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MODERN GERMANY 
 
MODERN GERMANY 
 
 ITS RISE, GROWTH, DOWNFALL 
 AND FUTURE 
 
 BY J. ELLIS BARKER 
 
 AUTHOR or 
 
 "THB FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY," "THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF BRITISH STATESMANSHIP" 
 
 " ECONOMIC STATESMANSHIP," ETC. ETC, 
 
 SIXTH EDITION, ENTIRELY RE WRITTEN 
 AND VERY GREATLY ENLARGED 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY 
 
 1919 
 
a)Dii7 
 
 .332 
 
 Z/ 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The Sixth Edition of Modern Germany is, as the title-page 
 states, " entirely re-written and very greatly enlarged." It 
 is in reality a new book. Hence the question arose whether 
 it should appear under its old title or under a new one. 
 
 The first five editions were mainly devoted to pointing 
 out the probability and danger of a German attack upon 
 civilisation, and to analysing the sources of the strength 
 of Imperial Germany and the elements of its weakness. 
 The attack, of which I had warned the nations in general, 
 and England in particular, in numerous books and articles 
 ever since 1900, took place at the exact moment which I 
 had indicated in 1907 (see p. 447 of this work), and it ended 
 as I had often foretold (see, for instance, pp. 447 to 450), 
 in Germany's defeat and downfall, in revolution, and in 
 the disappearance of the HohenzoUern dynasty. A new 
 Germany is arising. Owing to the march of events readers 
 are no longer interested in the aims and ambitions and 
 the foreign and domestic policy of defunct Imperial Ger- 
 many. They wish to understand the causes of Germany's 
 meteoric rise, of its wonderful political and economic 
 success and of its downfall, and to form an idea as to the 
 future of New Germany and of the German race. To 
 analyse and describe these is the purpose of this book. 
 Therefore, it had to be re-written throughout. 
 
 There was a considerable demand for a new edition of 
 Modern Germany both in England and in the United States. 
 As portions of the fifth edition have been embodied in the 
 present volume, it seemed only fair to intending purchasers 
 to indicate that fact by preserving the old title for what is 
 practically a new book. Of course, very drastic changes 
 had to be made to bring it up to date. Large portions 
 contained in the fifth edition, which are no longer of 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 interest except to historians, have been omitted, and the 
 new situation created by the War has been considered from 
 every point of view. The portions of the old text used 
 have been compressed to the utmost. Thus the present 
 issue gives in the most concise form all the information of 
 permanent interest and value which was contained in the 
 previous one, and considerably more than a hundred pages 
 of additional matter. Seven chapters are entirely new. 
 
 In its present form Modern Oermany is a companion 
 volume to The Foundations of Germany — A Documentary 
 Account Revealing the Secret of her Strength, Wealth, and 
 Efficiency, the second and very greatly enlarged edition of 
 which appeared in the autumn of 1918. The two books 
 are designed to supplement one another, and may almost 
 be considered the first and second volumes of a single work. 
 Both should be equally useful to students of Grerman 
 affairs. 
 
 Modern Germany has had a most gratifying success in 
 England and abroad. It has been used as a text-book at 
 some of the leading American Universities, and has even 
 been translated into Japanese and Mahratti. I hope that 
 the present issue will meet with as kind a reception as its 
 five predecessors. 
 
 The bulk of this volume has previously appeared in the 
 Nineteenth Century and After, the Fortnightly Review, the 
 Contemporary Review, and the National Review. However, 
 the chapters are not merely reprints of articles, some of 
 which are now more or less out of date. The original 
 essays have in many cases suppUed only the framework of 
 the various chapters, and they have been organically con- 
 nected. I would very cordially thank the editors of the 
 periodicals mentioned for allowing me to reprint part or 
 the whole of my contributions. 
 
 For the convenience of readers the chapters of this book 
 are briefly summarised in the Introduction. 
 
 J. Ellis Barker. 
 
 LOXDON, 
 
 Jamuxry 1919. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAQB 
 
 Preface "^ 
 
 OEUPTBR 
 
 I. Introduction 1 
 
 II. The Rise and Fall of Prusso-Germany . 12 
 
 III. William II.— His Character, Policy, and 
 
 Achievements . . . . • .31 
 
 IV. The Foreign Policy of Prusso-Germany . 43 
 
 V. The War Machine op Prusso-Germany— its 
 
 Creation and its Destruction . . 60 
 
 VI. The Imperial German Navy and its 
 
 Planned Oversea Operations , . 72 
 
 VII. Prusso-Germany' s World Policy and its 
 
 Policy towards the Anglo-Saxon States 82 
 
 VIII. The Responsibility for Anglo-German 
 Friction — German Evidence on the 
 Subject 106 
 
 IX. The Relations between Germany and 
 
 France • • 125 
 
 X. The Morocco Crisis of 1911 . . . 136 
 
 vu 
 
viii CONTENTS 
 
 J 
 
 CHAPTER PAGB 
 
 XI. Education and Mis-education in 
 
 Germany ...... 148 
 
 XII. The Fiscal Policy of Germany and its 
 
 Results 169 
 
 ;/- XIII. The Rural Industries of Germany . 184 
 
 V " XIV. The Railways and the Railway Policy 
 
 OF Germany ..... 214 
 
 "^ XV. Waterways and Canals. . . . 235 
 
 XVI. The Shipbuilding and Shipping Indus- 
 tries OF Germany .... 255 
 
 XVII. The Chemical Industries . . . 266 
 
 " XVIII. German Industrial Conditions pre- 
 vious TO the War . . . .276 
 
 XIX. The Rise, Growth, and Character of 
 
 the Social Democrahc Party . .291 
 
 XX. The Parliamentary Position in Germany 
 
 before THE War . . . . .311 
 
 XXI. Why and How Germany brought about 
 
 THE Great War 324 
 
 XXn. Why the Triple Alliance broke down 
 
 IN 1914 357 
 
 XXm. How the Military ruled Germany . . 370 
 
 XXIV. How the Army has ruined Germany . 397 
 
 XXV. The War Aims of the German Intel- 
 lectuals .,•,.. 427 
 
CONTENTS ix 
 
 CHAPTER PAGH 
 
 XXVI. German Demands for the Domination of 
 
 THE World 439 
 
 XXVn. The Future of Germany and of the 
 
 German Race 445 
 
 XXVni. The Future of Germany and of the 
 German Race (coritimied) — The Problem 
 OF Austria ...... 476 
 
 Analytical Index . , . . .491 
 
MODERN GERMANY 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 States are usually created by the collaboration of the 
 many. Most democracies owe their rise to the people of 
 whom they are composed. Modern Germany, Prusso- 
 Grermany, was an exception to the general rule. Like some 
 ancient feudal estate, it was the creation of a single family, 
 of the HohenzoUerns. 
 
 The HohenzoUerns were, as is pointed out in the second 
 chapter, a family of adventurers, of daring and thriving 
 Suabian robber-knights who obtained in the beginning of 
 the fifteenth century the poor, neglected, lawless, and almost 
 valueless district of Brandenburg from the Eong-Emperor 
 in return for services rendered. They established in that 
 savage country on the outskirts of the Empire a small State 
 which flourished greatly, and which grew, by successful 
 violence and trickery, into a kingdom and an empire. Thus 
 a family of feudal robber-knights, possessed of a robber- 
 knight morality and following a robber-knight policy, 
 created in the wilds a robber State which they treated as 
 if the land and the people dwelling therein were their personal 
 possession. 
 
 Nominally Prusso-Germany was a federation of inde- 
 pendent self-governing States. Germany and the States 
 of which it was composed possessed indeed all the para- 
 phernalia of constitutional, popular, and democratic govern- 
 ment. However, in reality Germany was merely an enlarged 
 Prussia. The King of Prussia could with more truth 
 proclaim Vitat c'est moi than Louis XIV. or Napoleon I. 
 
 1 
 
2 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The HohenzoUern rulers, considering the country their 
 property, administered it in accordance with ancient custom 
 as if it were a huge estate. They directed absolutely, and 
 as a rule in person, the army, the civil administration, the 
 foreign and domestic policy of the State, industry, trade, 
 and commerce, the Protestant and the Roman Catholic 
 Churches, the schools, the universities, and the press. They 
 not only controlled and directed all the activities of the 
 State, but they moulded the character of the people and 
 controlled the speech, thought, and action of the citizens 
 from the cradle to the grave. 
 
 The character and welfare of a State so ruled and so 
 constituted depend of course entirely upon the personality 
 of its ruler, who, owing to his enormous power, is able to 
 imprint his character upon the entire nation. During the 
 reign of the moderate and well-balanced King-Emperor 
 WiUiam I. Prusso-Germany behaved sanely and moderately, 
 and the State grew great owing to the able direction of 
 eminent experts, such as Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, who 
 were given the fullest scope. Under the personal rule of 
 the vain, boastful, capricious, impetuous, conceited, and 
 utterly incompetent William II., in whom were combined 
 the vices of most of his ancestors, the character of State 
 and nation changed completely, as is shown in Chapter III. 
 Experts in the art of government and administration were 
 replaced by applauding courtiers and by spineless syco- 
 phants. The complicated and delicate machinery of the 
 State was thrown out of gear by the clumsy interference of 
 its incompetent director. The character of the people was 
 degraded by the Emperor's policy, teaching, and pernicious 
 example. The whole nation became boastful, capricious, 
 conceited, and utterly unscrupulous. 
 
 Soon after his advent the Emperor proclaimed that he 
 would be his own Chancellor, that he would steer the young 
 Empire over a new course, his own course. He dismissed 
 Prince Bismarck, and Germany's foreign policy began to 
 reflect the Emperor's rashness, incapacity, and utter un- 
 trustworthiness. By his constant interference, bluster, and 
 
INTRODUCTION 3 
 
 threats, William II. completely transformed the character 
 of Germany's policy and damaged irretrievably the political 
 reputation of the State. Thus William II. destroyed 
 Germany's predominance in Europe which Bismarck had 
 created, and forced France, Russia, and England to combine 
 in self-defence, as is shown in Chapter IV. 
 
 Prusso- Germany was, by its history and tradition, a 
 robber State. It had grown great by successful aggression. 
 According to the Hohenzollern tradition, the army was the 
 bodyguard of the sovereign, and its strength and eflficiency 
 were the principal interest of the ruler. Moltke resigned 
 shortly after the advent of WilHam II. His successors, as 
 those of Prince Bismarck, were chosen not for their ability, 
 but for their subserviency. They were servile courtiers and 
 flatterers of WiUiam II., not men of the highest qualifications 
 possessed of a strong character. The Emperor became not 
 only his own Chancellor and his own Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, but his own Minister of War and his own Chief of 
 the Staff as well. His constant interference with military 
 matters was as disastrous to Germany as was his interference 
 ill foreign and domestic politics. Thus William II. destroyed 
 not only the life-work of Bismarck, but that of Moltke and 
 of Roon as well, as is shown in Chapter V. 
 
 William II. had often proclaimed that he would lead 
 Germany towards a great and glorious future. Bismarck, 
 after having made Germany supreme on the continent of 
 Europe, desired his country to follow a moderate and 
 peaceful policy. He attached particular value to good 
 relations with England. William II. thirsted for glory. 
 He completely lacked the sense of proportion. He wished 
 to acquire the rule of the seas and the mastery of the world. 
 He proclaimed in resounding sentences that Germany's 
 future lay upon the water, and created a navy designed to 
 humble England and the United States, as is shown in 
 Chapters VI. and VII. He called into being a nation-wide 
 agitation for the creation of a predominant fleet. The 
 preamble of the Navy Law of 1900 proclaimed : " Germany 
 requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest 
 
4 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy 
 of that Power." The entire governmental machine of 
 Germany and the great semi-official apparatus were em- 
 ployed to promote the Emperor's naval ambition by preach- 
 ing hostility to England, by preaching war with England. 
 The whole tribe of Government servants, of Government 
 nominees and of place-hunters, title-hunters, and decoration- 
 himters, of generals and admirals, professors and school- 
 masters, clergymen, lecturers, and journalists, was mobilised 
 for this purpose. These men demanded in unmeasured 
 and threatening language Germany's supremacy on the sea, 
 the humihation of England and of the United States, and 
 the establishment of a German world-empire dominating 
 the universe. These demands were joyfully received and 
 noisily supported by the masses of the people, who had been 
 trained to obey implicitly and unquestioningly the directions 
 received " from above." 
 
 Owing to the criminal foUy of William II. and of his 
 pUable and characterless supporters in the various Govern- 
 ment offices, Germany challenged and provoked England and 
 the United States not only by her naval armaments and her 
 naval agitation, but by her diplomacy as well. The fact 
 that Germany was chiefly, one might almost say solely, 
 responsible for the strained relations with England previous 
 to the War may be seen from Chapter IX., which shows, 
 exclusively by means of German evidence, where lay the 
 guilt for the protracted and acute Anglo-German tension. 
 
 After the Franco-German War of 1870-71 Bismarck 
 ensured Germany's security and peace by creating the 
 Triple Alliance, and he made France impotent for a war 
 of revenge by skilfully isolating it. William II. provoked 
 in turn not only Russia, England, and the United States, 
 but France as well, and he tried to humiliate that country 
 by his intervention in Morocco in 1905 and 1911. The 
 history of Germany's relations with France and the story 
 of the very interesting and important Morocco crisis of 1911 
 are told in Chapters IX. and X. 
 
 Before the War German education was universally 
 
INTRODUCTION 6 
 
 over-estimated. It was not sufficiently recognised abroad 
 that the chief purpose of the German schools was not to 
 elevate the character of the people, but to make them 
 abjectly obedient tools in the hands of their ruler and of 
 his government ; that they were designed to create not 
 ability and individuality, but servility ; that much of the 
 boasted training in the German educational establishments, 
 even in the universities and technical schools, was totally 
 misapplied. Mis-education has undoubtedly perverted the 
 mind of the German nation. That has clearly been proved 
 during the course of the War. Chapter XI., on " Education 
 and Mis-Education in Germany," gives a critical appreciation 
 of Grerman education, which is substantially reprinted from 
 previous editions of this book. It was first published in 
 the Contemporary Review in October 1906, and scandalised 
 at the time many English educationalists who blindly 
 admired the German educational system and wished to 
 copy it in almost every particular. 
 
 Chapters XII. to XVIII. deal with Economic Germany. 
 The German rulers, not the German people, created the 
 State and the nation, and they created also Germany's 
 economic success. The Grerman industries owe their rise 
 and growth largely to the economic policy of the State, and 
 particularly to skilfully-framed Protective Tariffs. The 
 result of Protection, which was introduced by Prince Bis- 
 marck in 1879, is shoAvn in Chapter XII. — " The Fiscal 
 Policy of Grermany and its Results." 
 
 Chapter XIII. describes at length the rural industries of 
 Grermany and analyses the causes of their extraordinary 
 prosperity. 
 
 Chapter XIV. deals with the railways and the railway 
 policy of Germany. That chapter should be particularly 
 interesting to those who wish the State to take over and 
 manage the private railways. Germany has managed its 
 State railways with considerable ability and success through 
 its all-powerful and practically irresponsible bureaucracy. 
 Whether England wiU be as successful in managing its 
 railways as a State undertaking depends, of course, chiefly 
 
6 INTRODUCTION 
 
 on the ability and the authority of those who will be called 
 upon to direct them. Bureaucratic management of eco- 
 nomic enterprises can be efficient only if it is carried on in 
 a businesslike manner by the ablest experts, provided of 
 course that these are not constantly hampered by party- 
 political interference. The supremacy of bureaucratic 
 routine, of " red-tape," of electoral influences, and the 
 meddling of party politicians with the railways for party- 
 political purposes would, of course, destroy their efficiency 
 and their profit-earning capacity. Bureaucratic automata 
 are as incapable of directing a great business undertaking 
 successfully as are party politicians who are mainly in- 
 terested in obtaining votes. 
 
 It is not generally known that Germany has a very highly- 
 developed system of inland waterways, that before the 
 War the tonnage of its inland fleet was twice as great as that 
 u-of its merchant marine, that its greatest harbour was not 
 ^Hamburg, but Ruhrort. Chapter XV. supplies full details 
 as to Grermany's Waterways and Canals, which should be 
 of particular interest to all who have the development of 
 inland transport by water at heart. 
 
 In its economic policy Germany was guided not by its 
 professors, but by its business men, not by abstract theories 
 and principles, but by practical considerations. Hence it 
 adapted its political means to the economic end in view. 
 While it developed its gigantic manufacturing industries 
 by means of fiscal protection, it created a prosperous ship- 
 building and shipping industry with the help of Free Trade. 
 However, it fostered its shipbuilding and shipping industries 
 also by preferential railway tariffs granted by the State 
 Railways and by various other means, as is shown in 
 Chapter XVI. 
 
 In the chemical industry, and especially in the manufac- 
 ture of dyes, Germany became predominant throughout 
 the world not so much owing to the policy of Protection 
 and to the high abihty of its chemists — the greatest chemical 
 discoveries were made by EngUshmen and Frenchmen — 
 but by State aid freely given for chemical research and for 
 
INTRODUCTION 7 
 
 chemical tuition, and especially by organised research, by 
 mass research, by team work, by the co-operation of an 
 army of chemists for certain predetermined ends, as is 
 described in Chapter XVII. 
 
 Chapter XVIII. sums up the results of Germany's eco- 
 nomic policy. It gives a picture of the vast and rapid 
 economic progress of the country, and furnishes full details 
 of the extraordinary prosperity which the German classes 
 and masses enjoyed up to 1914. 
 
 In Chapters XIX. and XX, the home-political position of 
 Germany previous to the War is dealt with. The former 
 chapter considers the rise, growth, and character of the 
 Social Democratic Party, its organisation, its achievements, 
 and its doctrines. The latter analyses the German parlia- 
 mentary position previous to 1914, and shows incidentally 
 that increasing difficulties in the field of domestic politics 
 were a contributory cause to the World War. Prusso- 
 Germany was ruled by the Emperor through a practically 
 irresponsible military and bureaucratic administration, with 
 the help of a subservient Conservative-governmental ma- 
 jority in the Reichstag. However, this majority of pro- 
 Government deputies represented only a minority of the 
 electorate. It misrepresented the people as a whole. The 
 great bulk of the electorate was opposed to the Government 
 and its policy. The growing numerical strength of the 
 opposition parties in the country made the management of 
 the Reichstag extremely and increasingly difficult for the 
 Government and its Conservative and other pro-Government 
 supporters in that assembly. It was feared by many that 
 before long the Government would find it impossible to secure 
 a docile and obedient Reichstag majority. Consequently 
 many Conservative politicians and soldiers thought that 
 the maintenance of the mihtary and autocratic form of 
 government imperatively demanded the disfranchisement 
 of the Liberal and Social Democratic masses by an alteration 
 of the franchise, which could be brought about only by a 
 Governmental coup d'etat. Many of the Emperor's staunchest 
 adherents thought that such a step could comparatively 
 
8 INTRODUCTION 
 
 easily be effected after a successful war. They believed 
 that a great victory would so immensely enhance the 
 prestige and authority of the Emperor and of his Government 
 that the disfranchisement of the masses could safely be 
 undertaken. 
 
 In Chapters XXI. to XXVIII. the Great War, its causes, 
 and its consequences are considered. Chapter XXI. deals 
 with the principal factors which led to its outbreak. The 
 chapter following it describes the causes which estranged 
 Italy from Germany and Austria- Hungary, and which 
 impelled that country to abandon its partners in the Triple 
 Alliance and to join the Entente group. 
 
 Chapter XXIII. depicts how the military ruled Germany 
 before the War ; how ambitious and reckless military 
 leaders, enjojdng the support of the Emperor, were allowed 
 to destroy the authority of the civil administration and to 
 make the German Foreign Office a subordinate branch of 
 the General Staff ; how the soldiers managed and mis- 
 managed Germany's foreign and domestic policy ; how they 
 influenced, guided, and corrupted public opinion throughout 
 the country ; how they caused an aggressive jingoism to 
 permeate even the heart of the young children in the ele- 
 mentary schools ; how they warped and distorted the mind 
 of the whole nation by preaching unceasingly a war of 
 conquest and of spohation and by preparing the people 
 for a great war of aggression. The famous Zabern incident 
 is described in the same chapter. 
 
 Prusso-Germany has been made great by its army and has 
 been ruined by it, as is shown in Chapter XXIV. Bismarck 
 and Moltke had in collaboration laid down a plan of cam- 
 paign in case of a war with France and Russia combined. 
 According to that plan, Germany was to respect strictly 
 Belgium's neutrality and France was to be induced to 
 violate it. If that plan had been carried out, England 
 would scarcely have intervened at the beginning of the 
 struggle. It would probably have preserved its neutrality, 
 and very Hkely it would have sided against France, had 
 France invaded Belgium, as Bismarck had expected. 
 
INTRODUCTION 9 
 
 "Rverj^hing was to be done to tempt France to invade 
 Germany through that country. Had Germany acted upon 
 the wise Bismarck-Moltke plan of campaign, the Germans 
 might have defeated their neighbours in the East and West 
 and acquired absolute supremacy in Europe, However, 
 to William II. or to those courtier-soldiers who succeeded 
 the great Moltke this safe and sound plan seemed too 
 obvious and too commonplace. They wished to dazzle the 
 imagination of the world. They wished for a more spec- 
 tacular, for a more overwhelming victory. Desiring to take 
 Paris by a rush and to destroy or capture the whole of the 
 French field armies by rapidly getting into their flank and 
 rear, the military leaders resolved to invade France by way 
 of Belgium. Thus they incurred at the outset the hostility 
 of Great Britain. Not satisfied with having forced England 
 into the ranks of their enemies, the military leaders of 
 Grermany outraged and exasperated the conscience of the 
 world by their barbarous and criminal warfare, and thus 
 created a world coalition against Germany. 
 
 In Chapter XXV. the war aims of the German intellectuals 
 are given in the form of a weighty petition signed by more 
 than a thousand university professors, high military and 
 civic dignitaries, leading business men, etc. Chapter XXVI. 
 supplies representative extracts from statements in which 
 Germany's domination of the world was demanded during 
 the War. 
 
 Chapters XXVII. and XXVIII. treat at considerable 
 length the future of Germany and of the German race. 
 Germany may follow two courses. The country may 
 either preserve its unity or become dissolved into its com- 
 ponent parts. Both possibilities have to be considered. 
 
 If the country should remain united, it will be utterly 
 ruined economically. In consequence of its defeat, it has 
 lost in Alsace-Lorraine, in Poland, and in the Danish districts 
 7,000,000 wealth-creating citizens. In addition it has lost 
 large stretches of agricultural territory, nearly one-half of 
 its coal, the bulk of its iron ore, vast quantities of potash 
 and of mineral oil, its Colonies, the bulk of its foreign trade. 
 
10 INTRODUCTION 
 
 of its foreign investments, of its shipping, etc. While 
 Germany's wealth-creating resources and income have been 
 very greatly diminished, the country's financial burdens 
 have been hugely increased through the War debt and 
 through the necessity of paying enormous indemnities to 
 the victorious nations. Consequently, Germany is bound 
 to remain poor for decades. As the people will find it 
 diflScult to make a living in Germany, the birthrate should 
 decUne. Millions of Germans will have to emigrate, and 
 they may be able to obtain abroad only the lowest and 
 meanest work, because of the hatred which they have 
 aroused against themselves throughout the world. The 
 Germans settled abroad and those Germans who will 
 emigrate from their country in the future will hasten to 
 become completely de-Germanised in order to lose the 
 terrible stigma which the War has imprinted upon the 
 whole people. In consequence of the huge emigration of 
 people from Germany which must be expected, and in 
 consequence of the complete absorption of the Germans 
 abroad by the people around them, the German race may 
 become stationary, if not retrogressive. 
 
 It seems extremely doubtful whether the Germans will 
 succeed in preserving their political unity. Rightly con- 
 sidered, the Germans are not a single race, but are men 
 belonging to several distinct and very different races who 
 happen to speak the same language. There are fundamental 
 differences between the various German races which have 
 fought each other in the past, and which only lately have 
 become united rather by force than by the natural course 
 of things. The differences between the various German 
 races, and especially between the Prussians and the non- 
 Prussians, are so great that it seems extremely doubtful 
 whether the Germans will be able to preserve their unity. 
 Very likely the country will be dissolved into its component 
 parts. Moreover, the German peoples may be troubled for 
 a very long time by civil commotions, for men who have 
 lived in abject, unreasoning servility for centuries cannot 
 easily estabhsh democratic self-government. Successful 
 
INTRODUCTION 11 
 
 democracies cannot be made. They grow up slowly and 
 painfully. They require men of a democratic temper and 
 a democratic frame of mind. The Great War may have 
 destroyed not only the Hohenzollern dynasty and the 
 German Empire, but may also have destroyed the greatness 
 of the German race. WiUiam II., desiring to become the 
 ruler of the universe, may have ruined not only himself 
 and his family, his brother monarchs, his allies and his 
 country, but even the future of his race. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE RISE AND FALL OF PRUSSO-GERMANY ^ 
 
 The world-empires which military conquest has created in 
 the past have, as a rule, proved exceedingly short-lived. 
 The gigantic dominions subdued and ruled by Alexander 
 the Great, Julius Csesar and his successors, Charlemagne, 
 Otto the Great, Attila, Jenghiz lOian, Tamerlane, the 
 Abbasids, Soliman the Magnificent, Charles V., and Napoleon 
 have rapidly declined and decayed, but never in the world's 
 history has a vast military empire collapsed so suddenly 
 and so utterly as that of William II. The Bolsheviks were 
 Germany's tools and Germany's agents. Hence all Germans 
 saw in Russia a German protectorate, a German possession, 
 a German India. In the summer of 1918 the empire of 
 WiUiam II. extended from Zeebrugge to Vladivostok and 
 to the Behring Strait, and from the Arctic Circle to the gates 
 of India. It comprised 350,000,000 inhabitants. The last 
 of the Hohenzollern rulers held sway over an immense 
 empire, the territory of which vastly exceeded the gigantic 
 empires conquered by the Romans, by Charlemagne, and 
 by Napoleon. Only the empires conquered by Attila and 
 by Jenghiz KJian could be compared to the new German 
 world-empire. The Germans thought that they had firmly 
 estabUshed the power of their country over the larger part 
 of Europe and of Asia. Their faith in the permanence of 
 their domination may be seen from the fact that after the 
 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk they invested vast sums in Russia, 
 and that, as late as the middle of September, Stock Exchange 
 quotations in Berlin, which had steadily been rising, were 
 
 1 From the Fortnightly Review, December 1918. 
 12 
 
THE RISE OF GERMANY 13 
 
 still at their highest. In a few weeks the greatest military 
 empire the world has ever seen tumbled down like a house 
 of cards, and Germany itself became a prey to a revolution 
 which may lead to the permanent dissolution of the State. 
 Overnight Germany has been precipitated from the giddy 
 height of domination over the two most populous continents 
 to the bottomless pit of ruin, chaos, poverty, and despair. 
 The powerful and apparently invincible Germany of yester- 
 day, which seemed firmly established for all time, has fallen 
 and may never rise again. Let us then inquire into the 
 causes of its downfall, and let us endeavour to cast a glance 
 into its future. 
 
 We can understand the historical events of the present 
 only if we are guided by the knowledge of the past. 
 
 In 1915 an eminent German historian, Herr Otto Hintze, 
 published a history of modern Germany, It was entitled 
 The Hohenzollerns and their Achievements — Five Hundred 
 Years of German History. The writer had chosen a most 
 appropriate title for his book. Modern Germany, Prusso- 
 Germany, was indeed not a national, but a purely dynastic 
 State. It was the State of the Hohenzollerns. The Hohen- 
 zoUern djmasty had firmly imprinted its character upon the 
 German State and nation. In fact the dynasty was the 
 State. Louis XIV. 's words, " L'etat c'est moi," was far 
 more applicable to the realm of the Hohenzollerns than it 
 was to that of Louis XIV. and of Napoleon I. 
 
 The Hohenzollerns were a family of daring and ambi- 
 tious Suabian robber-knights who lived by plunder. They 
 possessed the formidable castle of Zollern, perched high in 
 the Suabian Alps, whence they descended and plundered 
 the passing caravans of merchants and the townspeople 
 round about. By ability, violence, and cunning they had 
 succeeded in concentrating in their hands a considerable 
 amount of territory, wealth, and power. Owing to their 
 commanding position in the neighbourhood, they were made 
 hereditary Burgraves, military governors, of the important 
 city of Nuremberg. As Burgraves they had to defend the 
 castle, the burg, of Nuremberg, and to protect the Emperor's 
 
14 THE RISE OF GERMANY 
 
 interests. They were hereditary imperial officials, who had 
 to keep order, defend the town and district, and look after 
 its administration. 
 
 In the past Grermany had elected rulers. One Frederick 
 VI., Burgrave of Nuremberg, a man of considerable gifts, 
 rendered very valuable services to the Emperor Sigismond. 
 By unscrupulously influencing the election, he secured for 
 that monarch the crown of Germany. He assisted Sigismond 
 with advice, with money, and with arms, and received as 
 a reward the hereditary viceroyship of the turbulent Mark 
 of Brandenburg, with the government of which the much- 
 coveted electoral dignity was connected. Thus, five cen- 
 turies ago, Frederick VI. of Nuremberg became Frederick I. 
 Margrave of Brandenburg and Elector of the Holy Roman 
 Empire. 
 
 Brandenburg was at the time a wild district on the out- 
 skirts of Germany. The aboriginal inhabitants were Slavs. 
 They were ruled, or rather exploited, by a number of 
 reckless robber-knights, the Quitzows, Rochows, Puthtzs, 
 and others, who plundered the country mercilessly and 
 fllouted the Emperor. The modern Prussian Junkers are 
 the direct descendants of these men. Margrave Frederick 
 created order by the ruthless persecution of the evil-doers 
 and made the robber-knights his servants. His successors 
 increased the territory of Brandenburg and acquired, in 
 addition, a considerable district situated outside the Ger- 
 man Empire, the Dukedom of Prussia, which had been in 
 the possession of the Teutonic Knights. These had settled 
 among the Slavonic heathens and had governed the country 
 with incredible barbarity. 
 
 The Hohenzollerns and the Teutonic Knights before 
 them, acting like the Germans of the present in their African 
 colonies, ruled the heathen Slavs under their sway with 
 the greatest cruelty. They endeavoured to attract settlers 
 from the civilised south and west of Germany to the raw 
 and barbarous east by granting them the land of the natives 
 which they confiscated. Many of the new settlers were 
 impecunious robber-knights. Many were criminals who 
 
THE RISE OF GERMANY 
 
 15 
 
 had fled from justice. These men formed henceforth part 
 of the Brandenburg-Prussian aristocracy. The native in- 
 habitants and the poorer German settlers as well became 
 enslaved by a race of cruel, pitiless, and largely criminal, 
 feudal taskmasters. Their entreaties and complaints were 
 disregarded, and their revolts were suppressed with the 
 utmost ferocity. In many districts the native Slavs were 
 completely exterminated. Thus the pohcy of blood and 
 iron became the traditional pohcy of the Hohenzollerns and 
 of their supporters, and the native Prussians, who at one 
 time had been a spirited people, became a nation of duU, 
 dumb, and downtrodden serfs, who were ruled by homicidal 
 fighting men whose will was law, whose argument was the 
 sword, and who spent their Hves in gambhng, drinking, 
 and robbing. Thus robber-knights with robber morals 
 created in the wilderness of Eastern Europe a robber State. 
 It flourished greatly. The growth of Brandenburg-Prussia- 
 Germany may be visuaUsed from the following table : 
 
 Elector Frederick the First 
 
 Elector Frederick the Second 
 
 Elector Albrecht Achilles 
 
 Elector Johann Cicero 
 
 Elector Joachim the First 
 
 Elector Johann George 
 
 Elector Johann Sigismond 
 
 Elector Frederick WilUam the Great 
 
 King Frederick the First 
 
 King Frederick WilUam the First 
 
 King Frederick the Great 
 
 King Frederick William the Second 
 
 King Frederick William the Third 
 
 King Frederick William the Foiirth 
 
 King-Emperor Willieun the First 
 
 Sq. Kilometres. 
 
 29,478 
 
 39,985 
 
 42,272 
 
 36,363 
 
 38,130 
 
 39,413 
 
 81,064 
 110,836 
 112,524 
 118,926 
 194,891 
 305,669 
 278,042 
 279,030 
 540,742 
 
 Robbery in the form of war had been the trade of the 
 Hohenzollerns since the earhest ages. Violence was their 
 traditional policy, and their chief interest was the army. 
 They had originally created a mihtary State on a feudal 
 basis, a State composed of a servile people dominated by an 
 all-powerful fighting aristocracy. Gradually the adminis- 
 
16 THE RISE OF GERMANY 
 
 trative functions of the all-powerful aristocracy were 
 transferred to an all-powerful bureaucracy, and an all- 
 powerful military organisation took the place of the irregular 
 feudal levies. Both the bureaucracy and the military 
 apparatus were autocratically directed by the ruler, who 
 treated the country as if it were his own personal property 
 and the people as if they were his serfs. Thus a highly- 
 organised one-man government was introduced. Frederick 
 WilUam the Great Elector created the first standing army 
 in Europe. Prussia became an armed camp. Mirabeau 
 wittily said that Prussia was not a State which possessed 
 an army, but an army which possessed a State. 
 
 The table which gives a picture of the territorial growth 
 of Brandenburg-Prussia-Germany shows that practically all 
 Hohenzollern rulers greatly increased their possessions. 
 They had created an extensive and powerful State out of 
 the smallest and most unpromising beginning. Expansion 
 by conquest became the principal Hohenzollern tradition, 
 became the settled poHcy and the creed of the House. 
 
 The Hohenzollerns were not merely a family of glorified 
 robber-knights. Desiring to retain their conquests, they 
 strove to organise their new territories and to reduce their 
 inhabitants to unquestioning obedience. They recognised 
 at an early date that a spirit of submissiveness to authority 
 can be created not only by ruthless severity, but also by 
 gentler means, by a suitable secular and spiritual education. 
 Hence the Hohenzollerns cultivated with equal zeal their 
 armies and their schools. The schools were created not 
 so much for the purpose of increasing knowledge among the 
 people, and of making them intellectually independent, as 
 for that of making them useful to their rulers and of incul- 
 cating in them absolute obedience and blindly devoted 
 loyalty. In Prusso-Germany both the School and the 
 Church were made parts of the all-powerful bureaucratic 
 apparatus through which the Sovereign ruled the country. 
 
 Although, according to the Prussian Constitution of 1850, 
 teaching is free in Prussia, the private schools were sup- 
 pressed. The State directed the whole educational appa- 
 
THE RISE OF GERMANY 17 
 
 ratus. The schoolmasters formed a powerful supplementary 
 army. The teachers were civil servants whose official 
 position was deliberately disguised by not furnishing them 
 with uniforms. The principal aim of the elementary schools 
 was to teach patriotism and obedience to the Government, 
 but patriotism in Prussia did not so much mean love of 
 country as bUnd veneration of the Hohenzollerns. 
 
 German education was purely secular, and its basis an 
 unreasoning worship of the power of the State, personified 
 in the ruUng House, was Hohenzollern worship. Mr. de 
 Montmorency correctly stated in a letter to the Times 
 that the German schools taught " knowledge divorced from 
 morahty, efficiency divorced from responsibility, and Ufe 
 divorced from reUgion." Rehgion was purely formal and 
 conventional. On the other hand, the King-Emperor was 
 treated as the only veritable divinity. The Deity, reUgion, 
 and the civic virtues were considered matters of small 
 account. The fact that the King-Emperor was placed 
 high above the Deity may be seen even from the dry para- 
 graphs of the German Penal Code. While blasphemy, a 
 verbal insult to the Deity, was punishable by imprison- 
 ment from one day to three years, lese-majesti, a verbal 
 insult to the ruler, was punishable with imprisonment from 
 two months to five years. Prosecutions for blasphemy 
 were very rare and punishments mild, but prosecutions for 
 lese-majeste were frequent and punishments rigorous. 
 
 Both the Protestant and the Roman Cathohc Churches 
 were made part of the all-powerful bureaucracy, were made 
 subservient to the dynastic interests, to the ambitions, 
 and to the absolute direction of the Hohenzollerns. The 
 King-Emperor, as all-powerful summus episcopus of the 
 Prussian Church, directed through his personally-appointed 
 Supreme Church Council, the State-trained, State-selected, 
 State-appointed, and State-salaried Protestant clergy. By 
 indirect but exceedingly well-designed means the authority 
 of the ruler and of his government over the Roman Cathohc 
 bishops and clergy was made almost as great as that over 
 the official Protestant estabUshment. The clergy, Uke the 
 
18 THE RISE OF GERMANY 
 
 teachers, formed a well-drilled, army, whose duty was the 
 defence of Hohenzollernism. Herein lies the reason that 
 both the Protestant and the Roman Cathohc clergy in Grer- 
 many disgraced themselves during the War by applauding 
 every crime of the Emperor, by blasphemously declaring 
 that the War was a just and holy one, and by excusing and 
 even encouraging the greatest atrocities of the Grerman 
 Army and Navy. 
 
 Both the schools and the churches of Germany had for 
 many years taught a perverted morality, a mediaeval robber- 
 knight morality. They had taught that in pohtical matters 
 might is right, that craft, untruthfulness, intrigue, violence, 
 robbery, murder are praiseworthy if they benefit the State. 
 Dr. Muehlon, a former director of Krupps, wrote sadly in 
 his diary on the 31st of August 1914 : 
 
 " Until the ways and aims of poHtics cease to be at 
 variance with the plain principles of morahty universal 
 among men, the vocation of pohtics will be only an occupa- 
 tion for criminals. All servants of the State to-day main- 
 tain the dogma that the State's advantage is the highest 
 object, and one which consecrates all means. Craft, Ues, 
 forgery, deception, treachery, corruption, and murder now 
 call forth no disgust if only the State be advantaged." 
 
 While the mind of the German masses was corrupted by 
 the Governmental elementary schools and by the servile 
 Protestant and Roman Cathohc Churches, that of the 
 classes was similarly perverted in the Government-directed 
 higher schools and universities. Whenever the Hohen- 
 zollerns conquered a new portion of territory, they imme- 
 diately created in it high schools and universities, and the 
 bureaucracy took good care that all the professors of his- 
 tory, philology, philosophy, law, etc., were rehable and 
 active pohtical propagandists, who with servihty and 
 unwearying zeal devoted themselves heart and soul to the 
 cult of the Hohenzollern family and of the Hohenzollern 
 ideal of conquest. Thus universities and schools were 
 planted in conquered districts to act as instruments of 
 Prussification. 
 
THE RISE OF GERMANY 19 
 
 Practically all the historians of Prusso-Gtermany have 
 been official historians, courtier-historians, and the result 
 has been that the history of the HohenzoUerns and of their 
 State, as written by Hohenzollern subjects, has been falsified 
 and distorted to an incredible extent. As foreign historians 
 rehed for information largely on native German sources, 
 the fables relating to the HohenzoUerns which were set 
 on paper by these servile official scribes were only too 
 frequently accepted by the non-German historians who 
 wrote on German affairs. To this fact the HohenzoUerns 
 owe much of the prestige which they have enjoyed both in 
 Germany and abroad. According to the German historians, 
 nearly aU the HohenzoUerns were supermen, were men of 
 the highest character and of the greatest abiUty in peace 
 and war. They were endowed with all the human virtues. 
 In reality, the great majority of the HohenzoUern rulers 
 were personaUy worthless. They were men who were dis- 
 tinguished by their rapacity, their unscrupulousness, their 
 immorality, and their incapacity. Even those who were 
 politically great were personally despicable. Frederick I., 
 who in 1701 acquired the royal crown, was a vain and 
 worthless debauchee, and his son, Frederick WiUiam I., 
 " the drill-sergeant," was a choleric, homicidal brute. His 
 successor, Frederick the Great, was an utterly unscrupulous 
 cynic and a reckless gambler in human lives, who nearly 
 ruined Prussia by his totaUy unjustified attack on Silesia, 
 which furnished Wilham II. with a great precedent. King 
 Frederick WiUiam II, was a weak and despicable voluptuary, 
 who dabbled in mysticism and reUgion. His successor, 
 Frederick WiUiam III., was a dull, unprincipled nonentity. 
 His son. King Frederick William IV., was a muddle-headed 
 dreamer, who suffered from incipient insanity, and who 
 died from softening of the brain. His younger brother, 
 the ELing-Emperor WiUiam I., was a conscientious worker 
 and a weU-balanced normal man, whose successes in peace 
 and war were due to Bismarck's guidance. The personal 
 character of nearly aU the HohenzoUerns was evil. They 
 were reckless, ruthless, and faithless robber-barons, who 
 
20 THE RISE OF GERMANY 
 
 gave a free rein to their inherited criminal instincts and 
 propensities and to their personal vices. Most possessed 
 neither administrative nor mihtary abihty. Only the Great 
 Elector, King Frederick WilUam I., and King Frederick 
 the Great were brilliant exceptions, for they were great 
 organisers and soldiers. 
 
 The State of the HohenzoUerns was historically and 
 traditionally a robber State. Its rulers were men who 
 possessed a robber moraUty and who followed a robber 
 policy. That was, of course, never admitted by the venal 
 professors. On the contrary, these prostituted themselves 
 and their sciences by excusing, encouraging, praising, and 
 promoting a policy of naked and shameless violence and 
 faithlessness. They were the jackals and hyaenas of Hohen- 
 zollernism and were thrown some bones for their services. 
 For them, as for their masters, moral considerations did 
 not exist. So the Prussian philosophers and historians 
 spent their lives in laboriously expounding the logic, the 
 beauty, and the virtue of " Realpolitik," of " MachtpoUtik," 
 and furnished a pseudo-scientific cloak to political crime. 
 In the peaceful lecture-rooms and countless publications 
 they preached a poUcy of conquest, of treachery, of unre- 
 stricted brutality, of national crime, and pegged out claims 
 of conquest. All sciences were made subservient to the 
 HohenzoUern pohcy of aggression and plunder. For in- 
 stance. Professor Daniel, an eminent geographer, in writing 
 a compendium of geography of about 4,000 pages, which 
 was first published in 1862, claimed for Germany the pos- 
 session of Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. 
 His book was very widely read, especially by advanced 
 students, and particularly by the great army of school 
 teachers who formed the mind of modern Grermany. In 
 the preface of the second edition of 1867 the author stated : 
 
 " Indignation has been expressed abroad at my treating 
 Switzerland, Belgium, HoUand, and Denmark as appen- 
 dages to Germany. ... In the third and fourth volumes 
 I treat Grermany as a physical entity. Now, can anybody 
 seriously deny that these four States, parts of Switzerland 
 
THE RISE OF GERMANY 21 
 
 excepted, lie within the physical frontiers of Germany ? 
 And can anybody seriously denj'^ that the historical justi- 
 fication for their attachment to Germany is as strong as is 
 the geographical justification ? Switzerland and Holland 
 belonged to Germany till 1648, and Belgium till 1801, while 
 Denmark has at one time been a part of the Holy Roman 
 Empire." 
 
 The ninth section of Vol. IV. is superscribed " The Out- 
 lying German States — Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, 
 Luxemburg, Denmark." In the text following this head- 
 line we read : 
 
 " The five States mentioned can only be described as the 
 outlying States of Germany. Apart from small portions 
 of Switzerland, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland, all the 
 States mentioned lie within Germany's natural boundaries, 
 and they are inhabited by men of Germanic race. All of 
 these States have belonged to the old German Empire in 
 the past and were subject to feudal service. Germany 
 deplores the loss of these valuable members, and the popu- 
 lation of Switzerland and Belgium has strong sympathy 
 for Germany. . . . Germany is advancing. Owing to the 
 increase of its formidable military strength it will more and 
 more become Europe's centre of gravity. The Swiss, the 
 Belgians, and the Dutch are related to us Germans by 
 race and by language. They will necessarily and gladly 
 incline towards a powerful Germany, and both sides can 
 only gain by such a reunion." 
 
 In the first chapter of Daniel's third volume, which deals 
 with the physical geography of Germany, we read : 
 
 " The most northerly point of Germany is Cape Skagen, 
 in the north of Denmark, the most southerly the Gulf of 
 Fiume, the most westerly Cape Grisnez, on the English 
 Channel, and the most easterly point lies on the River 
 Warthe, in the neighbourhood of Rzgow and Tuszyn." 
 
 The eminent and widely-read German geographical 
 authority pegged out vast political-territorial claims for 
 Grermany, not only within the immediate neighbourhood of 
 the country, for his zeal took him much farther afield. In 
 
22 THE RISE OF GERMANY 
 
 the second volume of the edition of 1875 Professor Daniel 
 stated in the section which considers France : 
 
 " In view of French arrogance it must always be asserted 
 that we Germans possess historically justified claims to the 
 territories on the Rhone. At any rate, we must not be 
 more unhistorical than the French are themselves. There- 
 fore we add to the French names the German ones." 
 
 Continuing, the learned professor deals with the Provence 
 (Provintz), Marseilles (Marsilien), Aries (Arelat), Aix 
 (Waelsch Aachen), Orange (Orense), the Dauphine (Del- 
 phinat), Grenoble (Graswalde), Vienne (Waelsch Wien), 
 Lyon (Waelsch Leyden), Bescanyon (Bisanz), MontbeHard 
 (Miimpelgart), Belfort (Beffort), Toul (Tul), Verdun (Virten), 
 Nancy (Nanzig), Luneville (Liinstadt), Lille (Ryssel), Douai 
 (Dauwey), Cambrai (Kameryk), Valenciennes (Schwanen- 
 thal), Maubeuge (Malboden), etc. 
 
 Dozens, nay, hundreds, of eminent scientists acted like 
 Professor Daniel, as the advance guards of aggressive 
 Hohenzollernism, inculcating in the people the divine right 
 of conquest, and claiming for Germany the possession of 
 the lands of other nations as a matter of right on philo- 
 sophical, ethical, historical, geographical, ethnological, 
 military, philological, and economic grounds. 
 
 The servile German historians not only falsified German 
 history, but aU history, for the furtherance of the Hohen- 
 zollern idea of conquest and ruthlessness. The historians 
 of antiquity, such as Mommsen, extolled the policy of 
 conquest and of faithlessness, and treated democracy and 
 the policy of righteousness with withering contempt. That 
 may be seen by Mommsen's description of Julius Csesar 
 and by his opinion on the breach of the Caudine Treaty by 
 the Romans. His attitude is representative of practically 
 all Grerman historians. Attila and other savage conquerors 
 were held up to the admiration of the Germans. According 
 to the German historians, France was decadent and foppish ; 
 England, senile, cowardly, frivolous, and altogether des- 
 picable ; the United States were not a nation, but merely 
 
THE RISE OF GERMANY 23 
 
 a cosmopolitan crowd entirely devoted to mammon- worship, 
 etc. The fact that other nations had achieved great things 
 both in peace and in war was suppressed in the German 
 text-books. " Deulschland iiber AUes " summed up the 
 attitude of German science and German teaching towards 
 other nations. There was only one great nation in the 
 world, and that was Germany. Germany was foremost 
 among the peoples in character, culture, military strength, 
 ability, genius, and the HohenzoUerns were the greatest 
 and the most gifted race of rulers that had ever lived. 
 
 Prussia is, and always was, the most barbarous part of 
 Germany. Until a short time ago she had no science, no 
 art, no industry, no wealth. Frederick the Great despaired 
 of Prussia ever acquiring a true civilisation. German cul- 
 ture and German science were developed in the non- 
 Prussian South and West of Germany and in the non- 
 Prussian sea-coast towns. Prussia, having annexed by 
 force of arms the non-Prussian districts of Germany, pro- 
 ceeded to annex their cultural achievements as well and 
 to proclaim them as her own. The Prussians were taught 
 to consider all great Germans as their countrymen in the 
 narrower sense of the term. Lately the Prusso-Germans 
 were even taught that theirs was not merely the greatest 
 but the only true civilisation in the world. Ludwig Wolt- 
 mann devoted his life to proving by the most reckless 
 assertions and with the help of magnificently illustrated 
 books that all the most eminent Frenchmen, Italians, 
 Englishmen, etc., were really Germans, were of German 
 race, or at least of German descent, or possessed at all 
 events German physical characteristics or German features. 
 After the outbreak of the war he tactfully tried to gain for 
 Germany the support of the Italian people on cultural 
 grounds. Therefore, he asserted in a publication addressed 
 to the Italians : 
 
 " Anthropological investigations of the physical type 
 
 have proved beyond a doubt that most of the great geniuses 
 
 which Italy has produced were of German descent. To 
 
 the blond German type belonged Giotto, Dante, Donatello, 
 
 3 
 
24 THE RISE OF GERMANY 
 
 Massaccio, Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael, Botticelli, Titian, 
 Galilei, Tasso, Columbus, and among the modern Italians 
 Morgagni, Alfieri, Volta, Foscolo, Leopardi, Garibaldi, 
 Cavour, Bellini, Rossini, Donizetti, . Canova, Manzoni. 
 Only a few Italians, such as Michelangelo, Ariosto, Machia- 
 velli, Palestrina, Verdi, belonged to a mixed type." 
 
 Succeeding Hohenzollern rulers had tightened up the 
 national system of education, and had made it more and 
 more an instrument of dynastic propaganda and of pro- 
 vocative jingoism. In all schools, from the highest to the 
 lowest, a robber-knight morality was inculcated. Appoint- 
 ments, promotions, favours, honours, and money went to 
 those teachers and scientists who were most active in 
 promoting the Hohenzollern idea. Learned men are often 
 feeble, poor, and vain. German science was deliberately 
 corrupted and debauched by the Government. Eminent 
 scientists vied with each other in flattering their rulers 
 and extolling their very vices as the virtues of strong men. 
 Professorial sycophants fawned for official favours and 
 prostrated and prostituted themselves and the sciences to 
 which they were supposed to devote themselves to the 
 Hohenzollern fetish. Eminent German authorities on 
 international law shamelessly taught that international 
 law, as applied to war, existed only in the text-books and 
 in the imagination of weak, foolish, un warlike, and deca- 
 dent nations, that power was more important than right, 
 that in case of war all international rules and conventions 
 should be thrown to the winds, that for the State necessity 
 was the highest law, that the German Army could of course 
 not be hampered by the sacredness of treaties and by con- 
 siderations of humanity. Political philosophers and others, 
 eager to curry favour, taught that the State could flourish 
 only if it were above law and morality, and advocated a 
 policy of unrestrained brutal force, a robber-knight policy 
 on the largest scale. They taught the Germans not only 
 that might was right, but urged the German Government 
 and people into a war for the conquest of Germany's neigh- 
 bour States, of the sea, of England, of the world. Professor 
 
THE RISE OF GERMANY 25 
 
 Treitschke and many other German historians spent their 
 lives in urging Germany to embark upon a policy of conquest 
 and of spoliation, in which they saw a holy duty. Professor 
 Schmoller and many other leading political economists 
 advocated for economic reasons a war with England. 
 Scientists are supposed to devote themselves to the pro- 
 motion of science and of truth, for science is incompatible 
 with untruth. However, the unceasing advocacy of a 
 robber-policy and the exaltation of a robber-morality had 
 so completely destroyed the instinct of responsibility and 
 of truth among Germany's intellectual leaders that ninety- 
 three of Germany's most eminent scientists, among them 
 many prominent theologians and legists, disgraced them- 
 selves and German science for all time by issuing in 1914 
 a manifesto to the world, in which they mendaciously pro- 
 claimed that the other Powers had forced a war upon 
 innocent and peaceful Germany ; that upon France, 
 England, and Russia rested the blood-guiltiness ; that 
 Germany fought a clean war of self-defence. 
 
 The HohenzoUern Government had regimented, drilled, 
 and corrupted not only the schools, the churches, and Ger- 
 man science, but had also hired and suborned the German 
 Press. Independent scientific thought and independent 
 journaUsm, if in opposition to the Government and its aims, 
 were not allowed to exist. Dr. Muehlon wrote in his diary 
 on the 25th of September 1914 i 
 
 " The state of siege under which we are living suddenly 
 brings to the front all the venal scoundrels who lend the 
 Government their pens for every deed of shame, as bravos 
 hire their stilettos. The pick of the infamous writers 
 belong to three species. They consist, firstly, of those 
 offensively stupid retired officers who could not be utilised 
 as soldiers even in time of war ; secondly, of clerical digni- 
 taries who, with cold soul and kindly smile, trumpet forth 
 each bit of baseness as an heroic feat of German Protes- 
 tantism ; and, thirdly — the worst of all — of the countless 
 university professors of the modern type — men overloaded 
 with titles and distinctions — who swim with every patriotic 
 stream, creatures who have been bought or have stolen 
 
26 THE RISE OF GERMANY 
 
 their way in, who outside their special department seek no 
 truth and thoroughness but the fame of the day. This 
 highly esteemed scum of the three fashionable Prussian 
 circles tries to make history by lying, tries to create 
 * archives ' and ' data ' by impudent assertion." 
 
 The HohenzoUern cult and the cult of unrestricted vio- 
 lencfe and of aggressive war were made the universal faith. 
 The German people were dehberately miseducated, misin- 
 formed, and misled from the cradle to the grave. Even the 
 arts were made subservient to the dynastic idea of conquest, 
 to the worship of brute force. German music, German 
 architecture, German painting, Grerman scuplture aban- 
 doned the cult of the beautiful for that of the forceful, of 
 the shapeless, of the imposing, of the gigantic, of the over- 
 whelming. Religion itself came to be considered simply 
 as a pohtical and military asset. Many Germans beheved 
 that the gentle teachings of Christ were unfavourable to the 
 worship of power and of military success, to the Hohen- 
 zoUern idea, and that Christianity should be thrown on 
 the scrap-heap, as being no longer in accordance with the 
 spirit of the times. The result was that numerous ethical 
 and pseudo-rehgious societies arose throughout Germany 
 which preached that Christianity was a worn-out Oriental 
 faith which was quite out of place in a Germanic world. 
 These societies aimed at increasing the warlike spirit of the 
 people by purifying and energising the race and by weeding 
 out the mild Christian idea, which was supposed to^ enfeeble 
 the national fighting spirit and the will to victory. Turn- 
 ing their backs upon Christianity, many intellectual Germans 
 advocated the creation of a new, of a German, reUgion. 
 Many asserted that the ancient Germans had evolved the 
 highest form of religion in their primeval forests, and de- 
 manded that the worship of the merciless heathen gods of 
 battle, of Wotan and Thor, should be revived. Wotan and 
 Thor were once more to lead the nation. Pseudo-rehgious 
 organisations tried to renew and to popularise the worship 
 of the ancient tribal gods. Part of the Germans had 
 
THE RISE OF GERMANY 27 
 
 become utterly materialistic, part had become frankly 
 pagan. Wotan worship was spreading apace. 
 
 It has often been stated that Germany's frenzied attack 
 upon the world was caused by the example and teaching 
 of Bismarck. That is scarcely correct. Bismarck blended 
 in his policy daring with wisdom and caution. Therefore 
 he was successful in aU his undertakings. Unfortunately 
 he had given to the German people a Constitution in which 
 the King-Emperor was as all-powerful as were the petty 
 HohenzoUern rulers in the old feudal days. The King- 
 Emperor's absolute authority could not endanger the 
 country as long as the sovereignty was possessed by a ruler 
 of the unemotional caution and carefulness of WiUiam I., 
 who allowed himself to be directed by the practical wisdom 
 and experience of his great Chancellor. The advent of the 
 impetuous, headstrong, vain, impulsive, short-sighted, and 
 irresponsible WiUiam II. endangered the future of the 
 Empire. Bismarck, clearly recognising that Germany 
 could remain great only if she pursued a peaceful policy, 
 that the new Emperor might by his recklessness involve 
 Germany in ruin, wrote in his Memoirs, his political testa- 
 ment : 
 
 " In the future not only sufficient miUtary equipment, 
 but also a correct political eye, will be required to guide the 
 German ship of State through the currents of coalition, to 
 which, in consequence of our geographical position and our 
 previous history, we are exposed. 
 
 " We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling 
 among the nations which has been called forth through 
 our growth to the position of a real Great Power, by the 
 honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so con- 
 vince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is 
 more useful and less partisan, and also less harmful for the 
 freedom of other nations, than would be the hegemony of 
 France, Russia, or England. 
 
 " In order to produce this confidence it is, above every- 
 thing, necessary that we should act honourably and openly, 
 and be easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward 
 events." 
 
28 THE RISE OF GERMANY 
 
 Bismarck foresaw, and frequently foretold to his inti- 
 mates, that the rashness, aggressiveness, and megalomania 
 of William II. were likely to involve Germany in ruin, and 
 many passages in his Memoirs unmistakably hint at that 
 danger. Germany's downfall can therefore scarcely be 
 ascribed to Bismarck's policy and example. 
 
 Prusso-Germany was not a national, but a dynastic 
 State. It was the State of the Hohenzollerns. Hence 
 many of the HohenzoUern rulers were able to imprint their 
 personal character upon their submissive and docile sub- 
 jects. Under the government of the cautious, courteous, 
 and reserved William I. the German nation had also acted 
 cautiously and soberly. Under the government of a 
 blatant, vain, and boastful megalomaniac the whole nation 
 fell into a megalomaniacal frenzy, for William II. was faith- 
 fully supported in his histrionic extravagances by his 
 abject courtiers and by the bureaucratic, miUtary, profes- 
 sorial, ecclesiastical, educational, and journaHstic leaders 
 of Germany, who thirsted for recognition and promotion, 
 for place and power, and who were only too willing to be 
 the tools of the Emperor and of his Government. Thus 
 the vanity, boastfulness, and megalomania of the last of the 
 HohenzoUern rulers infected and morbidly affected the 
 whole nation. 
 
 Since the early days the Hohenzollerns have claimed 
 infallibility for themselves and for their government. The 
 people were taught, especially in the time of Frederick the 
 Great, that their ruler, his bureaucracy, and his miUtary 
 advisers could not err. The gigantic and universal suc- 
 cesses of Prusso-Germany in Bismarck's time had strength- 
 ened the belief of the people in the wisdom and infallibility 
 of its appointed rulers. A child-Hke faith that German 
 diplomats and generals could not err, that the war was 
 being fought " according to plan," that Germany was 
 bound to triumph, that the German people and the 
 German Army were irresistible and unconquerable, pre- 
 vailed throughout the country up to the autumn of 1918, 
 and the mihtary authorities maintained their reputation of 
 
THE RISE OF GERMANY 29 
 
 invincibility almost to the end by mendacious bulletins 
 and by an equally mendacious Press. The faith in 
 victory remained general in Germany up to the day when 
 the news of Bulgaria's downfall and unconditional sur- 
 render fell like a thunderbolt. Then the scales dropped 
 from the eyes of the people. They were not prepared 
 for failure, and still less for utter defeat and disaster. 
 The shock was too great to be borne. They became 
 a prey to despair. The strength of the nation and of 
 its army was suddenly broken. 
 
 The Prussians were supposed to be the most loyal of 
 subjects. The Hohenzollerns were beheved to be the most 
 firmly-rooted dynasty in the world. The unexpected and 
 unexampled defeat of Germany has destroyed five hundred 
 years of dynastic endeavour and of almost unparalleled 
 dynastic success. It has destroyed the HohenzoUern 
 legend and the HohenzoUern creed. WilHam II. has pulled 
 down the mighty fabric which his ancestors had laboriously 
 reared since the day when they settled in Brandenburg. 
 He has destroyed the life-work of Bismarck, of Frederick- 
 the Great, of Frederick WilUam I., and of the Great Elector. 
 Germany's faith in the HohenzoUern dynasty and in their 
 traditional policy has been destroyed, probably for aU time. 
 The future of Germany is dark. The people have had a 
 terrible awakening. Their dream of power and of domina- 
 tion is gone. The Great War wiU leave them permanently 
 impoverished. Their miUtary history may be at an end, 
 for wealth is power. The greatest resources of Imperial 
 Germany were its mineral riches. Half of Germany's coal 
 will faU to Poland. PracticaUy all its iron ore will fall to 
 France. The war wiU leave the country without aUies, 
 without friends, without colonies, with vastly diminished 
 resources, and with a gigantic war debt. In addition, Ger- 
 many will have to make good the colossal values which her 
 soldiers have destroyed in other countries. The German 
 people wiU be crippled for decades and perhaps for cen- 
 turies. Militarism may become for them an impossible 
 luxury. Poverty and dissatisfaction may become wide- 
 
30 THE RISE OF GERMANY 
 
 spread and permanent. The population may become 
 stagnant and perhaps retrogressive, for wealth determines 
 population. Moreover, a nation which has been herded 
 like sheep for centuries does not easily and quickly learn 
 the art of governing itself. Centuries of mechanical obedi- 
 ence, of Kadavergehorsam, may have destroyed not only the 
 conscience and wiU of the people, but even their mind and 
 their soul. It is difficult to convert a servile race into a 
 race of freemen. Besides, grave difficulties are bound to 
 arise between the harsh and backward Prussian East and 
 the advanced and comparatively gentle non-Prussian South 
 and West of Grermany. The Prussians are hated in the 
 South and West of Germany. The non-Prussian Germans 
 see in the Prussians the cause of their downfall, their task- 
 masters, and their enemies. Germany may split up along 
 racial lines. Possibly it will never recover from its defeat. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 WILLIAM II. — HIS CHARACTER, POLICY, AND 
 ACHIEVEMENTS ^ 
 
 Ever since his coronation in 1890 William II. was the 
 most-talked-about figure on the stage of the world. Very 
 likely more columns of the international press were filled 
 with accounts of his doings and sayings than with those of 
 all other sovereigns taken together. WiUiam II. was not 
 only an emperor and a king, but also an active states- 
 man, administrator, and poUtician, a commanding general 
 and admiral, a painter and a composer, a bustling stage- 
 manager, a conductor of an orchestra, and a sportsman. 
 The world heard him preach sermons, and give lectures 
 on naval matters and on commerce, on yachting and on 
 socialism, on agriculture and on new art, on archaeology 
 and on boat-building, on education, on theology, and on 
 countless other subjects. In consequence of his numerous 
 accompUshments and his feverish activity, he had come 
 to be considered to be either a genius of infinite range 
 and wonderful intelligence, or a restless, many-sided, over- 
 ambitious, over-enthusiastic, and exceedingly vain and con- 
 ceited charlatan. 
 
 WilMam II. was distinctly a talented man, endowed by 
 nature with a very active brain, rapid comprehension, a 
 retentive memory, and a fertile imagination. These charac- 
 teristics showed themselves in his earliest childhood. For 
 instance, once, when his governess, before inflicting bodily 
 chastisement, solemnly assured the little prince that his 
 punishment would hurt her more than it would hurt him, 
 
 1 From the Fortnightly Review, November 1902. 
 31 
 
32 WILLIAM II. 
 
 little William at once inquired whether it would hurt her 
 in that place where it would hurt him. 
 
 The Grerman Emperor was very highly strung, nervous, 
 and irritable ; impetuous to rashness, swayed by sudden 
 impulses, possessed of unbounded self-confidence, and 
 imbued with that fervent belief in himself, in his divine 
 mission, and in the special protection of Providence, which 
 is usually found in great men of the first order, such as 
 Alexander and Caesar, Cromwell and Napoleon. Having a 
 considerable gift of speech, it is only natural that his utter- 
 ances were never commonplace, but highly dramatic, 
 strenuous, and emphatic. 
 
 As Frederick the Great treated the " Unterthanen- 
 Verstand " with sublime contempt, administered at the 
 same time all the great offices of State in peace, commanded 
 the armies in war, and whiled away his spare time with his 
 flute and philosophy, with writing poetry and history, 
 composing and sketching, thinking himself great in aU these 
 subjects, to the amusement of Voltaire, even so WiUiam II. 
 felt capable not only of ruling Prussia and the German 
 Empire, so to say, single-handed, but also of directing 
 its commerce and education, its music and art — ^in short, 
 the whole machinery of the empire, and the whole intelli- 
 gence and activity of the nation. Frederick the Great was 
 the Emperor's ideal and model, and there was some resem- 
 blance between William II. and his great ancestor. Bis- 
 marck once remarked of the then Prince William : "In him 
 there is something of Frederick the Great, and he is also 
 able to become as despotic. W^hat a blessing that we have 
 a parliamentary government ! " 
 
 Bismarck had prophesied that the Emperor would be his 
 own Chancellor. Nevertheless, he was unwise enough not 
 to resign when the old Emperor died. Moltke was wiser. 
 He resigned six weeks after the new Emperor's advent. 
 
 Frederick the Great was a poet, an administrator, a 
 philosopher, and an author, but he was essentially a soldier. 
 In him the ambition to enlarge his dominions, which has 
 been characteristic of all the HohenzoUerns, was particularly 
 
WILLIAM II. 33 
 
 strongly developed, and he succeeded in nearly doubling 
 the territory under his sway, and in elevating Prussia to the 
 rank of a Great Power. William II., whose interests and 
 pursuits were far more multifarious than even those of 
 Frederick the Great, was also principally a soldier, and his 
 desire to increase the territory of his country was more than 
 an ambition with him ; it was a violent passion, as it was 
 with Frederick the Great. 
 
 The Emperor was a soldier by nature. Nowhere did he 
 feel more at home than among the officers of his army and 
 navy. He visited their mess-rooms very frequently, not as 
 an emperor, but as a comrade, and stayed for hours with 
 them, talking, jesting, and laughing. He did not mix with 
 civilians in a similarly cordial and unceremonious way. 
 His military education, as well as his inborn military in- 
 clinations, together with his love for Frederickian traditions, 
 not only coloured his political views and ambitions and 
 influenced his ideas of government, but they also tinged 
 his public utterances, which therefore usually took the form 
 of Imperial commands. Consequently, his frequent pro- 
 nouncements on art and education, religion, socialism, etc., 
 were not only of startling originality, but of a stiU more 
 startling vigour, especially as he never hesitated to fling 
 the whole weight of his Imperial authority into the balance 
 in order to enforce his private views upon an unwilling 
 section of the community or upon the whole nation. 
 
 The former rulers of Grermany stood, on principle, above 
 the political parties. William II. cheerfully descended into 
 the party arena, and joined the fray with the greatest 
 vigour, and, sometimes, with very unfortunate results. 
 Utterances such as the following were typical for him : 
 
 " For me, every Social Democrat is synonymous with 
 enemy of the nation and of the Fatherland." 
 
 This was addressed to the largest German party in his 
 speech of the 14th of May 1889. 
 
 Suprema lex regis voluntas, written as a demonstration to 
 
34 WILLIAM II. 
 
 parliamentary and popular opposition in the Golden Book 
 at Munich. 
 
 Sic volo sic jubeo, written under his portrait given to the 
 Minister of Public Worship and Education. 
 
 " Only one is master in the country. That am I. Who 
 opposes me I shall crush to pieces." 
 
 These sayings sound especially strange if we remember 
 that Germany was supposed to be a constitutional monarchy, 
 and that the " crushing to pieces " of German subjects could 
 only be effected by the independent law courts. These 
 utterances, and many more of similar' tone, which caused 
 much speculation in other countries, and consternation in 
 Germany, did not so much spring from the sudden impulse 
 of a passionate mind as from the Emperor's vanity and 
 conceit, from his deep-rooted conviction of his own genius, 
 and from a mystical belief in the absolute monarchical power 
 by divine right, vested by Providence in the German Emperor. 
 
 Under the Imperial Constitution of 1871 the powers of 
 the German Emperor were extremely great. The Con- 
 stitution said : 
 
 " . . . . The Emperor can declare war and conclude 
 peace, make alliances and other treaties, and nominate and 
 receive ambassadors. (Art. 11.) 
 
 " The Emperor can call, open, adjourn, and dissolve the 
 Federal Coimcil and the Imperial Diet. (Art. 12.) 
 
 " The Emperor can issue and promulgate laws, and super- 
 vises their execution. The Imperial enactments . . . require 
 the counter-signature of the Chancellor, who thereby assumes 
 the responsibility for them. (Art. 17.) 
 
 " The Emperor nominates officials . . . and orders their 
 dismissal." (Art. 18.) 
 
 Besides appointing all Imperial officials, the Emperor ap- 
 pointed all officers of the German Navy and of the Prussian 
 Army, as weU as the highest officers of the armies belonging 
 to the other German States included in the Empire, 
 
 Compared with the power of the British monarch, the 
 powers of the German Emperor with regard to foreign and 
 home politics were almost boundless. Nevertheless, Wil- 
 
WILLIAM II. 35 
 
 liam II. was not satisfied with his constitutional power, 
 so he increased it at the cost of his Chancellor, of his Ministers, 
 and of the Imperial Diet. Imperial decrees were issued 
 by the Emperor without the counter-signature of the 
 Chancellor, required by Article 17 of the Constitution. 
 Besides, it should not be forgotten that the counter-signature 
 of the German Chancellor, who by counter-signing assumed 
 the responsibility for the Emperor's acts, became a mere 
 formality when the Chancellor was not an experienced and 
 independent official, but simply an obedient tool appointed 
 by the Emperor whose duty it was to put the Imperial will 
 on paper. 
 
 In Bismarck's time the actual administration of the 
 country was in the hands of responsible experts, and, what 
 was more important, German policy was directed by the 
 wise foresight, unrivalled experience, calm deliberation, and 
 firmness of purpose of a great statesman. Though Bis- 
 marck was generally believed to be all-powerful, if not 
 tyrannical, a belief that stood him in good stead, his position 
 was much less commanding than is generally known. His 
 plans had to be submitted to the Emperor, who, in his turn, 
 used to talk the matter over with his wife. The old Emperor 
 was the soul of honour, conservative, cautious, and somewhat 
 slow to move. The Empress was pious and peace-loving, 
 with a distinct leaning towards Liberalism. Consequently, 
 Bismarck's boldness and daring in foreign affairs were often 
 tempered by the Emperor's wisdom and caution, and the 
 influence of the Empress over her husband made for modera- 
 tion in home affairs. The old Emperor acted as a brake 
 upon Bismarck, and the Empress as a brake upon her 
 husband. William I. was to Bismarck what the House of 
 Lords is to a Liberal House of Commons, and the com- 
 bination of Bismarck, the Emperor, and his wife was an 
 ideal one for foreign policy, ensuring the even continuance 
 of a vigorous, wise, discreet, and successful policy. 
 
 While Bismarck was in office German foreign and domestic 
 policy ran an even course, German policy was understand- 
 able abroad. Bismarck did not embark upon many risky 
 
36 WILLIAM II. 
 
 enterprises at once, but concentrated his master-mind upon 
 a few really important questions. His policy was at the 
 same time great and simple, as was his character. William 
 II. had not the commanding talent of a Bismarck for foreign 
 policy, nor was he subject to the restraining influences 
 which moderated the more adventurous plans of the great 
 Chancellor. Furthermore, William II. took as much 
 interest in the direction of the army and navy, of the national 
 administration, of shipping and commerce, of education, 
 art, sport, and countless other matters, as in the direction 
 of foreign poUtics. Consequently, he had not sufficient 
 leisure to concentrate his mind upon anything. Hence 
 German foreign policy became fitful, enigmatic, and unstable, 
 a replica of the Emperor's character. 
 
 Bismarck's diplomatic activity after the Franco-German 
 War was chiefly directed towards two great objects — the 
 maintenance of the Triple Alliance and the prevention of 
 an aUiance between France and Russia. As long as Bis- 
 marck was in oflfice, France and Russia were kept asunder. 
 Germany was the strongest and most respected Power on 
 the Continent, and its arbiter. Soon after Bismarck's 
 dismissal Germany ceased to be the first Power on the 
 Continent. Russia, who had been a reliable friend to 
 Germany until WiUiam II. came to the throne, was estranged 
 by the Emperor. The traditional good relations between 
 Russia and Germany, which had proved so valuable to her 
 in 1870, came to an end. Only fifteen months after Bis- 
 marck's dismissal, in July 1891, the rejoicings occasioned 
 by the visit of the French Fleet at Cronstadt proclaimed to 
 the world that Wilham II. had not only been unable to 
 continue the skilful isolation of France and to enjoy the 
 friendship of Russia, but that the Emperor had driven these 
 Powers into one another's arms by sheer bad diplomacy. 
 The work of which Bismarck was even more proud than of 
 the fashioning of the Triple Alliance, the keeping apart of 
 France and Russia, had been rapidly destroyed. 
 
 After Bismarck's dismissal independent, able Ministers 
 were replaced by time-servers and figureheads whose power 
 
WILLIAM II. 37 
 
 was extremely circumscribed. From a powerful, impersonal, 
 and therefore national ministerial policy by experienced 
 men, tempered by the moderation of a wise and cautious 
 ruler, German foreign and domestic policy became the 
 personal uncontrolled policy of a talented, vigorous, im- 
 pulsive, very self-satisfied and highly self-conscious monarch, 
 and was tinged by accidents of his health, and by his personal 
 feelings, moods, and prejudices. 
 
 The Emperor treated his Ministers not as experienced 
 and independent chiefs of the Departments of State, entitled 
 to opinions of their own, but as the executors of his will, 
 and he removed them as soon as they did not succeed in 
 fulfilling his wishes. His Ministers were changed with 
 surprising rapidity. Continuity of policy in foreign and 
 home affairs became impossible. Projects of great import- 
 ance were hurriedly brought forward and dropped in nervous 
 haste, and the suddenness with which the highest officials 
 were replaced taught them that it was not safe to oppose 
 or to criticise the wishes of the Emperor, that it was wisest 
 for them to execute his wishes and his whims without 
 question. Thus the high offices were filled with place- 
 hunters and spineless nonentities. 
 
 The German Parliament was already in Bismarck's time 
 little more than a money- voting and law-assenting machine 
 and a general taMng-shop, possessing hardly any influence, 
 and no control whatever, over the administration and policy 
 of the Government. The degradation became complete 
 under William II. 
 
 The Emperor interfered not only in matters of State, 
 but in minor matters as weU, as the following anecdote, told 
 by a prominent German architect, will show : Drawings for 
 a new church in BerUn were submitted to the Emperor for 
 assent or correction. The Emperor, intending to make a 
 marginal remark with regard to the cross on the top of the 
 steeple, put a letter for reference above the cross, and drew 
 a straight line from the letter down to the cross. Then he 
 changed his mind, and crossed the letter vigorously through. 
 When the architect received back his plans he studied 
 
38 WILLIAM II. 
 
 carefully the Emperor's corrections, but mistook the crossed- 
 through letter for a star. EJiowing better than to ask 
 questions, he built the church, and put a big star on a huge 
 iron pole high above the top of the cross. This strange 
 excrescence was in existence a few years ago, and may still 
 be visible. For similar reasons many monuments and 
 public buildings in Berlin and other parts of Germany are 
 of astonishing ugliness. 
 
 Blind obedience became the watchword in official circles 
 throughout the Empire, and even in professorial appoint- 
 ments by the nominally independent universities and in 
 judicial decisions by nominally independent judges a desire 
 to please the Emperor, a desire to please even the most 
 unreasonable Imperial wishes, became painfully apparent. 
 As the Emperor, apart from the powers already cited, could 
 influence those whom he wished to influence by bestowing 
 titles and decorations, and by social preferment, abject 
 flattery became rife in his surroundings and throughout 
 the empire. Examples of such flattery on the part of the 
 highest dignitaries of the empire were fitly described in 
 Germany under the name of " Byzantinism." 
 
 The domestic policy of the Emperor was an unfortunate 
 one. His anti-PoUsh policy infuriated the Poles. The lack 
 of toleration which became characteristic of German home 
 policy drove the Liberal elements of Germany into the 
 ranks of the Social Democratic Party, which came to include 
 numerous manufacturers, merchants, bankers, professional 
 men, etc. During the reign of William II. Social Democracy 
 became by far the strongest party in the empire. The 
 following figures show the numbers of Social Democratic 
 votes polled at the various general elections : 
 
 
 Total of 
 
 Social Democratic 
 
 Percentage of Social 
 
 
 Votes polled. 
 
 Votes. 
 
 Democratic Votes. 
 
 1887 . 
 
 7,540,900 
 
 763,100 
 
 10 '11 per cent. 
 
 1888 . 
 
 (A< 
 
 jcession of William II.) 
 
 1890 . 
 
 7,228,500 
 
 1,427,300 
 
 19-74 
 
 1893 . 
 
 7,674,000 
 
 1,786,700 
 
 23-30 
 
 1898 . 
 
 7,757,700 
 
 2,107,076 
 
 27-18 
 
 1903 . 
 
 9,495,586 
 
 3,010,771 
 
 31-71 
 
 1907 . 
 
 11,262,800 
 
 3,259,000 
 
 28-94 
 
 1912 . 
 
 12,206,808 
 
 4,250,329 
 
 34-82 
 
WILLIAM II. 39 
 
 It was only natural that Social Democracy grew by 
 leaps and bounds, trebling its votes in twenty years. The 
 Emperor began his reign as the " Arbeiter-Kaiser," called 
 an international congress for the benefit of the workers, and 
 received their deputations. Then turned round and pro- 
 claimed, "For me every Social Democrat is synonymous 
 with enemy of the nation and of the Fatherland." Lastly, 
 he had a Bill brought before the Reichstag, upon his per- 
 sonal initiative, making incitement to strikes a felony 
 punishable with penal servitude, from three to five years. 
 If anything was calculated to shake the confidence of the 
 German workers in their Kaiser and to increase Social 
 Democracy it was the Emperor's untimely, impulsive, and 
 iU-advised meddling and the " Penal Servitude BiU." 
 
 As the Emperor had not succeeded in increasing Ger- 
 many's territories by the arts and stratagems of diplomacy, 
 he turned towards his armed forces and immensely strength- 
 ened them. A comparison of Germany's armed strength 
 in 1888, the year of the Emperor's accession, and its strength 
 in 1914 is therefore interesting : 
 
 Peace Strength of the German Army 
 
 1888 .... 491,726 men 84,091 horses 
 
 1914 .... 800,046 ,, 160,092 „ 
 
 The great increase of the peace army was small if com- 
 pared with the increase in its war strength. 
 
 The following was the strength of the German Navy at 
 the beginning of the Emperor's reign and in 1914 : 
 
 1888 . . 189,136 tons 182,470 horse-power 15,573 men 
 
 1914 . . 1,041,010 ,, 1,832,840 ,, ,, 79,357 „ 
 
 The Emperor was uniformly unsuccessful in his foreign 
 pohcy and in his domestic policy. Being rather a soldier 
 than a diplomat, and being aware that the greatness of 
 Germany was won on the field of battle, William II, natur- 
 ally turned in his political disappointments towards the 
 ultima ratio regis. When his campaign against the Social 
 4 
 
40 WILLIAM II. 
 
 Democrats had failed, he addressed the officers of the Berlin 
 garrison, and admonished them to stand by him and to 
 shoot the malcontents in case he commanded them to do 
 so, as the Prussian soldiers shot the BerHn revolutionaries 
 in 1848. Again, when his attempts at seizing the Philip- 
 pines and his pro-Kruger campaign had failed, he turned 
 towards his fleet. On the 9th of October 1899 the Boers 
 issued their ultimatum ; nine days later, on the 18th of 
 October, the Emperor made the celebrated speech in 
 Hamburg containing the winged words, " Bitter not ist 
 uns eine starke Deutsche Flotte." German colonial aspira- 
 tions in Africa had been foiled by British diplomacy, and 
 the speech mentioned was the starting-point of the violent 
 anti-British agitation in Germany which culminated in 
 the passing of a Bill authorising the construction of a 
 fleet, intended, according to its preamble, to be so strong 
 as to be able to encounter successfully the most powerful 
 enemy on the seas. 
 
 While the German Emperor was showering the most 
 assiduous attentions upon England and America, as well 
 as upon France and Russia, and while peace was in his 
 mouth, a huge fleet was being built with the greatest pos- 
 sible dispatch and his army was increased with the utmost 
 rapidity. 
 
 The German Emperor possessed that abnormal versa- 
 tility and flexibility of mind which is sometimes described 
 with a different name. First he sat at Bismarck's feet as 
 his admiring disciple. Then he dismissed his great master 
 without ceremony, and completely changed the Bismarckian 
 foreign and domestic policy of Germany. First he gave 
 Caprivi a free hand. Then he ruled alone. First he took 
 up the cause of the working men, and then he threw them 
 over. First he was anti-colonial, and gave away the best 
 German colonies in exchange for the rock of Hehgoland. 
 Then he strained every nerve to acquire colonies. First 
 he provoked France, and then he flattered her. First he 
 flirted with the Poles, and then forbade Polish school- 
 children to say even their prayers in their own language- 
 
WILLIAM II. 41 
 
 At the end of this chapter I wrote, when it appeared as 
 an article in the Fortnightly' Review in November 1902 : 
 
 " In view of the Emperor's rapid and alarmingly fre- 
 quent changes of mood, and the equally rapid and kaleido- 
 scopic changes of his pohcy, in view of the bitterness which 
 must have been engendered in his mind by the failure of 
 his attempts at territorial aggrandisement and domestic 
 legislation, and in view of the nearly absolute control which 
 the German Emperor exercises, perhaps not de jure, but 
 certainly de facto, over the foreign policy of Germany and 
 over her army and navy, it appears not unHkely that 
 WilUam II. may some day act against some ' friendly ' 
 Power with the same startHng rapidity with which his great 
 ancestor, Frederick the Great, acted against Austria, when 
 he flung his armies into Silesia without any warning and 
 without any cause. 
 
 " It has been said that Great Britain has nothing to 
 fear from Germany, because of the family ties which con- 
 nect the Emperor with the British dynasty. Those who 
 beheve that sentimental considerations of a purely personal 
 kind will be allowed to stand in the way of the Emperor's 
 poHcy can hardly be acquainted with the diplomatic steps 
 which WilUam II. took against Great Britain when he 
 dispatched his telegram to Mr. Kruger. They should also 
 remember that the German Emperor placed himself un- 
 reservedly on the side of the Turks in the Grseco -Turkish 
 War, notwithstanding the fact that his own sister was the 
 wife of the heir to the Greek throne. 
 
 " In view of the character of the German Emperor, his 
 well-known ambitions and his enormous power, it would 
 seem that those nations at the cost of which Germany 
 could possibly increase her territory should ever be watch- 
 ful, and should ever be prepared against sudden surprises. 
 They would do well to study the pan-German manifestoes, 
 which, though they are of course disavowed and discredited 
 in official circles, give certainly some indication of Ger- 
 many's poUtical aspirations. We find in them recommenda- 
 tions for the ' alUance or absorption ' of ' Germanic ' 
 Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark, for the incorporation 
 of the western half of Austria -Hungary, creating a Ger- 
 man Empire stretching across Europe from the Baltic down 
 to Trieste, and for the acquisition of colonies in a temperate 
 
42 WILLIAM II. 
 
 zone in Asia Minor, South Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, 
 or ' wherever else opportunity should offer.' How many 
 of these projects will be accompHshed within the Emperor's 
 lifetime ? 
 
 " The theory has often been advanced that the time of 
 the personal poHcy of kings and emperors is gone, never to 
 return. The future may disprove that theory, and may 
 prove the German Emperor a political factor of the greatest 
 magnitude, and of unexpected influence upon the history 
 of Europe and of the world." 
 
 My forecast came true twelve years after it had been 
 made. WilUam II. was not a ruler of men, but merely a 
 vain, conceited, many-sided, and incapable crowned amateur, 
 who in a busy and strenuous life achieved nothing except 
 the ruin of his country, of his dynasty, of his allies, and of the 
 minor sovereigns of Germany. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRUSSO-GERMANY * 
 
 Germany, as known to the older generation, was a country 
 peopled with philosophers, poets, composers, slow and 
 sleepy officials, and backward peasants ; it was an sesthe- 
 tical, sentimental, day-dreaming land. The Germany of 
 1914 was matter-of-fact, hard-headed, calculating, cunning, 
 business-like, totally devoid of sentimentality and even of 
 sentiment, and very up-to-date. But modern Germany 
 and old Germany were two different countries. New Ger- 
 many was an enlarged Prussia. Old Germany continued 
 to vegetate and to dream dreams under the name and 
 under the banner of Austria. It should not be forgotten 
 that those Germans who used to be considered typical 
 representatives of Germany, such as Goethe, Schiller, 
 Lessing, Wieland, Jean Paul, Schlegel, Uhland, Lenau, 
 Hegel, Fichte, Beethoven, Mozart, Haydn, belonged to 
 old Germany and were non-Prussians. 
 
 Five hundred years ago the country where the foundation 
 of Prussia was laid was a wilderness infested with robber- 
 knights. With fire and sword the Hohenzollerns reduced 
 the rebellious knights and the independent cities of Bran- 
 denburg-Prussia to obedience, and created an absolutely 
 centralised State ruled by the sword. It remained miUtary 
 in character, partly because the population was composed 
 of lawless and reckless adventurers and criminals from 
 everywhere, partly because the State was ever threatened 
 by the neighbouring Slavs and by the armies of then power- 
 ful Poland. Thus, up to a comparatively recent time, 
 
 * From the Fortnightly Review, December 1905. 
 43 
 
44 
 
 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 savagery and arbitrary rule prevailed in Prussia. In 1650 
 London had 500,000 inhabitants, Paris had 400,000 in- 
 habitants, Amsterdam had 300,000 inhabitants, whilst 
 Berlin was a village of 10,000 inhabitants. Up to a very 
 recent time Prussia was a semi-barbarous State. 
 
 Prussia, like Rome, was founded by a band of needy 
 and warlike adventurers. Both States were artificial crea- 
 tions, both could maintain themselves only by force of 
 arms and extend their frontiers only by wars of aggression, 
 and the character of both States may be read in the records 
 of their early history. By the force of events and by the 
 will of her masterful rulers Prussia grew up. For centuries 
 she was a nation in arms. This may be seen from 
 the following figures, which more clearly illustrate the 
 history of Prussia than would a lengthy account : 
 
 
 Square 
 
 Kilometres of 
 
 Prussia. 
 
 Inhabitants 
 of Prussia. 
 
 Number of 
 Soldiers In Stand- 
 ing Army during 
 Peace Time. 
 
 Percentage 
 of Soldiers 
 to Popu- 
 lation. 
 
 1688 
 
 113,000 
 
 1,500,000 
 
 38,000 
 
 2-5 
 
 1740 
 
 121,000 
 
 2,250,000 
 
 80,000 
 
 3-6 
 
 1786 
 
 199,000 
 
 5,500,000 
 
 195,000 
 
 3-6 
 
 1865 
 
 275,500 
 
 18,800,000 
 
 210,000 
 
 M 
 
 1867 
 
 347,500 
 
 23,600,000 
 
 260,000 
 
 M 
 
 1914 (Germany) 
 
 541,000 
 
 67,000,000 
 
 800,646 
 
 1-2 
 
 Between 1688 and 1914 the population of Great Britain 
 has grown fivefold. During the same period the territory 
 ruled by the HohenzoUerns has grown fivefold in size and 
 its population has increased no less than forty-fold. In 
 1688 Great Britain had five times more inhabitants than 
 had Prussia, but in 1914 Germany had 50 per cent, more 
 inhabitants than Great Britain. These few figures prove 
 how successful had been the policy of the HohenzoUerns, 
 and in view of their success it is only natural that modern 
 Germany closely followed Prussia's political methods and 
 traditions. The foregoing table shows also that the mar- 
 vellous rapidity with which Prusso-Germany grew was due 
 to the strength of her army. Machtpolitik, the poUcy of 
 force, the policy of the mailed fist, was always Prussia's 
 favoured poHcy ; it had been exceedingly effective, and it 
 
GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 45 
 
 had, therefore, not unnaturally, become Prusso-Germany's 
 policy as well. 
 
 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the little 
 State of Prussia used to maintain a much larger army 
 than Austria, France, and other great, densely populated, 
 and wealthy States. Her army was, as a rule, exceedingly 
 well drilled and absolutely ready for war, and by her 
 army and by her not over-scrupulous diplomacy Prussia 
 succeeded in aggrandising herself at the cost of her neigh- 
 bours. 
 
 Up to the death of King Frederick William I. Prussia's 
 diplomacy was simple, crude, and clumsy, though energetic. 
 Frederick William's successor, Frederick the Great, opened 
 a new era in Prussia's foreign policy, for that monarch gave 
 to the diplomacy of his country a new character.^ The main 
 principle of Frederick the Great's foreign policy was to act 
 with startling rapidity against an unprepared and unsus- 
 pecting opponent. In his Expose du Gouvernement Prussien, 
 des Principes sur lesquels il route, avec quelques Reflexions 
 Politiques, which was written either in 1775 or 1776, he 
 advised his successor as follows : " Constant attention must 
 be paid to hiding, as far as possible, one's plans and am- 
 bitions. . . . Secrecy is an indispensable virtue in politics 
 as well as in the art of war." 
 
 During the year before he came to the throne, Frederick 
 the Great wrote his celebrated book, the Anti-Machiavel, 
 in order to confute Machiavelli's Prince, a book which, 
 according to Frederick's preface, was one of the most 
 monstrous and most poisonous compositions which had 
 ever been penned. Frederick dedicated the Anti-Machiavel 
 to his brother sovereigns. At the end of chapter vi. Frede- 
 rick emphatically proclaimed, " Let Caesar Borgia be the 
 ideal of Machiavel's admirers, my ideal is Marcus Aurelius." 
 
 The Anti-Machiavel, which was published in 1740, the 
 year in which Frederick ascended the throne, seemed to be 
 
 1 A very full account of the policy of Frederick the Great and of Bis- 
 marck will be found in my book The Foundations of Germany, John Murray, 
 London. 
 
46 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 a political pronunciamento of the highest importance and 
 the political programme of the King, and very likely it 
 was meant to appear as such in the eyes of the world and to 
 impress foreign rulers with Frederick's love of peace. How- 
 ever, in December of the very year during which the Anti- 
 Machiavel had appeared and had proclaimed that Frederick 
 meant to be a prince of peace, the King, under the shallowest 
 of pretexts and without a declaration of war, invaded 
 Silesia and wrested it from Austria, " because," as he 
 frankly confessed in his Memoirs, " that act brought prestige, 
 and added strength, to Prussia." 
 
 Marcus Aurelius was Frederick's ideal only in his Anti- 
 Machiavel. In one of his testaments Frederick the Great 
 showed himself an admirer and disciple of Machiavel, for 
 we read in that document : "A war is a good war when it 
 is undertaken for increasing the prestige of the State, for 
 maintaining its security, for assisting one's allies, or for 
 frustrating the ambitious plans of a monarch who is bent 
 on conquests which may be harmful to one's interests." 
 In other words, every advantageous war is a good war. 
 
 In 1741 Sweden declared war against Russia. Frederick 
 assured Russia on his word of honour that he had not 
 instigated that war, but his assurances were unavailing, and 
 Brakel, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, warned his 
 Government " not to believe the King, who was consumed 
 with ambitious projects and who would not keep the peace 
 as long as he was alive." It was Frederick's settled policy 
 to foment wars among his powerful neighbours. This policy 
 was formulated in the following words by Frederick the 
 Great in his Expose du Gouvernement Prussien, which was 
 written for the guidance of his successors : "If possible the 
 Powers of Europe should be made envious against one 
 another in order to give occasion for a coup when opportunity 
 offers." 
 
 Frederick the Great's attitude towards Russia furnishes 
 us with the key to Germany's historic and traditional pohcy 
 towards her Eastern neighbour. In Frederick the Great's 
 Histoire de mon Temps we read ; 
 
GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 47 
 
 " Of all neighbours of Prussia the Russian Empire is the 
 most dangerous, both by its power and its geographical 
 position, and those who will rule Prussia after me should 
 cultivate the friendship of those barbarians, because they 
 are able to ruin Prussia altogether through the immense 
 number of their mounted troops, whilst one cannot repay 
 them for the damage which they may do because of the 
 poverty of that part of Russia which is nearest to Prussia 
 and through which one has to pass in order to get into the 
 Ukraine." 
 
 Russia was dangerous to Prussia, and she possessed 
 nothing worth the taking. A war with Russia, even if 
 victorious, was therefore bound to be very unprofitable. 
 Hence it was in Prussia's interest to make Russia harmless 
 either by peaceful means or by involving her in wars with 
 other countries. 
 
 The easiest way to neutralise a powerful country and a 
 possible future enemy seemed to the King an alliance with 
 that very State. Therefore we read in his Expose du 
 Oouvernement Prussien : 
 
 " One of the first political principles is to endeavour to 
 become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may 
 become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason we 
 have an alliance with Russia, and thus we have our back 
 free as long as the alliance lasts." 
 
 In another part of his writings Frederick advised his suc- 
 cessors : " Before engaging in a war to the south or west of 
 the kingdom every Prussian prince should secure at any 
 cost the neutrality of Russia if he be unable to obtain her 
 active support." 
 
 According to Frederick's advice, alliances were to be 
 formed by Prussia, not so much for the defence of Prussia's 
 possessions as for their extension. Alliances were to be 
 considered as engagements which were to serve rather for 
 Prussia's benefit than for the mutual advantage of the allies, 
 and were to be instruments which were to serve more for 
 aggrandisement than for preservation and for defence. 
 
 Frederick's views as to the sanctity of a ruler's obUgations 
 
48 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 under a treaty of alliance are exceedingly interesting. As 
 the views of Frederick the Great and of Bismarck with 
 regard to a nation's duties under a treaty of alliance coin- 
 cided, and as these views considerably differ from the 
 English conception as to the sanctity of treaty bonds, it is 
 worth while quoting Frederick's views as to the binding force 
 of treaties which he expressed in his Memoirs as follows : 
 
 " If the ruler is obliged to sacrifice his own person for the 
 welfare of his subjects, he is all the more obliged to sacrifice 
 engagements the continuation of which would be harmful to 
 his country. Examples of broken treaties are frequent. . . . 
 
 " It is clear to me that a private person must scrupulously 
 keep his word even if he has given it rashly. If he fails to do 
 so, the law will be set into motion, and after all only an 
 individual suffers. But to what tribunal can a sovereign 
 appeal if another ruler breaks his engagements ? The word 
 of a private man involves but an individual ; that of a 
 sovereign involves, and may mean misery for, whole nations. 
 Therefore the problem may be summed up thus : Is it better 
 that a nation should perish or that a sovereign should break 
 his treaty ? Who would be so imbecile as to hesitate how 
 to decide ? " 
 
 The foregoing explanation reminds of Bismarck's cynical 
 remark recorded by Busch : " What are alliances ? Alli- 
 ances are when one has to." 
 
 On the 6th of December 1772 Frederick the Great wrote 
 to Voltaire, " The world is governed only by skill and 
 trickery," and one is amazed at the skill and trickery 
 with which, during many years of laborious, most intricate, 
 and unceasing diplomatic negotiations, Frederick II. en- 
 deavoured to involve Russia and Austria, his strongest 
 neighbours, in war with one another. Sometimes Poland 
 was the object which was to serve Frederick's policy, some- 
 times Turkey. In coimtless letters Frederick never tired 
 pointing out that Russia's advance meant a frightful danger 
 to Austria. On the 3rd of September 1770 Frederick met 
 Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Prime Minister, at Neustadt, 
 and impressed upon him that " Austria can on no account 
 allow Russia to cross the Danube. ... I am aware that, it 
 
GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 49 
 
 the Russians cross the Danube, you would be unable pas- 
 sively to look on. . . , Could you not persuade France to 
 make a declaration to you that, if you were to break with 
 Russia and to make war against her if the Russians should 
 cross the Danube, France would send 100,000 men to help 
 you ? You would confide the news to me and I would 
 make use of it." 
 
 In these attempts to commit Austria against Russia 
 we have the model which served Bismarck in 1866. At 
 the time of the Austro-Prussian War Napoleon III. en- 
 deavoured as an offset to Prussia's conquests to obtain some 
 territorial compensation for France on the left border of 
 the Rhine. Bismarck, unwilling to let it come to a rupture 
 between Prussia and France at that awkward moment when 
 hostilities had not yet ceased, proposed to Napoleon that 
 he should take Belgium, as he, Bismarck, had frequently 
 advised the Emperor in former years. Napoleon fell into 
 Bismarck's trap, and Benedetti handed at Bismarck's 
 request a draft agreement to Bismarck which was to be 
 placed before the King of Prussia. As soon as Benedetti 
 had given to Bismarck that compromising document, it was 
 sent to Russia to be shown to the Tsar, and Bismarck 
 explained to Benedetti that the delay in deciding upon it 
 was caused by the hesitation of the King of Prussia. By 
 this trick Bismarck succeeded in convincing the Tsar that 
 France was a disturber of the peace, and in securing Russia's 
 support in the subsequent war against France. 
 
 Frederick's skill and trickery was not confined to his 
 unceasing attempts to create war among his neighbours. 
 The division of Poland was Frederick's work, but he knew 
 how to put the odium of that transaction on the shoulders 
 of Russia, who, apparently, took the initiative. Austria 
 had intended to keep aloof from the partition of Poland, and 
 a short-sighted Prussian statesman would have endeavoured 
 to take advantage of Austria's disinclination to participate 
 in that shameful transaction in order to secure a larger 
 portion of Polish territory for Prussia. However, Frederick 
 looked farther ahead. He wished to induce Austria to assist 
 
50 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 in the spoliation of Poland. On the 16th of February 1772 
 Frederick wrote to Sohns : "If Austria gets no part of 
 Poland all the hatred of the Poles will be turned against us. 
 They would then regard the Austrians as their sole pro- 
 tectors, and the latter would gain so much prestige and 
 influence with them that they would have thousands of 
 opportunities for intrigues of all kinds in that country.'' 
 In these words we find the reasons which caused Frederick 
 to work upon Austria for years until he at last succeeded 
 in persuading her against her will that it would be in her 
 own interest if she took part in the division of Poland. By 
 giving Austria a part of Poland Frederick made his own 
 share of the plunder smaller but more secure. At the same 
 time he weakened Austria by furnishing her with a dis- 
 affected province and a cause of friction with Russia, for 
 those parts of Poland which fell to Austria were coveted by 
 the Russians. The partition of Poland bound the three 
 confederates in that crime to one another. Thus Frederick 
 succeeded in creating a situation which allowed Prussia to 
 aggrandise herself easily at the cost of the minor German 
 States and of France. 
 
 Bismarck's political successes were founded on, and made 
 possible by, the partition of Poland which had made Russia 
 Prussia's traditional friend and ally. He imitated Frede- 
 rick's policy when, in 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, he 
 estranged Italy and France by securing for France Tunis, 
 upon which Italy had the strongest claim, and when he 
 estranged Russia and Austria-Hungary by giving Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina to Austria, while Russia returned from the 
 Congress empty-handed. Owing to this arrangement, Aus- 
 tria and Russia and France and Italy were set against one 
 another. For their own safety Austria and Italy had to 
 seek Germany's support. Thus the Triple Alliance was 
 made a necessity. 
 
 Frederick the Great had said in his Expose : " All far-off 
 acquisitions are a burden to the State. A village on the 
 frontier is worth more than a principality two hundred and 
 fifty miles away." Bearing in mind the wisdom of Frede- 
 
GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 51 
 
 rick's maxim, Bismarck refused to embark in risky but 
 dazzling adventures which appealed to the imagination, and 
 which were suggested to him by the representatives of old 
 Germany, South German professors, and cosmopolitan 
 philanthropists who, fifty years ago, agitated in favour of 
 making Germany a sea Power. Not heeding their recom- 
 mendations, Bismarck kept in mind " the village on the 
 frontier." Believing that he ought first to settle the business 
 nearest at hand, he intended, before embarking on the sea, 
 to make Prussia the strongest Power on the Continent of 
 Europe. Nor was Bismarck wilUng to foUow the policy 
 recommended to him by the German Liberals, who, guided 
 by the declamation and the rhetoric fireworks of Mr. Cobden, 
 Mr. Bright, and other distinguished Englishmen, preached 
 disarmament, the weakening of the executive of government, 
 the establishment of a universal brotherhood among nations 
 in a universal commonwealth of commerce and the universal 
 freedom of trade. Believing that the Millennium was not 
 yet at hand, Bismarck refused to be guided by the some- 
 what hazy sentiments of unpractical, though large-hearted, 
 enthusiasts, and resolved to rely on the old Prussian 
 political traditions and methods, which he summed up in the 
 words " Blood and iron." He meant to raise Prussia to 
 further greatness not by a sentimental policy of drift, but 
 by vigorous action and by the sword. 
 
 Immediately on coming into power Bismarck doubled 
 the Prussian Army, and, bearing in mind Frederick's advice 
 to aUy Prussia with her most dangerous neighbour, her 
 future antagonist, he induced Austria in 1864 to enter, in 
 alliance with Prussia, upon a common campaign against 
 Denmark, who was deprived of Schleswig-Holstein with the 
 harbour of Kiel, and of more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. 
 Thus Bismarck brought Prussia back to her traditional 
 policy of conquest and reopened the war-era in Europe. 
 Two years later, after having secured Napoleon III.'s 
 benevolent neutrality in return for vague promises that 
 France should have Belgium, Bismarck attacked Austria, 
 Prussia's ally in the Danish campaign of 1864, being 
 
52 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 determined to humble Austria and to secure for Prussia 
 the leadership of the German States. 
 
 Having secured Russia's support, Bismarck turned 
 against France, who, by her benevolent attitude towards 
 Prussia during the Austro -Prussian War, had assisted 
 materially in Prussia's aggrandisement, exactly as Austria 
 had done in 1864. Through Bismarck's skilful manage- 
 ment of the Spanish question — the alteration in the text 
 of the Ems telegram was merely a minor incident — ^war 
 broke out between France and Prussia in 1870, and, after 
 a victorious campaign, in which the South German States 
 had to join, the German Empire was erected on the ruins 
 of France. The South German States became amalga- 
 mated with Prussia. Thus Prussia became almost synony- 
 mous with the German Empire. The King of Prussia 
 became the monarch of Germany, which, as WilHam I. 
 somewhat contemptuously, though very truly, said, was 
 merely "an enlarged Prussia." 
 
 Having raised Prussia to greatness, Bismarck, hke 
 Frederick the Great, endeavoured to weaken his most 
 powerful neighbour, Russia, who, at the outbreak of the 
 Franco-German War, had announced that she would assist 
 Germany if another Power should assist France. Thus 
 Russia had kept Austria, Italy, and Denmark at bay, who 
 were willing to help France, and had enabled Prussia to 
 defeat France and to raise herself to further greatness. 
 Encouraged, incited, and almost pushed by Bismarck, Russia 
 made war upon Turkey in 1877. This war utterly crippled 
 her strength, and, thanks to Bismarck's manipulation at the 
 Congress of Berlin, she was deprived of the fruits of her 
 victory, which she had expected Grcrmany would, in grati- 
 tude for her past services, assist in securing for her. 
 
 When Bismarck had established Germany's greatness 
 and had secured her paramountcy on the Continent of 
 Europe by weakening all her neighbours by creating dis- 
 cord between all European Great Powers, he thought that 
 the time had come for Germany to seek expansion in other 
 continents. He, not William II., originated Germany's 
 
GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 53 
 
 world policy. Already in 1876 Bismarck had contemplated 
 acquiring a large part of South Africa with the help of 
 the Boers, According to the very rehable Poschinger, 
 Santa Lucia Bay was to be acquired by Germany, and 
 German merchants were found ready to build a railway 
 from that harbour to Pretoria, and to run a line of ships 
 to Santa Lucia Bay, whereto, by specially cheap fares, 
 a great stream of German emigrants was to be directed. 
 Thus a German South Africa was to be founded. The 
 sum of 100,000,000 marks (£5,000,000) was thought to be 
 sufficient for financing that enterprise, and German busi- 
 ness men were willing to find that sum, provided 5 per 
 cent, interest on that sum was given them by the State 
 during ten years. At that time Germany was financially 
 exhausted through a violent Stock Exchange crisis, and 
 Free Trade had crippled her manufacturing industries. 
 Therefore this project had to be abandoned for lack of 
 funds. In 1884 Bismarck made another and more deter- 
 mined attempt at acquiring Santa Lucia Bay, but this 
 second attempt miscarried through the incapacity of his 
 son, to whom the negotiations had been entrusted. 
 
 Since the time when Prussia and Germany were given 
 Parliaments, Prusso-G«rman poHcy was no longer exclu- 
 sively shaped by the ruler and his trusted minister, but 
 it was influenced to some considerable extent by the will 
 and by the wishes of the people. Consequently, if we wish 
 to understand the foreign policy of Germany, we must not 
 only consider the attitude of the actual pohtical leaders 
 and the influence of those poUtical traditions which have 
 become the leading political axioms of State, but also the 
 views of the very influential German professors. 
 
 The German university professors have played a very 
 important part in the foreign policy of Germany. There 
 were twenty-three universities in Germany, in which more 
 than four thousand professors taught more than eighty 
 thousand students. These four thousand university pro- 
 fessors not only formed the minds of the professional men 
 and of the future high and low officials, and thus influenced 
 
54 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 cultured public opinion in the making, but they also wrote 
 much for the newspapers. The views of the German pro- 
 fessors carried very great weight with the public, and thus 
 they profoundly influenced not only the cultured circles but 
 the whole nation. 
 
 None of the German university professors has exercised 
 a greater influence upon the shaping and the development 
 of Germany's foreign policy than Professor von Treitschke, 
 the historian, who, during about thirty years, enjoyed the 
 greatest authority in the lecture room and with the Press 
 in matters political. No German professor of his time had 
 a greater weight and a more lasting influence with the 
 German patriots. Therefore we must take note of his 
 leading views and of the poHtical doctrines which he 
 inculcated. 
 
 Treitschke gazed ahead towards the time when his 
 dream of a Greater Germany, whose dominions would ex- 
 tend beyond the seas, would be realised ; when Germany 
 would be able to enter upon a world-embracing pohcy ; 
 when, after having acquired the harbours of HoUand and 
 built an enormous fleet, she would be able to measure her 
 strength with that of the Anglo-Saxon countries. The 
 claim of the Pan-Germans to the possession of the whole 
 Rhine was not of recent origin. It was based on Treitschke 's 
 claim which he formulated in his book, Politik, as follows : 
 
 " Germany, whom Nature has treated in a stepmotherly 
 manner, will be happy when she has received her due and 
 possesses the Rhine in its entirety. ... It is a resource of 
 the utmost value. By our fault its most valuable part has 
 come into the hands of strangers, and it is an indispensable 
 task for German policy to regain the mouths of that river. 
 A purely political union with HoUand is unnecessary, be- 
 cause the Dutch have grown into an independent nation, 
 but an economic union with them is indispensable. We 
 are too modest if we fear to state that the entrance of 
 Holland into our customs system is as necessary for us as 
 is our daily bread, but apparently we are afraid to pro- 
 nounce the most natural demands which a nation can 
 formulate." 
 
GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 65 
 
 In view of Grermany's dearth of habours the acquisition 
 of the Netherlands was considered the first step towards 
 entering upon a world-embracing pohcy and acquiring a 
 predominant position not only in Europe but in the world 
 across the ocean. It was clear to Treitschke that Germany 
 could acquire such a position only after England had been 
 crushed and after the rule of the sea had been wrested 
 from her. Then, and then only, would Germany find a free 
 field for her energy in every quarter of the world. This 
 was his view, and he explained the nature of the future 
 relations between Germany and this country with his usual 
 candour at every occasion. The pohcy which he recom- 
 mended towards England, and his opinion of her, may be 
 seen from the following characteristic extract from his 
 paper, Die Tiirkei und die Grossmdchte, published on the 
 20th of June 1876 : 
 
 " Whatever one may think of British Hberty, England of 
 to-day is no doubt a Power for action in the society of 
 nations, but her power is clearly an anachronism. It was 
 created in the olden time when the world's wars were 
 decided by naval battles and by hired mercenaries, and 
 when it was considered good pohcy to rob weU-situated 
 fortresses and naval ports without any regard to their 
 ownership and history. In this century of national States 
 and of armed nations a cosmopohtan trading Power such 
 as England can no longer maintain itself for any length of 
 time. The day will come and must come when Gibraltar 
 wiU belong to the Spaniards, Malta to the Itahans, Heligo- 
 land to the Germans, and the Mediterranean to the nations 
 who five on the Mediterranean, . . . England is to-day the 
 shameless representative of barbarism in International Law 
 Hers is the blame, if naval wars still bear the character 
 of privileged piracy." 
 
 Treitschke detested England, wished to see her crushed, 
 and hoped to see a huge German World Empire arise on 
 the ruins of Anglo-Saxondom. Decades would have to 
 pass by until Germany would be strong enough to destroy 
 the Anglo-Saxons. Meanwhile the most pressing need of 
 Germany seemed to Treitschke the acquisition of large 
 5 
 
66 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 colonies situated in a temperate zone whereto a stream of 
 German emigrants might be directed. In Deutsche Kdmpfe 
 we read : 
 
 " In the South of Africa circumstances are decidedly 
 favouring us. English colonial poHcy, which has been suc- 
 cessful everywhere else, has not had a lucky hand at the 
 Cape of Good Hope. The civilisation which exists there 
 is Teutonic, is Dutch. The policy of England in South 
 Airica, which vacillates between weakness and brutality, 
 has created a deadly and unextinguishable hatred against 
 her among the Dutch Boers. ... If our Empire has the 
 courage to foUow an independent colonial pohcy with 
 determination, a collision of our interests and those of 
 England is unavoidable. It was natural and logical that 
 the new Great Power of Central Europe had to settle affairs 
 with all Great Powers. We have settled our accounts with 
 Austria -Hungary, with France, and with Russia. The last 
 settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be 
 the lengthiest and the most difficult one." 
 
 Having taken note of the world-embracing poHtical 
 measures which Treitschke advocated, let us now consider 
 the leading maxims of his poHtical philosophy. Treitschke 
 lectured not only on history but on poHcy as well. The 
 poHtical theories which he taught were of very great im- 
 portance in developing the poHtical mind and the poHtical 
 conscience of modern Germany. It would lead too far 
 to describe Treitschke 's system of poHcy. It must suffice to 
 say that his system is an elaboration of the poHtical teach- 
 ings of MachiaveUi and the glorification of the poHtical 
 methods which have been adopted with such marveUous 
 success by Frederick the Great and by Bismarck. We 
 read in the beginning of his book Politik : 
 
 " It wiU always redound to the glory of MachiavelH that 
 he has placed the State on a soHd foundation, and that he 
 has freed the State and its moraHty from the moral pre- 
 cepts taught by the Church, but especially because he has 
 been the first to teach : ' The State is Power.' " 
 
 Starting from the fundamental conception that " The State 
 is Power," that it is not a moral agent, but merely power, 
 
GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 57 
 
 Treitschke logically arrived at the following conclusion 
 regarding the sacredness of treaties : " Every State re- 
 serves to itself the right of judging as to the extent of its 
 treaty obligations." 
 
 If we bear in mind Treitschke 's teaching, can we wonder 
 that Treitschke 's pupils gave such a peculiar interpretation 
 to the treaties signed by Germany ? Seeing in the State 
 not a moral representative of the nation, but merely power 
 personified, Treitschke was the most determined opponent 
 to international arbitration, for we read in his book Politik : 
 
 " The institution of international and permanent courts 
 of arbitration is incompatible with the very nature of the 
 State. Only in a question of secondary or tertiary import- 
 ance would it be possible to obey the ruHng of such a 
 court. For vital questions there exists no impartial foreign 
 power, and to the end of history arms will give the final 
 decision. Herein lies the sacredness of war." 
 
 Treitschke died in 1896, but his work survived him. 
 The seed which he had sown broadcast in countless lectures, 
 books, pamphlets, and newspaper articles bore fruit. Thus 
 he helped in opening an era of universal political unscrupu- 
 lousness in Germany and in creating a mighty popular 
 movement towards expansion oversea, with the object of 
 destroying the power of Anglo-Saxondom. 
 
 Bismarck's successors continued Bismarck's pohcy, and 
 had to improve upon it. Though Bismarck ostensibly was 
 Russia's friend, he had strengthened Turkey against Russia 
 by providing her with arms, with money, with railways, 
 and with officers. Bismarck's successors continued that 
 pohcy and extended it towards England as well. In Egypt 
 and in China Germany's agents intrigued against Great 
 Britain. The South African War would never have broken 
 out had Germany not deluded the Boers into the behef that, 
 as the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs de- 
 clared to England in writing, " the independence of the 
 Transvaal RepubUc is a German interest," and had she not 
 lavishly suppUed the Boers with arms and ammunition. 
 
 Germany unceasingly tried to create an effective counter- 
 
58 GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 poise against Great Britain. Bismarck encouraged Anglo- 
 Russian differences in Asia and set France and England 
 against one another over Egypt. He encouraged Russia and 
 France in their anti-British attitude, and his successors 
 continued Bismarck's poHcy, Germany's Venezuela poHcy 
 aimed at setting the United States against England. When 
 the United States took umbrage at the Anglo-German 
 Venezuela expedition and Great Britain wished to with- 
 draw, Germany insisted that it should be carried through, 
 arguing that some show of energy on the part of the strongest 
 naval and of the strongest military Power would cause 
 the United States to cUmb down and teach them to be 
 modest for at least thirty years. Happily British diplo- 
 macy did not stumble into the trap, and saw the point of 
 the argument, which was similar to that of Frederick the 
 Great when he told the Austrians that they could not 
 allow the Russians to cross the Danube, and that they 
 should oppose their crossing in alliance with France. 
 
 Some years ago the movement towards the unification 
 of the British Empire began to take shape. Canada offered 
 preferential fiscal treatment to the Mother Country. Other 
 colonies were inclined to foUow. Mr. Chamberlain cordially 
 responded to the advances made, and began to work for a 
 British Imperial Fiscal Union. Treitschke and his followers 
 had frequently declared that the British Empire was an 
 empire only in name, that it would gradually faU to pieces, 
 that the United States would have a similar fate. Germany 
 resolved to kill the movement towards Imperial Unification, 
 and declared commercial war against Canada. As the 
 penalising of Canada's exports failed to have the desired 
 effect, further measures were threatened. On the 29th 
 of June 1903 Lord Lansdowne made the following extra- 
 ordinary statement in the House of Lords : 
 
 " The position between Germany and Canada with which - 
 we were threatened is not one which His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment could regard as other than a serious position. It is 
 not merely that we foimd that Canada was liable to be 
 made to suffer in consequence of the preferential treatment 
 
GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY 59 
 
 which the Canadian Government had accorded to us, but 
 it was actually adumbrated in an official document that if 
 other colonies acted in the same manner as Canada, the 
 result might be that we, the Mother Country, would find 
 ourselves deprived of most-favoured-nation treatment." 
 
 Not satisfied with crippling British industries and trade, 
 Germany tried to oppose the political unification of the 
 Empire by threats. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE WAR MACHINE OF PRUSSO-GERMANY — ITS CREATION 
 AND ITS DESTRUCTION ^ 
 
 All the great empires which the world has seen, with 
 perhaps one solitary exception, that of the Chinese Empire, 
 have become great by force ; and aU the great empires 
 which have declined, or which have disappeared from the 
 world's stage, have been diminished or destroyed by force. 
 Diplomacy is fond of euphemisms, and diplomats like to 
 speak of gradual expansion by allowing free play to the 
 national forces and to the forces of Nature. They speak 
 of creating protectorates, of mapping out spheres of interest, 
 etc., when they are in reality bent on the aggrandisement 
 of the nation by force. Hence it comes that countries are 
 permanently and forcibly taken from their rightful owners 
 by what diplomats are pleased to call temporary occupation, 
 by peaceful penetration, by lease, by loan, etc. However, 
 notwithstanding all these conventional euphemisms and 
 diplomatic fictions, and notwithstanding the fact that the 
 foreign policy of all countries is always ostensibly guided 
 by the noblest motives, such as justice and humanity, the 
 fact remains that hitherto all policy has been based on force. 
 The territories which are possessed by modern States are 
 held by right of conquest — that is, by that right which 
 springs from the possession of superior force. 
 
 Even the cleverest diplomat will prove unsuccessful unless 
 his words are backed with adequate force. The diplomatic 
 ability and success of Frederick the Great, Napoleon I., 
 TaUeyrand, Metternich, Pahnerston, Bismarck, etc., con- 
 
 ^ From the Nineteenth Century and After, October 1902. 
 60 
 
THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 61 
 
 sisted largely, if not principally, in the superior material 
 force which these men were able to wield. Owing to the 
 fact that their diplomacy was backed by sufficient force, 
 they were exceedingly successful in their policy. The 
 fact that foreign policy is based upon force was nowhere 
 more clearly understood than in Prussia. 
 
 For two hundred and fifty years, since the time of the 
 Great Elector, Prussia has been always proportionately by 
 far the strongest military power in Europe. At the death 
 of Frederick William I., Prussia, which then had only about 
 3,000,000 inhabitants, had a standing army of 80,000 
 soldiers ; at the death of Frederick the Great, Prussia had 
 5,500,000 inhabitants and an army of no less than 195,000 
 soldiers. Modern Germany had in 1914 a population of 
 67,000,000 inhabitants and a standing army of 801,000 men, 
 but if the proportion of soldiers to the total population 
 had, in 1914, been as great as it was at the time of Frederick 
 WiUiam I. or Frederick the Great, she would have had 
 before the Great War a standing force of more than 2,000,000 
 men. 
 
 Germany was a nation in arms. Every able-bodied man 
 had to serve in the army, and the number of men enrolled 
 year by year amounted to about 350,000. The army on a 
 war footing was made up of a number of these levies, and 
 it could be made greater or smaller at will by calling out a 
 greater or lesser number of such yearly levies which were 
 called Reserves, Landwehr, Landsturm. The number of 
 men yearly enrolled had of late greatly increased, in accord- 
 ance with the increase in the peace strength of the army. 
 
 The Prusso-German Army has gone through varjdng 
 vicissitudes. Under Frederick the Great it proved itself 
 to be the first army in Europe. Twenty years after Frede- 
 rick's death, it was found to be quite worthless against 
 Napoleon I., and it fell to pieces at Jena and Auerstadt. 
 After the fatal year 1806, the Prussian Army was rapidly 
 reorganised and reformed by Scharnhorst and his able 
 co-workers, and later on it was again reorganised and 
 remodelled by Roon and Moltke. It is worth while to 
 
62 THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 
 
 inquire why Frederick the Great's incomparable army so 
 rapidly decayed after his death, and how the rotten army 
 of 1806 was rapidly and thoroughly reformed. 
 
 The army with which Frederick the Great had successfully 
 fought the united forces of nearly the whole Continent 
 during the Seven Years' War was organised upon an utterly 
 bad, wrong, and unhealthy basis. Only noblemen could 
 become officers, advancement went by length of service, 
 obedience was absolute and blind, restricting all initiative 
 among officers as well as among the rank and file. Detailed 
 regulations made thinking unnecessary, and had to be 
 carried out to the letter without question. The whole 
 military organisation of Prussia was absolutely centralised 
 -in Frederick the Great, who attended to its smallest details. 
 If a foreigner wished to witness a parade, he had to appeal 
 to the King. But what the army lacked in a practical 
 common-sense organisation, in individuality, and in initia- 
 tive, which qualities alone can make an army a healthy 
 living organism, was amply made up for by the Bang's 
 immense personal capacity. He ruled the army with a 
 hand of iron, and knew how to manage it, notwithstanding 
 its fundamental unsoundness. He inspected his troops very 
 frequently, his sharp eyes saw everything, and every officer 
 who did not come up to the King's expectations was im- 
 mediately dismissed. He knew the capacity of every 
 officer, foresaw all and prepared all. His detailed regula- 
 tions were to the point, his magazines were well filled, all 
 was ready for war, and his army remained up to his death 
 by far the first in Europe. Yet, but twenty years after his 
 death, it was easily smashed by Napoleon I. at Jena and 
 Auerstadt. When the great King was dead the faulty 
 system remained, and no personality arose either to fill his 
 place in that perverted system or to reform it root and 
 branch. With the death of Frederick the Great the huge 
 Prussian Army became a body without a soul, imposing to 
 look upon by reason of its size, but deficient in every other 
 qualification. Therefore it was predestined to fall. 
 
 Lacking the necessary understanding and energy, his 
 
THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 63 
 
 two successors, Frederick William II. and Frederick William 
 III., were contented to administer the army according to 
 Frederickian tradition, in the spirit of precedent. They 
 would have considered it a crime to introduce any reform 
 into the army, and blasphemy to doubt its proved ex- 
 cellence. The warnings and entreaties of sagacious patriots 
 to modernise the army fell on deaf ears. The whole interest 
 of Frederick WiUiam III. with regard to military matters 
 was concentrated upon parades and drills, the buttons and 
 laces of uniforms, the shape of shakos and helmets, and 
 similar futilities, in which, as Napoleon remarked, he was 
 a greater expert than any army tailor. 
 
 Only after Prussia's terrible defeat, and the loss of half 
 her territory in 1806, did the King and his advisers wake 
 up and begin to inquire seriously into the state of the army. 
 Progressive military men, among them the future Field- 
 Marshal Gneisenau, the intellectual leader of Bliicher's 
 army and his Chief of Staff, attributed the collapse of the 
 army largely to the neglect of preparations for war in time 
 of peace, to its occupation with futile drill exercises cal- 
 culated only for show on the parade-ground, to the neglect 
 of warlike manoeuvres and of target-shooting, to the in- 
 feriority of the Prussian arms as compared with the arma- 
 ment of the French in guns and rifles, to the slavish copying 
 of various institutions existing in foreign armies, which were 
 quite unsuitable to the needs of Prussia, to the blind conceit 
 of officers and of the nation in the invincibility of the army, 
 and to the incapacity of generals who were automatically 
 promoted by length of service, and not by merit, who had 
 partly become imbecile with old age. 
 
 A commission for the reorganisation of the army was 
 called, which did not consist of fossilised generals, or of 
 civilians unacquainted with war and with the military 
 needs of the nation, but of a select few of the ablest young 
 officers who had proved their value in the field, and who 
 were sure neither to be doctrinaires nor to be unduly bound 
 by tradition and text-books. This commission consisted of 
 two major-generals, four lieutenant-colonels, and one major. 
 
64 THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 
 
 It did not dazzle the nation with an imposing array of titles, 
 but it was destined to accomplish great things, for among 
 its members were men like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Grol- 
 mann, and Boyen. The members of this commission were 
 yomig men. Scharnhorst, the oldest commissioner, was 
 fifty-two years old; Grolmann, the yomigest, was only 
 twenty-nine years old. Their recommendations were thor- 
 ough and to the point. Soldiering was to be taken seriously 
 by the oJBficers. The army was to lose its character of a 
 Society institution, it was to be democratised, and was to 
 be managed on business principles. Among the recom- 
 mendations of the committee the following were the most 
 important : 
 
 " Advancement shaU take place, without regard to the 
 years of service, solely by merit. In case it is found neces- 
 sary, the youngest general is to command all others. Age 
 or length of service is to have no influence upon appoint- 
 ments. Few generals are to be made in peace, and brigades 
 are to be largely commanded by staff officers in war, so 
 that those who prove themselves the worthiest on active 
 service may be advanced to generalship. In peace a claim 
 to officer's position can only rest upon military knowledge 
 and education, and in war upon conspicuous bravery, 
 activity, and circumspection. Therefore aU individuals in 
 the whole nation who possess these qualifications have a 
 claim to the highest command. 
 
 "In giving only to the nobihty those privileges, all 
 talent and abihty in the other classes of the nation was lost 
 to the army, and the nobility did not consider itself under 
 the obHgation to take soldiering seriously, and acquire mili- 
 tary knowledge, as good birth and a long life were bound 
 to advance well-born individuals to the most exalted mili- 
 tary commands, without either merit or exertion on their 
 part. 
 
 " This is the reason why our officers were so behindhand 
 in knowledge and education as compared with men of other 
 professions in Prussia. For these reasons the army had 
 become a State within the State, instead of being the union 
 of all moral and physical forces of the nation. Advancement 
 by years of service had killed all ambition and emulation 
 among officers, for a good robust constitution alone granted 
 
THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 66 
 
 all that could be desired. True merit and talent proved 
 in free competition among officers was lost to the State, 
 and the deserved advancement of military genius became 
 impossible." 
 
 Besides, the commission insisted on the decentralisation 
 of the administrative machinery of the army. Each corps 
 was to be made independent, but was to be fully responsible, 
 and everything required for mobilisation, arms, stores, 
 horses, commissariat, etc., was to be kept at the head- 
 quarters of each corps or division in order to faciHtate rapid 
 and smooth mobiUsation in case of war. The endless train 
 of baggage, which had so greatly hampered the movements 
 of the Prussian Ajmy when opposed to the mobile troops 
 of Napoleon, was to be diminished, new arms were to be 
 introduced, up-to-date tactics were to take the place of 
 obsolete barrack-square driUs, and the soldier was to be 
 treated better in peace time in order to make soldiering 
 more attractive. 
 
 Largely owing to the measures taken upon these recom- 
 mendations, without overmuch regard to the obstinate 
 resistance of the tradition-bound generals of the old school, 
 Prussia, which Napoleon believed crippled for ever, was 
 able seven years later to meet the French Army in the field 
 with conspicuous success. 
 
 Since the time of Napoleon I. the art and science of war 
 had made enormous progress. A new era opened with the 
 advent of the prince of miUtary scientists, the " Schlach- 
 tendenker," Moltke, who elevated the art of war to the 
 level of an exact science. Let us see what Moltke did. 
 
 Frederick the Great and Napoleon I. used to make 
 elaborate preparations for war, but their preparations were 
 clumsy and superficial if compared with the minute study 
 and the detailed preparations for war made by Moltke. 
 As Napoleon concentrated the fire of hundreds of guns on 
 that point of the enemy's position which to him was of 
 the greatest importance and battered it in, even so Moltke 
 concentrated the organised intelhgence of hundreds of the 
 
66 THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 
 
 best brains in his army on the one point which to him was 
 the most valuable one. Moltke's chief aim was to surprise 
 the enemy by the unparalleled celerity of the mobiUsation 
 of his army, to fall upon him while he was still unprepared, 
 and to smash him before an attack was expected. With 
 this end in view he re-created the Prussian Greneral Staff, 
 and made it the active brain of the army. 
 
 Moltke, like most great commanders, did not lay down 
 his principles for the conduct of war in the shape of a book. 
 He evidently did not believe in taking the world and pos- 
 sible enemies of his country into his confidence. We must 
 therefore look to his campaigns and to the oflScial accounts 
 of his wars for his guiding principles. In the introduction 
 to the history of the Eranco-Grerman War, edited by the 
 historical department of the General Staff, over which 
 Moltke presided, occurs the celebrated passage : 
 
 " One of the principal duties of the General Staff is to 
 work out during peace in the most minute way plans for 
 the concentration and the transport of troops, with a view 
 to meet all possible eventualities to which war may give 
 rise. 
 
 " When an army first takes the field the most multi- 
 farious considerations — apolitical, geographical, as well as 
 miHtary — ^have to be borne in mind. Mistakes in the 
 original concentration of armies can hardly ever be made 
 good in the whole course of a campaign. All these arrange- 
 ments can be considered a long time beforehand, and — 
 assuming the troops are ready for war and the transport 
 service properly organised — ^must lead to the exact result 
 which has been contemplated." 
 
 How Moltke acted upon the principle of " working out 
 all possible eventualities of war in the most minute way " 
 may be seen from a few examples. Every reservist and 
 every miHtiaman possessed written or printed instructions 
 which told him exactly to which place he had to go for 
 enrolment in case of war. When he arrived at his place 
 of enrolment, his complete outfit for war, measured to his 
 person in peace, would be found waiting for him. Every 
 commander throughout the empire had complete general 
 
THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 67 
 
 instructions what to do in the case of war. The confidential 
 particular instructions regarding the final disposition and 
 direction of troops, transport, etc., towards the frontier, 
 were also in the possession of each commander, contained 
 in sealed envelopes, which were only to be opened on the 
 receipt of the order to mobilise. The military stores were 
 placed where they were wanted in case of war, in order to 
 avoid loss of time and congestion of railways in forwarding 
 them. A special department of the General Staff, con- 
 sisting of about twenty officers, studied the means of trans- 
 port, the capacities of the railways, and the number of 
 trucks and engines required for the conveyance of each 
 unit, and drew up a complete programme for the dispatch 
 of the countless trains required in case of war, upon which 
 programme the confidential sealed instructions were founded. 
 Consequently the transport of a million men or more, with 
 their horses, guns, stores, and baggage, to any frontier 
 could take place smoothly and rapidly without a hitch. 
 The arrival of each corps at the point where it would be 
 required was calculable, so to say, to the minute, and 
 every now and then the whole enormous arrangement of 
 time-tables had to be recast in order to allow for the con- 
 veyance of additional troops or stores, or for the use of an 
 additional piece of railway recently completed. Further- 
 more, the detailed plans for any and every campaign in 
 which Prussia could possibly be involved were always kept 
 ready in time of peace, and were frequently changed and 
 brought up to date. For instance, Moltke's first plan of 
 campaign in case of a war with France was dated 1857, 
 and his final dispositions, which were exactly carried out 
 in 1870, were made in winter, 1868. 
 
 However, not only were the resources of Germany studied 
 " in the most minute way " by Moltke and his staff, but 
 also those of all possible enemies. As a matter of fact, he 
 knew more about the strength and armaments of the 
 French Army, the time required for its mobilisation, the 
 configuration of the French frontier provinces, the capacity 
 of the French railways for transport, etc., than did any 
 
68 THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 
 
 man in the French War Office. In other words, Moltke 
 created an organisation which, by means of most minute 
 studies and the painstaking collection and comparison of 
 countless exact data, made war no longer the risky vague 
 encounter with hostile elements of uncertain strength, at 
 an uncertain time, and in an uncertain and unknown 
 country, as it had formerly been, but made war an en- 
 counter with certainties, and with clearly defined calculable 
 chances. 
 
 How weU Germany was prepared for the war of 1870-71 
 may be seen from the fact that we read in the Denkwiir- 
 digheiten of the then Prussian Minister of War, Count 
 Roon : 
 
 *' Roon has frequently said that the two weeks following 
 the memorable night of the mobihsation have perhaps been 
 the idlest and the freest from care during his career. As a 
 matter of fact, the mobihsation machine worked with such 
 exemplary exactitude, and so completely without friction, 
 that Roon and the War Office had not to reply to one 
 inquiry of the commanding generals or of other com- 
 manders. This was the case though the order for mobihsa- 
 tion was given without any previous warning, and though 
 many commanding generals and Staff officers were on their 
 summer hohday, and a good number of them were even 
 abroad." 
 
 Napoleon III. was vaguely aware of the numerical 
 inferiority of his army, as compared with the troops of 
 Germany. Consequently his idea had been to act with the 
 Hghtning rapidity and energy of his great ancestor, to 
 throw himself upon the south of Germany before Germany 
 was ready, carry the Southern States with him, and then 
 march against Prussia, strengthened by the accession of 
 the South German contingents. The plan was well con- 
 ceived, and might have succeeded if Napoleon III. had 
 calculated, not guessed, how long it would take France 
 and Germany to mobihse their armies, and if he had pre- 
 pared everything in peace time for such a rapid stroke 
 in the complete manner of the Prussian G^neralstab. But 
 
THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 69 
 
 in view of the preparedness of Prussia, and of France's 
 unpreparedness, this plan of campaign collapsed. The 
 Prussian Generalstab knew better than Napoleon III. 
 what France was able to do. In Moltke's memoir of 1868 
 we find the time necessary for the mobihsation of the French 
 Army correctly given. While France wanted three weeks 
 to complete the mobihsation of her army, Grermany took 
 only eleven days. Consequently Napoleon's brilhant plan 
 of campaign, which looked as fine on paper as did his army, 
 miscarried, for the well-schooled and perfectly-equipped 
 German army corps feU into their places with mathematical 
 precision, and with incredible rapidity crossed the frontier 
 in overwhelming numbers long before the French were ready 
 for their contemplated dash into the south of Germany. 
 
 Germany's victory over France was less due to superior 
 strategy or to superior tactics than to her great superiority 
 in methodic preparatory organisation. The victory of 
 1870-71 was a triumph of German organisation, and if we 
 study the history of the collapse of the French Army in 
 1870 in detail, and try to deduce the principal causes of 
 the success of the German Army, we arrive at the conclusion 
 that highly-organised foresight, fore-study, and fore-cal- 
 culation, represented by the Prussian Generalstab, led the 
 Germans to victory, and that the absence of these quahties 
 caused the defeat of the French. 
 
 The Prussian Generalstab did not only directly prepare 
 for war in the manner already described, but it also prepared 
 indirectly for war by studying strategy and the innovations 
 introduced into the tactics of other nations, studying new 
 arms and equipments, investigating everything and adopting 
 what was useful, educating officers in regular courses under 
 Moltke's personal supervision, surveying the country, etc. 
 In short, the Greneralstab served as the intellectual centre 
 of the army, as the clearing-house of most valuable in- 
 formation. It was the highest supervising, inspecting, 
 inventing, and organising authority. It was an organism 
 which enabled Moltke to hold all the threads of the army 
 in his hand, and make it obey the sUghtest pressure. 
 
7(y THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 
 
 Ruled by the Generalstab, the German Army was no 
 longer a clumsy and soulless military machine as it had 
 been in 1806, but became a living, sensitive, and intelligent 
 organism. In order to perpetuate his work, Moltke im- 
 planted firmly his spirit of thoroughness and his strategical 
 ideas into the Greneralstab, being its chief during thirty-one 
 years. Moltke not only served as an example to his officers, 
 and created a school of independent military thinkers in 
 Germany, but his principles of minute comprehensive 
 inquiry and of careful foresight were also applied to com- 
 merce and industry ; they helped in making Germany 
 surprisingly successful in the more peaceful arts. 
 
 The efficiency of the Prusso-German Army depended upon 
 its direction. WiUiam I. left it to Moltke. WiUiam II. 
 meant to direct the army in person. Court favourites took 
 the place of experienced soldiers. As his own Chancellor 
 the Emperor destroyed the life-work of Bismarck, and as 
 his own Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff 
 he destroyed the life-work of Moltke. Germany requested 
 the Allies for an armistice because her army had become 
 completely demoralised, and demanded peace practically at 
 any price ! The Vossische Zeitung stated on the 7th of 
 November 1918, in an article signed by "an officer at .the 
 front " : 
 
 " The German corps of officers has been brought up in 
 loyalty and rigid obedience, and, as long as the Kaiser does 
 not voluntarily proclaim an urgent desire to abdicate, 
 opinions to the contrary must not be expressed, and so 
 people may think that all the officers stand behind the 
 Kaiser. But even if it really were so, the officers, and 
 especially the higher officers, are not the army. Our army 
 has long ceased to be a real unit, and it has long been absurd 
 for the leaders to speak in the name of the army. . . . 
 
 " For a long time past there have been practically no 
 regular officers left at the front. The real army is so war- 
 weary, has been through such indescribable things, and has 
 achieved such wonderful things without any thanks except 
 in empty words, that its feelings are blunted towards the 
 question whether the Kaiser stays or goes. This army 
 
THE GERMAN WAR MACHINE 71 
 
 wants peace. The best parts of it want peace in honour, 
 but men and officers will not be willing to continue the war 
 for another day for sake of the Kaiser. 
 
 " This army must be asked its opinion. Hitherto it has 
 kept silent, fought and sufiEered, but much discontent, and 
 much just discontent, has accumulated in it, and the leaders, 
 who in the course of years have lost touch with the army, 
 must not deceive themselves. In the end these 7,000,000 
 or 9,000,000 men in arms are the decisive factor for the 
 internal development and the whole future of Germany. 
 This army must be heard ; its just wishes must find satis- 
 faction. This they have deserved of us and of Germany. 
 If those who have led the army hitherto are unable or 
 unwilling, it is the duty and the highest responsibility of the 
 new Grovernment to discover the facts through a civilian 
 War Secretary — if only in order to secure an orderly de- 
 mobilisation. 
 
 " All these questions are at least as important as the 
 question whether the generals and the staffs are opposed to 
 an abdication of the Kaiser. Everybody who for years has 
 fought for his country and his Kaiser, who in the first years 
 of war and in the intoxication of victory was honoured as 
 the highest symbol of the German people and army, must 
 be extremely reluctant to advocate abdication, but at 
 bottom he is moved to it by the same duty and courage 
 which urged him forward against enemy machine-guns. 
 The individual can go under ; the people must live. This 
 applies to the ruler as much as to the least of his citizens." 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE IMPERIAL GERMAN NAVY AND ITS PLANNED 
 OVERSEA OPERATIONS ^ 
 
 The navy of Imperial Germany was constructed rather for 
 military than for naval purposes. It was to serve as an 
 instrument of conquest which was to be effected by opera- 
 tions oversea after the defeat of the English and American 
 Fleets. The true purpose of the German Fleet was clearly 
 expressed in a very interesting pamphlet entitled Operationen 
 iiher See, by von Edelsheim, a member of the German 
 General Staff, from which I would give the following ex- 
 tracts : - 
 
 " Moltke declared that landings and operations with 
 landed troops were enterprises of subordinate importance ; 
 but the military commanders of the future will have to count 
 the preparation for, and the execution of, wars oversea 
 among their most important tasks. There is no State in 
 the whole world which possesses better forces and greater 
 means than Germany for the enterprise of war by landing. 
 In the first place the excellence and the readiness of our 
 army, and the celerity with which large masses of troops 
 can be mobilised, are not equalled by any other great Power ; 
 in the second place, Germany disposes of the second largest 
 commercial marine in the world, and has in the rapid large 
 steamers of her shipping companies a splendid transport 
 fleet, the excellence of which is not exceeded even by that 
 of England herself ; in the last place, the increase and 
 strengthening of our navy which is at present taking place 
 will guarantee increased security to the transport of our 
 troops oversea. These factors, which are peculiarly favour- 
 able for Germany's power, open a large field for our world 
 
 ^ From the National Review, April 1905. 
 
 72 
 
GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 73 
 
 policy, and render it possible for us to make our strong 
 military forces also useful for the greatness of the Empire, 
 and to conquer by the development of German power over- 
 sea the same feared and esteemed position in the world 
 which our victories of the last decennia have earned for us 
 in Central Europe. 
 
 " A further stimulus in this direction is to be found in the 
 fact that our navy wiU not be able at once to attain such 
 development that it can alone solve all tasks which may 
 have to be solved in an energetic world policy. Therefore 
 it is desirable that the strength of our army should be made 
 visible and available oversea to such nations as have so 
 far looked at Germany as a State by which they cannot 
 be reached. Thus we must consider not only landings in 
 conjunction with territorial wars, but also operations against 
 States which we can reach only by sea. 
 
 " Operations oversea must not be improvised, because 
 there is hope for their success only when the whole compli- 
 cated mechanism down to the smallest details has been 
 prepared in time. 
 
 " The possibility of utilising favourable situations and 
 favourable times for undertaking operations oversea is one 
 of the most important conditions for their success. When 
 the landing has been effected in such a way that the opponent 
 has been taken by surprise, even a strong country will hardly 
 succeed in concentrating sufficient forces in time wherewith 
 to meet the invader. The preparations for landing opera- 
 tions must therefore be furthered in time of peace to such 
 an extent that in time of war we feel sure of having the 
 advantage of surprising the enemy by our celerity in 
 mobilising and transporting our troops. 
 
 " The aim of our operations must be kept entirely secret, 
 and attempts should be made to deceive the enemy at least 
 with regard to the purpose for which the first preparations 
 are undertaken. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and the 
 manner in which it was commenced may be considered still 
 to-day as a model. 
 
 " A landing on the coast of the enemy is only possible if 
 the assailant has forces superior to those which the defender 
 can collect at the decisive moment in order to prevent a 
 landing. If a landing has taken place, even a victorious 
 naval battle is useless to the defender unless he disposes of 
 armies sufficiently strong to meet the invader with success. 
 
74 GERIVIAN NAVAL AIMS 
 
 Therefore it is absolutely necessary that the strength of our 
 Grerman Navy should be developed so far that the security 
 of the troops during a possible crossing is certain, and that 
 it is able to defeat, or at least to detain, any hostile fleet 
 which the opponent may collect at the moment when the 
 landing operation is contemplated. Therefore the way for 
 a transport of troops oversea should usually be opened by 
 an operation of the fleet, and the fact that a landing becomes 
 absolutely impossible if the battle on sea has an unfavourable 
 issue for us has to be taken into account. Thus the principle 
 may be deduced that all men-of-war which can be used 
 should be used for operations oversea in order to open the 
 way for a fleet of transports. 
 
 " For operations oversea a detailed plan of mobilisation 
 must be drawn up in exactly the same way as is done for 
 operations on land. The troops which are to be mobilised 
 must be determined in peace, their transport by railway, 
 their harbour of embarkation and the preparation for 
 embarkation must be prepared in order to ensure the greatest 
 possible celerity. As we have seen in the foregoing, it is 
 before aU necessary to proceed with a surprising quickness 
 which alone can assure us success. 
 
 " If the opponent disposes of considerable forces a simul- 
 taneous landing at several spots seems questionable, ... If 
 several places of debarkation are chosen, the protection of 
 these places towards the sea requires many ships of war ; 
 the scouting towards the land is made more di£Bcult, and 
 the enemy will easier be able to attack in superior numbers 
 the separate parts of the landing troops. Lastly, the unity 
 of command at the beginning of the operations wiU meet 
 with great difficulties, and time and means will be missing 
 to obviate these difficulties. Therefore it is recommendable, 
 if it is at all possible, to select only one spot of debarkation 
 and to bring up the transport fleet as closely as possible to 
 the coast. 
 
 " For a debarkation a harbour is naturally best. Less 
 favourable but still advantageous is a closed, protected 
 bay ; least favourable is the open coast. On the other 
 hand, a landing on the open coast wiU find the least resistance 
 on the part of the enemy, because it can be executed with 
 the greatest chance of surprise. If the point of landing 
 selected is close to a bay or to a harbour, the first task of the 
 troops which are landing will be to take possession of such 
 
GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 75 
 
 a place, in order to enable the fleet of transports to disembark 
 the majority of the troops, horses, and material at that spot. 
 The possession of a harbour will greatly accelerate these 
 operations and increase the security of the disembarkation 
 against a hostile attack from sea and land. If such a coup 
 does not succeed, the landing of the whole expeditionary 
 army must immediately take place by boats on the coast 
 without loss of time, and all preparations must be made for 
 such a possibility. Every transport must have with it a 
 sufficient quantity of material for disembarkation, in order 
 to be able to land everything on the open shore. It is 
 impossible to land in the face of strong fortifications or of 
 a strong hostile force ; the Russian landing manoeuvres 
 which have been made have fully proved that. 
 
 " The best security for landing by boats is always afforded 
 by the surprise. Therefore it is impossible to explore a 
 point of landing by ships sent in advance, which would only 
 show the opponent which the probable point of landing 
 would be, and he would therefore be enabled to take his 
 measures in time. Such proceedings can only be used in 
 order to deceive the enemy. The exploration of the possible 
 points of landing must have taken place already before the 
 beginning of the operations. 
 
 " The weU-known naval author Mahan recognises that 
 the offensive is characteristic of landing operations. The 
 history of war teaches how the success of well-executed 
 landings, such as those at Aboukir or Cape Breton, have 
 been partly marred by over-great caution of the landed 
 troops, because it was not recognised by the commanders 
 that energy and celerity in execution wiU counterbalance 
 all strategical disadvantages to such an operation. Quick 
 and energetic operations with closely concentrated forces on 
 the line of the smallest resistance are absolutely necessary 
 for the success of landing operations. 
 
 " Napoleon's campaign in Egypt proves that an army 
 may subsist for years, even in a country possessing poor 
 resources, when the connection with the home country is 
 cut off. Such independence is greatly facilitated in a civil- 
 ised, thickly-peopled, and rich country, as it will then be 
 much easier to get aU that is required in the way of food, 
 horses, material, etc., from local sources, and even ammuni- 
 tion may be manufactured in the enemy's country. 
 
 " An expeditionary army must economise to the greatest 
 
76 GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 
 
 extent its forces. Bloody victories may act like defeats on 
 them. Therefore, attacks on fortifications must be avoided 
 if they are avoidable. The chief thing is always the surpris- 
 ing celerity of the operations, and in order to attain the 
 main object aimed at all forces must be used with the 
 greatest energy and with an absolute lack of all consideration. 
 " At present the view prevails in our military circles that 
 operations oversea in connection with territorial wars are 
 worthless, and are even harmful, as greater success appears 
 likely by using those troops on land which might be used 
 as an expeditionary force. 
 
 Operations against England 
 
 " A conflict with England must be considered by Germany, 
 for a powerful progressive German trade forms for the 
 power of England at least as great a danger as the progress 
 of Russia towards India. In a purely naval war with 
 England we could count on success only at the beginning 
 of operations, but soon England would be able to bring to 
 the field such enormous naval forces that we should be 
 limited to the defensive and could hardly count on a for- 
 tunate issue of such operations. Even if we conclude an 
 alliance with Russia we might harm England permanently, 
 but we would not be able to directly threaten that State, 
 Only an alliance with France could menace England, but 
 owing to her geographical position and the great loss of time 
 which is occasioned by every operation initiated by aUies, 
 England would always be able to bring into the field a 
 maritime superiority even against that alliance unless she 
 be taken by surprise. 
 
 " England's weakness Mes in that factor which constitutes 
 our strength, the army. The Enghsh Army corresponds 
 neither in quantity nor quahty with England's position as 
 a Great Power, and does not even correspond with the size 
 of the country, for England feels convinced that the invasion 
 of her territory can be prevented by the fleet. That con- 
 viction is, however, not at aU justified . . , for though England 
 can collect immense fleets after some time, those of her 
 naval forces which are ready for war during the very first 
 days are not so overwhelming. Consequently an opponent 
 who is considerably weaker on the sea, and who concentrates 
 his forces and keeps them in a state of readiness, can expect 
 a temporary success. Therefore, in case a war with England 
 
GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 77 
 
 should be threatening, Germany should endeavour to throw 
 part of her army on the English coast, and thus to shift the 
 decision from the sea on to the enemy's country. As our 
 troops are far superior to the English troops, England's 
 enormous naval power would not have the slightest influence 
 upon the final decision. 
 
 " The army of England consists of the field army, the 
 reserve, the miHtia, the volunteers, and the yeomanry. In 
 case of an invasion by surprise, we need only consider of 
 these the field army with its reserve. The miUtia requires 
 so much time for concentration and equipment that only a 
 small fraction will be able to assist the field army in the first 
 and decisive struggle. The volunteers and the yeomanry 
 cannot in a short time bring into the field any considerable 
 forces useful for war. Besides, we must remember their 
 small military value, owing to which they would not be 
 serious opponents to our well-trained troops. The English 
 field army consists nominally of three army corps, each 
 composed of three divisions. Of these corps half the third 
 is composed of militia. Therefore it has either to be com- 
 pleted from the militia and will then come too late for action 
 in the first decisive battles, or it will march in its peace 
 strength and can then not be much stronger than a division. 
 Of the second army corps two divisions and one brigade of 
 cavalry are quartered in Ireland, of which at any rate the 
 larger part will remain there in order to prevent a rising of 
 the Irish, to whom the German invasion would bring the 
 liberty they long for. Immediately ready for war are 
 therefore only : 
 
 Three divisions of the first army corps. 
 About two divisions of the second army corps, 
 About one combined division of the third army corps 
 and three brigades of cavalry. 
 
 " As the mobilised strength of an English division amounts 
 in round numbers only to 10,000 men, whilst that of a Ger- 
 man division amounts to 16,000 men, four German divisions 
 and one cavalry division would already possess a superiority 
 over the British field army. However, we are able to ship 
 in the shortest time six infantry divisions, or five infantry 
 and one cavalry division, to England. How such an opera- 
 tion against England oversea should be conducted can of 
 course not be described in this place. 
 
78 GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 
 
 " If the weather be fair, the transport from our North 
 Sea harbours should be efiected in little more than thirty 
 hours. The English coast offers extensive stretches which 
 are suitable for landing troops. The country contains such 
 great resources that the army of invasion could permanently 
 live on these resources. On the other hand, the extent of 
 the island is so small that the English would never succeed 
 in vanquishing any army of invasion, once it had been 
 victorious. It is unhkely that such a war would be long 
 drawn out, or that considerable reserves would be required. 
 The material is largely renewable in the country itself. 
 Therefore we may without hesitation maintain that it wiU 
 be unnecessary to keep open communications with our own 
 country. 
 
 " The first object to be aimed at in invading England 
 would be the EngKsh field army ; the second would be 
 London. However, in all probabihty both objects would 
 be attained simultaneously, as in view of the small value of 
 the volunteers the whole field army would be required for 
 the defence of the fortifications of London. It would ob- 
 viously be impossible to let the capital fall into the hands 
 of an invader, especially in view of the pressure of public 
 opinion. But if London is taken by an army of invasion, 
 one or the other naval harbours wiU also have to be occupied, 
 in order to create a base for suppHes and for further opera- 
 tions which we are justified to thmk wiU lead to the conquest 
 of England. 
 
 Operations against the United States 
 
 " Operations against the United States of North America 
 would have to be conducted in a different manner. During 
 the last years political friction with that State, especially 
 friction arising from commercial causes, has not been 
 lacking, and the diflSculties that have arisen have mostly 
 been settled by our giving way. As this obliging attitude 
 has its limits, we have to ask ourselves what force we can 
 possibly bring to bear in order to meet the attacks of the 
 United States against our interests and to impose our will. 
 Our fleet will probably be able to defeat the naval forces of 
 the United States, which are distributed over two oceans 
 and over long distances. But it would be a mistake to 
 suppose that the defeat of their fleet will force the United 
 States with its immense resources into concluding peace. 
 
GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 79 
 
 " In view of the small number of American merchant-men, 
 in view of the small value of the American colonies which 
 are not even pacified, in view of the excellent fortifications 
 with which the great American seaports are provided, and 
 which cannot be taken except with very heavy losses, and 
 in view of the large number of American seaports, all of 
 which we cannot blockade at the same time, our fleet has 
 no means to force that opponent through successful maritime 
 operations to conclude a peace on our terms. 
 
 " The possibihty must be taken into account that the 
 fleet of the United States will at first not venture into 
 battle, but that it will withdraw into fortified harbours, in 
 order to wait for a favourable opportunity of achieving 
 minor successes. Therefore it is clear that naval action 
 alone will not be decisive against the United States, but 
 that combined action of navy and army will be required. 
 Considering the great extent of the United States, the 
 conquest of the country by an army of invasion is not 
 possible. But there is every reason to beheve that vic- 
 torious enterprises on the Atlantic coast, and the conquest 
 of the most important arteries through which imports and 
 exports pass, will create such an unbearable state of affairs 
 in the whole country that the Government will readily offer 
 acceptable conditions in order to obtain peace. 
 
 " If Grermany begins preparing a fleet of transports and 
 troops for landing purposes at the moment when the battle 
 fleet steams out of our harbours, we may conclude that 
 operations on American soil can begin after about four 
 weeks, and it cannot be doubted that the United States 
 will not be able to oppose to us within that time an army 
 equivalent to our own. 
 
 " At present the regular army of the United States 
 amounts to 65,000 men, of whom only about 30,000 could 
 be disposed of. Of these at least 10,000 are required for 
 watching the Indian territories and for guarding the fortifica- 
 tions on the seacoast. Therefore only about 20,000 men 
 of the regular army are ready for war. Besides, about 
 100,000 mihtia are in existence, of whom the larger part did 
 not come up when they were called out during the last war. 
 Lastly, the mihtia is not efficient ; it is partly armed with 
 muzzle-loaders, and its training is worse than its armament. 
 
 "As an operation by surprise against America is im- 
 possible, on account of the length of time during which the 
 
80 GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 
 
 transports are on the way, the landing can be effected only 
 by surprise. Nevertheless, stress must be laid on the fact 
 that the rapidity of the invasion will considerably facihtate 
 victory against the United States, owing to the absence of 
 methodical preparation for mobiUsation, owing to the in- 
 experience of the personnel, and owing to the weakness of 
 the regular army, 
 
 " In order to occupy permanently a considerable part of 
 the United States and to protect our lines of operation, so 
 as to enable us to fight successfully against all forces which 
 that country, in the course of time, can oppose to us, con- 
 siderable forces would be required. Such an operation 
 would be greatly hampered by the fact that it would require 
 a second passage of the transport fleet in order to ship the 
 necessary troops that long distance. However, it seems 
 questionable whether it would be advantageous to occupy 
 a great stretch of country for a considerable time. The 
 Americans will not feel inclined to conclude peace because 
 one or two provinces are occupied by an army of invasion, 
 but because of the enormous material losses which the whole 
 country wiU suffer if the Atlantic harbour towns, in which 
 the threads of the whole prosperity of the United States 
 are concentrated, are torn away from them one after the 
 other. 
 
 " Therefore the task of the fleet would be to undertake 
 a series of large landing operations, through which we are 
 able to take several of these important and wealthy towns 
 within a brief space of time. By interrupting their com- 
 munications, by destroying all buildings serving the State, 
 commerce, and the defence, by taking away all material 
 for war and transport, and, lastly, by levying heavy con- 
 tributions, we should be able to inflict damage on the 
 United States. 
 
 " For such enterprises a smaller military force wiU suffice. 
 Nevertheless, the American defence wiU find it difficult to 
 undertake a successful enterprise against that kind of 
 warfare. Though an extremely well-developed railway 
 system enables them to concentrate troops within a short 
 time on the different points on the coast, the concentration 
 of the troops and the time which is lost until it is recognised 
 which of the many threatened points of landing wiU reaUy 
 be utilised wiU, as a rule, make it possible for the army of 
 invasion to carry out its operation with success under the 
 
GERMAN NAVAL AIMS 81 
 
 co-operation of the fleet at the point chosen. The corps 
 landed can either take the offensive against gathering hostile 
 forces or withdraw to the transports in order to land at 
 another place. 
 
 " It should be pointed out that Germany is the only 
 Great Power which is able to tackle the United States 
 single-handed. England could be victorious on sea, but 
 would not be able to protect Canada, where the Americans 
 could find consolation for their defeats on sea. Of the other 
 Great Powers, none possess a fleet of transports required 
 for such an operation." 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 prusso-germany's world policy and its policy 
 towards the anglo-saxon states ^ 
 
 Up to 1870 the ambitions of the Grermans were for national 
 unity and for a leading role among the Continental nations. 
 When this object had been achieved by Bismarck's genius, 
 and when the fabric of the German Empire had been con- 
 soHdated and strengthened, the German horizon was rapidly 
 enlarged. Though not unmindful of her exposed Con- 
 tinental position and of the possibility of seeing her empire 
 expanding east, south, and west, Germany resolved to 
 become a great colonial Power. 
 
 Many decades back some of the greatest Gterman thinkers, 
 among them Treitschke, Schliemann, Roscher, List, Droysen, 
 pointed out that the problem of disposing of Germany's 
 surplus population in a temperate zone was an urgent one, 
 but at the time when these men wrote and spoke Germany 
 was still divided against herself and was powerless and poor. 
 She then possessed neither a navy nor a merchant marine 
 worthy the name, nor manufacturing industries, nor foreign 
 commerce, and for some thirty years the agitation for 
 colonies was restricted to the Universities, being ignored, 
 or even discountenanced, in official and in commercial 
 circles. Nothing illustrates the attitude of the German 
 people and Government in those times better than the 
 acquisition, in 1848, of a small fleet paid for largely by 
 the voluntary contributions of colonial enthusiasts, and its 
 subsequent sale by auction, in 1852, by the Government. 
 
 During the last few decades, but especially since Germany's 
 consolidation in 1871, the population of the empire increased 
 
 1 From the Fortnightly Review, March 1903. 
 82 
 
GERMANY'S ; WORLD POLICY 83 
 
 with wonderful rapidity. The population of Grermany 
 within her Umits of 1914 has risen as follows : 
 
 Averftge Increase 
 Qerman popalatioa. per annam. 
 
 1840 32,800,000 — 
 
 1850 35,400,000 260,000 
 
 1860 37,700,000 230,000 
 
 1870 40,800,000 310,000 
 
 1880 45,200,000 440,000 
 
 1890 49,400,000 420,000 
 
 1900 56,300,000 690,000 
 
 1913 67,000,000 850,000 
 
 German emigration, which accounted for the loss of 220,000 
 citizens in 1881, had sunk to only 18,545 in 1912, but this 
 sHght loss in population was more than counterbalanced 
 during recent years by a large immigration into Germany 
 from Austria, Russia, and Italy. Professor SchmoUer 
 estimated that the German population would amount to 
 104,000,000 in 1965, Hiibbe-Schleiden prophesied that it 
 would rise to 150,000,000 in 1980, and Leroy-Beaulieu, the 
 first French authority on these things, had estimated that 
 it would be 200,000,000 within a century. Germany was 
 loth to strengthen foreign nations with her emigration. The 
 former German colonies did not offer a sufficient outlet for 
 the emigration of white men. Consequently the resolution 
 had arisen to acquire territories in a temperate zone whenever 
 and wherever possible. 
 
 The rooted conviction that Germany must possess colonies 
 almost at any price, which had emanated from professorial 
 circles, gradually pervaded in the end the whole nation 
 from the highest to the lowest. 
 
 The German politicians and bureaucrats, who had no 
 experience in colonial policy, who often lacked sympathy, 
 understanding, enterprise, and imagination regarding co- 
 lonial matters, and who viewed the turbulent clamour for 
 colonies of the professor-led multitude with the hearty 
 dislike with which the initiative of the people was frequently 
 viewed by official Germany, quickly became the most 
 enthusiastic and the most uncompromising of colonial 
 fanatics when William II. lent his unreserved support to 
 
84 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 
 
 the colonial movement and gave it its anti-Anglo-Saxon 
 character. 
 
 Astonishment was frequently expressed at the peculiar 
 means by which Grermany tried to acquire colonies, but 
 those who are well acquainted with the character of official 
 and unofficial Germany could not wonder. Modern Ger- 
 many owed her greatness to the sword, and her national 
 character had nothing in common with the better-known 
 character of the Germany of the past. 
 
 In old Germany the centre of gravity lay in the more 
 easy-going south. Her character resembled that of Austria. 
 Modern Germany had been conquered by the East Prussian 
 nobility, the descendants of those hardy knights of the 
 Teutonic Order, who had wrested East Prussia from the 
 Slavs in countless battles, and converted the independent 
 heathen inhabitants into obedient Christian serfs. The 
 East Prussian nobility ruled the aboriginal inhabitants of 
 Prussia with the greatest harshness, and various mediaeval 
 institutions — for example, serfdom — prevailed in Prussia 
 even in the eighteenth century. Though serfdom in Prussia 
 was nominally abolished in 1807, its last remnants continued 
 to exist until a short time ago. Even recently the down- 
 trodden peasant in East Prussia humbly kissed the hands 
 of the squire and of his children and the hem of his wife's 
 garment, and submitted to correction by the whip. East 
 Prussia, with her arrogant nobility and submissive peasantry, 
 strongly resembled her neighbour Russia, in which country 
 also the nobility and the Government established themselves 
 by force. In East Prussia, as in Russia, the nobility was 
 wasteful, the estates were encumbered with mortgages, the 
 peasantry was ignorant, poor, and hard- worked, manu- 
 facturing industries were practically non-existent, and the 
 only way to acquire money known to the noblemen was 
 by force or by craft, not by industry. The descendants of 
 the valorous Teutonic knights did not introduce industries 
 on their estates or up-to-date methods into agriculture, as 
 will be shown in another chapter, but tried to obtain 
 from the Government high protective tarifiEs and other 
 
GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 85 
 
 favours through their representatives in the Reichstag, the 
 Agrarians. 
 
 The best example of the new German spirit was afforded 
 by Bismarck, who was a typical East Prussian in his policy 
 and in his methods. His appearance and his personality 
 suggested that he had a considerable amount of Slav blood 
 in him. At all events, Slavs and Slav methods were most 
 sympathetic to him, and nowhere did he feel more at home 
 than amongst the Russians in Russia. Bismarck's political 
 methods, which at first shocked German sentimentalism, 
 had made her great, and, owing to the assiduous and some- 
 what uncritical Bismarck cult which was carried on in that 
 country, these methods became in German eyes the natural 
 and classical methods of German statecraft and diplomacy. 
 
 The East Prussian squires were always treated as the 
 chief piUars of the throne, and they occupied the most 
 important official positions in Prussia and in Grermany. 
 Consequently, it was only natural that, when the question of 
 acquiring colonial possessions came to the front, Prusso- 
 Grerman officialdom turned instinctively to those means 
 which had proved so eminently successful in the past imder 
 Bismarck. It did so the more readily as to the Prusso- 
 German official, who had grown up in feudalistic ideas, the 
 liberal Anglo-Saxon institutions were as hateful as they were 
 to the Russian official, for the spreading of the Democratic 
 idea threatened to subvert the reign by caste and to destroy 
 the privileged position of the nobility and the bureaucracy. 
 To the German or Russian patriot, who looked back upon 
 the glorious expansion of his country by conquest from the 
 small beginnings made by the HohenzoUerns and the Ruriks, 
 the continued growth of his country by conquest seemed as 
 natural and as legitimate as expansion by peaceful means 
 appears to the Anglo-Saxons. To him the sword was not 
 the ultima ratio Regis, but an ordinary implement. 
 
 The anti-British movement in Germany was not a spon- 
 taneous outburst of irresponsible popular opinion, but an 
 agitation which was kindled and fanned by the Government. 
 The anti-British, as weU as the anti- American, movement 
 
86 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 
 
 emanated from the Government and those near it, and it 
 was assisted bv the inteUectual leaders of the nation. 
 
 In consideriiis the opinions expressed by leading Germans 
 on German coloJiial expansion and on Anglo-Saxon countries, 
 the fact that those opinions were by no means merely the 
 private opmions of irresponsible private citizens should 
 never be lost sight of. The rigorous disciphne which 
 Imperial Germany enforced on her citizens was doubly 
 ric^orous in respect of officials and officers, both on active 
 service and on the retired list. An opinion unfavourable 
 to the Government or to a measure taken by the Govern- 
 ment even thoucrh privately expressed by an official or 
 an officer, would, if reported to his superior, bring on hkn 
 severe "disciplinarv^' pimishment, or even dismissal. The 
 Government could also bring considerable pressure to bear 
 upon the nominaUv mdependent University professors, who 
 thirst after preferment by the State, titles, and decorations. 
 Consequentlv, it may be said that the pubhcly-expressed 
 opmions of kcting and retired officials and officers, and of 
 the University professors, with regard to German colomal 
 poUcy and Anglo-Saxon nations were approved of and 
 endorsed bv the Government. 
 
 German professors have in the past played a great part 
 in German history. Professor Luther brought about the 
 Reformation. The renascence of Prussia after her collapse 
 in 1806-1S07 was largely due to the patriotic actmty of 
 the German professors, among whom Professors Arndt, 
 Fichte ?nd Niebuhr were most prominent, and the unihca- 
 tion of the German Emph^e was the ideal and corstant 
 thoucrht of the professors long before the advent of Bismarck, 
 though thev intended to attain it by methods less vigorous 
 than those of blood and iron. The old national Parhament 
 of Frankfort and the German Fleet of 1848 are witnesses to 
 their aims. Therefore professorial utterances on matters of 
 poUcy could not be dismissed as being only " irresponsible 
 
 professors' talk." • 4. > 
 
 German politicians and German colomal enthusiasts 
 thought very highly of the value of tropical colomes, but 
 
GERiMXY'S WORLD POLICY 87 
 
 the acquLsition of settlement colonies in a temperate zone 
 was their principal aim and ambition, becaiLse these would 
 afford an outlet to the Grerman surplus population. Seeing 
 that most habitable and thinly-populated lands oversea 
 were in Anglo-Saxon hands, official and unofficial Germany 
 had been seriously considering the question whether it 
 would be possible to wrest suitable territories from Great 
 Britain or America. Li making their plans for colonial 
 expansion and surveying their chances against the Anglo- 
 Saxon countries, the Germans had come to the conclusion 
 that Great Britain was a senile, declining nation, and that 
 the United States were a young and vigorous nation, whose 
 political future and military potentialities seemed unlimited 
 unless, indeed, their progress was arrested by force. The 
 plans of the colonial enthusiasts, and of official Germany 
 as well, were shaped in accordance with these views. 
 
 The official and semi-official publications of Germany 
 were of course very careful not to reveal Germany's ultimate 
 aims as a world Power, which could only be gauged from the 
 opinions and hopes expressed by persons moving in weU- 
 informed circles. Those ultimate aims which were in every- 
 body's mouth were expressed with delightful candour in a 
 pamphlet. Die Abrechnung mil England, by C. Eisenhart, 
 Munich, 1900. In this book it was shown how (Germany 
 mth the help of her new fleet, first destroys the navy of 
 Japan and gains a footing in the East ; how afterwards, 
 while Great Britain is crippling Russia in Asia for the 
 convenience of Germany, she destroys the British Fleet ; 
 and, lastly, how the " insolence " of the United States is 
 punished by their complete defeat, Germany's victories 
 resulting in the acquisition of the best Anglo-Saxon posses- 
 sions, including Australia, and in Germany's paramountcy 
 over Anglo-Saxondom the world over. To this writer, as 
 to many others, German world policy was synonymous with 
 Grerman world supremacy and German domination over the 
 entire globe. Another candid writer, who, however, either 
 did not see as far as ^Ir. Eisenhart, or who did not care to 
 make known to the world the whole of his views, from 
 7 
 
88 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 
 
 political considerations, said in his book, Deutschktnd beim 
 Beginn des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, Berlin, 1900 : 
 
 " We consider a great war with England in the twentieth 
 century as quite inevitable, and must strain every fibre in 
 order to be prepared to fight that war single-handed. The 
 experience of all time shows that colonial empires are more 
 fragile and less enduring than continental empires. We do 
 not require a fleet against France or Russia, let them even 
 ravage our coasts in case of a war. We require a fleet only 
 against England.'^ 
 
 In a similar strain the Koloniale Zeitschrift wrote on the 
 18th of January 1900 : 
 
 " The old century saw a German Europe ; the new one 
 shall see a German world. To attain that consummation 
 two duties are required from the present German generation — 
 to keep its own counsel and to create a strong naval force." 
 
 Again, on the 28th of March 1900, the same journal 
 said : 
 
 " The nineteenth century was not the German century ; 
 it was the Prussian century. In the history of the world 
 the twentieth century will be caUed the German century." 
 
 In a leading article entitled " German World Policy," the 
 Deutsches Wochenblatt wrote on the 1st of February 1899 : 
 
 " It can hardly be doubted that at the outbreak of the 
 next great war Russia will take Constantinople. ... It is 
 possible that a general war against England will come before 
 the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. ... If Russia 
 attracts to herself the Slavonic peoples round the Danube, 
 our way via Salonika towards Asia Minor and Suez will be 
 lost for aU time. . . . Our motto should be : With the whole 
 Continent against England ; with Austria against Russia 
 when the time comes." 
 
 " Teutonicus " wrote in the same journal on the 19th of 
 August 1899: 
 
GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 89 
 
 " Our adversaries in a naval war would probably be our 
 Samoa partners (the United States and Great Britain). . . . 
 Now, as ever, the existence of our fleet depends upon the 
 goodwill of England, Therefore, it is clear that the North 
 Sea will be the theatre of war where our fate will be decided, 
 whether we fight for our interest in the China Seas or on the 
 eastern coast of America. Consequently, in a future naval 
 war, our North Sea fleet and our army of embarkation would 
 be mobilised at the moment when the Enghsh Mediterranean 
 fleet should effect a suspicious movement." 
 
 These utterances were more than the bombastic rodo- 
 montades of fantastical sensation-mongers, for the authors 
 of them had palpably taken their cue from the no less 
 unmistakable though slightly more diplomatically expressed 
 utterances of the Emperor, who set the ball roUing and gave 
 to the colonial movement its aggressive character by pointing 
 out that German colonial ambitions could only be satisfied 
 after Germany had secured the supremacy on the ocean — that 
 is, at the cost of Anglo-Saxon countries. As far back as the 
 24th of April 1897 William II. said in Cologne at a banquet : 
 
 " Neptune with the trident is a symbol for us that we have 
 new tasks to fulfil since the empire has been welded together. 
 Everywhere we have to protect German citizens ; every- 
 where we have to maintain German honour : that trident 
 must be in our fist ! " 
 
 On other occasions he coined the winged words : 
 
 " Our future lies upon the water." " Without the consent 
 of Germany's ruler nothing must happen in any part of the 
 world." " May our Fatherland be as powerful, as closely 
 united, and as authoritative as was the Roman Empire of 
 old, in order that the old Civis Romanus sum be replaced 
 by ' I am a German citizen ' ! " 
 
 On the 18th of October 1899 William II, made a speech 
 in which he said : 
 
 " We are in bitter need of a strong German navy. ... If 
 the increase demanded during the first years of my reign 
 had not been continually refused to me in spite of my 
 
90 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 
 
 pressing entreaties and warnings, for which I have even 
 experienced derision and ridicule, how differently should we 
 be able to further our flourishing commerce and our interests 
 oversea." 
 
 It can hardly be doubted that the Emperor's bitterness 
 at his inability to " further our interests oversea " was 
 caused by the political situation in South Africa. At the 
 time when he was speaking the Boer ultimatum had been 
 dispatched only nine days, and a strong German fleet, had 
 it then existed, might no doubt have been able to further 
 " the German interest in the Transvaal as an independent 
 State." On the 1st of January 1900 the Emperor WiUiam 
 announced in a speech his determination to possess an 
 overwhelmingly strong navy, in the following words : 
 
 " As my grandfather reorganised the army, so shall I 
 reorganise my navy, without flinching and in the same way, 
 so that it will stand on the same level as my army, and that, 
 with its help, the Grerman Empire shall reach the place 
 which it has not yet attained." 
 
 It may be objected that these and similar utterances of 
 WiUiam II. were the spontaneous and ill-considered private 
 opinions of a private man who happened to be the head of 
 the State, not pronunciamientos deliberately launched by 
 the head of the Empire ; that they were in fact not sanc- 
 tioned by the official representatives of German policy, 
 and, therefore, devoid of political significance. People who 
 express such views are evidently ignorant of the far-reaching, 
 nay, almost unlimited, pohtical power which was vested in 
 the German Emperor imder the Imperial Constitution, and 
 are not aware that William II. was his own ChanceUor. 
 
 Similar views to those pronounced by the German Em- 
 peror were also uttered by his responsible Ministers. For 
 instance, on the day of the disaster at Magersfontein, the 
 11th of December 1899, the then Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs, Prince Biilow, said in the Reichstag in 
 support of an immensely increased naval programme : 
 
GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 91 
 
 " The necessity to strengthen our fleet arises out of the 
 present state of the world and out of the circumstances of 
 our oversea policy. Only two years ago no one would 
 have been able to foresee in which way things would start 
 moving. It is urgent to define the attitude which we have 
 to take up in view of what is happening. . . . We must create 
 a fleet strong enough to exclude attack from any Power." 
 
 Again, a fortnight after the disaster of Spion Kop, Admiral 
 Tirpitz, the Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy, spoke 
 thus : 
 
 " We do not know what adversary we may have to face. 
 We must therefore arm ourselves, with a view to meeting 
 the most dangerous naval conflict 'possible.'''' 
 
 Prince Biilow said on the 12th of June 1900 : 
 
 "It is necessary that Germany should be strong enough 
 at sea to maintain German peace, German honour, and 
 German prosperity all the world over." 
 
 In all these official speeches a distinct hint was conveyed 
 as to the probability of a conflict with Great Britain, from 
 whom the supremacy at sea was to be wrested, and the regret 
 was guardedly expressed that Germany could not turn the 
 British difficulties and disasters in South Africa to account, 
 owing to the weakness of her fleet. 
 
 That the German Emperor's phrase, " That trident must 
 be in our fist," was not merely a metaphor spontaneously 
 born from banquet-heated enthusiasm, but the deliberate 
 statement of a well-considered policy, may be seen from the 
 dry, matter-of-fact preamble to the German Navy Bill of 
 1900, which said : 
 
 " Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war 
 against the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threaten- 
 ing the supremacy of that Power.''' 
 
 Some years afterwards Mr. Bassermann, the leader of the 
 Liberal Party in the German Reichstag, thought it necessary 
 to endorse, on behalf of his party, the official utterances 
 
92 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 
 
 quoted in the foregoing, and said at the Liberal Party 
 Congress on the 13th of October 1903 : 
 
 " In our attitude towards England we must keep cool, 
 and, until we have a strong fleet, it would be a mistake to 
 let ourselves be drawn into a hostile policy towards her. . . . 
 The development of the United States of North America 
 and their desire for expansion is likewise a lesson for us not 
 to be forgetful of our armaments, especially at sea." 
 
 Bearing in mind the dependence of Grerman public opinion 
 upon the views of the Emperor and his Government, it need 
 hardly be asserted that the o£B.cial and authoritative utter- 
 ances cited above were carefully weighed and well considered, 
 and that official statements such as these were responsible 
 for the less veiled, but more forcible, views expressed in 
 Die Abrechnung mit England, Deutschland heim Beginn des 
 Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts , the Koloniale Zeitschrift, the 
 Deutsches Wochenblatt, and hosts of others, and that the 
 violent anti-British campaign had little or nothing to do 
 with German sympathy with the Boers. 
 
 Some years before the War M. E. Lockroy, a man of great 
 ability and of sound judgment, who three times had been 
 Minister of Marine in France, visited Germany and was 
 allowed to inspect the German Fleet and dockyards, even 
 to the smallest details. That this permission was granted 
 to Germany's " hereditary enemy " seems astonishing, 
 unless we bear in mind that the numerous advances to 
 France made by the Emperor William II. and his Govern- 
 ment aimed less at ensuring the peace of Europe, or at 
 breaking up the alliance with Russia, than at securing the 
 assistance of the French Fleet for the overthrow of Great 
 Britain. That view was repeatedly expressed in Die Grenz- 
 boten, by far the most influential political weekly in Germany, 
 which very frequently spoke with the authority of the Ger- 
 man Foreign Office. In view of the close relations existing 
 between that journal and the German Foreign Office, the 
 views expressed in it are of exceptional weight and interest, 
 and they will consequently be occasionally cited hereafter. 
 
GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 93 
 
 On the 5th of October 1899 an article appeared ui Die 
 Grenzboten, which said : 
 
 " All differences between France and Germany benefit 
 only the nearly all-powerful enemy of the world. As long 
 as the French keep one eye fixed on Alsace-Lorraine, it is 
 no good that they occasionally look at England with the other 
 eye. Only when the German Fleet has a strength commen- 
 surate with her sea interests will the French seek our friend- 
 ship instead of being humihated by their hereditary enemy." 
 
 M. Lockroy, who might have become an important factor 
 in favour of a Franco-German alliance, in the event of his 
 returning subsequently to the Cabinet, seems not to have 
 been left in the dark about Germany's ambitions by his official 
 German hosts, for in his Lettres sur la Marine Allemande, 
 which appeared in 1901 , he summed up his impressions about 
 the purpose of the German Navy in the following way : 
 
 " Germany will be a great naval power in spite of her 
 geographical position and history. Her claim to rule the 
 waves will bring on a war with Great Britain earlier or later. 
 That war will be one of the most terrible conflicts of the 
 twentieth century. What its result will be no one can 
 foretell, but so much is sure, that Germany does everything 
 that human forethought and the patience and energy of a 
 nation can suggest." 
 
 His words confirm the existence of the wish of German 
 diplomacy to form an anti-British alliance with France, a 
 wish which was hinted at in 1899 in Die Grenzboten and in 
 many other inspired journals. This wish dictated also the 
 numerous personal advances made by WiUiam II. to in- 
 dividual Frenchmen and the advances made by German 
 diplomacy. 
 
 The views of the most distinguished and most respected 
 German professors with regard to Germany's poUcy of 
 colonial expansion at Anglo-Saxon cost coincided with 
 those expressed in Die Abrechnung mit England and similar 
 publications. They breathed the fiercest hatred against 
 Anglo-Saxon countries, especially against Great Britain, 
 the more immediate object of Germany's attention. 
 
94 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 
 
 Count Du Moulin- Eckart, professor of history at Munich, 
 wrote in his book Englische Politik und die Mdchte : 
 
 " Our present relations with England are similar to our 
 former relations with Austria. To both nations we are 
 related by race, by both we have been hampered in our 
 progress, and by both we have been deceived times without 
 number. Time will show whether co-operation with Eng- 
 land is possible. If it be impossible, a war will become 
 necessary, and then : Hail thee, Germany ! May the 
 genius of a Bismarck grant us then a second Koniggratz ! " 
 
 The late Professor Schmoller, a most prominent lecturer 
 on political economy at the Berlin University, a member 
 of the Prussian Privy Council and of the Prussian Upper 
 Chamber, gave a lecture in Berhn, Strasbourg, and Hanover, 
 which was largely circulated in print, in which he said : 
 
 " In various States, arrogant, reckless, cold-blooded daring 
 bullies (Gewaltmenschen), men who possess the morals of a 
 captain of pirates, as Professor Brentano called them so 
 justly the other day, push themselves more and more forward 
 and into the Government. . . . We must not forget that it 
 is in the freest States, England and North America, where 
 the tendencies of conquest. Imperial schemes, and hatred 
 against new economic competitors are growing up amongst 
 the masses. The leaders of these agitations are great 
 speculators, who have the morals of a pirate, and who are 
 at the same time party leaders and Ministers of State. . . . 
 The conquest of Cuba and the Philippines by the United 
 States alters their political and economical basis. Their 
 tendency to exclude Europe from the North and South 
 American markets must needs lead to new great conflicts. 
 It must also not be forgotten how England tried to wreck 
 our Zollverein, how she tried to prevent us from conquering 
 Schleswig-Holstein, and how anti- German she was in 1870. 
 . . . These bullies (Gewaltmenschen), these pirates and 
 speculators a la Cecil Rhodes, act like poison within their 
 State. They buy the press, corrupt ministers and the 
 aristocracy, and bring on wars for the benefit of a bankrupt 
 company or for the gain of filthy lucre. Where they govern 
 modesty and decency disappear, as do honesty and respect 
 for justice. Legitimate business cannot maintain itself, and 
 
GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 95 
 
 all classes of society are exploited and ill-used by a small 
 circle of capitalistic magnates, stock-jobbers, and specu- 
 lators. . . . We mean to extend our trade and industries far 
 enough to enable us to live and sustain a growing population. 
 We mean to defend our colonies, and, if possible, to acquire 
 somewhere agricultural colonies. We mean to prevent 
 extravagant mercantilism everywhere, and to prevent the 
 division of the earth among the three world powers, which 
 would exclude all other countries and destroy their trade. 
 In order to attain this modest aim we require to-day so badly 
 a large fleet. The German Empire must become the centre 
 of a coahtion of States, chiefly in order to be able to hold 
 the balance in the death-struggle between Russia and 
 England, but that is only possible if we possess a stronger 
 fleet than that of to-day. . . . We must wish that at any 
 price a German country, peopled by twenty to thirty million 
 Germans, should grow up in Southern Brazil. Without the 
 possibiUty of energetic proceedings on the part of Germany 
 our future over there is threatened. . . . We do not mean 
 to press for an economic alliance with Holland, but if the 
 Dutch are wise, if they do not want to lose their colonies 
 some day, as Spain did, they will hasten to seek our alliance." 
 
 Another distinguished professor of political economy, 
 Professor Dr. von Schaffle, wrote in the Milnchener Allge- 
 meine Zeitung on the 4th of February 1898 : 
 
 " The progress of our sea commerce has become so immense 
 that Germany must be prepared for anything on the part of 
 her rivals. Let us not deceive ourselves. The English, if 
 they can summon up the necessary courage, will try at the 
 first opportunity to give the deathblow to our commerce 
 oversea and to our export industries. The Transvaal 
 quarrel has made evident what we have to expect. Cecil 
 Rhodes, Chamberlain, and their accomplices are, in this 
 respect, only types of the thought and intentions of present- 
 day England towards new Germany. Great Britain will 
 move heaven and hell against the sea commerce of the new 
 Grerman Empire as soon as she can." 
 
 Another eminent scientist, the professor of political 
 economy, Von Schulze-Gaevernitz, wrote in the Nation, 
 the 5th of March 1898 : 
 
96 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 
 
 " In order to strengthen the sensible and peaceable 
 elements in England, and to confine commercial envy within 
 harmless bounds, we require the defence of a fleet. . . . 
 The British Cape to Cairo idea is opposed to French and 
 German interests, but German vital interests would be 
 affected by British control of the still undivided portion of 
 the world, especially of China and of Turkey." 
 
 Then, referring to the rapid colonial expansion of Great 
 Britain during the last decade, he significantly added : 
 " But should in future the day of liquidation arrive, Ger- 
 many must have the power to participate in it." 
 
 Professor Mommsen, probably the greatest historian of 
 modern times, wrote, regarding England, in the North 
 American Review for February 1900 : 
 
 " The repetition of Jameson's Raid by the English 
 Government (I won't say the English nation), dictated by 
 banking and mining speculations, is the revelation of your 
 moral and political corruption." 
 
 The former Under-Secretary of State, professor of poli- 
 tical economy Von Mayr-Strasbourg, wrote in the Miin- 
 chener Allgemeine Zeitung : 
 
 " Our national policy requires the firm backbone of a 
 strong fleet in order to oppose with energy the brutal in- 
 stincts of exporting countries, especially of those which 
 export agricultural produce. Our commercial policy re- 
 quires it in order to give to our home industries the certainty 
 of the continued supply of raw material and of open markets 
 for their exports." 
 
 Hans Delbriick, the distinguished professor of history at 
 Berlin, wrote in the North American Review of January 
 1900: 
 
 " England insists upon being the only great commercial 
 and colonial power in the world, and is only willing to aUow 
 other nations the favour of owning small fragments as 
 enclaves wedged in helplessly between her possessions. This 
 it is which we neither can nor intend to tolerate. . . . The 
 good things of this world belong to all civilised nations in 
 
GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 97 
 
 common. As England is not expected to give way peace- 
 ably, and as her great naval power cannot be overwhelmed 
 by a single State, the best remedy would be the alliance 
 against her of all her rivals together, especially of Russia, 
 France, and Grermany. . . . Such is the state of public 
 opinion in Germany. There is only one person in the whole 
 country who thinks otherwise, and that is the Kaiser." 
 
 From the foregoing small but representative selection of 
 opinions expressed by the elite of the German professors, 
 which might easily be increased sufficiently to fill a volume, 
 the nature- of Germany's colonial ambitions and the cause 
 of her fanatical hatred of Anglo-Saxondom should be 
 sufficiently clear. 
 
 The last phrase of Professor Delbriick, " There is only 
 one person in the country who thinks otherwise, and that 
 is the Kaiser," seemed quite true at the time when it was 
 written, for the combined agitation by the official classes, 
 the Universities, the entire German press, and the Protes- 
 tant clergy, had roused Germany to a frenzy of hatred ; 
 and though the " poor Boers " were constantly in the 
 mouth of the multitude, the utterances of the leaders, like 
 those cited, make it clear that the clashing of German 
 colonial ambitions and Anglo-Saxon interests, not German 
 sympathy with the Boers, was at the bottom of the anti- 
 British propaganda. 
 
 Owing to the rule of democracy, Anglo-Saxon diplomacy 
 works in the full glare of publicity, and cannot pursue a 
 far-seeing, secret, or unscrupulous policy, but is forced to 
 take short views and to act honestly ; while German as well 
 as Russian Cabinet policy was able to work with infinite 
 patience and in absolute secrecy, because it was unham- 
 pered by popular control. An example will illustrate this 
 point. Between 1860 and 1863 an expedition, sent out by 
 the Prussian Government, and accompanied by the cele- 
 brated geographer, Freiherr von Richthofen, explored 
 China, Japan, and Siam. After the most painstaking in- 
 vestigation of the Chinese coast and mainland, Freiherr 
 von Richthofen came to the conclusion that Kiau-chow 
 
98 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 
 
 was in every respect by far the most valuable harbour of 
 China, and when, in 1897, more than thirty years after his 
 survey, two German missionaries were murdered in China, 
 Germany immediately occupied Kiau-chow, which port was 
 certainly not selected by coincidence. 
 
 On the 5th of May 1898, a few days after the outbreak 
 of the Spanish-American War, Die Grenzboten, the most 
 influential political weekly, which was frequently inspired 
 by the Government, wrote, probably not without official 
 sanction : 
 
 " The number of Germans in the United States amounts 
 to nearly twenty millions, but many of them have lost their 
 native language or their German names. Nevertheless, 
 German blood flows in their veins, and it is only required 
 to gather them together under their former nationality in 
 order to bring them back into the lap of their mother 
 Germania. The German volunteers will, of course, have 
 to pay the heaviest blood tax in the war, as they alone form 
 the warlike element of the army. The promiscuous mob of 
 Englishmen, half-breeds, Irish, and negroes is too incoherent 
 and too unmilitary to show any soldierly qualities. Never- 
 theless, Germanism has to take a back seat in the army, 
 and generals' positions are almost exclusively in the hands 
 of Englishmen. 
 
 " We have to consider that more than ^three million 
 Germans live as foreigners in the United States who are 
 not personally interested in that country. A skilful Ger- 
 man national policy should be able to manipulate that 
 German multitude against the shameless war-speculators." 
 
 Had the issue of the Spanish-American War been un- 
 favourable to the United States, or had the attempt at 
 forming an anti- American coalition succeeded, the " skilful 
 manipulation " from Berlin of the German vote " against 
 the shameless war-speculators " might have been possible, 
 and might have borne much fruit. Germany's miscalcula- 
 tion as to the issue of the war, and as to the strength and 
 leanings of the German- Americans, seems to have caused 
 great disappointment in Berlin. This disappointment 
 appears to have been responsible for the reckless provoca- 
 
GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 99 
 
 tion which Admiral Dewey received from Admiral Diedrichs 
 before Manila, and which might have resulted in hostilities 
 between the American and German fleets, had it not been 
 for the timely presence of the British squadron and the 
 determined attitude of its admiral. 
 
 During the South African War the clashing of German 
 colonial ambitions and Anglo-Saxon interests became par- 
 ticularly marked, because in Africa German colonial ambi- 
 tions were clearly defined, and had become the ambitions 
 of the nation and of the populace ; in the Spanish- American 
 War they were vague and hazy, and exclusively the am- 
 bitions of German diplomacy, for to the German masses 
 the Spanish- American War had little significance. Already 
 in 1884, at the beginning of her colonial career, Germany 
 had attempted to gain a footing in Santa Lucia Bay, with 
 an eye to the possibility of joining hands with the Boer 
 republics close by, and of gaining, with their help, supremacy 
 in Africa, but Bismarck's attempt failed through the in- 
 capacity of his son, who conducted the negotiations in 
 London. 
 
 Undaunted by her first failure, Germany continued 
 to believe that her best chance of acquiring settlement 
 colonies lay in South Africa, and worked patiently and in 
 silence for the attainment of her ambition. The Jameson 
 Raid gave her a rude awakening. She feared the absorp- 
 tion of the Boer republics by Great Britain before Germany 
 and the Boers were ready to co-operate. In his anxiety to 
 maintain his hold upon South Africa, the German Emperor 
 sent his celebrated telegram to Mr. liruger, thus prema- 
 turely revealing Germany's innermost ambitions. The 
 existence of these ambitions was stiU further proved by 
 Baron Marschall von Bieberstein's official declaration that 
 " the continued independence of the Boer republics is a 
 German interest." 
 
 By the Emperor's impetuousness, Germany's ultimate 
 aims regarding South Africa were clearly disclosed to Great 
 Britain, a mistake which Bismarck would never have com- 
 mitted, and the Ej^uger telegram and the attitude of the 
 
100 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 
 
 semi-official press left the German nation with the erroneous 
 impression that the British Government had been behind 
 Jameson, and that the Emperor's veto had, once and for 
 aU, put an end to the aggressive plans of Great Britain. 
 Thus misled, it was not unnatural that the Germans believed 
 themselves to be the masters of the situation in South 
 Africa, and that the German press constantly advocated 
 the expulsion of Great Britain from that country. For 
 instance, on the 4th of July 1895, a few months after the 
 Jameson Raid, Die Grenzboten wrote : 
 
 " For us the Boer States, with the coasts that are their 
 due, signify a great possibility. Their absorption into the 
 British Empire would mean the blocking up of our last road 
 towards an independent agricultural colony in a temperate 
 clime. WiU England obstruct our path ? If Germany 
 shows determination. Never ! " 
 
 After surveying the globe, official Germany had evidently 
 come to the conclusion that South Africa would be an 
 ideal colony, more desirable even than South Brazil, and 
 that the most natural way to acquire it would be to wrest 
 it out of. British hands with the help of the Boers. Die 
 Grenzboten wrote on the 15th of April 1897 : 
 
 " The possession of South Africa offers greater advantages 
 in every respect than the possession of Southern Brazil. If 
 we look at the map our German colonies look very good 
 positions for attack." 
 
 In a similar strain the Koloniales Jahrhuch for 1897 
 wrote : 
 
 " The importance of South Africa as a land which can 
 receive an unlimited number of white immigrants must 
 rouse us to the greatest exertions, in order to secure there 
 supremacy to the Teuton race. The greater part of the 
 population of South Africa is of Low German descent. We 
 must constantly lay stress upon the Low German origin 
 of the Boers, and we must, before all, stimulate their 
 hatred against Anglo-Saxondom. . . . No doubt the Boers 
 will, with characteristically German tenacity, retake their 
 
GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 101 
 
 former possessions from the English by* combining slimness 
 with force. In this attempt they can count upon the 
 assistance of the German brother nation." 
 
 These quotations contain an unmistakable programme 
 and a very interesting forecast. 
 
 As the idea that Germany was the heir-presumptive to 
 South Africa was constantly discussed in the German press, 
 that idea had sunk deeply into the German mind. The 
 succession to that inheritance soon became with the masses 
 an impending event to be looked forw^ard to. It was only 
 a question of time when it would come to pass. In German 
 eyes South Africa had become indispensable to Germany, 
 it was already considered as a national asset, and in innumer- 
 able lectures, books, and articles its resources and possi- 
 bilities were discussed. 
 
 While dispatches regarding the suzerainty of the Trans- 
 vaal were being exchanged between Great Britain and that 
 country, the leading organs of the German press continued 
 preaching the expulsion of the British from South Africa, 
 an action calculated to strengthen the resistance of the 
 Boers, and to make them look to Germany for protection. 
 For instance, on the 16th of Jime 1898, when war between 
 the Transvaal and Great Britain seemed unavoidable. Die 
 Grenzboten wrote : 
 
 " The existence of the Boer States makes it, perhaps, 
 possible to regain the lost colony, including Delagoa Bay. 
 Here in the north of Cape Colony a weU-considered German 
 policy ,must be pursued, and the Emperor's telegram to 
 Kruger has already demonstrated our firm wiU to return the 
 Gladstonian ' hands ofE ' to the EngUsh. The possession of 
 the natural harbour of Delagoa Bay is a vital condition for 
 the Low Grerman States in South Africa. Without Low 
 Germanism in South Africa our colonies are worth nothing 
 as settlements. Our future is founded upon the victory of 
 Low Germanism, and upon the expulsion of the English 
 from South Africa, where, even in Cape Colony, they are 
 still in the minority. The prosperity of our South African 
 colonies, which singly are worth as little as Cameroon and 
 Togo, depends upon the possibility of connecting those two 
 
102 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 
 
 colonies, whereby England will be confined to the south, 
 and the dream of a great British colonial empire from the 
 Cape to Cairo will vanish." 
 
 If we look at the South African question from the Ger- 
 man point of view, and remember how German diplomacy 
 had plotted and laboured for the acquisition of South Africa 
 for fifteen years and more, how the telegram and the speeches 
 of William II. and the attitude and propaganda of the 
 German press had created the universal belief in Germany 
 that Great Britain could not move in South Africa without 
 Germany's consent, and that Germany's influence there 
 was paramount, we can understand with what dismay and 
 exasperation the outbreak of the South African War and 
 the prospect of seeing the Boer States absorbed by Great 
 Britain was greeted by the German people. 
 
 The disappointment felt in German official circles was 
 no less keen, and, not unnaturally, the question suggested 
 itself whether Great Britain's progress in South Africa 
 could not be stopped by force. Remembering her failure 
 to form a coalition against Great Britain in 1895, and 
 against the United States in 1898, Germany found herself 
 isolated and unable to save South Africa for herself. The 
 large naval programme of 1898, providing for seventeen 
 battleships, etc., coincided with the Spanish- American War. 
 Similarly, the outbreak of the South African War coincided 
 with the German Navy Bill of 1900, providing for a further 
 huge increase. Smarting under the sense of her impotence 
 against Great Britain, the Navy Bill of 1900 was brought 
 forward, which was to provide a fleet of such strength that, 
 according to the preamble of the Bill, " a war against the 
 mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the 
 supremacy of that Power." That fleet was to cost about 
 £100,000,000. In spite of that staggering amount, the 
 Navy Bill was rapidly passed, for its object to destroy 
 the power of Great Britain was greeted with delight by the 
 nation, and with hysterical jubilation by the masses. At 
 last Great Britain was to be brought to her knees. 
 
GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 103 
 
 The powerful Social Democratic Party did not prove an 
 effective obstacle to the execution of Germany's colonial 
 ambitions. Although the representatives of Labour ob- 
 jected to the Navy Bill, they objected neither to the pro- 
 spective humiHation of Great Britain nor to the acquisition 
 of foreign markets by conquest. The following lines from 
 the Sozialisiische Monatshefte for December 1899 faithfully 
 depicted the opinion of the German Labour Party : 
 
 " That Germany be armed to the teeth, possessing a 
 strong fleet, is of the utmost importance to the working men. 
 What damages our exports damages them also, and working 
 men have the most pressing interest in securing prosperity 
 for our export trade, be it even by force of arms. Owing to 
 her development, Germany may perhaps be obliged to main- 
 tain her position sword in hand. Only he who is under the 
 protection of his guns can dominate the markets, and in 
 the fight for markets German working men may come 
 before the alternative either of perishing or of forcing their 
 entrance into markets sword in hand." 
 
 From this and many similar manifestations it is clear 
 that no effective opposition against Germany's colonial 
 ambitions came from the ranks of the Social Democratic 
 Party. 
 
 Germany's military and naval leaders thought that Ger- 
 many's chances in case of a war with England were not 
 unfavourable. A fair indication of the spirit and the 
 intentions existing among the highest German officers may 
 be found in a remarkable article contributed to the Deutsche 
 Rundschau of March 1900, by General C. von der Goltz, an 
 article which was aU the more remarkable as General von 
 der Goltz was on active service. It should be added that 
 von der Goltz was the reorganiser of the Turkish Army, 
 and one of the most talented of German officers. He said : 
 
 ". . . We must contradict the opinion, which has so 
 frequently been expressed, that a war between Germany and 
 Great Britain is impossible. Great Britain is forced to dis- 
 tribute her fleets over many seas in peace as weU as in war, 
 and her home squadron is surprisingly weak in comparison 
 8 
 
104 GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 
 
 with her fleets in the Mediterranean and in India, the Far 
 East, Australia, the Red Sea, South Africa, the West Indies, 
 and the Pacific. Li that necessary distribution of her 
 strength lies Great Britain's weakness. Germany is in a 
 better position. Her navy is small, but it can be kept 
 together in Europe. Our colonies want no protection, for 
 a victory in Europe would give us our colonies back at 
 the conclusion of peace. With Great Britain matters are 
 different. If India, Australia, or Canada should be lost in 
 a war, they would remain lost for ever. . . . 
 
 "... For the moment our fleet has only one-fifth the 
 fighting value of the British Fleet, and Great Britain's 
 superiority over us is striking, but when the projected in- 
 crease of our fleet has been effected, the outlook for us will 
 be bright. The British home squadron, with which we 
 should have to deal, amounts to 43 battleships and 35 large 
 cruisers. Even if that fleet should be increased in the 
 future, it would no longer be an irresistible opponent to us. 
 Numbers decide as little on the sea as they do on land ; 
 numerical inferiority can be compensated for by greater 
 efficiency. . . . 
 
 " As places are not wanting where England's defences are 
 weak, it would be a mistake to consider a landing in Eng- 
 land as a chimera. The distance is short enough if an 
 admiral of daring succeeds in securing supremacy on the 
 sea for a short time. . . . 
 
 " The material basis of our power is large enough to make 
 it possible for us to destroy the present superiority of 
 Great Britain, but Germany must prepare beforehand for 
 what is to come, and must arm in time. Germany has 
 arrived at one of the most critical moments in her history, 
 and her fleet is too weak to fulfil the task for which it is 
 intended. We must arm ourselves in time, with aU our 
 might, and prepare ourselves for what is to come, without 
 losing a day, for it is not possible to improvise victories on 
 the sea, where the excellence of the material and the greatest 
 skill in handling it are of supreme importance." 
 
 When we consider the spirit of irreconcilable hostility 
 against Anglo-Saxondom that pervaded the countless ex- 
 pansionist manifestations in Germany, emanating from 
 official and semi-official quarters, from professorial and 
 mercantile circles, from the clergy and the proletariat, we 
 
GERMANY'S WORLD POLICY 105 
 
 cannot help being struck by the unanimity of hatred and 
 by the unflinching determination of Grermany to erect a 
 German world empire upon the ruins of Anglo-Saxondom, 
 Nowhere was the celebrated word of Sir Walter Raleigh, 
 " Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade ; who- 
 soever commands the trade commands the riches of the 
 world, and consequently the world itself," more frequently 
 quoted and more thoroughly appreciated than in Germany. 
 Germany had become great by the sword. She wished 
 to walk in the steps of her greatest rulers, Frederick II, 
 and Bismarck, but she disdained the advice of those most 
 successful expansionists. Frederick the Great's counsel, 
 " Secrecy is the soul of foreign politics," was as little 
 heeded by her recent rulers as Bismarck's recommendation 
 " not to meddle in the afifairs of foreign States unless one 
 has also the power to accomplish one's intentions." By 
 the foUy of her leaders Germany's plans were prematurely 
 and immistakably revealed to the world, and if the Anglo- 
 Saxon nations had been so blind as not to take the mea- 
 sures necessary to frustrate those plans, of which they had 
 received such ample and such long-dated warning, they 
 would have fully deserved the fate of Spain and Holland. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION — 
 GERMAN EVIDENCE ON THE SUBJECT * 
 
 Anglo-German relations, which used to be satisfactory 
 and cordial, had during the years preceding the War be- 
 come more and more strained and embittered. During the 
 Morocco crisis of 1911 the tension had increased to the 
 breaking-point. The two countries prepared for war and 
 their fleets for instant action. British and German sailors 
 waited impatiently for the signal. Had a British and a 
 German warship unexpectedly encountered one another, 
 mutual distrust might have led to the charging and training 
 of guns ; and if, through the loss of nerve on the part of 
 an officer, through the misunderstanding of an order, or 
 through an accident, a gun had gone ofif — and at such a 
 moment of supreme tension guns are apt to go off in an 
 imaccountable manner — a war to the death between Eng- 
 land and Germany might have ensued. Hence Germans 
 and Englishmen asked themselves : Why have Anglo- 
 German relations become so strained and embittered ? Is 
 Sir Edward — now Viscount — Grey to blame ? Can Anglo- 
 German relations be improved ? What can be done to 
 improve them ? 
 
 Let us first of all consider the pre-war situation from the 
 German point of view, relying exclusively upon German 
 evidence. 
 
 Before the War the world was told officially and semi- 
 officially by Grerman statesmen, writers, and lecturers that 
 Germany was a peaceful nation, which ever since the Franco- 
 German War of 1870-1871 had kept the peace, that she 
 
 ^ From the Fortnightly Review, March 1912. 
 106 
 
ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 107 
 
 could not in any way be blamed for the Anglo-German ten- 
 sion, that all was England's fault. Countless German Govern- 
 ment officials, professors, and journalists asserted that Great 
 Britain envied Germany for her economic success, and that 
 she worked unceasuigly, both openly and secretly, for Ger- 
 many's downfall, in order to rid herself of an inconvenient 
 competitor. They asserted that Great Britain pursued to- 
 wards Grermany that traditional policy of envy and plunder 
 which caused her to attack and despoil one by one all the 
 great industrial, commercial, and colonial nations of the 
 past. In hundreds of books and newspapers and from 
 thousands of platforms the Germans were informed that 
 the leading principle of British statesmanship was the pro- 
 motion of British trade by the destruction of Great Britain's 
 commercial rivals, that Great Britain grudged Germany 
 her " place in the sun," that she envied Germany her com- 
 merce and her shipping, that British diplomats had cribbed 
 and confined Germany with a network of hostile alliances, 
 and that they perfidiously hampered and opposed Ger- 
 many's progress in all parts of the world. 
 
 The German description of British policy was a calumny 
 and a fantastic distortion of history. Every one who is 
 acquainted with British history is aware that during the 
 last two centuries the principal aim of British policy has not 
 been the pursuit of commercial aggrandisement and colonial 
 expansion, but the maintenance of the balance of power 
 on the Continent of Europe. Great Britaia fought all her 
 greatest wars not for trade and colonies — for " plunder," 
 as the Germans say — but for the preservation of the balance 
 of power in Europe. For that great principle she fought 
 the Spaniards under Philip II., the French under Louis XIV., 
 Louis XV., Napoleon I., and the Russians in the Crimea ; 
 and the eventual conquest of the Spanish and French 
 colonies was, as Professor Seeley has shown, merely the 
 accidental consequence, but not the cause, of her great wars 
 against Spain and France. The great majority of Eng- 
 land's wars were not wars of aggression, but wars of defence. 
 
 The maintenance of the balance of power on the Con- 
 
108 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 
 
 tinent of Europe was and is one of the greatest of British 
 interests. It is clear that only a nation which has de- 
 stroyed the balance of power on the Continent, and which 
 has become supreme on the Continent, can hope success- 
 fully to attack Great Britain. It is equally clear that no 
 nation can maintain the mastery of the Continent of Europe 
 as long as a strong and independent England exists on its 
 flank. Hence a nation which strives for supremacy in 
 Europe feels impelled to attack Great Britain earlier or 
 later. History confirms this. AU the rulers, from Julius 
 Caesar to Napoleon I. and to WiUiam II., who have striven 
 to become supreme in Europe have made war upon Great 
 Britain. National security is more important than a pro- 
 fitable commerce and extensive colonies. A little considera- 
 tion shows that Great Britain's island position is secure 
 only as long as the balance of power on the Continent is 
 maintained intact ; and the more evenly the balance of 
 power on the Continent is adjusted, the greater is Great 
 Britain's security from continental attack. Consequently 
 the greatest and the most important task of British states- 
 manship has been in the past not the promotion of trade 
 and the acquisition of colonies, but the maintenance of the 
 balance of power in Europe. Great Britain has been 
 actuated in her foreign policy not by greed, but by the 
 instinct of self-preservation. 
 
 In the course of the last few decades British statesman- 
 ship has been given another task, which has become even 
 more important than the maintenance of the balance of 
 power on the Continent of Europe. A century ago, when 
 Great Britain fought Napoleon I., the British islands were 
 practically self-supporting. In the 'fifties of last century 
 Great Britain raised at home nine-tenths of the bread and 
 meat which her people required. Before the War of 1914- 
 1918 nine-tenths of the bread-corn and one-half of the 
 meat which the British people required came from abroad. 
 Philip II,, Louis XIV., Louis XV., Napoleon I. could hope 
 to subdue England by the slow process of invasion and 
 conquest ; now Great Britain can more easily and more 
 
ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 109 
 
 rapidly be subdued by starvation. Occasionally the supply 
 of wheat stored in Great Britain sufficed for less than a 
 month. Even a short interruption of the grain imports 
 would bring about a famine. No nation in the world pos- 
 sesses a more precarious food supply than Great Britain, 
 and none is more vitally dependent upon the free and un- 
 hampered entrance of food-ships into her ports. As Great 
 Britain has only sea frontiers, England can protect herself 
 against the danger of being starved into surrender only 
 if her fleet is strong enough to defend the freedom of the 
 sea against any Power and against any possible combina- 
 tion of Powers. Hence the possession of an unchallengeable 
 supremacy of her navy is now more important to Great 
 Britain than it has been at any time of her history, and 
 the maintenance of British naval supremacy has become 
 perhaps even more important a principle of British states- 
 manship than the maintenance of the balance of power in 
 Europe. The Germans themselves were aware that he who 
 threatens Great Britain's naval supremacy threatens not 
 only her trade and her colonies but her very life. In 1909 
 a little book for the use in schools, entitled Die Flotte als 
 notwendige Ergdnzung unserer natiormlen Wehrmacht, written 
 by Adolf Schroeder, was published in Germany. In it we 
 read : 
 
 " Were it possible to cut off Great Britain's supply of 
 food, in less than six weeks would the inhabitants die of 
 starvation. Britons are fuUy aware of the danger, and all, 
 from the noble lord to the labourer, are convinced that it is 
 the most important duty of the State to keep open and secure 
 the broad highway of the ocean on which British merchant- 
 men import food and raw material and export British manu- 
 factures. However, the security of the import and export 
 trade in the case of a country which is entirely surrounded 
 by the sea can be guaranteed only by a navy which is 
 stronger than that of any other State. But the Briton 
 requires more. He demands a fleet which, both ship for ship 
 and by their combined number, should be superior to the com- 
 bined fleets of the two most powerful nations which conceivably 
 might make war upon his country. That conviction is 
 
110 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 
 
 deeply rooted in the minds of all Britons, and all parties 
 agree in this principle which is a question of the natioTial 
 
 existence" 
 
 The italics are in the original. The Conservative Kreuz 
 Zeitung wrote on the 28th of January 1911 : 
 
 " England must protect her enormous and indispensable 
 imports of food against every disturbance, especially in case 
 of war. Therefore the English Government is compelled 
 to maintain a Navy strong enough to open all trade routes 
 and, if possible, to blockade all hostile squadrons in their 
 ports, ia order to protect the British Isles against the danger 
 of starvation and of a panic affecting the prices of food- 
 stufiEs." 
 
 Captain Hartwig Schubert wrote in his pamphlet, Die 
 Deutsche Schlachtflotte eine Gefahr fur Deutschland's Macht- 
 stellung, published in 1911 : 
 
 " Great Britain imports approximately five times as much 
 bread-corn and flour as Germany. Whilst England can 
 receive food only by sea, Germany can obtain it by land 
 across the frontiers of Denmark, Russia, Austria, Switzer- 
 land, France, Luxemburg, and HoUand. It follows that 
 Grermany requires no navy for the protection of her food 
 supply, whilst Great Britain can secure a sufficiency of 
 foodstuffs only as long as she possesses a fleet which is 
 strong enough to face any hostile combination of Powers." 
 
 No British statesman could have given clearer and fairer 
 statements proving Great Britain's need of the possession 
 of a paramount navy than the three given in the foregoing. 
 JMost thinking Germans agreed that Great Britain requires 
 a fleet of unchallengeable power for the protection of her 
 food supply. Therefore it must also have been clear to 
 aU Germans that a nation which challenges British naval 
 supremacy threatens Great Britain's very existence. Cap- 
 tain Schubert (late of the German Army) wrote : 
 
 " In the Franco-German War France had a superior fleet. 
 Germany's victories on land compelled the French to land 
 their sailors and to employ them for the defence of their 
 
ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 111 
 
 country on land. In a future war with France and Russia 
 we must strive to bring about the same result. A German, 
 naval victory in a war against France and Russia would be 
 unnecessary to us in case we are victorious on land. It 
 would be worthless to us should we be defeated on land, 
 because our land armies would be weakened by the men 
 on board our ships. Besides, if defeated on land, we could 
 not follow up a naval victory by the landing of armies in 
 the enemy's country, for we should then have no land 
 troops to spare. It is therefore clear that the Grerman 
 Navy is built only for use against England." 
 
 Captain Schubert's arguments were faultless and un- 
 answerable. His statement that the German Navy was 
 built only for use against England cannot be disproved. 
 
 In an interview which Professor Hans Delbriick, one of 
 the leading German professors, gave in December 1911 to 
 the Daily Mail, he spoke of " Britain's long-standing and 
 traditional political hostility to Germany." Germans are 
 fond of asserting that Great Britain has " always " been 
 hostile to Germany. This is one of their greatest grievances. 
 However, that complaint also can be disproved out of 
 German mouths. Herr Eduard Bernstein, one of the lead- 
 ing SociaUst writers and a man of widely-recognised emi- 
 nence, fairness, and honesty of purpose, published at the 
 end of 1911 a pamphlet entitled Die Englische Gefahr und 
 das Deutsche Volk, in which we read : 
 
 " All that has been written as to England's hostility to- 
 wards Germany before the foundation of the German Empire 
 in 1870 is merely idle and mischievous talk and invention. 
 England and Prussia and England and Austria were some- 
 times friends and sometimes opposed to each other, but in 
 their relations there was no fixed tendency and there could 
 be none, because no important clashing interests existed 
 between the British Empire and the two great German 
 States. Even during the first years of the Grerman Empire 
 there was no friction worth mentioning between Great 
 Britain and Germany. 
 
 li^/' During the struggle for Protection (in 1879 and after- 
 wards) German Free Traders were piUoried as ' English 
 
112 ANGLO -GERMAN FRICTION 
 
 agents.' The Protectionist literature of the period abounds 
 with attacks upon England. ... In consequence of the 
 Protectionist movement the instinct of self-preservation 
 impelled England to secure markets for the future, and 
 when in 1883 Germany began acquiring colonies she met 
 with British resistance. However, one must recognise that 
 that resistance was not the result of British illwill towards 
 the Grerman nation, for that resistance was caused, or 
 at least greatly increased, by Germany's introducing in 
 economic matters the policy of the closed door. It is only 
 fair to say that in many cases British resistance did not 
 emanate from the British Government itself, but from the 
 British colonies or from individual British colonists whose 
 claims for protection the Government in London was 
 bound at least formally to support. In several cases Ger- 
 many recognised the existence of old and valid British 
 claims. . . . When in 1888 the Emperor Frederick III. 
 came to the throne the nationalist German press began 
 a violent anti-British campaign, attacking the Empress 
 Victoria, ' the Englishwoman.' 
 
 " On the 7th of February 1896 (shortly after the Jameson 
 Raid) the Foreign Secretary, Freiherr von MarschaU, de- 
 clared in the Reichstag that the continued independence 
 of the Boer Republics was a German interest. Now the 
 publication of the correspondence of several of the Boer 
 leaders has shown that the leading Boers aimed not only 
 at the shaking off of England's paramountcy over the Boer 
 States, but that they intended to drive England out of 
 South Africa, and that they relied in this policy upon 
 Grermany's support. Meanwhile Germany had begun to 
 increase her fleet in feverish haste. In 1898 a Navy Bill 
 was passed providing for nineteen battleships, eight armour- 
 clads for coast defence, and forty-two cruisers at a cost of 
 £20,000,000, and William II. declared in Hamburg : ' We 
 are in bitter need of a strong German fleet.' Two years 
 later, in 1900, came another Navy Bill which doubled the 
 battle fleet provided by the BiU of 1898, and which increased 
 the sum required for shipbuilding to £40,000,000. Can 
 one wonder that the English were startled by our action ? 
 Whilst Secretary of State Admiral Hollmann had declared 
 in the Reichstag, ' The German coasts require no protection, 
 they protect themselves,' the Emperor had loudly pro- 
 claimed, ' The trident must be in our fist.' " 
 
•ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 113 
 
 By the Navy Bill of 1898, the provisions of which were 
 doubled by the Navy Bill of 1900, the building programme 
 of the German Navy was firmly laid down up to the year 
 1917. However, the year 1905 brought a second, the year 
 1908 a third, and the year 1912 a fourth enlargement, and 
 the moneys voted in respect of these five Navy BiUs greatly 
 exceeded in the aggregate the sum of £250,000,000. The 
 introduction to the Navy Bill of 1900 stated : " Grermany 
 requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest 
 naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy 
 of that Power." Germany dehberately set to work to chal- 
 lenge Great Britain's naval supremacy, and she proclaimed 
 in 1900 that intention officially from the housetops. The 
 original Navy Bills of 1898 and 1900, and their amendments 
 of 1905, 1908, and 1912, were carried after a passionate 
 anti-British campaign which was undoubtedly engineered 
 by the Government. It has been shown in the foregoing 
 that the possession of an u^jchaUengeable naval supremacy 
 is a matter of life or death for Great Britain, and that most 
 Germans who have given the matter a moment's thought 
 agreed that Great Britain must have a navy which is 
 stronger than that of any other Power, or of any probable 
 combination of Powers. Consequently it is clear that by 
 the naval policy which Germany had inaugurated in 1900 
 she deliberately challenged not only Great Britain's posi- 
 tion in the world, but her very existence as an independent 
 nation. 
 
 Most Germans who complained about British " in- 
 trigues " asserted that King Edward VII. was Germany's 
 greatest enemy, and that he was responsible for hedging 
 Germany about with a network of alliances and under- 
 standings. Yet a well-known and eminent German writer 
 on foreign politics, the Councillor of Legation, Herr von 
 Rath, wrote on the 3rd of November 1911 in Der Tag : 
 
 " To-day it cannot be denied that England strove in the 
 first instance for a political rapprochement with Germany, 
 and that King Edward VII. pursued this plan as soon as he 
 
114 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 
 
 had come to the throne. The strongest sea Power gravitated 
 towards the strongest land Power, and nobody can deny 
 nowadays that Germany rejected at that time the repeated 
 advances of British Conservative statesmen, such as Mr. 
 Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne, and the Duke of Devonshire." 
 
 As a matter of fact. Great Britain's attempts to be on 
 the best and the most intimate terms with Germany began 
 long before King Edward VII. had come to the throne. 
 Formerly Great Britain had followed the policy of " splen- 
 did isolation." In the 'eighties of last century, when Bis- 
 marck's policy of alliances divided Europe into two camps, 
 British statesmen began to recognise the desirability of 
 entering upon more intimate relations with one of the 
 two groups of nations. EngUshmen and Germans are far 
 more closely akin by race, national character, and religion 
 than are Enghshmen and Frenchmen or Englishmen and 
 Russians. Most Englishmen instinctively desired to march 
 side by side with their German cousins. Besides, at that 
 time there was constant friction in the colonial sphere 
 between France and Great Britain and between Russia 
 and Great Britain. Desiring to enter upon more intimate 
 relations with Germany, British diplomacy began to settle 
 aU outstanding differences between the two countries, so 
 as to abolish all causes of friction and of dispute. With 
 this object in view it concluded the Anglo-German Agree- 
 ment of 1890, which defined the British and the German 
 spheres of influence in East, West, and South- West Africa. 
 This Agreement was followed by the Anglo- Congolese 
 Agreement of 1894, and later by an Anglo-German under- 
 standing regarding the Portuguese colonies in the event of 
 their coming into the market. When in 1897 Germany 
 occupied Kiao-chow, Great Britain supported her, and re- 
 nounced aU intentions of connecting Wei-hai-wei by railway 
 with the Shantung hinterland, thus giving to Germany the 
 monopoly in the exploitation of that important and wealthy 
 province. In 1899 Great Britain concluded with Germany 
 the Samoa Agreement, according to which Great Britain 
 retired altogether from Samoa, while Germany received 
 
ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 115 
 
 the two most important islands of that group. In 1900 
 Great Britain concluded with Germany an agreement defin- 
 ing Anglo-German interests in China, the so-called Yangtse 
 Agreement. The mere enumeration of these various agree- 
 ments shows that during the decade 1890-1900 British 
 diplomacy consistently strove to abohsh all differences 
 with Germany in all parts of the world, with the object 
 of bringing about an Anglo-German rapprochement. Un- 
 fortunately all attempts of British diplomacy to win Ger- 
 many's goodwill and all the advances made by British 
 statesmen were rejected by Germany with scorn. Great 
 Britain, her statesmen, and even her rulers, were treated 
 by practically the whole semi-official press of Germany 
 with contempt, insults, and ridicule, and justified complaints 
 arose in responsible quarters that German statesmen were 
 taking unfair advantage of Great Britain by the employ- 
 ment of the most questionable diplomatic methods. 
 
 When British statesmen discovered that they had wasted 
 ten years in fruitless attempts at reconciling Germany, and 
 that Germany had treated every British advance as a sign 
 of cowardice on the part of a hateful enemy, and especially 
 when they saw that, almost within sight of the British 
 coast, an enormous fleet was being constructed, which, it 
 was officially proclaimed, was intended to challenge the 
 supremacy of " the mightiest naval Power," they recog- 
 nised that it was vain to hope any longer for Germany's 
 poHtical friendship, and they turned elsewhere. The 
 Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian ententes were brought 
 about not by King Edward, but by Germany herself, by 
 her anti-British policy. Germany herself forced Great 
 Britain to enter into arrangements with Germany's oppo- 
 nents. If, before 1914, Germany was hedged around by a 
 net- work of ententes and alliances, she should accuse not 
 the late King Edward, but only her own leaders. 
 
 Many years ago WiUiam II. proclaimed, " Germany's 
 future lies upon the sea." During more than twenty years 
 Germany had striven to acquire colonies for her surplus 
 population. The expansion of States is a natural move- 
 
116 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 
 
 ment. Continental States, such as Germany, can expand 
 on the land. Insular ones are compelled by nature to 
 expand Oversea . Oversea colonies are a necessity to an 
 over-populated State such as Great Britain, but they are 
 not so much a necessity to Germany. During a consider- 
 able number of years immigration into Germany has been 
 far greater than emigration from Germany. At the census 
 of 1907 it was found that no less than 1,342,292 foreigners 
 were living in Germany, German agriculturists, mine- 
 owners, and manufacturers complained constantly about a 
 shortage of labour. Germany did not suffer from over- 
 population. A nation can in safety embark upon a great 
 transmaritime policy only if the motherland is secure, if it 
 occupies an island like Great Britain or Japan, or if it 
 possesses practically an insular position such as the United 
 States. 
 
 The greater part of the German colonies was acquired 
 by Bismarck. However, although in Bismarck's time 
 Germany's position in Europe was exceedingly strong, Bis- 
 marck's principal care was to ensure Germany's security 
 on the Continent of Europe, and he attached the greatest 
 value to Great Britain's goodwill and support in view of 
 the possibility of continental complications. Considering 
 Germany's continental interests infinitely more important 
 than her transoceanic ones, he absolutely refused to pursue 
 a transmaritime and colonial policy in opposition to Eng- 
 land, fearing that an anti-British pohcy would drive 
 England into the arms of France and Russia. Even when 
 diplomatic differences had arisen between the two coimtries, 
 Bismarck wished to remain on cordial terms with Great 
 Britain. On the 2nd of March 1884, for instance, he stated 
 in the Reichstag with reference to an Anglo-German dispute : 
 
 " I shall do everything in my power in order sine ira et 
 studio, and in the most conciliatory manner, to settle this 
 matter in accordance with that quiet and friendly inter- 
 course which has at all times existed between England and 
 Germany, a quiet and friendly intercourse which is most 
 natural because neither Power possesses vital interests 
 
ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 117 
 
 which conflict with the vital interests of the other Power. 
 I can see only an error in the opinion that England envies 
 us our modest attempts at colonising." 
 
 He laid down at greater length his guiding principles in 
 his intercourse with Great Britain on the 10th of January 
 1885, when he stated in the Reichstag : 
 
 " The last speaker has told us that we must either aban- 
 don our colonial policy or increase our naval strength to 
 such an extent that we need not fear any naval Power, or, 
 to speak more clearly, that our navy should rival that of 
 England herself. However, even if we should succeed in 
 building up a navy as strong as that of England, we should 
 stiU have to fear an aUiance of England and France. Those 
 Powers are stronger than any single Power in Europe is 
 or ever can be. It follows that the policy indicated by the 
 last speaker is one which can never be striven after. 
 
 " I would also ask the last speaker not to make any 
 attempts either to disturb the peace between England and 
 Germany or to diminish the confidence that peace between 
 these two Powers will be maintained by hinting that some 
 day we may find ourselves in an armed conflict with Eng- 
 land. I absolutely deny that possibility. Such a possi- 
 bility does not exist, and all the questions which are at 
 present being discussed between England and Grermany 
 are not of sufficient importance to justify a breach of the 
 peace on either side of the North Sea. Besides, I really 
 do not know what disputes might arise between England 
 and Germany. There never have been disputes between the 
 two countries. From my diplomatic experience I cannot 
 see any reasons which can make hostilities possible between 
 them unless a Cabinet of inconceivable character should be 
 in power in England, a Cabinet which neither exists nor 
 which is ever likely to exist, and which criminally attacks 
 us." 
 
 Four years later, on the 26th of January 1889, only a 
 short time before his dismissal, he stated with reference to 
 the Anglo-German Zanzibar dispute in the Reichstag : 
 
 " I absolutely refuse to act towards the Sultan of Zanzibar 
 in opposition to England. As soon as we have arrived at 
 an understanding with England, we shaU take the necessary 
 
118 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 
 
 measures in Zanzibar in agreement with England. I do 
 not intend either actively to oppose England or even to 
 take note of those steps which subordinate British indi- 
 viduals have taken against us. In Zanzibar and in Samoa 
 we act in perfect harmony with the British Government. 
 We are marching hand m hand, and I am firmly resolved 
 that our relations shall preserve their present character. 
 English colonial interests compete with ours in numerous 
 places, and subordinate colonial officials are occasionally 
 hostile to German interests. Nevertheless we are acting in 
 perfect unison with the British GtDvernment, we are abso- 
 lutely united, and I am firmly resolved to preserve Anglo- 
 German harmony and to continue working in co-operation 
 with that country. 
 
 " The preservation of Anglo- German goodwill is, after 
 all, the most important thing. I see in England an old and 
 traditional ally. No differences exist between England and 
 Germany. If I speak of England as our aUy, I am not using 
 a diplomatic term. We have no alliance with England. 
 However, I wish to remain in close contact with England 
 also in colonial questions. The two nations have marched 
 side by side during at least 150 years, and if I should dis- 
 cover that we might lose touch with England, I should 
 act cautiously and endeavour to avoid losing England's 
 goodwill." 
 
 Modern Germany erected to Bismarck countless statues. 
 Bismarck's speeches, Bismarck's letters, and Bismarck's 
 memoirs were printed in hundreds of thousands of copies, 
 and they stand on the bookshelves of the people by the 
 side of SchiUer and Goethe. But modern Germany had 
 forgotten, or she dehberately disregarded, Bismarck's 
 policy and Bismarck's warnings. Through the shortsighted- 
 ness of Bismarck's successors the bonds of the Triple 
 Alliance were so much loosened that Germans themselves 
 raised periodically the cry that they were isolated in a 
 hostile world. Yet modern Germany needlessly increased 
 the dangers which threatened her on the Continent stiU 
 further by throwing Bismarck's warnings to the winds 
 and antagonising Great Britain, who might have proved 
 Germany's best and most valuable friend in her hour of need. 
 
ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION il9 
 
 The reason that for years before the War Great Britain 
 was no longer Germany's " old and traditional ally," as 
 Bismarck called her, must be sought not in Great Britain's 
 envy, but in the culpable mistakes of Germany's diplomacy. 
 On the 8th of November 1911 the Frankfurter Zeitung 
 published in the most prominent place an article from its 
 London correspondent in which the causes of the Anglo- 
 German differences in connection with the Morocco ques- 
 tion were unsparingly exposed in the following words : 
 
 " On the 15th of May the German Emperor came to 
 England in order to attend the unveiUng of the national 
 memorial to the late Queen. He was received by the 
 people of London with the greatest cordiality. Five weeks 
 later the German Crown Prince arrived in London to attend 
 the Coronation, and he was greeted with the same universal 
 goodwill. A week after King George's Coronation came the 
 bomb of Agadir. Of course one may say : the fact that 
 the Emperor was cordially received by the English people 
 has nothing to do with diplomatic relations. Germany 
 cannot regulate her political action by the visits of her 
 Sovereign. Such arguments show a complete lack of 
 understanding of the spirit of Western democracy. A 
 foreign monarch comes to England. He drives during a 
 week through London. He constantly takes off his grey 
 top-hat to cheering crowds, and the man in the street says 
 smilingly, ' JoUy fellow, isn't he ? ' Now the man in the 
 street makes public opinion, and, after all, Mr. Lloyd 
 George himself is a man in the street who has become a 
 minister. 
 
 " When the German Emperor arrived in London, the im- 
 pression became general in England that Germany would 
 remain quiet. If, at that time, the German Morocco poHcy 
 was already mapped out, then the Imperial visits to England 
 were a mistake. They brought us with the English people 
 the regrettable reputation of perfidiousness (Untreue). Now 
 the reproach of perfidiousness has adhered to German policy 
 for some time. That is known to everybody who is in 
 contact with international diplomacy. It is the irony of 
 fate that the German diplomatic apparatus, which is exclu- 
 sively served by men belonging to the best families of the 
 9 
 
120 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 
 
 aristocracy, does not at all enjoy the credit which is owed 
 to gentlemen." 
 
 Editorially the Frankfurter Zeitung wrote on the 29th of 
 December 1911 : 
 
 " The German Navy alone cannot have been the cause 
 of the acute differences which exist between Great Britain 
 and Germany. If we Germans strive for once to place 
 ourselves without prejudice in the position of the British, 
 we must confess that the distrust of Germany which pre- 
 vails on the other side of the Channel is not without cause. 
 If we Germans had had to hear certain utterances from the 
 mouth of a foreign sovereign, we also would have been 
 startled and would have thought it necessary to strengthen 
 our defences. Now we can only say to the British that the 
 monarchical utterances in question need not be taken too 
 tragically, because we have learned by experience that 
 big words are not followed by big deeds. We know now 
 that the KJruger telegram, the Imperial call to arms against 
 the Yellow Peril, the Emperor's speech at Damascus, his 
 journey to Tangier and the dispatch of the Panther, were 
 only dramatic gestures devoid of consequences. However, 
 they have had the unfortunate effect of evoking hostility 
 on the one side and high hopes on the other, which soon 
 were converted into bitter disappointment, and people 
 received the impression that German poUcy was either dan- 
 gerous or unreliable. Of late things have improved because 
 injudicious utterances from the highest quarter are no 
 longer reported. Still the distrust of Germany remains, 
 and we cannot be surprised at it. We tell the EngUsh un- 
 ceasingly that the German nation is peaceful, and that it 
 desires to live in harmony with England and all other 
 nations. However, these assurances make no impression, 
 for we are told : We are quite sure that the German people 
 is peaceful, but the German people does not make German 
 policy. German policy is made in a single, irresponsible, 
 and incalculable quarter. Therefore the peaceful assur- 
 ances of the German people have for us not a practical 
 but merely a Platonic value. What can we reply to that 
 argument ? " 
 
 In Bismarck's time German diplomacy enjoyed a twofold 
 distinction : it pursued a wise, sane, and far-seeing pohcy. 
 
ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 121 
 
 and the diplomatic apparatus was faultlessly served by 
 men of high ability. In the time of William II. German 
 diplomacy failed in both respects, and the German people 
 began to complain bitterly about the men in their diplo- 
 matic service. Towards the end of December 1911 Mr. 
 L. Raschdau, a former German ambassador, pubhshed in 
 several German papers an article on German diplomacy, in 
 which he stated that the German ambassadorial service 
 had become defective because the diplomatic career had 
 been reserved to members of the German aristocracy. 
 On this point the Frankfurter Zeitung wrote editorially on 
 the 29th of December 1911 : 
 
 " The Emperor's advisers and assistants are not selected 
 according to their talent and experience, but according to 
 circumstances imconnected with their career and duties. 
 One man is made an ambassador because he is an aristocrat 
 and a man of wealth, another one because he has pleasing 
 social talents, and the third is simply ' commanded ' to take 
 up the post of Imperial Chancellor. The result of such a 
 system, if one can call it a system, is naturally incapacity, 
 amateurishness, and lack of success." 
 
 In the foregoing pages it has been shown exclusively 
 by means of reliable German evidence that Germany was 
 responsible for the unsatisfactory state of Anglo-German 
 relations previous to 1914, that Anglo-German relations 
 had become what they were because, as the German wit- 
 nesses quoted admitted, Germany had deliberately pursued 
 an anti-British policy during a considerable number of 
 years. It has furthermore been shown that Germany's 
 colonial and transmaritime pohcy, with its strong anti- 
 British bias, was disapproved of by Prince Bismarck, and 
 that many thinking Germans were profoundly dissatisfied 
 not only with the direction of Germany's foreign policy, 
 but also with the men who occupied high positions in the 
 German diplomatic service. 
 
 Now we must ask ourselves : Why did Germany pursue 
 towards Great Britain a policy which compromised her 
 position in the world, which caused great disappointments 
 
122 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 
 
 to her, and which in the end led to a national disaster ? 
 The answer is simple. Before the Boer War, when Ger- 
 many embarked upon her transoceanic and anti-British 
 policy, Great Britain's power was much under-estimated 
 in Germany. During many decades German university 
 professors, schoolmasters, and publicists had taught the 
 doctrine that Englishmen were too selfish and too cowardly 
 to defend their country, that England, like Carthage, was 
 bound to fall through lack of patriotism among the people 
 and their reliance upon hired soldiers. They had taught 
 that the principal characteristics of the people in the British 
 colonies also was selfishness, that they lacked patriotism, 
 that they would cling to the motherland only as long as 
 the connection was profitable to them, that the dissolution 
 of the British Empire was inevitable, that Canada and the 
 other great British dominions would earlier or later follow 
 the example of the United States and secede. Roscher, 
 Treitschke, Schmoller, and many other eminent German 
 writers propounded these views. Thus Germany's colonial 
 and anti-British policy was based upon a false estimate of 
 the character and the latent strength of Great Britain and 
 her daughter States, and that false estimate was not revised 
 when the colonies supported Great Britain in the Boer 
 War in splendid loyalty with troops and money, when 
 Canada initiated the system of inter imperial preferences 
 and bore cheerfully Germany's fiscal hostility, when a 
 number of imperial conferences and imperial defensive 
 arrangements created the nucleus of an imperial army and 
 navy and of an imperial organisation, when Australia and 
 New Zealand introduced universal military service, and 
 when Australia, New Zealand, and Canada began to build 
 powerful squadrons of their own and voluntarily took a 
 share in the Empire's burden of defence. 
 
 In their endeavour to challenge British naval supremacy 
 the Germans were encouraged by a singular misconception. 
 They had been told by numerous writers on naval and 
 political subjects that, while the British yards could pro- 
 vide any number of warships, the British nation could not 
 
ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 123 
 
 furnish enough sailors for manning them. On the 28th of 
 October 1908 the Daily Telegraph had published an inter- 
 view with the German Emperor in which he had declared 
 that, in opposition to the majority of the German nation, 
 he was a sincere friend of England. The Emperor's 
 Anglophil utterances aroused the fury of the German 
 Nationalist press, and, referring to that interview, the 
 Allgemeine Evangelisclie Lutherische Kirchenzeitung , a lead- 
 ing Protestant Church paper, wrote in November of the 
 same year : 
 
 " The Emperor labours strenuously with the object of 
 gaining the goodwill of the British nation. That is not very 
 inspiring for us, but that policy is necessary as long as we 
 have to avoid a war with England, for which we are as yet 
 not strong enough. Only since a short time has the German 
 nation learned to understand the necessity of having a 
 powerful fleet. And we must continue building ships in 
 competition with England till the moment arrives when 
 England may still possess many more ships than we Ger- 
 mans have, but when the English can no longer find the 
 men for navigating and fighting their fleet. Until that 
 moment has arisen, it is madness to urge for war, and mean- 
 while the Emperor tries to make up for the indiscretions of 
 the German press by his advances to England." 
 
 The Kirchenzeitung summed up in a few lines the policy 
 which Germany had pursued towards Great Britain during 
 more than a decade. Even in the best-informed circles of 
 Germany the opinion was widely held that Great Britain 
 could not find as many sailors as she required, probably 
 because the British merchant marine was always short of 
 British sailors and employed many thousands of Scan- 
 dinavians, Lascars, etc. Only a short time before the War 
 one of the most eminent and best-informed German pro- 
 fessors told me that Great Britain experienced already the 
 greatest difficulty in manning her fleet, and he looked at 
 me with open-eyed astonishment when I told him that 
 the British naval authorities could always obtain ten re- 
 cruits for every single one they wanted. 
 
124 ANGLO-GERMAN FRICTION 
 
 Germany's anti-British policy was founded on a series of 
 misconceptions and erroneous estimates. Herein lay the 
 reason that her foreign policy was a gigantic mistake. The 
 responsibiUty for the tension between England and Ger- 
 many before the War lay not with the British Foreign 
 Minister, but exclusively with the Germans themselves. 
 Quos Deus vuU perdere, prius dementat. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE 
 
 On the 1st and 2nd of September 1870 the great tragedy 
 of Sedan was enacted. After a series of defeats, un- 
 paralleled in the world's history, France emerged from the 
 ordeal of the " Terrible Year" crushed, humiliated, reduced, 
 and impoverished — the very shadow of her former self. 
 Since then France had played a very inconspicuous role 
 on the stage of Europe. She had come to be considered 
 by many Germans as a dying country, as a parochial 
 concern. 
 
 So strongly was it assumed that le feu sacre de la revanche 
 had died down that official and semi-official Germany 
 thought the time had come for Franco-German co-opera- 
 tion. Guided by the German Emperor, official and semi- 
 official Germany bestowed graceful compliments upon dis- 
 tinguished Frenchmen at every opportunity. French and 
 German ships were seen side by side in Kiel Harbour at the 
 occasion of the opening of the Baltic and North Sea Canal 
 in 1895. In the Far East Russian, French, and German 
 ships jointly demonstrated the Japanese out of Port Arthur, 
 and M. E. Lockroy, France's ablest Minister of Marine, was 
 allowed to minutely inspect the Grerman Navy and the 
 Grerman Navy yards. France had, apparently, forgotten 
 her defeats, the time for reconciliation seemed to have 
 arrived. German writers began strongly to advocate a 
 Franco-German poHtical alliance and a Central-European 
 Customs Union. 
 
 Later on Franco-German relations became somewhat 
 overclouded. When, through the instrumentality of M. 
 
 ^ From the Fortnightly Review, September 1905. 
 125 
 
126 GERMANY AND FRANCE 
 
 Delcasse, France settled her differences with Great Britain, 
 Italy, and Spain, and made an attempt to have again a policy 
 of her own, the German Emperor intervened and forbade 
 the execution of the Morocco bargain, which had been 
 concluded between France and those Powers which could 
 claim a special interest in Moroccan affairs. How serious 
 and threatening the Morocco incident of 1905 was is 
 apparent from the steps towards the mobilisation of her 
 army which were taken by Germany at the time. As the 
 German exports to Morocco amounted then, on an average, 
 to a paltry £90,000 per annum, it was clear that the defence 
 of Germany's " commercial interests " was merely a pre- 
 text for Germany's action in Morocco. Her aim in creating 
 the Moroccan crisis was not to foster Germany's exports 
 to Morocco, but to detach France from Great Britain, 
 and to attach her to Germany. 
 
 French policy, although apparently most erratic and 
 unstable of purpose, has, through centuries, constantly 
 pursued the same aim. During centuries France has 
 fought for two objects — for the preservation of the Balance 
 of Power in Europe and for the possession of the Rhine 
 frontier. To obtain these ends France has successively 
 made war against the strongest Continental States which 
 threatened to enslave the Continent and ultimately to 
 engulf France. From the time, four centuries ago, when 
 she opposed Charles V., the mightiest monarch of Christen- 
 dom, who ruled. over Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, 
 and Spain, down to the present time, France has been the 
 champion of liberty on the Continent of Europe. When 
 Charles V. ruled almost the whole Continent, Christian 
 France allied herself with Turkey, the abhorred Infidel 
 Power, who was considered to stand outside the pale of the 
 comitas gentium, rightly thinking self-preservation the first 
 law of political ethics and the first duty to herself. History 
 repeats itself. When Germany had crushed France and 
 when Bismarck had succeeded in raising all the Powers of 
 Western Europe against France and in isolating her, France 
 turned to Russia for support, notwithstanding the incom- 
 
GERMANY AND FRANCE 127 
 
 patible differences which existed between the Western 
 Republic and the Eastern autocracy, differences which 
 made truly cordial relations impossible between them. 
 
 During four centuries France and Germany have fought 
 one another for supremacy in Europe. As long as Austria 
 was the strongest State in Germany, France supported 
 Austria's German enemies against her. Thus it was that 
 France, up to 1866, encouraged Prussia to aggrandise her- 
 self at Austria's cost, and that Bismarck, in crushing Austria, 
 received Napoleon's sympathy and support. 
 
 Since Bismarck's advent to power, or during about half 
 a century, France had been the dupe of Prusso-Germany's 
 policy. Napoleon III. received no gratitude for support- 
 ing Prussia against Austria. On the contrary, even at the 
 time when Napoleon was doing a priceless service to Bis- 
 marck by supporting Prussia against Austria, Bismarck 
 contemplated ruining France, and building up Germany's 
 unity on the ruins of France. A fortnight before the out- 
 break of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, when Austro- 
 Prussian relations were strained to breaking-point, Bis- 
 marck sent General Von Gabelenz to the Austrian Emperor 
 in Vienna, and proposed to the Emperor that peace might 
 be preserved among the Germanic nations by making a 
 common onslaught on France, conquering Alsace, and 
 creating a Greater Germany at the end of a victorious 
 campaign. Thus the Prusso-Austrian differences were to 
 be settled at the cost of France at the very moment when 
 France was lending Bismarck her support in his anti- 
 Austrian policy. Only through Austria's hesitation was 
 France saved from destruction in 1866, but she became the 
 victim of Bismarck's machinations four years later. 
 
 In order to keep France in good humour during the 
 Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck verbally promised France 
 the Rhine as a reward for her support, but when France 
 wished to have this promise given in writing, Bismarck 
 skilfully drew out negotiations and delayed and procrasti- 
 nated during the critical period of the war, until France's 
 support had become superfluous and events had brought 
 
128 GERMANY AND FRANCE 
 
 peace in sight. Before the conclusion of peace, France, 
 who began to fear that Bismarck was playing her false, 
 pressed for the territorial compensation which Bismarck 
 had held in view, but her demands were met with derision, 
 and the intimation that, in case of need, Bismarck would 
 not hesitate to make peace at any price with Austria, and 
 induce her to march together with Prussia against France. 
 In that case Austria and Prussia would aggrandise them- 
 selves at the expense of France. As a considerable part 
 of the French Army was fighting in Mexico at that time, 
 Napoleon was unable to prevent the undue strengthening of 
 Prussia, and it became clear that the historic struggle for 
 supremacy between France and Germany would soon have 
 to be renewed. 
 
 Since 1866 Bismarck had skilfully increased the bitter- 
 ness which France, after having been deceived by Bismarck, 
 naturally felt for Prussia, by inflicting a number of humilia- 
 tions upon French diplomacy in the Luxemburg question, 
 the Belgian question, etc., and by rousing the discontent 
 of the excitable French masses against Prussia by means 
 of bribed French newspapers. Bismarck required a Franco- 
 German War, for only the enthusiasm created by such a 
 war, which was likely to be immensely popular in Germany, 
 where the remembrance of the first Napoleon was still 
 kept alive, could make the unification of Germany possible. 
 Since 1866 a Franco-Prussian War had become unavoidable, 
 but French diplomacy was unskilful enough to walk into 
 the Spanish trap which Bismarck skiKully had baited, and 
 declared war against Prussia upon a pretext which, in the 
 eyes of the world, put France in the wrong. The mistake 
 of France's diplomacy was Bismarck's opportunity. On 
 the ruins of France, and in accordance with Bismarck's 
 programme, a united Germany was foimded, whose main 
 object it was proclaimed to be to resist for all time the 
 wanton aggression of Germany's hereditary enemy. The 
 unity of Germany was cemented with French blood, and 
 Thiers spoke truly when he said to Bismarck at Versailles, 
 " C'est nous qui avons fait V union de V AUemagne.^^ 
 
GERMANY AND FRANCE 129 
 
 By 1914 France had of course recovered from the enor- 
 mous losses which the war had caused. Nevertheless, it 
 had left indeUble traces upon the country. The enormous 
 wastage of national capital and the enormously increased 
 National Debt of the country, together with the necessity 
 for France to re-create her army on the largest scale, and 
 to maintain it, notwithstanding her shrunken resources in 
 men and money, had made necessary a most oppressive 
 taxation, which could be met only by the most rigid economy 
 on the part of all individual taxpayers. Hence the Franco- 
 German War led to a falling-ofF in the birth-rate of France, 
 which was much smaller after the war than it had been 
 before. It cannot be doubted that the stationariness of 
 the population of France was greatly, and perhaps chiefly, 
 caused by the after-effects of that unfortunate war. 
 
 In view of the fact that the Franco-German War had 
 inflicted decades of suffering upon all French families, it 
 could hardly be expected that the masses of the French 
 nation had become the friends and well- wishers of Germany. 
 The small rentiers of France and the thrifty peasants, with 
 all their love of peace and quiet, knew quite well that 
 taxation in France would remain high as long as France 
 was compelled to maintain her enormous army. Neverthe- 
 less, they were determined not to expose themselves to 
 the possibility of another disastrous defeat. Hence high 
 taxation was borne without grumbling in the silent hope 
 that a time would arrive when, in consequence of a victory 
 over Germany, France might again be able to lighten her 
 oppressive armour. 
 
 The German newspapers spoke the truth when they 
 asserted that the old spirit of revanche had died out in 
 France. Revanche is not a policy but a sentiment, and 
 France had learned, to her cost, how dangerous it is to be 
 led by sentiment in matters political. It was not so much 
 the aim of French policy to endeavour to weaken Germany as 
 it was to strengthen France. France wished to live in peace 
 and security with all her neighbours, Germany included, 
 but at the same time she wished to be strong enough to 
 
130 
 
 GERMANY AND FRANCE 
 
 be able to hold her own in the world. Policy is, after all, 
 based on force, and no policy can be successful which is not 
 backed by sufficient military and naval strength. Therefore 
 France had endeavoured to create and to maintain an army 
 sufficiently strong to meet that of Germany, but she found 
 her task from year to year more difficult, owing to the 
 increasing discrepancy between her population and tliat of 
 Germany, which is apparent from the following table : 
 
 
 
 
 Population of Germany. 
 
 Population of France 
 
 1872 41,230,000 
 
 36,103,000 
 
 1876 . 
 
 
 
 43,059,000 
 
 36,906,000 
 
 1881 
 
 
 
 45,428,000 
 
 37,672,000 
 
 1886 
 
 
 
 47,134,000 
 
 38,219,000 
 
 1891 
 
 
 
 49,762,000 
 
 38,343,000 
 
 1896 . 
 
 
 
 52,753,000 
 
 38,518,000 
 
 1901 
 
 
 
 56,862,000 
 
 38,962,000 
 
 1914 (estimated) 
 
 
 
 67,000,000 
 
 39,600,000 
 
 In 1914 the time seemed not to be far distant when France 
 would no longer be able to rival Germany in the number 
 of her soldiers, that France would automatically sink to a 
 secondary rank among the Great Powers of Europe. Time 
 was fighting on Germany's side. Therefore it was to the 
 interest of Germany to maintain peace with France as long 
 as possible, while it was to the interest of France to utilise 
 the earliest opportunity that might offer for crushing 
 Germany. 
 
 Bismarck did not believe that the Peace of Frankfort 
 would be a lasting one. He frequently foretold a renewal 
 of the struggle, should opportunity favour France. For 
 instance, he said in the Reichstag, on the 11th of January 
 1887: 
 
 " Has there ever been a French minority which could 
 venture publicly and unconditionally to say : We renounce 
 regaining Alsace-Lorraine. We shall not make war for 
 Alsace-Lorraine, and we accept the Peace of Frankfort in 
 the same spirit in which we accepted the Peace of Paris in 
 1815 ? Is there a ministry in Paris which would have the 
 courage to make such a declaration ? Why is there no such 
 
GERMANY AND FRANCE 131 
 
 ministry ? For the French have hitherto not lacked courage. 
 No such ministry exists, because such a policy is opposed to 
 public sentiment in France. France is like an engine which 
 is filled with steam up to the point of explosion, and a spark, 
 a clumsy movement of the hand, may suffice to cause an 
 explosion, to bring on war. However, the fire is so carefully 
 tended and nursed that it seems at first sight not likely that 
 it will ever be used for causing a conflagration in the neigh- 
 bouring country. 
 
 " If you study French history, you will find that the most 
 important decisions have been taken in France not by the 
 will of the people, but by the will of an energetic minority. 
 Those people in France who contemplate war with Germany 
 at present only prepare everything in order to be able to 
 commence such a war with the maximum of force. Their 
 task is to keep alive le feu sacre de la revanche, a task which 
 Gambetta defined in the motto : ' Ne parlez jamais de la 
 guerre, mais pensez-y toujours,* and that is to-day still the 
 attitude of France. French people do not speak of the 
 possibiUty of an aggressive war against Germany, but only 
 of the fear of being attacked by Germany. 
 
 " France will probably attack us as soon as she has 
 reason to think that she is stronger than we are. As soon 
 as France beUeves that she can defeat Germany, war with 
 Germany is, I think, a certainty. The conviction that 
 France is stronger than Germany may arise from the alli- 
 ances which France may be able to conclude. I do not 
 believe that such alliances will be concluded by France, and 
 it is the task of German diplomacy either to prevent the 
 conclusion of such alliances, or to counterbalance such 
 alliances with counter-alliances." 
 
 Convinced that France would seek to revenge her de- 
 feat, Bismarck endeavoured to ruin her by severe condi- 
 tions of peace. Although the Franco -German War had 
 cost Germany only about £60,000,000, he exacted about 
 £250,000,000 from the country, and was greatly disappointed 
 that France easily paid that sum and recovered rapidly. 
 Fearing France's revenge, Germany contemplated in 1875 
 an attack upon France, and in February of that year Herr 
 von Radowitz was sent to Russia to sound the Czar and to 
 find out whether Russia would remain neutral in the event 
 
132 GERMANY AND FRANCE 
 
 of the struggle between France and Germany being renewed. 
 Happily for France, Germany's design miscarried, owing 
 to the energetic opposition of Great Britain and Russia. 
 
 Finding himself foiled in his design to ruin France before 
 she had recovered from her defeat, Bismarck strove to 
 isolate France, being of opinion, as he said in his Memoirs, 
 that France would certainly aid Russia if a collision should 
 take place between that country and Germany. Therefore 
 he wrote, on the 20th of December 1872, to Count Arnim, 
 the German Ambassador in Paris : " We do not want to be 
 disturbed by France, but if France does not intend to keep 
 the peace we must prevent her finding allies." With this 
 object in view, Bismarck skilfully isolated France by 
 bringing her into collision with Italy, Spain, and Great 
 Britain. As long as Bismarck was in power the foreign 
 poUcy of France was directed from Berlin, and France had 
 not a friend, not a champion, in the wide world. She was 
 almost an outcast among the nations. 
 
 Bismarck carefully watched France's relations with 
 foreign countries, and as soon as he thought that France 
 was trying to pursue a policy of her own without consulting 
 Berlin, and to improve her relations with a foreign country, 
 he raised the spectre of war. In 1887, for instance, the 
 Goblet Ministry was trying to settle the Egyptian question, 
 and to arrive at an understanding with Great Britain . How- 
 ever, before France was able to come to the desired arrange- 
 ment, Bismarck used the ridiculous Schnabele incident on 
 the Franco-German frontier for a violent war-agitation, 
 compared with which the Morocco incident was child's- 
 play. France dropped the contemplated arrangement with 
 Great Britain, and on the 7th of May 1887 M. Goblet said 
 at Havre : 
 
 " For fifteen years we have been asking the country each 
 year for £40,000,000, and now, when the country has been 
 smitten on the one cheek, we can only advise her to turn the 
 other cheek to the smiter." 
 
 Soon after Bismarck had been dismissed by William II. 
 France succeeded in concluding an alliance with Russia. 
 
GERMANY AND FRANCE 133 
 
 Its conclusion was taken very philosophically at Berlin, 
 for such an event was considered to be inevitable in view 
 of the friction which had taken place between Russia and 
 Germany after William II. had come to the throne. There- 
 fore German diplomacy concentrated its efforts upon keep- 
 ing the Anglo-French differences alive, and tried to forestall 
 France by previously coming to an understanding with 
 England. At that time Germany's most valuable colonies, 
 including Zanzibar, were exchanged against the rock of 
 HeUgoland, an exchange which was greeted with dismay 
 by most Germans, for it was believed by them that that 
 bargain was most unsatisfactory for Germany. Even in 
 Great Britain people shook their heads at this exchange, 
 the advantage of which to Germany could not be seen. 
 Nevertheless, from the German point of view this exchange 
 was a most excellent bargain, for France had been fore- 
 stalled by it. Von Caprivi, the then Chancellor, did not 
 even try to explain that Germany had received an adequate 
 quid 'pro quo in giving up her best colonies, but simply stated 
 in the Reichstag, in defending the exchange : " We meant, 
 before all, to maintain our good understanding with Great 
 Britain." 
 
 It was Bismarck's poUcy not only to isolate France by 
 embroihng her with all her neighbours and by discrediting 
 her everywhere, but also to weaken her financial and military 
 power by encouraging her to waste her military and finan- 
 cial strength in unprofitable colonial adventures in every 
 quarter of the world. France went to West Africa and to 
 Tonkin at Bismarck's bidding, and she remained the tool of 
 Germany until in the year 1898 M. Delcasse entered the 
 French Foreign Office. 
 
 When M. Delcass6 became Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs he found, with amazement, that the foreign policy 
 of France was directed by Germany, and that, at the bidding 
 of German statesmen, France had obediently embroiled 
 herself with Italy over Tunis, with Spain over various ques- 
 tions, and with Great Britain over Egypt. Notwithstanding 
 the fact that it was his first task to settle the thankless 
 
134 GERMANY AND FRANCE 
 
 Fashoda problem, M. Delcasse entered upon his duties with 
 the firm determination to reconcile France with Italy and 
 Spain, and especially with Great Britain, and no longer to 
 oppose Great Britain in Germany's interests. In the 
 beginning of November 1898, a few days after Colonel 
 Marchand had been ordered back from Fashoda, M. Delcasse 
 said in his study to a friend of mine : "I mean not to leave 
 this fauteuil without having re-established good relations 
 with Great Britain." Such a declaration required con- 
 siderable moral courage at a time when Great Britain and 
 France stood on the brink of war. 
 
 When Germany saw that France was slipping from her 
 control, that France was trying to pursue a national policy, 
 and that she succeeded in making friends with Great Britain, 
 Italy, and Spain, she tried for a long time to regain control 
 over the foreign policy of France by personal advances to 
 individual Frenchmen, by flattering France, by urging that 
 the interests of France and Germany were identical, and by 
 persistently extolUng the benefits and the necessity of a 
 Franco-German alliance as the best guarantee for maintain- 
 ing peace in Europe. However, notwithstanding Germany's 
 advances, M. Delcasse remained passive and almost in- 
 different, and observed a cautious reserve towards Germany. 
 Nevertheless, Germany continued her advances until 
 the battle of Mukden had shown that the Russian Army 
 was no longer a factor upon the support of which France 
 could reckon in case of war with Germany. Then, and 
 then only, came the Morocco crisis and Germany's threat 
 of war ! 
 
 At no time were Germany's advances to France more 
 assiduous than when Germany was trying to raise a coalition 
 against England. At the outbreak of the Boer War the 
 whole German Press entreated France to join hands with 
 Germany and to assist in humbling Great Britain to the 
 dust. On 5th of October 1899, three days after the 
 mobiUsation of the Boer troops, an article appeared in Die 
 Orenzboten, the leading journal of the semi-official press of 
 Germany, in which it was said : 
 
GERMANY AND FRANCE 135 
 
 " All differences between France and Germany benefit 
 only the nearly all-powerful Enemy of the World. As long 
 as the French keep one eye fixed on Alsace-Lorraine, it is 
 no good that they occasionally look at England with the 
 other eye. Only when the strength of the German Fleet 
 is commensurate with her sea interest will the French seek 
 our friendship, instead of being humiliated by their heredi- 
 tary enemy." 
 
 In this and numerous other articles France was entreated 
 to crush England, her hereditary enemy, by joining a coali- 
 tion of Continental Powers. 
 
 France was under no illusion as to Germany's feelings 
 towards her. Silently she had borne a latent state of 
 war for decades. The French were to be rewarded for 
 their patient patriotism. Heroic sufferings had steeled the 
 national character and created a race of strong and earnest 
 men. Besides, decades of military endeavour had given 
 France an army which was to be the instrument for re- 
 creating the country and regaining what she had lost. 
 
 10 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE MOROCCO CRISIS OP 1911 * 
 
 On the 2nd of July 1911 the German papers published the 
 following official announcement : 
 
 " The German firms interested in the south of Morocco 
 have requested the Imperial Government, having regard 
 to the dangers which threaten the important German 
 interests in these parts in view of the possible spread of 
 the disorders prevaiUng in other parts of Morocco, to take 
 measures to protect the lives and property of Germans 
 and German protegSs in this region. The Imperial Govern- 
 ment, with this object in view, thereupon decided to send 
 His Majesty's ship Panther, which happened to be in the 
 neighbourhood, to the harbour of Agadir, and apprised the 
 Powers of the fact. The influential Moors of the district 
 have been simultaneously informed that no sort of un- 
 friendly intention towards Morocco or its inhabitants is 
 associated with the appearance of the German warship in 
 the harbour." 
 
 Thus ran the translation published in the Times of the 
 3rd of July of that year. Ostensibly the German Govern- 
 ment sent the Panther to Agadir in the south of Morocco 
 " to protect important German interests in these parts " 
 and " to protect the life and property of Germans and 
 German protegia in this region." Yet it was known to all 
 who had studied Moroccan affairs that Germany had no 
 important commercial interests in that country, and that 
 no German lives were endangered in or near Agadir, which 
 happens to be the best harbour on the Atlantic coast of 
 
 ^ From the Fortnightly Review, August 1911. 
 136 
 
THE MOROCCO CRISIS 137 
 
 Morocco. However, the official communication carefully 
 explained in its opening words that the warship was sent 
 at the request of "the German firms interested in the 
 south of Morocco." The onus of proof that German 
 interests and German lives were actually threatened was 
 therefore laid with skilful vagueness on unnamed, un- 
 enumerated, and unspecified German firms, which, for all 
 one knew, had their seat in Germany, and which conceiv- 
 ably were previously asked by the Government to make a 
 request for protection. By the wording of the communique 
 the German Government had left open a loophole for escape. 
 In case of need it could explain that " the German firms " 
 had called for protection without sufficient cause, and that 
 the ship would be withdrawn because, upon inquiry on the 
 spot, it had been found that neither the property nor the 
 lives of Germans and of German proteges in the south of 
 Morocco were endangered. 
 
 In Bismarck's time German diplomacy was dramatic 
 and vigorous. Under the direction of William II. it became 
 melodramatic and futile. For a second time within a few 
 years it interfered with menacing suddenness in Morocco, 
 but once more the stage-managing had been defective, and 
 the dispatch of the Panther was to prove as unprofitable, 
 and as little creditable, to German diplomacy as was the 
 Emperor's personal demonstration at Tangier on the 31st of 
 March 1905, when he promised his support to the Sultan. 
 
 The Morocco crisis of 1905 almost led to war be- 
 tween France and Germany. Germany had actually begun 
 mobilising her army when France bowed to the demonstra- 
 tion of force, giving Germany what is usually called a 
 diplomatic victory. However, she lost nothing substantial 
 by giving way, but Germany received in the following 
 year a diplomatic defeat at Algeciras, whence she returned 
 empty-handed, and she quietly withdrew for a time her 
 loudly advertised claims upon Moroccan territory. 
 
 It must have been clear even to the most credulous, the 
 most unsuspecting, and the most uncritical that in 1905 
 the German Emperor did not go to Tangier, and almost 
 
138 THE MOROCCO CRISIS 
 
 make war upon France, for the love of the Sultan of Morocco, 
 and that, in July 1911, Germany did not send the Panther 
 to Agadir to protect German lives and property. German 
 diplomacy had asserted from 1905 to 1911 that it was 
 anxious to preserve the independence and the integrity of 
 Morocco, and the open door for all nations, because of her 
 important economic interests in that country. That was 
 merely a diplomatic pretext, and it can scarcely be doubted 
 that Germany desired to acquire Morocco, or at least the 
 south of that country, and that she wished to defend its 
 integrity and independence until she was ready and able 
 to make it a colony of her own. 
 
 On the 19th of January 1912, in the course of a lawsuit 
 for libel which the Rheinisch-Westfdlische Zeitung brought 
 against the Orenzboten, the editor of the former stated : 
 
 " I demand that Mr. Class, the president of the Pan- 
 Germanic League, be called. At my wish he put himself 
 in contact with the Foreign Secretary, Herr von Kiderlen- 
 Wachter. The Foreign Secretary invited Mr. Class to meet 
 him at the Hotel Pfalzer Hof in Mannheim, and there they 
 have conferred for hours. The Foreign Secretary stated to 
 Herr Class : ' I support the policy of partitioning Morocco. 
 The Pan -Germanic demand is absolutely justified. You can 
 rely upon it that we shall stick to Morocco, and that you 
 will be greatly pleased with the German Morocco policy. I 
 am as much a Pan -German as you are.' Some time 
 afterwards Mr. Class called upon the Foreign Secretary, but, 
 failing to find him in, met Mr. Zimmermann, the Under- 
 Secretary. It was the day of the dispatch of the Panther 
 to Agadir. Herr Zimmermann told Herr Class that he 
 could give him some cheering news : ' You come just in 
 time. At this moment the Panther appears before Agadir. 
 We shall retain Agadir, and we intend to seize the whole 
 district and not to give up anything. After all, we abso- 
 lutely require settlement colonies for our excess of births. 
 Take care that no claims for compensation are raised in 
 the Press. We do not want compensations. We want 
 Morocco. France wishes to offer us the Congo.' " 
 
 The foregoing extract, which is a careful translation, and 
 which is taken from the report of the law-court proceedings 
 
THE MOROCCO CRISIS 139 
 
 published in the Tdgliche Rundschau of the 20th of January 
 1912, shows that, notwithstanding all official statements 
 that Germanyhad never intended to seize Moroccan territory, 
 statements which were made by the German Chancellor 
 and the Foreign Secretary in December 1911, the German 
 Government had actually intended to take a part of 
 Morocco. 
 
 Germany's interests in Morocco, as her interests in Asia 
 Minor, South Africa, and Southern Brazil, were not of 
 yesterday. Many decades ago the most farseeing and 
 patriotic Germans recognised that colonies in the temperate 
 zone, able to receive the German surplus population, were 
 the greatest need of their country. Animated by this con- 
 viction, many professors and other leaders of public opinion 
 agitated for the creation of a large German fleet — -the first 
 ships of the German Navy were built in the 'forties of the 
 last century with moneys raised by voluntary private 
 subscriptions ; others created important and purely German 
 settlements in Santa Catherina, in Rio Grande do Sul, in 
 the Cape Colony, and in Natal ; others explored, with or 
 without Government assistance, uncivilised countries which 
 they believed to be suitable for German colonisation and 
 which had not yet been appropriated by the European 
 Powers. Morocco was one of these, and it was explored in 
 the 'sixties of last century by the Germans, Gerhard Rohlfs 
 and von Maltzan, in the 'seventies by Noll, von Fritsch, 
 Rein, and Koch, in the 'eighties by Lenz and Quedenfeld, 
 and Professor Theobald Fischer travelled through that 
 country in 1888, 1899, and 1901. Professor Fischer was 
 considered to be the greatest German authority on that 
 country. 
 
 Prusso-Germany was the first country which introduced 
 a system of compulsory and national education directed by 
 the State. The education of the German citizen by the 
 State did not end with the time when the child left 
 school. It was continued during the rest of his or her 
 life. Prominent among the great German State institu- 
 tions for the education of the adult were the semi-official 
 
140 THE MOROCCO CRISIS 
 
 Press and the semi-official literature in the form of books, 
 the teachings of which were reinforced by the activity of a 
 host of Government inspired professorial and non-profes- 
 sorial lecturers, writers, and clergymen, who were let loose 
 whenever their assistance was required. The larger half of 
 the German Press of all parties, the Socialist papers excepted, 
 was constantly inspired by the Government. Thus public 
 opinion was created and constantly educated, and the more 
 serious and thoughtful minds were provided with informa- 
 tion by weighty semi-official books crammed with facts 
 and arguments which were written, or inspired, by the 
 Government departments. They served the same purpose 
 as the " handbooks for speakers " and " campaign books " 
 which are issued by the British party organisations at 
 election time. In 1904^-1905 a large portion of the semi- 
 official Press preached, in consequence of direct inspiration 
 from the chief of the German Foreign Office, the doctrine 
 that Germany required the south of Morocco, and in 1911 
 one read again in papers which stood under Govern- 
 ment influence demands for territorial "compensation" in 
 Morocco. The prevailing official view of the value of 
 Morocco to Germany may best be gauged from the very 
 lengthy paper, " Morocco and its Relations to the German 
 National Economy," published in the semi-official German 
 Naval Year Book, Nauticus, for 1909, and I would quote 
 from it the following important passages in their proper 
 sequence : 
 
 " Morocco is a kind of African peninsula, being isolated 
 by the sea and separated from the African continent by vast 
 mountains. The most important trade routes along the 
 West Coast of Africa, from Europe to South America, and 
 towards the future Panama Canal, pass its coast. The 
 country occupies the corner of Africa, and the corner 
 position of a continent is always a favourable world - 
 strategical factor. By its geographical and world -strategical 
 position Morocco is exceedingly favoured for commerce 
 and war. Only lately, when the traffic on the trade 
 routes through the Mediterranean along the northern 
 shore, and through the Atlantic along the western shore, of 
 
THE MOROCCO CRISIS 141 
 
 Morocco has become so active, the country has become 
 important. It lies to-day in the centre of the world's 
 traffic, 
 
 " Morocco is separated from the African continent by 
 high mountains, which separate it at the same time from the 
 desert. These give it a favourable climate by catching the 
 moisture which the wind brings from the Atlantic. Morocco 
 slopes from the mountain ranges in the interior towards 
 the Atlantic. Therefore the mountains act as an enor- 
 mous reservoir to the lower-ljdng lands. The province of 
 Sus is perhaps the most richly endowed part of Morocco. 
 One can scarcely form an exaggerated idea of the fruitful- 
 ness of a large part of the plains near the Atlantic coast. 
 The rainfall is small, but owing to the abundance of water 
 in the sub -soil, only a few feet below the ground, irrigation 
 can easily and cheaply be provided which would make 
 cotton-growing possible. 
 
 " Marakesh, like Milan and Munich, is, owing to its 
 position, a natural railway centre. Although animals are 
 raised in the most primitive fashion, and although the 
 prohibition to export them kills all enterprise, Morocco 
 possesses, according to a French official expert, 40,000,000 
 sheep, 11,000,000 goats, from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 cattle, 
 4,000,000 donkeys and mules, and 600,000 horses. How- 
 ever, these estimates are probably too large. Morocco is 
 rich in minerals, especially in iron, copper, antimony, and 
 salt. Mining used to flourish especially in the province 
 of Sus. Morocco has about 8,000,000 inhabitants, and 
 is able to maintain perhaps 40,000,000 people. In that 
 healthy coimtry, which is nearly quite free from malaria, 
 the living conditions for European emigrants are far more 
 favourable than in Algeria. Morocco, situated within sight 
 of Europe, and occupying an exceedingly important world- 
 strategical position, possesses vast natural resources which 
 have not yet been touched. Its conditions are mediaeval, 
 but in view of the proximity of the over-populated States 
 of Europe which require expansion, its exclusiveness cannot 
 be preserved much longer. Morocco may become the 
 granary and the ranch of Europe, and may provide it with 
 fruit, oil, cotton, and ore. At present it has not a single 
 mile of road or of railroad, and not a single bridge. Its 
 waterfalls will provide power. Morocco is an important 
 field for industrial activity." 
 
142 THE MOROCCO CRISIS 
 
 It will be noticed that the semi-official year book con- 
 sidered in the first place the great strategical value of 
 Morocco, and only in the second place its great economic 
 possibilities. It is also very interesting that it described 
 the province of Sus as the richest part of Morocco for both 
 agriculture and mining, and recognised in Marakesh its 
 natural railway centre. Now, Agadir was not only the 
 best harbour on the west coast, with 47 feet of water 
 within 30 yards of the shore, but it was also not far from 
 Marakesh, and was by far the best entrance gate to the 
 province of Sus and to the Soudan. Owing to the depth 
 and sheltered position of its harbour and to its geographical 
 situation, Agadir was far more important than Mogador, 
 which had 24,000 inhabitants. The latter had become a 
 large port only because the Moroccan Government closed the 
 port of Agadir in order to punish its citizens for a revolt. 
 Monsieur de Segonzac, a leading French authority on 
 Morocco, wrote in his book, Voyage au Maroc, published in 
 1903, the year before the German Government had first 
 taken an active interest in Morocco : 
 
 " Agadir is believed to be the best harbour on the Moroccan 
 coast. It is an open roadstead without obstacles, which 
 is sheltered against the breakers and the wind from the 
 open sea. I have been told that thirty metres from the 
 coast the water is fifteen metres deep. On the day when 
 the harbour of Agadir will be opened to European commerce 
 Mogador will cease to exist." 
 
 The greatest German authority on Morocco, Professor 
 Fischer, who had devoted more than thirty years to the 
 study of that country, and who had explored it on three 
 journeys, saw, like the semi-official German Naval Year 
 Book, in the land of the Moors a world-strategical position 
 of the very greatest importance. He was naturally less 
 reserved in his utterances than the Year Book, which was 
 written throughout in the ponderous, stodgy, and imper- 
 sonal style of official Germany, and I would quote from 
 some of his writings the following most interesting opinions : 
 
THE MOROCCO CRISIS 143 
 
 " Morocco occupies to-day a position of the very greatest 
 importance. The most important trade routes pass by its 
 coast : through the Mediterranean, to the rapidly develop- 
 ing West Coast of Africa, to Central America with the 
 Panama Canal, towards South America, which is rapidly 
 becoming settled and which already is of the greatest im- 
 portance for the food supply of Europe. The importance 
 of the Moroccan harbours lies in their position, for thence 
 many a vital nerve of the nations of Europe may be cut 
 through. — [Die Seehdfen von Marokko.) 
 
 " Morocco lies on the most important route of the world's 
 trade. It takes part in commanding that route, and its 
 ports on the Atlantic can become important bases for peace- 
 ful and warlike enterprises on the West Coast of Africa and 
 towards Central and South America. — {Geog.Zeitschrift,1901.) 
 
 " In the hands of a European Power able to develop its 
 rich resources, Morocco may become a source of strength 
 of the first importance, able to cause a change in the balance 
 of power in Europe. It is strange that Germany has no 
 political interests in Morocco. Our position as a world 
 Power and a commercial Power would be endangered 
 should Morocco fall into the hands of France. It is Ger- 
 many's task to maintain Morocco's independence. But 
 should an alteration of the map become inevitable, Ger- 
 many must have its part : El Haus and Sus. Our interests 
 at the Straits of Gibraltar are guarded by the jealousies of 
 France and Great Britain. — [Geog. Zeitschrift, 1903.) 
 
 " After thirty years' occupation with Moroccan affairs, and 
 after three journeys through that country, I have arrived at 
 the conviction that the world-political position of Morocco is 
 so great that that State which succeeds in taking it will, through 
 its possession, receive such an enormous increase in power 
 that all other States, especially Great Britain, Spain, and 
 Germany, will feel it as an unbearable hardship. — [Die See- 
 hdfen von Marokko.y 
 
 The italics were in the original. 
 
 Morocco looks small on the map, but it is, as the follow- 
 ing figures show, a large country : 
 
 Morocco .... 
 
 . 219,000 square milea 
 
 Algeria (limits of 1901) 
 
 . 184,474 
 
 Tunis .... 
 
 . 45,779 
 
 Germany in 1914 
 
 . 208,780 
 
 United Kingdom 
 
 . 121,391 
 
144 THE MOROCCO CRISIS 
 
 Morocco was almost as large as Algeria and Tunis com- 
 bined, and was larger than Imperial Germany. Its superior 
 size and climate, its vast agricultural and mineral resources, 
 and its superior geographical and strategical position make 
 it infinitely more valuable than Algeria. Besides, it is a 
 natural fortress. Its fruitful plains and uplands along 
 the Atlantic, which evoked the enthusiasm of Pomponius 
 Mela 1900 years ago, are sheltered towards the north and 
 west by the sea, and towards the east and south by the 
 enormous ranges of the Atlas Mountains, the peaks of which 
 rise up to 13,000 feet, and by the Sahara. Thus thinly- 
 populated Morocco is an ideal country both for European 
 settlement and for defence. Its world-strategical position, 
 upon which the German Navy Year Book and Professor 
 Fischer rightly dwelt, was very great, and its possession 
 would have been of particular value to Germany, especially 
 if she should wish to strike at France, Great Britain, or the 
 United States. In 1914 the German Fleet was tied to the 
 North Sea through the lack of coaling stations abroad. 
 Agadir, or some other port on the west coast of Morocco, 
 which could be reached in about a week by ships steaming 
 from Wilhelmshaven round the north of Scotland, would 
 have been a very convenient half-way house on the way to 
 the West Indies and Panama in case of a German- American 
 war ; it would have been the best possible base for cruisers, 
 or liners converted into cruisers, told off to prey on British 
 shipping, in case of an Anglo-German war ; it would have 
 been an ideal position in case of a Franco-German war, or 
 of Franco- German friction, by enabhug Germany to cause 
 serious trouble in Algeria. Algeria had an army of occu- 
 pation of 75,000 men, of whom 43,000 were Europeans. 
 France intended, in case of a great European war, to bring 
 over from Africa her European troops and some coloured 
 troops as well, replacing the Algerian garrison with West 
 African soldiers. The spirit of revolt was not yet dead in 
 Algeria. The Germans in Morocco could have caused 
 countless risings in the neighbouring Algeria in peace-time 
 by encouraging the disaffected, and could possibly have 
 
THE MOROCCO CRISIS 145 
 
 overthrown the French mobilisation scheme in Africa at the 
 moment of the outbreak of war by bringing about a great 
 revolt. As a matter of fact, a German settlement in Morocco 
 would have made Algeria untenable for France. The 
 assiduous advances which Germany made to the Moors 
 soon after the Franco-German War were probably inspired 
 by the wish of causing trouble to France in Algeria if the 
 war should be renewed. 
 
 I concluded an article, which I contributed to the Nine- 
 teenth Century and After in August 1911, with the following 
 emphatic warning : 
 
 " In view of the great strategical importance of Morocco, 
 its independence is no doubt very desirable for the peace 
 of the world. On the 31st of March 1905 the German 
 Emperor solemnly proclaimed at Tangiers : ' For Germany 
 the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco and the indepen- 
 dence of his comitry are beyond doubt. I shaU therefore 
 always be ready to support these.' Great Britain can 
 unreservedly endorse that unseMsh policy, and will no 
 doubt assist Germany in preserving Morocco's independence 
 against all comers. If, however, German diplomacy should 
 have changed its mind since 1905, and if it should have 
 arrived at the conviction that Morocco is not fit for self- 
 government, and that it should henceforth be governed by 
 Europeans under some scheme of partition, it seems perhaps 
 fairest that Spain should receive the northern half and 
 France the southern half of the country ; for the historical, 
 economical, political, and geographical claims of these two 
 nations to the possession of Morocco are infinitely stronger 
 than are those of Germany, whose claim to the south of 
 Morocco consists chiefly in the display and assertion of her 
 armed force. Morocco is of little value to Germany, except 
 as a means of terrorising and weakening France, as a means 
 of threatening several of the most important British trade 
 routes and Gibraltar, and as a means of setting Spain against 
 France and Great Britain. In German hands Morocco 
 would be a permanent danger to the peace of the world, 
 and it cannot be doubted that the peaceful nations of the 
 world ought to oppose Germany's occupation of that country. 
 Even her own allies may not care to be embroiled with their 
 neighbours over Morocco. Besides, it seems very doubtful 
 
146 THE MOROCCO CRISIS 
 
 whether the enlargement of the German dominion in Africa 
 would be desirable on humanitarian grounds. German 
 colonisation has been a failure because the Germans do not 
 know how to deal with the natives. German colonisation 
 has been distinguished by the brutal misdeeds of countless 
 officers and officials. The shameless plundering of the 
 natives in German South-west Africa drove the Hereros 
 into a rebellion which was suppressed by the extermination 
 of the men, women, and children, of whom many thousands 
 were driven into the waterless desert and condemned to 
 slow death by thirst and starvation. 
 
 " Germany has been trying to acquire Southern Morocco, 
 and perhaps the French Congo as well, by methods which 
 remind one of those employed by Louis XIV. of France. 
 But Louis XIV. observed at least some appearance of legality 
 in robbing the German Empire and the Spanish Netherlands 
 of valuable territories in time of peace, by obtaining edicts 
 justifying his violent proceedings by his Chambres de 
 Reunion, Germany has gone farther than Louis XIV. Ger- 
 many demanded the best part of Morocco and part of the 
 French Congo as ' compensation ' without telling us what she 
 required to be compensated for. That would apparently be 
 explained only after the transfer had been made. German 
 diplomacy has done an ill-service to the Empire. The 
 position and prestige of a State, as of an individual, depend 
 very largely on its reputation for honesty, straightforward- 
 ness, reliability, and fair-dealing. As a friend and admirer 
 of Germany, I regret that her diplomacy has laid Germany 
 open to the gravest suspicions, and has destroyed the belief 
 in her peacefulness and all that has been done during the 
 last few years for improving Anglo-German relations. 
 
 " War has been brought within the limits of vision. It 
 is to be hoped that Germany will turn away from the very 
 dangerous course upon which she has embarked, a course 
 which in a very short time may bring her into a collision 
 not only with France, but with several Great Powers ; and 
 as the Triple Alliance is believed to be a purely defensive 
 aUiance relating only to Europe, Germany may find her- 
 self deserted by her allies in the hour of trouble. Let us 
 hope that the Morocco crisis can be explained away as 
 the mistake of a single man. Let us hope that Herr von 
 Kiderlen-Waechter will be replaced without delay. That will 
 solve and explain the crisis, and the Morocco incident will 
 
THE MOROCCO CRISIS 147 
 
 soon be forgotten. Persistence on the dangerous and un- 
 precedented course which Germany is steering at the present 
 moment may imperil Germany's future, and may cost the 
 Emperor his throne. The German nation is intensely loyal 
 and patriotic, but it would never forgive a monarch who had 
 driven the nation into a disastrous war without adequate 
 reason." 
 
 My forecast came true more than seven years after it 
 had been made. 
 
 Germany's Morocco policy failed, both in 1905 and in 1911, 
 through the clumsiness of her diplomacy and because the 
 Powers recognised Germany's aim. Thus her intervention 
 in Morocco was merely a step towards her downfall. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION IN GERMANY * 
 
 During more than forty years the Emperor Frederick's 
 winged word, " The Prussian schoolmaster has won the 
 battle of Sadowa," had been dinned into the ears of EngHsh- 
 men. They were so often told that Germany owed her 
 great political, and especially her still greater economic, 
 success to her excellent education, that they set about to 
 copy the educational system of Germany, although it was 
 probably quite unsuitable for them. England and America 
 were flooded with a constantly growing stream of books 
 in praise of German education, but up to 1914 I failed to 
 discover a single book on the failure of German education, 
 although such a book was very urgently required. I intend 
 in the following pages to point out some of the shortcomings 
 as well as some of the very important characteristics and 
 factors of German education which have hitherto escaped 
 observation. 
 
 According to the latest statistics, Germany had before 
 1914 some 60,000 elementary State schools, with about 
 150,000 teachers, who instructed some 10,000,000 children ; 
 she had more than 1,000 higher schools, where about 20,000 
 teachers instructed more than 300,000 pupils, while at the 
 numerous universities, polytechnics, and other technical 
 high schools, about 6,000 professors and lecturers instructed 
 some 100,000 students. If we include the professional 
 private tutors we find that the army of German education- 
 alists numbered about 300,000. These figures are truly 
 astounding in their magnitude, and if "most educated " be 
 
 1 From the Contemporary Review, October 1906. 
 148 
 
EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 149 
 
 synonymous with "best educated," the Germans should 
 be the best-educated nation in the world. In fact, there 
 are practically no uneducated people in Germany. Of the 
 260,000 recruits who in 1905 joined the German Army, only 
 82 men coming from the frontier districts, where, for obvious 
 reasons, control is sometimes impossible, were unable to 
 read and write. It may therefore be asserted that in Ger- 
 many proper no uneducated people exist. 
 
 The genesis of the national educational system and of 
 the educational policy of Germany is a curious one. The 
 German school is by its history not a social but a political 
 institution. To make the revolution against the Roman 
 Catholic Church successful, Luther found it necessary to 
 oppose the powerful organisation of the Church which 
 directed the mind of the German masses with a national 
 and popular organisation powerful enough to oppose the 
 Almighty Church, and able to agitate among the masses 
 and to propagate the Protestant idea. The spiritual guid- 
 ance and direction of the Church of Rome and its world -em- 
 bracing organisation could be opposed only by a machine able 
 to control the national mind of Germany in the Protestant 
 interest, and to deprive the Roman Church of its supporters 
 in the country. Hence Luther strenuously advocated the 
 introduction of a national and Protestant education. Edu- 
 cation was not to benefit the few, but to embrace all. 
 Thus, through the revolt of Luther, and the necessity of 
 strengthening struggling Protestantism against the Roman 
 Catholic Church, the idea of a national, democratic, and 
 compulsory education arose, and was taken up by the 
 Protestant princes of Germany, who, as a rule, had become 
 Protestant in order to spoHate the wealthy Roman Catholic 
 Church. The assertion that a wave of idealistic sentiment 
 and of religious zeal created Protestantism in Germany, 
 that it was a pure and purely democratic movement, and 
 that the spirit of benevolence and of democracy created the 
 German school, is a fable, for schools and serfdom existed 
 side by side in Germany up to the nineteenth century. In 
 fact, in Germany, and especially in Prussia, school and 
 
150 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 
 
 serfdom, education and tyranny, went hand in hand, and 
 education was used by the Government as a means for 
 keeping the people in a state of subjection and of mental 
 servitude. 
 
 Up to the thirteenth century, Prussia was inhabited by 
 heathen savages, the ancient Prussialis, who were extirpated 
 by the knights of the Teutonic Order, to whom that savage 
 country had been granted, and when they had desolated it 
 by fire and sword, Prussia was colonised not only from all 
 parts of Germany but from all parts of Europe. Germans, 
 Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Swiss, Poles, etc., were attracted 
 by the early rulers of Prussia, partly to people the desolate 
 land, partly to work for their feudal masters, and some sort 
 of compulsory national education was evidently necessary 
 to unify all these incongruous elements, and to obviate the 
 danger of the country falling to pieces. Besides, a common 
 language was absolutely necessary in matters of administra- 
 tion. However, matters educational remained in a very 
 chaotic state, until Frederick William I., one of the greatest 
 rulers, and certainly the ablest and the most energetic 
 administrator, of Prussia, resolved to convert the loosely- 
 jointed, ill-organised, and promiscuously-peopled provinces 
 of Prussia into a unified, firmly -welded centralised State. 
 He meant to Germanise the^eople. Frederick William was 
 a ruler who did not brook .6.elay. In 1713, the very year in 
 which he came to the throne, he issued an edict which aimed 
 at compulsory education in Prussia, and as rapidly as the 
 scanty funds at his disposal allowed it, schools were built, 
 teachers procured or trained, and education extended. In 
 Lithuania alone, 1,105 new schools were erected, in order 
 to convert the Slav inhabitants of that country into German - 
 speaking Prussians, industrious, useful, and loyal citizens, 
 and obedient soldiers. 
 
 Frederick William's successor, Frederick the Great, 
 vastly enlarged the territory of Prussia, adding to the 
 country by his conquest of Silesia large districts inhabited 
 by Austrians, and by the partition of Poland, of which 
 Prussia received a considerable part, extensive provinces 
 
EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 151 
 
 peopled with Poles. Modern Germany, Prusso -Germany, 
 was a country which had sprung by conquest from the 
 smallest beginning from which ever a great State has arisen, 
 and the different nationalities which had been conquered 
 and joined together could not be kneaded into a homo- 
 geneous mass, and into a nation, except by compulsory 
 education. Germany would have borne an aspect similar 
 to that borne by Austria -Hungary, had not the rulers of 
 Prussia vigorously Germanised their country by means of 
 the schools and of compulsory education. The first twenty- 
 three years of Frederick the Great's rule were years of war, 
 but in 1763, the year in which the Seven Years' War, the 
 struggle with Austria, and the great Prussian War period 
 ended, he introduced the celebrated " Generallandschul- 
 recht," the law of compulsory and general education for the 
 whole of his dominions and all the multifarious nationalities 
 dwelling in them. 
 
 The educational organisation of Germany was an absolu- 
 tist machine, though at first sight it bears a strongly demo- 
 cratic appearance. In the character of Frederick the Great 
 the will of the autocrat and the mind of the philosopher 
 and democrat were curiously mingled. Though he treated, 
 his subjects like beasts of burden, he frequently declared 
 that a king should be the first servant of the State. In 
 matters educational we find the same contradiction. While 
 some of the edicts on education issued by the philosopher- 
 king breathed the most enlightened Liberalism — an example 
 will be given in the course of this chapter — a " Cabinet 
 Ordre " of the 7th of September 1779, issued by the king- 
 autocrat, laid down that " the people in the country are 
 only to learn a little reading and writing, for if they are 
 taught too much they will run to the towns in order to 
 become clerks, etc." Frederick the Great and his successors 
 did not wish to spread enlightenment among the masses 
 by means of the schools, but intended to educate the people 
 to be dutiful subjects to their king, hard-working peasants 
 and labourers satisfied with their station, and reUable and 
 patriotic soldiers, ready to sacrifice their lives for their 
 11 
 
1S2 EDUCATION AND MtS-Ei)UCATiON 
 
 country. For these reasons, the Prusso -German educa- 
 tional establishment always bore a distinctly military 
 character, and its first and principal object was to teach 
 and to enforce discipline, to nationalise the people, and to 
 create a strong sense of patriotism and of servility among 
 them. That the elementary schools of Germany with their 
 10,000,000 children were a most powerful, perhaps the most 
 powerful, tool in the hands of the German Government, 
 may be seen from the guiding regulations laid down in 1872 
 by Dr. FaUc, the Prussian Minister of Education, for in 
 them we read : 
 
 " The object of the Prussian elementary school has always 
 been to educate the growing generation to become pious, 
 patriotic men and women who are able by means of the 
 general education and training they receive to fill an honour- 
 able position in civil society. In whatever way the relations 
 of Church and State have been conceived, and whatever 
 theological tendency was paramount at any period, the re- 
 ligious and moral education of youth has at all times been 
 considered the foremost purpose of the schools, and never 
 have the administrative authorities of the State wavered in 
 pursuing the high ideal to sow the seeds of patriotic, religious, 
 and moral sentiment in the children, so that they will become 
 citizens whose inner worth can secure the welfare and pre- 
 servation of the State. 
 
 " But side by side with this exalted ideal, the requirements 
 of practical life have not been left out of sight. Children 
 must learn at school how to perform duties, they are to be 
 habituated to work, to take pleasure in their work, so as to 
 become efficient workers. This has been the aim of popular 
 education in Prussia since the earhest times, and to this day 
 it is plainly understood by all administrative officers and 
 teachers, and by the majority of parents, that it is the busi- 
 ness of the elementary school not merely to teach reading, 
 writing, and arithmetic, but to teach the citizens cheerfully 
 to serve their God, their native country, and themselves." 
 
 The Sunday schools in Great Britain had recently some 
 8,000,000 scholars, while the Sunday schools of Germany 
 had only some 800,000 scholars. These two figures indicate 
 at a glance the fundamental difference between English and 
 
EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 153 
 
 German education. While the leading feature in English 
 and American schools is piety, the teaching of religion and 
 the training of the character of the young, the leading 
 feature of the German elementary schools was, and always 
 has been, the teaching of a militant patriotism and mili- 
 tarism. Moral and religious education was treated as a 
 matter of secondary importance. Singing played a very 
 large part in German education, and especially in elementary 
 education, largely because singing assists splendidly in 
 marching. Battles may be won by outmarching the enemy. 
 Hence the very first songs which a German child learned 
 were military songs, such as : 
 
 I had a faithful comrade once, 
 
 No better could there be, 
 The drum was beat, the charge was led. 
 Together to the strife we sped. 
 
 And he kept step with me. 
 
 A bullet came, etc., etc. 
 
 Dawn of day, dawn of day [ 
 To death thou showest me the way, 
 For when the bugles loudly blow, 
 Full soon shall I be lying low. 
 
 With many a comrade true. 
 Etc., etc. 
 
 I have given all I am and have. 
 
 My heart, my head, my hand, 
 To you for which I like and love, 
 
 My dear old Fatherland. 
 
 Etc., etc. 
 
 The Chinese child learns spelling from the Confucian 
 classics, the German child learned spelling from tales illus- 
 trating German military valour. While the English schools 
 strive to elevate the child's character by instilling the civic 
 virtues, the German schools strove almost exclusively to 
 teach discipline and to arouse and to develop the military 
 inclinations, or rather the spirit of Jingoism, giving little 
 consideration to the training of character and practically 
 none to the development of the civic virtues. The birth- 
 day of the Emperor and the anniversary of the battle of 
 
154 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 
 
 Sedan were the two great school festivals, not only in the 
 elementary schools but in the higher schools as well, and 
 they were celebrated with patriotic songs, recitations, 
 speeches, etc. The " Hereditary Enemy " played a very 
 large part in the elementary history books of Germany. 
 No wonder, then, that the principal, and almost the only, 
 game of German school-children consisted in playing at 
 soldiers or at Frenchmen and Germans, or at Boers and 
 EngUshmen. In Bismarck's words : 
 
 " The mighty influence which the schools exercise in the 
 education of the nation consists in this — that the German 
 child, when handed over to the teacher, is like a blank sheet 
 of paper, and all that is written upon it during the course 
 of elementary education is written with indelible ink, and 
 will last through life. The soul of a child is like wax. 
 Therefore he who directs the school directs the country's, 
 future." 
 
 From the earUest time the Prussian Government raised 
 in the young an aggressive military patriotism. The Ger- 
 man elementary school was a branch establishment of the 
 German barracks. 
 
 In view of the rapid growth of the Social Democratic 
 Party in Germany, particular stress was, during the last 
 few decades, constantly laid upon the duty of the schools 
 to combat the Social Democratic movement. In an order 
 of the 1st of May 1889 William II. said : 
 
 " I have for a long time been occupied with the thought 
 of making use of the schools in their various grades for com- 
 bating the spread of Socialistic and Communist ideas. . . . 
 The school must endeavour to create in the young the 
 conviction that the teachings of Social Democracy contra- 
 vene not only the Divine command and Christian morals, 
 but are moreover impracticable." 
 
 However, the strenuous exertions of all the German 
 schools to fight Socialism, by depicting it as being wicked, 
 unpatriotic, and opposed to the Divine command, were 
 perfectly fruitless. 
 
EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 155 
 
 The aim of the German elementary schools was, accord- 
 ing to Dr. Falk, firstly, to promote patriotism ; secondly, 
 to foster religion and morality ; thirdly, to fit the young 
 for practical life. The tree is known by its fruit, and educa- 
 tion by its results. We have seen that the German elemen- 
 tary schools largely failed in their first and principal aim. 
 Let us now investigate the results of their religious, moral, 
 and practical education. 
 
 There were two great religions in Imperial Germany. 
 The Roman Catholics, who formed one-third of the popu- 
 lation, were pious, but their religiousness was not due to 
 the influence of the State schools but to that of their Church, 
 as may be seen from the fact that the Protestants of Ger- 
 many, who form two- thirds of the population, were not 
 at all religious. Protestantism was the State religion of 
 Prussia, but all the endeavours of the Government to make 
 the people religious were in vain. Church-going was not 
 even a social obligation in the Protestant parts of Germany, 
 where churches were few. Berlin was, according to the 
 complaint of the Emperor William, the capital worst pro- 
 vided with churches. Besides, the few Protestant churches 
 in existence stood almost empty, if we deduct the soldiers 
 and officers who had to attend. 
 
 ReUgiousness and morality ought to manifest themselves 
 in action, not merely in church-going. The fact that there 
 were on an average every year about 180,000 illegitimate 
 births in Germany, while there were only about 50,000 
 illegitimate births in Great Britain, and the fact that there 
 were every year about 12,000 suicides in Germany, as com- 
 pared with only 3,000 suicides in Great Britain, seem to 
 prove that the German schools ill-succeeded in fulfilling their 
 second aim and object. Both Christianity and morality 
 preach toleration. Yet toleration was in Germany con- 
 spicuous by its absence. Roman Catholics were ill-treated 
 by Protestants, and Jews by both. 
 
 The third aim of the elementary schools of Germany 
 was to prepare the young for practical life. As regards 
 teaching, the German elementary schools compared favour- 
 
156 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 
 
 ably with the British elementary schools, not in their com- 
 pleteness, but in the wise limitation of their programmes. 
 The German elementary schools taught chiefly homely and 
 necessary subjects, the elements of knowledge, while the 
 English elementary schools, having more ambitious aims, 
 strove to give to the child of the people a knowledge more 
 for show than for practical use, a smattering of everything, 
 but often not a sufficient knowledge of the most necessary 
 things, such as writing and spelling. The German child 
 learned a few necessary things fairly well, the English child 
 learned many things ill, most of which were unnecessary, 
 if not positively harmful. The German elementary schools 
 educated the young to be successful workers in their station, 
 the English elementary schools endeavoured to convert 
 the children of the poor into ladies and gentlemen able to 
 discuss all the ologies. While German peasant children 
 were satisfied to follow the occupation of their fathers, 
 English country children learned to hate the country, sneer 
 at the rural occupations, and desert the country for town, 
 largely in consequence of the townified and totally un- 
 suitable primary education which they received. It is a 
 misfortune that the town often legislates for the country 
 and determines its education. 
 
 The German child learned in the primary school to obey, 
 perhaps too slavishly to obey ; English Board School 
 education, erring in the opposite direction, gave the child 
 too much liberty, often allowed it to disobey, to be unruly. 
 German school-children were made to be orderly, punctual, 
 courteous, clean ; English Board School children were only 
 too often allowed to be dirty, untidy, and rude to their 
 teachers, and their teachers had hardly sufficient power to 
 correct them when admonition had failed. The German 
 teacher was an autocrat with a stick, who, it must be 
 admitted, occasionally abused his authority and ill-treated 
 the children ; the English teacher was only too often a 
 meek man or woman of sorrows, who was ill-treated by the 
 children. Discipline was the characteristic of the German 
 school, lawlessness that of the Enghsh school. As regards 
 
EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 157 
 
 order, discipline, and the sane limitation of learning, I think 
 that the German elementary schools compared favourably 
 with the English schools, but the German masses were quite 
 as ignorant and as narrow-minded as the English masses, 
 perhaps more so. 
 
 Unfortunately, English Board Schools have assumed 
 more and more the character of charity schools, where charity 
 is somewhat indiscriminately distributed to all applicants. 
 Hence most parents who can afford to do so send their 
 children to private schools, and the Board Schools have 
 become the preserve of the children of the poor, and centres 
 and breeding-places of social dissatisfaction and revolt. 
 In Germany, on the other hand, the children of the rich 
 and poor had to mingle as freely in all the schools as in 
 the army. The cause of the difference between the English 
 and the German educational system is obvious. In Great 
 Britain the children of the well-to-do used in the pre-Board 
 School times to go to private schools, and the children of 
 the poor to charity schools. As the Board Schools were 
 unfortunately evolved out of the old charity schools, the 
 elementary schools of the English nation were born with 
 the pauper stigma attached to them. Hence they are still 
 charity schools in the eyes of many people, and it is to 
 be feared that a too open-handed, and therefore unwise, 
 philanthropy is strengthening that impression . In Germany, 
 on the other hand, where compulsory education for all was 
 suddenly introduced, so to say on the same day, all children 
 had from the first to go to the schools which the Govern- 
 ment had provided, especially as the German Government 
 distinctly discountenanced the creation of private schools 
 which would have infringed upon the education monopoly 
 of the State. Numerous large private schools and church 
 and chapel schools similar to those existing in England 
 are unknown in Germany. While there were in Germany 
 before the War 60,000 elementary State schools with 
 10,000,000 children, there were only 643 private elementary 
 schools with 41,000 children. In other words, in Germany 
 only one child out of every 250 went to a private school. 
 
158 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 
 
 England has class schools and mass schools ; Germany had 
 practically only one kind of school — national schools. In 
 England education of a class type, or, rather, education 
 differentiating absolutely between classes and masses, tends 
 to keep classes and masses asunder. In Germany educa- 
 tion of a democratic type caused classes and masses to 
 commingle. 
 
 The English Board School child receives his tuition, 
 his books, and, if necessary, his meals, his boots, and his 
 clothes gratis, and the child is thus encouraged to become 
 a clamorous, rapacious, and unblushing sponger, relying on 
 doles, not on work, for a living. Besides, things which one 
 can get for nothing are not appreciated. Consequently 
 English parents accept gratuitous education grumblingly, 
 and they take often Kttle interest in the training of their 
 children. The German parents, on the other hand, have, 
 as a rule, to pay for the tuition of their children, for their 
 books, etc., and the free gift of meals, boots, and clothes 
 to school-children is very little known. Consequently, the 
 thrifty German parents mean to get full value for their 
 money, and take an interest in their children's education. 
 An English child can fairly easily avoid going to school by 
 the flimsiest of excuses, and parents often connive at the 
 avoidance of school. Therefore school attendance is very 
 irregular, and little work is done. In Germany, a rigorous 
 supervision and drastic and immediate punishment of 
 parents, masters, and others responsible for lack of attend- 
 ance causes avoidance of school attendance to be rare. 
 
 Education, as service in the army, is democratic in Ger- 
 many, in so far as it is compulsory and equal for all. 
 The children of rich and poor sit on the same bench. 
 WiUiam II. was educated at the ordinary intermediate school 
 of Cassel, sitting in the same room with the sons of pro- 
 fessional men, petty tradesmen, and the like. While this 
 indiscriminate mixing of the classes and masses in the ele- 
 mentary and intermediate schools may, and probably does, 
 lower the tone in the upper ranks of German society, it 
 certainly tends to raise the masses. The unwashed sons of 
 
EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 159 
 
 Grerman artisans feel uncomfortable in their grime when 
 looking at their better-cared-for schoolfellows, and learn to 
 wash themselves even without compulsion, for example is 
 better than precept, while dirty Board School children feel 
 quite comfortable, if exclusively surrounded by their more 
 or less uncleanly mates. Besides, this mingling of the 
 classes urges the children of the poor to become better off 
 by hard work and thrift, and kindles ambition in them at 
 their most important period of life, while the English School 
 Board child is only too apt to herd with the herd, to learn 
 to be improvident, and to rely more on the bounty of the 
 rich and of the local authorities, who generously provide 
 for all, than on his own exertions. The ideal of the 
 EngHsh middle-class is to become gentlemen — that is, to 
 live a life of ease without work, and the ideal of the poor 
 to live a life of ease at the cost of the community, while 
 the ideal of the German middle-class and lower-class is to 
 become rich by work. Thus education provides a powerful 
 stimulus for national activity in Germany, whilst class 
 education in England' acts as an incentive to work as little 
 as possible. 
 
 The ambition of the children of the German poor often 
 causes them to be the best scholars, and the spirit of 
 emulation compels the children of the rich, who otherwise 
 might be lazy, relying on their fathers' wealth and their 
 assured prospects, to work much more energetically than 
 they would do in schools where they need compete only 
 with their social equals. Owing to the great educational 
 opportunities given to the German poor and to the ambition 
 awakened in them to get on, many of the leading scientists, 
 medical men, lawyers. Government oflficials, etc., of Germany 
 have risen from the very lowest social stratum. 
 
 The mingUng of the classes in the lower and the higher 
 schools of Germany is due partly to the influence of Luther 
 already referred to but chiefly to that of Napoleon I. WTien 
 both the professional army and the caste system of Prussia 
 were defeated on the fields of Jena and Auerstadt, it became 
 clear to Prussian patriots that the era of national armies 
 
160 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 
 
 and of a national organisation of the State had arrived, that 
 the time of class rule, of the " Klassenstaat," had gone by. 
 The " Tugendbund," the Moral and Scientific League of 
 Virtue, which was created after the disasters of 1806, strove 
 to regenerate and to lift up the humiliated country by 
 elevating the masses. Stein, Hardenberg, Fichte, Niebuhr, 
 and the two Humboldts wished to bind rich and poor, 
 classes and masses together for the defence of the country. 
 With this object in view they strove to give to all equal 
 educational opportunities and an equal intellectual and 
 educational stake in the country. Napoleon's motto, 
 La carriere ouverte aux talents, was adopted by Prussia. 
 Notwithstanding the reactionary tendencies of later times, 
 equality in education, which had sprung from the disastrous 
 war of 1806-7, remained a characteristic of the Prusso- 
 Grerman schools. Hence we do not find in Germany a 
 desire to debar the children of the lower classes from a 
 liberal education. 
 
 The secondary schools of Imperial Germany were in the 
 main cramming establishments of the worst type, and they 
 were considered by parents and children as a great but 
 unavoidable evil. Professional careers required, as a rule, 
 nine years' preparatory study at the Gymnasium which 
 German boys enter when nine years old, and between the 
 ninth and the eighteenth year German boys studying at the 
 Gymnasia were exclusively occupied with cramming. The 
 Gymnasium is the classical school of Germany, in which 
 Latin and Greek form the nucleus of tuition, and in those 
 schools the dead languages, as well as the modern ones, 
 were taught in the most pitiful manner. Nothing in litera- 
 ture is more beautiful, and nothing can be more elevating 
 and more beneficial for the development of the intellect 
 and of taste, than the reading of the Greek and Latin classics 
 either in the original or in translation ; but the Greek and 
 Latin classics were not read but " translated," slowly dis- 
 sected, and every fragment carefully exailained under the 
 microscope, by the unfortunate scholar under the direction 
 of dry-as-dust philologists. A brilliant speech of Cicero or 
 
EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 161 
 
 Demosthenes, which must be read in a few hours in order 
 to be appreciated, was slowly chewed, re-chewed, and again 
 re-chewed during three months. The modern languages 
 were taught in the same idiotic fashion, and even the master- 
 pieces of German literature were not read and enjoyed, but 
 pedantically pulled to pieces line by line and word by word, 
 as if it were the aim of the German intermediate schools to 
 convert the German nation into a race of philologists. Other 
 subjects were similarly treated. History, for instance, was 
 learned from handbooks which, in the smallest possible com- 
 pass, gave the maximum of facts and dates, and in these 
 no attempt was made to show the organic development of 
 States and the causes and consequences of historical events. 
 The German school-books of history were merely compendia 
 of facts and dates, and were about as interesting as a railway 
 time-table. During nine years, the unfortunate German 
 boys were compelled to commit to memory an immense 
 quantity of unconnected, unpalatable, and mostly useless 
 information, presented in the most repelling form. 
 
 It may be that nine years of continual cramming improves 
 the memory of the pupils, but it seems more likely that the 
 memory suffers by being overtaxed. On the other hand, the 
 harm done by constant cramming, which is merely under- 
 taken for the object of passing an examination, is incalcul- 
 able. Since no attempt was made to develop the indepen- 
 dent thinking power of the scholars, the unfortunate pupils 
 became learned automatons, and though they had some 
 knowledge of Latin and Greek and French and various 
 sciences, they were usually not able to write German 
 correctly. The German newspapers and books were atroci- 
 ously written. Since the examination with which the nine 
 years' torture ended had to be passed to enable the scholar 
 to attend the university and to become a professional man, 
 the insane tyranny of the Gymnasium had to be borne. 
 When at last freedom dawned for the martyr, the first act 
 of those, who after nine years' weary and almost useless 
 labour had passed the concluding examination, often was 
 to make a bonfire of their books. A German who had passed 
 
162 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 
 
 the Abiturienten Examen endeavoured, as a rule, to forget 
 as rapidly as possible all the useless stufiE which he had to 
 learn during nine mis-spent years. 
 
 In order to show that the foregoing statements are not 
 exaggerated I would give two German opinions in support 
 of them. In the Frankfurter Zeitung of the 14th of December 
 1906, an article entitled " Education to Manliness " was 
 pubUshed, in which we read : 
 
 " Our schools do not form the character. That is the 
 complaint which, more or less clearly formulated, may be 
 found in all the books which advocate the reform of our 
 education. Our German schools turn men into machines, 
 educate them to submissiveness, to cowardice, to pettiness 
 and pedantry, to much that is unlovely and pernicious, and 
 they fail to form strong-minded, self-conscious men. And 
 the State requires nothing more than men, manly men. In 
 short, our German schools spoil the character of the child 
 and his intelhgence by systematically shackling his mind, 
 by cramming his brain, and by filHng it with dead matter. 
 Thus the thinking power is killed, individuality is destroyed, 
 and the mental horizon and the development of moral senti- 
 ment are narrowed and repressed." 
 
 In the preface of his book, Deutsche Schulerziehung, 
 Professor W. Rein, one of the leading educational authorities 
 of Germany, said : 
 
 " It cannot be denied that our schools have achieved 
 much. However, it was thought that the principal object of 
 schools was to distribute knowledge so as to prepare youth 
 for the labour of active life. Our schools were and are still 
 in the main devoted to instilhng knowledge, and in that 
 they have done much, but they have neglected the forma- 
 tion of character. 
 
 " In this respect the good English schools are no doubt 
 ahead of the German schools, because the former strive not 
 only to increase knowledge but also to raise men of char- 
 acter, firmness, and energy ; and the history of England 
 shows clearly to all those who have eyes to see what strong 
 and energetic men who know what they are doing are able 
 to achieve. Only a few German schools exist where work' 
 
EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 163 
 
 Bhops, playing-fields, school-gardens, common walks, and 
 excursions break the monotony of the study of dead books. 
 " We require educators, not merely teachers. A teacher 
 requires nothing but knowledge. An educator requires 
 more." 
 
 The authorities responsible for the programme of the 
 German Gymnasium probably thought that that institution 
 was most admirably adapted for preparing the young 
 intelligence for successful professional or administrative 
 careers, but they might have been enlightened by the broad- 
 minded instructions of Frederick the Great, addressed to 
 the professors of the Civil and Military Academy for Young 
 Gentlemen, in which the Eang said : 
 
 " The masters shall studiously endeavour not only to 
 store the memories of the pupils with useful knowledge, but 
 above all to create in them a certain agility of mind, which 
 shall render them capable of applying themselves not to one 
 study alone but to any that may be found expedient, in 
 particular to the cultivation of their reason and to the form- 
 ing of their judgment. To this end, it is necessary that the 
 masters should accustom their pupils to form just and clear 
 ideas of things." 
 
 Frederick the Great wished the young intelligence of the 
 nation to be liberally instructed in political matters, for he 
 wrote in the same M^moire : 
 
 " The preceptor will confine himself to giving his pupils 
 an idea of the rights of citizens, the rights of the people, 
 the rights of the monarch, and of that which is called Law. 
 He will not fail to impress upon their minds that Law, being 
 destitute of any actual sanctity for enforcing its observance, 
 is a vain phantom that sovereigns do not fail to display 
 in their instructions and manifestoes, though they often 
 violate its principles in their own conduct." 
 
 The broad-minded precepts of Frederick the Great were 
 utterly forgotten. A highly-educated young German, who 
 had spent twelve years at school, had as a rule not sufficient 
 knowledge of the political affairs of his country to be able 
 
164 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 
 
 to read the newspaper with profit, and he had, as a rule, no 
 knowledge whatever of his rights. 
 
 Germany had no less than 23 universities, at which 
 almost 3,000 professors and lecturers taught about 66,000 
 students. The number of the university students in Germany 
 has been increasing at a most remarkable rate. In 1870-1, 
 there were 12,256 university students in Germany ; in 1911, 
 66,358 were counted in that country. In the short space of 
 forty years the number of students in the German universi- 
 ties had more than quintupled. However, it may be doubted 
 whether it is a matter for congratulation that the German 
 universities have been turning out an ever-growing army 
 of unemployed doctors, lawyers, theologians, and teachers, 
 who, by the pressure of their competition, have lowered the 
 status of all professions and formed a huge learned, and 
 therefore the more dangerous, proletariat. Although the 
 German universities were leading in various directions, they 
 were scarcely superior to the high schools of Great Britain 
 in direct utility. I venture to affirm that the average 
 British doctor, lawyer, clergyman, and schoolmaster is dis- 
 tinctly superior to his German colleague. The superiority 
 of the German universities, which was very great in the 
 time when university teaching in Great Britain was at its 
 lowest ebb, is a thing of the past. The chief effect of the 
 activity of the German universities in creating a huge pro- 
 letariat of unemployed professional men is that the output 
 of books, mostly worthless, has enormously increased. 
 During the last thirty years the number of new books pub- 
 lished in Germany has in round figures increased from about 
 10,000 to 30,000 per year. 
 
 Although in 1914 Germany was no longer a model to Great 
 Britain in elementary, intermediate, and university educa- 
 tion, she was no doubt far ahead of England in technical 
 education. Therefore the German technical high schools 
 were far more popular with foreign students than the German 
 universities. Before the War, of the students at the 
 polytechnica, 20 per cent, were foreigners ; of the students 
 at the forestry academies, 30 per cent, were foreigners ; of 
 
EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 165 
 
 the students at the mining academies, almost 40 per cent, 
 were foreigners ; of the students at the universities, only 
 8 per cent, were foreigners. However, the efficiency of 
 technical education in Germany has been very much exag- 
 gerated. German technical education, like German general 
 education, was rather extensive than intensive, rather showy 
 than practical and thorough, and in not a few instances its 
 efforts were misdirected. For instance, enormous exertions 
 were made to advance architecture and the building trade, 
 and no expenses were spared, but the results achieved were 
 the reverse of satisfactory. The design of the public and 
 private buildings which during the last decade or two were 
 erected in Germany was as a rule laboured, unpleasing, or 
 ugly, and the inner arrangements were often unpractical. 
 The new Reichstag is a case in point. The numerous pre- 
 tentious but ugly monuments erected in Berlin and else- 
 where also testify to the fact that schools may give know- 
 ledge but cannot give ability. There is a German proverb, 
 Je gelehrter desto verkehrter, " The greatest fool is a learned 
 fool." There is much truth in that saying. 
 
 Germany had a huge number of technical schools of every 
 grade. There were technical schools for apprentices, for 
 artisans, for foremen, for managers, for directors of in- 
 dustrial establishments, for merchants and bankers, etc., 
 and every day additional technical schools were created. 
 Besides, itinerant instructors visited the villages, which 
 were too small to have technical schools of their own. In 
 many instances technical education was compulsory. The 
 thing was being overdone. Felisch wrote, " We pay for 
 our greater theoretical knowledge with diminished practical 
 ability," and Von Steinbeis complained, " Theoretical 
 education has been given such a preponderance that even 
 in our smallest workshops the pedantic spirit of the school 
 penetrates the air, a spirit which is not exactly conducive 
 to quick and efficient work, and which is absent in countries 
 which have arrived at a higher stage of industrial de- 
 velopment than Germany." Carl Roscher, speaking of the 
 learned proletariat issuing from the Technical High Schools, 
 
166 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 
 
 complained about the insufficient supply of practical workers 
 of the better class, and was of opinion that, " compared 
 with England and the United States, the education of our 
 young engineers at the Technical High Schools costs too 
 much money and too much time." In a lengthy report 
 on Grerman technical education, published in 1902 by the 
 United States Commissioner of Labour, we read with regard 
 to the German Technical High Schools, " The education 
 here received often exceeds the real needs of many branches 
 of industry. Hence there may result a loss of time which 
 could have been devoted to obtaining practical skill." 
 
 Many similar opinions given by high authorities on tech- 
 nical education could be quoted, which show that Charlotten- 
 burg and the other Technical High Schools of Germany, at 
 which an army of more than 12,000 students were trained, 
 were not an unmixed blessing. It is not without cause that 
 the best engineers in the world are the practically trained 
 English and American engineers, although their theoretical 
 knowledge may be small, if compared with that of their 
 inferior German competitors. It can also not be admitted 
 that the industrial success of Germany has been due to 
 the general education of the masses of industrial workers. 
 The fact that practically every man in Germany can read 
 and write had little if anything to do with the progress 
 of that country's industries. The Belgian industries were 
 comparatively more flourishing than those of Germany ; 
 yet in Belgium 10 per cent, of the recruits were unable to 
 write. It should also not be forgotten that Great Britain 
 had the best workmen in the world at the time when her 
 workers were practically uneducated. 
 
 German education had not a few excellent points, but 
 in many respects it was exceedingly unsatisfactory. The 
 chief practical value of the German schools consisted, in 
 my opinion, not in the knowledge disseminated, but in 
 the discipline instilled. Enghsh education, and especially 
 English primary education, is apt to make men lazy and 
 women flighty. German education, on the other hand, 
 teaches the young to work, to obey, and before all to obey 
 
EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 167 
 
 the authorities. German education, both civil and mili- 
 tary, had, by its teaching of discipline, created a docile, 
 perhaps a too docile, population of willing workers, who 
 were easily led. Bagehot wrote : " The natural impulse 
 of the English people is to resist authority." In Germany 
 no similar spirit of instinctive and unreasoning resistance 
 has been noticeable. Therefore national organisation and 
 national co-operation in matters political and economic 
 could easily be established in that country. It cannot too 
 often and too loudly be asserted that Imperial Germany 
 became great and powerful not through her education, but 
 through her discipline. National co-operation, the co- 
 ordination of all the national energies, is a mighty force, but 
 co-ordination is impossible without subordination. Unfor- 
 tunately the spirit of subordination seems to be incompatible 
 with the spirit of Democracy. However, while individualism 
 may create disorder, exaggerated drill is apt to produce 
 in a nation an abject docility and servility which may ruin it. 
 
 Germany owed her political and economic success cer- 
 tainly not to the book knowledge which her citizens received 
 in her schools, for the German schools, like all other schools, 
 merely turned out a mob of semi-educated mediocrities 
 possessed of an overworked and tortured memory and of an 
 under-developed or an undeveloped intelligence. Germany, 
 with all her schools and universities, and with her army of 
 300,000 teachers, was a far less intelligent and far less cul- 
 tured nation than the British nation. The general intelli- 
 gence and culture of a nation may be measured by the 
 Press, which reflects the national mind. Now I think that 
 no educated German will contradict me if I state that the 
 whole Press of Germany — dailies, weeklies, monthlies — was 
 not only vastly inferior to the British Press, but was quite 
 unworthy of the intelligence of a cultured nation. 
 
 The foregoing pages, which were written in 1906, show 
 that German education has been much overvalued and 
 much misunderstood in Great Britain, and it seems to 
 be a dangerous experiment to model British education on 
 the more unsatisfactory part of German education, the 
 12 
 
168 EDUCATION AND MIS-EDUCATION 
 
 dissemination of knowledge. After aU, great national 
 institutions, such as Parliament, civil service, army, and 
 schools, cannot mechanically be copied from other nations, 
 because such institutions are not dead things, but living 
 organisms which have slowly grown up from a deep historical 
 and national foundation. National education and national 
 armies must before all be national. They must be in accord- 
 ance not only with the peculiar requirements of the country, 
 but also with the peculiar character and spirit of its inhabi- 
 tants. Those who wish to introduce the German educational 
 system into Great Britain can make it a success only if 
 they begin by changing the character of EngUshmen. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE FISCAL POLICY OF GERMANY AND ITS RESULTS ^ 
 
 The close of the Napoleonic wars left Germany devas- 
 tated, impoverished, and exhausted ; her commerce and her 
 industries were destroyed. While the whole Continent had 
 been ravaged and ruined by incessant wars and hostile 
 invasions, British industries had flourished and prospered 
 in internal peace. After the Napoleonic wars the Continent 
 remained utterly exhausted for a long time ; its industries 
 were shattered, its wealth had disappeared, and during the 
 slow progress of its recuperation Great Britain conquered 
 the commerce and industries of the world. 
 
 Towards the middle of the nineteenth century. Great 
 Britain was the merchant, manufacturer, carrier, banker, 
 and engineer of the world. She ruled supreme in the realm 
 of business. Two-thirds of the world's shipping flew the 
 British flag, two-thirds of the coal produced in the world >^ 
 was British ; Great Britain had more miles of railway than 
 the whole Continent, and produced more cotton goods and 
 more iron than all the countries of the world combined. 
 Her coal mines were considered inexhaustible, and the 
 coal possessed by other nations was believed to be of such 
 inferior quality as to be almost useless for manufacturing 
 purposes. She had practically the manufacturing monopoly 
 of the world. The great German economist Friedrich 
 List wrote in his Zollvereinshlatt : " England is a world in 
 itself, a world which is superior to the whole rest of the 
 world in power and wealth." 
 
 Many British economists and merchants thought that 
 
 * From the Nineteenth Century and After, August 1903. 
 169 
 
170 ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
 England's economic position was overwhelmingly strong 
 and unassailable, that it would be impossible for other 
 nations to compete with her in neutral markets or to 
 protect with tariffs their own manufactures against the 
 invasion of the British industries. During the reign of 
 these intoxicating ideas of Great Britain's irresistible 
 economic power, Cobden proclaimed that " Great Britain 
 is, and always will remain, the workshop of the world." 
 Great Britain threw away her fiscal weapons, opened her 
 doors wide to all nations, and introduced Free Trade. 
 
 While Great Britain was the undisputed mistress of the 
 world's trade, industry, finance, and shipping, Germany 
 V/^was a poor agricultural country. She had been impover- 
 ished by her constant wars. She had neither colonies nor 
 good coal, nor shipping, nor even a rich soil nor a climate 
 favourable to agriculture. She was divided into a number 
 of petty States which were jealous of one another, and 
 which hampered one another's progress. Communications 
 in the interior were bad, and her internal trade was ob- 
 structed and undeveloped. Besides, she was burdened by 
 militarism, and she possessed only one good harbour. 
 According to the forecast of the British free traders, Ger- 
 many was predestined to remain a poor agricultural country, 
 exactly as Great Britain was predestined to remain a rich 
 industrial nation. 
 
 At that time arose in Germany "Fripdyj ^^h Ljst . a write r 
 on politica l economy and a convinced believer in Protection. 
 11'eTiad traveiredand seen the world, and had lived a long 
 time in England and the United States. Consequently he 
 spoke with greater practical knowledge on internatio aaJ 
 affairs than the majority of political economists. His 
 principal work. The National System of Political Economy, 
 was published in 1840, and created some stir at the time. 
 Like Cobden's doctrine of Free Trade, List's system of 
 national Protection was hailed with enthusiasm by the 
 business men of his country. It was viewed by the German 
 Governments with suspicion and dislike. Embittered and 
 disappointed by the lack of official appreciation and by the 
 
ECONOMIC POLICY 171 
 
 persecution of the German Governments, List shot himself 
 in 1846. After his death his system rapidly became as 
 authoritative for German economic policy as the system 
 of Adam Smith was for Great Britain. It became the 
 text-book of the German statesmen. Consequently it will 
 be interesting to consider some of List's more important 
 views. 
 
 At the time when Friedrich List wrote, Great Britain 
 was wealthy and powerful, while Germany was poor and 
 weak. List endeavoured to show how Great Britain had 
 become wealthy, and how Germany also might acquire 
 wealth, profiting from Great Britain's example. After in- 
 vestigating the economic history of England, he summed 
 up the result of his inquiry as follows : 
 
 " The English, by a system of restrictions, privileges, 
 and encouragements, have succeeded in transplanting on 
 to their native soil the wealth, the talents, and the spirit 
 of enterprise of foreigners. This policy was pursued with 
 greater or lesser, with speedier or more tardy, success just 
 in proportion as the measures adopted were more or less 
 judiciously adapted to the object in view, and applied and 
 pursued with more or less energy and perseverance. 
 
 " It is true that for the increase in her power and in her 
 productive capacity England is indebted not solely to her 
 commercial restrictions, to her protective laws, and to her 
 commercial treaties, but in a large measure also to her con- 
 quests in science and in the arts. 
 
 " How comes it that in these days one million of English 
 operatives can perform the work of hundreds of millions ? 
 It comes from the great demand for manufactured goods 
 which by her wise and energetic policy England has created 
 in foreign lands, and especially in her Colonies ; from the 
 wise and powerful protection extended to her home indus- 
 tries ; from the great rewards which by means of her patent 
 laws she has offered to every new discovery ; and from the 
 extraordinary facility for inland transport afforded by her 
 public roads, canals, and railways. 
 
 " England has for a long time monopoUsed the inventive 
 genius of every nation. It is no more than fair that England, 
 now that she has attained the culminating point of her 
 
172 ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
 industrial growth and progress, should restore again to the 
 nations of Continental Europe a portion of those productive 
 forces which she originally derived from them." 
 
 From these facts List drew the logical conclusion and 
 applied it to Germany. He said : 
 
 " Modern Grermany, lacking a system of vigorous and 
 united commercial policy, exposed in her home markets 
 to competition with a foreign manufacturing power in every 
 way superior to her own, while excluded at the same time 
 from foreign markets by arbitrary and often capricious 
 restrictions, is very far indeed from making that progress 
 in industry to which she is entitled by the degree of her 
 culture. She cannot even maintain her previously acquired 
 position, and is made a convenience of by that very nation, 
 until at last the German States have resolved to secure 
 their home markets for their own industries by the adoption 
 of a united vigorous system of commercial poUcy. 
 
 " We venture to assert that on the development of the 
 German protective system depend the existence, the inde- 
 pendence, and the future of German nationality. Only in 
 the soil of general prosperity does the national spirit strike 
 its roots and produce fine blossoms and rich fruits. Only 
 from the unity of material interests does unity of purpose 
 arise, and from both of these national power." 
 
 The position of disunited Germany in 1840 strangely 
 resembled the position of the scattered British Empire of 
 1903, and if we insert in the last two paragraphs quoted 
 the word " British Empire " for " Germany " List's words 
 might easily be attributed to Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. 
 
 By a curious coincidence List wrote in Germany when 
 Cobden and his disciples preached their gospel in Great 
 Britain. The British free traders, who, with their universal 
 theory and their cosmopohtan views, ignored the existence 
 of nations, naturally did not like to see a pronouncedly 
 national system of political economy arise. List's book 
 was vigorously attacked by Free Traders. The Edinburgh 
 Review devoted, in July 1842, an article of no less than 
 forty-two pages to his book, in which we find expressions of 
 contempt such as " a pretended system," " his poor miscon- 
 
ECONOMIC POLICY 173 
 
 ception of the doctrines which he tries to brand with the 
 nickname of cosmopolitan economy," " his treatise is un- 
 worthy of notice," " unworthy of grave criticism," etc. 
 The writer of that article, however, did not confine himself 
 to abuse, but " proved " to his own satisfaction that, whereas 
 England was, and ever would remain, the workshop of the 
 world, Germany was, and ever would remain, a poor 
 agricultural country, and that all attempts to build up 
 industries in Germany under the shelter of Protection were 
 misdirected and would prove a failure. The writer said : 
 
 " The manufactures in which our author exults are an 
 evil to Germany. The labour and capital which that country 
 has expended upon them have been forced from more 
 profitable employments." 
 
 The Edinburgh Review sapiently concluded : 
 
 " In Continental countries they naturally reason thus : 
 ' England has protected her manufactures — England is 
 rich ; if we protect our manufactures we shall be as rich as 
 she is.' They forget that England has unrivalled natural 
 capacities for manufacturing and commercial industry, and 
 that no country with capacities distinctly inferior can ascend 
 to an equal prosperity by any pohcy whatever." 
 
 We have now heard the voice of the English and of the 
 German prophet of the 'forties of the last century. Since 
 then Germany has had almost uninterrupted Protection, 
 and Great Britain almost uninterrupted Free Trade. Ger- 
 many, which was then a country without experience in 
 industry, finance, commerce, and shipping, without capital, 
 without colonies, without good coal, with only one good 
 harbour, a country weighed down by militarism, convulsed 
 by three great wars and a revolution, and, according to Free 
 Trade doctrines, " kept back " by Protection, became 
 nevertheless so wealthy and powerful that before the War 
 she competed with England in all foreign markets and even 
 in the home market, that she had some of the swiftest ships 
 on the ocean, that she was paramount in some of the most 
 important industries, and that she could even afford to 
 
174 ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
 emulate Great Britain's fleet after having created for herself 
 the strongest army in the world. 
 
 . Germany's progress under Protection was steady, con- 
 tinuous, and rapid. Between 1850 and 1900 Germany's 
 production of iron, her consumption of cotton, and her 
 savings banks deposits have grown gigantically. In 1914 
 her population had about four times the amount of savings 
 in the savings banks which was to be found in the British 
 savings banks. Sixty years ago the average wages of 
 British workmen were, according to List, four times as high 
 as the average wages of the German workmen. Before the 
 War German wages and British wages were equally high in 
 many instances. Hence German wages have under Pro- 
 tection risen fourfold in many trades. From a poor debtor 
 country, Germany had become a rich creditor country. 
 Formerly she had to borrow money in foreign countries and 
 on onerous terms. In 1914 German capital invested abroad 
 amounted probably to about £2,000,000,000. 
 
 In view of her triumphant economic progress, the economic 
 policy and views of leading Germans should be of great 
 interest. 
 
 Free Trade has never had much influence in Germany, 
 because Free Trade never flourishes in a struggling country. 
 Free Trade is an excellent policy for industries of irresistible 
 strength. Those industries which need not fear competi- 
 tion, which feel assured of a free market abroad and at 
 home, always favour Free Trade, while strugghng industries 
 always favour Protection. In France the Gironde, with its 
 matchless wines, is in favour of Free Trade. In the United 
 States the cotton belt and the wheat districts are for Free 
 Trade, while the industrial parts are for Protection. In 
 Germany, where neither nature nor exertion had given 
 to any industry an overwhelming power, the idea of Free 
 Trade had never taken hold of the country or of any part 
 of it. Jhering, the greatest German jurist of his time, 
 expressed very happily the ideas of the leading circles in 
 Germany on Free Trade when he wittily said : " It is a 
 matter of course that the wolves demand freedom of action 
 
ECONOMIC POLICY 175 
 
 for themselves, but if the sheep raise the same demand it 
 only proves that they are sheep." The demand for Free 
 Trade arose in Great Britain from the cotton industry, and 
 List was not slow in pointing out the real cause of that 
 demand. In his weekly paper, the Zollvereinsblatt, he drew 
 attention to the fact that England was then practically the 
 only cotton manufacturer in the world, that the British 
 cotton industry was by far the most powerful exporting 
 industry in the world, and that the demand of the British 
 cotton manufacturers for Free Trade was as natural as 
 for the other countries was resistance to that demand. 
 
 A certain number of Free Traders existed in Germany, 
 such as Prince-Smith, Wiss, Ascher, Michaelis, Wirth, 
 Hiibner, Soetbeer, Braun, Bamberger, Bohmert, Emming- 
 haus, Lammers, Meyer, Eras, Wolff. These men were 
 mostly professors, journahsts, and authors. They were 
 therefore never considered in their country as the spokes- 
 men of the productive industries. It is interesting to note 
 that the chief representative of Free Trade in Germany was 
 Prince-Smith, an Enghshman, and by profession an author. 
 In merchant and banking circles, especially in Hamburg, 
 Free Trade found naturally more support, for the purely 
 distributive business of the merchant and the banker is 
 greatly hampered by irksome and often vexatious customs 
 regulations. Besides, it is immaterial to merchants and 
 bankers whether they trade in foreign goods and bills or in 
 domestic ones, and unless patriotism is stronger than busi- 
 ness instinct these two classes always incUne towards Free 
 Trade. In consideration of these circumstances their plead- 
 ings were ignored, and the German Government made up 
 its mind to look chiefly after the interests of the productive 
 industries, which were considered to be the only basis of a 
 nation's wealth. 
 
 Bismarck, when referring in the Reichstag to the German 
 Free Traders, said : " They do not sow, neither do they 
 spin — nevertheless they are clothed and fed," He delighted 
 in describing them as people who pore all day long in their 
 study over books and papers, and who are perfectly un- 
 
17« ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
 acquainted with business life. His practical mind observed 
 that the men who in later years directed the commercial 
 policy of Great Britain were clergymen, like Adam Smith, 
 Malthus, and the elder Mill, that Ricardo was a stockbroker, 
 that Cobden went bankrupt, that Bright was a cotton manu- 
 facturer, and therefore personally interested in the estabhsh- 
 ment of Free Trade, and that Villiers was a lawyer. In 
 private conversation his derision of these men knew no 
 bounds. Nevertheless his standing instructions were that 
 his unflattering remarks on these men and on " Professor " 
 Gladstone should not get into the papers. 
 I According to Bismarck's opinion Free Trade in England 
 was a most excellent thing — ^for Germany — and he did not 
 like to see that happy state of affairs altered. Therefore 
 he wished neither to see the Free Traders of Great Britain, 
 whose rule was such a blessing to his country, attacked by 
 the German press nor Great Britain's belief in the panacea 
 of Free Trade shaken. Nevertheless when the German 
 Free Traders became too loud in their praise of British 
 Free Trade, of which they had no practical knowledge, he 
 had a pamphlet written on the Cobden Club by Lothar 
 Bucher, his confidential assistant, in which he declared, 
 " The Manchester Free Trade agitation is the most colossal 
 and the most audacious campaign of poUtical and economic 
 deception which the world has ever seen." 
 
 While some of the minor pohtical economists of Germany 
 were Free Traders, WiUielm Roscher, a leading economist, 
 considered Free Trade as impracticable and unattainable. 
 He wrote : 
 
 " When the feeling that all mankind constitutes one 
 family has abohshed all poUtical boundaries, and when 
 universal righteousness and love have killed all national 
 ambitions and jealousies, differences between nations will 
 become of rare occurrence. However, arguments presup- 
 posing such a state of affairs are not admissible before it has 
 been clearly proved that such ideal conditions exist. It is 
 so improbable that such an ideal state will ever be created, 
 and universal ' philanthropy ' is something so suspicious, the 
 
ECONOMIC POLICY 177 
 
 people are so unable to develop except when they constitute 
 a nation, that I should look at the disappearance of national 
 jealousies with concern. Nothing contributed more to the 
 subjection of Greece by Macedon and Rome than the cos- 
 mopolitanism of Greek philosophers." 
 
 Professor von Treitschke, the historian, condemned Free 
 Trade from the historian's point of view. He wrote in his 
 Politih : 
 
 " We have found it to be an erroneous idea that Protection 
 is only necessary for young industries. Old industries, too, 
 require protection against foreign competition. In this 
 respect ancient Italy teaches us a terrible lesson. If pro- 
 tective tariffs against Asiatic and African bread stuSs had 
 been introduced in time, the old Italian peasantry would 
 have been preserved and the social conditions of Italy would 
 have remained healthy. But Roman traders could import 
 cheap grain from Africa without hindrance, the rural 
 industries decayed, the rural population disappeared, and 
 the Campagna, which surrounds the capital, became a vast 
 desert." 
 
 Professor Mommsen expressed the same view in his 
 Bomische Geschichte. 
 
 One of the younger political economists, Mr. Victor Leo, 
 said in The Tendencies of the World's Commerce : 
 
 " Protective tariffs must continue, and a moderate increase 
 of them cannot be considered as a misfortune. In practice 
 it is not possible simply to drop entire industries because 
 similar industries can produce more cheaply somewhere 
 else. From the point of view of the world economist it is 
 correct to insist on a division of labour which gives to every 
 nation those industries for which it is most adapted ; 
 from the point of view of the national economist the dis- 
 advantages resulting from such a policy would be greater 
 than the advantage to the consumer of being able to buy 
 the article in question at a cheaper price." 
 
 The belief that Free Trade presupposes a universal 
 brotherhood among the nations, and is therefore impractic- 
 able, was general in Germany. Therefore we read in the 
 
178 ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
 article " Free Trade " in BrocTchaus's Encyclopedia , which 
 faithfully reflects the mind of the nation : 
 
 " As long as mankind is divided into autonomous States 
 possessing individual institutions, no State must expose 
 itself to the danger, which is not only an economic but also 
 a political and social danger, that home production should 
 lose its independence by over-powerful foreign competition. 
 ... A weaker State, if it wishes to preserve an independent 
 existence, is absolutely justified in safeguarding its imper- 
 fect means of production against foreign competition by 
 Protection." 
 
 In spite of the almost universal opposition to Free Trade, 
 Protection was not elevated to a dogma in Germany. It 
 was considered merely as a policy, which was well adapted 
 to the requirements of the time, but which, like every 
 policy, was subject to reconsideration in altered circum- 
 stances. Professor Schmoller, the distinguished lecturer at 
 Berlin University, stated : 
 
 " Protection and Free Trade are for me not principles, 
 but remedies for the political and economic organism which 
 are prescribed according to the state of the nation. A 
 doctor who would say that he prescribed on principle to 
 every patient restringentia or laxaniia would be considered 
 insane. However, that is the idea both of the extreme 
 Free Trader and of the extreme Protectionist." 
 
 Professor Biermer wrote, using a similar metaphor : 
 
 " Protection and Free Trade, rightly considered, are not 
 questions of principle, but only remedies of political and 
 economic therapeutics which, according to the state of the 
 patient, have to be prescribed sometimes in big ajid some- 
 times in small doses." 
 
 Professor Roscher wrote : 
 
 " The greater the extent of a territory protected by 
 tariffs, the sooner will active competition spring up within 
 its frontiers. Foreign markets are always uncertain. Hence 
 all customs unions between related States are to be recom- 
 mended, not only as financially, but also as economically 
 advantageous." 
 
ECONOMIC POLICY 179 
 
 The uncertainty of foreign markets and the danger of 
 becoming dependent for one's very existence on foreign 
 markets and on foreign goodwill became a matter of the 
 greatest concern to the statesmen and political economists 
 of Germany. Therefore there arose a feverish anxiety in 
 poUtical circles to acquire colonial possessions and to found 
 a Central European Customs Union, while the political 
 economists loudly warned the country against Germany 
 becoming economically dependent on foreign nations. Pro- 
 fessor Oldenberg said : 
 
 " When our home industries work for exportation and 
 live on foreign countries by exchanging their produce for 
 foreign food, the huge industrial structure of Germany 
 branches sideways into the air and is made to rest on 
 pillars of trade which are erected on foreign ground. But 
 those pillars, which support our very existence, will remain 
 standmg only for so long as it pleases the owner of the ground. 
 Some day, when he wishes to use his own land, he cuts off 
 the pillars of our existence from under us and thus jbreaks 
 down the building which we have reared on them." 
 
 Another economist, Mr. Paul Voigt, wrote : 
 
 " The loss of our export trade would bring starvation to 
 the masses of German workers, and compel them to emigrate 
 and to beg before the doors of foreign nations for work and 
 for food. The collapse of our export trade would be the 
 most terrible catastrophe in German history and would rank 
 with the Thirty Years' War as a calamity. It would wipe 
 out the German nation from the great nations of the world 
 and might end its political existence." 
 
 The cotton famine in Lancashire, the constantly growing 
 dependence of Great Britain on foreign food and raw 
 material, the numerous " corners " in grain and cotton 
 under which England had to suffer, made a deep and lasting 
 impression in Germany. 
 
 Before 1879 there had been a period of moderate Free 
 Trade in Germany, and in consequence German industries 
 were acutely suffering. At last Bismarck intervened and 
 inaugurated in that year a strongly protective policy. 
 
180 ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
 Since then Germany's prosperity has grown by leaps and 
 bounds. Up to the early 'eighties Germany was only 
 known as the provider of inferior goods, which were usually 
 clumsy imitations of English goods. Soon afterwards 
 Germany conquered the markets of the world with pro- 
 ducts of high excellence. 
 
 There were always many Free Traders in the German 
 Reichstag, as that assembly was largely composed of pro- 
 fessional men and of men belonging to the leisured class 
 who were consumers, who could easily understand the 
 " consumers' argument." Consequently, Bismarck's de- 
 mand for Protection met with considerable opposition from 
 the parliamentarians and from bankers and merchants. 
 Agriculture and the manufacturing industries enthusias- 
 tically supported him. It must be interesting for EngUsh- 
 men of all classes to follow Bismarck's arguments in favour 
 of Protection. In his speech of the 2nd of May 1879, in 
 which he introduced his protective policy, he said : 
 
 " I do not mean to discuss Protection and Free Trade 
 in the abstract. . . . We have opened wide the doors of 
 our State to the imports of foreign countries, and we have 
 become the dumping-ground for the over-production of all 
 those countries. Germany being swamped by the surplus 
 production of foreign nations, prices have been depressed, 
 and the development of all our industries and our entire 
 economic position has suffered in consequence. If the 
 danger of Protection were as great as we are told by enthu- 
 siastic free traders, France would have been impoverished 
 long ago, for she has had Protection since the time of 
 Colbert, and she should have been ruined long ago, owing 
 to the theories which have guided her economic policy. 
 
 " After my opinion, we are slowly bleeding to death 
 owing to insufficient Protection. This process has been 
 arrested for a time by the five milliards which we have 
 received from France after the war ; otherwise we should 
 have been compelled already five years ago to take those 
 steps which we. are taking to-day. 
 
 " We demand a moderate Protection for German labour. 
 Let us close our doors and erect some barriers in order to 
 reserve to German industries at least the home market, in 
 
ECONOMIC POLICY 181 
 
 which German good nature is at present being exploited 
 by the foreigner. The problem of a large export trade is 
 always an extremely delicate one. No more new countries 
 will be discovered ; the world has been circumnavigated, 
 and we can no longer find abroad new purchasers of import- 
 ance to whom we can send our goods. 
 
 " In questions such as these I view scientific theories with 
 the same doubt with which I regard the theories applied 
 to other organic formations. Medical science, as con- 
 trasted with anatomy, has made Uttle progress with regard 
 to those parts which the eye cannot reach, and to-day the 
 riddle of organic changes in the human body is as great as 
 it was formerly. With regard to the organism of the State, 
 it is the same thing. The dicta of abstract science do not 
 influence me in the slightest. I base my opinion on the 
 practical experience of the time in which we are living. I 
 see that those countries which possess Protection are pros- 
 pering, and that those countries which possess Free Trade 
 are decaying. Mighty England, that powerful athlete, 
 stepped out into the open market after she had strength- 
 ened her sinews, and said, Who will fight me ? I am pre- 
 pared to meet everybody. But England herself is slowly 
 returning to Protection, and in some years she will take 
 it up in order to save for herself at least the home market." 
 
 On the 14th of June 1882 Bismarck, in another speech 
 on Protection and Free Trade, said : 
 
 " I beheve the whole theory of Free Trade to be wrong. 
 . . . England has aboUshed Protection after she had benefited 
 by it to the fullest extent. That country used to have the 
 strongest protective tariffs until it had become so powerful 
 under their protection that it could step out of those 
 barriers like a gigantic athlete and chaUenge the world. 
 Free Trade is the weapon of the strongest nation, and 
 England has become the strongest nation owing to her 
 capital, her iron, her coal, and her harbours, and owing 
 to her favourable geographical position. Nevertheless she 
 protected herself against foreign competition with exorbi- 
 tant protective tari£Es imtil her industries have become so 
 powerful." 
 
 It is very interesting to observe that Prince Bismarck 
 predicted in 1882 that Great Britain would have to go 
 
182 ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
 back to Protection, " in order to secure for herself at least 
 the home market,''^ and that the demands for Protection 
 which were advanced by List in 1840, and by Bismarck in 
 1879, were based on the same arguments which were used 
 by Mr. Chamberlain. 
 
 German Free Traders of course predicted that Protection 
 would bring disaster to the German industries and especi- 
 ally to the German export trade. These objections were very 
 effectively dealt with by the German political economists. 
 Professor SchmoUer, for instance, said in 1879 : 
 
 " Exports will certainly suffer in one or the other branch, 
 but that is a point of minor consideration. At present the 
 conditions of our export business are so bad that they can 
 hardly become worse. Our export trade can only become 
 better if we have commercial treaties and an autonomous 
 tariff." 
 
 The Society for Social Policy in Berlin adopted the follow- 
 ing resolution : 
 
 " Considering that our endeavours to conclude com- 
 mercial treaties, which will open new markets to German 
 industries, must prove unsuccessful in view of the present 
 position of the world, and 
 
 " Considering that it will be necessary to increase some 
 important duties in order to place the finances of the 
 Empire on a firm basis, 
 
 " The Society for Social Policy declares itself in favour 
 of a moderate fiscal reform in a commercio-political and 
 protectionist direction by a tariff which is especially directed 
 against those countries which are particularly harmful to 
 German production." 
 
 The beneficial effect of the protective tariff on German 
 industries was immediate. On the 16th of March 1881 
 Mr. von Kardorff stated in the German Diet that 85,901 men 
 were occupied in the German iron and steel industries in 
 January 1879, and 98,224 men in January 1881. Mr. 
 iLoewe, another member of the Diet, reported on the same 
 date that in the important districts of Bochum and Dort- 
 
 / 
 
ECONOMIC POLICY 183 
 
 mund wages had risen from 5 to 15 per cent., and that 
 the men who some years ago had been only partly occupied 
 were now fully occupied. Some had formerly been working 
 only three or four days a week. Other deputies gave 
 similar reports. This rising tendency of wages continued 
 almost uninterruptedly from 1879 down to 1914. How 
 rapidly the wealth of Germany had grown since 1879 and 
 how wealthy Grermany had become is well known. 
 
 13 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES OF GERMANY ^ 
 
 Until the War had opened their eyes most EngUshmen 
 believed that a European State could not possess at the 
 same time flourishing manufacturing and prosperous rural 
 industries. Yet Germany possessed bo'Ji highly-developed 
 manufacturing industries and an exceedingly flourishing 
 agriculture. Therefore, it is worth while to study the 
 agricultural prosperity of Germany and its causes ; for if 
 Germany could make her rural industries pay, Great Britain, 
 which is far more favoured by Nature, should certainly be 
 able to do likewise. 
 
 Compared with Great Britain, Germany possesses a poor 
 soil, an unfavourable geographical position and structure, 
 and an unfavourable cHmate, her winter being long and 
 very severe. Her transport facilities for agricultural pro- 
 duce by land and water were formerly quite insufficient, 
 and even now her agricultural produce has to be carried for 
 hundreds of miles inland to the markets, while British fields 
 are everywhere in easy reach of the sea. In East Prussia 
 and Pomerania, for instance, there are agricultural districts 
 which lie twenty miles from the nearest railway station. 
 The rural labour of Germany also was, and probably is 
 still, inferior to that of Great Britain. A century ago, the 
 German peasants were serfs — serfdom lingered in places 
 until the middle of the nineteenth century — and until 1914 
 the independence of the peasantry was, in many parts of 
 Germany, more theoretical than real. Therefore Germany's 
 rural population was, and in certain parts of Germany is 
 
 1 From the Contemporary Review^ November 1905. 
 184 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 185 
 
 still, obstinately and stupidly conservative. When Frede- 
 rick the Great distributed clover seed to the peasantry, 
 they refused to sow it. When ordered to sow the seed, they 
 boiled it first in order to prevent it sprouting. When given 
 seed potatoes, they boiled the seed potatoes before putting 
 them in the ground. 
 
 Owing to the poverty of the soil, the inclemency of the 
 climate, long distances, the difficulties of transport, and 
 the backwardness and poverty of her rural population, 
 agriculture in Germany was extremely primitive when it 
 was highly successful and prosperous in England. Some 
 decades ago, prices for corn and meat were exceedingly low 
 in Germany, cattle were kept chiefly for ploughing and for 
 manure, and were largely fed on straw. Agricultural Ger- 
 many used to bear an aspect similar to that of agricultural 
 Russia of to-day. However, during forty or fifty years, 
 the rural industries of Germany have continually pro- 
 gressed, and they have progressed even during those decades 
 when Great Britain suffered from an unparalleled agricul- 
 tural depression. 
 
 Between 1875 and 1908, 3,200,000 acres which were under 
 cereals, and 1,000,000 acres which were under green crops, 
 went out of cultivation in Great Britain. But, notwith- 
 standing the great increase of pastures, the number of live 
 stock in Great Britain had, during that time, increased by 
 only 10 per cent. If we now turn from this dismal picture 
 of decay to Germany, we find that during the most trying 
 period of British agriculture, the rural industries of Germany 
 showed the following record : 
 
 AoBiouiiTirRAL Area of Germany 
 Hectares ( 1 hectare is equal to 2 i acres) 
 
 Corn crops. Oreen crops, 
 
 1883 15,723,970 6,700,600 
 
 1893 15,992,120 7,018,120 
 
 1900 16,050,990 7,437,790 
 
 1913 16,250,900 7,891,000 
 
 From the foregoing figures we see that, during a period 
 when, in Great Britain, an enormous area which was under 
 
 Oardcns. 
 
 Grasslands. 
 
 415,950 
 
 3,336,830 
 
 472,620 
 
 2,760,350 
 
 482,790 
 
 2,285,740 
 
 536,600 
 
 1,380,700 
 
186 
 
 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 the plough was abandoned to grass, the area under grass in 
 Germany has shrunk by almost two thirds, because it has 
 been taken under the plough and has been converted into 
 fields. And while the acreage of fields on which cereals 
 and vegetables are grown has been considerably increased, 
 agricultural processes have been so greatly improved that 
 each acre of agricultural land produces now very much 
 more than it used to do. This appears from the following 
 table : 
 
 Yield pee Hectare of Geound in Kilogeammes 
 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Rye. 
 
 Barley. 
 
 Oats. 
 
 Potatoes. 
 
 Bay. 
 
 1893 
 
 1670 
 
 1490 
 
 1480 
 
 1070 
 
 13.410 
 
 2230 
 
 1895 
 
 1640 
 
 1320 
 
 1680 
 
 1550 
 
 12,390 
 
 3700 
 
 1897 
 
 1700 
 
 1370 
 
 1560 
 
 1430 
 
 11,010 
 
 4280 
 
 1899 
 
 1910 
 
 1480 
 
 1820 
 
 1720 
 
 12,290 
 
 4040 
 
 1901 
 
 1580 
 
 1400 
 
 1790 
 
 1600 
 
 14,670 
 
 3760 
 
 1903 
 
 1970 
 
 1650 
 
 1950 
 
 1840 
 
 13,250 
 
 4450 
 
 1905 
 
 1920 
 
 1560 
 
 1790 
 
 1570 
 
 14,570 
 
 4410 
 
 1907 
 
 1990 
 
 1610 
 
 2060 
 
 2090 
 
 13,810 
 
 4170 
 
 1909 
 
 2050 
 
 1850 
 
 2120 
 
 2120 
 
 14,050 
 
 3710 
 
 1910 
 
 1990 
 
 1700 
 
 1850 
 
 1840 
 
 13,190 
 
 4740 
 
 1911 
 
 2060 
 
 1770 
 
 1990 
 
 1780 
 
 10,350 
 
 3370 
 
 1912 
 
 2260 
 
 1850 
 
 2190 
 
 1940 
 
 15,030 
 
 4680 
 
 1913 
 
 2360 
 
 1910 
 
 2240 
 
 2190 
 
 15,860 
 
 4930 
 
 From the foregoing tables it appears that while the 
 agricultural area of Germany has been considerably extended 
 the produce per acre has been universally and enormously 
 increased. At the same time the live stock of Germany has 
 astonishingly multiplied, notwithstanding the great shrink- 
 age of grass lands. The following figures give a record of the 
 fluctuation in the numbers of live stock since 1873 : 
 
 
 
 Live Stock of 
 
 Gbbtvtany 
 
 
 
 Horses. 
 
 Cattle. 
 
 Sheep. 
 
 Pigs. 
 
 1873 
 
 3,352,231 
 
 15,776,702 
 
 24,999,406 
 
 7,124,088 
 
 1883 
 
 3,522,525 
 
 15,786,764 
 
 19,189,715 
 
 9,206,195 
 
 1892 
 
 3,836,256 
 
 13,555,694 
 
 13,589,612 
 
 12,174,288 
 
 1897 
 
 4,038,485 
 
 18,490,772 
 
 10,866,772 
 
 14,274,557 
 
 1900 
 
 4,184,099 
 
 19,001,106 
 
 9,672,143 
 
 16,758,436 
 
 1907 
 
 4,337,263 
 
 20,589,856 
 
 7,681,072 
 
 22,080,008 
 
 1913 
 
 4,523,059 
 
 20,994,344 
 
 5,520,837 
 
 25,659,140 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 187 
 
 From the foregoing table we see that, while British live 
 stock, notwithstanding the enormous increase of the area 
 under grass, has increased by only about 10 per cent., the 
 horses of Germany have increased by about 33 per cent.,V. 
 the cattle by about 33 per cent., and the pigs by no less than ' 
 250 per cent., in spite of the decrease of pasture land. It is 
 true that at the same time the number of sheep has declined 
 by more than 19,000,000, largely owing to the shrinkage of 
 pasture land which was turned into fields ; but this shrink- 
 age is not BO serious as it seems. In Germany two pigs 
 represent about the same value as do five sheep. Con- 
 sequently, the 19,000,000 pigs which had been added repre- 
 sented more than double the value of the 19,000,000 sheep 
 which had been lost. 
 
 The total area of Imperial Germany was about 70 per 
 cent, greater than that of Great Britain, and as the popula- 
 tion of Germany was about 50 per cent, larger, Great Britain 
 was not much more densely populated than Germany. 
 Hence both countries could be fairly compared in size and 
 population with regard to agriculture. Now, both per 
 square mile of territory and per thousand of population, 
 there were more horses and far more cattle in Germany than 
 in Great Britain. Besides, there were five times more pigs. 
 Only in sheep Great Britain had a great advantage over 
 Germany, but this was not an advantage for which German 
 agriculturists were envious. Sheep require to be kept in 
 the open, on grass land. Hence, only waste lands in the 
 interior of Australia and of Argentina, but not valuable 
 agricultural land in populous parts of Europe and in the 
 immediate vicinity of their natural markets, were considered 
 in Germany proper for rearing sheep. The soil of Germany 
 was thought to be too valuable to serve as prairie land. 
 
 How severely the value of agricultural land had fallen 
 in Great Britain before the War is well known. In Germany 
 agricultural land had not fallen, but had considerably in 
 creased in value with the increase in its productive power. 
 
 If a German agriculturist fails, his lands are sold by 
 pubhc auction. Consequently the statistics of forced sales 
 
188 
 
 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 give a good indication of the position of Germany's agri- 
 culture. The number of forced sales declined since 1886 
 as follows, in Prussia : 
 
 1886-7 
 
 1889-90 
 
 1892-3 
 
 1895-6 
 
 1898-9 
 
 1903 
 
 1907 
 
 1909 
 
 Forced Sales in Prussia 
 
 2975 holdings 
 
 2014 
 
 2299 
 
 1834 
 
 1210 
 
 1047 
 
 737 
 
 668 
 
 On an average not one holding out of every two thousand 
 was yearly sold by public auction, and it should be noted 
 that, on an average, nine-tenths of these sales took place 
 in Eastern Germany, where pecuHar agricultural conditions 
 prevailed, which will be described in the course of this 
 chapter, and that the larger part of the holdings sold con- 
 sisted of large farms and estates from one hundred and 
 twenty-five acres upwards. Forced sales were exceedingly 
 rare in the middle and west of Germany, and especially in 
 the case of small and medium-sized farms. 
 
 How exceedingly profitable agriculture was in Germany 
 may be seen by comparing it with that of Great Britain. 
 If we make such a comparison, we find not only that there 
 was proportionately far more live stock in Germany than 
 in this country, but also that the area under corn -crops, 
 potatoes, etc., was six times as great as in Great Britain, 
 and that the rural industries of Germany afforded a very 
 good livelihood to a population which was many times 
 greater than that of this country. 
 
 We shall now inquire why Germany, with a poor soil, I 
 an unfavourable climate, bad geographical conditions, and' 
 a somewhat intractable peasantry, possessed a prosperous 
 and vigorously expanding agriculture, while the agriculture 
 of Great Britain, which possesses a better soil, better 
 climate, a better geographical position, a more open-minded 
 and progressive rural population, better markets, and which 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 189 
 
 I 
 had a far better start, and far more capital, was rapidly | 
 
 decaying. 
 
 If before the War a man took a railway trip through the 
 British Islands, and looked frequently out of the window, 
 he noticed chiefly grass fields, which covered 60 per cent, 
 of the agricultural area of the United Kingdom, but he 
 rarely saw cereals growing. If he took a railway journey 
 through Germany, he would see chiefly cereals, which, in 
 that country, take up more than 60 per cent, of the agri- 
 cultural ground. The proportion of grass lands in Germany 
 was no greater than the proportion of oat -fields in Great 
 Britain. In other words, pastures were met with as rarely 
 in Germany as oat-fields in Great Britain. 
 
 The following most important table shows how agricul- 
 tural land was owned in Germany. It gives a bird's- 
 eye view of the distribution of agricultural land in that 
 country. 
 
 AGBICXJIiTURAL HOLDINGS IN GERMANY IN 1907 
 
 Size of Holdings. 
 
 Number of 
 Holdings. 
 
 Acreage 
 Hectares (1 Hec- 
 
 Percentage 
 of Agricul- 
 
 
 tare = 2J Acres). 
 
 tural Area 
 
 Less than 5 acres . 
 
 3,378,509 
 
 1,731,317 
 
 5-4 
 
 5 to 12^ acres 
 
 1,006,277 
 
 3,304,872 
 
 10-4 
 
 12^ to 50 acres 
 
 1,065,539 
 
 10,421,565 
 
 32-7 
 
 50 to 125 acres 
 
 225,697 
 
 6,821,301 
 
 21-4 
 
 125 to 250 acres . 
 
 36,494 
 
 2,500,805 
 
 7-9 
 
 250 to 1250 acres . 
 
 20,068 
 
 4,503,159 
 
 14-2 
 
 1250 and more acres 
 
 3,498 
 
 2,551,854 
 
 8-0 
 
 Tota] 
 
 5,736,082 
 
 31,834,873 
 
 100-0 
 
 In the whole of Germany there were, in 1907, 5,736,082 
 agricultural properties, and the average size of the pro- 
 perties was about fifteen acres. It is remarkable that there 
 were no less than 3,378,509 individual holdings of an average 
 size of three acres and under. On the other hand, it should 
 be observed that by far the greater part of the agricultural 
 area of Germany, namely, 84 per cent, of the total, was 
 owned by agriculturists who cultivated more than 12^ acres. 
 Consequently, it is apparent that German agricultural land 
 
190 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 I was chiefly exploited by farmer-peasants, who possessed 
 I substantial properties. 
 
 The difference in the size of the individual holdings 
 appears to bring with it a striking difference in the way in 
 which these were cultivated. Imperial Germany could be 
 divided into two agricultural spheres — the Eastern part 
 and the Central and Western part. The east of Germany 
 is flat, sandy, and somewhat thinly populated. It is in- 
 sufficiently opened by waterways and railways, and land 
 was chiefly in the hands oiaristQ CTSktic owners, who possessed 
 large, and sometimes huge, estates. In the middle and the 
 west of Germany the country is broken, the soil is more 
 fruitful, the population is denser, manufactures prevail, 
 markets are near at hand, waterways and railways are 
 plentiful, and land was chiefly held by small farmers and 
 peasants who, as a rule, worked on freehold land. 
 
 In Prussia of the properties below five acres, 73*4 per 
 cent, were freehold ; of those from five acres to fifty acres, 
 87*3 per cent, were freehold ; of those from fifty to two 
 hundred and fifty acres, 93 per cent, were freehold ; of those 
 above two hundred and fifty acres, 81*8 per cent, were free- 
 hold. It therefore appears that the proportion of free- 
 holders was smallest among the very small and among the 
 very large proprietors. Of the properties of medium size 
 which covered the greater part of agricultural Germany, 
 the proportion of freehold land was largest, and more than 
 90 per cent, of the ground of medium -sized agricultural 
 estabhshments consisted of freehold properties. 
 
 The small agriculturists of Germany produced, on the 
 whole, larger harvests per acre than did the large land- 
 owners, who cultivated their fields with hired labour. 
 Largely owing to this difference, the middle and the west 
 of Germany were chiefly devoted to intensive culture. In 
 the east of Germany, where the large landowners were, 
 we find poor fields, less thorough cultivation, and smaller 
 crops. East Germany thus resembled Great Britain not 
 only in this, that the land was in the hands of a few large 
 owners, who liked to enjoy themselves in town, and who 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 191 
 
 left the supervision of their estates to their paid underlings ; 
 but a further resemblance to Great Britain could be found 
 in the fact that, in those districts, the raising of live stock 
 was more developed than the cultivation of the soil. Never- 
 theless, the small landowners in the middle and the west 
 of Grermany were not only more efficient in agriculture, 
 but also in stock-raising, for the small agriculturists raised 
 on their holdings far more horses, cattle, and pigs per acre 
 than did the large proprietors in the east. Some years ago 
 the German live stock was distributed as follows between 
 large and small agriculturists : 
 
 Average Quantity of Live Stock kept on 250 
 Acres of Ground 
 
 On properties from On properties from 50 acre* 
 
 5 to 50 acres. and more. 
 
 16 horses ..... 11 horses 
 
 147 cattle 37 cattle 
 
 242 pigs 20 pigs 
 
 In Germany one head of cattle was considered to be equal 
 in value to two -thirds of a horse, or to four pigs. If we now 
 reduce the live stock kept on the farms of the two types 
 given to " pig-units," if such a word may be used, we find 
 that the owners of fifty and more acres raised only 227 
 pig-units on the same quantity of ground on which smaller 
 farmers raised 915 pig -units. In other words, on an area 
 of the same size small agriculturists raised a little more 
 than four times as much live stock as was raised by the 
 larger landowners. 
 
 The following somewhat more detailed figures give a most 
 interesting picture of the greatly varying density of the 
 live-stock population on farms of different sizes. They 
 show that small holdings were most favourable for raising 
 pigs, that middle-sized properties were most suitable for 
 raising cattle and horses, and that large properties were least 
 suitable for raising live stock, except for comparatively 
 valueless sheep. In Germany one pig is estimated to be 
 equal in value to two and a half sheep, as has already been 
 mentioned. 
 
192 
 
 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 Average Number of Animals per 250 Acres on Properties 
 of Various Sizes in 1907 
 
 Size of Holding. 
 Below 1 J acres 
 1 J to 5 acres . 
 6 to 12 J acres 
 12^ to 50 acres 
 50 to 250 acres 
 250 to 500 acres 
 500 and more acres 
 
 Horses. 
 
 Cattle. 
 
 Pigs. 
 
 Sheep 
 
 1-5 
 
 31-7 
 
 319-0 
 
 29-0 
 
 3-3 
 
 59-7 
 
 128-6 
 
 12-6 
 
 5-6 
 
 73-2 
 
 71-3 
 
 . 8-3 
 
 9-6 
 
 57-2 
 
 47-5 
 
 10-5 
 
 9-5 
 
 42-0 
 
 29-0 
 
 18-4 
 
 6-6 
 
 17-3 
 
 14-0 
 
 44-0 
 
 6-4 
 
 22-0 
 
 13-3 
 
 50-3 
 
 From the foregoing tables it appears that the large holdings 
 of Germany were unfavourable to the thorough pursuit of 
 agriculture and to efficiency in cattle -raising as well. But 
 here, as in other things, les extremes se touchent. If holdings 
 become too small, animals can neither be raised nor be 
 employed in the field, spade work becomes necessary, and 
 human labour has to take the place of animal labour or 
 machine labour. 
 
 Animals kept in June 1907 on Agricultural Properties only 
 
 On Properties of 
 Less than 5 acres 
 6 to 12 i acres . 
 12 i to 50 acres. 
 
 50 to 250 acres. 
 250 acres and more 
 
 Horses. 
 
 71,369 
 
 241,636 
 
 1,323,290 
 
 1,202,176 
 
 652.536 
 
 Cattle. 
 1,315,572 
 3,155,323 
 7,873,092 
 5,305,871 
 2,327,291 
 
 Pigs. 
 4,383,244 
 3,107,008 
 6,334,238 
 3,655,156 
 1,386,272 
 
 Sheep and Lambs. 
 415,750 
 359,943 
 1,448,535 
 2,326,268 
 4,371,103 
 
 Total 3,491,007 19,977,149 18,865,918 8,921,599 
 
 In 1907 the peasants who farmed less than fifty acres 
 possessed one-half of all the horses, two-thirds of all the 
 cattle, and three-fourths of all the pigs. 
 
 Evidently the very small peasant cannot always avail 
 himself of animal labour on his tiny holding, owing to 
 poverty, lack of accommodation, or lack of fodder. There- 
 fore we find that the men who owned less than five acres 
 used, on an average, one-third of the horse power which 
 was employed on properties of larger size. The very small 
 cultivator made, however, a greater use of cattle for pulling 
 the plough than did the owner of a medium -sized farm. 
 His only cow had not infrequently to labour in the field. 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 193 
 
 The large landowner, on the other hand, appears not to 
 have made the fullest use of animal power, for we find 
 that he employed a smaller number of horses and cattle for 
 work than did the smaller cultivator. 
 
 It might be expected that the large German landowners, 
 who used less animal power for cultivation than the 
 small farmers, would be easily first in the use of labour- 
 saving, steam-driven machinery. This appears not to have 
 been the case, for we find that the smallest number of steam- 
 driven agricultural machines was used in the province of 
 East Prussia, where huge estates were common, while the 
 largest number was employed in the province of Saxony, 
 where middle-sized and small holdings prevailed. The 
 fact that labour-saving machinery was more used on medium - 
 sized than on large properties is clearly brought out in the 
 following figures, which relate to those two provinces : 
 
 Agricultural Steam Machinery used in 1907 
 
 Drills. 
 
 46,898 
 4,639 
 
 The difference in the quantity of machinery used in 
 purely agricultural East Prussia, with its huge estates, and 
 in chiefly industrial Saxony, with its small agriculturists 
 and independent peasants, is startUng ; and this difference 
 in the manner of cultivation goes far to explain why the 
 Grerman agrarians east of the Elbe loudly complained about 
 agricultural depression, while the peasants west of the Elbe 
 were, on the whole, prosperous and contented. 
 
 If we now look into the indebtedness of the agricultural 
 soil in Germany, we find the following astonishing varia- 
 tions in the various districts : 
 
 Estimated Indebtedness of the Agricultural Soil 
 
 East Germany 
 
 District Konigsberg ...... 60-90 per cent. 
 
 ,, Gumbinnen ...... 48'58 ,, 
 
 ,, Dantzig ...... 55-11 ,, 
 
 Marienwerder ..... 65-68 
 
 
 steam 
 
 
 Plougli: 
 
 Saxony . 
 
 . 439 
 
 East Prussia 
 
 80 
 
 Seed-casting 
 Machines. 
 
 Steam Threshing 
 Machines. 
 
 46,898 
 
 17,669 
 
 4,639 
 
 3,928 
 
194 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 Central Germany 
 
 District Magdeburg ...... 22-82 per cent. 
 
 ,, MersebTirg 27-82 „ 
 
 Erfurt 23-40 
 
 West Germany 
 
 Cologne 17-94 
 
 Treves 15-83 
 
 „ Aix-la-Chapelle 13-32 „ 
 
 The foregoing table is based on carefully compiled offi- 
 cial estimates. The thoroughly representative figures used 
 were taken from the official hand-book of the Agrarian 
 Party. From this table it appears that the agricultural 
 indebtedness of the soil was dangerously large in the east 
 of Grermany, medium -sized in the centre of the country, and 
 small in the west of the country. This curious difiference 
 arose from the fact that in the east of Germany huge estates 
 preponderated, while in the centre middle-sized properties 
 and in the west small holdings prevailed. The large German 
 landowner in Pomerania and East Prussia could easily 
 borrow from banks and other institutions at a reasonable 
 rate of interest, and he did so freely and somewhat in- 
 discreetly. Hence, his estates were encumbered with debts 
 up to the hilt. The medium-sized and somewhat obscure 
 agriculturists in Middle Germany could not so easily raise 
 money on their land. Lastly, the small cultivators who 
 prevail in the Rhenish Province, where, owing to the use 
 of the Code Napoleon and the French law of succession, the 
 land had been divided and subdivided in equal parts among 
 the children so often that individual holdings had become 
 very small, found it often absolutely impossible to raise 
 money on their freehold properties at any price. 
 
 In Great Britain very small landowners and peasants 
 would find no difficulty in raising money on their land, for 
 local usurers would prosper on the ignorance, the improvi- 
 dence, or the inexperience of the small cultivators to whom 
 they would lend money at 30, 50, or more per cent. But 
 the paternal Government of Germany was sensible enough 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 195 
 
 not to allow usurers to prey upon the ignorant or foolish 
 producers. Usury was as good as non-existent, owing to\. 
 most stringent usury laws. Consequently, if the German 
 cultivator could not raise money at low rates (up to 6 per . 
 cent.) and on fair security, he could not borrow money at all. [ 
 This disability was, no doubt, very inconvenient to some 
 improvident individuals, but from the point of view of a 
 truly national economy it seems a lesser evil to suppress 
 the usurers altogether than to allow them to become pros- 
 perous by relentlessly exploiting the poor, the weak, and 
 the foolish. 
 
 From the facts and figures which have so far been given, , 
 it is clear that the rural industries of Germany were highly 
 prosperous, but it is equally clear that the prosperity of the 
 German agriculturists was variable, and that it stood in a 
 somewhat close relation to the size of their holdings. The 
 larger properties were somewhat unproductive, and were 
 uneconomically exploited, largely because their owners 
 were not qualified, or not wilUng, to manage their estates 
 themselves. That large estates should yield disappointing 
 results is only natural. Hired labourers will work as little 
 as possible for their wages, and managers and overseers 
 will act in a similar manner. But even if these paid agents 
 are conscientious, their supervision will, in any case, cause 
 a considerable extra expense which burdens the land. 
 
 Many large landowners in Germany wished to shine in 
 ParHament or in society, or simply to enjoy themselves, 
 finding the country too dull. Such men — and they were 
 very numerous among the large landed proprietors — ■ 
 desired to spend much money, which they could easily raise 
 on their estates. Hence, the large estates of Germany 
 were not only the most wastefully exploited properties, but 
 they were at the same time those which were most heavily 
 burdened with mortgages. 
 
 While the large estates suffered from superfluity of land 
 and the extravagance of their owners, who, in their turn, 
 suffered from superfluity of leisure, the very small peasants' 
 properties suffered from lack of capital and from lack of 
 
196 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 labour-saving animal and machine power. For these 
 reasons, inefficient cultivation was common on both the 
 largest and the smallest agricultural properties. Therefore 
 land passed from the hands of very smaU peasants and of 
 very large landowners into the hands of townsmen, and in 
 the end the former freeholders were replaced by agricultural 
 leaseholders and labourers. For these reasons, we find 
 that men who worked less than five acres had only 73*4 
 per cent, of freehold land, and that the men who cultivated 
 more than two hundred and fifty acres had 81'8 per cent, 
 of freehold land, while the agriculturists who possessed 
 medium properties had more than 90 per cent, of freehold 
 land. 
 
 On properties measuring from five to two hundred and 
 fifty acres were found the substantial peasants and peasant- 
 farmers who were the backbone of Germany's agriculture. 
 Nine-tenths of their fields were freehold land. Their land 
 belonged to them and to their descendants for ever. These 
 peasant proprietors usually cultivated their holdings with 
 the assistance of their families. The men did the hard 
 work in the fields, the women looked after the cattle and 
 the children, helped at harvest -time, when the rural schools 
 closed in order to enable the small peasants to get the 
 assistance of their youngsters in picking up potatoes, 
 gathering sheaves, picking fruit, etc. Each member of the 
 peasant's family worked "«-ith love and earnestness, not for 
 a daily wage, but for himself, with the sense and pride of 
 property, and of absolute ownership. Where holdings 
 were so large that outside assistance was required, farm 
 servants or labourers were hired who, as a rule, lived with 
 the peasants. They formed part of the peasant's family, 
 and worked under the constant supervision of the owner. 
 Consequently, an agricultural labourer was certain to do 
 far more work on a peasant's farm in Westphalia under 
 the eye of the owner of the farm, than on a big estate in 
 Pomerania under the supervision of paid stewards and 
 inspectors. The well-to-do peasant was thrifty, robust, 
 healthy, and contented, while the small peasant, who had 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 197 
 
 but a few acres, worked himself to death, owing to lack of 
 land, lack of capital, and lack of labour-saving animal and 
 machine power. Co-operation of course helped the small 
 peasants very greatly in their struggle. A further account 
 of German agriculture is contained in my book Great and 
 Greater Britain (John Murray, London). 
 
 Some distinguished British politicians and statesmen 
 have recommended dividing the agricultural land of 
 Great Britain. Their policy has been summed up in the 
 cry " Three acres and a cow." Three acres and a cow may 
 perhaps be a good electioneering cry, but it is not a good 
 policy. Although life with three acres and a cow may 
 appear very idylhc to the townsman, who takes his arm- 
 chair as a coign of vantage, it is the reverse of idyllic from 
 the countryman's point of view. If the policy of " three 
 acres and a cow " should ever be carried out in Great Britain, 
 it would lead, no doubt, to a resettlement of the people on 
 the land. But it seems hardly desirable that the proletariat 
 of the congested towns should, by an ill-considered policy 
 and at a huge cost to the nation, be dumped into the country 
 and be transformed into an equally wretched and miserable 
 country proletariat. Besides, such an artificially created pro- 
 letariat could not be made to stop. A cloud of usurers would 
 descend on the country, and the British stage-peasants, 
 after having eaten their cow, would as rapidly as possible 
 raise enough money on their three acres to buy a ticket 
 for Canada, and the British country districts would be 
 left more desolate and more unproductive than before. 
 Such an experiment would certainly end in failure. What 
 Great Britain requires for the salvation of her agriculture 
 is, in the first place, the gradual creation of a substantial 
 peasant class, who work with their own hands on freehold 
 agricultural properties of moderate size. 
 
 In every business a certain fixity of conditions is required 
 to make it attractive. Where that fixity is lacking, a 
 calculation of risks and chances is impossible, and business 
 is turned into speculation. If the peasant has no land of 
 his own, but has to pay rent, his heart is not in his work. 
 
198 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 His improvements may eventually benefit the landlord. 
 His rent may in bad seasons be so higb as to ruin bim, and 
 in good seasons so low as to allow him to idle or to sublet 
 his land. Hence agriculture under a tenant system lacks 
 stability and security. The peasant or farmer wiU be turned 
 into a speculator. 
 
 PoHticians insufficiently acquainted with the real con- 
 ditions of agriculture may, of course, devise an elaborate 
 system for the fair and automatic adjustment of rents, and 
 for securing to the cultivators at the end of their tenure 
 the fruit of their labour, by suitable enactments. But such 
 a system, which may look excellent on paper, would hardly 
 work in practice. In the first place, it would be too com- 
 plicated. In the second place, a huge and costly official 
 machinery would have to be created, and the peasant would 
 have to pay for mediating and adjusting service which 
 would be productive of much costly litigation. Therefore a 
 freehold peasantry must be created, and it can be created 
 out of the greatly reduced army of rural labourers. Only 
 then will Great Britain have again a sturdy, prosperous, and 
 contented yeomanry as of old. 
 
 The creation of peasant freeholders should be accompanied 
 by legislation aboHshing the necessity of enclosing agricul- 
 tural properties with hedges, fences, etc. Hedges give, no 
 doubt, a peculiar charm to the landscape, but they con- 
 stitute a very onerous burden for agriculturists. The 
 expense of planting a hedge and of keeping it in order is 
 very great. Besides, the agricultural ground which is 
 wasted through hedges is not only the strip on which it 
 grows ; for, as it is difficult to go close to the hedge with 
 plough and harrow, two huge additional strips on both sides 
 of every hedge around every enclosed field remain unpro- 
 ductive. Thus hedges and fences cause an '^"enormous 
 unnecessary expense and waste, which would be much 
 increased if, through the creation of small holdings, hedges 
 should be multiplied. In Great Britain, as in most other 
 European countries, boundary stones at the corners of fields, 
 together with carefully-kept local registers of rural pro- 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 199 
 
 perties, should suffice to show the limits of individual 
 holdings, and should make the wasteful and primitive 
 method of enclosing unnecessary. The fall of the hedges 
 would diminish the picturesqueness of the country, but it 
 would immediately enhance the value of our agricultural 
 soil by many millions of pounds, and the men who now 
 clip hedges may t\irn their hands from useless to productive 
 labour. 
 
 In most countries of Europe the peasants were formerly 
 landless serfs, who had to be liberated and to be enabled to 
 acquire land by gradual payments spread over a number 
 of years. Grermany did so a century ago, and Great Britain 
 will have to do likewise, for the continuance of the impos- 
 sible tenant system means the extinction of agriculture. If 
 England wishes to possess again flourishing rural industries 
 she must begin at the base, and must first of all abolish her 
 present system of land tenure, and replace it by the freehold 
 system. She must begin by giving agriculture a stable, 
 safe, and permanent basis. If the cultivator has ground of 
 his own, he will love and cherish it. Otherwise, he will 
 desert the country and either emigrate or come to the 
 towns. Landowners will find it in their interests to sell 
 gradually their land, instead of letting it to cultivators under 
 a system which greatly benefits a host of unproductive and 
 useless middlemen, whom landlords and tenants have to 
 keep at a large expense to themselves. 
 
 British farmers complain of the insufficient number of 
 rural labourers, and the lack of agricultural workers is so 
 great that at harvest time swarms of town loafers migrate 
 from the slums to the country, and these men are employed 
 by the farmers, notwithstanding their utter unsuitability. 
 In Germany, the army of agricultural labourers has not 
 been shrinking, but it has increased, partly by the immigra- 
 tion of Russians, Austrians, Poles, etc. At the census of 
 1882 there were 5,763,970 rural labourers, male and female, 
 in Germany. At the census of 1895, 5,445,924 agricultural 
 hands were counted. At the census of 1907, 7,054,900 
 rural labourers of both sexes were counted. Of these almost 
 14 
 
200 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 a million were foreigners who came into Germany for the 
 harvest and went back to their homes across the frontier 
 when winter came. 
 
 The increase in the number of rural labourers in Germany, 
 
 in spite of the fact that machine power has largely supplanted 
 
 men power and animal power, is very remarkable, and it is 
 
 worth inquiring why the country population has remained 
 
 , almost stationary. 
 
 Two classes of agricultural workers have to be considered : 
 farm servants, who are engaged for a term, and day labourers. 
 The huge army of farm servants, male and female, is com- 
 posed of the sons and daughters of small peasants, who send 
 their children into service, partly in order that they should 
 earn a living, partly in order that they should learn improved 
 methods. The male farm servants expect to come, in 
 course of time, into the freehold property of their parents, 
 and therefore refuse to sacrifice a certain livelihood in the 
 country to an uncertain one in the towns ; while the female 
 farm servants naturally wish to work near their home and 
 their friends. The day labourers also are partly the children 
 of small peasants, and they refuse to leave the country in 
 which they have a substantial stake ; partly are they small 
 peasant proprietors, with properties of their own, which are 
 so small that they have to accept some outside work in 
 order to make a living. The following most interesting 
 table gives a clear picture of the different status of 
 agricultural day labourers in the east and in the west 
 of Germany. 
 
 
 Eastern Oermany 
 
 
 East Prussia 
 
 Westphalia 
 
 Pomerania 
 
 Agriculturalday 
 1 abourers with land . 
 
 . 12,935 
 
 . 13,578 
 
 . 14,475 
 
 Western Germany 
 
 Agriculturalday 
 labourers withoutland 
 
 154,777 
 
 117,927 
 
 111,457 
 
 Rhenish Province 
 Hesse- Nassau 
 Westphalia 
 
 . 28,866 
 . 12,172 
 . 15.828 
 
 38,411 
 15,744 
 16.425 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 201 
 
 From the foregoing figures we see that the landless 
 labourers, the agricultural proletariat, formed in the east of 
 Grermany, as they do in Great Britain, the overwhelming 
 majority of agricultural hands, for in that part of Germany 
 hardly one labourer out of ten had land of his own. On the 
 other hand, in the Western Provinces, the day labourers 
 who owned land and those who did not own land were about 
 equal in numbers. In the Eastern Provinces, where huge 
 estates owned by noblemen were to be found, the day 
 labourers were considered merely as two-legged cattle, and 
 were only too often treated as such. Therefore the whole I 
 interest of these landless labourers lay in their daily wages, 
 and they left the country for the town in order " to better • 
 themselves," without hesitation. Therefore, it came that 
 in the east of Germany the cry of lack of labour was just as 
 loud as in Great Britain. The lack of rural labour both in 
 east of Germany and Great Britain sprang evidently from 
 the same cause — the landlessness of the labourers. -> 
 
 Many British landowners have been wise enough to give 
 to their day labourers a stake in the country in the shape of 
 a cottage and a plot of ground, and their labourers stay 
 in consequence ; but the great proprietors in the east of 
 Germany, instead of acting likewise, had the incredible 
 heartlessness to clamour for legislation restricting the 
 freedom of migration for rural labourers. In the west of 
 Germany, where middle-sized, small, and very small farms 
 were mixed, the scarcity of rural labour was much less in 
 evidence. Happily for the employers of agricultural labour 
 in Germany, the rural wages paid in Austria -Hungary and 
 Russia were so low that every year an army of from 200,000 
 to 400,000 rural labourers flocked from Poland and Galicia; ' 
 into Germany. These temporary immigrants supplied the' 
 needful labour at the most critical time of the year, 
 exactly as do the Italian labourers, who yearly migrate in 
 hundred thousands into France, Switzerland, the United 
 States, and Argentina for the harvest. 
 
 British agriculture must create a large number of peasant 
 proprietors and peasant labourers, or employ in constantly 
 
202 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 growing numbers slum -dwellers, who, of course, may be 
 reinforced by immigrants from abroad. If British free- 
 holders should not be created in large numbers as rapidly 
 as possible, the agricultural work may have to be done by 
 foreigners. The British population will almost exclusively 
 live in the towns, and the national physique will still further 
 deteriorate. 
 
 The possession of freehold land is not only most important 
 to the farmer as an inducement to do his best, but it is 
 also of great importance inasmuch as it attaches the rural 
 workers to the soil. 
 
 In the manufacturing industries and in trade, young men 
 are chiefly wanted. In advertisements it is frequently 
 stated that men above forty or fifty years need not apply. 
 Old men are almost useless for manual labour in towns, but 
 they can find plenty of work in the country. According to 
 a census which was taken on the 1 4th of June 1895, the 
 proportion of agricultural labourers above fifty years in 
 Germany was 15-80 per cent., while the proportion of 
 industrial labourers above fifty years was only 9-30 per cent. ; 
 the proportion of agricultural labourers above sixty years 
 was 7* 31 per cent., whilst the proportion of industrial 
 labourers above sixty years was only 2*93 per cent. ; the 
 proportion of agricultural labourers above seventy years 
 was 1-94 per cent., whilst the proportion of industrial 
 labourers above seventy years was only 0-53. From these 
 figures it appears that the chance for old men to find em- 
 ployment in agriculture was in Germany from two to four 
 times as great as their chance to find occupation in trade 
 and in the manufacturing industries. In Great Britain, 
 where town life and town work is more of a rush and scramble 
 than in Germany, the chance of finding occupation for men 
 above forty or fifty years should be from three to six times 
 greater in agriculture than in the manufacturing industries 
 and in trade. The nation might usefully employ on the 
 land many thousands of old men who live now in the work- 
 house, and millions which are yearly spent in poor relief 
 might be saved. 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 203 
 
 In the beginning of this chapter it has been explained that 
 Germany's agriculture was very primitive at a time when 
 the rural industries of Great Britain were advanced and 
 most flourishing. When British agriculture was at the 
 height of its success, the spirit of scientific inquiry and 
 experiment arose, and the ambition to make improvements 
 of every kind was very strong. Hence, French and German 
 agriculturists and economists flocked to England to study 
 and to copy her highly-advanced agricultural methods, 
 which served as a model to all nations. 
 
 On the model of British agriculture the present prosperity 
 of the agriculture of Germany and France was founded. 
 Between 1798 and 1804, Albrecht Thaer published his 
 celebrated work. Introduction to the Knowledge of English 
 Agriculture, in three volumes, which was followed by a work 
 in four volumes, entitled The Fundamental Principles of 
 Agriculture, which was also based on his study of England's 
 rural industries. These books became the German agri- 
 culturist's Bible. Honours were showered upon Thaer 
 during his lifetime, and life-sized statues in marble and in 
 bronze of the man who introduced British agricultural 
 methods into Germany may now be found in Celle, in 
 Leipzig, and in Berlin. Later on, Wilhelm Hamm's book. 
 The Agricultural Implements and Machines of England, 
 which was published in 1845 in Brunswick, exerted almost 
 as great an influence as did Thaer's writings in Anglicising 
 German agricultural methods. 
 
 Great Britain was the pioneer in the empiric methods 
 of cultivation, in the introduction of improved machinery, 
 and in making scientific agricultural experiments. Through 
 the munificence of Sir John Lawes the experimental station 
 of Rothamsted was founded in 1840, and eleven years later 
 Germany followed his example by opening an experimental 
 station at Mockern, near Leipzig. But while Great Britain 
 opened her second experimental station more than thirty 
 years after the creation of the Rothamsted establishment, 
 Germany opened station after station in rapid succession. 
 In 1856, tVo experimental stations were opened at Bonn 
 
204 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 and at Breslau ; in 1857, three experimental stations arose 
 in Gottingen, Dahme, and Munich ; in 1858, another 
 institution was created in Insterburg ; and recently there 
 existed no less than seventy experimental stations in Ger- 
 many, where, by constant research and practical investi- 
 gation, scientific agriculture was advanced, seeds and 
 manures were tested, etc. 
 
 Great Britain was the first and the foremost nation in 
 applying science to agriculture. Private enterprise was 
 the pioneer, and has done wonders, but the isolated efforts, 
 made by some munificent, unselfish, and patriotic individuals, 
 have, on the whole, proved as ineffective as isolated efforts 
 at making improvements are always apt to prove. On the 
 other side of the Channel, the German Governments took 
 up the ideas which they received from England. They 
 exploited and applied them throughout Germany by means 
 of the Government machinery, and encouraged scientific 
 agricultural investigation with liberal grants. At the 
 present moment, even Japan is probably far ahead of 
 England in applying science to agriculture. 
 
 While Germany imitated this country in many respects, 
 she struck out a line of her own by the work of Justus von 
 Liebig. That great chemist published in 1840 his cele- 
 brated work, Organic Chemistry applied to Agriculture and 
 Physiology, which proved revolutionary. If Liebig had 
 lived in Great Britain, his work would have benefited only 
 the far-seeing few, for the officials would have remained 
 indifferent to his discoveries, even if they had understood 
 their value. They would have left their exploitation and 
 fruition to unaided private initiative. But the German 
 Government took care that his brilliant discoveries should 
 prove beneficial to the whole nation. Chemical investi- 
 gation and tuition was promoted and spread by the liberal 
 aid of the Governments which opened chemical laboratories 
 and created chairs of Chemistry throughout Germany. 
 Thus the chemical industry of Germany became the fore- 
 most in the world, and it proved of incalculable help to 
 Germany's agriculture. The greatest chemists were, and 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 205 
 
 are stiU, Frenchmen and Englishmen. Nevertheless, Ger- 
 many had the foremost chemical industry, because she had 
 an enormous number of working chemists, and an organ- 
 isation which favoured the exploitation of chemical and 
 other inventions throughout the whole of the empire. 
 
 When the German chemists produced sugar from beet- 
 roots, the West Indian planters laughed at the chemical 
 sugar ; but soon the German sugar industry stood supreme 
 in the world, perhaps less because of the bounties which the 
 Government granted than because of the improvements 
 which the German chemists gradually effected both in 
 agriculture and in the utilisation of the roots. How mar- 
 vellously the Grerman sugar industry improved with the 
 assistance of the chemist may be seen from the substantial 
 increase in the percentual yield of sugar. How great and 
 how continuous this improvement has been, and how 
 greatly the production of sugar has increased, may be seen 
 from the following figures : 
 
 1875-6 
 
 1880-1 
 
 1885-6 
 
 1890-1 
 
 1895-6 
 
 1900-1 
 
 1905-6 
 
 1908-9 
 
 1909-10 
 
 1913-4 
 
 Without the marvellous improvements in the percentage 
 of sugar extracted, the sugar production of Germany would 
 certainly not have grown sevenfold since the year 1875-6 
 and have become by far the largest in the world. Recently 
 the German raw sugar factories employed about 100,000 
 men during part of the year, while about 650,000 men were 
 occupied with growing the roots, which represented a value 
 of about £12,500,000. The sugar extracted was worth 
 about £20,000,000 per annum, of which half was exported, 
 and probably about £15,000,000 per annum was spent 
 
 Percentage of Raw Sugar 
 
 Production of Sugar 
 
 extracted from Beet. 
 
 in Germany. 
 
 8-60 per cent. 
 
 358,048 tons. 
 
 9-04 
 
 573,030 „ 
 
 . 11-85 
 
 838,105 „ 
 
 . 12-54 
 
 1,336,221 „ 
 
 . 14-02 
 
 1,637,057 „ 
 
 . 14-93 
 
 1,979,000 „ 
 
 . 15-27 
 
 2,400,771 „ 
 
 17-60 
 
 2,079,221 „ 
 
 . 15-80 
 
 2,037,397 „ 
 
 16-00 
 
 2,715,870 „ 
 
206 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 in wages in the sugar industry. The tops of the roots were 
 locally used for fodder, and the residue of the roots, from 
 which the sugar had been extracted, was dried and sold 
 for fodder which could be preserved through the whole 
 year, and which represented a value of about £2,000,000. 
 Thus the German chemists have, with the liberal assistance 
 of the Government, artificially created this enormous and 
 most valuable additional crop. 
 
 Evidently the policy of non-interference in business 
 matters is not without its disadvantages, but discretion 
 and knowledge is needed on the part of a Government 
 which wishes to interfere in matters of business. If Great 
 Britain wishes to apply science to industry and make it 
 more than a fashionable and popular cry, the higher educa- 
 tion must be reformed root and branch, and State aid must 
 be forthcoming without stint. But not only must money 
 be spent like water, it must be spent in the right direction, 
 for England has fallen behind-hand in the organised pursuit, 
 and especially in the organised apphcation, of science. The 
 cleverest chemists are of little service if, for lack of rank 
 and file, their inventions are exploited abroad. 
 
 British education is, unfortunately, more ornamental 
 than useful. Prussia alone had seven agricultural High 
 Schools, where about 2,500 pupils were trained by 200 
 teachers. Before the War these High Schools were attended 
 by 1 ,889 German students, and by no less than 524 foreigners. 
 Evidently, these courses were very popular not only with 
 German agriculturists, who, by the by, were very foolish 
 not to keep their knowledge for themselves. The State 
 aided these High Schools with grants of £37,000 per annum. 
 Besides there were 200 ambulant lecturers provided by the 
 State, who taught scientific agriculture. Furthermore, 
 there were in Prussia 350 other agricultural schools, with 
 2,000 teachers and 25,000 pupils, and facihties were pro- 
 vided in every direction for spreading the scientific know- 
 ledge of agriculture far and wide. Many teachers in rural 
 elementary schools voluntarily studied agriculture in the 
 High Schools, in order to be able to teach some useful and 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 207 
 
 valuable things to the country children and their parents. 
 The Prussian Ministry of Agriculture spent yearly about 
 £200,000 on agricultural education in all its branches, and 
 the sum-total spent by all the German Governments and 
 local authorities in this direction amounted to about 
 £500,000. 
 
 The general education in the rural districts of Great 
 Britain is unfortunately too townified, and the little boys 
 and girls are taught subjects at the schools which not 
 only are useless, but which unfit the children for rural life. 
 The boy who leaves the elementary schools has only too 
 often been estranged from the country, and has been 
 taught to turn up his nose at agriculture ; the girl aspires 
 to a situation in town and the possession of a piano. 
 Unfortunately, the mistakes which are made in primary 
 education can never be rectified. 
 
 Co-operation for agricultural purposes first sprang up 
 in England, but, owing to the indifference of the State, 
 it did not spread. The lack of co-operation among British 
 agriculturists is due not only to the indifference of the 
 State and the insularity of the people, but also to the fact 
 that every rural property is enclosed by a fence or a hedge 
 in England and by stone walls in Ireland and Scotland. 
 Not only are these hedges unnecessary and exceedingly 
 wasteful, but they form a most effective barrier to progress, 
 inter-communication, and co-operation. A farmer does 
 not like to look over another man's fence, and he does 
 not like his neighbour to look into his fields. 
 
 In Germany, in France, in Austria-Hungary, in Switzer- 
 land, and in other countries farmers do not work behind 
 the screen of a hedge. They constantly observe one another, 
 freely talk to one another, and a community of interest is 
 established. Thus the co-operative movement could more 
 easily develop in Germany than in England, especially as 
 its extension was actively assisted by the Government, 
 which saw in it a powerful factor for the advancement of 
 agriculture. 
 
 Aided by the State and by the communities, co-operation 
 
208 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 among the German agriculturists developed with ever- 
 increasing rapidity. In 1890 there were in Germany 3,000 
 co-operative agricultural societies. In 1908 there were 
 no less than 22,000 societies in existence. Of these, 
 16,092 were credit societies, 1,845 were societies for co- 
 operative buying and selling, 2,980 were co-operative dairy 
 societies and societies which deal with milk, and more 
 than 1,000 associations were devoted to various purposes. 
 How vast the number of these societies is in Germany 
 may be seen from the fact that there is now on an average 
 one co-operative society for every three hundred individual 
 holdings. 
 
 There are numerous associations for building dykes 
 against floods, for developing irrigation, for draining fields, 
 drying swamps, acquiring buUs and staUions for breeding 
 purposes, for milling and storing grain, for effecting in- 
 surance, etc., and in consequence small and poor farmers 
 may have the use of steam ploughs, threshing machines, 
 etc., at most moderate rates. Thus a comparatively small 
 quantity of expensive agricultural machinery is made to 
 do service to large numbers of peasants, much capital is 
 saved, and small cultivators receive all the advantages 
 which otherwise are only within the reach of wealthy 
 landowners. 
 
 The State and local bodies assist in the formation of such 
 associations, and often provide funds. Two or three small 
 and poor local bodies agree to buy on joint account certain 
 expensive machinery and hire it out by the day, while the 
 State or individual provinces undertake larger works for 
 the benefit of agriculture, such as the draining of the exten- 
 sive marshes near the coasts of the Baltic and of the North 
 Sea. 
 
 Perhaps the most important co-operative enterprise 
 created by the State is the Preussische Centralgenossen- 
 schaftskasse, the Central Bank of Co-operative Associations. 
 This huge bank, which was created in 1895, was meant to 
 be the banker of the co-operative societies. It accepts 
 deposits, grants loans, etc., and the State started it on its 
 
THE KURAL INDUSTRIES 209 
 
 career with a capital of £2,500,000 in cash. How great the 
 service of that bank has been may be gauged from the fact 
 that its turnover amounted to no less than £560,795,300 
 in 1908, and that it served as a bank to no less than 
 1,213,194 producers. The rate of interest charged by that 
 institution is extremely low, and fluctuates, as a rule, 
 between 3 per cent, and 4 per cent. 
 
 While agricultural co-operation in Germany is a powerful 
 factor in the economic life of the nation, it figures in this 
 country chiefly in the speeches of politicians, who very often 
 have a somewhat hazy idea of the meaning of co-operation. 
 
 Apart from the co-operative associations, the rural indus- 
 tries of Germany possess numerous huge and powerful 
 societies for improving the breed of horses and cattle, pro- 
 moting the keeping of fowls, for growing hops and fruit, 
 for keeping bees, etc. Many of these societies receive 
 considerable subventions from the State. 
 
 The whole of the agricultural population of Germany is 
 organised in some enormous political associations, Farmers' 
 Associations and Peasants' Societies, which have about a 
 million members. Through these associations the agri- 
 cultural interest of Germany exercised some considerable 
 influence in the Imperial Parliament, and in the various 
 local ParHaments, while in England, the classical land of 
 political organisation, agriculture is politically inarticulate, 
 and therefore neglected — an unknown factor, a plaything, 
 and a victim to the political parties and to local authorities, 
 without a friend, without an advocate, and without a 
 champion, especially as " the man in the street " is un- 
 fortunately a townsman. Had it not been for the , 
 powerful combinations of all the agriculturists, and for the/ 
 determined agitation of their representatives in Parhament, 
 the rural industries of Germany would certainly not have 
 obtained the strong fiscal protection which they have 
 enjoyed. 
 
 In Germany the consumer buys much agricultural pro- 
 duce directly from the producer. There are huge markets 
 in all German towns, even in the very largest, and there 
 
210 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 the peasants from the surrounding districts will be found 
 offering their produce for sale. The charges made for the 
 use of these markets is either purely nominal or nil. In 
 Great Britain, where similar markets are known only in 
 out-of-the-way places, the working man cannot buy agri- 
 cultural products from the farmer, but has to purchase them 
 from a shopman, who receives his goods from a wholesale 
 dealer. Therefore it is not the British farmer only who has 
 to maintain a host of unproductive middlemen ; the British 
 consumer also has to maintain an army of unnecessary 
 middlemen, which does not exist in Germany. In Germany, 
 no thrifty housewife would dream of buying her vegetables, 
 her fruit, her poultry, her eggs, her butter, etc., at a shop. 
 She goes to the market for her supply. The turnover of the 
 average greengrocer is very small, and as the goods are 
 easily perishable, the shopman has to charge sometimes 
 two, three, or four times the price which the producer 
 receives. Therefore vegetables and fruit which are luxuries 
 in England are the poor man's food in Germany. 
 
 In the biggest towns of Great Britain, and at the seaports 
 where foreign agricultural produce arrives in huge quanti- 
 ties, and has to be sold quickly, food is cheap, and is often 
 cheaper than it is in the country. In Germany, on the 
 other hand, where duties on imported food are levied on 
 arrival at the harbours, food is much cheaper in the country 
 districts where it is raised. Hamburg, the German Liver- 
 pool, is the most expensive town in Germany. Families in 
 reduced circumstances in Germany migrate to the country 
 for cheapness, while people living in the country districts 
 of Great Britain find it often cheaper to get their agricul- 
 tural produce from London. The British towns have 
 grown out of all proportion, not only because the chances 
 of finding employment for labour and relief for the destitute 
 are greater, and because there are no peasant proprietors 
 in the country, but also because food is cheaper in town than 
 in the village. 
 
 That agricultural products are cheaper in London than 
 they are in the country is most unnatural and most un- 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 211 
 
 fortunate. This artificial cheapness is an additional cause 
 of the ruin of agriculture. If we look at wholesale prices, 
 food is so cheap in Great Britain that agriculture, which in 
 selling its produce receives only the wholesale price, suffers ; 
 but if we look at the retail prices, we find the same products 
 extremely dear, owing to the exactions of the middleman. 
 The middlemen have spoiled the market for the rural 
 industries. The rural industries should strive to bring 
 producers and consumers together, and to eUminate those 
 crowds of unproductive and unnecessary go-betweens who 
 batten on the rural industries. 
 
 British agriculture suffers also from outrageously high 
 transport charges. In Grermany agricultural produce has 
 to travel enormous distances by rail, and is carried cheaply. 
 In Great Britain, where, owing to the size and happy con- 
 figuration of the country, agricultural products need travel 
 only trifling distances overland, railway carriage is often 
 prohibitive to farmers. The railways are even allowed to 
 exact far more from the British farmer than they charge 
 to the State-protected and prosperous foreign agriculturists. 
 Therefore it comes that American, Austrahan, and Con- 
 tinental fruit can be sold in London at a profit, while English 
 fruit often rots on the trees not far from town. Foreign 
 producers receive a greater bounty from the British railway 
 companies in the shape of preferential railway rates than 
 from their own Governments in the shape of fiscal protection. 
 
 In the congested towns, millions of poor are crying for 
 cheap food, and in the country districts hundreds of thou- 
 sands of farmers are crying for town prices for their veget- 
 ables, their meat, their fruit, etc. Yet the bitter cry of 
 country and town remains unheard. Consumers and pro- 
 ducers cannot meet because the railway companies stand 
 between the two and exact a ruinous toll in the form 
 of railway rates which are without a parallel in the world. 
 
 We have of late heard much of the deterioration of the 
 national physique, and it cannot be doubted that the sturdy 
 English race of former times is becoming almost extinct, 
 and is being replaced by a puny, stunted, sickly, sterile, 
 
212 THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 narrow-chested, weak-boned, eliort -sighted, and rotten- 
 toothed race. England's magnificent physique, which used 
 to be the envy of all foreign nations, is rapidly disappearing, 
 notwithstanding the fact that, according to the statistics, 
 no nation in Europe consumes more meat per head of 
 population than does Great Britain. But at the same 
 time, no nation in Europe leads a more unnatural and a 
 more artificial life. Out of one hundred Britons, no less 
 than sixteen are Londoners, and almost four -fifths of the 
 population live in towns. In Germany only three men out 
 of one hundred live in BerUn. 
 
 Not only do four-fifths of the people live in unnatural sur- 
 roundings, they are also unnaturally fed. Town mothers 
 rarely have a sufficiency of good milk. Milk is a luxury, and 
 pure milk is almost unobtainable. Hence, the poor town 
 babies are brought up on artificially coloured, chemically 
 treated, impure, and often adulterated cows' milk, on 
 patent foods, etc., while country babies are usually brought 
 up on their mothers' milk. Later on the town children, 
 who had never a proper start and a fair chance, are to a 
 large extent fed on tinned, chilled, frozen, chemically pre- 
 pared, and adulterated agricultural products, which are 
 imported from abroad. That a race which is brought up in 
 such a manner is not a strong one cannot be wondered at. 
 On the other hand in Ireland, where there is proportionately 
 a huge agricultural population, by far the finest specimens 
 of British manhood are to be found, although the Irish 
 country population was until recently poor and chronically 
 under -fed. The striking difference between the under-fed 
 but country-bred Irishmen and the over-fed, town-bred 
 Englishmen should give food for reflection. 
 
 German economists, statisticians, and generals have 
 from time to time drawn attention to the physical deteriora- 
 tion of the population in the large German towns, and have 
 made comparisons from which it is apparent that the birth- 
 rate in the German towns is rapidly falling, and that towns- 
 men in Germany are physically deteriorating and becomings 
 sterile. Therefore Bismarck refused to allow Germany to- 
 
THE RURAL INDUSTRIES 213 
 
 become a purely industrial State like England. He fostered 
 the rural industries of Germany directly and indirectly, so 
 as to preserve the strength and health of the nation, which, 
 after all, is its most valuable asset. 
 
 The foregoing short sketch shows why Germany, which 
 has a poor soil, an unfavourable climate, and an unfortunate 
 geographical position and structure, and a somewhat dull- 
 minded country population, possessed before the War a 
 powerful, flourishing, and expanding agriculture, while 
 Great Britain, which has the most fruitful soil in Northern 
 Europe, a mild and equable climate, a most favourable 
 geographical position and structure, an enterprising and 
 energetic population, and a great agricultural past, had 
 rural industries which had been decaying for decades. 
 This chapter shows that the ills from which England's rural 
 industries are suffering are not incurable. However, they 
 can only be cured by a man of action and of determination, 
 who is backed by a Government which is willing to lead. 
 
 Before all, the powerful agricultural interest must strive 
 to gain power by combination. It must form a solid 
 phalanx, and must assert its claims with energy in Parlia- 
 ment and before the local authorities, which only too often 
 tax and worry agriculturists out of existence. If the agri- 
 cultural interest remains politically formless, shapeless, 
 voiceless, and inert, it will continue neglected. If it is 
 united in mind and in purpose, the great political leader will 
 be forthcoming who will make the cause of agriculture his 
 own, and who is prepared to create conditions which 
 will make the rural industries powerful and prosperous. 
 England's latent agricultural resources are probably un- 
 paralleled in Europe. Great Britain may again become the 
 envy and the model of all European nations by the un- 
 rivalled excellence and prosperity of her agriculture. But 
 much hard work will have to be done to achieve such a 
 result, which is worthy of a great statesman's ambition, for 
 he who re-creates England's agriculture will regenerate 
 the race. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE RAILWAYS AND THE RAILWAY POLICY OF GERMANY * 
 
 At the beginning of the railway era, Great Britain pursued 
 a vigorous national policy, while the Governments of 
 divided Germany were cosmopolitan in theory and parochial 
 in practice ; Great Britain was Protectionist, but Germany 
 followed hazy ideas of Free Trade and Individualism ; Great 
 Britain was truly a United Kingdom, in Germany Particu- 
 larism was in excelsis, and German unity existed only in 
 the minds of some German ideaHsts ; Great Britain was pro- 
 gressive, active, and husthng, while Germany was back- 
 ward, conservative, impractical, and indolent. Industry 
 in Germany was incredibly behindhand. The country was 
 peopled by peasants and professors. Berhn had 200,000 
 inhabitants, and large provincial towns did not exist. 
 
 When in 1825 Great Britain opened the celebrated 
 Stockton -DarUngton Railway, and started railway building 
 with energy, Germany philosophised, gazed, and wondered. 
 Only ten years later, Germany timidly followed England's 
 lead by opening, on the 7th of December 1835, the Nurem- 
 berg-Fiirth Railway, which was less than four miles in 
 length. Only in 1838, when in this country 540 miles of 
 railway were open to traffic, Prussia opened her first line 
 from Potsdam to Zehlendorf , which was about thirteen miles 
 long. 
 
 But in the same year which saw the birth of her first 
 railway, Prussia passed a wise and far-seeing law, the law 
 of the 3rd of November 1838, by which the State gave the 
 greatest liberty to enterprising individuals to build railways, 
 
 1 From the Contemporary Review, October 1905. 
 214 
 
RAILWAY POLICY 215 
 
 but reserved to the State an adequate control over their 
 construction and management and over fares, freight rates, 
 etc. It laid down that the State was entitled to take over 
 private railways after thirty years at a valuation based on 
 the actual capital outlay, and provided that fares and 
 freights had to be proportionately lowered whenever the net 
 profit of railway companies should exceed 10 per cent, on 
 the capital actually invested. Great care was taken to 
 safeguard Prussia's national interests and to protect them 
 against the railway companies. Thie law remained for a 
 long time a dead letter. The State did not expropriate 
 private railways. 
 
 In the beginning of the railway era, the economic views 
 of the German Government were tinged by philosophy, 
 philanthropy, and romantic cosmopolitanism. They were 
 guided by abstract principles, beautiful theories, and senti- 
 mental reasons, not by practical, cold-blooded business 
 considerations. Germany was still a land of dreamers and 
 visionaries. Hence the voice of that great economic re- 
 former, Friedrich List, who passionately pleaded for a 
 "national" economic pohcy, was a voice crying in the 
 wilderness. He was hounded out of Germany by the 
 advocates of official indolence and indifference, scientific- 
 ally called " Non-interference," and, disappointed, abused, 
 persecuted, and impoverished, he shot himself in 1846. 
 Truly, no prophet is honoured in his own country during 
 his lifetime. Now the nation has erected a monument to 
 the man who was the intellectual originator of Bismarck's 
 protective policy and of his railway policy. 
 
 List's magnum opus, The National System of Political 
 Economy, appeared in 1840 ; but already in 1833, two years 
 before the miniature railway from Nuremberg to Fiirth was 
 opened, that far-seeing man wrote, On a Saxon Railway 
 System as the Basis of a German Railway System, and in 1838, 
 the year when Prussia built her first railway, he published 
 The National Transport System. List was greatly in advance 
 of his time. Although his strenuous recommendations to 
 organise railway transport and to develop industries in 
 15 
 
216 RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 Germany on a national basis with the assistance of the State 
 were little heeded by the doctrinaire politicians of his time, 
 List had at least the satisfaction that, owing to his agitation, 
 the Saxon Government assisted the building of the first 
 Saxon railway from Leipzig to Dresden, which had the 
 respectable length of almost seventy miles. Saxony allowed 
 the railway to issue 500,000 thalers, or about £75,000, in 
 bank-notes. 
 
 Railways were to Germany a British invention, and 
 Germany imported with the invention not only British 
 railway materials, locomotives, etc., but also the British 
 idea that the State should by no means interfere with 
 industrial freedom or engage in business pursuits. Guided 
 by axioms which were suggested to British professors of 
 political economy by the late Mr. Cobden and his satellites, 
 Brunswick, which in 1838 built the first State railway in 
 Germany, the line Brunswick- Wolf enbiittel, sold it in 1869 
 to a private company, from which it was purchased by the 
 Prussian State in 1880. 
 
 The railway systems of Great Britain and of Germany are 
 fundamentally different. While in England all the railways 
 are private companies, more than nine-tenths of the German 
 railways are owned, managed, and directed by the various 
 German Governments. In Germany, as in England, the 
 railway interest, the majority of the professors of political 
 economy, the Liberal Party, and a large proportion of the 
 officials were in favour of unrestricted private ownership, 
 and to them Great Britain served as an ideal and a model. 
 Hence it is worth while to take note of the weighty con- 
 siderations which caused the German States to buy, at a 
 gigantic figure and at more than their then market value, 
 practically the whole of the country's railways and to incur 
 the enormous and onerous responsibihties of managing and 
 extending them. 
 
 Up to the 'seventies the German States had not pursued 
 a settled and well-planned railway pohcy, but had acted in 
 accordance with the requirements of the moment. When 
 private enterprise came forward, railways were built by 
 
RAILWAY POLICY 217 
 
 limited companies ; but in cases when important strategical 
 or commercial railway lines were not undertaken by private 
 builders, the Government either assisted private companies 
 or built the lines itself. In consequence of the different 
 policies which had been followed in the different German 
 States, the organisation of Railway Germany was as confused 
 as was that of PoUtical Germany. There existed indepen- 
 dent private companies over which the State had some 
 control and railways which were run and completely con- 
 trolled by the State. Freights were dear, rates were un- 
 certain, railway business was exceedingly compHcated and 
 involved, and in many instances railway charges were fixed 
 on the principle , ' ' Charge what the traffic wiU bear . ' ' Where 
 there was competition, freights were cheap ; where there 
 was no competition, the people had to suffer at the hands 
 of the railways, which demanded the uttermost farthing ; 
 where there were feuds between railway companies, direct 
 travel and the speedy dispatch of goods were often impeded 
 by the trickery of the contending railways. Owing to the 
 arbitrariness and the exactions of the railways, and the 
 uncertainty of the constantly fluctuating rates, business 
 suffered severely. 
 
 The year 1879 was a memorable one for Germany. It 
 witnessed both the birth of Protection and the rise of the 
 magnificent system of the German State Railways. In 
 1876 Bismarck had tried to initiate both these measures for 
 developing the foreign trade of the country and for regulat- 
 ing its railway traffic. In the same year in which Prince 
 Bismarck penned the sentence " Nothing hut reprisals ^ 
 against their products will avail against those States which 
 increase their duties to the harm of German exports," and 
 took steps to introduce a protective tariff, he also tried to 
 protect the German producer against the exactions of the 
 German railway companies by proposing to transfer the 
 railways from the hands of private owners and of the in- 
 dividual States to the German Empire. However, in 1876 
 both attempts failed. Germany was not yet ripe for Pro- 
 
 ^ The italics are in the German original. 
 
218 RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 tection, and several of the minor States of Germany were 
 unwilling to hand over their railways to the Empire. When 
 recommending the transfer of the railways of Germany to 
 the Imperial Government, Bismarck said on the 26th of 
 April 1876 : 
 
 "... Germany is divided into sixty- three railway pro- 
 vinces, or rather territories, which are endowed with all 
 territorial and feudal rights and privileges, including the 
 right of making war ; and the railway boards avail them- 
 selves of these privileges, and even make wars against one 
 another, which cost much money, for the sake of power and 
 as a kind of sport. 
 
 " In my opinion, the railways are intended rather to serve 
 the requirements of trade than to earn a profit for their 
 owners. The profits which the individual States derive 
 from the railways owned by them, or which are distributed 
 to shareholders in the shape of dividends in the case of private 
 companies, are rightly considered a national taxation which 
 the State would be entitled to impose, but which is paid not 
 to the State but to the shareholders in private concerns. 
 It should be our aim to see that that taxation is not op- 
 pressive, but that it stands in due relation to the requirements 
 and the means of the railway users, that it is financially 
 just " 
 
 On the 1st of January Bismarck issued the following 
 interesting opinion as to the right of the State to withdraw 
 the privileges which it had previously granted to the private 
 railway companies. Bismarck wrote : 
 
 " Railways were meant to be, and are, instruments for 
 conveying the national traffic, and they were given their 
 far-reaching privileges and they were constructed in order 
 to serve the public and general interest. Therefore their 
 character as profit-earning instruments may be taken into 
 consideration only in so far as that character is compatible 
 with the general welfare, which has to be considered first 
 and foremost. Hence the right of constructing and ex- 
 ploiting railways can be considered only as temporary, and 
 their eventual purchase by the Government is a matter of 
 course." 
 
RAILWAY POLICY 219 
 
 In the same year Bismarck issued an interesting document 
 in which he summed up the evils caused by the private 
 ownership of railways, as follows : 
 
 "1. Unnecessarily high working expenses and correspond- 
 ingly high charges in consequence of the multiplicity of 
 railway boards, managers, offices, and the unnecessary 
 duplication of lines, stations, material, rolUng-stock, etc. 
 
 "2, Chaos of freight charges, there being 1,400 different 
 tariffs which are constantly changing, which are unclear, and 
 which make trade an uncertain and speculative venture. 
 
 "3. Because direct travel of passengers and goods over 
 the whole railway system of the country is often impeded 
 with the object of harming competing railway systems, and 
 consequently much damage is done to trade and industry." 
 
 The steps which Bismarck took in 1876 in order to in- 
 troduce Protection and to bring the German railways under 
 the direct and absolute control of the Imperial Government 
 were somewhat half-hearted. Possibly they were meant 
 to be merely preparatory ; but in 1879 Bismarck opened his 
 campaign in favour of Protection and for the acquisition of 
 the Prussian railways by the Prussian State in real earnest 
 and with his usual skill and energy. It was a very difficult 
 matter to make these two enormous measures acceptable 
 to the Governments of the individual States and to a majority 
 in the German ParKament, but his arguments proved con- 
 vincing both to the high officials of the aUied States and 
 to the elected representatives of the people. It is worth 
 while to take note of Bismarck's principal arguments in 
 favour of his anti-individuaUstic policy ; for in that year 
 Germany broke for good with British traditions, and refused 
 to follow any longer the laissez-faire policy of England. 
 
 Bismarck opened his railway campaign by writing on the 
 3rd of January the following letter to Messrs. Hofmann, 
 Friedenthal, and Maybach, who were the Prussian Ministers 
 for trade, home affairs, and railways : 
 
 " I intend to raise the question whether it be not necessary 
 to regulate the railway tariffs by imperial law. . . . The fact 
 
220 RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 that such far-reaching pubUc interests as the transport 
 business of railways is left to private companies and to 
 individual railway boards which are free from any super- 
 vision by the State, and the fact that these companies are 
 entitled to make their own interest their sole guide, finds no 
 analogy in the economic history of modern times except in 
 the way in which formerly a country's finances were farmed 
 out to certain individuals. In view of this fact, I intend, 
 after due investigation, to bring forward the question 
 whether it is not possible to introduce, by means of imperial 
 legislation, a imiform tariff on all the railways of Germany." 
 
 After having thus prepared his colleagues, he addressed 
 a long letter to the German States, represented in the 
 German Federal Council, of which the following abstract 
 gives the chief points of interest : 
 
 " The regulation of freights on railways, which are 
 public roads, is of far-reaching importance for the economic 
 interests of the nation, and nobody must be damaged 
 or be artificially hmited in their use. The Government 
 will no longer be able to abstain from promoting the public 
 interest by creating those conditions which are necessary 
 for the requirements of our national industries. The rail- 
 ways are pubUc roads for traffic, but can be used only by 
 one corporation. By granting to these corporations certain 
 privileges, such as that of expropriation, of police and of 
 raising capital, the State has ceded to the railways part of 
 its power. This part of its power was ceded to the railways 
 not in the interest of the proprietors of the railways, but 
 in that of the general public. Therefore it follows that the 
 management of a railway cannot be left entirely to the 
 discretion of the railway companies themselves. Their 
 management must be regulated in accordance with the 
 requirements of the pubHc and with an eye to the public 
 welfare. 
 
 " Therefore it follows that railway charges must not 
 be fixed solely in order to obtain the largest possible profit. 
 The State must not only consider the interest of the share- 
 holders in determining railway freights, but it has also 
 to see that the well-being of the population as a whole is 
 fostered and promoted, and that thus the vitality of the 
 nation will be strengthened. 
 
RAILWAY POLICY 221 
 
 " At any rate it means a damage to the interest of the 
 community if a railway corporation takes no notice of these 
 larger considerations. Hence the arguments which can be 
 raised against the system of private railways as such are 
 strengthened. Railways must not be allowed, by arbitrarily 
 fixed tariffs, to develop industries in certain parts and to 
 destroy other industries in other parts of the country. 
 Even the most far-seeing railway directors cannot reaUse 
 the consequences which a policy of discriminating tariffs may 
 have later on, although such a policy may prove beneficial 
 in the immediate future, and several railway boards have 
 already begun to understand that it is not their vocation 
 to act the part of Providence, to alter the natural conditions 
 of demand and supply, and to dominate trade and industry, 
 but that it is their duty to serve them. 
 
 " Starting from these considerations, it is clear that 
 railway tariffs should correspond with the requirements 
 of production and consumption, and should not be subject 
 to violent fluctuation. They should, therefore — 
 
 " 1. Be clear, and be drawn up in such a manner as to 
 enable everybody to easily calculate the freight for goods 
 sent. 
 
 " 2. They should secure to all citizens in all parts of the 
 country equality of railway charges. 
 
 " 3. They should eliminate the disadvantages which at 
 present weigh down the small producers. 
 
 " 4. They should secure the aboHshment of unnecessary, 
 and therefore wasteful, services, and ensure the honesty 
 of railway officials. 
 
 " These requirements are not fulfilled by the present 
 tariff system." 
 
 After describing in detail the vast number of different 
 tariffs and the confusion and injustice resulting from them, 
 as well as the impossibility for traders to make a clear 
 business calculation of railway charges, Prince Bismarck 
 continues : 
 
 *' Preferential tariffs are an injustice by the damage they 
 do to those who are not preferentially treated, and the 
 tendency of railways to differentiate not only locally but 
 also to give cheaper freight to senders of large quantities 
 may damage the national prosperity to a very great 
 
222 RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 extent. In order to secure large masses of goods, railways 
 will go down below their normal rates, and will even work 
 without a profit, and will thus favour the foreign producer 
 at the cost of our home industries. 
 
 " The railways which have received from the State the 
 monopoly of public transportation have the duty to treat 
 all railway users alike ; but differential tariffs of this kind 
 destroy the equal rights which all citizens should enjoy. 
 Through the changes effected by the tariffs, the economic 
 interests of the country become dependent upon the railway 
 companies, and our home industries, and the possibihties 
 which they have for selling their products, are subjected to 
 constant changes which cannot take place without inflicting 
 great damage upon individual interests. 
 
 " Those who argue that competition among railways 
 cheapens freights overlook the fact that railways recoup 
 themselves for their loss on competitive traffic by charging 
 proportionately higher rates on non -competitive traffic ; 
 and as railway competition brings cheap freights principally 
 to the largest towns, railway competition leads to an un- 
 healthy centralisation of trade and industry which economi- 
 cally and politically gives cause for concern. 
 
 " In order to avoid mutually ruinous competition, rail- 
 ways frequently combine and agree to direct the flow of 
 traffic in certain fixed proportions over the various lines 
 belonging to the combine. Hence goods are diverted from 
 the shortest and most natural route and travel over artifi- 
 cially arranged roundabout routes, a proceeding which is 
 opposed to the rational and economical dispatch of goods, 
 and which increases the costs of transport. 
 
 " These unnatural conditions would be abolished if the 
 railways were obliged to charge standard rates and to send 
 freight on normal routes, if unnecessary competition was 
 abohshed, and if the artificially diverted streams of traffic 
 would again be brought back to their natural routes. 
 
 " The foregoing statement shows that an improvement 
 can only be effected by insisting upon the principle that the 
 railways are meant for the service of the nation. In rail- 
 way matters changes are taking place which have already 
 been observed in the general development of nations. New 
 economic factors have arisen, and have grown up without 
 State interference, but soon the interest in these institutions 
 has become so great and so general that their further direc- 
 
RAILWAY POLICY 223 
 
 tion can no longer safely be left to the egotism and arbitrari- 
 ness of irresponsible individuals, but must be brought into 
 harmony with the general interests of the country." 
 
 Addressing ParHament, Prince Bismarck said : 
 
 ". . . Did formerly anybody trouble whether the intro- 
 duction of railways ruined the coaching industry and the 
 innkeeper ? The railway monopoly is to my mind far 
 more unjust than was that of the coaching industry, for 
 the railway monopoly actually means the farming out of 
 a province to a railway company. This monopoly arose 
 naturally when all other means of transport had been 
 killed by the railways. Every one who had goods to send 
 or to receive fell into the hands of the railways, and these 
 acted in exactly the same manner as did the Fermiers 
 Generaux who impoverished France before the Revolution, 
 for they also were given a large part of the country, and 
 were allowed to exploit it at their will. The object of the 
 railways is to squeeze out of the country the largest possible 
 dividends. This is an extraordinary abuse of the tax- 
 paying and traffic-requiring community which favours 
 those capitalists who were given the traffic monopoly that 
 accrued to the railways. . . ." 
 
 Following the lead given by his great chief, the Minister 
 of Railways, Maybach, declared on the 8th of November 
 1879, before ParUament : 
 
 ". . . As regards the tariff pohcy of railways, I am of 
 opinion that railway charges should be fixed in accordance 
 with the requirements of the country ; and if it be neces- 
 sary to give the second place either to the national interest 
 or to the railway interest, I am incHned to give the second 
 place to the railway interest. The system of private 
 railways has been imported from England, but it does not 
 suit Prussia. Prussia requires State railways. It is our 
 aim to take the railways out of the hands of speculators, 
 and to make them truly national for the defence of the 
 country and for the development of its prosperity." 
 
 Privately Bismarck remarked, in 1879, that it would be 
 his ideal that all goods imported from abroad should be 
 
224 RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 transported over the German railways at somewhat higher 
 rates than those of home production, for he could not allow 
 that the fiscal Protection which he had introduced in 1879 
 should be neutralised by preferential freight rates given 
 to the foreigner. As a matter of fact, he expected that the 
 preferential tariffs given on the German railways for Ger- 
 man industrial and agricultural products would be more 
 effective in protecting the home industries, and increasing 
 their strength and prosperity, than would be the moderate 
 fiscal Protection which he had introduced. 
 
 When the foregoing weighty arguments had prepared 
 the ground, a Bill for taking over the railways was brought 
 out on the 29th of October 1879, and the Memoire accom- 
 panying it laid down the following general principles : 
 
 " Among the various forms in which railways have been 
 developed in civilised countries, the system of State rail- 
 ways pure and simple is the only one which is able to 
 fulfil in the most satisfactory manner all the tasks of a 
 national railway policy, by creating uniformity throughout 
 the country and equality for all, and by promoting equally 
 the welfare of all interested in railways. Only in the case 
 of State railways is it possible to utilise to the full and in 
 the most thorough manner the enormous capital invested 
 in railways ; only in the case of State railways is it possible 
 to give direct and effective protection to the public interest 
 which is the Government's duty ; lastly only in the case of 
 State railways is it possible to establish a simple, cheap, 
 and rational railway tariff, to effectually suppress harmful 
 differentiation, and to create a just, diligent, and able 
 administration which is solely guided by considerations of 
 the general good. Therefore the State railway system 
 must be considered as the final development in the evolu- 
 tion of the railway system." 
 
 In his economic pohcy, Bismarck left the traditional 
 course which statesmen had followed hitherto. With 
 great boldness he broke with the doctrines of Free Trade, 
 non-interference, and Individuahsm, which were almost 
 universally accepted. He dehberately returned to the 
 economic policy of Oliver Cromwell and Colbert, and 
 
RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 225 
 
 revived, or rather re-created, the mercantile system, to 
 the horror of all professors of political economy. The 
 world has gradually been going back to the Mercantile 
 system, owing to Bismarck's economic reform of 1879, 
 although the professors of political economy have not yet 
 discovered this curious phenomenon. 
 
 According to economic theories which still enjoy great 
 prestige in England, State interference in economic matters 
 is a sure road to national ruin. Many text-books "prove " 
 that a State or municipal corporation is, per se, not fit to 
 engage in industrial pursuits. However, it does not follow 
 that governmental and municipal enterprise in matters 
 economic is bound to be a failure, because British Govern- 
 ment departments and municipalities which engage in 
 industrial pursuits are usually red-tape bound, amateurish, 
 and ignorant of business. 
 
 Immediately after 1879, Prussia rapidly bought up all 
 the more important lines, and within a few years the State 
 more than trebled its railway property. 
 
 Mileage of Railways of Prussia 
 
 
 State Railways. 
 
 Private Railways. 
 
 Total. 
 
 1879 
 
 . 6,323-6 kUs. 
 
 13,650-1 kils. 
 
 19,973-7 kilB 
 
 1880 
 
 . 11,455-3 „ 
 
 8,893-1 „ 
 
 20,348-4 „ 
 
 1881 
 
 . 11,584-6 „ 
 
 9,159-2 „ 
 
 20,743-8 „ 
 
 1882 
 
 . 14,825-6 „ 
 
 6,329-8 „ 
 
 21,155-4 „ 
 
 1883 
 
 . 15,301-1 „ 
 
 6,604-2 „ 
 
 21,905-3 „ 
 
 1884 
 
 . 19,766-9 ,, 
 
 3,002-6 „ 
 
 22,769-5 „ 
 
 1885 
 
 . 21,138-4 „ 
 
 2,496-6 „ 
 
 23,635-0 „ 
 
 In five years the State turned from a small railway 
 manager and owner to a railway monopolist. The Prussian 
 Government did not go to sleep once it had acquired the 
 railways, but extended them most energetically, as foUows : 
 
 Mileage of Prussian State Railways 
 
 1885 . 21,138 kils. 
 
 1895-6 25,214 „ 
 
 1900 27,513 „ 
 
 1909 33,217 ., 
 
 1913 35,301 „ 
 
226 
 
 RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 The activity and progressiveness of a railway system are 
 apparent not only by its length and growth, but also by its 
 equipment. The magnificent palatial railway stations of 
 Germany are well known. But it is not so well known 
 how rapidly the roUing-stock has increased since the year 
 when almost the whole of the railways were brought into the 
 possession of the State. 
 
 1879 . 
 1884-5 . 
 1889-90 
 1894-5 
 1900-1 
 1907 . 
 1909 . 
 
 Locomotives, 
 
 Passeiiijer Cars 
 
 7,152 
 
 10,828 
 
 8,367 
 
 13,063 
 
 9,425 
 
 15,177 
 
 10,991 
 
 18,391 
 
 13,267 
 
 24,225 
 
 17,177 
 
 32,755 
 
 19,171 
 
 37,243 
 
 Freight and 
 Luggage Cars. 
 
 148,491 
 
 174,157 
 
 194,705 
 
 231,266 
 
 303,364 
 
 377,649 
 
 411,945 
 
 During the thirty years following the creation of the 
 State railways, the rolling-stock of the country practically 
 trebled. Improved material was introduced everywhere ; 
 travelling was made infinitely more safe, more comfortable, 
 and more rapid on the State railways than it ever was on 
 the old private lines, and owing to the introduction of more 
 powerful engines, larger freight cars, etc., haulage became 
 far more economical and efl&cient. Before the War goods 
 trains in Germany conveyed, as a rule, more than twice the 
 weight which they carried in England ; but an exact com- 
 parison cannot be made, because the British railways do 
 not pubUsh ton-mile statistics, which would glaringly show 
 their inefficiency. While the most common truck in Great 
 Britain holds about ten tons, that mostly used in Germany 
 carries fifteen tons. The German goods trains haul a smaller 
 dead- weight, and are therefore much more economical than 
 are EngUsh toy trains puUed by toy engines, and composed 
 of insufficiently loaded toy trucks. 
 
 How rapidly the freight and passenger business on the 
 German railways has expanded since they came into the 
 possession of the State may be seen from the following 
 statistics : 
 
RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 227 
 
 
 Passenger Kilometres 
 
 Ton Kilometres 
 
 1879 . 
 
 3,797,172,000 
 
 8,644,625,000 
 
 1884-5 
 
 5,083,700,000 
 
 12,414,712,000 
 
 1889-90 
 
 6,903,526,000 
 
 16,142,648,000 
 
 1894-5 
 
 . 8,763,723,000 
 
 18,162,727,000 
 
 1900 . 
 
 . 14,310,204,000 
 
 27,434,536,000 
 
 1908 . 
 
 . 21,331,413,729 
 
 38,187,612,343 
 
 1910 . 
 
 , 25,221,995,000 
 
 42,538,085,000 
 
 The following have been the profits earned on the total 
 capital of all the railways of Prussia : 
 
 1869 
 1874 
 
 6-5 per cent. 
 4-4 
 
 1879 4-9 
 
 1884-5 4-9 
 
 1889-90 6-2 
 
 1894-5 
 
 1900 
 
 1905 
 
 1908 
 
 1910 
 
 6-6 
 7-0 
 7-4 
 6-3 
 6-5 
 
 Under private management the railway profits were 
 stagnant or retrogressive. They became rapidly progres- 
 sive after the railways had in 1879 been taken over by 
 the State. A profit of 6 to 7 per cent, on the whole railway 
 capital is a result of which an English railway director 
 might perhaps dream, but would not think, for the net 
 receipts of all the British railways have fluctuated for so 
 many years between ^ and 4 per cent, that 4 per cent, 
 appears now an ideally high return on the total British 
 railway capital. As Prussia borrowed the money with 
 which she bought the railways by means of loans, returning 
 about Z\ per cent., the State made every year on its railways 
 an immense profit, which flowed into its exchequer. 
 
 The railway-using public desires that the conveyance of 
 passengers and goods should be quick, convenient, punctual, 
 equitable, and cheap. These five requirements are well 
 fulfilled by the German State railways. Although before 
 the War a few show trains on British lines were faster than 
 the show trains on German lines, the average speed of 
 
228 RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 passenger trains was, according to a high German authority, 
 considerably greater in Germany than in Great Britain. 
 The German lines were no doubt more convenient than 
 the British lines, owing to the unity and uniformity of 
 their traflSic arrangements, trains, time-tables, etc. Tickets 
 issued from one town to another were, as a rule, available on 
 the different lines connecting the two towns. 
 
 In Great Britain it requires years of travel and of careful 
 observation to learn one's way across the country, and its 
 numerous lines, and to avoid the many pitfaUs which are 
 everywhere placed in the way of the inexperienced. In 
 Germany, such pitfalls do not exist, and the greatest simple- 
 ton will travel as cheaply, as comfortably, and as rapidly all 
 over the country as the most cunning commercial traveller. 
 On many British lines, and especially on those south of 
 London, trains appear to be late on principle. In Germany, 
 railway trains used to arrive, in nineteen times out of 
 twenty, to the minute, because the Government punished 
 severely those responsible for delay. 
 
 On British railways people are not equitably and not 
 equally treated. Individuals who can "influence freight" 
 are often able to extort favours from certain railways, and 
 the amount of freight charged is largely a matter of negotia- 
 tion and of influence. The British merchant cannot tell 
 beforehand what the freight will come to unless he inquires. 
 The British railways charge on freight " what the traffic 
 will bear " — that is, they put on the screw till the victim 
 shrieks or goes bankrupt. They are, no doubt, to a great 
 extent guilty of the ruin of agriculture and of certain in- 
 dustries. A rehable guide to the freight charges does not 
 exist, and it could not be compiled, for the freight charges 
 per mile, for the identical goods and even on the same line, 
 vary in almost every town. Therefore a complete freight 
 tariff for Great Britain would probably be bulkier than the 
 Encyclopcedia Britannica. Besides, freights fluctuate con- 
 stantly. Consequently, the British trader who has to send 
 goods by railway works in absolute uncertainty, and when he 
 sends his goods carriage forward, the chance is that the 
 
RAILWAY POLICY 229 
 
 railway company levies an extortionate toll at the other 
 end, and the trader loses his customer. This is particularly 
 often the case when goods are sent abroad, for the foreign 
 customer believes himself to be swindled when seeing the 
 high railway charge, and feels inclined to give his business 
 to a German exporter, whose freight charge is moderate and 
 not a matter of speculation. 
 
 The German State railways have largely contributed 
 to the prosperity of the German industries ; the British 
 railways have largely contributed to the stagnation and 
 decline of the British industries. In Great Britain trade 
 policy is made by the railways, which, without consulting 
 the traders, prescribe the course of trade, stimulating it here 
 and stifling it there. But the greatest injustice under 
 which the British producer suffers is that the British rail- 
 ways are allowed to convey foreign produce more cheaply 
 than the British. Thus they directly subsidise the foreigner 
 to the harm of the native producer. They support foreign 
 industries on the principle, " On British produce we charge 
 what we can, on foreign produce what we may ; British 
 produce has to come to us, foreign produce has to be 
 attracted." Unfortunately, redress for those who are 
 injured is very difficult, very costly, and almost impossible. 
 
 The German freight tariff is of the greatest simplicity. 
 There are only a few classes of goods, and every trader 
 possesses a little book by means of which the office-boy can 
 calculate in a moment the exact amount of the freight 
 charges for any weight between any two stations. Freight 
 charges in Germany are as uniform, as generally known, and 
 as simple as are postal charges. They are not determined 
 by negotiation, or by influence, and the goods of the 
 foreigner which compete with German goods are not carried 
 at a lower, but at a higher, rate than the native produce. 
 But foreign raw material is carried cheaply. Thus 
 Bismarck's ideal mentioned in the foregoing has been 
 fulfiUed. 
 
 While the British railways raise fares and freights at every 
 opportunity, the fares and freight charges of the Grerman 
 
230 
 
 RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 State railways have steadily been going down, as the follow- 
 ing jfigures show : 
 
 Receipts of the German Railways (per ton kilometre) 
 
 
 Goods by fast train. 
 
 Goods by ordinary train 
 
 
 pfennigs. 
 
 
 pfennigs. 
 
 1893 
 
 . 24-47 
 
 
 3-79 
 
 1896 
 
 . 24-09 
 
 
 3-79 
 
 1899 
 
 . 21-75 
 
 
 3-57 
 
 1902 
 
 . 17-01 
 
 
 3-52 
 
 1909 
 
 . 16-52 
 
 
 3-51 
 
 1913 
 
 . 17-97 
 
 
 3-58 
 
 Receipts of the German Railways (per 
 
 passenger kilometre) 
 
 
 1st Class. 2nd Class. 
 
 3rd Class. 
 
 4th Class. 
 
 
 pfennigs. pfennigs. 
 
 pfennigs. 
 
 pfennigs. 
 
 1893 . 
 
 . 7-87 4-96 
 
 2-94 
 
 1-99 
 
 1896 . 
 
 . 7-94 4-71 
 
 2-76 
 
 1-98 
 
 1899 . 
 
 . 7-75 4-66 
 
 2-69 
 
 1-96 
 
 1902 . 
 
 . 7-33 4-48 
 
 2-67 
 
 1-89 
 
 1909 . 
 
 . 7-48 4-06 
 
 2-54 
 
 1-85 
 
 In Great Britain the maximum charge for third-class 
 travelling was before the War Id. per mile, and in nine cases 
 out of ten the full maximum rate was charged. In Germany 
 the lowest class is the fourth class, where the average charge 
 was Id. per mile, while the charge for third class was about 
 ^. per mile. But travelling first class was much dearer 
 than in England. In Germany, the poor man travelled 
 cheaply, while in England the rich man travelled cheaply. 
 
 Unfortunately, the German statistics of passenger charges 
 and freight charges per mile cannot be compared with 
 similar British statistics, because comprehensive British 
 statistics are not issued by the British railway companies, 
 for reasons best known to themselves. The British railways 
 pubhsh neither these statistics nor their freight charges. 
 In 1884 Sir Henry Calcraft and Sir Robert Giffen, assistant 
 secretaries of the Railway and Statistical Departments, 
 regretted that " It is impossible to show what is the receipt 
 per ton per mile." In 1886 Mr. J. S. Jeans read a paper on 
 Railway Traffic before the Statistical Society, in which he 
 said : 
 
RAILWAY POLICY 231 
 
 " The average transport charges may be ascertained for 
 every European country except our own, as regards both 
 goods and passenger traffic. In Great Britain the railways, 
 whether by accident or by design, have hitherto con- 
 trived to make it impossible for the public to discover 
 the average charges for the transport of either the one 
 or the other, for any one railway or for the country as 
 a whole." 
 
 The demand has frequently been raised by the public 
 that the railways should publish their charges and their 
 earnings per ton mile and per passenger mile, etc. But 
 although the railways have, through their advocates in 
 the press, written and argued a great deal, they continue 
 to work in that congenial obscurity which they find, 
 apparently, most conducive to the conduct of their 
 business. 
 
 The Grerman States pursued a truly national railway 
 policy. Railways were built where they were wanted by 
 the population or by the State, even if they did not pay ; 
 for the Grerman State monopolist considered himself as the 
 servant of the nation and as the trustee of its interests, and 
 not the nation as the milch-cow of the railway department. 
 Hence, the Grerman States have encouraged the building of 
 canals and have in no way interfered with the building of 
 electrical trams, while the railways in the classical country 
 of Freedom and Non-interference have nefariously closed 
 the canals and have obstructed the building of electrical 
 tramways. 
 
 If we compare the capital of the German and the British 
 railways, we find that the British railway capital per mile 
 is almost two-and-a-half times as large as is the German 
 railway capital. The inflated capital of the British railways 
 hangs like a miUstone round their necks, and here we 
 have one of the chief reasons why fares and freights are 
 high in this country and low in Germany, and why rail- 
 way profits are large in Germany and small in Great 
 Britain. 
 
 British railway capital was not always as unwieldy as it 
 16 
 
232 
 
 RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 is now, but has gradually become so, as the following figures 
 
 prove 
 
 Capital of British Railways 
 
 1861 
 1871 
 1881 
 1891 
 1901 
 1910 
 
 Miles of 
 Railway Open. 
 
 Total Capital. 
 
 Capital per Mile 
 
 . 10,865 
 
 £362,327,000 
 
 £33,335 
 
 . 15,367 
 
 552,680,000 
 
 35,944 
 
 . 18,175 
 
 745,528,000 
 
 41,019 
 
 . 20,191 
 
 919,425,000 
 
 45,542 
 
 . 22,078 
 
 1,195,564,000 
 
 54,152 
 
 . 23,387 
 
 1,318,500,000 
 
 56,377 
 
 No doubt a large part of this colossal sum of now about 
 £60,000 per mile has been spent properly, but perhaps an 
 equally large part represents promoter's plunder, water, 
 and, before all, "improvements" for necessary renewals, 
 repairs, etc., which are, whenever possible, feloniously 
 charged to capital account, instead of being paid out of 
 earnings. 
 
 The German State railways have pursued a more con- 
 servative financial policy, as the following table shows. 
 When they were in private hands, they also increased their 
 capital year by year, though their financial excesses were 
 comparatively small. 
 
 Capital of German Railways 
 
 1871 . 
 
 . Marks 220,300 per 
 
 kilometre 
 
 1873 . 
 
 „ 242,300 
 
 »» 
 
 1875 . 
 
 „ 249,200 
 
 »> 
 
 1877-8 . 
 
 „ 265,000 
 
 " 
 
 1882-3 . 
 
 „ 265,400 
 
 
 1887-8 . 
 
 „ 255,100 
 
 ,, 
 
 1892-3 . 
 
 „ 253,200 
 
 »> 
 
 1902 . 
 
 „ 258,800 
 
 ,, 
 
 1909 . 
 
 „ 288,700 
 
 >» 
 
 The British railways were heavily handicapped from the 
 beginning by the extortions of the landowner, the promoter, 
 and the lawyer. The German railways also suffered at the 
 promoter's hands, but they got at least their ground cheaply. 
 Of the Prussian railway capital only 9'87 per cent, was 
 
RAILWAY POLICY 233 
 
 spent on account of land. Hence, land accounts on an 
 average for a capital outlay of only about £2,000 per mile 
 on the German railways, while the British railways had to 
 buy land at fancy prices. The law expenses also were 
 low in Germany, while they were extortionate in England. 
 The law costs in respect of the London, Brighton, and South 
 Coast Railway are said to have come to £4,806 per mile, 
 and those of the Manchester-Birmingham Railway to 
 £5,190 per mile. Apparently, it often cost British railways 
 much more to acquire their title than it cost German 
 railways to acquire their land. These are some of the dis- 
 advantages of unrestrained individuahsm, which is favoured 
 by the policy of laissez-faire. Laissez-faire means, unfor- 
 tunately, only too often, laissez-mefaire. 
 
 Three hundred years ago, Lord Bacon wrote : " There 
 are three things which make a nation great and prosperous : 
 a fertile soil, busy workshops, and easy conveyance for men 
 and commodities from one place to another." Colbert, the 
 father of the Mercantile System, left a beautiful saying : 
 " The most precious thing which a State possesses is the 
 labour of its people." All parties should combine to 
 protect the labour of the British people, and to promote 
 actively the industrial welfare of the nation. The policy 
 of Non-interference has had its day. Who restricts labour 
 destroys life ; who increases production makes a nation 
 great and prosperous. That is the lesson of the German 
 railways and of Bismarck's railway policy. 
 
 When, on the 24th of February 1881, Prince Bismarck 
 was told by the leader of the Radical Party that his economic 
 policy was unsound, unscientific, opposed to economic 
 principles and traditions, the Prince did not quote political 
 economists to support his policy, but retorted : " For me 
 there has always been one single aim and one single 
 principle by which I have been guided : Salus publica.^^ 
 May that also be the guiding-star of all those politicians 
 who have the economic regeneration of Great Britain at 
 heart. 
 
 State railways have been a great success in Germany, 
 
234 RAILWAY POLICY 
 
 but whether they would be a success in a democracy, such as 
 Great Britain, is an open question. They might become a 
 prey to party politics. Party leaders bent upon obtaining 
 votes might easily diminish their financial result and even 
 destroy their efficiency. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 WATERWAYS AND CANALS * 
 
 Up to 1914 England's most active and most dangerous 
 industrial rival was Germany. British merchants and 
 manufacturers often asserted, not without reason, that 
 the German industries were so exceedingly successful 
 largely because they enjoyed cheap transport facilities. 
 
 The natural conditions for cheap transport in Great 
 Britain and Germany are totally different, but they are 
 not by any means in favour of Germany. A glance at a 
 map of Europe will prove this assertion to be true. The 
 greatest industrial and exporting centres of Imperial Ger- 
 many were the following : The Rhenish- Westphalian 
 centre, with the towns of Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen, Ruhrort, 
 Barmen, Elberfeld, Essen, Bochum, Diisseldorf, Cologne, 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, etc. ; the Alsatian centre, with Mulhouse, 
 Gebweiler, Dornach, Cohnar, etc. ; the various centres 
 situated in the Palatinate, Hesse, Baden, Wiirtemberg, and 
 Bavaria, with the towns of Hochst, Ludwigshafen, Carlsruhe, 
 Mannheim, Offenbach, Frankfort, Reutlingen, Bamberg, 
 Nuremberg, etc. ; the centre in the Saxonies, with Chemnitz, 
 Glauchau, Zwickau, Plauen, Greiz, Gera, Dresden, Leipzig, 
 etc. ; and the Berlin district. In the north of Germany, 
 near the sea border, there were practically no industrial 
 towns. Bremen, Hamburg, Kiel, Liibeck, Stettin, Dantzig, 
 Konigsberg, did some manufacturing, but they could hardly 
 be called manufacturing towns. The manufacturing dis- 
 tricts were to be found in Central, and especially in Southern, 
 Germany, far from the sea. If we draw a straight line from 
 
 1 From the Contemporary Review, December 1914. 
 235 
 
236 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 
 
 the Rhenish- Westphalian centre, which was chiefly devoted 
 to the coal and iron industries, to its nearest harbour, 
 Antwerp, the distance, according to the towns chosen, 
 came to 100 to 150 miles. Berlin was separated by 90 
 miles of land from the sea. AJl the manufacturing towns 
 belonging to the other centres were separated from their 
 nearest harbour or from the sea border by a distance of 
 from 200 to 350 miles. The German industries as a whole 
 were carried on at an average distance of more than 200 
 miles from their harbours. 
 
 If we now look at a map of Great Britain, we find that 
 its industrial towns are in most instances situated either 
 on the sea or a few miles inland. They are carried on 
 as a rule not further than 10, 20, or 30 miles from the sea 
 border, and the maximum distance which need be con- 
 sidered, and which is altogether exceptional, is 60 miles in 
 a straight line. Consequently the raw materials imported 
 from abroad by sea and used in manufacturing, such as 
 cotton, wool, ores, metals, wood, etc., and the articles for 
 the consumption of the industrial workers, the prices of 
 which indirectly affect the cost of manufacturing, such as 
 wheat, flour, meat, petroleum, etc., had to travel a distance 
 which in Germany was from eight to ten times as long as 
 in Great Britain. The industrial products exported, also, 
 had in Germany to be transported inland eight or ten 
 times the distance which they had to travel in Great 
 Britain. 
 
 While Inverness, Aberdeen, Dundee, Perth, Glasgow, 
 Edinburgh, Greenock, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Sunderland, 
 Middlesbrough, Stockton-on-Tees, Bristol, Cardiff, Swansea, 
 Manchester, Preston, Barrow-in-Furness, London, Belfast, 
 etc., can manufacture on the very sea border, their German 
 competitors, the shipbuilding industry of course excepted, 
 had to labour more than 100 miles inland. But even the 
 German shipbuilding industry was at a great disadvantage, 
 for it also had to rely on the far-away industrial Hinter- 
 land for a large part of its supplies, notably coal and iron. 
 The natural advantages of Great Britain were so immensely 
 
WATERWAYS AND CANALS 237 
 
 in its favour that the German industries would have been 
 incapable of competing with the British industries had the 
 enormous advantages which their geographical position 
 offers been fully utilised. 
 
 Germany was very heavily handicapped by nature in 
 the race for industrial success, and the position of most 
 Continental countries was similarly unfavourable. The 
 manufacturing industries of France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, 
 and Russia, also, are carried on far inland. Lyons lies 
 160 miles from the sea ; the distance between Milan and 
 Genoa is only 80 miles, but Italy has no coal ; the manu- 
 facturing towns of Bohemia are 300 miles distant from 
 their harbour, and Lodz in Russian Poland is separated by 
 170 miles from the coast. One might almost say that in 
 Europe the industries are situated in the centre of the 
 Continent, with the exception of Great Britain, where 
 they are placed on, or close to, the sea border. Therefore 
 Great Britain might again acquire and maintain the indus- 
 trial monopoly, or at least industrial predominance, in 
 Europe should she avail herself of her most favoured 
 position. 
 
 As industrial Germany was thus heavily handicapped, 
 its industries required for their success a practical, business- 
 like education, the application of science to industry, thrift, 
 and a comprehensive and efficient system of cheap transport 
 whereby to bridge over the long distances which separate 
 the numerous interdependent industrial centres from one 
 another and which part these centres from the sea. 
 
 In the Middle Ages the foreign trade of Germany relied 
 chiefly on her waterways. The Valley of the Rhine was 
 the highway over which for more than 1 ,000 years the com- 
 merce flowed between the Orient and Great Britain, going 
 via Italy, Switzerland, and the towns of Flanders and 
 Holland. Before the age of steam and of machinery, the 
 Grerman industries flourished in the towns on the Rhine, 
 Elbe, and Danube, and their tributary streams. Their 
 prosperity was founded on cheap water transport. Nature 
 and tradition pointed to the waterways for Germany's 
 
238 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 
 
 prosperity, and modern Germany resolved to extend the 
 use of her historic waterways to the uttermost, notwith- 
 standing the example of Great Britain. 
 
 When the railways were introduced, Great Britain ceased 
 to extend her system of waterways. Her canals, which had 
 been the foremost in Europe, and which used to be the 
 admiration and envy of foreign nations, were declared to be 
 useless by the promoters of railways and their friends, and 
 the nation weakly and fooUshly allowed its canals to fall 
 into decay at the bidding of those interested in railways. 
 One of the greatest German authorities on inland navigation 
 wrote in a most important book on Inland Navigation in 
 Europe and North America, compiled by order of the Minister 
 of Public Works, which was published in 1899 : 
 
 " The artificial waterways of England are the oldest in 
 Europe. . . . Next to Sweden and Finland, Great Britain 
 possesses the closest net of water-courses in Europe, and 
 she is exceedingly favoured by nature for inland transport 
 by water owing to the climatic conditions prevailing, the 
 plenty and equal distribution of rain, and the mild winters 
 usual in that country, as well as owing to the formation of 
 the coast with its numerous inlets of the sea, which deeply 
 penetrates from all sides into the land. 
 
 " With the arrival of railways, the building of canals 
 ceased almost completely in 1830. The railways were 
 placed in a position in which they could easily destroy the 
 canals. Through traffic on the most important canal routes 
 had to pass through a number of different and independent 
 canal systems. As soon as a railway succeeded in obtaining 
 the control of an indispensable part of the canal route by 
 purchase, lease, or traffic agreement, it took to destroying 
 the traffic on the adjoining canals, either by enforcing 
 maximum rates or by numerous other expedients. After 
 having been damaged in this manner, canals were bought up 
 cheaply by the railways, which used them for traffic which 
 could not conveniently be handled by the railroads or they 
 stopped the canal traffic altogether. The numerous inde- 
 pendent canal companies possessed no central organisation, 
 and when, in 1844, an organisation for combined defensive 
 action was created, important parts of the canal system 
 
WATERWAYS AND CANALS 239 
 
 were already in the possession, or under the influence, of 
 the railways, and it was too late to oppose their further en- 
 croachments. In 1871 canal property had on an average 
 fallen to one- third of its former value. Only in 1873 were 
 the railways prohibited to close for traffic canals in their 
 possession, or to allow them to fall into disrepair." 
 
 Grermany had copied Great Britain in many ways, but 
 she had not by any means copied her bhndly. She refused 
 to adopt Free Trade, notwithstanding the vigorous agitation 
 of the Cobden Club and its professorial sympathisers in 
 Grermany. She declined to hand over the whole of her 
 productive industries to the tender mercies of her transport 
 industries, relying on the dogma of free competition, 
 preached by the champions of Free Trade. She declined 
 to let her agriculture be ruined. She firmly refused to let 
 her canal system decay in the interest and at the bidding 
 of the railways. Germany tried to develop all her industries 
 harmoniously, and not to allow one or the other to become 
 great and prosperous at the expense of the others. 
 
 Recognising the importance of cheap transport and of an 
 alternative transport system, Grermany steadily extended, 
 enlarged, and improved her natural and artificial waterways, 
 and kept on extending and improving them. 
 
 Since 1871 England has done practically nothing for 
 inland navigation, for the Manchester Ship Canal is a sea 
 canal. During the same period, Germany built about 
 1 ,000 miles of inland canals and immensely improved all her 
 navigable rivers. The German- Austrian canals lately pro- 
 posed or begun have a length of more than 1,500 miles, 
 while their probable cost should exceed £50,000,000. The 
 Rhine-Elbe Canal Bill of 1901, for instance, proposed the 
 spending of £19,450,000 within fifteen years. The very 
 cautious and very thrifty Government of Germany was 
 willing to sink immense sums in canals, although they would 
 prove exceedingly able competitors to the State railways. 
 The monopolist State was deUberately creating a most 
 powerful competition to itself. 
 
 Germany possesses a number of big rivers, but these were, 
 
240 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 
 
 until a very recent period, in a state of neglect. They were 
 natural water-courses with a natural, unevenly deep and 
 partly shallow bed, which did not allow of the use of big 
 ships, and the soft natural banks prevented ships going at 
 a considerable speed, because the heavy waves created by 
 their rapid progress would have washed them down into 
 the river. For this reason ships had to travel at a very 
 low speed in Germany exactly as they have to proceed on 
 British rivers, and even on those which are emphatically 
 industrial rivers. 
 
 The larger a ship or barge is, the cheaper is the cost of 
 transport, for the same number of men who are required to 
 look after a small barge can handle a large one. Besides, 
 the dead weight of the hull, the proportion of living room 
 to stowage room, etc., is of course far greater in a small than 
 in a large vessel. For the same reason for which ocean 
 steamers are increasing in size from year to year, the ships 
 and barges used in inland navigation are growing continually 
 bigger in those countries where inland navigation is fostered. 
 Again, the quicker a cargo boat travels, the more economical 
 it is, for time is money. In order to make it possible to use 
 large and swift cargo boats on her rivers, Germany set to 
 work to regulate her natural rivers. 
 
 With this object in view, the natural earthbanks of rivers 
 and canals were replaced by solid masonry walls, the river 
 beds were narrowed and deepened, the rocks which in many 
 parts — for instance in the Rhine at Bingen — were a danger 
 to navigation were blasted away, and provisions were made 
 to prevent the ice forming during severe winters and closing 
 streams and canals to navigation. Numerous well-equipped 
 harbours and quays were built by all towns within reach 
 of inland navigation, and gradually all the more important 
 German waterways were greatly perfected and improved. 
 Cologne, which in a straight line is situated about 150 miles 
 from the sea, was made a seaport, trading regularly with 
 England, Scandinavia, and Russia. High up the Rhine 
 and 300 miles inland lies Strasbourg, which formerly 
 could be reached only by the smallest river craft, but 
 
WATERWAYS AND CANALS 241 
 
 now boats carrying 600 tons are going to and from that 
 town. 
 
 The tributary streams of the Rhine also were very greatly 
 improved. The Main, for instance, was a shallow stream 
 with a depth of only 2| feet. This depth was gradually 
 increased to 8 J feet for a distance of twenty miles up-stream, 
 and at a cost of £400,000, in order to provide the industries 
 of Frankfort with cheap transport. Up to Frankfort, the 
 bed of the river Main is as deep as that of the Rhine, and 
 the same steamers which can travel on the Rhine can now 
 go up to Frankfort. 
 
 The towns at or near the Rhine vied with one another 
 in tapping that stream. Crefeld and Carlsruhe, which are 
 situated some distance away from the Rhine, dug canals 
 to that river, and many old-world sleepy towns on the 
 Rhine, which used to subsist on the wine- trade and on tourist 
 traffic, equipped the water's edge with the most perfect 
 and most up-to-date installations for warehousing and for 
 loading and unloading goods directly from train to steamer 
 or barge, and from boat to train. Formerly, sacks of wheat 
 weighing 2 cwt. each were carried on the shoulder by sturdy 
 men from small grain boats to old-fashioned sheds, where 
 they were stacked. Now huge ships fiUed with wheat in 
 bulk are unloaded by suction in a few hours, and the grain 
 is automatically weighed whilst being whisked from steamer 
 to store, or is put into sacks at an incredibly high speed 
 by machinery and dropped into railway trucks. Electricity 
 is largely made use of for working the machinery of these 
 harbours, and some of these are very likely the best-equipped 
 inland harbours in the world. 
 
 Formerly the greatest attraction for travellers on the 
 Rhine was its romantic scenery and its ruined castles. 
 Now its greatest interest lies in this, that it is perhaps the 
 most perfect waterway in the world for the promotion oi]j 
 industry. Its shores are no longer so remarkable for their 
 romantic views as for their countless smoking factory 
 chimneys. However, this bustling activity is not by any 
 means restricted to the Rhine. Everywhere in Germany 
 
242 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 
 
 water transport has been developed with the utmost energy. 
 On all the rivers and all the canals commercial and industrial 
 activity has marvellously developed, and the promotion of 
 water transport has become a passion with the German 
 business community. 
 
 On the British canals and rivers, which are, as a rule, only 
 shallow ditches filled with water, tiny barges loaded with 
 from 30 to 50 tons may be seen which are laboriously hauled 
 by horses at a speed of about three miles an hour. On the 
 German rivers and canals, trains of barges of 300, 500, or 
 1,000 tons each, which are hauled by steamers, may at every 
 hour and on every day be seen proceeding at a very con- 
 siderable speed. 
 
 Water transport possesses great advantages over trans- 
 port by land. A large iron barge of a loading capacity of 
 2,000 tons, and of the type which is used on the Rhine, costs 
 only about £5,000, or about £2 10s. per ton of load room. 
 A German railway wagon of ten tons' capacity costs 
 about £125, or £12 IO5. per ton of load room, and is there- 
 fore, as a vessel for carrying freight, five times more costly 
 than a barge. As regards the cost of moving freight by 
 land and water, water transport possesses an immense 
 advantage over land transport. On a horizontal road, and 
 at a speed of about three miles per hour, a horse can pull 
 about two tons ; on a horizontal railway it can pull about 
 15 tons ; on a canal it can pull from 60 to 100 tons. There- 
 fore, from four to six times the energy is required in hauling 
 goods by rail, and thirty to fiifty times as much force is 
 expended in hauling it by road, whatever the motive force 
 may be. Therefore, the cost of propulsion by water, 
 whether the motive force be horse traction, steam, or 
 electricity, is only a fraction of the cost of propulsion by 
 road or rail. Furthermore, the construction of railways 
 is exceedingly costly. On an average at least £20,000 to 
 £30,000 per mile are required to build a railway in a country 
 such as Great Britain or Germany, while a canal can often 
 be built at considerably smaller cost. A further circum- 
 stance in favour of water traffic Hes in this — that far more 
 
WATERWAYS AND CANALS 243 
 
 traffic can pass over a broad canal than can be sent over 
 railway. It is therefore clear that transport by water is, 
 and must always remain, so very much cheaper than land 
 transport, be it by road or by rail, that railways cannot 
 possibly compete with properly organised, properly managed, 
 properly planned, and properly equipped waterways. Hence 
 it is economically wasteful not to extend and develop 
 the natural and artificial waterways which a country 
 possesses, and it is absolutely suicidal and criminal to let 
 them fall into neglect and decay. \ 
 
 Canals and rivers are most suitable for the transport 
 of bulky goods which are not easily perishable, and which 
 need not be dehvered in the shortest possible time. There- 
 fore canals and rivers are particularly suitable for trans- 
 porting cotton, ore, metal, coal, wood, petroleum, grain, 
 manure, chemicals, fodder, wool, potatoes, cement, stone, 
 leather, salt, sugar, vegetables, fruit, machinery, and those 
 manufactured goods which are dispatched in fairly big 
 parcels or which are packed in strong boxes and bales. 
 / If it were not for the existence of the German waterways, 
 j the Grcrman industries would certainly not have flourished 
 I so much. The iron industry was completely dependent 
 / upon it for the imported iron ore, and that of Lorraine, had 
 to be carried over huge distances to the Ruhr coal district 
 to be smelted. Certain valuable products and by-products 
 of the German mines and ironworks, and the more bulky 
 products of the chemical industries of Germany could, 
 according to Major Kurs, a leading authority on inland 
 navigation, be sold in Germany and abroad only owing 
 to the cheapness of transport by water. In many cases 
 the profit was cut so fine that an increase of the freight 
 charges by about one-fiftieth of a penny per ton per 
 mile would have killed important industries. Germany's 
 industrial success was no doubt due to a large extent 
 to the immense assistance which she received from her 
 waterways. 
 
 In consequence of the energetic steps which were taken 
 for improving the navigable channel of the Rhine, the 
 
244 
 
 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 
 
 volume of transport flo^^^ing over that river inereased, 
 according to the otHoial statistics, in the folknving remark- 
 able manner : 
 
 Thkouoh Trafi 
 
 uo OF Goods Passing Emmerich (German-Dutch 
 
 
 Frontier) 
 
 
 I' p-strt-<iin. Doirn-strtatn. 
 
 1889 
 
 2.799.800 toiia 2,593,000 tons 
 
 1894 
 
 •4,771.500 „ 3,142,000 ,, 
 
 1897 
 
 0,929,100 „ 3,480.200 „ 
 
 1900 
 
 9.030.400 ., 4,129,700 ,. 
 
 1903 
 
 . 10,027.900 „ 7,211,900 „ 
 
 190G 
 
 . 13.402.400 „ 7,078,300 ., 
 
 1909 
 
 . 14.881.300 ,. 9,904,700 ,. 
 
 1913 
 
 . 19,823,047 „ 17,038,484 „ 
 
 An almost equally rapid increase in the traffic took place 
 on all the other rivers and ciinals. Owing to the marvellous 
 expansion of the traffic, the tonnage of the ships used in Ger- 
 man inland naviuation increased in the folloAvine manner : 
 
 1882 
 1887 
 1892 
 1897 
 1902 
 1907 
 1912 
 
 Tonnage op the German Iniand Fleet 
 
 yiimhtr of Ships, Tannagf. 
 
 . 18,715 1,058,200 tons 
 
 . 20,930 2,100,705 ,, 
 
 . 22,848 2,700,553 „ 
 
 . 22,504 3,370,447 ,, 
 
 . 24,839 4,873,502 ,, 
 
 . 20,235 5,914,020 „ 
 
 . 29,533 7,394,507 ,, 
 
 We have often heard of the marvellous progress of the 
 German merchant marine, but it would appear that the 
 progress of the German inland fleet has been much more 
 rapid. While the Gt*rman inland shipping increased 
 between 1S82 and 1912 from 1,658,260 tons to 7,394,567 
 tons, the German merchant marine increased between 
 1881 and 1913 only from 1,181,525 tons to 3,153,724 tons. 
 
 The full significance of this enormous increase in the 
 tonnage of inland shipping is brought out only if we take 
 note of the change in the character of Germany's inland 
 fleet, which is apparent from the following table : 
 
WATERWAYS AND CANALS 245 
 
 Classification of Ships of the German Inland Fleet 
 
 
 Shipt of 
 
 Ships of 
 
 Ships of 
 
 Ships of 
 
 Skips of 
 
 
 less than 
 
 100-150 
 
 150-250 
 
 250-600 
 
 600 and 
 
 
 100 tons. 
 
 tons. 
 
 tons. 
 
 tons. 
 
 more ton* 
 
 1887 . 
 
 . 11,281 
 
 5,460 
 
 1,757 
 
 1,271 
 
 220 
 
 1892 . 
 
 . 11,430 
 
 6,326 
 
 2,343 
 
 1,822 
 
 457 
 
 1897 . 
 
 . 10,390 
 
 4,405 
 
 S,irA 
 
 2,746 
 
 650 
 
 1902 . 
 
 . 10,764 
 
 1,705 
 
 5,732 
 
 4,087 
 
 1,661 
 
 1907 . 
 
 . 10,930 
 
 1,859 
 
 6,301 
 
 4,987 
 
 2,112 
 
 1912 . 
 
 . 11,843 
 
 2,264 
 
 6,316 
 
 6,027 
 
 3,073 
 
 The ships and barges of less than 150 tons decreased in 
 number during the last twenty years. The whole of the 
 immense increase in inland tonnage took place in ships of 
 large and of the largest size. This increase is particularly 
 striking in the case of ships of 600 tons and more, which 
 increased almost fifteen-fold. The decrease of the boats 
 measuring less than 150 tons should be particularly interest- 
 ing to Great Britain, inasmuch as a ship or a barge of 150 
 tons, which is too small for German inland transport, and 
 is considered to be ripe for the shipbreaker, is a very large 
 vessel in British inland navigation, in which ships of 30 or 
 50 tons abound. 
 
 How enormous the influence of the size of ships is on the 
 cost of transport may be seen from the following table, 
 which was supplied by one of the leading German authorities 
 on inland navigation : 
 
 Cost of Transport per Ton per Kilometre on Canals, in Ships of 
 Various Sizes. DuniNa a Ten Months' Shippino Season 
 
 150 
 
 200 
 
 300 
 
 400 
 
 450 
 
 600 
 
 1000 
 
 1500 tons 
 
 0-79 
 
 0-63 
 
 0-48 
 
 0-41 
 
 0-38 
 
 0-30 
 
 0-23 
 
 0-21 pfg. 
 
 One pfennig being about one-eighth of a penny, these 
 rates are roughly equal to the incredibly low charge of from 
 one-seventh to one-twenty-fourth of a penny per ton per 
 mile ! If British industries should secure rates approximating 
 those given above for their transport requirements, a new 
 era would dawn for them. 
 
 The foregoing table shows how exceedingly uneconomical 
 the toy barges are which ply upon British canals and rivers. 
 
246 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 
 
 The cost of transport in boats of 150 tons is about four 
 times as great as in boats of 1,500 tons. Nevertheless, even 
 boats of 150 tons are hardly to be found on British canals 
 and rivers, where barges of smaller size, such as 30 and 
 50 tons for instance, are still transporting goods at a 
 leisurely speed and excessive costs, exactly as they did in 
 the era of the mail coaches and turnpikes a hundred 
 years ago. 
 
 The cost of transport per ton per kilometre for barges of 
 a smaller size than 150 tons cannot be given, for such barges 
 are no longer of importance on the German waterways, and 
 the rates for such small boats are not supplied by the German 
 source from which the foregoing figures are taken. The 
 average size of the large boats plying on the German water- 
 ways is from 200 to 400 tons on the minor waterways, on 
 the Elbe it is 1,000 tons and more, and on the Rhine barges 
 from 2,000 to 2,350 tons may be seen. 
 
 The exceedingly low costs of transport given in the fore- 
 going for ships of various sizes apply of course only to new 
 and perfectly-equipped water-courses. They presuppose 
 a well-filled ship. But as the ideal state of the perfectly- 
 equipped water -course and the well-fiUed ship is at present 
 rather the exception than the rule in Germany, for there 
 are still many ships which can only be described as misfits, 
 it is worth while to take note of the average cost of transport 
 on the German rivers, and to allow for the fact that a large 
 portion of the tonnage is during part of the year only partly 
 employed or unemployed. One of the foremost German 
 authorities has furnished the following table of the actual 
 costs of water transport, which is most interesting, because 
 it gives a fair idea of the real, not the ideal, business con- 
 ditions : 
 
 Cost op Transport on Principal German RrvrsRS 
 
 Average Cost of Transport per Ton per Kilometre 
 
 On the Rhine. 
 
 Fiill load during one-third of year. 'j 
 
 Three-quarter load during one-third of year. >- 0-46 pfennig. 
 
 Half load during one-third of year. J 
 
WATERWAYS AND CANALS 24? 
 
 On the Elbe. 
 
 Ftill load during two-fifths of year, "\ 
 
 Three-quarter load during one-fifth of year. L n Rfi f 
 
 Half load during one- fifth of year. j 
 
 Quarter load dui'ing one-fifth of year. J 
 
 On the Oder. 
 
 Full load during one-quarter of year, "\ 
 Three-quarter load during one- quarter of year. I ^v n * 
 
 Half load during one-quarter of year, f 
 
 Quarter load during one-quarter of year, J 
 
 On the Vistula. 
 
 Full load during one-quarter of year. ^ 
 
 Three-quarter load during one-quarter of year, , „„ , 
 
 TT ir 1 J J • X f r 1 -38 pfennig. 
 
 Half load during one-quarter of year. I 
 
 Quarter load during one-quarter of year, J 
 
 The Oder and Vistula flow through chiefly agricultural 
 provinces in the east of Germany where freight is less 
 plentiful and less regular, and where the equipment for 
 economic transport is less advanced than in Central and 
 West Germany. Therefore the cost of transport is com- 
 paratively high on these rivers, being equal to about 
 one-sixth of a penny per ton per mile on the Oder, and one- 
 fourth of a penny per ton per mile on the Vistula. On the 
 Elbe the cost of transport is about one-eighth of a penny 
 per ton per mile, and on the Rhine it is as low as one-eleventh 
 of a penny per ton per mile. As in the foregoing table full 
 allowance appears to have been made for slack time and for 
 the time when navigation has to stop in consequence of 
 frost, these figures should give a fair indication of the actual 
 cost of transport. 
 
 The costs of transport from place to place are not merely 
 the costs of water carriage. We can obtain a real insight 
 into the costs of transport only if we compare all the costs 
 of water transport with all the costs of transport by railway. 
 In the following table, three typical cases are given in which 
 all the costs of water transport and of transport partly by 
 water and partly by rail are compared with all the costs of 
 transport by rail. The costs of water transport are calculated 
 on the basis of 600 ton vessels, a size which may be considered 
 17 
 
248 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 
 
 a fair average on the up-to-date waterways of Germany. 
 The costs of railway carriage are those of the Prussian State 
 railways, the transport costs and freight charges of which 
 are exceedingly low, as is generally known. 
 
 All Costs for Sending Coal 
 From Heme {Westphalia) to Hanover. By Canal. By Railway. 
 
 Distance 260 kilometres . . . 3-43 Mks. 5-80 Mks. 
 
 From Heme to Schonebeck on the Elbe. 
 
 Distance 444 kilometres, the mine 
 lying 7 kilometres away from 
 
 Heme Harbour .... 7-00 Mks. 9-00 Mks. 
 From Heme to Mannheim on the Rhine. 
 
 Distance 393 kilometres . . . 3-88 Mks. 8-30 Mks. 
 
 From the foregoing figures it appears that if all incidental 
 expenses are duly considered, the costs of carrying coal 
 between two of the places mentioned are roughly from 50 
 to 115 per cent, higher by railway than by canal only, or 
 by canal and river, or by railway and canal. As the trans- 
 port costs on the Prussian State railways are exceedingly 
 moderate — they are probably the lowest in Europe — this 
 result is surely very remarkable. 
 
 Owing to the greater cheapness of transport by water, 
 huge and increasing quantities of freight are naturally being 
 diverted from the German railways to the waterways, 
 especially as it has been found that well-equipped waterways 
 of sufficient size can deal more satisfactorily and more 
 rapidly with large quantities of goods than can the best- 
 equipped railways. Railway stations are always apt to 
 become congested, and they cannot so easily be enlarged 
 in order to keep pace with the growing traffic requirements 
 of the time as quays along the banks of rivers and canals. 
 Besides, the number of goods trains which can be dispatched 
 over a railway is limited in consequence of the exigency of 
 the general traffic, which must not be disturbed, while on 
 a river or canal of sufficiently generous size a practically 
 unhmited number of cargo boats can be sent at all times 
 and in either direction. Lastly, a goods train can carry 
 only a moderate load — 300 tons is an exceedingly satis- 
 
WATERWAYS AND CANALS 249 
 
 factory performance for a British train — while a train of 
 barges can easily transport several thousand tons of freight. 
 For these reasons a far larger quantity of goods can be sent 
 over a fair-sized waterway than can be sent over a railway 
 of similar length, and on a river or a well-equipped canal 
 enormous masses of goods can easily, quickly, and without 
 delay be forwarded, which would cause congestion, con- 
 fusion, and ultimately a complete breakdown on the best- 
 equipped and best-managed railway. The progressive use 
 of the waterways in Germany and their ability to handle 
 considerably larger quantities of freight than the railways 
 may be seen from the following figures : 
 
 
 Tkansport of Goods 
 
 on the German Waterways 
 
 
 Arrivals. 
 
 Departures. 
 
 1875 
 
 11,000,000 tons 
 
 9,800,000 tons 
 
 1885 
 
 14,500,000 ,, 
 
 13,100,000 ,, 
 
 1895 
 
 25,800,000 ,, 
 
 20,900,000 „ 
 
 1905 
 
 56,400,000 ,, 
 
 47,000,000 ,, 
 
 
 Tbanspokt of Goods 
 
 ON THE German Railways 
 
 
 Arrivals. 
 
 Departures. 
 
 1875 
 
 83,500,000 tons 
 
 83,500,000 tons 
 
 1885 
 
 100,000,000 „ 
 
 100,000,000 ,, 
 
 1895 
 
 164,000,000 ,, 
 
 167,000,000 ,, 
 
 1905 
 
 291,000,000 „ 
 
 297,700,000 „ 
 
 These figures show that between 1875 to 1905 the quantity 
 of freight handled by the German railways has increased 
 by a little less than 250 per cent., whilst the quantity of 
 freight dispatched over the German waterways has increased 
 by considerably more than 400 per cent. 
 
 If we now look at the record of ton kilometres, and at 
 the quantity of freight carried per kilometre on both railways 
 and waterways, we find the following figures : 
 
 Freight Record on German Railways 
 
 Ton Mlometres. "'"'" 'Jj7iL'iT''" 
 1875 .... 10,900,000,000 410,000 tons 
 
 1885 .... 16,600,000,000 450,000 ,, 
 
 1895 . . . . 26,500,000,000 590,000 ,, 
 
 1906 .... 51,200,000,000 820,000 „ 
 
250 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 
 
 FBEIGHT ErECOBD OF GERMAN WaTEBWATS 
 
 Ton kilometres. ^<"« "^ ^I'^^^'' dispateJied 
 
 per kilometre. 
 
 1875 .... 2,900,000,000 290,000 tons 
 
 1885 .... 4,800,000,000 480,000 ,, 
 
 1895 .... 7,500,000,000 750,000 ,, 
 
 1905 . . . . 15,000,000,000 1,500,000 ,, 
 
 From the foregoing figures it appears that the quantity 
 of goods which have been dispatched over each kilometre 
 of railway has increased during the thirty years under 
 review from 410,000 to 820,000 tons, or by only 100 per cent., 
 while during the same period the quantity of goods dis- 
 patched over each kilometre of waterway has increased from 
 290,000 tons to 1,500,000 tons, or by no less than 417 per 
 cent. Water carriage in Germany has expanded more than 
 four times as quickly as railway carriage. In 1875 the 
 goods traffic was 410,000 tons per kilometre of railway, and 
 only 290,000 tons per kilometre of waterway. At that time 
 the railways were still supreme. In 1905 this position had 
 been completely reversed, for the railways dealt in that 
 year with 820,000 tons of freight per kilometre, whilst the 
 waterways handled no less than 1,500,000 tons per kilo- 
 metre. Evidently the waterways are in the ascendant, 
 and if later figures were available, it would probably be seen 
 that the waterways have considerably improved upon their 
 record of 1905. 
 
 The effect of the extension and improvement of the 
 German waterways, both natural and artificial, may be 
 gauged from the significant fact that the most prosperous 
 industrial centres in Germany, though they lie far inland, 
 are situated close to the waterways of which they make the 
 most extensive use. The most prosperous part of industrial 
 Germany is the Rhenish- Westphahan district, with the 
 towns of Diisseldorf, Essen, Dortmund, etc. This is the 
 stronghold of the German iron and steel industry. The 
 industrial success of the Rhenish- Westphalian district 
 would have been impossible had it not been for the cheap 
 carriage of goods afforded by the Rhine. The following 
 
WATERWAYS AND CANALS 
 
 251 
 
 figures clearly show what water traffic has meant for the 
 chief industrial centre of Germany : 
 
 WATEB TbAFBIO of HOCHFELD-DtriSBUKG-RTTHEORT (RhENISH- 
 
 Westphalian District) 
 
 2,900,000 tons 
 3,500,000 
 
 1875 
 1880 
 1885 
 1890 
 1894 
 1896 
 1900 
 1909 
 1913 
 
 4,500,000 
 
 6,200,000 
 
 8,200,000 
 
 9,700,000 
 
 13,000,000 
 
 17,000,000 
 
 28,830,000 
 
 The traffic of that most important inland harbour, which 
 is unknown to most Englishmen, has grown prodigiously 
 since 1875. It stands now among the very foremost har- 
 bours of the world, and only those who have thoroughly 
 examined that enormous inland harbour can form an idea 
 of its vastness, the excellence of the harbour appliances, 
 and its activity. The Port of London appears asleep if 
 compared with that inland port, the name of which is hardly 
 known outside Germany. 
 
 The enormous activity of the German waterways has 
 greatly benefited Holland, for three-quarters of the through 
 trade of Holland is German water-borne trade. Holland 
 lives largely on German trade, and Germany resents that 
 the trade on her chief stream has to pass through a foreign 
 country to which it has to pay a heavy tribute. The un- 
 ceasing agitation of the Pan- Germanic League against 
 Holland, and its advocacy of the incorporation of Holland 
 into Germany, sprang to a great extent from the resentment 
 that the mouth of the Rhine is situated in a non-German 
 country. This feeling was not confined to the Pan- Germans. 
 It was one of the principal causes which determined the 
 Government to construct at immense expense the Rhine-Ems 
 Canal with the object of giving to the Rhine an outlet at 
 Emden, which was converted into a well-equipped port. 
 It was intended to divert the export and import traffic of 
 Germany from Rotterdam to Emden, to impoverish Holland, 
 
262 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 
 
 and to bring her to her knees by economic pressure. On the 
 11th of August 1899, the Dortmund- Ems Canal was opened. 
 The year book Nauticus, which was officially inspired, wrote 
 in the same year : 
 
 " In our time our dependence on foreign countries has 
 frequently been felt by the circumstance that the mouth of the 
 Rhine is in the hands of a foreign country, and that that 
 country in consequence draws away the chief profit of our 
 export industry. This state of dependence will be ended by 
 the Dortmund-Ems Canal, which gives to the Rhine, at least 
 for the Province of Westphalia, a German outlet in Emden."" ^ 
 
 Roads and canals are open to aU. Hence, free competition 
 ensures on roads and canals a cheap and effective service on 
 the part of the numerous carriers who make use of them. 
 When the British railways were in their infancy it was 
 expected by many sagacious men that the iron road also 
 would be a common road for the use of all on which com- 
 peting carriers would travel with conveyances of their own. 
 Their anticipations were not realised. The owners of the 
 iron roads, unUke the owners of roads and canals, became 
 the only carriers on them, and thus a monopoly arose 
 somewhat unexpectedly. The productive industries were 
 given over to the mercy of the railways, and these hastened 
 to close as quickly as possible the only alternative inland 
 trade routes, by acquiring and obstructing the canals or by 
 " repairing " them out of existence. 
 
 Great Britain possesses no adequate waterways for her 
 industries not so much because Nature has been unkind, as 
 because men have been short-sighted and neglectful. While 
 Germany has vigorously developed her waterways hundreds 
 of miles inland, Great Britain has not even adequately 
 regulated the Thames. London, with its incomparable 
 position, might become the finest entrepot in the world by 
 making a barrage east of the towTi, and converting the 
 stream for many miles below London into a gigantic lake 
 of still water where, undisturbed by the tides, ships could 
 
 1 The italics are in the German original. 
 
WATERWAYS AND CANALS 253 
 
 load and unload from train to ship and from ship to train, 
 and where they could store their goods in gigantic modern 
 warehouses. Instead of such a harbour, we find a mediaeval 
 river with mediaeval docks, where goods have to be "light- 
 ered," exactly as in the time of Charles I,, and even in the 
 heart of industrial and commercial London, the Thames, 
 which ought to be the best-equipped commercial river in 
 the world, presents its ancient and unlovely mud banks at 
 low tide exactly as it did 1,000 years ago. 
 
 The policy of the German Government with regard to 
 waterways was laid down in an official publication some 
 time ago as follows : 
 
 " Any means whereby the distances which separate the 
 economic centres of the country from one another can be 
 diminished, must be welcomed and be considered as a 
 progress, for it increases our strength in our industrial 
 competition with foreign countries. Every one who desires 
 to send or to receive goods wishes for cheap freights. Hence 
 the aim of a healthy transport policy should be to diminish 
 as far as possible the economically unproductive costs of 
 transport. A country such as Germany, which is happy 
 enough to produce on her own soil by far the larger part of 
 the raw material and food which it requires, occupies the 
 most independent and the most favourable position if, 
 owing to cheap inland transportation, its economic centres 
 are placed as near as possible to one another. When this 
 has been achieved, Germany will be able to dispense with 
 many foreign products, and it will occupy a position of 
 superiority in comparison with all those States which do not 
 possess similarly perfect means of transport. 
 
 " Many circumstances which in former times gave su- 
 periority to certain countries, such as the greater skill of 
 their workmen, superior machinery, cheaper wages, greater 
 natural fertility of the soil : all these advantages are gradu- 
 ally being levelled down by time and progress. But what 
 will remain is the advantage of a well-planned system of 
 transportation which makes the best possible use of local 
 resources and local advantages.^ It is to this that England 
 owes to a large extent her unique position for commercial 
 exchange with other countries." 
 
 ^ The italics are in the German original. 
 
254 WATERWAYS AND CANALS 
 
 These words are well worth reading, re-reading, and 
 remembering. England's " unique position for commercial 
 exchange," as the German document calls it, still remains, 
 while her equally unique position for industrial pursuits has 
 been spoilt and partly lost through the insufficiency, the 
 inefficiency, and the expensiveness of British inland trans- 
 port. It is for the nation and its Government to decide 
 whether they will allow Great Britain's industrial supremacy, 
 which nature has put into her reach and which she once 
 possessed, to be finally lost or to be regained. 
 
 Germany owed much of her industrial success to her wise 
 policy of protection. But with her protection was not 
 merely a fiscal, but a general and comprehensive policy. 
 She protected her population, not only against tariff attacks 
 from without, but also against the far more dangerous 
 attacks upon their prosperity from within. She protected 
 and fostered her industries, not only by her tariff, but also 
 by a practical national education, by equitable and cheap 
 laws, and before all by the provision of adequate, efficient, 
 and cheap means of transport. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE SHIPBTHLDING and shipping industries of GERMANY ^ 
 
 The fact that Germany had before the War an exceedingly 
 prosperous shipbuilding and shipping industry must appear 
 exceedingly strange to those who are convinced that a 
 prosperous shipping trade can be erected only on the basis 
 of Free Trade. Therefore it is of interest to investigate 
 why Germany, the classical land of protected industries, 
 possessed before the War a very flourishing mercantile 
 marine and shipbuilding industry. 
 
 Coal and iron, which are the principal materials used in 
 shipbuilding, are found in Germany not close to the sea coast, 
 but far inland in the middle and in the south of the country. 
 How enormous is the distance between the principal coal 
 and iron centres of Germany and the most important ship- 
 building towns may be seen from the following figures which 
 have been furnished by Messrs. von Halle and Schwarz, the 
 well-known authorities on German shipbuilding : 
 
 Distances between — 
 
 Essen. 
 Miles. 
 
 Aix-la- 
 
 Ohapelle. 
 Miles. 
 
 Saarbrucken. 
 Miles. 
 
 Kattowiti 
 Miles. 
 
 Wilhelmshaven 
 
 . 198 
 
 258 
 
 417 
 
 647 
 
 Bremen 
 
 . 165 
 
 237 
 
 402 
 
 581 
 
 Geestemiiade 
 
 . 204 
 
 277 
 
 437 
 
 620 
 
 Hamburg 
 
 . 243 
 
 318 
 
 482 
 
 534 
 
 Kiel 
 
 . 318 
 
 390 
 
 555 
 
 568 
 
 Liibeck 
 
 . 283 
 
 357 
 
 523 
 
 514 
 
 Danzig 
 
 . 640 
 
 716 
 
 798 
 
 380 
 
 Memel 
 
 . 872 
 
 950 
 
 1,028 
 
 568 
 
 From the foregoing table it appears that the average 
 
 distance which the heavy German raw material had to 
 
 1 From the Fortnightly Review, March 1906. 
 255 
 
256 SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 
 
 travel overland before being worked into ships was ap- 
 proximately 400 miles, a distance which is greater than that 
 which separates London from Glasgow. It should be added 
 that by far the largest part of the German iron ore came 
 from Lorraine and Luxemburg. Consequently the column 
 giving the distances between Saarbriicken and the various 
 shipbuilding towns, distances which range from 400 to 1,000 
 miles, is the most important. 
 
 From the table of the distances we can form an idea of the 
 difficulties under which the German shipbuilder had to work. 
 We can easiest realise them by imagining that the ship- 
 builders on the Clyde had to draw their raw material from 
 Portsmouth, Land's End, or London, overland through the 
 whole length of England. Great Britain is wonderfully 
 favoured by Nature, by her geographical structure, and by 
 the fact that coal, iron, populous towns, and harbours He in 
 immediate proximity of each other, not only for the pursuit 
 of shipbuilding, but for that of all manufacturing industries. 
 It should be added that most of the material used in German 
 shipbuilding was of German origin, that the German iron 
 travelled almost exclusively by rail over hundreds of miles 
 to the shipbuilding yards, and that the State railways wisely 
 conceded very low freights in order to foster shipbuilding. 
 
 During the middle of the last century German ship- 
 building was rather flourishing. Numerous shipyards on 
 the Elbe, the Weser, and along the North Sea coast were 
 building wooden sailing ships for which the raw material 
 was cheap and near at hand. In those days Germany 
 supplied England with much shipbuilding timber. Prussia, 
 always desirous to foster private industry by judicious 
 official encouragement, opened in 1836 a technical high 
 school of shipbuilding near Stettin, and the numerous fine 
 fast clippers, which between 1850 and 1860 carried vast 
 numbers of German emigrants to the United States, owed 
 their excellence to that pioneer institution. 
 
 When in the 'sixties iron-built steamships began to 
 displace wooden saihng ships, the German shipyards declined. 
 Great Britain, who was then practically the only industrial 
 
SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 257 
 
 country in the world, easily obtained the monopoly in iron 
 shipbuilding. During the 'sixties and 'seventies practically 
 all the German merchant steamships were built in England. 
 Competition with England seemed out of the question on 
 account of Germany's unfavourable geographical position. 
 Private enterprise in Germany shrank from undertaking an 
 apparently hopeless task, and Germany would have remained 
 an inland power, had not the Government again shown the 
 way and encouraged the creation of a shipbuilding industry 
 by a dehberate fostering policy. In 1870, a little before the 
 outbreak of the Franco-German War, the Prussian Govern- 
 ment estabhshed at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven repairing yards 
 for the few British-built warships of Prussia. The victorious 
 war and the unification of Germany encouraged the Prusso- 
 German Government to build experimentally an armoured 
 cruiser, the Preussen. The ship was a success, but although 
 it was far more expensive than it would have been if it 
 had been ordered in England, which then was the cheapest 
 market for ships of war, the German Government decided 
 to continue building its own warships, firmly expecting that 
 eventually a powerful and profitable German shipbuilding 
 industry would arise out of these small, costly, and appar- 
 ently hopeless beginnings. 
 
 On the 1st of January 1872 General von Stosch became 
 the head of the German Admiralty. He proved a very 
 capable and far-seeing organiser and administrator. He 
 resolved to create a powerful shipbuilding industry. The 
 creation of the German Navy proved a mighty stimulus to 
 the German shipyards and to the German iron industry, 
 especially as Von Stosch laid down the principle that all 
 German warships should be built in German yards exclusively 
 of German material. 
 
 When, in 1879, Bismarck resolved to abandon Free Trade, 
 he found that the German shipyards on the sea coast had 
 since 1853 been able to import all their raw material free of 
 duty, while the shipyards on the great rivers inland were not 
 similarly favoured. The latter found the prices of foreign 
 raw material too high owing to the duties charged. The 
 
268 SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 
 
 important shipbuilding industry on the rivers had decayed. 
 The very large river traffic on the Rhine was in Dutch hands. 
 They used Dutch ships. In introducing general agricultural 
 and industrial protection, Bismarck wisely made an ex- 
 ception in favour of the shipbuilding industry. The German 
 shipyards were exempted from all duties on the materials 
 used. Thus they were given complete Free Trade. From 
 a fiscal point of view, their business was carried on outside 
 the German frontier. Therefore the German shipbuilding 
 industry was treated like a foreign country by the German 
 iron industry, which relieved itself of unduly large stocks 
 by dumping iron and steel not only in England but in the 
 German shipyards as well. 
 
 Having given protection to all the German industries, 
 except the shipbuilding industry, Bismarck converted the 
 private railways of Prussia into State railways and arranged 
 that the heavy raw material used in German shipbuilding 
 should be hauled over the State railways at rates barely 
 covering the cost of transportation. Thus he bridged the 
 huge distances which separated the German seaports from 
 their industrial bases, and made it possible for the ship- 
 building industry to expand. Though not protected by 
 fiscal measures it was no less fostered by these preferential 
 traffic arrangements. 
 
 For some considerable time the German shipping com- 
 panies did not feel inclined to desert the British shipbuilders, 
 who had hitherto furnished them with excellent ships. They 
 did not trust the German shipbuilders, whose ability was 
 doubted. Up to 1879 the German yards were not able to 
 compete with English shipbuilders as regards price and 
 rapidity of delivery. German materials were far more 
 costly, and the working plant of the German shipyards was 
 quite inadequate. Only when, in 1879, the import duties on 
 shipbuilding materials had been abolished, and when at the 
 same time the German iron and steel industries had been so 
 much strengthened by Protection as to allow of their creating 
 branch industries devoted to shipbuilding, could the building 
 of merchant vessels on an adequate scale be inaugurated. 
 
SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 259 
 
 Germany hesitatingly commenced experimenting with 
 high-pressure boilers, and replaced the boilers of the old 
 Lloyd steamers with triple expansion engines of German 
 make. As these new boilers proved unsatisfactory, German 
 steamship owners felt disinclined to order steamers in 
 Germany. Only gradually were the difficulties overcome 
 which threatened to overwhelm the industry. Only in 1882 
 the Hamburg-American Line began to show some little 
 confidence in the ability of German shipbuilders by ordering 
 the Eugia from the Vulcan Company in Stettin, and the 
 Rhaetia from the Reiherstieg yard in Hamburg. Thus the 
 building of large vessels in Germany began. 
 
 Only fifteen years after the launch of the Preussen and 
 five years after the introduction of Free Trade for foreign 
 shipbuilding material and of preferential railway rates for 
 German shipbuilding material, the shipowners began to 
 order their ships from German builders. They did so not 
 from choice, but because they were induced, one might 
 almost say compelled. In 1884 Bismarck introduced a Bill 
 by which subsidies were to be given to the North German 
 Lloyd under the express stipulation that the ships to be 
 built were to be constructed in German shipyards by German 
 workmen and, as far as possible, of German material. That 
 action proved the salvation of the great German shipbuilding 
 industry. Events have vindicated Bismarck's far-seeing 
 policy, which was loudly condemned in British and in 
 German Free Trade circles. 
 
 The Government-subsidised North German Lloyd gave 
 the first important order to German builders by ordering, 
 under the Act of 1884, six liners from the Vulcan Ship- 
 building Company. These vessels were found satisfactory 
 in every respect, but the Vulcan Company had to buy 
 dearly its experience, for it lost heavily upon this pioneer 
 transaction. With perseverance the Vulcan Company 
 continued competing for the construction of fast steamers 
 without overmuch regard to financial risks, and it succeeded 
 in 1888 in securing the contract for the fast steamer Augusta 
 Victoria from the Hamburg- American Line notwithstanding 
 
260 
 
 SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 
 
 severe British competition. With the construction of that 
 steamer the great German shipbuilding yard struck out a 
 line of its own by introducing twin-screw propulsion for 
 transatlantic liners. Two years later the Vulcan built the 
 twin-screw steamer Filrst Bismarck, and the success achieved 
 by these two twin-screw ocean flyers, which at the time 
 were the fastest liners afloat, led in 1895 to the building of 
 the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse. That enormous vessel was 
 built within eighteen months, and its speed exceeded that 
 of any ship afloat. The Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse was 
 followed by the three great liners, Deutschland, Kronprinz 
 Wilhelm, and Kaiser Wilhelm II., all of which left far behind 
 them the foremost British liners. Thus the Vulcan had 
 brilliantly outstripped EngUsh competition in shipbuilding, 
 which, until then, had been considered invincible. 
 
 The following figures show the astonishing development 
 of the German shipbuilding industry since 1879, the year 
 when Protection was introduced into Germany, and since 
 1884, the year in which the Steamships' Subsidies Bill was 
 passed : 
 
 Iron and Steel Shipping Built in Germany 
 
 1880 
 1885 
 1890 
 1895 
 1900 
 1909 
 1913 
 
 23,986 register tons 
 
 24,554 
 100,597 
 122,712 
 235,171 
 326,318 
 458.755 
 
 In 1885 German shipbuilding was practically non-existent. 
 In 1906 Sir Charles Maclaren, presiding at the yearly meeting 
 of Palmer's Shipbuilding and Iron Company held at New- 
 castle, said that Germany was now building a greater ton- 
 nage than all the other Continental countries put together. 
 Germany's progress in shipbuilding has been truly mar- 
 vellous. It has been doubly marvellous in view of her most 
 disadvantageous geographical position and her lack of 
 experience. 
 
 By wise, far-seeing, determined State action wer^ the 
 
SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 261 
 
 German shipbuilding and shipping industries thus artificially 
 established, fostered, and developed. The astonishing 
 success of the German shipbuilding industry was due partly 
 to its excellent management and organisation, partly to the 
 appUcation of science and experience to industry, partly to 
 the courage and perseverance of its directors, partly to the 
 harmonious co-ordination and co-operation of the various 
 economic factors which in more individualistic countries, 
 such as Great Britain, are not co-ordinated. 
 
 The strong man can stand alone ; the weak must stand 
 together to protect themselves against the strong. The 
 industrial weakness of Germany proved the cause of its 
 strength, for the weakness of the individual German indus- 
 tries which competed hopelessly against England in the past 
 led to the formation of combinations for mutual support, 
 and then to the formation of gigantic cartels. 
 
 In Grermany the leading idea in the formation of industrial 
 combinations was not to secure an undue advantage to a 
 few wirepullers by the unscrupulous use of a monopoly, but 
 to secure a legitimate advantage to a number of domestic 
 producers by uniting their productive forces. The German 
 trusts and limited companies devoted themselves rather to 
 promoting industry than to exploiting the public, not because 
 German business men are more virtuous than are British 
 or American business men, but because the State kept a 
 very sharp eye on company promoters, directors, and 
 managers, and unsparingly punished with hard labour those 
 who contravened the very strict Company Law which was 
 devised to protect the pubUc and to teach the promoter that 
 honesty is the best poUcy. 
 
 The introduction of Protection in 1879 led to the formation 
 of numerous combinations in the German iron industry. 
 They strove to eliminate unnecessary competition, to regu- 
 late prices, to buy and sell collectively, to eUminate unneces- 
 sary middlemen, etc. According to Dr. Voelcker there were 
 in 1903 forty-four conventions, trusts, and syndicates in the 
 German iron industry. The multitude of these combinations 
 deprived co-operation in the German iron industry of much 
 
262 SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 
 
 of its usefulness. The contrast between these numerous 
 combinations in the iron industry and the gigantic German 
 coal trust which embraced practically the whole coal-mining 
 industry of Germany was too glaring to be allowed to remain. 
 In the beginning of 1904 a steel trust, embracing all Germany, 
 was founded. 
 
 At the time when the huge German steel trust was formed, 
 the German shipbuilders had been in the habit of buying 
 their material, not from the individual makers in retail 
 fashion, but through the representatives of the various 
 combinations. Therefore the central management of these 
 combinations was able to effect very great economies in 
 the production of metal wares used in shipbuilding by in- 
 troducing a wisely-organised specialisation and division of 
 labour among the numerous works belonging to the combine. 
 For instance, the different plates used in German shipbuild- 
 ing, about 150 in number, required special rollers, and in 
 endeavouring to produce every kind, or at least many kinds, 
 of steel plates, the various rolling-mills had not only to incur 
 an enormous capital expenditure in laying down a huge 
 plant, but the working expenses of the rolling-mills were 
 necessarily made unduly heavy because a large part of their 
 plant was unoccupied during part of the year. This un- 
 necessary and exceedingly wasteful multiplication of plant 
 was done away with by specialisation based on mutual 
 agreement which gave to every work a proportionate number 
 of specialities. Thus individual mills were enabled to 
 produce with a smaller and constantly occupied plant larger 
 quantities of uniform ship steel at a cheaper price than 
 hitherto and at a larger profit to themselves. In this way 
 judicious industrial combination may benefit both con- 
 sumers and producers. Trusts are by no means an unmixed 
 evil as many believe. 
 
 Not only the German steel producers, but the German 
 shipbuilders also formed a large combination. The Society 
 of German Shipyards at Berlin comprised no less than 
 forty- two individual yards. Thus the whole of the German 
 shipbuilding industry was> in a position to meet the whole 
 
SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 263 
 
 of the German steel industry in one room, and the two 
 combinations could, through their representatives, amicably 
 arrange matters between themselves to their mutual satis- 
 faction. Thus, suicidal petty rivalry and endless wrangling 
 between innumerable small concerns and a host of agents 
 and other useless but expensive middlemen were abolished. 
 The iron and the shipbuilding industries were united and 
 could meet one another not in a spirit of commercial rivalry, 
 of envy, and of secret or open hostility, but in friendly and 
 loyal co-operation. 
 
 Owing to co-operation and to systematic speciaUsation 
 and division of labour, the saving of unnecessary labour was 
 still further developed. The shipyards were taught by the 
 steel-makers to save trouble and expense to the steel industry 
 by adapting their requirements to the condition of the 
 steel- works. On the other hand the steel-makers were 
 taught by the shipbuilders how best to cater for the ship- 
 yards, and how best to adapt themselves to their require- 
 ments. The two great industries worked hand in hand 
 like a single concern, and friction, expense, and correspond- 
 ence between buyer and seUer were reduced to a minimum. 
 A shipbuilder who required steel plates or columns of a 
 certain kind had formerly to make inquiries at a large 
 number of works before being able to place his order, and 
 when he had made the most careful inquiry and studied the 
 market, he could not be quite sure that he would receive 
 exactly what he wanted at the cheapest price and in the 
 shortest time from the work which he had selected. His 
 task was henceforth easier. He could obtain all the in- 
 formation which he required at the central office of the steel 
 combination, which distributed all orders in such a way 
 as to ensure that they were most economically and most 
 rapidly executed according to standard specifications. 
 Through this arrangement buying ceased to be a science. 
 The convenience of being able to place orders rapidly on the 
 most favourable terms and without much inquiry caused 
 German shipbuilders to order their material in Germany, 
 even if they were offered the identical goods at a lower price 
 18 
 
264 
 
 SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 
 
 by well-known British makers. British steel almost ceased 
 to be used in German shipbuilding. Its elimination was 
 all the more remarkable as the German shipbuilding in- 
 dustries worked under Free Trade conditions. However, 
 much of the steel consumed by the German shipbuilders 
 was " dumped " steel, sold at, or under, cost price by German 
 makers, and was carried at a merely nominal charge, possibly 
 at a loss, by the German State railways to the sea coast. 
 The German shipbuilding industry enjoyed thus the ad- 
 vantages of both Protection and of Free Trade. 
 
 Since the creation of the German Empire the fleet of 
 German merchant steamships has increased as follows : 
 
 1871 
 
 81,994 tons 
 
 1881 
 
 215,758 „ 
 
 1891 
 
 723,652 ,, 
 
 1901 
 
 . 1,347,875 „ 
 
 1910 
 
 . 2,349,557 „ 
 
 1913 
 
 . 3,153,724 ,, 
 
 Before the War the tonnage of the two largest German 
 shipping companies approached 2,000,000, and the ships 
 possessed by the Nord Deutsche Lloyd and the Hamburg- 
 Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktien Gesellschaft were among 
 the finest in the world. 
 
 Bismarck's policy of fostering and promoting the German 
 shipping trade was energetically continued by William II., 
 partly by personal encouragement, partly by legislative and 
 administrative action. The German Government not only 
 assisted the German shipping and shipbuilding industries, 
 but endeavoured to damage their foreign competitors. The 
 German shipping companies did an enormous business in 
 shipping emigrants. They carried every year from 200,000 
 to 300,000 emigrants. Germany herself had practically 
 no emigration, as only about 20,000 emigrants left Germany 
 every year. Consequently the German shipping companies 
 endeavoured to attract emigrants from Austria -Hungary 
 and Russia to the German ports. In order to " induce " 
 Austrian and Russian emigrants to patronise the German 
 steamship lines, arrangements were made by the German 
 
SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPPING 265 
 
 Government at the Austrian and Russian frontiers. So- 
 called control stations for emigrants were erected through 
 which all foreign emigrants had to pass ostensiby in order 
 to be medically examined, but if these emigrants were not 
 in the possession of tickets issued by one of the German 
 steamship Unes they were forbidden to proceed. Emigrants 
 in the possession of tickets issued by the Cunard Company 
 or some other British line were ruthlessly turned back. 
 Thus the German companies secured the bulk of the valuable 
 emigrant traffic from Austria -Hungary and Russia. 
 
 The foregoing pages show that the German Government 
 shaped its economic policy not in accordance with the rigid 
 views of professors of political economy and of other more 
 or less scientific doctrinaires. It followed neither a rigid 
 policy of Protection nor an uncompromising doctrine of 
 Free Trade, but applied Protection and Free Trade accord- 
 ing to the requirements of individual cases. It did not 
 condemn trusts as being bad in themselves. Its economic 
 policy was not " scientific," but practical and businesslike. 
 German statesmen adapted their action to circumstances, 
 and they were guided by the views of practical business 
 men whom they consulted. These are the reasons which 
 enabled Grermanyto develop a great, prosperous, and success- 
 ful shipping and shipbuilding industry, notwithstanding 
 the greatest obstacles. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES ^ 
 
 The chemical industry was the youngest, the most vigorous, 
 and the most successful industry of Germany. While all 
 other German industries were fostered by the most skilfully- 
 framed protective tariff, the German chemical industry 
 achieved its commanding and world-wide success practi- 
 cally without fiscal aid. 
 
 The German chemical industry was so successful that it 
 obtained almost a world-monopoly in some of the most 
 important branches of chemical production. Many univer- 
 sally used chemical preparations were exclusively of German 
 manufacture. Before 1914 about four-fifths of the dyes 
 consumed in the world were made in Germany. The 
 chemical industry was one of Germany's most important 
 industries. It took a leading place among the great export- 
 ing industries of the country. 
 
 The meteoric development of the German chemical 
 industry may be gauged from the following table : 
 
 Impobts into and Exports from Germany of Coal-tab Dyes 
 
 
 Imports. 
 
 Exports. 
 
 
 Marks. 
 
 Marks. 
 
 1880 . 
 
 . 7,523,000 
 
 53,537,000 
 
 1885 . 
 
 . 4,205,000 
 
 47,782,000 
 
 1890 . 
 
 . 4,087,000 
 
 58,162,000 
 
 1895 . 
 
 . 4,206,000 
 
 81,590,000 
 
 1900 . 
 
 . 4,975,000 
 
 109,172,000 
 
 1905 . 
 
 . 6,363,000 
 
 165,795,000 
 
 1910 . 
 
 . 6,765,000 
 
 193,840,000 
 
 1912 . 
 
 . 6,537,000 
 
 209,166,000 
 
 1 From the Contemporary Review, May 1904. 
 266 
 
THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 267 
 
 Germany's exports of other chemicals developed at a 
 similarly rapid rate. 
 
 The chemical industry was for various reasons of national 
 importance to Germany. . Though it employed much un- 
 skilled labour, it was so prosperous that it paid very 
 good wages, considering the character of the work done. 
 Hence strikes were extremely rare. The following table 
 conveys a clear idea of the interest of German labour in the 
 chemical industry : 
 
 Employment and Wages in Chemical Industeies 
 
 
 Hands employed. 
 
 Total wages. 
 
 Wages per head 
 per annum. 
 
 1882 . 
 
 71,777 
 
 ? 
 
 V 
 
 1894 . 
 
 110,348 
 
 £4,981,000 
 
 £44-5 
 
 1895 . 
 
 114,587 
 
 6,173,000 
 
 44-14 
 
 1896 . 
 
 124,219 
 
 5,686,000 
 
 45-8 
 
 1897 . 
 
 129,827 
 
 6,045,000 
 
 46-2 
 
 1898 . 
 
 135,350 
 
 6,482,000 
 
 47-8 
 
 1899 . . 
 
 143,119 
 
 6,978,000 
 
 48-15 
 
 1900 . 
 
 153,011 
 
 7,746,000 
 
 50-12 
 
 1902 . 
 
 165,889 
 
 7,983,000 
 
 48-12 
 
 1906 . 
 
 202,177 
 
 10,545,000 
 
 52-20 
 
 1909 . 
 
 219,601 
 
 12,688,000 
 
 5780 
 
 1913 . 
 
 282,228 
 
 18,378,000 
 
 65-20 
 
 The constant growth of the German chemical industry 
 allowed not only of a yearly and considerable increase of 
 the labour employed, but also of a yearly increase of the 
 average wages. 
 
 The national importance of the German chemical industry 
 lay not only in the employment which it gave to the 
 wage-earning masses, but also in the great direct and 
 indirect benefits which other industries derived from it. 
 Chemical research was no longer confined to purely 
 chemical ends, for the chemists had most successfully ap- 
 plied their science to agriculture and to the manufacturing 
 industries. Many German industries owed their greatness 
 to the assistance of trained chemists. Chemical research 
 was applied with excellent effect to other industries — for 
 instance, metallurgy, the glass industry, agriculture. Hence 
 many prominent manufacturers, bankers, and landowners 
 sent their sons to the Universities and technical High 
 
268 
 
 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 Schools to study chemistry, so that they should be able 
 to avail themselves of the assistance of that science in 
 practical hfe. 
 
 The enormous national importance of a prosperous 
 chemical industry lies not only in the invaluable assistance 
 which that industry can give to nearly all other industries, 
 but also in the unthought-of resources which it will create 
 almost out of nothing. A century ago Great Britain's 
 wealthy sugar colonies were the envy of the world, and 
 sugar -planters laughed at the idea of producing sugar from 
 beet. However, the Grerman chemists ruined the West 
 Indian sugar-planters, and produced the "tropical pro- 
 duct " on a scale never dreamt of. Since 1890 Germany 
 produced artificial musk at Mulhouse, natural vanilla was 
 replaced by chemical vanilline, Japanese camphor by 
 synthetic camphor, and sugar by saccharine, and vegetable 
 dyes gave place to dyes made from tar. How natural 
 indigo has been crushed out of existence by the synthetic 
 indigo produced by German chemists may be seen from 
 the following figures : 
 
 1894-5 
 
 1895-6 
 
 1896-7 
 
 1897-8 
 
 1898-9 
 
 1899-1900 
 
 1900-1 
 
 1901-2 
 
 1905-6 
 
 1909-10 
 
 Acreage under 
 
 Indigo 
 
 in India. 
 
 1,705,977 acres 
 
 1,569,869 ,, 
 
 1,583,808 ,, 
 
 1,366,513 „ 
 
 1,013,627 „ 
 
 1,046,434 ,, 
 
 977,349 ,, 
 
 792,179 ,, 
 
 400,552 ,, 
 
 295,706 ,, 
 
 Value of Bxportt 
 
 of Indigo. 
 
 Tens of Rupees. 
 
 4,745,915 
 
 5,354,511 
 
 4,370,757 
 
 3,057,402 
 
 2,970,478 
 
 £1,795,007 
 
 £1,423,987 
 
 £1,234,837 
 
 £390,918 
 
 £234,544 
 
 Indigo Impobted to Great Britain 
 
 1895 
 1896 
 1897 
 1898 
 1899 
 1900 
 1901 
 1902 
 1907 
 1909 
 
 £1,392,534 
 1,533,722 
 1,470,574 
 890,803 
 986,090 
 542,089 
 788,820 
 498,043 
 151,297 
 139,336 
 
THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 269 
 
 Before the War Germany's exports of synthetic indigo 
 exceeded £2,500,000. 
 
 The facts and figures given make it clear that many a 
 " natural monopoly " which is at present possessed by 
 countries which control the tropics may be taken away 
 from them by the discoveries of the chemists. There is 
 no bound to the possibilities of chemistry, though prejudice 
 always asserts for a time that the natural product is superior 
 to the chemical one. The producers of natural indigo 
 assert that the natural dye is superior to the artificial, 
 while chemists maintain that both are equally good. At 
 any rate, the artificial product is by far the cheaper, and 
 the fatal effect of its production on the natural dye is visible 
 from the figures given. The effect of the discovery of 
 making artificial indigo may be seen from the following 
 figures : 
 
 Exports of Indigo 
 from Germany. 
 
 £410,000 
 
 320,000 
 
 240,000 
 
 380,000 
 
 390,000 
 
 465,000 
 
 635,000 
 
 925,000 
 
 1,035,000 
 
 1,083,000 
 
 1,974,000 
 
 2,666,000 
 
 A few years ago Germany was dependent for the indigo 
 she used on India. In 1913 she almost monopolised the 
 indigo market. Obviously the natural resources of a 
 naturally wealthy country may be taken away from it 
 without bloodshed by the able chemists of another country. 
 The possession of a strong chemical industry is therefore 
 of the utmost economic importance to all progressive coun- 
 tries, and it is also of very great importance in time of war. 
 
 Prince Bismarck remarked in 1894 : 
 
 " Peace is being maintained less owing to the peaceful 
 disposition of all Governments than owing to the ability 
 
 1895 
 1896 
 1897 . 
 
 
 
 
 Imports of Indigo 
 into Germany. 
 
 £1,075,000 
 
 1,055,000 
 
 635,000 
 
 1898 
 1899 
 1900 
 
 
 
 
 415,000 
 415,000 
 205,000 
 
 1901 
 
 
 
 
 215,000 
 
 1902 
 1903 
 1904 
 1909 
 1913 , 
 
 
 
 
 185,000 
 90,000 
 67,000 
 30,000 
 19,000 
 
270 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 of chemists in inventing new kinds of powder. ... It sounds 
 almost like irony, but it is the truth that the chemist is 
 keeping the swords in their scabbards, and that he decides 
 by his inventions whether there will be peace or war." 
 
 The commanding position of Germany's chemical industry 
 was in no way due to nature's bounty. On the contrary, 
 Germany was largely dependent on foreign nations for 
 many chemical raw products, which she turned into manu- 
 factures. As a rule she imported five times as much 
 chemical raw products as she exported, and her dependence 
 on foreign raw products was rapidly increasing. Grermany's 
 success was not due to the fortuitous possession of the first 
 matter. 
 
 The great success of Germany's chemical industry may 
 be traced to the simultaneous action of the following 
 causes : 
 
 1. The natural disposition and aptitude of the individual 
 German for close, patient, persevering, and painstaking 
 work and study. 
 
 2. The munificent and enlightened assistance and encour- 
 agement given by the German Governments to the study of 
 chemistry in all its branches regardless of expense and of 
 immediate profitable returns. 
 
 3. The spirit of combination and the absence of jealousy 
 among chemical scientists and manufacturers, whereby 
 scientific co-operation on the largest scale was made possible. 
 
 That these three factors have combined in making the 
 German chemical industry great is known to all who are 
 acquainted with that industry, for chemical talent of the 
 highest order flourishes rather in France and Great Britain 
 than in Germany. The German chemists owed their 
 successes rather to methodical combination and united 
 plodding than to the inventive genius of individuals, for 
 many of the most important chemical inventions were made 
 outside Germany, but they were most successfully exploited 
 in Germany. 
 
 In the beginning of the nineteenth century Great Britain 
 
THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 271 
 
 and France were the leading nations in the chemical indus- 
 tries and in chemical research. The production of aniline 
 dyes from coal tar was discovered in 1855 by Mr. W. H. 
 Perkin. Notwithstanding the EngUsh discovery, nearly the 
 whole of the anihne dyes used up to 1914 were made in 
 Germany, and by the irony of fate they were largely made 
 from English coal tar. A small and timely export duty on 
 coal tar would probably have had the effect of transferring 
 a large part of the chemical industry from Germany to 
 England. 
 
 A great chemical inventor is of little practical use to a 
 country unless his inventions are utilised to the fullest 
 extent by a large body of chemical manufacturers and 
 chemists. Otherwise his great discoveries will only benefit 
 that country where an apparatus exists for making use of 
 them. 
 
 The individual German has a great natural aptitude for 
 patient sedentary work. At an age when EngUsh boys 
 will romp or pursue various outdoor sports, German boys 
 will be found poring over books and making fretwork. 
 Owing to this disposition towards concentration and close 
 application, Germans may be found in all countries as 
 watchmakers, opticians, etc, A leaning towards chemistry 
 had been prevalent in Germany already in the Dark Ages. 
 Albertus Magnus, of Cologne, was the greatest chemist 
 of the thirteenth century, and Theophrastus Bombastus 
 von Hohenheim (better known under the name of Para- 
 celsus) the greatest chemist of the sixteenth century. In 
 the Middle Ages the capitals and university towns of the 
 various German States were the favourite haunts of alche- 
 mists, who spread the desire for chemical learning. Many 
 of them were swindlers, but many were guided by the spirit 
 of research, and not a few valuable discoveries were made 
 by them. Brandt, for instance, discovered phosphorus ; 
 Kunkel, ruby glass, etc. 
 
 The German pharmacists never were, and are not now, 
 merely shopkeepers who sell pills and patent medicines 
 and the productions of " manufacturing chemists." Patent 
 
272 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 medicines do not exist in Germany, being forbidden on 
 account of the great harm that is often done to the 
 community by unscrupulous manufacturing quacks. The 
 German pharmacists were, and are, manufacturing and 
 analytical chemists on a small scale, and in their daily 
 work they have made many valuable discoveries. Besides, 
 chemistry is with many German pharmacists a hobby. 
 Many boys become pharmacists through inclination towards 
 investigation and research. Many important chemical 
 works in Germany have had their beginning in tiny pharma- 
 cists' laboratories, and many leading chemists have come 
 from them. 
 
 When Justus von Liebig, the greatest German chemist, 
 was at school, the importance of chemistry was not under- 
 stood. At the German Universities there existed neither 
 adequate facilities for its study, nor were there any public 
 laboratories. Liebig's greatest service to his country lay 
 not so much in his fruitful investigations and discoveries — 
 which, by the way, chiefly benefited Great Britain and 
 France, for these countries then possessed the most largely 
 developed chemical industries — as in the organisation of 
 chemical study and research on a broad national basis. 
 0^ving to his exertions the first University laboratory, that 
 of Giessen, was created in 1825; and he strove less to 
 advance chemical science by his personal research than 
 to train a large number of pupils, in order to spread his 
 methods far and wide. His example was faithfully copied 
 by his numerous assistants. Many of the most prominent 
 German chemists living were initiated into that science by 
 the pupils of Liebig. Thus the spirit of Liebig is still active, 
 and the seed which he has planted has brought forth the 
 magnificent harvest garnered by the German chemical 
 industry. 
 
 The German Governments were won over to the cause 
 of chemistry by Liebig's agitation and by his numerous 
 popular writings. Therefore assistance came speedily 
 forward from all quarters of Germany. The laboratory of 
 the University of Marburg was opened in 1840, that of the 
 
THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 273 
 
 University of Leipzig in 1843, and from that time onward 
 laboratory followed laboratory, and the various German 
 Governments spent money without stint for the advance- 
 ment of chemistry. They did not listen to the doctrines 
 of laissez-faire. They neither waited for individual enter- 
 prise and private munificence to come forward, nor did they 
 inquire too closely whether an immediate profit could be 
 secured by encouraging chemistry with substantial grants. 
 They were convinced that the encouragement of chemistry 
 might be beneficial to the nation, and considered it their 
 duty to spend a little of the money of the nation on a 
 promising experiment. The consequence of this enhghtened 
 policy was that Germany had a huge army of trained 
 chemists, while England and other nations had only a few. 
 
 In former times a chemical factory was frequently founded 
 on some excellent receipt, the secret of which was most 
 jealously guarded by its owner. But nowadays it is 
 impossible to maintain a monopoly either by keeping a 
 process secret or by the protection of patents. Chemical 
 science has so greatly advanced that the same ultimate 
 end may be arrived at by a great variety of processes. 
 Consequently neither a secret process nor any number of 
 patents will ensure the continued success of a chemical 
 factory which scientifically stands stiU. A chemical factory 
 can maintain its position only if it remains, by constant 
 research and constant improvement, in the very forefront of 
 scientific excellence. Success can be won and maintained 
 only by the strenuous and constant research of chemists of 
 ability, by constant progress and the introduction of im- 
 proved methods. This is all the more necessary as the prices 
 of chemicals have been falling for many years, and will 
 apparently continue to fall. 
 
 Formerly it was possible to make industrially valuable 
 discoveries in a somewhat haphazard fashion by individual 
 and unconnected experiments, and the results arrived at 
 could be utilised through several generations. But through 
 the teaching of Liebig and his disciples a new era has begun. 
 Individual planless effort has made way for teamwork, 
 
274 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 
 
 for systematic, strictly logical, and exhausive research of 
 many chemists under leaders of standing ; and the problem 
 to be solved is patiently pursued in every direction by the 
 combined forces of chemistry until the final aim is arrived 
 at. Every success, every progress, every discovery, should 
 become common property, and should be the starting-point 
 for further and greater successes. In the laboratories of 
 the German Universities and of the great chemical works 
 thousands of highly-trained chemists co-operate as syste- 
 matically as workmen do in a factory, and the work that 
 is dropped by one chemist who falls out on the way is carried 
 on by another. Thus the army of German chemists have 
 continued their advance, and the astonishing success of the 
 German chemical industry has been brought about. 
 
 Combination is the watchword not only in the labora- 
 tories, but also in the counting-houses of the chemical 
 factories. In no German industry is there a larger propor- 
 tion of mammoth enterprises. The great individual works 
 were combined in groups for the regulation of prices. Ger- 
 many abounded in combinations (Kartelle), and these were 
 particularly numerous in the chemical industry. According 
 to an inquiry made in the beginning of 1905 there were then 
 in Germany 385 industrial combinations, 46 of which be- 
 longed to the great chemical group. These proved a blessing 
 to the chemical industry of Germany, but, by dumping, 
 they did much damage to the foreign chemical industries, 
 which they stifled. Thus they assisted in creating the world- 
 monopoly of the German chemical industry. 
 
 Of late much has been said and written as to the advan- 
 tages of education and on the application of science to 
 industry. However, many, perhaps most, people who 
 recommended education and the application of science to 
 industry have only a dim idea how education and science 
 may help industry. British education suffers from two 
 very great evils, which are unfortunately recognised by only 
 very few people. In the first place higher education is more 
 ornamental than useful, more literary than practical, and 
 does not fit men for the battle of life. In the second place 
 
THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 275 
 
 it is too often considered almost solely as a means to pass 
 an examination, and tends therefore rather to exercise the 
 memory than to strengthen the intelligence, the judgment, 
 and the critical faculties. In other words, the influence of 
 the crammer upon education is more noticeable than that 
 of the practical man. Education is more for show than for 
 use. 
 
 In the application of science to industry the crying neces- 
 sity of combination is insufficiently recognised. A British 
 chemist is apt to be an island. The average work accom- 
 plished by the average British chemist is probably greater 
 than that of his Gorman competitor, for the Englishman 
 puts more energy into his work, is more alert, and works 
 more quickly. Yet, though some of the greatest chemists 
 living are Englishmen, the British chemical industries 
 suffer owing to the lack of organised and co-ordinated 
 effort. In science co-operation is after all as necessary as 
 in agriculture and industry. The scientific and the indus- 
 trial part of the nation and its statesmen and politicians 
 can learn much from the rise of the chemical industry of 
 Germany. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 GERMAN INDFSTRIAIi CONDITIONS PREVIOUS TO THE WAR ^ 
 
 Whether the workers of a nation are prosperous or not 
 depends, in the first place, on the productivity of the 
 national industries, for it is obvious that only a people 
 which produces much will be able to consume much. The 
 prosperity of the workers depends largely upon the adequate 
 expansion of the national industries, for every year adds 
 to the existing population fresh numbers who have to be 
 housed, clothed, and fed, while the progress of civilisation 
 and of luxury creates constantly new wants among the 
 citizens. As great, but stagnant, industries cannot provide 
 for a rapidly increasing population with rapidly increasing 
 wants, the masses of the people can be prosperous only if 
 the national industries are so vigorously expanding that they 
 are able to provide the additional employment and com- 
 modities which are constantly called for. 
 
 Germany introduced Protection in 1879. Let us compare 
 German and British industrial conditions, taking as start- 
 ing-point 1880, wherever the figures for that year are 
 available. 
 
 The great productive industries are four in number — 
 mining, manufacturing, agriculture, trade. Germany, like 
 Great Britain, mines principally coal and iron ore. The 
 production of these has progressed as foUows in the two 
 countries, according to the Statistical Abstract for Foreign 
 Countries (Cd. 5446), published in autumn 1911 : 
 
 1 From the Fortnightly Review, August 1910. 
 276 
 
GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 277 
 
 Production of Coal and Lignite 
 
 1880 
 1890 
 1900 
 1909 
 
 1880 
 1890 
 1900 
 1909 
 
 In Oermany. 
 
 In Great 
 Britain. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Ton?. 
 
 59,118,000 
 
 146,969,000 
 
 89,291,000 
 
 181,614,000 
 
 149,788,000 
 
 225,181,000 
 
 217,433,000 
 
 263,774,000 
 
 Iron Ore 
 
 
 
 In Great 
 
 In Oermany. 
 
 Britain. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 7,239,000 
 
 18,026,000 
 
 11,406,000 
 
 13,781,000 
 
 18,964,000 
 
 14,028,000 
 
 25,505,000 
 
 14,980,000 
 
 In 1880 Great Britain produced 150 per cent, more coal 
 and 160 per cent, more iron ore than Germany. Things 
 have changed since then. In 1909 Great Britain produced 
 60 per cent, less iron ore than Germany, and her superiority 
 in the production of coal had shrunk to a paltry 20 per cent., 
 and threatens to be a thing of the past in a few years. On 
 balance, Great Britain exported 60,000,000 tons of coal a 
 year, while Germany exported only 10,000,000 tons. Hence 
 it appears that Germany had overtaken Great Britain in the 
 consumption of coal. In value Germany's mining produc- 
 tion had, according to the Statistical Abstract for Foreign 
 Countries, increased as follows : 
 
 1880 
 1890 
 1900 
 1909 
 
 £ 
 
 18,775,000 
 36,282,000 
 63,162,000 
 97,393,000 
 
 In value Germany's mining production had grown five- 
 fold during the twenty-nine years under review. 
 
 As the manufacturing industries are based on the use of 
 coal, iron, and steam, the manufacturing eminence and 
 progress of a country can best be measured by the national 
 consumption of coal and iron, and by the power of its steam 
 
278 
 
 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 engines. As regards the consumption of coal and iron, 
 Germany and Great Britain compare as follows : 
 
 Consumption of Coai, and Lignite 
 
 1880 
 1890 
 1900 
 1907 
 1909 
 
 1880 
 1890 
 1900 
 1907 
 1909 
 
 1880 
 1890 
 1900 
 1907 
 1909 
 
 In Germany. 
 
 In Great 
 Britain. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 57,008,000 
 
 129,078,000 
 
 90,798,000 
 
 152,876,000 
 
 149,804,000 
 
 179,083,000 
 
 208,195,000 
 
 195,466,000 
 
 206,321,000 
 
 198,080,000 
 
 p Pig Iron 
 
 
 Tn Germany. 
 
 In Great 
 Britain. 
 
 Tons, 
 
 Tons. 
 
 2,713,000 
 
 7,749,233 
 
 4,651,000 
 
 7,904,214 
 
 8,507;000 
 
 8,959,691 
 
 12,875,000 
 
 10,114,000 
 
 12,645,000 
 
 9,532,000 
 
 F Pig Iron 
 
 
 In Germany. 
 
 In Great 
 Britain. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 2,713,000 
 
 6,176,673 
 
 4,940,000 
 
 6,824,925 
 
 9,106,000 
 
 7,705,201 
 
 13^16,000 
 
 8,273,000 
 
 12,308,000 
 
 8,501,000 
 
 In 1880 Great Britain consumed 72,000,000 tons of coal 
 more than Germany. In 1909 she consumed 8,000,000 tons 
 of coal less than Germany. In 1880 Great Britain produced 
 5,000,000 tons of pig iron more than Germany. In 1909 
 she produced 3,100,000 tons less than Germany. In 1880 
 Great Britain consumed 3,500,000 tons of iron more than 
 Germany. In 1909 she consumed 3,800,000 tons less than 
 Germany. As the German people use much wood for fuel, 
 and require besides less coal for their closed stoves than 
 Englishmen do for their open fires, the difference in Germany's 
 favour is far greater than appears from the foregoing figures. 
 
 Whilst, since the introduction of Protection, Germany's 
 coal consumption has quadrupled, and her iron consumption 
 
GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 279 
 
 has quintupled, the power of her engines has increased even 
 more rapidly, as the figures for Prussia and Bavaria show : 
 
 Horse Power of Stationary Ste^m Engines 
 
 
 In Prussia. 
 
 
 In Bavaria, 
 
 
 1879 . 
 
 887,780 
 
 1879 
 
 
 70,678 
 
 1895 . 
 
 . 2,358,175 
 
 1889 
 
 
 124,680 
 
 1909 . 
 
 . 5,768,010 
 
 1908 
 
 
 428,253 
 
 1910 . 
 
 . 5,837,782 
 
 1910 
 
 . 
 
 V 
 
 Since the introduction of Protection the engine-power of 
 Germany has grown no less than sevenfold. Unfortunately, 
 economic science, as distinguished from barren economic 
 theory, has been very greatly neglected in this country. 
 Hence no statistics of steam engines similar to those pub- 
 lished in Germany are available for Great Britain, and we 
 are spared a comparison which probably would be exceed- 
 ingly humiliating. The figures given sho^Jil that the engine- 
 power of Germany has increased enormously since the 
 introduction of Protection, and as her new machines are 
 better, and therefore more productive, than her old ones, 
 and do not stand idle, we are justified in assuming that the 
 industrial production of Germany has grown at least sixfold 
 during thirty years of Protection. 
 
 If we now turn to agriculture, we find that the German 
 harvest has increased as follows : 
 
 The German Harvest 
 
 
 Bye. 
 
 Tons. 
 Wheat. 
 
 Oats. 
 
 1880 . 
 
 4,952,525 
 
 2,345,278 
 
 4,228,128 
 
 1890 . 
 
 . 5,868,078 
 
 2,830,921 
 
 4,913,544 
 
 1900 . 
 
 8,550,659 
 
 3,841,165 
 
 7,091,930 
 
 1908 . 
 
 . 10,736,874 
 
 3,767,767 
 
 7,694,833 
 
 1910 . 
 
 . 10,511,160 
 
 3,861,479 
 
 7,900,376 
 
 
 The German Harvest 
 
 
 
 
 Tons. 
 
 
 
 Potatoes. 
 
 Sugar. 
 
 Hay. 
 
 1880 . 
 
 . 19,466,242 
 
 415,000 
 
 19,563,388 
 
 1890 . 
 
 . 23,320,983 
 
 1,261,000 
 
 18,859,888 
 
 1900 . 
 
 . 40,585,317 
 
 1,795,000 
 
 23,116,276 
 
 1908 . 
 
 . 46,342,726 
 
 2,139,000 
 
 27,076,097 
 
 1910 . 
 
 . 43,468,397 
 
 2,037,397 
 
 28,250,115 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 
2§0 
 
 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 During the thirty years under review, when the pro- 
 ductivity of her mines and the output of her manufacturing 
 industries have grown about sevenfold, the rural industries 
 of Germany have not decayed or stood still. On the con- 
 trary, her soil produced in 1910 twice the quantity of bread 
 corn, oats, and potatoes, and five times the quantity of 
 sugar, which it produced before the introduction of Pro- 
 tection, During the same period British agriculture has 
 rapidly decayed, " owing to industrial prosperity," as the 
 Free Traders tell us, and all British crops, from wheat to 
 hops, have shrunk most lamentably, and have caused millions 
 of British acres to be deserted by the plough and to revert 
 to grass. 
 
 The increase of Germany's meat production is no less 
 surprising than that of her crops. Her meat production has 
 more than kept pace with the increase of her population, as 
 the following table indicates : 
 
 Population of 
 Germany. 
 
 1873 . . . 41,564,000 
 
 1883 . . . 46,016,000 
 
 1892 . . . 50,266,000 
 
 1897 . . . 53,569,000 
 
 1900 . . . 56,046,000 
 
 1904 . . . 57,475,000 
 
 1907 . . . 62,083,000 
 
 It will be noticed that between 1873 and 1907 the popula- 
 tion of Germany has increased by 50 per cent. During the 
 same period the number of her cattle has increased by 
 33 per cent., and that of her pigs by no less than 200 per cent. 
 Pork is the favourite meat of the German workers, whilst 
 mutton is little esteemed by them. In beef and pork com- 
 bined Germany now produces, per head of population, twice 
 as much meat as she did thirty years ago. Her meat 
 production has so greatly increased that Germany, not- 
 withstanding the greatly increased meat consumption of 
 her people, has become practically entirely independent 
 of foreign meat supplies during the very time when British 
 meat production has remained stationary, and EngUshmen 
 have become dangerously dependent on foreign supplies 
 
 Oattle in 
 
 Pigs In 
 
 Germany. 
 
 Germany, 
 
 15,776,702 
 
 7,124,088 
 
 15,786,764 
 
 9,206,195 
 
 17,555,834 
 
 12,174,442 
 
 18,490,772 
 
 14,274,557 
 
 18,939,692 
 
 16,807,014 
 
 19,331,568 
 
 18,920,666 
 
 20,630,544 
 
 22,146,532 
 
GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 281 
 
 for the greater part of the meat they eat. A comparison of 
 British and German live stock is humiliating. In 1907 Great 
 Britain possessed only 11,630,142 cattle and 3,967,163 pigs. 
 It is worth noting that, according to the international 
 statistics published in the Year-Book of the United States 
 Department of Agriculture for 1908, Germany produces 
 one-third of the world's potato crop. It is estimated that 
 this enormous crop is used as follows : 
 
 12,000,000 tons for human food. 
 
 17,600,000 
 
 , for fodder. 
 
 2,500,000 
 
 , for making spirit. 
 
 1,400,000 
 
 , for making starch. 
 
 5,200,000 
 
 , for seed. 
 
 5,000,000 
 
 , for loss and waste 
 
 Total 43,700,000 
 
 
 The British potato crop amounted in 1907 to 5,223,973 
 tons. The whole of the United Kingdom produced, there- 
 fore, merely as much potatoes as Germany used every year 
 for seed alone. According to the American statistics, 
 Germany produces one-sixth of the world's sugar. She 
 raises yearly from 12,000,000 tons to 15,000,000 tons of 
 sugar beet, which furnish 2,000,000 tons of sugar and 
 10,000,000 tons of fodder, which, like the bulk of the potato 
 harvest, is converted into pig meat. Germany's 22,000,000 
 pigs are merely a by-product of her intensive agriculture. 
 
 As all trade is exchange, the greatness of a nation's trade 
 cannot fairly be measured by its foreign trade alone, as 
 Free Traders do, especially as the home trade is far more 
 important than is the foreign trade, both in Great Britain 
 and in Germany, Free Traders never tire of assuring us 
 that Protection makes production dear, that it thus hampers 
 the sale of domestic manufactures in foreign markets, and 
 "destroys" the export trade. Since 1879 the exportation 
 of German manufactures has increased as follows : 
 
 £ 
 
 1880 83,500,000 
 
 1890 107,440,000 
 
 1900 149,100,000 
 
 1910 239,800,000 
 
282 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 The foregoing figures prove that Germany's foreign 
 trade also is exceedingly prosperous and rapidly expanding. 
 During the period 1880-1910, when Germany's manufactured 
 exports have increased by no less than 200 per cent., the 
 manufactured exports of Great Britain have increased by 
 only 70 per cent. 
 
 The statistics given prove that in all the productive 
 industries, in mining, manufacture, agriculture, and com- 
 merce, Germany's progress is stupendous, that Germany 
 has overtaken Great Britain in industrial production, 
 although England is still supreme in cotton and shipping ; 
 and it stands to reason that the German people must have 
 fully participated in this enormous expansion of national 
 wealth production and consequent prosperity. 
 
 Whether the masses of the people, of whom the majority 
 are wage-earners, are prosperous or not depends on three 
 factors — employment, wages, cost of living. Each of these 
 three factors will be separately considered. 
 
 Previous to the War unemployment appears to have been 
 many times larger in Great Britain than in Germany. Ac- 
 cording to the statistics of unemployment among Trade 
 Unionists, published by the British Board of Trade, there 
 were, as a rule, from three to four unemployed workers in 
 Great Britain to every single unemployed worker in Ger- 
 many. It is a weU-known fact that working men leave 
 their country chiefly through lack of employment. A 
 comparison of the emigration statistics of the two countries 
 shows that there were, as a rule, from ten to twelve British 
 emigrants to every single German emigrant. The harrowing 
 tale of the British emigration statistics, and of the British 
 statistics of unemployment among Trade Unionists, is amply 
 confirmed by a comparison of the British decennial censuses 
 with the German industrial censuses of 1892, 1895, and 1907. 
 Unfortunately, the British censuses and the German 
 industrial censuses are not strictly comparable. They have 
 been taken in different years, and different classifications 
 have been adopted in the two countries. Still, the existing 
 figures suffice to show how employment has changed in 
 
GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 283 
 
 certain important and comparable industries of the two 
 countries during a considerable space of time. 
 
 Employment in Certain Trades in Germany 
 
 
 Metal and 
 Machinery Trades. 
 
 Textile 
 Trades. 
 
 Building 
 Trades. 
 
 Agriculture. 
 
 1882 
 1895 
 1907 
 
 815,802 
 . 1,247,258 
 . 2,093,147 
 
 910,089 
 
 945,191 
 
 1,057,243 
 
 533,511 
 1,353,637 
 1,905,987 
 
 8,236,496 
 8,292,692 
 9,883,257 
 
 Employment in Certain 
 
 Trades in 
 
 the United 
 
 Kingdom 
 
 
 Metals and 
 Machinery. 
 
 TextUe. 
 
 Building 
 Construction. 
 
 Agriculture- 
 
 1881 
 1891 
 19Q1 
 
 978,102 
 . 1,145,386 
 . 1,475,410 
 
 1,430,985 
 1,519,861 
 1,462,001 
 
 926,135 
 
 955,573 
 
 1,335,820 
 
 2,574,031 
 2,420,926 
 2,262,454 
 
 A comparison of the two tables is most interesting. It 
 shows that during the period covered by the last three 
 censuses the German metal and machinery trades have 
 provided employment for 1,280,000 additional workers, 
 whilst the British metal and machinery trades have provided 
 work for only 497,000 additional workers ; that the workers 
 in the building trade have increased by 1,370,000 in Ger- 
 many, and by only 410,000 in the United Kingdom ; that 
 the workers in the textile trades have increased by 150,000 
 in Germany and by only 31,000 in the United Kingdom ; 
 that agriculture provides work for 1,600,000 additional 
 workers in Germany, and for 312,000 fewer workers in the 
 United Kingdom. Further figures, which I refrain from 
 giving through lack of space, confirm the tale of vastly 
 increased employment in Germany, and of slowly and in- 
 adequately increasing, stagnant, or shrinking employment 
 in Great Britain. 
 
 The British population increased by only 400,000 a year, 
 whilst the German population increased by no less than 
 900 ,000 a year. Notwithstanding the relatively small increase 
 in population, between 200,000 and 300,000 people emigrated 
 on balance every year from the United Kingdom, while 
 Germany, with her immense increase in population, had an 
 
284 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 emigration of from 20,000 to 30,000 only. On balance she 
 had no emigration, but received instead from 50,000 to 
 100,000 people a year from abroad, immigration exceeding 
 emigration by these numbers. People fled from England 
 by the hundred thousand, as from a stricken land, through 
 lack of work, while they migrated into Germany by the 
 hundred thousand, being attracted thereto by regular em- 
 ployment and good wages. In some districts of Germany the 
 amount spent in wages had trebled and quadrupled within 
 twenty years. According to the report of the Dortmund 
 Mining Society for 1906, the wages paid to the Dortinund 
 coal-miners have increased from £3,859,423 in 1886 to 
 £18,942,579 in 1906. In 1910 they amounted to £23,114,778 
 according to the Statistisches Jahrbuch. Those paid to the 
 coal-miners of Upper Silesia have increased from £981,995 
 in 1886 to £4,110,626 in 1906, and to £5,603,633 in 1910. 
 Those paid to the coal-miners in the Saar district have 
 increased from £999,840 in 1886 to £2,745,099 in 1906, and 
 to £2,939,405 in 1910. We cannot wonder that a very large 
 percentage of the coal-miners in Germany are foreigners — 
 Russians, Poles, Austrians, Italians, etc. 
 
 The price of labour, like the price of all commodities, is 
 regulated by the law of demand and supply. Hence it is 
 only natural that the great demand for labour of every kind 
 which prevails in Germany has raised general wages very 
 greatly in that country, while the insufficient demand for 
 labour in Great Britain not only drove hundreds of thousands 
 of Englishmen every year out of the country, but depressed 
 general British wages below the German level. 
 
 While in a few trades the nominal wages of the skilled 
 workers — that is, wages which leave out of account loss 
 through unemployment and short time — were higher in Great 
 Britain than in Germany, the general level of wages, and 
 especially of real wages, was certainly lower, especially as 
 the wages of the numerically far more important unskilled 
 workers were considerably higher in Germany than in 
 Great Britain. In Great Britain skilled workers received 
 approximately twice the wages of the unskilled workers 
 
GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 285 
 
 owing to the strength of the firmly-established Trade Unions, 
 which artificially restrict the supply of labour. In Germany I 
 the Trade Unions were of very recent date, and as they had / 
 not yet succeeded in securing abnormally high wages for \ 
 their members, the difference in the wages of skilled and 
 unskilled workers was very slight. How small this difference 
 is may be seen from a report, Household Budgets in Families 
 of Small Means, which was published by the German 
 Statistical Office in 1909. From that publication we learn 
 that the following average wages — not nominal wages, but 
 real wages actually earned in the course of a whole year, 
 which allow for short time and unemployment — were 
 received in the cases investigated : 
 
 
 £ «. d. 
 
 
 ». d. 
 
 
 Skilled workers 
 
 . 78 9 5 
 
 per year 
 
 or 30 2 
 
 per week 
 
 Unskilled workers . 
 
 . 65 3 
 
 ,, 
 
 or 25 1 
 
 J J 
 
 Dockers 
 
 . 79 12 11 
 
 ,, 
 
 or 30 7 
 
 , J 
 
 Road workers 
 
 . 60 14 11 
 
 >> 
 
 or 23 4 
 
 jj 
 
 General labourers . 
 
 . 67 5 8 
 
 j» 
 
 or 25 11 
 
 .J 
 
 While on an average British skilled workers in full employ 
 earned before the War from 30s. to 35s. per week, British 
 unskilled workers earned only from 18s. to 22s. per week. 
 Possibly the average level of wages among skilled Unionist 
 workers was slightly higher in Great Britain than in Ger- 
 many, owing to the strength of the British Trade Unions. 
 On the other hand, the average level of wages among un- 
 skilled workers was certainly considerably higher in Germany 
 than in Great Britain, owing to the greater demand for, and 
 the consequent scarcity of, labour. ' 
 
 That the wages of many German workers, especially of 
 non- Unionists, who form the vast majority, were higher 
 than the corresponding British wages, has been stated by 
 many competent authorities. The report of the Chamber 
 of Commerce of Elberfeld of 1908 stated : " Wages in 
 Germany are, in numerous instances, higher than wages in 
 England." The report of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce 
 of 1908 complained that the ready-made clothes trade was 
 leaving Berlin for London " because wages are lower in 
 
286 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 London than in Berlin." The report of the British Consul 
 in Frankfurt of 1908 said : 
 
 " When recently some important chemical works were 
 meditating the estabUshment of a factory in the United 
 Kingdom, the directorate of the German company decided, 
 after minute inquiries, so to prepare the plans of the new 
 factory that various branches of their GermaiTtfianufacture 
 could later be transferred to the United Kingdom, because 
 the workman's wages are, at the present moment, consider- 
 ably lower in England than in Germany." 
 
 The report of 1909 of the British Consul in Frankfurt, 
 who, by the by, was a Free Trader, stated : 
 
 " A report from a prominent firm in the colour-printing 
 trade runs as follows : ' While years back the wages paid 
 to printers in Germany were considerably less than those 
 paid in the United Kingdom, we should say that to-day 
 little, if any, difference exists between the earnings of the 
 average printer in the two countries ; while, with regard to 
 the specially skilled colour printer, we should say that, if 
 anything, the German to-day is in receipt of a higher wage 
 than the same calibre man in the United Kingdom. The 
 net result is, that whereas years ago fairly good colour 
 printed work might be procured from Germany at a saving 
 when compared with British work of the same quality, this 
 difference has entirely vanished to-day, with the very 
 natural result that a considerable amount of the work 
 which used to go to Germany is now placed with British 
 firms.' A report from a prominent brewing concern in the 
 North, one of the partners of which has given special atten- 
 tion to the question of comparative wages, assures me that 
 he has no doubt whatsoever that, on the whole, the German 
 workmen in the brewing business are decidedly better paid 
 than the British. In the paper industry a similar impression 
 prevails." 
 
 It cannot be doubted that, if we take into account the 
 many miUions of unskilled workers who receive a higher 
 wage in Germany than in Great Britain, the general level 
 of wages was considerably higher in Germany than in Great 
 Britain. 
 
GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 287 
 
 How greatly German wages in certain trades have risen 
 since 1879 may be seen from the following interesting 
 figures, furnished by an official German statistician, Mr. 
 Kuczynski, in 1909 : 
 
 Daily Average Wages in Marks 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 )ortmiii 
 Miners 
 
 id Rostock 
 Bricklayers 
 
 Berlin 
 Bricklayers 
 
 Berlin 
 Carpenters 
 
 1879 . . . 2-55 
 
 
 3-20 
 
 
 — 
 
 2-50 
 
 1884 
 
 
 3-08 
 
 
 3-20 
 
 
 3-75 
 
 — 
 
 1889 . 
 
 
 3-42 
 
 
 4-00 
 
 
 5-50 
 
 3-87 
 
 1894 . 
 
 
 3-73 
 
 
 4-20 
 
 
 5-25 
 
 4-83 
 
 1899 . 
 
 
 4-84 
 
 
 4-40 
 
 
 5-40 
 
 4-83 
 
 1904 
 
 
 4-,78 
 
 
 4-70 
 
 
 6-30 
 
 6-28 
 
 1907 
 
 
 5-98 
 
 
 5-30 
 
 
 6-75 
 
 — 
 
 
 Hamburg Elberfeld 
 Bricklayers. Bricklayers. 
 
 Workers at 
 Kxupp's. 
 
 1879 . 
 
 — 
 
 
 3-00 
 
 
 3-02 
 
 1884 . 
 
 
 5-00 
 
 
 3-00 
 
 
 3-55 
 
 1889 . 
 
 
 6-00 
 
 
 3-50 
 
 
 3-83 
 
 1894 . 
 
 
 6-00 
 
 
 3-80 
 
 
 4-06 
 
 1899 , 
 
 
 6-00 
 
 
 4-51 
 
 
 4-72 
 
 1904 . 
 
 
 6-30 
 
 
 4-60 
 
 
 4-88 
 
 1907 . 
 
 
 
 
 7-20 
 
 
 5-41 
 
 
 5-35 
 
 If the cost of food had risen more than wages, the con- 
 sumption of food, and especially of the more expensive kinds 
 of food, should have dechned in Germany. That this is 
 not the case appears from the White Books pubUshed by 
 the German Ministry of Finance in 1908, from which I 
 extract the following : 
 
 Average Consumption per Head of Population 
 
 1879 
 1889 
 1899 
 1906 
 
 Rye. 
 125-1 
 106-4 
 144-6 
 143-5 
 
 In KUogrammes. 
 Wheat. Barley. 
 
 50-6 
 56-2 
 89-8 
 94-4 
 
 40-6 
 50-6 
 69-5 
 82-5 
 
 Potatoes. 
 281-2 
 423-1 
 581-1 
 592-6 
 
 The consumption of beer per head increased from 85 
 litres per head in 1879-83 to 118 litres per head in 1904-7. 
 As regards meat, there are available only statistics regarding 
 
Beef. 
 
 In Kilogrammes. 
 Pork. 
 
 Total. 
 
 IM 
 
 18-1 
 
 29-2 
 
 14-0 
 
 20-6 
 
 34-6 
 
 15-2 
 
 27-9 
 
 43-1 
 
 14-4 
 
 27-9 
 
 42-3 
 
 288 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 the consumption of beef and pork in Saxony, which show 
 the following : 
 
 Consumption of Meat, Exclusive of Veal, Mutton, Poultry, and 
 Game, in Saxony 
 
 1880 . 
 1890 . 
 1900 . 
 1907 . 
 
 During the period of Protection the consumption of beef 
 and pork has grown by 50 per cent., not only in Saxony but 
 throughout Germany, and the German Ministry of Finance 
 published in its White Books of 1908 an estimate showing 
 that the German population consumed 55 kilogrammes of 
 meat of all kinds per head per year, as compared with only 
 52*2 kilogrammes per head per year for the British popula- 
 tion. 
 
 The foregoing pages show that employment was con- 
 siderably better in Germany than in Great Britain ; that 
 general wages were considerably higher in the former 
 country than in the latter ; that the cost of living was 
 considerably lower to the workers in Germany than to the 
 workers in England. From these three facts we must con- 
 clude that the German working man was considerably better 
 off than the British working man, and much corroborative 
 evidence can be adduced in support of this conclusion. 
 
 An eminent Free Trader, Lord Brassey, wrote in his 
 book. The New Fiscal Policy, " For the masses of our 
 population no test of progress can be more conclusive than 
 the deposits in the Post OflBce and Trustee Savings Banks." 
 Let us apply Lord Brassey' s test to Great Britain and 
 Germany, and compare their progress since the introduction 
 of Protection : 
 
 
 Savings Banks Deposits 
 in Germany. 
 
 £ 
 
 Savings Banks Deposits 
 in Great Britain. 
 
 £ 
 
 1880 . 
 1890 . 
 1900 . 
 1911 , 
 
 . 130,690,000 
 . 256,865,000 
 . 441,929,000 
 . 900,000,000 
 
 77,721,084 
 111,285,359 
 187,005,562 
 227,902,840 
 
GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 289 
 
 The foregoing table shows that during the period of 
 Protection, 1880-1911, the German people have placed 
 £770,000,000, and the British people have placed only 
 £139,000,000, into the Savings Banks, whilst between 1900 
 and 1911 the German people placed £459,000,000, and the 
 British people only £41,000,000, into the Savings Banks. 
 During these eleven years the German Savings Banks 
 Deposits have grown more than eleven times as quickly 
 as the British Savings Banks Deposits. It is worth noting 
 that more than £700,000,000 of the German Savings 
 Banks Deposits consisted of small sums which were 
 put into these banks by people belonging to the working 
 class. 
 
 British workers put their savings, not only into the 
 Savings Banks, but into Building, Friendly, Co-operative 
 Societies, and Trade Unions as well. According to the 
 second Fiscal Blue Book (Cd. 2337) these savings were as 
 follows : 
 
 Building Societies 
 Friendly Societies 
 Co-operative Societies 
 Trade Unions 
 
 62,000,000 
 
 43,000,000 
 
 40,000,000 
 
 5,000,000 
 
 Total 150,000,000 
 
 According to the White Books published by the German 
 Ministry of Finance, the savings in the German Co-operative 
 Societies alone were, in 1906-7, as follows : 
 
 Deposits 
 
 in Allgemeiner Verband 
 
 . 45,800,000 
 
 
 Verband Darmstadt . 
 
 . 68,650,000 
 
 
 ,, Neuwied 
 
 . 18,170,000 
 
 
 ,, Bavaria 
 
 9,730,000 
 
 
 ,, Baden 
 
 2,765,000 
 
 
 , , Wurtemberg 
 
 4,150,000 
 
 
 Trier . 
 
 1,715,000 
 
 
 ,, Hanover 
 
 4,895,000 
 
 
 ,, Posen . 
 
 6,150,000 
 
 
 ,, Berlin . 
 
 3,490,000 
 
 
 Total 165,515,000 
 
290 GERMAN INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS 
 
 It will be noticed that the savings in the German Co- 
 operative Societies alone exceeded those of all the British 
 popular societies combined. According to Heiligenstadt 
 {Jahrbuch filr Gesetzgebung 1901), the savings placed into 
 the Prussian Co-operative Societies should be £7,500,000, 
 and into all the German Co-operative Societies, £11,250,000 
 per year. In the State Insurance Societies there were more 
 than £100,000,000 to the credit of the workers, and many 
 hundreds of millions of pounds were invested by the workers 
 in freehold land and houses. 
 
 Workers who are poor cannot afford to join a trade imion. 
 The German Social-Democratic Trade Unions alone show 
 the following record : 
 
 
 
 
 
 Average 
 
 
 Number 
 
 Yearly 
 
 Accumulated 
 
 contribution 
 
 
 of members. 
 
 Income. 
 
 Funds. 
 
 per member 
 per year. 
 
 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 s. d- 
 
 1891 . 
 
 277,659 
 
 55,829 
 
 21,292 
 
 4 2 
 
 1893 . 
 
 223,530 
 
 111,218 
 
 30,352 
 
 9 11 
 
 1898 . 
 
 493,742 
 
 275,434 
 
 218,665 
 
 11 2 
 
 1903 . 
 
 887,698 
 
 820,999 
 
 648,686 
 
 18 8 
 
 1908 . 
 
 . 1,831,731 
 
 2,427,220 
 
 2,041,989 
 
 26 6 
 
 1910 . 
 
 . 2,128,021 
 
 3,216,110 
 
 2,628,700 
 
 24 10 
 
 The Social-Democratic and the Non-Socialist Trade 
 Unions combined had more than 4,000,000 members. 
 
 In nineteen years the number of German trade unionists 
 has grown eightfold, and their contributions nearly sixty- 
 fold. The average contribution per member has risen 
 from 45. 2d. per year to 24s. lOd. per year, or to 6d. a week. 
 Could ill-employed and badly-paid workers who, as we are 
 told, suffer severely from the dearness of food, spare 6d. a 
 week for unions which in Germany serve mainly, not for 
 purposes of insurance — that is done by the State Insurance 
 Societies — but for purposes of agitation ? In some of the 
 German unions the contributions are considerably higher 
 than 24s. lOd. a year or 6d. a week. In 1908 55,482 com- 
 positors contributed to their unions 80s. per head per year ; 
 16,648 lithographers contributed 60s. per head per year ; 
 146,337 wood- workers contributed 35s. per head per year ; 
 360,099 metal-workers contributed 33s, per head per year. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 THE RISE, GROWTH, AND CHARACTER OP THE SOCIAL 
 DEMOCRATIC PARTY ^ 
 
 Almost every country possesses a more or less turbulent 
 party which, as a rule, is in a small minority. In Germany 
 alone, of all countries in and out of Europe, it has happened 
 that by far the strongest political party has again and 
 again been branded officially and semi-officially as the 
 enemy of Society and of the country, " Die Umsturzpartei," 
 the party of subversion. For instance, at the Sedan banquet 
 on the 2nd of September 1895, the Emperor William II. 
 declared in a speech that the members of that vast party 
 which had polled 1,786,000 votes in 1893 were " a band of 
 fellows not worthy to bear the name of Germans," and on the 
 8th of September, in a letter to the Chancellor, he called the 
 Social Democrats " enemies to the divine order of things, 
 without a fatherland." 
 
 It would seem worth while to look into the history, 
 views, composition, and aims of that interesting party. 
 As the full history of the Social Democratic Party in Germany 
 would be as bulky as that of the British Liberal Party, it 
 will, of course, be impossible to give more than a mere sketch 
 of it in these pages. It may, however, be found that a 
 sketch brings out the essential points and light and shade 
 more clearly and more strongly than would a lengthy and 
 detailed account. 
 
 The creation of the Social Democratic Party in Germany, 
 
 like the inauguration of many other pohtical movements in 
 
 that country, was due not to the practical politician but 
 
 1 From the Nineteenth Century and After, May 1903. 
 291 
 
292 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
 to the bookish doctrinaire. Roughly speaking, it may be 
 said that that party has been created by the writings of the 
 well-known Socialist authors, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, 
 and Ferdinand LassaUe. It suffices to mention these names 
 in order to understand that German Social Democracy was 
 at first animated by the spirit of the learned and well- 
 meaning, but somewhat nebulous and very unpractical, 
 idealists who had read many books, and who sincerely wished 
 to lead democracy from its misery and suffering straight into 
 a millennium of their own creation. 
 
 The fate of the followers of Marx, Engels, and Lassalle 
 varied greatly. Some of them dissented and founded com- 
 paratively unimportant pohtical schools and groups of their 
 own. Some became anarchists like Johann Most. Some 
 lost themselves in theoretical speculations and became 
 respectable professors ; but the vast majority of Lassalle's 
 followers developed into the German Social Democratic 
 Party. That party became, by gradual evolution, the 
 pohtical representative of German labour under the able 
 guidance of talented working men. Its great leader was 
 the turner, August Bebel, and among the most prominent 
 members of the party were workmen such as Mr. Grillen- 
 berger, a locksmith ; Mr. Auer, a saddler ; Messrs. Molken- 
 buhr and Meister, cigar- workers ; Mr. Bernstein, the son 
 of an engine-driver ; Mr. von Volhnar, formerly a post-office 
 official. Working men such as those mentioned managed, 
 led, and controlled a party which before the War embraced 
 more than 4,000,000 men, and they maintained perfect 
 order and absolute discipHne among that vast number. 
 
 From its small beginnings up to the time of its present 
 greatness, German Social Democracy has been democratic 
 in the fuUest sense of the word. Some working men of a 
 similar stamp to those mentioned, together with Wilhelm 
 Liebknecht, a poor journalist, created the party, organised 
 it, and led it. These leaders were always under the constant 
 and strict control of the members of the party. Individual 
 members often inquired, sometimes in an uncomfortably 
 democratic spirit, not only into the expenditure of the 
 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 293 
 
 meagre party fund, which for a long time did not run into 
 three figures, and of which every halfpenny had to be 
 accounted for, but even cross-examined the party leader, 
 the aged Liebknecht, as to his household expenses, and 
 censured him for taking a salary as editor-in-chief of the 
 Vorwdrts, the great Social Democratic Party organ, and 
 keeping a servant. 
 
 The idea of equality, which is often found in small demo- 
 cratic societies, but which is usually lost when the society 
 expands into a party, especially if that party is of enormous 
 size, has been strictly preserved by the Social Democrats in 
 Germany. The conservation of its original character was all 
 the easier as the party had neither a great nobleman nor a 
 distinguished professor for a figure-head, nor even wealthy 
 brewers and bankers for contributors to the party fund, who 
 might have influenced the party policy as they do in other 
 countries. Thus the Social Democratic Party was, and has 
 remained, essentially a Labour Party ; it has preserved its 
 truly democratic, one might almost say its proletarian, 
 character. However, it has been sensible enough not to 
 write consistency on its banners, and has quietly dropped 
 one by one many of the Utopian views and doctrines which 
 it had taken over from the bookish doctrinaires who had been 
 its originators. 
 
 The Constitution of the German Empire gave universal 
 suffrage to its citizens, and the number of Social Democratic 
 votes, which had amounted to only 124,700 in 1871, rose 
 rapidly to 342,000 in 1874, and to 493,300 in 1877. Bis- 
 marck had been watching the rapid development of Social 
 Democracy with growing uneasiness and disUke, and was 
 casting about for a convenient pretext to strike at it when, 
 on the 11th of May 1878, Hodel, an individual of illegiti- 
 mate birth, besotted by drink, and degraded by vice and 
 consequent disease, fired a pistol at the Emperor William. 
 
 Long before his attempt on the Emperor, Hodel had been 
 expelled from the Social Democratic Party, to which he 
 had once belonged, on account of his character and his 
 anarchist leanings, and he had joined the " Christian Socia- 
 
294 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
 list Working Men's Party " of Mr. Stocker, the court 
 preacher. Consequently it was not possible, by any 
 stretch of imagination, to lay the responsibility for his deed 
 at the doors of the Social Democratic Party. Nevertheless, 
 Bismarck endeavoured to turn this attempt to account in 
 the same way in which, in 1874, he had laid the moral 
 responsibility for Kullmann's murderous attempt on himself 
 upon the Clerical Party against which he was then fighting. 
 He at once brought forward a Bill for the suppression of 
 Social Democracy, but it was rejected by 251 votes against 57. 
 
 By one of those fortuitous coincidences which have always 
 played so conspicuous a part in Bismarck's career, a second 
 attempt on the Emperor's life was made by Nobiling, only 
 three weeks after that of Hodel, and this time the aged 
 monarch was very seriously wounded. At one moment the 
 doctors feared for his life, but in the end the copious bleed- 
 ing was a blessing in disguise, for it rejuvenated the Emperor 
 in mind and body. 
 
 The two murderous attempts, following one another so 
 closely, naturally infuriated the population of Germany, 
 and, though Nobiling also was no Social Democrat, Bis- 
 marck succeeded this time in turning the feelings of the 
 people against Social Democracy. He immediately dis- 
 solved the Reichstag and fanned the universal indignation 
 at the crime to fever heat by his powerful press organisation. 
 In the numerous journals throughout the land which were 
 influenced from the Chancellory in BerHn, it was constantly 
 declared that these repeated outrages were the dastardly 
 work of Social Democracy. At the same time a reign of 
 terrorism against Social Democracy was initiated by the 
 German police. Countless political meetings of the Social 
 Democrats were forbidden, a large number of Social Demo- 
 cratic newspapers were suppressed, and the law courts 
 inflicted in one month no less than 500 years of imprison- 
 ment for Use-majeste. 
 
 During the enormous excitement prevailing and in the 
 seething turmoil caused by those two attempts, by the 
 critical state of the Emperor, by the passionate campaign 
 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 295 
 
 of the semi-official press against the Social Democratic 
 Party, and by the relentless persecutions waged against 
 its members, the new elections took place, and, naturally 
 enough, their result was a majority in favour of excep- 
 tional legislation against Social Democracy. Bismarck 
 brought his famous Sociahst Bill before Parhament without 
 delay, and it was quickly passed, and was published on the 
 21st of October in the Beichsanzeiger . 
 
 Then the reign of terror, of which the Social Democrats 
 had already received a foretaste, began in earnest. Within 
 eight months the authorities dissolved 222 working men's 
 unions and other associations, and suppressed 127 periodical 
 and 278 other publications, by virtue of the discretionary 
 powers given to them by the Socialist Law. Innumerable 
 bona fide co-operative societies were compelled by the police 
 to close their doors without any trial and without the possi- 
 bihty of appeal. Numerous Social Democrats were sum- 
 marily expelled from Germany at a few days' notice, through 
 the discretion which the new Act had vested in the police. 
 Many were placed under police supervision. Others were 
 not allowed to change their domicile. Thousands of Social 
 Democrats were thus reduced to beggary, many were thrown 
 into prison, many fled to Switzerland, England, or the 
 United States. 
 
 The first effect upon Social Democracy of the new law was 
 staggering. The entire party organisation, the entire party 
 press, and the right of the members of the party to free 
 speech, had been destroyed by the Government, and for 
 the moment the party had become a disorganised and 
 terrified mob. Everywhere in Germany scenes of tyranny 
 were enacted by the police. In Frankfort-on-the-Main, a 
 Social Democrat was buried, and, for some trifling reason, 
 the pohce attacked the mourners in the very churchyard 
 with drawn swords, and thirty to forty of the men were 
 wounded. In 1886 a collision took place between some 
 Social Democrats and some policemen in plain clothes, 
 who, according to Social Democratic evidence, were not 
 known to be poHcemen. With incredible severity, eleven 
 20 
 
296 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
 of the Social Democrats were punished for sedition, some 
 with no less than ten and a half years' penal servitude, 
 some with twelve and a half years of imprisonment. For 
 the moment the Social Democratic Party was staggered by 
 the rapidly succeeding blows. The election of 1878 reduced 
 the number of Social Democratic votes from 493,300 to 
 437,100, and in the next election, that of 1881, it sank even 
 as low as 312,000. 
 
 Prosecutions were not brought merely against Social 
 Democrats who were considered lawbreakers by the local 
 authorities and the poUce. On the contrary, the German 
 Government directed the law with particular severity 
 against the intellectual leaders of the party in Parliament, 
 in the vain hope of extirpating it. Bebel and Liebknecht, 
 the heads of the party and its leaders in the Reichstag, 
 were dragged again and again before the law courts by the 
 public prosecutor, often only in the attempt to construct, 
 by diligent cross-examination, a punishable offence out of 
 some inoffensive words which they had uttered, and time 
 after time the prosecution collapsed ignominiously, and 
 both men were found not guilty ; time after time they 
 were condemned to lengthy terms of imprisonment for 
 lese-majeste, high treason, and intended high treason. 
 
 Liebknecht received his last conviction of four months 
 of imprisonment for lese-majeste as a broken man of nearly 
 seventy years, and even his burial in August 1900 was marked 
 by that petty and annoying poUce interference under which 
 he had suffered so much during his life. No less than 
 2,000 wreaths and other floral tributes had been sent by 
 Liebknecht' s admirers, yet, in the immense funeral pro- 
 cession, in which about 45,000 people took part, not one 
 wreath, not one banner was to be seen, for the pohce had 
 forbidden their inclusion. Though hundreds of thousands 
 of Social Democrats attended the funeral in the procession 
 and in the streets of Berlin, and in spite of the provocative 
 orders of the police, no breach of the peace occurred, no 
 arrest took place, an eloquent testimonial to the orderliness 
 and discipline of the party of subversion. 
 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 297 
 
 Bismarck soon recognised that his policy of force and 
 violence promised to be unsuccessful. Therefore he tried 
 not only to vanquish Social Democracy by breaking up the 
 party organisation, confiscating its books and documents, 
 destroying the party press, and taking from Social Demo- 
 crats the right of free speech, but he tried at the same time 
 to reconcile the German working men with the Government 
 by instituting State Insurance for workers against old age 
 and disablement. Thus he hoped to entice them away 
 from their leaders, and to make them look to the State for 
 help. However, his Workmen's Insurance Laws failed to 
 fulfil the chief object which they were to serve. 
 
 According to the Social Democratic leaders the Imperial 
 Insurance scheme kept not one vote from Social Democracy, 
 especially as it did not satisfy the workers by its performance. 
 They complained that the benefits which they derived under 
 the Insurance scheme were purely nominal, that the pre- 
 miums paid came chiefly out of their own pockets, that 
 the contributions made by the employers were insufficient, 
 and that the cost of management was excessive. Conse- 
 quently it failed to appease Grerman democracy and was 
 scorned by it as a bribe. 
 
 Gradually the terror of prosecution wore o£F. Social 
 Democratic political meetings were held in secret. Party 
 literature printed in Switzerland was smuggled over the 
 frontier and surreptitiously distributed. By and by the 
 party pulled itself together, and found that determination 
 and perseverance which are born from adversity, and which 
 are bound to lead individuals and parties possessing these 
 quaUties to greatness. The campaign of oppression and 
 the creation of martyrs had done its work. As Bismarck 
 had created the greatness of the Clerical Party by the 
 " Kulturkampf," by the prosecution of Roman Catholicism, 
 even so he created the greatness of the Social Democratic 
 Party. Social Democracy began again to take heart, and, 
 from 1881 onwards, we find a marvellous increase in the 
 Social Democratic votes recorded, notwithstanding, or rather 
 because of, all the measures taken against it by the Grovern- 
 
298 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
 ment. The astonishing progress of the party since 1881 
 is apparent from the following table : 
 
 Election. 
 
 Social Democratic 
 Votes polled. 
 
 Total Votes polled. 
 
 Percentage of Social 
 Democratic Votes. 
 
 1881 
 
 312,000 
 
 5,097,800 
 
 6-12 per cent. 
 
 1884 
 
 
 
 550,000 
 
 5,663,000 
 
 9-68 
 
 1887 
 
 
 
 763,100 
 
 7,540,900 
 
 10-11 
 
 
 1890 
 
 
 
 1,427,300 
 
 7,228,500 
 
 19-74 
 
 
 1893 
 
 
 
 1,786,700 
 
 7,674,000 
 
 23-30 
 
 
 1898 
 
 
 
 2,107,076 
 
 7,752,700 
 
 27-18 
 
 
 1903 
 
 
 
 3,010,771 
 
 9,495,586 
 
 31-71 
 
 
 1907 
 
 
 
 3,259,000 
 
 11,262,800 
 
 28-94 
 
 
 1912 
 
 4,250,329 
 
 12,206,808 
 
 34-82 
 
 
 When Bismarck saw Social Democracy increasing, not- 
 withstanding all his efforts at repression, he tried another 
 method. It happened very frequently in Germany that 
 three, four, or more candidates, representing as many parties, 
 stood for one seat. If in such a case none of the candidates 
 obtained a majority over the combined votes given to all 
 the other candidates, a second poll had to take place between 
 the two candidates who had received the largest number 
 of votes, whilst the other candidates had to withdraw. In 
 order to destroy the chances of Social Democratic candidates 
 in the very frequent second polls, Bismarck and his press 
 used constantly to brand the Social Democratic Party as 
 the State-subverting Party, and to enjoin "the parties of 
 law and order," as he called the other parties, to stand 
 shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy of Society 
 and of the Fatherland. 
 
 Many years had passed since Bismarck's dismissal. Yet 
 official Germany did not discover a new method for the 
 treatment of Social Democracy. It merely copied Bis- 
 marck's example. Until yesterday the Social Democratic 
 Party was still loudly denounced by every good German 
 patriot as the party of subversion, which had to be 
 shunned and combated. Hence the election managers of 
 the numerous parties and factions did until recently, in 
 case of a second poll, usually give the votes of their party 
 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 299 
 
 to the candidate of any other party in order not to incur 
 the odium in official circles of having helped a Social Demo- 
 crat into the Reichstag. But voices of protest began to be 
 heard against the official fiction that Social Democracy was 
 a pest, the enemy of the Country, of Society, of Monarchy, 
 of the Family, and of the Church. In December 1902 
 Professor Mommsen wrote in the Nation : 
 
 " There must be an end of the superstition, as false as it 
 is perfidious, that the nation is divided into parties of law 
 and order on the one hand, and a party of revolution on 
 the other, and that it is the prime political duty of citizens 
 belonging to the former categories to shun the Labour 
 Party as if it were in quarantine for the plague, and to 
 combat it as the enemy of the State." 
 
 In March 1890 Bismarck was dismissed by the Emperor 
 William, and a few months later the exceptional law against 
 Social Democracy was withdrawn. The net result of that 
 law had been that 1,500 Social Democrats had been con- 
 demned to about 1,000 years of imprisonment, and that 
 the Social Democratic vote had risen from 437,158 to 
 1,427,298. The effect of the Socialist Law, with all its 
 persecution, was the reverse of what Bismarck had expected, 
 for it had made that party great. If less drastic means had 
 been employed by Bismarck, if less contempt and con- 
 tumely had been showered upon Social Democracy by the 
 official classes and society, and if instead consideration for 
 the legitimate wishes and confidence in the common sense 
 of the working men's party had been shown by the Govern- 
 ment, Social Democracy would not have attained its for- 
 midable strength. 
 
 Among the various causes which led to the rupture 
 between the present Emperor and Prince Bismarck, a pro- 
 minent place may be assigned to the difference in their 
 views with regard to the treatment of Social Democracy. 
 When William the Second came to the throne he clearly 
 saw the failure of Bismarck's policy of oppression, and, 
 probably influenced by the liberal views of his English 
 
300 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
 mother, resolved to kill Social Democracy with kindness. 
 This idea dictated his weU-known retort to Bismarck, " Leave 
 the Social Democrats to me ; I can manage them quite 
 alone ! " Even before Bismarck's dismissal WiUiam II. 
 demonstrated to the world his extremely liberal view 
 regarding the German workmen with that astonishing 
 impetuousness and with that complete disregard of the 
 views of his experienced official advisers to which the world 
 had to become accustomed. On the 4th of February 1890 
 an Imperial rescript was pubHshed, which lacked the neces- 
 sary counter-signature of the Imperial Chancellor whereby 
 the responsibility for that document would have been 
 fixed upon the Government. It declared it to be the duty 
 of the State "... to regulate the time, the hours, and 
 the nature of labour in such a way as to ensure the preser- 
 vation of health, to fulfil the demands of morality, and to 
 secure the economic requirements of the workers, to estab- 
 lish their equality before the law, and to facilitate the free 
 and peaceful expression of their wishes and grievances." 
 A second rescript called together an International Conference 
 for the Protection of Workers. 
 
 These Imperial manifestations were greeted with jubila- 
 tion by German democracy ; but the extremely liberal 
 spirit which these documents breathed vanished suddenly, 
 and gave way to autocratic and anti-democratic pronounce- 
 ments. While the words of the Imperial rescripts were 
 still fresh in every mind, and while German democracy still 
 hoped to receive greater consideration at the hands of the 
 Government, messages like the following, addressed to 
 democracy, fell from the Imperial lips : 
 
 " We HohenzoUerns take Our crown from God alone, 
 and to God alone We are responsible in the fulfilment of Our 
 duties. 
 
 " The soldier and the army, not Parliamentary majorities 
 and resolutions, have welded together the German Empire. 
 
 " Suprema lex regis voluntas. 
 
 " Only One is master in the country. That am I. Who 
 opposes Me I shall crush to pieces. 
 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 301 
 
 " 8ic volo, sic jubeo. 
 
 " All of you shall have only one will, and that is My will ; 
 there is only one law, and that is My law. 
 
 " ParUamentary opposition of Prussian nobility to their 
 King is a monstrosity. 
 
 " For Me every Social Democrat is synonymous with 
 enemy of the nation, and of the Fatherland. 
 
 " On to the battle, for ReUgion, Morality, and Order, and 
 against the parties of subversion. Forward with God ! 
 Dishonourable is he who forsakes his King ! " 
 
 The Emperor did not confine himself to making in public 
 pronouncements highly offensive and hostile to German 
 democracy, such as those mentioned, but set himself the 
 task of actively combating Social Democracy. Consciously 
 or unconsciously, he gradually dropped into Bismarck's 
 ways and copied, or rather exaggerated, Bismarck's methods, 
 Bismarck's tactics, and Bismarck's mistakes. When, on 
 the 13th of October 1895, a manufacturer named Schwartz 
 was murdered in Miilhausen by a workman who had been 
 repeatedly convicted of theft, WiUiam II. telegraphed 
 to his widow, "Again a sacrifice to the revolutionary move- 
 ment engendered by the Sociahsts," imitating Bismarck's 
 attempt at foisting the guilt for an individual crime upon 
 a ParUamentary party which then comprised 2,000,000 
 members. 
 
 The Socialistic Law of 1878 had been a complete failure. 
 Nevertheless, the Government tried to introduce, under a 
 different title, a near relative of that law, which breathed the 
 same spirit of intolerance and violence ; for in 1894 a Bill, 
 which became known under the name " Umsturz Vorlage " 
 (Subversion Bill), was brought out by the Government. 
 This Bill made it punishable " to attack publicly by insulting 
 utterances Religion, the Monarchy, Family, or Property 
 in a matter likely to provoke a breach of the peace, or to 
 bring the institutions of the State into contempt." That 
 Bill, which, with its flexible provisions, would have allowed 
 of the most arbitrary interpretations, and would have 
 virtually given a free hand to the police and to public 
 
302 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
 prosecutors and judges anxious to show their zeal by the 
 relentless persecution of Social Democracy, was thrown out 
 by the Reichstag. Notwithstanding its failure another 
 Bill of similar character, but intended for Prussia alone, 
 was laid before the Prussian Diet on the 10th of May 1897, 
 empowering the police to dissolve all meetings " which do 
 not conform with the law, or endanger pubhc security, 
 especially the security of the State or of the public peace." 
 This Bill also was rejected. 
 
 Shortly after his second failure, William II. made 
 another and stiU more startUng attempt to suppress 
 Social Democracy. On the 5th of September 1898, he 
 declared at a banquet in Oeynhausen, "... A Bill is in 
 preparation, and will be submitted to Parliament, by which 
 every one who tries to hinder a willing German worker from 
 doing his work, or who incites him to strike, will be punished 
 with penal servitude." Naturally this announcement, 
 which promised that strikers and their leaders would in 
 future be treated as felons, created an enormous sensation. 
 After a delay of nine months, which betrayed its hesitation, 
 the Government brought out a Bill, which, however, had been 
 considerably toned down with regard to its promised pro- 
 visions. Still it was draconic enough, for it made threats 
 against non- strikers, incitement to strike, and picketing 
 punishable with imprisonment up to one year. Its piece 
 de resistance was the following paragraph : 
 
 " If, through a strike, the security of the Empire or of one 
 of the single States has been endangered, or if the danger of 
 loss of human lives or of property has been brought about, 
 penal servitude up to three years is to be inflicted on the 
 men, and penal servitude up to five years on the leaders." 
 
 This BiU, like that of 1894, possessed an unpleasant 
 elasticity which could make it an instrument of tyranny 
 in the hands of servile judges. Hence the " Penal Servitude 
 Bill," which had so rashly and so loudly been announced 
 urbi et orbi by the Emperor, shared the ignominious fate of 
 the two Bills mentioned. 
 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 303 
 
 In their desire to stifle the voice of the people and to please 
 the Emperor many Conservatives recommended a coup 
 d'etat. For instance, Count Mirbach stated at the meeting 
 of his party, on the 1st of January 1895, that universal 
 suffrage was a derision of all authority, and recommended 
 the abohtion of the secret baUot. The same gentleman 
 stated in the Prussian Upper House, on the 28th of March 
 1895, " The country would greet with jubilation a decision 
 of the German Princes to create a new Reichstag on the basis 
 of a new Election Law." In the same place Count Franken- 
 berg stated two days later, " We hope to obtain a new 
 Election Law for the German Empire, for with the present 
 Election Law it is impossible to exist." Freiherr von 
 Zedlitz, Freiherr von Stumm, and Von Kardorff uttered 
 similar sentiments. At the meeting of the Conservative 
 Party on the 8th of March 1897, Freiherr von Stumm said, 
 " The right to vote should be taken away from the Social 
 Democrats, and no Social Democrat should be permitted to 
 sit in the Diet," and Count Limburg-Stirum likewise advo- 
 cated their exclusion. The official handbook of the Con- 
 servative Party, most Conservative and many Liberal 
 papers, warmly applauded these views. 
 
 The aims of the Social Democrats in Germany were similar 
 to those of the workers in other countries. They wished to 
 better themselves pohtically, economically, and socially. 
 PoUtically, German democracy was not free. Universal 
 suffrage existed for the Imperial Reichstag, but the German 
 Parhament had far less power than had the English Par- 
 liament under Charles I. The facts that the Emperor 
 could, at will, dissolve Parhament, according to Article 12 
 of the Constitution ; that he could nominate and dismiss 
 officials, according to Article 18 ; and that the Govern- 
 ment was responsible only to the Emperor, proved the 
 helplessness of the German Parhament before the 
 Emperor and his officials, who were nominated and dis- 
 missed, promoted and decorated by him, and by him 
 alone. Parhament in Germany had no control whatever 
 over, and hardly any influence upon, the poHcy and ad- 
 
304 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
 ministration of the Empire. Its sole duty was to vote 
 funds and laws. 
 
 In the single States, German democracy fared stiU worse. 
 The election for the Prussian Diet, to give an instance, took 
 place upon the following system. The whole body of the 
 electors was divided into three classes according to the 
 amount of taxes paid. Each class contributed an equal 
 amount and had the same voting power. The practical 
 working of this curious system may be illustrated by the case 
 of Berlin. The voters of Berhn belonging to those three 
 classes were in 1895 distributed in the following way : 
 
 Voters of the first class .... 1,469 
 ,, ,, second class .... 9,372 
 
 ,, ,, third class .... 289,973 
 
 Total of voters in Berlin . . 300,814 
 
 The figures given prove that the three classes system was 
 the capitalistic system par excellence, for each of the rich 
 men voting in the first class in Berlin possessed two hundred 
 votes, each of the weU-to-do men in the second class had 
 thirty votes, and the combined first and second classes, or 
 3| per cent, of the electorate, formed a solid two-thirds 
 majority over the remaining 96| per cent, of the electorate. 
 There were, besides, some further complications in that 
 intricate system which it would lead too far to describe. 
 That franchise was worthless to democracy, A similar kind 
 of franchise prevailed in other German States, 
 
 Socially also German democracy had much to complain 
 of. Except in the large centres, the position of the German 
 working man was a very humble one. Further grievances 
 were the all-pervading militarism, the exceptional and un- 
 assailable position of the official classes, the prerogatives 
 of the privileged classes, and the widespread immorality 
 which had undermined and debased the position of women 
 in Germany previous to the War. Nothing can better 
 illustrate the latter grievance of Social Democracy than 
 reference to the daily papers. For instance, in a pre-war 
 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 305 
 
 number of the Berlin Lokalanzeiger under my notice, there 
 were the following advertisements : 
 
 " Seventy-four marriage advertisements (some doubtful). 
 
 " Forty-nine advertisements of lady masseuses (all 
 doubtful), 
 
 " Nine demands for small loans, usually of £5, by ' modest 
 widows ' and other single ladies (all doubtful). 
 
 " Six acquaintances desired by ladies (all doubtful). 
 
 " Five widows' balls, ' gentlemen invited, admission free ' 
 (all doubtful). 
 
 " Thirty apartments and rooms ' without restrictions ' by 
 the day (all doubtful), 
 
 " Forty-seven maternity homes, ' discretion assured ; no 
 report home' (all doubtful). 
 
 " Sixteen babies to be adopted. 
 
 " Sixteen specialists for contagious disease." 
 
 These advertisements, found in one daily journal of a 
 similar standing to that of the London Daily Telegraph, and 
 similar in kind and extent of circulation, explain better the 
 state of moraUty in Germany, and the attitude of the German 
 Social Democratic working men, than would a lengthy dis- 
 sertation illustrated with voluminous statistics. This state 
 of affairs explains the importance with which the question 
 of morality and of the position of women was treated in the 
 political programme of German Social Democracy. 
 
 In order to become acquainted, not only with the actual 
 wishes of Social Democracy, but also with the tone in 
 which those wishes were expressed, and with the manner 
 in which they were formulated, we cannot do better than 
 turn to the Official Handbook for Social Democratic Voters. 
 The passages selected proved to Grerman officialdom that 
 Social Democracy was the enemy of the Country, of Society, 
 of Monarchy, of the Family, and of the Church, They^ 
 clearly show the fundamental ideas of that party and the 
 spirit by which it was animated. The Handbook says : 
 
 " The aim of Social Democracy is not to divide all 
 property, but to combine it and use it for the development 
 
30(5 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
 and improvement of mankind, in order to give to all a life 
 worthy of man. Work shall become a duty for all men 
 able to work. The word of the Bible, ' He that does not 
 work neither shall he eat,' shall become a true word. 
 
 " Marriage, in contradiction to religious teachings, is in 
 innumerable cases a financial transaction pure and simple. 
 Woman has value in the eyes of men only when she has a 
 fortune, and the more money she has the higher rises her 
 value. Therefore marriage has become a business, and 
 thousands meet in the marriage market, for instance, by 
 advertisements in newspapers, in which a husband or a wife 
 is sought in the same way in which a house or a pig is offered 
 for sale. Consequently unhappy marriages have never 
 been more numerous than at the present time, a state of 
 affairs which is in contradiction to the real nature of 
 marriage. Social Democracy desires that marriages be 
 concluded solely from mutual love and esteem, which is 
 only possible if man and woman are free and independent, 
 if each has a free existence and an individual personality, 
 and is therefore not compelled to buy the other or to be 
 bought. This state of freedom and equality is only 
 possible in the socialistic society. 
 
 " Who desires to belong to a Church shall not be hindered, 
 but he shall pay only for the expenses of his Church together 
 with his co-religionists. 
 
 " The schools and the whole educational system shall be 
 separated from the Church and religious societies, because 
 education is a civil matter. 
 
 " The God of Christians is not a German, French, Russian, 
 or English god, but a God of all men, an international God, 
 God is the God of love and of peace, and therefore it borders 
 upon blasphemy that the priests of different Christian 
 nations invoke this God of love to give victory to their 
 nation in the general slaughter. It is equally blasphemous 
 if the priest of one nation prays the God of all nations for 
 a victory over another nation. In striving to found a 
 brotherhood of nations and the peaceful co-operation of 
 nations in the service of civilisation, Social Democracy acts 
 in a most Christian spirit, and tries to realise what the 
 Christian priests of all nations, together with the Christian 
 monarchs, hitherto would not, or could not, realise. By 
 combining the workers of all nations, Social Democracy 
 tries to effect a federation of nations in which every State 
 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 307 
 
 enjoys equal rights, and in which the peculiarities of the 
 inner character of every nation may peacefully develop." 
 
 Ideas such as those quoted were instrumental in framing 
 the programme of the party, which was idealistic as well as 
 utiUtarian. The ten demands of the programme were : 
 
 ( 1 ) One vote for every adult man and woman ; a holiday 
 
 to be election day ; payment of members. 
 
 (2) The Government to be responsible to ParUament ; 
 
 local self-government ; referendum. 
 
 (3) Introduction of the militia system. 
 
 (4) Freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 
 
 (5) Equality of man and woman before the law. 
 
 (6) Disestablishment of the Churches. 
 
 (7) Undenominational schools, with compulsory attend- 
 
 ance and gratuitous tuition. 
 
 (8) Gratuitousness of legal proceeding. 
 
 (9) Gratuitous medical attendance and burial. 
 
 (10) Progressive Income Tax and Succession Duty. 
 Had the Social Democrats been as black as they were 
 
 painted, the leaders could not have kept the millions of 
 their followers in perfect order. Again, if the Social Demo- 
 cratic politicians were selfish or mercenary, as has been 
 asserted, they would not have died poor. Liebknecht 
 once said, and his case is typical for the leaders of Social 
 Democracy, " I have never sought my personal advantage. 
 If I am poor after unprecedented persecutions, I do not 
 account it a disgrace. I am proud of it, for it is an eloquent 
 testimony to my political honour." The Kolnische Zeitung, 
 commenting on these words, justly observed, " It would 
 be unjust to deny Social Domocracy the recognition of the 
 high personal integrity of its leaders." While the gravest 
 scandals have discredited more than one German party and 
 its leaders, the Social Democratic Party had, up to the War, 
 stood immaculate — an eloquent vindication of the moral 
 force of democracy, which force had been so thoroughly 
 misunderstood in Germany. 
 
 The lack of understanding and of sympathy with Social 
 
308 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
 Democracy and its aims was not restricted to official circles 
 in Germany. Typical of these views hostile to Social 
 Democracy is the following pronouncement by Professor H. 
 Delbriick, the distinguished historian, which appeared in 
 the Preussische Jahrbiicher for December 1895 : 
 
 " The duty of the Government is not to educate Social 
 Democracy to decent behaviour, but to suppress it, or, if 
 that should be impossible, at least to repress it, or, if that be 
 impossible, at least to hinder its further growth. . . . What 
 is necessary is that the sentiment should be awakened among 
 all classes of the population that Social Democracy is a 
 poison which can be resisted only by the strongest and 
 united moral opposition." 
 
 German democracy in the shape of the Social Democratic 
 Party could not only raise the claim of moral force and 
 numerical strength, of discipline and integrity, but could 
 also be proud of the consummate political ability of its 
 leaders and of the spirited support which these leaders 
 received from the members of the party. No better and no 
 juster testimonial, with regard to these quahties, can be 
 given than the pronouncement of the German historian, 
 Professor Mommsen : 
 
 "It is unfortunately true that at the present time the 
 Social Democracy is the only great party which has any 
 claim to political respect. It is not necessary to refer 
 to talent. Everybody in Germany knows that with brains 
 like those of Bebel it would be possible to furnish forth a 
 dozen noblemen from east of the Elbe in a fashion that 
 would make them shine among their peers. 
 
 " The devotion, the self-sacrificing spirit of the Social 
 Democratic masses, impresses even those who are far from 
 sharing their aims. Our Liberals might well take a lesson 
 from the discipline of the party." 
 
 While other German parties split into factions or decayed 
 owing to the unruliness of their undisciplined members or 
 to the apathetic support of the voters, or to the skilful action 
 of the Government, the Social Democratic Party in Germany 
 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
 309 
 
 was until recently constantly strong and undivided, not- 
 withstanding the many and serious difficulties which it 
 encountered. It was, no doubt, by far the best- led, the 
 best-managed, and the most homogeneous party in Ger- 
 many, and was the only party which, from an English point 
 of view, could be considered a party. Similarly, there was 
 in Germany no political journal more ably conducted than 
 the Social Democratic Party organ, the Vorwdrts. 
 
 The Social Democratic Party did not possess in the 
 Reichstag that numerical strength which one might expect 
 from the numerical strength of its supporters. This great 
 under-representation sprang partly from the fact that, in 
 the frequently occurring second polls, the other parties 
 usually combined against the Social Democratic candidate 
 as before related ; partly it was due to the fact that German 
 towns were until 1914 represented by the same number of 
 deputies as in 1871, notwithstanding the immense increase 
 in their population. No redistribution had been effected, 
 because the Government did not wish to strengthen the 
 Liberal and Social Democratic parties which had their 
 hold on the towns, and Parliament had no means of enforcing 
 a redistribution. How enormous was the disproportion 
 between votes and representatives in the Reichstag, and 
 how this disporportion favoured the two Conservative parties 
 and the Clerical Party, may be seen from the following 
 table : 
 
 Result of the General Election of 1907 
 
 
 Votes. 
 
 Members in 
 
 Imperial 
 
 Diet. 
 
 Average Number 
 
 of Votes 
 
 per Member. 
 
 Social Democrats 
 Centre (Roman Catholic Party) 
 National Liberals 
 Conservatives 
 
 Freisinnige (People's) Party- 
 Free Conservatives 
 
 Poles 
 
 Seven factions 
 
 
 3,259,000 
 
 2,179,800 
 
 1,637,000 
 
 1,060,200 
 
 736,000 
 
 471,900 
 
 453,900 
 
 1,465,000 
 
 43 
 
 104 
 
 55 
 
 62 
 
 27 
 24 
 20 
 61 
 
 75,790 
 20,959 
 29,764 
 17,132 
 27,259 
 19,662 
 22,695 
 24,016 
 
 Total .... 
 
 11,262,800 
 
 396 
 
 28,441 
 
310 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
 The consequence of the disproportion of votes to members 
 in the different parties was that the Social Democrats, who 
 commanded 28*94 per cent, of the votes, had only 10' 9 
 per cent, of the seats in the Reichstag of 1907, whilst the 
 Conservative Party, with only 94 per cent, of the votes, 
 had 18'24 per cent, of the seats, and the conser^ atively- 
 inclined Centre Party, with 19' 33 per cent, of t votes, 
 had no less than 26'26 per cent, of the seats. Ba^ d upon 
 the same proportion of votes to members which obtains with 
 the Centre Party and with the two Conservative Parties, 
 the representatives of the Social Democratic Party in the 
 Imperial Diet should have numbered more than 150, and 
 not 43. 
 
 Whilst Social Democracy was flourishing and increasing, 
 the various Liberal parties in Germany had been decaying 
 for many years. The reason for that phenomenon was 
 that the Liberal Party had striven to represent onlv such 
 Liberalism as was approved of by the Government. 
 Liberahsm shunned the Social Democratic Party and its 
 leaders like poison, in accordance with the official mot d'ordre. 
 Consequently the liberally-inclined German workman, small 
 trader, clerk, teacher, etc., whom that approved Court 
 Liberalism — which in reaUty was Conservatism in disguise 
 — did not suit, abandoned that pseudo- Liberahsm and gave 
 his vote to the Social Democratic candidate . 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 
 THE PARLIAMENTARY POSITION IN GERMANY 
 BEFORE THE WAR 
 
 Among the causes which prompted the German Government 
 in 1914 to embark upon a war of aggression was, no doubt, 
 the increasing difficulty of the parliamentary position, of 
 domestic politics. 
 
 Three phenomena in German pre-war politics seemed 
 almost inexplicable to the average Englishmen and Ameri- 
 can : the fact that Germany possessed not two large Parties, 
 but a large number of comparatively small and indepen- 
 dent political Parties and Groups ; the fact that Germany, 
 which was essentially a liberal-minded country, should have 
 lacked a powerful Liberal Party ; the fact that more than 
 one- third of the German citizens, who were very prosperous, 
 who received the advantages of a thoughtful paternal 
 Government, such as State Insurance against sickness, 
 accident, invalidity, and old age, and who enjoyed universal 
 manhood suffrage, should have been found in the Sociahst 
 camp in a country which was supposed to be a model to all 
 other countries as regards education and efficient adminis- 
 tration. Those three phenomena deserve inquiring into. 
 
 Imperial Grermany was a democratic country only in 
 outward appearance. It is true that she possessed universal 
 manhood suffrage, that plural voting was practically un- 
 known, and that the principle of one man one vote was 
 strictly carried out. As far as the voting went, Germany 
 was the most democratic country in the world. But here 
 the democratic character of Germany's poHtical institutions 
 ended. Germany's Constitution was neither gradually 
 21 311 
 
312 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 
 
 evolved by a people struggling to be free, as was the British 
 Constitution, nor was it devised in free discussion by a 
 number of eminent democratic statesmen and politicians 
 of different views as was the Constitution of the United 
 States. Germany was an enlarged Prussia. The German 
 Constitution was drawn up by a single man, by Prince 
 Bismarck, a Prussian, and he aimed at creating an instru- 
 ment which, though democratic in appearance, would not 
 be an efficient obstacle to the absolute rule traditional in 
 Prussia. Before all he desired to have a Constitution for 
 Germany which would make it easy and convenient for him 
 to administer the country according to his will. While 
 giving to the people universal manhood suffrage, he took 
 good care that their representatives in the Reichstag should 
 be powerless. The national government and administration 
 were to remain in the hands of an all-powerful bureaucracy. 
 Bismarck came to power at a moment when the internal 
 position of Prussia had become so desperate, when the 
 conflict between the Bang and his Parliament had become 
 so hopeless, that William I., who then was only King of 
 Prussia, could no longer find a ministry wiUing to carry on 
 the government of the country. The King had become so 
 despondent that he had actually drawn up an Act of Ab- 
 dication, and was about to retire into private life. Bismarck 
 induced WiUiam I. to entrust him with the government of 
 the country, and to tear up the Act of Abdication. Having 
 been given full power, Bismarck governed Prussia with a 
 hand of iron. He collected iUegaUy the taxes in opposition 
 to a hostile and protesting Parhament, and he conducted 
 three successful wars which made little Prussia the most 
 powerful State in Europe, and which made WiUiam I. 
 Emperor of a united Germany. WiUiam I. was loyalty per- 
 sonified. He, who had been about to abdicate and leave 
 the country, owed his great position to Bismarck. His 
 gratitude to Prince Bismarck was great. Bismarck felt 
 certain that he could absolutely rely upon the Emperor, 
 that the Emperor was likely to act always in accordance 
 with his own views. Therefore, in drawing up the German 
 
REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 313 
 
 Constitution, Bismarck could most easily secure all influence 
 and authority to himself by placing all power nominally 
 into the old Emperor's hands. 
 
 According to the Bismarckian Constitution, Germany 
 had no responsible ministers, but only one responsible 
 minister, the Imperial Chancellor, to whom all the Secre- 
 taries of State were responsible. The Chancellor, who thus 
 undertook responsibility for the conduct of all the depart- 
 ments of State, was responsible not to Parliament, but only 
 to the Emperor. In Germany, ministers and other high 
 dignitaries were taken not from the parliamentary Parties, 
 as in other parhamentary countries, but from the ranks 
 of the bureaucracy, the army, and the courtiers. Hence 
 Government and ParHament, and Government and people, 
 were out of touch. The ministers were the Emperor's 
 servants. They were appointed and dismissed by the 
 Emperor, and they stood outside and above the Reichstag 
 and the Parties. No vote of lack of confidence could, 
 therefore, shake the position of a minister as long as he 
 continued to enjoy the support of the monarch. When 
 Emperor and Chancellor agreed, Parliament was powerless, 
 especially as it was doubtful whether the German Reichstag 
 was, according to the Constitution, entitled to withhold 
 supplies by refusing the granting of taxes which had previ- 
 ously been estabhshed for an indefinite number of years. 
 In Germany, in Prussia, and in aU the minor German States, 
 the ministers were chosen and dismissed by the sovereign, 
 and they were responsible not to Parliament, but only to 
 the sovereign. Therefore the people represented in ParHa- 
 ment could not rid themselves of an incapable or unpopular 
 minister by voting against him, by withholding supplies, 
 or by not voting his salary. On the other hand, a Reichstag 
 which had become obnoxious to the Emperor or to his 
 Chancellor could be dissolved by the Government, for, 
 according to the Constitution, the Emperor was entitled to 
 dissolve it. An inconvenient Reichstag was simply sent 
 home in the hope that the next Reichstag would be of a 
 different character, and the powerful Government apparatus 
 
314 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 
 
 was set in motion to influence the people at Election time 
 in the desired way. Hence in Germany, and also in the 
 individual States composing it, all real power was in the 
 hands of the hereditary ruler, who was often far more 
 strongly influenced by the views of his courtiers and his 
 aristocratic entourage than by the views of the people, 
 especially as the views of the people were only too often 
 distorted by a venal press. In Germany parliamentarism 
 was therefore merely a form. The people were practically 
 powerless to interfere in matters of Government and ad- 
 ministration or to influence appointments which, especially 
 if the ruler was incapable and headstrong, often went rather 
 by favour than by merit. The Handhuch filr Sozialdemok- 
 ratische Wdhler wrote quite correctly : 
 
 " A Constitution was given by Bismarck to Germany 
 which provided for a democratic parliament based on uni- 
 versal manhood suffrage, but which, owing to the fact that 
 it left unclear the question whether the Reichstag is entitled 
 to withhold suppKes, placed all actual power into the hands 
 of the Federal Government, or rather into those of the 
 Prussian Government which serves as its centre. The King 
 of Prussia and the Prime Minister of the Prussian Cabinet, 
 who acts at the same time as Chancellor of the German 
 Empire, hold in their hands all real power. Bismarck made 
 a Constitution which would suit himself. 
 
 " Prussia rules in Germany, and Germany is ruled by the 
 aristocrats and plutocrats who are all powerful in the un- 
 democratic and non-representative Prussian parliament who 
 possess a decisive influence upon the Court and the army. . . . 
 Opinions differ as to the Reichstag's power of withholding 
 supplies. However, so much is certain that taxes and other 
 sources of the national income which have once been voted 
 cannot be discontinued in consequence of the veto of the 
 Reichstag." 
 
 The Imperial Constitution had laid down the principle 
 that there was to be one member of the Reichstag for every 
 100,000 inhabitants. Germany had in 1871 a little less 
 than 40,000,000 inhabitants, and in accordance with the 
 
REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 315 
 
 population of the time the new Imperial Reichstag waa 
 composed of 397 members. The Germans were a liberal- 
 minded people. The middle classes in the towns had 
 agitated during many decades for democratic and parlia- 
 mentary government, and they had received with delight 
 the gift of universal manhood suffrage, which seemed to 
 promise the advent of parliamentary government. Liberal- 
 ism was in excelsis, and not unnaturally it became the 
 controUing element in the new Reichstag. At the first 
 Election in the German Empire, that of 1871, the Liberal 
 Groups elected 203 members, and had therefore the absolute 
 majority in the House. At the second Election, that of 
 1874, they were represented by 212 members, and com- 
 manded an increased majority. Bismarck had meant to 
 give to Germany only the semblance of parliamentary 
 government. He did not wish to see his policy circum- 
 scribed by a Party which possessed the majority in the 
 Reichstag. Therefore he endeavoured to break up the great 
 Liberal Party, and he succeeded. Through Bismarck's 
 activity the Liberal Party was divided and subdivided into 
 a number of quarrelling and powerless factions. 
 
 In all countries Liberalism has found its adherents chiefly 
 in the large towns, and especially among the working men 
 in shop and factory. The German Liberal Party, the Party 
 which strove for real parliamentary government, and which, 
 therefore, was dangerous to the Government, could be 
 rendered impotent by separating the middle class of the 
 towns, which furnished the leaders, from the working men 
 in the towns, who were their natural followers. When the 
 Social Democratic Party arose, Bismarck saw his oppor- 
 tunity of crippling German Liberahsm. Two attempts on 
 the life of the Emperor William I. gave him the opportunity 
 of accusing the Social Democrats of that crime, and of 
 branding them as a Party of traitors, of assassins, and of 
 enemies to the established order. He instituted a campaign 
 of persecution. He raised the red spectre. He declared 
 that the Social Democrats were the enemies of religion, the 
 nation, and the fatherland, and that it was the duty of all 
 
316 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 
 
 good citizens to combine in fighting " the Party of revolution 
 and of subversion." 
 
 Imperial Germany had a considerable number of parties 
 and political groups, and these were apt to undergo kaleido- 
 scopic changes — between 1871 and 1912 there have been 
 11 Conservative Parties, 14 Liberal Parties, 2 Clerical Parties, 
 9 Nationalist and Particularist Parties, and 5 Socialist 
 Parties — but in reahty Germany, like every other country, 
 had only two great Parties, a Conservative Party and a 
 Liberal Party, Each of these two great Parties was, 
 through the lack of Party discipline and through Govern- 
 mental machinations, subdivided into a number of Groups. 
 The Clerical Centre Party, which represented chiefly the 
 Roman Catholic country districts of Germany, was naturally 
 Conservative in character. The Conservative and the 
 Centre Parties would probably have formed one great Party 
 had not Bismarck divided them by his persecution of 
 Roman Catholicism, the Kulturkampf, which made the 
 Roman CathoHc section a close union for mutual defence, 
 and which divided the Conservative Party into a Roman 
 Catholic and into a Protestant Group, which for a long time 
 fought one another. The old Liberal Party of Germany 
 had been broken up into a number of more and of less 
 advanced sections, and the Social Democratic Party was, 
 rightly considered, not a revolutionary Party, and not even 
 a Socialist Party, but only the most advanced and the 
 most dissatisfied wing of the old Liberal Party of Germany. 
 Formerly the German working men voted for the Liberal 
 candidates, and they would probably have continued to do 
 so had it not been for Bismarck's policy. 
 
 The Social Democratic Party was created by a number 
 of enthusiastic working men and of friends of the working 
 men. It was in the beginning merely a small working-men's 
 Party, which was led by working men and by a few im- 
 practical poHtical enthusiasts, doctrinaires, and philan- 
 thropists. Bismarck's persecution of the Social Democrats 
 had a threefold effect. In the first place it converted the 
 workmen leaders of the Party into martyrs, and caused the 
 
REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 317 
 
 workmen to join in thousands the Social Democratic Party. 
 In the second place, it embittered the Social Democratic 
 leaders, drove them to extreme views, caused them to make 
 violent speeches, and gave colour to their doctrine of the 
 Class War. In the third place, it caused the Liberal leaders 
 and the Liberal Party to become suspicious of working men 
 inclined towards Socialism, and of every measure which 
 might be interpreted and denounced by the Government as 
 helpful to Social Democracy. Thus a gulf was dug between 
 Liberalism and Labour. Labour was driven out of the 
 Liberal Party through the Government's pohcy. The 
 German Social Democratic Party was in reality a Liberal 
 Party which was largely recruited from the working men, 
 and which was led by Social Democratic spokesmen who 
 propounded somewhat out-of-date doctrines and Party 
 programmes. 
 
 Germany was until recently, as she had been in 1871, an 
 absolutely ruled country with a democratic franchise. A 
 German comic paper, the SimpUcissimus , printed just before 
 the Election of 1912 a cartoon in which a gentleman of 
 aristocratic appearance was addressing a number of people. 
 Underneath were the words : " Gentlemen, you have now 
 to fulfil that most important duty of German citizens of 
 voting for the Reichstag. When you have done so, it will 
 again be the Emperor's turn during the next five years." 
 
 At the General Election of 1912 the Conservative Parties 
 proper and the Central Party polled together 4,500,000 
 votes, while the Liberal and Socialist Parties polled together 
 no less than 7,500,000 votes. One may therefore say that 
 there was a majority of 3,000,000 votes against the Govern- 
 ment, that the Conservative Parties which supported the 
 Government were in a small minority. These figures make 
 it clear that it was of the utmost importance to the German 
 Grovernment to prevent a true representation of the people 
 in the Reichstag, and to prevent the representatives of the 
 7,500,000 voters, who were opposed to Conservatism, acting 
 in union. It was of the utmost importance for the Govern- 
 ment that the Liberal Party should remain irreconcilably 
 
318 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 
 
 divided against itself, that they should continue to form a 
 capitalistic section and a Socialistic section, and that these 
 two sections should make war upon one another in accord- 
 ance with Bismarck's policy up to 1914. Bismarck had 
 four successors, but every one of them saw the danger which 
 threatened Germany's established form of uncontrolled 
 and pseudo-popular Government from a reunion of the 
 great Liberal Party of 1871 through a reconciUation of the 
 Liberal sections with the Social Democratic section. Hence 
 every one of Bismarck's successors entreated all good 
 citizens to combine against " the Party of subversion and 
 of revolution." Before the General Election of 1907 it was 
 Prince Biilow, and before that of 1912 it was Herr von 
 Bethmann Hollweg, who painted to the electors in lurid 
 colours the danger of the " Red Peril." 
 
 Germany had a peculiar form of election. A candidate 
 was elected only when he received an absolute majority of 
 all the votes given. If, owing to the number of candidates 
 standing for the Reichstag, none of them received an 
 absolute majority, a second poll was held between those 
 two candidates who had received the largest number of votes 
 and therefore headed the poll. If, as was frequently the 
 case, there were three candidates — let us say a Conservative, 
 a Liberal, and a Social Democratic candidate — who fairly 
 evenly divided the poll between them, a second poll had to 
 take place. If now the " State-supporting Parties " could 
 be induced to vote against the Social Democrat and for the 
 Conservative candidate, the Liberal Party strengthened the 
 Conservative Party and the Government to its own harm. 
 Therefore the Government found it particularly important 
 at Election times to bring out the Red Peril, and especially 
 at the moment when the arrangements for the second polls 
 had to be made. That was always the time when the 
 German Government found it most desirable to keep wide 
 open the division between the capitalistic and the Social 
 Democratic wing of the Liberal Party by persuading all 
 good citizens to vote against the Red Peril. The importance 
 of the second poll may be gauged from the fact that in 1912 
 
REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 319 
 
 out cf the 397 members of the Reichstag only 206 were 
 elected at the first poll. It was, therefore, not unnatural 
 that en the 13th of January 1912, the day following the first 
 poll, vhich had shown a great decrease in the votes given to 
 the Conservative Parties and an enormous increase in those 
 given to the Liberal Parties, the North German Gazette 
 publiied a Government appeal which stated : 
 
 " A) the second polls Social Democracy cannot conquer 
 by its own strength. Every mandate which it wins it will 
 owe t) the non-Socialist citizens of Germany. The non- 
 Socialst Parties themselves will have to bear the blame if 
 the r«d flood rises still higher. . . . What non-Socialist 
 Party can make common cause with an enemy who proudly 
 shrieks his furious hatred in the face of them all and of the 
 wholeexisting order of the State ? And what is the attitude 
 of Sodal Democracy to our national demands and tasks ? 
 At hone the Socialists strive to isolate the working classes 
 from fU the other classes of the people. The Class War is 
 the ebment in which they live. Social Revolution, with 
 the atolition of private property, is their goal. Whilst they 
 fomen; hatred and practise terrorism at home, they worship 
 the piantom of universal brotherhood among nations 
 abroac. Therefore they are the hope of the foreign nations 
 which 3nvy and oppose the German Empire. 
 
 " Oir peace and prosperity can be preserved only if we 
 maintan ourselves as a strong and united nation able to 
 face tie world. Among the immediate tasks of the new 
 Reichsag will be the task of increasing our armed strength. 
 A Pary which calls itself international and which dares to 
 entertan the thought of a general strike in case of a mobilisa- 
 tion is by its very nature incapable of fulfilling these im- 
 portan tasks." 
 
 Hypcritical and hysterical appeals against the Social 
 Democats such as the foregoing emanated not only from 
 Germai officials and from the politicians belonging to the 
 Conserative Parties. The Emperor himself had branded 
 the Sodal Democrats in various speeches as "a band of 
 fellows lot worthy to bear the names of Germans," " enemies 
 to the livine order of things without a fatherland," etc. It 
 was of ourse ridiculous to describe a Party which embraced 
 
320 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 
 
 more than 4,250,000 grown-up men and considerably more 
 than one-third of the German population as " not "worthy 
 to bear the name of Germans," " enemies to the Divine order 
 of things without a fatherland." It was, however, equally 
 ridiculous to believe that the 4,250,329 people who in 1912 
 gave their votes to Social Democratic candidates would 
 subscribe to the orthodox Socialist doctrines. As a matter 
 of fact, the SociaHst Party had in 1911 only 837,0CD sub- 
 scribing members, of whom 108,000 were women. Deduct- 
 ing the women, we find that of the 4,250,329 Social Demo- 
 cratic voters only 729,000, or about one-sixth, were avowed 
 Socialists. We may therefore, perhaps, conclude that the 
 remaining five-sixths were men who voted for Social Demo- 
 cratic candidates without being convinced Socialist.'. 
 
 The reason that millions of Germans belonging to all 
 classes of society — bankers, merchants, doctors, school 
 teachers, and a very large number of Government oflfcials — 
 voted for Social Democratic candidates lay in this, tiat the 
 Social Democrats were the only Party which deterninedly 
 and unceasingly opposed the German Governmert, and 
 fought continually for real parliamentary govenment. 
 All the other Parties, the capitalistic Liberal Parties 
 included, opposed the Government only here and tiere in 
 the hope of becoming the Government Party and beiefiting 
 by the Government's bounty. The German Govenment 
 was not averse from rewarding political services with official 
 positions, rapid promotion in the Government anploy, 
 titles, decorations, and even with financial favours. There- 
 fore all opponents to the Government were meek andmild in 
 their criticism of the Government's poUcy and of the merman 
 institutions, and they accepted uncomplainingly tie sub- 
 ordinate position given to the people and its represeitatives. 
 I give one example out of many. The German Enperor's 
 indiscretion in pubfishing in the Daily Telegraph n 1908, 
 without the Chancellor's consent, an interview wHch was 
 very damaging to Germany's foreign policy, creafcd enor- 
 mous excitement throughout the country, and led to what 
 was called a " constitutional crisis." All the Part^ leaders 
 
REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 321 
 
 made violent speeches against the Emperor's usurpation of 
 political action in violation of the German Constitution, 
 which expressly lays down that every political act of the 
 Emperor must be approved of and countersigned by the 
 Imperial Chancellor. However, only the Social Democrats 
 took pohtical steps devised to make the German Govern- 
 ment responsible to Parliament by moving various amend- 
 ments to the German Constitution, the principal of which 
 ran as follows : " The Imperial Chancellor is responsible for 
 his official actions. His responsibility covers all political 
 actions of the Emperor, The Imperial Chancellor must be 
 dismissed if the Reichstag demands it." It is scarcely 
 necessary to say that the other Parties opposed the Social 
 Democratic proposals, which would have introduced the 
 beginning of parliamentary government. 
 
 The German Government tried to prevent the Liberal 
 Party becoming too powerful in the Reichstag, not only 
 by endeavouring unceasingly to keep it divided against 
 itself, but also by securing the over-representation in the 
 Reichstag of the Conservative and the under-representation 
 of the Liberal section of the community. Since 1871, and 
 especially since 1879, when Protection was introduced into 
 Germany, the population of the industrial and commercial 
 centres had grown enormously, while that of the country 
 districts had remained almost stationary. The towns 
 in Germany, as the towns in all countries, were the strong- 
 holds of Liberalism, Radicalism, and Socialism. Now, 
 although the population of the German towns had grown 
 enormously, no redistribution of the electoral districts had 
 been effected. In 1914 the Reichstag had still 397 members 
 as in 1871. Berlin had still only six representatives in the 
 Reichstag, although, according to its population, it should 
 have had more than twenty. However, by giving Berlin 
 fourteen additional representatives, the Government would 
 merely have added fourteen members to the Liberal and 
 Social Democratic Parties. Therefore Berlin had to be 
 satisfied with six members. A similar state of affairs pre- 
 vailed in all the large towns. 
 
322 REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 
 
 German parliamentary government — if one can speak of 
 parliamentary government in Germany under the Imperial 
 regime — was based on minority rule. By refusing the read- 
 justment of electoral districts, the German Government 
 tried to establish minority rule in permanence and to se- 
 cure the predominance of the Conservative and reactionary 
 Parties. 
 
 Parliamentary misrepresentation of the people was the 
 ideal of the Prussian aristocrats and bureaucrats, who hated 
 popular government, and who had had experience of the 
 advantages which the Prussian franchise gave to the 
 privileged classes. 
 
 The Imperial German Government, which was merely 
 the Prussian Government writ large, had no particular 
 liking for parliamentarism, and it did everything in its power 
 to hinder its development. The humiliating way in which 
 the payment of the Reichstag members was arranged was 
 characteristic of the Government's attitude towards them. 
 Since 1906 every member of the Reichstag was paid £150 
 per year, but from this sum £1 was deducted for every day 
 on which a member had either not attended at all or had 
 not attended a division. In order to prove that he had 
 actually attended the sitting, every member had, like an 
 office boy, to put down his name in an attendance book 
 provided for the purpose of control. 
 
 From year to year it was becoming more difficult for the 
 Government to continue governing the country with a 
 Reichstag elected under a manhood franchise and with a 
 Reichstag majority representing only a small minority of the 
 people. The German population was increasing by about 
 800,000 per year, and that increase took place practically 
 exclusively in the towns, the strongholds of Liberalism and 
 of Social Democracy. Through this natural growth of the 
 population the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties were 
 likely to receive every year an accession of about 200,000 
 voters. Year by year the minority rule became more 
 absurd and indefensible. Difficulties in domestic politics 
 no doubt contributed to the war of 1914. 
 
REICHSTAG AND PARTIES IN 1914 323 
 
 While the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties drew 
 their strength chiefly from the towns, the Conservative 
 and Centre Parties drew theirs chiefly from the country. 
 The German towns, the seats of Germany's wealth, industry, 
 and intelligence, were getting more and more impatient of 
 being ruled and taxed by the country, or rather by the 
 country squires, the " Junkers " and their Clerical allies. 
 They were getting more and more impatient of being 
 governed and shepherded and ordered about by bureaucrats 
 over whom they had no control. They were getting more 
 and more impatient of the constant and irksome restraints 
 which were imposed upon them by a paternal, honest, and 
 hard-working, but clumsily and constantly interfering, 
 police and officialdom. They had at last discovered that, 
 however they voted at Election time, they could not influ- 
 ence in the slightest Germany's legislation and adminis- 
 tration. They had discovered that they could not, with 
 their votes, give effective expression to their desire for the 
 redress of their grievances or compel the institution of those 
 reforms which they desired, that parliamentary govern- 
 ment was a sham. 
 
 In concluding this chapter, which first appeared in the 
 fourth edition of this book, and which was published in 
 July 1912, I stated : 
 
 " Possibly the Government may try to escape from the 
 critical domestic position towards which it is drifting by 
 engaging in a great war, which, if it be victorious, would 
 give new prestige and a fresh lease of power to the German 
 autocracy." 
 
 This forecast was to come true two years after it 
 had been published. 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 
 WHY AND HOW GERMANY BROUGHT ABOUT 
 THE GREAT WAR ^ 
 
 During the first half of 1914 peace in Europe seemed firmly 
 and permanently established. Although the situation in 
 Ireland was causing much anxiety, the people thought of 
 their holidays, and as foreign affairs were quite uneventful 
 and uninteresting the newspapers and periodicals filled the 
 space usually devoted to foreign poUtics with the discussion 
 of schemes for abolishing war and restricting national 
 armaments. In August five of the six European Great 
 Powers, with more than 400,000,000 people, were at war. 
 More than 20,000,000 soldiers had been mobilised and were 
 dealing out death and destruction. The greatest war the 
 world has seen, and perhaps the greatest the world will ever 
 see, had begun. People were asking : Why did the German 
 Emperor make war ? What was its real cause ? What 
 wiU be its issue and its consequences ? 
 
 Many people in England were surprised and amazed 
 that the German Emperor, who was considered to be the 
 strongest defender of the world's peace, should recklessly 
 have plunged all Europe into war ; that he should rashly 
 have jeopardised the existence of his country and of his 
 dynasty on account of Austria's quarrel with Serbia ; that 
 the Triple AUiance, which only recently had been renewed, 
 and which was proclaimed to be an absolutely reliable 
 partnership, should have broken down before the first shot 
 was fired ; that Germany, which was supposed to be the 
 best governed and administered country in the world, and 
 which imder Bismarck had always known how to isolate 
 
 ^ From the Nineteenth Century and After, September 1914. 
 
 324 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 325 
 
 her enemies and secure for herself the support of the leading 
 Powers, should, in company with Austria- Hungary and 
 Turkey, have gone to war with six powerful nations — 
 France, Russia, Great Britain, Belgium, Serbia, and Japan 
 — whose ranks seemed likely to increase to eight if, as 
 appeared probable, Italy and Roumania should range them- 
 selves on the side of Germany's opponents ; that the German 
 Navy should have remained absolutely inactive during the 
 first critical weeks of the war, when its value and influence 
 would have been greatest, and that the celebrated German 
 Army should have begun the campaign by a series of palpable 
 mistakes. However, the readers of the earlier editions of 
 this book and of the Nineteenth Century and After could 
 scarcely be surprised, for I had frequently and emphatically 
 foretold the War during more than a decade. Year after 
 year I warned the British and the German peoples with all 
 my strength of the coming catastrophe. Year by year I 
 watched with increasing concern the mistakes of Germany's 
 foreign and domestic policy, which were bound to lead to 
 disaster. In the preface to the fourth edition of this book, 
 published in the autumn of 1912, I wrote : 
 
 " During the last few years Germany's failures, to which 
 I had drawn attention in previous editions, have become 
 more saUent and more frequent. During twenty years the 
 German Foreign Office has serenely marched from failure 
 to failure. The Morocco fiasco is merely the last of a large 
 number of mistaken and unsuccessful enterprises. 
 
 " By her pohcy towards Great Britain, Germany has 
 brought into being the Triple Entente and that isolation 
 about which she has so frequently complained, and she is 
 accelerating the unification of the British Empire, which 
 she wishes to prevent and has tried to prevent. The failure 
 of her domestic pohcy is proclaimed by the constant increase 
 of the Social Democratic Party, which polled more than 
 4,250,000 votes at the Election of 1912. Germany's pros- 
 perity is admittedly phenomenal. Still, a careful observer 
 cannot help noticing that her economic progress is slackening. 
 Germany's future seems no longer as bright as it used to 
 appear." 
 
326 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 Although intimate friends of the Emperor often assured 
 me that he was a prince of peace, I never ceased to describe 
 him as immoderately ambitious, reckless, and dangerous to 
 the peace of the world, and I indicated almost the exact 
 moment when he would strike. In an article " England, 
 Germany, and the Baltic," which was given first place in the 
 Nineteenth Century in July 1907, 1 pointed out the enormous 
 strategical importance of the Baltic and Norths Sea Canal, 
 which was being greatly enlarged so as to make it available 
 to the largest German Dreadnoughts and which would 
 practically double the striking power of the German Fleet. 
 In one of the concluding paragraphs I said with aU the 
 emphasis which I could bring to bear : 
 
 " It is expected that eight years will be required to finish 
 the Baltic and North Sea Canal. Therefore during the 
 next eight years Germany will be unable to avail herself of 
 the great advantages furnished by the Baltic and North Sea 
 Canal, except for her smaller and older ships. Her magnifi- 
 cent new ships will for about eight years be restricted to 
 one of the German seas. Consequently Germany will, during 
 the next eight years, do all in her power to avoid a conflict 
 with a first-class naval Power. During the next eight years 
 Germany has every reason to keep the peace. Only when 
 the enlargement of the Baltic and North Sea Canal has been 
 accomplished will she be ready for a great naval war." 
 
 The article, and especially its conclusion, attracted a 
 great deal of attention, both in England and abroad. By 
 accelerating the work, the Kiel Canal was finished not in 
 eight years, but in seven. Its completion was celebrated 
 on the 24th of June 1914, five weeks before the outbreak of 
 the War, and by the irony of fate English warships took a 
 prominent part in the festivities. 
 
 To those who had given the matter some consideration 
 it was clear that if Germany should embark upon a world 
 war the Netherlands might become its principal theatre. 
 In an article, " The Absorption of Holland by Germany," 
 I wrote in the Nineteenth Century in July 1906 : 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 327 
 
 " During four centuries the Netherlands have been the 
 centre of gravity to the European Great Powers. The 
 sceptre of Europe lies buried not on the banks of the Bos- 
 phorus, but at the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt. 
 Therefore the Netherlands have during four centuries been 
 the battlefield on which the struggle for the mastery of 
 Europe and of the world has been decided. In the Nether- 
 lands the mighty armies with which PhiUp II. , Louis XIV. , 
 Louis XV., and Napoleon I. strove to subdue Europe and 
 to conquer the world were broken to pieces, and in the 
 Netherlands Germany may find either her Gembloux, her 
 Breda, or her Waterloo." 
 
 WHben William 11. came to the throne Germany domin- 
 ated Europe. Her position was impregnable and unas- 
 sailable. The Triple Alliance was absolutely reliable and 
 Germany's possible antagonists were isolated, for Bismarck 
 had with marvellous skill created a strong antagonism 
 between France and Italy, by giving Tunis, which was 
 claimed by Italy, to France. Besides, he had estranged 
 France and England by inciting France to encroach upon 
 England's Colonial domain and to pursue an anti-British 
 poUcy, and he had increased the differences between 
 England and Russia by encouraging Russia to press upon 
 England in Asia. As both France and Russia were an- 
 tagonistic to England, Germany could always count upon 
 Great Britain's support, or at least upon her benevolent 
 neutrality, in case of that war on two fronts which Bis- 
 marck dreaded so much. 
 
 The great value which the Iron Chancellor attached to 
 good and cordial relations with England was apparent from 
 many of his pubUc utterances. On the 10th of July 1885, 
 for instance, on the occasion of some colonial dispute be- 
 tween England and Germany, he stated in the Reichstag : 
 
 " I would ask the last speaker not to make any attempt 
 to disturb the good relations between England and Germany, 
 or to diminish the confidence that peace between these two 
 Powers will be maintained by hinting that some day we may 
 find ourselves in an armed conflict with England. I abso- 
 22 
 
328 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 lutely deny that possibility. It does not exist, and all the 
 questions which are at present being discussed between 
 England and Germany are not of sufficient importance to 
 justify a breach of the peace on either side of the North 
 Sea. Besides, I really do not know what dispute could 
 arise between England and Germany." 
 
 Four years later, on the 26th of January 1889, Bismarck 
 stated in the Reichstag with reference to Anglo-German 
 differences' regarding Zanzibar : 
 
 " The preservation of Anglo-Grerman goodwill is, after 
 all, the most important thing for us. I see in England an 
 old and traditional ally. No differences exist between 
 England and Germany. If I speak of England as our ally, 
 I am not using a diplomatic term. We have no alliance 
 with England, However, I wish to remain in close contact 
 with England also in colonial questions. The two nations 
 have marched side by side during at least a hundred and 
 fifty years, and if I should discover that we might lose 
 touch with England, I should act with caution and endeavour 
 to avoid losing England's goodwill." 
 
 Bismarck desired that Germany's relations with Great 
 Britain should be most cordial, because he counted upon 
 British support in case of a war with France and Russia 
 combined. He dreaded England's hostility not only 
 because Germany was vulnerable at sea, but also because 
 he knew that Germany and Austria- Hungary could reckon 
 upon the loyal support of allied Italy only as long as Great 
 Britain was either friendly or observed a benevolent 
 neutrahty. As Italy has very extensive coasts, as most of 
 her large towns can be sheUed from the sea, as her most 
 important strategic and commercial railways run close to 
 the seashore, and can easily be destroyed by the warships 
 of a superior naval Power, and as she is economically as 
 dependent upon her sea trade as is Great Britain, it was 
 clear that England's hostiUty to Germany and Austria- 
 Hungary would automatically lead to Italy deserting her 
 allies in case of war. Italy's desertion was foretold long 
 before the War by those acquainted with the true position, 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 329 
 
 as I, for instance, did in the chapter of this book which 
 deals with the Triple AlUance and which was published in 
 the Fortnightly Review in 1912. 
 
 Under Bismarck's guidance Germany had grown great 
 by three victorious wars. Having created Germany's 
 unity and firmly estabUshed the State, Bismarck desired to 
 estabhsh its permanence and security by pursuing a peaceful, 
 prudent, moderate, and concihatory foreign policy, rightly 
 fearing that a poHcy of dash and adventure, of interference, 
 provocation, and bluster, would raise dangerous enemies to 
 the new State. In one of the concluding chapters of his 
 Memoirs, his poHtical testament, that great statesman laid 
 down on large lines the policy which Germany ought to 
 pursue in the future, in the following phrases : 
 
 " In the future not only sufficient military equipment, 
 but also a correct political eye, will be required to guide the 
 German ship of State through the currents of coahtion to 
 which, in consequence of our geographical position and our 
 previous history, we are exposed. 
 
 " We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling 
 among the nations, which has been called forth through our 
 growth to the position of a real Great Power, by honourable 
 and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world 
 that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less 
 partisan, and also less harmful for the freedom of other 
 nations, than would be the hegemony of France, Russia, 
 or England. 
 
 " In order to produce this confidence, it is above every- 
 thing necessary that we should act honourably and openly, 
 and be easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward 
 events." 
 
 In 1888 William II. came to the throne. Believing that 
 he possessed the genius and the universality of Frederick 
 the Great, and being confirmed in that opinion by the 
 flatterers surrounding him, the young Emperor declared in 
 his overweening self-confidence that he was divinely in- 
 spired, that he had received his crown from God, and that 
 he was responsible only to God. 
 
 Intoxicated by the exuberance of his own verbosity and 
 
330 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 I 
 
 by the adulation of his entourage, and animated by a bound- [ 
 less confidence in himself, WiUiam II., like another Frederick | 
 the Great, took the control of all the great departments n 
 of State out of the hands of his responsible Ministers and i 
 assumed their direction. Soon after his accession he dis- 
 missed Prince Bismarck, who refused to carry out the hasty, 
 crude, and iU-considered views of the new Emperor. After 
 Bismarck's dismissal the young Emperor declared, with : 
 the admiring applause of his flattering courtiers, that he : 
 would steer the ship of State over a new course, his own 
 course, that he would lead the nation to a great and glorious I 
 future, that henceforth he would be his own Chancellor. 
 Pursuing a purely personal policy, and allowing himself to t 
 be swayed by the impulses of the moment, he threw caution s 
 to the wind, and irritated and exasperated, by his restless ' 
 and interfering policy, not only the continental Powers, : 
 both large and small, but also Great Britain, Germany's j 
 " old and traditional ally," and the United States. 
 
 From his retirement Bismarck looked upon the Emperor's « 
 activity with anxiety and dismay. He feared that William . 
 II. would endanger Germany's future. Obviously referring \ 
 to William II. and to the flattering courtiers surrounding 
 him, and comparing him with his grandfather, the Em- 
 peror William I., the founder of the German Empire, ' 
 Bismarck wrote in his Memoirs : 
 
 " The Emperor William I. was completely free from 
 vanity of this kind ; on the other hand he had in a high ' 
 degree a peculiar fear of the legitimate criticism of his ^ 
 contemporaries and of posterity. 
 
 " No one would have dared to flatter him openly to his i 
 face. In his feehng of royal dignity he would have thought 
 ' If any one has the right of praising me to my face, he i 
 has also the right of blaming me to my face.' He would , 
 not admit either. 
 
 " What I fear is, that by following the road in which we 
 are walking our future will be sacrificed to the impulses 
 of the moment. Former rulers looked more to the capacity 
 than the obedience of their advisers ; if obedience alone is ( 
 the qualification, then demands will be made on the general 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 331 
 
 ability of the monarch, which even a Frederick the Great 
 could not satisfy, although in his time politics, both 
 in war and peace, were less difficult than they are to-day." 
 
 WiUiam II. disregarded Bismarck's wise advice that 
 Germany should follow a frank and conciliatory policy, and 
 that she should endeavour to avoid friction with other 
 nations ; and, in addition, he made the fatal mistake of 
 challenging Great Britain's naval supremacy. Thus he 
 converted Germany's " old and traditional ally " into a 
 dangerous opponent. 
 
 Clearly recognising that Germany's naval policy would, 
 in case of a great European conflict, compel England to 
 support Germany's opponents, the writer of this book 
 repeatedly urged the danger of Germany's naval and anti- 
 British poUcy upon Prince Biilow, Admiral von Tirpitz, 
 and other leading Germans, but he preached to deaf ears. 
 
 In the summer of 1911 the second Morocco crisis broke 
 out in consequence of the dispatch of the Panther to Agadir. 
 It nearly led to war between France and Germany. Both 
 in England and in Germany war was expected, and Mr. 
 Lloyd George plainly announced in his Mansion House 
 speech that if Germany should attack France, Great Britain 
 would aid France in her defence. The tension between 
 Great Britain and Germany reached the breaking point. 
 In December 1911, when the Morocco question had been 
 settled, I happened to see one of the leading German 
 diplomats at the German Foreign Office. In the course of 
 a long conversation I pointed out once more that Germany's 
 trans-maritime policy not only endangered her security, 
 but was bound to lead to the break-up of the Triple AUiance ; 
 that she rashly risked her very existence ; that Germany's 
 safety on the Continent depended on good relations with 
 Great Britain ; that she would act wisely in ceasing to 
 antagonise France ; that she should not increase her fleet 
 beyond the provisions of her gigantic naval programme ; 
 that she should stop the anti-British agitation of the German 
 navy party ; that if Germany continued on the course on 
 
332 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 which she had embarked a collision between Great Britain 
 and Germany was inevitable. I added that an Anglo- 
 German war might lead not merely to Germany's defeat, but 
 to her downfall ; and that my action was undertaken rather 
 in the interest of Germany than in that of Great Britain, 
 for if the two countries should unhappily go to war Germany 
 would risk very much, while Great Britain would risk but 
 little. The eminent personage before whom I put these 
 considerations treated me with studied discourtesy. The 
 leaders of Germany's foreign policy seemed struck with 
 blindness. 
 
 A few weeks after this conversation the German Navy 
 programme received another enormous expansion. The 
 whole German Fleet was to be put on a permanent war 
 footing in time of peace. More ships were to be laid down, 
 and once more a virulent and extremely malicious anti- 
 British agitation was engineered in the German Press by the 
 Press Bureau of the German Admiralty. Shortly after my 
 return I wrote an article on " Anglo- German Differences and 
 Sir Edward Grey," which appeared in the Fortnightly Review, 
 and which was addressed to the German Foreign Office. In 
 ,^ that article I gave the following warning : 
 
 " Great Britain has little cause to plead for Germany's 
 goodwill, for she suffers little through the existing Anglo- 
 German tension, while isolated Germany suffers much and 
 risks more. While Great Britain's position throughout the 
 world is secure, that of Germany is very precarious because 
 of her exposed frontiers. As matters stand at present 
 Germany has far more need of Great Britain's support 
 than Great Britain has of Germany's. It is true that Ger- 
 many possesses still the strongest army in Europe, but it is 
 not strong enough to face a great European combination. 
 She is no longer a danger to the peace of the world, owing to 
 her isolation and to the estrangement of Great Britain. The 
 minds of her statesmen must rather be preoccupied with 
 the problem of defending Germany than with ambitious 
 wars of aggression. Under these circumstances it is mad- 
 ness for Germany's rulers to continue proclaiming that 
 Germany requires more Dreadnoughts, and still more 
 
TIJE OUTBREAK OF WAR 333 
 
 Dreadnoughts, and ever more Dreadnoughts against Great 
 Britam, 
 
 " Germany's prospects are dark and threatening. She 
 is not rich enough and not strong enough to maintain at 
 the same time the strongest army and a navy able to 
 challenge the strongest navy. Every nation which has 
 tried to become supreme on land and sea has failed." 
 
 When it became clear that Germany was determined to 
 continue her dangerous anti-British poHcy, I stated in an 
 article pubHshed in the Nineteenth Century in June 1912, 
 and entitled " The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany " : 
 
 " A nation can safely embark upon a bold and costly 
 trans-maritime policy only if it is secure on land, if it 
 either occupies an island, like Great Britain and Japan, 
 or if it occupies an isolated position and cannot be invaded 
 by its neighbours, Hke the United States. Germany has 
 three great land Powers for neighbours. Two of them, 
 France and Russia, are not friendly to Germany, and she 
 cannot rely with absolute certainty upon the support of 
 her third neighbour, Austria-Hungary, a fact of which Bis- 
 marck warned her in his Memoirs. Under these circum- 
 stances it is obvious that Germany's greatest need is not 
 expansion oversea, but defence on land ; that her greatest 
 interests lie not on the sea, but on terra firma.'^ 
 
 It was obvious to many that, owing to the unwise policy 
 of William II., the Triple Alliance had become a sham, 
 that Germany could no longer rely on Italy's support in 
 the hour of need. I wrote in the Nineteenth Century in 
 Jime 1912 : 
 
 " In matters of foreign policy praise or blame must be 
 meted out according to results. At the time of Bismarck's 
 dismissal the Triple Alliance was a solid and reliable partner- 
 ship, and as France on one side of Germany, Russia on 
 another, and Great Britain on a third were isolated, Ger- 
 many's position in the world was absolutely secure. She 
 dominated the Continent. 
 
 " By pursuing an anti-British poUcy, Germany has not 
 only driven Great Britain from Germany's side and has 
 driven her into the arms of France and Russia, but she 
 
334 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 has at the same time greatly weakened the formerly reliable 
 Triple Alliance. Few Germans believe that Germany can 
 count on Italy's support in the hour of need. Thus Grer- 
 many has simultaneously created the Triple Entente and 
 weakened, if not destroyed, the Triple AUiance. It is true 
 the Triple Alliance exists still — on paper. However, Italy 
 would not think of supporting Germany in a war against 
 France, and still less in a war against Great Britain or against 
 Great Britain and France combined. 
 
 " Few intelligent Germans reckon upon Italy's support. 
 Most think that in a great European war Italy will either 
 remain neutral or will be found on the side of Germany's 
 enemies." 
 
 In Bismarck's time, and at the beginning of the reign 
 of WiUiam II., Germany's position was absolutely secure. 
 Not only were Germany's enemies isolated, but the 
 Triple Alliance was in reality a Quintuple Alliance in 
 disguise. The loyalty of Italy was then undoubted, and 
 Germany could firmly reckon upon the support of Turkey 
 and of Roumania in case of need. Turkey and Roumania 
 could have afforded invaluable assistance to the Triple 
 Alliance in case of a war with Russia. By allowing Turkey 
 to be attacked and despoiled in quick succession, first by 
 Italy and then by the Balkan States, Germany seriously 
 changed the balance of power in Europe to her disadvantage ; 
 and Roumania, recognising that the central European group 
 of Powers was no longer the stronger one of the two, not 
 unnaturally turned towards the Powers of the Triple Entente 
 for support, especially as she desired to acquire those vast 
 territories of Austria-Hungary which border upon Rou- 
 mania, and which were inhabited by three million Rou- 
 manians. Through the foolish poUcy of the Emperor, 
 Turkey had been crippled and Roumania had been estranged. 
 Commenting on Germany's impolicy, I wrote in an article 
 " The Changing of the Balance of Power," published in the 
 Nineteenth Century Review in June 1913 : 
 
 " In view of the fact that Germany had driven Great 
 Britain into the arms of France and Russia, and had exposed 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 336 
 
 herself to the possibility of being simultaneously involved 
 in a great war by land and sea, it was of course of the 
 utmost importance to her that her position on land should 
 be absolutely impregnable. In these circumstances it was 
 clearly the first and most urgent duty of German states- 
 manship to take care that Austria-Hungary and Italy 
 should be as strong as possible, and that Roumania and 
 Turkey — and especially Turkey, the support of which 
 should be invaluable in case of complications with Great 
 Britain — should be firmly attached to Germany or to the 
 Triple AUiance. But with the same incredible short-sighted- 
 ness and levity with which Germany had embarked upon 
 an anti- British course, she allowed Turkey to be attacked 
 first by Italy and then by the Balkan States, and to be 
 utterly defeated. If Germany had possessed a poUcy, if 
 her diplomacy had been guided by a statesman, or merely 
 by a man possessed of common sense, she would have known 
 that the support of Turkey would be more valuable to her 
 in the hour of need than that of Italy. She would, there- 
 fore, either have attached Turkey to the Triple Alliance 
 by treaty, as General von Bernhardi had suggested, or she 
 would have rephed to Italy's ultimatum to Turkey by an 
 ultimatum of her own addressed to Italy, which very likely 
 would have prevented the war." 
 
 Year by year it became clearer that the German Emperor's 
 unceasing, imnecessary, and exasperating activity in all 
 quarters of the globe had made Germany's policy univer- 
 sally disliked and suspected, that Germany had come to 
 take that place among the nations which France occupied 
 in the time of Napoleon III., that Germany had become 
 the disturber of the world's peace, and was in danger of 
 being treated as such by the generality of nations. In an 
 article entitled " German Designs in Airica," published in 
 the Nineteenth Century and After in August 1911, 1 wrote : 
 
 " War has been brought within the limits of vision. It 
 is to be hoped that Germany will turn away from the very 
 dangerous course upon which she has embarked, a course 
 which in a very short time may bring her into a coUision 
 not only with France, but with several Great Powers ; and 
 as the Triple Alliance is believed to be a purely defensive 
 
336 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 alliance relating only to Europe, Grermany may find herself 
 deserted by her allies in the hour of trouble. Let us hope 
 that the Morocco crisis can be explained away as the mistake 
 of a single man. Let us hope that Herr von Kiderlen- 
 Waechter will be replaced without delay. That will solve 
 and explain the crisis, and the Morocco incident will soon 
 be forgotten. Persistence on the dangerous and unprece- 
 dented course which Germany is steering at the present 
 moment may imperil Germany's future, and may cost the 
 Emperor his throne. The German nation is intensely 
 loyal and patriotic, but it would never forgive a monarch 
 who had driven the nation into a disastrous war without 
 adequate reason." 
 
 Germany had become a danger to the peace of the world. 
 Time after time she had dragged the nations to the very 
 brink of a world- war. By his ceaseless, neurotic activity, 
 William II. was likely to raise a great coalition against 
 Germany. He was likely to be confronted in the hour of 
 trial by a Europe in arms, as was Napoleon I. a century 
 ago. In my article " The Failure of Post-Bismarckian 
 Germany," pubhshed in the Nineteenth Century and After 
 in June 1912, I wrote : 
 
 " Bismarck was constantly haunted by the thought of 
 the formation of a great European coalition against Germany. 
 This will be seen from his Memoirs, and from many of his 
 letters and conversations. Bismarck's worst fear may be 
 realised before long. Germany's post-Bismarckian diplomacy 
 is doing its best to destroy the work of the great Chancellor. 
 It has already destroyed Germany's security on the Conti- 
 nent. Yet there is no sign that the ' new course ' will be 
 abandoned." 
 
 The forecasts made came true in every particular. Ger- 
 many, which was the undisputed leader of the strongest 
 group of Powers in Europe, which dominated a Quintuple 
 Alliance, and which kept the other Powers in a state of 
 isolation and mutual distrust, had in August 1914 scarcely 
 a single real friend, and she was at war with nearly all 
 Europe. 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 337 
 
 It has been asserted that Germany went to war in order 
 to acquire the hegemony of Europe. That assertion is not 
 correct. Germany possessed the hegemony of Europe in 
 the time of Bismarck. She lost it through the mistaken 
 poUcy of William II., and she was trying to regain by force 
 what she has lost through her own folly. 
 
 Until 1914 the German Army was considered to be by far 
 the best army in the world. However, those who had 
 studied mihtary matters closely and without prejudice 
 were aware that the influence of William II. had been 
 as fatal to the German Army as it had been to Germany's 
 diplomacy. In the first place, since the time when the 
 German Emperor embarked upon naval competition with 
 Great Britain, the army was relatively neglected. It was 
 starved of money and men for the sake of the navy. In the 
 second place, William II. insisted upon being not only 
 his own Chancellor and Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs, but also his own Commander-in-Chief of the army 
 and navy, and his own Chief of the Staff of both services. 
 At the time when the Emperor made the nephew of the 
 Great Moltke Chief of the Staff, appointing him to the same 
 position which his uncle had fiUed with such wonderful 
 success, the rumour was current in weU-informed circles 
 in Berlin that von Moltke had asked not to be given that 
 most responsible position, because he thought that he did 
 not possess the necessary high qualifications, but that the 
 Emperor had replied, "Never mind, Moltke. You can 
 safely take the post. What you don't know I do, and I can 
 do the work for you." At a time when nobody dared to 
 question the pre-eminence and excellence of the German 
 Army, I wrote in the Nineteenth Century Review, in an 
 article entitled " The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Ger- 
 many," published in June 1912 : 
 
 " Guided by the maxim ' Germany's future lies upon the 
 water,' the leaders of the ' new course ' have been so anxious 
 to strengthen the navy that the German Army has been 
 neglected both quantitatively and qualitatively. Grer- 
 many's expenditure on the navy has been comparatively 
 
338 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 extravagant, and that on her army scarcely sufficient. Not 
 only quantitatively but qualitatively as well has the German 
 Army suffered during the ' new course.' German generals 
 complain that promotions are made less by merit and more 
 by favour than in former times. Similar complaints are 
 heard in most Government offices. They complain that 
 the officers are no longer as good as they used to be. Owing 
 to the rise in wages the German Army can no longer obtain 
 a sufficient number of good non-commissioned officers. The 
 German war material also is scarcely up to date. The 
 miUtary outfit of France is superior to that of Germany. 
 According to Lieutenant-Colonel Beyel, of the French 
 artillery, and many other experts, the German artillery is 
 inferior to the French. The tactics of the German Army 
 have become antiquated. According to various German 
 writers Germany has failed to learn the lessons of the 
 Boer War and of the Russo-Japanese War. Major Hoppen- 
 stedt pubHshed in 1910 a book, Bind wir Kriegsfertig ? in 
 which he showed that the German Army is too much occu- 
 pied with barracks-square drill and too little with warlike 
 training. Many officers attribute the neglect of the army 
 to the influence of the Emperor, who is severely criticised. 
 William I. was a soldier by nature. The army was his 
 principal interest. He did not understand the navy. 
 He tolerated no flatterers, and knew no favouritism. He 
 worked incessantly on the improvement of the army. 
 William II. has made the navy his hobby and attends 
 to the army perfunctorily, and many say that it is little 
 better managed than his Foreign Office." 
 
 After the Morocco crisis of 1911 Germany hastily tried to 
 improve her somewhat neglected army by greatly increasing 
 the establishment, improving arms and appliances, strength- 
 ening fortresses, etc. Her military expenditure rose from 
 £47,200,000 in 1912 to £50,400,000 in 1913, and to no less 
 than £83,500,000 in 1914, and a special "war levy" of 
 £50,000,000 was voted by the Reichstag for bringing the 
 army up to date. However, armies and navies are largely 
 spiritual things of slow organic growth. They cannot be 
 improvised, nor can they be rapidly improved if they have 
 been neglected for a long time, even if money is poured out 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 339 
 
 like water. Besides, monetary expenditure, however lavish, 
 cannot alter the spirit of an army and its supreme direction. 
 Money neither gives foresight nor does it destroy conceit 
 in the leaders. It neither replaces officers appointed by 
 favour by men of merit, nor does it improve a defective 
 organisation and faulty tactics. 
 
 Modesty, concentration, thoroughness, and hard work 
 command success in diplomacy and war. While modesty 
 and thoroughness were the great characteristics of William I. 
 and of his time, the reign of William II. had become 
 notorious for luxury, ostentation, arrogance, favouritism, 
 amateurishness, self-praise, self-advertisement, and con- 
 ceit. During the reign of WiUiam II. the old Prussian 
 virtues of frugality, modesty, and thoroughness disap- 
 peared. German idealism died, and Berlin became a 
 centre of coarse materiaUsm, of luxury, and of immorality. 
 Encouraged by the most exalted circles, all Germany gave 
 itself over to self-admiration and self-praise. In the 
 Emperor's speeches and in innumerable articles, lectures, 
 pamphlets, and books, the Germans were told that they 
 were, to quote the Emperor, " the salt of the earth," the 
 wisest, ablest, strongest, and most valiant nation in the 
 world, and that they were, therefore, entitled to rule the 
 universe. Foreign nations, especially the English, were 
 looked upon with undisguised contempt. Being convinced 
 of their irresistible might and their great destiny, many 
 Germans thought that Germany should become supreme 
 in the world by the free and unscrupulous use of her irre- 
 sistible strength. Although Bismarck had eloquently 
 warned the nation against Machtpolitik, against pursuing a 
 policy based on force, against the policy which had caused 
 the downfall of Napoleonic France, the idea of Machtpolitik 
 became the guiding principle of the German nation, and 
 the word Machtpolitik was in every one's mouth. Unfortun- 
 ately Bismarck had not practised in the earlier years of his 
 career what he preached in the later. In three great wars 
 he had given to little Prussia the hegemony of Europe. 
 Young Germany hoped, by another series of successful wars, 
 
340 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 to conquer the hegemony of the world. By sheer force and 
 audacity the world was to be made German. 
 
 The Government, following the fatal precedents set by 
 Bismarck, continued to rely on force in its foreign and 
 domestic policy. By force Germany was to conquer for 
 herself " a place in the sun." By force were the Poles, 
 Danes, and Frenchmen in the conquered provinces to be 
 denationalised. By force were Socialism and popular 
 dissatisfaction to be crushed. By force was the German 
 people to be governed against its will, and By force were 
 the rudimentary parliamentary institutions of Germany to 
 be abolished if parliament should cease to obey the will of 
 the ruling class. Patriotic Germans in their thousands had 
 been converted to the gospel of force, and they endeavoured 
 to aid the poKcy of the Government by creating enormous 
 organisations which advocated solving all German problems 
 by that means. The Navy League, with more than a miUion 
 members, demanded that Germany should have the strongest 
 fleet, the Army League that she should have the strongest 
 army, the Air League that she should rule the air. The 
 Ostmarkenverein and Nordmarkenverein agitated in 
 favour of denationalising the Poles and Danes dwelling in 
 the conquered provinces by force. A Government-aided 
 league made war on Socialism, and the Pan- Germanic League, 
 founded three years after the Emperor's accession, advo- 
 cated Germany's conquest of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, 
 the Baltic provinces of Russia, etc. It advocated the 
 Germanisation of Europe and of the world. An enormous 
 literature arose in which " the war of the future " was 
 vividly and patriotically described, Li hundreds of 
 romances the German people, and especially the younger 
 generation, were told how Germany would conquer France 
 and Russia, defeat the EngUsh Fleet, raise Lidia in rebellion, 
 invade England, deprive her of her colonies, punish the 
 United States for their arrogance, and tear up the Monroe 
 doctrine. Scarcely in any of these romances, or in any 
 serious books, was the possibihty of a German defeat 
 contemplated. Countless admirals, generals, university 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 341 
 
 professors, lecturers, authors, and journalists unceasingly 
 preached the need of power, but none the need of wisdom, 
 of caution, and of fairness. To discuss even the possibility 
 of disaster or to advocate moderation was considered un- 
 patriotic. 
 
 The Germans were a most docile nation. They were 
 what their rulers had made them. They might be arrogant 
 to foreigners, but they were always most obedient and re- 
 spectful to their rulers. That lay in their training. They 
 took from their rulers their policy and their opinions. Since 
 the advent of William II. an evil spirit had taken pos- 
 session of Germany. A quarter of a century of stirring 
 Imperial oratory, of Jingoist self-admiration, self-praise, 
 and brag had totally corrupted both the sterling character 
 and the mind of the German nation. 
 
 During the early part of the Emperor's reign the advocates 
 of Germany's expansion beheved in him. They trusted 
 that he, like his ancestors, would be a " Mehrer des Reiches." 
 Wilham II. had no doubt the ambition to increase the 
 territory and the glory of his country, but he had not 
 the ability. When, time after time, the Emperor failed in 
 his attempts to acquire new territories, when one diplo- 
 matic failure followed the other in quick succession, when 
 at last it became generally recognised that he habitually 
 threatened but did not act, Germany's leading men sarcas- 
 tically referred to him as the Eriedenskaiser, the Theater- 
 kaiser, and began openly to call him a coward. After his 
 second failure to overawe France by raising the Morocco 
 question, the ultra-patriotic Post of Berlin referred to him 
 as a " poltron miserable " in leaded print. His friends and 
 his own family, especially the Crown Prince, openly showed 
 their disgust that the Emperor's bold words were never 
 followed by suitable action. Many leading Germans began 
 to despair of the Emperor and of the future of their 
 country. William II. felt the ground on which he stood 
 crumbling under his feet. Deeds, not words, were expected 
 of him. 
 
 The Emperor's unceasing activity had alarmed the 
 
342 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 nations around, and they had made arrangements for their 
 mutual protection. Germany felt hampered and circum- 
 scribed by the Triple Entente. The balance of power was 
 felt to be a powerful check to Germany's desire for expan- 
 sion. Many of the most eminent mihtary men demanded 
 that Germany should endeavour to break up the Triple 
 Entente and destroy the balance of power. General von 
 Bernhardi, for instance, wrote in Unsere Zukunft : 
 
 " We can render secure our position on the Continent of 
 Europe only if we succeed in bursting the Triple Entente 
 and forcing France, which is never likely to co-operate with 
 Germany, to accept that position of inferiority which is 
 her due." 
 
 Numerous statements of similar import made by leading 
 Germans might easily be given. Germany repeatedly tried 
 to destroy the Triple Entente, but as her policy was no 
 longer directed by a master-hand, every attempt at weaken- 
 ing the bonds connecting France, Russia, and Great Britain 
 resulted in the strengthening of their determination to sup- 
 port each other. So Germany bided her time and waited 
 for a favourable opportunity. 
 
 Many patriotic Germans, and especially the leaders of 
 the Pan-Germanic League, advocated the creation of a 
 Greater Germany, the territories of which should reach 
 not only from Hamburg to Trieste, but from Hamburg to 
 Constantinople, and to the lands beyond the Straits. Asia 
 Minor was to become a German colony, the Bagdad Railway 
 a German railway, and thus Egypt and India would fall 
 into Germany's hands. 
 
 Austria-Hungary desired to make herself supreme in the 
 Balkan Peninsula, and to acquire the harbour of Salonica. 
 She allowed the Balkan War to break out, hoping that it 
 would result in the defeat of the Slavonic Balkan States, 
 or in the weakening of both sides, for either result would 
 have facilitated Austria's progress in the direction of 
 Salonica, However, Serbia blocked the way. The valley 
 of the Vardar is the great natural highroad from Vienna and 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 343 
 
 Pudapest on the one hand to Salonica and on the other hand 
 to Constantinople. The Vardar runs through the centre 
 of Serbia. To Austria's dismay the Balkan States were 
 victorious. A stronger Serbia, holding the gateway to 
 Constantinople, was likely to block Austria's and Germany's 
 path to the .^gean Sea and the Bosphorus. Desiring to 
 ruin Serbia, Austria brought about the second Balkan War. 
 In the course of the Balkan War and during the peace 
 negotiations she repeatedly threatened little Serbia with 
 war by inventing outrages done to Austrians — the most 
 notorious case was the infamous invention spread and main- 
 tained by the Austrian Government press for weeks that 
 the Serbians had perpetrated an unnamable mutilation 
 upon the Austrian Consul Prochaska — and by forbidding 
 Serbia to acquire an outlet on the Adriatic. However, while 
 Austria was threatening and blustering in pubKc, she was 
 very kindly but very firmly informed by Mr. Sazonoff in 
 private that an Austrian attack upon Serbia would be 
 equivalent to an Austrian attack upon Russia, that Russia 
 was as strongly interested in Serbia's independence as was 
 Great Britain in the independence of Belgium. Austria 
 clearly knew what the consequences of an attack on Serbia 
 would be. 
 
 When WiUiam II. had dismissed Bismarck he proclaimed 
 that he would henceforth be his own Chancellor. He no 
 longer required an able Chancellor, but only an obedient 
 one. In Bismarck's words quoted above, obedience alone 
 was made the qualification of the monarch's principal 
 adviser. Up to 1914 Bismarck had four successors : General 
 von Capri vi, who was accustomed to disciphne and did what 
 he was told ; Prince Hohenlohe, an outworn diplomat, who 
 was made Chancellor at the age of seventy-five, and who, 
 according to his Memoirs, was very badly treated by the 
 Emperor ; Prince Biilow, a sprightly diplomat and an enter- 
 taining companion full of good jokes and stories ; and Herr 
 von Bethmann-Hollweg, a dull but industrious bureaucrat, 
 who had no experience whatever of diplomacy and of 
 practical statesmanship. When, in the spring of 1892, 
 23 
 
344 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 Bismarck learnt that General von Caprivi intended resigning, 
 he said, according to Harden : 
 
 " I am not pleased with the news. At least he was a 
 general. Who will come next ? That is the question. If 
 you get for Chancellor a Prussian bureaucrat who has learned 
 his trade solely at his desk, then you will see strange happen- 
 ings which at present seem unbelievable." 
 
 This prediction of Bismarck's, as so many others, came true. 
 The unbelievable happened. 
 
 From evidence which it would lead too far to give in detail 
 in these pages it appears that the German Emperor and the 
 late Archduke Franz Ferdinand agreed on common action 
 against Serbia. Austria- Hungary was to pick a plausible 
 quarrel with that country, and Germany was to support the 
 action of her ally with her entire strength. Russia would 
 either intervene or abstain from action. If she only threat- 
 ened but did not act, Russia would lose all credit among 
 the Balkan Slavs, and Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany, 
 would, through Serbia and the Vardar valley, dominate 
 the Balkan Peninsula with Salonica and Constantinople. 
 An enormous step in advance would have been taken. If, 
 on the other hand, Russia should attack Austria-Hungary, 
 war between the two great groups of Powers would ensue. 
 As Great Britain had no direct interests in Serbia, it was 
 expected that she would keep neutral, especially if she 
 should at the time have her hands full with problems of her 
 own. If Great Britain should not take part in such a war, 
 Italy would no doubt support Germany and Austria-Hungary 
 in the hope of receiving valuable territorial compensation 
 for her assistance. By raising the Serbian question there 
 seemed to be a possibihty of ranging the three Powers of 
 the Triple AlUance against France and Russia. A war of 
 three Great Powers against two seemed very promising. A 
 few weeks before the Archduke's murder he was visited 
 by the German Emperor at his castle at Konopischt. It has 
 been asserted that a secret treaty was then concluded 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 345 
 
 between Germany and Austria, and very likely it dealt 
 with the Serbian question in the manner described above. 
 
 After the Archduke's murder Austria- Hungary kept quiet 
 for weeks. Apparently the outrage was to be treated as 
 an ordinary crime, and there was much reason to treat it 
 as such, for the murderers, though Serbs by race, were 
 Austrian citizens. On the 20th of July Sir Edward Grey 
 wrote to the British Ambassador in BerUn that Count 
 Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, 
 had " deprecated the suggestion that the situation [between 
 Austria-Hungary and Serbia] was grave." Three days 
 later, on the 23rd of July, Austria- Hungary dispatched to 
 Serbia, without any previous warning, a totally unaccept- 
 able ultimatum, accusing Serbia of being responsible for 
 the Archduke's death. She gave no proof of her assertion, 
 yet she demanded from Serbia that she should, within 
 forty-eight hours, divest herself of her sovereign rights and 
 place herself under Austria's protection and dependence. 
 What had happened in the meantime ? 
 
 The Irish crisis had been watched by all the Continental 
 Powers with the greatest interest. Civil war in Great 
 Britain seemed unavoidable. At the eleventh hour the King 
 called a conference of the leaders of all parties at Bucking- 
 ham Palace. A settlement by consent seemed possible. 
 That hope quickly disappeared. On the 22nd of July it 
 became generally known in London that the Conference 
 would be a failure, and on the 24th the leaders held their 
 last and purely formal meeting, when the impossi- 
 bihty of reaching an agreement was announced. Great 
 Britain not only had no direct interest in the Austro-Serbian 
 quarrel, but seemed likely to be lamed by the imminence 
 of civil war. Besides, Russia was expected to suffer from 
 famine in consequence of a bad harvest, and both the 
 French President and the French Prime Minister were abroad. 
 Last, but not least, the Russian and French armies were not 
 ready for war. Russia was about to reorganise and greatly 
 increase her army and to construct most important strategi- 
 cal railways, while, according to Senator Humbert's report 
 
346 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 confirmed by the Minister of War, France lacked heavy- 
 artillery, ammunition, and boots, and the French fortresses 
 required strengthening against the heavy artillery introduced 
 in Germany. The whole situation seemed most favourable 
 to the Germanic Powers. The longed-for moment had 
 arrived at last. Now or never was the time to strike. 
 The moment seemed all the more propitious as Germany 
 and Austria-Hungary had recently greatly strengthened their 
 armies ; as Russia had not yet followed suit and was be- 
 lieved to be unprepared ; as, according to Senator Hum- 
 bert's report, grave deficiencies existed in the French 
 Army ; and as, last but not least, the strategically most 
 important Baltic and North Sea Canal had just been 
 completed. 
 
 It has been asserted in Berlin that the initiative for 
 Austria's Serbian policy came from Vienna. That assertion 
 is quite inadmissible. Germany has unmistakably shown 
 to Austria-Hungary in the past that she, as the stronger 
 Power, was not willing to allow herself to be dragged into 
 adventures at the heels of her weaker partner. Besides, 
 Austria-Hungary had, ever since 1848, when Francis Joseph 
 came to the throne, followed a policy of drift and surrender. 
 Hence it seemed most improbable that her aged monarch 
 would, at the end of his days, and upon his own initiative, 
 act with such unexampled and reckless energy. It is true 
 that at the outbreak of the crisis the German Foreign 
 Office declared that they had no knowledge of Austria's 
 ultimatum to Serbia. However, according to a dispatch 
 sent by the British Ambassador in Vienna to Sir Edward 
 Grey, " the German Ambassador [in Vienna] knew the text 
 of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched 
 and telegraphed it to the German Emperor." According to 
 the British Ambassador's report the Emperor "endorsed 
 every line of it." Apparently the German Emperor either 
 inspired the fatal ultimatum himself or at least agreed 
 upon it with Austria-Hungary, leaving the German Foreign 
 Office in complete ignorance of his action. Similar things 
 had happened before. William II. was his own Chancellor 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 347 
 
 and his own Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and he 
 had no use for any but obedient Chancellors and Ministers. 
 From the hundred and fifty-nine documents contained in 
 the Correspondence respecting the European Crisis (Cd. 7467), 
 pubUshed with praiseworthy promptitude by the British 
 Foreign Office, it appears that all the Great Powers except 
 Germany urged Austria-Hungary to settle her quarrel with 
 Serbia by agreement in some form or other. Only Germany 
 raised difficulties by ominously declaring that the matter 
 did not concern any Power except Austria-Hungary and 
 Serbia, that arbitration, conference, or international dis- 
 cussion were out of the question, although she knew that 
 every Balkan question had so far been treated as one of 
 European concern by the Concert of Powers. Assured of 
 Germany's unconditional support, Austria-Hungary abso- 
 lutely declined all proposals towards an amicable settlement 
 made by Sir Edward Grey, and on the 28th of July Count 
 Berchtold informed Russia with haughty abruptness that 
 he could not even discuss Austria's Note to Serbia. 
 
 - But suddenly the aspect of affairs altered very seriously 
 to the disadvantage of Germany and Austria-Hungary. On 
 the 30th of July the British parties agreed to bury all their 
 differences in view of the critical foreign situation. The 
 second reading of the Home Rule Amending Bill was in- 
 definitely postponed. Great Britain was united and stood 
 ready for action. Immediately Austria's tone changed. 
 She now declared in courteous tones her readiness to 
 discuss her unacceptable ultimatum, and plainly displayed 
 her anxiety to come to an understanding with Russia. 
 Peace seemed secure. Unfortunately Austria-Hungary had 
 reckoned without Germany. Although Austria was ready 
 to negotiate, and although Russia declared on the 30th of 
 July that she would " stop all mihtary preparations," the 
 German Emperor sent in hot haste an ultimatum to Russia, 
 demanding that she should unconditionally demobihse 
 within twelve hours. War would be the consequence of 
 refusal. In order to make war with Russia absolutely 
 certain, the Berlin Lokalanzeiger was made to bring out a 
 
348 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 special edition which contained the untrue announcement 
 that the German Army had been mobilised. That announce- 
 ment was immediately telegraphed to Russia by the Am- 
 bassador. Soon afterwards the mobihsation of the German 
 Army was officially declared to be untrue, but as the Govern- 
 ment blocked the wires to Russia, the German denial, which 
 also was telegraphed to Russia by the ambassador, did not 
 reach his Government, which proceeded to mobilise its army. 
 Thus war was brought about, not owing to the differences 
 between Austria and Serbia or to Russia's intervention, 
 for Russia and Austria were both willing to adjust matters 
 peacefully. War was precipitated by the Emperor's action, 
 taken apparently against the advice of his Chancellor and his 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Why did William II. plunge his country and all Europe 
 into war at a moment when peace was in his grasp ? Possibly 
 he was urged into war by the war party. Possibly because 
 he dreaded the supreme disgrace of another diplomatic 
 failure, of another surrender. The governing class and 
 his own family were exasperated at the Emperor's surrenders 
 on the occasions of the first and second Morocco crises. 
 They would never have forgiven him a third surrender, 
 which would have been deadly to the prestige of Germany 
 and to that of the crown. In rushing into this war the 
 Emperor probably knew that he was endangering the very 
 existence of the Empire, that Germany might possibly be 
 defeated, for, addressing from the balcony of his Berlin 
 castle the citizens below on the 31st of July, he said : 
 
 " A fateful hour has fallen for Germany. Envious people 
 everywhere are compelling us to our just defence. The 
 sword has been forced into our hands. I hope that if my 
 efforts at the last hour do not succeed in bringing our 
 opponents to see eye to eye with us, and in maintaining 
 peace, we shall with God's help so wield the sword that we 
 shall restore it to its sheath again with honour. War would 
 demand of us enormous sacrifices in property and life, 
 but we should show our enemies what it means to pro- 
 voke Germany. And now I commend you to God. Go to 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 349 
 
 church and kneel before God and pray for His help and for 
 our gallant army." 
 
 While the Emperor asserted in his speech that Germany 
 was wantonly attacked, the White Book regarding the out- 
 break of war, published by his own Government, stated that 
 Germany unconditionally backed up Austria-Hungary in 
 her Serbian poUcy, with a view to foiling the poUcy of 
 Russia, who aimed at disintegrating and destrojdng the 
 Dual Monarchy ; in other words, that she dehberately 
 challenged that country. And, while protesting in an in- 
 troductory memorandum that Germany urged Austria to 
 preserve the peace, the German Government failed to publish 
 a single one of its dispatches sent to Vienna at that critical 
 period. No official document was published to show 
 that Germany recommended moderation in Vienna. That 
 omission was noteworthy. Germany was well aware that 
 she would appear to be the aggressor, and herein lies perhaps 
 the reason why the German Ambassador, shortly before 
 leaving Paris, drove repeatedly up and down the Quai 
 d'Orsay through the seething mass of the people. Perhaps 
 he had orders if possible to produce an incident which would 
 put France into the wrong. However, the Paris populace 
 kept its temper and offered no insult to the Ambassador. 
 
 Germany protested to the world that she was attacked. 
 Those who wish to find out whether Germany or her oppon- 
 ents were in the wrong need not study the numerous official 
 publications of the governments concerned. The fact 
 that Great Britain, France, and Russia promptly pubUshed 
 all their dispatches shows that they had little to conceal. 
 The fact that Germany pubHshed only a few picked com- 
 munications, and none of the vitally important ones which 
 she pretended she had addressed to Austria in the interest 
 of peace, gravely prejudiced Germany in the eyes of the 
 world. Moreover, it was most improbable that the miUtary 
 unready Powers should have attacked fully prepared Ger- 
 many and Austria-Hungary. As a rule the prepared, not 
 the unprepared, army is the aggressor. 
 
350 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 At the moment when Germany sent her ultimatum to 
 Russia it was evident that her position would be an extremely 
 dangerous one in case of war. Although Germany and 
 Austria-Hungary could conceivably hope to defeat France, 
 Russia, and Serbia on land, they could hardly hope to 
 defeat Great Britain on the sea. Besides, Italy was likely 
 to desert Germany and Austria-Hungary, and would have to 
 fear the vengeance of her former partners. Consequently 
 she became vitally interested in the defeat of Germany and 
 Austria- Hungary. Hence it was clear that, apart from higher 
 considerations, she would draw the sword and help in the 
 downfall of her former aUies so as to establish her own 
 security. Italy would in all probability try to recover 
 from Austria- Hungary the ItaHan Tyrol, Trentino, and 
 Trieste. These considerations must have been in the 
 Emperor's mind and in that of his diplomatic advisers on 
 the fatal 31st of July. Unfortunately military and naval 
 men were closeted with the Emperor and his diplomats, 
 and none of the Emperor's civil advisers possessed Bis- 
 marck's authority and determination and was ready to risk 
 his position for the sake of his country. Bismarck would 
 never have consented to such a suicidal war. He would 
 rather have raised the country against his Emperor. How- 
 ever, it was observed that when, after the fatal and final 
 decision, the Emperor and his Chancellor drove into Berlin, 
 the Chancellor's face was so distorted that the people in 
 the streets did not recognise him. Possibly he thought 
 that the Emperor had signed the death warrant of Germany 
 and of his dynasty. 
 
 When the Emperor resolved upon war with France and 
 Russia it was perhaps still somewhat doubtful whether 
 Great Britain would come to the aid of France, but soon 
 the Emperor made Great Britain's hostility certain by 
 invading Luxemburg and Belgium. That attack was not 
 unexpected. The strategical intentions of a military 
 nation in case of war can clearly be gauged by its strategical 
 railways and especially by their military platforms. To 
 detrain rapidly the gigantic armies used in modern war, 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 361 
 
 hundreds of thousands of horses and tens of thousands of 
 guns and vehicles, enormous military platforms and sidings 
 are required. By comparing the detraining capacity of the 
 military platforms on the Belgo- German frontier with that 
 on the Franco-German frontier, it was clear that Germany 
 intended to strike at France by way of Belgium. As France 
 had powerfully fortified her eastern frontier, it had been an 
 open secret for more than thirty years that Germany would 
 try to enter France by breaking through Belgium. In a confi- 
 dential and authoritative monograph Sketch of the Defences 
 of France against Invasion from Germany, marked " Secret," 
 and published by Harrison & Sons in 1887, we read : 
 
 " It is from the recognition of the extraordinary strength 
 of the north-eastern barrier that it is argued that Germany 
 will in a future war be forced to direct her attack by way 
 of Belgium. The best, shortest, and safest fine of invasion 
 from North or Central Germany, having Paris for its objec- 
 tive, lies unquestionably by the Meuse, Sambre, and Oise, 
 and foUows the latter river up to the gates of the capital. 
 The roads and railways connecting Cologne and Diisseldorf 
 with Aix-la-Chapelle lead thence on Liege, the northern 
 key to the vaUey of the Meuse and distant only about nine- 
 teen miles (a two days' march) from the German frontier. 
 From Li^ge, the valley of the Meuse, prolonged by the 
 valley of the Sambre, opens up a broad road into France, 
 which carries an invader without sensible interruption from 
 the plains of the Meuse basin into those of the Seine basin." 
 
 The general staffs of all nations were prepared for Ger- 
 many's breach of Belgium's neutrality. However, with 
 regrettable insincerity the German Government pretended 
 that France and Belgium were to be blamed for the univer- 
 sally expected invasion. On the 3 1st of July the German 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs complained to the 
 British Ambassador that Belgium had " already com- 
 mitted hostile acts by placing an embargo on a consign- 
 ment of corn to Germany." General von Emmich, the Com- 
 mander of the invading army, put forth the still more 
 ridiculous claim that invasion was justified because " some 
 French officers had crossed the Belgian frontier in disguise 
 
352 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 in motor-cars." His Proclamation to the Belgian people 
 was as follows : 
 
 " To my great regret German troops are compelled to cross 
 the frontier by inevitable necessity, the neutrality of Belgium 
 having been abeady violated by French officers who crossed 
 the frontier in disguise in motor-cars. Our greatest de- 
 sire is to avoid a conflict between our peoples, who have 
 hitherto been friendly and were formerly allies. Remember 
 Waterloo, where the German armies contributed to found 
 the independence of your country ! But we must have a 
 clear road. The destruction of bridges, tunnels, and rail- 
 ways will have to be considered hostile actions. I hope 
 that the German Army on the Meuse will not be called upon 
 to fight you. We want a clear road to attack those who 
 wish to attack us. I guarantee that the Belgian popula- 
 tion will not have to suffer the horrors of war. We will 
 pay for provisions, and our soldiers will show themselves 
 to be the best friends of a people for whom we have the 
 highest esteem and the greatest sympathy. It depends 
 upon your prudence and patriotism to avoid the horrors of 
 war for your country." 
 
 Lastly the Imperial Chancellor, with greater candour 
 than the German Foreign Secretary and the invading General, 
 pleaded simply necessity in the following speech delivered 
 in the Reichstag : 
 
 " Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and 
 necessity knows no law ! Our troops have occupied Luxem- 
 burg, and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. That, 
 gentlemen, is contrary to the dictates of international law. 
 It is true that the French Government has declared at 
 Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of 
 Belgium as long as her opponents respect it. We knew, 
 however, that France stood ready for the invasion. France 
 could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement 
 upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been 
 disastrous. So we were compelled to override the justified 
 protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. 
 The wrong — I speak openly — that we are committing we 
 will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal 
 has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 353 
 
 are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, 
 can have only one thought — how he is to hack his way 
 through." 
 
 These mutually contradictory and insincere explanations 
 were highly suggestive, as were the equally clumsy attempts 
 of the German Government to induce Belgium not to 
 resist the German armies by promising to restore her inde- 
 pendence " after a German victory " ; and the incredibly 
 foolish attempt of the Chancellor to induce Great Britain 
 to forsake France, by promising on the 29th of July that 
 in case of victory Germany would take no French territory, 
 but only the French colonies — two days later, on the 1st of 
 August, he improved this offer by stating that Germany 
 might guarantee " the integrity of France and her colonies " 
 — and to tolerate the invasion of Belgium against a promise 
 that Germany would evacuate the country at the end of 
 the War. They show that the German Foreign Office, which, 
 under Bismarck's control, was the best organised and best 
 informed Foreign Office in the world, had, under the per- 
 sonal government of William II. and under the nominal con- 
 trol of a bureaucrat unacquainted with diplomacy, become 
 a byword for incapacity, confusion, and ignorance among 
 the world's diplomats. The three contradictory explanations 
 of Germany's reasons for invading Belgium were due either 
 to the fact that the Foreign Office gave one explanation, 
 while the Emperor gave totally different instructions without 
 informing the Foreign Office, or to the fact that the Emperor 
 himself, within a few hours, three times changed his mind 
 as to the explanation which should be given. The German 
 Ambassadors were appointed by the Emperor. They 
 owed their position rather to favour than to merit, and they 
 had learned that they would fare best if they reported not 
 what was true and useful, but what the Emperor desired 
 to hear. Of course there were exceptions to the rule. Prince 
 Lichnowsky did his best to enUghten Berlin as to Great 
 Britain's attitude. Still, in the misinformation suppUed 
 by her diplomatic representatives lay probably the reason 
 
354 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 of Germany's endeavours by ridiculous and palpably in- 
 sincere promises to induce Great Britain and Belgium to 
 abandon their most vital interests without a stroke. Fore- 
 seeing that the War would lead to Germany's economic ruin, 
 I stated in the Nineteenth Century Review in September 
 1914: 
 
 " Although Germany no longer actually feeds herself, 
 although, after the United Kingdom, she is the largest 
 importer of food, she can resist almost indefinitely as far 
 as food is concerned. She produces about nine-tenths of 
 her bread corn, and the remaining tenth can be replaced 
 by potatoes and sugar, of which she has a huge surplus. . . . 
 On the other hand, there should be a serious deficiency in 
 butter, eggs, cheese, fish, coffee, tea, cocoa, and tobacco, 
 of which she imports large quantities. 
 
 " While, even if the War lasts a year and longer, Germany 
 will scarcely suffer from a shortage of the most necessary 
 foods, her industries will suffer very severely through the 
 cessation of her foreign trade and through shortage of coal 
 and lack of imported raw materials, such as wool, cotton, 
 silk, ore. Her people may also suffer from lack of coal, 
 as the vast majority of the miners have been called into 
 the army. . . . The war may well result in the destruction of 
 Germany's manufacturing industries, shipping, and foreign 
 trade, and in the general impoverishment of the people. 
 
 " If Germany should be defeated her political and economic 
 position will become a very serious one. She will probably 
 be deprived of large territories in the East, West, and 
 North. She will certainly lose to France Alsace-Lorraine, 
 the iron-ore beds of which are indispensable to her magnifi- 
 cent iron and steel trade, which is by far the largest German 
 industry. ... 
 
 *' Germany's manufacturing industries, Germany's ship- 
 ping and Germany's foreign trade may never recover from 
 the War. When the War is over, and especially if it is very 
 protracted, much of the German business will have fallen 
 into foreign hands. In addition impoverished Germany 
 may have to pay to the victors an indemnity compared 
 with which that paid by France would appear a trifle, . . . 
 
 " Poverty combined with high taxation does not afford 
 a congenial soil to the manufacturing industries. In the 
 
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 366 
 
 countries of her antagonists, France, Belgium, Great Britain, 
 and Russia, German business men have acquired huge 
 interests, and these also will in part be lost. The War may 
 totally destroy the great industrial position which Germany 
 has acquired during the past three or four decades. It 
 may convert Germany from a wealthy into a poverty- 
 stricken land, and the Germans may be compelled to 
 emigrate by the million to the United States and the British 
 Colonies in the same way in which the Irish emigrated after 
 the Potato Famine of 1 846. The outlook for Germany would 
 be terrible." 
 
 In the same article I foretold that Germany's defeat 
 would lead to revolution and the break-up of the Empire. 
 I wrote : 
 
 " The war may jeopardise, and perhaps destroy, not only 
 the entire Ufe-work of Bismarck and part of that of Frederick 
 the Great, it may not only impoverish Germany very 
 greatly, but it may also damage Germany's good name 
 for generations. With the same ruthlessness with which 
 her diplomats, following the principles of MachtpoUtik, 
 have disregarded the sacredness of treaties, making Ger- 
 many's advantage their only law, her soldiers have dis- 
 regarded the written laws of war, and, what is worse, the 
 unwritten law of humanity. According to numerous 
 accounts, the German soldiers have bombarded open and 
 undefended towns, wantonly burned down villages, killed 
 wounded soldiers and peaceful inhabitants of both sexes, 
 and executed all Belgian civilians caught with arms in their 
 hands, although, according to Article 2 of the Regulations 
 respecting the Laws and Customs of War, signed at The 
 Hague on the 18th of October 1907 by Germany herself : 
 
 ' The inhabitants of a territory not under occupation 
 who, on the approach of an enemy, spontaneously take up 
 arms to resist the invading troops without having had 
 time to organise themselves in accordance with Article 1, 
 shall be regarded as belHgerents if they carry arms openly, 
 and if they respect the laws and customs of war.' 
 
 " Though many of the accounts pubhshed may be untrue, 
 there is bound to be a considerable substratum of truth. 
 
356 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
 
 By these actions and by the infliction of crushing fines upon 
 the conquered towns and territories, the German Govern- 
 ment is not weakening resistance, but increasing the bitter- 
 ness and determination of its opponents, and it is doing 
 irremediable harm to the reputation of the race throughout 
 the world. . . . 
 
 " The question now arises whether the docile Germans 
 will bear their misfortunes patiently, or whether they will 
 rebel against the crowned criminal who has brought about 
 their misery. A revolt is possible, and it may take a two- 
 fold shape. Conceivably the Southern States might, after 
 a serious defeat of the German Army, detach themselves 
 from Prussia, refusing to fight any longer for the German 
 Emperor. The Empire may be dissolved. The secession 
 of the Southern States would no doubt be encouraged by a 
 victorious French Army, On the other hand, it is possible 
 that there would be a general rising of the people against 
 their rulers. The great majority of Germans are dissatisfied 
 with their form of government. A well-educated people 
 does not like to be governed like children. An absolutism 
 thinly disguised by parliamentary forms is tolerable only 
 as long as it is successful, and as the people are prosperous. 
 The vast majority of the Germans are Liberals, Radicals, and 
 Socialists. This majority has at present no influence what- 
 ever upon the government and policy of the country. 
 Failure of the Government in the present war would make 
 absolute government impossible in Germany. If Germany 
 should experience a serious defeat, she may either become 
 a strictly limited monarchy on the English model, or a 
 republic. As both the Emperor and the Crown Prince are 
 equally responsible for the present war, it may well happen 
 that the German people wiU refuse to be ruled any longer 
 by the Hohenzollerns. The rise of a German repubhc is 
 certainly within the limits of possibiUty." 
 
 My forecast of the economic and pohtical consequences 
 of the War, which was made immediately upon its outbreak, 
 was to prove correct. 
 
CHAPTER XXII 
 
 WHY THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BROKE DOWN IN 1914 * 
 
 Agreements between States are frequently compared 
 with agreements between individuals because of the simi- 
 larity of the quasi-legal wording used in both. However, 
 notwithstanding the analogy of the language used, and the 
 apparent similarity of the transaction, such comparison is 
 not justified. A civil agreement is absolutely binding 
 upon its signatories and can be enforced by a court of 
 law. A merchant who has agreed to sell certain goods at 
 a certain price cannot successfully try to avoid performance 
 by advancing the plea that fulfilment of the contract would 
 be unprofitable or disastrous to him. The binding force 
 of a civil contract is absolute. On the other hand, an 
 agreement between nations possesses neither imconditional 
 vaHdity nor unlimited binding force. By signing a contract 
 a merchant binds only himself, and he must fulfil the 
 contract even if he has signed away his property. His 
 misfortune affects only himself. Hence it is right that 
 the law courts enforce the unconditional fulfilment of private 
 contracts. But an agreement between States bears a 
 totally different character. Such an agreement is concluded, 
 not by the principals — that is, by the nations themselves — 
 acting in full knowledge of the case and of their responsi- 
 biUty, but only by their temporary agents who are acting 
 on the nation's behalf, by statesmen who have been 
 appointed to promote the interests of the nation and to 
 increase the prosperity of the people. They are the trustees 
 
 * From the Fortnightly Review, January 1912. 
 357 
 
368 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 
 
 of the nation, and they are neither entitled to sign away 
 the happiness and prosperity of the nation on behalf of 
 which they are acting, nor to fulfil treaty obligations if they 
 are convinced that their performance would be ruinous to 
 the people. Hence a statesman is in certain circumstances 
 bound to deny the validity and binding force of an inter- 
 national agreement, even if it has been signed, not by a 
 predecessor in office, but by himself. Treaties of alliance 
 resemble laws in their conditional validity. Laws lapse 
 automatically when they are no longer in accordance with 
 the spirit of the time. 
 
 On the British statute book there are many laws which 
 can no longer be enforced, although they have not been 
 formally repealed. Similarly treaties of alliance, having 
 been concluded between nations with the object of promoting 
 their common interests, lapse automatically when the treaty 
 Powers cease to possess those common interests and aims in 
 furtherance of which the treaties were originally concluded. 
 Bismarck, the father of modern statesmanship, explained 
 repeatedly with his usual directness and lucidity that treaties 
 of aUiance possess neither unconditional vahdity nor un- 
 limited binding force, that both were affected by changing 
 times and circumstances. He stated, for instance, in the 
 Reichstag on the 6th of February 1888 : 
 
 " No great Power can, for any length of time, be tied 
 by the wording of a treaty which is opposed to the interests 
 of the people, and if it has done so it will eventually be 
 compelled openly to declare : ' The times have altered. I 
 cannot do it.' And it must justify its action before the 
 people and before its aUies as best it can. But to ruin its 
 own people by fulfiUing one's treaty duties to the letter, 
 that is an action which no great Power can assent to. How- 
 ever, this is by no means demanded in any treaty. . . . 
 Treaties are only the expression of a community of aims and 
 of risks which are run by the treaty-concluding Powers." 
 
 In his political testament, his Oedanken und Erinnerungen, 
 Bismarck wrote : 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 359 
 
 " All contracts between great States cease to be uncon- 
 ditionally binding as soon as they are tested by the struggle 
 for existence. No great nation will ever be induced to 
 sacrifice its existence on the altar of treaty fidelity. . . . 
 To-day it is hardly possible for the Government of a great 
 Power to place its resources at the disposal of a friendly 
 State when the sentiment of the people disapproves of it. 
 . . . The clause Rebus sic stantibus is tacitly understood to 
 apply to aU treaties which involve performance." 
 
 The Triple Alliance was a purely defensive instrument. 
 It was repeatedly renewed and retained its defensive char- 
 acter. Bismarck foresaw that this Alliance might come 
 to an end by a change in the pohtical conditions of Europe, 
 for he wrote in his Qedanken und Erinnerungen : 
 
 *' The Triple Alliance has the significance of a strategical 
 position which was taken up in view of the threatening 
 dangers which prevailed at the time of its conclusion. It 
 has been prolonged from time to time, and it may be 
 possible to prolong it still further, but eternal duration is 
 assured to no treaty between great Powers, and it would 
 be unwise to consider it as affording a permanently secure 
 guarantee against all possible contingencies which may 
 modify the political, material, and moral conditions under 
 which it was brought into being. The Triple AUiance no 
 more constitutes a foundation capable of offering perennial 
 resistance to time and change than did the numerous other 
 Triple or Quadruple Alliances which preceded it." 
 
 The great German statesman actually foretold that the 
 Triple AUiance would come to an end if the relations between 
 Italy and France should become friendly, that Italy might 
 turn against Austria-Hungary if she could feel secure of 
 French aggression. He told Moritz Busch in 1888 : 
 
 " We cannot quite rely upon Italy. The French may 
 again gain ground in that country. France and Italy may 
 become friends not only after a change has taken place in 
 France's form of Government, but even if the Republic 
 should be maintained. In case of a reconciliation with 
 24 
 
360 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 
 
 France, Italy might resume her Irredentist policy and 
 renew her claims upon Austrian territory." 
 
 Bismarck had created bitter hostility between France and 
 Italy by giving at the Congress of Berlin Tunis to France. 
 Tunis lies at a distance of only a hundred miles from the 
 coast of Sicily and from that of Sardinia, Italy had the 
 strongest claims upon Tunis, partly because of her 
 geographical proximity, partly because nearly all the 
 European residents in Tunis were Italian citizens. Under 
 these circumstances France's occupation of Tunis was felt 
 as a serious attack upon Italy's interests. Soon after having 
 taken possession of Tunis, France converted into a first- 
 class arsenal and war harbour the port of Bizerta, which 
 is equidistant from Sicily and Sardinia, and stationed a 
 fleet there. Thus she was able to threaten Italy's enormous 
 and exposed coast-line simultaneously in the north-west 
 from Toulon and in the extreme south of the country. 
 It is widely known that Bismarck caused Italy to join the 
 Austro-German Alliance by giving Tunis to France, but only 
 a few people, most of whom are diplomats, are aware that 
 Bismarck threatened Italy with a war with Austria-Hungary 
 unless she would ally herself with the two Germanic States, 
 that Italy did not join the Austro-German AUiance by her 
 own free choice, but was actually coerced into joining it. 
 Describing the foreign policy of Count Robilant, a former 
 Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who took a very promi- 
 nent part in the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, the Mar- 
 chese Cappelli, who himself has been a Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, wrote in his book, La Politica estera del conte de 
 Robilant : 
 
 " None knew better than Count Robilant how much we 
 were isolated and how great was the danger arising from 
 the hostihty which certain Powers displayed towards us. 
 When Prince Bismarck went to Vienna in 1879 in connection 
 with the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance, the 
 Itahan Ambassador was the only Ambassador in Vienna 
 who was not visited by the Prince. That was not the only 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 361 
 
 evidence of Germany's attitude towards Italy. The 
 Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Andrassy, told 
 Bismarck that Austria had been constantly provoked by 
 the agitation of the Italian Irredentists and that she might 
 at last feel compelled to make war upon Italy, and he asked 
 the Prince whether, in that event, Germany would have 
 any objection to Austria taking possession of part of those 
 ItaHan Provinces which had been Austrian and which Austria 
 had lost to Italy in 1859 and 1866, Bismarck hesitated a 
 moment and then answered : ' No, we would not raise any 
 objections. Italy is none of our friends.' About the same 
 time the Papal Nuncio inquired whether Germany would 
 object to the re-estabhshment, or at least the partial re- 
 estabhshment, of the Pope's temporal power, and he received 
 exactly the same reply. These utterances showed Ger- 
 many's sentiments towards Italy." 
 
 Monsieur A. BiUot, who from 1890 to 1897 was the 
 French Ambassador in Rome, wrote : 
 
 " Italy's hesitation to join the Austro-German AlUance 
 was overcome by alarming the Italian Government. Ger- 
 many pretended to be favourably inchned towards the 
 Vatican, and took openly steps towards a reconciUation 
 with the Pope. Thus Italy was trapped into an alliance of 
 which the first advantage was to be this— that Italy would 
 be guaranteed against all attempts to restore the temporal 
 power of the Pope, a policy which was favoured, or at least 
 not disapproved of, by Germany." 
 
 Bismarck had the greatest contempt for Italy. In 
 1880 he said to Busch : " The Italians are like carrion crows 
 on the battlefield that let others provide their food. They 
 were prepared in 1870 to fall upon us with others if they 
 were promised a piece of Tyrol. At that time a Russian 
 diplomat said : ' What ! They are asking for something 
 again, although they have not yet lost a battle ! ' " Never- 
 theless he forced Italy into joining the Austro- Germany 
 AUiance, because he wished to be sure that in a war between 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one side, and France 
 and Russia on the other side, Austria-Hungary should be 
 able to use her entire army against Russia. 
 
362 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 
 
 Long before 1883, the year when Italy joined the Austro- 
 German Alliance, it had been Bismarck's policy to create 
 difEerences between France and Italy with regard to the 
 Mediterranean, differences which, by weakening France, 
 were likely to benefit Germany. He wrote, for instance, in 
 1868 to Count Usedom, his Ambassador in Italy : 
 
 " Italy is France's natural rival, and the two countries 
 wiU always be rivals and sometimes enemies. Nature has 
 thrown between the two an apple of contention, for which 
 they will fight for ever : the Mediterranean, that wonderful 
 inter-continental harbour of Europe, Asia, and Africa, that 
 channel between the Atlantic and the Pacific, that basin 
 which is surrounded by the fairest countries in the world. 
 It is surely not idle to believe that France envies Italy and 
 its position, which stretches far into the Mediterranean, and 
 which possesses the most beautiful shores and the shortest 
 route to the Orient. France and Italy can never become 
 AUies, sharing the advantages of the Mediterranean, for 
 this is an indivisible heritage. It belongs undoubtedly to 
 Italy, whose Mediterranean shores are twelve times as 
 extensive as are the Mediterranean shores of France." 
 
 How deeply Italy was wounded by France's occupation 
 of Tunis will be seen from the fact that the signature of the 
 Franco-Tunisian Treaty on the 12th of May 1881 was followed 
 two days later by the fall of the Cairoli Cabinet. Franco - 
 Italian relations became exceedingly strained. Italy began 
 in haste to increase her army and to build a fleet able to 
 encounter the strong French Navy. The tension between 
 the two countries caused the outbreak of a customs war 
 which lasted ten years. Her vast expenses on armaments, 
 and the virtual closing of the French frontier to Italian pro- 
 ducts, and of the Paris money market to Italian loans, im- 
 poverished Italy greatly and brought her to the verge of 
 national bankruptcy. 
 
 The policy of keeping France and Italy apart by artificial 
 means was successful only as long as Bismarck directed 
 Germany's policy. After his dismissal Germany's policy 
 lacked a firm, directing hand, France began to display 
 
\ THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 363 
 
 independent diplomatic initiative, and to pull the diplo- 
 matic wires of Europe as Bismarck had done during thirty- 
 years. Monsieur Delcasse resolved to clear away the 
 differences which Bismarck had created between France 
 and Great Britain on the one side, and between France and 
 Italy on the other, and he succeeded. The Franco-Italian 
 understanding began with the Agreement of 1898 regarding 
 Crete, and with a Treaty regarding Tripoli in 1899, The 
 Franco-ItaUan customs war, which had been so disastrous 
 to Italy, was ended. France and Italy arrived at a thorough 
 understanding as to the Mediterranean, and the two Powers 
 became friends. Italy felt no longer threatened by France, 
 for France acted towards her with the greatest loyalty. 
 As far as Italy was concerned, the Triple Alliance was no 
 longer a necessity. 
 
 If we wish to understand Italy's foreign policy in the 
 past, we must before all be acquainted with the Irredentist 
 movement. Irredenta Italia means the unredeemed Italy. 
 The larger part of Italy, including Florence, Milan, and 
 Venice, was until lately under Austrian domination. Austria 
 had terribly ill-treated her Italian subjects. The poUcy 
 of the Irredentists was to " redeem " those territories 
 which, though Italian in character, still belonged to foreign 
 countries, and to unite them with the kingdom of Italy. 
 The lands which the Irredentists claimed most loudly and 
 most persistently belonged to Austria-Hungary. They were 
 the Southern Tyrol and parts of the provinces of Istria and 
 Dalmatia, with the towns of Trieste, Pola, etc. The spirit 
 of the Irredentist became the spirit of Young Italy. In 
 the school-book history of Giovanni Soli, which was used 
 in the majority of elementary schools in Italy, occurs the 
 following passage : " By the conquest of Rome Italy was 
 freed nearly entirely from the domination of foreigners. We 
 say nearly entirely, because two parts of Italy belong still 
 to Austria — namely, the South of Tyrol and Istria with 
 Trieste, two beautiful countries which possess more than 
 1,000,000 inhabitants." 
 
 The first need of a great country is security from foreign 
 
364 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 
 
 aggression. The Italian Irredentists, indeed all Italian 
 patriots, were anxious that their country should be secure 
 from foreign attack. However, the mountain ranges which 
 separated Italy from Austria-Hungary were situated, not 
 on Italian but on Austrian soil, although their inhabitants 
 were Italians. An Austrian army could without difficulty 
 descend from the Tyrolese mountains into the plains of 
 Italy, and, by the irony of Fate, the very Tyrolese moun- 
 tains which should have protected Italy were inhabited 
 by Italians. 
 
 Italy was extremely vulnerable, not only on her Austrian 
 land frontier, but also on the coasts, and especially on the 
 coasts of the Adriatic facing Austria. Many large towns, 
 such as Genoa, Livorno, Naples, Reggio, Messina, Palermo, 
 Catania, Taranto, Brindisi, Ancona, Venice, and countless 
 smaller ones, are open coast towns which are exposed to 
 forced contribution, bombardment, and capture from the 
 sea. Rome, Padua, Ravenna, Pisa lie only about ten miles 
 from the coast. Italy's principal railways and high-roads 
 hug the shore from one end to the other of the peninsula, 
 and they can easily be destroyed in many places by small 
 landing-parties . 
 
 Nature had been very partial in creating the Adriatic. 
 She had given an open and almost defenceless coast to Italy, 
 and had created a large number of excellent, natural har- 
 bours protected by high surrounding hills and mountains 
 all along the coast which faces Italy. The western, or 
 Italian, shore of the Adriatic is mostly flat and sandy, and 
 is devoid of natural bays and harbours. Therefore the 
 ships anchoring in the small Italian ports are exposed to 
 all winds, and especially to the Bora, the most dangerous 
 wind of the Adriatic. The flatness of the shore makes 
 the landing of an army on the beach easy. The eastern 
 shore of the Adriatic is rocky and mountainous, and possesses 
 a profusion of deep and excellent bays, harbours, and inlets. 
 The Austrian ports of Pola, Cattaro, and Sebenico were 
 among the finest and largest protected natural harbours in 
 the world. Between Pola and Ragusa, a distance of three 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 366 
 
 hundred miles, there were some sixty ports on the Austrian 
 part of the Adriatic shore which could be used as stations 
 for torpedo-boats and submarines. The southern pro- 
 longation of the Austrian coast, the Albanian coast, also 
 had excellent natural harbours, which could easily be forti- 
 fied and converted into war harbours. Austria threatened 
 Italy as much on sea as on land. 
 
 The modern history of Italy is the history of her wars 
 with Austria. In the Southern Tyrol Austria held the key 
 to Italy's door. In the Adriatic and in the Balkan Peninsula 
 Austria opposed Italy's political and economic expansion. 
 Besides, she oppressed the Italians living in Austria. Italy 
 had been forced against her will to enter the Austro- Germany 
 AUiance. It is therefore only natural that many patriotic 
 ItaUans were bitterly opposed to Austria and to the Triple 
 Alliance. 
 
 In the year 1906 Signor Pellegrini wrote in his important 
 book. Verso la Guerra ? — II dissidio fra V Italia e V Austria : 
 
 " I beUeve we cannot live any longer under an illusion 
 which deceives us. We have lived under the impression 
 that the internal difficulties of Austria-Hungary are so 
 great as to prevent her from aggressive action towards our- 
 selves and from expansion towards the East. We have 
 beUeved that Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces after 
 the death of the present Emperor. These views are 
 erroneous. If the political crisis in Austria- Hungary should 
 become more acute, and there is reason for doubting this, 
 Austria-Hungary's need to expand and to acquire new 
 markets in the East will become all the greater. And as 
 long as Itahan commerce pursues its triumphant course 
 in the East, the more are the opposing interests of the two 
 nations likely to bring about the final collision. . . . 
 
 " We cannot continue a policy of vassalage which will 
 compromise for all time Italy's future in order to preserve 
 the outward form of the Triple Alhance. We must ask 
 ourselves : What are our interests ? Are we ready to 
 defend them ? What are the conditions of the Italians 
 who dwell on the shore of the Adriatic under foreign domina- 
 tion ? What are our interests on the Adriatic compared 
 with those of Austria ? What are the wishes of our people. 
 
366 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 
 
 and what is Italy's mission in the Balkan Peninsula ? Is 
 it possible to avoid a conflict with Austria ? I believe I 
 have shown that Austria-Hungary is at the same time our 
 aUy and our open enemy, against whom we must prepare 
 for war." 
 
 Signor Pellegrini proposed to meet the danger of a 
 collision with Austria-Hungary by an Alliance between 
 Italy and Russia : 
 
 " We have to calculate in the future with the fact that 
 the Austro-Hungarian Empire, though nominally our ally, 
 is our determined enemy in the Balkan Peninsula. There- 
 fore, it is meet that we should enter into more intimate 
 relations with Russia, the only nation which, in co-opera- 
 tion with Italy, can act as an adequate counterpoise. Only 
 thus we can secure the maintenance of the threatened 
 balance of power in the Balkan Peninsula." 
 
 Already in 1902 Monsieur Delcasse had recommended 
 to Italy, in an interview which was published in the 
 Giornale d' Italia on the 4th of January of that year, that 
 she should enter upon intimate relations with France and 
 Russia for the protection of her interests in the Balkan 
 Peninsula. 
 
 For some considerable time the Itahans had been earnestly 
 considering the possibility of a war with Austria-Hungary. 
 The Eassegna Contemporanea began pubhshing in July 
 1911 a series of articles by Colonel Angelo Tragni, entitled 
 " Ai Confini d' Italia," in which the military factors which 
 are important in a war with Austria-Hungary are discussed 
 at length. Italian military and naval men published 
 many books, pamphlets, and articles on the same subject. 
 However, the ItaUan soldiers were not alone in considering 
 professionally and publicly the possibility of an Austro- 
 Italian war, for their Austrian colleagues were similarly 
 occupied. One of the leading Austrian military papers, 
 the very important Danzer's Armeezeitung , printed during 
 1911 a series of articles on a possible Austro-Italian war. 
 They were subsequently printed in pamphlet form under the 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 367 
 
 significant title, Without Victory on Sea no Victory on Land : 
 the Decisive Significance of a Naval Victory in the Conduct 
 of a Land War with Italy. The pamphlet had a preface 
 written by the Austrian Vice- Admiral Chiari, in which we 
 read : 
 
 " Alliances do not last for ever and the ally of to-day may 
 be the enemy of to-morrow. One must not under-estimate 
 one's opponents. We should no longer meet the Italian 
 soldiers who were beaten by the Austrians at No vara, and 
 still less the Italian sailors who were beaten by the Austrians 
 at Lissa. I have always admired the splendid naval 
 material of Italy with feelings of envy." 
 
 The most important passages of the pamphlet itself 
 foUow, and I would mention that the italicised portions 
 of its preface and of its text were also italicised in the 
 original. All military technicalities have been omitted : 
 
 " The crisis during the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina has shown that notwithstanding our alliances we must 
 still reckon with the possibility of a war on several fronts. . . . 
 In Italy nearly all warlike preparations are directed against 
 Austria, her hereditary enemy, and her standard of arma- 
 ments is suppUed not by Italy's interests, but by our own 
 mihtary power. We must prepare armaments sufficient to 
 meet the whole force of Italy, but not of the Italy of to-day, 
 but of the Italy of to-morrow, when the unavoidable collision 
 will occur. . . . It is certain that we have to reckon with a war 
 on several fronts. Without hesitation one can prophesy 
 that our ally in peace will be our enemy in war, that Italy 
 will rather be found on the side of our enemies than on 
 our side, that we shall have to meet the combined armies 
 of Russia, Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro. That was 
 probably in the mind of the Minister of War when he spoke 
 of the possibility of a war on several fronts. . . . We should 
 naturally aim our first and our strongest blow at our nearest 
 and most dangerous opponent, at Italy. . . . 
 
 " During forty-five years we have been perfecting Austria's 
 armaments in order to arrive at mihtary superiority in 
 general, and, since some time, to be able to defeat Italy in 
 
368 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 
 
 particular. But we must not deceive ourselves. We shall 
 no longer meet the Italians of No vara and Custoza, for Italy 
 has not stood still. Nor shall we meet the Italians who 
 were defeated on the Adowa, for she has made up for past 
 neglect with redoubled energy. . . . 
 
 "Is, in case of a European conflagration, the superiority 
 of our armies operating in the Italian province of Venetia 
 against the Italian army so striking that we may reckon upon 
 the immediate and sweeping success which is necessary for 
 us in view of the difficult position in which we may find 
 ourselves ? Consideration of all factors shows that this 
 question must be answered in the negative. Our superiority 
 is not sufficiently great. The Italian army is, through its 
 numbers, organisation, armament, and training, able to 
 offer the most determined resistance even against the 
 mightiest enemy, and its power of resistance will be greatly 
 increased in a war which the Italian nation will wage with 
 all its heart. . . . 
 
 " Whilst the North-east of Austria- Hungary has sufficient 
 room for employing armies of from fifteen to twenty army 
 corps, the territory of Venetia is limited. Its narrowness 
 is a factor of the greatest importance. Owing to its narrow- 
 ness we can turn the flank of the Italian army only by operating 
 oversea, and herein lies one of our best chances and the abso- 
 lutely necessary condition of a victory on land. A decisive 
 victory of our fleet enables us to turn the Italian position and 
 leaves undefended the great centres of the country. Prepara- 
 tions must be made on the largest scale for the transport of 
 troops across the sea in very large numbers. A decisive 
 victory on sea ! That will be the principal need of the situa- 
 tion in a land war against Italy. The protection of our 
 coasts and harbours, which, according to semi-official 
 statements is the object of our fleet, is, in reahty, an un- 
 important matter." 
 
 Deeds reveal most clearly a country's aims and intentions. 
 For years the Italian and Austrian naval manoeuvres were 
 merely rehearsals of an Austro-ItaUan war. Both Italy 
 and Austria greatly strengthened their fortifications and 
 their garrisons on the Austro-Italian frontier, and, following 
 Germany's example, Austria-Hungary began building a 
 large fleet. 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BREAKDOWN 369 
 
 An alliance is an impossibility without mutual trust 
 and without a community of aims and interests. Between 
 Italy and Austria-Hungary there existed no trust and 
 besides, there existed not a community, but an incompati- 
 bility, of aims and interests. The Triple Alliance was 
 boimd to break down on the day of trial. 
 
CHAPTER XXIII 
 
 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY * 
 
 The true character of the former German government, the 
 fact that the military was absolutely supreme over the 
 civil power, was startUngly revealed to the world six months 
 before the outbreak of the Great War. The escapades of 
 a very young lieutenant in the little German garrison of 
 Zabern late in 1913, and the consequent differences between 
 the military and the civil population of the town, filled 
 the papers of the world during a couple of months and 
 very nearly led to a most serious constitutional crisis in 
 Germany in the beginning of 1914. The Zabern affair 
 was most characteristic of modern Germany, and the 
 little lieutenant may some day occupy a considerable space 
 in the constitutional histories of that country. 
 
 The whole world was greatly interested in the conflict 
 — the Italian papers in the South of Sicily, where I was 
 staying at the time, published every day two columns of 
 news regarding it — because it was generally recognised that 
 the Zabern conflict was not an event but a symptom. It 
 was not only a conflict between the officers and citizens of 
 an unimportant town, but a trial of strength between the 
 military and the civil authorities of Germany, between 
 reaction and progress, between might and right, between 
 absolutism and democracy, and herein lay its importance. 
 There were two powerful currents in Germany, an auto- 
 cratic and a democratic one, and no one can understand 
 Imperial Germany's foreign and domestic policy who is not 
 acquainted with the elements which clashed at Zabern. 
 
 1 From the Nineteenth Century and After, February 1914. '^^ 
 370 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 371 
 
 Therefore it is worth while to consider the foreign and 
 domestic policy of Grermany in the light of the Zabern 
 events. 
 
 Zabern is a little town of about nine thousand inhabi- 
 tants in Alsace. The vast majority of the people were 
 Germans by race and by language. They were thoroughly 
 loyal to Germany, and there had been no conflicts between 
 the civil population and the military Tintil Lieutenant von 
 Forstner, a youth of twenty, joined the garrison. He was 
 tactless enough to make before his men, some of whom 
 were French Alsatians, highly offensive remarks about 
 France ; to call the native Alsatian recruits " Wackes," 
 which means rowdies, larrikins ; to tell his soldiers that 
 they should use their weapons with energy should they come 
 into collision with the local civilians ; and to offer a prize 
 of ten marks to those who should succeed in " running a 
 man through " with their side-arms. His remarks became 
 the talk of the town, they found their way into one of the 
 local papers, and as the rumour got about that an infantile 
 and somewhat ludicrous physical mishap had occurred to 
 Lieutenant von Forstner while in a state of intoxication, he 
 was laughed at and teased by the people and especially 
 by children and youths. His fellow-officers took his part, 
 soldiers with fixed bayonets began to accompany the officers 
 on their walks through the town, Lieutenant von Forstner 
 was seen buying chocolates escorted by soldiers with fixed 
 bayonets, and dining at a public restaurant with a revolver 
 lying on the table. The merriment of the town increased 
 through this ludicrous exhibition, and small crowds began 
 to follow the officers and to collect before the barracks 
 awaiting developments. Then Colonel von Renter, the 
 commander of the regiment, instead of sending Lieutenant 
 von Forstner away, after complaining about insufficient 
 police protection to the civil authorities, resolved to take 
 the law into his own hands. He caUed his soldiers out, 
 apparently had ball cartridge served out and machine- 
 guns got in readiness, and threatened to fire upon the crowd 
 in front of the barracks which, according to his own state- 
 
372 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 ment before the military court, numbered only from forty 
 to one hundred people. The people ran away. Orders 
 were then given to the soldiers to arrest every civilian who 
 lingered near the barracks or who insulted the soldiers or 
 laughed at them, and thirty people were arrested, among 
 them some of the local judges who came from the law courts. 
 Soldiers, eager to arrest people who were supposed to have 
 laughed or jeered, pursued the fugitives into their houses, 
 and a front door was broken in during the man-hunt. The 
 prisoners secured were locked up in a coal-cellar all night ; 
 they were brought next morning before the civil magis- 
 trates, who immediately set them at liberty. However, 
 Lieutenant von Forstner remained a butt to the populace. 
 One day, when marching along with his soldiers, he was 
 jeered at by some youths. They were pursued by the 
 soldiers, but escaped. A lame shoemaker was left behind. 
 He was attacked by Lieutenant von Forstner with his sword 
 and received a cut over the head. 
 
 The high-handed action of the military was loudly con- 
 demned by all the Liberal, Radical, Clerical, and Socialistic 
 people of Germany and their press, but was praised by the 
 small but powerful Conservative Party and its papers. 
 When the matter was brought up before the Reichstag, 
 the Imperial Chancellor, instead of promising immediate 
 redress for the injustice done, expressed abstract views on 
 the conflict of right and wrong in an impersonal, detached, 
 and non-committal way, while the Minister of War, who 
 followed him, instead of expressing regret for the occurrences, 
 used the opportunity of making a glowing speech in praise 
 of the virtues of the Prussian officers and of the army who 
 were the defenders of the Throne and of the Fatherland. 
 In consequence of the attitude of the Imperial Chancellor 
 and the Minister of War, who seemed to flout the German 
 ParHament and people, a vote of censure on the Chancellor 
 was moved and was passed by the enormous majority of 
 two hundred and ninety-three to fifty-four. The Conserva- 
 tives alone supported the Government. To allay the anger 
 of people and Parliament, a judicial inquiry was announced. 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 373 
 
 and Lieutenant von Forstner was promptly sentenced to 
 forty-five days' imprisonment by a military court for 
 wounding the shoemaker. Proceedings against Colonel 
 von Renter were delayed. Lieutenant von Forstner ap- 
 pealed against the sentence, and his appeal and the case 
 of Colonel von Renter came simultaneously before the higher 
 military court at Strasbourg. 
 
 Before the appeal of the young lieutenant and the case 
 of Colonel von Reuter came on for hearing, one of the most 
 powerful officials in Germany, Herr von Jagow, the Pohce 
 President of Berlin, who was considered a possible successor 
 to Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg, published over his name 
 in the Conservative Kreuzzeitung a manifesto in form of a 
 letter in which he stated : 
 
 " Military exercises are acts of the State. Those who 
 try to impede acts of the State are liable to be prosecuted 
 and punished. Consequently Lieutenant von Forstner 
 could not be placed on trial, and could still less be punished. 
 The military court which condemned him has apparently 
 failed to be guided by these considerations. If the law stood 
 differently, its prompt amendment would be needed. For 
 if German officers, who are garrisoned in what is nearly the 
 enemy's country, are in danger of being prosecuted for 
 illegal detention because they endeavour to make room for 
 the exercise of the power of the State, the highest profession 
 in the land is disgraced." 
 
 The legal arguments of the President of the BerUn Police 
 were scarcely taken seriously, but his attempt to influence 
 the decision of the miUtary court in favour of the accused 
 officers at a time when the matter was still suh judice, the 
 fact that Herr von Jagow tried to use his great position 
 and influence in order to secure for the officers a judicial 
 verdict in their favour, outraged once more the Liberals, 
 Radicals, Clericals, and Socialists of Germany, but was 
 applauded by the entire Conservative Press. 
 
 The military court at Strasbourg declared both Colonel 
 von Reuter and Lieutenant von Forstner not guilty — the 
 colonel because, in detaining people, he had acted in ignorance 
 
374 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 of the law, and the lieutenant because he had wounded the 
 shoemaker in putative self-defence. 
 
 In the struggle between the military and civil power, 
 between the military and the people, the military had proved 
 victorious. Military absolutism and contempt of law had 
 been declared legal by a high military court. The German 
 nation was a well-driUed nation. From the tenderest age 
 the children were taught in the schools that obedience to 
 authority was the foremost duty of the citizen, that military 
 officers belong to an exalted and highly privileged class, that 
 the military uniform was sacred, that even the youngest 
 lieutenant was the representative of the Emperor-King. 
 In how high estimation officers were held in Germany may 
 be seen from this — that many of the leading business men 
 and estate owners whose names are generally known in 
 Germany had printed on their visiting cards the fact that 
 they were Lieutenants of the Reserve. 
 
 The German people apparently acquiesced in the Stras- 
 bourg verdict and were seemingly ready to pocket their 
 defeat by the military. The enormous excitement caused 
 at the time by the high-handed behaviour of the Zabern 
 officers died down. Militarism in Germany became as all- 
 powerful as ever. The well-known politician and publicist, 
 Herr Eduard Bernstein, wrote in the English Nation of 
 the 17th of January : 
 
 "It is no use concealing the truth. The hold of mili- 
 tarism on the German nation is certainly stronger than ever. 
 Were it otherwise, Mr. Lloyd George's timely remarks upon 
 the necessity of stopping the growth of armaments would 
 not have been passed over with a few embarrassed remarks 
 by the great Liberal Press of the Empire." 
 
 The significance of the Zabern verdict was recognised 
 throughout Germany. Democratic Germany was pro- 
 foundly depressed and humiliated, while Colonel von 
 Renter received more than fifteen thousand letters and 
 telegrams of congratulation from the supporters of absolutist 
 government. Herr von Jahn, who had presided at the 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 375 
 
 trial at Strasbourg, immediately after having read the 
 verdict in court, sent telegrams of congratulation to Herr 
 von Jagow, the Berlin President of Police, and to the famous 
 Herr von Oldenburg- Januschau, who, as a deputy, had 
 declared a few years before in the Reichstag, " The King 
 of Prussia and Emperor of Germany must be able to tell 
 a lieutenant at any moment : ' Take ten men with you 
 and close the Reichstag.' " 
 
 The Zabern affair offers some most valuable and impor- 
 tant lessons to all who are interested in Germany. Even 
 the most casual observer must be struck with several 
 curious phenomena which require explanation. He -will 
 ask : How is it that the phlegmatic, patient, and law- 
 abiding German population, which is very slow to anger, 
 has during the last few years twice been roused into such 
 a passion by the action of its rulers — once over the Emperor's 
 Daily Telegraph interview and then over the Zabern affair 
 — that the vast majority of the newspapers and people 
 have demanded an alteration of the Constitution by which 
 the people should be given greater power over the national 
 executive and administration? How is it that in both 
 cases the German Reichstag failed to take action whereby 
 to secure some control over the national executive and 
 administration ? And how is it that the angry passions 
 died down as quickly as they arose ? How is it that the 
 Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, instead 
 of promising to make similar military excesses impossible 
 in the future, adopted a weak and apologetic attitude ? 
 How is it that he remained Imperial Chancellor, although 
 that vote of censure was the third which the Reichstag 
 had passed upon him ? — The inefficient and somewhat 
 childish petulance of the German people, when provoked 
 by its rulers, the fact that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg 
 did not promise that he would make recurrence of events 
 like those at Zabern impossible, and the fact that the 
 German Parliament did not even try to provide a permanent 
 remedy for the grievances of the people by bringing pressure 
 to bear upon the German Government and Administration, 
 25 
 
376 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 sprang all from the same source. Germany, which had the 
 most democratic franchise in the world, possessed a Parlia- 
 ment, but no Parliamentary Government ; Grermany was 
 an almost autocratically governed military State which 
 possessed merely the semblance of representative Govern- 
 ment ; the German Parliament, unlike the British Parlia- 
 ment, had not been created by the people, but had been 
 bestowed upon the German people as a free gift by its rulers. 
 As the Reichstag existed not by the will of the people, but 
 by the permission of the Monarch, the Monarch could take 
 away his gift as soon as the representatives of the people 
 were no longer absolutely loyal and submissive to him and 
 to the officials he had appointed, but tried to enter upon 
 a conflict with the Imperial Government with a view to 
 limiting its practically absolute powers. 
 
 Germany, as William I. said, was merely an enlarged 
 Prussia. The Imperial Chancellor, like all German officials, 
 was nominated and dismissed by the Emperor, for, accord- 
 ing to Art. 18 of the Constitution, " The Emperor appoints 
 the Imperial officials, has their oaths taken, and effects 
 their dismissal if required." The Reichstag and the Party 
 Leaders could neither bring about the appointment of a 
 Government official, nor effect his dismissal or his resigna- 
 tion by a vote of censure. Moreover, a vote of censure 
 upon the Imperial Chancellor would have been an inter- 
 ference with the Imperial prerogative, an attempt to influ- 
 ence the Imperial will. Therefore it would only have 
 caused the censured Chancellor to be retained, for dismissal 
 after a vote of censure would have made it appear that the 
 Emperor had obeyed Parliament or given way to popular 
 pressure. The German Emperor was not likely to do 
 that. As the Reichstag knew that its votes of censure had 
 no practical effect whatever, it did not take its own votes 
 of censure very seriously, nor did any one in Germany. 
 Hence the relations between the Reichstag and the censured 
 Chancellor remained practically unchanged. 
 
 The arrogant attitude of the Zabern officers and the 
 great reserve maintained by the Imperial Chancellor in 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 377 
 
 the Reichstag when dealing with the Zabern events were 
 due to the fact that Germany was an almost autocratically 
 governed military State. Neither the Reichstag nor the 
 Imperial Chancellor had any influence over the army. Bis- 
 marck himself was quite powerless where the army was 
 concerned. Article 63 of the Imperial German Constitu- 
 tion stated : " The whole of the military forces of the 
 Empire will form a homogeneous army which is commanded 
 by the Emperor in war and in peace." As the Emperor 
 kept the command of the army in war and in peace abso- 
 lutely in his own hands and allowed no interference from 
 any quarter, least of all from any civilian, and as the 
 Chancellor's authority extended only to civil affairs, Herr 
 von Bethmann-HoUweg was of course powerless to promise 
 the Reichstag that Lieutenant von Forstner should be 
 punished or Colonel von Renter reprimanded. Where the 
 army was concerned the Imperial Chancellor had no greater 
 power than any ordinary citizen. 
 
 ALrticle 64 of the German Constitution stated : " All 
 German troops are obUged unconditionally to obey the 
 Emperor. That obligation is to form part of the mihtary 
 oath of fidelity." According to the Constitution, the 
 Emperor's power over the army was unhmited. A conflict 
 between the Imperial Army and the army of one of the 
 smaller German States was unthinkable. The commanders 
 of the troops and of the fortresses in the non-Prussian 
 States had, according to their oath, to obey the Emperor. 
 The independent armies of the individual States existed 
 rather in theory than in fact. Moreover, while in all 
 civil matters the orders of the Emperor required for their 
 validity the counter-signature of the Chancellor, who 
 thereby assumed responsibility for them, the Emperor's 
 orders regarding the army needed not be countersigned even 
 if they indirectly touched the budget. In mihtary matters 
 the authority of the Emperor was absolute. Interference 
 with the army by the civil government or by Parliament 
 was out of the question. 
 
 The German Army was, so to say, the Emperor's body- 
 
378 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 guard, and had been given a highly privileged position. 
 Officers were treated as the highest class of Society, not 
 only at Court, but throughout Germany. According to the 
 instructions they received, officers were not allowed to draw 
 their weapons when insulted, but " immediate use of their 
 arms was required should they be assaulted." According 
 to Dilthey's widely read textbook " every officer, non- 
 commissioned officer, and soldier is entitled to use his 
 arms if assaulted. He may use the arms which the Emperor 
 has given him for the protection of his person and of his 
 honour. Therefore arms must be used on suitable occasions, 
 and they must be used with an energy commensurate to 
 the dangerousness of the opponent." A civiUan who in 
 peace time lifted his hand against a German officer, even if 
 the officer was the aggressor, risked being sabred or shot. 
 Their highly privileged position and the right to use their 
 weapons were apt to make the German officers overbearing, 
 create men of the von Forstner type, and arouse much 
 dissatisfaction among the body of the citizens. 
 
 At the time of the excitement caused by the publication 
 of the German Emperor's interview in the Daily Telegraph 
 the Socialist members of the Reichstag proposed that the 
 Imperial Chancellor should be made responsible to the 
 Reichstag by an amendment of the Constitution. The 
 Reichstag did not accept that proposal. After the Zabern 
 scandal the Frankfurter Zeitung and other influential Liberal 
 and Radical journals proposed that supplies should be with- 
 held when the next budget came up for discussion, unless 
 the outraged citizens received full satisfaction. However, 
 once more it was unUkely that the Reichstag would quarrel 
 with the Imperial Government, which meant with the Em- 
 peror himself, for the Emperor was the Government. 
 
 Parhament holds the power of the purse. The Reichstag 
 could hope to limit the power of absolutism only by with- 
 holding supphes and bringing the Government to a stand- 
 still. Democratic Parliaments can use that power with 
 great effect, but the German Reichstag could not do so. 
 In parliamentarily governed countries the refusal of suppUes 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 379 
 
 by the people brings the government to a standstill, and 
 automatically brings about the fall of the governing states- 
 men. In Germany such a refusal would have had no 
 similar efEect. In Great Britain and other democratic 
 monarchies the people rule through their elected repre- 
 sentatives, who appoint the officials, and the King carries 
 out the will of the people. In Germany the Emperor ruled 
 through his officials with the assistance of the Reichstag, 
 and if the Reichstag, as the less important part of the 
 Government, should have refused to assist in governing 
 the country, the Government would simply have been carried 
 on without its assistance. According to Laband and 
 other leading writers on German Constitutional Law the 
 co-operation of the Reichstag for providing supplies was 
 only theoretically necessary. If suppUes were not voted, 
 the last year's taxes and imposts were automatically 
 renewed, and were collected by the officials, for the Reich- 
 stag had no authority to abrogate existing taxation. The 
 Handbuch fiir Sozialdemokratische Wdhler stated quite 
 correctly : 
 
 " Opinions differ as to the Reichstag's power of with- 
 holding suppUes. However, so much is certain, that 
 taxes and other sources of the national income, which have 
 once been voted, cannot be discontinued in consequence 
 of the Reichstag's veto." 
 
 The question whether Prusso-Germany could be governed 
 if the deputies should have refused to vote supplies was in 
 the last resort rather a question of practical politics than 
 of constitutional theory. In 1863 the Prussian Parliament 
 refused to allow the doubhng of the army and refused 
 supplies. Nevertheless the army was doubled. Bismarck 
 did not shrink from a conflict with Parliament, and the 
 necessary taxes were collected against Parliament's will. 
 The German citizens were very law-abiding and they 
 possessed a strong sense of caution. It would have been 
 dangerous for them to quarrel with a ruler who disposed 
 
S80 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 of 1,350,000 officials and of an army of 800,000 men in time 
 of peace. 
 
 Both at the time of the Daily Telegraph interview and 
 of the Zabern incident the Reichstag refused to act with 
 vigour against the Government because it recognised its 
 powerlessness. Had it entered upon a conflict with the 
 Government, which would have meant with the Emperor, 
 it would probably have been defeated by the Emperor, 
 who not only absolutely controlled the bureaucracy and 
 the army, but who had power over the national purse as 
 well. In every conflict between the people and the Govern- 
 ment the passionate outbursts of the Reichstag were only 
 of momentary duration, because its members were aware 
 that a serious conflict with the Emperor's Government 
 would not have led to the resignation of the Chancellor or to 
 the diminution of the Emperor's prerogative, but that it 
 would have led either to the dissolution of the Reichstag — 
 according to Article 12 of the Constitution the Emperor 
 had the right to dissolve it — or to a coup d'etat and an 
 alteration of the Constitution, which would have made the 
 Reichstag powerless for the future. 
 
 Prussia was a strongly Conservative, one might almost 
 say an anti-democratic, State. Yet Bismarck created in 
 the German Reichstag a Parliament based on the most 
 democratic franchise in the world. He did so, not actuated 
 by a sense of justice and fitness, but compelled by necessity. 
 When, in 1866, Prussia risked her existence in a struggle 
 with Austria, Bismarck offered to the people, who had been 
 vainly clamouring for parhamentary institutions for de- 
 cades, a democratic Parliament so as to obtain the neces- 
 sary support of the very influential German Liberals and 
 Democrats for that most dangerous war. However, Bis- 
 marck was not in love with the democratic franchise. He 
 did not endeavour to democratise the Prussian Parliament 
 (the Landtag), which was elected under the most anti- 
 democratic franchise in the world, and he quarrelled inces- 
 santly with the Reichstag and contemplated its destruction 
 by a coup d'etat. 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 381 
 
 The historian Professor Hans Deibriick, a well-informed 
 man, has told us in volumes 147 and 153 of the Preussische 
 Jahrbiicher, and in his Regierung und Volkswille, that 
 Bismarck intended to destroy the power of the Reichstag 
 by a coup d'etat. In 1884 the Federal Council, which 
 represented the rulers and the Governments of the individual 
 German States, had, at Bismarck's desire, solemnly declared 
 that the German Empire was a free and voluntary federa- 
 tion of the German sovereigns, and that this federation 
 could, in case of need, again be dissolved. When William II. 
 came to the throne Bismarck thought that the time was 
 ripe for action. Having found himself confronted by a 
 hostile majority in the Reichstag, he mapped out the fol- 
 lowing plan. He wished to dissolve the Reichstag by the 
 Emperor's authority — expecting that the sudden dissolu- 
 tion would lead to Socialist demonstrations in the streets. 
 These would be repressed with the greatest energy. 
 Blood would flow in the principal towns. Riots and revolts 
 would take place. A state approaching civil war would 
 be created. Then the German Emperor was to declare that 
 he could no longer govern Germany under the existing 
 conditions. He would renounce the Imperial Grown. 
 All the German sovereigns would be called to a conference. 
 The suggestion would then be made by them that the 
 German Empire should be reconstituted under the Presi- 
 dency of the King of Prussia, but the King of Prussia would 
 declare that he would be willing to reassume the Imperial 
 Crown only if the Imperial Constitution was altered, if all 
 those Germans who pursued a policy hostile to the State, 
 and especially all Socialists, were disfranchised, and if the 
 secrecy of the ballot was abolished. The sanguinary riots 
 and the dramatic renunciation of the Crown by the German 
 Emperor would have created an enormous sensation through- 
 out Germany. In their patriotic excitement and zeal the 
 German people would probably have enthusiastically 
 supported the projected reform of the franchise. The 
 crisis would have been over in a few days, and the electors 
 would have discovered when it was too late that th,ey had 
 
382 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 assisted in destroying the only democratic institution of 
 Germany. 
 
 Herr Delbriick's information as to Bismarck's intentions 
 is amply corroborated by conversations between Prince 
 Bismarck and the Prime Minister of Wiirtemberg, von 
 Mittnacht, and between the German Emperor and Prince 
 Hohenlohe reported in their Memoirs, by a conversation 
 between Bismarck and Herr Kaemmel, published by the 
 Grenzhoten in 1907, and by Bismarck's letter to Herr von 
 Helldorf, the leader of the Conservative Party, written in 
 1887, in which Bismarck stated : " I will devote the last 
 years of my life to correcting my greatest mistake, the 
 universal vote and the secrecy of the poU." Numerous 
 allusions to the necessity of abolishing the secrecy of the 
 vote and of disfranchising the Socialists and other enemies 
 of the Empire may be found in Bismarck's public speeches 
 and in his reported conversations. In his Memoirs we 
 read : "I have hinted in public speeches that the King of 
 Prussia might find himself compelled to lean for support 
 on the foundations afforded to him by the Prussian Con- 
 stitution, if the Reichstag should carry its hindrance to the 
 monarchical establishment beyond the limits of the endur- 
 able." In other places also Bismarck expressed the hope 
 that the German people would have the courage and 
 strength to rid themselves of the Reichstag if it should 
 prove itself a hindrance to Germany's development. Accord- 
 ing to the Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe, WiUiam II. told 
 the Prince that he was unwilling to act upon Bismarck's 
 suggestion and to begin his reign by shooting his subjects 
 and effecting a coup d'etat. The Emperor's refusal to act 
 his part was apparently the principal reason for his rupture 
 with Prince Bismarck and for Bismarck's subsequent dis- 
 missal. 
 
 Since Bismarck's dismissal the idea of weakening the 
 Reichstag and of abolishing Germany's democratic franchise 
 by a coup d'etat has frequently been contemplated by Ger- 
 man statesmen and politicians. Especially the small but 
 mighty party of the feudal Conservatives, who hate demo- 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 383 
 
 cracy, had been anxious that the Government should destroy 
 the Reichstag's power by violence. 
 
 In 1906-1907, when there was a great agitation for the 
 increase of the German Navy, and when the Reichstag 
 seemed disinchned to vote the funds required, many leading 
 German politicians and newspapers recommended that 
 the Government should provide the necessary funds by a 
 cowp d'etat, should the Reichstag prove obdurate ; that 
 the Government should levy the necessary taxes with or 
 without the Reichstag, and should, in case of need, govern 
 against the will of Parliament or without Parliament. 
 At the time of the General Election of 1907 the possibility 
 of a coup d'etat was again universally discussed. Many 
 Conservative politicians and many prominent Conservative 
 journals, such as the Kreuz-Zeitung , the Post, the Deutsche 
 Tageszeitung, the Hamburger Nachrichten, demanded an 
 Imperial coup d'etat disguised in the phrase " Reform of 
 the Franchise " ; and Prince Biilow seemed to contemplate 
 the possibility of abolishing, or at least modifying, parlia- 
 mentary government in Germany by force of arms if an 
 anti-expansionist Reichstag should be elected, for in his 
 election manifesto he threatened the anti-expansionist part 
 of the German community in no uncertain tone with " the 
 sword of Buonaparte." On the 19th of February 1910 
 Prince Hatzfeldt said in the Reichstag : 
 
 " The universal and secret vote has a history. The 
 present franchise is indissolubly connected with the German 
 Empire. It has welded together North and South Germany. 
 However, an alteration of the franchise may come in ques- 
 tion if the Reichstag should have a majority which threatens 
 the conditions essential to the life of the Empire." 
 
 Until 1918 the Conservatives maintained a predominant 
 position in the Reichstag, partly because the Conservative 
 deputies belonged to the ruling caste and because the 
 Conservative Party was considered to be the Government 
 party, partly because they knew how to increase their 
 weight in that assembly by a skilful policy and by a judicious 
 
384 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 co-operation with other parties, partly because they were 
 much over-represented. In 1871 Germany was divided into 
 parliamentary districts. Since that time the population 
 in the rural districts, which were dominated by the Con- 
 servatives, had remained stationary and had dechned in 
 many instances, while the population in the industrial towns 
 had increased enormously. The Government and the 
 Conservative Party had strenuously opposed the redistri- 
 bution of seats, and the result was that the democratic 
 towns were greatly under-represented, while the Conserva- 
 tive rural districts were greatly over-represented in the 
 Reichstag. In 1907 the electoral district of Teltow near 
 Berlin had 248,000 electors, while that of Lauenburg had 
 only 13,000 ; the district of Bochum-Gelsenkirchen had 
 144,000 voters, while Schaumburg-Lippe had only 10,000 
 voters, etc. The parhamentary strength of the Conserva- 
 tive Party was largely due to the prevalence of rotten 
 boroughs and to the intimidation of the rural voters by the 
 Conservative landowners. 
 
 The under-representation of the democratic parties in 
 the Lower House of Prussia was still more startling owing 
 to the three-classes system by which the Prussian masses 
 were disfranchised. By far the largest party in Germany 
 were the Social Democratic Party. Yet, until 1908, not a 
 single Social Democrat had been able to obtain a seat in 
 the " Representative " Assembly of Prussia, while the Con- 
 servative contingent always exceeded two hundred. Pre- 
 vious to the War there were in the Prussian Landtag only 
 six Social Democrats, as compared with 212 Conservatives, 
 although there were in Prussia three times as many Social 
 Democratic voters as Conservative voters. 
 
 Dissatisfaction with Governmental absolutism in all its 
 manifestations — the Zabern incident was only one out 
 of thousands — had greatly strengthened the democratic 
 parties of Germany, and the overbearing attitude of the 
 German bureaucracy and the sense of injustice done to the 
 people had particularly increased the number of the demo- 
 cratic extremists, the Socialists. Since the foundation of 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 385 
 
 the Empire the number of SociaHst votes polled at the 
 Reichstag elections had increased as follows : 
 
 1871 
 
 101,927 vote* 
 
 1881 
 
 311,969 ,, 
 
 1890 
 
 . 1,427,098 „ 
 
 1903 
 
 . 3,010,771 „ 
 
 1912 
 
 . 4,260,400 „ 
 
 In 1912 considerably more than one-third of the men who 
 voted for the Reichstag voted for Socialist candidates. 
 That fact alone shows that there was something radically 
 wrong in German domestic politics, that there was wide- 
 spread dissatisfaction among the German people. While 
 in 1912 the Socialists polled 4,250,400, the two Conservative 
 parties poUed together only 1,493,500 votes. Yet the 
 influence of the fifty-eight Conservative members in the 
 Reichstag was far greater than that of the 110 Socialists. 
 Bismarck skilfully split up the German Liberal Party, 
 setting one faction against the other. Had the democratic 
 parties united, had the German Liberals and Socialists co- 
 operated in the Reichstag against the Conservative parties, 
 they would have had the majority. Although they could 
 not have controlled the German administration, over which 
 the Reichstag had no influence, they could at least have 
 controlled German legislation, and absolutist legislation 
 would have become impossible. Considering the parUa- 
 mentary position of Germany, I wrote in the Nineteenth 
 Century and After in February 1914 : 
 
 " The Government is so strongly entrenched in its position 
 by the Emperor's control over the services and over the 
 national purse, and by Germany's feudal constitution, that 
 a Democratic Parliament cannot hope to obtain control 
 over the Government by gradual pressure, by orderly parlia- 
 mentary means. A democratic Reichstag can obtain such 
 control only by a revolution, and a revolution is impossible 
 in Germany as long as the army remains loyal to the 
 Emperor. Only a great defeat might democratise the 
 country." 
 
386 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 From year to year the German people was becoming 
 more democratically inclined. From year to year the dis- 
 satisfaction of the population with the form of Government 
 was increasing. With nearly every election the strength 
 of the democratic elements in the Reichstag was growing, 
 while that of the Conservative elements was dwindling. 
 From year to year the Conservative elements were more 
 hardly pressed by the advance of Democracy. Every year 
 absolutist legislation became more impossible. German 
 absolutism felt that its influence was waning. Hence its 
 most daring supporters called from year to year more 
 loudly for violent measures with which to stem the demo- 
 cratic tide. 
 
 Germany was rich, but Germany was very dissatisfied. 
 Those who were powerful were discontented because they 
 were not wealthy, and those who were wealthy because 
 they were not powerful. The Conservatives were dis- 
 satisfied because Liberalism and Socialism were rapidly 
 increasing, and the Liberals and Socialists because they 
 had no power and no influence, although they formed the 
 large majority of the citizens, possessed the bulk of the 
 country's wealth, and paid by far the largest part of the 
 taxes. 
 
 The German Conservatives believed in force as a policy. 
 They wished to Prussianise Germany by force, and to 
 establish by force the supremacy of absolutism in Germany, 
 and the supremacy of Germany in Europe and in the world. 
 
 The views of many German Conservatives as to Germany's 
 domestic policy were unreservedly given in Frymann's 
 Wenn Ich der Kaiser War' (Leipzig, 1912). The book cost 
 35., and had a large circulation. The copy in my possession 
 is marked 12th to 15th thousand. " Frymann " is a pseu- 
 donym. As the author intimated that he was grown up 
 at the time of the Franco-German War, he must have been 
 about sixty years old. The views of German Conservatives 
 as to Germany's foreign policy were well stated in the book 
 Unsere Zukunft by General von Bernhardi (Berlin, 1912). 
 An English translation of this book has been published 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 387 
 
 under the title Britain as Germany's Vassal, by Messrs. Wm. 
 Dawson & Sous, Ltd., London. Both books were repre- 
 sentative of a large literature. ^ 
 
 " Frymann," like most German Conservatives, was very 
 dissatisfied with the German franchise. He urged a reform 
 of the election law and advocated the formation of five 
 classes of electors. Votes should not merely be counted 
 but be weighed. Agricultural estate-owners and other 
 large employers of labour should be given a number of votes 
 corresponding to the number of hands employed. On 
 principle the weight of votes should be proportionate to the 
 amount of taxation paid, but men of high culture and of 
 great administrative ability should receive a considerable 
 number of votes. Those paying no taxes should have no 
 vote. The result of the policy advocated would be that 
 the property-owning and educated classes would at all 
 times command a majority in Parliament. Continuing, the 
 author proposed that the Government should alter the 
 franchise by a coup d'etat. He wrote : 
 
 " We must alter the electoral law at any price, and even 
 at the price of a conflict between the Government and 
 people, at the price of a coup d'etat. That sounds frivolous 
 and brutal. However, it is the same thing as if a father 
 resolves that a serious operation must be performed upon 
 his child in order to save its life. Pohtically the German 
 nation is ill unto death. It can be saved only by an altera- 
 tion of the Constitution, and if the Constitution cannot be 
 altered owing to the opposition of Parliament, then it must 
 be altered notwithstanding the will of Parliament, exactly 
 as a father orders the surgeon to operate on a child against 
 the child's will. 
 
 " We must consider in this connexion the possible occur- 
 rence of foreign difficulties. England's envy, France's 
 thirst for revenge, and Germany's need of expansion create 
 antagonisms which cannot be aboUshed unless Germany is 
 wilUng to abandon her position as a Great Power. Therefore 
 all who love the German people, and wish to accelerate the 
 advent of a crisis, will long for the outbreak of a war which 
 will wake all the wholesome and strong forces of the nation. 
 
 " If Germany should be victorious there will occur a great 
 
388 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 moral revival similar to that resulting from the Franco- 
 German War, and it will have similar political results. A 
 Reichstag with a large patriotic majority will be elected. 
 As that sentiment may be only transient, it should immedi- 
 ately be utilised. Immediately the Constitution should be 
 altered by the aboHtion of the present franchise. 
 
 "If we should be defeated — that, after all, is possible — 
 the present internal disunion would increase. It would 
 become a curse. It could be converted into order only by 
 the absolute will of a Dictator. A Dictatorship, supported 
 by the Army and all patriots, could then effect the necessary 
 revision of the Constitution." 
 
 *' Frymann " was anxious to combat Socialism by a 
 drastic anti- Socialist Law drafted after the Bismarckian 
 model. He wrote : 
 
 " In accordance with its provisions every action should be 
 prohibited which might serve to undermine, or threaten to 
 undermine, the existing order of State and Society. Meetings, 
 societies, journals, and periodicals of subversive tendency 
 should not be tolerated. The masses should be freed from the 
 present leaders of the Party of Subversion. All Sociahst 
 members of the Imperial Diet and the various State Parlia- 
 ments, all leaders and officers of the Sociahst Party, all 
 editors, pubhshers, and journaUsts connected with Socialist 
 papers and pubhcations, and all Socialist officers of Trades 
 Unions, in short, all who stand in the service of the Socialist 
 propaganda, should be expelled from the German Empire. 
 All Anarchists should receive the same treatment." 
 
 The author was, of course, an uncompromising anti- 
 Semite : 
 
 "It is absolutely necessary that the frontiers should be 
 completely closed against the immigration of Jews. It is 
 equally indispensable that foreign Jews who have not yet 
 acquired citizen rights should be expelled without delay 
 and without consideration. 
 
 " However hard it may seem to the German sense of 
 justice, we must restrict the rights of resident Jews. The 
 good may suffer together with the bad, but necessity must 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 389 
 
 steel our hearts to pity. We must demand that all Jews in 
 Germany be placed under alien law. 
 
 " The question at once arises : Wlio is a Jew ? We must 
 differentiate between race and faith. Jews are a race, and 
 those who have changed their faith are Jews still. We 
 must further re-establish the old Germanic principle that in 
 case of marriages between Jews and Christians the descend- 
 ants belong to the inferior race. Therefore it should be 
 laid down that all those are Jews who belonged to the 
 Jewish faith on the 18th of January 1871 or who are de- 
 scendants of those who were Jews at that date, even if only 
 one of the parents was a Jew." 
 
 The following measures should be taken : 
 
 " Jews should be excluded from all public employments 
 in the gift of the Empire, the single States and the local 
 authorities, whether such emplojmaent be in consideration 
 of a remuneration or purely honorary and gratuitous. Jews 
 should not be admitted to the service of the Army and Navy. 
 Jews should neither vote nor be elected. They should be 
 excluded from the profession of the law, and they should not 
 teach in schools. They should not manage theatres. News- 
 papers which have Jews for contributors should clearly 
 state that fact. The other newspapers, which one may 
 call German newspapers, should neither be owned by Jews 
 nor have Jewish managers, editors, or journalists. Banks 
 should not be conducted by Jews unless they are private 
 banks. Landed property should neither be owned by Jews 
 nor be hypothecated to them. In consideration for the 
 protection which Jews enjoy as aliens they should have to 
 pay double taxes." 
 
 The miUions of Poles, Frenchmen, and Danes annexed by 
 Germany should, according to " Frymann," be Germanised 
 by force : 
 
 " We must demand that the members elected by the 
 PoUsh nation into the German ParUament should have 
 only the right to speak, but not to vote, and that they 
 could demand to be heard only on questions which 
 touch the Poles or the district inhabited by them. If it 
 should be found that this provision is evaded by their co- 
 
390 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 operating with one of the ParUamentary parties, the right 
 to vote and the right to be elected should be definitely 
 taken away from the Poles. Pohsh newspapers and 
 periodicals should under all circumstances give a German 
 translation of the Polish text, and the only language per- 
 missible at public meetings of Poles should be German. . . . 
 ". . . We have acquired Alsace-Lorraine because the 
 territory is militarily necessary to us. The inhabitants 
 were thrown in. We have given them the option either to 
 become German subjects or to emigrate into France after 
 the acquisition of their country. Now we must give them 
 a second option, but a more thorough one. Every inhabi- 
 tant of Alsace-Lorraine who is of age should publicly de- 
 clare that he is an unconditional supporter of the German 
 Empire and he should enter into the obligation not to use 
 the French language in public or within his own house, nor 
 should he obtain newspapers, periodicals, or books from 
 France. Those who refuse to enter into this obligation 
 should have to leave the country without delay. Those 
 who contravene the foregoing should be expelled. All 
 private schools should be closed, and French should be 
 taught only as a foreign language, and no more time should 
 be devoted to it than is devoted to French in the other 
 parts of Germany. Newspapers printed in French should be 
 compelled to issue at the same time a German translation 
 of the French text. The Constitution of Alsace-Lorraine 
 should be aboUshed and its administration be placed under 
 a Minister with dictatorial powers. The Danes in Schleswig- 
 Holstein should receive the same treatment." 
 
 While " Frymann " recommended estabHshing the supre- 
 macy of absolutism in Germany by force, General von 
 Bernhardi proposed in Unsere Zukunft to establish by 
 force the supremacy of Germany in Europe and throughout 
 the world. He recognised that Germany's expansion was 
 restrained by the balance of power in Europe, that Germany 
 could not expand because the forces of the Triple Alliance 
 and the Triple Entente were about equally strong : 
 
 " We can render secure our position on the Continent of 
 Europe only if we succeed in bursting the Triple Entente 
 and forcing France, which is never likelv to co-operate with 
 
HOW THE mLITARY RULED GER]\IANY 391 
 
 Germany, to accept that position of inferiority which is 
 her due." 
 
 General von Bernhardi hated Great Britain with a pas- 
 sionate hatred, partly because her adhesion to the Franco- 
 Russian Alliance had re-established the balance of power 
 in Europe, partly because he envied Great Britain her 
 enormous possessions, partly because he despised her for 
 not possessing a national army. According to him " armed 
 strength in its moral, intellectual, and physical aspects is 
 the truest measure of civiUsation." Moreover, he beheved 
 that Great Britain wished to destroy Germany : 
 
 " Only England has an interest in bringing about a general 
 European war which would necessarily involve Germany. In 
 the first place England finds it from day to day more difficult 
 to man her rapidly increasing fleet. She seems to be approach- 
 ing the limits of her naval capacity. In the second place 
 the Baltic and North Sea Canal will soon be finished, and its 
 completion wiU yield considerable military advantages to 
 Germany. Lastly, the German Navy grows from year to 
 year, so that the conclusion lies near that the comparative 
 strength of the two countries will gradually be altered to 
 England's disadvantage. In the Mediterranean the Austrian 
 and the Italian navies are about to be strengthened. All 
 these circumstances make it clearly desirable for England 
 to bring about a war as soon as possible and to obtain the 
 assistance of France and Russia for such an undertaking. . . . 
 
 " German competition, German enterprise, and German 
 industry hamper Englishmen throughout the world, and 
 often prove superior. It is England's interest to destroy 
 Germany's competition, especially as the German nation 
 has the greatest ability among the nations of Europe and 
 the greatest hope of expansion, for it is a maritime State 
 of the first rank. It threatens to obtain a predominant 
 position on the Continent, to disturb the balance of power 
 in Europe which is so profitable to England, and to develop 
 a navy which may become dangerous to Great Britain. 
 Great Britain has aUied herself with Russia and France in 
 order to keep Germany down, to prevent her political 
 development and to destroy her fleet. We cannot be 
 deceived on that point. The German Fleet must be de- 
 26 
 
392 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 stroyed. That is the Alpha and the Omega of British policy. 
 It is the necessary and logical consequence of the Triple 
 Entente." 
 
 General von Bernhardi had not a very high opinion of 
 the British Fleet : 
 
 " The British Fleet is an extremely powerful opponent. 
 However, it suffers from a national weakness. It is already 
 difficult to secure a sufficient supply of men, and especially 
 of the higher ratings. Therefore, unless universal com- 
 pulsory service be introduced, a distinct limit is put to the 
 increase of the British Fleet. Besides, the German artillery 
 is at least as good as the English ; perhaps it is better. 
 The same apphes to the torpedo boats. Lastly, the newest 
 English ships correspond in no way to expectations." 
 
 The General thought that a war with Great Britain 
 was inevitable because Great Britain would never allow 
 Germany to acquire great colonial possessions. He wrote : 
 
 " We must enlarge Germany's colonial possessions and 
 acquire adequate territories suitable for the settlement of 
 white men. However, we cannot disguise from ourselves 
 the fact that England will undoubtedly oppose Germany's 
 acquisition of valuable Colonies, of coaUng stations and 
 naval bases. Colonies situated in the Temperate Zone can 
 scarcely be acquired without a war with other States. 
 
 " Exactly as Bismarck clearly recognised in his time, 
 that a healthy development of Prussia and Germany would 
 be possible only when the differences between Austria and 
 Prussia had finally been settled, so every German who looks 
 at the matter without prejudice is convinced that Germany's 
 further development as a world -Power is possible only when 
 the existing Anglo-German competition has come to an end. 
 Exactly as a cordial alhance was possible between Germany 
 and Austria only after the Austro-German War of 1866, so 
 we shall obtain an understanding with England, which 
 from many points of view is desirable, only after an Anglo - 
 German war." 
 
 General von Bernhardi recommended that Grermany 
 should secure the co-operation of the United States against 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 393 
 
 Great Britain and that Germany should weaken Great 
 Britain's power of resistance by fomenting risings through- 
 out the British Empire : 
 
 " There is a distinct conflict of interests between the 
 United States and England, firstly, because the United 
 States are England's most dangerous competitor in the 
 trade of the world and especially with Eastern Asia ; 
 secondly, because the United States are determined not in 
 any case to submit to England's naval predominance. The 
 Dominion of Canada forms another point of friction between 
 the two States, whilst there are no material differences 
 between the United States and Germany. It is true that 
 peaceful division of the world between England and the 
 United States is conceivable. However, no indications 
 can at present be found of such an understanding. As 
 matters are at present, the enormous increase in England's 
 power which would flow from the defeat of Germany would 
 be opposed to the interests of the United States. It follows 
 that the co-operation of the United States and of Germany 
 would be in the interests of both countries. 
 
 "It is to be borne in mind that in the English Colonies, 
 in India, South Africa, and Egypt, there is explosive material 
 in large quantities, so that it seems by no means unthinkable 
 that revolts and national risings would occur in the event 
 that England should be engaged in an unfortunate or 
 dangerous war. These are circumstances with which we 
 have to count, and it is our duty to make the best use of 
 them. . . . England would probably feel inclined to con- 
 clude peace if, in the course of a European war in which 
 she was engaged, risings and revolts took place in her Colonies 
 which threatened her pre-eminent position. It may be 
 considered as a matter which does not admit of dispute that 
 in India, in Egypt, and in South Africa there is sufficient 
 inflammable material." 
 
 General von Bernhardi thought that Great Britain and 
 Germany could come to an understanding only if Great 
 Britain was wilUng to abandon her allies on the Continent 
 and allow Germany to deal with them as she pleased. He 
 thought that Great Britain and Germany could conclude 
 an alliance only if Great Britain agreed not to oppose in 
 any way Germany's oversea expansion, and if she agreed to 
 
394 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 redistribute her fleet so as to allow Germany to rule the 
 North Sea. The General wrote : 
 
 " There are two possibilities of arriving at an under- 
 standing with England. An agreement with her can be 
 either lasting or transient. If a lasting agreement is desired, 
 the important interests of Germany must be safeguarded. 
 Nothing must remain that could impede their necessary 
 development. This demand makes it necessary for England 
 to abandon its claim to a predominant position in the world. 
 It involves England's recognition that England and Germany 
 have equal rights. England would have to give an absolutely 
 free hand to Germany in Europe, and would have to agree 
 beforehand to any increase of power of Germany on the 
 Continent which might arise out of a Central-European 
 federation of States or out of a Franco-German war. England 
 would have to abandon its diplomatic opposition to Ger- 
 many's colonial policy as long as Germany does not strive to 
 acquire Colonies at England's cost. England would have 
 to agree not to oppose Austria's expansion in the Balkan 
 Peninsula, nor to oppose Germany's economic policy in 
 Asia Minor, nor the development of the German Navy and 
 the acquisition of coahng stations. 
 
 " Whether such an understanding would take the form 
 of an alhance is an open question. In reality it would for 
 most purposes be equal to an Anglo-German alliance, and 
 on the basis of such an understanding England and Germany 
 could peacefully settle their economic interests. Such an 
 agreement of the two great Germanic States would create 
 an irresistible political force which would promote the 
 development of both nations in every way. It would 
 create a factor for civilisation which would more than any 
 other promote human progress. Thus a practical way 
 would be found to banish war and the danger of war for 
 ever, or at least to restrict its danger. Peace in Europe 
 would be secured by England's approaching the Triple 
 Alhance. At the same time a powerful counterpoise would 
 be created to the growing influence of the United States. 
 The pressure of East European Slavism would be diminished 
 and a powerful wall would be raised against the millions 
 of yellow men in the Far East. 
 
 " It would be seen that such an understanding between 
 England and Germany would have the most far-reaching 
 
HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 395 
 
 advantages not only to the two countries but to all mankind. 
 However, it is clear that England would have to alter her 
 entire policy. The basis of all negotiations should be the 
 demand that England would abandon the Triple Entente 
 and redistribute her fleet. After all, it is clear to every 
 thinking man that England and Germany can never enter 
 into friendly and cordial relations as long as Great Britain 
 is alhed with Germany's enemies. Besides, Germany 
 could never have any confidence as to the honesty of 
 England's peaceful intentions as long as the entire British 
 Navy is concentrated in the North Sea and kept ready for 
 an attack upon Germany." 
 
 General von Bernhardi evidently strove to secure for 
 Germany not only supremacy in Europe but supremacy 
 throughout the world. He wished to conclude an Anglo- 
 German alliance, but Germany was to be the predominant 
 partner. Great Britain was to help Germany to become 
 a world-Power, but in order to be on good terms with 
 Germany she was to disarm. She was to redistribute her 
 fleet and apparently leave the protection of her shores to 
 Germany. According to General von Bernhardi a durable 
 understanding between the two Powers could be concluded 
 only if Great Britain would consent to become Grermany's 
 vassal. 
 
 Concluding my article in the Nineteenth Century and After 
 in February 1914 upon which this chapter is based I stated : 
 
 " The Germans are frequently described as a peaceful 
 nation. They would more correctly be described as a well- 
 drilled and well-disciphned nation. They are firmly ruled 
 by a small class through an all-powerful bureaucracy, army, 
 and police. Absolute obedience to official orders is the first 
 duty of the citizen and the first law of the State. The well- 
 drilled Germans are a law-abiding people and their obedience 
 is absolute. Orderly grumbhng, if done in moderation, 
 is permitted. Hence, if the people are dissatisfied with 
 their rulers or disapprove of their policy, they may pro- 
 test but they will obey. That was seen in 1866. Then the 
 Prussians passionately protested against the " Bruderkrieg,'* 
 the fratricidal war, against Austria. Yet they obeyed and 
 fought. The Government has crushed the spirit of the 
 
396 HOW THE MILITARY RULED GERMANY 
 
 people. This lack of spirit constitutes Grermany's strength 
 but also her weakness. German enthusiasts have always 
 greatly admired, democratic government, but, unlike French- 
 men, Englishmen, Americans, Italians, Swiss, and Dutch, 
 they have never seriously fought for it. They were at best 
 half-hearted supporters of revolution. The nation rose 
 only, as in 1813 against Napoleon, when ordered by the 
 Government. In Germany the Government does not carry 
 out the will of the people, but the people execute the will 
 of the Government, and those who try to prove that Ger- 
 many is peaceful because the German merchants, clergy- 
 men, and working men do not wish for war, only show 
 that they are unacquainted with Germany's political char- 
 acter and organisation and with the elementary facts of 
 German history. The majority of Germans are undoubtedly 
 peaceful, hut that peaceful majority will go to war with alacrity 
 as soon as the ruling minority gives the signal. There is a 
 great difference between democratic and autocratic Germany, 
 a difference which is not sufficiently appreciated in other 
 countries. Democratic Germany talks much, but does not 
 act ; autocratic Germany acts, but does not talk. Democratic 
 Germany has filled the newspapers with loud complaints 
 about the Zabern incident ; autocratic Germany has not 
 talked at Zabern, but has acted, and the incident has closed 
 with the victory of autocratic Germany, Herein lies the 
 lesson of Zabern." 
 
 Only too soon my forecast was to come true. 
 
CHAPTER XXIV 
 
 HOW THE ARMY HAS RUINED GERMANY i 
 
 On the 28th of February 1870, four months before the 
 outbreak of the Franco -German ¥7ar, Colonel Stoffel, the 
 French Military Attache in Berlin, sent to his Government 
 a report in which he stated : "La Prusse n'est pas un 
 pays qui a une armee ; c'est une armee qui possede un 
 pays." Careful investigation will show that not the German 
 Emperor, the Crown Prince, the Junkers, or the professors, 
 but the German Army was chiefly responsible for the great 
 tragedy of the War ; that the army was largely responsible 
 for the mismanagement of Germany's foreign poHcy before 
 the outbreak ; that the army had forced Great Britain and 
 Italy into the ranks of Germany's enemies ; that the 
 army was responsible for the unexampled treachery and 
 mendacity of Germany's diplomacy ; that the army was 
 responsible for the hideous barbarities perpetrated by 
 Germany everywhere ; that the army drove the United 
 States into open hostility with Germany. The army which 
 had made modern Germany has been responsible for Grer- 
 many's downfall not only by its illegitimate activities in 
 the political sphere, but even by its professional faiUngs, 
 which will be described in these pages. Hence the army, 
 not only its head, the Emperor, should be held responsible 
 by the world, and especially by the German people them- 
 selves. In the course of these pages I shall show that 
 the control of the German Army had fallen into the hands 
 of military intriguers who completely mismanaged the War. 
 I shall show in these pages that, had Germany followed 
 
 1 From the Nineteenth Century and After, April 1916. 
 397 
 
398 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 the wise and far-seeing plan of campaign laid down by 
 Moltke, with Bismarck's co-operation, for the eventuality 
 of a war with France and Russia, Great Britain and Italy 
 might have remained neutral and Germany might easily 
 have defeated France and Russia and have acquired the 
 domination of the Continent of Europe in a few months, 
 and possibly in a few weeks, at a comparatively trifling cost 
 in human lives and treasure. I shall show, furthermore, 
 that she failed in this because she allowed the direction 
 of her foreign policy and of the State to be grasped by 
 reckless mihtary adventurers who mismanaged both her 
 diplomatic and her miUtary campaigns. 
 
 Bismarck and Moltke had accustomed Germany to short 
 and decisive wars, prepared by faultless diplomacy and 
 carried out by matchless strategy. The war of 1864 against 
 Denmark lasted only a few days. The war of Prussia against 
 Austria, the Seven Weeks' War, began on the 26th of June 
 1866 with the fighting at Hiihnerwasser. On the 3rd of July 
 the battle of Koniggratz was won. The war was decided 
 by seven days' fighting. On the 19th of July 1870 France 
 declared war on Prussia. On the 2nd of August the first 
 encounter took place at Saarbriicken. By the 2nd of Sep- 
 tember Napoleon III. and his entire army had been made 
 prisoners at Sedan, and the remaining two French armies 
 had been severely defeated and had withdrawn into Metz, 
 which was closely invested by German troops. The issue 
 of the war had been decided in exactly a month's fighting. 
 If General Steinmetz had obeyed Moltke's orders, the two 
 French armies would not have succeeded in reaching Metz, 
 but would have found their Sedan in front of that fortress. 
 All Germany looked, and not without reason, for another 
 lightning campaign at the outbreak of the War. 
 
 Although it is universally believed that warfare by a few 
 strokes of lightning-like rapidity was initiated by Moltke, 
 that it is a Prussian invention, this is a mistake. It was 
 first practised by Napoleon I. The most rapid and the 
 most complete defeat known to military history was his 
 defeat of Prussia in the Jena campaign of 1806. Modern 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 399 
 
 German strategy was based not on that of Frederick the 
 Great but on that of Napoleon I. As Prussia had, in 1806, 
 been completely defeated in a great and decisive battle 
 three days after the beginning of hostilities, surprise attack 
 and sudden defeat by a great and decisive battle became 
 the watchword of German strategists. Karl von Clause- 
 witz, the greatest German writer on strategy and a pupil 
 of the celebrated Scharnhorst, who had taken part in the 
 terrible Jena campaign as aide-de-camp to Prince August 
 of Prussia, wrote in his classical treatise On War : 
 
 " From the very conception of war it is obvious that the 
 following are the principal maxims regarding the use of 
 battles : 
 
 " (1) The destruction of the enemy's military force is the 
 most important object of war. 
 
 " (2) This destruction can best be effected by means of 
 a battle. 
 
 " (3) Only great and general battles can have a decisive 
 effect upon warfare. 
 
 " The battle is the bloodiest way of solving the problem 
 of war. Its principal effect consists not in killing the 
 enemy's soldiers, but in destroying his courage. A true 
 conception of war and general experience lead us to look 
 only to a great battle for the decision of a war. Instances 
 of a great battle deciding the whole campaign have been 
 frequent in modern times. A deliberately planned great 
 battle must therefore be regarded as the principal aim and 
 object of a campaign. A General must strive to throw his 
 whole weight into the scales in the first battle. He must 
 endeavour to win everjrthing by a single but most powerful 
 stroke. Bonaparte hardly ever entered upon a war without 
 endeavouring to defeat the enemy and to conquer his country 
 in a first and decisive encounter." 
 
 The wars of 1866 and 1870, like Napoleon's model cam- 
 paign of 1806, were won by superior preparedness and 
 superior numbers, by a surprise attack made with the 
 greatest energy upon an unready and hesitating enemy. 
 In accordance with Clause witz's precept, they were rather 
 won by killing the enemy's courage than by killing his 
 
400 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 soldiers. One might almost say that these wars were won 
 by bluff, for they were won at an incredibly small cost in 
 lives. According to the German official account the two 
 great wars by which modern Germany was created resulted 
 in the following losses : 
 
 Prussian Losses in the Wab of 1866 
 
 4,450 killed in battle 
 6,427 died of disease 
 16,177 wounded 
 
 Total . . 27,054 
 
 The casualties of the Franco-German War of 1870-71 are 
 stated in greater detail in the official history. They were 
 as follows : 
 
 German Losses in the War of 1870-71 
 
 
 OflBcers. 
 
 Men. 
 
 Homes. 
 
 Killed or died of wounds . 
 
 1,871 
 
 26,397 
 
 7,325 
 
 Wounded 
 
 4,184 
 
 84,304 
 
 5,547 
 
 Missing . . . . 
 
 102 
 
 12,752 
 
 1,723 
 
 Total . . . 6,157 123,453 14,595 
 
 Prussia defeated Austria in 1866 and acquired vast terri- 
 tories and the leadership of Germany at the cost of merely 
 10,877 human lives, and Germany defeated France in 1870-71 
 and acquired Alsace-Lorraine with more than 2,000,000 
 inhabitants at the cost of only 28,268 human lives. Com- 
 pared with the present war, which has infficted at least 
 8,000,000 casualties upon Germany, they were almost 
 bloodless. Besides they were extremely profitable. They 
 added vast territories and many millions of industrious 
 citizens to the State, In addition, like Napoleon's campaign 
 of 1806, they brought in vast sums of money owing to the 
 heavy contributions and the colossal monetary indenmities 
 exacted. 
 
 Germany owed her victory over France in 1870-71 chiefly 
 to her overwhelming superiority in men and guns. According 
 to the German official history the French and German 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 401 
 
 forces compared at the beginning of August 1870, when 
 hostilities were opened, as follows : 
 
 
 German Army. 
 
 French Army. 
 
 Battalions of Infantry 
 
 474 
 
 332 
 
 Squadrons of Cavalry 
 
 382 
 
 222 
 
 Giina . . . . 
 
 . 1,584 
 
 780 
 
 Napoleon III. wrote in his (Euvres Posthumes : 
 
 " Instead of having in line, as might have been expected, 
 385,000 men to oppose the 430,000 of Northern Germany 
 combined with the Southern States, the army, when the 
 Emperor arrived at Metz on the 25th, of July, amounted 
 only to 220,000, and, moreover, not only were the effectives 
 not up to their full complement, but much indispensable 
 war material was wanting." 
 
 On paper the German and French forces stood almost in 
 the proportion of two to one. If superior readiness, better 
 leading, and the moral factor be taken into account, they 
 stood approximately in the relation of three to one. France 
 had no chance against Germany. According to the official 
 Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften of 1889 the French and 
 German forces engaged in some of the most telling battles 
 were as follows : 
 
 
 German Strength. 
 
 French Strength. 
 
 At Weissenburg 
 
 48,000 infantry 
 
 4,650 infantry 
 
 
 2,950 cavalry 
 
 '650 cavalry 
 
 
 144 guns 
 
 18 guns 
 
 At Worth 
 
 89,000 infantry 
 
 42,800 infantry 
 
 
 7,750 cavalry 
 
 5,750 cavalry 
 
 
 342 guns 
 
 167 guns 
 
 At Spichem . 
 
 30,100 infantry 
 
 24,400 infantry 
 
 
 4,500 cavalry 
 
 3,200 cavalry 
 
 
 108 gions 
 
 90 guns 
 
 At Gravelotte 
 
 . 166,400 infantry 
 
 99,500 infantry 
 
 
 21,200 cavalry 
 
 13,300 cavalry^ 
 
 
 732 guns 
 
 520 guns 
 
 At Beaumont 
 
 . 116,200 infantry 
 
 90,700 infantry 
 
 
 16,100 cavalry 
 
 10,000 cavalry 
 
 
 *545 guna 
 
 ,468 guns 
 
 At Sedan 
 
 . 133,500 infantry 
 
 90,000|^"^^^*^y 
 I cavalry 
 
 
 21,350 cavalry 
 
 
 701 guns 
 
 408 guns 
 
402 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 It will be noticed that Germany, especially in the open- 
 ing battles of the war, had an absolutely overwhelming 
 superiority in infantry, cavalry, and guns. 
 
 Tactics largely depend upon strategy. As Germany had 
 made it a strategical principle to attack by surprise and in 
 overwhelming numbers, she made it a rule to fight with 
 sledge-hammer blows. In view of her enormous superiority 
 in men and guns, she could afford to employ in battle the 
 most sanguinary form of attack against the French, who 
 usually stood on the defensive. The German generals sacri- 
 ficed their men lavishly though not recklessly. That be- 
 comes clear from the casualty statistics given in this chapter. 
 
 Diplomacy and strategy, to be successful, must work 
 hand in hand. After the Franco-German War, Moltke and 
 Bismarck began to contemplate the contingency of a war 
 with France and Russia combined and to prepare for it. 
 Henceforth the possibihty of a war on two fronts became 
 the principal care and pre-occupation of these two men. 
 That pre-occupation dictated Bismarck's foreign policy. 
 To weaken Germany's possible antagonists, the Chancellor 
 strove to keep France occupied with Colonial adventures 
 in Africa and Asia, and he encouraged Russia to advance 
 towards Constantinople and India. By skilful diplomacy he 
 created friction between Russia and Great Britain, between 
 France and Great Britain, between Italy and France, and 
 he brought about the conclusion of the Triple Alliance which, 
 by the adhesion of Turkey and Roumania, became a Quin- 
 tuple Alliance in disguise. Bismarck thought Germany 
 to be large and strong enough and he wished for peace. 
 That may be seen from his posthumous memoirs and from 
 his numerous speeches, letters, newspaper articles, and con- 
 versations. The Triple AJliance was a purely defensive, a 
 conservative, instrument. Prince Biilow wrote in his book 
 Imperial Germany, confirming the views expressed by 
 Bismarck in his Memoirs : 
 
 " One may characterise the Triple Alliance as an alliance 
 with emphatically conservative tendencies. . . . The three 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 403 
 
 Central- European States are bound to each other by the 
 firm resolve to maintain the existing balance of power in 
 Europe, and, should a forcible change of that balance be 
 attempted, to prevent it, if need be, by force. The united 
 strength of Central Europe stands in the path of any revolu- 
 tionary European policy which might elect to follow the 
 courses pursued by Louis XIV. or Napoleon I. , . . The 
 founders of the Triple AlUance intentionally created a 
 guarantee of peace. 
 
 As the Triple Alhance was a purely defensive and con- 
 servative arrangement devised to restrain rulers of the type 
 of Louis XIV. and Napoleon I., it was obvious that a policy 
 of aggression, such as that pursued by Germany, would very 
 likely bring about its dissolution. 
 
 Bismarck attached the greatest value to Great Britain's 
 good-will and support -in case of a great war, especially as 
 Italy was likely to follow England's lead. Soon after Bis- 
 marck's dismissal, William II., by estranging Russia and 
 antagonising England, reversed Bismarck's policy and thus 
 destroyed the political system which the great Chancellor 
 had created by years of labour, a system which assured 
 Germany's peace and her supremacy in Europe. I have 
 shown in my book The Foundations of Germany by means 
 of numerous newspaper articles emanating from the Chan- 
 cellor, which had not previously been published in the English 
 language, that Bismarck not only opposed the Emperor's 
 venturesome policy with all his strength, but that he fore- 
 told in the clearest and most emphatic language that the 
 Emperor's incessant and provocative meddling in foreign 
 politics would lead to a great European war ; that the 
 war would be brought about by Austria's Balkan policy in 
 which Germany had no interest ; that Germany thus 
 would be compelled to foUow Austria's lead ; that the 
 unnecessary estrangement from England was bound to bring 
 about Italy's desertion in the hour of trial ; that Germany's 
 interference in the Far East and her shameful treatment 
 of Japan, whom she had ousted from Port Arthur, might 
 arouse the hostility of that country ; that the Emperor's 
 
404 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 neurotic and exasperating activity and his bluster might 
 bring about the creation of a world-wide combination of 
 Powers hostile to Germany, and that it might lead to the 
 ruin of his country. I shall now show by most interesting 
 documents which also have not yet been pubHshed in 
 England that, incited by military intriguers, William II. 
 destroyed Moltke's work as recklessly as he destroyed that 
 of Prince Bismarck. 
 
 In studying the possibility of a war on two fronts, Moltke 
 attached the greatest value to the integrity of Switzerland, 
 Luxemburg, and Belgium, for a twofold reason. These 
 neutral States greatly shortened the frontier which Germany 
 had to defend towards France. Besides they protected, 
 like two huge fortresses, the Northern and Southern flanks 
 of the German Army in the West. The Rhine, the Black 
 Forest, and the Vosges provided a most powerful natural 
 bulwark in the West of Germany. On Moltke's advice the 
 vast natural strength of this position had been very greatly 
 increased by extensive and most powerful fortifications. 
 In Moltke's opinion the Western frontier of Germany was, 
 owing to these enormously strong natural and artificial 
 obstacles, the most formidable defensive position in the 
 world. 
 
 The vast strength of the Western frontier of Germany 
 and the advantage of its being protected on both flanks 
 by neutral States and the special position of Belgium, the 
 violation of which was likely to induce Great Britain to 
 enter the War in defence of that country, were recognised 
 in the leading military circles in Germany. Bernhardi gave 
 expression to the highest military opinion in writing in his 
 book Unsere Zukunft, which came out shortly before the out- 
 break of the War : 
 
 " Germany's Western frontier is exceedingly favourable 
 for defence. Here a weak army can hold its own during 
 a long time and inflict heavy losses upon the enemy. If the 
 aggressor should endeavour to avoid the powerful Rhine 
 front by marching through Belgium or through Switzerland, 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 405 
 
 he would raise further enemies against himself, and thus 
 strengthen Germany." 
 
 Taking advantage of the tremendous strength of her 
 Western frontier Moltke had prepared the following plan 
 of campaign in case of a war with France and Russia com- 
 bined. Germany was, in the beginning of such a war, to 
 limit herself to the defensive on her almost impregnable 
 Western frontier with by far the smaller part of her army, 
 while the bulk of her forces was to be employed in the East. 
 According to Moltke' s plan, Germany was to defeat and 
 destroy with the bulk of her forces, and with the help of 
 her aUies, the Russian Army, and after Russia's collapse 
 she was to attack France with her whole strength. 
 
 That plan of campaign was safe and sound, and it had 
 inestimable advantages for Germany. By respecting the 
 neutraUty of Belgium and Luxemburg she was likely to 
 secure to herseK the good-will, or at least the neutrality, 
 of Great Britain. Besides, if England stood aside, Italy 
 was Ukely either to co-operate against France, or at least 
 to observe a benevolent neutrality, even if Germany should 
 be the aggressor. If France, on the other hand, desiring 
 to come to Russia's aid and being unable to break through 
 Germany's immensely strong position in Alsace-Lorraine, 
 should endeavour to get round the German flank, if she 
 should try to invade Germany by marching through 
 Belgium and Luxemburg, she would arouse the hostility of 
 Great Britain. The only weak spot in Western Germany 
 was the extreme south of Alsace. There a small and com- 
 paratively unimportant district was dominated by the 
 fortress of Belfort. That was the only disadvantage of 
 Moltke's scheme, and it was after all only a negligible one. 
 The invasion of Southern Alsace could hardly be avoided 
 under any plan of campaign, and indeed this district was 
 invaded by the French at the beginning of this War and 
 remained occupied by them throughout its course. 
 
 After Bismarck's dismissal in 1890 Germany's foreign 
 pohcy was reversed, as I have shown in another chapter 
 
406 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 and in my book The Foundations of Germany, and her 
 military policy was reversed as well. Moltke resigned 
 immediately after the Emperor's accession and died in 1891. 
 His successors apparently intended to change the plan of 
 campaign which that master of sane strategy had evolved 
 with Bismarck's co-operation. The security of the small 
 southern corner of Alsace against an attack from Belfort 
 was made a welcome pretext for demanding a change of 
 plans by those military men who, in case of a great war, 
 wished to strike immediately at France with Germany's 
 full force and desired to begin a war on two fronts by invad- 
 ing France by the easiest route, by way of Belgium. The 
 German Press has often served as a mouthpiece not only to 
 the Government, but also to powerful political and military 
 intriguers. The danger which threatened Western Germany 
 from Belfort was pointed out to the people in newspaper 
 articles calculated to impress them with the seriousness 
 of the position, which was greatly exaggerated. Bismarck 
 was a great patriot, and through his friends he was kept 
 well informed on current affairs after his dismissal. Desiring 
 to prevent irremediable mischief, he did not hesitate to 
 reveal Moltke's plan of campaign in a number of articles 
 in the Hamburger Nachrichten, in order to be able to defend 
 it. Ostensibly replying to those who had reproached him 
 in the Press for not having acquired Belfort in 1870, as he 
 might have done, Bismarck wrote on the 9th of January 
 1893 in that journal : 
 
 Field-Marshal Count von Moltke was so convinced of the 
 strength of Germany's position in the West with the for- 
 tresses of Strassburg, Metz, Mainz, and Coblenz that he 
 thought that, in case of a war on two fronts, it would be 
 possible for Germany to fight on the Western frontier on 
 the defensive until the war with Russia was brought to an 
 end. Moltke was of opinion that, in view of the excellence 
 of the railway system and the strength of the German 
 fortifications in the West, the French Army would be unable 
 to break through into Germany. Therefore he beheved 
 that Germany would be able to restrict herself to the 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 407 
 
 defensive in the West, and that she should embark upon an 
 attack upon France only after the Russian war had been 
 brought to an end," 
 
 A week later, on the 16th of January, he returned to the 
 charge and stated in the Hamburger Nachrichten : 
 
 " It is a fact which cannot be doubted that Count von 
 Moltke was of opinion that Germany, if engaged in a war 
 with France and Russia, could, in the possession of Metz, 
 Strassburg, Mainz, Cologne, and Coblenz, fight on the 
 defensive for an unlimited time in the West, employing the 
 bulk of her army in the East, ... It might be considered 
 an impertinence to reinforce the views of the great German 
 strategist with a non-military opinion. Still, it should be 
 added that in case of defensive warfare towards France, 
 the left shore of the Rhine, where it flows near the French 
 frontier, would be adequately protected. Only a part of 
 Alsace would lack the protection of the German troops. 
 Moreover, the position of the German Army, acting on the 
 defensive, would be protected by the neutral territory of 
 Belgium and Luxemburg on the one flank and by that of 
 Switzerland on the other flank. Besides, if the French, 
 issuing from Belfort, should invade Alsace, they might easily 
 be thrown across the frontier into Switzerland." 
 
 On the 1st of February the great Chancellor wrote in 
 the Hamburger Nachrichten : 
 
 It cannot be doubted that Moltke did not attribute an 
 exaggerated importance to Belfort. It can as little be 
 doubted that the Field-Marshal, when officially discussing 
 with the Imperial Chancellor the possibility of a simul- 
 taneous war with France and Russia, declared in the clearest, 
 in the most categorical, and in the most detailed manner 
 that in case of such an undesirable event Germany should 
 limit herself to the defensive in the West until the decisive 
 battles had been fought and won in the East, Further- 
 more, when doubt was expressed whether such proceeding 
 was advisable, he stated that the Rhine, with its fortresses, 
 constituted the strongest defensive position possessed by 
 any of the Great Powers. 
 
 It will be noticed that in her diplomatic and in her mihtary 
 campaign Germany acted in flagrant opposition to the plan 
 
 27 
 
40S How THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 which Moltke, with Bismarck's co-operation and approval, 
 had laid down. Its abandonment by the German General 
 Staff, and the consenof &h e German Emperor and Foreign 
 Office to the violation of Belgium's neutrality at the bidding 
 of military adventures, has proved the cause of Germany's 
 ruin. 
 
 If the German General Staff had intended to carry through 
 the wise and far-seeing plan of campaign devised by Moltke 
 and Bismarck, Germany might, at the beginning of the 
 Russo- Austrian controversy regarding Serbia, have declared, 
 as indeed she did, that it was a purely Austro-Serbian 
 quarrel. She might, in addition, have stated that, in case 
 of a ' totally unjustifiable ' Russian attack upon Austria, 
 she would of course have to act in accordance with her 
 defensive treaty and come to Austria's aid ; that Austria was 
 too weak to resist gigantic Russia single-handed ; that Ger- 
 many's assistance alone could save Austria from destruction. 
 Lastly, the German diplomats might have expressed the 
 hope that France would keep neutral in the quarrel in which 
 France had no concern, that Germany would in no case 
 attack France, but that she would of course defend herself 
 with the strength of despair should France wantonly in- 
 vade innocent and inoffensive Germany. In addition, the 
 German statesmen might have appealed to England and 
 have asked hei to use her influence with France for the 
 sake of peace. Had this been done, British pubhc opinion, 
 though perhaps not condemning France for coming to 
 Russia's aid and attacking Germany, would scarcely have 
 approved of Great Britain's intervention on France's behalf. 
 It seems practically certain that the pacificist section of the 
 Cabinet would have prevailed, that Great Britain would 
 have observed an attitude of neutrality. Meanwhile, the 
 two Central Powers, aided by Turkey and perhaps by 
 Roumania as well, might have rapidly defeated Russia 
 while the French were battering desperately but in vain 
 against the powerful frontier position of Alsace-Lorraine. 
 After Russia's defeat the Germans and Austrians, who 
 possibly would have been reinforced, and would scarcely 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 409 
 
 have been opposed, by the Italians, would have defeated 
 France. A comparatively short campaign would have 
 brought about the downfall of France and Russia, and 
 would have secured to Germany the undisputed predomin- 
 ance on the Continent and perhaps the possession of the 
 French Colonies as well. A Greater Germany would have 
 been organised, and in ten or twenty years she would prob- 
 ably have become so wealthy and powerful as to be able 
 to challenge successfully Great Britain and the United 
 States for the mastery of the sea and of the world. Thus 
 Germany might have surprised the world with a fait accompli 
 as did Bismarck and Moltke half a century before. The 
 British people would have awakened to their deadly danger 
 only when it was too late. 
 
 Why was the sane and safe diplomatic and strategical 
 plan of campaign devised by Bismarck and Moltke aban- 
 doned ? Why did the German Army invade Belgium, 
 although that step was likely to arouse Great Britain's 
 hostihty and bring about Italy's secession ? It is easy to 
 surmise the reason. The German Emperor's chief charac- 
 teristic was his vanity, and the military intriguers sur- 
 rounding him played successfully on his weakness. They 
 probably promised him the most dazzling military triumph 
 known to history, a victory compared with which those 
 won by Napoleon in 1806 and by Moltke in 1866 and 1870 
 would pale into insignificance. 
 
 Before the fatal invasion of Belgium the best-informed 
 Germans had warned France not to come to Russia's aid 
 should the Austro- Serbian quarrel lead to war between 
 Russia on the one side and Germany and Austria-Hungary 
 on the other. They had publicly and solemnly warned her 
 that if she kept faith with her ally, the German troops would 
 enter Paris within a month. They had foretold, in the 
 same masterful tone which Napoleon employed towards 
 Frederick WiUiam III. in 1806, that if France stirred she 
 would be crushed in a few weeks. The Geiman supreme 
 command intended to destroy the power of France by a 
 lightning campaign similar to that of 1806, and was firmly 
 
410 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 convinced that success was certain. There was indeed 
 good reason for this belief. France had assembled the bulk 
 of her troops on her Eastern frontier, facing Alsace-Lorraine, 
 anticipating that Germany would attack from the direction 
 of Metz and Strasbourg. Germany, on the other hand, 
 had sent to Alsace-Lorraine only sufficient troops to de- 
 fend that powerful position against a French attack. The 
 few German army corps which had been assembled there 
 were to act on the defensive. They would occupy and 
 detain the French main army. Meanwhile the principal 
 body of the German troops was to rush through Belgium, 
 to overthrow the few French army corps on the Franco- 
 Belgian border, and to march upon Paris. Paris would 
 be reached in about three weeks. Germany's colossal 
 mortars, the existence of which was not suspected, would 
 destroy the forts in a few hours. Paris would fall. Having 
 seized the capital, the Germans would immediately wheel 
 round and attack the French main army in the flank and 
 rear, driving it against the walls of Strasbourg and Metz 
 and across the Swiss frontier. It is an interesting link in 
 the chain of evidence that the German Government, after 
 invading Belgium and declaring that that country's resist- 
 ance to the German invasion was a crime, admonished 
 Switzerland by telegraph * ' to maintain and defend by all 
 means in its power the neutrality and inviolabihty of its 
 territory . . . trusting that the Confederation, owing to 
 the unshakable will of the entire Swiss nation, will succeed 
 in repelling any violation of its neutrality." In other 
 words, Germany admonished the Swiss to disarm and intern 
 the French army corps which, attacked in the rear, might 
 be forced to cross into Switzerland. Had the German plan 
 not miscarried, all France might indeed have been con- 
 quered in a month. Paris, the greatest fortress in the 
 world, was believed by all Frenchmen to be impregnable. 
 Had Germany, within about a month, taken Paris and 
 destroyed and captured practically the whole of the mobilised 
 French armies, the bewildered French, suddenly deprived 
 of both capital and army, might indeed have given way to 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 411 
 
 despair and have abandoned all hope and all thought of 
 resistance and have asked for peace, especially if their 
 capital had been threatened with the fate of Louvain, as 
 was apparently intended. Germany had undoubtedly 
 invaded Belgium hoping, in the manner described, to create 
 for the whole of the French armies a gigantic Sedan, to 
 catch them as in a net, and thus to achieve a victory com- 
 pared with which that won in 1870-71 would appear trifling. 
 
 The daring plan of the German General Staff to destroy 
 or capture the whole of the French armies and to enter 
 Paris within a month miscarried owing to Belgium's un- 
 expected resistance, Liege blocked Germany's way for 
 more than a week. As the German troops entering Belgium 
 had no heavy siege artillery with them, orders were given 
 to take the town and forts by assault at any cost. The 
 German troops were mown down by the thousand. Accord- 
 ing to Baron de Beyens 36,000 German soldiers were killed 
 in this desperate but unsuccessful effort. If that figure is 
 correct, and there is no reason to doubt its approximate 
 correctness, the Germans lost before Liege alone a con- 
 siderably larger number of men than they lost during the 
 whole war of 1870-71, in which, as shown on another page, 
 only 28,268 men were killed in battle and died of wounds. 
 
 Who made the plan of invading France by way of Belgium ? 
 Who was responsible for that insane step which brought Ger- 
 many no advantage, but which secured to her the hostility 
 of Great Britain and Italy and the reprobation of the 
 civilised world ? The plan was probably adopted about 
 the time when Bismarck made his disclosures in the Ham- 
 burger Nachrichten. His articles attracted at the time little 
 attention because their meaning was understood only by 
 the initiated few. However, the responsibility for carrying 
 out the plan lay of course not with Count Waldersee, or 
 any other General who first brought it forward, but with 
 von Moltke junior, the nephew of the great Moltke, who 
 was the Chief of the German General Staff at the outbreak 
 of the Great War ; with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the 
 Imperial Chancellor, who, however, only approved of it 
 
412 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 more or less unwillingly, and especially with the Supreme 
 Commander, the German Emperor, who, it is true, acted 
 upon the advice of Moltke junior. This explains his resigna- 
 tion, soon after the beginning of the War, " for reasons 
 of health." 
 
 The Nineteenth Century of June 1912 contained an article 
 of mine, " The Failure of Post-Bismarckian Germany," in 
 which I dwelt on the defects of the German Army, stating : 
 " German generals complain that promotions are made 
 less by merit and more by favour than in former times. 
 . . . William II. has made the navy his hobby and attends 
 to the army perfunctorily, and many say it is little better 
 managed than his Foreign Office." In making this statement 
 I thought particularly of von Moltke junior, the Chief of 
 the General Staff. 
 
 The invasion of Belgium did not lead to the destruction 
 and capture of all the French armies, the seizure of Paris 
 and the surrender of all France, but merely to Great Britain's 
 intervention. The violation of Belgium brought Germany 
 no gain, but enormous loss. The greatest military triumph 
 the world has seen did not materialise. The German Army 
 leaders made the most fearful miscalculation and the most 
 fearful blunder. 
 
 Of all her opponents Germany hated little Belgium prob- 
 ably most. By resisting the onslaught of her mighty 
 opponent, Belgium made Germany's intended surprise 
 attack upon France a failure. The German Army leaders, 
 having grossly, and fatally, mismanaged the German cam- 
 paign by disregarding the wise plan for the conduct of a 
 war on two fronts laid down by the elder Moltke in collabora- 
 tion with Bismark, damaged Germany still further by ill- 
 treating the unhappy Belgians, by venting upon them 
 their spirit of baffled rage, by deliberately practising upon 
 them every kind of brutality, inhumanity, indignity, arid 
 extortion. The German Army thus destroyed not only 
 Germany's hope of victory, but Germany's good name as 
 well. The army, not the Emperor, was chiefly responsible 
 for the atrocities perpetrated first in Belgium and then 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 413 
 
 elsewhere. The Emperor was essentially a vain and weak 
 man, and, like Napoleon III., whom he resembled in many 
 respects, the tool of the army. 
 
 In 1592, more than three centuries ago, the great Lord 
 Bacon wrote in his Certain Observations upon a Libel : 
 
 " Wars are no massacres and confusions ; but they are 
 the highest trials of right ; when princes and States, that 
 acknowledge no superior upon earth, shall put themselves 
 upon the justice of God for the deciding of their contro- 
 versies by such success, as it shall please Him to give on 
 either side. And as in the process of particular pleas between 
 private men, all things ought to be ordered by the rules of 
 civil laws ; so in the proceedings of the war nothing ought 
 to be done against the law of nations, or the law of honour." 
 
 To the horror of mankind Germany disregarded the law of 
 nations, the laws of war, and the law of humanity. She 
 deliberately tried to plunge the world into barbarism and 
 savagery. 
 
 The German Army and the German Navy stood, according 
 to the Imperial Constitution, under the direct command of 
 the Emperor. He was no doubt legally responsible for all 
 the abominations which the German forces have committed 
 on land and sea. However, study of German military 
 literature makes it clear that the guilt lies perhaps not so 
 much with the Emperor as with the Army. During the rule 
 of William II. the Army had become a State within the 
 State, as will presently be shown. It had become the 
 principal governing factor. It had ceased to be a tool. It 
 had established its own laws. For decades the mihtary 
 leaders of the forward school had been allowed to preach 
 the doctrine of ruthlessness in war. They had taught that 
 both in diplomacy, which they wished to control, and in 
 warfare all means were good which were expedient, which 
 were advantageous to Germany. That may be seen from 
 the writings of many of the most eminent German soldiers — 
 Bernhardi is a characteristic representative of that class — • 
 and from the handbook Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, the 
 
414 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 Customs of War, published by the General Staff in Berlin 
 in 1902, and translated into English by Professor Morgan. 
 The Government Committee presided over by Lord 
 Bryce concluded its Report on Germany's outrages in 
 Belgium as follows : 
 
 " It is proved 
 
 "I. That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate 
 and systematically organised massacres of the civil popula- 
 tion, accompanied by many isolated murders and other 
 outrages. 
 
 " II. That in the conduct of the War generally innocent 
 civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large 
 numbers, women violated, and children murdered. 
 
 "III. That looting, house-burning, and the wanton 
 destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by 
 the officers of the German Army, that elaborate provision 
 had been made for the systematic incendiarism at the very 
 outbreak of the War, and that the burnings and destruction 
 were frequent where no military necessity could be alleged, 
 being, indeed, part of a system of general terrorisation. 
 
 " IV. That the rules and usages of war were frequently 
 broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including 
 women and children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed 
 to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, 
 and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White 
 Flag. 
 
 " Sensible as they are of the gravity of these conclusions, 
 the Committee conceive that they would be doing less than 
 their duty if they failed to record them as fully established 
 by the evidence. Murder, lust, and pillage prevailed over 
 many parts of Belgium on a scale unparalleled in any war 
 between civilised nations during the last three centuries." 
 
 Surprise has been expressed that the citizens of a cultured, 
 well-ordered, and highly disciplined nation should have 
 been able to perpetrate the horrors described in Lord Bryce's 
 Report, not only in Belgium but elsewhere as well ; that 
 people who until recently were supposed to be kindly, 
 humane, and somewhat over-sentimental should have 
 been able to commit crimes for which savages would blush. 
 I think the fault lay not in the character of the German 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 415 
 
 people, but in the teachings which they had received from 
 their military leaders. The principal characteristic of the 
 German people was their docility, their wilHngness to do 
 as they were told. They were passive instruments in the 
 hands of their rulers and superiors, as they always have 
 been. The Germans were the only nation in Europe which, 
 though suffering from tjrranny and misrule, had never 
 successfully revolted against their tyrants. The German 
 soldiers were ordered to murder, burn, and plunder, and they 
 did this as conscientiously and as unquestioningly as they 
 obeyed the innumerable vexatious regulations and restric- 
 tions of their country. 
 
 Formerly the army and the militant section of the German 
 nation were kept in bounds. Soldiers interested themselves 
 only in their duties and did not mingle in politics. Louis 
 Schneider, the reader of William I., has told us in his Memoirs 
 that the old Emperor would neither tolerate that officers 
 should discuss with him political questions nor would he 
 allow Prince Bismarck to talk with him on miHtary affairs. 
 All this had changed under William II. The King of Prussia, 
 the Emperor of Germany, was by tradition a soldier. Prusso- 
 Germany was a military State. The army was the support 
 of the throne. It was the true aristocracy, the ruling class, 
 of the country. The military officers were naturally im- 
 patient of peace and were apt to demand war whenever 
 political complications arose. Bismarck succeeded in 
 curbing their ardour, in keeping them within bounds. He 
 checked the aggressive proclivities of the army and the 
 desire of the leading officers to give a warlike direction to 
 the national policy. However, he foresaw that, under a 
 weak and vain monarch, such as William II., the army might 
 become the predominating factor and dictate the national 
 policy. He foretold that under his rule the national policy 
 might be directed by the General Staff. Desiring to protect 
 his country against that danger, he wrote in his posthumous 
 Memoirs : 
 
 " How keenly Moltke wanted to put in practice his mili- 
 tary and strategic tastes and abilities I observed not only 
 
416 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 on this occasion, in July 1870, when war with France seemed 
 impending, but also in the days before the outbreak of the 
 war of 1866 against Austria. . . . 
 
 " In both cases his love of combat and delight in battles 
 were a great support to me in carrying out the policy which 
 I regarded as necessary, and which I had to carry out in 
 opposition to the intelligible and justifiable aversions in a 
 most influential quarter. His desire for war proved incon- 
 venient to me in 1867, in the Luxemburg question, and in 
 1875 and afterwards when the question arose whether it 
 was desirable, as regards a war with France which we should 
 probably have to face sooner or later, to bring it on antici- 
 pando before the adversary could improve his preparations. 
 I have always opposed the theory which advocates aggres- 
 sive wars, wars of precaution, of prevention, not only at 
 the Luxemburg period, but likewise subsequently for twenty 
 years, in the conviction that even victorious wars cannot 
 be justified unless they are forced upon one and that one 
 cannot look into the cards of Providence far enough ahead 
 to anticipate historical developments and make one's own 
 calculations accordingly. 
 
 " It is natural that in the Staff of the Army not only young 
 officers desirous of promotion, but also experienced strate- 
 gists, should feel the need of turning to account the efficiency 
 of their troops and their own capacity to lead, and of making 
 themselves prominent in history. It would be a matter of 
 regret if an enterprising military spirit did not exist in the 
 Army. It is the duty of the political, not the military, 
 heads of the State to keep these sentiments within the 
 limits which the nation's need of peace can justly claim. 
 That at the time of the Luxemburg question, during the 
 crisis of 1875, invented by Gortchakoff and France, and 
 even down to the most recent times, the General Staff and 
 its leaders have allowed themselves to be led astray and to 
 endanger peace lies necessarily in the very spirit of the 
 institution, which I would not forgo. It only becomes 
 dangerous under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of 
 proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally 
 unjustifiable influences." 
 
 William II. was the monarch " whose policy lacks sense 
 of proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitu- 
 tionally unjustifiable influences," described in Bismarck's 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 417 
 
 Political Testament. The German Foreign Office had be- 
 come an annexe of the General Staff. In a most important 
 German Official Secret Report, emanating apparently from 
 the German General Staff, and relating to the proposed 
 very great increase of the German Army which was effected 
 previously to the War, dated the 19th of March 1913, and 
 published in the French Yellow Book, we read : 
 
 " We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our 
 people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments 
 and policy of the French. We must accustom them to 
 think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity in order 
 to combat the provocation of our adversaries. We must 
 act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid 
 a crisis which might injure our economic existence. We 
 must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of 
 powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained 
 political relations an outbreak {Losschlagen) should be con- 
 sidered as a relief, because after it would come decades of 
 peace and prosperity, as after 1870." 
 
 The higher German officers did not disguise the fact that 
 they meant to direct Germany's foreign policy, which was 
 supposed to be managed by the Foreign Office. On the 
 6th of May 1913 the French Ambassador in Berlin reported 
 to his Government in Paris : 
 
 " I have been informed of some remarks made in a German 
 milieu by General von Moltke, who is considered here as the 
 most distinguished officer of the German Army. The inten- 
 tion of the General Staff is to act by surprise. ' We must 
 put on one side,' said General von Moltke, ' all commonplaces 
 as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has 
 become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way 
 as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success 
 alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to 
 leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged 
 to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that 
 she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of 
 inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly,' added the 
 General, ' we must anticipate our principal adversary as 
 soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and 
 
418 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resist- 
 ance.' This represents exactly the attitude of military 
 circles, and it corresponds with that of political circles." 
 
 It will be noticed that the German Army, as represented 
 by its chiefs, considered itself to be not an instrument of 
 government, but the Government, the State. 
 
 When complications arose between Serbia and Austria- 
 Hungary, not the German diplomats, but the Generals, 
 absolutely controlled the nation's foreign policy. The chiefs 
 of the German Foreign Office had to make the humiliating 
 admission that not they, but the heads of the Army, 
 directed Germany's diplomacy. On the 30th of July 1914 
 M. Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berhn, reported 
 to his Government two conversations which he had had 
 with the Secretary of State, von Jagow, and with the Under- 
 Secretary of State, Herr Zimmermann, which he summarised 
 as follows : 
 
 " I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had 
 himself told me that Germany would only consider herself 
 obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German 
 frontiers, and that this was not being done. He replied 
 that this was true, but that the heads of the Army were insisting 
 on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German 
 Army. . . ." 
 
 In another telegram of the same day M. Cambon re- 
 ported : 
 
 " According to the Under-Secretary of State, the military 
 authorities are very anxious that mobilisation should be ordered, 
 because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advant- 
 ages. Nevertheless, up to the present the haste of the Ger:eral 
 Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, has been successfully 
 prevented."" 
 
 M. Cambon's statements were confirmed by Baron de 
 Beyens, the Belgian representative in Berlin. He wrote on 
 the 1st of August to his Government : 
 
 " Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann went to the 
 Chancellor and to the Emperor, in order to secure that the 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 410 
 
 order for general mobilisation should not be issued to-day, 
 but they were met by the inflexible opposition of the Minister 
 for War and the Chiefs of the Army, who must have repre- 
 sented to the Emperor the fatal consequences of a twenty- 
 four hours' delay. The order was immediately issued and 
 brought to the knowledge of the general public by a special 
 edition of the Lokal-Anzeiger. I telegraphed it to you 
 immediately." 
 
 It is a well-known fact that at the last moment Austria 
 wished to draw back, but that Germany precipitated the 
 War, making Austria's intended concessions towards 
 Russia impossible by presenting an ultimatum at Petrograd. 
 At the critical moment the Army leaders prevented the 
 peaceful arrangement of the political difficulties. They 
 forced the Emperor's hands. 
 
 On the 5th of August 1914 Baron de Beyens had a final 
 conversation with Herr von Jagow, the Secretary, and Herr 
 Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary, of the German Foreign 
 Office. That conversation is reported in the second Belgian 
 Grey Book. The Belgian Minister reported : 
 
 "... Herr Zimmermann simply repUed that the Depart- 
 ment for Foreign Affairs was powerless. Since the order 
 for mobiUsation had been issued by the Emperor, all power 
 now belonged to the miUtary authorities. It was they who 
 had considered the invasion of Belgium to be an indispen- 
 sable operation of war. ' I hope,' he added with emphasis, 
 ' that this war will be the last. It must also mark the end 
 of the poHcy of aUiances which has led to this result.' 
 
 " From this interview I brought away the impression that 
 Herr Zimmermann spoke to me with his customary sincerity 
 and that the Department for Foreign Affairs, since the 
 opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict, had been on the 
 side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that 
 its views and counsels had not prevailed. To-day, even, 
 it is my belief, contrary to what I wrote you at first, that 
 Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann spoke the truth 
 when they assured my colleagues and myself that they did 
 not know beforehand the text itself of the ultimatum 
 addressed by Austria-Hungary to Serbia. A superior 
 power intervened to precipitate the march of events." 
 
420 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 The fact** that the German Foreign Office, and even the 
 Imperial Chancellor, had become subordinates to the 
 General Staff, that generals, not statesmen, guided Germany's 
 foreign policy, may be shown by numerous incidents of which 
 I will mention only one because it was particularly striking. 
 As I have previously stated, the Imperial Chancellor, Herr 
 von Bethmann-Hollweg, probably agreed more or less 
 unwiUingly to the violation of Belgium, being unable to 
 resist, in view of the assurance of the General Staff that the 
 result would be a complete victory of unparalleled magni- 
 tude which would completely eliminate France as a mili- 
 tary factor. Immediately after the invasion of Belgium 
 Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg confessed candidly in the 
 Reichstag that, in invading that country, Germany had 
 perpetrated a wrong. The military evidently did not approve 
 of the Chancellor's sincerity. General von Emmich, in 
 invading Belgium, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants 
 which probably had previously been drafted by the General 
 Staff in Berlin. He stated in it that the German forces 
 invaded Belgium because the neutrality of that country had 
 previously been violated by the French. The miUtary and 
 the civil power contradicted one another. The civil power 
 admitted a great wrong and the miUtary pleaded justifica- 
 tion. The German Government was bound to choose 
 between the two views. Being under the control of the 
 Army, the military view was adopted. It was proclaimed 
 everywhere that France had " forced " Germany to invade 
 Belgium by violating that country's neutrality. The 
 highest officials at the German Foreign Office were perfectly 
 aware that Germany had been in the wrong, that the viola- 
 tion could not be justified with the mendacious pretexts 
 employed by the Army. That was made clear by Herr 
 Zimmermann in his conversation with Baron de Beyens on 
 the 5th of August, for the Belgian representative reported : 
 
 " Herr Zimmermann expressed to me, with much emotion, 
 his profound regrets for the cause of my departure. But, 
 he added, the passage through Belgium is an absolute 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 421 
 
 necessity for us — a question of life or death (Sein oder nicht 
 sein). Germany must crush France as quickly as possible 
 in order to be able then to turn against Russia. 
 
 " Herr Zimmermann sought no pretext to excuse the 
 violation of our neutrality. He did not invoke the supposed 
 French plan, alleged against France by the Chancellor in 
 the speech which he had delivered the evening before in 
 the Reichstag, of passing through Belgium in order to attack 
 Germany on the lower Rhine, a plan to which Herr von 
 Jagow had alluded in his conversation with me." 
 
 German policy was controlled by the military. The 
 Foreign Office was a dependency of the General Staff. The 
 Chancellor and the highest officials at the Foreign Office 
 were forced to eat their words and to recant. As the 
 General Staff pleaded justification they had to do the same. 
 Official Germany proclaimed everywhere that the invasion 
 of Belgium was justified because France, which had practic- 
 ally no troops on the Franco- Belgian border, intended to 
 invade that country, and because Belgium " had sold her- 
 self " to England by discussing measures of defence with 
 her in case the country should be invaded by Germany. 
 The Belgian and the British Governments were, of course, 
 entitled to discuss measures of defence in case of a German 
 invasion which was threatened, long before the outbreak 
 of the War, by Germany's strategical railways and mihtary 
 preparations which pointed to an attack upon Belgium. 
 However, the Foreign Office authorities of Germany not 
 merely repeated, hke lackeys, the instructions which they 
 received from the General Staff, but they endeavoured to 
 *' prove " Belgium's guilt by deliberate forgery, by changing 
 the word " conversation " into the word " convention " 
 in the document which recorded the Anglo-Belgian Con- 
 versations regarding the measures to be taken should 
 Germany invade the country. 
 
 The German Army was also responsible for the U-boat 
 campaign, for Hindenburg and Ludendorff controlled the 
 navy. Thus the army forced the United States into the 
 War with disastrous results for Germany. The army, not 
 
422 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 the diplomats, were responsible for the peace of Brest- 
 Litovsk and for that of Bucharest which finally disgraced 
 Germany. 
 
 It has frequently been stated that not merely the German 
 Emperor and Germany's leaders were responsible for the 
 War, but that the whole nation was responsible for it because 
 the whole nation enthusiastically approved of the aggression. 
 It is true that the nation went to war with wild enthusiasm. 
 However, it must not be forgotten that that enthusiasm 
 was carefully raised before the War by the military leaders. 
 The German officers were not satisfied with running the 
 Government. They were not satisfied with dominating 
 the Emperor, the Chancellor, and the Foreign Office. They 
 strove, and strove successfully, to educate the nation and to 
 arouse in it a spirit of reckless aggression. It is a fairly 
 weU-known fact that the German Press was, during the War, 
 edited by the General Staff, but it is not so well known that 
 during many years previous to its outbreak German military 
 men had carried on a nation-wide campaign of incitement 
 to war. In 1913 Professor Nippold published in Berlin 
 a small but important volume, Der Deutsche Chauvinismus, 
 which seems almost unknown. It contained numerous 
 extracts from the German Jingo Press, and it summed up 
 the character of the war agitators and their aims as 
 follows : 
 
 " The German Chauvinists advocate war not merely 
 occasionally ; they arouse systematically in the German 
 nation a desire for war. They show not merely that the 
 people should prepare for war ; they teach that the nation 
 urgently requires war. War is depicted not as a possibility, 
 but as a necessity. It must come, and the sooner the better. 
 In the eyes of these men war is a necessity to the German 
 people, and a prolonged peace is an evil. They do not care 
 whether there is a reason for war or not. If there is no 
 reason, one must simply make war without a reason. . . . 
 
 "It is interesting to study the policy pursued by our 
 war agitators. They begin their activity with the children. 
 We have seen in the Jungdeutschland-Post [the paper of 
 an extensive boys' organisation of which General von der 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 423 
 
 Goltz is President] war described as the most desirable 
 event. Some organisations strive to arouse the war fever 
 in the young and some in the grown-up. Among the latter 
 the Alldeutsche Verhand and the Wehrverein should be 
 mentioned. Their teaching may be summed up thus : A 
 great war is a necessity, and it should arouse the delight of 
 the whole nation. . . . 
 
 " These agitators have raised the dogma that war is in- 
 evitable, and as it is in their opinion inevitable, they advo- 
 cate an aggressive war, a war of prevention, arguing ' As 
 war is bound to break out, let us see that it will break out 
 at the moment most favourable to Germany. Let us attack 
 the others as soon as it suits us, and before all let us attack 
 as soon as possible,' Having abandoned the idea of a de- 
 fensive, of a necessary, war, they preach an aggressive war 
 without cause, and believe that by their preaching they have 
 succeeded in converting the German people from a peaceful 
 nation into a nation of firebrands, eager to pick quarrels 
 with others. In their opinion armaments are not intended 
 to preserve the peace. Oh no ! The German nation needs 
 a war, and it would be a pity to leave the ready German 
 Army unused. 
 
 " The leading war agitators are the Nationalist Press, the 
 war organisations, such as the Alldeutsche Verhand, and 
 war-preaching Generals such as Generals Keim, Liebert, 
 Bemhardi, Eichhorn, Wrochem. These men have lost all 
 sense of responsibihty. General Keim, who is probably 
 the worst war agitator living, has ventured to assert that 
 Germany was free from Chauvinism ! 
 
 " In the eyes of these men Morality and Right are concep- 
 tions of little value. They look contemptuously down upon 
 these quahties and upon all except the mihtary achievements 
 of mankind, preaching the denial of all civihsation, and 
 eulogising the rule of unrestricted brutal might. That is 
 their great ideal. They recommend us to embark upon a 
 piratical war and to disregard international law and all 
 moral obligations. Their teaching is bound to lead to the 
 moral degeneration of the nation. 
 
 " Our war-preaching generals teach us that without a 
 war the moral quahties of the German people would deterio- 
 rate. To them the problem of Germany's expansion is 
 not a cause of war, for according to them a war would be 
 necessary on moral grounds, had Germany all the colonies 
 28 
 
424 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 she could wish for. They consider it a matter of course 
 that Germany should embark as early as possible upon a 
 war of aggression, and consider the advocacy of peace as a 
 sign of weakness. 
 
 " The military should not be allowed to force their class 
 ideas upon the German nation. It has never lacked military 
 spirit. It is not necessary to arouse it artificially. These 
 uniformed demagogues unceasingly raise the bogy of war 
 and at the same time sing its praise. To them all profes- 
 sions, except that of arms, are contemptible. What is 
 international law ? Rubbish ! What modern commerce, 
 industry, and science ? Effeminating occupations which 
 have diverted the people from their true occupation, from 
 war. To them war is the greatest blessing. 
 
 " Our war-generals despise our statesmen and politicians, 
 for they wish to control the National PoUcy themselves. 
 They think that the direction of the State in all its branches 
 should be left to the army. In their eyes the German 
 diplomats are incompetent. 
 
 " If the German Chauvinists should unhappily succeed in 
 making the Government beheve that they represent the 
 people, that they are the people, then war may break out 
 at any moment. They may carry the" Government with 
 them. These things have happened before, and they may 
 happen again. We should bethink ourselves in time, 
 for the spirit of aggression which these men have aroused 
 constitutes for Germany a grave danger against which one 
 can warn the nation neither too often nor too energetically." 
 
 Professor Nippold gave only the names of officers on half- 
 pay. He should have added that many of the most eminent 
 officers on active service were the principal leaders of the 
 Jingo campaign in Germany. Both the Ministry of War 
 and the Admiralty stimulated the desire for increased 
 armaments and for war by maintaining a widespread agita- 
 tion through their Press offices and by other means. Admiral 
 Tirpitz was in the first place not a naval administrator, but 
 a naval agitator. The Navy League was one of his instru- 
 ments of agitation, exactly as the Wehrverein was a tool 
 of the highest military authorities. 
 
 The details given in this chapter will suffice to show that 
 
HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERIVIANY 425 
 
 the German Army was principally responsible for bringing 
 about the War ; that the army dominated the German 
 Foreign Office and controlled Germany's foreign policy 
 before the outbreak of hostilities ; that the German Army 
 was responsible for the unparalleled mendacity of German 
 diplomacy ; that the German Army was responsible for the 
 invasion of Belgium ; that it was responsible for the inter- 
 vention of Great Britain and Italy ; that the men who 
 brought about the War were responsible for abandoning the 
 wise plan of campaign upon which Moltke and Bismarck 
 had settled and which might have led to Germany's triumph 
 within a few months. They suffice to show that the Army 
 was responsible for the abominations of which the German 
 forces were guilty, and that the Army, by carefully-planned 
 agitation, had corrupted the mind of the nation. A powerful 
 army is an invaluable tool, but a dangerous master. The 
 German Army leaders had made themselves supreme in the 
 State. They had been playing the same part as the Pre- 
 torians played in Ancient Rome, the Janissaries in Turkey 
 and the Strelitzi in Russia. They have deserved the same 
 fate. 
 
 The fear has been expressed that the great strengthening 
 of the British Army might introduce militarism into England 
 and Prussianise it. That fear is totally unfounded. The 
 British Army, however strong, would be under the control 
 of Parliament, of the people. In Germany Parliament 
 and people had no control and, indeed, no influence what- 
 ever, over the army. According to the Imperial Constitu- 
 tion the Emperor had sole control over the military forces, 
 and by the Constitution the strength of the army was laid 
 down for all time, and could therefore not be altered by 
 Parliament. By the fundamental law of the Empire every 
 German citizen had to serve in the army, and by the same 
 document its peace strength was fixed at 1 per cent, of the 
 population for all time. 
 
 Imperial Germany was supposed to be a Constitutional 
 Empire possessed of representative and very democratic 
 institutions, for every male adult was given a vote. If we 
 
426 HOW THE ARMY RUINED GERMANY 
 
 look into the Constitution a little more closely we find that 
 the country was ruled by a military oligarchy, that its 
 democratic institutions were a farce, that the people were 
 powerless. As military domination had been imposed 
 upon Germany by the Constitution, and as the people 
 could not alter the Constitution except with the consent of 
 their rulers, it was obvious that Germany could free herself 
 from the shackles of militarism only by a successful revolu- 
 tion. Germany bore domination by a military caste as long 
 as she was prosperous and invariably successful in war. 
 When she discovered that the military caste had ruined the 
 country, when the immense prestige enjoyed by the army 
 had disappeared, when the people saw in it the principal 
 cause of their misery, they rose and swept out of existence 
 the institutions which had brought about their downfall. 
 
CHAPTER XXV 
 
 THE WAR AIMS OF THE GERMAN INTELLECTUALS ^ 
 
 The most important factors of public opinion in Germany- 
 were three : the governing circles, the business men, and 
 the intellectuals. The war aims of the intellectuals were 
 authoritatively stated in a petition which was drawn up 
 on the 25th of June 1915 and which was sent to the 
 Imperial Chancellor. Appended to it were 1,341 signa- 
 tures. Among the signatories were 352 University Pro- 
 fessors, 158 educationalists and clergymen, 145 high officials, 
 burgomasters, and councillors, 148 judges and lawyers, 40 
 Parliamentarians, 18 retired admirals and generals, 182 busi- 
 ness men, 52 agriculturists, 252 artists, authors, and pub- 
 lishers. In view of the great prestige enjoyed by the German 
 professors and their vast influence upon public opinion, 
 the importance of the professorial demands was very great. 
 The weight of the professorial petition was vastly increased 
 by the signatures of eminent practical men which also were 
 appended to the document. Among these was Herr Kirdorf , 
 the principal director of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerk, 
 Germany's leading coal and iron undertaking. Herr Kirdorf 
 was for many years the President of the powerful organisa- 
 tion which represents the Grerman coal and iron industry. 
 Petitions which are intended to be signed by many of the 
 most influential men are drawn up carefully and cautiously. 
 They are as a rule worded with a good deal of reserve and 
 restraint in order to avoid discussion and opposition. There- 
 fore, the petition cf the professors must not be treated as 
 
 1 From Grumbach, Oermany'a Annexationist Aims, translated by 
 J. Ellis Barker, John Murray, 1917. 
 
 427 
 
428 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 
 
 if it were a rash statement made by some irresponsible hot- 
 heads. The document was worded as follows : 
 
 " The Petition of the Professors to the 
 Imperial Chancellor 
 
 ** The German nation and its Emperor have kept the 
 peace during forty-four years. They have kept it until its 
 maintenance became incompatible with the demands of 
 national honour and of self-preservation. In spite of the 
 growing strength and number of its population, Germany 
 has never thought of overstepping the narrow limits of its 
 continental territories as a conqueror. Its genius merely 
 compelled the nation to enter the world's markets in order 
 to secure there its economic existence in peaceful competi- 
 tion with the other nations. 
 
 " However, Germany's enemies wished to reduce our 
 narrow territories and to hamper our indispensable activi- 
 ties in the world's markets. They made plans which went 
 as far as the destruction of the German Empire. When they 
 recognised their danger, the Germans, from the highest to 
 the lowest, rose like one man, knowing that they had to 
 defend not only their country, but also their individuality, 
 their spiritual and moral treasures, the culture of Germany 
 and that of Europe, against the flood of barbarians coming 
 from the East and the desire of vengeance and the lust of 
 domination of the nations of the West. Victoriously, with 
 God's help, hand in hand with our faithful Allies, we have 
 been able to defend ourselves against half the world. 
 
 " Now, when in Italy a new enemy has arisen to Germany, 
 mere defence is no longer sufficient. Our enemies have 
 forced the sword into our hands and have compelled us to 
 make enormous sacrifices in blood and treasure. Now we 
 must protect ourselves against a similar surprise attack 
 from all sides, against a whole succession of wars waged with 
 our enemies when they have regained their strength. To 
 prevent this, we mean to establish ourselves so firmly and 
 so broadly in a secured and enlarged homeland that our 
 independent existence is guaranteed to us for generations. 
 " The people are unanimous and resolved in pursuing 
 this principal aim. The plain truth which we meet wherever 
 we look is this : There is only one fear among all the classes 
 of the people, and that fear is particularly broad and deep 
 
GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 429 
 
 among the masses of the people. It is the fear that, through 
 the delusive idea of foolish conciliatoriness, or through 
 nervous impatience, a premature, doubtful, and transient 
 peace might be concluded. It is feared that once more the 
 diplomat's pen might give up what the sword has victoriously 
 won, as happened a century ago. And that might happen 
 in the most fateful hour of destiny known to German history, 
 when peoples' minds display a greatness and unanimity 
 such as have never been known in the past and may never 
 be known in the future. 
 
 " Of a truth we do not strive after the domination of 
 the world. However, we mean to possess a share of world- 
 power proportionate to the greatness of Grermany's cultural, 
 economic, and warlike strength. Perhaps it will not be 
 possible to achieve simultaneously all the aims of national 
 security. This may not be feasible because of the number 
 of our enemies. Still, the utmost limit of the possible should 
 be obtained. Otherwise, the great sacrifices of the nation 
 and our great military efforts during the war will have been 
 vain. This is, we repeat it, the firm determination of the 
 German nation. 
 
 " It is the duty and the right of those who, through 
 their learning and position, have become the intellectual 
 leaders and protagonists of pubHc opinion, to give clear 
 expression to the resolution and to the firm will of the nation, 
 and to place the national wishes before the Government. 
 It is their duty to give powerful support to the Government 
 in its heavy task of enforcing Germany's necessary claims 
 against the faint-hearted individuals within the country 
 and against its tenacious enemies abroad, 
 
 " We invite all leaders of public opinion to fulfil this duty. 
 
 " We know full well that one must discriminate between 
 the desirable aims of the war and the final conditions obtain- 
 able at the peace, that everything depends on the ultimate 
 success of our arms, and that it cannot be our task to dis- 
 cuss the war objects of Austria -Hungary and Turkey. Hence 
 we have in the following merely briefly expressed our opinion 
 in giving utterance to our conviction that Germany must 
 have certain guarantees for a lasting peace, and that there 
 are certain aims which must be reached by the blood-sodden 
 road of the present war. 
 
 " (1) France. — We wish to aboHsh for all time the French 
 menace. We have been threatened by France for centuries. 
 
430 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 
 
 We have been assailed with French cries of vengeance from 
 1815 to 1870 and from 1871 to 1915. All classes of the 
 German people are convinced of this necessity. We cannot 
 abolish this danger through useless efforts at concihation, 
 to which France has always replied with the utmost 
 fanaticism. 
 
 " We would warn all Germans most seriously not to 
 indulge in self-deception. Even after the terrible lesson of 
 this disastrous war of revenge, France will continue thirsting 
 for vengeance as long as she possesses the necessary strength. 
 For the sake of our own existence we must enfeeble that 
 land politically and economically, without scruple or com- 
 punction, and improve Germany's mihtary-strategical posi- 
 tion towards France. To achieve this end a thorough -going 
 improvement of Germany's western frontier from Belfort 
 to the coast is needed. 
 
 " In addition we must, if possible, conquer part of the 
 French Channel coast in order to increase our strategical 
 security against England and to obtain better access to the 
 ocean. 
 
 " Special measures will have to be taken so that the 
 German Empire should not be internally weakened by its 
 external acquisitions. In order to avoid a position similar 
 to that which obtains in Alsace-Lorraine, the undertakings 
 and landed properties in the conquered districts which secure 
 to their owners power and influence should be transferred 
 from hands hostile to Germany to German hands, and the 
 indemnification of the original owners should be left to 
 France. No influence whatever upon the Empire should 
 be allowed to that part of the French population which has 
 been taken over by us. 
 
 " Furthermore, it is necessary that France — ^and France 
 among all our enemies in the first place — should have 
 imposed upon it a high war indemnity, and that no mercy 
 should be shown to it, although it has financially been 
 terribly bled through its own folly and British selfishness. 
 Details will be given further on. 
 
 " We should also remember that France has a dispro- 
 portionately large Colonial Empire, and that England might 
 enrich itself by seizing the French Colonies unless we seize 
 them ourselves. 
 
 " (2) Belgium. — Belgium, which we have won with so 
 much of the best German blood, we must firmly hold politic- 
 
GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 431 
 
 ally, militarily, and economically, whatever reasons may be 
 urged against such a step. On no point is the unanimity of 
 popular opinion greater. To the nation it is beyond doubt 
 a question of honour to hold on to that country. 
 
 " From the political and military points of view it is 
 clear that an independent Belgium would be nothing but 
 an English base for a very dangerous attack, a shield behind 
 which our enemies would gather anew. Economically the 
 acquisition of Belgium would mean a vast accession of 
 power to Germany. 
 
 " Nationally also Belgium can become a great gain to 
 Germany. The Flemish population, which is so closely 
 related to the Germans by their culture, may free itself in 
 course of time from its French shackles and may remember 
 its Germanic origin and character. 
 
 " Of the problems which we have to solve when we have 
 acquired Belgium we mention only this- — that the inhabi- 
 tants must be allowed no political influence within the 
 Empire. As in France, the undertakings and landed pro- 
 perties which give power and influence to their owners 
 must be taken out of the hands of persons hostile to 
 Germany and be placed into the possession of German 
 owners. 
 
 " (3) Russia. — On Germany's eastern frontier the popu- 
 lation of Russia grows with the greatest rapidity, increasing 
 by from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 per year. Within a genera- 
 tion Russia's population wiU come to 250,000,000. As this 
 overwhelming colossus threatens our eastern flank, con- 
 stituting undoubtedly the greatest danger to Germany and 
 to Europe in the future, Germany can maintain its place 
 in the world only by constructing a firm wall which will 
 protect us both against the stealthy progress of Slavism in 
 peace-time and against menacing inroads in case of war. 
 Besides, the healthy growth of Germany's national strength 
 and man-power must be secured by all means. 
 
 " A firm wall of protection and a basis for an increase of 
 the German race must be created on the land which Russia 
 will have to cede to us. We must have land suitable 
 for agricultural settlement, land where can be reared 
 healthy peasants who are an inexhaustible source of 
 national and racial power. We must have land which will 
 receive part of our surplus population and which will afford 
 new homes to those Germans abroad who wish to turn 
 
432 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 
 
 their back on the hostile countries to which they had formerly 
 migrated. We must have land which increases Germany's 
 economic independence, which suppHes us with food, which 
 affords the necessary counterpoise to the progressive indus- 
 trialisation and townification of the German people, which 
 preserves that balance of economic activities which has 
 proved so valuable during this war, and which prevents 
 the dangerous development of a one-sided national economy 
 such as that of England, We must have land which 
 counteracts the reduction in the birth-rate in the towns, 
 which prevents emigration and provides housing for the 
 needy. We must have land the colonisation and Ger- 
 manisation of which give new chances even to the learned 
 proletariat. Such land, which is needed for our physical, 
 moral, and intellectual welfare, is before all to be found 
 towards the east of Germany. 
 
 " The mihtary needs, and particularly our strategical 
 requirements, will determine how far Germany's eastern 
 frontier should be pushed forward. Along the eastern 
 limits of Posen and Silesia, and along the southern frontier 
 of East Prussia a belt of territory must be created which, 
 as far as possible, is free from non-German owners of land, 
 which would therefore be open for settlement to German 
 colonists. This German frontier belt will separate the 
 Prussian Poles from the Russian Poles and protect them 
 against the direct influence of the latter, who may achieve 
 their independence. We do not hesitate to point out that 
 the Baltic provinces of Russia, which Germans have cul- 
 tivated for 700 years, which possess a fruitful soil and 
 which are thinly populated, are a promising land suitable 
 for colonisation by German settlers. The inhabitants, 
 Lithuanians, Esthonians, and Letts, who are racially not 
 related to the Russians, will become useful as agricultural 
 labourers for temporary work in Germany proper. 
 
 " We demand colonial land from Russia on which we 
 can erect a frontier wall and create conditions for promoting 
 the growth of our population. The colonial land demanded 
 should, however, have a third function. It should be 
 Russia's war indemnity paid to us. After the war it will 
 probably be impossible to obtain from Russia an indemnity 
 paid either in cash or in securities. The disappointment 
 of the Russo-Japanese W-^ar, after which no indemnity was 
 paid, might repeat itself. But Russia can very easily pay 
 
GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 433 
 
 an indemnity in kind. The country is overburdened with 
 riches in land, arid we demand that the territory which is 
 to be ceded to us should to a large part be handed over 
 without their owners. In view of Russia's administrative 
 practice this is by no means a novel development. In 
 Russia the people are not so deeply rooted in the soil as 
 they are in Central and in Western Europe. Over and 
 over again Russia has transplanted large portions of its 
 populations from one district to other districts far away. 
 The possibiUty of removing a settled population must not 
 be measured with the insufficient standard of German 
 civihsation. If the political acquisition of Russian land 
 is to bring to us the necessary increase in power, we must 
 be able to dispose freely of the bulk of it. A peace with 
 Russia which does not bring about the waning of the 
 Russian incubus and which fails to supply the land necessary 
 to Germany, would mean "that a great opportunity of im- 
 proving Germany's poUtical, economic, and social health had 
 been thrown away. The final decision between Germany 
 and Russia would then be adjourned to some future date. 
 Another struggle for the existence of Germany and for 
 European culture would then be certain. 
 
 "(4) England, the East, the Colonies, Oversea Matters. — 
 Although the struggle with Russia has been particularly 
 grand and exceedingly glorious, and although we must 
 remember how dangerous the enormous bulk of Russia will 
 remain unless we succeed in bringing about its decom- 
 position, we must not forget for a moment that this 
 war has been in the last resort England's war against the 
 industrial, commercial, maritime, and colonial power of 
 Germany. 
 
 " The cause of England's hostility must determine Ger- 
 many's war aims with regard to England. This means 
 that we must assert our position in the world's trade and 
 assert Germany's sea power and oversea power as against 
 England. 
 
 " We must admit that England has taught us a valuable 
 lesson by blockading Germany during the war, and by 
 forcing us to organise the country so as to make it a self- 
 supporting State. We have learned in the first place — and 
 this has particularly been shown in this petition — that we 
 require a broader and better secured basis in Europe, so 
 that we shall be independent of other nations from the 
 
434 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 
 
 political, military, and economic points of view. We 
 mean, therefore, to create on the Continent and about our 
 national frontiers a continental economic sphere which 
 should be as large as possible, and which will make us in- 
 dependent of England and of other world empires. In this 
 respect Austria-Hungary and Turkey must be considered 
 in the first place. They will unlock to us the Balkan Penin- 
 sula and Asia Minor. Therefore it is necessary to secure 
 permanently, against Russian and EngUsh cupidity, Austria- 
 Hungary, the Balkan Peninsula, Turkey, and Asia Minor 
 as far as the Persian Gulf. The commercial relations with 
 our pohtical friends should be made closer with all means 
 in our power. 
 
 " Henceforward, in spite of England's hostihty and not- 
 withstanding the security of our continental position, we 
 must enter again upon the world-trade and become active 
 in the lands across the sea. A substantial part of Germany's 
 international trade will no doubt have to be established 
 in totally different directions. Old-established commercial 
 and maritime relations must be regained. In future we 
 must learn to stand on our own feet. We must eliminate 
 Enghsh mediation in finance and commerce, English arbi- 
 trage and English insurance. We have lost confidence in 
 England. Hence England must lose the profit which she 
 has formerly derived from Germany's commerce. We mean 
 to recreate our colonial empire. It should be more closely 
 jointed and stronger than it has been hitherto. Central 
 Africa would give us large territories, but they are of 
 insufiicient value. We must therefore, in addition, acquire 
 colonies elsewhere. Herein Lies the importance of Ger- 
 many's permanent connection with the world of Islam and 
 the necessity of a secure sea-route. Those who, disregard- 
 ing Germany's security against England's naval tyranny, 
 desire the acquisition of colonies, while being in favour of 
 giving up Belgium, under-estimate not merely the import- 
 ance of securing Germany's European basis. They make 
 the more serious pohtical mistake of striving after colonial 
 possessions without securing a safe connection oversea. 
 They would once more place Germany at the mercy of 
 England. 
 
 " We require the freedom of the sea. We fight England 
 with the object of obtaining that freedom for all nations. 
 In order to enforce the freedom of the sea, it is in the first 
 
GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 435 
 
 place necessary that Germany should obtain a strong 
 position on the Channel coast. We must, as has previously 
 been stated, have Belgium firmly in our grasp, and we 
 must, if possible, obtain in addition part of the coast of the 
 French Channel. Besides, it is necessary either to break 
 the chain of naval bases which England has created around 
 the world, or to neutralise them by caUing into existence 
 corresponding and equivalent German bases. Egypt, which 
 connects England with English Africa, and English Asia 
 on the one hand, and with Austraha on the other, and 
 which makes the Pacific Ocean an Enghsh lake, Egypt, 
 which, to use Bismarck's words, is to the British Empire 
 what the nerve at the back of the neck is to a man, is at the 
 same time the iron clamp which firmly connects England's 
 Eastern and her Western possessions and the instrument 
 with which England subdues both. In Egypt England's 
 vital nerve can be severed. If we succeed in this, we 
 take the great trade-route which leads through the Suez 
 Canal out of the hands of a single Power, In doing this 
 the rights of Turkey should as far as possible be respected 
 and preserved. 
 
 " England's power is based in the main upon its over- 
 whelming influence upon Governments and the Press 
 throughout the world. We are in bitter need of eUminating 
 the English cable and telegram monopoly. Our best ally 
 against England's influence throughout the world is the 
 freedom which we shall bring to all. In fighting for our 
 own deliverance from the Enghsh yoke we fight for the liberty 
 of the universe. We do not mean to exploit the nations 
 of the world, as the Enghsh have been doing, but, while 
 protecting our own interests, to act as the pioneers and 
 leaders of Europe who respect and secure the individuality 
 and the free development of all nations. 
 
 " (5) War Indemnity. — We desire as far as possible to 
 obtain a war indemnity which compensates us for the cost 
 of the struggle, which enables us to rebuild what has been 
 destroyed in East Prussia and in Alsace-Lorraine, which 
 allows us to form a fund from which pensions will be paid 
 to war invahds, war widows, and orphans, which permits 
 us to make good the losses suffered by private German 
 citizens, and allows us to replace and to improve the national 
 armaments. 
 
 " We are, of course, aware that the question of war indem- 
 
436 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 
 
 nities depends not only upon our military successes, but 
 also upon the financial ability of our enemies. Should we 
 be in the position of exacting an indemnity from England, 
 which has always been so thrifty in devoting English 
 blood to the war, no amount of money that could be exacted 
 would be sufficiently large. England has raised the world 
 against Germany chiefly with its money. If we wish to 
 strike at the most sensitive part of this nation of hucksterers, 
 we must strike at its purse. Before all, we must hit England 
 as hard as possible by striking at its money-bags, if we 
 have the power. However, it is more probable that 
 France, either alone, or, in the first place, must be counted 
 upon to furnish an indemnity. We should not hesitate to 
 put upon that country the heaviest financial burden. 
 Philanthropic sentimentalism would be totally out of place. 
 If the French wish to find relief, they may address them- 
 selves to their Allies on the other side of the Channel. If 
 these refuse to help their Allies financially, we should 
 obtain at least a political result with which we may be 
 satisfied. [The authors intimate that England's refusal to 
 help France paying the indemnity demanded by Germany 
 would lead to hostihty between the two countries.] 
 
 " Before all, we believe that it is less important to find 
 compensation for the damage suffered than to open to the 
 German nation new roads for its powerful development in 
 the future. Hence a monetary indemnity which com- 
 pensates us for the cost of the war is of comparatively 
 inferior importance. On the other hand, it is clear that, 
 should we not be able to obtain an adequate monetary 
 compensation, our demands for the surrender of land, of 
 indubtrial values, and of colonies, stated in the foregoing, 
 would gain both in political and in moral justification. We 
 must not come out of the war, when it has come to a 
 victorious end, with a loss. Otherwise posterity will 
 still consider Germany defeated, her victories notwith- 
 standing. 
 
 " We abstain from deciding how the important problem 
 of compensating Germany for its outlay should be solved, 
 but we would point out that it would be valuable to have 
 part of the monetary indemnity paid in securities, the 
 possession of which would strengthen Germany's economic 
 position in the countries of her political friends and which 
 would deliver these from the undue influence exercised 
 
GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 437 
 
 hitherto by England and France. [The signatories advocate 
 that England and France should be compelled to hand over 
 to Germany their investments in neutral countries.] 
 
 " (6) Kultur and Force. — ^If the signatories of this petition, 
 and especially the representatives of science, art, and the 
 Church among them, should be reproached that in the 
 present petition they have raised only political and economic 
 demands, relying upon force, and that they have forgotten 
 the spiritual problems of Germany's future, there should 
 be a threefold answer : 
 
 " The care of the German spirit is no part of Germany's 
 war aims or of Germany's peace conditions. 
 
 " The German spirit is for us the treasure of treasures, 
 the most precious possession of the nation and the root 
 cause of its superiority among the other nations. Still, 
 it is clear that before attending to Germany's spirit we must 
 enable the country to live in political and economic security. 
 Only then can we cultivate our spiritual treasures with the 
 necessary freedom. 
 
 " Lastly, we would say to those who think of the German 
 spirit as an abstraction divorced from power, to those who 
 wish to pursue what is called a policy of culture pure and 
 simple, that we do not wish for a spirituality which means 
 disintegration and decay, that we do not wish for an 
 unnational cosmopolitanism, which everywhere vainly 
 tries to find a home, and which falsifies the national char- 
 acter because it lacks a healthy national body. With our 
 demands we wish to create a healthy body within which 
 the German spirit may dwell. The enlargement of the 
 German body politic which we demand will not harm, 
 but will benefit, the German spirit, provided that the 
 increase is effected under the precautions which we have 
 indicated. 
 
 " We are aware that we have put forth great aims, and 
 that they are obtainable only if we are determined to make 
 all the necessary sacrifices, and to negotiate with the ut- 
 most energy. We appeal to the Bismarckian principle : ' In 
 political matters faith can indeed remove mountains. In 
 political matters courage and victory do not stand in the 
 relation of cause and effect, for the two are identical.' " 
 
 It will be noticed that the German intellectuals in their 
 petition demanded not only far-reaching annexations in the 
 
438 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 
 
 East and West, and vast monetary indemnities, but that 
 they urged that a large part of the population dwelling 
 within the conquered territories should be expropriated and 
 expelled, and that the owners of land, industrial undertak- 
 ings, etc., should be compensated at the cost of Germany's 
 victims. 
 
CHAPTER XXVI 
 
 GERMAN DEMANDS FOR THE DOMINATION OF THE WORLD ^ 
 
 Many Germans desired to make Germany absolutely para- 
 mount on the European Continent, to make their country 
 the leader of a Central European Federation of States 
 which would comprise 200,000,000 inhabitants or more, and 
 which would extend across the Narrows into Asia Minor. 
 Many hoped to extend the German Empire far beyond Asia 
 Minor, and to make Asia Minor a great military base 
 whence the bulk of Africa should be conquered and India 
 be threatened and attacked. Many, seeing still farther 
 ahead, hoped that their country would dominate the Far 
 East and that China would become a German Protectorate. 
 The views of German enthusiasts were limitless. Domina- 
 tion over the three continents of the old world should, in 
 their opinion, logically have led to Germany's domination 
 of the world. Diplomats, politicians, publicists, and business 
 men shared that hope. A former diplomat, Freiherr von 
 Mackay, wrote on the 27th of November 1915 in Das 
 Grossere Deutschland : 
 
 " Germany must become the Centre State of Europe ; 
 owing to its organising force, and its pohtical, economic, 
 and moral superiority, it will become the president of the 
 whole world and give the world rest and peace." 
 
 Many Germans saw in the Turkish Empire the indispen- 
 sable instrument for the achievement of world domination. 
 With the help of Turkey, India and China were to be con- 
 
 ^ From Grumbach, Germany's Annexationist Aims, translated by J. Elllis 
 Barker, Murray, 1917. 
 
 29 *39 
 
446 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 
 
 quered. Having conquered these, Germany was to civilise 
 and Germanise the world. The German language was to 
 become the world language. Herr Theodor Springmann, a 
 manufacturer, wrote in Deutschland und der Orient, Hagen, 
 1915 : 
 
 " Germany's connection with Turkey has become so 
 intimate through their brotherhood in arms that after the 
 happy close of the war we should found a friendship-colony. 
 We must strengthen Turkey within and without, suppress 
 corruption, improve the administration and the schools, 
 introduce compulsory and universal military service, organise 
 a war-ready army, and construct railways up to the frontiers 
 of the Caucasus, as well as towards India and Asia. Enor- 
 mous uncultivated territories await exploitation, and these 
 can produce so much grain and cotton that Germany would 
 never experience want in a future war. Enormous oil- 
 weUs, iron-mines, and manganese and copper deposits are 
 awaiting us. All these circumstances combined yield such 
 favourable conditions for an attack in case of future war 
 with Russia or England, and these measures will be such an 
 enormous help to us, that their aid will prove decisive. . . . 
 
 " If once we have succeeded in making Turkey a strong, 
 faithful, and devoted ally, then we can advance towards 
 our aim. India and China will be for Germany the per- 
 fection of its development. At the moment Germany is 
 not ripe for world-embracing greatness. And it is not our 
 misfortune, but a great blessing, that the Hindoos have 
 not yet revolted against England. . . . England's old 
 Colonial Empire must fall to pieces, for it is based on lies 
 and tyranny. . . . We shall tell the awakening nations of the 
 East : ' England has given you the knout, but Germany is 
 presenting you with golden liberty. Come to us, learn our 
 language, and study our achievements.' We shall close 
 to our enemies the German schools, the mainsprings of our 
 power, but open them to our friends, to India, Islam, and 
 China. Then the German language will become the world 
 language in this new world." 
 
 While some Germans, in accordance with the opinions of 
 Herr Springmann, hoped to dominate the world by conquer- 
 ing Africa and Asia and by forcibly depriving the British 
 
GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 441 
 
 race of its imperial domain, seizing India, Egypt, the African 
 possessions, etc., by an attack overland, others were of 
 opinion that Germany should obtain the mastery of the 
 world and the control of the British Empire by dominating 
 the British Isles themselves. The latter recommended an 
 invasion of England. After its successful accomplishment, 
 Dover was to be permanently occupied by Grerman troops, 
 and the British Empire was to be allowed to lead a shadow 
 existence. It should be nominally independent, but in 
 reality it should be a German possession endowed with the 
 appearances of self-government. A well-known publicist, 
 Konrad von Winterstetten, wrote in Nordkap-Bagdad, 
 Frankfurt, 1915 : 
 
 " A glance at the map shows that the dyke protecting 
 Germany against Russia must extend from the North 
 Cape to the Black Sea and thence to the Caucasus and to 
 the Persian Gulf. ... It is of immense importance that Ger- 
 many should possess lands producing cotton and ore. The 
 third necessity of world-policy is the possession of settle- 
 ment colonies where the surplus population can find 
 room. . . . 
 
 " There should be a Federation : Germany, Austria- 
 Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey — ^these States should 
 enjoy full sovereignty in internal affairs. They should be 
 firmly connected by a defensive and offensive alliance and 
 by binding military and political agreements. Gradually 
 a complete customs unity and economic unity would be 
 established. A Central European Empire should arise from 
 the war. An independent Albania ; Serbia should be 
 partitioned ; the three Northern States and the small States 
 of the West should be invited to join. This Federal Empire 
 would have 185,000,000 inhabitants, and, inclusive of the 
 Colonies, 240,000,000 inhabitants. . . . 
 
 " If the Central European State desires to be a World- 
 Power it must reach the shores of the Pacific, and it can 
 arrive there by way of Bagdad. If it has obtained a footing 
 on the Pacific Ocean, it can defend the valuable possessions 
 which Holland has in that sea. These Lutch possessions 
 must be entrusted to the Central European State, for 
 otherwise they may be lost. Holland has no option in this 
 
442 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 
 
 new epoch of world revolution and in the creation of 
 gigantic Empires. It can save its Colonies and independence 
 only by entering the Central European Federation. Other- 
 wise it will lose both. . . . 
 
 " Germany's territorial booty from France is not a 
 problem of arbitrary geographic rearrangement, but one 
 of political and economic necessity. It would be foolish 
 for Germany to burden itself with more French territory 
 than it needs. The ore-beds of Lorraine, the fortress of 
 Belfort, and the rest of the frontier-lands cannot escape 
 us even if our claims are drawn up with the utmost modesty. 
 The appropriation of a belt of territory along the Belgian 
 frontier from Verdun to Boulogne will probably be found 
 necessary in order to obtain an open door for invading 
 France, and a spring-board towards England. That would 
 be the best security of the peace. . . . 
 
 " More important than the question of correcting the 
 frontiers is the problem of the French Colonies. That 
 subject must be discussed elsewhere. It cannot be doubted 
 that the actual occupation of the French Colonies by Ger- 
 many is possible only after the defeat of the British Fleet. . . . 
 
 " England must be made incapable of ever again fighting 
 with Germany. . . . This can probably most easily be accom- 
 plished by making ourselves the masters of the European 
 head of the British World-Empire. The road from Grave- 
 lotte-Verdun to Lunkkk -Boulogne might be continued by 
 the occupation of the bridge-head of Uover by means of 
 which England can be dominated. That proposal may 
 seem fantastic, but it is as feasible as a landing in England 
 without which the war would last for years. Only the 
 conquest of London makes peace possible. After its con- 
 quest one condition of peace will be as easily enforceable as 
 any other. England, possessing only part of her Fleet — 
 the larger part being in our hands — England being militarily 
 always in our power, yet administering freely the World- 
 Empire, in which no customs duties would be allowed to be 
 levied, would henceforth be a most convenient neighbour to 
 Germany." 
 
 It is obvious that if Germany should succeed in making 
 itself supreme within the three old continents, and should 
 be able to dominate, or at least to over-awe, the British 
 Empire, the United States would become a negligible factor. 
 
GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 443 
 
 Hence little consideration need be paid to the Monroe 
 doctrine. Herr Alfred Hettner wrote in Der Deutsche 
 Krieg, Berlin, 1915 : 
 
 " We must strive after the enlargement of Germany's 
 colonial possessions, especially in Africa, and must particu- 
 larly aim at connecting them and rounding them off. It 
 would have been far easier to defend our colonies had 
 they been interconnected. The idea of an expansion and a 
 completion of our African colonies has been desired for a 
 long time, . . . 
 
 *' A portion of German public opinion is too modest with 
 regard to Ajnerica. Because the United States have raised 
 the Monroe doctrine and have, so to speak, told us Euro- 
 peans to clear out of America, it does not follow that we 
 must bow to that doctrine. If we do it as a rule, this is 
 due to the disunion of Europe, which has made it possible 
 for the United States to fish in troubled waters. The 
 Central and South American States have recognised the 
 Monroe doctrine only when it has protected them against 
 Europe. However, the three South American Great 
 Powers have deliberately opposed it when the United States 
 interfered in Mexico. . . . Territorial conquests in America 
 are out of the question, for there Germany's interests are 
 economic and cultural. . . . 
 
 " Germany cannot confine itself to its European area, 
 even if it is enlarged." 
 
 If Germany should succeed in dominating Europe, Asia, 
 and Africa, and in crippling or destroying the British 
 power, there would be only two Great Powers left in the 
 world — Germany and the United States. Some Germans 
 beUeved, with Herr Konrad von Winterstetten, that the 
 strength of a Germany dominating the three continents of 
 the old world would be so vast, if compared with that of 
 the United States, that that country need not seriously be 
 considered. Others thought that Germany and the United 
 States might agree to dominate the world jointly. They 
 proposed a partition of the world similar to that which 
 Napoleon proposed to the Czar Alexander I. on the raft on 
 the River Niemen in 1807. Herr Max Schubert, a manu- 
 
444 GERMANY'S WAR AIMS 
 
 facturer, wrote in Deutschland am Schicksalswege, published 
 in Leipzig in 1914 : 
 
 " Belgium, the bulk of whose population is of Germanic 
 descent, will, after the disgraceful deeds of the population, 
 probably remain permanently a part of Germany. If we 
 succeed in seizing, in addition to the Belgian coast, part 
 of the Atlantic coast of France, then we should obtain the 
 possibility of breaking England's supremacy in European 
 waters. If we can enforce peace with France and Russia, 
 victory over England will surely foUow. We can enforce 
 our will upon apparently inviolable England by means of 
 a Continental blockade and similar means. Possibly we 
 may succeed also in throwing England out of the Mediter- 
 ranean, where it has no business to be. . . . 
 
 " Production in large quantities, which is particularly 
 beneficial to the national economy, is possible only within 
 large economic areas. Already Germany forms such an 
 area. Together with its friends, and aUies, it would form 
 a huge economic area which would be beyond compare, 
 except in the United States. We could conclude friendship 
 with the United States and then we could lay down the law 
 to the world." 
 
CHAPTER XXVII 
 
 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND OF THE GERMAN RACE ^ 
 
 History teaches us that the settlement of difEerences 
 between neighbouring nations is a long-drawn-out process. 
 England and France fought one another almost continually 
 from prehistoric times through the Hundred Years' War 
 and through a war period of more than a hundred years 
 in the time of Louis XIV., Louis XV., the Repubhc, and 
 Napoleon. Nations have long memories. Great, proud, 
 and powerful nations, and even small ones, do not easily 
 become reconciled to the idea of having been defeated and 
 of having lost their position in the world. That may, for 
 instance, be seen from the fact that in recent times the 
 Serbians rose against the Turks largely in order to avenge 
 the disastrous battle of Kossovo which was fought in 1389 
 and which they still remembered. Throughout history 
 we meet with century-old passionate national resentments 
 which have led to war. Hence even a peace dictated by 
 the strictest justice and fairness may fail to prevent the 
 renewal of the struggle on the part of a defeated nation, 
 for if that nation should beUeve that it has a good chance 
 of completely reversing the verdict of history, it will prob- 
 ably take up arms once more and fight for its rehabiUtation. 
 In his great speech on the political situation, delivered on 
 the nth of January 1887, Prince Bismarck stated : 
 
 " The fight for the Franco- Glerman frontier began, his- 
 torically speaking, when France seized the three Bishoprics 
 of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. That event has been almost 
 forgotten. However, since then there has been scarcely 
 
 1 Written in November 1918 
 446 
 
446 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 a generation of Germans which has not been compelled to 
 draw the sword against France, Has then the epoch of the 
 Franco-German frontier struggle now at last come to a 
 conclusion ? You, gentlemen, can know that as little as 
 can I, I would therefore only express to you my personal 
 belief that the period of that struggle will not come to a 
 close unless the character of the French nation or the entire 
 international position should alter completely. I am of 
 opinion that the historical process between Germany and 
 France which has filled three centuries has not come to an 
 end." 
 
 Bismarck's prediction has proved correct, and we may 
 apply his opinion to the position arising from the present 
 War. We must therefore ask ourselves : Will the German 
 nation, which has been a military and a conquering nation, 
 most successful in war, since the time when it destroyed 
 the Roman Empire, plundered Rome, and overran and 
 devastated all Italy, Greece, the countries on the Danube, 
 France, Spain, North Africa, and Asia Minor, acknowledge 
 the justice of its defeat and of the peace settlement follow- 
 ing it ? Or will it endeavour to regain by war the great 
 position which it has lost, if the situation should happen to 
 be in its favour ? Germany's statesmen, politicians, his- 
 torians, and school-teachers may ascribe Germany's downfall, 
 not to her own disgraceful folly and criminal wickedness, 
 but to the envy of her opponents and to their overwhelming 
 strength, and they may arouse among the people the fervent 
 hope of a war of revenge, and of a great national revival 
 similar to that which followed the apparently irretrievable 
 disaster which overtook Prussia in 1806. What, then, 
 will be Germany's miUtary chances in the future ? Can a 
 renewal of the War in ten, twenty, or fifty years be prevented? 
 These questions are at present on everybody's lips, and I 
 shall try to answer them in the following pages. 
 
 It is difficult to foretell the events of the future. Still, 
 I will endeavour to analyse the impending evolution of 
 Germany, encouraged by the fact that my forecasts of that 
 country's course of action have hitherto proved not incorrect. 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 447 
 
 From 1900 onwards I foretold Germany's attack on civilisa- 
 tion in numerous articles published in the Nineteenth Cen- 
 tury Review and elsewhere. In July 1907 I went so far as to 
 assert in that Review, in an article entitled " England, Ger- 
 many, and the Baltic," that Germany would begin the Great 
 War only after having completed the enlargement of the 
 Kiel Canal. I stated : 
 
 " It is expected that eight years will be required to finish 
 the Baltic and North Sea Canal, Therefore during the 
 next eight years Germany will be unable to avail herself of 
 the great advantages furnished by the Baltic and North 
 Sea Canal, except for her smaller and older ships. Her 
 magnificent new ships will for about eight years be restricted 
 to one of the German seas. Consequently Germany will, 
 during the next eight years, do all in her power to avoid a 
 conflict with a first-class naval Power. During the next 
 eight years Germany has every reason to keep the peace. 
 Only when the enlargement of the Baltic and the North 
 Sea Canal has been accompUshed will she be ready for a 
 great naval war." 
 
 Germany actually began her attack four weeks after the 
 completion of the Canal. 
 
 Until autumn 1918 it was generally believed that the 
 Hohenzollern dynasty was the most firmly-established 
 dynasty in the world, that a revolution in Germany was 
 inconceivable. Yet I foretold, even before the War, that 
 WilUam II. would lose his throne by a revolution if he should 
 cause Germany to embark upon a wanton war of aggression 
 which would lead to the defeat of his country. I wrote, 
 for instance, at the time of the second Morocco crisis, in 
 an article entitled " German Designs in Africa," which 
 was published in the Nineteenth Century Review in August 
 1911 : 
 
 " War has been brought within the limits of vision. . . . 
 Persistence on the dangerous and unprecedented course 
 which Germany is steering at the present moment may 
 imperil Germany's future, and may cost the Emperor his 
 
448 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 throne. The German nation is intensely loyal and patriotic, 
 but it would never forgive a monarch who had driven the 
 nation into a disastrous war without adequate reason." 
 
 Immediately after the outbreak of the War I repeated my 
 forecast and added that defeat might lead to the break-up 
 of the German Federation. In an article entitled " The 
 Ultimate Ruin of Germany," which I was allowed to con- 
 tribute to the Nineteenth Century Review in September 
 1914, I stated: 
 
 " The War may jeopardise, and perhaps destroy, not only 
 the entire life-work of Bismarck and part of that of Frederick 
 the Great, it may not only impoverish Germany very 
 greatly, but it may also damage Germany's good name for 
 generations. . . . 
 
 " The question now arises whether the docile Germans 
 will bear their misfortunes patiently, or whether they will 
 rebel against the crowned criminal who has brought about 
 their misery. A revolt is possible, and it may take a two- 
 fold shape. Conceivably the Southern States might, after 
 a serious defeat of the German Army, detach themselves 
 from Prussia, refusing to fight any longer for the German 
 Emperor. . . . On the other hand, it is possible that there 
 would be a general rising of the people against their rulers. 
 The great majority of Germans are dissatisfied with their 
 form of government. A well-educated people does not like 
 to be governed like children. An absolutism thinly dis- 
 guised by parUamentary forms is tolerable only as long as 
 it is successful, and as the people are prosperous. The 
 vast majority of the Germans are Liberals, Radicals, and 
 Sociahsts. This majority has at present no influence what- 
 ever upon the government and policy of the country. Failure 
 of the Government in the present War would make absolute 
 government impossible in Germany. If Germany should 
 experience serious defeat, she may either become a strictly 
 limited monarchy on the English model, or a republic. 
 As both the Emperor and the Crown Prince are equally 
 responsible for the present War, it may well happen that the 
 German people will refuse to be ruled any longer by the 
 Hohenzollerns. The rise of a German republic is certainly 
 within the limits of possibiUty. 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 449 
 
 In April 1916 I dealt once more in the Nineteenth Century 
 Review with the probabihty of a German revolution in case 
 of defeat, and concluded an article entitled " How the Army 
 has Ruined Germany " with the words : 
 
 " Germany is supposed to be a Constitutional Empire 
 possessed of representative and very democratic institutions, 
 for every male adult is given a vote. If we look into the 
 Constitution a little more closely we find that the country 
 is ruled by a military oligarchy, that its democratic institu- 
 tions are a farce, that the people are powerless. As military 
 domination has been imposed upon Germany by the Con- 
 stitution, and as the people cannot alter the Constitution 
 except with the consent of their rulers, it is obvious that 
 Germany can free herself from the shackles of militarism 
 only by a successful revolution. Germany has borne 
 domination by a miUtary caste as long as she was prosperous 
 and invariably successful in war. When she discovers that 
 the mihtary caste has ruined the country, when the immense 
 prestige enjoyed by the army has disappeared, when the 
 people see in it the principal cause of their misery, they may 
 rise and sweep out of existence the institutions which have 
 brought about their downfall." 
 
 Thirteen months later, shortly after the Russian Revolu- 
 tion, I stated in an article entitled " Will Germany follow 
 Russia's Example ? " * which appeared in the Nineteenth 
 Century Review : 
 
 " History teaches us that the German race is as demo- 
 cratic as is the British race. ... If we study the causes of 
 successful revolution we find that they are two — political 
 dissatisfaction and economic distress. People will stand 
 oppression patiently and they will stand hunger, but they 
 will not easily stand both combined. If the Gt^rmans 
 should in due course suffer simultaneously from hunger 
 and defeat, they may well turn against their rulers and call 
 them to account. . . . 
 
 " Many who consider the possibihty of a revolution in 
 Germany imagine that it will be brought about by the 
 huge Social Democratic Part3^ They are wrong. In 
 1 Nineteenth Century and After, May 1917. 
 
450 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 Grermany, where Parliament is powerless, a revolution cannot 
 be made by a single party, however strong. It can be 
 brought about only if the bulk of the nation, regardless of 
 party, is determined to change the existing form of govern- 
 ment and if the army is with it, A serious German defeat 
 would give a fatal blow to the privileges of the ruhng 
 aristocracy and of the military caste and to the prosperity 
 of the great industrial and commercial middle-class. There- 
 fore it seems likely that in case of defeat the aristocracy, 
 the army, and the liberal middle-class may turn against 
 the Emperor. . . . 
 
 " The German people have no doubt begun to recognise 
 the folly and wickedness of the present War. They must 
 see that defeat is inevitable, and that it will bring about not 
 only the weakening of the State, but that it will leave the 
 nation impoverished and disrgraced throughcut the world. 
 They must recognise that, owing to the criminal conduct 
 of the War, not merely the German State but the German 
 race has become an outlaw throughout the world, that 
 the German people can rehabilitate themselves in the eyes 
 of the world only by repudiating the Emperor and their 
 Government and by punishing the guilty. . . . 
 
 A revolution in Germany consequent upon defeat is not 
 absolutely certain, but is highly probable in view of the 
 historic character of the German nation. The Grerman race 
 is naturally democratic, and the events of the War have 
 undoubtedly strengthened the democratic spirit to a very 
 great extent. That may be seen by the concessions whereby 
 the German Government tries vainly now to appease the 
 people. What the German people require is not the reform 
 of the Prussian franchise, but the direction of the policy 
 of the State by their elected representatives. I think the 
 German nation is too wise to allow again a single man, 
 who may be a degenerate, a madman, a criminal, or merely 
 a fool, to send millions of Germans to their death." 
 
 Germany's future may be considered from two very 
 different points of view. We may start either with the 
 assumption that Germany will retain her political unity 
 and her social stability or with the assumption that Ger- 
 many will go to pieces either politically or socially, or both 
 politically and socially. Let us then in the first instmce 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 451 
 
 consider Germany's future, on the assumption that she will 
 succeed in remaining united and in evolving peacefully a 
 democratic form of government. 
 
 In 1913 Germany had 67,000,000 inhabitants and France 
 had 39,700,000 inhabitants. In consequence of her defeat 
 Germany will lose Alsace-Lorraine and her Polish and 
 Danish districts. Germany's Alsatian, Polish, and Danish 
 subjects number about 7,000,000. The population of 
 Alsace-Lorraine is a little less than 2,000,000. Therefore, 
 as a result of the War, Germany's population should be 
 reduced to 60,000,000 and that of France increased to 
 41,700,000 if we disregard the war losses of both countries. 
 There would thus be three Germans to every two French- 
 men. In man-power Germany would still have a dangerous 
 superiority over France. One of the consequences of the 
 War may be that France will enter upon the most intimate 
 relations with Belgium and Luxemburg. Very likely these 
 three countries will form a union for mutual defence. As 
 Belgium and Luxemburg have together about 8,000,000 
 inhabitants, the French group would then have a popula- 
 tion of about 50,000,000. Germany's population would 
 still exceed that of France, Belgium, and Luxemburg com- 
 bined by 10,000,000. Her superiority in man-power would 
 still be very great. 
 
 Germany has been so greatly exhausted by the War that 
 an early war of revenge does not seem to lie within the limits 
 of the possible. We must therefore rather study the pros- 
 pective power of Germany than its present strength. 
 
 Unless the formation of a League of Nations should per- 
 manently and fundamentally change the historical character 
 of States and the character, ambitions, and strivings of the 
 men of whom they are composed, France will probably be 
 most exposed to a German attack, for Grermany can hope 
 to re-establish her paramount position on the Continent of 
 Europe only after having defeated that State which is at 
 the same time her century-old opponent and which possesses 
 the strongest army on the Continent and is therefore the 
 natural protector of Europe against a German domination. 
 
452 
 
 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 Military power depends largely on man-power. The pros- 
 pective development of the man-power of a country can 
 to some extent be gauged from its growth and increase in 
 the past. According to the official statistics of France and 
 of Germany the population of the two countries has grown 
 as follows since the time of the Napoleonic Wars : 
 
 
 Gennany within 
 
 Prance (since 1871, 
 
 Tear. 
 
 the Limits of 
 
 without Alsace- 
 
 
 1914. 
 
 Lorraine). 
 
 1816 . 
 
 . 24,833,000 
 
 29,480,000 
 
 1830 . 
 
 . 29,520,000 
 
 32,370,000 
 
 1860 . 
 
 . 35,397,000 
 
 35,630,000 
 
 1870 . 
 
 . *40,818,000 
 
 38,440,000 
 
 1871 . 
 
 . 40,997,000 
 
 36,190,000 
 
 1881 . 
 
 . 46,421,000 
 
 37,590,000 
 
 1891 . 
 
 . 49,762,000 -> 38,350,000 
 
 1901 . 
 
 . 56,874,000 
 
 38,980,000 
 
 1911 . 
 
 . 65,359,000 
 
 39,602,000 
 
 Between the years 1816 and 1911 the population of Ger- 
 many has increased in round figures by 40,000,000 and that 
 of France by only 10,000,000. If we allow for the transfer of 
 Alsace-Lorraine, the population of Germany has increased by 
 38,000,000 and that of France by only 12,000,000. During 
 the century under review, the German people has increased 
 more than three times as rapidly as the French population. 
 A line divides the table at the significant date of 1870-71. 
 It will be noticed that up to 1 870 the population of France 
 increased by 9,000,000 and that of Germany within the 
 limits of 1914 by 16,000,000. Up to the Franco-German 
 War the German population increased a little less than twice 
 as fast as the French population. On the other hand, 
 between 1871 and 1911 the French population increased 
 by only 3,400,000 and the German population by no less 
 than 24,500,000 or seven times as fast. The most starthng 
 fact, however, is that between 1901 and 1911 the French 
 population grew by 620,000, and the German population 
 by 8,500,000, or thirteen and a half times as fast as the 
 French population. If the population of Germany and of 
 France should increase as it has done during the last 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 453 
 
 decade, the population of the reduced Grermany would 
 expand from 60,000,000 in 1919 to about 100,000,000 
 inhabitants in the year 1950, while that of France, inclusive 
 of Alsace-Lorraine, would grow from 42,000,000 to about 
 45,000,000 inhabitants. By 1950 Germany's superiority over 
 France in man-power would be absolutely overwhelming, 
 and by the year 2000 France might militarily occupy 
 towards Grermany a position not dissimilar to that which 
 Belgium occupied in 1914. A Germany of 100,000,000 
 people, especially if supported by Austria and Hungary, 
 would, by sheer weight of numbers alone, dominate the 
 west and the south of the European Continent. As Russia 
 may remain permanently divided against herself, a Germany 
 of 100,000,000 inhabitants, especially if supported by a 
 populous Austria and Hungary, might dominate the east 
 of Europe as well, unless the numerous small nationaUties 
 dwelUng about the Danube or the peoples inhabiting what 
 once was the Russian Empire should combine in self- 
 defence, forming either alliances or federating among them- 
 selves. 
 
 The fact that since the Franco-German War of 1870-71 
 the expansion of France's population has constantly slack- 
 ened and has lately come almost to a standstill, while 
 during the same time the population of Germany has 
 increased ever more rapidly, is no mere chance coincidence. 
 The phenomenon of an increasing expansion of population 
 in Germany and of a growing stagnation of population in 
 France is not due to racial reasons, to the vigour of the 
 Grerman race, and to the selfishness or to the exhaustion 
 of the French stock, as the German Professors would have 
 us beUeve, but is due to economic causes. Adam Smith 
 stated correctly in his Wealth of Nations : 
 
 " The demand for those who live by wages necessarily 
 increases with the increase of the revenue and stock of 
 every country and cannot possibly increase without it. . . . 
 The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country 
 is the increase of the number of its inhabitants. . . . 
 
 " The value of children is the greatest of all encourage- 
 
464 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 ments to marriage. We cannot, therefore, wonder that 
 the people in North America should generally marry very 
 young. Notwithstanding the great increase occasioned by 
 such early marriages, there is a continual complaint of the 
 scarcity of hands in North America. The demands for 
 labourers, the funds destined for maintaining them, increase, 
 it seems, still faster than they can find labourers to 
 employ. . . . 
 
 " The demand for men, like that for any other commodity, 
 necessarily regulates the production of men ; quickens it 
 when it goes on too slowly, and stops it when it advances 
 too fast." 
 
 We live in the age of machinery. The advent of powerful 
 
 machinery has vastly increased the productive power of 
 
 men, and the result has been that a single worker can now 
 
 produce as much as a number could by the more primitive 
 
 processes. Hence population in the agricultural districts 
 
 of Europe has become stagnant if not retrogressive. On 
 
 the other hand, machinery has enabled millions of men to 
 
 earn a good living by manufacturing in the cramped areas 
 
 of the towns. For instance, the gigantic increase of the 
 
 German population since 1871 has taken place exclusively 
 
 in the towns, and particularly in the large manufacturing 
 
 towns. Between 1871 and 1910 Germany's population 
 
 in the towns of 100,000 inhabitants and more has increased 
 
 from 1,968,537 to 13,823,348, or by 600 per cent. ; in the 
 
 towns of from 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants it has grown 
 
 from 3,147,272 to 8,677,955, or by 150 per cent. ; in the 
 
 towns of from 5,000 to 20,000 it has increased from 
 
 4,588,364 to 9,172,333, or by 100 per cent. ; in the towns 
 
 of from 2,000 to 5,000 inhabitants it has grown from 
 
 5,190,801 to 7,297,770, or by only 50 per cent., and in the 
 
 .country towns and villages of less than 2,000 inhabitants 
 
 the population has actually decreased from 26,163,818 to 
 
 25,954,587. 
 
 The increase of population in densely inhabited European 
 countries depends chiefly, and almost entirely, on the 
 progress of the manufacturing industries carried on in the 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 455 
 
 towns, and the expansion of these depends principally 
 on the possession of cheap power, on steam raised by 
 coal. Hence the possession of coal determines industrial 
 power, national income, wealth, population, and military 
 strength, for military strength is based upon man-power 
 and industrial power. The enormous disadvantage at which 
 France has been, compared with Germany, with regard to 
 coal may to some extent be gauged from the following 
 figures : 
 
 Coal and lignite resources possessed by Germany . 423,356,000,000 tons 
 
 France . 17,583,000,000 „ 
 
 Coal and lignite production of Germany in 1913 . 273,650,000 ,, 
 
 France in 1913 . 40,190,000 „ 
 
 Before the War Germany's store of coal was twenty-five 
 times as large as that of France, and Germany's coal pro- 
 duction was almost seven times as great as was French 
 coal production. However, France suffered not only from 
 a crippHng shortage of coal, but from the fact that her coal 
 occurs in irregular patches and in strata which are very 
 thin and faulty. Hence coal is not only very scarce but is 
 extremely dear in France — before the War it was sold in 
 many districts at £5 per ton and over — while it is plentiful 
 and exceedingly cheap in Germany. Germany owes the 
 rapid increase of her wealth, and with her wealth of her 
 population, chiefliy to her vast store of cheap coal. 
 
 Population has more and more rapidly increased in 
 Germany since 1871 because the industries of the country 
 have prospered mightily since the unification of the Empire. 
 The victory over France and the inflow of the great indem- 
 nity which France had to pay gave a mighty impetus to 
 Germany's industries. France, on the other hand, was 
 crippled by that war. Her industries suffered not only 
 from lack of cheap coal, but they were furthermore handi- 
 capped by a great burden of taxation. The war had created 
 a vast load of debt upon which interest had to be paid. 
 For the sake of self-preservation, the French had to create 
 and to maintain an army able to meet the German forces. 
 30 
 
456 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 Of course the rapidly increasing military expenditure pressed 
 far more heavily on the smaller French population, chiefly 
 engaged in agriculture, than on the much larger and much 
 wealthier population of Germany, chiefly engaged in exceed- 
 ingly prosperous industries. 
 
 The French race is naturally a prolific race. The 65,000 
 Frenchmen who dwelt in Canada when it became Enghsh 
 in 1763 have since then increased to about 3,000,000. The 
 War of 1914-18 might, and ought to, lead to a vigorous 
 expansion of the victorious peoples and to a slackened 
 increase, and perhaps to the stagnation, if not to the 
 numerical decline, of the German population. 
 
 The Allies have announced that Germany will have to 
 make good the gigantic losses which she has inflicted upon 
 the civil population of her opponents. These losses alone 
 should amount to about £5,000,000,000, while the total 
 war expenditure of the Allies should be about ten times 
 as large. Germany will be required to pay the AUies to 
 the limit of her ability. In addition, Germany will obviously 
 have to deal with her own war expenditure either by paying 
 interest on her enormous war debt by means of hugely 
 increased taxes, or by repudiating her war loans. By the 
 latter process she would, of course, utterly ruin her capitahsts, 
 both great and small. Germany is quite unprepared for so 
 colossal a burden. Her fiinancial plan of campaign has 
 been as wildly reckless as her mihtary plan of campaign. 
 On the 20th of August 1915, when it must have been obvious 
 to all well-informed Germans that Germany might conceiv- 
 ably lose the war, Herr Helfferich, the Secretary of the 
 Imperial Treasury and a former Director of the Deutsche 
 Bank, stated with criminal levity in the Reichstag : 
 
 " As long as the enemy does not condescend to acknow- 
 ledge our invincibihty in the field and acts accordingly, 
 arms are the only means of convincing him of that fact. 
 (Hear, hear.) Therefore, we must continue fighting and 
 must bear all the sacrifices which the war involves. (Bravo.) 
 Now as far as the necessary financial supplies are concerned 
 we shall once more rely upon a loan. I have already in 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 457 
 
 March indicated the reasons which have caused the Govern- 
 ment to abstain as long as possible from introducing special 
 war taxes. The reasons then given exist still. We do not 
 wish to add to the gigantic war burdens borne by the Ger- 
 man people by increasing the taxes unless imperative 
 necessity should compel us to do so, ... As matters are, 
 we mean to adjourn the settlement of our war expenditure 
 to the peace and to the period following it. If God gives 
 us victory and enables us to order our lives in accordance 
 with our requirements, we must not forget the financial 
 question, (Loud applause.) That we owe to the future 
 of the people. (Hear, hear,) The future life of the German 
 people must as far as possible be kept free from the burden 
 which has arisen through the war. (Hear, hear.) The 
 leaden weight of a debt of thousands of millions should 
 deservedly be borne by those who have brought about the 
 War. (Hear, hear.) Let our enemies, not the Germans, be 
 crushed by that load for decades. (Loud applause.) 
 
 Similar speeches were delivered in the German Reichstag 
 and elsewhere almost up to the final catastrophe. Scarcely 
 an attempt was made to provide by means of taxes for 
 even part of the interest of the huge war debt. Germany 
 might have followed England's example and have raised 
 in the course of the War £2,000,000,000 in war taxes. Her 
 burden will now be doubly crushing to her. 
 
 Germany can, of course, not pay to the countries she 
 has damaged indemnities of thousands of millions of pounds 
 in cash. In the whole world there exists only about 
 £1,000,000,000 in gold. She can pay the foreign indem- 
 nities only in goods, and as foreign nations do not wish to 
 see their industries swamped and ruined by German manu- 
 factured imports, she will have to pay damages partly in 
 raw material and partly in the form of services. German 
 labour may have to rebuild what German soldiers have 
 destroyed. 
 
 By nature's bounty Grermany is exceedingly well sup- 
 plied with minerals. Within her frontiers of 1914 she had 
 by far the largest coal deposits in Europe, and huge iron 
 ore deposits, and her subsoil contained an unfathomable 
 
458 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 wealth of salts of all kinds. Her potash deposits have 
 hitherto had a world monopoly and her deposits of these 
 salts, which are of the greatest value to agriculture, and 
 which are indispensable for certain chemical purposes, are 
 absolutely inexhaustible. At a moderate valuation her 
 principal minerals in situ represented before the War the 
 following value : 
 
 £ 
 423,356,000,000 tons of coal at lO.-*. per ton = 211,678,000,000 
 
 4,000,000,000 tons of iron ore at 5». per ton = 1,000,000,000 
 
 50,000,000,000 tons of potash at 10s. per ton = 25,000,000,000 
 
 Total £237,678,000,000 
 
 The importance of the amount given may be gauged from 
 the fact that the so-called national wealth of the United 
 Kingdom — which, by the by, merely means the present 
 wealth of the present generation — is estimated to amount 
 only to about £20,000,000,000 or to one-twelfth of the 
 value of Germany's three principal minerals. The Ruhr 
 coal-basin alone contains 213,566,000,000 tons of coal, 
 which, at the low price of 10s. per ton, would represent 
 a capital value of £106,783,000,000. It is therefore 
 obvious that Germany can pay in minerals, though not in 
 cash, in the course of years all the damage she has done, 
 however large the amount may be. 
 
 The gigantic values represented by her minerals were the 
 basis of Germany's abounding and rapidly-increasing pros- 
 perity, were the principal cause of the rapid growth of her 
 population, and of her vast military strength. Unfortun- 
 ately for Germany, a very large part of her mineral wealth 
 occurs on territory inhabited by nationalities oppressed by 
 Germany which will be lost to her in consequence of the 
 War. Of her 4,000,000,000 tons of iron ore, 2,630,000,000 
 tons, or two-thirds of her store, occur in Lorraine-Luxem- 
 burg — Luxemburg was part of the German Zollverein. 
 The remaining third is scattered over eighteen separate 
 districts and their exploitation is comparatively un- 
 economical. Moreover, the quality of her Lorraine ore was 
 superior to that of the other German ores. Hence the 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 459 
 
 eighteen iron-ore fields in Germany proper furnished Ger- 
 many in 1910 only with about one- tenth of the metallic 
 iron which she consumed. 
 
 The War will seriously cripple Germany's purchasing 
 power, and if she should be unable to obtain vastly increased 
 imports of iron ore from France, Belgium, Sweden, etc., as 
 a set-off for her loss of the ore of Lorraine her gigantic iron 
 industry may well decUne to insignificance. 
 
 Before the War Germany had by far the largest iron 
 industry in Europe. She then produced approximately 
 three times as much iron and steel as the United Kingdom. 
 Germany's iron exports exceeded those of Great Britain, 
 and her exports of machinery, etc., were gigantic. Her 
 iron industry was expanding far more rapidly than that of 
 the United States. The iron industry occupied in Germany 
 a position of commanding pre-eminence. Directly and 
 indirectly it employed 2,250,000 workers. The decline of 
 the German iron industry would seriously affect many 
 German industries connected with it. It would vastly 
 reduce Germany's wealth and income and would very 
 notably weaken, if not disarm, the country militarily. 
 Germany's great miUtary strength was largely due to the 
 fact that she produced more iron and steel than all the 
 countries of Europe combined. 
 
 Germany's defeat will deprive her not only of the bulk 
 of her iron ore but also of vast quantities of coal. Germany 
 possesses two large coal-fields and a small one. Her large 
 coal-fields are in Southern Silesia and about the Ruhr 
 valley. The Ruhr coal-basin lies within Germany proper. 
 The other large coal-field, that of Silesia, lies within the 
 indisputable Polish zone. It seems likely that at the Peace 
 Congress Southern Silesia and its coal-field will be handed 
 over to Poland together with the numerous and important 
 industries which have arisen on and around the coal measures. 
 The Silesian coal-field contains, according to the best 
 geological information available, 165,987,000,000 tons of 
 coal. The importance of that figure may be seen from 
 the fact that the United Kingdom is supposed to possess 
 
460 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 altogether 189,535,000,000 tons of coal. In other words, 
 Germany seems likely to lose to Poland almost as much 
 coal as the entire store of coal of the United Kingdom. At 
 the low figure of 10s. per ton the coal of Southern Silesia 
 would represent a truly fabulous wealth. 
 
 Coal is heavy and bulky. Consequently manufacturers 
 like to place their works as closely as possible to the coal- 
 pits. Coal-fields attract manufacturing industries from far 
 and wide. After the peace, many industries in the north- 
 east, the centre, and the south-east of Germany will feel 
 compelled, for the sake of the coal which they need, to 
 transfer their establishments from German territory to Pohsh 
 soil, thus impoverishing Germany and enriching Poland. 
 Formerly hundreds of thousands of PoHsh labourers, anxious 
 to find work, migrated temporarily to Germany or settled 
 permanently in the country. In future hundreds of thou- 
 sands of Germans, who will be unable to find work in 
 Germany and who wiU have to take to unskilled labour, 
 may have to migrate to Poland in order to make a living, 
 and they may in course of time become Po Ionised. The 
 German Province of East Prussia with about 2,000,000 
 inhabitants will become an enclave of the new Polish State. 
 That backward province is almost certain to become 
 absorbed by the Poles who surround it. 
 
 The portion of Poland which formerly belonged to Russia 
 has highly-developed manufacturing industries. Industrial 
 Warsaw had before the War 1,000,000 inhabitants, and Lodz 
 — the Russian Manchester — had 500,000 inhabitants. In 
 view of the vast quantities of coal and of other minerals 
 which occur in Polish territory, it cannot be doubted that 
 Poland is destined to become one of the greatest industrial 
 countries in Europe, especially when the navigation on 
 the Vistula, the great natural artery of all Poland, which 
 has deliberately been stifled in the past by Germany and 
 Russia, is energetically developed. 
 
 The French, as has previously been stated, suffer acutely 
 through lack of coal. By the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine 
 they will obtain by far the largest iron-ore fields in Europe, 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 461 
 
 and very naturally will try to create in Lorraine the largest 
 iron industry of Europe, which hitherto has been possessed 
 by Germany, Until now the iron ore of Lorraine has 
 been smelted in Lorraine itself, and especially in the Ruhr 
 district, with coke made from Ruhr coal. It must, there- 
 fore, be expected that Germany will be required at the 
 peace to pay the indemnity due to France largely in Ruhr 
 coal. Germany cannot complain if this should be made 
 one of the peace conditions, for she has created a precedent 
 by exacting payments in raw materials and food from 
 famished Russia and from ruined Rumania. 
 
 The peace settlement should have very far-reaching 
 economic consequences. It should transfer vast quantities 
 of coal and numerous valuable industries from Eastern 
 Germany to the new Poland, and vast quantities of coal 
 and iron ore and many valuable industries depending on 
 these minerals from Alsace-Lorraine and from Western 
 Germany to France. Besides, France will obtain large 
 quantities of potash and of petroleum which are known to 
 exist in the regained provinces. 
 
 Raw products determine and dominate manufacturing. 
 It is only natural that many of the German manufacturing 
 industries which are dependent upon Silesian coal and 
 Lorraine iron may have to follow the transferred minerals 
 into France and Poland, even if they are located well 
 inside the new German frontier. The migration of Ger- 
 many's industries towards France and Poland would of 
 course be accelerated if taxation should be heavier in Ger- 
 many than in France and in Poland, or if manufacturing, 
 or social, conditions should be more favourable outside 
 Germany than within that country. Moreover, the Govern- 
 ments of France and Poland will no doubt do their utmost 
 to tempt and to attract the wealth -creating industries of 
 Germany across the border by those fiscal and adminis- 
 trative measures which Germany has taught them. 
 
 The departure of numerous industries from Germany 
 would, of course, lead to a considerable decrease in Germany's 
 wealth and income, and would harmfully affect the develop- 
 
462 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 ment of Germany's population and military strength. On 
 the other hand, the rise and growth of powerful industries 
 in France and Poland would, in accordance with Adam 
 Smith's dictum, lead to a more or less rapid augmentation 
 of the population in those countries, for the demand for 
 men regulates the supply of men. The transfer of industries 
 on a large scale from Germany to her neighbours in the 
 east and west would materially alter the balance of man- 
 power, and therefore the balance of military power as well, 
 between Germany and her neighbours. 
 
 Grermany is principally an industrial State. Her manufac- 
 turing industries constitute her chief resource. The Ger- 
 man manufacturing industries will suffer not only through 
 the loss of vast quantities of coal and of iron ore. Before 
 the War Germany was as dependent on foreign raw materials 
 — such as cotton, wool, silk, hides, oil, fat, rubber, iron 
 ore, copper, tin, fertilisers, etc. — as was Great Britain. In 
 addition she imported from abroad coffee, tea, cocoa, 
 tobacco, etc., and vast quantities of the most necessary 
 food-stuffs for men and beasts. Before the War Germany's 
 foreign trade was only slightly smaller than that of the 
 United Kingdom. Germany paid for her huge imports 
 of indispensable raw material and of food chiefly with 
 manufactured articles, particularly with machinery and iron- 
 ware, cotton, woollen and silk goods, chemicals, electrical 
 ware, glass, porcelain, paper, etc. In the course of the 
 War Germany has been absolutely denuded of imported raw 
 materials. Their purchase will require gigantic sums. In 
 view of the scarcity of shipping, of the urgent necessity 
 of repatriating the troops, and of carrying food-stuffs to 
 Europe, and in view of the world-wide demand for imported 
 raw products, Germany will have to wait a considerable 
 time for the materials which her industries require. Besides 
 their purchase will be difficult, for Germany has been 
 greatly impoverished by the War, and she will have to pay 
 vastly enhanced prices owing to the depreciation of her 
 currency and exchange. Furthermore she may not find 
 it easy to obtain the necessary shippirg, partly because she 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 463 
 
 will have to make good the losses which her U-boats have 
 inflicted, partly because the foreign sailors may refuse to 
 handle Germany's trade. Lastly some of the raw material 
 exporting nations, particularly Australia, may refuse to 
 supply her. Hence Germany will be able to obtain the 
 indispensable raw materials only with very great delay, 
 and her manufacturing rivals have already reserved for 
 themselves vast quantities of these raw products. 
 
 Germany can pay for the bulk of her indispensable 
 imports only with the exports of manufactured goods. 
 However, their sale abroad will be exceedingly difficult 
 owing to the universal hatred which she has aroused. Even 
 if foreign Governments should not discriminate against 
 her by special tariffs, both importers and the public will 
 decline for a long time to buy German goods. Luring 
 the four years of war Germany's foreign markets have been 
 captured by her enemies and the neutrals, and she will 
 find it difficult to recover them, for German business men 
 and German commercial travellers will be shunned almost 
 universally. Germany will find it exceedingly hard to 
 re-create her extremely valuable foreign trade, even if she 
 carries it on through neutral intermediaries. She will 
 have to begin at the bottom rung of the ladder and to work 
 her way slowly up. 
 
 Before the War Germany possessed the second largest 
 mercantile marine in the world. The War has destroyed 
 Germany's great position on the sea and her valuable 
 connections abroad. Remembering the U-boat outrages, 
 foreign nations may refuse to Grerman ships harbour, dock, 
 and coaling facilities, and merchants may refuse for decades 
 to employ the German carrying trade. Here again Ger- 
 many will have to work her way up from the very bottom. 
 Possibly she may try to disguise the identity of her ships 
 by placing them under foreign flags. Possibly she will 
 abandon her ocean trade altogether. 
 
 Before the War Germany had gigantic and extremely 
 profitable investments in foreign countries. She dominated 
 the banks and many of the most profitable industries in. 
 
464 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 Belgium, Italy, Rumania, Russia, Turkey, Argentina, 
 ChiU, and various other countries. She had huge invest- 
 ments in the United States and in the British Empire. 
 Her foreign investments have been liquidated during the 
 War. Her financiers and bankers will everywhere be un- 
 welcome. In addition to a large portion of her foreign 
 investments made before the War, she will lose the enor- 
 mous sums which, during the War, she has advanced to 
 Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. 
 
 Professor Werner Sombart has correctly pointed out that 
 Germany's economic success was very largely due to the 
 activity of Jews. They dominated German finance and 
 banking (Gwinner, Mendelssohn, Bleichroder), the shipping 
 trade (Ballin), the non-ferrous metal trade (Merton, Hirsch), 
 the electrical trades (Rathenau), etc. If, as seems likely, 
 Germany should become a declining country, her keen 
 Jewish business men will probably transfer their energies 
 to expanding and progressing lands, especially as they have 
 been treated by her as pariahs. 
 
 This necessarily brief and incomplete survey shows that 
 the War has inflicted upon the German body economic 
 injuries from which Germany will suffer for decades. 
 Owing to the War, Germany is bound to lose 7,000,000 
 valuable wealth-creating citizens, large agricultural terri- 
 tories, the bulk of her iron ore, almost one-half of her coal, 
 large quantities of potash and oil, a large portion of her 
 foreign trade, the bulk of her shipping trade, the bulk of 
 her international financial, banking and insurance business, 
 the bulk of her foreign investments, her colonies, and a 
 large portion of her manufacturing industries. Yet the 
 impoverished German people will have to pay out of their 
 vastly diminished income not only their own war expen- 
 diture but also a gigantic indemnity. Hence poverty and 
 unemployment are likely to become widespread. In 
 consequence of their difficulties many manufacturers will 
 have to transfer their operations to countries where con- 
 ditions are less unfavourable. Germany may therefore 
 witness an unprecedented emigration of industries and of 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 465 
 
 the workers employed in them, and in view of the feelings 
 which they have aroused German emigrants may obtain 
 only the roughest work. 
 
 The increase or decrease of population depends upon 
 national economic conditions. Owing to the War the 
 population of Germany may become stagnant, and may 
 possibly retrocede. She will remain poor for decades. 
 Possibly the War has destroyed for all time Grermany's 
 greatness and military power by destroying her economic 
 position and prosperity. While her population should 
 remain stagnant or decline, that of regenerated France 
 and of most other countries should rapidly increase. In a 
 few decades the British Empire, and even France, may 
 be far ahead of Germany in white population. Before long 
 Grermany may sink to the position of a second-rate Power, 
 and for financial reasons alone she may be unable to 
 maintain an army or to think of a war of revenge. Auto- 
 cratic Germany led the world in the policy of national 
 armaments and military preparedness, A democratic, 
 impoverished, and sobered Germany may lead the world 
 in the policy of disarmament. 
 
 Germany has lost not only her military preponderance 
 and her great economic position in the world, but also her 
 prestige and reputation. Her defeat has destroyed the 
 legend of the invincibility of her army and of the excellence 
 of her generals, and her ghastly diplomatic and adminis- 
 trative failures have destroyed the legend of German 
 genius for statecraft, organisation, and administration 
 which Bismarck had created. The world has come to be- 
 lieve that German economic success was largely due to 
 unscrupulousness, and Grerman science has become despised 
 by the contemptible attitude of her venal, blatant, and 
 servile professors during the War. The fact that ninety- 
 three of her most eminent scientists — ^among them many 
 legists, historians, and theologians — should have addressed 
 a manifesto to the world in which they proclaimed that 
 innocent Germany had been feloniously attacked by her 
 enigmies, that she fought a holy war of self-defence, and 
 
468 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 that she employed the most civilised methods of warfare 
 will never be forgotten, nor will it be forgotten that prac- 
 tically all the German historians have falsified not merely 
 Prusso-German history in order to glorify the HohenzoUerns 
 and to defend their misdeeds, but that they have distorted 
 foreign history as well with a view to exalting Prusso- 
 Germany and depreciating all the non-German peoples 
 and their achievements. Coming generations will find it 
 interesting to compare the rhapsodies of Ranke, Sybel, 
 Treitschke, and other courtier-historians with the more 
 critical and more truthful histories of Germany written 
 by the republican German historians of the future, and 
 to compare the teachings of the imperial and of the repub- 
 lican German professors of philosophy and of international 
 law. The crimes perpetrated by the German Army, and 
 their condonation by the German people, will discredit for 
 decades the educational system of Germany. The whole 
 German race has become disgraced. Dr. Muehlon, a former 
 Director of Krupps, burning with shame and horror at 
 Germany's actions, wrote in his diary, on the 25th and 
 27th of August 1914, when Germany's triumph seemed 
 certain : 
 
 " They are like savages, drunk with any victory — ^be it 
 only over unarmed victims — ^and dividing up the spoils, 
 the treasure, and the prisoners with fierce exultation in 
 their camp of tents. . . . 
 
 " If the Germans should now achieve the hegemony of 
 Europe, a universal flight of Europeans will begin. Even 
 the Germans will fall out among themselves and fly from 
 one another. Europe's remotest corners will become the 
 most coveted havens of refuge. An immense shifting of the 
 centres of intellectual life will take place. And should no 
 spot in Europe be left free from German rule, a regular 
 ' migration of the peoples ' will set in, whole peoples flocking 
 to the countries oversea, everywhere and anywhere to 
 be safe from the Germans. Europe will become so un- 
 pleasant a continent that it will haraly be worth while to 
 put up with the discomforts of a visit to it. Outside the 
 frontiers of the new Germanic Empire, however, no German 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 467 
 
 will be able to show his face. There, either the Germans 
 must quit the field or the others will, i.isdain and abhor- 
 rence will make every one insist upon being spared the sight 
 of a German. . . . 
 
 " Since Germany's cause in this War is the wrong cause, 
 Germany's exertions to win adherents can in any case 
 only be characterised as attempts at corruption. It is in- 
 evitably only the inferior members in the European system 
 who are drawn into alliance with Germany : the most 
 charitable interpretation of their action is to suppose they 
 are deceived or influenced by motives belonging to a lower 
 plane of civiUsation. 
 
 On the 6th of October he wrote : 
 
 " No wonder that Germany has not a friend outside the 
 country ; she deserves none. To speak frankly, such an 
 outside friend would be a suspicious individual, a friend of 
 materialism, lies, and bribery." 
 
 The Germans have become a race accursed. Before the 
 War Germans abroad were proud of their country of origin, 
 were proud of their nationality and tried to preserve it. 
 German schools, newspapers, clubs, etc., were to be found 
 everywhere. Henceforward, Germans abroad will have 
 to hide their heads and to disguise their origin through 
 shame. They will endeavour to lose their identity as soon 
 as possible and to forget the German language and the fact 
 that they have come from a country which has disgraced 
 itself for all time. German institutions abroad will dis- 
 appear. The German language will not be spoken outside 
 of Germany. 
 
 By her inhuman methods of warfare Germany has de- 
 stroyed for all time the widely held hope of her patriots 
 of a Greater Germany. According to the Handbook of the 
 Pan-German League of 1911 the world contained 97,600,000 
 Germans. Of these 70,000,000 dwelt in Germany and 
 in Austria-Hungary, 2,500,000 inhabited Switzerland, 
 12,000,000 were in the United States, 10,000,000 were so- 
 called "Low-Germans" — Belgians (Flemish), Dutchmen, 
 Luxemburgers, and Dutch Afrikanders — while about 
 
468 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 3,000,000 Germans were dispersed over the five continents. 
 Some of the figures given were of course grossly exaggerated. 
 In consequence of the shame which Germany has brought 
 upon the race, the Germans in the United States and else- 
 where Avill hasten to become completely de- Germanised. The 
 hope of attaching to their country, by bonds of affection 
 and esteem, the German-Swiss, the Flemish, and the Dutch 
 peoples, has been destroyed for all time. The dream of a 
 Greater Germany will never materialise. Germany's great- 
 ness has been destroyed by the War. She will neither 
 become a world- Power nor a great European Power. 
 
 So far Germany's future has been considered with the 
 assumption that she will be able to preserve her pohtical 
 unity and her social stabiUty. Let us now inquire whether 
 this assumption is correct. 
 
 Rightly considered the Germans are not of a single race. 
 They are men belonging to several races who happen to 
 speak the same language. For practical purposes it will 
 suffice to divide the Germans into Prussians and non- 
 Prussians. The important point to remember is that the 
 Prussians are in the minority in Germany and that that 
 Prussian minority has conquered the non- Prussian peoples 
 in the south, in the west, and in the north, and has imposed 
 upon them by force not a Prussian civihsation but merely 
 a Prussian administration. Prussia proper consists of the 
 provinces east of the Elbe. To the west of that river 
 dwell Saxons, Hanoverians, Westphahans, Hessians, Rhine- 
 landers. The people in the south of Germany are Bavarians, 
 Wiirtembergers, and Badeners, and the sea-faring people of 
 the north call themselves Hanseatics. The Prussians have 
 conquered and ruled the peoples of the north, south, and 
 west of Germany, but they have failed to assimilate them. 
 They have known how to make themselves feared, but they 
 have not succeeded in making themselves loved or even 
 liked. 
 
 The rule of the Prussians has been exceedingly severe, 
 for they are a stiff, hard, and harsh people. They are the 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 469 
 
 Spartans of Germany, and the non-Prussians may perhaps 
 be compared to the Athenians and Corinthians. Prussia's 
 rule has been imposed by force on the non-Prussians and 
 has been borne with reluctance, for the non-Prussians — 
 especially the people in the south and west — are genial, 
 gay, and easy-going, who hate sullen and brutal martinets. 
 Moreover, the people in the south and west are chiefly 
 Roman Cathohcs, while the Prussians are unbending Protes- 
 tants. Prussia represents force, and particularly military 
 force, while the non- Prussians represent German inteUigence, 
 sociability, and progress. Prince Biilow wrote in his book 
 Imperial Germany : 
 
 " German intellectual life, which the whole world has 
 learnt to admire and which even the first Napoleon re- 
 spected, is the work of the southern and western German 
 lands, achieved under the protection of her princes, small 
 States, and free cities. . . . German intellect was developed 
 in the west and the south, but the German State in Prussia." 
 
 The great rehgious reformers of Germany, Luther, Melan- 
 chthon, Hutten, and Reuchlin, were non-Prussians. Of 
 the great German poets and musicians, the following were 
 born outside Prussia : Hans Sachs, Opitz, Gellert, Lessing, 
 Wieland, Goethe, Schiller, Jean Paul, Schlegel, Korner, 
 Arndt, Uhland, Heine, Platen, Grimm, Holderlin, Scheffel, 
 Handel, Bach, Gluck, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Spohr, 
 Weber, Schumann, Schubert, Mendelssohn, Richard Wagner, 
 Strauss. Of the German philosophers, scientists, and 
 historians born outside Prussia I would mention Leibniz, 
 Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, Liebig, Friedrich List, 
 Savigny, Mommsen, Ranke, Raumer, Rotteck, Niebuhr, 
 Sybel, Treitschke. Not so very long ago Prussia was a 
 barbarous country. She owes her rise and growth very 
 largely to the abihty of statesmen and generals born outside 
 Prussia. Among these were Stein, Hardenberg, Derflinger, 
 SeydUtz, Schwerin, Bliicher, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, 
 Schill, Moltke, Roon, Voigts-Rhetz, Steinmetz. The 
 Hohenzollerns themselves are Suabians, South Germans. 
 
470 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 Stein, Hardenberg, Bliicher, Gneisenau, Schill, and Scharn- 
 horst — the statesmen and soldiers who freed Prussia from 
 the yoke of Napoleon ; Fichte, Korner, and Arndt — who 
 inspired the Prussian people with their pen during the War 
 of Liberation ; Friedrich List — the father of the Zollverein 
 and of Bismarck's economic policy ; Schneckenburger who 
 wrote The Watch on the Rhine, and Karl Wilhelm who set 
 it to music ; Hoffmann von Fallersleben who wrote Deutsch- 
 land, Deutschland iiber Alles, and Thiersch who wrote the 
 Prussian national anthem ; Nietzsche who provided Prussia 
 with the philosophy of the Superman and of ruthlessness ; 
 Ranke, Sybel, and Treitschke who falsified Prussia's history ; 
 Moltke, Roon, Steinmetz, and Voigts-Rhetz who created 
 modern Germany on the battlefields of France ; and Rauch 
 and Schliiter who beautified BerHn, were all non-Prussians 
 by birth. Nearly all the " great Prussians " were non- 
 Prussians, Bismarck, who was of very old Prussian stock, 
 is one of the few exceptions. Kant had a Scotch 
 grandfather and the brothers Humboldt had Huguenot 
 ancestors. 
 
 The fact that German civilisation is almost entirely non- 
 Prussian is very little known because the Prussians, after 
 having annexed the territory of Germany, annexed Ger- 
 man civilisation as well. With the same justification the 
 Spartans might have claimed Athenian art, science, com- 
 merce, navigation, and industry as their own after the battle 
 of Aegospotami. As the Prussians were barbarians, the 
 Hohenzollern rulers employed in their public services pre- 
 ferably South Germans and foreigners whose immigration 
 they favoured. Therefore, a large percentage of the most 
 eminent Prussians bear French, Italian, Dutch, Enghsh, 
 PoHsh, and Slavonic names, such as Du Bois-Reymond, 
 Verdy du Vernois, L'Estocq, Lassalle, Fouque, Francois, 
 Hutier, Lucchesini, Brentano, Capri vi, Yorck, Keith, 
 Chodowiecki, Lichnowsky, Biilow, Jagow, Virchow, etc. 
 Culture and character go hand in hand. Comparison of 
 Prussian with non- Prussian civilisation enables us to under- 
 stand the fundamental differences which exist between 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 471 
 
 the Prussians and the non-Prussians, and the dislike which 
 the Prussians and non-Prussians have for each other. 
 
 It is not unnatural that the people of the south and of 
 the west of Germany dislike Prussian manners and Prussian 
 methods of government. Prussian administrators and 
 Prussian officials have a positive genius for making them- 
 selves feared and hated. The vast majority of the people 
 of Alsace-Lorraine are German by language — in 1910 only 
 204,262 knew French — they bear German names, and they 
 may be of German race, as the Germans maintain. Yet the 
 vast majority of the people, though ignorant of French, 
 were not grateful for their reunion with Germany in 1871. 
 On the contrary, they were anxious to return to France 
 because they had learnt to hate their Prussian adminis- 
 trators and their brutality. When the French troops 
 entered the lost provinces they were cheered and hugged 
 by delirious people who often did not know a word of French. 
 Not so very long ago the South German States and Hanover, 
 dreading their Prussian neighbours, wished to place them- 
 selves under French protection. When, in 1857, Napo- 
 leon III. visited South Germany, he was received with 
 universal jubilation. His triumphal progress caused 
 amazement and consternation in Berlin. Up to 1866 the 
 Germans to the west of the Rhine, who had come under the 
 administration of Prussia in 1815 and who thirsted for 
 freedom from the Prussian yoke, would gladly have placed 
 themselves under French rule. The revolution of the 
 Rhenish Provinces in 1848 was anti- Prussian in character. 
 Up to 1870 the South German States had hoped that 
 France would free them from the Prussians who had become 
 their masters in 1866. If, in 1870, Napoleon had won the 
 first battles and had crossed the Rhine, all South Germany 
 would have risen against Prussia. The South German 
 Sovereigns were forced into the North German Confedera- 
 tion and into the German Empire and did not dare to resist, 
 dreading that they might share the fate of the King of 
 Hanover. 
 
 Prussia and the Prussians were in the past bitterly dis- 
 31 
 
472 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 liked and hated in Hanover and in the south and west of 
 Germany and they were not liked in the Hanseatic towns. 
 In the course of years considerable portions of the popula- 
 tion, mesmerised by Prussia's success and prestige and 
 Prussianised to some extent by a Prussian education, seemed 
 to have become reconciled to Prussia's rule. It remains to 
 be seen whether the West Germans, and especially the 
 South Germans, will care to remain " Muss-Preussen," 
 Prussians by compulsion, subject to Berlin, after the present 
 disaster which has destroyed the glamour of Prussia. The 
 most powerful cement of Germany was Prussia's strength, 
 ability, and prestige, and a common pride in the common 
 Imperial Army. That cement has disappeared. Ger- 
 many's unity was not a thing of natural growth, but a highly 
 artificial political creation. It was an enforced partnership. 
 It may not be able to stand the acid test of disaster. Many 
 Germans in the south and west are bound to see the cause 
 of their sufferings not merely in the person of WiUiam II. 
 and his Government, but in the system and traditions of 
 the Prussian State and in the character and aspirations 
 of the Prussian people. It seems therefore by no means 
 impossible that not only the South German States but the 
 non-Prussian parts of Prussia also may secede. It is not 
 inconceivable that the South and West German people, 
 and especially the people west of the Rhine, might wish 
 once more to place themselves voluntarily under the pro- 
 tection of France as they did in the time of the French 
 Revolution and of Napoleon I. The tendency towards 
 secession may be strengthened by the hope of thereby 
 escaping the penalty of the war indemnity. 
 
 The non- Prussian States have their own government and 
 administration. The Bavarians, Saxons, etc., think and 
 feel locally. They may create independent democratic 
 administrations of their own. They may federate among 
 themselves, but it seems questionable whether they would 
 care to federate with Prussia, for Prussia's preponderance 
 in sheer bulk and numbers is so great that they would 
 once more become helpless adjuncts of the Prussian State 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 473 
 
 and be forced to follow once more a Prussian policy and 
 to submit to Prussian dictation. As the South Germans 
 resemble the Austrians in character, and as both Austria 
 and her neighbour Bavaria are Roman Catholic States, 
 Bavaria and the other South German States may perhaps 
 once more unite with the country on the Danube. 
 
 For decades the Hanoverians have remembered their old 
 independence and their former connection with England. 
 It is quite possible that they also may wish to cut themselves 
 adrift from their Prussian conquerors. 
 
 While racial differences and incompatibilities and strongly 
 felt resentments seem to favour a secession of part, or of 
 all, the non-Prussian parts of Germany from Prussia, 
 powerful economic reasons may conceivably preserve 
 Germany's unity, at least for a time. All the individual 
 States participate in the great German market. The dis- 
 integration of Germany might lead to the erection of customs 
 barriers within Germany. It would accentuate the econo- 
 mic difficulties of the people. Another cause which may 
 counteract the separatist tendencies in the south and west 
 of Germany lies in the fact that Prussia possesses practically 
 all the coal in Germany, which, however, lies in Westphalian 
 and Rhenish territory. 
 
 If the non-Prussian parts of Germany should be guided 
 merely by prudential considerations, they will probably 
 maintain the connection with Prussia. However, as people, 
 especially at revolutionary times, are rather influenced by 
 their passions than by cool calculations of profit and loss, 
 separation between the Prussians and non-Prussians of 
 Germany seems quite possible, especially in view of the 
 overbearing character and domineering ways of the Prussians. 
 The non- Prussians are probably no longer willing to obey 
 their Prussian masters implicitly, and the Prussian bureau- 
 cracy and people may not be able to adjust their ways and 
 manners to the altered conditions of the times. 
 
 The secession of the non- Prussian parts of Germany would 
 be absolutely fatal to Prussia. Prussia proper is a back- 
 ward agricultural State which owes to the non-Prussian 
 
474 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 
 
 parts of Germany not only its culture but also its wealth. 
 Prussia's wealth has been created by the conquest of the 
 south, west, and north. In the south lie the teeming 
 factories of Saxony, in the west the coal-fields of the Ruhr 
 and the Rhine Valley, Germany's foreign trade is con- 
 centrated in Hamburg and Bremen, and her financial 
 strength and ability are derived from Frankfort. Berlin's 
 wealth is won in non-Prussian Germany. If the non- 
 Prussian portions of Germany should abandon Prussia, 
 that country would sink back into its original poverty and 
 Berlin would once more become a provincial town. 
 
 So far the German revolution has, as we are told, been 
 the most orderly and the most bloodless revolution in 
 history. It is ominous that the same praise was bestowed 
 upon the Russian revolution at its beginning. It is easy 
 enough for an indignant people to depose its ruler, capture 
 the government machine, and change the men at the top 
 and the ancient symbols of power, but it is difficult for a 
 nation which has lived in abject docihty and servility for 
 centuries to estabhsh an orderly Government on a demo- 
 cratic basis. The Germans have lost the spirit of self- 
 reUance and initiative through centuries of drill. Moreover, 
 democracies cannot be artificially created. They are plants 
 of natural and very slow growth. It takes generations 
 of patient endeavour to evolve the democratic spirit and 
 democratic traditions, and it is particularly difficult to 
 create an orderly democratic Government at a time when 
 the passions have been roused and when the people are 
 suffering. An orderly democratic Government can be 
 created only by men of moderation, who possess the instinct 
 of fairness, of reasonableness, and of self-control, who 
 possess the spirit of give and take. Unfortunately the 
 German Government has only cultivated among the people 
 the spirit of " take." By allowing the soldiers to murder, 
 plunder, outrage, steal, and burn, the late German 
 Government has aroused among the people a spirit of 
 violence and of lawlessness for which all Germany is likely 
 to suffer in due course. Germany has encouraged and has 
 
THE FUTURE OF GERMANY .475 
 
 created Bolshevism in Russia. That movement has been 
 a mighty weapon to Germany, but it may prove to be one 
 in the nature of a boomerang. Germany may conceivably 
 become known to history as the first country which has 
 produced an orderly and bloodless revolution, but the 
 greater probability seems to be that the birth of German 
 democracy will by no means be a painless and bloodless 
 process. 
 
 Germany will probably remain poor and weak for decades. 
 She may never recover from the War. She may decline 
 while other nations increase. Perhaps she will for a long 
 time be a prey to civil convulsions if not to anarchy. 
 
 Revolutions almost invariably breed counter-revolutions. 
 History teaches us that rulers who maintain that they are 
 responsible to God alone cannot be bound by any under- 
 taking, however solemn. Sovereigns who have abdicated 
 have more than once again seized power. William II. is 
 absolutely unscrupulous. The Alhes should therefore 
 reckon with the possibility that the privileged classes or 
 the Emperor may try to seize power by a coup d'etat or by 
 trickery. They must reckon with the possibiUty of an 
 Imperial revival, of a military dictatorship, of a renewal 
 of the War. It seems probable, however, that by her attack 
 of 1914 Germany has destroyed not only the Empire but the 
 future of the German race. To coming generations it may 
 seem as inexplicable that Germany challenged the world 
 and for a time held it at bay as it seems to the present 
 generation that, a few centuries ago, the Turks made all 
 Europe tremble. The Turks have fallen because they put 
 all their trust in brute force and in f rightfulness. Thus 
 they raised the world against themselves. Turkey was 
 ruined because the State became an appendage to its 
 standing army, the Janissaries. Those who live by the 
 sword shall perish by the sword, or, as the German poet 
 put it, Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht. 
 
CHAPTER XXVIII 
 
 THE FUTURE OF GERMANY AND OF THE GERMAN RACE 
 
 {continued) — the problem of Austria 
 
 Before the War Germany had 67,000,000 inhabitants. Of 
 these about 7,000,000 dwelled in Alsace-Lorraine, in the 
 PoUsh district in the east of the country, and in the Danish 
 district in the north. Their loss would reduce the German 
 population to 60,000,000 if we disregard both Germany's 
 losses in men during the War and the excess of births over 
 deaths since 1914. Austria-Hungary adjoins Germany in 
 the south. German Austria is a prolongation of Bavaria. 
 Austria and Bavaria are strictly Roman Catholic countries. 
 On racial, on poUtical, and on economic grounds the union 
 of Germany and of Austria seems only natural. In case 
 of a union of Austria with Bavaria, racial, political, and 
 economic reasons for an amalgamation would be reinforced 
 by reUgious ones as weU. We are told that Austria-Hungary 
 contains 12,000,000 Germans. If these should be united 
 to Germany, Germany's population would be increased to 
 72,000,000. Germany would therefore be stronger in man- 
 power after the War than she had been before its outbreak. 
 Under these circumstances, it is only natural that many 
 consider the possibility of a German- Austrian reunion with 
 grave concern. Hence it seems worth while to study 
 Austria's position and to cast a glance into its future. 
 
 German Austria adjoins Bavaria in the east. It stretches 
 from Lake Constance in the west to Pressburg in the east, 
 and from Gmiind in the north to Klagenfurt in the south. 
 Those who believe that 12,000,000 Germans dwell in a 
 compact mass in German Austria in immediate contact 
 with Bavaria are mistaken. At the Census of 1910 
 
 476 
 
THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 477 
 
 1 1 ,987,701 Germans were enumerated in the Dual Monarchy, 
 and they were distributed as follows : 
 
 In the Provinces of German Austria (Lower and 
 Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, 
 Tirol, and Vorarlberg) 6,118,546 
 
 In the Czechoslovak Provinces (Bohemia, Moravia, 
 
 and Austrian Silesia) 3,512,682 
 
 In the other Provinces of Austria (Galicia, Bukovina, 
 
 etc.) 319,038 
 
 In Hungary, especially in the Southern and Eastern 
 
 Districts 2,037,435 
 
 Total . ... 11,987,701 
 
 Of the 12,000,000 Germans who were enumerated in 1910 
 in Austria- Hungary, only about 6,000,000 lived in German 
 Austria in the immediate vicinity of Bavaria. Of the 
 remaining 6,000,000 Germans 3,500,000 dwell in the districts 
 claimed by the Czecho-Slovaks and 2,500,000 in the extreme 
 south and east of the late Dual Monarchy. The 2,500,000 
 Germans who live in Southern Hungary and in the far-off 
 Bukovina and Galicia are out of all contact with Germany 
 and with German Austria. They may be considered to be 
 lost to Germany. On the other hand, the bulk of the 
 3,500,000 Germans in Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian 
 Silesia occupy a long and narrow strip of land on the west, 
 north, and east of the new Czecho-Slovak State. They 
 form a German fringe of that new State along the borders 
 of German Silesia and Saxony. 
 
 It should be observed that the Germans are in a distinct 
 minority in the lands of the Czecho-Slovaks. According 
 to the Census of 1910 the 2,467,724 Germans of Bohemia 
 constituted 3676 per cent, of the population of that 
 country. The 719,435 Germans of Moravia formed 
 27 62 per cent., and the 325,523 Germans of Austrian 
 Silesia formed 43 90 per cent, of the population. In the 
 remaining provinces of the late Austrian Empire, namely 
 Carniola, Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, GaUcia, Bukovina, and 
 Dalmatia, the 319,038 Germans formed only 303 per cent. 
 of the population. The position of the Germans in Austria 
 is therefore as follows : 6,000,000 Germans adjoin Bavaria, 
 
478 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 
 
 forming a solid block, 2,500,000 Germans live in the far-off 
 parts of the late Monarchy or are dispersed in insignificant 
 numbers among non-German peoples, and 3,500,000 Germans 
 live in the districts claimed by the Czecho-Slovaks, where 
 they constitute approximately one-third of the population. 
 The question now arises as to the future of the German 
 fringe of Czecho-Slovakia, of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian 
 Silesia. 
 
 The Czechs claim, and with reason, that the German 
 bureaucracy of Austria and the Magyar bureaucracy of 
 Hungary have manipulated the census returns for pohtical 
 reasons, that the number of Czecho-Slovaks has been very 
 seriously understated and that of the Germans and 
 Magyars considerably overstated. Possibly there are only 
 about 2,500,000 Germans in Greater Bohemia — that is 
 Professor Benes's estimate — and many of these live not on 
 the German border, but inland among the Czechs. Many 
 Germans demand that the frontier districts of Bohemia 
 should be separated from that country and either be made 
 independent or be joined to Germany proper. On the 
 other hand, the Czecho-Slovaks not unnaturally desire to 
 retain their historical frontiers which coincide with the 
 boundaries set by Nature. 
 
 It is not easy to divide Bohemia along racial lines, for 
 the political and natural boundaries of the country coincide. 
 
 The boundary of Bohemia towards Germany is formed 
 by a number of important mountain chains— the Bohemian 
 Forest, the Ore Mountains, the Giant Mountains, and the 
 Sudetes. After all the problem of Bohemia's boundaries 
 is not a local but a European question. Bohemia, together 
 with Moravia and Austrian Silesia, occupies one of the 
 strongest and one of the most important strategical positions 
 in Europe. That country separates Berlin from Vienna 
 and Buda-Pesth on the one hand and Bavaria from German 
 Silesia on the other. It forms a gigantic saUent which 
 penetrates deeply into the centre of Germany, and it lies 
 right across the great natural high-road along the Elbe 
 which runs from Central Germany via Prague and Vienna 
 
THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 479 
 
 to the Black Sea, to Constantinople and to the Near East. 
 Bohemia is easily defendable, for it is a great natural fortress. 
 It is surrounded, especially in the direction of Germany, by 
 steep and lofty mountain walls, and it contains vast agricul- 
 tural, mineral, and industrial resources useful in war and 
 a highly intelligent and very martial population. The 
 strategical importance of Greater Bohemia may be gauged 
 from the fact that within a distance of about fifty miles 
 from that country lie some of the most important German, 
 Austrian, and Hungarian towns, such as Munich, Nurem- 
 berg, Regensburg, Erfurt, Chemnitz, Dresden, Leipzig, 
 Glogau, Breslau, Linz, Vienna, Buda-Pesth. The great 
 German industrial districts of Upper Silesia and of Saxony 
 lie just across the Bohemian border. Bismarck stated 
 repeatedly that the Power which controls Bohemia may 
 dominate Europe. Professor Lyde wrote in his book. 
 The Continent of Europe, London, 1913 : 
 
 " Bohemia, though only two-thirds the size of Scotland, 
 is the most important province of the Austrian Empire, 
 and its importance, political and historic, has been by no 
 means confined to the Empire. Much more truly than 
 Switzerland it is the heart of Europe, at about equal 
 distances from all the great seas, a marked physical unit 
 cut off by forested mountains, and yet with easy access 
 to those seas by the Saxon and Moravian, the Austrian 
 and the Magyar Gates, holding the balance between the 
 north-westward-flowing Elbe and the south-eastward- 
 flowing Danube, for centuries a focus of pohtical, intel- 
 lectual, and ethnic interests and to-day one of the most 
 important industrial areas in the world." 
 
 The Czecho- Slovaks desire to possess the whole of their 
 country not only for historical and sentimental reasons, 
 but also for very practical considerations. Bohemia is 
 naturally an exceedingly wealthy land which has always 
 been coveted by its neighbours. Besides, it forms a huge 
 wedge, the advance guard of Slavdom, which separates the 
 Germans on the Elbe from the Germans on the Danube, 
 the Germans on the Upper Rhine from those of Silesia, the 
 
480 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 
 
 Protestant Germans from the Roman Catholic Germans. 
 Because of its great natural wealth and its central and 
 dominating position right across the great strategical main- 
 road which connects Central Europe with Asia, Bohemia 
 has been one of the most important battle-grounds of the 
 world since time immemorial. It was, for instance, one 
 of the principal theatres of war during the Thirty Years' 
 War when its population was reduced from 2,000,000 to 
 800,000. An independent and powerful Bohemia restrains 
 and restricts Germany's liberty of military action as much 
 towards the East as an independent and powerful Belgium 
 does towards the West. Therefore the Germans consider 
 it a thorn in their side. A strong and hostile Bohemia 
 would make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for 
 the German peoples to resume their career of conquest in 
 the direction of Constantinople. Hence the Czecho- Slovaks 
 have to reckon with the possibility that Germany may be 
 hostile to them. They must be prepared for a surprise 
 attack on the part of the Germans who hem them in on 
 three sides. Therefore the Czechs demand that they should 
 control the protecting mountain walls which surround their 
 country and the passes through which the invader may 
 enter. Their security would be gone should the mountain 
 barriers be placed into German hands. 
 
 The Czecho-Slovaks have suffered from German hostility 
 for centuries. They have tried to shake off the German 
 yoke ever since the time of Huss, who was animated quite 
 as much by hostility to the tyrannous Germans as by 
 religious motives, who was quite as much a patriot as a 
 religious reformer. For centuries the Germans have en- 
 deavoured to destroy the independence, the language, 
 and the culture of the Czechs and to extirpate the race. 
 However, the Czechs are too wise to seek revenge for their 
 sufferings upon the Germans in their midst who may 
 become valuable citizens. President Masaryk has an- 
 nounced that the Czech Government will treat the Germans 
 dwelling in Bohemia with every consideration, spare their 
 susceptibilities, and not interfere with their institutions 
 
THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 481 
 
 and language. His statesmanlike attitude has been received 
 with joy by the Germans of Bohemia, and they will prob- 
 ably gladly acquiesce in the supremacy of the Czechs and 
 endeavour to co-operate with them. After all, the people 
 of the German fringe of Bohemia could scarcely form a 
 separate State. They might of course wish to unite with 
 Germany for sentimental reasons, but if they did so they 
 would obviously have to share in the heavy burdens which, 
 in consequence of their defeat, the German people will 
 have to bear for decades. Therefore their secession seems 
 unlikely. If they choose to remain citizens of Bohemia , they 
 will participate in the prosperity which that wealthy country 
 is certain to experience. It can therefore scarcely be 
 doubted that, prompted by prudence and self-interest, prac- 
 tically all the Germans dwelKng in the new Czecho-Slovak 
 State will cut themselves adrift from the Germans in 
 Grermany and in course of time they will probably become 
 completely merged with the dominant people. Freedom, 
 toleration, and prosperity are the best nationalisers. In half 
 a century the Germans of Bohemia may have become loyal 
 Czechs and the German language may have disappeared 
 from the country, provided, of course, that the Czecho- 
 slovak Government continues pursuing a wise policy towards 
 the German citizens. 
 
 It seems most probable that the bulk of the 6,000,000 
 Grermans of Austria- Hungary who live dispersed among 
 the Magyars, Rumanians, Poles, and Czecho-Slovaks will 
 retain their domicile and will earUer or later be absorbed 
 by the nationalities which surround them. Let us now 
 consider the position of the 6,000,000 German Austrians 
 who form a solid block adjoining Bavaria. 
 
 The development and strength of a race depends obviously 
 upon the economic factor. A people which possesses 
 vast wealth-creating resources can develop large and 
 rapidly-expanding industries, and these will give employ- 
 ment to an increasing population. A nation which lacks 
 adequate resources is condemned to poverty and insignifi- 
 cance. Its numbers can increase only slowly. Lastly, a 
 
482 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 
 
 nation which loses a large portion of its wealth-creating 
 resources and which is weighed down by heavy taxes will 
 either remain stationary or it will shrink in numbers, because 
 the people cannot make a living in their country and are 
 forced to seek work abroad. The latter is the position in 
 which Austria, and Hungary as well, finds herself owing 
 to the War. 
 
 The two principal economic resources of continental 
 countries are agriculture and the manufacturing industries, 
 for commerce and trade enrich only the few. Besides, 
 commerce and trade are dependent for their prosperity on 
 a flourishing home market. The provinces of German 
 Austria are very unfavourably situated for the pursuit of 
 agriculture and of manufacturing. German Austria is a 
 very mountainous, and a largely alpine, country in which 
 agriculture is only little developed. It is more suitable 
 for forestry than for farming. Consequently the popula- 
 tion of German Austria depends largely on imported food 
 for its subsistence. The imported food consumed by the 
 inhabitants of German Austria came hitherto partly from 
 Hungary, partly from the non-German provinces of the 
 Austrian Empire, especially from Bohemia, Moravia, 
 Silesia, and Galicia. German Austria paid for its imports 
 of food with exports of manufactured articles. 
 
 Unfortunately German Austria is also very unfavourably 
 situated for the pursuit of manufactures. The prosperity 
 of modern industry depends on an abundance of machinery, 
 depends on the possession of cheap motive power with 
 which to set machines in motion, depends very largely on 
 an abundance of cheap coal. According to the Report 
 Coal Resources of the World which was placed before the 
 International Geological Congress held in Canada, 1913, the 
 coal possessed by the Dual Monarchy compared as follows with 
 the coal possessed by Germany and the United Kingdom : 
 
 Germany . . . 423,356,000,000 tonB of coal and lignite 
 
 United Kingdom . 189,535,000,000 „ „ „ 
 
 Austria . . . 63,876,000,000 
 
 Hungary . . 1,717,000,000 
 
THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 483 
 
 It will b« noticed that the store of coal possessed by the 
 late Austrian Empire was only small, while that possessed 
 by the Kingdom of Hungary was quite insignificant. Herein 
 lay the reason that the Austrian industries were com- 
 paratively small, while Hungary was an almost purely agri- 
 cultural country. 
 
 Industries habitually settle on or near the coal measures, 
 so as to save the heavy cost of transportation for the bulky 
 fuel which they require. Unfortunately for German Austria 
 practically all the coal possessed by the late Austrian 
 Empire occurs on non-German territory, in Bohemia, 
 Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and Galicia. Hence the manu- 
 facturing districts of the Austrian Empire were situated on 
 territories inhabited by Czecho-Slovaks and Poles, who 
 have made themselves independent owing to the War. 
 German Austria is a densely populated country which is poor 
 both in agricultural and in industrial resources. 
 
 The superiority of the non-German provinces of Austria 
 in the production of food and the dependence of the Austro- 
 Germans upon food raised by the Czecho-Slovaks of 
 Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia and by the Poles of GaHcia 
 may be gauged from the following figures, the latest which 
 I have been able to obtain : 
 
 Austrian Habvest in 1912 in Qotntals 
 
 Bohemia, Mo- Wheat. Rye. Barley. Gate. Pulse. 
 
 rsvia, Silesia, 
 
 Galicia . . 14,703,661 22,997,531 14,637,698 18,901,686 2,085,922 
 
 All other parts of 
 
 Austria . 4,248,978 6,750,502 2,428,058 5,399,312 407,915 
 
 Total . 18,952,639 29,748,033 17,065,756 24,300,998 2,493,837 
 
 Fodder 
 _ , . ,, Hops. Potatoes. Sugar-beet. Roots and Straw. 
 
 Bohemia, Mo- Carrots. 
 
 ravia, Silesia, 
 
 Galicia . . 180,684 105,596,875 74,017,630 24,944,605 136,184,065 
 
 All other parts 
 
 of Austria . 20,776 19,819,230 5,220,065 14,225,572 46,624,328 
 
 Total . 201,460 125,416,105 79,237,695 39,170,177 182,808,393 
 
4M THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 
 
 HotiM. 0*ttlo. Pigs. 
 Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, 
 
 Galicia .... 1,328,974 6,793,303 3,626,480 
 
 All other parts of Austria . 473,874 3,366,706 2,805,600 
 
 Total . . . 1,802,848 9,160,009 6,432,080 
 
 It will be noticed that the Czecho-Slovak and the Polish 
 provinces of Austria produced in 1912 about three-quarters 
 of the wheat, oats, and straw raised by the Austrian Empire, 
 about five-sixths of the rye, pulse, and potatoes, about 
 six-sevenths of the barley, about two-thirds of the fodder 
 roots and carrots, about nine- tenths of the hops, and about 
 fifteen-sixteenths of the sugar-beet. The superiority of the 
 Czecho-Slovak and Polish districts in live-stock is similarly 
 marked, for they possessed in 1912 about two- thirds of the 
 cattle, three-fourths of the horses, and three-fifths of the 
 pigs. The bulk of the agricultural wealth of the late 
 Austrian Empire was situated in the non-German districts 
 of the Monarchy. 
 
 By far the most valuable minerals of the Austrian Empire 
 were black coal, brown coal (lignite), and mineral oil. These 
 three minerals combined furnished exactly seven-eighths of 
 the value of the entire mineral production of the country. 
 The production of black coal, brown coal, and mineral oil 
 was distributed as follows between the Czecho-Slovak and 
 PoHsh provinces of Austria and the remaining ones in 
 1911, the last year for which I have been able to obtain 
 official figures : 
 
 AtrSTBIAN MiNBBAL PbODUOTIGN IN 1911 IN QUINTALS 
 
 Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, BUck Ooal. Brown Goal. Mineral OH,- 
 
 Galicia .... 142,951,315 210,841,498 14,897,824 
 
 All other parts of Austria . 846,857 41,811,840 None 
 
 Total . . . 143,798,172 252,653,338 14,897,824 
 
 Practically all the black coal and four-fifths of the brown 
 coal produced by the late Austrian Empire came from 
 Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and Galicia, while all 
 the mineral oil produced came from Galicia. 
 
THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 485 
 
 The figures given show that German Austria was depen- 
 dent on its subject nations for food and fuel. Consequently 
 the revolt of the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles at the end of 
 the War led to starvation in Vienna and to a complete 
 absence of coal in the capital. 
 
 The great industries of the Austrian Empire were situated 
 in the non- German lands of the Monarchy and particularly 
 in Bohemia, which is singularly blessed by Nature's bounty 
 with agricultural and mineral resources of every kind. The 
 great Austrian sugar industry, which provides by far the 
 largest export item, was centred in Bohemia. Bohemian 
 glass ware, porcelain, earthenware, and musical instruments 
 are known throughout the world. The Austrian iron 
 industry was domiciled on Czech soil. The guns of the 
 Austrian artillery were made at Skoda near Pilsen. About 
 one-half of the beer brewed in Austria was made in Bohemia. 
 Pilsen beer was exported to all countries. Bohemia pos- 
 sesses very important textile industries and excels in the 
 production of embroideries, lace, leather, boots, hardware, 
 chemicals, furniture, etc. It abounds not only in minerals 
 of all kinds, but in mineral springs and health resorts, 
 such as Karlsbad, Marienbad, Franzenbad, and many 
 others. Bohemia had the most highly-developed railway 
 system in Austria and the best roads. The bulk of 
 Austria's exports was furnished by Bohemia, which is drained 
 by the Elbe. Hence Hamburg on the mouth of that river 
 was the most important harbour for Austria's foreign trade. 
 
 The enormous industrial superiority of the non-German 
 portions of Austria over the German provinces may be 
 gauged from the following figures : 
 
 Factories Camber of Beet-sugar Brewery 
 
 In 1019 Steam production Output In 
 
 ™ '■^^^' BoUers. In Quintals. HectoUtws. 
 Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, 
 
 Galicia .... 10,044 28,868 43,685,473 14,764,326 
 
 All other parta'of Austria . 6,885 10,702 4,333,770 7,945,106 
 
 Total . . . 16,929 39,570 48,019,243 22,709,431 
 
 As the non-German portions of the Empire of Austria pro- 
 duced the bulk of the food, minerals, and manufactures 
 
486 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 
 
 of the country, they created the bulk of the national 
 wealth and income and furnished therefore the bulk of the 
 national taxes as well. That may be seen from the follow- 
 ing comparison : 
 
 Taxes on Oongomption Land Tax in 
 
 In 1911. 1912. 
 
 Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, 
 
 Galicia .... 341,995,090 crowns 44,209,196 crowns 
 
 All other parts of Austria . 103,717,229 „ 25,050,325 
 
 Total . . . 445,712,319 crowns 69,259,521 crowns 
 
 The facts and figures given show that the people of German 
 Austria lived by exploiting the non-German portions of the 
 Empire. Vienna was wealthy, but its wealth was created 
 in the non-German provinces. The wealthy people of 
 Vienna derived their income from the non- German lands. 
 The Austrian capital was the centre of Austrian Society, of 
 the national administration, of science, of art, of music, 
 of education, of commerce, of banking, of finance, of sport, 
 of amusements of every kind, of fashion, and of the culinary 
 arts. It was, to some extent, a cosmopoHtan town. About 
 600,000 visitors came to the capital every year. Men 
 of non-German nationahty who made their income in 
 Bohemia, in Galicia, and elsewhere spent it in gay and 
 brilliant Vienna. Besides, the whole coimtry was made 
 tributary to Vienna by the wealthy landed aristocracy of 
 the Monarchy, by absentee landlords who possessed huge 
 estates in the non-German provinces, and by the Viennese 
 capitalists who possessed the bulk of the economic under- 
 takings which were carried on by the Germans and non- 
 Germans in the non-German provinces. The whole Empire 
 was thus mortgaged to the Viennese. The magnificent 
 Imperial Court and a garrison of 30,000 soldiers brought a 
 large amount of money to the capital, and wealthy Czechs, 
 Poles, Rumanians, Russians, Turks, Greeks, etc., spent 
 habitually a large portion of their income in that toAvn, 
 which was considered to be the capital of south-eastern 
 Europe. Vienna, being a centre of wealth and of fashion, 
 
THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 487 
 
 became, like Paris, a centre of the luxury trades which are 
 patronised by the rich and the elegant. 
 
 In consequence of the War the wealth of Vienna has dis- 
 appeared. The German-Austrian landlords who derived 
 their wealth from Polish, Bohemian, and Hungarian estates 
 wiU probably be expropriated by the Poles, Czechs, and 
 Magyars. The aristocratic idlers of Vienna will have to 
 turn to work. The wealthy financiers, bankers, and investors 
 of Vienna, to whom the whole Empire was in debt, will be 
 compelled to sell the bulk of their investments situated in 
 non- German Austria partly owing to the pressure which 
 will be probably exercised upon them by the non-German 
 peoples, who will dechne to continue paying tribute to 
 Vienna, partly owing to the ruin which the War will un- 
 doubtedly inflict upon them. The Czecho-Slovaks, Poles, 
 Bohemians, etc., will create capitals of their own and will 
 shun Vienna. With the disappearance of the Court and 
 the wealthy aristocracy the glamour of Vienna will go. 
 Vienna which was the capital of a great Empire will become 
 the principal town of a small State of 6,000,000 inhabitants. 
 It stands to reason that a little nation of 6,000,000 people 
 cannot maintain a capital inhabited by 2,000,000. Vienna's 
 luxury industries will decline and decay. Prague, Bucharest, 
 Warsaw, and Belgrade may put Vienna in the shade. 
 
 The Austro-Germans will suffer through the War in a 
 twofold manner. Their income, which was principally 
 derived from the non- German districts, will be vastly reduced 
 by the loss of their principal wealth-creating resources. In 
 addition, they will be weighed down by the burden of the 
 war debt and of the indemnities which they will have 
 to pay to the countries which the Austrian armies have 
 devastated. During the War the Government of the Dual 
 Monarchy has raised an enormous debt, which was taken 
 up chiefly by the financiers, bankers, and wealthy investors 
 of Vienna and Buda-Pesth. The non- German portions of 
 the Austrian Empire will of course refuse to take over their 
 share. Consequently the 6,000,000 Austro-Germans will 
 have to assume a financial burden which would have been 
 32 
 
488 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 
 
 unbearably heavy to the 30,000,000 inhabitants of the 
 Austrian Empire. The Austrian Government will there- 
 fore be compelled to repudiate the larger part or the whole 
 of the National Debt. The Austro- German bankers, finan- 
 ciers, and investors will consequently be ruined. 
 
 The new Austria will be an exceedingly small and poor 
 country. German Austria will of course not be able to 
 support a capital of 2,000,000 people. Vienna will in course 
 of time become an insignificant provincial town with a 
 rapidly declining population, and house property should 
 become exceedingly cheap. Having lost its agricultural, 
 mineral, and industrial resources, and the bulk of its paper 
 wealth, German Austria may become one of the poorest 
 countries in the world. Possibly its population will decline 
 very quickly. It is of course conceivable that misfortune 
 should cause the Austrian people to pull themselves together 
 and to make a new start. Agriculture and forestry in 
 German Austria may be improved. Lack of coal may cause 
 the Austro- Germans to convert their water-power into 
 electricity. New resources may be discovered in the 
 country. However, the greater probability seems to be that 
 German Austria will decline and decay, for the population 
 lacks energy and enterprise. The Austrian manufacturers, 
 bankers, and business men will probably go to Bohemia, 
 Poland, and other countries where conditions are more 
 favourable for the exercise of their abilities, and the Austrian 
 workers will emigrate by the hundred thousand from their 
 ruined country to the more prosperous lands around them 
 and to countries oversea. The position of Magyar Hungary 
 is very similar to that of German Austria. Buda-Pesth 
 may share the fate of Vienna. On the other hand, the 
 Magyars have an advantage over Austria in the possession 
 of the exceedingly fruitful Hungarian plain, the productivity 
 of which can be enormously increased. 
 
 If German Austria should unite with Grermany, Ger- 
 many's population would be augmented not by 12,000,000, 
 as is often asserted, but by only 6,000,000, and that number 
 may rapidly shrink if economic pressure and distress should 
 
THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 489 
 
 lead to the reduction of the Austrian population, A Ger- 
 man-Austrian reunion may take place, but it need not be 
 a lasting and a permanent union. It seems questionable 
 whether the Germans and the Austrians will care to com- 
 bine. The accession of an utterly impoverished and exhausted 
 Austria might appear to the Germans rather a loss than a 
 gain. Besides, the Austro- Germans themselves may no 
 longer wish to become citizens of Germany. Their desire 
 to enter the German Federation was exceedingly strong as 
 long as the German Empire enjoyed its great prestige. At 
 that time the Austro-Germans were anxious to become 
 members of a State which was rapidly progressing, immensely 
 wealthy and powerful, reputed invincible, and believed 
 destined to achieve the domination of the world. The 
 glamour which surrounded Imperial Germany has disap- 
 peared. Austria has been disillusioned by the War. Many 
 Austrians see in the Germans the cause of their downfall 
 and of their sufferings, and they curse the day on which 
 they went to war at the bidding of Berlin. During the 
 course of the War the Germans have treated the Austrians 
 not as aUies, but as underlings, with deliberate insolence 
 and contempt. Vienna starved while Berlin feasted. 
 
 Austrian admiration of the Germans may give way to 
 resentment and to bitter hatred. The Austro-Germans 
 may endeavour to forget that they were ever a great and 
 a conquermg nation. They will probably seek peace and 
 rest, and they may strive to live their own life in humble 
 and isolated insignificance. Possibly the alpine portions 
 of Austria which incline towards Switzerland may try to 
 find security by joining that country. Vorarlberg may be 
 the first province to undertake this step. I think those are 
 mistaken who believe that the Austro-Germans desire to 
 join the Germans of Germany with the object of embarking 
 at Germany's command upon a war of revenge at the 
 earhest opportunity. Very possibly the Great War has led 
 not only to the downfall of Austria, but to its final extinc- 
 tion. It seems not inconceivable that in a few decades the 
 stationary or shrinking population of Austria will have been 
 
490 THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA 
 
 absorbed by the surrounding Swiss, Italians, Czechs, Mag- 
 yars, and Poles. Austria's military and economic strength, 
 as that of Magyar Hungary, was derived from its subject 
 nations. The War has knocked away the props on which 
 both these States were erected. To-day Austria is only a 
 shadow of its former self. In a century the State which 
 at one time dominated the world may be but a remembrance 
 and its history may seem a romance or a fable to those 
 reading it. 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 Note. — The letter f. following a page niimber signifies " and following 
 page " ; the letters ff. signify " and following pages." 
 
 Abdication of William I., 312 f. 
 
 Adriatic Sea, 364 
 
 Agadir, 136 f. 
 
 Agricultural Co-operation, 207 ff. 
 
 Schools, 206 f. 
 Agricvdture, British, 197 ff. 
 
 German, 184 ff., 279, 
 283 
 ,, and Chemistry, 204 ff. 
 
 Albania, 365 
 Albert us, Magnus, 271 
 Alliances, Bismarck on, 358 f. 
 
 ,, Frederick the Great on, 
 
 47 f. 
 
 Alsace-Lorraine, 390, 406 ff., 445 f. 
 
 Anglo-German Friction, 86 ff., 106 ff. 
 
 Anti-British Policy, 86 ff., 106 ff., 
 
 332 ff., 391 ff., 433 ff., 440 ff. 
 Anti-SociaUst Law, 294 ff., 301 f., 
 
 388 
 Arbitration, 57 
 Architecture, Gterman, 165 
 Army, German, 39, 60 ff., 337 f., 
 
 370 ff., 397 ff. 
 Austria, Agricultural Wealth, 483 f . 
 ,, Aristocracy of, 487 
 ,, Finances of, 487 f. 
 „ Future of , 476 ff. 
 ,, Grermans in, 476 ff. 
 „ Harvest of, 483 f. 
 ,, Industries in, 485 
 ,, Mineral Wealth of, 484 
 ,, Resources of, 482 ff. 
 ,, Taxes in, 486 f. 
 ,, Wealth of , 486 f. 
 Austria- Htmgary, 342 f., 346 ff., 
 
 360ff.,476ff. 
 Austro-I^ussian War, 49, 127 f., 
 
 398, 400 
 Austro-Italian Differences, 360 ff. 
 
 B 
 
 Bacon, Lord, 233, 413 
 Balkan Peninsula, 364 ff. 
 Baltic Canal, 326, 346, 447 
 Barbarities of army, 355 f., 414 f., 
 
 466 f. 
 Barges, Size of, 245 
 Bassermann, 91 f. 
 fiavaria, 481 
 Bebel, A., 292, 296 
 Beet-sugar, 205 f., 279 
 Belfort, 406 
 
 Belgian Grey Book, 419 ff. 
 Belgium, 350 ff., 405 ff., 430 f. 
 Benedetti, 49 
 Benes, Professor, 478 
 Bernhardi, General von, 342, 390 ff 
 
 404 f., 423 
 Bernstein, Eduard, 111 ff., 292 
 
 374 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, 318, 352 £., 
 
 375, 411 f. 
 Beyens, Baron de, 411, 418 ff. 
 Biermer, Professor, 178 
 Billot, A., 361 
 Bismarck, 27 f., 35 f., 49, 50 ff., 
 
 116ff., 126 ff., 130 ff., 154, 175f., 
 
 180 f., 217, 233, 257 f., 269 f. 
 
 293 ff., 299 f., 312 ff., 327 f., 
 
 330 f., 336, 358 ff., 382 f., 402 ff 
 
 415 f., 445 f., 479 
 Bizerta, 360 
 
 Board Schools in England, 166 ff. 
 Bohemia, 477 ff. 
 Brandenburg, Rise of, 12 ff. 
 British Empire, 58, 82 ff., 86 ff 
 
 391 ff.,433ff.,440ff. 
 Brockhaus's Encyclopedia, 178 
 Bryce Commission, 414 
 Buda-Pesth, 488 
 Building SocietiM, 288 
 
 491 
 
492 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 Bfilow, Prince, 91, 318, 383, 402, 
 
 469 
 Bvisch, Moritz, 359 f., 361 
 
 C 
 
 Cambon, Ambassador, 418 f . 
 
 Canada, 58 f. 
 
 Canals, 235 ff. 
 
 Cartels, 261 ff., 274 
 
 Centre Party, 309, 310, 315 ff. 
 
 Chancellor, Imperial, 343, 375 ff. 
 
 Chauvinism, 422 ff. 
 
 Chemical Education, 266, 268 f., 
 
 272 ff. 
 Chemical Exports, 266, 268 f. 
 
 Industries, 266 ff. 
 Chemistry and Agriculture, 204 ff. 
 Chiari, Admiral, 367 f. 
 China, 440 
 
 Churches, 17 f., 26 f.,149, 155 
 Clausewitz, General von, 399 
 Clergy, 17f.,26f., 149, 155 
 Clerical Party, 309, 310, 315 ff. 
 Coal Consimaption, 278 
 „ Exports, 277 
 ,, Production, 277 
 ,, Resources, 455, 458,482 f. 
 Coal-tar Dyes, 266 
 Cobden, R., 172 
 Colonial Policy, 52 ff., 392 ff. 
 Colonies, 52 ff., 392 ff. 
 Combinations, Industrial, 261 ff., 
 
 274 
 Conservative Party, 303, 309, 310, 
 
 382, 383f.,386ff. 
 Constitution, 34 f., 312 ff., 316, 
 
 375 ff., 387 ff. 
 Consumption of Food, 287 f. 
 „ of Fuel, 278 
 
 of Iron, 278 
 Co-operation, Agricultural, 207 ff. 
 
 Industrial, 261 ff., 274 
 Co-operative Societies, 289 
 Coup d'etat, 380 ff., 387 f. 
 Crsimming, 160 f. 
 Czecho-Slovaks, 477 ff. 
 
 D 
 
 Daily Telegraph Interview, 320'f., 
 
 378, 380 
 Danes, 389 f. 
 Daniel, Professor, 20 ff. 
 Delbruck, Professor, 96 f., Ill, 308, 
 
 381 f. 
 Delcass6, 126, 133 f. 
 
 Domination of the World, 439 ff. 
 Duisburg-Ruhrort, 251 
 Du Moulin- Eckart, 94 
 Dyes, 266 
 
 E 
 
 Edinburgh Review, 172 £. 
 Education, Agricultviral, 206 f. 
 Chemical, 267 f. 
 English, 156 ff., 162 
 German, 16 ff., 139 f., 
 
 148 ff. 
 Patriotic, 152 ff. 
 Egypt, 393, 435 
 Elections, German, 298, 304, 309, 
 
 314 ff. 
 Emden Canal, 251 f. 
 Emigrant Traffic, 264 f. 
 Emigration, Prospective, 355, 464 f. 
 Emmerich Traffic, 244 
 Emmich, General von, 351 f. 
 Emperor, Position of, 17 f., 34 f., 
 
 375 ff. 
 Empire, British, 58, 82 ff., 86 ff., 
 
 391 ff., 433 ff., 440 ff. 
 Employment, 282 ff. 
 Engine Power, 279 
 England, 76 ff., 86 ff., 106 ff., 327 f., 
 391ff.,433ff.,440ff. 
 Education in, 156 ff., 162 
 Expansionist Policy, 52 ff. 
 Exports, Chemical, 266, 268 f. 
 ,, Manufactured, 281 
 
 F 
 
 Falk, Dr., 152 
 
 Fares, Railway, 230 
 
 Farming, 184 ff. 
 
 Finances, German, 456 ff. 
 
 Fiscal Policy, German, 169 ff., 
 
 257 ff. 
 Fischer, Professor, 142 f . 
 Food, 21 Iff. 
 
 „ Consumption, 287 f. 
 
 '„ Prices, 21 Iff. 
 Forced Sales, 188 
 Forstner, Lieutenant von, 371 ff. 
 France, 125 ff., 345 ff., 398, 400 f., 
 429 f., 442, 451ff.,455f. 
 ,, Population of, 130, 452 
 Franchise, Prussian, 304 
 Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 342 f . 
 Francis Joseph, Emperor, 346 
 Franco-German Relations, 126 ff., 
 
 345ff., 451ff., 465f. 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 493 
 
 Franco- German War of 1870, 68 f., 
 
 128 f., 398, 400 f, 
 Franco-German War, Cost of, 131 
 Frankfurter Zeitimg, 119 ff., 162 
 Frederick the Great, 45 ff., 62, 
 
 150 f., 163 
 Frederick William I., 150 
 Freeholds, Rural, 189 ff. 
 Free Trade and Protection, 169 ff., 
 
 257 ff. 
 Freights, Canal, 245 ff., 248 
 
 Railway, 220 ff.,229ff., 248 
 Frenchmen, 389 f. 
 French Yellow Book, 417 ff. 
 Friendly Societies, 289 
 Frymann, 386 ff. 
 
 G 
 
 General Election of 1917, 309, 383 
 
 of 1912, 317 
 Generalstab, 65 ff., 408 ff. 
 George, Lloyd, 331 
 Germany, Agriculture, 184 ff., 279, 
 283 
 Army, 39, 60 ff., 337 ff., 
 
 370 ff., 397 ff. 
 Canals, 235 ff. 
 ,, Chauvinism, 422 ff. 
 „ Chemical Industry, 266 ff. 
 Churches, 17 f., 26 f. 
 Education, 16 ff., 139 f., 
 148 ff. 
 ,, Finances, 456 ff. 
 
 Fiscal Policy, 169 ff., 
 257 ff. 
 „ Foreign Investments,l 74, 
 
 463 
 ,, Foreign Policy, 43 ff. 
 
 Future of , 445 ff. 
 ,, Industrial Conditions, 
 276 ff. 
 Mineral Wealth, 457 ff. 
 Navy, 39, 72 ff., 91, 102, 
 337 f., 391 f. 
 ,, Political Parties, 304, 
 
 309 f., 311 ff. 
 ,, Population Increase, 83, 
 
 130, 452 
 „ Railways, 214 ff. 
 ,, Reichstag, 312 ff. 
 
 Rise of, 12 ff.,43ff. 
 , , Shipping Industry , 2 55 ff . 
 ,, Social Democracy, 33 f., 
 38f.,103,291ff.,316ff., 
 384 ff. 
 „ War AimB, 427 ff., 439 ff. 
 ,, Wax Finance, 466 ff. 
 
 Grermany, Waterways, 235 ff. 
 
 ,, World Policy, 82 ff., 
 106ff.,427ff., 439 ff. 
 and France, 1 2 5 ff . , 34 5 ff . , 
 451 ff., 455 ff. 
 ,, and Great Britain, 76 ff., 
 
 86 ff., 106 ff. 
 ,, and Morocco Crisis, 126, 
 136 ff., 331 
 Goltz, General von der, 103 f. 
 Grenzboten, 93, 98, 100, 101, 134 f. 
 Grey Book, Belgian, 219 ff. 
 
 H 
 
 Hamburg- America Line, 259 ff. 
 
 Hamburger Nachrichten, 406 ff. 
 
 Harden, Maximilian, 344 
 
 Harvest, Gterman, 186, 279 
 
 Hatzfeldt. Prince, 383 
 
 Hay, Production of, 186, 279 
 
 Helfferich, Herr, 456 f. 
 
 Hettner, Alfred, 443 
 
 Hindenburg, 421 
 
 Historians, Teaching of German,] 9, 
 
 465 f. 
 Hodel, 293 
 
 Hohenlohe, Prince, 382 
 HohenzoUerns, Rise of, 13 ff. 
 Holdings, Rural, 189 ff. 
 HoUand, 54, 251 f., 326 f., 441 f. 
 Horse Powers, 279 
 Humbert, Senator, 345 f. 
 Hungary, Future of, 488 
 
 Illegitimacy, 155 
 
 Immorality, 304 f. 
 
 Indebtedness, Rural, 193 f. 
 
 Indemnity ,War, 435 ff., 457 ff. 
 
 India, 393, 440 
 
 Indigo, 268 f. 
 
 Industrial Conditions, 276 ff. 
 
 Inland Fleet, German, 244 f. 
 
 Instu-ance, 297 
 
 Intellectuals, War AimB of, 427 ff. 
 
 Intolerance, 155 
 
 Iron Consumption, 278 
 
 „ Ore, 458 ff. 
 
 „ Production, 277, 278 
 Irredenta Italia, 362 
 Italo-A\istrian Differences, 360 ff. 
 Italy, 350, 359 ff. 
 
 Jagow, Police President, 373 
 Jagow, Secretary of State, 418 ff. 
 
494 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 Jena and Auerstadt, 62 ff. 
 
 Jews, 388 f., 464 
 Jhering, Professor, 174 
 
 K 
 
 Kartels, 261 ff., 274 
 Keim, General, 423 
 Kiderlen-Waechter, 336 
 Kiel Canal, 326, 346, 447 
 Kirch enzeitung, 123 
 Kreuz Zeitung, 110, 373, 383 
 Kxuger Telegram, 99 
 Kultur, 437 
 Kultiirkampf, 316 
 
 Laboratories, Chemical, 272 ff. 
 
 Labour Conditions, 282 ff. 
 
 Labourers, Rural, 199 ff. 
 
 Landing Operations, 72 ff. 
 
 Landowners, German, 195f, 
 
 Land Tenure, 189 ff. 
 
 Leo, Victor, 177 
 
 Liberal Party, German, 309, 310 
 
 Lichnowsky, Prince, 353 
 
 Liebert, General, 423 
 
 Liebig, Justus von, 204, 272 
 
 Liebknecht, W., 292, 296 
 
 Li^ge, 411 
 
 Lignite, 277, 278, 458 
 
 List, Friedrich, 16 9 ff., 215f, 
 
 Live-stock, 186 f., 191 £., 280 
 
 Lloyd George, 331 
 
 Lockroy, 93 
 
 Lokalanzeiger, 305, 419 
 
 London, Port of, 252 f. 
 
 Ludendorff, General, 421 
 
 Luther, 86, 149 
 
 Luxemburg, 350, 352, 405 ff. 
 
 Lyde, Professor, 479 
 
 M 
 
 Machiavelli, 56 
 Machinery, 279 
 
 ,, Agricultural, 193 
 
 Machtpolitik, 339 f., 355 
 Mackay, Freiherr von, 439 
 Marschall von Bieberstein, 99 
 Masaryk, Professor, 480 f. 
 Maybach, 223 
 Mayr- Strasbourg, 96 
 Meat Consumption, 288 
 Merchant Marine, 255 ff. 
 
 Merchant Marine Subsidies, 269 f. 
 Middlemen, 211 
 
 Mineral Wealth, German, 457 ff. 
 Mining Production, 277 
 Mobilisation in 1914, 418 ff. 
 Moltke, Senior, 65 ff., 398, 402, 
 
 405 ff., 415 
 Moltke, Junior, 337, 417 f. 
 Mommsen, 96, 177, 299, 308 
 Morocco Crisis, 126, 136 ff., 331 
 Muehlon, Dr., 18, 25 f., 466 f. 
 
 N 
 
 Napoleon III., 401 
 Nauticus, Year Book, 140 f. 
 Navy, German, 39, 72 ff., 91, 102, 
 
 337 f. 391 ff 
 Navy BiUof 1900,91, 102 
 Navy League, German, 340 
 Nippold, Professor, 422 ff. 
 Nobiling, 294 
 Non- Prussians, 469 ff. 
 North German Gazette, 319 
 North German Lloyd, 259 ff. 
 North Sea Canal, 326, 346, 447 
 
 O 
 
 Oats, Production of, 186, 279 
 Occupations, 282 ff. 
 Oldenberg, Professor, 179 
 Oldenburg-Januschau, Von, 375 
 Ownership, Rural, 189 ff. 
 
 Pan-Germans, 340, 423 f., 467 f. 
 Parliament, German, 37, 304, 309 f., 
 311 ff. 
 ,, Prussian, 304 
 
 Parties, Parliamentary, 304, 309 f., 
 
 311ff. 
 Party Politics, 304, 309 f., 311ff.j 
 Pellegrini, Signer, 365 f . 
 Penal Servitude Bill, 302 
 Per kin, W. H.,271 
 Petition on War Aims, 427 ff. 
 Plan of Campaign, 405 ff. 
 Poland, 49 f., 459 f. 
 Poles, 340, 389 f. 
 Policy, Fiscal, 169 ff., 257 ff. 
 Political Parties, 304, 309 f., 311 ff. 
 Poll for Prussian Diet, 304 
 „ for Reichstag, 298, 309, 312 ff., 
 317 ff. 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 495 
 
 Poltron ]\Iis6rable, 341 
 Population, Increase of French, 
 130, 452 
 ,, Increase of German, 
 
 83, 130,452 
 Potash Deposits, 458 
 Potatoes, 186, 279, 281 
 Production, Agricultural, 185 ff. 
 Professors, Views of German, 18 ff., 
 
 53 f., 86, 93 ff., 139 f., 142 f., 
 
 162 f., 174, 177 ff., 308, 381 f., 
 
 427ff.,465f. 
 Progranome, Socialist, 305 ff. 
 Prussia, Rise of, 12 ff., 43 ff. 
 Prussians and non- Prussians, 469 ff. 
 
 R 
 
 Radical Party, 309, 310 
 Railway Capital, 232 
 
 , , Nationalisation, 2 1 7 ff . 
 Profits, 227 
 Railways, 211, 214 ff. 
 Rassegna Contemporanea, 366 
 Rath, Herr von, 113f. 
 Reichstag Poll, 298, 309, 312 ff., 
 317 f. 
 Powers of, 375 ff. 
 Rein, Professor, 162 
 Religion, 17 f., 26 f. 
 Research, Chemical, 272 ff. 
 Renter, Colonel von, 271 ff. 
 Rheinisch-Westfalische Zeitung,138 
 Rhine Frontier, 406 ft'. 
 
 „ Valley, 237, 240 ff., 246, 471 
 Rhine- Ems Canal, 251 f. 
 Robilant, Count, 360 
 Roman Catholic Church, 155 
 Roon, Von, 68 
 Roscher, Professor, 178 
 Rtihrort, 251 
 Rvual Industries, 184 ff. 
 Russia, 47, 345, 431 ff. 
 Rye, 186,279 
 
 Sales, Forced, 188 
 
 Savings Banks, 288 
 
 Schaffle, Professor, 95 
 
 Scharnhorst, 64 
 
 Schleswig-Holstein, 51 
 
 SchmoUer, Professor, 94 f., 178, 182 
 
 Schneider, Louis, 415 
 
 Schools, 16 ff., 1391, 148 ff. 
 ,, Agricultural, 206 f, 
 ,, Technical, I65f. 
 
 Schroder, Adolf, 109 f. 
 Schubert, Captain, 1 10 f. 
 
 Max, 443 f. 
 Schulze-Gaevernitz, Professor, 95 
 Sedan, 401 
 
 Separatist Tendencies, 469 ff. 
 Serbia, 342 f., 346 ff. 
 Shipbuilding Industry, 255 ff. 
 Shipping Industry, 255 f. 
 Ship Subsidies, 259 f. 
 Silesia, 459 f. 
 Small Holdings, 189 ff. 
 Smith, Adam, 453 f. 
 Social Democracy, 33 f., 38 f., 103, 
 
 291 ff., 316 ff., 384 ff. 
 South Africa, 57 f., 90 f., 99 ff., 
 
 335 f., 393 
 South German People, 469 ff. 
 States, 469 ff. 
 Spanish-American War, 98 
 Springmann, Theodor, 440 
 State Insurance, 297 
 
 ,, Railways, 217 ff. 
 Steam Engines, 279 
 Steel Trust, German, 262 
 Stock-raising, 186 f., 191 f. 
 Stosch, Von, 257 
 Subsidies, Shipping, 259 f. 
 Sugar Beet, 205, 281 
 
 ,, Production, 205 f., 279 
 Suicides, 155 
 Switzerland, 410 
 Synthetic Indigo, 68 f. 
 
 Tangiers, 126 
 
 Technical Education, 165 f. 
 Tenant Farmers, 189 ff. 
 Thaer, Albrecht, 203 
 Tirpitz, Admiral, 91 
 Tonnage, Inland Shipping, 244 
 
 ,, Merchant Marine, 264 
 Transport on Canals, 235 ff. 
 
 ,, on Railways, 220 ff,, 
 
 229 ff., 248 
 Transvaal, 57f.,335f. 
 Treaties, Bismarck on, 358 ff. 
 
 ,, Frederick the Great on, 
 47 f. 
 Treitschke, Professor, 64 ff., 90 f., 
 
 99 ff., 177 
 Triple Alliance, 36, 327, 333 f., 
 359 ff., 402 f. 
 ,, ,, Breakdown of, 
 
 357 ff. 
 Trusts, German, 261 ff., 274 
 Tunis, 360 
 Turkey, 57, 334, 335, 440 
 
496 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 Unemployment, 282 ff. 
 United States, 58, 72 ff„ 
 
 98 f., 444 
 Universities, 164 
 Usedom, Count, 362 
 
 78 ff., 
 
 Venezuela, 58 
 
 Vice in Germany, 304 f . 
 
 Vienna, Fate of , 487 f. 
 
 Voigt, Paul, 179 
 
 Vorwarts, 293 
 
 Voting, Parliamentary, 298, 304 
 
 W 
 
 Wages, 284 ff. 
 
 War Aims, German, 427 ff., 439 ff. 
 
 „ Book, Grerman, 413 
 
 ,, Customs of, 355 
 
 „ Finances, German, 456 ff. 
 
 „ Indemnity, 435 ff., 457 ff. 
 
 „ Outbreak of the, 324 ff. 
 407 ff. 
 
 „ Plans, German, 405 ff. 
 
 Waterways, 235 ff. 
 
 Wealth, Mineral, 457 ff. 
 
 Wheat Production, 186, 279 
 
 White Book, German, 349 
 
 William I., 35, 293, 312 f., 330 f., 
 376,415 
 ,, Abdication of, 312 f. 
 
 WiUiam II., 27 ff., 31 ff., 89£., 
 119 ff., 126, 133, 137, 154, 158, 
 299 ff., 320 f., 329 ff., 337 ff., 
 348ff.,413ff.,447ff.,475 
 
 Winterstetten, K. von, 441 f. 
 
 Woltmann, Professor, 23 f. 
 
 Women's Position, 304 f. 
 
 Workmen's Insurance, 297 
 
 World Domination, 439 ff. 
 
 „ Policy, German, 82 ff., 106ff. 
 „ War, The, 324 ff., 407 ff. 
 
 Yellow Book, French, 417 ff. 
 
 Zabern Incident, 370 ff. 
 Zanzibar, 117 f. 
 Zimmermann, Herr, 418 ff. 
 
 Printed by Hcuell, Watson <fc ViTiey, Ld., London and Aylesbury, England. 
 
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