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 Copy 1 
 
 THE BATTLE OF 
 SPRING HILL, TENNESSEE 
 
 November 29, 1864 
 
 A refutation of the erroneous statements made 
 
 by Captain Scofield in his paper entitled 
 
 "The Retreat from Pulaski to Nashville" 
 
 Captain John K. Shellenberger 
 
 One hundred, twenty-five 
 
 copies privately printed for the author by 
 
 THE ARTHUR H. CLARK COMPANY 
 
 Cleveland: 19 13 
 
THE BATTLE OF 
 SPRING HILL, TENNESSEE 
 
THE BATTLE OF 
 SPRING HILL, TENNESSEE 
 
 November 29, 1864 
 
 A refutation of the erroneous statements made 
 
 by Captain Scolield in his paper entitled 
 
 "The Retreat from Pulaski to Nashville" 
 
 Captain John K. Shellenberger 
 
 One hundred, twenty-five 
 
 copies privately printed for the author by 
 
 THE ARTHUR H. CLARK COMPANY 
 
 Cleveland: 19 13 
 
'055^ 
 
FOREWORD 
 
 In the second volume Sketches of War History, 
 issued by the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion, 
 there is a paper entitled "The Retreat from Pulaski 
 to Nashville" prepared and read December i, 1886, 
 by Captain Levi T. Scofield (spelled without an "h") 
 although it would appear from their similar methods 
 that he and General John M. Schofield (spelled with 
 an "h") were scions from the same tree. 
 
 This paper, while indulging in extravagant praise 
 of the generalship of Schofield and Cox during that 
 retreat, to which no one would raise any serious ob- 
 jection, descended to the sneaking methods of an assas- 
 sin in its desire to smirch the reputation of Wagner's 
 Division - a division, which by its conduct in both the 
 Battles of Spring Hill and Franklin, saved the army 
 from an imminent danger of destruction to which it 
 was subjected by grossly incompetent generalship. 
 As an instance of the covert methods used by Captain 
 Scofield in his efforts to dishonor Wagner's Division, 
 in describing what occurred in the Battle of Franklin, 
 he cunningly puts the ugly word, "cowards," which 
 he was afraid to use himself, into the mouth of Gen- 
 eral Wagner: "with terrible oaths he called them 
 cowards," and he indorses the fitness of the epithet by 
 his own statement: "but back they went to the town 
 and nothing could stop them." 
 
8 Foreword 
 
 At the close of that campaign I knew in a general 
 way, as any subaltern participant would know, that 
 gross blunders had been committed but was ignorant 
 regarding on whom the responsibility for the blunders 
 primarily rested. Some years before Captain Sco- 
 field's paper appeared I had been in correspondence 
 with General Opdycke and from him had learned 
 much about the true inwardness of the Battle of 
 Franklin. He was writing a history of that campaign 
 and at his request I had furnished him a statement of 
 what I knew about it. Unfortunately he died before 
 his work was completed and with his death my interest 
 in the matter lapsed until the appearance of Captain 
 Scofield's paper. I then began a critical investigation 
 to make a reply and soon struck the right trail regard- 
 ing the responsibility for the blunders and followed 
 it home. My paper was completed by the latter part 
 of 1889 and was sent to the Ohio Commandery, 
 where it was rejected for "harsh criticism of general 
 officers." The influence of General Cox was then too 
 strong in the Ohio Commandery for me to get a hear- 
 ing. I next sent the paper to the National Tribune^ 
 in which it appeared in the issues of January 30, Feb- 
 ruary 6 and 13, 1890. Many letters were received 
 about it- mostly complimentary but a few abusive. 
 The most valued one came from General Stanley in 
 which he stated that he was "surprised at the accuracy 
 with which you state your points." He did not 
 mention General Schofield's name in this letter and 
 was always very guarded in subsequent letters of any 
 mention of him, but in a later one, referring especially 
 
Foreword 9 
 
 to the Battle of Spring Hill, he stated, "Schofield's 
 claim [he has lectured on it], that it was all thought 
 out and planned by him, is trash." In the same mail 
 with the first letter came a much longer one from Mrs. 
 Stanley, scoring General Schofield and praising me 
 highly for the fearless manner in which I had told the 
 truth about him. Thus came assurances from the 
 most reliable source as to the truth of what I had told. 
 Some of the letters received at that time contained 
 valuable bits of criticism and additional bits of in- 
 formation of which I took advantage in subsequent 
 papers. In 1902, being then a resident of St. Paul, I 
 prepared a monograph on the Battle of Franklin 
 which was read before the Minnesota Commandery 
 at the meeting of December 9, 1902. They seemed 
 to enjoy "harsh criticism of general officers" in Min- 
 nesota, for the recorder assured me no other paper had 
 ever held more closely the undivided attention of its 
 auditors. Many of my correspondents had expressed 
 the wish that I would publish in pamphlet form the 
 National Tribune article, but this was never done. 
 Of the Franklin monograph a pamphlet edition was 
 printed and copies were mailed to every Commandery 
 of the Loyal Legion, to historical libraries, and to 
 many individuals, including General Schofield and 
 Captain Scofield. In my Franklin researches I had 
 incidentally picked up much valuable information 
 concerning the Battle of Spring Hill and after the 
 issue of the Franklin pamphlet I carried the Spring 
 Hill investigation to a finish, making a special trip to 
 Spring Hill, in October, 1906, to verify some of my 
 
lO Foreword 
 
 data. The result was a monograph on that battle 
 which was read at a meeting of the Missouri Com- 
 mandery of the Loyal Legion, February 2, 1907. A 
 pamphlet edition was printed and distributed as be- 
 fore. 
 
 Since then Captain Scofield has issued his paper in 
 a small bound volume profusely illustrated with por- 
 traits and pictures, and with several maps. One of 
 these maps professes to be of Spring Hill and vicinity, 
 drawn to scale, but really a creation of his own imag- 
 ination, a forgery made to back up the preposterous 
 claims of the regiment to which he belonged. He put 
 down roads and streams where none existed. He 
 located Wagner's entire division in a double line of 
 battle immediately south of Spring Hill and in front 
 of the position occupied by his own regiment. Man- 
 ifestly this was done to uphold the claim that his 
 regiment had repulsed the rebel attack after Wagner's 
 Division, in its front, had broken and run. As a mat- 
 ter of fact not a single regiment of Wagner's Division 
 was in the immediate vicinity where he located it. 
 Bradley's Brigade was more than half a mile to the 
 southeast. Lane's Brigade, the nearest flank, several 
 hundred yards to the northeast, and Opdycke's Bri- 
 gade about a half mile to the north. He had a copy 
 of my pamphlet which told the truth about the loca- 
 tion of Wagner's Division, as any one can verify who 
 will consult the official reports. I, therefore, charge 
 that in the preparation of his map he showed shame- 
 less dishonesty. The map accompanying this pam- 
 phlet is practically correct as I verified in my visit to 
 Spring Hill in 1906. 
 
Foreword 1 1 
 
 The text following, except for a few slight verbal 
 corrections, is the same as the paper read at the meet- 
 ing of the Missouri Commandery of the Loyal Le- 
 gion, February 2, 1907. 
 
 John K. Shellenberger. 
 Hampton, Virginia, March, 1913. 
 

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PREFACE 
 
 More than twenty-five years have passed since I 
 began to collect the materials from which this pam- 
 phlet has been evolved. As a substantial basis to 
 begin with, I was an eye-witness of all the fighting in 
 the vicinity of Spring Hill, that amounted to anything, 
 from the time Forrest attacked the 64th Ohio on the 
 skirmish line until Cleburne's Division recoiled from 
 the fire of the battery posted at the village. 
 
 Since I began collecting I have neglected no oppor- 
 tunity to increase my stock of information by conver- 
 sation, reading, or correspondence. I have twice re- 
 visited the battlefield. I have the government vol- 
 ume containing the official reports, all of which I have 
 carefully studied. Among my correspondents on the 
 Union side have been Generals Stanley, Wilson, Op- 
 dycke. Lane, and Bradley, besides many others of 
 lesser rank. I am as confident, from their letters, that 
 my paper would have the approval of those named, 
 who are now dead, as I am sure it has the approval of 
 General Wilson, to whom a manuscript copy was sub- 
 mitted for criticism. 
 
 Among other Confederates, I wrote to General S. 
 D. Lee, who referred me to Judge J. P. Young of 
 Memphis, Tennessee, with the statement that he had 
 exhausted the subject on the Confederate side. He 
 was present at Spring Hill as a boy soldier in Forrest's 
 
14 Preface 
 
 cavalry, and for years has been engaged in writing a 
 history of the Confederate Army of Tennessee, to 
 which he has given an enormous amount of careful 
 research. To him I am indebted for much of the 
 most valuable part of my information concerning the 
 Confederate troops. From the materials thus gath- 
 ered I have tried to give, within the compass of a Loyal 
 Legion paper, a clear and truthful account of the 
 affair just as it happened. That opinions will differ, 
 is shown by the fact that Judge Young holds General 
 Brown responsible for the Confederate failure, while 
 I believe that Cheatham, Stewart, and Bate were all 
 greater sinners than Brown. He was acting under 
 the eye of Cheatham, who could easily have forced 
 an attack by Brown's Division if he had been equal to 
 the occasion. 
 
 By a curious coincidence General Lee was present 
 as the guest of the Missouri Commandery at the meet- 
 ing when the paper was read, and, in commenting on 
 it. General Lee stated that I had told the truth about 
 as it had occurred. The deductions made from the 
 facts stated are my own. 
 
THE BATTLE OF SPRING HILL 
 
 It may be fairly claimed that the success of General 
 Sherman's famous march to the sea hung on the issue 
 of a minor battle fought at Spring Hill, in middle 
 Tennessee, the evening of November 29, 1864, when 
 Sherman and his army were hundreds of miles away 
 in the heart of Georgia. It will be remembered 
 that when Sherman started from Atlanta for Savannah 
 his old antagonist, General Hood, was at Florence, 
 Alabama, refitting his army to the limit of the waning 
 resources of the Confederacy for an aggressive cam- 
 paign into Tennessee. If Hood's campaign had 
 proved successful, Sherman's unopposed march 
 through Georgia would have been derided as a crazy 
 freak, and, no doubt, the old charge of insanity would 
 have been revived against him. By how narrow a 
 margin Hood missed a brilliant success, a truthful 
 account of the Spring Hill afifair will disclose. Much 
 has been written by interested generals of both sides 
 and by their partisan friends to mislead as to 
 the real situation. With no personal friendships or 
 enmities to subserve, it is the intention of this paper 
 to tell the truth without any regard to its efifect on the 
 reputation of any general. Federal or Confederate. 
 
 The Administration gave a reluctant consent to 
 Sherman's plan on the condition that he would leave 
 with General Thomas, commanding in Tennessee, a 
 
i6 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 force strong enough to defeat Hood. On paper 
 Thomas had plenty of men; but Sherman had taken 
 his pick of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and transporta- 
 tion, leaving the odds and ends with Thomas, consist- 
 ing largely of post troops garrisoning towns, bridge 
 guards in block-houses along the railroads, new regi- 
 ments recruited by the payment of the big bounties that 
 produced the infamous tribe of bounty jumpers, negro 
 regiments never yet tested in battle, green drafted men 
 assigned to some of the old depleted regiments in such 
 large numbers as to change their veteran character, 
 dismounted cavalrymen sent back to get horses, and 
 convalescents and furloughed men belonging to the 
 army with Sherman who had come up too late to join 
 their commands, organized into temporary compan- 
 ies and regiments. 
 
 Moreover, Thomas's forces were scattered from east 
 Tennessee to central Missouri, where General A. J. 
 Smith, with two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, was 
 marching for St. Louis to take steamboats to join 
 Thomas at Nashville. The only force available for 
 immediate field service consisted of the Fourth and 
 the Twenty-third Corps, the two weakest corps of 
 Sherman's army, which he had sent back to Thomas. 
 These two corps, temporarily commanded by General 
 Schofield, were thrown well forward towards Flor- 
 ence to delay Hood long enough for Thomas to con- 
 centrate and organize from his widely scattered re- 
 sources a force strong enough to give battle to Hood. 
 
 Passing over all prior operations, we will take up 
 the situation as it was the morning of November 29. 
 General Schofield had then well in hand on the north 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill ij 
 
 bank of Duck River, opposite Columbia, Tennessee, 
 the divisions of Kimball, Wagner, and Wood, com- 
 posing the Fourth Corps, and of Cox and Ruger, of 
 the Twenty-third Corps, Ruger's lacking one brigade 
 on detached service. Across the river were two divi- 
 sions of General S. D. Lee's corps of Hood's Army. 
 The preceding evening Hood, himself, with the corps 
 of Cheatham and Stewart, and Johnson's division of 
 Lee's corps, had moved up the river five and one-half 
 miles to Davis's Ford, where he was laying his pon- 
 toons preparatory to crossing. His plan was to detain 
 Schofield at the river by feinting with two divisions 
 while he would lead seven divisions past the left flank 
 and plant them across Schofield's line of retreat at 
 Spring Hill, twelve miles north of Duck River. As 
 Hood greatly outnumbered Schofield, his plan con- 
 templated the destruction of Schofield's army. 
 
 During the evening of the twenty-eighth, General 
 Wilson, commanding our cavalry, had learned enough 
 of Hood's movement to divine its purpose. In view 
 of its vital importance and to insure a delivery, he sent 
 a message in triplicate, each courier riding by a sepa- 
 rate road, informing Schofield of what Hood was 
 doing, and advising and urging him to get back to 
 Spring Hill with all his army by ten o'clock, the 
 twenty-ninth. General Wilson has stated that his 
 couriers all got through, the one riding by the shortest 
 road reaching Schofield's headquarters at three 
 o'clock in the morning of the twenty-ninth. 
 
 From the reports sent him by Wilson, General 
 Thomas at Nashville had also correctly divined 
 Hood's intention, and in a dispatch dated at three- 
 
1 8 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 thirty o'clock in the morning of the twenty-ninth - but 
 by the neglect of the night operator not transmitted 
 until six o'clock, when the day operator came on duty - 
 he ordered Schofield to fall back to Franklin, leaving 
 a sufficient force at Spring Hill to delay Hood until he 
 was securely posted at Franklin. 
 
 I was commanding Company B, 64th Ohio Regi- 
 ment, Bradley's Brigade, Wagner's division. The 
 brigade was under arms that morning by four o'clock, 
 and had orders to be ready to march on a moment's 
 notice. It is assumed that all the rest of the army 
 received the same orders, and that this action was taken 
 on account of the information brought by Wilson's 
 courier at three o'clock. But nothing was done until 
 eight o'clock, when the movements began which dis- 
 posed of our army as follows : 
 
 Wagner's division was sent to Spring Hill to guard 
 the reserve artillery and the wagon trains, which had 
 all been ordered there, from any raid by Hood's caval- 
 ry. General Stanley, the corps commander, went 
 with Wagner. Cox's division was posted along the 
 river, and was engaged all day in skirmishing with the 
 two divisions under Lee, which kept up a noisy dem- 
 onstration of forcing a crossing. Ruger's two bri- 
 gades were posted four miles north of Duck River, 
 where the pike to Spring Hill crosses Rutherford's 
 Creek, to hold that crossing. The divisions of Kim- 
 ball and Wood were aligned between Cox and Ruger, 
 facing up the river towards Hood's crossing. At nine 
 o'clock Post's brigade, of Wood's division, was sent up 
 the river to reconnoiter, and before eleven o'clock 
 Post had reached a position where he could see Hood's 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 19 
 
 column marching towards Spring Hill, and repeated- 
 ly reported that fact. 
 
 Nevertheless none of the four divisions near Duck 
 River were started for Spring Hill until after four 
 o'clock, when Schofield had heard from Stanley that 
 Hood was attacking at Spring Hill. 
 
 After the campaign Schofield claimed that its suc- 
 cess was due to his intimate knowledge of Hood's 
 character, gained while they were classmates at West 
 Point, which enabled him to foresee what Hood 
 would do under any given conditions, and then make 
 the best dispositions for defeating him. When, two 
 months later, Schofield was in Washington, where 
 they knew nothing about the details of the campaign, 
 he so successfully impressed his claim on the Admin- 
 istration that he was given the same promotion with 
 which General Sheridan had been rewarded for the 
 victory at Winchester, jumping at one bound from 
 the rank of captain to that of brigadier-general in the 
 regular army. But it is plain that after five hours of 
 deliberation that morning Schofield had reached a 
 wrong conclusion as to Hood's intention, for if "Ac- 
 tions speak louder than words," there can be no ques- 
 tion that Schofield's dispositions were made under 
 the conviction that Hood would march down the 
 river, after crossing, to clear the way for Lee to cross. 
 And so deeply infatuated was he with this self-im- 
 posed delusion that, disregarding the order of Thomas 
 and the advice of Wilson, he cherished it for about 
 five hours after Post had reported that Hood was 
 marching towards Spring Hill. 
 
 Wagner's advance, double-quicking through Spring 
 
20 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 Hill at noon, and deploying just beyond on a run, in- 
 terposed barely in time to head ofif the advance of 
 Hood's cavalry, Wagner arriving by the Columbia 
 Pike from the southwest and the cavalry by the Mount 
 Carmel Road from the east. General Forrest, com- 
 manding Hood's cavalry, had used his superior num- 
 bers so skillfully as to push back Wilson with our 
 cavalry just north of Mount Carmel, which is five 
 miles east of Spring Hill, before noon. Leaving one 
 brigade to watch Wilson, Forrest then crossed over 
 to Spring Hill with all the rest of his three divisions 
 of cavalry. If Wagner had arrived a few minutes 
 later he would have found Forrest in possession at 
 Spring Hill. 
 
 General Cox, in his book on this campaign, claims 
 that General Wilson committed a grave error in not 
 crossing over to Spring Hill, in advance of Forrest, 
 with all our cavalry. But in justice to Wilson it must 
 be remembered that at Mount Carmel he acted under 
 the belief that Schofield was following the advice he 
 had given early that morning. If Schofield had been 
 at Spring Hill at ten o'clock, as Wilson had advised, 
 with all his infantry, what reason could there have 
 been for the cavalry joining him there? 
 
 When Bradley's brigade, the rear of Wagner's col- 
 umn, was nearing Spring Hill, some of the cavalry 
 approached the pike through the fields to reconnoiter, 
 and the 64th Ohio was sent to drive them away. With 
 the right wing deployed as skirmishers and the left 
 wing in reserve, the regiment advanced steadily, driv- 
 ing before it the cavalry, without replying to the 
 harmless long-range fire they kept up with their car- 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 21 
 
 bines, but always galloping away before we could get 
 within effective range. About a mile east of the pike 
 we crossed the Rally Hill Road. This was the road 
 by which Hood's infantry column approached. There 
 it runs north nearly parallel with the pike to a point 
 five hundred yards east of Spring Hill, where it 
 turns west to enter the village. Leaving one of the 
 reserve companies to watch the road, the rest of the 
 regiment kept on in pursuit of the cavalry until our 
 skirmishers were abreast of the Caldwell house, about 
 eight hundred yards east of the road, when a halt was 
 called. A few minutes later, at two-thirty o'clock, 
 the left of our skirmish line, north of the Caldwell 
 house, was attacked by a line of battle in front while 
 the cavalry worked around our left flank. At the 
 time we believed the battle line to be a part of Hood's 
 infantry, and in a letter from General Bradley he 
 states that it caused great consternation at headquar- 
 ters in Spring Hill when Major Coulter of the 64th 
 came galloping back with the information that the 
 regiment was fighting with infantry. But investiga- 
 tion has disclosed that the battle line was composed of 
 rnounted infantry belonging to Forrest's command. 
 They were armed with Enfield rifles and always 
 fought on foot like ordinary infantry, using their 
 horses for traveling rapidly from place to place. 
 
 The four reserve companies were thrown in on a 
 run at the point of contact; but our line was soon 
 forced to fall back by the cavalry turning our left 
 flank, where they cut off and captured three of our 
 skirmishers. One of the three was badly wounded 
 that evening in trying to escape, a bullet entering from 
 
22 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 behind and passing through his mouth in a way to 
 knock out nearly one-half of all his teeth. We found 
 him in a hospital at Spring Hill when passing through 
 in pursuit of Hood's army after the victory at Nash- 
 ville. In relating his experience he stated that when 
 they were captured they were taken before some gen- 
 eral, name unknown to him, who questioned them 
 closely as to what force was holding Spring Hill. 
 The general was probably Forrest, for he was per- 
 sonally directing the attack on the 64th, but may have 
 been Hood himself, for he was on the Rally Hill 
 Road, less than a mile away, soon after the men were 
 captured. They all declared that they knew the 
 Fourth Corps was at Spring Hill, and they believed 
 all the rest of the army. Their declaration must have 
 carried greater weight on account of their own faith 
 in what they were telling, for at that time the whole 
 regiment believed that all the rest of the army had 
 followed to Spring Hill close on the heels of Wag- 
 ner's division. 
 
 Eventually the 64th was driven back across the 
 Rally Hill Road, where a last stand was made in a 
 large woods covering a broad ridge abutting on the 
 road about three-fourths of a mile southeast of Spring 
 Hill. While in these woods, occurred a bit of excit- 
 ing personal experience. A bullet, coming from the 
 right, passed through my overcoat, buttoned up to my 
 chin, in a way to take along the top button of my 
 blouse underneath the coat. That big brass button 
 struck me a stinging blow on the point of the left col- 
 lar-bone, and, clasping both hands to the spot, I com- 
 menced feeling for the hole with my finger tips, fully 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 23 
 
 convinced that a bullet coming from the front had 
 gone through me there and had inflicted a serious and 
 possibly a mortal wound. It was not until I had 
 opened the coat for a closer investigation that I found 
 I was worse scared than hurt. Some of the enemy 
 had secured a position on our right flank, where they 
 opened an enfilading fire, and it was one of their bul- 
 lets that had hit me. To get out of that fire the regi- 
 ment fell back towards the interior of the woods, 
 where it was so close to our main line that it was called 
 in. 
 
 It was then about three-thirty o'clock, and by that 
 time the situation of our army had become so critical 
 that nothing short of the grossest blundering on the 
 part of the enemy could save it from a great disaster, 
 and there was a fine possibility for destroying it. 
 
 Wagner's division had so much property to protect 
 that it was stretched out on a line extending from the 
 railway station, nearly a mile northwest of Spring 
 Hill, where two trains of cars were standing on the 
 track, around by the north, east, and south, to the 
 Columbia Pike on the southwest. Behind this long 
 line the village streets and the adjacent fields were 
 crammed with nearly everything on wheels belonging 
 to our army- ambulances, artillery carriages, and 
 army wagons to the number of about eight hundred 
 vehicles. The nearest support was Ruger's two bri- 
 gades, eight miles away, and it was about an hour later 
 before Ruger had started for Spring Hill. Opdycke's 
 brigade was covering the railway station and the 
 Franklin Pike on the north, and Lane's brigade the 
 Mount Carmel Road on the east. They had a con- 
 
24 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 nected line; but it was so long that much of it con- 
 sisted of skirmishers only. They had in their front 
 detachments of Forrest's cavalry feeling along their 
 line for an opening to get at the trains. Bradley's 
 brigade occupied an advanced, detached position on 
 the ridge to the southeast, that has been mentioned, to 
 cover the approach by the Rally Hill Road. There 
 v^as a gap of half a mile between Lane's right in front 
 of Spring Hill and Bradley's left out on the ridge. 
 Bradley had in his immediate front the main body of 
 Forrest's three divisions of cavalry and the three divi- 
 sions of infantry composing Cheatham's corps, while 
 four more divisions of infantry were within easy sup- 
 porting distance. In brief, ten of the twelve divisions, 
 cavalry included, composing Hood's army, were in 
 front of Spring Hill; and at four o'clock Hood was 
 attacking with his infantry Wagner's lone division, 
 guarding all our trains, while Schofield was still wait- 
 ing for Hood at Duck River with four divisions from 
 eight to twelve miles away. If Wagner's division 
 had been wiped out -a very easy possibility for the 
 overwhelming numbers confronting it while stretched 
 out on a line about three miles long, without any 
 breastworks - the rich prize of our ambulance train, 
 six batteries of artillery, and all our wagons with 
 their loads of supplies would have fallen into Hood's 
 hands, and the retreat of the four divisions would 
 have been squarely cut ofif, while having a short sup- 
 ply of artillery and no food or ammunition except 
 what the men were carrying in their haversacks and 
 cartridge boxes. The escape of our army from this 
 deadly peril was largely due to the great skill with 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 25 
 
 which General Stanley handled the situation at Spring 
 Hill, but manifestly no amount of skill on the part of 
 Stanley could have saved us, where the disadvantages 
 were so great, if the enemy had improved with a very 
 ordinary degree of vigor and intelligence the oppor- 
 tunity opened to them by Schofield's delusion as to 
 Hood's intention. General Hood rode with the ad- 
 vance of his column until after it had crossed Ruther- 
 ford's Creek, two and one-half miles south of Spring 
 Hill. It was then about three o'clock. There was 
 no bridge, and his men had to wade the creek, which 
 caused some delay. A short distance north of the 
 crossing Hood met Forrest and received his report of 
 the situation at Spring Hill as he had developed it 
 during the three hours preceding. He had met with 
 resistance on so long a line that no doubt he greatly 
 overestimated the force holding Spring Hill, and such 
 an estimate would agree with the story told by the 
 captured 64th men. 
 
 On the other hand, a courier had arrived with a 
 report from Lee that Schofield's main body was still 
 in his front at Duck River, and Lee's report was con- 
 firmed by the sounds of the heavy cannonading that 
 had been coming from his direction. These reports 
 disclosed that a part of Schofield's army was at Spring 
 Hill and a part at Duck River, but they conflicted as 
 to which position was held by his main body. In the 
 uncertainty thus arising. Hood decided, as his dispos- 
 itions clearly show, that his first move must be to plant 
 Cheatham's corps on the pike between those two parts. 
 Developments would then determine his next move. 
 Cleburne's division was the first to cross the creek, and 
 
26 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 marching up the road until his advance was close to 
 the woods where Forrest's men were fighting with the 
 64th Ohio, Cleburne halted and formed his battle line 
 along the road facing west towards the Columbia 
 Pike. If the intention had been to make a direct 
 attack, his line would have formed facing north to- 
 wards our line in the woods, where its position had 
 been developed by Forrest. The intention unques- 
 tionably was for Cleburne, avoiding any encounter 
 with our line in the woods, first to cross over to the 
 pike and then change direction and advance on Spring 
 Hill astride the pike, while Bate's division, following 
 Cleburne's, received orders as reported by Bate, to 
 cross to the pike and then sweep down the pike to- 
 wards Columbia. Hood himself gave the orders to 
 Cleburne and Bate and then established his headquar- 
 ters at the Thompson farm house near-by, about five 
 hundred yards west of the Rally Hill Road, and near- 
 ly two miles south of Spring Hill, where he remained 
 till next morning. To save time Cleburne started for 
 the pike as soon as he was ready, and Bate, then form- 
 ing on Cleburne's left, followed as soon as his forma- 
 tion was completed. 
 
 While Cleburne and Bate were moving out. Gen- 
 eral Cheatham was at the crossing hurrying over 
 Brown's division. Thus Brown could support either 
 Cleburne or Bate, as developments might dictate. 
 Uncandid statements have been made that Cheatham's 
 divisions were moved around in a disjointed manner 
 and without any plan. There was not only a logical 
 plan but a successful plan, if it had been carried out, 
 in the orders given to Cheatham's divisions. The 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 27 
 
 other four divisions were halted south of Rutherford's 
 Creek, and fronted into line facing west towards the 
 Columbia Pike. This proves that it was then Hood's 
 belief that Schofield's main body was still at Duck 
 River. If it should march up the pike and attack 
 Bate, the four divisions would be on its flank. If it 
 should attempt to reach the fortifications at Murf rees- 
 boro by cutting across the country south of Spring 
 Hill, the four divisions would be in a position to in- 
 tercept it. 
 
 General Bradley had four regiments in line in the 
 woods on the ridge, with the left towards the Rally 
 Hill Road and the right trending away towards the 
 pike. They faced in a southeasterly direction. To 
 cover more ground there were short gaps between the 
 regiments. The 65th Ohio was the right regiment of 
 the four, and to the right rear of the 65th was a gap of 
 a couple hundred yards extending out into cleared 
 land, where the /\.2& Illinois was posted, refused as to 
 the 65th and facing south to cover that flank. To the 
 front, right, and rear of the 42d was a broad expanse 
 of rolling fields extending on the right to the pike, 
 about one thousand yards away, where two guns were 
 posted to sweep the fields in front of the 42d with their 
 fire. To the left of the 42d an extension of the woods 
 ran out into the fields and concealed the 42d from 
 Cleburne until he had advanced almost abreast of its 
 position. When the 64th came oH the skirmish line 
 it was sent to the support of the 42d. The 36th Illi- 
 nois, Opdycke's only reserve, was hurried across on 
 double-quick from the other side of Spring Hill to 
 support the two guns at the pike. As many guns of 
 
28 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 the reserve artillery as could be utilized were placed 
 in battery around the southeasterly skirt of the village, 
 looking towards Bradley's position. Bradley's men 
 very hastily had constructed weak barricades of rails 
 or anything else they could lay their hands on. The 
 42d had such protection as was afforded by a rail 
 fence. 
 
 Shortly before four o'clock, having completed his 
 formation, Cleburne started to march across to the 
 pike. His division consisted of four brigades, but 
 one was on detached duty, and he had three in line- 
 Lowrey's on his right, then Govan's, then Granbury's. 
 First crossing a field in his front, Lowrey entered the 
 extension of the woods that has been mentioned, and 
 on emerging on the other side his right came in view 
 within easy range of the 42d, and that regiment opened 
 an enfilading fire, Lowrey's line being then almost per- 
 pendicular to the line of the 42d. It was this accident 
 of Lowrey's right passing within range of the 42d that 
 led to the failure of Hood's plan, which, up to that 
 minute, had been a great success. When the 42d 
 opened fire the two guns at the pike also opened, their 
 fire crossing that of the 42d, and the 64th, running 
 forward and intermingling ranks with the 42d, poured 
 in their fire. When our fire had thus developed our 
 position, out in those wide fields they could see just 
 what we had. They pulled down the rims of their 
 old hats over their eyes, bent their heads to the storm 
 of missiles pouring upon them, changed direction to 
 their right on double-quick in a manner that excited 
 our admiration, and a little later a long line came 
 sweeping through the wide gap between the right of 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 29 
 
 the 42d and the pike, and swinging in towards our 
 rear. Our line stood firm, holding back the enemy 
 in front until the flank movement had progressed so 
 far as to make it a question of legs to escape capture 
 when the regimental commanders gave the reluctant 
 order to fall back. The contact was then so close that 
 as the men on our right were running past the line 
 closing in on them they were called on with loud oaths, 
 charging them with a Yankee canine descent, to halt 
 and surrender; and, not heeding the call, some of 
 them were shot down with the muzzles of the muskets 
 almost touching their bodies. By the recession of the 
 two regiments on the flank the rear of the four regi- 
 ments in the woods became exposed. They were at- 
 tacked at the same time by Forrest in front and by 
 Cleburne on their right and rear and were speedily 
 dislodged. The attack was pressed with so much 
 vigor that, in a few minutes after the 42d had opened 
 fire, Bradley's entire brigade was in rapid retreat to- 
 wards Spring Hill, with Cleburne in close pursuit 
 and pouring in a hot fire. In falling back we had to 
 cross the valley of a small stream; and I never think 
 of our strenuous exertions to get out of a destructive 
 cross-fire, while running down the easy slope leading 
 to the stream, without recalling the story of the officer 
 who called to a soldier making the best time he could 
 to get out of a hot fire : "Stop, my man! What are 
 you running for?" 
 
 "Because I have no wings to fly with," called back 
 the soldier over his shoulder while increasing his 
 efforts to make better time. 
 
 As we descended into the valley, we uncovered our 
 
30 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 pursuers to the fire of the battery at the village, which 
 opened with shrapnel shells firing over our heads. 
 General Stanley, who was in the battery, reported that 
 not less than eight guns opened fire. As soon as Cle- 
 burne encountered that fire, he hastily drew back over 
 the ridge out of sight. All pursuit with its accom- 
 panying direct and cross-fire having thus ceased, 
 Bradley's men stopped running and walked back to 
 the vicinity of the battery, where a new line was 
 formed without trouble or confusion. When coming 
 down the slope towards the stream, Major Coulter, 
 whose horse had been killed, was running a few feet 
 in front of me, and I was just speculating whether my 
 short legs could keep up with his long ones, when he 
 called back over his shoulder: "Rally at this fence," 
 meaning a rail fence we were approaching. I had 
 a poor opinion of the fence as a place to attempt a 
 rally, for we would still be exposed to a cross-fire, but 
 wishing to obey orders I made for the strongest look- 
 ing fence corner in my front, and, jumping over and 
 stopping behind it, looked around to see if any con- 
 certed effort would be made to reform behind the 
 fence. In my brief halt there I had some opportunity 
 to observe the effect of our artillery fire on the enemy. 
 I saw by the smoke where a number of our shells ex- 
 ploded, and they all seemed too high in the air and 
 too far to the rear, for I could not see any men knocked 
 down by them. No doubt the fear of killing some of 
 our own men caused our gunners to aim high; and it 
 is probable that the noise made by so many guns and 
 exploding shells had more to do with stopping the 
 enemy than the execution that was done. Their after- 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 31 
 
 actions showed that they believed Bradley's brigade 
 to have been an outpost, that our main line was where 
 the battery was posted, and that so much artillery 
 must have a correspondingly strong infantry support. 
 
 General Bradley reported a loss of one hundred, 
 ninety-eight men in his brigade, nearly all of it falling 
 on the three regiments on the exposed flank, the other 
 three regiments falling back with light loss, because 
 their position had become untenable. He was dis- 
 abled with a wound, and Colonel Conrad, of the 15th 
 Missouri, then assumed command of the brigade. By 
 the casualties in the 65th Ohio, the command of that 
 regiment devolved upon the adjutant. Brewer Smith, 
 a boy only nineteen years old, and possibly the young- 
 est officer to succeed to the command of a regiment 
 throughout the war. 
 
 A regiment of the 23d corps, the provost guard at 
 Schofield's headquarters, which had come to Spring 
 Hill as a train guard, and was placed in support of the 
 battery at the village, has persistently claimed that 
 the salvation of our army was due to the heroic stand 
 it made after all of Wagner's division had run away. 
 In a historical sketch of the regiment in Ohio in the 
 War by Whitelaw Reid, occurs this statement: 
 
 At Spring Hill the regiment had another opportunity to 
 show its pluck. A division that had been sent forward in 
 charge of the trains was drawn up to resist any attack the rebels 
 might make while the regiment, being with the headquarters 
 train, was ordered to support a battery so placed as to sweep 
 an open field in front of the troops. The enemy, emerging 
 from the woods, marched steadily up to the National lines, 
 when the entire division broke and ran. 
 
 That is pretty strong language in view of the battle 
 
32 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 record of Wagner's division, for of the four brigades 
 out of all the brigades serving in all the western armies 
 given prominent mention by Colonel Fox in his book 
 on regimental losses as famous fighting brigades, two, 
 Opdycke's and Bradley's, belonged to Wagner's divi- 
 sion, to say nothing of the very awkward fact that the 
 brigades of Opdycke and Lane were on the other side 
 of Spring Hill, out of sight of Cleburne's attack, but 
 it is seriously so stated - 
 
 The entire division broke and ran, leaving the regiment 
 and the battery to resist the attack. Fixing bayonets the 
 men aw^aited the onset. As soon as the enemy came within 
 range they poured a well-directed fire into their ranks which, 
 being seconded by the battery, caused them to waver. Por- 
 tions of the retreating division having rallied, the rebels were 
 compelled to betake themselves to the woods. 
 
 In a paper on this campaign, Captain Levi T. Scho- 
 field relates how the officers of the regiment tried to 
 stop the flying troops and taunted their officers with 
 the bad example they were setting their men ; how the 
 regiment opened a rapid, withering fire from a little 
 parapet of cartridges which the officers, breaking open 
 boxes of ammunition, had built in front of the men; 
 and how their fire proved so destructive at that close 
 range that it stopped Cheatham's men who then fell 
 back and commenced building breastworks. In call- 
 ing them Cheatham's men, did the captain wish to 
 insinuate that Cheatham's whole corps was charging 
 on the regiment? He uses the words withering, de- 
 structive and that close range, in a way to raise the 
 inference that the contact was very close. The actual 
 distance was shrapnel-shell range, for the battery 
 stopped Cleburne with those missiles before he had 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 33 
 
 crossed the little stream more than one thousand yards 
 away, so that instead of a cool regiment of exceptional 
 staying qualities, delivering a destructive fire at very 
 close range, as pictured by the captain, the truth dis- 
 closes a highly excited, not to say a badly scared regi- 
 ment, wasting ammunition at too long range to do any 
 damage. That this was the truth is proved by the 
 very significant fact, not deemed worthy of mention 
 in either of the accounts quoted, that the regiment did 
 not lose a single man killed or wounded ; not one, and 
 it was not protected by breastworks. With impres- 
 sive mystery the captain describes the regiment as 
 what was left of it after the way it had been cut up in 
 the Atlanta campaign, with the same artful vagueness 
 used in the matter of the range, seeking to create the 
 inference that the battle losses of the regiment had 
 been very extraordinary. Again, to be specific, the 
 regiment lost in its three years' term of service two 
 officers and thirty-seven men killed or died of wounds, 
 less than one-third the average loss of the six regiments 
 composing Bradley's brigade, and it stands one hun- 
 dred, ninth among the infantry regiments of its state 
 in the number of its battle losses, or, excepting six 
 regiments that spent most of their time in garrison 
 duty, at the bottom of the list of all three years' regi- 
 ments sent from the state. It would appear that the 
 103d Ohio had become pretty well imbued with the 
 spirit characteristic of the headquarters with which 
 it was associated- to claim credit in an inverse ratio 
 to services rendered. 
 
 When Cleburne changed direction his left swung 
 in so close to the pike that the two guns and the 36th 
 
34 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 Illinois were driven away and Cleburne could then 
 have extended his left across the pike without meet- 
 ing with any further opposition. 
 
 Lowrey and Govan made the change in line of bat- 
 tle while Granbury faced to the right and followed 
 their movement in column of fours. Afterwards 
 Granbury about-faced, and moving back some dis- 
 tance in column, then fronted into line and advanced 
 to a farm fence paralleling the pike at a distance vari- 
 ously stated at from eighty to one hundred yards. His 
 line there halted and laid down behind the fence. 
 Cleburne and Granbury were both killed next day 
 and it is not known why Granbury did not go on and 
 take possession of the pike. The brigades of Lowrey 
 and Govan had become so badly mixed up in the pur- 
 suit of Bradley and in the recoil from the fire of the 
 battery, that their line had to be reformed. When 
 this was accomplished the intrepid Cleburne was 
 about to resume his attack towards Spring Hill when 
 he was stopped by an order from Cheatham, who had 
 brought up Brown's division on Cleburne's right, and 
 had also sent a staff officer to recall Bate with an order 
 for him to close up and connect with Cleburne's left. 
 This proves that developments, probably the fire of so 
 many guns opening on Cleburne, had convinced 
 Cheatham that the force holding Spring Hill was 
 strong enough to demand the attention of his entire 
 corps. His intention was for Brown to lead in an 
 attack, Cleburne to follow Brown, and Bate, when he 
 got up, to follow Cleburne. But on getting into posi- 
 tion Brown reported to Cheatham that he was out- 
 flanked several hundred yards on his right, and that 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 35 
 
 it would lead to inevitable disaster for him to attack. 
 The 97th Ohio of Lane's brigade was to the left of the 
 battery in front of Spring Hill, with the left of the 
 97th extending towards Mount Carmel Road. The 
 looth Illinois was on the other side of the road, sev- 
 eral hundred yards in advance of the 97th Ohio, and 
 the two regiments were connected by a part of the 40th 
 Indiana deployed as skirmishers. That was the force 
 that paralyzed the action of Brown's veteran division. 
 Cheatham then directed Brown to refuse his right 
 brigade to protect his flank and to attack with the rest 
 of his division; but Brown, still hesitating, Cheatham 
 then concluded that the force holding Spring Hill 
 was too strong for his corps alone to attack, for he 
 reported to Hood that the line in his front was too 
 long for him, and that Stewart's corps must first come 
 up and form on his right. But before Stewart could 
 get up, night had come. 
 
 It is notable that Brown's only excuse for not at- 
 tacking was that he was out-flanked on his right, for 
 the claim has been made that Hood arrived in front of 
 Spring Hill too late in the day to accomplish anything, 
 and Schofield himself has stated that his action was 
 based on a cool calculation, made from his intimate 
 knowledge of Hood's character, who had been defi- 
 cient in mathematics as a cadet, and could make no ac- 
 curate computation of the time required to overcome 
 difficulties: that Hood, marching by a muddy coun- 
 try road, would arrive in front of Spring Hill tired, 
 sleepy, and so much later than he had calculated, that 
 he would defer all action until next morning. Be- 
 tween '^shortly after daylight," when he started from 
 
36 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 Duck River, and three o'clock, when he had crossed 
 Rutherford's Creek, Hood had ridden about ten 
 miles - too short a distance to tire him out, and too 
 early in the day to become sleepy. He then sent for- 
 ward Cheatham's corps with plenty of time, before 
 night came, for Cheatham to have made a secure 
 lodgement on the pike, or to have run over Wagner's 
 division, the way it was strung out, if Cleburne's at- 
 tack had been promptly followed up with anything 
 like the vigor with which he had jumped on Bradley's 
 brigade. Hood's arrival in front of Spring Hill that 
 afternoon was clearly a contingency unlooked for by 
 Schofield, for it caught our army in a situation to 
 leave no reasonable hope of escape without dire dis- 
 aster, and Schofield himself, as will appear, was thor- 
 oughly frightened by the situation. That his after- 
 version of the saving merit of his cool calculation was 
 fully accepted by the Administration is proved by the 
 promotion he was given, when, in fact, his bad mis- 
 calculation was responsible for getting the army into 
 a trap from which it escaped through the failure of 
 the enemy to shut the door. Of the miracle of that 
 escape much remains to be told. When Wagner was 
 coming to Spring Hill, the 26th Ohio was detached 
 from the column to guard a country road entering the 
 pike more than a mile southwest of Spring Hill. Cap- 
 tain Kelly, of the 26th, informed me that the regiment 
 was driven of¥ that evening by a line of battle so long 
 as to extend far beyond either flank of the 26th. That 
 was Bate's division, and after driving ofif the 26th 
 there was nothing whatever to prevent Bate from 
 sweeping down the pike towards Columbia. If he 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 37 
 
 had diligently obeyed that order he would have pro- 
 gressed so far before Cheatham's recall order reached 
 him that he would have met Ruger coming to Spring 
 Hill, and then the cat would have been out of the bag. 
 Bate declined to obey Cheatham's first order because 
 it conflicted with the order direct from Hood, under 
 which he was acting, and Cheatham's order had to be 
 repeated. When the second order reached Bate he 
 was still loitering where he had encountered the 26th 
 Ohio. He had wasted about two hours of precious 
 time in doing nothing, for he had not only disobeyed 
 Hood's order to sweep down the pike, but he had not 
 even made a lodgement on the pike. It was then 
 about six-thirty o'clock, after dark, and Ruger's ad- 
 vance was just coming along. First leaving orders 
 for the other divisions to follow after dark, about 
 four-thirty o'clock Schofield had started with Ruger 
 to reinforce Stanley. Ruger skirmished with Bate 
 at the place and time indicated; but as Bate was off 
 to the east side, instead of astride the pike, where by 
 Hood's order he should have been, Ruger had no 
 difficulty in pushing past Bate. Granbury's brigade 
 was still lying behind the fence, close to the pike, and 
 after passing Bate, Ruger had to run the gantlet of 
 Granbury's line. Granbury had been notified that 
 Bate was coming from the left, and hearing Ruger 
 marching along the pike in the darkness, he mistook 
 him for Bate, so that Schofield himself, with Ruger, 
 rode along right under the muzzles of the muskets of 
 Granbury's line, in blissful ignorance of the danger 
 they were passing. Captain English, Granbury's as- 
 sistant adjutant-general, advanced towards the pike 
 
38 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 to investigate, but was captured by the flankers cover- 
 ing the march of Ruger's column, belonging to the 
 23d Michigan. Elias Bartlett of the 36th Illinois, 
 was on picket on the pike at the bridge across the creek 
 a half mile south of Spring Hill, and he informed me 
 that when Schofield came to his post he began eagerly 
 to inquire what had happened, saying that he had 
 feared everything at Spring Hill had been captured; 
 also that while they were talking, a Confederate 
 picket, near enough to hear the sound of their voices, 
 fired on them, and Schofield then rode on. A little 
 later Bate came up through the fields, Granbury fell 
 back from the fence and Cleburne and Bate then con- 
 nected and adjusted a new line with Bate's left brigade 
 refused so as to face the pike and all the rest of their 
 line running across the country away from the pike. 
 
 Bate had utterly failed to grasp the significance of 
 Ruger's passage, claiming that his flank was in danger, 
 and his representations to that effect were so urgent 
 that Johnson's division was brought up between nine 
 and ten o'clock and posted on Bate's left, Johnson's 
 line and the line of Bate's refused brigade paralleling 
 the pike at a distance of not more than one hundred 
 fifty yards. Many contradictory statements have been 
 made relative to the distance of that part of the Con- 
 federate line from the pike. The owner of the land 
 pointed out to me a small plantation graveyard as 
 being just inside their line that night. He said that 
 the position of their line was marked, after they had 
 gone in the morning, by the rail barricades they had 
 built, and by the remains of their bivouac fires, and he 
 very positively asserted that no part of their line, fac- 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 39 
 
 ing the pike, was distant more than one hundred, fifty 
 yards from the pike. All the intervening space was 
 cleared land. When the divisions of Cox, Wood, and 
 Kimball came up from Duck River later in the night, 
 they marched along unmolested within that easy range 
 of the Confederate line and could plainly see the men 
 around the bivouac fires. A staff officer was stationed 
 on the pike beyond Johnson's left, where the fires first 
 came into view, to caution the troops as they came up 
 to march by the fires as silently as possible. Captam 
 Bestow, of General Wood's staff, has related that when 
 the officer told Wood, riding at the head of his divi- 
 sion, that the long line of fires he could see paralleling 
 the pike so closely on the right was the bivouac fires 
 of the enemy, the veteran Wood was so astounded that 
 he exclaimed: "In God's name, no!" When they 
 came abreast of the fires one of Wood's orderlies, 
 believing it to be impossible they could be the enemy, 
 started to ride over to one of the fires to light his pipe, 
 but had gone only a short distance when he was fired 
 on, and came galloping back. A colonel of Johnson's 
 division has stated that he held his regiment in line, 
 momentarily expecting an order to open fire, until his 
 men, one after another, overcome with fatigue, had 
 all dropped to the ground to go to sleep. Some of 
 Johnson's men, on their own responsibility, went out 
 on the pike between the passage of the different divi- 
 sions, to capture stragglers for the sake of getting the 
 contents of their haversacks. They were the men who 
 made it unsafe, as reported by General Stanley, for a 
 staff officer or an orderly to ride along the pike when 
 a column of troops was not passing. 
 
40 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 General Hood had gone to bed in Thompson's house 
 when he was informed that troops were marching 
 along the pike. Without getting out of bed he di- 
 rected Colonel Mason, his chief of stafif, to send an 
 order to Cheatham to advance on the pike and attack, 
 but Mason admitted the next day, as stated by Gov- 
 ernor Harris of Tennessee, who was serving as a vol- 
 unteer aid on Hood's staff, that he never sent the 
 order. This strange neglect on the part of his own 
 chief of stafif affords a fitting climax to all the rest of 
 the imbecility that contributed to Hood's failure after 
 he had personally led the main body of his army to a 
 position where by all ordinary chances success should 
 have been certain. 
 
 There is a bit of Stanley's report that gives a clear 
 glimpse of the situation as Schofield and Stanley be- 
 lieved it to be after they had met that night: 
 
 General Schofield arrived from Columbia at seven o'clock 
 in the evening with Ruger's division. He found the enemy 
 on the pike and had quite a skirmish in driving them off. My 
 pickets had reported seeing rebel columns passing, east of our 
 position, as if to get possession of the hills at Thompson's 
 Station, and the anxious question arose whether we could force 
 our way through to Franklin. It was determined to attempt 
 this, and General Schofield pushed on with Ruger's division 
 to ascertain the condition of affairs. 
 
 Another vivid glimpse is afforded in the statement 
 of O. J. Hack, a conductor on the railroad, who was 
 also interested in a store at Columbia. He came down 
 the road that day on the last train southbound, having 
 in charge some goods for the store. At the Spring 
 Hill station he met the last train northbound and from 
 the trainmen learned that the army was retreating. 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 41 
 
 The two trains stood at the station that afternoon. 
 Some time after dark, being anxious to save his goods, 
 Hack went over to Spring Hill in quest of a guard to 
 run the trains back to Franklin. On inquiring for 
 headquarters he was directed to a large brick house 
 where he found Schofield and Stanley together. Scho- 
 field, recently arrived from Duck River, had just been 
 getting Stanley's account of the situation; and Hack 
 said that Schofield was in a condition of great agita- 
 tion, "walking the floor and wringing his hands." 
 When Hack had told what he wanted, Schofield 
 sharply replied that the enemy had possession of the 
 road north of Spring Hill, and the trains could not 
 move. The report of Stanley and the statement of 
 Hack concur in showing that it was then Schofield's 
 belief that Hood had possession of the Franklin Pike; 
 that the army was caught in a trap ; that the only way 
 out was the desperate expedient of forcing a passage 
 by a night attack, and, failing in that, he must fight a 
 battle next day under so many disadvantages that ruin- 
 ous defeat, with the probable loss of the army, was 
 staring him in the face. It would be interesting to 
 know what Schofield then thought about his intimate 
 knowledge of Hood's character, and his cool calcula- 
 tion based thereon, for which he afterwards so un- 
 blushingly claimed so much credit. 
 
 The two trains stood at the station until daylight 
 was beginning to dawn, when a detail of men came 
 and began to build fires to burn the cars; but the 
 detail was driven away, and the fires extinguished, 
 before much damage was done, by the advance of 
 the enemy. The two trains thus captured afforded 
 
42 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 the transportation to which Hood alluded in a letter 
 to Richmond, written when he was in front of Nash- 
 ville, wherein he stated that he had captured enough 
 transportation to make use of the railroad in bringing 
 up supplies. Schofield ignored the loss of the two 
 trains, for, in his official report, he explicitly states 
 that with the exception of a few wagons and of a few 
 cattle that were stampeded, he arrived at Franklin 
 without any loss. 
 
 When Schofield "pushed on with Ruger's division 
 to ascertain the condition of affairs," on his arrival at 
 Thompson's Station, three miles north of Spring Hill, 
 he found camp fires still burning, but the brigade of 
 cavalry that had been in possession there, withdrew 
 without making any resistance. This very consider- 
 ate action on the part of the cavalry was another of 
 those lucky fatalities that so notably contributed to 
 the escape of our army when such special fatalities 
 were a vital necessity for its escape. After posting 
 Ruger there to hold the cross roads, Schofield returned 
 to Spring Hill, where he arrived about midnight at 
 the same time with the advance of Cox's division com- 
 ing from Duck River. With this division he then 
 hurried through to Franklin, picking up Ruger as 
 he passed along, and thus saddling Stanley with all 
 the risk of saving the artillery and the trains. 
 
 If they had been lost Stanley would have been the 
 scapegoat but, with the same skill with which that 
 afternoon he had blufifed off ten-twelfths of Hood's 
 army with a single division, Stanley that night saved 
 the artillery and the trains. At three o'clock in the 
 morning, when only a part of the trains had pulled 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 43 
 
 out, the long column on the pike was brought to a 
 standstill by an attack some place in front. The situ- 
 ation was so critical that General Wood, who was then 
 with Stanley, believing it would be impossible to save 
 both troops and trains, advised that the trains be aban- 
 doned. Stanley, however, persevered until the attack 
 was beaten off and the column again in motion. The 
 two trains of cars had to be abandoned because a 
 bridge had been destroyed north of the station, and 
 about forty wagons were lost in the attacks made by 
 Forrest between Thompson's Station and Franklin. 
 Everything else was saved. 
 
 Stanley, by the way, was one of the many good sol- 
 diers who were overslaughed by the big promotion 
 obtained by Schofield. Stanley outranked Schofield, 
 both as a captain in the regular army and as a major- 
 general of volunteers. By assignment of the presi- 
 dent, gained by his extraordinary ability in the arts of 
 diplomacy, instead of by fighting ability displayed on 
 the battle-field, Schofield was a department command- 
 er while Stanley was a corps commander, and it thus 
 happened that Stanley was serving under his junior 
 in rank. 
 
 Wagner's division was the last to leave Spring Hill. 
 When night came Bradley's brigade began to en- 
 trench the line it was on, and kept at this work until 
 nearly midnight when the men were called under 
 arms, and spent all the remainder of that anxious, 
 weary night on their feet. While standing in column 
 we could hear to our left the rumble of the wheels 
 where the artillery and the wagons were pulling out, 
 and much of the time could be heard the dull tread of 
 
44 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 many feet and the clicking of accoutrements that told 
 of the march of a column of troops along the pike; 
 but there was no other sound - not even the shout of a 
 teamster to his mules or the crack of a whip. All the 
 surroundings were so impressive as to subdue the most 
 boisterously profane men. In expressing their dis- 
 satisfaction with the situation, they were always care- 
 ful to mutter their curses in a tone so low as to be 
 inaudible a short distance away, for, looking to our 
 right, we could see the glow on the sky made by the 
 bivouac fires of the enemy, and in some places could 
 see the fires with a few men about them cooking some- 
 thing to eat, or otherwise engaged, while most of their 
 men were lying on the ground asleep. Every minute 
 of those anxious hours we were looking for them to 
 awake to the opportunity that was slipping through 
 their fingers and grab hold of it by advancing and 
 opening fire on the congested mass of troops and 
 trains that choked the pike. Occasionally our col- 
 umn would move on a short distance. Any orders 
 that may have been given were spoken in a low tone 
 at the head of the column. You would be apprised 
 that the column was moving by the silent disappear- 
 ance in the darkness of your file leader. You would 
 hurry after him, and taking, perhaps, not more than a 
 dozen steps, would be brought to a sudden halt by 
 running against him, immediately followed by the 
 man in your rear bumping up against yourself. Then 
 would follow an indefinite wait until the column 
 would again move on a short distance. The wearing 
 suspense of the long waiting, while standing on our 
 feet, the exasperating halts following those false starts, 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 45 
 
 when everybody was almost frantic with impatience 
 to go on, the excessive physical fatigue, combined with 
 the intense mental strain when already haggard from 
 much loss of sleep during the three days and nights 
 preceding, make that night memorable as by far the 
 most trying in nearly four years of soldiering. It 
 afforded unspeakable relief when, just as daylight was 
 beginning to dawn, our column finally got away in 
 rapid motion for Franklin, the enemy dogging our 
 heels with their close pursuit. 
 
 The location of Hood's headquarters was central as 
 to the position of his troops until nightfall, and was, 
 therefore, a proper one. He was, however, too far 
 away to get any personal knowledge as to what was 
 going on at Spring Hill, and he had to rely on the 
 reports of his subordinates who were in contact with 
 our troops. The character of those reports is unmis- 
 takably indicated by the second move that Hood made. 
 His first move, as has been shown, was based on the 
 correct theory that a part of Schofield's army was at 
 Spring Hill and a part at Duck River, and it contem- 
 plated thrusting in Cheatham's corps between those 
 two parts. His second move, made after the fighting 
 was all over and he had received the reports of that 
 fighting, was based on the theory that all of Schofield's 
 army had reached Spring Hill, for, abandoning all 
 purpose of cutting off any part south of Spring Hill, 
 it contemplated seizing the pike north of Spring Hill 
 and cutting off Schofield's retreat to Franklin. 
 
 Between sunset and dark, as stated by General Stew- 
 art, which would be about five o'clock at that season 
 of the year, he received orders to cross Rutherford's 
 
46 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 Creek with his corps, to pass to the right of Cheat- 
 ham's corps, and to extend his right across the Frank- 
 lin Pike. After about five hours Stewart finally went 
 into bivouac with his right more than a mile away 
 from the Franklin Pike. His explanations for his 
 failure were the lack of a competent guide, the dark- 
 ness of the night, and the fatigue of his men. To ac- 
 complish Hood's orders required a march of a little 
 less than four miles by Stewart's head of column - 
 about three miles by a direct country road leading 
 nearly to the Mount Carmel Road, and the remaining 
 distance across the country lying between the Mount 
 Carmel Road and the Franklin Pike. It would seem 
 that a guide might have been found among the cavalry 
 who had explored the country that afternoon in devel- 
 oping the position of our line between the Mount Car- 
 mel Road and the railway station, west of the Frank- 
 lin Pike. There were also men in some of the Ten- 
 nessee regiments whose homes were in that vicin- 
 ity and who were thoroughly familiar with the 
 ground. That no great difficulties were involved in 
 the march is proved by the fact that Johnson's division 
 made a similar march in about two hours, later in the 
 night, to get into position on Bate's left. The night 
 was as dark, the men were as tired, the distance was as 
 great, and the way was as difficult for Johnson as for 
 Stewart. In view of these plain facts, it is a fair in- 
 ference that Stewart made a very lukewarm effort to 
 accomplish Hood's orders, that it was possible for 
 him, by a display of no more energy than Johnson 
 displayed, to have extended his right across the Frank- 
 lin Pike as early as seven o'clock, and then when Scho- 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 47 
 
 field started north with Ruger's division about nine 
 o'clock, he would have found the way effectually 
 barred. 
 
 The prime cause of Hood's failure was apparently 
 the lack of confidence in his generalship on the part of 
 so many of his subordinates. They had been dissatis- 
 fied with his appointment to the command of the army, 
 and their dissatisfaction had been greatly increased 
 by the failure of his attacks on Sherman's lines in 
 front of Atlanta. With the poor opinion they held of 
 Hood's ability, it was not possible for them to give to 
 any plan of his that wholehearted unquestioning sup- 
 port that gives the best guarantee of success. Simple 
 as his plan was, they all failed to grasp the importance 
 of getting possession of the pike and, Cleburne except- 
 ed, they all acted as if they were expecting a repetition 
 of the disastrous experience that had followed the 
 attacks on Sherman. The promptness with which 
 Cleburne turned and rolled up Bradley's brigade, 
 when he was so unexpectedly assailed on his own flank, 
 was the only energetic action on the part of any of 
 them after they had crossed Rutherford's Creek; and, 
 no doubt, if Cleburne had not been halted by Cheat- 
 ham's order, he would have gone on until he had 
 reaped the full measure of success made so easily pos- 
 sible by the faulty situation of our army. Amid all 
 the exciting occurrences of that eventful evening it is 
 amazing that no inkling of that faulty situation seems 
 ever to have entered the mind of any one of those vet- 
 eran generals. 
 
 Hood made a mistake, as stated by himself, in not 
 taking Lee's corps on the flank march instead of Cheat- 
 
48 John K. Shellenberger 
 
 ham's corps. He believed that with Lee in Cheat- 
 ham's place he would have succeeded, and in view of 
 the skill with which Lee executed the part assigned 
 to him to hold Schofield at Duck River, it is more than 
 probable he would have given at Spring Hill far 
 better support than Cheatham gave. Hood led Cheat- 
 ham within sight of an easy and brilliant success, and 
 it was the hesitation displayed by Cheatham, Brown, 
 and Bate at the critical time, that defeated Hood's 
 plan and saved Schofield's army. That their hesita- 
 tion was not due to any lack of courage on their part, 
 or on the part of the troops they commanded, was 
 abundantly proved by the unsurpassed courage with 
 which they assaulted at Franklin next day when it was 
 everlastingly too late. If they had fairly utilized at 
 Spring Hill one-tenth part of the courage that was 
 thrown away on the breastworks of Franklin, they 
 would have changed the later current of the war with 
 results too far reaching to be estimated. 
 
 The prime purpose of Schofield's campaign was to 
 delay Hood. How well he succeeded in that pur- 
 pose can be significantly stated in a single sentence: 
 the evening of November twenty-ninth he was at Duck 
 River, and the morning of December first he was at 
 Nashville, more than forty miles away. Then fol- 
 lowed the panicky feeling displayed by the Admin- 
 istration and by General Grant, because General 
 Thomas was not ready to attack Hood immediately on 
 his appearance in front of Nashville. If Schofield's 
 orders at Duck River had been to make no effort to 
 delay Hood but to get inside the fortifications of Nash- 
 ville with the least possible delay, he would not have 
 
The Battle of Spring Hill 49 
 
 covered the distance in so short a time without the spur 
 of Hood's flank movement. The celerity with which 
 he ran out of the country was due to the scare he got at 
 Spring Hill. 
 
 From Franklin next day he wired General Thomas 
 at Nashville that he had come through, but that the 
 least mistake on his part, or the fault of any subordin- 
 ate, might have proved fatal, that he did not want to 
 get into such a tight place again, that a worse position 
 for an inferior force than the one at Franklin could 
 hardly be found, that he had no doubt Forrest would 
 be in his rear next day, or doing some worse mischief, 
 and that he ought to fall back to Brentwood at once. 
 In short, his Franklin dispatches, read by the light of 
 Stanley's report and of Hack's statement, clearly show 
 that his mind was still dominated by the fright of 
 Spring Hill, and that he could feel no security short 
 of Brentwood, where he would be backed up too close 
 to Nashville for Hood to have room to repeat that 
 terrible flank movement. Not even the wrecking of 
 Hood's army on the breastworks of Franklin that even- 
 ing could reassure Schofield. He insisted on retreat- 
 ing to Nashville that night when thousands of the men 
 were in such a condition from more than forty hours 
 of incessant marching, fortifying, and fighting that 
 they dozed on their feet while they were walking, and 
 in spite of the manly protest of General Cox, who was 
 so urgent in his efforts to persuade Schofield no more 
 running was necessary, that he offered to pledge his 
 head he could hold the position.