw his forces. He 
 chose the former, and after riding along his line with 
 Longstreet, and reconnoitering and planning, at length 
 committed to that general the execution of his plan. Pick- 
 ett's division, which was supposed to be the flower of his 
 army, had only reached the field the afternoon before, 
 and had not therefore been engaged. "With this choice 
 division of well-tried and veteran troops, supported by 
 others whom we shall mention hereafter, it was proposed 
 to pierce the Federal left center. Preparatory, however, 
 to this great charge, the artillery was to concentrate its 
 fire upon Cemetery Hill with a view to dismount the guns, 
 demoralize the men, and thereby prepare the way for the 
 assault. General Alexander, Longstreet's chief of artil- 
 lery, massed several batteries close together on the elevated 
 ground near the Peach Orchard, (south of the Emmitts- 
 burg road,) which had been taken from Sickles the day 
 before. All along the north side of the Emmittsburg 
 
362 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 road, extending towards Gettysburg, as far as Codori's 
 house, many batteries were placed. It was on this line 
 that the celebrated Washington artillery, under Eshelman, 
 was posted, while Deering's artillery was still further to 
 the left of the line toward the town. All along the top of 
 Seminary Ridge, partly concealed by a skirt of woods, and 
 still further on in a circle, all around the ridge to the Har- 
 risburg road, batteries upon batteries were placed, ready to 
 join in the horrid din and hurl their missiles of destruction 
 upon the Federals. It is said that General Alexander, in 
 his official report, shows the number of pieces in position 
 to have been nearly two hundred, of which about one 
 hundred and forty were in and around the Confederate 
 center, while the remaining sixty pieces were on the right 
 and left of the line. This number is probably too large. 
 Federal authorities place the number at about one hundred 
 and twenty. 
 
 Let us now, before proceeding to detail the greatest and 
 most momentous struggle that ever occurred upon the 
 American continent, pay a visit to General Meade's head- 
 quarters and see what is transpiring there, and what pre- 
 parations are being made for the great event. Orderlies 
 were gathered about the door. Others were continually 
 coming in with reports. Signal officers were sending in 
 reports telegraphed from signal stations. The staff were 
 about the commanding general, engaged in earnest con- 
 sultation. The plan of the enemy was well understood, 
 and the gravity of the situation was duly appreciated. 
 There was no fear, but a solemn determination to resist 
 the expected shock, and overcome at all hazards. Such, 
 too, was the spirit which prevailed throughout the entire 
 
A TERRIBLE CONFLICT. 363 
 
 army. It was the determination of all to repulse the at- 
 tack or die in the effort. 
 
 From eleven o'clock, when the battle ceased upon the 
 right, until one p. M. silence prevailed. It was the solemn 
 pause of preparation, as if both sides were nerving for the 
 last, the supreme effort. At length at precisely seven 
 minutes past one o'clock, the awful silence was broken by 
 a signal gun upon Seminary Ridge. This was immediately 
 followed by the terrific roar of one hundred and twenty 
 guns, the fire of which was concentrated upon that part of 
 the line commanded by General Hancock. This command 
 comprised the First, Second, Third, and Eleventh Corps. 
 Owing to the convex shape of the Federal line, but eighty 
 guns could be placed to answer the Confederate fire. These, 
 however, belched forth defiance and death. This horrid 
 din continued for nearly two hours, and was not ex- 
 ceeded by anything like it that ever occurred upon this 
 continent, and it may be upon the entire globe.* The 
 very heavens seemed to be rent asunder by a succes- 
 sion of crashing sounds as if the artillery of the skies 
 were let loose upon earth. The air was filled with whiz- 
 zing, screaming, bursting shells, which sent many a mortal 
 to his last account. A single shell which exploded in the 
 Cemetery, killed and wounded twenty -seven men in one 
 regiment. Two Federal batteries were demolished, and 
 eleven caissons blown up. When the smoke from these 
 explosions was seen by the Confederates, their shouts and 
 
 * It may surprise the reader to learn that the sound of this cannonading 
 was heard one hundred and forty miles from Gettysburg. This facft will be 
 established in Chapter XL, where undoubted testimony will be given, togeth- 
 er with philosophical explanations by Professors Spencer V. Baird, of the 
 Smithsonian Institute, and A. B. Johnson, of the United States Light -House 
 Board. 
 
364 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 yells of exultation could at times be heard above the roar 
 of the guns. Horses were blown to pieces, trees were rid- 
 dled and cut down, rocks were splintered sending their 
 fragments in all directions, tombstones and iron railing in 
 the Cemetery were shivered, the ground was scored and 
 furrowed, and men were killed, but the batteries were not 
 silenced. The infantry sought shelter behind ledges and 
 stone fences, but the artillerists at the guns suffered most. 
 The destruction on both sides was terrible, but the Feder- 
 als were damaged most, because of the concentration of 
 the enemy's fire and their superior number of guns. 
 
 Mr. Wilkinson, of the New York Tribune, who was at 
 General Meade's head -quarters, thus describes the awful 
 scene : 
 
 " In the shadow cast by the tiny farm house, sixteen by 
 twenty, which General Meade had made his head -quarters, 
 lay wearied staff officers and tired correspondents. There 
 was not wanting to the peacefulness of the scene the sing- 
 ing of a bird, which had a nest in a<» peach tree within the 
 tiny yard of the whitewashed cottage. In the midst of its 
 warbling a shell screamed over the house, instantly fol- 
 lowed by another, and another, and in a moment the air 
 was full of the most complete artillery prelude to an in- 
 fantry battle that was ever exhibited. Every size and 
 form of shell known to British and American gunnery 
 shrieked, whirled, moaned, wh'stled, and wrathfully flut- 
 tered over our ground. As many as six in a second, con- 
 stantly two in a second, bursting and screaming over and 
 around the head - quarters, made a very hell of fire that 
 amazed the oldest officers. They burst in the yard — burst 
 next to the fence on both sides, garnished as usual with 
 
A STORM OF SHELLS. 365 
 
 the hitched horses of aides and orderlies. The fastened 
 animals reared and plunged with terror. Then one fell, 
 then another — sixteen lay dead and mangled before the 
 fire ceased, still fastened by their halters, which gave the 
 •expression of being wickedly tied up to die painfully. 
 These brute victims of a cruel war touched all hearts. 
 Through the midst of the storm of screaming and ex- 
 ploding shells an ambulance, driven by its frenzied con- 
 ductor at full speed, presented to all of us the marvelous 
 spectacle of a horse going rapidly on three legs. A hinder 
 one had been shot off at the hock. A shell tore up the 
 little step at the head -quarters cottage, and ripped bags 
 of oats as with a knife. Another soon carried off one of 
 its two pillars. Soon a spherical case burst opposite the 
 open door — another ripped through the low garret. The 
 remaining pillar went almost immediately to the howl of a 
 fixed shot that Whitworth must have made. During this 
 fire the horses at twenty and thirty feet distant were re- 
 ceiving their death, and soldiers in Federal blue were torn 
 to pieces in the road, and died with the peculiar yells that 
 blend the extorted cry of pain with horror and despair. 
 2^ot an orderly, not an ambulance, not a straggler was to 
 be seen upon the field swept by this tempest of orchestral 
 death, thirty minutes after it commenced. Were not one 
 hundred and twenty pieces of artillery trying to cut from 
 the field every battery we had in position to resist their 
 proposed infantry attack, and to sweep away the slight 
 defenses behind which our infantry were waiting? Forty 
 minutes — fifty minutes — counted watches that ran, O so 
 languidly! Shells through the two lower rooms. A shell 
 into the chimney that did not explode. Shells in the yard. 
 
366 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 The air thicker and fuller, and more deafening with the 
 howling and whirring of these infernal missiles. The 
 chief of staff struck — -Sethi Williams — loved and respected 
 through the army, separated from instant death by two 
 inches of space vertically measured. An aid bored with 
 a fragment of iron through the bone of the arm. And 
 the time measured on the sluggish watches was one hour 
 and forty minutes." 
 
 It will be of interest to know what was transpiring 
 during this time within the Confederate lines. The fol- 
 lowing accounts by Confederate officers will be read with 
 interest. Colonel W. H. Swallow, in the Southern Bivouac, 
 February, 1886, says: 
 
 "It was on the western slope of Seminary Eidge and 
 between it and Willoughby Run that the assaulting column 
 was formed. * * * Immediately after the column was 
 formed Generals Lee, Longstreet, and Pickett rode along 
 the lines several times inspecting the different alignments. 
 They then rode aside and had an earnest and animated 
 conversation together. After this conversation all three 
 again rode along the column and then retired together. 
 Their whole conduct showed in a manner not to be mis- 
 taken, how extremely dangerous and full of doubt these 
 officers regarded the proposed assault. As General Lee 
 rode away he looked mournfully at the column and mut- 
 tered more to himself than to others, 'The attack must 
 succeed.' " 
 
 The following graphic account by Captain H. T. Owen, 
 of the Eighteenth Virginia regiment, written for the Phil- 
 adelphia Weekly Times, of March 26th, 1881, reveals the 
 effect of the Federal cannonade upon the Confederate 
 
PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT. 367 
 
 lines. Captain Owen says: "On Friday morning, July 3d, 
 Pickett's division left its bivouac at dawn of day and mov- 
 ing around to the right reached the position assigned it in 
 the ravine behind Cemetery Ridge soon after six o'clock. 
 Long dark lines of infantry were massed along the bot- 
 toms, concealed from the enemy's view, and orders were 
 given ' to lie down and keep still to avoid attracting the 
 attention of the enemy.' About eight o'clock Generals 
 Lee, Longstreet and Pickett, in company, rode slowly along 
 up and down in front of the long lines of prostrate infan- 
 try, viewing them closely and critically as they rode along. 
 They were not greeted with the usual cheers, as orders had 
 preceded them forbidding this, but the men voluntarily 
 rose up and stood in line with uncovered heads and hats 
 held aloft while their chieftains rode by. This review over, 
 strong detachments were thrown forward to support the 
 artillery stationed along the crest of Oak Ridge and Cem- 
 etery Ridge, composed of about one hundred and twenty 
 cannon, and stretching along the brow of these ridges for 
 a mile. The supporting detachments were placed about a 
 hundred yards in the rear of this line of batteries and lay 
 down in the tall grass under a cloudless sky and with a 
 bright July sun pouring its scorching rays almost vertically 
 upon them for five long, weary hours, while they listened and 
 watched in painful suspense for some sound or some move- 
 ment to break that profound stillness which rested over 
 the vast battle-field and depressed the spirits like a dreads 
 ful nightmare. At one o'clock this awful stillness was 
 suddenly broken and the men startled by the discharge of 
 a couple of signal guns fired in quick succession, followed 
 by a silence of half a minute, and then, while their echo 
 
368 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 was yet rolling along the distant defiles and mountain 
 gorges, an uproar began as wonderful as had been the pre- 
 vious silence. General Lee's one hundred and twenty 
 guns opened at once with a crash and thunder sound that 
 shook the hills for miles around from crest to base, and 
 were instantly replied to by about eighty guns ranged by 
 General Meade along the front of Cemetery Kidge, about 
 one mile in front. 
 
 " ~No sound of roaring waters, nor wind, nor thunder, 
 nor of these combined, ever equaled the tremendous up- 
 roar, and no command, no order, no sound of voice, could 
 be heard at all above the ceaseless din of thousands of 
 shrieking shot and shell falling thick and fast on every 
 side and bursting with terrific explosions, while others by 
 thousands came bounding, skipping, racing and chasing 
 each other over the hill and down the slope, hissing, scoff- 
 ing, spitting and moaning like relentless demons as they 
 dashed through the detachments and went onward to crash 
 among the reserves far back in the rear. The bursting 
 shell in mid -heaven or upon the earth scattered death 
 wherever its fragments flew, and the shrill shot over head 
 or bounding madly across the field would both alike dip 
 through a line of prostrate men and tear away with a wail 
 to the rear, leaving a wide track of blood behind. The air 
 was filled with clouds of dust and volumes of sulphurous, 
 suffocating smoke rolled up white and bluish -gray like 
 frightful storm clouds, and hung like a pall over the field, 
 through the rifts and rents of which the sun with dim light 
 looked down upon the ghastly scene. 
 
 " After two hours the firing suddenly ceased, and silence 
 again rested for half an hour over the battle-field, during 
 
THE SCENE OF THE ASSAULT. 369 
 
 which time the Confederates were rapidly forming an at- 
 tacking column just helow the brow of Seminary Ridge. 
 Long double lines of infantry came pouring out of the 
 woods and bottoms, across ravines and little valleys, hurry- 
 ing on to the positions assigned them in the column. Two 
 separate lines of double ranks were formed a hundred 
 yards apart, and in the center of the column was placed 
 the division of Pickett, said to be 'the flower of Lee's 
 army,' — 4,481 privates, 244 company officers, 32 field 
 officers, and four general officers, making 4,761 all told. 
 In the front line was placed Kemper and Garnett's brigades 
 side by side, covered by Armistead's brigade in the second 
 line." 
 
 Before describing the great assault which followed this 
 terrible artillery prelude, the reader's attention is specially 
 called to the illustration given on the next page, which 
 shows the ground over which the assaulting columns 
 moved, as well as the point where the Federal line was 
 pierced. The Federal line from the center to its extreme 
 left was from the north-east to the south-west; but owing 
 to a curve toward the west at the point where this view 
 was taken, the prospect is south-west. The inside of the 
 line, and the breast- works of stone which yet remain, are 
 here seen. The house and barn to the right are Codori's. 
 They stand beside the Emmittsburg road, which is seen 
 running south -westwardly. This house marked about 
 the center of the assaulting column. The Confederate 
 position from which the columns of assault proceeded, was 
 about a half mile further to the right of this house, which 
 will be to the west. The umbrella - shaped tree by the side 
 of the tablet on the left, which yet remains, was the ob- 
 
 24 
 
A YANK KM RUSE. 371 
 
 jective point at which General Pickett directed his men 
 to aim, and it was at this place that the Confederates 
 pierced the Federal line. There the Confederate General 
 Armistead received his mortal wound, and a little to the 
 right Hancock was wounded. This place, by general eon- 
 sent, has been designated the High, water-mark of the Re- 
 bellion. There it reached its highest — its supreme effort, 
 and there it received its death-wound. 
 
 The Federal commanders well understood what the ob- 
 ject of this tremendous lire was, and calmly prepared to 
 meet it. After it had continued about an hour and a 
 half, the artillerists were ordered to slacken their lire so 
 as to give their guns time to cool for the final effort, as 
 well as to induce the enemy to suppose that he had 
 silenced them, and thus bring on the expected attack 
 sooner.* The ruse succeeded, and soon the enemy in three 
 massive lines were seen to emerge from the wooded crest 
 of Seminary Ridge, and to move steadily over the inter- 
 vening spaee towards the Federal left center. This assault- 
 ing force consisted of Pickett's division of Lonarstreet's 
 Corps, Ileth's division of Hill's Corps, — under the tempo- 
 rary command of General Pettigrew, Heth having been 
 wounded, — and the brigades of' Wilcox, Laic and Scales, 
 also of Hill's Corps, the whole amounting to from twelve 
 
 * Another cause for the cessation of the Federal fire has heen given, which 
 is, that General Warren, Meade's chief engineer, who was holding a position 
 on Round Top with some of the signal corps, constructed a temporary tele- 
 graph from the heights of the mountain to Meade's head-quarters. A little 
 after two o'clock he notified General M< ade that he was doing the enemy but 
 little injury, and that he was filling the valley between the two ridges with 
 smoke, under cover of which the Confederates would make their expected 
 assault. He also advised him to discontinue the firing and get read}- for the 
 assault. By Meade's permission General Hunt, the chief of artillery, arrest- 
 ed the firing all along the line. 
 
372 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 to fifteen thousand men.* Two brigades of Pickett's di- 
 vision formed the front, and one in the second line as a 
 support, with the brigade of Wilcox in the rear of the 
 right, to protect that flank. Heth's division moved on 
 Pickett's left, and Lane and Scales were placed in the rear 
 of its right. Its left was without reserve or support. 
 While these lines were being formed General Meade moved 
 his head - quarters from its exposed position, to Power's 
 Hill, where General Slocum was already established. 
 General Hunt also took advantage of the opportunity to 
 withdraw such of the guns as had been injured by the 
 
 • Colonel W. H. Swallow, who participated in the battle of Gettysburg-, on 
 the Confederate side, in response to a letter of inquiry from the writer, as to 
 the frontage of this great assaulting column, replies as follows : 
 
 " If I were to speak from the impression made while the column was mov- 
 ing before my eyes, I should say that from Brockenborough's brigade on the 
 left of Pettigrew's division to Kemper's right brigade of Pickett's division, 
 which measured the distance of the assaulting column, the frontage was 
 about three fourths of a mile. But if you also include the brigades of Thomas 
 and McGowan, which covered the left flank of Pettigrew's division, to the 
 brigades of Wilcox and Perry that covered the right flank of Pickett's divis- 
 ion, the distance was fully one mile. 
 
 "I make the depth 1,372 yards. My measurements, which were afterwards 
 made, were from line of battle to line of battle. 
 
 "Now it should be remembered that Trimble's division lay in line of bat- 
 tle, on the western slope of Seminary Ridge, in the rear of the artillery. 
 Now from Trimble's left to the right of Hays' division, the distance was 1,733 
 yards ; and from the right of Trimble's division to the central point of attack 
 on the Union line, the distance was 1,400 yards. From the left of Pickett's 
 division to the central point of attack on the Union line, the distance was 
 only 1,066 yards. From Pickett's right to the left of General Stannard's left 
 regiment was 1,350 yards. You will see that these figures will give an aver- 
 age of about 1,375 yards. 
 
 "The troops in the column that received the heaviest artillery fire were 
 Pettigrew's own brigade, commanded by Jones. The right of Trimble's com- 
 mand also reached the point of attack as far as Pickett's, but then Trimble's 
 men got there about fifteen minutes later than Pickett. General Kemper was 
 up to the works when repulsed. General Kemper writes to me: 'I was 
 nearly up to the Federal line, so near that I could easily see the faces and 
 the expression on the countenances of the Union men, and I thought I 
 could identify the individual soldier that shot me.' " 
 
AN IMPOSING BATTLE -COLUMN. 373 
 
 cannonading and replace them with others. The ammuni- 
 tion boxes were also replenished, and it was arranged that 
 as the foe came forward he should be met first with solid 
 shot, next with shell, and when he came to close quarters 
 with double charges of canister. When this attacking 
 force, preceded by a line of skirmishers, came into view, 
 cries of admiration were extorted from all who witnessed 
 it. It was probably the most imposing battle - column 
 seen during the war. "Here they come!" was uttered by 
 the men as the Confederates were seen to emerge from their 
 place of shelter. When this grand moving mass had 
 crossed about one third of the space between the two 
 armies, — about three quarters of a mile, — the Federal bat- 
 teries, which by a clever Yankee ruse the Confederates 
 were led to suppose they had silenced, opened upon them 
 in terrible and destructive discharges. Howard's guns on 
 Cemetery Hill, and the powerful batteries upon Round 
 Top, opened with terrible fury, ploughing through their 
 ranks from right to left and from left to right, tearing fear- 
 ful lanes through them, which were quickly closed again. 
 Still on they came yelling like demons; and when the Em- 
 mittsburg road was reached the Federal skirmishers behind 
 a stone wall were driven in. The Confederates leaped over 
 this wall and dashed forward, running at full speed until 
 they came within range of the infantry, when from twenty 
 thousand muskets a blinding, zig-zag flame burst upon 
 them. General Gibbon, now in command, — Hancock 
 having been wounded, — directed his men to make room 
 for the fatal grape, and volley after volley, in quick suc- 
 cession of double - shotted guns, poured their deadly con- 
 tents of iron hail upon the advancing foe. Sheets of iiame 
 
874 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and smoke and swiftly flying death bout in their faces, 
 until Pettigrew's men began to waver on the left and fall 
 behind. Pickett's division, however, yet pressed on, and 
 when within about live hundred yards of the Federal line, 
 Pickett halted and changed his direction somewhat obli- 
 quely. Wilcox and Lane, who guarded his right flank, did 
 
 GROUND OVER WHICH PICKETT'S MEN CHARGED. 
 (From a Photograph by Tipton.) 
 The house and barn which stand by the side of the Emmittsburg road are Codori's. 
 The elevated ground to the right, as seen above the fence, was the Con- 
 federate position, and from it Pickett's assaulting column came. 
 
 not make a corresponding change, but kept straight on, 
 and, as a consequence, a wide interval between the two 
 forces was soon made, and Pickett's flank was exposed. 
 General Standard, seeing his opportunity for a flank move- 
 ment, immediately changed the front of his brigade so as 
 
THE BRAVERY OF WEBB. 375 
 
 to place it perpendicular with the Confederate line of 
 march, and poured into them a terribly destructive fire at 
 short range. This caused many to surrender and others to 
 retreat, but the division still pressed forward. Here now 
 I will permit an eye -witness and participant to detail the 
 terrible struggle which followed. General Doubleday says: 
 
 " Arniistead's brigade, united to Garnett's, pressed on, 
 overpowered Hays' brigade of the Second Corps, and drove 
 it from its advanced position at the fence, back through 
 the batteries on the crest, and in spite of death -dealing- 
 bolts on all sides, Pickett determined to break Gibbons' 
 line and capture his guns. Although Webb's front was 
 the focus of the concentrated artillery fire, and he had 
 already lost fifty men and some valuable officers, his line 
 remained firm and unshaken. It devolved upon him now 
 to meet the great charge which was to decide the fate of 
 the day. It would have been difficult to find a man better 
 fitted for such an emergency. He was nerved to great 
 deeds by the memory of his ancestors, who in former days 
 had rendered distinguished services to the Republic, and 
 felt that the results of the war might depend upon his 
 holding his position. His men were equally resolute. 
 Cushing's battery, 'B,' Fourth United States Artillery, 
 which had been posted on his left, and Brown's Rhode 
 Island Battery on his right, were both practically destroyed 
 by the cannonade. The horses were prostrated, every 
 officer but one struck, and Gushing had but one serviceable 
 gun left. 
 
 "As Pickett's advance came very close to the first line, 
 young Cushing, mortally wounded, holding on to his in- 
 testines with one hand, ran his only gun down to the fence 
 
376 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 with the other, and said : ' Webb, I will give them one more 
 shot!' At the moment of the last discharge he called out, 
 ^Good byV and fell dead at the post of duty. Webb sent 
 for fresh batteries to replace the two that were disabled, 
 and Wheeler's First New York Independent Battery came 
 up just before the attack, and took the place of Cushing's 
 battery on the left. Arniistead pressed forward, leaped 
 the fence, waving his sword with his hat on it, followed 
 by about a hundred of his men, several of whom carried 
 battle flags, lie shouted, 'Give them cold steel, boys ! ' 
 and laid his hands upon one of the guns. The battery 
 for a few minutes was in his possession, and the Con- 
 federate flag flew triumphantly over our line. But Webb 
 was at the front very near Arniistead, animating and en- 
 couraging his men. He led the Seventy -second Pennsyl- 
 vania Regiment against the enemy, and posted a line of 
 wounded men in the rear to drive back or shoot every man 
 that deserted his duty. A portion of the Seventy -first 
 Pennsylvania, behind a stone wall on the right, threw in a 
 deadly fire, while a great part of the Sixty -ninth Penn- 
 sylvania and the remainder of the Seventy -first made 
 .stern resistance from a copse of trees on the left, near 
 where the enemy had broken the line, and where our men 
 were shot with the Confederate muskets touching their 
 breasts. Then came a splendid charge of two regiments 
 led by Colonel Hall, which passed completely through 
 Webb's line, and engaged the enemy in a hand to hand 
 eonflict. Arniistead was shot down by the side of the gun 
 he had taken. * * * Both Gibbon and Webb were 
 wounded, and the loss in officers and men was very heavy; 
 two Confederate brigadier- generals were killed, and more 
 
PETTIGREW'S RETREAT. 377 
 
 taken than twice Webb's brigade; six 
 battle flags and fourteen hundred and sixty -three muskets 
 were gathered in. * * * When Pickett — the great 
 leader — looked around the top of the ridge he had tem- 
 porarily gained, he saw it was impossible to hold the posi- 
 tion. Troops were rushing in on him from all sides. The 
 Second Corps was engaged in a furious assault on his 
 front. His men were fighting with clubbed muskets, and 
 even banner staves were intertwined in a fierce and hope- 
 less struggle. My division of the First Corps was on 
 his right flank, and the Third Corps was closing up to 
 attack. Pettigrew's forces on his left had given way, and 
 a heavy skirmish line began to accumulate on that flank. 
 He saw his men surrendering in masses, and, with a heart 
 full of anguish, ordered a retreat. Death had been busy 
 on all sides, and few, indeed, now remained of that mag- 
 nificent column which had advanced so proudly, led by 
 the !N"ey of the Confederate army, and these few fell back 
 in disorder, and without organization, behind Wright's 
 brigade, which had been sent forward to cover the retreat. 
 At first, however, when struck by Stannard on the flank, 
 and when Pickett's charge was spent, they rallied in a 
 little slashing, where a grove had been cut down by our 
 troops to leave an opening for our artillery. There two 
 regiments of Rowley's brigade of my division, the One 
 Hundred and Fifty -first Pennsylvania and the Twentieth 
 JSTew York State Militia, under Colonel Theodore B. Gates, 
 of the latter regiment, made a gallant charge, and drove 
 them out. Pettigrew's division, it is said, lost two thous- 
 and prisoners and fifteen battle flags on the left. * 
 
 * In this charge Pickett's division alone lost in killed, wounded, and cap- 
 tured, two thousand eight hundred and eighty -eight men. Taking the Con- 
 
378 T1IE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 " While this severe contest was going on in front of 
 Webl>, Wilcox deployed his command and opened a feeble 
 tire against Caldwell's division on my left. Stannard re- 
 peated the maneuver which had been so successful against 
 Kemper's brigade by detaching the Fourteenth and Six- 
 teenth Vermont to take Wilcox in Hank. Wilcox thus 
 attacked on his right, while a long row of batteries tore 
 the front of his line to pieces with canister, could gain no 
 foothold. lie found himself exposed to a tremendous 
 cross -tire, and was obliged to retreat, but a great portion 
 of his command were brought in as prisoners by Stannard, 
 and battle flags were gathered in sheaves."' f 
 
 As this great charge was the culmination in the series 
 of great and mighty efforts made by the Confederates to 
 overthrow the National forces, and as everything concern- 
 ing it will, in all the years to come, prove of the highest 
 interest, and as some of the best descriptions of it were 
 written by participants and eye-witnesses for the newspa- 
 pers, which will, if not presented in some substantial form, 
 soon be lost to the world, I will introduce here several 
 graphic descriptions from both Confederate and Federal 
 sources. The following was written by a correspondent 
 under the title of "Agate:" 
 
 " The great, desperate, final charge came at four o'clock. 
 The Confederates seemed to have gathered up all their 
 strength and desperation for one fierce, convulsive effort, 
 that should sweep over and wash out our obstinate resist- 
 ance. They swept up as before, the flower of their army 
 
 federate estimate as to its strength when it went into the fight, as about four 
 thousand six hundred, it will be seen that Pickett lost over one half of his 
 command. 
 
 fGeneral Doubleday's " Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," pages 193-197. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE CHARGE. 379 
 
 to the front, victory staked upon the issue. In some places 
 they literally lifted up and pushed back our lines; hut, 
 that terrible 'position' of ours! — whenever they entered 
 it, enfilading fires from half a score of crests swept away 
 their columns like merest chaff. Broken and hurled back, 
 they easily fell into our hands; and, on the center and left, 
 the last half hour brought more prisoners than all the rest. 
 
 "So it was all along the whole line; but it was on the 
 Second Corps that the flower of the Confederate army was 
 concentrated; it was there that the heaviest shock beat, 
 and shook, and even sometimes crumbled, our line. We 
 had some shallow rifle - pits, with barricades of rails from 
 the fences. The Confederate line, stretching away miles 
 to the left, in magnificent array, but strongest here, — Pick- 
 ett's "splendid division of Longstreet's Corps in front, the 
 best of A. P. Hill's veterans in support, — came steadilj', and 
 as it seemed resistlessly, sweeping up. Our skirmishers 
 retired slowly from the Emniittsburg road, holding their 
 ground tenaciously to the last. The Confederates reserved 
 their fire till they reached the same Emniittsburg road, 
 then opened with a terrific crash. From a hundred iron 
 throats, meantime, their artillery had been thundering on 
 our barricades. 
 
 "Hancock was wounded; Gibbon succeeded to the com- 
 mand, — approved soldier, and ready for the crisis. As the 
 tempest of fire approached its height, he walked along the 
 line, and renewed his orders to the men to reserve their 
 fire. The Confederates, — three lines deep, — came steadily 
 up. They were in point blank range. At last the order 
 <jame! From thrice six thousand guns, there came a sheet 
 of smoky flame, a crash, a rush of leaden death. The 
 
380 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 line literally melted away; but there came the second, re- 
 sistless still. It had been our supreme effort, — on the in- 
 stant we were not equal to another. Up to the rifle-pits, 
 across them, over the barricades, — the momentum of their 
 charge, the mere machine strength of their combined 
 action, — swept them on. Our thin line could tight, but it 
 had not weight enough to oppose this momentum. It was 
 pushed behind the guns. Right on came the enemy. They 
 were upon the guns, — were bayoneting the gunners, — were 
 waving their flags above our pieces. But they had pene- 
 trated to the fatal point. A storm of grape and canister 
 tore its way from man to man, and marked its track with 
 corpses straight down their line. They had exposed them- 
 selves to the enfilading fire of the guns on the western 
 slope of Cemetery Hill; that exposure sealed their fate. 
 The line reeled back, — disjointed already, — in an instant 
 in fragments. Our men were just behind the guns. They 
 leaped forward upon the disordered mass; but there was 
 little need of fighting now. A regiment threw down its 
 arms, and, with colors at its head, rushed over and surren- 
 dered. All along the field, smaller detachments did the 
 same. "Webb's brigade brought in eight hundred; taken 
 in as little time as it requires to write the simple sentence 
 that tells it. Gibbon's old division took fifteen stand of 
 colors. Over the fields the escaped fragments of the 
 changing line fell back, — the battle there was over. A 
 single brigade, Harrow's, (of which the Seventh Michigan 
 is part,) came out with fifty - four less officers and seven 
 hundred and ninety -three less men, than it took in! So 
 the whole corps fought, — so too they fought further down 
 the line. It was a fruitless sacrifice. They gathered up 
 
382 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 their broken fragments, formed their lines, and slowly 
 marched away. It was not a rout, it was a bitter, crush- 
 ing defeat." 
 
 The following graphic account is by Mr. Charles C. 
 Coffin, in his "Boys of '61:" 
 
 "As soon as the approach of the enemy was perceived 
 every man was on the alert. The cannoneers sprung to 
 their feet. The long lines emerged from the woods and 
 moved rapidly but steadily over the fields toward the Em- 
 mittsburg road. Howard's batteries burst into flame, 
 throwing shells with the utmost rapidity. There are gaps 
 in the Confederate ranks, but onward still they come. 
 They reach the Emmittsburg road. Pickett's division ap- 
 pears by Klingel's house. All of Howard's guns are at 
 work now. Pickett turns to the right, moving north, 
 driven in part by the fire rolling in upon his flunk from 
 Weed's Hill (Little Round Top) and from the Third, Fifth 
 and Sixth Corps batteries. Suddenly he faces east, de- 
 scends the gentle slope from the road behind Codori's, 
 crosses the meadow, comes in reach of the muskets of the 
 Vermonters. The three regiments rise from their shallow 
 trench. The men beneath the oak trees leap from their 
 low breast -works of rails. There is a ripple, a roll, a 
 deafening roar. Yet the momentum of the Confederate 
 column carries it on. It is becoming thinner and weaker, 
 but they still advance. The Second Corps is like a thin 
 blue ribbon. "Will it withstand the shock? 'Give them 
 canister! Pour it into them! ' shouts Major Charles How- 
 ard, running from battery to batter}*. The Confederate 
 line is almost up to the grove in front of Robinson's. It 
 has reached the clump of scrub oaks. It has drifted past 
 
THE WHIRLPOOL OF BATTLE. 383 
 
 the Vermont boys. Onward still, ' Break their third line! 
 Smash their supports!' cries General Howard, and Os- 
 borne and Wainwright send the fire of fifty guns into the 
 column, each piece fired three times a minute! The Cem- 
 etery is lost to view, — covered with sulphurous clouds, 
 flaming and smoking and thundering like Sinai on the 
 great day of the Lord! The front line of Confederates is 
 melting away, — the second is advancing to take its place; 
 but beyond the first and second is the third, which reels, 
 and breaks, and flics to the woods from whence it came, 
 unable to withstand the storm. Hancock is wounded, and 
 Gibbon is in command of the Second Corps. 'Hold your 
 fire, boys; they are not near enough yet,' says Gibbon, as 
 Pickett comes on. The first volley staggers, but does not 
 stop them. They move upon the run, — up to the breast- 
 works of rails, — bearing Hancock's line to the top of the 
 ridge, — so powerful their momentum. Men fire into each 
 other's faces, not five feet apart. There are bayonet thrusts, 
 sabre strokes, pistol shots; cool, deliberate movements on 
 the part of some, — hot, passionate, desperate efforts with 
 others; hand to hand contests; recklessness of life; tenacity 
 of purpose; fiery determination; oaths, yells, curses, hur- 
 rahs, shoutings; men go down on their hands and knees, 
 spinning round like tops, throwing out their arms, gulping 
 up blood, falling; legless, armless, headless. There are 
 ghastly heaps of dead men. Seconds are centuries; min- 
 utes, ages; but the thin line does not break. The Confed- 
 erates have swept past the Vermont regiments. ' Take 
 them in flank,' says General Stannard. The Thirteenth 
 and Sixteenth swing ont from the trench, turn a right 
 angle to the main line, and face to the north. They move 
 
384 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 forward a few steps, pour a deadly volley into the backs 
 of Kemper's troops. With a hurrah they rush on to drive 
 home the bayonet. The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth 
 Massachusetts and Seventh Michigan, Twentieth New 
 York, Nineteenth Maine, One Hundred and Fifty -first 
 Pennsylvania, and other regiments catch the enthusiasm 
 of the moment, and close upon the foe. The Confederate 
 column has lost its power. The lines waver. The soldiers 
 of the front rank look around for their supports. They 
 are gone, — fleeing over the field, broken, shattered, 
 thrown into confusion by the remorseless fire from the 
 cemetery and from cannon on the ridge. The lines have 
 disappeared like a straw in a candle's flame. The ground 
 is thick with dead, and the wounded are like the withered 
 leaves of autumn. Thousands of Confederates throw 
 down their arms and give themselves up as prisoners." 
 
 Having given these three accounts of this great assault 
 by Federals, it is but fair to follow them by the following 
 two by Confederates. The first is by a participant, Cap- 
 tain II. T. Owen, from whose article in the Philadelphia 
 Weekly Times, I have before quoted. Captain Owen says: 
 
 " The column of attack, composed of Wilcox's brigade, 
 Pickett's and Ileth's divisions, and several other com- 
 mands, detached for this duty, has been variously esti- 
 mated, but probably numbered about thirteen thousand 
 troops, the command of the whole line given to General 
 Pickett, a brave and fearless officer and a fit leader of this 
 forlorn hope, thrown forward to retrieve disaster or turn 
 by fierce conflict the waning fortunes of a dying cause. 
 Riding out in front, Pickett made a brief, animated ad- 
 dress to the troops, and closed by saying to his own 
 
pickett's assault. 385 
 
 •division: 'Charge the enemy, and remember old Virginia.' 
 Then came the command in a strong, clear voice: 'For- 
 ward! Guide center! March!' and the column, with a 
 front of more than half a mile, moved grandly up the 
 slope. Meade's guns opened upon the column as it ap- 
 peared above the crest of the ridge, but it neither paused 
 nor faltered. Round shot, bounding along the plain, tore 
 through their ranks and ricochetted around them; shells 
 exploded incessantly in blinding, dazzling flashes before 
 them, behind them, overhead and among them. Fright- 
 ful gaps were made from center to flank, yet on swept the 
 column, and as it advanced the men steadily closed up the 
 wide rents made along the line in a hundred places at 
 every discharge of the murderous batteries in front. A 
 long line of skirmishers, prostrate in the tall grass, firing 
 at the column since it came within view, rose up within 
 fifty yards, fired a volley into its front, then trotted on be- 
 fore it, turning and firing back as fast as they could reload. 
 The column moved on at a quick step with shouldered 
 arms, and the fire of the skirmish line was not returned. 
 Half way over the field an order ran down the line, 'Left 
 oblique,' which was promptly obeyed, and the direction is 
 changed forty -five degrees from the front to the left. Men 
 looking away, far off toward the left flank, saw that the 
 supporting columns there were crumbling and melting 
 rapidly away. General Pickett sent his brother, Major 
 Charles Pickett, galloping swiftly to rally, if possible, the 
 w T avering lines, saying to him: 'Unless they support us 
 on the left my division will be cut to pieces.' Major 
 Pickett and other officers rode anions; the breaking bat- 
 talions and vainly attempted to restore order, but hundreds 
 
386 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and thousands of fugitives from the front could be seen 
 fleeing from the field and went rushing pell - mell toward 
 the rear like dry leaves before a gale. Order was not re- 
 stored upon the left and Pickett's support there was gone 
 excepting some brave Tennesseeans and North Carolinians, 
 who never wavered in the storm, but closing up by the 
 side of Pickett's Virginians went as far, fought as long, 
 bled as freely, and fell as thick as Pickett's men. 
 
 "The command now came along the line, 'Front, for- 
 ward!' and the column resumed its direction straight 
 down upon the center of the enemy's position. Some men 
 now looking to the right saw that the troops there had 
 entirely disappeared, but how or when they left was not 
 known. The enemy in front, occupying an elevated posi- 
 tion and watching closely every movement of the ad- 
 vancing columns, say 'the right gave way first, then the 
 left broke up and fled the field, but the massive center, 
 composed of Pickett's veterans of iron nerve, wounded in 
 scores of battles, were coming sternly on.' Guns hitherto 
 employed in firing at the troops on the right and left sent 
 a shower of shells after the fleeing fugitives, and then 
 trained upon the center, where the storm burst in ten -fold 
 fury, as converging batteries sent a concentrated fire of 
 shot and shell in, through, and around the heroic column. 
 The destruction of life in the ranks of that advancing host 
 was fearful beyond precedent, officers going down by 
 dozens and the men by scores and fifties. Kemper has 
 gone down terribly mangled, but Garnett still towered 
 unhurt, and rode up and down the front line, saying in a 
 strong, calm voice: 'Faster, men! faster! Close up and 
 step out faster, but don't double quick!' The column 
 
A FLANK MOVEMENT. 387 
 
 was approaching the Emmittsburg road, where a line of 
 infantry, stationed behind a stone fence, was pouring in a 
 heavy fire of musketry. A scattering fire was opened 
 along the front of the division upon this line, when Gar- 
 nett galloped along the line and called out: 'Cease firing,' 
 and his command was promptly obeyed, showing the won- 
 derful discipline of the men, who reloaded their guns, 
 shouldered arms and kept on without slackening their 
 pace, which was still a ' quickstep.' 
 
 "The stone fence was carried without a struggle, the 
 infantry and the skirmish line swept away before the 
 division like trash before the broom. Two thirds of 
 the distance was behind, and the one hundred cannon in 
 the rear were dumb and did not reply to the hotly worked 
 guns in our front. We were now four hundred yards 
 from the foot of Cemetery Hill, when away oft* to the 
 right, nearly half a mile, there appeared in the open field 
 a line of men at right angles with our own, a long, dark 
 mass, dressed in blue, and coming down at a 'double 
 quick' upon the unprotected right flank of Pickett's men, 
 w T ith their muskets upon 'the right shoulder shift,' their 
 battle flags dancing and fluttering in the breeze created 
 by their own rapid motion, and their burnished bayonets 
 glistening above their heads like forest twigs covered with 
 sheets of sparkling ice when shaken by a blast. Garnett 
 galloped along the line saying: 'Faster, men! faster!' and 
 the front line broke forward into a double quick, when 
 Garnett called out: ' Steady, men ! steady! Don't double 
 quick. Save your wind and your ammunition for the 
 final charge!' and then went down among the dead, and 
 his clarion voice was no more heard above the roar of 
 
388 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 battle. The enemy were now seen strengthening their 
 lines, where the blow was expected to strike, by hurrying 
 up reserves from the right and left, the columns from op- 
 posite directions passing each other double along our front 
 like the fingers of a man's two hands locking together. 
 The distance had again shortened and officers in the 
 lines could be distinguished by their uniforms from the 
 privates. Then was heard behind that heavy thud of a 
 muffled tread of armed men that roar and rush of tramp- 
 ling feet as Armistead's column from the rear closed up 
 behind the front line and he (the last brigadier) took com- 
 mand, stepped out in front with his hat uplifted on the 
 point of his sword and led the division, now four ranks 
 deep, rapidly and grandly across that valley of death, 
 covered with clover as soft as a Turkish carpet. 
 
 "There it was again! and again! A sound filling the 
 air above, below, around us, like the blast through the top 
 of a dry cedar, or the whirring sound made by the sudden 
 flight of a flock of quail. It was grape and canister, and 
 the column broke forward into a double-quick and rushed 
 toward the stone wall where forty cannon were belching 
 forth grape and canister twice and thrice a minute. A 
 hundred yards from the stone wall the flanking party on 
 the right, coming down on a heavy run, halted suddenly 
 within fifty yards and poured a deadly storm of musket 
 balls into Pickett's men, double-quicking across their 
 front, and under this terrible cross-fire the men reeled and 
 staggered between falling comrades, and the right came 
 pressing down upon the center, crowding the companies 
 into confusion. "We all knew the purpose to carry the 
 heights in front, and the mingled mass, from fifteen to 
 
A DESPERATE CHARGE. 389 
 
 thirty deep, rushed toward the stone wall, while a few 
 hundred men, without orders, faced to the right and 
 fought the flanking party there, although fifty to one, and 
 for a time held them at bay. Muskets were seen crossed 
 as some men fired to the right and others to the front, and 
 the fighting was terrific, — far beyond all other experience 
 even of Pickett's men, who for once raised no cheer, while 
 the welkin rang around them with the ' Union triple 
 huzza.' The old veterans saw the fearful odds against 
 them, and other hosts gathering darker and deeper still. 
 
 "The time was too precious, too serious for a cheer; 
 they buckled down to the heavy task in silence, and fought 
 with a feeling like despair. The enemy were falling back 
 in front, while officers were seen among their breaking 
 lines striving to maintain their ground. Pickett's men 
 were within a few feet of the stone wall when the artillery 
 delivered their last fire from guns shotted to the muzzle. 
 A blaze fifty feet long went through the charging, surging 
 host with a gaping rent to the rear; but the survivors 
 mounted the wall, then over and onward, rushed up the 
 hill close after the gunners, who waved their rammers in 
 the face of Pickett's men and sent up cheer after cheer as 
 they felt admiration for the gallant charge. On swept the 
 column over ground covered with dead and dying men, 
 where the earth seemed to be on fire, the smoke dense and 
 suffocating, the sun shut out, flames blazing on every side, 
 friend could hardly be distinguished from foe, but the 
 division, in the shape of an inverted V, with the point 
 flattened, pushed forward, fighting, falling and melting 
 away, till half way up the hill they were met by a power- 
 ful body of fresh troops charging down upon them, and 
 
390 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 this remnant of about a thousand men was hurled back 
 out into the clover - field. Brave Armistead was down 
 among the enemy's guns, mortally wounded, but was last 
 seen leaning upon one elbow, slashing at the gunners to 
 prevent them from firing at his retreating men. Out in 
 front of the breast - works the men showed a disposition 
 to return for another charge, and an officer looking at the 
 frowning heights, with blood trickling down the side of 
 his face, inquired of another, 'What shall we do?' The 
 answer was, ' If we get reinforcements soon we can take 
 that hill yet.' But no reinforcements came, none were in 
 sight, and about a thousand men fled to the rear over dead 
 and wounded, mangled, groaning, dying men, scattered 
 thick, far and wide, while shot and shell tore up the earth 
 and minnie balls flew around them for more than a thou- 
 sand yards." 
 
 One other Confederate account is also given. It was 
 written by Colonel W. II. Swallow for the Southern Bivouac 
 of February, 1886. It is somewhat lengthy, but it is the 
 most circumstantial and interesting account of that great 
 climax of the rebellion yet laid before the public. By 
 permission of Colonel Swallow and the publishers of the 
 Bivouac, I give part of this interesting and valuable article. 
 Colonel Swallow says: 
 
 "The distance from Seminary Ridge, where Ileth's di- 
 vision crossed the plain, to the Federal works on Cemetery 
 Hill, where a part of Archer's Tennessee brigade burst into 
 them, is exactly one thousand two hundred and seventy- 
 three yards. In the months of July and August, 1880, 
 the writer measured the relative distances passed over by 
 the column of attack a number of times with due regard 
 
ARRANGEMENT OF CONFEDERATE FORCES. 391 
 
 to the speed of Heth's division, from which he reached 
 the conclusion that the division must have passed from the 
 top of Seminary Ridge to the Emmittsburg road in about 
 eight minutes. It was on the western slope of Seminary 
 Ridge and between it and Willoughby's Run that the as- 
 saulting column was formed. Pickett's division, composed 
 of the three brigades of Garnett, Kemper, and Armistead, 
 held the right of the column in the following order: On 
 the right of the division was Kemper's brigade, next Gar- 
 nett's, and to the rear, and in support of the other two, 
 was placed the brigade of Armistead. Heth's division, 
 commanded by General Pettigrew, formed the left of the 
 assaulting column and was placed in the following order: 
 Archer's Tennessee brigade, commanded by the brave 
 Colonel Frey, held the right of Heth's division and hooked 
 -on to Garnett's brigade, who formed the left of Pickett's. 
 Kext to Archer's brigade came Pettigrew's North Carolina 
 brigade, then Davis' Mississippi brigade, and then Brock - 
 enborough's Virginia brigade, that held the left of Heth's 
 division, which in the attack that followed was commanded 
 by General Pettigrew. Scales' and Lane's North Carolina 
 brigades of Pender's division, commanded by General 
 Trimble, of Maryland, were placed in the rear of Heth's 
 division, and, with Armistead, formed the second line of 
 the assaulting column. The two remaining brigades of 
 Pender's division, under McGowan and Thomas, were 
 placed on the left flank of the assaulting column, covering 
 the advance of Pettigrew's division. 
 
 "Wilcox's Alabama and Perry's Florida brigades of 
 Anderson's division were placed on the right flank of 
 Pickett's line, while Wright's Georgia brigade of the same 
 
392 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 division was suitably posted in reserve. It will be seen 
 from the above statement that all of A. P. Hill's corps was 
 more or less concerned in the movement, partly in the 
 direct column of attack, and partly on its flanks. It 
 would seem from this disposition of the force that the 
 movement ought more properly be called the i Assault of 
 A. P. Hill's Corps' than by any other name. But as Gen- 
 eral Lee thought fit to place the entire movement under 
 the direction and management of General Longstreet, it 
 is properly called ' Longstreet's Assault.' It would be a 
 misnomer to call this assault, as many writers have done r 
 ' The charge of Pickett's division,' for that would be to 
 strip the entire movement of much of its greatest signifi- 
 cance. 
 
 "Equally erroneous is the generally accepted statement 
 that the charge was made by Pickett, supported by Heth's 
 division, commanded by Pettigrew, and that the disaster 
 which followed was solely attributable to the failure of the 
 supporting division. The truth is that neither of those 
 divisions was specially assigned to support the other. That 
 peculiar curve in the ridge which rendered it necessary to 
 place Armistead in the rear of Kemper and Garnett, also 
 compelled Longstreet to place Scales and Lane under 
 Trimble, in the rear of Heth's division. 
 
 "Hence the entire column of attack moved in different 
 directions with one end in view, over different portions of 
 the earth's surface to a common center. 
 
 *iz ife it£ ^ ?1i ?fe rf£ ^ 
 
 " These men who composed the assaulting column proper r 
 by which the writer means the divisions of Heth and 
 Pickett with the brigades of Scales and Lane, were brought 
 
THE BATTLE OPENED. 393 
 
 together under different circumstances, and the column was 
 composed of troops from five States, — Virginia, Tennes- 
 see, North Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi. Their 
 strength was as follows : Pickett's division, three brigades, 
 aggregating four thousand, five hundred; Heth's division, 
 four brigades, five thousand; while the two brigades of 
 Scales and Lane, of Pender's division, commanded by 
 General Trimble, mustered about two thousand, five hun- 
 dred. The assaulting column, therefore, contained about 
 twelve thousand men. * 
 
 " There were nine brigades engaged in the direct column 
 
 of attack. 
 
 ******** 
 
 " At precisely seven minutes past one o'clock the awful 
 silence was broken, when two signal guns from Eshelman's 
 "Washington Artillery announced the opening of the can- 
 nonade. In a few moments all the Confederate batteries, 
 extending from our extreme right at the Peach Orchard on 
 the Emmittsburg road, in a circle around the ridge to the 
 Harrisburg road, belched forth one inextinguishable flame 
 of fire, to which the enemy responded from Cemetery Hill, 
 
 * Both Federals and Confederates have a peculiar kind of arithmetic by 
 which they overestimate the number of the opposing force and minify their 
 own. The time has come for fairness in these statements. It is with pleasure 
 then that I recall the facT; that Colonel Swallow estimates this assaulting force 
 at twelve thousand men, and Captain Owen, in the preceding- account, at 
 thirteen thousand. If, as Colonel Swallow says, "All of A. P. Hill's Corps 
 was more or less concerned in the movement, partly in the diredl column of 
 attack, and partly on its flanks," it is evident that the Federal estimate of 
 about fifteen thousand is nearly correel:. Colonel Swallow also protests 
 against calling this great episode "Pickett's Charge," or "The Charge of 
 Pickett's Division," sayingthat.it might more properly be called "The As- 
 sault of A. P. Hill's Corps," or "Longstreet's Assault." While entirely con- 
 curring in this remark, I have yet followed the general custom and term it 
 "Pickett's Charge," thereby avoiding the misunderstanding a new term 
 would produce with many readers. 
 
394 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and all around Cemetery Hill to Round Top. As soon as 
 the oannonade opened, Pickett's division, under cover of 
 the artillery, with its right flank protected by the brigades 
 of "Wilcox and Perry, was shifted forward a little to the 
 right and placed in position in the rear of the artillery, at 
 a distance of nine hundred yards from Cemetery Hill, 
 where it lay during the cannonade, while the divisions of 
 Pettigrew and Trimble remained very nearly on the ground 
 where they formed. The writer and many staff officers 
 and officers of the corps of engineers were, during the 
 whole cannonade, in an elevated position from which an 
 unobstructed view could be had of Seminary Itidge, from 
 the town to Longstreet's right. 
 
 ******** 
 
 "When the order for the assault" was given, Pickett's 
 division, which held a somewhat advanced line, moved 
 forward; the right of the division under General Kemper, 
 after passing through the Washington Artillery, crossed 
 the Emmittsburg road, and, had Kemper moved onward 
 in a straight line, he would have struck Stannard's bri- 
 gade, who was posted in a grove a little in front and on 
 the left of Hancock's Corps. But no sooner had General 
 Kemper crossed the road than he moved on the left flank, 
 having changed front, his brigade after passing south of 
 Codori's house and out- buildings, marched eastward to- 
 wards Gettysburg. In this movement of Kemper's bri- 
 gade his command passed between the Emmittsburg road 
 and Cemetery Pidge in the march to the center of attack. 
 As Kemper's right was passing Stannard's brigade on 
 Hancock's left, and at a distance of several hundred yards, 
 the latter officer ordered his command to move also by the 
 
MOVEMENT OF THE FORCES. 395 
 
 left flank, and closing to the left until Kemper's right 
 assumed the direct assault in his front, when by order of 
 Hancock (who was on this part of the ground watching 
 the movement), Stannard's command changed front, for- 
 ward in the first battalion, and delivered several volleys of 
 musketry into the flank and rear of Kemper's brigade, but 
 the latter officer, under orders from Pickett, moved on- 
 ward to the center of attack, not stopping to return the 
 fire. 
 
 " General Garnett, with his brigade, held the left of the 
 division, and started with Kemper to the enemy's works at 
 the same time. Garnett moved on Cemetery Hill by 
 marching eastward, towards Gettysburg, north of Codori's 
 house and out -buildings. The fences of the Emmittsburg 
 road, near Codori's house, had been nearly destroyed the 
 day before in the battle on our right. 
 
 " No sooner had Garnett and Kemper started with the 
 right and left of Pickett's division than General Armi- 
 stead, whose brigade was in the rear of both, followed 
 closely after them. Armistead, however, started from a 
 different position and passed over a different portion of 
 the earth's surface to the same point of attack. Almost 
 simultaneously with the advance of Garnett and Kemper, 
 and while the writer was intently watching their onward 
 march, his attention was directed to a dense column whose 
 front seemed to cover twice the front of Pickett's division. 
 This part of the column of attack had just burst through 
 a fringe of timber along Seminary Ridge, where our 
 artillery had been firing. 
 
 " When the writer first saw it this force was moving in 
 a direct line for Cemetery Hill, and both the assaulting 
 
396 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 column at this point and the enemy were now in full view 
 of each other. It proved to be Heth's division under Gen- 
 eral Pettigrew, with the brigades of Scales and Lane, of 
 Pender's division, commanded by General Trimble. All 
 our little group thought, from its appearance, that it was 
 A. P. Hill's whole corps, and shouted out, 'Here they 
 come! Here they are!! Hurrah!!!' This part of the at- 
 tacking column was moving in a straight line over a differ- 
 ent portion of the earth's surface from that of Pickett's 
 division, but to the same center of attack. The writer 
 would here remark that the lay of the ground around the 
 ridge, which obliged Longstreet to place Armistead to the 
 rear of Garnett and Kemper, also compelled him to form 
 Heth a little behind the ridge and place Trimble's com- 
 mand in the second line of the assaulting column. The 
 column of attack, now under way, moved steadily and 
 firmly to the enemy's works, distant one thousand two 
 hundred and seventy - three yards. The works of the 
 enemy, in front of the assaulting column, lay at an average 
 distance of about one hundred and fifty yards south of the 
 Emmittsburg road, and formed the defense of Hancock's 
 Corps on Meade's left center. These works consisted of 
 an irregularly formed old stone fence, but not of the same 
 height. At intervals there were breaks in the fence, and 
 these were filled up by temporary breast - works, composed 
 of rails and old logs, behind which earth was thrown to 
 the depth of several feet. 
 
 " That part of the enemy's works that stretched to the 
 right of the attacking column, was longer and stood for- 
 ward, advanced about one hundred and twenty feet, while 
 that part of the works on the left of the column of attack 
 
EFFECTIVE WORK OF FEDERAL BATTERIES. 397 | 
 
 bent inwardly, forming an angle, giving to the enemy's 
 line of defense an echelon formation, or horse -shoe ap- 
 pearance. 
 
 "Nothing occurred to the divisions of Fettigrew and 
 Trimble in their march from the crest of Seminary Ridge 
 to Cemetery Hill, until the column of attack was half-way 
 over the plain, when all of a sudden the enemy's artillery 
 opened upon our advancing lines a most terrific fire from 
 Cemetery Hill. 
 
 "On the right of our column Round Top and Little 
 Round Top were in a perfect blaze, and sent^forth one 
 continuous and inextinguishable flame of fire, hurling 
 their missiles of destruction into our advancing lines.* 
 
 " Seminary Ridge to the rear of the column, with the 
 Confederate batteries to the right and left of it, sent forth 
 their commingling smoke of fire and thunder, laden with 
 their messengers of death, into the enemy's left center. 
 
 "The first fire of the Federal artillery on the advancing 
 lines of Pettigrew and Trimble seemed to smite the column 
 of attack as if it had been struck by some unseen power, 
 some great physical body, causing the column to waver, 
 reel, and for a moment halt. 
 
 "It was only for a moment; in a few seconds the smoke 
 lifted, when deep gaps which extended through our lines 
 to the rear of the column could be seen. The brave 
 Confederates closing up those gaps, over the dead and 
 bleeding bodies of their companions, moved forward un- 
 flinchingly to the Emmittsburg road. Solid shot now 
 plowed through their ranks, grape and canister were doing 
 
 * Colonel Swallow is in error here. Big Round Top had no artillery: it was 
 inaccessible to cannon. 
 
398 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 their fatal work in the game of death, and sweeping away 
 hundreds from our advancing lines. Undismayed by the 
 blood and terror of the conflict, the assaulting column 
 pushed on. 
 
 "Some mighty, unseen power, over which they had no 
 control and whose influence they could not resist, impelled 
 them forward. As the column neared the road it was 
 within reach of the enemy's musketry, which poured 
 volley after volley into the column of attack, greatly thin- 
 ning its ranks. 
 
 "General Garnett, with the left of Pickett's division, 
 reached the road about the same time with Pettigrew, 
 while Armistead and Trimble were following closely after. 
 On the extreme right General Kemper's brigade was south 
 of the end of the road and near the works. Archer's Ten- 
 nessee brigade, holding the right of Pettigrew's division, 
 hooked on to the left of Garnett, and thus united the 
 whole column made a break to get over the first fence on 
 the Emniittsburg road. 
 
 " Scores of the survivors often related their anxious sus- 
 pense and the length of time it seemed to climb to the top 
 of the fence. As soon as the top of the fence was lined 
 with troops the whole line tumbled over, falling flat into 
 the bed of the road, while the. enemy's bullets buried 
 themselves in the bodies of the falling victims. Just 
 here at this point the brave General Garnett, of Virginia, 
 rode along his line covered with blood, with his head 
 bowed almost to his horse's neck. In a moment the Gen- 
 eral and his horse fell to the ground riddled with bullets 
 in all. parts of their bodies. The assaulting column only 
 remained in the road a few seconds. It could scarcely be 
 
TEMPORARY SUCCESS OF THE CONFEDERATES. 399 
 
 called a halt, when it rose and pushed over the second 
 fence, leaving many of their comrades dead and wounded 
 behind them. Just as the column crossed the second 
 fence it received a most withering fire of musketry, a per- 
 fect shower of lead; it staggered for a few seconds, halted, 
 returned the fire, and with one wild shout rushed forward 
 to the works. From the road to the works the column of 
 attack was for a few moments lost to view, being com- 
 pletely enveloped by the enemy's fire. The right of Petti- 
 grew's division — Archer's Tennessee brigade and Garnett's 
 brigade of Pickett's division — charged right on amid fire 
 and flame to the enemy's works, while Arrnistead and 
 the brigades of Scales and Lane, commanded by General 
 Trimble, followed closely after. Archer's Tennessee bri- 
 gade and Garnett's Virginia brigade struck the enemy's 
 fortifications at the same moment, when Lieutenant Finley, 
 of the Thirty -eighth Virginia, sprang to the left and 
 grasping one of Archer's captains by the hand exclaimed, 
 'Virginia and Tennessee will stand together on these 
 works to-day!' 
 
 "The left of the column, under Davis and Brocken- 
 borough, passed the advanced line of the wall where it 
 formed an angle, and moving forward in that direction 
 threatened to assault the right flank of Gibbon's division, 
 which held the advanced line of the enemy's defense, sup- 
 ported by the Federal division of General Hays, one of 
 the strongest and best divisions in the Federal army. The 
 First Tennessee and the greater part of the Seventh, with 
 the Thirty - eighth Virginia, and other portions of Garnett's 
 brigade rushed over the enemy's breast- works, driving the 
 enemy before them on his reserves. While he was beaten 
 
400 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 back the enemy contested the ground most stubbornly, 
 and the scenes that followed during those few moments 
 baffle description. A hand to hand encounter now took 
 place. They fired into each other's faces at the distance 
 of five and ten feet, and struck each other over the head 
 with the butt of the musket. * * * * 
 
 The struggle was soon ended, and a deadly fire from, the 
 right of Hays' division compelled the shattered remnants 
 of Garnett's and Archer's brigades to fall back to the 
 point where they had entered the enemy's fortifications. 
 As they did so they saw hundreds of their companions 
 dead and wounded upon the ground — boys in blue with 
 boys in gray, crawling over each other, all smeared with 
 blood. 
 
 "As part of Arcner's brigade and Garnett's entered the 
 works the rest of Archer's men on the left of his line also 
 crowded to the right, but received a heavy fire from the 
 two brigades of the enemy posted on the left of the column 
 and commanded by General Smyth, of Delaware, whose 
 name afterward obtained a melancholy celebrity. Petti- 
 grew's brigade, commanded by Colonel Jones, now uuited 
 with Archer's regiment,'whieh had not entered the fortifi- 
 cations, and attacked the enemy with the most desperate 
 determination. 
 
 " While the writer lay wounded with General Smyth at 
 Gettysburg, that officer told him that Pettigrew's brigade, 
 all along his front, were within thirty or forty feet of his 
 line and fought with a fiery determination that he had 
 never seen equalled. Some of Scales' brave fellows took 
 part in this assault. Three weeks after the battle General 
 Smyth showed the writer the exact spot where the First 
 
A FLANK ATTACK. 401 
 
 Delaware volunteers rushed to the front and broke the left 
 of Pettigrew's line. 
 
 " If any find fault with the falling off — or, rather, break 
 — that took place on the left of Pettigrew's brigade, the 
 answer is, that there were scarcely any left to stand. One 
 company of North Carolina troops in Pettigrew's brigade 
 lost every man (eighty -four strong) in killed and wounded. 
 
 "As another act of simultaneous occurrence, while 
 Archer and Garnett were in the works and Pettigrew and 
 others attacking them from the outside, General Hays 
 noticed Davis and Brockenborough trying to get their work 
 in on Gibbon's right flank. He instantly detached three 
 regiments from his division with a number of batteries and 
 attacked our loft, already weakening and beginning to 
 break before the assault of Sherrill and Smyth. 
 
 "The assaulting column on the left and center was now 
 completely broken, and in the confusion and terror that 
 followed, thousands fell upon the ground between the 
 works and the road and threw up their arms in token of 
 surrender, while the iron and leaden hail rushing from the 
 mouths of a hundred cannon was blazing over them like 
 the lightning's fiery scourge. 
 
 " On the right of the assaulting column General Kemper's 
 brigade was cut to pieces and its commander seriously 
 wounded; nearly all his command were killed, wounded, 
 and captured. 
 
 " General Armistead, who was before the works with his 
 brigade toward the closing scenes of the assault, rushed up 
 to a part of the wall which had been abandoned by Webb's 
 right, which was at the time falling back before Archer 
 and Garnett, and seeing that his men were using the works 
 
402 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 as a line of defense, as some of the first line to the right 
 and left were doing, cried out, ' Come forward, Virginians!' 
 He then drew his sword and, placing his hat on the top of 
 it, raised it high up into the air and, jumping over the 
 wall, again cried out, ' Come on, boys, we must give them 
 the cold steel; who will follow me?' 
 
 " Lieutenant - Colonel Martin, with over a hundred men, 
 responded to the call and followed their brave General. 
 Many brave men, however, weakened, and looked into 
 each other's faces with awe and astonishment. At this 
 moment the Federal brigades of Hall and Harrow rushed 
 to the right (Kemper having been repulsed in their front) 
 and attacked Armistead in flank, and at the same time 
 Webb's second line advanced and fired. 
 
 " General Armistead fell dead, and Colonel Martin and 
 all that followed were instantly shot down. Of those that 
 entered the fortification, fifty lay dead on the ground and 
 the remainder were terribly wounded. Not a soul escaped 
 to tell the tale to their companions. 
 
 " The Emmittsburg road was literally choked up with 
 the dead and wounded, while the space between the Fed- 
 eral fortifications and the road was covered with the dead 
 and dying victims of the struggle, to which might be 
 added thousands who lay upon the ground extending their 
 arms in token of surrender. 
 
 " The cries of the wounded for water, mingled with their 
 shrieks of agony from pain, greatly intensified the horror 
 of the scene. Three fourths of the assaulting column 
 were killed, wounded, or captured in less than half an 
 hour. 
 
 " The left of Pettigrew's old brigade, commanded by 
 
COVERING} THE RETREAT. 403 
 
 Colonel Jones, began to fall off almost simultaneously with 
 the right of the column under Kemper. The center of the 
 column, composed of part of Archer's Tennessee brigade, 
 commanded by the brave Colonel Frey, and part of Gar- 
 nett's Virginia brigade, were the only men in the column 
 of attack that carried their standards into the enemy's 
 fortification on Cemetery Hill. It is idle to ask such fool- 
 ish questions as who gave way first? which imply a want 
 of devotion and duty. Any intelligent soldier, accustomed 
 to the hardships of battle, who shall even at this day visit 
 Gettysburg and make himself acquainted with the ground 
 and insurmountable obstacles that lay in the front of the 
 .assaulting column, will not be very much surprised that 
 the attack failed; but his surprise will be greater still that 
 any, even the bravest soldiers, could have reached the 
 point they did and live. In the Federal lines Generals 
 Hancock, Webb, Stannard, Sherrill, and Smyth lay wound- 
 ed on the ground. Of the Confederates, Generals Armi- 
 stead and Garnett were killed, while Generals Kemper, 
 Trimble, and Pettigrew were wounded, with thousands of 
 others. General Alexander, after the repulse, ordered up 
 Wright's Georgia brigade to attack as a relief to Pickett, 
 but Longstreet stopped him, observing 'that the attack 
 had tailed.' Longstreet then ordered Wright to rally and 
 collect the scattered troops behind Anderson's division. 
 About twenty minutes after the repulse of the assaulting 
 column, General AVilcox with his brigade and Perry's 
 Florida brigade, who were on Pickett's right, had, by 
 some mistake that has never been explained, received 
 orders to advance, but as he reached the middle ridge in 
 front of Cemetery Ridge, lie could see nothing of Pickett's 
 
404 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 division, whose right Wilcox and Perry were covering, and 
 concluding that Pickett had actually passed over Cemetery 
 Ridge, he also commenced to follow after, but he was met 
 with a deadly fire of artillery in his front, while General 
 Stannard's brigade wheeled about and attacked "Wilcox 
 and Perry in flank, by which the Confederate line was 
 broken and great numbers of our men killed and wounded. 
 Wilcox and Perry then fell back and forming with Wright's 
 Georgia brigade, completed Anderson's division. 
 
 " This division of Anderson, of A. P. Hill's Corps, now 
 presented a line of defense on Seminary Ridge, behind 
 which the squads and detachments who survived in the 
 columns of attack, and reached the ridge, found shelter and 
 rest. Orders were instantly issued to Longstreet's divisions 
 on the right — Hood's and McLaw's — to be ready to move 
 to the ridge at a given signal. The same was done to the 
 division of Rodes, to fall back on Anderson immediately 
 if the enemy attempted to follow up the disaster." 
 
 While the terrible conflict, which we have just narrated, 
 was going on along the front, important operations were 
 in progress at other parts of the line, which had an im- 
 portant effect upon the final result. To these we will now 
 direct the attention of the reader. It was intended by 
 General Lee that the assault upon the Federal front 
 should take place simultaneously with an attack General 
 Ewell was to make upon the right. Johnson's division 
 was already in possession of the Federal's lines upon Culp's 
 Hill, and it was expected that a determined advance of his 
 troops, supported by others of E well's Corps, would enable 
 him to come in upon the Federal rear while Pickett cut 
 through the line in front. But this purpose was not car- 
 
ATTACK BY STUART'S CAVALRY. 405 
 
 ried out, for the reason that Longstreet again failed to exe~ 
 cute the part assigned him. He was not ready to attack 
 at the early hour when the engagement on the right be- 
 gan. Indeed, for this he cannot be blamed, for the attack 
 was commenced by the Federals. Johnson was within the 
 Federal line, and he was compelled to defend himself from 
 the efforts made to dislodge him. In this way Lee's plans 
 were frustrated, and when he learned that Johnson had 
 been driven out of the position he had gained the night 
 before, and could not co-operate with Pickett upon the 
 front, new plans had to be made. Stuart's cavalry, which 
 had reached the field the evening previous, reinforced by 
 Jenkins' brigade, were sent around the Federal right to 
 accomplish the same purpose. The object was to take 
 possession of the Baltimore pike and other roads in the 
 Federal rear; and, besides creating a diversion in favor of 
 Pickett, to be in a position to take advantage to capture 
 or destroy the army in case the assault in front was suc- 
 cessful. The movement of these troops was fortunately 
 discovered by General Howard from his elevated position 
 upon Cemetery Hill, and General Meade was promptly 
 notified. The Federal cavalry, which, during the pre- 
 ceding days of the battle, had done excellent service in 
 protecting the flanks and in repelling and driving the 
 enemy's cavalry, were again called upon to meet this 
 movement of Stuart; and General D. McM. Gregg, with 
 two brigades of his cavalry division, commanded respec- 
 tively by Colonels Mcintosh and Irvin Gregg, and Cus- 
 ter's brigade of the Third Division, was sent to repel this 
 threatened danger. When these two forces came into col- 
 lision, one of the most desperate cavalry engagements 
 
406 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 took place that occurred during the war. The design of 
 Stuart was well understood, and the Federal cavalry -men 
 appreciated the responsibility that was upon them, and 
 determined to repel the enemy or die in the effort. 
 
 Colonel "William Brooke -Rawle, who was present at 
 that engagement and participated in it, in a contribution 
 to the Annals of the War, pages 467-484, gives a detailed 
 and highly interesting description of this terrific affair. 
 His account is too lengthy to give in full, but as full justice 
 has not been done in previous histories to the Federal 
 cavalry for their excellent services at Gettysburg, I will 
 insert here the colonel's description of the great charge 
 and hand to hand conflict which occurred when Hampton's 
 brigade, which had been held in reserve, came upon the 
 field and threatened to turn the tide in favor of the enemy. 
 The colonel's account is as follows: 
 
 "Just then there appeared in the distance, turning the 
 point of woods on the cross - road by the Stallsmith farm, 
 a brigade of cavalry. It was manifest to every one that 
 unless this, the grandest attack of all, was checked, the 
 day would go hard with the Army of the Potomac. It 
 was Stuart's last reserve and his last resource, for, if the 
 Baltimore pike was to be reached, and havoc created in 
 our rear, the critical moment had arrived, as Pickett was 
 even then moving up to the assault of Cemetery Ridge. 
 
 "In close columns of squadrons, advancing as if in re- 
 view, with sabres drawn and glistening like silver in the 
 bright sunlight, the spectacle called forth a murmur of 
 admiration. It was indeed a memorable one. Chester 
 being nearest opened at once with his section, at the dis- 
 tance of three quarters of a mile. Pennington and Kinney 
 
A BATTLE OF CENTAURS. 407 
 
 soon did the same. Canister and percussion shell were 
 put into the steadily approaching columns as fast as the 
 guns could fire. The dismounted men fell back to the 
 right and left, and such as could got to their horses. The 
 mounted skirmishers rallied and fell into line. Then 
 Gregg rode over to the First Michigan, which, as it had 
 come upon the field some time before, had formed close 
 column 'of squadrons between and supporting the batte- 
 ries, and ordered it to charge. As Town ordered sabres to 
 be drawn and the column to advance, Custer dashed up 
 with similar orders, and placed himself at its head. The 
 two columns drew nearer and nearer, the Confederates 
 outnumbering their opponents as three or four to one. 
 The gait increased, — first the trot, then the gallop. Hamp- 
 ton's battle -flag floated in the van of the brigade. The 
 orders of the Confederate officers could be heard by those 
 in the woods on their left: 'Keep to your sabres, men, 
 keep to your sabres!' for the lessons they had learned at 
 Brandy Station and at Aldie had been severe. There the 
 cry had been: ' Put up your sabres! Draw your pistols and 
 fight like gentlemen!' But the sabre was never a favorite 
 weapon with Confederate cavalry, and now, in spite of the 
 lessons of the past, the warnings of the present were not 
 heeded by all. 
 
 "As the charge was ordered the speed increased, every 
 horse on the jump, every man yelling like a demon. The 
 column of the Confederates blended, but the perfect align- 
 ment was maintained. Chester put charge after charge of 
 canister into their midst, his men bringing it up to the 
 guns by the armful. The execution was fearful, but the 
 long rent closed up at once. As the opposing columns 
 
408 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 drew nearer and nearer, each with perfect alignment, every 
 man gathered his horse well under him, and gripped his 
 weapon the tighter. Though ordered to retire his guns, 
 towards which the head of the assaulting column was 
 directed, Chester kept on until the enemy were within 
 fifty yards, and the head of the First Michigan had come 
 into the line of his fire. Staggered by the fearful execu- 
 tion from the two batteries, the men in the front line of 
 the Confederate column drew in their horses and wavered. 
 Some turned, and the column fanned out to the right and 
 left, but those behind came pressing on. Custer, seeing the 
 front men hesitate, waved his sabre and shouted, ' Come 
 on, you Wolverines!' and with a fearful yell, the First 
 Michigan rushed on, Custer four lengths ahead. 
 
 " Mcintosh, as he saw the Confederate column advanc- 
 ing, sent his adjutant -general, Captain Walter S. ISTewhall, 
 to the left with orders to Treichel and Rodgers to rally 
 their men for a charge on the flank as it passed. But six- 
 teen men could get their horses, and with five officers they 
 made for the battle -flag. Kewhall, back once more with 
 the men of his own regiment, who, as he knew well, would 
 go anywhere, and sharing the excitement of the moment, 
 rushed in by the side of Treichel and Rodgers at the head 
 of the little band. Miller, whose squadron of the Third 
 Pennsylvania was already mounted, and had rallied, fired 
 a volley from the woods on the right, as the Confederate 
 column passed parallel with his line, but one hundred 
 yards off, and then, with sabres drawn, charged down into 
 the overwhelming masses of the enemy. 
 
 "The small detachment of the Third Pennsylvania,, 
 under Treichel and Rodgers, struck the enemy first, all 
 
"keep to your sabres, men!" 409 
 
 making for the color - guard. Newhall was about seizing 
 the flag when a sabre blow, directed at his head, compelled 
 him to parry it. At the same moment the color -bearer 
 lowered his spear and struck Newhall full in the face, tear- 
 ing open his mouth and knocking him senseless to the 
 ground. Every officer and nearly every man in the little 
 band was killed or wounded, although some succeeded in 
 cutting their way clear through. Almost at the same 
 moment Miller, with his squadron of the Third Pennsyl- 
 vania, struck the left flank about two thirds' of the way 
 down the column. Going through and through, he cut 
 off the rear portion and drove it back past Rummel's, 
 almost up to the Confederate battery, and nothing but the 
 heavy losses which he had suffered and the scattering of 
 his men prevented his going further, wounded though 
 he was. 
 
 " In the meantime, the two columns had come together 
 with a crash — the one led by Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee 
 (for he, too, was there,) and the other by Custer — and were 
 fighting hand to hand, Mcintosh, with his staff' and or- 
 derlies, and such scattered men from Michigan and other 
 regiments as he could get together, charged in with their 
 sabres. For minutes, which seemed like hours, amid the 
 clashing of the sabres, the rattle of the small arms, the 
 frenzied imprecations, the demands for surrender, the un- 
 daunted replies, and the appeals for mercy, the Confederate 
 column stood its ground. Captain Thomas, of the staff', 
 seeing that a little more was needed to turn the tide, cut 
 his way over to the woods on the right, where he knew 
 he could find Hart, with his fresh squadron of the First 
 New Jersey. In the melee, near the colors, was an officer 
 
CAVALRY SHAFT. 
 This column marks the place where the great cavalry engagement behind the right of 
 
 the Federal line occurred in the afternoon of the 3d, simultaneous with Pickett's 
 Uiol charge in front. (From a Photograph by Tipton,) 
 
THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY RETREAT. 411 
 
 of high rank, and the two headed the squadron for that 
 part of the fight. They came within reach of him with 
 their sabres, and then it was that Wade Hampton was 
 wounded. 
 
 " By this time the edge of the Confederate column had 
 begun to fray away, and the outside men to draw back. 
 As Hart's squadron, and the other small parties who had 
 rallied and mounted, charged down from all sides, the 
 enemy turned. Then followed a pell-mell rush, our men 
 in close pursuit. Many prisoners were captured, and many 
 of our men, through their impetuosity, were carried away 
 by the overpowering current of the retreat. 
 
 " The pursuit was kept up past Pummel's, and the 
 enemy were driven back into the woods beyond. The 
 line of fences and the farm buildings which constituted 
 the key -point of the field, and which, in the beginning of 
 the fight, had been in the possession of the enemy, re- 
 mained in ours until the end. All serious fighting for the 
 day was over, for Pickett's simultaneous assault had also 
 been repulsed, and the victory along the line was complete. 
 Skirmishing and some desultory artillery firing was kept up 
 at intervals by both forces until after nightfall, these dis- 
 turbances being caused by the enemy's endeavor to recover 
 their killed and wounded, who were lying thickly strewed 
 over the field in our possession. At dark Stuart withdrew 
 to the York pike, preparatory to covering the retreat of 
 Lee's army toward the Potomac. In the evening, Custer's 
 brigade was ordered to join its division. Gregg remained 
 all night in possession of the field, and in the morning 
 started in pursuit of the retreating enemy." 
 
 The force under General Gregg in this engagement 
 
412 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 numbered about five thousand men; while Stuart's force 
 has been estimated by reliable Confederate authority as 
 between six and seven thousand. The Count of Paris,, 
 however, who is generally conceded to be entirely reliable,, 
 estimates Stuart's force as considerably greater than the 
 Confederate estimate. It is needless to say that had not 
 Stuart been defeated in his purpose and driven back, the 
 results of the battle of Gettysburg would have been entirely 
 different from what they were. 
 
 But this brilliant affair behind the Federal right was 
 not the only occasion in which their cavalry did excellent 
 service during the series of engagements upon this his- 
 toric field. The left was the scene of the following dash 
 upon the foe. General Longstreet had given orders to> 
 that part of his corps which was opposite Round Top, to 
 make a demonstration upon that position for the purpose 
 of preventing reinforcements being sent from there to- 
 meet Pickett's charge. In accordance with this order r 
 the brigades of Benning, Robertson, and Law advanced to- 
 the attack, when they were unexpectedly called to meet a 
 dash of the Federal cavalry. The brigades of Farnsworth 
 and Merritt, accompanied by Graham's and Elder's batter- 
 ies, under the gallant Kilpatrick, came sweeping around 
 Big Round Top, screaming and yelling like demons, and 
 dashed upon the astonished foe. A terrific fight ensued in 
 which General Farnsworth was killed. He had been 
 promoted to the command of a brigade on the Sunday 
 previous, at General Meade's request, and now thus early 
 fell at the head of his brave troopers. Kilpatrick not 
 only came near capturing Longstreet's ammunition train,, 
 but compelled the troops, who were advancing towards 
 
THE CHARGE OF THE RESERVES. 413 
 
 Round Top, to fall back to protect their own flank. It is 
 altogether likely, too, that this dash upon the Confederate 
 flank, prevented any part of the forces there from partici- 
 pating in the great attack upon the Federal left center. 
 Of course two brigades of cavalry could not be expected 
 to accomplish much against a greatly superior number 
 of veteran infantry, such as these troopers met on that 
 occasion, but having accomplished what has been stated, 
 Kilpatrick withdrew. 
 
 Shortly after the repulse of Pickett, General Meade 
 rode down to Round Top, and seeing the enemy in front, 
 and learning that they had been annoying his men by 
 their fire, he ordered the Pennsylvania Reserves to charge 
 upon them. Colonel McCandless, who still occupied the 
 position he had seized and fortified the evening before, 
 dashed across the Wheat Field and into the woods beyond. 
 The Confederates fled before him. Bartlett's brigade of 
 the Sixth Corps advanced to the position reached by 
 McCandless, and other troops were moved up on the right. 
 The panic created by the repulse of Pickett seemed to 
 have seized upon the enemy upon this part of the line, for 
 they fled before the Reserves, leaving three hundred pris- 
 oners, one stand of colors, and five thousand stands of 
 arms in their possession. The Confederates, although 
 greatly outnumbering the Reserves, fell back nearly a 
 mile, and the ground lost by Sickles the day before was 
 recovered, with the wounded of the battle of the day 
 previous, that had lain there uncared for. 
 
 With this brilliant and successful charge by the Penn- 
 sylvania Reserves the battle of Gettysburg was ended; 
 .and it is but right that while heroic and patriotic men 
 
414 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 from many of the states of tlie Union participated in this 
 decisive engagement, its closing and final charge should 
 be made by the gallant sons of the state upon whose soil 
 it was fought. 
 
 The plan decided upon by General Lee for the battle 
 of this day, was evidently not carried out. This will ap- 
 pear in the following statements. General Lee, in his 
 report of the campaign, speaking of this day, says: 
 
 "The result of this day's operations (Thursday, July 2d,) 
 induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and 
 with the increased support that the position gained on the 
 right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting 
 columns, we should ultimately succeed; and it was accord- 
 ingly determined to continue the attack. The general 
 plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's 
 three brigades, which arrived near the battle field the after- 
 noon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning; 
 and General Ewell was directed to assault the enemy's 
 right at the same time." 
 
 The following facts are clear from the statement of 
 General Lee: 
 
 1. The attack upon the Federal left center was to have 
 been made simultaneously with EwelVs assault upon the right. 
 
 2. It was to take place in the morning, and not in the 
 afternoon. 
 
 3. It was to have been made with the two divisions of 
 Longstreet's Corps previously upon the field — Hood's and 
 McLaws' — reinforced by Pickett. 
 
 Why, now, was not this arrangement of the command- 
 ing general carried into execution? As in the delay of the 
 previous day, so in the departure from General Lee's or- 
 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONFEDERATE FAILURE. 415 
 
 dera in this, the blame is laid upon General Longstreet. 
 Colonel W. H. Taylor, of General Lee's staff, in Annals 
 of the War, page 312-31G, says: 
 
 "General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed 
 as early as was expected. It appears that he was delayed 
 by apprehensions that his troops would be taken in reverse 
 as they advanced. General Ewell, who had orders to co- 
 operate with General Longstreet, and who was, of course^ 
 not aware of any impediment to the main attack arranged 
 to be made on the enemy's left, having reinforced General 
 Johnson, whose division was upon our extreme left, during 
 the night of the 2d, ordered him forward early the next 
 morning. In obedience to these instructions, General 
 Johnson became hotly engaged before General Ewell 
 could be informed of the halt which had been called on 
 our right. After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in 
 which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his in- 
 trenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to 
 carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected 
 attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was 
 enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to 
 that of General Johnson, and finally, to threaten his flank 
 and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his 
 original position. General Lee then had a conference 
 with General Longstreet, and the mode of attack, and the 
 troops to make it, were thoroughly debated. I was present, 
 and understood the arrangement to be that General Long- 
 street should endeavor to force the enemy's line in his front. 
 That front was held by the divisions of Hood and McLaws. 
 To strengthen him for the undertaking, it was decided to 
 reinforce him by such troops as could be drawn from the 
 
416 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 center. Pickett's division of Longstreet's Corps was then 
 up, fresh and available. Heth's division of Hill's Corps 
 was also mentioned as available, having been, in a great 
 measure, recuperated since its active engagement of the 
 first day; so, also, were the brigades of Lane and Scales, 
 of Pender's division, Hill's Corps; and as our extreme 
 right was comparatively safe, being well posted, and not 
 at all threatened, one of the divisions of Hood and Mc- 
 Laws, and the greater portion of the other, could be re- 
 moved out of the lines and be made to take part in the 
 attack. Indeed, it was designed, originally, that the two 
 divisions last named, reinforced by Pickett, should make 
 the attack; and it was only because of the apprehensions 
 of General Longstreet that his corps was not strong 
 enough for the movement, that General Hill was called 
 on to reinforce him. Orders were sent to General Hill to 
 place Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's at 
 General Longstreet's disposal, and to be prepared to give 
 him further assistance if requested. The assault was to 
 have been made with a column of not less than two di- 
 visions, and the remaining divisions were to have been 
 moved forward in support of those in advance. This was 
 the result of the conference alluded to, as understood by 
 me. Lieutenant -General A. P. Hill appears to have had 
 the same impression, for he says in his report of the oper- 
 ations of his corps at this time: 'I was directed to hold 
 my line with Anderson's division and the half of Pender's, 
 now commanded by General Lane, and to order Heth's 
 division, commanded by Pettigrew, and Lane's and Scales' 
 brigades, of Pender's division, to report to Lieutenant- 
 General Longstreet, as a support to his corps, in the assault 
 
RESPONSIBILITY OF CONFEDERATE FAILURE. 417 
 
 on the enemy's lines.' * * * No more could be ex- 
 acted, or expected, of those men of brave hearts and nerves 
 of steel; but where are their supports to reap the benefit 
 of their heroic efforts, and gather the fruits of a victory so 
 nobly won? Was that but a forlorn hope, on Avhose suc- 
 cess, not only in penetrating the enemy's lines, but in 
 maintaining its hold against their combined and united 
 efforts to dislodge it, an entire army was to wait in quiet 
 observation? Was it designed to throw these few brigades 
 — originally, at the most, but two divisions, — -upon the 
 fortified stronghold of the enemy, while, full half a mile 
 away, seven ninths of the army, in breathless suspense, in 
 ardent admiration and fearful anxiety, watched, but moved 
 not? I maintain that such was not the design of the com- 
 manding general. Had the veteran divisions of Hood and 
 McLaws been moved forward, as was planned, in support 
 of those of Pickett and Pettigrew, not only would the 
 latter division, in all probability, have gained the enemy's 
 works, as did that of Pickett, but these two would have 
 been enabled, with the aid of Hood and McLaws, to resist 
 all efforts of the enemy to dislodge them. * * * It 
 appears that General Longstreet deemed it necessary to 
 defend his right flank and rear with the divisions of Mc- 
 Laws and Hood. These divisions, as before stated, con- 
 stituted all of the Confederate line held by Longstreet's 
 troops, and it is not apparent how they were necessary to 
 defend his flank and rear. The nearest infantry force of 
 the enemy, to our right, occupied the hills — Round Top 
 and Little Pound Top — and the only force that could be 
 said to threaten our flank and rear consisted of a few bri- 
 gades of cavalry, so posted as to protect the enemy's left. 
 
418 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 It is not my purpose here to undertake to establish the 
 wisdom of an attack on the enemy's position on the third 
 day, which General Longstreet contends was opposed to 
 his judgment, and of which he says he would have stayed 
 the execution, had he felt that he had the privilege so to 
 do; nor do I propose to discuss the necessities of the po- 
 sition, which he represents to have been such as to forbid 
 the employment of McLaws' and Hood's divisions in the 
 attack; neither do I seek any other than a just explana- 
 tion of the causes of our failure at that time; but well 
 recalling my surprise and disappointment when it was 
 ascertained that only Pickett's division, and the troops 
 from Hill's Corps had taken part in the movement, and 
 with positively distinct impressions as to the occurrences 
 just related, I deem it proper to record them for confirma- 
 tion or refutation as the undisputed facts of the case, and 
 the testimony of others, may determine." 
 
 In justice to General Longstreet I place on record here 
 what he has said in reply to the serious charges of Colonel 
 Taylor. This reply will be found in Annals of the War> 
 pages 431, 432. General Longstreet says: 
 
 " I may mention here that it has been absurdly said that 
 General Lee ordered me to put Hood's and McLaws' divis- 
 ions in support of Pickett's assault. General Lee never 
 ordered any such thing. After our troops were all arranged 
 for assault, General Lee rode with me twice over the lines 
 to see that everything was arranged according to his 
 wishes. He was told that we had been more particular in 
 giving the orders than ever before; that the commanders 
 had been sent for, and the point of attack had been care- 
 fully designated, and that the commanders had been 
 
GENERAL LONGSTREET's DEFENSE. 419 
 
 directed to communicate to their subordinates, and through 
 them to every soldier in the command, the work that was 
 before them, so that they would nerve themselves for the 
 attack, and fully understand it. After leaving me, he 
 again rode over the field once, if not twice, so that there 
 was really no room for misconstruction or misunderstand- 
 ing of his wishes, lie could not have thought of giving 
 any such an order. Hood and McLaws were confronted 
 by a largely superior force of the enemy on the right of 
 Pickett's attack. To have moved them to Pickett's sup- 
 port, would have disengaged treble their own number of 
 Federals, who would have swooped down from their rocky 
 fortresses against the flank of our attacking column, and 
 swept our army from the field." 
 
 In a foot-note to the same article from which the fore- 
 going has been taken, General Longstreet further says: 
 
 "Colonel Taylor says that General Lee, in his presence, 
 gave me orders to put Hood's and McLaws' divisions in 
 this column of attack. This I deny, and do not suppose 
 he will claim that any one else heard the order. If the 
 reader will examine any of the maps of Gettysburg, he 
 will see that the withdrawal of these two divisions from 
 their line of battle would have left half of General Lee's 
 line of battle open, and by the shortest route to his line of 
 supplies and retreat. Fully one half of his army would 
 have been in the column of assault, and half of Meade's 
 arm)' would have been free to sally out on the flank of our 
 column, and we should have been destroyed on that field 
 of battle, beyond a doubt, * * The only way for these 
 divisions to have been moved, was to have attacked the 
 heights in front. But this attack had been tried, and 
 
420 THE GKEAT INVASION. 
 
 failed the day before. If Pickett had shown signs of 
 getting a lodgment, I should, of course, have pushed the 
 other divisions forward to support the attack. But I saw 
 that he was going to pieces at once. * * To have rushed 
 forward my two divisions, then carrying bloody noses from 
 their terrible conflict the day before, would have been 
 madness." 
 
 In this conflict of statements in regard to this subject, 
 the only authority that could settle the question would be 
 General Lee himself. He, however, has gone, but he has 
 left a brief but significant remark, made to General Imbo- 
 den during the night after the battle of this day, which 
 seems to decide against General Longstreet. General 
 Imboden, in an article contributed by him to the Galaxy 
 of April, 1871, says that the night after this battle (Friday, 
 July 3d, 1863,) he met General Lee in the rear of his line. 
 After describing the General's fatigued and depressed con- 
 dition, and detailing some conversation which passed be- 
 tween them, General Imboden says that Lee addressed him 
 thus: "General, I never saw troops behave more magnifi- 
 cently than Pickett's division of Virginians did to - day in 
 their grand charge upon the enemy. And if they had been 
 supported, as tiny were to have been, — but, for some reason not 
 yet fully explained to me, they ivere not, — we would have 
 held the position they so gloriously won at such a fearful 
 loss of noble lives, and the day would have been ours." 
 
 Whether charged rightly or wrongly with delaying the 
 attack of this day as he clearly did delay the assault of the 
 day before, and with failing to make it with the whole of 
 the force that Lee intended and ordered, one thing is cer- 
 tain, — General Longstreet disapproved of making the 
 
GENERAL LONGSTREET'S RELUCTANCE. 421 
 
 attack at all, and when forced by the command of his 
 superior to make it, he did so with the utmost reluctance 
 and fully assured of its hopelessness. This he does not 
 attempt to conceal. The subject is so important that I 
 transcribe here the General's own statement in Annals of 
 the War, pages 429-431. General Longstreet says: 
 
 " Our artillery was in charge of General E. P. Alexan- 
 der, a brave and gifted officer. Colonel Walton was my 
 chief of artillery; but Alexander being at the head of the 
 column, and being first in position, and being, beside, an 
 officer of unusual promptness, sagacity, and intelligence, 
 was given charge of the artillery. The arrangements 
 were completed about one o'clock. General Alexander 
 had arranged that a battery of seven eleven-pound howitz- 
 ers, with fresh horses and full caissons, were to charge 
 with Pickett, at the head of his line, but General Pendle- 
 ton, from whom the guns had been borrowed, recalled them 
 just before the charge was made, and thus deranged this 
 wise plan. Never was I so depressed as upon that day. 
 I felt that my men were to be sacrificed, and that I should 
 have to order them to make a hopeless charge. I had in- 
 structed General Alexander, being unwilling to trust 
 myself with the entire responsibility, to carefully observe 
 the effect of the fire upon the enemy, and when it began to 
 tell to notify Pickett to begin the assault. I was so much 
 impressed with the hopelessness of the charge, that I 
 wrote the following note to General Alexander: ' If the 
 artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy 
 or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our efforts pretty 
 certain, I would prefer that you should not advise General 
 Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on 
 
422 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 'your judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect 
 you to let Pickett know when the moment offers.' To my 
 note the General replied as follows: 'I will only be able to 
 judge the effect of our fire upon the enemy by his return 
 fire, for his infantry is but little exposed to view, and the 
 smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer from 
 your note, there is an alternative to this attack, it should 
 be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it will 
 take all of the artillery ammunition we have left to test 
 this one thoroughly; and, if the result is unfavorable, we 
 will have none left for another effort; and, even if this is 
 entirely successful, it can only be at a very bloody cost.' 
 I still desired to save my men, and felt that if the artillery 
 did not produce the desired effect, I would be justified in 
 holding Pickett off. I wrote this note to Colonel Walton 
 at exactly half past one P. M.: 'Let the batteries open. 
 Order great precision in firing. If the batteries at the 
 Peach Orchard can not be used against the point we intend 
 attacking, let them open on the enemy at Pocky Hill 
 (Round Top).' The cannonading which opened along 
 both lines was grand. In a few moments a courier brought 
 a note to General Pickett (who was standing near me) 
 from Alexander, which, after reading he handed to me. 
 It was as follows: 'If you are coming at all, you must 
 come at once, or I can not give you proper support; but 
 the enemy's fire has not slackened at all; at least eighteen 
 guns are still firing from the Cemetery itself.' After I had 
 read this note, Pickett said to me, ' General, shall I ad- 
 vance?' My feelings had so overcome me that I would 
 not speak, for fear of betraying my want of confidence to 
 him. I bowed affirmation, and turned to mount my horse. 
 
longstreet's account of the charge. 423 
 
 Pickett immediately said, ' I shall lead my division for- 
 ward, sir.' T spurred my horse to the wood where Alex- 
 ander was stationed with artillery. When I reached him, 
 he told me of the disappearance of the seven guns which 
 were to have led the charge with Pickett, and that his 
 ammunition was so low that he could not properly support 
 the charge. I at once ordered him to stop Pickett until 
 the ammunition had been replenished. lie informed me 
 that he had no ammunition with which to replenish. I 
 then saw that there was no help for it, and that Pickett 
 must advance under his orders, lie swept past our artil- 
 lery in splendid style, and the men marched steadily and 
 compactly down the slope. As they started up the ridge, 
 over one hundred cannon from the breast - works of the 
 Federals hurled a rain of canister, grape, and shell down 
 upon them; still they pressed on until half way up the 
 slope, when the crest of the hill was lit with a solid sheet 
 of flame as the masses of infantry rose and fired. When 
 the smoke cleared away, Pickett's division was s:one. 
 Nearly two thirds of his men lay dead on the field, and 
 the survivors were sullenly retreating down the hill. 
 Mortal man could not have stood that lire. In half an 
 hour the contested field was cleared, and the battle of 
 Gettysburg was over." 
 
 When Pickett's great charge was repulsed, all of the 
 men that had engaged in it, and were not killed, wounded, 
 or captured, went streaming back to their own line. There 
 they were met and rallied by their officers, with the view 
 to be in readiness for a counter charge, which all sup- 
 posed would certainly follow. The condition of the Con- 
 federates at that part of their line is thus given by Colonel 
 
424 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Freeman tie, — the English officer previously referred to, — 
 in Blackwood 's Magazine of September, 1863: 
 
 "I soon began to meet many wounded men returning 
 from the front; many of them asked in piteous tones the 
 way to a doctor, or an ambulance. The further I got the 
 greater became the number of the wounded. At last I 
 came to a perfect stream of them flocking through the 
 woods in numbers as great as the crowd in Oxford Street 
 in the middle of the day. * * They were still under a 
 heavy fire; the shells were continually bringing down 
 great limbs of trees, and carrying further destruction 
 amongst their melancholy procession. I saw all this in 
 less time than it takes to write it, and although astonished 
 to meet such a vast number of wounded, I had not seen 
 enough to give an idea of the real extent of the mischief. 
 
 "When I got close up to General Longstreet, I saw one 
 of his regiments advancing through the woods in good 
 order; so, thinking I was just in time to see the attack, I 
 remarked to the General that ' I wouldn't have missed this 
 for anything.' Longstreet was seated on the top of a 
 snake -fence, in the edge of the wood, and looking per- 
 fectly calm and unperturbed. He replied, ' The d 1 you 
 
 wouldn't! I would like to have missed it very much; we've 
 attacked and been repulsed. Look there!' For the first 
 time I then had a view of the open space between the two 
 positions, and saw it covered with Confederates slowly and 
 sulkily returning towards us in small broken parties. * * 
 I remember seeing a general (Pettigrew I think it was) 
 come up to him and report that he was unable to bring 
 his men up again. Longstreet turned upon him and re- 
 plied with some sarcasm: 'Very well, never mind, then, 
 
LEE AT THE FRONT. 425 
 
 General; just let them remain where they are. The enemy 
 is going to advance, and will spare you the trouble.' * * * 
 Soon afterward I joined General Lee, who had in the 
 meanwhile come to the front, on becoming aware of the 
 disaster. lie was engaged in rallying and in encouraging 
 the troops, and was riding about a little in front of the 
 woods quite alone, the whole of his staff being engaged in 
 a similar manner further to the rear. His face, which is 
 always placid and cheerful, did not show signs of the 
 slightest disappointment, care, or annoyance; and he was 
 addressing to every soldier he met a few words of encour- 
 agement, such as, 'All this will come right in the end; we 
 will talk it over afterwards, — but in the meantime all good 
 men must rally. We want all good men and true men 
 just now,' etc. * * He said to me, 'This has been a sad 
 day for us, Colonel, — a sad day; but we can't expect 
 always to gain victories.' * * I saw General Wilcox (an 
 officer who wears a short round jacket and a battered 
 straw hat) come up to him, and explain, almost crying, 
 the state of his brigade. General Lee immediately shook 
 hands with him, and said, cheerfully, ' Never mind, General. 
 All this has been my fault, — it is I that have lost the fight, 
 and you must help me out of it in the best way you can.' " 
 Captain Owen, from whom I have previously quoted, 
 gives the following account of what transpired within the 
 Confederate lines after Pickett's repulse, and the demorali- 
 zation among the men which prevailed. Owen's account 
 is as follows: " Colonel Freemantle says, ' General Lee rode 
 among Pickett's men after the repulse, and with a few 
 kindly words rallied the broken troops; that he saw many 
 men with an empty sleeve seize a musket and turn readily 
 
426 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 into line; that there was less noise and confusion than on 
 an ordinary review.' Here are the facts of this rally of 
 Pickett's division. An attempt was made on the brow of 
 Cemetery Hill, in front of the Confederate batteries, by a 
 couple of officers, to rally the fugitives, but the effort 
 (under a heavy cross-fire from both sides) failed, and then 
 commenced a rout that soon increased to a stampede and 
 almost demoralization of all the survivors of this noted 
 charge without distinction of regiments or commands. 
 
 "A few hundred yards behind the Confederate batteries 
 there is a ravine along which runs a country road that 
 makes at one place an abrupt angle by turning or bending 
 to the left. At this point there is a bluff on one side and 
 a slight swamp on the other, creating a narrow pass 
 through which the fugitives, without distinction of rank, 
 officers and privates side by side, pushed, poured and rush- 
 ed in a continuous stream, throwing away guns, blankets, 
 and haversacks as they hurried on in confusion toward the 
 rear. Here another effort was made to rally the broken 
 troops, and all sorts of appeals and threats made to officers 
 and men who turned a deaf ear and hurried on, some of 
 the officers even jerking loose with an oath from the hand 
 laid on their shoulders to attract attention. At last a few 
 privates hearkening to the appeals halted and formed a 
 nucleus around which about thirty others soon rallied, and 
 with these a picket was formed across the road as a barrier 
 to further retreat and the stream of stragglers dammed up 
 several hundred strong. 
 
 " General Pickett came down from the direction of the 
 battle - field weeping bitterly, and said to the officer com- 
 manding the picket: * Don't stop any of my men. Tell 
 
ARRESTING THE FUGITIVES. 427 
 
 them to come to the camp we occupied last night;' and 
 passed on himself alone toward the rear. Other officers 
 passed by, but the picket was retained at this point until 
 Major Charles Marshall came galloping up from the rear, 
 and inquired ' what this guard was for and who placed it 
 here;' and finding the officer without orders, he moved 
 the picket back a few hundred yards and extended the line 
 along the stream or little creek found there. Here the 
 guard did duty until sundown, arresting all stragglers from 
 the battle-field, and Colonel Marshall took them forward 
 himself, with no other help, to where General Lee was on 
 the field, and it was to these men that Colonel Freemantle 
 heard General Lee address his kindly words, but none of 
 them had empty sleeves, as all the wounded were allowed 
 to pass to the rear. When Colonel Marshall first came 
 up to the picket across the road he had come from a 
 point still farther in rear, where he had been sent by 
 General Lee to rally the stragglers, if possible, and failing 
 to do so was returning to report to General Lee. Colonel 
 Marshall came down several times before sundown after 
 the stragglers collected by the picket, and carried up to 
 the field probably a total of four or five hundred men 
 during the evening." 
 
 There is a difference of opinion among those who par- 
 ticipated in the "battle of Gettysburg, as well as among 
 historians who have written of that engagement since, as 
 to whether or not Pickett's repulse should have been fol- 
 lowed by a counter charge by the Federal forces. As it is 
 simply a question of opinion, it may be well to give here 
 the views expressed by the following eminent persons: 
 
 General Longstreet says: " When this charge failed, I 
 
428 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 expected that, of course, the enemy would throw himself 
 against our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I sent 
 my staff officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, 
 and hurried to our line of batteries, as the only support 
 that I could give them, knowing that my presence would 
 impress upon every one of them the necessity of holding- 
 the ground to the last extremity. I knew if the army was 
 to be saved, those batteries must check the enemy. * * * 
 The enemy's skirmishers were then advancing and threat- 
 ening assault. For unaccountable reasons, the enemy did 
 not pursue his advantage."* 
 
 In his second contribution to the same work from which 
 the foregoing is taken (page 627), General Longstreet 
 further says: 
 
 "The charge (Pickett's) was disastrous, and had the 
 Federal army been thrown right upon the heels of Pick- 
 ett's retreating column, the results might have been much 
 more serious." 
 
 Mr. Swinton, in his "History of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac," quotes General Longstreet somewhat differently. 
 Mr. Swinton says: 
 
 " I have become convinced from the testimony of Gen- 
 eral Longstreet himself, that that attack would have re- 
 sulted disastrously. ' I had,' said that officer to the writer, 
 'Hood and McLaws, who had not been engaged; I had a 
 heavy force of artillery; I should have liked nothing 
 better than to have been attacked, and have no doubt I 
 should have given those who tried as bad a reception as 
 Pickett received.' " 
 
 General Alexander, the same officer to whom General 
 
 * Annals of the War, page 431. 
 
GENERAL ALEXANDER'S OPINION. 429 
 
 Longstreet referred to in a previous quotation, as having 
 charge of his artillery, says in a communication to the 
 " Southern Historical Papers " : 
 
 " I have always believed that the enemy here lost the 
 greatest opportunity they ever had of routing Lee's army 
 by a prompt offensive. They occupied a line shaped some- 
 what like a horse -shoe. I suppose the greatest diameter 
 of this horse -shoe was not more than one mile, and the 
 ground within was entirely sheltered from our observa- 
 tion and fire, with communications by signals all over 
 it, and they could concentrate their whole force at any 
 point and in a very short time without our knowledge. 
 Our line was an enveloping semi -circle, over four miles in 
 development, and communication from flank to flank, even 
 by courier, was difficult, the country being well cleared 
 and exposed to the enemy's view and fire, the roads all 
 running at right angles to our lines, and some of them at 
 least broad turnpikes, where the enemy's guns could rake 
 for two miles. Is it necessary now to add any statement 
 as to the superiority of the Federal force, or the exhausted 
 and shattered condition of the Confederates for a space of 
 .at least a mile in their very center, to show that a great 
 opportunity was thrown away? I think General Lee him- 
 self was quite apprehensive that the enemy would riposte, 
 and that it was that apprehension which brought him 
 .alone out to my guns, where he could observe all the indi- 
 cations." 
 
 General Trimble, who commanded a division of Hill's 
 'Corps, which supported Pickett in his charge, says: 
 
 " By all the rules of warfare the Federal troops should 
 {as I expected they would) have marched against our shat- 
 
430 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 tered columns and sought to cover our army with over- 
 whelming defeat." 
 
 The views of Federal officers are as follows. General 
 Doubleday says: 
 
 ""When Pickett's charge was repulsed, and the whole 
 plain covered with fugitives, we all expected that Welling- 
 ton's command at Waterloo of, 'Up, guards, and at them!' 
 would be repeated, and that a grand counter -charge 
 would be made. But General Meade had made no ar- 
 rangements to give a return thrust. It seems to me that 
 he should have posted the Sixth and part of the Twelfth 
 corps in rear of Gibbon's division the moment Pickett's 
 infantry were seen emerging from the woods, a mile and a 
 half oft'. If they broke through our center these corps 
 would have been there to receive them, and if they failed 
 to pierce our line and retreated, the two corps could have 
 followed them up promptly before they had time to rally 
 and reorganize. An advance by Sykes would have kept 
 Longstreet in position. In all probability we would have 
 cut the enemy's army in two, and captured the long line 
 of batteries opposite us, which were but slightly guarded."* 
 
 General Hancock, whose brilliant services during this 
 great engagement and elsewhere, justly entitle him to the 
 honorable distinction of "the superb soldier," subsequently 
 bestowed upon him, favored a counter -charge. Lying 
 wounded in an ambulance, he penned a few lines to Gen- 
 eral Meade, recommending that it be done.f 
 
 General Howard, too, favored an immediate advance 
 upon the enemy. In an article in the Atlantic Monthly, 
 
 * General Doubleday's " Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 202. 
 -j-General Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 202. 
 
FEDERAL CRITICISMS ON MEADE. 431 
 
 this excellent officer says that the fearful exposure to which 
 General Meade was subjected during the nearly two hours 
 of terrific cannonading preparatory to the charge, seemed 
 to have confused him so that he did not at first realize the 
 victory he had won, and therefore he failed to follow up 
 the advantage gained. 
 
 General Pleasanton says: 
 
 "From the suddenness of the repulse of the last charge 
 on July 3d, it became necessary for General Meade to de- 
 cide at once what to do. I rode up to him, and, after con- 
 gratulating him on the splendid conduct of the army, I 
 said: 'General, I will give you half an hour to show your- 
 self a great general. Order the army to advance, while I 
 will take the cavalry and get in Lee's rear, and we will 
 finish the campaign in a week.' lie replied: 'How do 
 you know Lee will not attack me again; we have done 
 well enough.' I replied that Lee had exhausted all his 
 available men; that the cannonade of the last two days 
 had exhausted his ammunition; he was far from his base 
 of supplies; and by compelling him to keep his army to- 
 gether, they must soon surrender, for he was living on the 
 country. To this the general did not reply, but asked me 
 to ride up to Round Top with him; and, as we rode along 
 the ridge for nearly a mile, the troops cheered him in a 
 manner that plainly showed they expected the advance." 
 
 Horace Greeley, in his "American Conflict," volume II., 
 page 388, presents the other side of this question in the 
 following language: 
 
 "Nor is General Meade justly blamable for not pushing 
 forward at once on the heels of his beaten foes. Around 
 him lay nearly or quite one fourth of his army killed or 
 
432 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 wounded; he knew that his own ammunition was running 1 
 low; he did not know that Lee's was even more completely 
 exhausted. If he had ordered a general advance, and 
 been repelled from Seminary Ridge by such a fire as had 
 met and crushed the Confederate assailants of Cemetery 
 Hill, he would have been reproached as rash and fool- 
 hardy by many who have deemed him deficient in courage 
 and heartiness because he did not make the Union a 
 Fourth of July present of the remnant of Lee's army." 
 
 Colonel James C. Bidclle, in Annals of the War, pages 
 215, 216, says: 
 
 " It had been General Meade's intention to order a gen- 
 eral advance from our left, after the close of the action; 
 but, owing to the lateness of the hour, and the wearied 
 condition of the army, with a 'wisdom that did guide his 
 valor to act in safety,' he abandoned the movement he 
 contemplated. For this he has been severely censured. 
 * * General Meade was not in the least 'demoralized' 
 by the enemy's fire, but realized fully the exact condition 
 of affairs. Lee had been repulsed, not routed, and, if 
 Meade had yielded to his own inclination to attack, he 
 would have been repulsed himself, and would thus have 
 thrown away the fruits of his great victory." 
 
 General McLaws, in an article contributed by him to the 
 Philadelphia Weekly Press, of April 21st, 1886, says: 
 
 " Some have asserted the belief that if General Meade 
 had assaulted immediately after 'Piekett's charge' he 
 would have gained an easy victory. I can see no reason 
 for such an opinion. It was a saying of General Jackson, 
 based on his observation of results in many encounters, 
 ' that our men sometimes fail to drive the enemy from 
 
A CONFEDERATE OPINION. 433 
 
 their positions, but they always fail to drive us from our 
 positions.' 
 
 "For General Meade to have made an assault with suffi- 
 cient force to have gained a victory over Lee's army, just 
 after Pickett's repulse, following Pickett's men, it would 
 have been necessary for him to have known beforehand 
 where the assault was to be made, to know that General 
 Lee had no preparations to assault elsewhere, and to have 
 given orders to his commanders that in the event of Pick- 
 ett's repulse an immediate advance was to be made by his 
 army. .But could General Meade know that only his 
 ■center was to be assaulted? Could he believe that after a 
 grand artillery display of hours, calling his attention to 
 the preparations for an assault somewhere, that in the 
 middle of the day his left center was to be the point of 
 attack, and that it was to be made by two divisions only, 
 one coming after, but not following the other, and with 
 their flanks unprotected? Had General Meade any reason 
 to think that there was nothing else to follow? 
 
 " Was it not more reasonable for him to suppose that 
 the force in the woods opposite his left, which, on the day 
 before, had made such a 'terrific attack,' would take part 
 in the engagement? 
 
 " He could see Pickett coming for at least a half mile 
 over an open country, and had every reason to think that 
 it was a demonstration to cover some other and more 
 formidable and better arranged assault, for it was not 
 reasonable to suppose that General Lee expected to defeat 
 his army with two divisions, coming one on the left of the 
 other, each in line, but one in the rear, without support 
 
 28 
 
434 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and being pelted with over two hundred guns from the 
 flanks and in front from the moment it formed while on 
 the march until it reached his works, — all this, besides the 
 work of destruction in its flanks from the infantry fire. I 
 repeat that General Meade had every reason to think that 
 something more serious than this was to follow, and to 
 come at once or very soon, and it was but an act of good 
 j udgment for him to keep his troops couchant, waiting the 
 denouement, t. 
 
 " That nothing else came, that no other assault was 
 made, is no reason why an attempt should be made to 
 blame General Meade for not attacking in turn. For if he 
 had followed Pickett's flying troops with a large portion 
 of his force he would have given his flanks to that force 
 in the woods, the amount of which he could not know; 
 but it was his good reason to think, when seeing the com- 
 position of that attacking his left center that a very large 
 force was there concentrated, and besides he would have 
 attempted to do that which the Confederates had failed to 
 do; that is, assault his enemy in position without due pre- 
 paration, and his advance would have been over the same 
 open country and exposed to the fire of over two hundred 
 guns. 
 
 " I have stated that unless orders had been given before- 
 hand for a general advance, should Pickett's assault prove 
 a failure, no movement could have been made in time and 
 w r ith sufficient force to meet the occasion. Such nas not 
 been the practice in war. It is not among the possibili- 
 ties. I do not recollect of an instance in our war, when 
 an assault on any position of the enemy's line having been 
 made, the enemy being in position entrenched to receive 
 
PARALLEL INSTANCES. 435 
 
 an attack, had risen en masse on failure of that assault 
 and attacked the whole opposing army, nor was it ever 
 done by our own troops. There are doubtless numerous 
 instances when the troops immediately opposed to the 
 assaulting forces have rushed out and made a short pursuit, 
 but that is done on an impulse and with small bodies with- 
 out previous orders from commanding general and never 
 amounts to a general movement. 
 
 "In the charge of Federals against Jackson's line at 
 Fredericksburg, when that charge failed, and it failed for 
 the same reason our assaults failed at Gettysburg, — that 
 is, because there was not a supporting force ample to take 
 advantage of the first success and push it, — it was ex- 
 pected that Jackson's force, the whole force, would have 
 jumped forward in pursuit, and in the language of the 
 time, 'Drive the enemy into the river.' But it was not 
 done. I was on Lee's Hill, looking at the retiring Feder- 
 als, and saw but Hoke's ISTorth Carolina Brigade dash out 
 in pursuit; but it, being unsupported, returned after going 
 a short distance. I have read that some of General 
 Early's command did the same as Hoke's, but I could not 
 see that part of the line. The truth is, it is an impossi- 
 bility for different commands to co-operate in such a con- 
 tingency depending on so many chances. General Lee, 
 with his point of attack selected hours beforehand, with 
 his intentions well known to his staff, to the corps com- 
 manders, to those who were to take part in the assault, 
 and to others, failed to get the co-operation needed, even 
 with the two divisions engaged in the charge on the 3d of 
 July. 
 
 " On the 2d of July General Lee reports that General 
 
436 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Longstreet was ordered to place the divisions of McLaws 
 and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the 
 enemy's left, which he was to drive in, etc. No time was 
 stated, but he evidently intended that it should be done 
 much earlier than it was done, and General Ewell was in- 
 structed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the 
 enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should an 
 opportunity offer. But it seems that there was a want of 
 co-operation between the corps, and we read that Early 
 fell back from his assault for want of exjieeted support. 
 
 " It would thus appear that if General Lee, with his 
 points of attack agreed upon beforehand and known to 
 all concerned, failed to get co-operation between his dif- 
 ferent commands, General Meade, who could not say 
 where the attack was to be made or what would be the 
 result, could not give orders in advance, of that private 
 nature which could possibly secure co-operation among 
 his commanders. 
 
 " And even if orders had been given before the assault 
 to be prepared to advance, should the intended assaults be 
 unsuccessful, the commanding general alone would be the 
 judge of the situation. He alone could give orders, when 
 and how to move the different commands, and to send 
 staff officers to conduct the troops to the positions they 
 would be called on suddenly to take. This would cause 
 so much delay, and probably so much confusion, as the 
 accidents of war would have changed many commanders, 
 some incompetent, that it would be nearly impossible to 
 make a successful attack, for enough time would be con- 
 sumed for the Confederates to have regained their de- 
 fensive lines, reorganized and recuperated, and be prepared 
 
CONDITION OF CONFEDERATE ARMY. 437 
 
 for an attack, and to be assaulted was just what General 
 Lee wanted. 
 
 "The failure of 'Pickett's charge' was not the defeat 
 of General Lee's army. The assaulting column was not 
 greater than that under Longstreet on the 2d. 
 
 "The Confederate army was not in retreat, but was now 
 in their turn 'at bay,' waiting in position and eager for 
 an assault to be made, and waited all of the 4th wishing 
 for it, and the army had about enough ammunition on 
 hand for another battle, but none to waste on experiments, 
 and thus could not make another assault. 
 
 "Therefore, it looks as if General Lee, while ordering 
 an assault, had great hopes that he might be assaulted in 
 turn, as he was ready for it, and believed that if one was 
 made it would have been disastrous to the Federals. 
 
 " I think that the record of that battle will warrant the 
 assertion that General Lee was not at any time during it 
 unprepared for an attack on his lines, and that on the 3d, 
 during and after Pickett's charge, he was stronger on the 
 defensive than at any other time." 
 
 Mr. Thomas Robins, jr., in the same paper, of April 18th, 
 says: "Between four and five o'clock on the evening of 
 July 3d the last shot was fired by General Webb's Phila- 
 delphia brigade, and the men composing the Confederate 
 assaulting column against the Federal center were either 
 retreating across the Emmittsburg road or rushing into 
 the Federal lines with hands thrown above their heads as 
 a sign of surrender. At that moment General Meade rode 
 up to the spot. His staff was scattered in all directions in 
 quest of reinforcements to strengthen the threatened point, 
 
438 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and the General was accompanied only by his son, who 
 was serving as his aid. The whole field was covered with 
 smoke, through which the combatants conld be seen indis- 
 tinctly moving backwards and forwards. General Meade 
 was unable to see whether or not the enemy had been re- 
 pulsed, and, turning to an officer who commanded a sec- 
 tion of Woodruff's battery, he inquired of him whether 
 the assaulting column had turned. The officer answered 
 that the Confederates were just about turning, and, in 
 proof of this, pointed to General Alexander Hays, com- 
 manding the third division of the Second Corps, who was 
 waving a captured flag. The commanding general, how- 
 ever, soon had a more convincing demonstration of the 
 fact, for within a minute he was surrounded by a howling 
 mob of Confederate prisoners who recognized him as an 
 officer of authority who could tell them where to go to 
 escape from the fire of their own guns. 
 
 "General Meade, having satisfied himself that the 
 assault was repulsed, turned, and rode to the summit of 
 Cemetery Hill to ascertain whether the Confederates had 
 renewed upon the right wing the desperate assaults of the 
 evening before. At the Cemetery he was soon surrounded 
 by a large cavalcade of officers, who came to offer their 
 congratulations and to ascertain his intentions. He found 
 that the enemy had undertaken no active operations 
 against either the Cemetery or Gulp's Hill. The decision 
 of General Meade was quickly made. He determined to 
 make an assault against the Confederate right wing, which 
 the repulse of Pickett had left exposed, and to endeavor to 
 break it before the gap in the lines, caused by the destruc- 
 tion of the Virginia division, could be closed up. Having 
 
GENERAL MEADE ORDERS AN ADVANCE. 439 
 
 formed this resolution, the General proceeded in person to 
 give the necessary orders to General Sykes, who was in 
 command of the Fifth Corps. This corps was posted in 
 the vicinity of the Round Tops; and General Meade, fol- 
 lowed by a large number of officers, rode out in front of 
 the lines, and proceeded at a hard gallop along the entire 
 Federal front. The effect upon the men was electrical. 
 The enthusiastic cheers of the entire army greeted this 
 appeal to their enthusiasm; and the effect upon the dispirit- 
 ed Confederates is mentioned by Colonel Freemantle, of 
 the British Guards, who accompanied General Longstreet 
 during the campaign. 
 
 "Arriving on Little Round Top, General Meade person- 
 ally directed General Sykes to advance his corps across 
 the same country which had been fought over the day 
 before, and to attack the divisions of Hood and McLaws, 
 which formed the extreme right wing of the Confederate 
 army. General Meade's action in ordering this attack 
 from the left instead of advancing from the center of his 
 line has been sharply criticised; but its wisdom is be- 
 yond question. To advance over the same ground as 
 that covered in Pickett's charge would have been only a 
 repetition of the Confederate General's mistake. Any one 
 who has seen the ground can not but recognize the danger 
 of such an operation. Commanded as it is by Seminary 
 Ridge in front, and by the high ground in the neighbor- 
 hood of the Peach Orchard on the flank, the plain between 
 the lines of the two armies is a veritable death trap for an 
 assaulting column from either. As the writer knows from 
 personal experience, the distance between the two ridges 
 can not be covered by brisk walking in less than twenty 
 
440 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 minutes, and, allowing for halts to reform broken lines and 
 to clear away obstructions, not less than half an hour 
 would have been occupied in advancing an assaulting 
 column from Ziegler's Grove to the Confederate position. 
 In that time an advancing column would have been sim- 
 ply annihilated. Besides, as Swinton points out in his. 
 ' Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,' the necessity 
 of strengthening the point at which Pickett's charge was 
 directed led to the mixing up of brigades, divisions, and 
 corps to such a degree that an organized advance from the 
 center immediately after the repulse of Pickett was quite 
 impossible. 
 
 " On the left, however, the advance of an assaulting 
 column is more or less covered by woods and inequalities 
 in the ground, and it is probable that, had the assault been 
 made promptly, General Lee would have suffered severely,. 
 and might have lost much of his artillery. What General 
 Meade said to General Sykes is not known. No record of 
 it exists. This much, however, is certain: That the assault 
 was not made in force sufficient to accomplish decisive re- 
 sults. General Warren, Meade's chief engineer, who was 
 in his confidence, and who was probably present at the 
 time when the order was given to General Sykes, states 
 positively in his testimony before the Congressional Com- 
 mittee on the conduct of the war that it was General 
 Meade's intention to move forward all the forces he could 
 get in line and assault the enemy in turn. What prevented 
 this assault? We have the answer at hand in General 
 Warren's testimony. ' Many officers were killed and 
 wounded,' he says. ' We were much shattered in this re- 
 spect, and there was a tone among most of the prominent 
 
THE FAILURE TO ADVANCE. 441 
 
 officers that we had quite saved the country for the time, 
 and that we had done enough; that we might jeopardize 
 all that we had won by trying to do too much.' 
 
 "All that was done in pursuance of General Meade's 
 orders was a gallant advance by the division of Pennsyl- 
 vania Reserves against General Hood's position. This 
 attack resulted in the recapture of the battle-field of the 
 second, together with a number of prisoners. Darkness 
 then put an end to the movement." 
 
 Mr. J. R. Sypher, in his " History of the Pennsylvania 
 Reserves," page 471, says: 
 
 " As soon as General Meade saw that success attended 
 his troops in the center, he rode to the left to order an 
 advance in support of the Reserves, who had marched so 
 promptly in obedience to his instructions. It was nearly 
 sunset, and before the forces could be sufficiently concen- 
 trated to make a charge on the right flank of the enemy, 
 darkness ensued, and it was too late to follow ud the vic- 
 tory." 
 
 It was not too late to accomplish decisive results by a 
 vigorous charge upon the Confederate right, as Mr. Sypher 
 seems to suppose, for nearly three hours of daylight yet 
 remained; nor were the troops, who would have led in the 
 charge, too much wearied, for the Sixth Corps had scarcely 
 been engaged during all the day, and the Fifth had been 
 but little engaged. Had an advance been made from the 
 Federal left center directly upon the heels of the retreat- 
 ing foe, success might have resulted, but only at a fearful 
 cost of life. But had it been made from the left, as it 
 seems General Meade contemplated, and the Pennsylvania 
 Reserves, backed by the remainder of the Fifth Corps and 
 
442 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 the whole of the Sixth, all of whom were within con- 
 venient distance, the discomfiture and rout, if not the en- 
 tire destruction of the Confederate army would most likely 
 have been effected. That such might have been the result, 
 had the advance been made from the left, seems to be 
 assured in the fact that the enemy fled before the Reserves, 
 in the charge made upon them, with scarcely any resist- 
 ance. This probability is further strengthened in the fol- 
 lowing statement made to General Crawford by Colonel 
 Semmes, who commanded a Georgia brigade in the en- 
 gagement with the Reserves already referred to. 
 
 Colonel Semmes, says: "There was much confusion in 
 our army so far as my observation extended, and I think 
 we would have made but feeble resistance if you had 
 pressed on, on the evening of the third." 
 
 General Meade, it should be remembered, had been in 
 chief command of the army but six days. The responsi- 
 bility which was thrust upon him was great indeed. A 
 false step at the juncture under consideration would have 
 resulted most disastrously. He had to decide, not simply 
 for the time, nor for the army under his command, but for 
 the whole country, for the Government, and for all time 
 to come. If he did not possess, as some have alleged, the 
 grasp of mind, the quickness of comprehension, which are 
 essential in great commanders when called upon to meet 
 sudden emergencies, and decide upon important move- 
 ments, he at least should be judged for what he had done, 
 not for what some think he should have done. In the case 
 under consideration he doubtless saw and felt the import- 
 ance of some counter action, but his caution, his in- 
 clination to be on the safe side, led him to defer the order 
 
THE CRISIS OF HISTORi. 443 
 
 for an aggressive movement until be had further tested 
 the matter, and in the seemingly justifiable delay the op- 
 portunity for its successful accomplishment passed away. 
 Perhaps he acted wisely in not putting in jeopardy all he 
 had already gained, but great results are seldom gained 
 except by great risks. Had Grant, or Sherman, or Sheri- 
 dan, or some other commander been in General Meade's 
 position, the risk might have been taken, and the results 
 might have justified it. If failure had followed, their 
 names would not shine as brightly in history as does that 
 of General George G. Meade. 
 
 The battle of Gettysburg, as is universally conceded, 
 was the turning point in the great war of the rebellion, 
 for from it the ultimate failure of the cause for which the 
 South fought was assured. And as. that battle was the 
 culmination, the crisis of the war, so the last great effort of 
 the Confederate chieftain, when he hurled fifteen thous- 
 and of his choicest troops against the Federal line, was 
 the culmination, the supreme crisis of that battle. The 
 rebellion at that point reached its high - water mark, and 
 from that period it gradually receded. That charge, 
 then, was the supreme crisis in our country's history, 
 and the turning point in its destiny. It failed, and with 
 its failure the fact was demonstrated that a government 
 founded upon oppression and wrong, could not succeed 
 in the light of the civilization and Christianity of this age. 
 The Republic was saved, redeemed, baptized, and conse- 
 crated anew to the coming ages. 
 
 It is a singular coincidence that the rebellion should re- 
 ceive its most decisive defeat in the east and west at the 
 same time; for the same shadow on the dial which marked 
 
444 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 the time of the crushing overthrow at Gettysburg, also 
 indicated a similar event in the great drama twelve hun- 
 dred miles away at Vicksburg. 
 
 The casualties of the two armies during the three days- 
 of battle, are officially stated by a publication from the 
 adjutant -general's office, Washington, bearing date, 1886, 
 as follows: 
 
 CASUALTIES OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Command. 
 
 General Head -quarters. 
 
 First Army Corps 
 
 Second Army Corps 
 
 Third Army Corps 
 
 Fifth Army Corps 
 
 Sixth Army Corps 
 
 Eleventh Army Corps... 
 
 Twelfth Army Corps 
 
 Cavalry Corps 
 
 Artillery Reserve 
 
 Total 
 
 Killed. 
 
 42 
 67 
 5° 
 
 28 
 2 
 
 33 
 
 18 
 
 5 
 2 
 
 247 
 
 55i 
 729 
 528 
 337 
 25 
 335 
 186 
 
 85 
 40 
 
 2,816 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 257 
 269 
 
 251 
 129 
 
 H 
 120 
 
 43 
 37 
 15 
 
 i,i37 
 
 Captured 
 or Missing. 
 
 "SS 
 
 2,952 
 2,917 
 
 2,775 
 1,482 
 
 171 
 1,802 
 
 767 
 
 315 
 
 172 
 
 13,355 
 
 62 
 
 182 
 
 n 
 
 2,140 
 
 355 
 59 2 
 210 
 
 30 
 
 i,449 
 
 65 
 
 399 
 
 13 
 
 < 
 
 4 
 6,024 
 
 4,35o 
 4,210 
 2,187 
 242 
 3,801 
 
 242 
 
 5,253 22,990 
 
 CASUALTIES OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 Command. 
 
 First Army Corps 
 
 Second Army Corps 
 
 Third Army Corps 
 
 Stuart's Cavalry Division 
 
 Grand total 
 
 910 
 
 809 
 
 837 
 
 36 
 
 2,592 
 
 4,336 
 3,823 
 
 4,407 
 140 
 
 12,706 
 
 o . 
 
 -o to 
 
 •3 2 
 
 P<"3 
 
 a 
 
 2,290 
 
 1,305 
 
 1,491 
 
 64 
 
 5,150 
 
 in 
 < 
 
 7,536 
 
 5,937 
 
 6,735 
 
 240 
 
 20,448 
 
 It will be seen in the foregoing, that the losses of the 
 Confederates at this battle, contrary to the genera/ opinion, 
 
THE LOSSES OF THE ARMIES. 445 
 
 were less than those of the Federals. The records of pris- 
 oners of war on file in the office of the Adjutant -General 
 of the United States Army bear the names of twelve 
 thousand two hundred and twenty -seven wounded and 
 unwounded Confederates captured by the Federal forces 
 at and about Gettysburg from July 1st to the 5th inclusive. 
 This large number of prisoners, in connection with the 
 fact that the number of casualties reported by the Con- 
 federate officers does not entirely harmonize with those of 
 the medical director, whose estimate is thus given, leads 
 to the inference that the report is not entirely correct. It 
 may be safely assumed, I think, that the losses of the two 
 armies were about equal. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. 
 
 53 
 
 
 v '4 
 
 Vt 
 
 'HE Confederate army had remaining fit for duty, at 
 the close of the battle of Gettysburg, about fifty 
 thousand men. This force, with its ammunition 
 ^h nearly exhausted, with its immense trains, amidst a 
 T terrific rain storm, which swelled the streams and 
 made the roads almost impassable, with a hostile people 
 all about it, and a swollen and impassable river in its 
 rear, was about to be withdrawn from the presence of its 
 victorious enemy and make its way back to Virginia, from 
 which it had come. The distance it had to traverse by the 
 route it chose — by Monterey Pass and Hagersto wn to 
 Williamsport — was about forty miles. The task, it will 
 readily be seen, was an exceedingly difficult one, and could 
 not have been made except at a great loss, had the pursuit 
 been vigorous and determined as it should have been. 
 
 The Federal army had remaining fit for duty, at the 
 close of the battle, about seventy - two thousand men. This 
 force, with its ammunition somewhat exhausted, but an 
 inexhaustible supply near at hand, elated with victory, in 
 the midst of its friends, and with reinforcements nearly 
 equal in number to its own that could have been called 
 upon for assistance, was about to be employed according 
 
 446 
 
FEDEKAL RESOURCES AFTER THE BATTLE. 447 
 
 to the best judgment of its commander, in preventing the 
 escape of its enemy. That it should have succeeded in 
 effecting this all -important object, with all these advan- 
 tages, will scarcely be denied. 
 
 In addition to the seventy -two thousand who remained 
 of the Army of the Potomac at the close of the great 
 struggle at Gettysburg, there were available and within 
 reach, the following troops: In the defenses of Washing- 
 ton and Baltimore probably from fifty thousand to sixty 
 thousand;* General Couch's emergenc} T men about Car- 
 lisle and Pine Grove, two divisions under Generals Dana 
 and Smith, about twenty thousand; French's division at 
 Frederick and Tennallytown, ten thousand; Milroy's refu- 
 gees in Bedford and Fulton counties, about three thousand ; 
 and several thousand under General Kelly in West Vir- 
 ginia. By a proper use of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
 road a force equal and probably superior in numbers to 
 Lee's, could and should have been drawn from Baltimore, 
 "Washington, and West Virginia, and placed upon the 
 south bank of the Potomac. This would have effectually 
 prevented the enemy from recrossing that river. Couch's 
 two divisions could and should have been ordered at an 
 earlier period to advance to the vicinity of Ilagerstown, 
 where Milroy's men from the west of the mountain, could 
 have joined them. Thus hemmed in on every side, with a 
 vigorous pursuit made by the army under General Meade, 
 either upon the line the enemy took, or the longer one 
 which Meade chose, the destruction or capture of Lee's 
 army must have ensued. But these combinations were 
 
 -General Pleasanton, in Annals of the War, page 458, says that there were 
 at that time seventy thousand troops in the defenses of Washington alone. 
 
448 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 not made, and the army of the Potomac was not sent for- 
 ward at once, and when it was sent in pursuit, it went by 
 a long and round - about way, and moved so slowly, that 
 the enemy was enabled to effect his escape. This failure 
 to follow up the advantages gained in the battle of Gettys- 
 burg, both immediately after the repulse of Pickett's great 
 assault and subsequently upon the withdrawal of Lee, has 
 caused some even to question whether or not after all the 
 Federals gained the victory. Colonel "W. H. Taylor, in 
 Annals of the "War, pages 316, 317, says: 
 
 "Notwithstanding the brilliant achievements of Ewell 
 and Hill on the first day, and the decided advantage gained 
 by Longstreet on the second, the failure of the operations 
 of the third day, involving as they did, but two divisions 
 of the army, deprived us of the prestige of our previous 
 successes, and gave a shadow of right to our adversary's 
 claim of having gained a victory. Their exultation, how- 
 ever, should be tempered with, moderation, when we con- 
 sider that, after one day of absolute quiet, the Confederates 
 withdrew from their front without serious molestation, and 
 with bridges swept away, and an impassable river in the 
 rear, stood in an attitude of deiiance until their line of re- 
 treat could be rendered practicable, after which they safely 
 recrossed into Virginia." 
 
 As soon as night closed in after the battle of the 3d 
 day of July, arrangements were made by the Confeder- 
 ates to return to Virginia. Generals Lee and Hill, seated 
 on camp-stools in the latter's tent, under the dim and 
 flickering light of a single candle, examined a map which 
 they had spread out upon their knees, and decided upon 
 the routes to be taken. * As many of the wounded as 
 
 *See General Imboden's account in the succeeding chapter. 
 
THE BEGINNING OF THE RETREAT. 449 
 
 were unable to walk, and for whom transportation could 
 be provided, were to be sent under a cavalry escort across 
 the mountain by Cashtown and Greenwood, and thence by 
 a side - road directly across the country to the Potomac at 
 Williamsport. Those of the wounded who were able to 
 walk were to accompany this train on foot. The army 
 was to proceed by Fairfield and Monterey Pass to Hagers- 
 town and Williamsport. At about four o'clock on the 
 following afternoon this wasron- train was in readiness to 
 move. It was about twenty -five or thirty miles in length, 
 and contained about ten or twelve thousand wounded and 
 suffering- men. A description of this immense aggregate 
 of human agony and distress, as well as some of the 
 thrilling incidents which befell it by the way, will be given 
 in the ensuing chapter. 
 
 Sometime during this night (Friday, 3d,) Ewell's Corps 
 was withdrawn from its exposed position in the town and 
 east of it, and placed behind Seminary Ridge. On the 
 next day field-works were thrown up to conceal their 
 intention of retreating, and to protect their rear in case 
 of an attack. Shortly after noon a heavy rain set in, 
 and in a short time the fields were covered with water, 
 the streams swollen, and the roads rendered almost im- 
 passable. At night, under cover of the darkness and 
 rain, the army began to retire by the road leading to 
 Fairfield and Monterey Pass, and shortly after daylight 
 in the morning of Sunday, July 5th, the last of them left. 
 Suspecting that the enemy were about to retreat, General 
 Mead directed General Pleasanton to send out reconnoit- 
 ering parties of cavalry. These, upon returning, reported 
 that the enemy were moving toward the Potomac in some 
 
450 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 confusion. General D. B. Birney, who had succeeded 
 General Sickles in the command of the Third Corps, 
 (General Sickles having been wounded,) says: 
 
 " I was ordered (on the 4th) to send out a reconnoissance 
 at daylight io ascertain the position of the enemy. I did 
 so early on Sunday morning, and reported that the enemy 
 were in full retreat. I also sent back for permission to 
 open upon the enemy with my rifled batteries as they 
 were crossing a point very near me, upon the turnpike 
 going toward Hagerstown; and the staff officer brought 
 me permission to do so. I had commenced the move- 
 ment to attack, when another staff officer arrived from 
 General Meade with a written order from him to make 
 no attack; which was done. My skirmishers advanced 
 and took possession of their hospitals, with a large number 
 of their wounded. I had sent some twenty orderlies with 
 a staff officer, who led the reconnoissance; and I reported 
 these facts constantly to General Meade; but his peremp- 
 tory order not to open fire at all prevented any pursuit 
 of the enemy." 
 
 About eleven o'clock, when there could no longer be 
 any doubt that the enemy were in full retreat, an order 
 was issued for pursuit. Mcintosh's brigade of Gregg's cav- 
 alry division was sent to Emmittsburg, and J. I. Gregg's 
 brigade was directed to proceed by Cashtown and across 
 the mountain to Greenwood. General Sedgwick was 
 ordered to follow directly on the track of the fugitives, 
 and after marching about eight miles he came upon the 
 rear guard under Early in the neighborhood of Fairfield. 
 After a considerable cannonade at long range, Sedgwick 
 reported to Meade that the enemy's position was too 
 
THE DILATORY PURSUIT. 451 
 
 strong to be carried. General Sedgwick was acting under 
 instructions from the commander in chief, and he doubt- 
 less understood that a general engagement was not in- 
 tended. The spirit in which Sedgwick was constrained to 
 construe General Meade's orders, is thus given by General 
 A. P. Howe, commanding a division of the Sixth Corps, 
 in his testimony before the committee of Congress on the 
 conduct of the war. General Howe, says: 
 
 " On the 4th of July, it seemed evident enough that the 
 enemy were retreating. How far they were gone, we 
 could not see from the front. We could see but a com- 
 paratively small force from the position where I was. On 
 Sunday, the 5th, the Sixth Corps moved in pursuit. As 
 we moved, a small rear guard of the enemy retreated. 
 We followed them, with this small rear guard of the 
 enemy before us, up to Fairfield, in a gorge of the mount- 
 ains. There we again waited for them to go on. There 
 seemed to be no disposition to push this rear guard when 
 we got up to Fairfield. A lieutenant from the enemy 
 came into our lines and gave himself up. He was a 
 Northern Union man, in service, in one of the Georgia 
 regiments; and, without being asked, he unhesitatingly 
 told me, when I met him as he was being brought in, that 
 he belonged to the artillery of the rear guard of the 
 enemy, and that they had but two rounds of ammunition 
 with the rear guard. But we waited there without receiv- 
 ing any orders to attack. It was a place where, as I in- 
 formed General Sedgwick, we could easily attack the 
 enemy with advantage. But no movement was made by 
 us until the enemy went away. Then one brigade of my 
 division, with some cavalry, was sent to follow on after 
 
452 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 them, while the remainder of the Sixth Corps moved to 
 the left." 
 
 Two separate expeditions, under command of bold and 
 daring commanders, away from the main army, and act- 
 ing according to their own judgment, were undertaken 
 about this time, which are worthy of mention here. They 
 illustrate what should have been the spirit in which to 
 conduct the pursuit, and what important results can be 
 accomplished if prosecuted with the proper force. Gen- 
 eral French, on Saturday, July 4th, marched from Fred- 
 erick City, Maryland, where he had remained during the 
 series of engagements at Gettysburg, to Turner's Pass in 
 the South Mountain, and held that important point for 
 the National army. He also sent a detachment to Fall- 
 ing Waters, on the Potomac river, a few miles east of 
 Williamsport, Maryland, and destroyed the pontoon bridge 
 erected there by the Confederates. On this same day 
 (Saturday, 4th,) Kilpatrick's cavalry division, reinforced 
 by lluey's brigade, of Gregg's division, moved from Em- 
 mittsburg up to Monterey Pass, with the purpose of strik- 
 ing the enemy's line. The following thrilling and graphic 
 account of the terrific night attack by that bold and in- 
 trepid leader, has been furnished me by Dr. H. G. Chritz- 
 man, who was connected with lluey's brigade. So far as 
 I am aware no account of that affair has ever before been 
 published. Dr. Chritzman, says: 
 
 " Jnly 4th, we moved to Emmittsburg and reported to 
 Kilpatrick; moved same evening to intercept E well's 
 wagon -train which was reported to be near Monterey 
 Springs. The brigade moved rapidly up the mountain - 
 road, striking Ewell's wagon- train about three o'clock in 
 
kilpatrick's dash upon the enemy. 453 
 
 the morning of July 5th, in the midst of a furious thunder 
 storm, whilst on its retreat from Gettysburg. 
 
 'At once there rose so wild a yell 
 Within that dark and narrow dell, 
 As if all the fiends from heaven that fell, 
 Had pealed the banner cry of hell." 
 
 This, combined with the Plutonic darkness made it one of 
 the nights long to be remembered. When we came up with 
 the wagon - train, Federal and Confederate cavalry, wagons, 
 ambulances, drivers and mules became a confused mass of 
 pursued and pursuing demons whose shouts and carbine 
 shots, mingled with the lightning's red glare and the 
 thunder's crash, made it appear as if we were in the in- 
 fernal regions. Especially so as the cries of the wounded 
 often rose high above the din of the conflicting forces. 
 
 "Frequently a driver would be shot or leave his mule 
 team, when the unrestrained animals would rush wildly 
 down the narrow road, and in many instances the wagons 
 with the mules attached would be found at daylight at 
 the bottom of some deep ravine crushed to pieces, with 
 the mules dead or dying. It was a fearful ride suiting 
 well the fearless intrepidity of our daring commander. 
 A Confederate brigade, then a long train of wagons and 
 ambulances, then our brigade in the center, with Ewell's 
 corps in our rear, going down that narrow mountain road 
 upon the principle of the devil take the hindmost, — you 
 have Kilpatrick's dash across Monterey Pass. 
 
 "The result of this brilliant movement was the capture 
 of a large number of wagons, ambulances, and mules with 
 fifteen hundred prisoners. The brigade reached the foot 
 of the mountain about daylight; leaving the Baltimore 
 pike where it turns toward Waynesborough, the column 
 
454 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 moved on to Smithsburg, Maryland, where the wagons 
 and ambulances were burned. The command rested at this 
 place during the day. As the shades of evening drew 
 nigh we were treated to a compliment of shot and shell by 
 Stuart, who appeared at Raven Rock Gap, above the little 
 village. Soon our battery got into position, when Stuart 
 was compelled to retire; our brigade taking up the line 
 of march for Boonsborough, where it arrived about mid- 
 night without further interruption." 
 
 The pursuit of Lee upon the same line he went having 
 been abandoned, and a movement by the round-about 
 way of the eastern base of the mountain through Emmitts- 
 burg, Frederick, Middletown, and Turner's Pass, having 
 been decided upon, it will be of interest to the reader to 
 see the movements of the several corps of the pursuing 
 army, to note the places of their encampments, as well as 
 the leisurely manner of the march, and to observe the time 
 and place when they again confronted their old antagonist. 
 These are given from reliable surces: 
 
 Sunday, 5. The Second Corps marched from Gettys- 
 burg to Two Taverns; the Fifth Corps to Marsh Run; the 
 Sixth Corps, as previously stated, to Fairfield; the Eleventh 
 Corps to Rock Creek; and the Twelfth to Littlestowu. 
 As already said, Gregg's cavalry brigade moved out on 
 the Chambersburg road to Greenwood; Buford's division 
 reached Frederick City, and Kilpatrick, reinforced by 
 Huey's brigade, of Gregg's division, moved from Emmitts- 
 burg upon the enemy by Monterey Pass. 
 
 Skirmishes took place this day between the Federal 
 cavalry and the retreating enemy at or near Smithsburg, 
 Maryland, and at Fairfield, Caledonia Iron Works, Green- 
 
MOVEMENTS OF THE FEDERALS. 455 
 
 castle, aud Ccarfoos' Cross Roads, Pennsylvania. That at 
 Caledonia Iron Works was between Gregg's cavalry and 
 the rear guard of Imbodcn's force in charge of the great 
 wagon train of wounded, and the one at Cearfoos' Cross 
 Roads was between Captain Jones' command and this 
 same force, as detailed in the succeeding chapter. The 
 skirmish at or near Sniithsburg was between Kilpatrick 
 and a part of Stuart's command. 
 
 Monday, 6. The First Corps marched from Gettysburg 
 to Emmittsburg; the Fifth Corps from Marsh Run to 
 Moritz Cross Roads; the Sixth Corps went from Fairfield, 
 Whither it had gone the day previous in pursuit of Lee, to 
 Emmittsburg, except Neill's brigade of Howe's division, 
 which, in conjunction with Mcintosh's brigade of cavalry, 
 was left at Fairfield to pursue the enemy; the Eleventh 
 Corps went from Rock Creek to Emmittsburg. Buford's 
 cavalry division went from Frederick to Williamsport and 
 thence back to Jones' Cross Roads; Kilpatrick's cavalry and 
 Huey's brigade went from Boonsborough via Hagerstown 
 to "Williamsport. At Hagerstown a spirited engagement 
 took place between these forces and Stuart's cavalry, after 
 which they went on to Williamsport, where they engaged 
 both Stuart and Imboden, in charge of the wagon train, 
 as detailed in the succeeding chapter. After this engage- 
 ment they returned and went into camp at Jones' Cross 
 Roads. . 
 
 Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's division, marched from 
 Emmittsburg to Fairfield; and J. I. Gregg's brigade, of 
 Gregg's division, moved from Greenwood to Marion. 
 Smith's division, of General Couch's command of emer- 
 gency men, moved from Pine Grove in the South Movm- 
 
456 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 tain, which it had reached on the evening of Saturday T 
 4th, direct from Carlisle by Mount Holly, to Newman's 
 Pass, where the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg 
 crosses the mountain. Kenly's brigade, of French's di- 
 vision, marched from Frederick en route to Maryland 
 Heights; and Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of the same 
 division, left Tennallytown via Washington and the Balti- 
 more and Ohio Railroad en route to Frederick. 
 
 Tuesday, 7. The Head - quarters of the Army were 
 moved this day from Gettysburg to Frederick City, and 
 the Reserve Artillery from Littlestown to Woodsborough. 
 The First Corps marched from Emmittsburg to Ham- 
 burgh; the Second Corps from Two Taverns, at which 
 place it remained since the 5th, to Taneytown; the Third 
 Corps, which up to this time had remained at Gettysburg, 
 marched by way of Emmittsburg to Mechanicstown; the 
 Fifth Corps from Moritz Cross Roads via Emmittsburg to 
 Utica; the Sixth Corps from Emmittsburg to Mountain 
 Pass, near Hamburgh; the Eleventh Corps from Emmitts- 
 burg to Middletown; and the Twelfth Corps from Littles- 
 town, where it had remained since the 5th, to Walkersville. 
 Buford's and Kilpatricks cavalry divisions and Huey's 
 brigade, of Gregg's division, moved from Jones' Cross 
 Roads to Boonsborough; J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade was 
 moving en route from Marion to Middletown ; Mcintosh's 
 brigade of cavalry and Neill's brigade, of the Sixth Corps, 
 which followed in the rear of the retreating Confederates, 
 moved across the Mountain by Monterey Pass to Waynes- 
 borough; Smith's division, of Couch's emergency men, 
 marched from Newman's Pass to Altodale; Kenly's bri- 
 gade, of French's division, with other troops forwarded by 
 
MOVEMENTS OF THE FEDERALS. 457 
 
 General Scheiick from Baltimore, reoccupied Maryland 
 Heights; and Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of French's 
 division, reached Frederick City from Washington. 
 
 Skirmishes took place at Downsville and Funkstown, 
 Maryland, and at Harper's Ferry, West Virginia. 
 
 Wednesday, 8. Head - quarters moved from Frederick 
 City to Middletown, and the Reserve Artillery from Woods- 
 borough to Frederick City. The First Corps marched 
 from Hamburgh to Turner's Gap, in South Mountain; the 
 Second Corps from Taney town to Frederick; the Third 
 Corps from Mechanicstown to a point three miles south- 
 west of Frederick; the Fifth Corps from Utica to Mid- 
 dletown; the Sixth Corps from near Hamburgh to Middle- 
 town; the Eleventh Corps from Middletown to Turner's 
 Gap, — Schurz's division being advanced to Boonsborough; 
 and the Twelfth Corps from Walkersville to Jefferson. 
 Smith's division of Couch's command, moved from Alto- 
 dale to Waynesborough. Campbell's and Mulligan's bri- 
 gades, of Kelly's command, department of West Virginia, 
 were concentrated at Hancock, whence they moved to 
 Fairview, on North Mountain. 
 
 Actions occurred this day at Boonsborough and Wil- 
 li am sport. 
 
 Thursday, 9. Head - quarters moved from Middletown 
 to Turner's Gap of the South Mountain, and the Reserve 
 Artillery from Frederick City to Boonsborough. The 
 Second Corps marched from Frederick City to Rohrers- 
 ville; the Third Corps from near Frederick City to Fox's 
 Gap in the South Mountain; the Fifth Corps from Mid- 
 dletown, by way of Fox's Gap, to near Boonsborough; 
 the Sixth Corps from Middletown to Boonsborough ; and 
 
458 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 the Twelfth Corps from Jefferson to Rohrersville. Elliott's 
 and Smith's brigades of French's division, marched from 
 Frederick to Middletown. 
 
 Skirmishes this day at Benevola (Beaver Creek), after- 
 ward General Meade's head -quarters. 
 
 Friday, 10. Head -quarters moved from Turner's Gap 
 to Beaver Creek, beyond Boonsborough, where it remained 
 until the enemy recrossed the Potomac river; the First 
 Corps marched from Turner's Gap to Beaver Creek, where 
 it was joined by Kenly's brigade, of French's division, from 
 Maryland Heights; the Second Corps from Rohrersville 
 to near Tilghnianton; the Third Corps from Fox's Gap 
 through Boonsborough to Antietam Creek, in the vicinity 
 of Jones' Cross - Roads, where it was joined by Elliott's and 
 Smith's brigades, of French's division, which marched from 
 Turner's Gap; the Fifth Corps from near Boonsborough 
 to Delaware Mills, on Antietam Creek; the Sixth Corps 
 from Boonsborough to Beaver Creek; the Eleventh Corps 
 from Turner's Gap to Beaver Creek; and the Twelfth 
 Corps from Rohrersville to Bakersville. Buford's and 
 Kilpatrick's cavalry divisions moved from Boonsborough 
 to Funkstown, and Huey's brigade, of Gregg's division, 
 moved from Boonsborough to Jones' Cross -Roads. 
 
 Saturday, 11. The Reserve Artillery was this day 
 brought forward from Boonsborough to Benevola. The 
 Second Corps moved from near Tilghmantown to the 
 neighborhood of Jones' Cross -Roads; the Twelfth Corps 
 from Bakersville to Fairplay and Jones' Cross -Roads; 
 Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry, from 
 Funkstown to Bakersville; J. I. Gregg's brigade from Mid- 
 dletown to Boonsborough; and Kilpatrick's division from 
 
THE FEDERAL PURSUIT. 459 
 
 Funkstown to near Ilagerstown. Neill's brigade of the 
 Sixth Corps, and Mcintosh's cavalry brigade, that had 
 crossed the mountain in the rear of the Confederates by 
 Monterey Pass, reached Waynesborough on the 7th, where 
 they were joined by Smith's division of Couch's emergency 
 men, which had advanced from Harrisburg by way of Mt. 
 Holly, Pine Grove, Newman's Pass, Greenwood, Funks- 
 town, and Qniney, and the whole command, except one 
 brigade, marched to Leitersbnrg. 
 
 Skirmishes occurred at or near Old Antietam Forge 
 (near Leitersburg), Clear Spring, Ilagerstown, Jones' 
 Cross -Roads (near Williamsport), and Funkstown. 
 
 Sunday, 12. The First, Sixth, and Eleventh Corps 
 moved from Beaver Creek to Funkstown; Mcintosh's cav- 
 alry brigade from Leitersburg to Boonsborough; Ivilpat- 
 rick's cavalry division and Ames' division of the Twelfth 
 Corps, occupied Ilagerstown ; Weill's brigade of the Sixth 
 Corps, moved from Leitersburg to Funkstown, where it 
 rejoined its corps; Smith's division (except one brigade 
 left at Waynesborough) marched from Leitersburg to 
 Gavetown; Dana's division, of Couch's emergency men, 
 which had advanced from Harrisburg by Carlisle, Ship- 
 pensburg, and Chambersburg, simultaneously with Smith's 
 advance by the mountain route, this day reached Green- 
 castle. General Couch himself reached Chambersburg on 
 Friday, 10th, where he established his head -quarters. 
 Averill's cavalry brigade, from West Virginia, were en route 
 from Cumberland to Fairview. 
 
 Skirmishes occurred this day at or near Ilagerstown, 
 Jones' Cross -Poads, and Funkstown. 
 
 Monday, 13. The two great armies were again together, 
 
460 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 face to face. Being in such close proximity, the move- 
 ments were necessarily but few, and these with great cau- 
 tion. The Sixth Corps moved from Funkstown to the 
 vicinity of Ilagerstown; Smith's division of Couch's com- 
 mand, moved from Waynesborough and Cavetown to 
 Ilagerstown and Beaver Creek; and Averill's cavalry bri- 
 gade joined Kelly's infantry at Fairview. 
 
 Skirmishes occurred at Ilagerstown, Jones' Cross Roads,, 
 and Funkstown. 
 
 During these days the Confederates had been busy and 
 had reached advanced positions. As previously stated,. 
 the Southern army withdrew from their lines behind Sem- 
 inary Ridge during the night of Saturday, July 4th, and 
 the morning of Sunday, 5th, and by marching day and 
 night reached Ilagerstown on the afternoon of Monday, 
 6th, and the morning of Tuesday, 7th. Finding that the 
 almost continuous rains had swollen the river so that he 
 could not recross it, Lee took up a strong position on 
 Marsh Run, below the town, completely covering the 
 fords at Williamsport and Falling Waters. The four or 
 five days which intervened before the Federal army came 
 up, were spent in the vigorous use of the spade and axe, 
 and by the time that army reached the field, the posi- 
 tion was almost impregnable. In addition to this the 
 stock of ammunition, which was nearly exhausted, was 
 replenished by supplies ferried across the river.* This 
 
 -'Persons residing in Williamsport, who lived there at the time, say that 
 the Confederate army received some ammunition while it lay in battle line 
 about Williamsport and Falling Waters, but not much. It was ferried across 
 the river. Professor J. Fraise Richard, the historian, in order to ascertain 
 from reliable sources to what extent that army was supplied with ammuni- 
 tion after the battle of Gettysburg, addressed a letter to General Longstreet 
 upon this subject, to which the following is the reply. A copy of this letter 
 has been kindly placed at my disposal: 
 
 
REASONS FOR MEADE'S DELAY. 461 
 
 fact has been explicitly stated by General Imboden, whose 
 account will be found in the ensuing chapter. 
 
 The distance which the Confederate army traversed from 
 Gettysburg to Hagerstown was about thirty -four miles. 
 The distance by the route the Federal army went was 
 about seventy miles. The former occupied but two days in 
 marching this distance, while the latter spent eight days in 
 its march. This evident want of haste in the pursuit can 
 only be accounted for by one of two reasons: either Gen- 
 eral Meade did not recognize the necessity of haste, sup- 
 posing that Lee could not recross the river because of its 
 swollen condition, or he did not desire again to engage 
 him in battle north of the river. That the latter seems to 
 
 Gainesville, Georgia., 27th April, 1886. 
 J. Fraise Richard: 
 
 Dear Sir — * * Replying to your question of supplies, I think I should 
 say that General Lee went into Pennsylvania with the avowed purpose of war 
 in its full import. There can be little doubt that he was fully supplied with 
 the necessary supplies. 
 
 Besides the eighty to one hundred rounds in the cartridge boxes. I guess 
 there were as many more in the ordnance train. 
 
 I am truly yours, James Longstreet. 
 
 General Early, in response to a letter of inquiry upon this same subject 
 from the same person, says: 
 
 With regard to our supply of ammunition, I have to say that the cartridge 
 boxes used by our troops were capable of carrying only about sixty rounds. 
 If the one you mention [one that was found upon the field] contained eighty 
 rounds, then the cartridges must have been packed in very closely. [This 
 box had no tin case for the cartridges; the latter having been crowded closely 
 into the leather openings. — J. F. Richard.] Besides the cartridges carried in 
 the boxes, we had ammunition wagons, in which an extra supply was carried; 
 but in a battle lasting three days much more than eighty rounds of cartridges 
 would be easily exhausted. 
 
 On the first day's fight at Gettysburg one of my brigades — the first engaged 
 — exhausted all of its ammunition before the others got into the fight, and 
 had to send back to the wagons for a fresh supply, as well as appropriate 
 that taken from the cartridge boxes of the dead, wounded, and prisoners of 
 the enemy. 
 
 After the three days fighting at Gettysburg, our ammunition, especially for 
 the artillery, certainly did get short; and if we had had no more than eighty 
 
4(32 THPJ GREAT INVASION. 
 
 have been the case will appear in the following additional 
 statement of General Howe, in his testimony before the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War. General Howe 
 says : 
 
 " We moved on through Boonsborough, and passed up 
 on the pike road leading to Hagerstown. After passing 
 Boonsborough it came to my turn to lead the Sixth Corps. 
 That day, just before we started, General Sedgwick ordered 
 me to move on and take up the best position I could over 
 a little stream on the Frederick side of Funkstown. As 
 I moved on, it was suggested to me by him to move care- 
 fully. 'Don't come into contact with the enemy; we don't 
 want to bring on a general engagement.' It seemed to be 
 the current impression that it was not desired to bring on 
 
 rounds of cartridges for the infantry, it would have been exhausted. But, 
 nevertheless, General L,ee halted his army near Hagerstown, on the retreat, 
 and offered battle to Meade, which the latter failed to accept. As we were 
 entirely dependent on the country in which we were operating for provisions 
 for the men and provender for the horses, and the Potomac was rapidly rising 
 in our rear, we had to move across it. It was impossible for us to carry pro- 
 visions into Pennsylvania sufficient to last for any length of time, and there- 
 fore we had to gather them in the country through which we passed. When 
 the armies confronted each other at Gettysburg it was impossible for us to 
 send out foraging parties, even if we had an abundant supply of ammunition. 
 We had no railroads or navigable water courses to bring up supplies for us, 
 and the retreat across the Potomac was therefore an absolute necessity. 
 
 Respectfully, J. A. Early. 
 
 Colonel W. H. Taylor, of General Tree's staff, writes as follows: 
 
 Norfolk, Virginia, May 17th, 1SS6. 
 Prof. J. Fraise Richard: 
 
 Dear Sir — * * It is true that our supply of ammunition was seriously 
 reduced after the several days engagements at Gettysburg; but it was not 
 exhausted. We had a sufficient supply for another general engagement, and 
 we were anxious to be assailed in the lines taken near Funkstown [the same 
 referred to by General Early]. Had such engagement occurred, it would 
 have been absolutely necessary then to have replenished our supply; and this 
 admonished General L,ee not to risk a fight, except on terms of his own, so 
 far removed from his base of supplies. 
 
 Yours respectfully, W. H. Taylor. 
 
GENERAL HOWE'S TESTIMONY. 463 
 
 a general engagement. I moved on until we came near 
 Funkstown. General Buford was along that way with 
 liis cavalry. I had passed over the stream referred to, and 
 found a strong position, which I concluded to take and 
 wait foi» the Sixth Corps to come up. In the meantime, 
 General Buford, who was in front, came back to me and 
 said, 'I am pretty hardly engaged here; I have used a 
 great deal of my ammunition; it is a strong place in front; 
 it is an excellent position.' It was a little further out than 
 I was — -nearer Funkstown. He said, 'I have used a great 
 deal of my ammunition, and I ought to go to the right; 
 suppose you move up there, or send up a brigade, or even 
 a part of one, and hold that position.' Said I, 'I will do 
 so at once, if I can just communicate with General Sedg- 
 wick; I am ordered to take up a position over here and 
 hold it, and the intimation conveyed to me was that they 
 did not want to get into a general engagement; I will send 
 to General Sedgwick, and ask for permission to hold that 
 position and relieve you.' I accordingly sent a staff' officer 
 to General Sedgwick, with a request that I might go up 
 at once and assist General Buford; stating that he had a 
 strong position, but his ammunition was giving out. Gen- 
 eral Buford remained with me until I should get an an- 
 swer. The answer was, 'No, we do not want to bring on 
 a general engagement.' ' Well,' said I, ' Buford, what can I 
 do? ' He said, ' They expect me to go farther to the right; 
 my ammunition is almost out. That position is a strong 
 one, and we ought not to let it go.' I sent down again to 
 General Sedgwick, stating the condition of General Buford, 
 and that he would have to leave unless he could get some 
 assistance; that his position was not far in front, and that 
 
404 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 it seemed to me that we should hold it, and I should like 
 to send some force up to picket it at least. After a time I 
 got a reply that, if General Buford left, I might occupy 
 the position. General Buford was still with me, and I 
 said to him, ' If you go away from there, I will kave to 
 hold it.' ' That's all right,' said he, ' I will go away.' He 
 did so, and I moved right up. It was a pretty good posi- 
 tion, where you could cover your troops. Soon after 
 relieving Buford, we saw some Confederate infantry ad- 
 vancing. I do not know whether they brought them from 
 Hagerstown, or from some other place. They made three 
 dashes, not in heavy force, upon our line to drive it back. 
 The troops that happened to be there on our line were 
 what we considered in the Army of the Potomac unusu- 
 ally good ones. They quietly repulsed the Confederates 
 twice; and the third time they came up, they sent them 
 flying into Funkstown. Yet there was no permission to 
 move on and follow up the enemy. AV"e remained there 
 sometime, until we had orders to move on and take a 
 position a mile or more nearer Hagerstown. As we moved 
 up, we saw that the Confederates had some light field- 
 works, — hurriedly thrown up, apparently, — to cover them- 
 selves while they recrossed the river. I think we remained 
 there three days, and the third night, I think, after we got 
 up into that position, it was said the Confederates recrossed 
 the river." 
 
 On Sunday, July 12th,— the army having nearly all come 
 up, — reconnoissances were made, and the different corps 
 placed in position. The Eleventh, First, and Sixth corps 
 were placed on the right, the Fifth and Third in the center, 
 and the Second and Twelfth on the left. The situation was 
 
SITUATION OF THE TWO ARMIES. 465 
 
 about this: The Confederate army was in a strong posi- 
 tion. Their numbers, however, had not been increased, 
 for no reinforcements had reached them. That they were 
 in a precarious condition, and that General Lee was im- 
 pressed* with the danger which threatened him, and was 
 looking to the contingency of attempting the recrossing of 
 the river higher up, even as far as Cumberland, Maryland, 
 will fully appear in General Imboden's account of his in- 
 terview Avith him, as found in the ensuing chapter. Gen- 
 eral Imboden, in his statement, says that their situation 
 then " was very precarious." 
 
 Upon the part of the Federal army, the situation may 
 be stated as follows: The army had been reinforced by 
 French's division, and Smith's division of Couch's emer- 
 gency men. That is to say, General Meade confronted 
 Lee's fifty thousand men with about eighty-six or eighty-seven 
 thousand, with the conditions of Gettysburg, so far as 
 positions are concerned, reversed. The great question 
 which Meade was now called upon to decide was, " Shall I 
 order an attack, and run the risk of defeat, and thus not 
 only lose all we gained at Gettysburg, but endanger the 
 National capital, and probably the very life of the Gov- 
 ernment?" It was a tremendous question, and the com- 
 mander in chief was unwilling to bear the responsibility 
 of deciding it alone, and he called into council the honored 
 chiefs upon whom he would have to rely in case of or-/ 
 dering an attack. The council convened on the evening 
 of Sunday, July 12th, and was composed of General 
 Wadsworth, commanding the First Corps, General Hays, 
 of the Second, General French, of the Third, General 
 Sykes, of the Fifth, General Sedgwick, of the Sixth, 
 
466 TUE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 General Howard, of the Eleventh, General Slocum, of the 
 Twelfth, and General Pleasanton, of the Cavalry. After 
 a long and careful consideration of the situation, the vote 
 was taken on the expediency of attacking the enemy next 
 morning, which resulted as follows: Generals Howard, 
 Wadsworth, and Pleasanton voted to attack, but Generals 
 Sedgwick, Slocum, Sykes, French, and Hays opposed it. 
 General Meade, having heard the decision, stated that 
 whilst he could have but a limited knowledge of the 
 enemy's strength or position, he was yet in favor of attack- 
 ing him, but that he would not do so against the opinion 
 and advice of a majority of his corps commanders. The 
 situation of General Meade was an exceedingly trying one. 
 He had been in the chief command of the army but a 
 short time, and he was urged by repeated orders from 
 President Lincoln to attack the enemy, but now he was 
 called upon either to disregard these orders, or execute 
 them against the judgment of a majority of his coun- 
 sellors. The responsibility was indeed a grave one, and he 
 decided not to order the attack. 
 
 This decision of General Meade not to advance upon 
 the enemy, has been severely censured. Certainly the 
 judgment of the eminent soldiers who were upon the 
 ground, and were better able to form an intelligent opinion 
 than persons at a distance, should have due weight in the 
 solution of this question. These men, and others as 
 eminent, but then absent because of their wounds, favored 
 an advance upon the heels of the enemy after the repulse 
 of Pickett's assault. It was not indifference nor cowardice, 
 then, which influenced their judgment on this occasion. 
 Plainly they saw that the opportunity had been lost, and 
 now the conditions were not favorable. 
 
GENERAL LEE CROSSES THE POTOMAC. 467 
 
 It is said that after the retreat of the Confederates, the 
 engineers examined the line of their works, and found 
 them very strong, and gave it as their opinion that an as- 
 sault would have resulted disastrously to the Federal army. 
 This view seems to be supported by the fact that in the 
 great battles between the Army of the Potomac and the 
 Army of aSTorthern Virginia, an assault by either upon a 
 strongly fortified position held by its opponent, was almost 
 without exception a failure. This fact is adduced by Gen- 
 eral Longstreet as the principal argument he used in his 
 discussion with General Lee, when deciding upon the 
 policy to be pursued in the Pennsylvania campaign, and 
 when it was decided, as he claims, that the campaign was 
 to be "offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics." 
 
 The day following the consultation between General 
 Meade and his corps commanders (Monday, 13th) was 
 rainy and misty, so that but little could be learned of 
 the enemy's position. That night, however, General 
 Meade decided to attack him the next morning, and or- 
 ders to that effect were issued accordingly. The river in 
 the meantime had fallen, and upon examination by the 
 Confederate engineers it was found that it could be forded. 
 This fact was reported to General Lee, as well as that of 
 the replacing of the pontoon at Falling Waters, and the 
 army withdrew from its lines during that night and re- 
 crossed into Virginia. E well's Corps waded the river up 
 to their arm -pits at Williamsport, and Longstreet and 
 Hill crossed upon the pontoon at Falling Waters.* Gen- 
 
 * The artillery and wagon-trains were driven across the river on the pon- 
 toon at Falling Waters which had been replaced. Old citizens residing- at 
 Williamsport, who saw the Confederates fording the river at that place, say- 
 that two lines, composed of the tallest men, were placed in the river from 
 
468 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 eral Kilpatrick, commanding the Federal cavalry on the 
 left, learning at three o'clock in the morning that the 
 Confederate pickets in his front were retiring, started 
 after them, and at half past seven A. m. came up with their 
 rear guard under General Pettigrew, about two miles 
 from their bridge at Falling Waters. After a short, but 
 hotly contested action, the enemy was driven to the river 
 with a loss of one hundred and twenty -five killed, and 
 fifteen hundred prisoners. General Pettigrew was mortally 
 wounded in this engagement. The Federal loss was one 
 hundred and five. It is a singular circumstance that the 
 same Confederate officer who led the reconuoissance to- 
 ward Gettysburg on the day preceding the battle, partici- 
 pated in the opening of the first day's engagement, and 
 led part of the great assaulting column in the attack of 
 the third, should lose his life in the last struggle north of 
 the Potomac. 
 
 When the intelligence was flashed over the country 
 that the Confederates had succeeded in escaping across 
 the Potomac river without another battle, disappoint- 
 ment and dissatisfaction were felt and expressed on every 
 hand. The Government too was dissatisfied, as the fol- 
 lowing dispatch from General Halleck to General Meade 
 shows : 
 
 " I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army 
 without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in 
 the mind of the President, and it will require an active, 
 energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression 
 that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore." 
 
 shore to shore, with their guns interlocked so as to give strength and stability 
 to the lines. Between these the remainder of the infantry made their way 
 through the water up to their necks. 
 
GENERAL SEDGWICK'S PURSUIT. 469 
 
 Whether or not the dissatisfaction with General Meade, 
 as expressed in this dispatch, was deserved, has been, and 
 ever will be, a subject of dispute. That he was not wholly 
 at fault, and that the causes of the delay in the pursuit 
 of the enemy were not wholly his own, will appear in the 
 following article, contributed to the Philadelphia Weekly 
 Press by Mr. Thomas Robins, jr. Mr. Robins says: 
 
 "On the morning of the 5th, signal officers and recon- 
 noitering parties reported to General Meade Lee's move- 
 ment by way of the Cash town and Fairfield roads, and 
 the southerly direction of the latter seemed to indicate 
 that the Potomac and not the Susquehanna was the 
 enemy's objective. How should he be pursued? There 
 were two ways open, one a direct pursuit by way of the 
 Cashtown and Fairfield roads, the other a pursuit by the 
 flank through Taneytown and Emmittsburg to Frederick, 
 and then over the southerly passes in the South Mountain 
 chain. General Meade was not content simply to start 
 blindly after the enemy by the flank without some effort 
 to open a way through the mountains by the Fairfield 
 Pass. He did not entirely abandon the chance of striking 
 in the rear of the retreating Confederates by means of a 
 direct pursuit. lie accordingly directed General Sedgwick 
 with the Sixth Corps — which had been comparatively un- 
 engaged during the battle, and was therefore in full force 
 and strength — to advance on the Fairfield road, pursue 
 the enemy vigorously, ascertain his intentions, and trans- 
 mit whatever information he might acquire to . head- 
 quarters. At the same time a detachment of cavalry was 
 sent along the Cashtown road in order that intelligence 
 might be given of any move toward the north on the part 
 
470 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 of General Lee. In the meantime orders for the move- 
 ments of the various corps were prepared, in order that 
 the advance by the flank toward Middletown might be 
 begun just as soon as General Sedgwick should report; 
 and a message was sent to General French at Frederick 
 to push on and occupy Boonsborough and the passes in 
 the mountains. 
 
 " General Sedgwick's column started at half past twelve 
 p. m. on the fifth. It was intended that the Third and 
 Fifth corps should support his movement, and that the 
 rest of the army should remain at Gettj^sburg or in that 
 vicinity. General Butterfield, the chief of staff, however, 
 without any authority from the commanding general, 
 issued the provisional orders for the movement of the 
 other corps in the direction of Middletown; and they 
 made more or less progress in that direction throughout 
 the day. General Sedgwick occupied the remainder of 
 the fifth in getting as far as Fairfield. There was no more 
 gallant oificer or persistent fighter in the whole army; but 
 the afternoon of the fifth wears away and night comes. 
 At two a. m. on the sixth General Meade implores him to 
 send some intelligence of the euerav; at nine A. m. he tells 
 him that he must push his reconnoissance, for the whole 
 army is waiting to know whether the Fairfield road can 
 be opened or not. Finally a reply is received. General 
 Sedgwick says that he lias reason to believe that Lee's 
 whole army is in the neighborhood of the Fairfield Pass, 
 and that it is possible that another engagement may be 
 had with the enemy in the mountains. 
 
 " By this time some of the corps were on the march to 
 Middletown under the orders issued by General Butter- 
 
ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY LOST. 471 
 
 field. Was a chance to fight another battle to be thrown 
 away? Was it possible that General Lee was not going 
 to recross the Potomac after all? Although beaten, never- 
 theless the Confederate army was still an invading force, 
 and while it remained on Northern soil the general in 
 command of the Army of the Potomac must not indulge 
 in any gambling military operations, but must act strictly 
 within his instructions to cover Washington and Balti- 
 more, lie, therefore, sent in hot haste and arrested the 
 progress of the Third and First corps, which had not moved 
 very far, and detained them to support General Sedgwick 
 in case of necessity. And then, after all this time had 
 been lost, General Sedgwick finally came to the conclusion 
 that the Fairfield Pass was too strong to be attacked, and 
 so reported to his commander. The latter immediately 
 concluded that it would involve delay and waste of time 
 to pursue the enemy any further on that road, and he con- 
 sequently directed the whole army to move down toward 
 Middletown. 
 
 "At this time an occurrence placed the Confederate gen- 
 eral in a position of the greatest peril. On the 3d of July 
 General French's cavalry surprised the Confederate guard 
 of the pontoon bridge over the Potomac at Falling Waters, 
 and succeeded in burning the platform and cutting loose 
 the boats, so that they were swept away by the current. 
 The following day it began raining; the waters of the Po- 
 tomac rose rapidly, and when Lee's army arrived on the 
 7th at Hagerstown it found itself blockaded, the pontoon 
 bridge gone, and all the fords submerged. Intelligence of 
 this was soon transmitted to the Union commander. Here 
 was another opportunity which he was quick to appreciate. 
 
472 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 With rapid concentration Lee might be struck a heavy 
 blow before he could cross the Potomac. But again ob- 
 stacles arose in the way of the Army of the Potomac. The 
 same storm which aided the Federals by submerging the 
 Potomac fords now became a hindrance in that it so broke 
 up the roads that a rapid concentration of the army was 
 impossible. 
 
 "Nevertheless, the general was unceasing in his en- 
 deavors to get his army forward. He keeps urging the 
 corps commanders to hurry. To Howard he writes that 
 he must leave those who have no shoes behind in Frederick 
 and push on with the rest. Then he takes a turn at New- 
 ton, then at Slocum, and then again at Howard. Finally 
 he dispatches a circular to all the corps commanders en- 
 closing a letter from Halleck urging forced marches, and 
 calls on them to use their best efforts to meet the wishes 
 of the President and the Commander in chief. 
 
 " Such was the second period of the pursuit. There were 
 no eventful incidents, but it was a time of great anxiety 
 and incessant toil for the Federal commander. His dis- 
 patches show that he was at work at all hours of the 
 day and night. The elements, the destitution of his worn- 
 out army, and the easy-going character of some of his 
 corps commanders combined to prevent a more rapid pur- 
 suit. "Well might he regret the loss of Reynolds and 
 Hancock. 
 
 " On the evening of the 9th, the army passed the South 
 Mountain, and was halted for the night with its right at 
 Boonsborough and its left at Rohrersville. The Confederate 
 army was then in a good position, the right resting on the 
 river near Downsville, and the left in the vicinity of 
 
RECONNOISSANCE OF CONFEDERATE POSITION. 473 
 
 Hagerstown, covering the road from that place to "Williams- 
 port. This position covered both the ford at Williamsport 
 and the remains of the pontoon -bridge at Falling Waters. 
 It ran along a range of high ground, and was very diffi- 
 cult to attack in front, owing to the broken character of 
 the country. The right wing was protected by the river. 
 On the left the country was level, but the proximity of 
 Conococheague creek, which empties into the Potomac 
 river at Williamsport, and the numerous stone walls made, 
 it a difficult position to turn. General Lee had added to 
 its natural strength by entrenching it completely; and 
 behind these earth -works his army lay, while his engineers 
 were making herculean exertions to establish communica- 
 tion with the south shore. On the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th 
 of July the cavalry of the two armies was constantly 
 engaged, the Confederates endeavoring to block the 
 advance of the Union forces, and the Federals to clear 
 the way. 
 
 " By the night of the 10th of July the Twelfth, Second, 
 Fifth, and Third corps were across Antietam creek and 
 in front of Williamsport, on which rested the right flank 
 of the enemy. The Sixth, Eleventh, and First Corps 
 were near Funkstown and Hagerstown in front of the 
 Confederate left. On the 11th and 12th of July the army 
 advanced in line to feel the enemy, and ascertain how he 
 was posted. Before this the commanding general had 
 tried by personal reconnoissances to find out something 
 of the Confederate position, so that an attack could be 
 directed against the weak points. He was assisted by the 
 two ablest men in the army, — General Warren, his chief 
 engineer, and General Humphreys, his chief of staff. The 
 
474 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 former was the man whose foresight had saved the Round 
 Tops and the position of Gettysburg to the Federal army 
 on the memorable 2d of July. The latter was distin- 
 guished as one of the two generals who had gained laurels 
 at the battle of Fredericksburg. Both were clear-headed 
 men, and no one could accuse either of any want of 
 stomach for a fight. Yet they could find no point for an 
 attack. ' Wherever seen, the Confederate position was 
 naturally strong,' says General Humphreys in his book, 
 "Gettysburg to the Rapidan." ' It presented no vulnerable 
 points, but much of it was concealed from view. Its 
 flanks were secure and could not be turned. In this con- 
 dition of affairs,' continues General Humphreys, ' General 
 Meade determined on the evening of the 12th of July to 
 move forward the next morning and make a reconnoissance 
 in force, supported by the whole army, feel the enemy and 
 attack him where weakest, if it should give any promise 
 of success.' 
 
 " What followed is best told by General Meade himself 
 in his testimony before the committee on the conduct of 
 the war. I give his own words: 
 
 * Having been in command of the army not more than 
 twelve or fourteen days, and in view of the tremendous 
 and important issues involved in the result, knowing that 
 if I were defeated the whole question would be reversed, 
 the road to Washington and to the North open, and all 
 the fruits, of my victory at Gettysburg dissipated, I did 
 not feel that I should be right in assuming the responsi- 
 bility of blindly attacking the enemy without any knowl- 
 edge of his position. I, therefore, called a council of my 
 corps commanders, who were the officers to execute this 
 duty, and laid before them the precise condition of affairs.' 
 
GENERAL M'LAWS' ACCOUNT. 475 
 
 "The council of war, with but two dissenting voices, 
 disapproved of the general's aggressive policy, and opposed 
 an attack. In this decision the Federal commander 
 acquiesced, and agreed to defer the attack for one day, in 
 order that an endeavor might be made by means of 
 further reconnoissance to find some weak spot in the 
 enemy's lines. The 13th of July was devoted to this 
 work, and orders were issued on that evening for the 
 whole army to move forward in accordance with the plans 
 of the day before. But it was too late. The bird had 
 flown. By superhuman efforts General Lee had re-estab- 
 lished the pontoon- bridge. Across this bridge on the 
 night of the thirteenth, he moved his baggage and artil- 
 lery, the infantry taking the fords. Before morning the 
 whole Confederate army was once more on the soil of 
 Virginia." 
 
 General MeLaws, in his article in the Philadelphia 
 Weekly Press, referred to in the previous chapter, says: 
 
 "General Lee's forces fell back leisurely without any en- 
 gagement between the infantry forces worthy of notice, and 
 on the 12th, when the main body of the enemy arrived, 
 took position previously selected, covering the Potomac 
 from Williamsport to Falling Waters, where it remained 
 for two days with the enemy immediately in front, mani- 
 festing no disposition to attack, but throwing up entrench- 
 ments along his whole line. 
 
 "The Confederate army was now concentrated and on 
 the defensive. General Lee himself had recovered in a 
 great measure from his fatigue consequent on his exhaust- 
 ing labors, and as he rode along the line he had adopted 
 1 joined him and rode with him for some distance. He 
 
476 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 was in good spirits and seemed confident of success if his; 
 lines were attacked, and he was evidently wishing for it. 
 If General Meade had attacked, his chances of success would 
 have been much less than they were at Gettysburg, as the 
 troops were eager to engage, and if they could have been 
 allowed to try to provoke an attack would have done so. 
 
 "On the 13th, the river having become fordable and the 
 bridge at Falling Waters having been reconstructed, Gen- 
 eral Lee, finding it difficult to obtain flour for his troops, 
 concluded not to wait on General Meade any longer and 
 retired across the river, with no great loss of men or ma- 
 terial — in fact, with much less than usually attends such 
 a movement made under such circumstances. 
 
 "And thus the invasion of Pennsylvania by the Con- 
 federate forces, under General Lee, was brought to a close, 
 and to General Meade is due the honor of the result." 
 
 Upon ascertaining in the morning that the enemy had 
 succeeded in effecting his escape, General Meade put 
 his army in motion, and marching by Pleasant Valley, 
 crossed the Potomac at Berlin. Halting a day on the 
 Leesburg and Winchester pike to ascertain the movements- 
 of the enemy, and to be assured that an attempt to cap- 
 ture the National Capital by a rapid march by his rear,, 
 would not be made in case he advanced and left the way 
 open, he again put his columns in motion and at length,, 
 near the close of July, reached his old position on the Rap- 
 pahannock. Lee moved rapidly down the valley, and pass- 
 ing through the mountain below Strasburg, concentrated 
 his army at Culpeper, and the memorable Pennsylvania 
 campaign of less than two months in duration was ended~ 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 J^ 
 
 THE GREAT WAGON TRAIN OF WOUNDED. 
 
 )S stated in a previous chapter, as soon as the dark- 
 
 j^/[$lF ness of night closed over the terrible scene of the 
 A third and concluding day of the series of battles at 
 Jt Gettysburg, General Lee began his preparations for 
 
 returning with his defeated and shattered forces to 
 Virginia.^ His first and greatest care, next to the safety 
 of his army, was for his large number of wounded, and 
 he determined to take as many of these with him as 
 possible. Consequently all his available transportation 
 was used for this purpose, and an immense train, not less 
 than twenty -five or thirty miles long, was loaded with 
 wounded and suffering men. All that could walk were 
 required to accompany this train on foot, and the remain- 
 der of the wounded were left to the care of the Federals. 
 This train was placed in charge of General J. D. Imboden, 
 and the head of it left the scene of conflict amidst a terrific 
 rain storm about four o'clock in the afternoon of Saturday, 
 July 4th. It recrossed the South Mountain by Cashtown — 
 the same way the army had come, — and at Greenwood left 
 the turnpike and took a country road which cuts directly 
 across toward the Potomac, leaving Chambersburg to the 
 right. This side road is known as the Pine Stump Road 
 
 477 
 
478 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Miid the Walnut Bottom Road. It passes through the 
 small places known as New Guilford and New Franklin, 
 and intersects the road leading south from Chambersburg 
 at Marion, six miles south of the former place. From 
 Marion the train proceeded to Greencastle and thence 
 diverged to the right and reached "Williamsport on the 
 Potomac by the Williamsport Pike. Such was the route 
 taken by this train, but, as will appear in statements by 
 eye-witnesses, it did not confine itself to the road. Fences 
 were torn away, and men and wagons took to the fields, 
 either to shorten the distances to be traversed or to acceler- 
 ate their progress. 
 
 This train was thirty -four hours in passing a given point. 
 General Imboden, who had charge of it, and whose state- 
 ment will be given, says it was seventeen miles long. Allow- 
 ing a mile of its length to each hour of passing any point, 
 and it will be seen that it was not less than thirty miles in 
 extent. Competent eye - witnesses have estimated the num- 
 ber of wounded in these wagons and walking along by 
 them, as not less than ten or twelve thousand. Add to 
 these the seven thousand live hundred and forty who were 
 left upon the field because too badly wounded to be borne 
 away, or for whom transportation could not be given, and 
 some idea may be formed of the extent of the losses of 
 those three eventful days. 
 
 All along the route by which this train made its way, 
 broken wagons and dead and dying soldiers were strewed. 
 The bottom of the wagons was smeared with blood. 
 Barns and houses were improvised into hospitals. Groans 
 and shrieks of agony filled the air as the wagons jolted 
 on the rough and stony way, while cries and prayers and 
 
GENERAL IMBODEN's DESCRIPTION. 479 
 
 curses were heard all along that moving line of human 
 woe. During all this time the rain was pouring down in 
 torrents, and the roads, as a consequence, were soon ren- 
 dered almost impassable. Wagons were ditched and teams 
 stalled, and as the roads became blocked the train took to 
 the fields where the wheels sank to the axles in the soft 
 earth. Drivers lashed their horses; curses and profanity 
 abounded; axles were broken; wagons and caissons, and 
 an occasional cannon, were abandoned; and dead soldiers 
 were taken from the wairons to ffive more room for the 
 remaining inmates, and thrown by the way -side. To add 
 to the terror of the scene the Federal cavalry were upon 
 them, and dashes were made here and there along the line 
 and hundreds of wagons with their miserable and suffering 
 inmates were captured. 
 
 The vastness of this train, and the ao-cn-c^atc of human 
 agony it contained, has never been understood by the 
 country. And now to bring these before the reader in 
 some adequate form, I append here several statements, 
 written especially for this history, b\- competent and relia- 
 ble persons who resided along the line. I will, however, 
 first introduce the following graphic description given by 
 General Imboden, who had charge of this train. This 
 statement was written for the Galaxy of April, 1871, from 
 which I copy it. After detailing his operations along the 
 line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in Western Vir- 
 ginia, from Cumberland to Hancock, Maryland, and his 
 entering Pennsylvania and march to the rear of the Con- 
 federate line near Gettysburg, where he arrived about 
 noon of Friday, July 3d, just previous to General Pickett's 
 great charge,. General Imboden says : 
 
480 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 " I belonged to no division or corps in the Confederate 
 army, and therefore on arriving near Gettysburg about 
 noon, when the conflict was raging in all its fury, I re- 
 ported directly to General Lee for orders, and was assigned 
 a position to aid in repelling any cavalry demonstration 
 that might occur on his flanks or rear. None being made, 
 my little force took no part in the battle. I then had 
 only about two thousand one hundred effective mounted 
 men, and a six-gun battery. 
 
 " When night closed upon the grand scene the Confed- 
 erate army was repulsed. Silence and gloom pervaded 
 our camps. We knew that the day had gone against us, 
 but the extent of the disaster was not known except in 
 high quarters. The carnage of the day was reported to 
 have been frightful, but the Confederate army was not 
 in retreat, and we all surmised that with the dawn of the 
 next day would come a renewal of the struggle. We also 
 knew that if such was the case, those who had not been 
 in the fight would have their full share in the honors and 
 dangers of the next day. All felt and appreciated the 
 momentous consequences of final defeat or victory on that 
 great field. These considerations made that, to us, one of 
 those solemn and awful nights that every one who fought 
 through our long war sometimes experienced before a 
 great battle. 
 
 "Few camp-fires enlivened the scene. It was a warm 
 summer's night, and the weary soldiers were lying in 
 groups on the luxuriant grass of the meadows we occu- 
 pied, discussing the events of the day or watching that 
 their horses did not straggle oft' in browsing around. 
 About eleven o'clock a horseman approached and deliv- 
 
GENERAL IMBODEN AND GENERAL LEE. 481 
 
 ered a message from General Lee that he wished to see 
 me immediately. I mounted at once, and, accompanied 
 "by Lieutenant McPhail of my staff, and guided by the 
 courier, rode about two miles toward Gettysburg, where 
 half a dozen small tents on the road -side were pointed 
 out as General Lee's head -quarters for the night. lie 
 was not there, but I was informed that I would find him 
 with General A. P. Hill half a mile further on. On 
 reaching the place indicated, a flickering, solitary candle, 
 visible through the open front of a common tent, showed 
 w T here Generals Lee and Hill were seated on camp-stools, 
 with a county map spread upon their knees, and engaged 
 in a low and earnest conversation. They ceased speaking 
 as I approached, and after the ordinary salutations General 
 Lee directed me to go to his head -quarters and wait for 
 him. He did not return until about one o'clock, when he 
 came riding along at a slow walk and evidently wrapped 
 in profound thought. 
 
 "There was not even a sentinel on duty, and no one of 
 his staff was about. The moon was high in the heavens, 
 shedding a flood of soft silvery light, almost as bright as 
 day, upon the scene. When he approached and saw us, 
 he spoke, reined up his horse, and essayed to dismount. 
 The effort to do so betrayed so much physical exhaustion 
 that I stepped forward to assist him, but before I reached 
 him he had alighted. He threw his arm across his saddle 
 to rest himself, and fixing his eyes upon the ground leaned 
 in silence upon his equally weary horse, — the two form- 
 ing a striking group, as motionless as a statue. The 
 moon shone full upon his massive features, and revealed 
 an expression of sadness I had never seen upon that fine 
 
482 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 countenance before, in any of the vicissitudes of the war 
 through which he had passed. I waited for him to speak 
 until the silence became painful and embarrassing, when 
 to break it, and change the current of his thoughts, I 
 remarked in a sympathetic tone, and in allusion to his 
 great fatigue: 
 
 " ' General, this has been a hard day on you.' 
 " This attracted his attention. He looked up and re- 
 plied mournfully: 
 
 "'Yes, it has been a sad, sad day to us,' and immedi- 
 ately relapsed into his thoughtful mood and attitude. 
 Being unwilling again to intrude upon his reflections, I 
 said no more. After a minute or two he suddenly 
 straightened up to his full height, and turning to me 
 with more animation, energy, and excitement of manner 
 than I had ever seen in him before, he addressed me in 
 a voice tremulous with emotion, and said: 
 
 " ' General, I never saw troops behave more magnifi- 
 cently than Pickett's division of Virginians did to-day 
 in their grand charge upon the enemy. And if they had 
 been supported, as they were to have been, — but, for 
 some reason not yet fully explained to me, they were not, 
 — we would have held the position they so gloriously won 
 at such a fearful loss of noble lives, and the day would 
 have been ours.' 
 
 "After a moment he added in a tone almost of agony: 
 "'Too bad! Too bad!! Oh! too bad!!' 
 " 1 never shall forget, as long as I live, his language, 
 and his manner, and his appearance and expression of 
 mental suffering. Altogether it was a scene that a his- 
 torical painter might well immortalize had one been 
 fortunately present to witness it. 
 
GENEKAL IMBODEN AND GENERAL LEE. 483 
 
 " Iii a little while lie called up a servant from his sleep 
 to take his horse; spoke mournfully, by name, of several 
 of his friends who had fallen during the day; and when 
 a candle had been lighted he invited me alone into his 
 tent, where, as soon as we were seated, he remarked: 
 
 " ' We must return to Virginia. As many of our poor 
 wounded as possible must be taken home. I have sent 
 for you because your men are fresh, to guard the wagon- 
 trains back to Virginia. The duty will be arduous, re- 
 sponsible, and dangerous, for I am afraid you will be 
 harassed b} T the enemy's cavalry. I can spare you as 
 much artillery as you require, but no other troops, as I 
 I shall need all I have to return to the Potomac by a 
 different route from yours. All the transportation and 
 all the care of the wounded will be intrusted to you. 
 You will recross the mountain by the Chambersburg 
 road, and then proceed to Williamsport, Maryland, by 
 any route you deem best, without halting. There rest 
 and feed your animals, then ford the river, and make no 
 halt till you reach "Winchester, where I will again com- 
 municate with you.' 
 
 "After a good deal of conversation he sent for his 
 chiefs of staff and ordered them to have everything in 
 readiness for me to take command the next morning, re- 
 marking to me that the general instructions he had given 
 would be sent to me next day in writing. As I was about 
 leaving to return to my camp, he came out of his tent 
 and said to me in a low tone: 'I will place in your hands 
 to-morrow a sealed package for President Davis, which 
 you will retain in your own possession till you are across 
 the Potomac river, when you will detail a trusty commis- 
 
484 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 sioned officer to take it to Richmond with all possible 
 dispatch, and deliver it immediately to the President. I 
 impress it upon you that whatever happens this package 
 must not fall into the hands of the enemy. If you should 
 unfortunately be captured, destroy it.' 
 
 "On the morning of the 4th of July my written in- 
 structions and the package for Mr. Davis were delivered 
 to me. It was soon apparent that the wagons and ambu- 
 lances and the wounded could not be ready to move till 
 late in the afternoon. The General sent me four four-gun 
 field batteries, which with my own gave me twenty -two 
 guns to defend the trains. 
 
 " Shortly after noon the very windows of heaven seemed 
 to have been opened. Rain fell in dashing torrents, and 
 in a little while the whole face of the earth was covered 
 with water. The meadows became small lakes; raging 
 streams ran across the road in every depression of the 
 ground; wagons, ambulances, and artillery -carriages 
 filled the roads and fields in all directions. The storm 
 increased in fury every moment. Canvas was no pro- 
 tection against it, and the poor wounded, lying upon the 
 hard, naked boards of the wagon bodies, were drenched 
 by the cold rain. Horses and mules were blinded and 
 maddened by the storm, and became almost unmanage- 
 able. The roar of the winds and waters made it almost 
 impossible to communicate orders. Night was rapidly 
 approaching, and there was danger that in the darkness 
 the 'confusion' would become ' worse confounded.' About 
 four o'clock in the afternoon the head of the column was 
 put in motion and began the ascent of the mountain. 
 After dark I set out to gain the advance. The train was 
 
THE HORRORS OF THE WAGON TRAIN. 485 
 
 seventeen miles long when drawn out on the road. It 
 was moving rapidly, and from every wagon issued wails 
 of agony. For four hours I galloped along, passing to 
 the front, and heard more — it was too dark to see — of 
 the horrors of war than I had witnessed from the battle 
 of Bull Run up to that day. In the wagons were men 
 wounded and mutilated in every conceivable way. Some 
 had their legs shattered by a shell or minnie ball; some 
 were shot through their bodies; others had arms torn to 
 shreds; some had received a ball in the face, or a jagged 
 piece of shell had lacerated their heads. Scarcely one in 
 a hundred had received adequate surgical aid. Many 
 of them had been without food for thirty -six hours. 
 Their ragged, bloody, and dirty clothes, all clotted and 
 hardened with blood, were rasping the tender, inflamed 
 lips of their gaping wounds. Very few of the wagons 
 had even straw in them, and all were without springs. 
 The road was rough and rocky. The jolting was enough 
 to have killed sound, strong men. From nearly every 
 wagon, as the horses trotted on, such cries and shrieks as 
 these greeted the ear: 
 
 "'Oh God! why can't I die?' 
 
 "'My God! will no one have mercy and kill me and 
 end my misery? ' 
 
 "'Oh! stop one minute and take me out, and leave me 
 to die on the road -side.' 
 
 '"I am dying! I am dying! My poor wife, my dear 
 children! what will become of you?' 
 
 " Some were praying; others were uttering the most 
 fearful oaths and execrations that despair could wring 
 from their agony. Occasionally a wagon would be passed 
 
486 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 from which only low, deep moans and sohs could be 
 heard. No help could be rendered to any of the sufferers. 
 On, on; we must move on. The storm continued and the 
 darkness was fearful. There was no time even to fill a 
 canteen with water for a dying man; for, except the 
 drivers and the guards disposed in compact bodies every 
 half mile, all were wounded and helpless in that vast 
 train of misery. The night was awful, and yet it was our 
 safety, for no enemy would dare attack us when he could 
 not distinguish friend from foe. We knew that when 
 day broke upon us we would be harrassed by bauds of 
 cavalry hanging on our flanks. Therefore our aim was to 
 go as far as possible under cover of the night, and so we 
 kept on. It was my sad lot to pass the whole distance 
 from the rear to the head of the column, and no language 
 can convey an idea of the horrors of that most horrible 
 of all nights of our long and bloody war. 
 
 "Daybreak on the morning of July 5th found the head 
 of our column at Greencastle, twelve or fifteen miles from 
 the Potomac river at Williamsport, our point of crossing. 
 Here our apprehended troubles from the Federal cavalry 
 began. From the fields and cross-roads they attacked us 
 in small bodies, striking the column where there were few 
 or no guards, and creating great confusion. 
 
 "To add still further to our perplexities, a report was 
 brought that the Federals in lar°;e force held Williams- 
 port. This fortunately proved untrue. After a great 
 deal of harassing and desultory fighting along the road, 
 nearly the whole immense train reached Williamsport a 
 little after the middle of the day. The town was taken 
 possession of; all the churches, school houses, etc., were 
 
GENERAL IMBODEX AT WILLIAMSPORT. 487 
 
 converted into hospitals, and proving insufficient, many 
 of the private houses were occupied. Straw was obtained 
 on the neighboring farms; the wounded were removed 
 from the wagons and housed; the citizens were all put to 
 -cooking, and the army surgeons to dressing wounds. The 
 dead were selected from the train, — for many had perished 
 on the way, — and were decently buried. All this had to 
 be done because the tremendous rains had raised the 
 river more than ten feet above the fording stage, and we 
 could not possibly cross. 
 
 " Our situation was frightful. We had over ten thou- 
 sand animals and all the wagons of General Lee's army 
 under our charge, and all the wounded that could be 
 brought from Gettysburg. Our supply of provisions con- 
 sisted of a few wagon -loads of flour, and a small lot of 
 cattle. My effective force was only about two thousand, 
 one hundred men and twenty - odd field pieces. We did 
 not know where the Confederate army was; the river 
 could not be crossed; and small parties of cavalry were 
 still hovering around. The means of ferriage consisted 
 of two small boats and a small wire rope stretched across 
 the river, which owing to the force of the swollen current 
 broke several times during the day. To reduce the space 
 to be defended as much as possible, all the wagons and 
 animals were parked close together on the river bank. 
 
 " Believing that an attack would soon be made upon 
 us, I ordered the wagoners to be mustered, and, taking 
 three out of every four, organized them into companies, 
 and armed them with the weapons of the wounded men 
 found in the train. By this means I added to my effective 
 force about five hundred men. Slightly wounded officers 
 
488 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 promptly volunteered their serviees to command these 
 improvised soldiers; and many of our quartermasters and 
 commissaries did the same thing. We were not seri- 
 ously molested on the fifth, but the next morning about 
 nine o'clock information reached me that a large body of 
 cavalry from Frederick, Maryland, was rapidly advancing 
 to attack us. As we could not retreat farther, it was at 
 once frankly made known to the troops that unless we 
 could repel the threatened attack we should all become 
 prisoners, and that the loss of his whole transportation 
 would probably ruin General Lee; for it could not be 
 replaced for many months, if at all, in the then exhausted 
 condition of the Confederate states. So far from repress- 
 ing the ardor of the troops, this frank announcement of 
 our peril inspired all with the utmost enthusiasm. Men 
 and officers alike, forgetting the sufferings of the past few 
 days, proclaimed their determination to drive back the 
 attacking force or perish in the attempt. All told, we 
 were less than three thousand men. The advancing force 
 we knew to be more than double ours, consisting, as we 
 had ascertained, of five regular and eight volunteer regi- 
 ments of cavalry, with eighteen guns, all under the com- 
 mand of Generals Buford and Kilpatrick. "We had no 
 works of any kind; the country was open and almost 
 level, and there was no advantage of position we could 
 occupy. It must necessarily be a square stand up fight, 
 face to face. We had twenty -two field guns of various 
 calibre, and one Whitvvorth. These were disposed in 
 batteries, in semi -circle, about one mile out of the village, 
 on the summit of a very slight rising ground that lies 
 back of the town. Except the artillery, our troops were 
 
GENERAL IMBODEN'S DEFENSE. 489 
 
 held out of view of the assailants, and ready to be moved 
 promptly to any menaced point along the whole line of 
 nearly two miles in extent. Knowing that nothing could 
 save us but a bold 'bluif' game, orders had been given to 
 the artillery as soon as the advancing forces came within 
 range to open fire along the whole line, and keep it up 
 with the utmost rapidity. A little after one o'clock they 
 appeared on two roads in our front, and our batteries 
 opened. They soon had their guns in position, and a very 
 lively artillery fight began. We fired with great rapidity, 
 and in less than an hour two of our batteries reported 
 that their ammunition was exhausted. This would have 
 been fatal to us but for the opportune arrival at the critical 
 moment of an ammunition train from Winchester. The 
 wagons were ferried across to our side as soon as possible, 
 and driven on the field in a gallop to supply the silent 
 guns. Not having men to occupy half our line, they 
 were moved up in order of battle, first to one battery, 
 then withdrawn and double - quicked to another, but 
 out of view of our assailants till they could be shown at 
 some other point on our line. By this maneuvering we 
 made the impression that we had a strong supporting 
 force in rear of all our guns along the entire front. To 
 test this, Generals Buford and Kilpatrick dismounted five 
 regiments and advanced them on foot on our right. We 
 concentrated there all the men we had, wagoners and 
 all, and thus, with the aid of the united fire of all our 
 guns directed at the advancing line, we drove it back, and 
 rushed forward two of our batteries four or five hundred 
 yards further to the front. This boldness prevented 
 another charge, and the fight was continued till near sun- 
 
490 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 set with the artillery. About that time General Fitzhugh 
 Lee sent a message from toward Greencastle, that if we 
 could hold out an hour longer he would reinforce us with 
 three thousand men. This intelligence elicited a loud and 
 long- continued cheer along our whole line, which was 
 heard and understood by our adversaries, as we learned 
 from prisoners taken. A few minutes later General J. 
 E. B. Stuart, advancing from Ilagerstown, fell unexpect- 
 edly upon the rear of their right wing, and in ten minutes 
 they were in rapid retreat by their left flank in the direc- 
 tion of Boonsborough. Night coming on enabled them 
 to escape. 
 
 " By extraordinary good fortune we had thus saved all 
 of General Lee's trains. A bold charge at any time be- 
 fore sunset would have broken our feeble lines, and we 
 should all have fallen an easy prey to the Federals. This 
 came to be known as 'the wagoners' light' in our army, 
 from the fact that so many of them were armed and did 
 such gallant service in repelling the attack made on our 
 right by the dismounted regiments. 
 
 "Our defeat that day would have been an irreparable 
 blow to General Lee, in the loss of all his transportation. 
 Every man engaged knew this, and probably in no fight 
 in the war was there a more determined spirit shown than 
 by this handful of cooped -up troops. The next day our 
 army from Gettysburg arrived, and the country is familiar 
 with the manner in which it escaped across the Potomac 
 on the night of the 18th. 
 
 "It may be interesting to repeat one or two facts to 
 show the peril in which we were until the river could be 
 bridged. About four thousand prisoners taken at Gettys- 
 
GENERAL LEE'S DIFFICULTIES. 491 
 
 iburg were ferried across the river by the morning of the 
 9th, and I was ordered to guard them to Staunton. Be- 
 fore we had proceeded two miles I received a note from 
 ■General Lee to report to him in person immediately. I 
 rode to the river, was ferried over, and galloped out to- 
 ward Ilagerstown. As I proceeded I became satisfied 
 that a serious demonstration was making along our front, 
 from the heavy artillery firing extending for a long dis- 
 tance along the line. I overtook General Lee riding to 
 the front near Hagerstown. He immediately reined up, 
 and remarked that he believed I was familiar with all the 
 fords of the Potomac above Williamsport, and the roads 
 approaching them. 1 replied that I knew them perfectly. 
 He then called up some one of his staff to write down my 
 answers to his questions, and required me to name all fords 
 .as high up as Cumberland, and describe minutely their 
 character, and the roads and surrounding country on both 
 sides of the river, and directed me to send my brother, 
 Colonel Imboden, to him to act as a guide with his regi- 
 ment, if he should be compelled to retreat higher up the 
 river to cross it. His situation was then very precarious. 
 When about parting from him to recross the river and 
 move on with the prisoners, he told me they would prob- 
 ably be rescued before I reached "Winchester, my guard 
 was so small, and he expected a force of cavalry would 
 cross at Harper's Ferry to cut us off; and he could not 
 spare to me any additional troops, as he might be hard 
 pressed before he got over the river, which was still very 
 much swollen by the rains. Referring to the high water, 
 he laughingly inquired, ' Does it ever quit raining about 
 here? If so, I should like to see a clear day.' 
 
492 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 "These incidents go to show how near Gettysburg came 
 to ending; the war in 1803. If we had been successful in 
 that battle, the probabilities are that Baltimore aud Wash- 
 ington would at once have fallen into our hands; and at 
 that time there was so large a 'peace party' in the North, 
 that the Federal Government would have found it diffi- 
 cult, if not impossible, to carry on the war. General Lee's 
 opinion was that we lost the battle because Pickett was 
 not supported ' as he was to have been.' On the other 
 hand, if Generals Buford and Kilpatrick had captured the 
 ten thousand animals and all the transportation of Lee's 
 army at AVilliamsport, it would have been an irreparable 
 loss, and would probably have led to the fall of Richmond 
 in the autumn of 1863. On such small circumstances do- 
 the affairs of nations sometimes turn." 
 
 Leaving out of the foregoing account that which is 
 evidently but a pardonable vanity in detailing his own 
 achievements, and the extraordinary valor and prowess 
 of his troops, General Imboden's statement presents the 
 condition of the Confederates, after their defeat at Gettys- 
 burg, in a faithful light. The acknowledgment of General 
 Lee of his overwhelming defeat, and his deep and undis- 
 guised distress thereat, stand in strange contrast with 
 the claims that have been made by some Confederate 
 writers that the Federals did not gain much of a vic- 
 tory after all. The statement also shows that in this im- 
 mense train there was as much distress as was probably 
 ever brought together on this continent. There were, it 
 is true, places and occasions where a greater number of 
 wounded were congregated, as in the Wilderness, and at 
 Gettysburg itself before the removal of these men, but as. 
 
MR. SNYDER'S ACCOUNT. 493 
 
 a moving mass of human agony, augmented and intensi- 
 fied by the roughness of the road, the rolling and jolting 
 of the wagons, the darkness of the night, the rain and the 
 mud, and the pursuing Federals, this event stands without 
 a parallel upon this continent, if not in all history. 
 
 I introduce next a statement prepared by Mr. Jacob C. 
 Snyder, who resided at the time of the passage of this 
 train upon his farm near New Franklin. Mr. Snyder says: 
 
 "About ten or eleven o'clock on the night of Satur- 
 day, July 4th, 1863, we heard a great noise of horses' 
 feet clattering and tramping along the road. It was at 
 first supposed that another detachment was passing to 
 Gettysburg. After a little the rumbling of wagons was 
 heard. I at once arose, struck a light, opened the door 
 and went out, and in less than fifteen minutes the large 
 hall of my house and the yard in front were filled with 
 wounded Confederate soldiers. They at once set up the 
 clamor to my wife and other members of my family, ' Water! 
 Water! ! Give us water!!' They also begged to have their 
 wounds dressed. 0, what a sight! I at once came to the 
 -conclusion that something unusual had taken place, and 
 as the rain was falling in torrents, I put on my overcoat 
 and walked out to the barn -yard at the roadside with a 
 staff in my hand. I there found that some cavalry -men 
 were driving part of my young cattle out of my barn- 
 yard. I walked up to the gate and closed it to prevent 
 any more from being driven out. The officer in charge, 
 sitting on his horse and seeing the staff" I carried, supposed 
 it to be a gun and at once rode away. At about one 
 o'clock a. m. a man with a short leg rode* up to the yard 
 gate in company with five or six others. He very politely 
 
494 THE GllEAT INVASION. 
 
 asked Mrs. Snyder for a drink of water. He seemed to 
 be strapped to his horse. "When riding away one of the 
 men said he was General Ewell. I afterward learned that 
 his amputated limb had gotten sore/ 1 ' The long -wished 
 for daylight at length dawned, and revealed to the farmers 
 along the road that their fences were torn down and that 
 ambulances and wagons, together with hundreds of cavalry, 
 were making a way through their fields, and that their 
 wheat, corn, and grass were being ruined. The narrow 
 road in many places was so badly cut up that the wagons 
 could scarcely get on, and many had to take the fields. 
 Broken down wagons and caissons, yet containing large 
 amounts of ammunition, were strewn all along the route. 
 0, what a sight! The groans of the wounded and shrieks 
 of the dying beggar description. I said to several of the 
 men — Major Throckmorton and others who had been 
 at my house on their way to Gettysburg, — 'What does 
 this mean? I think you have received a terrible whip- 
 ping.' They replied that they were only going back to 
 get more ammunition and would return and clean out the 
 
 *It will be remembered that General Ewell had lost a leg in a previous 
 battle, and afterward wore a wooden substitute. When he passed through 
 Chambersburg on his way to Gettysburg, he rode in a carriage, but when 
 going into battle, it is said, he was strapped to his horse. The stump of 
 his amputated limb, it is also said, sometimes became inflamed, so that 
 he would have to lay aside for awhile his artificial limb. A citizen of Get- 
 tysburg, who witnessed the incident, informed the writer that during an 
 interval of the battle, General Ewell, accompanied by his staff, rode out 
 Baltimore Street toward the Federal line and was fired upon, at which the 
 whole party beat a hasty retreat, keeping upon tne pavements rather than 
 the street where they woidd have been more exposed. Reaching a sheltered 
 place near the court house, some of his attendants either pulled off the gen- 
 eral's boot or examined a probable wound, which he had just received. The 
 general may have received a slight wound in his leg, or his amputated limb 
 may have become sore, and he was compelled to seek safety in the way in- 
 dicated by Mr. Snyder. And yet it seems strange that if such was the case 
 it was kept secret. 
 
BURIAL OF MAJOR M'DINE. 495 
 
 Yankees. I then said, ' It looks to me as if the Yankees 
 had completely cleaned you out, and I think, and I pre- 
 sume you think so yourselves, that you had better have 
 stayed at home and remained under the old flag.' At two 
 o'clock p. m. a company with a battery of six brass pieces 
 drew up in front of my barn and fed their horses. This 
 battery was supported and accompanied by about one 
 hundred cavalry and some infantry. The cavalry dis- 
 mounted in a ten acre field of prime wheat, all out in 
 head. At the same time during the halt the men were 
 slaughtering cattle at Mr. Jeremiah W. George's. At this 
 place some of the men died and were buried, and others 
 unable to go any further were left with Air. George. The 
 graves of some that died there can yet be seen along the 
 road; others are farmed over. Among those that were 
 buried was Major McDine, of South Carolina. He was 
 buried close by the well in a beautiful grove, and the 
 grave was marked by a head -board bearing his initials. 
 On the 20th day of April, 1866, three persons came to 
 Mr. George's in search of this grave. One of them was 
 the major's brother-in-law, who was accompanied by a 
 friend of the deceased, and the two were under the guid- 
 ance of a colored man who had been the major's servant, 
 and was with him when he died and was buried. In a 
 conversation with these persons I learned that Mrs. Mc- 
 Dine, the major's wife, had partially lost her mind upon 
 hearing of the death of her husband, and at her urgent 
 solicitation and with the hope of relieving her, they had 
 come in search of his body. They came from South 
 Carolina to Hagerstown, thence to Gettysburg, and then 
 under the guidance of the colored man, followed up the 
 
49G THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 way of the disastrous retreat until they came to Mr. 
 George's, where the guide at once recognized the place 
 and took them to the grave. The remains were taken 
 up, carried to a place near my spring, and there prepared 
 and enclosed in a box and taken along. 
 
 " Among the wounded left at Mr. George's was Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Benjamin F. Carter, of General Hood's 
 division, Longstreet's Corps. I visited Colonel Carter 
 frequently during his stay there. He was a man of more 
 than ordinary ability. He had enjoyed the advantages 
 of a fine education, and had great conversational powers. 
 He was a Texan and had served two years in the legis- 
 lature of that state. In the discussion of ' the principles 
 of the secession heresy' as he termed it, which he often 
 did with his companions, in my presence, I learned that 
 he was of the Alexander H. Stephens stamp. He was 
 taken to Chambersburg in an ambulance, where he sub- 
 sequently died. 
 
 "From Colonel Carter I obtained much information in 
 relation to the battle of Gettysburg. He had received 
 his wound in the first charge made by Law upon Little 
 Round Top, from the ' Devil's Den.' They had met a 
 heavy repulse from that place, and when General Long- 
 street ordered General Law to charge the second time, 
 the latter replied in these words: 'General Longstreet, I 
 regard a second charge a needless sacrifice of human life, — 
 to lead men against one of nature's impregnable barriers 
 so well manned and so bravely defended, — I disobey the 
 order.' 'These,' said Colonel Carter, 'were the precise 
 words used by General Law.' * 
 
 *Tliia alleged act of disobedience seems incredible, but General l,a.vf . 
 
SOME SOUTHERNERS' EXPERIENCE. 497 
 
 " On Monday morning, July 6th, about three o'clock, 
 four men drove into my yard with a two -horse carriage. 
 They asked to have their jaded horses fed and breakfast 
 for four persons, for all of which they proposed to pay. 
 I said that if they paid in greenbacks and not in Confed- 
 erate scrip, they could be accommodated. They were 
 evidently civilians and not soldiers, and belonged to the 
 higher grade of Southern aristocracy. They were cursing 
 and swearing about the Yankees getting one of their 
 blooded horses, tor which they said they were offered 
 fifteen hundred dollars. Their great trouble seemed to be, 
 * If the Yankees only knew what kind of a horse they 
 had.' They paid my son a five dollar Government note. 
 I told them that they had better get away or the Yankees 
 would get them and their old jades of horses. It was about 
 daylight when they left. It was evident that they ex- 
 pected the 'blue -coats' to be after them. Just as they 
 were about to leave some colored persons, who came along, 
 began to sing, 
 
 'I'se gwine back to Dixie, 
 
 No more I'se gwine to wander, 
 My heart 's turned back to Dixie, 
 
 I can't stay here no longer ; 
 I miss de old plantation, 
 
 My home and my relation, 
 My heart 's turned back to Dixie, 
 And I must go. 
 Chorus: — 'I'se gwine back to Dixie, 
 
 For I hear the children calling, 
 I see the sad tears falling, 
 My heart 's turned back to Dixie, 
 And I must go.' 
 
 in his article in The Century of December, 1SS6, relates it himself, but 
 somewhat different. 
 
498 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 " Never shall I forget that scene, and never did I see a 
 more forlorn and disgusted party than those five men, 
 when, in their old rickety two - horse carriage, drawn by 
 two old jaded horses, they drove away amidst the singing 
 of those negroes. 
 
 " In a few hours the ' Boys in Blue,' under General 
 Gregg, were on hand and took hundreds of prisoners." 
 
 Rev. J. Milton Snyder, a son of the writer of the fore- 
 going, relates as follows: 
 
 " I can well remember when the Confederate train of 
 wounded came from Gettysburg, by way of my father's 
 residence and New Franklin. I was quite young at the 
 time, and hence noticed many things that failed to attract 
 the attention of older persons. On Saturday evening, 
 July 4th, 1863, whilst we were quietly seated in the bouse, 
 my father heard a peculiar noise, — like the approach of a 
 heavy storm. This was, if I remember correctly, about 
 ten o'clock on Saturday night. Father went out into the 
 darkness to listen. A short time after a body of Confed- 
 erate cavalry came down the road from Greenwood. They 
 halted in front of father's house and called him out. The 
 night was very dark, and they asked to be directed to 
 Greencastle. They seemed to be lost or bewildered. My 
 father not knowing in the darkness whether they were 
 Federals or Confederates, directed them properly. About 
 midnight the first of the train of wounded reached our 
 place. The wagons kept the main road as much as possi- 
 ble, and on either side of the train a continual stream of 
 wounded soldiers kept moving. Thus they continued 
 coming and going the remainder of Saturday night, all 
 day Sunday, and the last wagon passed by New Franklin 
 
THE "WOUNDED AT GREENCASTLE. 499 
 
 Monday morning at nine o'clock. The train of wounded 
 left the pike at Greenwood, came on the old ' Walnut 
 Bottom Road' (called also the Pine Stump road), through 
 New Guilford by way of my father's house, through New 
 Franklin, thence to Marion and Greencastle. On Monday 
 morning Gregg's cavalry came after the train, following 
 the same route. General Gregg halted at father's place, 
 and camped in one of our fields east of New Franklin and 
 in our orchard. Some of our Franklin County boys were 
 with Gregg. The Confederates claimed that they were 
 going South for ammunition. Wounded Confederate 
 soldiers were left all along the route of retreat. Many 
 died and were buried by the road -side. I shall never 
 forget those ghastly wounds, those thousands of faces 
 dusky with powder, and that battery of black and horrid 
 field - pieces, which had sent, as could be seen, many 
 charges of grape and canister into the bosoms of our 
 brave men." 
 
 Rev. J. C. Smith, at that time a resident of Greencastle, 
 gives the following account: 
 
 " Saturday, July 4th, 1863, closed in perfect quiet at 
 Greencastle. Captain Dablgreen and his troops disap- 
 peared as mysteriously as they had come. The stragglers, 
 who had been bringing up the rear of Lee's army, had 
 either all passed through or had received a hint that 
 it would be a saving of muscle to advance no further 
 North just then. The citizens of Greencastle went to their 
 beds in entire ignorance of the results of the battle of 
 Gettysburg, hopeful to be sure, but not assured that all 
 was well. Four o'clock Sunday morning we awoke to 
 hear the rumbling of wagons, the tramping of horses, the 
 
500 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 noise and racket attending an army in motion. The first 
 question naturally would be, ' What does all this commo- 
 tion mean?' And the answer came readily and easily, 
 ' There goes another Confederate army to help decide the 
 battle of Gettysburg.' Hastily dressing and going out into 
 the street, we were supremely happy at seeing the army 
 heading the other direction. It was the army of wounded 
 from the battle - field hastening on toward the Potomac 
 to cross over to Virginia. No one, with any feelings of 
 pity, will ever want to see such a sight even once in a 
 life -time. Here came the men who but eight or ten 
 days before had passed through our town in the prime of 
 health, boasting of the exploits they would do when they 
 would have the happy chance of seeing the Union army. 
 A more crest-fallen, woe -begone mob may never have 
 been seen. Hurry was the order of the day. They seemed 
 almost to be pushing each other forward. Yet when asked 
 about the results of the battle, the officers invariably de- 
 clared that they gave the boys in blue a sound thrashing. 
 In conversation with an intelligent officer, I asked, 'If 
 you have thrashed our army so soundly, why are you leav- 
 ing us so hurriedly? Why not stay and occupy your con- 
 quered territory?' In reply he said: '0, we are just 
 taking these home to have them cured up, and with these 
 wasrons brine: on more ammunition and soldiers and finish 
 up the job.' Then said he, 'Did you hear from Vicks- 
 burg?' 'No,' said I. 'Well, Pemberton has captured 
 Grant and his army.' I did not feel as though I could go 
 into ecstacies over this, but still I hoped that for veracity 
 he might be classed among those creatures whom Paul 
 accurately describes in I. Tim. 1 : 12. The common soldiers 
 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED. 501 
 
 seemed to be either too stupid to speak, or else forbidden to 
 give a true account of the battle, but all the way through 
 the colored portion declared that they were badly whipped. 
 Such a scene of suffering, who may undertake to de- 
 scribe? No one counted the wounded. They could not be 
 counted because hundreds of wagons loaded with them 
 were a part of this train. All who were wounded in the 
 lower extremities were placed into these huge and rough- 
 rolling army wagons. When passing over any part of 
 the street where the wagon would jolt, they would yell 
 and groan with pain. Many had received their hurt on 
 Wednesday or Thursday before, with no attention paid 
 to them by surgeons, the doctors having been kept busy 
 with the graver cases. All who were wounded in the 
 head, the arms, the shoulders, the non- vital parts of the 
 body, were compelled to walk through the mud ankle- 
 deep, with no food save a little flour mixed with water 
 and baked on a few coals. Those wounded in the arms 
 or shoulders would tear away the garment and expose the 
 wounded part. Such arms — swollen to twice or thrice 
 their natural size — red and angry. When they came to 
 a pump, one would place his wounded member under the 
 spout while another would pump cold water on the sore. 
 Then he would do a like service to his comrade. Thus 
 the pumps were going all that day. I will particularize 
 one case; this will be a sample for probably five or six 
 thousand similar ones. He was from North Carolina; was 
 shot through the arm, between the shoulder and the elbow. 
 The arm was swollen to the size of a man's thigh, very 
 red and very much inflamed. Nothing had been done for 
 him by the doctor save to press a wad of cotton into the 
 
502 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 wound in each side of tlie arm. lie bad received the 
 injury on Wednesday. 'Now,' said he, 'I am going home, 
 and I will never enter the army again.' Said I, 'My dear 
 friend, I fear yon can't reach home soon. I learn that our 
 government has thrown an army on the south bank of the 
 Potomac' Said he, 'I never wanted to go into the war. 
 They came to my home and drove me into the army at 
 the point of the bayonet. The next time they come they 
 may shoot me down at my door; I will rather die than 
 fight again.' We estimated the number of wounded that 
 passed through our town at twelve to fifteen thousand. 
 It was an easy matter to trace their route of flight. Dead 
 horses, broken down and abandoned wagons, cannons, car- 
 riages and caissons, new made graves were everywhere to 
 be seen. It was simply a road covered with wrecks. 
 
 "On Monday evening, July 6th, abont sundown some 
 cavalry, being the rear guard, passed through, and there 
 ended our connection with the Southern Confederacy." 
 
 Mr. David Z. Shook, a resident of Greencastle, and an 
 eye-witness, relates the following: 
 
 "We were awakened by a rumbling sound in the direc- 
 tion of Chambersburg. It was the wagon -train from 
 Gettysburg. The teamsters and guards were somewbat 
 excited, and were hurrying through. Many of the wagons 
 were loaded with wounded, whose cries and groans were 
 pitiful indeed. We asked the Confederates what was up. 
 They told us that a battle had been fought at Gettys- 
 burg, but it was not at all decisive. They said, too, that 
 they were only taking their w T oundcd off, and that they 
 expected reinforcements from Virginia. They tried to 
 hide their defeat, but we saw that there were more than 
 
INCIDENTS AT GREENCASTLE. 503 
 
 wounded hurrying toward Virginia. One poor fellow 
 begged to be lifted out of a wagon and laid on the ground, 
 as his pain in the jolting wagon was unbearable, but the 
 teamsters hurried on and took no account of his entreat- 
 ies. The night following being very dark, many persona 
 in town engaged in capturing horses and cattle from the 
 train. As cattle passed by I saw many turned into alleys. 
 Horses tied behind wagons had their halters cut, and were 
 led away unobserved. Many horses, too, gave out here 
 and were left. They suffered greatly from not being shod 4 
 their hoofs being worn off to the quick. Many such were 
 offered for sale, — fine ones being offered for as little as 
 five dollars in Yankee money. I captured a line bay 
 horse, hid him in the barn, fed him well and felt proud 
 of my possession. A few days after a citizen of Green- 
 castle came to the barn, recognized his horse, proved him, 
 and took him away. The Confederates had taken this 
 horse on their way to Gettysburg, and I had the luck to 
 get him as my first capture, though I was in utter ignor- 
 ance of his belonging to a fellow townsman until he in- 
 formed me. Many persons threw taunts at the retreating- 
 foe, such as, 'How are you Gettysburg?' 'Have you 
 been to Philadelphia already?* and 'Did you meet the 
 Pennsylvania militia down there?' An officer rode up to 
 a pump and asked for water. A citizen standing by said, 
 'Did you get enough of Meade over there?' The officer 
 grew furious and called him an impudent puppy." 
 
 On Saturday evening some of the citizens of Chambers- 
 burg, who resided on the eastern outskirts of the town, 
 heard the low rumbling sound of this wagon - train, as it 
 proceeded across the country some six miles to the south- 
 
504 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 east; and the same night information was brought that 
 the train was of immense extent, and was hurriedly 
 making its way south. This information led us to suppose 
 that in the battle, fought east of the mountain, of which we 
 had some intimations, the Confederates had been worsted. 
 Of this we had no certain information until the morning 
 of Monday, July 6th. 
 
 At day -break on Sunday morning, July 5th, I was 
 called from my bed and requested to proceed immediately 
 to the King Street hospital to assist in removing from 
 wagons a number of wounded Confederates. The team- 
 sters in charge of these wagons had lost their way during 
 the night, and hud come into Chambersburg. Arriving 
 at the hospital I found in the street four or five wagons, 
 drawn by four mules each, and all loaded with wounded 
 men. Standing upon the pavement in front of the hospital 
 was a soldier with his arm off close to the shoulder. To 
 an inquiry made by one of our citizens as to what this 
 meant, the wounded Confederate replied, "It means that 
 Uncle Robert has got a of a whipping." This, how- 
 ever, was denied by others. O what a terrible sight 
 these men presented! Filthy, bloody, with wounds un- 
 dressed and swarming with vermin, and almost famished 
 for food and water, they presented such a sight as I hope 
 I may never again be called upon to witness. After they 
 were all taken into the hospital, arrangements were at 
 once made to have their wounds dressed and food supplied. 
 These arrangements a few of the citizens kept up until 
 the ensuing Friday, when General D. N. Couch, who 
 commanded this department, reached here, and relieved 
 us of our charge. Appreciating the importance of send- 
 
EXPLOITS OF CAPTAIN JONES* CAVALRY. 505 
 
 ing information to the authorities at Ilarrisburg of this 
 train, so that, if possible, it might be intercepted, I en- 
 gaged a man, who had jnst come in from the country 
 in search of information, to carry a dispatch. Telling 
 him the situation, and showing him the importance of 
 forwarding the information as soon as possible, he agreed 
 to bear my dispatch, addressed to Governor Curtin, to the 
 nearest telegraph station. Mounting his horse he rode 
 rapidly out the western pike, as we had heard that a repair 
 party was coming from that direction, and was not far 
 off, and that it repaired the telegraph line as it came. 
 Whether or not my dispatch was received by the authori- 
 ties at Ilarrisburg, I can not say. If it was received, and 
 the cavalry who were at that time in McConnellsburg, 
 had been ordered to proceed across the mountain against 
 that train, it all might have been captured. The few 
 cavalry -men who did make a dash upon it made large 
 captures. How they did it, and how they came to be 
 there, I will next proceed to narrate. 
 
 On the evening of Saturday, while this wagon train was 
 making its way across the South Mountain, a citizen of 
 Mercersburg — Hon. James O. Carson — sent a messenger 
 across the North Mountain with a few lines to Mr. W. S. 
 Fletcher, of McConnellsburg, informing him that there 
 were prowling about the former place a number of ma- 
 rauding stragglers from the Confederate army, and ask- 
 ing, if there were any Federal soldiers at the latter place, 
 that Mr. Fletcher would have some sent across for their 
 protection. There were in and about McConnellsburg at 
 that time nearly all of the men of General Milroy's com- 
 mand, who had escaped from Winchester into southern 
 
506 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Pennsylvania, and bad congregated at Everett, or Bloody 
 Run. There were the Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, 
 several companies of the First New York Cavalry, and 
 some infantry from several different regiments, the whole 
 under command of Colonel Pierce. Mr. Fletcher received 
 this letter late in the evening, and he at once proceeded 
 to Colonel Pierce's head- quarters and showed it to him, 
 asking him to send on the following morning Captain 
 Jones with about two hundred men to Mercersburg. Mr. 
 Fletcher asked that Captain Jones might be in command 
 of this force because of his daring exploit in defeating a 
 force of Confederates double the number of his own com- 
 mand in McConnellsburg a few weeks previous, as re- 
 lated in a previous chapter. To this request Colonel 
 Pierce agreed, and about two hundred men were detailed 
 for this duty, Captain Jones' own heroic Irishmen being 
 of the number. These men left McConnellsburg early 
 on Sunday morning, and when at Mercersburg, — ten 
 miles distant, — or probably before reaching that place, 
 they learned of the great wagon- train, and at once pro- 
 ceeded to intercept it. Captain Jones ran into this train 
 at Cearfoss' Cross -Roads, nearly midway between Green- 
 castle and Williamsport. After a sharp skirmish with the 
 guards, who were scattered somewhat thinly along the 
 line, the wagons were turned into the road leading to 
 Mercersburg. The train was cut out from Mr. Hide's 
 down to the farm formerly owned by Mr. David Zellers. 
 The wagons^ cut oft' south of the cross-roads were turned 
 about in the barn -yard of Mr. Zellers, and hastily driven 
 back to follow the other part of the captured train to Mer- 
 cersburg. Great gallantry was displayed by Captain Jones 
 and his brave troopers in this affair, and had all the cavalry 
 
FEDERAL CAPTURES. 507 
 
 at McConnellsburg been with this brave and dashing 
 officer, the whole of that train might have been captured. 
 
 In this gallant affair about one hundred wagons — as 
 many as this small body, of cavalry could handle — with 
 about one thousand wounded Confederates, who were in 
 the wagons, were captured. The head of this captured 
 train reached Mercersburg near evening, and the whole of 
 it passed on through the town and out toward the Gap, from 
 fear of being recaptured. At or near the Gap the head 
 of the train met a large detachment from the Fourteenth 
 Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Colonel Pierce. Believing 
 then that they were strong enough to protect themselves 
 from recapture, the whole turned again and went back to 
 Mercersburg, where the wounded were taken from the 
 wagons and placed in the Theological Seminary buildings 
 and other improvised hospitals. No sooner was this train 
 and its inmates disposed of, than the brave Jones wanted 
 to make another dash upon the enemy, but he was over- 
 ruled by Colonel Pierce. This was not the only instance 
 in the history of war, in which brave and earnest subordi- 
 nates were held in check, and great and important results 
 prevented by timid, hesitating commanders. 
 
 It will be remembered that General J. I. Gregg with his 
 brigade of cavalry had been sent in pursuit of this train. 
 These cavalry -men had skirmishes with its guard at Cale- 
 donia Iron Works, in the South Mountain, and at or near 
 Greencastle, capturing a large number of prisoners. The 
 writer passed along the pike from Chambersburg to Gettys- 
 burg in the afternoon of Monday, 6th, and from Fayetteville 
 to the top of the mountain passed hundreds of Confederate 
 prisoners under charge of detachments of General Gregg's 
 command. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 PHENOMENA OF BATTLE SOUND. 
 
 J^TjOIfaLTHOUGH but twenty -five miles from Gettysburg*,, 
 iiMlu the inhabitants of Chambersburg were scarcely 
 i aware that a great battle was being fought at the 
 A first named place. A few of our citizens, who re- 
 ' sided upon the outskirts of the town, heard the 
 sound of the guns. These sounds, however, were very in- 
 distinct. The large majority of our people did not hear 
 them at all. Aud yet, notwithstanding the reports of the 
 cannon were scarcely heard here, the following indubitable 
 testimony establishes the almost incredible fact that the 
 reports of the guns were heard as far as one hundred and 
 twenty and one hundred and forty miles away. This testi- 
 mony is from men of undoubted intelligence and veracity,, 
 whose standing and character are widely known. The first 
 is from Rev. C. Cort, a minister of the Reformed Church. 
 Mr. Cort's statement is as follows: 
 
 Mr. J. Hoke: 
 
 Dear Sir — As everything relating to the battle of Gettysburg will be of 
 increasing interest as the years pass by, I hereby submit to you for insertion 
 in your book the following singular phenomenon relating to the sound of the 
 guns at that great conflict: On Friday afternoon, July 3d, 1863, I was return- 
 ing to Somerset, Pennsylvania, from a trip to Mount Pleasant, in Westmore- 
 
 508 
 
THE SOUND OF THE CANNONADING. 509 
 
 land County, same state. Rev. George H. Johnston, then pastor of the 
 Reformed Church in Somerset, but now pastor of a congregation in West 
 Philadelphia, was my traveling companion. We stopped for a late dinner at 
 the hotel of a Mr. Hay, at the eastern base of Chestnut Ridge in Ljgonier 
 Valley, Westmoreland County, and while we were at dinner the landlord 
 -entered the room and remarked that a terrible battle must be going on some- 
 where. We replied that the latest telegraphic dispatches received at Mount 
 Pleasant before our departure indicated that the invading army under Gen- 
 eral L,ee had met the Federal forces at Gettysburg, and a great battle would, 
 no doubt, be fought there. Mr. Hay replied, " It must be going on now; we 
 hear the cannonading. " Expressing our astonishment at his statement, he 
 led us out to the end of his porch, where we distinctly heard what we re- 
 garded as heavy and continuous discharges of artillery in an easterly direc- 
 tion. This was about two o'clock, and the precise time when the great 
 artillery duel took place preparatory to Pickett's great charge upon the 
 Federal line. Upon going out to the turnpike the sound was still more dis- 
 tinct. We listened to the portentous sounds for some time with great interest 
 and anxiety, for we knew that to a great extent the destiny of our Govern- 
 ment depended upon the battle then in progress. The following entry in my 
 •diary indicates the thought which was uppermost in our minds at the time : 
 "May the L,ord of hosts give victory to the army of the Union, and may the 
 hordes of rebeldom be discomfitted in the valleys of our noble old Keystone 
 Commonwealth. ' ' 
 
 Mr. Hay told us that the cannonading had been going on more or less for 
 several days. We afterwards learned that hundreds of people had heard 
 the same sound all along the south - eastern border of Westmoreland County, 
 and that during the battle of Manassas the sound of the cannonading was 
 also distinctly heard throughout the same localities. The distance from the 
 place where we heard this cannonading to Gettysburg, in a straight line, was 
 not less than one hundred and forty miles. The configuration of the in- 
 tervening country, — the numerous transverse ridges of the Allegheny 
 mountains, — would seem to be unfavorable for the transmission of sound 
 so great a distance. And yet, while the fact is established beyond dispute 
 that the sound of the great conflict at Gettysburg was distinctly heard in one 
 of the western counties of the state, it was not heard in many intervening 
 localities not one third that distance from the scene of the conflict. Fven in 
 Chambersburg and Greencastle, but about twenty- five miles distant, bu. 
 few heard the cannonading, and the few who did hear it say it was very in 
 distinct. Here is a question for scientists to solve. Some military men to 
 "whom I stated the fact a few days later at Gettysburg, hooted at the idea of 
 
510 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 what I said, and supposed, I have no doubt, that I was telling an untruth, or 
 was mistaken. And yet the faEl is true beyond question, and upon the 
 strength of what I heard, I at once prepared to start for the scene of strife. 
 Yours respectfully, C. Cort. 
 
 Creencastle, Pennsylvania. 
 
 The following letter is from Rev. C. R. Lane, D. D., 
 an eminent and well-known divine of the Presbyterian 
 Church. Mr. Lane, at the time of the battle of Gettys- 
 burg, resided in Wyoming County, Pennsylvania. His 
 statement is as follows : 
 
 Chambersburg, August 19th, 1884. 
 Jacob Hoke, EJsq. : 
 
 Dear Sir — The facts referred to in our late conversation, as I understood 
 the matter at the time, are the following: The sound of the artillery at the 
 battle of Gettysburg, was heard on a mountain in the south-western part 
 of Wyoming County, a distance -measured in a straight line of at least one 
 hundred and twenty (120) miles. Supposing the alleged fact to be true, this 
 was a very remarkable propagation of sound and requires, 
 
 1st. A very favorable state of atmosphere for the propagation of sound. 
 
 2d. A favorable current of air; and 
 
 3d. Perhaps there was a cloud so situated as to reflect the sound to the 
 particular locality where it was heard. 
 
 Thanking you for your efforts to collect and preserve information in regard 
 to the war, I remain, Yours truly, C. R. Lane.* 
 
 -That the phenomena stated by Rev. C. Cort and Rev. Dr. Lane were not 
 confined to the battle of Gettysburg alone, but occurred at other great battles, 
 will appear in the following statements by Rev. Bishop J. J. Glossbrenner, D. 
 D., of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ, a resident of Churchville, 
 Augusta County, Virginia, and by Hon. F. M. Kimmell, at the time referred 
 to a resident of Somerset, Somerset County, Pennsylvania, and at present re- 
 siding in Chambersburg. Judge Kimmell was formerly presiding judge of 
 this district, and is a man well known all over the State. Bishop Glossbren- 
 ner, by reason of his age, extensive travels, and undoubted integrity, is known 
 from Pennsylvania to the Pacific Coast. The statements of these gentlemen 
 therefore, are beyond dispute. 
 
 The statement of Bishop Glossbrenner is as follows: 
 
 Churchville, Virginia, June 19th, 1884. 
 Mr. J. Hoke: 
 
 Dear Sir — In your note you desire me to state in writing what I com- 
 municated to you verbally some time ago. That fact is as follows: During 
 
TD.E SOUND OF THE CANNONADING. 511 
 
 Deeming the fact of the phenomenon authenticated be- 
 yond a doubt, and desiring to know the reasons why this 
 sound was heard at such great distances, and so indistinctly 
 at Chambersburg and at other intervening places, I com- 
 municated the facts to the officers of the Smithsonian In- 
 stitute, at Washington, D. C, and asked for an explanation, 
 to be used in my history. The following are the replies. 
 
 the great battles about Richmond, which is upwards of one hundred miles 
 
 from here, we distinctly heard the report of the cannonading. 
 
 Respectfully yours, J. J. Glossbrenner. 
 
 The following is Judge Kimmell's statement: 
 
 Chambersburg, September 12th, 1884. 
 Mr. J. Hoke: 
 
 Dear Sir — On the 21st of July, 1S61, I lived at Somerset, Somerset 
 County, Pennsylvania, distant from Cumberland, Maryland, thirty -seven 
 miles b}' turnpike road. This latter place is one hundred and ninety miles 
 by rail trom Baltimore, and as I now understand the geography of the 
 country one hundred and ninety miles would carry you from Cumberland 
 to either Washington or Bull Run in Virginia. This would make a distance 
 of some two hundred and thirty miles by the roads from Somerset to the 
 battle-field, or as the bird flies, or as sound carries, two hundred miles. 
 Standing on a hill which overlooks the town, in company with others, we 
 distinctly heard the "thuds" of the cannon of the battle, not once only nor 
 for a short time, but often and at intervals extending over hours. We, having 
 previously learned of the army having moved South, conjectured that a 
 battle was being fought between the Federal and Confederate forces, and we 
 were on the tip-toe of expectation. When the news came we found our con- 
 jectures fully verified, as to time and direction. Somerset lies on the west of 
 the main ridge of the Allegheny Mountain, fourteen miles from the summit. 
 The waters of the eastern slope of the mountain at that point are carried by 
 Wills Creek to the Potomac at Cumberland, and thence flow to Washington 
 City, D. C. The clouds during the. day were impending so far as we could 
 see. We learned that this was the case along the river, and my theory was, 
 whether right or wrong, that the clouds confined the sound to the valley of 
 the Potomac, and sent them to the mountains upwards, as through a funnel. 
 Along the Alleghenies above Cumberland, the sounds were heard by multi- 
 tudes. Our congregation near the summit adjourned the sermon to listen. 
 
 On the days of the Gettysburg fights I lived at Chambersburg, twenty -five 
 miles from the contest, in which there was immense cannonading, and never 
 heard it at all. I don't remember the condition of the clouds, and only re- 
 member the facts of the first fight, because the matter was the subject of 
 discussion. 
 
 I have heard or read somewhere that the sounds of Waterloo were heard 
 two hundred miles away. F. M. Kijimell. 
 
512 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 The first is from that eminent scientist, Prof. Spencer F. 
 Baird : 
 
 Washington, D. C, September 6, 1884. 
 Mr. J. Hoke: 
 
 Dear Sir — The irregularities of sound transmission referred to in your 
 letter of August 30th, have been repeatedly observed, and may be thus ex- 
 plained: With a gentle wind, the current of air is of course considerably 
 retarded near the surface of the earth by friction with its irregular outlines; 
 and as we rise higher the speed is ordinarily found to gradually increase for 
 some hundreds of feet. The effect of this partial retardation of the aerial 
 current on the spherical wave - fronts of sound, is to press forward their 
 higher portions more than the lower portions, — in the direction in which the 
 wind is moving, — and reversely to press back the upper portions of the 
 wave - fronts more than their lower portions, — in the opposite direction. It 
 thus results that sound -rays moving with the wind, tend to curve downward 
 toward the earth; and sound -rays moving against the wind, tend to rise up- 
 ward, and at the distance of a mile or so, to leave the observer in an acoustic 
 "shadow " — the sounds passing at some distance above his head. This has 
 been verified by climbing to eminences, where a lost sound is completely re- 
 covered. Sound probably travels as far against the wind as with it, but it is 
 refracted upward beyond the ears of the listener. (See the Smithsonian 
 Report for 1875, page 210.) 
 
 This subject was well discussed by the late Professor Henry, — a copy of 
 whose "Researches in Sound " is herewith mailed to your address. You will 
 find special reference to the abnormal effects observed during cannonading in 
 battles, at pages 492, 493. See also pages 512, 513. 
 
 Under certain circumstances, an intervening obstacle — as a bill — tends to 
 deflect sound - rays upward to some distance over the adjacent valley; so as 
 to render them quite audible at a considerable distance, while wholly inaudi- 
 ble through the middle distance. Yours very respectfully, 
 
 Spencer F. Baird, Secretary.* 
 
 *The following certificate from Rev. L,. W. Stahl, received subsequent to the 
 submission of this matter to the learned gentlemen of the Smithsonian Insti- 
 tute, presents this matter of the phenomena of sound in a new light. It will 
 be seen from this statement that the ground was the conductor and not the 
 
 atmosphere: 
 
 Annville, Pennsylvania, August 2d, 1886. 
 J. Hoke, Esq. : 
 
 Dear Sir — At the time of the war I resided in Madison, Westmoreland 
 County, Pennsylvania, on the Cumberland pike, twenty -eight miles from 
 Pittsburg. During the 2d of July, 1863, — the second day of the battle of 
 Gettysburg, — I was in a field near the village helping to harvest, and while 
 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE PHENOMENA. 513 
 
 The references made in the foregoing to Professor 
 Henry's "Researches in Sound" are as follows: 
 
 " The science of acoustics in regard to the phenomena 
 of sound as exhibited in limited spaces, has been developed 
 with signal success. The laws of its production, propaga- 
 tion, reflection and refraction have been determined with 
 much precision, so that we are enabled in most cases to 
 explain, predict, and control the phenomena exhibited 
 under given conditions. But in cases of loud sounds, and 
 those which are propagated to a great distance, such as are 
 to be employed as fog -signals, considerable obscurity still 
 exists. As an illustration of this I may mention the fre- 
 quent occurrence of apparently abnormal phenomena. 
 General Warren informs me that at the battle of Seven 
 Pines, in June, 1862, near Richmond, General Johnson, 
 of the Confederate army, was within three miles of the 
 scene of action with a force intended to attack the flank 
 of the Federal forces, and although listening attentively 
 for the sound of the commencement of the engagement, 
 the battle, which was a severe one, lasting about three 
 hours, ended without his having heard a single gun. (See 
 Johnson's report.) Another case of a similar kind oc- 
 curred to General McClellan, at the battle of Gaines' 
 Mills, June 27, 1862, also near Richmond. Although a 
 sharp engagement was progressing within three* or four 
 
 thus engaged one of our number, after raking together enough of wheat to 
 make a sheaf, laid the handle of his rake against his head while he bound 
 the grain thus raked together, when to his astonishment he heard distinctly 
 the roar of the cannon. I then too tried it and the sounds were very distinct. 
 We heard at intervals throughout the three days of battle, a strange roaring, 
 but it was only by the use of the rake handle that we could distinguish what 
 it was. This was in an air line not less than one hundred and fifty miles 
 from Gettysburg. Yours truly, 
 
 L. W. Stahl. 
 
514 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 miles for four or five hours, the General and his staff were 
 unaware of its occurrence, and when their attention was 
 called to some feeble sound they had no idea that it was 
 anything more than a skirmish of little importance. (See 
 Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.) A 
 third and perhaps still more remarkable instance is given 
 in a skirmish between a part of the Second Corps under 
 General "Warren and a force of the enemy. In this case 
 the sound of the firing was heard more distinctly at Gen- 
 eral Meade's head -quarters than it was at the head- 
 quarters of the Second Corps itself, although the latter 
 was about midway between the former and the point of 
 conflict. Indeed, the sound appeared so near General 
 Meade's camp that the impression was made that the 
 enemy had gotten between it and General Warren's com- 
 mand. In fact so many instances occurred of wrong im- 
 pressions as to direction and distance derived from the 
 sound of guns that little reliance came to be placed on 
 these indications." 
 
 By direction of Professor Baird the subject was also 
 referred to Professor A. B. Johnson, chief clerk of the 
 Light House Board, who kindly favored me with the fol- 
 lowing: 
 
 Washington, D. C, September io, 1S84. 
 Mr. J. Hoke: 
 
 Dear Sir — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 
 September 6th, 1884, which came to hand by due course of mail. 
 
 You state that during the battle of Gettysburg, Rev. C. Cort and others dis- 
 tinctly heard the sound of the cannonading in Westmoreland County, western 
 Pennsylvania, in an air line one hundred and forty miles almost west from 
 the field of conflict, while during that battle, at Chambersburg, but twenty- 
 five miles west from Gettysburg, the sound of the guns was not heard, ex- 
 cept indistinctly on the outskirts of the town. 
 
 You also state that Rev. Dr. L,ane says that the sound of the cannonading 
 at Gettysburg was heard in the southern part of Wyoming County, Pennsyl- 
 
professor Johnson's explanations. 515 
 
 vania, a distance of over one hundred and twenty miles north-east, in an air 
 line. 
 
 And you also say that at the instance of Professor Baird, of the Smith- 
 sonian Institution, you ask my opinion as to the cause of this phenomenon. 
 
 In reply, I beg leave to say that this phenomenon has received the atten- 
 tion of scientists for many years. 
 
 Dr. Derham, of England, writing in Latin to the British Philosophical 
 Society in 1708, seemed to consider it as caused by variations in temperature, 
 moisture, and the direction of the wind. Baron von Humboldt, and after 
 him Dr. Dove, Sir John Herschel and Dr. Robinson, held that aerial floccu- 
 lence caused this phenomenon, a theory which was adopted and amplified by 
 Professor Tyndall. Professor Joseph Henry, long the Director of the Smith- 
 sonian Institute, has, however, presented a more satisfactory theory and has 
 worked it out with great care by many experiments. He accepted as a good 
 working hypothesis, the suggestions made by Professor Stokes, of Cambridge, 
 England, founded upon those remarkable observations of the French Acade- 
 mician, De la Roche, which, roughly stated, is this: The several strata into 
 which a current of air may be divided, do not move with the same velocity. 
 The lowest stratum is retarded by friction against the earth; the one imme- 
 diately above, by friction against the lower; hence the velocity increases from 
 the ground upward, and when the direction of the sound is perpendicular to 
 the sound-wave, as when projected against the wind, it will be thrown up- 
 ward ahead of the observer, and when it is projected with the wind it will 
 be thrown downward toward the earth. 
 
 Professor Henry tested this theory by careful and often repeated experi- 
 ments, and announced the results of five different phenomena, with his idea 
 of their cause. One of these formula describes the case you cite in these 
 words: 
 
 " The audibility of sound at a distance and its inaudibility nearer the 
 source of sound." The cause of this aberration in audibility, he formulates 
 thus: "Sound moving with the wind is refracted doivn toward the earth, 
 while moving- against the zvind it is ref railed upward and passes over the 
 head of the observer.'''' 
 
 You will see from my several pamphlets on this general subject, which I 
 send you, that I have given this matter some attention, that I agree with 
 Henry rather than Tyndall, and that I have cited a number of instances which 
 have occurred under my own observation similar to those which you relate, 
 though on a smaller scale, — but that in each of these cases, the wind is blow- 
 ing against, rather than with the sound. 
 
 You ask me for a short statement of the reason of the phenomena you have 
 
516 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 related. In reply I beg to say that I am of the opinion that the aberration in 
 the audibility of the sound of the guns at Gettysburg was caused by the 
 wind; that is, the wind blowing against the sound-waves tilted them up so 
 that they first touched the earth near Chambersburg and then passed over it 
 describing one or more curves from there to the hearers in Westmoreland 
 County. 
 
 It is not improbable that the length of the cord of the arc described bv the 
 sound-wave was about the distance from Gettysburg to Chambersburg, and 
 that the sound was heard at intervals of twenty -five or thirty miles from 
 thence to the hearers in Westmoreland County and maybe beyond. It would 
 be interesting to know if this was the case. 
 
 An instance of this kind, though on a much smaller scale, is given on page 
 731 of my pamphlet, "Anomalies in the Sound of Fog Signals," and the 
 curve of the sound-wave showing the area of inaudibility in the observations 
 made near the White Head-L,ight Station, Maine, is indicated in a rude 
 wood cut on the next page. 
 
 The battle of Gettysburg lasted about three days, if I remember it cor- 
 rectly; it is possible that the wind during that time changed, so that the 
 same reasons which would have caused the sound of the guns to be heard in 
 Westmoreland County in one day, might cause them to be heard in Wyoming 
 County on another. 
 
 Guns were frequently heard at a great distance from battle-fields during 
 the War of the Rebellion, while they were not heard by persons compara- 
 tively near, but in the same direction. In one instance those near by did not 
 hear the noise of the guns when they could see their flash. This is the first 
 time I have had to consider this phenomenon when extending over twenty- 
 five miles. Within that distance, it seems to me, to be accounted for. When, 
 as in this instance, the distance is five or six times greater, I speak with less 
 confidence. But I do not see that the question of the distance changes the 
 principle. Yours very truly, 
 
 Arnold B. Johnson, Chief Clerk. 
 
 In the publications accompanying the foregoing letter, 
 Mr. Johnson has specially called attention to several places 
 which he has marked as bearing directly upon the phe- 
 nomena under consideration. These I annex. The first 
 quotation states Professor Henry's five phenomena of 
 sound, as referred to by Mr. Johnson: 
 
 "Professor Henry, in considering the results of General 
 
SOME PHENOMENA OF SOUND. 517 
 
 Duane's experiments, and his own, some of which were 
 made in company with Sir Frederick Arron and Captain 
 Webb, Her Britannic Majesty's Navy, both of the British 
 Light House Establishment, who were sent here to study 
 and report on our fog signal system, formulated these ab- 
 normal phenomena. He said they consisted of — 
 
 "1. The audibility of a sound at a distance and its in- 
 audibility nearer the source of sound. 
 
 "2. The inaudibility of a sound at a given distance in 
 one direction, while a lesser sound is heard at the same 
 distance in another direction. 
 
 "3. The audibility at one time at a distance of several 
 miles, while at another the sound can not be heard at more 
 than a fifth of the same distance. 
 
 "4. While the sound is generally heard further with 
 the wind than against it, in some instances the reverse is 
 the case. 
 
 "5. The sudden loss of a sound in passing from one 
 locality to another in the same vicinity, the distance from 
 the source of the sound being the same." 
 
 In illustration of the foregoing the following is cited: 
 
 "There are six steam fog whistles on the coast of Maine; 
 these have been frequently heard at a distance of twenty 
 miles, and as frequently can not be heard at the distance 
 of two miles, and this with no perceptible difference in the 
 state of the atmosphere. 
 
 "The signal is often heard at a great distance in one 
 direction, while in another it will be scarcely audible at 
 the distance of a mile. This is not the effect of wind, as 
 the signal is frequently heard much farther against the 
 wind than with it; for example, the whistle on Cape Eliza- 
 
518 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 betli can always be distinctly heard in Portland, a distance 
 of nine miles, during a heavy north - east snow storm, the 
 wind blowing a gale directly from Portland toward the 
 whistle." * 
 
 In illustration of his sound-wave theory, Professor 
 Henry states the following, as given in the same paper: 
 
 " It frequently happens on a vessel leaving a station that 
 the sound (of the fog whistle) is suddenly lost at a point in 
 its course, and, after remaining inaudible some time, is 
 heard again at a greater distance', and then is gradually 
 lost as the distance is further increased. This is attributed 
 to the upward refraction of the sound-wave, which passes 
 over the head of the observer, and continues an upward 
 course until it nearly reaches the upper surface of the cur- 
 rent of wind, when the refraction will be reversed, and the 
 sound sent downward to the earth. Or the effect may be 
 considered as due to a sound - shadow produced by refrac- 
 tion, which is gradually closed in at a distance by the 
 lateral spread of the sound-wave near the earth on either 
 side, in a direction which is not affected by the upper re- 
 fraction. Another explanation may be found in the prob- 
 able circumstance of the lower sheet of sound -beams 
 being actually refracted into a serpentine or undulating 
 course." 
 
 Upon this sound-wave theory, Mr. Johnson, also said: 
 
 " This ricochetting of sound, these intervals of audi- 
 bility, ought to be recognized by the mariner, who should 
 now understand that in sailing toward or from a fog-signal 
 
 *" Aberrations of Audibility of Fog Signals." A paper read before the 
 Philosophical Society of Washington, October 22, 1881, by Arnold B. Johnson, 
 Chief Clerk of the Light House Board. 
 
OTHER EXAMPLES AND PRINCIPLES. 519 
 
 in full blast, he might lose and pick up its sound several 
 times though no apparent object might intervene. And 
 the mariner now needed that science should deduce the 
 law of this variation in audibility and bring out some in- 
 strument which should be to the ears what the mariner's 
 compass is to the eyes, and also that variations of this 
 instrument yet to be invented, be provided for and cor- 
 rected as now are the variations of the mariner's compass. 
 The speaker referred to the benefit the mariner had de- 
 rived from the promulgation of Professor Henry's theory 
 of the tilting of the sound-wave up or down hy adverse 
 or favorable winds, and said that by this the sailor had 
 been led to go aloft in the one case and to get as near as 
 possible to the surface of the water in the other, when 
 trying to pick up the sound of a fog -signal." 
 
 Such are the explanations given of these phenomena by 
 these eminent scientists. The facts are exceedingly inter- 
 esting and are worthy of investigation. 
 
\ CHAPTER XII. 
 
 GETTYSBURG, THE NATION'S SHRINE. 
 
 "On Fame's eternal camping ground 
 Their silent tents are spread, 
 And Glory guards, with solemn round, 
 The bivouac of the dead." 
 
 !f//JS)S soon as the result of the series of engagements 
 r ^'Mfe between the Federal and Confederate armies at 
 I Gettysburg was known throughout the country, 
 •jh people from all sections flocked to that place. In 
 T traversing the field of conflict the evidences of the 
 tremendous struggle were visible in all directions. Dis- 
 abled cannon, abandoned and captured arms, broken down 
 fences, trampled and ruined fields of grass and grain, pools 
 of blood, dead and wounded men, and the bloated and 
 oftensive carcasses of horses, were some of the visible re- 
 sults. The hearts of patriots were saddened and their 
 feelings shocked to see the remains of the brave men who 
 had yielded up their lives that the Nation might live, he- 
 cause of the necessary haste with which they were interred, 
 in many instances but partially covered with earth. These 
 partly covered bodies were scattered for miles over ground 
 that would soon be cultivated. The graves which were 
 marked were only temporarily so, and the marks would 
 soon decay or be obliterated, and all traces of the sacred 
 
 520 
 
ORIGIN OF GETTYSBURG CEMETERY. 521 
 
 dust bo entirely lost. Humanity shuddered at the sight, 
 and patriotism revolted at such desecration. The idea 
 then was suggested of purchasing a suitable piece of 
 ground upon some elevated place, and gathering these 
 men from all parts of the field and decently interring them 
 side by side. Mr. David Wills, a citizen of Gettysburg, 
 submitted a proposition to effect the purpose to his Ex- 
 cellency, Governor Andrew G. Curtin, in a letter dated 
 July 24th, 1863; and the governor, with the promptness 
 and zeal for the cause of the Union, and the welfare and 
 comfort of the soldiers, which he had always shown, ap- 
 proved of the design, and appointed Mr. Wills as agent to 
 carry out the project. Mr. Wills at once opened corre- 
 spondence with the governors of other states, which had 
 soldiers dead upon the field, and they all with great 
 promptness responded and seconded the plan. About 
 seventeen acres of ground on Cemetery Hill, at the apex 
 of the triangular line of battle of the Union army, was 
 purchased and the title made to the State of Pennsylvania. 
 Ko more beautiful or appropriate place for the gallant 
 heroes who died upon that field, could be found than the 
 one selected. It is high and prominent. It was the center 
 of the Federal position. Upon it were planted the but- 
 teries which thundered forth death and destruction to the 
 foe; and it was there that the awful fire of Lee's one 
 hundred and twenty a;uns was concentrated during that 
 fearful two hours' artillery duel, which preceded Pickett's 
 great, but wild and disastrous charge. Lots in this ceme- 
 tery were gratuitously given to each State having dead on 
 the field. It was arranged that the expenses for the re- 
 moval and re-interment of the dead, the laying out, orna- 
 
PLAN OF THE CEMETERY. 523 
 
 Lenting, and enclosing of the grounds, erecting a lodge 
 £br the keeper, and constructing a suitable monument, 
 •should be borne by the several States, and assessed in 
 proportion to their population, as indicated by their repre- 
 sentation in Congress. 
 
 The Soldiers' National Cemetery is enclosed by a well 
 built stone wall, surmounted with heavy dressed capping 
 stones. This wall extends along the south, west, and 
 north sides of the grounds. The division fence between 
 it and the local cemetery of the town is of iron. The 
 lodge for the residence of the keeper is a beautiful 
 structure, and the front fence and gate -way are of orna- 
 mental iron work. The grounds have been graded, and 
 are adorned with many beautiful trees, shrubbery, and 
 flowers. The burial-place proper is semi -circular in 
 form. In the center of this semi -circle stands the Na- 
 tional Monument. The grounds from this center slope 
 off gradually in every direction. They are laid out in 
 lots, each State proportioned in size to the number of its 
 dead. Each of these lots is divided into sections, with a 
 space of four feet for a walk between the sections. There 
 are also spaces set apart for the Regulars, as also for 
 those whose identity could not be distinguished. Many 
 of those who fell in the first day's engagement are among 
 the latter; they lay either unburied and exposed to the sun 
 and rain, until the Monday following the battle, or were 
 but slightly covered. The outer division of the section 
 is lettered "A," and so on in alphabetical order. As the 
 observer stands in the center of the semi -circle, facing 
 the circumference, the burials are commenced at the right 
 hand of the section in each lot, and the graves are num- 
 
524 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 bered regularly. A register is kept of the number, name, 
 regiment, and company of the occupant of each grave. 
 Two feet of space is allowed to each, and they are laid 
 with their heads toward the center of the semi - circle. At 
 the head of the graves there is a stone wall, built up from 
 the bottom as a foundation for the head - stones, which are 
 placed along the whole length of each section, and on 
 
 GENERAL REYNOLDS' MONUMENT IN THE SOLDIERS' NATIONAL CEME- 
 TERY AT GETTYSBURG. (From a photograph by Tipton.) 
 
 which, opposite each grave, is engraved the name, regi- 
 ment, and the company of the deceased. These head- 
 stones are all alike in size, the design being wholly adapted 
 to a symmetrical order, and one which combines simplicity 
 and durability. The remains of the soldiers were taken 
 up and re-interred with great care. Every precaution was 
 
GENERAL REYNOLDS' MONUMENT. 525 
 
 taken to identify the unmarked graves, and also to pre- 
 vent the marked graves from losing their identity by the 
 defacement of the original temporary boards, on which 
 the names were written or cut by their comrades in arms. 
 The graves being all numbered, the numbers are regis- 
 tered in a record -book, with the name, company, and 
 regiment. This register will ever designate the graves 
 and preserve the identity of the occupants. The coffins 
 and head- stones were furnished by the Government, and 
 the cemetery is kept in order by persons appointed and 
 paid by the same. A careful account was also taken 
 and kept of each article found in the pockets, or about 
 the person of the deceased. 
 
 Not all, however, who fell at this place in the sacred 
 cause of Freedom were interred here. Many were taken 
 away by their friends and buried among their own kindred; 
 and many others who were wounded and taken to their 
 homes, or to distant hospitals, and died there, were laid 
 away to rest where they died. Among the killed who 
 were removed was the brave, the lamented Reynolds. His 
 body was borne to his native city, Lancaster, Pennsyl- 
 vania, where, amidst his own kindred, he sleeps. A beau- 
 tiful monument, however, has been erected by his com- 
 rades, in the National Cemetery, near the entrance, a view 
 of which is shown in our illustration. 
 
 But of all the gallant heroes who fell at Gettysburg, 
 "wherever they rest, it may truthfully be said: 
 
 "They fell devoted, but undying; 
 Their very names the gale seems sighing; 
 The rivers murmur of their name; 
 The woods are peopled with their fame; 
 The silent tombstone, cold and gray, 
 
526 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Claims kindred with their hallowed clay; 
 Their spirits wrap the dusky mountains; 
 Their memory sparkles over the fountains; 
 The meanest rill, the mightiest river, 
 Rolls mingling' with their fame forever." 
 
 The Soldiers' National Monument, standing in this semi- 
 circle, is one of the most beautiful works of art upon the 
 continent. The whole rendering of the design is intended 
 to be purely historical, telling its own story, with such 
 simplicity that any discerning mind will readily compre- 
 hend its meaning and purpose. 
 
 The superstructure is sixty feet high, and consists of a 
 massive granite pedestal, twenty -five feet square at the 
 base, crowned by a colossal statue, representing the Genius 
 of Liberty. Standing upon a three quarter globe, she 
 raises with her right hand the victor's wreath of laurel, 
 while with her left she gathers up the folds of our na- 
 tional flag under which the victory has been won. 
 
 Projecting from the angles of the pedestal are four 
 buttresses, supporting an equal number of allegorical 
 statues representing, respectively, War, History, Peace, 
 and Plenty. 
 
 War is personified by a statue of the American soldier, 
 who, resting from the conflict, relates to History the story 
 of the battle which this monument is intended to com- 
 memorate. 
 
 History, in listening attitude, records with stylus and 
 tablet the achievements of the field, and the names of the 
 honored dead. 
 
 Peace is symbolized by a statue of the American me- 
 chanic, characterized by appropriate accessories. 
 
 Plenty is represented by a female figure, with a sheaf 
 
1 mm 
 
 SOLDIERS' NATIONAL MONUMENT. 
 
 [527] 
 
o28 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 of wheat and fruits of the earth, typifying peace and 
 abundance as the soldier's crowning triumph. 
 
 Upon the panels of the main die between the statues are 
 appropriate inscriptions, one of which is the concluding- 
 part of President Lincoln's address upon the occasion of 
 the dedication of this cemetery, as follows: 
 
 " It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task 
 remaining before us — that from these honored dead we 
 take increased devotion to the cause for which they here 
 gave the last fall measure of devotion — that we here 
 highly resolve that the dead shall not have died in vain; 
 that the nation shall, under God, have a new birth of free- 
 dom, and that the government of the people, by the people? 
 and for the people, shall not perish from the earth." 
 
 The main die of the pedestal is octagonal in form, 
 panelled upon each face. The cornice and plinth above 
 are also octagonal, and are heavily molded. Upon this 
 plinth rests an octagonal molded base, bearing upon its 
 face, in high relief, the National arms. 
 
 The upper die and cap are circular in form, the die 
 being encircled by stars equal in number with the States 
 whose sons contributed their lives as the price of the 
 victory won at Gettysburg. 
 
 The ground thus purchased and set apart for the burial 
 of those who fell at Gettysburg in defense of the Govern- 
 ment, was, on November 19th, 1863, solemnly dedicated to 
 this sacred purpose. There were present, beside a vast 
 concourse of people from all parts of the country, the 
 President of the United States, several members of his 
 cabinet, the ministers of France and Italy, the governors 
 of several States, representatives of the army and navy, 
 
DEDICATION OF THE CEMETERY. 529 
 
 members of Congress, and many other distinguished per- 
 sons. A stand or platform was erected for the speakers 
 and invited guests. This stand stood just where the Na- 
 tional Monument now stands. The exercises were opened 
 by music by Birgfield's band, after which followed an elo- 
 quent and impressive prayer by Iiev. Thomas H. Stock- 
 ton, D. D., from which I make the following extracts: 
 
 "By this Altar of Sacrifice; on this Field of Deliver- 
 ance; on this Mount of Salvation; within the fiery and 
 bloody line of the ' Munitions of Rocks,' looking back to 
 the dark days of fear and trembling, and to the rapture of 
 relief that came after, we multiply our thanksgivings, and 
 confess our obligations to renew and perfect our personal 
 and social consecration to Thy service and glory. 
 
 "Oh, had it not been for God! For lo! our enemies, 
 they came unresisted, multitudinous, mighty, flushed with 
 victory, and sure of success. They exulted on our mount- 
 ains; they revelled in our valleys; they feasted, they rested; 
 they slept, they awakened; they grew stronger, prouder, 
 bolder, every day; they spread abroad, they concentrated 
 here; they looked beyond this horizon to the stores of 
 wealth, to the haunts of pleasure, and to the seats of power 
 in our capital and chief cities. They proposed to cast a 
 chain of slavery around the form of Freedom, binding 
 life and death together forever. Their premature triumph 
 was the mockery of God and man. One more victory, 
 and all was theirs! But behind these hills was heard the 
 feeble march of a smaller, but pursuing host. Onward 
 they hurried, day and night, for God and their country. 
 Foot -sore, way-worn, hungry, thirsty, faint, — but not in 
 heart, — they came to dare all, to bear all, and to do all 
 
530 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 that is possible to heroes. And Thou didst sustain them! 
 At first they met the blast on the plain, and bent before it 
 like the trees in a storm. But then, led by Thy hand to 
 these hills, they took their stand upon the rocks and re- 
 mained as firm and immovable as the} 7 . In vain were 
 they assaulted. All art, all violence, all desperation, failed 
 to dislodge them. Baffled, bruised, broken, their enemies 
 recoiled, retired, and disappeared. Glory to God for this 
 rescue! But oh, the slain! In the freshness and fulness 
 of their young and manly life, with such sweet memories 
 of father and mother, brother and sister, wife and children, 
 maiden and friends, they died for us. From the coasts 
 beneath the eastern sky, from the shores of northern lakes 
 and rivers, from the flowers of the western prairies, and 
 from the homes of the midway and border, they came here 
 to die for us and for mankind. Alas, how little we can 
 do for them! We come with the humility of prayer, with 
 the pathetic eloquence of venerable wisdom, with the 
 tender beauty of poetry, with the plaintive harmony of 
 music, with the honest tribute of our Chief Magistrate, 
 and with all this honorable attendance; but our best hope 
 is in thy blessing, O Lord, our God! Father, bless us! 
 Bless the bereaved, whether present or absent; bless our 
 sick and wounded soldiers and sailors; bless all our rulers 
 and people; bless our army and navy; bless the efforts for 
 the suppression of the rebellion; and bless all the associa- 
 tions of this day and place and scene forever. As the trees 
 are not dead, though their foliage is gone, so our heroes 
 are not dead, though their forms arc fallen. In their 
 proper personality they are all with Thee. And the spirit 
 of their example is here. It fills the air; it fills our hearts. 
 
president Lincoln's dedicatory address. 531 
 
 And, long as time shall last, it will hover in the skies and 
 rest on the landscape ; and the pilgrims of onr own land, 
 and from all lands, will thrill with its inspiration, and in- 
 crease and confirm their devotion to liberty, religion, and 
 God." 
 
 At the conclusion of this prayer, the Marine Band of 
 Washington rendered excellent and appropriate music, 
 after which Hon. Edward Everett delivered an able and 
 elaborate address. Following this address a chorus sang 
 the hymn composed specially for the occasion by B. B. 
 French, Esq., some verses of which are given at the close 
 of this chapter. The President of the United States, the 
 honored and revered Lincoln, then, amidst the tremen- 
 dous applause of the assembled multitude, arose and 
 slowly advanced to the front of the platform and de- 
 livered his celebrated dedicatory address, which was as 
 follows : 
 
 "Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought 
 forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in 
 Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are 
 created equal. 
 
 "Now we are 'engaged in a great civil war, testing 
 whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so 
 dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle 
 field of that Avar. We are met to dedicate a portion of it 
 as a final resting place of those who here gave their lives 
 that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and 
 proper that we should do this. 
 
 "But in a larger sense we can not dedicate, we can not 
 consecrate, we can not hallow this ground. The brave 
 men, living and dead, who struggled here have consecrated 
 
532 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 it far above our power to add or detract. The world will 
 little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can 
 never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, 
 rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that 
 they have thus so nobly carried on. It is rather for us to 
 be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us — 
 that from these honored dead we take increased devotion 
 to the cause for which they gave the last full measure of 
 devotion — that we highly resolve that the dead shall not 
 have died in vain; that the nation shall, under God, have 
 a new birth of freedom, and that the government of the 
 people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish 
 from the earth." 
 
 The words of the president were uttered in slow and 
 measured tones, and although not heard by the large ma- 
 jority of the people present, the most profound silence was 
 observed during their delivery. When he uttered the 
 closing sentences, which have become immortal, empha- 
 sizing each with a significant nod and jerk of his head, — 
 "that the government of the people, by the people, mid for the 
 people, shall not perish from the earth," — it occurred to the 
 writer, who stood within a few feet of him, that those 
 words were destined to an imperishable immortality. 
 
 After the president's dedicatory address, a solemn dirge 
 was sung, after which the benediction was pronounced by 
 Rev. II. L. Baugher, D.D. 
 
 The admiration of the people for President Lincoln ex- 
 ceeded that ever bestowed upon any other person within 
 my knowledge. It was evidently not so much for him 
 personally, as representatively. He was recognized as the 
 personification of the cause which was enshrined in every 
 
THE SPIRIT OF THE NATION. 533 
 
 patriot's heart, and for which the armies of the Union 
 were contending. To love the Union was to love Abraham 
 Lincoln. To hate and defame him was the acknowledged 
 evidence of disloyalty. The honored head of the Nation, 
 the humble and unpretending man from Illinois, standing 
 upon the ground where one of the greatest battles of 
 modern times occurred, and in which the existence and 
 destiny of the Government were in part decided, modestly 
 received the willing homage of the assembled thousands. 
 The Man — the President — the Government — the yet un- 
 decided peril to which it was exposed — the ground we 
 were on — the sleeping thousands all about us, whose blood 
 had been poured out upon that soil that the Nation might 
 live, all conspired to make the occasion one never to be 
 forgotten. 
 
 During the twenty -three years that have elapsed since 
 this ground was dedicated to the sacred purpose of the in- 
 terment of these honored dead, many improvements have 
 been made. Additional grounds have been purchased; 
 avenues along the lines held by the Federals have been 
 laid out; tablets have been erected to mark the places 
 where corps, divisions, brigades, and regiments stood, and 
 monuments where distinguished men fell. States whose 
 troops fought in this battle are appropriating money for 
 additional improvements, and in the years to come the 
 field of Gettysburg will increase in beauty and interest, 
 and will be visited by untold thousands. 
 
 Such was the origin of this final resting place for the 
 remains of the heroic men who fell upon the field of Get- 
 tysburg. Who can estimate the importance to the race 
 of their valor and heroism? They have fallen, but victory 
 
534 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 is ours — theirs the enrollment upon the scroll of undying 
 fame. They did not fight in vain. Not for themselves, 
 but for their children, for the race, for humanity, for 
 righteousness, for God, they gave themselves a willing 
 sacrifice. Their remains deserve the highest honor that 
 a grateful people can bestow. Their deeds will live in 
 history long after their bodies have mouldered into dust; 
 and the place where they lie will be honored, protected, 
 and preserved as a sad, but sacred, memento of their heroic 
 conduct. And, as was intimated in Dr. Stockton's im- 
 pressive prayer, the place where this great battle was 
 fought, the ground where the dust of the slain reposes, 
 has become the Nation's shrine, and pilgrims from our 
 own land, and from all lands, will ever continue to visit 
 it to catch a new inspiration of freedom, and increase and 
 confirm their devotion to Liberty, to Religion, and to God. 
 
 In the Soldiers' National Cemetery at Gettysburg there 
 are interred the bodies of three thousand five hundred and 
 fifty -five Union soldiers. They were from the following 
 states: Maine, one hundred and four; New Hampshire, 
 forty -eight; Vermont, sixty -one; Massachusetts, one hun- 
 dred and fifty -nine; Rhode Island, twelve; Connecticut, 
 twenty -two; New York, eight hundred and sixty -six; 
 New Jersey, seventy -eight; Pennsylvania, five hundred 
 and twenty -six; Delaware, fifteen; Maryland, twenty -two; 
 West Virginia, eleven; Ohio, one hundred and thirty -one; 
 Indiana, eighty; Illinois, six; Michigan, one hundred and 
 seventy-one; Wisconsin, seventy -three; Minnesota, fifty- 
 two ; United States Regulars, one hundred and thirty - eight; 
 Unknown, nine hundred and seventy - nine. These fallen 
 patriots having come together from the East, North, and 
 
THE DEDICATION HYMN. 535 
 
 "West, and stood side by side under one flag, inspired by 
 one spirit, and fought for one cause, it is bnt right and 
 proper that they should not be divided in death, but rest 
 in the ground hallowed by their valor and made sacred by 
 their blood. For them there is no more separation from 
 home and loved ones at their country's call, no more weary 
 marches, no more digging of trenches, no more charging 
 into yawning chasms of death, no more painful wounds 
 and sleepless nights, and long and weary days in hospitals. 
 All these are forever ended. On this Altar of Sacrifice, 
 this Mount of Salvation, this Field of Deliverance, and 
 surrounded by these Munitions of Rocks, let them rest 
 until the Archangel's clarion shall sound with a louder 
 blast than that which summoned them to this field of 
 heroic deeds. 
 
 " 'Tis holy ground — 
 This spot, where, in their graves, 
 Are placed our country's braves, 
 Who fell in freedom's holy cause, 
 Fighting for liberties and laws: 
 
 Let tears abound. 
 
 "Here where they fell, 
 Oft shall the widow's tears be shed; 
 Oft shall fond parents mourn their dead; 
 The orphan here shall kneel and weep, 
 And maidens where their lovers sleep, 
 
 Their woes to tell. 
 
 "Here let them rest: 
 And summer's heat and winter's cold 
 Shall glow and freeze above their mould— 
 A thousand years shall pass away — 
 A nation still shall mourn their clay 
 
 Which now is blest." 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 A GUIDE TO THE FIELD OF BATTLE. 
 
 MR^ISITORS to Gettysburg should bear in mind that 
 JE£ the field of battle extends over about twenty -five 
 _ I square miles; and while events of thrilling interest 
 
 fr occurred at every portion, a few points only, which 
 possess special interest, and from which a general 
 view of the whole may be had, can be visited by those 
 whose time is limited. Those, however, whose time will 
 justify it should employ one of the many excellent guides 
 at all times to be found, whose services, with the neces- 
 sary means of conveyance, can be had for a reasonable 
 compensation. To such as have but a day, or part of a 
 day, to spend in inspecting the field, the following direc- 
 tions will be of value. 
 
 In approaching Gettysburg from the north, you pass 
 along and through part of the battle field of the first day. 
 The wooded elevation to your right, just before entering 
 the town, is Oak Hill, and is almost the center of the Union 
 line. The line of battle extended from this ridge in a 
 north-easterly direction for about a mile. The ridge, 
 which you see to your right, and which extends for several 
 miles in a southerly direction, is Seminary Ridge. Along 
 
 536 
 
GENERAL VIEW OF GETTYSBURG. 537 
 
 this ridge, from the Chambersburg pike to a short distance 
 below Big Round Top, — about three miles, — the Con- 
 federate line extended during the battles of the second and 
 third days. That large brick building upon this hill, sur- 
 mounted by a cupola, is the Lutheran Theological Seminary, 
 from which the hill was named. The left of the Federal 
 line, on the first day's engagement, extended down some 
 distance below this building; and near it General Rey- 
 nolds was killed. That large white building to your left 
 is Pennsylvania College. It was used as a hospital during 
 the battle, and from its cupola General Lee took observa- 
 tions. The first road, or street, which leaves the town, 
 and leads up and over the hill in a westerly direction, is 
 the Chambersburg Pike. By this road the principal part of 
 the Confederate army came, and by it their great wagon 
 train of w T ounded retreated after the close of the three 
 days of conflict. Along this road, a short distance out, 
 stands a stone house in which General Lee had his head- 
 quarters. The next road immediately after this, which runs 
 in a south -westerly direction, crossing Seminary Ridge 
 below the seminary, is the Fairfield Road. It crosses the 
 South Mountain by Monterey Pass. Upon this road the 
 Confederate army retreated after the battle. 
 
 Turning to your left, you see in the distance the Adams 
 County'Alms-honse, around which desperate fighting took 
 place. The hills to your left are Gulp's and Wolff Hill 
 — names which have become historic. Cemetery Hill, 
 crowned with the stars and stripes, rises to your view just 
 beyond the town. 
 
 Arrived at Gettysburg, you will proceed first to East 
 Cemetery Hill. This stands at the southern edge 
 
538 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 of the town, and you reach it by going out Baltimore 
 Street, or the Baltimore Pike. Upon this hill, to your 
 left, and directly opposite the entrance to the Soldiers' 
 National Cemetery, is the center of the Federal position. 
 A view of the breast-works and cannon, which yet re- 
 main, is given on page 278 of this book. Ilerc the broken, 
 
 OBSERVATORY ON F.AST CKMKTKRY HIIJ,. 
 (From a photograph by Tipton,) 
 
 but heroic survivors of the First and Eleventh corps ral- 
 lied behind those guns which you see around you. And 
 here, in the evening of the second day's engagement, the 
 most desperate hand to hand fighting took place. The 
 Louisiana Tigers charged up and upon this hill and cap- 
 tured the guns, but after a desperate and terrific hand to 
 hand fight, in which the butts of guns, cannon rammers, 
 
VIEW FROM EAST CEMETERY HILL. Doi> 
 
 and stones were used, they were driven away, and in their 
 retreat a battery stationed to your right across that de- 
 pression, swept through and through them with grape 
 and canister. But let us mount the Observatory upon 
 this hill and take a survey. Here you have an excellent 
 view of the scene of the first day's engagement. From 
 Seminary Ridge, about a mile to the west, and a half mile 
 south of the Theological Seminary, to about two miles to 
 the north and north-east, at Barlow's Knoll, where a 
 monument may be seen, the line of battle extended. Over 
 the fields intervening the conflict raged; and when the 
 Federals were compelled to fall back, they retreated over 
 these and through the town to the hill upon which you 
 stand. Turning your eyes to the west and south-west you 
 have a fine view of Seminary Ridge upon which the Con- 
 federate line rested during the battles of the second and 
 third days. The illustrations upon pages 260 and 298 
 show this ridge from where the Chambersburg pike crosses 
 it, to that point where Pickett's division of Longstreet's 
 Corps joined the right of Hill's; and the illustration in 
 this chapter — View from Little Round Top looking west — 
 shows the extension of that hill to the extreme right of 
 the Confederate line. 
 
 Turning toward the east — but about a half mile — is 
 Culj^s Hill, a view of which is given on page 280, and be- 
 youd it is Wolff Hill, where the Federal right terminated. 
 Upon Gulp's Hill you will see the Federal breast- works, 
 which yet remain as is shown on page 302. A short 
 distance further east is Spangler's Spring, where, on the 
 evening of the second day of the battle, Johnson's division, 
 in the absence of nearly the whole of the Twelfth Corps, 
 
540 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 which defended that part of the line, and had been sent 
 to assist in repelling Longstreet's assault upon the left r 
 succeeded in obtaining an entrance, which, had it been 
 followed up, might have proved fatal to the Federals. 
 This position the Confederates held during the night, but 
 were driven out in the morning after a fearful and des- 
 perate engagement of six hours duration. The slain hero- 
 were many, the Confederates losing most heavily. 
 
 Returning from Culp's Hill, we enter the Soldiers' Na- 
 tional Cemetery, and view the beautiful resting-place of 
 the heroic slain. A beautiful view of this sacred place will 
 be found in the preceding chapter. That bronzed statu a 
 near the entrance is to the brave, noble, and gallant Rey- 
 nolds. Although the place of his death is a mile to the 
 west, and his body was interred at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 
 his statue was placed here. It is but right that in the ab- 
 sence of himself, that which represents him should be placed 
 among his gallant fallen comrades. From the Cemetery, as* 
 well as from the Observatory, you have an excellent view 
 of the Confederate position of the second and third days. 
 Upon that ridge their line was formed, and all along it 
 down to Round Top, and through the town, and around 
 to the north-east of it — a distance from one extreme to 
 the other of about four and a half miles — a line of bristling 
 bayonets stood. And all along that ridge, as well as upon 
 elevated positions to the north and north-east, across the? 
 fields and beyond the town, their batteries were planted. 
 These all in terrible concert opened upon the place where 
 you now stand during the fearful two hours' prelude to 
 Pickett's great assault upon the afternoon of the 3d of 
 July. The ground all about you was torn and ploughed 
 
ON THE WAT TO LITTLE ROUND TOP. 541 
 
 with shot and shell, and almost every foot of it was hal- 
 lowed with patriot blood. That modest looking building 
 you. see to your left, standing by the side of the Taney- 
 town road, was General Meade's Head -quarters. Just 
 before Pickett's great assault, General Meade removed 
 to Powers' Hill, which stands about half a mile to the 
 south -east by the Baltimore pike, where General Slocum 
 had previously established his head -quarters. 
 
 Having satisfied your curiosity, or spent as much time 
 as you have at your disposal in looking about this part of 
 the field, you will next proceed to Little Hound Top. 
 
 Round Top is about three miles south of Gettysburg, 
 and the train, if you go by rail, will land you at Round Top 
 Park, on the eastern slope of that historic hill. Passing 
 •down by rail from the town, you go between the lines of 
 the two armies — Seminary Ridge on your right, and Ceme- 
 tery Hill and Ridge on your left. That dilapidated yellow 
 farm house, with a barn opening toward you, about two 
 hundred yards to your right, and just on this crossing of 
 that lane, marks the extreme left of Pickett's great assault- 
 ing column. On your left you will see, on the slope of the 
 hill, a clump of trees, one of which is umbrella shaped. This 
 was the center and focus of the great charge, and General 
 Pickett, it is said, directed his men to aim at that place. 
 At that point the Federal line was pierced; there General 
 Armistead received his mortal wound; near it Hancock 
 was wounded; and there the rebellion received its death- 
 blow. Excellent views of this historic place, with the 
 ground over which the charge was made, are given on 
 pages 370, 874. To your right, as the train crosses the 
 Emmittsburg road, you will see a brick house and red barn. 
 
542 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 These are Codori's, so frequently spoken of in the history 
 of the battle. These buildings mark about the center of 
 Pickett's assaulting column. In and behind the grove, about 
 a half mile west, upon Seminary Ridge, this column was 
 formed. 
 
 Over the ground all about you the Confederate hosts 
 passed under a terrific artillery and musketry fire. The 
 guns from Round. Top and East Cemetery Hill ploughed 
 through and through them diagonally from right to left, 
 and from left to right, covering the ground with their 
 slain. 
 
 Arriving at Round Top Park, you ascend b} T a gradual 
 slope to its summit. The ground over which you pass is 
 historic. Over it the Union forces moved to charge the 
 enemy. Round Top was the key to the field, and to seize 
 and hold it the Confederates made the most determined 
 and desperate efforts, but were met and driven back by 
 the brave defenders of the Union. This hill was baptized 
 with blood. That monument which stands out so con- 
 spicuously marks the spot where the brave General Strong 
 Vincent fell. But a few feet to its rear General Weed fell, 
 and Lieutenant llazlett, in the act of catching him in his 
 arms, also fell pierced by the bullet of a sharp-shooter 
 from the Devil's Den. Near by, too, fell the lamented 
 Colonel O'Rourke while bravely leading his regiment against 
 the foe. Then to your left, where the ground begins to 
 slope toward the depression between Little and Big Round 
 Top, the heroic Chamberlain threw his hardy sons of Maine 
 into the form of the letter U to meet the foe, who pressed 
 upon him from every side. And down through the de- 
 pression between these two hills the Pennsylvania Reserves 
 
544 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 made their desperate charge, driving the enemy before 
 them, and this Hill of Salvation was saved to the Union 
 cause. And when the Federals by main force succeeded 
 in planting their cannon upon its rock- crowned brow, it 
 became a second Gibraltar, and victory was assured to the 
 cause of Freedom. Does it not seem that God planted 
 that rock -covered and rock -crowned hill just at that 
 place, with its bold, precipitous, and almost inaccessible 
 side to the enemy, and its comparatively gentle elevation 
 to the Federals, for the express purpose of saving the 
 American Union? 
 
 But let us sit down now, and by the aid of this beautiful 
 illustration, take a more extended view of the field. This 
 view, as its title indicates, gives us a north-eastern out- 
 look. But in order that you may have a correct under- 
 standing of the situation you will bear in mind that the 
 Federal line was in the shape of a fish-hook. The heel 
 of that hook rested upon the place where you now are, its 
 curve upon Cemetery Hill, — the high ground which is seen 
 three miles off to the right, — and its point upon Culp's 
 and Wolff Hills, which lie further to the right, or about a 
 half to three quarters of a mile south - east of Cemetery Hill. 
 These hills are not seen in this picture. Gettysburg lies 
 behind Cemetery Hill. The Federal line, then, on the 
 second and third days of the battle, extended from Round 
 Top, and in front of it, up across the ground between you 
 and that elevation in the extreme right, and then curving 
 in an easterly and then in a south-easterly direction, ended 
 upon Wolf Hill, — the whole about three and a half miles 
 in length. Seminary Ridge, upon which the Confederate 
 line lay, up as far as where the Chambersburg road crosses 
 
546 TIIE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 it, is faintly seen in the distance. This view embraces the- 
 whole field, from the Federal left to the center, and all the 
 ground within view was fought over. 
 
 But we introduce another view from this same hill, 
 looking west and north-west. 
 
 This view presents the theatre of the greatest events in 
 human history. Within an area scarcely more than a 
 mile square, and directly in front of you (the corps badge 
 on the monument marks its eastern side, or the side next 
 to you), amidst those fields and woods and rocks and stones, 
 fifty thousand armed men, like two mighty wrestlers, 
 struggled and fought for four hours for the mastery, 
 strewing the ground with their slain. But let me particu- 
 larize. The ridge, or high ground you see in the distance, 
 and which extends from one end of the picture to the 
 other, is Seminary Ridge, along which the Confederate line 
 lay during the battles of the second and third days. On 
 pages 260 and 298 you have a view of this ridge from 
 where the Chambersburg pike crosses it down beyond the 
 Theological Seminary. On that part of the ridge the 
 Federal left rested during the battle of the first day (facing 
 west), and Hill's Corps was stationed there during the 
 second and third days. This view shows that ridge from 
 where it ends in those pictures down to the Confederate 
 right a little below Big Round Top. The house and barn 
 which are seen just beyond the right of that grove are 
 Codori's. The Em.mittsburg road which leaves the town 
 close by the western base of East Cemetery Hill, — or near 
 the curve of the fish hook, — passes by that house. The 
 group of buildings this side of the grove are TrostWs; and 
 the lane, or narrow road, which is seen running westward 
 
VIEW FROM LITTLE ROUND TOP. 547 
 
 close by those buildings, intersects the Emmittsburg road 
 a short distance beyond that grove a little to the left. In 
 the left hand an°;le where these roads meet is the Peach 
 Orchard. General Sickles' line, in the battle of the after- 
 noon of the second day, extended along the Emmittsburg 
 road, some distance to the left of Codori's to the Peach 
 Orchard, where it formed an angle and passed down in a 
 south-easterly direction through and across the woods and 
 fields in your front to the Devil's Den, which is about six 
 hundred yards in a south-westerly direction from where 
 you sit. Against this line General Longstreet threw his 
 disciplined and brave fighters, and upon the angle at the 
 Peach Orchard the fire of sixty cannon was concentrated, 
 until after some of the most desperate fighting that ever 
 occurred upon this continent, the brave boys in blue were 
 compelled to fall back step by step, covering the ground 
 with the slain of the two armies. At the same time 
 Hood's Texans outflanked Sickles' left by the Devil's Den, 
 and made desperate efforts to capture this hill. Division 
 after division from the Second and Fifth Corps were sent 
 to assist in driving back the enemy, and at length the 
 hill was held. In that enclosed field a little to your right, 
 immediately south of Trostle's and across the lane from 
 that house is the Wheat Field. There occurred what is 
 called the Wliirlpool of the Battle. Regiments from three 
 corps, and from eight or ten brigades, here fought pro- 
 miscuously. The Confederate lines also seemed to be in 
 confusion. The scene as the men advanced and then fell 
 back, and fought in a circle and through and about each 
 othe*, resembled a huge whirlpool and suggested the title 
 given the battle at this place. Hundreds on each side 
 
548 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 here fell, and the ground was drenched with human gore. 
 Upon no other two places of equal extent upon the Ameri- 
 can continent, —the Wheat Field and the Peach Orchard, — 
 excepting probably the Bloody Angle at Spottsylvania, 
 were so many human lives lost, and so much human 
 blood shed. On page 327 a view of the Wheat Field is 
 given. That view is from the west, and from the lane 
 beyond Trostle's. Ayer's division of Regulars charged 
 down into the abyss before you and across the rocky space 
 into those woods, but were driven back with the loss of 
 nearly half their number. An officer who participated 
 in the charge says that it seemed like " going down into 
 hell." The illustration on page 825 shows this fearful vale. 
 It is called "The Valley of Death." In the terrific struggle 
 for the possession of this hill, the Confederates at length 
 came up by the ravine between Big and Little Hound 
 Top, a short distance to the left, and attacked the Federals 
 in flank and rear. At this juncture, when the result of 
 the struggle seemed to be so nearly decided in favor of 
 the Confederates, the Pennsylvania Reserves, under the 
 gallant Crawford, charged, and with tremendous cheers 
 dashed upon the foe and drove them at the point of the 
 bayonet down the slope, over the Valley of Death, and 
 across the stone fence by the "Wheat Field. This point 
 the gallant Pennsylvanians held to the close of the battle 
 of the following day, when, after the repulse of Pickett's 
 assault, they made another charge and regained the ground 
 lost by Sickles the day before. Big Round Top, just south 
 of you, had been occupied by Confederate sharp-shooters, 
 and in the evening after Longstreet's final repulse, a de- 
 tachment of Pennsylvania Reserves drove them away and 
 
VIEW FROM LITTLE ROUND TOP. 549 
 
 took possession of the hill, and held it until the final re- 
 treat of the enemy. Its abrupt, precipitous, and rocky 
 sides prevented artillery from being takeu to its summit, 
 hence it was of comparatively little value, and little eflbrt 
 was made for its possession. All along that lane, which 
 runs westward by Trostle's and the Wheat Field, and 
 among those rocks and boulders, south of it, are monu- 
 ments and tablets which mark the places where noble and 
 heroic men fell. Among them is that monument in the 
 Wheat Field to General Zook; the magnificent monument 
 to Colonel Ellis of the One Hundred and Twenty - fourth 
 New York, surmounted by his statue in marble, a little to 
 the left and just beyond the Devil's Den; and that hum- 
 ble stone tablet, which is seen across the Valley of Death, 
 marks the spot where Colonel Frederick Taylor, of the Buck- 
 tails, met his fate. All about Trostle's to the right of the 
 Wheat Field, the battle raged with terrible fury, and the 
 ground was strewed with the slain. The Devil's Den, that 
 wonderful freak of nature, the home of Confederate sharp- 
 shooters, by whose deadly aim so many prominent officer^ 
 fell, is seen about six hundred yards in front and a little 
 to the left. (Fine views of this are given on pages 320 
 and 322.) Visitors should, if possible, visit the places 
 named, all of which except the Peach Orchard, which is 
 about one mile distant, are within easy and convenient 
 reach. 
 
 Before dismissing this picture, there is one more view 
 which is "of special importance. Turn your eyes now to 
 the grove which stands upon Seminary Ridge, directly 
 west of Codori's, (toward the top of the picture,) and you 
 have the place where Picketfs great assaulting columns 
 
550 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 formed, and from which they came. The ground about 
 Codori's, and up to the Federal line, was the scene of 
 their great charge, and the artillery planted upon this 
 hill decimated their ranks as it ploughed through and 
 through them. 
 
 Big Round Top, as already stated, was not of so much 
 importance, and comparatively little fighting was done for 
 its possession. If able to do a little climbing, by all means 
 go to the top of this hill. Stone steps wind up to its 
 summit, upon which stands an Observatory, from the top 
 of which you will have a view of sublimity and grandeur, 
 as well as of historic interest, which has few equals any- 
 where. Upon a clear day, and without the aid of a glass, 
 Hanover and Littlestown to the east, Taneytown to the 
 south, and Emmittsburg to the south-west, can be seen. 
 Even the hills below Frederick, bordering on the Poto- 
 mac, are visible. With the aid of a glass the view is of 
 course more extensive and satisfactory. In the fields to 
 the east, sheltered by these hills, part of the immense 
 wagon train of the army was parked. The greater part 
 was left in the neighborhood of Frederick. Upon that 
 elevated ground west of you the Confederate right rested, 
 and in the ravine which intervenes Kilpatrick made his 
 famous dash upon the Confederates while Pickett's charge 
 was in progress. In this charge the gallant Farnsworth, 
 promoted to the command of a brigade but the Sunday 
 before, fell. 
 
 Visitors should, if possible, return to Gettysburg by the 
 Avenue, wdrich runs along the Federal line. Tablets and 
 monuments of exquisite design, and some of them exe- 
 cuted at great expense, are found all along this avenue. 
 
MONUMENTS ON THE FIELD. 551 
 
 These mark the places where distinguished men fell, as 
 also where the various corps, divisions, brigades, and regi- 
 ments fought. The different states whose sons fought 
 upon this field are vying with one another in erecting these 
 mementos. They are to be seen standing everywhere — 
 all over the field of strife. These, with the hundreds 
 which will yet be erected, in connection with the sacred 
 associations of the place, will make the Battle Field of 
 Gettysburg a place of the greatest interest upon the Ameri- 
 can continent during all the ages to come. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 A. 
 
 EXTRACT FROM HON. A. H. STEPHENS' ADDRESS AT SAVANNAH, GEORGIA. 
 
 Reference is made on page 108 to the address of Hon. A. H. Stephens in 
 Savannah, Georgia, March 21st, 1861, upon the occasion of his election to the 
 office of Vice-President of the Confederacy, in which he unequivocably de- 
 clared that Slavery was the basis and corner-stone of the new government 
 sought to be established. That part of this address which relates to this sub- 
 juct is as follows: 
 
 'But, not to be tedious in enumerating the numerous changes for the 
 better, allow me to allude to one other — though last, not least: the new con- 
 stitution has put at rest forever all the agitating questions relating to our 
 peculiar institution — African slavery as it exists among us — the proper 
 status 0/ the negro in our form af civilization. This was the immediate 
 cause of the late rupture and the present revolution. Jefferson, in his fore- 
 cast, had anticipated this, as the 'rock upon which the old Union would split.' 
 He was right. What was conjecture with him is now a realized fact. But 
 whether he comprehended the great truth upon which that rock stood and 
 stands, may be doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most 
 of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old constitution 
 were, that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of 
 nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. 
 It was an evil they knew not. well how to deal with; but the general opinion 
 of the men of that da}' was, that some how or other, in the order of Provi- 
 dence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away. This idea, 
 though not incorporated in the constitution, was the prevailing idea at the 
 time. The constitution, it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the 
 
 553 
 
554 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 institution while it should last, and hence no argument can be justly used 
 against the constitutional guarantees thus secured, because of the common 
 sentiment of the day. These ideas, however, were fundamentally zvrong. 
 They rested upon the assumption of the equality of the races. This was an 
 error. It was a sandy foundation; and the idea of a government built upon 
 it — when the storm came and the wind blew, it fell. 
 
 " Our new government is founded upon exailly the opposite ideas; its 
 foundations are laid, its corner stone rests upon the great trzilh that the 
 negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the su- 
 perior race, is his natural and normal condition. [Applause.] This, our 
 new government, is the first in the history of the world, based upon this 
 great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. This truth has been slow 
 in the process of its development, like all other truths in the various depart- 
 ments of science. It is so, even amongst us. Many who hear me, perhaps. 
 can recollect well that this truth was not generally admitted, even within 
 their day. The errors of the past generation still cling to many. Those at 
 the North who still cling to these errors with a zeal above knowledge we 
 justly denominate fanatics. All fanaticism springs from an aberration of the 
 mind; from a defect in reasoning. It is a species of insanity. One of the 
 most striking characteristics of insanity, in many instances, is, forming cor- 
 rect conclusions from fancied or erroneous premises; so with the anti- slavery 
 fanatics; their conclusions are right if their premises are. They assume that 
 the negro is equal, and hence conclude that he is entitled to equal privileges 
 and rights with the white man. If their premises were correct, their con- 
 clusions would be logical and just; but their premises being wrong, their 
 whole argument falls. I recollect once of having heard a gentleman from 
 one of the Northern states, of great power and ability, announce in the 
 House of Representatives, with imposing effect, that we of the South would 
 be compelled, ultimately, to yield up this subject of slavery; that it was im- 
 possible to war successfully against a principle in politics, as it was in physics 
 or mechanics — that the principle would ultimately prevail — that we, in 
 maintaining slavery, as it now exists with us, were warring against a principle 
 — a principle founded in nature — the principle of the equality of man. The 
 reply I made to him was, that, upon his own grounds, we should succeed; 
 that he and his associates in their crusade against our institutions would 
 ultimately fail. The truth announced, that it was impossible to war success- 
 fully against a principle in politics as in physics and mechanics, I admitted; 
 but told him it was he, and those acting with him, who were warring against 
 a principle. They were attempting to make things equal which the Creator 
 had made unequal. 
 
A. H. STEPHENS 7 ADDRESS. 555 
 
 "In the conflict thus far, success has been on our side complete, throughout 
 the length and breadth of the Confederate states. It is upon this, as I have 
 stated, our social fabric is firmly planted; and I can not permit myself to 
 doubt the ultimate success of a full recognition of this principle throughout 
 the civilized and enlightened world. 
 
 "As I have stated, the truth of this principle may be slow in development, 
 as all truths are, and ever have been, in the various branches of science. It 
 was so with the principles announced by Galileo — it was so with Adam 
 Smith, and his principles of political economy. It was so with Harvey, and 
 his theory of the circulation of the blood. It is stated that not a single one 
 of the medical profession, living at the time of the announcement of the 
 truths made by him, admitted them. Now they are universally acknowl- 
 edged. May we not, therefore, look with confidence to the ultimate universal 
 acknowledg ment of the truths upon which our system rests? It is the first 
 government ever instituted upon principles in strict conformity with nature, 
 and the ordination of Providence, in furnishing the materials of human 
 society. Many governments have been founded upon the principle of en- 
 slaving certain classes; but the classes thus enslaved were of the same race, 
 and their enslavement in violation of the laws of nature. Our system com- 
 mits no such violation of nature's laws. The negro, by nature, or by the 
 curse against Canaan, is fitted for that condition which he occupies in our 
 system. The architect, in the construction of buildings, lays the foundation 
 with proper material — the granite — then comes the brick or the marble. 
 The substratum of our society is made of the material fitted by nature for it; 
 and b}^ experience we know that it is the best, not only for the superior, but 
 for the inferior race, that it should be so. It is, indeed, in conformity with 
 the Creator. It is not for us to inquire into the wisdom of his ordinances, or 
 to question them. For his own purposes he has made one race to differ from 
 another, as he has made 'one star to differ from another in glory.' 
 
 " The great objects of humanity are best obtained when conformed to his 
 laws and decrees in the formation of governments as well as in all things 
 else. Our Confederacy is founded upon principles in stritl conformity with 
 Uiese laws. This stone, which was rejected by the first builders, 
 'is become the chief stone of the corner' in our new edifice." [Ap- 
 pVv *e.] 
 
556 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 The following beautiful poem, from which I have quoted a single a verse 
 on page 109, is given here in full. It was written by a Southern man to the 
 people of the South. In the rapid recuperation of the people of that section 
 of our restored Union from the effects of the war, and the increase of their 
 manufacturing and educational interests, the beautifully expressed desire of 
 the author has been already largely realized. That this prosperity may ever 
 continue is the wish and desire of every lover of his country, North as well 
 as South. 
 
 TO THE SOUTH. 
 
 O, subtle, musky, slumbrous clime ! 
 
 O, swart, hot land of pine and palm, 
 Of fig, peach, guava, orange, lime, 
 
 And terebinth and tropic balm I 
 I^and where our Washington was born, 
 When truth in hearts of gold was worn I 
 Mother of Marion, Moultrie, Lee, 
 Widow of fallen chivalry ! 
 No longer sadly look behind, 
 But turn and face the morning wind, 
 
 And feel sweet comfort in the thought : 
 " With each fierce battle's sacrifice 
 I sold the wrong at awful price, 
 
 And bought the good ; but knew it not." 
 
 Cheer up ! Reach out ! Breathe in new life ! 
 Brood not on unsuccessful strife 
 Against the current of the age ; 
 The Highest is thy heritage ! 
 I<eave off this death's-head scowl at Fate, 
 Throttle this hate insatiate, 
 And into thy true heart sink this : 
 "God loves to walk where Freedom is/" 
 
 There is no sweet in dregs and lees ; 
 There is no fruit on girdled trees. 
 Plant new vineyards, sow new fields, 
 For bread and wine the Future yields ; 
 Out of free soil fresh spathes shall start/ 
 Now is the budding -time of Art I 
 
Maurice Thompson's "to the south.", 557 
 
 But hark I Oh ! hear ! My senses reel I 
 Some grand presentiment I feel ! 
 A voice of love, bouquet of Truth, 
 The quick sound of the feet of Youth ! 
 
 1,0 ! from the war-cloud, dull and dense, 
 
 I/aval and chaste, and brave and strong, 
 Comes forth the South with frankincense, 
 
 And vital freshness in her song. 
 The weight is fallen from her wings ; 
 To find a purer air she springs 
 Out of the Night into the Morn, 
 Fair as cotton, sound as corn. 
 
 Hold ! Shall a Northman, fierce and grim, 
 With hoary beard and boreal vim, 
 Thus fling, from some bleak waste of ice, 
 Frost -crystals of unsought advice 
 
 To those who dwell by Coosa's stream, 
 Or on dark hummocks plant the cane 
 Beside the lovely Pontchartrain," 
 
 Or in gay sail -boats drift and dream 
 Where Caribbean breezes stray 
 On Pensacola's drowsy bay? 
 
 Not so ! I am a Southerner ; 
 
 I love the South ; I dared for her 
 
 To fight from Lookout to the sea, 
 
 With her proud banner over me ; 
 
 But from my lips thanksgiving broke, 
 
 As God in battle -thunder spoke, 
 
 And that Black Idol, breeding drouth 
 
 And dearth of human sympathy 
 
 Throughout the sweet and sensuous South, 
 
 Was, with its chains and human yoke, 
 Blown hellward from the cannon's mouth, 
 
 While Freedom cheered behind the smoke ! 
 
 Maurice Thompson. 
 Cruwfordsville, Indiana, 
 
558 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL SICKLES' ALLEGED DISOBEDIENCE OP 
 ORDERS, JULY 1ST, 1863. 
 
 Since the preparation of the chapters relating to the battles of the ist and 
 ad of July, 1S63, a controversy has arisen between certain gentlemen, formerly 
 ccnnected with the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac, and General 
 Sidles, in which the latter is charged with having disregarded an order sent 
 him i>y General Reynolds, in the early morning of July ist, and also one from 
 Generai Meade, on the following day. Unfortunately the only persons who 
 could axitde the truthfulness of these allegations have passed away, and we 
 are left to decide upon the facts and circumstances as related by others. These 
 facts, or statements, we condense and place upon record here. 
 
 That part of the oontroversy which relates to the conduct of General Sickles 
 on July ist, is aa follows: Colonel A. Wilson Norris, in an address delivered 
 at Gettysburg, July ist, 1886, upon the occasion of the dedication of a monu- 
 ment to General Reynolds upon the spot where he fell twenty -three years ago, 
 made two important statements: he attempted to vindicate the battle of the 
 first day from a charge previously made by General Sickles, in a speech de- 
 livered in Boston, Massachusetts, that it was but an accidental collision of the 
 advanced wings of the two armies, and without much influence upon the final 
 result; he also charged that he — Sickles — failed to perform the part assigned 
 to him by Reynolds. Colonel Norris asserted that Reynolds was perfectly 
 aware of the presence near Gettysburg of the enemy in force upon the evening 
 of Tuesday, June 30th, and that he had determined to proceed there the fol- 
 lowing morning and engage him; that he sent an order to Sickles to advance 
 at daylight to that place, which order reached him at one o'clock a. m. of 
 Wednesday, July ist, and that disregarding this order he delayed to march till 
 sometime in the afternoon and only reached the front late in the evening, and 
 that because of such delay the Union army was defeated. 
 
 To this allegation General Sickles enters a positive denial. In an address 
 delivered at Gettysburg, July 2d, 1886, upon the twenty -third anniversary of 
 his battle, Sickles said that General Meade, as well as Reynolds, was ignorant 
 of the fact that the enemy were in force at Gettysburg, that a place for battle 
 had been decided upon on the line of Pipe Creek, between Middletown and 
 Manchester, some twenty -three miles to the rear, and that the left wing of the 
 army, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps, was pushed forward 
 toward Fmmittsburg and Gettysburg as a mask to enable the army to con- 
 
THE GENERAL SICKLES CONTROVERSY. 559 
 
 centrate on the line chosen. The Third Corps, he said, was ordered to 
 Emmittsburg to hold the road running through that place, and while there, 
 as directed, in the afternoon of Wednesday, July ist, he received information 
 that a battle was in progress at Gettysburg; that Reynolds had fallen; that 
 the Federals were being sorely pressed, and that he was needed there. He 
 further says that although under imperative orders from the commander in 
 chief to remain at Emmittsburg and hold that place, he at once upon the 
 receipt of information of the perilous condition at the front, left two brigades 
 and a battery of artillery at that place, and with the remainder of his com- 
 mand moved as quickly as possible to Gettysburg. This, too, "without or- 
 ders; even against orders." 
 
 The case will be better understood by the following: Gettysburg, Taney- 
 town, and Emmittsburg form a triangle, with the first named as its apex, and 
 a line running nearly due west from the second named, its south-eastern 
 angle, to the last named, its south - western angle, as its base. The distance 
 from Gettysburg to Taneytown is thirteen miles, to Emmittsburg, ten miles, 
 and from Taneytown to Emmittsburg, ten miles. Midway between these two 
 last named places, at the crossing of the Monocacy, is Bridgeport. This 
 place is distant from Gettysburg, dire£l, twelve miles, and by way of 
 Emmittsburg, fifteen miles. Marsh Creek is four miles south of Gettysburg 
 on the road leading to Emmittsburg. There is another place called Marsh 
 Creek, four miles out from Gettysburg, on the road leading to Chambersburg. 
 Both these places are at crossings cf the same stream of water. During 
 the night of Tuesday, June 30th, —the night preceding the first day's engage- 
 ment, — General Meade was at Taneytown; Sickles, with the Third Corps, at 
 Bridgeport; Howard, with the Eleventh Corps, at Emmittsburg; and 
 Reynolds, with the First Corps, at Marsh Creek. In the forenoon of the 
 preceding day, a brigade of Confederates, under General Pettigrew, came 
 in by the Chambersburg pike to a point within a mile of Gettysburg, and 
 then fell back to Marsh Creek on the same road. At this place, during the 
 night following, the divisions of Heth and Pender, of Hill's Corps, were 
 encamped, and Anderson's division of the same corps, was four miles 
 further west at Cashtown. Rodes' and Early's divisions of Ewell's Corps, 
 were at Heidlersburg, ten miles north of Gettysburg. General Buford in 
 command of a division of Federal cavalry passed through Gettysburg in the 
 afternoon of the day (Tuesday), and apprised of the presence of the enemy, 
 encamped over night midway between Gettysburg and the enemy at Marsh 
 Creek. 
 
 Such was the situation on the night preceding the opening of the battle. 
 Let us now consider whether General Meade was fully apprised of the con- 
 
560 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 dition, and what were his plans; and whether General Reynolds, as has been 
 alleged, had another plan different from the plan of the commander-in-chief, 
 and whether General Sickles disregarded an order from him. Upon these 
 points the following testimonies are adduced. General Doubleday says: 
 
 " By evening Meade was fully apprised by telegrams and Buford's scouts, 
 that the enemy were concentrating on Gettysburg. He knew that Reynolds 
 at Marsh Creek was only about six miles from Hill at Cashtowu, but he sent 
 no orders that night, and gave no indication of having any plan. He simply 
 stated that the enemy were marching on Gettysburg, and he would issue 
 orders when they developed their intentions. Thus the opposing forces were 
 moving in directions that would necessarily bring them in contact, and a 
 fight or a retreat was inevitable, for one or both. Reynolds had the true spirit 
 of a soldier. He was a Pennsylvanian, and, inflamed at seeing the devasta- 
 tion of his native State, was most desirous of getting at the enemy as soon as 
 possible. I speak from my own knowledge, for I was his second in com- 
 mand, and he told me at Poolesville soon after crossing the river, that it was 
 necessary to attack the enemy at once, to prevent his plundering the whole 
 State. As he had great confidence in his men, it was not difficult to divine 
 what his decision would be. He determined to advance and hold Gettys- 
 burg. He directed the Eleventh Corps to come up as a support to the First, 
 and he recommended, bid did not order the Third Corps to do the same.'''' * 
 
 Speaking of the conduct of General Reynolds in the morning of Wednes- 
 day, July ist, after being apprised of the proximity of the enemy, General 
 Doubleday says: 
 
 "General Reynolds, in consequence of the duties devolving upon him as 
 commander of the left wing of the army, — that is, of the First, Third, and 
 Eleventh Corps, — had turned over the command of the First Corps to me. 
 He now made immediate dispositions to go forward to assist Bitford. * * 
 He sent for me about six o'clock in the morning, read to me the various 
 dispatches he had received from Meade and Buford, and told me he should 
 go forward at once with the nearest division — that of Wadsworth — to aid 
 the cavalry. He then instructed me to draw in my pickets, assemble the 
 artillery and the remainder of the corps, and join him as soon as possible. 
 Having given these orders he rode off at the head of the column, and I never 
 saw him again." f 
 
 General Doubleday's statement would seem to imply that Reynolds had 
 formed a purpose to fight the enemy at Gettysburg upon his own responsi- 
 bility, but in other statements it is evident that when he left Marsh Creek for 
 
 * " Chancellorsville and Gettysburg-," page 122. 
 f'Chancellorsvilleand Gettysburg," pages 124, 125. 
 
THE GENERAL SICKLES CONTROVERSY. 561 
 
 Gettysburg he did not go to carry out any prearranged plan of his own, but 
 " to assist Bu/ord" and " aid the cavalry," and that to afford this assistance 
 the Eleventh Corps was needed and was ordered up from Emmittsburg, and 
 that in his judgment the Third Corps might also be needed, and could render 
 as much service at the front as back at Kmmittsburg, to which place it had 
 been ordered. General Doubleday, it will be seen, clearly exonerates Sickles 
 from the charge of having been peremptorily ordered to proceed to Gettys- 
 burg, as has been charged. 
 
 General Sickles, in a letter to Mr. James Beale, of Philadelphia, dated July 
 17th, 1886, explains some seeming inconsistencies in his testimony before the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War and in his later statements in relation 
 to what he terms "his preliminary orders in going to Gettysburg " which throw 
 additional light upon this subject. An extract from that letter is as follows: 
 
 * * * * " You intimate a desire to learn from me whether or not 
 
 I received any orders to march to Gettysburg, as you seem puzzled to explain 
 a passage in my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War 
 (February 26, 1864), in which, by a misprint, I am made to speak of my ' pre- 
 liminary orders in going to Gettysburg,' etc. 
 
 "I have no hesitation in addressing you on the subject, as I recognize the 
 love of truth and justice which governs your conduct in this matter. 
 
 "So acute a critic and so well-informed a military student as yourself can 
 not fail to see from the context that the word ' Gettysburg ' in that sentence 
 of my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in which 
 I refer to ' my preliminary orders,' etc., was a misprint for Emmittsburg. I 
 say my orders were ' to go there and hold that position with my corps, as it 
 was regarded as a very important flanking position, to cover our rear and 
 line 0/ communication.' Surely this description could not possibly mean 
 Gettysburg, our most advanced position, to which Reynolds had been 
 ordered, and which he, not Sickles, was ordered to hold, temporarily at least. 
 The obvious misprint is preceded by another of the same tenor, in the same 
 paragraph, equally obvious, in which I am made to say: That I received a 
 dispatch from General Howard, 'at Gettysburg, 1 between two and three 
 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1st. Of course that dispatch was received 
 by me at Emmittsburg. 
 
 "The whole paragraph in my testimony, to which reference is made, is a 
 statement of the considerations and reasons which led me to move without 
 orders from Emmittsburg to the relief of General Howard. After summing 
 up the conflicting orders on the one hand and the earnest appeal of Howard 
 on the other, my conclusion is stated as follows: 'I therefore moved to Gettys- 
 burg on my own responsibility.' 
 36 
 
562 the' great invasion. 
 
 "Again, I proceeded to state in my testimony, February 26, 1864, that as 
 soon as I determined to march to Gettysburg, ' I addressed a communication 
 to General Meade from Emmittsburg informing him of what I had done, and 
 explaining my anxiety to have his sanction of it. I received a communica- 
 tion from him, informing me that he approved my course, and that the two 
 brigades and battery I had left at Emmittsburg would be relieved and ordered 
 to join me.' 
 
 "Why ask General Meade's approval of my march to Gettysburg if I 
 moved there pursuant to orders from competent authority ? 
 
 "The suggestion that I received orders from General Reynolds during the 
 night before his battle, directing me to march to Gettysburg, is absurd; that 
 is to say, it is a statement contradicted by all the facts and by all probabili- 
 ties. First. General Reynolds received his orders to move to Gettysburg 
 late in the night before his battle. Second. He did not know that the enemy 
 were approaching Gettysburg until Buford reported the enemy in his front, 
 on the Cashtown Road, on the morning of July 1st. Third. General Rey- 
 nolds, on the morning of July 1st, was ordered by General Meade to 'with- 
 draw the force at present at Gettysburg, two corps (First and Eleventh) by 
 the road to Taneytown and Westminster, and, after crossing Pipe Creek, de- 
 ploy toward Middleburg. The corps at Emmittsburg (Sickles' Corps) will 
 be withdrawn via Mechanicsville to Middleburg.' Fourth. My senior aid- 
 de-camp, Major H. E. Tremaine, sent by me on the morning of July 1st to 
 communicate with General Reynolds, reached Reynolds at Gettysburg shortly 
 before he fell and received no intimation from Reynolds of any order sent to 
 me to march to Gettysburg. General Tremaine, writing to me under date of 
 June 28th, 18S0, says: 'I recall my interview with General Reynolds shortly 
 before he was killed, and his message by me to you suggesting more than 
 otherwise that you had better come up, and that without orders you moved 
 your troops from Emmittsburg to Gettysburg.' Fifth. General Hancock in 
 his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War states: 'On 
 the morning of the 1st of July I received an order to march to Taneytown. I 
 arrived there about eleven o'clock and massed my troops. I then w r ent to 
 i the head-quarters of General Meade and reported to him. While I was 
 '; there General Meade told me all his plans. He said he had made up his 
 mind to fight a battle on what was known as Pipe Creek. 
 
 " 'Shortly after that conversation General Meade received a message from 
 General Reynolds, who, at Gettysburg, was really a mask, in order to allow 
 this movement (occupying the line of Pipe Creek) to go on in his rear.' 
 
 "Of course, General Reynolds, in command of the left wing of the army, 
 was as well informed as General Hancock or myself of the plans of General 
 
MR. BEALE'S DIGEST OF ORDERS. 563 
 
 Meade. I had received from General Meade, on the morning of July ist, a 
 similar communication. Is it conceivable — is it consistent with the soldierly- 
 qualities of Reynolds — that he should order the Third Corps to Gettysburg 
 in defiance of the plans of his commanding officer and in direct disobedience 
 of the orders requiring the whole of the left wing to fall back to Pipe Creek? 
 
 "The assertion by anybody that Reynolds gave such an order on the night 
 before his battle betrays the grossest ignorance of the character of General 
 Reynolds and of all the facts of history touching this question." 
 
 Mr. Beale, to whom the foregoing letter was addressed by General Sickles, 
 has published a digest of the orders, circulars, and other communications, 
 drawn from official sources, which passed between General Meade and his 
 subordinate commanders on the day before the first day's engagement, and also 
 upon the first day of the battle, which, besides showing the true situation at 
 that eventful time, prove conclusively that the charge of disobedience to an 
 order from General Reynolds to Sickles is entirely without foundation. The 
 following is Mr. Beale's paper: 
 
 Memoranda Referring to Movements, June 30 and July i, 1863. 
 June jo, 1S63. 
 
 1. Reynolds to Butterfield: 
 
 "The enemy will undoubtedly endeavor to turn our left by way of Fairfield 
 and mountain roads leading down into the Frederick and Emmittsburg pike, 
 near Mt. St. Mary's College." 
 
 He asks for an engineer officer to reconnoiter this position. 
 
 2. Meade answers at 11:30 A. M. 
 
 "In case of an advance in force either against you or Howard at Emmitts- 
 burg, you must fall back to that place, and I will reinforce you from 
 the corps nearest to you, which is Sickles', at Taneytown. " 
 
 3. At 12:45 p - M - Meade orders Third Corps to Emmittsburg, with sixty 
 rounds of ammunition, three days' rations, and ambulances. "Enemy re- 
 ported to be in force at Gettysburg. * * You will report to General 
 Reynolds, and throw out strong pickets on the roads from Emmittsburg to 
 Greencastle and Chambersburg. " 
 
 4. Meade to Sickles: 
 
 "It is of the utmost importance that you should move with your infantry 
 and artillery to Emmittsburg with all possible dispatch." 
 
 5. When about half way out toward Emmittsburg, Sickles receives a 
 verbal message— "Halt!" He writes Meade, enclosing Reynolds' order 
 relative to "Cat-tail Branch," and says, "It agrees with written orders re- 
 
564 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 ceived at I p. M. [see 3 and 4 above], but is in conflict with verbal order given 
 by the commanding general while on the march. Shall I move forward?" 
 
 [See also Humphrey's testimony, Report of the Committee on Conduct of 
 the War, page 3S9.] 
 
 6. Meade issues a circular saying he "has received information that the 
 enemy are advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg. * * Three 
 corps (First, Third, Eleventh,) are in vicinitv of Emmittsburg, the Third 
 Corps being ordered up to that point." 
 
 7. At 7:45 P. M. Sickles notifies Reynolds: " By direction of the general 
 commanding I have gone into camp here, countermanding a previous order 
 to go to Enimittsburg, and I am to wait here for further orders from 
 head - quarters A. of P. When these orders were received I sent Captain 
 Crocker, of my staff, to communicate them to General Reynolds, and to in- 
 form HIM OF MY POSITION." 
 
 INFERENCES. 
 
 (a.) The left wing was considered in some danger of being flanked. 
 
 (b.) Reynolds, if attacked, was to fall back. 
 
 (c.) Both Meade and Reynolds knew where the Third Corps was, it being 
 under Meade's special orders, and practically, temporarily detached from 
 Reynolds, though co-operating with him. 
 
 July 1, i86j. 
 
 8. Meade issues the "Pipe Creek order." (Report of Committee on Con- 
 duct of the War, page 353.) 
 
 9. He sends a circular to Reynolds in which he refers to "General Hum- 
 phreys, who is at Emmittsburg with the Third Corps," 
 
 10. "Pretty late in the morning" {vide Meade's testimony, page 347,) 
 Meade receives Buford's dispatch to Reynolds, dated at Gettysburg, June 30, 
 10:30 P. M. (Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, page 352.) 
 
 11. Meade to Sedgwick: 
 
 "It is not improbable he [the enemy] will reach that place [Gettysburg] 
 before the command under Major -General Reynolds (First and Eleventh 
 Corps), now on the way, can arrive there. Should such be the case, and 
 General Reynolds find himself in the presence of a superior force, he is in- 
 structed to hold the enemy in check, and fall slowly back. If he is 
 able to do this, the line indicated in the circular of to-day will be occupied 
 to-night." 
 
 12. Meade to French: 
 
 "In the event of our being compelled to withdraw or retire before the 
 
MR. BEALE'S DIGEST OF ORDERS. 565 
 
 enemy, you will be in readiness to throw your command by rail or march, as 
 may be most speedy, into the defenses of Washington." 
 
 13. Meade corrects the Pipe Creek order so far as it relates to route of 
 withdrawal of the corps at Fmmittsburg. 
 
 14. At 12:30 p. M. Meade writes Hancock: 
 
 "In view of the possible failure of Reynolds to receive the order to with- 
 draw his command by the route through Taneytown, * * proceed with 
 your troops out on the direct road to Gettysburg from Taneytown. When 
 you find that Reynolds is covering that road (instead of withdrawing by Em- 
 mittsburg, which it is feared he may do,) you will withdraw to Frizell- 
 burgh, as directed in the circular issued this morning." (See No. 13, ante.) 
 
 inferences. 
 
 (d.) Meade was well aware of the locality of the Third Corps. 
 
 (e.) He expected Reynolds, if attacked, to fall back, but was in doubt 
 whether Reynolds had received the Pipe Creek circular. (See No. 14, ante.) 
 
 (/.) Meade was taking all proper precaution in case of any reverse to his 
 army. (See No. 12, ante.) 
 
 Now, at 10:30 p. M. of June 30, Buford, at Gettysburg, was able to correctly 
 locate the Confederate army. I have found the scout who brought the news 
 late that evening on which this 10:30 dispatch is based. 
 
 Until 1 1 P. M. that night Howard and Reynolds were at Marsh Run, study- 
 ing maps, etc. (See Atlantic Monthly, July, 1S76, page 52.) 
 
 Soon after this, Buford appears at Marsh Run, and holds conference with 
 Reynolds. 
 
 Buford returns to Gettysburg with one of Reynolds' staff. 
 
 This staff officer reports to Reynolds "very early in morning of July 1st," 
 with the latest news. 
 
 Quite early on July 1st, before any of the First Corps marched, Buford again 
 appears at Marsh Run, and says to Reynolds, "I've run on a couple of regi- 
 ments in woods near Gettysburg, lend me some troops to feel them." 
 
 Reynolds forwards this news to Meade, and the First Corps march foi 
 Gettysburg. 
 
 How the rest of the First Corps may have traveled I know not, but I do 
 know our division (Robinson's) moved quite leisurely. In fact, when we re- 
 ceived the news of "trouble ahead," Robinson, his staff, and many of his 
 division, were eating cherries. 
 
 Now here are Buford and Reynolds in close and frequent conference — 
 Buford in full and correct knowledge of the locality of the enemy. How in 
 
566 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 the face of his 10:30 dispatch could Buford a few hours later speak of "a 
 couple of regiments," etc. 
 
 Meade was using Reynolds as a mask to cover the Pipe Creek movement 
 (see Hancock's testimony, page 404). Until Meade heard of Reynolds' death 
 (noon of July 1st), Meade was expecting Reynolds to fall back, if attacked, 
 (see 11 and 14, ante). 
 
 Did the death of Reynolds upset these plans ? Who is responsible for the 
 stand made on Seminary Ridge ? Had Buford and Reynolds concluded to 
 force the fight there at all hazards ? 
 
 See Wadsworth's testimony, page 413. 
 
 "It was a matter of momentary consultation between General Reynolds 
 and myself whether we would go into the town or take a position in front. 
 He decided we had better take a position in front." 
 
 Meade had doubts whether Reynolds had received the Pipe Creek circular 
 (see No. 14, ante). Did Reynolds ever get that circular ? The general belief 
 is he did not receive it. 
 
 At 11:20 a. m., July 1st, Meade receives Reynolds' message from Gettys- 
 burg (the aide quotes from his diary); at 12:30 Meade orders the Second Corps 
 out (see No. 14, ante), and at 1 : 10, Meade, having heard of Reynolds' death, 
 orders Hancock to the front, and (see Meade's testimony, page 330, 331,) about 
 6 or 7 o'clock p. M., having heard from Hancock, the Pipe Creek movement 
 is abandoned, and the Army of Potomac march on Gettysburg. 
 
 15. Sickles to Howard, 3:15 p. M. : 
 
 "I have at this moment received a communication from an officer of your 
 staff, and also two written communications dated at 1 and 1:30 P.M. I SHALL 
 move to Gettysburg immediately." 
 
 16. Sickles to Meade, 3: 15 p. M. : 
 
 " A staff officer from Howard and a communication dated Gettysburg 1:30 
 has just reached me. Howard requests me to support him, and I shall 
 
 MOVE IMMEDIATELY." 
 
 17. Sickles to Meade, 3:25 p. M.: 
 
 " I shall leave a brigade and a battery on the heights beyond Emmittsburg 
 toward Fairfield, and another to the left and rear of Emmittsburg. These 
 have orders, if unable to hold Emmittsburg, to fall back to Taneytown." 
 
 18. Sickles to Birney, 3:50 p. M.: 
 
 "Move your division to Gettysburg immediately and report to General 
 Howard." 
 
 19. Meade to Sickles, 4:40 p. m. : 
 
 " Have just learned that Howard has ordered you from Emmittsburg up to 
 Gettysburg; * * do not wish the approaches through Emmittsburg un- 
 
MR. BEALE'S DIGEST OF ORDERS. 567 
 
 guarded as they cover our left and rear. * * Hold on until you shall hear 
 from General Hancock, leaving a division at Emmittsburg, as it is a point 
 
 NOT TO BE ABANDONED EXCEPT IN AN EXTREMITY." 
 
 20. Meade to Hancock and Doubleday, 6 p. M. : 
 
 "Say to him (Slocum), I thought it prudent to leave a division of the Third 
 Corps at Emmittsburg. It can be ordered up to-night if necessary." 
 
 21. Meade to Sedgwick, 7 p. M. : 
 
 "The present prospect is, that our general engagement must be there" 
 (Gettysburg). 
 
 22. Meade to commanding officer at Emmittsburg, 7:30 p. M.: 
 
 Directs that "the division of General Sickles' Corps ordered to remain at 
 Emmittsburg move up and join their corps on the field of Gettysburg." 
 
 23. Sickles to Meade, 9:30 p. M. : 
 
 " Our left and rear is not sufficiently guarded. * * This is a good battle- 
 field." 
 
 This 9:30 message of Sickles' is of same tenor as one sent by Hancock at 
 5:25: "It is a position, however, easily turned." 
 
 [Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, page 357.] 
 
 INFERENCES. 
 
 (g.) Sickles moved from Emmittsburg on his own responsibility and 
 without delay. 
 
 (/i.) Meade was loth to let Sickles go, but on finding some troops had been 
 left at Emmittsburg, Meade fully endorsed Sickles. (Sickles really had an- 
 ticipated Meade's order.) See 17, 18, and compare 19 ante. 
 
 (£.) On the evening of July 1st, Meade was twice notified that the left of 
 his line was weak. (See No. 23, ante, and Hancock's testimony, page 405; 
 also Hancock's message, page 357.) 
 
 Thus it is shown beyond a peradventure that the movements of July 1st, 
 until noon, as far as they were controlled by General Meade, did not contem- 
 plate any serious engagement of First and Eleventh corps; that the Third 
 Corps was operating under direct and positive instructions from General 
 Meade ; that the Third Corps commander was guilty of no delay or postpone- 
 ment on July 1st in coming to the front; that he actually went in advance of 
 his orders; and that even before General Meade's arrival at Gettysburg, he 
 had been twice notified that the left of his line would need special attention. 
 
 James Beale, 
 Late 12th Mass. Inf'y, 2d Brig., 2d Div., 1st Corps, A. of P. 
 
 In summing up this matter the following conclusions seem to be fully 
 sustained from the facts given: 
 
568 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 i. If, as has been alleged, General Sickles received an order from Rey- 
 nolds at one o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, July ist, to move to 
 Gettysburg, that order was received by him at Bridgeport and not at 
 Kmmittsburg; and being already under orders from the commander-in-chief 
 to proceed in another direction to occupy what was supposed to be a very 
 important point, is it not reasonable to suppose that the reception of an order, 
 which indicated a departure from the plan determined upon, and the execu- 
 tion of which would derange that plan, would be at least reported to head- 
 quarters, but five miles distant? This inference is equally applicable were 
 the dispatch the " recommendation " spoken of by General Doubleday and 
 not a peremptory order. 
 
 2. General Sickles, as Doubleday says on page 125 of the book already 
 referred to, "was under orders to march to Kmmittsburg, to relieve the 
 Eleventh Corps, which was directed to join the First at Gettysburg." If 
 Reynolds issued an order to Sickles to march to Gettysburg, that order 
 was issued subsequent to the order to Howard, for the former was en 
 route to Kmmittsburg to enable the latter to comply with the order to him. 
 Howard's order evidently did not reach him until after six o'clock in the 
 morning. * 
 
 3. General Tremaine, of Sickles' staff, who was present at Gettysburg 
 when General Sickles delivered his address there, said that he was the only 
 officer in communication between Sickles and Reynolds, and that he was 
 sent by the former to the latter's head-quarters on the night of June 30th, 
 and that the first intimation he had of a desire upon the part of Reynolds for 
 Sickles to advance was about nine o'clock in the morning of July ist, and 
 that his wish did not come in the form of an order, but a suggestion, and that 
 he at once set out for Sickles' head-quarters to deliver this suggestion. That 
 suggestion for Sickles to advance is entirely inconsistent with an order pre- 
 viously given to do so; and it could not have reached him before ten o'clock 
 A. M. 
 
 4. General Carr says that he was in command that day (July ist,) while 
 Sickles, as directed by Meade, was reconnoitering the country about Km- 
 mittsburg for a battle - field in case one were needed there, and the first order 
 to move to Gettysburg came from Hancock about two o'clock p. M., and that 
 with that order came the news of Reynolds' death. 
 
 5. The foregoing should settle the question, and show that General 
 Sickles received no order from Reynolds, as alleged. The following, how- 
 ever, from General Meade establishes this fact beyond dispute: 
 
 •General Doubleday's " Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 124. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS. 569 
 
 Head-quarters Army of the Potomac, July i, 1:10 p. m., 1S63. 
 Commanding Officer of the Second Corps (Hancock): 
 
 The Major- General commanding has just informed me that General Reynolds 
 has been killed or badly wounded. He diredts that you turn over the command of 
 your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this 
 order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds' death, you assume command of the 
 corps there assembled, viz: The Eleventh, First, and Third, at Emmittsburg. If you 
 consider the ground and position there a better one to fight a battle under existing 
 circumstances, you will so advise the General and he will order all the troops up. 
 You know the Gene-al's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, 
 has gone out to see General Reynolds. 
 
 D. BUTTERFIELD, 
 
 Major -General and Chief of Staff. 
 
 The fact that General Meade located Sickles' Corps at Emmittsburg as late 
 as 1:10 p. m. on the first day of the battle, and ordered its advance, through 
 General Hancock, to Gettysburg, dissipates entirely the theory of an earlier 
 order from General Reynolds. Assuming then that the first order which 
 Sickles received to move to the front came from Hancock, and that Hancock 
 issued that order immediately upon receiving Meade's order, it could not 
 have reached him before the time stated by General Carr, namely, two o'clock, 
 and probably later, for the distance it had to be carried from Taneytown to 
 Emmittsburg is ten miles. 
 
 6. If General Reynolds, burning with the fire of patriotism, and a desire 
 to attack the invaders and despoilers of his State, did, in the exercise of a 
 discretion which his temporary position as commander of the left wing of 
 the army, enabled him to assume, form a plan and purpose of his own, which 
 conflicted with the plan of his commander in chief, and took measures to 
 carry his plan into execution without informing him of it when he had 
 abundant time to do so, he was guilty of disrespect and discourtesy, if not of 
 downright disobedience and insubordination. Who would entertain such a 
 reflection upon General Reynolds? 
 
 7. General Sickles, as already stated, was under orders from the com- 
 mander in chief to proceed to Emmittsburg and hold that place, and in 
 accordance with this order he did, in the morning of July 1st, proceed from 
 Bridgeport to the place named, and while there engaged in reconnoitering 
 the country for a battle-field in case one were needed there, he received 
 about two or three o'clock in the afternoon a dispatch from General Howard, 
 telling of the critical condition at Gettysburg, and directing him to come as 
 quickly as possible to his assistance. Upon the receipt of this order or re- 
 quest (General Sickles claims that under the circumstances he was not sub- 
 ject to the orders of Howard) he "without orders and against orders" left 
 
570 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 two brigades and a battery to hold the place and marched with all possible 
 speed with the remainder of his command to the point of danger. How 
 striking the contrast between his conduct and that of General Slocum, whose 
 corps was at Two Taverns, but five miles from the field, and who was repeat- 
 edly importuned by Howard to come to his assistance, but, held by Meade's 
 orders for an expected concentration elsewhere, refused to do so. 
 
 E>. 
 
 DID GENERAL SICKLES DISREGARD AN ORDER FROM GENERAL MEADE ON 
 
 JULY 2D, 1863? 
 
 It has generally been supposed that General Sickles acted imprudently, if 
 not in direct disobedience of orders, in advancing his line so far from the 
 position he was expected to take on July 2d. General Meade, in his official 
 report to the government, charges that, either through misapprehension or 
 disobedience, General Sickles advanced his line a half to three quarters of a 
 mile from the position he was directed to take, and that by so doing he 
 brought on the engagement before he (Meade) was prepared for it, and that 
 he thereby endangered the whole army. When this report was made General 
 Sickles went in person to President Lincoln and asked for a court of inquiry 
 for the purpose of correcting the charge, which, he claimed, was erroneous 
 and did him injustice. Mr. Lincoln said: "Sickles, they say you pushed 
 out your men too near the enemy, and began the fight just as that council 
 was about to meet, at three o'clock in the afternoon of the battle. I am 
 afraid what they say of you is true, and God bless you for it. Don't ask us 
 to order an inquest to relieve you from bringing on the battle of Gettysburg. 
 History will set you all right and give everybody his just place, and there is 
 glory enough to go all around." To the remonstrance of the president Gen- 
 eral Sickles yielded, and no inquiry was had into the charge made by the 
 commander-in-chief. Public opinion, however, from that day to the present 
 has been divided as to the propriety of Sickles' course, many believing that 
 he acted imprudently, and perhaps an equal number that the position he 
 took was the best one. Colonel Batchelder, the Government Gettysburg His- 
 torian, said once in the hearing of the writer, that he had consulted fifty-six 
 general officers who participated in the battle of Gettysburg, as to Sickles' 
 position, and they were about equally divided in their opinion regarding it. 
 
THE GENERAL SICKLES CONTROVERSY. 571 
 
 Recently General Sickles lias been making some extravagant assertions 
 touching the part his corps took in the battle of the 2d of July, claiming sub- 
 stantially that it fought the battle of Gettysburg, and that the battle of the 
 first day was but an accidental and unimportant affair. This indiscretion 
 upon his part, as might be expected, has led to a renewal of the charges 
 made against him, and much bad feeling has been evoked. The case has 
 assumed such shape that it demands our attention, and we shall consider it 
 as follows: 
 
 Colonel James C. Biddle, of General Meade's staff, in the Philadelphia 
 Press o? July 18th, 1886, thus presents the case against Sickles: 
 
 "General Meade, after a careful inspection of the ground, in the early 
 morning of July 2d, issued orders to his corps commanders directing the 
 positions they were to take. Under these orders General Sickles was di- 
 rected to form his corps in line of battle on the left of the Second Corps, 
 commanded by General Hancock, his right resting on Hancock's left and 
 his left on Round Top, if it was practicable to occupy it. Between eight and 
 nine o'clock A. M. these orders were repeated to General Sickles, and further- 
 more he was told that he was to relieve Geary's division, and to occupy the 
 position it was understood General Hancock had put Geary in the night 
 before. It should be stated here that General Geary had had two regiments 
 on Little Round Top during the night of July 1. Even as late as between 
 eleven A. M. and twelve M. General Sickles came to General Meade's head- 
 quarters, when the latter distinctly told him that his right was to be 
 Hancock's left, his left on Round Top, which General Meade poitiled out 
 to him. 
 
 " Between three and four p. M. I rode with General Meade to the left of our 
 line occupied by General Sickles with the Third Corps. General Meade, 
 after surveying the position, sent for General Sickles and on meeting him 
 said in my presence: 
 
 " 'General Sickles, why have you not obeyed my orders to connect with 
 General Hancock's left, with your left on Little Round Top?' 
 
 "General Sickles answered that he had moved out to occupy the high 
 ground on which he had formed his line. General Meade replied: 
 
 " 'This is neutral ground. The guns of the enemy command it, our guns 
 command it, and you can not occupy it for the very same reason that they 
 can not. ' 
 
 "General Sickles expressed regret that he should have occupied a posi- 
 tion that did not meet with General Meade's approval, and asked if he should 
 move to the line designated. General Meade replied: 
 
 " ' Yes, you may as well, at once. The enemy will not let you withdraw 
 
572 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 without taking advantage of your position, but you have to come back and 
 may as well do it at once as at any other time. ' 
 
 " General Sickles left to carry out this movement, and had not gone more 
 than a few hundred feet when the enemy opened upon him, enfilading his 
 entire corps. Genera] Meade called Sickles back and told him that it was 
 now too late for him to retire, and that he must hold his line as best he could 
 and that he would support him. 
 
 "General Warren had accompanied General Meade when he rode out to 
 General Sickles' advanced position. As soon as General Meade saw the 
 condition of affairs he ordered General Warren to ride at once to L,ittle 
 Round Top, see what troops, if any, were there and to take every measure 
 for its proper defense. Fortunately, by the timely arrival of the Fifth Corps, 
 which General Meade had ordered over to his left before going to General 
 Sickles, General Warren was enabled to secure Vincent's brigade, which 
 was hurried on to Round Top, and, after a most desperate and bloody en- 
 counter, secured this most important position, which Sickles had neglected 
 to occupy. General Meade remained on or about that part of the field where 
 the enemy's attack was made throughout the whole of the contest, bringing 
 forward reinforcements from all parts of the field, himself leading I^ock- 
 wood's brigade into action. His horse was shot under him during the en- 
 gagement. Finally, owing to the valor and admirable fighting of the troops, 
 to the hearty co-operation of the superior officers and to the skillful handling 
 of the army, was the enemy's attack repulsed, and a new line, where General 
 Meade had intended originally that General Sickles should form, was occu- 
 pied by the supports that had been brought up and held until the end of the 
 battle." 
 
 General Sickles, in an address delivered at Gettysburg, on the twenty- 
 third anniversary of the great engagement, thus gives his side of the case: 
 
 " It has been said that General Meade had formed a plan of battle on the 
 left, and assigned a position to my corps on that flank, from which I advanced 
 on the enemy too soon, and that advance so disarranged General Meade's 
 plans as to hazard their successful execution. My statement is that no plan 
 of battle whatever had been promulgated to an}' corps commander, or to any 
 officer of the general staff on July 2d. The enemy had a plan of battle, but 
 we had none." 
 
 The General further said that Meade's attention was altogether turned to 
 his right, where, he thought the real attack would be made; and that to the 
 repeated notices he sent him that the enemy was massing large bodies of 
 troops opposite his left, and that Little Round Top should be at once strongly 
 occupied, he paid no attention whatever. He further said that he sent 
 
THE GENERAL SICKLES CONTROVERSY. 573 
 
 Tepeatedly for Meade to come and see for himself, or to send General Warren, 
 his chief engineer, but neither of them paid any attention to his requests. 
 At length, when he found that he could not get either the commander in 
 chief, or his chief engineer, to come and see the point of danger and give his 
 support and orders, he asked for General Hunt, the chief of artillery, who 
 was sent, and who approved of the position he had taken. In support of 
 these allegations, as well as those to follow, Sickles quotes numerous authori- 
 ties, Federal and Confederate. Upon the point of having received no orders 
 from Meade, Sickles said, pointing to General Tremaine, who sat near him 
 and assented to what he said, " There 's the officer whom I kept in the saddle 
 from sunrise till the battle opened, imploring him (Meade) to send troops to 
 Xrittle Round Top." 
 
 The following are further extracts from this speech: 
 
 "The battle of July 2d was fought on the lines I occupied, on my own re- 
 sponsibility. The battle was fought, so far as the Third Army Corps is con- 
 cerned, without orders of any nature or kind whatever from the commanding* 
 general of the army of the Potomac. From sunrise on the morning of July 
 2d until after six o'clock in the afternoon, when I was wounded, I received 
 no order from General Meade relating to the dispositions of my troops or to 
 the conduct of the battle, except that I was to occupy the position General 
 Geary had left, which I at once reported to General Meade was no position 
 at all, and the further exception that at half- past three, when the battle was 
 in progress, General Meade directed me to call on General Hancock for sup- 
 port for my right and upon General Sykes for the support of the Fifth Corps 
 on my left and upon the artillery of the reserve for such batteries as I might 
 need. 
 
 "From half- past three in the afternoon until after six o'clock, when I was 
 wounded, I received no communication from him on the field. * * * * 
 
 "lam, therefore, alone responsible for the lines on which the battle of 
 July 2d was fought. Good or bad, it was my line. I am not responsible for 
 the delay in occupying Round Top, the key of our position on the left. I 
 had repeatedly urged General Meade to send infantry and artillery to Little 
 Round Top, but he did not do so, nor did he approve my suggestion that I 
 should occupy it in force. General Meade did not concur in my belief that 
 the enemy would make a serious attack on our left, hence he made no dispo- 
 sitions himself and authorized none on my part to meet such an attack. At 
 length, when the assault of the enemy was so imminent that I could wait no 
 longer for orders, I made my own dispositions to meet it. I advanced my 
 corps so as to occupy higher and better fighting ground, cleared away the 
 fences which obstructed my movements. I took positions which threatened 
 
574' THE "GRE AT _ INVASION! 
 
 the flank of the enemy in moving to our left and forced him to attack me on 
 my front. 
 
 " I knew that the enemy had massed in my front and on my left a much 
 larger force than I had under my command. I had so reported to General 
 Meade more than once or twice or thrice, but he did not accept my estimate 
 of the strength of the assaulting columns of the enemy, nor my judgment as 
 to the design of the enemy to turn our left. He believed the enemy was 
 making a demonstration on my front to cover a serious attack on our right. 
 The Fifth Corps had been kept all the morning on the right as a reserve. 
 There was no reserve within supporting distance on the left. Buford's di- 
 vision of cavalry, the only support on my left, had been ordered away to the 
 rear, toward Westminster." 
 
 Upon due consideration of the two conflicting statements thus given, I ar- 
 rive at the following conclusions: 
 
 1. It is scarcely conceivable that in such an emergency as confronted Gen- 
 eral Meade in the morning of July 2d, he would give no directions whatever 
 concerning the posting of troops on every part of the field, especially upon 
 his left, which was the most exposed, and to which his attention had been 
 specially directed. We assume then that he undoubtedly did give General 
 Sickles some order. 
 
 2. Colonel Biddle asserts most positively that General Meade did order 
 General Sickles to place his line with his right joining Hancock's left, and 
 his left upon little Round Top; and General Sickles declares as positively 
 that General Meade gave no order whatever. And yet both these men concur 
 in the statement that an order such as Colonel Biddle asserts Meade gave, 
 was actually given, with the qualification that Sickles was to place his troops 
 in the position General Geary had occupied during the night, which was upon 
 Little Round Top, "provided it was practicable to occupy -it." How can 
 this qualification, which is equally admitted by both Colonel Biddle and Gen- 
 eral Sickles, be reconciled with the declaration of the former of a positive 
 and unqualified order, and the assertion of the latter of no order whatever? 
 
 3. In this qualification, which is admitted by both parties, the solution 
 of the difficulty seems to lie. General Sickles was given a discretion so far as 
 occup3 - ing Little Round Top was concerned, and he used that discretion con- 
 cerning his whole line, and, for reasons which seemed satisfactory to himself 
 and his engineers, he chose the advanced position for which he is blamed. 
 
 4. General Sickles is again inconsistent in the fact that in the discretion 
 given him concerning Round Top, he reported that "that there was no posi- 
 tion there at all, ' ' and yet says that he sent aid after aid to the commander- 
 in-chief, urging him to send troops to occupy that place. 
 
THE GENERAL SICKLES CONTROVESY. 575 
 
 5. It seems clear that General Meade, in his earnest efforts to prepare for 
 an expected assault upon his right, did not pay sufficient attention to his left. 
 Upon no other ground can the strange oversight until too late to rectify it of 
 the advanced position taken by Sickles, and the neglect to occupy Little 
 Round Top, be accounted for. 
 
 6. The question at issue is not whether the advanced position Sickles took 
 was better than the one Meade expected him to take, but whether or not he 
 disobeyed the order of his commanding general. He certainly did receive a 
 qualified order, and interpreted the discretion it gave him liberally. 
 
 7. Among the advantages claimed by General Sickles for the line he chose 
 over the one Meade expected and qualifiedly ordered him to take, are these: 
 That both Little and Big Round Top were thereby secured to the Federal 
 army. If, he says, his line had been placed where Meade expected it to be 
 placed, the enemy would certainly have succeeded in siezing these two com- 
 manding eminences, and thereby the whole Federal line would have been 
 rendered untenable. Judging from the fact that the line he did take could 
 not be held with the force at his disposal, as he was driven back, he assumes 
 that the same result would have happened had he occupied Round Top, and 
 that important position would have fallen into the possession of the enemy 
 and the battle of Gettysburg would have been lost. It may be true that in 
 the position he took these eminences were secured to the Federal army, and a 
 final victory there assured; but what would have been the probable result 
 had he occupied and fortified that place ? Upon this question the following 
 remarks by General McLaws, taken from an article written by him for the 
 Philadelphia Weekly Press of August 4th, 1886, are important. General 
 McLaws says: * * * * * * 
 
 "But in the general results General Sickles might say that his corps, con- 
 sidered apart from the remainder of the army, was so posted that it not only 
 occupied a strong position of itself, but one which, while inviting an attack, 
 could be reinforced without the movement being known, as there was a dense 
 wood in his rear; that in carrying that position against General Sickles and 
 the strong reinforcements which were brought forward, that strong outwork 
 as it were, Longstreet's forces exhausted themselves, and by the time the 
 Confederate advance reached the main Federal line it was too scattered and 
 had lost so many commanders and rank and file as to be unfit and unable to 
 make any further combined effort and was, in consequence, recalled from the 
 most advanced position, as there was no support on hand from any other 
 corps. 
 
 "In the sense I have last considered it, I suppose, General Sickles haa 
 argued that his position was the cause of victory, as events turned out. 
 
576 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 "But before the crown of 'victory ' can be accorded to him we must dis- 
 cuss the chances and the strong probabilities of disaster which might have 
 happened, not only to his corps, but to the Federal army, because of this 
 advanced salient position, taken on his own responsibility, and then see if it 
 would not have been more advantageous to his corps and the army if he had 
 taken his position on the left extension of the main line, occupying and 
 fortifying the Round Tops. 
 
 "If General Sickles had taken position on the extension of General 
 Meade's main line occupying and fortifying Round Top and vicinity, cer- 
 tainly it would have been more difficult to carry Round Top by assault than 
 it was when occupied for the first time in great haste by General Warren's 
 orders, after the battle had commenced. And as it was not then seized by 
 the Confederates, there could have been no apprehension felt by General 
 Meade as to its capture had it been occupied as I have supposed — and as 
 the Round Tops were natural fortresses and could have been made practi- 
 cally impregnable — the Confederates arriving there, and seeing the formida- 
 ble preparations to receive them, would not, it is very probable, have made 
 the attempt to take them. There would have been no need of a reserve force 
 to aid in holding them. 
 
 "Whereas General Sickles, instead of taking his place on the extension of 
 the main line, which it would be natural for General Meade to suppose he 
 had done, did, without special orders, take an advanced position forming a 
 salient to the main line, and being there without orders and, as General 
 Meade says, contrary to orders, of course no support was provided to main- 
 tain him in that salient position, unless General Meade had determined to 
 make that his battle-ground. But he had no such intention, and as he was 
 the commander-in-chief it reads strange to a Confederate that a subordinate 
 should attempt to thwart the wishes of his chief. 
 
 "Thus being in that salient position and 'inviting' an attack, General 
 Sickles was assaulted by two divisions of Longstreet's Corps and forced back 
 to the main line, and if General Longstreet's advance had been supported, 
 followed by even another division, I do not think there can be any doubt but 
 that Round Top would have been occupied and held by the Confederates. 
 Therefore, it would seem that by occupying the salient position in the manner 
 it was done without orders, a very great risk was run of losing the key to the 
 battle-field. 
 
 "That it was not lost was owing to the rapid concentration by General 
 Meade of forces from other portions of the field, and one can imagine how 
 astonished General Meade was when he found out how near he had been to 
 losing Round Top, which he supposed, until then, had been occupied and 
 
THE GENERAL SICKLES CONTROVERSY. 577 
 
 fortified, but which had not been when his line was formed. The question 
 may well be propounded here: By whose fault was this great catastrophe so 
 near of accomplishment, and by whose exertions was it avoided? 
 
 "If General Stuart, with his cavalry, had been with General Lee at Cham- 
 bersburg — and he could have been if be had not gone within four miles of 
 "Washington in his travels — the whole of Lougstreet's Corps, including 
 Pickett's division, would have been up on the morning of the 2d of July, 
 and the 'supporting' division would have been present in the charge; but 
 not only this, the advance would have been made early on the morning of 
 the 2d of July, before Round Top was occupied! 
 
 If, when Lougstreet's divisions of McLaws and Hood made their charge, 
 General Ewell, who had been directed to co-operate, had so timed his ad- 
 vance on the right of the Federal army as to have struck General Meade's 
 right when all but one brigade of the force stationed there had been with- 
 drawn to resist Longstreet's assault, General Ewell could have carried the 
 heights, and, advancing his whole corps, the Federal reserve being away, 
 what then ? If the Round Tops had been occupied and fortified there would 
 have been no necessity of sending the reserve which had been posted there 
 to aid in averting the danger to Round Top. 
 
 "Thus the non- occupation and fortification of Round Top not only came 
 near being the loss of this position, but it was a mere chance that it was not 
 the cause of a very serious disaster on the right. 
 
 "It would, therefore, appear that the arrangements of the troops made by 
 General Meade, which contemplated the occupation of Round Top, were the 
 best possible to meet all emergencies. 
 
 ****** 
 
 "Had General Sickles taken possession of Round Top and vicinity with 
 his corps and fortified his position, as General Meade says he supposed had 
 been done, it must have been a surprise when General Meade learned that 
 the Confederates had attacked, in force, on his left. For, believing it im- 
 pregnable, he could have had no reasonable fear of bad results, and, while 
 wondering at the rashness of the move, he must have been more than ever 
 convinced that it was made to cover some other and more real attack. But 
 he must have been very much surprised when he learned the true state of the 
 case — that his orders had not been carried out, and that in consequence the 
 key to the battle-field was in imminent danger of being captured, and he 
 showed that he was fully posted as to the positions occupied by the com- 
 mands in his army b}' the skill and promptness with which he moved troops 
 from other and the most distant parts of the field to meet, as he did, this 
 emergency and pluck therefrom the flower of safety. 
 37 
 
578 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 "General Meade was in command of the army, and upon him rested the 
 responsibility as to the manner and mode of driving back the invaders — 
 whether to do this he chose to stand on the defensive in his stronghold or 
 assume the offensive was for him alone to say. It was not personal fame he 
 was looking after, but safety to his people and the success of his cause. He 
 was in the occupation of a line which on his left could have been made im- 
 pregnable, and his right, was, so General Sickles says, also impregnable. 
 That the commander on his left should leave the position which could be 
 made impregnable and offer battle in front of that position, thereby imper- 
 iling that position, and this without the knowledge or consent of the com- 
 mander in chief, thus taking upon himself to force the defensive plan into 
 an offensive movement, will have to be characterized by those whose inter- 
 ests he was serving. The assault, as it was, was unsuccessful. But if it had 
 been made on the same troops occupying an impregnable position, the 
 attacking party would have been defeated with far greater loss to themselves 
 and much less to the defenders than the records show." 
 
 Since the renewal of this controversy, a letter written by General Meade to 
 Colonel G. G. Benedict, of Burlington, Vermont, bearing date, March 16th, 
 1870, has been published. That part of it which relates to the condudl of 
 General Sickles on the second day at Gettysburg unmistakably fixes it (so 
 far as the personal testimony can go) that Sickles did disregard the order of 
 his commander-in-chief. The following is an extract from that letter: 
 
 "As to General Sickles having by his advance brought on an attack, and 
 thus compelled the battle which decided the war, you have completely 
 answered — and it is a very favorite theory with the partisans of this officer. 
 But these gentlemen ignore the facl: that of the eighteen thousand men killed 
 and wounded on the field during the whole battle, more than two thirds were 
 lost on the second day, and but for the timely advance of the Fifth Corps 
 and the prompt sending a portion on Round Top, where they met the enemy 
 almost on the crest, and had a desperate fight to secure the position — I say 
 but for these circumstances, over which Sickles had neither knowledge nor 
 control, the enemy would have secured Round Top, planted his artillery 
 there commanding the whole battle - field, and what this result would have 
 been, I leave you to judge. 
 
 " Now, when I wrote my report of the battle I honestly believed General 
 Sickles did not know where I wished him to go, and that his error arose 
 from a misapprehension of my orders, but I have recently learned from Gen- 
 eral Geary, who had the day before been sent by Hancock to hold the left, 
 and who, in doing so, had seen the great importance of Round Top and posted 
 a brigade on it, that on the morning of the 2d, when he received my order 
 
. THE GENERAL SICKLES CONTROVERSY. 579 
 
 that he would be relieved by the Third Corps, and on being relieved would 
 rejoin his own corps (Twelfth) on the right, after waiting for some time to be 
 relieved he sent to General Sickles a staff officer, with instructions to explain 
 the position and its importance, and to ask if troops could not be sent to re- 
 lieve him; that General Sickles would send one of his staff to see the ground, 
 and to place troops there on their arrival. He received for reply that General 
 Sickles would attend to it in due time. No officer or troops came, and, after 
 waiting till his patience was exhausted, General Geary withdrew and rejoined 
 his corps. 
 
 "Now, my first orders to General Sickles were to relieve the Twelfth Corps 
 Division (Geary's) and occupy tWeir position. Here is evidence that he knew 
 the position occupied by Geary's division, or could have known, and yet 
 failed to occi py it. Furthermore, when he came to my head - quarters at 
 about noon and said he did not know where to go, I answered: 'Why, you 
 were to relieve the Twelfth Corps.' He said they had no position; they were 
 massed awaiting events. Then it was I told him his right was to be Han- 
 cock'' s left, his left on Round Top, which I pointed out. Now, his right was 
 three-quarters of a mile in front of Hancock's left, and his left one-quarter 
 of a mile in front of the base of Round Top, leaving that key -point unoccu- 
 pied, which ought to liave been occupied by Longstreet before we could get 
 there with the Fifth Corps. Sickles' movement practically destroyed his 
 own corps, the Third, caused a loss of fifty per cent in the Fifth Corps, and 
 very heavily damaged the Second Corps, as I said before, producing sixty- 
 six per cent of the loss of the whole battle, and with what result? — driving 
 us back to the position he was ordered to hold originally. These losses of 
 the first and second day affected greatly the efficiency and morale" of the 
 army, and prevented my having the audacity in the offense that I might 
 otherwise have had. 
 
 "If this is an advantage, to be so crippled in battle without attaining any 
 
 object, I must confess I can not see it. Pardon my writing with so much 
 
 prolixity, but your generous defense and the clear view you have taken of 
 
 the battle have led me to wander thus far. 
 
 "Very truly yours, 
 
 "George G. Meade." 
 
580 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 K. 
 
 THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 In the campaign of the spring of 1864, General Hunter succeeded General 
 Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley, and by the orders of General Grant, ad- 
 vanced upon Lynchburg, Virginia, with the view of destroying the enemy's 
 resources at that place. On the 5th of June he met the enemy at Piedmont 
 and defeated him. Forming a junction on the 8th, with Crook and Averell 
 at Stauntou, he moved directly on Lynchburg by way of Lexington, reaching 
 the latter place on June 10th. Up to this time Hunter had been very suc- 
 cessful, and the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had 
 been very great. To meet this movement General Lee sent General Early with 
 his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg in advance of Hunter. After 
 some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of 
 ammunition, declined to give battle, and found himself under the necessity of 
 retiring from the place, and abandoning the chief object of his expedition. 
 This want of ammunition, and consequent inability to meet the force sent 
 against him, compelled him to choose as the route of his return the way of 
 the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up the Ohio River, and returning to 
 Harper's Ferry by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This movement un- 
 covered the valley, and Early, after some show of pursuit upon the route 
 Hunter had taken, fell back to the valley and rapidly advanced toward the 
 Potomac. Crossing this river on Thursday, July 7th, he turned hastily to- 
 ward the National Capital, defeating the Federal force under General Lewis 
 Wallace at the Monocacy River, on Saturday, July 9th. On Tuesday, the 12th, 
 the advance of his army came up in front of the defenses of Washington, 
 but finding them too strong to be carried, and fearing that the gathering 
 forces might cut his communications, Early, in the morning of the 13th, fell 
 back, recrossing the river at Edwards' Ferry, and passing through Snicker's 
 Gap with an immense train of plunder, which he had gathered by the way, 
 encamped about Martinsburg. The Federal force under General Hunter, 
 having arrived from the west, crossed the river and engaged Early, and 
 were finally compelled to recross and take position from Hancock, Maryland, 
 to Harper's Ferry, the main body being at the latter place. Each army had 
 cavalry stationed upon its flanks. The brigade of General John A. McCaus- 
 land was placed upon Early's left; the command of General Averell was 
 upon the Federal right and confronting McCausland. This was substantially 
 
THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG. 581 
 
 the situation up to Thursday, July 28th. It is needless to say that the prox- 
 imity of the Confederates, and their bold and aggressive movements, caused 
 intense excitement and alarm all along the Southern border of the tier of 
 counties immediately threatened. 
 
 On Thursday, July 28th, General Early directed General McCausland to 
 take his own brigade of mounted infantry and the cavalry brigade of General 
 Bradley T. Johnson, the two numbering about two thousand nine hundred 
 men, and proceed to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, and after capturing it, 
 levy a tribute upon it of one hundred thousand dollars in gold, or five hun- 
 dred thousand dollars in United States currency, and in default of the pay- 
 ment of either to burn the town. On this same day these two brigades were 
 assembled at or near Hammond's Mill, in Berkeley County, West Virginia. 
 During the ensuing night the Federal pickets on the north side of the Poto- 
 mac were captured, and in the early morning of Friday, 29th, the command 
 crossed at Cherry Run and McCo}''s fords, and with but little opposition ad- 
 vanced by way of Clearspring and Mercersburg upon Chambersburg. The 
 first knowledge the citizens of the latter place had of the approach of the 
 enemy was at about half past twelve o'clock of this day, when a scene of in- 
 discribable confusion at once took place. The contents of the bank, stores, 
 shops, and many private houses were hurriedly removed and secreted, — an 
 experience which the people of that place, and other towns along the southern 
 border, had often undergone. 
 
 About ten o'clock at night the Confederate force came up to the high hills 
 two miles west of town. At this place they remained during the night, kept 
 back probably by the firing of a single gun, which, with a few men — all the 
 soldiers then at this place — had been sent to retard the approach of the 
 enemy. 
 
 Chambersburg at this time was the head -quarters of the military district 
 of the Susquehanna, and although General Couch, its commander, had organ- 
 ized regiment after regiment specially to guard the southern border, they 
 were, as soon as organized, ordered to Washington to meet the danger 
 threatening that place. His inability, then, to meet this emergency may 
 be seen in the facl: that during the time Early was raiding Maryland and 
 threatening the Capital, his whole available force in the department did not 
 exceed three hundred men, and at this time he had but one hundred and 
 thirty -five under his command, of whom but about forty, including himself 
 and staff, were in the town. It will thus be seen that while the people of 
 the southern border had a military department, well and ably officered, they 
 were without troops, and that too at one of the most threatening periods of 
 the war. 
 
582 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 At an early hour in the morning- — Saturday, July 30th — General McCaus- 
 land placed about two thousand of his command in line upon a hill near the 
 western suburb of the town, and about one mile from its center. Six pieces 
 of artillery were also placed in position, and three shells were fired into the 
 place without any notice to the citizens. The remaining nine hundred of his 
 force were sent into the town, and the Court House bell was rung as a signal 
 for the citizens to assemble to hear his requisition. No response being made, 
 a guard under Major Harry Gilmore, of Baltimore, was sent around, who 
 captured some six or eight of our leading men and conducted them to the 
 front of the Court House. Captain Fitzhugh, McCausland's chief of staff, 
 then read to them General Early's requisition, demanding the immediate 
 payment of one hundred thousand dollars in gold, or five hundred thousand 
 dollars in United States currency, and in default of payment ordering the de- 
 struction of the town. This order stated that this requisition and threatened 
 burning were in retaliation for acts of destruction committed by General 
 Hunter in the Valley of Virginia, and specially naming some half dozen 
 dwellings which he had burned. The money demanded was not, and could 
 not be paid, for the reason that there was nothing like the amount demanded 
 remaining in the town. Besides the citizens did not feel like contributing to 
 aid in the overthrow of their government. While these negotiations were 
 going on the work of plunder had already been commenced. Stores, shops, 
 and other places of business were broken into and robbed of whatever of 
 their contents yet remained unremoved or unsecreted. In some cases saloons 
 •were opened and liquor obtained and some of the soldiers became intoxi- 
 cated. Citizens, too, along the streets were relieved of hats, caps, boots, 
 shoes, watches, etc. 
 
 As soon as General McCausland saw that the money demanded would not 
 be furnished he gave the order to commence the work of destruction. De- 
 tachments were sent to different parts of the town. Houses were opened, 
 furniture was broken and piled upon heaps in rooms and fired. In some 
 cases fire was kindled in closets, bureaus, and other depositories of clothing. 
 Many of the Confederate soldiers entered into this work with evident de- 
 light, and to the entreaties and tears of the aged, the infirm, of women and 
 children, they turned a deaf ear. Others, to their credit be it said, entirely 
 disapproved of the work, and 011I3- entered upon it because compelled to do 
 so. In some instances, in response to the cries and entreaties of the afflicted 
 inmates of houses entered, the unwilling soldiers would say: " I must obey 
 my orders and fire your house; you can do what you please when I leave." 
 In some cases, after fire had been kindled, others would come in and assist 
 in extinguishing it. Some sections of the town were entirely saved because 
 
SCENES IN CHAMBERSBURG. 583 
 
 the officers sent there refused to execute their barbarous orders, and in a few 
 cases officers and soldiers worked with citizens at the fire engine to extinguish 
 the flames. Cases were numerous in which valuable articles were taken 
 from those who were dragging tlieni from their burning homes, or through 
 streets and alleys, up upon the horses by their riders and safely deposited 
 upon the outskirts of the town. Others again were robbed of valuable arti- 
 cles which they were trying to carry away. The writer, while running with 
 his family through flame and smoke, was pursued and stopped by a Confed- 
 erate cavalryman and ordered to hand over a satchel. When assured that it 
 contained neither money nor valuables, but a few pieces of clothing, the man 
 desisted and rode away. No sooner did this one leave us than another rode 
 up and entreated one of the ladies of our compan3 r to mount his horse and 
 ride away, declaring that he would never use him again in the Confederate 
 service. 
 
 The scenes enacted in the streets during the earlier part of the burning 
 were distressing indeed. People were running wildly about in search of 
 children and friends. The occupants of houses were dragging from their 
 threatened or burning homes valuable articles, such as sewing machines, 
 articles of furniture, etc. Others with their arms full of clothing, bedding, 
 carpets, books, pictures, etc., were running hither and thither seeking places 
 of safety. In some cases these persons were compelled to sit down and pull 
 off their boots and hand them over to some cavalryman. 
 
 In a town the size of Chambersburg there were necessarily many aged, in- 
 firm, and sick persons, as well as some dead bodies of friends awaiting burial. 
 The infirm had to be assisted to places of safety; the sick removed; and 
 corpses temporarily buried in gardens. In several instances Confederate 
 soldiers assisted in these humane acts. In a few cases houses isolated from 
 others were spared and guards placed about them, because one or more of the 
 inmates were too ill to be removed; and others still were spared by paying a 
 ransom. Had the destruction occurred in winter, or at night, or during a 
 storm, the destruction of life, with other imaginable horrors, would have 
 been fearful. But it was in the morning and during a perfect calm. Atid yet 
 at one time a fearful cyclone, or funnel - shaped column, which originated in 
 the public square, where the converging flames seemed to have suddenly given 
 birth and shape to this terrible apparition, moved with a hissing and roaring 
 noise eastward along the line of Market Street, carrying far up into the heavens 
 innumerable flakes of fire, ignited shingles and bits of boards. In its course 
 it passed over the ground surrounding a residence which was not burned, and 
 in which clothing, bedding, furniture, etc., had been deposited. As this 
 whirling, hissing, and sucking cone touched these articles, it instantly drew 
 
584 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 some of the lighter ones up into the air. Pillows, feather-beds, bed quilts, 
 and other articles were carried up and fell at considerable distances. A little 
 girl of probably four years of age was caught by the monster and lifted six 
 or eight feet from the ground. 
 
 The conflagration at its height was a scene of surpassing grandeur and 
 terror. As building after building was fired, or caught from others, column 
 after column of smoke rose black, straight, and single; first one, then another, 
 and another. Each of these then, like huge serpents, writhed and twisted 
 into a thousand fantastic shapes, until all finally blended and commingled, 
 and formed one vast and livid column of smoke and flame which rose per- 
 pendicularly to the sky, and then spread out into a huge crown of sackcloth. 
 It was heaven's shield mercifully drawn over the scene to shelter from the 
 blazing sun the homeless and unsheltered ones that had fled to the fields and 
 cemeteries around the town, where they in silence and sadness sat and looked 
 upon the destruction of their homes and the accumulations of a life -time. 
 Add to all this the roaring and crackling of the flames, the sound of falling 
 walls, the distressing cries of burning animals, as horses, cattle, and swine, 
 and a picture of the terrible is seen which no one who witnessed it would 
 ever desire to have repeated. 
 
 General McCausland crossed the Potomac at Cherry Run and McCoy's fords, 
 thus turning the right flank of General Averell, who had been placed nearly 
 opposite him to watch him. As a demonstration in his favor, and to prevent 
 Averell from intercepting him, the divisions of Rodes and Ramsuer and the 
 cavalry brigade of Vaughan also crossed the river at Williamsport — Vaughan 
 pressing on as far as Hagerstown, Maryland. Averell, thus threatened upon 
 both flanks, was under the necessity of looking after his own safety, and accord- 
 ingly fell back into Pennsylvania, reaching Greencastle, eleven miles south of 
 Chambersburg, about sundown, where he went into bivouac. Learning of his 
 presence there, General Couch, who yet remained at Chambersburg, sent him 
 three successive dispatches peremptorily ordering him on to the latter plcae. 
 These dispatches were taken by couriers to the camp, but Averell could not be 
 found. For some reason which has never been satisfactorily explained, he 
 had changed the place of his own rest without the knowledge of his staff, and 
 when Couch's orders were taken to the camp no one knew where the General 
 was.* At length about four o'clock in the morning he was found and *he 
 
 « In so important a matter as this, in which a general officer of such well known 
 vigilance and efficiency as General Averell, is charged with indiscretion, or negligence, 
 resulting so disastrously as in this case, I have sought for the most positive information, 
 and append here extracts from letters from two reliable persons whose means of in- 
 formation will not be questioned. The first is from Thomas R. Bard, Esq., an at- 
 
GENERAL AVERELL'S DELAY. 585 
 
 dispatches placed in his hands, but it was then too late. General Couch, un- 
 able to communicate with him, and having no other force to rely upon, had 
 left the town. Averell at once put his command in motion, but still fearing; 
 an attack by Vaughan's command, which had pressed him the day before, 
 
 torney at the bar of Hueneme, Ventura County, California. Mr. Bard 'was formerly a 
 citizen of Chambersburg, but at the time of the war was in the forwarding and com- 
 mission business, at Hagerstown, Maryland, and also the agent at that place of the 
 Cumberland Valley Railroad Company, charged with the duty of superintending the 
 transportation of troops and supplies. Mr. Bard, after detailing his departure from 
 Hagerstown upon the approach of the Confederates in the evening of Friday, July 29th, 
 and his attendance upon the telegraph office at Greencastle, and the passage through 
 that place of Averell's forces, says: 
 
 "General Averell left three 'orderlies' at the telegraph office to convey to him all 
 messages that might be received for him, and encamped his troops in a grove distant 
 about one and a half miles north-east of Greencastle, and onty nine and a half miles 
 from Chambersburg. Late in the evening General Couch, commanding the Depart 
 ment of the Susquehanna, with head-quarters at Chambersburg, sent a message to 
 General Averell, which was promptly handed to one of the orderlies, who quickly 
 mounted his horse and rode off in the direction of General Averell's camp. Mr. B. 
 Gilmore, the telegraph operator at Chambersburg, kept us informed constantly of all 
 that was transpiring at that place, and of the movements of the Confederate force. It 
 is quite probable that I was informed by one of the operators as to the contents of the 
 message from General Couch. At any rate, at the time, I understood that General 
 Couch informed General Averell that the Confederate forces were at or had passed 
 through Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, and were moving toward Chambersburg; and 
 that being without adequate forces to check the movement, he inquired whether 
 Averell could be depended on for assistance. Later in the night two other messages 
 were received from General Couch for General Averell, and were promptly delivered 
 to the orderlies. The last of these messages was received probably about three o'clock 
 in the morning of July 30th. These messages reported the rapid approach of the 
 Confederates, and expressed great anxiety to learn if General Averell intended to render 
 assistance for the defense of Chambersburg. 
 
 " There had been no reply from General Averell, and learning that General Couch 
 had made preparations for leaving Chambersburg, and that in all probability the 
 communications with that place would soon be interrupted, I mounted a horse and 
 hurriedly rode out to find General Averell. On the road, about half way to the camp, 
 I met the orderlies riding leisurely toward Greencastle. In reply to my inquiry if they 
 had delivered their messages, they said that General Averell could not be found, and 
 that they did not know what to do with the messages. Hastily informing them of the 
 importance of the dispatches, I took them in my own hands, and telling them to follow 
 me, I spurred my horse and was soon at the grove. There was no sentry or guard to 
 halt me. All was quiet. There was not a sound save the champing of the feeding 
 horses; there were no lights or fires except the embers where the men had prepared 
 their evening meal. I dashed into the middle of the encampment, and there found a 
 solitary man to answer my inquiry, ' Where is General Averell ? ' He could not tell me. 
 An officer of a West Virginia regiment then appeared and said it would be difficult to 
 find General Averell, but offered to aid me in the search. While he prepared to mount 
 his horse, the booming of a cannon was heard in the direction of Chambersburg. The 
 
586 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 and to avoid being caught between it and the force under McCausland, he 
 proceeded in an easterly direction until he reached Greenwood, eight miles 
 from Chambersburg, when he turned westward and proceeded to the latter 
 place. The Confederates, apprised by their scouts of his approach, left the 
 
 officer expressed surprise and asked, '"What can that be?' I told him it supplemented 
 the messages which I brought, and indicated that McCausland had arrived at Cham- 
 bersburg. We rode hastily through the grove and soon found General Averell asleep 
 by the side of a fence. On being awakened, he raised upon his elbow and heard the 
 information I had brought. I had handed him the telegrams, but as there was no 
 light I told him what they contained, and informed him that they had been delivered 
 to his orderlies hours before. He made no reply, and, as I thought, was about to turn 
 over and go to sleep. Minutes seemed hours to me, and growing impatient I said to 
 him, 'General Averell, if you wish me to convey any answer to General Couch, I beg 
 you to let me have it quickly, for it is barely possible that I can get back before tele- 
 graphic communications will be cut off.' Without rising to put his troops in motion, 
 or without the slightest manifestation of interest in the condition of General Couch, or 
 of the peril to which the loyal people of Chambersburg were exposed, he merely said, 
 ' Tell Couch I will be there in the morning.' It was then, I think, about four o'clock, 
 a. m. Returning to Greencastle, I found that already the Chambersburg office was 
 closed, having first reported that General Couch had all his military forces and sup- 
 plies on the cars, and that the Confederate advance was about to enter the town." 
 
 The other account is from H. R. Fetterhoff, M. D,, of Baltimore, Maryland, but at the 
 time of the war telegraph operator at Greencastle, Pennsylvania. Dr. Fetterhoft 
 says: 
 
 " At the time these events transpired I was telegraph operator at Greencastle, and 
 had the means of knowing what was going on generally. In the evening of Friday, 
 July 29th, rS64, about eight o'clock, General Averell's command passed through Green- 
 castle on their way from Hagerstown toward Chambersburg, and bivouacked for the 
 night a short distance north of the town along the road leading to Chambersburg. If 
 my memory serves me right Genral Averell reported his arrival to General Couch at 
 Chambersburg. At least I so reported it to Mr. Gilmore, telegraph operator at Cham- 
 bersburg. The General sent three or four orderlies to my office and informed me of 
 his whereabouts. Mr. D. C. Aughinbaugh, operator at Hagerstown, Mr. T. R. Bard, 
 and I think several other persons from that place, were at the office in the evening and 
 at intervals during the night. The scouts reported that the Confederates had built 
 camp-fires in the neighborhood of State Line, four miles south of Greencastle,' and it 
 was supposed that they had encamped there for the night. About midnight, or per- 
 haps a little later, Mr. Gilmore informed me that the telegraph lines west of Cham- 
 bersburg on the rittsburg turnpike had been cut, showing that the enemy after 
 building the camp-fires at the State Line as a blind had moved in the direction of 
 Upton and Bridgeport on General Averell's left flank. I immediately informed 
 General Averell of this fact, when he sent me a message thanking me for the informa- 
 tion, and requesting me to keep him posted in regard to any information I might 
 obtain. About one o'clock a. m. July 30th, General Couch sent an order to General 
 Averell directing him to ' Move on to Chambersburg at once.' I immediately sent this 
 message with an orderly, but never heard from him again. In about a half hour 
 General Couch repeated the messaige in the same words, and I sent another orderly 
 with the message, but still no answer. The same order was repeated about every half 
 
THE EXTENT OF THE DESTRUCTION. 587 
 
 burning town about eleven o'clock and passed rapidly westward and crossed 
 the North Mountain into Fulton County and thence down the valley and re- 
 crossed the Potomac at Hancock, pursued by Averell. Had General Averell 
 informed his staff of his removal, Couch's dispatches would have reached him 
 in time, and the terrible disaster of Chambersburg would have been averted. 
 It certainly seems strange that a commander of Averell's sagacity should, 
 under the threatening circumstances, have committed so grave an oversight. 
 
 The work of destruction was commenced about eight o'clock in the morn- 
 ing, and by eleven o'clock the enemy had all gone, but so thorough had been 
 their work that the major part of Chambersburg — its chief wealth and busi- 
 ness, its capital and elegance — were laid in ruins. Ten squares of buildings 
 were burned and two thousand human beings were made homeless, and many 
 of them penniless. From this disaster the majority never recovered, but 
 lived the remainder of their days in poverty. Reduced from affluence to pov- 
 ertj', many were dependent upon the charity of the few whose homes escaped 
 the invaders' torch, as well as upon the provision made by the military au- 
 thorities to meet their immediate wants. 
 
 When the fire had subsided and the enemy had gone, the people who had 
 taken refuge in the cemeteries and fields around the town, returned to view 
 the remains of their ruined homes. Sad indeed were their feelings when 
 they stood by the scene of desolation, recognizing here and there among the 
 ruins some articles which reminded them of the past, as broken and warped 
 stoves, cooking utensils, etc. Rut when night came on, and a place of shelter 
 had to be sought, then only did they realize their sad condition. Such build- 
 ings as had escaped the common destruction were opened and were crowded 
 to their utmost capacity. Some made their way on foot to the country, or to 
 neighboring towns, and some removed to distant places, never again to reside 
 in Chambersburg. Chambersburg was founded A. D. 1764, and was burned 
 A. D. 1864. 
 
 The following is the aggregate of the buildings burned: Residences and 
 places of business, 266; barns and stables, 9S; out-buildings of various kinds, 
 
 hour until my orderlies were all gone and I had no one to carry the last message, 
 when Mr. Bard came to my office and volunteered to deliver it. After searching for 
 General Averell and finding him he delivered the message. I then learned that when 
 I had sent General Averell the information that the Confederates were in his rear, or 
 on his flank, he moved his head-quarters from the rear of his line, where it had been, 
 up into the line without informing the orderlies or any one else, consequently no one 
 knew where to find him, and the messages had not been delivered and only reached 
 him near four o'clock a. m. when Mr. Bard delivered them. The Confederates entered 
 Chambersburg about this time, and Mr. Gilmore bade me ' good-bye ' and left the 
 office." 
 
588 
 
 T1IE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 j 73; total buildings burued, 537. Two commissions, composed of compe- 
 tent and disinterested persons, appointed by the governor of the State, and 
 authorized by acts of the legislature, came to the town and adjudicated the 
 losses of the citizens by the fire. The claims adjudicated by these commis- 
 sions were carefully scrutinized. Each claimant was examined separately 
 and under oath, evidence besides his own being required. The claims thus 
 adjudicated were as follows: Real estate, $713,294.34; personal property, 
 $915,137.24: total, $1,628,431.58. Immediately after the fire the legislature of 
 
 ■ : 
 
 AFTER THE FIRE. 
 [This view, copied from a photograph taken shortly after the fire, shows the ruins of 
 the north-east corner of the public square. The column on the left marks the ruins of 
 the writer's dwelling and store, and the ruins to the right are those of the Court House. 
 Between these two buildings stood Franklin Hall. These three buildings were not in 
 line in front, but the hall was about twenty feet behind the writer's building, and the 
 Court House about seventy-five feet behind the hall. The walls of the hall had entirely 
 fallen except the column on the extreme right, which marks its south-west corner. 
 Had these walls not fallen the ruins of the Court House could not have been seen in 
 this picture] 
 
 the State was convened in special session, and after visiting the town and 
 ascertaining the destitution of the people, the sum of one hundred thousand 
 dollars was appropriated to meet the immediate wants of the needy. This 
 
REASONS FOR THE BURNING. 589 
 
 sum was divided, not pro-rata to the amount of losses sustained, but according 
 to the necessities of each. Subsequently an appropriation of five hundred 
 thousand dollars, followed a year or two later by another of three hundred 
 thousand, was made. These appropriations were divided pro-rata, and, as 
 "will be seen from the figures given, paid about one half the losses by the 
 fire. Certificates were given for the remainder, certifying to the amount, 
 "but not binding the State to pay it until the United States indemnifies the 
 State. 
 
 Three causes have been assigned for the destruction of Chambersburg. 
 One of these is that it was in revenge for the innocent hospitality the town 
 gave to John Brown and his misguided followers when planning their mad 
 raid upon Harper's Ferry. A second is, that it was in retaliation for alleged 
 acts of burning and destruction committed by Federal troops in the South, 
 and specially in the Shenandoah Valley, by orders of General Hunter dur- 
 ing the raid referred to in the opening of this article. A third opinion 
 regards it as a barbarous, wanton, and unjustifiable act. The true cause 
 will appear in the following statements. The first is a letter written by 
 General Early, who gave the order, in response to one addressed to him by 
 the writer: 
 
 Yellow Sulphur Springs, September 4th, 1S84. 
 J. Hoke, Esq: 
 
 Sir — Having been from home since the 5th of August, your letter of the 6th of 
 that month did not reach me until a very few days ago, when it was forwarded to 
 me from Lynchburg with a number of others. 
 
 As you desire my statement in regard to the burning of Chambersburg, Pennsyl- 
 vania, under my order in July, 1S64, I send you a copy of my " Memoirs of the Last 
 Year of the War," in which you will find, on pages 60 to 70, my account of that 
 affair. All I have to add, is that on my march from Lynchburg in pursuit of Gen- 
 eral Hunter, and down the valley on the expedition against Washington, I had seen 
 the evidences of the destruction wantonly committed by his troops under his orders, 
 including the burning of a number of private houses without provocation, among 
 them being the family residence, at Lexington, of ex-Governor Letcher; also the 
 Virginia Military Institute at the same place, and a part of the town of Newtown, 
 in Frederick County; and in addition there had been a wholesale destruction of pri- 
 vate property, including even wearing apparel of ladies, andj bed clothing; the beds 
 in many cases being cut to pieces and the feathers scattered to the winds. In addi- 
 tion, there had been the destruction of several towns in the South by Federal 
 troops, among them being the town of Darien, Georgia, in the year 1S63. When, 
 therefore, on my return from the expedition threatening Washington, I found that 
 Hunter, who had reached the lower valley on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
 after his flight to the Kanawha Valley, had been engaged in his accustomed work 
 and had burned the valuable residences of several citizens of Jefferson County, I 
 
590 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 determined to demand compensation therefor from some town in Pennsylvania, 
 and in the event of failure to comply with my demand to retaliate by burning said 
 town. The town of Chambersburg was selected because it was the only one of any 
 consequence accessible to my troops, and for no other reason. The houses men- 
 tioned with their contents, all of which were destroyed, were fully worth at least 
 $100,000 in gold, and I required $500,000 in United States currency in the alternative, 
 for the reason that said currency was rapidly depreciating, being then nearly three 
 to one in gold, and I determined to secure the full equivalent of $100,000 in gold. I 
 will add that according to the laws of retaliation in war, I would have been justi- 
 fied in burning Chambersburg without giving the town a chance of redemption. 
 
 Compare the expedition of Hunter into Virginia in June, 1S64, the campaign of 
 Sherman in Georgia and South Carolina, of Banks in the trans-Mississippi, and 
 Sheridan in the valley of Virginia, with General Lee in Pennsylvania, leaving out 
 of consideration Beast Butler's performances in New Orleans, and then say whether 
 the denunciations of those who applaud the destroyer of Atlanta, Georgia, and 
 Columbia, South Carolina, and him who boasted that, besides burning the town of 
 Dayton, he had so desolated the valley as that a crow flying over it would have to 
 carry its rations, should have any terror for me. 
 
 Respectfully, J. A. Early. 
 
 Accompanying the foregoing letter was a pamphlet of one hundred and 
 thirty- six pages, entitled "A Memoir of the Last Year of the War for In- 
 dependence in the Confederate States of America, containing an account of 
 the operations of his commands in the j^ears 1864 and 1S65, by Lieutenant- 
 General Jubal A. Early, of the Provisional Army of the Confederate States." 
 In a foot - note on page 70, General Early, speaking of the destruction of 
 Chambersburg, says: " For this act I, alone, am responsible, as the officers 
 engaged in it were simply executing my orders, and had no discretion left 
 them." As General Early, then, assumes the entire responsibility in this 
 matter, and claims as his justification the wanton destruction of property by 
 General Hunter in the Shenandoah Valley, it is but fair to give him a 
 further hearing, as well as to introduce other testimony to the allegations 
 he makes. I therefore quote from his pamphlet as follows: 
 
 "The scenes on Hunter's route from Lynchburg had been truly heart-ren- 
 ding. Houses had been burned, and helpless women and children left with- 
 out shelter. The country had been stripped of provisions, and many families 
 left without a morsel to eat. Furniture and bedding had been cut to pieces, 
 and old men and women and children robbed of all the clothing they had 
 except that on their backs. I_adies trunks had been rifled and their dresses 
 torn to pieces in mere wantonness. • • We had renewed evidence of the 
 outrages committed by Hunter's orders in burning and plundering private 
 houses. We saw the ruins of a number of houses to which the torch had 
 
GENERAL EARLY'S REASONS. 591 
 
 been applied by his orders. At Lexington he had burned the Military Insti 
 tute, with all its scientific apparatus; and Washington College had been plun- 
 dered and the statue of Washington stolen. The residence of ex - Governor 
 Letcher at that place had been burned by his orders, and but a few minutes 
 given Mrs. Letcher and her family to leave the house." (Page 48.) 
 
 Again General Early, on page 50, says: 
 
 "On this day (July 2d) we passed through Newtown where several houses, 
 including that of a Methodist minister, had been burned by Hunter's orders, 
 because a part of Mosby's command had attacked a train of supplies for 
 Sigel's force at this place. The original order was to burn the whole town, 
 but the officer sent to execute it had revolted at the cruel mandate of his su- 
 perior, and another had been sent who had but partially executed it, after 
 having forced the people to take the oath of allegiance to the United States 
 to save their houses. Mosby's battalion, though called 'guerillas' by the 
 enemy, was a regular organization in the Confederate army, and was merely 
 serving on detached duty under General Lee's orders. The attack on the 
 train was an acl: of legitimate warfare, and the order to burn Newtown, and 
 the burning of the houses mentioned, were most wanton, cruel, unjustifiable, 
 and cowardly." 
 
 One more quotation from this pamphlet is as follows: 
 
 "On the 26th (July) we moved to Martinsburg, the cavalry going to the 
 Potomac. The 27th and 28th were employed in destroying the railroad, it 
 having been repaired since we passed over it at the beginning of the month. 
 While at Martinsburg it was ascertained, beyond ail doubt, that Hnnter had 
 been again indulging in his favorite mode of warfare, and that, after his re- 
 turn to the valley, while we were near Washington, among other outrages, 
 the residences of Mr. Andrew Hunter, a member of the Virginia Senate, Mr. 
 Alexander R. Boteler, an ex -member of the Confederate Congress, and Ed- 
 mund I. Lee, with their contents, had been burned by his orders, only time 
 enough being given for the ladies to get out of the houses. * * I now came 
 to the conclusion that we had stood this mode of warfare long enough, and 
 that it was time to open the eyes of the people of the North to its enormity 
 by an example in the way of retaliation. I did not select the cases men- 
 tioned as having more merit or greater claims for retaliation than others, but 
 because they had occurred within the limits of the country covered by my 
 command, and were brought more immediately to my attention. 
 
 "The town of Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, was selected as the one on 
 which retaliation should be made, and McCausland was ordered to proceed 
 with his brigade and that of Johnson's and a battery of artillery to that 
 place, and demand of the municipal authorities the sum of $100,000 in gold 
 
592 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 or $500,000 in United States currency, as a compensation for the destruction 
 of the houses named and their contents; and, in default of payment, to lay 
 the town in ashes, in retaliation for the burning of these houses and others 
 in Virginia, as well as for the towns which had been burned in other South- 
 ern States. A written demand to that effect was sent to the municipal 
 authorities, and they were informed what would be the result of a failure to 
 comply with it. I desired to give the people of Chambersburg an oppor- 
 tunity of saving their town by making compensation for part of the injury 
 done, and hoped that the payment of such a sum would have the desired 
 effect, and open the eyes of the people of the North to the necessity of urging 
 upon their government the adoption of a different policy." 
 
 As General Early bases his retaliatory policy upon certain specific acts of 
 alleged vandalism upon the part of General Hunter, it is important that the 
 fullest information upon those facts that can be obtained should be con- 
 sidered here. I will therefore introduce some extracts from an article written 
 by General J. D. Imboden, for the Philadelphia Weekly Times, and repub- 
 lished in Annals of the War (pages 169-183), entitled "Fire, Sword, and the 
 Halter." This article by General Imboden is lengthy and enters into details, 
 covering the precise cases referred to by Early, as well as many others, to 
 which the latter but incidentally refers. General Imboden says: 
 
 "Up to his occupation of Staunton, where his army was so much strength- 
 ened by Crook and Averell, as to relieve his mind of all apprehension of 
 disaster, the conduct of General Hunter had been soldierly, striking his 
 blows only at armed men. But at Staunton he commenced burning private 
 property, and, as will be seen further on, the passion for house burning 
 grew upon him, and a new system of warfare was inaugurated that a few 
 weeks afterward culminated in the retaliatory burning of Chambersburg. * * 
 
 "From Brownsburg General Hunter proceeded to Eexington, encountering 
 only such delay as McCausland could effect with a single brigade of cavalry. 
 At Eexington he enlarged upon the operations begun at Staunton. On his 
 way, and in the surrounding country, he burnt mills, furnaces, store - houses, 
 granaries, and all farming utensils he could find, beside a great amount of 
 fencing, and a large quantity of grain. In the town he burnt the Virginia 
 Military Institute, and all the professor's houses except the superintendent's 
 (General Smith), where he had his head - quarters, and found a portion of 
 the family too sick to be removed. He had the combustibles collected to 
 burn Washington College, the recipient of the benefactions of the Father of 
 his Country by his will; but yielding to the appeals of the trustees and citi- 
 zens, spared the building, but destroyed the philosophical and chemical 
 apparatus, libraries, and furniture. He burned the mills and some private 
 
TESTIMONY REGARDING HUNTER'S CONDUCT. 593 
 
 stores in the lower part of the town. Captain Towns, an officer in General 
 Hunter's army, took supper with the family of Governor John Letcher. 
 Mrs. L,etcher having heard threats that her house would be burned, spoke 
 of it to Captain Towns, who said it could not be possible, and remarked that 
 he would go at once to head - quarters and let her know. He went, returned 
 in a half hour, and told her that he was directed by General Hunter to 
 assure her that the house would not be destroyed, and she might, therefore, 
 rest easy. After this, she dismissed her fears, not believing it possible that 
 a man occupying Hunter's position would be guilty of wilful and deliberate 
 falsehood to a lady. It, however, turned out otherwise, for the next morn- 
 ing, at half past eight o'clock, his assistant provost -marshal, accompanied 
 by a portion of his guard, rode up to the door, and Captain Berry dismount- 
 ed, rang the door bell, called for Mrs. Letcher, and informed her that Gen- 
 eral Hunter had ordered him to burn her house. She replied: 'There must 
 be some mistake,' and requested to see the order. He said it was verbal. 
 She asked if its execution could not be delayed till she could see General 
 Hunter? He replied: 'The order is peremptory, and you have five minutes 
 to leave the house.' Mrs. Letcher then asked if she could be allowed to re- 
 move her mother's, her sister's, her own, and her children's clothing. This 
 request being refused, she left the house. In a very short time they poured 
 camphene on the parlor floor and ignited it with a match. In the meantime 
 Miss Lizzie Letcher was trying to remove some articles of clothing from the 
 other end of the house, and Berry, finding these in her arms, set fire to them. 
 The wardrobe and bureaus were then fired, and soon the house was en- 
 veloped in flames. Governor Letcher's mother, then seventy - eight years 
 old, lived on the adjoining lot. They fired her stable, within forty feet of 
 the dwelling, evidently to burn it, too; bnt owing to the active exertions of 
 Captain Towns, who made his men carry water, the house was saved. While 
 Hunter was in Lexington, Captain Matthew White, residing near town, was 
 arrested, taken about two miles, and, without trial, was shot, on the allega- 
 tion that he was a bush-whacker. During the first year of the war he com- 
 manded the Rockbridge Cavalry, and was a young gentleman of generous 
 impulses and good character. The total destruction of private property in 
 Rockbridge County, by Hunter, was estimated and published in the local 
 papers at the time as over $2,000,000. The burning of the Institute was a 
 public calamity, as it was an educational establishment of great value. 
 
 "From Lexington he proceeded to Buchanan, in Botetourt County, and 
 camped on the magnificent estate of Colonel John T. Anderson, an elder 
 brother of General Joseph R. Anderson, of the Tredegar Iron Works, at Rich- 
 mond. Colonel Anderson's estate, on the banks of the Upper James, and hi* 
 34 
 
594 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 mansion, were baronial in character. The house crowned a high, wooded 
 hill, was very large, and furnished in a style to dispense that lavish hospitality 
 which was the pride of so many of the old-time Virginians. It was a seat of 
 luxury and refinement, and in all respects a place to make the owner con- 
 tented with his lot in this world. Colonel Anderson was old — his head as 
 white as snow — and his wife but a few years his junior. He was in no office, 
 and too old to fight — hence he was living on his fine estate strictly the life of 
 a private gentleman. He had often, in years gone by, filled prominent repre- 
 sentative positions from his count}'. There was no military or public object 
 on God's earth to be gained by ruining such a man. Yet Hunter, after de- 
 stroying all that he could on the plantation when he left it, ordered the grand 
 old mansion, with all its contents, to be laid in ashes. " * * * * 
 
 General Imboden, then, details the burning of several fine- mansions in the 
 Lower Valley, referred to also by General Early. He says: 
 
 " I shall conclude this already long narrative by citing a few more instances 
 of Hunter's incendiarism in the Lower Valley. It seems that, smarting under 
 the miserable failure of his grand raid on Lynchburg, where, during a march 
 of over two hundred miles, the largest force he encountered was under Jones, 
 at Piedmont, and he routed that, thus leaving the way open to Lynchburg 
 within three days, destroy the stores there and go out through West Virginia 
 unmolested, he had failed to do any thing but inflict injury on private citi- 
 zens, and he came back to the Potomac more implacable than when he left 
 it a month before. His first victim was the Hon. Andrew Hunter, of Charles- 
 town, Jefferson County, his own first cousin, and named after the General's 
 father. Mr. Hunter was a lawyer of great eminence, and a man of deservedly 
 large influence in his county and the state. His home, eight miles from. 
 Harper's Fern-, in the suburbs of Charlestown, was the most costly and ele- 
 gant in the place, and his family as refined and cultivated as any in the state. 
 His offense, in General Hunter's eyes, was that he had gone politically with 
 his state, and was in full sympathy with the Confederate cause. The general 
 sent a squadron of cavalry out from Harper's Ferry, took Mr. Hunter prisoner, 
 and held him a month in the common guard house of his soldiers, without 
 alleging any offense against him not common to nearly all the people of Vir- 
 ginia, and finally discharged him without trial or explanation, after heaping 
 these indignities upon him. Mr. Hunter was an old man, and suffered 
 severely from confinement and exposure. While he was thus a prisoner, 
 General Hunter ordered his elegant mansion to be burned to the ground, 
 with all its contents, not even permitting Mrs. Hunter and her daughter 
 to save their clothes and family pictures from the flames; and, to add to 
 the desolation, camped his cavalry within the inelosure of the beautiful 
 
FURTHER CONFEDERATE TESTIMONY. 595 
 
 grounds, of several acres, surrounding the residence, till the horses had de- 
 stroyed them. 
 
 " General Hunter's next exploit was at Shepherdstown, in the same county, 
 where, on the 19th of July, 1864, he caused to be burned the residence of 
 Hon. A. R. Boteler, ' Fountain Rock. ' Mrs. Boteler was a cousin of General 
 Hunter. This homestead was an old colonial house endeared to the family 
 by a thousand tender memories, and contained a splendid library, many pic- 
 tures, and an invaluable collection of rare and precious manuscripts, illus- 
 trating the early history of that part of Virginia, that Colonel Boteler had 
 collected by years of toil. The only members of the family who were there 
 at the time were Colonel Boteler's eldest and widowed daughter, Mrs. Shep- 
 herd, who was an invalid, her three children, the eldest five years old and the 
 youngest eighteen months, and Miss Helen Boteler. Colonel Boteler and his 
 sou were in the army, and Mrs. Boteler in Baltimore. The ladies and children 
 were at dinner when informed by the servants that a body of cavalry had 
 turned in at the gate, from the turnpike, and were coming up to the house." 
 
 General Imboden then proceeds to detail the manner of the burning of this 
 house by order of Ceneral Hunter, and follows this description with another 
 detailing the burning of the residence of Mr. Edmund I. L,ee, in the same 
 locality. He then concludes as follows: 
 
 "If the people of Chambersburg will carefully read this record of wanton 
 destruction of private property, this 'o'er true tale ' of cruel wrong inflicted 
 on the helpless, they will understand why, when goaded to madness, re- 
 muneration was demanded at their hands by General Early, and upon its 
 refusal retaliation was inflicted on the nearest community that could be 
 reached, and it was their misfortune to be that community. Contrast Lee in 
 Pennsylvania, in 1863, and Hunter in Virginia, in 1864, and judge them both 
 as history will." 
 
 I follow these accounts by Generals Early and Imboden with an extract 
 from a letter from F. C. Slingluff, Esq., a leading member of the bar of the 
 city of Baltimore, and a gentleman of unimpeachable veracity. Mr. Sling- 
 luff was a member of the First Maryland (Confederate) Cavalry, General 
 Bradley T. Johnson's brigade. He participated in the valley campaign, and 
 was an eye-witness of what he relates. He was also present, as a private t 
 in the destruction of Chambersburg. Mr. Slingluff says: 
 
 " * * Now 3'ou would like to know if the men whom I have described 
 (the men who assisted in burning Chambersburg, many of whom are now 
 among the leading merchants, lawyers, doctors, and farmers of Baltimore 
 and other parts of Maryland,) justified the burning of your town, in their 
 individual capacity, irrespective of the orders from head - quarters, under 
 
596 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 which they acted. I must say to you frankly that they did, and I never 
 heard one dissenting voice. And why did we justify so hard a measure? 
 Simply because we had long come to the conclusion that it was time for us to 
 burn something in the enemy's country. For the campaign of the preceding 
 year, when our whole army had passed through your richest section of coun- 
 try, where the peaceful homes and fruitful fields only made the contrast 
 with what we had left the more significant, many a man, whose home was in 
 ruins, chafed under the orders from General Lee, which forbade him to touch 
 them, but the orders were obeyed and we left the homes and fields as we 
 found them, the ordinary wear and tear of an army of occupation alone ex- 
 cepted. We had so often before our eyes the reverse of this wherever your 
 army swept through Virginia, that we were thoroughly convinced of the 
 justice of a stern retaliation. 
 
 " It is no pleasure to me to have to recall the scenes of those days, nor do 
 I do so in any spirit of vindictiveness, but I simply tell the truth in justifica- 
 tion of an ac5t which you and others may suppose was without justification. 
 We had followed Kilpatrick (I think it was) in his raid through Madison, 
 Greene, and other counties, and had seen the cattle shot, or ham -strung in 
 the barn -yards, the agricultural implements burned, the feather-beds and 
 clothing of the women and children cut in shreds in mere wantonness, farm- 
 house after farm-house stripped of every particle of provisions, private car- 
 riages cut and broken up, and women in tears lamenting all this. I do not 
 write here anything that I did not see myself. We had seen a thousand 
 ruined homes in Clark, Jefferson, and Frederick counties, — barns and houses 
 burned and private property destroyed, — but we had no knowledge that this 
 was done by ' official orders.' At last when the official order came openly 
 from General Hunter, and the burning was done there under his orders, and 
 when our orders of retaliation came, they met with the approbation, as I 
 have said, of every man who crossed the Potomac to execute them. Of 
 course we had nothing personal against your pretty little town. It just so 
 happened that it was the nearest and most accessible place of importance for 
 us to get to. It was the unfortunate victim of circumstances. Had it been 
 further off and some other town nearer, that other town would have gone, 
 and Chambersburg would have been saved." 
 
 These three persons whose statements have been given, while speaking of 
 the general disregard of private property in the South, concur in the allega- 
 tion of General Hunter's wholesale destructive propensities, and two of 
 them specifically refer to the destruction of the properties of Andrew Hunter, 
 A. R. Boteler, E. I. Lee, ex -Governor Letcher, J. T. Anderson, and the Vir- 
 ginia Military Institute. These six properties were specifically named by 
 
FEDERAL STATEMENTS. 597 
 
 General Karly in his order to McCausland, and upon these he based his 
 retributive demand upon Chambersburg. The responsibility, then, for the 
 destruction of Chambersburg, it will be seen, rests upon General Hunter. 
 Justice to him, and to the people of the South, as well as the truth of history, 
 demands a fair, candid, and impartial consideration of the case. 
 
 The fact of the destruction of the six properties named, as well as many 
 others by General Hunter, in his valley campaign, has not been denied. 
 Federal soldiers, who saw-these ruins, have freely admitted them. But while 
 these facts are conceded, General Hunter claims that he had sufficient 
 ground for his severity in the following consideration^: In no part of the 
 South, perhaps, was the hostility to the Union so bitter and malignant as 
 in the valley of Virginia. With but few exceptions the entire male popula- 
 tion, capable of bearing arms, were either in the Confederate army, or the 
 secret emissaries of such as were thus engaged. The entire valley was in- 
 fested with guerillas and bush-whackers who, during the day, assumed to be 
 farmers and tradesmen, and at night carried on the nefarious work of way- 
 laying straggling Federal soldiers and unprotected trains. Familiar with 
 every foot of ground in the valley, as well as with the mountain fastnesses, 
 they stole upon their victims, and then, under the cover of the night, fled to 
 places of safety. And as one of the evidences of the facts stated, the follow- 
 ing account of an a<5t of barbarity, committed by this class of men, is cited. 
 It was published in one of the papers of Martinsburg, West Virginia, July 
 23, 1864, under the caption of "A Fiendish Act." ".Six Union soldiers were 
 found strapped to a fence in the vicinity of Charlestown, having their throats 
 cut from ear to ear. The fiendish act is supposed to have been the work of 
 resident Confederates, who are farmers and tradesmen during the day and 
 guerillas at night. Virginia swarms with men of this class, who have, ever 
 since the commencement of the war, pursued a course of this kind, and who 
 have committed deeds so fiendish in their character as to put to blush the 
 darkest and bloodiest deeds of our Indian savages. It is said that General 
 
 Hunter is as mad as about this barbarous deed, and has arrested some 
 
 sixty residents of the neighborhood in which these unfortunate men were 
 found, and are now held in order, if possible, to ferret out the guilty parties 
 and bring them to justice." 
 
 Compare the date of the foregoing barbarous act with the arrest and im- 
 prisonment of Mr. Andrew Hunter, and the destruction of the properties 
 referred to in that neighborhood, and the cause which led General Hunter to 
 adopt so severe a retributive policy will be seen. In justification of the 
 destruction of the property of ex -Governor Letcher, it is said, whether truly 
 or falsely I can not say, that the form of a hand -bill was found in a printing 
 
598 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 establishment in Lexington, bearing Letcher's name, and urging the bush- 
 whacking of Federal soldiers; and, further, that his house was occupied by- 
 concealed sharpshooters, who fired upon some of General Hunter's men. 
 What the particular provocation was, which led to the destruction of the 
 other properties named, has not been stated. 
 
 The three gentlemen from whom I have quoted — Early, Imbodeu, and 
 Slingluff, — refer to the humane manner in which General Lee conducted his 
 campaign in Pennsylvania in 1863, and claim that no wanton destruction of 
 private property was made. This is freely admitted. With the exception 
 of the railroad buildings in Chambersburg, and one or two buildings on the 
 field of Gettysburg, no houses or barns were destroyed. Private property was 
 taken for the use of the army, but, except in a few cases by stragglers, the 
 regulations of siezure laid down by General Lee in general orders No. 72, 
 and issued specially for the Pennsylvania campaign, were strictly' observed. 
 Tiut while the comparative good conduct of the Confederates in Pennsylvania 
 is admitted, it must also be remembered that there was no bushwhacking of 
 them, nor depredations committed upon their trains. Suppose General Lee 
 had found a number of his men massacred by citizens as were the six 
 Federal soldiers near Charlestown, Virginia, and the houses of the people 
 used for concealed sharp-shooters, and his trains waylaid and robbed, would 
 he not have adopted a different policy, and would not the laws of civilized 
 warfare and the sentiment of the world have justified him in so doing? That 
 a retributive policy would have been adopted, and severe retaliation visited 
 upon the people, is clear from a paragraph in General Order,. No. 49, issued 
 by Lieutenant- General Ewell while in Chambersburg: "Citizens of the 
 country through which the arm)' may pass, who are not in the military 
 service, are admonished to abstain from all acts of hostility, upon a penalty 
 of being dealt zeith in a summary wanner." The contrast, then, is not be- 
 tween the conduct of General Lee in Pennsylvania, and his treatment of the 
 people there, and that of General Hunter in the Valley of Virginia and his 
 treatment of the people in that locality, but between the conduct of the peo- 
 ple of Pennsylvania, and their treatment of the Confederate army, and that 
 of the people of the valley and their treatment of the Federals. 
 
 The policy of the commanders of the Federal armies operating in the She- 
 nandoah Valley had been humane and lenient, notwithstanding the evils 
 complained of, but when General Hunter succeeded to the command in that 
 place, he adopted a different policy. From the time he assumed command 
 in that department he gave evidence that he had decided convictions as to 
 how to deal with such inveterate haters of the Union. He was convinced 
 that the mild and lenient course pursued by his predecessors had only em- 
 
GENERAL HUNTER'S SHENANDOAH CIRCULAR. 599 
 
 "boldened them in their unwarranted methods, and he determined to adopt a 
 retaliatory policy. Guerrillas and bushwhackers, whose depredations had 
 heretofore gone unpunished, were now notified that their claim to be in the 
 regular Confederate service, under which the}- claimed exemption from the 
 summary punishment inflicted upon irregular and unorganized soldiers, 
 would no longer avail them. He accordingly issued and circulated the fol- 
 lowing circular: 
 
 Head -quarters of West Virginia, — in the Field. 
 Valley of the Shenandoah. May 24th, 1864. 
 
 Sir — Your name has been reported to me with evidence that you are one of the 
 leading secessionist sympathizers in the valley, and that you countenance and abet 
 the bush-whackers and guerillas who infest the woods and mountains of this region, 
 swooping out on the roads to plunder and outrage loyal residents, falling upon them 
 and firing into defenseless wagon-trains and assassinating soldiers of this command, 
 who may chance to be placed in exposed positions. These practices are not recog- 
 nized by the laws of war of any civilized nation, nor are the persons engaged 
 therein entitled to any other treatment than that done by the universal code of 
 justice to pirates, murderers, and other outlaws. 
 
 But from the difficulties of th: country, the secret aid and information given to 
 these bush-whackers by persons of your class, and the more important occupation 
 of the troops under my command, it is impossible to chase, arrest, and punish 
 these marauders as they deserve. Without the countenance and help given to them 
 by the Confederate residents of the valley, they could not support themselves for a 
 week. You are spies upon our movements, abusing the clemency which has pro- 
 tected your persons and property, while loyal citizens of the United States, residing 
 within the Confederate lines, are invariably plundered of all they may possess, im- 
 prisoned, and in some cases put to death. It is from you and your families and 
 neighbors, that these bandits receive food, clothing, ammunition and information, 
 and it is from their secret hiding-places, in your houses, barns and woods, that they 
 issue on their missions of pillage and murder. 
 
 You are therefore hereby notified, that for every train fired upon, or soldier of the 
 Union wounded or assassinated by bush-whackers in any neighborhood within the 
 reach of my command, the houses and other property of every secession sympa- 
 thizer residing within a circuit of five miles from the place of the outrage, shall be 
 destroyed by fire, and that for all public property jayhawked or destroyed by these 
 marauders, an assessment of five times the value of such property will be made 
 iipon the secession sympathizers residing within the circuit of ten miles around the 
 point at which the offense was committed. The payment of this assessment will 
 be enforced by the troops of this department, who will sieze and hold in close 
 military custody the persons assessed, until such payment shall have been made. 
 This provision will also be applied to make good from the secessionists in the 
 neighborhood five times the amount of any loss suffered by loyal citizens of the 
 United States, from the action of the bush-whackers whom you may encourage. 
 
 If you desire to avoid the consequences herein set forth, you will notify your 
 
GOO THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 guerilla and bush-whacking friends to withdraw from that portion of the valley 
 within my lines, and to join, if they desire to fight for the rebellion, the regular 
 forces of the secession army in my front or elsewheie. You will have none but your- 
 selves to blame for the consequences that will certainly ensue if these evils are per- 
 mitted to continue. This circular is not sent to you for the reason that you have 
 been singled out as peculiarly obnoxious, but because you are believed to furnish 
 the readiest means of communication with the prominent secession sympathizers of 
 your neighborhood. It will be for their benefit that you communicate to them the 
 tenor of this circular. D. Hunter, 
 
 Major- General Commanding. 
 
 In his invasion of Pennsylvania, General I,ee fully appropriated to the use 
 of his army the resources of our people, conveying away with him all he had 
 transportation for. All was, however, taken under special instructions and 
 by specified officers, and either paid for in such money as he had, or vonchers 
 given. In the valley campaigns, Hunter and Sheridan did what Lee did in 
 Pennsylvania, except paying for what they took, and in addition destroyed 
 what they could not consume or carry away. This was done as a war measure 
 to deplete the resources of the enemy. The Valley of Virginia had been the 
 great store house from which supplies had been drawn for the army about 
 Richmond, and it was deemed necessary to destroy these resources. Conse- 
 quently all the grain, provender, and cattle that could not be used were de- 
 stroyed, and barns, granaries, mills, and factories burned. It was an extreme 
 measure allowable under the circumstances. The policy, however, inaugur- 
 ated by Hunter, as indicated in the foregoing circular, was still a sterner re- 
 sort, and could never be justified unless the provocations were actually such 
 as he states. If citizens — persons not regularly in the Confederate service, 
 and wearing the Confederate uniform — committed depredations upon his 
 trains and brutally waylaid and murdered his soldiers, he was justified in 
 resorting to the extreme measure of retaliating upon the citizens and their 
 property, and he was as clearly within the rules of civilized warfare in so- 
 doing as was I,ee in his more humane policy in Pennsylvania. The fault lies 
 With the people who first violated the rules of war by depredations upon the 
 soldiers. The severe punishment which followed was but the sequel of their 
 own actions. Chambersburg, then, was burned, not so much because of Gen- 
 eral Hunter's retaliatory policy in the Valley of Virginia, but because of the 
 barbarous violations of the laws of war by the citizens of the last named place. 
 
 War is a game at which the two contending parties can play, and any re- 
 taliatory or cruel policy inaugurated by the one is invariably followed by a 
 similar policy by the other. It need not seem strange, then, that the first 
 opportunity the Confederates had of retaliating upon their enemies, they 
 improved. They could scarcely have been expected to do otherwise. 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 Agate, description of Pickett's great 
 charge, 378. 
 
 Alexander, General, Chief of Confederate 
 Artillery, observes the effect of the ar- 
 tillery fire and notifies Pickett when 
 to advance, 421; gives his opinion as to 
 the probable result had Meade order- 
 ed a counter assault after Pickett's re- 
 pulse, 429. 
 
 Aldie, cavalry engagement at, 117. 
 
 Anderson, General R. H., commands a 
 division in Hill's Corps, 41; passes 
 through Chambersburg, 174; encamps 
 about Fayetteville, 191; crosses South 
 Mountain and encamps at Cashtown, 
 227; reaches Gettysburg and placed in 
 line of battle, 281, 300. 
 
 Archer, Confederate General, leads the 
 advance and opens the battle of Get- 
 tysburg, 266; captnred with part of his 
 brigade, 267. 
 
 Army of the Potomac, strength and or- 
 ganization, 34; reduced in numbers 
 after the battle of Chancellorsville, 47; 
 positions occupied before the move- 
 ment northward began, 66; discovers 
 Lee's purposes and moves northward, 
 76; daily marches, 76, 114; defeats Lee's 
 purposes and shuts him in the valley, 
 75; covers Washington and awaits 
 further developments, 115, 234; learns 
 of Lee's whereabouts and resumes its 
 march northward, 235; daily inarches, 
 236; change of commanders, 243; su- 
 preme patriotism, 247; positions occu- 
 pied during the night before the first 
 day's engagement, 257; casualties at 
 Gettysburg, 444; relative strength after 
 the battle, 446; pursuit of*the enemy, 
 451; daily marches, 455; comes up with 
 its enemy but fails to attack, 465; 
 
 marches upon the enemy's works but 
 finds them deserted, 467; re-occupies 
 its former positions on the Rappa- 
 hannock, 476. 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, strength, 37; 
 organization, 40; position before the 
 movement northward began, 66; re- 
 moves to Culpeper, 67; flushed with 
 the victory of Chancellorsville and 
 confident of success, 41; confidence in 
 its commander, 168; moves northward, 
 68, 76, 123, 132, 146, 160, 169; description 
 of, 207; commendable behavior, 175; 
 excellent discipline, 154, 209; immense- 
 ness, 215; objective, 218, 220; change of 
 objective, 225; movements eastward, 
 219; concentration near Gettysburg, 
 227; positions occupied during the 
 night before the first day's engage- 
 ment, 233; demoralization after Pick- 
 ett's repulse, statement by Colonel 
 Freemantle, 442; Captain Owen, 425; 
 Colonel Semmes, 442; casualties at 
 Gettysburg, 444; relative condition and 
 strength after the battle, 446; with- 
 draws from the field and falls back 
 toward the Potomac, 449; takes a strong 
 position below Hagerstown, 460; re- 
 crosses the river and re-occupies its 
 former position, 476. 
 
 Artillery prelude to Pickett's assault, ef- 
 fect within the Federal line described 
 by Wilkinson, 364, within the Confed- 
 erate lines by Captain Owen, 366. 
 
 Averell, General, advance from West Vir- 
 ginia, 459; strange conduct near Green- 
 castle, 584. 
 
 Ayers, General, brilliant charge, 326. 
 
 Baird, Prof. Spencer F., philosophical 
 explanation of the phenomena of bat- 
 tle sound, 512. 
 
 601 
 
602 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Baird, Thos. R., statement concerning 
 General Averell, 584. 
 
 Barnes, General, brilliant charge, 326. 
 
 Barracks, United States, at Carlisle, Penn- 
 sylvania, burned, 254. 
 
 Barksdale, General (Confederate), killed, 
 336. 
 
 Bartlett, N., reasons why Cemetery and 
 Culp's Hills were not assailed and oc- 
 cupied in the evening after the first 
 day's engagement, 286. 
 
 Battle near Greencastle (the first of the 
 war upon Pennsylvania soil), 123; of 
 North Mountain, 147; of Wrightsville, 
 1S6; at Oyster's Point, 199, 229; at Mc- 
 Conuellsburg, 200; at Westminster, 
 251; at Hanover, 253. 
 
 Beale, James, defense of General Sickles, 
 563- 
 
 Benedict, G. G., General Meade's letter to 
 in relation to General Sickles' conduct 
 on July 2d, 578. 
 
 Beverly Ford, or Brandy Station, cavalry 
 engagement at, 69. 
 
 Berryville, occupied by Colonel McRey- 
 nolds, 79; driven out by General Rodes, 
 81; occupied by General Lee, where 
 he perfects his plans for the invasion, 
 117, 121. 
 
 Biddle, Colonel James C, opinion as to 
 the propriety of a counter assault after 
 Pickett's repulse, 432; charges General 
 Sickles with disobedience of Meade's 
 order on July 2d, 571. 
 
 Birney, General, assumes command of 
 the Third Corps when Sickles was 
 wounded, 324; discovers the withdrawal 
 of the Confederates, and asks permis- 
 sion to fire upon them, but is forbid- 
 den, 450. 
 
 Bloody Run, or Fverett, the rendezvous 
 of part of General Milroy's refugees, 
 . 84. 
 
 Border, Southern, excitement upon the 
 approach of the enemy, 94, 96, 97. 
 
 Brandy Station, or Beverly Ford, cavalry 
 engagement at, 69, 
 
 Brand, J., perilous predicament, 101. 
 
 Brooks, General, commands department 
 of the Monongehala, 93. 
 
 Buford, General, commands a division of 
 Federal cavalry, 37; reconnoissances 
 upon the Federal left, 250; advances to 
 Gettysburg and encamps on the Cham- 
 bersburg road, 254; discovers the enemy 
 and dispatches to Reynolds, 261; en- 
 
 gages the Confederates, 259; heroic re- 
 sistance until the arrival of Reynolds, 
 262; dispatches to General Meade, 271; 
 covers the withdrawal of the Federals, 
 276. 
 
 Cafkf.rty, Sergeant, wounded in the 
 first engagement of the war on Penn- 
 sylvania soil, near Greencastle, 126. 
 
 Caledonia Iron Works (Hon. Thaddeus 
 Stevens') visited by Jenkins, 107; burn- 
 ed by Farly, 170. 
 
 Caldwell, General, brilliant charge, 326. 
 
 Carlisle, Pennsylvania, occupied by Fed- 
 eral militia, 254; entered by Jenkins' 
 cavalry, 173; occupied by General 
 Rodes, 173; evacuated, 227; re-occupied 
 by Federal militia under General 
 Smith, 254; its surrender demanded by 
 Fitzhugh Lee, 254; United States Bar- 
 racks burned, 254. 
 
 Carr, General, vindicates Sickles, 568. 
 
 Cashtown, Adams County, Pennsylvania, 
 its location and Lee's great strategic 
 place, 92. 
 
 Casualties, Army of the Potomac, 444; 
 Army of Northern Virginia, 444. 
 
 Cearfoos' Cross Roads, Confederate wagon 
 train intercepted at, 506. 
 
 Cemetery Hill, East, description of, 267, 
 27S; conflicting claims as to the Irst dis- 
 covery of its importance, 268; occupied 
 by Steiuwehr's division, 273; the Fed- 
 erals rally there, 278; failure of the 
 Confederates to drive the Federals 
 from it, reasons stated by General 
 Doubleday, 2S3; Colonel Taylor, 284; 
 General Fwell, 285; N. Bartlett, 286; 
 Longstreet, 2S6; Colonel Swallow, 287; 
 General Lee, 289; assaulted by Karly 
 who is terribly repulsed, 33S; the focus 
 of the great artillery prelude to Pick- 
 ett's assault, 363; selected as the sol- 
 diers' last resting place, 521. 
 
 Cemetery, Soldiers' National, description 
 of, 523; its dedication — solemn and im- 
 posing ceremonies, 52S. 
 
 Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, location, 
 89; excitement at the approach of the 
 Confederates, 97; McReynolds' wagon 
 train dashes through, 98; entered and 
 occupied by Jenkins, 100; evacuated, 
 in; re-occupied by same, r32; entered 
 by Confederate infantry, 135; requisi- 
 tions made for supplies, 138; com- 
 municates daily with the Federal au- 
 
ANALYTICAL IXDEX. 
 
 603 
 
 thorities at Harrisburg, 157; entered 
 by Lee and staff, 162; important con- 
 sultation between Lee and Hill, 162; 
 plundered by Longstreet, 191; rapid 
 passage through of Swell's great 
 wagon train, 217; Pickett's division 
 destroys the railroad and railroad 
 buildings, 204; entrance of Itnboden's 
 cavalry, 231 ; insolent demands and hur- 
 ried departure, 231; passage through 
 of cavalry brigade of Generals W. B. 
 Jones and B. Robertson, 232; entered 
 by straggling wagons with wounded 
 from Gettysburg, 304; occupied by 
 General Couch, 459; burned by the 
 Confederates, 580; reason assigned by 
 General Early, 5S9; General Imbodeu, 
 592; F. C. Slingluff, Esq., 595 
 
 Chamberlain, Colonel, heroic defense of 
 Little Round Top, 332. 
 
 Charge, Pickett's, descriptions by General 
 Doubleday, 375; Agate, 378; Coffin, 382; 
 Owen, 384; Swallow, 390; should it 
 have been followed by a counter as- 
 sault — opinions by Longstreet, 427; 
 Alexander, 428; Trimble, 429; McLaws, 
 432; Doubleday, 430; Hancock, 430; 
 Howard, 430; Pleasanton, 431; Biddle, 
 432; Semmes, 442; Robins, 437; Greeley, 
 43i; Sypher, 441; Swinton, 428. 
 
 Coffin, C. C, description of Pickett's 
 charge, 382. 
 
 College Cupola, used as an observatory by 
 Federals, 276, 269; by General Lee, 292. 
 
 Columbia Bridge burned, 1S5; probable 
 object of the Confederates in attempt- 
 ing to seize it, 190. 
 
 Consultation between Generals Lee and 
 Hill in Chambersburg, 162; Ewell and 
 Early, 157. 
 
 Cort, Rev. C, certifies to having heard the 
 cannonade one hundred and forty 
 miles from the field, 508. 
 
 Council of War between General Meade 
 and his commanders, at Gettysburg, 
 352; below Hagerstown, 465. 
 
 Couch, General D. N., relieved of the com- 
 mand of the Second Corps and placed 
 over the Department of Susquehanna, 
 93; moves his head-quarters to Cham- 
 bersburg, 459. 
 
 Court-Martial, Confederate, proceedings 
 of, 153- 
 
 Cove Gap, occupied by General Imboden, 
 172. 
 
 Cowen, Hon. E., alarming report of the 
 
 situation in Washington prior to the 
 battle of Gettysburg, 249. 
 
 Crawford, General S. W., commands the 
 Pennsylvania Reserves, 36; leads the 
 Reserves in a gallant charge, 333. 
 
 Cross, Colonel, killed, 326. 
 
 Culpeper Court House, concentration at of 
 the Confederate army, 6S. 
 
 Culp's Hill, why not occupied by the Con- 
 federates in the evening after the first 
 day's engagement, 2S3-289; its import- 
 ance discovered by Hancock, and 
 troops sent to occupy it, 281; occupied 
 by the Twelfth Corps, 281; assaulted 
 and temporarily occupied by Johnson, 
 341; Confederates, after a terrible en- 
 gagement, driven out, 358. 
 
 Curtin, Gov. A. G., proclamation, 93; certi- 
 fies to Rev. S. W. Pomeroy, 225. 
 
 Cushing, Lieutenant, heroic conduct and 
 death, 375. 
 
 Custer, General, cavalry commander, 37; 
 promoted to a Brigadiership, 248. 
 
 Dahlgren, Captain Ulric, gallant dash 
 upon the Confederates at Greencastle, 
 180, 182. 
 
 Dana, General, commands a division of 
 militia, 94; advances to Greencastle, 
 459- 
 
 Daniel's brigade reinforces Johnson on 
 Culp's Hill, 357. 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, confident of success in 
 the invasion and sends Alexander H. 
 Stephens to Washington to secure the 
 recognition of the Southern Confed- 
 eracy, 51; his letter of instructions, 51. 
 
 Devil's Den, 320, 322. 
 
 Doubleday, General Abner, commands a 
 division in First Corps, 35; gives rea- 
 sons why Lee invaded the North, 48; 
 reaches Gettysburg and assumes com- 
 mand upon the fall of Reynolds, 265; 
 claims for Reynolds the discovery of 
 the importance of Cemetery Hill, 26S; 
 says Howard refused to obey Hancock 
 when he reached the field, 279; de- 
 scribes Pickett's charge, 375; says Gen- 
 eral Meade should have ordered a 
 counter charge, 430. 
 
 Early, General J. A., commands a di- 
 vision of Swell's Corps, 40; engages 
 General Milroy at Winchester, 81; 
 crosses the Potomac and passes down 
 the Cumberland Valley by way of 
 
604 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 Hagerstown, Waynesborough, Quiney, 
 and Funkstown to Greenwood, 146; 
 visits General Ewell at'Chambersburg, 
 157; marches across the South Moun- 
 tain, 169; burns Caledonia Iron Works, 
 170; enters Gettysburg and makes a 
 demand for supplies, 171; hurried de- 
 parture for York, 183; receives the sur- 
 render of that place, 183; demands a 
 ransom for the town, 184; issues an 
 address to the citizens, 184; sends Gen- 
 eral Gordon to seize the bridge at 
 Wrightsville, 185; falls back to Heid- 
 lersburg, 227; comes unexpectedly up- 
 on the Federal right, 276; assaults Fast 
 Cemetery Hill and is repulsed, 337; 
 charged with foolishly breaking his 
 lines and therefore unprepared for this 
 assault, 348; crosses the Confederate 
 rear in the retreat. 450; states his rea- 
 sons for ordering the destruction of 
 Chambersburg, 589. 
 Fdward's Ferry, the place where the Fed- 
 eral army crossed the Potomac, 236. 
 Fmmittsburg, 272. 
 
 Errors of the Confederates first day's en- 
 gagement, 283; second day's, 343-349. 
 Errors of the Federals, 349. 
 Everett, or Bloody Run, place for Rendez- 
 vous for Milroy's defeated forces, 84. 
 Everett, Hon. Fdward, estimate of strength 
 of Confederate army, 37; states Lee's 
 plans in the invasion, 54, remarks up- 
 on I,ee's inactivity in the morning of 
 the second day of battle, 307; dedica- 
 tory address of the Soldiers' National 
 Cemetery, 531. 
 Ewell, Lieutenant-General R. S., com- 
 mands Second Corps Army of Northern 
 Virginia, 40; marches from Fredericks- 
 burg, Virginia, and reaches Culpeper, 
 68; departs for the valley, 76; reaches 
 Winchester and defeats Milroy, Si, 
 Drives Colonel McReynolds from Ber- 
 ryville, 81; crosses the Potomac and 
 leads the advance into Maryland and 
 Pennsylvania, 87, 123; enters Cham- 
 bersburg, 136; requisitions for sup- 
 plies, 139; issues two general orders, 
 131, 138; occupies Shirk's Hill; 146; ad- 
 vances to Carlisle, 173; departs for Get- 
 tysburg via Mt. Holly, and encamps 
 with Farly at Heidlersburg, 227; starts 
 for Cashtown, but hearing the guns at 
 Gettysburg proceeds to that place, 273; 
 falls upon the Federal center, 274; oc- 
 
 cupies Gettysburg and the left of the 
 Confederate line, 300; reasons for not 
 ordering an assault upon Culp's and 
 East Cemetery hills, 285; withdraws 
 from Gettysburg and takes position 
 behind Seminar}- Ridge, 449. 
 
 Fairfield, route of Lee's retreat, 449; 
 pursued to this place by General Sedg- 
 wick, 450; not permitted to attack the 
 enemy, and reasons stated by General 
 Howe, 451. 
 Falling Waters, Confederate pontoon de- 
 stroyed by General French, 452; pon- 
 toon repaired and the wagon trains 
 and artillery re-cross into Virginia, 
 467; Confederate rear attacked bv Gen- 
 eral Kilpatrick, 468. 
 Farnsworth, General, promoted to a brig- 
 adiership, 24S; killed in attack upon 
 the Confederate right, 412. 
 Fayetteville, 92. 
 
 Fetterhoff, Dr. H. R., statement concern- 
 ing General Averell, 586. 
 Fisher, Rev. S. R., D. D., excellent finan- 
 ciering, 145. 
 Frederick City, 93, 250. 
 
 French, General, moves from Maryland 
 Heights to Frederick, 248; occupies 
 Turner's Pass, 452; destroys Confed- 
 erate pontoon at Falling Waters, 452. 
 Freemantle, Colonel (British officer with 
 the Confederates), tells of the confi- 
 dence of the Confederates in their suc- 
 cess, 41; tells of the plundering of 
 Chambersburg, 193; describes the pil- 
 laging propensities of the Confeder- 
 ates, 177; describes the demoralization 
 of the enemy after Pickett's repulse, 
 424; describes Lee's conduct after the 
 failure of the assault, 425. 
 Frick, Colonel, commands the militia for 
 the protection of the Columbia Bridge, 
 185; unable to maintain his position, 
 he re-crosses the river and destroys 
 the bridge, 186; his official report of 
 J this transaction, 186. 
 Furnace, Caledonia, destroyed by General 
 Early, 170; Early's reasons for order- 
 ing its destruction, 171. 
 
 Geary, General, occupies Little Round 1 
 Top, 281, 318. 
 
 Gettysburg, location, 92; occupied by Gen- 
 eral Early, 170; requisitions for sup- 
 plies, 171; approached by Confederates 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 605 
 
 •under General Pettigrew, 232; Buford's 
 cavalry passes through, 258; arrival of 
 General Reynold's, 262; of Howard, 
 266; retreat through the town of the 
 Federals, 276; occupied by Ewell's 
 Corps, 300; evacuated, 449. 
 
 Gibbon, General, heroic conduct, 375; 
 wounded, 376. 
 
 Glossbrenner, Bishop J. J., certifies to 
 having heard the cannonading one 
 hundred miles from the field of action, 
 570. 
 
 Gordon, General, advances from York to 
 the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, 185. 
 
 Green, General, holds part of the line on 
 Culp's Hill, 341. 
 
 Greencastle, the first battle of the war up- 
 on Pennsylvania soil, near by, 124; 
 requisitions for supplies, 134; gallant 
 dash by Captain Dahlgren, 1S0, 182; 
 passage through of the great wagon 
 train of Confederate wounded, 499. 
 
 Greenvillage, 227. 
 
 Greenwood, 92. 
 
 Gregg, General D. McM., commands a di- 
 vision of Federal cavalry, 37. 
 
 Gregg, General J. I., commands a brigade 
 of Federal cavalry, 37; pursues the 
 wagon train of wounded, 450. 
 
 Greeley, H. , opinion as to whether or not 
 General Meade should have ordered a 
 counter charge after Pickett's repulse, 
 428. 
 
 Hagerstown, Maryland, 89. 
 
 Halleck, General in chief, disapproves of 
 Hooker's plans, 243; correspondence 
 on the subject, 243, 244; accepts Hook- 
 er's resignation and places General 
 Meade in command, 244; places Hooker 
 under arrest, 245. 
 
 Hampton, General Wade, commands a 
 brigade of Confederate cavalry, 41; 
 wounded in an engagement, 411. 
 
 Hancock, General W. S., succeeds General 
 Couch to the command of the Second 
 Corps, 35; commands the center of the 
 army, 37; occupies Thoroughfare Gap 
 and shuts Stuart in the Shenandoah 
 Valley, 117; sent to Gettysburg to as- 
 sume the command upon the fall of 
 Reynolds, 271; reaches the field and 
 decides upon making a stand there, 
 279; rallies and posts the troops, 2S1; 
 magnificent judgment of the situation, 
 281; turns the command over to Gen- 
 
 eral Slocum and reports to General 
 Meade at Taneytown, 280; again 
 reaches the front with the commander 
 in chief, 2S0; his corps reaches the 
 field, 303; place in the line of battle, 
 303; reinforces Sickles, 326; sends as- 
 sistance to Howard, 338; heroic con- 
 duct, 363; wounded, 373; advises Gen- 
 eral Meade to throw his army upon 
 the heels of Pickett's defeated men, 
 430. 
 
 Hanover, cavalry engagement at, 252. 
 
 Hanover Junction, 183. 
 
 Harper's Ferry, S4, 87. 
 
 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, location, 89; 
 head-quarters of the Department of 
 the Susquehanna, 93; preparations 
 made for the enemy, 94; Lee's objective, 
 55, 5S; probable method of attack, 190, 
 220; the order to attack countermand- 
 ed and plan changed, 56, 219; the au- 
 thorities there kept constantly inform- 
 ed of important Confederate move- 
 ments, 157. 
 
 Hawkins, George, captured in Chambers- 
 burg, 100. 
 
 Hays, General, commands a brigade in 
 Early's division, 40: perceives the im- 
 portance of Fast Cemetery and Culp's 
 hills, and asks permission to occupy 
 them, 2S6; storms East Cemetery Hill 
 in the evening of the second day's en- 
 gagement and is repulsed, 338. 
 
 Hazlett, Lieutenant, killed upon Little 
 Round Top, 330. 
 
 Head-quarters of General Lee, 291; scene 
 in, 355- 
 
 Head-quarters of General Meade, 352; coun- 
 cil of war there, 352; scene at, 362. 
 
 Heidlersburg, union of Early's and Rodes* 
 divisions, 227. 
 
 Henry, Professor, extracts from his writ- 
 ings relating to the pheupmena of 
 battle sound, 513, 514. 
 
 Heth, General, commands a division of 
 Hill's Corps, 41; passes through Cham- 
 bersburg, 160; encamps about Fayette- 
 ville, 160; crosses the South Mountain 
 and encamps at Cashtown, 203; ad- 
 vances to Marsh Creek, 227; proceeds 
 toward Gettj-sburg and encounters 
 Buford's cavalry, 259; object of this 
 advance, . 259; -wounded, 277; severe 
 losses of his division, 277. 
 
 Hill, Lieutenant General A. P., commands 
 Third Corps Army of Northern Vir- 
 
606 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 ginia, 41; leaves Fredricksburg and 
 marches to Culpeper, 77; marches down 
 the Shenandoah Valley, 78; crosses the 
 Potomac, 153; advances to below Green- 
 castle, 157; enters Chambersburg, 161; 
 in consultation with General Lee, 162; 
 in camp at Cashtown when the col- 
 lision at Gettysburg first occurred, 259; 
 position of his corps in the battle line 
 of the 2d and 3d, 300; failure to sup- 
 port Wright, 345. 
 Hill, Shirk's (below Chambersburg), occu- 
 pied by Jenkins' cavalry, 105; by Rodes' 
 infantry, 146; awe-inspiring view from 
 at Longstreet's Corps in motion, 204. 
 Hood, General, commands a division of 
 Longstreet's Corps, 40; crosses the Po- 
 tomac and marches down the valley, 
 153, 173; passes through Chambers- 
 burg, 174; marches to Fayetteville, 
 204; proceeds to Gettysburg and en- 
 camps at Marsh Creek, 228; placed in 
 position, 313; desperate attempt to 
 capture Little Round Top, 323; wound- 
 ed and quits the field, 334. 
 Hooker, General Joseph, commands the 
 Army of the Potomac, 34; suspects 
 Lee's purpose to invade the North, 
 and informs President Lincoln, 67; or- 
 ders a reconnoissance, 6S; takes meas- 
 ures to defeat Lee's plans, 74; his army 
 in motion, 76, 114; hems him in the 
 valley, 118; Washington completely 
 covered, when he waits for the further 
 development of his enemy's purpose, 
 234; crosses the Potomac, 236; proposes 
 to cut Lee's line of communication 
 but is thwarted by General Halleck, 
 243; enters into a spirited correspond- 
 ence and tenders his resignation, 
 which is accepted, 243; succeeded by 
 General Meade, 247; farewell to the 
 army, 4245; visits Washington without 
 orders, and is placed under arrest by 
 Halleck, 245. 
 Howard, General O. O., commands the 
 Eleventh Corps, 36; with the left wing 
 of the army under Reynolds, 37; re- 
 ceives at Emmittsburg Reynolds' or- 
 der and marches to Gettysburg, 262; 
 reaches the field and assumes com- 
 mand, 267; discovers the importance of 
 Cemetery Hill and orders Steinwehr's 
 division to occupy it as a rallying 
 place, 26S; the discovery of this posi- 
 tion claimed for General Reynolds, 
 
 269; superseded in command by Gen- 
 eral Hancock, 279; General Double- 
 day's allegation that he refused for 
 awhile to obey Hancock, 279; heroic 
 efforts in rallying the defeated troops, 
 279; repels the assault of the enemy 
 upon his front, 338; gives his opinion 
 respecting Meade's failure to follow up 
 Pickett's repulse by a counter assault, 
 430; favors an attack upon the enemy 
 below Hagerstown, 466. 
 
 Howe, General, relates his experience in 
 pursuit of Lee, 451, 462. 
 
 Huber, Benjamin S., carries an important 
 dispatch to the authorities at Harris- 
 burg, 164; his account of his perilous 
 trip, 164-166. 
 
 Humphreys, General, commands a divis- 
 ion of the Third Corps, 36; his posi- 
 tion in the engagement of the second 
 day, 320; driven back after terrific 
 fighting, 323. 
 
 Hunt, General, Chief of Artillery of the 
 
 Army of the Potomac, 35; claimed by 
 
 Sickles as approving of the position 
 
 I he chose, 319; judicious preparations 
 
 for meeting Pickett's assault, 372. 
 
 Hunter, General D., commander of an 
 expedition in the Valley of Virginia, 
 .sSo; charges of cruelty and vandalism 
 by Early, 589; Imboden, 592; Slingluff, 
 595; his case stated, 597; his circular to 
 the people, 599. 
 
 Invasion ok tub North, reasons why, 
 stated by General Longstreet, 44; 
 Doubleday, 48; inferred from A. H. 
 Stephens' mission to Washington, 51; 
 indications of perceived, and prepara- 
 tions 'made for, 67. 
 
 Information, method of communicating 
 important events to the authorities, 
 
 157- 
 Imboden, General J. D.. Confederate com- 
 mander, 41; destroys the railroad and 
 canal from Cumberland, Maryland, to 
 Hancock, 172; crosses the Potomac 
 and enters Pennsylvania, 172; occu- 
 pies Cove Gap and Mercersburg, 172; 
 plundering propensities of a detach- 
 ment of this force, 173; skirmish with, 
 200; detachment defeated in McCon- 
 nellsburg, 200; advance to Chambers- 
 burg, 231; hasty departure eastward, 
 231; reaches the Confederate line, 480; 
 interview with General Lee, 481; de- 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 607 
 
 scribes Lee's despondency, 482; in 
 charge of the wagon train of wounded, 
 483- terrible scenes by the way, 4S5; in- 
 trusted with an important paper for 
 Jefferson Davis, 483; Lee's anxiety for 
 the safety of his army, 491; reasons 
 stated for the burning of Chambers- 
 burg, 592. 
 
 Jenkins, General, Confederate Cavalry 
 Commander, 41; pursues MeReynolds' 
 wagon train, S7; crosses the Potomac 
 at Williamsport, 87; advances into 
 Pennsylvania, cju; enUrs Chambers- 
 burg, 99; thrilling events in the town, 
 100; occupies Shirk's Hill, 105; re- 
 prisals upon the town authorities, 105; 
 requisition upon the place, 106; orders 
 the stores and shops opened, 109; scovirs 
 the country for horses, 107; captures 
 and sends South negroes. 107; falls 
 back below Greencastle, 111; maraud- 
 ing parties sent out in all directions, 
 in, 112; again advances, 124; engages 
 Federal cavalry near Greencastle, 125; 
 re-enters Chambersburg, 132; requisi- 
 tions upon the town, 132; passes on 
 down the valley, 146; through Carlisle, 
 173; Mtchanicsburg, 162; skirmish at 
 Oyster's Point, 229; covers Rodes' 
 withdrawal, 229; occupies and plun- 
 ders Petersburg, 229; interesting state- 
 ment by Mr. F,. Hiteshew, 230; receives 
 a dispatch and hurries on to Gettys- 
 burg where he is wounded, 231; joins 
 Stuart in the great cavalry engage- 
 ment behind the Federal right, 405. 
 
 Johnson, General, commands a division 
 of Kwell's Corps, 4p; invests Winches- 
 ter, 83; crosses the Potomac, 132; passes 
 through Chambersburg, 157; encamps 
 about Shippensburg, 160; hurried 
 withdrawal toward Gettysburg, 227; 
 encamps about Greenwood, 
 reaches Gettysburg, 281; position in 
 line oi battle, 500; attacks the Federal 
 right and is temporarily successful, 
 341 ; failure to improve his opportunity, 
 348; driven out after a desperate 6 
 359; withdrawn behind Seminary 
 Ridge, 449. 
 
 Johnson. Professor A. B., Chief Clerk 
 United States Light House Board, phi- 
 losophical paper explanatory of the 
 phenomena of battle sound, 514. 
 
 Jones, Captain, First New York Cavalry, 
 
 defeats a detachment of Imboden's 
 men in McConnellsburg, Pennsylva- 
 nia, 200; dash upon the Confederate 
 wagon train at Cearfoos' Cross Roads, 
 506. 
 Jones, General W. F., Confederate Cavalry 
 Commander, 41; covers the withdrawal 
 of Johnson's division from the Cum- 
 berland Valley, 231; passes through 
 Chambersburg and on east toward 
 Gettysburg, 232. 
 
 Kilpatrick, General Judson, Federal 
 Cavalry Commander, 37; succeeds Gen- 
 eral Stahl in command of his division, 
 248; engages Stuart at Hanover, 253; 
 dash upon the Confederate right at 
 Gettysburg, 412; terrific night attack 
 upon the retreating Confederates, 452; 
 attack upon the Confederate rear at 
 Falling Waters, 468. 
 
 Kimmel, Hon. F. M., important services 
 in forwarding information to the au- 
 thorities at Harrisburg, 158; testifies 
 to having heard the sound of the can- 
 nonading two hundred miles from the 
 field, 511. 
 
 Knipe, General, Commander of Federal 
 Militia, 120; advances from Harrisburg 
 to a short distance south of Chambers- 
 burg, 121; informed of the enemy's 
 proximity, 128; flight of his command, 
 128; falls back from Carlisle upon the 
 approach of the Confederates, 173. 
 
 I.ank, Rev. C. R.. 1). I>.. certifies to having 
 heard the cannonading one hundred 
 and twenty miles from the field, 510. 
 
 I,ee, General R. F,., Commander of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia, 40; rea- 
 sons for invading the North, 47; with- 
 draws his army from Fredericksburg 
 and concentrates at Culpeper, 67; re- 
 views Stuart's cavalry preparatory to 
 its advance, 69: official orders to Stuart 
 revealing his plans captured, 70; his 
 armv forced to the Shenandoah Valley 
 route, 73; reaches Berryville and issues 
 a general order, 121; enters Chambers- 
 burg, 162; holds a consultation with 
 General Hill, 164; departs eastward, 
 164; importance attached to tin's move- 
 ment and it is reported at Harrisburg, 
 165; description of his appearance, 
 167; establishes his head-quarters near 
 Chambersburg, 169; issues another gen- 
 
608 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 eral order, 174; visited in his camp by 
 Mrs. Ellen McClellan, 197; by Dr. J. L. 
 Suesserott, 205; plans an attack upon 
 Harrisburg, 169; arrival of Longstreet's 
 scout and change of plan, 219; rides 
 from Chambersburg with Longstreet 
 to Greenwood, 226; again on the way, 
 but hearing the sound of guns he rides 
 forward to ascertain the cause, 227; 
 reaches Seminary Ridge and observes 
 the flight of the Federals, 284; anxiety 
 concerning General Stuart and the 
 where-abouts of the Federal army, 290; 
 reconnoiters the Federal position and 
 determines to attack, 311; refuses 
 Longstreet's counsel, 309; dissatisfied 
 with his tardiness, 317; scene at his 
 head-quarters, 355; again rejects Long- 
 street's counsel and orders another as- 
 sault, 360; distress at Pickett's repulse 
 and assists in rallying the troops, 425; 
 interview with General Imboden, 4S1; 
 deep depression and lament over his 
 defeat, 482; sends the wounded to Vir- 
 ginia, 483; withdraws from the field 
 and retreats southwardly, 451; unable 
 to re-cross the river he takes a strong 
 position below Hagerstown, 460; sends 
 for General Imboden and inquires 
 concerning the upper fords of the Po- 
 tomac, 491; the river falling he re- 
 crosses into Virginia, 467. 
 
 Lee, General Fitzhugh, Confederate Cav- 
 alry Commander, 41 ; demands the sur- 
 render of Carlisle, 254; burns the United 
 States barracks, 254. 
 
 Lincoln, President, apprised by General 
 Hooker of Lee's purpose to invade the 
 North, 67; calls for volunteers, 94; 
 anxiety to have Meade attack Lee in 
 the retreat, 466; dedicatory address of 
 the Soldiers' National Cemetery at 
 Gettysburg, 531. 
 
 Lockwood's Maryland Brigade, reinforces 
 the Twelfth Corps and assists in driv- 
 ing Johnson's division from Culp's 
 Hill, 358. 
 
 Longstreet, Lieutenant -General James, 
 commands the First Corps Army of 
 Northern Virginia, 40; estimate of the 
 strength of Lee's army, 3S; objections 
 to the Northern invasion, and plan 
 proposed by him, 44; claims an agree- 
 ment between Lee and himself that 
 the invasion should be "offensive in 
 strategy, but defensive in tactics," 45; 
 
 contradictory statements as to the 
 time of the scout's arrival, 57; crosses 
 the Potomac and advances into Penn- 
 sylvania, 153; encamps near Cham- 
 bersburg, 174; plunders the town, 191; 
 two of his divisions advance to Fay- 
 etteville, 203; rides with Lee from 
 Chambersburg to Greenwood, 223; 
 from Greenwood toward Gettysburg, 
 224; opposes an attack upon the Fed- 
 erals, but counsels a flank movement, 
 308, 360; charges Lee with departing 
 from the plan agreed upon, 308; tardi- 
 ness in attacking, 316; blamed by 
 Southern writers, 313; defense, 341; 
 his statement as to how Little Round 
 Top was occupied, 351; extravagant 
 estimate of the number of Federal 
 troops engaged against him, 335; again 
 counsels Lee to flank the Federals, 
 360; Lee dissents and orders him to 
 attack their left center, 360; again slow 
 in executing this order, 415; loth to 
 order the advance of Pickett, he com- 
 mits to General Alexander this duty, 
 421; reply to Colonel Freemantle's con- 
 gratulations upon the supposed suc- 
 cess of Pickett, 421; his opinion of the 
 probable result of a counter assault 
 by the Federals, 429. 
 Long, General A. L., Chief Military Secre- 
 tary to General Lee, states reasons for 
 the invasion, 43; claims superior gen- 
 eralship for Lee in stealing away from 
 the Federal army, 75; says that York, 
 Pennsylvania, is where Lee expected 
 to concentrate his army for battle, 55; 
 criticism of the Count of Paris as to 
 Lee's alternatives, 62; probable result 
 of a counter charge after Pickett's re- 
 pulse, 427. 
 
 Mahon, T. M., captures Lieutenant Smith, 
 
 103. 
 Marion, Pennsylvania, 89; approach to of 
 
 Jenkins cavalry, 125; the great wagon 
 
 train passes through, 478. 
 Marsh Creek (on the Chambersburg Pike), 
 
 encampment of Heth's and Pender's 
 
 divisions, 233; advance from by the 
 
 same, 259; reached by the divisions of 
 
 McLaws and Hood, 228. 
 Marsh Creek (on the Fmmittsburg road), 
 
 encampment at of First Corps, 257; 
 
 advances to Gettysburg, 261. 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 609 
 
 Marches, daily (Federal army), see Army 
 of the Potomac. 
 
 Marches, (daily Confederate army), see 
 Army of Northern Virginia. 
 
 Maryland Heights, escape to of part of 
 Milroy's force, S;; occupied by General 
 French, 243. 
 
 Martinsburg, West Virginia, occupied by 
 General Rodes, 87. 
 
 McLaws, General L., commands a division 
 of Longstreet's Corps, 40; encamps 
 below Chambersburg, 174; advances to 
 Fayetteville, 203; reaches Marsh Creek, 
 228; position in line of battle, 313; en- 
 gages Sickles, 322; gives his opinion 
 of Meade's judgment in refusing to 
 order a counter assault after Pickett's 
 repulse, 432; states Meade's wise de- 
 cision in not ordering an assault of Lee 
 below Hagerstown, 475; criticises 
 Sickles' conduct on July 2d, 575. 
 
 McLellan, Mrs. Ellen, interview with Gen- 
 eral Lee, 197. 
 
 McClellan, Major H. B. (General Stuart's 
 staff), relates how Stuart's head-quar- 
 ter's chest was captured, 70; estimate 
 of the numbers engaged in the cav- 
 alry engagement of Beverly Ford, or 
 Brandy Station, 74; vindicates General 
 Stuart for his course around the Fed- 
 eral army, 241. 
 
 McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania, visited by 
 Confederate cavalry under Colonel 
 Ferguson, 112; occupied by General 
 Stewart's Confederate Brigade, 152; 
 brilliant cavalry engagement and dis- 
 graceful flight of Pennsylvania mili- 
 tia, 200. 
 
 McReynolds, Colonel, evacuates Berry- 
 ville and marches to Winchester, So; 
 his wagon train heads for the Poto- 
 mac pursued by Jenkins, 87; dashes 
 through Chambersburg, 98. 
 
 Meade, General George G., relieved of the 
 command of the Filth Corps and 
 placed in command of the Army of 
 the Potomac, 244; address to the army 
 upon assuming command, 247; in coun- 
 cil with General Reynolds, 248; asks 
 for the promotion of Kilpatrick, Cus- 
 ter, Merritt, and Farnsworth, 24S; care- 
 fully reconnoiters the country and se- 
 lects the line of Pipe Creek for a battle 
 field, 255; apprised at Taneytown of 
 the presence of the enemy at Gettys- 
 burg and the fall of Reynolds, he sends 
 38 
 
 Hancock to the front to take command 
 and report upon the position selected 
 there, 270; orders the army to Gettys- 
 burg, 2S0; reaches the field, 2S0; spends 
 the night in preparation, 301; contem- 
 plates an attack upon the Confederate 
 left, but abandons it upon the advice 
 of Slocum and Warren, 304; discovers 
 Sickles' position and posts the Fifth 
 Corps upon the line originally intend 
 ed, 321; did Sickles disobey his order 
 in posting his corps (see Appendix D); 
 calls a council of war and decides to 
 remain and fight the battle there, 352; 
 exposed condition during the terrible 
 artillery prelude to Pickett's assault, 
 364; removes to Powers' Hill, 372; rides 
 to Round Top after Pickett's repulse 
 and orders the Pennsylvania Reserves 
 to advance upon the enemy, 439; vari- 
 ous opinions as to the propriety of or- 
 dering a counter charge upon Pickett's 
 repulse, 427-442; forbids an attack up- 
 on the retreating enemy, 450; daily 
 marches in pursuit, 454; comes up with 
 Lee in his new position, 460; calls a 
 council of war, which oppose an at- 
 tack, 465; responsible position, 474; 
 urged by President Lincoln he orders 
 an advance the next morning, but 
 finds that the enemy has escaped 
 across the river, 467; dissatisfaction of 
 General Halleck with the escape of 
 the enemy, 468; did General Meade 
 act wisely in not attacking Lee in his 
 strong position — opinion of Thomas 
 Robins, 469, General McLaws, 475, 
 evidence of the engineers, 467. 
 
 Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, 89; entered 
 by Jenkins, 182. 
 
 Merritt, General, promoted, 248. 
 
 Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, occupied by 
 Stewart's infantry', 147; by Imbodcu's 
 cavalry, 173; by the wounded Confed- 
 erates captured by Captain Jones, 507. 
 
 Militia, Pennsylvania, called into service, 
 93; advance from Harrisburg up the 
 valley, 254; disgraceful flight from the 
 enemy at McConnellsburg, 202; heroic 
 but rash conduct of Captain Wallace's 
 company upon North Mountain, 147. 
 
 Militia, New York, in position below 
 Chambersburg, 121; panic and dis- 
 graceful flight, 128; slanderous stories 
 circulated b3' these men, 130. 
 
 Milroy, General, in command at Winches- 
 
610 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 ter, 78; informed of the approach of 
 the Confederates he declares his abil- 
 ity to maintain his position, 79; daily 
 reconnoissances, 79; attacked by the 
 enemy and desperate fighting, S3; 
 evacuates Winchester but is intercep- 
 ted and routed, 84; escape of part ol 
 his command to Maryland Heights, 
 and others to Everett, or_Bloody Run, 
 Pennsylvania, 84. 
 
 Monongahela, Department of, establish- 
 ed, 93- 
 
 Moss, Lieutenant-Colonel, conduct at 
 North Mountain, 147. 
 
 Moses, Major, Chief Commissary of Long- 
 street's Corps, transactions with, 194. 
 
 Mountain, North, skirmish at, 148. 
 
 Negroes, hunted, captured, and taken 
 South by the Confederates, 96, 107. 
 
 New Franklin, passage through of the 
 great wagon train, 493. 
 
 New York Militia (see Militia, New York). 
 
 Newville, Pennsylvania, 89. 
 
 Norris, Colonel A. Wilson, charges Gen- 
 eral Sickles with disobeying an order 
 from General Reynolds, 558. 
 
 Northern Virginia, Army of (see Army of 
 Northern Virginia). 
 
 Observations from a tree top, 127; from 
 a church steeple, 217. 
 
 Orchard, Peach, terrible fighting and great 
 slaughter, 323, 328. 
 
 Orders, general, issued by General Hooker, 
 244; Meade, 247, 256; Lee, 121, 174; Ewell, 
 131, 138; Early, 184. 
 
 Order, Meade to Hancock, 271. 
 
 O'Rourke, Colonel, killed on Little Round 
 Top, 330. 
 
 Owen, Captain (Confederate) description 
 of the effects of the artillery fire with- 
 in the Confederate lines, 366; Pickett's 
 charge, 384; demoralization after his 
 repulse, 425. 
 
 Oyster's Point, skirmishes at, 199, 229. 
 
 Paris, Count of, estimate of the strength 
 of Lee's army, 38; of Stuart's force in 
 the great cavalry engagement, 412; re- 
 marks upon Lee's alternatives when 
 confronted by the Federal army at 
 Gettysburg, 62. 
 
 Pender, General, commands a division of 
 Hill's Corps, 41; passes through Cham- 
 bersburg, 174; encamps at Greenwood, 
 
 191; crosses the South Mountain to 1 
 Cashtown, 227; encamps at Marsh 
 Creek, 227; engages in the battle, 276. 
 
 Pennsylvania, Southern, description of, 
 89, 90. 
 
 Pennsylvania Reserves, brilliant charge 
 upon the enemy, 333; holds the ad- 
 vanced line, again charges and re- 
 covers the ground lost by Sickles, 413. 
 
 Petersburg, Pennsylvania, plundered by 
 Jenkins, 229. 
 
 Pettigrew, General, commands a brigade 
 in Heth's division, Hill's Corps, 41; 
 leads a reconnoissance to near Gettys- 
 burg, 232; falls back to Marsh Creek, 
 233; leads a division in Pickett's charge, 
 371; killed at Falling Waters, 468. 
 
 Pickett, General, commands a division of 
 Longstreet's Corps, 40; encamps near 
 Chambersburg, 174; remains behind 
 and destroys the railroad, 204; rapid 
 march to the front, 357; leads in the 
 great charge (see Charge, Pickett's). 
 
 Pipe Creek, line of, chosen for the battle 
 field, 255. 
 
 Pittsburg, Head-quarters of the Depart- 
 ment of the Monongahela, 93; prepa- 
 rations made for the enemy, 94. 
 
 Pleasanton, General, Commander of the 
 Federal Cavalry, 37; reconnoissance 
 across the Rappahannock and battle 
 of Beverly Ford, 68; states the proba- 
 ble result of a flank movement by 
 Lee as recommended by Longstreet, 
 63; of a countercharge by Meade after 
 Pickett's repulse, 431. 
 
 Pollard, E. A. relates Lee's confidence in 
 his army, 42; A. H. Stephens' mission 
 to Washington, 54. 
 
 Poolesville, the ford of the Potomac where 
 Lee expected to cross, 54. 
 
 Potomac, Army of (see Army of the Poto- 
 mac). 
 
 Pomeroy, Rev. S. W., bears an important 
 dispatch to Harrisburg, 222. 
 
 Powers' Hill, occupied by Generals Meade 
 and Slocum, 372. 
 
 Powell, Colonel (Confederate), describes 
 the desperate effort to capture Little 
 Round Top, 331. 
 
 Rawle, Colonel W. Brooke, account of 
 the great cavalry engagement, 406. 
 
 Requisitions upon Greencastle, 134; Cham- 
 bersburg, 106, 132, 139, 193; Gettysburg, 
 191; Mechanicsburg, 1S3; York, 184, j 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 611 
 
 Reynolds, General J. F., Commander of 
 the First Corps and left wing, 35; in 
 council with Meade, 248; advances to- 
 wards Gettysburg, 251; encamps over 
 night at Marsh Creek, 252; receives 
 Buford's dispatch and proceeds to the 
 front, 262; killed by a sharp shooter, 
 264; his body conveyed to Lancaster 
 and buried, 265; consideration of the 
 claim that he first discovered Ceme- 
 tery Hill, 269. 
 ) Rihl, Corporal, killed in the first engage- 
 ment of the war upon Pennsylvania 
 soil, 125. 
 
 Richmond, threatened by way of the 
 Peninsula by General Dix, 115. 
 
 Richmond Inquirer's correspondent's ac- 
 count of Hill's failure to support Wil- 
 cox, Perry and Wright, 344. 
 
 Robertson, General, commands a cavalry 
 brigade under Stewart, 41; covers the 
 withdrawal of Confederate infantry 
 from the Cumberland Valley, 231; 
 passes through Chambersburg and 
 proceeds to Gettysburg, 232. 
 
 Robins, Thomas, Jr., defends General 
 Meade for not ordering a counter 
 charge after Pickett's repulse, 437; for 
 his alleged tardiness in pursuing Lee, 
 469. 
 
 Rodes, General, commands a division of 
 Ewell's Corps, 40; drives Colonel Mc- 
 Reynolds from Berryville, 86; occupies 
 Martinsburg, S7; crosses the Potomac 
 and encamps near Williamsport, 87; 
 advances to Greencastle, 131; passes 
 through Chambersburg and occupies 
 Sherk's Hill, 160; passes through Car- 
 lisle, 173; marches across South Moun- 
 tain via Mt. Holly Pass and encamps 
 at Heidlersburg, 227; proceeds towards 
 Cashtown, but turns towards Gettys- 
 burg upon hearing the guns, 273; falls 
 upon the Federal center, 276; occupies 
 Gettysburg, 339; entangled in the 
 street and unable to co-operate with 
 Early in his assault of East Cemetery 
 Hill, 340-347- 
 
 Rosengarten, Major J. G., certifies to hav- 
 ing heard General Reynolds order the 
 occupation of Cemetery Hill, 269; de- 
 scribes the fall of Reynolds, 263. 
 
 Round Top, Big, occupied by Colonel 
 Fisher, 334. 
 
 Round Top, Little, its importance first 
 discovered by General Hancock and 
 
 Geary sent to occupy it, 281; Sickles 
 ordered to take Geary's place, but 
 does not do so, 318; Confederates per- 
 ceive its importance and make desper- 
 ate efforts to seize it, 323-329; thrilling 
 account of the struggle by Colonel 
 Powell, 331; its importance accidental- 
 ly discovered by General Warren, 328; 
 strange oversight of Federal com- 
 manders, 350; manner of its discovery 
 stated by General Longstreet, 351; 
 Werd, Vincent, O'Rourke and Hazlett 
 killed upon it, 329, 330. 
 
 Schaff-, Rev. Dr. P., description of ex- 
 citement upon the approach of the 
 Confederates, 95; capturing free ne- 
 groes, 96. 
 
 Schenck, General, commander at Balti- 
 more, 79. 
 
 Scotland, Pennsylvania, 104, 120. 
 
 Scout, Longstreet's, statement of General 
 Longstreet, 56; harmonizing conflict- 
 ing statements as to the time of his 
 arrival, 57; change of Lee's plans upon 
 the reception of the information he 
 brought, 56, 218. 
 
 Scouting Service, method of communicat- 
 ing important information to the au- 
 thorities at Harrisburg, 157; messages 
 carried by B. S. Huber, 164; by Rev. S. 
 W. Pomeroy, 222. 
 
 Sedgwick, General, commander of the 
 Sixth Corps, 36; reconnoiters the ene- 
 my on the south bank of the Rappo- 
 haunock, 68; all-night march to Get- 
 tysburg, 303; placed in reserve, 304; 
 called to assist in saving Round Top, 
 334; pursues the retreating enemy, 
 450. 
 
 Seiders, J. A., captures George Hawkins, 
 103. 
 
 Seminary Ridge, the Confederate position 
 of July 2d and 3d, 299, 260, 29S, 539. 
 
 Shirk's Hill, occupied by Jenkins, 105; by 
 Ewell, 146. 
 
 Shippensburg, 90. 
 
 Sickles, General, commander of the Third 
 Corps, 350; charged with disobeying 
 an order from Reynolds, 272; this 
 charge considered at length, 538; with 
 disobeying an order from General 
 Meade, 319; this charge considered, 
 570; receives news of the situation at 
 Gettysburg and moves to that place, 
 272; his position in the line, 318; was 
 
612 
 
 THE GREAT INVASION. 
 
 it tlie right one, .319, 575; his defense 
 by himself, 55S, 561, 572; by James 
 Beal, 563; wounded and superseded by 
 General Bimey, 324. 
 
 Semmes, Colonel, opinion as to the proba- 
 ble result of a charge upon the Con- 
 federate right after Pickett's repulse, 
 442. 
 
 Slingluff, F. C, reasons for burning 
 Chambersburg, 595. 
 
 Slbcuni. General, commander of the 
 Twelfth Corps, 37; receives Howard's 
 pressing calls for assistance, but re- 
 fuses to go forward, 272, 274; reaches 
 the field and temporarily assumes 
 command, 280; occupies Culp's Hill, 
 301; opposes Meade's plan of attack- 
 ing the Confederate left, 304; his lines 
 depleted to reinforce the Federal left, 
 333; temporary success of the Confed- 
 erates and occupation of his lines dur- 
 ing the night, 341; enemy driven out 
 after a terrific engagement, 358. 
 
 Smith, General, commands a division of 
 Militia, or Emergency Men, 94; moves 
 from Harrisburg to Carlisle, 254; re- 
 fuses Fitzhugh Lee's demand for the 
 surrender of that place, 254; advances 
 towards the enemy, 455. 
 
 Smith, Lieutenant, captured in Chambers- 
 burg, 104. 
 
 Smith, Rev. J. C, account of the great 
 ■wagon train of wounded, 499. 
 
 Snyder, Jacob C, account of the wagon 
 train of wounded and incident about 
 Benjamin Branklin, 493. 
 
 Snyder, Rev. J. Milton, description of the 
 ■wagon train, 498. 
 
 South Mountain, passes of, 90. 
 
 Stahl, General, commander of a division 
 of Federal cavalry, 118; joins the Army 
 of the Potomac, 118; superseded in 
 command by Kilpatrick, 248. 
 
 Stahl, Rev. I,. W., certifies to having 
 heard the guns one hundred and fifty 
 miles, 512. 
 
 Stannard, General, commander of a Ver- 
 mont brigade, 35; gallant and hero'.c 
 conduct, 333, 374, 387. 
 
 Steeple, church, observations, from, 217. 
 
 Steinwehr, General, Commander of a di- 
 vision of Eleventh Corps, 36; occupies 
 East Cemetery Hill, 278; repulses an 
 attack of theLouisana Tigers, 338. 
 
 Stephens, Hon. A. H., extract from his cele- 
 brated "Corner Stone" address, 553; 
 
 sent by Jefferson Davis to Washing- 
 ton and copy of his letter of instruc- 
 tions, 51, 52; turned back at Fortress 
 Monroe, 53. 
 
 Stevens, Hon. Thaddeus, narrow escape 
 from capture, 107; his iron works rob- 
 bed by Jenkins. 107; burned by Early, 
 170; Early's reasons for doing so, 171. 
 
 Stewart, General, commander of a brigade 
 of Rode's division, 40; occupies Mer- 
 cersburg, 147; crosses North Mountain 
 and is attacked by Captain "Wallace, 
 147; occupies McConnellsburg, 152; 
 sends am expedition up the valley and 
 crosses the mountain, 152; recrosses 
 the mountain and rejoins Rode's at 
 Chambersburg, 152. 
 
 Strile, Mr., a citizen, killed, 176. 
 
 Stuart, General J. E. B., Confederate Cav- 
 alry commander, 41; desperate en- 
 gagement at Beverly Ford, or Brandy 
 Station, 69; his headquarters chest 
 containing Lee's orders of instruc- 
 tion captured, 70; crosses the Potomac 
 and moves northward, 115; defeated at 
 Aldie, 117; at Upperville, 119; shut in 
 the Shenandoah Valley, 117; emerges 
 from the valley and crosses the Poto- 
 mac, 239; breaks the Baltimore and 
 Ohio Railroad, 231; captures a wagon 
 train, 249; panic in Baltimore and 
 Washington, 249; encounters the Fed- 
 erals at Westminster, 251; attacked at 
 Hanover by Kilpatrick, 253; heads for 
 York, Pennsylvania, where he ex- 
 pected to join Early, 253; crosses the 
 track of Early and White, but fails to 
 learn of it, 253; hears of Early's de- 
 parture for York, but misinformed as 
 to his course, he turns toward Car- 
 lisle, 254; arrives at Carlisle he finds it 
 occupied by Federal militia, 254; de- 
 mands the surrender of the place and 
 shells the town and burns the United 
 States Barracks, 254; heads for Gettys- 
 burg and reaches that place in the 
 evening of July 2d, 254; great cavalrj' 
 engagement behind the Federal right, 
 406; attacked by Kilpatrick while 
 crossing the mountain, 452; his course- 
 around the Federal army, considered 
 by General Lee, 60; Longstreet, 60; 
 Colonel W. H. Taylor, 60; his defense, 
 240; Lee's ignorance of the Federal 
 army because of his course, 60; Lee's 
 uneasiness concerning him, 2yo. 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 613 
 
 Stockton, Rev. Thomas, D. D., impressive 
 prayer at the dedication of the Soldier's 
 National Cemetery at Gettysburg, 529. 
 
 Strasburg Pass, preparations to resist 
 marauding parties, 178. 
 
 Steinwehr's division occupies East Ceme- 
 tery Hill, 267. 
 
 Suesserott, Dr. J. L-, interview with Gen- 
 eral Lee, 205. 
 
 Susquehanna, Department of, established 
 93; commanded by, 93. 
 
 Swallow, Colonel W. H., description of the 
 opening of the first day's battle, 265; 
 reasons why Culp's and East Cemetery 
 Hills were not occupied, 287; Early's 
 unpreparedness for the assault upon 
 Cemetery Hill in the evening of the 
 second day, 347; Rodes entangled in 
 the streets of Gettysburg, 339, 347; de- 
 scribes Pickett's assaulting columns, 
 372; Pickett's charge, 390. 
 
 Swinton, opinion as to the propriety of a 
 counter charge after Pickett's repulse, 
 440. 
 
 Sykes, General, succeeds General Meade 
 in command of the Fifth Corps, 36; 
 reaches Gettysburg, 303; position in 
 the line, 321. 
 
 Sypher, J. R., opinion as to whether or 
 not General Meade should have 
 ordered a counter charge after Pick- 
 ett's repulse, 441. 
 
 Taneytown, Maryland, General 
 Meade's headquarters, 270. 
 
 Taylor, Colonel W. H., Lee's Adjutant- 
 General, estimate of the number of 
 Lee's army, 3S; loss to the Confederates 
 by reason of General Stuart's course, 
 60; reasons why East Cemetery Hill 
 was not occupied, 2S4; criticizes Long- 
 street's tardiness, 316; Longstreet's 
 failure to carry out Lee's plans on the 
 third day, 415; questions the complete- 
 ness of the Federal victory at Gettys- 
 burg, 44S; states the amount of am- 
 
 '••'. munition on hand after the battle, 462. 
 
 Taylor, Colonel F., killed, 334. 
 
 Thompson, Maurice, poem, 109, 556. 
 
 .Thoroughfare Gap, 117. 
 
 Tigers, Louisiana, repulsed from East 
 t Cemetery Hill, 338. 
 
 .Top, Big Round, (see Round Top, Big). ->_ 
 
 [Top, Little Round (see Round Top, Little). 
 
 Train, Great Wagon, description by Gen- 
 eral Imboden, 4S5; J. C. Snyder, 493; 
 J. Milton Snyder, 49S; Rev. J. C. 
 Smith, 499; D. Z. Shook, 502. 
 
 Tremain, General, vindicates General 
 Sickles, 568. 
 
 Trimble, General, opinion of the probable 
 result of a counter charge, 429. 
 
 Turner's Pass, secured by General French, 
 452. 
 
 Two Taverns, Twelfth Corps, at, 270. 
 
 Upper villi;, cavalry engagement at, 118. 
 
 Vermont Brigade (Stannard's), heroic 
 
 conduct, 333, 374, 387. 
 Vincent, General, killed on Little Round 
 
 Top, 329. 
 
 Warren, General, Chief of the Engi- 
 neer Corps, 35; opposes an attack upon 
 the Confederate left, 304; accidentally 
 discovers the importance of Little 
 Round Top, 328; strange oversight of 
 this important position, 350. 
 
 Wallace, Captain, attacks Stewart's bri- 
 gade on North Mountain, 148. 
 
 Webb, General, heroic conduct in repell- 
 ling Pickett's assault, 375, 376. 
 
 Weed, General, killed upon Little Round 
 Top, 330. 
 
 Wheat Field, 327, 328. 
 
 White's Battalion (Confederate) passes 
 from York to Gettysburg, 227. 
 
 Willis, Colonel (Confederate), Provost 
 Marshal of Greencastle, 131; Cham- 
 bersburg, 137; Williamsport, Mary- 
 land, 90. 
 
 Winchester, Virginia, occupied by General 
 Milroy, 78; invested by Early and 
 Johnson, 81; evacuated, 83. 
 
 Wilkinson's account of the great artillery 
 prelude, 364. 
 
 Wrightsville, Pennsylvania, occupied by 
 General Gordon, 185; bridge burned, 
 186. 
 
 York, Pennsylvania, Lee's expected 
 point of concentration and battle, 55, 1 
 190, 242; occupied by Early, 183; re- 
 quisitions upon, 184; address to, 1S4; 
 evacuated, 227. 
 
 Zinn, Colonel, 147. 
 Zook, General, killed, 326. 
 

I'nion Troops (bUiej 
 OmWm«« Troop*, (red 
 
 GETTYSBURG AND VICINITY. 
 
 Show, n g the lines of Battle July. 1863.