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 '^ef^iASHm^V^^ 
 
 A Syllabus of 
 
 Pg^chology. 
 
 • • 
 
 BRYANT. 
 
BY THE SAME AUTHOR; 
 
 I. The World-Energy and its Self- 
 
 Conservation. — i2mo. $1 50 
 
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A SYLLABUS of 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY, 
 
 BY 
 
 'J 
 
 ■/ 
 
 WILLIAM Mf ^BRYANT, 
 
 Instructor in Mental and Moral Philosophy 
 ST. LOUIS HIGH SCHOOL. 
 
 ^y^^^ 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 
 CHICAGO 
 S. C. GRIGGS & CO. 
 
 KAV 4 1093 ) 
 
 1893 / 
 
 ffvfy 
 
v*> 
 
 ^%<- 
 
 COPYEIGHT 1892 
 
 Bx Wm. M. Bbyant 
 
 Copyright 1893 
 By Wm. M. Beyant 
 
z ? ^ 
 
 PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. 
 
 This Syllabus, prepared primarily for use in my 
 own classes, is published in its present form with the 
 bel'ef that, as emphasizing the more essential aspects 
 of the subject and omitting minor details, it may 
 prove serviceable as (in the stricter sense) a text 
 for the brief course in Psychology practicable in high 
 schools and academies generally. It is also hoped 
 that, as a summary view of the subject, it may prove 
 acceptable as a guide to private students as well. 
 
 I am convinced that, for younger pupils especially, 
 brief text-books are essential to anything like clear- 
 ness and continuity of results. No doubt this neces- 
 sitates only so much the greater degree of careful 
 preparation on the part of the teacher. But in any 
 case really vital results can be secured only in the de- 
 gree in which the teacher throws his whole life into 
 his work. It is, above all, through the contagion of 
 his own personal enthusiasm that interest is to be 
 awakened on the part of his pupils ; just as it is 
 only through the freshness and validity of his own 
 knowledge of the subject that his pupils can be led to 
 apprehend its fundamental features, and to assimilate 
 the proper method by which they can hope to become 
 
independent inquirers. A working teacher will 
 always have working pupils ; and this the more if they 
 are not overwhelmed with text-books rendered wholly 
 unmanageable for them by sheer excess of details. 
 For the more immediate purposes of education by 
 far the greater part of details and illustrative matter 
 can best be given directly in the class — it being 
 assumed that the teacher himself is properly equipped. 
 
 The outline here presented has developed directly 
 through work in the school-room during the past seven 
 years. I hope I need hardly say that I have drawn 
 freely upon the works of leading thinkers, both ancient 
 and modern. How far my work shows genuine as- 
 similation and organic reproduction of results, the 
 critical reader will, of course, decide for himself. A 
 more extended text-book of the subject for use in 
 more advanced classes is in preparation on the same 
 general plan, and will, as I hope, be ready for issue 
 within the coming year. 
 
 For the convenience of private students a selected 
 list of hand and reference books is added at the end 
 of this Syllabus. 
 
 NOTE TO SECOND EDITION. 
 
 The favorable reception given to the first edition 
 of this little book leads me to issue the second edition 
 without further change than to add a few brief notes 
 as an appendix. 
 
A SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION. 
 
 In Psychology Mind is considered ?ls 2in Individual ; 
 that is, as an indivisible unit of Energy. As such 
 it has many modes clearly distifiguishable^ but wholly 
 inseparable from one another. It is the special func- 
 tion of Psychology as a Science to define the funda- 
 mental modes of Mind and to show the necessary 
 relations which those modes sustain one with another. 
 Its task is not to trace individual idiosyncrasies, but 
 rather to outline and account for the essential char- 
 acteristics of Mind considered in its universal nature 
 or type. And if Psychology takes account of 
 "mental diseases" it does so only that it may the 
 more clearly define the true ©r normal type. 
 
 From its very nature as an indivisible unit of En- 
 ergy Mind acts always as one. All its modes are 
 involved in every act ; one or another mode being 
 predominant in each act. 
 
 The most complex phases are present from the 
 first, but are latest in attaining maturity in the course 
 of the unfolding of the individual mind. It is for 
 this latter reason that there is the appearance of serial 
 
6 
 
 development in the unfolding of the several aspects of 
 mind — as if one aspect began developing only after the 
 development of another had been completed. 
 
 In its development Mind presents tw^o strongly con- 
 trasted aspects. The first is predominantly Physical 
 and comprises the v^hole range of Sensation. The 
 second is predominantly Spiritual and unfolds in the 
 three mutually inclusive phases of (A) Intellect^ (B) 
 Sensibility and (C) Will. 
 
 It can here be only remarked in passing that CoU' 
 sciousness is the most comprehensive characteristic of 
 mind as a concretely realized unit of Energy. It is, 
 primarily, the sense of unity and continuity of the in- 
 dividual life. It is the form of recognition (1) of 
 self as distinguished from external objects, (2) of the 
 identity of the self of present experience with the self 
 of past experiences, and (3) of self asaself—i.e,^ 
 5d//^consciousness. This last form involves all the 
 higher aspects of experience. The more rudimen- 
 tary forms, for the very reason that they are rudimen- 
 tary, are non-reflective. Hence in such forms con- 
 sciousness is directed outward rather than inward. 
 Much passes in its own process of which the individual 
 is unconscious, or only obscurely conscious. For 
 example, a child's consciousness is mainly of outward 
 appearances in their most immediate {i. e.^ simplest) 
 character. On the other hand, it has no conscious- 
 ness of the real nature of those outward appearances. 
 Its attitude toward the facts of the world it lives in is 
 
that of "unsuspecting innocence '^ or '•'• naivete. ^^ 
 It is conscious, and yet not conscious that it is con- 
 scious. It has knowledge ; but its knowledge is in 
 every particular only rudimentary in degree and 
 hence requires the most thorough-going revision be- 
 fore it can be counted as knowledge in any degree 
 approaching real adequacy. It is this merely initial 
 aspect of consciousness in contradistinction with con- 
 sciousness in its fullest measure which has given rise 
 to the riddle of "unconscious consciousness." 
 
 II. SENSATION. 
 
 As the predominantly physical aspect of mind, 
 Sensation can be brought under scientific review only 
 through the direct co-operation of the two sciences, 
 Physiology and Psychology. Thus the scientific 
 account of Sensation gives rise to, and in its posi- 
 tive aspect constitutes the larger portion of, Physi- 
 ological Psychology. Body, as the organ of mind, 
 presents itself as a legitimate object of study in Psy- 
 chology. This is, of course, especially true of that 
 part of the bodily organism serving more directly as 
 the mind's instrumentality — /. ^., the nervous system ; 
 and, above all, of the brain as pre-eminently the 
 organ of mind. 
 
 A. Nature of Sensation. — Every Sensation is 
 essentially an act of mind. At the same time it is 
 an act which in its nature is simply a response to an 
 immediate physical stimulus ; that is, in Sensation 
 
mind is relatively passive* Whatever the nature of 
 the external stimulus, there must be an immediate 
 contact of the medium of stimulation w^ith the sense- 
 organ. In which fact there is strong intimation of 
 the view (already entertained by Aristotle) that all 
 the senses are modifications of the sense of Touch. 
 This view is, besides, confirmed by the results of 
 modern biological science. The chief senses are 
 Sight, Hearing, Touch, Muscular Sense, Taste, Smell, 
 Temperature. The negative aspect of all sensation 
 is that of Pain as due to injury sustained by nervous 
 tissue — especially that of the nerve-fibers. 
 
 B. Limits of Sensation. — Sensation is the rudi- 
 mentary aspect of the mind. Hence Sensation is not 
 realizable as a "simple" mode of mind, since in its 
 very existence all the other modes are already neces- 
 sarily implied. Thus Sensation has its limitation in 
 this: that it is the simplest aspect of relation between 
 the mind and an external stimulus. As such it is the 
 initial aspect at once of Intelligence, of Sensibility 
 and of Will. 
 
 C. Classification of the Senses. — As the im- 
 mediate (simplest) relation of the mind to external 
 stimuli, sensation presents both an objective and a 
 subjective aspect. And as this relation between the 
 mind and external stimuli involves the intermediation 
 of the bodily organism, sensation also necessarily pre- 
 sents a physiological aspect. 
 
 Thus the senses are found to present several special 
 
groups of characteristics according as they are con- 
 sidered in respect of the physical stimulus, the 
 psychical response, or the physiological medium; 
 and hence they are to be grouped into classes with 
 reference (1) to their objective aspect, (2) to their 
 subjective aspect, and (3) to their physiological 
 aspect. 
 
 1. Considered in their objective aspect, the senses 
 are seen to be either (a) Geometrical — i, e.^ media 
 through which consciousness of space-relations is 
 awakened; or (b) non-geometrical — i. e.^ as possess- 
 ing little or no suggestion of such relations. 
 
 a. The Geometrical Senses are i^a) Sight, (/5) 
 Touch, and (7) the Muscular Sense. The first is the 
 medium for perception of form and color ; the second 
 for perception of form and texture, the third for per- 
 ception of states of matter and of motion (the latter 
 subjectively experienced as "sense of motion ; " as in 
 movement of the limbs, etc.) 
 
 b. The Non-Geometrical Senses are («) Hear- 
 ings (/5) Taste, (y) Smell, (^5) Temperature. In all 
 these the geometrical character of the stimulus is 
 broken up before the psychical response, properly 
 speaking, begins. 
 
 2. Considered in their subjective aspect, the senses 
 are either (a) Intellectual — i. e. , media through which 
 there is awakened consciousness of the world in all 
 its characteristics, external and internal; or (b) Or- 
 ganic — i. e. , media through which there is awakened 
 
10 
 
 consciousness of physiological states of the individual 
 as referred directly or indirectly to external stimuli. 
 
 a. The Intellectual senses are (a:) Sight, (/?) 
 Hearing, (7) Touch and (d) the Muscular Sense. 
 
 All these senses are involved in the minutest and 
 most commonplace, as w^ell as in the most important, 
 details of life. The first two are involved in the 
 higher range of Art and Science, supplementing one 
 another in the most complex w^ays in both these 
 spheres. 
 
 Sight, as pre-eminently the geometrical sense, is 
 constantly called into use as absolutely indispensable 
 to science in its widest range as well as to all the arts 
 of visible representation ; while hearing is the me- 
 dium of all spoken language on the one hand and of 
 the art of music on the other ; in which latter it shows 
 its subtlest and most thoroughly subjective character. 
 Both Touch and the Muscular Sense have a higher 
 value intellectually than is commonly assigned them. 
 Touch is constantly exercised to correct the impres- 
 sions of form as developed through the sense of 
 vision ; w^iile the Muscular Sense is the sense through 
 which the mind attains full conviction of the objective 
 realty of the sensuous world. 
 
 b. The Organic Senses are («) Taste, (/?) Smell, 
 and (y) the sense of Temperature. (Other more or 
 less vague forms of sensation are to be included as 
 organic — as aspects of the genei'al sense-conscious- 
 ness^ diffused feeling, Gemeingefuehl.) 
 
11 
 
 Smell and taste are also otherwise known as **Senses 
 of Nutrition." 
 
 3. Considered in their physiological aspect the 
 senses are either (a) Mechanical — i, e., senses in 
 which the response is to a simply mechanical exci- 
 tation of the nerve-ends; or (b) Chemical — i, e.^ 
 senses in which the response is to an actual chemical 
 change produced by the stimulus in the end-organs of 
 the nerves. 
 
 a. The Afeckanical senses are («) Hearing, (^) 
 Touch, (7) the Muscular sense and (d) the Tempera- 
 ture sense. 
 
 b. The Chemical senses are («) Sight, (/3) Taste, 
 and (y) Smell. 
 
 It is at once evident that to Psychology in its higher 
 phases the subjective aspect of sensation is the most 
 important, and next to this the objective ; while the 
 physiological aspect is of subordinate import. Never- 
 theless even the most exalted phases of mind neces- 
 sarily involve physiological functions. Only, the 
 more explicitly the higher phases of the mind are 
 developed, by so much the more does the sense-aspect 
 show itself as limited to a relatively narrow sphere 
 and as realizing its highest values precisely then when 
 most thoroughly subordinated to the highest functions 
 of mind. So that, even to ascertain the highest values 
 of sensation, we must turn to the study of those higher 
 modes of mind known as Spiritual in contrast with 
 its sensuous or Physical modes. 
 
12 
 III. THE INTELLECT. 
 
 The predominantly spiritual aspect of mind unfolds 
 its highly complex character in the completely inter- 
 fused, though clearly distinguishable, modes known 
 as Intellect, Sensibility and Will. 
 
 The development of all science depends upon the 
 predominance of the mode of mind named Intellect. 
 For this reason it is desirable to begin the develop- 
 ment of the science of mind in its predominantly 
 spiritual phase, with an analysis of this special aspect 
 of mental activity. 
 
 Sensation is predominantly physical ; and yet, in 
 order really to be sensation, it must also present a 
 psychical aspect. This psychical aspect appears pri- 
 marily as the simple function of the physical. But 
 further investigation (embodied in the whole of mod- 
 ern biological science) discovers the universal law 
 that while in its immediate character structure limits 
 function, yet essentially and in the total history of 
 organisms function determines structure. So that the 
 structural form is but the organic embodiment — the 
 concrete expression — of the functional activity. The 
 more complex the organism the more elaborate the 
 functional process presupposed as necessary to account 
 for the structural form. 
 
 Applying this in the present connection, it appears 
 that in truth the human body is but the embodiment 
 — the concrete expression — of the human mind 
 
13 
 
 (heredity being allowed for). The brain is, doubt- 
 less, the more immediate organ of the mind; the en- 
 tire body is still none the less, as a ivhole^ organic to 
 the mind. 
 
 The psychic life involved in and constituting the 
 essential aspect of sensation becomes explicit as in- 
 tellectual activity, first of all in Perception; i. e., in 
 those psychical experiences in which there is actual 
 presentation of objects to the mind. With the pro- 
 gressive unfolding of mental power the mind is able 
 to revive the modes thus established. That is, through 
 the exercise of its own power the mind is able at 
 length to bring about a Re-presentation of objects 
 through the objective aspects of modes established in 
 the mind itself in the process of Perception. But 
 there is involved in this re-presentative process the 
 recognition of relations as between objects ; and rela- 
 tions can be apprehended only in Thought, 
 
 The Intellect thus presents as its fundamental 
 modes: Perception^ Re-presentation and Thought, 
 
 There is to be noted here the significant fact that 
 while the lower and more generalized aspects of life are 
 due directly to heredity, and (in vertebrates) are organ- 
 ically unfolded at birth into fairly perfected form in the 
 spinal cord as their central organ ; the more individual- 
 ized and higher aspects of life have their organic de- 
 velopment in the brain. Whence it is by no means sur- 
 prising that at birth this organ is very immature and 
 attains full structural development only through the 
 
14 
 
 higher functions of individualized life- — requiring, in 
 fact, for the attainment of full maturity at least twice 
 the time necessary for the complete unfolding of the 
 bodily organism in its other aspects. The more 
 individualized the structure the more completely does 
 its actual determination— that is, its realization into 
 full efficiency — depend upon individualized functions. 
 
 We have next to consider the special aspects of the 
 mind considered as Intelligence. 
 
 A. Perception is to be considered: (1) as Pro- 
 cess; (2) as Product* 
 
 1. As Process it begins In Sensation, and consists 
 in the immediate reference of psychic states to sensu- 
 ous objects. 
 
 a. The character of the perception in any given 
 case depends upon that of the sensation, as this in 
 turn depends upon the character of the stimulus which 
 the sense-organ is suited to transmit. 
 
 b. The sense which presents in completest form 
 both the subjective and the objective aspects of sensa- 
 tion is that of vision. For this reason it is taken as 
 the type, and from it the analysis of sensation in its 
 more general character is developed. 
 
 This assumed, the first phase of every sensation is 
 simple consciousness of change. The second is the 
 expression of the inherent demand of the mind for 
 cause. It consists In the gathering of attention upon 
 the fact of change experienced in the mind. The 
 third phase consists In turning the attention in thedi- 
 
15 
 
 rection from which the stimulus comes. The fourth^ 
 in distinguishing one portion of space from surround- 
 ing space (seeing the object). The fifths in distin- 
 guishing the object from one's self — i. e.^ recogniz- 
 ing it as one's own object, and yet as an object. 
 
 c. In the last two phases, especially, there is evi- 
 dently implicit an act of discrimination or judgment 
 (thought). Whence it appears that not even the sim- 
 plest act of perception can take place without involv- 
 ing in some degree the highest mode of intelligence 
 — i. e,^ Thought, 
 
 2. The Product of perception is at once both sub- 
 jective and objective, and is called a Percept, 
 
 a. As subjective the Percept is a mode of the mind 
 considered as a unit of energy and is limited to a 
 single characteristic, as color or sound. As objective, 
 it is the seeming renewed presence of the object, 
 though the latter be no longer within view. This 
 seeming presence of the object is called the Image. 
 Both the subjective mode and its objective aspect, the 
 Image, are necessary and complementary phases of 
 the Percept. (In its fullest meaning the term "image" 
 is here used technically for the objective aspect of any 
 and every Percept developed through any one of the 
 senses). 
 
 b. Even of the objective aspect of Percepts, by 
 far the greater part is still a subjective creation. Color, 
 sound, odor, flavor, warmth or cold — all these are 
 subjective products. They are aspects of the 
 
16 
 
 " Image,** indeed, and hence belong to the objective 
 aspect of the percept. But the percept as a whole 
 is still a psychical product, having no real resem- 
 blance to the outer object save in the single aspect 
 of shape. (In vision the geometrical relations in- 
 volved in the stimulus are preserved for the retina by 
 passing through the circular opening of the Iris ; 
 just as in touch those relations are preserved for the 
 mind by the simultaneous sensations of direct contact 
 through definitely localized end-organs of this sense.) 
 Thus, even in this simplest phase of its activity, mind 
 show^s itself possessed of creative power in marvelous 
 degree. 
 
 B. Representation. — But a percept really be- 
 comes matured as such only through successive 
 stages. An object must be seen many times before 
 it is rightly seen. And repetition means Retention. 
 That there can be any consciousness of a second ex- 
 perience as second there must be retained in con- 
 sciousness the product of that experience which, in 
 contrast with the present, is recognized as former or 
 first. 
 
 Repetition, besides, requires only that the object 
 presented the second (or thousandth) time be the 
 same in kind. Each act of Perception is, doubt- 
 less, of a particular thing only. And yet so much 
 of Thought is present in perception that the typical 
 form is after all what is really seen. (Further on will 
 be seen the deep-reaching significance of this fact in 
 the process of naming and classifying. ) 
 
17 
 
 1. Involuntary Reproduction of Percepts, Any 
 gwen Act of Perception^ then, is always strictly 
 of a given particular object. On the other hand, 
 the developed Percept is generic and universal. 
 
 A percept is developed through repeated acts of 
 perception into clearness and accuracy and adequacy. 
 And for each of those repeated acts of Perception, 
 through v^hich are brought about the correction and 
 deepening of a percept already partially formed in 
 the mind, a new act of perception of similar charac- 
 ter is primarily the necessary occasion. Such revival 
 of a Percept constitutes the simplest phase of Re- 
 tention ; and in this form it is known as simple Repre- 
 sentation. We have here, in fact, precisely that 
 mode of Representation known as Involuntary Re- 
 production of Percepts. And this is, of course, suc- 
 ceeded naturally by the voluntary phase of activity 
 within this same sphere. That is, with exercise of 
 power there is increase of power. And such increase 
 of power on the part of a living unit, as we shall see 
 further on, tends inevitably toward .y^Z/^activity ; in 
 other words, toward the voluntary or independent 
 exercise of povv'er. And since this first general aspect 
 of voluntary Representation is still exclusively occu- 
 pied with imagery, it is properly termed Imagination. 
 
 (Involuntary reproduction of percepts, as the sim- 
 plest aspect of Retention, is of interest chiefly because 
 of its being the transition from simple Perception to 
 the sphere of Imagination properly speaking.) 
 
18 
 
 2. Imagination. With every repetition of an act 
 of perception the percept as a mode of the mind 
 becomes more fully developed. This is one aspect 
 in the maturing of the mind as a unit of energy. And 
 with this approximation toward maturity the mind at 
 length becomes able in increasing degree to repro- 
 duce its own modes in conscious degree at will. 
 That is, the voluntary aspect of Representation is 
 attained. Or, again, in Perception the object is /r^- 
 sented to the mind. As percepts are matured through 
 repetition the object comes to be r^-presented 
 through the image — i. e., through the objective phase 
 of the Percept. And this process attains at length a 
 voluntary character. In other words the mind be- 
 comes increasingly able to control its own modes as 
 those modes mature. Or rather, the proof of in- 
 creasing maturity consists here precisely in the self- 
 activity manifested in the greater readiness and ease 
 with which percepts are reproduced at will. 
 
 It is this control of imagery, including not merely 
 the voluntary revival of Percepts, but also, and more 
 especially, the modification and new creation of 
 Images that is properly termed Imagination, 
 
 Of this there are two chief aspects — (a) the 
 ^Esthetic, and (b) the Scientific. 
 
 a. .Esthetic Phase, a. Already in childhood the 
 (Esthetic phase of Imagination attains a remarkable 
 development. The percepts of the child-mind are 
 vivid, but lacking in accuracy and in adequacy. 
 
19 
 
 Imperfectly developed, they easily undergo modifi- 
 cation. And this either with or without choice on 
 the part of the child. Hence the imagery of the 
 child-mind assumes any character, according to the 
 immediately prevailing mood of the child, and alto- 
 gether regardless of the laws prevailing in the actual 
 outer world. 
 
 Unrestrained by any consciousness of such laws the 
 child-mind creates a whole world of imagery which 
 is in great degree arbitrary and subjective. It is only 
 by continuous collision with the actual objective 
 world that the thought-aspect of the child-mind is 
 stimulated into concrete development. And this as- 
 pect it is which, more and more completely fused 
 with the processes of the Imagination, renders the 
 products of the Imagination more rational — i. e.^ 
 more and more harmonious with the actual objective 
 world. 
 
 CJiildish Fancy is the Idealism of the childhood 
 stage of mind. Experience — chiefly in the negative 
 form of disappointment — reduces this more and more 
 to the prose of Realism. 
 
 It is the childhood stage in the grovv^th of the race 
 that gives rise to myths — the first form of interpreta- 
 tion of the World in its relation to man as a dis- 
 tinctively spiritual being. 
 
 /?. With the gradual adjustment of the mind of 
 the race, and of the mind of the individual through 
 the race, to the World in its more rational character 
 
20 
 
 the conceptions constituting the central element in 
 products of the Imagination become more consistent. 
 And this in turn gives to the products themselves a 
 more rhythmic character. It is upon this interfusion 
 of the thought-element v^rith the sensuous element 
 that the rank of art-v\^orks as products of the Imagi- 
 nation chiefly depends. It accounts for the differ- 
 ence between a Chinese idol and a Phidian Zeus ; 
 between a nursery tale and a Divina Comedia. It 
 is the clew leading up out of the crude Idealism of 
 childhood, through the immediate facts of the "Real" 
 World, to the ultimate types of that Idealism which 
 is possible only to the rationally matured mind. 
 
 It is in seizing and adequately representing these 
 ultimate, eternal types of Beauty in their sensuous 
 aspects that Imagination proves its highest creative 
 power. 
 
 (1) The simplest phase in the process of the imagina- 
 tion is that of the voluntary reproduction oi Percepts. 
 This always implies a purpose, an Ideal, consciously 
 or unconsciously entertained. In its very nature the 
 mind, as already indicated, demands Perfection. 
 
 (It is for Metaphysics rather than for Psychology 
 to account for this demand, and to explain more fully 
 what Perfection in its ultimate nature really is.) 
 
 As Imagination the mind demands perfection of 
 sensuous form. In simple voluntary reproduction of 
 percepts this appears in the selection spontaneously 
 
21 
 
 made as between one and another percept or group 
 of percepts. 
 
 (2) But this very selection tends not merely to render 
 the most "perfect" percepts more vivid as modes of 
 the mind, but also to fuse the finest objective char- 
 acteristics of the finest percepts in the whole range of 
 a given type into one typically ferfect Image, So 
 that voluntary Reproduction of Images already in- 
 volves the process which, in its explicit phase, is 
 properly called Creative Lnagination. Both process 
 and product must vary within the range of each of the 
 special senses. But only for the senses of Sight and 
 Hearing can the product ever really rise to the rank of 
 an art- work. 
 
 b. Scientific Phase, a. The Scientific phase of 
 Imagination appears on first view to be confined 
 mainly to the simple reproductive aspect — the pur- 
 pose (Ideal) here being to attain the highest possible 
 degree of clearness, accuracy and adequacy in the 
 representation of typical forms as they actually occur 
 in nature. Indeed, in every phase of science, having 
 reference to space forms, this mode of Imagination 
 is constantly called into play ; while in this sphere 
 creative Imagination is limited rather to invention (^. 
 g.^ developing forms of apparatus or machinery) 
 with a view to satisfying either a scientific purpose 
 or an immediately "practical" human need. 
 
 /?. But, as the thought-element of the mind becomes 
 explicit, relations are apprehended, and become the 
 
22 
 
 chief "object" of attention; and relations can be 
 seized and represented only in forms specially adapted 
 to such purpose. 
 
 Now, as a relation can be seized only in thought^ so 
 it can be represented only through a sign. And this 
 sign must of necessity be produced (created) by the 
 mind itself. Again, the whole range of signs through 
 which Thought is represented constitutes Language, 
 And the sensuous forms of Language — consisting of 
 the spoken sounds or of the written signs of such 
 sounds — are in their entire compass nothing else than 
 a complex product of the Imagination. 
 
 Thus we have here a special and highly advanced 
 phase of creative Imagination. It is, indeed, subor- 
 dinated to the exclusive purpose of creating signs for 
 the representation of Thought and hence may very 
 appropriately be given the name of the Sign-Creating 
 Imagination. But the subtlety of its function shows 
 the high rank to which Imagination here attains. 
 
 3. Memory, But the complexity of Thought neces- 
 sitates an immense range both in number and in vari- 
 ety of such signs. And this in turn can be realized 
 only through a corresponding development of the 
 power of Retention. Not only so, but here the power 
 of Retention assumes a new and highly significant 
 character. In the spheres of Representation already 
 considered. Retention is everywhere necessarily im- 
 plied ; but everywhere also, in those spheres the re- 
 tention is of modes of mind the objective aspects of 
 
23 
 
 which are images. In the sphere of Representation 
 now reached the real "object" of attention is a quality 
 or group of qualities seen in some special relation; 
 and a relation can be seized only in thought; and 
 thought can be adequately expressed only in words. 
 
 Here, then, the retention is of words and of the 
 modes of Thought represented in and through the 
 words. This phase of Retention constitutes by far 
 the most important sphere of activity for what is 
 commonly known as Memory. 
 
 And because of the importance of having a term 
 the use of which shall constantly emphasize this 
 aspect of Retention in contrast with those aspects in 
 which imagery constitutes the invariable form of 
 Representation, it is desirable, in Psychology espe- 
 cially, to restrict the use of the term " Memory" to 
 that aspect of Retention in which the form of Repre- 
 sentation consists of words. 
 
 a. Word-Memory, Thus considered, Memory 
 presents its simplest phase in the acquisition of Lan- 
 guage, which is also simply the objective form of the 
 process of developing thought. Here as elsewhere 
 Life consists in, and is developed through successive 
 responses to, stimuli from what for the individual 
 is primarily a literally external world. The child 
 begins to learn Language by hearing "words" 
 (groups of sounds) in given relations. Only as 
 he comes to apprehend in its proper connection 
 
2i 
 
 a given group of sounds does such group of sounds 
 become an actual word for him. 
 
 Only by slow degrees, through thousand-fold repe- 
 tition, is this last result actually attained ; and with 
 this comes the impulse to actually speak — to produce 
 articulate sound, just as the rudimentary phase of 
 thought (present from the very outset of the individual 
 life) is vaguely represented in inarticulate sound. 
 
 (Of the highest practical importance in the actual 
 development of language on the part of the indi- 
 vidual, as well as of special interest in science, is the 
 nervous process consisting of the training of the organ 
 of hearing, the establishment of practical connection 
 between this organ and the brain, especially with 
 that part of the cerebral cortex devoted to speech, 
 and finally the development of actual communication 
 between this center and the vocal organs. It is to be 
 noted, too, that this physiological order coincides 
 with the only conceivable psychical order in the 
 acquisition of Language by the individual.) 
 
 First of all, then, the sensuous element, consisting 
 of the spoken word, serves as the medium through 
 which the thought-element, properly speaking, is de- 
 veloped in the individual mind. And in this initial 
 stage the thought-element can be seized only as the 
 sensuous element of Language is actually presented to 
 the mind through the sense of Hearing (and, later, 
 through the sense of vision in learning the written 
 form of Language). 
 
25 
 
 Here, then, we have a phase of Memory that may 
 appropriately be termed Word-Memory. 
 
 b. Reproductive Memory, But with the continu- 
 ance of the psychical activity here involved, the 
 thought-element becomes so far matured and so com- 
 pletely interfused with the sensuous element of the 
 corresponding words, that the mind is able indepen- 
 dently to reproduce the thought-element, and with , 
 this the word as its objective, organic form. That 
 is, we have here the special phase of Retention prop- 
 erly called Reproductive Memory. 
 
 c. Mechanical Memory. A further stage of ad- 
 vancement is reached when the thought-element has 
 become so far enriched in the mind of the individual 
 as to require a more or less extended group of words 
 from which to choose in order to express this or that 
 particular shade of meaning ; the latter depending 
 upon the special relation emphasized in any given 
 case. Here so mature is the thought-element and so 
 complete is the "command of Language," that, the 
 theme being given, thought develops with perfect 
 freedom and the language, serving as the exact em- 
 bodiment of the thought, is made use of without 
 conscious effort. Hence the phase of Retention here 
 involved is appropriately named Mechanical Memory , 
 
 Its physiological aspect is a species of automatic 
 action as the organic result of long-continued nervous 
 processes. 
 
26 
 
 In this highest form of memory we have the ma- 
 tured appliances and aptitudes for the highest forms 
 of intellectual activity — namely, the various forms of 
 Thought, 
 
 C. Thought. Some degree of anticipation in re- 
 spect of this part of the subject has been altogether 
 unavoidable even in the summary view just completed 
 of Imagination and Memory. It can not be too 
 strongly emphasized that in the actual development 
 of the mind, all its modes are present at every stage. 
 It is, let us repeat, because the more complex phases 
 attain, and can only attain, explicit development at 
 correspondingly later stages in the entire process of 
 mental growth that there is any appearance of one 
 phase succeeding another in that process. 
 
 On the other hand (to confine ourselves now to the 
 sphere of Intelligence), Thought is, as we have seen, 
 already implicit in the very simplest act of percep- 
 tion ; just as it is also implicit, though in far more 
 complex character, in Imagination ; while it is even 
 presupposed as in greater or less degree an explicitly 
 developed mode of mind throughout the whole range 
 of Memory, properly speaking. 
 
 It is Thought in this explicit character that we have 
 next to consider. 
 
 1. Conception. — An act of perception consists in 
 the immediate response of the mind to some external 
 stimulus upon the organ of one or another of the 
 
27 
 
 senses. An act of the (creative) Imagination con- 
 sists in the fusing of the objective characteristics of 
 many percepts into one universal or typical Image. 
 
 a. Process of Conception. — An act of thought of 
 the simplest degree consists (as we have next to note) 
 in the seizing together in their unity a more or less 
 complex group of qualities as constituting one object. 
 But the actual performance of such act presupposes 
 a degree of mental growth which is itself attainable 
 only through a more or less extended series of efforts ; 
 that is, there must have been presented in succession 
 to the mind through one or more of the senses many 
 objects^ each of which still gave rise to essentially the 
 same group of psychical reactions. 
 
 Along with this there must have been frequent 
 repetitions of a given sound or group of sounds in 
 the hearing of the individual and in such way as to 
 bring this sound or group of sounds into explicit con- 
 nection in his mind with the objects successively 
 apprehended. The identity of the sound or group 
 of sounds in each recurring experience of this reaction 
 must help to emphasize in his mind the identity of the 
 characteristics constituting any one object of a given 
 series with those constituting any other object of the 
 same series ; just as, on the other hand, the sound or 
 group of sounds must come at length to be fused in 
 his mind with the group of characteristics thus grad- 
 ually seized together in their unity and explicitly 
 
28 
 
 recognized as constituting the object. It is then that 
 for the first time the sound or group of sounds consti- 
 tutes a wordybr him. 
 
 When this has actually taken place in any given 
 mind, such mind has performed an act of Conception. 
 That is, it has seized together in their unity a given 
 group of characteristics, which are found to constitute 
 v/hatever is essential in each one of an indefinitely 
 extended series of objects, w^hich objects are thus 
 seen to be identical with one another in kind or ty^e, 
 
 b. Product of Conception. — But this Process has 
 for its Product a permanent mode of mind ; and this 
 mode is properly called a Concept. And the objec- 
 tive form of the concept is just that sound or group 
 of sounds which, as we have seen, becomes for the 
 individual a word in the proper sense of the term 
 only when it attains in his mind precisely this charac- 
 ter: that it is the outer, organic form of the concept. 
 
 (The formation of more abstract concepts, as that 
 of color, or of form, or of magnitude, or of weight, or 
 of quality, etc., can here be no more than merely 
 mentioned.) 
 
 It is to be noted now that while a Percept has for 
 its subjective aspect a sensuous element (as color, or 
 sound, or odor), the objective form of which is an 
 ^'•I?nage',^'' a Concept has for its subjective aspect a 
 thought~ii:\Qi-nQi\t, the only adequate objective form of 
 which is a word. 
 
29 
 
 Such, in brief, is the distinction between the pro- 
 ducts of these two widely different, and yet closely 
 allied, modes of intelligence, 
 
 2. Understanding. — We have next to note that in 
 the very process of Conception there is involved the 
 recognition of identity in characteristics as between 
 one and another of a series of objects. For this reason 
 the same name can be rightly applied to different ob- 
 jects. Naming is, in truth, a process of identifying — 
 of seeing the one in the many. That is, again, to as- 
 sign the same name to different objects is to see each 
 particular object of a given series as universal in its 
 essential, integral character. It is to see in that ob- 
 ject all those fundamental characteristics constituting 
 each of the other objects of the series. It is to see 
 that in such series the particular objects are really 
 different from one another only in an external or 
 formal sense ; that essentially, in their fundamental 
 nature, they are identical. 
 
 Now this entire process of ranging objects in series 
 according to their essential characteristics, and 
 naming them accordingly, is the process oi classifica- 
 tion. It begins^ indeed, in the most superficial noting 
 of some external mark specially striking to the 
 sensuous aspect of mind — as in the naming of the 
 "cat-bird." In the field of science, on the other hand, 
 it culminates in the recognition of identities in or- 
 ganic structure as expressive of identities in functional 
 activity — for example, in tracing the class "Pheno- 
 gam," or the class "Vertebrate." 
 
30 
 
 It is to be added that when the fundamental 
 characteristics are so presented to us that we recog- 
 nize the typical nature of any given object, and 
 thus, also, the typical nature of the class to which 
 it belongs, we indicate our mental adjustment to 
 the given fact by the expression: "I understand." 
 It is as if the mind felt its own essential subjec- 
 tive unity to be emphasized in each act of seizing 
 together in their unity the group of characteristics 
 constituting an object. Hence, for the mode of 
 thought here indicated by its leading characteristic no 
 more appropriate designation can be found than: 
 ^^ Understanding*^ — a term which literally affirms the 
 subjective unity of the mind in every conscious ob- 
 jective reference. For example, if I say (think) 
 *'lily," there is conscious reference to an object which 
 is a unit. The significance of such process is two- 
 fold. On the one hand attention is given chiefly to 
 the inseparable, though distinguishable, qualities 
 which in their unity constitute the one given object. 
 On the other \i2in^^inany objects are seen to be each a 
 repetition of this same unity of characteristics. Each, 
 then, is essentially the same as any other of the series. 
 Hence the same designation applies to each and all 
 alike. The whole series thus comes to be seen in a lar- 
 ger unity called a class. But again, as the power able 
 to seize these various aspects of unity, the mind can 
 not but feel in increasing degree its own unity and 
 self-identity with each repetition of such experience. 
 
31 
 
 Let us note now, that in what immediately precedes, 
 there emerges into explicit form that deep-reaching 
 significance already noticed as inherent even in the 
 immediate product of Perception. 
 
 (In this whole sphere, too, as in those preceding, 
 there is constantly required, and here brought into 
 more explicit form, as a necessary condition of 
 accuracy and adequacy of result, the special mode 
 of mental activity known as Attention^ the more 
 developed form of which makes its appearance in this 
 sphere as Observation. And this, especially in the 
 field of the Sciences of Observation, is simply Per- 
 ception subordinated to Thought.) 
 
 3. yudgment. — But this very process of Identifi- 
 cation can attain explicit form only in so far as it in- 
 volves the critical mode of mind ; and it can attain 
 trustworthy results only in so far as it is completely 
 interfused with that mode. 
 
 It is easy to see identities. Primitive man saw 
 them everywhere and filled the world with myths^ — 
 often beautifully rational, but also often monstrously 
 irrational. If Science, if Art in its highest form, 
 is to be attained it can be only through a careful noting 
 of differences as well as of points of identity. In this 
 way alone can the classifications of science be expect- 
 ed to coincide with the types of the actual world. 
 In no other way can the forms of art be restricted 
 to their proper function of unfolding into rhythmic. 
 
32 
 
 sensuous expression the fundamental aspects of Truth 
 inherent in and constituting the essence of all the 
 forms of the Real World. 
 
 Understanding, then, as the mode of thought by 
 which identities are recognized, is still a powerless 
 abstraction except in so far as it is interfused with the 
 complementary mode of thought — i. e.^ the mode by 
 which the natural lines of distinction are traced out 
 between individual and individual, between species 
 and species. 
 
 Nature itself is a vast process of differentiation* 
 The growth of mind consists in its own self-differen- 
 tiation, in its own self-definition. And the normal 
 aspect of this latter process in the sphere of Thought 
 is the unfolding of definitions in the mind which con- 
 form as precisely and as adequately as possible to the 
 definitions or thought-forms concretely unfolded in 
 the actual objects of the world constituting the mind's 
 environment. In the process of nature a progressive 
 scission takes place in the universal Substance and a 
 particular form — a rose — unfolds as the concrete em- 
 bodiment of a thought-form constituting a generic 
 character. 
 
 To such fact the relatively undifferentiated mind re- 
 sponds by a similar progressive scission withm its 
 own being ; and when in any given case this process 
 is fairly matured the mind is said to have * 'arrived at" 
 (it has simply developed within itself) a decision 
 
33 
 
 concerning the fact. It has come to know the fact. 
 In other words, it has adjusted its own subjective mode 
 to the given form of objective reality. 
 
 It has now recognized, not merely a similarity; it 
 has also recognized difference. And difference is 
 limitation of identity. 
 
 Now this tracing of differences as they inhere in 
 the nature of things is the exercise of thought in that 
 special mode properly named Judgment; and it is 
 evident that in no other way than through the more 
 or less complete interfusion of Understanding and 
 Judgment can a really rational or organic view of the 
 world be attained. 
 
 (The following further points can here be brought 
 together only by way of enumeration : (1) All thought 
 is a tracing of relations, whether of likeness or of 
 difference ; (2) Every relation presupposes two or 
 more objects — each representing a more or less ex- 
 tended class ; (3) In the mind of the individual each 
 ^''object^^ is a concept', (4) Thinking, then, is really 
 a comparison of concepts; (5) The objective form 
 of a concept is a word, and thus (6) the objective 
 form of a thought — whether the relation seized be 
 that of likeness or of difference — must be a proposi- 
 tion.) 
 
 4. Reason. — But, even so, Understanding and 
 Judgment appear as in unstable equilibrium. How- 
 ever far they may presuppose one another, yet, as 
 contrasted modes of mind, they still appear as in 
 
34 
 
 more or less positive conflict. Now likeness, and now 
 difference, is the emphasized aspect of the relations 
 apprehended. Whence it is evident that unless there 
 is a further and higher mode of Thought than either 
 Understanding or Judgment, there can be no point of 
 rest for the mind in this highest sphere of Intelligence. 
 
 And yet already, even In the simpler phases of 
 Intelligence, we have noticed that in the very nature 
 of the mind there is an inherent demand for Perfec- 
 tion, In the sensuous phase this demand is satisfied 
 when the psychical response is to a nervous excitation 
 which is in full unison with the external stimulus. In 
 the sphere of Thought the demand for Perfection is 
 satisfied only when there is recognized a complete 
 interfusion of relations of Likeness and of Difference 
 in a more or less complex unit presenting one or 
 another degree of self-sufl5cing wholeness — for ex- 
 ample: a sphere (planet), a cube (crystal), a cell 
 (organic unit), a rose (organism), a soul (conscious 
 unit of Energy), God (the absolute, self-knowing, 
 creative, all-inclusive, all-unfolding Substance.) 
 
 As such Zb/^/zVy necessarily involves both Likeness 
 and Difference in concrete interfusion it is evident 
 that the psychical act of seizing such Totality can be 
 an act neither of the Understanding as such nor of 
 Judgment as such ; but rather that it must be an act 
 consisting of a mode of Thought involving both these 
 as its subordinate factors. 
 
35 
 
 Something of this seizure of Totality is foreshad- 
 owed in Conception, eacH act of which, as already 
 pointed out, is the seizing-together in their unity a 
 given group of characteristics as constituting one 
 object. So also in the explicit process of the Under- 
 standing in Classification there is the seizing-together 
 of many objects as each embodying one universal or 
 typical form ; while in Judgment the precise unity of 
 such typical form is emphasized by the clear appre- 
 hension of its limits (both external and internal). 
 
 But when Likeness and Difference are clearly re- 
 cognized as mutually complementary in any possible 
 concrete unit so that the unit is seen to be of necessity 
 precisely what it is, neither more nor less, then To- 
 tality is fairly apprehended and the unit may be said 
 to be fairly comprehended. 
 
 And this comprehension of a unit in its necessary 
 complementary relations of Likeness and Difference 
 is precisely the process known as Reasoning; and the 
 mode of Thought which is alone adequate to such 
 process is properly called Reason, 
 
 Note further that as a given (explicit) act of Judg- 
 ment consists in a comparison of concepts and has for 
 its organic form a Proposition ; so any given (explicit) 
 act of Reason consists in a comparison of specific 
 "judgments," and has its organic form in a syllogism. 
 This may be extended to any degree of elaboration in 
 the process of Reasoning or Inference. 
 
36 
 
 (In its method Psychology presupposes Logic, just 
 as in its subject-matter Logic presupposes Psychology. 
 As the natural history of mind Psychology has a wider 
 range than Logic, which is devoted exclusively to 
 tracing out the fundamental method of Thought in 
 its fully matured degree. As developing the neces- 
 sary forms of Thought, and hence as developing the 
 essential aspects of the method of all science, Logic 
 is of wider scope than Psychology, which is limited 
 in its range to applying the universal method of Logic 
 in one single department of knowledge.) 
 
 It remains to be noted as self-evident that with 
 Reason, as the mode of mind through which Totality 
 is apprehended and things are comprehended, the 
 culmination of the phase of mind known as Intelli- 
 gence is attained once for all. 
 
 A moment's reflection leads to this further remark: 
 That in every phase or degree of intelligence there is 
 necessarily implied some measure of Feeling or 
 Sensibility. Whatever we are related to in con- 
 sciousness is either attractive or repellent. We ex- 
 perience either desire or aversion toward it. We are 
 led, therefore, to consider next the nature of this 
 special mode of mind which is seen to be a necessary 
 accompaniment of every act of our Intelligence. 
 
 IV. SENSIBILITY. 
 
 As a preliminary definition it may be said that Sen- 
 sibility is the passive form of Consciousness — the 
 
37 
 
 simple "sense" of harmony or of contradiction as be- 
 tween the individual mind and its environment. 
 
 The special character of Sensibility depends upon 
 the nature of the relations in which the individual 
 mind is involved. These relations are (A) in their 
 objective aspect Physical^ in their subjective aspect 
 organic; (B) in their objective aspect 6'c?««/, in their 
 subjective aspect Individual; (C) in their objective 
 aspect Cosmic^ in their subjective aspect Personal. 
 
 We have thus three special phases of sensibility. 
 The first of these is spontaneous, and is evidently 
 limited to the sensuous aspect of life. The second is 
 already more or less deliberative, and is developed 
 through the institutional or "practical'* aspect of life; 
 the third is specifically contemplative, and is unfolded 
 mainly through what is known, in the wider sense of 
 the term, as the Spiritual aspect of life. 
 
 Here again the absolute unity of mind is to be em- 
 phasized. In the present part of our summary view we 
 have to consider, not successive stages^ but only spe- 
 cial aspects of Sensibility — distinguishable but wholly 
 inseparable. As with the various phases of Intelli- 
 gence, so here, the appearance of serial development 
 is due to the fact that the more complex the phase the 
 greater the extent of time necessary to its complete 
 unfolding. Nor is it to be forgotten that Intelligence 
 and Sensibility are also mutually complementary and 
 completely interfused phases of consciousnes5. 
 
38 
 
 A. Sensuous Aspect of Sensibility. The phase 
 of Sensibility involved in the sensuous aspect of life 
 is primarily that of the agreeable or the disagreeable. 
 According as the physical stimulus acts upon the 
 organism so as to excite rythmic responses or the 
 reverse — raising or lowering the "tone" of the ner- 
 vous system — the aspect of the response consisting of 
 feeling will be in one or another degree pleasurable 
 or painful. 
 
 Each of the senses constitutes a medium for an 
 extended range of experiences of the agreeable or 
 the reverse. Here, too, the character of the expe- 
 rience will of course depend upon the nature of the 
 particular sense. At one extreme are the senses of 
 nutrition (smell and taste) with their predominantly 
 physiological character. At the other extreme are 
 the senses of Sight and Hearing with their predom- 
 inantly psychical character. The latter senses, in- 
 deed, serve as media for experiences of the most 
 refined nature, extending into the higher degrees of 
 Sensibility. 
 
 The psychical response to the stimulus from the 
 environment is here, indeed (in this elementary phase 
 of Sensibility), mainly of the reflex type. That is, 
 the response is primarily organic^ and is to be ex- 
 plained biologically as due to the complex, highly 
 endowed structural form which has its origin in the 
 experience of the race. 
 
39 
 
 But here, too, increased realization of individual 
 life depends upon the continuous adjustment of the 
 individual living unit to its environment. The more 
 perfect the adjustment, the more positive is the con- 
 nection between the unit and its environment; and 
 hence, by so much the greater will be that pleasurable 
 feeling which is but the subjective form of unison be- 
 tween self and the environment upon which the growth 
 of self depends — the "self" attaining explicit realiza- 
 tion, indeed, only in the living unit known as human. 
 
 One of the most striking forms in which Sensibility 
 of the simpler degree makes its appearance is that of 
 the pleasure of mere living in which the instinct of 
 self-preservation is so closely involved. Inseparable 
 from this egoistic sentiment, too, as its complementary 
 form, is the equally spontaneous (organic) pleasure 
 in the lives of others, and the efforts for the preserva- 
 tion of those lives, to which such pleasurable phase 
 of Sensibility leads. 
 
 Thus, even in this simple, rudimentary phase ot 
 Sensibility, the interdependence of the egoistic and 
 the altruistic sentiments is clearly manifest. Never- 
 theless, in this sphere each experience of pleasure or 
 of pain is more or less isolated and may very well be 
 followed by an experience of*directly opposite char- 
 acter. This is conspicuously the case in child-life, 
 where sudden and violent transitions in feeling are to 
 be expected aS a matter of course. And this the more 
 for the reason that the intellectual aspect of child-life 
 
40 
 
 is confined chiefly, in the first place, to indiscriminate 
 perception — the response here taking place with 
 equal readiness to any and every stimulus, so that 
 any given series of experiences will be altogether 
 heterogeneous, and hence conspicuously lacking in 
 coherence — and, in the second place, to the mainly 
 capricious aspect of imagination known as childish 
 fancy. 
 
 But all agreeable experiences, in the fact that they 
 are agreeable^ possess one commoyt quality. And 
 the greater the range and variety of such experiences 
 the more do they tend to fuse into a more or less con- 
 tinuous state. From being broken up into a series of 
 more or less isolated and contradictory moods the 
 mind attains a character of continuity in feeling. It is 
 this which leads over (by simple development) into the 
 next more adequate phase of Sensibility. It is easy to 
 see, too, that this elevating and rationalizing of Sensi- 
 bility will depend largely upon the intellectual habit 
 de v^eloped by the individual. Habitual dwelling upon 
 rational sensuous forms is one essential condition of 
 cultivating a genuinely rhythmic or normal state of 
 feeling within the limits of sensuous life. 
 
 B. Practical Aspect of Sensibility. — In the 
 institutional aspect of life the experience of the 
 individual takes on a predominantly human char- 
 acter. In the relations of home, of school, of so- 
 ciety in general, the Individual finds in manifold 
 forms and in increasing degree substantial grounds 
 
41 
 
 of security. His associations are more or less uni- 
 form. Stimulus and Encouragement are constantly 
 extended to him. The great mass of conditions con- 
 stituting his immediate actual environment (especi- 
 ally the social world in its entire compass) exhibits 
 more or less explicit and consistent organic unity. 
 Such, at least, is the case in the normal life of the 
 individual. 
 
 Whence the sentiment of the Individual deepens 
 into more and more clearly defined form and is 
 increasingly characterized by consistency and con- 
 tinuity. It is this aspect of Sensibility which in its 
 most general character is properly named Contentment. 
 
 But also this phase of Sensibility depends largely 
 for its fullest development upon the general (intel- 
 lectual) power of Representation exercised by the 
 Individual himself. To revive a percept is not merely 
 to strengthen the percept in its character of an intel- 
 lectual product. It is also to deepen and render more 
 vivid the aspect of feeling which is already necessa- 
 rily involved in the process of perception, and which 
 thus tends inevitably to recur along with each repro- 
 duction of the percept. 
 
 Thus as the intellectual process of Representation 
 develops into the voluntary degree, and especially as 
 Imagination attains maturity in its normal creative 
 character, the Sentiment of Contentment becomes cor- 
 respondingly strengthened and enriched ; just as, on 
 the other hand, the abnormal activity of the intellect- 
 
42 
 
 ual power of Representation can not but involve con- 
 tradiction ; and with this there develops inevitably 
 that sense of contradiction which is known as discon- 
 tent. 
 
 It is in this sphere especially that we have that wide 
 range of pleasurable experiences which, in their char- 
 acter of Sensibility, are grouped under the phrase : 
 "Sentiment of the Beautiful." And when this be- 
 comes the leading motive the Intelligence and the 
 Will are brought into play in the creation of works 
 of art as well as in the deliberate contemplation of 
 natural beauty. 
 
 Here, too, above all, is the sphere of the most com- 
 plex interplay of the egoistic and the altruistic senti- 
 ments, such as self-respect, love of friends, love of 
 home, love of country, delight in the rhythm of social, 
 of political and (on the human side) of religious life, 
 both as actually realized and as conceivably realizable. 
 
 But this very process of enriching and refining Sen- 
 sibility through the fuller development of the Imagi- 
 nation is already an idealizing process, and as such 
 brings us to the consideration of the next higher phase 
 of Sensibility. 
 
 C. Spiritual Aspect of Sensibility. This next 
 higher phase, as already intimated, is unfolded 
 mainly through the contemplative or reflective 
 aspect of life. In the whole course of what is 
 ordinarily called Education, there are constantly em- 
 phasized in the mind of the Individual the universal 
 
43 
 
 and permanent aspects of the world. Power to dis- 
 criminate between the vanishing and the abiding in all 
 objects of interest is thus steadily cultivated. So that 
 on every hand proofs multiply for the Individual, that 
 beneath all the vanishing forms of the world about 
 him, there is an assured basis of unalterable Law. 
 And, as this conviction grows clearer, the sentiment 
 of contentment deepens into a profound sense of 
 security. 
 
 But the refined pleasure thus experienced tends to 
 stimulate the contemplative mood in still further de- 
 gree. Imagination is called into play to picture, as 
 thought is called into active exercise to demonstrate, 
 the existence of a Perfect World ; and this especially 
 in respect of the spiritual and abiding interests of 
 man. To know the Law of Gravity gives substantial 
 ground for the sense of physical security. Knowing 
 the divine Law of the identity in nature of all minds, 
 and hence of the identity as between the divine and 
 the human nature, constitutes the basis for an absolute 
 sense of the spiritual security of the Individual. 
 
 The sense of harmony between the Individual and 
 the rationally ordered physical world is simple com- 
 fort. The sense of harmony between the Individual 
 and the established order of the social world is called 
 feace. The sense of harmony between the Individ- 
 ual and the eternal order of the divinely constituted 
 spiritual world is, in the proper sense of the term, 
 Haffiness. 
 
44 
 
 Or it may be said that Sensibility in the sphere of 
 sensuous life bears the normal character of pleasure ; 
 while in the sphere of social life it may rise to the 
 rank of joy ; and that in the sphere of the higher 
 spiritual life it attains the character of serenity. 
 It is in this latter sphere of the relations of the 
 Individual to his environment, in its character of 
 the universal or cosmic order, that the sentiment of 
 sublimity on the one hand, and especially the religious 
 phase of sentiment on the other, attains each its freest 
 development. 
 
 The first of these three fundamental phases of Sen- 
 sibility, let us repeat, unfolds through the automatic 
 and reflex processes in the normal sensuous life. The 
 second unfolds through the willing self-adjustment of 
 the Indvidual to the institutional world. The third 
 is realized in consciousness first of all through the in- 
 tellectual apprehension of the essentially abiding char- 
 acter of the World, both in its physical and in its 
 spiritual aspect. And when real Happiness arises 
 as consisting in the clear sense of more or less fully 
 realized harmony between the Individual life and the 
 eternal or divine World as his ultimate and absolutely 
 adequate environment, then Sensibility has attained 
 its most adequate typical character, and can there- 
 after develop only in degree. Nor is it to be forgot- 
 ten that the germinal aspects of all these phases are 
 present in interfusion in the very beginning of the in- 
 dividual life, and that the explicit unfolding of the 
 
.45 
 
 one is later than that of the other, merely because of 
 the greater complexity in nature of the one over that 
 of the other. 
 
 It is further to be noted that the more complex 
 phases of Sensibility, like the more complex phases 
 of the other fundamental modes of mind, depend 
 for their development upon harmony of relations as 
 betvs^een the Individual and his environment. 
 
 x\nd yet the very Ideal of harmony as between the 
 Individual and his Environment in all its degrees 
 necessarily implies that the harmony is to be realized. 
 Otherwise the sentiment must be that of 2/j;zhappiness 
 as the subjective aspect of dissonance between the 
 Individual and the contemplated perfect World. 
 Hence a completed view of the mind necessarily in- 
 cludes the consideration of a further mode — the mode 
 by which actual practical self-adjustment to the En- 
 vironment in its fullest significance is to be accom- 
 plished. This mode of Mind is known as the Will, 
 And to this we have next to turn our attention. 
 
 V. WILL. 
 
 If Sensibility is characteristically the passive aspect 
 of mind, Will is no less characteristically its active 
 aspect. It is especially as Sensibility that the mind is 
 said to be "susceptible,^' "impressible," "respon- 
 sive.** But \ki\s fassivity of the mind is only another 
 name for its receptivity \ and receptivity, in its fuller 
 import, is reaction^ 
 
46 
 
 Now, this tendency to respond, to reacts upon any 
 and every stimulus, of whatever character, from the 
 environment, is precisely that "practical," that "act- 
 ive," phase of mind which in actual exercise is known 
 as Will. Whence it appears that the relation between 
 Sensibility and Will, just as that between Sensibility 
 and Intelligence, is one of interdependence and mutual 
 interfusion. On every hand the absolute unity of 
 Mind is emphasized. 
 
 Thus in its widest significance Will may be de- 
 fined as the mind, considered as a Power-to-do ; just 
 as the Intellect maybe defined as the mind considered 
 as a Power-to-know ^ and just as Sensibility may be de- 
 fined as the mind considered as a Power-to-feel, 
 
 Like the other phases of mind. Will has its initial 
 aspect in the sensuous degree of life. Here it is in- 
 volved in organic functions and in the structural forms 
 expressive of those functions. Just as the sensory 
 nerves and the cerebral centers constitute the organic 
 media of Intellect and of Sensibility; so the motor 
 nerves with the spinal cord and certain cerebral 
 centers, along with the whole system of voluntary 
 muscles, constitute the organic aspect of the Will. 
 
 Here, indeed, the truth, already so often insisted 
 upon, becomes specially conspicuous — the truth, 
 namely, that the whole mind requires a whole or- 
 gan^ which organ is in reality the entire body. And 
 yet it is not to be forgotten that development means 
 dijferentiation — the specialization of structural form 
 
47 
 
 to correspond with, as the organic expression of, 
 progressively specialized functional activity. Nor is 
 this anywhere more to be emphasized than in the 
 development of the mind as Will. Here, also, we 
 have to consider Mind (1) in its hereditary or physio- 
 logical relations; (2) in its social or institutional re- 
 lations, and (3) in its cosmic relations. 
 
 The phase of the Will developed through the first 
 of these groups of relations is known as Instinct; 
 the phase developed through the second group is 
 known as Habit; the phase unfolded through the 
 third may properly be called Freedom. 
 
 A. The Will as Instinct. This organic aspect 
 of Will is seen above all in the lower orders of animals 
 and in children. Doubtless the most rudimentary 
 degree of Will is shown in the form of that "contract- 
 ility," which with its complementary phase of "irri- 
 tability" as a premonition of feeling and intelligence, 
 specially characterizes the simple unicellular animal. 
 And whatever judgment may be passed upon the 
 "psychic life of micro-organisms" it is beyond question 
 that biological science has done most important service 
 in furnishing clews to the solution of hitherto very 
 obscure "problems of life and mind ;" and this no less 
 in respect of the Will than of Intelligence and of 
 Sensibility. 
 
 The Will can no longer be exclusively restricted to 
 the explicitly conscious phases of life. In its charac- 
 ter of mind considered as a Power-to-do it appears 
 
48 
 
 first of all in "unconscious" organic activity. Here it 
 is especially conspicuous under the form of Reflex ac- 
 tion. The Individual reacts upon the environment in 
 this or that manner, not from any conscious purpose 
 of his own, but rather because in his spinal cord exist 
 in organic fusion the cumulative results of the voli- 
 tions, conscious and unconscious, of the Race as his 
 collective ancestor. Thus far he is simply and liter- 
 ally a "creature of instinct;" that is, of inherited 
 tendencies. 
 
 In this sphere movements take place in a "pur- 
 posive" way indeed; but the "purpose" is present 
 only in the organic structure of the animal ; not as a 
 mode of its individualized consciousness. Nor can 
 this "purpose" really be accounted for save as a 
 specialized organic manifestation of that all-inclusive 
 Purpose which constitutes the ultimate, unalterable 
 Method of Creation and which is seen everywhere to 
 lead up from simpler to more complex forms ; Irom 
 not-living to living structures ; from unconscious to 
 conscious units. (This is the metaphysical presuppo- 
 sition underlying all modern science, especially the 
 biological sciences, and above all manifest in modern 
 Psychology in which those sciences find their culmina- 
 tion. It is, in fact, just this presupposition which con- 
 stitutes the central element of vitality in these sciences. ) 
 
 But, as the product of Heredity, it is evident that this 
 phase of the Will of the Individual is absolutely f re- 
 determined. His acts are not his own. An incalcu- 
 
49 
 
 lable complex of forces have converged and fused 
 into a living mechanism which seems, indeed, to act 
 from that higher spontaneity consisting of conscious 
 purpose ; but which, in reality^ acts only from that 
 lower spontaneity consisting merely of simple mechan- 
 ical reaction upon this or that given physical stimu- 
 lus. It is not free will, but will absolutely ^r^f/^^- 
 tined. 
 
 And yet, so far as responses to stimuli coming 
 from the environment are such as to extend and in- 
 tensify the harmony between the individual and his 
 environment, there is increase of Life, of vigor, of 
 unhindered rhythmic activity — growth in physical 
 power and grace — development of what may be 
 termed physical and 'physiological freedom, on the 
 part of the individual. His relations to his environ- 
 ment are such that everything contributes to the fur- 
 therance of his life. Every contact with the World 
 renews his strength. It is in his rhythmic relation to 
 the rational World that man, both physical and 
 spiritual, is the true Antasos. 
 
 Nor must it be overlooked that in its concrete 
 development the rudimentary phase of Will is com- 
 pletely interfused with Perception on the one hand 
 and with the sense of the agreeable or the reverse on 
 the other. At the same time the tendency will be to 
 repeat those acts which involve a sense of the agree- 
 able and to avoid those which involve a sense of the 
 disagreeable. So that already in Instinct there are 
 
50 
 
 involved conditions tending to a choice as betv^^een 
 actions of one and those of another character with 
 respect to the individual life. Such choice, carried 
 out, results in more or less definitely fixed tendencies 
 on the part of the individual ; and such tendencies 
 are known as Habits, It is this aspect of Will that 
 we have next to bring under notice. 
 
 B. The Will as Habit. As the result of heredity 
 Instinct is individualized Will only in the sense of an 
 organically realized tendency to repeat the general 
 course of actions of one's ancestors. And yet because 
 this tendency is the compound product of the activity 
 of all one's ancestors, the instinct of the individual 
 can never suffice to bring him into complete harmony 
 with his environment; which, besides, is itself con- 
 stantly undergoing change and hence is in greater or 
 less degree different from that of any of his ancestors. 
 
 Hence, while from his organic nature the Individual 
 of course responds to stimuli from his environment, 
 such responses can not but be imperfect. So that 
 from the first there is inevitable more or less disson- 
 ance in the experience of the Individual in consequence 
 of the more or less pronounced collisions taking place 
 between himself and his environment through his im- 
 perfect responses to the stimuli he receives therefrom. 
 
 Such dissonance in the experience of the individual 
 constitutes fain ; and the result of pain is to stimu- 
 late the intelligence to inquiry as to the cause of the 
 pain. This discovered there is (in the normal life) 
 
51 
 
 conscious, purposive effort toward more perfect self- 
 adjustment to the environment — a process which, 
 traced back to its least adequate degree, is doubtless 
 unconscious, though in every phase, from the simplest 
 to the most complex, still purposive ; expressive, t, 
 e., oi the Intelligence inherent in the total creative 
 Process. (Rightly understood '' Heredity," espec- 
 ially in respect of man's intellectual and moral 
 nature, necessarily implies the fullest degree of ac- 
 tual spiritual qualities on the part of his "ancestry." 
 But this points clearly to the necessity of including 
 in our estimate of Man's ancestry that ultimate self- 
 knowing Energy, which is, in truth, the indispensable 
 presupposition of that wonderful Method of Creation, 
 constituting what, in its concrete aspect, is known as 
 the Process of Evolution. So that all the more direct 
 forms of Heredity, commonly recognized as such, 
 are really to be regarded as but special aspects of the 
 whole process by which Man, as a conscious unit of 
 Energy, realizes his descent from, as well as his as- 
 cent to, the ultimate creative Personal Energy. 
 Only from this latter can Man really " inherit '^ the 
 qualities which constitute his essential nature as Man. 
 Such metaphysical note is quite indispensable to the 
 proper comprehension of the human mind as the real 
 subject of Psychology.) 
 
 It is thus that individualized acts come to be per- 
 formed ; and as such conscious, purposive acts come 
 be multiplied in some one given direction a new 
 
52 
 
 tendency is developed in the individual mind (and 
 hence, also, in the organism embodying such mind). 
 
 Such are the tendencies which, arising directly, as 
 they do, from the invidualized actions of a given 
 individual unit (here considered as human) are prop- 
 erly termed Habits, 
 
 Those habits expressive of and tending to empha- 
 size the substantial adjustment of the Individual to 
 the environment in its rational and permanent charac- 
 ter are for that reason the habits tending to prolong, 
 extend and enrich the life of the Individual. Hence, 
 they are called ^^oa? habits. On the other hand, those 
 habits expressive of and tending to emphasize dis- 
 sonance as between the individual and his environ- 
 ment are for that reason habits tending to impov- 
 erish and ultimately to destroy the life of the Indi- 
 vidual. Hence, they are properly called bad habits. 
 
 The extreme degree of the complexity of the en- 
 vironment in respect of the Will considered as Habit 
 can only be hinted at here. Besides the merely 
 physical aspect (in which Instinct still plays an im- 
 portant part) there is the whole range of the social 
 environment — the institutional world — in which cus- 
 tom^ as the organic form of the communal Will, is 
 the dominant feature. It is progressive adjustment 
 to this as the most immediate concrete aspect of the 
 spiritual environment that constitutes the unfolding of 
 the will as Habit in the higher sense of the term. 
 
53 
 
 But here again the environment itself undergoes 
 change — is imperfect and must (normally) advance to 
 more complex andnnore rhythmic forms. Further, the 
 advancement of the Individual is the advancement 
 of the Race, vs^hich again constitutes the more com- 
 plex aspect of the environment of the Individual. 
 From which the difficulties in the v^^ay of the Individ- 
 ual's self-adjustment to his environment may be 
 measurably appreciated. 
 
 And not only so but because Custom, as the or- 
 ganic form of the communal Will, is in reality the 
 cumulative result of the life of the Race, and be- 
 cause the development of the Individual's will con- 
 sidered as Habit is practically limited to the custom 
 of his time, it would seem that here, too, the form 
 and possible extent of the actual development of the 
 individual Will is predetermined ; that in this sphere 
 also the Individual is essentially a creature of pre- 
 destination. 
 
 And yet the more complete the Individual's self- 
 adjustment to the social environment (in its rational 
 character) the more evidently will there be for him 
 increase of Life, of vigor, of easy, rhythmic activity 
 — growth in intellectual and moral power and grace 
 — development of what may be called social or 
 ethical freedom on the part of the Individual. 
 
 The negative aspect of such Freedom is the ah- 
 sence of hindrance. Its positive aspect is the sense 
 
54 
 
 of Power, Here, too, every rational contact with the 
 World in its rational character adds to the realized 
 power of the Individual. In organic relation with the 
 source of life his own life constantly expands. 
 
 Let us note, besides, that self- activity is the central 
 characteristic of every living unit. And in man, as 
 the highest order of living units, self-activity attains 
 in ever greater degree the character of conscious, de- 
 liberate self-direction — I. e., the character of that 
 genuine spontaneity which may properly be called 
 Freedom. 
 
 In this whole sphere there is the most complex 
 interaction between Habit as the active phase of 
 mind and the sentiment of Contentme^tt as the 
 specially passive phase of mind, mediated by 
 Imagination as (in this sphere) the corresponding 
 phase of Intelligence considered as the contemplative 
 or regulative phase of mind. 
 
 The Will as habit is directly involved in the whole 
 sphere of intellectual development. "Habits of study" 
 are "intellectual" habits, indeed. But this means 
 nothing else than that in all intellectual activity there 
 is necessarily implied choice both of subject-matter 
 and of method. And "choice" is nothing else than 
 the subjective aspect of that "Spontaneity" which is 
 manifested outwardly or objectively in definite acts of 
 Will. The complete interfusion of Intellect and 
 Will, the absolutely indivisible unity of Mind, is here 
 again emphasized in the highest degree. 
 
55 
 
 C. The Will as Freedom. In its instinctive 
 phase Will is simply organic and unconscious. In the 
 phase of Habit it is conscious, but not yet critically 
 reflective. With widened experience situations arise 
 which stimulate the Intelligence to deliberately ques- 
 tion the whole order of the World. The sense of in- 
 evitable, irrepressible dissonance as between the indi- 
 vidual and his environment can not be allayed save 
 through the discovery (1) of the ultimate nature 
 both of the Individual and of his environment, and 
 (2) of the true means and method of final adjust- 
 ment of the former to the latter. 
 
 It is this impulse that gives rise to all science, 
 whether of the natural or of the spiritual world. Sci- 
 ence itself, is, indeed, the intellectual self-adjustment 
 of man to his environment and as such already in- 
 volves Will. (^Attention is no less volitional than 
 intellectual. And it is, of course, only through 
 attention that any single step in the sphere of science 
 can be taken). And further, as Science progresses 
 so does the more thorough-going pracHcal seli-adjust- 
 ment of man to the environment advance in complexity 
 and precision. 
 
 On the physical side this is illustrated by the whole 
 course of Invention. On the spiritual side it is illus- 
 trated by the progressive development of '-'•self-cofn- 
 inand^''^ which is the conscious subordination of pres- 
 ent, but momentary, "real" values to ultimate and 
 permanent ideal values. 
 
56 
 
 This involves the discovery of the ultimate Laws of 
 the spiritual aspect of the World — the discovery, that 
 is, of their permanence, their comprehensive nature, 
 their consistency as a total System. Further than this it 
 involves the recognition of the fact that self-ad- 
 justment to this System on the part of the Individual 
 has for its necessary logical consequence the extend- 
 ing and enriching of his spiritual life, while neglect 
 of such self-adjustment to — still more antagonism 
 with — this System must result no less inevitably in 
 narrowed and impoverished spiritual life on his part. 
 
 Here the real truth of the Socratic doctrine that 
 * 'Virtue is knowledge," and that thus "no man will 
 do wrong knowingly," comes clearly to light. For 
 he who really knows all the consequences of an evil 
 deed, the remote as well as the immediate, will never 
 commit that deed. 
 
 In this higher sphere, then. Freedom is expressed 
 in deliberate conformity to the divine Law of Reason ; 
 while it consists ^that growing Power-to-do (or to 
 refrain from doing) which is the inevitable result of 
 unison between the individual life and the ultimate 
 spiritual order of the World. In other words, Free- 
 dom is conscious conformity to Reason. Or, it is the 
 adjustment of one's life to the ultimate order of the 
 Cosmos — the Eternal World. 
 
 Evidently, then, while the Will as Instinct is the 
 product of the deeds of one's ancestors and is thus 
 wholly predestined, yet at the same time the Will as 
 
57 
 
 Habit, and still more in its higher degree of conscious, 
 reflective Will, is the cumulative product of one's own 
 individzialized deeds and constitutes the positive, 
 active phase of that total of individual character 
 which can not but become intensified and enriched in 
 its very Individuality with each additional phase of 
 positive, rhythmic relation that comes to be realized 
 between itself and the ultimate, rational World- 
 order which in its very nature is the source of all Life. 
 In harmony with the World the World as a whole 
 proves organic to one's Life. In antagonism with 
 the World the World in just that far proves alien and 
 inimical to one's Life. 
 
 Such is the clew to the tracing out of what consti- 
 tutes genuine, concrete Freedom as characterizing true 
 spiritual Individuality in its highest sense of Person- 
 ality. And here, evidently, as complementary to 
 this highest phase of Will, considered as the active 
 aspect of Mind, there is involved Thotight as the 
 highest phase of Intelligence considered as the con- 
 templative aspect of Mind, while the sense of growing 
 unison betvv^een the contemplated Ideal on the one 
 hand and the actual Life of the Individual on the 
 other appears in the character of Happiness as the 
 highest phase of Sensibility, considered as the passive 
 aspect of mind. 
 
 Initially predestined the Individual may, neverthe- 
 less, attain Freedom. But this again is a process of 
 Evolution. The type is infinite ; the actual realiza- 
 
58 
 
 tion in and for the Individual must ever remain 
 finite. Freedom is attainable, yet never wholly at- 
 tained. No man ever was or could be born free. 
 Only through obedience^ only through persistent, 
 progressive self-adjustment of the individual Life 
 to the established order of the world in its change- 
 less character can such Life be extended and enriched 
 to a degree of realized individual Power worthy of 
 being even remotely designated as Freedom. 
 
 And yet the very infinitude of the Type gives as- 
 surance of infinite perfectibility for the individual 
 human mind whether considered as a Power-to-know, 
 or as a Power-to-feel, or as a Power-to-do. The 
 realization of human Personality is to be attained only 
 through an infinitely extended evolutional process, 
 consisting of ceaseless approximation to that perfect 
 Personality which is self-expressed in the totalCosmic 
 Order. 
 
 We have thus traced in brief outline the typical 
 nature of mind considered as an individual unit of 
 Energy. But this very tracing out of the essential 
 characteristics of the type or Ideal of Mind in its m^\- 
 Yidual and personal nature must inevitably raise the 
 question : Through what means and by what method 
 is this type or Ideal to be unfolded into reality in and 
 for the Individual ? 
 
 The more immediate answer to this question con- 
 stitutes a further science — ^the science of Ethics, 
 
59 
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES TO SECOND EDITION. 
 
 1. By carefully noting as a ivhole what is said of Perception 
 (pp. 14-16), the reader will avoid confusing the 'Mmage " 
 on the retina with the "image" constituting the objective 
 aspect of the Percept. This caution is the more necessary 
 since the beginner in psychology can scarcely be expected to 
 appreciate the importance of the distinction. 
 
 2. On p. 56, it is by no means intended to say that Virtue 
 consists in knowledge alone. The reader is to keep in view 
 the organic unity of the mind as at once a Power-to-know, a 
 Power-to-feel and a Power-to-do. Every act of the mind 
 involves the whole mind — a fact emphasized throughout the 
 Syllabus. Virtue is wise, but is real Virtue only in so far as 
 it is wise-action. Even so it is virtue in the truest sense 
 only in so far as it is wise-action gladly performed. It is this 
 joyous devotion-in-action to the Cosmic Order, in its 
 ultimate character of Personal Creator, that constitutes the 
 Love which is the "fulfilling of the Law." 
 
 3. Here, indeed, we are not merely trenching upon the 
 field of Ethics ; we are even crossing the line where Moraity 
 merges into Religion. And this emphasizes a third point. 
 The ethical aspect of Life would seem to require that in any 
 outline, however meager, of Psychology, some reference to 
 Conscience ought to be found. Upon this point I offer here 
 only the following brief intimation: Conscience is not a 
 "faculty " of the mind. It is not an aspect of Intelligence 
 merely, nor of Sensibility merely, nor of Will merely. It is 
 rather a central quality or characteristic of the mind as a 
 whole. It is the practical aspect of Consciousness. Knowl- 
 edge, as the product of intellectual activity, may be said to 
 be Virtue in the abstract, and capable of becoming Virtue in 
 
60 
 
 the concrete only through the coincidence of Will with 
 Intelligence.^ Similarly Cousciousuess in the narrower 
 sense is mere intellectual apprehension of the conditions of 
 Life, while Conscience is Consciousness raised to the power 
 of conviction that the normal conditions of Life must be 
 actually complied with, in one's own experience, if one 
 would avoid Death and attain actual Life. Hence, what 
 Consciousness (in its predominantly intellectual aspect) is 
 to Psychology, that Conscience is to Ethics, as the science 
 which has for its central purpose to discover and appraise 
 the means and the method by which the Type or Ideal of 
 Personality unfolded in Psychology is to be brought into 
 realization in and for the Individual human mind. It 
 appears, then, that just as the science of Psychology begins 
 naturally with a consideration of Consciousness in general 
 and proceeds by analysis to unfold its various aspects from 
 simple sensation to the most complex forms of deliberative 
 Will, so the science of Ethics must find its normal beginning 
 in the study of Conscience and proceed from this to unfold 
 the various specific forms in which human action progress- 
 ively gives to Conscience its concrete realization. 
 
 These notes are in response to friendly suggestions made 
 by Dr. B. F. Hayes, of Bates College, and by the reviewer of 
 the Syllabus, in the Neiv York Independent. 
 
 1 . Cp. above, p. 54 and elsewhere. 
 
61 
 
 The following list of Hand and Reference books on 
 Psychology was prepared directly in answer to a request 
 for such list made by a group of people entering upon a sys- 
 tematic study of the subject. 
 
 As the request comes just while the foregoing Syllabus is 
 passing through the press it has occurred to me that to ap- 
 pend the list here may very likely prove a convenience to 
 those private students into whose hands the Syllabus may 
 chance to fall. My choice of works has been, not merely 
 with reference to their intrinsic value, but also with a view 
 to their mutually corrective and supplementary character. 
 
 I. HANDBOOKS. 
 
 1. Hoefding, Harald, Outlines of Psychology, 
 
 2. Sully, J.y Outlines of Psychology. 
 
 3. jBam, ^,, Mental Science. 
 
 4. Dewey J J., Psychology (Text-book). 
 
 5. Lotze, H.j Psychology (Brief Sketch). 
 
 6. AristotUy Psychology (Text and Translation by E. 
 
 Wallace) . 
 
 7. Volkmann, TF., Lehrbuch der Psychologic. (3rd Ed., 
 
 2 Vols.) 
 
 II. SPECIAL WORKS. 
 
 8. Eomanesj G. J., Mental Evolution in Animals. 
 
 9. Bomajies, G. J"., Mental Evolution in Man. 
 
 10. Preyer, W., The Mind of the Child. 
 
 Part I. The Senses and the Will. 
 
 Part II. The Development of the Intellect. 
 
 11. Mueller, 3Iax, Science of Tho-aght. (2 Vols.) 
 
 12. Sully, J., Sensation and Intuition. 
 
 13. Sully, J., Illusions. 
 
 14. Bitot, T., Select Works (Humboldt Library), incl. 
 
 ''Diseases of the Memory," "Diseases of the Will'* 
 and "Diseases of Personality.'* 
 
^x^ 
 
 62 
 
 15. Colsenet, E., La Vie Inconsciente de L'Esprit (based 
 
 on Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious). 
 
 16. Moll^ A.t Hypnotism. (Cont. Science Series.) 
 
 III. WORKS EMPHASIZING GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 17. Lotze, H.y Microcosmiis (Especially Books II and V). 
 
 18. Schopenhauer J A., The World as Will and as Represen- 
 
 tation (Especially Books II, III and IV). 
 
 19. Spencer, H.y Principles of Psychology. (2 Vols.) 
 
 20. Lewes J G. if., Problems of Life and Mind (Especially 
 
 Series. III). 
 
 21. Taine, if., On Intelligence. 
 
 22. James J W., Principles of Psychology. 
 
 23. Humef Works. (Ed. by T. H. Green.) 
 
 24. Hegel f G. W. F., Philosophie des Geistes. (French 
 
 version, with copious notes, by Vera.) 
 
 25. Fichte, J. G., The Science of Knowledge. 
 
 26. Plassmann, II. E.y Die Psychologic auf Grundlage der 
 
 Physik, gemass der Schule des h, Thomas. (Modern 
 Catholic standpoint.) 
 
 IV. WORKS ON PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 27. Ladd, G. T.y Outlines of Physiological Psychology. 
 
 (An excellent r^sum6 of the subject.) 
 
 28. Bastian, II. C, The Brain as an Organ of Mind. 
 
 29. Carpenter, W. B., Mental Physiology. 
 
 30. Wundt, TF., Grundziige der Physiologishen Psychologic. 
 
 (In the 3d Ed., 2 Vols., this is still the great work 
 on the subject.) 
 

 
 
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