LOGICK 
 
 OR, THE 
 
 RIGHT USE OF REASON 
 
 IN THE 
 
 INQUIRY AFTER TRUTH. 
 
 WITH A VARIETY OF 
 
 HULES TO GUARD AGAINST ERROR, 
 
 IN THE AFFAIRS OF 
 
 RELIGION AND HUMAN LIFE, 
 AS WELL AS IN THE SCIENCES. 
 
 BY ISAAC WATTS, D,D. 
 
 A NEW EDITION, 
 CORRECTED AND IMPROVED. 
 
 LONDON: VW 
 
 Printer 1 , by T. Oilier, Salisbury-fquare, 
 
 for g. g. and j. robinson', otridge and son j ogilvy 
 and son; j. scatcherd; j. Mathews; ,.longman and 
 rees ; c. lav/; lackungton and co. j and j. mawman. 
 
 1801, 
 
r (? 
 
; >t*2. 
 
 TO 
 
 SIR JOHN HARTOPP, BART. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 I' T "|s fit the Piiblick fhould receive, through your 
 Hands, wliat was written originally for the Af- 
 firmance of your younger Studies, and was then 
 prefented to you. 
 
 It was by the repeated Importunities of our 
 Learned Friend Mr. John Eames, that I was per- 
 fuaded to rcvife the Rudiments of Logic i, and when 
 I had once Raftered myfelf to begin the Work, I 
 was drawn {till oil ward far beyond my firft Defign, 
 even to the Neglecl, or too long Delay, of other 
 prefting and important Demands that were upon 
 me. 
 
 It has been my Endeavour to form every Part of 
 
 3 Treatife both for the Inftru6tion o( Students, 
 t: open their Way into the Sciences, and for the 
 more extenfive and general Service of Mankind* 
 that the Gentleman and the Chriftian might find- 
 their Account in the Perufal as well as the Scholar. 
 I have therefore collected and propofed the chief 
 Principles and Rules of right Judgment in Matters 
 of common and facred Importance, and pointed 
 out our mod frequent Miftakes and Prejudices in 
 the Concerns of Life and Religion, that we might 
 better guard againfl: the Springs of Error, Guilt 
 and Sorrow, which furround us in our State of 
 Mortality. 
 
 You know, Sir, the great Defign Of this noble 
 
 Science is to refcue our reafoning Powers from 
 
 their unhappy Slavery and Darknefs ; and thus, 
 
 with all due Submiffion and Deference, it offers an 
 
 umble Affitlance to divine Revelation. Its chief 
 
 ufinefs is to relieve the natural WeakneiTes of the 
 
 A3 Mind 
 
VI DEDICATION. 
 
 Mind by fome better Efforts of Nature ; it is to 
 diffule a Light over the Underftanding in ouf In- 
 quiries after Truth, and not to furnifh the Tongue 
 with Debate and Controversy. True Logick is not 
 that noify Thing that deals all in Difpute and 
 Wrangling, to which former Ages had debafed and 
 confined it ; yet its Difciples mud acknowledge 
 alio, that they are taught to vindicate and defend 
 the Truth, as well as to fearch it out. True Logick 
 doth not require a long detail of hard Words to 
 amufe Mankind, and to puff up the Mind with 
 empty Sounds, and a Pride of falfe Learning; yet 
 fome Diftinclions and Terms of Art are neceffary to 
 range every Idea in its proper Clafs, and to keep our 
 Thoughts from Confufion. The World is now 
 grown fo wife as not to fuffer this valuable Art to 
 be engrofled by the Schools. In fo polite and 
 knowing an Age, every Man of Reafon will covet 
 fome Acquaintance with Logick, fince it renders its 
 daily Service to Wifdom and Virtue, and to the 
 Affairs of common Life, as well as to the Sciences, 
 
 I will not prclurne, Sir, that this little Book is 
 improved fince its firft Compofure in Proportion to 
 the Improvements of your manly Age. But when 
 you lliall pleafe to review it in your retired Hours, 
 perhaps you may refrefh your own Memory in fome 
 of the early Parts of Learning : And if you find all 
 the additional Remarks and Rules made fo familiar 
 to you already by your own Observation, that there 
 is noth^ig new among them, it will be no unpleaf- 
 ing Refleclion, that you have fo far anticipated the 
 prefent Zeal and Labour of, 
 
 SIR, 
 
 Your mojl faithful, and 
 
 London, Aug. Obedient Servant, 
 
 24, 1724. 
 
 I. WAITS.. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 AND 
 
 GENERAL SCHEME.- 
 
 IOGICK is the Art of ujing Reason* well in 
 ^j our Inquiries after Truth, and the Communica- 
 tion of it to others. 
 
 Reason * is the Glory of human Nature, and 
 one of the chief Eminencies whereby we are raifed 
 above our Fellow-Creatures the Brutes in this lower 
 World. 
 
 Reqfon, as to the Power and Principles of it, is 
 the common Gift of God to all Men ; though all 
 are not favoured with it by Nature in an equal 
 Degree: But the acquired Improvements of it in 
 different Men, make a much greater Diftinclion 
 between them than Nature had made. I could 
 even venture to fay, that the Improvement of Rea- 
 Jbn hath raifed the Learned and the Prudent in the 
 European World, almoit as much above the Hot- 
 tentots, and other Savages of Africa, as thofe Sa- 
 vages are by Nature fuperior to the Birds, the Beafts, 
 2nd the Fimes. 
 
 Now the Defign of Logick is to teach us the right 
 Ufe of our Reafon, or Intelleclual Powers, and the 
 Improvement of them in ourfelves and others ; this 
 is not only neceffary in order to attain any compe- 
 tent Knowledge in the* Sciences, or the x\ffairs of 
 
 Learning, 
 
 * The Word Reqfon in this Place is not confined to the mere 
 Faculty of reafoning, or inferring one Thing from another, 
 but kckides all the intellectual Powers of Man. 
 
% INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Learning, but to govern both the greater and the 
 meaner Aclions of Life. It is the Cultivation of 
 our Reafon by which we are better enabled to diftin- 
 guifh Good from Evil, as well as Truth from Falf- 
 hood : And both thefe are Matters of the highefl 
 Importance, whether vve regard this Life, or the 
 Life to come. 
 
 The Purfuit and AcquifiiioH of Truth is of infi^ 
 nite Concernment to Mankind. Hereby we be- 
 come acquainted with the Nature of Things both 
 in Heaven and Earth, and their various Relations 
 to each other. It is by this Means we difcover 
 our Duty to God and our Fellow-Creature? : By 
 this we arrive at the Knowledge of Natural Reli- 
 gion > and learn to confirm our Faith in divine Re- 
 velation, as well as to underftand what is revealed. 
 Our Wifdom, Prudence, and Piety, our prefent 
 Conduct, and our future Hope, are all influenced 
 by the Ufe of our rational Powers in the Search 
 after Truth. 
 
 There are feveral Things that make it very necef-^ 
 fary that our Reafon fboukl have ibme Ailiftance 
 in the Exercife or Ufe of it. 
 
 The firft is, the Depth and Difficulty of many 
 Truths, and the Weakntfs of our Reafon to fee far 
 into Things at once, and pe?ietrate to the Bottom of 
 them. It was a Saying among the Ancients, Ve- 
 ritas in Puteo, " Truth lies in a Well ;" and, to 
 carry on this Metaphor, we may very jufty fay, that 
 Logick does, as it were, fupply us with Steps whereby 
 we may go down to reach the Water; or it frames 
 the Links of a Chain, whereby we may draw the 
 Water up from the Bottom. Thus, by the Means 
 of many Rc.fonings, well connected together, Phi- 
 lofophers in our Age have drawn a thoufanp 1 Truths 
 out of the Depths of Darknefs, which our Fathers 
 were utterly unacquainted with. 
 
 Another 
 
INTRODUCTION 3 
 
 Another Tiling; that makes it neceflary for our 
 Reafon to have ibme i^ffiitance given it, is the Dif- 
 
 and Falfe Colours in which many Things appear 
 'to us in this prefent imperfect State: There are a 
 thoufand Things which are not in reality what they 
 appear to be, and that both in the natural and the 
 moral World ; So the Sun appears to be flat as a 
 Plate of Silver, and to be lefs than twelve Inches 
 in Diameter : The Moon appears to be as big as the 
 
 and the Rainbow appears to be .a large fub- 
 ftantial Arch in the Iky ; all which are in reality 
 grois Fa 1 (hoods. So Knavery puts on the Fape of 
 Juftice y , Hypocrijy and Superftition wear the Vizard 
 of Piety \ Deceit and Evil are often clothed in the 
 Shapes and Appearances of Truth and Goodnefs* 
 Now Logick helps us to (trip off the outward Dif- 
 guife of Things, and to behold them, and judge 
 of them in their own Nature. 
 
 There is yet a farther Proof that our intellectual 
 or rational Pczvers need fome Affiftance, and that 
 is, becaufe they arc fo frail and fallible in the pre- 
 fent State ; we are impofed upon at Home as well 
 as Abroad-. We are deceived by our Se?ifes, by our 
 rinatiins. by our Paffivns and Appetites, by the 
 Authority of Men, by Education and Cuflom, &c. 
 and we are led into frequent Errors, by judging 
 according to thefe falfe and flattering Principles, 
 rather than according to the Nature of Things. 
 Something of this Frailty is owing to our very Con- 
 ftitution, Man being compounded of Fleili and 
 Spirit : Something of it arifes from our Infant 
 State, and our growing up bv fmail Degrees to 
 Manhood, fo that we form a thoufand Judgments 
 before our Reafon is mature. But there is (till 
 more of it owing to our original Defection from 
 God ; and the fool i fh and evil Difpofitions that are 
 found in fallen Man : So that one great Part of 
 
 the 
 
A INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the Defign of Logick is to guard us again ft the de- 
 lufive Influences of our meaner Powers, to cure 
 the Miftakes of immature Judgment, and to raife 
 , us in fome Meafure from the Ruins of our Fall. 
 
 It is evident enough from all thefe Things, that 
 our Reajon needs the Affiftance of Art in our In- 
 quiries after Truth or Duty ; and without fome 
 Skill and Diligence in forming our Judgments 
 aright, we (hall be led into frequent Miftakes, 
 both in Matters of Science, and in Matters of 
 Praclice, and fome of thefe Miftakes may prove 
 fatal too. 
 
 The Art of Logick, even as it affifts us to gain 
 the Knowledge of the Sciences, leads us on to- 
 ward Virtue and Happinefs ; for all our fpeculative 
 Acquaintance with Things fhould be made fubfer- 
 vient to our better Conducl in the civil and religious 
 Life, This is infinitely more valuable than all Spe- 
 culations -, and a wife Man will ufe them chiefly 
 for this better Purpofe. • 
 
 All the good Judgment and Prudence that any 
 Man exerts in his common Concerns of Life, with- 
 out the Advantage of Learning, is called natural 
 Logick: And it is but a higher Advancement, and 
 a farther Affiftance of our rational Powers, that is 
 defigned by and expedled from this artificial Lo- 
 gick. 
 
 In order to attain this, we rnuft inquire what are 
 the principal Operations of the Mind, which are put 
 forth in the Exerciie of our Reafon : And we fhali 
 find them to be thefe four, namely, Perception, 
 Judgment, Argumentation and Difpojition. 
 
 JSJow the Art of Logick is compofed of thofe Ob- 
 fcrvations and Rules, which Men have made about 
 thefe four Operations of the Mind, Perception, 
 Judgment, Reafsmng, and Dfpofition, in Order to 
 aflili: and improve them. 
 
 I. Per- 
 
INTRODUCTION-. 5 
 
 I. Perception, Conception, or Apprehenfion, is the 
 mere fimple Contemplation of Things offered to 
 our Minds, without affirming or denying any 
 Thing concerning them. So we conceive or think 
 of a Horfe, a Tree, High, Swift, Slow, Animal, 
 Time, Motion, Matter, Mind, Life, Death, he. 
 The Form under which thefe Things appear to the 
 Mind, or the Refult of our Conception or Appre- 
 henfion, is called an Idea. 
 
 II. Judgment is that Operation of the Mind, 
 whereby we join two or more Ideas together by 
 one Affirmation or Negation ; that is, we either 
 affirm or deny this to be that. So this Tree is high; 
 That Horfe is not fwift ; The Mind of Man is a 
 thinking Being ; Mere Matter has no Thought be- 
 longing to it ; God is jufl ; Good Men are often mi- 
 
 ferahle in this World; A righteous Governor will 
 make a Difference betwixt the Evil and the Good; 
 which Sentences are the Effect of Judgment, and 
 are called Proportions. 
 
 III. Argumentation or Reafoning\ is that Opera- 
 tion of the Mind, whereby w T e infer one Thing, that 
 is, one Proportion', from two or more Proportions 
 premifed. Or it is the drawing a Conclufion, which 
 before was either unknown or dark, or doubtful, 
 from fome Proportions which arejnore known and 
 evident. So when we have judged that Matter 
 cannot think, and that the Mind of Man doth think, 
 we then infer and conclude, that therefore the Mind 
 of Man is not Matter. 
 
 So we judge that A juft Governor will make a 
 Difference between the Evil and the Good ; we judge 
 alio that God is Vijujl Governor; and from thence 
 we conclude, that God will make a Difference be- 
 tween the Evil and the Good. 
 
 Th 
 
6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 This Argumentation may be carried on farther, 
 thus, God will one Time or another make a Diffe- 
 rence between the Good and the Evil : But there is 
 little or no Difference made in this World : There- 
 fore, there mujl be another World wherein this Diffe- 
 rence Jhall be made. 
 
 Thefe Inferences or Conclujions are the Effects of 
 Reafoning, and the three Propofltions taken all to- 
 gether are called a Syllogifm or Argument, 
 
 IV. Difpofition is that Operation of the Mind, 
 whereby we put the Ideas, Proportions and Argu- 
 ments, which we have formed concerning one Sub- 
 jeer, into fuch an Order as is fitter!: to gain the 
 clearer! Knowledge of it, to retain it longer!, and 
 to explain it to others in the beft Manner : Or, in 
 fhort, it is the ranging of our Thoughts in fuch 
 Order, as is bell for our own and others Conception 
 and Memory. The EfFecl of this Operation is 
 called Method. This very Defcription of the four 
 Operations of the Mind and their Effecls, in this 
 Order, is an Inftance or Example of Method. 
 
 Now as the Art of Logick affifts our Concep- 
 tions, fo it gives us a large and comprehenfive View 
 of the Subjects we enquire into, as well as a clear 
 and diftjjnct Knowledge of them. As it regulates 
 our Judgment and our Reafoning, fo it fee u res us 
 from Mi flakes, and gives us a true and certain 
 Knowledge of Things ; and as it furnifhes us with 
 Method, fo it makes our Knowledge of Things 
 both eafy and regular, and guards our Thoughts 
 from Con fu (ion. 
 
 Logick is divided into four Parts, according to 
 thefe four Operations of the Mind, which it directs, 
 and therefore we (hall treat of it in this Order. 
 
 the 
 
A TABLE OF THE 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 THE Introduction, or general Scheme ', Page I • 
 
 The FIRST PART, namely, 
 Of Perception and Ideas* 
 
 Chap. L Of the Nature of Ideas, p. 8. 
 
 Chap. II. Of the Objects of Perception. Sect, i. Of 
 Being in general, p. 10. Sect. 2. Of Sub/lances 
 and their various Kinds, p. u. Sett. 3. Of 
 Modes and their various Kinds ; andfirfi of effen- 
 tial and accidental Modes, p. 16* Seel. 4. The 
 farther Divifions of Mode, p. 20. Seel:.' 5. Of 
 the ten Categories. Of Subftance modified, p. 25* 
 Sect. 6. Of Not-Being, p. 26* 
 
 Chap. III. Of the feveral Sorts of Perception or Ideas. 
 Sect. 1. Of fenfible, fpirited, and abjlr acted Ideas > 
 p. 28. Sect. 2. Offimple and complex, compound 
 and collective Ideas, p. 33* Seel. 3. Of Univer- 
 fal and particular Ideas, real and imaginary ', p. 34* 
 Seel. 4. The Divi/ion of Ideas with regard to their 
 Qualities, p. 39. 
 
 Chap. IV. Of Words and their fever al Divifons, to* 
 gether with the Advantage and Danger of them. 
 Sect. 1. Of Words in general and their Ufe, p. 45. 
 Seel. 2. Of negative and pofitive Terms, p. 51. 
 Sect. 3. Ofjimple and complex Terms, p. 54. 
 
 A 4 Sect 
 
VI II CONTEXTS, 
 
 Seel. 4. Of Words common and proper , p. 56,- 
 
 Seel. 5. Of concrete and abfiracl Terms, p. 58. 
 
 Sect. 6". Of univoca I and equivocal Words, p. 58. 
 
 Seel:. 7. Various Kinds of 'equivocal Words -, p. 61. 
 Seel. 8. The Origin or Caufes of equivocal 
 
 Words, p. 67^ 
 
 Chap. V. General Directions relating to our Ideas : 
 nan ely, 1. Of acquiring a Treafure of Ideas. 
 2. (f retaining Ideas in Memory. 3. Of felecling 
 ufeful Ideas. 4. Of the Government of our 
 Thoughts, p. 71. 
 
 Chap. VI. Special Rules to direcl our Conception of 
 Things, p. 79. Seel. 1. Of gaining clear and dif- 
 tincl Ideas, p. 80. Seel. 1* Of the Definition of 
 Words or Names, p. 82. Seel. 3, Direcl ions con- 
 cerning the Definition of Names, p. 84. Seel. 4. 
 Of the Definition of Things, p. 100. Seel;. 5. Rules 
 of Definition of the Thing, p. 105. Seel. 6. Ob- 
 fcrvaiions concerning the Definition of Things, p. 
 108, Seel. 7. Of a complete Conception of Things, 
 p. 1 1 7« Seel. 8. Of Divifion, and the Rules of 
 it, p, 118. Seel. 9. Of a comprehenfive Concep- 
 tion of Things, and of AbftraEHon,^. 124* Seel. 
 10. Of the exienjive Conception of Things, and of 
 Dijlribution, p. 128. Seel, n.« Of an orderly Con- 
 ception of Things, p. 133. Seel.. 12. Thefe five 
 Rules of Conception exemplified,^. 135. Seel. 13. 
 An illufiration of the Jive Rules by Similitudes + p. 
 
 The SECOND FART, namely, 
 Of Judgment and Propofition. 
 
 CHAP. I. Of the Nature of a Propofition, and its 
 feveral Parts, p. 144. 
 
 Chap* 
 
CONTENTS. 2X 
 
 Chap. II. Of the various Kinds of Propoftions. Sect. 
 i . Of univerfal, particular, indefinite ', andfingular 
 Proportions, p. 147. Sec"l. 2. Of affirmative and 
 negative Proportions ,. p. 156. Se£h 3. 0/" the Op- 
 position and Converfion of Proportions, p. 158. Se6l. 
 4. 0/* pure and modal Proportions, p. 161. Seel. 5. 
 Offngular Propofitions, whether fimple or complex y 
 p. 163. Seel. 6. Of compound Propofitions, \>* 165. 
 Sect. 7. Of /r«£ <2w^ y^^" Proportions, p. 171. 
 Seel. 8. Of certain and doubtfid Propofitions of 
 Knowledge and Opinion, p. 174. Seel:. 9. Of Senfe 9 
 Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reafon, Faith, and In- 
 fpiration, p. 177. 
 
 Chap. III. The Springs of falfe Judgment, or the 
 Doclrine of Prejudices, p. 186. Seel:. 1. Preju- 
 dices arifing from Things, p. 188. Seel. 2. Pre- 
 judices arifing from Words, p. 195. Sect. 3. Pre- 
 jndices arifing from our/elves, p. 198. Seel. 4. 
 Prejudices arifing from other Perfons, p. 214. 
 
 Chap. IV. General Directions to ajjfift us in judging 
 aright, p. 231. 
 
 Chap. V. Special Rules to direel us in judging of par- 
 ticular Objecls. Seel. 1. Principles and Rules of 
 judgment concerning the Objecls of Senfe, p. 249. 
 Seel:. 2. Principles and Rules of Judgment, in Mat- 
 ters of Reafon and Speculation? p. 253. Seel. 3. 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters cf 
 Morality and Religion, p. 259. Seel. 4. Principles 
 and Rules of Judgment in Matters of human Pru- 
 dence, p. 263. Seel:. 5. Principles and Rules of 
 Judgment in Matters of human Tefiimony, p. 266. 
 Seel. 6. Principles and Rules of Judgment in Mat- 
 ters of divine Te/limony, p. 271. Seel. 7. Prin- 
 ciples and Rules of judging concerning Things paft y 
 prefent, and to come, by the mere Ufe of Reafon. 
 p. 275. 
 
 The 
 
Contents. 
 
 The THIRD PART, namely, 
 of Reafoning and Syllogifm. 
 
 CHAP. L Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and of the 
 Parts of which it is compofed, p. 280* 
 
 Chap. II. Of the various Kinds of Syllogifms, with 
 particular Rules relating to them. Seel. 1. Of unu 
 verfal and particular Syllogifms, both negative and 
 affirmative, p. 283. Seel. 2. Of [plain , fimple Syl- 
 logifms, and their Rules, p. 285. Seel. 3. Of 
 ihe Moods and Figures of fimple Syllogifm, p. 289. 
 Seel. 4. Of complex Syllogifms, p. 292. Sect. 5. 
 Of conjunctive Syllogifms, p. 296. Sect. 6. Of com- 
 pound Sy I logifms, p. 301. Seel. 7. Of the middle 
 Terms, of common Places or Topics, and Invention 
 of Argument, p. 305. Sect. 8. Of fever al Kinds 
 of Arguments and Demori/iraticns,-p. 308. 
 
 Chap. III. The fioclrme J Sophifms. Sect. 1. Of 
 feveral Kinds ofSophiJr- their Solution, p. 3 1 3. 
 
 Sect. 2. Two general Tcjls of true Syllogifms, and 
 Methods of folving all Sophifms, p. 323. 
 
 Cha p. IV. Some general Rules to direel our Reqfon* 
 '"£, P- 3 26 - 
 
 The FOURTH PART, namely, 
 of Method. 
 
 CHAP. I. The Nature and Kinds of Method^ p. 340. 
 CHAr. II. General and fpecial Rules of Method \ 
 P- 349- 
 
 INTRO- 
 
GEORGE R. 
 
 GEORGE the Second, by the Grace of God, King of 
 Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, 
 &c. To all to whom thefe Prefents fhall come, Greeting. 
 Whereas James Buckland, James Waugh, John Ward, Thomas 
 Longman, and Edward Dilly, Citizens and Bookfellers of our 
 City of London, have by their Petition humbly reprefented unto 
 Us, that they have purrhafed the Copy-Right of the Whole 
 Works of the late Doctor Isaac Watts, and that they are 
 now printing and preparing for the Prefs new Editions with 
 Improvements of fevenl of the feparate Pieces of the faid Doctor 
 lfaac Watts. They have therefore molt humbly prayed Us, 
 that We would be gracioufly pleafed to grant them our Royal 
 Licence and Protection for the fole printing, publifiiing, and 
 vending the faid Works, in as ample Manner and Form as has 
 been done in Cafes of the like Nature ; We being willing to 
 give all due Encouragement to Works of this Nature, which 
 may be of public Ufe and Benefit, are gracioufly pleafed to con- 
 defcend to their Requeft, and do therefore by thefe Prefents, 
 as far as may be agreeable to the Statute in that Behalf made 
 and provided, grant unto them, the faid James Buckland, James 
 Waugh, John Ward, Thomas Longman, and Edward Dilly, their 
 Executors, Adminiftrators, and Ailigns, our Royal Privilege 
 and Licence, for the fole printing, publifiiing, and vending 
 the faid Works for the Term of fourteeen Years, to be com- 
 puted from the Date hereof, ftri&ly forbidding and prohibiting 
 all our Subjects within our Kingdoms and Dominions, to re- 
 print, abridge, or tranflate the fame, either in the. like, or any 
 other Volume or Volumes whatfoever, or to import, buy, 
 vend, utter, or diftribute any Copies thereof reprinted beyond 
 the Seas, during the aforefaid Term of Fourteen Years, with- 
 out, the Confcnt and Approbation of the faid James Buckland, 
 James Vfraugh, John Waul, Thomas Longman, and Edyjard Dilly, 
 their Extjcutors, Adminiftratbrs and Ailigns, by Writing under 
 their Hands and Seals firft had and obtained, as they and every 
 of them' offending herein, will anfvver the contrary at their 
 Peril, whereof the Commiffioners and other Officers of our Cuf- 
 toms, the Matter, Wardens, and Company of Stationers of our 
 City of London, and all other our Officers and Minifrers, whom 
 it may concern, are to take Notice, that due Obedience be ren- 
 dered to our Pleafure herein fignitied. 
 
 W. PIT T. 
 
THE 
 
 FIRST PART 
 
 OF 
 
 L O G I C K 
 
 Of Perceptions and Ideas. 
 
 THE firft Part of Logick contains Obferva- 
 tions and Precepts about the firft Operation 
 of the Mind, Perception or Conception: And fince 
 all our Knowledge, how wide and large foever it 
 grow, is founded upon our Conception and Ideas, 
 here we (ball confider, 
 
 1 . The general Nature of them, 
 
 2. The Objects of our Conception, or the Arche- 
 types or Patterns of theje Ideas. 
 
 3. The federal Dhffions of them. 
 
 4. The Words and Terms whereby oiir Ideas are 
 £xpre(fed. 
 
 5. General Direcliofis about our Ideas. 
 
 6\ Special Rules to direcl our Conceptions, 
 
 B CHAP. 
 
8 I.0GICK ! OE, THE [PART I* 
 
 CHAP. L 
 
 Of the Nature of Ideas. 
 
 FIRST, the Nature of Conception or Per- 
 ception fhall j Lift be mentioned,* though 
 this may feem to belong to another Science rather 
 than Logic k. 
 
 Perception is that Act of the Mind (or, as fome 
 Philofophers call it, rather a Pqflion or Impreffion) 
 whereby the Mind becomes confcious of any 
 Thing; as when I feel Hunger, Thirft, or Cold, 
 or Heat ; when I fee a Horfe, a Tree, or a Man ; 
 when I hear a human Voice, or Thunder, I atn 
 confcious of thefe Things, and this is called Per- 
 ception. If I fludy, meditate, wifh, or fear, I am 
 confcious of thefe inwards A&s alfp, and my Mind 
 perceives its own Thoughts , Wiflies, Fears , &c. 
 
 An Idea is generally defined a Refrefentation of 
 a Thing in the Mind ; it is a Representation of 
 fomcthing that we have feen, felt, heard, &c. or 
 been confcious of. That Notion or Form of a Horfe, 
 a Tree, or a Man, which is in the Mind, is called 
 the Idea of a Horfe, a Tree, or a Man. 
 
 That Notion of Hunger, Cold, Sound, Colour, 
 Thought, or Wifh, or Fear, which is in the Mind ? 
 is called the Idea of Hunger, Cold, Sound, Willi, 
 &c. 
 
 It is not the outward Object, or Thing which is 
 perceived, namely, the Horfe, the Man, &c. nor 
 is it the very Perception, or Senje, and Feeling, 
 
 * Note, The Words Conception and Perception are often ufed 
 promifeuoufly, as I have done here, becauie I would not cm- 
 barrals a Learner with too many Diftin&ions ; but it' I were 
 to diftinguifh them, I would lay Perception is the Confcioui- 
 nefs of an Object when prefent : Conception is the forming an 
 Idea of the Object whether prefent or abfent. 
 
 namely, 
 
CH. lf| RIGHT USE OF REASON. 9 
 
 namely^ of Hunger, or Cold, &c. which is called 
 the Idea ;butitisthe Thing as it exifis in the Mind 
 by Way of Conception or Reprefentation, that is 
 properly called the Idea, whether the Object be 
 prefent or abfent. 
 
 As a Horfe, a Man, a Tree, are the outward 
 Objects of our Perception, and the outward Arche- 
 types, or Patterns of our Ideas ; To our own Sen fa- 
 tions of Hunger, Cold, &c, are alfo inward Ar- 
 chetypes, or Patterns of our Ideas i But the Notions 
 or Piclures of thefe Things, as they are considered, 
 or conceived in the Mind, are precifcly the Ideas 
 that we have to do with in Logick. To fee a Horfe, 
 or to feel Cold, is one Thing ; to think of, and 
 converfe about a Man, a Horfe, Hunger, or Cold, 
 is another. 
 
 Among all thefe Ideas, fuch as reprefent Bodies 
 are generally called Images, efpecially if the Idea 
 of the Shape be included. Thofe inward Repre- 
 fentations which we have of Spirit, Thought, Love, 
 Hatred, Caufe, EffecJ, he. are more pure than men~ 
 tal Ideas, belonging more efpecially to the Mind, 
 and carry nothing of Shape or Senfe in them. 
 But I ihall have Occafion to fpeak more particu- 
 larly of the Original and the Diftinclion of Ideas 
 in the third Chapter. I proceed therefore now to 
 confider the Objects pf our Ideas. 
 
 B 2 CHAP. 
 
lO LOGICK : OR, THE [PAKT I. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the Ohjeifs of Perception, 
 
 SECT. L 
 
 Of Being in general. 
 
 riT^HE Object of Perception is that which is 
 JL reprefented in the Idea, that which is the 
 Archetype or Pattern, according to which the Idea 
 is formed ; and thus Judgments, Prop oft lions, Rea- 
 fons, and long Difcourfes, may all become the Ob- 
 jects of Perception ; but in this Place we fpeak 
 chiefly of the jirft and more fimple Objects of it, 
 before they are joined and formed into Proportions 
 or Difcourfes. 
 
 Every Object of our Idea is called a Theme, 
 whether it be a Being or -Not -Being ; for Not- Be- 
 ing may be propofed to our Thoughts, as well as 
 that which has a real Being. But let us firft treat 
 of Beings, and that in the larger!: Extent of the 
 Word. 
 
 A Beim* is confidered nspojfible, or as aclual. 
 
 When it- is confidered as poffible, it is faid to. 
 have an Ejfence or Nature ; fuch were all Things 
 before their Creation : When it is confidered as 
 aclual, then it is faid to have Exigence alfo ; fuch 
 arc all Things which are created, and God himfclf 
 the Creator. 
 
 Effence therefore is but the very Nature of any 
 Being, whether it be actually exifting or no. A 
 Rofe in Winter has an Effence, in Summer it has 
 Exijlence ajfo. 
 
 Note, 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 11 
 
 Note, There is but one being which includes 
 Exiftence in the very Eflence of it, and that is 
 God, who therefore actually exifts by natural and 
 eternal Neceffity : But the actual Exiflcnce of 
 every Creature is very diftinct from its Effence, for 
 it may be, or may not he, as God pleafes. 
 
 Again, Every Being is confidered either as fub- 
 ftfting in and by itfelf ; and then it is called a Sub- 
 fiance , or it fubfiils in and by another, and then 
 it is called a Mode or Manner of Being. Though 
 few Writers allow Mode to be called a Being in the 
 fame perfect Senfe as a $ubfta?ice is ; and fome 
 Modes have evidently more of real Entity or Being 
 than others, as will appear when we come to treat 
 of them. Thefe Things will furnifh us with Mat- 
 ter for large Difcourfe in the following Sections. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of Substances and their various Kinds, 
 
 ASubftance is a Being which can fubfift by itfelf", 
 without Dependence upon any other created 
 Being. The Notion offub/ifiing by itfelf, gives Oc- 
 cafion to Logicians to call it a Subftance. So a Horfe, 
 a Houfe, Wood, Stone, Water, Fire, a Spirit, a 
 Body 3 an Angel, are called Subftances,htC2LU& they 
 depend on nothing but God for their Exiftence. 
 
 It has been ufual alfo in the Defcription of Sub' 
 fiance to add, it is that which is the Subject of Modes 
 or Accidents ; a Body is the Subftance or Subject^ 
 its Shape is the Mode. 
 
 But left we be led into Miftakes, let us here take 
 Notice, that when a Subftance is faid to fubftfi with- 
 out Dependence upon another created Beings all that 
 we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utterly 
 deftroyed and reduced to nothing, by any Power 
 
 B 3 inferior 
 
12 LOGICK : OE, THE [PART I, 
 
 inferior to that of our Creator ; though its prefent 
 particular Form, Nature and Properties, may be 
 altered and deflroyed by many inferior Caufes : A 
 Horfe may die and turn to Duft ; Wood may be 
 turned into Fire, Smoke, and Afhes ; a Houfeinto 
 Rubbim, and Water into Ice or Vapour; but the 
 £ubftance or Matter of which they are made, itill 
 remains, though the Forms and Shapes of it are 
 altered. A Body may ceafe to be a Houfe or a 
 Horfe, but it is a Body flill ; and in this Scnfe it 
 depends only upon God for its Exigence. 
 
 Among Sub/lances fome are thinking or eonfeious 
 Beings, or have a Power of Thought, fuch as the 
 Mind of Man, God, Angels. Some are extended 
 and /olid, or impenetrable, that is, they have Di- 
 mensions* of Length, Breadth, and Depth, and 
 have alfo a Power of Refiflanee, or to exclude 
 every Thing of the fame Kind from being in the 
 fame Place. This is the proper Character of 'Matter 
 or Body. 
 
 As for the Idea of Space, whether it be void or 
 full, that is, a Vacuum or a Pknu?n, whether it be 
 interfperfed among all Bodies, or may be fuppofed 
 to reach beyond the Bounds of the Creation, it is 
 an Argument too long and too hard to be difputed 
 in this Place what the Nature of it is : Jt has been- 
 much debated whether it be a real Subftance, or 
 a mere Conception of the Mind, whether it be 
 the Immenfity of the divine Nature, or the mere 
 Order of co-exiftent Beings ; whether it be the 
 Manner of our Conception of the Diftances of 
 Bodies, or a mere Nothing. Therefore I drop the 
 Mention of it here, and refer the Reader to the 
 firjl EJfay among the Plulofophical Effiiys by J, W* 
 publifhed 1733. 
 
 Now if we feclude Space out of our Confidera- 
 tion, there will remain but two Sorts of Subftances> 
 in the World, that is, Matter and Mind, or as we 
 
 other wife 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 13 
 
 otherwife call them, Body and Spirit ; at leaft we 
 have no Ideas o£any other Subftance but thefe.* 
 
 Among Subftances, fome are called Simple, fome 
 are Compound, whether the Words be taken in a 
 philofophical or a vulgar Senfe* 
 
 Simple Subftances, in a philofophical Senfe, are 
 either Spirits, which have no manner of Compofi- 
 tion in them, and in this Senfe God is called afimple 
 Being ; or they are the firfl Principles of Bodies, 
 which are ufually called. Elements^ of which all other 
 
 Bodies 
 
 * Beeaufe Men have different Ideas and Notions of Subftances 
 I thought it not proper intirely to omit all Accounts of them, 
 and therefore have thrown them into the Margin. 
 
 Some Philofophers fuppofe that our Acquaintance with Mat-* 
 ftr or Mind, reaches no farther than the mere Properties of 
 them, and that there is a Sort of unknown Being, which is the 
 Subfiance or the SubjeH by which thefe Properties of folid Ex- 
 ten/ion and of Cogitation are fupported, and in which thefe Pro- 
 perties inhere or exift. But perhaps this Notion arifes only 
 from our turning the mere abftracted or logical Notion of Sub" 
 fiance orfelfifub/i/iing, into the Notion of a diftinct physical or 
 natural Being, without any Neceffity. Solid Extenfion feems to 
 me to be the very Subitance of Matter, or of all Bodies ; and a 
 Power of Thinking, which is always in acl, feems to be the very 
 Subitance of all Spirits ; for God himfelf is an intelligent, al- 
 mighty Power : nor is there any need to feek for any other fe- 
 cret and unknown Being, or abflratted Subjiance, intirely dif- 
 tinct from thefe, in order to fupport the feveral Modes or Pro- 
 perties of Matter or Mind, for thefe two Ideas are fufficient for 
 that Purpofe ; therefore I rather think thefe are Subjiances. 
 
 It muft be confefTed, when we fay, Spirit is a thinking Sub* 
 fiance, and Matter is an extended folid Subfiance, we are ibme- 
 times ready to imagine that Exteniion and Solidity are but 
 mere Modes and Properties of a certain unknown Subftance 
 or Subject which fupports them, and which we call Body ; and 
 that a Power of Thinking is but a mere Mode and Property 
 of fome unknown Subitance or Subject which fupports it, and 
 which We call Spirit : But I rather take this to be a mere Mif- 
 take, which We are led into by the grammatical Form and Ufe 
 of Words: ; and perhaps our logical Way of Thinking by Sub" 
 fiances and Modes, as well as our grammatical Way of talking 
 by Subftanti'ves and AdjeSiives, help to delude us into the Sup- 
 pofition. 
 
 However, that I may not be wanting to any of my Readers, 
 I would let them know Mr. Locke's Opinion^ which has ob- 
 
 B 4 tained 
 
14 LOGICK : Ob, THE [PART t. 
 
 Bodies, are compounded : ElenwUs are fuch Sub- 
 fiances as cannot be refolved, or reduced, into two 
 or more SubiKmces of different Kinds. 
 
 The various Seels of Philofophers have attri- 
 buted the Honour of this Name to various Things. 
 , The Pcripatctick, or Followers of Ar'tfiotle, made 
 Fire, Air, Earth, and Water, to be the four Ele- 
 ments, of which all earthly Things were com- 
 pounded ; and they fuppofed the Heavens to be a 
 Quint effence, or fifth Sort of Body, difiincl: from ail 
 thefe : But iince Experimental Philofophy and 
 
 tained much in the prefent Age, and it is this : " That our Idea 
 " of any particular Subitance, is only fuch a Combination of 
 " iimple ideas as re prefent that Thing as fubtifting by itfelf, in 
 " which the fuppofed or cont'ufed Idea of Subitance (fuch as it 
 v is) is always ready to offer itfelf. It is a Conjunction of Ideas 
 " co-exifting in fuch a Caufe of their Union, and makes the 
 " whole Subject fubfifl by itfelf, though the Caufe of their 
 " Union be unknown; and our general idea of Subftancc arifes 
 " from the Selt-fubfiftence of this Collection of Ideas." 
 
 Now if this Notion of Subfiance reft here, and be confidered 
 merely as an unknown Caufe of the Union of Properties, it is 
 much more eafy to be admitted ; but if Ave proceed to fuppofe 
 a fort of real, fubftantial, diftinct Being, different from folid 
 Quantity or Extension in Bodies, and different from a Panwr <f. 
 Thinking in Spirits, in my Opinion it is the Introduction of a 
 needlefs fcholaftical Notion into the real Nature of Things, and 
 then fancying it to have a real Eodftence. 
 
 Mr. Loch, in his Ejjay of Human Under/} an din%, Rook II. 
 Chap. 22. §. 2. feems to ridicule this common Idea of Subflavce, 
 which IVl en have generally fuppofed to be a fort of Subfiratum 
 diftinct from all Properties whatsoever, and to be theSuppoit 
 of all Properties. Yet in Book IV. Chap. 3. §. 6. he feems 
 to fuppofe there may be fuch an unknown Subfiratum, which 
 may be capable of receiving the Properties both of Matter and 
 of Mind, namely, Extension, Solidity, and Cogitation ; for he 
 fuppofes it poifible for God to add Cogitation to that Sub/lance 
 which is Corporeal, and thus to caufe Mailer to think. If this 
 be true, then Spirits (for aught we know) may be corporeal 
 Beings, or thinking Bodies, which is a Do&rine too favourable 
 to the Mortality of the Soul. But I leave thefe Debates to the- 
 Philofophers of the ad will not be too poutive in my 
 
 Opinion of this abftritfe Subject. 
 
 See more of this Argument in Pbilofophical F.jjavs, before 
 cited, BJfay '-d. 
 
 Mat he- 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 15 
 
 Mathematicks have been better underilood, this 
 Doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The Che- 
 's make Spirit, Salt, Sulphur, Water, and Earth, 
 to be their five Elements, becaufe they can reduce 
 all tcrreftrial Things to thefe five : This feems to 
 come nearer the Truth; though they are not all 
 agreed in this Enumeration of Elements . In fhort, 
 our modern Philofophers generally fuppofe Matter 
 or Body to be one fimple Principle, or Jolid Exten- 
 fion, which being diverfified by its various Shapes, 
 Quantities, Motions, and Situations, makes all the 
 Varieties that are found in the Univerfe ; and there- 
 fore they make little Ufe of the Word Element, 
 
 Compound Subfiances are made up of two or more 
 fimple Subitances : So every Thing in this whole 
 material Creation, that can be reduced by the Art of 
 Man into two or more different Principles or Sub- 
 itances, isa Compound 'Body in the philofophical Senfe. 
 
 But if we take the Words Simple and Compound 
 in a vulgar Senfe, then all thofe are fimple Subfiances, 
 which are generally efleemed uniform in their 
 Natures. So every Herb is called a Simple ; and 
 every Metal a Mmerah, though the Chemift per- 
 haps may find nil his feveral Elements in each of 
 them. So a Needle is a fimple Body, being only 
 made of Steel ; but a Sword or a Knife is a Com- 
 pound, becaufe its Haft or Handle is made of Ma- 
 terials different from the Blade. So the Bark of 
 Peru, or the Juice of Sorrel, is & fimple. Medicine : 
 But when the Apothecaries Art has mingled feve- 
 ral Simples together, it becomes a Compound, as 
 Diafcordium or Mithridate. 
 
 The Terms of pure and mixt, when applied to 
 Bodies, are much akin to fimple and compound. So 
 a Guinea is pure Gold, if it has nothing but Gold 
 in it, without any Alloy of bafer Metal : But if 
 any other Mineral or Metal be mingled with it, it 
 is called a mixt Sub (lance or Body. 
 
 Subftances are alfo divided into animate and in- 
 animate* 
 
iff LOGICS: OR, the [part r. 
 
 animate . Animated Subftances are either animal 
 or vegetable* . 
 
 Some of the animal Subftances have various orga- 
 flicai or inftrumental Parts, fitted for a Variety of 
 Motions from Place to Place, and a Spring of 
 Life within themfelves, as Beafts, Birds, Fifties, 
 and Infects ; thefe are called Animals. Other ani- 
 mated Subftances are called Vegetables, which have 
 within themfelves the Principles of another fort of 
 Life and Growth, and of various Productions of 
 Leaves, Flowers, and Fruit, fuch as we fee hi 
 Plants, Herbs, and Trees* 
 
 And there are other Subftances, which are called 
 inanimate, becaufe they have no fort of Life in 
 them, as Earth, Stone, Air, Water, &c. 
 
 There is alfo one Sort of Subftancc, or Being* 
 which is compounded of Body and Mind, or a rational 
 Spirit united to an Animal ; fuch is Mankind. 
 Angels, or any other Beings of the fpiritual and in* 
 vifible World, who have aftumed vifible Shapes for 
 a Seafon, can hardly be reckoned among this Order 
 of compounded Beings; becaufe they drop their 
 Bodies, and diveft themfelves of thofe vifible Shapes* 
 when their particular Meflagc is performed, and 
 thereby mew that thefe Bodies do not belong to their 
 Natures. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of Modes, and their, various Kinds, and firft of 
 eflential and accidental Modes, 
 
 THE next fort of Objects which are reprd- 
 fented in our Ideas, are called Modes ^ or 
 Manners of Being \. 
 
 * Note, Vegetables as well as Animals, have gotten the Name' 
 of animated Subftances, becaufe fome of the Ancients fuppofeel 
 Herbs and Plants, Beafts and Birds, &c. to have a fort of Souls 
 cliftmcr. from Matter, or Body. 
 
 f Note, The Term Mode is by fome Authors applied chiefly to 
 the Relations, or relative Manners of Being. But in logical 
 
 Treutifes 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 17 
 
 A Mode is that which cannot fubfift in and of 
 itfelf, but is always efteemed as belonging to, and 
 fubfi fling by the Help of fome Sub fiance, which 
 for that Reafon is called its Sub j eel. A Mode 
 muft depend on that Subftance for its very Exig- 
 ence and Being ; and that not as a Being depends 
 on its Caufe (for fo Sub/lances themfelves depend 
 on God their Creator ;) but the very Being of a 
 Mode depends on fome Subftance for its Subjecl, in 
 which it is, or to which it belongs ; fo Motion, 
 Shape, Quantity, weight, are Modes of the Body ; 
 Knowledge, Wit, Folly, Love, Doubting, Judg- 
 ing, are Modes of the Mind; for the one cannot 
 fublifl without Body, and the other cannot fubfift 
 without Mind. 
 
 Modes have their feveral Divifions, as well as 
 Subftances. 
 
 I. Modes are either ejfential or accidental. 
 
 An ejfential Mode ox Attribute, is that which be- 
 longs to the very Nature or Eflence of the Subject 
 wherein it is ; and the Subject can never have the 
 fame Nature without it ; fnch is Roundnefs in a 
 Bowl, Hardnefs in a Stone, Softnefs in Water, vital 
 Motion in an Animal, Solidity in Matter, Thinking 
 in a Spirit ; for though that Piece of Wood which 
 is now a Bowl may be made fquare, yet if Round- 
 nefs be taken away, it is no longer a Bowl : So that 
 very Flefh and Bones, which is now an Animal, 
 may be without Life or inward Motion ; btf t if all 
 Motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an Ani- 
 mal, but a Carcafs : So if a Body or Matter be 
 divcfted of Solidity , it is a mere void Space, or No- 
 thing ; and if Spirit be intirely without Thinking, 
 I have no Idea of any Thing that is left in it; 
 
 therefore 
 
 Treatifes it is often ufed in a larger Senfe, and extends to all 
 Attributes whatfoever, and includes the moft effential and inward 
 Properties, as well as outward Refpe&s and Relations, and 
 reaches to Anions themfelves as well as Manners oi Action. 
 
IS LOGICK : OR, THE [PART !, 
 
 therefore fo far as I am able to judge, Confcioufnefs 
 muit be its effential Attribute*. Thus all the 
 Perfections of God are called his Attributes^ for he 
 cannot be without them. 
 
 An ejjtntial Mode is either primary or fee 'ondary. 
 
 A primary ejfential Mode, is the firft or chief 
 Being that conftitutes any Being in its particular 
 Effence or Nature, and makes it to be that which 
 it is, and diftinguifbes it from all other Beings : 
 This is called the Difference in the Definition of 
 Things, of which hereafter : So Roundnefs is the 
 primary effential Mode or Difference of a Bowl ; 
 the Meeting of two Lines is the primary effential 
 Mode, or the Difference of an Angle ; the Perpen- 
 dicularity of thefe Lines to each other, is the Dif- 
 ference of a right Angle : Solid Extenfion is the pri- 
 mary Attribute or Difference of Matter ; Confciouf 
 fiefs, or at lcaft a Power of Thinking, is the Differ- 
 ence or primary Attribute of a Spirit^; and to 
 fear and love God, is the primary Attribute of a 
 pious Alan. 
 
 Afecondary effential Mode, is any other Attribute 
 of a Thing, which is not of primary Confedera- 
 tion : This is called a Property: Sometimes indeed 
 it goes towards making up the Effence, efpeclally 
 of a complex Being, fo far as we are acquainted with 
 it ; foraetimes it depends upon, and follows from 
 the Effence of it ; fo Volubility or Aptnefs to roll, 
 is the Property of a Bowl, and is derived from its 
 Roundnefs. Mobility, and Figure, or Shape, are 
 
 Properties 
 
 * Note, When I call folid Extenfion an effential Mode or At- 
 tribute of Matter, and a Power of Thinking an eflential Mode 
 or Attribute of a Spirit, I do it in Compliance with common 
 Forms of Speech : but perhaps in Reality thefe are the very 
 Ejettces or Subftances themielves, and the moft fubftantial Jdeas 
 that we can form of Body and Spirit, and have no need of any 
 (we know not what) Subfiratum, or unintelligible Subftance, 
 to fupport them in their Exigence or Being. 
 
 + See the Note in the foregoing Page. 
 
CH. II.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. I9 
 
 Properties of Matter ; and it is the Property of a 
 pious Man to love his Neighbour. 
 
 An accidental Mode, or an Accident, is fuch a 
 Mode as is not necejjary to the Being of a Thing, 
 for the Subject may be without it, and yet re- 
 main of the fame Nature that it was before ; or it 
 is that Mode which may be feparated or aholifbed 
 from its Subject : So Smoothnefs or Roughnefs, 
 Blacknefs or Whitenefs, Motion or Reft, are the Ac- 
 cidents of a Bowl ; fbr thefe may be all changed, 
 and yet the Body remain a Bowl ftill : Learning, 
 Jiiftice, Folly, Sicknefs, Health, are the Accidents 
 of a Man ; Motion, Squarenefs, or any particular 
 Shape or Size, arc the Accidents of Body : Yet 
 Shape and Size in general are evTential Modes of 
 it ; for a Body muft have fome Size and Shape, 
 nor can it be without them : So Hope, Fear, Wijh- 
 ing, AJfeating, and Doubting, are Accidents of the 
 Mind, though Thinking in general feems to be 
 ejfential to it. 
 
 Here obferve, that the Name of Accident has 
 been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetick Phi- 
 lofophers to all Modes 3 whether efTential or acci- 
 dental ; but the Moderns confine this Word Acci- 
 dent to the Senfe in which I have defcribed it. 
 
 Here it fhould be noted alfo, that though the 
 Word Property be limited fometimes in logical 
 Treatifes to the Jecondary ejfential Mode, yet it is 
 ufed in common Language to fignify thefe four 
 forts of Modes \ of which fome are effeutial, and 
 fome accidental. 
 
 1. Such as belong to every Subject of that Kind, 
 but not only to thofe Subjects. So yellow Colour and 
 Duclility are Properties of Gold ; they belong to 
 all Gold, but not only to Gold i For Saffron is alio 
 yellow, and Lead is duclile. 
 
 2. Such as belong only to o%e Kind of SubjecT, 
 but not to every Subject of that Kind. So Learning, 
 
 Reading^ 
 
20 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART 1. 
 
 Readings and Writings are Properties of human Na- 
 ture ; they belong only to Man, but not to all Men. 
 
 3. Such as belong to every Subject of one Kind, 
 and only to them, but not always. So Speech or 
 Language is a Property of Man, for it belongs to 
 fill Men, and to Men only ; but Men are not always 
 fpeaking. 
 
 4. Such as belong to every Subjecl of one Kind, 
 and to them only and always. So Shape and Divi- 
 
 Jibility are Properties of Body ; fo Omnifcience and 
 Omnipotence are Properties of the Divine Nature ; 
 for in this Senle Properties and Attributes are the 
 fame; and, except in logical Treat ifes, there is 
 fcarce any Diftinction made between them. Thefe 
 are called Propria quarto modo in the Schools, or 
 properties of the fourth Sort. 
 
 Note, Where there is any one Property or ejjential 
 Attribute fo fuperior to the reft, that it appears 
 plainly that all the reft are derived from it, and 
 fuch as is fufficient to give a full Diftinclion of that 
 Subjecl: from all other Subjects, this Attribute 
 or Property is called the effe?itial Difference, as is 
 before declared ; and we commonly fay, the Ef- 
 fence of the Thing confifts in it ; fo the Effence of 
 Matter in general feems to confift in Solidity, or 
 folid Extension. But for the moft Part we are fo 
 much at a lofs in finding out the intimate Eflcnce 
 of particular natural Bodies, that we are forced to 
 diftinguifh the ejfential Difference of moft Things 
 by a Combination of Properties. So a Sparrow is a 
 Bird which has fuch coloured Feathers, and fuch 
 a particular Size, Shape, and Motion. So Worm- 
 wood is an Herb which has fuch a Leaf of fuch a 
 Colour, and Shape, and Tafte, and fuch a root 
 and Stalk. So Beafts and Fifties, Minerals, Me- 
 tals, and Works of Art fometimes, as well as of 
 Nature, are diftinguifhed by fuch a Collection of 
 Properties. , 
 
 SECT- 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. %l 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 The farther Divifions of Mode. 
 
 THE fecond Divifion of Modes is into abfoluie 
 and relative. An abfolute Mode is that which 
 belongs to its Subject, without Refpecl to any 
 other Beings whatfoever : But a relative Mode is 
 derived from the Regard that one Being has tQ 
 others. So Roundnefs and Smoothnefs are the abfo- 
 luie Modes of a Bowl ; for if there were nothing 
 elfe exifting in the whole Creation, a Bowl might 
 be round and fmooth : But Greatnefs and Smallnejs 
 are relative Modes ; for the very Ideas of them 
 are derived merely from the Comparifon of one 
 Being with others : A Bowl of four Inches Diame- 
 ter is very great, compared with one of an Inch 
 and a half; but it is very f mall, in Companion of 
 another BqwI, whofe Diameter is eighteen or twen- 
 ty Inches. Motion is the abfolute Mode of a Body, 
 but Swiftnefs or Slownefs are relative Ideas ; for 
 the Motion pf a Bowl on a Bowling-green \sfwift, 
 when compared with a Snail ; and it \sflow when 
 compared with a Cannon-bullet. 
 
 Thefe relative Modes are largely treated of by 
 fome logical and metaphyseal Writers, under the 
 Name of Relations : And thefe Relations themfelves 
 are farther fubdivided into fucli as arife from ihs 
 Nature of Things, and fitch as arife merely from 
 the Operation of our Minds ; one Sort are called 
 real Relations, the other mental*, fo the Likenefs of 
 one Egg to another is a real Relation, becaufe it 
 arifes from the real Nature of Things ; for whe- 
 ther there was any Man or Mind to conceive it or 
 no, one Egg would be like another : But when 
 we confider an Egg as a Noun Subjlantive in Gram- 
 mar, or as fignified by the Letters egg, thefe 
 are mere mental Relations^ and deriye their very 
 
 Nature 
 
%% . LOGICK *. OK, THE f PART T. 
 
 Nature from the Mind of Man. Thcfc fort of 
 Relations are called by the Schools Enila Rationis, 
 or fecond Notions, which have no real Being, but 
 depend intirely on the Operation of the Mind. 
 
 III. The third Divifion of Modes (hew us they 
 are either intrinfical or extrinfical. Intrinfical Modes 
 axe conceived to be in the Subject or Subftance, as 
 when we fay a Globe is rounds or fwift, rolling, or 
 at reft : Or when we fay, a Man is tall, or learned \ 
 thefe are intrinfick Modes: But extrinfick Modes axe 
 liich as arife from fomething that is not in the 
 Subject or Subftance itlelf ; but it is a Manner of 
 Being which fome Subftances attain by Reafon of 
 fomething that is external or foreign to the Sub- 
 ject ; as, This Globe lies within two Yards of the 
 Wall-, or, This Man is beloved, or hated. Note> 
 Such Sort of Modes as this laft Example, are called 
 external Denominations. 
 
 IV. There is a fourth Divifion much akin to 
 this, whereby Modes are laid to be Inherent, or 
 Adherent, that is. Proper or Improper. Adherent 
 ox improper Modes, arife from the joining of fome 
 accidental Subftance to the chief Subject, which 
 yet may be feparated from it ; fo when a Bowl is 
 wet, or a Boy is clothed, thefe are adherent Modes ; 
 for the Water and the Clothes are diftinct Sub- 
 ftances, which adhere to the Bowi, or to the Boy : 
 But when we fay, the Bowl is fwift or round; when 
 we fay, the Boy is flrong or witty, thefe axe proper 
 or inherent Modes, for they have a fort of In-being 
 in the Subftance itfelf, and do not arife from the 
 Addition of any other Subftance to it. 
 
 V. Aclion and PaJJion arc Modes or Manners 
 which belong to Subftances, and fhould not in- 
 tirely be omitted here. When a Smith with a 
 hammer ftrikes a Piece of Iron, the Hammer and 
 
 the 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 23 
 
 the Smith are both Agents or Subjects of Action ; 
 the one is the Prime or Supreme, the other the Sub- 
 ordinate : The Iron is the Patient, or the Subject 
 of Paflion, in a philofophical Senfe, becaufe it re- 
 ceives the Operation of the Agent : Though this 
 Senfe of the Words Pqffion and Patience differs 
 much from the vulgar Meaning of them.* 
 
 VI. The Jtxth Divifion of Modes may be into 
 Phyfical, that is* Natural, Civil, Moral, and Su- 
 pernatural. So when we confider the Apoftle Paul, 
 who w r as a little Man, a Roman by the Privilege of 
 his Birth, a Man of Virtue or Honefty* and an in- 
 ferred Apoftle; his low Stature is a. phyfical Mode, 
 his being a Roman is a civil Privilege, his Honejly 
 is a moral Consideration, and his being infpired is 
 fupernatural. 
 
 VII. Modes belong either to Body or to Spirit, 
 or to both. Modes of Body belong only to Matter 
 or to corporeal Beings ; and thefe are Shape, Size, 
 Situation, or Place, &c. Modes of Spirit belong 
 only to Minds;, fuch are Knowledge, AJfent, Dif- 
 
 fent, Doubting, Reafoning, he. Modes which be- 
 long to both have been fometimes called mixt 
 Modes, or human Modes, for thefe are only found 
 in human Nature, which is compounded both of 
 Body and Spirit ; fuch are Senfation, Imagination, 
 Pqffion, &c. in all which there is a Concurrence of 
 the Operations both of Mind and Body, that is, . 
 of animal and intellectual Nature. 
 
 But the Modes of Body may be yet farther dif- 
 tinguifhed. Some of them are primary Modes ox 
 Qualities, for they belong to Bodies confidered in 
 
 * Note, Agent fignifies the Doer, Patient the Sufferer, Aftion is 
 Doing, PaJJion is Suffering: Agent and Action have retained their 
 original and philofophical Senfe, though Patient and Pailion 
 have acquired a very different Meaning in common Language. 
 
 C them- 
 
24 LOGICK J OR, THE [pART I. 
 
 themfelves, whether there were any Man to take 
 Notice of them or no ; fuch are thofe before-men- 
 tioned, namely, Shape, Size, Situation, &c. Se- 
 condary Qualities, or Modes, are fuch Ideas as we 
 afcribe to Bodies on account of the various Impref- 
 fions which are made on the Senfes of Men by 
 them; and thefe are called fenfible Qualities, which 
 are very numerous ; fuch are all Colours, as Red, 
 Green, Blue, &c. fuch are all Sounds, as Sharp, 
 Shrill, Loud, Hoarfe ; all Tajles, as Sweet, Bitter, 
 Sour ; all Smells, whether Plea/ant, Offenfive, or 
 Indifferent ; and all Taclile Qualities, or fuch as 
 affecl the Touch or Feeling, namely, Heat, Cold, 
 Sec. Thefe are properly cnUedfecondary Qualities ; 
 for though we are ready to conceive them as exift- 
 ing in the very Bodies themfelves which afTecl: our 
 Senfes, yet true Philofophy has moft undeniably 
 proved, that all thefe are really various Ideas or 
 Perceptions excited in human Nature, by the dif- 
 ferent Impreffions that Bodies make upon our 
 Senfes by their primary Modes ; that is, by means 
 of the different Shape, Size, Motion, and Pofition 
 of thofe little invilible Parts that compofe them. 
 Thence it follows, that afecondary Quality, confi- 
 dered as in the Bodies themfelves, is nothing elfe 
 but a Power or Aptitude to produce fuch Senfa- 
 tions in us ; See Locke's EJfay on the Underjlanding, 
 Book II. Ch. 8. 
 
 VIII. I might add, in the laft Place, that as 
 Modes belong to Sub/lances, fo there are fome alfo 
 that are but Modes of other Modes : For though 
 they fubfift in and by the Sub/lance, as the original 
 Subjecl of them, yet they are properly and directly 
 attributed to fome Mode of that Subftance. Motion 
 is the Mode of a Body ; but the Swiftnefs, or Slow- 
 nefs of it, or its Direclion to the North or South, 
 are but Modes of Motion. Walking is the Mode 
 
 or 
 
CH. II.] UIGHT USE OP REASON. 25 
 
 or Manner of a Man or of a Bead ; but Walking 
 gracefully implies a Manner or Mode fuperadded 
 to that Action. All comparative and fuperlative 
 Degrees of any Quality, are the Modes of a Mode, 
 as Swifter implies a greater Meafure of Swiftnefs. 
 
 It would be too tedious here to run through all 
 the Modes, Accidents, and Relations at large, that 
 belong to various Beings, and are copioufly treated 
 of in general, in the Science called Metaphyftcks, 
 or more properly Ontology : They are alfo treated 
 of in particular in thofe Sciences which have af- 
 fumed them fcverally as their proper Subjedls* 
 
 SECT. V, 
 
 Of the ten Categories. Of Subjlance modified. 
 
 TYJE have thus given an Account of the two 
 V V chief Objects of our Ideas, namely, Sub- 
 fiances and Modes, and their various Kinds : And 
 in thefe laft Sections we have briefly comprifed the 
 greateft Part of what is neceflary in the famous 
 ten Ranks of Being, called the ten Predicaments, 
 or Categories of Arifiotle, on which there are end- 
 Jefs Volumes of Difcourfes formed by feveral of 
 his Followers. But that the Reader may not ut- 
 terly be ignorant of them, let him know the Names 
 are thefe : Subjlance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, 
 Aclion, PaJJion, Where, When, Situation, and Cloth- 
 ing* It would be mere Lofs of Time to fhew how 
 loofe, how injudicious, and even ridiculous this 
 ten-fold Divifion of Things is : And whatsoever 
 farther relates to them, and which may tend to 
 improve ufeful Knowledge, fhould be fought in 
 Ontology, and in other Sciences. 
 
 Befides Subjlance and Modes, fome of the Mo- 
 derns would have us confider the Subftance modified, 
 
 C2 a* 
 
26 LOGICK I OR, THE [PART T. 
 
 as a diftincl: object of our Ideas ; but I think there 
 is nothing more that need be faid on this Subje6r, 
 than this, namely, There is feme Difference be- 
 tween a Sub (la nee when it is considered with all 
 its Modes about it, or clothed in all its Manners of 
 Exigence, and when it is diftinguifhed from them, 
 and considered naked without them. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Of Not-Being. 
 
 AS Being is divided into Subftance and Mode, 
 fo we may confider Not-Being with regard to 
 both thefe. 
 
 I. Not-Being is confklered as excluding all Sub- 
 ftance, and then all Modes are alfo neceilarily ex- 
 cluded ; and this we call pure Nihility, or mere 
 Nothing. 
 
 This Nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a phi- 
 lofophical Senle; fo we fay, there is nothing in the 
 Cup, in a vulgar Scnfe, when we mean there is no 
 Liquor in it ; but we cannot fay, there is nothing in 
 the Cup, in a ftricl philofophical Scnfe, where there 
 is Air in it, and perhaps a Million of Rays sf Light 
 are there, 
 
 II. Not-Being, as it has Relation to Modes or 
 Manners of Being, maybe confidercd either as a 
 mere Negation, or as a Privation. 
 
 A Negation is the Abfence of that which does 
 not naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeak- 
 ing of, or which has no Right, Obligation, or 
 Neceffity to be prefent with it ; as when wc fay, 
 a Sto?ie is inanimate, or Blind, or Deaf, that is, it 
 has no Life, nor Sight, nor Hearing ; nor when 
 we fay a Carpenter or a Fiflierman is unlearned, thefe 
 are mere Negations. 
 
 But 
 
CH. II.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 27 
 
 But a Privation is the Abfence of what does 
 naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeaking of, 
 or which ought to be prefent with it ; as when a 
 Man or a Horje is deaf, or blind, or dead ; or if a 
 Phyfician or a Divine be unlearned, thefe are called 
 Privations : So the Sinfulness of any human Aclion 
 is faid to be a Privation ; for Sin is that Want of 
 Conformity to the Law of God, which ought to be 
 found in every Action of Man. 
 
 Note, There are fome Writers who make all 
 forts of relative Modes or Relations, as well as all 
 external Denominations, to be mere Creatures of the 
 Mind, and Entia Rationis, and then they rank 
 them alio under the general Head of Not-Beings ; 
 but it is my Opinion, that whatfoever may be 
 determined concerning mere ?nental Relations and 
 external Denominations, which feem to have fome- 
 thing lefs of Entity or Being in them, yet there are 
 many real Relations, which ought not to be reduced 
 to fo low a Clafs ; fu*h are the Situation of Bodies, 
 their mutual Dijlances, their particular Proportions 
 and Meafures, the Notions of Fatherhood, Brother- 
 hood, So?ifhip, &c. all which are relative Ideas. The 
 very Efience of Virtues or Holinefs confifts in the 
 Conformity of our Actions to the Rule of Right 
 Reaibn, or the Law of God : The Nature and E{- 
 fence of Sincerity is the Conformity of our Words 
 and Actions to our Thoughts, all which are but 
 mere Relations ; and I think we mud not reduce 
 fuch politive Beings as Piety, and Virtue, and 
 Truth, to the Rank of Non- Entities, which have 
 nothing real in them, though Sin, (or rather the 
 Sinfulnefs of an Aclion) may be properly called a 
 Not-Being ; for it is a Want of Piety and Virtue. 
 This is the moft ufual, and perhaps the juileft Way 
 of reprefenting thefe Matters. 
 
 C 3 CHAP, 
 
28 LOGICK : OR, THE [PAItT I, 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of thefeveral Sorts of Perceptions or Ideas. 
 
 IDEAS may be divided with Regard to their 
 Original, their Nature, their Objecls, and their 
 Qualities. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Offenjible, fpiritual, and abjlracled Ideas. 
 
 THERE has been a great Controversy about 
 the Origin of Ideas, namely, whether any of 
 our. Ideas are innate or no, that is, born with us, 
 and naturally belonging to our Minds. Mr. Locks 
 utterly denies it ; others as pofitively affirm it. 
 Now, though this Controverfy may be compro- 
 mifed, by allowing that there is a Senfe wherein 
 our firft Ideas of fome Things may be faid to be 
 innate ) (as I have fhewn in fome Remarks on Mr> 
 Locke 's EJfay, which have lain long by me) yet it 
 does not belong to this Place and Bufinefs to have 
 that Point debated at large, nor will it hinder our 
 Purfuit of the prefent Work to pafs oyer it in Si- 
 lence. 
 
 There is fufficient Ground to fay, that all our 
 Ideas, with regard to their Original, may be di- 
 vided into three Sorts, namely, fenfible, fpiritual, 
 and abjlracled Ideas. 
 
 I. Sen/ible or corporeal Ideas, are derived origi- 
 nally from our Senfes, and from the Communica- 
 tion wh ; ch the Soul has with the animal Body in 
 this prefent State ; fuch are the Notions we frame 
 of all Colours, Sounds, Tajles, Figures, or Shapes 
 
 and 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 2Q 
 
 and Motions ; for our Senfes being converfant about 
 particular fenfible Objects, become the Occafions 
 offeveral diftinct Perceptions in the Mind ; and 
 thus we come by the Ideas of Yellow, Wliite, Heat, 
 Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all thofe which 
 we call fenfible Qualities. All the Ideas which we 
 have of Body, and the fenfible Modes and Proper- 
 ties that belong to it, feem to be derived from 
 Senfation. 
 
 And howfoever thefe may be treafured up in 
 the Memory, and by the Work of Fancy, may be 
 increafed, diminifhed, compounded, divided, and 
 diverfified, (which we are ready to call our Inven- 
 tion) yet they all derive their firft Nature and Be- 
 ing from fomething that has been let into our 
 Minds by one or other of our Senfes. If I think 
 of a golden Mountain, or a Sea of liquid Fire, yet 
 the lingle Ideas of Sea, Fire, Mountain, and Gold, 
 came into my Thoughts at flrft by Senfation ; the 
 Mind has only compounded them. 
 
 II. Spiritual* or Intellectual Ideas, are thofe 
 which we gain by reflecting on the Nature and 
 Actions of our own Souls, and turning our 
 Thoughts within ourfelves, and obferving what is 
 tranfacted in our own Minds. Such are the Ideas 
 we have of Thought, AJfent, Diffent, Judging, Rea- 
 fon, Knowledge, Under/landing, Will, Love, Fear, 
 Hope. 
 
 By Senfation the Soul contemplates Things (as 
 it were) out of itfelf, and gains corporeal Repre- 
 fentations oxfenfille Ideas : By Refleclion the Soul 
 contemplates itfelf, and Things within itfelf, and 
 by this Means it gains fpiritual Ideas, or Reprefen- 
 tations of Things intellectual. 
 
 * Here the. Word Spiritual is ufed in a mere natural, and 
 «ot in a religious Senfe. 
 
 C 4 Here 
 
30 LOGICK ! OK, THE [PART I. 
 
 Here it may be noted, though the firft Original 
 of thefe two Sorts of Ideas, namely, Senfible and 
 Spiritual, may be entirely owing to thefe two Prin- 
 ciples, Senfation and Reflection, yet the Recollection 
 and frefh Excitation of them may be owing to a 
 thoufand other Occafions and Occurrences of Life. 
 We could never inform a Man who was born 
 Blind or Deaf, what we mean by the Words Yel- 
 low, Blue, Red, or by the Words Loud or Shrill, 
 nor convey any juft Ideas of thefe Things to his 
 Mind, by all the Po^vers of Language, unlefs he 
 has experienced thofe Senfations of Sound and Co- 
 lour ; nor could we ever gain the Ideas of Thought, 
 Judgment, Reafon, Doubting, Hoping, &c. by all the 
 Words that Man could invent, without turning 
 our Thoughts inward upon the Actions of our own 
 Souls. Yet when once we have attained thefe Ideas 
 by Senfation and Reflection, they may be excited 
 afrefh by the Ufe of Names, Words, Signs, or by 
 any Thing elfe that has been connected with them 
 in our Thoughts ; for when two or more Ideas 
 have been affociated together, whether it be by 
 Cuftom, or Accident, or Defign, the one prefently 
 brings the other to Mind, 
 
 III. Befides thefe two which we have named, 
 there is a third Sort of Ideas, which are commonly 
 called abflraCted Ideas, becaufe though the original 
 Ground or Occafion of them may be Senfation, or 
 Reflection, or loth, yet thefe Ideas are framed by 
 another Act of the Mind, which we ufually call 
 AbflraCtion. Now the Word AbflraCtion fignifies 
 a withdrawing fome Parts of an Idea from other 
 Parts of it, by which 'Means fuch abflracled Ideas 
 are formed, as neither reprefent any Thing corpo- 
 real or fpiritual, that is, any Thing peculiar or 
 proper to Mind or Body, Now thefe are of twQ 
 Kinds. 
 
 Some 
 
CH. III.] KIGHT USE OF REASON. 31 
 
 Some of thefe dbflraSed Ideas are the moft abfor 
 lute, general and univerfal Conceptions of Things, 
 confklered in themfelves, without Refpect to 
 others ; fuch as Entity or Being, and Not-Being, 
 Effence, Exigence, Aft, Power, Subftance, Mode, 
 Accident, he. 
 
 The other Sort of abftrafted Ideas are relative, as 
 when we compare feveral Things together, and 
 confider merely the Relations -of one Thing to 
 another, entirely dropping the Subject of thofe 
 Relations, whether they be corporeal or fpiritual ; 
 fuch are our Ideas of Caufe, Ejfeft, Likenefs, Vn- 
 likenefs, Subjeft, Objeft, Identity, or Samenefs, and 
 Contrariety, Order, and. other Things which are 
 treated of in Ontology. 
 
 Moft of the Terms of Art in feveral Sciences 
 may be ranked under this Head of ' abftrafted Ideas, 
 as Noun, Pronoun, Verb, in Grammar, and the- 
 feveral Particles of Speech, as wherefore, therefore, 
 when, how, although, howjbever, he. So Connec- 
 tions, Tranfitions, Similitudes, Tropes, and their va- 
 rious Forms in Rhetorick. 
 
 Thefe abftrafted Ideas, whether abfolute or re- 
 lative, cannot fo properly be faid to derive their 
 immediate, complete, and diftincl Original, either 
 from Senfation, or Reflection, ( 3 ) Becaufe the Na- 
 ture and the Actions both of Body and Spirit give 
 us Occafion to frame exactly the fame Ideas of 
 Effence, Mode, Caufe, Ejfeft, Likenefs, Contrariety, 
 he. Therefore thefe cannot be called either fenftble 
 or fpiritual Ideas, for they are not exact Reprefen- 
 tations either of the peculiar Qualities or Aftions of 
 Spirit or Body, but feem to be a diftinct Kind of 
 Idea framed in the Mind, to reprefent our moft 
 general Conceptions of Things, or their Relations to 
 one another, without any Regard to their Natures, 
 whether they be corporeal or fpiritual. And, ( 2 ) 
 i^ae fame general Ideas, of Caufe and Ejfeft, Like- 
 nefs, 
 
32 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I* 
 
 nefs, &c. may be transferred to a thoufand other 
 Kinds of Being, whether bodily or fpi ritual, be- 
 fides thofc from whence we firft derived them ; 
 Even thofe abfiracled Ideas, which might be firft 
 occafioned by Bodies, may be as properly afterward 
 attributed to Spirits. 
 
 Now, though Mr. Locke fuppofes Senfation and 
 Refleclion to be the only two Springs of all Ideas, 
 and that thefe two are fufficient to furnifh our 
 Minds with all that rich Variety of Ideas which 
 we have ; yet Ahftrattion is certainly a different 
 Act: of the Mind, whence thefe abfiracled Ideas 
 have their Original ; though perhaps Senfation or 
 Reflection may furnifh us with all the firft Objects 
 and Occafions whence thefe abfiracled Ideas are 
 excited and derived. Nor in this Senfe and View 
 of Things, can I think Mr. Locke himfejf would 
 deny my Reprefentation of the Original of ab-* 
 firacled Ideas, nor forbid them to Hand for a dif- 
 tinct. Species. 
 
 Note, Though we have divided Ideas in this 
 Chapter into three Sorts, namely, fenfible, fpiri- 
 tual, and abfiracled, yet it may not be amifs juft 
 to take Notice here, that a Man may be called a 
 compound Subfiance, being made of Body and Mind, 
 and the Modes which arife from this Compofition 
 are called mixed Modes, fuch as Senfation, Pajfion, 
 Difcourfe, &c. fo the Ideas of this Subitance or 
 Being, called Man, and of thefe mixed Modes, 
 may be called ?nixed Ideas, for they are not pro* 
 perly and firictly Jpiritual, fenfible, or abfiracled* 
 See a much larger Account of every Part of this 
 Chapter in the Philofophical EJfajs, by /. Watte* 
 Effay III, IV, &e. 
 
 sect! 
 
£H. HI.] RIGHT USE OF REASOST, S3 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of fimple and complex, compound and collecJhe Ideas* 
 
 IDEAS confidered in their Nature, arc either 
 fimple or complex, 
 
 K fimple Idea is one uniform Idea, which cannot 
 be divided or diftinguifhed by the Mind of Man 
 into two or more Ideas ; fuch are a multitude of 
 our Senfations ; as the Idea of Sweet, Bitter, Cold, 
 Heat, White, Red, Blue, Hard, Soft, Motion, Rejt, 
 and perhaps Extenfion and Duration : Such are alio 
 many of our fpiritual Ideas ; fuch as Thought , 
 Will, Wifh, Knowledge, &c. 
 
 A complex Idea is made by joining two or more 
 fimple Ideas together ; as a Square, a Triangle, a 
 Cube, a Pen, a Table, Reading, Writing, Truth, 
 Fal/hood, a Body, a Man, a Horfe, an Angel, a heavy 
 Body, afwift Horfe, &c. Every Thing that can 
 be divided by the Miqd into two or more Ideas is 
 called complex. 
 
 Complex Ideas are often conlidered as Jingle and 
 dijlincl Beings, though they may be made up of 
 feveral fimple Ideas ; (b a Body, a Spirit, a Houfe 9 
 a Tree, a Flower. But when feveral of thefe Ideas 
 of a different Kind are joined together, which are 
 wont to be confidered as diftinet fingle Beings, 
 this is called a compound Idea, whether thefe united 
 Ideas be fimple or complex. So a Man is com- 
 pounded of Body and Spirit, fo Milhridate is a 
 compound Medicine, becaufe it is made of many 
 different Ingredients : This I have fhewn under 
 the Doclrine of Subftances. And Modes alfo may 
 be compounded ; Harmony is a compound Idea 
 made up of different Sounds united : So feveral dif- 
 ferent Virtues mud be united to make up the com- 
 pounded 
 
34 LOGICK : OK, THE [PAKT I. 
 
 pounded Idea or Character, either of a Hero, or a 
 Saint. 
 
 But when many Ideas of the fame Kind are 
 joined together and united in one Name, or under 
 .one View, it is called a colleclive Idea ; fo an Army 
 or a Parliament, is a Collection of Men ; a D/V- 
 tionary or Nomenclature, is a Collection of Words, 
 a -F/tf£/£ is a Collection of Sheep ; a jPbr^ or Grove, 
 2. Collection of Trees ; an Heap, is a Collection of 
 Sand, or Corn, or Duft, &c. a. City, is a Colleclion 
 of Houfes ; a Nofegoy, is a Collection of Flowers ; 
 a Month, or a IW, is a Collection of Days ; and a 
 Thoufand, is a Colleclion of Units. 
 
 The precife Difference between a compound and 
 collective Idea is this, that a compound Idea unites 
 Things of a different Kind, but a colleclive Idea 
 Things of the fame Kind : Though this Difti tac- 
 tion in fome Cafes is not accurately obfervcd, and 
 Cuftom . oftentimes ufes the Word compound for 
 colleclive. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of univerfal and particular Ideas, real and ima- 
 ginary. 
 
 IDEAS, according to their Objecls, may firfl bo 
 divided into particular or univerfal. 
 A particular Idea is that which reprefents one 
 Thing only. 
 
 Sometimes the one Thing is reprefented in a 
 
 loofe and indeterminate Manner, as when we fay, 
 
 fome Man, any Man, one Man, another Man ; fome 
 
 Horfe, any Horfe ; one City, or another ; which is 
 
 called by the Schools Individuum Fagum. 
 
 Sometimes the particular Idea reprefents one 
 Thing in a determinate Manner, and then it is 
 
 called 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 35 
 
 called 'ajinguhr Idea ; fuch is Bucephalus, or Alex- 
 ander $ Horfe, Cicero the Orator, Peter the Apoftle, 
 the Palace of Verf allies, this Book, that River, the 
 New Fur eft, or the City of London: That Idea 
 which reprefents one particular determinate Thing 
 to me, is called a fngidar Idea, whether it be 
 fimple, or complex, or compound. 
 
 The Objecl of any particular Idea, as well as 
 the Idea itfelf, is fometimes called an Individual: 
 So Peter is an individual Man, London is an indi- 
 vidual City. So this Book, one Horfe, another Horfe 'j 
 are all Individuals ; though the Word Individual i3 
 more ufually limited to one fingular^ certain, and 
 determined Objecl. 
 
 An univ erf al Idea, is that which reprefents a com- 
 mon Nature agreeing to feveral particular Things ; 
 lb a Horfe, a Man, or a Book, are called univ erf al 
 Ideas, becaufe they agree to 'dWHorfes, Men, or Books. 
 
 And I think it not amifs to intimate in this 
 Place, that thefe Univ erf al Ideas are foraned by that 
 Acl of the Mind which is called Abftraclion, that 
 is, a withdrawing fome Part of an Idea from other 
 Parts of it : For when fmgular Ideas are firlt let 
 into the Mind by Senfation or Reflection, then, 
 in order to make them univerfal, we leave out, or 
 drop all thofe peculiar and determinate Characters, 
 Qualities, Modes, or Circumftances, which belong 
 merely to any particular individual Being, and by 
 which it differs from other Beings ; and we only 
 contemplate thofe Properties of it, wherein it agrees 
 with other Beings. 
 
 Though it inuft be confeffed, that the Name of 
 abftracled Ideas is fometimes attributed to univer- 
 fal Ideas, both fenftble or fpiritual, yet this Ab- 
 ftraclion is not ib great, as when we drop out of 
 £>ur Idea every fenftble or fpiritual Reprefentation, 
 and retain nothing but the moft general and abfolute 
 
 Conceptions 
 
36 logics: or, Titfc [parti. 
 
 Conceptions of Thing??, or their mere Relations to 
 one another, without any Regard to their particu- 
 lar Natures, whether they be fenfible or fpirituah 
 And it is to this Kind of Conceptions we more 
 properly give the Name of abftracled Ideas, as in 
 the firft Section of this Chapter. 
 
 An univerfal Idea is either general or fpirituah 
 
 A general Idea is called by the Schools a Genus ; 
 and it is one common Nature agreeing to feveral 
 other common Natures. So Animal is a Genus, 
 becaufe it agrees to Horfe, Lion, Whale, Butterfly, 
 which are alfo common Ideas ; fo Fijh is a Genus, 
 becaufe it agrees to Trout, Herring, Crab, which 
 are common Natures alfo. 
 
 Afpecial Idea is called by the Schools a Species ; 
 it is one common Nature that agrees to feveral 
 fingular individual Beings ; fo Horfe is a fpecial 
 Idea, or a Species, becaufe it agrees to Bucephalus, 
 Trott and Snowball. City is a fpecial Idea, for it 
 agrees to London, Paris, Briftol. 
 
 Note, Ift. Some of thefe Univerfals are Genufes, 
 if compared with lefs common Natures ; and they 
 are Species, if compared with Natures more com- 
 mon. So Bird is a Genus, if compared with Eagle, 
 Sparrozv, Raven, which are alfo common Natures : 
 But it is a Species, if compared with the more ge- 
 neral Nature, Animal. The fame may be faid of 
 Fifh, Beafl, &c. 
 
 This Sort of univerfal Ideas, which may either 
 be confidered as a Genus, or a Species, is called 
 Subaltern ; But the higheft Genus, which is never 
 a Species, is called the mqfi general-, and the loweft 
 Species, which is never a Genus, is called the mofi 
 fpeciaL 
 
 It may be obferved here alfo, that that general 
 Nature or Property wherein one Thing agrees with 
 inoft other Things, is called its more remote Genus : 
 
 So 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 3? 
 
 So Subftance is the remote Genus of Bird, Or Beaft, 
 becaufe it agrees not only to all Kinds of Animals, 
 but alfo to Things inanimate, as Sun, Stars, 
 Clouds, Metals, Stones, Air, Water, &c. But 
 Animal is the 'proximate or neareji Genus of Bird, 
 becaufe it agrees to fewer other Things. Thofe 
 general Natures which itand between the neareft 
 and moft remote, are called intermediate. 
 
 Note II. In univerfal Ideas it is proper to con- 
 fider their Comprehenfion and their Extenfion *. 
 
 The Comprehenfion of an Idea regards all the ef- 
 lential Modes and Properties of it : So Body in its 
 Comprehenfion takes in Solidity, Figure, Quantity, 
 Mobility, &c. So a Bozvl in its Comprehenfion in- 
 cludes Roundnefs, Volubility, &c. 
 
 The Extenfion of an univerfal Idea regards all 
 the particular Kinds and iingle Beings that are 
 contained under it. So a Body in its Extenfion £a- 
 cludes Sun, Moon, Star, Wood, Iron, Plant, Animal, 
 &c. which are feveral Species, or Individuals, under 
 the general Name of Body. So a Bowl, in its Ex- 
 tenfion, includes a wooden Bowl, a Brafs Bowl, a 
 white and black Bowl, a heavy Bowl, £sfc. and all 
 Kinds of Bowls, together with all the particular 
 individual Bowls in the World. 
 
 Note, The Comprehenfion of an Idea is fometimes 
 taken in fo large a Senfe, as not only to include 
 the eflential Attributes, but all the Properties, 
 Modes and Relations whatfoever, that belong to 
 any Being, as will appear, Chap. VI. 
 
 This Account of Genus and Species is Part of 
 that famous Doclrine of Univerfals, which is taught 
 in the Schools, with* divers other Formalities be- 
 longing to it ; for it is in this Place that they in- 
 troduce Difference, which is the primary eflential 
 
 Mode, 
 
 * Note, The Word Extenfion here Is taken in a mere logical 
 Senfe, and not in zphyfical and mathematical Senfe. 
 
38 LOGTCK. : OR, THE [pAK* V 
 
 Mode, and Property, or the fecondary cfTentia! 
 Mode, and Accident,, or the accidental Mode ; and 
 ihefe they call the five Predicables, beeaufe every 
 Thing that is affirmed concerning any Being muffi 
 be either the Genus, the Species, the Difference, 
 ibme Property, fome Accident : But what farther is 
 neceflary to be faid concerning thefe Things will 
 be mentioned when we treat of Definition. 
 
 Having finifhed the Doctrine of univerfal and 
 particular Ideas, I fhould take Notice of another 
 Divifion of them, which alfo hath Refpeet to their 
 Objecls 5 and that is, they are either real or ima- 
 ginary. 
 
 Real Ideas are fuch as have a juft Foundation irt 
 Nature, and have real Objecls, or Exemplars* 
 which did, or do, or may actually exift, according 
 to the prefent State and Nature of Things ; fuch 
 are all our Ideas of Long, Broad, Swift, Slow, 
 Wood, Iron, Men, Horfes, Thoughts, Spirits, a cruel 
 Mafier, a proud Beggar, a Man feven Feet hrgh. 
 
 Imaginary Ideas, which are alfo called fantafii- 
 cal, or chimerical, are fuch as are made by enlarg- 
 ing, diminifhing, uniting, dividing real Ideas in 
 the Mind, in fuch a manner, as no Objecls, or 
 Exemplars, did or ever will exift, according to 
 the prefent Courfe of Nature, though the feveral 
 Farts of thefe Ideas are borrowed from real Ob- 
 jects ; fuch are the Conceptions we have of a Cen- 
 taur, a Satyr, a golden Mountain, a fiying Horfe^ 
 a Dog without a Head, a Bull lefs than a Moufe, or 
 a Moufe as big as a Bull, and a Man twenty Feet 
 high. 
 
 Some of thefe fantafiic Ideas are poffible, that 
 is, they are not utterly inconfiftent in the Nature 
 of Things; and therefore it is within the Reach 
 of Divine Power to make fuch Objects; fuch are 
 inoft of the Inftances already given ; But Impoffi- 
 
 bles 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 3Q 
 
 hies to carry an utter Inconfiftence in the Ideas 
 which are joined; fuch aw f elf -aclive Matter, and 
 infinite or eternal Men, a pious Man without Honefiy^ 
 or Heaven without Holinefs. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 The Divifion of Ideas, with Regard to their Qualities. 
 
 IDEAS, with Regard to their Qualities, afford 
 us thefe feveral Divifions .of them. 1. They 
 are either clear and difiincl, or ohfcure and confuted. 
 2. They are vidgar or learned. 3. They are jvr- 
 fecl or imperfecl. 4. They are true ovfalfe. 
 
 I. Our Ideas are either clear and difiincl, or oh- 
 fcure and confufed. 
 
 Several Writers have diftinguifhed the clear 
 Ideas from thofe that are difiincl ; and the confufed, 
 Ideas from thofe that are ohfcure ; and it muft be 
 acknowledged, there may be fome Difference be- 
 tween them ; for it is the Clearnefs of Ideas for 
 the moft part makes them difiincl ; and the Oh- 
 JcurityofldeQs is one Thing that will always bring 
 a fort of Confufioyi into them. Yet when thefe 
 Writers come to talk largely upon this Subject, 
 and to explain and adjuft their Meaning with great 
 Nicety, I have generally found that they did not 
 keep up the Diftinclion they iirfl deligned, but 
 they confound the one with the other. I (hall 
 therefore treat of clear ox difiincl Ideas, as one and 
 the fame Sort, and ohfcure or confufed Ideas, as 
 another. 
 
 A clear and difiincl Idea, is that, which reprefents 
 the Objccl of the Mind with full Evidence and 
 Strength, and plainly diftinguifhes it from alLother 
 Object s w hat foevcr. 
 
 D An 
 
40 LOGICK : OR, THE [>ART I. 
 
 An oh/cure and confufed Idea reprefents the Ob- 
 ject either fo faintly, fo imperfe6tly, or fo mingled 
 with other Ideas, that the Obje6t of it doth not 
 appear plain to the Mind, nor purely in its own 
 Nature, nor fufficiently diflinguifhed from other 
 Things. 
 
 When we fee the Sea and Sky nearer at Hand, 
 Ave have a clear and diftincl Idea of each ; but 
 when we look far toward the Horizon, efpccially 
 in a mifty Day, our Ideas of both are but obfcure 
 and confufed \ for we know not which is Sea and 
 which is Sky. So when we look at the Colours of 
 the Rainbow, we have a clear Idea of the red, the 
 Hue, the green in the Middle of their feveral Arches, 
 and a diftincl Idea too, while the Eye fixes there ; 
 but when we confider the Border of thofe Colours, 
 they fo run into one another, that it renders their 
 Ideas confufed and obfcure. So the Idea which we 
 have of our Brother, or our Friend, whom we fee 
 daily, is clear and diftincl ; but when the Abfence 
 of many Years lias injured the Idea, it becomes 
 obfcure and confufed. 
 
 Note here. That fome of our Ideas may be vtry 
 clear and diftincl in one Refpeet, and very obfcure 
 and confufed in another. So when we fpeak of a 
 Chiliagonum, or a Figure of a thoufand Angels, we 
 in ay have a clear and diftincl rational Idea of the 
 Number o?ie thoufand Angels ; for we can demon- 
 it rate various Properties concerning it by Reafon : 
 But the Image, or fenftble Idea, which we have of 
 the Figure, is but confufed and obfcure ; for wc 
 cannot precifely diftinguifh it by Fancy from the 
 Image of a Figure thai has nine hundred Angels, or 
 nine hundred and ?iinety. So when we fpeak of the 
 infinite Divifibiliiy of Matter, we always keep in 
 our Minds a very clear and difiincl Idea of Divi- 
 ft on and Diviftbdity ; but after we have made a 
 little Progreis in dividing, and come to Parts 
 
 that 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON - . 41 
 
 that are far too fmall for the Rea'bh of otir Senfes, 
 then our Ideas, or fenfible Images of thefe little 
 Bodies, become obfcure and indifilncl, and the Idea 
 of Infinite is very obfcure, hnperfecl, and confufed. 
 
 II. Ideas are either vulgar or learned. A vulgar 
 Idea reprefents to us the moil obvious and fenfible 
 Appearances that are contained in the Object of 
 them : But a learned idea penetrates farther into 
 the Nature, Properties, Reafons, Caufes, and Ef- 
 fects of Things. This is bed illufirated by fome 
 Examples* 
 
 It is a vulgar Idea that we have of a Rainbow ^ 
 when we conceive a large Arch in the Clouds, 
 made up of various Colours parallel to each other; 
 But it is a learned Idea which a Philofopher has* 
 when he confiders it as the various Reflections and 
 Refra6tions of Sun-beams, in Drops of falling 
 Rain. So it is a vulgar Idea which we have of 
 the Colours offolid Bodies, when we perceive them 
 to be, as it were, a red, or blue., or green Tinc- 
 ture of the Surface of thofe Bodies : But it is a phi- 
 lofoph'ical Idea when we con fid er the various Colours 
 to be nothing elfe but different Senfations excited 
 in us by the varioufly refracted Rays of Light, 
 reflected on our Eyes in a different Manner, ac- 
 cording to the different Size, or Shape, or Situa* 
 tion of the Particles of which the Surfaces of thofe 
 Bodies are comoofed. It is a vulvar Idea which 
 we have of a Watch or Clock, when we conceive 
 of it as a pretty Inftrument, made to (hew us the 
 Hour of the Day : But it is a learned Idea which 
 the Watchmaker has of it, who knows all the feve- 
 ral Parts of it, the Spring, the Balance, the Chain, 
 the Wheels, their Axles, tsc. together with the 
 various Connections and Adjustments of each Part, 
 whence the exact and uniform Motion of the In- 
 dex is derived, which points to the Minute or the 
 
 D 2 Hour. 
 
42 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART I. 
 
 Hour. So when a common Underftanding reads 
 VirgiVs iMneid, he has but a vulgar Idea of that 
 Poem, yet his Mind is naturally entertained with 
 the Story, and his Ears with the Verfe : But when 
 a Critick, or a Man who has Skill in Poefy, reads 
 it, he has a learned Idea of its peculiar Beauties, 
 he taftes and relifhes a fuperior Pleafure ; he ad- 
 mires the Roman Poet, and willies he had known 
 the Chriflian Theology, which would have furnifhed 
 him with nobler Materials and Machines than all 
 the Heathen Idols. 
 
 It is with a vulgar Idea that the World beholds 
 the Cai'toons of Raphael at Hampton-Court ; and 
 every one feels his Share of Pleafure and Entertain- 
 ment : But a Painter contemplates the Wonders 
 of that Italian Pencil, and fees a thoufand Beau- 
 ties in them which the vulgar Eye neglected : His 
 learned Ideas give him a tranfcendent Delight, and 
 yet, at the fame Time, difcover the Blemifhes 
 which the common Gazer never obferved. 
 
 III. Ideas are either perfe3 or imperfett, which 
 are otherwife called adequate or inadequate, 
 
 Thofe are adequate Ideas which perfectly repre- 
 fent their Archetypes or Objects. Inadequate Ideas 
 are but a partial, or incomplete Reprefentation of 
 thofe Archetypes to which they are referred. 
 
 All our fimple Ideas are in fome Senfe adequate 
 or perfect, becaufe^///>/^ Ideas, considered merely 
 as our fir ft Perceptions, have no Parts in them : So 
 we may be faid to have a perfect idea of White, 
 Blacky Sweet, Sour, Length, Light, Motion, Reft, 
 &c\ We have alio a. perfect Idea of- various Fi- 
 gures, as a Triangle, a Square, a Cylinder, a Cube, 
 a Sphere, which are complex Ideas : But our Idea 
 or Image of a Figure of a thoujand Sides, our Idea 
 of the City of London, or the Powers of a Load- 
 Jlone, are very •imperfect, as well as all our Ideas 
 
 of 
 
 
CH. Ill/] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 43 
 
 of infinite Length or Breadth, infinite Power, Wif- 
 dom, or Duration ; for the Idea of infinite is endleis 
 and evergrowing, and can never be completed. 
 
 Note, i . When we have a perfect Idea of any 
 Thing in all its Parts, it is called a complete laea ; 
 when in all its Properties, it is called comprehenjjve. 
 Bat when we have bat an inadequate and imperfeS 
 Idea, we are only faid to apprehend it ; therefore 
 we ufe the Term Apprehenfion when we fpeak of 
 our Knowledge of God, who can never be compre~ 
 hended by his Creatures. 
 
 Note 2. Though there are a Multitude of Ideas 
 which may be called perfeel, or adequate in a vul- 
 gar Senfe, yet there are fcarce any Ideas which are 
 adequate, comprehenfive, and complete in a philofo- 
 phical Senfe ; for there is fcarce any Thing in the 
 World that we know, as to all the Parts and 
 Powers and Properties of it, in Perfection. Even 
 fo plain an Idea as that of a Triangle has, perhaps, 
 infinite Properties belonging to it, of which we 
 know but a ihw. Who can tell what are the 
 Shapes and Pofitions of thofe Particles, which 
 caufe all the Variety of Colours that appear on the 
 Surface of Things ? Who knows what are the 
 Figures of the little Corpufcles that compofe and 
 diftinguifh different Bodies ? The Ideas of Brafs, 
 Iron, Gold, Wood, Stone, Hyjop, and Rojemary, have 
 an infinite Variety of hidden Myfteries contained 
 in the Shape, Size, Motion, and Poiition of the 
 little Particles of which they are compofed ; and, 
 perhaps, alfo infinite unknown Properties and 
 Powers, that may be derived from them. And if 
 we arife to the Animal World, or the World of 
 Spirits, our Knowledge of them mud be amazingly 
 im perfect, when there is not the lead Grain of 
 Sand, or empty Space, but has too many Queftions 
 and Difficulties belonging to it for the wifeft Phi- 
 lofopher upon Earth to anfwer and refolve. 
 
 D 3 IV. Our 
 
44 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 IV. Our Ideas are either true or falfe ; for an 
 Idea being the Reprefentation of a Thing in the 
 Mind, it muft be either a true or a falfe Reprefen- 
 tation of it. If the Idea be conformable to the 
 Object or Archetype of it, it is a true Idea ; if 
 not, it is a falfe one. Sometimes our Ideas are 
 referred to Things really exiting without us, as 
 their Archetypes. If I fee Bodies in their proper 
 Colours, I have a true Idea : But when a Man 
 under the Jaundice fees all Bodies Yellow, he has 
 a falfe Idea of them. So if we fee the Sun or Moon 
 rlfing or fitting, our Idea reprefents them bigger 
 than when they are on the Meridian : And in this 
 Senfe it is a falfe Idea, becaufe thofe heavenly 
 Bodies are all Day and all Night of the fame Big- 
 nefs. Or when I fee ajlraight Staff appear crook* 
 ed while it is half under the Water, I fay, the 
 Water gives me a falfe Idea of it. Sometimes our 
 Ideas refer to the Ideas of other Men, denoted 
 by fuch a particular Word, as their Archetypes : 
 So when I hear a P rot eft ant ufe the Words Church 
 and Sacraments, if I underftand by thefe Words a 
 Congregation of Faithful Men who profefs Chrijlia- 
 nity, and the two Ordinances, Baptilrn and the 
 Lord's Supper, I have a true Idea of thofe Words 
 in the common Senfe of Proteflants : But if the 
 Man who fpeaks of them be a Papifl, he means 
 the Church of Rome and the feven Sacraments, and 
 then I have a m'iftaken Idea of thofe Words, as 
 fpoken by him, for he has a different Senfe and 
 Meaning : And in general whenfoever I miflake 
 the Senfe of any Speaker or Writer, I may be faid 
 to have a falfe Idea of it. 
 
 Some think that Truth or Falfliood properly be- 
 longs only to Proportions, which (hall be the Sub- 
 ject of Difcourfe in the fecond Part of Logick ; for 
 if we confider Ideas as mere Impreffions upon the 
 Mind, made by outward Objects, thofe Impref- 
 fions 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 45 
 
 lions will ever be conformable to the Laws of Na- 
 ture in fuch a Cafe : The Water will make a Stick 
 appear crooked, and the horizontal Air will make 
 the Sun and Moon appear bigger. And generally 
 where there is Falfhood in Ideas, there- feems to be 
 {oinefecret or latent Proportions ; whereby we judge 
 falfely of Things. This is more obvious where we 
 take up the Words of a Writer or Speaker in a 
 miftaken Senfe, for we join his Words to our own 
 Ideas, which are different from his. But after all, 
 lince Ideas are Pictures of Things, it can never be 
 very improper to pronounce them to be true or 
 falfe, according to their Conformity, or Nonconfor- 
 mity to their Exemplars. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of Words and their feveral Dlvifions, together 
 with the Advantage and Danger of them. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of Words in general, and their Ufe. 
 
 THOUGH our Ideas are flrft acquired by the 
 Perception of Objecls, or by various Senfa- 
 tions and Reflections,- yet we convey them to each 
 other by the means of certain Sounds, or written 
 Marks, which we call Words ; and a great Part of 
 our Knowledge is both obtained and communi- 
 cated by thefe Means, which are called Speech or 
 
 Language. 
 
 D 4 But 
 
46 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 But as we are led into the Knowledge of Things 
 by Words, fo we are oftentimes led into Error or 
 Miitake by {he Ufe or Abufe of Words alfo. And 
 in order to guard again ft fuch Miftakes, as well 
 as to promote our Improvement in Knowledge, it 
 is neceflary to acquaint ourfelves a little with 
 Words and Terms. We fhall begin with thefe 
 Obfervations. 
 
 Obfervation 1. Words (whether they are fpoken 
 or written) have no natural Connection with the 
 Ideas they, are deiigned to iignify, nor with the 
 Things which are reprefcnted in thofe Ideas. There 
 is no manner of Affinity between the Sounds white 
 in EngliJJi, or blanc in French, and that Colour 
 which we call by that Name ; nor have the Letters, 
 pf which thefe Words are compofed, any natural 
 Aptnefs to fignify that Colour rather than red or 
 green. Words and Names therefore are mere arbi- 
 trary Signs invented by Men to communicate their 
 Thoughts or Ideas to one another. 
 
 Obferv. 2. If one fingle Word were appointed 
 to exprefs but one iimple Idea, and nothing elfe, 
 as White, Black, Sweet, Sour, Sharp, Bitter, Ex- 
 ten/ion, Duration, there would be fcarce any Mif- 
 take about them. 
 
 But alas ! It is a common Unhappinefs in Lan- 
 guage, that different fimple Ideas are fometimes 
 exprcfled by the fame Word , fo the Words fweet 
 and Jharp are applied both to the Objecls of hear- 
 ing and tailing, as we fhall fee hereafter ; and this, 
 perhaps, may be one Caufe or Foundation of Gb- 
 Jcurity and Error arifing from Words. 
 
 Objerv. 3. In communicating our complex Ideas 
 to one another, if we could join as many pe- 
 culiar and appropriated Words together in one 
 Sound, as we join fimple Ideas to make one com- 
 plex one^ we fhould feldom be in danger of mis- 
 taking ; 
 
CH. IV.} RIGHT USE OF REAS'ON. 4? 
 
 taking : When I exprefs the tafte of an Apple, 
 which we call the Bitter-Sw^et, none can miltake 
 what I mean. 
 
 Yet this Sort of Compojition would make all Lan- 
 guage a molt tedious and unweildy Thing, fince 
 moil of our Ideas are complex, and many of them 
 have eight or ten limple Ideas in them ; fo that the 
 Remedy would be worie than the Difeafe ; for what 
 is now expreffed in one fhort Word, as Month, or 
 Year, would require two Lines to exprefs it. It is 
 necefTary, therefore, thvxjl-ngle- Words be invented 
 to exprefs complex Ideas, in order to make Lan- 
 guage fbort and ufeful. 
 
 But here is our great Infelicity, that when Jingle 
 Words fignify complex Ideas, one Word can never 
 diliinclly manifeft all the Parts of a complex Idea ; 
 and thereby it will often happen, that one Man 
 includes more or UJs in his Idea, than another does, 
 while he affixes the fame Word to it. In this Cafe 
 there will be Danger of Miflake between them, for 
 they do not mean \hefa?ne Objecl, though they ufe 
 Xhejame Name. So if one Perfon or Nation, by 
 the Word Year, mean twelve Months of thirty 
 Days each, that is, three hundred and fixty Days, 
 another intend a Solar Year of three hundred iixty 
 five Days, and a third mean a Lunar Year, or 
 twelve Lunar Months, that is three hundred fifty 
 four Days, there will be a great Variation and Er- 
 ror in their Account of Things, unlefs they are 
 well apprized of each other's Meaning beforehand. 
 This is iuppoled to be the Reafon,^ why ibme an- 
 cient Hijlories, and Prophecies, and Accounts of 
 Chronology, are fo hard to be ad juried. And this 
 is the true Reai'on of fo furious and endlefs De- 
 bates on many Points in Divinity; the Words 
 Church, JVorJhip, Idolatry, Repentance, Faith, 
 Ehclion, Merit, Grace, and many others which 
 fignify very complex Ideas, are not applied to in- 
 clude 
 
48 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 elude juit the fame fimple Ideas, and the fame 
 Number of them, by the various contending Par- 
 ties; thence arife Confu (ion and Conteft. 
 
 Obferv.- 4. Though a fingh Name does not cer- 
 tainly manifefl to us all the Parts of a complex Idea, 
 yet it mufl be acknowledged, that in many of our 
 complex Ideas the fingle Name may point out to 
 us fome chief Property which belongs to the Thing 
 that the Word fignifies ; efpecially when the Word 
 or Name is traced up to the Original, through fe- 
 veral Languages from whence it is borrowed. So 
 an Apoflle fignifies one who is fent forth. 
 
 But this tracing of a Word to its Original, 
 (which is called Etymology) is fometimes a very 
 precarious and uncertain Thing : And after all, 
 we have made but little Progrefs towards the At- 
 tainment of' the full Meaning of a complex Idea, by- 
 knowing fome one chief Property of it. We know 
 but a fmall Part of the Notion of an Apoflle, by 
 knowing barely that he \*> fent forth. 
 
 Obferv. 5. Many (if not mofr) of our Words 
 which are applied to moral and intellectual Ideas, 
 when traced up to their Original in the learned 
 Languages, will be found to fignify fenfibh and 
 corporeal Things. Thus the Words Apprehenfion, 
 Under ft anding^ Abftracl-wn, Invention, Idea, Infe- 
 rence, Prudence, Religion, Church, Adoration, &c. 
 have all a corporeal Signification in their Original. 
 The Name Spirit itfelf figq|fies Breath or Air, in 
 Latin, Greek, and Hebrew : Such is the Poverty of 
 all Languages, they are forced to ufe thefe Names 
 for incorporeal Ideas, which Thing has a Tendency 
 to Error and Confnfion. 
 
 Obferv. (3. The lad thing I fhall mention that 
 leads us into many a Miftake is, the Multitude of 
 ( ;!)jcdts that one Name fometimes fignifies : There 
 is almoft an infinite Variety of Things and Ideas 
 
 both 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. £§ 
 
 both fimple and complex, beyond all the Words 
 that are invented in any Language ; thence it be- 
 comes almoft necefiary that one Name fhould fig- 
 nify feveral Things. Let us but confider the two 
 Colours of Yellow and Blue, if they are mingled 
 together in any considerable Proportion they make 
 a Green : Now there may be infinite Differences of 
 the Proportions in the Mixture of Yellow and Blue ; 
 and yet we have only thefe three Words, Yellow, 
 Blue, and Green, to fignify all of them, at leaft by 
 one fingleTerm. 
 
 When I ufe the Word Shore, I may intend there- 
 by a Coajl of Land near the Sea, or a Drain to carry 
 vff. Water, or a Prop to fupport a Building ; and 
 by the Sound of the Word Porter, who can tell 
 whether I mean a Man who bears Burdens, or a 
 Servant who wails at a Nobleman s Gate? The 
 World is fruitful in the Invention of UtenfJs of 
 Life, and new Characters and Offices of Men, yet 
 Names intirely new arefeldom invented ; therefore 
 old Names are almofi: necelfarily ufed to fignify 
 new Things, which may occafion much Confufion 
 and Error in the receiving and communicating of 
 Knowledge. 
 
 Give me leave to propofe one fingle In fiance, 
 wherein all thefe Notes fhall be remarkably exem- 
 plified. It is the Word Bifliop, which in French 
 is called Evique ; upon which I would make thefe 
 feveral Obfervations. 1. That there is no natural 
 Connection between the (acred Office hereby Signi- 
 fied, and the Letters or Sound which fignify this 
 Office ; for both thefe Words, Evique or BiJIiop, 
 fignify the fame Office, though there is not one 
 Letter alike in them ; nor have the Letters which 
 compofe the Enghjh or the French Word any Thing 
 facred belonging to them, more than the Letters 
 that compofe the Words King or Soldier, 2. It 
 
 the 
 
50 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 the Meaning of the Word could be learned by its 
 Derivation or Etymology, yet the original Deri- 
 vation of Words is oftentimes very dark and un- 
 fearchable ; for wbo would imagine that each of 
 tbefe Words are derived from the Latin Epifcopus, 
 or the Greek Ema-no'n-og ? Yet in this Inftance we 
 happen to know certainly the true Derivation ; 
 the French being antiently writ Evefque, is bor- 
 rowed from the firft Part of the Latin Word ; and 
 the old Englifh Bifcop from the Middle of it. 
 3. The original Greek Word fignifies an Over- 
 looker, or one who Hands higher than his Fellows, 
 and overlooks them : It is a compound Word, 
 that primarily fignifies fenfible Ideas, tranflated to 
 fignify or include fcveral moral ox intelleclual Ideas ; 
 therefore all will grant that the Nature of the 
 Office can never be known by the mere Sound or 
 Senfe of the Word Overlooker. 4. I add farther, 
 the Word Biflwp or Epifcopus, even when it is thus 
 tranflated from a fenfible Idea, to include feve- 
 ral intelleclual Ideas, may yet equally fignify an 
 Overfeer of the Poor, an Infpeclor of the Cuftoms ; 
 a Surveyor of the Highways ; a Supervijor of the 
 Excife, &cl But by the Confcnt of Men, and the 
 Language of Scripture, it is appropriated to fig- 
 nify a f acred Office of the Church. 5. This very 
 Idea and Name, thus tranflated from Things fen- 
 fible, to fignify a fpiritual and facred Thing, con- 
 tains but one Property of it, namely, one that has 
 the Oversight, or Care over others : But docs not 
 tell us whether it includes a Care over one Church 
 or many ; over the Laity, or the Clergy. 8. 
 Thence it follows, that thofe who in the complex 
 Idea of the Word Bijfop include an Overfightover 
 the Clergy, or over a whole Diocefe of People, a 
 Superiority to Prcfbyters, a diflinct Power of Or- 
 dination, &c, EKMiS neeetiarily difagrec with thofe 
 
 who 
 
CH. IV.] , RIGHT USE OF REASON. 5! 
 
 who include in it only the Care of a (ingle Congre- 
 gation. Thus according to the various Opinions 
 of Men, this Word fignifies a Pope, a Galilean 
 BiJJiop, a Lutheran Superintendent, an Engl/Jh Pre- 
 late, a Paftor of a Jingle AJfembly, or a Prefiyter 
 or Elder, Thus they quarrel with each other per- 
 petually ; and it is well if any of them all have 
 hit precifely the Senfe of the facred Writers, , and 
 included juft the fame Ideas in it, and no others. 
 
 I might make all the fame Remarks on the 
 Word Church or Kirk, which is derived from 
 Kv£i8 otxog, or the Houfe of the Lord, contracted in- 
 to Kyrioick, which fome fuppofe to iignify an Af~ 
 Jembly vf Chrijlians, fome take it for all the World 
 that profejfes Chrijiianity, and fome make it to 
 mean only the Clergy ; and on thefe Accounts it 
 has been the occafion of as many and as furious 
 Controverfies as the Word Bijhop which was men- 
 tioned before. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 Of negative and pojitive Terms*. 
 
 FROM thefe and other Confiderations it will 
 follow, that if we could avoid Error in out 8 
 Purfuit of Knowledge, we muft take good Heed to 
 the Ufe of Words and Terms, and be acquainted 
 with the various Kinds of them. 
 
 •1. Terms are either pojitive or negative. 
 
 Negative Terms are fuch as have a little Word 
 or Syllable of denying joined to them, according 
 to the various Idioms of every < Language ; as 
 Unpleafant, Imprudent, Immortal, Irregular, Ignorant, 
 
 Infinite it 
 
52 lOGICK J OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 Infinite, Endlefs, Lifelefs, Deathlefs, Nonfenfe, Abyfs, 
 Anonymous, where the Prepofitions Urn, Im, In i 
 Non, A, An, and the Termination lefs, fignify a Ne- 
 gation, either in Englifh, Latin, or Greek. 
 
 Pofitive Terms are thofe which have no fiich 
 negative Appendices belonging to them, as Life, 
 Death, End, Senfe, Mortal. 
 
 But fo unhappily are our Words and Ideas link- 
 ed together, that we can never know which are 
 pofitive Ideas, and which are negative, by the 
 Word that is ufed to exprefs them, and that for 
 thefe Reafons. 
 
 \Ji, There are fome pofitive Terms which are 
 made to fignify a negative Idea ; as Dead is pro- 
 perly a Thing that is deprived of Life; Blind im- 
 plies a Negation or Privation of Sight ; Deaf a 
 Want of Hearing ; Dumb a Denial of Speech. 
 
 idly, There are alfo fome negative Terms which 
 imply pofitive Ideas, fuch as Immortal and Death- 
 lefs, which fignify ever-living, or a Continuance in 
 Life : Infolent, fignifies rude and haughty ; Indem- 
 nify, to keep fafe ; and Infinite, perhaps, has a po- 
 fitive Idea too, for it is an Idea ever-growing ; and 
 when it is applied to God, it Signifies his complete 
 Perfection. 
 
 odly, There are both pofitive and negative Terms, 
 invented to fignify the fame, inftcad of contrary 
 Ideas ; as Unhappy and Miferable, Sin lefs and Holy, 
 Pure and Undefiled, Impure and Filthy, Unkind and 
 Cruel, Irreligious and Profane, Unforgiving and Re- 
 vengeful, &c. and there is a great, deal of Beauty 
 and Convenience derived to any Language from 
 this Variety of Expreffion ; though fometimes it a 
 little confounds our Conceptions of Being and Not- 
 being, our pofitive and negative Ideas. 
 
 4<hly, I may add alfo, that there are fome Words 
 which are negative in their original Language, but 
 
 feem 
 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE GP REASON. 55 
 
 feem pofitive to an EngUJhman, becaufe the Nega- 
 tion is unknown ; an Abyfs, a Place without a Bot- 
 tom ; Anodyne, an eafing Medicine ; Amnefiy, an 
 Unremcmbrance or general Pardon; Anarchy , a 
 State without Government ; Anonymous, that is, 
 namelcfs ; Inept, that is, not fit ; Iniquity, that 
 is, Unrighteoufnefs ; Infant, one that cannot fpeak, 
 namely, a Child ; Injurious, not doing Juiiice or 
 Right! 
 
 The Way therefore to know whether any Idea 
 be negative or not, is to confider whether it pri- 
 marily imply the Ab fence of any pofitive Being or 
 Mode of Being; if it doth, then it is a Negation, 
 or negative Idea ; otherwife it is a pofitive one, 
 whether the Word that cxpreifcs it be pofitive or 
 negative. Yet after all, in many Cafes this is 
 very hard to determine, as in Amnefiy, Infinite, 
 Abyfs, which are originally relative Terms, but 
 they fignify Pardon, &c. which feem to be pofi- 
 tive. So Darknefs, Madnefs, Clown, are pofitive 
 Terms, but they imply the Want of Light, the 
 Want of Reafon, and the Want of Manners ; and 
 perhaps thefe may be ranked among the negative 
 Ideas. 
 
 Here note, That in the Rnglifii Tongue two ne~ 
 gative Terms are equal to one pofitive, and fignify 
 the fame Thing, as not unhappy \ fignifies happy ; 
 not immortal, fignifies mortal ; he is no imprudent 
 Man, that is, he is a Man of Prudence : But the 
 Senfe and Force of the Word in fuch a negative 
 Way of Expreffion, feem to be a little dimkiiihedi 
 
 sect: 
 
54 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of fimple and complex Terms. 
 
 II. r | AERMS are divided in to firnple or complex. 
 J^ A Jimple Term is one Word, a complex 
 Term is when more Words are ufed to fignify one 
 Thing. 
 
 Some Terms are complex in Words, but not in 
 Senfe, fuch is the fecond Emperor of Rome ; for it 
 excites in our Mind only the Idea of one Man, 
 namely, Augufius. 
 
 Some Terms are complex in Senfe, but not in 
 Words ; fo when I fay an Army, a Foreft, I mean 
 a Multitude of Men or Trees f and almoft all our 
 moral Ideas, as well as many of our natural ones, 
 are expreffed in this Manner ; Religion, Piety, Loy- 
 alty, Knavery, Theft, include a Variety of Ideas, 
 in each Term. 
 
 There are other Terms which are complex both 
 in Words and Senfe ; fo when I fay a fierce Dog, 
 or a pious Man, it excites an Idea, not only of thofe 
 two Creatures, but of their peculiar Characters 
 alfo. 
 
 Among the Terms that are complex in Senfe but 
 not in Words, we may reckon thofe iimple Terms 
 which contain a primary and a fecondary Idea in 
 them ; as when I hear my Neighbour fpeak that 
 which is not true, and I fay to him, this is not 
 true, or this is fa If; I only convey to him the 
 naked Idea of his Error ; this is the primary Idea : 
 But if I fay it is a Lie, the Word Lie carries alfo 
 a fecondary Idea in it, for it implies both the Falf- 
 hood of the Speech, and my Reproach and Cen- 
 fure of the Speaker. On the other Hand, if I fay 
 it is a Miflake, this carries alfo afecondary Idea with 
 
 it; 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. S 5 
 
 it ; for it not only refers to the Falfhood of his 
 Speech, but includes my Tendernefs and Civility 
 to him at the fame Time. Another Inftance may 
 be this ; when I ufe the Word, Incefl, Adultery, 
 and Murder, I convey to another not only the 
 primary Idea of thofe Actions, but I include alfo 
 the fecondary Idea of their Unlawfulnefs, and my 
 Abhorrence of them. 
 
 Note, \fl, Hence it comes to pafs, that among 
 Words which fignify the fame principal Ideas, fome 
 are clean and decent, others unclean ; fome chafe, 
 others ohfcene ; fome are kind, others are affronting 
 and reproachful, becaufe o£ the fecondary Idea which 
 Cuftom has affixed to them. And it is the Part of 
 a wife Man, when there is a NeceiTity of expreffirig 
 any evil Aclions, to do it either by a Word that has 
 a fecondary Idea of Kindnefs or Softnefs ; or a Word 
 that carries with it an Idea of Rebuke and Severity, 
 according as the Cafe requires : So when there is a 
 Neceffity of expreffing Things unclean or ohfcene, a 
 wife Man will do it in the moft decent Language, 
 to excite as few uncleanly Ideas as poflible in the 
 Minds of the Hearers. 
 
 Note, 'idly, In Length of Time, and by the 
 Power of Cuftom, Words fometimes change their 
 primary Ideas, as fhall be declared, and fometimes 
 they have changed their fecondary Ideas, though the 
 primary Ideas may remain : So Words that were 
 once chafte, by frequent Ufe grow ohfcene and un- 
 cleanly ; and Words that were once honourable may, 
 in the next Generation, grow mean and contemptible. 
 So the Word Dame originally fignified a Miftrefs 
 of a Family, who was a Lady, and it is ufed ftill 
 in the Englifh Law to fignify a Lady ; but in com- 
 mon Ufe nowadays it reprefents a Farmer s Wife, 
 or a Mifrefs of a Family of the lower Rank in the 
 Country. So thofe Words of Rabfliakeh, Ifa. xxxvi, 
 12. in our Tranflation, (Eat their own Dung, &c.) 
 
 E w 7 cre 
 
56 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 were doubtlefs decent and clean Language, when 
 our Tranilators wrote them, above a hundred Years 
 ago. The Word Eat has maintained its old fecon- 
 dary Idea and inoffenfive Senfe, to this Day ; but 
 the other Word in that Sentence has by Cuftom ac- 
 quired a more uncleanly Idea, and fhould now ra- 
 ther be changed into a more decent Term, and fo 
 it fhould be read in publick, unlefs it fhould be 
 thought more proper to omit the Sentence.* 
 
 For this Reafon it is that the Jewifh Rabbins 
 have fupplied other chaile Words in the Margin of 
 the Hebrew Bible, where the Words of the Text, 
 through Time and Cuftom, are degenerated, fo as 
 to carry any bafe and unclean fecondary Idea in them ; 
 and they read the Word which is in the Margin^ 
 which they call Keri, and not that which was writ- 
 ten in the Text, which they called Chetib, 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of Words common and proper, 
 
 III. JJ/ORDS and Names are either common or 
 proper. Common Names are fuch as ftand 
 for univerfal Ideas, or a whole Rank of Beings, 
 whether general or fpecial. Thefe are called Ap- 
 pellatives - 9 fo Flflt, Bird, Man, City, River, are 
 common Names; and fo are Trout, Eel, Lobfler, 
 for they all agree to many Individuals, and fome of 
 them to many Species : But Cicero, Virgil \ Bucepha- 
 lus, London,' Rome, Mtna, the Thames, are proper 
 Names, for each of them agrees only to one fmgh 
 Being. 
 
 * So in fome Places of the facred Hiftorians, where it is 
 written. Every one that pijjdh againjl the Watt, we fhould read, 
 fverj Male, 
 
 Note 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 5/ 
 
 Note here, firfi, That a^ro^rName may become 
 in fome Senfe common, when it hath been given to 
 ieveral Beings of the fame Kind ; fo - Ctefar, which. 
 was the proper Name of the firfT Emperor, Julius, 
 became alfo a common Name to all the following 
 Emperors. And Tea, which was the proper Name 
 of one fort of Indian Leaf, is now-adays, become 
 a common Name for many Infufions of Herbs, or 
 Plants, in Water; as Sage-Tea, Alehoof-Tea^ Limon- 
 Tea, &c. So Peter, Thomas, John, William, may 
 be reckoned common Names alfo, becaufe they 
 are given to many Perfons, itnlefs they are deter- 
 mined to fignify a fingle Perfon at any particular 
 Time or Place. 
 
 Note in the fecond Place, that a common Name 
 may become proper by CufTom, or by the Time^ 
 or Place, or Perfons that ufe it ; as in Great-Bri- 
 tain, when we fay the King, we mean our prefent 
 rightful Sovereign King George, who now reigns; 
 when we fpeak of the Prince, we intend his Royal 
 Highnefs George Prince of Wales : If we mention 
 the City, when we are near London, we generally 
 mean the City of London : when in a Country 
 Town, we fay the Parjon, or the Efquire, all the 
 Parifh knows who are the Angle Perfons intended 
 by it; fo when we are fpeaking of the Hiftory of 
 the New Teftament, and ufe the Words Peter, 
 Paul, John, we mean thofe three Apoitles. 
 
 Note, in the third Place, That any co?7imon~N&mQ 
 whatfoever is made proper, by Terms of Particu- 
 larity added to it, as the common Words Pope, 
 King, Horfe, Garden, Book, Knife, &c. are deiigned 
 to iignify a fingular Idea, w 7 hen we fay the prejhit 
 Pope ; the King of Great Britain ; the Horfe that 
 won the lajl Plate at Newmarket ; the Royal Garden 
 at Kenfingion ; this Book, that Knife, &c. 
 
 E 2 SECT, 
 
58 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I* 
 
 SECT. V. 
 Of concrete and abftracl Terms, 
 
 IV. Jj^rORDS or Terms are divided into abflracl 
 
 and concrete, 
 
 Abftracl Terms fignify the Mode or Quality of a 
 Being, without any Regard to the Subject, in which 
 it is ; as Whitenefs, Roundnefs, Length, Breadth, 
 Wifdom, Mortality, Life, Death, 
 
 Concrete Terms, while they exprefs the Quality, 
 do alfo either exprefs or imply, or refer to fome 
 Subject to which it belongs ; as white, round, long, 
 broad, wife, mortal, living, dead. But thefe are not 
 always Noun Adjeclives in a grammatical Senfe, 
 for a Fool, a Knave, a Philofopher, and many other 
 Concretes, are Subjlantives, as well as Knavery, 
 Folly, and Philofophy, which are the abflracl Terms 
 that belong to them. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Of Univocal and Equivocal Words, 
 
 V. JJ/ r ORDS and "Terms are either univocal or 
 
 equivocal, Univocal Words are fuch as fig- 
 nify but one Idea, or at leaft but one Sort of Thing ; 
 equivocal Words are fuch as fignify two or more 
 different Ideas, or different Sorts of Objecls. The 
 Words Book, Bible, F'ifJi, Houfe, Elephant, may be 
 called univocal Words ; for I know not that they 
 fignify any Thing elfe but thofe Ideas to which 
 they are generally affixed ; but Head is an equi- 
 vocal Word, for it fignifies the Head of a Nail, or 
 
 of 
 
 
CH. IV.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 5Q 
 
 of a Pin, as well as of an Animal : Nail is an equi- 
 vocal Word, it is ufed for the Nail of I he Hand, or 
 Foot, or for an Iron Nail to fatten any Thing. 
 Poft is equivocal, it is a Piece of Timber, or afwift 
 Mejfenger. A Church is a religious Affembly, or the 
 large fair Building where they meet; and fome- 
 tiines the fame Word means a Synod of Bifhops, or 
 of Prefbyters, and in fome Places it is the Pope and 
 a general Council. 
 
 Here let it be noted, that when two or more 
 Words fignify the fame Thing, as Wave and Bil- 
 low, Mead and Meadow, they are ufually cailed 
 fynonymous Words : But it feems very ftrange, that 
 Words, which are directly contrary to each other, 
 fhould fometimes reprefent almoft the fame Ideas ; 
 yet thus it is in fome few Inftances ; a valuable, or 
 an invaluable Bleffing ; a fliameful, or a fnamelefs 
 Villain ; a thick Skull, or a thin fiuWd Fellow, a 
 mere Paper Skull; a Man of a large Confcience, 
 little Confcience, or no Confcience ; a famous Rafcal, 
 or an infamous one. So uncertain a Thing is hu- 
 man Language, whofe Foundation and Support is 
 Cuftom ! 
 
 As Words fignifying the fame Thing are called 
 fynonymous, fo equivocal Words, or thofe which 
 iignify feveral Things, are called homonymous, or 
 ambiguous ; and when Perfons ufe fuch ambiguous 
 Words, with a Deiign to deceive, it is called Equi- 
 vocation. 
 
 Oxxx Jimple Ideas, and efpecially the fenfible Qua- 
 lities, furnifh us with a great Variety of equivocal 
 or ^ambiguous Words ; for thefe being the firft, and 
 moft natural Ideas we have, we borrow foine of 
 their Names, to Iignify many other Ideas, both 
 fimple and edmplex. The Word Sweet exprefles 
 the pleafant Perceptions of almoft every Sen fe ; 
 Sugar is fweet, but it hath not the fame Sweetnefs 
 
 E 3 as 
 
60 LOGICK ! OR, THE [PART I; 
 
 as Miifick ; nor hath Muiick the Sweetnefs of a 
 Rofe; and a fweet Profpecl differs from them all : 
 Islor yet have any of thefe the fame Sweetnefs as 
 Difcourfe, Counfel, or Meditation hath ; yet the 
 Royal Pfalmift faith of a Man, We took fweet 
 Counfel together ; and of God, My Meditation of 
 him Jhall be fweet. Bitter is alfo fuch an equivocal 
 Word ; there is bitter Wormwood ', there are bitter 
 Words, there are bitter Enemies, and a bitter cold 
 Morning. So there is a Sharpnefs in Vinegar, and 
 there is a Sharpnefs in Pain, in Sorrow, and in 
 Reproach ; there is a fharp Eye, a (harp Wit, and 
 a fharp Sword : But there is not one of thofe {even 
 Sharpneffes the fame as another of them, and a 
 fharp Eaft Wind is different from them all. 
 
 There are alfo Verbs or Words of Action, which 
 are equivocal, as well as Nouns or Names. The 
 Words to bear, to take, to come, to get, are fuffi- 
 cient Inftances of it ; as when we fay, to bear a 
 Burden, to bear Sorrow or Reproach, to bear a 
 Name, to bear a Grudge, to bear Fruit, or to bear 
 Children; the Word bear is u fed in very different 
 Senfes : And fo is the Word get, when we fay, to 
 get Money, to get in, to get off to get ready, to 
 get a Stomach, and to get a Cold, Sec. 
 
 There is alfo a great deal of Ambiguity in many 
 of the Englidi Particles ; as, but, before, befide, with, 
 without, that, then, there, for, forth, above, about, 
 «kc. of which Grammars and Dictionaries will fuf- 
 iicicntly inform us. 
 
 SECT, 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 6l 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 Parlous Kinds of equivocal Words, 
 
 IT would be endlefs to run through all the Va- 
 rieties of Words and Terms, which have differ- 
 ent Senfes applied to them ; I (hall only mention 
 therefore a few of the mo(t remarkable and moil 
 ufeful Diftinetions among them. 
 
 ly?, The firft Divifion of equivocal Words lets 
 us know that fome are equivocal only in their Sound 
 or Pronunciation ; others are equivocal only in Wri- 
 ting, and others, both in Writing and in Sound. 
 
 Words equivocal in Sound only, are fuch as 
 thefe ; the Rein of a Bridle, which hath the fame 
 Sound with the Reign of a King, or a Shower of 
 Rain ; but all three have different Letters, and 
 diftmcl fpelling. So Might, or Strength, is equi- 
 vocal in Sound, but differs in Writing from Mite, 
 a little Animal, or a finall Piece of Money. And 
 the Verb to write, has the fame Sound with Wright 
 a Workman, Right or Equity, and Rite or Cere- 
 mony ; but it is fpelled very differently in them all. 
 
 Words equivocal in Writing only, are fuch as 
 thefe ; to tear to pieces, has the fame Spelling with 
 a Tear : To lead, or guide, has the fame Letters as 
 Lead, the Metal : And a Bowl for Recreation, is 
 written the fame Way as a Bowl for Drinking ; but 
 the Pronunciation^for all thefe is different. 
 
 But thofe Words which are moft commonly and 
 juftly called equivocal, are fuch as are both writ- 
 ten and pronounced the fame Way, and yet have 
 different Senfes or Ideas belonging to them ; iiich 
 
 E 4 are 
 
62 # LQGICK : OR, THE [p£KT. I. 
 
 are all the InfTances which were given in the pre- 
 ceding Section. 
 
 Among the Words which are equivocal in Sound 
 only, and not in Writing, there is a large Field for 
 Peribns who delight in Jefts and Puns, in Riddles 
 and Quibbles, to fport themfelves. This Sort of 
 Words is alfo ufed by wanton Perfons to convey 
 lewd Ideas, under the covert of Expreffions capable 
 of a chafte Meaning, which are called double En- 
 iendres ; or when Perfons fpeak Faljliood with a 
 Defign to deceive, under the Covert of Truth, 
 Though it muft be confeffed, that all Sorts of 
 equivocal Words yield fufficient Matter for fuch 
 Purpofes. 
 
 There are many Cafes alfo, wherein an equivo- 
 cal Word is ufed, for the fake of Decency, to cover 
 afoul Idea : For the mod chafte and modevT, and 
 well-bred Perfons, having fometimes a NecefHty 
 to fpeak of the Things of Nature, convey their 
 Ideas in the moft inoftenlive Language by this 
 Means. And indeed, the mere Poverty of all 
 Languages makes it necefiary to ufe equivocal 
 Words upon many Occaflons, as the common Wri- 
 tings of Men, and even the Holy Book of God 5 
 fufriciently man i fed. 
 
 idly, Equivocal Words are ufually diftinguifh- 
 ed, according to their Original, into fuch, whole 
 various Senfes arifc from mere Chance or Occident, 
 and fuch as are made equivocal by Defign ; as the 
 Word Bear fignifies &fhaggy Beajl, and it fignifies 
 alfo to bear or carry a Burden ; this feems to be 
 the mere 'Effect of Chance: But if I call my Dog 
 Bear, becaufe he is fhaggy, or call one of the 
 Northern Conftellations by that Name, from a 
 fancied Situation of the Stars in the Shape of that 
 Animal, then it is by Defign that the Word is 
 made yet further equivocal, 
 
 But 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 63 
 
 But becaufe I think this common Account of 
 the Spring or Origin of equivocal Words is too 
 flight and imperfect, I (hall referve this Subject to 
 be treated of by itfelr^ and proceed to the third 
 Divifion. 
 
 3dly, Ambiguous, or equivocal Words, are fuch 
 as are fometimes taken in a large and general 
 Senfe, and fometimes in a Senfe more firicl and li- 
 mited, and have different Ideas affixed to them ac- 
 cordingly. Religion, or Virtue, taken in a large , 
 Senfe, includes both our Duty to God and our Neigh- 
 bour ; but in a more ftricl, limited, and proper 
 Senfe, Virtue fignifies our Duty tozvards Men, and 
 Religion our Duty to God. Virtue may yet be taken 
 in the ftricleft Senfe, and then it fignifies Power 
 or Courage, which is the Senfe of it in fdme Places 
 of the New Teftament. So Grace, taken in a 
 large Senfe, means the Favour of God, and all the 
 fpiritual Bleffings that proceed from it, (which is 
 a frequent Senfe of it in the Bible) but in a limited 
 Senfe it fignifies the Habit of Holinefs wrought in 
 us by Divine Favour, or a complex Idea of the 
 Chriflian Virtues. It may alio be given in the 
 ftricleit Senfe ; and thus it fignifies any Jingle 
 Chrifiian Virtue, as in 2 Cor.viu.6, 7- where it is 
 ufed for Liberality. So a City, in a ftricl, and pro- 
 per Senfe, means the Houjes inclofed within the. 
 Walls ; in a larger Senfe, it reaches to all the 
 Suburbs. 
 
 This larger and ftrlBer Senfe of a Word is ufed 
 in almoft all the Sciences, as, well as in Theology, 
 and in common Life. The Word Geography, 
 taken in a Jiricl Senfe, fignifies the Knowledge of 
 the Circles of the earthly Globe, and the Situation 
 of the various Parts of the Earth ; when it is taken 
 in a little larger Senfe, it includes the Knowledge 
 of the Seas alfo ; and in the largefi Senfe of all, 
 
 it 
 
$4 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 it extends to the various Cufloms, Habits, and 
 Governments of Nations. "When an Aflronomer 
 ufes the Word Star in its proper and Uriel Senfe, 
 it is applied only to the fixed Stars, but in a large 
 Senfe it includes the Planets alio. 
 
 This equivocal Senfe of Words belongs alfo to 
 many proper Names : So Afia, taken in the largefl 
 Senfe, is one Quarter of the World ; in a more 
 limited Senfe it fignifies Natolia, or the leffer Afia ; 
 but in the ftricleft Senfe it means no more than one 
 little Province in Natolia, where flood the Cities 
 of Ephefus, Smyrna, Sardls, &c* And this is the 
 moil frequent Senfe of it in the New Teflament. 
 Flanders and Holland, in a Uriel Senfe, are but two 
 fingle Provinces among the feventeen, but in a 
 large Senfe Holland includes feven of them, and 
 Flanders ten. 
 
 There are alfo fome very common and little 
 Words in all Languages, that are ufed in a more 
 exlenfive, or more limited Senfe ; fuch as all, every , 
 whatfoever, &c. When the Apoftle fays, all Men 
 have finned, and all Men muft die, all is taken in 
 its moil uniyerfal and extenfive Senfe, including 
 all Mankind, Rom. v. 1'2. When he appoints 
 Prayer to be made for all Men, it appears by the 
 following: Verfes, that he reftrains the Wprd all to 
 fignify chiefly all Ranks and Degrees of Men, 
 ] Tim. ii. ]. But when St. Paul fays, I pleafe all 
 Men in all Things, 1 Cor. x. 33. the Word all is 
 exceedingly limited, for it reaches no farther than 
 trot he pi en fed all thofe Men whom, he converfed 
 with in 0// Things that were lawfnl. 
 
 <U'hly, Equivocal Words are, in the fourth Place, 
 fliftinguifhed by their literal or figurative Senfe. 
 Words' are ufed in a proper or literal Senfe, when 
 they are defigned to fignify thofe Ideas for which 
 they were originally made, or to which they are 
 
 primarily 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. <33 
 
 primarily and generally annexed; but they are ufed 
 in a figurative or tropical Senfe, when they are 
 made to fignify fome Things, which only bear 
 either a Reference or a Refemblance to the primary 
 Ideas of them. So when two Princes contend by 
 their Armies, we fay they are at War, in a proper 
 Senfe ; but when we fay there is a War betwixt 
 the Winds and the Waves in a Storm, this is called 
 figurative, and the peculiar Figure is a Metaphor, 
 So when the Scripture fays, Riches make them/elves 
 Wings, and fly away as an Ragle toward Heaven, 
 the Wings and the Flight of the Eagle are proper 
 Expreffions ; but when Flight and Wings are ap- 
 plied to Riches, it is only by way of Figure and 
 Metaphor. So when a Man is faid to repent, or 
 laugh, or grieve, it is literally taken ; but when 
 God is faid to he grieved, to repent, or laugh, &c. 
 thefe are all figurative Expreffions borrowed from 
 a Refemblance to Mankind. And when the Words 
 Job or Rfther are ufed to fignify thofe very Perfons, 
 it is the literal Senfe of them ; but when they lig- 
 nify thofe two Books of Scripture, this is a. figura- 
 tive Senfe. The Names of Horace, Juvenal, and 
 Milton, are ufed in the fame Manner, either for 
 Books or Men. 
 
 When a Word, which originally fignifies any 
 particular Idea or Object, is attributed to feveral 
 other Objecls, not fo much by way of 'Refemblance, 
 but rather on the account of fome evident Reference 
 or Relation to the original Idea, this is fometimes 
 peculiarly called an analogical Word ; fo a found 
 or healthy Pulfe ; a found Dig ft ion ; found Sleep ; 
 are all fo called with Reference to a found and 
 healthy Conftitution ; but if you fpeak of found 
 Doclrine, or found Speech, this is by way of Refem- 
 blance to Health ; and the Words are metaphorical: 
 Yet many Times Analogy and Metaphor are ufed 
 
 pro- 
 
66 LOGICK \ OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 promifcuoufly in the fame Senfe, and not diftin- 
 
 guifhed. 
 
 Here note, That the Deflgn of metaphorical 
 Language, and Figures of Speech, is not merely to 
 reprefent our Ideas, hut to reprefent them with 
 Vivacity, Spirit, Affection, and Power; and though 
 they often make a deeper Impreflion on the Mind 
 of the Hearer, yet they do as often lead him into 
 a Miftake, if they are ufed at improper Times, 
 and Places. Therefore, where the Defign of the 
 Speaker or Writer is merely to explain, in/irucl, 
 and to lead into the Knowledge of naked Truth, 
 he ought for the moft Part to ufe plain and' proper 
 Words, if the Language affords them, and not to 
 deal much in figurative Speech. But this Sort of 
 Terms is ufed very profitably by Poets and Orators, 
 whofe bufinefs is to move, and perfuade, and work 
 on the Paffions, as well as on the Underflanding. 
 Figures are alio happily employed in proverbial 
 moral Sayings by the wifefi and the he/l of Men, to 
 imprefs them deeper on the Memory by fenfible 
 Images ; and they are often ufed for other valuable 
 Purpofes in the /acred Writings. 
 
 bthiy, I might adjoin another Sort of equivocal 
 Words ; as there are fome which have a different 
 Meaning in common Language, from what they 
 have in the Sciences ; the Word Pajfion fignifies the 
 receiving any Aclion in a large philofophical Senfe ; 
 in a more limited philofophical Senfe, it fignifies 
 any of the slffeclions of human Nature, as Love, Fear, 
 Joy, Sorrovj, &c. But the common People con- 
 fine it only to dinger : So the Word Simple, philo- 
 fophically, fignifies Single, but vulgarly it is ufed 
 for FooliJJi. 
 
 Gihly, Other equivocal Words are ufed fome- 
 times in an ab/olute Senfe, as when God is called 
 pgtfecJ ; which allows of no Defect ; and fome- 
 
 times 
 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. Qj 
 
 times in a comparative Senfe, as good Men are 
 oftentimes called perfecl in Scripture, in Compa- 
 nion of thofe who are much inferior to them in 
 Knowledge or Holinefs : But I have dwelt rather 
 too long upon this Subject already, therefore I add 
 no more. 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 The Origin or Caufes of equivocal Words. 
 
 NOW, that we may become more fkilful in 
 guarding ourfelves and others again ft the 
 Danger of Miftakes which may arife frorn equivo- 
 cal Words, it may not be amirs to conclude this 
 Chapter with a fhort Account of the various Ways 
 or Means whereby a Word changes its Significa- 
 tion, or acquires any new Senfe, and thus becomes 
 equivocal, efpecially if it keeps its old Senfe alfo. 
 
 1 . Mere Chance fometimes gives the fame Word 
 different Senfes ; as the Word Light fignifies a 
 Body that is not heavy ; and it alfo fignifies the 
 Effecl of Sun-BeaniS) or the Medium whereby we fee 
 Objecls : This is merely accidental, for there feems 
 to be no Connection between thefe two Senfes, nor 
 any Reafon for them. 
 
 1. Error and Miflake is another Occafion of 
 giving various Senfes to the fame Word.; as when 
 different Perfons read the Names of Priejl, Bifhop, 
 Church, Eafter, Sec. In the New Teftament, they 
 affix different ideas to them, for want of Acquaint- 
 ance with the true Meaning of the facred Writer; 
 though it it muft be confeffed, thefe various Senfes, 
 which might arife at fir ft from honeft Miftake, 
 may be culpably fupported ana* propagated by \n- 
 tereft, Ambition, Prejudice, and a Party-Spirit on 
 any Side, 
 
 3. Tnre 
 
6S LOGICK t OR, THE [PART I; 
 
 3 Time and Cufiom alters the Meaning of Word s> 
 Knave heretofore fignified a diligent Servant (Gna- 
 vus ;) and a Villain was an under Tenant to the 
 Lord of the Manor (Fillicus ;) but now both thefe 
 Words carry an Idea of Wickednefs and Reproach 
 to them. A Ballad once fignified a folemn and 
 facred Song> as well as one that is trivial, when 
 Solomons Song was called the Ballad of Ballads : 
 but now it is applied to nothing but trifling Verfe* 
 or comical Subjects. 
 
 4. Words change their Senfe- by Figures and 
 Metaphors, which are derived from fomz real Ana- 
 logy or Refemblance between feveral Things ; as 
 when Wings and Flight are applied to Riches, it 
 iignifies only, that the Owner may as eafily lofe 
 them, as he would lofe a Bird who flew away with 
 Wings. 
 
 And I think, under this Head we may rank thofe 
 Words, which Signify different Ideas, by a Sort of 
 an unaccountable far- fetch t Analogy, or diftant 
 Refemblance, that Fancy has introduced between one 
 Thing and another ; as when we fay, the Meat is 
 green, when it is half-roafted : We fpcak of airing 
 Linen by the Fire, when we mean drying or warm- 
 ing it : We call for round Coals for the Chimney* 
 wdien we mean large fquare ones : And we talk of 
 the Wing of a Rabbit , when we mean the Fore-leg : 
 The true reafon of thefe Appellations we leave to 
 the Criticks. 
 
 5. Words alfo change their Senfe by the fpecial 
 Occafion of ufing them, the peculiar Manner of 
 Pronunciation, the Sound of the Voice, the Motion 
 of the Face, or Geflures of the Body ; fo when an 
 angry Matter fays to his Servant, it is bravely done ! 
 or you are a fine Gentleman ! he means ju ft the con- 
 trary ; namely, it is very ill done ; you are a firry 
 Fellow ; It is one way of giving a fevere Reproach, 
 
 for 
 
€H. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 6g 
 
 for the Words are fpoken by way of Sarcafm, or 
 Irony. 
 
 6. Words are applied to various SenfeS, by new 
 Ideas appearing or arifing fader than new Words are 
 framed. So when Gunpowder was found out, the 
 Word Powder, which before fignined only Duft^ 
 was made then to fignify that Mixture or Compofi- 
 film, of Nitre, Charcoal, ckc. And the Name Canon, 
 which before fignified a Law or a Rule, is now alfo 
 given to a great Gun, which gives Laws to Na- 
 tions. So Footboys, who had frequently the com- 
 mon Name of Jack given them, were kept to turn 
 the Spit, or to pull off their Mailer's Boots; but 
 when Inftruments were invented for both thofe Ser ■ 
 vices, they were both called Jacks, though one 
 was of Iron, the other of Wood, and very different 
 in their Form. 
 
 7. Words alter their Significations according to 
 the Ideas of the various Perfons, Seels, or Parties 
 who ufe them, as we have hinted before ; fo when 
 a Papift ufes the Word Here ticks, he generally 
 means the Prot eft ants ; when a P rot eft ant ufes the 
 Word, he means any Perfons who are wilfully (and 
 perhaps contentioufly) obflinate in fundamental Er- 
 rors. When a Jew fpeaks of the true Religion, he 
 means the Inflitution of Mofes ; when a Turk men- 
 tions it, he intends the Doclrine of Mahomet ; but 
 when a Chriftian makes ufe of it, he defigns to fig- 
 nify Chriftia?iity, or the Truths and Precepts of the 
 Gofpel. 
 
 8. Words have different Significations accord- 
 ing to the Book, Writing, or Difcourfe in which 
 they Hand. So in a Treatife of Anatomy, a Foot 
 fignifies that Member in the Body of a Man : But 
 in a Book of Geometry or Menfuration, it fignifies 
 twelve Inches. 
 
 If I had room to exemplify moft of thefe Parti- 
 culars in one (ingle Word, I know not where la 
 
 choofe 
 
70 logick: OR; the [part i. 
 
 c >fe a fitter than the Word Sound, which feems, 
 as it were by Chance, to fignify three diftinct Ideas, 
 namely, Healthy, (from Sanus) as a found Body ; 
 No'ife (from Sonus) as a ^/ri// Sound ; and to found 
 the Sea (perhaps. from the French Sonde, a Probe, 
 or an Inftrument to find the Depth of Water.) 
 From thefe three, which I may call original Senfes, 
 various derivative Senfes arife; as found Sleep, found 
 Lwigs, found Wind and Limb, a found Heart, a 
 found. Mind, found Doclrine, a found Divine, found 
 Reafon, a found Cafk, found Timber, a foAind Re- 
 proof, to beat one fbundly, to found one's Meaning 
 or Inclination, and a Sound or narrow Sea ; turn 
 thefe all into Latin, and the Variety will appear 
 plain. 
 
 I confefs, fome few of thefe which I have men- 
 tioned as the different Springs of equivocal Words, 
 may be reduced in fome Cafes to the fame Origi- 
 nal : But it muft alfb be granted, that there may be 
 other Ways befides thefe whereby a Word comes 
 to extend its Signification, to include various Ideas, 
 and become equivocal. And though it is the Buli- 
 nefs of a Grammarian to purfue thefe Remarks 
 with more Variety and Particularity, yet it is alfo 
 the Work of -a Logician to give Notice of thefe 
 Things, left Darknefs, Confufion, and Perplexity, 
 be brought into our Conceptions by the means of 
 Words, and thence our Judgments and Reafonings 
 become erroneous. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
CH. V.] RIGHT USE OP REASON". 71 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 General Directions relating to our Ideas. 
 
 Di red ion I. TjVRNISH yourfehes with a rich Va- 
 riety of Ideas ; acquaint y our 1 elves 
 with Things ancient and modern , Things natural, 
 civil and religious; Things domeftic and national ; 
 Things of your native Land, and of foreign Coun- 
 ties; Things prefent, pad, and future; and above 
 all, be well acquainted with God and yourfelves ; 
 learn animal Nature, and the Workings of your 
 own Spirits. 
 
 Such a general Acquaintance with Things will 
 be of very great Advantage. 
 
 Thtjhfi Benefit of it is this : it will affift the 
 Ufe of Reafon in all its following Operations; it 
 will teach you to judge of Things aright, to argue 
 juftly, and to methodfe your Thoughts with Accu- 
 racy. When you (hall find feveral Things akin to 
 each other, and feveral different from each other, 
 agreeing in fome Part of their Idea, and difagree^ 
 ing in other Parts, you will range your Ideas in 
 better Order, you will be more eafily led into a 
 diftincl Knowledge of Things, and. will obtain a 
 rich Store of proper Thoughts and Arguments 
 upon all Oecafions. 
 
 You wiil tell me, perhaps, That you deflgn the 
 Study of the Law or Divinity ; and what Good 
 can Natural Philofophy or Mathematicks do you, or 
 any other Science, not directly fubordinate to your 
 chief Deflgn ? But let it be contidered, that all 
 Sciences have a Sort of mutual Connection ; and 
 Knowledge of all Kinds fits the Mind to reafon and 
 judge bettenconcerning any particular Subject. I 
 
 F have 
 
fri LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 Jiave known a Judge upon the Bench betray his 
 Ignorance, and appear a little confu fed in his Sen- 
 timents about a Cafe of fufpecled Murder brought 
 before him, for want of fome Acquaintance with 
 a?iimal Nature and Philofophy. 
 
 Another Benefit of it is this ; fuch a large and 
 general Acquaintance with Things will fecure you 
 from perpetual Admirations and Surprijes, and 
 guard you againft that Weaknefs of ignorant Per- 
 fons, who have never feen any Thing beyond the 
 Confines of their own Dwelling, and therefore they 
 wonder at almoft every Thing they fee ; every 
 Thing beyond the Smoke of their own Chimney, 
 and the Reach of their own Windows, is new and 
 ftrange to them. 
 
 A third Benefit of fuch an univerfal Acquaint- 
 ance with Things, is this ; it will keep yon from 
 being too pojitive and dogmatical, from, an Excefs 
 of Credulity and Unbelief, that is, a Readinefs to 
 believe, or to deny every Thing at 'flrft Hearing ; 
 when you fhall have often feen, that ft range and 
 uncommon Things, which often feemed incredi- 
 ble, are found to be true ; and Things very com- 
 monly received as true, have been found falfe. 
 
 The Way of attaining fuch an extenfive Treafure of 
 Ideas, is, with Diligence to apply yourfelf to read 
 the beft Books ; converfe with the moft knowing 
 and the wife ft of Men ; and endeavour to improve 
 by every Perfon in whofe Company you are; fuffer 
 ho Hour to pafs away in a lazy Idlenels, an im- 
 pertinent Chattering, or ufelefs Trifles : Vifit other 
 Cities and Countries when you have feen your own, 
 under the Care of one who can teach you to profit 
 by Travelling, and to make wife Obfervations ; 
 indulge a juft Curiofity in feeing the Wonders of 
 Art and Nature ; fearch into Things yourfelves, as 
 well as learn them from others; be acquainted with 
 
 Men 
 
CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASONV 73 
 
 Men as well as Books ; learn all Things as much 
 as you can at firft Hand; and let as many of your 
 Ideas as pofiibie be the Reprefcntations of Things, 
 and not merely the Reprefcntations of other Men's 
 Ideas: Thus your Soul, like fome noble Building, 
 fhall be richly furnifhed with original Paintings, 
 and not with mere Copies. 
 
 Direct IF. Ufe the mofi proper Methods to retain 
 that Treafure of Ideas which you have acquired; for 
 the Mind is ready to let many of them flip, unlefs 
 fome Pains and Labour be taken to fix them upon 
 the Memory. 
 
 And more efpccially let thofe Ideas be laid up 
 and preferved with the greater! Care, which are 
 molt directly fuited. either to your eternal Welfare, 
 as a Chriftian^ or to your particular Station and 
 Profeffion in this Life ; for though the former Rule 
 recommends an univerfal Acquaintance wi'hThings, 
 yet it is but a more general and fuperflcial Know* 
 ledge that is required or expected of any Man, in 
 Things which are utterly foreign to his own Bufi- 
 nefs : But it is neceflary you fhould have a more 
 particular and accurate Acquaintance with thofe 
 Things that refer to your peculiar Province and 
 Duty in this Life, or your Happinefs in another. 
 
 There are fome Perfons who never arrive at any 
 deep, folid, or valuable Knowledge in any Science, 
 or any Bufinefs of Life, becaufe they are perpetually 
 fluttering over the Surface of Things, in a curious 
 and wandering Search of infinite Variety ; ever 
 hearing, reading, or afking after fomething new, 
 but impatient of any Labour to lay up and pre- 
 ferve the Ideas they have gained ; Their Souls may 
 be compared to a Looking glafs, that wherefocver 
 you turn it, it receives the Images of all Objects, 
 but retains none. 
 
 Fa In 
 
74 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 In order to preferve your Treafure of Ideas, and 
 the Knowledge you have gained, pnrfue the follow- 
 ing Advices, efpecially in your younger Yeats. 
 
 J. Recollect every Day the Things you have feen, 
 or heard, or read, which may have made an Addi- 
 tion to your Underftanding : Read the Writings 
 of God and Men with Diligence and perpetual 
 Reviews : Be not fond of haftening to a new Book, 
 or a new Chapter, till you have well fixed and 
 eftablifhed in your Minds what was ufeful in the 
 laft : Make ufe of your Memory in this Manner, 
 and you will fenfibly experience a gradual Im- 
 provement of it, while you take care not to load 
 it to Excefs. 
 
 2. Talk over the Things which you have feen, 
 heard, or learnt, with Jome proper Acquaintance. 
 This wdll make a frefh Impreffion upon your Me- 
 mory ; and if you have no Fellow-Student at hand, 
 none of equal Rank with yourfelves, tell it oyer to 
 any of your Acquaintance, where you can do it 
 with Propriety and Decency ; and whether they 
 learn any Thing by it or no, your own Repetition 
 of it will be an Improvement to yourfelf : And 
 this Practice alfo will furnifh you with a Variety of 
 Words, and copious Language to exprefs your 
 Thoughts upon all Occafions. 
 
 3. Commit to Writing fome of the mod confi- 
 derable Improvements which you daily make, at 
 lead fuch Hints as may recall them again to your 
 Mind, when perhaps they are vanifhed and loft. 
 And here I think Mr. Locke % Method of Adver- 
 
 Jaria, or Common- Places, which he defcribes in the 
 End of the firft Volume of his Poflhumous Works, 
 is the beft ; ufing no learned Method at all, fet- 
 ting down Things as they occur, leaving a dif- 
 tincl Page for each Subject, and making an Index 
 to the Pages. 
 
CH. V.] KIGHT USE OF REASON. *] O 
 
 At the End of every Week, or Month, or Year, 
 you may review your Remarks for thefe Reaibns : 
 Firft, to judge of your own Improvement ; when you 
 fhall fi.nd that many of your younger Collections 
 are either weak and trifling; or if they are juft 
 and proper, yet they are grown now fo familiar to 
 you, that you will thereby fee your own Advance- 
 ment in Knowledge. And in the next Place, what 
 Remarks you find there worthy of your riper Ob- 
 fervation, you may note them with a marginal Star, 
 inftcad of tranfcribing them, as being worthy of 
 your fecond Year's Review, when the others are 
 neglected. 
 
 To fhorten fomething of this Labour, if the 
 Books which you read are your own, mark with a 
 Pen or Pencil, the moft confiderable Things in 
 them which you delire to remember. Thus you 
 may read that Book the fecond Time over with 
 half the Trouble, by your eye running over the 
 Paragraphs which your Pencil has noted. It is 
 but a very weak Objection againft this Practice to 
 fay, 1 ' Jhall fpoil my Book; for I perfuade myfelf, 
 that you did not buy it as a Bookfeller to fell it 
 again for Gain, but as a Scholar, to improve your 
 Mind by it; and if the Mind be improved, your 
 Advantage is abundant, though your Book yields 
 lefs Money to your Executors.* 
 
 Direct:. III. As you proceed both in Learning and 
 hi Life, make a wife Obfervation what are the Ideas, 
 
 * Note, This A-dvice of Writing, Marking, and Reviewing 
 your Marks, refers chiefly to thofe occajional Notions you meet 
 with either in Reading or in Converfation : but when you are 
 direttly 2.n& prcfejfedly purfuing any Subject of Knowledge in a 
 good Syftcm in your younger Years, the Syjlem itfelf is your 
 Common- pi ace-book, and muft be entirely reviewed. The fame 
 may be faid concerning any Treatife which clofely, fucciu&ly, 
 and accurately handles any particular Theme. 
 
 F 3 what 
 
76 LoGieK ; or, th£ [parti. 
 
 what the D'tfcourfes and the Parts of Knowledge that 
 have been more or lefs ufefid to your f elf or others. In 
 our younger Years, while we are furnishing our 
 Minds with a Treafure of Ideas, our Experience is 
 but fmall, and our Judgment weak ; it is therefore 
 impoffible at that Age to determine aright con- 
 cerning the real Advantage and Ufefidnefs of many 
 Things we learn. But when Age and Experience 
 have matured your Judgment, then you will gra- 
 dually drop the more vjelefs Part of your younger 
 Furniture, and be more folicitous to retain that 
 which is rnofi: neceflary for your Welfare in this 
 Life, or a better. Hereby you will come to make 
 the fame Complaint thatalmoft every learned Man 
 has done after long Experience in Study, and in 
 the Affairs of human Life and Religion: Alas I 
 how many Hours, and Days, and Months, have I 
 loft in purfidng Jome Parts of Learning, and in read- 
 ing fome Authors, which have turned to no other Ac- 
 count, hut to inform me that they were not worth my 
 Labour and Purfuit ! Happy the Man who has a 
 wife Tutor to conduct him through all the Sciences 
 in the firft Years of his Study ; and who has a pru- 
 dent Friend always at hand to point out to him, 
 from Experience, how much of every Science is 
 worth his Purfuit ! And happy the Student that is 
 \o wife as to follow fuch Advice. 
 
 Direct: IV. Learn to acquire a Government over 
 your Ideas and your Thoughts, that they may come 
 when they are called, and depart when they are bid- 
 den. There are fome Thoughts that rife and in- 
 trude upon us while we fbun them ; there are 
 others that fly from us, when we would hold and 
 fix them. 
 
 If the Ideas which you would willingly make the 
 Matter of your prefent Meditation are ready to fly 
 
 from 
 
GH. V.]- , RIG-HT USE OP REASONS $.? 
 
 from you, you mud be obftinate in the Purfuit of 
 them by an Habit of fixed Meditation ; you mult 
 keep your Soul to the Work, when it is ready to 
 ftart ailde every Moment, unlefs you will aban- 
 don yourfelf to be a Slave to every wild Imagina- 
 tion. It is a common, but it is an unhappy and 
 a fhamefu! Thing, that every Trifle that comes 
 acrofs the Senfes or Fancy mould divert us, that a 
 buzzing Fly fhould teaze our Spirits and fcatter 
 our beft Ideas : But we muft learn to be deaf to 
 and regardlefs of other Things, befides that which 
 we make the prefent Subject of our Meditation ; 
 And in order to help a wandering and fickle Hu- 
 mour, it is proper to have a Book or Paper in our 
 Hands, which has fome proper Hints of the Sub- 
 ject that we defign to purfue. We muft be refolute 
 and laborious, and fometimcs conflict with our- 
 felves, if we would be wife and learned. 
 
 Yet I would not be too fevere in this Rule : It 
 muft be confeiTed there are Seafons when the Mind, 
 or rather the Brain, is over-tired or jaded with Study 
 and Thinking ; or upon fome other Accounts ani- 
 mal Nature may be languid or cloudy, and unfit to 
 affift the Spirit of Meditation ; at fuch Seafons 
 (provided that they return not too often) it is bet- 
 ter fometimes to yield to the prefent Indifpofition : 
 for if Nature entirely refill, nothing can be done 
 to the Purpofc, at leaft in that Subject or Science. 
 Then you may think it proper to give yourfelf up 
 to fome Hours of Leifure and Recreation, or ufeful 
 Idlenefs ; or if not, then turn your Thoughts to 
 fome other alluring Subjecl, and pore no longer 
 upon the frfi, till fome brighter or more favour- 
 able Moments arife. A Student (hall do more in 
 one Hour, when all Things concur to invite him 
 to any fpecial Study, than in four Hours, at a dull 
 and improper Seafon, 
 
 F 4 I would 
 
73 LOGICK ! OB, THE [PART I. 
 
 I would alfo give the fame Advice, if fomeiv?i;z, 
 or worthlefs, or foolifh Idea, will croud itfelf into 
 your Thoughts ; and if you find that all your La- 
 bour and W refiling cannot defend yourfelf from 
 it, then divert the Importunity of that which of- 
 fends you by turning your Thoughts to fome en- 
 tertaining Subject, that may amufe you a little, and 
 draw you off from the troublefome and impofmg 
 Gueft ; and many a Time alfo in fuch a Cafe, 
 when the impertinent and intruding Ideas would 
 divert from prefent Duty, Devotion and Prayer 
 have been very fuccefsful to overcome fuch obfti- 
 nate Troubles of the Peace and Profit of the Soul. 
 
 If the natural Genius and Temper be too vola- 
 tile, fickle, and wandering, fuch Perfons ought in 
 a more efpecial Manner to apply themfclves to 
 mathematical Learning, and to begin their Studies 
 with Arithmetick and Geometry ; wherein new 
 Truths continually afifiiig to the Mind, out of 
 the plainefl and eafiefl Principles, will allure the 
 Thoughts with incredible Plcaiure to the Purfuit : 
 This will give the Student fuch a delightful Taile 
 of reafoning, as will fix his Attention to the fingle 
 Subject which he purfues, and by Degrees will cure 
 the habitual Levity of his Spirit : But let him not 
 indulge and purfue thefe ib far, as to negleel the 
 prime Studies of his defigned Profefiion. 
 
 
 CHAP. 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 79 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Special Rules to direcl our Conceptions of Things. 
 
 A Great Part of what has been already written 
 is defigned to lay a Foundation for thofe 
 Rules which may guide and regulate our Concep- 
 tions of Things ; this is our main Bufinefs and De- 
 iign in the Jirft Part of Logick. Now if we can 
 but direct our Thoughts to a juft and happy Man- 
 ner in forming our Ideas of Things, the other Ope- 
 rations of the Mind will not fo eafily be perverted ; 
 beeaufe moil of our Errors in Judgment, and the 
 Weaknels, Fallacy, and Miftakes of our Argu- 
 mentation, proceed from the Darknefs, Confufion, 
 Defect, or fome other Irregularity in our Concep- 
 tions. 
 
 The Rules to affift and direct our Conceptions 
 are thefe : 
 
 i. Conceive of Things clearly and dijlinclly in 
 their own Natures, 
 
 2. Conceive of Things completely in all their 
 
 Parts. 
 
 3. Conceive of Things comprehenfroely in all their 
 
 Properties and Relations. 
 
 A. Conceive of Things exienjively in all their 
 Kinds. 
 
 5. Conceive of Things orderly, or in a proper 
 
 Method. 
 
 SECT. 
 
60 LOGICK : ORj THE [t»ART I* 
 
 SFXT. I. 
 
 Of gaining clear and diftincl Ideas. 
 
 THE fir (I Rule is this, Seek after a clear and dif- 
 tincJ Conception of Things as they are in their 
 ozvn Nature, and do not content yourf elves with ohfcure 
 and conjufcd Ideas, where clearer are to he attained. 
 There are fome Things indeed whereof diftincl: 
 Ideas are fcarce attainable, they feem to furpafs the 
 Capacity of the Underftanding in our prefent State ; 
 fuch are the Notions of Eternal, Immenfe, Infinite, 
 whether this Infinity be applied to Number, as an 
 infinite Multitude ; to Quantity, as infinite Length, 
 or Breadth ; to Powers and Perfections, as Strength, 
 Wifdom, or Goodnefs, infinite, &c. Though 
 Mathematicians in their Way demonftrate feveral 
 Things in the Doclrine of Infinites, yet there are 
 flill fome infolvable Difficulties that attend the Ideas 
 of Infinity, when it is applied to Mind or Body \ 
 and while it is in Reality but an Idea ever growing, 
 we cannot have fo clear and diflincl: a Conception 
 of it as to fecure us from Miflakes in fome of our 
 Reafonings about it. 
 
 There are many other Things that belong to the 
 material World, wherein the fharpefi Philofophers 
 have never yet arrived at clear and diftincl: Ideas ; 
 fuch as the particular Shape, Situation, Contexture, 
 and Motion of the J mall Particles of Minerals, Me- 
 tals, Plants, &c. whereby their very Natures and 
 Eflences are diftinguifhed from each other. Nor 
 have we either Senfes or Infiruments fufficiently 
 nice and accurate to find them out. There arc 
 other Things in the World of Spirits wherein our 
 Ideas are very dark and confufed, fuch as their 
 Union with animal Nature, the Way of their acling on 
 
 material 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON - . 81 
 
 material Beings, and their Converfe with each other. 
 And though it is a laudable Ambition to fearch 
 what may be known of thefe Matters, yet it is a 
 vaft Hindrance to the Enrichment of our Under- 
 ftandings if we fpend too much of our Time and 
 Pains among Infinites and Unfearchables, and thofe 
 Things for the Inveftigation whereof we are not 
 furnifhed with proper Faculties in the prefent ; State. 
 It is therefore of great Service to the true Improve- 
 ment of the Mind, to diftinguifh well between 
 Knowables and Unknowables. 
 
 As far as Things are know ah J e by us, it is of ex- 
 cellent Ufe to accuftom ourfelves to clear and diftind 
 Ideas. Now among many other Occailons of the 
 Darknefs and Miftakes of our Minds, there are 
 thefe two Things which mod remarkably bring Con- 
 fufion into our Ideas. 
 
 1. That from our Infancy we have had the Ideas 
 of Things fo far connected with the Ideas of Words 9 
 that we often miftake Words for Things, we mingle 
 and confound one with the other. 
 
 2. From our youngeft Years we have been ever 
 ready to confider Things not fo much in their own 
 Natures, as in their various Refpecls to ourfelves, 
 and chiefly to our Senfes ; and we have alfo joined 
 and mingled the Ideas of fome Things, with many 
 other Ideas ,to which they were not akin in their own 
 Natures. 
 
 In order therefore to a clear and difiincl Know- 
 ledge of Things, we mufl: unclothe them of all thefe 
 Relations and Mixtures, that we may contemplate 
 them naked, and in their own Natures, and dif- 
 tinguifh the Subject that we have in View from all 
 other Subjects whatfoever : Now to perform this 
 well, we mufl: here confider the Definition of Words, 
 and the Definition of Things. 
 
 SECT. 
 
82 logick : or, the [part ?. 
 
 SECT. If. 
 
 Of the Definition of Words or Names. 
 
 IF we could conceive of Things as Angels and 
 unbodied Spirits do, without involving them 
 in thofe Clouds which Words and Language throw 
 upon them, we mould feldom be in Danger of fiich 
 Mifiakes as are perpetually committed by us in the 
 prefent State ; and indeed it would be of unknown 
 Advantage to us to accuftom ourfelves to form 
 Ideas of Things without Words, that we might know 
 them in their own proper Natures. But (ince wc 
 mud ufe Words, both to learn and to communi- 
 cate moft of our Notions, we fhould doit with jud 
 .Rules of Caution. I have already declared in Part, 
 how often and by what Means our Words become 
 the Occafion of Errors in our Conceptions of 
 Things. To remedy fuch Inconveniencies, wc 
 muft get an exact Definition of the Words wc make 
 ufe of, that is, we muft determine precifely the 
 Senfe of our Words, which is called the Definition 
 of the Name. 
 
 Now a Definition of the Name being only a De- 
 claration in what Senfe the Word is ufed, or what 
 Idea or Object we mean by it, this may be ex- 
 prefTed by any one or more of the Properties, 
 Effects, or Circumftanccs of that Object which do 
 fufficiently diftinguifh it from other Objects : As 
 if I were to tell what I mean by the Word Air, I 
 may fay, it is that thin Matter which we breathe in 
 and breathe out continually ; or it is that fluid Body 
 in which the Birds fiy a little above the Earth ; or 
 it is that invifible Matter which fills all Places near 
 the Rarih y or which immediately ericompaffcs the Globe 
 
CH. VI*] EIGHT USE OF REASON. 83 
 
 of Earth and Water. So if I would tell what I 
 mean by Light, I would fay it is that Medium zvhere- 
 by we fee the Colours and Shapes of Things ; or it is 
 that which diftinguiJJies the D,ay from the Night, If 
 I were afked what I mean by Religion, I would 
 an Aver, it is a Colleclion of all our Duties to God, 
 if taken in a ftricl and limited Senfe ; but if taken 
 in a large Scnfe, it is a Colleclion of all our Duties 
 both to God and Man. Thefe are called the Defi- 
 nitions of the Name. 
 
 Note, In defining the Name there is no Necef- 
 fity that we fhould be acquainted with the intimate 
 EfTence or Nature of the Thing ; for any Manner 
 of Description that will but fufficiently acquaint an- 
 other Perfon what we mean by fuch a Word, is a 
 fufficient Defnitio?ifor the Name. And on this Ac- 
 count a fynonymous Word, or a mere Negation of 
 the contrary, a Tranflation of the Word \x\to another 
 Tongue, or a Grammatical Explication of it, is fome- 
 times fufficient for this Purpofe ; as if one would 
 know what I mean by a Sphere, I tell him it is a 
 Globe ; if he afk what is a Triangle, it is that which 
 has three dingles ; or an Oval is that which has the 
 Shape of an Egg. Dark is that which has no Light ; 
 Afihma is a Difficulty of Breathing ; a Diaphor click 
 Medicine, or a Sudorifick, is fomething that will 
 provoke Sweating ; and an Infolveut, is a Man that 
 cannot pay his Debts, 
 
 Since it is the Defign of Logick, not only to 
 affift us in Learning but in Teaching alfo, it is ne- 
 ceflary that we fhould be furnifhed with fome parti- 
 cular Directions relating to the Definition of Names, 
 both in Teaching and Learning. 
 
 SECT. 
 
84 LOGICK t OR, THE ['PART I. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Directions concerning the Definition of Names. 
 
 Direct. I. TTAVE a Care of mailing ufe of mere 
 Words, injlead of Ideas, that is, fuch 
 Words as have no Meaning, no Definition belong- 
 ing to them : Do not always imagine that there are 
 Ideas wherefoever there are Names : For though 
 Mankind hath fo many Millions of Ideas, more 
 than they have Names, yet fo foolifh and lavifh are 
 we, that too often we ufe fome Words in mere 
 Wafte, and have no Ideas for them ; or at leafl, 
 our Ideas are fo exceedingly (battered and confut- 
 ed, broken and blended, various and unfettled, 
 that they can fignify nothing toward the Improve- 
 ment of the Underftanding. You will find a great 
 deal of Keafon for this Remark, if you read the 
 fop'ifli Schoolmen, or the myftic Divines. 
 
 Never reft fatisfied therefore with mere Words 
 which have no Ideas belonging to them, or at lead 
 no fettled and determinate Ideas. Deal not in fuch 
 empty Ware, whether you are a Learner or a 
 Teacher ; for hereby fome Perfons have made 
 themfclves Rich in Words, and learned in ttteir 
 own Eftcem ; whereas in Reality, their Under- 
 ftandings have been poor, and they knew nothing. 
 
 Let me give, for Inftance, fome of thofe Writ- 
 ers or Talkers who deal much in the Words Na- 
 ture, Fate, Luck, Chance, Perfection, Power, Life, 
 Fortune, Inftincl, &c. and that even in the moft 
 calm and inftruclive Parts of their Difcourfe ; 
 though neither they thcmfelves nor their Hearers 
 have any fettled Meaning under thofe Words ; and 
 
 thus 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 85 
 
 thus they build up their Reafonings, and infer what 
 they pleafe, with an Ambition of the Name of 
 Learning, or of .-fublime Elevations in Religion ; 
 whereas in Truth, they do but amufe themfelves 
 and their Admirers with /welling Words of Vanity r , 
 under/landing neither what they /ay, nor whereof 
 they affirm. But this Sort of Talk was reproved of 
 old by the two chief Apoftles, St. Peter, and St 
 Paul, I Tim. i. 7. and 2 Pet. ii. 18. 
 
 When Pretenders to Philofophy or good Senfe 
 grow fond of this Sort of Learning, they dazzle 
 and confound their weaker Hearers, but fall un- 
 der the Neglect of the Wife. The Epicureans are 
 guilty of this Fault, when they afcribe the Forma- 
 tion of the World to Chance : The Ariflotelians, 
 when* they fay, Nature ahlmrs a Vacuum: The 
 Stoics, when they talk of Fate, which is fuperior 
 to the Gods : And the Gamefters, when they curfe 
 their Ill-luck, or hope for the Favours of Fortune. 
 Whereas, if they would tell us, that by the Word 
 Nature they mean the Properties 0/ any Being ', or 
 the Order 0/ Things efiablijhed at the Creation ; that 
 by the Word Fate, they intend the Decrees 0/ God, 
 or the necef/ary Conneclion and Influence 0/ /econd 
 Cau/es and Effecls ; if by the Word Luck or Chance 
 they fignify the ab/olute Negation 0/ any Determi- 
 nate Cau/e, or only their Ignorance 0/ any /uch 
 Cau/e, we (hould know how to converfe with 
 them, and to affent to, or diffent from their Opi- 
 nions. But while they flutter in the Dark, and 
 make a Noife with Words which have no fixed 
 Ideas, they talk to the Wind, and never can 
 profit. 
 
 I would make this Matter a little plainer dill, 
 by Inftances borrowed from the Perifaietick Phi- 
 lofophy, which was once taught in all the Schools. 
 The Profeflbr fancies he has ailigned the true Rea- 
 
 ibn 3 
 
86 LOGICK : OR, THE . [PART r. 
 
 fon, why all heavy Bodies fetid downward, why 
 Amber will draw Feathers or Straws, and the Load- 
 Jlone drazv Iron, when he tells you, that this is 
 done by certain gravitating and attractive Quali- 
 ties, which proceed from the fubjlantial Forms of 
 thofe various Bodies. He imagines that he has 
 explained why the Loadflones * North Pole JJiall 
 repel the North End of a magnetick Needle, and at- 
 tract the South, when he affirms that this is done 
 by its Sympathy with one End of it, and its Anti- 
 pathy againft the other End. Whereas in Truth, 
 all thefe Names of Sympathy, Antipathy, fubftanlial 
 Forms and Qualities, when they are put for the 
 Caufes of thefe Effects in Bodies, are but hard 
 Words, which only exprefs a learned and pompous 
 Ignorance of the true Caufe of natural Appear- 
 ances ; and in this Senfe they are mere Words 
 without Ideas, 
 
 This will evidently appear, if one afk me, Why 
 a concave Mirror or convex Glafs will burn Wood in 
 the Sun-beams, or why a Wedge will cleave it ? 
 And I fhould tell him, it is by an uflorious Qua- 
 lity in the Mirror or Glafs, and by a cleaving 
 Power in the Wedge, arifing from a certain un- 
 known fubjlantial Form in them, whence they de- 
 rive thefe Qualities ; or if he fhould afk me, Why 
 a Clock flakes, and points to the Hour? and I fhould 
 fay, it is by an indicating Form and Sonorifick Qua- 
 lity ; whereas I ought to tell him how the Sun- 
 beams are collected and united by a Burning-Glafs ; 
 whence the mechanical Force of a Wedge is de- 
 rived ; and what are the Wheels and Springs, the 
 Pointer, and Hammer, and Bell, whereby a Clock 
 gives Notice of the Time, both to the Eye and 
 
 the 
 
 * Note, Some Writers cull that the South-Pole of a Load-ftone 
 which attra&s the South-End of the Needle ; but I choolc to 
 follow thoic who call it the North-pole. 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 87 
 
 the Ear. But thefe ujiorious and cleaving Pozvers, 
 fonorous and indicating Forms and Qualities, do 
 either teach the Inquirer nothing at all but what 
 he knew before, or they are mere Words without 
 Ideas *. 
 
 And there is many a Man in the vulgar and in 
 the learned World, who imagines himfelf deeply 
 fkilled in the Controverfies of Divinity, whereas he 
 has only furnifhed himfelf with a Parcel of fcho- 
 laftick or myftick Words, under fome of which the 
 Authors themfelves had no juft Ideas ; and the 
 Learner when he hears, or pronounces them, hath 
 fcarce any Ideas at all. Such Sort of Words fome- 
 times have become Matters of immortal Contention, 
 as though the Gofpel could not ftand without them ; 
 and yet the Zealot perhaps knows little more of 
 them than he does of Shibboleth, or Higgaion, Selah> 
 Judges xii. 6. Pfal. ix. 10. 
 
 Yet here I would lay down this Caution, that 
 there are feveral Objedls of which we have not a 
 clear and difnncl Idea, much lefs an adequate or 
 comprehend ve one, and yet we cannot call the 
 Names of thefe Things, Words without Ideas ; 
 
 G fuch 
 
 * It may be ohjefied here, "And what does the modern Phi- 
 •I lofopher, with all his Detail of mathematical Numbers, and 
 " Diagrams, do more than this toward the Solution of thefe 
 " Difficulties ? Does he not defcribe Gravity by a certain un- 
 " bwnjon Force, <whereby Bodies tend doavmvard to the Center f 
 ** Hath he found the certain and mechanical Reafons of At-* 
 " fraction, Magnetifm, &e. ? I anfvjer, That the Moderns 
 have found a thoufand Things by applying Mathematicks to 
 Natural Philofophy, which the Antients were ignorant of; and 
 when they ufe any Names of this Kind, vix. Gravitation, At- 
 traction, &c. they ufe them only to fignify, that there are fuch 
 Effects and fuch Caufes, with a frequent Confeffion of their 
 Ignorance of the true Springs of them : They do not pretend to, 
 make thefe Words ftand for the real Caufes of Things, as though 
 they thereby affigned the true philoibphical Solution of thefe 
 Difficulties ; for in this Senfe they will lull be Wards without 
 Ideas, whether in the Mouth of an old Philofopher or a ncvj 
 
88 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 fuch are the Infinity 'and Eternity of God himfelf, 
 and Union of our own Soul and Body, the Union of 
 the divine and ■ * human Natures in Jefus Chrifl, the 
 Operation of the Holy Spirit on the Mind of Man, &c. 
 Thefe ought not to be called Words without Ideas, 
 for there is fufEcient Evidence for the Reality and 
 Certainty of the Exiftence of their Objects ; though 
 there is fome Confufion in our cleared Concep- 
 tions of them ; and our Ideas of them, though 
 imperfect, are yet fufficient to converfe about 
 them, fo far as we have Need, and to determine 
 fo much as is neceffary for our own Faith and 
 Practice. 
 
 Direct. II. Do not fuppofe that the Natives or 
 EJfences of Things always differ from one another, 
 as much as their Names do. There are various 
 Purpofes in human Life, for which we put very 
 different Names on the fame Thing, or on Things 
 whofe Natures are near akin ; and thereby often- 
 times, by making a new nominal Species, we are 
 ready to deceive ourfelves with the Idea of another 
 real Species of Beings : And thofe whofe Under- 
 standings are led away by the mere Sound of 
 Words, fancy the Nature of thofe Things to be very 
 different whofe Names are fo, and judge of them 
 accordingly. 
 
 I may borrow a remarkable Inftance for my 
 Purpofe almoft out of every Garden, which con- 
 tains a Variety of Plants in it. Moft or all Plants 
 agree in this, that they have a Root, a Stalk, 
 Leaves, Buds, Bloffoms, and Seeds : But the Gar- 
 dener ranges them under very different Names, as 
 though they were really different Kinds of Beings, 
 merely becaufe of the different Ufe and Service to 
 which they are applied by Men ,: As for Inftance, 
 thofe Plants whofe Roots are eaten, ihall appro- 
 priate 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REAS6N. 8Q 
 
 priate the Name of Roots to themfelves ; fa cb are 
 Carrots, Turnips, RadiJJies, &b. If the Leaves are 
 of chief Ufe to us, then we call them Herbs ; as 
 Sage, Mint, Thyme : If the Leaves are eaten raw, 
 they are termed Sallad ; as Lettuce, Pur/lain:' If 
 boiled they become Pot-herbs ; as Spinage, Cole- 
 worts ; and fome of thofe fame Plants, which are 
 Pot-herbs in one Family, are Sallad in another. 
 If the Buds are made our Food, they are called 
 Heads, or Tops \ fo Cabbage Heads, Heads of Af- 
 paragus and Artichokes. If the Blojfom be of mofl 
 Importance, we call it a Flower ; fuch are Daijies, 
 Tulips, and Carnations, which are the mere Blof- 
 foms of thofe Plants. If the Hujk or Seeds are 
 eaten, they are called the Fruits of the Ground, 
 as Peas* Beans, Strawberries, &c. If any Part of 
 the Plant be of known and common Ufe to us in 
 Medicine, we call it a phyfical Herb, as Carduus 9 
 S curvy -grajs ; but if we count no Part ufcful, we 
 call it a Weed, and throw it out of the Garden ; 
 and yet perhaps our next Neighbour knows fome 
 valuable Property and Ufe of it; he plants it in his 
 Garden, and gives it the Title of an Herb or a 
 Flower. You fee here how fmall is the real Difc' 
 tinction of thefe feveral Plants, confidered in their 
 general Nature as the lejjer Vegetables : Yet what 
 very different Ideas we vulgarly form concerning 
 them, and make different Specks of them, chiefly 
 becaufe of the different Names given them. 
 
 Now when Things are fet in this clear Light, 
 it appears how ridiculous it would be for two Per- 
 fons to contend, whether Dandelion be an Herb or 
 a Weed ; whether it be a Pot-herb or Sallad ; when 
 by the Cuftom or Fancy of different Families, this 
 one Plant obtains all thefe Names according to 
 the feveral Ufes of it, and the Value that is put 
 •upon it. 
 
 G 2 Note 
 
90 logick: ok, the [part j. 
 
 Note here, that I find no manner of Fault with 
 the Variety of Names which are given to feveral 
 Plants, according to the various Uies we make of 
 them. But I would not have our Judgments im- 
 pofed upon hereby, to think that thefe mere nomi- 
 nal Species, viz. Het'bs, Sallad, and Weeds , become 
 three really different Species of Beings, on this Ac- 
 count, that they have different Names and Ufes. 
 But I proceed to other Infiances. 
 
 It has been the Cuftom of Mankind, when they 
 have been angry with any Thing, to add a new ill 
 Name to it, that they may convey thereby a hate- 
 ful Idea of it, though the Nature of the Thing ftill 
 abides the fame. So the Papifls call the Prote/lants, 
 Hereticks : A profane Perfon calls a Man of Piety , 
 a Prectfian: And in the Times of the Civil War in 
 the laft Century, the Royalijls called the Parlia* 
 mentarians, Fanaticks, Roundheads, and Sectaries*. 
 And they in Requital called the Royalijls, Malig- 
 nant s : but the Partizans on each Side were really 
 neither better nor worfe for thefe Names. 
 
 Is has alfo been a frequent Practice, on the other 
 Hand, to put new favourable Names upon ill Ideas, 
 on purpofe to take off the Odium of them. But 
 notwithstanding all thefe flattering Names and 
 Titles, a Man of profufe Generofity is but a Spend- 
 thrift ; a natural Son is a Bajlard flill ; a Gallant 
 is an Adulterer ; and a Lady of Pleafure is a 
 Whore. 
 
 Direcl. III. Take heed of believing the Nature 
 and EJfence of two or more Things tq be certainly the 
 fame, becaufe they may have the fame Name given 
 them. This has been an unhappy and fatal Occa- 
 fion of a thoufand Miftakes in the natural, in the 
 civil, and in the religious Affairs of Life, both 
 amongft the Vulgar and the Learned. I fhall give 
 
 two 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON". 9*1 
 
 two or three Inftances, chiefly in the Matters of 
 Natural Phdofphy, having hinted feveral Dangers 
 of this Kind relating to Theology, in the foregoing 
 Difcourfe concerning equivocal Words. 
 
 Our elder Philofophers have generally made ufe 
 of the Word Soul to iignify that Principle where- 
 by a Plant grows, and they call it the vegetative 
 Soul: The Principle of the animal Motion of a 
 Brute has been likewife called a Soul, and we have 
 been taught to name it the fenji 'five Soul : They 
 have alio given the Name Soul to that fuperior 
 Principle in Man, whereby he thinks, judges, rea- 
 fons, &c. and though they diflinguifhed this by 
 the honourable Title of the rational Soul, yet in 
 common Difcourfe and Writing we leave out the 
 Words vegetative .fenfitive, and rational-, and make 
 the Word Souliervc for all thefe Principles: Thence 
 we are led early into this Imagination, and there 
 is a Sort offpirilual Being in Plants and in Brutes 9 
 like that in Men. Whereas if we did but abftracl 
 and feparate thefe Things from Words, and com- 
 pare the Caufe 6f Growth in a Plajit, with the 
 Caufe of Reafoning in Man, (without the Word 
 Smd) we mould never think that thefe two Prin- 
 ciples were at all like one another ; nor mould we 
 perhaps fo eaflly and peremptorily conclude, that 
 Brutes need an intelligent Mind to perform their 
 animal Actions. 
 
 Another Inftance may be the Word Life, which 
 being attributed to Plants, to Brutes, and to Men, 
 and in each of them afcribed to the Soul, has very 
 eafily betrayed us from our Infancy into this Mis- 
 take, that the Spirit or Mmd, or thinking Principle, 
 in Man, is the Spring of vegetative and animal Life 
 to his Body : Whereas it is evident, that if the 
 Spirit or thinking Principle of Man gave Life to his 
 animal Nature, the way to fave Men from dying 
 
 G 3 would 
 
9^ logick: or, this [parti, 
 
 would not be to ufe Medicines, but to pcrfuade 
 the Spirit to abide in the Body. 
 
 I might derive a third Instance from the Word 
 Heat, which is ufed to fignify the Senfation we 
 have when we are near the Fire, as well as the 
 Caufe of that Senfation, which is in the Fire itfelf ; 
 and thence we conclude from our Infancy, that 
 there is a Sort of Heat in the Fire refembling our own 
 Senfation, or the Heat which we feel : Whereas in 
 the Fire there is nothing but little Particles of 
 Matter, of fuch particular Shapes, Sizes, Situa- 
 tions, and Motions, as are fitted to imprefs fuch 
 Motion on our Flefh or Nerves as excite the Senfe 
 of Heat. Now if this Caufe of our Senfation in 
 the Fire had been always called by a diftinct Name, 
 perhaps we had not been fo rooted in this Miftake, 
 that the Fire is hot with the fame Sort of Heat that 
 vje feel. This will appear with more Evidence, 
 when we confider that we are fecure from the fame 
 Miftake where there have been two different Names 
 allotted to our Senfation, and to the Caufe of it ; 
 as, we do not fay, Fain is in the Fire that burns 
 us, or in the Knife that cuts and wounds us. ; for 
 we call it hurtling in the Fire^ cutting in the Kwfe, 
 and Fain only when it is in ourfelves. 
 
 Numerous Inftanccs of this Kind might be de- 
 rived from the Words fweet, four, loud, flirill, and 
 almoft all the fenfible Qualities, whofe real Natures 
 we miftake from our very Infancy, and we are 
 ready to fuppofe them to be the fame in us, and 
 in the Bodies that caufe them ; partly becaufe the 
 Words which fignify our own Senfations are ap- 
 plied alfo to fignify thofe unknown fhapes and Mo- 
 tions of the little Corpufcles, which excite and 
 caufe thofe Senfations. 
 
 Direct 
 
CH. VI.]' RIGHT USE OP REASON. Q3 
 
 Direct. IV. In Converfation or Reading he diligent 
 to find out the true Senfe, or diflincl Idea, which the 
 Speaker or Writer affixes to his Words, and efpecially 
 to thofe Words which are the chief Sub j eel of his Dif- 
 courfe. As far as poffible take heed, left you put 
 more or fewer Ideas into one Word, than the Per- 
 fon did when he wrote or fpoke ; and endeavour 
 that your Ideas of every Word may be the fame as 
 his were : Then you will judge better of what he 
 fpeaks or writes. 
 
 It is for want of this that Men quarrel in the 
 Dark ; and that there are fo many Contentions in 
 the feveral Sciences, and efpecially in Divinity. 
 Multitudes of them arife from a Miftakeofthe 
 true Senfe or complete Meaning in which Words 
 are ufed by the Writer or Speaker ; and hereby 
 fometimes they Je em to agree, when they really differ 
 in their Sentiments; and fometimes they feemto 
 differ when they really agree. Let me give an In- 
 fiance of both. 
 
 When one Man by the Word Church mall un- 
 derftand all that believe in Chrifl ; and another by 
 the Word Church means only the Church of Rome ; 
 they may both afTent to this Proportion, There is 
 no Salvation cut of the Church, and yet their inward 
 Sentiments may be widely different. 
 
 Again, if one Writer mall affirm that Virtue added 
 to Faith is fufficient to make a Chrifiian, and another 
 fhall as zealoufly deny this Proportion, they feem 
 to differ widely in Words, and yet perhaps they 
 may both really agree in Sentiment : If by the 
 Word Virtue, the affirmer intends our whole Duty 
 to God and Man ; and the t)enier by the Word 
 Virtue means only Courage, or at mod our Duty 
 towards our Neighbour, without including in the 
 Idea of it the Duty which we owe to God. 
 
 G 4 Many 
 
94 LOGICK : Oil, TH2 [pAKT I. 
 
 Many fuch Sort of Contentions as thefe are, if 
 traced to their Original, will be found to be mere 
 Logomachies •, or Strifes and Quarrels about Names 
 and Words, and vain JaftgUngs, as the Apoftle calls 
 them in his firft Letter of Advice to Timothy. 
 
 In order therefore to attain clear and difimel Ideas 
 of what we read and hear, we muft fearch the Senfe 
 of Words ; we muft confider what is the Original 
 and Derivation in our own or foreign Languages ; 
 what is their common Senfe amongft Mankind, or 
 in other Authors, efpecially fuch as wrote in the 
 fame Country, in the fame Age, about the fame 
 Time, and upon the fame Subjects : We mud 
 confider in what fenfe the fame Author nfes any 
 particular Word or Phrafc, and that when he is 
 difconrting on the fame Matter, and efpecially 
 about the fame Parts or Paragraphs of his Writing : 
 We mult confider whether the Word be ufed in a 
 ftrict and limited, or in a large and general Senfe ; 
 whether in a literal, in a figurative, or in a pro- 
 phetick Senfe ; whether it has any fecondary Idea 
 annexed to it befides the primary or chief Senfe. 
 We muft inquire farther, what is the Scope and 
 Defign of the Writer ; and what is the Connection 
 of that Sentence with thofe that go before it, and 
 thofe which follow it. By thefe and other Methods 
 we are to Search out the Definition of 'Names ■, that 
 is, the true Senfe and Meaning in which any Au- 
 thor or Speaker ufes any Word, which may be the 
 chief Subject of Difcourfe, or may carry any con- 
 fiderable Importance in it. 
 
 Direct. V. When we communicate our Notions to 
 others, merely with a Defign to inform and improve 
 their Knowledge, let us in the Beginning of our Dif- 
 courfe take Care to adjufi the Definition of Names 
 wherefoever there is Need of it ; that is, to determine 
 • • • • _ flairdj 
 
CH. VI,} EIGHT USE OF REASON. 95 
 
 plainly what we mean by the chief Words which are 
 the Suhjecl of our Difcourfe ; and be fare always to 
 keep the fame Ideas, whenfoever we ufe the fame 
 Words, unlefs we give due Notice of the Change, 
 This will have a very large and happy Influence, 
 in fecuring not only others but ourfelves too from 
 Confufion and Miflake; for even Writers and 
 Speakers themfelves, for Want of due Watchful- 
 nefs, are ready to affix ^different ideas to their own 
 Words, in different Parts of their Difcourfes, and 
 hereby bring Perplexity into their own Reafonings, 
 and confound their Hearers. 
 
 It is by an Obfervation of this Rule that Mathe~ 
 maticians have fo happily fecured themfelves, and 
 the Sciences which they have profefled, from Wrang- 
 ling and Controverfy ; becaufe whenfoever in the 
 Progrefs of their Treatifes they have Occafion to 
 ufe a new and unknown Word, they always define 
 it, and tell in what Senfe they fhall take it; and 
 in many of their Writings you find a Heap of 
 'Definitions at the very Beginning. Now if the 
 Writers of Natural Philofophy and Morality had 
 ufed the fame Accuracy and Care, they had effec- 
 tually fecluded a Multitude of noify and fruitlefs 
 Debates out of their feveral Provinces : Nor had 
 that facred Theme of Divinity been perplexed with 
 fo many intricate Difputes, nor the Church of 
 Chrifl been torn to pieces by fo many t Sects and 
 Factions, if the Words Grace, Faith, Right eoufnefs t 
 Repentance, Juftification, Worfliip, Church, Bifliop, 
 Prefbyter, &c. had been well defined, and their 
 Significations adj Lifted, as near as poffible, by the 
 Ufe of thofe Words in the New Teftament ; or at 
 leaft, if every Writer had told us at firfl in what 
 Senfe he would ufe thofe Words. 
 
 Direct. VI. In your own Studies, as well as hi 
 the Communication of your Thoughts to others merely 
 
 for 
 
Q6 logick : or, the [part i. 
 
 for their Information, avoid ambiguous and equivo- 
 cal Terms as much as pojfible. Do not ufe fuch 
 Words as have two or three Definitions of the Name 
 belonging to them, that is, fuch Words as have 
 two or three Senfes, where there is any Danger of 
 Miftake. Where your chief Bufinefs is to inform 
 the Judgment, and to explain a Matter, rather 
 than to perfuade or affect, be not fond of exprefs- 
 ing yourfelves in figurative Language, when there 
 are any proper Words that fignify the fame Idea in 
 their literal Senfe. It is the Ambiguity of Names, 
 as we have often faid, that brings almoft infinite 
 Confufion into our Conceptions of Things. 
 
 But where there is a Neceffity of ufing an am- 
 biguous Word, there let double. Care be ufed in 
 defining that Word, and declaring in what Senfe 
 you take it. And be fure to fuffer no ambiguous 
 Word ever to come into your Definitions. 
 
 Direct. VII. In communicating your Notions, rift 
 every Word as near as pojfible in the fame Senfe in 
 which Mankind commonly ufe it ; or which Writers 
 that have gone before you have ufually affixed to it, 
 upon Condition that it is free from Ambiguity. 
 Though Names are in their Original merely arbi- 
 trary, yet we fhould always keep to the eflablifhed 
 Meaning of them, unlefs great Neceffity requires 
 the Alteration ; for when any W r ord has been ufed 
 to fignify an Idea, that old Idea will recur in the 
 Mind when the Word is heard or read, rather 
 than any new Idea which we may fallen to it. 
 And this is one Reafon why the received Defini- 
 tion of Names fhould be changed as little as pof- 
 fiblc. 
 
 But I add farther, that though a Word intirely 
 new, introduced into a Language, may be affixed 
 to what Idea you plcafe, yet an old Word ought 
 never to be fixed to an unaccuflomed Idea, with- 
 out 
 
CH. VI.]) RIGHT USE OF REASON. 9? 
 
 out juft and evident Neceffity, or without prefent 
 or previous Notice, left we introduce thereby a 
 Licence for all Manner of pernicious Equivocations 
 and Faljhoods ; as for Inftance, when an idle Boy 
 who has not feen his Book all the Morning, (hall 
 tell his Mailer that he has learned his Leffon, he 
 can never excufe himfelf by faying, that by the 
 Word Lejfon he meant his Breakfafl, and by the. 
 Word learn he meant eating ; furcly this would be 
 connrued a downright Lie, and his fancied Wit 
 would hardly procure his Pardon. 
 
 In ufing an ambiguous Word, which has been 
 ufed in different Senfes, we may choofe what we 
 think the moil proper Senfe, as I have done, p. 86. 
 in naming the Poles of the Loadflone, North or 
 South. 
 
 And when a Word has been ufed in two or 
 three Senfes, and has made a great Inroad for 
 Error upon that Account, it is of good Service to 
 drop one or two of thofe Senfes, and leave it only 
 one remaining, and fix the other Senfes or Ideas 
 to other Words. So the modern Philofophers, 
 when they treat of the human Soul, they call it the 
 Mind, or Mens humana, and leave. the Word Anima, 
 Qr Soul, to fignify the Principle of Life and Motion. 
 in mere Animal Beings. 
 
 So the Poet Juvenal has long ago given us a Hint 
 of this Accuracy and Diftinclion, when he fays of 
 Brutes and Men, 
 
 Indulfit mundi communis Condiior illis 
 Tantam Animas ; ?iohis Animum quoque. 
 
 Sat. ix. v.- 1.34. 
 
 Exception. There is one Cafe, wherein fame of 
 thefe laft Rules concerning the Definition of Words, 
 may be in fome meafure difpenfed with; and that 
 
 is* 
 
Q% LOGICK : OK, THE [PART t. 
 
 is, when ftrong and rooted Prejudice hath eftab- 
 Jil'hed fon^e favourite Word or Phrafe, and long 
 ufed it to exprefs fomc miftaken Notion, or to 
 finite Tome inconfittent Ideas ; for 'then it is forne- 
 times much calier to lead the World into Truth 
 by indulging their Fondncfs for a Phrafe, and by 
 aiiigning and applying new Ideas and Notions to 
 their favourite Word ; and this is much fafer alfo 
 than to awaken all their Paffions by rejecting both 
 their old Words, and Ph rales, and Notions, and 
 introducing all new at once : Therefore we con- 
 tinue to fay, there is Heat in the Fire, there is Cold- 
 nefs in Ice, rather than invent new Words to ex- 
 prefs the Powers which are in Fire or Ice, to ex- 
 cite the Sen fat ions of Heat or Cold in us. For 
 the fame fteafon fome Words and Phrafes which 
 are lefs proper, may be continued in Theology y 
 while People are led into clearer Ideas with much 
 more Eafe and Succefs, than if an Attempt were 
 made to change all their beloved Forms of Speech. 
 
 In other Cafes, thefe logical Directions fhould 
 generally be obferved, and different Names affixed 
 to different Ideas. 
 
 Here I cannot but take Occafion to remark, 
 that it is a confiderable Advantage to any Lan- 
 guage to have a Variety of new JVords introduced 
 into it, that when in Courfe of Time new Objecls 
 and new Ideas arife, there may be new Words and 
 Names afligned to them : And alfo where one fin- 
 gle Name has fuftained two or three Ideas in Time 
 pail, thefe new Words may remove the Ambiguity 
 by being affixed to fome of thofe Ideas. This 
 Practice would, by Degrees, take away Part of the 
 Uncertainty of Language. And for this Rcafon I 
 cannot but congratulate our Englifli Tongue, that 
 it has been abundantly enriched with the Tranfla- 
 tion of Words from ail our Neighbour Nations, as 
 
 well 
 
CH. VI.3 HIGHT USE OF REASON. §() 
 
 well as from ancient Languages, and thefe Words 
 have been as it were enfranchifed amongft us; for 
 French, Latin, Greek, and German Names will Sig- 
 nify Englijh Ideas, as well as Words that are an- 
 ciently and intirely Englijh. 
 
 It may not be amifs to mention in this Place, 
 that as the D: termination of the particular Senfe 
 in which any Word is ufed, is called the Defim* 
 tion of the Nairn, fo the Enumeration of the vari- 
 ous Senfes of an equivocal Word, is fomctimes 
 called the Divifion or Diftinclion of the Name ; and 
 for this Pnrpofe good Dictionaries are of excellent 
 life. 
 
 This Diftinclion of the Name or Word is greatly 
 neceflary in Argumentation or Difpute ; when a 
 fallacious Argument is ufed, he that anfwers it 
 diitinguifhes the feveral Senfes of fome Word or 
 Phrafe in it, and (hews in what Senfe it is trzi£ % 
 #nd in what Senfe it is evidently fal& 
 
 SECT, 
 
100 10G1CK : OR, THE [p&RT I, 
 
 SECT. IV, 
 
 Of the Definition of Things. 
 
 AS there is much Confufion introduced into 
 our Ideas, by the Means of thofe Words to 
 which they are affixed, fo the mingling our Ideas 
 with each other without Caution, is a farther Oc- 
 cafion whereby tl?ey become confufed. A Court 
 Lady, born and bred up amongft Pomp and Equi- 
 fage, and the vain Notions of Birth and Quality, 
 conftantly joins and mixes all thefe with the Idea 
 of herfelf, and (he imagines thefe to be effential to 
 her Nature, and as it were neceffary to her Being : 
 thence (lie is tempted to look upon menial Servants, 
 and the loweft Rank of Mankind, as another Spe- 
 cies of Beings, quite diftincl from herfelf. A Plow- 
 hoy > that has never travelled beyond his own Vil- 
 lage, and has feen nothing but thatched Houfes and 
 his Parifh Church, is naturally led to imagine that 
 Thatch belongs to the very Nature of a Houfe, 
 and that that muft be a Church which is built of 
 Stone, and efpecially if it has a Spire upon it. A 
 Child whofe Uncle has been exceffive fond, and his 
 $choolmafler very fevere, eafily believes that Fond- 
 pefs always belongs to Uncles, and that Severity is 
 effential to Mafiers or hiftmclors. He has feen alfo 
 Soldiers with red Coats, or Minifters with long black 
 Gowns, ana 1 therefore he pcrfuades himfclf that 
 thefe Garbs are effential to the Characters, and that 
 he is not a Minifter who has not a long black Gown, 
 nor can he be a Soldier who is not dreffed in red. 
 It would be well if all fuch Miflakes ended with 
 Childhood. 
 
 It 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 101 
 
 It might be alfo fubjoined, that our complex 
 Ideas become conf'ufed, not only by muting or 
 blending together more fimple or fingle Ideas than 
 really belong to them, as in the Inftances juft 
 mentioned ; but Obicurity and Confufion fome- 
 times come upon our Ideas alio, for want of unit- 
 ing a fuffic'mit Number of Jingle Ideas to make the 
 complex one : So if I conceive of a Leopard only 
 as a fpotted Beafi, this does not diftinguifh it from 
 a Trger or a Lynx A nor from many Dogs or Ho?fes, 
 which are fpotted too ; and therefore a Leopard 
 muft have fome more Ideas added to complete 
 and diftinguifh it. 
 
 I grant that it is a large and free Acquaintance 
 with the World, a watchful Obfervation and dili- 
 gent Search into the Nature of Things, that muft 
 fully correct this Kind of Errors : The Rules of 
 Logick are not fufficient to do it : But yet the Rides 
 of Logick may inrtrucl us by what Means to diftin- 
 guifh one Thing from another, and how to fearch 
 and mark out, as far as may be, the Contents and 
 Limits of the Nature of diftinct Beings, and thus 
 may give us great Aftiftance towards the Remedy 
 of thefe Miftakes. 
 
 As the Definition of Names frees us from that 
 Confufion which Words introduee, fo the Defini- 
 tion of Things will in fome meafure guard us again ft 
 that Confufion which mingied Ideas have intro- 
 duced: For as a Definition of the Name explains 
 what any Word means, fo a Definition of the Thing 
 explains what is the Nature of that. Thing. 
 
 In order to form a Definition of any Thing, we 
 muft put forth tnefe three Acts of the* Mind. 
 
 Firft, Compare the Thing to be defined with 
 other Things that are moft like to ittelf, and iee 
 wherein its Eflence or Nature agrees with them ; 
 and this is called the general Nature or Genus in a 
 
 Definition : 
 
102 . LOGICK : OK, THE [PART I, 
 
 Definition : So if you would define what Wine is, 
 firft compare it with other Things like itfelf, as 
 Cyder \ Ferry, &c. and you will find it agrees 
 erfentially with them in this, that it is a Sort of 
 Juice. 
 
 Secondly, Confider the moft remarkable and 
 primary Attribute, Property, or Idea wherein this 
 Thing differs from thofe other Things that are 
 moft like it; and that is its ejfential or fpecifick 
 Difference : So Wine differs from Cyder and Perry , 
 and all other Juices ; in that it is preffed from a 
 Grape. This may be called its fpecial Nature, 
 which diftinguifhes it from other Juices. 
 
 Thirdly, Join the general and fpecial Nature 
 together, or (which is all one) the Genus and the 
 Difference, and thefe make up a Definition. So the 
 Juice of a Grape, or Juice prejfed from Grapes, is 
 the Definition of Wine. 
 
 So if I would define what Winter is, I confider 
 firft wherein it agrees with other Things which 
 are moft like it, namely, Summer, Spring, ^utmnn, 
 and I find they are all Seafons of the Year ; there- 
 fore a Seafon of the Year is the Genus. Then I 
 obferve wherein it differs from thefe, and that is 
 in the Shorinefs of the Days ; for it is this which 
 does primarily diftinguifh it from other Seafons ; 
 therefore this may be called its fpecial Nature, or 
 its Difference. Then by joining thefe together I 
 make a Definition. Winter is that Seafon of the Year 
 wherein the Days are Jhorteji. I confefs indeed this 
 is but a ruder Definition of it, for to definp it as 
 an accurate Aftronomer, I muft limit the Days, 
 Hours and Minutes. 
 
 After the fame Manner, if we would explain or 
 define what the Picture of a Man is, we confider 
 firft the Genus, or general Nature of it, which is 
 a Reprefentation ; and herein it agrees with many 
 
 other 
 
CH. VI.] fclGHT USE OP REASON; 103 
 
 other Things, as a Statue, a Shadow, a Print, a 
 verbal Defcription of a Man, &c. Then we con- 
 fider wherein it differs from thefe, and we find it 
 differs from a verbal Defcription, in that it is a 
 Reprefentation to the Eye, and not to the Ear : It 
 differs from a Statue, in that it is a Reprefentation 
 upon a flat Surface, and not in a folid Figure : It 
 differs from a Shadow, in that it is an abiding Re* 
 prefentation, and not a fleeting one : It differs from 
 a Print or Draught, becaufe it reprefents the Go- 
 lours by Paint, as well as the Shape of the Object 
 by Delineation. Now fo many, or rather fo few 
 of thefe Ideas put together, as are juft fuffrcient to 
 diftinguifh a Piclure from all other Reprefentations, 
 make up its eflential Difference, or its Jpecial Na- 
 ture; and all thefe are included in its being painted 
 on a plain Surface. Then join this to the Genus, 
 which is a Reprefentation ; and thus you have the 
 complete Definition of the Piclure of a Man, name- 
 ly, it is the Reprefentation of a Man in Paint upon 
 a Surface, (or a Plane.) 
 
 Here it muft be obferved, that when we fpeak of 
 the Genus and Difference as com poling a Definltion 9 
 it mud be always underftood that the neareft Genus, 
 and the fpecifick Difference are required. 
 
 The next general Nature, or the neareft Genus, 
 muft be ufed in a Definition, becaufe it includes all 
 the reft as Parts of its complex Idea ; as if I would 
 define Wine, I muft fay, Wine is a Juice, which is 
 the neareft Genus ; and not fay } Wine is a Liquid, 
 which is a remote general Nature ; or, Wine is a 
 Subftance, which is yet more remote, for Juice in- 
 cludes both Subftance and Liquid. Beiides, neither 
 of thefe two remote general Natures would make 
 any Diftinction between Wine and a thoufand 
 other Subftances, or other Liquids, a remote Genus 
 leaves the Thing too much undiftinguifhed. 
 
 H The 
 
104 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I, 
 
 The fpec'ifick Difference is that primary Attribute 
 which diftinguifhes each Species frdm one another, 
 while they ftand ranked under the fame general 
 Nature or Genus. Though Wine differs from 
 other Liquids, in that it is the Juice of a certain 
 Fruity yet this is but a general or generick Differ- 
 ence, for it does not diftinguifh Wine from Cyder 
 or Perry ; the fpecifick Difference of Wine therefore 
 is its Prejfure from the Grape ; as Cyder is preffed 
 from Apples, and Perry from Pears, 
 
 In Definitions alfo we muft ufe the primary At- 
 tribute that diftinguifhes the Sfecies or fpecial Na- 
 ture, and not attempt to define Wine by its parti- 
 cular Taftes, or Effects, or other Properties, which 
 are but feco?tdary or consequential, when its Prejfure 
 from the Grape is the moft obvious and primary 
 Distinction of it from all other Juices. I confefs 
 in fome Cafes it is not fo eafily known, which is 
 the primary Idea that diftinguifhes one Thing from 
 another ; and therefore fome would as foon define 
 Winter by the Coldnefs of the Sea/on, as by the 
 Shortnefs of the Days : though the Shortnefs of the 
 Days is doubtlefs the moft jufl, primary, and phi- 
 lofophical Difference betwixt that and the other 
 Seafons of the Year, fince Winter Days are always 
 Jliortejl, but not always the coldejl ; I add alfo, that 
 the Shortnefs of the Days is one Caufe of the Cold- 
 rufs, but the Cold is no Caufe of their Shortnefs. 
 
 SECT. 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 105 
 
 SEGT. V, 
 
 Rules of Definition of the Thing. 
 
 T 
 
 H E fpecial Rules of a good Definition are 
 thefe : 
 
 Rule I. A Definition mufi he univerfal, or as fome 
 call it adequate ; that is, it muft agree to all the 
 particular Species or Individuals that are included 
 under the fame Idea ; fo the Juice of a Grape agrees 
 to all proper Wines, whether Red, White, French, 
 Spanijh, Florence, &c. 
 
 Rule II. It muft he proper and peculiar to the 
 Thing defined \ and agree to that alone ; for it is the 
 very Delign of a Definition effectually to diftin- 
 guifh one Thing from all others : So the Juice of 
 a Grape agrees to no other Subfiance, to no other 
 Liquid, to no other Being but Wine. 
 
 Thefe two Rules being obferved, will always 
 render a Definition reciprocal with the Thing de- 
 fined; which is a fcholaflick Way of Speaking, to 
 flgnify that the Definition may be ufed in any Sen- 
 tence in the Place of the Thing defined ; or they 
 may be mutually affirmed concerning each other, 
 or fubftituted in the Room of each other. The 
 Juice of the Grape is Wine, or Wine is the Juice of 
 the Grape. And wherefoever the Word Wine is 
 ufed, you may put the Juice of the Grape in (lead 
 of it, except when you conlider Wine rather as a 
 Word than a Thing, or when it is mentioned in, 
 fuch logical Rides. 
 
 H 2 Rule 
 
106 EOGICK : OR, TfiTE [[PART 1. 
 
 Rule III. A Definition ought to be clear and plain'; 
 for the Defign of it is to lead us into the Know- 
 ledge of the Thing defined. 
 
 Hence it will follow, that the Words ufed in a 
 Definition ought not to be doubtful, or equivocal 
 and obfcure,- bat as plain and eafy as the Language 
 will afford : And indeed it is a general Rule con- 
 cerning the Definition both of Names and Things, 
 that no Word fhould be ufed in either of them, 
 which has any Darknefs or Difficulty in it, unlefs 
 it has been before explained or defined. 
 
 Hence it will follow alio, that there are manv 
 Things wbi*cb cannot well be defined either as to 
 the Name or the. Thing, unlefs it be by fynony- 
 mous Words, or by a Negation of the contrary 
 Idea, &c. for learned Men know not how to make 
 them more evident, or more intelligible, than the 
 Ideas which every Man has gained by the vulgar 
 Methods of Teaching. Such are the Ideas of Ex- 
 ten/ion, Duration, Thought, Confcioufnefs, and mod 
 of our flmple Ideas, and particularly fenfible Qua- 
 lities, as White, Blue, Red, Cold, Heat, Shrill, Bit- 
 ter, Sour, &c. 
 
 We can fay of Duration, that it is a Continuance 
 in Being, or a not ceafing to be ; we can fay of 
 Confcioufnefs, that it is as it were a Feeling within 
 our/elves ; we may fay Heat is that which is not 
 Cold; or Sour is that which is like Vinegar ; or we 
 may point to the clear Sky, and fay, that is Blue. 
 Thefe are the vulgar Methods of teaching the De- 
 finitions of Names, or Meaning of Words. But 
 there are fome Philofophcrs, whofe Attempts to de- 
 fine thefe Things learnedly, have wrapt up their 
 Ideas in greater Darknefs, and expofed themfelvcs 
 to Ridicule and Contempt ; as when they define 
 Heat, they fay, it is Qualitas congregans homogenea 
 & fegregans heterogenea, that is, a Quality gather- 
 ing 
 
•CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 107 
 
 ing together Things of the fame Kind, and fepa- 
 rating Things of a different Kind. So they define 
 White, a Colour arlfing from the Prevalency of 
 Brightnefs : Bat every Child knows Hot and White 
 better without thefe Definitions. 
 
 There are many other Definitions given by the 
 Peripatetick Philofophers, which are very faulty by 
 Reafon of their Obfcurlty ; as Motion is defined by 
 •them the Acl of a Being in Pozver, fo far forth as it 
 is in Power. Time is the Meafure or Number of 
 Motion according to pafl, prefent and future. The 
 Soul is the Acl of an organlcal natural Body, hav- 
 ing Life in Power ; and feveral others of the fame 
 Stamp. 
 
 Rule IV. It is alfo commonly prefcribed amongft 
 •the Rules of Definition, that itfliouldbefJiort, fo 
 that it mufl have no Tautology in it, nor any Words 
 fuperfluous. I confefs, Definitions ought to be ex- 
 •pref&d in as few Words as is confident with a 
 clear and juft Explication of the Nature of the 
 Thing defined, and a Diftinction of it from all 
 other Things befide : But it is of much more 
 Importance, and far better, that a Definition mould 
 explain clearly the Subject we treat of, though the 
 Words be many, than to leave Obfcurities in the 
 •Sentence, by confining it within too narrow Li- 
 mits. So in the Definition which we have given 
 of Loglck, that it is the Art of ufing Reafon zvell in 
 the Search -after Truth, and the Communication of it 
 toothers, it has indeed many Words in it, but it 
 could not well be fhorter. Art is the Genus where- 
 in it agrees with Rhetorick, Poefy, Arlthmetlck, 
 Wreftling, Sailing, Building, &c. For all thefe are 
 Arts alfo: But the Difference or fpecial Nature 
 of it is drawn from its Object, Reafo?i ; from the 
 Acl:, ufmg it well, and from its two great Ends or 
 
 H 3 Defigns, 
 
108 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 Defigns, namely, the Search after Truth, and the 
 Communication of it ; nor can it be juftly defcribed 
 and explained in fewer Ideas. 
 
 V, If we add a fifth Rule, it mull be, that neU 
 ther the Thing defined, nor a mere fynonymous Na?ne, 
 Jhould make a Part of the Definition, for this would 
 be no Explication of the Nature of the Thing ; and 
 a fynonymous Word at bed could only be a Defi- 
 nition of the Name. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Obfervations concerning the Definition of Things. 
 
 BEFOFE I part with this Subject, I muft pro- 
 pofe feveral Obfervations which relate to the 
 Definition of Things. 
 
 \fi Obfervat. There is no Need that in Defini- 
 tions we (hould be confined to one fingle Attribute 
 or Property, in order to cxprefs the Difference of 
 the Thing defined., for fometimes the effential Dif- 
 ference confifts in two or threeldeas or Attributes. 
 So a Grocer is a Man who buys and fells Sugar, and 
 Plumbs, and Spices for Gain. A Clock is an En- 
 gine with Weights and Wheels, and Jhews the Hour 
 of the Day both by pointing andfiriking : And if I 
 were to define a Repeating Clock, I muft add an- 
 other Properly, namely, that it alfo repeats the 
 Hour. So that the true and primary effential Dif- 
 ference of fome complex Ideas confiftingin feveral 
 diftin6t Properties, cannot be well exprefled with- 
 out conjunctive Particles of Speech. 
 
 'id Objervat. There is no Need that Definitions 
 fhould always be pofitive, for fome Things differ 
 from others merely by a Defect of what others 
 
 have; 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 10$ 
 
 have ; as if a Chair be defined a Seat for a Jingle 
 P erf on with a Back belonging to it, then a Stool is a 
 Seat for afingle Perfon without a Back ; and a Form 
 is a Seat for fever al Perfons without a Back : Tbefe 
 are negative Differences. So Sin is Want of Con- 
 formity to the Law of God ; Blindnefs is a Want of 
 Sight ; a Vagabond is a Perfon without a Home, 
 Some Ideas are negative, and their Definitions 
 ought to be fo too. 
 
 3d Obfervat. Some Things may have two or 
 more Definitions, and each of them equally jufl 
 and good ; as a Mile is the Length of eight Fur- 
 longs, or it is the third Part of a League, Eternal 
 is that which ever was, and ever fttall be ; or it is 
 that which has no Beginning, and fhall have no End, 
 Man * is ufually defined a rational Animal : But 
 it may be much better to define him a Spirit united 
 to an Animal offuch a Shape, or an Animal offuch 
 a peculiar Shape united to a Spirit, or a Being com- 
 pofed offuch an Animal and a Mind, 
 
 4th Obfervat. Where the EJfences of Things are 
 evident, and clearly diftinc! from each other, there 
 we may be more exacl and accurate in the Defini- 
 tions of them : But where their EJfences approach 
 near to each other, the Definition is more difficult. 
 A Bird may be defined a feathered Animal with 
 Wings, a Ship may be defined a large hollow Build- 
 ing made to pafs over the Sea with Sails : But if you 
 afk me to define a Bat, which is between a Bird 
 
 * The common Definition of Man, namely, a rational Ani- 
 mal, is very faulty ; 1 . Becaufe the AnimalAs not rational ; the 
 Rationality of Man arifes from the Mind to which the Animal 
 is united. 2. Becaufe if a Spirit mould. be united to a Horfe 
 and make it a rational Being, furely this would not be a Man; 
 It is evident therefore that the peculiar Shape mud enter into 
 the Definition of a Man to render it juft and perfect ; and for 
 want of a full Defcription thereof, all our Definitions are de- 
 fective. 
 
 H4 and 
 
110 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 and a Beqft, or to define a Barge and Hoy, which 
 are between a Boat and a SZ?//>, it is much harder 
 to define them, or to adjuft the Bounds of their 
 Effence. This is very evident in all monftrous 
 Births, and irregular Produclions of Nature, as well 
 as in many Works of Art. which partake fo much 
 of one Species and fo much of another, that we 
 cannot tell under which Species to rank them, or 
 how to determine their fpecifick Difference. 
 
 The feveral Species of Beings are feldom precife- 
 ly limited in the Nature of Things by any certain 
 and unalterable Bounds : The Effences of many 
 Things do not conflft in indivijihili, or in one evi- 
 dent indivifible Point, as fome have imagined ; 
 but by various Degrees they approach nearer to, 
 or differ more from others that are of a kindred 
 Nature. So (as I have hinted before) in the very 
 Middle of each of the Arches of a Rainbow, the 
 Colours of green, yellozv, and red, are fufficiently 
 dirtinguifhed ; but near the Borders of the feveral 
 Arches they run into one another, fo that you 
 hardly know how to limit the Colours, nor whe- 
 ther to call it red or yellow, green or blue. 
 
 5th Obfervat. As the highejl or chief Genus *s, 
 namely, Being and Not-Being, can never be defined, 
 becaufe there is no Genus fuperior to them ; fo 
 neither can fmgle Ideas or Individuals be well de- 
 fined, becaufe either they have no ejfential Dif- 
 ferences from other Individuals, or their Differ- 
 ences are not known ; and therefore Individuals 
 are only to be defcribed by their particular Cir- 
 cumflances : So King George is diftinguifhed from 
 all other Men and other Kings, by defcribing him 
 as the firfi King of Great-Britain of the Houfe of 
 Brunfwick ; and Wejlminfter-Hall is defcribed by 
 its Situation and its Vk 3 &c. 
 
 That 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. Ill 
 
 .That individual Bodies can hardly have any 
 eflential Difference, at lead within the Reach of 
 our Knowledge, may be made thus to appear; 
 Methufelah, when he was nine hundred and iixty 
 Years old, and perhaps worn out with Age and 
 Weaknefs, was the fame Perfon as when he was 
 in his full Vigour of Manhood, or when he was an 
 Infant, newly born ; but how far was his Body the 
 fame ? Who can tell whether there was any Fibre 
 of his Flefh or his Bones that continued the fame 
 throughout his whole Life ? Or who can determine 
 which were thofe Fibres ? The Ship in which Sir 
 Francis Drake failed round the World, might be 
 new built, and refitted fo often, that few of the 
 fame Timbers remained ; and who can fay whether 
 it mufl be called the fame Ship or no ? And what 
 is its efTential Difference ? How fhall we define 
 Sir Francis Drakes Ship, or make a Definition for 
 Methufelahf. 
 
 To this Plead belongs that mod difficult Quef- 
 tion, What is the Pr'mciple of Individuation? Or 
 what is it that makes any one thing the fame as it 
 was fome Time before ? This is too large and la- 
 borious an inquiry to dwell upon in this Place : Yet 
 I cannot forbear to mention this Hint, namely, 
 Since our own Bodies mufl rife at the lafl Day for 
 us to receive Rewards or Punifhments in them, 
 there may be perhaps fome original Fibres of each 
 human Body, fome Stamina Vita, or primeval Seed 
 of Life, which may remain unchanged through all 
 the Stages of Life, Death, and the Grave; thefe 
 may become the Springs and Principles of a Refur- 
 reclion, and fufficient to denominate it the fame 
 Body. But if there be any fuch conftant and vital 
 Atoms which diftinguifh every human Body, they 
 #re known to God only. 
 
 6ik 
 
112 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 6th Obfervat. Where we cannot find out the 
 Effence or effential Difference of any Species or Kind 
 of Beings that we would define, we muft content 
 ourfelves with a Collection of fuch chief Parts or 
 Properties of it, as may belt explain it fo far as 
 it is known, and beft diftinguifh it from other 
 Things : So a Marigold is a Flower which hath 
 many long yellow Leaves, rowul a Utile Knot of Seeds 
 in the Midfi, with fuch a peculiar Stalky &c. So if 
 we would define Silver, we fay it is a white and 
 hard Metal, next in Weight to Gold : If we would 
 define an Elder-Tree, we might fay it is one among 
 the leffer Trees, whofe younger Branches are J oft and 
 full of Pith, whofe Leaves are jagged or indented, 
 and of fuch a particular Shape,, and it hears large 
 Clufters offmall black Berries : So we muft define 
 Water, Earth, Sto??e, a IJon, an Eagle, a Serpent, 
 and the greateft Part of natural Beings, by a Col- 
 lection of thofe Properties, which according to 
 our Obfervation diftinguifh them from all other 
 Things. This is what Mr. Locke calls nominal 
 Effences, and nominal Definitions. And indeed, 
 fince the effential Differences of the various na- 
 tural Beings or Bodies round about us arife from 
 a peculiar Shape, Size, Motion, and Situation of 
 the ftnall Particles of which they are compofed, 
 and fince we have no 'fufficient Method to in- 
 form us what thefe are, we muft be contented 
 with fuch a Sort of Definition of the Bodies they 
 compofe. 
 
 Here note, That this Sort of Definition, which 
 is made up of a mere Collection of the moft re- 
 markable Parts or Properties, is called an imperfeel 
 Definition, or a Defcription ; whereas the Definition 
 is called perfefl, when it is compofed of the effen- 
 tial Difference, added to the general Nature or 
 Genus. 
 
 7th 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 113 
 
 7 th Obfervat. The p erf "eel Definition of any Being 
 always includes the Definition of the Name whereby 
 it is called, for it informs us of the Senfe or Mean- 
 ing of that Word, and (hews us what Idea that 
 Word is affixed to : But the Definition of the Name 
 does by no Means include a per fed Definition of 
 the Thing ; for as we have faid before, a mere 
 fynonymous Word, a Negation of the contrary, 
 or the mention of any one or two diftinguifhing 
 Properties of the Thing, may be a fufficient Defi- 
 nition of the Name. Yet in thofe Cafes where the 
 eflential Difference or EfTence of a Thing is un- 
 known, there a Definition of the Name by the chief 
 Properties, and a Defcription of the Thing, are much 
 the fame. 
 
 And here I think it necefTary to take Notice of 
 one general Sentiment, that feems to run through 
 that excellent Performance, Mr. Locke 's EJfay of 
 human Underfianding, and that is, " That the Ef- 
 " fences of Things are utterly unknown to us, and 
 " therefore all our Pretences to diftinguifli the Ef- 
 " fences of Things, can reach no farther than mere 
 " nominal Effences ; or a Collection of fuch Pro- 
 * perties as we know ; to fome of which we affix' 
 tc particular Names, and others we bundle up, 
 " feveral together, under one Name : And that 
 " all our Attempts to rank Beings into different 
 " Kinds or Species, can reach no -farther than to 
 " make mere nominal Species ; and therefore our 
 fC Definition of Things are but mere nominal De~ 
 " fcnptions or Definitions of the Name." 
 
 Now that we may do Juftice to this great Au- 
 thor ; we ought to confider that he confines this 
 Sort of Difcourfe only to the Effence offimple Ideas, 
 and to the Effence of Subfiances, as appears evident 
 in the fourth and fixfh Chapters of his Third 
 Book ; for he allows the Names of mixed Modes 
 
 always 
 
114 logick: or, the [parti. 
 
 always to fignify the real Effences of their Species, 
 Chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial Things to 
 have real dlflincl Species ; and that in the Diftinc- 
 tion of their Effences, there is generally lejs Confur- 
 fion and Uncertainty than in natural, Chap. VT. 
 Sect. 40, 4i. though it mud be confeffed, that he 
 fcarce makes any Diftinction between the Defini- 
 tion of the Name and the Definition of the Thing, as 
 Chap. IV. and fometimes the Current of his Dif- 
 eourfe decries the Knowledge of Effences in fuch 
 general Terms, as may juftly give Occasion to 
 Miftake. 
 
 It muft be granted, that the Eflence of mod of 
 our fimple Ideas, and the greatest Part of particular 
 natural Subflances, are much unknown to us ; and 
 therefore the eflential Difference of fenfible Qua- 
 lities and of the various Kinds of Bodies, (as I have 
 faid before) lie beyond the Reach of our Under- 
 standings : We know not what makes the primary 
 real inward Diftinclions between Red, Green, Sweet, 
 Sour, &c. between Wood, Iron, Oil, Stone, Fire, 
 Water, Flefih, Clay, in their general Natures, nor 
 do we know what are the inward and prime Dis- 
 tinctions between all the particular Kinds or Species 
 in the Vegetable, Animal, Mineral, Met a Hick, or 
 Liquid World of Things. See Philofoph. Effays, 
 Effay xi. Se&. 1. 
 
 But ftill there is a very large Field for the Know- 
 ledge of the Effences of Things, and for the Ufe 
 of per feci Definitions amongft our complex Ideas, the 
 modal Appearances and Changes of Nature, the Works 
 of Art, the Matters of Science, and all the Affairs 
 of the civil, the moral, and the religious Life ; 
 And indeed it is of much more Importance to alt 
 Mankind, to have a better Acquaintance with the 
 Works of Art for their own Livelihood and daily 
 Ufe, with the,. Affairs of Morality for their Behar 
 
 viour 
 
Cti. ' ViJ] EIGHT USE OF REASON. 115 
 
 viour in this World, and with the Matters of Re- 
 ligion, than we may be prepared for the World to 
 come than to be able to give a perfect Definition of 
 the Works of Nature. 
 
 If the particular EfTences of Natural Bodies are 
 unknown to us, we may yet be good Philofophers, 
 good Artifts, good Neighbours, good Subjects, and 
 good Chriftians without that Knowledge, and we 
 have juft Reafon to be content. 
 
 Now that the Ef fences of fome of the modal Ap~ 
 pearances and Changes in Nature, as well as Things 
 of Art, Science, and Morality, are fufficiently known 
 to us to make perfecl Definitions of them, will ap- 
 pear by the Specimen of a few Definitions of thefe 
 Things. 
 
 Motion is a Change of Place. Swiftnefs is the paf- 
 fing over a long Space in a fhort Time. A natural 
 Day is the Time of one alternate Revolution of 
 Light and Darknefs, or it is the Duration of twenty- 
 four Hours. An Eclipfe of the Sun is a Defect in 
 the Sun's Tranfmiffion of Light to us by the Moon 
 interpofing. * Snow is congealed Vapour. * Had 
 is congealed Rain. An * ljland is a Piece of Land 
 riling above the furrounding Water. An * Hill is 
 an elevated Part of the Earth, and a * Grove is a 
 Piece of Ground thick fet with Trees. An Houfe 
 is a Building made to dwell in. A Cottage is a mean 
 Houfe in the Country. A Supper is that Meal 
 which we make in the Evening. A, Triangle is a 
 Figure compofed of three Sides. A Gallon is a 
 Meafure containing eight Pints. A Porter is a Man 
 who carries Burdens for Hire. A King is the chief 
 
 Ruler 
 
 * Note, I/land, Hill, Grove, are not deiigned here in their 
 more remote ana '' Jubjlantial Natures, (if I may fo exprefs it) or as 
 the Matter of them is Earth ; for in this Senfe we know not 
 their Effence, but only as considered in their modal Appearances, 
 whereby one Part of Earth As diftincniifhed from another. The 
 fame may be faid of Snow, Hail, ISc. 
 
116 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 Ruler in a Kingdom. Veracity is the Conformity 
 of our Words to our Thoughts. Covet oufnefs is an 
 exceffive Love of Money, or other Poflcilions. 
 Killing is the taking away the Life of an Animal. 
 Murder is the unlawful killing of a Man. Rhetorick 
 is the Art of fpeaking in a Manner fit to perfuade. 
 Natural Philofophy is the Knowledge of the Pro- 
 perties of Bodies, and the various Effects of them, 
 or it is the Knowledge of the various Appearances 
 in Nature, and their Caufes ; and Logick is the Art 
 of ufing our Reafon well, &c. 
 
 Thus you fee the efTential Differences of various 
 Beings may be known, and are borrowed from their 
 Qualities and Properties, their Caufes, Effecls, Ob- 
 jecls, Adjuncl, E?ids, &c. and indeed as infinitely 
 various as the EJfences of Things are, their Defini- 
 tions mull: needs have various Forms. 
 
 After all, it mull; be confeffed, that many Logi- 
 cians and Philofophers in the former Ages, have 
 made too great a Buftle about the Exactnefs of their 
 Definitions of Things, and entered into long fruit- 
 lefs Controverfies, and very ridiculous Debates in 
 the feveral Sciences, about adjuding the Logical 
 Formalities of every Definition ; whereas that Sort 
 of wrangling is now grown very juftly contemptible, 
 fince it is agreed that true Learning and the Know- 
 ledge of Things depends much more upon a large 
 Acquaintance with their various Properties, Caufes, 
 Effects, Subject:, Object, Ends, and Defigns, than 
 it does upon the formal and fcholaftick Niceties of 
 Genus and Difference. 
 
 SECT. 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 117 
 
 SECT. VIL 
 
 Of a complete Conception of Tilings. 
 
 HAVING dwelt To long upon the firft Rule 
 to direct our Conceptions, and given an Ac- 
 count of the Definition both of Names and Things , 
 in order to gain clear and diftincl Ideas, we make 
 hade now to ihe fecond Rule to guide our Concep- 
 tions, and that is, Conceive of Things completely in 
 all their Parts. 
 
 All Parts have a Reference to fome Whole: 
 Now there is an old Diftinction which logical 
 Writers make of a Whole and its Parts into four 
 feveral Kinds, and it may be proper juit to mention 
 them here. 
 
 1 . There is a metaphyfical Whole, when the Ef- 
 fence of a Thing is faid to coniift of two Parts, the 
 Genus and the Difference, that is, the general and 
 the fpecial Nature, which being joined together 
 make up a Definition. This has been the Subject 
 of the foregoing Sections. 
 
 2. There is a mathematical Whole, which is better 
 called integral, when the feveral Parts which go to 
 make up the Whole are really diftinct from one 
 another, and each of them may iubliit apart. So 
 the Head, the Limbs, and the Trunk, are the in- 
 tegral Parts of an animal Body; fo Units are the 
 integral Parts of any large Number ; fo thefe Dif- 
 courfes which I have written concerning Perception, 
 Judgment, Reafoning, and Difpofition, are the four 
 integral Parts of 'Logic 'k. This Sort of Parts goes 
 to make up the Compktenefs of any Subject, and 
 this is the chief and moft direct Matter of our Dif- 
 courfe in this Section. 
 
 3. There 
 
118 LOGlCKi OR, THE! [PAR? I* 
 
 3. There is a phyfical or effential Whole, which 
 is ufually made to fignify and include only the two 
 ejfential Parts of Man, JWyand Soul : But I think 
 the Senfe of it may better be altered, or at leaft 
 inlarged, and fo include all the efTential Modes, 
 Attributes, or Properties, which are contained in 
 the Comprehenfion of any Idea. This (hall be the 
 Subject of Difcourfe under the third Rule to direB 
 our Conceptions. 
 
 4. There is a logical Whole, which is alfo called 
 an Univerfal \ and the Parts of it are all the par- 
 ticular Ideas to which this univerfal Nature ex- 
 tends. So a Genus is a Whole in refpecl of the fe- 
 veral Species which are its Parts. So the Species is 
 a Whole, and all the Individuals are the Parts of it. 
 This fhall be treated of in the fourth Rule to guide 
 our Conceptions. 
 
 At prefent we confider an Idea as an integral 
 Whole, and our fecond Rule directs us to contem- 
 plate it in all its Parts : But this can only refer to 
 complex Ideas, for fimple Ideas have no Parts. 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 Of Divifion, and the Rules of it. 
 
 SINCE our Minds are narrow in their Capa- 
 city, and cannot furvey the fevcral Parts of any 
 complex Being, with one tingle View, as God fees 
 all Things at once ; therefore we muft, as it were, 
 take it to Pieces, and confider of the Parts fepa- 
 rately, that we may have a more complete Concep- 
 tion of the Whole. So if I would learn the Na- 
 ture of a Watch ; the Workman takes it to Pieces 
 and fhews me the Spring, the Wheels, the Axles, 
 the Pinions, the Balance, the Dial-plate, the Point- 
 er, the Cafe, &c. and defcribes each of thefc Things 
 
 to 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 11Q 
 
 to me apart, together with their Figures ^and their 
 Ufes. If I would know what an Animal is, the 
 Anatomift. confiders the Head, the Trunk, the 
 Limbs, the Bowels, apart from each other, and 
 gives me diftincl Lectures upon each of them. So 
 a Kingdom is djvided into its feveral Provinces ; a 
 Book into its feveral Chapters, and any Science is 
 divided according to the feveral Subjecls of which 
 it treats. 
 
 This is what we properly call the Divifion of an 
 Idea, which is an Explication of the Whole of its 
 feveral Parts, or an Enumeration of the feveral Parts 
 that go to eompofe any Whole Idea, and to render 
 it complete. And I think when Man is divided 
 into Body and Soul, it properly comes under this 
 Part of the Doctrine of integral Divifion, as well 
 as when the mere Body is divided into Head, Trunks 
 and Limbs ; This Divifion is fometimes called 
 Partition. 
 
 When any of the Parts of any Idea are yet far- 
 ther divided in order to a clear Explication of the 
 Whole, this is called a Subdivifion ; as when a Year 
 is divided into Months, each Month into Days, and 
 each Day into Hours, which may alfo be farther 
 fubdivided into Minutes and Seconds, 
 
 It is necefiary, in order to the full Explication 
 of any Being, to confider each Part, and the Pro- 
 perties of it, diftincl: by itfelf as well as in its Rela- 
 tion to the Whole : For there are many Properties 
 that belonp; to the feveral Parts of a Being which 
 cannot properly be afcribed to the Whole, though 
 t4iefe Properties may fit each Part for its proper 
 Station, and as it (lands in that Relation to the 
 whole complex Being : As in a Houfe, the Doors 
 are moveable, the Rooms lquare, the Cietings white, 
 the Windows tranfparent, yet the Houfe is neither 
 moveable, nor fquare. nor white, nor transparent. 
 
 I the. 
 
120 LOSICK : OR, THE [pART U 
 
 Thefpecial Rules for a good Divifion are theje : 
 
 I. Rule. Each Part fingly taken muft contain lefs 
 than the Whole, but all the Parts taken collectively 
 {or together) mnfi contain neither more nor lefs than- 
 the Whole. Therefore if in difeourfing of a Tree 
 you divide it into the Trunk and Leaves, it is an im* 
 perfecl Divifion, becaufe the Root and the Branches 
 are needful to make up tfre Whole. So Logick 
 would be ill divided into Apprehenfion, Judgment, 
 and Reafoning ; for Method is a confiderable Part 
 of the Art which teaches us to ufe our Reafon 
 right, and fhould by no Means be omitted. 
 
 Upon this Account, in every Divifion wherein 
 we defign a perfecl: Exact ncis, it is neeefiary to 
 examine the whole Idea with Diligence, left we 
 omit any Part of it through Want of Care ; though 
 in fome Cafes it is not poffible, and in others it is 
 not neceffary, that we fhould defcend to the mi- 
 nute ft Parts. 
 
 II. Rule. In all Diroifions we fhould firfl confder 
 the larger and more immediate Parts of the SubjecJ, 
 and not divide it at once into the more minute^ and re- 
 mote Parts. It would by no Means be proper to 
 divide a Kingdom firfl: into Streets, and Lanes, and 
 Fields % but it muft be firfl: divided into Provinces 
 or Counties, then thofe Counties may be divided 
 into Towns, Villages, Fields, &c. and Towns into 
 Streets and Lanes. 
 
 III. Rule. The fever al Parts of a J)lvlfion ought 
 to he oppojile, thai is, one Part ought not to contain 
 another. It would be a ridiculous Divifion of an 
 Animal into Head, Limbs, Body, and Brains, for 
 the Brains arc contained in the Head. 
 
 Yet 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASOtf » 121 
 
 Yet here it muft be noted, that fometimes the 
 Subjects of any Treatife, or the Objects of any 
 particular Science, may be properly and necefla- 
 rily fo divided, that the fecond may include the 
 firft, and the third may include the firft and fecond, 
 without offending againft this Rule, becaufe in the 
 fecond or following parts of the Science orDifcourfe, 
 thefe Objects are not confidered in the fame Man- 
 ner as in the urn 1 ; as for Inftance, Geometry divides 
 its Objects into Lines, Surfaces, and Solids : Now 
 though a Line be contained in a Surface, or a Solid, 
 yet it is not confidered in a Surface feparate and 
 alone, or as a mere Line, as it is in the firft Part of 
 Geometry, which treats of 'Lines. So Logick is rightly 
 divided into Conception, Judgment, Reafoning, and 
 Method. For though Ideas or Conceptions are con* 
 tained in the following Parts of Logick, yet they 
 are not there treated of as feparate Ideas, which are 
 the proper Subject of the firft Part. 
 
 IV. Rule. Let not Subdivifions he too numerous 
 without Neceffiiy : For it is better many Times to 
 diftinguith more Parts at once, if the Subject will 
 bear it, than to mince the Difcourfe by exceffive 
 dividing and fubdividing. It is preferable there- 
 fore in a Treatife of Geography, to fay that in a 
 City we will confider its Walls, its Gates, its Build- 
 ings, its Streets, and Lanes, than to divide it formally 
 firft into the encamp ajjing wad. the ettcompa/fedFavts ; 
 the encompaffing Parts are the Walls and Gates ; 
 the encompaffed Parts include the Ways and the 
 Build'mgs ; the Ways are the Streets and the Lanes ; 
 Buildings confift of the Foundations and the Super- 
 flruclure, &c. . 
 
 Too great a Number of Subdivifions has been 
 affected by fome Perfons in Sermons, Treatifes, In- 
 ftructions, &c. under Pretence of greater Accu- 
 
 I 2 racy : 
 
Ill hOGICKi OR, THE [PART L 
 
 racy : But this Sort of Subtilties hath often caufed 
 great Confufion to the Underftanding, and fomc- 
 times more Difficulty to the Memory. In thefe 
 Cafes it is only a good Judgment can determine 
 what Suhdivifions are ufeful. 
 
 V. Rule. Divide every Subjecl according to the 
 fpecial Defignyou have in view. One and the fame 
 Idea or Subject may be divided in very different 
 Manners, according to the different Purpofes we 
 have in difcourfing of it. So if a Printer were to 
 confider the feveral Parts of a Book, he muft divide 
 it into Sheets, the Sheets into Pages, the Pages into 
 Lines, and the Lines into Letters. But a Gram- 
 marian divides a Book into Periods, Sentences, and 
 JVords, or Parts of Speeeh 5 ?.s Noun, Pronoun, Verh, 
 he. A Logician coniulers a Book as divided into 
 Chapters, Sections, Arguments, Proportions, Ideas ; 
 and, with the help of Ontology, he divides the Pro- 
 portions into Subjecl; Objecl, Property, Relation, 
 ABion, Paffwn, Caufc, Effecl, &c. But it would 
 be very ridiculous for a Logician to divide a Booh 
 into Sheets, Pages, and Lines ; or for a Printer to 
 divide it into Nouns and Pronouns, or into Propor- 
 tions, Ideas, Properties, or Caufes. 
 
 VL Rule. In ally our Divifions ohferve with great 'eft 
 ExaBnefs the Nature of Things. And here I am 
 constrained to make a Subdivision of this Rule into 
 two very neceiiary Particulars. 
 
 (] ) Let the Parts of your Divifion hefuch as are 
 properly dijiinguijlicd in Nature. Do not divide 
 afunder thofe Parts of the Idea which are intimately, 
 united in Nature, nor unite thofe Tilings into one 
 Part which Nature has evidently disjoined : Thus 
 it would be very improper, in treating of an animal 
 Body, to divide it into the juperior and inferior 
 
 Halves ^ 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 123 
 
 Halves ; for it would be hard to fay how much be- 
 longs by Nature to the inferior Half, and how 
 much to thzfuperior. Much more improper would 
 it be ftiil to divide the Animal into the right hand 
 Tarts and left hand Parts, which would bring greater 
 Confufion. This would be as unnatural as if a 
 Man mould cleave a Hafel-nut in Halves through 
 the Hufik, the Shell, and the Kernel, at once, and 
 fay, a Nut is divided into thefe two Parts ; whereas 
 Nature leads plainly to the three-fold Diflinction 
 of Hujk, Shell, and Kernel, 
 
 (2) . Do not affecl Duplicities, nor Triplicities -, nor. 
 any certain Number of Parts inyourDivifion of Things ; 
 for we know of no fuch certain Number of Parts 
 which God the Creator has obferved in forming all 
 the Varieties of his Creatures ; nor is there any 
 uniform determined Number of Parts in the various 
 Subjects of human Art or Science ; yet fome Pcr- 
 fons have diflurbed the Order of Nature, and abufed 
 their Readers, by an Affectation of 'Dichotomies, Tri- 
 chotomies, Sevens, Twelves, &c. Let the Nature 
 of the Subject, confidered together with the Defign 
 which you have in View, always determine the 
 Number of Parts into which you divide it. 
 
 After all, it muft be confeifed that an intimate 
 Knowledge of Things, and a judicious Obfervation, 
 will affift in the Bufinefs of Divifion, as well as of 
 Definition, better than too nice and curious an At- 
 tention to the mere Formalities of logical Writers, 
 without a real Acquaintance with Things. 
 
 I 3 SECT. 
 
124 ^ogick: or, the [part 
 
 SECT. IX, 
 
 Of a comprehenjive Conception of Things, and of 
 Abflraclion. 
 
 THE third Rule to direct our Conceptions, re- 
 quires us to conceive of Things comprehenfively. 
 As we muft furvey an Object in all its Parts to 
 obtain a complete Idea of it, fo we muft con(ider it 
 in all its Modes, Attributes, Properties, and Rela- 
 tions, in order to obtain a comprehenjive Conception 
 of it. 
 
 The Comprehenjion of an Idea, as it was explain- 
 ed under the Doclrine of Univerfals, includes only 
 the effential Modes or Attributes of that Idea ; but 
 in this Place the Word is taken in a larger Senfe; 
 and implies alfo the various occafional Properties, 
 accidental Modes •, and Relations. 
 
 The Neceflity of this Rule is founded upon the 
 fame Reafon as the former, namely, That our Minds 
 are narrow and fcanty in their Capacities ; and as 
 they are not able to confider all the Parts of a 
 complex Jdca at once, fo neither can they at once 
 contemplate all the different Attributes and Circum- 
 Jlances of it : We muft therefore confider Things 
 fucceffively and gradually in their various Appear- 
 ances and Circumftances : As our natural Eye can- 
 not at once behold the fix Sides of a Dye or Cube, 
 nor take cognizance of all the Points that are mark- 
 ed on them, and therefore we turn up the Sides 
 fucccftiveiy, and thus furvey and number the Points 
 that are marked on each Side, that we may know 
 the Whole. 
 
 In 
 
CH. VI.] RHJHT USE OP REASON-. 125 
 
 Jn order to a comprehenjivc View of any Idea, 
 we muft flrft confider, whether the Object of it 
 has an Exigence as well as an Effence ; whether it 
 be a Jimple or complex Idea ; whether it be a &*#- 
 fiance or a Mode.; if it be a Subflance, then we muft 
 inquire what are the efjeniial Modes of it which are 
 neceftary to its Nature, and what are thofe Proper- 
 ties or Accidents of it which belong to it, occasion- 
 ally, or as it is placed in fome particular Circum- 
 ftances : We muft view it in its internal and abso- 
 lute Modes, and obferve it in thofe various exter- 
 nal Relations in which it ftands to other Beings : 
 We muft coniider it in its Powers and Capacities 
 either to do or fuffer ; We muft trace it up to its 
 various Caufes, whether fupreme or fubordinate e 
 We muft defcend to the Variety of its Effecls, and 
 take Notice of the feveral Ends and Dejigns which 
 are to be attained by it. We muft conceive of it 
 as it is either an Objecl or a SubjecJ, what are the 
 Things that are akin to it, and what are the Oppo- 
 Jites or Contraries of it ; for many Things are to 
 be known both by their contrary and their kindred 
 Ideas. 
 
 If the Thing we difcourfe of be a mere Mode, we 
 muft inquire whether it belongs to Spirits or Bodies.; 
 whether it be a phyfical or moral Mode : If moral, 
 then we muft coniider its Relation to God, to our 
 Selves, to our Neighbours ; its Reference to this 
 Life, or the Life to come. If it be a Virtue, we 
 muft feek what are the Principles of it, what are 
 the Rules of it, wfcat are the Tendencies of it, and 
 what are the falfe Virii&s that counterfeit it, and 
 what are the real Vices that oppofe it, what are 
 the Ev Us which attend the Neg lecl of it, and what 
 are the Rewards of the Praclice of it, b oth here 
 and hereafter* 
 
 I 4 If 
 
126 LOGIGK *. OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 If the Subject be hiftorical, or a Matter of Facl^ 
 we may then inquire whether the action was done at 
 all; whether it was done in fuck a Manner, or by 
 fuck Perfons as is reported ; at wkat Time it was 
 done; in wkat Place, by what Motive, and for 
 what Defgn ; what is the Evidence of the Facl, who 
 are the WitneJJes ; what is their Characler and Cre- 
 dibility ; what Signs there are of fuch a Facl ; what 
 concurrent Circwnftances which may either fupport 
 the Truth of it, or render it doubtful. 
 
 In order to make due Inquiries into all thefe, 
 and many other Particulars which go towards the 
 complete and comprehenfive Idea of any Being, the 
 Science of Ontology is exceeding necefiary. This is 
 •what was wont to be called the firfl Part of Met a- 
 phyficks in the Peripateiick Schools. It treats of 
 Being in its mofi general Nature, and of all its Af- 
 feclions and Relations. I confefs the Old Popifh 
 Schoolmen have mingled a Number of ufelefs Sub- 
 tilties with this Science ; they have exhaufted their 
 own Spirits, and the Spirits of their Readers, in 
 many laborious and intricate Trifles ; and fome of 
 their Writings have been fruitful of Names without 
 Ideas, which have done much Injury to the facred 
 Study of Divinity. Upon this Account many of 
 the Moderns have mofl unjuflly abandoned the 
 whole Science at once, and thrown Abundance of 
 Contempt and Raillery upon the very Name of 
 Metapkyficks ; but this Contempt and Cenfure is 
 very unreafonable, for. this Science, fcparated from 
 fome Ariftotelian Fooleries, and fcholaftick Subtil- 
 ties, is fo necefiary to a diftfnet Conception, folid 
 Judgment, and juft Reafoning on many Subjects., 
 that fometimes it is introduced as a Part ofLogick, 
 ami not without Reafon. And thofe who utterly 
 defpife and ridicule it, either betray their own Ig- 
 norance, or will be fuppofed to make their Wit 
 
 and 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 127 
 
 and Banter a Refuge and Excufe for their own 
 Lazincfs. Yet thus much I would add, that the 
 later Writers of Ontology are generally the Deft on 
 this Account, becaufe they have left out much of 
 the ancient Jargon, See the Brief Scheme of Onto- 
 logy in the Philofophical E/fays, by I. Watts. 
 
 Here let it be noted, that it is neither ufeful, ne- 1 
 ceflary, or poffible to run through all the Modes, 
 Circumjlances, and Relations of every Subject we 
 take in Hand ; but in Ontology we enumerate a 
 great Variety of them, that fo a judicious Mind 
 may choofe what are thofe Circumjlances, Relations 9 
 and Properties of any Subject, which are mod ne- 
 ceffary to the prefent Defign of him that fpeaks or 
 writes, either to explain, to illuftrate, or to prove 
 the Point. 
 
 As we arrive at the complete Knowledge of an, 
 Idea in all its Parts, by that Acl of the Mind 
 which is called Divi/ion, fo we come to a compre- 
 henfive Conception of a Thing in its feveral Pro- 
 perties and Relations, by that Acl of the Mind 
 which is called Abftraclion ; that is, we confider 
 each (ingle Relation or Property of the Subject 
 alone, and thus we do as it were withdraw and fe- 
 parate it in our Minds, both from the Subjecl itfelf, 
 as well as from other Properties and Relations, in 
 order to make a fuller Observation of it. 
 
 This Acl of Abftraclion is faid to be twofold, 
 either Precifive or Negative. 
 
 Precifive Abftraclion is, when we confider thofe 
 Things apart which cannot really exifl apart ; as 
 when we confider a Mode, without confidering its 
 Sub/lance and Subjecl, or one ejfential Mode, with- 
 out another. Negative Ab/lraclion is, when we 
 confider one Thing feparate from another, which 
 may alfo exifl without it ; and when wc conceive of 
 a Subjecl without conceiving of its accidental Modes 
 
 or 
 
128 logick: or, the £part r. 
 
 or Relations ; or when we conceive of .one Accident 
 without thinking of another. If I think of read- 
 ing or writing without the exprefs Idea of fome 
 Man, that is precifive Abjlraclion ; or if I think of 
 the Attraction of Iron , without the exprefs Idea of 
 fome particular magnetick Body. But when I think 
 of a Needle without any Idea of its Sharpnefs, this 
 is negative Abftraclion ; and it is the fame when I 
 think of its Sharpnefs without considering its 
 Length 
 
 SECT. X. 
 
 Of the exienfive Conception of Things, and of 
 Diflribution. 
 
 AS the Completenefs of an Idea refers to the fe- 
 veral Parts that compofe it, and the Compre- 
 henfion of an Idea includes its various Properties, 
 fo the Extenfion of an Idea denotes the various Sorts 
 or Kinds of Beings to which the fame Idea belongs : 
 And if we would be fully acquainted with a Sub- 
 jec% we muft obferve, 
 
 This fourth Rule to direct our Conception?, 
 namely, Conceive of Things in all their Extenfion ; 
 that is, we muft fcarch out the various Species, or 
 Special Natures which are contained under it, as a 
 Genus or gener<d JS'ature. If we would know the 
 Nature of an Animal perfectly, we muft take Cog- 
 nizance of Beafls, Birds, FiJJies, and Infecls, as well 
 as Men, all which are contained under the general 
 Nature and Name of Animal. 
 
 As 
 
€H. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 120 
 
 As an integral Whole is diftinguifhed into its fe- 
 veral Parts by Divifion, fo the Word Diftribution 
 is moil properly ufed when we ctfftinguifh an uni- 
 verfal Whole into its feveral Kinds or Species : And 
 perhaps it had been better if this Word had been 
 always confined to this Signification, though it 
 mufl be confeffed, that we frequently fpeak of the 
 Divifion of an Idea into its feveral Kinds, as well as 
 into its feveral Parts. 
 
 The Rules of a good Diftribution are much the 
 fame with thofe which we have before applied to 
 Divifion j which may be juft repeated again in the 
 briefeft Manner, in order to give Examples of 
 them. 
 
 I. Rule. Each Part fmgly taken muft contain lefs 
 than the Whole, but all the Parts taken collectively, 
 or together, mufl contain neither more nor lefs 
 than the Whole ; or, as Logicians fometimes ex- 
 prefs it, the Parts of the Divifion ought to exhaujl 
 the whole Thing which is divided. So Medicine is 
 juflly diftributed into Prophylaclick, or the Art of 
 preferving Health ; and Therapeutick, or the Art of 
 reftoring Health; for there is no other Sort of 
 Medicine befides thefe two. But Men are not well 
 diftributed into tall or Jhort, for there are fome of 
 a middle Stature. 
 
 II. Ride. In all Diftribution s we iliould firft con- 
 fider the larger and more immediate Kinds or Spe- 
 cies, or Ranks of Being, and not divide a Thing 
 at once into the more minute and remote. A Ge- 
 nus iliould not at once be divided into Individuals, 
 or even into the low eft Species, if there be a Species 
 
 fuperior. Thus it would be very improper to di- 
 vide Animal into Trout, Lobfter, Eel, Dog, Bear, 
 Eagle, Dove, Wormy and Butterfly, for thefe are 
 
 inferior 
 
130 logick: oe, the [past i. 
 
 inferior Kinds ; whereas Animal ought firft to be 
 difiributed into Man, Beaft, Bird, Fijh, Infecl; and 
 then Beaft mould be diiiributed IntoDog, Bear, 8tc. 
 Bird into Eagle, Dove, 8cc. Fijh into Trout, Eel, 
 hobjler, he. 
 
 It is irregular alfo to join any inferior Species in 
 the fame Rank or Order with the fuperior ; as if 
 we fhould diftinguifh Animals into Birds, Bears, and 
 Oyjlers, &c. it would be a ridiculous Diftribution. 
 
 III. Rule. The feveral Parts of a Diftribution 
 ought to be oppofite ; that is, one Species or Clafs 
 of Beings in the fame Rank of Division, ought not 
 to contain or include another; fo Men ought not 
 to be divided into the Rich, the Boor, the Learned, 
 and the Tall; for poor Men may be both learned 
 and tall, and fo may the Rich. 
 
 But it will be objected, are not animated Bodies 
 rightly diftributcd into Vegetative and Animal, or 
 (as they are ufually called) Senfitive? Now the 
 fenfitive contains the vegetative Nature in it, for 
 Animals grow as Well. as Plants. I anfvver, that in 
 this, and all fuch Diftributions, the Word vegeta- 
 tive fignifies merely vegetative ; and in this Senfe 
 Vegetative will be fufficiently oppofite to Animal, 
 for it cannot be faid of an Animal, that it contains 
 mere Vegetation in the Idea of it. 
 
 IV. Rule. Let not Subdivisions be. .too numerous, 
 without Neceffity ; therefore I think Quantity is 
 better diflinguiflied at once into & Line, a Surface, 
 and a Solid ; than to fay, as Ramus does, that Quan- 
 tity is either a Line, or a Thing lined-, and a Tiling 
 lined is either a Surface or a Solid. 
 
 V. Rule. Diflribute every Subject according to 
 the fpecial pcfign you have in View, fo far as is 
 
 neceffary 
 
CH. VI.] EIGHT USE OF REASON. 131 
 
 neceftary or ufeful to your prefent Inquiry. Thus 
 a Politician distributes Mankind according to their 
 civil Characters into the Riders and the Ruled: 
 and a Fhyfician divides them into the Sick or the 
 Healthy, but a Divine distributes them into Turks, 
 Heathens, Jews, or Christians. 
 
 Here note, That it is a very ufelefs Thing to dif- 
 tribute any Idea into fuch Kinds or Members as 
 have no different Properties to be fpoken of; as it is 
 mere trifling to divide right .Angles into fuch whoje' 
 Legs are equal, and whqfe Legs are unequal, for as 
 to the mere right Angles they have no different 
 Properties. 
 
 "VI. Rule. In all your Distributions obferve the 
 Nature of Things with great Exactnefs ; and do 
 not affect any particular Form of Distribution, as 
 fome Perfons have done, by dividing every Genus 
 into two Species, or into three Species ; whereas Na- 
 ture is infinitely various, and human Affairs and 
 human Sciences have as great a Variety, nor is there 
 any one Form of Distribution that will exactly fuit 
 with all Subjects. 
 
 Note, It is to this Doctrine of Distribution of a 
 Genus into its fever at Species, we muft alfo refer the 
 Distribution of a Caufe according to its feveral Ef» 
 feels, as fome Medicines are heating, fame are cooling ; 
 or an Effecl, when it is distinguished by its Caufes ; 
 as Faith is either halt upon divine Teftirnony or hu- 
 man. It is to this Head we refer particular artifi- 
 cial Bodies, when they are diStinguiStied according 
 to the Matter they are made of, as a Statue is either 
 of Brafs, of Marble, or Wood, &c. and any other 
 Beings, when they are diitinguifhed according to 
 their End and Defign, as the Furniture of Body or 
 is d; her for Ornament or Ufe. To this Head 
 
 alio 
 
332 iogick: or, the [part i. 
 
 alfo we refer Subjecls when they are divided accord- 
 ing to their Modes or Occidents ; as Men are either 
 merry, or grave, or fad ; and Modes, when they are 
 divided by their Subjects, as Dijlempers belong to the 
 Fluids, or to the/olid Parts of the Animal, 
 
 It is alfo to this Place we reduce the Propofals of 
 a Difficulty under its various Cafes, whether it be in 
 Speculation or Practice : As, to (hew the Reafon 
 of Sunbeams burning Wood, whether it be done by a 
 convex Glafs or a concave : or to (hew the Conjlruc- 
 tion and Menfuration of Triangles, whether you have 
 two Angles and a Side given, or two Sides and an 
 Angle, or only three Sides. Here it is neceflary 
 to diftribute or divide a Difficulty in all its Cafes, in 
 order to gain a perfect Knowledge of the Subject 
 you contemplate. 
 
 It might be obferved here, that Logicians have 
 fometimes given a Mark or Sign to diftinguifti when 
 it is an integral Whole, that is divided into its Parts 
 or Members, or when it is a Genus, an univerfal 
 Whole, that is diftributed into its Species and Indi- 
 viduals. The Rule they give is this: Whenfoever 
 the whole Idea can be directly and properly affirmed 
 of each Part, as a Bird is an Animal, a Fifli is an 
 Animal, Bucephalus is a Horfe, Peter is a Man, then 
 it is a Diftribution of a Genus into its Species, or a 
 Species in its Individuals ; But when the Whole 
 cannot be thus directly affirmed concerning every 
 Part, then it is a Divifion of an Integral into its 
 feveral Parts or Members-, as we cannot fay the 
 Head, the Breaft, the Hand, or the Foot is an Ani- 
 mal, but we fay, the Head is a Part of the Animal, 
 and the Foot is another Part. 
 
 This Rule may hold true generally in corporeal 
 Beings, or perhaps in all Subftanccs : But when we 
 fay the Fear of God is Wifdom, andfo is human Ci- 
 vility, Criticifm is true Learning, and fo is P hilar 
 
 fophy ; 
 
CH. V*.] RIGHT USE OF KEASXfrT. 133 
 
 fopJty: To execute a Murderer is Jujlice, andtofave 
 and defend the Innocent is Juftice too. In thefe Cafes 
 it is not fo eafily determined, whether an integral 
 Whole be divided into its Parts, or an Univerfal 
 into its Species : For the Fear of God may be called 
 either one Part or one Kind of Wifdom : Criticifm 
 is one Part, or one Kind of Learning : And the 
 Execution of a Murderer may be called a Species of 
 Juftice, as well as a Part of it. Nor indeed is it 
 a Matter of great Importance to determine this 
 Controverfy. 
 
 SECT. XI. 
 
 Of an orderly Conception of Things. 
 
 THE laft Rule to direct our Conceptions, is, that 
 we fhould rank a?id place them in a proper Me- 
 thod and juft Order. This is of neceflary Ufe to 
 prevent Con m (ion ; for as a Trader who never 
 places his Goods in his Shop or Warehoufe in a 
 regular Order, nor keeps the Accounts ofiiis buy- 
 ing^ and felling, paying and receiving, in a juft 
 Method, is in the utmofi Danger of plunging all 
 his Affairs into Confufion and Ruin : fo a Student 
 who is in the Search of Truth, or an Author or 
 Teacher who communicates Knowledge to others, 
 will very much obftruct his Defign, and confound 
 his own Mind or the Minds of his Hearers, unleffc 
 he range his Ideas in juft Order. 
 
 If we would therefore become fuccefsful Learners 
 or Teachers, we mud not conceive of Th tugs in a 
 confufed Heap ^ but difpofe our Ideas in fome ce?~tam 
 Method, which may be moft eafy and ufeful both 
 for the Underftanding and Memory ; and be fure, 
 
 as 
 
134 LOGICKt OR, theJ ("part i. 
 
 as much as may be, to follow the Nature of Things^ 
 for which many Rules might be given, namely, 
 
 1. Conceive as much as you can of the EJfent'iah 
 of any Subject, before you confider its Accidentals. 
 
 2. Survey the firft general Parts and Properties 
 of any Subject, before you extend your Thought* 
 to difcourfe of the particular Kinds or Species of it* 
 
 3. Contemplate Things firft in their own Jimpk 
 Natures, and afterwards view them in Compofition 
 with other Things ; unlefs it be your prefent Pur- 
 pofe to take a compound Being to Pieces, in order to 
 find out, or to (hew the Nature of it, by fearching 
 and difcovering of what Simples it is compofed. 
 
 4. Confider the abfolute Modes or Affections of 
 any Being as it is in itfelf, before you proceed to 
 confider it relatively, or to furvey the various Rela- 
 tions in which it ftands to other Beings, &c. 
 
 Note, Thefe Rules chiefly belong to the Method 
 of Inftruclions which the Learned called Syntheiick. 
 
 But in the Regulation of our Ideas, there is fel- 
 dom an abfolute NecefTity that we fhould place 
 them in this or the other particular Method ;. It is 
 poffible in fome Cafes that many Methods may be 
 equally good, that is, may equally affift the Un- 
 derftanding and the Memory : To frame a Method 
 exquifitely accurate, according to the ft net Nature 
 of Things, and to maintain this x\ccuracy from the 
 beginning to the End of a Treatife, is moil rare 
 and difficult Thing, if not impoflible. But a larger 
 Account of Method would be very improper in this 
 Place, left we anticipate what belongs to the fourth 
 Part of Logic k. 
 
 SECT. 
 
CH. VI. j RIGHT USE OP REASON, 13$ 
 
 sect, m 
 
 Thefe five Rules of Conception exemplified* 
 
 IT may be ufeful here to give a Specimen of the 
 five fpecial Rules to direelour Conceptions, which 
 have been the chief Subject of this long Chapter 
 and reprefent them practically at one View. 
 
 Suppofe the Theme of our Difcourfe were the 
 PaJJions of the Mind, 
 
 lfi 9 To gain a clear and dijlincl Idea of PaJfion> 
 we muft define both the Name and the Thing. 
 
 To begin with the Definition of the Name. We 
 are not here to underftand the Word Paffion in its 
 vulgar and mod limited Senfe, as it fignifies merely 
 Anger or Fury ; nor do we take it in its molt ex- 
 teniive philosophical Senfe, for the fufaining the 
 Aclion of an Agent ; but in the more limited phi !o- 
 fophical Senfe, Pajfions lignify the various Affecliom 
 of the Mind, fuch as Admiration, Love, or Hatted i 
 this is the Definition of the Name. 
 
 We proceed to the Definition of the Thing. Paf- 
 fion is defined a Sen/at ion of forne fpecial Commotion 
 in animal Nature, occafioned by the Minors Percef> + 
 tion of fome ObjecJ fuited to excite that Commotion. 
 * Here the Genus, or general Nature of Paffion ■, 
 
 * Since this was written, I have puhliihed a ihort Treatife 
 of the PaJJions, wherein I havefo far varied from this Definition 
 as to call them fcnfille Commotions of our tubole Nature, both Soul 
 and Body, occafumed by the Mind* s Perceptions of fome Objects, &c* 
 I made this Alteration in the Defcription of the Faiiions'in that 
 Book chiefly to include, in a more explicit Manner* the Paf- 
 fions of Dffire and Aversion, which are A6ts of Folithn rather 
 than Sevfntions. Yet fince fome Commotions of animal Mature 
 attend all the Paffions, and iince there is always* a Senlation of 
 thefe Commotions, I fhall not change the Definition i have 
 written here ; for this will agree to all the Paffions, whether 
 they include any Act of Volition or not ; nor indeed is the Mat- 
 ter of any great Importance. Nov. 17, 1728, 
 
 K i$ 
 
136 XOGICK ! OR, THE [PART £ 
 
 is a Senfation of Jome Jpecial Commotion in animal 
 Nature ; and herein, it agrees with Hanger, Thirft, 
 Pain, &c. The ejfential Difference of it is, that 
 this Commotion arijes from a Thought or Perception 
 of the Mind) and hereby it is diftinguifhed from 
 Hunger, Thirft, or Pain. 
 
 Icily, We muft conceive of it completely, or fur- 
 vey the feveral Parts that compofe it. Thefe are 
 (1.) The Mind's Perception of Jome ObjecJ. (2.) The 
 confequent Ruffle, or f pedal Commotion of the Nerves, 
 and Blood, and animal Spirits* And (3.) The Sen- 
 Jation of this inward Commotion* 
 
 3dly, We mull confider it comprehenfively, in its 
 various Properties, The moil effential Attributes 
 that make up its Nature have been already men- 
 tioned under the foregoing Heads. Some of the 
 moil confiderable Properties that remain are thefe, 
 namely, That Pajfion belongs to all Mankind, in 
 greater or leflfer Degrees : It is not conjlantly prejent 
 with us, but upon Jome certain Occajion: It is ap- 
 pointed by our Creator for various ujeful Ends and 
 Purpojes, namely, to give us Vigour in the Pur- 
 fuit of what is good and agreeable to us, or in the 
 Avoidance of what is hurtful : // is very proper 
 for our State of Trial in this World : It is not utterly 
 to be rooted out of our Nature, but to be moderated 
 and governed according to Rules of Virtue and Reli- 
 gion, &c. 
 
 Athly, We muft take Cognizance of the various 
 Kinds of it, which is called an 'extenjive Conception 
 of it. If the Object which the Mind perceives be 
 very uncommon, it excites the Paflion of Admira* 
 tion : If the Object nppear agreeable, it raif'es Love i 
 If the agreeable Object be abjent and attainable, it 
 is Dejire : if likely to be attained, it excites Hope : 
 If unattainable \ D.efpair : If it be prejent and pof- 
 Jejfed, it is the Pajjion of Joy : If loji, it exe'ites 
 Sofroitf : If the Object be dijagreeubk. it caufes in 
 
 general 
 
Cft. VI.] RIGHT USS OP REASON. 137 
 
 general Hatred or Averjion: If it be abfent, and 
 yet we are in Danger of it, it raifes our Fear : If 
 it be prefent, it is Sorrow and Sadnefs, 8cc. 
 
 5^/y, All thefe Things, and many more which/ 
 go to compofe a Treatife on this Subject, mufi be 
 placed in their proper Order : A flight Specimen of 
 which is exhibited in this fhort Account of '-Pa/fion, 
 and which that admirable Author Defcartes has 
 treated of at large ; though for want of Sufficient 
 Experiments and Obfervations in natural Philofo- 
 phy, there are fome few Miltakes in his Account 
 of animal Nature. 
 
 SECT. XIII. 
 
 An lllujlratlon of thefe five Rules by Similitudes, 
 
 THUS we have brought the firft Part of Logick 
 to a Conclufion : And it may not be impro- 
 per here to reprefent its Excellencies (Co far as we 
 have gone) by general Hints of its chief Defign 
 and Ufe, as well as by a various Companfon of it 
 to thofe Inftruments which Mankind have invent- 
 ed for their feveral Conveniencies and Improve- 
 ments. 
 
 The Dejign of Logick is not to furnifh us with 
 the perceiving Faculty, but only to direcl and 
 affift us in the Ufe of it : It doth not give us the 
 Object of our Ideas, but only cafts fuch a Light 
 on thofe Objects which Nature furnifhes us with, 
 that they may be the more clearly and ditrinctly 
 known : It doth not add new Parts or Properties 
 to Things, but it difcovers the various Parts, Pro- 
 perties, Relations, and Dependencies of one Thing 
 upon another, and by ra?iking all Things under 
 general and fpecial Heads, it renders the Nature, 
 or any of the Properties, Powers, and Ufes of a 
 
 K 2 Thing, 
 
138 LOGICK t OR, THE [PART I. 
 
 Thing, more eafy to be found out, when we feek 
 in what Rank of Beings it lies, and wherein it agrees 
 with, and wherein it differs from others. 
 
 If any Comparifons would illuftrate this, it may 
 be thus reprefented. 
 
 I. When Logick affifts us to attain a clear and 
 diftincl Conception of the Nature of Things by De- 
 finition, it is like thofe Glajfes whereby we behold 
 fuch Objects diftinctly, as by Reafon of their 
 Smallnefs, or their great Diftance, appear in Con- 
 fulion to the naked Eye : So the Tele/cope difcovers 
 to us diftant Wonders in the Heavens, and (hews 
 the milky Way, and the bright cloudy Spots in a very 
 dark Sky, to be a Collection of little Stars, which 
 the Eye unaffifted beholds in mingled Confufion. 
 So when Bodies are too fmall for our Sight to fur- 
 vey them diftinctly, then the Micro/cope is at hand 
 for our Affiftance, to {hew us all the Limbs and 
 Features of the mojl minute Animals,, with great 
 Clearnefs and Diftinction. 
 
 II. When we are taught by Logick to view a 
 Thing completely in all its Parts, by the Help of 
 Divifion, it has the Ufe of an anatomical Knife , 
 which difTects an animal Body, and feparates the 
 Veins, Arteries, Nerves, Mufcles, Membranes, &c. 
 and fhews us the feveral Parts which go to the Com- 
 pofition of a complete Animal. 
 
 III. When Logick inftructs us to furvey an 
 Object comprehenfively in all the Modes, Properties, 
 Relations, Faces, and Appearances of it, it is of the 
 fame Ufe as a terreftrial Globe, which turning round 
 on its Axis, reprefents to us all the Variety of Lands 
 and Seas, Kingdoms, and Nations on the Surface of 
 the Earth, in a very fhort Succeflion of Time 
 fhews the fituations and various Relations of them 
 
 to 
 
 v. 
 
CH. VI.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 139 
 
 to each other, and gives a comprehenfive View of 
 them in Miniature. 
 
 IV. When this Art teaches us to dlfirtbute any 
 extenfeve Idea into its different Kinds or Species, it 
 may be compared to the prifmatick Glafs, that re-* 
 ceives the Sun-beams or Rays of Light, which 
 feem to be uniform when falling upon it, but it 
 feparates and diftributes them into their different 
 Kinds and Colours, and ranks them in their pro- 
 per Succeffion. 
 
 Or if we defcend to Sid>divifions and fubordinate 
 Ranks of Being, then Diftribution may alfo be faid 
 to form the Refemblance of a natural Tree, where- 
 in the Genus or general Idea frauds for the Root or 
 Stock, and the feveral Kinds or Species, and Indi- 
 viduals, are diftributed abroad, and reprefented in 
 their Dependence and Connection, like the feveral 
 Boughs, Branches, and lejfer Shoots. For Inftance, 
 let Animal be the Root of a logical Tree, the Re- 
 femblance is feen by mere Infpeclion, though the 
 Eoot be not placed at the Bottom of the Page. 
 
 K 3 Animal 
 
140 
 
 £0GICK t OR, THE 
 
 [PART t, 
 
 Man 
 
 Philip. 
 James. 
 Peter. 
 Thomas, &c. 
 
 Horfe 
 
 C Trot. 
 
 £ Bayard, &c B 
 
 Be^Sf" -ft"* 
 
 • |^ J Spaniel. 
 
 j Greyhound. 
 
 l 
 
 Bear. &fa. I n \ c ,' 
 3 ^Beagle, &c. 
 
 Animal^ Bird 
 
 Fifli 
 
 C Eagle 
 1 Lark 
 
 ^ Durk — 
 (^Gooie, &fc, 
 
 Trout 
 Whale 
 Oyfler, SV. 
 
 EnglifrT 
 Mufcovy. 
 Hook-Bill, &p, 
 
 Infeft J 
 
 f Flying- 
 
 I 
 
 Creeping- 
 
 CWafp. 
 
 £Bee, &c. 
 
 C Worm. 
 
 < Ant, 
 
 C Caterpillar, &c. 
 
 The fame Similitude will ferve alfo to illufTrate 
 the Divifwn and Subdivifion of an integral Whole 
 into its feveral Parts. 
 
 When Logiek di reels us to place all our Ideas 
 in a proper Method^ mofr convenient both for In- 
 firuclion and Memory, it cloth the fame Service 
 as the Cafes of well-contrived Shelves in a large Li- 
 
C VI,] KIGHT USE OF REASON. 141 
 
 Irary, wherein Folios, Quartos, Oclavos, and lef- 
 fer Volumes, are difpofed in fuch exact Order under 
 the particular Heads of Divinity^ Hi/lory, Mathe- 
 :ks, ancient and mifcellaneous Learning, &c. 
 that the Student knows where to find every Book, 
 and lias them all as it were within his Command at 
 once 5 hecaufe of the exacl Order wherein they are 
 placed. 
 
 The Man who has fuch Afliftances as thefe at 
 hand, in order to manage his Conceptions and regu- 
 late his Ideas, is well prepared to improve his 
 Knowledge 5 and to join thefe Ideas together in. a. 
 regular Manner by Judgment, which is the fecond 
 Operation of the Mind, and will be the Subject of 
 fecond Part of Logick. 
 
 K4 THE 
 
142 LOGICK : OK, THF [part lie 
 
 • v-^ 
 
 THE 
 
 SECOND PART 
 
 OF 
 
 L O G I C K, 
 
 Of Judgment and Profofitpn. 
 
 WHEN the Mind has got Acquaintance with 
 Things by framing Ideas of them, it pro- 
 ceeds to the next Operation, and that is, to comr 
 pare thefe Ideas together, and to join them by 
 Affirmation, or disjoin then by Negation, according 
 as we find them to agree or difagree. This Act of 
 the Mind is called Judgment; as when we have by 
 Perception obtained the Ideas of Plato, a Philofo- 
 pher, Man, Innocent, we form thefe Judgments \ 
 Plato was a Phdofopher ; no Man is innocent. 
 
 Some Writers have aflerted, that Judgment con- 
 iifts in a mere Perception of the Agreement or Dif- 
 ftgreement of Ideas. But f rather think there is an 
 Act of the Will (at lead in mod Cafes) neceflary 
 to form a Judgment ; for though we do perceive or 
 think we perceive Ideas to agree or difagree, yet 
 we may fometimes refrain from judging or aflenting 
 
 to 
 
RIGHT USE OP REASON; 14S 
 
 to the Perception, for fear left the Perception 
 (hould not be fufficiently clear, and we fhouid be 
 miftaken : And I am well aflured at other Times^ 
 that there are Multitudes of Judgments formed, and 
 a firm Aflent given to Ideas joined or disjoined, 
 before there is any clear Perception whether they 
 agree or diftgree ; and this is the Reafon of fo many 
 falfe Judgments or Miftakes among Men. Both 
 'thefe Practices are a Proof that Judgment has fome- 
 thing of the Will in it, and does net merely confift 
 in Perception, fince we fometimes judge (though 
 unhappily) without perceiving, and fometimes we 
 perceive without immediate judging. 
 
 As an Idea is the Refult of our Conception or 
 Apprehenfion, fo a Proportion is the Effect of Judg- 
 ment. The foregoing Sentences, which are Ex- 
 amples of the Act of Judgment, are properly called 
 proportions. Plato is a Philofopher, &c. 
 
 Here let us confider, 
 
 1 . The general Nature of a Propofition, and the 
 farts of which it is compofed. 
 
 2. The various Divi/ions or Kinds of Proportions. 
 
 3. The Springs of falfe Judgment, or the Doclrint 
 of Prejudices. 
 
 4. General Direclions to affift us in judging aright \ 
 
 5. Special Rules to direel us in judging particular 
 QbjecJs. 
 
 CHAP, 
 
144 LOGiCK : (m, thj* [part ir. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Nature of a Proportion, and its fever al 
 Parts. 
 
 A Proportion is a Sentence wherein two or more 
 Ideas or Terms are joined or disjoined by one 
 Affirmation .or Negation, as Plato was. a Philoso- 
 pher : Every jingle is formed by two Lines meeting : 
 ]$o Man living on Earth can he completely happy. 
 When there are ever fo many Ideas or Terms in 
 the Sentence, yet if they are joined or disjoined 
 merely by one Angle Affirmation or Negation, they 
 may be refolved into feveral Propositions which are 
 Implied therein, as will appear hereafter. 
 
 In defcribing a Propofition, I ufe the Word Terms 
 as well as Ideas., beeaufe when mere Ideas are join- 
 ed in the Mind without Words, it is rather called 
 a Judgment ; but when clothed with Words, it is 
 called a Proportion, even though it be in the Mind 
 only, as well as when it is exprefled by fpeaking 
 or writing. 
 
 There are three Things which go to the Nature 
 and Conftitution of a Proportion,' namely, th&'Sub* 
 jeel, the Predicate, and the Copula. 
 
 The SubjecJ of a Proportion is that concerning 
 which any Thing is affirmed or denied : So Plato, 
 Angle, Man living on Earth, are the Subjects of the 
 foregoing Proportions. 
 
 The Predicate is that which is affirmed or de-r 
 nied of the Subject ; fo Philofoplier is the Predicate 
 of the fir ft Proportion ; formed by two Lines meet- 
 ing, is the Predicate of the fecond ; capable of 
 
 . being 
 
jEH. I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 145 
 
 being completely happy, the proper Predicate of the 
 third. 
 
 The Suhjecl and Predicate of a Propofition taken 
 together, are called the Matter of it ; for thefe are 
 the Materials of which it is rnade. 
 
 The Copula is the Form of a Proportion ; it re- 
 prefents the Acl of the Mind affirming or denying, 
 and it is exprefled by the Words am, art, is, are, 
 &c. or am not, art not, is not, are not, Sec. 
 
 It is not a Thing of Importance enough to create 
 a Difpute, whether the Words no, none, ?iot, never, 
 &c. which disjoin the Idea or Terms in a negative 
 Propoficion, fhall be called a Part of the Subject of 
 the Copula, or of the Predicate. Sometimes per- 
 haps they may feem moft naturally to be included 
 jn one, and fometimes in another of thefe, though a 
 Proportion is ufually denominated affirmative or. 
 negative from its Copula, as hereafter. 
 
 Note 1. Where each of thefe Parts of a Propor- 
 tion is not exprefled diftinclly in lb many Words, 
 yet they are all underftood, and implicitly contain- 
 ed therein ; as Socrates difputed, is a complete Pro- 
 portion, for it lignifies Socrates was difputing. So 
 / die, iignifies / am dying. I can write, that is, 
 I am able to write. In Latin and Greek, one fingle 
 Word is many Times a complete Proportion. 
 
 Note 2. Thefe Words, am, art, is, &c. when 
 they are ufed alone without any other Predicate, 
 fignifying both the Acl of the Mind judging, which 
 includes the Copula, and iignify alfo aclual Exig- 
 ence, which is the Predicate of that Proportion. 
 So Rome is, rgnires Rome is exiftent : There are 
 fome Jirange Mo?ifters, that is, Jomejlrange Monfters 
 are exiftent : Carthage is no more, that is, Carthage 
 has no Being. 
 
 Note 3. The Subject and Predicate of a Propo- 
 rtion, are not always to be known and diftinguifti- 
 
 ed 
 
146 LOGICKt OR, THE [PART ir, 
 
 ,ed by the placing of the Words in the Sentence, 
 but by reflecting duly on the Senfe of the Words, 
 and on the Mind or Pefign of the Speaker or 
 Writer : As if I fay, in Africa there are many Lions, 
 I mean many Lions are exiStent in Africa : Many 
 JLions is the Subject, and exiflent in Africa is the 
 Predicate. It is proper for a Philofopher to under- 
 Jiand Geometry ; here the Word proper is the Pre- 
 dicate., and all the Reft is the Subject, except Is 
 the Copula. 
 
 Note A. The Subject and Predicate of a Proposi- 
 tion ought always to be two different Ideas, or two 
 .different Terms •; for where both the Terms and 
 Ideas are the fame, it is called an identical Propor- 
 tion, which is mere trifling, and cannot tend to 
 promote Knowledge ; fuch as, a Ride is a Ride, or 
 good Man is a good Man. 
 
 But there are fome Proportions, wherein the 
 Terms of the Subject and Predicate feem to be the 
 fame ; yet the Ideas are not the fame ; nor can 
 thefe be called purely identical or trifling Propo- 
 rtions ; fuch as Home is Home ; that is Home is a 
 convenient or delightful Place ; Socrates is Socrates 
 fiill ; that is, the Man Socrates isflill a Philofopher : 
 The Hero was not a Hero ; that is, the Hero did not 
 Jhew his Courage: What I have written, I have 
 written; that is, what I wrote 1 Jlill approve, and 
 ivill not alter it : What is done, is done ; that is, it 
 cannot he undone. It may be ealily obferved in thefe 
 Propositions the Term is equivocal, for in the Pre- 
 dicate it has a different Idea from what it has in the 
 Subjecl. 
 
 There are alfo fome Proportions wherein the 
 Terms of the Subject and Predicate differ, but the 
 Ideas are the fame ; and thefe are not merely iden- 
 tical ox trifling Propositions; as impudent is ffiame- 
 fefs j a Bdlow is a Wave j or Fluclus (in Latin) is a 
 
 Wave ; 
 
CH. II.] HIGKT USE OF REASON"; l4f 
 
 Wave ; a Globe is a round Body, In thefe Propofi- 
 tions either the Words are explained by a Defini- 
 tion of the Name, or the Ideas by a Definition of 
 the Thing, and therefore they are by no Means 
 ufelefs, when formed for this Purpofe. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the various Kinds of Propojitiom. 
 
 PRopofitions may be diirributed into various 
 Kinds, according to their Subjecl, their Copula , 
 their Predicate, their Nature or Compofition, their 
 Senfe, and their Evidence, which Diftributions will 
 be explained in the following Sections. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of univerfal, particular, indefinite, andfmgular 
 Propojitions. 
 
 PRopofitions may be divided according to their 
 Subjecl into univerfal and particular ; this is 
 lifually called a Divifton, arifing from the Quantity. 
 An univerfal Proportion is when the Subjecl: is 
 taken according to the whole of its Extenfion ; fo 
 if the Subjecl: be a Genus, or general Nature, it 
 includes all its Species or Kinds : If the Subject be 
 a Species, it includes all its Individuals. This 
 
 Univerfality 
 
146 tOGICK i OR, THg [PART lL 
 
 Univerfality is ufually fignifled by tnefe Words, 
 all, every, no, none, or the like ; as, All Men mufi 
 die : No Man is Almighty : Every Creature had a 
 Beginning. 
 
 A particular Proportion is when the Subject is 
 not taken according to its whole Extenfion ; that 
 is, when the Term is limited and retrained to 
 fame one or more of thofe Species or Individuals, 
 whofe general Nature it exprefies, but reaches not 
 to all ; and this is ufually denoted by the Words, 
 fome, many % a few, there are which, &c. as, Some 
 Birds can fmg well : Few Men are truly wife : There 
 are Parrots which will talk a hundred Things. 
 
 Under the general Nameofuniverfal Proportions, 
 we may juftly include thofe that arefingular, and 
 for the moft Part thofe that are indefinite alfo. 
 
 Kfingidar Proportion is when the Subject is a 
 lingular or individual Term or Idea ; as, Defcartes 
 was an ingenious Philofopher : Sir lfaac Newton has 
 far exceeded all his Predeceffors : The Palace at 
 Hampton Court is a pleafant Dwelling : This Day 
 is very cold. The Subject here muft be taken ac- 
 cording to the whole of its Extenfion, becaufe be- 
 ing an Individual, it can extend only to one, and 
 it muft therefore be regulated by the Laws of uni- 
 verfal Propofilmis. 
 
 An indefinite Propofition, is when no Note, either 
 of Univerfality or Particularity, is prefixed to a 
 Subject, which is in its own Nature general ; as a 
 Planet is ever changing its Place : Angels are noble 
 Creatures. Now this Sort of Propofition, efpecially 
 when it defcribcs the Nature of Things, is ufually 
 counted univerfal alfo, and it fuppofes the Subject 
 to be taken in its whole Extenfion : For if there 
 were any Planet which did not change its Place, or 
 any Angel that were not a noble Creature, thefe 
 Proportions would not be flriclly true. 
 
 Yet 
 
CH. II.] EIGHT USE 0£ HEASON"." 1£Q 
 
 Yet in order to fecure us againft Miflakes in 
 judging of univerfal, particular, and indefinite Pro- 
 portions, it is necefTary to make thefe following 
 Remarks. 
 
 I. Concerning univerfal Proportions, 
 
 Note I. Univerfal Terms may either denotes 
 metaphyfical, a phyfical, or a moral Univerfality. 
 
 A metaphyfical or mathematical U?iiverfality, is 
 when all the Particulars contained under any ge- 
 neral Idea have the fame Predicate belonging to 
 them without any Exception whatfoever ; or when 
 the Predicate is fo eiTential to the univerfal Subject, 
 that it deftroys the very Nature of the Subject 
 to be without it ; as, All Circles have a Center and 
 Circumference : All Spirits in their ozvn Nature are 
 immortal, 
 
 A phyfical oi 1 natural Univerfality, is when ac- 
 cording to the Order and common Courfe of Na- 
 ture, a Predicate agrees to all the Subjects of that 
 Kind, though there may be fome accidental and 
 preternatural Exceptions ; as, All Men ufe Words 
 to exprefs their Thoughts, yet dumb Perfons are ex- 
 cepted, for they cannot fpeak. All Beqfis have four 
 Feet, yet there may be fome Monfiers with five ; 
 or maimed, who have but three. 
 
 A moral Univerfality, is when the Predicate agrees 
 to the greater!: Part of the Particulars which are 
 contained under the univerfal Subject. ; as, All 
 Negroes are fiupid Creatures : All Men are govern- 
 ed by Affeclion ra :her than by Reafon : All the old 
 Romans loved their Country : And the Scripture 
 ufes this Language, when St. Paul tells us, The 
 Cretes are always Liars. 
 
 Now it is evident, that the fpecial or lingular 
 Conclufion cannot be inferred from a moral Uni- 
 verfality, nor always and infallibly , from a phyfical 
 
1 50 ioGick: ok, the [paiit : ii* 
 
 one, though it may always be inferred from a 
 Univerfality which is metaphyseal, without any 
 Danger or Poffibility of a Miftake. 
 
 Let it be obferved alfo, that ufually we make 
 little or no Di (Unction in common Language, be- 
 tween a Subject that is phyfeeally or meta^hyfically 
 univerfal. 
 
 Note 2. An univerfal Term is fometimes taken 
 collectively for all its particular Ideas united toge- 
 ther, and fometimes diftributively, meaning each of 
 them jingle alone. 
 
 Inftances of a eolleclive Univerfal are fuch as 
 thefe : All thefe Apples will Jill a Bujhel ; All the 
 Hours of the Night are fufficient for Sleep : All the 
 Rules of Grammar overload the Memory. In thefe 
 Proportions it is evident, that the Predicate be- 
 longs not to the Individuals fepar at ely, but to the 
 whole eolleclive Idea ; for we cannot affirm the 
 fame Predicate if we change the Word all into one 
 or into every, we cannot fay one Apple or every 
 Apple will fill a Bujhel) &c. Now fuch a eolleclive 
 Idea, when it becomes the Subject of a Propofition, 
 ought to be efteemed as one (ingle Thing, and this 
 renders the Propofition Jingular or indefinite, as we 
 fhall fhew immediately. 
 
 A diflrihutive Univerfal will allow the Word all 
 to be changed into every, or into one, and by this 
 Means is diftinguifhed from a eolleclive. 
 
 Inftances of a difiributive Univerfal are the mofi 
 common on every Occaiion ; as, all Men are mor- 
 tal : Every Man is a Sinner, &c. But in this Sort 
 of Univerfal there is a Diftribution to be made, 
 which follows in the Remark. 
 
 Note 3. When an univerfal Term is taken difi 
 tributively, fometimes it includes all the Individu- 
 als contained in its inferior Species: As when I 
 fay every Sieknefs has a Tendency to Death ; I mean 
 
 every 
 
GH. II.] RlGkT USE OF REASON. 151 
 
 Every individual Sicknefs, as well as every Kind. 
 But fometimes it includes no more than merely 
 each Species or Kind ; as when the Evangelift lays, 
 Chrift healed every Difeafe, or every Difeafe was 
 healed by Chrift ; that is, every Kind of Difeafe. 
 The frft of thefe, Logicians call the Diftribiition 
 of an Univerfal in jingula Generum ; the lafi is a 
 Difcribution in genera fmgulorum. But either of 
 them joined to the Subject render a Proportion 
 univerfal. 
 
 Note A. The Univerfality of a Subject is often 
 reftrained by a Part of the Predicate ; as when we 
 fay, All Men learn Wifdom by Experience : The lini* 
 verfal Subject, all Men, is limited to fignify only* 
 all thofe Men who learn Wifdom. The Scripture 
 alfo ufes this Sort of Language, when it fpeaks of 
 all Men being juflified by the Right eoufnefs of one, 
 Rom. v. J 8. that is 3 all Men who are juflified ob- 
 tain it in this Way. 
 
 Obferve here, That not only a metaphyfical or na- 
 tural, but a moral Univerfality alfo is oftentimes 
 to be reftrained by~ a Part of the Predicate ; as 
 when we fay, Ail the Dutch are good Seamen i All 
 the Italians are fubtll Politicians ; that is, thofe 
 among the Dutch that are Seamen are good Sea^ 
 men ; and thofe among the Italians who are Poli- 
 ticians, are fubtil Politicians, that is : they are ge- 
 nerally fo. 
 
 Note 5. The Univerfality of a Term is many 
 Times reftrained by the particular Time, Place, Cir- 
 cumflance, &c. or the Defign of the Speaker ; as 
 if we were in the City of London, and (ay, All the 
 Weavers went to present their Petition ; we mean 
 only Ail the Weavers who dwell in the Oily. So 
 when it is faicl in the Gofpel, All Men did marvel, 
 Mark v. 20. it reaches only to All thofe Men who 
 heard of the Miracles of onr Saviour. 
 
 L Here 
 
152 LOGICK : OR, THE [p ART II, 
 
 Here alio it fhould be obferved, that a moral 
 Univerfality is retrained by Time, Place, and other 
 Circum (lances, as well as a natural-, Co that by 
 thefe Means the Word all fometimes does not ex- 
 tend to a tenth Part of thofe who at firft might feem 
 to be included in that Word. 
 
 One Occafion of thefe Difficulties and Ambi- 
 guities that belong to univerfal P r op o fit ions, is the 
 common Humour and Temper of Mankind, who 
 generally have an Inclination to magnify their Ideas, 
 and to talk roundly and ' univ erf ally concerning any 
 Thing they fpeak of"; which has introduced uni- 
 verfal Terms of Speech into Cuftom and Habit,, in 
 all Nations, and ail Languages, more than Nature 
 or Reafon would diclate ; yet when this Cuitom is 
 introduced, it is not at ail improper to ufe this 
 Sort of Language in Solemn and facred Writings, 
 as well as in familiar Difcourfe. 
 
 II. Remarks concerning indefinite Propofitions. 
 
 Note J. Proportions carrying in them univerfal 
 Forms of Exprefiion, may fometimes drop the 
 Note of Oinverfality, and become indefinite, and 
 yet retain the fame univerfal Senfe, whether meta- 
 phyfical, natural, or moral ; whether collective or 
 dijiributive, 
 
 We may give Inftances of each of thefe. 
 
 Metaphyseal ; as, A Circle has a Center and Cir- 
 cumference, Natural ; as, Beafls have four Feet. 
 Moral ; as, Negroes are fiupid Creatures. Collec- 
 tive ; as, The Apples will fill a Bufhel. Diftributive ; 
 as, Men are mortal. 
 
 Note 2. There are many Cafes wherein a collec- 
 tive Idea is expreffed in a Proportion by an indefi- 
 nite Term, and that where it deferibes the Nature 
 or Quality of the Subject, as well as when it de- 
 clares (bine pafi Matters of Fa 61 -, as, Fir-trees fiet 
 
 in 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 153 
 
 in good Order will give a charming Profpedl: this 
 muft fignify a Collection of Fir-trees, for one makes 
 no Profpecl. In Matters of Fact this is more evi- 
 dent and frequent ; as, The Romans overcame the 
 Gauls : The Robbers fur rounded the Coach : The wild 
 Geefe flew over the Thames in the Form of a Wedge. 
 All thefe are collective Subjects. 
 
 Note 3, In indefinite Propofitions the Subject is 
 often retrained by the Predicate, or by the fpecial 
 Time, Place, or Circumftances, as well as in Pro- 
 pofitions which are exprefsly univerfal ; as, The 
 Chinefes are ingenious Silk-Weavers ; that is, thofe 
 Chinefes which are Silk-Weavers are ingenious at 
 their Work. The Stars appear to us when the Twi- 
 light is gone ; this can fignify no more than the 
 Stars which are above our Horizon. 
 
 Note 4. All thefe Reftrictions tend to reduce, 
 fome indefinite Propofitions almoft into particular^ 
 as will appear under the next Remarks. 
 
 III. Remarks concerning particular Propofitions. 
 
 Note 1. A particular Proposition may fometimes 
 be exprefTed indefinitely, without any Note of Par- 
 ticularity prefixed to the Subject ; as, In Times of 
 Coufufion Laws are not executed: Men of Virtue are 
 difgraced, and Murderers efcape ; that is, fome Laws, 
 fome Men of Virtue, fome Murderers : Unlefs we 
 fhould call this Language a moral Umverfality, 
 though I think it can hardly extend fo far. 
 
 Note 2. The Words fome, a few, &c. though 
 they generally denote a proper Particularity, yet 
 fometimes they exprefs a collective Idea ; as, Some 
 of the Enemies befct the General around : A few 
 Greeks would beat a thoufand Indians. 
 
 I conclude this Section with a few general Re- 
 marks on this Subject, namely, 
 
 6 
 
 L 3 Gen. 
 
154 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 
 
 Gen. Rem. I. Since univerfal^ indefinite, and par- 
 ticular Terms in the plural Number may either be 
 taken in a collective or dlftrihutive Senfe, there is 
 one fhort and eafy Way to find when they are col- 
 lective and when dlftrihutive, namely, If the plural 
 Number may be changed into the lingular, that is, 
 if the Predicate will agree to one (ingle Subject, it 
 is a dlftrihutive Idea ; if not, it is collective. 
 
 Gen. Rem. II. Univerfal and particular Terms in 
 the plural Number; fuch as, all, fame, few, many, 
 &c. when they are taken in their dlftrihutive Senfe, 
 reprefent fever al jingle Ideas ; and when they are 
 thus affixed to the Subjecl of a Proportion, render 
 that Proportion univerfal or particular, according 
 to the Univerfality or Particularity of the Terms 
 affixed. 
 
 Gen. Rem. III. Univerfal and particular Terms in 
 the plural Number, taken in their collective Senfe, 
 reprefent generally one collective Idea. 
 
 If this one collective Idea be thus reprefented 
 (whether by univerfal or particular Terms) as the 
 Subjecl: of a Proportion, which defcrihes the Nature 
 of a Thing, it properly makes either afingular or an 
 indefinite Propofition ; for the Words, all, fome, a few, 
 &e. do not then denote the Quantity of the Propo- 
 rtion, but are efteemed merely as Terms which 
 conned! thelndividuals together in order to compofe 
 one collective Idea. Obferve thefe In fiances ; All 
 the Sycamores in the Garden would make a large 
 Grove ; that is, this one Colledt ion of Sycamores, 
 which is njingnlar Idea. Some of the Sycamores in 
 the Garden would make a fine Grove: Sycamores would 
 make a noble Grove : In thefe Lift the Subjecl is ra- 
 ther indefinite thmfingular. But it is very evident, 
 that in each of thefe Propofitiohs the Predicate can 
 
 only 
 
€H. II.] EIGHT USE OF REASON'. 155 
 
 only belong to a colleclive Idea, and therefore the 
 Subject muft be efteemed a colleBlve. 
 
 If this collective Idea (whether reprefented by 
 univerfal or particular Terms) be ufed in defcribing 
 pafi Matters of Fact, then it is generally to be 
 efteemed ajtngular Idea, and renders the Propofi- 
 tion fingular ; as, All the Soldiers of Alexander made 
 hut a little Army ; A few Macedonians vanquifhed 
 the large Army of Darius : Some Grenadiers in the 
 Camp plundered all the neighbouring Towns. 
 
 Now we have (hewn before, that if a Proportion 
 defcribing the Nature of Things has an indefinite 
 Subject, it is generally to be evteemed univerfal in 
 its propofitional Senfe : And if it has a fingular 
 SubjecJ, in its propofitional Senfe it is always ranked 
 with Univerfals. 
 
 After all, we muft be forced to confefs, that the 
 Language of Mankind, and the Idioms of Speech, 
 are fo exceeding various, that it is hard to reduce 
 them to a few Rules ; and if we would gain a juft 
 and precife Idea of every univerfal, particular, and 
 indefinite Expreffion, we mud not only confider 
 the peculiar Idiom of the Language, but the Time, 
 the Place, the Occafion, the Circumftances of the 
 Matter fpoken of, and thus penetrate as far as pof- 
 fible into the Defign of the Speaker or Writer. 
 
 I 3 SECT, 
 
J 56 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II t 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of Affirmative and Negative Propositions. 
 
 TT JHEN a Proportion is confidered with re- 
 W gai'd to its Copula, it may be divided into 
 affirmative and negative ; for it is the Copula joins 
 or disjoins the two Ideas. Others call this a Divi- 
 lion of Proportions according to their Quality, 
 
 An Affirmative Prop ofit ion is when the Idea of the 
 Predicate is fuppofed to agree to the Idea of the 
 Subject, and is joined to it by the Word is, or are, 
 which is the Copula : as, All Men are Sinners. But 
 when the Predicate is not fuppofed to agree with 
 the Subject, and is disjoined from it by the Particles 
 is not, are not, &c. the Propofition is negative ; as, 
 Man is not innocent ; or, no Man is innocent. In an 
 Affirmative Propofition, we afiert one Thing to 
 belong to another, and, as it were, unite them in 
 Thought and Word : In Negative Proportions, we 
 feparate one Thing from another, and deny their 
 Agreement. 
 
 It may feem fomething odd, that two Ideas or 
 Terms are faid to be disjoined, as well as joined by 
 a Copula : But if we can but fuppofe the negative 
 Particles do really belong to the Copula of negative 
 Proportions, it takes away the Harfhnefs of the 
 expreffion : and to make it yet tofter, we may 
 confider that the Predicate and Subject: may be 
 properly faid to be joined in a Form of Words as a 
 Propofition, by connective Particles in Grammar 
 or Logick, though they are disjoined in their Senfe 
 and Signification. Every Youth, who has learned 
 his Grammar, knows there are fuch Words as 
 disjunctive Proportions. 
 
 Several 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON, 15/ 
 
 Several Things are worthy our Notice on this 
 Subject. 
 
 Note lit, As there are ibme Terms, or Words, 
 and Ideas, (as I have (hewn before) concerning 
 which it is hard to determine whether they are 
 negative or pojitive, \o there are fome Propofitions 
 concerning which it may be difficult to fay, whe- 
 ther they affirm or deny : As, when we fay, Plato 
 was no Fool : Cicero was 710 unjkdful Orator : 
 Cafar made no Expedition to ISlufcovy : An Ofler 
 has 710 Part like an Eel : It is not necejfary for a 
 Pliyjician to [peak French : and, for a Phyfician to 
 /peak French is medlefs. The Senfe of theie Propo- 
 rtions is very plain and eafy, though Logicians 
 might fquabble perhaps a whole Day, whether they 
 fhould rank them under the Names of Negative or 
 Affirmative. 
 
 Note 2d, In Latin and Englifh two Negatives 
 joined in one Sentence make an Affirmative ; as 
 when we declare No Man is 7iot mortal ; it is the 
 fame as though we faid, Ma?i is mortal. But in 
 Greek, and oftentimes in French, two Negatives 
 make but a ftronger Denial. 
 
 Note 3d, If the mere negative Term, not, be 
 added to the Copula of an umverfal Affirmative 
 Proposition, it reduces it to a particular Negative ; 
 as, All Men are not wife, Ggnifies the lame as, Some 
 Men are not wife. 
 
 Note 4th, In all affirmative Proportions, the 
 Predicate is taken in its whole Comprehenfion ; 
 that is, every cffential Part and Attribute of it is 
 affirmed concerning the Subject ; as when I fay, 
 A true Clirlflian is an honefi Man, every Thing that 
 belongs to Honefiy is affirmed concerning a true 
 Chriftian. 
 
 Note 5th. In all negative Proportions the Pre- 
 dicate is taken in its whole Extenfion ; that is, 
 
 L 4 every 
 
158 LOGTCK : OR, THE [p ART II. 
 
 every Species and Individual that is contained in 
 the general Idea of the Predicate, is utterly denied 
 concerning the Subject ; fo in this Proportion, 
 A Spirit is 120 1 an Animal, we exclude all Sorts and 
 Kinds and particular Animals whatfoever from the 
 Idea of a Spirit. 
 
 From thefe two hit Remarks we may derive this 
 Inference, that we ought to attend to the entire 
 Comprehenfion of our Ideas, and to the univerfal 
 JLxtenfio.1% of them, as far as we have proper Capa- 
 city for it, before we grow too confident in our 
 affirming or denying any Thing which "may have 
 the leaf! Darknefs, Doubt, or Difficulty attending 
 it : It is the want of this Attention that betrays us 
 into many MHlakes. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of the Oppofition and Converjlon of Propositions* 
 
 NY two Ideas being joined or disjoined in 
 various Forms will afford us fcveral Propo- 
 rtions : All thefe may bediffinguifhed according to 
 their Quantity and their Quality* into four, which 
 are marked or denoted by the Letters, A, E, I, O, 
 thus : 
 
 r Univerfal Affirmative. 
 , J Univerfal Negative, 
 
 denotes a < p articu)ar Affirmative. 
 
 I Particular Negative. 
 
 • The Reader fhould remember here, that a Propofition ac- 
 cording to its Quantity is called Univerfal or Particular ; and ac- 
 cording to its Quality •, it is either Affirmative or Negative. 
 
 according 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 15Q 
 
 according to thefc old Latin Rhimes — 
 
 Afferit A, Negat E, verum generaliter Ambte. 
 Afferit I, Negat O, fed particular iter Amho. 
 
 This may be exemplified by thefe two Ideas, a 
 Vine and a Tree. 
 
 A, Every Vine is a Tree. 
 
 E, No Vine is a Tree. 
 
 I, Some Vine is a Tree. 
 
 O, Some Vine is not a Tree. 
 
 The Logicians of the Schools have written many 
 
 large Trifles concerning the Oppofition and Conver- 
 
 fion of Proportions. It will be fufficient here to 
 
 grive a few brief Hints of thefe Things, that the 
 
 Learner may not be utterly ignorant of them. 
 
 Proportions which are made of the fame Subject 
 and Predicate, are faid to be oppojite, when that 
 which is denied in one is affirmed in the other, 
 either in whole or in part, without any Conlidera- 
 tion whether the Proportions be true or no. 
 
 If they differ both in Quantity and Quality they 
 are called Contradictory ; as, 
 
 _ J ■ J a . | Thefe can never be both true 
 
 J. ree 
 ~ " r/ . . ^ > or both falfe at the fame 
 U borne V me is not ! m- 
 cr> \ Time. 
 
 a Tree. J 
 
 If two Univerfals differ in Quality they are Con- 
 traries ; as, 
 
 A Every Vine is a^ T u r u u *u *. 
 
 rr y f I hefe can never be both true 
 
 J. ree . . 
 
 E No 'Fine is a f !°f f th /, r ; but thc >' ma >' be 
 rn J both falfe. 
 
 If two particular Proportions differ in Quality 
 they are Subcontraries ; as, 
 
 I Some 
 
160 logick: or, the [part ii. 
 
 I Some Vine is a^\ -p U r i_t.ii 
 
 rp I Inele may be both true to- 
 
 O Some Vine is not \ f 1 ^' )f f ^ can never 
 rr j be both falfe. 
 
 a Tree. J 
 
 Both particular and univerfal Proportions which 
 agree in Quality, but not in Quantity, are called 
 Subaltern, though thefe are not properly oppofite ; 
 as, 
 
 A Every Vine is a Tree. 
 I Some Vine is a Tree, 
 
 Or thus : 
 
 E No Vine is a Tree. 
 
 O Some Vine is not a Tree. 
 
 The Canons of Jubaltern Proportions are ufually 
 reckoned thefe three ; namely, (i.) If an univerfal 
 Proportion be true, the Particular will be true alfo, 
 but not on the contrary. And, (2.) If a particular 
 Proportion be falfe, the univerfal muft be falfe too, 
 but not on the contrary. (3.) Subaltern Proportions, 
 whether univerfal or particular, may fometimes be 
 both true and fometimes both falfe. 
 
 The Converfion of Proportions, is when the Sub- 
 ject and Predicate change their Places with Pre- 
 fervation of the Truth. This may be done with 
 conftant Certainty in all univerfal Negatives and 
 particular Affirmatives ; as, No Spirit is an Animal, 
 jpiay be converted, No Animal is a Spirit; and, Some 
 Tree is a Vine, may be converted, Some Vine is a 
 Tree. But there is more of formal Trifling in this 
 Sort of Difcourfe than there is of folid Improvement, 
 becaufe this Sort of Converfion ariies merely from 
 the Form of Words, as connected in a Proportion, 
 rather than from the Matter. 
 
 Yet it may be ufeful to obferve, that there are 
 fome Proportions, which by Rcafon of the Ideas 
 or Matter of which they are compofed, may be 
 
 converted 
 
CH. II.] BIGHT USE OP REASON. l6l 
 
 converted with conftant Truth : Such are thofe 
 Proportions whofe Predicate is a nominal or real 
 Definition of the Subject, or the Difference of it, 
 or a Property of the fourth Kind, or a fuperlative 
 Degree of any Property or Quality whatfoever ; or 
 in fhort, wherefoever the Predicate and the Subject 
 have exactly the fame extension, or the fame Com- 
 prehenfion ; as, Every Vine is a Tree bearing 
 Grapes : and every Tree hearing Grapes is a Vine ; 
 Religion is the trueft Wifdom ; and, The trueft Wif- 
 dom is Religion : Julius Cafar was the fir ft Emperor 
 of Rome ; and The firft Emperor of Rome was Julius 
 Ccefar. Thefe are the Proportions which are pro- 
 perly convertible, and the'y are called reciprocal 
 Propofitions. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of pure and modal Propositions. 
 
 ANOTHER Divifion of Proportions among the 
 fcholaftick Writers, is into pure and modal. 
 This may be called (for Difii net ion -fake) a Divifion 
 accord'mg to the Predicate. 
 
 When a Proportion merely exprefles that the 
 Predicate is connected with the Subject, it is called 
 a pure Propofition ; as, Every true Chriftian is an 
 honeft Man. But when it includes alfo the Way. 
 and Manner wherein the Predicate is connected 
 with the Subject, it is called a modal Propofition ; 
 as, when I fay, It is neceffary that a true Chriftian 
 Jhould he an honeft Man. 
 
 Logical Writers generally make the Modality of 
 this Propofition to belong to the Copida, becaufe it 
 fhews the Manner of the Connection between the 
 Subject and Predicate, jBut if the Form of the. 
 
 Sentence 
 
162 logick: or, the [part ir. 
 
 Sentence as a logical Proportion be duly confider- 
 ed, the Mode itfelf is the very Predicate of the 
 Proposition, and it muft run thus : That a true 
 Chriflian Jhould he an honeji Man is a necejfary Things 
 and then the whole primary Proportion is included 
 in the Subjecl of the modal Propofition. 
 
 There are four Modes of connecting the Predi- 
 cate with the Subjecl, which are ufually reckoned 
 up on this Occafion, namely, Neceffity and Con- 
 tingency, which are two Oppolites ; PoJJibility and 
 Impoffibility, which are alio Oppofites ; as, // is 
 necejfary that a Globe fliould be round : That a Globe 
 he made of Wood or Glajs, is an nnnecejfary or con- 
 tingent Thing : It is impojfible that a Globe fnould 
 lefquare : It is pojfible that a Globe may be made of 
 Water. 
 
 With Regard to the modal Proportions which the 
 Schools have introduced, I would make thefe two 
 Remarks. 
 
 Remark I. Thefe Proportions iri Englifh are 
 formed by the Resolution of the Words, muft fre> 
 might not be, can be, and cannot be, into thofc more 
 explicate Forms of a logical Copula and Predicate, 
 is necejfary, is contingent, is pojfible, is impojfible : 
 For it is necejfary that a Globe Jhould be round, fig 
 niiies no more than that a Globe mi ft be round. 
 
 ■ Remark 2. Let it be noted, that this quadruple 
 Modality is only an Enumeration of the natural 
 Modes or Manners wherein the Predicate is con- 
 nected with the Subjecl: : We might alfo defcribe 
 fevcral moral and civil Modes of connecling two 
 Ideas together, namely, Lawfulnefs and Unlaw- 
 fulnefs, Convenience, and hiconvenicncy, <kc. whence 
 we may form fuel) modal Proportions as thefe : 7/ 
 is unlawful for any Perfon to kill an innocent Man : 
 
 It 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. l6$ 
 
 It is unlawful for Chriftians to eat Flejh in Lent : To 
 tell all that we think is inexpedient : For a Man to be 
 affable to his Neighbour is very convenient, &c. 
 
 There are feveral other Modes of fpeaking where- 
 by a Predicate is connected with a Subjecl : Such 
 as, it is certain, it is doubtful, it is probable, it is ini- 
 probable, it is agreed, it is granted, it is f aid by the 
 Ancients, it is written, &cc. all which will form other 
 Kinds of modal Proportions. 
 
 But whether the Modality be natural, moral, &c. 
 yet in all thefe Proportions it is the Mode is the 
 proper Predicate, and all the reft of the Proportion, 
 except the Copula (or Word is) belongs to the Sub- 
 jecl; and thus they become pure Proportions of a 
 complex Nature, of which we (hall treat in the next 
 Section ; fo that there is no great Need of making 
 Modals of a diftincl: fort. 
 
 There are many little Subtilties which the 
 Schools acquaint us with concerning the Converfion 
 and Oppojition and Equipollence of thefe modal Pro- 
 portions fuited to the Latin or Greek Tongues, 
 rather than the Englifh, and fit to pafs away the 
 idle Time of a Student, rather than to enrich his 
 Undemanding. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Of Jingle Propositions, whether Simple or Complex. 
 
 WHEN we confider the Nature of Proportions, 
 together with the Formation of them, and 
 the Materials whereof they are made, we divide 
 them into fngle and compound. 
 
 A Single Proportion is that which has but one 
 Subjecl: and one Predicate ; but if it has more 
 Subjects, or more Predicates, it is called a Compound 
 
 Pro- 
 
164 logick : ok, Tttfi [part ii. 
 
 Propofition, and indeed it contains two or more 
 Propofitions in it. 
 
 A Single Propofition (which is alfo called cate- 
 gorical) may be divided again into Jimple and com- 
 plex*. 
 
 A purely Jimple Proportion is that whofe Subject 
 and Predicate are made up of fingle Terms ; as, 
 Virtue is deferable : Every Penitent is pardoned : No 
 Man is innocent. 
 
 When the Subject or Predicate, or both, are 
 made up of complex Terms, it is called a complex 
 Propofition ; as, Every fine ere Penitent is pardoned : 
 Virtue is deferable for its own Sake : No Man alive 
 is perfeclly innocent. 
 
 If the Term which is added to the Subject of a 
 complex Propofition be either effential or any way 
 neceflary to it, then it is called explicative, for it 
 only explains the Subject ; as, Every mortal Man 
 is the Son of Adam. But if the Term added to 
 make up the complex Subject, does not neceflarily 
 or conftantly belong to it, then it is determinative, 
 and limits the Subject to a particular Part of its 
 Extenflon ; as, Every pious Man feiall be happy. 
 In the firft Propofition the Word mortal is merely 
 explicative: In the fecond Propofition the Word 
 pious is determinative. 
 
 Here note, that whatfoever may be affirmed or 
 denied concerning any Subject with an explicative 
 Addition, may be alfo affirmed or denied of that 
 Subject without it, as we may boldly fay, Every 
 Man is the Son of Adam, as well as every mortal 
 Man : But it is not fo, where the Addition is 
 
 * As Jimple Ideas are oppofed to complex, and Jingle Ideas to 
 <ompound, fo Propofitions are diftingrufhed in the fame Manner : 
 The Knglifh Tongue, in this refpect, having iome Advantage 
 above the lea led Languages, which have no ufual Word to 
 di (ting uifh Jingle from Jimple. 
 
 deter- 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 165 
 
 determinative, for we cannot fay, Every Manjhall 
 be happy, though every pious Man (hall be fo. 
 
 In a complex Proportion the Predicate or Sub- 
 ject is ibmetimes made complex by the Pronouns 
 who, which, whofe, to whom, &c. which make ano- 
 ther Proportion ; as, Every Man who is pious 
 Jhall he faved: Julius, whofe Sir name was C<efar 9 
 overcame Pompey : Bodies, which are tranfparent, 
 have many Pores. Here the whole Proportion is 
 called the primary or chief, and the additional Pro- 
 portion is called an incident Proportion. But it is 
 (till to be efteemed in this Cafe merely as a Part of 
 the complex Term ; and the Truth or Falfhood of 
 the whole complex Proportion is not to be judged by 
 the Truth or Falfhood of the incident Proportion, 
 but by the Connection of the whole Subject with 
 the Predicate. For the incident Proportion may 
 be falfe, and abfurd, or impoffible, and yet the 
 whole complex Proportion may be true ; ds,AHorfe 
 which has Wings might fly over the Thames. 
 
 Berde this Complexion which belongs to the Sub- 
 ject or Predicate, logical Writers ufed to fay, there 
 is a Complexion which may fall upon the Copula alfo : 
 But this I have accounted for in the Section con- 
 cerning modal Propofitions ; and indeed it is not of 
 much importance whether it were placed there or 
 here. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Of 'compound Propositions. 
 
 yd Compound Propofition is made up of two or more 
 Subjedts or Predicates, or both ; and it con- 
 tains in it two or more Proportions, which are 
 either plainly exprejfed, or concealed and implied. 
 
 The 
 
l66 LbdiCK: OR, the [part if, 
 
 The ftrft Sort of compound Proportions are thofe 
 wherein the Compofition is exprejjed and evident, 
 and they are diffinguifhed into thefe fix Kinds, 
 namely, Copulative, Disjunctive, Conditional, Caufal, 
 Relative, and Difcretive. 
 
 I. Copulative Propositions are thofe which have 
 more Subjects, or Predicates connected by affirma- 
 tive or negative Conjunctions ; as, Riches and Honour 
 are Temptations to Pride : Ctefar conquered the Gauls 
 and the Britons : Neither Gold nor Jewels w'dlpur* 
 chafe Immortality. Thefe Proportions are evidently 
 compounded, for each of them may be refolved into 
 two Propositions, namely, Riches are Temptations 
 to Pride ; and Honour is a Temptation to Pride ; and 
 ib the reft. 
 
 The Truth of copulative Proportions depends 
 upon the Truth of all the Parts of them ; for if Cae- 
 far had conquered the Gauls, and not the Britons, 
 or the Britons, and not the Gauls, the fecorid copu- 
 lative Proportion had not been true. 
 
 Here note, Thofe Proportions, which cannot be 
 refolved into two or more rmple Proportions, are 
 not .properly copulative, though two or more Ideas 
 be connecled and coupled by fuch Conjunctions, 
 either in the Subject or Predicate ; as, Two and 
 three make jive : Majefty and Meeknefs do not often, 
 meet : The Sun, Moon, and Stars, are not all to be 
 feen at once. Such Proportions are to be efteemed 
 merely complex, becau'fe the Predicate cannot be 
 affirmed of each fingle Subject, but only of all of 
 them together as a co lie dive Subject. 
 
 II. Disjunctive Proportions, are when the Parts 
 arc disjoined or oppoied to one another by disjunc- 
 tive Particles ; as, // is either Day or Night : The 
 
 Weather 
 
OH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. l67 
 
 Weather is either jhimng or rainy : Quantity is either 
 Length, Breadth^ or Depth. 
 
 The Truth of Disjunctives depends on the neccf* 
 fary and immediate Oppofition of the Parts ; there • 
 fore only the lad of thefe Examples is true ; but 
 the two firft are not ftriclly true, becaufe Twilight 
 is a Medium between Day and Night ; and dry 
 •cloudy Weather is a Medium between Jiihnng and 
 
 raining. 
 
 III. Conditional or hypothetical Proportions, are 
 thofe whofe Parts are united by the conditional 
 Particle if; as, If the Sun be fixed, the Earth mufi 
 move : If there he no Fire, there will he no Smoke. 
 
 Note, The firft Parts of thefe Proportions, or 
 that wherein the Condition is contained, is called 
 the Antecedent, the other is called the Confequeiit. 
 
 The Truth of thefe Proportions depends not at 
 all on the Truth or Falfhood of their two Parts, 
 but on the Truth of the Connection of them ; for 
 each Part of them may be falfe, and yet the whole 
 Propofition true ; as, if there he no Providence, there 
 will he no future Punijhment. 
 
 IV. Caufal Proportions, are where two Propofi- 
 tions are joined by caufal Particles ; as, Houfes were 
 not built that they might be dejlroyed : Rehoboam was 
 unhappy becaufe he followed evil Counfel. 
 
 The Truth of a caufal Propofitio?i arifes not from 
 the Truth of the Parts, but from the caufal Influence 
 that the one Part of it has upon the other ; for both 
 Parts may be true, yet the Proportion falfe, if one 
 Part be not the Caufe of the other. 
 
 Some Logicians refer reduplicative Proportions to 
 this Place ; as, Men, confdered as Men, are rational 
 Creatures, that is, becaufe they are Men. 
 
 M V. Re- 
 
l68 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART II. 
 
 V. Relative Propojitio?is have their Parts joined 
 by fuch Particles as exprefs a Relation or Com- 
 parifon of one Thing to another ; as, When you are: 
 
 Jilent, I will /peak : As much as you are worthy Jo 
 much Jkall you be ejleemed : As is the Father, Jo is 
 the Son: Where there is no Tale-Shearer, Contention 
 will ceaje. 
 
 Thefe are very much akin to conditional Propo- 
 rtions, and the Truth of them depends upon the 
 juftnefs of their Connection. 
 
 VI. Di/cretive Propofitions are fuch wherein va- 
 rious and feemingly opposite Judgments are made, 
 whofe Variety or Distinction is noted by the Par- 
 ticles but, though, yet, <kc. as, Travellers may change 
 their Climate, but not their Temper ; Job was patient, 
 though his Grief was great. 
 
 The Truth and Goodnefs of a difcretive Propo- 
 Jition, depends on the Truth of both Parts, and 
 their Contradiftindtion to one another; for though 
 both Parts fhould be true, yet if there be no feem- 
 ing Oppofition between them, it is an ufelefs 
 AfTertion, though we cannot call it a falfe one ; 
 as, Dejcartes was a PhiloJopher,yet he was a French- 
 man : The Romans were valiant, but they Jpoke 
 Latin ; both which Propofitions are ridiculous 
 for want of a feeming Oppofition between the 
 Parts. 
 
 Since we have declared wherein the Truth and 
 Faljliood of thefe compound Propositions confift, it is 
 proper alfo to give fome Intimations how any of 
 thefe Propofitions, when they are falfe, may be op-< 
 pojed or contradicled. 
 
 All compound Propofitions, except Copulatives 
 and Dijcretives, arc properly denied or contra- 
 dicled when the Negation arYecls their conjunctive 
 Particles 5 as, if the disjunctive Propofitiop allerts, 
 
 // 
 
CK. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 1 6() 
 
 It is either Day or Night ; the Opponent fays, // 
 is not either Day or Night ; or, // is not necejfary that 
 it fhould be either Day or Night : So the hypothetical 
 Propofltion is denied, by faying, // does not follow 
 that the Earth muft move if the Sun he fxt. 
 
 A disjunctive Propofltion may be contradicted alfo 
 by denying all the Parts ; as, It is neither Day nor 
 Night. 
 
 And a caufal Propofltion may be denied or op- 
 pofed indirecliy and improperly, when either Part of 
 the Propofltion is denied ; and it muft be falfe if 
 either Part be falfe ; butihe Defign of the Propo- 
 sition being to (hew the caufal Connection of the two 
 Parts, each Part is fuppofed to be true, and it is 
 not properly contradicted as a caufal Propofltion, 
 unlefs one Part of it be denied to be the Caufe of 
 the other. 
 
 As for Copulatives and Difcretives, becaufe their 
 Truth depends more on the Truth of their Parts, 
 therefore they may be oppofed or denied, as many- 
 Ways as the Parts of which they are compofed may 
 be denied ; fo this copulative Proportion, Riches 
 and Honour are Temptations to Pride, may be denied 
 by faying, Riches are not Temptations, though Ho- 
 nour may he : or, Honour is not a Temptation, though 
 Riches may he ; or, Neither Riches nor Honour are 
 Temptations, &c. 
 
 So this difcretive Propofltion, Job was patient, 
 though his Grief was great, is denied by faying, Job 
 was not patient, though his Grief was great : or, Job 
 was patient, but his Grief was not great : or, Job was 
 ?wt patient, nor was his Grief great. 
 
 We proceed now to the fecond Sort of compound 
 Proportions, namely, fuch whofe Compofition is not 
 expreffed, but latent or concealed ; yet a fmall Atten- 
 tion will find two Proportions included in them. 
 Such are thefe that follow. 
 
 M 2 1. Ex~ 
 
1/0 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 
 
 1. Exclufives ; as, The pious Man alone is happy, 
 It is only Sir Ifaac Newton could find out true Philo- 
 
 fophy. 
 
 2. Exceptives ; as, None of the Ancients but Plato 
 well defended the SouVs Immortality, The Protejlants 
 worfhip hut one God. 
 
 3. Comparatives ; as, Pain is the great eft Afflic- 
 tion. No Turk was fiercer than the Spaniards at 
 Mexico. 
 
 Here note, That the comparative Degree does not 
 always imply the poftive ; as if I fay, A Fool is bet- 
 ter than a Knave, this does not affirm that Folly k 
 good, but that it is a lefs £w/than Knavery. 
 
 4. Inceptives and Deceptives, which relate to the 
 beginning or ending of any Thing ; as, The Latin 
 Tongue is not yet forgotten. No Man before Orpheus 
 wrote Greek Perfe. Peter Czar of Mufcovy began to 
 civilize his Nation. 
 
 To thefe may be added Coniinuatives ; as, Rome 
 remains to this Day, which includes at lead two 
 Propositions, namely, Rome was, and Rome is. 
 
 Here let other Authors fpend Time and Pains in 
 giving the precife Definitions in all thefe Sorts of 
 Propofitions, which may be as well underftood by 
 their Names and Examples : Here let them tell 
 what their Truth depends upon., and how they are 
 to be oppofed or contradicted ; but a moderate 
 Share of common Senfe, with a Review of what is 
 faid on the former Compounds, will fuffice for all 
 thefe Purpofes, without the Formality of Rules. 
 
 sect; 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 171 
 
 SECT. VIL 
 
 Of true andfaJfe Proportions. 
 
 PRopofitions are next to be confidered according 
 to their Senfe or Signification, and thus they 
 are diftributed into true and falfe. A true Propo- 
 rtion reprefents Things as they are in themfelv r es ; 
 but if Things are reprefented otherwife than they 
 are in themfelves, the Propofition is falfe* 
 
 Or we may defcribe them more particularly thus : 
 a true Propofition joins thofe Ideas and Terms toge- 
 ther whofe Objects are joined and agree, or it dis- 
 joins thofe Ideas and Terms, whofe Objects dis- 
 agree, or are disjoined ; as, Every Bird has Wings ; 
 Si Brute is not immortal. 
 
 A falfe Propofition joins thofe Ideas or Terms 
 whofe Objects clifagree, or it disjoins thofe whofe 
 Objects agree ; as, Birds have no Wings ; Brutes 
 are immortal. 
 
 Note, It is impoffible that the fame Propofition 
 fhould be both true and falfe at the fame Time, in 
 the fame Senfe, and in the fame Refpect ; becaufe a 
 Propofition is but the Reprefentation of the Agree- 
 ment or Difagreement of Things : Now it is im- 
 poffible that the fame Thing fhould be and not be, or 
 that the fame Thing fhould agree and not agree, at the 
 fame Time, and in the fame Refpecl. This is a firft 
 Principle of human Knowledge. 
 
 Yet fome Proportions may feem to contradict 
 one another, though they may be both true, but 
 in different Senfes, or Refpects, or Times ; as, 
 Man was immortal in Paradife, and Man was mor- 
 tal in Paradife. But thefe two Proportions mud 
 be referred to different Times ; as, Man hfore his 
 
 M 3 Fall 
 
17'2 LOGtCK: OR, THE [PART II. 
 
 Fall was immortal, but at the Fall he became mor- 
 tal. So we may fay now, Man is mortal, or Man 
 is immortal, if we take thefe Proportions in dif- 
 ferent Refpecls ; as, Man is an immortal Creature 
 as to his Soul, but mortal as to his Body. A great 
 Variety of Difficulties and feeming Contradictions, 
 both in holy Scripture and other Writings, may 
 be folvedand explained in this Manner. 
 
 The moft important Queftion on this Subject is 
 this, What is the Criterion, or dijlinguijh'mg Mark of 
 Truth t How (hall we know when a Proportion is 
 really true or falfe ? There are fo many Difguifcs 
 of Tm*h in the World, fo many falfe Appearances 
 of Truth, that fome Seels have declared there is no 
 Poffibility of diftinguifhing Truth from Faljhood ; 
 and therefore they have abandoned all Pretences to 
 Knowledge, and maintain ftrenuoufly that nothing 
 is to he known. 
 
 The firit Men of this Humour made themfelves 
 famous in Greece by the Name of Sceptics, that 
 is, Seekers : They were alfo called Academicks, 
 borrowing their Name from Academia, their School, 
 or Place of Study. They taught that all Things 
 are uncertain, though they allowed that fome are 
 more probable than others. After thefe arofe the 
 Seel of Fyrrhonicks, fo named from Fyrrho their 
 Mafter, who would not allow one Proportion to 
 be more probable than another ; but profefTed that 
 all Things were equally uncertain. Now all thefe 
 Men (as an ingenious Author expreflcs it) were 
 rather to be called a Seel of Liais than Philosophers, 
 and that Cenfurc is juft for two Reafons : (1 .) Bc- 
 caufe they determined concerning every Propor- 
 tion that it was uncertain, and believed that as a 
 certain Truth, while they profeflcd there was no- 
 thing certain, and that nothing could be determined 
 concerning Truth or Falfhood ; and thus their very 
 
 Doctrine 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE Otf REASON. 173 
 
 Doctrine gave itfelf the Lie. (2.) Becaufe they 
 judged and acted as other Men did in the common 
 Affairs of Life ; they would neither run into Fire 
 nor Water, though they profefled Ignorance and 
 Uncertainty, whether the one would burn, or the 
 other drown them. 
 
 There have been fome in all Ages who have too 
 much affected this Humour, who difpute agairift 
 every Thing, under Pretence that Truth has no 
 certain Mark to dift'mguijli it. Let us therefore in- 
 quire what is the general Criterion of Truth f And 
 in order to this, it is proper to confider what is the 
 Reafon why we affent to thofe Propofitions which 
 contain the molt certain and indubitable Truths ; 
 fuch as thefe, The Whole is greater than a Part ; 
 Two and three make five. 
 
 The only Reafon why we believe thefe Propo- 
 fitions to be true, is becaufe the Ideas of the Sub- 
 jects and Predicates appear with fo much Clearnefs 
 and Strength of Evidence to agree to each other, 
 that the Mind cannot help difcerning the Agree* 
 ment, and cannot doubt of the Truth of them, but 
 is conftrained to judge them true. So when we 
 compare the Ideas of a Circle and a Triangle^ or 
 the Ideas of an Oyjler and a Butterfly , we fee fuch 
 an evident Difagreement between them, that we 
 are fure that a Butterfly is not an Oyjler ; nor is a 
 Triangle a Circle* There is nothing but the Evi- 
 dence of the Agreement or Difagreement between 
 two Ideas, that makes us affirm or deny the one or 
 the other. 
 
 Now it will follow from hence, that a clear and 
 diftincl Perception, or fall Evidence of the Agreement 
 a?id Difagreement of our Ideas to one another , or to 
 Things, is a certain Criterion of Truth : For fince 
 our Minds are of fuch a Make, that where the 
 Evidence is exceeding plain and llrong, we cannot 
 M 4 withhold 
 
\*]A logick; or, the [part it. 
 
 withhold our Allen t, we fhould then be neceffarily 
 expofcd to believe Fa 1 (hood, if complete Evidence 
 ihould be found in any Proportions that are not 
 true. But furely the God of perfect Wifdom, 
 Truth, and Goodnefs, would never oblige his 
 Creatures to be thus deceived ; and therefore he 
 would never have conftituted us of fuch a Frame, 
 as would render it naturally impoffible to guard 
 again ft Error. 
 
 Another Confequence is naturally derived from 
 the former ; and that is, that the only Reafon why 
 we fall into Mi flake, is becaufe we are impatient 
 to form a Judgment of Things before we have a 
 clear and evident Perception of their Agreement or 
 Difagreement ; and if we will make hafle to judge 
 while our Ideas arc obfeured or confufed, or before 
 we fee whether they agree or difagree, we fhall 
 plunge ourfelves into perpetual Errors. See more 
 on this Subject in an Effay on the Freedom of U r ill 
 in God and Man: Publifhed in 1732. Section 1. 
 page 13. 
 
 Note, What is here aflerted concerning the Ne- 
 ceffity of clear and diflinct Ideas, refers chiefly to 
 Propofitions which we form ourfelves by our own 
 Powers : As for Propofitions which we derive from 
 the Tefthnony of 'other s 3 they will be accounted for 
 in Chap. IV. 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 Of certain and dubious Propofitions, of Knowledge 
 and Opinion, 
 
 SINCE we have found that Evidence is the great 
 Criterion, and the furc Mark of Truth ; this, 
 leads us directly to confider Propofitions according 
 
 to 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON: lfo 
 
 to their Evidence ; and here we mu,ft take Notice 
 both of the different Degrees of Evidence, and the 
 different Kinds of it. 
 
 Proportions according to their different Degrees 
 of Evidence are diftinguifhed into certain and 
 tjkibious*. 
 
 Where the Evidence of the Agreement or Dif- 
 agreement of the Ideas is fo ftrong and plain, that 
 we cannot forbid nor delay our Aflent ; the Pro^ 
 pofition is called certain, as, Every Circle hath a 
 Center ; The World did not create it/elf. An Aflent 
 to fuch Proportions is honoured with the Name of 
 Knowledge, 
 
 But when there is any Obfcurity upon the Agree- 
 ment or Difagreement of the Ideas, fo that the 
 Mind does not clearly perceive it, and is not com- 
 pelled to afTent or diftent, then the Proportion, in 
 a proper and philofophical Senfe, is called dotd^tful 
 or uncertain ; as, The Planets are inhabited ; The 
 Souls of Brutes are mere Matter ; The World will 
 not ftand a thou/and Years longer ; Dido built the 
 City of Carthage, &c. Such uncertain Proportions 
 are called Opinions, 
 
 When we conrder ourfelves as Philofophers, or 
 Searchers after Truth, it would be well if we always 
 fufpended a fullJudgment or Determination about 
 any Thing, and made farther Inquiries, where this 
 plain and p erf eel Evidence is wanting ; but we are 
 
 fo 
 
 * It may be objected, that this Certainty and U?icertainiy being 
 ©nly in the Mind, the Divifion belongs to Proportions rather 
 according to the Degrees of our djfent, than the Degrees of Evi- 
 dence. But it may well be anfwered, that the Evidence here in- 
 tended is that which appears fo to the Mind, and not the mere 
 Evidence in the Nature of Things : Befides, (as we dial] ftievv im- 
 mediately) the Degree of jQJJent ought to be exactly proportionable 
 to the Degree of Evidence : And therefore the Difference is no- 
 great, whether Proportions be called certain or uncertain y accord- 
 ing to the Meafure of Evidence, or of JJJent. 
 
1.76 LOGrCK 5 OR, THE [PART IT. 
 
 fo prone of ourfelves to judge without full Evi- 
 dence, and in fome Cafes the Neceffity of Aclion 
 in the Affairs of Life, conftrains us to judge and 
 determine upon a tolerable Degree of Evidence, 
 that we vulgarly call thofe Proportions certain, 
 where we have but very little Room or Reafon to 
 doubt of them, though the Evidence be not com- 
 plete and reliftlefs. 
 
 Certainty, according to the Schools, is difh'n-t 
 guifhed into Objeclive and Subjective. Objeclive 
 Certainty, is wheiKthe Proportion is certainly true 
 in itfclf ; and Subjeclive, when we are certain of 
 the Truth of it. The one is in Things, the other 
 is in our Minds. 
 
 But let it be obferved here, that every Propor- 
 tion in itfelf is certainly true or certainly falfe. For 
 though Doubtfuhefs or Uncertainty feems to be a 
 Medium between certain Truth and certain Falf- 
 hood in our Minds, vet there is no fuch Medium 
 in Things themfelves, no, not even in future 
 Events : For now at this Time it is certain in it- 
 felf, that Midfummer-Day /even Years hence will be 
 ferene, or it is certain it will be cloudy, though we 
 are uncertain and utterly ignorant what Sort of 
 Day it will be : This Certainty of diftant Futurities 
 is known to God only. 
 
 Uncertain or dubious Proportions, that is, Opi- 
 nions, arc diftinguifhed into probable, or impro* 
 bable. 
 
 When the Evidence of any Proportion is greater 
 than the Evidence of the contrary, then it is a pro- 
 bable Opinion : Where the Evidence and Argu- 
 ments are (ironger on the contrary Side we call it 
 improbable. But while the Arguments on either 
 Side feera to be equally ftrong,- and the Evidence 
 for and aga'wft any Proportion appears equal to 
 the Mind, then in common Language we call it a 
 
 doubtful 
 
CH. II.] HIGHT USE OP REASON. 177 
 
 doubtful Matter. We alfo call it a dubious or doubt~ 
 ful Proportion, when there are no Arguments on 
 either Side, as, next Chrijimas-Day will be a very 
 Jliarp Frofl. And in general, all thofe Proportions 
 are doubtful, wherein we can perceive no mfficient 
 Marks or Evidences of Truth or Faljhood. In fuch 
 a Cafe, the Mind which is fearching for Truth 
 ought to remain in a State of Doubt or Sufpenfe, 
 until fuperior Evidence on one Side or the other 
 incline the Balance of the Judgment, and determine 
 the Probability or Certainty to the one Side. 
 
 A great many Propofitions which we generally 
 believe or difbelieve in human Affairs, or in the 
 Sciences, have very various Degrees of Evidence, 
 which yet arife not to complete Certainty , either of 
 Truth or Falfhood. Thus it comes to pafs that 
 there are fuch various and almoft infinite Degrees 
 of Probability and Improbability. To a weak Pro- 
 bability we fhould give a weak AvTent; and a 
 ftrojiger Aflent is due where the Evidence is greater, 
 and the Matter more probable. If we proportion 
 our AJfent in all Things to the Degrees of Evidence? 
 we do the utmoft that human Nature is capable of 
 in a rational Way to fecure itfelf from Error. 
 
 SECT. IX. 
 
 Of Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reajon, Faith, 
 a?id Infpiration. 
 
 AFTER we have confidered the Evidence of 
 Propofitions in the various Degrees of it, we 
 come to furvey the * fever -a I Kinds of Evidence, or the 
 different Ways whereby Truth is let into the Mind, 
 and which produce accordingly feveral Kinds of 
 
 Knowledge. 
 
17$ , LOGICK : OK, THE [PART If. 
 
 Knowledge. We (hall diftribute them into thefc 
 fix; namely, Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Rea- 
 fotiy Faith , and Infpiration ; and then diftinguifh 
 the Proportions which are derived from them. 
 
 I. The Evidence of Senfe is, when we frame a 
 Propofition according to the Dictates of any of our 
 Senfes ; fo we judge that Grafs is green ; that a 
 Trumpet gives a pleafant Sound; that Fire burns 
 IVood ; Water is foft, and Iron is hard ; for we 
 have feen, heard, or felt all thefe. It is upon this 
 Evidence of Senfe, that we know and believe the 
 daily Occurrences in human Life ; and almoft all 
 the Hiftories of Mankind, that are written by 
 Eye or Ear-Witneffes, are built upon this Prin- 
 ciple. 
 
 Upon the Evidence of Senfe we do not only, in- 
 clude that Knowledge which is derived to us by 
 our outward Senfes of Hearing ■, Seeing, Feeling, 
 Taftingy and Smelling ; but that alfo which is de- 
 rived from the inward Senfations and Appetites of 
 Hunger, Thirfl, Eafe, Fleafure, Fain, Wearinefs, 
 Refi t <kc. and all thofe Things which belong to the 
 Body ; as, Hunger is a painful Appetite ; Light is 
 pleafant ; Reft isfweet to the weary Limbs, 
 
 Propofitions which are built on this Evidence, 
 may be named fenjible Proportions, or the Di£tates 
 of Senfe. 
 
 IT. As we learn what belongs to the Body by 
 the Evidence of Senfe, fo we learn what belongs to 
 the Soul by an inward Confcioufnefs , which may 
 be en lied a Sort of internal Feeling, or fpi ritual 
 Sen fat ion of w hat pafles in the Mind ; as, 1 think 
 before Ifpeak ; I defire large Knowledge ; I fufpeel 
 my own Fraclice ; 1 Jludied hard To-day ; My Con- 
 ference bears tVitnefs of my Sincerity ; My Soul hates 
 
 vain 
 
€H. IlfJ EIGHT USE OF REASON. IJQ 
 
 •vain Thoughts ; Fear is an unedfy FaJJlon ; Long 
 Meditation on one Thing is tirefome. 
 
 Thus it appears that we obtain the Knowledge 
 of a Multitude of Proportions, as well as of lingle 
 Ideas, by thofe two Principles which Mr Locke 
 calls Senfation and Refleclion : One of them is a 
 Sort of Confchufnefs of what affecls the Body, and 
 the other is a Confcioufnefs of what gaffes in the 
 Mind. 
 
 Propositions which are built on this internal Con- 
 fcioifnefs, have yet no particular or diftinguifhing 
 Name affigned to them. 
 
 III. Intelligence relates chiefly to thofe abftraeled 
 Proportions which carry their own Evidence with 
 them, and admit no Doubt about them. Our 
 Perception of this Self Evidence in any Proportion 
 is called Intelligence, It is our Knowledge of thofe 
 firft Principles of Truth which are, as it were, 
 wrought into the very Nature and Make of our 
 Minds : They are fo evident in themfelves to every 
 Man who attends to them, that they need no 
 Proof. It is the Prerogative and peculiar Excel- 
 lence of thefe Propofitions, that they can fcarce 
 ever be proved or denied : They cannot early be 
 proved, becaufe there is nothing fuppofed td be 
 more clear or certain, from which an Argument 
 may be drawn to prove them. They cannot well 
 be denied, becaufe their own Evidence is fo bright 
 and convincing, that as foon as the Terms are 
 nnderftood, the Mind neceflarily aflents ; fuch are 
 thefe, Whatfoever acleth hath a Being : Nothing has 
 no Properties : A Fart is lefs 'than the Whole : No- 
 thing can he the Caufe of iff elf 
 
 Thefe Proportions are called Axioms, or Max-* 
 tins, or firji Principles ; thefe are the very Foun- 
 dations of all improved Knowledge and Reafon- 
 
 ings, 
 
ISO logick: or, the [part it, 
 
 ings, and on that* Account thefe have been thought 
 to he. innate Proportions, or Truths born with us. 
 
 Some fuppofe that a great Part of the Knowledge 
 of Angels and human Souls in the feparate State 
 is obtained in this Manner, namely, by fuch an 
 immediate View of Things in their own Nature, 
 which is called Intuition, 
 
 IV. Reafoning is the next Sort of Evidence, and 
 that is, when one Truth is inferred or drawn from 
 others by natural and juft Methods of Argument ; 
 as, if there be much Light at Midnight, I infer, 
 it proceeds from the Moon ; becaufe the Sun is un- 
 der the Earth *. If I fee a Cottage in a Foreft, I 
 conclude, fome Man has been there and built it. 
 Or when I furvey the Heavens and Earth, this 
 gives Evidence to my Reafon, that there is a God 
 who made them. 
 
 The Proportions which I believe upon this Kind 
 of Evidence, are called Conchfions or rational 
 Truths ; and the Knowledge that we gain this 
 Way is properly Science, 
 
 Yet let it be noted, that the Word Science is 
 ufually applied to a whole Body of regular or me- 
 thodical Obfervations or Proportions, which learn- 
 ed Men have formed concerning any Subject of 
 Speculation, deriving one Truth from another by 
 a Train of Arguments. If this Knowledge chiefly 
 directs our Praclice, it is ufually called an Art, 
 And this is the moil remarkable Diftinction be- 
 tween an Art and a Science , namely, the one refers 
 chiefly to Praclice, the other to Speculation, Nttr 
 tural Philofophy, or- Phyficks, and Ontology, are 
 Sciences ; Logick and Rhetorick are called Arts ; 
 but Mathematics include both Art and Science ; 
 
 for 
 
 * Note, Since this Book was written, we have had fo many 
 Appearances of the Aurora Borealis as reduces this Inference only 
 to a Probability. 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 181 
 
 for they have much of Speculation, and much of 
 Practice in them. 
 
 Obferve here, That when the Evidence of a 
 Proportion derived from Senfe, Confdoufnefs, In- 
 telligence, or Reafon, is firm and indubitable, it 
 produces fuch Ailent as we call a natural Cer- 
 tainty. 
 
 V. When we derive the Evidence of any Pro- 
 portion from the Teftimony of others, it is called 
 the Evidence of Faith ; and this is a large Part of 
 our Knowledge. Ten thoufand things there are 
 which we believe merely upon the Authority or 
 Credit of thofe who have fpoken or written of 
 them. It is by this Evidence that we know there 
 is fuch a Country as China , and there was fuch a 
 Man as Cicero who dwelt hi Rome. It is by this 
 that mod of the Tranfactions in human Life are 
 managed : We know our Parents and our Kindred 
 by this Means, we know the Perfons and Laws of 
 our prefent Governors, as well as Things that are 
 at a vail diilance from us in foreign Nations, or in 
 ancient Ages. 
 
 According as the Perfons that inform us of any 
 Thing are many or few, or more or lefs wife, and 
 faithful, and credible, fo our Faith is more or lefs 
 firm or wavering, and the Propofition believed is 
 either certain or doubtful ; but in Matters of Faith, 
 an exceeding great Probability is called a moral 
 Certainty. 
 
 Faith is generally diftinguimed into Divine and 
 Human, not with Regard to the Propofttions that 
 are believed, but with Regard to the Teftimony 
 upon which we believe them. When God reveals 
 any Thing to us, this gives us the Evidence of 
 divine Faith ; but what Man only acquaints us 
 with, produces a human Faith in us; the one 
 
 being 1 
 
182 LOGICK ! OR, THE [PART H. 
 
 being biSi'It upon the Word of Man, arifes but to 
 moral Certainly ; but the other being founded on 
 the Word of God, arifes to an abfolute and infaRU 
 hie AJfuravce, fo far as we underfland the Mean- 
 ing of this Word. , This is called j r up >er -natural Cer- 
 tainty. 
 
 Proportions which we believe upon the Evidence 
 of human Teilimony, are called Narratives, Rela- 
 tions, Reports, Hijlorical Obfervations, &c. but 
 fuch as are built on Divine Teftimony, are termed 
 Matters of Revelation ; and if they are of great Im- 
 portance in Religion, they are called Articles of 
 Faith. 
 
 There are fome Proportions or Parts of Know- 
 ledge which are faid to be derived from Obferva- 
 tion and Experience, that is, Experience in our- 
 felves, and the Obfervations we have made on 
 other Perfons or Things ; but thefe are made up 
 of fome of the former Springs of Knowledge joined 
 together, namely, Senfe, Confcioufnefs , Reafon, Faith, 
 &c. and therefore are not reckoned a diftincl Kind 
 of Evidence. 
 
 VI. Infpiration, is a Sort of Evidence diftmcV 
 from all the former, and that is, when fuch an 
 overpowering Impreffion of any Proportion is made 
 upon the Mind by God him f elf y that gives a con- 
 vincing and indubitable Evidence of the Truth and 
 Divinity of it : So were the Prophets and the 
 Apoftles infpired *. 
 
 Sometimes God may have been pleafed to make 
 ufe of the outward Scnfes, or the inward Work- 
 ings of the Imagination, of Dreams, Apparitions, 
 Vifions, and Voices, or Reafoning, or perhaps 
 human Narration, to convey divine Truths to the 
 Mind of the Prophet ; but none of thefe would be 
 
 fufficicnt 
 
 * Ntfe here, I fpeak chiefly of the higheit Kind of Infpirahon* 
 
CH. II.] EIGHT USE OF REASON. 183 
 
 fufficient to deferve the Name of Infpiration, with- 
 out a fuperior or divine Light and Power attending 
 them. 
 
 This Sort of Evidence is alfo very diftincl: from 
 what we ufually call divine Faith ; for every com- 
 mon Chriitian exercifes divine Faith when he be- 
 lieves any Proportion which God has revealed in 
 the Bible upon this Account, becaufe God has /aid 
 it, though it was by a Train of Reafonings that he 
 was led to believe that this is the Word of God : 
 Whereas in the Cafe of Infpiration^ the Prophet 
 not only exercifes divine Faith, in believing what 
 God reveals, but he is under a fuperior heavenly 
 Impreffion, Light, and Evidence, whereby he is 
 allured that God reveals it. This is the moil emi- 
 nent Kind offupernatural Certainty. 
 
 Though Perfons might be afTured of their own 
 Infpiration, by fome peculiar and inexpreffible Con- 
 fcioufnefs of this divine Infpiration and Evidence in 
 their own Spirits, yet it is hard to make out this 
 Infpiration to others, and to convince them of it, 
 except by fome antecedent or confequent Prophe- 
 cies or Miracles, or fome publick Appearances 
 more than human. 
 
 The Propofitions which are attained by this Sort 
 of Evidence are called infpired Truths. This is 
 divine Revelation at firfr. Hand, and the Dictates of 
 God in an immediate Manner, of which Theolo- 
 gical Writers difcourfe at large : But fince it be- 
 longs only to a few Favourites of Heaven to be 
 infpired, and not the Bulk of Mankind, it is not 
 neceflary to fpeak more of it in a Treatife of Lo- 
 gick, which is defigned for the general Improve- 
 ment of human Reafon. 
 
 The various Kinds of Evidence upon which we 
 believe any Proportion , afford us thefe three Re- 
 marks : 
 
 N Remark 
 
1£4 tOGrcK i OK, THE [pAET II. 
 
 Remark I. The fame Propofition may be known 
 to us by different Kinds of Evidence : That the 
 Whole is bigger than a Tart is known by our Senfes, 
 and it is known by the Self-Evidence of the Thing 
 to our Mind. That God created the Heavens and 
 the Earth is known to us by Reafon, and is known 
 alio by divine Teflimony or Faith. 
 
 Remark II. Among thofc various Kinds of Evi- 
 dence, fome are generally ftrongcr than others in 
 their own Nature, and give a better Ground for 
 Certainty. Inward Confciouftiefs and Intelligence, as 
 well as divine Faith and lnfpiration, ufually carry 
 much more Force with them than Senfe or human 
 Faith, which are often fallible ; though there are 
 Inftances wherein human Faith, Senfe, and Reafon- 
 ing, lay a Foundation alfo for complete AfTurance, 
 and leave no Room for Doubt. 
 
 Reafon in its own Nature would always lead U3 
 into the Truth in Matters within its Compafs, if 
 it were ufed aright, or it would require us to fuf- 
 pend our Judgment where there is want of Evi- 
 dence. But it is our Sloth, Precipitancy, Senfe, 
 Paffion, and many other Things, that lead our Rea- 
 fon aftray in this degenerate and imperfect State : 
 Hence it comes to pafs that we are guilty of fo many 
 Errors in Reafoning, efpecially about divine Things, 
 becaufe our Reafon either is bufy to enquire, and re- 
 folved to determine about Matters that are above 
 our prefent Reach ; or becaufe we mingle many 
 Prejudices and fecret Influences of Senfe, Fancy, 
 Puff on, Inclination, &c. with our Excrcifes of Rea- 
 fon, and judge and determine according to their 
 irregular Inftances. 
 
 Div/ne Faith would never admit of any Contro- 
 verfies or Doubtings, if we were but allured that 
 God had fpoken, and that wc rightly understood his 
 Meaning. 
 
 Remark 
 
e&. ii. j Right use of reason. 185 
 
 Remark III. The greater Evidence and Certainty 
 of any Proportion does not depend upon the Va- 
 riety of the Ways or Kinds of Evidence, whereby 
 it is known, but rather upon the Strength and De- 
 gree of Evidence, and the Clearnefs of that Light 
 in or by which it appears to the Mind. For a Pro- 
 portion that is known only one Way may be much 
 more certain, and have itronger Evidence, than 
 another that is fuppofed to be known many Ways. 
 Therefore thefe Proportions, Nothing has no Pro- 
 perties ; Nothing can make it/elf; which are known 
 only by Intelligence, are much furer and truer than, 
 this Proportion, The Rainbow has real and inherent 
 Colours in it ; or than this, The Sun rolls round the 
 Earth ; though we feem to know both thefe lad 
 by our Senfes, and by the common Tejlimony of our 
 Neighbours. So any Proportion that is clearly evi- 
 dent to our own Confcioufnefs or divine Faith, is 
 much more certain to us than a thoufand others 
 that have only the Evidence of feeble and obfcure 
 Sen/a tions, of mere probable Reafonings and doubtful 
 Arguments, or the Witnefs of fallible Men, or even 
 though all thefe fhould join together; 
 
 N 2 CHAR 
 
180 
 
 kOGIGK: OR, THE [pARTH. 
 
 CHAP, III, 
 
 The Springs offalfe Judgment, or the Doclrhie 
 of Prejudices. 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 IN the End of the foregoing Chapter, we havfr 
 furveyed the feveral Sorts of Evidence on which 
 we build our Attent to Propofitions. Thefe are 
 indeed the general Grounds upon which we form 
 our Judgments concerning Things. What remains 
 in this Second Part of Logick, is to point out 
 the feveral Springs and Caufes of our Mijlakes in 
 judging, and to lay down fome Rules by which we 
 fhould conduct ourfelves in patting a Judgment on 
 every Thing that is propofed to us. 
 
 I confefs many Things which will be mentioned 
 in thefe following Chapters, might be as well re- 
 ferred to the Third Part of Logick, where we 
 fhall treat of Reafoning and Argument ; for moft of 
 our falfe Judgments feem to include a fecret bad 
 Reafoning in them : and while we (hew the Springs 
 of Error, and the Rules of true Judgment, we do 
 at the fame Time difcover which Arguments are 
 fallacious, which Reafonings are weak, and which 
 are jutt and ftrong. Yet fince this is ufually called 
 a judging HI or judging well, I think we may with- 
 out any Impropriety treat of it here ; and this will 
 lay a furer Foundation for all Sorts of Ratiocination 
 and Argument. 
 
 Ra(h Judgments are called Prejudices, and fo 
 are the Springs of them. This Word in common 
 Life figniiies an ill Opinion which we have conceived 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 187 
 
 offome other Per/on, or fome Injury done to him. But 
 when we ufe the Word in Matters of Science, it 
 fignifies a Judgment that is formed concerning any 
 Per/on or Thing before fufficient Examination ; and 
 generally we fuppofe it to mean a falfe Judgment or 
 Miftake: At leaft it is an Opinion taken up without 
 folid Reaibn for it, or an AfTent given to a Propo- 
 rtion before we havejufi: Evidence of the Truth of 
 it, though the Thing itfelf may happen to be true. 
 
 Sometimes thefe rafh Judgments are called Pre* 
 foJfe.ffions ; whereby is meant, that fome particular 
 Opinion has poflefied the Mind, and engaged the 
 AfTent, without fufficient Search or Evidence of 
 the Truth of it. 
 
 There is a vail Variety of thefe Prejudices and 
 Prepojfejfions, which attend Mankind in every Age 
 and Condition of Life ; they lay the Foundations 
 of many an Error, and many an unhappy Praclice, 
 both in the Affairs of Religion, and in our civil 
 Concernments, as well as in Matters of Learning. 
 It is neeeflary for a Man who purfues Truth to in- 
 quire into the Springs of Error, that as far as pof- 
 fible he may rid himfelf of old Prejudices, and watch 
 hourly again ft new ones. 
 
 The Number of them is fo great, and they are 
 fo interwoven with each other, as well as with the 
 Powers of human Nature, that it is fometimes hard 
 to diltinguifh them apart ; yet for Method's Sake 
 we fhall reduce them to thefe four general Heads, 
 namely, Prejudices arifing from Things, or from 
 Words, from our/elves^ or from other Perfons ; and 
 after the Defcription of each Prejudice, we fhall 
 propofe one or more Ways of curing it. 
 
 N 3 SECT. 
 
188 LOGICK: OK, THE [PART II. 
 
 SECT. L 
 
 Prejudices ariftng from Things. 
 
 THE firjl Sort of Prejudices are thofe which arife 
 from the Things themfelves about which we 
 judge. But here let it be obferved, that there is 
 nothing in the Nature of Things that will neceftarily 
 lead us into Error, if we do but ufe our Reaibn 
 aright, and withhold our Judgment till there ap- 
 pear fufflcient Evidence of Truth. But fince we 
 are fo unhappily prone to take Advantage of every 
 doubtful Appearance and Circumflance of Things 
 to form a wrong Judgment, and plunge ourfelves 
 into Mivlake, therefore it is proper to confider what 
 there is in the Things themfelves that may occafion 
 our Errors. 
 
 I. The Obfcu-rity offome Truths, and the Difficulty 
 offearching them out, is one Occafion of rath and 
 miitaken Judgment. 
 
 Some Truths are difficult becaufe they lie remote- 
 from the firft Principles of Knowledge, and want a 
 long Chain of Argument to come at them : Such 
 are many of the deep Things of Algebra and Geo- 
 metry, and fome of the Theorems and Problems of 
 moil Parts of the Mathematicks. Many Things 
 alio in Natural Philojbphy are dark and intricate 
 upon this Account, becaufe we cannot come at any 
 certain Knowledge of them without the Labour of 
 many and difficult, as well as chargeable Expert 
 ments. 
 
 There are other Truths which have great Dark-, 
 nefs upon them, becaufe we have no proper Means 
 %v Medium to come at the Knowledge of therm 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. ISC) 
 
 Though in our Age we have found out many of 
 the deep Things of Nature by the AfTiftance of 
 dalles and other Inftruments ; yet we are not hi- 
 therto arrived at any fufficient Methods to difcover 
 the Shape of thofe little Particles of Matter which 
 diflinguifh thefeveral Sapours, Odours, arid Colours 
 of Bodies ; nor to find what Sort of Atoms corn- 
 pole Liquids or Solids, and diftinguifh Wood, Mi- 
 nerals, Metals, Glafs, Stone, &c. There is a Dark- 
 nefs alfo lies upon the Aelions of the intelleclual 
 or angelical World ; their Manners of Subfiftence 
 and Agency, the Power of Spirits to move Bodies, 
 and the Union of our Souls with this animal 
 Body of ours, are much unknown to us on this 
 Account. 
 
 Now in many of thele Cafes., a great Part of 
 Mankind is not content to be entirely ignorant ; 
 but they rather choofe to form ra(h and hafty 
 Judgments, to guefs at Things without "juft Evi- 
 dence, to believe fomething concerning them be- 
 fore they can know them ; and thereby they fall 
 into Error. 
 
 This Sort of Prejudice, as well as molt others, is 
 cured by Patience and Diligence in Inquiry and 
 Reafoning, and a Sujpenfwn of Judgment, till we 
 have attained fome proper Mediums of Knowledge^ 
 and till we fee fuflicient Evidence of the Truth, 
 
 II. The Appearance of Things in a Difguife, is 
 another Spring of Prejudice, or rafh Judgment. 
 The Outfide of Things, which firft ftrikes us, is 
 oftentimes different from their inward Nature ; 
 and we are tempted to judge fuddenly according 
 to outward Appearances. If a Piclure is daubed 
 with many bright and glaring Colours, the vulgar 
 Eye admires it as an excellent Piece ; whereas 
 the fame Perfon judges very contemptuoufly of 
 N 4 fome 
 
190 LOGICK : OR, THE [pAKT II. 
 
 fome admirable Defign, fketched out only with a 
 black Pencil on a coarfe Paper, though by the 
 Hand of Raphael. So the Scholar fpies the Name 
 of a new Book in a publick News-Paper ; he is 
 charmed with the Title, he purchafes, he reads 
 with huge Expectations, and finds it all Trafli 
 and Impertinence : This is a Prejudice derived from 
 the appearance ; we are too ready to judge that 
 Volume valuable which, had fo good a Frontif- 
 piece. The large Heap of Encomiums and fwell- 
 ing Words of Affurance that are beftowed on 
 Quack- Medicines in publick Advertifements, tempt 
 many a Reader to judge them infallible, and to 
 ufe the Pills or the Flaifter, with vail; Hope, and 
 frequent Difappointment. 
 
 We are tempted to form our Judgment of Per- 
 fans as well as Things by thefe outward Appearances. 
 Where there is Wealthy Equipage, and Splendor, 
 we are ready to call that Man happy ; but we fee 
 not the vexing Difquietudes of his vSoul : And 
 when we fpy a Perfon in ragged Garments, we 
 form a dcfpicable Opinion of him too fuddenly ; 
 we can hardly think him either happy or wife, our 
 Judgment is fo itrangely biafTed by outward and 
 fenfible Things. It was through the Power of 
 this Prejudice that the Jews rejected our bleflcd 
 Saviour ; they could not fufFer themfelves to be- 
 lieve that the Man who appeared as the Sou of a 
 Carpenter was al fo the Son of God. And becaufe 
 St. Paul was of little Stature, a mean Pretence, 
 and his Voice contemptible, fome of the Corinthi- 
 ans were tempted to doubt whether he was infpired 
 or no. 
 
 This Prejudice is cured by a longer Acquaintance 
 with the Worlds and a jufl Obfervatiou that Things 
 are fome limes better and fome times worfe than they 
 appear to be. We ought therefore to red rain our 
 
 exceffive 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. i()l 
 
 exceffive Forwardnefs to form our Opinion of Per- 
 fons or Things before we have Opportunity to fearch 
 into them more perfectly. Remember that a grey 
 Beard does not make a Philofopher ; all is not Gold 
 that glifters ; and a rough Diamond may he worth an 
 immenje Sum. 
 
 III. A Mixture of different Qualities in the fame 
 Thing, is another Temptation to judge amifs. 
 We are ready to be carried away by that Quality 
 which ftrikes the firfl or the ftrongeft Impreffions 
 upon us, and we judge of the whole Object accord- 
 ing to that Quality, rcgardlefs of all the reft ; or 
 fometimes we colour over all the other Qualities 
 with that one Tincture, whether it be bad or 
 good. 
 
 When we have juft Reafon to admire a Man for 
 his Virtues ', we are fometimes inclined not only 
 to negledt his Weakneffes, but even to put a good 
 Colour upon them, and to think them amiable. 
 When we read a Book that has many excellent 
 Truths in it, and divine Sentiments, we are tempt- 
 ed to approve not only that whole Book, but even 
 all the Writings of that Author. When a Poet, 
 an Orator, or a Painter, has performed admirably 
 in feveral illuftrious Pieces, we fometimes alfo ad- 
 mire his very Errors, we miftake his Blunders for 
 Beauties, and are fo ignorantly fond as to copy 
 after them. 
 
 It is this Prejudice that has rendered fo many 
 great Scholars perfect Bigots, and inclined them to 
 defend Homer or Horace, Livy or Cicero, in their 
 Miftakes, and vindicate all the Follies of their fa- 
 vourite Author. It is this that tempts fome great 
 Writers to fupport the Sayings of almoft all the 
 ancient Fathers of the Church, and admire them even 
 jn their v^ry Reveries. 
 
 On 
 
1Q% LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 
 
 On the other Hand, if an Author has profefTed 
 heretical Sentiments in Religion, we throw out- 
 Scorn upon every Thing he writes, we defpife even 
 his critical or mathematical Learning, and will 
 hardly allow him common Senfe. If a Poem has 
 fome Blemifh in it, there is a fet of falfe Criticks 
 who decry it univerfally, and will allow no Beauties 
 there. 
 
 This Sort of Prejudice is relieved by learning 
 to diftinguifh Things well, and not to judge in the 
 Lump. There is fcarce any Thing in the World 
 of Nature or Art, in the World of Morality or 
 Religion, that is perfectly uniform. There is a 
 Mixture of Wifdom and Folly, Vice and Virtue, 
 Good and Evil, both in Men and Things. We 
 fhould remember that fome Perfons have great 
 Wit and little Judgment ; others are judicious, but 
 not witty. Some are good humoured without Co?n- 
 fliment ; others have all the Formalities of Com- 
 plaifance, but no good Humour. We ought to 
 know that one Man may be vicious and learned, 
 while another has Virtue without Learning. That 
 many a Man thinks admirably well, who has a poor 
 Utterance ; while others have a charming Manner 
 of Speech, but their Thoughts are trifling and im- 
 pertinent. Some are good Neighbours, and cour- 
 teous, and charitable toward Men, who have no 
 Piety towards God ; others are truly religious, but 
 of morofe natural Tempers. Some excellent Sayings 
 are found in very 'filly Books* and fome (illy Thoughts 
 appear in Books of Value. We fhould neither 
 fraife nor difpraife by Wholefale, but feparate the 
 Good from the Evil, and judge of them apart: The 
 Accuracy of a good Judgment confiits much in 
 making fuch Diftinctions. 
 
 Yet let it be noted too, that in common Dif-* 
 courfe we ufuaily denominate Perfons and Things 
 
 according 
 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 1Q3 
 
 according to the major Part of their Character. 
 He is to be called a wife Man who has but few 
 Follies : He is a good Philofopher who knows much 
 of Nature, and for the moil Part reafons well in 
 Matters of human Science : And that Book JhouJd 
 be esteemed well written, which has more of good 
 Senfe in it than it has of Impertinence. 
 
 IV. Though a Thing be uniform in its own 
 
 Nature, yet the different Lights in which it may he 
 placed, and the different Views in which it appears 
 to us, will be ready to excite in us miftaken Judg- 
 ments concerning it. Let an ereel Cone be placed 
 on a horizontal Plane, at a great Di fiance from the 
 Eye, and it appears a plain Triangle ; but we (hall 
 judge that very Cone to be nothing but a flat Cir- 
 cle, if its Bafe be obverted towards us. Set a 
 common round Plate a little obliquely before our 
 Eyes afar off, and we fhall think it an oval Fi* 
 gure : But if the very Edge of it be turned towards 
 us, we (hall take it for a Jiraight Line. So when 
 we view the feveral Folds of a changeable Silk, we 
 pronounce this Part red, and thnXyellow, becaufe 
 of its different Pofition to the Light, though the 
 Silk laid fmooth in one Light appears all of one 
 Colour. 
 
 When we furvey the Miseries of Mankind, and 
 think of the Sorrows of Millions, both on Earth 
 and in Hell, the divine Government has a terrible 
 4 f peel, and we may be tempted to think hardly 
 even of God himfelf : But if we view the Proftw 
 fion of his Bounty and Grace amongft his Crea-. 
 tures on Earth, or the happy Spirits in Heaven, 
 we fhall have fo exalted an Idea of his Goodnefs as 
 to forget his Vengeance. Some Men dwell en-, 
 tirely upon the Promifes of his Gofpel, and think 
 him all Mercy ; Others, under a melancholv Frame* 
 
 * dwell 
 
1Q4 LOGICK : OR, THE [p ART II. 
 
 dwell upon his Terrors and his Threatening, and 
 are overwhelmed with the Thoughts of his Severity 
 and Vengeance, as though there were no Mercy in 
 him. 
 
 The true Method of delivering ourfelves from 
 this Prejudice, is to view a Thing on all Sides, to 
 compare all the various Appearances of the fame 
 Thing with one another, and let each of them have 
 its full Weight in the Balance of our Judgment, 
 before we fully determine our Opinion. It was by 
 this Means that the modern Aftronomers came to 
 find out that the Planet Saturn hath a flat broad 
 Circle round its Globe, which is called its Ring, by 
 obfervingthe different Appearances as a narrow or 
 a broader Oval, or, as it fometimes feems to be, a 
 Jlraiglit Line, in the different Parts of its twenty- 
 nine Years Revolution through the Ecliptic, And 
 if we take the fame juft and religious Survey of the 
 great and blejfed God in all the Difcoveries of his 
 Vengeance and his Mercy, we (hall at laft conclude 
 him to be both juft and good. 
 
 V. The cafual Affociation of many of our Ideas 
 becomes the Spring of another Prejudice or rafh 
 Judgment, to which we are fometimes expofed. 
 If in our younger Years we have taken Medicines 
 that have been naufeous, when any Medicine w hat- 
 foe ver is afterward propofed to us under Sicknefs, 
 wc immediately judge it naufeous : Our Fancy has 
 fo clofely joined thefe Ideas together, that we know 
 not how to feparate them : Then the Stomach feels 
 the Difguft, and perhaps refufes the only Drug 
 that can preferve Life. So a Child who has been 
 let Blood joins the Ideas of Pain and the Surgeon 
 together, and he hates the Sight of the Surgeon, 
 becaufe he thinks of his Pain : Or if he has drank 
 a bitter Potion, he conceives a bitter Idea of the 
 
 Cup 
 
CH. III.] RIGHt USE OP REASON. 1Q5 
 
 Cup which held it, and will drink nothing out of 
 that Cup. 
 
 It is for the fame Reafon that the Bulk of the 
 common People are fo fuperftitioufly fond of the 
 Pfalms tranflated by Hopkins and Sternhold, and 
 think them facred and divine/ becaufe they have 
 been now for more than an hundred Years bound 
 up in the fame Covers with our Bibles. 
 
 The belt Relief againil this Prejudice of Ajfocid- 
 tion is to confider, whether there be any natural 
 and neceffary Connection between thofe Ideas, 
 which Fancy, Cujlom, or Chance hath thus joined 
 together ; and if Nature has not joined them, let 
 our Judgment correct the Folly of our Imagination^ 
 and feparate thefe Ideas again. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Prejudices arifing from Words, 
 
 OUR Ideas and Words are fo linked together, 
 that while we judge of Things according to 
 Words, we are led into feveral Miflakes. Thefe 
 may be diftributed under two general Heads, 
 namely, fuch as arife from Jingle Words or Phrafes, 
 or fuch as arife from Words joined in Speech, and 
 compojing a Difcourfe. 
 
 I. The mod imminent and remarkable Errors, 
 of the firit Kind, are thefe three, (l.) When our 
 
 Words are infignificant, and have no Ideas ; as when 
 the myftical Divines talk of the Prayer of Silence \ 
 the fupernatural a?id pajfive Night of the Soul, the 
 Vacuity of Powers, the Sufpenfion of all Thoughts : 
 
 Or 
 
jg6 LOGICS! OR, THE ["FART It* 
 
 Or (2.) When our Words are equivocal, and fig- 
 nify two or more Ideas, as the Words Law, Light, 
 Flefli, Spirit, Right eoufnefs, and many other Terms 
 in Scripture : Or (3.) When two or three Words 
 are jfynonymous, and fignify one Idea, as Regenera- 
 tion and new Creation in the New Teftament ; 
 both which mean only a Change of the Heart from 
 Sin to Holinefs ; or, as the Eleclor of Cologn and the 
 BiJJiop of Colo gn are two Titles of the fame Man. 
 
 Thefe Kinds of Phrafes are the Occafion of va^ 
 rious Miftakes ; but none fo unhappy as thofe in 
 Theology : For both Words without Ideas, as well 
 as fynonymous and equivocal Words, have been ufed 
 and abufed by the Humours, Paflions, Interelts, or 
 by the real Ignorance and Weaknefs of Men* to 
 beget terrible Contends among Chriftians. 
 
 But to relieve us under all thofe Dangers, and 
 to remove thefe Sorts of Prejudices which arife from 
 Jingle Words or Phrafes, I muft remit the Reader 
 to Part I. Chap. IV. where I have treated about 
 Words, and to thofe DirecJions which I have given 
 concerning the Definition of Names, Part l. Chap. 
 VI. Sed. 3. 
 
 II. There is another Sort of falfe Judgments or 
 Miftakes which we are expofed to by W^ords ^ and 
 that is, when they are joined in Speech, and compofe a 
 Difcourfe ; and here we are in Danger two Ways. 
 
 The one is, when a Man writes good Senfe, or 
 fpeaks much to the Purpofe, but he has not a 
 happy and engaging Manner of Expreffion. Per- 
 haps he ufes coarfe or vulgar Words, or old, 
 obfolete, and unfafhionablc Language, or Terms 
 and Phrafes that are foreign, latinized, fcholaftick, 
 very uncommon, and hard to be underftood : 
 And this is ftill worfe, if his Sentences are long and 
 intricate, or the Sound of them harfh and grating 
 
 to 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON* 1<}7 
 
 to the Ear. All thefe indeed are Defecls in Style, 
 and lead fome nice and unthinking Hearers or 
 Readers into an ill Opinion of all that fuch a Perfon 
 fpeaks or writes. Many an excellent Difcourfe of 
 our Forefathers has had Abundance of Contempt 
 cad upon it by our modern Pretenders to Senfe, for 
 Want of their diftinguifhing between the Language 
 and the Ideas. 
 
 On the other Hand, w r hen a Man of Eloquence 
 fpeaks or writes upon any Subject, we are too 
 ready to run into his Sentiments, being fweetly 
 and infenfibly drawn by the Smoothnefs of his 
 Harangue, and the pathetick Power of his Lan- 
 guage. Rhetorick will varnifh every Error^ fo 
 that it fhall appear in the Drefs of Truth, and put 
 fuch Ornaments upon Vice, as to make it look 
 like Virtue : It is an Art of wondrous and exten- 
 five Influence ; it often conceals, obfcures, or over- 
 whelms the Truth, and places fometimes a grofs 
 Falfhood in a moft alluring Light. The Decency 
 of Action, the Mufick of the Voice, the Harmony 
 of the Periods, the Beauty of the Style, and all the 
 engaging Airs of the Speaker, have often charmed 
 the Hearers into Error, and perfuaded them to 
 approve whatfoever is propofed in fo agreeable a 
 Manner. A large Aflembly Hands expofed at once 
 to the Power of thefe Prejudices, and imbibes them 
 all. So Cicero and Demofthenes made the Romans 
 and the Athenians believe almoft whatfoever they 
 pleafed. 
 
 Te beft Defence againit both thefe Dangers, is 
 to learn the Skill (as much as poffible) offeparat- 
 ing our Thoughts and Ideas from Words and Phrafes, 
 to judge of the Things in their own Natures, and 
 in their natural or juft Relation to one another, 
 abftradted from the Ufe of Language, and to 
 maintain a (teady and obftinate reiblution, to 
 
 hearken 
 
1<JS LOGICK ! OR, THE [PART IT. 
 
 hearken to nothing but Truth, in whatfoever Style 
 or Drefs it appears. 
 
 Then we mall hear a Sermon of pious and juft 
 Sentiments with Efteem and Reverence, though 
 the preacher has but an unpolifhed Style, and 
 many Defects in the Manner of his Delivery. 
 Then we fhall neglect and difregard all the flatter- 
 ing Infin nations, whereby the Orator would make 
 Way for his own Sentiments to take Pofleflion of 
 our Souls, if he has not folid and inftructive Senfe 
 equal to his Language. Oratory is a happy Ta- 
 lent when it is rightly employed, to excite the 
 Paffions to the Practice of Virtue and Piety ; but, 
 to fpeak properly, this Art has nothing to do in 
 the Search after Truth. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 "Prejudices arifing from ourf elves. 
 
 NEITHER Words nor Things would fo often 
 lead us aftray from Truth, if we had not 
 within ourfelves fuch Springs of Error as thefe that 
 follow. 
 
 I. Many Errors are derived from our Weahiefs 
 of Reafon, and Incapacity to judge of Things in our 
 Infant State. Thefe are called the Prejudices of 
 Infancy. We frame early Miftakes about the com- 
 mon Objccls which furround us, and the common 
 Affairs of Life: We fancy the Nurfe is our hefl- 
 Friend, becaufe Children receive from their Nurfes 
 their Food and other Conveniencies of Life. We 
 judge that Books are very unp!eafantThings,bccaufe, 
 perhaps, we have been driven to them by the 
 
 Scourge 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 1 QQ 
 
 Scourge. We judge alfo that the Sky touches the 
 diftant Hills, becaufe we cannot inform ourfelves 
 better in Childhood. We believe the Stars ars 
 not rifen till the Sun is fet, becaufe we never fee 
 them by Day. But fome ofthefe Errors may fee m 
 to be derived from the next Spring. 
 
 The way to cure the Prejudices of Infancy is to 
 diftinguifh, as far as we can, which are thofe Opi- 
 nions which we framed in perfect Childhood ; to 
 remember that at that Time our Reafon was inca- 
 pable of forming a right Judgment, and to bring 
 thefe Proportions again to be examined at the Bar 
 of mature Reafon. 
 
 II. Our Senfes give us many a falfe Information 
 of Things, and tempt us to judge amifs. This is 
 called the Prejudice of Senfe ; as when we fuppofe 
 the Sun and Moon to be flat Bodies, and to be but a 
 few Inches broad, becaufe they appear fo to the 
 Eye. Senfe inclines us to judge that Air has no 
 Weight i becaufe w 7 e do not feel it prefs heavy upon 
 us ; and we judge only by our Senfes that Cold 
 and Heat, Sweet and Sour, Red and Blue, &tc. are 
 fuch real Properties in the Objects themfelves, 
 and exactly like thofe Senfations which they excite 
 in us. 
 
 Note i Thofe Miflakes of this Sort which all 
 Mankind drop and lofe in their advancing Age, 
 are called mere Prejudices of Infancy ; but thofe 
 which abide with the vulgar Part of the World, 
 and generally with all Men, till Learning and Phi- 
 lofophy cure them, more properly attain the Name 
 of Prejudices of Senfe. 
 
 Thefe Prejudices are to be removed feveral 
 Ways, (l.) By the Afli fiance of one Senfe we 
 cure the Miftakes of another ; as when a Stick 
 thrift into the Water feems crooked, we are prevent- 
 
 O ed 
 
200 LOGICK i OR, THE [PART II. 
 
 cd from judging it to be really fo in itfelf, for 
 when we take it out of the Water, both our Sight 
 and our Feeling agree and determine it to be 
 ftraight. (2.) The Exercife of our Reafon, and 
 an Application to mathematical and philofopbical 
 Studies, cures many other Prejudices of Senfe, both 
 with relation to the heavenly and earthly Bodies. 
 (3.) We fhouM remember that our Senfes have 
 often deceived us in various Inflances, that they 
 give but a confufed and imperfect Reprefentation 
 of Things in many Cafes, that they often repre- 
 fent falfely thofe very Objects to which they feem 
 to be fuited, fuch as the Shape, Motion, Size, and 
 Situation, of grofs Bodies, if they are but placed 
 at a Diftance from us ; and as for the minute Par- 
 ticles of which Bodies are compofed, our Senfes 
 cannot diflinguifh them. (4.) We fhould remem- 
 ber alfo, that one prime and original Defign of our 
 Senfes/ is to inform us what various Relations the 
 Bodies that are round about us bear to our own ani- 
 mal Body, and to give us notice what is pleafant 
 and ufeful, or what is painful and injurious to us; 
 but they are not fufficient of themfelves to lead us 
 into a philofopbical Acquaintance with the inward 
 Nature of Things. It mud be confefTed, it is by 
 the Affiftance of the Eye and the Ear efpecially 
 (which are called the Senfes of Difcipline) that our 
 Minds are furni died with various Parts of Know- 
 ledge, by reading, hearing, and observing Things 
 divine and human ; yet Reafon ought always to 
 accompany the Exercife of our Senfes, whenever 
 we would form a jufi Judgment of Things pro- 
 pofed to our Enquiry. 
 
 Here it is proper to obferve alfo, that as the 
 Weaknefs of Reafon in our Infancy, and the Dic- 
 tates of our Senfes, fometimes in advancing Tears , 
 lead the wifer Part of Mankind aftray from Truth ; 
 
 fo 
 
CH. Ill ] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 201 
 
 fo the meaner Parts of our Species, Perfons whofe 
 Genius is very low, whofe Judgment is always 
 weak, who are ever indulging the Dictates of Senfe 
 and Humour, are but Children of a larger Size, they 
 ftand expofed to everlafting Miftakes in Life, and 
 live and die in the Mid ft of Prejudices* 
 
 III. Imagination is another fruitful Spring of 
 falfe Judgments. Our Imagination is nothing elfe 
 but the various Appearances of our fenfible Ideas 
 in the Brain, where the Soul frequently works in 
 uniting, disjoining, multiplying, magnifying, di~ 
 minifhing and altering the feveral Shapes, Colours, 
 Sounds, Motions, Words and Things, that have 
 been communicated to us by the outward Organs 
 of Senfe. It is no wonder therefore if Fancy leads 
 us into many Miftakes, for it is but Senfe at fecond 
 hand. Whatever is ftrongly impreffed upon the 
 Imagination, fome PerfonS believe to be true. 
 Some will choofe a particular Number in a Lottery^ 
 or lay a large Wager on a fingle Chance of a Dye, 
 and doubt not of Succefs, becaufe their Fancy feds 
 fo powerful an Impreffion, and allures them it will 
 be profperous. A thoufand pretended Prophecies 
 and Infpirations , and all the Freaks of Fnthufiafm, 
 have been derived from this Spring. Dreams are 
 nothing elfe but the Deceptions of Fancy : A De* 
 lirium, is but a fhort Wildnefs of the Imagination ; 
 and a fettled irregularity of Fancy, is Diftraclion 
 and Madnefs. 
 
 One Way to gain a VicTory over this unruly 
 Faculty, is to fet a WatQh upon it perpetual ly, 
 and to bridle it in all its Extravagancies ; never to 
 believe any thing merely becaufe Fancy dictates 
 it, any more than I would believe a Midnight* 
 Dream, nor to truft Fancy any farther than it is 
 attended with fevere Rcafon. It is a very ufeful 
 
 O 2 and 
 
202 LOGICK I OR, THE [pA-RT. II. 
 
 and entertaining Power of human Nature in Mat- 
 ters of Illuflration^ Perfuqfeon, Oratory , Poefy, Wit y 
 Converfation, &c. but in the calm inquiry after 
 Truth, and the final Judgment of Things, Fancy 
 fhould retire, and ftand afide, unlefs it be called 
 in to explain or illuilrate a difficult Point by a Si- 
 militude. 
 
 Another Method of Deliverance from the Pre- 
 judices of Fancy , is to compare the Ideas that arife 
 in our Imaginations with the real Nature of Things ^ 
 as often as we have occafion to judge concerning 
 them ; and let calm and fedate Reafon govern and 
 determine our Opinions, though Fancy fhould fhew 
 never fo great a Reluctance. Fancy is the inferior 
 Faculty, and it ought to obey. 
 
 IV. The various Pajfions or Affections of the Mind 
 are numerous and endlefs Springs of Prejudice, 
 They difguife every Objecl they con verfe with, 
 and put their own Colours upon it, and thus lead 
 the Judgment aftray from Truth. It is Love that 
 makes the Mother think her own Child the faircft, 
 and will fometimes perfuade us that a Blemifh is a 
 Beauty. Hope and Defire make an Hour of De- 
 lay fcem as long as two or three Hours ; Hope 
 inclines us to think there is nothing too difficult 
 to be attempted ; Defpair tells us that a brave 
 Attempt is mere Rafhnefs, and that every Diffi- 
 culty is unfurmountable. Fear makes us imagine 
 that a Bufh fhaken with the Wind, has fome fa- 
 vage Beafl in it, and multiplies the dangers that 
 attend our Path ; But ftill there is a more unhappy 
 Effect of Fear when it keeps Millions of Souls in 
 Slavery to the Errors of an eftablifhed Religion : 
 What could perfuade the wife Men and Philofo- 
 phcrs of a Popifh Country to believe the grofs 
 Abfurdities of the Romijh Church, but the Fear 
 
 of 
 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 203 
 
 of Torture, or Death, the Galleys, or the biquifition? 
 Sorrow and Melancholy tempt us to think our Cir- 
 cumftances much more difmal than they are, that 
 we may have fame Excufe for Mourning : And 
 Envy represents the Condition of our Neighbour 
 better than it is, that there may be fame Pretence 
 for her own Vexation and Uneafinefs. Anger, and 
 Wrath, and Revenge, and all thofe hateful Paffions, 
 excite in us far worfe Ideas of Men than they de~ 
 ferve, and perfuades us to believe all that is ill of 
 them. A Detail of the evil Influence of the Af- 
 fections of the Mind upon our Judgment, would 
 make a large volume. 
 
 The Cure of thefe Prejudices is attained by a 
 eonftant Jealoufy of ourfelves, and Watchfulnefs 
 over our Pajfions, that they may never interpofe 
 when we are called to pafs a Judgment of any 
 Thing : And when our Affections are warmly en- 
 gaged, let us abftain from judging. It w r ould be 
 alfa of great Ule to us to form our deliberate 
 Judgments of Perfons and Things in the calmeft 
 and fereneft Hours of Life, when the Pajfions of 
 Nature are all filcnt, and the Mind enjoys its mod: 
 perfect Compofure : And thefe Judgments fa form- 
 ed fhould be treaiured up in the Mind, that we 
 might have recourfe to them in Hours of Need. 
 See many more Sentiments and Directions relating 
 to this Subject, in my Doclrine of the Pajfions, 
 Second Edition enlarged. 
 
 V. The Fondnefs we have for Self, and the Re* 
 la t ion which other Perfons and Th'mgs have to our- 
 f elves, furnifh us with another long Lift of Pre- 
 judices, This indeed might be reduced to the 
 Pajfion of Self Love, but it is fa copious an Head 
 that I choofe to name it as a diftincl Spring of falfe 
 Judgments. We are generally ready to fancy 
 
 O 3 every 
 
204 LOGICK ! OR, THE [PART. II, 
 
 every Thing of our own has fomething peculiarly 
 valuable in it, when indeed there is no other Rea- 
 fon, but becaufe it is our own. Were we born 
 among the Gardens' of Italy * the Rocks of SwiU 
 zerland, or the Ice and Snows of Rujjla and Swe* 
 den, (till we fhould imagine peculiar Excellencies 
 in our native Land. We conceive a good Idea of 
 the Town and Village where we firft breathed, and 
 think the better of a Man for being born near us. 
 We entertain the bed: Opinion of the Perfons of 
 our own Party, and eafily believe evil Reports of 
 Perfons of a different Seel or Faclion. Our own 
 Sex, our Kindred, our Houfes, and our very Names y 
 feem to have fomething good and defirable in 
 them. We are ready to mingle all thefe with our* 
 /elves, and cannot bear to have others think meanly 
 of them. 
 
 So good an opinion have we of our own SentU 
 ments and Praclices, that it is very difficult to be- 
 lieve what a Reprover fays of our Conduct: and 
 we are as ready to affent to all the Language of 
 Flattery. We fet up our own Opinions in Religion 
 and Philofophy, as the teds of Orthodoxy and Truth ; 
 and we are prone to judge every practice of other 
 Men either a Duty or a Crime > which we think 
 would be a Crime or a Duty in us, though their 
 Circumftances are vaftly different from our own. 
 This Humour prevails fometimes to fuch a Degree, 
 that we would make our own Tqfte and Inclination 
 the Standard by which to judge of every Difh of 
 Meat that is fet upon the Table, every Book in a 
 Library, every Employment, Study, and Bufinefs, 
 oi Life, as well as every Recreation. 
 
 It is from this evil Principle of fetting up Self 
 for a Model what other Men ought to be, that the 
 Aniichrijlian Spirit of Impofition and Perfecution 
 had us original : Though there is no more Rca- 
 
 fon 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 205 
 
 ion for it than there was for the Practice of that 
 Tyrant, who having a Bed fit for his own Size, was 
 reported to ftretch Men of low itature upon the 
 Rack, till they were drawn out to the Length of 
 his Bed ; and fome add alfo, that he cut off the 
 Legs of any whom he found too long for it. 
 
 It is alfo from a Principle near akin to this, that 
 we pervert and ftrain the Writings of many vene- 
 rable Authors, and efpecially the facred Books of 
 Scripture, to make them fpeak our own Senfe. 
 Through the Influence which our own Schemes or 
 Hypothefes have upon the Mind, we fometimes be- 
 come fo fharp-fighted as to find thefe Schemes in 
 thofe Places of Scripture where the Holy Writers 
 never thought of them, nor the Holy Spirit in- 
 tended them. At other Times, this Prejudice 
 brings fuch a Dimnefs upon the Sight, that we can- 
 not read any thing that oppofes our own Scheme, 
 though it be written as with Sun-beams, and in 
 the plainefl Language ; and- perhaps we are in 
 Danger in fuch a Cafe of winking a little againfl 
 the Light. 
 
 We ought to bring our Minds free, unbiavled, 
 and teachable, to learn our Religion from the Word 
 of God ; but we have generally formed all the 
 lefler as well as the greater Points of our Religion 
 beforehand, and then we read the Prophets and 
 Apoftles only to pervert them to confirm our own 
 Opinions. Were it not for this Influence of Self, 
 and a Bigotry to our own Tenets, we could hardly 
 imagine that fo many ftrange, abfurd, inconfiftent, 
 wicked, mifchievous, and bloody Principles, fhould 
 pretend to fupport and defend themfelves by the 
 Go/pel of Chrift. 
 
 Every learned Critick has his own Hypothecs ; 
 and if the common Text be not favourable to his 
 Opinion, a various Leclion fhall be made authen- 
 
 O 4 tick. 
 
206 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART. II. 
 
 tick. The Text muft be fuppofed to be defective, 
 or redundant, and the Senfe of it (hall be literal, 
 or metaphorical, according as it beft fupports his 
 own Scheme. Whole Chapters or Books (hall be 
 added or left out of the facred Canon, or be turned 
 into Parables, by this Influence. Luther knew not 
 well how to reconcile the Epiftle of St. James to 
 the Doctrine of *J unification by Faith alone, and fo 
 he could not allow it to be divine. The Papifts 
 bring all the Apocrypha into their Bible, and ftainp 
 Divinity upon it ; for they can fancy Purgatory is 
 there, and they find Prayers for the Dead. But 
 they leave out the fecond Commandment, becaufe it 
 forbids the Worfhip of Images,, Others fuppofe the 
 Mofaick Hiftory of the Creation, and the Pall of Man, 
 to be oriental Ornaments, or a mere Allegory, be- 
 caufe the literal Senfe of thofe three Chapters of 
 Genefis do not agree with their Theories. Even 
 an honeft plain-hearted and unlearned Chrijlian is 
 ready to find fomething in every Chapter of the 
 Bible to countenance his own private Sentiments ; 
 but he loves thofe Chapters beft which fpeak his 
 own Opinions plainelt : This is a Prejudice that 
 flicks very clofe to our Natures : the Scholar is 
 infefted with it daily, and the Mechanick is not 
 free. 
 
 Self has yet a farther and a more pernicious In- 
 fluence upon our Underflandings, and is an un- 
 happy Guide in the Search after Truth. When 
 our own Inclination, or our Eafe, our Honour, or 
 our Profit, tempts us to the Practice of any Thing 
 of fufpected Lawfulnefs, how do we ftrain our 
 Thoughts to find Arguments for it, and pcrfuadc 
 ourfelves it is lawful ? We colour over Iniquity 
 and finful Compliance with the Names of Virtue 
 and Innocence, or at lead of Conflraint and Neceffi^ 
 ty. All the different and oppolite Sentiments and 
 
 Practices 
 
CH. III.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 20? 
 
 Practices of Mankind are too much influenced by 
 this mean Bribery, and give too juft Occafion for 
 fatyrical Writers to lay, that Self -Inter eft governs, 
 all Mankind, 
 
 When the Judge had awarded due Damages to 
 a Perfon into vvhofe Field a Neighbour's Oxen had 
 broke, it is reported that he reverfed his own Sen- 
 tence, when he heard that the Oxen which had 
 clone this Mifchief were his own. Whether this 
 be a Hi/lory or a Parable^ it is frill a juft Reprefen- 
 tation of the wretched Influence of Self to corrupt 
 the Judgment. 
 
 One way to amend this Prejudice, is to thru ft 
 Selfib far out of the Qucftion that it may have no 
 Manner of Influence whenfoever we are called to 
 judge and confider the naked Nature, Truth, and 
 Juftice of Things. In Matters of Equity between 
 Man and Man, our Saviour has taught us an ef- 
 fectual Means of guarding againft this Prejudice, 
 and that is, to put my Neighbour in the Place of 
 Tnyfelf and myfeif'm the Place of my Neighbour, ra- 
 ther than be bribed by this corrupt Principle of 
 Self-Love to do Injury to our Neighbours. Thence 
 arifes that Golden Rule of dealing with others as we 
 would have others deal with us. 
 
 In the Judgment of Truth and Faljhood, .Right 
 and Wrong, Good and Evil, we ought to confider 
 that every Man has a Self as well as we ; and 
 that the Tafl.es, Paffions, Inclinations and Interefts 
 of different Men are very different, and often con- 
 trary, and that they dictate contrary Things : Un- 
 Jefs therefore all Manner of different and contrary 
 Proportions could be true at once, Self can never 
 be a juft Teft or Standard of Truth and Falfhood, 
 Good and Evil. 
 
 YL The 
 
S08 logick: or the [part. ii. 
 
 Vic The Tempers, Humours, and peculiar Turns 
 of the Mind, whether they be natural or acquired, 
 have a great Influence upon our Judgment, and 
 become the Occafion of many Mi/lakes. Let us 
 furvey a few of them. 
 
 (l.) Some Perfons are of an eafy and credulous 
 Temper, while others are perpetually difcovering a 
 Spirit of Contradiclion. 
 
 The credulous Man is ready to receive every 
 Thing for Truth, that has but a Shadow of Evi- 
 dence ; every new Book that he reads, and every 
 ingenious Man with whom he converfes, has Power 
 enough to draw him into the Sentiments of the 
 Speaker or Writer. He has fo much Complaifance 
 in him, or weaknefs of Soul, that he is ready to 
 refign his own Opinion to the firft Objection which 
 he hears, and to receive any Sentiments of another 
 that are afTcrted with a pofitive Air and much Af- 
 furance. Thus he is under a Kind of Neceflity, 
 through the Indulgence of this credulous Humour, 
 either to be often changing his Opinions, or to be- 
 lieve Inconfiftencies. 
 
 The Man of Contradiclion is of a contrary Hu- 
 mour, for he {lands ready to oppofe every Thing 
 that is faid • He gives a flight Attention to the 
 Reafoos of other Men, from an inward fcornful 
 Prefumption that they have no Strength in them. 
 When he reads or hears a Difcourfe different from 
 his own Sentiments, he does not give himfelf 
 Leave to confider whether that Difcourfe may be 
 true ; but employs all his Powers immediately 
 to confute it. Your great Di/puters, and your 
 Men of Controverfy, are in continual Danger of 
 this Sort of Prejudice: They contend often for 
 Victory, and will maintain whatfoever they have 
 aflerted, while Truth is loft in the Noife and Tu- 
 mult 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE ©F EEASON. 10Q 
 
 mult of reciprocal Contradiction;: ; and it frequent- 
 ly happens, that a Debate about Opinions is turned 
 into a mutual reproach of Perfons. 
 
 The Prejudice of Credulity may in fome Meafure 
 be cured, by learning to let a high Value on Truth, 
 and by taking more Pains to attain it ; remember^ 
 ing that Truth oftentimes lies dark and deep, and 
 requires us to dig for it as hid Treafure ; and that 
 Falfhood often puts on a fair Difguife, and there- 
 fore we fhould not yield up our Judgment to every 
 plaufible Appearance. It is no Part of Civility or 
 good Breeding to part with Truth, but to main- 
 tain it with Decency and Candour. 
 
 A Spirit of Contradiclion is fo pedantick and 
 hateful, that a Man mould take much Pains with 
 himfelf to watch againlt every Inftance of it: He 
 fhould learn fo much good Humour, at lead, as 
 never to oppofe any Thing without juft and folid 
 Reafon for it : He fhould abate fome Degrees of 
 Pride and Morcfenefs, which are never-failing In- 
 gredients in this Sort of Temper, and fhould feek 
 after fo much Honejly and Confcience, as never to 
 contend for Conqueft or Triumph ; but to review 
 his own Reafon s, and to read the Arguments of his 
 Opponents (if pofiible) with an equal IndifTerency, 
 and be glad to fpy Truth, and to fubmit to it, 
 though it appear on the oppofite Side. 
 
 (2.) There is another Pair of Prejudices derived 
 from two Tempers of Mind, near akin to thofe I 
 have juft mentioned; -and thefe are the dogmatical 
 and the fceptical Humour 3 that is, always pofitive? or 
 always doubting. 
 
 By what Means foever the Dogmaiifi came by 
 his Opinions, whether by his Senfes, or by his 
 Fancy, his Education or his own Reading, yet he 
 believes them all with the fame Affurance that 
 })e does a mathematical Truth \ he has fcarce any 
 
 mere 
 
210 LOGICK, OR, THE [PART If, 
 
 mere Probabilities that belong to him ; every Thing 
 with him is certain and infallible , every punctilio 
 in Religion is an Article of his Faith, and he an- 
 iwers all Manner of Objections by a fovcreign 
 Contempt. 
 
 Perfons of this Temper are feldom to be con* 
 vinced of any Miftake : A full Affurance of their 
 own Notions makes all the Difficulties on their 
 own Side vanifh fo entirely, that they think etfery 
 Point of their Belief is written as with Sun Beams, 
 and wonder any one fhould find a Difficulty in it. 
 They are amazed that learned Men fhould make 
 a Controverfy of what is to them fo perfpicuous and 
 indubitable. The lowed Rank of People, both 
 in learned and in vulgar Life, is very fuhje6l to 
 this Obftinacy. 
 
 Scepticifm is a contrary Prejudice. The Dogma- 
 tijl is fure of every Thing, and the Sceptick believes 
 Nothing. Perhaps he has found himfelf often 
 mifraken in Matters of which he thought himfelf 
 well affiured in his younger Days, and therefore he 
 is afraid to give Aflent to any Thing again. He 
 fees fo much Shew of Reafon for every Opinion, 
 and fo many Objections alfo arifing againft every 
 Doctrine, that he is ready to throw off the Belief 
 of every Thing : He renounces at once the Purfuit 
 of Truth, and contents himfelf to fay, There is 
 nothing certain. It is well, if through the Influ- 
 ence of fuch a Temper he does not cad away his 
 Religion as well as his Philofophy, and abandon 
 himfelf to a profane Courfe of Life, regardlefs of 
 Hell or Heaven. 
 
 Both thefe Prejudices lad mentioned, though 
 they are fo oppofitc to each other, yet they arife 
 from the fame Spring, and that is, Impatience of 
 Study , and Want of diligent Attention in the Search 
 of Truth. The Dogmatifl is in hade to believe 
 
 fome- 
 
CH. III.]' RIGHT USE OF REASON. 211 
 
 fomething; he' cannot keep himfelf long enough 
 in Sufpenfe, till fome bright and convincing Evi- 
 dence appear on one Side, but throws himfelf ca- 
 fually into the Sentiments of one Party or another, 
 and then he will hear no Argument to the con- 
 trary. The Sceptick will not take Pains to fearch 
 Things to the Bottom, but when he fees difficul- 
 ties on both fides, refolves to believe neither of 
 them. Humility of Soul, Patience in Study, Dili- 
 gence in Inquiry, with an honeji Zeal for Truth, 
 would go a great Way towards the Cure of both 
 thefe Follies. 
 
 (3.) Another Sort of Temper that is very inju- 
 rious to a right Judgment of Things, is an incon- 
 Jlant, fickle, changeable Spirit, and a very uneven 
 Temper of Mind. When fuch Perfons are in one 
 Humour, they pafs a Judgment of Things agree- 
 able to it ; when their Humour changes, they re- 
 verie their fhft Judgment, and embrace a new 
 Opinion. They have no Steadinefs of Soul \ they 
 want Firmnefs of Mind fufficientto eftablifh them-- 
 felves in any Truth, and are ready to change it 
 for the next alluring Falfhood that is agreeable to 
 their Change of Humour. This Ficklenefs is fome- 
 times fo mingled with their very Conftitution by 
 Nature, or by Di item per of Body, that a cloudy 
 Day and a lowering Sky (hall ftrongly incline them 
 to form an Opinion both of themfelves, and of 
 Perfons and Things round about them, quite diffe- 
 rent from what they believe when the Sun Jhines, 
 and the Heavens are ferene. 
 
 This Sort of People ought to judge of Things 
 and Perfons in their mo ft fedate, peaceful, and 
 compofed Hours of Life, and refer ve thefe Judg- 
 ments for their Conduct at more unhappy Seafons. 
 
 (4.) Some Perfons have a violent amd turgid 
 Manner both of Talking and Thinking j whatsoever 
 
 they 
 
il2 logics: : or, $M [part, if, 
 
 they judge of, it is always with a Tincture of this 
 Vanity. They are always in Extremes, and pro- 
 nounce concerning every Thing in the Superlative. 
 If they think a Man to be learned, he is the chief 
 Scholar of the Age : If another has low Parts, he is 
 the great eft Blockhead in Nature : If they approve 
 any Book on divine Subjects, // is the beft Book in 
 the World next to the Bible : If they fpeak of a Storm 
 cf Rain or Hail, it is the mofi terrible Storm that fell 
 fince the Creation : And a cold Winter Day is the 
 coldeft that ever was known. 
 
 But the Men of this fwelling Language ought 
 to remember, that Nature has ten thoufand mode- 
 rate Things in it, and does not always deal in Ex- 
 tremes as they do. 
 
 (5.) I think it may be called another Sort of 
 Prejudice derived from Humour, when fome Men 
 believe a Doctrine merely bccaife it is ancient, and has 
 been long believed ; others are fo fond of Novelty^ 
 that nothing prevails upon their AfTent fo much 
 as new Thoughts and new Notions. Again, there 
 are fome who fet a high •Efteem upon every Thing 
 that is foreign and farfetched ; therefore China 
 Pictures are admired, how aukward foever : Others 
 value Things the more for being of our own native 
 Growth, Invention, or Manufacture, and thefe as 
 much defpiic foreign Things. 
 
 Some Men of Letters and Theology will not be- 
 lieve a Proportion even concerning a fublime 
 Subject, till every Thing myftertous, deep and 
 difficult is cut off from it, though the Scripture 
 averts it never fo plainly ; others are fo fond of a 
 Myftery, and Things incomprehenfible, that they 
 would fcarce believe the Do&rine of the Trinity, 
 if it could be explained ; they incline to that 
 foolifli Rant of one of the Ancients, Credo quia 
 
 impojfibile 
 
CH. Ill] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 1\$ 
 
 bntofftbile eft \ iC I believe it becaufe it is impof- 
 fible." 
 
 To cure thefe Miftakes, remember that neither 
 antique nor novel, foreign nor native, myfterious nor 
 plain, are certain Characters either of Truth, or 
 Falihood. 
 
 I might mention various other Humours of Men. 
 that excite in them various Prejudices, and lead 
 them into rain and miftaken Judgments; but 
 thefe are fufficient for a Specimen. 
 
 "VII. There are feveral other Weakneffes which 
 belong to human Nature, whereby we are led into 
 Miftakes, and indeed are rendered almoft inca- 
 pable of paffing a folid Judgment in Matters of 
 great Depth and great Difficulty. Some have a 
 native Obfcurity of Perception, (or fhall I call it a 
 want of natural Sagacity . ? ) whereby they are hin- 
 dered from attaining clear and diitincl Ideas. Their 
 Thoughts always feem to have fomething confufed 
 and cloudy in them, and therefore they judge in 
 the Dark. Some have a Defeclof Memory, and 
 then they are not capable of comparing their pre- 
 fent Ideas with a great Variety of others, in order 
 to fecure themfelves from Inconiiftency in Judg- 
 ment. Others may have a Memory large enough, 
 yet they are fubjeel; to the fame Errors from a 
 Narrownefs of Soul, and fuch a Fixation and Con- 
 finement of Thought to a few Objecls, that they fcarce 
 ever take a Survey of Things wide enough to judge 
 wifely and well, and to fecure themfelves from all 
 Ineonfiftencies. 
 
 Though thefe are natural Defecls and Weakneffes, 
 yet they may in fome Meafure be relieved by La- 
 bour, Diligence, and a due Attention to proper 
 Rules. 
 
 But 
 
214 fcOGICK; OR, THE [p ART If* 
 
 Bat among all the Caufes offalfe Judgment which 
 are within our/elves, I ought by no Means to leave 
 out that univerfal and original Spring of Error, 
 which we are informed of by the Word of God ; 
 and that is, the Sin and Defeclion of oiir jirft Parent s\ 
 whereby all our heft natural Powers both of Mind 
 and Body are impaired, and rendered very much 
 inferior to what they were in a ftate of Innocence* 
 Our Underftanding is darkened, our Memory con- 
 tracted, our corrupt Humours and Palfions are 
 grown predominant, our Reafon enfeebled, and 
 various Diforders attend our Conflitution and ani- 
 mal Nature, whereby the Mind is firangely im~ 
 pofed upon in its Judgment of Things. Nor is 
 there any perfect Relief to be expected on Earth* 
 There is no hope of ever recovering from thefe 
 Maladies, but by a fincere Return to God in the 
 Ways of his own Appointment, whereby we (hall be 
 kept fafe from all dangerous and pernicious Errors 
 in the Matters of Religion ; and though Imperfec- 
 tions and Mifiakes will hang about us in the prefent 
 Life, as the Effects of our original Apoflacy from 
 God, yet we hope for a full Deliverance from them 
 when w r e arrive at Heaven. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Prejudices arifing from other Perfons. 
 
 WERE it not for the Springs of Prejudice 
 that are lurking in ourfelves, we fhould not 
 be fubje6t to fo many Mifiakes from the Influence 
 of others : But fince our Nature is fo fufceptive of 
 Errors on all Sides, it is fit we fhould have Hints 
 ond Notices given us, how far other Perfons may 
 have Power over us, and become the Cauies of our 
 
 falfe 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 215 
 
 falfe Judgments. This might all be caft into one 
 Heap, for they are all near akin, and mingle with 
 each other; but for Diftinclion-fake let them be 
 called the Prejudices of Education, of Cujlom, ot Au- 
 thority, and iuch as arife from the Manner of Pro- 
 pcfal. 
 
 I. Thofe with whom our Education is intruded, 
 may lay \k\zfirft Foundation of many Mijiakes in our 
 younger Years. How many Fooleries and Errors 
 are inltilled into us by our Nurfes, our Fellow- 
 Children, by Servants or unfkilful Teachers, which 
 are not only maintained through the following 
 Parts of Life, but fometimes have a very unhappy 
 Influence upon us 1 We are taught that there are 
 Goblins and Bugbears in the , Dark ; our young 
 Minds are crouded with the terrible Ideas ofGho/is 
 appearing upon every Occafion, or with the pleafanter 
 Tales of Fairies dancing at Midnight, We learn to 
 prophefy betimes, to foretel Futurities by good or evil 
 Omens, and to prefage approaching Death in a Fa- 
 mily by Ravens and little Worms, which we there- 
 fore term a Death-Watch. We are taught to know 
 beforehand, for a Twelvemonth together, which 
 Days of the Week will be fair or foul, which will be 
 lucky or unlucky ; nor is there any Thing fo filly, 
 but may be impofed upon our Underftandings in 
 that early Part of Life ; and thefe ridiculous Sto- 
 ries abide with us too long, and too far influence 
 the Weaker Part of Mankind. 
 
 We choofe our particular Seel and Party in the 
 civil, the religious, and the learned Life, by the In- 
 fluence of Education. In the Colleges of Learn- 
 ing, fome are for the Nominals, and fome for the 
 Realifts in the Science of Metaphyficks, becaufe 
 their Tutors were devoted to thefe Parties. The 
 eld Philofophy and the new have gained thousands 
 
 P of 
 
216 logick : on, THE [part II. 
 
 ofPartifans the fame Way: And t\ cry Religion 
 has its Infant Votaries, who are born, live and die 
 in the fame Faith, without Examination of any 
 Article. The Turks arc taught early to believe in 
 Mahomet', the jews in Mofes ; the Heathens wor- 
 ffiip a Multitude of Gods, under the Force of their 
 Educatoin. And it would be well if there were not 
 Millions of Chri/lians, \sho have little more to fay 
 for their Religion, than that they were born and 
 bred up in it. The grtateft Part of the Chriftian 
 World can hardly give any Rcafon why they be- 
 lieve the Bible to be the Word of God, but becaufe 
 they have always believed it, and they were taught 
 fo from their Infancy. As Jews and Turks, and 
 American Heathens, believe the mofl monftrous and 
 incredible Stories, becaufe they have been trained 
 up amongft them, as Articles of Faith ; fo the 
 Papifts believe their Tranfiibftantiation, and make 
 no Difficulty of aflenting to Impoffibilities, fince 
 it is the current Doctrine of their Catcchifms. By 
 the fame Means the feveral Seels and Parties in 
 Chriflianity, believe all the Jlrained Interpretations 
 of Scripture, by which they have been taught to 
 fupport their own Tenets : They find nothing 
 difficult in all the abfurd Gloffes and farfetched 
 Senfes that are fometimes put upon the Words of 
 the facrcd Writers, becaufe their Ears have been 
 always accuflomed to thefe Gloffes ; and therefore 
 they fet fo fmooth and eafy upon their Undcrdand- 
 ihgs, that they know not how to admit the mod 
 natural and eafy Interpretation in oppofition to 
 them. 
 
 In the fame Manner we are nurfed up in many 
 filly and grofs Miflakcs about domtflick Affairs, as 
 well as in Matters of political Concernment. It is 
 upon the fame Ground that Children are trained up 
 to be Whigs and Tories betimes; and every one 
 
 learns 
 
CH. Ill ] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 2 17 
 
 learns the diftinguifhed Terms of his own Party, as 
 the Papifts learn to fay their Prayers in Latin, with- 
 out any Meaning, Reafon, or Devotion. 
 
 This Sort of Prejudice muft be cured by calling 
 all the Principles of our young Years Jx> the Bar 
 of more mature Reafon, that we may judge of the 
 Things of Nature and political _ Affairs by jufter 
 Rules of Philofophy and Obfervation : And even 
 the Matters of Religion muft be firft inquired into 
 by Reafon and, Confcience, and when thefe have led 
 us to believe Scripture to be the Word of God, then 
 that becomes our fovereign Guide, and Reafon 
 and Confcience muft fubmit to receive its Dic- 
 tates. 
 
 IL The next Prejudice which I fhall mention, 
 is that which arifes from the Cuftom or Fafhion of 
 thofe amongft whom we live. Suppofe we have freed 
 ourfelves from the younger Prejudices of our Edu- 
 cation^ yet we are in Danger of having our Mind 
 turned afide from Truth by the Influence of gene- 
 ral Cuftom. 
 
 Our Opinion of Meats and Drinks, of Garments 
 and Forms of Salutation, are influenced much more 
 by Cuftom, than by the Eye, the Ear, or the Talte. 
 Cuftom prevails even over Senfe itfelf, and there- 
 fore no wonder if it prevail over Reafon too. 
 What is it but Cuftom that renders many of the 
 Mixtures of Food and Sauces elegant in Britain, 
 which would be aukward and naufeous to the In- 
 habitants of China, and indeed were naufeous to 
 us when we firft tailed them ? What but Cuftom 
 could make thofe Salutations polite in Mufcovy, 
 which are ridiculous in France or England? We 
 call ourfelves indeed the politer Nations, but it is 
 we who judge thus of ourfelves ; and that fancied 
 Polltenefs is fometimes more owing to Cuftom than 
 
 P 2 Reafon. 
 
218 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART II. 
 
 Reafon* Why are the Forms of oar prefent Gar-* 
 merit counted beautiful, and thofe Fafhions of our 
 Anceftors the Matter of ScofFand Contempt, which 
 in their Day were all decent and genteel ? It is 
 Cuftom that forms our opinion of Drefs, and recon- 
 ciles us by Degrees to thofe Habits which at firft 
 feemed very odd and monftrous. It muft be grant- 
 ed, there are fome Garments and Habits which 
 have a natural Congruity or Incongruity, Modefly, 
 or Immodefty, Decency or Indecency, Gaudery or 
 Gravity ; though for the moil Part there is but 
 little Reafon in thefe Affairs : But what little there 
 is of Reafon or natural Decency -, Cuftom triumphs 
 over it all. It is almoit iinpoilible to perfuade a 
 gay Lady that any thing can be decent which is 
 out ofFaftion : And it were well if Fajhion ftretched 
 its Powers no farther than the Bufinefs of Drapery 
 and the fair Sex. 
 
 The Methods of our Education are governed 
 by Cuftom, It is Cuftom^ and not Reafon, that 
 fends every Boy to learn the Roman Poets, and be- 
 gin a little Acquaintance with Greeks before he is 
 bound an Apprentice to a Soapboiler or Leather- 
 feller. It is Cuftom alone that teaches us Latin 
 by the Rules of a Latin Grammar ; a tedious and 
 abfurd Method ! And what is it but Cuftom that 
 has for paft Centuries confined the brighteft Ge- 
 niufes, even of the higheft Rank in the Female 
 World, to the Bufinefs of the Needle only, and 
 fecluded them moft unmercifully from the Plea- 
 fures of Knowledge, and the divine Improvements 
 of Reafon ? But we begin to break all thefe Chains, 
 and Reafon begins to diclate the Education of 
 Youth. May the growing Age be learned and 
 wife ! 
 
 It is by the Prejudice ariling from our own Cuf 
 toms 9 that we judge of all other civil and religious 
 
 Forms 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 1\g 
 
 Forms and Praclices, The Rites and Ceremonies 
 of War and Peace in other Nations, the Forms of 
 Weddings and Funerals, the feveral Ranks of Ma- 
 giflracy, the Trades and Employments of both Sexes, 
 the. pub lick and the domejiick Affairs of Life \ and 
 almoft every Thing of foreign Cuftoms, is judged ir- 
 regular. It is all imagined to be unreafonable or 
 unnatural, by thofe who have no other Rule to 
 judge of Nature and Reafo?i 9 but the Cuftoms of 
 their own Country, or the little Town w 7 here they 
 dwell. Cufiom is called a fecond Nature? but we 
 often miftake it for Nature iff elf. 
 
 Befides all this, there is a Fafhion in Opinions, 
 there is a Fafhion in Writing, and Printing, in Style 
 and Language, In our Day it is the Vogue of the 
 Nation, that Parliaments may fettle the Succejfion of 
 the Crown, and that a People can make a King ; in 
 the iaft Age this was a Doctrine akin to Treafon, 
 Citations from the Latin Poets were an Embellifh-, 
 ment of Style in the laft Century, and whole Pages 
 in that Day were covered with them ; it is now 
 forbidden by Cufiom, and expofed by the Name 
 of Pedantry ; whereas in Truth both thefe are Ex- 
 tremes. Sometimes our printed Books fhall abound 
 in Capitals, and fometimes reject them all. Now 
 we deal much in Effays, and moil unreafonably 
 defpife fyflematick Learning, whereas our Fathers 
 had a juit Value for Regularity and Syfiems ; then 
 Folios and Quartos were the fafhionable Sizes, as 
 Volumes in Octavo are now. We are ever ready 
 to run into Extremes, and yet Cuftom flill per-* 
 fnades us that Reafon and Nature are on our 
 Side. 
 
 This Bufinefs of the Faflnon has a mofl power- 
 ful Influence on our Judgments ; for it employs 
 thole two ilrong Engines of Fear and Shame to 
 operate upon our Underftandings with unhappy 
 
 P 3 Succefs, 
 
220 LOGICK : OR, THE [p ART IT. 
 
 Succefs. We are afhamed to believe or profefs an 
 unfashionable opinion in Philofophy, and a cow- 
 ardly Soul dares not To much as indulge a Thought 
 contrary to the e/iablijhed or fajhionahle Faith, nor 
 act in Oppofition to Cuftom, though it be accord- 
 ing to the Dictates of Reafon. 
 
 I confefs, there is a Refpect due to Mankind, 
 which fbould incline even the wifefl of Men to fol- 
 low the innocent Cuftoms of their Country in the 
 outward Practices of civil Life, and in fome mea- 
 sure to fubmit to Fa fh ion in all indifferent Affairs, 
 where Reafon and Scripture make no Remontf ran- 
 ees againft it. But the Judgments of the Mind 
 ought to be for ever free, and not biafTed by the 
 Cuftoms and Fajhions of any Age or Nation what- 
 foever. 
 
 To deliver our Understandings from this Dan- 
 ger and Slavery, we fhould confider thefe three 
 Things. 
 
 1. That the greater! Part of the civil Cuftoms of 
 any particular Nation or Age, fpring from Humour 
 rather than Reafon, Sometimes the Humour of 
 the Prince prevails, and fometimes the Humour 
 of the People. It is either the Great or the Many 
 who dictate the Fafhion, and thefe have not al- 
 ways the higher! Reafon on their Side. 
 
 2. Confider alfo, that the Cuftoms of the fame 
 Nation in different Ages, the Cuftoms of different 
 Nations in the fame Age, and the Cuftoms of dif- 
 ferent Towns and Villages in the fame Nation, 
 are very various and contrary to each other. The 
 
 fajhionahle Learning, Language, Sentiments, and 
 Rules of Politenefs, differ greatly in different Coun- 
 tries and Ages of Mankind; but Truth and Reafon 
 are of a more uniform and fleady Nature, and 
 do not change with the Fafhion. Upon this Ac- 
 count, to cure the Prepoffefftons which arife from 
 
 Cuftoni) 
 
CH. Ill] ' RIGHT USE OF REASON. 221 
 
 'Cu/iom, it is of excellent Ufe to travel, and fee the 
 Cuftoms of various Countries, and to read the Tra- 
 vels of other Men, and the Hiftory of paft- Ages, 
 that every Thing may not feem ftrange and un- 
 couth which is not praclifed within the Limits of 
 our own Parifh, or in the narrow Space of our own 
 Life-time. 
 
 3. Confider yet again, how often we onrfelvcs 
 have changed our own Opinions concerning the 
 Decency, Propriety, or Congruity of feveral Modes 
 or Practices in the World, efpecially if we have 
 lived to the Age of thirty or forty. Cujiom or 
 Fajhion, even in all its Changes, has been ready to 
 have fome Degree of Afcendency over our Un- 
 der (landings, and what at one Time feemed decent , 
 appears obfolete and difagreeable afterward, when 
 the Fafhion changes. Let us learn therefore to 
 abfiract as much as poilible from Cu/iom and 
 Fafhion, when we would pais a Judgment con- 
 cerning the real Value and intrinfick Nature of 
 Things. 
 
 II L The Authority of Men, is the Spring of ' ano* 
 ther Rank of Prejudices. 
 
 Among thefe, the Authority of our Forefathers 
 and ancient Authors is mod remarkable. We pay 
 Deference to the Opinion of others, merely becaufe 
 they lived a thoufand Years before us ; and even 
 the Trifles and Im pertinencies that have a Mark 
 of Antiquity upon them, are reverenced for this 
 Reafon, becaufe they came from the Ancients. 
 
 It is granted, that the Ancients had many wife 
 and great Men among them, and fome of their 
 Writings, which Time hath delivered clown to us, 
 are truly valuable : But thofe Writers lived rather 
 in the Infant State of the World ; and the Phi/o- 
 fophers, as well as the polite Authors of our Age, 
 
 P 4 ar v * 
 
222 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART. II. 
 
 are properly the Elders, who have fecn the Mif- 
 takes of the younger Ages of Mankind, and cor- 
 rected them by Obfervation and Experience. 
 
 Some borrow all their Religion from the Fathers 
 of the Chriftian-Church ; or from their Synods or 
 Councils ; but he that will read Montieur Bailie 
 on the Ufe of the Fathers, will find many Reaibns 
 why they are by no Means fit to Didtate our Faith 
 fince we have the Gofpel of Chri/l, and the Writ- 
 ings of the Apoftles and Prophets in our own 
 Hanc!s. 
 
 Some Perfons believe every Thing that their 
 Kindred, their Parents, and their Tutors believe. 
 The Veneration and the Love which they have 
 for their Ancejlors, incline them to fwallow down 
 all their Opinions at once, without examining 
 what Truth or Falfhood there is in them. Men 
 take up their Principles by Inheritance, and de- 
 fend them as , they would their Eftates, becaufe 
 they are born Heirs to them. I freely grant, that 
 Barents are appointed by God and Nature to teach 
 us all the Sentiments and Practices of our younger 
 Tears; and happy are thofe whofe Parents lead 
 them into the Paths of Wifdom and Truth ! I 
 grant farther, that when Perfons come to Years of 
 Difcretion, and judge for themfelves, they ought 
 to examine the Opinions of their Parents, With the 
 greateft Modeily, and with an humble Deference 
 to their fuperior Character; they ought, in Mat- 
 ters perfectly dubious, to give the Preference to. 
 their Parents Advice, and always to pay them the 
 firft Refpecl, nor ever depart from their Opinions 
 and Practice, till Rcafon and Conference make it 
 necefiary. But after all, it is poflible that Parents 
 may be miftaken, and therefore Reafon and Scrip- 
 ture ought to be our final Rules of Determination 
 
 in 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 223 
 
 in Matters that relate to this World, and that 
 which is to come. 
 
 Sometimes a favourite Author, or a Writer of 
 great Name, drags a thoufand Followers after him 
 into his own Miftakes, merely by the Authority of 
 his Name and Character. The Sentiments of Arif- 
 totle were imbibed and maintained by all the Schools 
 in Europe for feveral Centuries; and a ( Citation 
 from his Writings was thought a iufficient Proof 
 of any Proportion. The great Defcartes had alio 
 too many implicit Believers in the lait Age, though 
 he himfelf, in his Philofophy, difclaims all fuch 
 Influence over the Minds of his Readers. Calvin 
 and Luther , in the Days of Reformation from Po- 
 pery, were learned and pious Men, and there have 
 been a Succeflion of their Difciples even to this 
 Day, who pay too much Reverence to the Words 
 of their Mailers. There are others who renounce 
 their Authority, but give themfelves up in too fer- 
 vile a Manner to the Opinion and Authority of 
 other Mailers, and follow as bad or worfe Guides 
 in Religion. 
 
 If only learned, and wife, and good Men had 
 Influence on the Sentiments of others, it would 
 be at leail a more excufable Sort of Prejudice, and 
 there would be fome Colour and Shadow of Reafon 
 for it: But that Riches, Ho?iours and outward 
 Splendor fhould fet up Perfons for Dictators to all 
 the reft of Mankind ; this is a mofl fhameful In- 
 vafion of the Right of our Underflandings on the 
 one Hand, and as fhameful a Slavery of the Soul 
 on the other. The poor Man, or the Labourer, 
 too often believes fuch a Principle in Politicks, or 
 iu Morality, and judges concerning the Rights of 
 the King and the People, juft as his wealthy Neigh- 
 bour does. Half the Parifh follows the Opinion 
 of the Efquire, and the Tenants of a Manor fall 
 
 into 
 
224 LOGICK : OR, THE fpART IF. 
 
 into the Sentiment of their Lord, efpecially if he 
 lives amongil them. How unreafonable and -yet 
 how common is this ! 
 
 As for Principles of Religion, we frequently 
 find how they are taken up and forfaken, changed 
 and refumed by the Influences of Princes. In all 
 Nations the Priefts have much Power alfo in dic- 
 tating the Religion of the People, but the Princes 
 dictate to them : And where there is a great Pomp 
 and Grandeur attending the Pried hood in any 
 Religion whatfoever, with fo much the more Re- 
 verence and ftronger Eaith do the People believe 
 whatever they teach them : Yet it is too often 
 evident, that Riches, and Dominions, and high 
 Titles, in Church or State, have no Manner of Pre- 
 tence to Truth and Certainty, Wifdom and Good- 
 nefs, above the reft of Mortals, becaufe thefe Supe- 
 riorities in this World are not always conferred ac- 
 cording to Merit. 
 
 I confefs, where a Man of Wifdom and Tears, 
 of Obfervation and Experience, gives us his Opi- 
 nion and Advice in Matters of the civil or the mo- 
 ral Life \ Reafon tells us we fhould pay a great 
 Attention to him, and it is probable, he may be 
 in the Right. Where a Man of long Exercife in 
 Piety fpeaks of praclical Religion, there is a due 
 Deference to be paid to his Sentiments : And the 
 fame we may fay concerning an ingenious Man long 
 verfed in any Art or Science, he may jufily expect 
 due Regard when he fpeaks of his own Affairs and 
 proper Bufinefs. But in other Things each of thefe 
 may be ignorant enough, notwithstanding all their 
 Piety and Years, and particular Skill : Nor even 
 in their own proper Province are they to be believed 
 in every Thing without Refcrvc, and without Exa- 
 mination, 
 
 Tq 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 225 
 
 To free ourfelves from thefe Prejudices, it is 
 fufficient to remember, that there is no Rank nor 
 Character among Mankind, which has any juft 
 Pretence to fway the Judgments of other Men by 
 their Authority : For there have been Perfons of 
 the fame Rank and Character who have maintained 
 different and contrary Sentiments ; but all thefe 
 can never be true, and therefore the mere Name or 
 Reputation that any of them pofleffes, is not a fuf- 
 ficient Evidence of Truth. 
 
 Shall we believe the Ancients in Philofophy / 
 But fome of the Ancients were Stoicks fome PerU 
 patcticks, fome Plato?iicks, and fome Epicureans, 
 fome Cynicks) and fome Scepticks. Shall we judge 
 of Matters of the Chriftian Faith by the Fathers , 
 or Primitive Writers for three or four hundred 
 Years after Chrift? But they often contradicted 
 one another, and themfelves too ; and what is 
 worfe, they fometimes contradicted the Scripture 
 itfelf. Now among all thefe different and con- 
 trary Sentiments in Philofophy and Religion, which 
 of the Ancients muft we believe, for we cannot be- 
 lieve them all ? 
 
 Again, To believe in all Things as our Predecef- 
 fors did, is the ready Way to keep Mankind in an 
 everlafting State of Infancy, and to lay an eter- 
 nal Bar again ft all the Improvements of our Rea- 
 fon and our Happinefs. Had the prefent Age of 
 Philofophers fatisfled themfelves with the fubftan- 
 tial Forms and occult Qualities of Ariftotle, with the 
 /olid Spheres , Ecceniricks, and Epicycles of Ptolemy r , 
 and the ancient Aftronomers ; then the great Lord 
 Bacon, Copernicus, and Defcartes, with the greater 
 Sir Ifaac Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Boyle, had 
 rifen in our World in vain. We mud have blun- 
 dered on ftill in fucceflive Generations among 
 Abfurdities and thick Darknefs, and a hundred 
 
 ufeful 
 
226 LOGICK ; OK, THE jjPART in 
 
 ufeful Inventions for the Happinefs of human Life 
 had never been known. 
 
 Thus it is in Matters of Philofophy and Science. 
 But, you will fay^Jhall not our own Ancestors deter- 
 mine our Judgment in Matters of civil or religious 
 Concernment? If they muft, then the Child of a 
 Heathen muft believe that Heathenifm is Truth ; 
 the Son of a Papifi muft Aflent to all the Abfur- 
 dities of Popery ; the Pofterity of the Jews and So- 
 cinians muft for ever be Socinians and Jews ; and 
 a Man whofe Father was of Republican Principles, 
 muft make a Succeffion of Republicans in his Fa- 
 mily to the End of the World. If we ought al- 
 ways to believe whatfoever our Parents, or our 
 Priefls, or our Princes believe, the Inhabitants of 
 China ought to worfhip their own Idols, and the 
 Savages of Africa ought to believe all the Non- 
 fenfe, and pracTtife the Idolatry of their Negro Fa* 
 thers and Kings* The Britifh Nation, when it was 
 Jleathen, could never have become Chrijlian ; and 
 when it was a Slave to Rome, it could never have 
 been reformed. 
 
 Belides, let us confider, that the great God, 
 our common Maker, has never given one Man's 
 Underftanding a legal and rightful Sovereignty 
 to determine Truths for others, at leaft after they 
 are paft the State of Childhood or Minority. No 
 lingle Perfons, how learned and wife, and great 
 foever, or whatfoever natural, or civil, or ecclefiaf- 
 iical Relation he may have to us, can claim this 
 Dominion over our Faith. St. Paul the Apoftle, 
 in his private Capacity, would not do it; nor hath 
 an infpired Man any fuch Authority, until he 
 makes his divine Commifiion appear. Our Saviour 
 himfclf tells the Jews, that if he had not done fuch 
 wondrous Works among them, they had not finned 
 in difbelieving his Doclrines, and refufing him 
 
 for 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. < l r L t ] 
 
 for the Mejfiah, No Bifhop or Prefbyter, no Sy- 
 nod or Council, no Church or Afiembly of Men, 
 iince the Days of Infpiration, hath Power derived 
 to them from God, to make Creeds or Articles of 
 Faith for us, and impofe them upon our Under- 
 ilandings. We mult all act according to the bed 
 of our own Light, and the Judgment of our own 
 Confciences,,ufing the belt Advantages which Pro- 
 vidence hath given us, with an honeft and im- 
 partial Diligence to enquire and fearch out the 
 Truth : For every one of us muji give an Account 
 of himfelfto God. To believe as the Church, or the 
 Court believes, is but a forry and a dangerous Faith : 
 This Principle would make more Heathens than 
 Chrijlians, and more Papijis than Protejiants ; and 
 perhaps lead more Souls to Hell than to Heaven ; 
 for our Saviour himfelf has plainly told us, that if 
 the Blind will be led by the Blind, they mufi both fall 
 into the Ditch. 
 
 Though there be fo much Danger of Error arif- 
 ing from the three Prejudices laft mentioned, yet 
 before I difmifs this Head, I think it proper to take 
 Notice, that as Education, Cujlom, and Authority, 
 are no fure Evidences of Truth, fo neither are they 
 certain Marks of Fal/hood; for Reafon and Scrip- 
 ture may join to dictate the fame Things which 
 our Parents, our Nurfes, our Tutors, our Friends, 
 and our Country, believe and profefs. Yet there 
 appears fometimes in our Age, a Pride and Petu- 
 lancy in Youth, zealous to call: off the Sentiments 
 of their Fathers and Teachers, on Purpofe to (hew 
 that they carry none of the Prejudices of Education 
 and Authority about them. They indulge all man- 
 ner of licentious Opinions and Practices, from a 
 vain Pretence of afferting their Liberty. But 
 alas ! This is but changing one Prejudice for ano- 
 ther ; and fometimes it happens by this Means, 
 
 that 
 
228 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART II. 
 
 that they make a Sacrifice both of Truth and 
 Virtue to the vile Prejudices of their Pride and 
 
 Senfuality, 
 
 IV. There is another Tribe of Prejudices which 
 are near akin to thofe of Authority ', and that is, 
 when we receive a Doctrine becaufe of the Manner 
 in which it is propofedto us by others i I have already 
 mentioned the powerful Influence that Oratory and 
 fine Words have to infmuate a falfe Opinion, and 
 fometimes Truth is refufed, and fufFers Contempt 
 in the Lips of a wife Man, for want of the Charms 
 of Language : But there are feveral other Manners 
 of Propofa/s, whereby miltaken Sentiments are pow- 
 erfully conveyed into the Mind. 
 
 Some Pcrfons are eafily perfuaded to believe what 
 another diclates with a pqfitive Air, and a great De- 
 gree of A fficrance : They feel the overbearing Force 
 of a confident Dictator, efpecially if he be of a fu- 
 pcrior Rank or Character to themfelves. 
 
 Some are quickly convinced of the Truth of 
 any Doctrine, when he that propofes it puts on all 
 the Airs of Piety , and makes folemn Appeals to Hea- 
 ven, and Protejiations of the Truth of it : The pious 
 Mind of a weaker Chriftian is ready to receive 
 any Thing that is pronounced with fuch an awful 
 Solemnity. 
 
 It is a Prejudice near akin to this, when a hum- 
 ble Soul is frighted into any particular Sentiments 
 of Religion, becaufe a Man of great Name or Cha- 
 racter pronounces Herefy upon the contrary Sen- 
 timents, calls the Diibclievcr out of the Church, 
 -dud forbids him the Gates of Heaven. 
 
 Others are allured into particular Opinions by 
 
 gentler P radices on the Unclerftanding : Not only 
 
 the foft Tempers of Mankind, but even hardy and 
 
 ;cd Souls, arc fometimes led away Captives to 
 
 Error 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 12Q 
 
 Error by the/oft Air of Addrefs, and the fweet and 
 engaging Methods of Perfuajion and Kindnefs. 
 
 I grant, where natural or revealed Religion plain- 
 ly diclate to us the infinite and everlafiing Impor- 
 tance of any facred Doctrine, it cannot be impro- 
 per to ufe any of thefe Methods, to perfuade Men 
 to receive and obey the Truth, after we have given 
 fufficient Reafon and Argument to convince their 
 UnderiTandings. Yet all thefe Methods, confi- 
 dered in themfelves, have been often ufed to con- 
 vey Falfhood into the Soul as well as Truth ; and 
 if we build our Faith merely upon thefe Founda- 
 tions, without Regard to the Evidence of Truth, 
 and the Strength of Argument, our Belief is but 
 the, Effecl of Prejudice-. For neither the pofitive, the 
 awful ovfolemn, the terrible, or tht gentle Methods 
 of Addrefs, carry any certain Evidence with them 
 that Truth lies on that Side. 
 
 There is another Manner of propofing our own 
 Opinion, or rather oppojing the Opinions, of others, 
 which demands a mention here, and that is when 
 Perfons make a Jefi ferve inftead of an Argument ; 
 when they refute what they call Error by a Turn of 
 Wit, and anfwer every Objection againfl their own 
 Sentiments, by catting a Sneer upon the Objector. 
 Thefe Scoffers practife with Succefs upon weak and 
 cowardly Spirits : Such as have not been well efta- 
 blimed in Religion or Morality, have been laughed 
 out of the beft Principles by a confident Buffoon ; 
 they have yielded up their Opinions to a witty Ban- 
 ter, and fold their Faith and Religion for a Jejt, 
 
 There is no Way to cure thefe Evils in iuch a 
 degenerate World as we live in, but bv learning 
 to diftinguiih well between the Sub/lance of any 
 Doclrine, and the Manner of Addrefs, either in 
 propofing, attacking, or defending it ; and then 
 by letting a juft and fevere Guard of Reafon and 
 
 Conference 
 
230 tOGICK I OR, THE [pART II. 
 
 Confcience over all the Exercifes of our Judg- 
 ment, refolving to yield to nothing but the con- 
 vincing Evidence of Truth, religioufly obeying the 
 Light of Reafon in Matters of pure Reafon, and the 
 Di elates of Revelation in Things that relate to our 
 Faith. 
 
 Thus we have taken a brief Survey of fome of 
 the infinite Varieties of Prejudice that attend Man- 
 kind on every tide in the prefent State, and the 
 Dangers of Error or of rajh Judgment, we are 
 perpetually expofed to in this Life : This Chapter 
 fhall conclude with one Remark, and one Piece 
 of Advice. 
 
 The Remark is this : The fame Opinion, whether 
 ■falfe or true, may be diclated by many Prejudices 
 at the fame Time ; for, as I hinted before, Prejudice 
 may happen to dictate Truth fometimes as well as 
 Error. But where two or more Prejudices oppofe 
 one another, as it often happens, the flronger pre- 
 vails and gains the Alien t : Yet how feldom does 
 Reafon interpofe with fufficient Power to get the 
 Afcendent of them all, as it ought to do 1 
 
 The Advice follows, namely, Since we find fuch 
 a Swarm of Prejudices attending us both within and 
 without; fince we feel the Weaknefs of our Rea- 
 fon, the Frailty of our Natures, and our Infuffi- 
 ciency to guard ourfelves from Error upon this 
 Account, it is not at all unbecoming the Character 
 of a Logician or a Philofopher, together with the 
 Advice already given, to direct every Perfon in his 
 Search after Truth to make his daily Addrefles to 
 Heaven, and implore the God of Truth to lead him 
 into all Truth, and to afk Wifdom of Him who giveth 
 liberally to them that aik it, and upbraideth us not 
 with our own Follies. 
 
 Such a devout Practice will be an excellent Pre- 
 parative for the beft Improvement of-all the Di- 
 
 reclions 
 
CH, IV.] EIGHT USE OF EEASON. 231. 
 
 reclions and Rules propofed in the two following 
 Chapters. 
 
 CHAP. IV, 
 
 ■General Direffiions to affijl us in judging aright. 
 
 THE chief Defign of the Art of Logick is to 
 affift us in forming a true Judgment of 
 Things ; a few proper Obfervations for this End 
 have been dropt occafionally in fome of the forego- 
 ing Chapters : Yet it is neceilary to mention them 
 again in this Place, that we may have a rriore 
 complete and fimultaneous View of the general 
 Directions, which are neceilary in order to judge 
 aright. A Multitude of Advices may be framed 
 for this Purpofe ; the chief of them may, for Order 
 Sake, be reduced to the following Heads. 
 
 I. Direcllon. When We convlder oiirfelves as 
 Philofophers, or Searchers after 'Truths we fhould ex- 
 amine all our old Opinions afrejh, and enquire what 
 was the Ground of them, and whether our Affent u)ere 
 built on juft Evidence ; and then we fhould cajl off 
 all thofe Judgments which were formed heretofore with* 
 out due Examination. A Man in Purfuit of Know- 
 ledge, mould throw off all thofe Prejudices which 
 he had imbibed in Times pad, and guard againft 
 all the Springs of Error, mentioned in the preced- 
 ing Chapter, with the utmoft Watchfulnefs for 
 Time to come. 
 
 Ofrferve here, That this Rule of ' tafihig away all 
 our former prejudicate Opinions and Sentiments, is not 
 propofed to any of us to be practifed at oncej con- 
 sidered as Men of Bufinefs or Religion, as Friends 
 
 Q or 
 
232 LOGICK t OR, THE [PART XI. 
 
 or Neighbours, as Fathers or Sons, as Magifirates, 
 Subjects, or Christians \ but merely as Philofo.phcrs 
 and Searchers after Truth : And though it may be 
 well prefumed that many of our Judgments, both 
 true and falfe, together with the Practices built 
 thereon in the natural, the civil, and the religious 
 Life, were formed without fufficient Evidence; yet 
 an univerfal Rejection of all thefe might deftroy at 
 once our prefent Senfe and Practice of Duty with 
 regard to God, ourfehes, and our Fellow-Creatures* 
 Mankind would be hereby thrown into fuch a State 
 of Doubting and Indifference, that it would be too 
 long ere they recovered any Principles of Virtue or 
 Religion by a Train of Reafonings. 
 
 Befides, the common Affairs of human Life often 
 demand a much fpeedier Determination, and we 
 muft many Times act upon prefent Probabilities : 
 The Bulk of Mankind have not Time and Leifure 
 and Advantages fufficient to begin all their Know- 
 ledge anew, and to build up every fingle Opinion 
 and Practice afrefh, upon the jufteft Grounds of 
 Evidence. 
 
 Yet let it be obferved alfo, that fo far as any Pcr- 
 ion is capable of forming and correcting his No- 
 tions, and his Rules of Conduct in the natural, ci- 
 vil, and religious Life, by the ltrict Rules of ' Logicku 
 and fo far as he hath Time and Capacity to review 
 his old Opinions, to re-examine all thofc which are 
 any ways doubtful, and to determine nothing with- 
 out juft Evidence, he is likely to become fo much 
 the wifer and the happier Man, and if divine Grace 
 affiil him, fo much the better Chriftian. And 
 though this cannot be done all at once, yet it may 
 be done by prudent Steps and Degrees, till our 
 whole Set of Opinions and Principles be in Time 
 corrected and reformed, or at leaft cftablifhed upon 
 jufter Foundations, 
 
 II. Direct 
 
CH. IV.] BKJJH? USE OP REASON* 233 
 
 II. Direct. Endeavour that all your Ideas of thofi , 
 Objecls, concerning which you pafs any ^Judgment, be 
 clear and Diflincl, complete, comp re-enfive, extenfeve 
 and orderly, as far as you have Oct on to judge con- 
 cerning them. This is the Sofeftance of the lajl 
 Chapter of thefrf Part of Logick* The Rules which 
 direcl our Conceptions mud be reviewed, if we would 
 form our Judgments aright. But if we will make 
 hafte to judge at all Adventures, while our Ideas 
 are dark and confufed, and very Imperfecl, we fhall 
 be in danger of running into many Miftakes. This 
 is like a Perfon who would pretend to give the 
 Sum total of a large Account in Arithmetick, with- 
 out furvcying all the Particulars; or as a Painter* 
 who profeffes to draw a fair and diflincl: Landfcape 
 in the Twilight, when he can hardly diftinguifh a 
 Houfe from a Tree. 
 
 Obferve here, That this Direclion does not require 
 us to gain clear, diflincl;, complete Ideas of Things 
 in all their Parts, Powers and Qualities, in an ab* 
 folute Senfe; for this belongs to God alone, and is 
 impoffible for us to attain : But it is expreffed in a 
 relative or limited Senfe ; that is, our Ideas fhould 
 be clear, diflincl, and comprehenfive, &V. at leaft 
 fo far as we have Occqfion at that Time to judge con- 
 cerning them. We may form many true and certain 
 Judgments concerning God, Angels, Animals, Men^ 
 Heaven, Hell, EsV. by thole partial and very imper- 
 fect Conceptions of them to which we have attaint- 
 ed, if we judge no farther concerning them than 
 our Conceptions reach. 
 
 We may have a clear and diflinct Idea of the 
 Ex'tftence of many Things in Nature, and affirm 
 that they do exifl, though our Ideas of their intimate 
 EJfences and Caufes, their Relations and Manners of 
 Aclion, are very confufed and obfeure. We may 
 judge well concerning feveral Properties of any 
 
 Q. 1 Being 
 
'234 LOGICIC : OR, THE [PART H. 
 
 Being, though other Properties are unknown \ for 
 perhaps we know not all the Properties of any Be- 
 ing whatfoever. 
 
 Sometimes we have clear Ideas of the abfolute 
 Properties of an Objecl: ; and we may judge of them 
 with Certainty, while the relative Properties are very 
 obfcure and unknown to us. So we may have a 
 clear and juft Idea of the Area of a Parallelogram, 
 without knowing what Relation it bears to the 
 Area of a Triangle or a Polygon ; I may know the 
 Length of the Diameter of a Circle, without know- 
 ing what Proportion it has to the Circumference. 
 
 There are other Things, whofe external relative 
 Properties, with Refpecl: to each other, or whofe 
 Relation to us, we know better than their own in- 
 ward and abfolute Properties, or their elTential dif- 
 tinguifhing Attributes. We perceive clearly, that 
 Fire will warm or burn us, and will evaporate Watery 
 and that Water will allay our Thirji, or quench the 
 Fire, though we know not the inward diflingui/l)- 
 ing Particles, or prime effential Properties of Fire or 
 Water. We may know the King, and Lord Chan- 
 cellor, and affirm many Things of them in their 
 legal Characters, though we can have but a confufed 
 Idea of their Perfons or natural Features, if we have 
 never feen their Faces. So the Scripture has re- 
 vealed God himfelf to us, as our Creator, Preferver, 
 Redeemer, and Sanclifler, and as the Objecl of our 
 Worfhip, in clearer Ideas than it has revealed many 
 other abftrufe Queftions which may be railed about 
 his own Divine Effence or Sub/lance, his Immcnjity 
 or Omniprefcnce. 
 
 This therefore is the general Obfervation in order 
 to guide our Judgments, that we Jhould not allow 
 ourf elves to form a ^Judgment concerning Things far- 
 ther than our clear and diflinft Ideas reach, and then 
 we are not in Danger of Error. 
 But there is one cojifidcrablc Objeclion agninft this 
 
 Rule, 
 
CH. iv.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 235 
 
 Rule, which is necefTary to be anfwered ; and there 
 is one juft and reafonable Exception? which is as 
 needful to be mentioned. 
 
 The Objection is this : May we not judge fafely 
 concerning fame total or complete Ideas? when we 
 have a clear Perception only of fome Parts or Pro- 
 perties of them? May we not affirm, that All that is 
 in God is eternal? or that all his unknown Attributes 
 are infinite? though we have fo very imperfect an 
 Idea of God? Eternity? and Infinity f Again, may we 
 not fafely judge of particular Objecls? whofe Idea is 
 obfeure, by a clear Idea of the general I May I not 
 affirm, that every unknown Species of Animals has 
 inward Springs of Motion? becaufe I have a clear 
 Idea that thefe inward Springs belong to an Animal 
 in general ? 
 
 Anfwer* AH thofe fuppofed unknown Parts? Pro* 
 perties or Species? are clearly and ditti nelly perceived 
 to be connected with, or contained in the known 
 Parts? Properties? ox general Ideas? which we fuppofe 
 to be clear and dittinct as far as we judge of them : 
 And as we have no particular Idea of thofe unknown 
 divine Attributes? or unknown Species of Anirnals ; fo 
 there is nothing particular affirmed concerning them 
 beyond what belongs to the general Idea of Divine 
 Attributes or Animals? with which I clearly and dis- 
 tinctly perceive them to be connected. 
 
 It may be illuttrated in this Manner. Suppofe 
 a long Chain lies before me, whofe nearett Links I 
 fee are iron Rings, and I fee them fattened to a Poll 
 near me, but the moil diflant Links lie beyond the 
 Reach of my Sight, fo that I know not whether 
 they are oval or round, Brafs or Iron : Now I may 
 boldly affirm, the whole length of this Chain is f aft* 
 ened to the Pofl? {qv I have a clear Idea that the 
 neareft Links -Sre thus fattened, and a clear Idea 
 that the dittant Links are connected with the near- 
 eft, if I can draw the whole Chain toy one Link. 
 
 Q3 Or, 
 
23(3 L0GICK, OR, THE [PART II, 
 
 Or thus : If two known Ideas, A and B, are 
 evidently joined, or agree, and if C unknown be 
 included in A, and alfo D unknown be included 
 in B, then I may affirm that C and D are joined 
 and agree : For I have a clear Perception of the 
 Union of the two known Ideas A and B ; and alfo 
 a clear Perception of the Connexion of the un- 
 known Ideas with the known. So that clear and 
 dijlincl Ideas muft (till abide as a general necefiary 
 Qualification, in order to form a right Judgment j 
 And in4eed it is upon this Foot that all Ratiocina- 
 tion is built, and the Conclufions are thus form- 
 ed, which deduce things unknown from Things 
 known. 
 
 Yet it feems to me, that there is one juft Li- 
 mitation or Exception to this general Ride of Judg* 
 ment 9 as built on clear and diftincl: Ideas, and it is 
 this : 
 
 Exception. In Matters of mere Tejlimony, whe* 
 ther hitman or divine, there is not always a Necejfity 
 of clear and dijlincl Ideas of the Things vjhich are be-. 
 lie-ved. Though the Evidence of Proportions, which 
 are entirely for " d by ourf elves, depends on the Clear* 
 rjefs and Difhnct. efs of thofe Ideas of which they 
 are compofed, auu on our own clear Perception of 
 their Agreement or Difagreernent, yet we may 
 juftly aftent to Proportions formed by others, when 
 we have neither a very clear Conception in our- 
 felves of the two Ideas contained in the Words, 
 nor how they agree or dii agree ; provided always, 
 that we have a clear and fufficient Evidence of the 
 Credibility of the Perfons who inform us. 
 
 Thus when we read in Scripture the great Doc- 
 trines of the Deity ofChrift, of the Union of the divine 
 and human Natures in him, of the divine Agency of 
 the hie fled Spirit, that the Son is the Brightness of his 
 Father's Glory, that all things were created by him 
 andjor him, that the Son Jhall give up his Kingdom to 
 
 the 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON, 237 
 
 the Father, and that God Jh all be all in all; we may 
 fafely believe them : For though our Ideas of thefe 
 Objedts themfelves are not fufficien'tly clear, dif- 
 tinct, and perfect, for our own Minds to form thefe 
 Judgments or Proportions concerning them, yet 
 we have a clear and diftinct Perception of God's 
 revealing them, or that they are contained in Scrip- 
 ture ; and this is fufficient Evidence to determine 
 our ArTent. 
 
 The fame thing holds true in fome Meafure, 
 where credible human Tejiimony afTures us of fome 
 Propoiitions, while we have no furlicient Ideas of 
 the Subject and Predicate of them to determine 
 our Aflent. So when an honert and learned Ma- 
 thematician afTures a Ploughman that the three An- 
 gles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles, or 
 that the Square of the Hypotenufe of 'a right-angled 
 Triangle is equal to the Swn of the Squares of the two 
 Sides ; the Ploughman, who has but confufed Ideas 
 of thefe Things, may firmly and fafely believe thefe 
 Propoiitions, upon the fame Ground, becaufe he 
 has evidence of the Skill and Faithfulnefs of his 
 Informer.* 
 
 III. Direclion. 
 
 * Perhaps fome may object againft this Reprefentat 
 Things, and lay, that " We cannot properly be faid to 
 
 fentation of 
 believe 
 M a Proposition any farther than we ourfelves have Ideas under 
 ii the Terms : Therefore if we have no Ideas under the Term?, 
 (t we believe nothing but the Connexion of Words or Sounds ; 
 " and if we have but obfeure and inadequate Ideas under the 
 " Terras, then we partly believe a Connexion of Things, and 
 (s partly a Connection of Sounds. But that we cannot pro- 
 '•' perk- be faid to believe the Proposition, for our Faith can never 
 w go beyond our Ideas." 
 
 Now to fet this Matter in a clear Light. I fuppofe that every 
 Proportion which is propofed to my ArTent, is a Sentence made 
 up of Terms which have fome Ideas under them known or un- 
 known to me. I confefs, if I believe there are" no Ideas at all 
 under the Terms, and there is nothing meant by them, then in- 
 deed, with regard to me, it is the mere joining of Sounds : But 
 if, for Inftance, a Ploughman has credible Information from an 
 RbAfcfft and (kiiiui Mathematician, that an Ellipsis is made by the. 
 
 Seflion 
 
238 LO&ICK : OR, THE [PART H, 
 
 III. Diredion. When you have obtained a 
 clear and comprehenfive Ideas as are needful, both 
 
 of 
 
 Seflion of a Cone, he believes the Proportion, or he believeg 
 the Sentence is true, as it is made up of Terms which his ln- 
 fprmant underftands, though the Ideas be unknown to him ; 
 that is, he believes there are fome Ideas which his Informant 
 has under thefe Words which are really connected. And, I 
 think, this may juftly be called believing the Propofition, for it is 
 a belief of fomething more than the mere joining of 'Sounds ; it is 
 a Belief of the real Connexion of fome unknown Ideas belong- 
 ing to thofe Sounds, and in this Senfe a man may be faid to 
 believe the Truth of a Propofition, which he doth not under- 
 stand at all. 
 
 With more Reafon ftill may we be faid to believe the Propo- 
 sition upon credible Teftimony, if we have fome Sort of Ideas 
 under the Terms, though they are but partial, or inadequate 
 and obfeure ; fueh as divine Anfwcrs were given by Urim ond 
 Thu?mnim : For fince it is purely upon Teftimony we believe 
 the known Parts of the Ideas fignified by thofe Words to be con- 
 nected, upon the fame Teftimony we may alfo believe the ««- 
 known Parts of the Ideas fignified by thofe Words to be con- 
 nected, namely, becaufe our Informant is knowing and faith- 
 ful. And in this Senfe we may juftly be faid to believe a Pro- 
 pofition of Scripture entirely, which we underftand but very 
 impefedlly, becaufe God who reveals it is knowing and faithful 
 \n Perfection. 
 
 And, indeed, unlefs this Reprefentation of the Matter be al- 
 lowed, there are but very few Proportions in the World, even 
 inhuman Things, to which we can give an entire AfTent, or 
 which we may be faid either to know, or to believe, becaufe 
 there is fcarce any Thing on Earth of which we have an ade- 
 quate, and moft perfect idea. And it is evident, that in divine 
 Things there is fcarce any Thing which we could either know 
 or believe without this allowance: For though Reafon and Re- 
 velation join to inform me that God is holy, how exceeding ina- 
 dequate are my Ideas of God, and of his Holinefs? Yet 1 may 
 boldly and entirely aflent to this whole Propofition, fince I 
 am fure that every known and unknown Idea fignified by the 
 I erm God, is connected with the Ideas pf the Term Holinefs, 
 becaufe Reafon partly informs me, but efpecially becaufe the 
 divine Teitimony which has connected them, is certainly cre- 
 dible. 
 
 I might argue upon this Head perhaps more forcibly from 
 the 'Doctrine of God's fncomprehensiblenefs. Jf we could believe 
 nothing but what we have Ideas of, it would be impoffiblc for 
 v>: to believe that God is incomprehensible: For this implies in it 
 
 a Belief 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT UjSE OP REASON. "23(*) 
 
 of the Subject and Predicate of a Proposition, then 
 compare thofe Ideas of the Subjecl and Predicate 
 together- with the utmoft attention , and obferve how 
 
 far 
 
 a Belief that there are fome unknown Ideas belonging to the 
 Nature of God. Therefore we do both believe and proteis that 
 fomething concerning unknown Ideas, when we believe and 
 pro lefs that God is inccmprebensible. 
 
 I perfuade my felt* that mod of thofe very Perfons who object 
 againil my Reprefentation of Things, will yet readily confefs, 
 they believe all the Proportions in Scripture, rather than declare 
 they do not believe fever al of them ; though they muft acknowledge 
 that feveral of them are far above their Underftanding, or that 
 they have fcarce any Ideas of the true Senfe of them. And there- 
 fore where Proportions derived from credible Teflimony are made 
 up of dark or inadequate Ideas, I think it is much more proper 
 to iuy, ive believe them, than that ive do not belien/e them, left we 
 cut off a Multitude of the Proportions of the Bible from our 
 Atfent of Faith. 
 
 Yet let it be obferved here, that when we believe a Pro- 
 polition on mere Tettimony, of which we have no Ideas at all, 
 we can only be faid to give a general implicit Affent to the Truth of 
 that Proposition, without any particular Knowledge of, or explicit 
 Jljfent to the fpec'ial Truth contained in that Proposition : And this 
 our implicit Jjfent is of very little Ufe, unlefs it be to teftify 
 our Belief of the Knowledge and Veracity of him that in- 
 forms us. 
 
 As our Ideas of a Proportion are more or lefs clear and 
 adequate, as well as juft and proper, fo we do explicitly af- 
 fent more or lefs to the particular Truth contained in that Pro- 
 portion. And our Affent hereby becomes more or lefs ufeful 
 for the Increaie of our Knowledge, or the Direction of our 
 Practice. 
 
 When divine Teftimony plainly propofes to our Faith fuch 
 a Proportion whereof we have but obfeure, doubtful and in- 
 adequate Ideas, we are bound implicitly to believe the Truth 
 of it, as expreiTed in thole Terms, in order to mew our Sub-» 
 million to God who revealed it, as a God of perfect Know- 
 ledge and Veracity : But it is our Duty to ufe all proper Me- 
 thods to obtain a farther and explicit Knowledge of the par* 
 ticular Truth contained in the Proportion, if we would im- 
 prove by it either in Knowledge or Virtue. All neceiTary Rules 
 oi Grammar and Criticifm mould be employed to find out the 
 very Ideas that belong to thofe Words, and which were de-_ 
 figned by the divine Speaker or Writer. Though we may be-* 
 lieve the Truth of a Propolition which we do not understand, 
 yet we mould endeavour to underftand every Proportion which 
 >ve believe to be true. 
 
240 JLOGICK, OR, THE - [FART IT. 
 
 far they agree \ and wherein they differ : Whether 
 the Proportion may be affirmed A bfo lute iy or Rela- 
 tively^ whether in Whole or in Party whether Uni- 
 verfally or Particularly, and then under what par- 
 ticular Limitations, Turn thefe Ideas about in 
 your Mind, and take a View of them on all Sides, 
 juit as a Mafon would do to fee whether two hewn 
 Stones exadtly fait eaeh other in every Part, and 
 are fit to be joined in erecting a carved or fluted 
 Pillar. 
 
 Compare the whole Subjecl with the whole Pre- 
 dicate in their feveral Parts : Take Heed in this 
 Matter that you neither add to nor diminifh the 
 Ideas contained in the Subjecl: or in the Predicate ; 
 for fuch an Inadvertence or Miflake will expofe 
 you to great Error in Judgment. 
 
 IV. Direction. Search for Evidence of Truth 
 with Diligence and Honejiy, and be heartily ready to 
 receive Evidence ', %vh ether for the Agreement or Dif- 
 agreement of Ideas, 
 
 Search with Diligence ; fpare no Labour in fearch- 
 ing for the Truth in due Proportion to the Impor- 
 tance of the Proportion . Read the beft Authors 
 who have writ on that Subjecl: ; confult your wife 
 and learned Friends in Convcrfation ; and be not 
 unwilling to borrow Hints toward your Improve- 
 ment from the meaneft Perfon, nor to receive any 
 Glimpfe of Light from the movt unlearned. Dili- 
 gence and Humility is the Way to thrive in the 
 Riches of the Underftanding, as well as in Gold 
 ar Silver. Search carefully for the Evidence of 
 Truth, and dig for Wifdom as for hid Treafure. 
 
 Search with a fieady Honefty of Soul, and a 
 fincere Impartiality to find the Truth. Watch 
 againft every Temptation that might bribe your 
 Judgment, or warp it aiide from Truth. Do not 
 
 indulge 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 241 
 
 indulge yourfelf to wifh any unexamined Propofition 
 were true orfalfe. A Wifh often perverts the Judg- 
 ment, and tempts the Mind ftrangely to believe 
 upon flight Evidence whatfoever we wifli to be true 
 or falfe. 
 
 V. Direclion. Since the Evidence of the Agree- 
 ment or Difagreement of two ideas is the Ground 
 of our Afient to any Propofition, or the great 
 Criterion of Truth ; therefore we Jhould fufpend our 
 Judgment, and neither affirm nor deny till this Evi~ 
 dence appear. 
 
 This Direclion is different from the fecond; for 
 though the Evidence of the Agreement or DiJ agree- 
 ment of two Ideas mod Times depends on the Clear- 
 nefs and Diilinclnefs of the Ideas themfelves, yet 
 it does not always arife thence. Tefiimony may be 
 a fufficient Evidence of the Agreement or Difa- 
 greement of two obfcure Ideas, as we have feen juft 
 before in the Exception under the fecond Direclion, 
 Therefore, though we are not univerfally and in 
 all Cafes bound to fufpend our Judgment, //// our 
 Ideas of the Objecls themfelves are dear and difiincl, 
 yet we muft always fufpend our Judgment, and 
 withhold our Afient to, or Denial of any Propofi- 
 tion, till forne juft Evidence appear of its Truth ,or 
 EalfooocL It is an Impatience of Doubt and Suf- 
 penfe, a Rafhnefs and Precipitance of Judgment, 
 and Haitineis to believe fomething on one Side or 
 the other, that plunges us into many Errors. 
 
 This Direclion to delay and fufpend our Afient is, 
 more particularly neceflary to be obferved when fuch 
 Propofitions offer themfelves to us as are fupported 
 by Education, Authority, Cuflom, Inclination, Inte- 
 reft, or other powerful Prejudices; for our Judg- 
 ment is led away infenfibly to believe all that they 
 diclatc; and where Prejudices and Dangers of Error 
 
 are 
 
242 logick: or the [part. ir. 
 
 are multiplied, we fhould fet the drifter Guard 
 upon our AHent. 
 
 Yet remember the Caution or Limitation here 
 which I gave under the firji DireBion, namely, that 
 this is not to be too ftrfctly applied to Matters of 
 daily PraBice, either in human Life or Religion ; 
 but when "we confider ourfelves as Philofophers, or 
 Searchers after Truth, we fhould always withhold 
 our Aflent where there is not juft Evidence : And 
 as far and as fad as we can, in a due Confidence 
 with our daily neccfiary Duties, we (hould alfo re- 
 form and adjud all our Principles and Practices both 
 in Religion and the civil Me, by thefe Rules. 
 
 VI. DireBion. We mud judge of every Propor- 
 tion by thefe proper and peculiar Mediums or Means, 
 whereby the Evidence of it is to be obtained, whether 
 it be Senfe, Confcioufnefs, Intelligence, Reafon, or 
 Teflimony. All our Faculties and Powers are to be 
 employed in judging of their proper Objects. 
 
 If we judge of Sounds, Colours, Odours, Sapors, 
 the Smoothnefs, Roughnefs, Softnefs, or Hardnefs of 
 Bodies, it nmft be done by the Ufe of our Senfes : 
 But then we muft take Heed that our Senfes are 
 well difpofcd, as fhall be (hewn afterward. 
 
 And fince our Senfes in their various Exercifes 
 arc in fotmc Cafes liable to be deceived, and more 
 especially when by our Eyes or Ears we judge of 
 the Figure, Quantity, Diflance, and I ofition of Ob- 
 jects that are afar off, we ought to call our Reafon 
 in to the AffrTtance of our Senfes, and correct the 
 Errors of one Senfe by the Help of another. 
 
 It is by the rowers of Senfe and Reafon joined 
 together, that we muft judge philosophically of 
 the inward Nature, the fee ret Properties and Powers, 
 the C a ufe s and EffeBs, the Relations and Proportions 
 of a thoufand corporeal Objects which furround us 
 
 on 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 1A3 
 
 on Earth, or are placed at a Diftance in the Hea- 
 vens. If a Man, on the one Hand, confines him- 
 felf only to fenfibk Experiments, and does not ex- 
 ercife Reafon upon them, he may furprife himfelf 
 and others with ftrange Appearances, and learn to 
 entertain the World with Sights and Shows, but 
 will never become a Philofopher : And, on the other 
 Hand, if a Man impriibn himfelf in his Clofet, and 
 employ the moil exquifite Powers of Reafon to find 
 out the Nature of things in the corporeal World, 
 without the Ufe of his Se?ifes, and the Practice of 
 Experiments,, he will frame to himfelf a Scheme of 
 Chimeras inftead of true Pbilofophy. Hence 
 came the Invention of fubftantial Forms and Quali- 
 ties^ of Materia prima and Privation, with all the 
 infignificant Names ufed by the Peripatetick Wri- 
 ters ; and it was for want of more Experiments, 
 that the great Defcartes failed in feveral Parts of 
 his philofophical Writings. 
 
 In the abfir acted and fpeculative Parts of the Ma- 
 thematicks, which treat of Quantity and Number, 
 the Faculty of Reafon muft be chiefly employed to 
 perceive the Relation of various Quantities, and 
 draw certain and ufeful Conclufions ; but it wants the 
 Affifiance of Senfe alfo to be acquainted with Lines, 
 Angles and Figures. And in praclical Mathematicks 
 our Senfes have frill greater Employment. 
 
 If we would judge of the pure Properties and 
 Aclions of the Mind, of the Nature of Spirits, their 
 various Perceptions and Powers, we mull: not en- 
 quire of our Eyes and our Ears, nor the Images 
 or Shapes laid up in the Brain, but we muft have 
 Recourfc to our own Ccnfcioufnefs of' what paiTes 
 within our own Mind. 
 
 If we are to pafs a Judgment upon any Thing 
 that relates to Spirits in a State of Union with ani- [ 
 mal Nature, and the mist Properties of Senfaj'wn,. 
 
 Fancy 3 
 
244 tOGlCK : o&, tHR [pA&t. ii* 
 
 Fancy+ Appetite, PaJJton, Pleafure and P^/«, which 
 arife thence, we mud confult our own Senfations, 
 and the other Powers which we find in ourfelves 
 confidered as Men or Creatures madi up of a Mind 
 and an Animal, and by juft Reafons deduce proper 
 Confequences, and improve our Knowledge in 
 thefe Subjects. 
 
 If we have Occalion to judge concerning MaU 
 ters done in paji Ages, or in diftant Countries, and 
 where we ourfelves cannot be prefent, the Powers 
 of Senfe and Reafon, for the mofl Part, are not Ef- 
 ficient to inform us, and we muft therefore have 
 Recourfe to the Teftimony of others : And this is 
 either divine or human* 
 
 In Matters of .mere human Prudence, we'fhall find 
 the greateft Advantage by making wife Obferva- 
 tions on our own Conduct, and the Conduct of 
 others, and a Survey of the Events attending fuch 
 Conduct. Experience in this Cafe is equal to a na* 
 tural Sagacity, or rather fuperior. A Treafure of 
 Qbfervations and Experiences collected by wife Men, 
 is of admirable Service here. And perhaps there 
 is nothing in the World of this Kind equal to the 
 facred Book of Proverbs, even if we look on it as a 
 mere human Writing. 
 
 In Queftions of Natural Religion, we muft exer- 
 cife the Faculty of Reafon which God has given us ; 
 and fince he has been pleafed to afford us his Word^ 
 we fhould confirm and improve, or correct our 
 Reafoning on this Subject by the Divine Afliftance 
 of the Bible. 
 
 In Matters of Revealed Religion, that iSj Chri/Ii* 
 anity, Judaifm, EsV. which we could never have 
 known by the Light of Nature, the Word of God 
 is our only Foundation and chief Light ; though 
 here our Reafon muft be ufed both to find out the 
 true Meaning of God in his Word, and to derive 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 245 
 
 juft Inferences from what God has written, as well 
 as to judge of the Credentials whereby Divine Tes- 
 timony is diftinguilhed from mere human Teftimony y 
 or from Impofture. 
 
 As Divine Revelation can never contradict right 
 Reafon, for they are two great Lights given us by 
 our Creator for our Gondii el ; fo Reafon ought by 
 no Means to affume to itfelf a power to contradict 
 Divine Revelation. 
 
 Though Revelation be not contrary to Reafon, yet 
 there arc four Clajfes wherein Matters of Revelation 
 may be faid to r\it above, or go beyond our Reafon. 
 
 1 . When Revelation afferts two Things of which %ve 
 have clear Ideas, to be joined, whofe Connection or 
 Agreement is not dif cover able by Reafon ; as when 
 Scripture informs us, that The Dead Jh all rife, that 
 The Earth Jhall be burnt up, and the Man Chrift 
 Jefus Jhall return from Heaven, none of the Things 
 could ever be found out or proved by Reafon. 
 
 2. When Revelation affirms any Proportion, while 
 Reafon has no clear and diftincl Ideas of the Subjecl 
 or of the Predicate ; as God created all Things by Je- 
 fus Chrift : By the Urim and Thummim God gave 
 forth Divine Oracles. The Predicate of each of thefe 
 
 Proportions is to us an obfeure Idea, for we know 
 not what was the peculiar Agency of Jefus Chrift f 
 when God the Father created the World by him ; 
 nor have we any clear and certain Conception what 
 the Urim and Thummim were, nor how God gave 
 Anfwers to his People by them. 
 
 3. When Revelation, in plain andexprefs Language^ 
 declares fome Doctrine which our Reafon at prefent 
 knows not with Evidence and Certainty, how or in 
 what Senfe to reconcile to fome of its own Principles j 
 as, that the Child Jefus is the mighty God, I fa. ix. 6. 
 which Proportion carries a feeming Oppofition to 
 the Unity and Spirituality of the Godhead, which are 
 Principles of Reafon. 
 
 4. When 
 
246 LOGICK I OR, THE [PART IJ, 
 
 4. When two Propofitions or Doclrines are plainly 
 ajferted by Divine Revelation, which our Reafon at 
 prefent knows not how or in what Senfe, with Evidence 
 and Certainty ', to reconcile with one another ; as, The 
 Father is the only true God, John xvii. 3. and yet 
 Chrift is over all, God blejfedfor ever, Rom. ix. 5. 
 
 Now Divine Revelation having declared all thefe 
 Propofitions, Reafon is bound to receive them, be- 
 cause it cannot prove them to be utterly inconfiftent 
 or impoflible, though the ideas of them may be 
 obfcure, though we ourfelves fee not the rational 
 Connexion of them, and though we know not cer- 
 tainly how to reconcile them. In thefe Cafes Rea- 
 fon muft fubmit to Faith ; that is, we are bound to 
 believe what God ajferts, and wait till he {hall clear 
 up that which feems dark and difficult, and till the 
 Myjleries of Faith (hall be farther explained to us, 
 either in this World or in the World to come,* and 
 Reafon itfelf diclates the Submiffion. 
 
 VII. Direclion. It is very ufcful to have fome ge- 
 neral Principles of Truth fettled in the Mind, whofe 
 Evidence is great and obvious, that they may be always 
 ready at Hand to affifl us in judging of the great Va- 
 riety of Things which occur. Thefe may be called 
 firjl Notions, or fundamental Principles ; for though 
 many of them are deduced from each other, yet 
 moll or all of them may be called Principles when 
 compared with a thoufand other Judgments which 
 we form under the Regulation and Influence of 
 thefe primary Propofitions. 
 
 Every Art and Science, as well as the Affairs of 
 civil Life and Religion, have peculiar Principles 
 of this Kind belonging to them. There are Me- 
 taphyseal, Phyfical, Mathematical,' Political, (Econo- 
 mical, Medicinal, Theological, Moral and Prudential 
 
 * See fomething more on this Subjedt. Dire ft. II. preceding, 
 and Chap, V. Seel. 6. 
 
 Principles* 
 
€!H. iv] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 247 
 
 Principles of Judgment. It would be too tedious 
 to give a Specimen of them all in this Place. Thofe 
 which are of the moil: univerfal Ufe to us, both as 
 Men and as Ghrifiians, may be found in the follow- 
 ing Chanter among the Rules of "Judgment about par- 
 ticular Objects. 
 
 VIII. Diretfiotik Let the Degrees of your Affeni to 
 every Proportion, bear an exact Proportion to the dif- 
 fere?tt Degrees of Evidence. Remember this is one 
 of the greater! Principles of Wifdom that Man can 
 arrive at in. this World, and the bed human Secu- 
 rity againft dangerous Miftakes in Speculation or 
 Practice. 
 
 In the Nature of Things of which our Know* 
 ledge is made up, there is infinite Variety in their 
 Degrees of Evidence. And as God hath given our 
 Minds a Power to fufpend their AfTent till the 
 Evidence be plain, fo we have a Power to receive 
 Things which are propofed to us with a ftronger or 
 weaker Belief in an infinite Variety of Degrees^ 
 proportionable to their Evidence, I believe that the 
 Planets are inhabited, and I believe that the Earth 
 rolls among them yearly round the Sun \ but I do not 
 believe both thele Proportions with an equal Firm- 
 nefs of Aflent, becauie the Arguments for the lat- 
 ter are drawn from mathematical Obfervations ; but 
 the Arguments for the former are but probable Gon± 
 jeclures and moral Reafo?iings» Yet neither do I be- 
 lieve either of thefe Proportions fo firmly, as I do 
 that the Earth is about twenty-four thoufand Miles 
 round, becauie the mathematical Proof of this is 
 much eafier^ plainer and ftronger. And yet farther, 
 when I fay that the Earth' was created by the Power 
 if God, I have iiili a more infallible Afiiirance of 
 this than of all the reft, becaufc Reafon and Scrip* 
 ture ioin to aflure me of it. 
 
 R IX, 
 
248 LOGICK t OR, THE [PART tl. 
 
 IX. Direction. Keep your Mind always open U 
 receive Truths and never Jet Limits to your own Im- 
 provement. Be ready always to hear what may be 
 objected even againft your favourite Opinions, and 
 thofe which have had longeft Pofleflion of your Af- 
 fent. And if there fhould be any new and uncon- 
 troulable Evidence brought againft thefe old or be- 
 loved Sentiments, do not wink your Eyes faft againft 
 the Light, but part with any Thing for the Sake of 
 Truth : Remember when you overcome an Error 
 you gain Truth ; the Victory is on your Side, and 
 the Advantage is all your own. 
 
 I confefs, thofe grand Principles of Belief and 
 Practice, which univerfally influence our Conduct 
 both with Regard to this Life and the Life to come, 
 fhould be fuppofed to be well fettled in the flrft 
 Years of our Studies ; fuch as, the Exigence and Pro- 
 vidence of God, the Truth of Chrijlianity, the Autho- 
 rity of Scripture, the great Rules of Morality, &c* 
 We fhould avoid a light fluttering Genius, ever 
 ready to change our Foundations, and to be carried 
 about with every wind of Doclrine* To guard againft 
 which Inconvenience, we fhould labour with ear- 
 ned Diligence and fervent Prayer, that our moft 
 fundamental and important Points of Belief and 
 Practice, may be eftablifhed upon juft Grounds of 
 Reafon and Scripture, when we come to Years of 
 Difcretion, and fit to judge for ourfelves in fuch 
 important Points. Yet fince it is poflible that the 
 Folly or Prejudices of younger Years may have 
 eftablifhed Pcrfons in fotne miftaken Sentiments, 
 even in very important Matters, we fhould always 
 hold ourfelves ready to receive any new Advantage 
 toward the Correction or Improvement even of our 
 eflablijhcd Principles, as well as Opinions of lefler 
 Moment. 
 
 CHAR 
 
CH. T.3 RIGHT USE OP REASON. 249 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Special Rules to direft us in judging of parti- 
 cular Objects. 
 
 IT would be endlefs to run through all thofe par- 
 ticular Objects concerning which we have Oc- 
 cafion to pafs a Judgment at one time or another. 
 Things of the mofl frequent Occurrence, of the 
 wideft Extent, and of the greater!: Importance, are 
 the Objects and Exercifes of Senfe, of Reafon and 
 Speculation ; the Matters of Morality , Religion and 
 Prudence-, of human and divine Teftimony, together 
 with the EJfays of Reafoning upon Things paft and 
 future. Special Rules relating to all thefe will be 
 the Subject of the following Sections. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment concerning the 
 Objects of Senfe. 
 
 THOUGH our Senfes are fometimes liable to 
 be deceived, yet when they are rightly dif- 
 pofed, and fitly exercifed about their proper Objecls, 
 with the juft Afliltance of Reafon, they give us fuf- 
 ficierrt Evidence of Truth. 
 
 This may be proved by an Argument drawn 
 from the Wifdom, Goodnefs, and Faithfulnefs of God 
 our Creator. It was He gave us our Senfes, and he 
 would not make us of fuch a Conftitution as to be li- 
 able to perpetual Deception and unavoidable Error 
 in uling theffc faculties of Senfe in the belt Manner 
 R 2 we 
 
'25Q logick: or the [part. 11 
 
 we are capable of, about thofe very Things which 
 are the proper Objecls of them. 
 
 This may be proved alio by the /// Confequences 
 that would follow from the Suppofttion of the Con- 
 trary. If we could have no Certainty of the Dic- 
 tates of our Senfes, we could never be fure of any 
 of the common Affairs and Occurrences of Life. 
 Men could not tranfacl any of their civil or moral 
 Concerns with any Certainty of Juftice ; nor in- 
 deed could we eat or drink, walk or move, with 
 Safety. Our Senfes direct; us in all thefe. 
 
 Again, the Matters of Religion depend in fome 
 Meafure upon the Certainty of the Dictates of 
 Senfe ; for Faith comes by Hearing ; and it is to our 
 Senfes that God appeals in working Miracles to 
 prove his own Revelation. Now if when our Eyes 
 and Ears, and other Organs of Senfe are rightly 
 difpofed aad exercifed about their proper Objecls, 
 they were always liable to be deceived, there 
 could be no Knowledge of the Gofpel, no proof 
 of Divine Revelation by Virions, Voices, or Mi- 
 racles. 
 
 Our Senfes will difcover Things near us and 
 round about us, which are neceflary for our prefent 
 State, with fufficient Exact nefs ; and Things dif- 
 tant alfo, fo far as they relate to our neceflary Ufe 
 of them. 
 
 Nor is there Need of any more accurate Rules 
 for the Ufe of our Senfes in the Judgment of all 
 the common Affairs of Life, or even of miraculous and 
 divine Operations, than the vulgar Part of Mankind 
 are iu&iciently acquainted with by Nature, and by 
 their own daily Observations. 
 
 But if we would ex prefs thefe Rules in a more 
 exact Manner, how to judge by the Dictates of our 
 
 $enfes, they fhould be reprcferucd thus ; 
 
 » 
 
 1. We 
 
CF. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 251 
 
 1 . Wc muft take Care that the Organs of our Se?ife 
 be rightly difpofed, and not under the Power of any 
 Diftemper or confiderable Decay ; as for Inftance, 
 that our Eyes are not tinctured with the jfaundice, 
 when we would judge of Colours, left we pronounce 
 them all yellow : That our Hands are not burning 
 in a Fever, nor benumbed with Frofl or the Palfy^ 
 when we would judge of the Heat or Coldnefs of any 
 Object : That our Palate be not vitiated by any 
 Difeafe, or by fome other improper Ta/le, when we 
 would judge of the true Tq/ie of any Solid or Li- 
 quid. This Direction relates to all our Senfes, but 
 the following Rules chiefly refer to our Sight. 
 
 2. Wc muft obferve whether the Objecl be at a 
 proper Difiance ; for if it be too near or too far off, 
 our Eyes will not fufficiently diftinguifh many 
 Things which are properly the Objects of Sight ; 
 and therefore (if poffible) we muft make nearer Ap- 
 proaches to the Object, or remove farther from it, 
 till we have obtained that dueDiftauce which gives 
 us the clcareft Perception. 
 
 3. We muft not employ our Sight to take a full 
 Survey at once of 'Objecl l s that are too large for it; 
 but we muft view them by Parts, and then judge of 
 the Whole : Nor muft our Senfes judge of Objecls 
 too finally for fome Things which appear through 
 Glaffes to be really and diftinctly exiftent, are either 
 utterly in vifible,or greatly confufed, when we w ? ould 
 judge of them by the naked Eye. 
 
 4. We muft place ourfehes in fuch a Pofition to- 
 ward the Objecl, or place the Objecl in fuch a Po- 
 fition toward our Eye. as may give us the cleareft Re- 
 
 prefentation of it ; for a different Pofition greatly 
 alters the Appearance of the Shape of Bodies. 
 And f r this Reafbn we fhould change the Pofition 
 both of the Eye and the Objecl in fome Cafes, that 
 . R 3 by 
 
252 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART 1U 
 
 by viewing the Objecl in feveral Appearances, we 
 may pafs a more complete and certain Judgment- 
 concerning it 
 
 5. We mult confider what the Medium is by 
 which Objecls are reprefented to our Seufes ; whether 
 it be thinner or thicker ; whether it be Air or Va- 
 pour, or Water, or Glafs, &c. whether it.be duly- 
 enlightened or dufky ; whether it reflect or refract, 
 or only tranfmit the Appearance of the Object; and 
 whether it be tinctured with any particular Colour; 
 Whether it be moving or at Reft. 
 
 6. We muft fometimes ufe other Helps to affift 
 our Senfes ; and if we make ufe of Glajfes, we 
 muft make all juft Allowances for the Thieknefs 
 or Thinnefs of them, for the Clearnefs or Dulnefs, 
 for the Smoothnefs or Roughnefs, for the Plain- 
 nefs, the Convexity or Concavity of them, and for 
 the Diftance at which thefe Glajfes are placed from 
 the Eye, or from the Object, (or from one another, 
 if there be two or more Glaffes ufed) and all this 
 according to the Rules of Art. The fame Sort of 
 Caution fhould be ufed alfo in Mediums which aflift 
 the Hearing, fuch as Speaking-Trumpets, Hearing- 
 Trumpets, &c. 
 
 7- If the Object-may be propofed to more Senfes 
 than one, let us call in the Affift a nee of iome other 
 Senfes to examine it, and this will increale the Evi- 
 dence of what one Senfe dictates. For Example ; 
 Our Ear may affift our Eye in judging of the Dif- 
 tance of Bodies, which are both vifible and fono- 
 rous, as an exploded Cannon, or a Cloud charged with 
 Thunder. Our Feeling may affift our Sight in judg- 
 ing of the Kind, the Shape, Situation, or Diftance 
 of Bodies that are near at Hand, as whether a Gar- 
 merit be Silk or Stuff, &c. So if I bothy^, hear, and 
 embrace my Friend, I am fure he is prefent. 
 
 8. We 
 
€H. V.] RIGHT USE OP SEASON. 253 
 
 8. We fhould alfo make feveral Trials, at fome 
 diftant Times, and in different Circum fiances, com- 
 paring former Experiments with later, and our own 
 Obfervations with thofe of other Perfons. 
 
 It is by fuch Methods as thefe that modern Phi- 
 lofophy has been fo greatly improved by the Ufe of 
 fenfible Experiments. 
 
 SECT. XL 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 Reafm and Speculation. 
 
 IT is by Reafon we judge both in Matters of Spe- 
 culation and Pradke$ there are peculiar Rules 
 which relate to Things pradical, whether they be 
 Matters of Religion, Morality, or Prudence; yet 
 many Thiogs in this Section may be applied to 
 fraclical Enquiries and Matters of Faith, though 
 it chiefly relates to Knoidedge or Speculations of 
 Reafon. 
 
 1 . Whatfbever clear Ideas we can join together 
 without InconMency, are to be counted PoJfible 9 
 becaufe Almighty Power can make whatfoever we 
 can conceive. 
 
 2. From the mere PoJJibility of a Thing we can- 
 not infer its aclual Exijience , nor from the Non- 
 Exijlence of it can we infer its hipojfibility. 
 
 Note, The Idea of God feems to claim an Ex- 
 emption from this general Rule ; for if he be pof- 
 iible, he certainly exifts, becaufe the very Idea 
 includes Eternity, and he cannot begin to be : If 
 he exift not, he is impoflible, for the very fame 
 Reafon. 
 
 R 4 3. What 
 
254 logick : or, the [part rr. 
 
 3. Whatfoever is evidently contained in the Idea 
 of any Thing, may be affirmed of that Thing with 
 Certainty. Reafon is contained in the Idea of a 
 Man ; and Exifience is contained in the Idea of 
 God ; and therefore we may affirm God exi/is, and 
 Man is reafcnable. 
 
 4. It is impoffible that the fame Tiling mould 
 be, and not be at the fame Time, and in the fame 
 Ilefpect. Thence it follows, that two contradictory. 
 Ideas cannot be joined, in the fame Fart of the fame 
 Subjecl, at the fame Time, and in the fame Ref peels .* 
 Or, that two contradictory Propofitions can never be 
 both true. 
 
 5. The more we converfe with any Subject: in its 
 various Properties^ the better Knowledge of it we 
 are likely to attain; and by frequent and repeated 
 Enquiries and Experiments, Reafonings and Con- 
 verfations about it, we confirm our true Judgments 
 of that Thing, and correct our former Miftakes. 
 
 6. Yet after our utmoft Enquiries, we can never 
 be allured by Reafon, that we know all the Powers 
 and Properties o\ any finite Being. 
 
 7. {(finite Beings are not adequately known by 
 us, much lefs the Things' infinite: For it is of the 
 Nature of a finite Mind not to be able to compre- 
 hend what is infinite. 
 
 8. We may judge and argue very juftly and cer- 
 tainly concerning Infinites, in fome Parts of them, 
 or fo far as our Ideas reach, though the Infinity of 
 them hath fomething ineomprehenfible in it. And 
 this is built on the general Rule following, namely, 
 
 9. Whatfoever is fufficiently clear and evident, 
 ought not to be denied, though there are other 
 Things belonging to the fame Subject, which can- 
 not be comprehended. I may affirm many Things 
 \vith Certainty concerning human Souls 5 their Union 
 
 with 
 
CH. V.] RIGHT USE OP SEASON". 255 
 
 with Bodies, concerning; the Divisibility of Matter, 
 and the Attributes of God, though many other Things 
 relating to them are all Darknefs to us. 
 
 10. If any Opinion propofed has either no Argils 
 merits, or equal Arguments for and again ft it, we 
 mult remain in perfect Sufpenfe about it, till con- 
 vincing Evidence appear on one Side. 
 
 ] 1 . Where preferit Neccffity of Action does not 
 con (train us to determine, we fhould not immedi- 
 ately yield up our AfTent to mere probable Argu- 
 ments, without a due Referve, if we have any rea- 
 sonable Hope of obtaining greater Light and Evi- 
 dence on one Side or the other : For when the Ba- 
 lance of the Judgment once refigns its Equilibrium 
 or Neutrality to a mere -probable Argument, it is 
 too ready to fettle itfelf on that Side, to that the 
 Mind will not eafilv change that Judgment, though 
 bright and ftrong Evidence appear afterwards on 
 the other Side. 
 
 12. Of two Opinions, if one has unanfwerable 
 Difficulties attending it, we mult not reject it im- 
 mediate! v, till we examine whether the contrary 
 Opinion has not Difficulties as unanfwerable. 
 
 13. It each Opinion has Objections againft it 
 which we cannot anfwer, or reconcile, we fhould 
 rather embrace that which has the leafi Difficulties 
 in it, and which has the belt Arguments to lup- 
 port it : And let our Aflent bear Proportion to the 
 fuperior Evidence. 
 
 14. If any Doctrine hath very ftrong and fuf- 
 ficient Light and Evidence to command our AfTent, 
 we ill ou Id not reject it becauie there is an Objection 
 or two againft it which we are not able to anfwer ; 
 for upon this Foot a common Chriftian would be 
 baffled out of every Article cf his Faith, and mud 
 renounce even the Dictates of his Reafon and his 
 
 Senfes ; 
 
256 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART IJT. 
 
 Senfes; and the moft learned Man perhaps would 
 hold but very few of them fail : For fome Objec- 
 tions which attend the facred Doclrine of the Eter- 
 nity and the Omniprefence of God, and the philofo- 
 phieal Doctrines of Light, Atoms, Space, Motion, 
 &c. are hardly folvable to this Day. 
 
 15. Where two Extremes are propofed, either 
 in Matters of Speculation or Praclice, and neither 
 of them has certain and convincing Evidence, it is 
 generally fa fed to take the Middle Way. Mode- 
 ration is more likely to come near the Truth than 
 doubtful Extremes. This is an excellent Rule to 
 judge of the Characters and Value of the greatelt 
 Part of Perfons and Things ; for Nature feldom 
 deals in Superlatives. It is a good Rule alfo by 
 which to form our Judgment in many fpeculative 
 Controverfies ; a reconciling Medium in fuch Cafes 
 does often bell fecure Truth as well as Peace. 
 
 l6. When two different Proportions have each 
 a very Itrong and cogent Evidence, and do not 
 plainly appear inconliltent, we may believe both 
 of them, though we cannot at prefent fee the Way 
 to reconcile them. Reafon, as well as our own 
 Co7ifcioufnefs, allures us, that the Will of Man is 
 free, and that Multitudes of human Aclions are in that 
 Refpecl contingent-, and yet Reafon and Scripture 
 allure us, that God foreknows them all, and this im- 
 plies a certain Fatality. Now though learned Men 
 have not to this Day hit on any fo clear and happy 
 Method as is delired to reconcile thefe Propolitions, 
 yet fince we do not fee a plain Inconliftency in 
 them, we juftly believe them both, becaufc their 
 Evidence is great. 
 
 17. Let us not therefore too fuddenly determine 
 in difficult Matters, that two Things are utterly in- 
 conftflcnt : For there are many Proportions which 
 
 may 
 
CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REAS0X. 257 
 
 may appear inconfijlent at firft, and yet afterwards 
 we find their Conlljkncy, and the Way of reconciling 
 them may be made plain and ealy : As alio, there 
 are other Proportions which may appear conjiftent 
 at firit, but after due Examination we find their 
 Inconfifhncy. 
 
 18. For the fame Heafon we fhould not call 
 thofe Difficulties utterly infolvable^ or thole Objec- 
 tions unanfuuerable, which we are not prefently able 
 to anfwer : Time and Diligence may give farther 
 Light. 
 
 19. In fhort, if we will fecure ourfelves from 
 Error, we fhould not be too frequent or hafty in 
 afferting the certain ConJJlency or Inconfijlency , the 
 abfolute Uni-verfality, JSecejfity, or ImpoJJibUity of 
 Things, where there is not the brighter! Evidence. 
 He is but a young and raw Philofopher, who, when 
 he fees two particular Ideas evidently agree \ imme- 
 diate! v afieris them to 'agree imi-ve?fally, to agree 
 
 r arilv, and that it is impojjible it Jhoitld be other- 
 . Or when he fees evidently that two particular 
 Ideas happen to difagree, he prefently aflerts their 
 corn,.;,; and natural huonjiftency, their utter Im- 
 poffibility of Agreement, and calls every Thing 
 contrary to bis Opinion Abfurdity and Nonfenfe* A 
 true Philosopher will affirm or deny with much 
 Caution [od^fty, unlefs he has thoroughly ex- 
 
 amine;: and found tm- Evidence of every Part of 
 his "Allen ion exceeding plain. 
 
 20. Let ib have a Care of building our AfTurance 
 of any important Point ol Doctrine upon one Jingle- 
 Argument^ if there are more to be obtained. We 
 fhould not flight and reject all other Arguments 
 which fupport the fame Doctrine, left if our jfa- 
 vourite Argument ihould be refuted, and fail us, we 
 fhould be tempted to abandon that important Prin- 
 ciple 
 
258 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 
 
 ciple of truth. I think this was a very culpable 
 Practice in Defcartes y and fome of his Followers, 
 who when he had found out the Argument for the 
 Existence of 'God r , derived from the Idea of a mojl per- 
 feci and felfexiflent Beings he feemed to defpife and 
 abandon all other Arguments againft Atheifm* 
 
 21. If we happen to have our chief Arguments for 
 any Opinion refuted, we (hould not immediately 
 give up the Opinion itfelf ; for perhaps it may be a 
 Truth ftill, and we may find it to be juftly fup- 
 ported by other Arguments, which we might once 
 think weaker, or perhaps by new Arguments which 
 we knew not before. 
 
 22. We ought to efleem that to be fufficient Evi- 
 dence of a Propofition, where both the Kind and the 
 Force of the Arguments or Proofs, are as great as 
 the Nature of the Thing admits, and as the Necef- 
 fity or Exigence of the Cafe requires. So if we 
 have a credible and certain Teftimony that Chrijl rofe 
 from the Dead, it is enough ; we are not to expecl 
 mathematical or ocular Demonfiration for it, at leafl 
 in our Day. 
 
 23. Though we (hould feek what Proofs may be 
 attained of any Proposition, and we fhould receive 
 any Number of Arguments which are juft and Evi- 
 dent for the Confirmation of the fame Truth, yet 
 we muft not judge of the Truth of any Proportion 
 by the Number of Arguments which are brought to 
 fupport it, but by the Strength and Weight of them : 
 A Building will ft and firmer and longer on four 
 large Pillars of Marble, than on ten of Sand, or 
 Earth or Timber. 
 
 24. Yet where certain Evidence is not to be 
 found or expected, a confiderable Number of proba- 
 ble Arguments carry great Weight with them even 
 in Matters of Speculation. That is a probable Hy- 
 pothecs 
 
CH. V.] RIGHT USE OP REASOtf. 25$ 
 
 pothefis in Philofophy, or in Theology, which goes 
 farthett towards the Solution of many difficult 
 Queitions arifing on any Subject. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Principles and Rales of Judgment in Matters of 
 Morality and Religion. 
 
 HERE it may be proper in the firft Place to 
 mention a few Definitions of Words or 
 Terms. * 
 
 By Matters of Morality and Religion, I mean 
 thole Things which relate to our Duty to God, 
 ourfelves, or our Fellow-Creatures. 
 
 Moral Good, or Virtue, or Holinefs, is an Action 
 or Temper conformable to the Rule of our Duty. 
 Moral Evil, or Vice, or Sin, is an Action or Tem- 
 per unconformable to the Rule of our Duty, or a 
 Neglect to fulfil it. 
 
 Note, The Words Vice, or Virtue, chiefly imply 
 the Relation of our Actions to Men and this World. 
 Sin and Holinefs rather imply their Relation to 
 God and the other World. 
 
 Natural Good is that which gives us Pleafure or 
 Satisfaction. Natural Evil is that which gives us 
 Pain or Grief. 
 
 Happinefs confifts in the Attainment of the high- 
 eft and molt lafting natural Good. Mifery con fi ft s 
 in fuffering the higheft and mod laiting natural 
 Evil ; that is, in fhort, Heaven or Hell. 
 
 Though this be a juft Account of perfecl Happi- 
 nefs and perfecl Mifery, yet wherefoever Pain over- 
 balances Pleafure, there is a Degree of Mifery ; and 
 
 wherefoever 
 
266 LOGICK : OE, THE fpART It, 
 
 wherefoever Pleafure overbalances Pain, there is a 
 Degree of Happinefs. 
 
 I proceed now to lay down fome Principles and 
 Rules of Judgment in Matters of Morality and Reli- 
 gion, i 
 
 1. The Will of our Maker, whether discovered 
 by Reafon or Revelation, carries the higher! Au- 
 thority with it, and is therefore the highefl Rule of 
 Duty to intelligent Creatures ; a Conformity or 
 Nonconformity to it determines their Actions to 
 be morally good or evil. 
 
 2. Whatfoever is really an immediate Duty to- 
 ward ourfelves, or toward our Fellow-Creatures, is 
 more remotely a Duty to God ; and therefore in 
 the Practice of it we mould have an Eye to the 
 Will of God as our Rule, and to his Glory as our 
 End. 
 
 3. Our wife and gracious Creator has clofely 
 united our Duty and our Happinefs together ; and 
 has connected Sin, or Vice, and Punijhment ; that 
 is, he has ordained that the highefl natural Good and 
 Evil fhould have a clofe Connection with moral 
 Good and Evil, and that both in the Nature of 
 Things, and by his own pofitive Appointment. 
 
 4. Confcience fhould feek all due information, 
 in order to determine what is Duty, and what is 
 Sin, becaufe Happinefs and Mifery depend upon it. 
 
 5. On this Account our Inclination to prefent 
 temporal Good, and our Averfion to prefent temporal 
 Evil, muft be wifely overbalanced by the Conlide- 
 ration of future and eternal Good or Evil, that is, 
 Happinefs or Mifery. And for this Reafon we 
 fhould not omit a Duty, or commit a Sin, to gain 
 any temporal Good, or to avoid any temporal Evil. 
 
 6. Though our natural Reafon in a State of Inno- 
 cence might be fufficicnt to find out -thofe Duties 
 
 which 
 
CH. V.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. *l6\ 
 
 which were neceflary for an innocent Creature, in 
 order to abide in the Favour of his Maker, yet in a 
 fallen State, our natural Reafon is by no Means fuf- 
 ficient to find out all that is neceffory to reflore a 
 finful Creature to the divine Favour. 
 
 7. Therefore God hath condefcended, in various 
 Ages of Mankind, to reveal to finful Men what 
 he requires of them in order to their Reforation 9 
 and has appointed in his Word fome peculiar Mat- 
 ters of Faith and Practice, in order to their Sal- 
 vation. This is called Revealed Religion", as the 
 Things knowable concerning God and our Duty 
 by the Light of Nature, are called Natural Reli- 
 gion* 
 
 8. There are alfo many Parts of Morality, and 
 natural Religion, or many natural Duties relating to 
 God, to ourfelves, and to our Neighbours, which 
 would be exceeding difficult and tedious for the 
 Bulk of Mankind to find out and determine by na- 
 tural Reafon ; therefore it has pleafed God in this 
 facred Book of Divine Revelation, to exprefs the 
 mofl necefTary Duties of this Kind in a very plain 
 and eafy Manner, and make them intelligible to 
 Souls of the lowelt Capacity ; or they may be very 
 eafily derived thence by the Ufe of Reafon. 
 
 9. As there are fome Duties much more necef 
 fary, and more important than others are, fo every 
 
 Duty requires our Application to underfland and 
 praclife it, in Proportion to its Neceffity and Im* 
 portance. 
 
 10. Where two Duties feem to (land in Oppo- 
 sition to each other, and we cannot practife both, 
 the left muft give Way to the greater, and the 
 Omifiion of the lefs is not finful. So ceremonial 
 Laws give Way to moral : God zuill have Mercy 
 and not Sacrifice* 
 
 11. 
 
262 LOGICK : OR, THE £pART 1U 
 
 J 1 . In Duties of natural Religion, we may judge 
 of the different Degrees of their NeceAity and Im- 
 portance by Reafon, according to their greater or 
 more apparent Tendency to the Honour of God/ 
 and the' Good of Men : But in Matters of revealed 
 Religion, it is only divine Revelation can certainly 
 inform us what is mo ft neceAary and moil impor- 
 tant ; yet we may be a Aided alfo in that Search by 
 the Exercifes of Reafon. 
 
 12. In Actions wherein there may be fome Scruple 
 about the Duty or Lawfulness of them, we mould 
 choofe always the fafed Side, and abftain as far as 
 we can from the practice of Things whofe Lawful- 
 ness we fufpecl. 
 
 13. Points of the greatejl Importance in human 
 Life, or in Religion, are generally the mod evi- 
 dent, both in the Nature of Things, and in the 
 Word of God ; and where Points of Faith or 
 Practice are exceeding difficult to find out, they 
 cannot be exceeding important. This Propofition 
 may be proved by the Goodnefs and Faithfulnefs 
 of God, as well as by Experience and Obferva- 
 tion. 
 
 15. In fome of the outward Practices and Forms 
 of Religion, as well as human Affairs, there is fre- 
 quently a prefent NeceJJity offpeedy Aclion one Way 
 or another: In fuch a Cafe, having Surveyed Argu- 
 ments on both Sides, as far as our Time and Cir- 
 cumdnnces admit, we mud guide our Practice by 
 thofe Re a Jons which appear moft probable, and feem 
 at that Time to overbalance the red ; yet always 
 referring Room to admit farther Light and Evi- 
 dence, when fuch Occurrences return again. It 
 is a Preponderation of circumjtaniial Arguments that 
 mud determine our Actions in a thouiand Occur- 
 rences* 
 
 15. We 
 
CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 203 
 
 15. We may alfo determine upon probable Argu- 
 ments where the Matter is off?nall Confequence and 
 would not anfwer the Trouble of feeking after Cer- 
 tainty, Life and Time are more precious than to 
 have a large Share of them laid out in fcrupulous 
 Enquiries, whether fmoaking Tobacco, or wearing a 
 Perriwig be lawful or no. 
 
 1 6. In Affairs of greater Importance, and which 
 may have a long, lading, and exteafive Influence 
 on our future Conduct or Happinefs, we fhould 
 not take up with Probabilities, if Certainty may be 
 attained. Where there is any Doubt on the Mind, 
 in fuch Cafes, we fhould call in the Afliftance of 
 all manner of Circum trances, Reafons, Motives, 
 Confequences on all Sides : We muit wait longer 
 and with earned Requeit feek human and divine 
 Advice before we fully determine our Judgment, 
 and our Practice ; according to the old Roman 
 Sentence, Quod Jiatuendum eft femel, deliberandum eft 
 diu. We mould be long in coniidering what w§ 
 mult determine once for all. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 human Prudence* 
 
 THE great Defign of Prudence, as diflinct from 
 Morality and Religion, is to determine and 
 manage every Affair with Decency, and to the bed 
 Advantage. 
 
 That is decent, which is. agreeable to our. State, 
 Condition or Circumftances, whether it be in Be- 
 haviour, Difcourfe, or Action. 
 
 S That 
 
264 tOGICK ! OR, THE ' [pART II. 
 
 That is advantageous which attains the mbft and 
 beft Purpofcs, and avoids the moft and greateft In- 
 conveniences. 
 
 As there is infinite Variety in the Circumftances. 
 of Perfons, Things, Actions, Times and Places, fo 
 "we niuii be mrnilhcd with fuch general Rules as are 
 accommodable to all this Variety by a wife Judg- 
 ment and Discretion : For what is an Act of con* 
 fummate Prudence in ibme Times, Places, and Cir- 
 cumftances, would be confummaie Folly in others. 
 ISIow thefe Rules may be ranged in the following 
 Manner. 
 
 1 . Our Regard to Perfons or Things mould be 
 governed by the Degrees of Concernment we have 
 with them, the Relation we have to them, or the 
 Expectation we have from them. Thefe mould be 
 the Meafures by which we fhould proportion our 
 Diligence and Application in any Thing that re- 
 lates to them. 
 
 2. We mould always confider whether the 
 Thing. we purfue be attainable-, whether it be wor- 
 thy our Purfuit ; whether it be worthy of the De- 
 gree of Purfuit ; whether it be worthy of the Means 
 ufed, in order to attain it. This Rule is neceflary 
 both in Matters of Knowledge, ' and Matters of 
 Praclice* 
 
 3. When the Advantages and Difadv ant ages, Con- 
 veniences and Inconveniences of any Action are ba- 
 lanced together, we mud finally determine on that 
 Side which has the fuperior Weight ; and the fooner 
 in Things which are neceflarily and fpeedily to be 
 done or determined. 
 
 4. If Advantages and Difadv ant ages in their 
 own Nature arc equal, then thole winch are moft 
 certain or likely as to the Event, mould turn the 
 Scale of our Judgment, and determine our Prac- 
 tice. 
 
 5. Where 
 
CH. V.] * EIGHT USE OF REASON. 265 
 
 5. Where the Improbabilities, of Succefs or Ad* 
 vantage are greater than the Probabilities, it is not 
 Prudence to act or venture, if the Action may be 
 attended with Danger or Lofs equal to the propofed 
 Gain It is proper to enquire whether this be not 
 the Cafe in almofl all Lotteries ; for they that hold 
 Stakes will certainly fecure Part to them (elves ; and 
 only the Remainder being divided into Prizes, mull 
 render the Improbability of Gain to each Adventurer 
 greater than the Probability, 
 
 6. We mould not defpife or neglect any real 
 Advantage i and abandon the Purfuit of it, though 
 we cannot attain all the Advantages that we defire. 
 This would be to act like Children, who are fond of 
 fomething which itrikes their Fancy moft, and ful- 
 len and regardlefs of every Thing elfe, if they are 
 not humoured in that Fancy. 
 
 7. Though a general Knowledge of Things be ufe- 
 ful in Science and in human Life, yet we fhould 
 content ourfelves with a more fuperflcia! Know- 
 ledge of thofe Things which have the leafl Relation 
 to our chief End and Defign. 
 
 8. This Rule holds good alfo in Matters of Bu- 
 finefs and Practice, as well as in Matters of Know- 
 ledge ; and therefore we fhould not grafp at every 
 Thing, left in the End we attain nothing, Perfons 
 that either by an Inconstancy of Temper, or by a 
 vain Ambition, will purfue every Sort of Art and 
 Science, Study and Bufinefs*, feldom grow excel- 
 lent in any one of them : And Projeclors who form 
 twenty Schemes, feldom ufe itifficient Applica- 
 tion to finiih one of them, or make it turn to good 
 Account. 
 
 Q. Take heed of delaying and trifling amongft 
 
 the Mea?is inftead of reaching at the End, Take- 
 
 'heed of waiting a Life in mere fpeculative Studies, 
 
 which is called to Aclion and EwJ)!;yment : Dwell 
 
 S 2 not 
 
^66 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART H, 
 
 not too long in philofophical, mathematical, or gram* 
 piatical Parts of Learning, when your chief Defign 
 is Law, Phyfck, or Divinity. Do not fpend the 
 Day in gathering Flowers by the Way-fide, left 
 Night come upon you before you arrive at your 
 Journey's End, and then you will not reach it. 
 
 10. Where the Cafe and Circumjiances of wife 
 and good Men refcmble our own Cafe and Circum- 
 
 fiances, we may borrow a great deal of Inflruction 
 toward our prudent Conduct from their Example ; 
 as well as in all Cafes we learn much from their 
 Converfaiion and Advice. 
 
 11. After all other Rules remember this, that 
 mere Speculation in Matters of human Prudence can 
 never be a perfect Director, without Experience 
 and Obfervation. We may be content therefore in 
 our younger Years to commit fome unavoidable 
 Miftakes in Point of Prudence, and we (hall fee 
 Miftakes enow in the Conduct of others, both 
 which ought to be treafured up amongft our ufeful 
 Obfervations, in order to teach us better Judgment 
 for Time to come. Sometimes the Mi/lakes, Impru- 
 dencies, and Follies, which ourfelves or others have 
 been guilty of, give us brighter and more effectual 
 Leflbns of Prudence, than the wifeft Counfels, and 
 the faireft Examples could ever have done. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Principles and Rides of Judgment in Matters of 
 hitman Tcftimony. 
 
 THE Evidence of human Teftimony is not fo 
 proper to lead us into the Knowledge of the 
 Effcnce and inward Nature of Things, as to ac- 
 quaint us with the JSxiftence of Things, and to 
 
 inform 
 
CH. V.] BIGHT USE OP REASOtf. l6f 
 
 inform us of Matters of Fuel both paft and prefent. 
 And though there be a great deal of Fallibility in 
 the Teftimony of Men, yet there are fome Things 
 we may be almoft, as certain of, as that the Sun 
 Jhines, or that five twenties make a Hundred. Who 
 is there at London that knows any Thing of the 
 World, but believes there is fuch a City as Paris 
 in Fra?ice ; that the Pope dwells at Rome ; that Ju- 
 lius Caefar was an Emperor \ or that Luther had a 
 great Hand in the Reformation f 
 
 If we obferve the following Rules, we may ar- 
 rive at fuch a Certainty in many Things of hu- 
 man Teftimony, as that it is morally impoffible we 
 fhould be deceived, that is, we may obtain a moral 
 Certainty. 
 
 1. Let us confider whether the Thing reported 
 be in itfelf pojftble ; if not, it can never be credible^ 
 whofoever relates it. 
 
 2. Confider farther whether it be probable, 
 whether there are any concurring Circumjlances to 
 prove it, befide the mere Teftimony of the Perfon 
 that relates it. I confefs, if thefe laft Conditions 
 .are wanting, the Thing may be true, but then it 
 ought to have the ftronger Teftimony to fup- 
 port it. 
 
 3. Confider whether the Perfon who relates it be 
 capable of knowing the Truth : Whether he be a 
 Jkilful Judge in fuch Matters, if it be a Bufinefs of 
 Art, or a nice Appearance in Nature, or fome cu- 
 rious Experiment in Philofophy. But if it be a 
 mere Occurrence in Life, a plain, fenfible Matter 
 of Facl, it is enough to enquire whether he who 
 relates it were an Eye or Ear-Witnefs, or whether 
 he himfclf had it only by Hearfay, or can trace it 
 up to the Original. 
 
 S3 4, Con- 
 
2(38 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART. II, 
 
 4. Confider whether the Narrator be honeft and 
 faithful, as well as fkilful : Whether he hath no 
 
 Bias upon his Mind, no peculiar Gain or Profit by 
 believing or reporting it, no Inter eft ox Principle 
 which might warp his own Belief afide from Truth; 
 or which might tempt him to prevaricate, to fpeak 
 faffely, or to give a Reprefentation a little different 
 from the naked Truth of Things. In fhort, whe- 
 ther there be no Occafion ofSufpicion concerning this 
 Report. 
 
 5. Confider whether fever al Perfons agree toge- 
 ther in the Report of this Matter ; and if fo, then 
 whether thefe Perfons who joined together in their 
 Teftimony, might not be fuppofed to combine toge- 
 ther in a Falfloood. Whether they are Perfons of 
 
 ft efficient ft ill? Probity? and Credit. It might be alfq 
 enquired, whether they are of different Nations, 
 Seels, Parties, Opinions, or Interefts. For the 
 more divided they are in all thefe, the more likely 
 is their Report to be true, if they agree together 
 in their Account of the fame Thing ; and efpecially 
 if they peril ft in it without wavering. 
 
 6. Confider farther, whether the Report were 
 capable of being eaftly refuted at ft? ft if it had not 
 been true; if fo, this confirms the Teftimony. 
 
 7. Enquire yet again, whether there has been a 
 conftant? uniform Tradition and Belief of this Matter, 
 from the very firft Age or Time when the Thing 
 was tranfacled, without any reafonable Doubts or 
 Contradictions. Or, 
 
 8. If any Part of it hath been doubted by any 
 conflderablc Perfons, whether it has been fearched 
 out and afterwards cdnfirmea^ by having all the 
 ScfUpfes and Doubts removed. In cither of thefe 
 Cafes the Ttftimonv becomes more "firm and cre- 
 dible. 
 
 9. Enquire, 
 
CM. V.] RIGHT USE OP REASON, I69 
 
 q. Enquire, on the other Hand, whether there 
 are any confiderable Objections remaining againfl the 
 Belief of that Proportion fo attefted. Whether 
 there be any Thing very improbable in the Thing 
 itfelf. Whether any concurrent Circumflances feern 
 to oppofe it. Whether any Perfon or Perfons give 
 a pofitive and plain Tefiimony againfl it. Whether 
 they are equally Jkilful and equally faithful as thofe 
 who affcrt it. Whether there be as many or 
 more in Number, and whether they might have 
 any fecret Bias or Influence on them to contra- 
 dict it. 
 
 10. Sometimes the entire Silence of a Thing may 
 have fomething of Weight toward the Decifion of 
 a doubtful Point of Hi dory, or a Matter of hu- 
 man Faith, namely, where the Facl is pretended 
 to be publick, if the Perfons who are filent about 
 it were fkilful to obferve, and "could not but 
 know fuch an Occurrence $ if they were engaged 
 by Principle or by Intereft to have declared it: 
 If they had fair Opportunity to fpeak of it : And 
 thefe Things may tend to make a Matter fufpi- 
 cious, if it be not wery well attefted by pofitive 
 Proof. 
 
 11. Remember that in fome Reports there are 
 more Marks of Falfhood than of Truth, and in 
 others there are more Marks of Truth than of 
 Falfhood. By a Companion of all thefe Things 
 together, and putting every Argument on one 
 Side and the other into the Balance, we mud 
 form as good a Judgment as we can which Side pre- 
 ponderates ; and give a ftrong or a feeble Affent 
 or Diflent, or withhold our judgment entirely, 
 according to the greater or leffer Evidence, accord- 
 ing to more plain or dubious Marks of Truth or 
 Falfhood* 
 
 S4 12.0b* 
 
270 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 
 
 1% Obferve that in Matters of human Tefti- 
 itiony there is oftentimes a great Mixture of Truth 
 and Faljloood in the Report itfelf: Some Parts of 
 the Story may be perfectly true, and ibme utterly 
 falfe ; and fome may have fuch a blended Confu- 
 iion of Circumftances whieh are a little warpt afide 
 from the Truth, and mifreprefented, that there is 
 need of good Skill and Accuracy to form a Judg- 
 ment concerning them, and determine which Part 
 is true, and which is falfe. The whole Report is 
 not to be believed, becaufe fome Parts are indubi- 
 tably true, nor the whole to be rejected, becaufe 
 fome Parts are as evident Faljhoods. 
 
 We may draw two remarkable Obfervations from 
 this Section. 
 
 Obferv. I. Plow certain is the Truth of the Chrif- 
 tian Religion, and particularly of the Refurrr^lion of 
 Chrift, which is a Matter of Fact on which Chrif- 
 tianity is built ! We have almoft all the concurrent 
 Evidences that can be derived from human Testimony 
 joining to confirm this glorious Truth. The Fa6t 
 js not impoffible ; concurrent Circumftances call 
 a favourable Afpeci on it ; it was foretold by one 
 who wrought Miracles, and therefore not unlikely, 
 nor unexpected : The Apoftles and firft Difciples 
 were Eye and Ear-Witnefles, for they converfed 
 with their rifen Lord ; they were the moft plain, 
 honell: Men in themfelves ; the Temptations of 
 worldly Interefts did rather difcourage their Belief 
 and Report of it : They all agree in this Matter, 
 though they were Men of different Characlcrs; 
 Pharifces and FiJJjermen, and Publicans, Men of yu- 
 dea and Galilee, and perhaps fome Heathens, who 
 were early converted : The Thing might eafily 
 have been difproved if it were falfe ; it hath been 
 conveyed by conftant Tradition and Writing down 
 
 to 
 
CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 271 
 
 to our Times ; thofe who at firft doubted, were af- 
 terwards convinced by certain Proofs ; nor have any 
 pretended to give any Proof of the contrary, but 
 merely denied the Fact with Impudence, in Oppo- 
 fition to all thefe Evidences. 
 
 Obferv. II. How weak is the Faith which is due 
 to a Multitude of Things in Ancient human Hif- 
 tory ! For though many of thefe Criteria, or Marks 
 of Credibility, are found plainly in the more general 
 and publick Facls, yet as to a Multitude of particu- 
 lar Fuels and Circumftances, how deficient are they 
 in fuch Evidence as (hould demand our Aflent ! 
 Perhaps there is nothing that ever was done in all 
 paft Ages, and which was not a publick Fact, fo 
 well attefted as the Refurreclion ofChrift. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of divine 
 
 Teftimony. 
 
 AS human Teftimony acquaints us with Matters 
 of Fad, both paft and prefent, which lie be- 
 yond the Reach of our own perfonal Notice ; fo 
 divine Teftimony is fuited to inform us both of the 
 Nature of Things, as well as Matters of Fact, and 
 of Things future, as well as prefent ox paft. 
 
 Whatfoever is dictated to us by God himfelf, or 
 by Men who are divinely infpired, muft be believed 
 with full AfTurance. Reafon demands us to believe 
 whatfoever divine Revelation dictates : For God is 
 perfectly wife, and cannot be deceived ; he is faith- 
 ful and good, and will not deceive his Creatures : 
 And when Reafon has found out the certain Marks 
 or Credentials of divine Teftimony to belong to any 
 
 Proportion, 
 
27^ toGTCK : on, the [part ii. 
 
 Proportion, there remains then no farther Enquiry 
 to be made, but only to find out the true Senfe 
 and Meaning of that which God has revealed, for 
 Reafon itfelf demands the Belief of it. 
 
 Now divine Teftimony or Revelation requires thefe 
 following Credentials. 
 
 ] . That the Proportions or Doctrines revealed 
 be not inconjtfient with Reafon ; for intelligent Crea- 
 tures can never be bound to believe real Inconfif- 
 tencies. Therefore we arefurethe Popifh Doctrine 
 of Tranfubftantiation is not a Matter of divine Re- 
 velation, becaufe it is contrary to all our Senfes and 
 our Reafon, even in their proper Exercifes. 
 
 God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of 
 himfelf, and agreeable to his own Nature and di- 
 vine Perfections. Now many of thefe Perfections 
 are difcoverable by the Light of Reafon, and what- 
 soever is inconfiftent with thefe Perfections cannot 
 be a divine Revelation, 
 
 But let it be noted that in Matters of Praclice 
 towards our Fellow-Creatures -, God may command 
 us to act in a Manner contrary to what Reafon 
 would direct antecedent to that Command. So 
 Abraham was commanded to offer up his Son a Sa- 
 crifice : The Jfraelites were ordered to borrow of the 
 Egyptians without paying them, and to plunder 
 and flay the Inhabitants of Canaan : Becaufe God 
 has a fovereign Right to all Things, and can with 
 Equity difpoflefs his Creatures of Life and every 
 Thing which he has given them, and efpecially 
 fuch finful Creatures as Mankind ; and he can ap- 
 point whom he pleafes to be the Init rumen ts of 
 this juft Difpoffeffion or Deprivation. So that 
 thefe divine Commands are not really inconfiftent 
 with right Re<?fo;i ; for whatsoever is fo cannot be 
 believed, where that Inconfjlency appears. 
 
 - 2. Upon 
 
CH. V.] RIGHT USE OF REASON - . 273 
 
 2. Upon the lame Account the whole Doclrine of 
 Revelation muft be confijient with itfelf; every Part 
 of it muft be confident with each other : And 
 though in Points of Practice latter Revelation may 
 repeal or cancel former divine Laws, yet in Matters 
 of Belief no latter Revelation can be inconfiftent 
 with what has been heretofore revealed. 
 
 3. Divine Revelation mud be confirmed by fome 
 divine and fuper natural Appearances , fome extraor- 
 dinary Signs or Tokens i Vifions, Voices, or Miracles 
 wrought^ or Prophecies fulfilled. There muft be 
 fome Demonftrations of the Prefence and Power of 
 God, iuperior to all the Powers of Nature, or the 
 fettled Connection which God as Creator has eftab- 
 lifhed among his Creatures in this vifible World. 
 
 4. If there are any fuch extraordinary and won- 
 derful Appearances and Operations brought to con- 
 tefl with, or to oppofe divine Revelation, there mult 
 and always will be fuch a Superiority on the Side of 
 that Revelation which is truly divine, as to manifeft 
 that God is there. This was the Cafe when the 
 Egyptian Sorcerers contended with Mofes. But the 
 Wonders which Mofes wrought, did fo fartranfcend 
 the Power of the Magicians, as made them confefs 
 It was the Finger of God. 
 
 5. Thefe divine Appearances or Atteftations to 
 Revelation muft be either known to our/elves, by 
 our own perfonal Observation of them, or they 
 muft be fufficienUy dttejzed by others, according to 
 the Principles and Rules by which Matters of human 
 Faith are to be judged in the foregoing Section. 
 
 Some of thofe, who lived in the Nations and 
 Ages where Miracles were wrought, were Eye and 
 Ear-WitnefTes of the Truth and Divinity of the 
 Revelation ; but we, who live in thefe diftant Ages, 
 mull Jiave them derived down to us byjuftand 
 
 inconteftible 
 
27^ LOGICK, OR, THE [PART H* 
 
 inconteftible Hijlory and Tradition. We alfo, eveft 
 in thefe diftant Times, may fee the Accomplifh- 
 ment of fome ancient Prediclions, and thereby ob- 
 tain that Advantage toward the Confirmation of 
 our Faith in divine Revelation, beyond what thofe 
 Perfons enjoyed who lived when the Predictions? 
 were pronounced. 
 
 6. There is another very confiderable Confirma- 
 tion of divine Teftimony ; and that is, when the Doc- 
 trines themfelves, either on the Publication or the 
 Belief of them, produce fupernatural Effects. Such 
 were the miraculous Powers which were communi- 
 cated to Believers in the firft Ages of Chriftianity, 
 the Converfion of Jews or Gentiles, the amazing Suc- 
 cefs of the Gofpel of Chrifl, without human Aid, and 
 in Oppofition to a thoufand Impediments ; its 
 Power in changing the Hearts and Lives of igno- 
 rant and vicious Heathens, and wicked and profane 
 Creatures in all Nations, and filling them with a 
 Spirit of Virtue, Piety and Goodnefs. Wherefoever 
 Perfons have found this Effect in their own Hearts, 
 wrought by- a Belief of the Gofpel of Chrijl, they 
 Lave a Witnefs in themfelves of the Truth of it, 
 and abundant Reafon to believe it divine. 
 
 Of the Difference between Reafon and Revelation 
 and in what Senfe the latter is fuperior, fee more 
 in Chap. II. Seel. 9. and Chap. IV. Direcl. 6. 
 
 SECT. 
 
CH. V.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 275 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 Principles a?id Rides of judging, concerning Things 
 pafi, prefent, and to come, by the ?nere Ufe of 
 Reafon, 
 
 THOUGH we attain the greateft Affurance of 
 Things pafi and future by divine Faith, and 
 learn many Matters of Fa6t, both pafi and prefent, 
 by human Faith, yet Reafon alfo may in a good De- 
 gree affift us to judge of Matters of Fact, both pafi y 
 prefent, and to come, by the following Principles. 
 
 1. There is zSyfiem of Beings round about us, of 
 which we ourfelves are a Part, which we call the 
 World, and in this World there is a Courfe of Na- 
 ture, or a fettled Order of Caufes, Effecls, Antece* 
 dents, Concomitants, Confequences, &c. from which 
 the Author of Nature doth not vary but upon very 
 important Occafions. 
 
 2. Where Antecedents, Concomitants, and Confe* 
 quents, Caufes and Effecls, Signs and Things fignified, 
 Subjecls and Adjuncls, are neceffarily connected 
 with each other, we may infer the Caufes from the 
 Effecls, and Effects from Caufes, the Antecedents 
 from the Confequents, as well as Confequents 
 from Antecedents, EsrV. and thereby be pretty 
 certain of many Things both pafi, prefent^ and to 
 come. It is by this Principle that Afironomers can 
 tell what Day and Hour the Sun and Moon were 
 eclipfed five hundred Tears ago, and predict alj. 
 future Eclipfes as long as the World fhall Hand. 
 They can tell precifely at what Minute the Sun rifes 
 or fets this Day at Pequin in China^ or what Alti* 
 tudes the Dogfiar had at Mid-night or Mid*noon in 
 Rome, on the Day when Julius Caefar was Jlain. 
 
 Gardeners 
 
376 kOGlCK, OR, THE [fART II,, 
 
 Gardeners upon the fame Principle can foretel the 
 Months when every Plant will be in Bloom, and the 
 Ploughman knows the Weeks of Harveft : We are 
 fure, if there be a Chicken, there was an Egg : If 
 there be a Rainbow, we are certain // rains not far 
 off': If we behold a Tree growing on the Earth, we 
 know it has naturally a Root under Ground. 
 
 3. Where there is a necejfary Connexion between 
 Caufes and Effecls, Antecedents and Consequents, Signs 
 and Things figriified, we know alfo that like Caufes 
 will have like Effects, and proportionable Caufes will 
 have proportionable Effects, contrary Caufes will 
 have contrary Effecls ; and obferving Men may 
 form many Judgments by the Rules of Similitude 
 and Proportion, where the Caufes, Effeds, &V. are 
 not entirely the fame. 
 
 . 4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain 
 Connexion between Antecedents, Concomitants and 
 Confeque?its, we can give but a Conjecture, or a 
 probable Determination. If the Clouds gather, or 
 the Weather-Glafs finks, we fuppofe it will rain : 
 If a Man /pit Blood frequently with Coughing, we 
 fuppofe his Lungs are hurt : If very 'dangerous Symp- 
 toms appear, we expect his Death, 
 
 5. Where Caufes operate freely, with a Liberty 
 of Indifference to this or the contrary, there we can- 
 not certainly know what the Effects will be : For 
 k fcems to be contingent, and the certain Know- 
 ledge of it belongs only to God. This is the' Cafe 
 in the great eft Part of human Actions. 
 
 6. Yet wife Men by a juil Obfervation of human 
 Nature, will give very probable Conjectures in this 
 Matter, alfo concerning Things pafl, or Things* 
 future, becaufe human Nature in all Ages and Na- 
 tions has fuch a Conformity to itfelf. By a Know- 
 ledge of the Tempers of Men and their prefent 
 
 Cir- 
 
CH. V,] RIGHT USE OF- REASON". 277 
 
 Ci ream fiances, we may be able to give a happy 
 Guefs what their Condudt will be, and what will 
 be the Event, by an Obfervation of the like 
 Cafes in former Times. This made the Emperor 
 Marcus Antoninus to fey, " By looking back into 
 " Hiftory, and confidering the Fate and Revoiu- 
 " tions of Governments, yon will be able to form 
 " a Guefs, and almoft prophefy upon the Future. 
 • f For Things pa ft, prefent, and to come, are 
 cf flrangely uniform, and of a Colour ; and are 
 " commonly caff, in the .fame .Mould. So that 
 " upon the Matter, forty Years of human Life may 
 " ferve for a Sample of ten thouiand." Collier's 
 Antoninus, Book VII. Sect. 50. 
 
 7. There are alfo fome other Principles of Judg- 
 ing concerning the part Actions of Men in former 
 Ages, befides Books, Hi/lories and Traditions, which 
 are the Mediums of conveying human Teftimony ; 
 as we may infer the Skill and Magnificence of the 
 Ancients by fome Fragments of their Statues, and 
 Ruins of their Buildings. We know what Roman 
 Legions came into Great Britain by Numbers of 
 Bricks dug out of the Earth in fome Parts of the 
 Ifland, with the marks of fome particular Legion 
 upon them, which mutt have been employed there 
 in ^Brick-making. We rectify fome Miflakes in 
 Hiftory by Statues, Coins, old Altars, Uienfds of War, 
 &c. We confirm or di.i prove fome pretended Tra- 
 ditions'and hiflorical Writings, by Medals, Images ', 
 Piclures, Urns, SsV, 
 
 Thus I have gone through all thofe particular 
 Objects of our Judgment which I firft propofed, and 
 have laid down Principles and Rules by which we 
 may fafely conduct ourfelves therein. There is a 
 Variety of other Objecls, concerning which we 
 are occasionally called to pafs a Judgment, namely, 
 The Characters of Perfons* the Value and Worth 
 
27& LOGICK : OR, THE [PART II. 
 
 of Things, the Senfe and Meaning of particular 
 Writers, Matters of Wit, Oratory, Poefy, Matters of 
 Equity in judicial Courts, Matters of Trqffick and 
 Commerce between Man and Man, which would be 
 endlefs to enumerate. But if the general andfpe- 
 cial Rules of Judgment which have been mentioned 
 in thefe two laft Chapters, are treamred up in the 
 Mind, and wrought into the very Temper of our 
 Souls in our younger Years, they will lay a Foun- 
 dation for juft and regular Judgment concerning 
 a thoufand fpecial Occurrences in the religious, ci- 
 vil, and learned Life* 
 
 THE 
 
I V9 1 
 
 THE 
 
 THIRD PART 
 
 OF 
 
 L O G I C K. 
 
 Of Reafoning and Syllogifm. 
 
 AS the firft Work of the Mind is Perception, 
 whereby our Ideas are framed, and the fe- 
 cond is Judgment, which joins or disjoins our Ideas, 
 and forms a Proportion, lb the third Operation of 
 the Mind is Reafoning, which joins feveral Propo- 
 rtions together, and makes a Syllogifm, that is, an 
 Argument whereby we are wont to infer fomething 
 that is lefs known, fro?n Truths which are more evi- 
 dent* 
 
 In treating of this Subject, let us confider more 
 particularly, 
 
 I. The Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Parts of 
 which it "is compofed. 
 
 - 2. The feveral Kinds of Syllogifms, with parti- 
 €ular Rules relating to them. 
 
 T 3. The 
 
280 LOGICK? OR THE [p ART. III. 
 
 3. The Doclrine of Sophifms, or falfe Reafoning r 
 together with the Means of avoiding them, and the 
 Mariner offolving or anfwering them. 
 
 4. Some general Rules to direcl our Reafoning. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Parts of 
 which it is compofed. 
 
 F the mere Perception and Comparison of two 
 Ideas would always fhew us whether they agree 
 or difagree ; then all rational Propofitions would be 
 Matters of Intelligence, or firft Principles, and there 
 would be no Ufe of Reafoning, or drawing any 
 Confequences. It is the Narrownefs of the human 
 Mind which introduces the Neceffity of Reafoning. 
 When we are unable to judge of the Truth or Falf- 
 hood of a Proportion in an immediate Manner, by 
 the mere Contemplation of its Subject and Predi- 
 cate, we are then conftrained to ufe a Medium, and 
 to compare each of them with foine third Idea, that 
 by feeing how far they agree or difagree with it, 
 we may be able to judge how far they agree or dif- 
 agree among themfelves : As, if there are two 
 Lines, A and B, and I know not whether they are 
 equal or no, I take a third Line C, or an Inch, and 
 apply it to each of them ; if it agree with them 
 both, then I infer that A and B are equal', but if 
 it agree with one, and not with the other, then I 
 conclude A and B are unequal : If it agree with 
 neither of them, there can be no Companion. 
 
 So 
 
CH. I.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 281 
 
 So if the Queftion be whether God muft be wor- 
 Jhipped, we feek a third Idea, fuppofe the Idea of a 
 Creator, and fay, 
 
 Our Creator muft be worfhipped. 
 
 God is our Creator. 
 
 Therefore God muft be worjhipped. 
 
 The Comparifon of this third Idea, with the two 
 diftincT: Parts of the Queftion, ufually requires two 
 Proportions, which are called the Premifes : The 
 third Proportion which is drawn from them is the 
 Conclufion, wherein the Queftion itfelf is anfwered, 
 and the Subject and Predicate joined either in the 
 Negative or the Affirmative. 
 
 The Foundation of all affirmative Conclufions is 
 laid in this general Truth, that fo far as two pro- 
 pofed Ideas agree to any third Idea, they agree 
 alfo among themfclves. The Character of Creator 
 agrees to God, and Worjhip agrees to a Creator, 
 therefore Worjhip agrees to God. 
 
 The Foundation of all Negative Conclufions is this, 
 that where one of the two propofed Ideas agrees 
 with the third Idea, and the other difagrees with 
 it, they muft needs difagree fo far alfo with one 
 another ; as, if no Sinners are happy, and if Angels 
 are happy, then Angels are not Sinners. 
 
 Thus it appears what is the ftridl and juft No- 
 tion of a Syllogifm: It is a Sentence or Argument 
 made up of three Propolitions, fo difpofed, as that 
 the laft is neceflarily inferred from thofe which go 
 before, as in the Inftances which have been juft 
 mentioned. 
 
 In the Conftitution of a Syllogifm two Things may 
 be confidered, viz. the Matter and the Form of it. 
 
 The Matter of which a Syllogifm is made up, is 
 
 three Proportions ; and thefe three Proportions are 
 
 made up of three Ideas or 'Terms varionflv joined. 
 
 T2 'The 
 
282 LOGICK : OR, TtfE [PART III, 
 
 The three Terms are called the remote Matter of 
 a Syllogifm ; and the three Propofitions the proximo 
 or immediate Matter of it. 
 
 The three Terms are named the Major, the M/- 
 nor, and the Middle. 
 
 The Predicate of the Conelufion is called the 
 w^/or Term, becaufe it is generally of a larger Ex- 
 tenfion than the minor Term, or the Subjecl. The 
 major and minor Ternis are called the Extremes* 
 
 The middle Term is the f/>/ro? Idea invented and 
 difpofed in two Propofitions, in fuch a Manner as 
 to fhevv the Connexion between the major and minor 
 Terms in the Conelufion ; for which Reafon the 
 ?niddle Term itfelfis fomctimes called the Argument* 
 
 That Proportion which contains the Predicate 
 of the Conelufion, connected with the middle 
 Term, is ufnally called the major Proportion, where- 
 as the minor Prepojition conne6ts the middle Term 
 with the Subjecl: of the Conelufion, and is fome- 
 times called the AJJumption. 
 
 Note, This exact Diftinclion of the feveral Parts 
 of a Syllogifm, and of the major and minor Terms 
 connected with the middle Term in the major and 
 minor Propofitions, does chiefly belong to Jimplc 
 or categorical Syllogifm, of which we (hall fpeak in 
 the next Chapter, though all Syllogifms whatfoever 
 have fomething analogical to it. 
 
 Note farther, That the major Proportion is ge- 
 nerally placed firft, and the minor fecond, and the 
 Conelufion in the laft Place, where the Syllogifm is 
 regularly compofed and reprefented. 
 
 The Form of a Syllogifm is the framing and dif- 
 pofing of the Premifes according to Art, or juft 
 Principles of Reafoning, and the regular Inference 
 of the ° nclufion from them. 
 
 The 
 
CH. II.] HIGHT USE OF REASON. 283 
 
 The Ac! of Reafoning, or inferring one Thing 
 from another, is generally exprefled or known by 
 the Particle Therefore, when the Argument is form- 
 ed according to the Rules of Art ; though in com- 
 mon Difcourfe or Writing, fuch cafual Particles as 
 For, Becaufe, manifeft the Act of Reafoning as well 
 as the illative Particles Then and Therefore: And 
 wherefoever any of thefe Words are ufed, there is 
 a perfect Syllogifm expreffed or implied, though 
 perhaps the three Proportions do not appear, or 
 jare not placed in regular form. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the various Kinds of Syllogifms, with parti* 
 cular Rules relating to them. 
 
 SYLLOGISMS are divided into various Kinds, 
 either according to the Queftion which is proved 
 by them, according to the Nature and Compofitim 
 of them, or according to the middle Term, which is 
 ufed to prove the Queftion. 
 
 S E G T. I. 
 
 Of 'univerfal and particular Syllogifms, both negative 
 and affirmative. 
 
 ACCORDING to the Quefiion which is to be 
 proved, fo Syllogifms are divided into uni* 
 verfal Affirmative, univerfal Negative, particular Af- 
 firmative^ and particular Negative,. This is often 
 called a Pivifionof Syllogifms drawn from the Con- 
 T $ clufion - 9 
 
284 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART IIT. 
 
 clujion ; for fo many Sorts of conclusions there may 
 be, which are marked with the Letters A,E, I, 0. 
 
 In an univerfal affirmative Syllogifm, one Idea is 
 proved univerfally to agree with another, and may 
 be univerfally affirmed of it ; as, every Sin deferves 
 Death, every unlawful Wijh is a Sin ; therefore every 
 unlawful Wifh deferves Death. 
 
 In an univerfal negative Syllogifm, one Idea is 
 proved to difagrce with another Idea univerfally, 
 and may be thus denied of it; as, no, Injuflice can 
 be pleafing to God; all Perfecution for the Sake of 
 Confcience is Injuflice ; therefore no Perfecution for 
 Confcience Sake can be pleafing to God. 
 
 Particular affirmative ', and particular negative SyU 
 logifms, may be eafily underftood by what is faid of 
 Univerfals, and there will be fufficient Examples 
 given of all thefe in the next Section. 
 
 The general Principle upon which thefe univerfal 
 and particular Syllogifms are founded, is this, 
 Whatfoever is affirmed or denied univerfally of 
 any Idea, may be affirmed or denied of all the par- 
 ticular Kinds or Beings, which are contained in 
 the Extenflon of that univerfal Idea. So the De- 
 fert of Death is affirmed univerfally of Sin, and an 
 unlawful Wijh is one particular Kind of Sin, which 
 is contained in the univerfal Idea of Sin, therefore 
 the Defert of Death may be affirmed concerning an 
 unlawful Wijh. And fo of the reft. 
 
 Note, In the Poctrine of Syllogifms, a fingular 
 and an indefinite Propofition are ranked among 
 Univerfals, as was before obferved in the Doctrine 
 of Proportions. 
 
 SECT. 
 
CM. II.] HIGHT USjE OF REASON. 2,85 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of plain, Jimple Syllogifm, and their Rules. 
 
 THE next Divifion of Syllogifms is mto fingle 
 and compound. This is drawn from the Nature 
 and Compofition of them. 
 
 Single Syllogifms are made up of three Propor- 
 tions : Compound Syllogifms contain more than 
 three Proportions, and may be formed into two or 
 more Syllogifms. 
 
 Single Syllogifms, for Diftinclion's Sake, may be 
 divided into * Simple, Complex, and Conjunctive.^ 
 
 Thofe are properly called fimple or categorical Syl- 
 logifms, which are made up of three plain, fingle or 
 categorical Proportions, wherein the middle Term is. 
 evidently and regularly joined with one Part of the 
 Queftion in the major Proportion, and with the 
 other in the minor, whence there follows a plain 
 fingle Concluflon ; as, every human Virtue is to be 
 fought with Diligence ; Prudence is a human Virtue y 
 therefore Prudence is to be fought diligently. 
 
 Note, Though the Terms of Proportions may 
 be complex-, yet where the Com portion of the 
 whole Argument is thus plain, fimple, and regular, 
 it is properly called a fimple Syllogifm, rnce the 
 Complexion does not belong to the fyllogiftic Form 
 of it. 
 
 Simple Syllogifms have feveral Rules belonging to 
 
 them, which being obferved, will generally fecure 
 
 us from falfe Inferences : But thefe Rules being. 
 
 T 4 founded 
 
 * As Ideas and Proportions are divided into single and com- 
 pound, and single are fubdivided mto.simpk and complex ; io there 
 are the fame Divilions and Subdiviiions applied to Syllogifms. 
 
28(5 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART III, 
 
 founded on four general Axioms, it is neceflary to 
 mention thefe Axioms beforehand, for the Ufe of 
 thofe who will enter into the fpeculative Reafon of 
 all thefe Rules. 
 
 Axiom i. Particular Proportions are contained 
 in Univerfals, and may be inferred from them ; 
 but Univerfals are not contained in Particulars, 
 nor can be inferred from them. 
 
 Axiom 2. In all univerfal Proportions, the Sub- 
 ject is univerfal : In all particular Propofitions, the 
 Subject is particular. 
 
 Axiom 3. In all affirmative Propofitions, the Pre- 
 dicate has no greater Exrenfion than the Subject ; 
 for its Extenfion is retrained by the Subject, and 
 therefore it is always to be efteemed as a particular 
 Idea. It is by mere Accident, if it ever be taken 
 univerfally, and cannot happen but in fuch univer- 
 fal or lingular Propofitions as are reciprocal. 
 
 Axiom 4. The Predicate of a negative Propofition 
 is always taken univerfally, for in its whole Ex- 
 tenfion it is denied of the Subject. If we fay no 
 Stone is vegetable, we deny all Sorts of Vegetation 
 concerning Stones, 
 
 The Rules of Jimple, regular Syllogifms are 
 thefe. 
 
 Rule I. The middle Term mufl not be taken twice 
 particularly, but once at leaft univerfally. For if the 
 middle Term be taken for two different Parts or 
 Kinds of the fame univerfal Idea, then the Subject 
 of the Conclufion is compared with one of thefe 
 Parts, and the Predicate with another Part, and this 
 will "never (hew whether that Subject and Predicate 
 agree or difagree : There will then be four di/lincl 
 Terms in the Syllogifm, and the two Parts of the 
 
 Queftion 
 
€H. II.] RIOHT USE OP REASON. 287 
 
 Queftion will not be compared with they^ third 
 Idea; as if I foy,fome Men are pious, and fame Men 
 are Robbers, I can never infer that fome Robbers 
 are pious, for the middle Term Men being taken 
 twice particularly, it is not the fame Men who are 
 fpoken of in the major and minor Proportions. 
 
 Rule II. The Terms in the Conclufion mufi never be 
 taken more univerfally than they are in the Premifes. 
 The Reafon is derived from the firft Axiom, that 
 Generals can never be inferred from particulars. 
 
 Rule III. A negative Conclufion cannot be proved 
 by two affirmative Premifes. For when the two 
 Terms of the Conclufion are united or agree to the 
 middle Term, it does not follow by any Means that 
 they difagree from one another. 
 
 Rule IV. If one of the Premifes be negative, the 
 Conclufion mufi be negative. For if the middle Term 
 be denied of either Part of the Conclufion, it may 
 fhew that the Terms of the Conclufion difagree, 
 but it can never (hew that they agree. 
 
 Rule V. If either of the Premifes be particular, the 
 Conclufion mufi be particular. This may be proved 
 for the molt Part from the firft Axiom. 
 
 Thefe two laft Rules are fometimes united in this 
 ftngle Sentence, The Conclufion always follows the 
 weaker Part of the Premifes. Now Negatives and 
 Particulars are counted inferior to Affirmatives and 
 Univerfals. v 
 
 Rule VI. From two negative Premifes nothing can 
 be concluded. For they ieparate the middle Term 
 both from the Subject and Predicate of the Con- 
 clufion, and when two Ideas difagree to a third, 
 
 we 
 
2S8 logick: or, the [part m. 
 
 we cannot infer that they either agree or difagree 
 with each other. 
 
 Yet where the Negation is a Part of the middle 
 Term, the two Premifes may look like Negatives 
 according to the Words, but one of them is affir- 
 mative in Senfe ; as, What has no Thought cannot 
 reafon ; but a Worm has no Thought \ therefore a 
 Worm cannot reafon. The minor Propofition does 
 really affirm the middle Term concerning the Sub- 
 ject, namely, a Worm is what has no Thought L , and 
 thus it is properly in this Syllogifm an affirmative 
 Propofition. 
 
 Rule VII. From two particular Premifes nothing 
 can be concluded. This Rule depends chiefly on the 
 firfl: Axiom. 
 
 A more laborious and accurate Proof of thefe 
 Rules, and the Derivation of every Part of them 
 in all poffible Cafes, from the foregoing Axioms, 
 require fo much Time, and are of fo little Impor- 
 tance to affirt the right Ufe of Reafon, that it is 
 needlefs to infift longer upon them here. See all 
 this done ingenioufly in the Logick called the Art 
 of Thinking, Part III. Chap. III. &c. 
 
 SECT 
 
CH. II.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 18Q 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of the Moods and Figures of Jimple Syllogifm^ 
 
 SIMPLE Syllogifms are adorned and furrounded 
 in the common Books of Logick with a Variety 
 of Inventions about Moods and Figures, wherein by 
 the artificial Contexture of the Letters A, E, /, and 
 0, Men have endeavoured to transform Logick, or 
 the Art of Reafoning, into a Sort of Mechanifm, and 
 to teach Boys to fyllogife, or frame Arguments and 
 refute them, without any real inward Knowledge 
 of the Queftion. This is almofl in the fame Man- 
 ner as School-boys have been taught perhaps in their 
 trifling Years to compofe Latin Verfes, that is, by 
 certain Tables and Squares, with a Variety of Let^ 
 ters in them, wherein by counting every fixth, fe- 
 venth, or eighth Letter, certain Latin Words fhould 
 be framed in the form of Hexameters or Pentameters; 
 and this may be done by thole who know nothing 
 of Latin or of Verfes. 
 
 I confefs fome of thefe logical Subtleties have 
 much more Ufe than thofe verifying Tables, and 
 there is much Ingenuity difcovered in determining 
 the precife Number of Syllogifms that may be 
 formed in every Figure, and giving the Reafons of 
 them ; yet the Light of Nature, a good Judgment 
 and due Confideration of Things, tend more to ' 
 true Reafoning than all the Trappings of Moods 
 and Figures. 
 
 But left this Book be charged with too great De- 
 fects and Imperfections, it may be proper to give 
 fhort Hints of that which fame Logicians have fpent 
 fo much Time and Paper upon. 
 
 All 
 
290 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART III. 
 
 All the poffible Compofitions of three of the Let- 
 ters, A, E, /, 0, to make three Proportions amount 
 to Jixty-four; but fifty-four of them are excluded 
 from forming true Syllogifms by the [even Rules in 
 the foregoing Seclion . The remaining "Ten are va- 
 rioufly diverlified by Figures and Moods into four- 
 teen Syllogifms. 
 
 The Figure of a Syllogifm is the proper Difpofi- 
 tion of the middle Term with the Parts of the 
 Queftion. 
 
 A Mood is the regular Determination of Propo- 
 rtions according to their Quantity and Quality, 
 that is, their univerfal or particular Affirmation or 
 Negation; which are fignified by certain artificial 
 Words wherein the Confonants are neglecled, and 
 thefe four Vowels A^ E, I, 0, are only regarded. 
 
 There are generally counted thre£ Figures* 
 
 In ihcjir/l of them the middle Term is the Sub- 
 ject of the major Propofition, and the Predicate of 
 the minor. This contains four Moods, called, Bar* 
 bara^ Celarent, Darii, Ferio, And it is the Excel- 
 lency of this Figure, that all Sorts of Queftions or 
 Conclufions may be proved by it, whether A, E, I 9 
 or 0, that is, univerfal or particular, affirmative or 
 Hegative; as, 
 
 Bar- Every wicked Man is truly miferable ; 
 ba- All Tyrants are wicked Men ; 
 ra. Therefore all Tyrants are truly miferable, 
 
 Ce~ He that's always in Fear is not happy ; 
 la- Covetous Men are always in Fear; 
 rent. Therefore covetous Men are not happy. 
 
 D& 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 2QI 
 
 Da- Whatfoever furthers our Salvation is good 
 for us. 
 ri- Some Afflictions further our Salvation ; 
 /. Therefore fome Afflictions are good for us. 
 
 Fe- Nothing that muft be repented of is truly 
 
 * defirable ; 
 rl- Some Pleafures muft be repented of; 
 0. Therefore there are fome Pleafures which 
 are not truly defirable. 
 
 In the fecond Figure the middle Term is the Pre- 
 dicate of both the Premifes : this contains four 
 Moods, namely, Cefare, Came/ires, Feftino, Baroco, 
 and it admits only of negative Concluiions; as, 
 
 Ce- No liar is fit to be believed ; 
 
 fa- Every good Christian is fit to be believed : 
 
 re. Therefore no good Chriflian is a liar. 
 
 The Reader may eafily form Examples of the 
 reft. 
 
 The third Figure requires that the middle Term 
 be the Subject of bot*h the Premifes. It has fix 
 Moods, namely, Darapti, Felapton, Bijamis y Datifi 9 
 Bocardo^ Ferijon : And it admits only of particular 
 Concluiions ; as, 
 
 Da- Whofoever loves God (hall be faved ; 
 rap- All the Lovers of God have their Ircmer- 
 feci ions. 
 //. Therefore fome who have Imperfections 
 ihall be faved. 
 
 I leave the Reader to form Examples of the 
 reft. 
 
 The 
 
figi LOGICK : OK, THE [PART III. 
 
 The Moods of thefe three Figures are comprized 
 in four Latin Verfes : 
 
 Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, quoque primae. 
 Cefare, Came/ires, Fejlino, Baroco, fecundse. 
 Tertia Darapti, fibi vindicat, atque Felapton, 
 Adjungens D if amis, Datifi, Bocardo, Ferifon. 
 
 The Jpecial Rules of the three Figures are thefe. 
 
 In the Jir/t Figure the major Propofition muft al- 
 ways be univerfal, and the minor affirmative. 
 
 In the fecond Figure alfo the major muft be uni- 
 verfal, and one of the Premifes, together with the 
 Conclufion, muft be negative. 
 
 In the third Figure the minor muft be affirma- 
 tive, and the Conclufion always particular. 
 
 There is alfo a fourth Figure, wherein the middle 
 Term is predicated in the major Propofition, and 
 fubjected in the minor : But this is a very indirect 
 and oblique Manner of concluding, and is never 
 ufed in the Sciences, nor in human Life, and there- 
 fore I call it ufelefs. — Some Logicians will allow it 
 to be nothing elfe but a mere Inverfion of the firft 
 Figure ; the Moods of it, namely, Baralipton, or 
 Barbari, Calentes, Dibatis, Fefpamo, Frefifom, are 
 not worthy to be explained by one Example. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of Complex Syllogifms. 
 
 IT is not the mere Ufe of complex Terms in a 
 Syllogifm that gives it this Name, though one 
 of the Terms is ufually complex ; but thofe are pro- 
 perly called complex Syllogifms, in which the middle 
 Term is not connected with the whole Subject, or 
 
 the 
 
CH. II.] EIGHT USE OF EEASO>7. 1Q3 
 
 the whole Predicate in two diliincl: Proportions, 
 bat is intermingled and compared with them by 
 Parts, or in a more confuted Manner, in different 
 Forms of Speech ; as, 
 
 The Sun is a fer.felefs Being ; 
 
 The Perlians worshipped the Sun ; 
 
 Therefore the Perfians i bed afenfelefs Being* 
 
 Here the Predicate of the Conclusion is ivorfbip- 
 
 ftddfenfelefs Being, Part of which is joined with 
 the middle Term Sun in the major Proportion, and 
 the other Part in the minor. 
 
 Though this Sort of Argument is confefTed to be 
 entangled or . .and irregular •, if examined by 
 
 the Rules of Jimp: V bis ; vet there is a great 
 
 Variety of Arguments ufed in Books of Learning, 
 and in common Life, whole Conlequence is Itrong 
 and evident, and which mult be ranked under this 
 Head ; as, 
 
 I. Exclufive Proportions will form a complex 
 Argument ; as, fcs cf 
 Heaven; true Cbriftians are Favourites cf Heaver.; 
 therefore true Chriftians are pious Men. Or thus, 
 Hypocrites are r. Mem therefore Hypocrites 
 
 wt Favour ires cf Heaven. 
 
 II. Ext [ make fuch com- 
 plex Syllogifms : as, 1 I . ime to the 
 
 the Nur/e is no r :; therefore 
 
 the Nurfe came not to the Confi 
 
 III. Or*. Comparative Proportions ; as, Know-' 
 
 than Riebes ; is better than 
 
 . ban Rii 
 
 Or 
 
294 LOGICK ! OR, THE [PARTlII. 
 
 Or thus, a Dove will fly s a Mile in a Minute ; a 
 Swallow flies fwifter than a Dove ; therefore a Swal- 
 low will fly more than a Mile in a Minute. 
 
 IV. Or Inceptive and Defltive Proportions \ as, 
 the Fogs vanijh as the Sun rifes ; but the Fogs have 
 not yet begun to vanijh \ therefore the Sun is not yet 
 rifen. 
 
 V. Or Modal Proportions ; as, it is necejfary 
 that a General under/land the Art of War ; but Caius 
 does not under/land the Art of War ; therefore it is 
 necejfary Caius Jhould not be a General, Or thus, A 
 total Eclipfe cf the Sun would caufe Darknefs at Noon ; 
 it is pojfible that the Moon at that Time may totally 
 eclipfe the Sun ; therefore it is pojfible that the Moon 
 may caufe Darknefs at Noon. 
 
 Beficie all theie, there is a great Number of com- 
 plex Syllogifms which can hardly be reduced under 
 any particular Titles, becaufe the Forms of human 
 Language are fo exceeding various ; as, 
 
 Chriflianity requires us to believe what the Apoflles 
 wrote: St. Paul is an Apoflle\ therefore Chriflianity 
 requires us to believe what St. Paul wrote. 
 
 No human Artifl can make an- Animal ; a Fly or a 
 Worm is an Animal ; therefore no human Artifl can 
 make a Fly or a Worm. 
 
 The Father always lived in London ; the Son al- 
 ways lived with the Father ; therefore the Son always 
 lived in London. 
 
 The Bloffom foon follows the full Bud; this Fear- 
 tree hath many full Buds ; therefore it will fhortly 
 have many Blofjoms. 
 
 One Hailflone never falls alone ; but a Hail/lone 
 fell jufl now 5 therefore others fell with it. 
 
 Thunder 
 
CH. II. j EIGHT USE OF REASON. 2Q5 
 
 Thunder feldom comes without Lightning ; but it 
 thundered Teflerday \ therefore probably it light ned 
 
 Mofes wrote before the Trojan War ; the firfl 
 Greek Hiftorians wrote after the Trojan War ; there- 
 fore the firfl Greek Hiftorians wrote after Mofes* 1 . 
 
 Now the Force of all thefe Arguments is {o 
 evident and conclufive, that though the Form of 
 the Syllogifm be never fo irregular, yet we are fure 
 the Inferences are juft and true ; for the Premifes, 
 according to the Reafori of Things, do really con- 
 tain the Conclufion that is deduced from them, which 
 is a never-failing Teftof a true Syllogifm, as fhall 
 be fhewn hereafter; 
 
 The Truth of rrioft of thefe complex Syllogifms 
 tnay alfo be made to appear, if needful, by reduc- 
 ing them either to regular , ftmple Syllogifms, Or to 
 fome of the conjunctive Sytlogifms, which are de- 
 fcribed in the next Section. I will give an Inftance 
 only in the firft, and leave the reft to exercife the 
 Ingenuity of the Reader. 
 
 The firfl: Argument may be reduced to a Syllo- 
 gifm in Barbara, thus, 
 
 The Sun is afenfelefs Being} 
 
 What the Perfians worfhipped is the Sun; 
 
 Therefore what the Perfians worfhipped is afenfe- 
 lefs Beingi Though the coriclufive Force of this 
 Argument is evident without the Reduction. 
 
 * Perhaps fome of thefe Syllogifms may be reduced to thofe 
 which I call Connexive afterward ; but it is of little Moment to 
 what Species they belong 5 for it is not any formal Set of Rules, 
 fo much as the Evidence and Force of Reafon, that mud de- 
 termine the Xruth Gr Falfhood of all fuch Syllogifms. 
 
 V SECT, 
 
296 logick : or, the [part hi, 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Of Conjunctive Syllogifms. 
 
 THOSE are called conjunclive Syllogifms, wherein 
 one of the Premifes, namely the Major, has 
 diftinct. Parts, which are joined by a Conjunction, 
 or fome fuch Particle of Speech. Mofi: Times the 
 Major or Minor, or both, are explicitly compound 
 Proportions : and generally the major Proportion 
 is made up of two diftincl Parts or Proportions, 
 in fuch a Manner, as that by the Aflertion of one 
 in the Minor, the other is either aflerted or denied 
 in the Conclufwn: Or, by the Denial of one in the 
 Minor, the other is either afferted or denied in the 
 Conclufion. It is hardly poffible indeed to fit any 
 fhort Definition to include all the Kinds of them ; 
 but the chief amongft them are the conditional 
 Syllogifm, the disjunclive, the relative, and the 
 connexive. 
 
 I. The conditional, or hypothetical Syllogifm, is 
 that whofe Major or Minor, or both, are conditional 
 Proportions ; as, If there be a'God, the World is go- 
 verned by Providence-, but there is a God; therefore 
 the World is governed by Providence. 
 
 Thcfc Syllogifms admit two Sorts of true x\rgu- 
 mentation, whether the Major is conditional. 
 
 1. When the Antecedent is aflerted in the Mi- 
 nor, that the Confequent may be aflerted in the Con- 
 clufion ; fuch is the preceding Example. This is 
 called arguing from the P oft ion of the Antecedent to 
 the Poftion of the Confequent. 
 
 2. When the Confequent is contradicted in the 
 minor Proportion, that the Antecedent may be 
 
 contradicted 
 
Ctt. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. iQl 
 
 contradicted in the Conclufion ; as, If Atheifts are 
 in the right, then the World exifis without a Caufe ; 
 but the World dees not exift without a Caufe ; there- 
 fore Atheifts are not in the right. This is called ar- 
 guing from the renoving of the Confequent to the re~ 
 moving of the Antecedent. 
 
 To remove the Antecedent or Confequent here, 
 does not merely fignify the Denial of it, but the 
 Contradiction of it ; for the mere Denial of it by a 
 contrary Proportion will not make a true Svllo- 
 gifm, as appears thus : If every Creature be rea- 
 sonable, every Brute is reafonable ; but no Brute is 
 reafonable ; therefore no Creature is reafonable. — 
 Whereas if you fay in the Minor, but every Brute 
 is not reafonable, then it would follow truly in the 
 Conclufion, therefore every Creature is not rea* 
 fonable. 
 
 When the Antecedent or Confequent are nega- 
 tive Proportions, they are removed by an Affirma- 
 tive ; as 5 If there be no God, then the World does not 
 dif cover creating Wifdom ; but the World does dij cover 
 creating Wifdom ; therefore there is a God. In this 
 Inftance the Confequent is removed or contra- 
 dicted in the Minor, that the Antecedent may be 
 contradicted in the Conclufion. So in this Argu- 
 ment of St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. If the Dead rife nop, 
 Chrifl died in vain ; but Chrift did not die in vain \ 
 therefore the Dcadjhall rife. 
 
 There are alfo two Sorts of falfe Arguing, 
 namely, (\.)From the removing of the Antecedent 
 to the removing of the Confequent) or, (2.) From the 
 Pofttion of the Confequent, to the Pofttion of the Ante- 
 cedent. Examples of thefe are eafiiy framed ; as, 
 
 (].) If a Minifter were a Prince he muft be ho- 
 noured ; but a Minifter is not a Prince ; 
 
 Therefore he muft not be honoured. 
 
 U 2 (2.) If 
 
2Q8 LO&ICK : OR, THE [PART III. 
 
 (2.) If a Minijier were a Prince ', he muft be ho- 
 noured; but a Minijier muft be honoured \ 
 
 Therefore he is a Prince. 
 
 Who fees not the ridiculous Falfhood of both 
 thefe Syllogifms ? 
 
 Objerv. I. If the Subject of the Antecedent and 
 the Coniequent be the fame, then the, hypothetical 
 Syllogifm may be turned into a categorical one ; as, 
 If Caefar be a King, he muft be honoured ; but Caefar 
 is a King , therefore, &c. This may be changed 
 thus, Every King muft be honoured , but Caefar is a 
 King'? therefore, &c. 
 
 Obferv. II. If the major Proportion only be eon-, 
 ditional, the Conclufion is categorical: But if the 
 Minor or both be conditional, the Conclufion is alio 
 eonditional ; as, 57?? Worjhippers of Images are Idola- 
 iers ; If the Papifts worfhip a Crucifix, they are Wor- 
 jhippers of an Image : therefore, If the Papifls wor- 
 jhip a Crucifix, they are Idolaters. But this Sort of 
 Syllogifms fhould be avoided as much as poffible 
 in Difputation, becaufe they greatly embarrafs a 
 Caufe : The Syllogifms, whofe Major only is hypo- 
 thetical, are very frequent, and ufed with great Ad- 
 vantage. 
 
 II. A disjunctive Syllogifm is when the major 
 Proportion is disjunctive ; as, The Earth moves in 
 a Circle or an Ellipfis ; but it does not move in a 
 Circle ; therefore it moves in an Ellipfis. 
 
 A disjunclive Syllogifm may have many Members 
 or Parts ; thus, /*/ // either Sp?-ing, Summer, Autumn, 
 or Winter, but it is not Spring, Autumn, or Winter ; 
 therefore it is Summer. 
 
 The true Method of arguing here, is from the 
 Affirtion of one, to the Denial of the rejl, or Jrom 
 
 the 
 
CSH. II.] SIGHT USE OF REASON". 2QQ 
 
 the Denial of one or more, to the Affertion of what 
 remains ; but the Major fhould be fo framed, that 
 the feveral Parts of it cannot be true together, 
 though one of them is evidently true. 
 
 Ill* A relative Syllogifm requires the Major Pro- 
 portion to be relative; as, Where Chrift is , there 
 Jhall his Servants be ; but Chrijl is in Heaven ; there- 
 fore his Servants Jhall he there alfo. Or, As is the 
 Captain, fo are his Soldiers ; but the Captain is a 
 Coward ; therefore his Soldiers are fo too. 
 
 Arguments that relate to the Doctrine of Pro- 
 portion, muft be referred to this Head ; as, As two 
 are to four, fo are three to fix; but two make the half 
 of four, therefore three make the half of fix. 
 
 Befides thefe, there is another Sort of Syllogifm 
 which is very natural and common, and yet Au- 
 thors take very little Notice of it, call it by an im- 
 proper name, and defcribe it very defectively ; and 
 that is, 
 
 IV. A connexive Syllogifm. This fome have called 
 copulative ; but it does by no Means require the 
 Major to be a copulative nor a compound Propo- 
 fition (according to the Definition given of it, 
 Part II. Chap. II. Seel. 6.) but it requires that two 
 or more Ideas be fo connected, either in the com- 
 plex Subject or Predicate of the Major, that if 
 one of them be affirmed or denied in the Minor, 
 common Senfe will naturally fhew us what will be 
 the Confequence. It would be very tedious and 
 ufelefs to frame particular Rules about them, as 
 will appear by the following Examples, which are 
 very various, and yet may be farther multiplied. 
 
 U3 (I.) Meek- 
 
300 I.0GICK : OR, THE [PART. HI. 
 
 (l.) Meeknefs and Humility always go together*, 
 Mofes was a Man of Meeknefs-, therefore Mqfes was 
 alfo humble. Or we may form this Minor, Pharaoh 
 was no humble Man ; therefore he was not meek. 
 
 (2.) No Man can ferve God and Mammon \ the 
 
 covetous Manferves Mammon ; therefore he cannot 
 
 ferve God, Or the III in or may run thus, the true 
 
 Chrifiian ferves God} therefore he does not ferve 
 
 Mammon, 
 
 (3.) Genius muff join with Study to make a great 
 Man \ Florino has Genius ', but he cannot ffudy ; 
 therefore Florino will never be a great Man, Or 
 thus, Quint us ffudies hard, but has no Genius; 
 therefore Ouintus will never be a great Man. 
 
 (4.) Guio cannot make a Dinner without Flefh and 
 Fifh ; there was no Fiji to be gotten To-day ; there- 
 fore Gulo this Bay cannot make a Dinner, 
 
 (5.) London and Paris are in different Latitudes \ 
 ihe Latitude of London is 5 if Degrees ; therefore 
 this cannot be the Latitude of Paris. 
 
 (6.) Jofeph and Benjamin had one Mother ; Ra- 
 chel was the Mother of Jofeph ; therefore Jhe was 
 Benjamin's Mother too, 
 
 (7.) The Father and the Son are of equal Stature \ 
 the Father is fix feet high ; therefore the Son is fix 
 Feet high alfo, 
 
 (8.) Pride is inconfffent with innocence; Angels 
 have innocence ; therefore they have no Pride. Or 
 thus, Devils have Pride; therefore they have not 
 Innocence. 
 
 . I might multiply other Inftanccs of thefe con- 
 nexive Syllqgifms, by bringing in all Sorts of ex- 
 ceptive, exclufve, comparative, and modal Propor- 
 tions into the Compofition of them ; for all thefe 
 may be wrought into conjunclive, as well as into 
 fmple Syllogiiius, and thereby we may render 
 
 them 
 
C.H. II.] RIGHT. USE OF REASON. 301 
 
 them complex. But it would wafte Time and Paper 
 without equal Profit. 
 
 Concerning thefe various Kinds of conjunctive 
 Syllogifms, take thefe two Obfervations. 
 
 Obferv. I. Mod of them may be transformed into 
 categorical Syllogifms, by thofe who have a Mind 
 to prove the Truth of them that Way ; or they 
 may be eafily converted into each other by chang- 
 ing the Forms of Speech. 
 
 Obferv. II. Thefe conjunctive Syllogifms are fel- 
 dom deficient cr faulty in the Form of them ; for 
 fuch a Deficience would be difcovered at firft 
 Glance generally by common Reafon, without any 
 artificial Rules of Logick : The chief Care there- 
 fore is to fee that the major Proportion be true, 
 upon which the whole Force of the Argument ufu- 
 ally depends. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Of Compound Syllogifms* 
 
 WE properly .call thofe compound Syllogifms , 
 which are made of two or move Jingle Syl- 
 logifms, and may be refolded into them. The chief 
 Kinds are thefe ; Epkhircma, Dilemma*. Profyllogif 
 tn&s 9 and Sorites* 
 
 I. Epichirema is a Syllogifm which contains the 
 Proof of the Major or Minor, or both, before it 
 draws the Concluiion. This is often ufed in Writ- 
 ing, in publick Speeches, and in common Conver- 
 fation ; that fo each Part of the Difcourfe may be 
 confirmed and put out of Doubt, as it^fnoves 
 * U4 - on 
 
302 5 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART III. 
 
 on toward the Conclufion, which was chiefly de- 
 figned. Take this Inftance : 
 
 Sicknefs may be good for us ; for it weans us from 
 the Pleafures of Life, and makes us think of dying \ 
 
 But we are uneafy under Sicknefs, which appears 
 by our Impatience, Complaints, Groanings, &c. ' 
 
 Therefore we are uneafy fometimes under that which 
 is good for us. 
 
 Another Inftance you may fee in Cicero's Oration 
 an Defence of Milo, who had flain Clodius. His 
 major Proportion is, that it is lawful for one Man to. 
 kill another who lies in wait to kill him $ which he 
 proves from the Cuftom of Nations , from natural; 
 Equity, Examples, he. his Minor is, that Clodius 
 laid wait for Milo ; which he proves by his Arms % 
 Guards, &c. and then infers the Conclusion, that 
 it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius. 
 
 II. A Dilemma, is an Argument which divides 
 the Whole into all its Parts or Members by a difi 
 junclhe Proposition, and then infers fomething con- 
 cerning each Part which is finally inferred con- 
 cerning the Whole. Inrlances of this are frequent ; 
 as, In this Life we tnufi either obey our vicious Inclh 
 nations, or r'ejijh them : To obey them, will bring Sir$ 
 and Sorrow ', to rejifi them is laborious and painful \ 
 therefore we cannot be perfectly free from Sorrow 
 or Pain in this Life. 
 
 A Dilemma becomes faulty or ineffeBual three 
 Ways : Fir/l, When the Members oi the Divifion 
 are not well oppofed, or not fully enumerated ; 
 for then the Major is falfe. Secondly, When what 
 is aflerted concerning each Part is not juft ; for 
 then the Minor is not true. Thirdly, When it- 
 may be retorted with equal Force upon him who 
 utters it. 
 
 There 
 
<CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON* 303 
 
 There was a famous ancient Inftance of this 
 Cafe, wherein a Dilemma was retorted. Euathlus 
 promifed Protagoras a Reward when he had taught 
 him the Art of Pleading, and it was to be paid the 
 iirft Day that he gained any Caufe in the Court* 
 After a eonfiderable Time Protagoras goes to Law 
 with Euathlus for the Reward, and ufes this Di- 
 lemma: Either the Caufe will go on my Side, or on 
 yours : if the Caufe goes on my Side, you muft pay me 
 according to the Sentence of the fudge : If the Caufe 
 goes on your Side, you muft pay me according to your 
 Bargain : Therefore, whether the Caufe goes for me 
 or againft me, you muft pay me the Reward^ But 
 Euathlus retorted this Dilemma thus : Either I 
 Jhall gain the Caufe or lofe it: If I gain the Caufe ^ 
 then nothing will be due to you according to the Sen-? 
 fence of the Judge : But if I lofe the Caufe, nothing 
 will be due to you according to my Bargain : There- 
 fore whether I lofe or gain the Caufe, I will not pay 
 you, for nothing will be due to you. 
 
 Note i, A Dilemma is ufualiy defcribed as though 
 it always proved the Abfurdity, Inconvenience, or 
 Unreafonablenefs of fqme Opinion or Practice; 
 and this is the motl: common Defign of it ; but it 
 is plain, that it may alfo be ufed to prove the 
 Truth or Advantage of any Thing propofed ; as ? 
 In Heaven we Jhall either have Defires or not : If we 
 have no Defires, then we have full Satisfaction ; if 
 we have Defires, they fh all be fatisfied as f aft as they 
 arife ; therefore in Heaven we Jhall be completely fa- 
 tisfied. 
 
 Note 2. This Sort of Argument may be com? 
 pofed of three or more Members, and may be called 
 a Trilemma, 
 
 III. A Profyllogifm is when two or more Syllo- 
 gifms are fo connected together, that the Conclu- 
 
301 LOGICK *. OR, THE [PART III. 
 
 fion of the former is the i irjor or the Minor of the 
 following; cs, Blood cannot think ; to the Soul cf 
 Man thinks ; therefore //;<? SW ^ M^« w not Bhod; 
 but the Soul of a Brute is his Blood, zee or ling to the 
 Scripture; therefore the Soul of Man is diferent 
 from the Soul of a Brute. See another Inftance in 
 the Introduction to this Treat ife, p. 5. 
 
 IV. A Sorites is when feveral middle Terms are 
 chofen to connect one another fucceffively in feve- 
 ral Piopofitions, till the lafl Proportion connects 
 its Predicate with the fkfi Subjecl. Thus, All Men 
 of Revenge have their Souls often uneafy ; uneafy 
 Souls are a Plague to t hen f elves ; now to be one's own 
 Plague is Folly in the Exirehie : therefore all Men of 
 Revenge are extreme Fools. 
 
 The Apoft'e, Ro?n. viii. 2g. gives us an Inftance 
 of this Sort of Argument, if \i were reduced to ex- 
 act Form : Whom he foreknew thofe he predeflinated ; 
 'whom he predeflinated he called ; whom he called he 
 juftified; whom he jvftifted he glorified ; therefore 
 whom he fore k tew he glorified. 
 
 To thef. byllogtfms it may not be improper to 
 add, induction, which is, when ftoni fevieral Parti- 
 cular Proportions we infer one general ; as, The 
 Doctrine of the Socinians cannot be proved from the 
 Gofpels, it cannot be proved from the Acls of the Apof 
 ties, it cannot be proved from the Epiflles, nor the 
 Look of Revelation; therefore it cannot be proved 
 from the New, Tcfiamer.t. 
 
 Note, This Sort of Argument is often defcclivc, 
 becnufe there is not. due Care taken to enumerate 
 all the Particulars on which the Conclufion fhould 
 depend. 
 
 Aii thefc four Kinds of Syllcgifms in this Scclion 
 may be called redundant, becaufe they have more 
 
 than 
 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASONS 305 
 
 than three Proportions. But there is one Sort of 
 Syllogifm which is defective, and is called an En* 
 thymem, becaufe only the Conclufion with one of 
 the Premifes is exprefled, while the other is fup- 
 pcfed and referved in the Mind : Thus, There is 
 no true Religion without good Morals : Therefore a 
 Knave cannot be truly religious ; Or thus, It is our 
 Duty to love our Neighbours as ourf elves.; therefore 
 there are but few who perform their duty, * 
 
 Note, This is the moft common Sort of Argu- 
 ment smongft Mankind both in Writing and in 
 Speaking; for it would take up too much Time, 
 and too much retard the Difcourfe, to draw out all 
 our Arguments in Mood and Figure. Bcfides, 
 Mankind love to have fo much Compliment paid 
 to their Underflandings, as to fuppofe that they 
 know the Major or Minor, which is fupprefTed and 
 implied, when you pronounce the other Premife 
 and the Conclufion. 
 
 If there be any Debate about this Argument, 
 the Syllogifm muft be completed in order to try its 
 Force and Goodnefs, by adding the abfent Propo- 
 rtions. 
 
 SECT. VII, 
 
 Of the middle Terms, of common Places or Toficks^ 
 and Invention of Arguments, 
 
 THE next Divifion of Syllogifms is according 
 to the middle Term, which is made ufe of in 
 the Proof of any Propofition. Now the middle 
 Term (as we have hinted before) is often calied 
 Argument, becaufe the Force of the Syllogifm de- 
 pends upon it. We muft make a little Delay here 
 
 to 
 
306 LOGICK : OP., THE £pART I jr. 
 
 to treat briefly of the Doctrine of Topics , or Places 
 whence middle Terms or Arguments are drawn. 
 
 Ail Arts and Sciences have fome general Sub- 
 jects which belong to them, which are called Topics 
 or common Places 5 becaufe middle Terms are bor- 
 rowed, and Arguments derived from them for the 
 Proof of the various Proportions which we have 
 Occafion to difcourfe of. The Topics of Gram- 
 mar, are Etymology, Noun, Verb, Conflruclion, Signi- 
 fication, &c. The Topics of Logick are Genus, Spe- 
 cies, Difference, Property, Definition, Divifion, &c. 
 The Topics of Ontology, or Metaphyficks, are, Caufe, 
 Effecl, Aclion, Paffion, Identity, Oppofition, Subjecl, 
 Adjuncl, Sign, &c. The Topics of Morality, or 
 Ethics, are Law, Sin, Duty, Authority, Freedom of 
 Will, Command, Threatning, Reward, Punijhment y 
 &c. The Topics of Theology, are, God, Chrifi, 
 Faith, Hope, Worjhip, Salvation, &c. 
 
 To thefe feveral Topics there belong particular 
 Obfervations, Axioms, Canons, or Rules,* which 
 are laid down in their proper Sciences ; as, 
 
 Grammar hath fuch Canons, namely, Words in a 
 different Conflruclion obtain a different Senfe. Words 
 derived from the fame Primitive may probably have 
 fome Affinity in their original Meaning, &c. 
 
 Canons in Logick are fuch as thefe, Every Part 
 of a Divifion fingly taken mujl contain lefs than the 
 Whole. A Definition muft be peculiar and proper to 
 the Thing defined. Whatever is affirmed or denied of 
 the Genus, may be affirmed or denied of the Species, &c. 
 
 Metaphyfical Canons are fuch as thefe : Final 
 Caufes belong only to intelligent Agents. If a natural 
 and neceffary Caufe operate, the Effecl will follow, 
 
 * A Canon is a Propofition declaring fome Property of the 
 Subject, -which is not expreffed ip the Definition or Divifion of 
 it. 
 
 he. 
 
CH. II.] EIGHT USE OF REASON". 30/ 
 
 &c. and there a: of many more 
 
 in eac 
 
 Now i: has been the Cuftom of thole who teach 
 . Rbe::rick, to direct their Difciples when 
 they n Argument^ to confultthe feveral To- 
 
 ich are lliited to the Subject of Difcourfe, 
 and to rummage over the Definitions, Divisions, 
 and Canons that belong to each Topic. This is 
 called the /:•:_ / and it is 
 
 taught with much Solemnity in fome Schc 
 
 I grant there may be good U this Practice 
 
 for Peribos of a lower Genius, when they are to 
 
 jurfe for the Publick : or for 
 
 e of fuperior Parts, to i their Memory, 
 
 a Subject which 
 
 nlongal xigjhts, or when 
 
 thei: ier Indifpdfition and 
 
 Languor : but when a Man of moderate Sagacity 
 
 sr ot his Theme by juit Di- 
 
 and Enc bldoro need to run 
 
 ::" all the Topics that he 
 
 anient or Matter of 
 
 ig : And indeed it is only a Man of Seme 
 
 and Judgment I 1 ufe common Places or Topics 
 
 well; for amongft this A' he only knows 
 
 : is fit tc : out; as well as what is rlt to 
 
 be fpoken. 
 
 By fotne logical Writers this Bufinds of Topics 
 and Inve ner with 
 
 Matl Figures and £ filled with 
 
 the barbarous technics 
 
 R:p:;:, _ EsV. as lad 
 
 were to be led illy in certain e 
 
 Harnelies an _>;s to find out Arguments 
 
 to prove or ;\ ion whatsoever, 
 
 w i th e of the Ideas. No w 
 
 there is no Need to throw Words of Contempt on 
 
 fuch 
 
308 LOGICK, OR, THE [pART lit, 
 
 fuch a Practice; the very Defcription of it carries 
 Reproof and Ridicule in Abundance* 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 Of fever al Kinds of Arguments and Demonjlrations. 
 
 WE proceed now to the Diviflon of Syllogifms 
 according to the middle Term ; and in this 
 Part of our Treatife the Syllogifms themf^lves are 
 properly called Arguments, and are thus distributed ; 
 
 I. Arguments are called Grammatical, Logical, 
 Metaphyseal, Phyfical, Moral, Mechanical, Theolo- 
 gical, &c. according to the Art, Science, or Sub- 
 ject, whence the middle Term or Topic is borrow- 
 ed. Thus, if we prove that no Man Jhould fieal 
 
 from his Neighbour, becaufe the Scripture forbids 
 it, this is a theological Argument : If we prove it 
 from the Laws of the Land, it is political ; but if 
 we prove it from the Principles of Reafon and 
 Equity, the Argument is moral* 
 
 II. Arguments are either certain and evident, or 
 doubtful and merely probable* 
 
 Probable Arguments are thofc whofe Conclufions 
 are proved by ibme probable Medium ; as, This 
 Hill zvas once a Church-yard, or a Field of Battle, be- 
 caufe there are many human Bones found here* This 
 is not a certain Argument, for human Bones might 
 have been conveyed there fome other Way. 
 
 Evident and certain Arguments are called Demon- 
 flratiuns ; for they prove their Conclufions by clear 
 Mediums and undoubted Principles; and they are 
 generally divided into thefc two Sorts. 
 
 1. Do 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 30<) 
 
 ]. Demon ftrations a Priori^ which prove the 
 Effect by its necefiary Caufe ; as, I prove the Scrip- 
 ture is infallibly trilt, becaufe it is the Word of God? 
 who can?iot lie, 
 
 '2. Demon ft rations a Pofier'wri, which infer the 
 
 Caufe from its neccilary 1 -ffeet ; as, I infer there 
 
 hath been the Hand offome Artificer here, became I 
 
 find a curious Figure,, Or, I infer ^ there is a God? 
 
 from the Works of his Wifdom in the vfible World, 
 
 The la(t of thefe is called Demonfiraiio t* oti, 
 becaufe it proves only the Exittence of a Tiling; 
 the firft is named Demonfiraiio t« Mori, becaufe it 
 fhews only the Caufe of Exiftencc. 
 
 But Note, That though thefe two Sorts of Argu- 
 ments are moft peculiarly called De?nonfirations, yet 
 generally any ftrong and convincing Argument ob- 
 tains that name; and it is the Cuftom of Mathe- 
 maticians to call all their Arguments Demonfirations? 
 from what Medium foever they derive them. 
 
 V 
 
 III. Arguments are divided into artificial and 
 , inartificial. 
 
 An artificial Argument is taken from the Nature 
 and Circum [lances of the Things; and if the Ar- 
 gument be ftrong, it produces a natural Certainty; 
 as, The World was firft created by God 3 becauie no- 
 thing can create itfelf. 
 
 An inartificial Argument is the Tefiimony of 
 s another: and this is called orinnaL when our In- 
 formation proceeds i mined lately from the Perfons 
 concerned, or from Eye or Ear-Wit nefles of a Facb 
 It is called Tradition when it is delivered by the 
 Report of others. « 
 
 We have taken Notice before, the Tefiimony is 
 either dh'iue'or human. If the human Testimony 
 be ftrong, it produces a 'moral Certainty, but 
 
 uiviae 
 
310 LOGICKt OR, THE [PART. Ill; 
 
 divine Teffimony produces a fupef natural Certainty 
 which is far fuperior. 
 
 Note, Arguments taken from human < fejiimony^ 
 as well as from Laws and Rules of Equity, are called 
 moral \ and indeed the fame Name is alfo applied 
 to every Sort of Argument which is drawn from 
 the free Adions of God, or the contingent A ft ions of 
 Men, wherein we cannot arife to a natural Certainty, 
 but content ourfelves with an high Degree of Pro- 
 bability, which in many Cafes is fcarce inferior to 
 natural Certainty* 
 
 IV. Arguments are either direii or indtrecl. It 
 is a direcl Argument, where the middle Term is fuch 
 as proves the Quefiion itfelf, and infers that very 
 Proportion which was the Matter of inquiry. An 
 indirect, or oblique Argument, proves or refutes fome 
 other Proportion, and thereby makes the Thing 
 enquired appear to be true by plain Confequence. 
 
 Several Arguments are called indireel i as, (l.) 
 When fome contradictory Propofition is proved to 
 be falfe, improbable, or impoffible : Or when upon 
 Suppofition of the Falfhood, or Denial of the ori- 
 ginal Proportion, fome Abfurdity is inferred* This 
 is called a Proof per impojfibile, or a Reduclio ad 
 abfurdum. (2.) When fome other Proportion is 
 proved to be true which is lefs probable, and thence 
 it follows that the original Proportion is true, be- 
 caufe it is more probable. This is an Argument 
 ex minus probabili ad magis. (3.) When any other 
 Proportion is proved, upon which it was before 
 agreed to yield the original Queftion. This is an 
 Argument en Concejfo. 
 
 V K There is yet another Rank of Arguments 
 which have Latin Names ; their true Diftinclion is 
 derived from the Topics or middle Terms which 
 
 are 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 311 
 
 are ufed in them, though they are called an Addrefs 
 to our Judgment, our Faith, our Ignorance, our Pro- 
 fefpon, our Modefty, and our Pajfions. 
 
 1 . If an Argument be taken from the Nature or 
 Exiftence of Things, and addrcfled to the Reafon 
 of Mankind, it is called Argumentum ad Judicium. 
 
 2. When it is borrowed from fome convincing 
 Teftimony, it is Argumentum ad Fidum, an Addrefs 
 to our Faith. 
 
 3. When it is drawn from any infufficient Me- 
 dium whatfoever, and yet the Oppofer has not Skill 
 to refute or anfwer it, this is Argumentum ad Igno- 
 rantiam, an Addrefs to our Ignorance. 
 
 A. When it is built upon the profefTed Principles 
 or Opinions of the Perfon with whom we argue, 
 whether the Opinions be true or falfe, it is named 
 Argumentum ad Hominem, an Addrefs to oxxv profef- 
 fed Principles. St. Paul often ufes this Argument 
 when he reafons with the Jews, and when he fays, 
 1/peak as a Man. 
 
 5. When the Argument is fetched from the Sen- 
 timents of fome wife, great, or good Men, whofe 
 Authority we reverence and hardly dare oppofe, it 
 is called Argumentum ad Verecundiam, an Addrefs 
 to our Mode fly. 
 
 6. I add finally, When an Argument is borrowed 
 from any Topics which are fuited to engage the In- 
 clinations and Paffions of the Hearers on the Side 
 of the Speaker, rather than to convince the Judg- 
 ment, this is Argumentum ad Pajfioncs, an Addrefs 
 to the Pajfions ; or if it be made publickly, it is 
 called ad Populum, or an Appeal to the People. - 
 
 After all thefe Divifions of Syllogifms or Argu- 
 ments, anting from the middle Term, there is one 
 Diftinclion proper to be mentioned which arifes 
 from the Premifes. An Argument is called uniform, 
 when both the Premifes are derived from the fame 
 
 X Spring 
 
312 kOGJCKt OR, THE [PART Id. 
 
 Spring of Knowledge, whether it be Senfe, Reafon, 
 Confcioufnefs , human Faith, or divine Faith : But 
 when the two Premifes are derived from different 
 Springs of Knowledge, it is called a mixt Argu- 
 ment. 
 
 Whether the Conclusion rauft be called Human 
 or Divine, when one or both Premifes are Matters 
 of Divine Faith, but the Conclusion is drawn by 
 human Reafon, I leave to be difputed and determined 
 in the Schools of Theology. 
 
 Thus the fecond Chapter is finifhed, and a parti- 
 cular Account given of all the chief Kinds of Syllo- 
 fifms or Arguments which are made Ufe of among 
 Men, or treated of in Logick, together \v\th fpecial 
 Rules for the Formation of them, as far as is ne- 
 cefiary. 
 
 If a Syllogifm agrees with the Rules which are 
 given for the Conftruclion and Regulation of it, it 
 is called a true Argument : If it difagrees with thefe 
 Rules, it is a Paralogifm, or falfe Argument : But 
 when a falfe Argument puts on the Face and Ap- 
 pearance of a true one, then it is properly called a 
 Sophifm, or Fallacy, which fhall be the Subject of 
 the next Chapter. 
 
 CHAP, 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USJE OF HEASOtf. sH3 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 The DoSirlne of Sophifms. 
 
 FROM Truth nothing can really follow but 
 what is true : When toever therefore we find 
 afalfe Conchl/Ion drawn from Premifes which feem 
 to be true, there muft be fome Fault in the De- 
 duction Gr Inference; or elfe one of the Premifes 
 is not true in the Senfe in which it is ufed in that 
 Argument. 
 
 When an Argument carries the Face of Truth 
 with it, and yet leads us into Mifrake, it is a So* 
 phifm ; and there is fome Need of a particular De« 
 fcription of thefe fallacious Arguments, that we 
 may with more Eafe and Readinefs detect and 
 folve them. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of J eve nil Kinds of Sofdiijms, and their Solution. 
 
 AS the Rules of right Judgment, and of good 
 Ratiocination, often coincide with each other, 
 io the Docirine of Prejudices, which was treated of 
 in the Seco?id Part of Logick, has anticipated a great 
 deal of what might be laid on the Subject of So- 
 fhifms ; yet I (hail mention the mod remarkable 
 Springs of falfe Argumentation, which are reduced 
 by Logicians to fome of the following Heads. 
 
 X 2 1. The 
 
314 logick: or, the [part hi. 
 
 I. The firft Sort of Sophifm is called Ignoratio 
 JZlenchi, or a Miftake of the Que/} ion ; that is, when 
 fomething elfe is proved which has neither any ne- 
 ceflary Connexion or Confiitency with the Thing 
 enquired, and confequently gives no Determination 
 to the Enquiry, though it may feem at firft Sight 
 to determine the Queilion ; as, if any mould con- 
 clude that St. Paul was not a native Jew, by prov- 
 ing that he was born a Roman ; or if they mould 
 pretend to determine that he was neither Roman 
 nor Jew, by proving that he was born at Tarjus in 
 Cilicia : Thefe Sophifms are refuted by {Viewing 
 that all thefe three may be true ; for he was born 
 of Jewifh Parents in the City of Tarjus, and by 
 fome peculiar Privilege granted to his Parents, or 
 bis native City, he was born a Denizen of Rome. 
 Thus there is neither of thefe three Characters of 
 the A po file inconlirtent with each other, and there- 
 fore the proving one of them true does not refute 
 the others. 
 
 Or if the Que ft ion be propofed, Whether Exccfs 
 of Wine can be hurtful to him that drinks it, and the 
 Sophifter fhould prove that it revives his Spirits, it 
 exhilarates his Soul, it gives a Man Courage, and 
 makes him firong and aStive, and then he takes it 
 for. granted that he has proved his Point. 
 
 But the Refpondent may eafily (tew, that though 
 Wine- may do all this, yet it may be finally hurt- 
 ful both to the Soul and Body of him that drinks it 
 io Rxcefs. 
 
 Difputers when they grow warm, are ready to 
 run into this Fallacy : They drefs up the Opinion 
 of their Adverfary as they pleafe, and afcribe Sen- 
 timents to him which he doth not acknowledge ; 
 and when they have with a great deal of Pomp at- 
 tacked and confounded thefe 'Images of Straw 
 
 of 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 315 
 
 of their own making, they triumph over their Ad- 
 verfary as though they had utterly confuted his 
 Opinion. 
 
 ft is a Fallacy of the fame Kind which a Difpu- 
 tant is guilty of, when he finds that his x\dveriary 
 is too hard for him, and that he cannot fairly prove 
 the Queflion firft propofed ; he then with Slynefs 
 and Subtlety turns the Difcourfe aiide to fome other 
 kindred Point, which he can prove, and exults in 
 that new Argument wherein his Opponent never 
 contradicled him. 
 
 The Way to prevent this Fallacy is by keeping 
 the Eye fixed on the precife Point of Difpute, and 
 neither wandering from it ourfelves, nor fufFering 
 our Antagonift to wander from it, or fubflitute any 
 Thing elfe in its Room. 
 
 II. The next Sophifm is called Petitio Pr'meipii, 
 or a Suppoftion of what is not granted ; that is, when 
 any Proportion is proved by the fame Proportion 
 in other Words, or by fomething that is equaliy un- 
 certain and difputcd : As if any one undertake to 
 prove that the human Soul is extended through all -the 
 Parts of the Body, becaufe it refides in every Mem- 
 ber, which is but the fame Thing in other Words. 
 Or, if a Papjl fbould pretend to prove that his Re- 
 ligion is the only Catholick Religion ; and is derived 
 from Chrijt and his Apoftles, becaufe it agrees zvitti 
 tlie Doclrine of all the Fathers of the Church, all the 
 holy Martyrs, and all the Chrifiian World throughout 
 all Ages : Whereas this is the great Point in Con- 
 tefl, whether their Religion does agree with that of 
 all the Antients and the primitive Chriftians, or no. 
 
 III. That Sort of Fallacy which is called a Circle, 
 is very near akin to the Petitio Principii ; as when 
 
 X 3 one 
 
3l6 tOGlCK!" OR, THE- [pAKt III. 
 
 one of the Premifes in a Syllogifm is queftioned 
 and oppofed, and we intend to prove it by the Con- 
 clufion : Or, when in a Train of Syllogifms we 
 prove the laft by recurring to what was the Conclu- 
 sion of the Firft. The Papifts are famous at this 
 Sort of Fallacy, when they prove the Scripture to 
 he the Word of God by the Authority or infallible Tef- 
 timony of their Church ; and when they are called to 
 fbew the infallible Authority of their Church, they 
 pretend to prove it by the Scripture. 
 
 IV. The next Kind of Sophifm is called non 
 Caufd pro Caufa, or the Afjtgnation of a falfe Qaufe. 
 This the Peripaietick Philofophers were guilty of 
 continually, when they told US' that certain Beings, 
 which they caUcdfubftantial Forms, were the Springs 
 of Colour, Motion, Vegetation, and the various Ope- 
 rations of natural Beings in the animate and inani- 
 mate World ; when they informed us that Nature 
 was terribly afraid of a Vacuum, and that this was 
 the Caufe why the Water would not fall out of a 
 long Tube if it was turned upfide down : The jl/o- 
 derns as well as the Antients fall often into this Fal- 
 lacy, when they pofitively affign the Reafons of na- 
 tural Appearances, without Sufficient Experiments 
 to prove them. 
 
 A/lrologei's.are overrun with this Sort of Falla- 
 cies, and they cheat the People grofsly by pretend- 
 ing to tell Fortunes, and to deduce the Caufe of the 
 various Occurrences in the Lives of Men from the 
 various Fo/itions of the Stars and Planets, which 
 they call AfpecJs. 
 
 When Comets and Eclipfes of the Sun and IS loon 
 arc conftrued to fignify the Fate of Princes, the 
 Revolution of States, Famine, Wars and Calami- 
 tics of all Kinds, it is a Fallacy that belongs to this 
 Rank of Sophifms. 
 
 There 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 317 
 
 There is fcarce any Thing more common in hu- 
 man Life than this Sort of deceitful Argument. 
 If any two accidental Events happen to concur, 
 one is prefently made the Caufe of the other. If 
 Ti tius wronged his 'Neighbour of a Guinea, and in 
 fix Months after he fell down and broke his Leg, 
 weak Men will impute it to the divine Vengeance 
 on Titius for his former Injuftice. This Sophifm was 
 found alfo in the early Days of the World : For 
 when holy Job was fur rounded with uncommon Mife- 
 ries, his own Friends inferred, that he was a mofl 
 heinous Criminal, and charged him with aggravated 
 Guilt as the Caufe of his Calamities ; though God 
 himfelf by a Voice from Heaven folved this uncha- 
 ritable Sophifin, and cleared his Servant Job of that 
 charge. 
 
 How frequent is it among Men to impute Crimes 
 to wrong Perfons ? We too often charge that upon, 
 the wicked Contrivance and premeditated Malice 
 of a Neighbour, which arofe merely from Ignorance, 
 or from an unguarded Temper. And on the other 
 Hand, when we have a Mind to excufe ourfelves^ 
 we pracTife the fame Sophifm «, and charge that upon 
 our Inadvertence or our Ignorance, which perhaps 
 was defigned Wickednefs. What is really done by 
 a Neceffity of Ci re um fiances, we fometimes im- 
 pute to Choice. And again, we charge that upon 
 Neceffity which was really defired and chofen. 
 
 Sometimes a Perfon acts out of Judgment, in 
 Oppoiition to his Inclination ; another Perfon per- 
 haps acls the fame Thing out of Inclination, and 
 againft his Judgment. It is hard for us to deter- 
 mine with Aifarance, what are the inward Springs 
 and fecret Caufcs of every Man's Conduct \ and 
 therefore we mould be cautious and flow in palling 
 a Judgment where the Cafe is not exceeding evi- 
 X 4 dent : 
 
318 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART III. 
 
 dent : And if we fhould miftake, let it rather be on 
 the charitable, than on the cenforious Side. 
 
 It is the fame Sofhifm that charges mathematical 
 Learning with leading the Minds of Men to Scepticifm 
 and Infidelity ', and as unjuftly accufes the new Philo- 
 fophy of paving the Way to Herefy and Schifm. Thus 
 the Reformation from Popery has been charged ^ith 
 the Murder and Blood of Millions, which in Truth 
 is to be imputed to the Tyranny of the Princes and 
 the Priefis, who would not fuffer the People to re- 
 form their Sentiments and their Practices accord- 
 ing to the Word of God. Thus Christianity in the 
 primitive Ages was charged by the Heathens with 
 all the Calamities which, befel the Roman Empire, 
 becaufe the Chriftians renounced the Heathen Gods 
 and Idols. 
 
 The Way to relieve ourfelves from thofe So- 
 phifms, and to fecure ourfelves from the Danger of 
 falling into them, is an honeft and diligent Enquiry 
 into the real Nature and Caufes of Things, with a 
 conitant Watchfulnefs againit all thofe Prejudices 
 that might warp the Judgment afide from Truth in 
 that Enquiry. 
 
 5. The next is called Fallacia-Accidentis, or a 
 Sophifm wherein we pronounce concerning the 
 Nature and ejfential Properties of any Subject ac- 
 cording to fomething which is merely accidental to 
 it. This is akin to the former, and is alfo very fre- 
 quent in human Life. So if Opium or the Peruvian 
 Bark has been ufed imprudently or unfuccefsfully, 
 whereby the Patient has received Injury, fome 
 weaker People abfolutely pronounce againft the Ufe 
 of the Bark or Opium upon all Occalions whatfoever, 
 and arc ready to call them Poifon. So Wine has 
 been the accidental Occalion of Drunkennefs and 
 
 Quarrels ; 
 
CH. III.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 31Q 
 
 Quarrels ; Learning and Printing may have been the 
 accidental Caufe of Sedition in a State ; the Read- 
 ing of the Bible, by Accident, has been abufed to 
 promote Herefies or deftruclive Errors ; and for thefe 
 Reafons they have all been pronounced evil Things* 
 Mahomet forbad his Followers the Ufe of Wine ; 
 the Turks difcourage Learning in their Dominions; 
 and the Papijls forbid the Scripture to be read by 
 the Laity. But how very unreafonable are thefe 
 Inferences, and thefe Prohibitions which are built 
 upon them ! 
 
 VI. The next Sophifm borders upon the former; 
 and that is, when we argue from that which is true 
 in particular Circu??i/lances, to prove the fame Thing 
 true abfolutely r , Jimply ', and abflracled from all Circum- 
 Jlances ; this is called in the Schools a Sophifm a 
 diclo fecundum quid ad diclum fimpliciter ; as, That 
 which is bought in the Shambles is eaten for Dinner ; 
 raw Meat is bought in the Shambles ; therefore raw 
 Meat is eaten for Dinner. Or thus, Livy writes 
 Fables and Improbabilities when he defcribes Prodigies 
 and Omens ; therefore Livfs Roman Hi/lory is never 
 to be believed in any Thing. Or thus, There may be 
 fome Mi /lake of Tranfcribers in fome Part of Scrip- 
 ture ; therefore Scripture alone is not afafe Guide for 
 cur Faith. 
 
 This Sort of Sophifm has its Reverfe alfo ; as 
 when we argue from that which is true Jimply, and 
 abfolutely, to prove the fame Thing true in all par- 
 ticular Circwnjlances whatfoever* ; as if a Traitor 
 fhould argue from the fixth Commandment, Thou 
 
 Jhalt 
 
 * This is arguing from a moral Univerfality , which admits of 
 fome Exceptions, in the fame Manner as may be argued from 
 metaphyseal or a natural Univerfality, which admits of no Ex- 
 ception. 
 
320 rOGICKL: OR, THE [PART. III. 
 
 Jhalt not kill a Man, to prove that he himfelf ought 
 not to be hanged : Or if a Madman fhould tell me, 
 / ought not to withhold his Sword from him, becaufe 
 no Man ought to withhold the Property of another, 
 
 Thefe two fait Species oi 'Sophifms are eafily folv- 
 ed, by (hewing the Differenec betwixt Things in 
 their abfolute Nature, and the fame Things fur- 
 rounded with peculiar Circumflances, and confidered 
 in regard to fpecial Times, Places, Perfons and Oc- 
 cafions; or by (hewing the Difference between a 
 moral and a metaphyseal Univerfality, and that the 
 Proportion will hold good, in one Cafe, but not in 
 the other. 
 
 VII. The Sophifms of Compojition and Divijion 
 come next to be mentioned. 
 
 The Sophifm of Compofition is when we infer any 
 Thing concerning Ideas in a compounded Senje, 
 which is only true in a divided Serif e. And when 
 it is faid in the Gofpel that Chrift made the Blind to 
 fee, and the Deaf to hear, and the Lame to walk, 
 we ought not to infer hence that Chrifi performed 
 Contradictions ; but thofe who were blind before, 
 were made to fee, and thofe who were deaf beJore 9 
 were made to hear, &c. So when the Scripture af- 
 fures us, the worft of Sinners may be faved; it lig- 
 nites only, that they who have been the worft of Sin- 
 ners may repent and be faved, not that they fhall 
 be faved in their Sins. Or if any one mould argue 
 thus, Two and three are even and odd', Jive are two 
 and three-, therefore Jive are even and odd. Here 
 that is very faifely inferred concerning two and three 
 in Union, which is only true of them divided. 
 
 The Sophifm of Divijion is when we infer the 
 lame Thing concerning Ideas in a divided Senfe, 
 which is only true in a compounded Scnfe\ as, it we 
 fhould pretend to prove that every Soldier in the 
 
 Grecian 
 
CH. III.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 321 
 
 Grecian Army put an hundred thoufand Perfons to 
 Flight, becaule the Grecian Soldiers didfo. Or if a 
 Man fhould argue thus, five is one Number ; two 
 and three are five ; therefore two and three are one 
 Number* 
 
 This Sort of Sophifms is committed when the 
 Word All is taken in a collective and a dtjlributive 
 Senfe, without a diit Diftinelion ; as, if any one 
 fhould reafon thus ; All the mufical Injiruments of 
 the Jewifh Temple made a noble Concert-, the Harp 
 was a mufical Inftrument of the Jewifh Temple \ 
 therefore the Harp made a noble Concert. Here the 
 Word All in the Major is collective, whereas fuch 
 a Conclulion rea/aires that the Word AM fhould be 
 distributive. 
 
 It is the fame Fallacy when the univcrfal Word 
 All or No refers to Speciss in one Proportion, and 
 to Individuals in another ; as, All Animals were in 
 Noah's Ark ; therefore no Animals perifhed in the 
 flood: Whereas in the Preinife all Animals fiemfies 
 every Kind of Animals, which does not exclude or 
 deny the drowning of a thoufand Individuals. 
 
 VIII. The la ft Sort of Sophifms arifes from cur 
 jfibvfe of the Ambiguity of Words, which is the largeft 
 and molt extenfive Kind of Fallacy; and indeed 
 feveral of the former Fallacies might be reduced to 
 this. Head. 
 
 When the Words or Phrafes are plainly equivocal?, 
 they are called Sophifms of Equivocation , as, if we 
 fhould argue thus : He that fends forth a Book into 
 the Light, defires it to be read ; He that throws a 
 Book into the Fire, fends it into the Light ; therefore 
 he that throws a Book into the Fire defires it to be 
 read. 
 
 This Sophifm, as well as the foregoing, and all 
 of the like Nature, are folved by (hewing the diffe- 
 rent 
 
322 logick: or, the [part hi, 
 
 rent Senfes of the Words, Terms or Phrafes. Here 
 Light in the major Proportion {ignifies the publick 
 View of the World; in the Minor it fignifies the 
 Brightnefs of Flame and Fire ; and therefore the Syl- 
 logifm has four Terms, or rather it has no middle 
 Term, and proves nothing. 
 
 But where fuch grofs Equivocations and Ambigui- 
 ties appear in Arguments, there is little Danger of 
 im poling upon ourfelves or others. The greater! 
 Danger, and which we are perpetually expofed to 
 In Reafoning, is, where the two Senfes or Signifi- 
 tions of one Term are near akin, and not plainly 
 diftinguifhcd, and yet they are really fufficiently 
 different in their Senfe to lead us into great Mis- 
 takes, if we are not watchful. And indeed the 
 greater! Part of Controversies in the facred or civil 
 Life, arife from the different Senfes that are. put 
 upon Words, and the different Ideas which are in- 
 cluded in them ; as have been (hewn at large in 
 the firft Part of Logick, Chap, IV. which treats of 
 Words and Terms. 
 
 There is after all thefe, another Sort of Sophifm 
 which is wont to be called an imperfecl Enumeration 
 or afalfe Induclion^ when from a few Experiments 
 or Obfervations Men infer general Theorems and 
 univerfal Proportions. But this is fufficiently no- 
 ticed in the foregoing Chapter, where we treated of 
 that Sort of Syllogifm which is called Induclion. 
 
 SECT. 
 
CH. III.] KIGHT USE OP REASON, 323 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Two general Tefls of true Sylkgifms, and Methods of 
 f Giving all Sophifms. 
 
 BESIDES the fpecial Defcription of true Syl- 
 logifms and Sophifns already given, and the 
 Rules by which the one are framed, and the other 
 refuted, there are thefe two general Methods of re- 
 ducing all Syllogifms whatfoever to a Teji of their 
 Truth or Falfhood. 
 
 I. The firft is, that the Premifes mufl, at leaft 
 implicitly, contain the"Conclufion ; or thus, One of the 
 Premifes mujl contain the Gonclufion, and the other 
 mujl Jhew that the Conclufion is contained in it. The 
 Reaibn of this Rule is this ; when any Propofition 
 is offered to be proved, it is necefTary to find ano- 
 ther Proportion which confirms it, which may be 
 called the containing Propofition ; but becaufe the 
 fecond muft not contain the firft in 'an exprefs 
 Manner, and in the fame Words,* therefore it is 
 necefTary that a third or ojlenfive Propofition be 
 found out, to fhewthat the fecond Propofition con- 
 tains the firft, which was to be proved. Let us 
 make an Experiment of this Syllogifm : Whofoever 
 is a Slave to his natural Inclinations, is miferable : 
 the wicked Man is a Slave to his natural Inclinations ; 
 therefore the wicked Man is miferable. Here it is 
 evident that the major Propofition contains the 
 
 * It is confeffed that conditional and disjundi<ve major .Propo- 
 rtions do expreisly contain all that is in the Conclufion; but 
 then it is not in a certain and condufi-ve Manner, but only in a 
 dubious Form of Speech, and mingled with other Terms ; and 
 therefore it is not the fame exprefs Propofition. 
 
 Conclufion*; 
 
324 logicx : or, the [part m. 
 
 Conclufion ; for under the general Character of a 
 Slave to natural Inclinations i a wicked Man'is con- 
 tained or included ; and the minor Proportion de- 
 clares it ; whence the Conclujion is evidently de- 
 duced, that the wicked Man is ?niferable. 
 
 In many affirmative Syllogifms we may fuppofe 
 either the Major or the Minor to contain the Con- 
 clusion, and the other to fhew it; for there is no 
 great Difference. But in negative Syllogifms it is 
 the negative Proportion that contains the Conclu- 
 iion, and the affirmative Proportion fhews it ; as, 
 every wife Man majlers his FaJJions ; no angry Man 
 majlers his Paffions ; therefore no angry Man is wife* 
 Here it is more natural to fuppofe the Minor to 
 be the containing Propoftion ; it is the Minor impli- 
 citly denies Wifdom concerning an angry Man y be- 
 catife jiiqjzering the Pafjions is included in Wifdom y 
 and the Major (hews it. 
 
 Note, This Rule may be applied to complex and 
 conjunctive ', as well as fimpie Syllogifms, and is 
 adapted to fhew the Truth or FaKhood of any of 
 them. 
 
 II. The fecond is this ; As the Terms in every 
 Syllogifm are ufually repeated twice y fo they mufl be 
 taken precifely in the fame Senfe in both places : For 
 {he greateft Part of Mi (lakes that arife in forming 
 Syllogifms, is derived from fomc little Difference 
 jn the Senfe of one of the Terms in the two Parts of 
 the Syllogifm wherein it is ufed. Let us con^der 
 the following Sophifms. 
 
 1 . It is a Sin to kill a Man ; a Murderer is a 
 Man ; therefore, it is a Sin to kill a Murderer. Flere 
 the Word /{"///in the firft Proportion lignites to kill 
 unjujtty> or without Law ; in the Conclu^on it is 
 taken abfolutely for putting a Man to Death in gc* 
 neraL and therefore the Inference is not good. 
 
 2. What 
 
CH. III.] EIGHT USE OP REASON. 325 
 
 2. What I am , you are not ; but 7" am a Man\ 
 therefore you are not a Man. This is a relative Syl- 
 logifm : But. if it be reduced to a regular 'categorical 
 Form, it will appear there is Ambiguity in the 
 Terms, thus ; What I am, is a Man ; you are not 
 what I ara ; therefore you are not a Man. Here 
 what I am in the major Proportion is taken fpe~ 
 daily tor my Nature \ but in the minor Proportion 
 the fame Words are taken individually for my Per- 
 
 Jon ; therefore the Inference muft be falfe, for the 
 Syllogifm docs not take the Term what I am both 
 Times in the fame fenfe. 
 
 3. He that fays you are an Animal, fays true \ y b\\t 
 he that fays you are a Goofe, fays you are an Animal \ 
 therefore, he that fays you are a Goofe, fays true. In 
 the major Proportion the Word Animal is the Pre- 
 dicate of an incidental Propofiticn ; which incidental 
 Proportion being affirmative, renders the Predicate 
 of it particular, according to Chap. II. Seel. 2. 
 Axiom 3. and confequently the Word Animal there 
 fignires only human Animality. In the major Pro- 
 portion the Word Animal, for the fame Reafon, 
 iignires the Animality of a Goofe ; whereby it be- 
 comes an ambiguous Perm, and unrt to build the 
 Concluron upon. Or if you fay, the Word Animal 
 in the Minor, is taken for human Animality, then 
 the Minor is evidently falfe. 
 
 It is from this laft general Tefi of Syllogifms. that 
 we derive the Cuftom of the Refpondent in anfwer- 
 ing the Arguments of the Opponent, which is to 
 diringuifh upon the major or minor Proportion, 
 and declare which Term is ufed in two Senfes, and 
 in what Senfe the Proportion may be true 5 and in 
 $rhat Senfe it is falfe. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
326 &OGICK : OR; THE [PART IIT. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Some general Rules to direct our Reafonhig. 
 
 OST of the general and fpecial Directions 
 given to form our Judgments aright in the 
 preceding Part of Logick might be rehearfed here; 
 for the Judgments which' we pafs upon Things are 
 generally built on fome fecret Reafonihg or Argu- 
 ment by which the Proportion is fuppofed to be 
 proved. But there may be yet fome farther Af- 
 fifrances given to our reajoning Powers in their 
 Search after Truth, and an Obiervation of the fol- 
 lowing Rules will be of great Importance for that 
 End. 
 
 Rule I. Accujlom your) elves to clear and dijlincl 
 Ideas i to evident Proportions, tojlrong and convincing 
 Arguments. Converfe much with thofe Friends, and 
 thole Books, and thofe Parts of Learning, where 
 yon meet with the greateft Clearnefs of Thought, 
 and Force of Rcafoning. The mathematical Sci- 
 ences, and particularly Ariihmeiick^ Geometry, and 
 Mechanicks^ abound with thefe Advantages : And 
 if there were nothing valuable in them for the Ufes 
 of human Life, yet the very fpeculative Parts of 
 this Sort of Learning' are well worth our ftudy ; 
 for by perpetual Examples they teach us to conceive 
 with Clearnefs, to connect our Ideas and Propor- 
 tions in a Train of Dependence, to Reafon with 
 Strength and Demon fl ration, and to diftinguifli 
 between Truth and Falfhood. Something of thefe 
 Sciences fhould be ftudied by every Man who pre- 
 tends to Learning, and that, as Mr. Locke cxprefTes 
 
 it. 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OP SEASON. 327 
 
 it, not fo much to make us Mathematicians^ as to make 
 us reasonable Creatures. 
 
 We mould gain fuch a Familiarity with Evi- 
 dence of Perception and Force of Reafoning, and 
 get fuch a Habit of difcerning clear Trirhs, that 
 the Mind may he foon offended with Obfrurity 
 and Confufion : Then we (hall, as it were, natu- 
 rally and with Eale reftrain our Minds from rafh 
 Judgment, before we attain juft Evidence of the 
 Propofition which is offered to us: and we (hall 
 with the fame Eafe, and, as it were, naturally feize 
 and embrace every Truth that is propofed with juft 
 Evidence. 
 
 This Habit of 'conceiving clearly ', of judging jujlly, 
 and of realoning well, is not to be aitained merely 
 by the Happinefs of Constitution, the Brightness 
 of Genius, the belt natural Parts, or the heft Col- 
 lection of logical Precepts : It is Cuflom and Prac» 
 the that mujl form and eilablifh this Habit. We 
 mult apply ourfelves to it till we perform all this 
 readilv and without reflecYme on Rules. A cohe- 
 rent Thinker \ and a Jlricl Reafoner^ is not to be 
 made at once by .a Set ot Rules, any more than a 
 good Painter or Mufician may be formed extempore ', 
 by an excellent Lecture on Mufick or Painting. 
 It is of infinite importance, therefore, in our youn- 
 ger Years, to be taught both the Value and the 
 Praclice of conceiving clearly, and realoning right: 
 For when we are grown up to the Middle of Life, 
 or part it, it is no wonder that we fhould not learn 
 good Realoning, any more than that an ignorant 
 Clown mould not be able to learn fine Language, 
 Dancing, or a courtly Behaviour, when his ruftic 
 Airs have grown up with him till the Age of 
 Forty. 
 
 Y For 
 
328 LOGICK : OR, THE [p'AET lit. 
 
 For want of this Care, fo?ne Perfons of Rank and 
 Education dwell all their Days among obfcure Ideas ^ 
 they conceive and judge always in Confufion, they 
 take weak Arguments for Demonstration, they an* 
 led away with the Difguifcs and Shadows of Truth, 
 Now if fueh Perfons happen to have a bright Ima- 
 gination, a Volubility of Speech, and a Copioufhefs 
 of Language, they not only impofe many Errors 
 upon their own Underfrandings, but they (lamp 
 the Image of their own Miftakes upon their Neigh- 
 bours alfo, and fpread their Errors abroad. 
 
 It is a Matter of jufl Lamentation and Pity, to 
 confider the Weaknefs of the common Multitude of 
 Mankind in this Refpeel, how they receive any 
 Thing into their AfTent upon the moft trifling 
 Grounds. True Reafoning hath very little Share 
 in forming their Opinions. They relift the moft 
 convincing Arguments by an obftinate Adherence 
 to their Prejudices, and believe the moft impro- 
 bable Things with the greateft Affurance. They 
 talk of the abftrufeft Myfteries, and determineupon 
 them with the utmoft Confidence, and without jufl 
 Evidence either from Reafon or Revelation. A 
 confufed Heap of dark and inconfiftent Ideas make 
 up a good Part of their Knowledge in Matters of 
 Philofofhy as well as Religion, having never been 
 taught the Ufe and Value of clear and juft Rea- 
 foning. 
 
 Yet it mult be flill con felled that there are fome 
 Myjieries in Religion, both natural and revealed, as- 
 well as fome abjirufe Points in Pbilofophy, wherein 
 the Wife as well as the Unwife mull be content 
 with obfcure Ideas! There are feveral Things,, 
 efpecially relating to the invilibie World, which 
 arc unfearehable in our prefent State, and there- 
 fore we muft believe what Revelation plainly dic- 
 tates. 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 329 
 
 tates, though the Ideas may be obfcure. Reafon 
 itfelf demands this of us; but we mould feek for 
 the brighteft Evidence both of Ideas, and of the 
 Connection of them, wherefoever it is attainable. 
 
 Rule IT. Enlarge your general Acquaintance with 
 Tidings daily i in order to attain a rich Furniture of 
 Topicks, or middle Terms, whereby thofe Proportions 
 which occur may be either proved or dif proved ; but 
 efpecially meditate and enquire with great Diligence 
 and Exaclnefs into the Nature, Properties, Circum- 
 fiances and Relations of the particular Subjecl about 
 which you judge or argue. Coniider its Caufes, Ef- 
 fects, Confequences, A ijuncls, Gppofites, Signs, 
 &c. fo far as is needful to your prefent Purpofe* 
 You mould furvey a Queftion round about, and on 
 all Sides, and extend yonr Views as far as poffible, 
 to every Thing that has a Connection with it. This 
 Practice has many Advantages in it; as,. 
 
 1. It will be a Means to fuggeft to your Mind 
 proper Topicks for Argument about any Propor- 
 tion that relates to the fame Subjecl. 
 
 1. It will enable you with greater Readinefs and 
 Juflnefs of Thought to give an anfver to any fud- 
 den Quetlion upon that Subjrcl, whether it arifes 
 in your own Mind, or is propofed by others. 
 
 3. This will inftrucl you to give a plainer and 
 fpeedier Solution of any Difficulties that may at- 
 tend the Theme of your Difcourfe, and to refute 
 the Objections of thofe who have efpoufed a con- 
 trary Opinion. 
 
 4. By fuch a large Survey of the whole Subjecl 
 in all its Properties and Relations,. you will be bet- 
 ter fecured from Inconfiftencies, that is, from avert- 
 ing or denying any Thing in one Place, which 
 contradicts what you have aiTerted or denied in 
 
 Y 2 another ; 
 
330 LOGICK ! OH, THE [^ART III. 
 
 another : And to attain thefe Ends, an Exten five- 
 nefs of Undertaking, and a large Memory, are of 
 unfpeakable Service. 
 
 One would be ready to wonder foinetimes bow 
 eafily great and wife and learned Men are led into 
 Affcrtions in fome Parts of the fame Treatifc, 
 which are found to be fcarce confident with what 
 they have afierted in other Places : But the true 
 Reafon is, the Narrownefs of the Mind of Man, that 
 it cannot take in all the innumerable Properties and 
 Relations of one Subject with a fingle View ; and 
 therefore whilft they are intent on one particular 
 Part of their Theme, they bend all their Force of 
 Thought to prove or difprove fome Propofition 
 that relates to that Part, without a fufficient Atten- 
 tion to the Confequences which may flow from it, 
 and which may unhappily affect another Part of the 
 fame Subject ; and by this Means they are fome- 
 times led to fay Things which are inconfifrent. 
 In fuch a Cafe, the great Dealers in Difpute and 
 Controverfy take Pleafure to caft Nonfenfe and Self 
 Contradiction on their Antagonifl, with huge and 
 hateful Reproaches. For my Part, I rather choofe 
 to pity human Nature, whofe neceffary Narrownefs 
 of UnderfTanding expofes us all to fome Degrees 
 of this Frailty. But the moil extenlive Survey 
 poffible of our whole Subject is the beft Remedy 
 againfl it. It is our judging and arguing upon a 
 partial View of Things, that expofes us to Mif- 
 takes, and pufhes us into Abfurdities, or at leaft 
 to the very Borders of them. 
 
 Rule III. hifearching the Knowledge of Things, 
 always keep the precife Point of the prefent Quef 
 lion in your Eye. Take Heed that you add nothing to 
 it while you are arguing, nor omit any Part of it. 
 
 Watch 
 
CH* IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 331 
 
 Watch carefully left any new Ideas Aide in to 
 mingle themfelves either with the Subject or the 
 Predicate. See that the Queftion be not altered by 
 the Ambiguity of any Word taken in different 
 Senfes ; nor left any fecret Prejudices of your own, 
 or the fophiftical Arts of others, cheat your Under- 
 ftanding by changing the Queftion, or fhuffling in 
 any Thing elfe in its Room. 
 
 And for this End it is ufeful to keep the precife 
 Matter of Enquiry as ftmple as may be, and difen- 
 gaged from a Complication of Ideas, which do not 
 neceffarily belong to it. By admitting a Compli- 
 cation of Ideas, and taking too many Things at 
 once into one Queftion, the Mind is fometimes 
 dazzled and bewildered, and the Truth is loft in 
 fuch a Variety and Confufton of Ideas ; whereas 
 by limiting and narrowing the Queftion, you take 
 a fuller Survey of the whole of it. 
 
 By keeping the lingle Point of Enquiry in our 
 conftant View, we fhall be fecured from fudden, 
 rafh, and impertinent Refponfes and Determina- 
 tions, which fome have obtruded inftead of Solu- 
 tions and folid Anfwers, before they perfectly knew 
 the Queftions, 
 
 Rule IV. When y-ou have exafily conjtdered the 
 preeife Point of Enquiry, or what is unknown in the 
 Queftion, then conjider what, and how much you know 
 already of this Queftion, or of the Ideas and Terms of 
 which it is compofed. It is by a Com pari fon of the 
 known and unknown Parts of the Queftion toge- 
 ther, that you find what Reference the Part known 
 hath unto, or what Connection it hath with the 
 Thing that is fought: Thofe Ideas, whereby the 
 known and unknown Parts of the Queftion are 
 connected, will furmfh you with middle Terms or 
 
 Y 3 Argu-« 
 
332 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART lit, 
 
 Arguments whereby the Things propofed may be 
 proved or dii proved. 
 
 In this Part of your Work, namely, Comparing 
 Ideas together*, take due Time, and be not too hairy 
 to come to a Determination, efpeeially m Points of* 
 Importance. Some Men when they fee a little 
 Agreement or £)H agreement between Ideas, they 
 prefume a great deal, and to jump into the Con- 
 clufion : This is a fhort Way to Fancy, Opinion 
 and Conceit, but a moll unfafe and uncertain Way 
 to true Knowledge and Wifdom. 
 
 Eulr V. In c hoofing your middle Terms or Argu* 
 ments to prove any Queftion^ always take fuch Topicks 
 as are fureft^ and leaf fallible ; and which carry the 
 great eft Evidence and- Strength with them. Be not fo 
 foiienous about the Number, as ihe Weight of your 
 Arguments, efpeeially in proving any Proportion 
 wheh admits of natural Certainty , or of compleai 
 Demonfrat'wn. Many Times we do Injury to a 
 Caufe by dwelling upon trifling Arguments. We 
 amufc our Heareis with uncertainties, by multi- 
 plying the Number of feeble Reafonings, before 
 we mention thofe which are more fubftantial, con- 
 clusive and convincing. And too often we yield 
 up our own Alien? to mere probable Arguments, 
 where ceuain proofs may be obtained. 
 
 "1 et it mutf be confeffed, there are many Cafes 
 wen rein the g owing Number of probable Argu- 
 ments i icrcaics (he Degree of Probability, and gives 
 a great and fufbcient Confirmation to the Ttinh 
 which i- fought ; as, 
 
 (i.) "When we are enquiring the true Senfe of 
 any W »rd or Phrafe, we arc more confirmed in 
 the S 'Unification of it, by finding the lame Expre£- 
 fiori to w[r(\ in feveral Authors, or in feveral Places 
 of the lame Author. 
 
 (2.) When 
 
<:H. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 333 
 
 (2.) When we are fearching out the true Mean- 
 ing or Opinion of any Writer, or enquiring into 
 any facred Doctrine of Scripture, we come to a 
 iurer Determination of the Truth by feveral diftinct 
 Places wherein the fame Thing is exprefled or 
 plainly implied ; becaufe it is not fo probable that 
 an honeft ikilful Reader fhouid miftake the mean- 
 ing of the Writer in many Places, as he may in 
 one or two. 
 
 (3.) When we would prove the Importance of 
 any fcriptural Doctrine or Duty, the Multitude of 
 Texts wherein it is repeated and inculcated upon 
 the Reader, feems naturally to inftruct us that it 
 is a Matter of greater Importance, than other 
 Things which are but ilightly or fingly mentioned 
 in the Bible. 
 
 (4.) In fearching out Matters of Fa 61 in Times 
 paft, or in diftant Places, in which Cafe moral EvL 
 dence is fufficient, and moral Certainty is the utmoft 
 w r hich can be attained, here we derive a greater 
 AfTurance of the Truth of it by a Number of Per- 
 fons, or a Multitude of Circumftances concurring 
 to bear Witnefs to it. 
 
 (5.) From many Experiments in natural Philofo- 
 pby we more fafely infer a general Theorem, than 
 we can from one or two. 
 
 (6.) In Matters which require prefent Practice, 
 both facred and civil, we rnuft content ourfelves 
 oftentimes with a mere Preponderation ofprobabfe 
 Reafons or Arguments. Where there are feveral 
 Reafons on each Side, for and againft a Thing that 
 is to be done or omitted, a fmall Argument added 
 to. the Heap may juftly turn the Balance on one 
 Side, and determine the Judgment, as I have noted 
 in the Second Part of LogicL 
 
 Y4 To 
 
334 toGiCK : or, the [part nr. 
 
 To conclude- ■• ; a growing Acquaintance with 
 Matters of Learning, and a daily Improvement of 
 our Undemanding in Affairs human and divine, 
 will belt teach us to judge and dittinguihh in what 
 Cafes the Number of Arguments adds to their 
 Weight and Force : It is only experience can fully 
 inform us when wemuftbe determined by probable 
 Tof'cks, and when we mull feek and expedt Demon* 
 Jl rat ions* 
 
 Rule VI Prove your Conelufion (as far as pof 
 Jible) by' fame Proportions that are in them/elves more . 
 plain , evident., ana certain, than the Conelufion \ or 
 at leafi fuch as are more known, and more intelligible 
 to the perfon whom you would convince. If we neglect 
 this Rule, v\e (hall endeavour to enlighten that 
 which is obfeure by fomething equally or more 
 obfeure, and to confirm that which is doubtful by 
 fomething equally or more uncertain. Common 
 Senle dictates to all Men, that it is unpoilible to 
 eftablifh any Truth, and to convince others of it, 
 but by fomething that is better known to them 
 than that Truth is. 
 
 Bull VII. Labour in all your A rguings to enlighten 
 the Underflanditig, is well as to conquer and capti- 
 vate the Judgjient. Arpuc in luch a Manner as 
 may give a natural (lift i.cl, and tolid Knowledge 
 of Things* to yo'ui Hc< icrs, as well as to force their 
 Aficnt b\ a mere Proof at the Queftion. Now to 
 att.iin this End, the chief Topick or Medium of 
 your D 1 odtraiion mould be fetched as much as 
 pofliblc, from the IN;. ture of the Thing to be proved, 
 or trom I of Things which are moil naturally con- 
 nected With it. 
 
 Geometri* 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 335 
 
 Geometricians fometimes break this Rule with- 
 out Neceffity, two Ways, namely, 
 
 1. When they prove one Proportion only by 
 fhewing what Abfurdities will follow if the con- 
 tradictory Proportion be fuppofed or admitted t 
 This is called Reduclio ad Abfurdum*, or Demonftra- 
 tio per Impojfibile. As for In (lance, When they prove 
 ail the Radii of a Circle to be equal, by fuppofing one 
 Radius to be longer or fhorier than another, and 
 then {hewing what abfurd Confequences will fol- 
 low. 1 his, I confefs, forces the Aflent, but it does 
 not enlighten the Mind, by fhewing the true Rea- 
 fon and Caufe why all Radii are equal, which is de- 
 rived from the very Construction of a Circle: For 
 fince a Circle is formed by fixing one End of a 
 ftraight Line in the Centre, and moving the other 
 End round, (or which is all one, by Compaffes kept 
 open to a certain Extent) it follows evidently that 
 every Part of the Circumference being thus de- 
 fcribed, mud be equally diftant from the Center, 
 and therefore the Radii, which are Lines from the 
 Center to the Circumference, muft be all equal. 
 
 2. Geometricians forget this Ride when they 
 heap up many far-fetched Lines, Figures and Pro- 
 portions to prove fome plain, fimple, and obvious 
 Propofition. This is called a Demonftration per 
 aliena Iff remota, or an Argument from unnatural 
 and remote Mediums : As if, in order to prove the 
 Radii of a Circle are all equals I ihould make fe- 
 
 vera! 
 
 * Note, This Rule chiefly refers to the Hftablijbmcnt of fome 
 Truth, rather than to the Refutation of Error. It is a very 
 common and ufeful Way of arguing, to refute a falfe Propor- 
 tion, by {hewing what evident balfhood or Abfurdity will fol- 
 low from it : For what Fropofition foever is really abfurd and 
 falfe, does effectually prove that Principle to be falfe from which 
 it is derived; fo that this Way of refuting an Error, is not fo 
 ufually called Redtiilto ad Abfmdum^ 
 
S3fj LOGICK ! OR, THE [PART III. 
 
 veral Triangles and Squares about the Circle, and 
 then from fome Properties and Proportions of 
 Squares and Triangles prove that the Radii of a 
 Circle are equal* 
 
 Yet it mufl be confefled, that fometimes fuch 
 Queftions happen, that it is hard!}' poilible to prove 
 them by dired Arguments drawn from the Nature 
 of Things, &c. and then it may not only be lawful 
 but necefiary to ufe indirect Proofs, and Arguments 
 drawn from remote Mediums, or from the Abfurdity 
 sf the contradictory Suppqfitions. 
 
 Such indireel and remote Arguments may alfo 
 be fometimes ufed to confirm a Proportion, which 
 has been before proved by Arguments more dircei 
 and immediate. 
 
 Rule VIII. Though Arguments fhould give 
 Light to the Subject, as well as conftrain the Af- 
 fent, you mud learn to diftinguijh well between an 
 Explication and an Argument, and neither impofe upon- 
 yourf elves, nor ffjfer yourf elves to be impofe d upon by 
 others ) by miftaking a mere Ulujiration for a convin" 
 cing Reafon, 
 
 Axioms themfelves, or felf-evident Proportions, 
 may want an Explication or Ulujiration, though they 
 are not to be proved by Reafoning. 
 
 Similitudes and Allufions have oftentimes a very 
 happy Inflaenee to explain fome' difficult Truth, 
 and to render the Idea of it familiar and eafy. 
 Where the Refemblance is juft and accurate, the 
 Influence of a Simile may proceed fo far as to (hew 
 the Poflibility of the Thing in Queftion : But 67- 
 miliiudes muft not be taken as a folid Proof of the 
 Truth or Exiftence of thofe Things to which they 
 have a Refemblance. A too great Deference paid 
 to Similitudes, or an utter Rejection of them, feem 
 
 to 
 
CH. IV.] RIGHT tTSE OF KEASON. 33? 
 
 to be two Extremes, and ought to be avoided. The 
 late ingenious Mr. Locke, even in his Enquiries 
 after Truth, makes great Ufe of Similes for fre- 
 quent Illuftration, and is very happy in the Inven- 
 tion of them, though he warns us alfo left we mi£- 
 take them for conclufive Arguments. 
 
 Yet let it be noted here, that a Parable or a Si- 
 militude ufed by any Author, may give a (ufficient 
 Proof of the true Senle and Meaning of that Au- 
 thor, provided that we draw not this Similitude 
 beyond the Scope and Defign for which it was 
 brought ; as when our Saviour affirms, Rev. iii. 3. 
 / will come on thee as a Thief', this will plainly prove 
 that he defcribes the Unexpeclednefs of his Appear- 
 ance, though it is by no Means to be drawn to iig^ 
 nify any Injuftice in his Defign. 
 
 Rule IX In your whole Courfe of Reafoning keep 
 your Mind Jincerely intent on the Purfuit of Truths 
 and follow folid Argument wherefoever it leads you* 
 Let not a Party Spirit , nor any Pajfion or Prejudice 
 whatfoev^r, ftop or avert the Current of your Rea- 
 foning in Qaeft of true Knowledge. 
 
 When you are enquiring therefore into any Sub- 
 ject, maintain a due Regard to the Arguments and 
 Objections on both Sides of a Queftion : Confider, 
 compare, and balance them well, before you de- 
 termine for one Side. It is a frequent, but a very 
 faulty Practice, to hunt after Arguments only to 
 make good one Side of a Queftion, and entirely to 
 neglect and refufe thofe which favour the other 
 Side. If we have not given a due Weight to Ar- 
 guments on both Sides, we do but wilfully mif- 
 guide our Judgment, and abufe our Reafon, by for- 
 bidding its Search after Truth. When we efpoufe 
 Opinions by a fecret Bias on the Mind, through 
 the Influences of Fear, Hope, Honour, Credit, In- 
 terest, 
 
338 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART. HI. 
 
 ierefti or any other Prejudice \ and then feek Argu- 
 ments only to fupport thofe Opinions, we have 
 neither done our Duty to God nor to ourfelves ; 
 and it is a Matter of mere Chance if we '(tumble 
 upon Truth in our Way to Eafe and Preferment. 
 The Power of Reafoning was given us by our Maker 
 for this very End, to purfue Truth ; and we abufe 
 one of his richefl Gifts, if we bafely yield it up to 
 be led attray by any of the meaner Powers of Na- 
 ture, or the perifhing Interefts of this Life. Rea» 
 fan itfelf, if honeftly obeyed, will lead us to receive 
 the divine Revelation of the Gofpel, where it is duly 
 propofed, and this will (hew us the Path of Life 
 everlafting. 
 
 THE 
 
RIGHT USE OP REASON. 339 
 
 THE 
 
 FOURTH PART 
 
 OF 
 
 L O G I C K 
 
 Of Di/fiofition and Method. 
 
 IT is not merely a clear and dijlincl Idea, a well 
 formed Proportion, or a juji Argument, that is 
 fufficient to fearch out and communicate the 
 Knowledge of a Subject. There muft be a Variety 
 and Series of them difpofed in a due Manner, in 
 order to attain this End : And therefore it is the 
 Defign of the laft Part of Logick, to teach us the 
 Art of Method. It is that muft fecure our Thoughts 
 from that Confufion, Darknefs and Miftake, which 
 unavoidably attend the Meditations and Difcourfes 
 even of the brighteft Genius who defpifesthe Rules 
 of it. 
 
 I. We fhall here confider the Nature of Method, 
 and the fever al Kinds of it. 
 
 II. Lay down the general Rules of Method, with 
 a few Particulars under them. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
34fc LOGICK : OK, THE £ PART IV. 
 
 CHAP. L 
 
 Of the Nature of Method, and the fever al Kinds 
 of it, namely, Natural and Arbitrary, Syn- 
 thetick and Analytick. 
 
 METHOD, taken in the largeft Senfe, implies 
 the placing of fever al Things , or performing 
 fever al Operations, in fuch an Order, as is moft con- 
 venient to attain fome End propofed : And in this 
 Senfe it is applied to all the vt oiks of Nature and 
 Art, to all the divine Affairs of Creation and Pro- 
 vidence; and to the Artifices Schemes, Contri- 
 vances and Practices of Mankind, whether in na- 
 tural, civil, or facred Affairs. 
 
 Now this orderly Dlpoiition of Things includes 
 the Ideas of Prior, Pofierior, and Simultaneous ; of 
 Superior, Inferior, and. Equal', of Beginning, End, 
 and Middle, &c. which are defcribe>i more par- 
 ticularly among the general Affeclions of Being, in 
 Ontology. 
 
 But in Logick Method is ufually taken in a more 
 limited Senle, and the Nature of it is thusdefcribed: 
 Method is the Difpojition of a Variety of Thoughts on 
 any Subjecl, in fuch Order as may befi ferve to find 
 oat unknown Truths, to explain and confirm Truths 
 that are known, or to fix them in the Memory. 
 
 It is diftributed into two general Kinds, namely, 
 Natural and Arbitrary. 
 
 Natural Method is that which obferves the Or- 
 der of Nature, and proceeds in fuch a Manner, as 
 that the Knowledge of the Things which follow, 
 depends in a great Meafure on the Things which 
 
 8° 
 
€H. 1-3 RIGHT USE OP REASON. 341 
 
 go before, and this is twofold, viz. Synthetick and 
 Analytick, which are fometimes called Synt hefts, and 
 Analyfis* 
 
 Synthetick Method is that which begins with. the 
 .Parts-f~, and leads onward to the Knowledge of 
 the Whole ; it begins with the mod fimple Prin- 
 ciples, and general Truths, and proceeds by De- 
 grees to that which is drawn from them, or com- 
 pounded 
 
 * The Word Analyjis has three or four Senfes, "which it may 
 not be improper to take Notice of here. 
 
 t. It fignifies the general and particular Heads of a Difcourfe, 
 with their mutual Connections, both co-ordinate and fubordi 
 nate, drawn out by Way of Abftract into one or more Tables, 
 which are frequently placed like an Index at the Beginning or 
 End of a Book. 
 
 2. It iignifies the refolving of a Difcourfe into its various 
 Subjects and Arguments, as when any Writing of the ancient 
 Prophets is refolved into the prophetical, hifiorical, doflrinal, 
 and practical Parts of it ; it is laid to be analyfed in general, 
 when a Sentence is didinguifhed in the Nouns, the Kerbs? 
 Pronouns, Ad'verbb, and other particles of Speech which com- 
 pofe it, then it is faid to be analyfed grammatically ■. When the 
 lame Sentence is diftinguifhed into %ubjecl and Predicate, Pra- 
 poftion, Argument, Ail, Object, Caufe, Ejfetf, Adjunct, Oppo~ 
 Jite > &c. then it is analyfed logically and mstaphyfcally. This lat'i 
 
 is what is chiefly meant in the theological Schools, when they 
 fpeak of analyfng a Text of Scripture. 
 
 3. Analysis Iignifies particularly the Science of Algebra? 
 wherein a Quedion being propofed, one or more Letters, as, 
 x, y, %, or Vowels, as «, e , /, &c. are made Ufe of to fignify 
 the unknown Number, which being intermingled with feverai 
 known Numbers in the Queition, is at iaft, by the Rules of 
 Art, feparated or releafed from that Entanglement, and its par- 
 ticular Value is found out by mewing its Equation, or Equality 
 to fome known Number. 
 
 4. It figmfies analytical Method, as here explained in Logick. 
 
 f Note. It is conferred that Synthesis often begins with the 
 Genus, and proceeds to the Species and Individuals. But the genus 
 or generick Nature is then confkiered only as a physical or ejjintml 
 Part of the Species, though it be fometimes called an univefal. 
 or logical Whole. Thus fynthetick Method maintains its own Der 
 fcription Mill, for its begins with the Parts, and proceeds to the- 
 Whole, which is compofed of them. 
 
342 LOGICK, OK, THE [PART HI. 
 
 pounded of them : And therefore it is called the 
 Method of Compojition. 
 
 Analytick Method takes the whole compound as 
 it finds it, whether it be a Species or an Individual, 
 and leads us into the Knowledge of it, by refolving 
 it into its firft Principles or Parts, its generick Na- 
 ture, and its fpecial Properties ; and therefore it is 
 called the Method of Refolution. 
 
 Asfynthetick Method is generally ufed in teaching 
 the Sciences after they are invented, fa analytick is 
 moft praclifed in finding out Things unknown. 
 Though it niuft be confefTed, that both Methods 
 are fometimes employed to find out Truth and to 
 communicate it. 
 
 If we know the Parts of any Subject eafier and 
 better than the Whole, we confidcr the Parts dif- 
 tindrJv, and by putting them together, we come to 
 the Knowledge of the Whole. So in Grammar, 
 we firlt learn to know Letters, we join them to 
 make Syllables, out of Syllables we compofe Words, 
 and out o Words we.nhke Sentences and Difcourfes. 
 So the Phyjician and Apothecary knows the Nature 
 and Powers of his Simples, namely, his Drugs, his 
 Herbs, his Minerals, &c, and putting ihem toge- 
 ther, and confidermg their fpveral Virtues, he finds 
 what will be the Nature and Powers of the Bolus, 
 or any compound Medicine: This is the fynthetick 
 Method. 
 
 But if we are better acquainted with the Whole 
 than we are with particular Parts, then we divide 
 or relolve the Whole into its Parts, and thereby 
 gain a diftincl Knowledge of them. So in vulgar 
 Life we learn in the grois what Plants or Minerals 
 are; and then by Chemiftry we gam the Knowledge 
 of Salt, Sulphur, Spirit, Water, Earth, which are 
 the Principles ot them. So we are firft acquaint- 
 ed with the whole Body of an Animal, and then 
 
 by 
 
CH. I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON". 343 
 
 by Anatomy or Dijfefiion, we come to learn all the 
 inward and outward Parts of it. This is the analytic 
 Method. 
 
 According to this moft general and obvious Idea 
 of fynthetick and analytick Method, they differ from 
 each other as the Way which leads up from a 
 Valley to a Mountain differs from itfclf, con fide reel 
 as it leads down from the Mountain to the Valley ; 
 or as St Matthew and St. Luke prove Chrift to be 
 the Son of Abraham ; Luke finds it out by Analyfis, 
 riling from Chri/i to his Anceftors ; Matthew teaches 
 it in the fynthetick Method, beginning from Abra- 
 ham, and (hewing that Chrift is found among his 
 Pcfterity. Therefore it is a ufual Thing in the Sci- 
 ences, when we have by Analyfts found out a Truth, 
 we ufe the fynthetick Method to explain and deliver 
 it, and prove it to be true. 
 
 In this eafy View of Things, thefe two Kinds of 
 Method may be preferved confpicuoufly, and en- 
 tirely diviincf : But the Subjects of Knowledge be- 
 ing infinite, and the Ways whereby we arrive at 
 this Knowledge being almofl infinitely various, it 
 is very difficult, and almoft impofiible, always to 
 maintain the precife Diftinction between thefe two 
 Methods. 
 
 This will evidently appear in the following Ob* 
 fervations. 
 
 Obferv. I. Analytick Method being ufed chiefly to 
 find out Things unknown, it is not limited or con- 
 fined merely to begin with fame whole Subject, and 
 proceed to the Knowledge of its Parts, but it takes 
 its Rife fometimes from any fmgle Part or Property, 
 or from any thing whatsoever that belongs to a 
 Subject which happens to be firlt and moft eafily 
 known, and thereby enquires into the more ab- 
 flrufe and unknown Parts, Properties, Caufes, Ef- 
 Z ' feds, 
 
344 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART IV. 
 
 fects, and Modes of it, whether abfolute or rela- 
 tive : As for inflance, 
 
 (1.) Anatyfis finds out Caufes by their Effects. 
 So in the lpcculative Part of natural Philofophy, 
 when we obfcrve Light, Colours, Motions, Hard- 
 nefs, Softnefs, and other Properties and Powers of 
 Bodies, or any of the common or uncommon Ap- 
 pearances of Things either on Earth or in Heaven, 
 we fearch out the Caufes of them. So by the va- 
 rious Creatures we find out the Creator, and learn 
 his Wifdom, Power and Goodnefs. 
 
 (2.) It. finds out Effects by their Caufes. So the 
 practical and mechanical Part of natural Philofophy 
 confiders fuch Poweis of Motion, as the Wind, the 
 Fire, and the Water, &c. and then contrives what 
 Ufes they may be applied to, and what will be their 
 Effects in order to make Mills and Engines of va- 
 rious Kinds. 
 
 (3.) It finds out the general and fpecial Nature 
 of a Thing by eonfidering t»he various Attributes 
 of the Individuals, and obferving what is common 
 and what is proper, what is accidental, and what is 
 efTcntial. So by furveying the Colour,, the Shape, 
 Motion, Reji, Place, Solidity, Extenfion of Bodies, 
 we come to find that the Nature of Body in general 
 hfolid Extenfion ; becaufe all other Qualities of Bo- 
 dies are changeable, but this belongs to all Bodies, 
 and it endures through all Changes; and becaufe 
 this is proper to Body alone, and agrees not to any 
 Thing die ; and it is the Foundation of all other 
 Properties. 
 
 (4.) It finds out the remaining Properties or 
 Parts of a Thing, by having lb me Parts or Properties 
 given. So the Area of a Triangle is found by know- 
 ing the Height and the Bafe. So by having two 
 Sides, and an Angle of a Triangle given, we find the 
 remaining Side and Angles. So when we know Co- 
 gitation 
 
GH. I.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 345 
 
 gitation is the prime Attribute of a Spirit, we infer 
 its Immateriality ', and thence its' Immortality* 
 
 (5.) Analyfis finds the Means neeeffary to attain a 
 propofed End, by having the End firft affigned. 
 So in morale political ', (Economical, Affairs, having 
 propofed the Government of 'Self ] a Family, a Society 9 
 or a Nation, in order to their bed Intereft, we con- 
 flder ana fearch out what are the proper Lazvs, Rules 
 and Means to effect it. So in the Practices of Ar- 
 tificers ^ and the Manufacturers of various Kinds, 
 the End being propofed, as, making Cloth, Houfes, 
 Ships, &c. we find out Ways of compofing thefe 
 Things for the feveral Ufes of human Life. But 
 the putting any of thefe Means in Execution to at- 
 tain the End, is fynthetick Method* 
 
 Many other Particulars might be represented to 
 (hew the various Forms of analytick Method, where- 
 by Truth is found out, and fome of them come 
 very near to fynthetick ; fo as hardly to be diflin- 
 guifhed. 
 
 Obferv. II. Not only the Investigation of Truth, 
 but the Communication of it alfo is often practifed 
 in fuch a Method, as neither agrees precifely to 
 fynthetick or analytick. Some Sciences, if you con- 
 sider the whole of them in general, are treated in 
 fynthetick Order ; fo Phyfics, or. natural Philcfophy, 
 begins ufually with an Account of the general Na- 
 ture and Properties of Matter or Bodies, and by De- 
 grees defcends to confider the particular Species of 
 Bodies with their Powers and Properties ; yet it is 
 very evident, that when Philofophers come to parti- 
 cular Plants and Animals, then by Chemiftry and Ana- 
 tomy they analyfe or refolve thofe Bodies into their 
 feveral conilituent Parts. On the other Hand, Lc- 
 gick is begun in analytick Method ; the Whole is di- 
 vided into its integral Parts, according to the four 
 Z 2 Operations 
 
% 
 
 346 LOGICK : OR, THE [pART IV- 
 
 Operations of the Mind ; yet here arid there fynthe- 
 tick Method is ufed in the particular Branehes of it, 
 for it treats of Ideas in general firft, and then de- 
 fcends to the feveral Species of them ; it teaches us 
 how Proportions are made up of Ideas, and Syllogifns 
 of Propositions, which is the Order of Compofition. 
 
 The antient Scholaflic Writers have taken a great 
 deal of Pains, and engaged in ufelefs Difputes about 
 thefe two Methods, and after all have not been able 
 to give fuch an Account of them as to keep them 
 entirely diftinct from each other, neither in the 
 Theory nor in the Practice. Some of the Moderns 
 have avoided this Confufion in fome Meafure, by 
 confining themfelves to defcfibe almoft nothing 
 elfe but the fynthetick and analytick Methods of Geo- 
 ??ietricians, and Algebraifls, whereby they have too 
 much narrowed the Nature and Rules of Method, 
 as though every Thing were to be treated in ?nathe- 
 matical Forms. 
 
 Upon the whole, I conclude, that neither of thefe 
 two Methods fhould be too fcrupuloufly and fupci- 
 ftitioufly purfued, either in the Invention or in the 
 Communication of Knowledge. It is enough, if 
 the Order of Nature be but obferved in making the 
 Knowledge of Things following depend on the 
 Knowledge of the Things which go before. Often- 
 times a mixed Method will be found moft effectual 
 for thefe Purpofes ; and indeed a wife and judi- 
 cious Profpedl of our main End and Dcfign muft 
 regulate all Method whatfoever. 
 
 Here the Rides of natural Method ought to be 
 propofed, (whether it be analytick or fynthetick, or 
 mixed :) but it is proper firft to give fome Account 
 of arbitrary Method, left it be thruft at too great a 
 Diftance from the firft mention of it. 
 
 Arbitrary Method leaves the Order of Nature, and 
 accommodates itfelf to many purpofes; fuch as, to 
 
 treafurc 
 
CH. I.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 347 
 
 treafure up Things, and retain them in Memory,; 
 to harangue and perfuade Mankind to any Practice 
 in the religious or the civil Life ; or to delight, 
 amufe, or entertain the Mind. 
 
 As for the Affiftance of the Memory, in 'mod 
 Things a natural Order has an happy Influence ; 
 for Reafon itfelf deducing one Thing from another, 
 greatly affifts the Memory by the natural Connec- 
 tion and mutual Dependence of Things. But there 
 are various other Methods which Mankind have 
 made Ufe of for this Purpofe, and indeed there are 
 fome Subjects that can hardly be reduced to Ana- 
 lyfis or Synthefis. 
 
 In reading or writing Hi/lory, fome follow the 
 Order of the Governors of a Nation, and difpofe 
 every Tran faction under their particular Reigns : So 
 the facred Books of Kings and Chronicles are writ- 
 ten. Some write in A?inals or Journals, and make 
 a new Chapter of every Year. Some put all thofe 
 Tranfactions together which relate to one Subjecl : 
 that is, all the Affairs of one War, one League, one 
 Confederacy, one Qouncil, &c. though it lafted many 
 Years, and under many Rulers. 
 
 So in writing the Lives of Men, which is called 
 Biography, fome Authors follow the Tract of their 
 Tears, and place every Thing in the precife Order 
 of Time when it occurred : Others throw the Tem- 
 per and Character of the Perfons, their private Life, 
 their public k Stations, their perfonal Occurrences, 
 their domejliclz Conduct, their Speeches, their Boohs 
 or Writings^ their Sicknefs and Death, into fo many 
 di ft in 61 Chapters. 
 
 In Chronology fome Writers make their Epochas 
 to begin all with one Letter : So in the Book called 
 Duclpr Hifloricus, the Periods all begin with C; as, 
 Creation, Catcdyfm^ or Deluge, Chaldean Empire, 
 Cyrus, Chrift, Conjlantine, <kc. Some divide their 
 Z 3 Accounts 
 
348 LOGICK *. OR, THE [PART IV. 
 
 Accounts of Time according to the four great 
 Monarchies ; Ajfyfian, Perfian, Grecian and Ro- 
 man. Others think it ferves the Memory beft to 
 divide all their Subjects into the remarkable Num- 
 ber of Sevens ; fo Prideaux has written an Intro* 
 duclion to Ilijlory And there is a Book of Divinity 
 called Fajciadus Controverfarium, by an Author of 
 the fame Name, written in the fame Method, 
 wherein every Controverfy has /even Queflions be- 
 longing to it ; though the Order of Nature feems 
 to be too much neglected by a Confinement to this 
 Jeptenary Number. 
 
 1 hole Writers and Speakers, whofe chief Bufinefs 
 is toamufe or delight, to allure, terrify, or perfuade 
 Mankind, do not confine. themfelves to any natural 
 Order, but in a cryptical or hidden Method, adapt 
 every Thing to their deiigned Ends. Sometimes 
 they omit thofe Things which might injure their De- 
 fi gn, or grow tedious to their Hearers, thoueh they 
 feem to have a neceffary Relation to the Point in 
 Hand : Sometimes they add thofe Things which 
 have no great Reference to the Subject, but are 
 fuited to allure or refrefh the Mind and the Ear. 
 They dilate fometimes, and flourifh long upon little 
 Incidents, and they fkipover, and but lightly touch 
 the drier Part of their Theme. They place thejirji 
 Things lqfi 9 and the laft Things firjl, with won- 
 drous Art, and yet fo manage it as to conceal their 
 Artifice, and lead the Senfes and Paffions of their 
 Hearers into a pleafingand powerful Captivity. 
 
 It is chiefly Poefy and Oratory that require the 
 Practice of this Kind of arbitrary Method: They 
 omit Things cfTentia! which are not beautiful, they 
 infert little need lets Circumftances, and beautiful 
 Digreffions, they invert Times and Actions, in 
 order to place every Thing in the moll: affecting 
 Light, and for this End in their Practice they ne- 
 
 gle6l 
 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 349 
 
 gleet all logical Forms ; yet a good Acquaintance 
 with the Forms of Logick and natural Method is of 
 admirable Ufe to thofe who would attain thefe Arts 
 in Perfection. Hereby they will be able to range 
 their own Thoughts in fueh a Method and Scheme, 
 as to take a more large and comprehenlive Survey of 
 their Subject and Defign in all the Parrs of it; and 
 by this Means they will better judge what to ehoofe 
 and what to refute ; and how to drefs and manage 
 the whole Scene before them, fo as to attain their 
 own Ends with greater Glory and Succefs. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 The Rules of Method, general and particular. 
 
 THE general Requisites of true Method in the 
 Purfuit or Communication of Knowledge, 
 may be all comprifed under the following Heads. 
 It muft be (\.) Safe. (2.) Plain and eaj). (3.) 
 Diftmcl. (4.) Full or without Defecl. (5.) Short 
 or without Superfluity. (6.) Proper to the Subjecl 
 and the Dtjign. (7.) Connecled,. 
 
 Rule I. Among all the Qualifications of a good 
 Method, there is none more neceflary and impor- 
 tant than that it fhoukl befafe andfecure from Er- 
 ror ; and to this End thefe four particular or /fecial 
 Directions (hould be obferved. 
 
 ] . Ufe great Care and Circumfpeclion in laying the 
 Foundations of your Dtfcourfe, or your Scheme of 
 Thoughts upon any Sutjecl. Thofe Propositions 
 which arc to (tand as fii ft Principles, and on which 
 the whole Argument depends, mull be viewed on 
 all Sides with the iitmoft Accuracy, left an. Error 
 
 being 
 
350 LOGICK : OR, THE [PART IV. 
 
 being admitted there, fhould diffufe itfelf through 
 the whole Subject. See therefore that jour gene- 
 ral Definitions or Descriptions are as accurate as the 
 Nature of the Thing will bear : See that your £■*- 
 neral Divifions and Distributions be juft and cxacl, 
 according to the Rules given in the firfl Part of 
 Logick : See that youf Axioms be fufficiently evi- 
 dent, fo as to demand the Aflent of thofe that ex- 
 amine them with due Attention : See that your firji 
 and more immediate Conjequences from thefe Principles 
 be well drawn ; and take the fame Care of all other 
 Proportions that have a powerful and fpreading In- 
 fluence through the feveral Parts of your Dif- 
 courfe. 
 
 For want of this Care fometimes a large Treatife 
 has been written by a long Deduction of Confe- 
 quences from one or two doubtful Principles, which 
 Principles have been effectually refuted in a few 
 Lines, and thus the wholeTreatife has been deftroyed 
 at once : So the largeff and faireft Building finks and 
 tumbles to the Ground, if the Foundations and Cor- 
 ner-Stones of it are feeble and inefficient. 
 
 2. It is a very advifeable Thing that yowx primary 
 and fundamental Propofitions be not only evide?it and 
 true, but they Jhould be made a little familiar to the 
 Mind by dwelling upon them before you proceed far- 
 ther. By this Means you will gain fo full an Ac- 
 quaintance with them, that you may draw Confe- 
 quences from them with much more Freedom, 
 with greater Variety, brighter Evidence, and with a 
 firmer Certainty, than if you have but a flight and 
 fuddcn View of them. 
 
 3. As you proceed in the Connection of your 
 Arguments, fee that your Ground be made firm in 
 every Step. See that every Link of your Chain of 
 .Rca foning be itrong and good : For if but one 
 
 Link 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF EEASOK. 351 
 
 Link be feeble and doubtful, the whole Chain of 
 Arguments feels the Weaknefs of it, and lies cx- 
 pofed to every Objector, and the original Queftion 
 remains undetermined. 
 
 4. Draw up all your Propojitions and Arguments 
 with fo much Caution, and exprefs your Ideas with 
 fuch a jajl Limitation, as may preclude or anticipate 
 an) t Objections. Yet remember this is only to be 
 done as tar as it is poilible, without too much in- 
 tangling the Quciiion, or introducing complicated 
 Ideas and obfeuring the Senfe. But if fuch a cau- 
 tious and limited Diefs of the Quefiion ihould ren* 
 der the Ideas too much complicated, or the Senfe 
 obfeure, then it is better to keep the Argument 
 more fimple, clear and ealv to be underftood, and 
 afterwards mention the Objections diitinclly in their 
 full Strength, and give a diftinct Anfwer to them. 
 
 Rule II. Let your Method be plain and eafy, fo 
 that your Hearers or Readers, as well as yourfelf, 
 may run through it without Embarraflment, and 
 may take a clear ;md comprehenfive View of the 
 whole Scheme. To this End the following parti* 
 cidar Direcliojis will be ufeful. 
 
 ] . Begin always with thofe Things which are beft 
 known, and mqft obvious, whereby the Mind may have 
 no Difficulty or Fatigue, and proceed by regular and 
 eafy Steps to Things that are more difficult. And as 
 far as poilible, let not the UnderLtanding, or the 
 Proof of any of your Portions, depend on the Po- 
 ll tions that follow, but always on thofe which go 
 before. It is a Matter of Wonder that in fo know- 
 ing an Age as this, there (hould be fo manv Per- 
 fons offering Violence daily to this Rule, by teaching 
 the Lathi Language by a Grammar written in Latin y 
 which Method feems to require a perfect Know- 
 ledge 
 
352 LOGICK : OR, THE [PAKT IV. 
 
 ledge of an unknown Tongue, in Order to learn 
 the firft Rudiments of it. 
 
 2. Do not affeel excefjive Hq/le in learning or 
 teaching any Science, nor hurry at once into the Midji 
 of it, left you be too foon involved in feveral new 
 and flrange Ideas and Propofitions, which cannot 
 be well underftood without a longer and clofer 
 Attention to thofe which go before. Such Sort of 
 Speed is but a Wade of Time, and will conllrain 
 you to take many Steps backward again, if you 
 would arrive at a regular and compleat Knowledge 
 of the Subject. 
 
 3. Be not fond of crowding too many Thoughts and 
 Reafonings into one Sentence or Paragraph, beyond the 
 Apprehenfion or Capacity of your Readers or Rearers. 
 There are fome Perfons of a good Genius and a 
 capacious Mind, who write and fpeak very ob- 
 fcurely upon this Account ; they affeel; a long Train 
 of Dependencies before they come to a Period ; 
 they imagine that they can never fill their Page with 
 too much Senfe ; but they little think how they 
 bury their own bed Ideas in the Crowd, and ren- 
 der them in a Manner invifible and ufelefs to the 
 greater! Part of Mankind. Such Men may be 
 great Scholars, yet they are but poor Teachers. 
 
 4. For the fame Rcafon avoid too many Subdivi- 
 fions. Contrive your Scheme of Thoughts in fuch 
 
 a Manner as may finifh your whole Argument with 
 as few inferior Branchings as Rcafon will admit; 
 and let them be fuch as are obvious and open to the 
 Underftanding, that they may come within one 
 fingle View of the Mind. This will not only affift 
 the Underftanding to receive, but it will aid the 
 Memory alfo to retain 'Truth : Whereas a Difcourfe 
 cut out into a vaft Multitude of gradual Subordi- 
 nations, has many Ineonvenicncics in it ; it gives 
 
 Pain 
 
CH. II ] RIGHT USE OF REASON-. 353 
 
 Pain to the Mind and Memory, in fur v eying and 
 retaining the Scheme of Difcourfe, and expofes the 
 unfkilful Hearers to mingle the fuperior and infe- 
 rior Particulars together ; it leads them into a thick 
 Wood inftead of open Day-light, and places them 
 in a Labyrinth, in ft cad of a plain Path. 
 
 5 . Give all Diligence in your younger Tears to ob- 
 tain a clear and eafy Way of exprejfing your Concep- 
 tions, that your Words, as fait as you utter them, 
 may {tamp your own Ideas exaclly on the Mind of 
 the Hearer. This is a mod happy Talent for the 
 Conveyance of Truth, and an excellent Security 
 againft Miftakes and needlefs Controverfies. 
 
 Rule III. Let your Method be diflincl, and with- 
 out the perplexing Mixture of Things that ought 
 to be kept feparate, and this will be eafily prac- 
 tifed by four Direclions. 
 
 1. Do not bring unnecejfary heterogeneous* Mat- 
 ter into your Difcourfe on any Subjecl ; that is, do not 
 mingle an Argument on one Subjecl: with Matters 
 that relate entirely to another, but juft fo far as is 
 neceffary to give a clearer Knowledge of the Subjecl: 
 in Hand. Examples in Logick may be borrowed 
 from any of the Sciences to illudrate the Rules: 
 But long Interpolations of 'natural Philofophy, of the 
 Imagination and Pafjlons, of Agency of Spirits united 
 to bodies, &c. break the Thread of Difcourfe, and 
 perplex the Subjecl. 
 
 2. Let every complicated Theme or Idea be divided 
 into its diftinci fingle Parts, as far as the Nature of 
 the SubjeSf and your prefent Defgn requires it. Tho* 
 you mu(t not abound in ncedieis bubdivifions, yet 
 
 * Things of one Kind are called Homogeneous, Things of 
 different kinds are Heteroo-tneous. 
 
 fom string 
 
354 LOGICK ! OR, THE [pART. IV. 
 
 fomething of this Work is very necefTary ; and it 
 is a good Judgment alone can dictate how far to 
 proceed in it, and when to ftop. 
 
 Compound Ideas mult be reduced to a fimple 
 Form in order to underftand them well. You may 
 eafily matter that Subject in all the Parts of it by a 
 regular Succeffion, which would confound the Un- 
 .derftanding to furvey them at once. So we come 
 to the Knowledge of a very perplexed Diagram in 
 Geometry, or a complicated Machine in Mechanicks % 
 by having it parcelled out to us into its feveral 
 Parts and Principles, according to this and the 
 foregoing Rule of Method. 
 
 3. Call every Idea, Proportion and Argument to its 
 proper Clafs, arid keep each Part of the Sub j eel in its 
 own. Place. Put thole Things all together that be- 
 long to one Part or Property, one Confederation or 
 View of your Subject. This will prevent needlefs 
 Repetitions, and keep you from intermixing Things 
 which are different. We mull maintain this Dif- 
 tinction of Things and Places if we would be fafe 
 from Error. It is Confufion that leads us into 
 endlefs Miftakes, which naturally arife from a va- 
 riety of Ideas ill-joined, forted, or ill-difpofed. It 
 is one great Ufe of Method, that a Multitude of 
 Thoughts and Proportions may be fo diftinctly 
 ranged in their proper Situations, that the Mind 
 may not be overwhelmed with a confufed Atten- 
 tion to them all at once, nor be diffracted with 
 their Variety, nor be tempted to unite Things 
 which ought to be feparated, nor to disjoin Things 
 which fhould be united. 
 
 4. In the Partition of your Difcourfe into di/lincl 
 Heads, take Heed that your Particulars do not inter- 
 fere with the General, nor with each other. Think 
 
 it is not enough that you make ufe of diftinct Ex- 
 
 preflions 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON. 355 
 
 preflions in each Particular, but take Care that the 
 Ideas be diftindt alfo. It is mere Foolery to mul- 
 tiply diftincT: Particulars in treating of Things , 
 where the Difference of your Particulars lies only 
 in Na?nes and Words, 
 
 Rule IV. The Method of treating a Subject: 
 fhould be plenary or full, fo that nothing may be 
 wanting \ nothing which is neceflary or proper 
 fhould be omitted. 
 
 When you are called to explain a Subject, do 
 not pafs by, nor ikip over any Thing in it which is 
 very difficult or obfcure. 
 
 When you enwneraie the Parts or the Properties 
 of any Subject, do it in a compleat and compre- 
 henfi've Manner. 
 
 When you are ajferting or proving any Truth, 
 fee that every doubtful or difputable Part of the 
 Argument be well fupported and confirmed. 
 
 If you are to illuflrate or argue a Point of Djffi* 
 atlty, be not too fcanty of Words, but rather be- 
 come a little copious and difFulive in your Lan- 
 guage : Set the Truth before the Reader in feve- 
 ral Lights, turn the various Sides of it to View, in 
 order to give a full Idea and firm Evidence of the 
 Proportion. 
 
 When you are drawing, up a Narrative of any 
 Matter of Fact, fee that no important Circum- 
 stance be omitted. 
 
 When you propofe the Solution of any Difficulty \ 
 confider all the various Cafes wherein it can hap- 
 pen, and (hew how they may be folved. 
 
 In fhort, let your Enumerations, your Divijions 
 and Dijlributions of Things be fo accurate, that no 
 needful Part or Idea may be left out. 
 
 This 
 
356 logick: or, the [part iv. 
 
 This Fulnefs of Method does not require that every 
 Thing fhould be laid which can be laid upon any 
 Subject ; for this would make each (ingle science 
 endlefs : But you fbould fay every Thing which is 
 ijecefTary to the Defign in View, and which has a 
 proper and direct Tendency to this End ; always 
 proportioning the Amplitude of your Matter, and 
 the Fulnefs of your Difcourfe to your great De- 
 iign, to the Length of your Time, to the Conve- 
 nience, Delight and Profit of your Hearers. 
 
 Rule V. As your Method mull be full without 
 Deficiency , fo it mud be fhort, or without Super* 
 fiuity. The Fulnefs of a Difcourfe enlarges our 
 Knowledge, and the well concerted Brevity faves 
 our Time. In order to obferve this Rule, it will 
 be enough to point out the chief of thofe Super- 
 fluities or Redundancies which fome Perfons are 
 guilty of in their Difcourfes, with a due Caution 
 againfl them. 
 
 1 . Avoid all needlefs repetitions of the fame Thing 
 in different Farts of your Difcourfe, It muft be con- 
 feffed there are feveral Cafes wherein a Review of 
 the fame foregoing Proportion is needful to ex- 
 plain or prove feveral of the following Pofitions ; 
 but let your Method be fo contrived, as far as pdf- 
 fiblc, that it may occafion the feweft Rchearfals 
 of the fame Thing ; for it is not grateful to the 
 Hearers without evident Neceffity. 
 
 2. Have a Care of tedious Prolixity, or drawing 
 out any Fart of your Difcourfe to an unneceffary and 
 tirefome length. It is much more honourable for 
 an Instructor, an Orator, a Pleader, or a Preacher, 
 that his Hearers fhou Id fay, I was afraid he woidd 
 have done, than that they fhould be tempted to ihew 
 Signs of Uncafinefs, and long for the Conclufion. 
 
 Befides, 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OF REASON. 357 
 
 Betides, there is another Inconvenience in it ; 
 when you affect to amplify on the former Branches 
 of a Difcourfe, you will often lay a Neceffity upon 
 yourfelf of contracting the latter and mod ufeful 
 Parts of it, and perhaps prevent yourfelf in the 
 mod important Part of your Delign. Many a 
 Preacher has been guilty of this Fault in former 
 Days, nor is the prefent Age without fome In- 
 fiances of this Weaknefs. 
 
 3. Do not multiply Explications where there is no 
 Difficulty ', or Darknefs, or Danger of Mijlake. Be 
 not fond of tracing every Word of your Theme, 
 through all the grammatical, the logical, and meta- 
 phyfical Characters and Relations of it; nor fhevv 
 your critical Learning in fpreading abroad the va- 
 rious Senfes of a Word, and the various Origin of 
 thofe Senfes, the Etymology of Terms, the fynony- 
 mous and the paronymous or Kindred Names, &c. 
 where the chief Point of Difcourfe does, not at all 
 require it. You would laugh at a Pedant, who pro- 
 felting to explain the Athanafian Creed, mould ac- 
 quaint you that Aihanafiiis is derived from a Greek 
 Word, which, fignifies Immortality , and that the 
 fame Word \A3-avac-i* fignifies alio the Herb Tanfy. 
 
 There are fome Perfons fo fond of their learned 
 Diitinclions, that they will fhevv their Subtlety by 
 dijlinguifning where there is no Difference-: And the 
 la m-e lil ly Affectation will inUoduce . Di/linclions, 
 upon every Occurrence, and bring three or four 
 Negatives upon every Subject of Difcourfe ; firft to 
 declare what it is not, and then what it is : Whereas 
 fuch Negatives ought never to be mentioned where 
 there is no apparent Danger of Mifiake. How 
 ridiculous would that Writer be, who, if he were 
 fpeaking of the Nicene Creed, fhould declare nega- 
 tively, 1 . That he did not mean the Doclr'me which 
 
 the 
 
358 logick: on, ths [part ir. 
 
 the Inhabitants of Nice believed, nor (1.) A Creed 
 written by them, but (3.) Positively a Creed com- 
 pofed by fever at Chriftian Bifliops met together in the 
 City gf" Nice : The Pofitive is Sufficient here> and 
 the two Negatives are impertinent. 
 
 4. Be not fond of proving thofe Things which need 
 flo Proof; Such as felf-evident Proportions and 
 Truths univerfally confefled, or Such as are entirely 
 agreed to and granted by our Opponents. It is 
 this vain AfFeclation of proving every Thing that 
 has led Geometricians to Sorm ufclefs and intricate 
 DemonvTrations to Support Some Theorems which 
 are Sufficiently evident to the Eye by InSpeclion, 
 or to the Mind by the ftrit Mention of them ; and 
 it is the Same Humour that reigns Sometimes in 
 the Pulpit, and Spends half the Sermon in proving 
 Some general Truth which is never disputed or 
 doubted, and thereby robs the Auditory of more 
 ufeSul Entertainment. 
 
 5. As there are Some Things So evidently true, 
 that they want no Proof, So there are others fo evU 
 dently falfe that they want no Refutation. It is mere 
 trifling, and a Wade of our precious Moments, to 
 invent and raiSe Such Objections as no Man would 
 ever make in earned, and that merely for the Sake 
 of anfwering and folvingthem : This breaks in no- 
 torioufly upon the due Brevity of Method. 
 
 6. Avoid in general all learned forms, all Trap" 
 pings of Art, and Ceremonies of the Schools, where 
 there is no need of them. It is reported concern- 
 ing the late Czar of Mifcovy, that when he lirSt ac- 
 quainted himielf with mathematical Learning, he 
 praclifed all the Rules of Circumvallation and Con- 
 iravallation, at the Siege of a Town in Livonia ; 
 and by the Length of thofe Formalities 'he' loSt the 
 Opportunity oS taking the Town, 
 
 7- Da 
 
CH. II. ] RIGHT USE. OF REASON. 359 
 
 7. " Do not liiffer every occafional and inciden- 
 a tal Thought to carry you away into a long Pa- 
 " rentbefis, and thus to ftretch out your Diicourfe, 
 £i and divert you from the Point in Hand." In 
 the Purfuit of your Subject, if any ufeful Thought 
 occur which belongs to ibme other Theme, note it 
 down for the Sake of your Memory on ibme other 
 Paper, and lay it by in Referve for its proper Place 
 and Seafon : But let it not incorporate itfelf with 
 your prefent Theme, nor draw off your Mind from 
 your main Bufmefs, though it fhould be ever fo in- 
 viting. A Man, who walks directly but flowly to- 
 wards his Journey's End, will arrive thither much 
 fooner them his Neighbour, who runs into every 
 crooked Turning which he meets, and wanders 
 afide to gaze at every Thing that ftrikes his Eyes 
 by the Way, or to gather every gaudy Flower that 
 grows by the Side of the Road. 
 
 To fum up all : ." There is an happy Medium to 
 £i be obferved in our Method, fo that the Brevity 
 " may not render the Senfe obfeure, nor the Argu- 
 si ment feeble, nor our Knowledge merely fuperfi- 
 if cial -. And on the other Hand, that the Fulnefs 
 &i and Copioufnefs of cur Method may not wafte 
 (i the Time, tire the Learner, or fdl the Mind with 
 <c Trifles and I iri pertinencies." 
 
 The copious and the cantracledWzv of Writing 
 have each their peculiar Advantages. There is a 
 proper Ufe to be made of large Paraphrafes, and 
 full, particular, and dtffujt^e Explications and Argu- 
 ments \ thefe are fitter! for thofe who de(i<in to be 
 acquainted thoroughly with every Part of the Sub- 
 ject. There is alfo a Ufe of ' Jkorter Hints, Abflracls, 
 and Compendtumz, to inllruct thole who feck only a 
 flight and general Knowledge, as well as to refrefh 
 the Memory of thofe who have learned the Science 
 already, and gone through a larger Scheme. But 
 
 A a it 
 
300 LOGIC K : OR, THE [PART IV. 
 
 it is a grofs Abufe of thefe various Methods of In- 
 ft ruction, when a Perfon has read a mere Compen- 
 dium or Epitome of any Science, and he vainly ima- 
 gines that be underftands the whole Science. So 
 o le Boy may become a Pkilofopher by reading over 
 the mere dry Definitions and Divifions of Scheiblers 
 Compmdium of Peripateticifm: So another may boaft 
 that he underftands Anatomy, becaufe he has fecn 
 a Skeleton; and a third profefs himfelf a learned 
 Divine, when he can repeat the Apojlles Creed. 
 
 Rule VI. "Take Care that your Method be 
 " proper to the Subjecl in Hand, proper to your 
 " prefent Deiign, as well as proper to the Age and 
 " Place wherein you dwell." 
 
 1 . Let your Method be proper to the SubjecJ. All 
 Sciences muft not be learned or taught in one Me- 
 thod. Morality and Theology, Metaphyfich and Lo- 
 gick, will not be eafily and happily reduced into a 
 ftricl: mathematical Method : Thofe who have tried, 
 have found much inconvenience therein. 
 
 Some Things have more Need to be explained 
 than to be proved ; as Axioms, or felf-evident Pro- 
 portions ; and indeed all the jirft great Principles, 
 the chief and moft important Doctrines both ofna^ 
 tural and revealed Religion % for when the Senfe of 
 them is clearly explained, they appear fo evident in 
 the Light of Nature or Scripture, that they want no 
 other Proof. There are other Things that Hand 
 in Need of Proof, as well as Explication, as many 
 mathematical Theorems^ and feveral deep Contro- 
 versies in Morality and Divinity. There are yet 
 other Sorts of Subjects which want rather to be 
 warmly imprcfled upon the Mind by fervent Ex- 
 hortations, and ftand in more Need of this than 
 they do cither of Proof or Explication ; fuch are 
 the moft general, plain and obvious Duties of Piety 
 
 towards 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USB OP REASON. 36l 
 
 towards God, and Love towards Men, with the Go- 
 vernment of all our Inclinations and PaJJions. Now 
 thefe feveral Subjefls ought to be treated in a dif- 
 ferent Manner and Method. 
 
 Again, There are fome Subjects in the fame 
 Treatife which are more ufeful and neoerlary than 
 others, and fome Parts of a Subjecl which are emi- 
 nently and chiefly deftgned by a Writer or Speaker : 
 True Method will teach us to dwell longer upon 
 thefe Themes, and to lay out more Thought and 
 Labour upon them ; whereas the fame Art of Me- 
 thod will teach us to cut fhort thcfe Things which 
 are ufed only to introduce our main Subject, and to 
 Hand as Scaffolding merely to aid the Structure of 
 our Difcourfe. It will teach us alfo to content our- 
 felves with brief Hints of thofe Matters which are 
 merely occafional and incidental. 
 
 2. Your Method mud be adjufted by your De- 
 fign ; for if you treat of the fame Subjecl: with two 
 different Views and Defigns, you will find it ne- 
 ceflary to ufe different Methods. Suppofe the 
 Doclrine of the facred Trinity were your Theme, 
 and you were to read a Lecture to young Stu- 
 dents on that Subjecl, or if you defigned a Trea- 
 tife for the Conviction of learned Men, you would 
 purfue a very different Method from that which 
 would be proper to regulate a practical Difcourfe, 
 or a Sermon to inftruct common Cbriftians merely 
 in the pious Improvement of this Doctrine, and 
 awaken thera to the Duties which are derived 
 thence. 
 
 In fhort, we muft not firft lay down certain and 
 precife Rules of Method, and refolve to confine the 
 Matter we difcourfe of to that particular Form and 
 Order of Topics ; but we mult well confider, and 
 itudy the Subject of our Difcourfe thoroughly, and 
 
 A a 2 take 
 
362 LOGICK : OR, THE [fAKT IT, 
 
 take a jufl Survey of our prcfent Dejign, and thcfe 
 will give fufficient Hints of the particular Form and 
 Order in which we fhould handle it, provided that 
 we are moderately {killed in the general Laws of 
 Method and Order. 
 
 Yet let it be noted here, that, neither the Subjecl 
 nor Matter of a Difcourfe, nor the particular De~ 
 fign of it, can fo preeifely determine the Method, 
 as to leave no Room for Liberty and Variety. The 
 very fame Theme may be handled, and that alfo 
 with the fame Defign, in feveral different Me- 
 thods, among which it is hard to fay which is the 
 bell. In writing a Syftem of Divinity, fome begin 
 with the Scriptures, and thence deduce all other 
 Doctrines and Duties. Some begin with the Being 
 of God and his Attributes, fo far as he is known by 
 the Light of Nature, and then proceed to the Doc- 
 trines of Revelation. Some diflinguifh the whole 
 Subjecl: into the Credcnda and Agenda, that is, 
 Things to be believed, and Things to be done. Some 
 think it bed to explain the whole Chriftian Reli- 
 gion by an hiftorical Detail of all the Difcoveries 
 "which God has made of himfelf to this lower JForld, - 
 beginning at the Creation in the firft Chapter of 
 Genefis, and fo proceeding onward according to 
 -the Narrative of the Old and New Teftament. 
 And there are others that endeavour to include the 
 Whole of Religion under thefe four Heads, namely, 
 The Jpoftles Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Ten I 
 mandments, and the two Sacraments; though 1 cim- 
 not but think this is the lealt accurate of any. The 
 fame Variety may be allowed in treating other Sub- 
 jects ; this very Treatife of Logic k is an Inftance of 
 it, whole Method differs very considerably from 
 any others which 1 have fecn, as they differ alfo 
 greatly from one another, though feveral of them 
 arc conferred to be well written. 
 
 3. Though 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP REASON-. 363 
 
 3. Though a juft View of our Subjetl and our 
 Defign may dictate proper Rules of natural Method, 
 yet there mull be fome little Deference at leaft 
 paid to the Cuftom of the Age wherein we live, and 
 to the Humour and Genius of our Readers or 
 Hearers ; which if we utterly reject and difdain, 
 our Performances will fail of the defired Succefs, 
 even though we may have followed the juft Rules 
 of Method. 1 will mention but this one Inftance: 
 In the former Century it was frequent with learned. 
 Men to divide their Theme or Subject into a great 
 Multitude of co-ordinate Members or Parts, they 
 abounded alfo in the Forms of Logick and Diftinc- 
 tion, and indulged numerous Ranks of Subordina- 
 tion. Now though we ought not to abandon the 
 Rules of juft Method and DhiJio?i, in order to com- 
 port with the modifh Writers in our Age who have 
 renounced them, yet it is prudent to pay fo much 
 Refpecl to the Cuftom of the Age, as to ufe thefe 
 Forms of Divifion with due Moderation, and not 
 affect to multiply them in fuch a Manner, as to give 
 an early and needlefs Difguft to the Generality of 
 our prefent Readers. The fame may be faid con- 
 cerning various other Methods of conduct in the 
 Affairs of Learning, as well as the Affairs of Life, 
 wherein we muft indulge a little to Cuftom : And 
 yet we muft by no Means fuffer ourfelves fo far to 
 be impofed upon and governed by it, as to neglect 
 thofe Rules of Method which are neceftary for the 
 fafe, eafy, and compleat Inquiry into Truth, or the 
 ready and effetlual Communicatio7i of it to others. 
 
 Rule VII. The laft Requifite of Method is, that 
 the Parts of a Difcourfe fnoidd be ^well connected ; 
 and thefe three (liort Dire&ions will fuffice for this 
 Purpofe. 
 
 1. " Keep 
 
364 logick: or, the [part ir, 
 
 1. "Keep your main End and Defign ever in 
 * View, and let all the Parts of your Difcourfe 
 4 * have a Tendency towards it, and as far as poffi- 
 " ble make that Tendency vifible all the Way:'* 
 Otherwife the Readers or Hearers will have Reafon 
 to wonder for what End this or that Particular was 
 introduced. 
 
 2. " Let the mutual Relation and Dependence 
 " of the feveral Branches of your Difcourfe be fo 
 " juft and evident, that every Part may naturally 
 *' lead onward to the next, without any huge 
 " Chafms or Breaks, which interrupt and deform 
 " the Scheme." The Connexion of Truths Ihould 
 arife and appear in their fucceffive Rank and Or- 
 der, as the feveral Parts of a fine Profpecl afcend 
 juft behind each other, in their natural and regu- 
 lar Elevations and Diftances, and invite the Eye to 
 climb onward with conftant Pleafure till it reach 
 the Sky. Whatfoever horrid Beauty a Precipice 
 or a Cataract may add to the ProfpccT of a Coun- 
 try, yet fuch Sort of hideous and abrupt Appear- 
 ances in a Scene of Reasoning are real Blemifhes 
 and not Beauties. When the Reader is palling 
 over fuch a Treatife, he often finds a wide Vacancy, 
 and makes an uneafy Stop, and knows not how to 
 tranfport his Thoughts over to the next Particular, 
 for want of foine Clue or connecting Idea to lay 
 hold of it. 
 
 3. " Acquaint yourfelf with all the proper and 
 " decent Forms of Tranfiiion from one Part of a 
 "Difcourfe to another, and praclife them as Oc- 
 u cafion offers." Where the Ideas, Proportions 
 and Arguments, are happily difpofed, and well 
 connected, the Truth indeed is fecure; but it ren- 
 ders the Difcourfe much more agreeable, when 
 proper and graceful Exprcffion joins the Parts of it 
 
 together 
 
CH. II.] RIGHT USE OP KEASGN. 365 
 
 together in fo entertaining a Manner, that the 
 Reader knows not how to leave off till he hath ar- 
 rived at the End. 
 
 Thefe are the general and moil important Rules 
 of true Method ; and though they belong chiefly 
 to the Communication of Knowledge, yet an early 
 and thorough Acquaintance with them will be of 
 confiderable Ufe toward the Purfuit and Attain- 
 ment of it. 
 
 Thofe Perfons who have never any Occafion to 
 communicate Knowledge by Writing or by publick 
 Difcourfes, may alfo with great Advantage perufe 
 thefe Rules of Method, that they may learn to judge 
 with Juuice and Accuracy concerning the Per- 
 formances of others. And befldes, a good Ac- 
 quaintance with Method, will greatly affift every 
 one in ranging, difpofing and managing all human 
 Affairs. 
 
 The particular Means or Method for a farther 
 Improvement of the Underflanding are very va- 
 rious, fuch as Meditation, Reading * Converfmg, 
 Difputing hy Speech or by Writing, Quefiion and An- 
 fwer, &c. And in each of thefe Praclices fome 
 ipecial Forms may be obferved, and fpecial Rules 
 may be given to facilitate and fecure our Inquiries 
 after Truth : but this would require a little Volume 
 by itfelf, and a Treat; fe of Logick has always been 
 efteemed fufficientJy compleat without it. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 T. Gillet, Printer, Saliibory-Square. 
 

 
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