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 Jebruaru 3, 1915 
 
 
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 .53 
 
The Attack and Defense of 
 Little Round Top. 
 
 Mr. Commander and Companions : 
 
 WE Americans like to boast of our democratic spirit ; but 
 we are often most amiably inconsistent in it. We do 
 not "dearly love a lord"; we can not abide a caste; we 
 want no aristocracy of mere privilege. Yet we do 
 believe, as thoroughly as any people on earth, in an 
 aristocracy of real merit; and we do rightly pride 
 ©urselves on any honorable inheritance we may have in such ances- 
 tral worth. My own good old father, born on a farm, was a fine 
 example of such inconsistency. He fairly scorned the idea of a 
 privileged ancestry. Asked once if he had not a family coat-of-arms : 
 "Oh, yes," he replied; "let me tell you about it. It's a currycomb 
 and a sawbuck ; both rampant!" That wasn't so bad, either; con- 
 sidering that that old soldier-hero Cincinnatus himself left a plow 
 to serve the state, and then went back to it. And yet, after my 
 father's death, I found among Iiis papers a lengthy genealog}"^ of 
 his ancestors, written by himself, in which he had not failed to note 
 whatever was really worthy in any of them. So much stronger is 
 human nature than human prejudice. 
 
 I think this feeling of family pride is always particularly strong 
 in the case of a soldier-ancestor or relative. That famous old 
 oracle, Dr. Johnson, came very near the truth when he said: "Every 
 man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier." But 
 no one has put the matter better than our own late and lamented 
 Companion, General Beatty, when he said once before this Com- 
 mandery: "The most enduring legacy any man can leave his 
 children, and the one they will esteem most highly, is a good 
 military record. ... If there has been a soldier in the family, it 
 is the one thing the family never forgets — the one thing the family 
 biographer never fails to mention. In short" — he concludes — "the 
 father's military record is the son's patent of nobility." I think we 
 all agree to that. 
 
Now, there are two purposes of our Order which we have in 
 common with most of the fifty other American societies of honor: 
 first, the perpetuation of the memory of the services of the Original 
 Companions ; and, second, the perpetuation of the principles for 
 which they fought. In all this we Hereditary Companions have 
 our bounden and grateful part — and one which we can always be 
 doing. But there is also another practice of our Order which has 
 been almost a part of its life so far, and that is in calling out the 
 personal reminiscences, bj' its Original Companions, of their own 
 observations and experiences in the war. In these, of course, we 
 hereditary members have no real share. But I have thought that 
 where, as in my own case, the Original Companions from whom we 
 derive did not live to speak of what they themselves saw and knew, 
 it might not perhaps be considered altogether unreasonable or 
 unbecoming in us to speak, for them, of the things in which they 
 bore their personal part. At any rate, it is on this assumption that 
 I venture to say something tonight about this particular fight for 
 "Little Round Top," Gettysburg, in which my brother. General 
 Strong Vincent, took part. 
 
 What I shall say is practically a summary of one of the more 
 recent volumes of our Civil War literature. It was published in 
 1913, and is entitled 'The Attack and Defense of Little Round 
 Top, Gettysburg." Its author is Oliver W. Norton, a successful 
 and retired business man of Chicago, a member and ex-Commander 
 of our Illinois Commandery, and a member of our Commandery-in- 
 Chief. The value of this book as an authority consists in two 
 facts : first, that the author, although long entirely blind, has 
 unearthed and brought together original reports and letters of 
 leading men in that fight, most of which were unknown to the 
 historians, and some of which have never before been published; 
 and, second, the fact that the author was himself a personal eye 
 witness of new and important incidents which he relates, connected 
 with some critical moments in that fight. At the time he was 
 brigade bugler, mounted, and bearer of the brigade's headquarters 
 flag. As it was his duty to be always near his brigade commander, 
 Colonel Vincent, he had, in this way, exceptional opportunities of 
 hearing what was said and seeing what was done. When the fight 
 was on, however, and until his services as color bearer were again 
 needed, he seized a musket and fought in the ranks with his 
 regiment. 
 
 But, to begin with, let me now briefly recall the principal facts 
 which led up to this particular fight. 
 
In the summor of 1863, Lee undertook to divert the Federal 
 offensive from Richmond, and to take the offensive himself against 
 Washington. He also hoped to pass around Washington's main 
 defences on the Potomac and attack it on the flank or rear. In 
 order to do this, he marched northward, first into Maryland and 
 tlien into Pennsylvania ; also carrying the war in this way into the 
 enemy's country. But first Hooker, and then Meade, keeping 
 himself all the while between Lee and Washington, marched north- 
 ward, too. almost exactly parallel with Lee. Finally, as Lee had 
 decided to give battle, when the advance corps of the two armies 
 met near Gettysburg on July 1st, there was a preliminary struggle, 
 in which Major-General Reynolds of our First Corps was killed. 
 
 On July 2nd the main bodies of both armies began to arrive, and 
 as the commanders-in-chief chose their positions, the two lines of 
 battle were still practically those on which the two armies had 
 marched. That is to say, each line stretched, generally, in a north 
 and south direction, Lee's army facing east and Meade's facing 
 west. Gettysburg lay well to the north, between the two lines. 
 But Lee's advance columns had, on July 1st, passed through Gettys- 
 burg or around it, and so to the east of it, as far as Gulp's Hill, 
 where that day's battle was fought; and from there Lee's line on 
 July 2nd extended back around the town and then nearly straight 
 southwardly along Seminary Ridge for three or four miles. Meade's 
 line, on the other hand, taking advantage of the higher land, was in 
 the shape of a horseshoe, with the convex side toward the enemy; 
 or, perhaps, more like a fish-hook, with the barb and main curve at 
 Gulp's Hill, the straight shank lying southwardly along Cemetery 
 Ridge, with the ground rising steadily higher, until the line ter- 
 minated at the bold and rough elevations since known as the Two 
 Round Tops. The two armies were thus separated by a valley 
 nearly a mile wide, filled in its upper part with flourishing farms, 
 but widening and deepening at its lower end southwardly into rocky 
 and heavily wooded hills and ravines. Through the center of this 
 valley, from north to south, and about midway between the two 
 armies, ran the Emmittsburg Road. 
 
 In the early morning of July 2nd neither I^ee nor Meade was 
 ready to strike again. Each was awaiting the arrival of the rest 
 of his army. Meanwhile Meade had posted Sickles' Corps at the 
 extreme left of the Union line, on Cemetery Ridge, reaching almost 
 as far as the Little Round Top. But Sickles, for some reason — 
 probably because the intervening woods obstructed his view of the 
 enemy's position and movements — soon moved part of his corps, 
 viz., Humphrey's Division, forward to the Emmittsburg Road, near 
 
a peach orchard, still facing this part of his line westward toward 
 the enemy's line on Seminary Ridge. Birney's Division, however, 
 he faced southward — that is, down the valley and partly across it — 
 with his line at right angles with Humphrey's, and reaching from 
 Humphrey's left on the Emmittsburg Road back to the famous 
 "Devil's Den" of rocks, which lay in front of Little Round Top 
 but was still separated from that by a considerable distance. Both 
 Round Tops were thus left entirely unprotected. About two o'clock 
 Meade, inspecting his lines, told Sickles he had moved too far out. 
 When Sickles offered to withdraw to his former position: "I wish 
 to God you could sir," replied Meade; "but you see those people 
 don't intend to let yovi." For Longstreet's artillery had just opened 
 on Birnej'^'s position — (But this is anticipating slightly — for the 
 sake of a story!) 
 
 Now Longstreet's Corps was on the extreme right of the Con- 
 federate line, so facing, but also far outstretching, the left of the 
 Union line. During the morning Lee wanted Longstreet to begin 
 his attack. But Longstreet hesitated, for several reasons. Part 
 of one of his divisions — Hood's — had not arrived. Another of his 
 divisions — Pickett's — was also still to come up. Longstreet said 
 to Hood: "The General (meaning General Lee) is a little nervous 
 this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without 
 Picket, I never like to go into battle with one boot off." 
 
 But about three o'clock Longstreet decided not to wait any 
 longer for Pickett, and ordered a direct frontal attack up the 
 Emmittsburg Road on Birnej^'s position. Just about this time 
 Law's scouts had reported to him, and he to Hood, that Meade's 
 left did not reach Little Round Top ; that there were no Union 
 troops at all on Big Round Top, still further to the left; that it 
 was thus possible for the Confederates to march out of sight and 
 unhindered, clear around the lower or southern side of Big Round 
 Top; outflank and attack Meade in the rear; capture his commissary 
 and ammunition trains, parked in the hollow of his horseshoe line, 
 and so demolish his whole position. Under these circumstances — 
 that is, with the manifest advantage of such a plan — Law entered a 
 formal protest to Hood, and Hood, in his turn, to Longstreet, 
 against the uncertain, but certainly costly, frontal attack on Birney 
 which had been ordered. No less than three separate times and by 
 three separate messengers Hood made this protest to Longstreet — 
 the only one. Hood said, he ever made. Longstreet's only reply each 
 time was: "General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmittsburg 
 Road." Longstreet even came himself to Hood to give him the last 
 answer. Some of Longstreet's own officers claim that Longstreet 
 
was sullen because lie did not approve of Lee's policy of the 
 offensive here ; and Longstreet, in his own book, throws all the 
 blame on Lee for not ridin<>; with him and personally directing his 
 attack. 
 
 But by this time Longstreet, having ignored Hood's plan to 
 encircle Big Round Top and so get into Meade's rear, had decided 
 to attempt the same result in a ditferent way. That is to say, be- 
 side the direct frontal attack up the Emmittsburg Road on Birney's 
 whole line. Hood was also to pass beyond Birney's left at the Devil's 
 Den, go up the ravine between the two Round Tops, and so, by a 
 shorter line, outflank Meade's entire position on the left and attack 
 him in the rear. 
 
 Little Round Top, as we have seen, terminated Cemetery Ridge, 
 at the extreme southern end of Meade's original lines. It is a bold, 
 rocky hill, probably 150 to 200 feet high. Its western side towards 
 the main valley is rough and steep. Its southern side, toward Big 
 Round Top, is even rougher and steeper, and covered with great 
 rocks and boulders, but sloping more gradually at the bottom to the 
 swale which separates Little Round Top from Big Round Top. 
 This latter hill is probably 300 or 400 feet high. The apexes of 
 the two hills are probably 1,000 feet apart. The sides of Big 
 Round Top slope more gradually. So that there was room enough, 
 to be sure, between the two hills for a very considerable body of 
 Confederate troops to pass up the swale. But, on the other hand, 
 this was also extremely difficult on account of the thick woods and 
 the enormous number of rocks and boulders covering the whole 
 ground, even out so far as the Devil's Den — and beyond it. 
 
 Let us now turn to the other side of our story. Along in the 
 early afternoon of this same day, July 2nd, Meade, finding that 
 Sickles had abandoned his original position on Cemetery Ridge at 
 the extreme left, sent General Warren, at Warren's own request, to 
 see how things were there. For Meade himself knew how carefully 
 that part of his line needed to be protected ; he had already sent 
 Geary's Division the night before to Little Round Top and only 
 relieved him in the morning with Sickles' Corps. Warren, arriving 
 at Little Round Top, found nobody there but some signal men. 
 They told him they thought they had seen troops in a clump of 
 woods half a mile toward the Emmittsburg Road. Warren ordered 
 a shot from Smith's Battery, located at the Devil's Den, sent into 
 those woods ; and, in the resulting commotion, caught the gleam of 
 sunlight on gun barrels and bayonets there. Warren instantly 
 divined the intended Confederate attack on Little Round Top, which 
 was as yet entirely unprotected, and sent one of his aides to Sickles 
 
asking for a brigade ; but Sickles said he could not spare a man. 
 Warren then sent another aide to Meade himself asking for a 
 division ; and Meade sent back an order to Sykes of the Fifth Corps 
 to furnish the troops. The Fifth Corps, arriving early in the 
 morning, had first been sent to support Meade's right; but on the 
 arrival of the Sixth Corps, the Fifth, being relieved, was massed 
 in the rear of the Federal left, until it was now being moved forward 
 in the middle of the afternoon, to support Birney, already hard 
 pressed by Longstreet. 
 
 What happened from this on, at Little Round Top, and how 
 Vincent got there just when he did, are points about which the 
 leading historians have hitherto hopelessly disagreed. Hardly any 
 of them, as our present author points out, actually took part in this 
 particular fight, and the leading men on the Union side who did 
 were nearly all killed. We shall, however, hear from Warren and 
 Chamberlain later on. 
 
 But to quote the historians briefly. Swinton says: "The leading 
 division of the Fifth Corps, under Barnes, was passing out to 
 reinforce Sickles. Warren assumed the responsibility of detaching 
 from this force the brigade of Vincent, and this he hurried up to 
 hold the position." Doubleday says: "Warren, without losing a 
 moment, rode over to Barnes, took the responsibility of detaching 
 Vincent's brigade and hurried it back to take position on Little 
 Round Top." The Comte de Paris says: "Sykes had immediately 
 ordered Colonel Vincent, commanding Barnes' Third Brigade, to 
 proceed to occupy the foot of Little Round Top." Walker says: 
 "Warren takes the responsibility of detaching the foremost troops 
 and hurries them forward to anticipate the Confederates." Hunt 
 says: "The enemy was already advancing, when, noticing the 
 approach of the Fifth Corps, Warren rode to meet it, caused Weed's 
 and Vincent's Brigades and Hazlitt's Battery to be detached and 
 hurried them to the summit." De Trobriand says: "Warren took 
 upon himself to detach a brigade commanded by Colonel Vincent, 
 and to hurry it on the run to the summit of Little Round Top." 
 Powell says: "Sykes yielded to Warren's urgent request and Barnes 
 directed Colonel Vincent to proceed to that point with his brigade." 
 Stine says: "Warren, seeing Vincent's brigade approaching, rode 
 up to Sykes and Barnes, and requested that Vincent be moved on 
 Little Round Top and hold it." Sykes, in his report at the time, 
 says: "In the meantime Vincent's brigade had seized the rocky 
 height, closely followed by Weed's. These troops were posted 
 under the direction of General Warren." Barnes, in his report at 
 the time, says : "General Sykes yielded to General Warren's earnest 
 
request: and I (Barnes) immediately direeted Colonel Vincent to 
 proceed to that point with his brigade." (If Barnes did himself 
 issue such an order to Vincent, it will be plain later on that it never 
 reached Vincent.) So much for the histories and the reports. 
 They all seem to indicate that V^incent acted simply in obedience 
 to orders; some say Warren's, some say Sykes', Barnes says his own. 
 
 Now let us hear next, however, from the personal letters of some 
 of these same leaders, written later on. These letters are the new 
 and first-class authorities found by our author, and which were 
 mostly in the possession of Captain Farley, the historian of the 
 110th New York Regiment. In 186t Lieutenant Mackenzie, of 
 Warren's Staff, wrote General Meade, saying: "General Sickles, 
 when called on by General Warren, through me, to furnish troops 
 for the defense of that position, refused, stating his whole command 
 was necessary to defend his front. General Sykes furnished troops 
 as soon as called on," But General Sykes himself, writing Captain 
 Farle}', in 1872, says: "How Vincent got to Round Top, I do not 
 know ; unless hearing my aide-de-camp deliver the orders for the 
 corps to take the left of the line, he made his way there, of his 
 own soldierly instinct." General Warren, also writing Captain 
 Farley in 1872, says: "I did not see Vincent's Brigade come up; 
 but I suppose it was about this time they did, and, coming up 
 behind me through the woods and taking post to the left (their 
 proper place), I did not see them." And again, also in 1872, 
 Warren writes: "If I detached Vincent's Brigade, I don't recollect 
 it." And again: "You may be sure if I had given the account of 
 my taking responsibility of detaching troops and hurrj'ing them at 
 the last moment to the hilltop, I should have said that it was 
 O'Rorke and his regiment that I detached." (This was the case.) 
 These personal letters alone, then, would seem conclusive that 
 neither Warren nor Sykes recollected having given Vincent orders. 
 
 But now let us hear the still more direct testimony of our author 
 himself. It will be remembered that Sykes, with his Fifth Corps, 
 was now moving forward to support Sickles ; and Barnes, of the 
 First Division, had gone ahead to select his position. Here Warren's 
 aide, coming back with an order from Meade to Sykes to send troops 
 to Little Round Top, met Sykes. I now quote the author's own 
 words: "Sykes immediately sent one of his staff to direct Barnes 
 to send one of his brigades. But Barnes had not returned to the 
 division. Vincent was sitting on his horse at the head of the column, 
 waiting orders. Seeing Sykes' aide approaching, he rode forward 
 to meet him. I followed with the flag, and distinctly heard the 
 following conversation: "Captain, what are your orders.''" The 
 
Captain replied: "Where is General Barnes?" Vincent said: 
 "What are your orders? Give me your orders!" The Captain 
 answered: "General Sykes told me to direct General Barnes to 
 send one of his brigades to occupy that hill yonder/' pointing to 
 Little Round Top. Vincent said: "I will take the responsibility 
 of taking my brigade there." Returning to the brigade, he directed 
 Colonel Rice, the (next) senior Colonel, to bring the brigade to the 
 hill as rapidly as possible ; then rode away to the northwest face 
 of the hill. I followed him." So much in the author's exact words. 
 
 He then says, substantially, that Vincent did not stop on the 
 flat ridge of Little Round Top and post his troops there; for there 
 they could have offered little resistance to the threatened attack, 
 through the thick woods, up the ravine between the two hills. But, 
 instead, Vincent led his column, out of sight, through the woods 
 behind Little Round Top; then down the ravine, past the southern 
 shoulder of this hill and around to and along its steep western 
 slope, about half way up its face ; so fronting, at a considerable 
 distance, the Devil's Den, which was Birney's extreme left. 
 
 Here, then, Vincent's Brigade (the Third, of the First Division, 
 of the Fifth Corps), of about twelve hundred men, was posted, in 
 the following order: On the western face of Little Round Top, on 
 his extreme right, the 16th Michigan, with part of its own right 
 running back up the hill, so guarding its own flank ; next, to the 
 left, on the same western face, the 44th New York; then the 83rd 
 Pennsylvania (Vincent's own regiment), still partly on the western 
 face, but also M'ith its left bent well back on the southern slope, 
 and so up the ravine ; then, on the extreme left, the 20th Maine, 
 continuing the line up the ravine along the southern slope of Little 
 Round Top, and facing Big Round Top. 
 
 The forces selected by Hood to make the attack here were part 
 of Law's Brigade, of five Alabama regiments, and part of Robert- 
 son's Brigade of four regiments — three from Texas and one from 
 Arkansas. Within ten minutes after Vincent's men were in position, 
 the first attack, made by about half of this Confederate force, was 
 along Vincent's whole line, and was desperately renewed again and 
 again for at least half an hour. Finding this unsuccessful for the 
 time being, the Confederates made two additional moves. For the 
 rest of Hood's Division had meanwhile driven back Ward from his 
 position near the Devil's Den, on Birney's extreme left. The way 
 being thus cleared, three more regiments of the attacking force 
 were now thrown against Vincent's extreme right, hoping to break 
 his line there and so outflank him. Soon that part of the 16th 
 Michigan, viz., about three companies of it, which were guarding 
 
 10 
 
this flank, overj^owered by tliis terrific assault, gradually gave way 
 and was driven back; and it was here that Vincmt, trying to rally 
 these men, fell mortally wounded. Just about this time Weed's 
 Brigade, of Ayres' Division of the Fifth Corps, was moving forward 
 to reinforce Sickles. Warren, who was still on the ridge of I>ittle 
 Round Top, seeing the newly threatened attack on Vincent's right 
 and riding down off the ridge for reinforcements, promptly and 
 unhesitatingly detached O'Rorke's 1 iOth New York from Weed's 
 Brigade (Warren's old command) and hurried it to the hill. 
 O'Rorke told Warren that General Weed was ahead and expected 
 the brigade to follow him. "Never mind that," said Warren, "bring 
 your regiment up here and I will take the responsibility." Soon 
 the 140th came over the crest, on the run and with a yell, just as 
 Vincent's right was driven back and the Confederates had got foot- 
 hold on the steep western face of the hill. With no time to load 
 guns, but with bayonets fixed, the 140th now dashed down upon the 
 Confederates and quickly drove them back into the valley, pursuing 
 them and taking many prisoners. But this great success cost this 
 fine regiment its gallant and beloved Colonel O'Rorke, who fell dead 
 close to where Vincent lay. Shortly after, the rest of Weed's 
 Brigade, sent back for the purpose, had come up and taken position 
 in support of Lieutenant Hazlitt's battery on the hilltop. Soon 
 Weed, too, was shot; and Hazlitt, stooping over him to take his 
 last words, was also instantly killed, falling literally across Weed's 
 body. Altogether it was a ghastly and costly harvest of splendid 
 young Union leaders reaped, in so short a time, by the Confederate 
 sharpshooters who were now at Devil's Den, only a quarter of a 
 mile away, and concealed behind its great rocks as big as houses. 
 
 The other new move of the enemy, at almost the same time, 
 was against Chamberlain's 20th Maine Regiment, on Vincent's 
 extreme left. Chamberlain himself, writing only two years ago, in 
 Hearst's Magazine, says: "Reaching the southern face of Little 
 Round Top, I found Vincent there, with intense poise and look. 
 He said with a voice of awe, as if translating the tables of the 
 eternal law, 'I place you here. This is the left of the Union line. 
 You understand. You are to hold this ground at all costs.' I did 
 understand full well; but had more to learn regarding the costs." 
 He had, indeed ! For now the two other Alabama regiments, not yet 
 engaged, had made their way through the woods along the slope 
 of Big Round Top. in order to outflank and enfilade the 20th Maine. 
 To meet this attack Chamberlain refused his left wing to a position 
 nearly at right angles to the rest of his regiment, and had to take 
 long intervals to do it. Writers on both sides describe the fighting 
 here as most desperate. The advancing and retreating lines, it is 
 
 11 
 
said, "surged back and forth like waves" over a space of a few 
 hundred feet. A Confederate officer, surrendering his sword with 
 one hand, fired his pistol at Chamberlain's head with the other. 
 At least five separate assaults were made and repulsed in the course 
 of an hour or two. A third of Chamberlain's men were dead or 
 disabled. Their ammunition was gone. The enemy was in no 
 better shape. It was growing dark. At last Chamberlain ordered 
 the bayonet; and the enemy was soon hopelessly and finally driven 
 from the field here, as elsewhere, about Little Round Top. Five 
 hundred prisoners were taken, including two Colonels. Colonel 
 Oates, commanding one of the Alabama regiments, says in his 
 history: "I found the undertaking to capture Little Round Top too 
 great for m}'^ regiment. We were not driven from the field; I 
 ordered the retreat"; but adds, like an honest man, "When the 
 signal was given, we ran like a herd of wild cattle !" 
 
 It was now nine o'clock. The fight in defense of Little Round 
 Top had been made and won. The key of the Union position on 
 that day's battlefield was still in our hands. There was little danger 
 of a renewed attack at this point by the exhausted Confederate 
 troops. But to guard against any such thing, the 20th Maine was 
 moved higher up on Big Round Top ; the lines of the 83rd Penn- 
 sylvania and 4'4th New York were straightened and extended to 
 join it, and a fresh brigade (Fisher's) was also moved up about 
 midnight in support. So closed the day of that fight on July 2nd. 
 
 Of the vital importance of this fight at Little Round Top to the 
 Union cause there can be little doubt. There were other struggles 
 during the war as great as that at Gettysburg. There were equal 
 devotion and valor on that and other fields. But Gettysburg seems 
 rightly regarded as the first real break in Lee's power, foretelling 
 its end. The next day's final struggle there, with the repulse of 
 Pickett's magnificent though hopeless charge against Meade's center, 
 was still to be made. But there can be no question that Little 
 Round Top was the critical point of the battle on July 2nd. As 
 Colonel Powell says in his "History of the Fifth Corps": "His- 
 torians have exhausted themselves in describing the actions at the 
 'Peach Orchard.' . . . Great stress has been laid on the results of 
 Pickett's charge , . . but the truth of history is, that the little 
 brigade of Vincent, with the self-sacrificing valor of the 20th Maine, 
 under the gallant leadership of Joshua L. Chamberlain, fighting 
 among the rocks and scrub-oaks in the vale between the Round 
 Tops and July 2, 1863, saved to the Union arms the historic field 
 of Gettysburg. Had they faltered for one instant, there would 
 have been no grand charge of Pickett; and Gettysburg would have 
 
 12 
 
been the mnusoleum of departed hopes for the National cause ; for 
 I,onf;street would have enveloped Little Round Top, capturing all 
 on its crest fi'om the rear and held the key of the whole position." 
 
 Lastly, our own author, Norton, declares that the one purpose 
 of his seemingly belated book is, through the new information he 
 furnishes, to secure the simple truth and justice of all the facts — 
 and especially as they concern Vincent's part at Little Round Top. 
 He does not hesitate to give Warren all the great primary credit 
 he deserves in this fight, for his keen military eye and sound 
 judgment, his prompt action in sending for reinforcements and his 
 unhesitating assumption of responsibility in detaching and hurrying 
 up O'Rorke's llOth New York at a critical moment. And with no 
 less credit to Warren as a man; for Warren was himself the most 
 modest and generous of men, never claiming credit for himself, 
 always ready to give it to others. O'Rorke's timely and successful 
 charge is also seen to have been one of the saving factors in the 
 fight. He was a fine officer, only recently graduated from West 
 Point at the head of his class. Nor is there any less appreciation 
 of the splendid part Chamberlain played here and for which indeed 
 he was made Brigadier-General shortly afterward. (He was finally 
 brevetted ^Lajor-General of Volunteers, and ^vas after the war 
 Governor of Maine, and subsequently President of Bowdoin 
 College.) But our author does insist that "hitherto, in two respects, 
 justice has never been done to Vincent." First, as to Vincent's 
 willingness, too, to take responsibility and his promptness in acting 
 on it. he says: "In spite of all that Warren, Sykes and Barnes did, 
 it would have been too late, had not Vincent moved without waiting 
 for an order from his immediate superior." "The second respect," 
 he says, "is in not having given Vincent the credit due him for his 
 kiunvledge and skill in the choice of a position. (Vincent was not 
 a trained soldier, but a civilian.) But the position chosen by 
 Vincent," he claims, "was the best possible for preventing the 
 Confederates from turning or capturing the hill. The event proved 
 that his instinct for the point of vantage was of the highest order." 
 Hood himself said in his report to Longstreet: "I found that by 
 reason of the concavity of the enemy's (that is, Vincent's) line we 
 would be subject to a destructive fire in flank and rear as well as 
 in front ; and that it was impossible . . . under this number of 
 cross-fires, to put the enemy to flight." Even Longstreet wrote our 
 author in 1901 as follows: "It gives me pleasure to state, in refer- 
 ence to the worth of Little Round Top to the Union Army at 
 Gettysburg, that it was everything to the success of the Union 
 battle. And," he continued, "General V^incent's prompt action in 
 moving to save that point held it and was the means of getting the 
 
 13 
 
battle to his side. Many minutes' delay would have given the Con- 
 federates the field." 
 
 And, finally, since the publication of Mr. Norton's book two 
 years ago, a West Point pi-ofessor has written him that he has 
 cleared up confusion, made good his points, and that his book is 
 now a text-book at West Point on "The Attack and Defense of 
 Little Round Top." 
 
 Colonel Vincent's ai)pointment as Brigadier-General was made 
 the next day by President Lincoln, on General Meade's recom- 
 mendation by telegraph. He died, however, five days afterward, 
 on July 7th, just as the appointment reached him. A heroic-size 
 bronze figure of General Vincent, on a high pedestal, stands on 
 the southern slope of Little Round Top. 
 
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