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EXPERIENCE 
 
 THE 
 
 TEST OF GOVERNMENT; 
 
 ■WRITTEN 
 
 DURING THE YEARS 1805 AND 1806. 
 
 TO AID THE INVESTIGATION OF PRINCIPLES, AND OPERATION 
 OF THE EXISTING 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND LAJVS 
 PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 Experience is a dear school, but fools will learn in no other 
 ....and scarce in that poor richard. 
 
 PHILADELPHIJ: 
 
 PRINTED BY WILLIAM DVANE. 
 1807. 
 
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ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 THE remarks which compose the following papers, were written 
 without regard to system or style ; and, as the objects presented 
 themselves, in a situation favorable for dispassionate observation, and 
 out of the vortex of party passions. They are riot personal, there- 
 ^ fore cannot give offence. They develope the actual operations of 
 ■- government generally, but more immediately point out the enor- 
 ^ mous abuses wliich flow from the exorbitant power vested in the 
 ^ executive. There are repetitions, but they will be found useful, as 
 5 they are intended to place the same object in different points of 
 view, and thereby render the facts more clear ; and, what is of im- 
 portance in discussion, familiar to the reader. They inculcate the 
 principle, that it is necessary for the people, to keep alive the 
 spirit of investigation — to have frequent recurrence to first princi- 
 ples ; and thereby guard against that tendency so natural to the 
 mind of man, of accumulating and perpetuating power ; ' which 
 commences by degrees, grows bulky and formidable in its progress, 
 and if not timeously prevented in its effects, must end in subverting 
 every free government, and terminate in a hideous and tyrannic 
 uristocracv. 
 
EXPERIEXCK 
 
 TEST OF GOVERNMENT 
 
 LAWS. 
 
 ESSAY I. 
 
 Oy THE NAfUI^E OF GOVEliNMEN'f AND LEGAL POirEi!. 
 
 DESPOTIC government lias many adherents, who never 
 reason until after they act. They decide first and enquife after- 
 wards. There are none however, who reiiise their assent to the 
 principle that— governments are histituted for the henefit of man, 
 and although their burthen be a comparative eVil, it is borne to 
 prevent greater, which must exist Avithout them. Were all men 
 moderately well educated, informed, wise, and virtuous, each would 
 have correct views and useful pursuits : each would undersand bet- 
 ter than is usual, what best promotes happiness ; and having his own 
 felicity in prospect, would so wisely combine with the happiness 
 of others, that government would be divested of a great part of 
 that occupation required, as it is now conducted. 
 
 But such is the situation of man, that the wants created by socie- 
 ty itself, and kept up by example, together with the gratification 
 of unruly passions, raise anxieties which too frec|uently impel to 
 improper pursuits : hence, injuries, injustice, and vice, render re- 
 strauit necessary, lest the corrupt and powerftd sliould unjustly con- 
 vert the produce of the hidustry of others to their exclusive benefit. 
 To the wise and virtuous, these would be greater evils than the bur- 
 then of government ; men therefore associate for mutual security 
 and good, and for these ends only, submit to beuig governed. 
 They surrender into the political stock of the community a feiv 
 powers to delegates, who make what are called laws, and each 
 contributes a part of the produce of his industry, that the re- 
 mainder of each may be secured, and that, in its enjoyment, placed 
 out of the reach of interruption or violence. A system of go- 
 vernment must be the best, which at the least expence most 
 effectually secures these ends to the community so associated. 
 
 The institutions of society,, are generally denominated la\\ s ; 
 but it may be fit btfore we proceed farther, to explain the term 
 
( 6 ) 
 
 more clearly ; for if there were not different species ofinstitution,'"the 
 ordinary meaning of tiie term, which signifies something written or 
 published'as a rule, by which the members of society are required 
 to act, and forbid to transgress, would be competent for common 
 use. But as there are varieties, and as they are sometimes con- 
 founded, or mistaken one for the other ; the confusion produces 
 doubt, and doubt always has a tendency to injure that which the 
 doubt concerns. 
 
 On the formation of societies or nations, either before the disco- 
 very of the art of writing, or before the application of letters to 
 legislation— the laws consisted in certain obvious maxims or prin- 
 ciples to which all agreed, because they concerned the security of 
 each member, against wrong from some other member ; or a whole 
 society from injury meditated by some other society. The intro- 
 duction of letters, and their progress, produced more enlarged 
 ideas and embraced a more comprehensive scope. Laws came to 
 be written, but cunning evaded or perverted them ; tyranny violated 
 them ; a revision was necessary ; and soon after limits were fixed 
 to the power of those who were entrusted to manage public 
 affairs ; or to execute the laws formed by the will of the society. 
 The experience of every day pointed out some new want of pro- 
 visions fsr the common protection ; some guard for the weak 
 against the strong ; some limitation of authority, some prohibition 
 of abuse. These gave rise to declaratory laws, or laws declaring 
 certain great rules, which were to govern other inferior branches 
 of regulation or ia\v ; • from the same sources arose great charters, 
 as they have been called and bills of rights. But the greatest 
 improvement of all, has been a Constitution, which is in other 
 words, a written law, which is to remain inviolate, and by the spirit 
 iUid principles of which all other laws are to be regulated, and 
 contrary to which in any part, no act of legislation can be valid or 
 obligatory ; so long as those who made the constitution think proper 
 to preserve it unaltei'ed. 
 
 Hence a consiitution appears to be a law of a superior nature ; and 
 to be held as tlie basis of all other laws, while it remains unaltered. 
 This constitution or supreme law, is the .frame by wliich society is 
 kept together ; and its concerns regulated ; for it is at once the law 
 of all the people, and the rule by which the ordinary legislature 
 and all other branches of public authority is guided and governed. 
 
 TJie laws of a free state therefore consist of the supreme law, or 
 constitution, which defines tl\e limits of ordinary legislation ; the acts 
 of the legislative conformable to the constitution is the ordinary law. 
 Tiiat branch of government wlncfi is intended to be expressed by 
 the judiciary, or juridical department, is still subordinate to the 
 legislative authorify, in as much as it is bound by the acts of the 
 legislative body ; in this department exists a great monster in what 
 is called common law ; that i>, a pretended law which was neitner 
 proposed, digested nor written, nor dciibtrated upon, either by the 
 constituting power of the stute, ncr by the ordinary legislature, which 
 
( 7 ) 
 
 remains still t/rnvritfrfi, which every body is presumed to know, and 
 punishable for violating ; and yet it is acknowltgcd to be unknoun 
 in all its branches to any one man ; this indefinite scheme oi" sub- 
 telty we shall leave out of the discussion, in order to pursue those 
 branches of government which are understood, are a\ rilten, and 
 which we can approacli and toucii and examine without diniculiy 
 or much eflort at uivestii^ation ; we investigate the system, but leave 
 the common law for other pens. 
 
 Much has been said on the suljject of checks and balances in 
 government; but e.r/itr/<J!ce proves, that, as a check or balance, it 
 is no matter of what number of branches, powers, or authoi-ities an 
 original system is constituted ; for wlien once they are filled with 
 officers, unless othcrwiNe checked than by each other, there is such 
 a tendency in men to serve themselves, that the different authorities, 
 or deputed officers, too frequently unite, and form a preponderance 
 contrary to the original designs of their government. 
 
 Experience proves that there is vo check — there can be none, bu( 
 the iieoj\le ; and when ever they give up their power absolutely to 
 any set of men, under any modification, without reserving to 
 themselves a short periodical resumption of their power, there is 
 an end to liberty, as far as the resignation extends. 
 
 Although we can have no doubt of the virtue of a majority of 
 the officers in any new society, in the first instance, if taken fairly 
 from the people, m so enlightened a country as ours, yet a political 
 instituiion should be so formed, as effectually to secure fidelity, to 
 discourage corruption, and in the most easy manner to jirovide for 
 the removal of unprincipled officers. 
 
 All men naturally love power, the virtuous as well as the vicious ; 
 they love weaUh also ; as well on account of the ease and comfort 
 which it procures, as of the power which is attendant on its posses- 
 sion ; hence" there is an inducement for officers to do well, if they 
 are well paid, under a periodical resumption, independent of virtue ; 
 in order that through their faithfulness to the interest of the people, 
 the pow-er and compensation may be continued. 
 
 Experience proves that nothing else secures the community any 
 length of time against tyranny and corruption, but this resumptioii 
 of power ; or, in other words, a political system, which places exHry 
 officer at certain reasonable periods, according to the nature of the 
 trust reposed in him, precisely in the* same situation in which he 
 was before he was elected or appointed, as a private citizen, to be 
 again submitted to the ordeal of public opinion, and elected or 
 appointed, or rejected, upon the true principle of democracy — u-(iliuj 
 to the fieo}ile.. 
 
 If a person who had been in public employment should have 
 been useful, and remains virtuous, there will be two chances to 
 one, that he will either be placed again where he was, or niised 
 higher than before. But if he should have made an evil use of 
 power, or discovered imbecility of mind ; so long as wisdom and 
 
( 8 ) 
 
 virtue predominate in the community, so long he will be necessi- 
 tated to n^ix with the people, without putting them to the expence 
 of a trial. Human A^isdom is not competent to contrive so power- 
 ful an auxiliary of virtue, so imperious a check upon vice as— 
 
 rUBLIC OriNION. 
 
 Under all political systems hitherto adopted, which have carried 
 with them the idea of freedom, cUid a security of rights, the powers 
 and duties have been divided, and partially committed to different 
 assemblages of men, under difie'.'ont names, and for different pur- 
 poses ; in order that each might form a check on the others, and all 
 on each. But independent of the idea of checks, there can be no 
 doubt, that in thus distributing duties among several classes of 
 officers, under the same system ; Provided they arc n t uselessly 
 numer us^ advanlcW^es result ; more talents and virtue may be called 
 into action ; duties, by being simplified, are better understood, and 
 may be better performed : more time is required to corrupt, and 
 \vhere corruption arises, more wealth is necessary to influence men 
 to base purposes. The history of government, however, sorrowfully 
 evinces the necessity o{oX\\Qtc\\^iQ\\^^,t\YoX\cfficers checked by fficers^ 
 or ofticers checked under an idea of virtue, except as it exists in a 
 community, or nation. It is in public life as it is in private agency ; 
 there is no perfect safety, without frequent accountability ; and no 
 accountability can be safe, but that which is directly or indirectly 
 to the people, because they alone are mterested. 
 
 Human nature behig fond of acquiring power, ond seldom 
 willing to relinquish it ; in almost every instance where power has 
 been unlimited in extent or duration, it has been abused. And 
 although this abuse may have arisen from weak heads, as well as 
 from corrupt minds, yet it requires a corrective to secure the 
 community against its evil consequences in either case. This 
 furnishes a sound reason, why every officer in government should 
 have all his duties defined, and be limited to a certain portion of 
 time. With some it might be for a longer, with others for a 
 shorter period. But they should always be elected by the people 
 themselves, when practicable ; but if inconvenient, then by faitliful 
 agents to whom that power had been previously delegated for the 
 express purpose. 
 
 When the people delegate this power, it is much safer for them 
 to place it in the hands of a large body, than a S7}iull one ; or thiyi 
 in the hands of one man .' For thereby patronage and its conse- 
 quences favoriteism and corruption, will be proportionably pre- 
 vented. 
 
 Mankind are too generally selfish, and will sometimes be 
 warped from principle by interest ; but in a large body, there will 
 be a diversity of interests, and a number of leading members 
 differently engaged in those interests ; some of whom would be 
 corrupt enough to secure their friends at the expence of their 
 country, if an opportunity offered; but the private interest of 
 others, nay envy itself, vicious as it is, in the absence of virtue, 
 
C 9 ) 
 
 7-night be forced to supply its place, and would have a strong 
 tendency to prevent improper a[)[X)intnienls. 
 
 Under such circumstances, from the large number of electors, 
 there would be less chance of bargaininj^, and a greater probability 
 that the result would be, the s^Jcction of suitable characters. 
 
 Periodical uccountabiiicy should be so frequent as to produce cir- 
 cumspection ; but there should not be so many oflicers elected or 
 appointed, at any one period, as to endanger public tranquillity, 
 througli the anxiety which might be excited, on the failure of their 
 fav')rite measiu'es, when the most obnoxious were driven by the 
 people from oflicc. 
 
 ESSAY 11. 
 
 o.v -riiF. DisTRiBvnoyr of power among fHE delaca^es 
 
 OF <rHE PEOPLE. 
 
 IN Pennsylvania a constitution or system of government has been 
 formed and adopted, consisting of three branches, legislative, exe- 
 cutive and judicial. 
 
 The legislature is divided into senate and house of representatives. 
 The first a small body of 26 persons ; one fourth of the members 
 go out annually, and those elected in their places continue in 
 oflRce four years. The other a larger body, of 106 persons elected 
 annually. These two bodies by a concurrent vote pass bills, which 
 if approved by the executive, become law. 
 
 The executive is a single person, elected by the people triennially ; 
 he is denominated i^ovcrnor, elected for three years, but is eligible 
 nine years in succession. His general powers and duties are — 
 1. Af^'-a/Zt'e legislation : — 2. Making appointment^-^iuid, 3. See- 
 ing the laws faithfully executed. 
 
 The judiciary or courts of law, under the direction of judges 
 differently named, and with different powers, from a single justice 
 ■of the peace, up to the judges of the supreme or state court. All 
 these officers receive their appointments from the governor, hold 
 their commissions without limitation of rime, under the vague and 
 futile terms, during good behavLiir ; and except in the cases of ad- 
 dress or impeachment by the legislature ; (both of which modes of 
 address and control are now considered fallacious,) are independent 
 of the governor wlio appointed them, and of the people also, under 
 the preserit constitution — or form of government. 
 
 These various principles descend minutely in their detail, into 
 various branches, and when viewed together, shew plainly, 
 that the leading men in the convention, who framed it, had nothing 
 more constantly in their view, than the British system of king 
 lord';, commons, f(ud the court of king's bench as their model. It 
 
 B 
 
( 10 ) 
 
 may be saying too much, that they were corrupt ; but it may be* 
 said, without clanger of error, that they wei'e either very ignorant, 
 or very adverse to the principles of free and equal government; 
 they wanted to retain the essence of monarchy and aristocracy ; - 
 they had neither a king nor a nobility ; and happily, it must require 
 more than an age or two of comiption, before public opinion could 
 be so much debauched as to suffer any to be esiabUshed. 
 
 The basis of our constitution, nevertheless, is good, so far as it 
 relates to periodical elective representation, but no farther. The 
 form could have been better, the checks more fitly adapted to the 
 safety and the interests of the people, so that they would have operated 
 more strongly against the intrigue and corruption of incidental rulers. 
 The theory of the constitution is, that the senate, the least body 
 in number but most permanent, is made a check on the represen- 
 tatives; and the executive a check on both. But were not all 
 three checked periodically by new elections from the people (for 
 herein is all our safety) there can be no doubt but their decrees 
 would become as tyrannical as if made by one branch, or even by 
 one man. 
 
 According to the theory, the house of representatives is pre-sup- 
 posed to partake more of the passions and versatility of the people, 
 than the senate ; but surely it has shewn a more sensible feeling of 
 their wants and necessities, and represents more truly their recent 
 state. If therefore liberty be safe in any part of our system, it 
 must be in such a numerous body, selected so largely and lately 
 from among their constituents. 
 
 Both branches have equal controul over the treasury, except in 
 the joint vote at the treasurer's election ; then the house of repre- 
 sentatives, from their greater number, have it in their power to e- 
 lect whom they please. 
 
 It is true, it is a principle establised that revenue bills must origi- 
 nate in the house of representatives ; this is a very absurd and total- 
 ly inapplicable imitation of the supposed right of the English house 
 of commons ; yet, if money is to be raised, it is not material in which 
 house a bill originates ; for although the senate is farther removed 
 from the people, by the difference of one and four years tenure of 
 office, yet it can check any money bill in its passage, or carry it 
 through ; which is all tht; house of representatives can do, after it« 
 first stage ; their persons and property are alike involved in the- 
 burthen and their property in the measure. 
 
 In England, fiom whence tliis principle was imported with others 
 that are even worse, the house of lords represents the hereditary 
 nobility ; that is they represent th<nnf<elves^ and several of them are 
 either members or dependants on the royal family. There it pre 
 vents tlie commons from being uselessly teased by repeated propo- 
 sitions for raising money, when they do not intend to grant any. 
 It has some application there, where elections are influenced by the 
 ministry ; it is a privilege wrested from the nobility, a\ ho neverthe 
 less contend foe it still ; but here it is useless, tho' perfectly harmless. 
 
( n ) 
 
 Two branches unequally constituted are calculatetl to retard legisr 
 iMion ; they arc expensive on that account ; but bills by beini^ rt-larded, 
 may be perfected they Siiy ; and when pernicious, are more likely 
 to fail than to be complealed. There is more time allowed for ex- 
 posing errors, and correcting mistakes, where there is a double 
 legislature. 'I'he senate is never to be more than one tliird, nor 
 less than one fourth of the number of members in the liouse of 
 representatives. But this number is too large and expensive for a 
 mere revisory body. It cannot produce talents and virtue superior 
 to the other chamber, because it is composed of persons t..ken 
 by the same persons from the same source, partly for the same 
 pvn-poses. It is too small to be out of the reach of corruption ; es- 
 pecially while such unbounded patronage rests in the executive. It 
 deliberates at the same time, under the same roof, and mixing fre- 
 quently with the members of the other branch, must partially par- 
 take of the same passions and be exposed from its small number to 
 intrigues. By being too far removed from the power of the people, 
 it has a portion more of aristocracy, and arrogates to itself a little 
 7nore consecjuence ; pays a Utile less attention to the public will, and 
 is from these causes an unsafe and iniproper body for the true ends 
 of legislation. 
 
 In order to have the compleat expression of the public will in 
 the legislation, executive patronage either should not be suffered to 
 cxiaj,, or the power of appointment should be placed in other hands ; 
 or members of the legislature should not be competent for any office. 
 Under an intriguing governor, so small a body will be dangerous 
 from the common frailty of man. For if a bill were about to 
 pass, to check useless power ; or a law to be repealed, which was 
 more favourable to the patronage of the executive, than to the liber- 
 ty of the people ; the senate being small, and a majority on the 
 question smaller ; if two or tiuee members should be corrupt, and 
 any office of emolument within the gift of the executive, it could 
 easily, and without any commilment, be held out as an induce- 
 ment, as a price for their voles, when opposed to the executive, 
 and would frequently destroy the measure. 
 
 Without the total alteration of the power of appointment which 
 would place the legislature out of the way of temptation ; it would 
 be better to have a senate as numerous as the house of representa- 
 tives ; for it is safer to tnist the warmth and even passions of a 
 large body taken annually from the people, guarded as they ever 
 will be by their virtue, than to the wisdom of a small body ffiot a 
 ■very great deal mser than the others J whose opinions can easily be 
 knoAvn before a vote is passed. 
 
 The senate or first branch of a double legislature to be safe and 
 usefiil, should be as numerous as the house of representatives. Its 
 members should be elected annually, in common with the members 
 of the other branch, and selected by lot, Wt en the whole convened 
 |br the purpose of legislation. If small aristocracies or selfish fac- 
 
( 12 ,) 
 
 tions should have been formed, in the former houses, or become 
 formed among the members before the annual meeting, their 
 weight and influence would be effectuedly broken by ihe separation 
 of tlie influential members by lot into diflercnt houscb, where they 
 would probably receive a new and belter bias, their attention would 
 be directed from partial and selfish plans ; and finally, when private 
 interest could not be served, their minds would be more strongly 
 drawn with the virtuous members to tlie public good ; and then 
 public virtue wovdd supercede the prevailing avarice of office and 
 lust for public money. 
 
 These observations vi'ill not be relished by those who believe ru- 
 lers less selfish than the liistory of all governments prove too many 
 of them to be ; and those concerned in unfair practices would drive 
 propositions for a reform, from the commuJiity ; but experience 
 annually evinces, that man comes into the legislature, and into eve- 
 ry department of government with the frrdlties of human nature 
 about him. Such as he has been at home, in private life, such 
 will he be thei^e ; and every possible temptation to abuse ought to be 
 avoided in the original system, and removed from having any 
 chance of operation upon his mind. 
 
 The most virtuous and honest politician meets public life by the 
 aid of iiis friends, to whom he must feel a certain portion of gratitude, 
 which the system should render him unable to discharge, at the 
 pubhc expense or in any other way, than in faithfully attending to 
 the public good, in the honest discharge of the duties of his office. 
 But now he is no sooner in the legislature, then he sees the exe- 
 cutive clothed with such ample powers, that he knows he can fully 
 recompense his particular friends by recommending them for ap- 
 pointments, provided he can anchor in the port of executive grace. 
 This never will be difficult, while a governor, six years out of rdne 
 needs reciprocal aid. 
 
 A new member of the legislature not fully understandmg the 
 principles of democracy ; not perceiving that public characters must 
 fill importcUit offices, or public confidence in the goverment wil? 
 diminish ; innocently believes, that offices may as well be filled by 
 one set of men as by another, so far as respects the state, if the 
 duties are but well performed ; but as it respects himself, it will 
 become genial with his feelings, entirely to serve those friends, 
 who have hitherto served liim ; and reconciles its justice to his 
 mind, by endeavouring to believe, that the state is well served. 
 
 A citizen on his first entrance into the legislature, before liis mind 
 becomes acquainted with the corrupting nature of patronage, is, be- 
 fore he perceives it, fast progressing uito a labyrinth of executive 
 influence, without suspecting himself of impropriety ; and without 
 strictly exanuning the tendency of his actions ; until one commit- 
 ment alter another, renders it difficult for him to make a safe and 
 honorable retreat. It is only after he has committed errors that he 
 discovers, the cause and the progress in which he fell ; and nine times 
 
( 13 ) 
 
 in ten, he iias too much false pride, or too little resolution to 
 lacc liack his steps or correct his course. 
 
 The members of the lej^islature, notwithstanding, have as good 
 a n>.;lit, undei- the present system, as other men have, to receive 
 commissions from the executive ; the same right to procure 
 them for the pubhc characters who are their friends ; but the 
 evil lies in tlieir being tempted by the hope of office, to give such 
 votes as unnecessarily augment the already enormous power and 
 patronage of the officer to whom the duties of appointment is en- 
 trusted ; to serve a host of his creatures, whc always surround 
 the legislature, read his Avill, and whisper his wishes to the 
 menibers. 
 
 Under such circumstances, the senate composed of but few 
 members, some of them neither armed against intrigue nor always 
 sufficiently conversant with the world to suspect it ; of others perhaps, 
 designedly pursuing every executive measure from selfish motives, 
 must always be dangerous. 
 
 hut suppose, for a moment, that executive patronage were done 
 away ; still that small body, from the very weakness of human nature, 
 would be unsafe. The weaker members would be assailed by the 
 cunning and wealthy, and pursued from house to house, for the 
 purpose of influencing a majority in the carrying of some sinister 
 measures ; or with design to defeat some laudable and useful prin- 
 ciple, which had passed the house of representatives. It is no 
 TUicommon saying that a t^ood dimicr has often carried a bad 
 'ucasure. 
 
 But if there be danger in thus forming an avenue fo power, 
 r.d leavuig it in the hands of a few, who will naturally be disposed 
 o serve themselves and their friends, in preference to discharg- 
 ing tlicir duty ; how much more dangerous must it be, to place 
 that power in the hands of one man^ and in addition thereto, 
 gi\ing him a negative on every law about to pass, that might be 
 unfavourable to the gratification of his ambition, or likely to blast the 
 avaricious pursuits of a surrounding class of designing men. 
 
 The absurdity in a free government, of an executive negative, is 
 ^ot common to all the states of the union. In several of the states, 
 lor example Jersey, the executive has no share affirmative or ne- 
 gative in the legislative power ; and with good reason ; for the 
 principle is a total subversion of the principles of a free govern- 
 ment and of reason itself. The will of the majority is the supreme 
 law, according to the principles of our natural and equal rights. 
 But here the will of one man, is put in competition with the will 
 of 150 men; and he is authorised to render nugatory all that they 
 have done. 
 
 But this is not the whole of the absurdity, the two bodies of men 
 composing the legislature, deliberate and debate upon all measures ; 
 and every measure brought before each house must be read, and 
 open to debate and objection if required at each time ; and the con- 
 currence of a majoiity of each house is requisite to its passage 
 
( H ) 
 
 Vv'hUe the executive who neither hears the arguments nor has £hem 
 reported to them ; and who from the mei-e constitution of human 
 nature, cannot be presumed to know every thing, or any thing, as 
 well as 150 men combined and deliberating — this one man can 
 undo at a dash of caprice, or under the operation of selfishness or 
 passion, all that they have deliberately done. 
 
 ESSAY III. 
 
 iS -THE 'TENURE OF THE yuDlCIARr — {OMl^AI'IBLE WIl'H REPIiE^ 
 ■ HEN-rATirE GOVERNMENT? 
 
 WHEN we view the officers in the judiciary system, stand inde- 
 pendent of the peopie, out of the controul of their constituents ; njt 
 responsible, h\xi uncontroltd and iiidejieiidtnt, the prospect is unfavor- 
 able to liberty. 
 
 In following the British institutions, the convention lost sight of 
 reliresentatwe democracy, and a periodical responsibility, that just 
 easy, and rational mode, of removing obnoxious or useless officers, 
 or of rewarding by restoring the worthy and faithful, without dan- 
 ger to the government, or expence to the people. 
 
 The juridical portion of the constitution, appears as if it was 
 purposely formed for the convenience of the judges, rather than for 
 utility to Ihe people ; from a contemplation of it, a sti-anger might 
 suspect that the society was instituted for the benefit of the judici- 
 ary alone ; affording evidence, that legal characters influenced the 
 convention ; that each lawyer supposed, the day must come which 
 would elevate him on the bench of the supren^e court ; or that his 
 inerit would raise him to the chair of chief justice of the state. 
 
 The phrase indc};iendence of the judges, is borrowed from Britain ; 
 in'antient times the judges were removable at the pleasure of their 
 king ; that is like oflicers of the army, they held their commissi^ 
 ons during the king's pleasure; the judges in those days were 
 found too subservient to their creator and the disposer of their 
 (ortuncs ; great tyranny was exercised over the people, through 
 the influence of the executive power over the judges ; and at a fa- 
 vorable occasion, when the popular voice had some influence, the 
 -■' - iudges were made by law, indejiendent of the executive, not of the 
 C' - people ; for they never were since the Norman conquest dependent 
 on the people. Their tenure of office by the modern law, was dur- 
 ing good behavior ; but of this good behavior, there is no explana- 
 tion in what it consists, nor what is bad behavior. This imitation 
 of the British system, therefore is in no shape applicable to free 
 government ; the first principle of which is res/io?isibility to and 
 not inde/iendence of the people. The experience we have had 
 also shews that the practice is as absurd as the theory was falsQ, 
 inapplicable, and delusive. 
 
( 15 ) 
 
 The ju(li^«s ou!.i,liL to be independent of the iiidivuluals over whosc- 
 causes they pveside, but not of the connininity wlio created them. 
 They now form a i^overnment within a government; they may re- 
 present the executive, Mhat tliey cull the bar, or themselves, but 
 they do not rejiresent or even duly regard the peo[)le. 
 
 A community must be depraved, if respect for virtue, do not so 
 far predominate, as that a judge would be the more beloved and 
 esteemed, for every act of impartial justice done between individuals, 
 although the individuals themselves might be oflended. Virtue in 
 the person of lui elective judge, would have nothing more to fear, 
 ihan it now has in an elective legislature. If they mean to be un- 
 faithful or tyrannic, the people ought to make them afraid. 
 
 There are wrong ways of doing right tlnngs. A judge may be 
 just and impartial, yet another maybe tyrannical and overbearing; 
 one may despise and insult the suitors ; to whom in other respects 
 he deals impariial justice. Such judges as the latter ought justly 
 to fear a periodical resumption of power ; a being called to give an 
 account of lus stewardship ; he ought never to have been a judge 
 among i\ free people. 
 
 It is jx)Ssible nho^bajrly ]wsdblt\ that in some instances, a judge 
 every way qualified as a man and officer, might be left out of office ; 
 and a worse, elected or appointed to serve the people in his place. 
 This although an evil, is of less magnitude iii government, and if 
 the act come directly from the people themselves, the consequence 
 would be easier, and more peaceably borne by them, than if it had 
 resulted from any other source ; and in a periodical resinnption, a 
 remedy presently presents itself; if they had made a wrong choice, 
 they only would feel it ; and the remedy would follow the disco- 
 very. 
 
 To be a good judge, it is not only necessary that a man shoukl 
 be wise and impartial, but the people must thhik him so. He who 
 Tiever had, or who loses the public confidence, ouglit not to be a 
 judge ; his decisions Mill not be satisfactory ; he cannot be useful ; 
 and then tlie first principle of government recurs, '■'■ For %vhose good 
 Kvan the man o/iJwi7itvd?" If for ti;e people's good, surely he ought 
 to be removed, because instead of a good, as was intended for them 
 he has become an evil. ^ 
 
 In Enghuid the case is different ; government there, is only profes- 
 sedly uitended for the good of the people, and even that in a subor- 
 dinate degree ; for their good is lield to be subserxient to a good 
 that is esteemed greater; that of the nobility and royalty. The 
 king is in fact at the head of the nobility, for in all cases where tlie 
 crown or nobility becomes a paily in a suit, it is right in BntLsh 
 Jiolicy,\.\\dX the judge should be independent ol the people— for says 
 IJlackstone " He is the mirror by wliich the king's image is reflect- 
 '■d" in order that if there should be a departure froni justice, what 
 to the nobility appears to be the least interest, the interest of the 
 people, — should be sacrificed. 
 
( 16 ) 
 
 It is a sacrifice of liberty to place the judges independent of the 
 community, whose minister they arc, and who pay them for their 
 service, and for whose benefit they were instituted ; and to whom, 
 by election or re-appointment, they ought to be periodically ac- 
 countable. 
 
 Under this view, our judiciary system appears pregnant with 
 evil, from the chief justice down to the most paltry justice of peace. 
 These officers might have been legally appointed under the pre- 
 sent constitution, and many of them are good men ; but wliei'e 
 they are not, they must nevertheless be justices, or judges during 
 life ; the evil under the present system must remain, without any 
 effectual remedy. Their accountability by impeachment or ad- 
 dress through the legislature, has been proved to be much worse 
 than ideal ; it is so far removed from the people, that many will bear 
 insult and injury, rather than be at the expence and anxiety of a 
 regular hearing before that body. And it is melancholy to-state, 
 that men who have had public virtue enough to complain of hideous 
 injuries, have, instead of justice, entailed on them and their families 
 new persecutions, amounting, as far as public feeling and justice 
 would admit, to a proscription in the midst of society. 
 
 This independence of the judges ; this appointment during good 
 behaviour, is one of t e greatest absurdities in a democracy that 
 can possibly be imagined ; and in many instances operates exactly 
 the reverse of what was expected by the people. In many instan* 
 ces it is a continuance during bad behaviour. It is truly the coun- 
 terpart of hereditary government ; for though the sons of rulers are 
 not rulers by descent, yet by descent thousands are ruled under an 
 indirect ancestral choice, in the aristocratic appomtment and conti- 
 nuance of the judges and justices of the peace ; and consequently 
 by men, whom neither directly by themselves, nor indirectly by 
 their agents, have they ever had, or ever can have a vote in ap- 
 pointing. 
 
 The judiciary is composed of a numerous body of men ; they 
 form an aristocracy which has nothing to check its growth, but 
 public opinion aiid public virtue. While this security lasts, they 
 cannot do much evil, but the moment these fail,— -and they will ebb 
 and flow like other things,— our situation will be gradually growing 
 worse, and unless the principle be amended, the consequences to 
 be expected, are incalculable CAils to ourselves, and our latest 
 posterity. 
 
t 17 ) 
 
 ^ ESSAY IV. 
 
 Dots 7'HE yUDIClARr SYSTEM PRODUCE A REAL REDRESS OP 
 li^ROSCS? 
 
 THE jucUciavy forms an arisloracy which hasnolhint; to check, its 
 growtli, but ])uljlic opinion and public virtue ; these operate but very 
 slii^:uly ; yet they must, under the present public impression, in 
 due time pro\'ide a better system as a remedy that will remove the 
 evil. It is an evil wliich to be proved needs only to be mentioned ; 
 it conies home to tlie door of every man ; good or bad, wise or igno- 
 rant ; almost all see the effects and thousands feci them. 
 
 Allusion is now more particularly made to the justices of the 
 peace. There are many good men among them, but a great num- 
 ber, some way or other, are bad Some of them were orignally bad 
 men, both avaricious and immoral. They entered the office by 
 another door tlian that winch democracy points out ; they entered 
 through favoriteism imd intrigue. Others have become bad officers 
 by their improper independence of the people. Weak heads have 
 become intoxicated with power, anul tliey have entered warmly with 
 the adherents to British institutions, into the idea that an office ap- 
 pointed for public use and convenience, when an individual is invested 
 with its authoi'ity, constitutes nfrcchold estate — or estate in^f'^ sinifile. 
 
 No doubt many of these men once supjwsed government was made 
 for the good of the people ; but being seduced by an improper inde- 
 pendence, they now act^ as if they believed that the people Avere 
 made for the good of the magistrates, and are willing to tiu-n them 
 to their own convenience and aggrandizement. By this means the 
 people by theii- very institutions estal)lish premiums for enmity and 
 and treachery to their rights and interests. 
 
 The governor has power to appoint a competent number of ma- 
 gistrates, of which number also he is the sole judge ; and no law can be 
 made under this constitution to restraiti him, from appointing any 
 number he may think necessary to promote his influence. The 
 number has encreased ever since 1790, with an accelerated pro- 
 gress, and the more it encreases, the more it must encrease, to 
 satisfy the minions of power. 
 
 When one dies or leaves his district, frecjuently tw^o arc appoint- 
 ed, because one could not be had central. Sometimes the formei' 
 has returned and again officiated ; and thus from one— h ivc arisen 
 three. Nay sometimes an elopement has taken place, and continu- 
 ed for more than a year, when the officer has again returned to his 
 station of public business without public confidence, and remained 
 independent of the people to the disgrace of the community. 
 
 If a remedy be asked for these evils under the present system, 
 the answer must be, that there is none ; there can be noncy but a re- 
 currence to the principles of reformation. 
 
 C 
 
( 18 ) 
 
 The nvimber of justices is great ; we find them in all places, but 
 too seldom find them respectable ; — because the office has become 
 so cheap, that many of our best citizens are not willing to accept 
 it ; and we have no evidence nor security that every new governor 
 will not think it his interest to make it still cheaper. For if he 
 should be corrupt, he may count on the encrease of justices as an 
 encrease of popularity, and calculate on their gratitude to support 
 his re-election. 
 
 Although the justices of peace are of no expencetothe people, in 
 the first instance, yet they are costly in the sequel. The weak and 
 vain officers, as well as the corrupt and vicious, have much in their 
 power, either to manage the disputes of their neighbours to their 
 own advantage ; to encrease them for vain purposes, or mer- 
 cenary ends, or to quiet them for the good of the community. 
 Corruption and design can raise several actions out of one, and 
 when there is no periodical check, a bad heart will too often indulge 
 in the evil. 
 
 With some justices this is frequently the case ; and why is it so, 
 but because they belong to the executive who appoints them, and 
 not to the people of whom they are hidependent ; or because they 
 belong to themselves, under the present constitution, rather than to 
 either, being independent of both. 
 
 Impeachment and address are the only modes pointed out by the 
 constitution for removal, and yet when considered in their applica- 
 tion, they are found to be completely delusive, 
 
 A justice one hundred miles from the legislature, though he 
 should frequently do, wrong iii his office, insult the citizens, and even 
 practice extortion, is in no great danger of being brought before the 
 legislature, unless he should be met with by a man of uncommon 
 spirit, Avho will not be imposed upon ; and who will spend more 
 time and money than ten times his loss by the justice, merely for 
 the sake of the public good. 
 
 It is said by the enemies of equal rights, that the people are turbu- 
 lent, uneasy under wholesome restraint, and could not be supposed 
 to suffer a justice to abuse them. But experience proves, that 
 they are too peaceable to carry every grievance to the legislature, 
 and therefore very improper acts of their justices pass with impu- 
 nity, 
 
 IVIen ought to complain of evil when they feel it, and if to resist 
 oppression with a manly energy deserve that name, who is to blame, 
 the authors of oppression or those who resist. But the people fre- 
 quently bear the abuse of power too long ; even until their rulers 
 have filled the measure of their iniquity ; and it is no wonder, if in 
 the hour of desperation, they proceed to acts of extravagance, 
 which every good man in his cooler moments must deplore. 
 
 These are some of the many evils resulting from the justices be- 
 ing independent of the people. They are evils which arise from 
 the people's having resigned their power to these officers, without 
 reserving to themselves a periodical resumption of that power. By 
 
( ly ) 
 
 their having abandoned the exercise of sovereignty to tlie execu- 
 tive, in a case where, without tuiy inconvenience, they could have 
 exercised it themselves. In a case where he cannot have correct 
 information, although he is obliged to act ; and where they have all 
 the means necessary to form a correct opinion, as to the characters 
 which they ought to select. 
 
 The judicial aristocracy will not favour these ideas, although 
 the wise and good men among them may. The selfish and evil 
 disposed, will unite to oppose what they believe to be contrary to 
 their interest a'i ofliccrs. Having become obnoxious to the people 
 by their abuse of jiower ; having received their offices in many in- 
 stances, without the knowledge of the p-.-ople, and in others contra- 
 ry to their wishes, they dread any in\provement of the present 
 system, because it would put them on the back ground of the com- 
 munity, where many of them would ever remain. 
 
 It is a principle in democracy, and it is a just one, that whatever 
 power the people in their individual capacity can conveniently 
 exercise in an orderly way, should never be delegated to officers ; and 
 as they can conveniently and orderly elect their justices of peace in 
 such districts as arc or may be formed, they ought not to delegate that 
 power to a governor or to an assembly, but exercise it themselves. 
 The most domestic among the people, are generally acquainted 
 with each other, through their townships and districts ; and all the 
 most active characters especially, who would be likely to be elected 
 justices of the peace, would be well known to every citizen ; it is, 
 therefore, not possible that in any district whatever, they would be 
 so uninformed of each other, as not to choose the best men for 
 public officers. 
 
 But suppose them, by choice, to be deceived, and make mistakes ; 
 as the evil arose among themselves under a system, that puts the 
 power again into their own hands, in a few years, they would pa- 
 tiently bear the consequences, wait that period, and take care not 
 to place it a second time, Avhere it had once been abused. 
 
 Although the justice were not the best of men, yet, under such a 
 system, if he loved power, the design of retaining it would operate 
 so as to correct many of the less evils that might arise out of a bad 
 disposition. 
 
 Under this mode, the justices of the peace must retain the con- 
 Sdence of the people, or they could not long retain the office, which 
 would then be founded upon confidence. The people would cease 
 to be uneasy ; they could remove the cause of any uneasiness 
 themselves ; tiiey could do it without any loss of time, or any 
 expence, at the expiration of the period for which their justices 
 were elected. ' "" 
 
 If, by chance, they injured themselves by leaving out a wcTthy 
 man, /w would have no right to complaui ; he would have known 
 that he had been elected for the good of the people, to continue 
 until a certain period ; and afterwards at their will to be re-elected 
 or rejected. He would have known the tenure of his oflice, its 
 period had been fulfilled, and he could not legally ask for more. 
 
( 20 ) 
 
 This mode of election by the people, would preclude midnight 
 appointments : every thing would be done at a fair open township or 
 district election. It would check the unprincipled intriguer, and 
 bring to candid investigation, the character of every man who became 
 a candidate for office. 
 
 Were the justices thus elected, within districts formed of a con- 
 venient size, without being so small as to create too many officers j 
 the office would soon rise in importance, many of our best citizens 
 who have leisure, would accept the place as an honorable trust, in 
 which they would have every inducement to act respectably for the 
 sake of their own continuance, as well as the good of their fellow 
 men. A bad man would scarcely be elected a second time ; his bad 
 conduct the few years of his periodin office, would assuredly consign 
 him to perpetual oblivion, ■ 
 
 The best criterion to judge of the future is by the past ; the justices 
 that were foiTnerly elected by the people, many of them were 
 among the first characters ; there was always a sufficient number 
 of them in every county, to conduct the business of the courts with 
 decency and ability. It is impossible to help contrasting them 
 ■\vith the present. In this the people have shewn more dignity and 
 a better understanding of their own true interest, than all the wisdom 
 of two governors, aided by those who surrounded, and shaded 
 them from the unhallowed touch of the swinish multitude. Upon 
 the whole, the present system is calculated rather to prevent re- 
 dress than to obtain it; and to add to, instead of diminishing, the 
 evils of society. 
 
 ESSAY V. 
 
 OF DECEITS ON THE PEOPLE CONCERNING yUSTlCE. 
 
 THE abuses of judicial proceedings in this state have been strong- 
 ly contested between the bench and the bar on one side, and the 
 people on the other for many years. The two former are inci- 
 dentally in the exercise of the judicial power, and until lately, felt 
 themselves independent of the people. They now indeed see there 
 must at last be a reform ; the i^dea goads them, and from 
 ailticipated defeat, they are the more inflamed for domination. 
 They see that finally they will be reduced to the ranks of equality 
 with the people. 
 
 The principle of arbitration has been developed, and successfully 
 contended for ; even the most tiioughtlt- ss have only to be put in mind 
 of their interest in it, to know and understand it ; and this has been 
 done by able pens skilfully exerted. But tb.ey have partly contended 
 on bad ground. The principle thougli good abstracted from the 
 constitution will always be lame under it 
 
 It is evident to the bar, that the words, "trial by jury as hereto- 
 fore" will always, to the generality, afibrd a field for argument, on 
 which they can perpetuaily dilate ; that it affords them pretext to 
 argue in favor of a system which gi\'es emolument and influence to 
 
C '^1 ) 
 
 an excluiiivc sect, veiled under iheir cunt in technicals : and 
 even to minds uncontannnaled witli court cant will, like tliv 
 i^lorioiis uncertuiiitii of the common luiv^ leave a doubt, whether 
 the convention intended to preserve every part of the form 
 wiihovit trusting tlie ])eo[)le's ordinary representatives to alter 
 the minutest part, hov.cver inconvenient. It will leave a doui>l ; 
 for from the features of the constitution itself, it is plainly deduciblc, 
 tliat tiie majority ol" its framers doubted the \\ isdom and viitue of 
 the people ; lukI conceived themselves of a superior order, able to it- 
 gvilate their concerns, and therefore might have intended to leave 
 nothing for posterity to do. Having no errors in their view to 
 correct, though Me y<>r?;i of the trial is evidently one, they provided 
 no remedy, no means to remove them. They wished to make the 
 people believe, what the aristocracy still inculcate, that the iji- 
 strument is sacred from the unhallowed touch ; that it is an eulogium 
 upon the wisdom of man, and might be polluted by vulgar hands. 
 
 Under tliis idea of PKRFKeTAiuLiTY,///(°yor/« of the trial is so de- 
 signedly interwoven w ith the trial itself, that difficulties in a reform 
 stare the reformer in the face. A reform is absolutely and evident- 
 ly necessary, but the dilliculty is to efl'ect it, without uifringing the 
 letter of the constitution, perhaps its spii'it also ; and when effected 
 consistently with that insti'ument drags too much expence and 
 delay for the citizens who are destitute of property and leisure, 
 
 I'hese evils are unavoidable ; they are the efiect of early habits, 
 and prejudices, and of artful subtelties which operated in the con- 
 vention, and cannot be removed but by a revision. Not by a 
 radical change of the excellent principles of the trial by jtiry, 
 which ought always to remain inviolate ; but by modifying the ex- 
 pression, so as to make the trial by jury consist in a dispassionate 
 and hicorrupt selection, an open candid investigation and decision ; 
 not to be made under less than a specific number of respectable 
 citizens, . with unbiassed minds, out of the reach of dependence and 
 fear; and who would have no inducement to do wrong. Such 
 a jury trial ought to be as fixed as the base of the Alleghany, but 
 tlic impro\-ement of the form, and the prevention of abuse, should 
 be left to the ordinary powers of legislation. 
 
 It is Weakness or wickedness to contend, that under the legal 
 idea, the Avords " trial by jury as heretofore" are adapted to the 
 present state and wishes of society. Tlie people have been petiti- 
 oning for a revision of tins very form f<om time to time, under the 
 idea of extending the powers of the justices of the peace. The 
 legislature in almost every instance, ha', e attempted to gratify them, 
 but insurmountable diflicullies presented themselves. They were 
 afraid of infracting the constitution on one side, or rcStdcting the 
 nghts of the people on the other; and every thing produced, has 
 been short of tlie public w ish ; and ever Avill be so, until the hos- 
 tility which impedes the improvement, be removed from the consti- 
 tution. That being done, the people will emaiicipate themselves 
 frona the clamour of the aristocracy, save much of the expence 
 
( 2^ ) 
 
 •and drudgery of courts, and secure the advantages of a cheap and 
 easy mode of arbitration and jury trial. 
 
 There is no necessity in numerous cases for the present form of 
 jury trial, in contentions about property. Even the bench and bar 
 are willing to dispense with it in contentions for small sums, and 
 the people might do it in all. 
 
 The bendi and bar dispense at present with not only the form 
 of jury trial, but even with the trial itself, if the property in dis- 
 pute is not worthy the attention of the wealthy, nor profitable to the 
 attorney ; but when it is to a larger amount, disputes with them 
 assume importance, become sacred, and must be consecrated by 
 the bench and the bar. Every claim in dispute, above ten pounds 
 value, they believe should be tried by a court and jury, under the 
 operation of a mystic science, which like Alchemy of old, had no other 
 value than the technical absurdity under which it was concealed ; 
 every suit under that amount, may be tried by any body ; even by 
 arbitrators. What absurdity 1 The claims of the poor, of the people 
 ■who eaiTTi their bread by the sweat of their brow, under this system, 
 are not worth regarding ; but the claims of the few, the rights of 
 wealth, are to be guarded by the eagle eye of a lawyer. But the 
 most serious part of the evil is, that when the diff rcnce arises be- 
 tween a poor man and a rich man, the lattter has all the advantage 
 which large fees hold over the priests of justice. 
 
 There is not a single reason in favor of a jury trial, but what 
 will apply to property of small, as well as large amount, when held 
 by persons of corresponding circumstances ; and before one court 
 as well as before another ; then why is it not generally applied ; and 
 in chancery as well as in other courts ? 
 
 I know but little of technicals; I have never renounced common 
 sense to learn them ; but in common with others, I know that a 
 trial about the right of property, is a trial about firojierty in any 
 coiut ; and if the jury trial in all its forms, be essential to its secu- 
 rity, I can see but one reason why it is dispensed with in chancery, 
 and in that the bench and the bar already having the power, con- 
 sider themselves capable of transacting the business, ■v\ithout the 
 aid of the people. 
 
 The noise 'dbonX jury m'c/ is therefore a cheat, it is raised merely 
 to keep the people's interest out of their own hands. The bench 
 and bar of this state, have long struggled for chancery poivers, 
 where no jiny is admitted, and have ah^ays been prevented by the 
 people ; and always will be. 
 
 In land disputes at present, where the board of property decide 
 who has the right of patenting ; so far as they are uninfluenced by the 
 executive ^d the bar, decide as arbitrators ; they decide as both 
 court and jury. Their decisions are far removed from the people ; 
 subject indirectly and improperly to the control of the executive, 
 and open at all times to the sophistry of the bar ; and, therefore, 
 the want of a jury trial any more than the want of legal knowledge 
 in that court, has never given any umbrage, to tliose who were 
 
( 23 ) 
 
 making; so much noise about the people destroying themselves, by 
 a revision of the constitution, and reform of the judiciary. 
 
 It appears improbable, that a compleat reform in the judiciary 
 ^vill take place aii:reeably to the general wish, previous to a reform 
 in the constitution. Like the jury trial, the supreme covn-t is so 
 interAvoven uith the system, and the other courts so much cour 
 nected with it, that to amend the detail under the leading princi- 
 ples and connection, will be Ibund like pouring water through the 
 wrong end of a funnel. 
 
 The present existing system is derived from monarchy and aris- 
 tocracy — the court of Ung'.s bench, and partakes of the spirit of 
 the monarch and his nobles ; but is badly adapted to the haljils of 
 men under any genuine democracy. The court like the monarch 
 seems to dictate, but its dictates would be inoperative, were they 
 not aided by the bar, as the wishes of the king are aided by his 
 nobility. These two persons willingly unite when they can, they 
 would be every thing and let the people be nothing — nodung but 
 the machinary to be wound to any purpose and to any point. They 
 must l)e sworn to give a true verdict, and starvecl,till they compl) 
 with the wishes of the court. If they agree among themselves, 
 the court may differ fropi them, set their verdict aside, destroy all 
 they have done, aTtdtfds is the boasted jury trial 1 1 
 
 The circuit court held by the supreme judges, \vltl)in the seve- 
 ral counties, may be useful at present, but it ever wc should have 
 a democratic comt — a representative court within each county, in 
 Avhich the people will have confidence, its use except in crinunal 
 cases, will be totally superceded. 
 
 The general opinion, until lately, seems to have given the circuit 
 court only the trial of the most important cases, to which the 
 knowlege of the infeiior courts was not adequate. But if any 
 knowlege be wanting, it cannot be that derived from common 
 sense ; that prevails as much in inferior courts, as in the superior ; 
 as much at the plough as at the bar. If it be a knowlege of the 
 mode of proceedings, that consists mostly in the knowlege of 
 technicals, a difliculty that will be removed, by a revision of the 
 system. But it is now very well understood, that the circuit court 
 is almost wholly used for delay — for a prevention of justice by the 
 litigious. 
 
 When causes have been continued below, until they must be tried 
 or removed ; removal is resorted to, only to produce new delay, 
 wliich, instead of ending knotty cases, prevents the trial of the most 
 simple, sometimes double the usual time ; and three times out of 
 four, when the litigious can delay no longer, they will, if possible, 
 avoid a trial, by a comjiromiae ofjunticc. 
 
 Man is the creature of habit, and truth has the greatest difficulty 
 to root out error, or we should never, under a free government, 
 have so long submitted to the evils of the judiciary, and rules of 
 law which no two judges or lawyers know, or can agree upon.— 
 We should have been guided by common sense to the pause of 
 
( 24 ) 
 
 actions f(M' a knowlege of them, and a rational mode of termination 
 v.'ould have follo\\ed. 
 
 if v/e resort to experience, all the actions which have arisen, 
 are from very simple causes ; mostly from angry men whose 
 passions darken their understandings from a knowlege of justice, 
 or from avaricious m^en who, unjustly, covet the property of 
 others : both could luive been ended fairly, while they were new 
 enough to be understood by dispassionate men of common sense, 
 not interested on either side. Here is the use and benefit of arbi- 
 tration, the most rational mode of settling disputes ; but it does not 
 suit the interest of the bench and bar. They wish to legalize every 
 valuable suit, and lard it witli the technicals of a few courts below, 
 and a few courts above, and end it to their own advantage. They 
 study to encrease the variance and intricacy to their profit, wthout 
 which tliey could not be enriched. They speak loud about jury 
 tiial, but are always ready to dispense with the people's serntcs 
 therein, when they can be court and jury themselves. 
 
 If wc had not followed too closely the form of the English judi- 
 ciary, a mu<:h more simple plan of coints and juries would have 
 been devised ; better adapted to our h:ibits as a free people, and 
 almost infinitely preferable to th.e one used at present. 
 
 ^Vhen we view Pennsylvama as an independent state, every part 
 connected with the whole ; we see it united principally for defence, 
 and presently discover all the unity that is absolutely necessary for 
 judicial purposes ; so much in extent, as produces a physical 
 power, sufficient when aided by public opinion, to ensure internal 
 order under the operation of law..' 
 
 When a nation, or peo[)le, are settled on an extensive soil, and 
 connected for their defence, utility soon points out the necessity of 
 small divisions. Scarcely any thing, but defence, relative to soci- 
 ety, requires much extent. Were the state a plain, about thirty 
 miles scjuare, is the space which, if not very populous, might be 
 conveniently allotted for a county, anil about five for a to^vnship ; 
 and this extent Avould answer all the purposes for which they 
 %vere originally designed, without inconvenience or burthen to the 
 people. 
 
 Every county is acquainted with the nature of its oa\ii disputes ; 
 and in this enlightened country, where nine tenths of the people 
 can read and write, and one tenth though following the plough or 
 throwing the shuttle, are scriveners, can settle their own disputes 
 among themselves in the most beneficial manner ; either by arbi- 
 tration in its first or second stage ; or in their county court, with 
 the printijile extended to a reformed jury trial, before judges 
 chosen from among themselves ; but further than this, an action 
 ought never to go. 
 
 It is absurd to suppose that a citizen of Northumberland should 
 understand the concerns of the people of Alleghany better than 
 themselves, or that a judge of Berks could assist the wisdom of 
 Philadelphia in settling disputes. But all this may be necessary, 
 
( 25 ) ^ 
 
 v.hen suits are carried from courl to coiii-t, and coiu^nvied from 
 year to year, until tliey become so intricate tliat even a court ol 
 lawyers c.;nnot conipreliend them. 
 
 A county couit composed of five judges, to be chosen by the 
 people, to serve for five years, gointj out by rotation, one annually, 
 and re-eligible— districts composed of from three to six counties — • 
 superintended by presidents to be chosen for the same time, either 
 by the people at large in the manner that senators are now chosen, 
 if not too inconvenient ; or to be appointed by the executive and 
 
 approbated by the assembly a triennial state court to be 
 
 held at the seat of government by the supreme judges iind presi- 
 dents, in order that uniiorn\ity might be kept in view through the 
 state, would answer all the purposes with less expence, and abun- 
 daritiy less fatigue to the people, of the supreme — circuit court- 
 quarter sessions, &:c. Sec. now in use through the state. If any 
 
 error or mistake appeared, it might be rectified discretion 
 
 might be used as at present to order a new trial. 
 
 It will be ailedgeil tnat these courts would not be adequate to de- 
 termine difficult cases ; that ignorance' would operate injustice. 
 
 Let it be supposed, (though it is not admitted) that this would 
 sometimes be tne case ; yet will a few instances, of that kind, hap- 
 pening rarely (not more frequently than at present) be as great an 
 evil, as the delay and expence which now take place in the most 
 ti-lrling cases, to the prevention of justice iind ruin of families ? 
 
 But cases are not ciiincuit in their first stage ; we know they are 
 not ; they are made so for the purposes of avarice. 
 
 Every enlightened man knows, that near to liimself, at his own 
 door, among the many disputes he -has seen aiise, he has never 
 known one, but what coVild have been faiily ended upon the prin- 
 ciples of equity, by a few disinterested intelligent men v.-iihin the 
 vicinity of tlie parties, soon after it had happened ; provided the angry 
 or iraudulaiit had been obliged to submit before it had been rendered 
 difficult by technical obscurity. And when a large "proportion of 
 the suits were sifted away by arbitration, the courts proposed woidd 
 be competent to tiie final ending of all disputes to any amount, that it 
 might be thought proper to exempt from the first tribunal. Mostly 
 at the first court, but geneially at the second, the i>arties could be 
 prepared, if they knew they must, with the best, and worst evi- 
 dence their cases admitted. 
 
 The bench and bar will lift their hands with affected surprise 
 and indignation, on hearing a proposition for so simple and speedy 
 a mode, and speak of tlie consequences of precipitancy, and want 
 of legality, without wishing to remember, that \\hen..a. man is 
 charged with felony or murder, under the present system, unless 
 he should have abundance of money, he will be obliged to be ready 
 for trial the first term, although in some instances it might be po.-,- 
 Fible to prove absence and innocence of the crime. Ikit if it be a 
 contention about property — the value of a horse or two or three 
 cows, the action can be delayed for years. 
 
 D 
 
( 26 ) 
 
 The present incorrect system is evidently calculated to oppress 
 every clsss of citizens destitute of wealth and leisure ; those who 
 are possessed of both, may be armed to meet its evils. 
 
 There is no necessity for the subsisting solemn mockery, of the 
 mere form of a jury trial about property, provided the substance of 
 a candid trud be strictly attended to ; and tlie courts proposed, 
 "would answer the puiposes of a technical court, which is now sur- 
 rounded by lawyers quoting authorities and splitting cases for hours, 
 to prevent honest suitors from coming directly to the point of decision. 
 
 But in criminal cases, for c:ipital offences, where life is at stake, 
 there is something disagreeable in a decision, which may take a fellow 
 creature away from the community, and send liim to eternity. There 
 is then something attached to the office of judge, that should not 
 be called odious, but it is (lisagreeal)le to such an extent, that it 
 would be better, that the officer who unfolds such a scene, should 
 reside at a distance from the kindred, the friends, the associates of 
 the amputated member of the gloomy circle. 
 
 The form of the trial could not be too simple; but without un- 
 necessary delay, it should be slow and solemn ; evidencing that the 
 laws in a democracy have the greatest regard for the life of man ; 
 for the life of its citizens. I'or it has become a question among wise 
 and good men, as well christians as other philosophers, " Whether 
 a community having a refractory member, a heinous offender 
 against the lavi's of order and morality in custody, within their 
 power, have a right to take his life away for offences ; if without 
 the infliction of such punishment, they could render him safe and 
 useful by labour?" Or in other words, " whether the community 
 have a right to put any man to death in cold blood, when it would 
 be dastardly cruel and criminal, for the soldier to do it in the field 
 of battle after his enemy is vanquished V 
 
 Although no odium should attach to the office of judge, while 
 the laws of the commonwealth punish with death, yet if the doubt 
 of its propriety become prevalent, an alteration will take place, and 
 however worthy, mild, and amiable may have been the disposition 
 of the court in the operation of sanguinary laws, the solemn scenes 
 of execution, will never cease presenting themselves to the minds 
 of the vicinity during the present age ; and the judge Avill continue a 
 perpetual abhorrence to the connections of the wretched sufferer, 
 and an object disagreeable to thousands of prudent men. 
 
 The utility of executions on offenders, or to the offended com- 
 munity, and their effects are delicate questions, that must coolly 
 ripen ; and although it would be right to take a robber or murderer, 
 or disturber of the public peace dead or alive, that would not yield 
 to be tried by the laws, for crimes alledged ; yet so soon as he should 
 be safely in custody, would it not be better to be at the expence of 
 his subsistance, than to see his life taken away for the offence ? 
 
 If the community could be safe from his evil disjiosition, if repa- 
 ration could be made for the offence, would not the conscience of 
 every individual concerned, feel perfectly at ease, in a\ oiding a use-. 
 
( 127 ; 
 
 >ess sacrifice, by leaving the life of the offender in the hundsof ita 
 omnipotent creator, to be retjuired at his pleasure. 
 
 ESSAY VI. 
 
 9N rilE PERNICIOUS INFLUENCE OF FASIOU!^ POtt'ERS IN THE 
 EXECUflVE. 
 
 IN Pennsylvania, the governor or executive officer, has a nega- 
 tive on the passage of laws, almost equal to two thirds of both 
 branches of the legislature. This legislative negative iias always 
 been useless, sometimes worse, and might at critical periods be 
 Lnjiu'ious to the state. 
 
 But he has otJier powers which arc extremely pernicious under 
 the best governors; that is, the absolute power of filling offices, 
 where in many instances it is impossible for him to know the men. 
 
 His information may be through corrupt or selfish channels j 
 
 sometimes from men who wish to ha\e their friends appointed. 
 
 Under a corrupt governor it will still be worse ; every son, every 
 
 kinsman, his favorites and theirs, whether capable or not ; with or 
 
 without the public confidence, \\iil be brought from obscurity ; even 
 
 from other states not by the people — and placed over the 
 
 people, to bask in the sunshine of royal patronage ; and those ex- 
 cluded in whom the people, have every reasonable confidence. 
 
 Our government is a democracy ; it is foimded on public opinion j 
 and whether good or dclcctive, rises out of the people ; the system 
 therefore should have been so framed as that no door could be 
 open to such abuses. 
 
 The constitution ought to have been such, that when evils arise, 
 the people at certain periods by election or otherwise, should be 
 able constitutionally to check them. 
 
 But the evils of absolute appointments imt'mit limitation of time, 
 have no check, they are both the origin and result of despotism : 
 they arise from power in the first and second instance, perniciously 
 placed, and are the soiu'ce of permanent evil. 
 
 I'he governor is the legitimate organ of the government ; the 
 head or the executive ; as soon therefore as the people legitimately 
 say a man should receive any important appointment or office, 
 there would be no evil in directing the exccutiNC to commission 
 him ; thereby expressing the iniblic will. But in no instance should 
 he have absolute power to appoint to office except immediately 
 under himself, where from the nature of the duties to Lc performed, 
 the officers were directly to be accountable to liim as the head of 
 the executive department : where he would be itcquainted with their 
 quaUfications and faithfulness, and immediately answerable for their 
 conduct to the people. 
 
( 28 ) 
 
 So many offices being in the t^ift of the executive ; in the gift of. 
 any one man, howe>er good he might be ; however virtuous the 
 minds of the applicants would consequently consume too great 
 a portion of that time, which could be more ri-tionully and usefully 
 employed in seeing that the laws were faithfvilly executed through 
 the state ; and that speculations were prevented near the govern- 
 ment. 
 
 But if he were bad, and it were possible more to corrupt him, 
 the present pdwers and duties throw so much adulation at his feet j 
 samany sycophants as well as honest citizens within his vision, 
 that it is morally impossible, that the man to whom thousands bow, 
 should not daily and hourly become worse, until in the n.idst of 
 slansh minds, he should be worshipped into forgetfubiess of law, 
 of the rights of the people, and of a correct knowlege oi himself. 
 
 In this despotic power, or triennial despotism given to the gover- 
 nor, tiie convention turned tiieir eyes again to Britain. They mis- 
 took the executive for the fountciin of honor, and supposed as the 
 British suppose of their king — that a governor could do no wrong ; 
 when witniu a democracy, he is the mere emanation of sovereign- 
 ty—a reflection of power from tb.e people, and as accountable to 
 them by a periodical resumption of their power, as any other 
 officer. 
 
 The governor's election or appointment is entirely popular, it is 
 democratic ; but his powers are aristocratic, without any check, 
 but a wide spread distant and ideal responsibility : his fiuictions 
 are absolutely dcs/:otic. The appointments are too numerous to 
 come from any one department, they sliould be divided. 
 
 The governor is ignorant three times out of four, of the qualifi- 
 cations of the men whom he appoints to office. He may some- 
 times do wrong knowingly ; but he must at other times do wrong 
 necessarily, from the defect of the system, in vesting him with the 
 absolute power of appointment of hundreds of meo to office, with 
 whom he never can has e been acquainted. Here then is a greater 
 evil than would result from elections ; for at least those in a man's 
 neighbourhood could judge of his charc^cter and qualifications. 
 
 Under a false idea of political perfection, the convention gave 
 the executive unnatural, and in respect to appointments unlimited 
 power; but they became alarmed with the idol tliey had set up — . 
 wita tiieir own idol — no wonder — and directly suid, he shall in no 
 instance, exercist this jjower longer than nine years in succession, 
 thou<:;h the people wish it. Wiiut an abiiurdity ! The convention 
 would neither trust their own iflol, nor the wisdom of the people. 
 What a sad situation 1 Had liiey only given liim useful power and 
 no more "than one man could exercise consistently with the public 
 safety, they would not Have feared the despot, nor tied the hands 
 of the people. 
 
 Under the present system, a governor once elected, is probably 
 in every instance so powerfully entrenclied in office behind iii own 
 creatures, many removeable at will, as to continue nine years j and 
 
C .'J > 
 
 the idea of his tricnniiil elec'aoii, or impcachmtnt for mihdemcanor 
 111 ollicc, praclic;.lly dclusivt; iaid i itiiculoiis. 
 
 lie tliut holds the breath of so many oflficcrs, let him be a j^ootl 
 or evil tjiovcrnor, is likely, in every instuiice to be continued for 
 nine years. Nay, drunkenness, ciibhipation, insolence or tyranny, 
 vill scarcely prevent liini. He should have such moderate powers, 
 so limited as to have Icli him less dangerous, or under tlie present 
 system made eligible to otiice, after his first triennial period, at 
 least for nine years. Thus \vilh the greater tyrants, the people 
 would have h.d the smaller ones removed that were insolent or 
 evil, every third year, and prevented the executive groM th of ab- 
 solute power, by a rapid cliange of rulers. 
 
 This power thus placed in a governor, is necessarily pernicious, 
 because he is bcjvuid to perform duties which he ctmnot understand, 
 wnd he appoints men of wiiom he can have no opportunity of know, 
 lege. He returns to private life, but leaves many of his creatures 
 in the judiciary, lasting monuments of the impel feciion of oin- po- 
 litical institutions. ^V ithout evil intention he might have men in 
 power, in office, able to walk the serpentine p .it:, between law aid 
 justice, exercising petty tyranny during life, without coming witli- 
 m retich of detection so as to produce a removal. 
 
 ESSAY VII. 
 
 OF rue. DAHG&ROVS POJlEJi OF THE LXECVriVK OrKR TflE PUBLtC 
 
 rt/iiSE.' 
 
 IN a democracy the executive should have as little influence 
 over the treasury, as is consistent with liis genei'al powers of sceiu"' 
 the laws faithfully executed; for fear it should become, hi iiis 
 hands, an engine of corruption, and under colour of facilitating the 
 execution of the laws, be indirectly Uoed to debase and corrupt the 
 eople. 
 
 The purse of the people, in the hands of their officers, should be 
 used as carefully as the blood of a puLient by a prudent physician, 
 for, although it is not the soul of democracy, yet, if it be drawn 
 improperly, and lavished away on a set of unpruicipied intriguers, 
 under colour of law, it will have a strong tendency to injuie the 
 body jwlitic ; and by weakening public confidence in democratic 
 iiistilutiuiis, cvciilurtlly destroy the very vitals of our political 
 existence. 
 
 The treasury ought to be kept as near to the people as is con- 
 sistent with their scattered siiualion ; hence, by awi^e constitutional 
 regulation, although not sullicier.tly extensive, the state treasurer 
 is elected annually, by a joint vote of the members of both houses. 
 11 liis integrity be iioul)tedj although there be no proof of embezzle- 
 
( 30 ) 
 
 ment of the public money) he can be left Out of office ihe year 
 following, without the expence of an impeachment. 
 
 Formerly the treasurer was possessed of the power, in part, of 
 an accountant officer. To this power, as well as the safe keeping 
 of the money, undoubtedly the convention turned their attention 
 when his election was instituted ; but that power is now chiefly 
 vested in the register and comptroller, where no doubt it would 
 be as safe, were the same check, annual election extended. But 
 instead of that, they are appointed by the executive under law 
 during pleasure ; and not accountable to the people through the 
 annual representatives, as the convention seem to have intended the 
 officer holding the purse of the state should always be. 
 
 The governor's constitutional power over the treasury, is only to 
 see the laws faithfully executed ; but under the laws noAV in force, 
 when a difference of opinion arises between the register and the 
 comptroller, on the settlement of accounts, which is either with- 
 holding or drawing money from the treasury, the governor is to be 
 the umpire and shall decide. 
 
 As -these officers are appointed Ijy him and removable at plea- 
 sure, he has from their dependence an improper influence over 
 them, when they are passing //ar;zc?//a/- accounts ; for there are but 
 few men who accept offices, that v/ould persevere in saving money 
 to the state, at the risk of losing comfortable livings. 
 
 Indeed this risk, this very idea of doing their duty, should con- 
 vince every mind, that the system which puts virtue to such a test 
 in a democracy is defective. For instead of a temptation to do 
 wrong, every officer froni a correct distribution of powers, should 
 have the greatest inducement to do right This would be effected, 
 were their appointments to be approbated and sustained, by a large 
 body to be delegated immediately from the people ; and Avhere as 
 has heretofore been shewn, from the number of members, while the 
 majority of the people remamed virtuous, there would be but very 
 little chance of favoritism; or any probability that improper influ- 
 ence over the minds of these officers would take place. 
 
 It is true that the constitution declares, that no money shall be 
 drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations 
 made by law ; yet as there will be vague expressions in the laws 
 themselves, it may at times be difficult to know what species ot 
 accounts the legislature intended should be paid. This gives a 
 latitude, a discretion which the accountant officers may fairly use 
 to the benefit of the state, or if they want integrity, sadly abuse 
 for the benefit of individuals. 
 
 The governor having these men in his fingers, should he be sel- 
 fish, should one 7nan be evil, will be likely to have all accounts 
 passed and paid^ to which his interest, or the interest of his friends 
 or dependant _iinder any connection, has the most remote relation ; 
 under some law, or the construction oj laiv. 
 
 The expression in the constitution is defective ; it only secures 
 the annual election of the treasurer, without explicitly securing the 
 election, or approbation by the assembly of the officers in the trea- 
 
( 31 ) 
 
 siiry department ; Avithout securing the election or approbation ot 
 j'U the principal men, who cither handle or draw money from the 
 treasury ; or admit arid settle accounts having that tendency. 
 
 From the revolutionary war down to 1792, when the in- 
 lri,a:ues of the lew were creating patronage; when the few and 
 (heir friends were making hasty strides to all the posts of profit and 
 honour, in a way moi'e congenial viih their wishes, than through 
 tlie confidence of the people ; tlien not even the skeleton, nothing 
 hut the fihadjiv of a shade, the name of a treasurer was left in the 
 liandsof the j^eople's nearest representatives ; and the sole discretion 
 of tl.e treasury committed to the safekeeping of the executive. 
 
 Tm'o of the governor's creatures, however good or bad the men, 
 whether known or unknown to the people, now settle all accomits, 
 and he by his warrants draws the money, Mitliout any check, but 
 through these very men, who knoM they can be removed the mo- 
 ment they give their patron oflence. 
 
 It can be no question whether the governor be wise and virtu- 
 ous enough safely to be trusted with the appointment of the officers 
 who are to open and shut the public purse at pleasure ; nor whe- 
 ther treasury powers, as to receipts and payments should on any 
 occasion, be put into the hands of the executive ; the question has 
 been settled by the convention, and the principle fixed in the con- 
 stitution. And although the words are not so explicit as they 
 ought to have been, yet their spirit is evident. For as the head of 
 the treasury department is to be annually chosen by the legislature, 
 and other officers in the same department to be appointed as may be 
 directed by law, it cannot be understood, that a law could be con- 
 stitutional, that would derive those subordinate officers from ano- 
 ther source, and give them powers superior to the treasurer. It 
 must be a violation of tlie constitutional principle to vary the pow- 
 erof withholding or paying safely, from the officer so carefully 
 named in the instrument, and so sclemnly elected by the votes of 
 the whole legislature. 
 
 Every law that either negatively or positi\ely, gives that respon- 
 sibility to executive officeis, and takes aAvay the money check 
 from the officer of the legislature, named in the constitution, under 
 any idea or notion, is absolutely unconstitutional. 
 
 The executive is clothed Mith many powers by the constitution, 
 jbut this is reserved ; and designedly reserved to prevent liim from 
 having the opportunity of using the purse of the people, if he be- 
 came corrupt, in aid of his other power, for the purposes of sub- 
 verting the principles of libeHy. ^ * • 
 
 If the convention intended anything, they intended tateep the 
 pm-se from the executive ; and by the words in the constitution, 
 which say that " all other officers in the treasury department shall 
 be appointed in such manner as is or shall be directed by law," 
 mean, that the legislature might chuse, whether these officers 
 should also be elected by the members; or consider the responsi- 
 bility of the annually elected treasurer sufficient to ensure fidelity 
 
( 2^ ) 
 
 througliout the department, when the whole were dcHved from 
 him as their head, lie from the members, and they directly from 
 the people in too large a body, hastily to admit of corruption. 
 
 On the death of the state treasurer, there is no provision in the 
 constitution, to continue the duties of the office until the ensuing 
 year, neither has any hitherto been made by law upgn the subject ; 
 iience on the death of two treasurers, one in the recess of the le- 
 gislature, and the other during th.eir sitting, the state was partially 
 i)arari7xd. In the former case, the transaction of the business by 
 the clerk without law, was indirectly approbated until the legisla- 
 ture convened ; and in the latter case, a special law passed for the 
 election of another, while the business of the state was at a stand. 
 
 These two instances plainly point out the necessity of a law, 
 making ' such provision, that the business should meet no impedi- 
 ment on the death of the officer. 
 
 The legislature have long since provided, that there should be 
 a deputy secretary of state, although entirely useless and unne- 
 cessary ; for on the death of the secretary, the executive could ap- 
 point another and no evil arise ; yet they have neglected to direct 
 the appointment of a deputy treasurer, when it would be absolute- 
 ly useful on the death of a treasurer ; thg executive having no pow- 
 er to touch the office, nor appoint another ; and where there 
 should afways be such an officer appointed by the treasurer, and 
 approbated by the legislature. He should be the responsible offi 
 cer in case of the treasurer's death, and without distraction conti- 
 nue the business of the state, in the treasury office until a succeed- 
 ing election. 
 
 ESSAY VIII. 
 
 •THE Srs-TEM OF 'I'lIE <rREASURT NUGA^ORT, AND DES7'nuC7'I'/E 0>' 
 jrs INDENTION. 
 
 VARIOUS have been the modes hitherto adopted, to render the 
 money of the state safe in the hands of tiie treasurer, and prevent 
 him from embezzUng it. They have all failed, and the evidence 
 of sundry facts incontestibly proves, that from the earliest periods 
 to the present day, the most effectual guard has been the virtue of 
 the treasurer ; and when this has failed, the money of the state 
 has been wasted. 
 
 Under the present treasury system, the surplus money must be 
 deposited in bank ; the bank book therefore at settlement will exhi- 
 bit the balance nearly of tlie money in the treasury. 
 
 The official check upon the treasurer, is his exhibiting to the 
 register general a monthly report, containing the balance at the end 
 of the preceding month, tiie receipts antl payments during the pre- 
 sent, and the balance remaining at the end. This, although a ver 
 
( 33 ) 
 
 ry imperfect check, may be of some use to deter liir.oroijs kr.aves 
 but ciumot prevent capital mischief, nor clie<k even slit^;i>t en-ors. 
 
 For as but one receipt in many instances is t^i.tn for cash re- 
 ceived, and that sometimes carried to a remote part of tlie state, it 
 follows, that no public notice of some payments is given, but by 
 the treasurer himself, or payor when he comes to make, a final 
 settlement, which m«y be several years afterAvards. 
 
 The act of 180.> enables the accountants to inspect the treasu- 
 rer's accoiuit v^'ith the bank of Pennsylvania and its branches; and 
 the act of 1804 to investi;^ale the office and chest; and had the 
 state no interest in the Philadelphia bank, the information derived 
 from these sources, would furnish evidence, that the money was 
 safe, or that it was not, but could never prevent any misapplicati- 
 on ; and is better adapted as security to the character of an honest 
 treasurer, who may be unjustly calunmii.ted, than to the purse of 
 the people in the hands of a man who is corrupt and dares to de- 
 fraud. In fact, the two last provisions seem unfortunately to form 
 aback door, bv which an artfid and designing treasurer may legal- 
 ly discharge his sureties, and make himself alone responsible for 
 designed delii\'ivienries. 
 
 For it h!is been decided in the supreme court against the state, 
 that the treasurer's siu'eties being bound for one year only, are 
 not answerable for money that is wasted aftt;r its expiration ; hence 
 if after a re-election, and before security be entered, the treasury 
 be investigated, and evidence given of the safety, of the money, 
 the former sureties are discharged, all the money of the state is in 
 the power of the treasurer, and he alone responsible. 
 
 However plausible those checks may have appeared, when insti- 
 tuted, such might be their operation ; and the treasurer after his re- 
 election, and while the legislature was silting, might artfully delay 
 giving security, draw out all the money from the banks, under the 
 plausible pretext of paying the cxpcnce of the session (which no ac- 
 countant covdd prevent) then privately and hastily spread his drafts 
 (pavable at the bank) over the state, and receive value from persons 
 ignorant of the fraud [the state would have to pay them] and design- 
 edly become insolvent, bringing loss and confusion on the state. 
 
 The accountant officers, in such cases, could do no more ; thnj 
 never huve done more., than give informatio!i of delinquencies after 
 they happened, recollect the money, or state the improbability of 
 its recovery. 
 
 But if on the contrary, the accountants themselves were to be- 
 come so corrupt, as boldly to advocate the right of the treasurer, 
 after entering security, " to make what use he pleased of*the pub- 
 lic money wliilc it was in his power, provided it was ready when 
 called for ;" could it be understood to mean any thing else, but an 
 invitation to enter the current of speculatiou, whereby he might 
 be sacrificed to their avarice ; and instead of their being a guard 
 to the interest of the people, betray the cause that virtue and (iuty 
 would bid them si.'iport. 
 
 E 
 
( 34 ; 
 
 But now let us pause, and view the provisions of 1 803 and 1 804^ 
 in respect to the investigation of the treasury, by two of the go- 
 vernor's creatures. I'he governor before that period, was really 
 the treasury, and drew what money he pleased from the treasu- 
 ry ; but since, even the idea of holding the money for others safe- 
 ly by the treasurer is totally taken away ; no dependence, not even 
 of honesty without wisdom, to be placed in the officer of the as- 
 sembly ; the incompetency of the legislature to make a prudent 
 choice acknowleged, and the infallibility of the executive admitted. 
 
 The first law directs the hivestigation of the bank books, the 
 second obliges the treasurer to open the chest, and have the money 
 counted, for fear he should do without law, what others can do 
 under it — waste the money. How excellent, disinterested, and pure- 
 are the governor's officers ! How suspicious even to the members, 
 the treasurer just chosen by themselves ! 
 
 This operation being contrary to common sense, evidences an 
 exterior influence. That is the assembly vote as if they believed 
 (what the mind continually repels) that they were incapable of 
 choosing one man from the whole state fit to be trusted. And 
 then follows the consequence, that the governor must take care of 
 him, and of the treasury vmtil the subsequent year. 
 
 In the assembly, as well as in every other place, soYne of the 
 members who have weak minds and but little delicacy, have more 
 assurance and fluency of speech, than some others who possess sound 
 judgment and clear heads. Such are more acti\'e than prudent, in 
 bringing forward business, by which from a certain quarter they 
 obtain celebrity This gives them consequence. Their talents are 
 extolled, their vanity flattered, and they are made to believe, they 
 possess all the wisdom of the body— .ihat were it not for them, ig- 
 norance would ruin the state. 
 
 Attempts are not wanting to inculcate the false idea, " That in large 
 bodies, the responsibility is so divided that it is lost, and the mem- 
 bers care not what they do ; that the executive is single and alone 
 responsible, therefore careful. That under such circumstances, 
 while the wiser fev/, have it in their power, it is better to have just 
 principles fixed by law, which cannot easily be repealed ; let the 
 executive have full power, he will do right ; it is uncertain who 
 will be in the legislature hereafter, and now is the time to effect 
 these objects." Should improper attempts be made under such 
 ideas, and virtue in the popular body repel the insult, the hint is 
 improved, all the members but the fc.u are blockheads, without 
 common sense, unfit to be trusted. 
 
 Here are instantly two parties. Call them what you please, you 
 neither alter tbeir nature nor .pursuits. Tory and ivhig^ federal and 
 antifederal^ aristocratic and democratic, court and co;f?//rz,/— their 
 objects are always different. The one believes in executive infalli- 
 bility, and evidences a pleasure in hearing, and sometimes in giv- 
 ing the legislature abuse. I'he other, votes to lessee, executive 
 power, believing that the spread of the members over the whole 
 
( 35 ) 
 
 State, brings a knoAvlege of the wants and wishes of the people 
 effectually to one jwint 
 
 Perhaps the t\\ o parties should now be denominated the executive 
 and leirintutivc parties, or firoroga/ive and po/ndar ; for one gives 
 all power to the governor, the other wo\ild rather trust a numerous 
 body, which from its very numl)cr, cannot so easily be interested 
 in error. 
 
 Formerly, when the treasurer was elected, the assembly took the 
 security ; but they are not now believed to be capable of judging of 
 security ! The governor must do it for them, and thereby, has it in 
 his flower to embarrass the treasurer elect by refusing good men. 
 
 But more than tliis is in his power under the present constitution. 
 If business of a certain kind, is to be done in a certain way, that 
 needs but little explanation, the treasurer perhaps can be made a 
 creature. He may be adjUtant general, an office in the gift of the 
 executive worth six or eight hundred dollars a year. He may be 
 made a clerk of a court, or even a justice of the peace, as well as a 
 treasurer ; or he may receive any other office in the gift ot the 
 executive that would have a tendancy to produce a disposition of 
 accommodation. 
 
 The principal risk the state now runs of n^oney being lost, after 
 receiving it into the treasury, is on account of the possibility of the 
 banks or treasurer failing ; w4ien either could be made the sole place 
 of deposit, and t\\o risks reduced to one. 
 
 No money has hithferto been lost through the errors or misappli- 
 cation of tlic banks ; the institutions are answerable for the embezzle- 
 ment or errors of individuals : but larg'i sums have been lost or 
 embezzled through the neglect of the state, by the treasurers and 
 comptroller ; the banks are therefore, certainly the safest place of 
 deposit for public money, into which, in the first instance it should 
 always be paid, and so secured by law, as not to be liable to be drawn 
 by the treasurer, except in the payment of legal demands on the 
 state ; settled by the register, and checked by himself. 
 
 Were such a mode adopted, it would lessen both the risk of the 
 state and of the treasurer ; and he as an honest man, would be better 
 satisfied. Not needing to use, nor intending to abuse power, he would 
 not wish to possess it. 
 
 A check to the bank could be instituted, by giving two tickets 
 or receipts for each sum received ; with directions, one to be '!• no- 
 sited directly or indirectly with the treasurer, and the other for the 
 use of the person paying money to the state. 
 
 The treasurer being thus relieved from immediately holding and 
 paying the money, might be more usefully employed, in acting the 
 part of a comptroller of accounts to the register, and render the 
 present comptroller's office useless. ' 
 
 On the settlement of an account, the treasurer should have the 
 power of checking abuses, and errors ; and where any impropriety 
 appeared, as an officer responsible to the people through the legi- 
 
( 36 ) 
 
 slature, stop the payment of the money until a re-examination and 
 pi'oper udjuslnicnt took place. 
 
 Instead of the t!;overnor being treasurer, and signing blank war- 
 rants to be filled with any sum at the pleu'^ure of two of his crea- 
 tures, and paid over the head of the legisbtive check, the treasurer, 
 Avithout b.andling a cent should pay the claim, at bunk, after set- 
 tlement by the register. -Ae would then be responsible to the 
 members for its propriety or impropriety at the anvsual election. 
 
 The constitiuion, though defective in many of its pints, would 
 admit of an improvement under law of the treasury system ; for 
 doubtless the intention was to keep the money in the power of the 
 assembly ; but the treasurer is now become no more than a nose 
 of wax, liable to be twisted whether he will or not, to suit the pm- 
 poses of corruption, and to the prejudice of the state. 
 
 The people must judge by the payments heretofore made, whe- 
 ther this power has ever been abused. The design here is only to 
 shew, that such is the tendency of the present system ; that it can 
 be abused, almost with impunity ; and that under this constitutitm, 
 it could and should be amended, so as to make the treasm-er's elec- 
 tion of some use to the people, and to answer the end of its insti- 
 tution. 
 
 Money should be drawn in no other way fiom the banks, than 
 by the treasurer's draft, or Avarrant attached to and corresponding 
 •uith the register's authenticated report of a specific debt, admitted 
 and settled to be due from the state. The treasurer as usual, should 
 giA-e the legislature an annual account of receipts and payments, 
 and the banks should deliver them an abstract also from their state 
 account, in form of a bank book or short ledger, sheAving the mo- 
 ney received and paid, and the balance in the bank at the end of 
 the year. 
 
 If these documents corresponded Avith the register's report, they 
 would form evidence of the safety of the money, and the treasurer 
 not being permitted to receive money, nor make payments in any 
 other Avay, no embezzlement could take place, except by collusi- 
 on of the banks ; Avhich from the vigilance of the directors of those 
 institutions, is never likely to take place. 
 
 ESSAY IX. 
 
 OF CHECKS AND BALANCES IN fHE LAND DEPARTMENT. 
 
 IT is not difficult to knoAv the difference between men and mea- 
 sures ; nor to learn that the detail and operation of our system, is as 
 imperfect as the conslilution out of Avhich it arises. 
 
 Among the minor defects, none present themsehes more strong- 
 ly, than the arrangements made in the land department ; nor do 
 any produce more complaints from those Avho have the fatigue and 
 pei-plexity of doing their business therein. 
 
( 37 ) 
 
 The i!;«t\ crnor in the plenitude of his power is at the head of the 
 
 (L-partnicnt, and all giants of land made to the citizens arc in 
 
 his name. Every man Avho obtains a i)atent mvist do it by trotlhi^ 
 to L'ae four land onkes ; and probably in order that something very 
 ir.ystcrious — vei'v proiound, may appear to the farmer in the trans- 
 action of public business, he is made to perform a second tour, to 
 the same orPxes, with a ticket in lis hand, which he has not leisure 
 to investigate ; and thus to obtain a patent, has become by its 
 siuull mijsurt/, a m.cncy maldng job to' a i'cw tiiikrs about the scut 
 of government ; wiVen the ajjpiicart ought to be able to obtain it at 
 two ofiices alone ; the surveyor general's and the secretary's. 
 
 It is impossible that the governor, unless he reside at the seat of 
 government, couul attend to the individual call of every man, who 
 wants a patent or warrant ; he signs blanks to l>e fdled at the se- 
 cretary's or surveyor's offices v.ith proper cjuantities of land at the 
 stated prices. Here then is a //o////ra/'/>c/<Tv (like the governor's 
 commission, muler t/ic' idea of confidence to every di unken gin re 
 tailer) played off to make the farmer suppose, that wl-.ile /le was in 
 waiting, the great governor was attending to /its business ; when 
 his parchmcrit or paper, probably luul been signed, among hun- 
 dreds oi other blanks, more than a year before his application, and 
 filled by a svibaltern clerk, known by nothing perhaps beUer, than 
 his insolence to those who furnish his bread. 
 
 To assign duties to any officer, moi'e than he has time to per- 
 form, is as absurd as to assign him duties, without the recpiisite in- 
 formation upon which he ought to act. The proper officer might 
 as well sign the governor's name, or his own, to the paper,. as to 
 do the essential part, direct the quantity of land, and what itioney 
 ought to be paid. All this is done under the idea of checks and 
 balances, or nvheeb vAthin iv/ircls, and held up, as secvu'ity for the 
 fidelity of the officers, and a prevention of errors. But ever since 
 the year ninety-nine, wheiv delinquencies happened by way of spe- 
 culation (by men, one of whom met with elevation for his aid to 
 criminality, and his unfaithfidnes%therein to his patron) the pub- 
 lic are aware, that all these offices furnish no check to the officer, 
 nor guard against embezzlement of the property of the state. The 
 failings and detection of one, may induce more secrecy, but is no 
 proof of more honesty nor more safety. 
 
 The idea of their making quaiterly returns upon oath, is a crite- 
 rion by wliich to judge, that otlicr checks are wanting; and it is 
 doubtful whether this, solemn and sacred as it is, has always been 
 sufficient. But as measures and not men are here the principal 
 object, personality is avoided, as far as justice to the public will 
 permit; greater forbearance would border on criminality, and can- 
 not be expected, though a development should excite detestation 
 against men in power, debased by more than their insignificance. 
 
 When the republicans obtained the power in ninety-nine, it was 
 expected that a new arrangeir t vvould be made ; that a consolida- 
 tion of tlie land officers wou' .e place — that they would be re- 
 
C S8 ) 
 
 duced to one or two at most, and the applicant saved the trouble 
 and degradation of dancing attendance in imitation of the European 
 courts, several days, after four heads of departments, and twelve or 
 fifteen clerks, merely to obtain a patent — but this was not done. 
 As soon as the people, had by their exertions, ousted or subverted 
 the prevailing aristocracy, the public mind in its exultations forgot 
 to compleat the object of the change, which was measures ; and a 
 few courtiers under the present system of patronage, found means 
 to quiet the fears of the legislature,'and procure individual standings 
 at the expence of the community ; a new aristocracy was formed. 
 Hence it has become doubtful whether there will be a land office 
 reform, without being preceded by a constitutional reform, so as to 
 place characters in office, who would virtuously lend their aid to 
 divest government of useless practices and unnecessary expence. 
 They are now useful ; they encrease patronage, and extend the 
 governor's influence, and it would uncreate any of his creatures to 
 give tliat information to the legislature, which would tend to lessen 
 their number, or reduce their perquisites. 
 
 It is as true as it is expensive, that there can be no use, nor any 
 good reason assigned for so many officers in the land depai'tment. 
 There is not half so much use for a receiver general at the seat of 
 government, where the treasurer resides, as there isj for two or 
 three deputy treasurers in different parts of the state (which can 
 also be done without) to receive public money, and save the expence 
 to the distant citizens of carrying it to the seat of government, but 
 when it is carried there, to pay it to one, that he may pay it to 
 another— to pay it to a less treasurer, the receiver general, that he 
 may pay it to a greater receiver general, that is the state treasurer 
 < — is absurd — it borders on the ridiculous. 
 
 It is true that the receiver general's books are not all posted, 
 •notwithstanding that officer, in 1799, received more than one 
 thousand dollars for ha\"ing performed, A\'hat it is since evident, he 
 had scarcely touched. Posting is desirable, but in these books, the 
 difference is small to clerks, and the applicants know no inconve- 
 nience—there is no detention. The account is so simple that, by 
 its date, it is found by inspection, and as but one or two entries are 
 included in the most intricate, it is settled with ease. It would be 
 better that the accounts were posted, because the state has more 
 than once paid the expence ; but as their present situation has the 
 advantage of upholding sinecures, and the payment of clerk hire is 
 held in aid of a subordinate phalanx, if the future should be judged 
 of by the past, there is no probabilty of their being completed for a 
 century to come. 
 
 The receiver general appears to be no more in finance than a 
 subaltern treasurer, or under receiver, taking the trouble of the 
 detail of the receipts of xmoncy for land sold, from his principal the 
 treasurer ; when the money could be paid to the treasurer, or, in 
 the fii-st instance, into the bank, and"^'^" receiver's salary and con- 
 tingencies saved to the state. '^^ t^' 
 
( 39 > 
 
 When the patent is written under the direction of the secretary 
 of the land oflice, and signed by him or the governor, it could be 
 enrolled by an additional clerk in the same oflice, where the patent 
 books should be kept; and the fees of the rcU's-oflicer also saved. 
 
 Under this reform, and the abolishment of the comptroller's 
 office, which is totally useless, there would be but Jivf heads of 
 department left, including the treasurer, instead of the present 
 eii^/it ; and if necessary, Avhich is doubtful, the tAvo remaining 
 land officers could have one of the other heads of department asso- 
 ciated with them, to continue the board of property, or coiat of 
 equity, for the decision of land disputes. 
 
 The duties to be performed in the land offices, are necessary 
 duties, but they can be performed in two, as well as in twent}'. 
 This is not all, to pay two unnecessary heads of department under 
 the idea of a check, that checks nothing but money from the trea- 
 sury^ requires a little explanation. 
 
 The receiver general according to the register's report of finance, 
 receives annually for lands sold by the state, from forty to 
 sixty thousand dollars. He produces an account quarterly to the 
 register general ; the secretary and surveyor general do the same 
 as to the fees, and all swear they make a true return of all the 
 money received, to the best of their knowledge ; when their clerks 
 have received nearly all that hi\s been received, and swear nothing 
 about the business. According to their several returns they are set- 
 tled with, exhibiting ^vhat, and only what books they please ; yet 
 if they produced all, that which occupies the time of two or three 
 offices, could not be re-settled so as to correct errors, not to notice 
 omissions, with all the extra attention he would be able to give. 
 
 'I'his check amounts to no more, tb.an tlie oath of the officer for 
 the tidelity of his clerk! What a check — avhat a balance ! hanging • 
 all on one side; the oath of the man wlio directs another to receive 
 the money, and give a true account of ti.e sums received ! ! I 
 
 Although the legisl.ture by the ..ctol April 20, 179 5, provides that 
 no clerks in the land offices shall receive fees, gratuities, or monies 
 for transacting business relating to said offi.ces while acting as clerks 
 therein, have honestly endeavoured to root out bribery and corrup- 
 tion ; yet under good 7iatured co7)i/ilacc7icc, it would be morally im- 
 possible to prevent overgrown speculatois from sliding a feAv 
 dollars occasionally through the lid of a pliable desk, or leaving a 
 few hundreds of the tail of a handsome dcpcfsit, tinthout ever beir^g 
 called for. 
 
 Under these idle, these visionary checks, would it be any wonder, 
 if such clerks should trillc with ti.eir subordinate conhdence, and 
 amass wealth by all evil ways and niean.s ? \\'ould it be any thing 
 mysterious, if in half a dozen years, they should rise from needy 
 obscurity into opulence ; should have their weak heads turned with 
 their own consequence, and with their equipages, figin-e in the- 
 circles of luxurv and shew ? 
 
( 40 ) 
 
 Were it not for turning officers out of doors, who as they are 
 judges in a court of equity, may begin to think themselves (under 
 the legal idea) possessed of a freehold estate in the salary^ the cal- 
 culations of the price of land, and interest could be made with the 
 secretary of the land office, where the land is applied for; and the 
 patent enrolled there also, where it is written, as well as to continue 
 the other two offices, to the manifest disadvantage of applicants, 
 no safety by way of check, and a loss to the state of several thou- 
 sands a year ; beside the omissions made up of negatives too 
 difficult to explain or calculate. 
 
 ESSAY X. 
 
 MORE OF tHB GREAf MASfER CHECK-, AND THE Llf-tLE CHECKS 
 AND BALANCES. 
 
 THE governor of Pennsylvania has a power by way of check, to 
 (he iveakness and ca/irice of the peo/ile in legislation, nearly equal 
 to two thirds of both branches. He can negative bills and pre- 
 vent them from becoming law, unless re-passed by two thirds of 
 each house. Men who are fond of other checks and balances be- 
 side the people ; and who believe it essential to free government, 
 to keep the branches distinct and independent of each other ; can- 
 not contend for this power in the executive, on, any other prin- 
 ciple, than that of the people being their oimi worst enemies, and 
 requiring this triennial pendulum, which, by its vibrations, is to 
 keep therii. from destroying themselves. 
 
 But this check absurd as it is ; absui'd as must ever be the idea 
 of one man's wisdom, being equal to the deliberate wisdom of 
 two thirds of the members of two branches, taken by the same 
 persons from the same source ; still this legislative power inci- 
 dental to the executive, is neither more dangerous, nor less ex- ' 
 traordinary, than a judicial power arising from the same source ; 
 the appointment of the board of property, under the tenure by 
 which the officers hold their commissions. 
 
 The governor has no power to continue them longer than his 
 own triennial period ; b^ut as the constitution is silent on the sub-, 
 ject, they arc only commissioned during his pleasure ; although 
 they constitute, v.'hat ought from its' own nature, to be consider- 
 ed a respectable coiu-t of equity. 
 
 Let it be supposed, that like any other officer, the go-vemor 
 might be corrupt : he is the principal mover or maiit spring of 
 this court, and although he does not sit therein, he can have an 
 influence over it. For if he can instantly annihilate the political 
 existenceof the officers ; if he can take away their offices and 
 their salaries, without shadow of corruption, without trial or com- 
 plaint, it cannot be doubted, but he can have an improper influ- 
 ence over them, and sooner or later, at one time or another. 
 
( 41 ) ^ 
 
 there will he a pemicious effect produced hy Ihcir dependence 
 upon the will if one mem. 
 
 Hlis not an executive vested with so much patronage as many 
 followers as any other officer? I\h;y they not be speculators? INLuiy 
 anioni^- such have hitherto been, and themselves or friends have 
 suits before the bo..rd of property where original titles are tiled? 
 Cannot foid play be used under the idea of seeing the laws faith- 
 fully executed, iv'uliuit any coir.v.itmcnt ? And by the eloquence of 
 five hundred poiuids a year, coidd not the governor have as fair 
 a chance of silencirig the whisperings of conscience in the breasts 
 of the land officci's as corrupt nature coidd afford ? 
 
 These things may never have taken place, yet a slight inves- 
 tigation of the system will Hash conviction to every inteliigcnt 
 mind, that such consequences may naturally result ; that abu- 
 ses might pass for years \vithout detection, even though suspici- 
 ons ai'ose of executive corruption. 
 
 Why sliould the governor hold these offices at his will ? What 
 nearer connection can there be between the executi e and the 
 board of property, than between him and other courts, except 
 in the muids of those who discern no wisdom but that which 
 emanates from the executive fountain ? What relation can exist 
 but that which relates to patronage, and the security of the pub- 
 lic servants from the reach and responsibility of the people ? 
 This has always been the aim of tyrants, and of those who pro- 
 fited by their injustice. Hence the judges independence of the 
 people, has been clamoured for by the aristocracy from one end of 
 the state to the other, without a single idea being thrown out, 
 that the judges in the board of property — of this court cf equity, 
 should be independent of the execuii\e. Not a murm.ur that 
 they should be legal characters, while the governor holds their 
 breath ; while every possibility exists of legal tricks being played 
 off upon them through the executive. 
 
 Would abuses be likely to take place, if the land officers held 
 their offices by the approbation of the people's annual representa- 
 ti\ es, either annually or tiiennially ? By the approbation of the 
 only men to whom the proceedings in the offices are completely 
 open— by the men who w^oukl be able to give them a salutary 
 check, and very few of whom, have ever been concerned in land 
 speculations? 
 
 Were tlieir appointments to be approbated by a num.erous bo- 
 <Jy, favoritism as has been elsewhere shewn, would be excluded, 
 and persons to fill these offices, selected from the state at large; 
 AThose characters moral and political coidd not be questioned. 
 
 If they became bad, complaints they could not obviate would 
 be exhibited against them, and none be found able to screen them 
 irom the ordeal of representative democracy. 
 
 There wouldnot tlien be the least chance for an open or conceal- 
 ed confederacy taking place in any of these offices, and extend- 
 ing through the state, by means of clerks and deputy surveyors, 
 so as to procure the surveying of the best tracts of hmd as tl • 
 
 F 
 
( 4-2 ■) 
 
 paice of deputy corruption, which might enable the head of arty 
 department in the course of eight or ten years, to lise by specu- 
 lation, from insolvency to the possession of a landed estate, worth 
 one hundred thousand dollars. 
 
 These are not the dreams of theorists, they are the result of 
 observation, and ex/iericnce, without which no system can be un- 
 derstood. Such means are within the power of intelligent mem- 
 bers in the legislature, if they act without fear of the magnitude 
 of the task, or permitting the diversion of their minds to other 
 objects by the interested few, who endeavour to profit by their 
 ignorance of human cullibiiity. 
 
 Perfection will never result from imperfection ; but it is to be 
 hoped, that the people will remain wise and virtuous enough, to 
 correct imperfections which are evident, without being alarmed 
 by the ill-founded fears of the timid, or terrified into silence by 
 those who a few years ago — a few years before they rose from 
 obscurity into office, were the loudest for a reform of abuses ; 
 but who since their elevation, have by their conduct evinced, 
 that the struggles in Pennsylvimia in 1799, have terminated only 
 in placing a new set of men in office, whose morals and politics 
 were equally detestable, and many of them not possessing half the 
 dlgnitij of their corru/it predecessors. 
 
 ESSAY XL 
 
 ON THE VANCEH OF EXCESSIVE CONFIDENCE. 
 
 THE love of glory or. a desire of fame, as well as virtue, has 
 a powerful eflect upon the mind : none who are enlightened can 
 be totally divested of this principle. 
 
 A wish of perpetuating a name, by acts of virtue, disinterest- 
 edness, and public spirit, and of handing it down conspicu- 
 ously to posterity, when accompanied by a sound mind, and 
 splendid talents, is capable of producing the greatest good. 
 
 When mankind are so fortunate, as to find an union of such 
 virtues in one or more individuals, and feel their happy effects 
 emanating from an exalted station ; gratitude consigns almost 
 unlimited confidence to them, but freemen are too apt to forget 
 every j^recuutionary check, and too frequently make the man 
 strongei' than the government itself, in which he is placed. 
 
 As every good, has attendant evils ; so sometimes hath de- 
 spotism occasional good ; but emburrassment is always the conse- 
 quence oi^ thv-:, unbomidrd confidence. 
 
 Washington through a course of unwearied and patriotic ser- 
 \ ices, justly gained the confidence of an enlightened and grate- 
 ful people. His early earned fame united to virtue, spurred him 
 on at the revolution, to the most generous actions ; his patience 
 ojicl perseverance, his coolness and decision, will never be torgot- 
 i,en J they will be remembered while happiness and freedom arc 
 
( 45 ) 
 
 enjoyed. The people could have trusted him with all their 
 rights and privileges, without resrictiou or restraint. 
 
 But what has been the consequence ? Where Washington left 
 olT, others stopt short; or took up an adverse course. The power 
 acquired through confidence justly ol)tained, has since been en- 
 joyed with little more than a shadow of claim to merit, to the sinis- 
 ter advancement of families ; the interest of their particular 
 fi'iends ; and has invited attempts at many high-toned measures, 
 to tlie great disadvantage of the people. 
 
 Washington as Mell as Cincinnatus was a farmer ; one of the 
 men who laboured in the earth ; the chosen people of (iod (says 
 a celebrated writer) if ever he had a chosen people, in whose 
 breasts is kept aiive the sacred fire of liberty. So great was the 
 people's confidence in him, that many who did not approve of all 
 the provisions of the federal constitution, s.>id they would never- 
 theless acquiesce under it, because they believed it was so form- 
 ed, on purpose to provide a place adapted to his greatness of mind. 
 These people forgot that Washington could not live for ever. 
 
 These observations are made to shew, that however good, how^- 
 ever virtuous the people, power should always be conferred with 
 a sparing hand, guarded with a watchful eye ; the avenues to cor- 
 ruption and despotism closed, and principles and measures, not 
 men, should be the aim of poliiiciansr 
 
 Instead of extending the period of reform, the proper time to 
 remove unnecessary power, is when virtue and wisdom are in 
 office; there is scarcely any other time. 
 
 It is villanous, weak, or vain in officers to make objections and 
 say, "we do not intend to abuse the pul)iic confidence." The 
 power if necessary, should be well guarded ; if useless annihilated. 
 'I'he officer who will not aid the pul)lic by his exertions is a tyrant,; 
 and plotting treason against liberty. He will take it into his own 
 safekeGi)ing and exclusive occupancy, when opportunity offers. 
 
 Rulers shoidd be men of moderate desires, hating covetousness. 
 They should be men who would be satisfied with useful power 
 and a reasonable couipcnsation for their services, which would 
 affcjrd them a comfortable living; and if much time were spent in 
 the public service, they should be enabl d to lay so much aside, 
 as would prevent want in the evening of life. 
 
 But the men who seek more ; who seek to accumulate wealth by 
 the opportunity an office affords for speculation, in order thiit their 
 fi'iends may roll in luxury, and follow^ useless occupations, degrade 
 their station, injure democracy, and should be spurned into obscurity. 
 
 Since Pennsylvania has been a government, either aristocratic 
 or democratic ; both under the Penns and the Commonwealth,* 
 great and reiterated complaints have i)een made of the rapacity 
 of the men near its government. Theircupidity for wealth, their 
 combinations ia speculation— .their putting themselves in the way 
 of the needy soldier, some to depreciate and some to purchase — 
 their ingrossing Wyoming rights — their speculations in the North 
 American Insurance Company, and five million loan, not to men- 
 tion new loans, purparts, kr. Sec. have b^^en so much agitated; so 
 
( 44 ) 
 
 much complained of; so frequcnlly bvouglit before the public, thai 
 tin;;, should long ago have been sifted by the executive, who is 
 solemnly sworn to see the laws f.dthfully executed, and if evils 
 existed proper remedies applied. 
 
 Officers should not only be viituous ; not only innocent ; but in a 
 dernocracy, so totally devoid of suspicion, that envy could not blast 
 their reputation. 
 
 "VVhatever is obtained by speculation must be taken from the com- 
 munity, and it would be the height of baseness, as v/eil as injustice, 
 that those who are near the governmei->t, -\\ho ai-e paid for their 
 services, should take from the needy. It would be abominable to 
 send the war-vvorn veteran, to sell his land at the door, Avhcre a 
 centinei had been previously placed to undervalue it; who M'ouki 
 recommend him to a second, instructed to despise it ; and to a third 
 ^vho would purchase it out o{7nere choHty, at seventy-five per cent. 
 less than its real value. This would indeed be the abommation 
 of desolation, and in time destroy the people's confidence in 
 democracy. 
 
 Is human nature thus corrupt ! Is it possible that under a 
 democracy as well as under an aiistocracy, we find instances of the 
 same eviis ! That Ave find complaints of the dcsic;ning, filling 
 their coffers at the public expence, as well as at the expence 
 of virtue ! If the complaints be well founded, it proves, that 
 on our democracy, we have engrafted the feat.:res, the prin- 
 ciples, the habits of aristocracy. That the system is defective — 
 that aithouph frequeaitly changing men, wx have been neglect- 
 ing principles and rights. That because the virtuous have 
 acted correctly, Ave have wholly neglected to correct the system, 
 so as to restrain the vicious. The people have throAvn off the 
 yoke of masters, and become free, but have nevertheless suffered 
 themselves to be imposed upon by many of their OAvn servants. 
 A n.ethod should be devised, that Avould in an effectual man- 
 ner, prevent every opportunity that an off.ce affords, of tlie 
 olhrr; turnir.g his atterition to speculation. He should not be 
 starved ; the labourer is Avorthy of his hire ; but servants should not 
 be too numerous. Make public business worth the attention of 
 pul)!ic characters, but after that is done, prevent them from bat-? 
 tering' upon the labour of tlie poor. 
 
 The bfusteiing officer, inflated by a fcAv hastily accumulated 
 thousaTids, ATiil spuni the idea of being treated as a suspicious 
 character, Avho, in the exercise of public duties, AAould need a 
 check, or should be laid under the restraint of a penal code. 
 
 But the surest method of reasoning is, from the past to the 
 future. If officers have frequently departed from theii' duty here- 
 tofore, others Avill be as likely to do it hereafter; and like the 
 community at large, who, under Uuv, are all alike restrained from 
 doing evil, because some are corrupt, they should have laws so 
 adar><^ed, as to prevent every chance of corruption. 
 
 The officers of the federal government are, in some respects, 
 prohibited from trading, forfeartheirpubiic spirit shouldbeIost,and 
 
( 45 ) 
 
 from patriots, their minds become mercenary, and unfit for their 
 stations; but the heads of departments in Pennsylvania, are left as 
 tree as air, to pin-chuse, by themselves or friends, any kind of 
 public securities, or disputed titles to lands, and as part, or the 
 whole, of tlie l)oard ot property, have the priviledge of dcciduig 
 upon their own claims. 
 
 These c\ ils are so repugnant to common sense, so productive 
 of the most serious consequences, that it is wonderful they have 
 never been corrected under either constitution, though the peo- 
 ple lun e been loud in their complaints under both. 
 
 Would there be any impropriety, in the state saying that in its 
 important ofiices, " We will give the men employed a living ; they 
 shall have no anxiety about the necessaries of life, but they shall 
 conscientiously devote their time to the public service with an 
 undivided attention ; We shall not accept it upon any other terms; 
 of this they shall make the most sole^v.: appeal, and should they 
 be faithless, we will punish them as criminals." W^ould this be 
 unjust? Would it be wrong to exact from public servants, highly 
 responsible, all their attention? 
 
 Under a democracy, where the government rests upot\ 
 public virtue, there should be none but public characters of tried 
 wisdom and virtue introduced into the more important ofhccs. 
 For the duty of office is not a business of favoriteism, it is a 
 solemn agency, in which the people can never be satisfied, ex- 
 cept in the ser\ ices of men Avhom they know to be faithful to 
 their interests. Such could be found, and would be willing to 
 serve the people upon these terms; and the people should not be 
 prevented from receiving the benefit of their services through the 
 inflliencc of fuvoriteism corruptly or blindly flowuig from one 
 man. 
 
 Public characters arc as likely to be virtuous, at least, as pri- 
 vate individuals. They enjoy the public confidence,'while their ac- 
 tions are satisfactory to the people. Character would aid their 
 virtue, and be a greater security in future. ^ The union of these 
 in any individual, having cost years in acquiring, would be dearer 
 to part witli, than life itself, and a future security to the public, 
 equal to any that it is possible they can ever obtain of man. 
 
 ESSAY XII. 
 
 OW fHF. OFFICE OF SECREfARr OF tUK COMMOKlVEALTll JXD ITS 
 PERVERSIOy. 
 
 IN a former essay it is observed, that the secretary of state 
 is intended to be a check to the executive ; and that the assernbly 
 can investigate the official conduct of the governor through him: 
 his appointment, therefore, should have been otherwise dei'ived, 
 in order that the legislature might receive information of execu- 
 tive conduct, through a channel void of suspicion. 
 
( 46 ) 
 
 The secretary is literacy independent of the governor for three 
 years, yet, as the governor can hold under three triennial elec- 
 tions ; then six years out of nine, the secretary's subsequent ap- 
 pointments are pending with him ; from the disposition of human 
 nature, it is not likely that he can act a very independent part, 
 ^vhile he knows that in futm-e he is liable to be left out for the 
 most trifling offence. He is, therefore, to be considered an ex- 
 ecutive creature, subordinate to the governor. His appointment 
 under the present system, should have been peiiodically by 
 the assembly, the body to whom the governor in amenable for 
 misbehaviour in office ; or else he should be continued until the 
 nine years expired, or the governor were removed. 
 
 But worse than that has happened. The governor's office has 
 twisted itself under usage, connected with law, into the secre- 
 tary's office, and appears to have absorbed nearly all its powers. 
 So much so, that the idcu oT any other office for governor seems 
 to be almost lost. The two offices have become one in practice, 
 under the apparent contiol of the governor himself; partly by 
 inattention in framing laws, prescribing duties to the executive; 
 and partly by accidental habits or inten. ^ted views. 
 
 The governor, by being vested with many of the powers natu- 
 rally belonging to the office of state treasurer, as well as having 
 nearly all the discretion of making contracts through the agency 
 of the secretary, has also had the secretary's office converted into 
 a kind of left-handed accountant department. He issues warrants 
 from that office, on the treasury, to pay the contracts ; and even 
 to pay quarterly salaries, so low as thirty five dollars to an asso- 
 ciate judge, which meet with very little investigation afterwards, 
 except a formal entry by two of his o^\-n accountant officers, and 
 a draft which the treasurer is bound by laiv to give, until it is paid 
 at bank. 
 
 , These warrants arc prepared, printed, and then mostly signed 
 in the form of other blanks, and filled in the secretary's office as 
 if it belonged to the governor". 
 
 Would not s.fac dmite — a stamp to be used by the waiter in 
 the office, and applied to warrants after they were filled with the 
 dates, and sums desired, be equal, at least, to a blank warrant, 
 signed by the governor, and afterwards filled with any sum, at 
 the pleasure of the secretary, deputy secretary, or clerk ; and as 
 good and valid in common sense, if not in common law ? 
 
 The warrants are entered with the register, and left at the 
 comptroller's after entry, for the applicants, and then piiid at the 
 treasury, by a check on the bank. 
 
 But the treasurer, with one-fourth of the cxpence and trouble, 
 could pay the money at bank, without handling it himself; as 
 stated in Essay VIH. by his draft attached to the register's certi- 
 ficate of a settled acco\int. 
 
 Issuing warrants at the secretary's office, opens a door for se- 
 veral useless clerks and runners, unless their use be sought in 
 tlie scurrility of ministerial papers, published in aid of triennial 
 
C 47 ) 
 
 exertions, for the support of an executive master, who would 
 save the people from their worst enemies, themselves; o-' the 
 neat packages of well boxed papers and pamphlets spread at cer- 
 tain periods, through tlie compiucency of stage owners and dri- 
 vers, to the most remote con\ers of the state. 
 
 The useless formality of warrants, if done at all, should be 
 issued by the governor, through a private clerk in an ofike of his 
 own; and a simple entry thereof, made at the secretary's office, 
 as a constitutional record ; that the offices might be kept as 
 distinct as the constitution designed. This would give time for 
 recordU)g the acts of assembly, which properly belongs to the 
 secretary's ofhce. 
 
 The secretary of state, is not intended by the constitution, to 
 be the governor's secretary f he is a state oUiccr at the head of a 
 department, over whom the executive ought to have no control. 
 
 If the secretary be rcr,ii:>s in his duty, or act corruptly in the 
 department, the governor might, as in other cases recommend 
 an impeachment. 
 
 The enrollment of the laws belong to the secretary of state, as 
 naturally as the enrollment of the patents belongs to the secretary 
 of the land office. The rolls office and the receiver general's 
 appear to be appendages of the landed estate ; when all were te- 
 nants under the proprietary aristocracy, in the time of the pro- 
 vmce, and altogether useless under the commonwealth. 
 
 There was then a receiver general, as well as a province trea- 
 surer, because the proprietary had an interest separate from the 
 people of the province. The money arising from the sale of lands, 
 as well as (juit-rents was his own, and never to go into the treasury, 
 to mix with the money of the people. 
 
 There is but one interest, the interest of the people under the 
 commonwealth ; and the secretary of the land office who writes 
 the patent, should be the officer to enroll it. They are all in one 
 form; and the patent, and the enrollment book, both printed 
 blank and filled. They should be done at one place (for each 
 would take but a few minutes) to avoid inconvenience to appli- 
 cants. The price of the land, the interest and fees ^hould be as- 
 certained at the same place, and paid at bank before the patent 
 issues. The ticket or receipt for the money, should entitle the 
 bearer named, to the receipt of the warnint or patent, and should 
 be finally deposited with the treasurer as a check to the bank. 
 
 The secretaiy has always collected and arranged the laws, and 
 should enroll them as soon as they are put into his hands. 
 
 The partial payment of fees to dlHerent otiicers, arose from 
 the officers being formerly supported by those fees. They wer« 
 then their means of living ; but the officers all except one, arc nov* 
 salai'y officers, and should have nothing to do with illegal perquisites. 
 
 It is remarkable, b\it no way marvellous, that this money in its 
 passage to the treasury, has always had a contrary motion from 
 the land speculations. If the latter were rapid, the former was 
 slow. If the speculations were slow, the proi^ress of the money 
 seemed faster and sometimes even direct. 
 
( 48 > 
 ESSAY XIII. 
 
 OF fHE EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE, 
 
 IN Essay VII. it is said, that the state treasurer, since the close 
 of the revolutionary war, has been reduced to i he shadow of a shade. 
 He is truly now rendered an unnecessary ofticer, who has no du- 
 ties to perform. He forms no kind of check to the exorbitant 
 power ol the executive, which comes in, by such indirect and un- 
 expected modes, that very few have a knowlege, that his power is 
 absolu e over the money of the state. 
 
 It has been heretofore shewn, that the whole power of the trea- 
 sury depai'tment is in the hands of tke governor. He can directly 
 or indirectly, under law or the construction of law, draw out every 
 cent of money, and if he chuses, legally trifle in this manner with 
 the principle of the constitution, which secures to the people the 
 election ot the treasurer annually, by their annual representatives. 
 
 Of what use can it be to elect a treasurer with so much forma, 
 lity, to take care of the money, which the laws direct to. be con . 
 stantly deposited in bank ; and then oblige him by another la-» , 
 immediately to draw it out, to pay the orders of the governor's 
 accountants (signed by the governor) whenever they wish it 
 should be di'awn ? 
 
 The governor's orders might as well be directed at once to the 
 bank where the money is deposited, vvithout uselessly passing- 
 through the hand of the treasurer, who cannot check an impro- 
 per payment. 
 
 But the shadow of a shade^ has in it another meaning wider this 
 cojiMtiuion^ quite as applicable to the assembly that produces the 
 treasurer, as to the treasurer that is produced. 
 
 If some few members of the general assembly, say nine sena- 
 tors out of twenty -five, or more than one third out of the present 
 ratio, be partially aiverted from a firm attitude ; if these nine can 
 be brought fairly, or unfairly seduced, to subserve the executive 
 will ; ought we not, after the example of the ivorshi/ful judge, to 
 eail them an executive negative pregnant^ able to control (with the 
 governor's aid) the legislative will of sixteen other senators, and 
 the whole number of members in the house of representatives ? 
 
 Here the negative wisdom of nine senators, with a little exe- 
 cutive aid, is too heavy for the possitive wisdom of sixteen other 
 senators, and the whole house of representatives. This system 
 should be styled an eulogium upon the weakness, folly, or cunning 
 of human nature. 
 
 On a view of these things, is it not a fair conclusion that legis- 
 lative proceedings may be so marred, as that nothing important 
 will be supported, that counteracts the opinions and wishes of a 
 cunning, intriguing, executive magistrate? 
 
 'Tis ti ue, a governor may be so vain, and hold the people and 
 their representatives in such compleat contempt, that a spirit of 
 
( 49 ) 
 
 opposition will sometimes be reused, so as tobcar down the natural 
 tendency of the principles of aiistocracy ; and cany importidit 
 measuixs in an extraordinary manner over the head of ihe exe- 
 cutive. 
 
 Perhaps this has been done in a few instances, but it has hap- 
 pened rarely ; and when it did happen, it only served as a signal to 
 jirovoke conicmpt and arro^!;aiKe, to proceed more efl'ectvtally by 
 the tempting- influence of patronaf-c, upon the principles of the 
 court of St. James's, and thereby render the representative body 
 (notwithstanding the a irtue of a majority) completely a fiolitical 
 fifiade, producing little more than shadows of measures of protec- 
 tion, security, or justice. 
 
 How many principles arc brought forward at the seat of gc* 
 vernment for legislative investigation (suited to the interest of a 
 certain class) which have been warped into one or other of the 
 houses, or palmed through the committee of ways and means, 
 that cannot be traced to a greater extent ? Where do these things 
 come from ? The new members and less influential, being un- 
 suspecting, seldom know where they originate. Some of the old 
 members, with all the dignity and virtue becoming public ser- 
 vants, as well as a few of the new, when they detect these spu- 
 rious impositions, make all the head they are able against them; 
 yet it frequently happens that these illegitimates progress 
 through both houses, are advocated by exectuive echo in and out 
 of doors, and often pass into lav/s, before the people are aware, 
 or a majority of their members discovei' their pernicious tendency. 
 If baseness is sometimes discovered near the assembly, the 
 authors are covered from investigation, either by their insignifi- 
 cance; or under sub-appointments, and their acts too soon forgotten. 
 Ever}' session opens a new scene of intrigue, and produces new 
 and inexperienced members to be intiigued with ; some of whom 
 are imposed upon as their predecessors were, so that nine may 
 be obtiiined out of twenty -five, for particular purposes, by a dimi- 
 nuti\ e set of stationary intriguers void of talents and principle. 
 
 If all the evils that are wcmted, cannot be obtained, yet much 
 of the good naturally arising from a legislature will be industri- 
 ously prevented ; andthe firobanonanj b.dij thereby proved to be too 
 light, an undermatch for the stationary host, and legislation under 
 the present system little more thai^ a shade producing shadows. 
 
 If it were proposed to the people of Pennsylvania to vest the 
 executive directly with legislative powers, and to relieve them 
 from the expence of an assembly, they would justly spurn tlie idea. 
 But if the executive can frequently procure such laws indirectly 
 as he wishes, and oUt of one hundred and eleven members, induce 
 nine senators to be of his opinion, dS\d firmtnt laws that are obnox- 
 ious to him from passing ; it brings legislative power as near to 
 annihilation as the most abject sycophant could wish ; this advan- 
 tage is also on the side of the executive, that the idea of legislative 
 authority goes out to the people, and adds a sanction to measures, 
 which without it would be scouted from the community. 
 
( 50 ■) 
 
 If to thfesc considerations be added, the weight of official infiu- 
 cnce at the annual election, exerted in the different counties 
 through the prothonotaries, registers, and recorders, deputy and 
 ■sub-deputy surveyors, sub-states attorneys and brigade inspectors, 
 who mostly look for re-appointment, or continuance ; a weight 
 that under this system, naturally falls into the scale in favour of 
 the candidates that are known to be pursuing the measures of the 
 executive ; and afterwards add to all this, a few brigade inspec- 
 tors, and deputy surveyors who (holding commissions under the 
 executive) are improperly sent to the assembly ; few will be so 
 confident as to afiirm, that an aristocratic governor has it not in 
 his power directly or indirecly to give laws to the state, prejudi- 
 cial to their interests, pernicious to their liberties, and destructive 
 of free government. 
 
 This was not seen, scarcely suspected by many for some time, 
 under the early operation of the present constitution ; but now 
 nothing seems better understood, nor is perhaps better managed 
 by the few who cling to power, who are even busily employed in 
 under drudgery, too despicable even for vicious minds of a more 
 capacious make. 
 
 ; ESSAY XIV, 
 
 REFORM 'THE VITAL PRIl^CIPLE OF FREE COVERNMENT". 
 
 A political system approaching towards perfection, must like 
 the animal system, have a renuovating principle within itself, by 
 which the evils arising, as they are discovered, may be remov- 
 ed, and the body politic brought to a sound and healthy state. 
 
 The most perfect of the works of creation known to man, is 
 inan. And in every instance when he is attacked by disease, he 
 finds a pruiciple within his system, tending to remove the evil, 
 restore order, and produce that regularity which nature intended 
 should reign. 
 
 In every system that can be formed, there will be imperfecti- 
 on ; but the mind of man is incapable of stanciing still. It is ei . 
 Iher progressing in knowle; e, or deciming into ignorance. It 
 is either advancing in virtue, or by imperceptible degrees, sink- 
 ing into corruption. When the people neglect their interest, 
 they afibrd their rulers an (opportunity of retreating fiom freedom 
 back towards despotism. Though the system remain literally the 
 same, the officers take advanta;j;e of its defects, and mostly by 
 eradu-il abuses, entrench tliemselves and fi lends in office, until 
 the general interest, as much iis possible is put out of view. 
 
 Hence the necessity, that every o) iginal form of free govern- 
 ment, like the federal constitution, should have a conventional 
 article, providing a mode of correction for its weak, inconvenient, 
 and defective parts. iVnd then so long as the vigilance of the peo- 
 
( 51 ) 
 
 ■pie remained, so Ion?; as they would have as jrood a form of ^- 
 vernmcnt, as it is possible for the limited uisdoni of miin to 
 obtain. 
 
 If the people became inattentive and depraved, a constitution 
 would not, could not, be of any avuil, loncj; to secure them in the 
 enjoyment of liberty. It is therefore idle to fear a revision — to 
 fear that an amendment to the constitution, would set every thini; 
 or any thini^ afloat, that \\ as not ailoat before ; or that it would evi- 
 dence such versatility in the people, as finally to destroy the credit 
 of democracy, the confidence they have in their government, and 
 induce them to enlist for their safety and case under a despotism. 
 
 Vigilance and a love of freeaom, leud to an exam.ination of the 
 conduct of officers; and if unfaithfulness be evident, under a diffi- 
 culty of removal, it is a proof of defects in the constitution or 
 laws ; but it would answer no valuable j^urpose to stop there ; at- 
 tempts should be made to displace corrupt men ; and by amend- 
 ments, as far as possible, prevent an opportunity of similar evils 
 arising. 
 
 A ciifinition of rights, a restriction of powers, and a specificatioft 
 of duties, have many advantages ; but the keystone of Itbertxj^ is 
 the annual convention of the people, by their representatives, to 
 consult upon iheir o\\ti affairs, and to pursue thereby their own 
 interests and huppiness. 
 
 Without this annual meeting, the servants of tlie people would 
 iioon become their masters. The laws, the constitution, and 
 every thing that is valuable to freemen, would be prostrated lower 
 than the earth itself. 
 
 This annual meeting of the people, by their ar.nual represen- 
 tatives, under all goveiTimcnts where it has been established, has 
 been the dread of aiistocrats, made tyrants to tremblQ, and been 
 hateful to all the proud oppressors of man. 
 
 Rewards or bribes, in a numerous assembly will be vain. 
 Members will sometimeserr ; individuals may be influenced orcor- 
 rupted ; but it will be mor'.\l! v iirossible for the majority of a large 
 body taken annually from the people to be corrupted and wilfully 
 stray from their duty. They will remain the wiiiing defenders of 
 liberty, moved by nothing but the interests and • i'^hes of their con- 
 stituents, which they will pursue as their own. In so en irh^ened 
 a state as Pennsylvania; the period must be short, that thev mny 
 not forget their own dignity, and lose sight of their principles of 
 liberty, so as to adulate a tyrant or rally rour.da despot. 
 
 This annual meeting of the people, is the c'reat security of equal 
 rights ; it ought never to be dispensed with at any time, nor on uny 
 occasion ; nor ought any power or office be held for a longer 
 tenure. But it need not always be confined to legislation ; Uie 
 people ought to act periodically as a revisory bodv. Once in ten 
 years, there should be elected a convention solely lor that purpose, 
 and in that year orduiary legislation to be omitted. 
 
 Defects in the constitution could be examined and corrected ; 
 ^d if very great cauiiou were necessary, in order that all might 
 
( 52 ) 
 
 have information upon so important a sr.bject, any alteration or 
 amendment which might be made, shoviM be submitted to the 
 adoption or rejection, of Uie ordinary mcmberscf the next suc- 
 ceeding; lcp,islature. 
 
 Delegates coaiuig together as a convention, once in ten years, 
 would be as great a guard Lo the liberties of the people that year, 
 as the ordinary legislature could be ether years, and no additional 
 expence thereby would be brought upon the people. 
 
 Had such a principle as tlds, been engrafted in the constitution, 
 the clamour about anarchy and self destruction would not have been 
 made. Evils as they became evident vvould have been removed. 
 
 The servants of the people would not have made such strides 
 towards becoming their masters ; and we should have been progres- 
 sing gradually towards a state of unexampled rational liberty ; not 
 the envy, but the desirable object of imitation for other states. 
 
 The enemies of mankind always Avish to meet them single, that 
 may be able to defe.t them when their strengh is divided. They 
 are always afraid of the people coming together to consult upon 
 their common good. They arc v/illing to call it riot, sedition, and 
 insurrection whenever they can, and if possible scare the people 
 with themselves. They are well assured that every amendment 
 to constitutions as well as every revolution in government, however 
 unhappily some have been conducted, has taken place in conse- 
 quence of the abuse of power, and stands as a monument censuring 
 the conduct of public officers. 
 
 As the weak and defective parts of law, are the gain of dishonesty, 
 and the advantage of the bar, so the defects in the constitution, are 
 converted to the benefit of the corrupt, who administer the govern- 
 ment. As soon therefore as any attempt is made to remedy 
 defects, and remove abuses, no wonder that a clamour is raised 
 against the reformers. The necessity of a reform having arisen 
 from the cori'uption and abuse of officers, they and their parasites 
 justly anticipate a removal, on being spurned from their elevation 
 and degraded. 
 
 They revile the ignorance of the swini/ih muldtude, but really 
 dread the wisdom, virtue, and vigilance of the people, which alive 
 to the subject, will hurl them from their once fancied security. 
 
 Though they predict destruction to pursue the heels of every 
 improvement, they believe nothing in danger, but themselves, their 
 offices, and their salaries. 
 
 They are careful of the public money, when a convention is abput 
 to be called, but anxiously support the bench and the bar, though 
 the consequence of that independence, in the trial of the judges 
 and justices by the legislature, within a few years, has cost the 
 state more than fifty thousand dollars. 
 
 They know that a revision of the constitution, would remove the 
 cause of such enormous expences, but they are also certain, that 
 themselves and adherents would forever be removed, entirely 
 from political life, unless they reform their lives and their political 
 principles to due respect for elective government. 
 
ESSAY XV. 
 
 I'JIZ EXECUTIVE POWER AS It IS ABSURD^ DESPOTIC IN TACT. 
 
 ON a pcM'usal of the foregoing essays, it will be evident, that 
 the c:;ccutive, vmder such a system, as is contemplated, would not 
 have that cxoibitant jxiwcr, that the executive now possesses. In 
 democratic instiliitions but little should fall, in times of peace, to 
 to the share of uny one ofllicer. When it is otherwise, there can- 
 not be a f.dr and useful distributicii. 
 
 The governor at present is well chosen. Evevy citizen who has 
 resided two years in the state, and within that time paid a state or 
 county tax, has a voice ; poor am! rich alike ; but the error lies in 
 comniitling too much power into his hands. He has more than the 
 V. '; jdom of any one man, united to the strictest virtue, should be 
 entrusted with. 
 
 As there ought to be but one operative will in a democracy, the 
 will of a majority, as soon as th^t is ascert.iined in an enlightened 
 community needs no check ; else it would be no longer a demo- 
 cracy ; but a suspicious aristocracy, vain, delusive, and dan.eerous. 
 
 If it be checked at alf, it should be by a superior intelligence, 
 derived from a lugher source than man ; such as no individual in 
 any community can possess. 
 
 If there is a fair expression of the public Avill, it should not af- 
 terwards be checked, by a part of that will, existing in a few selfish 
 or vain individuals. 
 
 When Mililin sat in a former assembly and in convention, he 
 had but one vote, like any other member ; and in 1790 when he 
 was elected governor, it may be asked, if he had more wisdom by 
 virtue of tliat election, than he formerly possessed? Had it en- 
 creased so much/as to make it a just balance, equal to two thirds, 
 less one, of botii houses of assembly ? 
 
 M<Kean was in the convention of ninety ; and let his law-know- 
 ledge have been what it might before, his vote in that body, was 
 neither more nor less, than the vote of Pedan of York or lawyer 
 Lewis of Philadelphia. But in the year 17;' 9, by being elfct- 
 cd governor, under the magic of the present constitution, it instan- 
 taneously became equal to two thirds, less one, of the Avholc 
 legislature. 
 
 Miflflin when governor in December ninety-nine, had power 
 equal to two thirds less one, of both houses ; but in the very same 
 month, the same man under his election to the assembly in the 
 house of representatives, had no more power, nor •wisdom qfcoursr, 
 than its seventy-eighth part. 
 
 Can a mere change of situation, from the assembly to the execu- 
 tive chair, give a man wisdom and virtue, equal to the additional 
 power he immediately receives, when he is elected governor? Or 
 can a subsequent election to the assembly, take away liis under- 
 standing ? 
 
( 54 ) 
 
 Mifflin and M'Kean, became no wiser on being elected govciTi' 
 ors. They reniiiined the same in respect of knov/iedge, or they 
 declined. Any alteration neither made them nnore useful, nor 
 I'espcctable. They were neither more e..sy of access, nor their 
 passions nor appetites more strictly subjugated. They were still 
 men of like passions with other men, and comparatively not pos- 
 sessing superior merit or knowledge to thousands of other men in 
 the state. They were still men; and let the people elect to the 
 same office whom they may, they never w ill be better men for 
 being clothed with useless, exorbicant, or dangerous power. 
 
 When the democratic will is obtained, it should be operative. 
 The executive should be so designed, as to produce so desirable 
 an effect. This cannot be done Avhile the system arrays one 
 branch in hostility to another, as the legislature and governor are 
 now placed ; nor while oiic man in one branch has so much power, 
 wh.o nuiy have little wisd(jm or prudence, and other men in otlier 
 branches so little weight. 
 
 All the power necessary to an executive in a democracy, is merely 
 to be the organ, the central point to fiu-ther not frustrate the legisla- 
 tive Avill, and when that will shall be known, to bring it i'lto operation. 
 
 But even in this, it should not be single ; the governor should 
 have the assistance o£ persons deriving power seperatcly, in ano- 
 ther way from the peopley in two or three years, arrogance and 
 vanity, of which we find plenty about eveiy man, might build 
 him up so as to check or prevent the will of a majority. 
 
 He should have a council derived from the legislature. Each 
 house as soon as organized might elect tAvo or three members to 
 continue one year; to associate with the govenor, who together" 
 should possess the executive power. 
 
 The governor should be the organ or head, and on an equal 
 division, besides his own, have the casting vote. 
 
 The infallibility of a governor, and his despotic power are in 
 government precisley as pernicious, as the infallibility in any 
 church, of one of its members, when clothed with absolute power, 
 and placed over others 
 
 Laws passed by a majority of the members elected to serve in 
 each house ; or by a majority elected to serve in both (when the 
 two disagree) executed and carried into effect by such an execu- 
 tive, could not fail of being an expression of the public will, and 
 would give general satisfaction. 
 
 As the executive duties would be lessened, by the people's elec- 
 tion of the justices and county judges ; rmd the court appointment 
 of prothonotarics and recorders there would be few appointments 
 for the executi\ e to make, except the four heads of departments, 
 and some of the most iniportant judicial and military officers, wdiich 
 could be approbated by one or both houses of the assembly. 
 
 Tf the powers and duties were thus lessened, the executive 
 could attend t& the operations at the seat of government, where 
 the principal officers would perfonii their duty. And the council 
 being annual, would not be likely to enter into the speculations 
 which have so after prevailed to the injury of the state. 
 
( 55 ) 
 
 Yet it would be better to huv»; t.n amuial trctisurer with conticiiin^ 
 powers diicctiy responsible to the assembly ; and the reasonableness 
 and propiiety ol" wiiose paynienls should annually be investi^-ated 
 by aeomniitlee ofaceouritunts appointed iVon\ their own body. 
 
 Under such a system the asi^cnibly would have but little to do, 
 but guard the liberties oi' the people and ie'jfislate, the sessions 
 would not be near so long as heaiinu: the complaints agiiinst judges 
 and justices now make tliem, ar.c; the public expcuce thereby 
 would be considerably ies.^ened. 
 
 ESSAY XVI. 
 
 PKOyF.Cf FOR A REFORMATION OF THE CONSTltcriOS. 
 
 THE preminent amendments proposed to the constitution are, 
 — 1st. The legislature to be elected annually, Vvithout distinction, 
 and vested solely v/ith the law-making power. When met, to be 
 divided by lot, equally into two houses. Bills to pass by a majori- 
 ty of the members elect in each house, or on a disagreement of 
 the two houses, by a majority of the members elect of both hou- 
 ses, convened in one house, and then to become law. 
 
 2d. The executive power to be vest-d in a governor chosen by 
 tlie people for three years ; to be aided by a small annual council. 
 
 3d. The judicial power to be vested in justices of the peace 
 elected by the people in townships or districts and to serve three 
 years. In county courts consisting of the justices of the peace ; 
 or county judges'to be chosen by the people, one annually, and 
 to serve five years. Presidents of districts, over from three to six 
 counties, to be chosen by the people if convenient ; or nominated 
 by the executive, and approbated by the legislatiu-e, to serve five 
 vears. Supreme judges for the trial of capital offences, over the 
 whole state ; to be nominated by the executive, and approbated 
 bv a vote of the legislature, and not to continue in office more than 
 seven years. 
 
 4th. The officers of miiilia, to be elected within their compa- 
 nies, by the members of each ; — of regiments, by the members 
 of each ;— of brigades by the field officersof regiments ;— and of di- 
 vision, by tlic majority of commanders of regiments; and to be 
 eommissioned for five years only. 
 
 5th. The holding offices under the United States, to be incom- 
 patible with holding of offices under this state ; and the holding 
 of any office except in the militia, where no salary or perquisite 
 is annexed, incompatible with holding a seat in the legislature. 
 
 6th. Prothoncta;ics, recorders, and other court officers to be 
 appointe. i by the respective courts for five years. 
 
 7th. Shci'ilT's to bo Cicctcd as at present. Tlie highest 
 
 in vole to enter security in court and be preferred. On f liiure 
 oi' giving sccr.ri'.y by the first, the second or third, on compliance 
 to be received ; or on the death of the shcrifi", to serve during the. 
 
( 56 ) 
 
 year. No coroners necessary ; their dvities transferred in case of 
 casual death to the justices, and court business for or against the 
 sheriff performed under deputations from the court. 
 
 ' th. The state treasurer to be elected annually as at present ; 
 and all the other officers in the receipt of public money, to derive 
 their appointments from him, or from the legislature ; and to be 
 kept distinct from the executive. 
 
 • 9th. The governor, heads of departments, supreme judges, 
 and presidents of districts to have salaries, v/hich shall neither be 
 encreased nor diminished, during the period for which they shall 
 have been elected to serve. But salaries may be altered, and the 
 law operate immediately after the expiration of their period. 
 
 10th. No officer to be commissioned for a greater length of 
 time than five years ; and liable to be impeached for misbehavi- 
 our, or removed for incompetency. 
 
 1 1th. County judges to have daily pay but no salaries. 
 
 12th. A convention instead of the legislature to sit every tenth 
 year. 
 
 ESSAY XVII. 
 
 PROyECI' OF A REFORM IN LEGISLATION AND ADMINISI'RATIOS. 
 
 THE laws may be amended in the following manner, so as to 
 save a large sum of money annually to the state. 
 
 1st. All public money received in the first instance at bank, and 
 the treasurer without handling it in any instance, pay it out by a 
 check attached to the register's certificate of a settled account ; with 
 power to stop payment,' until convinced of its propriety. 
 
 2d. The treasurer vested with controlling powers, and prevent- 
 ed from holding any office under the executive ; and the comptroll- 
 er's office abolished. , 
 
 3d. The secretary's office kept distinct from the governor s 
 ©ffice, and bound to record his acts. 
 
 4th. The governor to draw money from the treasury as others 
 draw it ; and no warrants for the payment thereof to pass through 
 
 5th The receiver general's office abolished, and the duties of 
 calculation, and settlement of land accounts, transferred to the 
 secretary of the land office. 
 
 6th The rolls office abolished. The duUes of enrolimg patents 
 ta-ansferrcd to the secretary of the land office, and of enrolimg laws 
 to the secretary of stcttc. 
 
 7th The land oihcers to receive no money, except tor copies 
 and searches ; but to direct the applicant to deposit the price of land 
 and patent in the bank, and he or they to lea vC the bank ticket or 
 receipt with the treasurer. 
 
C ^7 ) 
 
 Sth. The ofikc of deputy secretary of the state abolished, and a 
 deputy treasurer established ; to assist while living, and transact 
 business on the death of the treasurer. 
 
 9th. The otTicers of government and clerksprohibitcd directly or 
 indirectly from trading i:i land or public securities under severe 
 penallies. And all the real estate held by them, when they entered 
 business, together with what they might purchase while in oflice, 
 held as security for the property, private and public, which passed 
 through their hands. 
 
 lOtii. The mode, of granting tavern licences, changed from the 
 governor, to the county courts, and the county treasurer checked, 
 by the annual report of the prothonotary under oath to the register- 
 general. 
 
 Under the foregoing reform of law, tlicre would be a large sum 
 annually saved. And if the responsibility of payment were 
 placed upon the treasurer, where the constitution designed it should 
 rest, it is much easier to conceive, by a vieM- of the annual pay- 
 ments heretofore made, and an examination into the data, upon 
 which they are founded, than pleasant to say, how much money 
 uiight be saved by the treasurer paying it away, as governors 
 would do their own. 
 
 . The salaries, perquisites, and contingencies of the secretary of 
 state's oflice, now annually amount to about S6,136 ; which under 
 a reform of law, would bo lessened, by striking off most of the 
 printing, the deputy's salary, and the salaries of all the clerks but 
 one ; so that if the secretary were to be allowed his present salary 
 of g2,000, for which no good reason can be given, while other 
 heads of department receive but S 1333 33, the expcnces of that 
 office would amount to no more than S2,000 for himself, Sl^OO^^ 
 for a clerk, and goOO for rent and contingencies, in all say S3, 500, 
 which deducted from S5,136, leaves a saving of - g2,636 
 Comptroller's salary, clerk hire. Sec, save as per 
 
 register general's report of December, 1806, - 4,3/9 
 Receiver's ditto ditto per ditto 2,933 
 
 rent, fuel, stationary, S.c. out of view (supposed) 400 
 
 Rolls office fees, contingencies, and rent (supposed) 3,000 
 
 Deduct the salaries of two additional clerks given 
 
 to the secretary of the land oflice, . * - 1,000 
 
 Annually saved under reform of law, • 12,f,48 
 
 If the constitution were amended, so as that the judiciary officers 
 should hold their commissions for limited periods, then impeach- 
 ments would scarcely be known ; the meeting of the legislature 
 might be put off' until the holidays were over, which some of the 
 members celebrate ; say until about the middle of January ; one 
 third of the time the session new generally consumes, would be 
 cut off, and consequently one third of the expence saved. 
 
 The legislative expence for about four months, amounts annu- 
 ally t« gGQjOOO 
 
 H 
 
( 58 ) 
 
 Sav of thiit buii"i uuJer rerorm — lof ihc coi'.stitiilion, 
 
 saved, - ' - -, - - - - -^''^'®^' 
 
 —And under reform of hiv/, u'ocut - , l-.\339 
 
 ■ Under both, annuaily saved - - S^-^^GO 
 
 ESSAY XVIII. 
 
 ■T'HE VU'fr OF 1'HE PEOPLE fO fHEMSELVES. 
 
 CAN we find reasonable men in., the state, who are ar;-ainst a 
 reform imder law, that wovjkl anntially save S '2,000, and^the wub- 
 lic business be as well done,.Qi' better tlian at present. This relbrm 
 might be made without touching the constitution — without agitating 
 our minda with the fear of ourselves. All classes that are honest 
 could unite ; it is the interest of the people. The democrats want' 
 a constitutional reform ; but a reform under law, would remove 
 part of the existing evils, and in nine or ten years save at least 
 S 100,000. Those of any party who will oppose it, must either be 
 blind partizans, or themselves or friends interested in the salaries 
 or abuses, and care not how much tlie i)eople are ground by taxes, 
 which will some time have to be collected to support an expensive 
 system. 
 
 For the funds of the state consisting of dividends fron) bank 
 stock, produce of the land offices; eviction, duties, &c. which all 
 fluctuate, and in case of war the most material might fail ; the peo- 
 ple must then be saddled with atax of one%iu:idred and fifty thou- 
 sand dollars annually, besides the cost of collection, to keep the 
 government in motion. 
 
 Although many are anxious for a constitutional reform, yet it 
 ought noi to take place, until a majority of the people shall be 
 convinced of its utility. 
 
 It must have its first operation in the legislative body, being a legiti- 
 mate delegation from all parts of the state, and :he only place under 
 the present system, where the people can originate it; they there- 
 fore sliould elect such members as arc of their own opinion, to 
 bring it about in as moderate, easy, ar.d prudent a manner as pos- 
 sible. 
 
 That it will be done without noise cannot be expected. . There 
 are too many wlw have wormed themselves into power, without 
 principle, that would draw tlie last cent from the public, to sup- 
 port themselves there. Such will make a noise to the last, rather 
 than suffer any improvement. But many honest and disinterested 
 men who -cling to the constitution for fear the people by a con- 
 vention would destroy themselves, ought on th.cir own principles 
 to exert themselves, to reform the laws, so as to remove some ol the 
 prevailing evils, and thereby prevent a convention as long as they can. 
 
( 59 ) 
 
 \Vhen ihe conveiuion vas called in 1790, il was done too Itiisli- 
 iy. It was not done in the manner pointed nut by ll.e ronslitulion 
 of seventy -six ; neither vn. re tlie majority of the people satisfied with 
 the chanf>,-e. They acciuiesced. It has answered tlic exjcctalion 
 of its friends; it has founded an aristocracy. It has exceeded the 
 expectation of its enen\ies ; it has produced greater evils than they 
 conjectured. 
 
 The aristocrats raised the.cry of perjury against the assembly 
 for expressing an opinion as >assemblyn en — for saying that the 
 constitution was <]efective, and intimating that as soon as a suRi- 
 cienl number of the citizens petitioned for a reforni, steps might 
 be taiicn to call a convention to alter it. 
 
 What is pt-rjury ? It is swearing falsely, knowingly, and wilful- 
 ly. This definition is short, but' correct. 
 
 The assem.bly of 1790 as well as cf 1804, had sworn to sup- 
 port the constitution — that is, ■whenever tliey were to make laws 
 under it, the laws should correspond with the principles it cou- 
 , tained. But in both instances they believed that th.e constitutions 
 "were inconvenient andcuglitto be amended. 
 
 In 1790 they invited their constituents to send delegates to 
 coia\ emion to rectify the ca ils. They did not violate the provisi- 
 ons, by passing luv.'s in hostility knowingly ; this would ha^ e been 
 perjury. 
 X 71iey were swoni — haw ? Not to support the constitution for 
 \evcr, i(oo(i, or bad. They never swore they would bo silent as to 
 its defects ; it would have been absurd ; it would have been swear- 
 ing to be false to themselves, and to the people. 
 
 SAvcaring to tilings as facts which never took place, is perjury. 
 Swearing to snpport an opinion, even that the constitution is good, 
 and afterward discovering- its defects, and endeavouring to alter it, 
 is not perjury. The constitution, as to its perfection, being found- 
 ed on opinion, and that opinion changing; an oath founded upon 
 both must fall ; it has no foundation in Virtue, on v i.ich it can stand, 
 and fulls without crime. If tliere be crime, it cannot be in o re- 
 lease from an improper obligation ; but consists in ha\-ing entered 
 ^to it, without con hide ration. 
 
 An okh is a solemnity that should be warilv entered into and 
 when It is used to establisli the belief of facts which never took 
 place, It 13 perjury and an abominable crime. Tut if an oath be 
 taken to support a principle founded on opinion, as soon as that opi- 
 nion IS charged, a recantation becon-.es necessary ; it tVould be cri- 
 minality to continue in error a single njoment. 
 
 Sundry men bound themselves under oath, neither to.eift ror to 
 drmk until they had killed Paul. W as it perjury, if after they saw the 
 evil ot the obligation, they released themselves from its perform- 
 ance. 
 
 'I'hc members of assembly in 1805, saw defects in the constitu- 
 tion— evils had been experienced lor years, and they ciuididly cx- 
 iiressed .n opinion. Had they been corrupt, tliey,vvould not have 
 acted openly and so modestly. They expressed an opinion, and 
 
( 60 ) 
 
 left it as an inoperative principle upon record, to be brought into 
 operation, when the people should tliink. proper. 
 
 Perjury always implies an o ith in support of known falshood, or 
 unknown facts, independent of opinion. To know a fact, and con- 
 firm it solemnly upon oath is not perjury ; but to swear to facts not 
 known, whether true or false, is perjury in conscience, because 
 they are sworn to be true, without any knowlege of the fact. 
 
 In mere matters of opinion, as it respects the future ; when 
 opinions change, the obligation ceases ; for it would be criminal to 
 act contrary to conscience. How else could the revolutionary pa- 
 triots, many of whom were virtuous and religious, who had been 
 sworn to support the king before independence, have afterwards 
 opposed his measures and the measures of his ministry, and revolt- 
 ed from under his government I How else could the officers and 
 the people, who were bound on oath to support the constitution of 
 seventy-six, have set it aside, and established tlvie constitution of 
 1790, and continued innocent? The tories and the disaffected 
 attached to the crown, to aid the king, cried perjury in seventy-six, 
 just as the enemies of reform have lately done. 
 
 An oath is indeed solemn and sacred. It is calling the father of 
 the universe — the great Jehovah, on whom we depend for protec- 
 tion and salvation, to witness our honesty in the declaration of truth, 
 in relation to facts we affirm ; and resting salvation upon our vera- 
 city. But in not properly considering the difference between Jacts 
 and opinions^ and the application of an oath to either or both, unea- 
 siness in the minds of a few honest and good men has arisen, and 
 given room for extending the clamours of the designing ^id 
 vicious. * 
 
 But every citizen should keep in mind, that the denial of the 
 right to alter the constitution now is a denial of the right for ever. 
 That if it is true now, it was true always, and that the revolution 
 of 1776, was awror?^ and a disgrace, and not a right and a glory. 
 
 To deny tlie right to reform or correct defects in the constitu- 
 tion, is in fact to say the people have no rights. 
 
 That the people are their own worst enemies. 
 
 That the sovereignty of the people is ideal, and not real, and 
 goes at once to perpetuate and never to correct abuses. 
 

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