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LETTER 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 Hon. Timothy Pickering, 
 
 A SENATOR OF TEE UNITED STATES 
 
 FROM THF. 
 STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS: 
 
 EXHIBITING TO HIS CONSTITUENTS 
 
 A VIEW OF THE IMMINENT DANGER 
 OF AV 
 
 UjXjXJScessary and ruixous jfar. 
 
 ADDRESSED TO 
 
 His Excellency JAMES SULLIVAN, 
 Governor of the said State. 
 
 BOSTOK, PRisrF.n. 
 JiXW-HAVEVj Rt-FRiyfEiy Br OLJVEM STEELS ASD C9. 
 
 1«08. 
 
 / 
 
.T- 
 
 To the Reader. 
 
 THE following Is a public Letter. It is very properly addressed to 
 the Governor, and through him to the Legislature : by this channel it 
 •\vould have come most regularly to the eye of the whole people. It is 
 not known to the publishers why it has not been already printed for the 
 use of the public ; — whether it is only delayed, or intended to be entirely 
 Avithheld. But a copy, which was sent from Washington, after the ori- 
 ginal, to a private friend, has been happily obtained for the press. 
 
 If at this day any honest citizen can doubt of the great credit and 
 weight to which the facts and opinions of the writer are fairly entitled, 
 such citizen is referred to the Writer's enemies for information. Among 
 these many of the most respectable will say, that his pure patriotism 
 and intrepid public virtue have honored the name of Republican in our 
 country, and would have honored the best of the Romansj in the beat 
 days of Rome. 
 
 Jiosion, March 9/A, 1808. 
 
LETTER, &c. 
 
 City of fVasfungton, February 16, 1808. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 I 
 
 N the even current of ordinary times, an 
 address from a Senator in Congress to his constituents 
 might be dispensed with. In such times, the proceedings 
 of the Executive and Legislature of the United States, ex- 
 hibited in their j&w^/ic ac^i", might be sufficient. But the 
 present singuku- condition of our countr}^ when its most in- 
 teresting concerns, wrapt up in mystery, excite universal 
 alarm, requires me to be no longer silent. Perhaps I am li- 
 able to censure, at such a crisis, for not sooner presenting, 
 to you and them, such a view of our national affairs as my 
 official situation has placed in my power. I now address it 
 to you, Sir, as the proper organ of communication to the 
 legislature. 
 
 The attainment of truth is ever desirable : and I cannot 
 permit myself to doubt that the statement I now make must 
 be acceptable to all ^\"ho have an agency in directing the af- 
 fairs, and who are guardians of the interests of our Common- 
 wealth, which so materially depend on the measures of the 
 Government oHhc JSation. At the same time, I am aware of 
 the jealousy with which, hi these unhajjpy days of party di^- 
 
scntions, my communications may, by some of my constitu- 
 ents, be received. Of this I will not complain : w hile I ear- 
 nestly wish the same jealousy to be extended towards all 
 public men. Yet I may claim some shiu-e of attention and 
 credit — that shai'e which is due to the man who defies the 
 world to point, in the whole course of a long and public life, at 
 one instance of deception, at a single departure from truth. 
 
 The EMBARGO demands the first notice. For perhaps 
 no act of the National Government has ever produced so 
 much solicitude, or spread such universal alarm. Because 
 all naturally conclude, that a measure pregnant with incalcula- 
 ble mischief to all classes of our fellow-citizens, A\ouldnot 
 have been proposed by the President, and adopted by Con- 
 gress, but for causes deeply affecting the interests and safe- 
 ty of the nation. It must have been under the influence of 
 this opinion that the legislative bodies of some States have 
 expressed their approbation of the Embargo, either explicit- 
 ly, or by implication. , 
 
 The folloAN ing were all the papers laid by the President 
 before Congress, as the grounds of the Embargo. 
 
 1. The proclamation of the King of Great-Britain requir- 
 ing the return of his subjects, the seamen especially, from 
 foreign countries, to aid, in this hoin^ of peculiar danger, in 
 defence of their own. But it being an acknowledged princi- 
 ple, that every nation has a right to the ser\ice of its sub- 
 jects in time of war, that proclamation could not furnish the 
 slightest ground for an Embargo. 
 
 2. The extract of a letter from the Grand Judge Rcgnier 
 to the French Attorney General for the Council of prizes. 
 This contained a partial interpretation of the imperial block- 
 ading decree of November 21, 1806. This decree, indeed, 
 and its interpretation, present flagrant violations of our neu- 
 tral rights, and of the existing treat) betw een the United 
 States and France : but still, the execution of that decree 
 could not (from the small number of French cruisers) ex- 
 tensively interrupt our trade. These two pajjcrs were 
 pul:)lic. 
 
 3. The letter from our Minister, Mr. Armstrong, to Mr. 
 Champagny, the French Minister of Foreign AflUirs : and 
 
 4. Mr. Champagny 's answer. Botli these ought, ii\ 
 form or substance, also to have been made public. The 
 
latter would have fiirnislied to our nation some idcaof tlic 
 views and expectations of France. But both were with- 
 drawn bv the President, to be deposited among other Exec- 
 uti^ e secrets : while neither presented any new ground to 
 justify an Embargo. 
 
 In the Senate, these papers were refered to a commitlee. 
 The committee quickly reported a bill for laying an embar- 
 go, agreeably to the President's proposal. This \\as read 
 a first, a second, and a third time, and passed ; and all in the 
 short compass of about four hours ! A little time was repeat- 
 edly asked, to obtain further information, and to consider a 
 measure of such moment, of such universal concern : but 
 these requests were denied. We were hurried into the pas- 
 sage of the bill, as if there was danger of its being rejected, 
 if we were allo\\ed time to obtain further information, and 
 deliberately consider the subject. For to that time our ves- 
 sels were freely sailing on foreign voyages ; and in a national 
 point of ^ iew, the departure of half a dozen or a dozen 
 more, ^^•hile we were encjuiring into the necessity or expedi- 
 ency of the Embargo, was of little moment. Or if the dan- 
 ger to our vessels, seamen and merchandize liad been so 
 extreme as not to admit of one day's delay, ought not that 
 extreme danger to have been exhibited to Congress ? The 
 Constitution which requires the President " to give to 
 Congress information of the state of the union," certainly 
 meant, not partial^ but complete information, on the subject 
 of a communication, so far as he possessed it. And when 
 it enjoins him " to recommend to their consideration such 
 measures as he should judge necessary and expedient," it 
 as certainly intended that those recommendations should be 
 bottomed on mfonnation commiDiicated^ not on facts xvith- 
 licld, and locked up in the Executive cabinet. Hod the 
 public safety been at stake, or any great public good been 
 presented to our view, but which would be lost by a mo- 
 ment's delay ; there would luiAe been some apology for dis- 
 patch^ though none for acting xvithout due information. In 
 truth, the measure appeared to me then, as it still do.s, and 
 as it appears to the public, without a sufficient motive, with- 
 out a legitimate object. Hence the general enquiry — " For 
 what is the Embargo laid '?" And 1 challenge any man 
 not in the secrets of the Executive to tell. I know, Sir, 
 that the President said the papers abovcmentioned " show- 
 
cd that great and increasing- dangers threatened our vessels, 
 our seamen, and our merchandize :" but I also know tliat 
 they exhibited no n<fU' dangers; none oi which our mer- 
 chants and seamen had not been well apprized. The Brit- 
 ish ijroclamation had many da}s before been published in 
 the newspapers [the copy laid before us by the President 
 had been cut out of a newspaper ;] and so had the substance 
 if not the words of Regnier's letter. Yet they had excited 
 little concern among merchants and seamen, the preserva- 
 tion of whose persons and propert}' was the professed object 
 of the President's recommendation of an Embargo. The 
 merchants and seamen could accurately estimate the dangers 
 of continuing their commercial operations ; of which dangers 
 indeed, the actual premiums of insurance were a satisfactory- 
 gauge. Those premiums had very little increased ; by the 
 British proclamation not a cent : and by the French decree 
 so little as not to stop commercial enterprizes. The great 
 numbers of vessels loading or loaded, and prepared for sea ; 
 the exertions every where made, on the first rumour of the 
 Embargo, to dispatch them ; demonstrate the President's 
 dangers to be imagimiry — to have been assumed. Or if 
 gi-eat and real dangers, unknown to commercial men, were 
 impending, or sure to fall, how desirable was it to have had 
 them ojjicialhj declared and published ! This would have 
 produced a \'oluntaiy embargo, and prevented e\ery com- 
 plaint. Besides tlie dangers clearly defined and under- 
 stood, the })ublic mind would not have been disquieted 
 with imaginaiy feiU's, the more tormenting, because uncer- 
 tain. 
 
 It is true that considerable numbers of vessels were col- 
 lected in our ports, and many held in suspense : not, how- 
 c\ er, from any new dangers w hich appeared; but from the 
 mysterious conduct of our aft'airs, lifter the attack on the 
 Cliesapeake ; and from the painful apprehension that the 
 course the President was pursuing \\ould terminate in wiu*. 
 The National Intelligencer (usually considered as the Exec- 
 utive n'.'.vspaper) ga\ e the alarm ; and it was echoed through 
 the United States. W'ar, probable or inevitable war, was 
 the constaiu theme of the newspapers, and of tlic conversa- 
 tions, as was reported, of persons supposed to be best hifor- 
 jned of Evecuti\e designs. Yet amid thisdinofwar.no 
 
;idequate preparations were seen making to meet it. The 
 order to detach a hundred thousand niihtia to fight the Brit- 
 ish navv (for there was no appearance of an enemy in any 
 other shape) was so completely absurd, as to excite, \; ith 
 men of common sense, no other emotion than ridicule. Not 
 the shadow of a reason that could operate on the mind of a 
 man of common understanding can be oftered in its justifica- 
 tion. The refusal of the British officer to receive the frigate 
 Chesapeake i\si\ p?-ize when tendered by her comnumder, is 
 a demonstration that the attack upon her was exclusively for 
 the purpose of taking their deserters ; and not intended as 
 the commencement of a 7var between the two nations. The 
 President knew that the British had noin\-ading arm}' to land 
 on our shores ; and the detached militia would be useless, 
 except against land-forces. Why then was this order for 
 the Militia given? — The nature of the case, and the actual 
 state of things, authorize the inference, that its immediate, if 
 not its onli/ object, was to increase the public alarm, to ag- 
 gravate the public resentment against Great-Britain, to ex- 
 cite a war pulse ; and in the height of this artificial fever of 
 the public mind, which was to be made known in Great- 
 Britain, to renew the demands on her go\ eniment ; in th« 
 poor expectation of extorting, in that state of things, conces- 
 sions of points which she had always considered as htr rights^ 
 and which at all times and under all circumstances, she had 
 uniformly refused to relinquish. The result of the subse- 
 quent negociation at London has shewn how utterly unfound- 
 ed was the President's expectation, how perfectly useless 
 all this bluster of war. While no well informed man doubt- 
 ed that the British government would make suitable repara- 
 tion for the attack on the Chesapeake ; the President him- 
 self, in his proclamation, had placed the aftair on that foot- 
 ing. A rupture between the two nations, said he, " is equal- 
 ly opposed to the interests of both, as it is to assurances of 
 the most friendly dispositions on the part of the British gov- 
 ernment, in the midst of which this outrage was committed. 
 In this light the subject cannot hut present itself to thatgor- 
 cmment, and strengthen the motives to an honorable repa- 
 ration for the wrong which has been done." And it is tiow 
 well known that such reparation might ha\e been promptly 
 obtained in London, had the President's instructions to IVIr. 
 
Monroe been compatible with such an adjustment. He was 
 required not to nci^ociate on this single, transient act (which 
 when once adjusted was for ever settled) but in connection 
 with another claim of long standing, and, to sav the least, of 
 doubtful right ; to Avit, the exemption from impressmeiit of 
 British seamen found on board American merchant vessels. 
 To remed}' the evil arising from its exercise, by \vinch our 
 own citizens were sometimes impressed, the attention of 
 our government, under every administration, had beei. ear- 
 nestly engaged : but no practicable plan has yet been ccai- 
 tri\'ed : \\iiile no man who regards the truth, will question 
 the disposition of the British government to adopt any ar- 
 rangement that will secure to Great Britain the services of 
 her own subjects. And now, when the unexampled situa- 
 tion of that country (left alone to maintain the conflict with 
 France and her numerous dependent States — left alone to 
 withstand the Power which menaces the liberties of the 
 world) rendered the aid of all her subjects more than ever 
 needful ; there was no reasonable ground to expect that she 
 would } ield the right to take them when foiuxl on board the 
 merchant vessels of any nation. Thus to insist on her yield- 
 ing this point, and inseparably to connect it with the aftlar of 
 the Chesapeake, ^^•as tantamount to a determination not to 
 negociate at all. 
 
 I write. Sir, with freedom ; for the times are too perilous 
 to allow those who are placed in high and responsible situa- 
 tions to be silent or reserved. The peace and safety of our 
 country are suspended on a thread. The course we have 
 seen pursued leads on to war — to a war with Great Britain 
 — a war absolutely without necessity — a war which, Avhether 
 disastrous or succcessful, must bring misery and ruin to the 
 United States : misery by the destruction of our na^ igation 
 and commerce (perhaps also of our fairest sea-port towns 
 and cities) the loss of markets for our produce, the want of 
 foreign goods and manufactures, and the other evils incident 
 to a state of war : and ruin, by the loss of our libert}- and 
 independence. For if ^ith the aid of our arms, Great Britain 
 were subdued — from that moment (though flattered perhaps 
 with the name of allies) we should become the Provinces of 
 France. This is a result so obvious, that I must crave your 
 pardon for noticing it. Some advocates of Executive mcas- 
 
ufcs admit it. They acknowledge that the navy of Britairt 
 is our shield against the overwhelming power of France. — 
 Why then do they persist in a course of conduct tending to 
 a rupture with Great Britain ? Will it be believed that it is 
 principally, or solely, to procure inviolability to the merchant 
 flag- of the United States ? In other words, to protect all sea- 
 men, British subjects^ as well as our own citizens, on board 
 our merchant vessels '? It is a fact that this has been made 
 the greatest obstacle to an amicable settlement with Great 
 Britain. Yet (I repeat) it is perfectly well known that she 
 desires to obtain only her own suhjects ; and that American 
 citizens, impressed l)y mistake, are delivered up on duly au- 
 tlienticated proof. The e\ il m e complain of arises from the 
 impossibility of always distinguishing the persons of two 
 nations who a few years since were one people, who exhibit 
 the same manners, speak the same language, and possess 
 similai- features. But seeing that we seldom hear com- 
 plaints in the great navigating States, how happens there ta 
 be such extreme sympathy for American seamen at JFash- 
 ifigton ? Especially in gentlemen from the interior States, 
 which have no seamen, or from those Atlantic States whose 
 native seamen bear a very small proportion to those of New-- 
 England ? In fact, the causes of complaint are much fewer 
 than are pretended. They rarely occur in the States whose 
 seamen are chiefly natives. The first merchant in the Uni- 
 ted States, in answering my late enquiry about British im- 
 pressments, says, " Since the Chesapeake affair we have had 
 no cause of complaint. I cannot find one single instance? 
 where they have taken one man out of a merchant vesseL 
 I have had more than twenty \'essels arrived in that time^ 
 without one instance of a man being taken by them. Three 
 Swedes were taken out by a French frigate. I have made 
 enquiry of all the masters that have arrived in this vicinity, 
 and cannot find any complaint against the British cruisers." 
 Can gentlemen of known hostility to foreign commerce 
 'in our own vessels — who are even willing to annihilate it (and 
 such there are) — can these gentlemen plead the cause of our" 
 seamen because they really wish to //ro^ccnhem? Can those 
 desire io protect our seamen, who, by lapng an unnecessary- 
 embargo, expose them hy X\\o\\s-^,ndsXo starve or beg? — One 
 gentlemcp. hu^ said (and I believe he does not stand alone) 
 
 B 
 
10 
 
 that sooner than admit the principle that Great Britain had 
 a right to take her 07vn subjects from our merchant vessels^ he 
 would abandon commerce altogether ! — To wi.^c will every 
 man in New-England and of" the other navigating States, 
 ascribe such a sentiment ? A sentiment which, to prevent 
 the temporary loss of fi\ e men, by impres'-, w ould reduce 
 fifty thousand to beggary '? But for the Embargo, thousands 
 4epending on the ordinary operations of commerce, an ould 
 now be employed. E\en under the restraints of the orders 
 of the British Government, retaliating the French imperial 
 decree, \try large portions of the world remain open to the 
 commerce of the United States. We may yet pursue our 
 trade w\\h the British dominions, in ever}- part of the globe ; 
 with Africa, with China, and with the colonies of France, 
 Spain and Holland, And let me ask, whether in the midst 
 of a profovmd peace, when the powers of Europe possessing 
 colonies, would, as formerly, confine the trade with them to 
 their own bottoms, or admit us, as foreigners, only under 
 great limitations, we could enjoy a commerce much more 
 extensive than is practicable at this moment, if the Flmbar- 
 go were not in the way ? Why then should it be continued ? 
 vVhy rather was it ever laid ? Can those be legitimate rea- 
 sons for the Embargo which are concealed from Congress, 
 at the moment when they are recjuired to impose it ? Are the 
 reasons to be found in the dispatches from Paris ? These 
 have been moved for; and the motion was quashed by the 
 advocates for the Embargo, Why are these dispatches 
 withheld by the Executive ? Why, when all classes of citi- 
 zens anxiously enquire " For what is the Embargo hiid ?" 
 is a satisfactory answer denied ? Why is not Congress made 
 acquainted with the actual situation of the United States in 
 relation to France ? Why, in this dangerous crisis, iu-e Mr. 
 Armstrong's letters to the Secretur}- of State absolutely with- 
 held, so that a line of them cannot be seen ? Did they con- 
 tain no information of the demands and intentions of the 
 French Emperor ? Did the lievatge sail from England to 
 France, autl there \\ ait three or four weeks for dispatches 
 of no importance ? If so, why, regardless of the public solici- 
 tude, are the contents so carefully concealed ? If really un- 
 important, w hat harm cim lu-ise from telling Congress and the 
 Nation, ojjicuillijy that they contain nothing of moment to the 
 safety, tli'c liberty, the honor, or the interests of the United 
 
11 
 
 States? On the contrails are they so closely loclced up be- 
 cause they will not bear the light ? Would their disclosure 
 rouse the spirit of the people, still sluml^ering in blind confi- 
 dence in the Executive ? Has the French Emperor decku-ed 
 that he will have no neutrals '? Has he reciuired that our ports ^ 
 4ike those of his vassal states in Europe, be shut against Brit- 
 ish commerce? Is the Embargo a substitute, a milder form 
 of compliance with that harsh demand, which if exhibited in 
 its naked and insulting aspect, the Americcan spirit might 
 yet resent ? Are we still to be kept profoundly ignorant of 
 the declarations and avowed designs of the French Emperor, 
 although these may strike at our liberty and independence ? 
 And, in the mean time, are we, by a thousand irritations, by 
 clierishing prejudices, and by exciting fresh resentments,^ to 
 be drawni gradually into a war witli Great Britain ? Why 
 amidst the extreme anxiety of the public mind, is it still kept 
 on the rack of fearful expectation, by the President's por- 
 tentous silence respecting his French dispatches ? — In this 
 concealment there is danger. In this concealment must be 
 wrapt up the real cause of the Embargo. On any other sup- 
 position it is inexplicable- 
 
 I am alarmed. Sir, at this perilous state of things; I cannot 
 repress my suspicions-, or forbear thus to exhibit to you the 
 grounds on which they rest The i^ople are advised to re- 
 pose implicit confidence in the National Government : in 
 that unboimded confidence lies our danger. Armed witli 
 that confidence, the Executive may procure the adoption of 
 measures which may overwhelm us \\ith ruin, as surely a^ 
 if he had an army at' his heels. By flilse policy, or by inordi- 
 nate fears, our country may be betrayed, and subjugiited to 
 France, as surely as by corruption. I trust. Sir, that no one 
 who knows me will charge it to vanity when I say, that 1 
 have some knowlcxlge of public men and of public aftairs : 
 and on that knowledge, and with solemnity, I declare to you, 
 that I have no confidence in the wisdfjm or correctness of our 
 public measures: that our country is i-i imrnin-jnt danger: 
 that it is essentia] to the public safety that the .l)lind confi- 
 dence in our Rulers should cease ; tliat the State Legislatures 
 should know the facts and reasons on which inijiortant gen- 
 eral laws are founded-, and espenaUtj, that those States whose 
 farms are on the ocean^ and whose harvests are gathered r,i 
 '«very sea, should immediate! i/ .and scriouslij coitsidcr how t» 
 
12 
 
 preserve them. In all the branches of Govcrnmenl, commer- 
 cial infonnation is wantinj^ ; and in " this desart," called a 
 city, that want cannot be supplied. Nothing but the sense of 
 the commercial States, clearly and emphaticidly expressed, 
 will save them from ruin. 
 
 Are our thousands of ships and vessels to rot in our har- 
 bors ? Are our sixty thousand seamen and fishermen to be 
 deprived of employment, and, tVith their families, reduced 
 to \\ant and beggury ? Are our hundreds of thousands of 
 farmers to be compelled to suflcr their millions in surplus pro- 
 duce to perish on their hands, that the President may make an 
 experiment on ovr patience and fortitude, and on the tower- 
 ing pride, the boimdless ambition, and unyielding ]:)ersever- 
 ance of the Conqueror of Europe ? Sir, I have reason to be- 
 lieve that the President contemplates the continuance of the 
 Emljargo until the French Emperor rej)eals his decrees vio- 
 lating as well his treaty with the United States as every neu- 
 tral right ; and until Britain thereupon recals her retaliating 
 orders ! — By that time we may have neither ships nor sea- 
 men ; and that is precisely the point to which some men 
 "wish to reduce us. To see the 'nupj'ovklence of this project, 
 (to call it by no harsher name, and without adverting to ul- 
 terior Aiews) let us look back to former years. 
 
 Notwithstanding the v/cU-founded complaints of some in- 
 dividuals, and the murmurs of others ; notwithstanding the 
 frequent Executi^■e declarations of maritime aggressions 
 committed by Great-Briiain ; notwithstanding the outrage- 
 ous decrees of France and Spain, and the \\ anton spoliations 
 practised and executed by their cruisers and tribunals, of 
 which we sometimes heai* a faint whisper; — the commerce 
 of the United States has hitherto prospered beyond all ex- 
 ample. Our citizens have accumulated ^\■ealth ; and the 
 j)ublic revenue, annually increasing, has been the president's 
 annual bos.st. 
 
 These facts demonstrate, that although Great Britain, 
 "widi her thousand ships of war, could lKi\e deslroycd our 
 commerce, she has reallv done it no essential injury ; and that 
 the other belligerents, heretofore restrained by some reg-ard 
 to National Law, and limited by the small number of their 
 cruisers, have not inflicted uj)on it any deep wound. Yet in 
 this full tic!'- r)r M!'''rA^, our eonimerc*" is sud(K nlv arrcjlcd . 
 
an alarm of war js raised: fearful apprehensions arc ex- 
 cited : tlie merchiuits, in paiticular, tlirown into a state of 
 consternation, are advised, l>y a voluntary embargo, to keep 
 their vessels at home. And wJiat is the cause of this mighty 
 but mischievous alarm ? We kno.v it in its whole extent. 
 It xvas the unauthorised attack of a Britis/i naval officer on the 
 American frigate Chesapeake^ to search far ami take son. e de- 
 serters known to have been rcccirced un boards n'ho had been ofteii 
 demanded^ and as often refused to be delivered ups, As was 
 €xj)ected by all considerate men. and by the President him- 
 self (as I have before ol'-eivt d) the Lritish government, on 
 the first information < - t . rtunalc event (and without 
 
 waiting for an appl it ,■1 , ,v • ^ wed ihc act of its officer — 
 disclaimed the princ'; '-_ 1. ..; as cuiij^- National armed ves- 
 sels — and declared iu iva«iiiess Lo iirVj suitable repara- 
 tion, as soon as the stacc of f^^ca?c should be fully known. 
 
 Under such c.;rcumst;'.nces,^'ho can justify this alarm of 
 war? An alarm which greatly (ti'j<]uit tcdthe public mind, and 
 occasioned an interruption of commerce extremely injurious 
 to our merchants and sea-faring citizens. 
 
 I will close this long letter by stating ail the existing pre- 
 tences — for there are no causes — for a war with Great-Brit- 
 ain. 
 
 1. The British ships of war, agreeably to a right claimed 
 and exercised for ages — a right claimed and exercised du- 
 ring the whole of the administrations of Washington, of 
 Adams, and of Jefferson — continue to take some of the Bri- 
 tish seamen found on board our merchant vessels, and with 
 ihcm a smiiil number of ours, from the impossil^ility of al- 
 wavs distinoruishin'r Enorlishmen from citizens of the United 
 States. On this point our government well know that G. 
 Britain is jierfectly w illir.g to adopt any an'angemcnt that 
 can be devised, which \\ ill secure to her ser\ ice the seamen 
 who archer own subjects; and at the same time exempt 
 ours from impressment. 
 
 2. The meichant vessels of France, Spain and Holland, 
 being dri\ en from the ocean, or destroyed, the commerce of 
 those countries with one another, and with their colonics, 
 could no longer be carried on by ti'.emsehes. Here the ves- 
 sels of neutral nations came in to their aid, and carried on 
 nearly the whole commerce of those nations. With their 
 
u 
 
 seamen thus liberated from the merchant senice, those na- 
 tions, in the present and preceding wars, were enabled to 
 man their ships of war ; and the neutral \essels and seamen 
 supplying their places, became in fact, though not in name^ 
 auxiliaries in war. The conmierce of those nations, with- 
 out one armed ship on the sea appropriated for its protection, 
 was intended thus to be secured under neutral flags ; while 
 the merchant vessels of Great-Britain, \\\\h its numerous 
 armed ships to guard them, were exposed to occasional cap- 
 tures. — Such a course .A ;hi:igs Great-Britain has resisted, 
 not in the present only, but in former wars ; at least as far 
 back as that of 1756. And :;-^'"^, ha- d:\imed and maintain- 
 ed aright to impos op th"*^ iraeice -..ome limits and re- 
 straints ; beca^ise Itwr -' , rce v-hich was denied by 
 those nations to m: otralii . t<-> of p'^ce ; because it was a 
 commerce of imm .i-.se viilwt^itc the subjects of her enemies ; 
 and because it fille :• their Lreiisuries with money to enable 
 them to carrj- on their Wij-s v ith Great-Britain, 
 
 3. The third and only remaining pretence for war with 
 Great-Britain, is the unfortunate aflfair of the Chesapeake ; 
 which having been already stated and explained, I w ill only 
 remark here, that it is not to be believed that the British 
 Government, after being defeated as before mentioned, in its 
 endeavors to make reparation in London for tlie ^vTong done 
 by its servant, would ha^ e sent hither a sj^ecial envoy to 
 give honorable satisfaction, but from its sincere desire to 
 -close this wound, if our own Governvi-ent would suffer it to be 
 healed. 
 
 Permit me now to ask, what man, impartially viewing the 
 subject, will haAC the boldness to say that there exists any 
 cause for plunging the United States into a war with Great- 
 Britain? \Vho that respects his reputation as a man of com- 
 mon discernment w ill say it ? Who that regards the interests 
 and welfare of his country- will say it ? Who then can justify, 
 who can find an excuse for a course of conduct \^ hich has 
 brought our country into its jyresent state of alarm, embar- 
 rassment and distress ? For myself. Sir, I must declare the 
 opinion, that no free country \vas ever before so causelessly 
 and so blindly thrown from the height of prosperity, and 
 plunged into a state of cb-eadful anxiety and suffering. But 
 i"rom this degraded and wretched situation it is not yet too 
 late to escape. Let the dispatches from our Minister in 
 
15 
 
 France be no longer concealed. Let the President per- 
 form the duty required of him by the Constitution ; by giv- 
 ing to Congressy}/// injhrmattoji of the state of the union in 
 respect to foreign nations. Above ail, let him unfold our ac- 
 tual situation with France. I^t him tell us what are the de- 
 mands and proposals of her Ruler. Had these been honora- 
 ble \.q the United States, would not the President have been 
 eager to disclose them ? that they are of an entirely differ- 
 ent nature, that they are dishononihle^ that they are ruinous to 
 our commercial interests, and dangerous to our liberty and in- 
 dependenccy we are left to infer. 
 
 I hope, Sir, that the nature and magnitude of the subject 
 will furnish a sufficient apology for the length and style of 
 this letter. Perhaps some may deem it presumptuous thus 
 to question the correctness of the proceedings of our Gov- 
 ernment. A strong sense of duty, and distressing appre- 
 hensions of National ruin, have forced the task upon me. 
 To some, the sentiments which, in the sincerity of my heart, 
 I have expressed, may give offence : for often nothing of- 
 fends so much as truth. Yet I do not desire to offend 
 any man. But when I see the dangerous extent of Execu- 
 tive influence : when I see the Great Council of the Nation 
 called on to enact laws deeply affecting the interests of all 
 classes of citizens, without adequate information of the rea- 
 sons of that call : when I observe the deceptive glosses with 
 which the mischiefs of the Embargo are attempted to be 
 palliated ; ^wA posterior ^uew^^adcluced as reasons to justify 
 the measure ; when I know that the risks of continuing their 
 commercial pursuits against all known dangers can and will 
 be more accurately calculated by our merchants than by 
 our Government ; when if any 7iew dangers to commerce 
 were impending, of which our merchants were uninformed, 
 but of whicli the Government obtained the knowledge 
 through its Minister at Paris, or elsewhere, it was plainly the 
 dwty of the Executive to make those dangers known to 
 Congress and the Nation : and since if so made known, the 
 merchants and sea-fu'ing citizens would, for their own inter- 
 ests and safety, ha^ e taken due precautions to guard against 
 them ; and as it hence appears certain that an Embargo was 
 not necessary to the safety of " our seamen, our vessels, 
 or our merchandize :" when. Sir, I see and consider these 
 
16 
 
 things, and their evil tendency : in a \\ ord, u*hen I obscr\e 
 u eourse of proceeding wiiich to me appears calculated to 
 mislead the public mind to public ruin, I cannot be silent. 
 Regardless, therefore, of personal consequences, I have un- 
 dertaken to communicate these details ; ^vith the view to 
 dissipate dangerous illusions ; to give to my Constituents 
 correct information ; to excite enquiry ; and to rouse that 
 vigilant jealousy which is characteristic of REPUBLI- 
 CANS, and essential to the preservation of their rights, their 
 liberties, and their independence. 
 
 I have the honor to be, 
 
 very respectfully, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 TIMOTHY PICKERING. 
 
 His Excellency JAMES SULLIVAN, 
 Governor of the Common-wealth of Massachusetts.