ί*'>^1(ΚΪ5^^' r.J^ '^^^ >ί^ W^S! ^#>.ί τι pp. 2Λ Glass Book T55"G GjpglitN " U i^ "5 CuEssaam oe«)bi& I THUCYDIDES TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH WITH INTRODUCTION, MARGINAL ANALYSIS, AND INDEX BY B. JO WET T, M.A. MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD DOCTOR IN THEOLOGY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LEYDEN ΙΕϊιιίίϊϊ, ioitij a Preface to American lEnition A. P. PEABODY, D.D., LL.D. \ BOSTON D. LOTHROP & CO., PUBLISHERS FEANKLIN STREET 1883 Copyright, 1883. D. L0THROP AND Company. ' ι I f C5o TO THE EIGHT HONORABLE VISCOUNT SHERBROOKE, ONE OF THE Best (3xzzk Scfjfllars in 3EngIanii, WHOSE GENUINE LOVE OF ANCIENT CLASSICAL LITEEATUEE (THOUGH SOMETIMES DISSEMBLED) * IS AS ΛΥΕΕΕ IvNOWN TO HIS FEIENDS, AS THE KINDNESS OF HIS HEAET, AND THe'cHAEM OF HIS CONVEESATION. PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION. The History of the Peloponnesian War, while in the original it has unique claims on the careful study of the classical and philological scholar, is of hardly less interest to the general reader. It is a model work, both for precision and for conciseness. Its fl details of place and person, time and number, are so minutely accurate, that one need never drop the thread of continuous narrative for a single moment. The story carries within itself full evidence of its authenticity. The author, himself an actor in the events which he records, and conversant with many of the leading persons concerned in them during the twenty years and more which the history covers, evidently put on record little or nothing which had not fallen within his own personal knowledge, or been learned directly from the actors or sufferers. His, too, is the most transparent of all histories. I He employs no pigments; he is perfectly dispas- 1 sionate. The few transient glimpses that he gives I of himself dispose us to regard him as just and ί humane; but he manifestly thought his own moral i portraiture out of place in the narrative, and sedu- lously kept himself in the background. VI PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITIOK This work has, as we thint, its highest value as a chapter in the history of civihzation considered in- dependently of literary and artistic culture. The Periclean age has left monuments of genius which succeeding times have copied and emulated, but never equalled. The inquiry naturally suggests itself, whether the manners and morals of the age, especially of the Athenian people, had been moulded or essentially modified by the liberal culture, attained in a transcendent measure by the few, and largely accessible to the many. In this field of inquiry Thucydides is, undoubtedly, the most trustworthy witness extant, however willingly the partial Phil- hellelie would set aside his testimony. It would be presumptuous to criticise, and super- fluous to commend Professor Jowett's Translation. Every Greek scholar is fully aware of his eminence — it is hardly too much to say pre-eminence — both as a translator and as a critic. The English edition from which this reprint is made is in two volumes, — the second (referred to in the Introduction) con- sisting of critical notes, valuable, indeed intelligible, only to the Greek scholar, and to him only with the Greek text in hand. The present publication has for its sole design to place the great ivork of Thucydides Avithin easy reach of those who can, or will, read it only in English. The first volume, therefore, alone is reprinted. The sheets have been carefully com- pared, and brought into entire conformity, with the English edition. A. P. Peabody. liiTEODUCTIOlSr. The text which has been followed m this transla- tion (except where a departure from it is indicated at the foot of the page) is that of the first smaller edi- tion of Poppo (1843-1851), Avhich adheres -more closely to the authority of the MSS. than the later edition begun by Poppo and continued by Stahl. It was originally intended that the work should contain a series of essays on subjects connected with Thucy- dides. But the accomplishment of this part of the design has been unavoidably delayed. The writer hopes to complete what is wanting in the course of a year or two. He gratefully acknowledges the valuable help of more than one friend ; first, and above all, of "W. H. Forbes, Fellow of Balliol College, λυΥιο during several years has been his unwearied and disinterested felloAV- laborer in a long and necessarily tedious work. FeΛV persons take as much conscientious pains about their own writings as he has taken about those of another. To his admirable scholarship is due mainly the degree of accuracy which the translator has been able to attain ; and he is indebted to him for many excellent remarks and suggestions. The essay on Inscriptions viii INTRODUCTION. in the second volume has been in great measure com- piled from data which he has collected and analyzed. The translator will always reckon the days which they have passed together in the study of Thucydides to have been among the happiest and most useful of his life. To his friend Professor Campbell of St. Andrews, besides many other obligations, his best thanks are due for the correction of several errors in the notes. The full and well-arranged index to the text is the work of Mr. Matthew Knight, who has given an amount of thought and care to it rarely bestowed on such ungracious tasks. The translator has had the advantage of being anticipated by Mr. Crawley, late Fellow of "Wor- cester College, and in part by Mr. Wilkins, Fellow of Merton College. He has not refrained from consult- ing their translations in several passages, and desires to express his gratitude for the assistance which he has received from them. He has also occasionally referred to the clear and elegant French translation of .Betant, but much more frequently to his invaluable lexicon. The old version of Hobbes, though bearing a famous name, is very rough and inaccurate, and has been sometimes praised a good deal beyond its real merits. An interest would attach to Dr. Smith's translation, if it could be believed that Lord Chatham (who, it may be remembered, gave special instructions that his son William Pitt should read Thucydides at College) had contributed to the work " the Funeral Oration." But the hand of the great Orator is nowhere discernible in the performance. The edition of Dr. Arnold has given a powerful INTRODUCTION. ΐχ stimulus to the study of Thucydides in England. Himself inspired with the love of his author, he inspired the love of him in others. He certainly pos- sessed that quality of a Commentator from which an ancient writer gains so much, the gift of intelligent appreciation. He first showed how Thucydides might be translated with elegance and accuracy. Though not a great philologer or a learned inquirer, and add- ing little to actual knowledge, he created an interest about geography and archaeology, and even about the interpretation of difficult passages, such as never existed before among his countrymen. His notes are often models of good English and good sense. It is to be regretted that, amid the variety of his pursuits, he never gained an intimate and idiomatic acquaint- ance with the language of Thucydides, and never formed a sound notion of textual criticism. He is frequently led away by fanciful comparisons of things Biblical and Classical, of Greek and English con- structions, and of events ancient and modern. The influence of i^iebuhr over him is perceptible in his speculations about ancient Greek races. But he had a true feeling for Greek history and life, and all students of Thucydides have reason to be thankful to him. "When a great man undertakes the office of an interpreter he throws a light upon the page which the merely verbal critic is incapable of communicating, and it would be ungrateful to scan too closely his deficiencies in scholarship. A new epoch in the knowledge of Thucydides was made by Poppo's edition, beginning in the year 1815 with ^^ Commentationes Criticae," and ending in the year 1856 with a " Commentatio de Historia Thucy- i. / / INTRODUCTION. didis." The bulk of the work is contained in two volumes of prolegomena, and in eight volumes of text and scholia, and of annotations on them. This grand edition may be criticised on the grounds of old-fash- ioned scholarshijD, of imperfect judgment of the MSS., of deficiency in historical imagination, and of immod- erate prolixity. But Poppo has the great merit of being almost always right. There is no trace of the mind and genius of Arnold to be discovered in his pages ; they are not written in a form either attractive or suggestive to the student of history. Yet the true scholar will look with respect and admiration on the twelve volumes, not merely as a vast thesaurus in which nearly everything illustrative of Thucydides has been accumulated, but because the editor mani- fests a real insight into the meaning of his author. For Poppo was the first who saAV that the language of Thucydides had a laAV of its ΟΛνη, and was not merely to be judged of by the precepts of gram- marians, Avhether ancient or modern. Taking the accusations of Dionysius of Halicarnassus as his basis, he proceeds to show that the supposed irregu- larities of Thucydides, the confusions of persons, genders, numbers, voices, moods, tenses, are not real confusions or irregularities, but are attributable to an imperfect or unfixed state of grammar or lan- guage, and have a principle underlying them. Either they folloiv some analogy or verbal association; or they obey the sequence of thought rather than the rules of grammar; or they are due to some attraction of sound or sense; or they blend the language of poetry and prose at a time when the Uyo were not yet accurately distinguished. Of two legitimate usages, INTRODUCTIOK xi that which afterwards fell into disuse, and which therefore appears to be irregular, is sometimes pre- ferred. Many of the so-called solecisms are at vari- ance, not so much with grammar, as with the practice of later Greek; or, if they are ungi^ammatical, we must enlarge our notions of grammar that we may be able to embrace them. At the same time it would be maintained by Poppo that Thucydides has rarely, if ever, allowed himself liberties not to be found somcAvhere in other winters. These principles he bases ui3on a large induction of examples, and par- tially succeeds by the help of them in emancipat- ing himself and his author from grammatical super- stitions. Poppo's edition is eminently distinguished by so- briety of judgment. Trained in the school of Her- mann (although the Master in later life forgot his own lesson), he had been early warned against the license of conjectural emendation; and his familiar acquaintance with the language of Thucydides en- abled him to see that conjecture is unnecessary, where a scholar of a more general type would have pronounced against the genuineness of the text. It must be admitted that he has not the gift of clear exposition or of exhibiting the parts of an argument in their true relation to one another; and in winding through the long notes of the larger edition we have sometimes a diiiiculty in separating his ΟΛνη vieΛV fiOm that of others whom he is confuting. But though his meaning is not always apj)arent on the surface, there is to be found at the bottom good sense and true philological tact. The life-time de- voted by him to the study of Thucydides was by no "^ xii INTRODUCTION. means wasted, for he restored to a great writer natural principles of interpretation. Later editors have added comparatively little to him, and would probably have done better if they had followed more closely in his footsteps. The most distinguished of his successors, Classen, while equalling, or perhaps exceeding him, in subtle analysis of the language, falls very far short in soundness of judgment. The translator is never- theless bound to acknowledge that he is under con- siderable obligations to his work, as well as to the useful edition of Bohme. Some valuable contribu- tions to the study of Thucydides have been made by the minute learning of Kriiger: of these he has also availed himself. The language of Thucydides presents a curious and interesting problem, because it belongs to a period Λvhen the uses of words and constructions Λvere not yet fixed, and an original writer had much greater freedom in varying them than was possible in the Alexandrian times. As centuries went "on, "the individual withered" and "the world" of language ^^ was more and more." There was no force of mind seelring expression for itself, trying experiments, or struggling against the conventionalities which were imposed upon it. The daily practice of oratory, the precepts of a thousand grammarians, reduced the mighty genius of Hellas to the level of a later generation. Men instead of wrestling with language and logic, fell under the dominion of them. ISTo one in the age of Aristotle would have dared to write like ^schylus or Thucydides ; as no one in our own day would attempt to imitate Shakspeare. INTRODUCTION. xiii Poetry sooner submitted to the yoke than prose, which had hitherto been used only in the current είρομένη λέξις^ and' was incapable of expressing the higher thoughts of men, in the age when the heaven of abstractions, " Won from the void and formless infinite," was just begining to appear. Thucydides came under the influence of that new intellectual world which broke upon the Greek in the fifth century before Christ, and which is never sufficiently appreciated by us because we have inherited it and habitually live in it. But not at once was language adequate to re- ceive or take up into itself the ideas which were ask- ing for expression. The forms of speech and writing were slowly adjusted to the mental movement of the age. Words had to be distinguished from things, arguments from fallacies. The grammatical con- struction and the logical connection of clauses and sentences were still clumsy and irregular, especially in Attic, though the sense of art was not wanting, and the sophist was busy elaborating his new rules and formulas, which had a remarkable fascination for the minds of the Athenians. Hence we see in the same writer the perfection of art and the greatest want of art, good taste and errors of taste, the meagre and false artificiality of the sophist combined with an antique beauty and masterly power in the delineation of facts. The speeches of Thucydides everywhere exhibit the an- titheses, the climaxes, the plays of words, the point which is no point, of the rhetorician, yet retain amid these defects of form a weight of thought to which XlV INTRODUCTION. succeeding historians can scarcely show the like. The narrative on the other hand is natural and simple, in the highest degree picturesque and dramatic, often deeply pathetic by its very severity, generally intelligible, and only getting into a tangle when at- tempting to express political and philosophical re- flections, as in the Corcyraean sedition. He who considers that Thucydides was a great genius writing in an ante-grammatical age, when logic was just be- ginning to be cultivated, who had thoughts far beyond his contemporaries, and who had. great diffi- culty in the arrangement and expression of them, who is anxious but not always able to escape tautology, will not be surprised at his personifications, at his confusion of negatives and affirmatives, of conse- quents and antecedents, at his imperfect antitheses and involved parentheses, at his employment of the participle to express abstract ideas in the making, at his substitution of one construction for another, at his repetition of a word, or unmeaning alteration of it for the sake of variety, at his over-logical form, at his forgetfulness of the beginning of a sentence be- fore he arrives at the end of it. The solecisms or barbarisms of which he is supposed to be guilty are the natural phenomena of a language in a time of transition; and though not always, as Poppo main- tains, common to other Greek writers, yet having some analogy by which they may be defended. They are also to be ascribed to a strong individual- ity, which subtilizes, which rationalizes, which con- centrates, which crowds the use of words, which thinks more than it can express (ψελλ^ζομένω γαρ εοικε) . Dionysius of Halicarnassus is right in attrib- INTRODUCTIOIir. XV uting the obscurity of Thucydides to himself as well as to his age ; for his contemporaries, •Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Xenophon, are far from secure. It is a commonplace, but one which cannot be too often repeated, that we must interpret an ancient writer by himself and by his own age, and not by modern notions. We must not add on to him our mysteries and moralities, or translate his confused modes of thought into our more distinct ones (more distinct at least to us). Neither must we measure him by our standards of right and wrong. His range of view may be limited, but we cannot safely enlarge it. Ήον can we argue from his inconsistencies or omission of details; nor draw inferences from his precise words, because we cannot expect him to use legal accuracy. The whole manner of ancient writ- ing \vas different from our own; we do not know whether the words or sentences of Thucydides were Λvritten down as soon as they occurred to the mind, or were long preserved in the treasure-house of memory. At what time the successive portions of his history were completed must forever remain un- certain to us. The sources from which the ancient historian gathered his narrative are very dissimilar to those which are at the disposal of the modern, the first meagre and oral, the latter often overwhelming the compiler by the very mass of his written and printed materials. A few ancient inscriptions at Athens or Delphi, the brief narrative of a writer like Hellanicus (i. 97), whom we can easily believe to have been "inaccurate in his chronology," or of An- tiochus the Syracusan (though there is no evidence that he was acquainted with the latter), the witness XVI INTRODUCTION. to events which was afforded by statues and build- mgs, such 'as the "columns taken from sepulchres" which \vere inserted in the walls of Athens, the de- crees of the senate, people, and magistrates, the best old traditions (i. 9 init.) — these are about all the suhsidia which Thucydides had to use. Modern history is gathered out of a multitude of books. Thucydides drew his narrative fresh from the lips of men after hearing the different accounts of the contending parties (v. 26 fin.). Whether his views are true or false \ve can only determine by internal evidence; for it is useless to balance them against the ever-diminishing truth and CA^er-increasing fic- tion of a later generation. N^or can Ave supplement the one by the other. Thucydides may possibly have been unjust to Cleon, but the sus23icion is not confirmed by the statement of Marcellinus that Cleon was the proposer of the decree by which he ivas ban- ished; for such an anecdote is more likely to be in- vented than not. AVhen, as in modern histories of ancient Greece, the good cloth of Herodotus or Thucydides or Xenophon is patched Avith the trans- parent gauze of Diodorus and Plutarch, the whole garment becomes unequal and ragged. There is a special impropriety in combining the fictions of later writers with the narrative of Thucydides, who stands absolutely alone among the historians, not only of Hellas, but of the world, in his impartiality and love of truth. We must accept ancient historians as they are, with their limited ideas and restricted means of knowledge, with their Hellenic conceptions of mor- ality and of nature. They are disappointing, like the IKTEODUCTIOK xvu Elgin marbles, to those who expect to find in them modern sentimentahsm or a modern political philoso- phy. But, like the Elgin marbles, to those who can appreciate their simplicity, their beauty, their origin- ality, they will seem to be worth all the rest. There have been many commentaries on the Classics both in ancient and modern times; and a kind of commentary on them is furnished by the ideas which the ancients themselves entertained about their great writers. But most of the ancient commentaries, and some of the modern, rather interpret to us the age in which they Λvere written than the author who is sup- posed to be illustrated by them. The treatise of Dionysius of Halicarnassus on the style of Thucy- dides, except in so far as it confirms the text in a multitude of passages, adds nothing to our knowl- edge of the book; but it throws a striking light on the narrow and feeble intelligence of the Graeco- Roman rhetorician and historian of the first century B.C., and of the world for which he wrote. Early criticism consists almost entirely in adapting the past to the present, in obtruding the notions of a later age upon an earlier one. And it is only by degrees that mankind have been able to exclude the subjective ele- ment which is always reappearing, and have learned to interpret an author from himself, or in the study of an age to confine themselves to the range of its ideas. Hitherto each age seems to have required its own interpretation or adaptation of Scripture, or of the Classics, and to have been dissatisfied with that of any other. It may be asked whether, as philology progresses and words are understood to have a fixed meaning — not that " which we bring to them," but XVm IKTKODUCTION. that which is contained in them — the art of interpre- tation must be always going on, like the labor of the Danaides, pouring into a sieve knowledge which is perpetually flowing out, and in eyery generation requiring to be replenished. Must we during every ten or twenty years have ncAV Commentaries on the Gospels and Epistles, new editions of Homer, Thucy- dides, Aristotle? No sooner does one appear than it begins to be forgotten, and another is with some anxiety expected. Such a perennial stream of inter- pretation tends to discredit itself, and may suggest the thought that it would be better to reprint old books instead of Avriting new ones. But there is really some answer to be made to the objection. In the first place, Λve have not so completely got rid of the " subjective " element as we are sometimes inclined to imagine. And after all the pains and labor which have been bestowed upon them by German and English scholars, we cannot be said even now to ha\^e editions of the principal Classics in \vhich nothing is superfluous and nothing Avanting. The old failings of the commentator, want of proportion, ostentation of learning, love of emendation, perverse ingenuity, the habit of controversy, still cling to him. Secondly, although many old editions are better than most new ones, the subtle advance of philological criticism, even during the last thirty or forty years, does make the correction of old-fashioned opinions necessary; there is hardly any book written in this century which does not require such a purgation almost equally AAdth those of preceding centuries. Little if anything can now be added to the sources of our kno\vledge, but there is a higher standard of evidence by which our INTKODUCTION. χίχ materials have to be estimated; and more discrimina- tion is needed in separating what is really certain from matters of opinion and conjectm^e. All criticism requires to be criticised before we can make a nearer approach to the truth. The traditions of famous scholars have not unfrequently to be repudiated in the light of facts. The wheat has to be separated from the chaff; the voluminous learning of past ages to be recast in easier and more manageable forms. And if Greek literature is not to pass away, it seems to be necessary that in every age some one who has drunk deeply from the original fountain should renew the love of it in the world, and once more present that old life, with its great ideas and great actions, its creations in politics and in art, like the distant remembrance of youth, before the delighted eyes of mankind. NOTE. In referring to the dates placed at the head of the English text,- it must be remembered that Thucydides' "year" or the "year of the war" begins about three months after the corresponding year B. C, and about three months before the corresponding Olympic year. For example, the attempt on Potidaeaof iv. 135 belongs to 422, not to 423 B. C. ; and the treaty of v. 47 to 01. 89. 4, not to 01. 90. 1. THUCYDIDES, BOOK I. Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the I. i. war in which the Peloponnesians and the Athenians fouofht ao'ainst one another. He bes^an to write when they first took up arms, belieAang that :'t ivould be great and memorable above any previous war. For he aro^ued Greatness of "^ '■ ^ the war. that both states were then at the full height of their military power, and he saw the rest of the Hellenes either sidino: or intendins: to side with one or other of them. Ko movement ever stirred Hellas more deeply than this ; it was shared by many of the Bar- barians, and might be said even to affect the world at large. The character of the events which preceded, whether immediately or in more remote antiquity, owing to the lapse of time cannot be made out with certainty. But, judging from the evidence which I am able to trust after most careful inquiry,^ I should imaofine that former ao:es were not OTeat either in their wars or in anything else. The country which is now called Hellas was not 2. regularly settled in ancient times. ^ The people were S?iofH?ni: 1 Or, connecting ώΐ' with μακρότατο»' : "But after carrying the inquiry to the farthest point at which any trustworthy evidence can be obtained." 2 Or, taking οΰ 71 άλα* closely together : ''until recent times." 1 EAELY lii^HABITANTS OF HELLAS. readiness of the early- tribes to migrate : the richer districts the more un- settled ; some of the poorer, like Attica, in reality the more pros- perous. migratory, and readily left their homes whenever they were overpowered by numbers. There was no com- merce, and they could not safely hold intercourse Λνίίΐι one another either by land or sea. The several tribes cultivated their own soil just enough to obtain a main- tenance from it. But they had no accumulations of wealth, and did not plant the ground ; for, being with- out Avails, they ivere never sure that an invader might not come and despoil them. Living in this manner and knowing that they could anyAvhere obtain a bare sub- sistence, they were always ready to migrate ; so that they had neither great cities nor any considerable resources. The richest districts were most constantly changing their inhabitants ; for example, the countries which are now called Thessaly and Boeotia, the greater part of the Peloponnesus with the exception of Arcadia, and all the best parts of Hellas. For the productive- ness of the land increased the power of individuals ; this in turn Avas a source of quarrels by Avhich com- munities ^ Avere ruined, while at the same time they Avere more exposed to attacks from Avithout. Certainly Attica, of AA^hich the soil was poor and thin, enjoyed a long free- dom from civil strife, and therefore retained its original inhabitants. And a striking confirmation of my argu- ment is afforded by the fact that Attica through im- migration increased in population more than any other region. For the leading men of Hellas,^ Avhen driven out of their oAvn country by AA^ar or revolution, sought an asylum at Athens ; and from the very earliest times, being- admitted to rights of citizenship, so greatly increased ^ Or, " gave to some commnnities greater poAver; this "was a source of quarrels, by Avhich they," etc. 2 Or, taking ές τά άλλα in anotlier sense: "that Attica through immigration increased in population quite out of proportion to her increase in other respects;" or, supplying τ'^ν "Ελλάδα and taking μετοικίας in another sense: "And here is a striking confirmation of my argument tliat the constant migrations were the cause Λvhich prevented tlie rest of Hellas from increasing equally with Attica. The leading men of Hellas," etc. MINOS. the number of inhabitants that Attica became incapable I. of containing them, and was at last obliged to send out colonies to Ionia. The feebleness of antiquity is further proved to me 3. by the circumstance that there appears to have been Jjj^^i^y^^ no common action in Hellas before the Trojan War. l^^^^i^;^ . And I am inclined to think that the very name was ^ο^ο^^^^^^^ not as yet given to the whole country, and in fact did f Jj?4"iians'^; not exist at all before the time of Hellen, the son of ^'^tion in°'' ' Deucalion; the different tribes, of Avhich the Pelasgian gfJ^^J^^^^- was the most widely spread, gave their own names to wa?"^ different districts. But when Hellen and his sons be- came powerful in Phthiotis, their aid was invoked by other cities, and those who associated with them gradually began to be called Hellenes, though a long time elapsed before the name prevailed over the Λvhole country. Of this Homer affords the best evidence ; for he, idthough he lived long after the Trojan War, nowhere uses this name collectively, but confines it to the followers of Achilles from Phthiotis, who were the original Hel- lenes ; when speaking of the entire host he calls them Danaans, or ArgiΛ"es, or Achaeans. JSi either is there any mention of Barbarians in his poems, clearly because there were as yet no Hellenes opposed to them by a common distinctive name. Thus the several Hellenic tribes (and I mean by the term Hellenes those Λvho, while forming separate communities, had a common language, and were afterwards called by a common name),^ owing to their weakness and isolation, were never united in any gi'eat enterprise before the Trojan War. And they only made the expedition against Troy after they had gained con- siderable experience of the sea. Minos is the first to whom tradition ascribes the 4. possession of a navy. He made himself master of a Beginnings ■^ «^ of civiliza- tion : Klines 1 Or, supplying κληθέντες mth both clauses: "those who suc- cessively acquired the Hellenic name, which first spread among the several tribes speaking the same language, and afterwards became universal." PIEACY. conquers the islands and clears the sea of pirates. 5. Old cus- toms which are still ex- isting iu some parts of the coun- try : dress of Athenians and Spartans. great part of what is now termed the Hellenic sea ; he conquered the Cyclades, and was the first colonizer of most of them, expelling the Carians and appointinof his own sons to govern in them. Lastly, it was he Avho, from a natural desire to protect his growing revenues, sought, as far as he was able, to clear the sea of pirates. For in ancient times both Hellenes and Barbarians, as well the inhabitants of the coast as of the islands, when they began to find their way to one another by sea had recourse to piracy. They were commanded by powerful chiefs, who took this means of increasing their wealth and providing for their poorer followers. They would fall upon the unwalled and straggling towns, or rather villages, which they plundered, and maintained them- selves by the plunder of them ; for, as yet, such an occupation was held to be honorable and not disgrace- ful. This is proved by the practice of certain tribes on the mainland who, to the present day, glory in piratical exploits, and by the witness of the ancient poets, in whose verses the question is invariably asked of newly-arrived voyagers, whether they are pirates ; ^ which implies that neither those who are questioned disclaim, nor those who are interested in knowing censure the occupation. The land too was infested by robbers ; and there are pails of Hellas in which the old practices still continue, as for example among the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and the adjacent regions of the continent. The fashion of wearino^ arms amono^ the continental tribes is a relic of their old predatory habits. For in ancient times all Hellenes carried weapons because their homes were undefended and intercourse was unsafe ; like the Barbarians they went armed in their every-day life. And the continuance of the custom in certain parts of the country proves that it once preΛ^ailed everywhere. The Athenians ΛΓere the first who laid aside arms and adopted an easier and more luxurious way of life. Quite recently the old-fashioned refinement of dress still 1 Od. iii. 73 fP. ; ix. 252; Hymn to Apoll. 452 ff. OTHER AKCIENT CUSTOMS. lingered among the elder men of their richer class, who I. wore under-garments of linen, and bound back their hair in a knot with golden clasps in the form of grasshoppers ; and the same customs long survived among the elders of Ionia, having been derived from their Athenian ancestors. On the other hand, the simple dress which is now com- mon was first worn at Sparta ; and there, more than any- where else, the life of the rich was assimilated to that of the people. The Lacedaemonians too were the first who in their athletic exercises stripped naked and rubbed themselves over with oil. But this was not the ancient custom ; athletes formerly, even when they were con- tending at Olympia, wore girdles about their loins, a practice which lasted until quite lately, and still prevails among Barbarians, especially those of Asia, Avhere the combatants at boxing and wrestling matches wear girdles. And many other customs which are now confined to the Barbarians might be shown to have existed formerly in Hellas. In later times, when navigation had become general 7. and wealth was be£:innino: to accumulate, cities were fortified i^ c ^ ' ^ toAviis begin built upon the sea-shore and fortified ; peninsulas too *^ first Inland were occupied and walled-off with a view to commerce th?s?a^.s^oS^ and defence against the neighboring tribes. But the older towns both in the islands and on the continent, in order to protect themselves against the piracy which so long prevailed, were built inland ; and there they remain to this day. For the piratical tribes plundered, not only one another, but all those who, without being sailors, lived on the sea-coast. The islanders were even more addicted to piracy than g. the inhabitants of the mainland. They were mostly The pirates Carian or Phoenician settlers. This is proved by the islands of Cciricin or fact that when the Athenians purified Delos ^ durino* the piioenician -yv , origin. Feloponnesian War and the tombs of the dead Λvere opened, more than half of them were found to be Carians. They were known by the fashion of their 1 Cp. iii. 104 init. THE TROJAN EXPEDITION". I. 9. Rise of the Pelopidae : the wealth and ροΛνβΓ which Aga- memnon in- herited from Atreus and Eurystheus enabled him to assemble the chiefs who fought at Troy. arms which were buried with them, and by their mode of burial, the same which is still practised among them. After Minos had established his navy, communication by sea became more general. For, he having expelled the pirates ^ when he colonized the greater part of the islands, the dwellers on the sea-coast began to grow richer and to live in a more settled manner ; and some of them, finding their Avealth increase beyond their ex- pectations, surrounded their towns with walls. The love of γ nesian War was a protracted struggle, and attended by caiamitie^'s! calamities such as Hellas had never known Avithin a andSa- like period of time. Never were so many cities cap- Among tke tured and depopulated — some by Barbarians, others by 16 CAUSES OF THE WAK. latter might be enumer- ated earth- quakes, eclipses, droughts, and lastly, the plague. QJ^^^^-'- 24. The story of Epidamnus. Civil strife and war with the barbarians. Hellenes themselves fio'htinoj ao^ainst one another ; and several of them after their capture were repeopled by strangers. Never were exile and slaughter more fre- quent, whether in the war or brought about by civil strife. And rumors, of which the like had often been current before, but rarely verified hj fact, now appeared to be well grounded. There were earthquakes unpar- alleled in their extent and fury, and eclipses of the sun more numerous than are recorded to have happened in any former age ; there were also in some places great droughts causing famines, and lastly the plague, ivhich did immense harm and destroyed numbers of the people. All these calamities fell upon Hellas simultaneously with the war, which began when the Athenians and Pelopon- nesians violated the thirty years' truce concluded by them after the recapture of Euboea.^ Why they broke it, and what were the grounds of quarrel, I λυΙΙΙ first set forth, that in time to come no man may be at a loss to know what was the origin of this great war. The real though unavowed cause I believe to have been the growth of the Athenian power, which terrified the T/acedaemonians and forced them into war; but the reasons publicly alleged on either side were as follows. The city of Epidamnus is situated on the right hand as you sail up the Ionian Gulf. Near it dwelt the Tau- lantians, a barbarian tribe of the Illyrian race. The place was colonized by the Corcyraeans, but under the leadership of a Corinthian, Phallus, son of Eratocleides, who was of the lineage of Heracles ; he was iuAdted, according to ancient custom, from the mother city, and Corinthians and other Dorians joined in the colony. In process of time Epidamnus became great and populous, but there followed a long period of civil commotion, and the city is said to have been brought low in a war against the neighboring barbarians, and to have lost her ancient power. At last , shortly before the Peloponnesian War, the notables were overthrown and driven out by the 1 Cp. i. 115, 146. THE EPIDAMNIANS AT COEIXTH. 17 B.C. 435 or 434. 01. 86, 2 or 3. people ; the exiles went over to the barbarians, and, I. uniting with them, plundered the remaining inhabitants both bv sea and land. These, findino; themselves hard The prayer ^ . of the Epi- pressed, sent an embassy to the mother-city Corcyra, ^^;^jfjf^^ begging the Corcyraeans not to leave them to their j^s rejected fate, but to reconcile them to the exiles and put doΛvn ^^^^^^l"^^^^ their barbarian enemies. The ambassadors came, and sitting as suppliants in the temple of Her^ preferred their request ; but the Corcyraeans would not listen to them, and they returned without success. The Epidam- 25. nians, finding that they had no hope of assistance from Corcyra, knew not what to do, and sending to Delphi inquired of the God whether they should deliver up the city to their original founders, the Corinthians, and en- deavor to obtain aid from them. The God replied that they should, and bade them place themselves under the leadership of the Corinthians. So the Epidam- T^ey place nians went to Corinth, and informing the Corinthians ^otection of the answer which the oracle had given, delivered °^ co^iiitii• up the city to them. They reminded them that the original leader of the colony was a citizen of Corinth ; and implored the Corinthians to come and help them, and not leave them to their fate. The Corinthians took up their cause, partly in vindication of their own rights (for they considered that Epidamnus belonged to them quite as much as to the Corcyraeans), partly too because they hated the Corcyraeans, who were their own colony but slighted them. In their common festivals they would not allow them the customary privi- leges of founders, and at their sacrifices denied to a Corinthian the rio^ht of receivinsr first the lock of hair cut from the head of the \dctim, an honor usually granted by colonies to a representative of the mother-country. In fact they despised the Corinthians, for they were more than a match for them in military strength, and as rich as any state then existing in Hellas. They would often boast that on the sea they were Λ^ery far superior to them, and would appropriate to themselves the naval 18 SIEGE OF EPIDAMNUS. B.C. 435 or 434. 01. 86, 2 or 3. 26. The Corin- thians send troops and colonists to Epidamnus. The Corcy- raeans de- mand their dismissal; on being refused they besiege the city. 27. The Corin- thians pre- pare for war and pro- claim a renoAvn of the Phaeacians, who were the ancient m- habitants of the island. Such feelings led them more and more to strengthen their navy, which was by no means despicable ; for they had a hundred and twenty triremes when the war broke out. Irritated by these causes of offence, the Corinthians were too happy to assist Epidamnus ; accordingly they invited any one who was willing to settle there, and for the protection of the colonists dispatched Λvith them Am- bracian and Leucadian troops and a force of their own. All these they sent by land as far as Apollonia, which is a colony of theirs, fearing that if they went by sea the Corcyraeans might oppose their passage. Great was the rage of the Corcyraeans when they discovered that the settlers and the troops had entered Epidamnus and that the colony had been given up to the Corinthians. They immediately set sail with five and twenty ships, folloΛved by a second fleet, and in insulting terms bade the Epidamnians receive the exiled oligarchs, who had gone to Corcyra and implored the Corcyraeans to re- store them, appealing to the tie of kindred and pointing to the sepulchres of their common ancestors.^ They also bade them send away the troops and the new settlers. But the Epidamnians would not listen to their demands. Whereupon the Corcyraeans attacked them with forty ships. They were accompanied by the exiles whom they were to restore, and had the assistance of the native Il- ly rian troops. They sat down before the city, and made proclamation that any Epidamnian who chose, and the foreigners, might depart in safety, but that all who re- mained would be treated as enemies. Being met by a refusal, the Corcyraeans proceeded to invest the city, which is built upon an isthmus. When the ncAvs reached the Corinthians that Epi- damnus w^as besieged, they equipped an army and proclaimed that a colony was to be sent thither ; all who Avished might go and enjoy equal right of citizen- ' Cp. iii. 58 med., 59 init. EMBASSY FROM CORCYRA £0 CORINTH. 19 B.C. 435 or 434 ; 01. 86, 2 or 3. ship; but any one who was unwilling to sail at once I. mio-ht remain at Corinth, and, if he made a deposit of colony to ο ^ Epidamnus. fifty Corinthian drachmae, might still have a share in H^ff^l^^ the colony.i Many sailed, and many deposited the ggj^iy^^,^^ money. The Corinthians also sent and requested the ^ convoy. Megarians to furnish them with a convoy in case the CorcjTaeans should intercept the colonists on their voyage. The Megarians accordingly provided eight ships, and the Cephallenians of Pal^ four; the Epi- daurians, of whom they made a similar request, five ; the Hermionians ones ; the Troezenians two ; the Leu- cadians ten ; and the Ambraciots eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they begged moneys and of the Eleans money, and ships without crews. On their own account they equipped thirty ships and three thousand hoplites. When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations 28. thay came to Corinth, takino: with them Lacedaemonian Thecor- *^ , ' ο ^ ^ cyraeans and Sicyonian envoys, and summoned the Corinthians propose ar- •^ "^ bitration, to withdraw the troops and the colonists, tellino^ them offering untn ■•■ . . ^ decision be that they had nothing to do with Epidamnus. If they |^^|^^*aw made any claim to it, the Corcyraeans expressed them- fJ^the^orFn- selves willing to refer the cause for arbitration to such ^iLw^th^iS' Peloponnesian states as both parties should agree upon, Jothto^J and their decision Avas to be final ; or, they were willing ^^?J, to leave the matter in the hands of the Delphian oracle. Sent.^^^' But they deprecated war, and declared that, if war there must be, they would be compelled by the Corinthians in self-defence to discard their present friends and seek others whom they would rather not, for help they must have. The Corinthians replied that if the Corcyraeans would withdraw the ships and the barbarian troops they would consider the matter, but that it would not do for them to be litigating while Epidamnus and the colonists were in a state of siege. The Corcyraeans rejoined that they would consent to this proposal if the Corinthians on * Fifty Corinthian drachmae are equivalent to eighty-three Attic drachmae: reckoning the Attic drachma at 9fd., the sum would amount to 3i. 7s. Qd. at amnus 20 CAPTURE OF EPIDAiMmJS. B.C. 435 or 434 ; 01. 86, 2 or 3. I. 29. The Corin- thians refuse and declare war. Sail- ing to Epi- damnus they are met and attacked by the Corcy- raeans and completely defeated. On the same day Epidamnus surrenders. 30. The Cor- cyraeans, having com- mand of the sea, plunder the allies of Corinth. their part would withdraw their forces from Epidamnus : or again, they were willing that both parties should remain! on the spot, and that a truce should be made until the decision was given. The Corinthians turned a deaf ear to all these over- tures, and, when their vessels were manned and their allies had amved, they sent a herald before them to declare war, and set sail for Epidamnus with seventy- five ships and two thousand hoplites, intending to give battle to the Corcyraeans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellichus, CalHcrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes ; the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchi- das the son of Isarchus. ^Yhen they arrived at Actium in the territory of Anactorium, at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, where the temple of Apollo stands, the Corcyi'aeans sent a herald to them in a small boat forbidding them to come on. MeauAvhile their crews got on board ; they had previously equipped their fleet, strengthening the old ships with cross- timbers, so as to make them serviceable. The herald brought back no message of peace from the Corinthians. The Corcyraean ships, numbering eighty (for forty out of the hundred and twenty were engaged in the blockade of Epidamnus), were now fully manned ; these sailed out against the Corinthians and, forming line, fought and won a complete victory over them, and destroyed fifteen of their ships. On the very same day the forces besieging Epidamnus succeeded in compelling the city to capitulate, the terms being that the Corinthians until their fate was deter- mined should be imprisoned and the strangers sold. After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans raised a trophy on Leucimme, a promontory of Corcyra, and put to death all their prisoners with the exception of the Corinthians, Avhom they kept in chains. The defeated Corinthians and their allies then returned home, and 1 Or, *' or again they would agree to arbitration on the condition that both parties should remain," etc. COEmTHIAN AND CORCYEAEAN EMBASSIES. 21 B.C. 435 or 434 ; 01. 86, 2 or 3. B.C. 433 ; 01. 86, 4. the Corey raeans (who were now masters of the Ionian I. sea), sailmo• to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, devasted At length >" ο '^ ' the Corin- th e country. They also burnt Cyllen^, where the t^i^ns form J *} ^ ^ a camp to Eleans had their docks, because they had supplied the protect them. Corinthians with money and ships. And, during the greater part of the summer after the battle, they retained the command of the sea and sailed about plundering the allies of the Corinthians. But, before the season w^as over, the Corinthians, perceiving that their allies were suffering, sent out a fleet and formed a camp at Actium and near the promontory of Cheimerium in Thesprotia, that they might protect Leucas and other friendly places. The Corcyraeans Λvith their fleet and army stationed themselves on the opposite coast at Leucimm^. Neither party attacked the other, but during the remainder of the summer they maintained their respective positions, and at the approach of wdnter returned home. For the Λ^hole year after the battle, and for a year 31. after that, the Corinthians, exasperated by their defeat, Thecorin- were busy in buildino^ ships. They took the utmost pare to renew •^ ο i J the war, and pains to create a o-reat navy : rowers Λvere collected the corcy- ο ./ raeans in from the Peloponnesus and from the rest of Hellas by alarm send ^ "^ an embassy the attraction of pay. The Corcyraeans were alarmed *» Athens ■*- «^ *^ whither they at the report of their preparations. They reflected that are followed ^ ^ ir J by Corinthian they had not enrolled themselves in the league either of envoys. the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians, and that allies in Hellas they had none. They determined to go to Athens, join the Athenian alliance, and get what help they could from them. The Corinthians, hearing of their intentions, also sent ambassadors to Athens, fearing lest the combination of the Athenian and Corcyraean navies might prevent them from bringing the war to a satisfac- tory termination. Accordingly an assembly Avas held at which both parties came forward to plead their respective causes ; and first the Corcyraeans spoke as follows : — "Men of Athens, those who, like ourselves, come to 32. others who are not their allies and to whom they have speech of the never rendered any considerable service and ask help 22 SPEECH OF THE CORCYKAEANS. B.C. 433 ; 01. I. Our neu- trality was a mistake, and has left us isolated at the mercy of the Corinthi- ans and their allies. 33. "We ask the aid of Athens, Avho will thus assist the oppressed, and gain our undying affec- tion. She should not reject the otter of the Corcyraean navy of them, are bound to show, in the first place, that the granting of their request is expedient, or at any rate not inexpedient, and, secondly, that- their gratitude Λνϋΐ be lasting. If they fulfil neither requirement they have no right to complain of a refusal. Now the Corey raeans, when they sent us hither to ask for an alliance, w^ere confident that they could establish to your satisfiiction both these points. But, unfortunately, we have had a practice alike inconsistent with the request which we are about to make and contrary to our own interest at the present moment : — Inconsistent ; for hitherto we have never, if we could avoid it, been the allies of others, and now we come and ask you to enter into an alliance with us : — Contrary to our interest ; for through this practice w^e find ourselves isolated in our war with the Corinthians. The policy of not making alliances lest they should endanger us at another's bidding, instead of being wisdom, as \ve once fancied, has now unmis- takably proved to be weakness and folly. True, in the last naval engagement we repelled the Corinthians single-handed. But now they are on the point of attacking us with a much greater force which they have drawn together from the Peloponnesus and from all Hellas. IVe know that we are too weak to resist them unaided, and may expect the worst if we fall into their hands. We are therefore compelled to ask assistance of you and of all the world ; and 3"ou must not be hard upon us if now, renouncing our indolent neutrality which was an error but not a crime, we dare to be inconsistent. " To you at this moment the request Λvhich we are making ofibrs a glorious opportunity. In the first place, you will assist the oppressed and not the oppressors ; secondly, you will admit us to your alliance at a time when our dearest interests are at stake, and λυΙΙΙ lay up a treasure of gratitude in our memories which will have the most abiding of all records. Lastly, we have a navy greater than any but your own. Eeflect ; Avhat good fortune can be more extraordinary, what more annoying S PEECH OF THE COECYBAEANS. 23 B.C. 433 ; 01. 86, 4. to your enemies than the voluntary accession of a power I. for whose alliance you would have given any amount of money and could never have been too thankful ? This power now places herself at your disposal ; you are to incur no danger and no expense, and she brings you a good name in the world, gratitude from those who seek your aid, and an increase of your own strength. Few have ever had all these advantages offered them at once ; equally few when they come asking an alliance are able to give in the Λvay of securit3i and honor as much as they hope to receive. "And if any one thinks that the war in which our ,^?;,S^„y services may be needed will never arrive, he is mistaken. He does not see that the Lacedaemonians, fearing the growth of your empire, are eager to take up arms, and that the Corinthians, who -are your enemies, are all- powerful with them. They begin with us, but they will go on to you, that we may not stand united against them in the bond of a common enmity ; they will not miss the chance of weakenino- us and streno^theninoj- themselves. And it is our business to strive first, we offering and you accepting our alliance, and to forestall their designs, instead of waiting to counteract them. " If they say that Λve are their colony, and that therefore 34. you have no right to receive us, they should be made to a eoioiTy oY^ understand that all colonies honor their mother-city ihfaSs^but Λvhen she treats them well, but are estranged from her ί^^^οπΛ^γ by injustice. For colonists are not meant to be the woS^Sby^ servants but the equals of those who remain at home. ^^^"^* And the injustice of their conduct to us is manifest : for we proposed an arbitration in the matter of Epidamnus, but they insisted on prosecuting their quarrel by arms and w^ould not hear of a legal trial. ^ When you see how they treat us who are their own kinsmen, take warning : if they try deception, do not be misled by them ; and if they make a direct request of you, refuse. For he passes through life most securely Λvho has least reason to re- proach himself with complaisance to his enemies. 1 Cp. i. 29 init. 24 SPEECH OF THE COKCYKAEANS. B.C. 433 ; 01. 86, 4. I. 35. Reasons -wliy the Athenians should re- ceive the Corcyraeans into alliance. They will not break the treaty. 36. They cannot afford to be scrupuloiis; Corcyra is on the Avay to Sicily; and is one of the three great maritime powers of Hellas. " But again, you Λνίΐΐ'ηοΐ break the treaty with the Lace- daemonians ^ by receiving us : for we are not allies either of you or of them. What says the treaty ? — ' Any Hel- lenic city which is the ally of no one may join whichever league it pleases . ' And hoΛv monstrous , that they should man their ships, not only from their own confederacy, but from Hellas in general, nay, even from your subjects, while they would debar us from the alliance which natu- rally oiFers and from every other, and will denounce it as a crime if you accede to our request ! With far better reason shall Λνβ complain of you if you refuse. For you will be thrusting away us who are not your enemies, and are in peril ; and, far from restraining the enemy and the aggressor, you Avill be allowing him to gather fresh forces out of your own dominions. How unjust is this ! Surely if you would be impartial you should either prevent the Corinthians from hiring soldiers in your dominions, or send to us also such help as you can be induced to send ; but it would be best of all if you would openly receive and assist us. Many, as we have already intimated, are the advantages which we offer. Above all, our enemies are your enemies, Λvhich is the best guarantee of fidelity in an ally ; and they are not weak but Λvell able to injure those who secede from them. Again, when the proffered alliance is that of a maritime and not of an inland power, it is a far more serious matter to refuse. You should, if possible, allow no one to have a fleet but yourselves ; or, if this is impossible, whoeΛ^er is strongest at sea, make him j^our friend. ■^ Some one may think that the course which we recom- mend is expedient, but he may be afraid that if he is convinced by our arguments he will break the treaty. To him we reply, that if he Avill only strengthen himself he may make a present of his fears to the enemy, but that if he reject the alliance he will be weak, and then his confidence, however reassuring to himself, will be anything but terrifying to enemies who are strong. It 1 Cp, i. 115 init. SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS 25 B.C. 433 ; 01. 86, 4. is Athens about which he is advising, and not Corcyra : I. will he be providing for her best interests if, Λvhen war is imminent and almost at the door, he is so anxious about the chances of the hour that he hesitates to attach to him a state which cannot be made a friend or enemy with- out momentous consequences ? Corcyra, besides oiFering many other ad\^antages, is conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily ; it stands in the way of any fleet coming from thence to the Peloponnesus, and can also protect a fleet on its way to Sicily. One ' word more, which is the sum of all we have to say, and should convince you that you must not abandon us. Hellas has only three considerable navies : — there is ours, and there is yours, and there is the Corinthian. Now, if the Corinthians get hold of ours, and you allow the two to become one, you will have to fight against the united navies of Corcyra and the Peloponnesus. But, if 3^ou make us your allies, you will have our navy in addition to your ΟΛνη ranged at your side in the im- pending conflict." Thus spoke the Corcyraeans : the Corinthians replied as follows : — "Since these Corc^a-aeans have chosen to speak, not 37. only of their reception into your alliance, but of our The neu- misdoino's, and of the unjust war which has been forced corcyraeausa '-' '^ pretence by upon them by us, we too must touch on these two ^^iiicii they •^ , ^ ' _ couceal their points before we proceed to our main argument, that you crimes. may be better prepared to appreciate our claim upon you, and may have a good reason for rejecting their pe- tition. They pretend that they have hitherto refused to make alliances from a wise moderation, but they really adopted this policy from a mean and not from a high motiΛ^e. They did not want to have an ally Avho might go and tell of their crimes, and who Avould put them to the blush whenever they called him in. Their insular position makes them judges of their own offences against others, and they can therefore afford to dispense Avith judges appointed under treaties ; for they hardly ever 2β SPEECH OF THE COEIN'THIANS. B.C. 433 ; 01. 86, 4, I. visit their neighbors, but foreign ships are constantly driven to their shores by stress of weather. And all the time they screen themselves under the specious name of neutrality, making beUeve that they are unwilling to be the accomplices of other men's crimes. But the truth is that they wish to keep their own criminal courses to themselves : where they are strong, to oppress ; where they cannot be found out, to defraud ; and whatever they may contrive to appropriate, never to be ashamed. If • they were really upright men, as they profess to be, the greater their immunity from attack, the more clearly they might haΛ^e made their honesty appear by a willingness to submit differences to arbitration. 38. "But such they haA^e not shown themselves either •StiPtiieiir^'^ towards us or towards others. Although they are our have^^oigld colouy, they have always stood aloof from us, and now and insulted they are fighting against us on the plea that they were not sent out to be ill used. To Avhich we rejoin that we did not send them out to be insulted by them, but that we mio'ht be recos^nized as their leaders and receive proper respect. At any rate, our other colonies honor us ; no city is more beloved by her colonies than Corinth. That we are popular with the majority proves that the Corcyraeans have no reason to dislike us ; and, if it seems extraordinary that we should go to Avar with them, our defence is that the injury which they are doing us is unexampled.^ Even if we had been misled by passion, it would hsLYG been honorable in them to make allowance for us, and dishonorable in us to use violence when they showed moderation. But the}^ have wronged us over and over again in their insolence and pride of Avealth ; and now there is our colony of Epidamnus, which they would not acknowledge in her distress, but when we came to the rescue, the}^ seized and are now holding by force. 39 . " They pretend that they first offered to have the matter ^ Or, "and there is nothing extraordinary in our going to war with them, for they are doing us an unexampled injmy." SPEECH or THE COEINTHIAiiS. 27 B.C. 433 ; 01. 86, 4. decided by arbitration. The appeal to justice might have I. some meaiiino: in the mouth of one who before he had Tiie corcy- ^ raeans pro- recourse to arms acted honorably, as he now talks fairly i pose arbi- , , *^ tration and but not when it is made from a position of security and ^^^^^^^/^^ advantage. Whereas these men began by laying siege J^^f^^^^ to Epidamnus, and not until they feared our vengeance danger. did they put forward their specious oifer of arbitration. And as if the Λvrong which they have themselves done at Epidamnus were not enough, they now come hither and ask you to be, not their allies, but their accomplices in crime, and would have you receive them when they are at enmity with us. But they ought to have come ivhen they were out of all danger, not at a time when we are smarting under an injury and they have good reason to be afraid. You have never derived any benefit from their power, but they will now be benefited by yours, and although innocent of their crimes, you will equally be held responsible by us. If you were to have shared the consequences with them, they ought long ago to have shared the power with you.^ " We have shown that our complaints are justified and 40. that our adversaries are tyrannical and dishonest ; we P^^P will now prove to you that you have no rio'ht to receive treaty by r J «/ σ receiTing them. Admitting that the treaty allows any unenrolled ^i^O^J'^ei cities to join either league, this provision does not apply eJemlS^^^ to those who have in view the injury of others, but only to him who is in need of protection, — certainly not to one who forsakes his alleo'iance and Λvho will brins^ war instead of peace to those ivho receive him, or rather, if they are wise, Avill not receive him on such terms. And war the Corcyraeans ΛνΙΙΙ bring to you if you listen to them and not to us. For if you become the allies of the 1 Or, " whose actions corresponded to Ms professions, before he entered on the struggle." 2 The last words of the chapter are omitted by Poppo on the authority of several of the best MSS. ; they may perhaps be a gloss. If they are retained they may be translated : ' ' But you ought not to share all the consequences of their crimes, while in the crimes, and in them alone, you have no part." 28 SPEECH OF THE 0ΟΒΙΚΤΗΙΑΙνΓ8. B.C. 433 ; 01. 86, 4. B.C. 491 ; 01. 72, 2. I. Corcyraeans you will be no longer at peace with us, but will be converted into enemies ; and we must, if you take their part, in defending ourselves against them, defend ourselves against you. But you ought in common justice to stand aloof from both ; or, if you must join either, you should join us and go to war with them ; to Corinth you are at all events bound by treaty, but with Corcyra you never even entered into a temporary negotiation. We did not And do not set the precedent of receivins: the rebellious encourage •*■ ^ your rebel- subjccts of othcrs. At the rcvolt of Samos,! when the nous subjects, •^ ' thouMuot other Peloponnesians were divided upon the question of receive ours, giving aid to the rebels, we voted in your favor and expressly maintained ^ that every one should be allow^ed to chastise his own allies.' If you mean to receive and assist evil-doers, we shall assuredly gain as many allies of yours as you will of ours ; and you will establish a principle Avhich will tell against yourselves more than against us. 41 . " Such are the grounds of right w^hich we urge ; and wenr^sb? ^ they are sufficient according to Hellenic law. And may netan vva?^ ^^ veiiturc to recall to your minds an obligation of which we claim the repayment in our present need, we and you being not enemies who seek one another's hurt, nor yet friends ivho freely give and take ? There was a time before the Persian invasion when you were in want of ships for the Aeginetan war, and we Corinthians lent you twenty : the service ivhich we then rendered to you gave you the victory over the Aeginetans,^ as the other, Avhich prevented the Peloponnesians from aiding the Samians, enabled you to punish Samos. Both benefits were con- ferred on one of those critical occasions when men in the act of attacking their enemies are utterly regardless of everything but victory, and deem him who assists them a friend though he may have previously been a a^foe, him who opposes them a foe, even though he may happen to be a friend ; nay, they will often neglect their own interests in the excitement of the struggle. 1 Cp. i. 115. 2 cp. Herod, vi. 89. SPEECH OF THE COEIKTHIAKS. 29 B.C. 433/ 01.86,4. "Think of these things ; let the younger be informed I. of them by their elders, and resolve all of you to render 42. like for like. Do not say to yourselves that this is just, but that in the event of war something else is expedient ; ;, for the true path of expediency is the path of right. The war with which the Corcyraeans would frighten you into doing wrong is distant, and may never come ; is it worth while to be so carried away by the prospect of it, that you bring upon yourselves the hatred of the Corinthians which is both near and certain? Would you not be wiser in seeking to mitigate the ill-feeling which your treatment of the Megarians has already inspired?^ The later kindness done in season, though small in compari- son, may cancel a orreater previous wrons^. And do not To do no τ ■J ^ i ο Avrong IS be attracted by their offer of a great naval alliance ; for ^^^^^^'^^^^^^J ^ to do no wrono^ to a neiorhbor is a surer source of streno^th ainance. than to gain a perilous advantage under the influence of a momentary illusion. "We are now ourselves in the same situation in which 43. you were, when we declared at Sparta that every one so placed should be allowed to chastise his own allies ; and we claim to receive the same measure at your hands. You were profited by our vote, and we ought not to be injured by yours. Pay what you owe, knoAving that this is our time of need, in which a man's best friend is he who does him a service, he who opposes him, his worst enemy. Do not receive these Corcyraeans into alliance in despite of us, and do not support them in injustice. In acting thus you λυΙΙΙ act rightly, and will consult your own true interests." Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Athenians heard both sides, and they held two 44. assemblies ; in the first of them they were more in- The Athe- '' mans after fluenced by the Avords of the Corinthians, but in the fp^e hesita- •^ ' tion enter second they chano^ed their minds, and inclined towards intoadefen- •^ & ? sive alliance the Corcyraeans. They would not go so far as to make ^^^ii corcyra. an alliance both offensive and defensive ivith them ; for 1 Cp. i. 67 fin. 30 ALLIANCE OF ATHENS WITH COKCYEA. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. Motives of the Athe- nians. 45. They send ten ships to Corcyra, giving them orders to act on the de- fensive. 46. The Corin- thian ileet sails against Corcyra. then, if the Corcyraeans had requh^ed them to join in an expedition against Corinth, the treaty with the Pelopon- nesians would have been broken. But they concluded a defensive league, by which the two states promised to aid each other if an attack were made on the territory or on the allies of either. For they knew that in any case the war with Peloponnesus was inevitable, and they had no mind to let Corcyra and her navy fall into the hands of the Corinthians. Their plan Λvas to embroil them more and more with one another, and then, when the war came, the Corinthians and the other naval powers would be weaker. They also considered that Corcyra was conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily. Under the influence of these feelings, they received the Corcyraeans into alliance ; the Corhithians departed ; and the Athenians now despatched to Corcyra ten ships commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Dio- timus, the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. The commanders received orders not to engage with the Corinthians unless they sailed against Corcyra or to any place belonging to the Corcyraeans, and at- tempted to land there, in w^hich case they were to resist them to the utmost. These orders were intended to prevent a breach of the treaty.^ The Corinthians, \vhen their preparations were com- pleted, sailed against Corcyra Λvith a hundred and fifty ships, — ten Elean, twelve Megarian, ten Leucadian, twenty-seven Ambraciot, one from Anactorium, and ninety of their own. The contingents of the several cities W'Cre commanded by their own generals. The .Corinthian commander w^as Xenocleides, the son of Eu- thycles, Λvith four others. The fleet sailed from Leucas, and, arriving at the mainland opposite Corcyra, came to anchor at Cheimerium, in the country of Thesprotia. Cheimerium is a harbor^; above it, at some distance 1 Cp. i. 40 init. 2 Or, " Here there is a harbor.' SEA-FIGHT NEAR CHEBIERIUM. 31 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. from the sea, in that part of Thesprotia called Eleatis, I. lies the city of Ephyr^, near which the Archerusian lake finds a Λγay into the sea; the river Acheron, whence the name is derived, flows through Thesprotia and falls into the lake. Another river, the Thyamis, forms the boundary of Thesprotia and Cestrine, and the promon- tory of Cheimerium runs out between these two rivers. Here the Corinthians anchored and encamped. The Corey raeans, observing their approach, manned 47. a hundred and ten ships. These•, which were placed J^'X^io^Jes. under the command of Meiciades, Aesimides, and Eury- batus, took up a position off one of the islands called Sybota; the ten Athenian ships accompanied them. The land force occupied the promontory of Lucimm^, whither a thousand Zacynthians had come to the aid of Corcyra. The Corinthians on their part were sup- ported by a large force of barbarians, which collected on the mainland ; for the inhabitants of this region have always been well disposed towards them. The Corinthians had now made their preparations, and, 48. taking with them three days' provisions, put off by night from Cheimerium, intending to give battle : at break of day they descried the Corcyraean fleet, Avhich had also put out to sea and was sailing to meet them. As soon as they saw one another, they ranged themselves in order of battle. On the right Corcyraean wing were the Athe- nian ships. The Corcyraeans themselves occupied the centre and the left wing', and were draAvn up in three divisions, each under the command of one of the generals. On the rio'ht wins: of the Corinthians were the Meo'arian and Ambraciot ships, in the centre the contingents of their other allies ; they themselves with their swiftest vessels formed the left wing, which was opposed to the Athe- nians and to the right division of the Corcyraeans. The standards were now raised on both sides, and the 49. two fleets met and fouo^ht. The decks of both were character ^ of tiie en- crowded with heavy infantry, with archers and with jave- gagement. lin men ; for their naval arrangements were still of the 32 SEA-FIGHT NEAR CHEIMERIUM. B.C. 432; 01.87. Partial suc- cess of tlie Corcyraeans on the left vrhxg and their com- plete defeat on the right. I. old clumsy sort. The engagement was obstinate , but more courage than skill was displayed, and it had almost the appearance of a battle by land. When two ships once charged one another it was hardly possible to part com- pany, for the throng of vessels was dense, and the hopes of victory lay chiefly in the heavy-armed, who maintained a steady fight upon the decks , the ships meanwhile remaining motionless . There were no attempts to break the enemy's line . Brute force and rage made up for the want of tactics . Everywhere the battle was a scene of tumult and confu- sion. At any point where they saw the Corcja-aeans distressed, the Athenians appeared and kept the enemy in check ; but the generals, who were afraid of disobeying their instructions, would not be2:in the attack themselves. The Corinthians suffered most on their rio'ht wino\ For the Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them, drove them in disorder to the shore, and sailed right up to their encampment ; there landing, they plundered and burnt the deserted tents. In this part of the battle the Corin- thians and their allies were worsted, and the Corc3^raeans preΛ^ailed. But the left wing of the Corinthians, where their own ships were stationed, had greatly the advan- tage, because the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were originally inferior, had now twenty vessels detached in the pursuit. When the Athenians saw the distress of the Corcyraeans, they began to assist them more openly. At first they had abstained from actual collision, but when the Corcyraeans fled outright and the Corinthians pressed them hard, then every man fell to work ; all dis- tinctions were forgotten ; - Corinthian and Athenian another. 5Q^ The Corinthians, having put to flight their enemies, never stopped to take in tow the hulls of the vessels which they had disabled, but fell upon the men ; they rowed up and do^^ii and βΙβΛν them, giving no quarter, and unintentionally killing their own friends ; for they were not aΛvare that their right wing had been defeated. The Athe- nians share in the en- gagement. the time had arrived when were driven to attack one MORE ATHENIAN VESSELS. 33 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. There were so many ships on one side and on the other, I. and they covered so great an extent of water, that, when the engagement had once begmi, it was hard among conquerors and conquered to distinguish friend from foe. For never before had two Hellenic navies so numerous met in battle. ΛVhen the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they turned their attention to their own wrecks and dead bodies. Most of these were recovered by them and conveyed to Sybota, a desert harbor of Thesprotia, whither their barbarian allies had come to support them. They then formed afresh and once more made a move- ment towards the Corcyraeans, who, taking such vessels as had not been disabled, and any others which they had in their docks, together with the Athenian ships, put out to meet them, dreading a descent upon Corcyra. It was now late in the day and the Paean had been already sounded for the onset, ivhen the Corinthians suddenly began to row astern. They had descried pgariTctof sailing towards them twenty vessels which the Athenians ^^a^'ships^^' had sent to reinforce the former ten, fearing what had actually happened, that the Corcyraeans Λvould be de- feated, and that the original squadron Avould be insuffi- cient to protect them. The Corinthians, who had the first view of these 51. vessels, suspecting that they were Athenian and that ^^ets^^^ there were more of them than they saw, were beginning separate. to retreat. The Corcyraeans, OAving to their position, could not see them, and they wondered why the Corin- thians rowed astern. At length some one who spied the advancing fleet exclaimed, " Yonder are ships coming ; '* and then the Corcyraeans, as it Λγas getting dark, like- wise retired, and the Corinthians turned about and sailed away. Thus the tΛvo fleets separated after a battle which lasted until nightfall. The twenty ships which came from Athens under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus, and Andocides the son of Leogoras, made their way through the wrecks and corpses and sailed into the 3 34 I^IESSAGE OF THE CORINTHIAKS. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. 52. The Corin- tliians want to returu home. 53. They hold a parley with the Athenians. 54. The Corin- thians ΓΘ- Corcyraean station at Leucimme almost as soon as they were sighted. At first in the darkness the Corcyraeans feared that they were enemies, but they soon recognized them and the Athenian vessels came to anchor. On the next day the thirty Athenian and all the Corey raean ships which were fit for service, wanting to ascertain Avhether the Corinthians would fight, sailed to the harbor at Sybota where their fleet lay. The Corin- thians, putting out into deep water, drew up their ships in line and so remained, but they did not intend to begin the battle. For they saw that fresh ships, which had re- ceived no damage in the action, had arrived from Athens, and their ΟΛνη position was one of great difficulty. They had to guard the prisoners in their vessels, and there were no means of refitting in such a desert place. They were more disposed to consider how they should get home than to fight. For they feared that the Athenians, deeming the peace, now that blows had been exchanged, to be already broken, would intercept their return. They therefore determined to send a few men in a boat without a flag of truce to the Athenians, and so test their intentions. The men were to deliver the following mes- sage : "You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war and violate the treaty. We were only chastising our enemies, and you come with a hostile force and place yourselves betAveen us and them. If it is your intention to hinder us from sailing to Corcyra, or whithel*soeverΛYe choose, and you are going to break the treaty, take us first and deal with us as enemies." Whereupon all the Corcyraeans who were within hearing cried out " Take and kill them." But the Athenians replied :" Men of Peloponnesus, we are not beginning war, and we are not violating the treaty ; we are only aiding the Corcyraeans, who are our allies. If you mean to sail against Corcyra or any place belong- ing to the Corcyraeans, we will do our utmost to prevent you, but, if you Avant to go anywhere else, you ma3^" Reassured by this reply, the Corinthians prepared to sail home, first setting up a trophy at the Sybota which THE COECYKAEAK CAPTIVES. 35 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. is on the mainland. The Corcyraeans took up the wrecks I. and dead bodies Avhich were carried towards them, the ^^'J^^^' current and the wind which had risen during the night ^jj'^''^^^ having scattered them in all directions. They then set ^'>y^s^• up a rival trophy on the island of Sybota. Both parties claimed the victory, but on different grounds. The Corinthians had retained the advantage in the sea-iight until nightfall, and had thus secured a greater number of wrecks and dead bodies ; they had taken not less than a thousand prisoners and had disabled about seventy ships. The Corcyraeans, on the other hand, had destroyed some thirty sail, and when reinforced by the Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead bodies which had drifted in their direction; whereas the enemy on the evening of the battle had rowed astern at sight of the Athenian ships, and after their arrival had not come out against them from Sybota. Upon these grounds both sides raised trophies and claimed the victory. On their 55. homeward voyage the Corinthians took by stratagem Anactorium, a town situated at the mouth of the Am- bracian Gulf, which they and the Corcyraeans held in common ; there they placed colonies of their own, and returned to Corinth. Of their Corcyraean captives eight hundred who were slaves they sold, but two hundred and fifty they detained in prison, treating them with much consideration, in the hope that, when they returned, they would ivin over Corcyra to the Corinthian interests : ^ it so happened that the majority of them were among the most influential men of the state. Thus the war ended to the advantage of Corcyra, and the Athenian fleet re- turned home. This was the first among the causes of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians alleging that the Athenian fleet had taken part Avith the Corcyraeans and had fought against them in defiance of the treaty. Thero soon arose another cause of quarrel between the 56. Athenians and Peloponnesians. Potidaea, which is situ- Affair of ated on the isthmus of Pallene , was originally a Corinthian '^^^ Athe- 1 Cp. iii. 70. 36 DEFECTION OF PEKDICCAS. B.C. 432; 01.87. I. nians com- mand the Potidaeans to raze their walls and to give hostages. 57. Perdiccas quarrels with the Athenians and tries to stir up Avar between Pel- oponnesus and Athens. 58. The Poti- daeans send envoys to Athens and Sparta. colony, although at this time the tributary and ally of Athens. Νολυ the Corinthians were forming plans of vengeance, and the Athenians, \vho suspected their in- tentions, commanded the Potidaeans to raze their walls on the side of Fallen^ and give hostages ; also to send away and not to receive for the future the magistrates whom the Corinthians annually sent to them. For they were afraid lest the Fotidaeans might be persuaded by the Corinthians and Ferdiccas to revolt, and might in- duce the rest of Chalcidice to follow their example. These measures of precaution were taken by the Athenians immediately after the sea-fight oif Corey ra. The hostility of the Corinthians was no longer doubtful, and Ferdiccas, king of Macedon, the son of Alexander, hitherto the friend and ally of Athens, had now become an enemy. He had quarrelled with the Athenians because they had made an alliance with his brother Fhilip and with Derdas, who were leagued against him. Alarmed by their attitude, he sent envoys to Sparta and did all he could to stir up a war between Athens and the Felopon- nese. He also sought the alliance of Corinth, for he had an eye to the revolt of Fotidaea ; and he proposed to the Chalcidians and to the Bottiaeans that they should join in the revolt, thinking, that if he had the assistance of the neighboring peoples, the difficulties of the war would be diminished. The Athenians became aware of bis designs and resolved to forestall the revolt of the cities. They were already intending to send against Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes, and ten others, and they told their admirals to take hostages from the Potidaeans and to demolish their wall. They were also to keep watch over the toAvns in the neigh- borhood and prevent any attempt at rebellion. Meanwhile the Potidaeans sent envoys to the Athenians in the hope of persuading them to take no strong mea- sures ; but at the same time other eiiA^oys of theirs accom- panied a Corinthian embassy to Lacedaemon and exerted REVOLT OF FOTIDAEA. 37 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. themselves to procure assistance in case of need. A long I. negotiation was carried on at Athens \vhich ended in ^ijey re-^^^ nothing, and made no difference ; the ships destined for aTslsunce Macedonia were also sent ao'ainst Potidaea. But at Lace- ^^^^ sparta. daemon they were promised by the magistrates that if the Athenians attacked Potidaea they would invade At- tica. So they seized the opportunity and revolted : the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans swore alliance with them and joined in the rcA^olt. Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull doΛvn their towns on the sea-coast, and settling at Olynthus inland, there to form one strong city. On their removal he gave them part of his own territory of Mygdonia about the Lake Bolbe to cultivate while the contest lasted. So , dismantling their cities, they settled up the country and made preparation for war. The Athenians, Λvhen the thirty ships arrived in Chal- 59. cidic^, found that Potidaea and the other cities had al- niSifmider ready revolted. Whereupon the generals thinking that »ΓΪίν?£^*^^ they were not strong enough without more troops to act Thty^flrsif ' against the rebels as well as against Perdiccas, directed tlfoni^!'^ their attention to Macedonia, which was their original destination, and there carried on a regular campaign in concert ivith Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country from the interior. Now that Potidaea had revolted and the Athenian 60. ships were on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians JSlis'^seSd grew anxious about the town ; they felt that the danger ihe°afd*of came home to them, and dispatched thither volunteers unde^tL of their own and other troops whom they attracted by rSiSf ^^ pay from various parts of the Peloponnese, numbering in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light- armed. Their commander was Aristeus the son of Adeimantus, who had always been a great friend of the Potidaeans ; it was mainly out of regard for him that most of the Corinthian soldiers volunteered on the expe- dition. They arrived in Chalcidic^ forty days after the revolt of Potidaea. The news of the revolt in Chalcidic^ quickly reached 61. 38 AKKIYAL OF THE ATHEXIAKS. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. AtTierdan reinforce - nieuts imder Callias arrive in Macedonia; the Athe- nians make a temporaryj peace with Perdiccas and move on to Potidaea. 62. Engagement at the Isthmus of Pallene. Athens, and the Athenians, when they heard that Aris- teus had come with reinforcements, sent against the re- volted towns forty ships and two thousand of their own hoplites mider the command of Callias the son of Cal- liades, and four others. The expedition, sailing first of all to Macedonia, found that the former thousand had just taken Thermo and were blockading Pydna ; they joined in the siege themselves ; but before long the Athenian army were constrained to come to an understanding and make an alliance with Perdiccas. For Potidaea, now that Aris- teus had arrived, urgently demanded their presence ; so they prepared to quit Macedonia. They first marched out of their way to Beroea, which they attempted to take with- out success. Returning to their route, they moved on by land towards Potidaea with three thousand hoplites of their own and a large force of allies ; they had also six hundred Macedonian horse, who fought under Philip and Pausanias ; meanwhile their ships, in number seventy, sailed along the coast. Proceeding by slow marches, they arrived on the third day at Gigonus and there encamped. The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesian force under Aristeus had now taken up a position at the Isthmus on the side towards Olynthus, where they awaited the coming of the Athenians ; they held their market out- side the walls of Potidaea. The allies had chosen Aris- teus general of all the infantry, and of the cavalry Perdiccas, for he had no sooner joined than he again de- serted the Athenians and was ηοΛν fighting on the side of the Potidaeans, having appointed lolaus to be his lieutenant at home.^ The plan of Aristeus was as fol- lows : — His own army Avas to remain on the Isthmus and watch for the approach of the Athenians, while the Chal- cidians, their allies from beyond the Isthmus, and the two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas were stationed at Olynthus ; and as soon as the Athenians attacked Aristeus and his army, they were to fall upon them in 1 Or, "to take his place with the expedition;" cp. infra, τή*/ παρά Περδίκκου διακοσίαν ϊηπον. ATHENIAN YICTORY. 39 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. the rear; thus the enemy would be assailed on both I. sides. But Callias the Athenian general and his col- leagues sent the Macedonian horse and a few of the allied troops toΛvards Olynthus that they might check any movement in that quarter, while they themselves, quitting their position, marched against Potidaea. When they had reached the Isthmus and saAv the enemy preparing for battle, they did the same. The two ar- mies soon closed. The wing led by Aristeus, which was composed of his Corinthian followers and other picked troops, routed their opponents and pursued them far away ; but the rest of the army, both Potidaeans and Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenians and fled into the city. Aristeus, when he returned from the pursuit and 63. perceived that the other Λving of his army ivas defeated, ^^^fsTJiis hesitated whether he should make for Olynthus or return JefeS^^ to Potidaea. Both courses were hazardous ; but at last fn mSng^^ he determined to contract his troops into the smallest ^oVotidaea!^ compass and force his way at full speed into Potidaea. Harassed by the missiles of the enemy he pushed for- ward through the water ^ along the bank in front of the sea-wall, not without loss ; but he contrived to save the greater part of his army. When the battle began, the allies of the Potidaeans in Olynthus, which is only about seven miles ^ distant, and is visible from Potidaea, seeing the standards raised, came out a little way to support their friends ; and the Macedonian horse drew up in order of battle to oppose them. But victory quickly declared for the Athenians ; and when the standards were torn down, the Olynthian auxiliaries retired within the Avails, and the Macedonians rejoined the Athenians : thus on neither side did the cavalry take any part in the action. The Athenians raised a trophy and granted the Potidae- ans a truce for the burial of their dead. Of the Poti- 1 Cp. Herod, viii. 129. 2 Sixty stadia, tlie stadium being reclconed at two liundred and two yards. 40 BLOCKADE OF FOTIDAEA. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. I. daeans and their allies, there fell someΛvhat less than three hundred ; of the Athenians, a hundred and fifty, and their general Callias. 64. The Athenians instantly blockaded the town on the JSnibiotk- ^^^^ towards the Isthmus, raising a Λvall, which they tt tiSt miiy^" guarded ; but the side towards Pallene was left open. towaM? the They Avere conscious that they were too iveak both to iftenvTrds, guard thc Isthmus, and, crossing over to Fallen^, there of iefuforce- ^o build another wall; they feared that if they divided piiSmio"^^^ their forces, they would be attacked by the Potidaeans io\iardf^^ and their allies. Afterwards, when the Athenians at Pallene. homc heard that on the side towards Pallene Potidaea was not invested, they sent out sixteen hundred hoplites of their own under the command of Phormio the son of Asopius. On his arrival in Pallene he made Aphytis his head-quarters, and brought his army by slow marches up to Potidaea, wasting the country as he went along. No one came out to meet him, and so he built a wall towards Pallen^. Potidaea was now closely invested on both sides, while the Athenian ships, cruising about, cut off all communication from the sea. 65. Aristeus despaired of saving the place unless aid came Aristeus from Pclopoiinesus, or he was relieved in some unfore- leaves Po- ^ -n, . • i i i • • tidaeaand sccu manner. Bems: anxious to husband provisions, he carries ou the ^^ i i^ •ι i war outside proposcd to the o'aiTison that they should avail them- the walls. r l & ./ ^ selves of the first favorable wind and sail away, leaving behind five hundred men, of Avhom he offered to be one. But they would not listen to him ; so, wanting to do the best he could, and to further the Peloponnesian in- terests beyond the walls, he sailed out undiscovered by the Athenian guard-ships. He did not leave the coun- try, but assisted the Chalcidians in carrying on the Λvar. He succeeded in cutting off a large force of Sermylians by an ambuscade which he laid near their city ; he also exerted himself to obtain aid from Peloponnesus. Phormio with his sixteen hundred hoplites, now that Potidaea was invested, ravaged Chalcidico and Bottled, and captured several places. MEETING OF ALLIES AT SPARTA. 41 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. Such Avere the causes of ill-feeling which at this time I. existed between the Athenians and Peloponnesians : 66. the Corinthians complaining that the Athenians were blockading their colony of Potidaea, Avhich was occu- pied by a Corinthian and Peloponnesian garrison ; the Athenians rejoining that the Peloponnesians had excited to revolt a state which was an ally and tributary of theirs, and that they had now openly joined the Poti- daeans, and were fighting on their side. The Pelopon- nesian war, however, had not yet broken out ; the peace still continued ; for thus far the Corinthians had acted alone. But now, seeing Potidaea besieged, they bestirred 67. themselves in earnest. Corinthian troops were shut up of'thlcodu- Avithin the Avails, and they were afraid of losing the JJlifevauces toAvn ; so Avithout delay they invited the allies to meet nltanstSd" at Sparta. There they inveighed against the Athenians, ^®s^"^^^• Avhom they afiirmed to have broken the treaty and to have wronged the Peloponnesians. The Aeginetans did not venture to send envoys openly, but secretly they acted Avith the Corinthians, and Avere among the chief in- stigators of the Avar, declaring that they had been robl^ed of the independence which the treaty guaranteed them. The Lacedaemonians themselves then proceeded to summon any of the allies Avho had similar charges ^ to bring against the Athenians, and calling their own ordinary assembly told them to speak. Several of them came forward and stated their Avrongs. The Megarians alleged, among other grounds of complaint, that they were excluded from all harbors Avithin the Athenian dominion and from the Athenian market, contrary to tlie treaty. The Corinthians Avaited until the other allies had stirred up the Lacedaemonians ; at length they came forward, and, last of all, spoke as foHoAvs ; — " The spirit of trust, Lacedaemonians, which animates β8, 1 Or, adopting the inferior reading τώΐ' συμμάχων τε καΐ εΐ ης : " proceeded to summon any of their own allies, and anyone else, who had similar charges," etc. 42 SPEECH OF THE COKINTHIANS. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. I. your own political and social life, makes you distrust SiLS'^com- others who, like ourselves, have something unpleasant ffiiys^'o/the ^o say,i and this temper of mind, though favorable to Spartans, moderation, too often leaves you in ignorance of Avhat is going on outside your ΟΛνη country. Time after time we have warned you of the mischief Λvhich the Athenians would do to us, but instead of taking our words to heart, you chose to suspect that w^e only spoke from interested motives. And this is the reason why you have brought the allies to Sparta too late, not before but after the in- jury has been inflicted, and when they are smarting under the sense of it. Which of them all has a better ria^ht to speak than ourselves, who have the heaviest accusations to make, outraged as we are by the Athenians, and neg- lected by you ? If the crimes which they are commit- ting against Hellas were being done in a corner, then you might be ignorant, and we should have to inform you of them : but now, ^vhat need of many words ? Some of us, as you see, have been already enslaved ; they are at this moment intriguing against others, notably against allies of ours ; and long ago they had made all their pre- parations in expectation of w^ar. Else why did they seduce from her allegiance Corey ra, which they still hold in defiance of us, and w^hy are they blockading Potidaea, the latter a most advantageous post for the command of the Thracian peninsula, the former a great naval power which might have assisted the Peloponnesians ? 69. "And the blame of all this rests on you; for you ^siavjy originally allowed them to fortify their city after the pvelZuir^ Persian War,2 and afterwards to build their Long ΛYalls ;3 ment"^^^^^" ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ hour you have gone on defrauding of liberty their unfortunate subjects, and are now beginning to take it away from your own allies. For the true enslaver of a people is he who can put an end to their slai^ery but has no care about it ; and all the more, if he be reputed the champion of liberty in Hellas. — And so we have met 1 Or, " makes you distrustful of us when we bring a charge against others." 2 Cp. i. 90-92. ^ Cp. i. 107. SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. 43 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. at last, but with what difficulty ! and even now we have I. no definite object. By this time we ought to have been considering, not whether we are wronged, but how we are to be revenged. The aggressor is not now threatening, but advancing ; he has made up his mind, while we are resolved about nothing. And we know too well how by slow degrees and with stealthy steps the Athenians en- croach upon their neighbors. While they think that you are too dull to observe them, they are more careful, but, when they know that you wilfully overlook their aggres- sions, they will strike and not spare. Of all Hellenes, Lacedaemonians, you are the only people who never do anything : on the approach of an enemy you are content to defend yourselves against him, not by acts, but by intentions, and seek to overthrow him, not in the infancy but in the fulness of his strength. How came you to be considered safe ? That reputation of yours was never justified by facts. We all know that the Persian made his ivay from the ends of the earth against Peloponnesus before you encountered him in a worthy manner ; and ηοΛν you are blind to the doings of the Athenians, who are not at a distance as he was, but close at hand. Instead of attacking your enemy, you wait to be attacked, and take the chances of a struggle which has been de- ferred until his power is doubled. And you know that the Barbarian miscarried chiefly through his own errors ; and that we have oftener been delivered from these very Athenians by blunders of their own, than by any aid from you. Some have already been ruined by the hopes which you inspired in them ; for so entirely did they trust you that they took no precautions themselves. These things we say in no accusing or hostile spirit — let that be understood — but by way of expostulation. For men expostulate with erring friends, they bring accusa- tion against enemies who have done them a wrong. " And surely we have a right to find fault with our 70. neighbors, if any one ever had. There are important contrast of interests at stake to which, as far as we can see, niauand 44 SPEECH OF THE ΟΟΚΙΝΤΗΙΑΙίβ. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. I. you are insensible. And you have never considered Spartan what manner of men are these Athenians ^ \vith whom characters. you will have to fight, and how utterly unlike your- selves. They are revolutionary, equally quick in the conception and in the execution of every new plan ; while you are conservative — careful only to keep what you have, originating nothing, and not acting even Λvhen action is most necessary. They are bold beyond their strength ; they run risks which prudence would con- demn ; and in the midst of misfortune they are full of hope. Whereas it is your nature, though strong, to act feebly ; when your plans are most prudent, to distrust them; and when calamities come upon you, to think that you will never be delivered from them. They are impetuous, and you are dilatory ; they are always abroad, and you are always at home. For they hope to gain something by leaving their homes ; but you are afraid that any new enterprise may imperil what you have already. When conquerors, they pursue their victory to the utmost ; when defeated, they fall back the least. Their bodies they devote to their country as though they belonged to other men ; their true self is their mind, which is most truly their own when employed in her service. When they do not carry out an intention Λvhich they have formed, they seem to have sustained a personal bereavement ; when an enterprise succeeds, they have gained a mere instalment of what is to come ; but if they fail, they at once conceive new hopes and so fill up the void . With them alone to hope is to have , for they lose not a moment in the execution of an idea. This is the life- long task, full of danger and toil, which they are always imposing upon themselves . None enjoy their good things less, because they are always seeking for more. To do their duty is their only holiday, and they deem the quiet of inaction to be as disagreeable as the most tiresome business. If a man should say of them, in a word, that 1 For descriptions of Athenian character, cp. ii. 37 ff.; iii. 38; 42, 43; vi. 76; 87. SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. 45 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to I. allow peace to other men, he would simply speak the truth. "In the face of such an enemy, Lacedaemonians, you 71. persist in doing nothing. You do not see that peace is ^emon^ians best secured by those who use their strength justly, but Se their whose attitude shows that they have no intention of sub- f^actloif. mitting to ^\Tong. Justice with you seems to consist in giving no annoyance to others, and in defending your- selves only against positive injury. ^ But this policy would hardly be successful, even if your neighbors were like yourselves ; and in the present case, as we pointed out just noAV, your ways compared with theirs are old- fashioned. And, as in the arts, so also in politics, the new must always prevail over the old. In settled times the traditions of government should be observed : but Avhen circumstances are changing and men are compelled to meet them, much originality is required. The Athe- nians have had a wider experience, and therefore the administration of their state has improved faster than yours. But here let your procrastination end ; send an army at once into Attica and assist your allies, espe- cially the Potidaeans, to whom your word is pledged.^ Do not alloTV friends and kindred to fall into the hands of their worst enemies ; or drive us in despair to seek the alliance of others ; in taking such a course we should be doino^ nothinii wrono; either before the o^ods ivho are the witnesses of our oaths, or before men whose eyes are upon us. For the true breakers of treaties^ are not those \vho, when forsaken, turn to others, but those Λvho forsake allies whom they have sworn to defend. We will remain your friends if you choose to bestir yourselves ; for we should be guilty of an impiety if we deserted you without cause ; and we shall not easily find allies equally congenial to us. Take heed then : you have inherited from your fathers the leadership of Peloponnesus ; see that her greatness sufiers no diminution at your hands." 1 Or, " in running no risk even in self-defence." ^ Cp. i. 58 med. 3 Cp. i. 123 fin. 46 SPEECH OF THE ATHEXIAJTS. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. I. 72. Some Athe- nian envoys who happen to be at Sparta de- sire to ad- dress the assembly. 73, They recall the memory of their ser- vices in the Persian War. Thus spoke the Corinthians, iiow there happened to be staying at Lacedaemon an Athenian embassy which had come on other business, and when the envoys heard what the Corinthians had said, they felt bound to go before the Lacedaemonian assembly, not with the view of answering the accusations brought against them by the cities, but thej^ wanted to put before the Lacedaemonians the whole question, and make them understand that they should take time to deliberate and not be rash. They also desired to set forth the greatness of their city, reminding the elder men of what they knew, and inform- ing the younger of what lay beyond their experience. They thought that their w^ords would sway the Lacedae- monians in the direction of peace. So they came and said that, if they might be allowed, they too would like to address the people. The Lacedaemonians invited them to come forward, and they spoke as follows : — "We ivere not sent here to argue with your allies, but on a special mission ; observing, however, that no small outcry has arisen against us, we have come forAvard, not to answer the accusations which they bring (for you are not judges before whom either we or they have to plead), but to prevent you from lending too ready an ear to their bad advice and so deciding wrongly about a very serious question. We propose also, in reply to the Λvider charges which are raised against us, to show that Avhat we have acquired we hold rightfully and that our city is not to be despised. *^ Of the ancient deeds handed down by tradition and which no eye of any one who hears us ever saw, Avhy should we speak ? But of the Persian War, and other events which you yourselves remember, speak we must, althouo^h w^e have brouo:ht them forward so often that the repetition of them is disagreeable to us.^ When Ave faced those perils we did so for the common benefit : in the solid good you shared, and of the glory, whatever 1 Or, " although it may be disagreeable to you to hear what we are always bringing forward." SPEECH OF THE ATHENIAKS. 47 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. good there may be in that, we would not be wholly de- I. prived. Our Avords are not designed to deprecate hos- tility, but to set forth in evidence the character of the city Avith which, unless you are very careful, you will soon be involved in war. We tell you that we, first and alone, dared to engage with the Barbarian at Marathon, and that, when he came again, being too Aveak to defend ourselves by land, we and our whole people embarked on shipboard, and shared Avith the other Hellenes in the victory of Salamis. Thereby he was prevented from sailing to the Peloponnesus and ravaging city after city ; for against so mighty a fleet liow could you have helped one another? He himself is the best witness of our words ; for when he was once defeated at sea, he felt that his power was gone and quickly retreated with the greater part of his army. "The event proved undeniably that the fate of Hellas 74. depended on her navy. And the three chief elements of success were contributed by us ; namely, the greatest number of ships, the ablest general, the most devoted patriotism. The ships in all numbered four hundred, ^ and of these, our own contingent amounted to nearly two-thirds. To the influence of Themistocles our general it was chiefly due that we fought in the strait, which was confessedly our salvation ; and for this service you your- selves honored him above any stranger who ever visited you. Thirdly, we displayed the most extraordinary courage and devotion ; there was no one to help us by land ; for up to our frontier those who lay in the enemy's path were already slaves ; so we determined to leave our city and sacrifice our homes. Even in that extremity we did not choose to desert the cause of the allies Avho still resisted, and by dispersing ourselves to become use- less to them ; but we embarked and fought, taking no ofience at your failure to assist us sooner. We maintain then that we rendered you a service at least as great as you rendered us. The cities from which you came to 1 Reading with the great majority of MSS. τετρακοσίας. 48 SPEECH OF THE ATHEIN^IANS. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. I. help us were still inhabited and you might hope to re- turn to them ; your concern was for yourselves and not for us ; at any rate you remained at a distance while we had an}i;hing to lose. But Λve went forth from a city which Λvas no more, and fought for one of which there was small hope ; and yet we saved ourselves, and bore our part in saving you. If, in order to preserve our land, like other states, Ave had gone over to the Persians at first, or afterAvards had not ventured to embark be- cause our ruin was already complete, it would have been useless for you with your weak navy to fight at sea, but everj^thing would have gone quietly just as the Persian desired. 75. "Considering, Lacedaemonians, the energy and sagacity S^/bJ^Liated ^hich wc then displayed, do we deserve to be so bitterly savSfHeuas? liated by the other Hellenes merely because we have an was no^t^n^^^ empire ? That empire Avas not acquired by force ; but but ttS^°^' y^l•^ would not stay and make an end of the Barbarian, cuStauces!^' ^i^cl the allics came of their own accord and asked us to be their leaders. The subsequent development of our power was originally forced upon us by circumstances ; fear was our first motive ; afterwards ambition, and then interest stepped in. And when we had incurred the hatred of most of our allies; when some of them had already revolted and been subjugated, and you were no longer the friends to us which 3^ou once had been, but suspicious and ill-disposed, how could we without great risk relax our hold ? For the cities as fast as they fell away from us would have gone over to you. And no man is to be reproached who seizes every possible ad- vantao^e when the dano-er is so o-reat. 76. "At all events, Lacedaemonians, we may retort that The Lace- you, in the excrcisc of your supremacy, manaoe the cities daemonians „ ' , . i"^ i • /• would have of PeloDonncsus to suit your own views ; and that ii you, been Avorse ^ -^ i λ i η • than they and uot we, had persevered in the command of the allies long enough to be hated, you would have been quite as intolerable to them as Ave are, and would have been compelled, for the sake of your own safety, to rule with a were. SPEECH OF THE ATHEXIANS. 49 B.C. 432 ; 01. ST. strong hand. An empire was offered to us : can you I. wonder that, acting as human nature always will, we ac- cepted it and refused to give it up again, constrained by three all-powerful motives, ambition, fear, interest ? We are not the first Avho have aspired to rule ; the Avorld has ever held that the Aveaker must be kept down by the / stronger. And we think that we are worthy of power ; and there was a time when you thought so too ; but now, when you mean expediency you talk about justice. Did justice ever deter any one from taking by force whatever he could ? Men who indulge the natural ambition of empire deserve credit if they are in any degree more careful of justice than they need be. How moderate we are would speedily appear if others took our place ; indeed our verj^ moderation, which should be our glory, has been unjustly converted into a reproach. "For because in our suits with our allies, regulated by 77. treaty, we do not even stand upon our rights, but have ^^^^^^^^^ instituted the practice of deciding them at Athens and JlcaUSSy by Athenian law, we are supposed to be litigious. None subictl^iaw of our opponents observe why others, Avho exercise do- ?£e^iawof\he minion elseΛvhere and are less moderate than we are in stronger. their dealings with their subjects, escape this reproach. Why is it? Because men λ\^ο practise violence have no longer any need of law. But Λve are in the habit of meeting our allies on terms of equality, and, therefore, if through some legal decision of ours, or exercise of our imperial power, contrary to their own ideas of right, they suffer ever so little, they are not grateful for our modera- tion in leaving them so much, but are far more offended at their trifling loss than if we had from the first plun- dered them in the face of day, laying aside all thought of Ιάλυ. For then they would themselves have admitted that the weaker must give way to the stronger. Man- kind resent injustice more than violence, because the one seems to be an unfair advantage taken by an equal, the other is the irresistible force of a superior. They were patient under the yoke of the Persian, who inflicted on 4 50 SPEECH OF THE ATHEOTANS. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. I. them far more grievous wrongs ; but now our dominion is The ruler of odious in their eyes. And no wonder : the ruler of the the day is . -, tit• always un- day IS always detested by his subjects. And should your emjoire supplant ours, may not you lose the good-will which you ολυθ to the fear of us ? Lose it you certainly will, if you mean again to exhibit the temper of which you gave a specimen Λγhen, for a short time, you led the con- federacy against the Persian. For the institutions under which you live are incompatible Λvith those of foreign states ; and further, when any of you goes abroad, he respects neither these nor any other Hellenic laws.^ 78. " Do not then be hasty in deciding a question ivhich is SSmSStns serious ; and do not, by listening to the misrepresenta- toTar St^the ^ous and complaiuts of others, bring trouble upon your- othefs^.^^"^ ^^ selves. Realize, while there is time, the inscrutable nature of war ; and how when protracted it generally ends in becoming a mere matter of chance, over which neither of us can have any control, the event being equally unknown and equally hazardous to both. The misfortune is that in their hurry to go to war, men begin with bloAvs, and Avhen a reverse comes upon them, then have recourse to Avords. But neither you, nor we, have as yet committed this mistake ; and therefore Avhile both of us can still choose the prudent part, we tell you not to break the peace or violate your oaths. Let our differ- ences be determined by arbitration, according to the treaty. If you refuse, we call to witness the gods, by Avhom you have sAvorn, that you are the authors of the war ; and we will do our best to strike in return." 79. When the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought by the allies against the Athenians, and their rejoinder, they ordered everybody but themselves to withdraw, and deliberated alone. The majority were agreed that there was now a clear case against the Athenians, and that they must fight at once. But Archidamus their king, who was held to be both an 1 For the misconduct of Spartan officers abroad, cp. i. 95; i. 130; iii. 32; iii. 93 fin. ; viii. 84 init. SPEECH OF ARCHIDAMUS. 51 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. able and a prudent man, came forward and spoke as I. follows : — " At my age, Lacedaemonians, I have had experience 80. of many wars, and I see several of you who are as old as J^t?rfo?the I am, and who will not, as men too often do, desire war Athenians. because they have never known it, or in the belief that it is either a good or a safe thing. Any one who calmly reflects will find that the war about which you are now deliberating is likely to be a very great one. When we encounter our neighbors in thePeloponnese, their forces are like our forces, and they are all within a short march. But when we have to do with men whose country is a long way off, and who are most skilful seamen and thoroughly provided with the means of war, — having wealth, private and public, ships, horses, infantry, and a population larger than is to be found in any single Hellenic territory, not to speak of the numerous allies \vho pay them tribute, — is this a people against whom we can lightly take up arms or plunge into a contest unprepared? To Avhat do we trust? To our navy? There we are inferior ; and to exercise and train our- selves until we are a match for them, will take time. To our money? Nay, but in that we are weaker still; we have none in our treasury, and we are never willing to contribute out of our private means. " Perhaps some one may be encouraged by the superior 81 . quality and numbers of our infantry, Avhich will enable ^^j-e^Jf us regularly to invade and ravage their lands. But their JjJl?: empire empire extends to distant countries, and they will be ^fg*®^"^^ ^'^ able to introduce supplies by sea. Or, again, we may ^y^^Sch' try to stir up revolts among their allies. But these are suppo?Sd;*^ mostly islanders, and we shall have to employ a fleet in theirl^natF their defence, as Avell as in our own. How then shall we ^^^^^^^• carry on the war ? For if we can neither defeat them at sea, nor deprive them of the revenues by which their navy is maintained, we shall get the Avorst of it. And having gone so far, we shall no longer be able even to make peace with honor, especially if we are believed to 52 SPEECH OF ARCHIDAMUS. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. I. have begun the quarrel. We must not for one moment flatter ourseh^es that if we do but ravage their country the Λvar will be at an end. Nay, I fear that we shall bequeath it to our children ; for the Athenians with their higji spirit will never barter their liberty to save their land, or be terrified like novices at the sight of war. 82. "Not that I would have j^ou shut your eyes to their Do not take dcsio'ns and abstain from unmaskino^ them, or tamely up arms yet. ^ ^ ^ ^ ο ' J sufier them to injure our allies. But do not take up arms yet. Let us first send and remonstrate with them : we need not let them know positively whether Λve intend to go to war or not. In the meantime our own preparations may be going forward ; we may seek for allies wherever we can find them, ^vhether in Hellas or among the Bar- barians, who will supply our deficiencies in ships and money. Those who, like ourselves, are exposed to Athenian intrigue cannot be blamed if in self-defence they seek the aid not of Hellenes only, but of Barbarians. And we must develope our own resources to the utmost. If they listen to our ambassadors, well and good ; but, if not, in two or three years' time we shall be in a stronger position, should we then determine to attack them. Per- haps too when they begin to see that we are getting ready, ^and that our words are to be interpreted by our actions^, they may be more likely to jdeld ; for their fields will be still untouched and their goods undespoiled, and it will be in their power to save them by their decision. Think of their land simply in the light of a hostage, all the more valuable in proportion as it is better cultivated ; you should spare it as long as you can, and not by reducing them to despair make their resistance more obstinate. For if we allo^v ourselves to be stung into premature action by the reproaches of our alhes, and waste their country before we are ready, we shall only involve Peloponnesus in more and more diffi- culty and disgrace. Charges brought by cities or persons against one another can be satisfactorily aiTanged ; but 1 Or, *' and that our words too sound a note of war." SPEECH OF ARCHIDAMUS. 53 B.C. 432; 01.87. when a great confederacy, in order to satisfy private I. ffrudires, undertakes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, it is not easy to terminate it with honor. " And let no one think that there is any want of courage 83. in cities so numerous hesitating to attack a single one. JJ^Sdice^ The allies of the Athenians are not less numerous ; they ^e^ar^^tiJiS' pay them tribute too ; and war is not an affair of arms, aglinst Ath- but of money which gives to arms their use, and which agaiiithe is needed above all things Λvhen a continental is fighting SlnVm^r'e. against a maritime power : let us find money first, and then we may safely allow our minds to be excited by the speeches of our allies. We, on whom the future respon- sibility, whether for good or evil, will chiefly fall, should calmly reflect on the consequences which may follow. " Do not be ashamed of the slowness and procrastina- 84. tion with \vhich they are so fond of charging you ; if you J^g^J^^^^ begin the war in haste, you will end it at your leisure, be- Jjur afs^e-' cause you took up arms Λvithout suflicient preparation. ^^cipS^eare Remember that Ave have always been citizens of a free ou? |?eatness. and most illustrious state, and that for us the policy undeivaiue^^ which they condemn may well be the truest good sense aSd^e^SS and discretion. It is a policy which has saved us from JortuSe.^" growing insolent in prosperity or giving way under adversity, like other men. We are not stimulated by the allurements of flattery into dangerous courses of which we disapprove ; nor are we goaded by offensive charges into compliance Avith any man's Avishes. Our habits of discipline make us both brave and wise ; brave, because the spirit*of loyalty quickens the sense of honor, and the sense of honor inspires courage ; wise, because we are not so highly educated that we have learned to despise the laws, and are too severely trained and of too loyal a spirit to disobey them. We have not acquired that useless over-intellio^ence Avhich makes a man an excellent critic of an enemy's plans, but paralyzes him in the moment of action. We think that the wits of our enemies are as good as our own, and that the element of fortune cannot be forecast in words. Let us assume 54 THE SHORT SPEECH OF STHENELAIDAS. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. I. 85. We can af- ford to wait, and should try arbitra- tion first. 86. We must stand by our allies. that they have common prudence, and let our prepara- tions be, not words, but deeds. Our hopes ought not to rest on the probabiHty of their making mistakes, but on our own caution and foresight. We should remem- ber that one man is much the same as another, and that he is best Avho is trained in the severest school. "These are principles which our fathers have handed down to us, and we maintain to our lasting benefit ; Λνβ must not lose sight of them, and when many lives and much wealth, many cities and a great name are at stake, Ave must not be hasty, or make up our minds in a few short hours ; we must take time. We can afford to wait, when others cannot, because we are strono-. And now, send to the Athenians and remonstrate ^γith. them both about Potidaea, and about the other Avrongs of which your allies complain. They say that they are to have the matter tried ; and against one who willing offers to submit to justice you must not proceed as ao:ainst a criminal until his cause has been heard. In the meantime prepare for war. This decision will be the best for yourselves and the most formidable to your enemies." Thus spoke Archi damns. Last of all, Sthenelaidas, at that time one of the Ephors, came forward and addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows : — "I do not know what the long speeches of the Athenians mean. They have been loud in their own praise, but they do not pretend to say that they are dealing honestly ivith our allies and Avith the Peloponnesus. If they be- haved well in the Persian War and are now behavinor badly to us they ought to be punished Uvice over, because they were once good men and have become bad. But we are the same now as we were then, and we shall not do our duty if Ave allow our allies to be ill-used, and put off helping them, for they cannot put off their troubles. Others may have money and ships and horses, but Ave have brave a,llies and Ave must not betray them to the Athenians . If they Avere suffering in Avord only , by Avords THE TEE ATT HAS BEEN BROKEN. 55 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. B.C. 445 ; 01. 83, 4. and legal processes their wrongs might be redressed ; but I• now there is not a moment to be lost, and we must help them with all our might. Let no one tell us that Λνβ should take time to think when we are suffering injustice. Nay, we reply, those who mean to do injustice should take a long time to think. Wherefore, Lacedaemonians, prepare for war as the honor of Sparta demands. With- stand the advancing power of Athens. Do not let us betray our allies, but, with the gods on our side, let us attack the evil-doer." When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken he, being Ephor, 87. himself put ^ the question to the Lacedaemonian as-P^i^ace- sembly. Their custom is to signify their decision by ^^^^^^^1^^ cries and not by voting. But he professed himself unable JJ| ^the-^ to tell on which side was the louder cry, and \vishing Jofve to^go to to call forth a demonstration which mis^ht encoura«:e ^^^^• the warlike spirit, he said, ^'AYhoever of you, Lacedae- monians, thinks that the treaty has been broken and that the Athenians are in the wrong, let him rise and go yonder " (pointing to a particular spot), " and those who think otherwise to the other side." So the assembly rose and divided, and it was determined by a large majorit}^ that the treaty had been broken. The Lacedaemonians then recalled the allies and told them that in their judg- ment the Athenians were guilty, but that they wished to hold a general assembly of the allies and take a vote from them all; then the war, if they approved of it, might be undertaken by common consent. Having ac- complished their purpose, the Peloponnesians returned home, and the Athenian envoys, Avhen their errand was done, returned likewise. Thirteen years of the thirty years' peace which was concluded after the recovery of Euboea had elapsed and the fourteenth year had begun Λvhen the Lacedaemonian assembly decided that the treaty had been broken. In arriving at this decision and resolving to go to war, 8S, the Lacedaemonians Avere influenced, not so much by the speeches of their allies, as by the fear of the Athenians 56 RISE OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE. B.C. 479 ; 01. 15, 2. 89. The Athe- ι J nians after ■ the retreat of the Persians continue the Avar. 90. The Lace- daemonians at the insti- gation of their allies try to pre- vent the Athenians from re- building their walls. and of their increasing power. ^ For they saw the greater part of Hellas already subject to them. How the Athenians attained the position in which they rose to greatness I will now proceed to describe. When the Persians, defeated both by sea and land, had re- treated from Europe, and the remnant of the fleet, which had escaped to Mycale, had there perished, Leoty chides, the Lacedaemonian king, Λγho had commanded the Hel- lenes in the battle, returned home with the allies from Pel- oponnesus . But the Athenians and their allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, Avho had recently reA^olted from the king, persevered and besieged Sestos, at that time still in the hands of the Persians. Remainino' there through the winter they took the place, wliich the Barbarians deserted. The allies then sailed back from the Helles- pont to their respective homes. Meamvhile the Athenian people, now quit of the Barbarians, fetched their \vives, their children, and the remains of their property from the places in which they had been deposited, and set to work, rebuilding the city and the walls. Of the old line of wall but a small part was left standing. Most of the houses were in ruins, a few only remaining in Λvhich the chief men of the Persians had lodged. The Lacedaemonians knew what would happen and sent an embassy to Athens. They would rather them- selves have seen neither the Athenians nor any one else protected by a wall; but their main motive was the importunity of their allies, who dreaded not only the Athenian navy, which had until lately been quite small, but also the spirit which had animated them in the Per- sian War. So the Lacedaemonians requested them not to restore their walls, ^ but on the contrary to join with them in razing the fortifications of other toΛvns outside the Peloponnesus which had them standing. They did not reveal their real Λvishes or the suspicion which they entertained of the Athenians, but argued that the Bar- barian, if he again attacked them, Avould then have no ^ Cp. i. 23 fin. 2 (jp. i. QQ init. THE ATHENIANS KEBUILD THEIR WALLS. 57 B.C. 479-478; 01. 75, 2, 3. strong place which he could make his head-quarters as I. he had lately made Thebes. Peloponnesus would be a sufficient retreat for all Hellas and a good base of opera- tions. To this the Athenians, by the advice of Themis- tocles, replied, that they would send an embassy of their own to discuss the matter, and so got rid of the Spartan envoys. He then proposed that he should himself start at once for Sparta, and that they should give him col- leagues who ivere not to go immediately, but were to wait until the wall reached the lowest height which could possibly be defended. The whole people, men, Λvomen, and children, should join in the work, and they must spare no building, private or public, which could be of use, but demolish them all. Havins: o^iven these instructions and intimated that he would manage affairs at Sparta, he departed. On his arrival he did not at once present himself officially to the magistrates, but delayed and made. excuses ; and when any of them asked him "why he did not appear before the assembly," he said " that he was waitins^ for his coUeasfues, who had been detained by some engagement ; he was daily expecting them, and wondered that they had not appeared." The friendship of the Lacedaemonian magistrates for 91. Themistocles induced them to believe him ; but when The Lace- daemonians everybody who came from Athens declared positively are outwitted that the wall was building and had already reached a ^^^^• considerable height, they knew not what to think. He, aware of their suspicions, desired them not to be misled by reports, but to send to Athens men whom they could trust out of their own number w^ho would see for them- selves and bring back word. They agreed ; and he at the same time privately instructed the Athenians to detain the envoys as quietly as they could, and not let them go until he and his colleagues had got safely home. For by this time Habronichus the son of Ly sides, and Aris- tides the son of Lysimachus, Avho were joined with him in the embassy, had arrived, brinofinir the neΛvs that the wall was of sufficient height ; and he Avas afraid that the 58 THEMISTOCLES AT SPARTA. B.C. 479-478; 01. 75, 2, 3. I. Lacedaemonians, when they heard the truth, might not allow them to return. So the Athenians detained the envoys, and Themistocles, coming before the Lacedae- monians, at length declared in so many Λvords that Athens was now provided with walls and could protect her citizens ; henceforward, if the Lacedaemonians or their allies wished at any time to negotiate, they must deal with the Athenians as with men who knew quite well what was for their own and the common good. When they boldly resolved to leave their city and go on board ship, the}^ did not first ask the advice of the Lacedae- monians, and, Avhen the two states met in council, their own judgment had been as good as that of any one. And now they had arrived at an independent opinion that it Λvas better far, and would be more advantageous both for themselves and for the whole body of the allies, that their city should have a wall ; Avhen any member of a confederacy had not equal military advantages, his counsel could not be of equal weight or worth. Either all the allies should pull down their walls, or they should acknowledo^e that the Athenians were in the rio'ht. 92. On hearing these w^ords the Lacedaemonians did not openly quarrel Avith the Athenians ; for they professed that the embassy had been designed, not to interfere with them, but to offer a suggestion for the public good; besides at that time the patriotism which the Athenians had displayed in the Persian War had created a warm feeling of friendliness between the two cities. They were annoyed at the failure of their purpose, but they did not shoAv it. And the envoys on either side returned home without any formal complaint. 93. In such hurried fashion did the Athenians rebuild the walls of their city. To this day the structure shoivs evidence of haste. The foundations are made up of all sorts of stones, in some places umvrought, and laid just as each worker brought them ; there were many columns too, taken from sepulchres, and many old stones already cut, inserted in the work. The circuit of the city was But appear- ances are maintained, and there is no open quarrel. COMPLETION OF THE PIKAEUS. 59 B.C. 478 or 477; 01. 75, 3 or 75, 4. B.C. 481 ? 01. 74, 4? extended in every direction, and the citizens, in their I. ardor to complete the design, spared nothing. Themistocles also persuaded the Athenians to finish construc- ■^ . tion of tb.e the Piraeus, of which he had made a beo'inmno• m his Piraeus, ' . . ^ and founda- year of office as Archon. The situation of the place, tion of the •^ ^ maritime ivhichhad three natural havens, was excellent ; and now einpireof ' Athens. that the Athenians had become sailors, he thought that a good harbor would greatly contribute to the extension of their power. For he first dared to say that ' they must make the sea their domain,' and he lost no time inlaying the foundations of their empire. By his advice, they built the wall of such a width that two wagons carrying the stones could meet and pass on the top ; this width may still be traced at the Piraeus ; inside there was no rubble or mortar, but the whole wall was made up of large stones hewn square, which were clamped on the outer face with iron and lead. The height was not more ■ than half what he had originally intended ; he had hoped by the very dimensions of the wall to paralyze the designs of an enemy, and he thought that a handful of the least efficient citizens would suffice for its defence, ivhile the rest might man the fleet. His mind was turned in this direction, as I conceive, from observing that the Persians had met with fewer obstacles by sea than by land. The Piraeus appeared to him to be of more real consequence than the upper city. He was fond of telling the Athe- nians that if they were hard pressed they should go down to the Piraeus and fight the world at sea. Thus the Athenians built their walls and restored their city immediately after the retreat of the Persians. Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus was now sent from 94. Peloponnesus with twenty ships in command of the Hel- Cyprus and . -^ ./ r- Byzantyim lenic forces ; thirty Athenian ships and a number of the t^ken. •^ -t Tyranny allies sailed with him. They first made an expedition ^"pu'iSrity of against Cyprus, of which they subdued the greater part ; Pausanias. and afterwards against Byzantium, which was in the hands of the Persians, and was taken while he was still in command. 60 PAUSAKIAS DEPOSED ΓΚΟΜ HIS COMMAND. B.C. 477 or 476; 01. 75, 4 or 76. The allies transfer themselves to the Athe- nians. I. He had already begun to be oppressive, and the allies 95. were offended with him, especially the lonians and others who had been recently emancipated from the king. So they had recourse to their kinsmen the Athenians and begged them to be their leaders, and to protect them against Pausanias, if he attempted to oppress them. The Athenians took the matter up and prepared to interfere, being fully resolved to manage the confederacy in their own way. In the meantime the Lacedaemonians sum- moned Pausanias to Sparta, intending to in\^estigate certain reports which had reached them ; for he was ac- cused of numerous crimes by Hellenes returning from the Hellespont, and appeared to exercise his command more after the fashion of a tyrant than of a general. His recall occurred at the very time when the hatred which he inspired had induced the allies, with the ex- ception of the Peloponnesians, to transfer themselves to the Athenians. On arrivino^ at Lacedaemon he was punished for the wrongs which he had done to particular persons, but he had been also accused of conspiring with the Persians, and of this, which was the principal charge and was generally believed to be proven, he was ac- quitted. The goΛ^ernment however did not continue him in his command, but sent in his place Dorcis and certain others with a small force. To these the allies refused allegiance, and Dorcis, seeing the state of affairs, returned home. Henceforth the Lacedaemonians sent out no more commanders, for they were afraid that those Λvhom they appointed would be corrupted, as they had found to be the case with Pausanias ; they had had enough of the Persian War ; and they thought that the Athenians Λvere fully able to lead, and at that time believed them to be their friends. 96. Thus the Athenians by the good-will of the allies, Avho co^l^eracy dctcstcd Pausauias, obtained the leadership. They im- mediately fixed Avhich of the cities should supply money and which of them ships for the Λvar against the Bar- barians, the avowed object being to compensate them- selves and the allies for their losses by devastating the THE ATHENIAITS LEAD THE ALLIES. 61 B.C. 477 or 476 ; 01. 75, 4 or 76. B.C. 476-466 ; Ol. 76-78, 3. King's country. Then was first instituted at Athens I. the office of Hellenic treasurers (Helleno-Tamiai), who received the tribute, for so the impost was termed. The amount Avas originally fixed at 460 talents^ The island of Delos was the treasury, and the meetings of the allies were held in the temple. At first the allies Avere independent and deliberated in 97. a common assembly under the leadership of Athens. The interval But in the interval between the Persian and the Pelo- Persian and Peloponne- ponnesian Wars, by their military success and by policy ^^^^\^^^J^^ in dealino^ Λvith the Barbarian, with their own rebellious mostiiis- o ^ tones. allies and Λvith the Peloponnesians who came across their path from time to time, the Athenians made immense strides in power. I have gone out of my ivay to speak of this period because the writers who have preceded me treat either of Hellenic afiairs previous to the Persian invasion or of that invasion itself; the intervening portion of history has been omitted by all of them, with the ex- ception of Hellanicus ; and he, where he has touched upon it in his Attic history, is very brief, and inaccurate in his chronology. The narrative will also serve to ex- plain how the Athenian empire grew up. First of all under the leadership of Cimon, the son of 98. Miltiades, the Athenians besieged and took from the S^n^s*iibject Persians Eion upon the Strymon, and sold the inhabit- cavystnlj^^^' ants into slavery. The same fate befell Scyros, an island ^"^^^^• in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopes ; this they colonized themselves. They also carried on a war with the Cary- stians of Euboea, who, after a time, capitulated; the other Euboeans took no part in the war. Then the Naxians revolted, and the Athenians made war against .them and reduced them by blockade. This was the first of the allied cities which was enslaved contrary to Hellenic law ; the turn of the others came later. The causes Λvhich led to the defections of the allies ^9. were of difibrent kinds, the principal being their neglect amS contS- topay the tribute or to furnish ships, and, in some cases, ^"^® ™°"®^ » About £110,400. 62 WHO BEGIN TO REVOLT. B.C. 476^66 ; 01. 76-78, 3. B.C. 465 ; 01. 78, 4. instead of ships. As they grow weaker the Athe- nians be- come more oppressive. I. failure of military service. For the AtheniaDS were ex- acting and oppressive, using coercive measures towards men who were neither willing nor accustomed to w^ork hard. And for various reasons they soon began to prove less agreeable leaders than at first. They no longer fought upon an equality with the rest of the confederates, and they had no difficulty in reducing them ivhen they re- volted. Now the allies brought all this upon themselves ; for the majority of them disliked military service and absence from home, and so they agreed to contribute a regular sum of money instead of ships. Whereby the Athenian navy was proportionally increased, while they themselves were always untrained and unprepared for war when they revolted. 100. A little later the Athenians and their allies fought two battles, one by land and the other by sea, against the Persians, at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia. The Athenians, under the command of Cimon the son of Miltiades, on the same day conquered in both, and took and destroyed Phoenician i^essels numbering in all two hundred. After a while the Thasians revolted ; a quarrel had arisen between them and the Athenians about the Thracian market and the mine on the Thracian coast opposite, of which the Thasians received the profits. The Athenians sailed to Thasos, and gaining a victory at sea, landed upon the island. About the same time they sent ten thousand of their own people and of their allies to the Strymon, intending to colonize the place then called the Nine Ways and now Amphipolis. They gained possession of the Nine Ways, Avhich were inhabited by the Edoni, but, advancing into the interior of Thrace, they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia, by the united Thracians,^ whose country was threatened by the neΛv settlement. 101. The Thasians, now defeated and blockaded, had re- course to the Lacedaemonians and entreated them to The Athe- nians conquer in a sea and land fight at the river Eurymedon. Revolt of Thasos. Attempted colonization of Amphi- polis. 1 Or, reading συμπαίκτες, as Poppo is inclined to do, stroyed to a man by the Tliracians." were de- THE SIEGE OF THASOS AND ΙΤΗΟΜέ. 63 B.C. 464 ; 01. 79. B.C. 463-461 ; Ol. 79, 2-4. invade Attica. Unknown to the Athenians they agreed, I. and were on the point of setting out Λvhen the great Kevoit of the earthquake occurred and was immediately followed by ^viio seize the revolt of the Helots and the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea, who seized Ithome. These Helots were mostly the descendants of the Messenians who had been en- slaved in ancient times, and hence all the insurgents were called Messenians. While the Lacedaemonians w^ere thus eno^ao-ed, the Thasians, who had now been blockaded for more than two years, came to terms with the Athenians ; they pulled down their walls and surrendered their ships ; they also agreed to pay what was required of them whether in the shape of immediate indemnity or of tribute for the future ; and they gave up their claim to the mainland and to the mine. The siege of Ithome proved tedious, and the Lacedae- 102. monians called in, amono^ other allies, the Athenians, τ^^^*^^■ ' ο ' ' mans come who sent to their aid a considerable force under Cimon> g^iaice^of The Athenians were specially invited because they were daemonians reputed to be skilful in siege operations, and the length susp^e1i?ed by of the blockade proved to the Lacedaemonians their own are dismised deficiency in that sort of warfare ; else why had they fnafagT^^ not taken the place by assault ? This expedition of the Athenians led to the first open quarrel between them and the Lacedaemonians. For the Lacedaemonians, not succeeding in storming the place, took alarm at the bold and original spirit of the Athenians. They reflected that they were aliens in race, and fearing that, if they were allowed to remain, they might be tempted by the Helots in Ithome to change sides, they dismissed them, while they retained the other allies. But they concealed their mistrust, and merely said that they no longer needed their services. ΝοΛν the Athenians saw that their dis- missal was due to some suspicion Λvhich had arisen and not to the less offensive reason Λvhich was openly avow^ed ; they felt keenly that such a slight ought not to have been offered them by the Lacedaemonians ; and so, on their 64 ΑΤΗΕΝΙΑΙί EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. B.C. 463-461 : 01. 79, 2-79, 4. B.C. 460 ; 01. 80. 103. Fall of Ithome. The Athe- nians settle the exiled Messenians at Kaupactus. Athens gains the alliance of Megara, as Avell as of Argos and Thessaly. 104, Egyptian revolt. return home, they forthwith a])andoned the aiiiance which they had made wdth them against the Persians and went over to their Argive enemies. At the same time both Argos and Athens bound themselves to Thes- saly by a common oath of alliance. In the tenth year of the siege the defenders of Ithom^' were unable to hold out any longer, and capitulated to the Lacedaemonians. The terms w^ere as follows : They were to leave Peloponnesus under a safe-conduct, and w^ere never again to return ; if any of them Λvere taken on Peloponnesian soil, he was to be the slave of his captor. Now an ancient oracle of Delphi was current among the Lacedaemonians, bidding them let the sup- pliant of Ithomaean Zeus go free. So the Messenians left Ithom^ with their wdves and children ; and the Athenians, w^ho were now the avowed enemies of Sparta, gave them a home at Xaupactus, a place w^hich they had just taken from the Ozolian Locrians. The Athenians obtained the alliance of the Megarians, who revolted from the Lacedaemonians because the Co- rinthians Λvere pressing them hard in a war arising out of a question of frontiers. Thus they gained both Megara and Pegae ; and they built for the Megarians the long w-alls, extending from the city to the port of Nisaea, w^hich they garrisoned themselves. This was the orio-inal and the main cause of the intense hatred w^hich the Corinthians entertained toAvards the Athenians. Meanwhile Liaros the son of Psammetichus, king of the Libyans who border on Egypt, had induced the greater part of Egypt to revolt from Artaxerxes the King. He began the rebellion at Mareia, a city opposite the island of Pharos, and, having made himself ruler of the country, called in the Athenians. They were just then carrying on Avar against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies ; and, quitting the island, they w^ent to his aid. They sailed from the sea into the Nile, and, getting possession of two-thirds of Memphis, proceeded to attack the remaining part called VICTORIES OF THE ATHEiaANS. 65 B.C. 460-457 ; 01. 80, 1-4. the AYhite Castle, in which the Persians and Medes had I. taken refuge, and with them such Egyptians as had not joined in the revolt. An Athenian fleet made a descent upon Halieis, where 105. a battle took place against some Corinthian and Epidau- The Atte- ••^ ~ Γ mans defeat rian troops ; the Corinthians stained the Adctory. Soon f'^ Aegine- -t^ ' ο »/ tans, capture afterwards the Athenians fought at sea off Cecryphaleia l^^^iJelila?^' withaPeloponnesian fleet, Avhich they defeated. A war conntmaJ?^ next broke out between the Aeginetans and the Athe- g^^l^^ ^^^' nians, and a great battle was fought off the coast of Aegina, in which the allies of both parties joined ; the Athenians were victorious, and captured seventy of the enemy's ships ; they then landed on Aegina, and under the command of Leocrates thesonof Stroebus, besieged the town. Thereupon the Peloponnesians sent over to the assistance of the Aeginetans three hundred hoplites who had previously been assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians. The Corinthians seized^ on the heights of Geraneia, and thence made a descent with their allies into the ]\Iegarian territory, thinking that the Athenians, who had so large a force absent in Aegina and in Egypt, would be unable to assist the Megarians ; or, if they did, Avould be oblio^ed to raise the sies^e of Aeoina. But the Athenians, without moving their army from Aegina, sent to Megara under the command of INIyronides a force consisting of their oldest and youngest men, who had remained at home. A battle was fought, which hung equally in the balance ; and when the two armies separated, they both thought that they had gained the victory. The Athenians, who did however get rather the better, on the departure of the Corinthians erected a trophy. And then the Corinthians, irritated by the reproaches of the aged men in the city, after tΛvelve days' preparation came out again, and, claiming the victory, raised another trophΛ^ Hereupon the Athenians sallied out of Megara, killed those who Λvere erecting the tro- phy, and charged and defeated the rest of the army. 1 Omitting the stop after κατέλαβορ, 5 6Q LACEDAEMONIANS IN BOEOTIA. B.C. 460-457 ; Ol. 80, l-l. B.C. 457 ; Ol. I. 106. They suffer great loss in their retreat. 107. The Athe- nians build their long ■walls. Battle of Tanagra. The Corinthians now retreated, but a considerable number of them were hard pressed, and missing their way got into an enclosure belonging to a private person, Λvhich was surrounded by a great ditch and had no exit. The Athenians, perceiving their situation, closed the entrance in front with heavy-armed troops, and, placing their light troops in a circle round, stoned all who had entered the enclosure. This Avas a great blow to the Corinthians ; but still the main body of their army returned home. About this time the Athenians began to build their long walls extending to the sea, one to the harbor of Phalerum, and the other to tlie Piraeus. The Phocians made an expedition against the Dorians, who inhabit Boeum, Cytinium, and Erineum, and are the mother people of the Lacedaemonians ; one of these towns they took. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians under the com- mand of Mcomedes the son of Cleombrotus, who was general in the place of the king Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias (he being at that time a minor), came to the assistance of the Dorians Avith fifteen hundred hoplites of their own, and, of their allies, ten thousand, and com- pelled the Phocians to make terms and to restore the town. They then thought of returning ; but there were difficulties. Either they might go by sea across the Crisaean Gulf, in which case the Athenian fleet Avould be sure to sail round and intercept them, or they might march over Mount Geraneia ; but this seemed dangerous when the Athenians were holding Megara and Pegae . The pass was not easy, and was ahvays guarded b^'the Athenians, who were obviously intending to stop them by that route also. So they determined to remain in Boeotia and con- sider how they could best get home. They had another motive : — Certain Athenians Avere privately making over- tures to them, in tlie hope that they would put an end to the democracy and the building of the long walls. But the Athenians were aware of their embarrassment, and they also suspected their design against the democracy. BATTLES OF TANAGKA AND OENOPHTTA. 67 B.C. 457 ; Ol. 80, 4. B.C. 455 ; 01. 81, 2. So they went out to meet them with their whole force, I. includinof a thousand Arsfives and contino-ents from tlie ο Cj ο other allies ; they numbered in all fourteen thousand men. Among them were some Thessalian cavalry, who came to their aid in accordance with the treaty^, but these deserted to the Lacedaemonians during the engagement. The battle was foujiht at Tanaora in Boeotia, and the 108. Lacedaemonians and their allies, after great slaughter on oeiophyta. both sides, gained the \actory. They then marched into iejnaf^^'"^ the Megarian territory, and, cutting down the fruit-trees, returned home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the Athe- nians made another expedition into Boeotia under the command of Myronides, and there was a battle at Oeno- phyta, in Avhich they defeated the Boeotians and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They pulled down the Avails of Tanagra and took as hostages from the Opuntian Locrians a hundred of their richest citizens. They then completed their own long walls. Soon afterwards the Aeginetans came to terms with the Athenians, dis- mantling their walls, surrendering their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute for the future. The Athenians, under the command of Tolmides the son of Tolmaeus, sailed round Peloponnesus and burnt the Lacedaemo- nian dock-yard. 2 They also took the Corinthian town of Chalcis, and, making a descent upon Sicyon, defeated a Sicyonian force. The Athenians and their allies were still in Egypt, 109. where they carried on the Avar with varying fortune. At ^^ectuai^^" first they were masters of the country. The King sent to obtahfL*s1st- Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian, who was well supplied Lacllaemon, with money, in the hope that he might persuade the kh^g^a^ii^gth Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and so draw off the dn'^ng^tilf Athenians from Egypt. He had no success ; the money '^^ϊο?''"" was being spent and nothing done ; so, with what re- ^^«"^p^^^• mained of it, he found his way back to Asia. The King then sent into Egypt Megabyzus the son of Zopyrus, a 1 Cp. i. 102 fin. 2 ι e. Gytliium. 68 END OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION, B.C. 455 ; 01. 81, 2. 110. Nearly the whole of the expedition to Egypt, including a reinforce- ment of fifty triremes, is destroyed. 111. Attempted restoration of Orestes, the Thessa- lian exile. The Athe- nians under Persian, who marched overland Λvith a large aitny and defeated the Egyptians and their allies. He drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and finally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he blockaded them during eighteen months. At length he drained the canal and diverted the water, thus leaving their ships high and dry and joining nearly the whole island to the mainland. He then crossed over with a land force, and took the island. Thus, after six years' fighting, the cause of the Hellenes in Egypt was lost. A few survivors of their great army found their way through Libya to Cyrene ; by far the larger number perished. Egypt again submitted to the Persian yoke, although Amyrtaeus, the king in the fens, still held out. He escaped capture owing to the extent of the fens and the braΛ^ery of their inhabitants, who are the most warlike of all the Egyptians. Inarus the king of Libya, the chief author of the revolt, was betrayed and impaled. Fifty additional triremes, which had been sent by the Athenians and their allies to relieve their other forces, in ignorance of ivhat had happened, sailed into the Mendesian mouth of the Nile. But they were at once attacked both from the land and from the sea, and the greater part of them destroyed by the Phoeni- cian fleet, a few ships only escaping. Thus ended the great Egyptian expedition of the Athenians and their allies. About this time Orestes, the exiled son of the Thes- salian king Echecratides, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Takino^ with them a force of the Boeo- tians and Phocians, Λvho were now their allies, they marched against Pharsalus in Thessaly. They made themselves masters of the country in the neighborhood of their camp, but the Thessalian cavalry stopped any further advance. They could not take the place, and none of their plans succeeded ; so they returned and brought back Orestes. A short time afterwards a thousand Athenians, under FIVE YEARS' TRUCE. 69 B.C. 454 ; 01. 81, 3. B.C. 448 ; 01. 83, 2. the command of Pericles the son of Xanthippus, em- I. barking on board the fleet which they had at Pegae, ^|/^^^ι^\\^ now in their possession, coasted along to Sicyon, and sicyonians. there landing, defeated the Sicyonians who came out to meet them. With the least possible delay taking on board Achaean troops and sailing to the opposite coast, they attacked and besieged Oeniadae, a to\vn of Acar- nania ; but failing to reduce it, they returned home. After an interval of three years a five years' truce was 112. concluded between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. J^^^^^^^^ The Athenians now abstained from war in Hellas itself, f^fZ'^}^!^'^ but made an expedition to Cyprus Λvith two hundred genfto Egypt ships of their own and of their allies, under the com- cfmo».^^ mand of Cimon. Sixty ships Λvere detached from the faiamfsln armament and sailed to Egypt, at the request of Amyr- ^yp^^• taeus the king in the fens ; the remainder proceeded to blockade Citium. Here Cimon died, and a famine arose in the country ; so the fleet quitted Citium. Arriving off Salamis in Cyprus they fought at sea and also on land with Phoenician and Cilician forces. Gaining a victory in both engagements, they returned home, accompanied by the ships Avhich had gone out with them and had now come back from Egypt. After this the Lacedaemonians engaged in the so-called Sacred War and took possession of the temple of Delphi, which they handed over to the Delphians. But no sooner had they retired than the Athenians sent an expedition and recovered the temple, which they handed over to the Phocians. Some time afterwards the Athenians, under the com- 113. mand of Tolmides the son of Tolmaeus, Λvith a thousand defeat of the ' Athenians at hoplites of their own and contingents of their allies, made RevoSonin an expedition against Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and cer- Boeotia. tain other places in Boeotia which Avere in the hands of oligarchical exiles from different Boeotian toAvns, and still remained hostile to them. They took Chaeronea, and leaving a garrison there, departed. But while they were on their march, the exiles λυΙιο had occupied Orcho- menus, some Locrians, some Euboean exiles and others 70 lyCEEASIN G DIFFICULTIES OF ATHENS. B.C. 447 ; 01. 83, 2. B.C. 440 ; 01. 85. I. of the same party, set upon them at Coronea and defeated them, killing many and taking many prisoners. The Athenians then agreed to evacuate Boeotia upon condi- tion that the prisoners should be restored. And so the Boeotian exiles returned to their homes, and all the Boeotians regained their independence. 114. Not long afterwards Euboea revolted from Athens. iXia^^ Pericles had just arrived in the island with an Athenian thritiieniai army when the news came that Megara had likewise re- AtticT.''''* volted, that the Peloponnesians were on the point of ?/thl Pe?o- invading Attica, and that the Megarians had slaughtered aSd°r?covlry the Athenian garrison, of whom only a few had escaped to of Euboea. ^^fgaea. The Megarians had introduced a force of Corin- thians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the city, and by their help had eifected the revolt. Pericles in haste with- drew his army from Euboea. The Peloponnesians then invaded Attica, under the command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, the Lacedaemonian king. They advanced as far as Eleusis and Thria but no further, and after ravaging the country, returned home. Thereupon the Athenians under the command of Pericles again crossed over to Euboea and reduced the whole country ; the Hestiaeans they ejected from their homes and appropri- ated their territory ; the rest of the island they settled by agreement. 115. Soon after their return from Euboea they made a truce 'S^ni'agree ^^^ thirty ycars with the Lacedaemonians and their al- p^acefhe?dby ^^^S' restoring Nisaca, Pegae, Troezen and Achaia, which lopiinesut wcrc the places held by them in Peloponnesus . Six years sam°anf,^who ^^ter the Samiaus and Milesians fell out about the posses- by\be ^^^^^ sion of Priene , and the Milesians , who Avere getting worsted Byzantians. |j^ ^j^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ Athcus and complained loudly of the Samians. Some private citizens of Samos, who w^anted to overthrow the government, supported their complaint. "Whereupon the Athenians, sailing to Samos with forty ships, established a democracy, and taking as hostages fifty boys and fifty men whom they deposited at Lemnos, they returned leaving a garrison. But certain of the THIRTY TEARS' TRUCE. REVOLT OF SAMOS. 71 B.C. 440 ; 01. 85. Samians who had quitted the island and fled to the main- I. land entered into an alliance with the principal oligarchs Avho remained in the city, and with Pissuthnes the son of Hystaspes, then governor of Sardis, and collecting troops to the number of seven hundred they crossed over by night to Samos. First of all they attacked the victorious populace and got most of them into their power ; then they stole away the hostages from Lemnos, and finally revolted from Athens. Tlie officers and garrison of the Athenians whom they captured Λvere delivered by them into the hands of Pissuthnes. They at once prepared to make an expedition against Miletus. The Byzantians joined in their revolt. When the Athenians heard of the insurrection they 116. sailed to Samos with sixty ships. But of this number i^/a?ii^defeat they sent away sixteen, some toΛvards Caria to keep a at se^^"^^*^^^ look out for the Phoenician fleet, others to summon aid from Chios and Lesbos. With the remaining forty-four ships they fought at sea under the command of Pericles and nine others, near the island of Tragia, against seventy Samian vessels, all sailing from Miletus, of which twenty were transports ; the Athenians gained the Λdctory. After receiving a reinforcement of forty ships from Athens and of twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos they disembarked, and having the superiority on shore, invested the city with three walls ; they also blockaded it by sea. At the same time Pericles took sixty ships of the blockading force and sailed hastily towards Caunus in Caria, news having ar- rived that a Phoenician fleet was approaching ; Stesa- goras and others had already gone with five ships from Samos to fetch it. Meanwhile the Samians made a sudden sally, and at- 117. tackins: the naval station of the Athenians which was Temporary ■- 11. success and unprotected, destroyed the guard-ships and engaged and ^}^^^ s^^J^c- defeated the other vessels which put out to meet them, samiaus. During some fourteen days they were masters of the sea about their own coasts, and carried in and out Avhatever they pleased. But Λvhen Pericles returned, they were 72 CAUSES OF THE PELOFOyKESIAK WAE. B.C. 439 ; 01. 85, 2. I. again closely blockaded ; and there soon arrived from Sns^aS"^' Athens forty additional ships under Thucydides, Hag- submit. j-^Qj-^^ ^^^^ Phormio, twenty more under Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. The Sa- mians made a feeble attempt at a sea-fight, but soon they Λvere unable to resist, and after nine months Avere forced to surrender. The terms of capitulation Avere as follows : They were to raze their walls, give hostages, surrender their ships, and pay a full indemnity by regu- lar instalments. The Byzantians too agreed to return to their allegiance. 118.S Not long afterwards occurred the aifairs of Corey ra S^umed^roni ^^^^ Potldaea, which have been already narrated, and the Lacedaemo-^^ various othcr circumstanccs ivhich led to the Pelopon- dlcided t?Sf nesian War. Fifty years elapsed between the retreat of tain^he^inc- X^rxcs and the beginning of the war ; during these years De?phL?^ took place all those operations of the Hellenes against oracle. ^^^^ another and against the Barbarian which I have been describing. The Athenians acquired a firmer hold over their empire and the city itself became a great power. The Lacedaemonians saw what was going on, but during most of the time they remained inactive and hardly attempted to interfere. They had never been of a temper prompt to make war unless they Avere com- pelled ; and they were in some degree embarrassed by enemies near home. But the Athenians were gro wing- too great to be ignored and were laying hands on their allies. They could now bear it no longer ; they made up their minds that they must put out all their strength and overthrow the Athenian poAver by force of arms. And therefore they commenced the Peloponnesian War. They had already voted in their own assembly that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were guilty ; ^ they now sent to Delphi and asked the god if it would be for their advantage to make Avar. He is reported to have answered that, if they did their best, ^ But. cp. vii. 18 med. THE A LLIES AT SPAETA. 73 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. they would he conquerors, and that he hhnself, invited I. or uninvited, Avould take their part. So they again summoned the allies, intending to put 119. to them the question of war or peace . When their repre- ^e^^jjjgj^f sentatives arrived, an assembly Avas held ; and the allies JJj'g^sij^g on said what they had to say, most of them complaining ^^® ^^^^• of the Athenians and demanding that the war should proceed. The Corinthians had alrea-dy gone the round of the cities and entreated them privately to vote for the war ; they were afraid that they would be too late to save Potidaea. At the assembly they came forward last of all and spoke as follows ; — " Fellow allies, we can no longer find fault with the 120. Lacedaemonians ; they have themselves resolved upon No more fault •^ ^ ^ ••• to be found war and have brouo^ht us hither to confirm their de- with the Lace- ~ daemonians. cision. And they have done well ; for the leaders of a Tiie Athe- •^ ' mans are confederacy, while they do not neglect the interests of an"|fike^^*° their own state, should look to the general weal ; as they ^?AviiiinS^?o are first in honor, they should be first in the fulfilment fifey shSSid of their duties. Now those among us λυΙιο have ever ilady"fco^^^ had dealings with the Athenians, do not require to be fi|ht!ig?^ warned against them ; but such as live inland and not on any maritime highway should clearly understand that, if they do not protect the sea-board, they will not be able to carry their produce to the sea, or to receive in return the goods which the sea gives to the land. They should not lend a careless ear to our Avords, for they nearly concern them ; they should remember that, if they de- sert the cities on the sea-shore, the danger may some day reach them, and that they ^re consulting for their own interests quite as much as for ours. And therefore let no one hesitate to accept Λvar in exchange for peace. AYise men refuse to move until they are wronged, but brave men as soon as they are wronged go to war, and when there is a good opportunity make peace again. They are not intoxicated by military success ; but neither will they tolerate injustice from a love of peace and ease. For he whom pleasure makes a coward will 74 SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. B.C. 432 ; Ol. 87. I. quickly lose, if he continues inactive, the delights of ease which he is so unwilling to renounce ; and he whose arrogance is stimulated by victory does not see hoΛV hollow is the confidence which elates him. Many schemes Avhich were ill-advised have succeeded throusfh the still greater folly which possessed the enemy, and yet more, Avhich seemed to be wisely contrived, have ended in foul disaster. The execution of an enterprise is never equaP to the conception of it in the confident mind of its promoter ; for men are safe while they are thinking, but, Avhen the time of action comes, then they lose their presence of mind and fail. 121. "We, however, do not make war upon the Athenians mriJitoTiie "^ ^ spirit of vain-glory, but from a sense of wrong ; 4^mimbe?s tlicrc is ample justification, and when we obtain redress, skUMi^mia- ^^'^ ^^^^^ P^^ ^P ^^® sword. For every reason we are oiJ^fll^t^^ii likely to succeed. First, because we are superior in level v^th ^ Humbers and in military skill ; secondly, because we all theirs. obey as one man the orders given to us. If they are strong at sea, Ave too Avill provide a navy, for Avhich the means can be supplied partly by contributions from each state, partly out of the funds at Delphi and Olympia. A loan ivill be granted to us, and by the ofier of higher pay we can draw away their foreign sailors. The Athenian power consists of mercenaries, and not of their ΟΛνη citizens ; but our soldiers; are not mercenaries, and there- fore cannot so be bought, for Ave are strong in men if poor in money. Let them be beaten in a single naval engage- ment and they are probably conquered at once ; but sup- pose they hold out, we shall then have more time in which to practise at sea. As soon as we have brought our skill up to the level of theirs our courage will surely give us the victory. For that is a natural gift which they cannot learn, but their superior skill is a thing acquired, which we must attain by practice.^ ^d moil^* "And the money which is required for the war, we will ^ Reading όμοια. 2 Or, " which we must overcome by practice." SPEECH OF THE COKINTHIANS. 75 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. provide by a contribution. What ! shall their allies never ^• fail in paying the tribute which is to enslave them, and shall we refuse to give freely in order to save ourselves and be avenged on our enemies, or rather to prevent the money which Ave refused to give from being taken from us by them and used to our destruction ? '' These are some of the means by which the war may 122. be carried on; but there are others. We may induce ^y g^iu^g ' ^ over their their allies to revolt, — a sure mode of cuttinof off the aiifsyemay ' c» cut oil their revenues in which the strength of Athens consists ; or resources. we may plant a fort in their country ; and there are many expedients which will hereafter suggest them- selves. For war, least of all things, conforms to pre- scribed rules ; it strikes out a path for itself when the moment comes. And therefore he ivho has his temper under control in warfare, is safer far, but he who gets into a passion is, through his own fault, liable to the greater fall. " If this Avere merely a quarrel between one of us and if we quietly •11 1 Λ 1 Τ • IT submit Λνβ our neiofhbors about a boundary Ime it Avould not shaii deserve "^ , "^ to be slaves. matter ; but reflect : the truth is that the Athenians are a match for us all, and much more than a match for any single city. And if we allow ourselves to be divided or are not united against them heart and soul — the whole confederacy and every nation and city in it — they will easily overpower us. It may seem a hard saying, but you may be sure that defeat means nothing but doAvnright slavery, and the bare mention of such a possibility is a disgrace to the' Peloponnese : — shall so many states suffer at the hands of one ? Men will say, some that we deserve our fate, others that we are too cowardly to resist : and we shall seem a degenerate race. For our fathers were the liberators of Hellas, but we cannot secure even our own liberty ; and while we make a point of overthrowing the rule of a single man in this or that city, we allow a city which is a tyrant to be set up in the midst of us. Are Ave not open to one of three most serious charges — folly, cowardice, or 76 SPEECH OF THE COKINTHIANS. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. I carelessness? For you certainly do not escape such imputations by wrapping yourselves in that contempt- uous wisdom which has so often ^ brought men to ruin, as in the end to be pronounced contemptible folly. 123 . " But why should we dwell reproachfully upon the past, w"a?yo?have ^^^cpt in the interest of the present ? We should rather, theSiSgof li^oking to the future, devote our energies to the task ^ur^side, and ^^^^i^^ ^® havc immediately in hand. By labor to win b?eak?iie°* virtuc, — that IS the lesson which we^ have learnt from treaty. ^^^ fathers, and which you ought not to unlearn, because you chance to have some trifling advantage over them in wealth and power ; for men should not lose in the time of their wealth what was gained by them in their time of want. There are many reasons why you may advance with confidence. The God has spoken and has promised to take our part himself. All Hellas will fight at our side from motives either of fear or of interest. And you will not break the treaty, — the God in bidding you go to war pronounces it to have been already broken, — but you will avenge the violation of it. For those who attack others, not those who defend themselves, are the real violators of treaties.^ 124. "On every ground you will be right in going to war : o^as^^arl^ it is our United advice ; and if you believe community iSiVl^ioLo. of interests to be the surest srround of strens^th both to be*th?wly'to ii^^i^i^^^^s and states, send speedy aid^ to the Poti- ^^^' daeans, who are Dorians and ηοΛν besieged by lonians (for times have changed) , and recover the liberties Avhich the rest of the allies have lost. We cannot go on as we are : for some of us are already sufiering, and if it is known that we have met, but do not dare to defend ourselves, others will soon share their fate. Acknow- 1 Or, '' For we cannot suppose that, having avoided these errors, you have wrapped yourselves in that contemptuous wisdom, which has so often," etc. 2 Reading ημΐν. 3 Cp. i. 71 fin. * Reading ταντά: or, with all the MSS. retaining ταί5τ« : *'And as it is most certain that the policy which Λve recommend is for our advantage both as states and individuals, send speedy aid," etc. EMBASSIES SENT TO AND FRO. 77 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. B.C. 620 ? 01. 40 ? ledging then, allies, that there is no alternative, and I. that we are advising you for the best, vote for war ; and be not afraid of the immediate danger, but fix your thoughts on the durable peace which will follow. For by war peace is assured, but to remain at peace when you should be going to war may be often very dangerous. The tyrant city which has been set up in Hellas is a standing menace to all alike ; she rules over some of us already, and would fain rule over others. Let us attack and subdue her, that we may ourselves live safely for the future and deliver the Hellenes whom she has , enslaved." Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedaemonians, having heard the opinions of all 125. the allies, put the question to them all, one after the other, J^g^enuJ^^"^ great and small alike, and the majority voted for war. preparation. But, although they had come to this decision, they were not ready, and could not take up arms at once ; so they determined to make the necessary preparations, each for themselves, Λvith the least possible delay. Still nearly a whole year was passed in preparation before they invaded Attica and commenced open hostilities. During this year they sent embassies to Athens and 126. made various complaints that their grounds for going cyio?S°^ to Λvar might be all the stronger in case the Athenians tlon^of «Ίβ refused to listen. The first ambassadors desired the g^iless.^^^ Athenians to drive out "the curse of the Goddess." The curse to which they referred was as follows : Li the days of old there was an Athenian named Cylon, who had been an Olympic victor ; he was powerful and of noble birth ; and he had married the daughter of The- agenes, a Megarian who Λvas at that time tyrant of Megara. In answer to an inquiry which Cylon made at Delphi, the God told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens at the greatest festival of Zeus. Thereupon he obtained forces from Theagenes, and, persuading his friends to join him, when the time of the Olympic festival in Peloponnesus came round, he took possession 78 THE CURSE OF THE GODDESS. B.C. 620? 01.40? of the Acropolis, intending to make himself tyrant. He thought that this was the greatest festival of Zeus, and, having been an Olympic victor, he seemed to have an interest in it. But Avhether the greatest festival spoken of was in Attica or in some other part of Hellas Λvas a question which never entered into his mind, and the oracle said nothing about it. (For the Athenians also have a greatest festival of Zeus — the festiA^al of Zeus ^ the Gracious, or Diasia, as it is called — this is held outside the city and the whole people sacrifice at it, some, ordinary victims, others, a kind of offering peculiar to the country.) However, Cylon thought that his inter- pretation was right, and made the attempt at the Olym- pic festival. The Athenians, when they saw what had happened, came in a body from the fields and invested the Acropolis. After a time they grew tired of the siege and most of them went away, committing the guard to the nine Archons, and giving them full powers to do what they thought best in the \vhole matter; for in those days public affairs were chiefly adminis- tered by the nine Archons.^ Cylon and his companions were in great distress from want of food and Λvater. So he and his brother made their escape ; the rest, being hard pressed, and some of them ready to die of hunger, sat as suppliants at the altar Λvhich is in the Acropolis. When the Athenians, to whose charge the guard had been committed, saw them dying in the temple, they bade them rise, promising to do them no harm, and then led them away and put them to death. They even slew some of them in the very presence of the awful Goddesses at whose altars, in passing by, they had souo'ht refuo-e. The murderers and their descendants are held to be accursed, and offenders against the God- dess. These accursed persons were banished by the Athenians ; and Cleomenes, the Lacedaemonian king, again banishad them from Athens in a time of civil 1 Placing tlie comma before instead of after Jtaaia. 2 Cp. Herod, v. 71. THE CUKSE OF TAENAEUS. 79 B.C. 477 ; 01. 7o, 4. strife hy the help of the opposite faction, expelling the I. livinof and disinterrino: and castins^ forth the bones of the dead.i Nevertheless they afterwards returned, and to this day their race still survives in the city. The Lacedaemonians desired the Athenians to drive 127. away this curse, as if the honor of the Gods were their aSched to first object, but in reality because they knew that the i^encies. curse attached to Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, by his mother's side, and they thought that if he were banished they would find the Athenians more manage- able. They did not really expect that he would be driven into exile, but hoped to discredit him Avith the citizens and make them believe that his misfortune was to a certain extent the cause of the war. For he was the leader of the state and the most po^verful man of his day, and his policy was utterly opposed to the Lacedaemonians. He would not suffer the Athenians to give way, but Avas always urging upon them the necessity of war. The Athenians retaliated by demanding that the Lace- 128. daemonians should drive away the curse of Taenarus. TheAthe- •^ mans re- They referred to the murder of certain Helots Avho had taiiate by ^ desirnig tiie taken refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus ; ^fanito"!? e these the Lacedaemonians, having first raised by the cuSes^^^The hand, had then led away and slain. The Lacedae- gjf|jg°^ ^^f monians themselves believe this act of theirs to have ti?mmxfe?of been the cause of the great earthquake Avhich visited pHaSuXts; Sparta. 2 The Athenians also bade them drive out the Atiien?offiie curse of Athene of the Brazen House. The story is St'cTuSTb? as follows : When Pausanias the Lacedaemonian was p5?uslSias^fn originally summoned by the Spartans to give an account of leitempie. of his command at the Hellespont, ^ and had been tried and acquitted, he was no longer sent out in a public capacity, but he hired a trireme of Hermione on his ΟΛνη account and sailed to the Hellespont, pretending that he had gone thither to fight in the cause of the Hellenes. In reality he wanted to prosecute an intrigue with the 1 Cp. Herod, v. 70, 72. 2 Cp. i. lOl, 102. 3 Cp. i. 95. 80 STORY OF PAUSAyiAS. B.C. 478 or 477 ; Ol. 75, 3 or 4. I. King, by which he hoped to obtain the empire of Hellas. He had already taken the first steps after the retreat from Cyprus, when he captured Byzantium. The city was at that time held by the Persians and by certain relatives and kinsmen of the King, who were taken prisoners. These he restored to the King without the knowledge of the allies, to whom he declared that they had made their escape. This act was the beginning of the whole afifair, and thereby he originally placed the King under an obligation to him. His accomplice was Gongylus the Eretrian, to whose care he had entrusted Byzantium and the captives. To this same Gongylus he also gave a letter addressed to the King, of which, as was afterwards discoΛ"ered, the terms were as follows : — "Pausanias, the Spartan commander, desiring to do you a service, sends you back these captives of his spear. And I propose, if you haΛ^e no objection, to marry your daughter, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Hellas under your SΛγay. I think that I can accomplish this if you and I take counsel together. Should you approve of my proposal, send a trusty person to the sea and through him we will negotiate. " Thus far the letter. 129. Xerxes was pleased, and sent Artabazus the son of Intrigues of Phamaccs to the sea, commandinii him to assume the Pausamas ' ο T^ith Xerxes, government of the satrapy of Dascylium in the room of Megabates. An answer Avas entrusted to him, Λγhich he was to send as quickly as possible to Pausanias at Byzan- tium ; he Λvas to show him at the same time the royal seal. If Pausanias gave him any order about his own affairs he was to execute it with all diligence and fidelity. Artabazus came down to the sea, as he was desired, and transmitted the letter. The answer of the King was as follows : — "Thussaith Xerxes, the King, to Pausanias. The bene- fit which thou hast done me in saving the captives who Λvere taken at Byzantium be^^ond the sea is recorded in my house for ever, and thy words please me. Let neither day nor night hinder thee from fulfilling diligently the PAUSANIAS SUMMONED TO SPAKTA. 81 B.C. 477 or 476 tf ; 01. 75, 4 or 76 ff. promise Avhich thou hast made to me ; spare not gold or I. silver, and take as large an army as thou wilt, where- soever it may be required. I have sent to thee Arta- bazus, a good man; act with him for my honor and welfare, and for thine own, and be of good courage." Pausanias received the letter. He had already ac- 130. quired a high reputation among the Hellenes when in ^a^ifd^wa command at Plataea, and noAV he was so great that he ^^aSS elts his could no longer contain himself or live like other men. ^^J^^l^g"^ As he marched out of Byzantium he wore Persian ap- parel. On his way through Thrace he was attended by a body-guard of Medes and Egyptians, and he had his table served after the Persian fashion. He could not conceal his ambition, but indicated by little things the greater designs which he was meditating. He made himself difficult of access, and displayed such a violent temper towards everybody that no one could come near him ; and this was one of the chief reasons why the confederacy transferred themselves to the Athenians. The news of his behavior soon reached the Lacedae- 131. monians ; who recalled him in the first instance on this He is re- called, a ground.^ And now, when he had sailed away in the ship ^^?ξ^1^^^ of Hermiond without leave, and was evidently carryino^ daemonians ' «^ '^ & and thrown on the same practices ; when he had been forced out of j,^*t^sPon°°' Byzantium and the gates had been shut against him by ο«™γ?£-^^^ the Athenians ; and when, instead of returning to Sparta, ^^^^ ^^^ *^^^^• he settled at Colonae in Troas, and was reported to the Ephors to be negotiating with the Barbarians, and to be staying there for no good purpose, then at last they made up their minds to act. They sent a herald to him with a despatch rolled on a scytale, commandi'ng him to follow the officer home, and saying that, if he refused, Sparta would declare war against him. He, being desirous as far as he could to avoid suspicion and believing that he could dispose of the accusations by bribery, returned for the second time to Sparta. On his return he was at once thrown into prison by the Ephors, who have the power ^ Cp i. 95 init. * 6 82 HIS ES^TRIGUES WITH THE HELOTS. B.C. 477 or 476 If ; 01. 75, 4 or 76 If. 132. Sufficient evi- dence cannot be obtained. At last his coniidential servant opens a letter Λvllich he -vv^as to carry to the Persian satrap, and finding an order for his own death, turns in- former. to imprison the king himself. But after a time he con- trived to come out, and challenged any one who asserted his guilt to bring him to trial. As yet, hoΛvever, neither his enemies among the citizens nor the Spartan government had any trustworthy evi- dence such as would have justified them in inflicting punishment upon a member of the royal family holding royal oflSce at the time. For he was the guardian as well as cousin of the king, Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, Avho Avas still a minor. But his disregard of propriety and afiectation of Barbarian fashions made them strongly suspect that he was dissatisfied with his position in the state. They examined into any violation of established usage which they could find in his preΛάous life ; and they remembered among other things hoΛv in past times he had presumed on his own authority to inscribe on the tripod at Delphi, which the Hellenes dedicated as the first fruits of their victory over the Persians, this elegiac couplet : — ■ Pausanias, captain of the Hellenes, having destroyed the Persian host, Made this offering to Phoebus for a memorial." The Lacedaemonians at once efiaced the lines and in- scribed on the tripod the names of the cities Avhich had taken part in the overthrow of the Barbarian and in the dedication of the oflTerino-. But still this act of Pausa- nias gave ofience at the time, and now that he had again fallen under suspicion, seemed to receive a new light from his present designs. They were also in- formed that he was intrio-uino^ with the Helots ; and this was true, for he had promised them emancipation and citizenship if they would join him in an insurrec- tion and help to carry out his whole design. Still the magistrates ΛνοηΜ not take decided measures ; they even refused to believe the distinct testimony Avhich certain Helots brought against him ; their habit haΛάng always been to be sloΛV in taking an irrevocable decision against HE IS BETKAYED BY HIS SERYAKT. 83 a Spartan without incontestable proof. At last a certain I. man of Argilus, who had been a favorite and was still a confidential servant of Pausanias, turned informer. He had been commissioned by him to carry to Artabazus the last letters for the King, but the thought struck him that no previous messenger had ever returned ; he took alarm, and so, having counterfeited the seal of Pausanias in order to avoid discovery if he were mistaken, or if Pausanias, wanting to make some alterations, should ask him for the letter, he opened it, and among the directions given in it found written, as he had suspected, an order for his ΟΛνη death. He showed the letter to the Ephors, who Avere now 133. more inclined to believe, but still they wanted to hear ^^keKISc* something from Pausanias' own mouth ; and so, accord- Taenarus, ing to a plan preconcerted with them, the man went to ^airsomeof' Taenarus as a suppliant and there put up a hut divided Pau^amaf * by a partition. In the inner part of the hut he placed fnJJihlthe some of the Ephors, and when Pausanias came to him ϊϋ,^^ΐιοΐΓ^^^ and asked him why he was a suppliant, the whole truth was at once revealed to them. There was the man re- proaching Pausanias with the directions which he had found in the letter, and going into minute details about the whole afiair ; he protested that never on any occa- sion had he brought him into any trouble when sent on his service in this matter to the King : Λvhy then should he share the fate of the other messensfers, and be re- warded with death? And there was Pausanias, admit- ting the truth of his words, and telling him not to be angry at what had happened, offering to raise him by the hand that he might safely leave the temple, and bidding him go about the business at once and not make difficulties. ,^-— The Ephors, who had heard every word, went away 134. for the present, intending, now that they had certain ^«|^^^^\'ϊ^ knowledge, to take Pausanias in the city. It is said that p"'Snias. he was on the point of being arrested in the street, Λvhen iJnipif oT ^^® the face of one of them as they approached revealed to ^^^^"^ 84 DEATH OF PAUSANIAS. B.C. 471 ; 01. 77, 2. I. and is there shut in and starved to death. 135. Themistocles is implicated in the plot, and officers are sent to take him. him their purpose, and another who was friendly warned him by a hardly perceptible nod. Whereupon he ran and fled to the temple of Athene of the Brazen House and arrived before them, for the precinct Avas not far oflf. There, entering into a small house which be- longed to the temple, that he might not sufier from exposure to the weather, he remained. When his pur- suers, who had failed in overtaking him, came up, they unroofed the building, and having made sure that he was within and could not get out, the}^ built up the doors, and, investing the place, starved him to death, He was on the point of expiring in the temple where he lay, when they, observing his condition, brought him out ; he was still breathing, but as soon as he Avas brought out he died. The Spartans were going to cast his body into the Caeadas, a chasm into which they throw male- factors, but they changed their minds and buried him somewhere in the neighborhood. The God of Delphi afterwards commanded them to transfer him to the place where he died, and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, as the inscription on the column testifies. The oracle also told them that they had brought a curse upon themselves, and must offer two bodies for one to Athene of the Brazen House. Whereupon they made two brazen statues, which they dedicated, intending them to be an expiation for Pausanias. To this judgment of the God himself the Athenians referred when they retorted on the Lacedaemonians, telling them to banish the curse. ΝοΛν the evidence which proved that Pausanias was in league with Persia implicated Themistocles ; and the Lacedaemonians sent ambassadors to the Athenians charo^ino^ him likcAvise with treason, and demandino' that he should receive the same punishment. The Athe- nians agreed, but having been ostracized he was living at the time in Argos, whence he used to visit other parts of the Peloponnese. The Lacedaemonians were very ready to join in the pursuit; so they and the THEMISTOCLES AND ADiHETUS. 85 Athenians sent officers, who were told to arrest him I. wherever they should find him. Themistocles received information of their purpose, 136. and fled from the Peloponnesus to the Corcyraeans, who p seeks re- *- ^ ' fuge among Avere under an oblioiition to him. The Corcyraeans said ^^® corcyrae- c «/ ans; tliey are that they were afraid to keep him, lest they should incur ^^t^ens^Ld the enmity of Athens and Lacedaemon ; so they con- and^stndTiS veyed him to the neighboring continent, whither he Avas ^pf/Jf com- followed by the officers, who constantly inquired in which jjjf^^^ ^^tx^. direction he had gone and pursued him everywhere. S^il'Sfs- OAving to an accident he was compelled to stop at the as^a^su^pSnt house of Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was not ^t the hearth. his friend. He chanced to be absent from home, but Themistocles presented himself as a suppliant to his wife, and was instructed by her to take their child and sit at the hearth. Admetus soon returned, and then Themistocles told him who he was, adding that if in past times he had opposed any request which Admetus had made to the Athenians, he ought not to retaliate on an exile. He was now in such extremity that a far weaker adversary than he could do him a mischief ; but a noble nature should not be revenged by taking at a disadvantaofe one so srood as himself. Themistocles further argued that he had opposed Admetus in some matter of business, and not Λyhen life Λvas at stake ; but that, if Admetus delivered him up, he would be consigning him to death. At the same time he told him who his pursuers Avere and what was the charge against him. Admetus, hearing his words, raised him up, together 137. with his own son, from the place ivhere he sat holdins: Admetus Λ Λ 'Λ Λ ' Λ - ι•ι 1 1 r« η gives him ρΓΟ- the child m his arms, Avhich was the most solemn form of tection, and when the supplication. Not lono^ afterwards the Athenians and officers arrive ^ ^ ^ m pursuit, Lacedaemonians came and pressed him to give up the |f"^^ci^sjiimto fuofitive, but he refused ; and as Themistocles wanted to whence he c5 ' sails to go to the King, sent him on foot across the country to the Ephesus. sea at Pydna (which was in the kingdom of Alexander). There he found a merchant vessel sailing to Ionia, in 86 THEMISTOCLES AT THE PERSIAN COURT. B.C. 466 ; Ol. 78, 3. B.C. 465 ; 01. 78, 4. I. His letter to the Kiug. 138. Going to the Court of Persia, he acquires the favor of the King and re- ceives great honor, but shortly after dies. which he embarked ; it was driven, however, by a storm to the station of the Athenian fleet which was blockadins: Naxos. He was unknown to his fellow passengers, but, fearing what might happen, he told the captain who he was and why he fled, threatening if he did not save his life to say that he had been bribed to take him on board. The only hope was that no one should be allowed to leave the ship while they had to remain off Naxos ; if he complied with his request, the obligation should be abundantly repaid . The captain agreed , and after anchor- ing in a rough sea for a day and a night oflf the Athenian station, he at length arrived at Ephesus. Themistocles rewarded him Λvith a liberal present ; for he received soon afterwards from his friends the property which he had deposited at Athens and Argos. He then went up the country with one of the Persians who dwelt on the coast, and sent a letter to Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, who had just succeeded to the throne. The letter was in the folloΛving words : "I, Themistocles, have come to you ; I, who of all Hellenes did your house the greatest injuries, so long as I was compelled to defend myself against your father ; but still greater benefits when I was in safety and he in danger during his retreat. And there is a debt of gratitude due to me " (here he noted how he had forewarned Xerxes at Salamis of the resolution of the Hellenes to withdraw, ^ and how through his in- fluence, as he pretended, they had refrained from break- ing doAvn the bridges ).'2 "Now I am here, able to do you many other services, and persecuted by the Hellenes for your sake. Let me wait a year, and then I will myself explain Avhy I have come." The Kino• is said to have been astonished at the bold- ο ness of his character, and told hhn to wait a year as he proposed. In the interval he made himself acquainted, as far as he could, with the Persian language and the manners of the country. When the year was over, he arrived at the court and became a greater man there 1 Cp. Herod, viii. 75. 2 Cp. Herod, viii. 108. CHARACTEK OF THEMISTOCLES. 87 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. than any Hellene had ever been before. This was due I. partly to his previous reputation, and partly to the hope J^JifcjJa?-^^^ which he inspired in the King's mind that he would Jatu^iSJute- enslave Hellas to him ; above all, his ability had been ^-J^'tf ^3°'^" tried and not found wanting. For Themistocles Λvas a JJeSuaion, man whose natural force was unmistakable ; this was JiiVn e?nei-^^ the quality for which he was distinguished above all ^^^^^' other men ; from his own native acuteness, and without any study either before or at the time, he was the ablest judge of the course to be pursued in a sudden emergency, and could best divine what was likely to happen in the remotest future. Whatever he had in hand he had the power of explaining to others, and even where he had no experience he was quite competent to form a sufficient judgment ; no one could foresee with equal clearness the good or evil event which was bidden in the future. In a word, Themistocles, by natural power of mind and Λvith the least preparation, was of all men the best able to ex- temporize the right thing to be done. A sickness put an end to his life, although some say that he poisoned himself because he felt that he could not accomplish Avhat he had promised to the King. There is a monu- ment of him in the agora of the Asiatic Magnesia, where he was governor — the King assigning to him, for bread. Magnesia, which produced a revenue of fifty talents ^ in the year ; for wine, Lampsacus, which was considered to be the richest in Avine of any district then knoAvn ; and Myus for meat. His family say that his remains were carried home at his ΟΛνη request and buried in Attica, but secretly ; for he had been accused of treason and had fled from his country, and he could not lawfully be interred there. Such Avas the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, the two most famous Hellenes of their day. Thus the demand for the banishment of the accursed, 139^ made by the Lacedaemonians on the occasion of their The Lace- n j_ Λ .1 jiixi (laemonians nrst embassy, was met by a counter demand on themakeafinai demand for 1 About £12,000. 88 SPEECH OF PERICLES. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. I. the restora- tion of in- dependence to the Hellenes. Speech of Pericles. 140. I still give you my old advice, — Do not yield to the Pelo- ponnesians. part of Athens. Later they came again and told the Athenians that they must raise the siege of Potidaea and restore Aegina to independence. Above all, and in the plainest terms, they insisted that if they wanted to BYert war, they must rescind the decree which excluded the Megarians from the market of Athens and the har- bors in the Athenian dominions. But the Athenians would not listen to them, nor rescind the decree ; al- leging in reply that the Megarians had tilled the holy ground and the neutral borderland, and had received their runaway slaves. Finally, there came from Sparta an embassy, consisting of Ehamphias, Melesippus, and Hegesander, who said nothing of all this, but only, " The Lacedaemonians desire to maintain peace, and peace there may be if you will restore independence to the Hellenes . " Whereupon the Athenians called an assembly and held a discussion ; it seemed best to them to make up their minds and to give a complete and final answer. Many came forward to speak, and much Avas said on both sides, some affirming that they ought to go to Λvar, and others that this decree about the Megarians should be rescinded and not stand in the way of peace. At last Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, who was the first man of his day at Athens, and the greatest orator and states- man, came forward and advised as follows : — "Athenians, I say, as I always have said, that we must never yield to the Peloponnesians, although I knoΛv that men are persuaded to go to war in one temper of mind, and act when the time comes in another, and that their resolutions chano^e with the chans^es of fortune. But I see that I must give you the same, or nearly the same, advice which I gave before, and I call upon those Λvhom my words may convince to maintain our united deter- mination, even if we should not escape disaster ; or else, if our sagacity be justified by success, to claim no share of the credit. 1 The movement of events is often as wayward and incomprehensible as the course of human 1 Cp. ii. 64 init. SPEECH OF PERICLES. 89 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. thought ; and this is why we ascribe to chance whatever I. belies our calculation. S'tle'iTce^' "For some time past the designs of the Lacedaemonians nfaTseem^^ have been clear enough, and they are still clearer now. submifsioS^to The treaty says that when differences arise, the ΪΛνο only^'piovoke parties shall refer them to arbitration, and in the mean- ml^s^^lnd time both are to retain what they have. But for arbitra- ISss of οΪγ in- tion they never ask ; and when it is offered by us, they ^^p^"'^^^^^®• refuse it. They want to redress their grievances by arms and not by argument ; and ηοΛν they come to us, using the language, no longer of expostulation, but of com- mand. They tell us to quit Potidaea, to leave Aegina independent, and to rescind the decree respecting the Meo^arians. These last ambassadors sro further still, and announce that we must give the Hellenes independence. I would have none of you imagine that we will be fight- ins^ for a small matter if we refuse to annul the Meofarian decree, of which they make so much, telling us that its revocation would preΛ^ent the war. You should have no lingering uneasiness about this ; you are not really going to war for a trifle. For in the seeming trifle is involved the trial and confirmation of your whole purpose. If you yield to them in a small matter, they will think that you are afraid, and Λνϋΐ immediately dictate some more oppressive condition ; but if you are firm, you will prove to them that they must treat you as their equals. Wherefore make up your minds once for all, either to give way Avhile you are still unharmed, or, if we are going to war, as in my judgment is best, then on no plea, small or great, to give way at all ; we will not con- descend to possess our own in fear. Any claim, the , "^ ^ Unless you smallest as well as the greatest, imposed on a neio-hbor niean to give ο ^ L .^ y.^y ηοΛν, you and an equal when there has been no les^al award, can mustdeter- \ σ ' mine never to mean no thins: but slavery. gjye way at ο »/ all. is or need '' That our resources are equal to theirs, and that we JJ^^ft^fJ^® shall be as strong in the war, I will now prove to you ϊ°^,^ ad^^an- in detail. The Peloponnesians cultivate their own soil, pe^ioponn^e^^^ and they have no wealth, either public or private. Nor lie^'pooi'aid 90 SPEECH OF PERICLES. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. till their own land, tliey are unaccus- tomed to great wars, and divided in race. 142. They can- not do you any real harm by building a rival city have they any experience of long wars in countries beyond the sea; their poverty prevents them from fighting, except in person against each other, and that for a short time only. Such men cannot be often manning fleets or sending out armies. They would be at a dis- tance from their own properties, upon which they must nevertheless draw, and they Λνϋΐ be kept off the sea by us. Now wars are supported out of accumulated wealth, and not out of forced contributions. And men who cultivate their own lands are more ready to serve with their persons than with their property ; ^ they do not despair of their lives, but they soon grow anxious lest their money should all be spent, especially if the war in which they are engaged is protracted beyond their calcu- lation, as may well be the case. In a single pitched battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are a match for all Hellas, but they are not able to maintain a war against a power different in kind from their own ; ^ they have no regular general assembly, and therefore cannot execute their plans with speed and decision. The con- federacy is made up of many races ; all the representa- tives have equal votes, and press their several interests. There follows the usual result, that nothing is ever done properly. For some are all anxiety to be revenged on the enemy, while others only Avant to save their money. The members of such a confederacy are slow to meet, and when they do meet, they give little time to the con- sideration of any common interest, and a great deal to schemes which further the interests of their particular state. Every one fancies that his own neglect λυΙΙΙ do no harm, but that it is somebody else's business to keep a look-out for him, and this idea, cherished alike by each, is the secret ruin of all. " Their greatest difficulty Λνϋΐ be want of money, which they can only provide slowly ; delay Λνϋΐ thus occur, and war Λvaits for no man. Further, no fortified place which they can raise against us'•^ is to be feared any more than 1 Cp. 121 med. 2 Cp. viii. 96 fin. ^ Cp. i. 122 init. SPEECH OF PERICLES. 91 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. their navy. As to the first, even in time of peace it I. would be hard for them to build a city able to compete pos^s^ij?^^ Λvith Athens ; and how much more so when they are in an ^n^ihey?^^ enemy's country, and our walls will be a menace to them Sln\?they quite as much as theirs to us ! Or, again, if they simply 1?%™^ ^°^ raise a fort in our territory, they may do mischief to some part of our lands by sallies, and the slaves may desert to them ; but that will not prevent us from sailing to the Peloponnese and there raising forts against them, and in other ways by the help of our navy, which is our strong arm, retaliating upon them. For ive have gained more experience of fighting on land from warfare at sea than they of naval affairs from warfare on land. And they will not easily acquire nautical skill ; ^ even you your- selves, who have been practising ever since the Persian War, are not yet perfect. How can they, who are not sailors, but tillers of the soil, do much? They will not even be permitted to practise, because a large fleet will constantly be lying in wait for them. If they were watched by a few ships only, they might run the risk, trusting to their numbers and forgetting their inexperi- ence ; but if they are kept off the sea by our superior strength, their want of practice will make them unskilful, and their want of skill timid. Maritime skill is like skill of other kinds, not a thing to be cultivated by the way or at chance times ; it is jealous of any other pursuit which distracts the mind for an instant from itself. " Suppose, again, that they lay hands on the treasures 143. at Olympia and Delphi, and tempt our mercenary sailors 25[o5\^!f Λvith the offer of higher pay,^ there might be serious ^^*^^®^^ , danger, if we and our metics ^ embarking alone Avere not pfy^ aM If ^^ still a match for them. But we are a match for them : can-do' wiSJ and, best of all, our pilots are taken from our own^^*^^®"^* citizens, while no sailors are to be found so good or so numerous as ours in all the rest of Hellas. No mercenary Avill choose to fight on their side for the sake of a few days' high pay, when he will not only be an 1 Cp. i. 121 med. 2 Cp. i. 121 init. ^ Cp. iii. IG iiiit. 92 SPEECH OF PERICLES. B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. We must guard the city and the sea, aud not mind about our houses and lands in the country. 144. Let our answer be : We Avill grant independence to our allies, if the Lace- daemonians Avill alloAV their subjects to choose their own form of gov- ernment. exile, but will incur greater danger, and will have less hope of victory. " Such I conceive to be the prospects of the Pelopon- nesians. But we ourselves are free from the defects which I have noted in them ; and Λve have great ad- vantages. If they attack our country by land, we shall attack theirs by sea ; and the devastation, even of part of Peloponnesus, will be a very different thing from that of ail Attica . For they , if they want fresh territory , must take it by arms, whereas we have abundance of land both in the islands and on the continent ; such is the power which the empire of the sea gives. Reflect, if we were islanders, Λvho would be more invulnerable? Let us imagine that we are, and acting in that spirit let us give up lands and houses, but keep a watch over the city and the sea;. We should not, under any irritation at the loss of our property, give battle to the Peloponnesians, ivho far outnumber us. If we conquer, we shall have to fight over again with as many more ; and if we fail, besides the defeat, our confederacy, which is our strength, will be lost to us ; for our allies will rise in revolt when we are no longer capable of making war upon them. Mourn not for houses and lands, but for men ; men may gain these, but these will not gain men. If I thought that you would listen to me, I would ^say to you, ^ Go yourselves and destroy them, and thereby prove to the Pelopon- nesians that none of these things will move you.' " I have many other reasons for believing that you will conquer, but you must not be extending your empire while you are at Λvar, or run into unnecessary dangers. I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies' designs. But of all this I will speak again when the time of action comes ; for the present, let us send the ambassadors aΛvay, giving them this answer : 'That we will not exclude the Megarians from our markets and harbors, if the Lacedaemonians will not exclude foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies, from Sparta ; for the treaty no more forbids the one than the other. NEAR APPROACH OF THE WAR. 93 B.C. 432 ; 01. 87. That we will concede independence to the cities, if they I. were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon ^^ntwaifbut as the Lacedaemonians allow their subject states to be J^^y ^stni^ governed as they choose, not for the interest of Lace- fesff l^d wl" daemon, but for their own. Also, that we are willing to Sr wafinT offer arbitration according to the treaty. And that we of'ou/''"^^^ do not want to begin war, but intend to defend ourselves ^^^^®'^^• if attacked.' This answer Avill be just, and befits the dignity of the city. We must be aware, however, that Avar will come ; and the more willing we are to accept the situation, the less ready will our enemies be to lay hands upon us. Remember that where dangers are greatest, there the greatest honors are to be won by men and states. Our fathers, when they withstood the Persian, had no such empire as we have ; what little they had they forsook : not by good fortune but by wisdom, and not by power but by courage, they repelled the Bar- barian and raised us to our present height of greatness. We must be worthy of them, and resist our enemies with all our might, that we may hand down our empire unimpaired to posterity." Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, 145. approving, voted as he told them, and on his motion ni^^^adopt answered the Lacedaemonians in detail as he had sug- alvlc?' gested, and on the whole question to the 'effect " that they would do nothing upon compulsion, but were ready to settle their differences by arbitration upon fair terms according to the treaty." So the ambassadors went home and came no more. These were the causes of offence alleged on either 146. side before the war be£:an. The quarrel arose imme- war though t5 ^ not formally diately out of the affair of Epidamnus and Corey ra. f™jj-^e"t^'^ But, although the contest was imminent, the contending parties still kept up intercourse and visited each other, without a herald, but not with entire confidence. For the situation was really an abrogation of the treaty, and might at any time lead -to war. 94 OUTBREAK OF THE WAR. B.C. 431 ; 01. 87, 2. BOOK 11. II. 1. And now the war between the Athenians and ?hewfr^°^ Peloponnesians and the allies of both actually began. Henceforward the struggle was uninterrupted, and they communicated Λvith one another only by heralds. The narratiΛ^e is arrano-ed accordino- to summers and winters and follows the order of events. 2. For fourteen years the thirty years' peace- Avhich was ^t^eJplatSa concludcd after the recovery of Euboea remained un- bymgiit. broken. But in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis the high-priestess of Argos was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood, Aenesias being Ephor at Sparta, and at Athens Pythodorus having two months of his archon- ship to run, in the sixth month after the engagement at Potidaea and at the beginning of spring, about the first watch of the nioiit an armed force of somewhat more ο than three hundred Thebans entered Plataea, a city of Boeotia, which was an ally of Athens, under the com- mand of two Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, the son of Phy- leides, and Diemporus, the son of Onetorides. They were invited by Naucleides, a Plataean, and his partisans, who opened the gates to them. These men Avanted to kill certain citizens of the opposite faction and to make over the city to the Thebans, in the hope of getting the power into their own hands. The intrigue had been con- ducted by Eurymachus the son of Leontiades, one of the chief citizens of Tliebes. There was an old quarrel between the two cities, and the Thebans, seeing that war THE THEBA^^S STJEPRISE PLATAEA. 95 B.C. 431 ; 01.87,2. was inevitable, were anxious to surprise the place while II. the peace lasted and before hostilities had actually broken out. No watch had been set ; and so they were enabled to enter the city unperceived. They grounded their arms in the Agora, but instead of going to work at once and making their way into the houses of their enemies, as those who invited them suggested, they re- solved to issue a conciliatory proclamation and try to make friends with the citizens. The herald announced that if any one wished to become their ally and return to the ancient constitution of Boeotia, he should join their ranks. In this way they thought that the in- habitants would easily be induced to come over to them. The Plataeans, when they found that the city had been 3. surprised and taken, and that the Thebans were within pePia- ■■• \ ^ taeans, ter- their walls, Avere panic-stricken. In the darkness they gjj^^^^gj^j?® ivere unable to see them and greatly over-estimated their {1^^'/^^^^^ numbers. So they came to tenns, and accepting the Jfgcoy^in^ proposals which were made to them, remained quiet, the of^the^euemy more readily since the Thebans offered violence to no and fa?iipon one. But in the course of the negotiations they some- t^e Thebans. how discovered that their enemies were not so numerous as they had supposed, and concluded that they could easily attack and master them. They determined to make the attempt, for the Plataean people were strongly attached to the Athenian alliance. They began to col- lect inside the houses, breaking through the party- walls that they might not be seen going along the streets ; they hkewise raised barricades of wagons, unyoking the beasts which- drew them, and took other measures suit- able to the emergency. When they had done all which could be done under the circumstances, they sallied forth from their houses, choosing the time of night just before daybreak, lest, if they put off the attack until dawn, the enemy might be more confident and more a match for them. While darkness lasted they would be timid, and at a disadvantage, not knowino^ the streets so 96 DEFEAT OF THE THEBAJiS. B.C. 431 ; 01. 87, 2. Π. well as themselves. So they fell upoD them at once hand to hand. 4. When the Thebans fomid that they had been deceived Ster'^ome^ie- ^^^3^ closcd their ranks and resisted their assailants on lu?fly.^BS every side. Two or three times they drove them back. thiZlf, °^ ^^^ when at last the Plataeans charged them with a great siah7in the shout, and the women and slaves on the housetops Iscapl; ti2^ scrcamed and yelled and pelted them with stones and sur^ieSiii ^iles, the confusion being aggravated by the rain Avhich had been falling heavily during the night, they turned and fled in terror through the city. Hardly any of them knew the way out, and the streets were dark as well as muddy, for the affair happened at the end of the month when there was no moon ; whereas their pursuers knew well enough how to prevent their escape ; and thus many of them perished. The gates by which they entered were the only ones open, and these a Plataean fastened with the spike of a javelin, which he thrust into the bar instead of the pin. So this exit too was closed and they were chased up and down the city. Some of them mounted upon the wall and cast themselves down into the open. Most of these were killed. Others got out by a deserted gate, cutting through the bar unperceived, AN-ith an axe which a \voman gave them ; but only a few, for they were soon found out. Others lost themselves in different parts of the city, and were put to death. But the greater number kept together and took refuge in a large building abutting upon the wall, of which the doors on the near side chanced to be open, they thinking them to be the gates of the city, and expecting to find a Λvay through them into the country. The Plataeans, seeing that they were in a trap, began to consider whether they should not set the building on fire, and burn them where they were. At last they and the other Thebans Avho were still alive, and were wandering about the city, agreed to surrender themselves and their arms unconditionally. Thus fared the Thebans in Plataea. 5. The main body of the Theban army, which should SLAUGHTER OF THE THEBAN PRISONEES. 97 B.C. 431 ; 01. 87, 2. have come during the night to the support of the party Π. entering the city in case of a reverse, having on their ^eit?come march heard of the disaster, were now hastening to the Th^piSal^ rescue. Plataea is about eight miles distant from f^| J^p^^^^ Thebes, and the heavy rain which had fallen in the ^ίίΓββΐβ night delayed their arrival ; for the river Asopus had outsicS'thr^ swollen, and was not easily fordahle. Marching in the heiSd ρϊηί rain, and with difficulty crossing the river, they came up an'Jfathiac- too late, some of their friends being already slain and TiJebau ac- others captives. AYhen the Thebans became aware of store^the p?is- the state of affairs, they resolved to lay hands on theiSansre^- Plataeans who Λvere outside the walls ; for there were prisoners men and property left in the fields, as would naturally death! happen when a sudden blow Avas struck in time of peace. And they meant to keep any one whom they caught as a hostage and exchange him for one of their own men, if any of them were still ahve. But before they had executed their plan, the Plataeans, suspecting their in- tentions, and fearing for their friends outside, sent a herald to the Thebans protesting against the crime of which they had been guilty in seizing their city during peace, and warning them not to touch anything which was outside the walls. If they persisted they threatened in return to kill the prisoners ; but if they retired, they would give them up. This is the Theban account, and the}^ add that the Plataeans took an oath. The Plataeans do not admit that they ever promised to restore the captives at once, but only if they could agree after nego- tiations ; and they deny that they took an oath. How- ever this may have been, the Thebans withdrew, leaving the Plataean territory unhurt ; but the Plataeans had no sooner got in their property from the country than they put the prisoners to death. Those who were taken were a hundred and eighty in number, and Eurymachus, with whom the betrayers of the city had negotiated, was one of them. When they had killed their prisoners, they sent a 6. messenger to Athens and gave back the dead to the S^i^^Jow- 1 98 PREPAEATIONS FOR THE WAR. B.C. 431 ; 01. 8T, 2. II. ing only of the attempt on th.e city, bid the Pla- taeans spare their prison- ers. Learn- ing the truth they garrison Plataea and remove the ■women and children. 7. Both sides now prepare for the struggle. Thebans under a flag of truce ; they then took the neces- sary measures for the security of the city. The news had already reached Athens, and the Athenians had instantly seized any Boeotians who were in Attica, and sent a herald to Plataea bidding them do no violence to the Theban prisoners, but wait for instructions from Athens. The neΛYS of their death had not arrived. For the first messenger had gone out when the Thebans entered, and the second ivhen they were just defeated and captured ; but of what followed the Athenians knew nothing ; they sent the message in ignorance, and the herald, when he arrived, found the prisoners dead. The Athenians next despatched an army to Plataea, and brought in corn. Then leaving a small force in the place they conveyed away the least serviceable of the citizens, together with the women and children. The afiair of Plataea Avas a glaring violation of the thirty years' truce, and the Athenians now made prep- arations for war. The Lacedaemonians and their allies made similar preparations. Both they and the Athenians meditated sending embassies to the King,i and to the other Barbarian potentates 2 from whom either party might hope to obtain aid ; they likewise sought the alliance of independent cities outside their own dominion. The Lacedaemonians ordered their friends in Ital}^ and Sicily, in addition to the ships Avhich they had on the spot, to build others in number proportioned to the size of their cities ; for they intended to raise the Pelopon- nesian navy to a total of five hundred. The cities were also required to furnish a fixed sum of money ; they were not to receive more than a single Athenian ship, but were to take no further measures until these prep- arations had been completed. The Athenians reviewed their confederacy, and sent ambassadors to the places immediately adjacent to Peloponnesus — Corcyra, Ce- phallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus. They perceived that if the^^ could only rely upon the friendship of these Cp. ii. 67 init. ; iv. 50. 2 Cp. ii. 29, 67. GENERAL SYMPATHY WITH LACED AEMON. 99 B.C. 431 ; 01. 87, 2. states,^ they might completely surround Peloponnesus II. with war. On neither side were there any mean thoughts ; they δ• were both full of enthusiasm : and no wonder, for all men and^entifu- are energetic when they are making a beginning. At hSs!^ that time the youth of Peloponnesus and the youth of Athens were numerous ; they had never seen war, and were therefore very willing to take up arms. All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict between her two chief cities. Many were the prophecies circulated and many the oracles chanted by diviners, not only in the cities about to eno:ao:e in the struo:o:le, but throuo:hout Hellas. Quite lately the island of Delos had been shaken by an earthquake for the first time within the memor}^ of the Hellenes ; this was interpreted and generally believed to be a sign of coming events. And everything of the sort which occurred was curiously noted. The feeling of mankind was strongly on the side of the StSf aM Lacedaemonians ; for they professed to be the liberators JSeSans! of Hellas. Cities and individuals were eager to assist them to the utmost, both by word and deed ; and where a man could not hope to be present, there it seemed to him that all things were at a stand. For the general indignation against the Athenians was intense ; some were longing to be delivered from them, others fearful of falling under their sway. Such was the temper which animated the Hellenes, 9. and such were the preparations made by the two powers amlion^^ for the \var. Their respective allies were as follows : — ®^^^^^ ^^^®• The Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Pelo- ponnesians with the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans — they were both neutral ; only the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the Lacedaemonians at first ; after- wards all the Achaeans joined them.^ Beyond the borders of the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Phocians, Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians 1 Taking βεβαίως with εΐ σψίσι φίλια ταντα εϊη. 2 Cp. V. 82. init. 100 SPEECH OF ARCH IDAMUS. B.C. 431 ; Ol. 87, 2. H. were their allies. Of these the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leuca- dians provided a navy, the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry, the other states only in- fantry. The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania, Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which were their tributaries. There was the maritime region of Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, the islands that lie to the east within the line of Pelopon- nesus and Crete, including all the Cyclades with the exception of Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra furnished a navy ; the rest, land forces and money. Thus much concerning the two confederacies, and the character of their respective forces. 10. Immediately after the afiiiir at Plataea the Lacedae- dael^nSns uionians determined to invade Attica, and sent round lm™t?me^it word to their Peloponnesian and other allies, bidding Isthmus. them equip troops and provide all things necessary for a foreign expedition. The various states made their preparations as fast as they could, and at the appointed time, with contino:ents numberino: two-thirds of the forces of each, met at the Isthmus. When the whole army was assembled, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, and the leader of the expedition, called together the Speech of generals of the different states and their chief officers Archidamus. ^^^^ most distinguished men, and spoke as follows : — 11. " Men of Peloponnesus, and you, allies, many are the We have had expeditions which our fathers made both within and great experi- ^ ence in ΛΥΆτ, without the PeloDonnesc, and the veterans amono: our- and our army x ' ο finlr"%utwe ^^^^'^^ ^^® experienced in war ; and we never went forth S^haste^aid ^^^^ ^ greater army than this. But then we should miemy too^ remcmbcr that, whatever may be our numbers or our cheap. valor, wc are going against a most powerful city. And we are bound to show ourselves worthy of our fathers, and not wanting to our own reputation. For all Hellas is stirred by our enterprise, and her eyes are fixed upon SPEECH OF ARCHIDAMUS. 101 B.C. 431; 01.87,2. US : she is friendly and would have us succeed because II. she hates the Athenians. Now although some among you, surveying this great host, may think that there is very little risk of the enemy meeting us in the field, we ought not on that account to advance heedlessly ; but the general and the soldier of every state should be always expecting that his own division of the army will be the one first in danger. War is carried on in the dark ; attacks are generally sudden and furious, and often the smaller army, animated by a proper fear, has been more than a match for a larger force which, disdaining their opponent, were taken unprepared by him. When invading an enemy's country, men should always be confident in spirit, but they should fear too, and take measures of precaution ; and thus they will be at once most valorous in attack and impregnable in defence. " And the city which we are attacking is not so utterly For they are powerless, but is in the best possible state of preparation, prepa?fd/ and for this reason our enemies may be quite expected least likeiy to meet us in the field. Even if they have no such in- sit idiy by tention beforehand, yet as soon as they see us in Attica, waste their wasting and destroying their property, they will cer- tainly change their mind. For all men are angry when they not only sufier but see, and some strange form of calamity strikes full upon the eye ; the less they reflect the more ready they are to fight ; above all men the Athenians, who claim imperial power, and are more disposed to invade and waste their neighbor's land than to look on while their OAvn is being wasted. Eemem- bering how great this city is which you are attacking, and what a fame you will bring on your ancestors and yourselves for good or evil according to the result, follow whithersoever you are led ; maintain discipline and caution above all things, and be on the alert to obey the word of command. A great army is most assured of glory and safety when visibly animated by one spirit." Having thus spoken, Archidamus dismissed the as- 12. sembly. His first step was to send Melesippus, the son ^,^^s^^„^ 102 THE LAST ΕΪΠ^ΟΥ FROM SPARTA. B.C. 431; 01.87,2. II. Melesippus to Athens J but he is refused ad- mission to the city, and im- meoiately sent across the frontier. 13. Pericles suspecting that Archi- damus will spare his lands, either from friend- ship, or to prejudice him with the Athenians, promises to give them to the public if they are un- injured by the enemy. of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens in the hope that the Athenians might after all give way, when they saw their enemies actually on the march. But they would not admit him to the assembly, nor even into the city. ' For Pericles had already carried a motion to the effect that they would have nothing to do with herald or embassy while the Lacedaemonians were in the field. So Mele- sippus was sent away without a hearing and told that he must cross the frontier before sunset ; if the Lacedae- monians wanted to hold any parley Λvith the Athenians, they must go home first. He was attended by an escort in order to prevent his communicating w4th any one. When he arrived at the Athenian frontier, and was about to leave them he uttered these words : " This day will be to the Hellenes the beginning of great sorrows." On the return of the herald to the camp Archidamus learned that the Athenians were not as yet at all in the mood to yield ; so at last he moved forward his army and prepared to enter Attica. The Boeotians who had sent their contingent of two-thirds, including their cavalry, to the Peloponnesian army, marched to Plataea with the remainder of their forces and wasted the country. IVhile the Peloponnesians were gathering at the Isthmus, and were still on their way, but before they entered Attica, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, who Avas one of the ten Athenian generals, knowing that the invasion was inevitable, and suspecting that Archidamus in v/asting the country might very likely spare his lands, either out of courtesy and because he happened to be his friend, or by the order of the Lacedaemonian authorities (who had already attempted to raise a prejudice against him 1 when they demanded the expulsion of the polluted family, and might take this further means of injuring him in the eyes of the Athenians) , openly declared in the assembly that Archidamus was his friend, but not to the injury of the state, and that supposing the enemy did not destroy his lands and buildings like the rest, he Cp. i. 126 init. and 127. THE RESOUECES OF ATHEN^S. 103 B.C. 431 ; Ol. 87, 2. would make a present of them to the public ; and he Π. desired that the Athenians would have no suspicion of him on that account. As to the general situation, he repeated his previous advice ; they must prepare for war and bring their property from the country into the city ; they must defend their avails but not go out to battle ; they should also equip for service the fleet in which lay their strength. Their allies should be kept well in hand, for their power depended on the revenues which they derived from them ; military successes were generally gained by a wise policy and command of money. The He reminds state of their finances was encouraoins: ; they had on an niaus of their . . enormous averao:e six hundred talents ^ comins^ in annually from wealth and σ ^ ^ ^ ο ./ military and their allies, to say nothino^ of their other revenue ; and navaire- , '^ , ^ . sources, tell- there were still remaining in the Acropolis six thousand ^5^1^*^^™^^. talents of coined silver. (The whole amount had once if,e^^*ct'Vi^tii been as much as nine thousand seven hundred talents^, prudence. but from this had to be deducted a sum of three thousand seven hundred expended on various buildings, such as the Propylaea of the Acropolis, and also on the siege of Potidaea). Moreover there was uncoined gold and silver in the form of private and public ofierings, sacred vessels used in processions and games, the Persian spoil and other things of the like nature, worth at least five hun- dred talents 2 more. There were also at their disposal, besides Λvhat they had in the Acropolis, considerable treasures in various temples. If they were reduced to the last extremity they could even take off the plates of gold with which the image of the goddess was over- laid ; these, as he pointed out, weighed forty talents, and Λvere of refined gold, which was all removable. They might use this treasure in self-defence, but they were bound to replace all that they had taken. By this estimate of their wealth he strove to encourage them. He added that they had thirteen thousand hoplites, be- sides the sixteen > thousand who occupied the fortresses 1 About £144,000. 2 About £2,328,000, 104 THE ATHENIANS REMOVE INTO THE CITY. B.C. 431 ; Ol. 87, 2. II. or who manned the walls of the city. For this was the number engaged on garrison duty at the beginning of the war,^ whenever the enemy invaded Attica ; they were made up of the elder and younger men, and of such metics as bore heavy arms. The Phaleric wall extended four miles from Phalerum to the city walls : the portion of the city wall which was guarded was somewhat less than five miles ; that between the Long Wall and the Phaleric requiring no guard. The Long Walls running down to the Piraeus were rather more than four and a- half miles in length ; the outer only was guarded. The whole circuit of the Piraeus and of Munychia ivas not quite seven miles, of which half required a guard. The Athenian cavalry, as Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve hundred, including mounted archers ; the foot- archers, eighteen hundred ; of triremes fit for service the city had three hundred. The forces of various kinds which Athens possessed at the commencement of the war, when the first Peloponnesian invasion was impending, could not be estimated at less. To these Pericles added other arguments, such as he was fond of using, which were intended to prove to the Athenians that victory was certain. 14. The citizens were persuaded, and brought into the city FoXwing^Ms t^^ir children and wives, their household goods, and even gaSerinto *^^ wood-work of their houses, which they took down. the city; Their flocks and beasts of burden they conveyed to Euboea and the adjacent islands. The removal of the inhabitants Λvas painful ; for the Athenians had always been accustomed to reside in the 15. country. Such a life had been characteristic of them but reluctant- more than of any other Hellenic people, from very early had ever timcs. Li the davs of Cecrops and the first kino-s, down loved a coun- j l σ ^ ^\l^}^^' }^ to the reio:n of Theseus, Attica was divided into com- old times they f^ ' lived in muucs, haviiio' their ΟΛνη toivn halls and maoistrates. separate ' e ο ^ communes, Except in casc of alarm the whole people did not assemble in council under the king, but administered Cp. what is said of the citizens on garrison duty, vii. 28 init. THE EARLY DAYS OF ATHENS. 105 B.C. 431 ; 01. 87, 2. their own affairs, and advised together in their several TT. townships. Some of them at times even went to war un?je ^ 1 \)xxt Ave honor we are called a democracy, for the administration is in ^^^"ther^iih' the hands of the many and not of the few. But while oui'pubiic the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private Jiom^excTu- disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognized ; and siveuess, our when a citizen is in any Λvay distinguished, he is preferred 1 Reading ψ,θομεν. 118 FUNEKAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. B.C. 431; 01.87,2. II. private from suspicion; yet we revere alike the in- i unctions of laAV and custom. 38, We find re- laxation in our amuse- ments, and iu our homes ; and the Avhole world con- tributes to our enjoy- ment. 39. In war we singly are a match for the Pelopon- nesians united ; though we have no secrets and undergo no laborious training. to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit. Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country whatever be the obscurity of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbor if he does what he likes ; we do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant. While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit of rever- ence pervades our public acts ; we are prevented from doing wrong by respect for authority and for the laws, having an especial regard to those which are ordained for the protection of the injured as well as to those un- written laws which bring upon the transgressor of them the reprobation of the general sentiment. " And Ave have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from ,toil; we have regujar games and sacrifices throughout the year; at home^th^ style of our life is refined ; and the delight which we daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy. Because of the greatness of our city the fruits of the whole earth flow in upon us ; so that we enjoy the goods of other countries as freely as of our own. " Then, again, our military training is in many respects superior to that of our adversaries. Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him. We rely not upon management or trickery, but upon our own hearts and hands. And in the matter of education, Λvhereas they from early youth are alwa^^s undergoing laborious exercises which are to make them brave, we live at ease, and yet are equally ready to face ^the perils which they face^ And here is the proof. The Lacedaemonians come into Attica not by themselves, but with their whole confederacy following ; we go alone 1 Or, " perils such as our strength can bear; " or " perils which are enough to daunt us." FUNERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. 119 B.C. 431 ; 01. 87, 2. into a neighbor's country ; and alttiough our opponents Π. are fighting for their homes and we on a foreign soil, we have seldom any difficulty in overcoming them. Our enemies have never yet felt our united strength ; the care of a navy divides our attention, and on land we are obliged to send our own citizens everywhere. But they, if they meet and defeat a part of our army, are as proud as if they had routed us all, and when defeated they pretend to have been vanquished by us all. " If then we prefer to meet danger with a light heart but without laborious training, and with a courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by law, are we not greatly the gainers ? Since we do not anticipate the pain, although, when the hour comes, we can be as brave as those who never allow themselves to rest ; and thus too our city is equally admirable in peace and in war. For 40. we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and ^^ are not •^ ^ ^ ^ enervated by we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth culture, or vulgarized by ive employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there wealth, we is a real use for it. To avow poverty \vith us is no ffclffSrs^be- disgrace : the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid notMifg?s^* it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state d'iSusiiSr because he takes care of his own household ; and even S^othS?^^^ those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair fromfitSLt, idea of politics. ΛΥβ alone regard a man who takes no gene^rois*^^ interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a orfreeSSm. useless character ; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act and of acting too, whereas other men are courage- ous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection. And they are surely to be esteemed the bravest spirits who, having the clearest sense both of the pains and pleasures of life, do not on that account shrink from danger. In doing good, again, we are unlike. others ; we make our friends by conferring, not by receiving favors. Now he 120 FUlSrERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. B.C. 431 ; 01. 87, 2. II 41. In fine, Athens is the school of Hel- las. She alone in the hour of trial rises above her reputa- tion. Her citizens need no poet to sing their praises ; for every land bears wit- ness to their valor. 42. The praise of the city is the praise of these men, for they made her great. who confers a favor is the firmer friend, because he would fain by kindness keep alive the memory of an obligation ; but the recipient is colder in his feelings, because he knows that in requiting another's generosity he will not be \vinning gratitude, but only paying a debt. We alone do good to our neighbors not upon a calcu- lation of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and fearless spirit. To sum up : I say that Athens is the school of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian in his ΟΛνη person seems to have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace. This is no passing and idle word, but truth and fact ; and the assertion is verified by the position ίσ \vhich these qualities have raised the state. For in the hour of trial Athens alone among her contemporaries is superior to the report of her. No enemy who comes against her is indignant at the re- verses which he sustains at the hands of such a city ; no subject complains that his masters are unworthy of him. And we shall assuredly not be Avithout witnesses ; there are mighty monuments of our power which will make us the wonder of this and of succeeding ages ; we shall not need the praises of Homer or of any other panegyrist whose poetry may please for the moment,^ although his representation of the facts will not bear the light of day. For we have compelled every land and every sea to open a path for our valor, and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity. Such is the city for whose sake these men nobly fought and died ; they could not bear the thought that she might be taken from them ; and every one of us who 'survive should gladly toil on her behalf. "I have dwelt upon the greatness of Athens because I want to show you that we are contending for a higher prize than those who enjoy none of these privileges, and to establish by manifest proof the merit of these men whom I am now commemorating. Their loftiest praise has 1 Cp. i. lOmed., and 21. FUNEEAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. 121 B.C. 431 ; 01. 87, 2. been already spoken. For in magnifying the city I have II. magnified them, and men like them whose virtues made gcSind'^p^oo'i* her glorious. And of how few Hellenes can it be said as Sed detth of them, that their deeds when weighed in the balance *° dishonor. have been found equal to their fame ! Methinks that a death such as theirs has been gives the true measure of a man's worth ; it may be the first revelation of his virtues, but is at any rate their final seal. For even those who come short in other ways may justly plead the valor with which they have fought for their country; they have blotted out the evil with the good, and have bene- fited the state more by their public services than they have injured her by their private actions. None of these men were enervated by wealth or hesitated to resign the pleasures of life ; none of them put off the evil day in the hope, natural to poverty, that a man, though poor, may one day become rich. But, deeming that the pun- ishment of their enemies was sweeter than any of these things, and that they could fall in no nobler cause, they determined at the hazard of their lives to be honorably avenged, and to leave the rest. They resigned to hope their unknown chance of happiness ; but in the face of death they resolved to rely upon themselves alone. And when the moment came they were minded to resist and suffer, rather than to fly and save their lives ; they ran away from the word of dishonor, but on the battle-field their feet stood fast, and in an instant, at the height of their fortune, they passed away from the scene, not of their fear, but of their glory. ^ " Such was the end of these men ,* they were worthy of 43 . Athens, and the livins^ need not desire to have a more contemplate ^ and love heroic spirit, although they may pray for a less fatal issue. ^J^^^ff J^J^ The value of such a spirit is not to be expressed in words, ^hem^^^^^® Any one can discourse to you for ever about the ad- ^^^y ^®^® vantages of a brave defence which you know already. 1 Or, taking τνΧης with καιρόν: ''while for a moment they were in the hands of fortune, at the height, not of terror but of glory, they passed away." 122 FUNERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. B.C. 431 ; 01. 87, 2. Π. united in their deaths, hut their glory is separate and single. Their sepulchre is the remem- brance of them in the hearts of men, Fol- loAV their ex- ample Avith- out fear : it is the prosper- ous, not the unfortunate, ■who should be reckless. 44. The parents of the dead are to be comforted rather than pitied. But instead• of listening to him I would have you day by day ήχ your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her ; and Avhen you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of conflict had the fear of dishonor ahvays present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives to her as the fairest oflfering which they could present at her feast. The sacrifice which they collectively made was individually repaid to them ; for they received again each one for himself a praise Avhich grows not old, and the noblest of all sepulchres — I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives, and is proclaimed always and on every fitting occasion both in word and deed. For the Λvhole earth is the sepulchre of famous men ; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their ΟΛνη country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples, and, esteeming courage to be freedom and freedom to be happiness, do not weigh too nicely the perils of war. The unfortunate who has no hope of a change for the better has less reason to throw a\vay his life than the prosperous Avho, if he survive, is alwa^^s liable to a change for the worse, and to Λvhom any acci- dental fall makes the most serious cliflTerence. To a man of spirit, coΛvarclice «md disaster coming together are far more bitter than death, striking him unperceivecl at a time when he is full of courage and animated by the general hope. "AYherefore I do not now commiserate the parents of the dead who stand here ; I would rather comfort them. You know that 3^ our life has been passed amid manifold vicissitudes ; and that they may be deemed fortunate who have gained most honor, whether an honorable m F UNERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. 123 B.C. 431 ; 01. 87. 2. death like theirs, or an honorable sorrow like yours, II. and whose days have been so ordered that the term of ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ their happiness is likewise the term of their life. I know S;;^[|i\ii^ how hard it is to make you feel this, when the good for- andslryTthe tune of others will too often remind you of the gladness ο^1?ι4 swd which once lightened your hearts. And sorroAV is felt iow^ia?ge at the want of those blessings , not which a man never happiness laf knew, but which were a part of his life before they were coSsoied by^ taken from him. Some of you are of an age at which thosl who° they may hope to have other children, and they ought to ^^^^^^^' bear their sorrow better ; not only will the children who may hereafter be born make them forget their own lost ones, but the city will be doubly a gainer. She will not be left desolate, and she will be safer. For a man's counsel cannot have equal weight or worth, when he alone has no children to risk in the general danger. To those of you who have passed their prime, I say ; * Con- gratulate yourselves that you have been happy during the greater part of your days ; remember that your life of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory of those who are gone. For the love of honor alone is ever young, and not riches, as some say, but honor is the delight of men ivhen they are old and useless.' " To you who are the sons and brothers of the de- 45. parted, I see that the struggle to emulate them λυΙΠ be Κΐι?ίί^ίΐι an arduous one. For all men praise the dead, and, how- ί" pie hlrdto ever pre-eminent your virtue may be, hardly will you nieia^^jeli- be thought, I do not say to equal, but even to approach uviiSbiit them./ The living have their rivals and detractors, but ηοΠιίβ deld. when a man is out of the way, the honor and good-will wSoVsre- whicli he receives is unalloyed. / And, if I am to speak natural Aveak- of womanly virtues to those of you who will henceforth "void both be widoAvs, let me sum them up in one short admonition : Eiame.^" To a woman not to show more weakness than is natural to her sex is a great glory, and not to be talked about for good or for evil among men. "I have paid the required tribute, in obedience to the 46. law, making use of such fitting words as I had. The piSi^due 124 THE PLAGUE. B.C. 431 : 01. 87, 2. B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. Π. tribute of Ϊ words to thei dead. The • city AVill pay them in dee& as by this funeral, so too by the . maintenance of their children. 47. Second in- vasion of Attica ; outbreak of the plague, 48. which com- menced in Aethiopia. The origin and causes of it are unknown, but I shall confine my- self to the tribute of deeds has been paid in part ; for the dead have been honorably interred, and it remains only that their children should be maintained at the public charge until they are gT0\Nrn up ; this is the solid prize with which, as with a garland, Athens crowns her sons living and dead, after a struggle like theirs .j) For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there*the noblest citizens are enlisted in the service of the state.' And now, when you have duly lamented, every one his own dead, you may depart." Such was the order of the funeral celebrated in this winter, with the end of which ended the first year of the Peloponnesian War. As soon as summer returned, the Peloponnesian army, comprising as before two-thirds of the force of each confederate state, under the command of the Lacedaemonian king Archidamus, the son of Zeuiidamus, invaded Attica, where they established themselves and ravaged the country. They had not been there many days when the plague broke out at Athens for the first time. A similar disorder is said to have previously smitten many places, particularly Lemnos, but there is no record of such a pestilence occurring elsewhere, or of so great a destruction of human life. For a while physicians, in ignorance of the nature of the disease, sought to apply remedies ; but it was in vain, and they themselves were among the first victims, because they oftenest came into contact with it. No human art was of any avail, and as to supplications in temples, inquiries of oracles, and the like, they Λvere utterly useless, and at last men were overpoAvered by the calamity and gave them all up. The disease is said to have begun south of Egypt in Aethiopia ; thence it descended into Egypt and Libya, and after spreading over the greater part of the Persian empire, suddenly fell upon Athens. It first attacked the inhabitants of the Piraeus, and it was supposed that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns, no conduits having as yet been made there. It afterwards THE PLAGUE. 125 B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. reached the upper city, and then the mortality became II. far greater. As to its probable origin or the causes ^|*|jf \^^^ which might or could have produced such a disturbance suiferer. of nature, every man, whether a physician or not, will give his own opinion. But I shall describe its actual course, and the symptoms by which any one who knows them beforehand may recognize the disorder should it ever reappear. For I was myself attacked, and witnessed the sufferings of others. The season was admitted to have been remarkably free 49. from ordinary sickness ; and if anybody was already ill The ciiarac- '^ ^ *j 'J >J teristics of of any other disease, it was absorbed in this. Many who *i^® vas ο . . the word. pected, for men's memories reflected their sufferings, the argument in favor of loimos prevailed at the time. But if ever in future years another Dorian war arises which happens to be accompanied by a famine, they will prob- ably repeat the verse in the other form. The answer of the oracle to the Lacedaemonians when the God was asked '^ whether they should go to war or not," and he replied ^' that if they fought with all their might, they would conquer, and that he himself would take their part ^," was not forgotten by those who had heard of it, and they quite imagined that they were witnessing the fulfilment of his words. The disease certainly did set in immediately after the invasion of the PeloDonnesians, and did not spread into Peloponnesus in any degree worth speaking of, ivhile Athens felt its ravages most severely, and next to Athens the places which were most populous. Such was the history of the plague.^ After the Peloponnesians had wasted the plain they 55. entered what are called the coast lands (Paralus) and^iiePeio- \ / ponnesians at penetrated as far as Laurium, where the Athenians have peSc^e^stm their silver mines. First they ravaged that part of the ^eSTe^f?om^ coast which looks towards Peloponnesus, and afterwards |°t"s^eSis'a that situated toΛvards Euboea and Andros . But Pericles , ?o''?ailge' Pe- who was still general, continued to insist, as in the loponnesus. former invasion, that the Athenians should remain within their walls. Before , however, the Peloponnesians had left the plain 5 6 . and moved forward into the coast lands he had begun to equip an expedition of a hundred ships against Pelo- ponnesus. When all ivas ready he put to sea, having on 1 Cp. i. 118 fin. 2 Cp. iii. 87. 9' 130 THE PLAGUE AT POT IDAEA. B.C. 430 ; Ol. 87, 3. board four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred II• cavahy conveyed in horse transports which the Athenians then constructed for the first time out of their old ships. The Chians and Lesbians joined them with fifty vessels. The expedition did not actually put to sea until the Peloponnesians had reache'd the coast lands. Arriving at Epidaurus in Peloponnesus the Athenians devastated most of the country and attacked the city, Λvhich at one time they w^ere in hopes of taking, but did not quite succeed. Setting sail again they ravaged the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, which are all places on the coast of Peloponnesus. Again putting off they came to Prasiae, a small town on the coast of Laconia, ravaged the country, and took and plundered the place. They then returned home and found that the Pelopon- nesians had also returned and were no longer in Attica. 57. All the time during which the Peloponnesians remained p?nn^siaiis ^^ ^^^^ couutry and the armament of the Athenians con- Stlra^stiy^of ^^^^"^^^ at sca the plague was raging both among the forty days, troops and iu the city. The fear which it inspired w^as said to have induced the enemy to leave Attica sooner than they intended ; for they heard from deserters that the disease was in the city, and likewise saw the burn- ing of the dead. Still in this invasion the whole coun- try was raA^aged by them, and they remained about forty days, which was the longest stay they ever made. 58. In the same summer, Hagnon the son of Nicias, and f|Snst*Poti- Cleopompus the son of Cleinias, who were colleagues pfa^gue brllks ^^ Periclcs in his military command, took the fleet which theSSop?, 1^6 ^^^ employed and sailed forthwith against the Thra- fOTcemeSr' ci^^i^ Chalcidiaus and against Potidaea, which still held Athens!'' out. On their arrival they brought engines up to the walls, and tried every means of taking the town. But they did not succeed ; nor did the result by any means correspond to the magnitude of their armament ; for thither too the plague came and made dreadful havoc among the Athenian troops. Even the soldiers who were previously there and had been in good health SPEECH OF PEEICLES. 131 B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. cauo-ht the infection from the forces under Hao^non. Π. But the army of Phormio^ escaped, for he and his sixteen hundred troops had left Chalcidic^. And so Hagnon returned with his fleet to Athens, having lost by the plague out of four thousand hoplites a thousand and fifty men in forty days. But the original armament ^ remained and prosecuted the siege. After the second Peloponnesian invasion, now that 59. Attica had been once more ravaged, and the war and ^-^η^^ηΓΐοΓ the plague together lay heavy upon the Athenians, a flj^g'^Jg^J/^ ^''^ change came over their spirit. They blamed Pericles Jpo^pe™. because he had persuaded them to go to war, declaring JefencS'^ that he was the author of their troubles ; and they were anxious to come to terms with the Lacedaemonians. Accordingly envoys were despatched to Sparta, but they met with no success. And now, being completely at their wit's end, they turned upon Pericles. He saw that they were exasperated by their misery and were behav- ing just as he had always anticipated that they would. And so, being still general, he called an assembly, want- ing to encourage them and to convert their angry feelings into a gentler and more hopeful mood. At this assembly he came forward and spoke as follows : — "I was expecting this outburst of indignation; the 60. causes of it are not unknown to me. And I have sum- J^y^^ ^"ser IS mconsid- moned an assembly that I may remind you of your maSyTyoT" resolutions and reprove you for your inconsiderate anger th?fortmils against me, and want of fortitude in misfortune. In vicSfi depend on those of the state. If my judgment it would be better for individuals them- iie^tatl"^ selves that the citizens should suffer and the state flourish ihat^i^ijar than that the citizens should flourish and the state suffer. StlieSed, A private man, however successful in his own dealings, SSto the" if his country perish is involved in her destruction ; but sifouid y5u if he be an unprosperous citizen of a prosperous city he Sow? ^^ is much more likely to recover. Seeing then that states can bear the misfortunes of individuals, but individuals cannot bear the misfortunes of the state, let us all stand ^ Cp. i. 64 med. 2 Cp. i. 59, 61 init. 132 SPEECH OF PEEICLES. B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. II. 61. I am not changed, but you are changed by misfortune. Such a change is un- becoming the citizens of Athens : you should forget your sorrows, and think only of the public good. by our country and not do what you are doing now, who because you are stunned by your private calamities are letting go the common hope of safety, and condemning not only me who advised, but yourselves who consented to, the war. Yet I with whom you are so angry venture to say of myself, that I am as capable as any one of devising and explaining a sound policy ; and that I am a lover of my country, and incorruptible. Now a man may have a policy which he cannot clearly expound, and then he might as well have none at all ; or he may possess both ability and eloquence, but if he is disloyal to his country he cannot, like a true man, speak in her interests ; or again he may be unable to resist a bribe, and then all his other good qualities will be sold for money. If, when you determined to go to war, you believed me to have somewhat more of the statesman in me than others, it is not fair that I should now be charged with anything like crime. " I allow that for men who are in prosperity and free to choose it is great folly to make war. But when they must either submit and at once surrender independence, or strike and be free, then he who shuns and not he who meets the danger is deserving of blame. For my own part, I am the same man and stand where I did. But you are changed ; for you have been driven by misfortune to recall the consent which you gave when you were yet unhurt, and to think that my advice was wrong because your own characters are weak. The pain is present and comes home to each of you, but the good is as yet un- realized by any one; and your minds have not the strength to persevere in your resolution, now that a great reverse has overtaken you unawares. Anything which is sudden and unexpected and utterly beyond calculation, such a disaster for instance as this plague coming upon other misfortunes, enthralls the spirit of a man. Nevertheless, being the citizens of a great city and educated in a temper of greatness, you should not succumb to calamities however overwhelming, or darken (I SPEECH OF PERICLES. 133 B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. the lustre of your fame. For if men hate thepresump- Π. tion of those who claim a reputation to which they have no right, they equally condemn the faint-heartedness of those who fall below the glory Λvhich is their own. Yoq should lose the sense of your private sorrows and lay fast hold of the common good. " As to your sufferings in the war, if you fear that they 62. may be very great and after all fruitless, I have shoΛvn ίί^γοηι-ΐ^- you already over and over again that such a fear is STrSitiSs? groundless. If you are still unsatisfied I ivill indicate yo?L^e''Sb?o''.* 1 one element of your superiority which appears to have oftV^sIa!"^^ escaped you S although it nearly touches your imperial JL^worid!''^ greatness. I too have never mentioned it before, nor JXiir pSes- TT-r , Jii• J- J. sions in com- would I now, because the claim may seem too arrogant, parison Avith if I did not see that you are unreasonably depressed. Kelp*that, You think that your empire is confined to your allies, but sooi7?eiain tlie rest I say that of the two divisions of the world accessible to Meet youv man, the land and the sea, there is one of which you are disdain, as absolute masters, and have, or may have, the dominion rational -\T • 1 1 1 • conviction to any extent which you please. JN either the o^reat kmo: of yovir ^ ii 1 • 1 Ti x- superiority. nor any nation on earth can hinder a navy like yours from penetrating whithersoever you choose to sail. When we reflect on this great power, houses and lands, of which the loss seems so dreadful to you, are as nothing. We ought not to be troubled about them or to think much of them in comparison ; they are only the garden of the house, the superfluous ornament of wealth ; and you may be sure that if we cling to our freedom and preserve that, we shall soon enough recover all the rest. But, if we are the servants of others, we shall be sure to lose not only freedom, but all that freedom gives. And w4iere your ancestors doubly succeeded, you ivill doubly fail. For their empire was not inherited by them from others but won by the labor of their hands, and by them pre- 1 Or, taking υπάρχον ύμΐν absolutely: "a consideration which, however obvious, appears to have escaped you." Or, again, taking μεγέθους πέρι with ένθυμηθψαι-. " one element of your superiority which nearly touches your empire, but of which you never seem to have considered the importance." 134 SPEECH OF PERICLES. Π. B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. 63. Tour empire is at stake, and it is too late to resign it ; for you have already- incurred the hatred of mankind. 64. Nothing has happened, ex- cept the plague, but what Ave all anticipated when we agreed on war. Do not lose the spirit served and bequeathed to us. And surely to be robbed of what you have is a greater disgrace than to fail in obtaining more. Meet your enemies therefore not only jvith spirit but with disdain. Any coward or fortunate fool may brag and vaunt, but he only is capable of dis- dain whose conviction that he is stronger than his enemy rests, like our own, on grounds of reason. Courage fighting in a fair field is fortified by the intelligence which looks down upon an enemy ; an intelligence re- lying, not on hope, which is the strength of helplessness, but on that surer foresight which is given by reason and observation of facts. " Once more, you are bound to maintain the imperial dignity of your city in which you all take pride ; for you should not covet the glory unless you will endure the toil. And do not imagine that you are fighting about a simple issue, freedom or slavery ; you have an empire to lose, and there is the danger to which the hatred of your imperial rule has exposed you. Neither can you resign your power, if, at this crisis, any timorous or inactive spirit is for thus playing the honest man. For by this time your empire has become a tyranny which in the opinion of mankind may have been unjustly gained, but which cannot be safely surrendered. The men of whom I Avas speaking, if they could find followers, Avould soon ruin a city, and if they were to go and found a state of their own, would equally ruin that. For inaction is secure only when arrayed by the side of activity ; nor is it expedient or safe for a sovereign, but only for a subject state, to be a servant. " You must not be led away by the advice of such citizens as these, nor be angry with me ; for the resolu- tion in favor of war was jour own as much as mine. What if the enemy has come and done Avhat he was certain to do when you refused to yield ? What too if the plague followed? That was an unexpected blow, but Ave might have foreseen all the rest. I am well aware that your hatred of me is aggravated by it. But i SPEECH OF PERICLES. 135 B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. how unjustly, unless to me you also ascribe the credit Π. of any extraordinary success which may befall you ^ ! ^^d? K^i! ^The visitations of heaven should be borne with resigna- f^lj^^'^^J^ -^ Ition, the sufferings inflicted by an enemy ivith manliness. renderVlr^^ This has always been the spirit of Athens, and should |u tS^|/°^ not die out in you. Know that our city has the greatest name in all the world because she has never yielded to misfortunes, but has sacrificed more lives and endured severer hardships in war than any other ; wherefore also she has the greatest power of any state up to this day ; and the memory of her glory will always survive. Even if we should be compelled at last to abate somewhat of our greatness (for all things have their times of growth and decay), yet will the recollection live, that, of all Hellenes, we ruled over the greatest number of Hellenic subjects ; that we withstood our enemies, whether single or united, in the most terrible wars, and that we were the inhabitants of a city endowed with every sort of wealth and greatness. The indolent may indeed find fault, but 2 the man of action^ will seek to rival us, and he who is less fortunate will envy us. To be hateful and offensive has ever been at the time the fate of those who ί\ have aspired to empire.^ But he judges well who accepts / unpopularity in a great cause./ Hatred does not last long, and, besides the immediate splendor of great actions, the renoΛvn of them endures for ever in men's memories. Looking forward to such future glory and present avoidance of dishonor, make an effort now and secure both. Let no herald be sent to the Lacedae- monians, and do not let them know that you are de- pressed by your sufferings. For the greatest states and the greatest men, when misfortunes come, are the least depressed in spirit and the most resolute in action." By these and similar words Pericles endeavored to 65. appease the ano^er of the Athenians ao^ainst himself, The Athe- ^ ^ ® » ' niaus follow 1 Cp. 1. 140 init. 2 Or, taking καΐ αύτδς with βονλόμενος : "he who is ambitious Uke ourselves," 136 THE POLICY OF PEEICLES. B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. II. aud to divert their minds from their terrible situation. vfce^ut a?e ^^^ ^^® conduct of public afikirs they took his advice, and uStii they^^^ scnt no more embassies to Sparta ; they were again eager hfm? ^He^ '^^ prosccute the war. Yet in private they felt their suiFer- thefr?s?lim, i^^gs keenly ; the common people had been deprived even fe'ldiSa^il. of the little which they possessed, while the upper class delthhS tiad lost fair estates in the country with all their houses evInTettJr and rich furniture. Worst of all, instead of enjoying thmfciirin| pcacc, they were now at war. The popular indignation advice ab?ut was uot pacificd until they had fined Pericles ; but, soon sound^f^thl afterwards, with the usual fickleness of the multitude, woiidSiiy they elected him general and committed all their afikirs have followed . ■, • i rr^i ... i • • j it. But they to his charge. Ineu' private sorrows were begmmng to ally embark- " bc Icss acutcly felt, and for a time of public need they enterprises, thought that there w^as no man like him. During the city was peace while he was at the head of afikirs he ruled with the struggles prudeucc ; under his ^ruidance Athens was safe, and of rival dema- ιίιι•ι η λ . , . . -^χτι gogues, reached the heio'ht οί her neatness m his time. vVhen ■whereas Peri- '-' τ i i cies had been the war bes^an he showed that here too he had formed a their natural ^ leader. truc estimate of the Athenian power. He survived the commencement of hostilities two years and six months ; and, after his death, his foresight was even better ap- preciated than during his life. For he had told the Athenians, that if they would be patient and would attend to their navy, and not seek to enlarge their do- minion Avhile the war was going on, nor imperil the existence of the city, they would be victorious ; but they did all that he told them not to do, and in matters Avhich seemingly had nothing to do with the war, from motives of private ambition and private interest they adopted a policy which had disastrous efiects in respect both of themselves and of their allies ; their measures, ^had they been successful, Avould only have brought honor and profit to individuals, and, when unsuccess- ful, crippled the city in the conduct of the war. The reason of the difference Avas that he, deriving authority from his capacity and acknowledged Avorth, being also 1 Or, '' while they continued to succeed, only brought." m EREOKS OF THE ATHENIANS. 137 B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. a man of transparent integrity, was able to control Π, the multitude in a free spirit ; he led them rather than was led by them ; for, not seeking power by dishonest arts, he had no need to say pleasant things, but, on the strength of his own high character, could venture to oppose and even to anger them. When he saw them unseasonably elated and arrogant, his Avords humbled and awed them ; and, when they were depressed by groundless fears, he sought to reanimate their confidence. Thus Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest citizen. But his successors were more on an equality with one another, and, each one struggling to be first himself, they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of aflfairs to the whims of the people. Such weakness in a great and imperial city led to many errors, of which the greatest was the Sicilian expedition ; not that the Athenians miscalculated their enemy's power, but they themselves, instead of con- sulting for the interests of the expedition which they had sent out, were occupied in intriguing against one another for the leadership of the democracy^, and not only grew remiss in the management of the army, but became embroiled, for the first time, in civil strife. And Even after the Sicilian -^ vet after they had lost in the Sicilian expedition the ter they held '^ '^ ^ ^ ^ out against greater part of their fleet and army, and were distracted t^^^ ^^^ ®"e- c X i/ ' inies and by revolution at home, still they held out three years ^^^"^^^7 not only against their former enemies, but against the ^^^[^fuin^^jj Sicilians who had combined with them, and against gji^er^go most of their own allies Avho had risen in revolt. Even *!!fs*(]^^jie*^^®^ when Cyrus the son of the King joined in the war and ^\fj^* ^^*®^ supplied the Peloponnesian fleet Λvith money, they con- tinued to resist, and were at last overthrown, not by their enemies, but by themselves and their own internal dissensions. So that at the time Pericles was more than justified in the conviction at which his foresight had arrived, that the Athenians would win an easy victory over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians. 1 Cp. Yi. 28. π. 66, 138 PELOPONNESIAK ENVOYS SENT TO PERSIA. B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their The Lace- allics scut a fleet of a hundred ships against the island of a?ta?rzacyn- Zacjuthus, which Hcs opposite Elis. The Zacjnthians ίβεϋιίΓ^^*^*^* are colonists of the Peloponnesian Achaeans, and were allies of the Athenians. There were on board the fleet a thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites, under the command of Cnemus the Spartan admiral. They disembarked and ravaged the greater part of the country ; but as the in- habitants would not come to terms, they sailed away home. 67. At the end of the same summer, Aristeus the Corin- Envoyssent thian, the Lacedacmouian ambassadors Aneristus, Mco- from the ' ' Peioponne- Jaus and Stratodcmus, Timao:oras of Teo^ea, and PoUis sian cities to ' ο σ ^ detaSed b^^ of Argos who had no public mission, were on their way Svei u ^to^ ^^ Asia in the hope of persuading the King to give them niant.^^They ^^loney and join in the war. They went first of all to Athen7iiid*^ Sltalccs SOU of Tcrcs, in Thrace, wishing if possible to put to death, j^tach him from the Athenians, and induce him to lead an army to the relief of Potidaea, which was still block- aded by Athenian forces ; they also wanted him to con- vey them across the Hellespont on their intended journey to Pharnaces, the son of Pharnabazus, who was to send them on to the king. At the time of their arrival two Athenian envoys, Learchus the son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, chanced to be at the court of Sitalces ; and they entreated his son Sadocus, who had been made an Athenian citizen^, to deliver the envoys into their hands, that they might not find their way to the King and so injure a city which Avas in some degree his own. He consented, and, sending a body of men with Learchus and Ameiniades, before they em- barked, as they were on their way through Thrace to the vessel in which they were going to cross the Hellespont, seized them ; they were then, in accordance with the orders of Sadocus, handed over to the Athenian envoys, w^ho conveyed them to Athens. On the very day of their arrival the Athenians, fearing that Aristeus, whom they considered to be the cause of all their troubles at Potidaea 1 Cp, ii. 29 fin. WAK BETWEEN AMBKACIA AND AMPHILOCHIA. 139 B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. and in Chalcidicd , would do them still further mischief if he Π. escaped, put them all to death without trial and without hearing ivhat they wanted to say ; they then threw their bodies doAvn precipices. They considered that they had a right to retaliate on the Lacedaemonians, who had begun by treating in the same way the traders of the Athenians and their allies when they caught their vessels off the coast . of Peloponnesus. For at the commencement of the war, all whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea were treated by them as enemies and indiscriminately slaughtered, whether they were allies of the Athenians or neutrals. About the end of the same summer the Ambraciots, 68, with a laro^e Barbarian force which they had called out, The Am- ~ «^ braciots make made war upon the Amphilochian Aro^os and upon Am- ^^^r without ■'■■'■ σ J. success upon philochia. The original cause of their enmity against *^fanA?^vS the ArgiΛ^es was as follows : — The Amphilochian terri- tory had been occupied and the city founded by Amphi- lochus the son of Amphiaraus, who on returning home after the Trojan War was dissatisfied at the state of Argos. He fixed the site on the shore of the Ambra- cian Gulf, and called the new city by the name of his native place ; it was the greatest city in that region, and its inhabitants were the most powerful community. Many generations afterwards, these Amphilochians in a time of distress invited their neighbors the Ambraciots to join in the settlement, and from them they first learned the Hellenic language which they now speak ; the other Amphilochians are Barbarians. After a while the Ambra- ciots drove out the Amphilochian Argives and themselves took possession of the city. The expelled Amphilochians placed themselves under the protection of the Acarna- nians, and both together called in the Athenians, who sent them a fleet of thirty ships under the command of Phormio . When Phormio arrived , they stormed Argos , and sold the Ambraciots into slavery ; and the Amphi- lochians and Acarnanians dwelt together in the place. The alliance between the Acarnanians and Athenians then first began. The hatred of the Ambraciots towards 140 SUEEEKDER OF POTIDAEA. B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. Π. the Amphilochian Argives commenced ΛΎΐΰι the enslave- ment of their countrymen; and now when the war offered an opportmiity they invaded their territory, ac- companied by the Chaonians and some others of the neighboring Barbarians. They came as far as Argos and made themselves masters of the country ; but not being able to take the city by assault they returned, and the several tribes dispersed to their own homes. Such Avere the events of the summer. 69. In the following winter the Athenians sent twenty Nau^ctifs* ships ou an expedition round Peloponnesus. These were senifto collect P^^^^^ uuder the command of Phormio, who, stationing LycSliid himself at Naupactus, guarded the straits, and prevented feared Ind ^^^ ^^^® from sailing either out of or into Corinth and slain. -j^j^g Crisacau Gulf. Six other vessels were sent to collect tribute in Lycia and Caria ; they were under the com- mand of Melesander, who was to see that Peloponne- sian privateers did not establish themselves in those parts, and damage merchant vessels coming from Pha sells and Phoenicia and all that region. But he, going up the country into Lycia Avith an army composed of Athenians taken from the crews and of allied troops, was defeated and himself and a part of his forces slain. 70. "" In the same winter the Potidaeans,who were still block- ThePoti- aded, found themselves unable to hold out ; forthePelo- daeans are compelled by poiinesian invasions of Attica did not make the Athenians hunger to sur- ^ render. The withdraw I and they had no more food. When they had Athenians ' ./ -J ^enTrai^for ^uffcrcd cvcry sort of extremity, even to the eating of |™|^^sy human flesh, they entered into communications with the Athenian generals, Xenophon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus the son of Callimachus, to whom the siege had been en- trusted. They, seeing that the army was suffering from the exposed situation, and considering that the city had already spent two thousand talents ^ on the siege, ac- cepted the terms proposed. The Potidaeans, with their wives and their children, and likewise the foreign troops, ^ I £480,000. 2 cp. i. 60. THE PELOPONNESIAKS ATTACK PLATAEA. 141 B.C. 430 ; 01. 87, 3. B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. were to come out of the city, the men with one garment, Π. the women with two, and they were allowed a certain fixed sum of money for their journey. So they came out under a safe-conduct, and went into Chalcidic^, or wherever they could find a home. But the Athenians blamed the generals for coming to terms without their authority, thinking that they could have made the city surrender at discretion. Soon afterwards they sent thither colo- nists of their own. Such were the events of the Avinter. And so ended the second year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history. In the following summer the Peloponnesians, and the 71. allies under the command of Archidamus the son of ife^peiop(?n^^ Zeuxidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, instead of in- ^®,5hfdami^^'^ vading Attica, made an expedition against Plataea. |Sea. There he encamped and was about to ravage the country, when the Plataeans sent envoys to him bearing the folio wins: messao:e : — " Archidamus, and you Lacedaemonians, in making Protest war upon Plataea you are acting unjustly, and in a piataeans. manner unworthy of yourselves and of your ancestors, vouarevio- Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedaemonian, promise of in- when he and such Hellenes as were ivilling to share the wMcIi Pausa- dano-er with him fouo'ht a battle in our land and liberated after the ® ^ . battle of Hellas from the Persian, offered up sacrifice in the Agora Piataea. of Plataea to Zeus the God of Freedom, and in the presence of all the confederates then and there restored to the Plataeans their country and city to be henceforth independent ; no man Λvas to make unjust war upon them at any time or to seek to enslave them ; and if they were attacked, the allies λυΙιο ivere present promised that they would defend them to the utmost of their power. These privileges your fathers granted to us as a reward for the courage and devotion which we displayed in that time of danger. But you are acting in an opposite spirit ; for you have joined the Thebans, our Avorst enemies, and have come hither to enslave us. Wherefore, calling to witness the Gods to v/hom we all then SAVore, and also 142 ARCHIDAMUS AND THE PL^TAEAITS. B.C. 429 ; Ol. 87, 4. IL 72. Archidamus oit'ers peace if they will eitlaer join the Lacedae- monian con- federacy or remain neu- tral. The Pla- taeans reply that they cannot act withont the Athenians, and also that they distrust the Thehans. Archidamus then asks them to sur- render the city till the end of the war. the Gods of your race and the Gods who dwell in our country, we bid you do no harm to the land of Plataea. Do not violate your oaths, but allow the Plataeans to be independent, and to enjoy the rights ivhich Pausanias granted to them." To this appeal Archidamus rejoined : — " What you say, Plataeans, is just, but your acts should correspond to your words. Enjoy the independence which Pausanias granted to you, and assist us in freeing the other Hellenes who were your sworn confederates in that time of danger and are now in subjection to the Athenians. With a view to the emancipation of them and of the other subject states, this great war has been undertaken and all these preparations made. It would be best for you to join with us, and observe the oaths yourselves which you would have us observe. But if you prefer to be neutral, a course which we have already once proposed to you, retain possession of your lands, and receive both sides in peace, but neither for the pur- poses of war; and we shall be satisfied." The Plataean ambassadors then returned to the city and reported these words of Archidamus to the people, who made answer that they could not do what they were asked without the sanction of the Athenians, in whose power they had left their wives and children, and that they also feared for the very existence of their state. When the Lacedaemonians >vere gone the Athenians might come and not allow them to carry out the treaty ; or the Thebans, Λνΐιο would be included in the clause requiring them Uo receive both sides,' might again attempt to seize their town. To this Archidamus, wanting to reassure them, made the following answer : — " Then deliver over your city and houses to the Lace- daemonians ; mark the boundaries of your land, and number your fruit-trees and anything else Avhich can be counted. Go yourselves whithersoever you please, while the war lasts, and on the return of peace we will give back to you all that we have received. Until then we THE PLATAEANS WILL NOT DESERT ATHENS. 143 B.C. 429; 01.87,4. will hold your property in trust, and will cultivate your Π. ground, paying you such a rent as will content you." Upon hearing these words the envoys again returned 73. into the city, and, after holding a consultation with the S^aS^b- people, told Archidamus that they wished first to com- missSnto^' municate his proposals to the Athenians, and if they AtSikn^ could get their consent they would do as he advised ; in tgtdby°hem the meantime they desired him to make a truce with *^^^^^^^• them, and not to raA^age their land. So he made a truce which allowed sufficient time for their ambassadors to return from Athens ; and meanwhile he spared their land. The Plataean envoys came to Athens, and after advising with the Athenians they brought back the following message to their fellow-citizens : — " Plataeans, the Athenians say that never at any time since you first became their allies ^ have they suflered any one to do you wrong, and that they will not forsake you ηοΛν, but will assist you to the utmost of their power ; and they conjure you, by the oaths which your fathers SAvore, not to forsake the Athenian alliance." When the answer came, the Plataeans resolved not to 74. desert the Athenians, but patiently to look on, if they SiLTthey^^ must, while the Lacedaemonians wasted their country, J^e i?actdS* and to endure the worst. Ή ο one was henceforward to ^o^saSr^'^^" leave the town, but answer was to be made from the walls that they could not possibly consent to the Lace- daemonian proposal. King Archidamus, as soon as he received the reply, before proceeding to action, fell to calling upon the gods and heroes of the country in the folloAving words : — " Ο ye Gods and heroes who possess the land of Plataea, Archidamus •^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' appeals to the be our witnesses that our invasion of this land in which ^«^^, our fathers prayed to you before they conquered the Persians, and Avhich you made a field of victory to the Hellenes, has thus far been justified, for the Plataeans first deserted the alliance ; and that if we go further we shall be guilty of no crime, for we have again and 1 Herod, vi. 108 144 SIEGE OF PLATAEA. B.C. 429; 01.87,4. II. again made them fair proposals and they have not listened to us. Be gracious to us and grant that the real authors of the iniquity may be punished, and that they may obtain revenge who lawfully seek it." 75. After this appeal to the Gods he began military opera- SS-Sifns t'lons. In the first place, the soldiers felled the fruit-trees ptiopomil- ^^^^ surrounded the city with a palisade, that henceforth mound^whSh 1^0 oue might get out. Then they began to raise a coniftCT?cTby Hiouud agaiust it, thinking that with so large an army hefgiif o?l at work this ΛνοηΗ be the speediest way of taking the waiiaid^bT pl^cc. So they cut timber from Cithaeron and built on eanii ffon7^^ Cither sidc of the intended mound a frame of logs placed emoun . ^ross-wisc in order that the earth might not scatter. Thither they carried wood, stones, earth, and anything which would fill up the vacant space. They continued raising the mound seventy days and seventy nights without intermission ; the army was divided into relays, and one party worked while the other slept and ate. The Lacedaemonian officei*s who commanded the con- tingents of the allies stood over them and kept them at work. The Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, con- structed a wooden frame, which they set upon the top of their own wall opposite the mound ; in this they inserted bricks, Λvhich they took from the neighboring houses ; the wood served to streno-then and bind the structure together as it increased in height ; they also hung cur- tains of skins and hides in front ; these were designed to protect the wood-work and the Avorkers, and shield them ao^ainst blazinsr arrows. The wooden wall rose high, but the mound rose quickly too. Then the Pla- taeans had a new device; — they made a hole in that part of the wall against which the mound pressed and drew in the earth. 76. The Peloponnesians discovered what they were doing, and threw into the gap clay packed in wattles of reed, which would not scatter and give way like the loose earth. Whereupon the Plataeans, baffled in one plan, resorted to another. Calculating the direction, they dug SIEGE OF PLATAEA. 145 B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. a mine from the city to the mound and again drew the II. earth inward. For a long time their assailants did not Sg^de" find them out, and so what the Peloponnesians threw on piatltan^ was of little use, since the mound was always being drawn Κο? de-°"*^ oiF below and settling into the vacant space. But in tS^oTd wSi spite of all their efforts, the Plataeans were afraid that kVresJeut? °^ their numbers would never hold out against so great an army ; and they devised yet another expedient. They left off working at the great building opposite the mound, and beginning at both ends, where the city wall returned to its original lower height, they built an inner wall pro- jecting inwards in the shape of a crescent, that if the first wall Avere taken the other might still be defensible. The enemy would be obliged to carry the mound right up to it, and as they advanced inwards would have their trouble all over again, and be exposed to missiles on both flanks. While the mound was rising the Peloponnesians brought battering engines up to the Avail ; one which Avas moved forward on the mound itself shook a great part of the raised building, to the terror of the Plataeans. They brought up others too at other points of the wall. But the Plataeans dropped nooses over the ends of these By ingenious engines and drew them up ; they also let down huge dSfi thJ^ beams suspended at each end by long iron chains from rams of the two poles leaning on the wall and projecting over it. These beams they drew up at right angles to the ad- vancing battering ram, and whenever at any point it was about to attack them they slackened their hold of the chains and let go the beam, which fell with great force and snapped off the head of the ram. \ At length the Peloponnesians, finding that their 77. were useless, and that the new wall was rising J^nneS^s opposite to the mound, and perceiving that they could Jled hi^^t not without more formidable means of attack hope oiSre.^ ^^*^ to take the city, made preparations for a blockade. But first of all they resolved to try whether, the wind favoring, the place, which Avas but small, could not be set on fire ; they were anxious not to incur the 10 146 SIEGE OF FL ATAEA. B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. II. expense of a regular siege, and devised all sorts of plans in order to avoid it. So they brought faggots and threw them down from the mound along the space between it and the wall, which was soon filled up when so many hands were at work ; then they threw more faggots one upon another into the city as far as they could reach from the top of the mound, and casting in lighted brands with brimstone and pitch, set them all on fire. A flame arose of which the like had never before been made by the hand of man ; I am not speaking of fires in the mountains, when the woods have sponta- neously blazed up from the action of the wind and mutual attrition. There was a great conflagration, and the Plataeans, who had thus far escaped, were all but destroyed ; a considerable part of the town was un- approachable, and if a wind had come on and carried the flame that way, as the enemy hoped, they could not have been saved. It is said that there was also a violent storm of thunder and rain, which quenched the flames and put an end to the danger. 78. The Peloponnesians, having failed in this, as in their ^eir^iJ'^ former attempts, sent away a part of their army but drS a double ^^^'^^^^^^ ^^® rcst,^ and dividing the task among the SficitTaM contingents of the several cities, surrounded Plataea with a^gulrd^of''^ a wall. Trenches, out of which they took clay for the InTthi''^^ bricks, were formed both on the inner and the outer side Boeotians, ^f ^^^ wall. About the rising of Arcturus ^ all was com- pleted. They then drew ofi" their army, leaving a guard on one half of the wall, Avhile the other half was guarded by the Boeotians ; the disbanded troops returned to their homes. The Plataeans had already conveyed to Athens ^ their wives, children, and old men, with the rest of their unserviceable population. Those who remained during the siege were four hundred Plataeans, eighty Athenians, and a hundred and ten women to make bread. These were their exact numbers when the siege began. There Ketaining in the tex το d^ XoLnbl• αφέντες, 2 i. e. , about the middle of September. ^ ii. 6 fin. EXPEDITION AGAINST CHALCIDICi:. 147 B.C. 429 ; 01. 87. 4. was no one else, slave or freeman, within the walls. The Π. blockade of Plataea was now complete. Durino: the same summer, when the corn was in full 79. ear, and about the time of the attack on Plataea, the J^^f^tSck Athenians sent an expedition against the Chalcidians of i^f eig^e- Thrace and against the Bottiaeans, consisting of two J]|"e g^^jj^h thousand heavy -armed troops of their ΟΛνη and two fi^st ^ctori- hundred horsemen under the command of Xenophon San^eS•^^' the son of Euripides, and two others. They came close iiiivintl'tiie up to the Bottian Spartolus and destroyed the crops. iifSlwld* They expected that the place would be induced to yield Seat?/ with to them by a party within the walls. But the opposite party sent to Olynthus and obtained from thence a gar- rison, partly composed of hoplites, which sallied out of Spartolus and engaged with the Athenians under the walls of the town. The Chalcidian hoplites, and with them certain auxiliaries were defeated, and retreated into Spartolus, but then• cavalry and light-armed troops had the advantage over those of the Athenians. They were assisted by a feAV targeteers, who came from the district called Crusis. The engagement was scarcely over when another body of targeteers from Olynthus came up to their aid. Encouraged by the reinforcement and their previous success, and supported by the Chalcidian horse and the newly-arrived troops, the light-armed again attacked the Athenians, who began to fall back upon the two companies which they had left with their baggage : as often as the Athenians charged, the enemy retired ; but Avhen the Athenians continued their retreat, they pressed upon them and hurled darts at them. The Chalcidian cavalry too rode up, and where\^er they pleased charged the Athenians, who now fled utterly disconcerted and were pursued to a considerable dis- tance. At length they escaped to Potidaea, and, having recovered their dead under a flag of truce, returned to Athens with the survivors of their army, out of Avhich they had lost four hundred and thirty men and all their generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, having set 148 THE PELOPOXXESIAXS IXYADE ACAKXAXIA. B.C. 429 ; 01, 87. 4. Π. 80. The Anibra- ciots persuade the Lacedae- monians to send a land and sea force under Cne- mus against Acamania. Disembark- ing his troops, he is joined^ by a number of barbarous tribes and marches towards Stratus. up a trophy and earned off their dead, disbanded and dispersed to their several cities. In the same summer, not Ions: afterwards, the Am- braeiots and Chaonians, designing to subjugate the whole of Acarnania and detach it from the Athenian alli- ance, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to ec^uip a fleet out of the confederate forces, and to send into that region a thousand hoplites. They said that if the Lacedae- monians would join with them, and attack the enemy both by sea and land, the Acamanians on the sea-coast would be unable to assist the inland tribes, and they might easily conquer Acarnania. Zacynthus and Cephal- lenia would then fall into their hands, and the Athenian fleet would not so easily sail round Peloponnesus. They might even hope to take Xaupactus. The Lacedaemo- nians agreed, and at once despatched Cnemus, who was still admiral,^ with the thousand hoplites in a few ships ; they ordered the rest of the allied navy to get ready and at once sail to Leucas. The interests of the Ambraciots were zealously supported by Corinth, their mother city. The fleet which was to come from Corinth, Sicyon, and the adjacent places was long in preparation : but the con- tingent from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia was soon equipped, and waiteil at Leucas. L"ndiscoΛ'ered by Phormio, the commander of the twenty Athenian ships which were keeping guard at Xaupactus, Cnemus and his thousand hoplites crossed the sea and began to make preparations for the land expedition. Of Hellenes he had in his army Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians whom he brought with him, — of Barbarians a thousand Chaonians, who, having no king, were led by Photius and Xicanor, both of the governing family and holding the presidency for a year. ^Xkh the Chaonians came the Thesprotians, who, like them, have no king. A ]Molossian and Atintanian force was led by Sabylinthus, the guardian of Tharypas, the king, who was still a minor ; the Paravaeans were led by > Cp. ii. 66. BATTLE OF STRATUS. 149 B.C. 429 ; Ol. 87, 4. their king Oroedus, and were accompanied by a thousand Π. Orestians placed at the disposal of Oroedus by their king Antiochus. Perdiccas also, unknown to the Athenians, sent a thousand Macedonians , Avho arrived too late . With this army Cnemus, not waiting for the ships from Cor- inth, began his march. They passed through the Ar- give territory and plundered Limnaea, an unwalled village. At length they approached Stratus, which is the largest cityin Acarnania, thinking that, if they could take it, the other places would soon come over to them. The Acarnanians, seeing that a great army had in- 81. vaded their territory, and that the enemy was threaten- ^£^^^15?^" ing them by sea as well as by land, did not attempt any pjJ^Sio^^con^ united action, but guarded their several districts, and Jivel^to^' sent to Phormio for aid. He replied that a fleet of the of^JlS"*^^ enemy was about to sail from Corinth, and that he could mulma?chts not leave Naupactus unguarded. Meanwhile the Pelo- ??rf?dfvil-^^ ponnesians and their allies marched in three divisions ihe^keiiSiet to\vards Stratus, intending to encamp near and try nego- chaou&i2i^ tiations ; if these failed, they would take stronger meas- SSd,Tttempt ures and assault the wall. The Chaonians and the other p!a?e,^biit^Li Barbarians advanced in the centre ; on the right wing bUh^^nSre were the Leucadians, Anactorians, and their auxiliaries ; ^^^ ^ on the left Avas Cnemus Avith the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots. The three divisions were a long way apart, and at times not even in sight of one another. The Hellenic troops maintained order on the march and kept a lookout, until at length they found a suitable place in which to encamp ; the Chaonians, confident in themselves, and having a great military reputation in that part of the country, would not stop to encamp, but they and the other Barbarians rushed on at full speed, hoping to take the place by storm and appropriate to themselves the glory of the action. The Stratians per- ceiving their approach in time, and thinking that, if they could overcome them before the others arrived, the Hel- lenic forces Avould not be so ready to attack them, set ambuscades near the city. AYhen they were quite close, 150 SEA-FIGHT KEAR NATJPACTUS. B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. Π. 82. Cnemus wathdra-vrs his troops to Oeniadae, •whence they are conveyed home. 83. The fleet of the Pelopon- nesians wLich ■was intended to support Cnemus is compelled to engage by Phormio. the troops came out of the city and from the ambuscades and fell upon them hand to hand. "Whereupon the Cha- onians were seized with a panic and many of them per- ished ; the other Barbarians, seeing them give way, no longer stood their ground, but took to flight. Neither of the Hellenic divisions knew of the battle ; the Cha- onians were far in advance of them, and were thought to have hurried on because they wanted to choose a place for their camp. At length the Barbarians in their flight broke in upon their hues ; they received them, and the two divisions uniting during that day remained where they were, the men of Stratus not coming to close quarters with them, because the other Acarnanians had not as yet arrived, but slinging at them from a dis- tance and distressing them greatly. For they could not move a step without their armor. ΝοΛν the Acar- nanians are famous for their skill in slin£:ino:. \Yhen night came on, Cnemus Avithdrew his army in haste to the river Anapus, which is rather more than nine miles from Stratus, and on the folloΛving day car- ried off his dead under a flag of truce. The people of Oeniadae were friendly and had joined him ; to their city therefore he retreated before the Acarnanians had col- lected their forces. From Oeniadae all the Peloponnesian . troops returned home. The Stratians erected a trophy of the battle in Λvhich they had defeated the Barbarians. The fleet from Corinth and the other allied cities on the Crisaean Gulf, which was intended to support Cnemus and to prevent the Acarnanians on the sea-coast from assisting their friends in the interior of the country, never arrived, but was compelled, almost on the day of the battle of Stratus, to fight with Phormio and the tAventy Athenian ships which were stationed at Xaupac- tus. As they sailed by into the open sea, Phormio was watching them, preferring to make his attack outside the orulf. Now the Corinthians and their allies were not equipped for a naval engagement, but for the conveyance of troops into Acarnania, and they never imagined that DEFEAT OF THE PELOPONiiESIANS. 151 B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. the Athenians with twenty ships ΛνοπΜ venture to engage Π. their own forty-seven. But, as they were coasting along the southern shore, they saw the Athenian fleet following their movements on the northern ; they then attempted to cross the sea from Patrae in Achaea to the opposite continent in the direction of Acarnania, when they again observed the enemy bearing down upon them from Chalcis and the mouth of the river Evenus. They had previously endeavored to anchor under cover of night, but had been detected. So at last they were compelled to fight in the middle of the channel. The ships were commanded by generals of the cities which had furnished them ; the Corinthian squadron by Machaon, Isocrates, and Ae'atharchidas. The Peloponnesians arrano^ed their Tbeir sMps , . . 1 , . -, form a circle. ships 111 such a manner as to make the largest possible circle without leaving an inlet, turning their prows out- wards and their sterns imvards ; within the circle they placed the smaller craft which accompanied them, and nve of their swiftest ships that they might be close at hand and row out at whatever point the enemy charged them. The Athenians ranged their ships in a single line and 84. sailed round and round the Peloponnesian fleet, which The Athe- ^ ' mans sail they drove into a narrower and narrower space, almost roSSdSiuhe touching as they passed, and leading the crews to sup- ^g^^inl^^^^^ pose that they were on the point of charging. But they eSy%*ves- had been warned by Phormio not to begin until he gave iSi? wE the signal, for he was hoping that the enemy's ships, not ihefr^aSck having the steadiness of an army on land, would soon c?m£e^ fall into disorder and run foul of one another ; they ^^^^'^^y- would be embarrassed by the small craft, and if the usual morning breeze, for which he continued waiting as he sailed round them, came down from the gulf, they would not be able to keep still for a moment. He could attack whenever he pleased, because his ships were bet- ter sailers ; and he knew that this would be the right time. When the breeze began to blow, the ships, which were by this time crowded into a narrow space and Λvere 152 WKATH OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS. B.C. 429; 01.87,4. II. distressed at once by the force of the wind and by the small craft Λvhich were knocking up against them, fell into confusion ; ship dashed against ship, and they kept pushing one another away with long poles ; there were cries of " keep oif" and noisy abuse, so that nothing could be heard either of the word of command or of the cox- swains' giving the time ; and the difficulty which unprac- tised rowers had in lifting their oars in a heavy sea made the vessels disobedient to the helm. At that moment Phormio gave the signal ; the Athenians, falling upon the enemy, began by sinking one of the admiral's vessels, and then wherever they went made havoc of them ; at last such was the disorder that no one any longer thought of resisting, but the ivhole fleet fled away to Patrae and Dym^ in Achaea. The Athenians pursued them, captured twelve ships, and taking onboard most of their creΛvs, sailed away to Molycreium. They set up a tro- phy on Ehium, and having there dedicated a ship to Poseidon, retired to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians likewise, Avith the remainder of their fleet, proceeded quickly along the coast from Dym^ and Patrae to Cyl- len^, Λvhere the Eleans have their docks. Cnemus with the ships from Leucas, which should have been joined by these, arrived after the battle of Stratus at Cyllene. 85. The Lacedaemonians at home now sent to the fleet The Lace- three commissioners, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lyco- daemonians ' ' ' ./ send Brasidas phiOu, to advisc Cncmus. He was told that he must and two -t ' advisi *^ contrive to fight again and be more successful ; he should Cnemus. j^q^ alloiv a few ships to keep him ofi" the sea. The recent sea-fight had been the first attempt of the Lace- daemonians, and they were quite amazed and could not imagine that their own fleet was so inferior to that of the enemy. They suspected that there had been coward- ice, not considering that the Athenians were old sailors and that they were onl}^ beginners. ^ So they despatched the commissioners in a rage. On their arrival they and Cnemus sent round to the allied cities for ships, and 1 Cp. i. 142. PEEPARATIOIiS FOR A SECOND ENGAGEMENT. 153 B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. equipped for action those which were on the spot. Phor- II. mio likewise sent home messengers to announce the ^^η^^^^α victory, and at the same time to inform the Athenians [^e^tg^o^' of the preparations which the enemy %vere making. He orShem to told them to send him immediately as large a reinforce- l^st? ^^^*^ ment as possible, for he might have to fight any day. They sent him twenty ships, but ordered the commander of them to go to Crete first ; for Nicias of Gortys in Crete, who was the proxenus of the Athenians, had induced them to send a fleet against Cydonia, a hostile town which he promised to reduce. But he really invited them to please the Polichnitae, who are neigh- bors of the Cydonians. So the Athenian commander took the ships, went to Crete, and joined the Polichnitae in ravaging the lands of the Cydonians ; there, owing to contrary winds and bad weather, a considerable time was wasted. While the Athenians were detained in Crete the Pelo- S6. ponnesians at Cyllene, equipped for a naval engagement, ^eg^i^f anT' coasted along to Panormus in Achaia, whither the Pelo- ^p aToSuon^ ponnesian army had gone to co-operate with them. ea?h othe?, Phormio also coasted along to the Molycreian Rhium and cSsaean^^ anchored outside the gulf with the twenty ships which ^^^^' had fought in the previous engagement. This Phium Λvas friendly to the Athenians ; there is another Rhium on the opposite coast in Peloponnesus ; the space between them, which is rather less than a mile, forms the mouth of the Crisaean Gulf. When the Peloponnesians saw that the Athenians had come to anchor, they likewise anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Rhium which is in Achaia, not far from Panormus, where their land forces were stationed. For six or seven days the two fleets lay opposite one another, and were busy in prac- tising and getting ready for the engagement — the one resolved not to sail into the open sea, fearing a recurrence of their disaster, the other not to sail into the strait, because the confined space was favorable to their enemies. At length Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other 154 SPEECH OF PELOPONNESIAN COMM ANDERS. B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. Π. Peloponnesian generals determined to bring on an en- gagement at once, and not wait until the Athenians too received their reinforcements. So they assembled their soldiers, and, seeing that they were generally dispirited at their former defeat and rehictant to fiofht, encourao-ed them in the following words ; — 87. "The late sea-fight, Peloponnesians, may have made J^ou^^^e terri- some of you anxious about the one which is impending, Bit?iJS^?ere ^^^^ ^^ really affords no just ground for alarm. In that parSd!"" Your battle wc wcrc, as you know, ill-prepared, and our whole S?outAveShs expedition had a military and not a naval object. For- skfiifor^Sth- t^i^e was in many ways unpropitious to us, and this sknus^use-^ being our first sea-fight we may possibly have suffered ou^pailwiif 3- little from inexperience. The defeat which ensued aSik better, was uot the result of cowardice ; nor should the un- ?n doToS^^* conquerable quality which is inherent in our minds, and ^"^^* refuses to acknowledge the victory of mere force, be depressed by the accident of the event. For though fortune may sometimes bring disaster, yet the spirit of a brave man is always the same, and while he retains his courage he will never allow inexperience to be an excuse for misbehavior. And whatever be your own inex- perience, it is more than compensated by your superiority in valor. The skill of your enemies which you so gTeatly dread, if united with courage, may be able in the moment of dano'er to remember and execute the lesson which it has learned, but without courage no skill can do anything at such a time. For fear makes men forget, and skill which cannot fight is useless. And therefore against their greater skill set your own greater valor, and against the defeat Avhich so alarms you set the fact that you were unprepared. But now you have a larger fleet ; this turns the balance in your favor ; and you will fight close to a friendly shore under the protection of heavy- armed troops. Victory is generally on the side of those who are more numerous and better equipped. So that we have absolutely no reason for anticipating failure. Even our mistakes will be an additional advantage, SPEECH OF PHOEMIO. 155 B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. because they will be a lesson to us. Be of good courage, II. then, and let every one of you, pilot or sailor, do his own duty and maintain the post assigned to him. We will order the attack rather better than your old com- manders, and so give nobody an excuse for cowardice. But, if any one should be inclined to waver, he shall be punished as he deserves, while the brave shall be honored with the due rewards of their valor." Such were the words of encouragement addressed to 88. the Peloponnesians by their commanders. Phormio too, ^g^hSiaiiors fearing that his sailors might be frightened, and observing aSSbfe^s that they were gathering in knots and were evidently thenf.*^^^^^^^^ apprehensive of the enemy's numbers, resolved to call them together and inspirit them by a suitable admoni- tion. He had always been in the habit of telling them and training their minds to believe that no superiority of hostile forces could justify them in retreating. And it had long been a received opinion among the sailors that, as Athenians, they were bound to face any number of Peloponnesian ships. When, however, he found them dispirited by the sight which met their eyes, he deter- mined to revive their drooping courage, and, having assembled them together, he spoke as follows : — " Soldiers, I have summoned you because I see that 89. you are alarmed at the numbers of the enemy, and Iie?/thl^*^°^ would not have you dismayed when there is nothing to Jf^tiL^^^ fear. In the first place, the reason why they have pro- yS^Jtiieir vided a fleet so disproportionate is because we have sriaige"^^^ defeated them already, and they can see themselves that defJat?/^^ they are no match for us ; next, ^as to the courage which ^?Γ;^2) they suppose to be native to them and which is the S uiS?^^* ground of their confidence when they attack us,i that fus'^ofayi** reliance is merely inspired by the success which their ίίηάΨ{3)^ experience on land usually gives them, and will, as they *^®^^° fancy, equally insure them by sea. But the superiority ^ Or, taking the antecedent to ω as supplied by the clause ού dt' άλλο Ίί θαρσονσιν . . κατορΘον)/τ€ς : "as to the ground of the confi- dence with which they attack us as if courage were native to them." 156 SPEECH OF FHORMIO. B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. II. which we allow to them on land we may justly claim battil^'ffSi? ^^^' ourselves at sea ; for in courage at least we are their ihltyoiiTlry ^quals, and the superior confidence of either of us is shows yoiS'''' really based upon greater experience. The Lacedae- Twrn notfif nionians lead the alHes for their own honor and glory ; futitheguif, the majority of them are dragged into battle against ronfined"^ ^^^^^ wlll ; if they were not compelled they would never baffle youi^ have Ventured after so great a defeat to fight again at keep yiir^°^ sea. So that you need not fear their valor; they are mSiXfor^the far morc afraid of you and Λvith better reason, not only ^remaSfof^' bccausc you havc already defeated them, but because stake?^^^ ^ they cannot believe that you would oppose them at all if you did not mean to do something worthy of that great victory. For most men when, like these Peloponnesians, they are a match for their enemies^ rely more upon their strength than upon their courage ; but those who go into battle against far superior numbers and under no constraint must be inspired by some extraordinary force of resolution. Our enemies are well aΛvare of this, and are more afraid of our surprising boldness than they would be if our forces were less out of proportion to their own. Many an army before now has been overthroAvn by smaller numbers owing to want of experience ; some too through cowardice ; and from both these faults Λve are certainly free. If I can help I shall not give battle in the gulf, or even sail into it. For I know that where a few vessels which are skilfully handled and are better sailers engage with a larger number which are badly managed the confined space is a disadvantage. Unless the captain of a ship see his enemy a good way oflf he cannot come on or strike properly ; nor can he retreat when he is pressed hard. The manoeuvres suited to fast- sailing vessels, such as breaking of the line or returning to the charge, cannot be practised in a narrow space. The sea-fight must of necessity be reduced to a land- fight ^ in v/hich numbers tell. For all this I shall do my 1 Or, " For men who, like these Peloponnesians, are numerically superior to the enemy whom they face." ^ Cp. vii. 62. THE ATHENIANS OUT-MANCEUYEED. 157 B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. best to provide. Do you meanwhile keep order and Π. remain close to your ships. Be prompt in taking your instructions, for the enemy is near at hand and watching us. In the moment of action remember the yalne of silence and order, which are always important in war, especially at sea. Eepel the enemy in a spirit worthy of your former exploits. There is much at stake ; for you will either destroy the rising hope of the Peloponnesian navy, or bring home to Athens the fear of losing the sea. Once more I remind you that you have beaten most of the enemy's fleet already; and, once defeated, men do not meet the same dangers with their old spirit." Thus did Phormio encourage his sailors. The Peloponnesians, when they found that the Athe- 90. nians would not enter the straits or the e'ulf, determined ^^^ Peiopon- c5 ' nesians oy a to draw them in a2:ainst their Λνϋΐ. So they weifi^hed ί^^^^^^ ^ί" σ t/ ο tacK on JN au- anchor early in the morning, and, ranging their ships the Athi-^^^ four deep, stood in towards the gulf ^ along their own Jitf .^iSj"^ *^® coast, ^ keeping the order in which they were anchored. timSfgupon The right wing, consisting of twenty of their fastest miT'of tillir vessels, took the lead. These were intended to close S? ^biTv- upon the Athenians and prevent them from eluding Sesseiiaus. their attack and getting beyond the wing in ease Phormio, apprehending an attack upon Naupactus, should sail along shore to its aid. He, when he saw them weighing anchor, was alarmed, as they anticipated, for the safety of the town, which was undefended. Against his will and in o^reat haste he embarked and sailed alonsr for the shore ; the land forces of the Messenians followed. The Peloponnesians, seeing that the enemy were in single file and were already within the gulf and close to land, which Avas exactly what they wanted, at a given signal suddenly brought their ships round, and the whole line faced the Athenians and bore down upon them, every ship rowing at the utmost speed, for they hoped Ϊ Reading ηαρά for έηί with the Laurentian and three other MSS. Or, adopting the conjecture ξκεΐνων for ^αυτΐάν. "making for the enemy's shore, and," etc. 158 EXPLOIT OF ΑΙί ATHENIAN SHIP. B,C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. Π. 91. The Lace- daemonians cliase the eleven Athe- nian ships, which had escaped, to Naupactus. One of these by a sudden turn sinks her pursuer. 92. The Athe- nians, taking ad- to cut off all the Athenian fleet. Eleven vessels which were in advance evaded the sudden turn of the Pelopon- nesians, and rowed past their right wing into the open water ; but they caught the rest, forced them aground, and disabled them. All the sailors Avho did not sAvim out of them were slain. Some of the empty ships they fastened to their own and began to tow away ; one they had already taken with the crew, but others were saved by the Messenians, who came to the rescue, dashed armed as they were into the sea, boarded them, and, fighting from their decks when they were being already towed away, finally recovered them. While in this part of the engagement the Lacedae- monians had the victory and routed the Athenian ships, their twenty vessels on the right Aving w^ere pursuing the eleven of the Athenians which had escaped from their attack into the open water of the gulf. These fled, and, with the exception of one, arrived at Xaupactus before their pursuers. They stopped off the temple of Apollo, and, turning their beaks outward, prepared to defend themselves in case the enemy followed them to the land. The Peloponnesians soon came up ; they were singing a paean of victory as they rowed, and one Leucadian ship far in advance of the rest was chasing the single Athe- nian ship which had been left behind. There chanced to be anchored in the deep water a merchant vessel, round which the Athenian ship roAved just in time, struck the Leucadian amidships, and sank her. At this sudden and unexpected feat the Peloponnesians were dismayed ; they had been carrying on the pursuit in disorder because of their superiority. And some of them, dropping the blades of their oars, halted, intending to await the rest, which was a foolish thing to do when the enemy were so near and ready to attack them. Others, not knowing the coast, ran aground. When the Athenians saAV what was going on their hopes revived, and at a given signal they charged their enemies with a shout. The Lacedaemonians did not VICTORY OF THE ATHENIANS. 159 B.C. 429; 01.87,4. long resist, for they had made mistakes and were all in II. confusion, but fled to Panormus, whence they had put to Seconfu-^ sea. The Atheninas pursued them, took six of their ^p",^ ^^"^ ships which were nearest to them, and recovered their glfnlc^. own ships which the Peloponnesians had originally dis- ^^®*® victory. abled and taken in tow near the shore. The crews of the captured vessels were either slain or made prisoners. Timocrates the Lacedaemonian ^ was on board the Leu- cadian ship which went down near the merchant vessel ; when he saw the ship sinking he killed himself; the body was carried into the harbor of Naupactus. The Athenians then retired and raised a trophy on the place from which they had just sailed out to their victory. They took up the bodies and Λvrecks ivhich were floating near their own shore, and gave back to the enemy, under a flag of truce, those which belonged to them. The Lacedaemonians also set up a trophy of the victory which they had gained over the ships destroyed by them near the shore ; the single ship which they took they dedicated on the Achaean Ehium, close to the trophy. Then, fearing the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements, they sailed away under cover of night to the Crisaean Gulf and to Corinth, all with the exception of the Leu- cadians. And not long after their retreat the twenty Athenian ships from Crete, which ought to have come to the assistance of Phormio before the battle, arrived at Naupactus. So the summer ended. At the beginning of winter, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the 93. other Peloponnesian commanders, on the sus^o^estion of ThePeiopon- -■- ^ ' ^ oO nesians deter- some Meo^arians, before the fleet which had returned to mine to make ~ ' an attempt on Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf dispersed, determined ^^^^ fj^TJ^us, to make an attempt on Piraeus, the harbor of Athens. ^an^Vsafa- The entrance was unclosed and unguarded ; as was ^^^| ^^^ ^■^^" natural, since the Athenians were complete masters of inland. the sea. Each sailor Avas to carry his cushion and his oar with its thong, and cross on foot with all haste from 1 Cp. ii. 85 init. 160 THE PIKAEUS IN" DANGER. B.C. 429; 01.87,4. II. 94. Temporary panic at Athens. Re- lief is imme- diately sent to Salamis, and the Pelo- ponnesians retire. Corinth to the Athenian side of the Isthmus ; they were to go to Megara and from Nisaea, the harbor of jNIegara, to launch forty ships \vhich happened to be lying in the docks ; thence they were to sail straight for the Piraeus. No guard-ships were stationed there, for no one ever expected ^that the enemy would attempt a surprise of this kind. As to an open and deliberate attack, how was he likely to venture on that ? and if he even entertained such a design, would he not have been found out in time ?^ The plan was immediately carried out. Arriving at night they launched the ships from Xisaea and sailed away, but not to the Piraeus ; the danger seemed too great, and also the wind is said to have been unfavorable. So they gave up their original idea and made for the projecting point of Salamis which looks toAvards Megara ; here there was a fort, and three ships were stationed in order to prevent anything being conveyed by sea into or out of Megara. This fort they assailed, towed away the ships without their crews, and ravaged the rest of Salamis, which was unprepared for their attack. By this time fire-signals had carried the alarm to Athens, nothing which happened in the war caused a greater panic. The inhabitants of the city thought that the enemy had ah^eady sailed into the Piraeus ; the belief in the Piraeus was that Salamis had been taken, and that the enemy were on the point of sailing into the harbor, Avhich, if they had been bolder, they might easily have done, and no wind would have prevented them. But as soon as day daΛvncd, the Athenians, coming down with the whole strength of the city to the Piraeus, launched their ships, and embarking in tumultuous haste, sailed to Salamis, while their land-forces remained and guarded the Piraeus. When the Peloponnesians saAv the fleet coming they sailed quickly back to Nisaea, but not bl^ 1 Or, taking ^ττε/ differently, and καθ'ήσυχίαν in the sense of " with- out interference : " " tliat the enemy would make a sudden attack of this kind. An attempt so bold and open was i)ot likely to be unop- posed, or the very design, if entertained, to escaf)e detection." SITALCES MAKES TYAK ϋΡΟΐΤ PERDICCAS. 161 B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. until they had ravaged the greater part of Salamis and II. taken many prisoners and much spoil, as well as the three ships which lay off the fort of Budorum. There was some apprehension about their ο^ντι ships ; for they had long been laid up and were not sea-worthy. Arriving at Megara they marched back again to Corinth, and the Athenians, having failed to overtake them in Salamis, sailed back likewise. Henceforth they kept more care- ful watch over the Piraeus, among other precautions closing the entrance to the harbor. About the same time, at the beginning of winter, 95. Sitalces the Odrysian, the son of Teres, kino^ of Thrace, sitaices, king i. -.. 1 ρ Λ1 11. 'of Thrace, in made war upon Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, kins: of alliance with -'■ ' ' C- Athens, at- Macedon, and upon the Thracian Chalcidians. There tacks Perdic- *■ ^ cas and the were two promises, of which he wished to perform one, Thracian ί ^ -L ' Chalcidians. and exact fulfilment of the other. The promise of which he claimed fulfilment had been made to him by Perdiccas, when, being hard pressed at the beginning of the war, he wanted Sitalces to reconcile him to the Athenians,^ and not to restore and place on the throne his brother Philip, who was his enemy ; but Per- diccas did not keep his word. The other was a promise Avhich Sitalces had himself made to the Athenians when he entered into alliance with them, that he would put an end to the Chalcidian war. For these two reasons he invaded the country, taking with him Amyntas the son of Philip, whom he intended to make king of Macedon, and also certain Athenian envoys who had just come to remind him of his engagement, and the Athenian com- mander Hagnon. For the Athenians on their part Avere bound to assist him against the Chalcidians with ships and with as large an army as they could provide. Accordingly Sitalces, beginning with the Odrysae, Qg^ made a levy of all his Thracian subjects dwelling be- The forces of tween Mount Haemus and !Mount Ehodop^ as far as ^^*^ ^^^' the shores of the Euxine and of the Hellespont. Beyond 1 The reconciliation had been effected through the instrumentality of Nymphodorus ; ii. 29. 11 162 THE KINGDOM OF SITALCES. B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. Π. the Haemus he made a levy of the Getae and of all the nations lying towards the Euxine on this side of the Ister. Now the Getae and their neighbors border on the Scythians, and are equipped like them, for they are all horse-archers. He also summoned to his standard many of the highland Thracians, who are independent and carry dirks ; they are called Dii, and most of them inhabit Mount Rhodope ; of these some were attracted by pay, while others came as volunteers. He further called out the Agrianians, the Laeaeans, and the other Paeonian nations Λvho were his subjects. These tribes were the last within his empire ; they extended as far as the Graaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which rises in Mount Scombrus and nows through the country of the Graaeans and Laeaeans ; there his dominion ended and the independent Paeonians began. In the direction of the Triballi, who are likewise independent, theTreres and the Tilataeans formed his boundary. These tribes dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and reach west- ward as far as the Oscius. This river rises in the same mountains as the Nestus and the Hebrus, a ΛνΙΜ and extensive range which adjoins Ehodope. 97. The empire of the Odrysae measured by the coast- Extent and line reaches from the city of Abdera to the mouth of the wealtti of tne ^ SJ^J?'^ Ister in the Euxine. The voyas^e round can be made empire. ^ σ by a merchant vessel, if the wind is favorable the whole way, at the quickest in four days and as many nights. Or an expeditious traveller going by land from Abdera to the mouth of the Ister, if he takes the shortest route, will accomplish the journey in eleven days. Such was the extent of the Odrysian empire toAvards the sea ; up the country the land journey from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and to the Strymon, this being the longest line w^hich can be drawn from the sea into the interior, may be accomplished by an expeditious traveller in thirteen da3's. The tribute Λvhichwas collected from the Hellenic cities and from all the barbarous nations in the reio^n of Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, under whom SITALCES MARCH ES INTO MACEDONIA. 163 B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. the amount was greatest, was valued at about four liun- Π. dred talents of coined money, ^ reckoning only gold and silver. Presents of gold and silver equal in value to the tribute, besides stuffs embroidered or plain, and other articles, were also brought, not only to the king himself, but to the inferior chiefs and nobles of the Odrysae. For their custom was the opposite of that which prevailed in the Persian kingdom ; they were more ready to receive than to give, and he who asked and was refused was not so much discredited as he who refused when he was asked. The same custom prevailed among the other Thracians in a less degree, but among the Odrysae, who were richer, more extensively ; nothing could be done without presents. By these means the kingdom became very powerful, and in revenue and general prosperity exceeded all the nations of Europe which lie between the Ionian Sea and the Euxine, in the size and strength of their army being second only, though far inferior, to the Scythians. For if the Scythians were united, there is no nation which could compare with them, or would be capable of resisting them^ ; I do not say in Europe, but even in Asia — not that they are at all on a level Avith other nations in sense, or in that intelligence which uses to advantage the ordinary means of life. Such \vas the great country over which Sitalces ruled. 98. When he had collected his army and his preparations sitaices and ^ ^ ■■■ his army \vere complete he marched into Macedonia, passing first ^J^^^^^^*^®" of all through his own territory, and then through Cer- cine, a desert mountain Λvhich lies between the Sinti and the Paeonians. He went by the road which he had himself constructed when he made his expedition against the Paeonians and cut down the forest. As he left the Odrysian territory in going through the mountain he had on the right hand the Paeonians and on the left hand the Sinti and Maedi ; on quitting the mountain he arrived at Doberus in Paeonia. He lost no part of his army on the march, except by sickness, but rather 1 £96,000. 2 cp. Herod, iv. 46. 164 THE HOST OF SITALCES. B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. II. increased it; for many of the independent Thracian tribes followed him of their own accord in hopes of plunder. The whole number of his forces was esti- mated at a hundred and fifty thousand, of which about two-thirds were infantry and the rest cavalry. The largest part of the cavalry was furnished by the Odrysae themselves, and the next largest by the Getae. Of the infantry, those armed Avith dirks who came from the independent tribes of Mount Ehodop^ were the most warlike. The remainder of the army was a mixed multitude, chiefly formidable from its numbers. 99. Having mustered at Doberus, they made ready to Early iiistory clesccnd ovcr the heio^hts into the plains of Macedonia, of the ]Mace- ^ ο . dorn^" ^"§- which were the territory of Perdiccas. There is an upper Macedonia, Λvhich is inhabited by Lyncestians, Elimiots, and other tribes ; these are the allies and tributaries of the lower Macedonians, but have kings of their ΟΛνη. The maritime country Λvhich we now call Macedonia Λvas conquered and formed into a kingdom by Alexander the father of Perdiccas and his ancestors the Temenidae, who originally came from Argos.^ They defeated and drove out of Pieria the Pierians, who afterwards settled in Phagres and other places at the foot of Mount Pangaeus, beyond the Str3^mon ; the land which lies under Mount Pangaeus towards the sea is still called the Pierian vale. They also drove out of Bottia, as it is called, the Bottiaeans, who are now the neighbors of the Chalcidians, and they acquired a narrow strip of Paeonia by the river Axius, reaching down to Pella and the sea. Beyond the Axius they possess the coun- try called Mygdonia reaching to the Strymon, out of which they have driven the Edonians. They ex- pelled from the country still called Eordia the Eor- dians, of whom the greater part perished, but a small remnant of them settled in the neighborhood of Physca ; and from Almopia the Almopians. They and their subjects further subdued and still hold various places 1 Herod, viii. 137-139. PROGEESS OF THE mVASION. 165 B.C. 429; 01.87.4. belongingto other tribes, Anthemus, Grestonia, Bisaltia, Π. and a great part of the original Macedonia. But the whole of this country is now called Macedonia, and was under the rule of Perdiccas the son of Alexander at the time of the invasion of Si takes. The Macedonians were unable to defend themselves 100. against the onset of such a vast host ; they therefore ^nfretke" retired into their strongholds and forts, which at that sSSnghiids. time were feΛV. For those which now exist were built oppoLTheS by Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who, when he became Ir^compeued king, made straight roads and in various ways improved f JrSSty^f the country. In his force of cavalry and infantry and SesTst!^^ *^ in his military resources generally he surpassed all the eight kings who preceded him. The Thracian army leaving Doberus, invaded first of all the country which had formerly been the principality of Philip, and took Eidomene by storm. Gortynia, Ata- lante, and some other towns came to terms out of regard for Amyntas, the son of Philip, who accompanied the expedition. They also besieged but failed to take Europus ; they next advanced into that part of Mace- donia which lay on the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. Farther south into Bottiaea and Pieria they did not penetrate, but were content to ravage the territory of Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians had no idea of facing them ivith infantry, but sent for additional cavalry from their allies in the upper part of the country, and, although a handful of men, dashed in amongst the great Thracian host wherever they pleased. ]S^o one withstood their onset ; for they were excellent horsemen and well protected with coats of mail. But hemmed in, as they continually were, by a multitude many times their own number, they ran into great danger. At last, feeling that they were not strong enough to encounter such superiority of force, they desisted. Sitalces now held a conference with Perdiccas touchinof 101 . the matters which o^ave occasion to the war. The fleet sitai^es ο holds a which the Athenians had promised never arrived ; for conference 166 EETURX OF SITALCES. B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. Π. not believing that Sitalces would come, they only sent SsJ'and^after gi^^ and envoys to him. After waiting for them in vain f Ji'Jampailn ^^ despatched a part of his army against the Chalcidians chJSdfafrs'^ and Bottiaeans, and, driving them within their walls, Efs'^i^'eplfew^^ devastated the country. While he was encamped in had^S"^^"^ these parts, the Thessalians, who lie towards the south, by^Perd^Icas) the Magnesiaus and other dependants of the Thessalians, home.^ Alarm and all the Hellenes as far as Thermopylae were afraid ^ ^ ^^' that his army would move on them, and took measures of precaution. Those independent Thracian tribes to the north beyond the Strymon who dwelt in the plains, namely, the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and Der- saeans, were also in great alarm. A belief arose, Avhich spread far and wide among the enemies of Athens, that the Athenians meant to lead their Odrysian allies against the rest of Hellas. Meanwhile Sitalces overran and ravaged Chalcidic^, Bottice, and Macedonia, but could not effect his objects ; and, his army being without food and suffering from the winter, he was persuaded by his nephew, λύΥιο next to himself had the greatest authority, Seuthes the son of Spardacus,^ to return home at once. Now Perdiccas had secretly gained over Seuthes, pro- mising to give him his sister in marriage, with a portion. And so Sitalces and h^'s army, having remained thirty days in all, of which eight were passed among the Chal- cidians, returned home in haste. Perdiccas in fulfilment of his promise gaΛ^e his sister Stratonice in marriage to Seuthes. Thus ended the expedition of Sitalces. 102. During the same winter the Athenian forces at Nau- The Athe- pactus, after the Peloponnesian fleet had dispersed, made iiians, under , -, η -τ\λ . • ι Phormio, an expedition under the command ot Phormio into the pedition mto ccntre of Acamaiiia Avith four hundred hoplites of their own taken from the fleet ^ and four hundred Messenian hoplites. They first coasted along toAvards Astacus^ and disembarked. From Stratus, Coronta, and other places they expelled those of the inhabitants whom they 1 Cp. iv. 101 fin. 2 Cp. ii. 83 init. ; 92 fin. 3 Cp. ii. 30; 33. Acarnania. THE STORY OF ALCMAEON. 167 B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. distrusted, and restoring Cynes the son of Theolytus to II. Coronta, they returned to their ships. Oeniadae, of -SicesiibTe^^ which the inhabitants, unlike the rest of the Acarnanians, AoodfngVf^^ were their persistent enemies, was unapproachable in o^p^l^e Ϋο^' winter. For the toΛvn is in the midst of a marsh formed ihlEcM-^^ by the river Achelous, which, rising in Mount Pindus ?ormldbythl and passing first through the territory of the Dolopians, thJrivlr.^^ Agraeans, and Amphilochians, and then through the Saeo^^after Acarnanian plain, at some distance from its mouth flows ί5ΐΧ£,ϊ by the city of Stratus and finds an exit into the sea near foimd^a Sme g-\ • ^ tj_• • • J. • Ji IT which was in- Oemadae : an expedition m winter is thus rendered dicated to him impossible by the water. Most of the islands called of Apoiia^ ^ Echinades are situated opposite to Oeniadae and close to the mouth of the Achelous. The consequence is that the river, which is large, is always silting up ; some of the islands have been already joined to the mainland, and very likely, at no distant period, they may all be joined to it. The stream is wide and strong and full of mud ; and the islands are close together and serve to connect the deposits made by the river, not allowing them to dissolve in the water. For, lying irregularly and not one behind the other, they prevent the river from finding a straight channel into the sea. These islands are small and uninhabited. The story is that when Alcmaeon the son of Amphiaraus was wandering over the earth after the murder of his mother, he was told by Apollo that here he should find a home, the oracle intimating that he would never obtain deliverance from his terrors until he discovered some country which was not yet in existence and not seen by the sun at the time when he slew his mother ; there he might settle, but the rest of the earth was accursed to him. He knew not what to do, until at last, according to the story, he spied the deposit of earth made by the Achelous, and he thought that a place suflScient to support life must have accumulated in the long time during Λvhich he had been wandering since his mother's death. There, near Oeniadae, he settled, and becoming ruler, left to the country the name of his son 168 RETUEN OF FHQEMIO. B.C. 429 ; 01. 87, 4. Π. Acarnan. Such is the tradition which has come down to us concerilino: Alcmaeon. 103. The Athenians under Phorniio sailed back from Acar- The Atiie- nauia to Naupactus, and later, at the bevith great exertion and only after a hard struggle ; for the ice in it was not frozen hard enough to bear, but was half water, as is commonly the case when the ivind is from the east and not from the north. And the snow which the east wind brought in the night had greatly swollen the water, so that they 1 could scarcely accomplish the passage. It was the violence of the storm, however, which enabled them to escape at all. From the ditch the Plataeans, leaving on the right 24. hand the shrine of Androcrates, ran all together along Jo^^^Jj-df* ^^ the road to Thebes. They made sure that no one ΛνοηΜ aiid^iien ever suspect them of having fled in the direction of their ξ^β mo°uu-^ enemies. On their Avay they saw the Peloponnesians Athen?. pursuing them with torches on the road which leads to Athens by Cithaeron and Dryoscephalae. For nearly a mile the Plataeans continued on the Theban road ; they then turned off and ivent by the way up the mountain leading to Erythrae and Hysiae, and so, getting to the hills, they escaped to Athens. Their number was two hundred and tΛvelve, though they had been originally more, for some of them Λvent back to the city and never got over the ivall ; one who was an archer was taken at the outer ditch. Tlie Peloponnesians at length gave up the pursuit and returned to their lines. But the Plataeans in the city, knowing nothing of what had happened, for those who had turned back had informed them that not one Λvas left alive, sent out a herald at daybreak, wanting to make a truce for the burial of the dead ; they then discovered the truth and returned. Thus the Plataeans scaled the wall and escaped 1 Taking ύηερέχβιν in the sense of " superare: " or, " could liardly keep above the surface in crossing." 2 Cp. iii. 20 med. 184 FOUKTH INYASIOK OF ATTICA. B.C. 428 : 01. 88. B.C. 427 ; 01. III. 25. Salaethus is sent from Lacedaemon to Mityleno with the news that help is on the way. 26. After de- spatching a fleet under Alcides to Lesbos, the Peloponnesi- ans invade Attica, caus- ing great dis- tress. 27. Salaethus, despairing At the end of the same Avinter Salaethus the Lace- daemonian was dispatched in a trireme from Lacedae- mon to Mitylen^. He sailed to Pyrrha, and thence, proceeding on foot, made his way, by the channel of a torrent at a place where the line of the Athenian wall could be crossed, undiscovered into Mitylene. He told the government that there \vas to be an invasion of Attica, and that simultaneously the forty ships \vhich were coming to their assistance ΛνοηΜ arrive at Lesbos ; he himself had been sent in advance to bring the news and take charge of affairs. Whereupon the Mitylenaeans recovered their spirits, and ivere less disposed to make terms with the Athenians. So the winter ended, and with it the fourth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides Avrote the history. With the return of summer the Peloponnesians de- spatched the two and forty ships which they intended for Mitylene in charge of Alcidas, the Lacedaemonian admiral. They and their allies then invaded Attica, in order that the Athenians, embarrassed both by sea and land, might have their attention distracted from the ships sailing to Mitylene. Cleomenes led the invasion. He was acting in the place of his nepheΛv, the king Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, who was still a minor. All the country Avhich they had previously overrun, wherever anything had grown up again, they ravaged afresh, and devastated even those districts ivhich they had hitherto spared. This invasion caused greater dis- tress to the Athenians than any, except the second. For the Peloponnesians, who Λvere daily expecting to hear from Lesbos of some action on the part of the fleet, which they supposed by this time to have crossed the sea, pursued their ravages far and Λvide. But Avhen none of their expectations Λvere realized, and their food was exhausted, they retired and dispersed to their several cities. Meanwhile the Mitylenaeans, finding as time went on that the ships from Peloponnesus never came, and that SURRENDER OF MITYLENE. 185 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. their provisions had run short, Avere obliged to make III. terms with the Athenians. The immediate cause was ?ii^plopie^^^ as folloΛVS : — Salaethus himself began to despair of the upoVS^ arrival of the ships, and therefore he put into the hands ^^^i®^• of the common people (who had hitherto been light- armed) shields and spears, intending to lead them out against the Athenians. But, having once received arms, they would no longer obey their leaders ; they gath- ered into knots and insisted that the nobles should bring out the corn and let all share alike ; if not, they ΛνοηΜ themselves negotiate with the Athenians and surrender the city. The magistrates, knowing that they were helpless, and 28. that they would be in peril of their lives if they were left n^eui^fe^ng out of the convention, concluded a general agreement f^sHe^sis^- with Paches and his army stipulating that the fate of city^J^Paches the Mitylenaeans should be left in the hands of the «itTifSe- Athenians at home. They weve to receive him and his SiSuid deSe forces into the city ; but might send an embassy to tTe^iuhaMt-^ Athens on their own behalf. Until the envoys returned, Paches Λvas not to bind, enslave, or put to death any Mitylenaean. These Avere the terms of the capitulatioh. Nevertheless, when the army entered, those Mityle- naeans who had been principally concerned with the Lacedaemonians Avere in an agony of fear, and could not be satisfied until they had taken refuge at the altars. Paches raised them up, and promising not to hurt them, deposited them at Tenedos until the Athe- nians should come to a decision. He also sent triremes to Antissa, of which he gained possession, and took such other military measures as he deemed best. The forty ships of the Peloponnesians, which should 29. have s^one at once to Mitylene, lost time about the Pelo- The peiopon- ^ ^ nesian fleet ponnese, and proceeded very leisurely on their voyage. Sj^^^ieut ^^"^ They were not discovered by any ships from Athens, XfckSs^Tear- and arrived safely at Delos ; but on touching at Icarus gafis^to*^ ^'^"' and Myconus they heard, too late, that Mitylend was ^^^batum, taken. Wanting to obtain certain information, they 186 SPEECH OF TEUTIAPLUS. B.C. 427 : 01. ΠΙ. and holds a council. Speech of Teutiaplus. 30. Let us hurry on to INIity- leue. "We shall find the Athenians off their guard. The art of the general is to surprise others, never to be s\ir- prised. 31. It is also pro posed to oc- cupy some town, and raise a revolt in Ionia. But Alcidas re- jects both propositions. He hurries home. sailed to Embatum in Erythrae, which they reached, but not until seven days after the fall of Mitylen^. Ha\'ing now made sure of the fact, they consulted as to what measures should next be taken, and Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as folloΛvs : — " M}' opinion, Alcidas, and you, my fellow-commanders of the Peloponnesian forces, is that Ave should attack Mitylene at once, just as Ave are, before our an-iA^al is known. In all probability we shall find that men who have recently gained possession of a city Avill be much off their guard, and entirely so at sea, on which element they do not fear the attack of an enemy, and where our strength at present chiefly lies. Probablj^ too, their land forces, in the carelessness of victory, will be scattered up and down among the houses of the city. If we were to fall upon them suddenly by night, with the help of our friends inside, should there be any left, I have no doubt that Mitylene would be ours. The danger should not deter us ; for we should consider that the execution of a military surprise is always dangerous, and that the general Avho is never taken off his guard himself, and never loses an opportunity of striking at an unguarded foe, will be most likely to succeed in war." His words failed to convince Alcidas ; whereupon some Ionian exiles and the Lesbians who were on board the fleet ^ recommended that, if this enterprise appeared too hazardous, he should occupy one of the Ionian towns or the Aeolian Cyme : having thus es- tablished their headquarters in a city, the Pelopon- nesians might raise the standard of revolt in Ionia. There was a good chance of success, for every one Avas glad of his arrival ; they might cut off a main source of Athenian revenue ; and although they themselves would incur expense, for the Athenians Avould blockade them,^ the attempt was worth making. Pissuthnes might very likely be persuaded to co-operate. But Alcidas ob- 1 i.e. , the envoys λνΐιο had been sent to Sparta. Cp, iii. 4 fin. , 5 fin. 2 Adopting with Bekker the conjecture έφορμοΰσιΐ'. EETUKiq- OF ALCIDAS. 187 B.C. 427; 01.88,2. jected to this proposal equally with the last; his only ΙΠ. idea Avas, now that he had failed in saving Mitylen^, to get back as fast as he could to Peloponnesus. Accordingly he sailed from Embatum along the coast, 32. touching at ^lyonnesus in the territory of Teos ; he there Sfe?^remo°n- slew most of the captives Λyhom he had taken on his S*fo?Ms voyage. He then put into harbor at Ephesus, where siaySg tiie a deputation from the Samians of Anaea ^ came to him. ^^Sil he had They told him that he had an ill manner of liberating *^^^°• Hellas, if he put to death men who were not his enemies and were not lifting a hand against him, but were allies of Athens from necessity : if he went on in this way he would convert few of his enemies into friends, and many of his friends into enemies. He was convinced by them, and allowed such of the Chian prisoners as he had not yet put to death and some others to go free. They had been easily taken, because, when people saw the ships, instead of flying, they came close up to them under the idea that they were Athenian ; the thought never entered into their minds that while the Athenians were masters of the sea, Peloponnesian ships would find their way across the Aegean to the coast of Ionia. From Ephesus Alcidas sailed away in haste, or rather 33. fled ; for while he Λvas at anchor near Clarus he had been He sails from sio'hted by the Athenian sacred vessels, Paralus and rect for Peio- η('^Ί ' • Λ • Λ Ί Ί 1 η ponnesvis, Salammia, which happened to be on a voyao^e from leaving been ' ■'•■'•. ^ ^ sighted by the Athens. In fear of pursuit he hurried throus^h the Paraius and •■■ '- Salammia, open sea, determined to stop nowhere, if he could help andispur- ^ ^ IT 7 χ- sued as far as it, until he reached Peloponnesus. News of him and his 'ψ^'^^^ ^y fleet Λvas brought to Pachesfrom the country of Erythrae, and indeed kept coming in from all sides. For Ionia not being fortified, there was great apprehension lest the Peloponnesians, as they sailed along the coast, might fiill upon the cities and plunder them, even though they had no intention of remaining. And the Paralus and Salaminia reported that they had themselves seen him at Clarus. Paches eagerly gave chase and pursued hina * Cp. iii. 19 fin. ; iv. 75 med. 188 PACHES AT NOTIUM. B.C. 427; 01.88,2. III. as far as the island of Patmos, but, seeing that he was no longer within reach, he returned. Not having come up with the fleet of the Peloponnesians upon the open sea, he congratulated himself that they had not been over- taken somewhere near land, where they would have been forced to put in and fortify themselves on shore, and the Athenians would have had the trouble of watching and blockading them. 34. As he was sailing along the coast on his return he Paches on his touclicd at Notium, the port of Dolophon. Here some retu rn puts m ^ i i tie^p'irtS intiabitants of the upper town had taken up their abode ; tSiviStiin ^'^^' ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ captured by Itamenes and the Barba- Periiknflc- ™^is, who had been invited into the city by a certain hidbeeS^ local faction. The capture took place about the time of HeTak^s^ie ^he sccoud iuvaslou of Attica. The refugees Λvho settled trSciiemisiy i^ Notium again quarrelled among themselves. The one milid?/ffi^^" piii^y» having introduced Arcadian and Barbarian auxili- SenSnl arlcs whom they had obtained from Pissuthnes, stationed tL^cSioph^ them in a fortified quarter of the toΛvn ; the Persian faction SiSa! ^^ ' °" from the upper city of Colophon joined them and were living with them. The other party had retired from the city, and being now in exile, called in Paches. He pro- posed to Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the fortress, that they should hold a conference, under- taking, if they could not agree, to put him back in the fort, safe and sound. So he came out, and Paches kept him in custody without fetters. In the meantime he made an attack upon the unsuspecting gamson, took the fortress, and slaughtered all the Arcadians and Barbarians whom he found within. He then conducted Hippias into the fort, according to the agreement, and when he was inside seized him and shot him to death Λvith arrows. He next handed over Notium to the Colo- phonians, excluding the Persian party. The Athenians afterwards gathered together all the Colophonians who could be found in the neio'hborino: cities and colonized the place, to which they gave Liavs like their ΟΛνη, under regular leaders whom they sent out from Athens. THE DECREE AGAINST MITYLENE. 189 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. On returning to Lesbos, Paches reduced Pyrrha and ΠΙ. Eresus, and finding Salaethus, the Lacedaemonian gov- 35. ernor, concealed in Mitylene, sent him to Athens. He saiaethusis Λ -ΛΓ' -i captured and also sent thither the Mitylenaeans whom he had de- sent to '^ Athens with posited in Tenedos, and any others who seemed to JJ^^^^^^J^^" haΛ^e been implicated in the revolt. He then dismissed rebels. the greater part of his army, and, by the aid of the remainder, settled as seemed best to him the affairs of Mitylene and Lesbos. When the captives arrived at Athens the Athenians 36. instantly put Salaethus to death, althouoii he made TheAthe- «^ ■•■ . mans put various offers, and amons: other thinsfs promised to f ^^^f *^^S *<^ ' c? ο I death and procure the ivithdrawal of the Peloponnesians from gf^^Vt^^ Plataea, which was still blockaded. Concerning the grown -ϊρ other captives a discussion Λvas held, and in their Mityien^l^ on indignation the Athenians determined to put to death iSey'beghito not only the men then at Athens, but all the grown- [ffe Mity-""^ up citizens of Mitylen^, and to enslave the Avomen and νο"Γρ?Γ-^^" children ; the act of the Mitylenaeans appeared inexcus- magStrates able, because they ivere not subjects like the other states anofhlr Avhich had rei^olted, but free. That Peloponnesian ships ^^^®"^^'^• should have had the audacity to find their Λvay to Ionia and assist the rel^els contributed to increase their fury, and led them to suspect that the revolt ^was a long premeditated affair. So they sent a trireme to Paches announcing their determination, and bidding him put the Mitylenaeans to death at once. But on the follow^- ing day a kind of remorse seized them ; they began to reflect that a decree which doomed to destruction not only the guilty, but a whole city, was cruel and monstrous. The Mitylenaean envoys who were at Athens^ per- ceived the change of feeling, and they and the Athenians \\dio were in their interest prevailed on the magistrates to bring the question again before the people ; this they were the more willing to do, because they saw themselves that the majority of the citizens were anxious to ha^^e an opportunity given them of reconsidering their decision. 1 Or, " was part of an extensive scheme." 2 Cp, [[[^ 28 med. 190 SPEECH OF CLEON. B.C. 427 ; 01. always chang- ing your minds. III. An assembly was again summoned, and diiferent opinions were expressed by different speakers. In the former as- sembly, Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, had carried the de- cree condemning the Mitylenaeans to death. He Avas the most violent of the citizens, and at that time exercised Speech of by far the greatest influence over the people. ^ And now he came forward a second time and spoke as follows : — 37. "I have remarked again and again that a democracy ISowhS^\o cannot manage an empire, but never more than now, Siipire^; y^u whcu I scc you regrcttliig your condemnation of the kSdto^yiu? Mitylenaeans. Having no fear or suspicion of one ^οΓίονβ^οη^ another in daily life,^ you deal with your allies upon the qSick wits a?e Same principle , and you do not consider that whenever you yield to them out of pity or are misled by their specious tales, you are guilty of a weakness dangerous to yourselves, and receive no thanks from them. You should remember that your empire is a despotism ^ ex- ercised over unwilling subjects, who are always con- spiring against you ; they do not obey in return for any kindness which you do them to your own injury, but in so far as you are their masters ; they have no love of you, but they are held down by force. Besides, what can be more detestable than to be perpetually changing our minds? We forget that a state in which the laws, though imperfect, are unalterable, is better off than one in which the laws are good but powerless.^ Dulness and modesty are a more useful combination than clever- ness and license ; and the more simple sort generally make better citizens than the more astute. For the latter desire to be thought wiser than the laws ^ ; they want to be always taking a lead in the discussions of the assembly ; they think that they can nowhere have a finer opportunity of speaking their mind,^ and their folly generally ends in the ruin of their country ; whereas the others, mistrusting their own capacity, admit that the laws are wiser than themselves : they do not pretend to » Cp. iv. 21 med. 2 Op. i. 68 init. ^ Cp. ii. 63 med. * Cp. vi. 18 fin. 5 Cp. i. 84 med. ^ Cp. iii. 40 init. SPEECH OF CLEON. 191 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. criticize the arguments of a great speaker ; and being III. impartial judges, not ambitious rivals, they are generally in the right. That is the spirit in which we should act ; not suffering ourselves to be so excited by our own cleverness in a war of wits as to advise the Athenian people contrary to our own better judgment. " I myself think as I did before, and I wonder at those 38. who have brous^ht forward the case of the Mitylenaeans "^^y j» their •^ , '^ punisnment ao:ain, thus interposino; a delay which is in the interest delayed? & ' 1 ο ./ ΛΥιΙΙ any one of the evil-doer. For after a time the answer of the pretend that ~ their crimes sufferer waxes dull, and he pursues the offender with ^^ ^^ gff'i ? ' -t or would any less keenness ; but the vengeance which follo\vs closest thlirS^aiT upon the wrong is most adequate to it and exacts ^^Jjf^^f J "Sid the fullest retribution. And again I wonder who will Jfj^.J^^^f^c'ts answer me, and whether he will attempt to show that niScy^o?^ the crimes of the Mitylenaeans are a benefit to us, or tlS?^^^'^ that Avhen we suffer, our allies suffer with us. Clearly he must be some one who has such confidence in his powers of speech as to contend that you never adopted what was most certainly your resolution ; ^ or else he must be some one who, under the inspiration of a bribe, elaborates a sophistical speech in the hope of diverting you from the point. In such rhetorical contests the city gives away the prizes to others, while she takes the risk upon herself. And you are to blame, for you order these contests amiss. When speeches are to be heard, you are too fond of using your eyes, but, where actions are concerned, you trust your ears ; you estimate the possibility of future enterprises from the eloquence of an orator, but as to accomplished facts, instead of accepting ocular demonstration, you believe only what ingenious critics tell you." No men are better dupes, sooner deceived by novel notions, or slower to follow approved advice. You despise what is familiar, while you are worshippers of every new extravagance. Not a man of you but would be an orator if he could; * Or, " that what all men believe to be true is absolutely false.'* 2 Cp. vii. 48 med. 192 SPEECH OF CLEON. B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. III. when he cannot, he will not yield the paLm to a more successful rival : he avouM fain show that he does not let his wits come limping after, but that he can praise a sharp remark before it is well out of another's mouth j he would like to be as quick in anticipating what is said, as he is slow in foreseeing its consequences. You are always hankering after an ideal state, but you do not give your minds even to what is straight before you. In a Avord, you are at the mercy of your own ears, and sit like spectators attending a performance of sophists, but very unlike counsellors of a state. 39. "I want you to put aside this trifling, and therefore dolie^S^o^ I say to you that no single city has ever injured us so MuielS^ ^^ deeply as Mitylen^ . I can excuse those who find our so mur/ea^*^ 1'^^® ^^^ heavy to bear, or who have revolted because du'?genceV?s ^^le cueuiy have compelled them. But islanders who StofeS.^^ had walls, and were unassailable by our enemies, except piopYe s1S?uid at sea, and on that element were sufficiently protected aSkMortifey hy a fleet of their own, who were independent and ?rguiity^''if' treated by us with the highest regard, Avhen they act you pardon them your other subjects thus they have not revolted (that word would imply wm ΐ)ΓΙ?>^^^ that they were oppressed), but they have rebelled, and enterinoj the ranks of our bitterest enemies, have con- couraged to revolt ; and iec?o?r eni- spircd with them to seek our ruin. And surely this is Siir own ^ far more atrocious than if they had been led by motives of ambition to take up arms against us on their own account. They learned nothing from the misfortunes of their neighbors who had already revolted and been subdued by us, nor did the happiness of which they were in the enjoyment make them hesitate to court destruc- tion. They trusted recklessly to the future, and cherish- ing hopes Λvhich, if less than their wishes, were greater than their powers, they went to war, preferring might to right. No sooner did they seem likely to win than they set upon us, although we were doing them no wrong. Too swift and sudden a rise is apt to make cities in- solent, and in general, ordinary good-fortune is safer than extraordinary. jMankind apparently find it easier SPEECH OF CLEOK 193 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. to drive away adversity than to retain prosperity. We III. should from the first have made no diiference between the Mitylenaeans and the rest of our allies, and then their insolence would never have risen to such a height ; for men naturally despise those who court them, but respect those who do not give way to them. Yet it is not too late to punish them as their crimes deserve. And do not absolve the peo2:)le Avhile you throw the blame upon the nobles. For they were all of one mind when ΛΥβ were to be attacked. Had the people deserted the nobles and come over to us, they might at this moment have been reinstated in their city ; but they considered that their safety lay in sharing the dangers of the oligarchy, and therefore they joined in the revolt. Reflect : if you impose the same penalty upon those of your allies who wilfully rebel and upon those who are constrained by the enemy, which of themΛγill not revolt upon any pretext however triΛdal, seeing that, if he suc- ceed, he will be free, and, if he fail, no irreparable e\^il will follow? We in the meantime shall have to risk our lives and our fortunes against every one in turn. When conquerors we shall recover onlj^ a ruined city, and, for the future, the revenues Λvhich are our strength Λγϋΐ be lost to us.^ But if Λve fail, the number of our adversaries will be increased. And when we ought to be employed in repelling our regular enemies, Ave shall be wastino^ time in fio-htino: ao-ainst our own allies. "Do not then hold out a hope, which eloquence can 40. secure or money buy, that they are to be excused and ^?ί^<^*ί® ^ ^ ^ 'J misled by that their error is to be deemed human and venial. p^^J^^J^JJ ^ Their attack was not unpremeditated ; that might have tem^ll"^ been an excuse for them ; but they knew what they were ^^o^^^^ilTto doing. This was my original contention, and I still ie^lls you maintain that you should abide by your former decision, 1.\|μ"ο and not be misled either by pity, or by the charm of Slfattiiem words, or by a too forgiving temper. There are no ^^ ^'*^^^' three things more prejudicial to your poAver. ]Mercy 1 Cp. iii. 46 med. 13 194 SPEECH OF CLEOK B.C. 427 : 01. 88, 2. III. should be reserved for the merciful, and not thrown iTn^^iilT^' away upon those λυΙιο will have no compassion on us, and who must by the force of circumstances always be our vengeance. wovild have treated you. S'^roibie^"'® enemies. And our charming orators will still have an Tiiiesw^n ^reua,! but one in which the questions at stake will not that rebemon ^^^ ^^ gravc, and the city will not pay so dearly for her ished by"""" ^^I'i^f pleasure in listening to them, while they for a good death. spccch get a good fee. Lastly, forgiveness is naturally shown to those who, being reconciled, will continue friends, and not to those who Λνίΐΐ always remain what they were, and will abate nothing of their enmity. In one word, if you do as I say, you will do what is just to the ]Vtitylenaeans, and also what is expedient for your- selves ; but, if 3^ou take the opposite course, they will not be grateful to you, and you Λνϋΐ be self-condemned. For, if they Λvere right in revolting, you must be wrong in maintaining your empire. But if, right or Λvrong, you are resolved to rule, then rightly or \vrongly they must be chastised for your good. Otherwise you must give up your empire, and, when virtue is no longer dangerous, you may be as virtuous as you please. Punish them as they would have punished you ; let not those who have escaped appear to have less feeling than those Λνΐιο conspired against them. Consider : Λvhat might not they have been expected to do if they had conquered ? — especially since they were the aggressors. For those who wantonly attack others ahvays rush into extremes, and sometimes, like these Mitylenaeans, to their own de- struction. They know the fate w^hichis reserved for them if their enemy is spared ; Λvhen a man is injured without a cause he is more dangerous if he escape than the enemy Avho has only suffered what he has inflicted. ^ Be true then to yourselves, and recall as vividly as you can Λvhat you felt at the time ; think how you would Ϊ Cp. iii. 37 fin. 2 Or, referring the words to the Mitylenaeans : "He who has gone out of his way to bring a calamity upon himself is more danger- ous if he be allowed to escape than the enemy who only retaliates." SPEECH OP DIODOTUS. 195 B.C. 427; 01.88,2. have given the world to crush your enemies, and now HI. take your revenge. Do not be soft-hearted at the sight of their distress, but remember the danger which was once hanging over your heads. Chastise them as they deserve, and prove by an example to your other allies that rebellion will be punished with death. If this is made quite clear to them, your attention will no longer be diverted from your enemies by wars against your own allies." Such were the words of Cleon ; and after him Dio- 41. dotus the son of Eucrates, Avho in the previous assembly |i*®J^^^^^ had been the chief opponent of the decree which con- demned the Mitylenaeans, came forward again and spoke as follows : — "I am far from blaming those who invite us to re- 42. consider our sentence upon the Mitylenaeans, nor do I we are right in reconsider- approve oi the censure which has been cast on the ing the • η Ί ΤΊ • Ί Ί case of the practice oi deliberatmo: more than once about matters Mitylenaeans. ■*- ^ He is foolish, so critical. In my opinion the two thmo^s most adverse even if he be •^ -•■ ^ *-' honest, who to o^ood counsel are haste and passion ; the former is would have ο -"^ ' no delibera- generally a mark of folly, the latter of vulgarity and ^^o^sel^he narrowness of mind. When a man insists that words Jj^^ jjJI^^"^:^ ought not to be our guides in action, ^ he is either want- c??rupTlii- ing in sense or wanting in honesty: he is wanting in f * g^^^^ "^^®^" sense if he does not see that there is no other way inivhich aigifments. we can throw light on the unknown future ; and he is n^Liesllom^ not honest if, seeking to carry a discreditable measure, shows favor and knowing that he cannot speak well in a bad cause, *°^°^®• he reflects that he can slander well and terrify his op- ponents and his audience by the audaciousness of his calumnies. Worst of all are those who, besides other topics of abuse, declare that their opponent is hired to make an eloquent speech. If they accused him of stupidity only, when he failed in producing an impres- sion he might go his way having lost his reputation for sense but not for honesty ; whereas he who is ac- cused of dishonesty, even if he succeed, is viewed Avith 1 Cp. ii. 40 med. 196 SPEECH OF DIODOTUS. B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. III. 43. But you are too clever : you are al- Avays suspect- ing that a speaker has some inter- ested motive. You punish the giver of bad advice, and not your- selves, for following him. suspicion, and, if he fail, is thought to be both fool and rogue. And so the city suffers : for she is robbed of her counsellors by fear. Happy would she be if such citizens could not speak at all, for then the people would not be misled. The good citizen should prove his supe- riority as a speaker, not by trying to intimidate those who will follow him in debate, but by fair argument ; and the wise city ought not to give increased honor to her best counsellor, any more than she ivill deprive him of that which he has ; while he whose proposal is rejected not only ought to receive no punishment, but should be free from all reproach. Then he who suc- ceeds will not say pleasant things contrary to his better judgment in order to gain a still higher place in popular favor, and he who fails Λνϋΐ not be striving to attract the multitude to himself by like compliances. "But we take an opposite course; and still worse. Even when we know a man to be giving the wisest counsel, a suspicion of corruption is set on foot; and from a jealousy which is perhaps groundless, we allow the state to lose an undeniable advantage. It has come to this, that the best advice when offered in plain terms is as much distrusted as the worst ; and not only he who wishes to lead the multitude into the most dangerous courses must deceive them, but he who speaks in the cause of right must make himself believed by lying. In this city, and in this city only, to do good openly and without deception is impossible, because you are too clever ; and, when a man confers an unmistakable benefit on you, he is rewarded by a suspicion that, in some underhand manner, he gets more than he gives. But, whatever you may suspect,^ when great interests are at stake, we who advise ought to look further and weigh our words more carefully than you whose vision is limited. And you should remember that we are ac- countable for our advice to you, but you who listen are accountable to nobody . If he who gave and he who ^ Reading άξιοΰι^τι. I SPEECH OP DIODOTUS. 197 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. followed evil counsel suffered equally, you would be ΙΠ. more reasonable in your ideas ; but now, whenever you meet with a reverse, led away by the passion of the moment you punish the individual who is your adviser for his error of judgment, and your own error you con- done, if the judgments of many concurred in it. " I do not come forward either as an advocate of the 44. Mitylenaeans or as their accuser ; the question for us ^oneT/*'°" rightly considered is not, what are their crimes? but, faAv.^^YSf/^ what is for our interest ? If I prove them ever so nSt to mike guilty, I will not on that account bid 3^ou put them jus^i^efo ex- to death, unless it is expedient, i^either, if perchance ρ®^^®^^^• there be some degree of excuse for them, Λvould I have you spare them, unless it be clearly for the good of the state. For I conceive that we are now concerned, not Λvith the present, but Avith the future. When Cleon insists that the infliction of death wdll be expedient and will secure you against revolt in time to come, I, like him, taking the ground of future expediency, stoutly maintain the contrary position ; and I ΛνοηΚΙ not have you be misled by the apparent fairness of his proposal, and reject the solid advantages of mine. You are angry ivith the Mitylenaeans, and the superior justice of his argument may for the moment attract 3^ou ; but Ave are not at law Avith them, and do not want to be told what is just ; we are considering a matter of policy, and de- sire to knoAv how Ave can turn them to account. " To many offences less than theirs states have affixed 45 . the punishment of death ; nevertheless, excited by hope, abimdinuy men still risk their lives. jSTo one when venturing on a tie penalty of perilous enterprise ever yet passed a sentence of failure detelUnt.^ on himself. And Avhat city Avhen entering on a revolt nim-e it&t!ll^^ ever imagined that the power Avhich she had, Avhether aii^a^by their her own or obtained from her allies, did not justify the by?i-ust in^^ attempt ? All are by nature prone to err both in public ^^^■*^^®• and in private life, and no \aw Avill prevent them. Men have gone through the Avhole catalogue of penalties in the hope that, by increasing their severity, they may 198 SPEECH OF DIODOTUS. • B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. III. suffer less at the hands of evil-doers. In early ages the punishments, even of the worst offences, would nat- urally be milder ; but as time went on and mankind continued to transgress, they seldom stopped short of death. And still there are transgressors. Some greater terror then has yet to be discovered ; certainly death deters nobody. For poverty inspires necessity with daring ; and wealth engenders avarice in pride and in- solence ; and the various conditions of human life, as they severally fall under the sway of some mighty and fatal power, through the agency of the passions lure men to destruction. Desire and hope are never wanting, the one leading, the other following, the one devising the enterprise, the other suggesting that fortune will be kind ; and they do immense harm, for, being unseen, they far outweigh the dangers which are seen. Fortune, too, assists the illusion, for she often presents herself un- expectedly, and induces states as Avell as individuals to run into peril, however inadequate their means ; and states even more than indiΛ4duals, because they are throwing for a higher stake, freedom or empire, and because Avhen a man has a Avhole people acting with him, %e exaggerates the importance of his aims^ out of all reason. In a Λvord, then, it is impossible, and simply absurd, to suppose, that human nature, ivhen bent upon some favorite project, can be restrained either by the power of law or by any other terror. 46. ' ' We ought not therefore to act hastily out of a mistaken The threat of reliance on the security which the penalty of death affords. wni^make ^^^^ should AYC drivc our rebellious subjects to despair ; theistincir ^^^^y must uot thiuk that there is no place for repentance, we^shan m5y ^1' ^^^^^ ^^^^Y ^^^^7 ^^^ ^^ ^^^J moment wipe out their fft^^oui"^^ offences. Consider: at present, although a city may preve^ntion/^ actually havc revolted, Avhen she becomes conscious of menu"^^^" ^icr weakucss she will capitulate while still able to defray the cost of the war and to pay tribute for the future ; but if we are too severe, will not the citizens make better 1 Or, reading αύτόρ : " he magnifies himself." SPEECH OF DIODOTUS. 199 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. preparations, and, when besieged, resist to the last, know- ΠΙ. ing that it is all the same Avhether they come to terms early or late ? Shall we not ourselves suffer ? For we shall Λvaste our money by sitting down before a city which refuses to surrender ; when the place is taken it will be a mere ivreck, and we shall in future lose the revenues derived from it ^ ; and in these revenues lies our military strength. Do not then weigh offences with the severity of a judge, Avhen you will only be injuring yourselves, but have an eye to the future; let the penalties which you impose on rebellious cities be mod- erate, and then their wealth will be undiminished and at your service. Do not hope to find a safeguard in the severity of your laws, but only in the vigilance of your ad- ministration. At present Λνβ do just the opposite ; a free people under a strong government will always revolt in the hope of independence ; and when w^e have put them down we think that they cannot be punished too severely. But instead of inflicting extreme penalties on free men Λvho revolt, Λve should practise extreme vigilance before they revolt, and never allow such a thought to enter their minds. When, however, the}^ have been once put down we ought to extenuate their crimes as much as possible. "Think of another great error into which you would 47. fall if you listened to Cleon. At present the popular κ you destroy party are everywhere our friends ; either they do not join naeaus who with the oligarchs, or, if compelled to do so, they are jf^Y^"^ always ready to turn ao-ainst the authors of the revolt ; ^iisi^owin- '^ ^, ^ , gratitude and and so in croinsr to war with a rebellious state vou have alienate the ^ C> J popular party the multitude on your side. But if you destroy the E^enT^thl' people of jNIitylend who took no part in the revolt, and JJ^^oiid be' Λvho voluntarily surrendered the city as soon as they got enTto^pardon arms into their hands ; in the first place they were your ^^®"^• benefactors, and to slay them would be a crime ; in the second place you Avill play into the hands of the ruling oligarchies, who henceforward, ivhen they can induce a city to revolt, will at once have the people on their side ; 1 Cp. iii. 39 fin. 200 SPEECH OF DIODOTUS. B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. III. for you will have proclaimed to all that the innocent and the guilty Λνίΐΐ share the same fate. Even if they Avere guilty 3'Ou shoidd wink at their conduct, and not allow the only friends whom you have left to be converted into enemies. Far more conducive to the maintenance of our empire would it be to suffer Avrong willingly, than for the sake of justice to put to death those Λvhom ΛYe had better spare. Cieon may speak of a punishment Λvhich is just and also expedient, but you λυΙΙΙ find that, in any pro- posal like his, the two cannot be combined. 48. ^^ Assured, then, that what I advise is for the best, and Pass sentence yieldiuo' neither to pity nor to lenity, for I am as un- at leisure on «^ "^ i ./ ./ ' the prisoners wilHiio^ as Cleou cau bc that you should be influenced sent liitlier by σ ^ J ^ sS??tiie^^ by any such motives, but simply weighing the arguments rest. which I have urged , accede to my proposal . Pass sentence at your leisure on the Mitylenaeans whom Paches, deem- ing them guilty, has sent hither ; but leave the rest of the inhabitants where they are. This will be good policy for the future, and will strike present terror into your ene- mies. For wise counsel is really more formidable to an enemy than the severity of unmeaning violence." 49. Thus spoke Diodotus, and such Avere the proposals on The motion of either side which most nearly represented the opposino^ Diodotiis IS J Γ ΧΙΟ just carried, parties. lu spltc of the reaction there was a struo^He A trireme is ••- ■'■ ~^ whi^h b^^^' between the tΛvo opinions ; the show of hands was very great exer- near, but the motion of Diodotus prevailed. The Athe- tions arrives ' *■ saie Mity- i^i'i^s iustautly despatched another trireme, hoping that, leue. jf j-i^Q second could overtake the first, ^ which had a start of about twenty-four hours, it might be in time to save the city. The Mitylenaean envoys provided wine and barley for the creΛv, and promised them great rewards if they arrived first. And such was their energy that they continued roAving Λγhilst they ate their barley, kneaded with Λvine and oil, and slept and rowed by turns. Fortunately no adverse Tvind sprang up, and, the first of the two ships sailing in no great hurry on her untoAvard errand, and the second hastening as I have described, ^ Keading devziqagy TAKING OF MINOA. 201 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. the one did indeed arrive sooner than the other, but not III. much sooner. Paches had read the decree and was about to put it into execution, when the second ap- peared and arrested the fate of the city. So near was Mitylen^ to destruction. / The captives Avhom Paches had sent to Athens as being 50. the most guilty numl)ered about a thousand, or rather at^^^t^^ng^lre more ; these the Athenians, upon the motion of Cleon, i-^VianfifS* put to death. They razed the walls of the Mitylenaeans vfd?d Ι^οΐ^^' and took away their fleet. Then, instead of imposing ^JJ^ensT tribute on them, they divided the Avhole island, exclusive of the territory of Methymna, into three thousand por- tions, of which they dedicated three hundred to the Gods ; the remainder they let out to cleruchi ^ taken from their own citizens, whom they chose by lot and sent to Lesbos. The Lesbians undertook to pay them a yearly rent of two minae ^ for each portion and culti- vated the land themselves. The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the continent Λvhich the Mitylenaeans held,^ and these henceforward were sub- ject to Athens. Thus ended the revolt of Lesbos. D uring the same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos , 51. the Athenians, under the command of Mcias, the son of TheAtiie- ' ' mans under Mceratus, made an expedition against the island of ^ure^lndfor- Minoa, which lies in front of Megara ; the Megarians ooikfoa^^^*^ had built a fort there and used the island as a military station. But Nicias wanted the Athenians to keep a watch over Megara, not, as hitherto, from Budorum in Salamis, but from this spot, which was nearer; the Peloponnesians would then be no longer able to send out triremes, as they had already done on one occa- sion,* or privateers from the harbor unobserved, and nothing could be brought in by sea to Megara. First of all he took ^two projecting towers on the side of 1 Cleruchi, literally " portioners," Athenians who received land in a conquered country, but remained citizens. 2 SI. 25. Qd. 3 cp. iv. 52 med. * Cp. ii. 93, 94. ^ Or, '' two towers projecting from Nisaea." 202 SURRENDER OF PLATAEA. B.C. 427 I 01. 88, 2. m. 52, The Platae- ans surrender to the Lace- daemonians, and five men are sent from Sparta to de- cide their fate. They obtain leave to speak in their own defence. the island towards Nisaea by the help of engines from the sea, and, having thus freed a way into the channel dividing Minoa from the coast of Megara, he fortified the point nearest the mainland, where, by a bridge through a lagoon, aid could be brought to the island, lying as it did at that point close to the shore. The work was completed in a few days. Nicias then proceeded to build a fort on the island, and, leaving a garrison, re- turned Λvith the rest of his army. In this summer and about the same time the Plataeans, who had exhausted their food and could no longer hold out, capitulated to the Peloponnesians. The enemy had assaulted their wall and they were unable to defend themselves. But the Lacedaemonian commander knew their weakness, and was desirous that the place should be surrendered and not stormed ; he had instructions from home to this efiect, the intention being that if some day a treaty of peace were concluded, and both parties agreed to give up all the places which they had taken by force of arms,i Plataea might be excepted on the ground that the inhabitants had come to terms of their own accord. So he sent a herald to inquire whether they would surrender the place to the Lacedaemonians and submit to their decision ; the guilty were to be punished, but no one without a just cause. The Pla- taeans, now in the last stage of Aveakness, surrendered the city ; and for a few days, until the five men who were appointed judges came from Lacedaemon, the Peloponnesians supplied them with food. On the ar- rival of the judges no accusation w^as brought against them ; they were simply asked one by one. Whether they had done any kind of service to the Lacedae- monians or to their allies in the present Avar. Before making their reply they requested leave to speak at length, and appointed two of their number, Astyma- chus the son of Asopolaus, and Lacon the son of Aeimnestus, who was the Lacedaemonian proxenus, 1 Cp. V. 17 nied. SPEECH OF THE PLATAEANS. 203 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. to be their advocates. They came forward and spoke ΠΙ. as follows : — '^Men of Lacedaemon, we surrendered our city be- 53. cause we had confidence in you ; we were under the we hoped to • Ί 1 • 1 1 • Ί IT ^^^^ ^ legal impression that the trial to which we submitted would trial and to ■•- receive ]us- be leo:al, and of a very different kind from this; and tice at your ο ' «^ ^ liands, but we when we accepted you and you alone to be our judges, ^o^^f^^^'we which indeed you are, we thouo^ht that at your hands we noAvtear that •^ ' ο •/ "vve are to be had the best hope of obtaining justice. But we fear that the TSaSs. we are doubly mistaken, having too much reason to sus- pect that in this trial our lives are at stake, and that you will turn out to be partial judges. So we must infer, because no accusation has been preferred against us calling for a defence, but we speak at our own re- quest ; and because your question is a short one, to which the answer, if true, condemns us, and, if false, is exposed at once. In the extremity of our helplessness, our only and our safest course is to say something, what- ever may be our fate ; for men in our condition are sure to reproach themselves with their silence, and to fancy that the unuttered word, if spoken, would have saved them. " But by what arguments can we ever convince you ? If we were unacquainted with one another we might with advantage adduce in evidence matters of which you Λvere ignorant, but now you know all that we can say ; and we are afraid, not that Λve are criminals in your eyes because you have decided that Λve fall short of your own standard of virtue, 1 but that we are being sacrificed to please others, and that the cause which we plead is already prejudged. " Still we may urge our claims of justice against our 54. Theban enemies, and our claims of s-ratitude upon you Treat us either as and the other Hellenes ; the recollection of our o^ood friends or as , τ , ~. open enemies. deeds may perhaps move you. To your short question, Remember f Turi ^1 • ^1 • 1 -. . , o^i' conduct W nether in this war we have done any service to the (i) "^ ti^e Per- . •^ sian War, (2) Lacedaemonians and their allies,* we reply, that, ^if we i^it^^if^oi* ' I J ' ' of the Helots. are enemies you are not wronged, because you have received no good from us ; and if you deem us friends, 1 Cp. iii. 57 init. 204 SPEECH OF THE PLATAEAJSTS. B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. B.C. 519 ; 01. 65, 2. ΠΙ. you who have made war upon us, and not we, are to blame'. During the late peace and in the Persian War our conduct was irreproachable ; λ\^ Avere not the first to violate the peace, and we were the only Boeotians Λνΐιο took part in repelling the Persian invader and in the liberation of Hellas. Although we are an inland city, we joined in the sea-fight of Artemisium ; Λve Λvere at your side when you fought in our laud under Pausanias, and, whatever dangers the Hellenes underwent in those days, we took a share beyond our strength in all of them. And you, Lacedaemonians, more especially should re- member how at the time Avhen Sparta was panic-stricken by the rebellion of the Helots, Λvho seized Ithome after the earthquake, 1 we sent a third part of our own citizens to your aid ; these are things not to be forgotten. 55. " Such was the spirit Λvhich animated us in the great We only left (Javs of oM : uot uutil later did Ave become your enemies, you wheu you J ' J f uf against the ^^^ ^^^ ^^^'^ Originally your own fault. For Avhen Ave Siius'togo*^ sought your help against the violence of the Thebans, Sam!^^Thty y^^ rejected us and bade us turn to the Athenians, who theStandhow wcrc iicar, whereas you were at a distance. Yet even in abalidln "^^ί^ War you liavc neither suffered nor were ever likely ^^^^ to sufier anything A^ery atrocious at our hands. If we refused to revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we Avere quite right ; for they assisted us against the Thebans Avhen you shrank from the task ; and after this it would have been dishonorable to betray them. They had been our benefactors ; we had been at our OAvn re- quest admitted to their alliance, and we shared the rights of citizenship with them. ΗοΛν could we refuse to respond loA^ally to their call? When you or they in the exercise of your supremacy have acted, it may be, wrongly and led your allies into evil courses, the leaders and not the followers are to be blamed. 56. "The Thebans have inflicted many injuries upon us, The The- and their latest crime, as you are Avell aware, is the tacked us causc of our prcscut misfortunes. They came, not only 1 Cp. i. 101. SPEECH OF THE PLATAEANS. 205 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. same e on in time of peace, but at a holy season, and attempted III. to seize om^ city ; we riofhteously and in accordance ^^ *™® ^^ •^ ' C ^ peace : were with universal law defended ourselves and punished ^g^-JJ^^s ^^ the aggressor, and there is no reason why we should J^av? erred It now suffer for their satisfaction. If you take your own en-'o^out-*^^ present advantage and their present hatred to be the JS tome?' measure of justice, you will prove yourselves, not upright ξ^ΐϊβΐϊΐ and impartial judges, but the slaves of expediency. The wiiTch w Thebans may appear serviceable now, but of far greater SSdeS^^^' service to you were we and the other Hellenes when ίΙΙνΓίίβ you were in far greater danger. For now you invade ^^^®^^^^^• and menace others, but in those days the Barbarian Λvas threatening to enslave us all, and they were on his side. May we not fairly set our former patriotism against our present offence, if indeed we have offended? You will find that the one more than outiveighs the other ; for our service to you was performed at a time when very few Hellenes opposed their courage to the power of Xerxes ; they ivere then held in honor, not who, looking to their own advantage, made terms with the invader ^ and were safe, but Λvho, in the face of danger, dared the better part. Of that number were we, and there was a time when we received the highest honor at your hands, but now we fear that these same principles, which have led us to prefer a just alliance with the Athenians to an interested alliance with you, Λνϋΐ be our destruc- tion. And yet the consistency of men's conduct should be consistently acknoΛvledged. For true expediency is only this — to have an endurins^ sense of latitude to- wards good allies Avhose virtues are recognized by us, while we do not neglect our ow^n immediate interest. " Consider, before you act, that hitherto you have been 57. s^enerally esteemed amono- Hellenes to be a pattern of Remember ^ .^, . ~ ^ your own rep- nobility ; if you decide unjustly (and this judgment can- ^ο^ίί,"^^^ not be hidden, for you, the judges, are famous, and we, Jg^^ent^^^^^^' who are judged by you, are of good repute), mankind 1 Or, reading αύτοΐς, and referring tlie word to the Persians : "who, looking to advantage, forwarded the course of the invader." 206 SPEECH OF THE PLATAEAJi'S. B.C. 427 ; 01. m. by allowing Plataea, Avhose name your fathers inscribed on the Delphian tripod, to be blotted out in order to please the Thebans. 58. Do not bring infamy upon yourselves by slaying sup- pliants. Your ancestors are buried in our land, and we have honored them by year- ly gifts. Will you give them up to their murderers, and enslave will be indignant at the strange and disgraceful sentence which you will have passed against good men (although you may be better yourselves) .^ They Avill not endure to see spoils taken from us, the benefactors of Hellas, dedicated by our enemies in the common temples. Will it not be deemed a monstrous thing that the Lacedae- monians should desolate Plataea ; that they whose fathers inscribed the name of the city on the tripod at Delphi in token of her valor, 2 should for the sake of the Thebans blot out the whole people from the Hellenic world? For to this we have come at last. When the Persians conquered our land, we were all but ruined ; and now, when we plead before you, who were once our dearest friends, the Thebans have prevailed against us. We have had to meet two terrible trials, the danger first of starvation, if we had not given up the city; and secondly, of condemnation to death. The Plataeans, who Avere zealous in the cause of Hellas even beyond their strength, are now friendless, spurned and rejected by all. None of our own allies will help us, and we fear that you, Ο Lacedaemonians, our only hope, are not to be depended upon. " Yet once more for the sake of those Gods in whose name we made a league of old, and for our services to the cause of Hellas, relent and change your minds, if the Thebans have at all influenced you : in return for the wicked request which they make of you, ask of them the righteous boon that you should not slay us to your own dishonor.^ Do not bring upon yourselves an evil name merely to gratify others. For, although you may quickly take our lives, you will not so easily obliterate the infamy of the deed. We are not enemies whom you might justly punish, but friends who were compelled to go to war with you ; and therefore piety 1 Cp. iii. 53 fin. 2 Cp. i. 132 init. 3 Or, '' ask of them the boon that you should not kill those whom you ought not, and receive an honest gratitude from us, instead of a disgraceful gratitude from them." country in SPEECH OF THE PLATAEANS. 207 B.C. 427; 01.88,2. demands that you should spare our lives. Before you III. pass judgment, consider that we surrendered ourselves, ^yi^ichthe and stretched out our hands to you ; the custom of genl^was Hellas does not allow the suppliant to be put to death. ^^'^^^ Remember too that we have ever been your benefactors. Cast your eyes upon the sepulchres of your fathers slain by the Persians and buried in our land, whom we have honored by a yearly public ofiering of garments, and other customary gifts. We were their friends, and we gave them the first fruits in their season of that friendly land in which they rest; we were their allies too, Avho in times past had fought at their side ; and if you now pass an unjust sentence, will not your conduct strangely contrast with ours ? Reflect : Λvhen Pausanias buried them here, he thought that he Λvas laying them among friends and in friendly earth. But if you put us to death, and make Plataea one with Thebes, are you not robbing your fathers and kindred of the honor Avhich they enjoy, and leaving them in a hostile land in- habited by their murderers? !N^ay more, you enslave the land in which the Hellenes won their liberty ; you bring desolation upon the temples in Λvhich they prayed when they conquered the Persians ; and you take aAvay the sacrifices which our fathers instituted from the city ΛνΜΰΙι ordained and established them. "These things, Ο Lacedaemonians, would not be for 59. your honor. They would be an ofience as^ainst the^^t^*fP* •^ 'J ^ <^ you by the common feelino• of Hellas and ao^ainst your ancestors, common ~ ο ./ gods or You should be ashamed to put us to death, who are your ^f^^^{^ benefactors and have never done you* any wrong, in o?th«^^not order that you may gratify the enmity of another, we dKo?* Spare us, and let your heart be softened towards us ; be ξο7ιΓ"^^^ Λνίββ, and have mercy upon us, considering not only ^ve wouiV how terrible Λνϋΐ be our fate, but \vho the sufferers are ; Sedlif^^^® think too of the uncertainty of fortune, which may strike yiu'wiiiot any one however innocent. AVe implore you, as is be- put us back coming and natural in our hour of need, by the Gods ^ °^ ^^*^' whom the Hellenes worship at common altars, to listen 208 SPEECH OF THE PLATAEANS. B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. III. to our prayers. We appeal to the oaths which your and let us fathers swore, and entreat you not to foro^et them. We meet our ' ./ σ fate. kneel at your fathers' tombs, and we call upon the dead not to let us be betrayed into the hands of the Thebans, their dearest friends to their bitterest enemies. We remind you of the day on Avhich we shared in their glorious deeds — we who on this day are in danger of meeting a fearful doom. And noAv we say no more ; to men in our case, though we must, there is nothing harder than to make an end ; for \vith the end comes the decisive hour. Our last word is that we did not surrender Plataea to the Thebans, — far rather would we have perished from hunger, the most miserable of deaths, — but to you, in whom we trusted, and, if you will not listen to us, you ought at least to replace us in the same position, and allow us to choose our destiny, whatever it may be. We adjure you not to deliver us, the Plataeans, who ivere so loyal to the cause of Hellas, and who are now suppliants to you, Ο Lacedaemonians, out of your own hands and your own good faith, into the hands of the Thebans, our worst enemies. Be our saviours. You are liberating the other Hellenes ; do not destroy us." 60. Such were the words of the Plataeans ; ivhereupon aisooKn^^ the Thcbaus, fearing that the Lacedaemonians might speak.^^ gi^^ Way, camc forward and said that since, against their judgment, the Plataeans had been allowed, instead of answering the question, to make a long defence, they too wished to speak. Permission was granted and they spoke as follows : — 61 . " We should iiever have asked to speak, if the Plataeans We should j^ij briefly answered the question which \vas put to not have ^ ~l ι tE?pil-^ them,i and had not turned upon us and arraigned us taeans had while they made a long and irrelevant defence of their Sult^hear ^^^'^ doiiigs, excusiiig themselves from charges which aiwSr nobody brought against them, and praising what nobody Tilers? blamed. AVe must answer their accusations of us, and parated j^^j. ^ little closely into their glorification of themselves, ^ Cp. i. 37 init. REPLY OF THE THEBANS. 209 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. that neither our baseness nor their superior reputation III. may benefit them, and that, before you judge, you may f^o^^thjfjf hear the truth both about us and them. Our quarrel and wen?" with them arose thus : — Some time after our first occu- AtixeSa*^! pation of Boeotia^ we settled Plataea and other places, out of which Λνβ drove a mixed multitude. But they refused to acknowledge our leadership according to the original agreement, and, separating themselves from the other Boeotians, deserted the traditions of their ancestors. When force was applied to them they ivent over to the Athenians, and, assisted by them, did us a great deal of mischief; and we retaliated. " They say that when the Barbarian invaded Hellas 62. they were the only Boeotians who did not join the ^β3ά?άΛί?ίϊ Persian ; and this is their great glory, and our great re- fn^tfe^^vli^of proach. But we say that if they did not side with the το whSwe Persians, it Λvas only because the Athenians did not ; wJjJnot oi? and on the same principle, they alone of all the Boeotians aSd thaf ^^^' afterward sided with the Athenians when the liberties fought^^"^^ of Hellas were attacked by them. But, consider hoAV Sie'iSitfon different were the circumstances in Avhich we and they are^nmv^oghi acted. In those days our state was not governed by an ^^^ for it. oligarchy which granted equal justice to all, nor yet by a democracy ; the power was in the hands of a small cabal, than which nothing is more opposed to law or to true political order, or more nearly resembles a tyranny. The rulers of the state, hoping to strengthen their private interest if the Persian ΛΥοη, kept the people down and brought him in. The city at large, Λvhen she acted thus, was not her own mistress ; and she cannot be fairly blamed for an error which she committed when she had no constitution. After the Persian departed, and she obtained a constitution, you may see how we fought against the Athenians when they became aggressive and endeavored to subjugate us as well as the rest of Hellas. Owing to our divisions they actually conquered the greater part of the country ; but Ave defeated them at 1 Cp. i. 12. 14 210 REPLY OF THE THEBANS. B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. in. 63. But they of tlieir o\vn free-will abetted the Atlienians in tlieir ag- gressions upon Hellas. Tliey plead obligation, but no obli- gation can justify a crime. 64. ■^Tien they resisted the Persian it Avas only be- cause the Coronea, and liberated Boeotia ;^ and at this moment Λνβ are zealously co-operating in the liberation of Hellas, providing caΛ^alry and munitions of war more largely than any of the allies. Thus much in answer to the charge respecting our Persian tendencies. " And now we will proceed to show that you, and not we, have done the greater wrong to Hellas, and are deserving of every sort of punishment. You say that you became allies and citizens of Athens in order that you might be protected against us. If so, you ought to haΛ^e invited their aid only against us, and not to have assisted them in their attacks upon others ; such a course was certainly open to you : even if you were in some degree coerced by the Athenians, you had previously made the alliance with the Lacedaemonians against the *• Persians, to Λvhich you are so fond of appealing. That alliance would at any rate have restrained our hands, and above all would have secured to j^ou freedom of de- liberation. You Λvere your own masters and no longer under compulsion when you made common cause with the Athenians. Your allegation is that they were your benefactors and that you could not honorably betray them ; but how far more dishonorable and Avicked to betray all the Hellenes Avith whom ^-ou had sAvorn alli- ance, than the Athenians only, the one the liberators, the other the enslavers of Hellas ! The return which you made to them is unequal, nay, infamous ; you say that you invited them to assist you because you were wronged, and then you became their accomplices in wronging others. Surely ingratitude is shown in refusing to return an honorable kindness, Avhen it can be done honoralily, not in refusing to return a kindness Avhich, however justly due, cannot be returned without a crime. "You have thus made plain that when you alone among the Boeotians refused to join the Persian cause, this Avas not out of any love for Hellas, but because the Athenians did not ; and that you wanted ^ to act Avith 1 Cp. iv. 92 fin. 2 Or, "and because you wanted," etc. EEPLY OF THE THEBANS. 211 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. B.C. 456 ; 01. 81. them and not with us ; and now you claim the benefit HI. of the virtue which others inspired in you. But this is ^Sd Mm. not reasonable ; having once chosen the Athenians, fight Jow^ghown on their side, and do not at the last moment be saying fn^thlfr true that the old alliance ought to save you. For you have hfve'foSlited abandoned it, and by the violation of it, instead of cSimsipon striving to prevent, have aided in the enslavement of the ^®^^^^• Aeginetans and of other members of the alliance. And youΛvere not, like us, under compulsion, but free, living under your ancient laws. Moreover, you persisted in refusing that last oflfer of peace and neutrality which we made to you before the siege began. ^ Who more thoroughly than you deserve the hatred of the Hellenes ? than you who have only displayed your virtues to their injur}^? You have given proof that the merit which you claim for your former actions does not properly belong to you ! Your true nature and constant desire are now revealed in the light of day ; for you have followed the Athenians in the path of injustice. Thus much we have to say as to our involuntary dealings with the Persians, and your voluntary dealings with the Athenians. " The last offence which you lay to our charge is that 65. we unlawfully assailed your city in time of peace, and at Tiiey say that ♦^ ^ '^ ^ ^ ^ ^ we broke a holy season ; even in that affair we do not think our- "?J^ *^^j.^^ selves more in fault than you. We do not deny that we because we •^ f' were luvited were wrong if of our own mere motion we went to your J^a^nS* city, fought with you, and ravaged your land. But when of ihS?^°*^° certain of the noblest and richest of your citizens, who ci^zeus. wished to Λvithdraw you from a foreign alliance and to bring you back to the national institutions of Boeotia, came and invited us, wherein are we to blame? As you say yourselves, the leaders rather than the followers are the transgressors. 2 But in our opinion, neither we nor they were really guilty. Like yourselves they were citi- zens, and they had a greater stake in the country than you have ; they opened their own gates and received 1 Cp. ii. 72, 73. 2 Cp. iii. 55 fin. had sworn to spare 212 REPLY OF THE THEBANS. B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. in. us into their native city, not as her enemies but as her friends. They desired that the bad among you should not grow worse, and that the good should have their reward. They wanted to reform the principles of your citizens, and not to banish their persons ; they would have brought them back into a natural union with their kindred, that Plataea might be the ally of all and the enemy of none. 66. " And the proof that we acted in no hostile spirit is At^first^they ^ that we did no harm to any one, but made a proclama- joinus, but tion that whoever w^ished to live under the national after awnile S^Liisi^w^ institutions of Boeotia should join us. You came to whoniHhey^ ^^ gladly, and, entering into an Jigreement, for a time offered no opposition; but afterwards, Avhen you dis- covered that we were few, you turned upon us. Even allowing that we did act somewhat inconsiderately in entering your toTvn without the consent of your whole people, still how different was your conduct and ours I For if you had followed our example you Avould have used no violence, but thought only of getting us out by persuasion, whereas you broke the agreement and attacked us. Now we do not so much complain of the fate of those whom you slew in battle — for they indeed suffered by a kind of law — but there were others who stretched out their hands to you; and although you gave them quarter, and then promised to us that you would spare them, in utter defiance of law you took their lives — Avas not that a cruel act? Here are three crimes which you committed within a few hours ; the breach of the agreement, the slaughter of the prisoners which folloΛved, and the lying promise which you made to us that you would not slay them if we did no in- jury to your property in the fields ; and yet you insist that we are the criminals, and that you ought to be acquitted. Not so ; if the Lacedaemonians give just judgment : but for all these offences you shall suffer. 67. ''We have entered into particulars, Lacedaemonians, kiowih?^ both for your sakes and for our own, that you may know EEPLY OF THE THEBAKS. 213 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. the sentence which you are going to pass on them to III. be righteous, and still more righteous the vengeance JE^ piJia? which we have taken. Do not let your hearts be £^^; ^^J^^g softened by tales about their ancient virtues, if they S?y pJteni ever had any ; such virtues might plead for the injured, a^doubif p^- but should bring a double penalty^ on the authors of a pJiynot base deed, because they are false to their own character. iSv^SLis. Let them gain nothing by their pitiful lamentations, or fo?tine"they by appealing to your fathers' tombs and their own themselves. desolate condition. We tell you that a far sadder tiSn to^hem" fate was inflicted by them on our murdered j^outh, of ^^^"^' whose fathers some fell at Coronea in the act of bring- ing Boeotia to join you, while others are left in their old age by their solitary hearths, and entreat you, with far better reason, to punish the Plataeans. Men who suffer an umvorthy fate are indeed to be pitied, but there should be joy over those vv^ho suffer justly, as these do. For their present desolation they may thank themselves : they might have chosen the Λvorthier alliance, but they wilfully renounced it. We never injured them until they first sinned against us ; the spirit of hatred and not of justice possessed them, and even now they are not punished half enough. For they are going to suffer by a lawful sentence, not, as they pretend, stretching out their suppliant hands on the field of battle, but delivering themselves up to justice under the terms of a capitulation. Maintain then, Lacedaemonians, the common Hellenic law which they have outraged, and give to us, ivho have suffered contrary to law, the just recompense of our zeal in your cause. Do not be moved by their words to spurn and reject us,^ but show Hellas by example that, when a cause is tried at your tribunal, deeds and not words will prevail. If the deeds be good, a brief statement of them is enough ; if they be evil, speeches full of 'fine sentiments do but veil them. If all persons in authority were like you, and would sum up a case in a short question, and pass 1 Cp. i. 86 init. Cp. iii. 57 fin. 214 ΓΑΤΕ OF THE PLATAEAis^S. B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. ΠΙ. sentence upon all the offenders at once, men would be less tempted to seek out fair words in order to excuse foul deeds." 68, Thus spake the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges ThePiatae- thouo'ht that uo obiectiou could be made to their ques- ans are put to ~ «^ ^ thei?cft^*^ tion, whether the Plataeans had done them any service gr?^d^ *^^ in the war. For they pretended to have expected neutrality from them in the times before the war, on the strength of the original treaty concluded with Pausanias after the defeat of the Persians. And just before the siege they had made to them a proposal ^ of neutrality in accordance with the terms of the same treaty ; but the Plataeans had refused. Considering that they had been wronged by them, and that they w^ere now released from the obligations of the treaty by the failure of their just intentions, they again brought up the Plataeans one after another, and asked each of them separately, Whether he had done any service to the Lacedae- monians and their allies in the Avar? When he said Xo, they took him away and slew him ; no one was spared. They put to death not less than two hundred Plataeans, as well as twenty-five Athenians who had shared with them in the siege ; and made slaves of the women. For about a year the Thebans gave possession of the city to certain Megarians, who had been driven out by a re volution, ^ and to any surviving Plataeans who were of their own party ; but they afterwards razed the whole place to the very foundations, and built near the precinct of Here an inn forming a square of two hundred feet ; it had Uyo stories, and chambers all round. They used the roofs and the doors of the Pla- taeans ; and of the brass and iron articles of furniture found within the walls they made couches, Avhich the}^ ^ Or, taking τ^ξίουν in a different sense, and repeating it before καΐ οτε ύστεροι^: " For they had been constantly requesting them, as they said, to remain neutral in the times before the war, . . . and they had repeated the request when just before the siege they had made to them a proposal," etc. 2 Cp. iv. 66 init. LACEDAEMONIAN EXPEDITION" TO COKCYKA. 215 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. B.C. 519 ; 01. 65, 2. dedicated to Here ; they also built in her honor a stone ^I, temple a hundred feet long. The Plataean territory they converted into public land, and let it out for terms of ten years ; some of their own citizens occupied it. Throughout the whole affair the severity shoΛvn by the Lacedaemonians to the Plataeans was mainly promoted by a desire to gratify the Thebans, who seemed likely to be useful allies to them in the war then just beginning. Such was the fate of Plataea, which was overthrown ninety-three years after the Plataeans entered into alliance vrith Athens. i The forty Peloponnesian ships which had been sent 69. to the aid of Lesbos, as they fled through the open sea JfcS.^^He pursued by the Athenians,^ Λvere caught in a storm niak?reSdy^ near Crete, and, making their way in a straggling ti cor^yra.^^^ condition from Crete to the Peloponnesus, found at Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot triremes, and Brasidas, the son of Tellis, w^hp had been sent out as a commissioner to advise Alcidas. The Lacedae- monians at home, after the failure of their attempt on Lesbos, had determined to increase their navy and sail to Corcyra, w^hich was in a state of revolution. The Athenian squadron at Naupactus consisted of twelve ships only, and the Lacedaemonians wanted to reach the island before any more vessels could arrive from Athens. Brasidas and Alcidas made their preparations accordingly. Now Corcyra had been in an unsettled state ever 70. since the return of the prisoners who were taken at sea ^[^settied in the Epidamnian war,^ and afterwards released by the Corinthians. They were nominally ransomed for a sum i51e^p^iYsm°ers of eight hundred talents^ on the security of their J^Jj^Jj^ffVom proxeni, but in reality they had been induced to try <^^^"^*^• and gain over Corcyra to the Corinthian interest. They went from one citizen to another, and solicited them to revolt from Athens. On the arrival of an Athenian and 1 Cp. Herod, vi. 108. 2 Cp, [[i 33^ 3 Cp. i. 55 med. * £192,000. state of Corcyra, orig- inating in the 216 THE CORCYEAEAN SEDITION. B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. m. Trial of Pei- tliias, the popular lead- er. His acq\iittal. Trial of the oligarchs, and murder of Peithias and of sixty others. 71. Temporary triumph of the oligarchs. also of a Corinthian vessel conveying ambassadors, there was a discussion in the assembly, and the Corcyraeans voted that they would continue allies of Athens accord- ing to their agreement, ^ but would reneΛv their former friendship with the Peloponnesians. A certain Peithias, who voluntarily acted as the proxenus of the Athenians, and was the popular leader, was summoned by the partisans of the Peloponnesians to take his trial, they affirming that he Avanted to bring Corcyra under the yoke of Athens. He was acquitted, and then he in turn summoned their five richest men, declaring that they were in the habit of cutting poles for vines in the sacred precinct of Zeus and Alcinous ; ηοΛν for each pole the penalty was fixed at a stater. ^ They were condemned ; but the fine was so excessive that they Avent and sat as suppliants in the temple of Zeus and Alcinous, begging that they might pay the money by instalments. Peithias, who happened to be a member of the senate as well as the popular leader, persuaded the senators to put the law in execution. The culprits, knowing that the law was against them, and perceiving that Peithias as long as he remained in the senate Avould try to induce the people ^ to make an alliance ofiensive and defensive with Athens, conspired together, and, rushing into the council chamber Avith daggers in their hands, sIcav him and others to the number of sixty, as Avell private persons as senators. A fcAv who Avere of the same party with him took refuge in the Athenian trireme, Avhich had not yet left. The next step taken by the conspirators was to assemble the people and tell them that they had acted for the best, and in order to secure them against the tj^ranny of Athens. For the future they should receive neither Athenians nor Peloponnesians, unless they came peacealily with one ship ; to bring more ^ Cp. i. 44. 2 If the gold stater, about 16s. ; if the silver Athenian stater, about 3s. 3cZ. ; if the silver Corinthian stater (ten Aeginetan obols), about 2s. 2d. 3 Or, "before he ceased to be a senator would persuade the people." THE COECYRAEAN SEDITIOK 217 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. should be deemed the act of an enemy ; and this pro- III. posal they compelled the people to ratify. They also sent envoys to Athens, λ\^ο were to put the most favor- able color on the affair, and to dissuade the refugees Tvho had fled thither from taking any inconvenient step which might lead to a counter-revolution. When the envoys arrived, the Athenians arrested them 72. as disturbers of the peace, and deposited them in Aeo^ina, Envoys from ir ^ i. Ο ' Corcyra are together with any of the refugees whom they had gained \^^^|^®^ ^^g. over. In the meantime, the Corcyraean oligarchs who p^p^J^*^® were now in power, on the arrival of a Corinthian trireme ρ^^*^• and Lacedaemonian envoys, attacked and defeated the people, who at nightfall took refuge in the Acropolis and the higher parts of the city, and there concentrated their forces. They also held the Hyllaic harbor ; the other party seized the Agora, where most of them lived, and the adjacent harbor which looked towards the continent. On the following day they skinnished a little, and 73. both parties sent messeno'ers round the country in- Reinforee- . . . . ^ , . , meiits arrive. vitmg the slaves to jom them, and promismg them liberty ; the greater number came to the aid of the people, while the other faction was reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the mainland. After resting a day they fought again, and the people, 74. who had the adΛ^antao:e in numbers and in the strenolh '^^ a second ^ ^ ~ ~ conflict the of their positions, stained the victorv. Their Avomen p?^p^^ ^^'^ / ' ^«- ^ victorious. joined vigorously in the fray, hurling tiles from the housetops, and showing amid the uproar a fortitude beyond their sex. The conflict was decided towards evening ; the ohgarchy, fearing lest the people should take the arsenal Λvith a sudden rush and so make an end of them, set fire to the private houses which sur- rounded the Agora, as well as to the larger blocks of buildings, sparing neither their own property nor that of any one else in their determination to stop them. Much merchandise was burnt, and the Λvhole city would haΛ^e been destroyed if the wind had earned the flame in 218 THE CORCYRAEAN SEDITION. B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. Arrival of tAvelve Athe- nian ships un- der Nicostra- tus, who vain- ly tries to re- concile the contending parties. m. that direction. Both parties now left oiF fighting, and kept watch in their own positions during the night. When the popular cause triumphed, the Corinthian vessel stole away and most of the auxiliaries crossed over unobserved to the continent. 75. On the following day, Mcostratus the son of Diitre- phes, an Athenian general, arrived from Naupactus Λyith twelve ships and five hundred Messenian hoplites. He tried to efiect a reconciliation between the two parties, and on his suggestion they agreed to bring to trial ten of the most guilty persons, Avho immediately fled. The rest were to live together, and to make a truce with one another, and with Athens an alliance ofiensive and de- fensive. Having accomplished his purpose he was about to sail away, when the leaders of the people induced him to leave five of his own vessels, that the enemy might be less inclined to stir, promising to man five ships of their own and send them with him. He agreed, and they selected the crews of the ships out of the opposite faction. But the men were afraid of being sent to Athens, and sat as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. Mcostratus sought to raise them up and reassure them, but they would not trust him ; where- upon the people armed themseh^es, arguing that their mistrust and unwillingness to sail was a proof of their evil designs. They took their enemies' arms out of their houses, and some of them whom they chanced to meet would have been slain if Nicostratus had not interfered. The rest, to the number of about four hundred, Avhen they saw what Avas going on took refuge anew in the temple of Here. But the people, fearing that they would resort to violence, persuaded them to rise and conveyed them at once to the island that lies in front of the temple of Herd, whither provisions were regularly sent to them. At this stage of the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after the suppliants had been conveyed to the island, the fifty-three Peloponnesian ships from Cyllene, Λvhich 76. Appearance of the Pelo- ponnesian .fleet. THE CORCYRAEAN SEDITION. 219 B.C. 427 ; 01. 88, 2. since the expedition to Ionia had been in harbor III. there, 1 arrived on the scene, still under the command of Alcidas. Brasidas, his adviser, was on board. They anchored for the night at Sybota, a harbor on the mainland, and when the morning broke they sailed upon Corey ra. The whole place was in an uproar ; the people dreaded 77. their enemies within the city no less than the Pelo- Se"oiti!e cm^ ponnesian fleet. They hastened to equip sixty ships, SSanf^^ and as fast as they were manned sent them out against pliopJuii^! the Peloponnesians, although the Athenians entreated ^^^^^• to be allowed to sail out first, leaving them to follow as soon as they had got their fleet together. But when in this straggling fashion their ships approached the enemy, two of them at once deserted; in others the crews were fio^htino^ Λvith one another, and evervthin Cp. iii. 107 init. 2 Cp. i. 55 init. THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY. 245 B.C. 426 ; 01. 88, 3. send a larger fleet to their aid ; for their territory was in III. the power of the Syracusans, and they were kept off the sea by a few ships only ; so they were preparing to resist, and had begun to collect a navy. The Athenians manned forty ships for their relief, partly hoping to finish the war in Sicily the sooner, partly because they wanted to exercise their fleet. They despatched one of the commanders, Pythodorus, with a few ships, intending to send Sophocles the son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, with the larger division of the fleet afterwards. Pythodorus, having now succeeded Laches in the command, sailed at the end of the winter against the Locrian fort Λvhich Laches had previously taken, ^ but he was defeated by the Locrians and retired. In the early spring a stream of fire, not for the first 116. time, issued from Mount Aetna, which is the highest J^JP*i°^ °^ mountain in Sicily, and devastated a portion of the terri- tory of the Catanaeans who dwell on the skirts of Aetna. The last eruption is said to have taken place fifty years before ; and altogether three eruptions are recorded since the Hellenes first settled in Sicily. Such were the events of the winter ; and so ended the sixth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history. 1 Cp. iii. 99. 246 KEVOLT OF THE MESSENIANS. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. BOOK IV. lY. 1. In the following summer, about the thne when the Thesyracu- com comes hito ear, ten Syracusan and ten Locrian sans and ' «^ duc?Messeno ^hips took possessiou of Messeue in Sicily, whither they the Athl-'^'^'^ had gone by the invitation of the inhabitants. And so LSfrikn^^at Mcsscue re volted from the Athenians. The Syracusans £?ade^tiie°^^ took part in this affair chiefly because they saw that Ehe^S.''* Messene Λvas the key to Sicily. They were afraid that the Athenians would one day establish themselves there and come and attack them with a larger force. The Locrians took part because the Rhegians were their enemies, and they wanted to crush them by sea as well as by land. They had already invaded the territory of Ehegium with their whole army, in order to hinder the Rhegians from assisting the Messenians ; they were also partly instigated by certain Rhegian exiles who had taken refuge with them. For the Rhegians had been for a long time torn by revolution, and in their present condition could not resist the Locrians, who for this very reason were the more disposed to attack them. After wasting the country, the Locrians withdrew their land forces ; but the ships remained to protect Messend. Another fleet which the allies were manning was in- tended to lie in the harbor of Messen^, and to carry on the war from thence. 2. During the spring and about the same time, before Fifthinva; the com was in full ear, the Peloponnesians and their sion of Attica. ^ ^ ^ ' ^ allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis the DEMOSTHENES AT PYLOS. 247 B.C. 425; 01.88,4. son of Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king. They lY. encamped and ravaged the country. The Athenians sent to Sicily the forty ships, ^ which TheAtiie- •^ %, mans send Λvere now ready, under the command of Eurymedon and forty addi- *^ ^ tional ships to Sophocles, the third general, Pythodorus, having gone ^io^iJ^gn^g^;,, thither beforehand. Orders were o^iven to them, as the ν companies σ 'J them on a passed Corcyra, to assist the Corcyraeans in the city, ^^JgJoJi^^^'^' who were harassed by the exiles in the mountain. ^ The Peloponnesians had already sent sixty ships to the assistance of the exiles, expecting to make themselves masters of the situation with little difficulty ; for there was a great famine in the city. Demosthenes, since his return from Acarnania, had been in no command, but now at his own request the Athenians allowed him to make use of the fleet about the Peloponnese according to his judgment. When they arrived oflf the coast of Laconia and heard 3. that the Peloponnesian ships Avere already at Corcyra, ^ants^tir^^ Eurymedon and Sophocles wanted to hasten thither, forlffy Pyfos. but Demosthenes desired them first to put in at Pylos JJ^^irgu-^^^ and not to proceed on their voyage until they had done °^^^*^• what he wanted. They objected, but it so happened that a storm came on and drove them into Pylos. Instantly Demosthenes urged them to fortify the place ; this being the project Λvhich he had in view when he accompanied the fleet. ^ He pointed out to them that there was abund- ance of timber and stone ready to their hand, and that the position Avas naturally strong, while both the place itself and the country for a long way round was uninhabited. Pylos is distant about forty-six miles from Sparta, and is situated in the territory Λvhich once belonged to the Messenians ; by the Lacedaemonians it is called Cory- phasium. The other generals argued that there were plenty of desolate promontories on the coast of Pelo- ponnesus which he might occupy if he Avanted to waste the public money. But Demosthenes thought that this 1 Cp. iii. 115 med. 2 ^p, iu. 35 gu, 3 Beading with many good MSS. X^winlevae 248 CONSTKUCTION OF THE FORT. B,C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. ly. The Athe- nians are de- tained by- stress of Aveather. At length the idea is taken np and car- ried out by the common soldiei's. 5. The fort is completed in six days : five ships are left with Demos- thenes, the rest go on to Corcyra. 6. Recall of the Pelo- particular spot had exceptional advantages. There was a harbor ready at hand ; the Messenians, λυΙιο were the ancient inhabitants of the country and spoke the same language ivith the Lacedaemonians, would make de- scents from the fort and do the greatest mischief; and they would be a trusty garrison. As neither generals nor soldiers would listen to him, he at last communicated his idea to the officers of divi- sions ; who would not listen to him either. The weather was still unfit for sailing ; he was therefore compelled to remain doing nothing ; until at length the soldiers, ivho were standing about idle, were themselves seized with a desire to fortify the place forthwith. So they put their hands to the Λvork ; and, being unprovided Avith iron tools, brought stones which they picked out and put them together as they happened to fit ; if they required to use mortar, having no hods, they carried it on their backs, which they bent so as to form a resting-place for it, clasping their hands behind them that it might not fall oif. By every means in their poΛver they hurried on the weaker points, Avanting to finish them before the Lacedaemonians arrived. The position was in most places so strongly fortified by nature as to have no need of a wall. The Lacedaemonians, who were just then celebrating a festival,^ made light of the news, being under the impression that they could easily storm the fort when- ever they chose to attack it, even if the Athenians did not run away of themselves at their approach. They were also delayed by the absence of their army in Attica. In six days the Athenians finished the Λvall on the land side, and in places toivards the sea where it was most required ; they then left Demosthenes with five ships to defend it, and with the rest hastened on their Λvay to Corcyra and Sicily. The Peloponnesian army in Attica, when they heard that Pylos had been occupied, quickly returned home, » Cp. V. 54; V. 82 init. EEASSEMBLma OF THE PELOPONNESIANS. 249 B.C. 425 ; Ol. 88, 4. Ao-is and the Lacedaemonians thinkino^ that this matter IV. touched them very nearly. The invasion had been made From iSa. ' quite early in the year, while the corn Λvas yet green, and they \vere in want of food for their soldiers ; more- over the wet and unseasonable weather had distressed them, so that on many grounds they were inclined to return sooner than they had intended. This was the shortest of all the Peloponnesian invasions ; they only remained fifteen days in Attica. About the same time Simonides, an Athenian general, 7. collectinir a few troops from the Athenian crarrison, and Temporary c5 ^ . . , • 1 1 1 1 capture and a larofer force from their allies m that neio'hborhood, subsequent & ^ loss of a place took Eion in Chalcidice, a colony of Mende, Avhich had called Eion. been hostile to Athens ; the place Λvas betrayed to him. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans quickly came to the rescue, and he was driven out with consider- able loss. On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the 8. Spartans and the Perioeci in the neighborhood of the go to^KiS^^ city 1 went at once to attack Pylos, but the other Lace- tSefr ameT"^ daemonians, having only just returned from an expe- thiJ)|\vSch dition, were slower in arriving. A message Avas sent Jo οοϊ?γι4!^* round the Peloponnesus bidding the allies come without a moment's delay and meet at Pylos ; another message summoned the sixty Peloponnesian ships from Corcyra. These were carried over the Leucadian isthmus,^ and, undiscovered by the Athenian ships, which were by this time at Zacynthus, reached Pylos, Λvhere their land forces had already assembled. While the Peloponnesian fleet was still on its way, Demosthenes succeeded in despatching, unobserved, two vessels to let Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet know of his danger, and to bid them come at once. While the Athenian ships were hastening to the assist- ance of Demosthenes in accordance with his request, the Lacedaemonians prepared to attack the fort both by sea and by land; they thought that there would be 1 Or, " in the neighborhood of Pylos." 2 q^^ {[^ qi i^it. 250 THE SCEI^E OF ACTIOJf. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88. 4. IV. little difficulty in taking a work hastily constructed daeliiSfitns ^^^^ defended by a handful of men. But as they ex- FackufefortT P^cted the speedy arrival of the Athenian fleet they Pyfo^fs^'^'''^^ meant to close the entrances to the harbor, and pre- iSand'sphic-^ vent the Athenians from anchoring there should they ifie ϊαΐβ-'''' fail in taking the fort before their arrival. o?cSpy'"vith The island which is called Sphacteria stretches along inYtw"enty^'^ the land and is quite close to it, making the harbor safe ^®"* and the entrances narrow ; there is only a passage for two ships at one end, which was opposite Pylos and the Athenian fort, while at the other the strait is wide enough to admit eight or nine. The length of the island is about a mile and three-quarters ; it was wooded, and being uninhabited had no roads. The Lacedaemonians Λvere intending to block up the mouths of the harbor by ships placed close together Avith their prows out- Λvards ; meanΛyhile, fearing lest the Athenians should use the island for military operations, they conveyed thither some hoplites, and posted others along the shore of the mainland. Thus both the island and the main- land would be hostile to the Athenians ; and noΛvhere on the mainland Avould there be a possibility of landing. For on the shore of Pylos itself, outside the entrance of the strait, and where the land faced the open sea, there were no harbors, and the Athenians would find no position from which they could assist their countrymen. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, avoiding the risk of an engagement at sea, might take the fort, Λvhich had been occupied in a hurry and Avas not provisioned. Under this impression they conveyed their hoplites over to the island, selecting them by lot out of each division of the army. One de- tachment relieved another ; those who went over last and were taken in the island were four hundred and tΛventy men, besides the Helots Avho attended them ; they Avere under the command of Epitadas the son of Molobrus. 9. Demosthenes, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were m^diby^^ about to attack him both by sea and by land, made Demos- j^'g ^^^^^ preparations. He drew up on shore under DISPOSITION OF THE ATHENIAN" TROOPS. 251 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. the fort the three triremes remaining to him out of IV. the nve Avhich had not gone on to Corcyra, and.pro- ^^^^^f^^^ilf tected them by a stockade ; their crews he armed with ^l^J^l ^^^" shields, but of a poor sort, most of them made of wickerwork. In an uninhabited country there was no possibility of procuring arms, and these were only obtained from a thirty-oared privateer and a light boat belonging to some Messenians who had just ar- rived. Of these Messenians about forty were hoplites, whom Demosthenes used with the others. He placed the greater part both of his heavy and light-armed forces upon the side of the place which looks towards the mainland and was stronger and better fortified ; these he ordered, if they should be attacked, to repel the land forces, while he himself selected out of the whole body of his troops sixty hoplites and a few archers, and marched out of the fort to the seashore at the point where the Lacedaemonians seemed most likely to attempt a landing. The spot which he chose lay towards the open sea, and was rocky and dangerous ; but he thought that the enemy would be attracted thither and would be sure to make a dash at that point because the fortifications were weaker. For the Athe- nians, not expecting to be defeated at sea, had left the wall just there less strong, knowing that if their enemies could once force a landing the place would in any case easily be taken. Accordingly, marching doΛvn to the very edge of the sea, he there posted his hoplites ; he was determined to keep the enemy ofi* if he could, and in this spirit he addressed his men : — "My companions in danger, let none of you now on 10. the eve of battle desire to display his wits by reckonino• Demosthenes L -^ 'J ο advises his up the sum of the perils which surround us ; let him "i^J^kToV^ rather resolve to meet the enemy without much thought, "ie^Vh?'^^ but Avith a lively hope that he will survive them all. In ^ΐίηΙϊβΐΓ cases like these, when there is no choice, reflection is ^^^^^• useless, and the sooner danger comes the better. I am sure that our chances are more than equal if we will 252 SPEECH OF DEMOSTHEXES. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. IV. The place is inaccessible if they keep their ground, bnt if they re- tire, very ac- cessible in- deed. They are on laud, the enemy on water, l^et them stand firm, and keep him oft' the beach. 11. Difficulty of effecting a landing. Brasidas greatly dis- tinguishes himself. only stand firm, and, having so many advantages, do not take fright at the numbers of the enemy and throw them all away. The inaccessibility of the place is one of them ; this, however, will only aid us if we maintain our position ; when we have once retreated, the ground, though difiicult in itself, will be easy enough to the enemy, for there ΛνίΠ be no one to oppose him. And if we turn and press upon him he will be more obstinate than ever ; for his retreat will be next to impossible. On shipboard the Peloponnesians are easily repelled, but once landed they are as o-ood as we are. Of their numbers aoain we need not be so much afraid; for, numerous as they are, fcAV only can fight at a time, ολ\ ing to the difficulty of bring- ing their ships to shore. We are contending against an army superior indeed in numbers, but they are not our equals in other respects ; for they are not on land but on water, and ships require many favorable accidents before they can act with advantage. So that I consider their embarrassments to counterbalance our want of numbers. You are Athenians, who know by experience the diffi- culty of disembarking in the presence of an enemy, and that if a man is not frightened out of his Λvits at the splashing of oars and the threatening look of a ship bearing down upon him, but is determined to hold his ground, no force can move him. It is now your turn to be attacked, and I call on you to stand fast and not to let the enemy touch the beach at all. Thus you will save yourselves and the place." The Athenians, inspirited by the words of Demos- thenes, went down to the shore and formed a line along the water's edge. The Lacedaemonians now began to move, and assaulted the fort with their army by land, and with their fleet, consisting of forty-three ships, by sea. The admiral in command Avas Thrasymelidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spartan ; he made his attack just Avhere Demosthenes expected. The Athenians defended them- selves both by sea and land. The Peloponnesians had divided their fleet into relays of a few ships — the space THE GALLANTEY OF BKASIDAS. 253 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. would not allow of more — and so resting and fighting by IV. turns they made their attack with great spirit, loudlj^ ex- horting one another to force back the enemy and take the fort. Brasidas distinguished himself above all other men in the engagement ; he was captain of a ship, and seeing his fellow-captains and the pilots, even if they could touch anywhere, hesitating and afraid of running their ships on the rocks, he called out to them: "Not to be sparing of timber Avhen the enemy had built a fort in their country ; let them Λvreck their ships and force a landing : " this he said to his own countrymen, and to the allies that " they should not hesitate at such a moment to make a present of their ships to the Lacedaemonians, who had done so much for them ; they must run aground, and somehow or other get to land and take the fort and the men in it." While thus upbraiding the others he compelled his 12. own pilot to run his ship aground, and made for the ^^^*^^|^^ ^^^^ gangway. But in attempting to disembark he was g^ieicL^^ struck by the Athenians, and after receiving many SSraiSYS wounds, he sAvooned away and fell into the fore part *^^ battle. of the ship ; his shield slipped off his arm into the sea, and, being washed ashore, was taken up by the Athenians and used for the trophy which they raised after their victory. The Peloponnesians in the other ships made great efforts to disembark, but were unable on account of the roughness of the ground and the tenacity with which the Athenians held their position. It was a singular turn of fortune which drove the Athe- nians to repel the Lacedaemonians, who were attacking them by sea, from the Lacedaemonian coast, and the Lacedaemonians to fight for a landing on their own soil, now hostile to them, in the face of the Athenians. For in those days it was the great glory of the Lacedae- monians to be an inland people distinguished for their military prowess, and of the Athenians to be a nation of sailors and the first naval power in Hellas. The Peloponnesians, having continued their efforts 13. 254 RETURN OF THE ATHENIAN FLEET. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. IV. during this day and a part of the next, at length S^pIiopoT desisted; on the third day they sent some of their tS^^thei?' ships to Asinέ for timber with which to make engines, l^eiii'a/'^^ hoping by their help to take the part of the fort looking IndpJsJufe towards the harbor where the landing Λvas easier, al- pro^.^* though it was built higher. Meanwhile the Athenian ships arrived from Zacynthus ; they had been increased in number to fifty by the arrival of some guard-ships from Naupactus and of four Chian vessels. Their com- manders saw that both the mainland and the island were full of hoplites, and that the ships were in the harbor and were not coming out : so, not knowing Λvhere to find anchorage, they sailed away for the present to the island of Prote, which was close at hand and uninhabited, and there passed the night. Next day, having made ready for action, they put off to sea, intending, if, as they hoped, the Peloponnesians were willing to come out against them, to give battle in the open ; if not, to sail into the harbor. The Peloponnesians did not come out, and had somehow neglected to close the mouths as they had intended. They showed no sign of moving, but were on shore, manning their ships and preparing to fight, if any one entered the harbor, which was of considerable size. 14. The Athenians, seeing how matters stood, rushed in The Atiie- upou them at both mouths of the harbor. Most of the mans rusn m J^ Siouths of the enemies' ships had by this time got into deep Avater and the enemy ^^^ Were faciug them. These they put to flight and pursued ti^ciosef ^Tbe t^iem as well as they could in such a narroΛV space, ans^SrSl-"^' dainaging many and taking five, one of them with the Ι^^τροΙη^""^ crew. They charged the remaining vessels even after menstauonid ttiey had reached the land, and there were some Λvhich Se cut off"^ they disabled λυΙιΙ^ the crews Avere getting into them and before they put out at all. Others they succeeded in tying to their own ships and began to drag them away empty, the sailors having taken flight. At this sight the Lacedaemonians Avere in an agony, for their friends were being cut off in the island ; they hurried to the rescue, and dashing armed as they were into the sea. BATTLE m THE HARBOE. 255 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. took hold of the ships and pulled them back; that IV. was a time Λvhen everybody thought that the action was at a stand where he himself was not engaged.^ There was a tremendous conflict ; the tΛvo combatants in this battle for the ships interchanging their usual manner of fighting; for the Lacedaemonians in their excitement and desperation did, as one may say, carry on a sea-fight from the land, and the Athenians, who were victorious and eager to push their good-fortune to the utmost, Avaged a land-fight from their ships. At length, after great efforts and much damage inflicted on both sides, they parted. The Lacedaemonians saved their empty ships, with the exception of those which were first taken. Both sides retired to their encampments ; the Athenians then raised a trophy, gave up the dead, and took possession of the wrecks. They lost no time in sailing round the island and establishing a guard over the men who were cut ofi' there. But the Peloponnesians on the mainland, who had now been joined by all their contingents, remained in their position before Pylos. At Sparta, when the news arrived, there was great 15. consternation ; it was resolved that the mao^istrates Consternation ^ at Sparta. should ffo down to the camp and see for themselves ; Finding that ~ ••■ ' nothing can they could then take on the spot any measures which g®^j.^Sns*^^ they thought necessary. Finding on their arrival that aifd Ln?ai?J nothing could be done for their soldiers in the island, aSoipeace and not liking to run the risk of their being starved to death or overcome by force of numbers,'^ they decided that with the consent of the Athenian generals they would suspend hostilities at Pylos, and sending ambas- sadors to ask for peace at Athens, would endeavor to recover their men as soon as possible. The Athenian commanders accepted their proposals, 16. and a truce was made on the following conditions : — SS tlucl " The Lacedaemonians shall deliver into the hands of ^^^ ^*^®" 1 Or, taking κε^ωλνοθαι, with έκαστος: "that was a time when every one felt that he Λvas under a restraint because he was unable to be everywhere and to do everything." 2 Omitting ij after βιασθέί'τας. 256 THE TRUCE. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. IV. the Athenians at Pylos the ships in which they fought, ?^®f^^ii^"L and shall also brins^ thither and deliver over any other ship^oiwar ^^Ψ^ ^^ ^^"^^' which are in Laconia ; and they shall make Sais^who? ^^ assault upon the fort either by sea or land. The liit?'^'^^ Athenians shall permit the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send to those on the island a fixed quantity of kneaded flour, viz. two Attic quarts ^ of barley-meal for each man, and a pint of wine, and also a piece of meat ; for an attendant, half these quantities ; they shall send them into the island under the inspection of the Athenians, and no vessel shall sail in by stealth. The Athenians shall guard the island as before, but not land, and shall not attack the Peloponnesian forces by land or by sea. If either party violate this agreement in any particular, however slight, the truce is to be at an end. The agreement is to last until the Lacedaemonian am- bassadors return from Athens, and the Athenians are to convey them thither and bring them back in a trireme. When they return the truce is to be at an end, and the Athenians are to restore the ships in the same condition in which they received them." Such were the terms of the truce. The ships, which Avere about sixty in number, were given up to the Athenians. The ambassadors went on their way, and arriving at Athens, spoke as follows : — 17. " Men of Athens, the Lacedaemonians have sent us to many^words°^ negotiate for the recovery of our countrymen in the sfoiJ'iequiSis. islaud, lu the hope that you may be induced to grant Jgrearoli'^^'' US tcrms such as will be at once advantageous to you piiSig^ur- and not inglorious to us in our present misfortune. If we thJ'chaiS speak at length this Λνϋΐ be no departure from the custom of our country. On the contrary, it is our manner not to say much where few words Λνϋΐ suffice, but to be more liberal of speech when some weighty communication has to be made and words are the ministers of action.^ * The choenix was about two pints, dry measure ; the cotyle about half a pint. 2 Or, taking λό/ΟΓ? with ^ίίάσκοϊ'τας :" wheii some weighty com- munication has to be made by words, if anything is to be really done." of fortune. SPEECH OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS. 257 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. Do not receive what we say in a hostile spirit, or imagine IV. that we deem you ignorant and are instructing you, but regard us simply as putting you in mind ^ of what you already know to be good policy. For you may turn your present advantage to excellent account, not only keeping what you have won, but gaining honor and glory as Λν^Ι. You will then escape the reverse which is apt to be experienced by men who attain any unusual good fortune ; for, having already succeeded beyond all expectation, they see no reason Λvhy they should set any limit to their hopes and desires. Whereas they who have oftenest known the extremes of either kind of fortune ought to be most suspicious of prosperity ; and this may naturally be expected to be the lesson which experience has taught both us and you. ^^Look only at the calamity which has just overtaken 18. us, who formerly enjoyed the greatest prestige of any Jo^^fj.™ig5 Hellenic state, but are now come hither to ask of you ^o*^f/*i^oJ^ ^f the boon which at one time we should have thought our- gi°^^tJatVu selves better able to confer. You cannot attribute our ^^^^^^^^^^^^^*^ mishap to any want of power ; nor to the pride which an increase of power fosters. We Λvere neither stronger nor weaker than before, but we erred in judgment, and to such errors all men are liable. Therefore you should not suppose that, because your city and your empire are powerful at this moment, you will always have fortune on your side. The wise insure their ΟΛνη safety by not making too sure of their gains, and when disasters come, they can tell better where they are ; they know that war will go on its way ivhithersoever chance may lead, and will not be bound by the rules which he who begins to meddle Λvith would fain prescribe. They of all men will be least likely to meet with reverses, because they are not pujffed up with military success,- and they will be most inclined to end the struggle in the hour of victory. It will be for your honor, Athenians, to act thus towards us. And then the victories which you have 1 Cp. iv. 95 init. ; iv. 126 init. ; v. 69 fin. 258 SPEECH OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. ly. gained already cannot be attributed to mere luck ; as they certainly will be if, rejecting our prayer, you should hereafter encounter disasters, a thing which is not un- likely to happen. But you may if you will leave to posterity a reputation for power and wisdom which no dano'er can eifect. 19. "The Lacedaemonians invite you to make terms with S'^^^'J^*^y°^them and to finish the war. They offer peace and al- emnfties^?e^* liauce and a general friendly and happy relation, and cneVwifen" ^^^^Y ^^^^ ^" Tctum their countrymen who are cut off Snmwsmid ii^ tlie island. They think it better that neither city vSslry to^^" should ruu any further risk, you of the escape of the gratitude!^ °^ besicgcd, w^ho may find some means of forcing their way out, we of their being compelled to surrender and passing absolutely into your hands. We think that great enmities are most efiectually reconciled, not Λνΐιβη one party seeks revenge, and, getting a decided superiority, binds his adversary by enforced oaths and makes a treaty with him on unequal terms, but when, having in his power to do all this, he from a generous and equitable feeling overcomes his I'esentment, and by the modera- tion of his terms surprises his adversary, who, having sufiered no violence at his hands, is bound to recompense his generosity not with evil but Λvith good, and who, therefore, from a sense of honor, is more likely to keep his Avord. And mankind are more ready to make such a concession to their neater enemies than to those with whom they have only a slight difierence.^ Agahi, they joyfully give way to those who first giΛ^e way them- selves, although against overbearing power they will risk a conflict even contrary to their own better judgment. 20. " Now, if ever, is the time of reconciliation for us both, Eeconciiia- bcforc Cither has suffered any irremediable calamity, tion is still , . τ i τ • χ• possible; for which iTiust causc, bcsidcs the ordinary antaiionism oi nothing irre- . • τ i parable lias contendinij states, a personal and inveterate hatred, and happened. <.^ ^ i Who began ^yjn deprive you of the advantao:es which we now offer. the war is a l ^ η While the contest is still undecided, Avhile you may 1 Cp. V. 91 init. CLEON THE POPULAR LEADER. 259 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. acquire reputation and our friendship, and while our IV. disaster can be repaired on tolerable terms, and disgrace polnt^but aΛ^erted, let us be reconciled, and choosing peace instead [hicieditS^ of war ourselves, let us give relief and rest to all the Su^e'lnited, Hellenes. The chief credit of the peace will be yours. J^rdiof^^^ Whether we or you drove them into Avar is uncertain ; ^^^^^^• but to give them peace lies with you, and to you they will be grateful. If you decide for peace, you may assure to yourselves the lasting friendship of the Lacedaemo- nians freely offered by them, you on your part em- ploying no force but kindness only. Consider the great advantages which such a friendship will yield. If you and we are at one, you may be certain that the rest of Hellas, Avhich is less powerful than we, will pay to both of us the greatest deference." Thus spoke the Lacedaemonians, thinking that the 21. Athenians, who had formerly been desirous of makino^ The Athe- •^ ~ mans at the terms with them, and had only been prevented by their instigation of 'J i- «/ Cleon insist refusal, 1 Avould now, when peace Avas offered to them, ?"j,JJsP^^^^^^® joyfully agree and would restore their men. But the Athenians reflected that, since they had the Lacedae- monians shut up in the island, it was at any time in their power to make peace, and they wanted more. These feelings were chiefly encouraged by Cleon the son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader of the day who had the greatest influence over the multitude.^ He per- suaded them to reply that the men in the island must first of all give up themselves and their arms and be sent to Athens ; the Lacedaemonians were then to re- store Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia. Now, these places had not been taken in war, but had been sur- rendered under a former treaty ^ in a time of reverse, when the Athenians were more anxious to obtain peace than they now were.^ On these conditions they might recover the men and make a treaty of such duration as both parties should approve. 1 Cp. ii. 59. 2 cp. iii. 56 fin. s Cp. i. 115 init. * Or, " were making and not receiving offers of peace." 260 PEETENDED YIOLATION OF THE TEUCE. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. IV. To this reply the Lacedaemonians said nothing, but 22. only requested that the Athenians Avould appoint com- The proposal missloners to discuss Λvith them the details of the ao-ree- oi tlxe Lace- ο daemouiaiis meut and quietly arrive at an understandino^ about them TO (llbCUSS ^^ ta?nn''priifS ^^ ^^^^y could. This proposal was assailed by Cleon in un- iyeited.^^^^^ measured language : he had always known, he said, that pSied^to^^™' they meant no good, and ηοΛν their designs were unveiled ; ue|otiatioDs. ^^1' ^^^^7 Were unwilling to speak a Λvord before the people, but Avanted to be closeted with a select few ;^ if they had any honesty in them, let them say what they wanted to the whole city. But the Lacedaemo- nians knew that, although they might be ivilling to make concessions under the pressure of their calamities, they could not speak openly before the assembly (for if they spoke and did not succeed, the terms which they offered might injure them in the opinion of their allies) ; they saw, too, that the Athenians Avould not grant w^hat was asked of them on any tolerable conditions. So, after a fruitless negotiation, they returned home. 23. Upon their return the truce at Pylos instantly came TheAtiie- -^o an end, and the Lacedaemonians demanded back mans refuse ' PeiopOTine-^^ their ships according to the agreement. But the Athe- sistin¥ou ^^" ^^^^1^^ accuscd them of making an assault upon the fort, inSlciion^of ^^'^^ ^^ some other petty infractions of the treaty which They btock- senmed hardly Avorth mentioning. Accordingly they re- teria^^^^^" fused to restore them, insisting upon the clause which said that if "in any particular, however slight," the agree- ment were violated, the treaty was to be at an end. The Lacedaemonians remonstrated, and went away protest- ing against the injustice of detaining their ships. Both parties then renewed the war with the utmost vigor. The Athenians had tAVO triremes sailing round Sphac- teria in opposite directions throughout the day, and at night their ivhole fleet was moored about the island, except on the side towards the sea Avhen the wind Avas high. Twenty additional ships had come from Athens to assist in the blockade, so that the entire number was 1 Cp. V. 85. AFFAIRS OF SICILY. 261 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. seventy. The Peloponnesians lay encamped on the IV. mainland and made assaults against the fort, watching for an opportunity which might present itself of rescuing their men. Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans and the allies 24. brought up the fleet which they had been equipping ^ ^he symcu- to Messene, and joining the other fleet, which was keep- tJj'e^'i^f ^"^ ing guard there, carried on the war from thence. They gfumlio^^" were instigated chiefly by the Locrians, who hated the HopeTof the Ehegians, and had already invaded their territory with syracusans. their whole force. They were eager to try their fortune in a naval engagement, for they saw that the Athenians - had only a few ships actually on the spot, the larger portion of the fleet which had been despatched to Sicily being, as they heard, engaged in the siege of Sphac- teria. If they conquered at sea they hoped to blockade Rhegium both by sea and land ; they would easily master the place, and their affairs would then be really gaining strength. Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy, and Messene, of Sicily, are close to one another; and if Rhegium were taken the Athenians Λvould not be able to lie there and command the strait. Now the strait is that portion of sea between Rhegium and Messen^ wdiere Sicily is nearest to the continent ; it is the so- called Charybdis b}^ which Odysseus is said to have passed. The channel Λvas naturally considered danger- ous ; for the strait is narrow, and the sea flowing into it from two great oceans, the Tyrrhenian and Sicilian, is full of currents. In this strait the Syracusans and their allies, wdio had 25. somewhat more than thirty ships, were compelled to partial defeat fio^ht late in the clay for a vessel which Λvas sailinsf santieetby throuo'h. They put out as^ainst sixteen Athenian and «ians and T», . , . τ . Kliegiaiis in eio^ht Rheo^ian ships ; but, bems: defeated by the Athe- the straits of '- ο «/ JVIesseuc. nians, they made a hasty retreat, each ship a§ it best could, to their stations at Messene and near Rhegium ; one ship was lost. Night closed the engagement. After 1 Cp. iv. 1 fin. 262 THE ATHENIANS ANT) THEIK SICILIAN ALLIES. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. TV. this the Locrians quitted the Rhegian territory, and the c?s?oYS' Syracusans and their confederates united their fleet and who^tSe'two anchored at the promontory of Pelorus near Messen^, sMps!^^^^ where their land-forces were also stationed. The Athe- nians and Rhegians, sailing up to them, and seeing that the crews were not there, fell upon the empty vessels, but an iron grapnel Avas thrown out at them, and they in their turn lost a ship, from which the crcAv escaped by sAvim- ming. Then the Syracusans embarked, and, as they were being towed along the shore towards Messene, the Athenians again attacked them. Making a sudden twist outwards they struck the first blow at the Athenians, who lost another ship. Thus, both in the moyement along the coast and in the naval engagement which ensued, the Syracusans proved themselves quite a match for the Athenians, and at length made their way into the harbor at Messen^. Unsuccessful xi^c Athenians, hear mo; that Camarina was beinsr attempts of ο • * i • i theMesseni- ^etraved to the SATacusans by a certain Archias and aus upon ^ ./ ^ Naxos, and of ι^[^ confederates, sailed thither. Meamvhile the Messe- the Leonxmes ' andAthe- niaiis, witli their Avhole power by land and Avith the mans upon ' *- «^ Thfltite- allied fleet, made Avar upon Naxos, a Chalcidian city thne^vftil• which Avas their neighbor. On the first day they forced tht'iontSt. the Xaxians to retire Avithin their Avails and ravaged the country ; on the morroAv they sailed round to the river Acesines, again ravaged the country, and with their land- forces made incursions in the neighborhood of the city. But in the meantime a large body of Sicels came doAA^n over the heights to assist the Naxians against the Messe- nians. Perceiving this they took heart, and shouting to one another that the Leontines and their other Hellenic allies Avere coming to succor them, they sallied out of the city, charged the Messenians, and put them to flight with a loss of more than a thousand men ; the rest Avith difficulty escaped, for the barbarians fell upon them in the roads and destroyed most of them. The allied fleet, putting into Messene, broke up and returned home. Whereupon the Leontines and their allies, in concert Avith THE SITUATION AT PYLOS. 263 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. the Athenians, marched against the ηοΛν^ enfeebled Mes- IV. sene. The Athenian fleet attempted an assault of the harbor Avhile the army attacked the city. But the Messenians and a Locrian garrison under Demoteles, which after their disaster at iiaxos had been left . to protect tiie place, suddenly falling upon them put to flight the main body of the Leontines with great loss ; whereupon the Athenians disembarked, came to their aid, and, falling on the Messenians Λvhile they were still in confusion, chased them back to the city. They then erected a trophy and retired to Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily went on fighting against one another by land ; but the Athenians took no part in their operations. At Pylos meanwhile the Athenians continued to 26. blockade the Lacedaemonians in the island, and the The blockade of Pylos was Peloponnesian army on the mainland remained in their difficult ■•■ "^ OΛVlng(l)to old position. The watch was harassino^ to the Athe- ^^"^ «f food ^ ^ ^ and AYater ; nians, for they were in ivant both of food and water; (2) to the con- there was only one small well, \vhich Λvas inside the fort, ^^^ ^^-'^^^ ™- fined space (3) to the in possibility of and the soldiers were commonly in the habit of scraping shoie^-\^4f to away the shingle on the seashore, and drinking any JaJeTby'th? water which they could get. The Athenian garrison nfan^foithe was crowded into a narrow space, and^their ships having S^suppUes!^ no regular anchorage, the crews took their meals on land by turns ; one half of the army eating while the other lay at anchor in the open sea. The unex- pected length of the siege was a great discouragement to them ; they had hoped to starΛ^e their enemies out in a few days, for they were on a desert island, and had only brackish water to drinii. The secret of this pro- tracted resistance was a proclamation issued by the Lacedaemonians ofiering large fixed prices, and free- dom if he were a Helot, to any one who• %vould convey into the island meal, Λvine, cheese, or any other provision suitable for a besieged place. Many braved the danger, especially the Helots ; they started from all points of Peloponnesus, and before daybreak bore down upon the 264 FEARS OF THE ATHEMANS. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. IV. shore of the island looking towards the open sea. They took especial care to have a strong Λvind in their favor, since they were less likely to be discovered by the triremes when it blew hard from the sea. The l)lockade was then impracticable, and the crews of the boats were perfectly reckless in running them aground ; for a \^alue had been set upon them, and Lacedaemonian hoplites Λvere ivaiting to receive them about the landing- places of the island. All however Avho ventured when the sea Λvas calm were captured. Some, too, dived and sw^am by way of the harbor, drawing after them by a cord skins containing pounded linseed and poppy-seeds mixed Avith hone}^ At first they Λvere not found out, but afterwards watches ivere posted. The two parties had all sorts of devices, the one determined to send in food, the other to detect them. 27. When the Athenians heard that their own ai-my Λvas The situation suiferins:, and that supplies were introduced into the IS reported to ^ -^ ^ , be critical, island, thev beo^an to be anxious and Avere apprehensive Cleon denies ' »/ ο i i. The Athe?" ^^^^ ^^^® blockade might extend into the winter. They nians Avant to reflected that the conveyance of necessaries round the send commis- •^ pyioT Cleon Pelopouuese would then be impracticable. Their troops genSs^Jnd ^^'^^^ ^^^ ^ dcscrt placc, to wliicli, βΛ^βη in summer, they sindj^notcom-'^^'^i'® ^^^^ ^^^^® ^^ ^^^^ ^ Sufficient supply. The coast SitTflS.' ^^'^s w^ithout harbors ; and therefore it would be im- So^tSethe possible to maintain the blockade. Either the w^atch wJie^^nerai. would be relaxed and the men would escape ; or, taking advantage of a storm, they might sail aAvay in the ships Avhich brought them food. Above all, they were afraid that the Lacedaemonians, feeling the strength of their position, would make no more overtures to them,^ and they regretted having rejected their advances. Cleon, knowing that he Λvas an object of general mistrust, because he had stood in the way of peace, challenged the reports of the messengers from Pylos ; ivho re- ^ Or, ** Above all they feared that the Lacedaemonians, who no longer made overtures to them, must now be reassured of the strength of their own position." CLEON AND mciAS. 265 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. joined that, if their words Avere not believed, the Athe- lY. nians should send commissioners of their ΟΛνη. And so Theaaenes and Cleon himself were chosen commis- sioners. As he knew that he could only confirm the report of the messengers Avhom he was calumniating, or would be convicted of falsehood if he contradicted them, observing too that the Athenians Avere disposed to take active measures, he advised them not to send com- missioners, Avhich would only be a loss of valuable time, but, if they were themselves satisfied Avith the report, to send a fleet against the island. Pointedly alluding to Nicias the son of Niceratus, Avho Avas one of the generals and an enemy of his, he declared sarcastically, that, if the generals were good for anything, they might easily sail to the island and take the men, and that this was Avhat he Avould certainly do himself if he were general. Nicias perceived that the multitude were murmuring 28. at Cleon, and askino' " why he did not sail — now was The people - - ^ miirmur at his time! if he thouo-ht the capture of Sphacteria to be i""^• Nicias ^ ^ ^ '■^ resigns m.ms such an easy matter : " and hearino- him attack the i^^^\• .^e at •^ ^ first holds generals, he told him that, as far as they were con- ^ί^ί-'Λ^ί cerned, he mio-ht take an ν force which he required and compelled to ' ο " J- sail. He then try. Cleon at first imagined that the offer οΓ Nicias ^f|^^>;f^^.*J^^f*^ was only a pretence, and was A\dlling to go ; but finding ^vftwn twenty that he was in earnest, he tried to back out, and said i^SniSis^ that not he but Nicias was general. He was i^qav ^^^^^^ ^* ^^^^• alarmed, for he never imno'ined that Nicias Avould £>ό so far as to give up his place to him. Again Nicias bade him take the command of the expedition against Pylos, Avhichhe formally gave up to him in the presence of the assembly. And the more Cleon declined the proffered command and tried to retract what he had said, so much the more the multitude, as their manner is, urged Nicias to resign and shouted to Cleon that he should sail. At length, not kn wing hoAv to escape from his own words, he undertook the expedition, and, coming forward, said thai he was not afraid of the * Readinr•' δ τ*. 266 THE ATHENIANS AND CLEON. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. rV. Lacedaemonians, and that he would sail without with- drawing a single man from the city if he were allowed to have the Lemnian and Imbrian forces now at Athens, the auxiliaries from Aenus,w^ho were targeteers, and four hundred archers from other places. With these and with the troops already at Pylos he gave his Λvord that within twenty days he would either bring the Lace- daemonians alive or kill them on the spot. His vain words moved the Athenians to laughter ; nevertheless the wiser sort of men were pleased Λvhen they reflected that of two good things they could not fail to obtain one — either there would be an end of Cleon, λυΙιΙοΙι they would have greatly preferred, or , if they were disappointed he would put the Lacedaemonians into their hands. 29. When he had concluded the affair in the assembly, Dlmolthenes ^^^^ ^^^^ Athenians had passed the necessary vote, he iea^ue"heai•- '^^^^ choicc of Demostliencs, one of the commanders Sfeady^mldi- ^t Pylos, to bc his collcaguc, and proceeded to sail with tackSpSAhe ^^^^ speed. He selected Demosthenes because he heard disSnis^i- ^^^^ ^^ ^^'^^ already intending to make an attack upon l^SiideiL• ^1^^ island ; for the soldiers, Λvho were suffering much from the discomfort of the place, in w^hich they \vere rather besieged than besiegers,^ Λvere eager to strike a decisive Μολυ. He had been much encouraged by a fire which had taken place in the island. It had previously been nearly covered with wood and was pathless, having never been inhabited ; and he had feared that the nature of the country would give the enemy an advantage. For, however large the force with which he landed, the Lace- daemonians might attack him from some place of am- bush and do him much injury. Their mistakes and the character of their forces would be concealed by the wood ; whereas all the errors made b}' his own army Avould be palpable, and so the enemy, with whom the poAver of attack would rest, might come upon them sud- denly wherever they liked. And i,f they were compelled to go into the wood and there engage, a smaller force 1 Cp. vii. 11 fin. fire THE PLAN OF DEMOSTHENES. 267 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. which knew the ground Avould be more than a match IV. for the larger number Avho Avere unacquamted with it. Their own army, however numerous, would be destroyed ivithout knowing it, for they would not be able to see where they needed one another's assistance. Demosthenes was led to make these reflections from 30. his experience in Aetolia,^ ivhere his defeat had been in ^W^^^j^^ a great measure owing to the forest. Plowever, while the Jjumbeilid^ Athenian soldiers were taking their midday meal, with a J'^l'eiem/. guard posted in advance, at the extremity of the island, being compelled by want of room to land on the edge of the shore at meal-times, some one unintentionally set fire to a portion of the wood ; a Λvind came on, and from this accident, before they knew ivhat was happening, the greater part of it ivas burnt. Demosthenes, who had preΛdously suspected that the Lacedaemonians when they sent in provisions to the besieged had exaggerated their number, saw that the men λνβΥβ more numerous than he had imagined. He saw too^ the increased zeal of the Athenians, Λvho were ηοΛν convinced that the attempt was Avorth making, and the island seemed to him more accessible. So he prepared for the descent and despatched messengers to the allies in the neighbor- hood for additional forces. Cleon sent and announced to Demosthenes his approach, and soon afterwards, bringing Tvith him the army \vhich he had requested, himself arrived at Pjdos. On the meeting of the two generals they first of all sent a herald to the Lacedae- monian force on the mainland, proposing that they should avoid any further risk by ordering the men in the island to surrender with their arms ; they were to be placed under surveillance but well treated until a general peace was concluded. Finding that their proposal was rejected, the Athe- 3L• nians waited for a day, and on the night of the day S^I^Lacedie^^ following put off", taking with them all their heavy- "jj^ti'i^ge^^"^^^^ armed troops, whom they had embarked in a few ships, stations, the Cp. iii. 98. 2 Reading τό τε. 268 THE ATTACK UPON THE ISLAND. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. TV, A little before claAvn they landed on both sides of the Γαργΐί^'ΐΐιΓ' island, toΛvaΓds the sea and towards the harbor, a force Sd.^^*^^ amounting in all to about eight hundred men. They then ran as fast as they could to the first station on the island. Now the disposition of the enemy was as follows : This first station was garrisoned by about thirty hoplites, w^hile the main body under the command of Epitadas w^as posted near the spring in the centre of the island, where the ground was most level. A small force guarded ^ the furthest extremit}^ of the island opposite Pylos, Avhich \vas precipitous towards the sea, and on the land side the strongest point of all, being protected to some extent by an ancient wall made of rough stones, Λvhich the Spartans thought w^ould be of use to them if they Λvere overpowered and compelled to retreat. Such was the disposition of the Lacedaemonian troops. 32. The Athenians rushed upon the first garrison and cut JSnto^iites ^^^^ down, half asleep as they were and just snatching Sof the ^P their arms. They had not seen the enemy land, and iisoliif cut f^^i^cied that their ships were only gone to keep the cus- ?estofthe^ tomary watch for the night. When the dawn appeared, the rest of the army began to disembark. They Λvere the crews of rather more than seventy ships, including Sarfioc- ^^^ ^ut the lowest rank of roAvers, variouslj?- equipped, highei^p^oints Tlicrc Averc also archers to the number of eight hundred, and as many targeteers, besides the Messenian auxiliaries and all who were on duty about Pylos, except the guards, who could not be spared from the Avails of the fortress. Demosthenes divided them into parties of two hundred, more or less, who seized the highest points of the island in order that the enemy, being completely surrounded and distracted by the number of their opponents, might not know whom they should face first, but might be exposed to missiles on every side. For if they attacked those who were in front, they Avould be assailed by those behind ; and if those on the flank, by those posted on the other; and Avhichever way they moved, the light-armed * Heading αυτό το εσχατον, or, αυτό τοϋσχατον» Athenian forces wliicli land later are distributed in of the island. THE LACEDAEMONIANS AT A DISADYAKTAGE. 269 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. troops of the enemy were sure to be in their rear. These lY. were their most embarrassing opponents, because they were armed with bows and javelins and slings and stones, which could be used with eifect at a distance. Even to approach them was impossible, for they conquered in their very flight, and, Avhen an enemy retreated, pressed close at his heels. Such was the plan of the descent which Demosthenes had in his mind, and which he now carried into execution. The main body of the Lacedaemonians on the island 33. under Epitadas, when they saw the first garrison cut to ^n£J7ioJ-' pieces, and an army approaching them, dreΛv up in battle abiltol;^e array. The Athenian hoplites were right in front, and ilgS-lmied the Lacedaemonians adΛ^anced against them, wanting uoops!^^ to come to close quarters ; but, having light-armed ad- versaries both on their flank and rear, they could not get at them or profit by their own military skill, for they were impeded by a shoΛver of missiles from both sides. Mean- while the Athenians, instead of going to meet them, re- mained in position, while the light-armed again and again ran up and attacked the Lacedaemonians, who drove them back where they pressed closest. But though compelled to retreat they still continued fight- ing, being lightly equipped and easily getting the start of their enemies. The ground was diflScult and rough, the island havino- been uninhabited ; and the Lacedae- monians, who were encumbered by their arms, could not pursue them in such a place. For some little time these skirmishes continued. But 34. soon the Lacedaemonians became too weary to rush out Tiieyare 1 . ., IT 1 .11 sorely dis- upon their assailants, Λνΐιο began to be sensible that their tressed. resistance grew feebler. The sight of then' own number, which was many times that of the enemy, encouraged them more than anything ; they soon found that their losses were trifling compared with Λvhat they had ex- pected ; and familiarity made them think their oppo- nents much less formidable than when they first landed, cowed by the fear of facing Lacedaemonians. They now 270 THE COiiFLICT DEEPENS. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. ly . despised them, and Avith a loud cry rushed upon them in a body, hurling at them stones, arrows, javelins, Avhichever came first to hand. The shout Avith which they accom- panied the attack dismayed the Lacedaemonians, Avho were unaccustomed to this kind of Avarfare. Clouds of dust arose from the newly-burnt wood, and there was no possibility of a man's seeing Avhat was before him, owing to the shoAvers of arroAvs and stones hurled by their assail- ants which were fl3ang amid the dust. And ηοΛν the Lace- daemonians began to be sorely distressed, for their felt cuirasses did not protect them against the arrows, and the points of the javelins broke oif where they struck them . Thev were at their Avits' end, not beino^ able to see out of their eyes or to hear the word of command, Avhich was drowned by the cries of the enemy. Destruction Avas staring them in the face, and they had no means or hope of deliverance. 35. At length, finding that so long as they fought in the They retreat same uarrow sDot morc and more of their men were to the fortifa- ■•■ cation at the wouudcd, thcv closcd their ranks and fell back on the extremity oi ' «^ iVfi^o^^'i last fortification of the island, which Avas not far oft* and and deiend ' ' wiXgfeltlr where their other garrison Avas stationed. Instantly the Suse?hey" ught-amied troops of the Athenians pressed upon them exposed.^^^^ with frcsli Confidence, redoubhng their cries. Those of the Lacedaemonians who were caught by them on the way were killed, but the greater number escaped to the fort and ranged themselves Avith the garrison, resolved to defend the heights whercA^er they Avere assailable. The Athenians followed, but the strength of the position made it impossible to surround and cut them off, and so they attacked them in face and tried to force them back. For a long time, and indeed during the greater part of the day, both armies, although suffering from the battle and thirst and the heat of the sun, held their own ; the one endeavoring to thrust their opponents from the high ground, the other determined not to give way. But the Lacedaemonians now defended themselves with greater ease, because they were not liable to be taken in flank. PARLEY WITH THE ENEMY. 271 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. There was no sign of the end. At length the general TV. of the Messenian contmgent came to Cleon and Demos- 35, thenes, and told them that the army was throΛving aΛγay xiieMesse- its pams, but if they would o'ive him some archers and finds a way τ t 1 Ά • η Ί jii ι•ιι round bv the liiiht-armed troops, and let him nnd a path bv which he rocks and re- ^ . λιτί"• 1 appears sud- miirht o-et round m the rear of the Lacedaemonians, he deniy in tiieii .... rear. thought that he could force his way in. Having obtained his request, he started from a point out of sight of the enemy, and making his way wherever the broken ground afforded a footing, and where the cliff was so steep that no guards had been set, he and his men with great diffi- culty got round unseen and suddenly appeared on the high ground, striking panic into the astonished enemy and redoublino- the courao-e of his ολυιι friends who were watching for his reappearance. The Lacedaemonians were now assailed on both sides, and to compare a smaller thing to a greater, were in the same case Λvith their own countiymen at Thermopylae. For as they perished when the Persians found a Λvay round by the path, so now the besieged garrison were attacked on both sides, and no longer resisted. The disparity of numbers, and the failure of bodily strength arising from Λvant of food, compelled them to fall back, and the Athenians were at length masters of the approaches. Cleon and Demosthenes saw that if the Lacedae- 37. monians 2:ave way one step more they would be de-cieonand •^ '^ ^ 'J Demosthenes stroΛ^ed by the Athenians ; so thev stopped the enofao-e- i^^it^^, ^^^ ^ '^ ..' X JT i? c Lacedaemo- ment and held back their own army, for they wanted, if "ianstosur- •^ ' 'J ' render. possible, to bring them alive to Athens. They were in hopes that when they heard the offer of terms their courage might be broken, and that they might be in- duced by their desperate situation to yield up their arms. Accordingly they proclaimed to them that they might, if they would, surrender at discretion to the Athenians themselves and their arms. Upon hearing the proclamation most of them lowered 38. their shields and waved their hands in token of their The Lace- willingness to yield. A truce was made, and then Cleon on the main- 272 THE LACEDAEMONIANS SUERENDEK. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. land give their consent, and the offer is accepted. The prisoners brought to Athens num- ber ΐΛνο hun- dred and ninety-t^vo, of Avhoui a hun- dred and tAventy are Spartans. 39. Duration of the blockade. Supply of food. and Demosthenes, on the part of the Athenians, and Styphon the son of Pharax, on the part of the Lacedae- monians, held a parley. Epitadas, who was the first in command, had been already slain ; Hippagretas, who was next in succession, lay among the slain for dead; and Styphon had taken the place of the two others, having been appointed, as the law prescribed, in case anything should happen to them. He and his com- panions expressed their Λvish to communicate with the Lacedaemonians on the mainland as to the course which the}^ should pursue. The Athenians alloived none of them to stir, but themselves invited heralds from the shore ; and after two or three communications, the herald who came over last from the body of the army brought back Avord, "The Lacedaemonians bid you act as you think best, but 3^ou are not to dishonor yourselves." Whereupon they consulted together, and then gave up themselves and their arms. During that day and the following night the Athenians kept guard over them ; on the next day they set up a trophy on the island and made preparations to sail, distributing the prisoners among the trierarchs. The Lacedaemonians sent a herald and coiiA^eyed away their own dead. The number of the dead and the prisoners was as follows : — Four hundred and twenty hoplites in all passed over into the island ; of these,two hundred and ninety-two were brought to Athens ali\'e, the remainder had pei'ished. Of the surA^ivors the Spartans numbered about a hundred and twenty. But few Athenians fell, for there was no regular engagement. Eeckoned from the sea-fight to the final battle in the island, the time during which the blockade lasted Avas ten weeks and two days. For about three v/eeks the Lacedaemonians were supplied Avith food while the Spartan ambassadors were gone to solicit peace, but during the rest of this time they li\^ed on what Avas brought in by stealth. A store of corn and other pro- visions was found in the island at the time of the capture ; for Epitadas the general had not served out FULFILMENT OF CLEON'S PROMISE. 273 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. full rations. The Athenians and Peloponnesians now IV. withdrew their armies from Pylos and returned home. And the mad promise of Cleon was fulfilled ; for he did bring back the prisoners within twenty days as he had said. Nothing which happened during the war caused 40. greater amazement in Hellas ; for it was universally o/H?nasat^* imagined that the Lacedaemonians would never give S the La?^-^^ up their arms, either under the pressure of famine or daemonians. in any other extremity, but would fight to the last and die sword in hand. No one would believe that those who surrendered were men of the same quality with those who perished. There is a story of a reply made by a captive taken in the island to one of the Athenian allies Λvho had sneeringly asked, " Where were their brave men — all killed?"! He answered that " The spindle " (meaning the arrow) " would be indeed a valuable weapon if it picked out the brave." He meant to say that the destruction caused by the arrows and stones was in- discriminate. On the arrival of the captives the Athenians resolved 41, to put them in chains until peace was concluded, but The prisoners ^^ ^ . ^^® detained if in the meantime the Lacedaemonians invaded Attica, fo/l^tS^^^ to bring them out and put them to death. They placed ^^^οΐ^ί^' a garrison in Tylos ; and the Messenians of Naupactus, Jfso^^pfios. regarding the place as their native land (for Pylos is moniam^rT situated in the territory ivhich was once Messenia), sent ^efo?^*^^"^ thither some of themselves, being such troops as were best suited for the service, who ravaged Laconia and did great harm, because they spoke the same language with the inhabitants. The Lacedaemonians had never before experienced this irregular and predatory warfare ; and finding the Helots desert, and dreading some serious domestic calamity, they were in great trouble. Although not wishing to expose their condition before the Athe- nians, they sent envoys to them and endeavored to * Literally, *'Were their dead brave?" implying that the living were not. 274 ATHENIAN EXPEDITION TO COKINTH. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. lY. 42. Athenian troops land near Solvgeia. The Corin- thians, -who are warned from Argos, come out to meet them. 43. Obstinate conflict on the hill of Solygeia. The two armies drive one another recover Pylos and the prisoners. But the Athenians only raised their terms, and at last, after they had made many fruitless journeys, dismissed them. Thus ended the affair of Pylos. During the same summer and immediately• afterwards the Athenians attacked the Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand heavy-armed, and cavalry to the number of two hundred conveyed in horse trans- ports. They were accompanied by allies from Miletus, Andros, and Carystus. Nicias the son of Mceratus, and two others, were in command. Very early in the morn- ing they put in between the promontory Chersonesus and the stream Eheitus, to that part of the coast which is overhung by the Solygeian ridge ; there in ancient times Dorian invaders had taken up their position and fought against their Aeolian enemies in Corinth, and to this day there is a village, called Solygeia, on the hill which they occupied. From the beach where the crews landed this village is distant nearly a mile and a half, the city of Corinth about seven miles, and the Isthmus about two miles and a quarter. The Corinthians, having had previous intimation from Argos of the intended invasion, came in good time to the Isthmus, The Avhole popula- tion, with the exception of those who dwell to the north of the Isthmus and five hundred troops who were em- ployed in protecting Ambracia and Leucadia,^ was on the watch to see where the Athenians ivould land. But, having sailed in before daylight, they were not dis- covered : the Corinthians, however, were soon informed by signals of their landing ; and so, leaving half their troops at Cenchreae in case the Athenians should attack Crommyon, they came to the rescue with all speed. Battus, one of the two generals who were present in the engagement, taking a single division of the force, went to Solygeia, intending to protect the village, which was not fortified; Lycophron ivith the remainder of the army attacked the enemy. The Corinthians first Cp. iii. 114 fin. BATTLE OF SOLYGEIA. 275 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. of all assailed the right win^ of the Athenians, which TV. had only just landed in front of the Chersonesus, and Jj^^^^j^^^ ^^^ then engaged with the rest. The conflict was stubborn, and all hand to hand. The Athenians, who were on the right wing, and the Carystians, who were on the extreme right, received the Corinthians, and with some difficulty drove them back. They retired behind a loose stone wall, and the whole place being a steep hillside, threw the stones down from above ; but soon they raised the Paean and again came on. Again the Athenians re- ceived them, and another hand to hand fight ensued, when a division of the Corinthians coming to the aid of their left wing, forced back the right wing of the Athenians and pursued them to the sea ; but the Athe- nians and Carystians in their turn again drove them back from the ships. Meanwhile the rest of the two armies had been fighting steadily. On the right wing of the Corinthians, Λvhere Lycophron was opposed to the Athenian left, the defence was most energetic ; for he and his troops were apprehensive that the Athenians would move on the village of Solygeia. For a long time 44. neither would o:ive way, but at leno^th the Athenians, TiieAthe- ^ , *^ , ^ , ' mans gam a havino: an advantasre in cavalry, with which the Corin- partial vic- O ο ^7 toTj, but, thians were unprovided, drove them back, and theyj^™^^^^* retired to the summit of the ridge, where they grounded [^foi^emlnt their arms and remained inactive, refusing to comedown. iotleSSps. In this defeat of their right wing the Corinthians in- curred the heaviest loss, and Lycophron, their general, was slain. The whole army ivas now forced back upon the high ground, where they remained in position ; they were not pursued far, and made a leisurely retreat. The Athenians seeing that they did not return to the attack, at once erected a trophy and began to spoil the enemies' dead and take up their own. The other half of the Corinthians who were keeping guard at Cenchreae, lest the Athenians should sail against Crommyon, had their view of the battle intercepted by Mount Oneium. But when they saw the dust and knew what was going on, 276 THE ATHEKIANS AT METHON:fe. B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. ly. they instantly came to the rescue. The elder men of Corinth hearing of the defeat likewise hastened to the spot. The united army then advanced against the Athenians, who fancying that a reinforcement had come from the neighboring states of Peloponnesus, quickly retreated to their ships, taking their spoils and their own dead, with the exception of two whom they could not find ; they then embarked and sailed to the neighbor- ing islands. Thence they sent a herald asking for a truce, and recovered the two dead bodies w^hich ivere missing. The Corinthians lost two hundred and twelve men ; the Athenians hardly so many as fifty. 45. On the same day the Athenians sailed from the islands fcenfoAte ^^ Cromuiyon, which is in the territory of Corinth, u^ontiTter- ^^^^^Y fourtceu milcs from the city, and, there anchor- coSSf Af- ^^^o' ^^®y ravaged the country and encamped during the thl ifelghb?r- iiiglit. . On the following day they sailed along the coast c?ommyon ^^ Epldaurus, wlicrc they made a descent, and then Eptdauni? passcd ouward and came to Methon^, which is situated MlSionl b^ a bctwccn Epidaurus and Troezen. They built a ivall agarrisonT^^ across the isthmus, and so cut off the peninsula on which Methon^ stands. Leaving a garrison, they continued for some time to ravage the country of Troezen, Halieis, and Epidaurus. The fleet, when the fortification Λvas completed, returned home. 46. Just about this time Eurymedon and Sophocles, who TheAthe- had started from Pylos on their voyao^e to Sicily with mans on their «^ jo,/ way to Sicily the Athenian fleet, arrived at Corcyra, and in concert stop at Cor- ' ^ ' oif^rchsln ^^^^^ ^^® popular party attacked the Corcyraean oli- ^??endlf oS^ S^^^^"^» who, after the revolution, had crossed over into Sefr fitV^^^ the island and settled in Mount Istone. They became lefttothe Hiastcrs of the country again, and were doing great peopiei^" mischicf.^ The Athenians assaulted and took their fortress ; the garrison, who had fled in a body to a peak of the hill, came to terms, agreeing to give up their auxiliaries and surrender their arms, but stipulating that their own fate should be decided by the Athenian > Cp. iii. 85. THE END OF THE CORCTEAEAK OLIGARCHS. 277 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. people. The garrison themselves were conveyed by the IV. generals to the island of Ptychia and kept there under a promise of safety until they could be sent to Athens ; on condition however that if any of them w^ere caught attempting to escape, they should all lose the benefit of the agreement. Now the leaders of the Corcyraean democracy feared that when the captives arrived at Athens they would not be put to death ; so they devised the fol- lowing trick: -They sent to the island friends of the captives, whom with seeming good-will they instructed to tell them that they had better escape as fast as they could, for the fact Λvas that the Athenian generals were about to hand them over to the Corcyraean democracy ; they would themselves provide a vessel. The friends of the captives persuaded a few of them, 47. and the vessel was provided. The prisoners were taken Tiie captive ■"• ^ ohgarcns are sailino; out ; the truce was at an end, and they were all induced by a & ' ' .; trick to break instantly delivered up to the Corcyraeans. The feeling ^ud are d? which the Athenian generals displayed greatly con- ii^^^^en-^^ *^ tributed to the result ; for, being compelled to proceed gScyraelnsf to Sicily themselves, they were well known to wish that no one else should gain the credit of bringing the prisoners to Athens ; and therefore the agreement was interpreted to the letter, 1 and the contrivers of the trick thouofht that they could execute it with impunity. The Cor- cyraeans took the prisoners and shut them up in a large building ; then leading them out in bands of twenty at a time, they made them pass between two files of armed men ; they Avere bound to one another and struck and pierced by the men on each side, whenever any one saw among them an enemy of his own ; and there ivere men with whips, who accompanied them to the place of exe- cution and quickened tlie steps of those who lingered. In this manner they brought the prisoners out of 48. the building, and slew them to the number of sixty, JSy'^ undiscovered by the rest, who thought that they were i^^assacred. 1 Or, '-and so the pretext turned out to be the exact truth;" or, " and so the pretext seemed to correspond to the facts." 278 mGHT CLOSED UPON" THEIK SUFFERINGS. B.C. 425; 01. rV. taking them away to some other place. But soon they ^rL^^Ssf found out what was happening, for some one told them, want'themto and thcu they Called upou the Athenians, if they wanted otheSlo'^^^ them to die, to take their lives themselves. Out of the ^n^ith'iS-^ building they refused to stir, and threatened that into it, Thiy umi' if they could help, no one should enter. The Corcy- vS^aglto^"" raean populace had not the least intention of forcing ^^^^^' a way in by the door, but they got upon the roof and, making an opening, threw tiles and shot arrows down from above. The prisoners sought to shelter themselves as they best could. Most of them at the same time put an end to their own lives ; some thrust into their throats arrows which Λvere shot at them, others stransrled themselves with cords taken from beds which they found in the place, or with strips which they tore from their own garments. This went on during the greater part of the night, which had closed upon their sufferings, until in one way and another, either by their own hand or by missiles hurled from above, they all perished. At day- break the Corcyraeans flung the dead bodies cross-wise on wagons and carried them out of the city. The women Avho were taken in the fortress on Mount Iston^ were reduced to slavery. Thus the Corcyraeans in the mountain were destroyed by the people, and, at least w^hile the Peloponnesian war lasted, there was an end of the great sedition ; for there was nothing left of the other party worth mentioning. The Athenians then sailed for Sicily, their original destination, and there fought in concert with their allies. 49. At the end of the summer the Athenian forces in Anactorium Kaupactus and some Acarnanians made an expedition IS occupied oy ^ ^ theAcarna- afi^aiust Auactorium, a Corinthian town at the mouth of mans. ο ' the Ambracian Gulf, which was betrayed to them. The Acarnanians expelled the Corinthians, and sent a colony of their own, taken from the whole nation, to occupy the place. So the summer ended. 50. Durinir the ensuins: winter Aristides, the son of Ar- PeSn ^ chippus, ouc of the commanders of the Athenian vessels SEIZTJKE OF ARTAPHERNES. 279 B.C. 425 ; 01. 88, 4. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. which collected tribute from the allies, captured at Eion, IV. upon the Strymon, Artaphernes, a Persian, who was on derjtcSs"^^ his way from the king to Sparta. He was brought to ζ^ |^« Athens, and the Athenians had the despatches which he ^^mti^ins of was carrying and which were written in the Assyrian τϊβ Atlie-^"^^' character translated, and read them ; there were many Sm blck^ matters contained in them, but the chief point was a S «leS• o'^f remonstrance addressed to the Lacedaemonians by the at^ih?ti™of king, who said that he could not understand what they deatiftir' wanted ; for, although many em^oys had come to him, ^JtuSsT no two of them agreed. If they meant to make them- selves intelligible, he desired them to send to him another embassy with the Persian envoy. Shortly afterwards the Athenians sent Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and ivith him an embassy of their own, but they found that Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, had recently died ; ^ for the embassy arrived just at that time. Whereupon they returned home. During the same winter the Chians dismantled their 51. new walls by order of the Athenians, who suspected that The chians, •^ ^ suspected of they meant to rebel, not however without obtainins: from rebellion, ^ , ^ are required the Athenians such pledo-es and assurances as they i? dismantle Σ^ Ό J their walls. could, that no violent change should be made in their condition. So the winter came to an end ; and with it the seventh year in the Peloponnesian War, of which Thucydides wrote the history. Early in the ensuing summer there was a partial eclipse 5 2 . of the sun at the time of the new moon, and within the An eclipse of first ten days of the same month an earthquake. anearth- The main body of the refugees who had escaped from Mitylen^ and the rest of Lesbos had established them- The Lesbian selves on the continent. They hired mercenaries from h?d flttied^S Peloponnesus or collected them on the spot, and took take Ehoe-^ ' Rhoeteium, but on receiving a payment of two thousand A^tJiSlis. Phocaean staters,^ they restored the toΛvn uninjured. They then made an expedition against Antandrus and ^ The value of the Phocaean stater is not precisely kno^n : it was somewhat less than that of the Attic stater (about 16s.). 280 CAPTURE OF CYTHERA. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. rV. took the city , which was betrayed into their hands . They hoped to liberate the other so-called " cities of the coast," which had been formerly in the possession of the Mity- lenaeans andΛYere now held by the Athenians, ^ but their principal object Avas Antandrus itself, Λvhich they in- tended to strengthen and make their headquarters. Mount Ida was near and would furnish timber for ship- building, and by the help of a fleet and in other ways they could easily harass Lesbos which was close at hand, and reduce the Aeolian towns on the continent. Such were their designs. 53. During the same summer the Athenians ivith sixty Itantl^nd η ^^^P^» ^^^^ thousaud hoplitcs, and a few cavalry, taking expedition also Certain Milesian and other allied forces, made against ' Importance ^^^ expedition against Cythera, under the command of of the island, ;^"icias the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes , and Autocles the son of Tolmaeus . Cj'thera is an island which lies close to Laconia off Cape Malea ; it is inhabited by Lacedaemonian Perioeci, and a Spartan officer called the Judge of Cythera was sent thither every year. The Lacedaemonians kept there a garrison of hoplites, which was continually relieved, and took great care of the place. There the merchant vessels coming from Egypt and Libya commonly put in ; the island was a great protection to the Lacedaemonians against depredation by sea, on which element, though secure by land, they were exposed to attack, for the whole of Laconia runs out towards the Sicilian and Cretan seas.^ 54. The Athenian fleet appeared off Cythera, and with a TheAthe- detachment of ten shii)s and tΛvo thousand Milesian mans capture ^ Scandeia. An hoplitCS tOOk Scaudeia, one of the cities on the sea- engagement ■■■ wmcii?he^^^ shore. The rest of their army disembarked on the side aJidefSted ^^ ^^^ islaiid lookiiig towards Malea, and moved on to and the ^]^g lowcr city of the Cytherians, which is also on the sea-coast ; there they found all the inhabitants encamped in force. A battle was fought in which the Cytherians 1 Cp. iii. 50 fin. 2 Cp. Herod, vii. 235. DESPOJiDENCT OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS. 281 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. held their ground for some little time, and then, be- TV. taking themselves to flight, retired to the upper city, latts!^ Tb?^' They at length surrendered to Mcias and his colleagues, rava^^e tSI placing themselves at the disposal of the Athenians, but Laconia. stipulating that their lives should be spared. Nicias had already contrived to enter into communication with some of them, and in consequence the negotiations were speedier, and lighter terms were imposed upon them both at the time and afterwards.^ Else the Athenians would have expelled them, because they were Lacedae- monians and their island was close to Laconia. After the capitulation they took into their own hands Scandeia, the city near the harbor, and secured the island by a garrison. They then sailed away, made descents upon Asine, Helos, and most of the other maritime towns of Laconia, and, encamping wherever they found con- venient, raΛ^aged the country for about seven days. The Lacedaemonians, seeing that the Athenians bad 55. got possession of Cythera, and anticipating similar de- Jae^iiolStns scents on their own shores, nowhere opposed them with ^^i^d^^' their united forces, but distributed a body of hoplites TheyS on in garrisons through the country, Avhere their presence iilsftltlSiln seemed to be needed. They kept strict watch, fearing aid ρ31ϊ^ lest some domestic revolution should break out. Already γβΧβΓ' a great and unexpected blow had fallen upon them at Sphacteria ; Pylos and Cythera were in the hands of the Athenians, and they were beset on every side by an enemy against Λvhose swift attacks precaution was vain. Contrary to their usual custom they raised a force of four hundred cavalry and archers. Never in their his- tory had they shoΛvn so much hesitation in their military movements. They were involved in a war at sea, an element to Avhich they were strange, against a power like the Athenians, in whose eyes to miss an opportunity was to lose a victory. 2 Fortune too was against them, and they were panic-stricken by the many startling reverses which had befallen them within so short a 1 Cp. iv. 57 fin. 2 Cp. i. 70 med. 282 ATHENIAN ATTACK ON THYEEA. B.C. 424; 01.89. lY. 56. The small garrisons stationed in the country- are afraid to move. 57. Athenian attaclc upon Thyrea, where the Aeginetan exiles are set- tled. The Lacedaemo- nian garrisons refuse to enter the to^vn, which is taken, and its inhabit- ants put to death by the Athenians. time. They feared lest some new calamity like that of the island might overtake them ; and therefore they dared not venture on an engagement, but expected all their undertakings to fail; they had never hitherto known misfortune, and now they lost all confidence in their own powers. While the Athenians were ravaging their coasts they hardly ever stirred ; for each garrison at the places where they happened to land considered in their de- pressed state of mind that they were too few to act. One of them, however, which was in the neighborhood of Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, did offer some resistance, and by a sudden rush put to flight the scattered light- armed troops ; but, being encountered by the hoplites, they again retired with the loss of some few men and arms. The Athenians, raising a trophy, sailed away to Cythera. Thence they coasted around to Epidaurus Limera and, after devastating some parts of its territory, to Thyrea, which is situated in the country called Cynuria, on the border of Argolis and Laconia. The Lacedaemonians, who at that time held the town, had settled there the Aeginetan exiles,^ whom they wished to requite for services rendered to them at the time of the earthquake and the Helot revolt, and also because they had always been partisans of theirs, although sub- jects of the Athenians. Before the Athenian ships had actually touched, the Aeginetans quitted a fort on the sea-shore which they were just building and retired to the upper city, where they lived, a distance of rather more than a mile. One of the country garrisons of the Lacedaemonians which was helping to build the fort was entreated by the Aeginetans to enter the walls, but refused, thinking that to be shut up inside them would be too dangerous. So they ascended to the high ground, and then, con- sidering the enemy to be more than a match for them, would not come doAvn. MeauAvhile the Athenians landed. 1 Cp. ii. 27. GENERAL CONGKESS OF SICILIAK STATES. 283 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. marched straight upon Th}T.'ea with their whole army, IV. and took it. They burnt and plundered the city and carried away with them to Athens all the Aeginetans who had not fallen in the battle, and the Lacedaemonian go\"ernor of the place, Tantalus, the son of Patrocles, who had been wounded and taken prisoner. They also had on board a few of the inhabitants of Cythera, whose removal seemed to be required as a measure of pre- caution. These the Athenians determined to deposit in some of the islands ; at the same time they allowed the other Cytherians to live in their ΟΛνη country, paying a tribute of four talents.^ They resolved to kill all the Aeginetans whom they had taken in satisfaction of their long standing hatred, and to put Tantalus in chains along with the captives from Sphacteria. During the same summer the people of Camarina and 58. Gela in Sicily made a truce, in the first instance with a conference *^ . is held at Gela one another only. But after a while all the other between the ^ representa- Sicilian states sent envoys to Gela, where they held a ^^^s of the conference in the hope of effecting a reconciliation, states. Many opinions were expressed on both sides ; and the representatives of the different cities wrangled and put in claims for the redress of their several grievances. At length Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a Syracusan, who had been the chief agent in bringing them toge- ther, ^ stood forward in the assembly and spoke as fol- lows : — "Sicilians, the city to which I belong is not the least 59. in Sicily, nor am I about to speak because Syracuse n^ermocrites suffers more than other cities in the war, but because I ^^J ^^ ™o®^ ' go to Ti'ar ? want to lay before you the poKcy w^hich seems to me best expicT^ giiL fitted to promote the common good of the whole country. Sej^^iuose. You well know, and therefore I shall not rehearse to you Jiiiios?^•^ at length, all the misery of war. Nobody is compelled to go to war by ignorance, and no one who thinks that he will gain anything from it is deterred by fear. The » £960. 2 Or, "whose words chiefly influenced their decision." 284 SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES. B.C. 424 : 01. TV. more than they gain they had better make peace. 60. The interests of the whole country and not of indi- vidual cities only are at stake. For the Athenians are upon us. 61. We gain nothing by war. We only invite the common enemy. The Athe- nians care truth is that the aggressor deems the advantage to be greater than the suftering ; and the side which is attacked would sooner run any risk than suffer the smallest im- mediate loss. But when such feelings on the part of either operate unseasonably, the time for oifering counsels of peace has arrived, and such counsels, if we will only listen to them, will be at this moment invaluable to us. Why did we go to war ? Simply from a consideration of our ow^n individual interests, and Tvith a view to our interests Ave are now trying by means of discussion to ob- tain peace ; and if, after all, we do not before we separate succeed in getting our respective rights, we shall go to war again. But at the same time we should have the sense to see that this conference is not solely concerned Avith our private interests, but with those of thcAvhole country. Sicily is at this moment imperilled by the designs of the Athenians, and we must try, if not too late, to save her. The Athenians are a much more convincing argument of peace than any words of mine can be. They are the greatest power in Hellas ; they came hither with a few ships to spy out our mistakes ; though we are their natural enemies, they assume the honorable name of allies, and under this flimsy pretence turn our enmity to good account. For when we go to ivar and invite their assistance (and they are fond of coming whether they are invited or not) we are taxing ourselves for our own destruction, and at the same time paving the way for the advance of their empire. And at some future day, when they see that we are exhausted, they are sure to come again Avith a large armament, and attempt to bring all Sicily under their yoke.^ '' And yet if w^e must call in allies and involve our- selves in dangers, as men of sense, looking to the interest of our several states, we should set before us the pros- pect of gaining an increase of dominion, not of losing what we already have. We should consider that internal quarrels more than anything else are the ruin of Sicily 1 Cp. iv. 1 med. SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES. 285 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. and her cities ; we Sicilians are fighting against one TV. another at the very time Λvhen we are threatened by a SJjJJan^aid^^^ common enemy. Knowing this, Ave should be reconciled ^^jt ^ί^ίί^^ man to man, city to city, and make an miited effort for the preservation of all Sicily. Let no one say to him- self, " The Dorians among us may be enemies to the Athenians, but the Chalcidians, being lonians, are safe because they are their kinsmen." For the Athenians do not attack us because we are divided into two races, of Λvhich one is their enemy and the other their friend, but because they covet the good things of Sicily which we all share alike. ^ Is not their reception of the Chal- cidian appeal a proof of this?^ They have actually gone out of their way to grant the rights and privileges of their old treaty to those who up to this hour have never aided them as required by the terms of that treaty. The ambition and craft of the Athenians are pardonable enough. I blame not those who wish to rule, but those who are willing to serve. The same human nature which is always ready to domineer over the subservient, bids us defend ourselves against the aggressor. And if, knowing all these things, we continue to take no thought for the future, and have not every one of us made up our minds already that first and foremost we must all deal wisely with the danger Λvhich threatens all, we are grievously in error. " Now a mutual reconciliation would be the speediest Let us make way of deliverance from this danger ; for the Athenians then they wiii do not come direct from their own country, but first mg in sicUy. plant themselves in that of the Sicilians who have invited them. Instead of finishing one war only to begin another, we should then quietly end our diflfer- ences by peace. And those who came at our call and had so good a reason for doing wrong will have a still better reason for going away and doing nothing. " Such is the great advantage which we obtain by 62. sound policy as against the Athenians. And why, if ^^uidwe 1 Cp. vi. 77, 79. 2 Cp. iii. 86. 286 SPEECH OF HEKMOCEATES. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. lY. peace is acknowledged by all to be the greatest of bless- bfesISgs^ o?^ ings , should λ\χ not make peace among ourselves ? What- of leiying on^ ^^^^ good 01* cvil IS the portiou of SLiiy of us, is not peace οΓλυά??^^^ more likely than war to preserve the one and to alleviate the other ? And has not peace honors and glories of her own unattended by the dangers of war ? (But it is un- necessary to dilate on the blessings of peace any more than on the miseries of war.) Consider what I am saying, and instead of despising my words, may every man seek his own safety in them ! And should there be some one here present who was hoping to gain a permanent ad- vantage either by right or by force, let him not take his disappointment to heart. For he knows that many a man before ηοΛν who has sought a righteous revenge, far from obtaining it, has not even escaped himself; and many an one \vho in the consciousness of power has grasped at what was another's, has ended by losing what was his own. The revenge of a wrong is not always successful merely because it is just ; nor is strength most assured of victory when it is most full of hope. The in- scrutable future is the controller of events, and, being the most treacherous of all things, is also the most bene- ficent ; for when there is mutual fear, men think twice before they make aggressions upon one another. 63. "And now, because we know not what this hidden ithenS•^^ future may bring forth, and because the Athenians, who puiish yoil ^^® dangerous enemies , are already at our gates , — having wiiT^lkeyS these two valid reasons for alarm, let us acquiesce in our of you?""'^^ disappointment, deeming that the obstacles to the ful- friends. filmcnt of our individual hopes ^ are really insuperable. Let us send out of the country the enemies who threaten us, and make peace among ourselves, if possible forever ; but if not, for as long as we can, and let our private enmities bide their time. If you take my advice, rest ■ assured that you ivill maintain the freedom of your several cities ; from which you will go forth your own masters, ' Or, reading 'έκαστος τι: "to tlie accomplishment of those things which each of us in whatever degree was hoping to effect." THE SICILIANS AGKEE TO MAKE PEACE. 287 B.C. 424 : 01. 89. and recompense, like true men, the good or evil which is IV. done to you. But if you will not believe me, and we are enslaved by others, the punishment of our enemies will be out of the question. Even supposing we succeed in obtaining vengeance to our hearts' content, we may perhaps become the friends of our greatest enemies, we certainly become the enemies of our real friends. " As I said at first, I am the representative of a great 64. city Avhich is more likely to act on the aggressive than on ^^^^^J^ ^ the defensive ; and yet with the prospect of these dangers l^^^gg/to before me I am willing to come to terms, and not to^^^^l^^f^' injure my enemies in such a way that I shall doubly dfthfnS.*° injure myself. Nor am I so obstinate and foolish as to ^|£1η, imagine that, because I am master of my OAvn will, I can licmans! *^^ control fortune, of whom I am not master ; but I am dis- posed to make reasonable concessions. And I would ask the other Sicilians to do the same of their own accord, and not to ivait until the enemy compels them. There is no disgrace in kinsmen yielding to kinsmen, whether Dorians to Dorians, or Chalcidians to the other lonians. Let us remember, too, that we are all neighbors, in- habitants of one island home, and called by the common name of Sicilians. When we see occasion we will fight among ourselves, and will negotiate and come to terms among ourselves. But we shall always, if we are wise, unite as one man against the invader ; for when a single state sufiers all are imperilled. We will never again introduce allies from abroad, no, nor pretended media- tors. This policy will immediately secure to Sicily two great blessings ; she will get rid of the Athenians, and of civil war. And for the future we shall keep the island free and our o^vn, and none will be tempted to attack us." Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians 65. took his advice and as^reed amono^ themselves to make Terms of the treatrv " uti peace, on the understanding that they should all retain possidetis." what they had ; onlv Moro^antine was handed over to the «ians are (iisScitisfieii Camarinaeans, who were to pay in return a fixed sum to with their the Syracusans. The cities in alliance with Athens sent 288 UNDUE ELATION OF THE ATHENIANS. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. ly. generals, and believe that they might have con- quered Sicily if they had not been bribed. 66, The citizens of Megara, thinking it better to have one enemy than two, pro- pose to re- store the exiles. The popular lead- ers in alarm enter into negotiation with the Athenians. for the Athenian generals and told them that a treaty was about to be made in which they might join if they pleased. They assented ; the treaty was concluded ; and so the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily. When the generals returned, the Athenians punished two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, ivith exile, and im- posed a fine on the third, Eurymedon, believing that they might have conquered Sicily but had been bribed to go away. For in their present prosperity they were indignant at the idea of a reverse ; they expected to accomplish everything, possible or impossible, with any force, great or small. The truth ivas that they were elated by the unexpected success of most of their enter- prises, which inspired them with the liveliest hope. During the same summer the citizens of Megara were hard pressed by the Athenians, Λνΐιο twice every year in- vaded the country with their whole army, ^ as well as by their own exiles in Pagae, who had been driven out by the people in a revolution, ^ and Λvere continually harassing and plundering them. So they conferred together upon the advisability of recalling the exiles, lest they should expose the city to destruction from the attacks of two enemies at once. The friends of the exiles became aware of the movement and ventured to urge the measure more openly than hitherto. But the popular leaders, knowing that their partisans were in great extremity and could not be trusted to hold out in support of them much longer, took alarm and entered into negotiation with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates the son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes. They thought that they Avould incur less danger by surrendering the city to them than by the restoration of the exiles whom they had themselves expelled. So they agreed that the Athenians should in the first place seize their Long Walls, ^ which were a little less than a mile in length, and extended from the city to their harbor Nisaea. They wanted to prevent the Peloponnesians interfering from Msaea, of 1 Cp. ii. 31 2 Cp, iii. es med. » Cp. i. 103 fin. LONG WALLS OF MEGARA TAKEN. 289 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. which they formed the sole garrison, being stationed IV. there to secure Megara. The conspirators were then to try and place in the hands of the Athenians the upper city, which would be more ready to come over when they once had possession of the Long Walls. Both parties had now made all necessary preparations, 67. both in Λvord and act. The Athenians sailed at nightfidl gjl Α?ϊΐ2?α? to Minoa, the island in front of Megara, with six hundred Segaia^'^TUe hoplites under the command of Hippocrates. They then ipen^dTo took up their position not far from the Long Walls, in a MlSian^^^^ trench out of which the bricks for the walls had been and tiily^*^^' dug. A second division of the Athenian army, con- Long waus. sisting of light-armed Plataeans and of a part of the force employed in guarding the frontier, under the com- mand of Demosthenes the other general, lay in ambush at the temple of Ares, which is nearer still. During the night no one knew Avhat they were about, except the men who were immediately concerned. Just before daybreak the conspirators executed their plan. They had long ago provided that the gates should be open Avhen required ; for by the permission of the commander, who supposed them to be privateering, they had been in the habit of conveying a scuUing-boat out of the town by night. This they placed upon a Avagon, and carried it down to the sea through the trench ; they then sailed out, and just before day broke, the boat was brought back by them on the wagon and taken in at the gates ; their object being, as they pretended, to baffle the Athenian watch at Minoa, since the vessel would never appear in the harbor at all. The wagon had just arrived at the gates, ivhich were opened for the boat to enter, when the Athenians, with whom the whole afiair had been preconcerted, seeing this movement, rushed out of the ambuscade, wanting to get in before the gates were shut again and while the wagon Avas still in them, and prevented them from being closed. At the same instant their Megarian confederates cut down the guards stationed at the gates. First of all the Plataeans and the frontier guard under Demosthenes Nisaea. The plot is de- tected by the oligarchical party in time 290 MEGARA STILL HOLDS OUT, B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. lY. rushed in where the trophy now stands. No sooner were they within the gates than the Peloponnesians who were nearest and saw what was going on hastened to the rescue ; but they were overpowered by the Plataeans, who secured the gates for the entrance of the Athenian hoplites as they came running up. 68. Then the Athenians entered, and one after another ThePeiopon- procccded to mount the wall. A few Peloponnesian nesians, sup- -^ ^ •'- posiug the p'uards at first resisted and some of them Avere killed : Megariaus to ^ have gone ^ut the OTcatcr part took to flifi^ht ; they were terrified over to the ox η ^ J NiS ^The ^^ ^^® night attack of the enemy, and fancied, when they saw the Megarians who were in the conspiracy fighting against them, that all the Megarians had betrayed them. gariltseif." ^^ ^^^ occurrcd at the same time to the Athenian herald, without orders, to make proclamation that any Megarian who pleased might join the ranks of the Athenians. When the Lacedaemonians heard the proclamation none of them remained any longer, but thinking that the Athenians and Megarians had reallj^ combined against them they fled into Msaea. When the mornino• dawned and the Lons^ Walls were already captured, MegaraAvas in a tumult, and those who had ne£:otiated with the Athenians and a laro^e number of others who were in the plot insisted upon opening the gates and going out to battle. Now they had agreed that the Athenians should immediately rush in ; and they were themselves to be anointed Avith oil ; this was the mark by which they were to be distinguished, that they might be spared in the attack. There was the less danger in opening the gates, since there had now arrived four thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred horse, who by a previous arrangement had come from Eleusis during the night. When they were anointed and had collected about the gates some one in the secret acquainted the other party, ivho instantly came upon them in a compact body and declared that there should be no going out ; even Avhen they were stronger than at present they had not ventured to take the field ; the danger to the city BUT yiSAEA SUEEENDERS. 291 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. was too palpable ; if any one opposed them the battle IV. would have to be fought first within the walls. They did not betray their knoAvledge of the plot, but assumed the confident tone of men who were recommending the best course. At the same time they kept watch about the gates ; and thus the conspiracy was foiled. The Athenian generals became aware that some diffi- 69. culty had arisen, and that they could not carry the city by The Athe- •^ ' *^ J ^ J J nians cut oif storm. So they immediately set about the circumvalla- Nisaeaby a «^ *^ cross wall. tion of Nisaea, thinldno• that, if they could take it before The town- any assistance arrived, Megara itself would be more likely gfa'J.Htfon to capitulate. Iron and other things needful, as well as capitulates. masons, were quickly procured from Athens. Beginning from the wall which they already held they mtercepted the approach from Megara by a cross wall, and from that drew another on either side of Nisaea down to the sea. The army divided among them the execution of the trench and walls, obtaining stones and bricks from the suburbs of the toAvn. They also cut down timber and fruit-trees and made palisades where they were needed. The houses in the suburbs were of themselves a sufficient fortification, and only required battlements. All that day they continued working ; on the following day, towards evening, the wall was nearly finished, and the terrified inhabitants of Msaea having no food (for they depended for their daily supplies on the upper city) , and imagining that Megara had gone over to the enemy, despairing too of any aid soon arriving from Peloponnesus, capitulated to the Athenians. The conditions were as follows : — They. Λvere to go free, every man paying a fixed ransom and giving up his arms ; but the Athenians might deal as they pleased with the Lacedaemonian commander and any Lacedaemonian that was in the place. Upon these terms they came out, and the Athenians, having severed the communication of Megara with the Long Walls, took possession of Nisaea and prepared for further action. It so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, the Lace- 70. 292 ENERGY OF BRASIDAS. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. TV. daemonian, who was equipping an expedition intended SftioOp?" ^^^ Chalcidic^, was in the neighborhood of Sicyon and Se So'tilns Corinth at the time. Hearing of the capture of the for an army. ^^^^^ Walls, and fearing for the safety of the Pelopon- nesians in Nisaea, and of Megara itself, he sent to the Boeotians, desiring them to bring an army and meet him with all speed at Tripodiscus. The place so called is a village of Megara situated under ]Mount Geraneia. Thither he also came himself, bringing two thousand seven hundred Corinthian, four hundred Phliasian, and six hundred Sicyonian hoplites, as Avell as the followers whom he had previously collected. ^ He had hoped to find Nisaea still untaken ; but the news of the capture reached him at Tripodiscus, where he did not arrive until night. He immediately took with him a body of three hundred chosen men, and before his arrival in the country was reported reached Megara, undiscovered by the Athenians, who were near the sea. He professed that he wanted, and he really meant if he could, to attempt the recovery of Nisaea ; but the great point was to get into Megara and make that safe. So he demanded admission and held out hopes of regaining Nisaea. 71. The two factions in Megara were both equally afraid to SftS Megara, I'^ceivc him — the one lest he should introduce the exiles SSion^i^ts and drive them out, the other lest the people, fearing this SceTve^Sm!^ Very thing, should set upon them and ruin the city, which would then be distracted by civil war and at the same time beset by the Athenians. And so both parties determined to wait and see what would happen. For they both ex- pected a battle to ensue between the Athenians and the army which had come to the relief of the city, and when the victory was won the party whose friends had con- quered could more safely join them. Brasidas, thus failing hi his purpose, returned to the main body of his troops. 72. At dawn of day the Boeotians appeared. Even before tians^ani^e. ^^^^ ^'^^'^ summoucd by Brasidas they had intended to 1 Cp. iv. 80 fin. NEITHEK SIDE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE. 293 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. relieve Megara ; for the danger came home to them ; and IV. their whole force was already collected at Plataea. When actfeToF his messenger arrived they were more resolved than ever, SenS^""^ and sent forward two thousand two hmidred heavy-armed cavalry, and six hundred horse, allowing the greater number to return. The entire army of Brasidas now amounted to six thousand hoplites. The Athenian hoplites were drawn up near Msaea and the sea, their light-armed troops ivere scattered over the plain, when the Boeotian cavalry came riding up, fell upon the light-armed, and drove them to the shore. The attack was unexpected, for in no former invasion had aid come to the Megarians from any quarter. The Athenian cavalry now rode for- ward and there was a long engagement, in which both parties claim to have won a victory. The Athenians drove the general of the Boeotian cavalry and a few other horsemen up to the walls of Msaea, and there slew them and took their arms. As they retained pos- session of the dead bodies, and only restored them under a flag of truce, they raised a trophy. Still in respect of the Λvhole engagement neither side when they parted had a decided advantage. The Boeotians retired to their main body, and the Athenians to Nisaea. Brasidas and his army then moved nearer to the sea 73. and to the town of Megara, and there, taking up a con- ThePeiopon- T , ,,. -, ' η 1 nesians, liav- vement position and marshallmo: their forces, they re- ing shown τ . , . ΓΤΛ1 'ν' that they are mamed without movms:. They were expectmo: the leady to en- ^ '^ X ο gage, do not Athenians to attack them, and knew that the Meo-a- «are to risk a ^ battle. The nans were waitino^ to see who ΛνουΜ be the conquerors. Athenians are ^ J- even more un- They were very λυ^Ι satisfied, for two reasons. In the i^^i"sto •^ «^ ' fight than the first place they were not the assailants, and had not o-one Peiopoii\\e- -»■ «^ ' & sians. The out of their way to risk a battle, although they had clearly BrTidaVif* shown that they were ready to engage ; and so they might M^gaiSby tiS fairly claim a victory Λvithout fighting. Again, the result paff^''^''''^ in regard to Megara was good : for if they had not put in an appearance they would have had no chance at all, but would have been as good as beaten, and beyond a doubt would immediately have lost the city. Whereas 294 REYOLUTION IN MEGAEA. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. rV. now the Athenians themselves might be unwilling to fight ; and, if so, they would gain their object without striking a blow. And this turned out to be the fact ; for the Megarians did in the end receive Brasidas. At first the Athenians came out and drew up near the Long Walls, but not being attacked they likewise remained inactive. The generals on their side were restrained by similar reflections. They had gained the greater part of what they wanted ; they Avould be ofiering battle against a superior force ; and their own danger would be out of proportion to that of the enemy. They might be victorious and take Megara, but if they failed the loss would fall on the flower of their infantry. Whereas the Peloponnesians were naturally more willing to encounter a risk which would be divided among the several contingents making up the army now in the field ; and each of these was but a part of their w^hole force, present and absent. Both armies waited for a time, and, when neither saw the other moving, the Athenians first of the two retired into Nisaea and the Peloponnesians returned to their previous position. Whereupon the party in Megara friendly to the exiles took courage, opened the gates, and received Brasidas and the generals of the other cities, considering that the Athenians had finally made up their minds not to fight, and that he was the conqueror. They then entered into negotiations with him ; for the other faction which had conspired Avith the Athenians was now paralyzed. 74. After this the allies dispersed to their several cities Megara now and Brasidas returned to Corinth, where he made prepa- the hands of ratious for his expedition into Chalcidic^, his original who cruelly ' destination. When the Athenians had also o^one home, ousiyputto such of the Meorarians as had been chiefly concerned death their opponents, with them, knowing that they were discovered, at once slipped away. The rest of the citizens after conferring with the friends of the exiles recalled them from Pegae, first binding them by the most solemn oaths to consider the interests of the state and to forget old quarrels. But THE COAST OF ASIA MINOR. 295 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. no sooner had they come into office than, taking the TV. opportunity of a review and drawing up the divisions apart from one another, they selected about a hundred of their enemies, and of those who seemed to have been most deeply implicated with the Athenians, and com- pelled the people to give sentence upon them by an open vote ; having obtained their condemnation, they put them to death. They then established in the city an ex- treme oligarchy. And no government based on a counter revolution effected by so few ever lasted so long a time. During the same summer Demodocus and Aristides, 75. two commanders of the Athenian fleet which collected Λ'^ί^,'^^^'^^ Avliich bad be- tribute from the allies, happened to be in the neio-h- come tbe ^ irr Ο beadquarters borhood of the Hellespont: there were only two of oftbeLes- ί ^ 'J biau exiles, is them, the third, Lamachus, having sailed with ten ships *fiiSifans^^ into the Pontus. They saw that the Lesbian exiles were going to strengthen Antandrus as they had intended, ^ and they feared that it would prove as troublesome an enemy to Lesbos as Anaea had been to Samos ; ^ for the Samian refugees who had settled there, aided the Peloponnesian navy by sending them pilots ; they likewise took in fugi- tives from Samos and kept the island in a state of per- petual alarm. So the Athenian generals collected troops from their allies, sailed to Antandrus, and, defeating a force which came out against them, recovered the place. Not long afterwards Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus and had anchored in the territory of Heraclea at the mouth of the river Calex, lost his ships by a sudden flood which a fall of rain in the upper country had brought down. He and his army returned by land through the country of the Bithynian Thracians ivho dwell on the Asiatic coast, and arrived at Chalcedon, a Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus. Li the same summer, and immediately after the with- 76. drawal of the Athenians from Meo-ara, the Athenian TiieAtbe- - . ο 7 mans enter general JJemosthenes arrived at Naupactus with forty "'*» com- ^ ^ «^' munication ships. A party in the cities of Boeotia who wanted to ^"tbtbe ^ Cp. iv. 52. 2 cp. iii 19; iii. 32 init. 296 DESIGNS UPON BOEOTIA. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. ly . overthrow their constitution and set up a democracy like democraticai that of Athens, had entered into communications with party m ' SeiSklto ^^^^ ^^^^ ^yith. Hippocrates, and a plan of operations had whn?tS^^^^ been concerted, chiefly under the direction of Ptoeodorus, aizlneSLn. ^ Theban exile. Some of the democraticai party under- took to betray Siphae, which is a seaport on theCrisaean Gulf in the Thespian territory, and certain Orchomenians were to deliver up to the Athenians Chaeronea, which is a dependency of the Boeotian, or as it was formerly called, the Minyan, Orchomenus. A body of Orcho- menian exiles had a principal hand in this design and kept a Peloponnesian force in their pay. The town of Chaeronea is at the extremity of Boeotia, near the territory of Phanoteus in Phocis, and some Phocians took part in the plot. The Athenians meanwhile were to seize Delium, a temple of Apollo which is in the district of Tanagra looking towards Euboea. In order to keep the Boeotians occupied with disturbances at home, and prevent them from marching in a body to Delium, the whole movement was to be made on a single day, which wsis fixed beforehand. Κ the attempt succeeded, and Delium was fortified, even though no revolution should at once break out in the states of Boeotia, they might hokl the places which they had taken and plunder the country. The partisans of demo- cracy in the several cities would have a refuge near at hand to which in case of failure they might retreat. Matters could not long remain as they were ; and in time, the Athenians acting Λvith the rebels, and the Boeotian forces being divided, they would easily settle Boeotia in their interest. Such was the nature of the proposed attempt. 77, Hippocrates himself, with a force from the city, was Demosthenes ready to march into Boeotia when the moment came, from Naupac- Hc had scnt Demostliencs beforehand with the forty pocrates Avith ships to Naupactus, intending him to collect an army of Acarnamans and other allies of the Athenians in that region and sail against Siphae, which was to be betraj^ed BRASI DAS m THESSALY. 297 to them. These oiDerations were to be carried out simul- IV. taneously on the day appointed. tohwadT^^ Demosthenes on his arrival fomid that the confederate ^^^l^asijJ^^ Acarnanians had abeady compelled Oeniadae to enter the Athenian alliance. He then himself raised all the oeniadae . , -I τ η J 1 forced into forces of the allies m those parts and proceeded nrst to the Athenian τ 1 * 1 TT • aJliance. make war upon Salynthms and the Agraeans.i Havmg subdued them, he took the necessary steps for keeping his appointment at Siphae. During this summer, and about the same time, 78. Brasidas set out on his way to Chalcidice with seven- ^g^oittd^b teen hundred hoplites. AYhen he arrived at Heraclea ^^^^Tt^thi in Trachis, he despatched a messenger to PKarsalus, JJ^keshis where he had friends, with a request that they would SsSiy!^^^ conduct him and his army through the country. Ac- i^^g^agef cordingly there came to meet him at Melitia, in Achaea Phthiotis, Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas,Torylaus, and Strophacus who was the proxenus of the Chalcidians. Under their guidance he started. Other Thessalians also conducted him ; in particular, Niconidas a friend of Perdiccas from Larissa. Under any circumstances it would not have been easy to cross Thessaly without an escort, and certainly for an armed force to go through a neighbor's country without his consent was a pro- ceeding which excited jealousy among all Hellenes. Besides, the common people of Thessaly were always well disposed toΛvards the Athenians. And if the tra- ditions of the country had not been in favor of a close oligarchy, Brasidas could never have gone on ; even as it was, some of the opposite party met him on his march at the river Enipeus and would have stopped him, saying that he had no business to proceed Λvilhout the consent of the whole nation. His escort replied that they would not conduct him if the others objected, but that he had suddenly presented himself and they were doing the duty of hosts in accompanying him. Brasidas himself added that he came as a friend to the Thessalian land ^ Cp. iii. Ill fin.] 298 BEASIDAS AERIYES IN" CHALCIDICi:. B.C. 424 ; 01. IV. 79. Brasidas reaches Perdiccas. 80. The Lace- daemonians encoui-age the expe- dition of Brasidas in the hope of making a and people, and that he was making war upon his enemies the Athenians, and not upon them. He had never heard that there was any ill-feeling between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians which prevented either of them from passing through the territory of the other ; however, if they refused their consent, he avouM not and indeed could not go on ; but such was not the treatment which he had a right to expect from them. Upon this they departed, and he by the advice of his escort, fearing that a large force might collect and stop him, marched on at full speed and without a halt. On the same day on which he started from Melitia he arrived at Pharsalus, and encamped by the river Apidanus. Thence he went on to Phacium, and thence to Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort returned ; and the Perrhaebians, Λνΐιο are subjects of the Thessalians, brought him safe to Dium in the territory of Perdiccas, a city of Macedo- nia which is situated under Mount Olympus on the Thessalian side. Thus Brasidas succeeded in running through Thessaly before any measures were taken to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidic^. He and the revolted tribu- taries of the Athenians, alarmed at their recent suc- cesses, had invited the Peloponnesians. The Chalcidians were expecting that the first efforts of the Athenians would be directed against them. The neighboring cities,, although they had not revolted, secretly joined in the invitation. Perdiccas Λvas not a declared enemy of Athens, but Λvas afraid that the old differences be- tAveen himself and the Athenians might revive, and he was especially anxious to subdue Arrhibaeus, king of the Lyncestians. The Lacedaemonians were the more willing to let the Chalcidians have an army from Peloponnese owing to the unfortunate state of their affairs. For now that the Athenians were infesting Peloponnesus, and especially Laconia, they thought that a diversion Avould be best effected if they could retaliate on them by sending THE SPAKTANS AND THEIK HELOTS. 299 B.C. 424; 01. 89. troops to help their dissatisfied allies, who moreover ly. were oiferino: to maintain them, and had asked for diversion, and r^ . . getting rid of assistance from Sparta with the mtention oi revoltmo-. tiieHeiots. ^ , <^ Tneir mon- They were also glad of a pretext for sending out of strous cruelty the way some of the Helots, fearing that they would ery. take the opportunity of rising afibrded by the occupa- tion of Pylos. Most of the Lacedaemonian institutions were specially intended to secure them against this source of danger. Once, when they were afraid of the number and vigor of the Helot youth,this was what they did :- They proclaimed that a selection would be made of those Helots who claimed to have rendered the best service to the Lacedaemonians in war, and promised them liberty. The announcement wa^ intended to test them ; it was thought that those among them who were foremost in asserting their freedom would be most high-spirited, and most likely to rise against their mas- ters. So they selected about two thousand, who were crowned with garlands and went in procession round the temples ; they were supposed to have received their liberty ; but not long afterwards the Spartans put them all out of the way, and no man knew how any one of them came by his end. And so they were only too glad to send with Brasidas seven hundred hoplites who were Helots. The rest of his army he hired from Pelo- ponnesus.^ He himself was even more willing to go than they were to send him. The Chalcidians too de- 81. sired to have him, for at Sparta he had always been ^^^^^^^Jlf^J^ ^^ considered a man of energy. And on this expedition membmed^" he proved invaluable to the Lacedaemonians. At the η^ιι^Γ^^^^ "^ time he gave an impression of justice and moderation in his behavior to the cities, which induced many of them to revolt, while others were betrayed into his hands. Thus the Lacedaemonians Avere able to lio-hten the pressure of war upon Peloponnesus ; and when shortly afterwards they desired to negotiate, they had places to give in return for what they sought to recover. ' » Cp. iv. 70 med. 300 BKASIDAS AND PEKDICCAS. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. IV. And at a later period of the war, after the Sicilian ex- pedition, the honesty and ability of Brasidas which some had experienced, and of which others had heard the fame, mainly attracted the Athenian allies to the Lacedaemo- nians. For he was the first Spartan who had gone out to them, and he proved himself^ to be in every way a good man. Thus he left in their minds a firm conviction that the others would be like him. 82. The Athenians, hearing of the arrival of Brasidas in TheAthe- Chalcidice, and believino^ that Perdiccas was the insti- nians declare . . . *^ Perdiccas a» o^ator of the expedition, declared the latter an enemy enemy. ox-' j and kept a closer watch over their allies in that region, 83. Perdiccas, at once uniting the soldiers of Brasidas with b?tweei?^°^ his owu forces, made war upon Arrhibaeus the son of B?asida?sSSn Bromerus, Idug of the Lyncestiaus, a neighboring people rSfputiabout ^^ Macedonia ; for he had a quarrel ivith him and wanted Arrhibaeus. ^q subdue him. But whcu he and Brasidas and the army arrived at the pass leading into Lyncus, Brasidas said that before appealing to arms he should like to try in person the effect of negotiations, and see if he could not make Arrhibaeus an ally of the Lacedaemonians. He was partly influenced by messages which came from Arrhibaeus expressing his willingness to submit any matter in dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas ; and the Chalcidian ambassadors who accompanied the ex- pedition, recommended him not to remove from Per- diccas' path all his diflSculties, lest, when they Avere wanting him for their own affairs, his ardor should cool. Besides, the envoys of Perdiccas when at Sparta had said somethins: to the Lacedaemonians about his makino^ many of the neiohborino^ tribes their allies, and on this ground Brasidas claimed to act jointly with Perdiccas in the matter of Arrhibaeus. But Perdiccas answered that he had not brought Brasidas there to arbitrate in the quarrels of Macedonia ; he had meant him to destroy ^ Or, taking πξίώτος closely with ^οΈ,ας-. "For of all the Spartans who had been sent out, he was the first who proved himself," etc. BRASIDAS AT ACANTHUS. 301 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. his enemies when he pointed them out. While he, Per- IV. diccas, was maintaining half the Lacedaemonian army, Brasidas had no business to be holding parley with Arrhibaeus. But in spite of the opposition and resent- ment of Perdiccas, Brasidas communicated with Arrhi- baeus, and was induced by his words to withdraw his army without invading the country. From that time Perdiccas thought himself ill-used, and paid only a third instead of half the expenses of the army. During the same summer, immediately on his return 84. from Lyncus, and a little before the vintao-e, Brasidas, Brasidas is . *^ IT. A admitted into remiorced by Chalcidian troops, marched as^amst Acan- Acanthus and thus, a colony of Andros. The inhabitants of the city citizens. were not agreed about admitting him ; those who, in concert with the Chalcidians, had invited him, being opposed to the mass of the people. So he asked them to receive him alone, and hear what he had to say be- fore they decided ; and to this request the multitude, partly out of fear for their still ungathered vintage, were induced to consent. Whereupon, coming forward to the people (and for a Lacedaemonian he was not a bad speaker) , he addressed them as follows : — " Men of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me 85. out at the head of this army to iustify the declaration ^^ come to ^ ^ >} yon as the which we made at the beoinnino^ of the war — that we liberators of ο & Hellas : why were o^oino^ to fio^ht ao^ainst the Athenians for the liber- do you close ο ο ο ο your gates ties of Hellas. If we have been long in coming, the ^^οΐ• Refusal reason is that we were disappointed in the result of the ^^n'^ave^a war nearer home ; for we had hoped that, without in- o?her^it?er volving you in danger, we might ourselves have made Sidtvniiig^o a speedy end of the Athenians. And therefore let no ^l^JZ ^^^^ one blame us ; we have come as soon as we could, and JtSinsS^ with your help will do our best to overthrow them. But ^'^^^®^• how is it that you close your gates against me, and do not greet my arrival ? We Lacedaemonians thought that we Avere coming to those who even before we came in act were our allies in spirit, and would joyfully receive us ; having this hope we have braved the greatest dangers, 302 SPEECH OF BRASIDAS. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. rV. marching for many days through a foreign country, and have shown the utmost zeal in your cause. And now, for you to be of another mind, and to set your- selves against the liberties of your own city and of all Hellas, would be monstrous ! The evil is not only that you resist me yourselves, but wherever I go people will be less likely to join me ; they will be offended w^hen they hear that you to whom I first came, representing a powerful city and reputed to be men of sense, did not receive me, and I shall not be able to give a satis- factory explanation, but shall have to confess either that I offer a spurious liberty, or that I am weak^ and incapable of protecting you against the threatened attack of the Athenians. And yet when I brought assistance to Nisaea in command of the army which I have led hither, the Athenians, though more numerous, refused to engage with me ; and they are not likely now, when their forces must be conveyed by sea, to send an army against you equal to that which they had at 86. Nisaea. And I myself, why am I here? I come, not I am not the ^q imuvQ but to emancipate the Hellenes. And I have representa- «^ ' ■•- tive of a fac- bouud the e:overnment of Lacedaemon by the most tion : and ο ^ ./ Insiave^eitiier solcmii oaths to rcspcct the independence of any states many.'^'Thi'^ whlch I may bring over to their side. I do not want n£5S! miiike ^^ gain your alliance by force or fraud, but to give you idant^htvea ^urs, that we may frere you from the Athenian yoke. character to j ^j^j^k that you ought uot to doubt my word w^hen I offer you the most solemn pledges, nor should I be regarded as an inefficient champion; but you should confidently join me. "If anyone among you hangs back because he has a personal fear of anybody else, and is under the impression that I shall hand over the city to a partjs him above all I would reassure. For I am not come hither to be the tool of a faction ; nor do 1 conceive that the liberty which I bring you is of an ambiguous character ; I ^ Or, taking έττιφίρει»^ after αΐτίαρ εξω : "but shall be deemed either to offer a spurious liberty, or to be \Yeak." SPEEC H OF BEASIDAS. 303 B.C. 424 ; Ol. 89. should forget the spirit of my country were I to en- IV. slave the many to the few, or the minority to the whole people. Such a tyranny would be worse than the dominion of the foreigner, and Λve Lacedaemonians should receive no thanks in return for our trouble, but instead of honor and reputation only reproach. We should lay ourselves open to charges far more detest- able than those which are our best weapons against the Athenians, who have never been great examples of virtue. For to men of character there is more disgrace in seeking aggrandizement by specious deceit than by open violence ;i the violent have the justification of strength which fortune gives them, but a policy of in- trigue is insidious and wicked. " So careful are we ivhere our highest interests are at 87. stake. And not to speak of our oaths, you cannot have if yo^^win ί ' «^ not be our better assurance than they give whose actions, when ^^^^^J*^,^' ^^® & ._ _ must be your enemies. compared \vith their professions, afford a convincing jj^^^^^g^^j^^y proof that it is their interest to keep their word. we^c^amioT' ^' But if you plead that you cannot accept the pro- oppSiSon.^'^ posals Avhich I offer, and insist that you ought not to suffer for the rejection of them because you are our friends ; if you are of opinion that liberty is perilous and should not in justice be forced upon any one, but gently brought to those who are able to receive it, — I shall first call the gods and heroes of the country to witness that I have come hither for your good, and that you would not be persuaded by me : I shall then use force and ravage your country without any more scruple. I shall deem myself justified by two overpoΛvering argu- ments. In the first place, I must not permit the Lace- daemonians to suffer by your friendship, and suffer they will through the revenues Avhich the Athenians will con- tinue to derive from you if you do not join me ; and in the second place, the Hellenes must not lose their hope of liberation by your fault. On any other ground we should certainly be wrong in taking such a step ; it 1 Cp. i. 77 med. 304 THE MISTAKE OF THE DAT. B.C. 424 ; 01. ly. The Acan- tliians, who are afraid of losing tlieir vintage, de- termine to revolt from Atjeus. 89. The plot for the betrayal of Boeotia is discovered. is only for the sake of the general weal that we Lace- daemonians have any right to be forcing liberty upon those who would rather not have it. For ourselves, we are far from desiring empire, but we want to overthrow the empire of others. And having this end in view, we should do injustice to the majority if, while bringing independence to all, we tolerated opposition in you. Wherefore be well advised. Strive to take the lead in liberating Hellas, and lay up a treasure of undying fame. You will save your own property, and you will crown your city with glory." Thus spoke Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides, partly under the attrac- tion of his words, and partly because they were afraid of losing their vintage, determined by a majority, voting secretly, to revolt from Athens. They pledged Brasidas to stand by the engagement to Λvhich the government of Sparta had sworn before they sent him out, and to respect the independence of all whom he brought over to the Lacedaemonian alliance. They then admitted his army ; and shortly afterwards Stageirus, a colony of the Andrians, revolted also. Such were the events of the summer. Meanwhile the betrayal of Boeotia into the hands of Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, was on the eve of accomplishment. At the beginning of the ensuino* Avinter Demosthenes and his fleet were to appear at Siphae, and Hippocrates simultaneously to march upon Delium. But there was a mistake about the day, and Demosthenes, with his Acarnanian and numerous other allies drawn from that neighborhood, sailed to Siphae too soon. His attempt failed ; for the plot was betrayed by Nicomachus a Phocian, of the town of Phanoteus, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians. Whereupon there was a general levy of the Boeotians, for Hippocrates, who was to hnYe been in the country and to have distracted their attention, had not yet arrived ; and so they forestalled the Athe- THE ATHENIANS FOETIFY DELIUM. 305 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. nians by the occupation of Siphae and Chaeronea. lY. When the conspirators in the Boeotian cities saw that there had been a mistake they made no movement from within. Hippocrates had called out the whole force of Athens, 90. metics as well as citizens, and all the strangers who J^^f^ii^der were then in the city. But he did not arrive at Delium Sy'^pe-^' until after the Boeotian had retired from Siphae. He iSakhodjot encamped and fortified Delium, which is a temple of Laves'the ^"^ Apollo. His army dug a trench around the temple and territory. the sacred precinct, the earth which they threw up out of the trench forming a rampart ; along this rampart they drove in a palisade, and cutting down the vines in the neighborhood of the temple threw them on the top. They made a like use of the stones and bricks of the houses near, which they pulled down, and by every means in their power strove to increase the height of the rampart. Where the temple buildings did not extend they erected wooden towers at con- venient places ; the cloister which had once existed had fallen down. They began their work on the third day after their departure from Athens, and continued all this and the Uvo following days until the mid-day meal. ΛVhen it was nearly finished the army retired from Delium to a distance of a little more than a mile, intending to go home. The greater part of the light- armed troops proceeded on their march, but the hoplites piled their arms and rested. Hippocrates, who had remained behind, was occupied in placing the guards at their posts, and in superintending the completion of that part of the outworks w^hich was still unfinished. Meanwhile the Boeotians were o:atherinof at Tanaofra. 91. ο ο ο All the forces from the difierent cities had now arrived. ^ans^aTSe They saw that the Athenians were already marching i?|g|fndiTde- homewards, and most of the Boeotarchs (who are in pursueUe number eleven) disapproved of giving battle, because the fcrolsYile enemy had left the Boeotian territory. For when the ^''''^^''• Athenians rested in their march they were just on the 306 SPEECH OF PAGOm)AS. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. IV. borders of Oropia. ButPagondas the sonof Aeoladas, one of the two Boeotarchs from Thebes, Λvho was in command at the time (the other being Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas) , wanted to fight/ believing that the risk was Avorth encounterins:. So callinfi: the sol- diers to him in successive divisions, that they might not all leave their arms at once, he exhorted the Boeotians to march against the Athenians and to hazard battle, in the following Avords : — 92. " Men of Boeotia, no one among us generals should TheAthe- ever have allowed the thouo^ht to enter his mind that mans are oiir ^ ~ inveterate -^e ous^ht uot to fio'ht With the Athenians, even althous^h enemies, c ο ' ο fiidth^m^^ we may not overtake them on Boeotian soil. They They are the bave crosscd our frontier ; it is Boeotia in which they aggressors, ' «^ deflndii?-* have built a fort, and Boeotia which they intend to lay thlm^vSh^ut waste. Our enemies they clearly are wherever we find toThiSf. them, and therefore in that country out of which they S^lyidin-'^^ came and did us mischief. But perhaps not to fight therareTife Hiay appear to some one to be the safer course. Well Sus'of^air''" then, let him Avho thinks so think again. AVhen a man at^'their^ ^^""^ being in full possession of his own goes out of his way wrr^ecove^ed to attack otlicrs becausc he covets more, he cannot re- coronea^ and flcct too much ; but whcu a man is attacked by another, ?howthem and has to fight for his own, prudence does not allow nofbTar''" of reflection. In you the temper has been hereditary iipiSuty! which would repel the foreign invader, whether he be in another's country or in your own ; the Athenian invader above all others should be thus repelled, because he is your next neighbor. For among neighbors an- tagonism is ever a condition of independence, and against men like these, who are seeking to enslave not only near but distant countries, shall Λve not fight to the last ? Look at their treatment of Euboea just over the strait, and of the greater part of Hellas. I Avould have you know that whereas other men fight Λvith their neighbors about the lines of a frontier, for us, if Λνβ 1 Or, omitting the words "who was in command at the time:" " wanted to fisht Avhile he held the command." THE BOEOTIA NS PREPARE TO FIGHT. 307 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. B.C. 447 ; 01. 83, 2. are conquered, there will be no more disputing about lY. frontiers, but one fixed boundary, including our whole country, for the Athenians will come in and take by force all that we have. So much more dangerous are they than ordinary neighbors. And men who, like them, wantonly assail others, Λνϋΐ not hesitate to attack him who remains quietly at home and only defends himself; but they are not so ready to overbear the adversary Λvho goes out of his own country to meet them, and when there is an opportunity strikes first. We have proved this in our own dealings with the Athenians. Once, owing to our internal dissensions, they took possession of our land, but we overcame them at Coronea, and gave Boeotia that complete security which has lasted to this day.i Eemember the past ; let the elder men among us emulate their own earlier deeds, and the younger who are the sons of those valiant fathers do their best not to tarnish the virtues of their race. Confident that the God whose temple they have impiously fortified and now occupy will be our champion, and relying on the sacrifices, which are favorable to us, let us advance to meet them. They may satisfy their greed by attacking those who do not defend themselves ; but we will show them that from men whose generous spirit ever impels them to fight for the liberties of their country, and who will not see that of others unjustly enslaved, — from such men they will not part without a battle." With this exhortation Pagondas persuaded the Boeo- 93. tians to march against the Athenians, and quickly moved ailn^nmn-^^ his army forward (for the day was far advanced ) . As soon S^fen^^'^* as he approached the enemy he took up a position where gye^indred a hill intercepted the view, and there drew up his army Thtban^^ and prepared for action. Hippocrates, who was still at aSanged Delium, heard that the Boeotians were advancing, and ^ρ,^Ιί-^^ sent a message to the army bidding them get into position. He himself came up shortly afterwards, 1 Cp. iii. 62 fin 308 DISPOSITION OF THE FORCES. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. lY. having left three hundred cavalry at Delium, in order SoTihrn! ^^^^ ^^^y ^ig^* protect the place if assailed, and also might watch their opportunity and attack the Boeotians while the battle was going on. To these the Boeotians opposed a separate force. When everything was ready they appeared over the crest of the hill, and halted in the order which they proposed to maintain in the engage- ment ; they numbered about seven thousand hoplites, more than ten thousand light-armed troops, a thousand cavalry, and uve hundred targeteers. The Thebans and the Boeotians of the adjoining district occupied the right wing. In the centre were the men of Haliartus, Coronea, and Copae, and the other dwellers about the Lake Copais. On the left wing were the Thespians, Tana- graeans, and Orchomenians ; the cavalry and light-armed troops Λvere placed on both wings. The Thebans were formed in ranks of five and twenty deep ; the formation of the others varied. Such was the character and array of the Boeotian forces. 94. All the hoplites of the Athenian army were arranged Numbers of in rauks eio^ht deep ; their numbers equalled those of the Atlienian ο -i ^ j. hoplites their opponents ; the cavalry were stationed on either same as of the wing. No regular light-armed troops accompanied them, they are ' for Athcns had no oro^anized force of this kind. Those drawn up σ ^ ^ eight deep, ^j^q Originally joined the expedition were many times over the number of the enemy ; but they were to a great extent without proper arms, for the whole force, strangers as well as citizens, had been called out. Having once started homewards, there were but few of them forth- coming in the engagement. When the Athenians were ranged in order of battle and on the point of advancing, Hippocrates the general, proceeding along the lines, exhorted them as follows : — 95. "Men of Athens, there is not much time for exhorta- %httng not *^^^' ^^^ *^ ^^^ brave a few words are as good as many ; only to gain J qj^ Qjj|y goiug to remind, not to admonish, you.^ Let » Cp. iv. 17 med.j 126 init. ; v. 69 fin. BATTLE OF DELIUM. 309 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. no man think tnat because we are on foreign soil we are TV. running into great danger without cause. Although in for^^hi's^^* Boeotian territory we shall be fighting for our οΛνη. If of Hheis'^^ we are victors, the Peloponnesians, deprived of the Jlyea^Jfirit Boeotian cavalry, will never invade our land again, so ^oShy of «Te that in one battle you win Boeotia and win at the same SSophyta. time for Attica a more complete freedom. Meet them in a spirit worthy of the first city in Hellas — of that Athens which we are all proud to call our country ; in a spirit too worthy of our fathers, who in times past under Myronides at Oenophyta overcame these very Boeotians and conquered their land." Thus spoke Hippocrates, and had gone over half the 96. army, not havino^ had time for more, when the Boeotians The right •^ ' ^ . ' . wing of the (to whom Pao'ondas lust before eDo^aoins^ had been Athenians V σ 'f ^ σ <_- ο overcomes makins^ a second short exhortation) raised the Paean, theBoeo- ~ ^ ^ tians, and the and came down upon them from the hill. The Athe- f|giit ^^ing of ■■■ ^ the Boeotians nians hastened forward, and the two armies met at a run. 27®^??ί^®^ ' the Athe- The extreme right and left of either army never engaged, iJe?udden for the same reason ; they were both prevented by water- of ?ome Boe courses. But the rest closed, and there was a fierce Jjfe'^Ath'enilns struggle and pushing of shield against shield. The left defeated*^ wing of the Boeotians as far as their centre was worsted by the Athenians, who pressed hard upon this part of the army, especially upon the Thespians. For the troops ranged at their side having given way they were sur- rounded and hemmed in ; and so the Thespians who perished were cut down fighting hand to hand. Some of the Athenians themselves in surrounding the enemy were thrown into confusion and unwittingly slew one another. On this side then the Boeotians were overcome, and fled to that part of the army which was still fighting ; but the right wing, where the Thebans were stationed, over- came the Athenians, and forcing them back, at first step by step , were following hard upon them , when Pagondas , seeing that his left wing was in distress, sent two squad- rons of horse unperceived round the hill. They suddenly appeared over the ridge ; thevictoriouswingof the Athe- 310 THE BOEOTIAN AND ΑΤΗΕΚΙΑΐ^• HEEALDS. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. rV. nians, fancying that another army was attacking them, was struck with panic ; and so at both points, partly owing to this diversion, and partly to the pressure of the advancing Thebans who broke their line, the rout of the Athenian army became general. Some fled to the sea at Delium, others towards Oropus, others to Mount Parnes, or in any direction which gave hope of safety. The Boeotians, especially their cavalry and that of the Locrians which arrived when the rout had begun, pursued and slaughtered them. Night closed upon the pursuit, and aided the mass of the fugitives in their escape. On the next day those of them who had reached Oropus and Delium, which, though defeated, they still held, were conveyed home by sea. A garrison was left in the place. 97. The Boeotians, after raising a trophy, took up their TheAthe- qwu dead, and despoiled those of the enemy. They mans are re- ' jr . j j fused permis- ^j^^n left them under the care of a o^uard, and retirinof sion to bury & ' Ο thSrotrnd"^" ^^ Tanagra, concerted an attack upon Delium. The h^vlblen herald of the Athenians, as he was on his way to ask facISegl fo^ ttieir dead, met a Boeotian herald, who turned him back, declaring that he would get no answer until he had returned himself. He then came before the Athe- nians and delivered to them the message of the Boeo- tians, by Λvhom they were accused of transgressing the universally recognized customs of Hellas. Those who invaded the territory of others ever abstained from touching the temples, whereas the Athenians had forti- fied Delium and were now dwelling there, and doing all that men usually do in an unconsecrated place. They were CA^en drawing, for common use, the water which the Boeotians themselves were forbidden to use except as holy water for the sacrifices. They therefore on behalf both of the God and of themselves, invoking Apollo and all the divinities who had a share in the temple, bade the Athenians depart and carry off what belonged to them. 98. Upon the delivery of this message the Athenians sent DISPUTE ABOUT THE TEMPLE. 311 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. to the Boeotians, a herald of then* own, who on their TV. behalf declared that they had done no injury to the J^^^^f defend temple, and were not going to do any if they could help ; agSfthl they had not originally entered it with any injurious gac^j-^flge^ intent, but in order that from it they might defend Jjort Jpou themselves against those who were really injuring them. poJen^t? According to Hellenic practice, they who were masters of the land, whether much or little, invariably had posses- sion of the temples, to which they were bound to show the customary reverence, but in such ways only as were pos- sible. There was a time when the Boeotians themselves and most other nations, including all who had driven out the earlier inhabitants of the land which they now occupied, attacked the temples of others, and these had in time become their own. So the Boeotian temples would have become theirs if they had succeeded in conquering more of Boeotia. So much of the country as they did occupy was their own, and they did not mean to leave it until compelled. As to meddling with the water, they could not help themselves ; the use of it was a necessity which they had not incurred Λvantonly ; they were resisting the Boeotians who had begun by attacking their territory. When men Λvere constrained by war, or by some other great calamity, there was every reason to think that their offence was forgiven by the God himself. He who has committed an involuntary misdeed finds a refuge at the altar, and men are said to transgress, not when they presume a little in their distress, but when they do evil of their own free-will. The Boeotians, who demanded a sacred place as a ransom for the bodies of the dead, were guilty of a far greater impiety than the Athenians who refused to make such an unseemly bargain. They desired the Boeotians to let them take aivay their dead, not adding the con- dition " if they would quit Boeotia," for in fact they were in a spot which they had fairly won by arms and not in Boeotia, but simply saying *' if they would make a truce accordinof to ancestral custom." 312 DELIUM TAKEN BY THE BOEOTIANS. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. rV The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia QQ they might take what belonged to them, but must The Boeo- depart out of it ; if they were in their own land they aw'this^pot could do as they pleased. They knew that the territory d^adbodies^ of Oropus, in which the dead lay (for the battle took ®" place on the border) , was actually in the possession of Athens, but that the Athenians could not take them away without their leave, and they were unwilling as they pretended to make a truce respecting a piece of ground which did not belong to them.^ And to say in their reply " that if they w^ould quit Boeotian ground they might take what they asked for," sounded plausible. Thereupon the Athenian herald departed, leaving his purpose unaccomplished. 100. The Boeotians immediately sent for javelin-men and They attack, slinofers froui the Malian Gulf. They had been loined and, by the ^ ... help of an after the battle by the Corinthians with two thousand ingenious *^^^^^^ j SSi^^l^en^^^P^^^®^' and by the Peloponnesian garrison which had ter theXttie. ®^^^^^^®^ Msaea,^ as well as by some Megarians. They now marched against Delium and attacked the rampart, employing among other military devices an enoine, with which they succeeded in taking the place ; it was of the following description. They sawed in two and hollowed out a great beam, which they joined together again very exactly, like a flute, and suspended a vessel by chains at the end of the beam ; the iron mouth of a bellows directed downwards into the vessel was attached to the beam, of which a great part was itself overlaid with iron. This machine they brought up from a distance on carts to various points of the rampart, where vine stems and wood had been most extensively used, and when it was quite near the wall they applied a large bellows to their own end of the beam, and blew through it. The blast, prevented from escaping, passed > Or, taking ^η^^ϊ» with ύτΓ^ρ τη? ^xe/vwv: " and they were unwill- ing to make a truce respecting a piece of ground which was claimed by the Athenians." 2 Cp. iv. 69 fin. EXPEDITIOIi AGAIKST AMPHIPOLIS. 313 B.C. 424 ; Ol. 89. B.C. 497 ; 01. 70, 4. into the vessel which contained burning coals and sul- lY. phur and pitch ; these made a huge flame, and set fire to the rampart, so that no one could remain upon it. The garrison took flight, and the fort was taken. Some were slain ; two hundred were captured ; but the greater number got on board their ships and so reached home. Delium was captured seventeen days after the battle. 101. The Athenian herald came shortly afterwards in igno- '^yJ^L• ranee of its fate to ask again for the dead, and now the be?iiig™ut Boeotians, instead of repeating their former answer, gave among^tw them up. In the battle the Boeotians lost somewhat Ss th?geS" less than five hundred ; the Athenians not quite a thou- sand, and Hippocrates their general ; also a great num- ber of light-armed troops and baggage-bearers. Shortly after the battle of Delium, Demosthenes, on J^nure of^a^ the failure of the attempt to betray Siphae, against t^^SlsTn" which he had sailed with forty ships, ^ employed the sicyonia. Agraean and Acarnanian troops together with four hundred Athenian hoplites whom he had on board in a descent on the Sicyonian coast. Before all the fleet had reached the shore the Sicyonians came out against the invaders, put to flight those who had landed, and pursued them to their ships, killing some, and making prisoners of others. They then erected a trophy, and gave back the dead under a flag of truce. While the aflfair of Delium was going on, Sitalces, the l^tJi^ef who Odrysian kin o^, died ; he had been eno^ao^ed in an ex- i^ ^1,^9^^^•^?^ ♦^ σ ' ' 5? & by his nephew pedition against the Triballi, by whom he Avas defeated seuthes. in battle. Seuthes the son of Spardocus,^ his nephew, succeeded him in the kingdom of the Odrysians and the rest of his Thracian dominions. During the same winter, Brasidas and his Chalcidian 102. allies made an expedition against Amphipolis upon the ^J^J^^^^jj^d river Strymon, the Athenian colony. The place where J^j^'^J'''"''^^ the city now stands is the same Avhich Aristagoras of AmphipoUs. Miletus in days of old, when he was flying from King Darius, attempted to colonize ; he was driven out by » Cp. iv. 77 init., 89. 2 Cp. ii. 101 fin. 314 BRASIDAS AT AMPHIPOLIS. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. B.C. 437 ; 01. 85, 4. TV, the Edonians.i Two and thirty years afterwards the Athenians made another attempt ; they sent a colony of ten thousand, made up partly of their own citizens, partly of any others who liked to join ; but these also were attacked by the Thracians at Drabescus, and perished. 2 Twenty-nine years later the Athenians came again, under the leadership of Hagnon the son of Mcias, drove out the Edonians, and built a town on the same spot, which was formerly called " The Nine Ways." Their base of operations was Eion, a market and seaport which they already possessed, at the mouth of the river, about three miles from the site of the present town, which Hagnon called Amphipolis, because on two sides it is surrounded by the river Strymon, and strikes the eye both by sea and land. Wanting to enclose the newly- founded city, he cut it oif by a long ivall reaching from the upper part of the river to the lower. 103. Against Amphipolis Brasidas now led his army. Start- ^S^ed^ by ^^''o ^^^^^ Amac ill Chalcidice , towards evening he reached ants^of Argi- -^^^0^^ ^iid Brouiiscus at the point where the lake Bolb^ duViSs a?my Ao^s liito thc sea ; having there supped, he marched on near A^ipM- during the iiight. The weather was wintry and some- poiis. what snowy ; and so he pushed on all the quicker ; he was hoping that his approach might be known at Amphi- polis only to those who were in the secret. There dwelt in the place settlers from Argilus, a toΛvn which was originally colonized from Andros ; these and others aided in the attempt, instigated some by Perdiccas, others by the Chalcidians. The town of Argilus is not far off, and the inhabitants ivere alwa3^s suspected by the Athenians, and were always conspiring against Am- phipolis. For some time past, ever since the arrival of Brasidas had given them an opportunity, they had been concerting measures with their countrymen inside the walls for the surrender of the city. They now revolted from the Athenians, and received him into their toAvn. On that very night they conducted the army onwards 1 Cp. Herod, v. 124. ^ Cp. i. 100 fin. THUCYDIDES. 315 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. to the bridge over the river, which is at some distance ly. from the town. At that time no walls had been built down to the river, as they have since been; a small guard was posted there. Brasidas easily overcame the guard, owing partly to the plot within the walls, partly to the severity of the weather and the suddenness of his attack; he then crossed the bridge, and 'at once became master of all the possessions of the Amphipolitans out- side the walls. For they lived scattered about in the country. The passage of the river was a complete surprise to the 104. citizens within the walls. Many who dwelt outside were The country ^^ outside tne taken. Others fled into the town. The Amphipolitans Jt^i\sm?r7 were in great consternation, for they suspected one an- i^\ake"the^ other. It is even said that Brasidas, if, instead of allow- ?-hucy^?es^ ing his army to plunder, he had marched direct to the ^^^^^^» place, would probably^ have captured it. But he merely occupied a position, and overran the country outside the walls ; and then, finding that his confederates within failed in accomplishing their part, he took no further step. Meamvhile the opponents of the conspirators being superior in number prevented the immediate opening of the gates, and acting with Eucles, the general to whose care the place had been committed by the Athenians, sent for help to the other general in Chalcidice, Thucy- dides the son of Olorus, who wrote this history ; he was then at Thasos, an island colonized from Paros, and distant from Amphipolis about half a day's sail. As soon as he heard the tidings he sailed quickly to Am- phipolis with seven ships Λvhich happened to be on the spot: he wanted to get into Amphipolis if possible before it could capitulate, or at any rate to occupy Eion. MeanΛvhile Brasidas, fearing the arrival of the ships 105. from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides had the ^J^.f^J^^^.^'^^ right of working gold mines in the neighboring ah trict of Thrace, and was consequently one of the leading 1 Or, " It is said to have been the impression that Brasidas," etc., omitting " probably." 316 SUKKENDER OF AMPHIPOLIS. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. rV. men of the country, did his utmost to get possession of the city before his arrival. He was afraid that, if Thucy- dides once came, the people of Amphipolis would no longer be disposed to surrender. For their hope would be that he would bring in allies by sea from the islands, or collect troops in Thrace and relieve them. He there- fore offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any Am- phipolitan or Athenian might either remain in the city and have the enjoyment of his property on terms of equality ; or if he preferred, might depart, taking his goods with him, within five days. 106. When the people heard the proclamation they began SiteVbyfhe ^^ waver; for very few of the citizens were Athenians, Thu^ySdS* ^^^ greater number being a mixed multitude. Many buTfs too^iate within the walls were relatives of those who had been pMpJusf^" captured outside. In their alarm they thought the terms reasonable ; the Athenian population because they were too glad to withdraw, reflecting how much greater their share of the danger was, and not expecting speedy relief; the rest of the people because they retained all their existing rights, and were delivered from a fate which seemed inevitable. The partisans of Brasidas now proceeded to justify his proposals without disguise, for they saw that the mind of the whole people had changed, and that they no longer paid any regard to the Athenian general who was on the spot. So his terms were accepted, and the city was surrendered and de- livered up to him. On the evening of the same day Thucydides and his ships sailed into Eion, but not until Brasidas had taken possession of Amphipolis, missing Eion only by a night. For if the ships had not come to the rescue with all speed, the place would have been in his hands on the next morning. 107. Thucydides now put Eion in a state of defence, de- down^e^^^^^ siring to provide not only against any immediate attempt river to Eion, Qf Brasidas, but also ao^ainst future dano^er. He received but fails in ' » & piace^ *^^ the fugitives who had chosen to quit Amphipolis accord- ing to the agreement and wished to come into Eion. ALA BM OF THE ATHENIAKS. 317 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of small craft IV. down the river to Eion, hoping that he might take the point which runs out from the wall, and thereby com- mand the entrance to the harbor; at the same time he made an attack by land. But in both these attempts he was foiled. Whereupon he returned and took meas- ures for the settlement of Amphipolis. The Edonian town of Myrcinus joined him, Pittacus the king of the Edonians having been assassinated by the children of Goaxis and Brauro his wife. Soon afterwards Galepsus and Oesym^ (both colonies from Thasos) came over to him. Perdiccas likewise arrived shortly after the taking of Amphipolis, and assisted him in settling the newly- acquired towns. The Athenians were seriously alarmed at the loss of 108. Amphipolis; the place was very useful to them, and Tiie Athe- ίτ sr ^ L */ mans are supplied them with a revenue, and with timber which ^h^voit of they imported for ship-building. As far as the Strymon ^™P^g'|"JJ'^ the Lacedaemonians could always have found a way to t^tiilir^otS the allies of Athens, if the Thessalians allowed them to tScS Tiie pass; but until they gained possession of the bridge, ^f^T^itj».g^^^_ they could proceed no further, because, for a long way f^waina^lSai above, the river forms a large lake, and below, towards stolid b^e in- Eion, it was guarded by triremes. All difficulty seemed ?heShl?a^ter now to be removed, and the Athenians feared that more jl^ousy^S' of their allies would revolt . For Brasidas in all his actions ^ΐδίΓαΓ showed himself reasonable, and whenever he made a ^^^^^^• speech lost no opportunity of declaring that he was sent to emancipate Hellas. The cities which were subject to Athens, when they heard of the taking of Amphipolis and of his promises and of his gentleness, were more impatient than ever to rise, and privately sent embassies to him, asking him to come and help them, every one of them wanting to be first. They thought that there was no danger, for they had jmder-estimated the Athenian power, which afterwards proved its greatness and the magnitude of their mistake ; they judged rather by their own illusive wishes than by the unerring rule of prudence. 318 EXCITEMENT AMONG ATHENIAN SUBJECTS. B.C. 424 ; OL lY. 109. Recovery of their long walls by the Megarians. Description of Acte and its cities. Brasi- das marches thither, and is joined by most of them. For such is the manner of men ; what they like is always seen by them in the light of unreflecting hope, what they dislike they peremptorily set aside by an arbitrary conclusion. Moreover, the Athenians had lately received a blow in Boeotia, and Brasidas told the allies what was likely to attract them, but untrue, that at Nisaea the Athenians had refused to fight with his unassisted forces. 1 And so they grew bold, and were quite con- fident that no army would ever reach them. Above all, they were influenced by the pleasurable excitement of the moment ; they were now for the first time going to find out of what the Lacedaemonians were capable when in real earnest, and therefore they were willing to risk anything. The Athenians were aware of their disafiec- tion, and as far as they could, at short notice and in winter time, sent garrisons to the difierent cities. Bra- sidas also despatched a message to the Lacedaemonians, requesting them to let him have additional forces, and he himself began to build triremes on the Strymon. But they would not second his efibrts, because their leading men were jealous of him, and also because they preferred to recover the prisoners taken in the island and bring the Avar to an end. In the same winter the Megarians recovered their long walls which had been in the hands of the Athe- nians," and razed them to the ground. After the taking of Amphipolis, Brasidas and his allies marched to the so-called Act^, or coast-land, which runs out from the canal made by the Persian king, and extends into the peninsula ; it is bounded by Athos, a high mountain projecting into the Aegean sea.^ There are cities in the peninsula, of which one is Sane, an Andrian colony on the edge of the canal looking towards the sea in the direction of Euboea; the others are Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothous, Olophyxus, and Dium; their inhabitants are a mixed multitude of barbarians, 1 Cp. iv. 85 fin. Cp. iv. 68, 69. Cp. Herod, vii. 22. BRASIDAS AT TORONE. 319 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. speaking Greek as well as their native tongue. A few lY. indeed are Chalcidian ; but the greater part are Pelas- gians (sprung from the Tyrrhenians w^ho once inhabited Lemnos and Athens), or Bisaltians, Crestonians, Edo- nians. They all dwell in small cities. Most of them joined Brasidas, but San^ and Dium held out ; where- upon he remained there for a time and wasted their territory. Finding that they would not yield, he promptly made 110. an expedition against Torone in Chalcidice, which ^vas nSesan held by the Athenians. He was invited by a few of the against' °° inhabitants, w^ho were ready to deliver the city into his haitTO^UtsSt hands. Arriving at night, or about daybreak, he took conSie"' tT up a position at the temple of the Dioscuri, which is ίβΛνοΐ^ίίβ^ distant about three furlongs from the city. The great ^ body of the inhabitants and the Athenian garrison never discovered him ; but those Toronaeans who were in his interest, and knew that he was coming, were awaiting his approach ; some few of them had privately gone to meet him. When his confederates found that he had arrived, they introduced into the city, under the com- mand of Lysistratus an Olynthian, seven light-armed soldiers carrying daggers (for of twenty who had been originally appointed to that service only seven had the courage to enter) . These men slipped in undiscovered hy way of the wall where it looks tow^ards the sea. They ascended the side of the hill on Avhich the city is built, and slew the sentinels posted on the summit ; they then began to break down the postern-gate towards the promontory of Canastraeum. Meanwhile Brasidas advanced a little with the rest 111. of his army, and then haltins^, sent forward a hundred They and his , /> 1 partisans in taro^eteers, that as soon as any of the orates were opened, Torone break e' . «^ ^ ^ ^ openapost- and the signal agreed upon displayed, they might rush em gate. in first. There was a delay, and they, wondering what had happened, drew by degrees nearer and nearer to the city. Their partisans in Toron^, acting with the soldiers who had already got inside, had now broken through 320 CAPTURE OF ΤΟΕΟΝί:. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. ly. the postern-gate, and proceeded to cut the bar which fastened the gates near the market-place. They then brought round some of the targeteers by way of the postern-gate, and introduced them into the city, hoping to strike panic into the unconscious citizens by the sudden appearance of an armed force in their rear and on both sides of them at once. Their next step was to raise the fire-signal according to agreement; they then received the rest of the targeteers through the gates by the market- place. 112. Brasidas, when he saw the signal, gave his army the B?as?dSo*ia "^^rd to advauce, and ran forward. Eaising with one frim tli^^^ voice a shout which struck terror into the souls of ΐοΛνη,Γοβίιίη. tjjg inhabitants, they folloΛved him. Some of them dashed in by the gates ; others found a way in at a place where the wall had fallen down and was being repaired, getting up by some planks which were placed against it, intended for draΛving up stones. He himself with the main body of his army ascended to the upper part of the city, wanting to make the capture thorough and secure ; the rest of his soldiers overran the town. 113. While the capture was proceeding the Toronaeans The Athenian grenerall γ , who knew nothino^ about the plot, were in garrison take i-- ^ «^ ' ο ί ' refuge in coufusiou. The couspirators and their party at once joined the assailants. Of the Athenian hoplites, who to the number of fifty chanced to be sleeping in the Agora, a few were cut down at once, but the greater number, when they saw what had happened, fled, some by land, others to the Athenian guard-ships, of which two were on the spot, and reached safely the fort of Lec^i^hus, a high point of the city, which the Athenians had occupied and retained in their οΛτη hands ; it runs out into the sea, and is only joined to the mainland by a narrow isthmus ; thither fled also such Toronaeans as Avere friendly to the Athenians. 114. It was now daylight, and the city being completely in Brasidas his powcr, Brasidas made proclamation to the Toronaeans sumraons ■•• ^ . i «r» i the Athe- who had taken refuge Λvith the Athenians that it they MODERATION OF BRASIDAS. 321 B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. liked they might come out and return to their homes ; lY. they would suffer no harm in the city. He also sent a ^l^^J'^ ^t' herald to the Athenians, bidding them take what was ί,^^^ΐ-ίΧ^"* their own and depart under a flag of truce out of Lecy thus . JruJl^ ηΓ* The place, he said, belonged to the Chalcidians, and not pacific words to them. They refused to go, but asked him to make a of Toron^f ^ truce with them for a day, that they might take up their dead, and he granted them two days. During these two days he fortified the buildings which were near Lecythus, and the Athenians strengthened the fort itself. He then called a meeting of the Toronaeans , and addressed them much in the same terms which he had used at Acanthus.^ He told them that they ought not to think badly of those citizens who had aided him, much less to deem them traitors ; for they Λvere not bribed and had not acted with any view of enslaving the city, but in the interest of her freedom and welfare. Those of the inhabitants who had not joined in the plot were not to suppose that they would fare worse than the rest ; for he had not come thither to destroy either the city or any of her citizens. In this spirit he had made the proclamation to those who had taken refuge Λvith the Athenians, and he thought none the worse of them for being their friends ; when they had a similar experience of the Lacedae- monians their attachment to them ΛνοηΜ be still greater, for they would recognize their superior honesty ; they were only afraid of them now because they did not know them. They must all make up their minds to be faith- ful allies, and expect henceforward to be held responsible if they offended ; but in the past the Lacedaemonians had not been wronged by them ; on the contrary, it was they who had been \vronged by a power too great for them, and were to be excused if they had opposed him. With these Avords he encouraged the citizens. On the 115. expiration of the truce he made his intended attack upon The fan of πΛί A 1 • 1 ^ a wooden Lecythus. The Athenians defended themselves from to^er *^ frightens the fortress, which was weak, and from some houses t^^ Athe- ' Cp. iv. 85-87. 21 322 TAKING OF LECYTHUS. B.C. 424 ; 01. 89. IV. ΛνΙιίοΚ had battlements. For a whole day they repulsed flyTotS? ^^^® assault; but on the morrow an engine was brought ships. agamst them, from which the Lacedaemonians proposed to throw tire upon the wooden bulwarks. Just as the army was drawing near the Λvall, the Athenians raised a wooden tower upon the top of a building at a point where the approach T^as easiest and where they thought that the enemy would be most likely to apply the engine. To this tower they carried up numerous jars and casks of Avater and great stones ; and many men mounted upon it. Suddenly the building, being too heavily Aveighted, fell in with a loud crash. This only an- noyed and did not much alarm the Athenians who Avere near and sslw what had happened, but the rest were ter- rified, and their fright was the greater in proportion as they were further off. They thought that the place had been taken at that spot, and fled as fast as they could to the sea Avhere their ships lay. 116. Brasidas witnessed the accident and observed that Brasidas thev ΛΥβΥβ abandoniuo: the battlements. He at once takes the fort •^ ® and'^uts'to^ rushcd forward Avith his army, captured the fort, and death those p^t to death all whom he found in it. Thus the Athe- who are found -l nians ivere driven out ; and in their ships of war and other vessels crossed over to Fallen^. There happened to be in Lecythus a temple of Athene ; and when Brasi- das was about to storm the place he had made a proc- lamation that he who first mounted the wall should receive thirty minae ^ ; but now, believing that the cap- ture had been effected by some more than human power, he gave the thirty minae to the goddess for the service of the temple, and then pulling down Lecythus and clearing the ground he consecrated the Avhole place. The rest of this Avinter he spent in settling the adminis- tration of the toAvns which he already held, and in con- certino: measures asfainst the rest. At the end of the w^inter ended the eighth year of the war. ll'j^ Early in the foUoiving spring the Lacedaemonians and » About £122. in It TEUCE BETAVEEN ATHENS AND LACED AEMOK 323 B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. Athenians made a truce for a year. The Athenians TV, hoped to prevent Brasidas from gaining over any more nJ^^f^because of their allies for the present ; the interval would give ρΐβ£βη?ίνΓο£ them leisure for preparation ; and hereafter, if it was for sScS^f"^ their interest, they might come to a general understand- S?LaSiae- ing. The Lacedaemonians had truly divined the fears SuTe^they^' of the Athenians, and thought that, having enjoyed an cOT?r threap. intermission of trouble and hardship, they would bcpJac^fSi more willing to make terms, restore the captiΛ^es taken ^^^^' in the island, and conclude a durable peace. Their main object was to recover their men while the good-fortune of Brasidas lasted ; on the other hand, they feared that, if he continued in his successful career and established a balance between the contending powers, they might still be deprived of them. And the loss would not be com- pensated by their equality with the enemy or by the prospect of victory.^ So they made a truce for them- selves and their allies in the folloΛving terms : — "I, Concerning the temple and oracle of the Pythian 118, Apollo, it seems good to us that any one who will Terms of shall ask counsel thereat without fraud and without fear, according to his ancestral customs. To this we, the Lacedaemonians and their allies here present, agree, and we will send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians, and do our best to gain their assent likewise. " 11. Concerning the treasures of the God, we will take measures for the detection of evil-doers, both you and we, according to our ancestral customs, and any one else who ΛνΙΙΙ, according to his ancestral customs, proceeding always with right and equity. Thus it seems good to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in respect of these matters. " III. It further seems good to the Lacedaemonians and their allies that, if the Athenians consent to a truce, either party shall remain within his own territory, ^ Or, ''And although they would then be fighting on an equality with the Athenians, the final victory would still be doubtful." 324 TERMS OF TRUCE. B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. lY. retaining Λvbat he has. The Athenians at Coryphasium shall keep within the hills of Buphras and Tomeus. They shall remain at Cythera,i but shall not communi- cate Avith the Lacedaemonian confederacy, neither we with them nor they Λvith us. The Athenians who are in Nisaea 2 and Minoa ^ shall not cross the road which leads from the gates of the temple of Msus to the temple of Poseidon, and from the temple of Poseidon goes direct to the bridge leading to Minoa ; neither shall the INIega- rians and their allies cross this road ; the Athenians shall hold the island Λγhich they have taken, neither party com- municating Λγith the other. They shall also hold what they now hold at Troezen,* according to the agreement concluded between the Athenians and Troezenians. "IV. At sea the Lacedaemonians and their allies may sail along their own coasts and the coasts of the con- federacy, not in ships of war, but in any other rowing vessel whose burden does not exceed uyq hundred talents.^ " V. There shall be a safe-conduct both by sea and land for a herald, with envo3^s and any number of at- tendants which may be agreed upon, passing to and fro between Peloponnesus and Athens, to make arrange- ments about the termination of the war and about the arbitration of disputed points. " VI. While the truce lasts neither party, neither we nor you, shall receive deserters, either bond or free. "VII. And we shall give satisfaction to you and you shall give satisfaction to us according to our ancestral customs, and determine disputed points by arbitration and not by arms. " These things seem good to us, the Lacedaemonians, and to our allies. But if you deem any other condition more just or honorable, go to Lacedaemon and explain your views ; neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies will reject any just claim which you may prefer. 1 Cp. iv. 53, 54. ^Ci>. iv. 69. ^ Cp. iii. 51. * Cp. iv. 45. δ About 12 tons. PROYISION FOR A PERMANENT PEACE. 325 B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. "And we desire you, as you desire us, to send envoys IVo invested ivith full powers. " This truce shall be for a year." The Athenian people passed the following decree. During the The prytanes were of the tribe Acamantis, Phaenippus heralds and was the registrar, Niciades Λvas the president. Laches pass to and moved that "a truce be concluded on the terms to which cuss the the Lacedaemonians and their allies had consented ; and permanent peace. might it be for the best interests of the Athenian people ! " Accordingly the assembly agreed that ^^ the truce shall last for a year, beginning from this day, being the four- teenth day of the month Elaphebolion.i During the year of truce ambassadors and heralds are to go from one state to another and discuss proposals for the termination of the war. The generals and prytanes shall proceed to hold another assembly, at which the people shall discuss, first of all, the question of peace, Λvhatever proposal the Lacedaemonian embassy may offer about the termina- tion of the Λyar. The embassies now present shall bind themselves on the spot, in the presence of the assembly, to abide by the truce just made for a year." To these terms the Lacedaemonians assented, and 119. they and their allies took oath to the Athenians and ^^j:2^^l. •^ ratification their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month ^^ *^® *^^<^®• Gerastius. Those Avho formally ratified the truce were, on behalf of Lacedaemon, Taurus the son of Echetimi- das, Athenaeus the son of Pericleidas, Philocharidas the son of Erixidaidas ; of Corinth, Aeneas the son of Ocytus, Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus ; of Sicyon, Damo- timus the son of Naucrates, Onasimus the son of Mega- cles ; of Megara, Nicasus the son of Cecalus, Menecrates the son of Amphidorus ; of Epidaurus, Amphias the son of Eupaidas ; and on behalf of Athens, Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Autocles the son of Tolmaeus. Such were the terms of the armis- tice ; during its continuance fresh negotiations for a final peace were constantly carried on. 1 March — April, 326 SCIONS RECEIVES BEASIDAS. B.C. 423; 01.89,2. lY. 120. Meanwhile Scionfe re- volts. Brasi- das sails thither by night in a small boat, and having summoned the citizens, warmly praises their conduct. 121 Honors showered on Brasidas. He enters into com- munication with INIende and Potidaea. While in the course of the negotiations the Athenians and Lacedaemonian envoys were passing to and fro, Scione, a town of Pallene, revolted irom the Athenians and joined Brasidas. The Scionaeans, according to their own account, sprang originally from Pallene in Pelopon- nesus, but their ancestors returning from Troy Λvere carried by the storm which the Achaean fleet encoun- tered to Scione, where they took up their abode. Brasi- das, when he heard of the revolt, sailed thither by night, sending before him a fi-iendly trireme, while he himself followed at some distance in a small boat, thinking that if he met any vessel, not a trireme, larger than the boat, the trireme would protect him,i while if another trireme of equal strength came up, it Avould fall, not upon the boat, but upon the larger vessel, and in the meantime he Avould be able to save himself. He succeeded in crossing, and havino' summoned a meetins: of the Scionaeans, he repeated Avhat he had said at Acanthus and Torone, adding that their conduct was deserving of the highest praise ; for at a time Λvhen the Athenians were holding Potidaea and the isthmus of Pallene, and they, being cut ofi* from the mainland, Avere as defenceless as if they had been islanders, they had taken the side of liberty un- bidden. They were not such cowards as to wait until they Avere compelled to do Λvhat Avas obviously for their own interest ; and this was a suflScient proof that they Avould endure like men any hardships, however great, if only their aspirations could be realized. He should reckon them the truest and most loyal friends of the Lacedaemonians, and pay them the highest honor. The Scionaeans Λvere inspirited by his words ; and one and all, even those who had previously been against the movement, took courage and determined to bear cheerfully the burdens of the war. They received Brasidas with honor, and in the name of the city crowned him Λvith a golden croΛvn as the liberator of 1 Reading airi^^ or, reading αύτη, trireme ΛVOuld protect him." the mere presence of the EFFECT OF THE TKUCE IN CHALCIDICE. 327 B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. Hellas ; many, too, in token of their personal admiration, IV. placed garlands on his head, and congratulated him, as if he had been a victor in the games. For the present he left a small garrison with them and returned, but soon afterwards again crossed the sea with a larger army, being desirous, now that he had the help of the Scio- naeans, to attempt Mende and Potidaea ; he made sure that the Athenians would follow him with their ships to Fallen^, which they would consider an island; and he washed to anticipate them. Moreover he had entered into negotiations with these cities, and had some hope of their being betrayed to him. But before he had executed his intentions, a trireme 122. arrived conveyins; the ambassadors who went round to MeanwMie he , . r, . τ Τ is stopped in proclami the truce, Aristonymus from Athens, and iiis career by •^ the annonnce- Athenaeus from Lacedaemon. His army then returned mei^t of the *^ truce, which to Torone, and the truce was formally announced to[^adreaiiy ' .... heen made him. All the allies of the Lacedaemonians in Chalcidice before the revolt of ao^reed to the terms. Aristonvmus the Athenian as- sciono Bra- es «^ sidas refuses sented orenerally, but findino^ on a calculation of the^^s^^^*^® ο v? ' σ place up. days that the Scionaeans had revolted after the con- JtS^ans ^ elusion of the truce, refused to admit them. Brasidas insisted that they were in time, and would not surrender the city. Whereupon Aristonymus despatched a mes- sage to Athens. The Athenians were ready at once to make an expedition against Scion^. The Lacedae- monians, however, sent an embass}^ to them and pro- tested that such a step would be a breach of the truce. They laid claim to the place, relying on the testimony of Brasidas, and proposed to have the matter decided b}^ arbitration. But the Athenians, instead of risking an arbitration , wanted to send an expedition instantly ; for they were exasperated at discovering that even the islanders were now daring to revolt from them, in a futile reliance on the Lacedaemonian power by land. The greater right was on their side ; for the truth was that the Scionaeans had revolted two days after the truce Avas made. They instantly carried a resolution, 328 KEVOLT OF ΜΕΪίϋΕ. B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. IV. moved by Cleon, to destroy Scione and put the citizens to the sword ; and, while abstaining from hostilities else- where, they prepared to carry out their intentions, 123. In the meantime Mende, a city of Fallen^ and an ?e'Sve^s%iie ^ΐ'^^^ι^ί^η colouy rcvoltcd from them. Brasidas felt justi- aftS^th?^^ iied in receiving the Mendaeans, although, Avhen they tke uSce?"^ ^^ came to him, the peace had unmistakably been declared, because there were certain points in which he too charged the Athenians with violating the treaty. His attitude was encouraging to them ; they saw his zeal in the cause, which they likewise inferred from his unwillingness to hand over Sciond to the Athenians. Moreover the persons who negotiated with him were few in number, and having once begun, would not give up their purpose. For they feared the consequences of detection, and therefore compelled the multitude to act contrary to their own wishes. When the Athenians heard of the revolt they were more angry than ever, and made preparations against both cities. Brasidas, in expectation of their attack, conveyed away the wives and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans to Olynthus in Chal- cidice, and sent over five hundred Feloponnesian hop- lites and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, under the sole command of Folidamidas, to their aid. The two cities concerted measures for their defence airainst the Athenians, ivho were expected shortly to arrive. 124. Brasidas and Ferdiccas ηοΛν joined their forces, and Brasidas and made a secoud expedition to Lvncus ao^ainst Arrhibaeus. Perdiccas ^ " . again invade Fcrdiccas led his own Macedonian armv and a force the country aM defear""^ of hoplitcs Supplied by the Hellenic inhabitants of his army. ^j-^g couutry. Brasidas, besides the Foloponnesians who remained v/ith him, had under his command a body of Chalcidians from Acanthus and other cities, Avhich sup- plied as many troops as they severally could. The entire heavy-armed Hellenic forces numbered about three thousand ; the Chalcidian and Macedonian cavalry nearly a thousand, and there Avas also a great multitude of barbarians. They entered the territory of Arrhibaeus, PANIC IK THE ARMY OF PERDICCAS. 329 B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. and there finding the Lyncestians ready for battle, they lY. took up a position in face of them. The infantry of the two armies were stationed upon two opposite hills, and between them was a plain, into which the cavalry of both first descended and fought. Then the Lyncestian heavy- armed troops began to advance from the hill, and form- ing a junction with their cavalry, offered battle. Brasidas and Perdiccas ηοΛν drew out their army and charged ; the Lyncestians were put to flight and many slain ; the rest escaped to the high ground, and there remained inactive. The conquerors raised a trophy, and waited for two or three days expecting the arrival of some Illyrians whom Perdiccas had hired. Then Perdiccas wanted, instead of sitting idle, to push on against the villages of Arrhibaeus, but Brasidas was anxious about Mende, and apprehensive that the Athenians might sail thither and do some mischief before he returned. The Illyrians had not appeared ; and for both reasons he Avas more disposed to retreat than to advance. But while they were disputing, the news arrived that 125. the Illyrians had lust betrayed Perdiccas and ioined Meanwhile , i/ ./ J some Illy- Arrhibaeus, whereupon they both resolved to retreat ; rians who had for they were afraid of the Illyrians, Λvho are a nation Perdiccas •^ . . J 7 joined Arrhi- of Avarriors. Owino^ to the dispute nothinii had been ^^eus. tms '^ ^ c^ treachery- determined respecting the time of their departure. Night ^Jd^flfJ^^^'^^ came on, and the Macedonians and the mass of the p^®(^™/s°^ barbarians were instantly seized with one of those un- accountable panics to which great armies are liable.^ They fancied that the Illyrians were many times their real number, and that they were close at their heels ; so, suddenly betaking themselves to flight, they hastened homewards. And they compelled Perdiccas, when he understood the state of affairs, which at first he did not, to go away without seeing Brasidas, for the two armies Avere encamped at a considerable distance from one another. At dawn Brasidas, finding that Arrhibaeus and the Illyrians were coming on and that the Mace- 1 Cp. vii. 80 med. 330 SPEECH OF BRASIDAS. B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. rV. donians had already decamped, resolved to follow them. So he formed his hoplites into a compact square, and placed his light-armed troops m the centre. He selected the youngest of his soldiers to run out upon the enemy at whatever point the attack might be made. He himself proposed during the retreat to take his post in the rear with three hundred chosen men , meaning to stop the fore- most of his assailants and beat them off. Before the Illyrians came up he exhorted his soldiers, as far as the shortness of the time permitted, in the foΠoΛving words : — 126. "Did I not suspect, men of Peloponnesus, that you p^rsiei^^Brl- '^W ^® terrified because you have been deserted by a^e?iS^^^^" your companions and are assailed by a host of bar- YoSSefew barians, I should think only of encouraging and not mln^iutso of instructing you.i But ηοΛν that ΛΥβ are left alone in homeland ^hc facc of uumcrous cucmies, I shall endeavor in a few mgagains?*' words to impress upon you the main points Avhich it con- barbarians, J. Λ ' Γ 1 V J ί. 1 Τ7^ Do not be ccms you to be miormed ot and to remember, h or you byVe1?out- ought to fight like men not merely when you happen to landish cries i ^ n• ν i j i • i• j and gestures, bavc allics prcscut, Dut bccausc courage IS native to you ; They make a i i i /- i ^ ^ • χ * vain flourish uor shouid you icar any number oi loreign troops. discipline, Ecmcmber that in the cities from Avhich you come, stood quietly, not the many govern the few, but the few govern the many, and have acquired their supremacy simply by successful fighting. Your enemies are barbarians, and you in your inexperience fear them. But you ought to know, from your late conflicts with the Macedonian portion of them^ — and any estimate which I can form, or account of them which I receive from others, would lead me to infer — that they will not prove so very formid- able. An enemy often has weak points which wear the appearance of strength ; and these, Λvhen their nature is explained, encourage rather than frighten their oppo- nents. As, on the other hand, where an army has a real advantage, the adversary who is the most ignorant is also the most foolhardy. The Illyrians, to those who have no experience of them, do indeed at first sight 1 Cp. iv. 17 med. ; iv. 95 init. ; v. 69 fin. ^ Cp. iv. 124 rned. EEPULSE OF THE BAKBAEIANS. 331 B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. present a threatening aspect. The spectacle of their ^^• numbers is terrible, their cries are intolerable, and the brandishing of their spears in the air has a menacing effect. But in action they are not the men they look, if their opponents will only stand their ground ; for they have no regular order, and therefore are not ashamed of leaving any post in Λvhich they are hard pressed ; to fly and to advance being alike honorable, no imputation can be thrown on their courage. When every man is his own master in battle he wdll readily find a decent excuse for saving himself. They clearly think that to frighten us at a safe distance is a better plan than to meet us hand to hand ; else Λvhy do they shout instead of fighting ? You may easily see that all the terrors wdth which you have invested them are in reality nothing ; they do but startle the sense of sight and hearing. If you repel their tumultuous onset, and, when opportunity offers, withdraw again in good order, keeping jour ranks, you will sooner arrive at a place of safety, and will also learn the lesson that mobs like these, if an adversary withstand their first attack, do but threaten at a distance and make a flourish of valor, although if he yields to them they are quick enough to show their courage in following at his heels ^vhen there is no dano^er." Brasidas, having addressed his army, began to retreat. 127. Whereupon the barbarians with loud noise and in 2Teat Jiie iiiyrians, *■ ο finding that disorder pressed hard upon him, supposing: that he was tiieymakeno ••■ ^ 7 J. i ο impression, flying, and that they could overtake and destroy his ^^eb?rde?°" troops. But, ivherever they attacked, the soldiers ap- pointed for the purpose ran out and met them, and Brasidas himself with his chosen men received their charge. Thus the first onset of the barbarians met with a resistance which surprised them, and whenever they renewed their attack the Lacedaemonians received and repelled them again, and when they ceased, proceeded with their march. Thereupon the greater part of the barbarians abstained from attacking: Brasidas and his diccas. 332 PEEDICCAS AND BEASIDAS. B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. IV. Hellenes in the open country ; but leaving a certain number to follow and harass them, they ran on after the fugitive Macedonians and killed any with whom they fell in. They then secured beforehand the narrow pass between two hills which led into the country of Arrhi- baeus, knowing that this was the only path by which Brasidas could retreat. And as he Λvas approaching the most dangerous point of the defile they began to sur- round him in the hope of cutting him off. 128. Perceiving their intention, he told his three hundred to S?4?them' 1®^^^ their ranks and run every man as fast as he could fmfiS^u?^'" ^^ ^^® ^^P ^^ ^^® ^^ ^^® ^^^^^' being the one which he inl'inCTeiei tliouglit the barbarians would be most likely to occupy ; SFandPer- ^^^^ before a larger number of them could come up and surround them, to dislodge those who were already there, i They accordingly attacked and defeated them ; and so the main body of his army more easily reached the summit ; for the barbarians, seeing their comrades de- feated and driven from the high ground, took alarm ; they considered too that the enemy were already on the borders of the country, and had got away from them, and therefore followed no further. Brasidas had now gained the high ground and could march unmolested ; on the same day he arrived at Arnissa, which is in the dominion of Perdiccas. The soldiers were enraged at the hasty retreat of the Macedonians, and when they came upon carts of theirs draAvn by oxen, or any baggage which had been dropped in the flight, as Avas natural in a retreat made in a panic and by night, they of themselves loosed the oxen and slaughtered them, and appropriated the baggage. From that time forward Perdiccas regarded Brasidas in the light of a foe, and conceived a ncAV hatred of the Peloponnesians, which Avas not a natural feeling in an enemy of the Athenian. Nevertheless, disregarding his own nearest interests, he took steps to make terms with the one and get rid of the other. ' Adopting with Poppo tlie correction έπόντας. SIEGE AND CAPTUKE OF ΜΕΚΟέ. 333 B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. Brasidas returned from Macedonia to Torone, and TV. when he arrived there found the Athenians abeady 129. in possession of Mende. Thinking it now too late to Nicias at- cross over to Pallene, and assist Mend^ and Scion^, he takeMend§, but fails. remained quiet and guarded Toron^. While he was engaged with the Lyncestians, the Athenians, having completed their preparations, had sailed against Mend^ and Scion^ with fifty ships, of which ten were Chian, conveying a thousand hoplites of their own, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and targeteers furnished by their allies in the neighborhood. They were under the command of Nicias the son of Mceratus, and Mcostratus the son of Diitrephes. Sailing from Potidaea and putting in near the temple of Poseidon, they marched against the Mendaeans. Now they and three hundred Scionaeans who had come to their aid, and their Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred hop- lites in all, Λvith Polydamidas their commander, had just encamped outside the city on a steep hill. Nicias, taking with him for the assault a hundred and twenty Methonaean liglit-armed troops, sixty select Athenian hoplites, and all the archers, made an attempt to ascend the hill by a certain pathway, but he Λvas wounded and failed to carry the position. Nicostratus, Λvith the re- mainder of his troops approaching the hill, which was hard of access, by another and more circuitous route was thrown into utter confusion, and the whole army of the Athenians was nearly defeated. So on this day the ! Athenians, finding that the Mendaeans and their allies refused to give way, retreated and encamped ; and Λvhen night came on, the Mendaeans likewise returned to the city. On the following day the Athenians sailed round to 130- the side of Mend^ looking towards Scione ; they took the se^iienSe^'o?" suburb, and during the whole of that day devastated the JuviSs, country. No one came out to meet them ; for a division fafis^iito had arisen in the city, and on the folio wins: nio^ht the o^th?^ Atlieuians three hundred Scionaeans returned home. On the next 334 SIEGE OF SCIONE. B.C. 423 : 01. 89, 2. IV. day Nicias with half his army went as far as the Scio- ^slS^a?e^" naean frontier and devastated the country on his march, Stadef ^^*^^ while Nicostratus with the other half sat down before the upper gates of Mende, out of Λvhich the road leads to Potidaea. In this part of the city within the walls the Mendaeans and their allies chanced to have their arms deposited, and Polydamidas, arraying his forces in order of battle, was just exhorting the Mendaeans to go forth. Some one of the popular faction answered in the heat of party that he ΛνοηΜ not go out, and that he did not care to fight, but no sooner had he uttered the words than he w^as seized by the Peloponnesian commander and roughly handled. Whereupon the people lost patience, caught up their arms, and made a furious rush upon the Pelopon- nesians and the opposite party who were in league with them. They soon put them to flight, partly because the onslaught was sudden , and also because the gates were thrown open to the Athenians, which greatly terrified them. For they thought that the attack upon them was premeditated. All the Peloponnesians who were not killed on the spot fled to the citadel, which they had previously kept in their own hands. Mcias had now returned and was close to the city, and the Athenians rushed into Mende with their whole force. As the gates had been opened without any previous capitula- tion they plundered the town as if it had been stormed ; and even the lives of the citizens were with difl&culty saved by the efibrts of the generals. The ^Mendaeans were then told that they were to retain their former constitution, and bring to trial among themselves any whom they thought guilty of the revolt. At the same time the Athenians blockaded the garrison in the AciO- polis by a Λvall extending to the sea on either side and established a guard. Having thus secured Mend^, they proceeded against Scione. 131. The inhabitants of Scion^ and the Peloponnesian The irarrison had come out to meet them and occupied a Athenians ο * _ blockade steep hill in front of the city. The hill had to be taken F ERDICCAS REJOINS THE ATHEmAKS. 335 B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. by the Athenians before they could effect the ch'cum- TV. valkdon of the place. So they made a furious attack gaSfsonS^® and dislodged those who were stationed there ; i they S^UyTnto then encamped, and after raising a trophy, prepared *^® p^^''®• to invest the city. Soon afterwards, while they were engaged in the work, the Peloponnesian auxiliaries who were besieged in the Acropolis of Mende, forcing their way out by the sea-shore, broke through the watch and came to Scione by night. Most of them eluded the Athenians who were encamped outside, and got into the town. While the circumvallation of Scione was proceeding, 132. Perdiccas, who, after what had occurred in the retreat η^^ϊβϊΐ? from Lyncus, hated Brasidas, sent heralds to the Athe- ^\\'J"i?e nian generals, and came to an understanding with them, Toprove^his which without loss of time he took measures to carry ^^"^^/a'stop to out. 2 It so happened that Ischagoras the Lacedae- nSianS-" monian Avas then on the eve of marching \vith an army throug\r*^ to reinforce Brasidas. Perdiccas was told by Nicias that, ^'^^^^^^^• bavins: now made friends with the Athenians, he should give them some evidence of his sincerity. He himself too no longer wished the Peloponnesians to find their way mto his country. And so by his influence over the Thes- salian chiefs, with whom he was always on good terms, he put a stop to the whole expedition ; indeed, the Lace- daemonians did not even attempt to obtain the consent of the Thessalians. Nevertheless, Ischagoras, Ameinias, and Aristeus, λυΙιο had been sent by the Lacedaemonian government to report on the state of affairs, found their way to Brasidas. They brought with them, though con- trary to law, certain younger Spartans, intending to make them governors of the cities, instead of leaving the care of them to chance persons. Accordingly Brasidas ap- pointed Clearidas the son of Cleonymus governor of 1 Reading έηόντας. 2 Or, *' having commenced negotiations immediately after the retreat " (cp. iv. 128 fin. ) ; in which case, however, ευθύς τότε άρξάμενος and ετύγχανε τότε must refer to different times. 336 CHRYSIS, THE ARGIVE PRIESTESS. B.C. 423 ; 01. 89, 2. IV. 133. Harsliness and ingrati- tude of the Thebans to- wards the Thespians. Burning of the temple of Kerb at Argos. 134. Indecisive action be- tween the Tegeans and Mantineans. 135. Unsuccessful attempt made by Brasidas on Potidaea. Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas ^ the son of Hegesander governor of Toron^. During the same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians, charging them with Athenian tendencies. This was an object which they always had in Λdew, and now they had their opportunity, because the flower of the Thespian army had fallen in the battle of Delium.^ During the same summer the temple of Here at Argos was burnt down ; Chrysis the priestess had put a light too near the sacred garlands, and had then gone to sleep, so that the whole place took fire and was consumed. In her fear of the people she fled that very night to Philus ; and the Argives, as the law provided, appointed another priestess named Phaeinis. Chrysis had been priestess during eight years of the war and half of the ninth when she fled. Towards the close of the summer Scion^ was completely invested, and the Athe- nians, leaving a guard, retired with the rest of their army. In the followino: winter the Athenians and Lacedae- monians remained inactive, in consequence of the armis- tice ; but the Mantineans and the Tegeans with their respective allies fought a battle at Laodicium in the territory of Orestheum ; the victory Avas disputed. For the troops of both cities defeated the allies on the wing opposed to them, and both erected trophies, and sent spoils to Delphi. The truth is that, although there was considerable slaughter on both sides, and the issue was still undecided when night put an end to the conflict, the Tegeans encamped on the field and at once erected a trophy, while the Mantineans retreated to Bucolium and raised a rival trophy, but afterwards. At the close of the same winter, towards the beginning of spring, Brasidas made an attempt on Potidaea. He approached the place by night and planted a ladder against the walls. Thus far he proceeded undiscovered ; 1 Reading, according to Dobree's conjecture, Πασιτελίδαν, not ΈηιτεΙΙδαν. Pasitelidas is mentioned, v. 3, as Governor of Torone. 2 Cp. iv. 96 med. NIGHT ATTEMPT UPON POTIDAEA. 337 B.C. 423 ; Ol. 89, 2. for the ladder was fixed at a point which the sentinel IV. who was passing on the bell had just quitted, and before he had returned to his post. But Brasidas had not jet mounted the ladder when he was detected by the gar- rison : whereupon he withdrew his army in haste without waiting for the dawn. So the winter ended, and with it the ninth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history. 338 ΕΧΡΙΚΑΤΙΟΝ OF THE TEUCE. B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. BOOK y. V. 1 . With the return of summer the j^ear of the truce ex- ttiYtSce and pi^^d, but hostilities were not resumed until after the res^mpS P^'thiau games. During the armistice the Athenians seS'pS:!-* removed the Delians from Delos ; they considered them Be^s^ °* impure and unworthy of their sacred character by reason of a certain ancient offence. The island had been puri- fied before, when they took the dead out of their sepul- chres as I have already narrated ; ^ but this purification, which seemed sufficient at the time, was now thought unsatisfactory because the inhabitants had been suffered to remain. Pharnaces gave to the Delians an asylum at Adramyttium in Asia, and whoever chose went and settled there. 2. When the armistice was over, Cleon, haΛάng obtained cifa°i?iSS *^ the consent of the people, sailed on an expedition to the tiiichinfat Chalcidian cities with thirty ships conveying twelve ?ntoTo?ono. hundred Athenian hoplites, three hundred Athenian horsemen, and numerous allies. Touching first at Scione (which was still blockaded) , and taking from thence some hoplites of the besieging force, he sailed into the so- called Colophonian port, which was near the city of Torone ; there learning from deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone, and that the garrison Λvas too Aveak to resist, he marched with his army against the town, and sent ten ships to sail round into the harbor. First he 1 Cp. i. 8 init. ; iii. 104 init. ; v. 32 init. ; viii. 108 med. CAPTURE OF ΤΟΕΟΝίί. 339 B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. came to the new line of Avail which Brasidas had raised V. when, wanting to take in the suburbs, he broke down a part of the old wall and made the whole city one. But Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian governor, and the 3. pfarrison under his command came to the defence of this "wtiie Pasi- o ^ telidas is de- quarter of the town, and fought against their assailants, l^^^^^^^ w^ho pressed them hard. Meanwhile the Athenian fleet Α*^^®^^?ι?ϊηίο was sailing round into the harbor, and Pasitelidas feared ^^d the to^ that the ships would take the city before he could return |e\^ayai of and defend it, and that the new fortifications would be^^^^^*^^• captured and himself in them. So he left the suburb and ran back into the city. But the enemy were too quick ; the Athenians from the ships having taken Torpn^ before he arrived ; while their infantry followed close upon him, and in a moment dashed in along with him at the breach in the old Avail. Some of the Pelo- ponnesians and Toronaeans were slain upon the spot, others w^ere captured, and among them Pasitelidas the governor. Brasidas was on his Avay to the relief of Torone at the time, but, hearing that the place was taken, he stopped and returned ; he was within four miles and a half at the time of the capture. Cleon and the Athe- nians erected two trophies, one at the harbor and the other near the new wall. The women and children Avere made slaves ; the men of Torone and any other Chal- cidians, together with the Peloponnesians, numbering in all seven hundred, were sent to Athens. ThePelopon- nesian prisoners were liberated at the peace which was concluded shortly afterwards ; the rest were exchanged man for man against the prisoners whom the Olynthians had made. About the same time Panactum, a fortress on the Athenian frontier, was betrayed to the Boeotians. Cleon, putting a garrison into Torone, sailed round Mount Athos, intending to attack Amphipolis. . About the same time three envoys, of whom one was 4. Phaeax the son of Erasistratus, were sent by the Athe- Revolution ' ^ m Leontini. nians with two ships to Italy and Sicily. After the ^^rch"b general peace and the Avithdrawal of the Athenians from *^® ^^^^ °^ 340 ATHENIAN EMBASSY TO SICILY. B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. y. Sicily,^ the Leontines had enrolled many new citizens the syracu- and the people contemplated a redistribution of the land. sans drive ___, , . , ..,,.. outthepeo- Ihc Oligarchy, perceiving their intention, called in the then settle in Svracusans and drove out the people, who separated and Syracuse, but *' τ . i τ rr^i some of them Wandered up and down the island. The olis^archv then soon grow ο ./ ^jcontented made ail agreement with the Syracusans ; and, leaving ihT\7^^^ their own city deserted, settled in Syracuse, and received ■"^iJ^ie^Th^e^ the privileges of citizenship. Not long afterwards some |g^*^^gainst of them grew discontented, and, quitting Syracuse, occu- ninfti^o P^®^ ^ place called Phoceis, which was a part of the combine towu of Lcontim, and Bricinniae, a fortress in the Leon- biciiy against ' ' Syracuse. fjj^Q territory. Here they were joined by most of the common people who had been previously driven out, and from their strongholds they carried on a continual war- fare against Syracuse. It was the report of these events which induced the Athenians to send Phaeax to Sicily. He was to warn the Sicilians that the Syracusans Λvere aiming at supremacy, and to unite the allies of Athens, and if possible the other cities , in a war against Syracuse . The Athenians hoped that they might thus save the Leontine people. Phaeax succeeded in his mission to the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines, but in Gela he failed, and, convinced that he could not persuade the other states, went no further. Eeturning by land through the country of the Sicels, and by the way going to Bricin- niae and encouraging the exiles, he arrived at Catana, where he embarked for Athens. 5. On his voyage, both to and from Sicily, he made pro- The Italian posals of friendship to several of the Italian cities. He Locnans -"• , ^ ^ "^•^v^A^i^^^^y iJ-lso fell in with some Locrian settlers who had been with Athens. driven out of Messen^. After the agreement between the Sicilian towns, a feud had broken out at Messen^, and one of the two parties called in the Locrians, who sent some of their citizens to settle there ; thus Messen^ was held for a time by the Locrians. They were re- turning home after their expulsion when Phaeax fell in with them, but he did them no harm ; for the Locrians 1 Cp. iv. 65 init. CLEON" SAILS AGAESTST AMPHIPOLIS. 341 B.C. 422; 01.89,3. had already agreed with him to enter into a treaty with V. the Athenians. At the general reconciliation of the Sici- lians, they alone of the allies had not made peace with Athens. And they would have continued to hold out had they not been constrained by a war with the Itoneans and Melaeans, who were their neighbors and colonists from their city. Phaeax then returned to Athens. Cleon had now sailed round from Torone against Am- 6. phipolis, and, makino: Eion his headquarters, attacked cieon remains ■*• ^ ' ^ ... at Eion wait- Stao:eirus,^ a colony of the Andrians, Avhich he failed to ingfonein- c> ' «^ ' for cements; take. He succeeded, however, in stormino^ Galepsus,^ Brasidas as- ' ' ο Jr ' cends tlie hill a Thasian colony. He sent an embassy to Perdiccas, ^fCerdyiium ^^ "^ 'to recon- desirino^ him to come with an armv, accordino^ to the ^o^^^^- terms of the alliance, ^ and another to Polles, the King of the Odomantian Thracians, who was to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as he could ; he then remained quietly at Eion waiting for reinforcements. Brasidas, hearing of his movements, took up a counter-position on Cerdylium. This is a high ground on the right bank of the river, not far from Amphipolis, belonging to the Argilians. From this spot he commanded a view of the country round, so that Cleon was sure to be seen by him if, as he expected, despising the numbers of his op- ponents, he should go up against Amphipolis without waiting for his reinforcements. At the same time he pre- pared for a battle, summoning to his side fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries and the entire force of the Edo- nians, who were targeteers and horsemen ; he had already one thousand Myrcmian and Chalcidian targeteers, in addition to the troops in Amphipolis. His heavy-armed, when all mustered, amounted to nearly tivo thousand, and he had about three hundred Hellenic cavalry. Of these forces about fifteen hundred were stationed with Brasidas on Cerdylium, and the remainder were drawn up in order of battle under Clearidas in Amphipolis. Cleon did nothing for a time, but he was soon com- 7. pelled to make the movement which Brasidas expected. Feelings of ■*■ *■ the soldiers 1 Cp. lY. 88 fin. 2 Cp. iv. 107 fin. Cp. iv. 132 init. 22 342 CLEON LOOKIiiG DOWN UPON" AMPHIPOLIS. B.C. 422 : 01. 89, 3. y. For the soldiers were disgusted at their inaction, and craStP^^^ ^1'®^^ comparisons between the generals ; what skill and Ms ownTo?- enterprise might be expected on the one side, and what hfmseif."\t ignorance and cowardice on the other. And they re- compeikfd by membcrcd how unwilling they had been to follow Cleon mulstrmove when they left Athens. He, observing their murmurs, asclndikhiix and not wanting them to be depressed by too long a a^riew^Sf "ife stay in one place, moved onwards. He went to work in couu ry. ^^^ same confident spirit which had already been suc- cessful at Pylos, and of which the success had given him a high opinion of his own wisdom. That any one would come out to fight with him he never even imagined ; he said that he was only going to look at the place. If he waited for a larger force, this was not because he thought that there was any risk of his being defeated, should he be compelled to fight, but that he might completely surround and storm the city. So he stationed his army upon a steep hill above Amphipolis, Avhence he surveyed with his own eyes the lake formed by the river Strymon, and the lie of the country on the side to- wards Thrace. He thought that he could go away without fighting whenever he pleased. For indeed there * was no one to be seen on the walls, nor passing through the gates, which were all closed. He even imagined that he had made a mistake in coming up against the city without siege-engines ; had he brought them he would have taken Amphipolis, for there Avas no one to prevent him. 8. No sooner did Brasidas see the Athenians in motion, Brasidasde- than he himself descended from Cerdylium, and went scends from "^ ce^yiium.^ iuto Ampliipolis. He did not go out and draw up inferiority of j^jg forccs iu ordcr of battle ; he feared too much the his ΟΛνη ' teniKnes^to^" inferiority of his own troops, not in their numbers (which Athe'Sans^in ^'^rc about cqual to those of the enemy) but in quality ; deiachmeSis. ^OY the Athenian forces were the flower of their army, and they Avere supported by the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians . So he determined to employ a manoemTe , thinking that, if he showed them the real number and SPEECH OF BEASIDAS. 343 B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. meagre equipment of his soldiers, he would be less likely Y. to succeed than if he came upon them before there had been time to observe him, and when as yet they had no real grounds for their contempt of him. Selecting a hundred and fifty hoplites, and handing over the rest to Clearidas, he resolved to make a sudden attack be- fore the Athenians retired, considering that, if their reinforcements should arrive, he might never again have an opportunity of fighting them by themselves. So he called together all his troops, and wishing to encourage them, and explain his plan, spoke as follows : — "Men of Peloponnesus, I need not waste words in 9. telling you that we come from a land which has always ]^ξ and"SSy been brave, and therefore free, and that you are Dorians, ^ to St^ionl- and are about to fight with lonians whom you have Ι^ξ^^ tuidel- ^ beaten again and again. But I must explain to you my pitn^"Sie plan of attack, lest you should be disheartened at the tS|ua?/* seeming disproportion of numbers, because we go into retleaf.p'iist, battle not Avith our whole force but with a handful of men. foTthou^of Our enemies, if I am not mistaken, despise us ; they cKidas*^^^ believe that no one will come out against them, and so ^°"^^^°^ "^• they have ascended the hill, where they are busy looking about them in disorder, and making but small account of us. Now, he is the most successful general^ who discerns most clearly such mistakes Λ^^hen made by his enemies, and adapts his attack to the character of his own forces, not always assailing them openly and in regular array, but acting according to the circumstances of the case. And the greatest reputation is gained by those strata- gems in which a man deceives his enemies most com- pletely, and does his friends most service. Therefore while they are still confident and unprepared, and, if I read their intentions aright, are thinking of with- drawing rather than of maintaining their ground, while they are off their guard and before they have recovered their presence of mind, I and my men will do our best ^ Cp. i. 124 init. ; vi. 77 nied. ; vii. 5 fin. ; viii. 25 med. and fin. 2 Cp. iii. 30 fin. 344 SALLY OF BRASIDAS. B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. to anticipate their retreat, and will make a rush at the centre of the army. Then, Clearidas, when you see me engaged, and I hope striking panic into them, bring up your troops, the Amphipolitans and the other allies, open the gates suddenly, run out, and lose no time in closing with them. This is the way to terrify them ; for reinforcements are always more formidable to an enemy than the troops with which they are already en- gaged. Show yourself a brave man and a true Spartan, and do you, allies, follow manfully, remembering that readiness, obedience, and a sense of honor are the virtues of a soldier. To-day you have to choose between freedom and slavery ; between the name of Lacedae- monian allies, which you will deserve if you are brave, and of servants of Athens. For even if you should be so fortunate as to escape bonds or death, servitude will be your lot, a servitude more cruel than hitherto ; and what is more, you will be an impediment to the liberation of the other Hellenes. Do not lose heart ; think of all that is at stake ; and I will show you that I can not only advise others, but fight myself." 10. When Brasidas had thus spoken, he prepared to sally i',?o^,^wl^^ forth with his own division, and stationed the rest of his nis army to ' h?iltu(i^* army with Clearidas at the so-called Thracian gates, attacked by ^^^^ ^^^7 flight comc out and support him, in ac- STeionded^^ cordaucc with his instructions. He had been seen iieAth^^^' descending from Cerdylium into Amphipolis, and then To^ed!'^ ofiering up sacrifice at the temple of Athena within the SoSidS '^ walls ; for the interior of the city Λvas visible from the cie?n^siaS*^ surrouudlng country. While he was thus employed, a hia?s1)?tiie report was brought to Cleon, who^ had just gone for- victoryau ^yard to reconnoitre, that the whole army of the enemy could plainly be seen collected inside the town, and that the feet of numerous men and horses ready to come forth were visible under the gate. He went to the spot 1 Or, taking the words «al ταύτα ηράσσοντος as subordinate to φαρερον γενομένου: " and then oifering up sacrifice at the temple of Athene within the walls, for the interior of the city, etc., . . and making preparations. A report was brought to Cleon, who," etc. DEFEAT AKD DEATH OF CLEON. 345 B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. and saw for himself ; but not wishing to hazard a regular enofaofement until his allies arrived, and thinkino^ he could get away soon enough, he gave a general signal for retreat, at the same time ordering his forces to retire slowly on the left wing, which Avas the only direction possible, towards Eion. They appeared to linger ; where- upon he caused his own right wing to wheel round, and so with his unshielded side exposed to the enemy began to lead oif his army. Meanwhile Brasidas, seeing that the Athenians were on the move, and that his op- portunity was come, said to his companions and to the troops : " These men do not mean to face us ; see how their spears and their heads are shaking ; such behavior always shows that an army is going to run away. Open me the gates as I ordered, and let us boldly attack them at once." Thereupon he went out himself by the gate leading to the palisade and by the first gate of the long wall Avhich was then standing, and ran at full speed straight up the road, where, on the steepest part of the hill, a trophy now stands : he then attacked the centre of the Athenians, who were terrified at his audacity and their own disorder, and put them to flight. Then Clearidas, as he was bidden, sallied forth by the Thra- cian gates ivith his division, and charged the Athenians. The sudden attack at both points created a panic among them. Their left wing, which had proceeded some little way along the road towards Eion, was cut ofi", and instantly fled. They were already in full retreat, and Brasidas was going on to the right wing when he was wounded ; the Athenians did not observe his fall, and those about him carried him off the field. The ris^ht wing of the Athenians was more disposed to stand. Cleon indeed, who had never intended to remain, fled at once, and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer. But his soldiers rallied where they were on the top of the hill, and repulsed Clearidas two or three times. They did not yield until the Chalcidian and Myrcinian cavalry and the targeteers hemmed them in 346 yiCTOET akd death of br^^sidas. B.C. 422; 01.89,3. V. and put them to flight with a shower of darts. And so the rout became general, and those of the Athenians who were not slain at once in close combat, or de- stroyed by the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers, hard-pressed and wandering by many paths over the hills, made their way back to Eion. Brasidas was car- ried safely by his followers out of the battle into the city. He was still alive, and knew that his army had conquered, but soon afterwards he died. The rest of the army returned with Clearidas from the pursuit, spoiled the dead, and erected a trophy. 11. Brasidas was buried in the city with public honors BraSSs?* in front of what is now the Agora. The whole body of piiittS^^^" ^^^ allies in military array followed him to the grave. hcTnors'Sf^a^ The Amphipolitaus enclosed his sepulchre, and to this fovmde"/ ^'^y they sacrifice to him as to a hero, and also celebrate Hag^ion, who gamcs and yearly ofierings in his honor. They like- fSmd^S^ ^^^^ wise made him their founder, and dedicated their colony . to him, pulling down the buildings which Hagnon had erected,^ and obliterating any memorials ivhich might have remained to future time of his foundation. ^ For they considered Brasidas to have been their deliverer, and under the present circumstances the fear of Athens induced them to pay court to their Lacedaemonian allies. That Hagnon should retain the honors of a founder, now that they were enemies of the Athenians, seemed to them no longer in accordance with their interests, and was repugnant to their feelings. They gave back to the Athenians their dead, who numbered about six hundred, while only seven were slain on the other side. For there Avas no regular engage- ment, but an accident led to the battle ; and the Athe- nians were panic-stricken before it had Tvell begun. After the recovery of the dead the Athenians went home by sea. Clearidas and his companions remained and administered the affairs of Amphipolis. 12. At the end of the summer, a little before this time, Ϊ Or " the sliriiie of Hagnon." ^ Cp. iv. 102 fin. CESSATION OP MILITARY MOVEMENTS. 347 B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy-armed, under the Y. command of the Lacedaemonian generals Rhamphias, ^en1"en?by Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, set out for Chalcidice. Siniiisto^" Coming first to Heraclea in Trachis, they regulated ^rSveiat'^ whatever appeared to them to be amiss. They were ^eraciea, staying there when the battle of Amphipolis occurred. And so the summer came to an end. The following winter Rhamphias and his army went 13. as far as Pierium in Thessaly , but as the Thessalians i>"t ^s not ai- «^ lowed to pass would not let them proceed, and Brasidas, for whom ^jj"ggg|5^ these reinforcements were intended, was dead, they re- turned home, thinking that the time for action had gone by. They felt that they were not competent to carry out the great designs of Brasidas, and the Athenians had now left the country defeated. But their chief reason for not proceeding was that the Lacedaemonians, at the time when they left Sparta, were inclined towards peace. After the battle of Amphipolis and the return of 14. Rhamphias from Thessaly, neither side undertook any Both the .,. . -!-» 1 Ti Athenians military operations . Both alike were bent on peace . The and Lacedae- , , monians, be- Athenians had been beaten at Delium, and shortly after- ing alike dis- •^ appointed m ivards at Amphipolis ; and so they had lost that con- their hopes, ir L ^ J ^ now desire fidence in their own strength which had indisposed them p^^^^• to treat at a time when temporary success seemed to make their final triumph certain. They were afraid too that their allies would be elated at their disasters, and that more of them would revolt ; they repented that after the afiair at Pylos, when they might honorably have done so, they had not come to terms. The Lacedaemonians on the other hand inclined to peace because the course of the ivar had disappointed their expectations. There was a time when they fancied that, if they only de- vastated Attica, they would crush the poΛver of Athens within a few years ; ^ and yet they had received a blow at Sphacteria such as Sparta had never experienced until then ; their country \vas continually ravaged from Pylos and Cythera ; the Helots were deserting, and they were » Cp. i. 81 fin. 348 MOTIVES OF THE TWO GREAT POWERS. B.C. 422; 01.89,3. 15. The desire of the Lacedae- monians is the stronger because they want to re- cover the prisoners. 16. Brasidas and Cleon for very- different reasons had been both enemies to peace. But now they are dead, and Nicias and Pleistoanax, the two leading men of their respective states, have always fearing lest those who had not deserted, relynig on the help of those who had, should seize their oppor- tunity and revolt, as they had done once before. More- over, a truce for thirty years which they had made with Argos was on the point of expiring ; the Argives were unwilling to renew it unless Cynuria were restored to them, and the Lacedaemonians deemed it impossible to fight against the Argives and Athenians combined. They suspected also that some of the Peloponnesian cities would secede and join the Argives, which proved to be the case. Upon these grounds both governments thought it de- sirable to make peace. The Lacedaemonians were the more eager of the two, because they wanted to recover the prisoners taken at Sphacteria ; for the Spartans among them were of high rank, and all alike related to them- selves. They had negotiated for their recovery immedi- ately after they were taken, but the Athenians, in the hour of their prosperity, would not as yet agree to fair terms. ^ After their defeat at Delium, the Lacedaemonians were well aware that they would now be more compliant, and therefore they had at once made a truce for a year, during which the envoys of the two states were to meet and ad- vise about a lasting peace. When Athens had received a second blow at Amphipolis, and Brasidas and Cleon, who had been the two greatest enemies of peace, — the one be- cause the war brought him success and reputation, and the other because he fancied that in quiet times his rogueries would be more transparent and his slanders less credible, — had fallen in the battle, the two chief aspirants for po- litical power at Athens and Sparta, Pleistoanax '^ the son of Pausanias , King of the Lacedaemonians , and Mcias the son of Niceratus the Athenian, who had been the most fortunate general of his day, became more eager than 1 Cp. iv. 41 fin. 2 Or, omitting ot εν before huarigct,: "these (i.e., Cleon and Bra- sidas) being at the time the two great champions for the supremacy of their respective states ; Pleistoanax," etc. NICIAS AND PLEISTOANAX. 349 B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. ever to make an end of the war. Mcias desired, whilst he Υ . was still successful and held in repute, to preserve his good Jfotiv^fo?''^ fortune ; he would have liked to rest from toil, and to give ^^ Jjo^th? the people rest ; and he hoped to leave behind him to ^^• other aofes the name of a man^vho in all his life had never brought disaster on the city. He thought that the way to gain his wish was to trust as little as possible to for- tune, and to keep out of danger ; and that danger would be best avoided by peace. Pleistoanax wanted peace, because his enemies were always stirring up the scruples of the Lacedaemonians aojainst him, and insistinof when- ever misfortunes came that they Avere to be attributed to his illegal return from exile. For they accused him and Aristocles his brother of inducing the priestess at Delphi, whenever Lacedaemonian envoys came to in- quire of the oracle, constantly to repeat the same answer : " Bring back the seed of the hero son of Zeus from a strange country to your own; else you will plough with a silver ploughshare : " Until, after a banishment of nineteen years, he persuaded the Lace- daemonians to bring him home again with dances and sacrifices, and such ceremonies as they observed when they first enthroned their kings at the foundation of Lacedaemon. He hixZ been banished on account of his retreat from Attica, when he was supposed to have been bribed. ^ While in exile at Mount Lycaeum he had occupied a house half within the sacred precinct of Zeus,through fear of the Lacedaemonians. He was vexed by these accusations, and thinking that 17. in peace, when there would be no mishaps and the Lace- The nega . ••• tiations daemomans would have recovered the captives, he would proceed. ^ Both parties himself be less open to attack, whereas in war leadins: ^s^^^ *« ^ ' ο give up men must always have the misfortunes of the state J^^^^* ^^^^^J^ laid at their door, he was very anxious to come to oniy™e terms . Negotiations were commenced during the winter. ^eS pia- Towards spring the Lacedaemonians sounded a note JJeYtht of preparation by announcing to the allies that their » Cp. i. 114; ii. 21 init. 350 CLAIMS UKGED ON BOTH SIDES. B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. V. services would be required in the erection of a fort ; they niaps Nisaea, thouo'ht that the Athenians would thereby be induced wliicli had , ~ , "^ ^eej sur- to Hsteu to them. At the same time, after many confer- ences and many demands urged on both sides, an under- . standing was at last arrived at that both parties should give up what they had gained by arms. The Athenians, however, were to retain Msaea, for when they demanded the restoration of Plataea the Thebans protested that they had obtained possession of the place not by force or treachery, but by agreement ; ^ to which the Athenians rejoined that they had obtained ISTisaea in the same manner. 2 The Lacedaemonians then summoned their allies; and although the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians "were dissatisfied, the majority voted for peace. And so the peace was finally concluded and ratified by oaths and libations, the Lacedaemonians binding themselves to the Athenians and the Athenians to the Lacedaemonians in the following terms : — 18. The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their respec- ?reaTy.°^ *^® tivc allics, make peace upon the following terms, to which they swear, each city separately : — I. Touching the common temples, any one who pleases may go and sacrifice in them and inquire at them, on behalf either of himself or of the state, according to the custom of his country, both by land and sea, without fear. II. The precinct and the temple of Apollo at Delphi and the Delphian people shall be independent, and shall retain their own revenues and their own courts of justice, both for themselves and for their territory, according to their ancestral customs. III. The peace between the Athenians and their confederates and the Lacedaemonians and their con- federates shall endure fifty years, both by sea and land, without fraud or hurt. TV. The}^ shall not be allowed to bear arms to the hurt of one another in any way or manner ; neither the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athe- Cp. iii. 52 init. 2 Cp. iv. 69 fin. THE TERMS OF PEACE. 351 B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. nians and their allies, nor the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaemonians and their allies ; and they shall determine any controversy which may arise be- tween them by oaths and other legal means in such sort as they shall agree. y. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians. YI. The inhabitants of any cities which the Lace- daemonians deliver over to the Athenians may depart whithersoever they please, and take their property with them. The said cities shall be independent, but shall pay the tribute which was fixed in the time of Aristides. After the conclusion of the treaty the Athenians and their allies shall not be allowed to make war upon them to their hurt, so long as they pay the tribute. The cities are these — Argilus,^ Stageirus,^ Acanthus, ^ Scolus, Olynthus,* Spartolus : ^ these shall be allies neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians, but if the Athenians succeed in persuading them, having their con- sent, they may make them allies. YII. The Mecybernians, Sanaeans,^ and Singaeans shall dwell in their own cities on the same terms as the Olynthians and Acanthians. YIII. The Lacedaemonians and the allies shall restore Panactum^ to the Athenians. The Athenians shall re- store to the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium,^ Cythera,^ Methon^,io Pteleum, and Atalant^.^i IX. The Athenians shall surrender the Lacedaemo- nian captives whom they have in their public prison, or who are in the public prison of any place within the Athenian dominions, and they shall let go the Pelopon- nesians who are besieged in Sciond, and any other allies of the Lacedaemonians who are in Scione, and all whom Brasidas introduced into the place, ^^ ^nd any of the allies 1 Cp. iv. 103 med. ^ Cp. ii. 79 init. » Cp. iv. 54. 2 Cp. iv. 88 fin. ^ Cp. iv. 109 fin. lo Cp. iv. 45. 8 Cp. iv. 88. 7 Cp. V. 3 fin. η Cp. ii. 32. * Cp. i. 58 med. s Cp. iv. 3 med. 12 Cp. jy. 123 fin. 352 CONCLUSION" OF THE TREATY. B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. V. of the Lacedaemonians Avho are in the public prison at Athens, or in the public prison of any place ivithin the Athenian dominions. The Lacedaemonians and their allies in like manner shall restore those of the Athenians and their allies who are their prisoners. X. Eespecting Scion^,^ Toron^,^ and Sermyle, or any cities which are held by the Athenians, the Athenians shall do with the inhabitants of the said cities, or of any cities which are held by them, as they think fit. XL The Athenians shall bind themselves . by oath to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, city by city, and the oath shall be that which in the several cities of the two contracting parties is deemed the most binding. The oaths shall be in the following form :-* I λυΙΙΙ abide by this treaty and by this peace truly and sincerely.' The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall bind themselves by a similar oath to the Athenians. This oath shall be renewed by both parties every year ; and they shall erect pillars at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, at Athens in the Acropolis, at Lacedaemon in the temple of Apollo at Amyclae. XII. If anything whatsoever be forgotten on one side or the other, either party may, without violation of their oaths, take honest counsel and alter the treaty in such manner as shall seem good to the two parties, the Athe- nians and Lacedaemonians. 19. The treaty begins, at Lacedaemon in the Ephorate of Ratification, Pleistolas, and on the twenty-seventh day of the month Artemisium, and at Athens in the Archonship of Alcaeus, on the twenty-fifth day of the month Elaphebolion.^ The following persons took the oath and ratified the treaty : On behalf of the Lacedaemonians, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Da'ithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus ; on behalf of the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, ^ Cp. V. 32 init. 2 Cp. v. 3. ^ March — April. OPPOSITION OF THE CHALCIDIANS. 353 B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, lolcius, Timo- y. crates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes. This treaty was concluded at the end of winter, just 20. at the beginning of spring, immediately after the City ^^ted a^im?i Dionysia. Ten years, \vith a difference of a few days, ySr?^*^" had passed since the invasion of Attica and the com- mencement of the war. I Avould have a person reckon the actual periods of time, and not rely upon catalogues of the archons or other official personages whose names may be used in different cities to mark the dates of past events. For whether an event occurred in the beginning, or in the middle, or whatever might be the exact point, of a magistrate's term of office is left uncertain by such a mode of reckoning. But if he measure by summers and winters as they are here set down, and count each summer and winter as a half year, he will find that ten summers and ten winters passed in the first part of the war. The Lacedaemonians — for the lot having fallen upon 21. them they had to make restitution first — immediately Tiie Lace- , τ 1 . . Ί τ 1 daemonians released tneir prisoners, and sendms^ three envoys, Ischa- restore their ^ • ^ ^ prisoners, but o^oras, Menas, and Philocharidas, to Chalcidic^, com- P^aridasre^ ^ , ' ' fuses to de- manded Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the liJ?'' VP ^^: ^ i. X phipolis, and Athenians, and the other cities to accept the articles ^^^η^^^^ί of the treaty which severally concerned them. But ^e'^the'*^ they did not approve of the terms, and refused, t^^^ty• Clearidas, who acted in the interest of the Chalcidians, would not give up the place, and said that it was not in his power to do so against their will. Accompanied by envoys from the Chalcidian cities, he himself went direct to Lacedaemon, intending to defend himself in case Ischagoras and his colleagues should accuse him of insubordination ; he also wanted to know whether the treaty could still be reconsidered. On his arrival he found that it was positively concluded, and he himself was sent back to Thrace by the Lacedaemonians, who commanded him to giΛ-e up Amphipolis, or, if he could not, at any rate to withdraw all the Peloponnesian forces from the place. So he returned in haste. 354 DISCOIS-TENT OF THE ALLIES. B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. V. The representatives of the other allies ivere present at 22 Lacedaemon, and the Lacedaemonians urged the re- The allies are luctant states to acccpt the treaty. But they refused but thi Lace- for the same reasons as before, ^ and insisted that they fearing ffie- must havc morc equitable conditions. Finding that tiiitiesfrom tlicy ivould uot comc in, the Lacedaemonians dismissed mifs^tiiem them, and proceeded on their own account to make an alliance witii alliance with the Athenians. They thouo-ht that the Atliens Argives, whose hostile intentions had been manifested by their refusal to renew the peace at the request of Ampelidas and Lichas, the Lacedaemonian envoys who had gone thither, beino• now unsupported by the Athe- nians, would thus be least dangerous and that the rest of Peloponnesus w^ould be least likely to stir. For the Athenian alliance, to which they would otherwise have had recourse, would now be closed to them. There were present at the time Athenian envoys, and after a negotiation the two parties took oaths, and made an alliance, of which the terms were as follows : — 23. The Lacedaemonians shall be allies of the Athenians auiance^*^^ for fifty ycars, on the following conditions : — I. If any enemy invade the Lacedaemonian territory and harm the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedaemonians in any way which they can, and to the utmost of their power ; and'* if the enemy ravage their territory and depart, the offending city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and Athe- nians, and shall suffer at the hands of both of them, and neither city shall cease from war before the other. These things shall be performed honestly, and zealously, and sincerely. II. If any enemy invade the Athenian territory and harm the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians shall assist them in any way which they can, and .to the utmost of their poAver ; and if the enemy ravage their territory and depart, the offending city shall be the enemy of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, and shall suffer at the Ϊ Cp. V. 17 fin. ALLIANCE OF ATHENS AND SPAKTA. 355 B.C. 422 ; 01. 89, 3. hands of both of them, and neither city shall cease from Y. war before the other. These things shall be performed honestly, and zealously, and smcerely. m. If the slaves rebel, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedaemonians with all their might and to the utmost of their power. lY. These provisions shall be sworn to on both sides by the same persons who sΛvore to the former treaty. Every year the Lacedaemonians shall go to Athens at the Dionysia and renew the oath, and the Athenians shall go to Lacedaemon at the Hyacinthia and renew the oath. Both parties shall erect pillars, one in Lace- daemon at the temple of Apollo in Amyclae, another at Athens in the Acropolis at the temple of Athena. Y. If the Lacedaemonians and Athe'nians agree that anything shall be added to or taken away from the treaty of alliance, whatever it be, this may be done without violation of their oaths. On behalf of the Lacedaemonians there took the 24. oaths, Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Eatmcation. Metagenes, Acanthus, Dai'thus, Ischagoras, Philocha- ridas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. On behalf of the Athenians there took the oaths, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Mcias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates,Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes. This alliance was made shortly after the treaty ; at Eestoration the same time the Athenians restored to the Lace- ers taken^af" daemonians the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. The ^p^^°^®"^• summer of the eleventh year then began. During the previous ten years the first war, of which the history has now been written, went on without intermission. The treaty and the alliance which terminated the ten 25. years' war were made in the Ephorate of Pleistolas at ^i^st _ , Ί 1 1 τ Corinth and Lacedaemon, and the Archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, «ther Peio- mi 1 11 ponnesian Ihose who accepted the treaty were now at peace : but ^fi?erwa?ds the Corinthians and several of the Peloponnesian cities *^® ^*^^ 356 THUCYDIDES. B.C. 421 ; 01. 89, 4. B.C. 414 ; 01. 91, 3. y. did what they could to disturb the arrangement. And so ?ifi?s^5SS" ^^efore long a new cause of quarrel set the allies against cmateSt ^^^ ^^® Lacedaemoniaiis ; who also, as time went on, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians, because in certain par- ticulars they would not execute the provisions of the treaty. For six years and ten months the two poAvers abstained from invading each other's territories, but abroad the cessation of arms was intermittent, and they did each other all the harm which they could. At last they were absolutely compelled to break the treaty made at the end of the first ten years, and to declare open war. 26. The same Thucydides of Athens continued the his- The peace torv, folloAviuo' the ordcr of events, which he reckoned was merely " ^ ^ nominal, and \)γ summers aiid Avinters, up to the destruction of the may fairly be " '- ^ reckoned in Athenian empire and the takino: of Piraeus and the the twenty- -■- c5 ^ seven years' Lono^ Walls bv the Lacedacmoiiians and their allies. Avar. The » J prediction of Altoofether the war lasted twenty-seven years, for if any " thrice nine «^ j j ^ j years " was q^^q arsfuc that the interval durinof which the truce con- the only c Ο wS^veiifie? tiiiued should be excluded, he is mistaken. If he have I nfyseKTived I'^gard to the facts of the case, he will see that the term whowa?,^ " peace " can hardly be applied to a state of things in twei5y"ila?s "^^^lich neither party gave back or received all the places me^t^hadthe Stipulated ; morcovcr in the Mantinean and Epidaurian of k^no^il wars and in other matters there were violations of the both sides, treaty on both sides ; the Chalcidian allies maintained their attitude of hostility towards Athens, and the Boeotians observed an armistice terminable at ten days' notice. So that, including the first ten 3'^ears' war, the doubtful truce which followed, and the war which fol- lowed that, he who reckons up the actual periods of time will find that I have rightly given the exact number of years with the difference only of a few^ days. He will also find that this was the solitary instance in which those whg put their faith in oracles were justified by the event. For I Avell remember how, from the beginning to the end of the war, there was a common and often- repeated saying that it was to last thrice nine years. I lived through the whole of it, and was of mature years MOVEMENTS OF ΟΟΚΙΝΤΗ AND ARGOS. 357 B.C. 421 ; 01. 89, 4. and judgment, and I took great pains to make out the V. exact truth. For twenty years I was banished from my country after I held the command at Amphipolis, and associating with both sides, with the Peloponnesians quite as much as with the Atlienians, because of my exile, I Avas thus enabled to watch quietly the course of events. I will now proceed to narrate the quarrels which after the first ten years broke up the treaty, and the events of the war Avhich folloΛved. After the conclusion of the fifty years' peace and of 27. the subsequent alliance, the ambassadors Avho had been ^^^ίί^ϊ^^ο invited to the conference from the other states of Pelo- f^ftex thJ ponnesus left Lacedaemon. They all went home except ^TiTouJ?*^ the Corinthians, Avho turned aside to Argos and opened ίί^"ίϊΙοοηΐθ communication with certain of the Argive magistrates, a^|relt Peio- saying that the Lacedaemonians had made peace and ^oSSacy. alliance with the Athenians, hitherto their mortal ene- mies, to no good end, but for the enslavement of Pelo- ponnesus, and that the Argives Avere bound to take measures for its deliverance. They ought to pass a vote that any independent Hellenic city which would allow a settlement of disputes on equal terms might enter into a defensive alliance with them. The negotiation should not be carried on with the assembly, but the Argives should appoint a few commissioners having full powers, lest if any states appealed to the people and were re- jected their fiiilure should become public. They added that hatred of the Lacedaemonians would induce many to join them. Having offered this recommendation the Corinthians returned home. The Argive magistrates, after hearing these proposals, 28. referred them to their colleagues and the people. The ^e^in^ «ίΙΓ' Argives then passed a vote, and elected twelve com- Jedaemon^^' missioners ; through these any of the Hellenes who nent'Tnd' pleased might make an alliance with them, except the fead'peiopon- Athenians and Lacedaemonians, who could only be ad- w?rm\y into mitted to the league with the sanction of the Argive people. The Argives Avere the more inclined to take 358 ΜΑΝΤΙΝΕΑ JOINS THE NEW ALLIANCE. B.C. 421 ; 01. 89, 4. V. 29. The Man- tineans join tlie Argives. Great uneasi- ness is caused by the powers ■which the treaty gave to the Athe- nians and Lacedaemo- nians. 30 The Lace- daemonians this course because their truce with the Lacedaemonians being about to expire, they saw that war was imminent. Moreover they were encouraged by the hope of be- coming the leaders of Peloponnesus. For at this time the reputation of Lace daemon had fallen very low ; her misfortunes had brought her into contempt, while the resources of Argos were unimpaired. For the Argives had not taken part in the war with Athens, and, being at peace with both parties, had reaped a harvest from them. The first to enter the alliance ofiered by the Argives to any Hellenes Λvho were willing to accept it were the Mantineans and their allies, w^ho joined through fear of the Lacedaemonians. For, during the war Λvith Athens, they had subjected a part of Arcadia, which they thought that the Lacedaemonians, ηοΛν that their hands were free, would no longer allow them to retain. So they gladly joined Argos, reflecting that it was a great city, the constant enemy of Sparta, and, like their own, governed by a democracy. When Mantinea seceded, a murmur ran through the other states of Peloponnesus that they must secede too ; they imagined that the Mantineans had gone OΛ^er to the Argives because they had better infor- mation than themselves, and also they were angry with the Lacedaemonians, chiefly on account of that clause in the treaty with Athens, Λvhich provided that the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, if agreed, might add to or take away from them whatever they pleased.^ This clause aroused great uneasiness among the Pelopon- nesians, and made them suspect that the Lacedaemonians meant to unite with the Athenians in order to enslave them ; ^ they argued that the power of altering the treaty ought to have been given only to the whole confederacy. Entertaining these fears they generally inclined towards Argos, and every state was eager to follow the example of Mantinea and form an alliance Avith her. The Lacedaemonians perceived that great excitement prevailed in Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians had » Cp. V. 18 § 12. 2 cp. iv. 20 fin. LACEDAEMONIAyS AT ΟΟΕΙΝΤΗ. 359 B.C. 421; 01.89,4. inspired it and were themselves on the point of making Y. a treaty with Argos. So they sent envoys to Corinth, Jo^^^J^iSis desiring to anticipate what might happen. They laid ?ieh'aii"'^ the blame of having instigated the whole movement on ^"iSciiTiie the Corinthians, and protested that, if they deserted S^ifthaT them and joined the Argives, they would be forsworn ; b^tiayTife"* indeed they were already much to blame for not accept- cS.'*^'^"^ ing the peace made with Athens, although there was an article in their league which said that what the majority of the allies voted should be binding unless there Λvas some impediment on the part of gods or heroes. Now the Corinthians had previously summoned those of the allies who, like themselves, had rejected the treaty: and, replying in their presence, they were unwilling to speak out and state their grievances, of which the chief was that the Lacedaemonians had not recoΛ'^ered for them SoUium^ or Anactorium.'^ But they pretended that they could not betray their allies in Thrace, to whom when they originally joined in the revolt of Potidaea, they had sworn a separate oath,^ and had afterwards renewed it. They denied therefore that they were violating the terms of the league by refusing to join in the peace with the Athenians ; for, having sworn in the name of the Gods to the Potidaeans, they Avould be violating their oaths if they betrayed them : the treaty said "unless there was some impediment on the part of Gods and heroes," and this did appear to them to be an impediment of that nature. Thus far they pleaded their former oaths ; as to the Argive alliance the}^ Λvould take counsel with their friends, and do what- e\^er was right. So the Lacedaemonians returned home. Now there happened to be at that time Argive envoys present at Corinth who urged the Corinthians to join the alliance without more delay, and the Corinthians told them to come to their next assembly. Soon afterwards envoys from Elis likeT\dse arrived at 31. Corinth, who, first of all making an alliance Avith the SJ^n^P^'^reed' 1 Cp. ii. 30 init. 2 Cp. iv. 49. 3 Cp. i. 58. 360 DISPUTE BETWEEN ELIS AKD LEPREUM. B.C. 421 ; 01. 89, 4. Y. Corinthians, went on to Argos, and became allies of the tothJEieSil Argives in the manner prescribed. Now the Eleans igreem^l ^^^ ^ quarrcl with the Lacedaemonians about the town ported by th? ^^ Lepreum. A war had arisen between the Lepreans nfans^^The and Certain Arcadian tribes, and the Eleans having fagt'jointhe t>een called in by the Lepreans came to assist them, ilaful. The on Condition of receiving half their territory. When aid'chikiidi- they had brought the war to a successful end the Silefiotif" Eleans allowed the inhabitants of Lepreum to culti- andMe^ga-^^^ vatc the land themselves, paying a rent of a talent to Olympian Zeus. Until the Peloponnesian war they had paid the talent, but taking advantage of the Avar they ceased to pay, and the Eleans tried to compel them. The Lepreans then had recourse to the Lace- daemonians, who undertook to arbitrate. The Eleans suspected that they ΛνοηΚΙ not have fair play at their hands ; they therefore disregarded the arbitration and ravaged the Leprean territory. Xevertheless the Lace- daemonians went on with the case and decided that Lepreum was an independent state, and that the Eleans Avere in the wrong. As their award was rejected by the Eleans they sent a garrison of hoplites to Lepreum. The Eleans, considering that the Lacedaemonians had taken into alliance a city Avhich had seceded from them, appealed to the clause of the agreement which provided that whatever places any of the confederates had held previous to the Avar Avith Athens should be retained by them at its conclusion, and acting under a sense of in- justice they now seceded to the Argives and, like the rest, entered into the alliance with them in the manner prescribed. Lnmediately afterwards the Corinthians and the Chalcidians of Thrace joined ; but the Boeotians and the Megarians agreed to refuse,^ and, jealously watched by the Lacedaemonians, stood aloof; for they were well aware that the Lacedaemonian constitution was far more conirenial to their own oliiiarchical form of o-overnment than the Argive democracy. ^ Cp. V. 38 init. THE CORmTHIANS WAYER. 361 B.C. 421 ; 01. 89, 4. During the same summer, and about this time, the Y. i Athenians took Scione, put to death all the grown-up 32. V men, and enslaved the women and children; they then capture of gave possession of the land to the Plataeans. They Eestorktion also replaced the Delians in Delos,^ moved partly by ^^^lians. The the defeats which they had sustained, partly by an oracle ^J|®^g°J^i^i. of the Delphic god. About this time, too, the Phocians g^ifntiiiins and Locrians went to war. The Corinthians and Argives |^,"ΪΙνβ ^e-^ (who were ηοΛν allies) came to Tegea, which they hoped Bo^oUaSs!^^ to withdraw from the Lacedaemonian alliance, thinking that if they could secure so large a district of Pelo- ponnesus they \vould soon have the whole of it. The Tegeans however said that they could have no quarrel with the Lacedaemonians ; and the Corinthians, who had hitherto been zealous in the cause, now began to cool, and Λvere seriously afraid that no other Peloponnesian state would join them. Nevertheless they applied to the Boeotians and begged them to become allies of them- selves and of the Argives, and generally to act with them ; they further requested that they would accompany them. to Athens and procure an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, similar to that which the Athe- nians and Boeotians had made Avith one another shortly after the conclusion of the fifty years' peace. If the Athenians did not agree, then the Corinthians demanded • of the Boeotians that they should renounce the armis- tice and for the future make no truce without them. The Boeotians on receiving this request desired the Corinthians to say no more about alliance with the Argives. But they went together to Athens, w^here the Boeotians failed to obtain the* armistice for the Corinthians, the Athenians replying that the original truce 2 extended to them, if they were allies of the Lace- daemonians. The Boeotians however did not renounce their own armistice, although the Corinthians expostu- lated, and argued that such had been the agreement. Cp. V. 1. 2 cp. V. 18. 362 THE PRISOiTERS FROM ^HE ISLAIO). B.C. 421 ; 01. Y. 33. The Lace- daemonians free the Parrhasians from the Mantiueans. 34. The Helots who served with Brasidas are emanci- pated and settled at Lepreum. The prisoners from the island are for a time de- prived of citizenship. Thus the Corinthians had only a suspension of hostilities with Athens, but no regular truce. During the same summer the Lacedaemonians with their whole force, commanded by their King Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, made war upon the Parrhasians of Arcadia, who were subjects of the Mantineans.^ They had been invited by a faction among the Parrhasians ; and moreover they wanted to demolish a fortress in the Parrhasian town of Cypsela, threatening the Laconian district of Sciritis, which the Mantineans had built and garrisoned. The Lacedaemonians devastated the country of the Parrhasians ; and the Mantineans, leaving the custody of their ΟΛνη city to a force of Argives, them- selves garrisoned the territory of their allies. But being unable to save either the fort of Cypsela or the cities of Parrhasia, they went home again ; whereupon the Lace- daemonians, having demolished the fort and restored the independence of the Parrhasians, returned home likewise. In the course of the same summer the troops seiwing in Thrace, which had gone out under Brasidas and were brought home by Clearidas after the conclusion of peace, arrived at Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians passed a A^ote that the Helots who had fought under Brasidas should be free and might dwell wherever they pleased. Not long afterwards, being now enemies of the Eleans, they settled them, together with the Neodamodes, at Lepreum, which is on the borders of Laconia and Elis. Fearino: lest their own citizens Λyho had been taken in the island and had dehvered up their arms might expect to be slighted in consequence of their mis- fortune, and, if they retained the pj-ivileges of citizens, would attempt revolution, they took away the right of citizenship from them, although some of them were holding office at the time. By this qualification they Λvere deprived of their eligibility to offices, and of the legal right to buy and sell. In time, however, their privileges were restored to them. 1 Cp. V. 29 init. DISPUTES ABOUT THE TEEATY. 363 B.C. 421; 01.89,4. Durino' this summer the Dictidians took Thyssus, a V. town of Mount Athos, which was in alliance with the 35^ Athenians. During the Λvhole summer intercourse con- TheLace- tinued between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. But dSn'St giv^up almost as soon as the peace was concluded both Athe- TheAthe- . . nians retain nians and Lacedaemonians beo^an to mistrust one another, Pyios. They •-=' . agree hOAV- because the places mentioned in the treaty w^ere not ever to witii- •■■ ^ draw the given up. For the Lacedaemonians, who were to make ^^®|^^^;j^ restitution first, according to the lot, had not surren- dered Amphipolis and the other less important places which they held, and had not made their allies in Chalcidice, nor the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians accept the treaty, but only kept declaring that they would join the Athenians in coercing them if they contmued to refuse. They even fixed a time, though they did not commit themselves in Λvriting, within which those who would not come into the treaty w^ere to be declared the enemies of both parties. The Athenians, seeing that nothing was being really done, suspected the Lacedaemo- nians of dishonesty, and therefore they would not give up Pylos when requested to do so by the Lacedaemonians ; they even repented that they had restored the prisoners taken at Sphacteria, and resolved to keep the other places until the Lacedaemonians had fulfilled their part of the contract. The Lacedaemonians replied that they had done what they could. They had delivered up the Athenian prisoners who were in their hands, and had withdraAvn their soldiers from Chalcidice ; they had neg- lected nothing which lay within their power. But they could not give away Amphipolis, of which they were not entirely masters ; they Avould however try to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians into the treaty, to get back Panactum, and recover all the Athenian captives who were in the hands of the Boeotians. They still con- tinued to insist on the restoration of Pylos, or at any rate on the withdrawal of the Messenians and Helots, now that the Lacedaemonians had Λvithdrawn their troops from Chalcidice ; the Athenians might, if they liked, 364 WAE ΡΑΚΤΥ m POWER AT SPARTA. B.C. 421 ; 01. 89, 4. V. garrison the place themselves. After many long con- ferences, held during the summer, they persuaded the Athenians to withdraw the Messenians, Helots, and Lacedaemonian deserters : these the Athenians settled at Cranii in Cephallenia. So during this summer there /as peace and intercourse between Athens and Sparta. 36. Before the folloAving Avinter the Ephors under whom NeAvEphors the Dcace was concluded were succeeded by others, of come into •*• ^ ' office, who whom some were actually opposed to it. Durins^ the are m the m- ^ ri ο terest of the winter cmbassics from the allied states arrived at Sparta, Avar party. -i ' thaTthT^^^^ including representatives of Athens , Boeotia , and Corinth , SiTn fiSt join ^^^uch Avas said with no result. As the ambassadors were and cofin^ departing, Cleobulus and Xenares, the Ephors who were anS^aS' Hiost dcslrous of renewing the war, entered into a private oncuethe negotiation with the Boeotians and Corinthians, recom- th?Lace^^^^ mending them to unite as closely as possible, and sug- daemonians. g^sting that the Bocotiaus should first enter the Argive alliance and then try and make the Argives, as Λν^Ι as themselves, allies of the Lacedaemonians. The Boeo- tians w^ould thus escape the necessity of accepting the peace with Athens ; for the Lacedaemonians would prefer the friendship and alliance of Argos to an^^thing which they might lose by the enmity of Athens and the dissolution of the treaty. The two Ephors kneΛv that a satisfactory alliance with Argos was an object Avhich the Lacedaemonians always had at heart, perceiving as they did that it would enable them to carry on the war beyond the Peloponnesus with greater freedom. At the same time they entreated the Boeotians to give up Panactum to the Lacedaemonians, in order that they might ex- change it for P^dos, and so be in a better position for .enewins: the war with Athens. 37. The Boeotians and Corinthians, having received from TheBoeo- Xenares and Cleobulus and their other Lacedaemonian tians agree. Two Argives friends the instructions Avhich they Avere to convey to make a simi- "^ ^ ... lar proposal their Ο wn cfovernments , returned to their respective cities. to them. c> ' ... /T> 1 1 J On their way home two Argives high in office, who had been waiting for them on the road, entered into com- ARGIYES KEGOTIATE WITH BOEOTIANS. 365 B.C. 421 ; 01. 89, 4, munications with them, in the hope that the Boeotians, Y. like the Corinthians, Eleans, and^Iantineans, might join their alliance ; if this could only be accomplished, and they could act together, the}^ might easily, they said, go to Avar or make peace, either with Lacedaemon or with any other power. The Boeotian envo3's were pleased at the proposal, for it so happened that the request of the Argives coincided with the instructions of their Lace- daemonian friends. AYhereupon the Argives, finding that their proposals were acceptable to the Boeotians, promised to send an embassy to them, and so departed. When the Boeotians returned home they told the Boeo- tarchs Avhat they had heard, both at Lacedaemon and from the Argives Avho had met them on their way. The Boeotarchs were glad, and their zeal was quickened when they discovered that the request made to them by their friends in Lacedaemon fell in with the projects of the Argives. Soon afterwards the envoys from Argos ap- peared, inviting the Boeotians to fulfil their engagement. The Boeotarchs encouraged their proposals, and dis- missed them ; promising that they would send envoys of their own to negotiate the intended alliance. In the meantime the Boeotarchs and the envoys from 38. Corinth, Meo-ara, and Chalcidice determined that they ^^**H. ' "-■ ' '^ negotiation Avould take an oath to one another, pledging themselves f^^fg^'Sf/ou^ ^ to assist whichever of them was at any time in need, ^InT"^^^ and not go to war or make peace without the consent of all. When they had got thus far, the Megarians and Boeotians, who acted together in the matter,^ were to enter into an agreement with the Argives. But before the oath was sworn, the Boeotarchs communi- cated their intentions to the Four Councils of the Boeotians, whose sanction is always necessary, and urged that oaths should be offered to any cities which were willing to join ivith them for mutual protection. But the Boeotian Councils, fearing that they might ofi'endthe Lacedaemonians if they took oaths to the Corinthians ' Cp. V. 31 fin. δββ PYLOS AND PANACTUM. B.C. 421 ; 01. 89, 4. V. who had seceded from them, rejected their proposal. For the Boeotarchs did not tell them what had passed at Lacedaemon, and how two of the Ephors, Cleobulus and Xenares,and their friends, had advised them first to become allies of Argos and Corinth, and then to make a further alliance with the Lacedaemonians. They thought that the Councils, whether informed of this or not, would be sure to ratify their foregone decision when it was communicated to them. So the plan broke down, and the Corinthian and the Chalcidian envoys went away Avithout efiecting their purpose. The Boeotarchs, who had originally intended, if they succeeded, to extend the alliance if possible to the Argives, gave up the idea of bringing this latter measure before the Councils. They did not fulfil their promise of sending envoys to Argos, but the whole business was neglected and deferred. 39. During the same winter the Olynthians made a sudden The Lace- attack upoii Mecvbema,^ w^hich was held by an Athe- daemonians ^ ^ '^ \ ^ ^ wanting to niaii ^'arnson, and took it. The Athenians and Lace- recover pyios . . persuade the dacmoniaiis still continued to neo^otiate about the places Boeotians, c ^ ^ ^ the^maite ^^l^ich had uot bceii restored, the Lacedaemonians hoping ^mF,^n^^t tliat, if the Athenians 2rot back Panactum from the alliance, to ' ο Knactum. Bocotiaus, they might themselves recover Pylos. So they sent an embassy to the Boeotians, and begged of them to give up Panactum and the Athenian prisoners to themselves, that they might obtain Pylos in return for them. But the Boeotians refused to give them up, unless the Lacedaemonians made a separate alliance with them as they had done with the Athenians. Now the Lacedaemonians knew that, if they acceded to this request, they would be dealing unfairly with Athens, because there was a stipulation which forbade either state to make war or peace Avithout the consent of the other ; but they were eager to obtain Panactum and thereby, as they hoped, recover Pylos . At the same time the party who wished to break the peace with Athens were zealous on behalf of the Boeotians. So they made the 1 Cp. V. 18, § 7. ALAKM AT ARGOS. 367 B.C. 420 ; 01. 90. alliance about the end of winter and the beginning of V. spring. The Boeotians at once commenced the demolition of Panactum ; and the eleventh year of the war ended. Immediately on the commencement of spring, the, 40. Argives, observing that the envoj^s whom the Boeotians ^^fa^^^^e^^f promised to send had not arrived, that Panactum was f^JagreT^" being demolished, and that a private alliance had been BoJotSn?^ made between the Lacedaemonians and the Boeotians, ^οηι^ηϊΐη^' began to fear that they \vould be isolated, and that the ^^pos^S whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedaemonians. 4*Suded? For they thought that the Boeotians were demolishing Panactum by the desire of the Lacedaemonians, and had likewise been induced by them to come into the Athenian treaty : and that the Athenians were cognizant of the whole affair But, if so, they could no longer form an alliance even with Athens, although they had hitherto imagined that the enmity of the two powers would secure them an alliance with one or the other, and that if they lost the peace with Lacedaemon they might at any rate become allies of the Athenians. So in their perplexity, fearing that they might have to fight Lacedaemon, Tegea, Boeotia, and Athens all at once, the Argives, who at the time when they were proudly hoping to be the leaders of Peloponnesus had refused to make a treaty with Lacedaemon, now sent thither two envoys, Eustrophus and Aeson, who were likely to be Λν^Ι regarded by the Spartans. For under present circumstances it seemed to them that nothino; better could be done than to make a treaty with the Lace- daemonians on whatever terms, and keep out of war. The envoys arrived, and began to confer with the 41. Lacedaemonians respectino- the conditions on which the Tbey send 1 111 1 n^ * . envoys to peace should be made, ihe Archives at first demanded Lacedae- mon, who, that the old quarrel about the border-land of Cynuria, a -'^^fi ,, , J ' making a district Avhich contains the cities of Thvrea and An- fo^iisii stip- «/ Illation thend and is occupied by the Lacedaemonians, should cyn^ria be referred to the arbitration of some state or pei'son. ^o^PfuJ^^ Of this the Lacedaemonians would not allow a word 368 ARGIYES NEGOTIATE AT LACEDAEMOK B.C. 420 ; 01. 90. a peace with the Lacedaemo- nians for fifty years. 42. Indignation of the Athe- nians at the separate alliance and at the demolition of Panactum, which should have been re- stored intact. to be said, but they professed their readiness to renew the treaty on the old terms. The Argives at length induced them to make a fifty years' peace, on the un- derstanding however that either Lacedaemon or Argos, provided that neither city were suffering at the time from war or plague, might challenge the other to fight for the disputed territory, as they had done once before when both sides claimed the victory ; but the conquered party was not to be pursued over their own border. The Lacedaemonians at first thought that this proposal was' nonsense ; however, as they were desirous of having the friendship of Argos on any terms, they assented, and drew up a written treaty . But they desired the envoys, before any of the provisions took effect, to return and lay the matter before the people of Argos ; if they agreed, they were to come again at the Hyacinthia and take the oaths. So they departed. While the Argives were thus engaged, the envoys of the Lacedaemonians — Andromedes, Phaedimus, and Antimenidas — who were appointed to receive Panac- tum and the prisoners from the Boeotians, and give them up to the Athenians, found Panactum already demolished by the Boeotians. They alleged that the Athenians and Boeotians in days of old had quar- relled about the place, and had sworn that neither of them should inhabit it, but both enjoy the use of it. However, Andromedes and his colleagues conveyed the Athenian prisoners who were in the hands of the Boeotians to Athens, and restored them ; they further announced the destruction of Panactum, maintaining that they were restoring that too,^ inasmuch as no enemy of the Athenians could any longer dwell there. Their words raised a violent outcry among the Athe- nians ; they felt that the Lacedaemonians were dealing unfairly with them in two respects : first, there was the demolition of Panactum, which should have been de- 1 Or, "maintaining that this," i.e., its destruction, " was equivalent to its restoration" {καΐ τοϋτο, τήν κ.αθαίρεσίν, άηόδοσιρ alvai). ALCIBIADES. 369 B.C. 420 ; 01. 90. liyered standing ; secondly, they were informed of the V. separate alliance which the Lacedaemonians had made Avith the Boeotians, notwithstanding their promise that they would join in coercing those who did not accept the peace. They called to mind all their other short- comings in the fulfilment of the treaty, and conscious that they had been deceived, they answered the envoys ^^. roughly, and sent them away. When the difference between the Lacedaemonians 43. and Athenians had gone thus far, the war party at ^^fyoutSld Athens in their turn lost no time in pressing their views. itade?l?ri- Foremost among them was Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, ^yant of *^^ a man who would have been thought young in any other sSS^^^^Mm city, but ivas influential by reason of his high descent : dLmmiians", he sincerely preferred the Argive alliance, but at the at AtSi^.^"^ same time he took part against the Lacedaemonians from temper, and because his pride was touched. For they had not consulted him, but had negotiated the peace through Mcias and Laches, despising his youth, and disregarding an ancient connection with his family, who had been their proxeni; a connection which his grandfather had renounced, and he, by the attention which he had paid to the captives from Sphacteria, had hoped to have renewed. Piqued at the small respect which was shown to all his claims, he had originally opposed the negotiations ; declaring that the Lacedae- monians were not to be trusted, and that their only object in making terms was that they might by Athe- nian help crush the Argives, and afterwards attack the Athenians themselves ivhen they had no friends. As soon as the rupture occurred he promptly despatched a private message to the Argives, bidding them send an embassy as quickly as they could, together with repre- sentatives of Mantinea and Elis, and invite the Athenians to enter the alliance ; now Λvas the time, and he would do his utmost to assist them. The Argives received his message, and thus became 44. aware that the alliance with the Boeotians had been ^estion tiS 24 370 THE SPARTAN EMBASSY. B.C. 420 ; Ol. 90. ' Y. made without the consent of the Athenians, and that a Argives Λνΐιο violent QuaiTel had broken out between Athens and »ΓΘ ^^)ίΙΓΐΙ^ 111- thinSmoiT L^'Cedaemon. So they thought no more about their cinneSioi''* auibassadors who w^ere at that very moment negotiating deiuociSic ^^^® peace with Lacedaemon, but turned their thoughts S also by towards Athens. They reflected that Athens was a city navaiTm-^^ Avhich had been their friend of old ; ^ like their own it AtheuianV*^^ '^'«^s govcmed by a democracy, and would be a powerful ally to them at sea, if thej^ were invoh^ed in war. They at once sent envoys to negotiate an alliance with the Athenians ; the Eleans and Mantineans joined in the embassy. Thither also came in haste three envoys from Lacedaemon, who were thought likely to be ac- ceptable at Athens — Philocharidas, Leon, andEndius.^ They were sent because the Lacedaemonians were afraid that the Athenians in their anger would join the Argive alliance. The envoys, while they demanded the restora- tion of Pylos in return for Panactum, were to apologize for the alliance with the Boeotians, and to explain that it was not made with any view to the injury of Athens. 45. The}^ delivered their message to the council, adding Aicibiades by that thcv camc with full power to treat about all difFer- a trick cle- *^ ceivestiie . euccs. Alcibiadcs took alarm; he feared that if the Lacedaemo- nian envoys, euvovs made a similar statement to the people they would They are per- «^ i i ./ suadedto ^yin them over to their side, and that the Archive alliance deny m the ' ^ t!> ^owCTs whiih "^0^1^ be rejected. Whereupon he devised the following SoViedJecf" trick : he solemnly assured the Lacedaemonians that if they would not communicate to the people the extent of their powers, he Avould restore Pylos to them, for he would use his influence in their favor instead of against them, and Avould arrange their other differences. But his real aim all the time was to alienate them from Mcias, and to bring about an alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, Avhich he hoped to eflTect, if he could only discredit them in the assembly, and create the impression that their intentions were not honest, and that they never told the same tale twice. And he 1 Cp. i. 102 fin. Cp. viii. 6 med. in the council. IRRI TATION AT ATHENS. 371 B.C. 420 ; 01. 90. succeeded; for when the envoys appeared before the V. assembly, and in answer to the question whether they had full powers replied "No," in direct contradiction to what they had said in the council, the patience of the Athenians was exhausted, and Alcibiades declaimed ao-ainst the Lacedaemonians more violently than ever. The people Λvere carried away and were ready to have in the Arsfives, and make an alliance with them and their confederates on the spot. But an earthquake occurred before the final vote was taken and the as- sembly w^as adjourned. The trick which had deceived the Lacedaemonians 46. themselves completely deceived Nicias, who could not c5?es"SSc1as, understand the disavowal of their powers. Neverthe- SieJIIon- less in the assembly which met on the following day piS-t ^ίά^^ he still continued to maintain that the Athenians ought hel^SfmsTii to prefer the friendship of Sparta, and not to conclude m^nd^atf^ the Argive alliance until they had sent to the Lacedae- spa?S! ^The monians and ascertained their intentions. He urged fSf?^^^^^^ them not to renew the war now, when it could be put oif with honor to themselves and discredit to the Lace- daemonians ; they were successful and should seek to preserve their good fortune as long as they could, but the Lacedaemonians were in a bad way, and Avould be only too glad to fight as soon as possible at all hazards. And he prevailed on them to send envoys, of whom he was himself one, requiring the Lacedaemonians, if they w^ere sincere in their intentions, to rebuild and restore Panactum, to restore Amphipolis, and to renounce their alliance with the Boeotians unless they came into the treaty, according to the stipulation which forbade the contracting parties to make a new alliance except by mutual consent. If we, they added, had wanted to deal unfairly, we should already have accepted an alliance with the Argives, Avhose ambassadors have come hither to ofier it. They entrusted the representation of these and their other grievances to Nicias and his colleagues, and sent them away to Sparta. On their arrival they 372 TEE AT Υ BETWEEN ATHENS AND AKGOS. B.C. 420 ; 01. 90. V. 47. Terms of an alliance be- tween the Athenians and the Argive con- federacy. delivered their message, which they concluded by de- claring that unless the Lacedaemonians renounced their alliance with the Boeotians in case the latter still refused to accept the peace, the Athenians on their part would enter into an alliance with the Argives and their con- federates. The Lacedaemonians refused to give up their Boeotian alliance, Xenares the Ephor, with his friends and partisans, carrying this point. However they con- sented to ratify their former oaths at the request of Nicias, who was afraid that he would return without having settled anything, and would incur the blame of failure, as indeed he did, because he was held to be responsible for the original treaty with the Lacedae- monians. When the Athenians learned on his return that the negotiations with Sparta had miscarried, they were furious ; and acting under a sense of injustice, entered into an alliance with the Argives and their allies, whose ambassadors were present at the time, for Alcibiades had introduced them on purpose. The terms were as follows : — I. The Athenians and the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, on their own behalf and that of the allies over whom they severally rule, make a peace to continue for a hundred years both by sea and land, without fraud or hurt. The Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies shall not make war asrainst the Athenians and the allies over whom they rule, and the Athenians and their allies shall not make war against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, in any sort or manner. II. Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea shall be allied for a hundred years on the following conditions : — If enemies invade the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to Athens and render the Athenians any assistance Λvhich they may demand of them, in the most effectual manner and to the utmost of their power. And if the enemy spoil their territory and depart, the offending city shall be an TEE AT γ BETWEEN ATHENS AND ARGOS. 373 B.C. 420 ; 01. 90. enemy to Argos, Mantinea, Elis, and Athens, and suffer at the hands of all these cities ; and it shall not be law- ful for any of them to make peace Λvith the offending city unless they have the consent of all the rest. And if enemies shall invade the territory of the Eleans or Argives or Mantineans, the Athenians shall go to Argos, Mantinea, or Elis, and render these cities any assistance which they may demand of them, in the most effectual manner and to the utmost of their power. If an enemy spoil their territory and depart, the offending city shall be an enemy to Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, and shall suffer at the hands of all these cities ; and it shall not be lawful for any of them to make peace with the offending city unless they have the consent of all the rest. m. The confederates shall not allow armed men to pass through their own territory, or that of the allies over whom they severally rule or may rule, or to pass by sea, with hostile intent, unless all the cities have formally consented to their passage — that is to say, Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis. TV. The city which sends troops to help another shall supply them with provisions for thirty days, counting from the time of their arrival at the city which summons them ; it shall also provide for them at their departure. But if the city Avhich summons the troops wishes to employ them for a longer time, it shall give them pro- visions at the rate of three Aeginetan obols^ a day for heavy-armed and light-armed troops and for archers, and an Aeginetan drachma ^ for cavalry. V. The city which sent for the troops shall have the command when the war is carried on in her territory. Or, if the allied cities agree to send out a joint expedi- tion, then the command shall be equally shared among all the cities. YI. The Athenians shall swear to the peace on their own behalf and on that of their alUes ; the Argives, Ϊ About Sd. 2 About Is. 4d. 374 TREATY BETWEEii ATHENS AND AEGOS. B.C. 420 ; 01. 90. V. Mantineans, and Eleans, and their allies shall swear city by city. The oath shall be taken over full-grown victims, and shall be that oath which in the countries of the several contracting parties is deemed the most binding. The form of oath shall be as follows : — "I will be true to the alliance, and will observe the agreement in all honesty and without fraud or hurt ; I will not transgress it in any way or manner." ttfelSiSfa-'^'' ^t Athens the senate and the home magistrates shall treaty^aid swcar, and the Prj^tanes shall administer the oath ; at for changes, ^^.g^g j-^^q senate and the council of eighty and the Artynae shall swear, and the eighty shall administer the oath ; at Mantinea the demiurgi and the senate and the other magistrates shall swear, and the theori and the polemarchs shall administer the oath. At Elis the demiurgi and the supreme magistrates and the six hundred shall swear, and the demiurgi and the guardians of the law shall administer the oath. Thirty days be- fore the Olympian games the Athenians shall go to Elis, to Mantinea, and to Argos, and renew the oath. Ten days before the Great Panathenaea the Argives, Eleans, and Mantinaeans shall go to Athens and renew the oath. The agreement concerning the treaty and the oaths and the alliance shall be inscribed on a stone column in the Acropolis by the Athenians, by the Ar- gives on a similar column in the temple of Apollo in the Agora, and by the Mantinaeans in the temple of Zeus in the Agora. They shall together erect at Olympia a brazen column at the coming Olympic games. And if these cities think it desirable to make any change in the treaty, they shall add to the provisions of it. What- ever the cities agree upon in common shall hold good. 48. Thus the peace and the alliance were concluded. Sis ?Siiie^"o Nevertheless the previous treaty between the Lacedae- ArSiv^sin monians and the Athenians was not on that account Suatce!'''^'' renounced by either party. The Corinthians, although allies of the Argives, took no part in the new alliance ; they had already refused to swear to an oifensive and ELIS ΑΉ Ώ LACEDAEMON. 375 B.C. 420 ; 01. 90. defensive alliance Avhich the Eleans, Argives, and Man- V. tineans had previously made Avith one another. They said that they were satisfied with the original defensive alliance which bound them only to assist one another when attacked, but not to join in offensive movements. Thus the Corinthians severed themselves from the allies, and were again beginning to turn their thoughts to the Lacedaemonians . During the summer the Olympic games were cele- 49. brated, the Olympiad being that in which Androsthenes, '^^^^^^^^^ξ' an Arcadian, won his first victory in the pancratium. IJ^'J^^he The Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple by ^l^f^^ the the Eleans, and so could neither sacrifice nor contend fiey hid^a? in the games. For they had refused to pay the fine cuiandS?-"^' ivhich, according to Olympic law, the Eleans had im- Lep^eum dm•- posed upon them, alleging that they had brought an p"f iJ^^c?/ind armed force against the fortress of Phyrcus, and had ^ pay^the^ introduced some hoplites of their own into Lepreum SponTC^ during the Olympic truce. The fine amounted to two thousand minae,^ being Uyo minae^ for each hoplite, which is the penalty imposed by the law. The Lace- daemonians sent envoys who argued that the sentence Avas unjust, for at the time Λvhen their troops entered Lepreum the truce had not been announced at Lace- daemon. The Eleans replied that the truce (which they always proclaim first to themselves) had already begun with them, and that while they were quietly observing the truce, and expecting nothing less, the Lacedaemo- nians had treacherously attacked them. The Lacedae- monians rejoined by asking why the Eleans proclaimed the truce at all at Lacedaemon if they considered them to have broken it already — they could not really have thought so when they made the proclamation ; and from the moment Avhen the announcement reached Lacedae- mon all hostilities had ceased. The Eleans were still positive that the Lacedaemonians Λvere in the wrong, and said that they would never be persuaded of the contrary. 1 About £8125. 2 About £8 2s. Qd, 376 THE OLYMPIC GAMES. B.C. 420 ; 01. 90. y. 50. Fear of a dis- turbance at the games, which turns out to be unfounded. But if the Lacedaemonians were willing to restore Le- preum to them, they offered to remit their own share of the penalty, and pay on their behalf that part which was due to the God. As this proposal was rejected, the Eleans made an- other : the Lacedaemonians need not give up Lepreum if they did not like, but since they wanted to have access to the temple of Olympian Zeus, they might go up to his altar and swear before all the Hellenes that they would hereafter pay the fine. But neither to this offer ΛνοηΜ the Lacedaemonians agree ; they were therefore excluded from the temple and from the sacrifices and games, and sacrificed at home. The other Hellenes, ivith the exception of the inhabitants of Lepreum, sent representatives to Olympia. The Eleans however, fear- ing that the Lacedaemonians would force their way into the temple and offer sacrifice, had a guard of young men under arms ; there came to their aid likewise a thousand Argives, and a thousand Mantineans, and certain Athenian horsemen, who had been awaiting the celebration of the festival at Argos. The whole assembly were in terror lest the Lacedaemonians should come upon them in arms, and their fears were redoubled when Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus, was struck by the officers. As a Lacedaemonian he had been excluded from the lists, but his chariot had been entered in the name of the Boeotian state, and was declared victorious. He had then come forward into the arena and placed a garland on the head of his charioteer, wishing to show that the chariot was his own. When the blows were given the anxiety became intense, and every one thought that something serious would happen. But the Lace- daemonians did not stir, and the festival passed off quietly. The Olympic games being over, the Argives and their allies w^ent to Corinth, and requested the Corinthians to join them. An embassy from Lacedaemon was also present. After much discussion nothing ivas concluded, ALCI BIADES IIST FEL0F0JOO:SUS. 377 B.C. 420 ; 01. 90. B.C. 419 ; 01. 90, 2. for an earthquake broke up the assembly, and the envoys V. from the several states returned home. So the summer ended. In the following whiter there w^as a battle between 51. the Heracleans of Trachis and the Aenianians, Dolopes, ^I^^^J; Malians, and certain Thessalians. These were neigh- ^^^atedtg^he boring Wbes hostile to the place, for it was in order to *^^^^^• control them that the place was originally fortified ; they had been enemies to it from the first, and had done it all the damage in their power. In this battle they gained a victory over the Heracleans. Xenares, son of Cnidis, the Lacedaemonian governor, and many of the Hera- cleans were killed. Thus ended the winter, and with it the twelfth year of the war. At the besfinnins^ of the foUowino^ summer the Boeo- 52. tians took possession of Heraclea, w^hich after the battle ^j^ns^take was in a miserable plight. They dismissed Hegesippidas, gJ^acSa^ ^^ the Lacedaemonian governor, for his misconduct, ^ and occupied the place themselves. They were afraid that now, when the Lacedaemonians were embroiled in Pelo- ponnesus, the Athenians would take it if they did not. But, for all that, the Lacedaemonians were ofiended. During the same summer, Alcibiades, the son of Activity of Cleinias, now one of the Athenian generals, acting iiiAchaiaand concert with the Aro-ives and their allies, led into Pelo- Peiopon- ^ nesus. ponnesus a small Athenian force of hoplites and archers. He collected other troops from the Athenian allies in the Peloponnese, and, marching with his army through the country, organized the affairs of the confederacy. Coming to Patrae, he persuaded the citizens to build walls reach- inof down to the sea. He was intendino- also to erect a fort ο ο himself on the promontory of Rhium in Achaia. But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and others to whose interests the fort would have been injurious, came and prevented him. In the same summer there broke out a war between the 53. Epidaurians and the Ari^ives. The occasion of the war The Argives on a flimsy was as follows :-The Epidaurians were bound to send a pretext 1 Cp. iii. 93 fin. 378 THE ΜΟΝΤΗ CARNEUS. B.C. 419 ; 01. 90, 2. V. victim as a tribute for the water meadows^ to the SaiSsttL temple of Apollo Pythaeus over which the Argives had Epidaurians. ^j^i^f authority, and they had not done so. But this charge was a mere pretext ; for in any case Alcibiades and the Argives had determined, if possible, to attach Epidaurus to their league, that they might keep the Corinthians quiet, and enable the Athenians, to bring forces to Aro-os direct from Aeo^ina instead of sailing: ο ο ο round the promontory of Scyllaeum. So the Argives prepared to invade Epidauria, as if they wished on their own account to exact payment of the sacrifice. 54. About the same time the Lacedaemonians with their daeiion^tns "^^ιοίβ forcc, uudcr the command of King Agis the son make™^° of ArcMdamus, likewise made an expedition. They are defefred Hiarchcd as far as Leuctra, a place on their own frontier fices^andtue 11^ the direction of Mount Lycaeum. No one, not even SielatteT*^' the citics Avhence the troops came, knew whither the evaSby the expedition was going. But at the frontier the sacrifices goinAvlth the proved unfavorable ; so they returned, and sent word to Safiist'^^ their allies that, when the coming month was over, which pi aurus. ^^^ Camcus, a month held sacred by the Dorians, they should prepare for an expedition. When they had re- treated, the Argives, setting out on the twenty-seventh day of the month before Carneus, and continuing the observance of this day during the whole time of the expedition, invaded and devastated the territory of Epidaurus. The Epidaurians summoned their allies, but some of them refused to come, pleading the sanctity of the month ; others came as far as the frontier of Epidauria and there stopped. 55. AYhile the Argives were in Epidauria, envoys from the held Ι'ΓμΙπ- difiTerent cities met at Mantinea, on the invitation of the between Epi- Athenians . A conference was held , at which Euphamidas Sios^inter- the CoHnthian remarked that their words and their theifrtnewed. actious Averc at Variance ; for they were conferring about peace Avhile the Epidaurians and their allies were in the field against the Argives ; first let envo3^s from both * Or, reading βοταμίων, a άπαξ Ιε^όμενον, simply " the meadows." WAR BETWEEN EPIDAUEUS ΑΝΏ ARGOS. 379 B.C. 419 ; 01. 90, 2. parties go and induce the armies to disband, and then V. they might come back and discuss the peace. His adΛάce was approved; so they went straight to the Argives and compelled them to withdraw from Epi- dauria. But, when they re-assembled, they were still unable to agree, and the Argives again invaded and began to ravage the Epidaurian territory. Whereupon the Lacedaemonians likewise made an expedition as far as Caryae ; but again the sacrifices at the frontier proved unfavorable, and they returned home. The Argives, after devastating about one-third of Epidauria, also returned home. One thousand Athenian hoplites, under the command of Alcibiades, had come to their aid. But hearing that the Lacedaemonian expedition was over, and seeing that there was no longer any need of them, they departed. And so passed the summer. In the following winter the Lacedaemonians, unknown 56. to the Athenians, sent by sea to Epidaurus a orarrison of TheLace- •^ ■"■ " daemonians three hundred under the command of Ao^esippidas. The send a gan-i- o ^^ son oy sea to Arofives came to the Athenians and complained that, Epidaurus. C I ' The Argives notwithstanding the clause in the treatj^ Avhich forbade ^^^^^^^h?^^^ the passage of enemies through the territory of any of i^noJiJfg'^ife ' " " ~ " Lacedaemo- nians to pass. The Athe- nians declare did not retaliate by replacing the Messenians and Helots Soken?^^ in Pylos, and letting them ravage Laconia, they, the Argives, would consider themselves Avronged. The Athenians, by the advice of Alcibiades, inscribed at the foot of the column on which the treaty was re- corded ^ words to the effect that the Lacedaemonians had not abided by their oaths, and thereupon conveyed the Helots recently settled at Cranii^ to Pylos that they might plunder the country, but they took no further steps. During the winter the war between the Argives and Epidaurians continued ; there was no regular engagement, but there were ambuscades and incursions in w^hich losses were inflicted, now on one ' Cp. V. 47. § 3. 2 cp. V. 18. § 4; 23. § 5. 3 Cp. v. 35 fxii. the contracting parties, ^ they had allowed the Lacedae- ^Si^tipT monians to pass by sea along the Argive coast. If they TiieAthe- 380 LACEDAEMONIANS MAEU WAK UPOIST AEGOS. B.C. 419 ; 01. 90, 2. B.C. 418 ; 01. 90, 3. 57. The Lacedae- monians at length, take the field in earnest. Their allies muster at Phlius. 58. The Argives and their allies march into Arcadia ; there they find the Lace- daemonians isolated. But Agis evades them and joins the rest of the army at Phlius. side, now on the other. At the end of the winter, when the spring was approaching, the Argives came with scaling-ladders against Epidaurus, expecting to find that the place was stripped of its defenders by the war, and could be taken by storm. But the attempt failed, and they returned. So the winter came to an end, and with it the thirteenth year of the war. In the middle of the following summer, the Lacedae- monians, seeing that their Epidaurian allies were in great distress, and that several cities of Peloponnesus had seceded from them, Λvhile others were disafiected, and knowing that if they did not quickly take measures of precaution the evil Avould spread, made war on Argos with their whole forces, including the Helots, under the command of Agis the son Archi damns, the Lacedae- monian kino^. The Teo-eans and the other Arcadian allies of the Lacedaemonians took part in the expedi- tion. The rest of their allies, both from within and without the Peloponnesus, mustered at Phlius. Among the other contingents there came from Boeotia five thousand heavy-armed, and as many light-armed, five hundred cavalry, and attached to each horseman a foot- soldier ; and from Corinth two thousand heavy-armed, while the Phliasians joined ivith their whole force, be- cause the army was to assemble in their country. The Argives, having had previous notice of the Lace- daemonian preparations, and seeing that they were actually on their march to join the rest of the army at Phlius, now took the field themselves. The Manti- neans and their allies and three thousand Elean hop- lites came to their aid. They advanced to Methydrium in Arcadia, where they fell in Avith the Lacedaemonians. The two armies each occupied a hill, and the Argives, thinking that they now had the Lacedaemonians alone, prepared for action. But in the night Agis removed his forces unknown to them and joined the allies at Phlius. At dawn the Aririves became aware of his departure, and moved first to Argos, then to the MOVEMENTS OF THE TWO ARMIES. 381 B.C. 418 ; 01. 90, 3. Nemean road, by which they expected the Lacedae- V. monians and their allies to descend into the plain. But Agis, instead of taking the road by which he was expected, led the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epi- daurians by a more difficult path, and so made his way down ; the Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians went by another steep pass ; the Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians he commanded to descend by the Nemean road, where the Argives had taken up their position, in order that, if the Argives should return and attack his own division of the army in the plain, they might be pursued and harassed by their cavalry. Having made these dispositions, and having come down into the plain, he began to devastate Saminthus and the neigh- borhood. It was now daylight, and the Argives, who had be- 59. come aware of his movement, quitted Nemea and went arYsti-^^^^^ in search of the enemy. Encountering the Phliasian [Se^uemy^ and Corinthian forces, they killed a few of the Phlia- Irgi^eS?-^ sians, and had rather more of their ΟΛνη troops killed by ih?eJdhd- the Corinthians. The Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyo- ax^rSi'thi^ nians marched as they Λvere ordered towards Nemea, but geiJ'oYwWch found the Argives no longer there, for by this time they whoiiy'^uncon. had descended from the high ground, and seeing their two of thSfr^ lands ravaged were drawing up their troops in order of pi^josl a^^ battle. The Lacedaemonians prepared to meet them. The Argives were now surrounded by their enemies ; for on the side of the plain the Lacedaemonians and their division of the army cut them off from the city ; from the hills above they were hemmed in by the Co- rinthians, Phliasians and Pellenians, towards Nemea by the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megarians, and in the absence of the Athenians, Avho alone of their allies had not arrived, they had no cavalry. The main body of the Argives and their allies had no conception of their danger. They thought that their position was a favor- able one, and that they had cut off the Lacedaemonians in their own country and close to the city of Argos. 382 HASTY PEACE COiiCLUDED. B.C. 418 ; 01. 90, 3. V But two of the Argives, Thrasyllus one of the βγβ generals, and Alciphron the proxenus of the Lacedae- monians, came to Agis when the armies were on the point of engaging, and urged him privately not to fight ; the Argives Λvere ready to offer and accept a fair arbi- tration, if the Lacedaemonians had any complaint to make of them ; they ΛΥοηΜ gladly conclude a treaty, and be at peace for the future. 60. These Argives spoke of their OAvn motion ; they had ^cVted^b^ no authority from the people ; and Agis, likeΛγise on his mlgnifii^nt ^^^ authonty, accepted their proposals, not conferring PeTopSmie-^ with his couutrymcn at large, but only with one of the returiShLme. Laccdaemonian magistrates who accompanied the ex- giili fault pedition. He made a treaty with the Argives for four commanders, moiiths, Within whicli they were to execute their agree- ment, and then, without saying a word to any of the allies, he at once withdrew his army. The Lacedae- monians and their allies folloAved Agis out of respect for the law, but they blamed him severely among them- selves. For they believed that they had lost a glorious opportunity; their enenues had been surrounded on every side both by horse and foot ; and yet they were returning home having done nothing worthy of their great effort. No finer Hellenic army had ever up to that day been collected ; its appearance was most striking at Nemea while the host was still one ; the Lacedaemo- nians were there in their full strength ; arrayed by their side were Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megarians, from each state chosen men — they might have been thought a match not only for the Argive confederacy, but for another as large. So the army returned and dispersed to their homes, much out of humor Avith Agis. and the The Argives on their part found still greater fault greater. ^*' with thosc who had made the peace, unauthorized by the people ; they too thought that such an opportunity Avould never recur, and that it was the Lacedaemonians who had escaped, for the combat would have taken -tlOEE ATHENIAK TKOOPS m FELOPOyKESE. 383 B.C. 418 ; 01. 90, 3. place close to their own city, and they had numerous V. and brave allies. And so, as they were retreating and had reached the bed of the Charadrus, where they hold military trials before they enter the city, they began to stone Thrasyllus. He saved his life by flying to the altar, but they confiscated his property. Soon afterwards there arrived an Athenian reinforce- 61. ment of a thousand hoplites and three hundred horse, ^ndSie^Tiies under the command of Laches and Nicostratus. The acknoViedge Argives, although dissatisfied with the truce, were re- τϊβ A?gives luctant to break it, so they bade them depart ; and, when coisent'S^ they desired to treat, they would not present them to ¥hIi?iiitSi the assembly until they were compelled by the im- o/chomenuff portunity of their Mantinean and Elean allies, who had iSiderlio not yet left Argos. The Athenians then, speaking by ^^^^' the mouth of their ambassador Alcibiades, told the Argives in the presence of the rest that they had no right to make the truce at all independently of their allies, and that, the Athenians having arrived at the opportune moment, they should fight at once. The allies were convinced, and they all, with the exception of the Argives, immediately marched against Orcho- menus in Arcadia ; the Argives, though consenting, did not join them at first, but they came afterwards. Their united forces then sat down before Orchomenus, which they assailed repeatedly ; they were especially anxious to get the place into their hands, because certain Ar- cadian hostages had been deposited there by the Lacedaemonians. The Orchomenians, considering the weakness of their fortifications and the numbers of the enemy, and beginning to fear that they might perish before any one came to their assistance, agreed to join the alliance : they were to give hostages of their ΟΛνη to the Mantineans, and to deliver up those whom the Lacedaemonians had deposited with them. The allied force, now in possession of Orchomenus, 62. considered against what town they should next pi'o- ^^ theli^^^ ceed ; the Eleans wanted them to attack Lepreum, the ^^^®^ "°^ 384 EXASPERATION" OF LACEDAEMONIANS. B.C. 418; 01. 90. 3. y. Mantineans Tegea. The Argives and Athenians sided anfo?g\hem- ^^^^ ^^^ Mantineans ; whereupon the Eleans, indignant EiSns rSirn ^^^^^ ^^^J ^^^ ^^it voted for the expedition against Le- ?es??i the preum, returned home, but the remainder of the allies to ittack^^""^ made preparations at Mantinea to attack Tegea. They Tegea. were assisted by a party within the walls who were ready to betray the place to them. 63. The Lacedaemonians, when after making the four die^i^nltns i^ionths' trucc they had returned home, severely blamed ^^ίΐίϊΙΓ Agis because he had not conquered Argos, and had lost thlm^^^^ an opportunity of which, in their own judgment, they thTyi^pm^nt ^^^ nevcr before had the like. For it was no easy to^bf μΓ^^^ matter to bring together a body of allies so numerous advisers. ^j^^j brave. But when the news came that Orchomenus had fallen they were furious, and in a fit of passion, which was unlike their usual character, they had almost made up their minds to raze his house and fine him in the sum of a hundred thousand drachmae.^ But he besought them not to punish him, promising that he would atone for his error by some brave action in the field; if he did not keep his word they might do as they pleased with him. So they did not inflict the fine or demolish his house, but on this occasion they passed a law which had no precedent in their history, providing that ten Spartans should be appointed his counsellors, ^ ^ who \vere to give their consent before he could lead the army out of the city. 64. Meanwhile word was brought from their friends in The Lacedae- Teo^ca that thcv must come at once, since Tegea was monians & v? τ i again lead about to seccdc and had almost seceded already to the lorth their *^ whole force Arofivcs and their allies. Whereupon the Lacedae- to the sup- σ ^ port of Tegea. nionians led out their whole force, including the Helots, with an alacrity which they had never bt^.fore displayed, and marched to Orestheum in Maenalia. They told ' About £6700, supposing the sum to be giv can only end seem to bclic vour words. We see that, althousrh you in our ruin. *^ 7 ο ./ may reason with us, you mean to be our judges ; and that at the end of the discussion, if the justice of our cause prevail and we therefore refuse to yield, we may expect war ; if we are convinced by you, slavery." Cp. iii. 91 init. - Or, "unexamined." you must look at THE MELIAN• CONTROYEESY. 399 B.C. 416; 01. ,91. Ath! Naj, but if you are only going to argue from Y. fancies about the future, or if you meet us with any other §7^ purpose than that of lookino: your circumstances in the Nay, but face and savmg your city, we have clone ; but it tms is facts your intention we will proceed.' Mel.' It is an excusable and natural thing that men d)S, in our position should have much to say and should it must be as ■L *^ ^ you, and not indulge in many fancies. But we admit that this con- as Λνβ, please. ference has met to consider the question of our preser- vation ; and therefore let the argument proceed in the manner which 3^ou propose.' Ath,' Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine 89. words ; we will not go out of our way to prove at length Sg^a^^iSt*^^^' that we have a right to rule, because we overthrew the eni^y Js^SJ^^' Persians ^ ; or that we attack you now because we are ^°^^• sufi'ering any injury at your hands. We should not convince you if we did ; nor must you expect to con- vince us by arguing that, although a colony of the Lacedaemonians, you have taken no part in their ex- peditions, or that you have never done us any wrong. But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at Λvhat is possible, for we both alike know that into the discussion of human aifairs the question of justice only enters Λvhere the pressure of necessity is equal, and that the powerful exact w^hat they can, and the weak grant Avhat they must.' Mel.' A\^ell, then, since you set aside justice and invite 90. us to speak of expediency, in our judgment it is cer- fakJThen^ tainly expedient that you should respect a principle iiiat^ou^"^ Avhich is for the common o-ood ; and that to every man siiouid notbe Avhen in peril a reasonable claim should be accounted a claim of right, and any plea which he is disposed to urge, even if failing of the point a little, should help his cause. Your interest in this principle is quite as great as ours, 2 inasmuch as you, if you fall, will incur 1 Cp. vi. 83 init. 2 Or, '' inasmuch as you, if you disregard it, will by your example 400 THE MELIAN CONTROYERST. B.C. 416 ; 01. 91. V. the heaviest vengeance, and will be the most terrible example to mankind. ^ ' 91. Ath.' The fall of our empire, if it should fall, is we'^have^J'^^ uot au eveiit to which we look forward wdth dismay ; yoSwhJhive ^^^ ruling states such as Lacedaemon are not cruel to iesson"oV^^ their vanquished enemies. And we are fighting not piSentbSh so much against the Lacedaemonians as against our you.^^^^^^ ΟΛτη subjects who may some day rise up and overcome their former masters.^ But this is a danger which you may leave to us. And we will now endeavor to show that w^e have come in the interests of our empire, and that in what we are about to say we are only seeking the preservation of your city. For ive want to make you ours with the least trouble to ourselves, and it is for the interests of us both that you should not be destroyed.' 92. MelJ It may be your interest to be our masters, but Buthowfoi•* 1ι^)Λν can it be ours to be your slaves?' "^^ Ath! To you the gain will be that by submission you ,, ^ .*;** , Avill avert the worst ; and we shall be all the richer for You will suf- fer less and your preservation.' we shall gam «^ ^ more. ΜβΙ.^ But uiust wc bc your enemies ? Will you not ^^' receiA^e us as friends if we are neutral and remain at May Ave not . , , ^ » be neutral ? pcace With yOU t 95. Ath.^ No, 3^our enmity is not half so mischievous Our subjects to US as 3^our friendship ; for the one is in the eyes of tSSf^^*^^*^ our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our vreakness.' . 96. Mel.'' But are your subjects really unable to distin- But Ave are cruish betAveen states in which you have no concern, and not a colony c «^ ' of yours. tliosc Avliich are chiefly your own colonies, and in some cases have revolted and been subdued by you?' 97. Ath.^ Why, they do not doubt that both of them have justify others in inflicting the heaviest vengeance on you should you fall." ^ Or, taking ϊστι δε... δ άγων as a parenthesis, and giving a different sense to nov and αύτοΙ: " With the Lacedaemonians, how- ever, we are not now contending; the real danger is from our many subject states, who may of their own motion rise up and overcome their masters." THE MELIAN CONTROVERSY. 401 B.C. 416 ; 01. 91. a good deal to say for themselves on the score of justice, Y. hut they think that states like yours are left free because Youaretaik- ^ ^ ingaboutjus- they are able to defend themselves, and that we do not ii^^^sH^• , ♦/ ' We say tnat attack them because we dare not. So that your sub- J^^^fr^eJ*^^" jection will give us an increase of security, as well as cantSaM- an extension of empire. For we are masters of the sea, ®^^• and you who are islanders, and insignificant islanders too, must not be alloΛved to escape us.' Mel.^ But do you not recognize another danger? For 98. once more, since you drive us from the plea of justice ^^ur^^o\i^°* and press upon us your doctrine of expediency \ we ^euSsfnto must show you what is for our interest, and, if it be enemies? for yours also, may hope to convince you: -Will you not be making enemies of all who are now neutrals? When they see how you are treating us they will expect you some day to turn against them ; and if so, are you not strengthening the enemies whom you already have, and bringing upon you others who, if they could help, would never dream of being your enemies at all ? ' AthJ' Wq do not consider our really dangerous ene- 99. mies to be any of the peoples inhabitino^ the mainland The neutral .1./.1 Λ η • -i c^ ' Λ peoples of the who, secure m their freedom, may defer mdeiimtely any mainland ,.,,, . J J have nothing measures of precaution which they take ao:ainst us, but to tear from ,,., , ^ us, and there- islanders who, like you, happen to be under no control, fore we have ^ , nothing to and all who may be already irritated by the necessity ^^"^ ^^^"^ of submission to our empire — these are our real enemies, subjects and for they are the most reckless and most likely to brin»• islanders are '' ^ 'J Q our danger. themselves as well as us into a danger which they cannot but foresee.' Jie/.' Surely then, if you and your subjects will brave 100. all this risk, you to preserve your empire and they to be Jo/em ^S-e* quit of it, how base and cowardly it Avould be in us, who JitjectTfor retain our freedom, not to do and suffer anything rather sSf ^ibe than be your slaves.' slaves? Ath! Not so, if you calmly reflect: for you are not 101. fighting against equals to whom you cannot yield without There is no J. ^ , . *^ coAvardice disgrace, but you are taking counsel whether or no you in yielding * Or, '' and insist upon our compliance with your interests." 402 THE MELIAN CONTEOYEEST. B.C. 416 ; 01. 91. V. shall resist an overwhelming force. The question is not foj-cl^^"^'' one of honor but of prudence.' 102. JieZ.' But we know that the fortune of war is some- Si^tYortuSI times impartial, and not always on the side of numbers. may befriend jf y^re yield uow all is ovcr ; but if we light there is yet a hope that we may stand upright.' 103. Ath.^ Hope is a good comforter in the hour of danger, ^eat de^ ^^'^^ AA^hcu men havc something else to depend upon, al- oiiiy^detecfed tliougli hurtful, slie is not ruinous. But when her spend- rSeady^'^^''^ thrift uaturc has induced them to stake their all, they ruined. ^^^ γ^^^ ^^ ^^^ -^ -^^ ^^^ momeiit of their fall, and not till then. AYhile the knoΛvledge of her might enable them to beware of her, she never fails. ^ You are weak and a single turn of the scale might be your ruin. Do not you be thus deluded ; avoid the error of which so many are guilty, who, although they might still be saved if they would take the natural means, when visible grounds of confidence forsake them, have recourse to the imnsible, to prophecies and oracles and the like, which ruin men by the hopes which they inspire in them.' 104. Mel^ We know only too well how hard the struggle ^eaven win must be agaiust your power, and against fortune, if she LaSda^mii^ ^^^^ ^^^ mean to be impartial. JN^evertheless ayc do not succor^^ despair of fortune ; for we hope to stand as high as you in the favor of heaven, because we are righteous, and you against whom we contend are unrighteous ; and we are satisfied that our deficiency in power will be com- pensated by the aid of our allies the Lacedaemonians ; they cannot refuse to help us, if only because we are their kinsmen, and for the sake of their own honor. And therefore our confidence is not so utterly blind as you suppose.' 105. Atli.' As for the Gods, we expect to have quite as Songe? much of their favor as you : for are Λνβ not doing or 1 Or, "they see her as she is in the moment of their fall; and afterwards, when she is known and they might be ware of her, she leaves them nothing worth saving." THE MELIAK COJ^TROYERSY. 403 B.C. 416 ; 01. 91. claiming anything which goes beyond common opinion Y. about divine or men's desires about human things. For should rule "^ over the of the Gods we belie\^e, and of men we know, that by a ^\f.'^^^Jf γ^^ ^ law of their nature wherever they can rule they Avill. ^^^dsSSdmen, This law^ was not made by us, and we are not the first gj^s li^'Is*^'*^ who have acted upon it ; we did but inherit it, and shall ijg^f/yj^i^^^^ bequeath it to all time, and we know that you and all daem Cp. i. 68 init. 2 Qr, *' when we need tlieir aid." 404 THE MELIAJi CONTROYERSY. B.C. 416 ; 01. 91. V. close at hand, and they can better trust our loyal feeling because we are their kinsmen.' 109. Atli.'' Yes, but what encourages men who are invited y?i!ciil?ve^ to joiu in a conflict is clearly not the good-will of those ciJnt\o^make ^^^^ summou them to their side, but a decided supe- dangerTJr*^ nority lu real power. To this no men look more keenly Thly wm not than the Lacedaemonians ; so little confidence have they a?is^iaid?^ *^ in their own resources that they only attack their neigh- bors when they have numerous allies, and therefore they are not likely to find their way by themselves to an island, when λλ^θ are masters of the sea.' 110. Mel,^ But they may send their allies : the Cretan sea Their ships is a larofe place ; and the masters of the sea will have may hnd their c i ' 3thevma ^^^re difficulty in overtaking vessels which want to iilad? Attica escape than the pursued in escaping. If the attempt awty yo^r | shouM fail they may invade Attica itself, and find their allies. ^yg^y ^Q allies of yours whom Brasidas did not reach ; and then you will have to fight, not for the conquest of a land in which you have no concern, but nearer home, for the preservation of your confederacy and of your own territory.' 111. Ath.' Help may come from Lacedaemon to you as Wait and you it has come to othei's, and should you ever have actual will see. ^ ^ ^ «^ Nothing experience of it, then you will know that never once which you -»■ ^ *j ^olnt^^You ^^^^^ t^® Athenians retired from a siege through fear hyV^S^*^ of a foe elsewhere. You told us that the safety of your honm? Think ^^^J would be your first care, but we remark that, in again. ^^^ loiig discussiou, uot a word has been uttered by you which would give a reasonable man expectation of deliverance. Your strongest grounds are hopes deferred, and what power you have is not to be compared Avith that which is already arrayed against you. Unless after we have withdrawn you mean to come, as even now you may, to a wiser conclusion, you are showing a great want of sense. For surely you cannot dream of flying to that folse sense of honor which has been the ruin of so many Avhen danger and dishonor were staring them in the face. Many men with their eyes still open ANSWER OF THE MELIAiiS. 405 B.C. 416 ; 01. 91. to the consequences have found the word " honor" too Y. much for them, and have suffered a mere name to lure them on, until it has drawn down upon them real and irretrievable calamities ; through their own folly they have incurred a worse dishonor than fortune would have inflicted upon them. If you are wise you Avill not run this risk ; you ought to see that there can be no disgrace in yielding to a great city which invites you to become her ally on reasonable terms, keeping your own land, and merely paying tribute ; and that you will certainly gain no honor if, having to choose between two alternatives, safety and war, you obstinately prefer the worse. To maintain our rights against equals, to be politic with superiors, and to be moderate towards inferiors is the path of safety. Reflect once more when Ave hsLYG withdrawn, and say to yourselves over and over again that you are deliberating about your one and only country, which may be saved or may be destroyed by a single decision.' The Athenians left the conference : the Melians, after 112. consulting among themselves, resolved to persevere in J^^^to^^ their refusal, and made answer as follows :-" Men of 5^®^^• Athens, our resolution is unchanged ; and we Λνϋΐ not in a moment surrender that liberty \vhich our city, founded seven hundred years ago, still enjoys ; we will trust to the good-fortune which by the favor of the Gods has hitherto preserved us, and for human help to the Lacedaemonians, and endeavor to save ourselves. We are ready however to be your friends, and the enemies neither of you nor of the Lacedaemonians, and we ask you to leave our country when you have made such a peace as may appear to be in the interest of both parties." Such was the answer of the Melians ; the Athenians, 113. as they quitted the conference, spoke as follows :-" Well, i^^st words , . τ . _ ■, -. . ' of the Athe- we must say, judging from the decision at which you ^^ans. have arrived, that you are the only men who deem the future to be more certain than the present, and regard 406 SIEGE OF MELOS. B.C. 416 ; 01. 91, Y. things unseen as already realized in your fond anticipa- tion, and that the more you cast yourselves upon the Lacedaemonians and fortune, and hope, and trust them, the more complete will be your ruin." 114. The Athenian envoys returned to the army; and the niSif^wock- generals, when they found that the Melians would not adeMeios. yield, immediately commenced hostilities. They sur- rounded the town of Melos with a wall, dividing the work among the several contingents. They then left troops of their own and of the allies to keep guard both by land and by sea, and retired with the greater part of their army; the remainder carried on the blockade, 115. About the same time the Argives made an inroad into Inroad of Phliasia, and lost nearly eio^htv men, who were cauo^ht in Argives into ' »/ σ ./ ' σ Phliasia. ^γ^^ auibuscadc by the Phliasians and the Ars^ive exiles. Atnenians at «^ d Quan'ei be- ^^^^ Athenian garrison in Pylos took much spoil from αΐΓοοΐίίίΐί!^ ^l^e Lacedaemonians ; nevertheless, the latter did not Athenians be- I'enounce the pcacc aiid go to war, but only notified fore Melos. j^^ ^ proclamation that if any one of their own peo- ple had a mind to make reprisals on the Athenians he might. The Corinthians next declared war upon the Athenians on some private grounds, but the rest of the Peloponnesians did not join them. The Melians took that part of the Athenian wall which looked towards the agora by a night assault, killed a few men, and brought in as much corn and other necessaries as they could ; they then retreated and remained inactive. After this the Athenians set a better watch. So the summer ended. 116. In the followinof winter the Lacedaemonians had dae^iiiiiitns intended to make an expedition into the Argive terri- Sllde^Argo- tory, but finding that the sacrifices which they ofi'ered de\S?ed^by' ^^ the frontier were unfavorable^ they returned home. the sacrifices, r^j^^ Argivcs, suspcctiug that the threatened invasion was instigated by citizens of their ΟΛνη, apprehended some of them ; others however escaped. About the same time the Melians took another Cp. V. 54, 55. ( SUEEEOT3EE OF MELOS, 407 B.C. 416 ; 01. 91. part of the Athenian wall ; for the fortifications were Y. insufficiently guarded. Whereupon the Athenians sent Meios taken fresh troops, under the command of Philocrates the son inhabitants of Demeas. The place was ηοΛ7 closely invested, and there was treachery among the citizens themselves. So the Melians were induced to surrender at discretion. The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of military age, and made slaves of the women and children. They then colonized the island, sending thither uyg hundred settlers of their own. 408 SETTLEMENT OF SICILY. B.C. 416 ; 01. 91. BOOK VI. YI. 1. The Athe- nians, igno- rant of the size and resources of the island, determine to send a great expedition to Sicily. 2. Thucydides describes the races by ■which the island Avas in- habited. 1. The mythical Cyclopes and Lae- strvgones. 2. The Sicanians from Spain said to be autocli- thons, 3. Some Trojans, and 4, some Phocians, During the same winter the Athenians conceived a desire of sending another expedition to Sicily, larger than that commanded by Laches and Eurymedon.^ They hoped to conquer the island. Of its great size and numerous population, barbarian as well as Hellenic, most of them knew nothing, and they never reflected that they were entering on a struggle almost as arduous as the Peloponnesian War. The voyage in a merchant- vessel round Sicily takes up nearly eight days, and this great island is all but a part of the mainland, being divided from it by a sea not much more than two miles in width. I will now describe the original settlement of Sicily, and enumerate the nations Avhich it contained. Oldest of all were (1) the Cyclopes andLaestrygones, \vho are said to have dΛvelt in a district of the island ; but who they were, whence they came, or whither they went, I cannot tell. We must be content with the legends of the poets, and every one must be left to form his own opinion. (2) The Sicanians appear to have succeeded these early races, altliough according to their own ac- count they were still older; for they profess to have been children of the soil. But the fact is that they were Iberians, and were driven from the river Sicanus in Iberia by the Ligurians. Sicily, which was originally Cp. iii. 115. THE RACES AND CITIES OF SICILY. 409 B.C. 416 ; 01. 91. called Trinacria, received from them the name Sicania. YI. To this day the Sicanians inhabit the western parts of sJny aTtef the island. (3) After the capture of Troy, some Trojans Troi?^^5?%iie who had escaped from the Achaeans came in ships to fiafj! ^e? The Sicily ; they settled near the Sicanians, and both took ϊ^ι^^^^^^^^ηβ. the name of Elymi. The Elymi had two cities, Eryx and Egesta. (4) These were joined by certain Phocians, who had also fought at Troy, and were driven by a storm first to Libya and thence to Sicily. (5) The Sicels were originally inhabitants of Italy, whence they were driven by the Opici, and passed over into Sicily ; — according to a probable tradition they crossed upon rafts, taking advantage of the wind blowing from the land, but they may have found other Avays of effecting a passage ; there are Sicels still in Italy, and the country itself was so called from Italus, a Sicel king. They entered Sicily with a large army, and defeating the Sicanians in battle, drove them back to the southern and Avestern parts of the country ; from them the island, formerly Sicania, took the name of Sicily. For nearly three hundred years after their arrival until the time when the Hellenes came to Sicily they occupied the most fertile districts, and they still inhabit the central and southern regions. (6) The Phoenicians at one time had settlements all round the island. They fortified headlands on the sea-coast, and settled in the small islands adjacent, for the sake of trading with the Sicels ; but when the Hellenes began to find their way by sea to Sicily in greater numbers they withdrew from the larger part of the island, and forming a union established themselves in Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus, in the neighborhood of the Elymi, partly trusting to their alliance with them, and partly because this is the point at which the passage from Carthage to Sicily is shortest. Such were the Barbarian nations who inhabited Sicily, and these were their settlements. (7) The first Hellenic colonists sailed from Chalcis in 3. Euboea under the leadership of Thucles, and founded iieSo Naxos ; there they erected an altar in honor of Apollo ^^ι^^^^^:- 410 THE CITIES OF SICILY. B.C. 416; 01.91. Λ"Ι. the Founder, which is still standing Λvithout the city, fiom chScis ^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^' religious embassies sacrifice before they f2^''sy/fcT2ef ^^^^ ^^'^^ Sicil}^ (8) In the following year Archias, one iboutmBio! o^ ^^^ Heraclidae, came from Corinth and founded 730B!c!l*an(i Syi'acusc, first driving the Sicels out of the island of ftom^Naxos. Ortygia ; and there the inner city, no longer surrounded by the sea, now stands ^ ; in process of time the outer city was included within the walls and l)ecame populous. (9) In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse Thucles and the Chalcidians went forth from Naxos, and driving out the Sicels by force of arms, founded first Leontini, then Catana. The Catanaeans however chose a founder of their own, named Evarchus. 4. (10) About the same time Lamis came from Megara, (m Tha^^sus Ι^^ϊ'ίϊ^οίι^ο a colony to Sicily, where he occupied a place Η i)iPean^ ' callcd Trotilus, upon the river Pantacyas ; but he soon Megara, from aftcrwards ioincd the settlement of the Chalcidians at Megara, ^^ fs^^seUnu?*^' Lcontim ; Λvith them he dwelt a short time, until he was H?wa*iin drlvcu out ; he then founded Thapsus, where he died. B.c\'7S'Geia ^is followcrs quitted Thapsus and founded the city inTcSte,"^^" which is called the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel ao)^grigen- ^^ii^g» ^ad betrayed the place to them and guided them GeTa,?82B.c. thithcr. There they remained two hundred and forty- S-^Sieul, five years, and Λvere then driven out of their town and fromcVme:. |^^^^ ^^ q^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^f Syracusc ; but before they were driven out, and a hundred years after their own foundation, they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus ; he had come from Megara, their own mother state, to take part in the new colony. (11) In the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, Antiphemus of Rhodes and Entimus of Crete came with their followers and together built Gela. The city was named from the river Gela, but the spot which is ηοΛν the Acropolis and was first fortified is called Lindii. The institutions of the new settlement Avere Dorian. Exactly a hundred and eight years after their own foundation the inhabitants of ^ Or, "wliicli is now outside the city." 2 Reading ηερικλυζομέι^η with all the MSS. THE CITIES OF SICILY. 411 B.C. 494 ; OL 71, 3. B.C. 498^91 ; 01. 70, 3-72, 2. Gela founded Agrigentum, which they named from the YI river Acragas ; they appointed Aristonoas and Py stilus founders of the place, and gave to it their own institutions. (12) Zancl^ was originally colonized by pirates who came from Cym^, the Chalcidian city in Opicia ; these were followed by a large body of colonists from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, who shared in the allotment of the soil. The first settlement was lead by Perieres of Cym^, the second by Crataemenes of Chalcis. Zancle was the original name of the place, a name given by the Sicels because the site was in shape like a sickle, for which the Sicel Avord is Zanclon. These earlier settlers were afterwards driven out by the Samians and other lonians, who when they fled from the Persians found their way to Sicily.^ ISTot long afterwards Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium, drove out these Samians. He then repeopled their city Avith a mixed multitude, and called the place Messene after his native country. Himera was colonized from Zancle by Eucleides, 5. Simus, and Sacon. Most of the settlers Λvere Chalcidian, JJoiil^nJ^'. but the Myletidae, Syracusan exiles who had been B^c.^anTa^ defeated in a civil war, took part in the colony. Their euB^!lirom language was a mixture of the Chalcidian and Doric fi^5 Sfa- dialects, but their institutions were mainly Chalcidian. syScSe? (13) Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracu- ^^^-^•^• sans, Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenae nearly twenty years after Acrae. Camarina was origin- ally founded by the Syracusans exactly a hundred and thirty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse ; the founders were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Cama- rinaeans revolted, and as a punishment for their revolt were violently expelled by the Syracusans. After a time Hippocrates, the tyrant of Gela, receiving the terri- tory of Camarina 2 as the ransom of certain Syi'acusan prisoners, became the second founder of the place, which he colonized anew. The inhabitants were once more 1 Cp. Herod vi. 22, 23. 2 Cp. Herod, vii. 154. 412 MOTIVES OF THE ATHENIANS. B.C. 491-^78 ; 01. 72, 2-75, 3. B.C. 416 ; 01. 91. VI. driven out by Gelo, who himself colonized the city for the third time.^ 6. These were the nations, Hellenic or Barbarian, who Ambition was inhabited Sicily, and such was the o^reat island on which the real mo- . . tive of tiie the Athenians were determined to make war. They Sicilian expe- «^ wSch'the virtuously professed that they Λvere going to assist their ^mK??n oc- ^^^^ kinsmen and their newly-acquired allies, ^ but the warTetwe^n simple truth Λvas that they aspired to the empire of sfihmsf^The Sicily. They were principally instigated by an embassy envoyt.^^^ which had come from Egesta and Avere urgent in re- questing aid. The Egestaeans had gone to war Avith the neighboring city of Selinus about certain questions of marriage and about a disputed piece of land. The Selinuntians summoned the Syracusans to their assist- ance, and their united forces reduced the Egestaeans to great straits both by sea and land. The Egestaeans envoys reminded the Athenians of the alliances which they had made with the Leontines under Laches in the former war,^ and begged them to send ships to their relief. Their chief argument was, that if the Syracusans were not punished for the expulsion of the Leontines, but were allowed to destroy the remaining allies of the Athenians, and to get the Avhole of Sicily into their own hands, they would one day come with a great army, Dorians assisting Dorians, who were their kinsmen, and colonists assisting their Peloponnesian founders, and would unite in overthroAving Athens herself. Such being the danger, the Athenians would be wise in combining with the allies who were still left to them in Sicily against the Syracusans, especially since the Egestaeans would themselves provide money sufficient for the war. These arguments Avere constantly repeated in the ears of the Athenian assembly by the Egestaeans and their partisans ; at length the people passed a vote that they 1 Or, adopting the con jecture Γελώων: " and the city was colonized for the third time by the inhabitants of Gela." This accords with the statement of Diodorus, xi. 76. 2 The Camarinaeans and Agrigentines, v. 4 fin., and some of ihe Sicels, iu. 103 init., 115 init. ^ Cp. iii. 86. SMALL WARS IX ARGOLIS AXD MACEDO^iLA. 413 B.C. 416 ; Ol. 91. B.C. 415 : 01. 91, 2. would at all events send envoys to ascertaia on the spot VI. whether the Egestaeans really had the money which they professed to have in their treasury and in their temples, and to report on the state of the war with Selinus. So the Athenian envoys were despatched to Sicily. During the same winter the Lacedaemonians and their 7. allies, all but the Corinthians, made an expedition into J^^^^^^J^-^^g the Argive territory, of which they devastated a small ^g^^fg^^^tey part, and, having brought with them wagons, carried ^^^^^if^he away a few loads of corn. They settled the Argive ^^^,Γ'""' exiles at Orneae, where they left a small garrison, StlcL"'^'^ and having made an agreement that the inhabitants of peopte?il-^ Orneae and the Argives should not injure one another's Ifhenfan?^ land for a given time, returned home Avith the rest of t>^t escape. their army. Soon afterwards the Athenians arrived Λ7ith thirty ships and six hundred hoplites. They and the people of Argos with their whole power went out and blockaded Orneae for a day, but at night the Argive exiles within the walls got away unobserved by the besiegers, who were encamped at some distance. On the following day the ArgiΛ^es, perceiving what had hap- pened, razed Orneae to the ground and returned. Soon afterAvards the Athenian fleet returned likewise. The Athenians also conveyed by sea cavalry of their The 1- Mill! f Athenians own , and some Macedonian exiles Avho had taken retu^e ravage ^ Macedonia. with them, to Methone on the borders of Macedonia, and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. Whereupon the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who were maintaining an armistice terminable at ten days' notice with the Athenians, and commanded them to assist Perdiccas, but they refused. So the winter ended, and with it the sixteenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history. Earl}^ in the next spring the Athenian em^oys returned g from Sicily. They were accompanied by Egestaeans who The Athe- brought sixty talents ^ of uncoined silver, being a month's tiTretxi^ pay for sixty vessels which they hoped to obtain from envoys'^ 1 £14,400. 414 THE ATHENIANS DECIDE FOE WAR B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. Λ^Ι. convoke an assembly, which decides in favor of war. At a second assem- bly, called for the purpose of voting sup- plies, iS'icias still endeav- ors to deter them from going to Λvar at all. 9. I must say what I be- lieve to be the truth. This war is impolitic and ill-timed. Athens. The Athenians called an assembly, and when they heard both from their own and from the Egestaean envoys, amongst other inviting but untrue statements, that there was abundance of money Ij'ing ready in • the temples and in the treasury of Egesta,^ they passed a vote that sixty ships should be sent to Sicily ; Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, Kicias the son of Niceratus, and La- machus the son of Xenophanes were appointed com- manders. They were told to assist Egesta against Seli- nus ; if this did not demand all their military strength they were empowered to restore the Leontines, and generally to further in such manner as they deemed best the Athenian interest in Sicily. Five days after- wards another assembly was called to consider what steps should be taken for the immediate equipment of the expedition, and to vote any additional supplies which the generals might require. Nicias, who had been appointed general against his will, thought that the people had come to a wrong conclusion, and that upon slight and flimsy grounds they were aspiring to the conquest of Sicily, Avhich was no easy task. So, beins: desirous of divertins^ the Athenians from their purpose, he came forward and admonished them in the following terms : — " I know that we are assembled here to discuss the preparations which are required for our expedition to Sicily, but in m}^ judgment it is still a question Λvhether we ought to go thither at all ; we should not be hasty in determining a matter of so much importance, or allow ourselves to rush into an impolitic war at the instigation of foreigners. Yet to me personally war brings honor ; and I am as careless as any man about my ΟΛνη life ; not that I think the Λvorse of a citizen who takes a little thought about his life or his property, for I believe that the sense of a man's ΟΛνη interest will quicken his in- terest in the prosperity of the state. But I have never been induced by the love of reputation to say a single ^ Cp. vi. 4G. SPEECH OF NICIAS. 415 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. word contrary to what I thought ; neither Λνϋΐ I now : I I. will say simply what I believe to be best. If I told you to take care of what you have and not to throw a\vay present advantao-es in order to gain an uncertain and distant good, my words would be powerless against a temper like yours. I ivould rather argue that this is not the time, and that your great aims will not be easily realized. "I tell you that in going to Sicily you are leaving 10. many enemies behind you, and seem to be bent on Jj^^^^lg^^^.^^^ bringing new ones hither. You are perhaps relying ί^,^ΧηΓ upon the treaty recently made, which if you remain quiet t?e^dleamin| may retain the name of a treaty ; for to a mere name the at)?oad we *^ intrigues of certain persons both here and at Lacedae- t?actinjen"e- mon have nearly succeeded in reducing it. But if you Th^ciial•^^^ .,1 • •mi cidians are meet Λνιίΐι any serious reverse, your enemies will be upon stm in re- you in a moment, for the agreement was originally ex- tracted from them by the pressure of misfortune, and the discredit of it fell to them and not to us.^ In the treaty itself there are many disputed points ; and, unsatisfactory as it is, to this hour several cities, and very powerful cities too, persist in rejecting it. Some of these are at open war with us already ^ ; others may declare war at ten days' notice ^ ; and they only remain at peace because the Lacedaemonians are indisposed to move. And in all probability, if they find our power divided (and such a division is precisely what we are striving to create), they will eagerly join the Sicilians, whose alliance in the war they would long ago have given anything to obtain. These considerations should weigh with us. The state is far from the desired haven, and we should not run into danger and seek to gain a new empire before we have fully secured the old. The Chalcidians in Thrace have been rebels all these years and remain unsubdued, and there are other subjects of ours in various parts of the mainland ivho are uncertain in their alleiiiance. And we forsooth cannot lose a moment in avenirins: the » Cp. V. 46 init. 2 q^^ y, 115 jned. 3 Cp. V. 26 med., vi. 7 fin. 416 SPEECH OF yiCIAS. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. YI. wrongs of our allies the Egestaeans, while we still defer the punishment of our revolted subjects, whose offences are of lons^ standino:. 11. "And yet if we subdue the Chalcidian rebels we may Sicily, even if retain our hold on them; but Sicily is a populous and conquered, . ^^ ./ χ jr cannot be distant couutry, over which, even if we are victorious, we shall hardly be able to maintain our dominion. And how foolish it is to select for attack a land which no conquest can secure, while he \vho fails to conquer will not be where he was before ! The Sicilians, " I should Say that the Sicilians are not dans^erous to if they Avere i - ά j-i• t• ti united, would you, — ccrtaiuly not ]n their present condition, and they Sparta to would bc cvcn less so if they were to fall under the sway make war •^ •' uponyoii of thc Syracusaus (and this is the prospect with which because they ./ ν ax would fear the Eo'estacaus would fain scare you). At present indi- that a united ♦-' ./ / χ Hellas might yiduals mio'ht cross the sea out of friendship for the make war ^ χ Th?iesfan Laccdacmonians ; but if the states of Sicily were all Sown^the ui^ited in one empire they would not be likely to make Sartd!^^^ war upon another empire. For whatever chance they mtkis you^ may have of overthrowing us if they unite with the Pelo- LacSemo- ponncsiaiis, there Λνϋΐ be the same chance of their being Sey^are^bid- OA^erthrowu themsclves if the Peloponnesians and Athe- ti^ef^^^ nians are ever united against them.^ The Hellenes in Sicily will dread us most if we never come ; in a less degree if we display our strength and speedily depart ; but if any disaster occur, they will despise us and De ready enough to join the enemies who are attacking us here. We all know that men have the greatest respect for that which is farthest off, and for that of which th^. reputation has been least tested ; and this, Athenians, you may verify by your own experience. There was a time when you feared the Lacedaemonians and their allies, but now you have got the better of them, and because your first fears have not been realized you despise them, and even hope to conquer Sicily. But you ought not to be elated at the chance mishaps of your enemies ; before you can be confident you should » Cp. viii. 46. SPEECH OF NICIAS. 417 B.C. 415; 01.91,2. have gained the mastery over their minds. ^ Remember IV that the Lacedaemonians are sensitive to their disgrace, and that their sole thought is how they may even yet find a way of inflicting a blow upon us which will re- trieve their own character ; the rather because they have labored so earnestly and so long to Λνίη a name for valor. If we are wise we shall not trouble ourselves about the barbarous Egestaeans in Sicily ; the real ques- tion is how we can make ourselves secure against the designs of an insidious oligarchy. " We must remember also that we have only just re- 12. covered in some measure from a great plague and a ^^^^^^ ^^ great w^ar, and are beginning to make up our losses in ^nd h^cu^eT-^' men and money. It is our duty to expend our new thlse adven- resources upon ourselves at home, and not upon begging J^emseives. exiles who have an interest in successful lies ; who find it expedient only to contribute words, and let others tight their battles ; and who, if saved, prove ungrateful ; if they fail, as they very likely may, only involve their friends in a common ruin. ""^ "I dare say there may be some young man here who AiciMades is delighted at holding a command, and the more so to ?omSS -, I'j. jc λ ' J.9 11 Τ such an expe- because he is too young tor his post^ ; and he, regarding dition,andhe , , . ' i J. Λ ±. 'Λ , only wants to only his own interest, may recommend you to sail ; he indulge his may be one who is much admired for his stud of horses, iiorses at and Avants to make something out of his command which expense. will maintain him in Jiis extravagance. But do not you give him the opportunity of indulging his own magnifi- cent tastes at the expense of the state. Remember that men of this stamp impoverish themselves and defraud the public. An expedition to Sicily is a serious busi- ness, and not one which a mere youth can plan and carry into execution oflf-hand. The youth of whom I 13. am speaking has summoned to his side vouno• men like ^^ ^^^ ^is , . -.^ , «^ ο youthful himseli, whom, not ΛVlthout alarm, I see sittino- bv him supporters, ' ο J who rather in this assembly, and I appeal against them to you elder alarm me. 1 Cp. ii. 87 init. ; vi. 72 init. 2 Omitting the comma after ΙκνίΚεΧν. 27 418 CHAEACTEE OF ALCIBIADES. B.C. il5 ; 01. 91, 2. VI. rhey Avill charge you Avitli coward- ice, but uever luind that. Do not inter- fere in Sicily ; let the Eges- tueans tight their ΟΛνη battles. 14 The Prytanis need not fear to bring be- fore you once more the question of the expedi- tion itself. 15. The Athe- nians refuse to rescind the former vote. The war is strongly ad- vocated by Alcibiades, who wants citizens. If one of you should be placed next one of his supporters, I would not have him ashamed or afraid of beino^ thouo-ht a coward if he does not vote for war. Do not, like them, entertain a desperate craving for things out of your reach ; you Ι^ηοΛν that by prevision man}^ successes are gained, but few or none by mere greed. On behalf of our country, now on the brink of the greatest danger which she has ever known, I entreat you to hold up your hands against them. Do not interfere with the boundaries which diΛ'ide us from Sicily. I mean the Ionian gulf which parts us if we sail along the coast, the Sicilian sea if we sail through the open Λvater ; these are quite satisfactory. The Sicilians have their οΛνη country ; let them manage their own concerns. And let the Egestaeans in particular be informed that, having originall}' gone to war with the Selinuntians on their own account, they must make peace on their own account. Let us have no more allies such as ours have too often been, whom we are expected to assist when they are in misfortune, but to Λvhom we ourselves when in need may look in Λ'ain. "And you, Prj^tanis, as you wish to be a good citizen, and believe that the welfare of the state is entrusted to 3^ou, put my proposal to the vote, and lay the question once more before the Athenians. If you hesitate, re- member that in the presence of so many Avitnesses there can be no question of breaking the law, and that you w^ill be the physician of the state at the critical moment. The first dutj^ of the good magistrate is to do the very best Λvhich he can for his countrj^ or, at least, to do her no harm which he can avoid." Such Λvere the words of Nicias. Most of the Athe- nians who came forward to speak were in favor of v\^ar, and reluctant to rescind the vote which had been already passed, although a few took the other side. The most enthusiastic supporter of the expedition Avas Alcibiades the son of Cleinias ; he was determined to oppose Nicias, who was always his political enemy and had just now SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES. 419 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. spoken of him in disparaging terms ; but the desire to YI. command was even a strons^er motive with him. He t» gam an •^ empire ana to was hoping that he might be the conqueror of Sicily and m^'^ ^J^_ Carthage ; and that success ivould repair his private t^'fjj^gWt fortunes, and gain him money as well as glory. He had ciuSs^went a great position among the citizens and was devoted to l^l^^^ "" ^Sr ^^ horse-racing and other pleasures which outran his means, sending his And in the end his wild courses went far to ruin the SeiSfhe w3 Athenian state. For the people feared the extremes to and S^Sn- which he carried his lawless self-indulgence, and the far- war\vas*^om- reaching purposes which animated him in all his actions. Srio^rmen?" They thought that he was aiming at a tyranny and set themselves against him. And therefore, although his talents as a military commimder were unrivalled, they entrusted the administration of the war to others, because thray personally objected to his private life ; and so they speedily shipwrecked the state. He now came forward ^ and spoke as follows : — "I have a better right to command, men of Athens, 16. than another; for as Mcias has attacked me, I must ^^yp^^^^te ' extravagance begin by praising myself ; and I consider that I am beniS?^^ And worthy. Those doino^s of mine for which I am so much ^^^y should ♦^ ο men com- cried out against are an honor to myself and to my Sok^d do^^ ancestors, and a solid advantage to my country. In Jo^^unlte? consequence of the distinguished manner in which I i^oVdown represented the state at Olympia, the other Hellenes SSfJruinate formed an idea of our power which even exceeded the oreTt min* reality, although they had previously imagined that ^\e amwSon^i Were exhausted by war. 1 sent into the lists seven merlts^are not chariots, — no other private man ever did the like; I dSinTthefi^ was victor, and also won the second and fourth prize ; TheTooiisu and I ordered everything in a style Λvorthy of my victory. ίοτ%ί^^^ The general sentiment honors such magnificence ; and amancl7^ the energy which is shown by it creates an impression of power. At home, again, whenever I gain eclat by pro- viding choruses or by the performance of some other public duty, although the citizens are naturally jealous of me, to strangers these acts of munificence are a new 420 SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. VI. 17. And now abide by your in- tention. There is nothing to fear in Sicily. The Sici- lians are a ars:umeiit of our strength. There is some use in the folly of a man who at his own cost benefits not only himself but the state. And where is the injustice, if I or any one who feels his own superiority to another re- fuses to be on a ΙβΛ el with him ? The unfortunate keep their misfortunes to themselves. We do not expect to be recognized by our acquaintance when we are down in the world ; and on the same principle why should any one complain when treated with disdain by the more fortu- nate ? He who would have proper respect shown to him should himself show it towards others. I know that men of this lofty spirit, and all who have been in any way illustrious, are hated while they are alive, by their equals especially, and in a lesser degree by others who have to do with them ; but that they leave behind them to after- ages a reputation which leads exen those who are not of their family to claim kindred with them, and that they are the glory of their country, which regards them, not as aliens or as evil-doers, but as her own children, of whose^ character she is proud. These are my own aspirations, and this is the reason why my private life is assailed ; but let me ask you, whether in the management of public aifairs an}^ man surpasses me. Did I not, with- out invohdng you in any great danger or expense, combine the most poΛverful states of Peloponnesus against the Lacedaemonians, whom I compelled to stake at Mantinea all that they had upon the fortune of one day ? and even to this hour, although they were victo- rious in the battle, they haxe hardly recovered courage. "These were the achievements of my youth, and of what is supposed to be my monstrous folly ; thus did I by winning words conciliate the Peloponnesian powers, and my heartiness made them believe in me and follow And now do not be afraid ^ of me because I am me. young, but while I am in the flower of my days and Nicias enjoys the reputation of success, use the services 1 Adopting the conjectui-e ηεφόβησθε, and placing a full stop after SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES. 421 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2, of US both. Having determined to sail, do not ciiange VI. your minds under the impression that Sicily is a great iu^e%?pro' power. For although the Sicilian cities are populous, S?|nt^fand their inhabitants are a mixed multitude, and they readily SL?ais^ give up old forms of government and receive new ones Ii^ioS?w?* from without. No one really feels that he has a city oi f^^^'S^fo^'^ his own ; and so the individual is ill-provided with arms, n^liSs?^'^^" and the country has no regular means of defence. A man looks only to what he can win from the common stock by arts of speech or by party violence ; hoping if he is overthrown, at any rate to carry off his prize and enjoy it elsewhere. They are a motley crew, who are never of one mind in counsel, and are incapable of any concert in action. Every man is for himself, and will readily come over to any one wiio makes an attractive offer ; the more readily if, as report says, they are in a state of revolution. They boast of their hoplites, but, as has proved to be the case in all Hellenic states, the number of them is grossly exaggerated. Hellas has been singularly mistaken about her heavy infantry ; and even in this Λvar it was as much as she could do to collect enough of them. The obstacles then w^hich wdll meet us in Sicily, judging of them from the information w^hich I have received, are not great ; indeed, I have overrated them, for there will be many barbarians w-ho, through fear of the Syracusans, wall join us in attacking them.i And at home there is nothing which, viewed rightly, need interfere ivith the expedition. Our fore- fathers had the same enemies whom we are now told that we are leaving behind us, and the Persian besides ; but their strength lay in the greatness of their navy, and by that and that alone they gained their empire. Never were the Peloponnesians more hopeless of success than at the present moment ; and let them be ever so confident, they can only invade us by land, which they will equally do whether we go to Sicily or not. But on the sea they 1 Cp. vi. 88 init., 98 init., 103 med. 422 SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. Λ'^Ι. cannot hurt us, for we shall leave behind us a navy- equal to theirs. 18. " AYhat reason can we give to ourselves for hesitation ? Why then what cxcusc cau wc make to our allies for den vino: hesitate "^ «/ ο For an im- thcui aid ? ΛΥβ have sworn to them , and have no rio^ht perial power . i . i the true to aro-uc that tbev ucver assisted us.^ In seekmo: their policy of de- . ^ . "^ . ® fence is to alliauce we did not intend that they should come and attack. We •^ cannot lose help US hei'c, but that they should harass our enemies and Ave shall ... probably be- jn Sicily, and prevent them from comins; hither. Like come masters 7 of Hellas. ^w other imperial powers, we have acquired our dominion Let young i χ ^ ι to^etheiand ^^^ ^^^^ rcadiuess to assist any one, Λvh ether Barbarian or sme toTus^^ Hellene, who may have invoked our aid. If we are all i,°o?jr^^^°^ to sit and do nothino^, or to draw distinctions of race when our help is requested, we shall add little to our empire, and run a great risk of losing it altogether. For mankind do not await the attack of a superior power, they anticipate it. AVe cannot cut down an empire as we might a household ; but having once gained our present position, vro must keep a firm hold upon some, and contrive occasion against others ; for if we are not rulers we shall be subjects. You cannot afford to regard inaction in the same light as others might, unless you impose a coiTespondiug restriction on your policy. Convinced then that we shall be most likely to in- crease our power here if we attack our enemies there, let us sail. AYe shall humble the pride of the Pelopon- nesians Avhen they see that, scorning the delights of repose, we have attacked Sicily. By the help of our acquisitions there we shall probably become masters of all Hellas ; at any rate we shall injure the Syracusans, and at the same time benefit ourselves and our allies. Whether we succeed and remain or depart, in either case our navy will ensure our safety ; for at sea we shall be more than a match for all Sicily. Nicias must not divert you from your purpose by preaching indolence, and by trying to set the ^'oung against the old ; rather in your accustomed order, old and young taking counsel 1 Cp. iv. 61 med. SECOND SPEECH OF NICIAS. 423 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. together, after the manner of your fathers who raised VI. Athens to this height of greatness, strive to rise 3^et higher. Consider that youth and age have no power unless united ; but that the lighter and the more exact and the middle sort of judgment, when duly attempered, are likely to be most efficient. The state, if at rest, like everything else will wear herself out by internal friction. Every pursuit which requires skill will bear the impress of decay, whereas by conflict fresh experience is ahvays being gained, and the city learns to defend herself, not in theory, but in practice. My opinion in short is, that a state used to activity will quickly be ruined by the change to inaction ; and that they of all men enjoy the greatest security who are truest to themselves and their institutions even when they are not the best." Such were the words of Alci blades. After hearing 19. him and the Eo-estaeans and certain Leontine exiles The people ~ are bent on who came forvN^ard and earnestly entreated assistance, ^^'^•,^\*^/^s 'J ' now dwells on reminding the Athenians of the oaths which they had ί^^β"οΤΐϊίβ sworn, ^ the people were more than ever resolved upon q^^df^ war. Nicias, seeing that his old argument would no longer deter them, but that he might possibly change their minds if ha insisted on the magnitude of the force which Avould be required, came forward again and spoke as follows : — "Men of Athens, as I see that you are thoroughly 20. determined to 2:0 to war, I accept the decision, and The Hellenic ^ . . cities m Sicily will advise you accordinofly, trustiiiij that the event will are free and •^ »-,./' ο powerful; be such as we all ^yϊύ\. The cities which we are about *^^y ^^^^ numerous to attack are, I am informed, powerful and independent ca?Ii?^^"^ of one another; they are not inhabited by slaves, who would gladly pass out of a harder into an easier con- dition of life ; and they are very unlikely to accept our rule in exchange for their present liberty. 2 As regards numbers, although Sicily is but one island, it contains a great many Hellenic states. Not including Naxos and Catana (of which the inhabitants, as I hope, Avill be » Cp. iii. 86. 2 Cp. vii. 55 fin. 424 SECOND SPEECH OF NICIAS. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. VT• our allies because they are the kinsmen of the Leontines), there are seven other cities fully provided ivith means of warfare similar to our own, especially Selinus and Syracuse, the cities against which our expedition is particularly directed. For they have numerous hoplites, archers, and javelin-men, and they have many triremes which their large population will enable them to man ; besides their private wealth, they have the treasures of the Selinuntian temples ; and the Syracusans receive a tribute which has been paid them from time immemo- rial by certain barbarian tribes. Moreover, they have a numerous cavalry, and grow their ΟΛνη corn instead of importing it : in the two last respects they have a great advantage over us. 21. " Against such a poAver more is needed than an in- Andwemust sio:nificant force of marines; if Λve mean to do iustice take with us a ^ , . . . ' correspond- to our desio'n wc must embark a multitude of infantry ; mg force of "^ . . iiopiites, and neither must we allow ourselves to be kept within our if not of ί ^avSin-mln ^ί^^^^ ^J ^^^ uumbcrs of their cavalry^. For what if the for^vrshau' Sicilians in terror combine against us, and we make no taiicoSry. ^16^(^8 exccpt the Egestaeaus who can furnish us with horsemen capable of opposing theirs? To be driven from the island or to send for reinforcements, because we were wanting in forethought at first, would be dis- graceful. We must take a powerful armament with us from home, in the full knowledge that we are going to a distant land, and that the expedition will be^ of a kind very different from any which you have hitherto made among your subjects against some enemy in this part of the world, yourselves the allies of others. Here a friendly country is always near, and you can easily obtain supplies. There you will be dependent on a country ^ which is entirely strange to you, and whence 1 Or, " and not to be kept within our lines by the numbers of their cavalry, we must embark a multitude of infantry." 2 Reading σιρατενσόμενοι and άησρττισοντες. 3 Or, " you will be removed to a country; " or, reading with Bekker άτΐαρτήσαί^τες, " you will find yourselves dependent on," or " will have been removed to a country." SECOND SPEECH OF NICIAS. 425 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. during the four winter months hardly even a message VI. can be sent hither. " I say, therefore, that we must take with us a large 22. heavv-armed force both of Athenians and of allies, Food must be . brought from whether our own subiects or any Feloponnesians whom i^ome, and we '^ ο • must have the we can persuade ^ or attract by pay ^ to our service ; also command of plenty of archers and javelin-men to act against the ^^ξ-^^^Ι'ξ ^^ enemy's cavalry. Our naval superiority must be over- fj^o^^^g'i^l'.^'^^ whelming, that we may not *only be able to fight, but w^^'^®• may have no difficulty in bringing in supplies. And there is the food carried from home, such as wheat and parched barley, which Λνϋΐ have to be conveyed in merchant- vessels ; w^e must also have bakers, drafted in a certain proportion from each mill, who will receive pay, but will be forced to serve, in order that, if we should be detained by a calm, the army may not want food ; for it is not every city that will be able to receive so large a force as ours. We must make our preparations as com- plete as possible, and not be at the mercy of others ; above all, we must take out with us as much money as Ave can ; for as to the supplies of the Egestaeans which are said to be awaiting us, we had better assume that they are imaginary. " Even supposing w^e leave Athens with a force of our 23. own, not merely equal to that of the enemy, but in every ^^,^^^^ο^Μη way superior, except indeed as regards the number of t» chance. hoplites Avhich they can put into the field, for in that respect equality is impossible, still it will be no easy task to conquer Sicily, or indeed to preserve ourselves. You ouo'ht to consider that we are like men ο^οίηο^ to found a city in a land of strangers and enemies, who on the very da}^ of their disembarkation must have command of the country ; for if they meet with a disaster they will have no friends. And this is what I fear. We shall have much need of prudence ; still more of good-fortune (and Avho can guarantee this to mortals ?) . Wherefore I would trust 1 Cp. vi. 29 med. 2 Cp. vi. 43 med. ; vii. 5Y fin. 426 ENTHUSIASM FOE THE EXPEDITION. B.C. 415 ! 01. 91, 2. VI. myself and the expedition as little as possible to accident, and would not sail until I had taken such precautions as will be likely to insure our safety. This I conceive to be the course which is the most prudent for the whole state J and, for us who are sent upon the expedition, a security against danger. If any one thinks otherwise, to him I resign the command." 24. These were the words of Nicias. He meant either to niln^aiinot ^^tcr the Athenians by bringing home to them the thfvasf force vastness of the undertaking, or to provide as far as g?eitertie^^^ hc could for the safety of the expedition if he Avere thi more they Compelled to proceed. The result disappointed him. safety!^^^^ °^ Far from losing their enthusiasm at the disagreeable prospect, they were more determined than ever ; they approved of his advice, and were confident that every chance of danger was now removed. All alike Λvere seized Avith a passionate desire to sail, the elder among them convinced that they would achieve the conquest of Sicily ,-at any rate such an armament could sufier no disaster ; the youth were longing to see with their own eyes the marvels of a distant land, and were confident of a safe return ; the main body of the troops expected to receive present pay, and to conquer a country which would be an inexhaustible mine of pay for the future. The enthusiasm of the majority Λvas so overwhelming that, although some disapproved, they were afraid of being thought unpatriotic if they voted on the other side, and therefore held their peace. 25. At last an Athenian came forward, and calling upon a^^^oviSoSi Nicias, said that they would have no more excuses and the'foi?es re- ^^^^js ; hc must spcak out and say what forces the quired. peoplc wcrc to votc him. He replied, with some un- willingness, that he would prefer to consider the matter at leisure with his colleagues, but that, as far as he could see at present, they ought to have at least a hundred triremes of their own ; of these a certain number might be used as transports,^ and they must order more 1 Cp. ch. 31 init., 43 init. THE MUTILATIO?^ OF THE HERMAE. 427 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. triremes from their allies. Of heavy-armed troops they YI. ΛΥοαΙά require in all, including Athenians and allies, not less than five thousand, and more if they could possibly have them ; the rest of the armament must be in proportion, and should comprise archers to be procured both at home and from Crete, and slingers. These forces, and Λvhatever else seemed to be required, the generals would make ready before they started. Upon this the Athenians at once decreed that the 26. generals should be empowered to act as they thought Preparations best in the interest of the state respecting the numbers of the army and the whole management of the expedition. Then the preparations began. Lists for service were made up at home and orders given to the allies. The city had newly recovered from the plague and from the constant pressure of war ; a new population had grown up ; there had been time for the accumulation of money during the peace ; so that there was abundance of everything at command. While they were in the midst of their preparations, 27. the Hermae or square stone fio^ures carved after the Meanwhile . 7. 1 . τ . occurs the ancient Athenian fashion, dnd standins^ everywhere at outrage on c5 ./ ^]^Q Hermae : the doorways ^ both of temples and private houses, in the -unknmvn one nio'ht had nearly all of them throuo^hout the city ^^^^ ^H^pected ^ «^ ^ «^ of designs their faces mutilated. The oifenders were not known, against the ' democracy. but great rewards were publicly offered for their detec- tion, and a decree Avas passed that any one, whether citizen, stranger, or slave, might without fear of punish- ment disclose this or any other profanation of which he was cognizant. The Athenians took the matter greatly to heart — it seemed to them ominous of the fate of the expedition ; and they ascribed it to conspirators who wanted to eftect a revolution and to overthrow the democracy. Certain metics and servants gave information, not 28. ^ Or κατά το έηιχώριορ must be taken with πολλοί: "or square figures of carved stone which, after the ancient Athenian fashion, usually stand at the doorways," etc. 428 THE SUPPOSED PLOT. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. yi. indeed about the Hermae, but about the mutilation of is"iiiSfibl?at other statues which had shortly before been perpetrated p?ofaneicts. ^Y souie jouiig mcu ill SL drunkcu frolic : they also said andothtil tbat the mysteries were repeatedly profaned by the ceieSfng °^ celcbratiou of them in private houses, and of this im- inprivSl"^^ pi^ty they accused, among others, Alcibiades. A party houses. ^^^^^ were jealous of his influence over the people, Avhich interfered with the permanent establishment of their own, thinking that if they could get rid of him they would be supreme, ^ took up and exaggerated the charges against him, clamorously insisting that both the mutilation of the Hermae and the profanation of the mysteries were part of a conspiracy against the democracy, and that he Avas at the bottom of the whole affiiir. In proof they alleged the excesses of his ordinary life, which w^ere unbecoming in the citizen of a free state. 29. He strove then and there to clear himself of the Sfed^blfSe^^ charges, and also offered to be tried before he sailed hfs^nlmies^* (for all was ηοΛν ready) , in order that, if he were guilty, theyVnfhave ^^^ might bc punished, and if acquitted, might retain S^obta^niig^ his command. He adjured his countrymen to listen tioS^f thT^" to no calumnies which might be propagated against feiied. ^^' him in his absence ; and he protested that they would be w^iser in not sending a man who had so serious an imputation hanging over him on a command so im- portant. But his enemies feared that if the trial took place at once he would have the support of the army ; and that the people would be lenient, and would not forget that 2 he had induced the Argives and some Mantineans to join in the expedition. They therefore exerted themselves to postpone the trial. To this end they suborned fresh speakers, who proposed that he should sail now and not delay the expedition, but should return and stand his trial within a certain num- ber of days. Their intention ivas that he should be 1 Cp. ii. 65 fin. 2 Or, supplying αύτόρ with θεραπενων: "being well disposed to him because," etc. , THE FAEEWELL. 429 B.C. 415; 01.912. recalled and tried when they had stirred up a stronger YI. feeling against him, which they could better do in his absence. So it was decided that Alcibiades should sail. About the middle of summer the expedition started 30. for Sicily. Orders had been previously given to most e^^^^jj^g^^ of the allies, to the corn-ships, the smaller craft, and ^'{i5*euianlat generally to the vessels in attendance on the arma- o^Vinhig^* ment, that they should muster at Corcyra, whence the whole fleet was to strike across the Ionian gulf to the promontory of lapygia. Early in the morning of the day appointed for their departure, the Athenians and such of their allies as had already joined them went down to the Piraeus and began to man the ships. The entire population of Athens accompanied them, citizens and strangers alike. The citizens came to take farewell, one of an acquaintance, another of a kinsman, another of a son ; the crowd as they passed along were full of hope and full of tears ; hope of conquering Sicily, tears because they doubted whether they would ever see their friends again, when they thought of the long voyage on \vhich they were sending them. At the moment of parting the danger was nearer; and terrors which had never occurred to them when they were voting the expedition ηοΛν entered into their souls. Nevertheless their spirits revived at the sight of the armament in all its strength and of the abundant provision which they had made. The strangers and the rest of the multitude came out of curiosity, desiring to Avitness an enterprise of which the greatness exceeded belief. No armament so magnificent or costly had ever been 31. sent out by any single Hellenic power, though in mere pSfoS'S number of ships and hoplites that which sailed to Epi- nilnt^Tast dauras under Pericles and afterwards under Hagnon to neS^^ith""' Potidaea ^ Avas not inferior. For that expedition consisted ^*• of a hundred Athenian and fifty Chian and Lesbian triremes, conveying four thousand hoplites all Athenian citizens, three hundred cavalry, and a multitude of » Cp. ii. 56, 58. 430 THE ATHENIAN ARMADA. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. VI. allied troops. Still the voyage was short and the equip- ments were poor, whereas this expedition was intended to be long absent, and was thoroughly provided both for sea and land service, wherever its presence might be required. On the fleet the greatest pains and expense had been lavished by the trierarchs and the state. The public treasury gave a drachma ^ a day to each sailor, and furnished empty hulls for sixty swift sailing vessels, and for forty transports carrjnng hoplites. All these were manned with the best crews which could be obtained. The trierarchs, besides the pay given by the state, added somewhat more out of their own means to the wages of the upper ranks of rowers and of the petty of&cers.^ The figure-heads and other fittings provided by them were of the most costly description. Every one strove to the utmost that his ΟΛνη ship might excel both in beauty and swiftness. The infantry had been well selected and the lists carefully made up. There was the keenest rivalry among the soldiers in the matter of arms and personal equipment. And while at home the Athenians Λvere thus competing with one another in the performance of their several duties, to the rest of Hellas the expedition seemed to be a grand display of their power and greatness, rather than a preparation for war. If any one had reckoned up the whole expenditure (1) of the state, (2) of individual soldiers and others, including in the first not only what the city had already laid out, but what was entrusted to the generals, and in the second what either at the time or afterwards private persons spent upon their outfit, or the trierarchs upon their ships, the provision for the long voyage which every one may be supposed to have carried with him over and above his public pay, and what soldiers or traders may have taken for purposes of exchange, he would have found that altogether an 2 Others translate " the crews generally," or " the soldiers' servants." PBAYEES AND LIBATIONS. 431 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. immense sum amounting to many talents was withdrawn VI. from the city. Men were quite amazed at the boldness of the scheme and the magnificence of the spectacle, which were everywhere spoken of, no less than at the great disproportion of the force when compared with that of the enemy against whom it was intended. Never had a greater expedition been sent to a foreign land ; never Λvas there an enterprise in which the hope of future success seemed to be better justified by actual power. When the ships were manned and everything required 32. for the voyao^e had been placed on board, silence was Players •^ ο ^ ' . oif ered by the proclaimed by the sound of the trumpet, and all with ^^jpie fleet one voice before setting sail ofiered up the customary ^Pjfg^^sl^iioJ; prayers ; these were recited, not in each ship, but by a ^o^g^^nd" single herald, the Λvhole fleet accompanying him. On p^Sn^^ every deck both oflicers and men, mino^lino^ wine in ^iitl^?Loo bowls, made libations from vessels of gold and silver, ^^gi^^• The multitude of citizens and other well-wishers who were looking on from the land joined in the prayer. The crews raised the Paean, and when the libations were completed put to sea. After sailing out for some distance in single file, the ships raced with one another as far as Aegina ; thence they hastened onwards to Corcyra, where the allies who formed the rest of the army were assembling. Meanwhile reports of the expedition were coming in Eumorsof the to Syracuse from many quarters, but for a long time reach syra- nobody gave credit to them. At length an assembly was held. Even then difierent opinions wxre expressed, some affirming and others denying that the expedition was coming. At last Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, believing that he had certain information, came forward, and warned the Syracusans in the following words : — "I dare say that, like others, I shall not be believed 33. when I tell you that the expedition is really coming ; and H^el-mS-^^ I am well aware that those who are either the authors TifeTare or reporters of tidings which seem incredible not onlj^ yoliiiS°*^ fail to convince others, but are thought fools for their p^^^p^^® ^^^ 432 SPEECH OF HEKMOCRATES. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. YI. pains. Yet, when the city is in danger, fear shall not Se^repfred^ ®^^P ^^ mouth, for I am convinced in my own mind nothing to ^^^^ ^ ^^^^ better information than anybody. The wniiiSS^^ Athenians, wonder as you may, are coming against us afid g¥e?t^S- "^^^^ ^' gi*eat fleet and army ; they profess to be assist- nlvlr^eymetoii^g t^^^^i' Egestacau allics and to be restoring the ^°^^• Leontines. But the truth is that they covet Sicily, and especially our city. They think that, if they can conquer us, they will easily conquer the rest. They Λνϋΐ soon be here, and you must consider how with your present resources you can make the most successful defence. You should not let them take you by surprise because you despise them, or neglect the whole matter because you λυΙΙΙ not believe that they are coming at all. But to him who is not of this unbelieving temper I say :- And do not you be dismaj^ed at their audacity and power. They cannot do more harm to us than we can do to them ; the very greatness of their armament may be an advantage to us, it will have a good effect on the other Sicilians, who will be alarmed, and in their terror will be the more ready to assist us. Then, again, if in the end we overpoΛver them, or at any rate drive them away baffled, for I have not the slightest fear of their accomplishing their purpose, we shall have achieved a noble triumph. And of this I have a good hope. Earely have great expeditions, whether Hellenic or Barbarian, when sent far from home, met with success. They are not more numerous than the inhabitants and their neigli- bors, who all combine through fear ; and if owing to scarcity of supplies in a foreign land they miscarry, al- though their ruin may be chiefly due to themselves, they confer glory on those whom they meant to overthrow. The greatness of these very Athenians was based on the utter and unexpected ruin of the Persians, ^ who were ahvays supposed to have directed their expedition against Athens. And I think that such a destiny may very likely be reserved for us. 1 Cp. i. 69 fin. SPEECH OF HEEMOCRATES. 433 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. " Let us take courage then, and put ourselves into a YI. state of defence ; let us also send envoys to tlie Sicels, 34. and, while >ve make sure of our old allies, endeavor to Letussum- ' mon our old gain new ones. We will despatch envoys to the rest of f j^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Sicily, and point out that the danger is common to all ; ^|Γη8^οΜαϊη we will also send to the Italian cities in the hope that ^}^^f ^ϊ^^ *iV® ■*■ 1 est; 01 oiciiyj they may either join us, or at any rate refuse to receive thS|^,Ya"ce- the Athenians. And I think that we should send to J^^^S; ^if the Carthaginians ; the idea of an Athenian attack is Ske^niy^ad- no novelty to them ; they are always living in appre- ^^ouid^o and hension of it. They will probably feel that if they leave A«!enians us to our fate the trouble may reach themselves, and weVSid therefore they may be inclined in some way or other, Sat^^Jm, secretly, if not openly, to assist, us. If willing to help, ^^^οΐΙΓηο? of all existing states they are the best able ; for they ^liiembai? have abundance of gold and silver, and these make war, Thlymlgit like other things, go smoothly. Let us also send to the nfayed^byour Lacedaenionians and Corinthians, and entreat them to give up the come to our aid speedily, and at the same time to revive ^^^^ the war in Hellas. I have a plan which in my judgment is the best suited to the present emergency, although it is the last which you in your habitual indolence Avill readily embrace. ^ Let me tell you what it is. If all the Sicilian Greeks, or at least if we and as many as ivill join us, taking two months' provisions, would put out to sea with all our available ships and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of lapygia, thereby proving to them that before they fight for Sicily they must fight for the passage of the Ionian Sea, ive should strike a panic into them. They would then reflect that at Tarentum (which receives us) , we, the advanced guard of Sicily, are among friends, and go forth from a friendly country, and that the sea is a large place not easy to traverse with so great an armament as theirs. They would know that after a long voyage their ships will be unable to keep in line, and coming up slowly and few at a time will be at our mercy. On the other hand, if 1 Cp. i. 145 fin. 434 SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. VI. they lighten their vessels and meet us in a compact body with the swifter part of their fleet, they may have to use oars, and then we shall attack them when they are exhausted. Or if we prefer not to fight, we can retire again to Tarentum. Having come over with slender supplies and prepared for a naval engagement, they will not know what to do on these desolate coasts. If they remain we can blockade them : if they attempt to sail onwards they will cut themseh^es off from the rest of their armament, and Avill be discouraged ; for they will be for from certain whether the cities of Italj^ and Sicily will receive the m . In my opinion the anticipation of these difficulties will hamper them to such a degree that they Λνίΐΐ never leave Corcyra. While they are holding con- sultations, and sending out spies to discover our number and exact position, they Avill find themselves driven into winter ; or, in dismay at the unexpected opposition, they may very likely break up the expedition ; especially if, as I am informed, the most experienced of their generals has taken the command against his will, and would gladly make any considerable demonstration on our part an excuse for retreating. I am quite sure that rumor Λνίΐΐ exao'o'erate our streno-th. The minds of men are apt to be s^vayed by Λyhat the}^ hear ; and the}^ are most afraid of those who commence an attack, or who at any rate show to the ao-aressor betimes that he will meet with resistance ; for then they reflect that the risk is equally divided. And so it will be with the Athenians. They are now attacking us because they do not believe that we shall defend ourselves, and in this opinion they are justified by our refusal to join with the Lacedae- monians in putting them down. But if they see us enterprising almost to rashness,^ they λυΙΙΙ be more dis- mayed at our unexpected resistance than at our real power. Take my advice ; if possible, resolve on this bold step, but if not, adopt other measures of defence as 1 Or, '' that tliey were mistaken, and that we boldly yenture," etc. Cp. ii. 89 med. FACTIOuq^ AT SYEACUSE. 435 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. quickly as possible. Kemember each and all of you YI. that the true contempt of an invader is shown by deeds of valor in the field, and that meanwhile the greatest service which you can render to the state is to act as if you were in the presence of danger, considering that safety depends on anxious preparation. ^ The Athenians are coming ; I am certain that they are already on the sea and will soon be here." Thus spoke Hermocrates. Great Avas the contention 35. which his words aroused among the Syracusan people, ^^^\^^fl^'• some assertino* that the Athenians would never come, never come; i5 and, What and that he was not speaking truth, others asking, ''And ^^|^^^^^ψ ^ if they should come what harm could they do to us ^^λυ saw the nearly so great as we could do to them?" while others were quite contemptuous, and made a jest of the whole matter. A few only believed Hermocrates and realized the danger. At last Athenagoras, the popular leader, vfho had at that time the greatest influence with the multitude, came forward and spoke as follows : — " He is either a coward or a traitor Avho would not 36. reioice to hear that the Athenians are so mad as to come ^Pf^«^ ^^ ••' Athenagoras. hither and deliver themselves into our hands. The ^iiese alarms are spread by audacity of the people who are spreading these alarms ^^η¥ϊ?ΙιΓνβ^ does not surprise me, but I do Λvonder at their foll}^ tio?fro^m^^" if they cannot see that their motives are transparent. si^nL^^Th?" Having private reasons for being afraid, they want to e^c^ldhSy^^ strike terror into the whole city that they may hide ^^ρ^'^^^^ι^• themselves 2 under the shadow of the common fear. And now, what is the meaning of these rumors ? They do not grow of themselves ; they have been got up by persons who are the troublers of our state. And you, if you are wise, will not measure probabilities by their reports, but by what we may assume to be the intentions of shrewd and experienced men such as I conceive the Athenians to be. They are not likely to leave behind them a power such as Peloponnesus. The war which ' Cp. ii. 11 med. 2 Or, "that they may hide their own consciousness of guilt." 436 SPEECH OF ATHENAGOEAS. B.C. 415 : 01. 91, 2. yi. they have abeady on their hands is far from settled, and will they go out of their way to bring upon themselves another as great? In my opinion they are only too glad that we are not attacking them, considering the number and poAver of our states. 37. "Even if the rumor of their comins^ should turn out than\'niat?h ^^ ^^ ^^'^®' ^ ^^^ ^^^'^ ^^^^ Siclly is morc able than l?aiir4*d^" Peloponnesus to maintain a great war. The whole island ?Sseff/§ey' ^^ better supplied in every way, and our own city is sSi^oT^tr herself far more than a match for the army which is quei^syrl-^^" Said to be threatening us ; ay, and for another as great. ^^^®• I know that they Λνϋΐ not bring cavalry with them, and ΛνΙΙΙ find none here, except the ΐβΛΥ horsemen which they may procure from Egesta. They cannot provide a force of hoplites equal to ours,^ for they haΛ^e to cross the sea ; and to come all this distance, if only with ships and with no troops or lading, would be work enough. ^ I know too that an armament which is directed against so great a city as ours will require immense supplies.^ Nay, I venture to assert that if they came hither, having at their command another city close upon our border as large as Syracuse, and could there settle and carry on war against us from thence, the}^ would still be destroj^ed to a man ; hoiv much more when the Λγhole country will be their enemy (for Sicily will unite), and when they must pitch their camp the moment they are out of their ships, and will have nothing but their Avretched huts and meagre supplies, being prevented by our cavalry from advancing far beyond their lines ? Indeed I hardly think that they λυΙΙΙ eifect a landing at all. So far supe- rior, in my judgment, are our forces to theirs. 38. "The Athenians, I repeat, know all that I am telling TheAthe- you, and do not mean to throw aΛvav what they have mans are ./ ' ., »/ a shrewd gQ^ . J ^m pretty sure of that. But some of our people 1 Cp. vi. 23 init. 2 Placing a comma after έλθόντας, omitting the comma after δει, and taking μέγα γάρ . . κομισθψαί as a parenthesis. 8 Cp. vi. 21 med. SPEECH OF ATHENAGOKAS. 437 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. are fabricating reports wliich neither are, nor are ever YI. likely to be true. I know, and have always known, that Sot ukeTy'to by words like these, and yet more mischievous, if not by sei^es^'These acts, they want to intimidate you, the Syracusan people, flbSSttdV and make themselves chiefs of the state. And I am cSpfratofs, afraid that if they persevere they will succeed at last, girtJe^gov-^ and that we shall be delivered into their hands before τ£?ιΐο^ιΓ*^ we have had the sense to take precautions or to detect siSii resist and punish them. This is the reason why our city is iJi?' ^ always in a state of unrest and disorganization, lighting against herself quite as much as against foreign enemies, and from time to time subjected to tyrants and to narrow and wicked oligarchies. If the people will only support me I shall endeaA^or to prevent any such mis- fortunes happening in our day. With you I shall use persuasion, but to these conspirators I shall apply force ; and I shall not Avait until they are detected in the act (for who can catch them?), but I shall punish their in- tentions and the mischief which they Avould do if they could. For the thoughts of our enemies must be punished before they have ripened into deeds. If a man does not strike first he will be the first struck. As to the rest Tirade of the oligarchical party, I must expose them and have tSe young an eye on their designs ; I must also instruct them ; ^ ^ ' that, I think, will be the ivay by which I can best deter them from their evil courses. Come noAv, young men, and answer me a question which I have often asked myself. * What can you want?' To hold office already? But the laAV forbids. And the law Avas not intended to slight you had you been capable ; it was passed because you Avere incapable. And so you would rather not be on an equality with the many ? But when there is no real difference betAveen men why should there be a privileged class ? "I shall be told that democracy is neither a wise nor 39. a just thing, and that those Avho have the money are Tiie true most likely to govern well. To which I ansAver, first composed of •^ ^ various of all, that the people is the name of the whole, the elements ; 438 SPEECH OF ATHEISTAGORAS. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. yi. while an oli- garchy takes all the good and gives the people their full share of the evil. 40. Blind fools, if you are not knaves, the city will never he imposed upon by you. 41. One of the generals deprecates the use of bad lan- oligarchy of a part ; secondly, that the rich are the best guardians of the public purse, the wise the best coun- sellors, and the many, when they have heard a matter discussed, the best judges ;i and that each and all of these classes have in a democracy equal privileges. Whereas an oligarchy, while giving the people the full share of danger, not merely takes too much of the good things, but absolutely monopolizes them. And this is what the powerful among you and the young would like to have, and what in a great city they will never obtain. " Ο most senseless of men, for such 3^ou are indeed if you do not see the mischief of your own schemes ; never in all my experience have I known such blindness among Hellenes, or such wickedness if you have your eyes open to what 3^ou are doing. Yet even now learn if you are stupid, repent if you are guilty ; and let your aim be the welfare of the whole country. Eemember that the good among you will have an equal or larger share in the government of it than the people ^ ; while if you want more you will most likely lose all. Away with these reports ; we know all about them, and are determined to suppress them. Let the Athenians come, and Syracuse will repel her enemies m a manner Avorthy of herself ; we h'a\^e generals who will look to the matter. But if, as I suspect, none of your tales are true, the state is not going to be deceived, and λυΙΙΙ not in a moment of panic admit you to power, or impose upon her own neck the yoke of slavery. She will take the matter into her own hands, and when she gives judgment will reckon words to be equally criminal with actions. She will not be talked out of her liberty by you, but will do her utmost to preserve it ; she will be on her guard, and will put you down with a strong hand." Thus spoke Athenagoras. Whereupon one of the generals rose, and suffering no one else to come forward, closed the discussion himself in the folloAving words : — ^^ There is little wisdom in exchansrins: abuse or in Cp. ii. 40 med. 2 Cp. ii. 37 init. ' THE ATHE^AIS-S CEOSS THE S EA. 439 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. sitting by and listening to it ; let us rather, in view of YI. the reported danger, see how the whole city and every fjjfjfks'thl re- man in it may take measures for resisting the invaders §^?4ί• ? ood worthily. Why should not the city be richly furnished JK^^^^'^^f^g with arms, horses, and all the pride and pomp of war; ti^earmy. where is the harm even if they should not be wanted? We, who are generals, will take in hand all these matters and examine into them ourselves ; and we will send messengers to the neighboring cities in order to obtain information, and for any other purpose which may be necessary. Some precautions Λve have taken already, and whatever occurs to us Λve will communicate to you." When the general had thus spoken, the assembly dispersed. The Athenians and their allies Avere by this time col- 42. lected at Corcyra. There the generals began by holding ^ufat cor- a final review of the ships, and disposed them in the order finaVre^iew in which they were to anchor at their stations. The me*nt!'^hich* fleet was divided into three squadrons, and one of them 5ntS"hre^e assigned by lot to each of the three generals, in order to ^^"^^°^^• avoid any difficulties Λvhich might occur, if they sailed together, in finding Avater, anchorage, and provisions where they touched ; they also thought that the presence of a general with each division would promote good order and discipline throughout the fleet. They then sent before them to Italy and Sicily three ships, which had orders to find out what cities in those regions would receive them, and to meet them again on their way, that they might know before they put in. At length the great armament proceeded to cross 43. from Corcyra to Sicily. It consisted of a hundred and At length "^ '' tliey cross thirty-four triremes in all, besides two Ehodian vessels ^^^^^^ "^, *' ' a hundred of fifty oars. Of these a hundred were Athenian ; sixty fo\i*^"*^' trh-ei and two being swift vessels, and the remaining forty transports • t^'^emes the rest of the fleet was furnished by the Chians and Pontlis other allies. The hoplites numbered in all five thousand ^^;;\7„'J5 one hundred, of whom fifteen hundred were Athenians ^^nS taken from the roll, and seven hundred who served as 440 THE ΑΤΗΕΝΊΑΧ8 AREIYE AT EHEGIUM. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. YI. lioplites, four liuudred and eighty arcli- ers, seveu liuudi-ed. sliiigers, a hundred and twenty ^Nlega- riau light- armed, and thirty horse- men. 44. Tlie fleet in- cluded thirty merchant- ships and a hundred small vessels. Arriving at Ehegiiun they are refused, admittance into the city, hut are sup- plied with provisions and allowed to anchor. marines were of the fourth and lowest class of Athenian citizens. The remainder of the hoplites were furnished hy the allies, mostly by the subject states ; but five hundred came from Argos, besides two hundred and Mty ]Mantinean and other mercenaries. The archers were in all four hundred and eighty, of whom eighty were Cretans. There were seven hundred Ehodian slingers, a hundred and twenty light-armed Megarians who were exiles,^ and one horse transport which con- veyed thirty horsemen and horses. Such were the forces with which the first expedition crossed the sea. For the transport of provisions thirty merchant- ships, which also com^eyed bakers, masons, carpenters, and tools such as are required in sieges, were included in the armament. It was likewise attended by a hundred small vessels ; these, as well as the merchant- vessels, Avere pressed into the service. Other merchant- vessels and lesser craft m great numbers followed of their own accord for purposes of trade. The whole fleet now struck across the Ionian sea from Corcyra. They arrived at the promontoiy of lapygia and at Tarentum, each ship taking its own course, and passed along the coast of Ital3^ The Italian cities did not admit them within their walls, or open a market to them, but allowed them water and anchorage ; Tarentum and Locri refused even these. At length they reached Ehegium, the extreme point of Italy, Avhere the fleet reunited. As they were not received within the walls they encamped outside the city at the temple of Artemis ; there they were provided by the inhabitants with a market, and drawing up their ships on shore they took a rest. They held a conference with the Ehegians, and pressed them, being Chalcidians themselves, to aid their Chalcidian kinsmen the Leon- tines. But the Ehegians replied that the}^ Avould be neutral," and would only act in accordance with the decision of all the Italian Greeks. The Athenian com- manders ηοΛν began to consider how they could best VCp. iv. 74. BAD NEWS FKOM EGESTA. 441 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. commence operations in Sicily. MeanΛvhile they were YI. expecting the ships which had gone on and ΛΥβτβ to meet them from Egesta ; for they wanted to know whether the Egestaeans really had the money of which the mes- sengers had brought information to Athens. From many quarters the news began to reach the 45. Syracusans that the Athenian fleet Avas at Ehegium, ^.^gluSit and the report was confirmed by their spies. They now |e!uft*iJem-" no longer doubted, but fell to work heart and soul. To |a7n|st? some of the Sicel towns they sent troops, to others envoys ; they also garrisoned the forts in the territory of Syracuse, and AAdthin the city itself inspected the horses and arms, and saw that they were in good con- dition. In short, they made every preparation for a w^ar which was rapidly approaching, and almost at their gates. The three ships which had gone forward to Egesta 46. now returned to the Athenians at Ehegium ; they re- Si?by'^the ported that of the money which had been promised, ^ho^hllfbor- thirty talents ^ only were forthcoming and no more. The p'iate'\yMch spirits of the generals fell at once on receiving this their env^s^Hfit first discouragement. They were also disappointed at ^^^^^^• the unfavorable answer of the Ehegians, whom they had asked first, and might naturally have expected to join them because they Λvere kinsmen of the Leontines, and had always hitherto been in the Athenian interest. Nicias expected that the Egestaeans would fail them ; ^ to the two others, their behavior appeared even more incomprehensible than the defection of the Ehegians. The fact was that when the original envoys came from Athens to inspect the treasure the Egestaeans had prac- tised a trick upon them. They brought them to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx, and showed them the ofie rings deposited there, consisting of bowls, flagons, censers, and a good deal of other plate. Most of the vessels were only of silver, and therefore they made a show quite out of proportion to their value. They ' £7200. 1 Cp. vi. 22 fin. 442 COUisTCIL OF WAK. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. VI. also gave private entertainments to the crews of the triremes : on each of these occasions they produced, as their own, drinking- vessels of gold and silver not only collected in Egesta itself, but borrowed from the neigh- boring towns, Phoenician as well as Hellenic. All of them exhibitino• much the same vessels and makinor ever^nvhere a great display, the sailors were amazed, and on their arrival at Athens told every one what heaps of wealth they had seen. When the news spread that the Egestaeans had not got the money, great was the unpopularity incurred throughout the army by these men, who having been first imposed upon themselves had been instrumental in imposing upon others. 47. The o^enerals now held a council of war. Nicias was Opinions of of opiuion that they should sail with the whole fleet tlie three gen- ■•• «^ erais. Nicias ao^aiust Scliuus, wliich was their main errand : if the would sail ο ' Sif mlkfi' Egestaeans provided pay for all their forces, they ΛΛ^οηΜ taeanrpay shapc tlicir course accordingly ; if not, they would de- άϊρΐ%^|^ mand maintenance for sixty ships, the number Λvhich the AtheSi he°* Egestacaus had requested, ^ and remain on the spot until Somel ^'^*"^^ they had brought the Selinuntians to terms either by force or by negotiation. They would then pass along the coast before the eyes of the other cities and display the visible power of Athens, while they proved at the same time her zeal in the cause of her friends and allies ; after this they would return home, unless a speedy way of relieving the Leontines or obtaining support from some of the other cities should unexpectedly present itself. But the}^ should not throw away their οΛνη resources and imperil the safety of Athens. 48. Alcibiades urged that it would be a disgrace to have Aicibiades crone forth λ\'ύ\ι SO ο-γβίχί ail armament and to return Avould do ^ " more; without achicvinof anythino•. They should send envoys he Avould ο ^ © •/ .' attack bo Selinus and Syracuse, first gaining over the other i-Litiivx^aj_^ ^. -iv^xxv-v^^ ^x^ ^.xxv> x.xv.vv,j^,v.x.vvv.x.^ .^...v..., ^^j^^^ — ο attack both ^o cvcry city of Sicily, with the exception of Selinus Syracuse, c^y^^ Syracusc ; they should also negotiate with the Sicels, over the ' making friends of the independent tribes, and persuading the rest to revolt from the Syracusans. They would 1 Cp. vi. 8 init. OPINIONS OF THE GENERAL 443 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. thus obtain food and reinforcements. They should first ^ -*■ appeal to the Messenians, whose city being on the ftatS^ highway of traffic was the key of Sicily, and possessed a harbor from which the Athenian forces could most conveniently watch the enemy. Finally, when they had brouo-ht the cities over*to them and knew who Avould ο be on their side in the war, they should attack Selinus and Syracuse, unless the Selinuntians would come to terms with the Egestaeans, and the Syracusans would permit the restoration of the Leontines. Lamachus was of opinion that they ought to sail 49. direct to Syracuse, and fight as soon as possible under J^iJ^^^^that the walls of the city, while the inhabitants were un- g^ioad^Sifto prepared and th^ consternation was at its height. He IgtTt^onie^ argued that all armies are most terrible at first ; if the ^^^^^' should fight They establish appearance of them is long delayed the spirits of men SlgaS.^^ ^* revive, and, when they actually come, the sight of them only awakens contempt.^ If the Athenians could strike suddenly, while their opponents were still in fear and suspense, that would be the best chance of victory. Not only the sight of the armament which would never seem so numerous again, but the near approach of sufier- ing, and above all the immediate peril of battle, would create a panic among the eneni}^ Many of the Syra- cusans would probably be cut ofl' in the country, not believing in the approach of an invader ; and while the villagers were trjing to convey their property into the city, their own army, which Λvould be encamped close under the walls, would be masters of the field and could have no lack of provisions. In the end, the other Sicilian Greeks, instead of joining the Syracusan alli- ance, Avould come over to them, and ΛνοηΜ no longer hesitate and look about them to see which side would conquer. He was also of opinion that they should make Megara their naval station,2 the fleet returning 1 Cp. vii. 42 med. 2 Reading έφορμίσθέντας, a conjecture of Schaefer's adopted by 444 ALCIBIADES AT NAXOS AND CATANA. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. ^^I. thither from Syracuse and anchoring in the harbor. The place was deserted, and was not far distant from Syracuse either by land or by sea. 50. Lamachus having thus spoken nevertheless gave his AMbSes^ ΟΛνη voicc for the proposal of Alcibiades. Whereupon and^rifim- Alcibiades sailed across in his a^^miral's ship to Messen^, Invof to Mes- ^^^cl piOposcd ail alliance to the inhabitants. He failed noTudmitted. ^o coiiviiice them, for they refused to receive the Athe- foict^ire-^^ nians into the city, although they offered to open a Naios, but market for them outside the walls. So he sailed back cataua! ^ to Rhcgium. The generals at once manned sixty ships, SyScuse?^ ° Selecting the crews indifferently out of the entire fleet, and taking the necessary provisions coasted along to Naxos ; they left the rest of the army and one of them- selves at Ehegium. The Naxians received them into their city, and they sailed on to Catana ; but the Cata- naeans, having a Syracusan party within their walls, denied admission to them ; so they moved to the river Terias and there encamped. On the following day they ivent on to Syracuse in long file with all their ships, except ten, which they had sent forward to sail into the great harbor and see whether there was any fleet launched. On their approaching the city a herald was to proclaim from the decks that the Athenians had come to restore their allies and kinsmen the Leontines to their homes, and that therefore any Leontines λυΙιο were in Syracuse should regard the Athenians as their friends and bene- factors, and join them ivithout fear. When the proc- lamation had been made, and the fleet had taken a survey of the city and harbors, and of the ground which was to be the scene of operations, they sailed back to Catana. 51. The Catanaeans now held an assembly, and although tocLana''' ^^^^J ^tiH rcfuscd to rccelve the army, they told the SiSilrf^nd generals to come in and say what they had to say. a way in Vhile Alcibiadcs was speaking and the people of the Poppo; or, following the MSS. and reading έφορμ7]θέιηας: "there taking up a secure position and thence attacking Syracuse." EECALL OF ALCIBIADES. 445 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. city had their attention occupied with the assembly, YI. the soldiers broke down unobserved a postern gate ^^^^^ιί'" which had been badly walled up, and finding their way T^he^vgfie into the town began to walk about in the market-place, fhfthe^'from Those of the Catanaeans who were in the Syracusan ^^^s^^^• interest, when they saw that the enemy had entered, took alarm and stole aΛvay. They were not numerous, and the other Catanaeans voted the alliance with the Athenians, and told them to bring up the rest of their army from Ehegium. The Athenians then sailed back to Rhegiiitn, and with their entire force moved to Catana, where on their arrival they began to establish their camp. But meanwhile news came from Camarina that if they 52. would go thither the Camarinaeans would join them. n£,ns^s?n'first They also heard that the Syracusans were manning a ^iifS^has as navy. So they sailed with their whole force first to ?hen tol!ama- Syracuse, but they found that there was no fleet in al-Tn^t^ie-"^^^ preparation; they then passed on to Camarina, and ^^^^^"^ *^^^®• putting into the open beach they sent a herald to the city. The citizens would not receive them, declaring that their oath^ bound them not to receive the Athe- nians if they came with more than one ship, unless they themselves sent for a greater number. So they sailed away without effecting their purpose. They then disembarked on a part of the Syracusan territory, which they ravaged. But a few S3'racusan horse coming up killed some of their light-armed troops who were straggling. They then returned to Catana. There they found that the vessel Salaminia had come 53. from Athens to fetch Alcibiades, who had been put upon^^^^-'^^''^" his trial by the state, and was ordered home to defend fei?r *^ himself. With him were summoned certain of his soldiers, E?cit'ement who were accused, some of profaning the mysteries, Athenians, others of mutilation of the Hermae. For after the de- SSitthe" parture of the expedition the Athenians prosecuted both Όΐ\ϊβ^*^°" inquiries as keenly as ever. They did not investigate 1 Cp. iv. 65 init. 446 EECOLLECTIOXS OF THE TTEAii'TS. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. B.C. 514 ; 01. 66, 3. yi. the character of the informers, but in their suspicious the™adiS iiiood listened to all manner of statements, and seized tiaSdae!^'^' ^^^^ imprisoned some of the most respectable citizens on the evidence of ΛYretches ; they thought it better to sift the matter and discover the truth ; and they would not allow even a man of good character against whom an accusation was brought to escape without a thorough investigation, merely because the informer was a rogue. For the people, who had heard by tradition that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons ended in great op- pression, and knew moreover that their power was overthrown, not by Harmodius or any efforts of their own, but by the Lacedaemonians,^ were in a state of incessant fear and suspicion. 54. l^ow the attempt of Aristogiton and Harmodius arose Not Hippias out of a lovc affair, which I will narrate at leno-th ; and the reigmng ^ ^ ' ο ' tyrant, but the narrative Λνϋΐ show that the Athenians themselves Hipparchus, wasiiaiSby S^^^ quitc ail iuaccuratc account of their own tyrants, and ASSo^cri- ^iicl of the incidciit in question, and know no more than Spt'iiose*" other Hellenes.^ Pisistratus died at an advanced age aSlii^The ^^^ posscssioii of the tjn^anny, and then, not, as is the Souai?*^^^^' common opinion, Hipparchus, but Hippias (Λvho was iio^AvitiimS^ the eldest of his sons) succeeded to his poAver. Har- w;intfngTn Hiodius was iu the flower of youth, and Aristogiton, a they^rltafned citizcn of the middle class, became his lover. Hip- iaAvs%ut^^ parchus made an attempt to gain the affections of hold ovl'/the Harmodius, but he would not listen to him, and told offices. Aristogiton. The latter was naturally tormented at the idea, and fearing that Hipparchus who was powerful would resort to \dolence, at once formed such a plot as a man in his station might for the overthroΛv of the tyranny. Meanwhile Hipparchus made another attempt ; he had no better success, and thereupon he determined, not indeed to take any violent step, but to insult Harmodius in some secret place, ^ so that his motive 1 Cp. Herod, v. 65. 2 Cp. i. 20. ? Reading τόττω with all the MSS. ; or, reading τςόπω: " in some underhand manner." HIPPIAS THE ELDER SON. 447 B.C. 514 ; 01. 66, 3. could not be suspected. To use violence would have YI. been at variance \vitli the general character of his ad- ministration, which was not unpopular or oppressive to the many ; in fact no tyrants ever displayed greater merit j)Y capacity than these. Although the tax on the produce of the soil which they exacted amounted only to five per cent., they improved and adorned the city, and carried on successful wars ; they were also in the habit of sacrificing in the temples. The city mean- while was permitted to retain her ancient laws ; but the family of Pisistratus took care that one of their own number should alwa^^s be in office. Among others Avho thus held the annual archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, a son of the tyrant Hippias. He was named after his grandfather Pisistratus, and during his term of office he dedicated the altar of the TAvelve Gods in the Agora, and another altar in the temple of the Pythian Apollo. The Athenian people afterwards added to one side of the altar in the Agora and so concealed the inscription upon it ; but the other inscription on the altar of the Pythian Apollo may still be seen, although the letters are nearly eifaced. It runs as follows : — *' Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, dedicated this memorial of his archonship in the sacred precinct of the Pythian Apollo." That Hippias was the eldest son of Pisistratus and 55. succeeded to his power I can positively affirm from ^roofs^more special information which has been transmitted to me. ^nc?no^*of But there is other evidence. Of the legitimate sons of ίί^ρρ^^^ί,ί Pisistratus he alone had children ; this is indicated by ^^''^ ^^'^^^' ^°^• the altar just mentioned, and by the column which the Athenians set up in the Acropolis to commemorate the oppression of the tyrants. For on that column no son of Thessalus or of Hipparchus is named, but five of Hippias who were born to him of JNIyrrhine the daughter of Callias the son of Hyperechides ; now there is a presumption that the son who married first would 448 HAEMODIUS AND AEISTOGITON. B.C. 514 ; 01. 66, 3. VI. be the eldest. MoreoΛ"er, his name is inscribed on the same column^ immediately after his father's ; this again is a presumption that he was his eldest son and suc- ceeded him. I think too that Hippias would have found a difficulty in seizing the tyranny if Hipparchus had been tyrant at the time of his death and he had tried to step into his place. As it was, owing to the habitual dread which he had inspired in the citizens, and the strict discipline which he maintained among his body-guard, he held the government with the most perfect security and without the least difficulty. Xor did he behave at all like a younger brother, who would not have known what to do because he had not been regularly used to command.^ Yet Hipparchus by reason of his violent end became famous, and obtained in after ages the reputation of having been the tyrant. 56. When Hipparchus found his adΛ^ances repelled by The rest of Hamiodius he carried out his intention of insulting him. the story. ^ ^ ^ ο Tiie revenge There was a young sister of his whom Hipparchus and aBdAristo- i^jg fneuds first invited to come and carry a sacred giton. ^ «^ basket in a procession, and then rejected her, declaring that she had never been invited by them at all because she was unworthy. At this Harmodius was very angry, and Aristogiton, for his sake, more angry still. They and the other conspirators had already laid their prepara- tions, but were waiting for the festival of the great Panathenaea, when the citizens Avho took part in the procession assembled in arms ; for to wear arms on any other day would have aroused suspicion. Harmodius and Aristogiton were to begin the attack, and the rest were immediately to join in, and engage with the guards» The plot had been communicated to a few only, the better to avoid detection ; but they hoped that, however ^ Or, reading with nearly all the MSS. ip ifj ττρώττι σττ^λτ^: "on the front part of the column." But the words can hardly bear this meaning. The word ηρώττ^ is probably derived from ηρωτος which follows. 2 Or, giving a more precise sense to ξύρΒχως: " because he had suc- ceeded to the command and not been used to it." ASSASSIN ATION OF HIFFARCHUS. 449 B.C. 514 ; 01. 66, 3. {e^v struck the blow, the crowd who would be armed, YI. tilthouo-h not in the secret, ΛνοηΜ at once rise and assist in the recovery of their own liberties. The day of the festival arrived, and Hippias went out 57. of the citv to the place culled the Ceramicus, where he Harmodius •^ ••• . 1 IT 1 andAristo- Λvas occupied with his guards m marshalling the pro- 1^^^^°^^^^^^;^ cession. Harmodius and Aristogiton, w^ho w^ere ready {,^|5;^|y^ Λvith their daggers, stepped forΛvard to do the deed. But Η?ρρ?4^1η? seeing one of the conspirators in familiar conversation ρ|^/^^Ρ^^^^5ίϊ with Hippias, who was readily accessible to all, they ^^(f^Si?^^^ took alarm and imagined that they had been betrayed, ^®^*^• and were on the point of being seized. Whereupon they determined to take their revenge first on the man who had outraged them and was the cause of their desperate attempt. So they rushed, just as they w^ere, within the gates. They found Hipparchus near the Leocorium, as it was called, and then and there falling upon him with all the blind fuiy, one of an injured lo\^er, the other of a man smarting under an insult, they smote and slew him. The crowd ran together, and so Aristogiton for the present escaped the guards ; but he was afterwards taken and not very gently handled. Harmodius perished on the spot. The news was carried to Hippias at the Ceramicus ; 58. he went at once, not to the place, but to the armed men Hippias. dis- ••- semoling ms who were to march in the procession and, being at a ^^?!j^'^ss, ^^■ distance, were as yet ignorant of what had happened. |enland^^*^~ Betraying nothing in his looks of the calamity which had giJpfcied befallen him, he bade them leave their arms and go to a certain spot which he pointed out. They, supposing that he had something to say to them, obeyed, and then bidding his guards seize the arms, he at once selected those whom he thought guilty, and all who Avere found carrying daggers ; for the custom was to march in the procession with spear and shield only. Such was the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton, 59. which began in the resentment of a lover ; the reckless THe rule ° , 'of Hippias attempt which followed arose out of a sudden fright. ^^^^^^ ^^ 29 450 DEPOSITIOJ^ OF HIPPI AS. B.C. 514 ; 01. 66, 3. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. YI. To the people at large the tyranny simply became more pressive. He oDDressive, and Hippias, after his brother's death livino- is deposed by „ ^ the Lacedae- in oTcat fear, slcw many of the citizens : he also be^an monians, and σ ^ ./ ' G Sui-t'o/per- ^^ ^^^^^ abroad in hope of securing an asylum should a oiiiis^^'*'^^^ revolution occur. Himself an Athenian, he married his ircheSco daughter Archedice to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of Hippocles the tyrant of Lampsacus ; for he observed that the family of Hippocles had great influence with King Darius. Her tomb is at Lampsacus, and bears this inscription : — *'This earth covers Archedice, the daughter of Hippias, The man ivho was great among the Hellenes of his day. Her father, her husband, her brothers, and her sons were tyrants. Yet was not her mind lifted np to vanity." Hippias ruled three years longer over the Athenians. In the fourth year he was deposed by the Lacedae- monians and the exiled Alcmaeonidae. He retired under an agreement, first to Sigeium, and then to Aeantides at Lampsacus. From him he went to the court of Darius, Tvhence, returning twenty years later Λvith the Persian army, he took part in the expedition to Marathon, being then an old man. 60. The Athenian people, recalling these and other n^nfbecome traditions of the tyrants which had sunk deep into Soieeicited their miiids, Avere suspicious and savage against the Sf iiieiSoX^ supposed profaners of the mysteries ; the whole affair beiieve^to ui- Seemed to them to indicate some conspiracy aiming at destgnagaSst oligarchy or tyranny. Liflamed by these suspicions they iacy!^"con- had already imprisoned many men of high character. o?the"pds^'^^ There Avas no sign of returning quiet, but day by day the movement became more furious and the number of arrests increased. At last one of the prisoners, who was believed to be deeply implicated, was induced by a fellow-prisoner to make a confession — whether true or false I cannot sa}^ ; opinions are divided, and no one knew at the time, or to this day knows, who the ofl^enders were. His companion argued that even if he Λvere not oners. THE MYSTERY OF THE HERMAE. 451 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. guilty he ought to confess and claim a pardon ; ^ he VI. would thus save his own life, and at the same time deliver Athens from the prevailing state of suspicion. His chance of escapmg would be better if he confessed his guilt in the hope of a pardon, than if he denied it and stood his trial. So he gave evidence both against himself and others in the matter of the Hermae. The Athenians were delighted at finding out what they supposed to be the truth ; they had been in despair at the thought that the conspirators against the democracy would never be known, and the}^ immediately liberated the informer and all whom he had not denounced. The accused they brought to trial, and executed such of them as could be found. Those who had fled they condemned to death, and promised a reward to any one who would kill them. No one could say whether the sufferers were justly punished ; but the beneficial efiect on the city at the time was undeniable. The enemies of Alcibiades, who had attacked him 61. before he sailed, continued their machinations, and popu- suspicion of ' :> JT 1 Alcibiades in« lar feelino^ was deeply stirred as^ainst him. The Athe- creased by σ It/ σ the appear- nians ηοΛν thought that they knew the truth about the L^cedfemo- Hermae, and they Avere more than ever convinced that fijf Isthmus* the violation of the mysteries which had been laid to his Ji^bSe^ charge was a pai-t of the same conspiracy, and was to SfeTiSpSon be explained in the same way. It so happened that Spg^' The while the city was in this state of excitement a small senfto^ifrist Lacedaemonian force proceeded as far as the Isthmus, escapeiVr having something to do in Boeotia. They were supposed JiosS ω"^ to haΛ^e come, not in the interest of the Boeotians, but ηβΐΓ" by a secret understanding with Alcibiades ; and the Athe- nians really believed that but for their own alacrity in arresting the accused persons the city would have been betrayed. For one whole night the people lay in arms in the temple of Theseus, which is within the Avails. About this time too the friends of Alcibiades at Arsros were sus- pected ®f conspiring against the Argive democracy, and » Cp. vi. 27. 452 ALCIBIADES CONDEMNED TO DEATH. B.C. 415 ; 01. 96, 2. VI accordingly the Argive hostages who had been deposited in the islands ^ ^veve at once given up hy the Athenians to the vengeance of the Argive j)eople. From every quarter suspicion had gathered around Alcibiades, and the Athenian people were determined to have him tried and executed ; so they sent the ship Salaminia to Sicily bearing a summons to him and to others against whom information had been given. He was ordered to follow the officers home and defend himself, but they were told not to arrest him ; the Athenians, liaAdng re- gard to their interests in Sicily, were anxious not to cause excitement in their own camp or to attract the attention of the enemy, and above all not to lose the Mantineans and Argives, whom they knew to have been induced by his influence to join in the expedition.^ He in his own ship, and those who were accused with him, left Sicily in company wdth the Salaminia, and sailed for Athens. When they arrived at Thurii they followed no further, but left the ship and disappeared, fearing to return and stand their trial when the prejudice against them Avas so violent. The crew of the Salaminia searched for them, but after a time, being unable to find them, gave up the search and went home. Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed not long afterwards in a small vessel from Thurii to Pelo- ponnesus, and the Athenians, on his non-appearance, sentenced him and his companions to death. 62. The two Athenian generals Avho remained in Sicily Expedition to ^q^ divided the fleet between them by lot, and sailed to- Egesta. Cap- «^ ' ture of Hyc- -^v^ards ScHuus and Esfesta ; they wanted to know whether ^rm^"r?tiirns ^^^^ Egcstacaus would give them the promised money, cltana ^^ ^^^^-^ ^^^^ ^^ ascertain the condition of the Selinuntians fakl^Hybia. ^^^^ ^^^^ nature of their quarrel with the Egestaeans. Sailing along the north coast of Sicily, which looks towards the Tyrrhenian Gulf, they touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in this part of the island. But they were not received, and passed on. On their voyage they tookHyccara, acity on the seashore, which, although 1 Cp. V. 84 init. 2 Cp. vi. 29. ATHENIANS IK THE NOETH OF SICILY. 453 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. of Sicanian origin, was hostile to the Egestaeans.^ They VI. reduced the inhabitants to slavery, and handed the place over to the Egestaeans, ΛYhose cavalry had now joined them. The Athenian troops then marched back through the country of the Sicels until they arrived at Catana; the ships which conveyed the prisoners going round the coast to meet them. Mcias had sailed strais^ht from Hyccara to Egesta, where he did his business, and having obtained thirty talents ^ of silver, rejoined the army at Catana. The Athenians on their return disposed of their slaves ; ^ the sum realized by the sale was about a hundred and twenty talents.^ They next sailed round to their Sicel allies and bade them send reinforcements. Then with half of their army they marched against Hybla Geleatis, a hostile town, which they failed to take. And so ended the summer. Early in the ensuing winter the Athenians made 63. preparations for an attack upon Syracuse ; the Syra- ^s^nJife η cusans likeΛvise prepared to take the offensive. For ^theSam^^^ when they found that their enemies did not assail them at once, as in their first panic they had expected, day by day their spirits rose. And now the Athenians, after cruising about at the other end of Sicily, where they seemed to be a long way off, had gone to Hybla, and their attack upon it had failed. So the Syracusans despised them more than ever. After the manner of the populace when elated, they insisted that since the Athe- nians Avould not come to them, their generals should lead them against Catana. Syracusan horsemen, who were always riding up to the Athenian army and watch- ing their movements, would ask insultingly Avhether, instead of resettling the Leontines in their old home, they Avere not themselves going to settle down with their good friends the Syracusans in a new one. The generals were aware of the state of affiirs. They 64. determmed to draw the whole Syracusan army as far ^^^^,;^^^ * Cp. vi. 2 med. s Cp. vii. 13 fin. 2 Cp. vi. 46 init. * £28,800. 454 THE SYKACUSANS AT CATANA. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. YI. as possible out of the city, and then in their absence sail ceive the thither bv nio'ht and take up a convenient position un- Syracusans ./ c r , l by a fictitious j]2olested. Thev knew that they would fail of their message and «^ «^ to cltSiT ^*^ P^^T*^^^ ^ ^^ they tried to disembark their men in the face of an enemy who was prepared to meet them, or if they marched openly by land and were discovered, for they had no cavalry of their own, and the Syracusan horse which were numerous would do o^reat harm to their light-armed troops and their camp-followers. Whereas if they sailed thither by night they would be enabled to take up a position in which the cavalry could do them no serious mischief. The exact spot near the temple of Olympian Zeus which they afterwards occupied was indicated by Syracusan exiles who accompanied them. Accordingly the generals devised the following plan ; they sent to Syracuse a man of whose fidelity they Λvere assured, but whom the Syracusan leaders believed to be a friend of theirs. He was a Catanaean, and professed to come from adherents of their party whose names were familiar to them, and whom they kncAV to be still re- maining in Catana." He told them that the Athenians lay within the city eΛ^ery night away from the camp in Λvhich their arms were deposited, and if at daΛΛ^n on a set day the Syracusans Avith their Avhole force would come and attack the troops left in the camp, their partisans in Catana would themselves shut the Athe- nians up in the town ^ and fire their ships ; meanAvhile the Syracusans might assault the palisade, and easily take the camp — preparations had been made,^ and many of the Catanaeans were in the plot ; from them he came. 65. The Syracusan generals were already in high spirits, ^S*S ^^^ before this proposal reached them had made up ' Omitting καί before εΐ έκ των νέων. 2 Cp. vi. δ1. 2 Beading αύιαυς after άποκλτισ3ΐν: or, reading τους instead of αϋτονς : " Shut up those of the Athenians who were in the town." δ Placing a comma after ιίδη. THE ATHEOTANS AT SYRACUSE. 455 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. their minds to have all things in readiness for a march VI. to Catana. So they trusted the man the more recklessly, awaybynigiit •^ '^ ' and disein- and at once fixed the day on Avhich they ΛνοηΜ arrive. g^J^^^^g They then sent him back, and issued orders for an ex- pedition to their whole army, including the Selinuntians and the rest of their allies, who had now joined them. "When they were ready and the appointed day drew near they marched towards Catana, and encamped by the river Sj^maethus in the Leontine territory. The Athenians, aware of the approach of the Syracusans, took all their own army and Sicel or other allies on board their ships and smaller craft, and sailed away at nightfall to Syracuse. At dawn they disembarked op- posite the temple of Olympian Zeus, intending to seize a place for their camp , almost at the same moment the Syracusan horse who had advanced before the rest to Catana discovered that the whole Athenian army had put out to sea, whereupon they returned and told the infantry ; and then all together hurried back to protect the city. The distance from Catana to Syracuse was considerable, ^^, and in the meantime the Athenians had quietly estab- They occupy ± .y a strong poSi- lished themselves m an advantas^eous position, where ^ion. The *- ■■■ ' ' Syracusans they could give battle whenever they pleased, and the ifaten/'^'^"^ Syracusan horse were least likely to harass them either before or during the engagement. On one side they were protected by walls, and houses, and trees, and a marsh ; on another by a lino of clifis. They felled the trees • , near, and bringing them down to the sea made a ! palisade to protect their ships ; on the shore of Dascon - , too they hurriedly raised a fortification of rough stones and logs at a point where the ground was most accessible j to the enemy, and broke down the bridge over the river | Anapus. No one came out from the walls to hinder ι them in their work. The first to appear at all were the \ returning cavalry ; after a while the mfantry camo up \ and re-formed. They at once marched right up to the | Athenian position, but the Athenians did not come out 1 456 SHOKT SPEECH OF NICIAS. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. VI. 67. The Athe- nians prepare for battle ; they are drawn up eight deep and the Syracusans sixteen deep. We are picked men, and they are the populace of a city. They despise us, but will not fight us. We are far from home and retreat is impossible. to meet them ; so they retired and encamped on the other side of the Helorine Road. On the next day the Athenians and their allies per- pared to give battle. Their order was as follows .--The Argives and Mantineans formed the right wing, the Athenians held the centre ; on the left wing were the remaining allies. Half of their army Λvhich formed the van Avas ranged eight deep. The other half was drawn up likewise eight deep close to their sleeping-places, in a holloiv oblong. The latter were told to Λvatch the engagement, and to move up to the support of any part of the line which might be distressed. In the midst of the reserve thus disposed were placed the baggage- bearers. The Syracusans drew up their heavy-armed sixteen deep ; the army consisted of the ivhole Syracusan people and their allies, chiefly the Selinuntians,who were in the city ; they had also two hundred horsemen from Gela, and twenty, with about fifty archers, from Camarina. The cavalry, numbering in all twelve hundred, Λvere placed upon the right wing, and beside them the javelin- men. The Athenians determined to begin the attack. Just before the battle Nicias went up and down, and addressed the following words to all and each of the various peoples who composed the army : — "What need, soldiers, is there of a long exhortation when Ave are all here united in the same cause ? ^ The mere sight of this great army is more likely to put courage into you than an eloquent speech and an infe- rior force. 2 We are Argives and Mantineans, and Athe- nians and the chief of the islanders ; and must not the presence of so many brave allies inspire exery one of us with a good hope of victory, especially Avhen we reflect that our opponents are not like ourselves picked soldiers, but a whole city Avhich has turned out to meet us. They are Sicilians too, who although they may despise us, will not stand their ground against us ; for their skill is not equal to their courage. Consider again » Cp. vii. 61 init. 2 Cp. v. 69 fin. ; vii. 91 fin., 77 med. THE FIEST EliGAGEMENT. 457 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. that we are far from home, and that there is no friendly VI. land near but what you can ivin with your sivords.^ The generals of the enemy, as Iwell know, are appealing to very different motives. They say to them, ^ you are fighting for your own country,' but I say to you that you are fighting in a country which is not your own, and from ΛΛdlich, if you do not conquer, retreat will be impossible, for swarms of cavalry Λνϋΐ follow at your heels. Remember your own reputation, and charge valiantly, deeming the difliculties of your position and the necessity which constrains you to be more formida- ble than the enemy." Nicias having thus exhorted his men led them at 69. once to the charo^e. The Syracusans did not expect ^^ syra- ?5 •^ ^ cusans are that they would have to fight just at that moment, and ί'^'^Ρ^ι^ΡΙ^-'^ some of them had even gone away into the city, which ^ave pS was close at hand ; others came running up as fast as tut airfifi- they could, and, although late, joined the main body one MotivSofthe by one at the nearest point. For they showed no want *^^^ armies. of spirit or daring in this or any other engagem^ent ; in courage they were not a whit inferior to their enemies, had their skill only been adequate, but Avhen it failed they could no longer do justice to their good intentions. On this occasion they were compelled to make a hasty defence, for they never imagined that the Athenians would begin the attack. Nevertheless they took up their arms and immediately Λvent forward to meet them. For a Avhile the throwers of stones, and slingers, and archers skirmished in front of the two armies, drivinof one an- other before them after the manner of liirht-armed troops. Then the soothsayers brought out the customary victims, and the trumpets sounded and called the infantry to the charge. The two armies advanced ; the Syracusans to fight for their country, and every man for life now and liberty hereafter ; on the opposite side, the Athe- nians to gain a new country, and to save the old from defeat and ruin ; the Argives and the independent allies 1 Cp. vii. 77 fin. 458 DEFEAT OF THE SYKACUSANS. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. VI. 70. The Syra- cusans are de- feated, but they are saved in their re- treat by their cavalry. 71, The Athe- nians, sensi- ble of their de- ficiency in cavalry, return to Catana and Naxos, where they eager to share the good things of Sicily, and, if they returned victorious, to see their own homes once more. The courage of the subject allies was chiefly inspired by a lively consciousness that their only chance of life was in victory ; thej^ had also a distant hope that, if they assisted the Athenians in overthrowing others, their own yoke might be lightened. The armies met, and for a long time the issue was doubtful. During the battle there came on thunder and lightning, and a deluge of rain ; these added to the terror of the inexperienced who were fighting for the first time, but experienced soldiers ascribed the storm to the time of year, and were much more alarmed at the stubborn resistance of the enemy. ^ First the Argives drove back the left wing of the Syracusans ; next the Athenians the right iving which was opposed to them. Whereupon the rest of the army began to give Avay and were soon put to flight. Their opponents did not pursue them far, for the Syracusan horsemen, Avho were numerous and had not shared in the defeat, interposed, and wherever they saw hoplites advancing from the ranks attacked and drove them back. The Athenians pursued in a body as far as they safely could, and then returned and raised a trophy. The Syracusans rallied on the Helorine Eoad, and did their best to re- form after their defeat. They did not neglect to send some of their forces as a guard to the Olympieum, fear- ing lest the Athenians should plunder the treasures of the temple. The rest of the army returned to the city. The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple at all, but collecting their dead, and laying them on a pyre, they passed the night where they were. On the follow- ing day they gave back the Syracusan dead under a flag of truce, and gathered from the pyre the bones of their own dead. There had fallen of the Syracusans and of their allies about two hundred and sixty ; of the 1 Or, giving a slightly different meaning to the present: "at the prospect of the enemy's success." RETURiT ΟΤ ATHENIANS TO CATANA. 459 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. Athenians and their allies not more than fifty. The VI. Athenians then, takino^ with them the spoils of their intend to Λνίη- ' c5 -I- ter while tney enemies, sailed back to Catana. Winter had now set ?^*^"^ ^^i.^- ' lorcenients m, and they thought that before they could do anything and siciiy!'^ more at Syracuse they must send for horsemen from Athens, and collect others from their Sicilian allies ; without them they would be at the mercy of the Syra- cusan cavalry. They also Avanted to obtain both in Sicily and from Athens a supply of money, and to gain over some of the Sicilian cities. These would be more Avilling to listen to them after their Aactory. They had likewise to provide food, and to make the other requisite preparations for attacking Syracuse in the spring. Ac- cordingly they sailed away to Naxos and Catana, intend- ing to winter. The Syracusans, after burying their dead, called an 72. assembly. Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a man of ^olnTs^Suf ^^ first-rate ability, of distinguished bravery, and also of cusans^the'" great military experience, came forward and encouraged J^gf^^J^^/eat. them. He told them not to be disheartened at the JavJ/e^ver^ result of the battle ; for their resolution had not been ItSvefowl^!^ defeated ; ^ but they had suffered from want of disci- piSlJ^and'" pline. Yet they had proved less unequal than might fec?esy. 'i' have been expected ; and they should remember that they had been contending against the most experienced soldiers of Hellas ; they were unskilled Avorkmen, and the Athenians masters in their craft. ^ Another great source of Aveakness had been the number of generals (there were fifteen of them) ; the division of authority had produced disorganization and disorder among the troops. If they had a few experienced generals, and during the winter got their hoplites into order, providing arms for those who had none, and so raising the number of their forces to the utmost, while at the same time they insisted on strict drill and discipline, they would have a good chance of victory ; for they had courage already, and only wanted steadiness in action. Both qualities 1 Cp. ii. 87 init. ; vi. 11 fin. 2 Reading χειροτέχ}•αις. 460 GOOD ADVICE OF HERMOCEATES. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. VI. 73. The Syracu- sans follow his advice, and send envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon. 74. Alcibiades having con- trived that Messene should be betrayed, now betrays the betrayers. The Athe- nians take up their winter quarters at Naxos. would improve together ; they would learn steadiness in the school of danger, and their natural courage would be enforced by the confidence which skill inspires. The generals whom they elected should be not only few but entrusted with full power, the people taking a solemn oath to them that they ivould be allowed to command according to their own judgment. The secrets of the army Avould then be better kept, and everything would be done in a more orderly and straightforward manner. The Syracusans listened to him, and voted all that he desired. They chose three generals and'no more ; Hermocrates himself, Heraclides the son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus the son of Execestus. They also sent am- bassadors to Corinth and to Lacedaemon requesting aid, and urged the Lacedaemonians to make war openly and decidedly against the Athenians on their behalf; thus they would either draw them off from Sicily, or at any rate prevent them from sending reinforcements to the army which was there already. No sooner had the Athenians returned in the fleet to Catana than they sailed to Messen^, expecting that the city would be betrayed to them. But they were dis- appointed. For Alcibiades, when he ivas recalled and gave up his command, foreseeing that he would be an exile, communicated to the Syracusan party at Messend the plot of which he was cognizant. ^ They at once put to death the persons whom he indicated ; and on the appearance of the Athenians the same party, rising and arming, prevented their admission. The Athenians re- mained there about thirteen days, but the weather was bad, their provisions failed, and they had no success. So they went to Naxos, and having surrounded their camp with a palisade, proposed to pass the winter there. They also despatched a trireme to Athens for money and cavalry, which were to arrive at the beginning of Cp. vi. 50 init. H ERMOCRATES AT CAMARmA. 461 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. The Syraciisans employed the winter in raising a VI. wall near the city, which took in the shrine of Apollo 75. Temenites and extended all along that side of Syracuse The symcu- _^ ^-^ Sans extend which looks towards Epipolae ; they thus enlarged the J^^jJ.^^^^/^ area of the city, and increased the difficulty of investing ^^^^^J^^^^ ' it in case of defeat. They fortified and garrisoned «|™ρ^|* ^^^ Megara, and also raised a fort at the Olympieum,^ ^®"lmbas?yto sides fixing palisades at all the landing-places along the camarma. shore. They knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, and so, marching out with their whole army to Catana, they ravaged the country and burnt the huts and the camp of the Athenians ; they then returned home. They heard that the Athenians were sending an embassy to gain over the Camarinaeans on the strength of their former alliance, which had been made under Laches,^ and they despatched a counter embassy of their own. They suspected that the Camarinaeans had not been over-zealous in sendinof their contins^ent to the first battle, and would not be willing to assist them any longer now that the Athenians had gained a victory ; old feelings of friendship Avould revive, and they would be induced to join them. Accordingly Hermocrates came with an embassy to Camarina, and Euphemus with another embassy from the Athenians. An assembly of the Camarinaeans was held, at which Hermocrates, hoping to raise a prejudice against the Athenians, spoke- as follows : — " We are not here, Camarinaeans, because we suppose 76. that the presence of the Athenian army will dismay you ; ^^ fear we are more afraid of their as yet unuttered words, to swords but *^ 'the Avords which you may too readily lend an ear if you hear them J^^^^® j without first hearing us. You know the pretext on ^^η^ω b^ Avhich they have come to Sicily, but we can all guess {jut th?"' their real intentions. If I am not mistaken they want, enliaTeri not to restore the Leontines to their city, but to drive us awdS' out of ours. Who can believe that they who desolate home?the the cities of Hellas mean to restore those of Sicily, or 1 Cp. vii. 4 fin. 2 Qp, m 56. 462 SPEECH OF HEKMOCRATES, B.C. 415 ; 01. 91. 2. ly. that the enslavers and oppressors of the Chalcidians whrniTiieiTa^s ^^ Euboea have any feeling of kindred toΛvards the eichaiigifor colonists of these Chalcidians in Leontini? In their the Persians, conqucsts at homc, and in their attempt to conquer Sicily, is not the principle upon which they act one and the same? The lonians and other colonists of theirs who were their allies, wanting to be revenged on the Persian, freely invited them to be their leaders ; and they accepted the invitation. But soon they charged them, some with desertion, and some with making war upon each other ; ^ any plausible accusation which they could bring against any of them became an excuse for their overthrow. It Λvas not for the liberties of Hellas that Athens, or for her own liberty that Hellas, fought against the Persian ; they fought, the Athenians that they might enslave Hellas to themselves instead of him, the rest of the Hellenes that they might get a new master, who may be cleverer, but certainly makes a more dishonest use of his wits. 77. "HoAvever, the character of the Athenians is known to Tiie old tales you already, and we do not come here to set forth their tricks are be- enomiitics, Λvhich would be an easy task, but rather to mg repeated ' *^ ' here. Shall accusc oursclvcs. Wc liavc had a warnino^ in the fate of we allow our- Ο tiS in bl ^^^ Hellenes elsewhere ; we know that they were reduced sScciimbVne ^^ slavcry bccausc they ΛνοηΜ not stand by one another. by one? j^^^ when the same tricks are practised upon us,^ and we hear the old tale once more about the restoration of *our kinsmen the Leontines,' and the succor of ^ our allies the Egestaeans,' why do we not all rise as one man and sho\v them that here they will find, not lonians, nor yet Hellespontians, nor islanders, who must always be the slaves, if not of the Persian, of some other master ; but Dorians^ and free inhabitants of Sicily, sprung from the independent soil of Peleponnesus ? Are we waiting till our cities are taken one by one, when Ave know that this is the only way in which we can be conquered ? » Cp. i. 99. ^ 2 cp.iv. 61 med. 3 Cp. i. 124 init. ; v. 9 init. : vii. δ fin. ; viii. 25 med. SPEECH OF HEEMOCRATES. 463 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. We see what their policy is : how in some cases their VI. cunning words soav ill-feeling ; in others they stir up Avar by the offer of alliance ; or again, by some well-invented phrase specially agreeable to an individual state they do it all the mischief which they can. And does any one suppose that, if his countryman at a distance perishes, the danger will not reach him, or that he who suffers first Λνϋΐ have no companions in ruin ? " If any one fancies that not he, but the Syracusan, is 78. the enemy of the Athenian, and asks indignantly 'why JgyfS^are ^^^ should I risk myself for you?' let him consider that in yfuiSfve?.'^ fighting for my country he will be at the same time S^usio L fighting in mine for his own.i And he will fight with yo^JamiOt''* less danger, because I shall still be in existence ; he will Hlhtlmo^unt not carry on the struggle alone, for he \vill have me for tfoSr^nd^ an ally. 2 Let him consider that the Athenian is not ilnen you"*^ really seeking to chastise the enmity of the Syracusan, haVVuTba?k, but unddf• pretence of attacking me may be quite as de- have offered sirous of drawing hard and fast the bonds of friendship have' waited* with him. And if any one from envy, or possibly from fear (for greatness is exposed to both) , would have Syra- cuse sufier that we may receive a lesson, but survive for his own security, he is asking to have a thing which human power cannot compass. For a man may regulate his own desires, but he is not the dispenser of fortune ;^ and the time may come when he will find himself mis- taken, and Avhile mourning over his own ruin he may possibly wish that he could still have my prosperity to envy. But he cannot bring me back again when he has once abandoned me and has refused to take his share in the common danger, which, far from being imaginary, is only too real. For though in name you may be saving me, in reality you will be saving your- selves. And you especially, Camarinaeans, ivho are our next neighbors, and on whom the danger will fall next, should have anticipated all this, and not be so slack in ^ Cp. iii. 13 med. 2 Heading ϊρημος. 3 Cp. iv. 64 init. 464 SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. VI. 3^our alliance. Instead of our coming to you, you should have come to us. Suppose the Athenians had gone to Camarina first, would you not at this moment be praying and begging for assistance? Then why did not you present yourselves at Syracuse, and say to us in our time of danger, ^ Never yield to the enemy?' But, hitherto, neither you nor any of the Sicilians have shown a spirit like this. 79. " You may perhaps disguise your cowardice under the You may pre pretciice of impartiality : you may balance betΛveen us tendimpar- , , . -, ^ ; \^ . *^ _ tiaiity, but and the invaders, and plead that you have an alliance with you will really , . , . -r-» i n• be conspiring the Athenians. But that alliance was made on the sup- with. your . . , . , enemies positi Oil that you Avcrc luvadcd by an enemy, not aofainst a against your ^ *^ . '^ ./ ' ο friends. fricud ; and you promised to assist the Athenians if they were WTonged by others, not when, as now, they are doing wrong themselves. Are the Ehegians who are Chalci- dians so very anxious to join in the restoration of their Leontine kinsmen ? ^ And yet how monstrous tJiat they, suspecting the real meaning of this plausible claim, should display a prudence for which they can give no reason ; and that you, who have every reason for a like prudence, should be eager to assist your natural ene- mies, and to conspire with them for the destruction of those Λνΐιο by a higher law are j^our natural kinsmen. This should not be. You must make a stand against them. And do not be afraid of their armament. There is no dano^er if we hold too^ether : the dansrer is in dis- union, and they want to disunite us. Even Avhen they ensraofed with our unaided forces, ^ and defeated us in battle, they failed in their main purpose, and quickly retired. 80. " If then we can once unite, there is no reason for dis- un^jnwiii b^e courageiiient. But there is every reason why you, Avho Silei^side ^^'^ ^^^^' allics, should meet us more cordially. We ma}^ Sr 'be un- ^® ^^^® ^^^"^^ ^^Ψ ^^^^ come to us from Peloponnesus, true to both, ^^β^ ^j^g Peloponncsians are far better soldiers than the Athenians. Let no one think that the caution which ' Cp. vi. 44 fin., 46 init. 2 β^^ cp. vi. 65 init., 67 med. SPEECH OF EUFHEMTJS. 465 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. professes to be in league with both, and therefore gives VI. aid to neither, is just to us or safe for you. Such a policy, though it may pretend to impartiality, is really unjust. For if through your absence the victor over^ comes and the vanquished falls, have you not abandoned the one to his fate and alloΛved the other to commit a crime ? How much nobler would it be to join your injured kinsmen, and thereby maintain the common in- terest of Sicily and save the Athenians, whom you call your friends, from doing wrong ! "To sum up :-We Syracusans are quite aware that tou who are there is no use in our dilatino^ to you or to any one else should not η 1 ΤΓ» betraj^ your on matters which you know as well as ourselves. But kinsmen to . lonians. If we prefer a prayer to you ; and solemnly adjure you they conquer to consider, that, if you reiect us, we, who are Dorians absorbed by ' ' «^ •^ ' ' . them ; if we like yourselves, are betrayed by you to lonians, our conquer. .^^ inveterate enemies, Λyho are seeking our ruin. If the y^u. Athenians subdue us, your decision λυΙΙΙ have gained them the day ; but the honor will be all their own, and the authors of their victory will be the prize of their victory. If on the other hand we conquer, you who have brought the peril upon us will have to suifer the penalty. Reflect then, and take your choice : will you have pres- ent safety and slavery, or the hope of delivering your- selves and us, and thereby escaping the dishonor of submitting to the Athenian yoke, and the danger of our enmity, which will not be short-lived ? " Thus spoke Hermocrates. Euphemus, the Athenian 81. envoy, replied as follows • — "We had come to renew our former alliance, but the 82. attack made upon us by the Svracusan envov renders it True, we ■^ *^ " *^ are lonians, necessary for us to vindicate our title to empire.^ He ^Jij^^^J'^^f himself bore the stronofest witness in our favor when he porian and said that Dorians and lonians are inveterate enemies, gcltio?^' And so they are. We lonians dwelling in the neighbor- ^^^p'JJ^ hood of the Peloponnesians (who are Dorians and more Jo dJfetd numerous than themselves) have had to consider the best 1 Cp. i. 73 init. 30 466 SPEECH OF EUPHEMUS. B.C. 415; 01.91, 2. VI. way of securing our independence. After the Persian ourselves, War we were delivered by the help of our newly-acquired enslaved our navy froiii the rule and supremacy of Lacedaemon ; they Avere slaves had uo iiiore rio;ht to domineer over us than we over already, and ^ made^l•^^^ them, except the right of the stronger, which at the time "i '^s. they possessed. We then assumed the leadership of the king's former subjects, Λγhich we still retain ; if we were not to be the slaves of the Peloponnesians we thought that we must have the means of self-defence. And what if we did subjugate those kinsmen of ours Λvhom the Syracusans say that we have enslaΛ^ed, the lonians and the islanders? On the strictest principles, where Avas the injustice ? For we were their mother-cit^^, and they joined in the Persian invasion. They had not the courage to revolt from him and to destroy their homes, as we did when we left our city. But they chose slavery for their own portion, and would have imposed it upon us. 83. " We rule then, in the first place, because we deserve We come to rulc : for we provided the laro^est navy and showed hither for our ^ . own sake as the most patriotic alacrity in the cause of Hellas ;^ while well as for ■»■ *^ ^ vours; and those who bccame our subiects were willins^ shwes to the for voiirs as t' σ Persian, and were doing us mischief. And secondly, we were anxious to o^ain additional streno^th ao^ainst the Peloponnesians. We do not tell you in grandiloquent words that we have a right to rule on the ground that we alone overthrew the Barbarians, ^ nor do we pretend that we fought for the liberty of our allies, and not equally for our own and the general liberty. ^ Can any man be blamed because he makes the natural provision for his own safety?^ The same care of our safety has brought us hither, and we can see that our presence here is for your benefit as well as for our own. This we will prove to you ; and our proofs shall be drawn from the calumnies of our enemies, and from the suspicions and fears Avhich most sway your minds. For we know that those who are timorous and mistrustful Ϊ Cp. i. 74 init. ^ Cp. vi. 76 fin. 2 Cp. V. 89 init. * Cp. i. 75 fin. for youi"s well as for our own. SPEECH OF EUPHEMUS. 467 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. may be won for the moment by alluring words, but YI. that when the time of action comes they follow their own interests. " We have told you already that fear makes us main- tain our empire at home ; and that a like fear brings us to your shores. For we desire by the help of our friends to secure our position in Sicily. And we have not come to enslave you, but to save you from being enslaved. Let no one imagine that your welfare is no 34. business of ours, for if you are preserved, and are strono: it is for our interest tliat enouo^h to hold out as^ainst the Syracusans, they will you should be , 1 Ti τ . η 1 '"'τ^ 1 . τ . . independent. be less likely to aid the Peloponnesians, and so to injure we are quite •^ ^ "' consistent in us. Thus you become at once our first concern. And restoring the •^ Cnalcidians we are quite consistent in restorinof the Leontines, not ρ siciiy and ^ ^ '^ ^ ' m stibjectmg like their kinsmen in Euboea to be subiects, but to be ti^e chai- «^ ^ cidians in as strong as ever we can make them, that from their Euboea. position on the border they may harass the Syracusans and do our work. In Hellas we are a match for our enemies single-handed ; and as to our subjection of the Chal cidians at home, which Hermocrates finds so in- consistent Λvith our emancipation of the Chal cidians here, it is for our advantage, on the one hand, that the cities of Euboea should have no armed force and contribute money only, and, on the other hand, that the Leontines and our friends in Sicily should be as independent as possible. "Now to a t3rrant or to an imperial city ^ nothing is 85. inconsistent which is expedient, and no man is a kins- ^^ act upon . 1 . τ τ principle, and man who cannot be trusted. In each case we must t^at princi- , /> . τ . τ . P^® requires make iriends or enemies accordingf to circumstances, a different . . ^ policy to and here our mterest requires, not that we should weaken different ^ cases. our friends, but that our friends should be too strong for our enemies. Do not mistrust us. In Hellas we act upon the same principle, managing our allies as our interest requires in their several cases. The Chians and Methymnaeans furnish us with ships, and are their own masters ; the majority are less independent, and 1 Cp. ii. 63; iii. 37 init. 468 SPEECH OF EUPHEMUS. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. yi. pay ii tribute ; others, although they are islanders and might be easily conquered, enjoy complete freedom, be- cause they are situated conΛ^eniently for operations about Peloponnesus.^ So that in Sicily too our policy is likely to be determined by our interest, and, as I Avas saying, b}'" our fear of the Syracusans. For they desire to be your masters, but first they must unite you in a common suspicion of us, and then either by force, or through your isolation when we have failed and retired, they will dominate Sicily. This is inevitable if you now join them. Your united power will be more than we can manage, and the Syracusans, Avhen we are gone, will be too much for you. He who thinks otherwise 86. is comdcted out of his own mouth. For when you £ts°ra-"^ originally invited us the danger Avhich w^e should incur if we allowed you to fall into the hands of the Syra- cusans Avas precisely what you held before our eyes, cuse would rule Sicily, and we give you back your have uotSig ^^^^l ηοΛν you ought not to distrust the argument by us,^who^aie^ w^hich you hoped to convince us. Xor should you sus- at a distance, but much, to pect us because we bring hither a force larger than sTracu^Siis,^^ beforc ; for λνβ have to contend against the power of iSghborsand Syracuse. Much more to be mistrusted are they. getat^yoS Without your aid we cannot even remain AvhercAA^e are, so^iy^some^ and if wc wcrc so dishonorable as to make conquests haveiost^? w^e should bc unable to retain them,^ for the voyage is long, and it would be a hopeless task to garrison great cities which, though situated on an island, haA^e the resources of a continent. Whereas these men are your nearest neighbors. And they dwell not in a camp, but in a city far more powerful than the forces which w^e have brought to Sicily ; they are always scheming against you, and never miss a chance, as they have often shown, especially in their conduct towards the Leontines. And now they have the impudence to stir you up against those Λνΐιο resist them, and have thus far saved Sicily from passing under their yoke. As if you had no eyes ! Far more real than the security offered 1 Cp. ii. 7 fin. ; vii. 57 med. ^ Cp. vi. 11 init. SPEECH OF EUPHEMUS. 469 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. by them is that to Λvhich we invite you, a security which I. we and you gain from one another, and we beseech you not to throw it away. Reflect : the Syracusans are so numerous that with or without allies they can always find their Λyay to you, but you will not often have the chance of defending yourself with the aid of an army like ours. And if from any suspicion you allow us to depart unsuccessful, or perhaps defeated, the time may come Λvhen you wall desire to see but a fraction of that army, although, if it came, it would be too late to save you. -" "But we would not have either you, Camarinaeans, 87. or others moved by their calumnies. We have told you Enough of ^ ^ «^ these sus- the whole truth about the suspicions Λvhich are enter- picions. we ^ came at your tained of us ; Ave will now sum up our arofuments, and owninvita- we think that they ought to convince you. We rule Jlg^^s^^®^ over the cities of Hellas in order to maintain our in- f^^^^^ ^^j^^^ dependence, and we emancipate the cities of Sicily that advile^SI hiit they may not be used against us. And we are com- gJivlVof^iur pelled to adopt a policy of interference because we fg^eve^^^iJeie have many interests to guard. Lastly, we come now, {heoppTe^or as we came before, not uninvited, but upon your own J^end of the invitation, to assist those of you who are sufiering yoSitifi^'ta- wrong. Do not sit in judgment upon our actions, or wuhTh?^* seek to school us into moderation and so divert us from ^^^^^^^°^• our purpose (the time for good advice has gone by), but in as far as our busy, meddlesome spirit can be of service to you as well as to ourselves, take and use us ; remember that these qualities, so far from being in- jurious to all alike, actually benefit great numbers of the Hellenes. For in all places — however remote from our sphere — both he who fears and he who intends injustice, the one because he has a lively hope that from us he will obtain redress, and the other because he may well be alarmed for the consequences if we answer to the call, must both alike submit, the one to learn moderation against his will, the other to receive at our hands a deliverance Avhich costs him nothing^. 470 ΟΑΜΑΕΙΝΆ IS NEUTEAL. B.C. 415 ; Ol. 91, 2. VI. Do not reject the common salvation which is offered to you at this moment, as Avell as to all who seek it, but following the example of your countrymen join with us, and instead of having always to watch the Syra- cusans, assert your equality and threaten them as they have long been threatening you." 88. Thus spoke Euphemus. !N^ow the CamarinaeansAvere ri^L^nTtus- swayed by opposite feelings ; they had a good will to Sgns^of^fhe ^^® Athenians, tempered by a suspicion that they might ^ndl^?"^ be intending to enslave Sicily, whereas the Syracusans, sy?acu?a?^^^ from their proximity, were always at feud with them. Thly resolve ^ut they ATcrc uot SO much afraid of the Athenians as eithl?,^the* of their Syracusan neighbors, \vho, as they thought, butuTpiSess might win without their assistance. This ivas the reason neutrality, ^^j^^ ^|^^^ ^^^^^ them the Small body of horse which took part in the first battle ; and in a like spirit they now determined that for the future they would give real as- sistance only to the Syracusans, but to a very moderate extent. For the present however, that they might seem to deal equal justice to the Athenians, especially after their recent victory, they resolved to return the same answer to both. Such were the considerations which led them to reply, that as two of their allies were at war with one another, they thought that under the circumstances the best way of observing their oaths would be to assist neither. So the two embassies de- parted. TheAthe- The Syracusaus proceeded Avith their own prepara- sicei country, tious for the War, and the Athenians who were en- fromSor camped at Naxos tried by negotiation to gain over as send envoys manv of the Siccls as they could. The dwellers in to Carthage ii.-i η. ^ λ m ji andTyrrhe- tlic plaiii Λνΐιο wcrc subjccts ot the Syracusans mostly prepare for stood aloof, but the Siccl Settlements in the interior the siege of ι•ίί\ Syracuse. (which had always been independent) at once, with a few exceptions, joined the Athenians, and brought down food to the army ; in some cases money also. Against those Λvho were recalcitrant, troops were despatched by the Athenians ; and some of them were forced into SYRACUSANS AT CORmTH ΑΚΌ SPARTA. 471 B.C. 415; 01.91,2. submission, but others were protected by the garrisons VI. which the Syracusans sent to their aid. They then transferred their station from Naxos to Catana, and reconstructing the camp which had been burnt by the Syracusans, 1 passed the winter there. In the hope of obtaining assistance they sent a trireme to Carthage with a proposal of friendship ; likewise to Tyrrhenia, since some of the cities there were offering of themselves to join in the war : to the various Sicel tribes ^ and to the Egestaeans they issued orders that they were to send as many horse as possible. They further prepared bricks, tools, and whatever else was requisite for siege opera- tions, intending, when the spring arrived, to prosecute the war with vifi^or. The envoys whom the Syracusans had sent to Corinth The oorin- -, T- , Q 1 1 J 1 J thians are the and ^acedaemon ^ endeavored on the voyage to per- first who suade the Italian Greeks that they were equally threat- thesyracu- -I AT • Ί ' ΊΊΊΊΊ ^^" envoys. ened by the Athenian desis^ns, and should take an They go with "^ ~ them to interest in the war. When they arrived at Corinth the ν sparta, where . , *^ " they meet appealed to the Corinthians for aid on the o^round of Aicibiades, , who had come relationship. The Corinthians, takino^ the lead of all thither under , , ^ a safe-con- the Hellenic states, with the utmost enthusiasm voted ^^^^t. the aid which was asked. They sent with the Syracusan envoys ambassadors of their own to the Lacedaemo- nians, bearing a joint request that they ΛνοηΜ resume open hostilities at home, and unite with them in send- ing help to Sicily. At Lacedaemon the Corinthian ambassadors met Aicibiades and his fellow exiles. He had sailed at once from Thurii in a trading vessel to Cyllene in Elis, and thence proceeded to Lacedaemon on the invitation of the Lacedaemonians themselves, first obtaining a safe-conduct ; for he was afraid of them after his proceedings in the matter of the Mantinean league. "^ And so it came to pass that the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and Aicibiades appeared simultaneously in the Lacedaemonian assembly, and concurred in urging 1 Cp. vi. 15 med. s Cp. vi. 13. 2 Cp. vi. 98 init. 4 Cp. v. 43 ff., 61 ff. 472 ALCIBIADES AT SPARTA. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. VI. the same request. The Ephors and the magistrates were already intending to send eni^oys to the Syra- cusans bidding them make no terms with the Athe- nians, although they were not disposed to assist them actively. But now Alcibiades came forward and stim- ulated the energies of the Lacedaemonians in the fol- lowing words : — 89. "I must endeavor first of all to remove a prejudice ex'SraimSs. i^ga^Hst mysclf, Icst through suspicion of me you should se7v?5ou!^but ^^1'^^ ^ ^^'^'^^ ^^^' t^ considerations of public interest. My i?atSu1tand auccstors in consequence of some misunderstanding re- ί was nofa" nouiiccd the office of Lacedaemonian Proxenus ; I myself but^aif h^erld- Tcsumed it, and did you many good offices, especially ofthlstafe^'^ after your misfortune at Pylos. My anxiety to serve DemSSacy, you iicvcr ccased, but when you Avere making peace with liabieTi Athcus you negotiated through my enemies, thereby abuse, Avas i• • j.a ί i • • j • i our natural coniemng powcr on them, and bringing dishonor upon erument^lnd mc.^ And if I thcii tumed to the Mantineans and we could not . . -, η • j i j • . i change it. Argivcs and opposed you in that or m any other way you were rightly served, and any one who while the wound was recent may have been unduly exasperated against me should now take another and a truer νίβλν. Or, again, if any one thought the worse of me because I was inclined to the people, let him acknowledge that here too there is no real ground of offence. Any power adverse to despotism is called democracy, and my family have ahvays retained the leadership of the people in their hands because we have been the per- sistent enemies of tyrants. Living too under a popular government, how could Λve avoid in a great degree conforming to circumstances? However, Λve did our best to observe political moderation amid the prevailing license. But there w^ere demagogues, as there alwaj^s have been, wdio led the people into evil Avays, and it was they Avho drove me out.^ AVhereas we were the leaders of the state as a whole, ^ and not of a part 1 Cp. V. 43. 2 cp. viii. 65 rned. 3 Cp. vi. 39 init. SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES. 473 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. only; it was oar view that all ought to combine in VI. maintaining that form of government which had been inherited by us, and under which the city enjoyed the greatest freedom and glory. Of course, like all sensible men, we knew only too λυ^Ι what democracy is, and . I better than any one, who have so good a reason for abusing it. The follies of democracy are universally admitted, and there is nothing new to be said about them. But we could not venture to change our form of government when an enemy like yourselves Λvas so near to us. " Such is the truth about the calumnies under which 90. I labor. And ηοΛν I Λνϋΐ speak to you of the matter J^^iSfgns Avhich you have in hand, and about \vhich I, in so far |™βγ*χ®^^ΐγ as I have better information, am bound to instruct ^l^suJfee'ded you. We sailed to Sicily hoping in the first place to Γο^ηΙβΐΓ'"^ conquer the Sicilian cities ; then to proceed against the nlsuf^the Hellenes of Italy ; and lastly, to make an attempt on HeFias^ would the Carthaginian dominions, and on Carthage itself. beeSours. If all or most of these enterprises succeeded, ive meant finally to attack Peloponnesus, bringing with us the whole Hellenic power Λvhich we had gained abroad, besides many barbarians whom we intended to hire — Iberians and the neighboring tribes, esteemed to be the most w^arlike barbarians that now are.^ Of the timber Avhich Italy supplies in such abundance Λve meant to build numerous additional triremes, and with them to blockade Peloponnesus. At the same time making in- roads by land with our infantry, Λve should have stormed some of 3' our cities and invested others. Thus we hoped to crush you easily, and to rule over the Hellenic Avorld. For the better accomplishment of our \"arious aims our newly-acquired territory ΛνοηΜ supply money and pro- visions enough, apart from the revenue Λvhich we receive in Hellas. "You have heard the objects of our expedition from 91. him Λvho knows them best ; the sfenerals Λvho remain siciiy is lost ο unless you 1 Keadiug μαχιμωτάτους and placing a comma after έκεΐ. 474 SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. YI. will persevere and carry them out if they can. And FescSe" *Th ^^^ ^^^ ^^ provc to you that if you do not come to the nit'uiite'aud I'^scue Sicily Λνϋΐ be lost. If the Sicilian cities would tlone^ilio ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^y might even now, notwithstanding their AtheSiin^sf^^ want of military skill, resist with success ; but the Syra- andi Spartan cusaus alouc, whosc wholc forccs have been already at™?and defeated, and who cannot move freely at §ea, ivill be un- le^^i know ^blc to wlthstaud the power which the Athenians already A?heniaii*^^ hi^vc Oil the spot. Aiid Syracusc once taken, the whole You mifsTbe of Sicily is in their hands ; the subjugation of Italy will up an oiug. £^υ^^^ , ^^^ ^]^^ danger Λvhich, as I was saying, threatens you from that quarter, will speedily overwhelm you. And therefore remember every one of you that the safety, not of Sicily alone, but of Peloponnesus, is at stake. No time should be lost. You must send to Sicily a force of hoplites who will themselves handle the oars and will take the field immediately on landing. A Spartan commander I conceive to be even more indis- pensable than an army ; his duty will be to organize the troops which are already enlisted, and to press the un- willing into the service. Thus you will inspire confidence in your friends and overcome the fears of the Avavering. Here too in Hellas you should make open war. The Syracusans, seeing that you have not forgotten them, will then persevere in their resistance, while the Athe- nians will have greater difficulty in reinforcing their army. You ought above all to fortify Decelea in Attica ; the Athenians are always in dread of this ; to them it seems to be the only calamity which they have not already experienced to the utmost in the course of the war. And the way to hurt an enemy most surely is to inform yourself exactly about the weak points of which you see that he is conscious, and strike at them. For every man is likely to ΙίηοΛν best himself the dangers Avhich he has most to fear. I will sum up briefly the chief though by no means all the advantages which you will gain, and the disadvantages which you will inflict, by the fortification of Decelea. The whole stock of the SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES. 475 B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. country will fall into your hands. The slaves will come YI. over to you of their own accord ; what there is besides will be seized by you. The Athenians will at once be deprived of the revenues which they obtain from the silver mines of Laurium, and of all the profits which they make by the land or by the law courts : above all, the customary tribute will fail ; for their allies, w^hen they see that you are now carrying on the war in earn- est, Λνϋΐ not mind them. How far these plans are exe- cuted, and with how much speed and energy, Lacedae- monians, depends us you ; for I am confident that they are practicable, and I am not likely to be mistaken. "You ought not in fairness to think the worse of me 92. because, havino- been once distins^uished as a lover of my Athens has ' ο c? J compelled me country, I now cast in my lot Λvith her worst foes and at- ^ ^® she!?^' tack her with all my might ; or suspect that I speak only cJ^ni^r^y^"^ γΐ^ with the forwardness of an exile. An exile I am indeed ; oniy^hat?^ I have lost an ungrateful country, but I have not lost ™g^j.^ '^^^^^ the power of doing you service, if you will listen to me. The true enemies of my country are not those who, like you, have injured her in open war, but those Λvho have compelled her friends to become her enemies. I love Athens, not in so far as I am Avronged by her, but in so far as I once enjoyed the privileges of a citizen. The country which I am attacking is no longer mine, but a lost country which I am seeking to regain. He is the true patriot, not Avho, when unjustly exiled, abstains from attacking his country, but who in the warmth of his affection seeks to recover her ivithout regard to the means. I desire therefore that you, Lacedaemonians, will use me without scruple in any service however difficult or dangerous, remembering that, according to the familiar saying, ' the more harm I did you as an enemy the more good can I do you as a friend.' For I know the secrets of the Athenians, while I could only guess at yours. Remember the immense importance of your present decision, and do not hesitate to send an expedition to Sicily and Attica. By despatching a 476 DECELEA, GYLIPPUS. B.C. 415 ; 01. 91, 2. B.C. 414 ; 01. 91. 3. VI. 93. The Lace- daemonians determine to fortify Decelea and to send G j• lip- pus to Syra- cuse. 94. Operations of Athe- nians in the eastern district of Sicily. Arrival of horsemen fraction of your forces to co-operate in Sicily you may save great interests, and may overthrow the Athenian power once and forever. And so henceforward you may dwell safely yourselves and be leaders of all Hellas, which will follow^ you, not upon comjiulsion, but from affection." Thus spoke Alcibiades : the Lacedaemonians, wdio had been intending to send an army against Athens, but were still hesitating and looking about them, w^ere greatly strengthened in their resolution when they heard all these points urged by him who, as they thought, knew best. Accordingly they now turned their thoughts to the fortification of Decelea, and determined to send im- mediate assistance to the Syracusans. They appointed Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, commander of the Syracusan forces, and desired him to co-operate with the Syracusan and Corinthian representatives, and send aid to Sicily in the speediest and most eftective manner Λvhich the circumstances admitted. Whereupon he told the Corinthians to despatch immediately two ships to him at Asine, and to fit out as many more as they meant to send ; the latter were to be ready for sea Avhen the season arrived. Coming to this understand- ing the envoys departed from Lacedaemon. About this time the trireme which the Athenian gen- erals had despatched from Sicily for money and cavalry^ arrived at Athens. The Athenians hearing their request, voted supplies of food and a force of cavalry for the army. So the Λvinter ended, and with it the seven- teenth year in the Peloponnesian War of Λvhich Thucy- dides wrote the history. At the very beginning of the follow^ing spring the Athenians quitted Catana, and sailed along the coast towards the Sicilian Megara ; this place, as I have already mentioned,^ in the days of Gelo the tyrant was depop- ulated by the Syracusans, who still retain possession of the country. They disembarked, and after ravaging 1 Cp. vi. 74 fin. 2 Cp. vi. 4 init. ARGIYES AKD LACEDAEMONIANS. 477 B.C. 414 ; 01. 91, 3. the fields proceededto attack a small Syracusan fortress,^ VI. but Λvithout success ; they then moved ou some by land f^o^J^'^^ii^J^a, and some by sea to the river Terias, and gomg up the country wasted the plain and burned the corn. They encountered a fcAv Syracusans, some of whom they killed, and setting up a trophy returned to their ships. They then sailed back to Catana, and having taken in provisions marched with their whole force against Cen- toripa, a Sicel town, Avhich capitulated. Thence they returned, and on their way burned the corn of the Inessians and the Hyblaeans. Arriving at Catana they found that the horsemen to the number of two hundred and fifty had come from Athens according to order, with their equipments, but without horses, which they ex- pected to procure on the spot. Thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents of silver^ had arrived also. During the same spring the Lacedaemonians led an 95. army against Argos, and advanced as far as Cleonae, ALncedae- moman mva- but retired in consequence of an earthquake. The ^io^^ «^ -^^go- .-,-,, lis stopped by Archives in their turn invaded the neio-hborinsf district ^^ earth- •^ «^ ο quake. of Thyrea, and took a OTeat deal of spoil from the Lace- -^Ψΐ%^ ^"- •^ ' ^ ο Γ vade Thyrea. daemonians, which was sold for no less than twenty-five Rf"^gat ' «^ Tliespiae. talents^. Somewhat later the populace of Thespiae^ made an attack upon the government, but the attempt did not succeed; for the Thebans came to the rescue. Some of the insurgents were apprehended, others fled to Athens. Tiie Syracusans heard that the Athenians had re- 96. ceived their cavalry, and that they would soon be upon The syra- them. Thev considered that, unless the Athenians determine , to guard gained possession of Epipolae (Avhich was a steep place J^^^P^g^®' looking down upon Syracuse), the city could not easily ^{^if^^^^^^' be invested, even if they Avere defeated in battle ; they Jevfew^b therefore determined to guard the paths leading to the Sant•*^^' summit that the enemy might not get up by stealth. At all other points the place was secure, as it lies high 1 Cp. vi. 75 init. 3 £6,000. 2 £72,000. '^^ 4 Cp. iv. 133 init. 478 ATHE^IAKS SURPRIS E EPIPOLAE. B.C. 414 ; 01. 91, 3. VI. and slopes right down to the city, from the interior of which it can all be seen ; the Syracusans call it Epip- olae (or the plateau), because it is above the level of the adjacent country. Hermocrates and his colleagues had now entered upon their command. The whole people went out at break of day to the meadow skirting the river Anapus, and proceeded to hold a review of their forces. A selection was at once made of six hundred hoplites, who Λvere appointed to guard Epipolae, and to run in a body to any point at which they w^ere needed. They Avere commanded by Diomi- lus, an Andrian exile. 97. On the very same morning the Athenians were like- uiobse?ved ^^^® holding a muster of their army. They had come north of the fj^om Cataiia with their whole force, and had put in iimmft^S*^^ unobserved near a place called Leon, which is distant pit to^fiight^ from Epipolae not quite a mile ; there they disem- BanhoplSes. harked their troops. Their ships cast anchor at Thap- sus, ivhich is a peninsula Avith a narrow isthmus, running out into the sea, and not far from Syracuse either by land or w^ater. The Athenian sailors made a palisade across the isthmus and remained at Thapsus, while the troops ran to Epipolae, and gained the summit by the way of the Euryelus before the Syracusans saw them or could come up to them from the meadow where the review was going on. Nevertheless Diomilus with his six hundred hurried to the spot, accompanied by the rest of the army, each man running as fast as he could ; but the distance from the meadow Avhich they had to traverse before they could engage was not less than three miles ; consequently they were in disorder when they closed with the Athenians. They were defeated in the engagement which ensued on Epipolae, and re- tired into the city. Diomilus and about three hundred others were slain. The Athenians erected a troph}^ and gave up to the Syracusans the bodies of the dead under a flag of truce. On the following day they went down to the city itself, but as the Syracusans did not come THE WALL AND THE FIRST CROSS-WALL. 479 B.C. 414; 01.91,3. out against them, they retired and built a fort upon YI. Labdalum, at the edge of the clifls of Epipolae looking toΛvards Megara, in order that when they advanced either to fight or to construct lines, the place might serve as a depository for their baggage and their prop- erty. Not long afterwards the Athenians were joined by 98. three hundred Eirestaean horsemen, and about a hun- T?ieAthe- O ' ^ mans now dred more furnished by the Sicels, Naxians, and others. J^^^J%|'J^evastation ^ ' ο of Laconia to Peloponnesus and joined Charicles and his thirty ^"^ erection 1 About 250 tons. 2 Or, " wrenched them up and broke them off." 502 PROGRESS OF THE SECOND EXPEDITION. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. VII. ships. 1 He embarked the Argive hoplites, and, pro- of a second ceedino^ to Laconia, first devastated some pail; of the Pyjos oppo- ο ^ r Semolthlies ^^^'^^ of Epidaurus Limera. Next the Athenians landed Sstedfn these ^^ ^^® district of Lacouia opposite Cj^thera, where there saSrfoiward ^^ ^ temple of Apollo. They raΛ"aged various parts of to corcyra. ^^^ countrj, and fortified a sort of isthmus in the neigh- borhood, that the Helots of the Lacedaemonians might desert and find a refuge there, and that privateers might make the place, as they did Pylos, their headquarters for marauding expeditions. Demosthenes assisted in the occupation, and then sailed to Corcyra, intending to collect additional forces from the allies in that region, and to make his way with all speed to Sicily. Charicles waited until he had completed the fort, and then leaving a garrison, he sailed home with his thirty ships, accom- panied by the Argives. 27. During the same summer there an-ived at Athens Thra^ifnsar- thirteen hundred Thracian targeteers of the Dian race, tiToin^thf ^ ^^<^ carried dirks ; they were to have sailed with De- expedition. niosthcnes to Sicily, but came too late, and the Athe- nians determined to send them back to their native country. Each soldier was receiving a drachma ^ per day ; and to use them against Decelea would have been too expensive. Thucydides For during this summer Decelea had been fortified by speak of the the wholc Pelopounesian army, and ivas henceforward ings caused regularly occupied for the annoyance of the country by ficationof a succcssiou of o'arrisoiis sent from the allied cities, which perma- whosc iiicursioiis did immciise harm to the Athenians ; nently com- manded the the destruction of property and life which ensued was a whole coun- i r J try. peser- chief cause of their fall. Hitherto the invasions had been tion of twenty s?a7e¥'''^reat ^"^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^ prcvcut them froui gathering the prod- cSie aiir ""^ ^^^ of the soil in the interval ; but now the Pelo- caSy.^ ponnesians were always on the spot; and sometimes they were reinforced by additional troops, but always the regular garrison, who were compelled to find their own supplies, overran and despoiled the countiy. The ^ Cp. vii. 20 init. ^ g^a. DISTEESS OF ATHENIANS AT HOME. 503 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. Lacedaemonian king, Agis, was present in person, and YII. devoted his whole energies to the war. The suJfferings of the Athenians were terrible. For they were dis- possessed of their entire territory ; more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, ^ many of them artisans ; all their sheep and cattle had perished, and now that the cavalry had to go out every day and make descents upon Decelea or keep guard all over the country, their horses were either wounded by the enemy, or lamed by the roughness of the ground and the incessant fatigue. Provisions, which had been formerly conveyed by the 28. shorter route from Euboea to Oropus and thence over- Provisions ■*• ^ brought a land throuo^h Decelea, were now carried by sea round the long way ~ ' »J round. promontory of Sunium at great cost. Athens Λvas obliged ^^^^^^ξ ^^ to import everything from abroad, and resembled a fort *ι^^" ^ΐίά^^ϊ^ rather than a city. In the day-time the citizens guarded ί^'ο^ ^y Sigh? the battlements by relays ; during the night every man l^^^^' ^^wo was on service except the cavalry ; some at their places ^/oniihe*^ of arms, others on the wall, ^ summer and winter alike, ^egeff^^^^" until they were quite worn out. But worse than all was paraSS? the cruel necessity of maintaining two wars at once, and they carried on both with a determination which no one would have believed unless he had actually seen it. That, blockaded as they were by the Peloponnesians, who had raised a fort in their country, they should refuse to let go Sicily, and, themselves besieged, persevere in the siege of Syracuse, which as a mere city might rank Λvith Athens, and — whereas the Hellenes generally were ex- pecting at the beginning of the war, some that they would survive a year, others two or perhaps three years , certainly not more, if the Peloponnesians invaded Attica — that in the seventeenth year from the first invasion, after so exhausting a struggle, the Athenians should have been strong enough and bold enough to go to Sicily at all, and to plunge into a fresh war as great as that in which they were already engaged — how contrary Avas all this to the expectation of mankind ! Through the vast » Cp. viii. 40 med. 2 Cp, [i 13 β^. ; viii. 69 init. 504 TEKEIBLE FATE OF MYCALESSUS. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. VII. expense thus incurred, above all through the mischief done by Decelea, they Λvere now greatly impoverished. It was at this time that they imposed upon their allies, New financial instead of the tribute, a duty of five per cent, on all measure. ' *^ ^ ^ ^ things imported and exported by sea, thinking that this would be more productive. For their expenses be- came heavier and heavier as the war grew in extent, and at the same time their sources of revenue were dried up. 29. And so, being in extreme want of money, and desirous TheThia- ^q econoiiiize, they at once sent away the Thracians who cians are sent «^ *' AthSahJns^^ cauic too latc for Demosthenes, ordering Diitrephes to atforcATkee coiivcy them homc, but, as they must needs sail through deS-edtoii!f t^^® Euripus, to employ them in any Λvay which he could Si^J^can by^^* agaiust the enemy. He landed them at Tanagra and sack^iycate there made a hasty raid ; in the evening he sailed from theticYafeof' Chalcis in Euboea across the Euripus, and disembarking fngs moveT^" his troops in Boeotia led them against the town of Myca- tipity?^^^ lessus. He passed the night unperceived at the temple of Hermes, w^hich is distant from Mycalessus about two miles, and at the dawn of day he assaulted and captured the city, which is not large. The inhabitants were taken off their guard: for they never imagined that an enemy would come and attack them at so great a distance from the sea. The walls were weak, and in some places had fallen down ; in others they were built low ; while the citizens, in their sense of security, had left their gates open. The Thracians dashed into the town, , sacked the houses and temples, and slaughtered the I inhabitants. They spared neither old nor young, but / cut down, one after another, all whom they met, the I women and children, the very beasts of burden, and \ every living thing which they saw. For the Thracians, ■ when they dare, can be as bloody as the w^orst bar- barians.^ There in Mycalessus the wildest panic ensued, and destruction in every form was rife. They even fell Ϊ Or, " For the Thracians, like all very barbarous tribes, are most bloody when they are least afraid." DEMOSTHENES m THE ΙΟΝΙΑΝ GULF. 505 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. /upon a boy's school, the largest m the place, which the VII. ^ children had just entered, and massacred them every one. "NTo greater calamity than this ever affected a whole city ; never was anything so sudden or so terrible. When the news reached the Thebans they hastened to 30. the rescue. Coming upon the Thracians before they had τ te Thebans gone far, they took away the spoil, and putting them to Shey^re flight, pursued them to the Euripus, where the ships fvithTosito i which had brouo'ht them were moored. Of those Λvho ^^^"^^^^ί'^• ο fell, the greater number were slain in the attempt to embark ; for they did not know how to SAvim, and the men on board, seeing what was happening, had anchored their vessels out of bow-shot. In the retreat itself the Thracians made a very fair defence against the Theban cavalry which first attacked them, running out and closing in again, after the manner of their country ; and their loss was trifling. But a good many who remained for the sake of plunder were cut off Λvithin the city and slain. The Avhole number who fell Λvas two hundred and fifty, out of thirteen hundred. They killed, however, some of the Thebans and others ivho came to the rescue, in all about twenty, both horse- men and hoplites. Scirphondas, one of the Theban Boeotarchs, Avas slain. A large proportion of the My- calessians perished. Such was the fate of Mycalessus ; considering the size of the city, no calamity more de- plorable occurred during the war.^ Demosthenes, after helping to build the fort on the 31. Laconian coast, sailed away to Corcyra.^ On his way ^^i5ii°^*u^"o^ thither he destroyed a merchant-vessel anchored at i^le^ ^^^ίτ-^* Pheia in Elis, which Avas intended to convey some of the ™r^;lgs'i,l{Js Corinthian hoplites to Sicily. But the crew escaped, ^ieylonJct and sailed in another vessel. He ivent on to Zacynthus siSiy^aid and Cephallenia, where he took on board some hoplites, forclmentsto and sent to the Messenians of Naupactus for others ; he ^'^^ρ^«*^• then passed over to the mainland of Acarnania, and touched at Alyzia and Anactorium,^ which were at that » Cp. iii. 113 fin. 2 Cp. γ^ι 26. 3 Cp. iv. 29; v. 30 med. 506 DESTRUCTION OF SYBACUSAN ALLIE S. ' B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. VII. time occupied by the Athenians. While he was in those regions he met Eurymedon returning from Sicily, whither he had been sent during the winter in charge of the money which had been voted to the army ; ^ he re- ported, among other things, the capture of Plemmyrium by the Syracusans, of which he had heard on his voyage home. Conon too, the Governor of Naupactus, brought word that the twenty-five Corinthian ships 2 which ΛveΓe stationed on the opposite coast were still shoΛving a hostile front, and clearly meant to fight. He requested the generals to send him reinforcements, since his own ships — eighteen in number — were not able to give battle against the twenty-five of the enemy. Demos- thenes and Eurymedon sent ten ships, the swiftest which they had, to the fleet at Naupactus, λ\ hile they themselves completed the muster of the expedition. Eurymedon, sailing to Corcyra, ordered the Corey raeans to man fif- teen ships, and himself levied a number of hoplites. He had turned back from his homeward voyage, and Λvas now holding the command, to which, in conjunction with Demosthenes, he had been appointed. Demosthenes meanwhile had been collecting slingers and javelin-men in the neighborhood of Acarnania. 32. The ambassadors from Syracuse who had gone to the SfOTce-^ cities of Sicily after the taking of Plemmyrium, and had Sie'cftiliof"^ persuaded them to join in the war, were now about to ?use aledl-^' bring back the army which they had collected. Nicias, Imbuscade^^ having previous information, sent word to the Si eel aiiies^'the allies of Athens who commanded the road, such as the emans. (jgn^QpjpQg j^^^j Alicyaci, and told them not to let the forces of the enemy pass, but to unite and stop them ; there was no likelihood, he said, that they w^ould even think of taking another road, since they were not allowed to go through the country of the Agrigentines. So when the forces of the Sicilian towns Avere on their way, the Sicels, complying with the request of the Athenians, set an ambush in three divisions, and falling upon them ^ Cp. vii. 16 fin. 2 Cp. vii. 17 fin., 19 fin. DEMOSTHENES ON THE COAST OF ITALY. 507 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. suddenly when they were oif their guard, destroyed ΥΠ. about eight hundred of them, and all the envoys except the Corinthian ; he brought the survivors, numbering fifteen hundred, to Syracuse. About the same time arrived a reinforcement from 33. Camarina^ of five hundred hoplites, three hundred iave- Reinforce- ^ *' ments from lin-men, and three hundred archers. The Geloans also camarmaand ' ^ ^ ^ Gela. Nearly sent nve ships with four hundred iavelin-men and two ^i^^.f^^^i© «f ^ ^ ... Sicily unites hundred horsemen. Hitherto the Sicilian cities had only ^^Jj^^jJaiS® watched the course of events, but now the whole island, with the exception of Agrigentum, which was neutral, united with the Syracusans against the Athenians. After their misfortune in the Sicel country, the Syra- TheAtiienian cusans deferred their intended attack for a time. The to lapygS!^ forces which Demosthenes and Eurymedon had collected received\t from Corcyra and the mainland were now ready, and they hold a review^ they passed over the Ionian Sea to the promontory of lapygia. Proceeding onwards, they touched at the lapygian islands called Choerades, and took on board a hundred and fifty lapygian javelin-men of the Messa- pian tribe. After rencAving an ancient friendship Λvith Artas, a native prince who had furnished the javelin- men, they went on to Metapontium in Italy. They persuaded the Metapontians, who were their allies, to let them have two triremes and three hundred javelin- men ; these they took with them and sailed to Thurii. At Thurii they found that the party opposed to the Athenians had just been driven out by a revolution. Wishing to hold another muster and inspection of their whole army, and to be sure that no one was missing, they remained there for some time. They also did their best to gain the hearty co-operation of the Thu- rians, and to efiect an offensive and defensive alliance with them, now that they had succeeded in expelling the Anti- Athenian party. About the same time the Peloponnesians in thier fleet 34. of twenty-five ships, which was stationed opposite the J^^^Jf^|j^J,n 1 Cp. vi. 88 init. 508 SEA-FIGHT OFF THE COAST OF ACHAIA. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. VII. Athenian fleet at Naupactus to protect the passage of tSilioS?'^" the merchant-vessels going to Sicily, made ready for cSdnthiaii action. They manned some additional ships, which audtiieAtiie-pj^jgg(j their nmiibcr nearly to that of the Athenians, 1113.118. JLlie •^ ' lyTssTsfedby ^^^ anchored at Erineus of Achaia, which is in the ΪΙηίΤιΓίΓβ territory of Ehypae. The bay in which they were tieS sMp? stationed has the form of a crescent, and the infantry of the Corinthians and of the allies, which had come from the country on both sides to co-operate with the fleet, was disposed on the projecting promontories. The ships, which Avere mider the command of Polyan- thes the Corinthian, formed a close line between the two points. The Athenians sailed out against them from Naupactus with thirty-three ships, under the command of Diphilus. For a Avhile the Corinthians remained motionless ; in due time the signal was raised and they rushed upon the Athenians and engaged ivith them. The battle was long and obstinate. Three Corinthian ships were destroyed. The Athenians had no ships absolutely sunk, but about seven of them were rendered useless ; for they \vere struck full in front by the beaks of the Corinthian vessels, which had the projecting beams of their prows designedly built thicker, and their bows Avere stoven in. The eno-ao-ement was undecided and both sides claimed the victory ; but the Athenians gained possession of the wrecks because the wind blew them toΛvards the open sea and the Corinthians did not put out again. So the two fleets parted. There was no pursuit, nor were any prisoners taken on either side. For the Corinthians and Peloponnesians ΛYere fighting close to the land and thus their crews escaped, while on the Athenian side no ship was sunk. As soon as the Athenians had returned to Xaupactus the Corin- thians set up a trophy, insisting that they were the victors, because they had disabled more of the enemy's ships than the enemy of theirs. They refused to ac- . knowledge defeat on the same ground which made the Athenians unwilling to claim the victory. For the SECOND ENGAGEMENT IN THE HARBOR. 509 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. Corinthians considered themselves conquerors, if they ΥΠ. were not severely defeated ; but the Athenians thought that they were defeated because they had not gained a signal victory. When however the Peloponnesians had sailed away and the land-army was dispersed, the Athe- nians raised another trophy in Achaia, at a distance of about two miles and a quarter from the Corinthian station at Erineus. Such was the result of the engagement. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, when the Thurians had 35. determined to help them, and had furnished seven hun- The Thurians •^ join the Athe- dred hoplites and three hundred javelin-men, commanded ^jfe^^^j^ej^ian the ships to sail towards the territorv of Crotona, and ^^et and ^ ^ ' army pass themselves, after holding a review of all their infantry at iJaiiln^coasts the river Sybaris, led them through the territory of *^ ^^^g^^"^• Thurii. On their arrival at the river Hylias the people of Crotona sent to them, and said that they could not allow the army to march through their country. So they directed their march down to the sea and passed the night at the mouth of the river, where they were met by their ships. On the following day they re-embarked the army and coasted along, touching at the cities which they passed, with the exception of Locri,i until they came to the promontory of Petra near Rhegium. The Syracusans, hearing of their approach, desired to 36. have another trial of the fleet, and to use the army which The syra- CU.S3,I1S they had collected with the express purpose of brinfrinsr ™^^^^ p^^P" ^^^ &» arations on an ens^aofement before Demosthenes and Eurvmedon for another 1 • o• •Ί T-» Λ» • sea-fight. arrived m Sicily. Profiting by the experience Λvhich they TUey adopt had acquired in the last sea-fight, they devised several J^o'J'of"^^^' improvements in the construction of their vessels. They JiiJ^^I^o'il cut down and strengthened the prows, and also made giV^and the beams which projected from them thicker : these ff; ^i\te^^"' latter they supported underneath with stays of timber Eeamf '"^ extending from the beams through the sides of the ship ^efrsuLd a length of nine feet Avithin and nine without, after the *ai?ow fashion in which the Corinthians had refitted their prows before they fought with the squadron from Naupactus. ^ Cp. vi. 44 med. 510 IMPKOVED FORM OF SYRACUSAN SHIPS. ' B.C. 413 ; Ol. 91, 4. VII. For the Syracusans hoped thus to gain an advantage wMcii'the ^^^^ ^^® Athenian ships, which were not constructed to hidno rSom I'^sist their improvements, but had their prows slender, and'tJThe^inl hecausc thcj wcre in the habit of rowing round an tSown^ °^ enemy and striking the side of his vessel instead of pilots. meeting him prow to prow. The plan would be the more effectual, because they were going to fight in the Great Harbor, where many ships would be crowded in a narrow space. They would charge full in face, and presenting their own massive and solid beaks would stave in the hollow and weak forepart of their enemies' ships ; 1 while the Athenians, confined as they were, would not be able to wheel round them or break their line before striking, to which manoeuvres they mainly trusted — the want of room would make the one im- possible, and the Syracusans themselves would do their best to prevent the other. What had hitherto been con- sidered a defect of skill on the part of their pilots, the practice of striking beak to beak, would now be a great advantage, to which they would have constant recourse ; for the Athenians, when forced to back water, could only retire towards the land, which was too near, and of which but a small part, that is to say, their own encampment, was open to them. The Syracusans would be masters of the rest of the harbor, and, if the Athenians were hard pressed at any point, they would all be driven together into one small spot, Avhere they would run foul of one another and fall into confusion. (Which proved to be the case ; for nothing was more disastrous to the Athenians in all these sea-fights than the impossibility of retreating, as the Syracusans could, to any part of the harbor) . Again, while they themselves had command of the outer sea, and could charge from it and back water into it whenever they pleased, the Athenians would be unable to sail into the open and turn before striking ; ^ besides, Plemmyrium was hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbor was narrow. 1 Omitting the comma at αΖτοϊς, * Cp. 11. 91 med. ATTACK BY SEA ΑΝΏ LAND. 511 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. Having thus adapted their plans to the degree of VII. naval skill and strength which they possessed, the Syra- 37. cusans, greatly encouraged by the result of the previous gf^P^^ ^^^ enffao-ement, attacked the Athenians both by sea and forces attack C5 ο ' «^ the Athenian land. A Kttle before the fleet sailed forth Gylippus led l^"^^' ^^^^.^^ the land-forces out of the city against that part of the βϊ«^^,[§^5^^ Athenian wall which faced Syracuse, while some of the ^βηΐγ^\ϊ^γ' heavy-armed troops, which together with the cavalry gelent^y-Sve and light infantry were stationed at the Olympieum, ^pgf^^^ approached the lines of the enemy from the opposite side. Nearly at the same instant the ships of the Syra- cusans and their allies sailed out. The Athenians at first thought that they were going to make an attempt by land only, but when they saw the ships suddenly bearing down upon them they were disconcerted. Some mounted the walls or prepared to meet their assailants in front of them ; others went out against the numerous cavalry and javelm-men, who were hastening from the Olympieum and the outer side of the Λvall ; others manned the ships or prepared to fight on the beach. ΛVhen the crews had got on board they sailed out with seventy-five ships ; the number of Syracusan ships being about eighty. Durmg a great part of the day the two fleets continued 38. advancino^ and retreatins^ and skirmishins^ with one slight result ο ^ . ® of the first another. Neither was able to 2'ain any considerable ^^r^ t^^y ^ *^ mg. isicias advantas^e, only the Syracusans sank one or two ships ^«Ρ'^ΐϊ•δ ^lis ο ' «^ .^ 1 ships and of the Athenians ; so they parted, and at the same time ^ί,^ηΤ-νΞΊβ the infantry retired from the walls. On the following feet theiSi' day the Syracusans remained quiet and gave no sign ^^^feated. of Avhat they meant to do next. Seeing how close the conflict had been, Mcias expected another attack ; he therefore compelled the trierarchs to repair their ships wherever they were injured, and anchored merchant- vessels in front of the palisades which the Athenians had driven into the sea so as to form a kind of dock for the protection of their own ships ; these he placed at a distance of about two hundred feet from one another, in order that any ship which was hard-pressed might have 512 THE BATTLE ΚΕΝΕ WED ON THE NEXT DAT. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. VII. a safe retreat and an opportunity of going out again at leisure. These preparations occupied the Athenians for a whole day from morning to night. 39. On the next day, in the same manner as before but The second at an earlier hour, the Syracusans attacked the Athenians day IS wear- ' «^ SSho^t^ both by sea and land. Again the ships faced one an- JlgemeSr other, and again a great part of the day Λλ^as passed in sjilcusins skirmishing. At length Ariston the son of Pyrrhichus, takelhei? ^ Coriiithian, who was the ablest pilot in the Syracusan Si^tbSch. fleet, persuaded the commanders to send a message to the proper authorities in the city desiring them to have the market transferred as quickl}^ as possible to the shore, and to compel any one who had food for sale to bring his whole stock thither. The sailors ΛνοηΜ thus be enabled to disembark and take their midday meal close to the ships ; and so after a short interval they might, without waiting until the next day, renew the attack upon the Athenians Λvhen least expected. 40. The generals, agreeing to the proposal, sent the They soon re- 113 essao:e, and the market was brouo^ht down to the turn, to the ^=5 ' ^ gre^^surprise shorc. Suddenly the Syracusans backed water and nians, Avho rowcd towards the city ; then disembarkino^ they at are now com- «^ ' η J SarVand ^^^^® ^^^^^ their mcal on the spot. The Athenians, fight. regarding their retreat as a confession of defeat, dis- embarked at leisure, and among other matters set about preparing their own meal, taking for granted that there would be no more fighting that day. Suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and again bore down upon them ; the Athenians, in great disorder, and most of them fasting, hurried on board, and with considerable difficulty got under Aveigh. For some time the two fleets looked at one another, and did not engage ; after a while the Athenians thought they had better not delay until they had fairly tired themselves out, but attack at once. So, cheering on one another, they charged and fought. The Syracusans remained firm, and meeting the enemy prow to prow, as they had resolved, stove in by the strength of their beaks a great part of the bows VICTOKY OF THE SYRACUSANS. 513 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. of the Athenkin ships. Their javelin-men on the decks YII. greatly injured the enemy. Still more mischief was done by Syracusans who rowed about in light boats and dashed in upon the blades of the enemy's oars, or ran up alongside and threw darts at the sailors. By such expedients as these the Syracusans, who 41. made a o^reat effort, o-ained the victory ; and the Athe- TheAthe- ^ ^ *^ nians are de- nians, retreatino: between the merchant-vessels, took feated and re- ^ . . turn to their refuo'e at their own moorins^s. The ships of the enemy moorings ο ox./ with a loss of pursued them as far as the entrance, but they were ^woVricu- prevented from following further by leaden dolphins, Ιοπ^^ξ^^^^οο which were suspended aloft from beams placed in the cL^^Sfnlihe merchant-vessels. Two Syracusan ships, in the exulta- theXct.^^ tion of victory, approached too near and were disabled ; one of them was taken with its whole crew. The Syra- cusans damaged many of the Athenian ships and sank seven ; the crews were either killed or taken prisoners. They then retired and raised trophies of the two sea- fights. They Λvere now quite confident that they ivere not only equal but far superior to the Athenians at sea, and they hoped to gain the victory on land as well. So they prepared to renew the attack on both elements. But in the midst of their preparations Demosthenes 42. and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian reinforce- Y'^^^^ t^^^ ^ Syracusans ments. They brouo-ht a fleet, includino^ foreio^n ships, of are making •^ c5 ^ ' ^ σ ο Γ 7 preparations about seventy-three sail, carrying five thousand heavy in- ^ttaci De fantry of their own and of their allies, numerous iavelin- mo^tiienes ^ ^ ^ arrives. men, slingers, and archers, both Hellenic and Barbarian, feTmfntdto and abundant supplies of every kind. The S3^racusans aSt^o^i^e and their allies were in consternation. It seemed to attSk'ip^on them as if their perils would never have an end when sanSoss''-'^" they saw, notwithstanding the fortification of Decelea, ^ay o/the another army arriving nearly equal to the former, and ^^^y®^"^• Athens displaying such exuberant strength ; while the first Athenian army regained a certain degree of con- fidence after their disasters, Demosthenes at once saw how matters stood ; he knew that there ivas no time to 33 514 AEEIYAL OF DEMOSTHENES. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. VII. 43. Failure of an attempt to take the wall in front be lost, and resolved that it should net be with him as it had been with Nicias. For Nicias wiis dreaded at his first arrival, but when, instead of at once laying siege to Syracuse, he passed the winter at Catana, he fell into contempt, and his delay gave Gylippus time to come with an army from Peloponnesus. Whereas if he haa struck hard at first, the Syracusans would never even have thought of getting fresh troops ; strong in their own self-sufficiency, they Avould have recognized their inferiority only when the city had been actually in- vested, and then, if they had sent for reinforcements, they would have found them useless. Demosthenes, reflecting on all this, and aware that he too Λvould never again be in a position to inspire such terror as on the da}^ of his arrival, desired to take the speediest advan- tage of the panic caused by the appearance of his army. Accordingly, seeing that the cross-wall of the Syracusans which had prevented the Athenians from investing them was but a sins^le line, and that if he could s^ain the com- mand of the Λvay up to Epipolae and take the camp w^hich was on the high ground, the wall Λvould be easily captured, for no one would remain to Λvithstand them, he resolved to make the attempt at once. This would be the shortest Avay of putting an end to the war. If he succeeded, S^^racuse would fall into his hands ; if he failed, he meant to bring away the expedition ; he would no longer wear out the Athenian army and weaken the state to no purpose. The Athenians began by ravaging the fields of the Syracusans about the Anapus, and regained their former superiority both by sea and land. At sea the Syracusans no longer opposed them ; and on land they merely sent out parties of cavalry and javelin-men from the Olym- pieum. Before he attacked Epipolae, Demosthenes wished to try what could be efiected Avith engines against the counter-wall. But the engines which he brought up were burnt by the enemy, who fought from the wall, NIGHT ATTACK ON EPIPOLAE. 515 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. and, after making assaults at several points, the Athe- ΥΠ. nian forces were repulsed. He now determined to delay Leaving no longer, and persuaded Nicias and his colleagues to t^^c^^^^^^^^^^ carry out the plan of attacking Epipolae. To approach P^'f^f^g.^^" during the daytime and ascend the heights unprotected Ji^t^^g^jJJ^/ appeared to be impossible ; so he resolved to attack by a^y \ο as^'^ night. He ordered provisions for five days, and took f;,^e;\i^tikes with him all the masons and carpenters in the army ; ^mi drfves'* also a supply of arrows and of the various implements puslSi hfs' which would be required for siege-works if he were areTmaledat victorious. About the first watch he, Eurymedon, and οπΙβϊ'^*τΐιβ Menander led out the whole army and marched towards him^y"i!fg'fo/-^ Epipolae. Nicias was left in the Athenian fortifications, th^ey aie met Keaching Epipolae at the Euryelus, where their first tiaislndput army had originally ascended,^ and advancing undis- ° ^^ ** covered by the garrison to the fort which the Syracusans had there erected, they took it and killed some of the guards . But the greater number made good their escape and carried the news to the three fortified camps, one of the Syracusans, one of the other Sicilians, and one of the allies, which had been formed on Epipolae ; they also gave the alarm to the six hundred who were an advanced guard stationed on this part of Epipolae. ^ They hastened to the rescue, but Demosthenes and the Athenians came upon them, and, m spite of a vigorous resistance, drove them back. The Athenians imme- diately pressed forward ; they were determined not to lose a moment or to slacken their onset until they had accomplished their purpose. Others took the first part of the Syracusan counter-wall and began to drag off the battlements; the guards ran away. Meanwhile the Syracusans, the allies, and Gylippus with his own troops, Avere hurrying from the outworks. The boldness of this night attack quite amazed them. They had not re- covered from their terror when they met the Athenians, who were at first too strong for them and drove them back. But now the conquerors, in the confidence of Ϊ Cp. vi. 97 med. 2 q^^ y[^ qq β^. 516 VICTOEY ENDIi^G IN DEFEAT. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. Vn. victory, began to advance in less order; they wanted to force their way as quickly as they could through all that part of the enemy which had not yet fought, and they were afraid that if they relaxed their efforts the Syracusans might rally. The Boeotians were the first to make a stand : they attacked the Athenians, turned, and put them to flight. 44. The Tvhole army now fell into utter disorder, and the ^mislonfu- perplexity was so great that from neither side could the bSSnd^p^Ss particulars of the conflict be exactly ascertained. In fOTefwho^Ire ^^^^ daytime the combatants see more clearly ; though fng^back.^^^' e^en then only what is going on immediately around nght^thT' them, and that imperfectly — nothing of the battle as a ΐί?ϊαϊί•^Γ^' whole. But in a night engagement, like this in which watchword, ίλγο great armies fought — the only one of the kind which contofbSto occurred during the Λvar — who could be certain of any- Frte^nds ' thing ? Tlic moou was bright, and they saw before them, friiids. as men naturally would in the moonlight, the figures of theSfseiveT ouc auothcr, but were unable to distinguish ivith cer- ciiffs, leaving taiiity Λνΐιο was friend or foe. Large bodies of heavy- hind others " amicd troops, both Athenian and Syracusan, Avere moving way in the about in a narrow space ; of the Athenians some were are cut off. already worsted, while others, still unconquered, were carrying on the original movement. A great part of their army had not yet engaged, but either had just mounted the heights, or were making the ascent ; and no one knew which way to go. For in front they were de- feated already ; there was nothing but confusion, and all distinction between the two armies was lost by reason of the noise. The victorious Syracusans and their allies, who had no other means of communication in the dark- ness, cheered on their comrades with loud cries as they received the onset of their assailants. The Athenians Λvere looking a])out for each other ; and every one Avho met them, though he might be a friend who had turned and fled, they imagined to be an enemy. They kept constantly asking the watchword (for there was no other mode of knowing one another), and thus they not only THE ATHENIANS ARE DRIVEN" BACK. 517 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. caused great confusion among themselves by all asking VII at once, but revealed the word to the enemy. The watch- word of the Syracusans was notsoliableto be discovered, because being victorious they kept together and were more easily recognized. So that when they were encountered by a superior number of the enemy they, knowing the Athenian watchword, escaped ; but the Athenians in a like case, failing to answer the challenge, were killed. Most disastrous of all were the mistakes caused by the sound of the Paean, which, the same being heard in both armies, was a great source of perplexity. For there were in the battle Argives, Corcyraeans, and other Dorian allies of the Athenians, and when they raised the Paean they inspired as much alarm as the enemy themselves ; so that in many parts of the army, when the confusion had once begun, not only did friends terrify friends and citizens their fellow-citizens, but they attacked one an- other, and were with difficulty disentangled. The greater number of those who were pursued and killed perished by throwing themselves from the cliffs ; for the descent from Epipolae is by a narrow path. The fugitives who reached the level ground, especially those who had served in the former army and knew the neighborhood, mostly escaped to the camp. But of the newly -arrived many missed their way, and, wandering about until daybreak, were then cut off by the Syracusan cavalry w4io were scouring the country. On the following day the Syracusans erected two 45. trophies, one on Epipolae at the summit of the ascent, fSftJo^^ the other at the spot where the Boeotians made the first SeSms stand. The Athenians received their dead under a flag Sken^^^^ of truce. A considerable number of them and of their allies had fallen ; there were however more arms taken than there were bodies of the slain ; for those who were compelled to leap from the heights, whether they perished or not, had thrown away their shields. The confidence of the Syracusans was restored by 46. their unexpected success, and they sent Sicanus with by thei?^^"^ 518 DEMOSTHEIfES PROPOSES TO DEPART. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. YII. success the SyracusaBS seek for the third time aid in Sicily. They make an attack on Agrigentum. 47. Athenian council of vrar. There is sickness in the camp and the soldiers are dispirited. Demosthenes votes for im- mediate de- parture. 48. Nicias, who is partly swayed by information from Syra- cuse, is in his Ολνη mind undecided. But in public he refuses to go• They will be censured at home, and even fifteen ships to Agrigentum, then in a state of revolution, that he might Tvin over the place if he could. Gylippus had gone off again by land to collect a new army in the other parts of Sicily, hoping after the victory of Epi- polae to carry the Athenian fortifications by storm. Meanwhile the Athenian generals, troubled by their recent defeat and the utter discouragement which pre- vailed in the army, held a council of war. They saw that their attempts all failed, and that the soldiers were weary of remaining. For they were distressed by sick- ness, proceeding from two causes ; the season of the year was that in wdiich men are most liable to disease ; and the place in Avhich they w^ere encamped w^as damp and unhealthy. And they felt that the situation w^as in every way hopeless. Demosthenes gave his voice against remaining ; he said that the decisive attack upon Epipolae had failed, and, in accordance with his original intention, he should vote for im.mediate departure, Avhile the voyage was possible, and while with the help of the ships which had recently joined them they had the upper hand at any rate by sea. It was more expedient for the city that they should make war upon the Pelo- ponnesians, Avho were raising a fort in Attica, than against the Syracusans, whom they could now scarcely hope to conquer ; and there was no sense in carrying on the siege at a A^ast expense and wdth no result. This w\as the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias in his ΟΛΥη mind took the same gloomy view of their affairs ; but he did not w^ish openly to confess their w^eakness, or by a public vote given in a numerous assembly to let their intention reach the enemy's ears, and so to lose the advantage of departing secretly when- ever they might choose to go. He had moreover still some reason to suppose that the Syracusans, of whose condition he was better informed than the other generals, were likely to be w orse off than themselves if they would only persevere in the siege ; they would be worn out by the exhaustion of their resources ; and πολύ the Athe- DOUBTS AND FEARS OF NICIAS. 519 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. nians with their additional ships had much greater com- VII. mand of the sea. There was a party in Syracuse itself ??e?sonby which ivanted to surrender the city to the Athenians, sokue?^'' and they kept sending messages to Mcias and advising atlKJnd? him not to depart. Having this information he was still ^iaTo?'^^ wavering and considering, and had not made up his ind the mind. But in addressing the council he positively re- f/debtS fused to withdraw the army ; he knew, he said, that mTi^cenSes,^ the Athenian people would not forgive their departure if than them- they left without an order from home. The men upon wdiose votes their fate w^ould depend would not, like themselves, have seen with their οΛηι eyes the state of affairs ; they would only have heard the criticisms of others, and would be convinced by any accusations which a clever speaker might bring forward.^ Indeed many or most of the Λ^ery soldiers w^ho were now crying out that their case was desperate would raise the opposite cry Avhen they reached home, and would say that the generals were traitors, and had been bribed to depart ; and therefore he, knowing the tempers of the Athenians, would for his own part rather take his chance and fall, if he must, alone by the hands of the enemy, than die 2 unjustly on a dishonorable charge at the hands of the Athenians. And, after all, the Syracusans were in a condition Λvorse than their own ; for they had to maintain mercenary troops ; they w^ere spending money on garrisons, and had now kept up a large navy for a whole year ; already in great difficulties, they would soon be in greater ; they had expended two thousand talents,^ and were heavily in debt ; the Avhole of their large army had to be fed, and if there were any lack of provisions their affairs would be ruined. For they depended on mercenaries, who, unlike the Athenian allies, were under no compulsion to serve. Therefore he said they Ϊ Cp. iii, 38 med. ^ Or, ''would for liis own part rather take his chance, and fall, if he must, by the hands of the enemy, like any private soldier, than dia*' 3 £480,000. 520 mCIAS EEFUSES TO DEPAKT. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. yil. ought to persevere in the siege, and not go αλΥ^γ dis- heartened by the greatness of the expense, for they were far richer than the enemy. ^ 49. Nicias spoke thus decidedly because he knew exactly Demosthenes jjow matters stood in Syracuse ; he was aware of their and Euryme- «^ ' fns^sfthafthe ^^^^ ^^ money, and of the secret existence of that party Saiueive withiu the walls which wished λυ^Ι to the Athenians, and fSmp^efsl- ^^^^ continually sending word to him not to depart ; and th^^aft^ri ^^^ confidence in his navy, if not in his army, which ηοΛν tSlf beniv- possessed him was greater than ever. But Demosthenes N^iSas would not hear for an instant of persisting in the siege ; rSoi^Sre- if> ^^^ s^^^> t^^^ army must remain and ought not to be maimng. rcmovcd Λvithout a votc of the assembly, then they should retire to Thapsus or Catana, whence they might overrun the whole country ivith their land-forces, maintaining themselves at the expense of the enemy and doing him great damage. They would thus fight their battles, not cooped up in the harbor, which gave an advantage to the enemy, but in the open sea, ivhere their skill would be available and their charges and retreats would not be circumscribed by the narrow space ivhich now hampered their movements whenever they had to put in or out. In a word, he ivholly disapproved of the Athenians con- tinuing in their present position ; they should with all speed break up the siege and be gone. Eurymedon took the same side. Still Nicias resisted ; there w^as delay and hesitation, and a suspicion that he might have some ground which they did not know for his unwillingness to yield. And so the Athenians staid on where they w^ere. 50. Meanwhile G^dippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse. Gyiippusre- gicanus had not succeeded in his desi«:n upon Amaen- turns AVitii re- σ -i σ »_ inforcenients. ^^γ^ . fo^. ^yhue hcAvas at Gela on his way the party inclined Failure of ' ^ i ./ άΒβΓ'ί^οϊ' *^ friendship Avith the Syracusans had been driven out. Agrigentum. Gylippus biOuglit back a large army, together with the hoplites Avho had been sent in merchant-vessels from Pelo- 1 Or, "disheartened at the idea of the enemy's riches; for they were far richer themselves." ECLIPSE OF THE MOON. 521 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. ponnesus in the spring, ^ and had come hy way of Libya Λ"ΙΤ. to Selinus. They had been driven to Libya by stress of ο/ρ^ίο "^^πηβ- weather, and the Cyrenaeans had sfiven them two triremes f\^'} siiipspn ' «^ ο their way to and pilots. On tlieir voyage they had made common cause Ι^^^αοΰείιΐ^ Avith the Evesperitae, who were besieged by the Libyans. JSir^Th7 After defeating the Libyans they sailed on to Neapolis, ^Ssn'm/^^' a Carthaginian factory, which is the nearest point to pfrtfAlheit Sicily, the passage taking two days and a night only; ecii^ed"'^ thence they crossed and came to Selinus. On their iie soldiers arrival, the Syracusans immediately prepared to i^eiiew ^^^"^^ **^ ^*^^' their attack upon the Athenians, both by land and sea. And the Athenian generals, seeing that their enemy had been reinforced by a new army, and that their own aifairs, instead of improving, Tvere daily growing worse in every respect, and being especially troubled by the sickness of their troops, repented that they had not gone before. Even Nicias now no longer olyected, but only made the condition that there should be no open voting. So, maintaining such secrecy as they could, they gave orders for the departure of the expedition ; the men Avere to prepare themselves against a given signal. The prepa- rations were made and they were on the point of sailing, when the moon, being just then at the full, was eclipsed. The mass of the army was greatly moved, and called upon the generals to remain. Nicias himself, who Λvas too much under the influence of divination and omens, refused even to discuss the question of their removal until they had remained thrice nine days, as the soothsayers prescribed. This was the reason why the departure of the Athenians Avas finally delayed. And now the Syracusans, having heard what had 51. happened, were more eao^er than ever to prosecute the The syra- '^ ^ cusans de- Λvar to the end ; they saw m the intention of the Athe- termine not '^ . to let their mans to depart a confession that they ivere no lonsrer enemies go. ^ ^ ^ c^ Thej again superior to themselves, either by sea or land ; and they attack the did not want them to settle down in some other part of ^nd drive ^ Ά small Sicily where they would be more difficult to manage, party of 1 Cp. vii. 19. 522 DEATH OP EUKYMEDON. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. YII. but sought to compel them forthwith to fight at sea, theSiSJes^^ uudcr the disadvantages of their present position. So they manned their ships and exercised for as many days as they thought sufficient. When the time came they began by attacking the Athenian hues. A small number both of the hoplites and of the cavalry came out of some of the gates to meet them ; they cut off however a portion of the hoplites, and putting the whole body to flight, drove them within their walls. The entrance was narrow, and the Athenians lost seventy horses and a {e^y infantry. 52. The Syracusan army then retired. On the ηιοη-ΟΛν fight^ilThe t^eir ships, in number seventy-six, sailed forth, and at EMym'edon ^^^ samc time their land-forces marched against the ihe Athl^'''^ walls. The Athenians on their side put out with fiafeci'^^ ^®" eighty-six ships ; and the two fleets met and fought. Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, hoping to surround the enemy, extended his line too far towards the land, and was defeated by the Syracusans, who, after overcoming the Athenian centre, shut him up in the inner bay of the harbor. There he Λvas slain, and the vessels which were under his command and had followed him were destroyed. The Syracusans now pursued and began to drive ashore the rest of the Athenian fleet. 53. Gylippus, observing the discomfiture of the enemy, The defeat is ^yj^Q ^y^rc beiufi: defeated and driven to land beyond their partially com- ο «^ ITldlliSre ^^^'^^ palisade and the lines of their camp, hastened with TyrSeSlnl ^ P^"^^^ ^^ ^^^^ amiy to the causeΛvay w^hich ran along the S?fntgafn harbor, intending• to kill all Λvho landed, and to assist nlir Si'^^""^ ti^e Syracusans in capturing the ships, Avhich could be firShip Sdfs. more easily towed aAvay if the shore was in the hands of their friends. The Tyrrhenians, Λvho guarded this part of the Athenian lines, seeing G^dippus and his forces advance in disorder, rushed out, and attacking the fore- most put them to flight, and drove them into the marsh called Lysimeleia. But soon the Syracusans and their allies came up in greater numbers. The Athenians in ANOTHER ATHENIAN DEFEAT AT SEA. 523 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. fear for their ships advanced to the support of the ΥΠ. Tyrrhenians, and joined in the engagement ; the Syra- cusans were overcome and pursued, and a few of their heavy-armed slain. Most of the Athenian ships were saved and brought back to the Athenian station. Still the Syracusans and their allies took eighteen, and killed the whole of their crews. Then, hoping to burn the remainder of the fleet,. they procured an old merchant- vessel, which they filled with fagots and brands ; these they lighted, and as the ^\'ind 1:>^Λν right upon the enemy they let the ship go. The Athenians, alarmed for the safety of their fleet, contrived means by which they ex- tinguished the flames, and succeeded in keeping the fire- ship at a distance. Thus the danger was a\^erted. The Syracusans now raised a trophy of their naval 54. victory, and another markino' their interception of the The syracu- •^ ^ •■ sans raise two hoplites on the hio-her «Tound close to the wall at the tiopiii?s; the ■•- ο ο ^ Athenians place where they took the horses. The Athenians raised lll'^l^^^^ ^ a trophy of the victor}^ over the land-forces whom the Tyrrhenians drove into the marsh, and of that which they had themselves gained with the rest of the army. The Syracusans, who up to this time had been afraid 55. of the reinforcements of Demosthenes, had now o-ained TheAthe- ' c: mans m de- a brilliant success by sea as well as by land ; the Athe- Kneve? be- nians were in utter despair. Great was their surprise tended with a at the result, and still greater their regret that they had aMpop^iius ever come. The Sicilian Avere the only cities which ^^^^^^^^ *^®^ they had encountered similar in character to their own,^ enjoying the same democratic institutions and strong in ships, cavalry, and population. They were not able by holding out the prospect of a change of government to introduce an element of discord among them \vhich might haΛ'^e gained them over,^ nor could they master them by a 3 decided superiority of force. They had failed at al- most every point, and were already in great straits, when the defeat at sea, which they could not have thought pos- sible, reduced their fortunes to a still lower ebb. Ϊ Cp. viii. 96 fin. 2 Cp. vi. 20 init. 3 Or, '^ by their." 524 EXULTATION OF THE SYEACUSANS. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. yil. The Syracusans at once sailed round the shores of the ^Q harbor without fear, and determined to close the mouth, Thesyracu- ^^^^^ the Athenians might not be able, even if they toSeThf wanted, to sail out by stealth. For they were now hlu?oi.'^They striviiig, uo lougcr to achieve their own deliverance, but theTead in ^ to cut off the escapc of the Athenians ; they considered tlie liberation ; i • 'u.• i j η • • j j 'j. i of HeUas. their position already lar superior, as indeed it was, and they hoped that if they could conquer the Athenians and their allies by sea and land, their success ΛνοηΜ be glorious in the eyes of all the Hellenes, Λvho would at once be set free, some from slavery, others from fear. For the Athenians, having lost so much of their power, would never be able to face the enemies who would rise up against them. And the glory of the deliverance would be ascribed to the Syracusans, who would be honored by all living men and all future ages. The conflict was still further ennobled by the thought that they were now conquering, ^ not only the Athenians, but a host of their allies. And they themselves ivere not alone, but many had come to their support ; they were the leaders of a war in which Corinth and Lacedaemon were their partners ; they had oflTered their own city to bear the brunt of the encounter, and they had made an im- mense advance in naval power. More nations met at Syra- cuse than ever gathered around any single city, although not so many as the whole number of nations enrolled in this war under the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. 57. I will ηοΛν enumerate the various peoples who came Athenian to Sicily as frieuds or enemies, to share either in the con- quest or in the defence of the country, and who fought before Syracuse, ^ choosing their side, not so much from a sense of right or from obligations of kinship, as from the accident of compulsion or their own interest. (A) In Hellas The Athenians themselves, Λvho were lonians, went of Proper. ' ' 1 Or, taking the words as a reflection, not of the Syracusans, but of Thucydidcs himself: " And indeed there was everything to ennoble the conflict; for they were now conquering," etc. 2 Adopting the conjecture Συρακούσανς. FINAL ENUMERATION OF THE FORCES. 525 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. their OAvn free-will against the Syracusans, who were VTI. Dorians ; they were followed by the Lemnians and Im- ^e\5^ri °^^ brians, and the then inhabitants of Aegina/ and by the Hestiaeans dwelling at Hestiaea in Euboea : ^ all these were their ολλ^ι colonists, speaking the same language with them, and retaining the same institutions. Of the rest who joined in the expedition, some were (u) subjects subjects, others independent allies, some again mer- taries who cenaries. Of the subjects and tributaries, the Ere- loniaas. trians, Chalcidians, Styreans, and Carystians came from Euboea ; the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians from the islands ; the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. Of these however the Chians '^ were independent, and instead of paying tribute, provided ships. All or nearly all were lonians and descendants of the Athenians, with the exception of the Carystians, who are Dryopes. They were subjects and constrained to follow, but still they w^ere lonians fighting against Dorians. There were (2) Aeoiians, also Aeoiians, namel}^ the Methymnaeans,'^ who fur- subjects. nished ships but were not tributaries, and the Tenedians and Aenians, who paid tribute. These Aeoiians were compelled to fight against their Aeolian founders, the Boeotians, who formed part of the Syracusan army. The Plataeans were the only Boeotians opposed to Boeotians ; an antagonism which was natural, for they hated one another. The Ehodians and Cytherians Λvere (s) Dorians, both Dorians ; the Cytherians, although Lacedaemonian agaiist colonists, bore arms in the Athenian cause against the Lacedaemonians who came with Gylippus ; and the Ehodians, though by descent Argive, Avere compelled to fight against the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and against the Geloans, who wxre actually their own colony,•^ and were taking part with Syracuse. Of the islanders (ni) Allies around Peloponnesus, the Cephallenians and Zacyn- in^dependent. thians were independent ; ^ still, being islanders, they reaii^^"^^ 1 Cp. ii. 27 med. ■* Cp. iii. 50 med. ; vi. 85 med. 2 Cp. i. 114 fin. δ Cp. vi. 4 med. Cp. vi. 85 med. 6 Cp. ii. 7 fin. ; vi. 85 med. 526 THE ATHENIAi^S AND THEIR ALLIES. B.C. 413 : 01. 91, 4. yii. compelled, either (1) islanders, or (2) cities hav- ing special enmities. (iv) Volun- tary allies. (B)Allies in Italy and Sicily, followed under a certain degree of constraint ; for the Athenians were masters of the sea. The Corey raeans, who were not only Dorians but actually Corinthians, were serving against Corinthians and Syracusans, al- though they were the colonists of the one and the kins- men of the other ; they followed under a decent appear- ance of compulsion, but gladly, because they hated the Corinthians.^ The Messenians too, as the inhabitants of Naupactus were now called, including the garrison of Pylos, which was at that time held by the Athenians, were taken by them to the war. A few Megarians,^ having the misfortune to be exiles, were thus induced to fight against the Selinuntians, who were Megarians like themselves. 3 The service of the remaining allies was voluniary. The Argives,^ not so much because they Λvere allies of Athens, as because they hated the Lacedaemonians, and individually for the sake of their own immediate advantage, folloived the Athenians, who Λvere lonians, beino: themselves Dorians, to fio^ht as^ainst Dorians, The Mantineans and other Arcadians were mercenaries accustomed to attack any enemy Avho from time to time might be pointed out to them, and were now ready, if they were paid, to regard the Arcadians, who Λvere in the service of the Corinthians,^ as their enemies. The Cretans and Aetolians also served for hire ; the Cretans, who had once joined with the Rhodians in the founda- tion of Gela,^ came with reluctance ; ne\"ertheless for pay they consented to fight against their own colonists. Some of the Acarnanians came to aid their Athenian allies, partly from motives of gain, but much more out of regard for Demosthenes'' and good-w^ill to Athens. All these dwelt on the eastern side of the Ionian Gulf. Of the Hellenes in Italy, the Thurians and Metapon- tians, compelled by the necessities of a revolutionary 1 Cp. i. 25 med. ^ q^^ j^^ 74. ^i 43 gn. 3 Cp. vi. 4. init. * Cp. vi. 43. , 5 Cp. vii. 19 fin. β Cp. vi. 4 med. Cp. iil. 105 foil. ; vii. 31 fin. THE STKACUSANS AND THEIE ALLIES. 527 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. period, joined in the enterprise ; of the Hellenes in YII. Sicily, the Naxians and Catanaeans. Of Barbarians, including ι••Ίΐ -,. . barbarians. there were the Egestaeans, who invited the expedition, and the greater part of the Sicels, and, besides native Sicilians, certain Tyrrhenians ^ who had a quarrel Λvith the Syracusans ; also lapygians,^ Avho served for hire, These were the nations Λvho followed the Athenians. The Syracusans, on the other hand, Λvere assisted by 53. the Camarinaeans, Avho were their nearest neighbors, syracusan and by the Geloans, who dwelt next beyond them ; and habitants of then (for the Ao:rio'entines, Avho came next, were neutral) from the ^ ... southern, (2) by the still more distant Selinuntians. All these in- from the . . .... . northern habited the region of Sicily which lies towards Libya. • was draw from -•■ χ σ the higher the Λvant of food. For they had already sent to Catana, ground, and ^ *^ «^ ' fi^iftS?*^ when they intended to depart, and stopped the supplies ; way out by ^^^β^ thcv could o'et 110 morc unless they recovered the sea, or, if de- ./ ο SncL^' ^^ command of the sea. They resolved therefore to quit their lines on the hio^her £:round and to cut off bv a cross-wall a space close to their ships, no greater than was absolutely required for their baggage and for their sick ; after leaving a guard there they meant to put on board every other man, and to launch all their ships, Avhether lit for service or not ; they would then fight a decisive battle, and, if they conquered, go to Catana; but if not, they would burn their ships, and retreat by land in good order, taking the nearest way to some friendly country, Barbarian or Hellenic. This design they proceeded to execute, and Avith drawing quietly from the upper walls, manned their whole fleet, com- pelling every man of any age at alt suitable for service SPEECH OF NICIAS TO HIS MEN. 529 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91. 4. to embark. The entire number of the ships which thej VII. manned Λvas about a hundred and ten. They put on board numerous archers and javelin-men, Acarnanians, and other foreigners and made such preparations for action as the nature of the plan imposed upon them by their necessities allowed. When all Λvas nearly ready, Mcias seeing Nicias, perceiving that the soldiers were depressed by of his^SdSis ^-^ strives to their severe defeat at sea, which was so new an ex- encourage perience to them, while at the same time the want oi provisions made them impatient to risk a battle with the least possible delay, called his men together, and before they engaged exhorted them as folloΛvs : — " Soldiers of Athens and of our allies, Ave have all the 61. same interest in the comino^ struofo-le ; ^ every one of us if ^e ^i^ ^e c» CO ' ^ ^ ixiay see our as well as of our enemies will now have to fio^ht for his ^lomes once c>^ ^ more. We life and for his country, and if only we can win in the f^® ^«^ ^f^^ ♦^ ' «^ ^ tyros, and impending sea-fight, every one may see his native city JeSsfdown and his own home once more. But we must not be ^^ ^®^^^^®^• faint-hearted, nor behave as if we were mere novices in the art of war, who when defeated in their first battle are full of cowardly apprehensions and continually re- tain the impress of their disaster. You, Athenians, have had great military experience ; and you, allies, are always fighting at our side. Kemember the sudden turns of war ; let your hope be that fortune herself may yet come over to us ; and prepare to retrieve your de- feat in a manner worthy of the greatness of your own army which you see before you.^ "We have consulted the pilots about any improve- 62. ments which seemed likely to avail ao^ainst the crowdino- we are going '^ ^ ^ » to fight a of ships in the narrow harbor, as well as ao:ainst the i^nd-battie at ^ ' c) sea ; and have troops on the enemy's decks, which in previous engage- g^^^^tld b^ ments did us so much harm, and we have adopted them <^"^" ^■^.«^"* as far as we had the means. Many archers and javelin- men will embark, and a great number of other troops, whom if we were going to fight in the open sea we should not employ because they increase the weight of the ships, 1 Cp. vi. 68 init. ^ Cp.-vi. 68 med. ; vii. 77 med. 34 530 SPEECH OF NICIAS TO HIS MEK B.C. 413; 01.91,4. YII. and therefore impede our skill ; but here, where we are obliged to fight a land-battle on shipboard,^ they will be useful. We have thought of all the changes w^hich are necessary in the construction of our ships, and in order to counteract the thickness of the beams on the enemy's prows, for this did us more mischief than anything else, we have provided iron grapnels, which will prevent the ship striking us from retreating if the marines are quick and do their duty. For, as I tell you, Λve are positively driven to fight a land-battle on shipboard, and our best plan is neither to back water ourselves nor to allow the enemy to back water after w^e have once closed with him. Recollect that the shore, except so far as our land- forces extend, is in their hands. 63. ^' Knowing all this, you must fight to the last with all d^r?is?y• J^ur Strength, and not be driven ashore. When ship elgSed^yJu strikes ship refuse to separate until 3^ou have swept the 2p?rate until ©ncmy's licavy-armcd froui their decks. I am speaking Iwep^ ttfe to the hoplites rather than to the sailors ; for this is the Sck? Tothe speci^^l duty of the men on deck. We may still reckon YoihaVe 01^ the Superiority of our infantry. The sailors I would Srshfps'i^To exhort, nay I would implore them, not to be paralyzed Kenfemifer ^J their disastcrs ; for they Λνϋΐ find the arrangements on deck improved, and the numbers of the fleet increased. Some among you have long been deemed Athenians, though they are not ; and to them I say, consider how the glory tlie advan- tages which you derived from your connection show^ha^^* precious is that privilege, and how worthy to be de- fended. You were admired in Hellas because you spoke your weak η ess is mori than ano- ther's strength. our language and adopted our manners, and you shared equally Λvith ourselves in the substantial advantages of our empire, while you gained even more than we by the dread which you inspired in subject-states and in your security against injustice. You alone have been free partners in that empire ; you ought not to betray it now. And so, despising the Corinthians whom you have beaten again and again, and the Silicians who never dared to withstand us when our fleet was in its prime, repel your 1 Cp. i. 49 init. SPEECH OF GYLIPPUS TO HIS MEN". 531 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. enemies, and show that your skill even amid weakness VII. and disaster is superior to the strength of another in the hour of his success. "Let me appeal once more to you who are Athenians, 64. and remind you that there are no more ships like these ;^"^Ji°ans in the dockyards of the Piraeus, and that you have no "^tihat\hT more recruits fit for service. In any event but victory fjfends^ar^'^ your enemies here will instantly sail against Athens, while ^tak|.^and our countrymen at home, who are but a remnant, will be g^eataels and unable to defend themselves against the attacks of their §Si?is former foes reinforced by the new invaders. You ivho ^J^'^^stedto are in Sicily will instantly fall into the hands of the Syracusans (and you know how you meant to deal with them) , and your friends at Athens into the hands of the Lacedaemonians. In this one struggle you have to fight for yourselves and them. Stand firm therefore now, if ever, and remember one and all of you who are em- barking that you are both the fleet and army of your country, and that on you hangs the whole state and the great name of Athens : for her sake if any man exceed another in skill or courage let him display them now ; he will never have a better opportunity of doing good to himself and saving his country." Nicias, as soon as he had done speaking, gave orders 65. to man the ships. Gylippus and the Syracusans could ^^sSe^tthe see clearly enough from the preparations which the ^^^^^"^^^^^^^^ Athenians Avere makino^ that they were ofoino• to fio*ht. ^^*^ counter- tj »/ & & & improve- But they had also previous notice, and had been told g^S^'p^g ex- of the iron grapnels ; and they took precautions against ^°'"*' *^^'''• this as against all the other devices of the Athenians. They covered the prows of their vessels with hides, ex- tending a good way along the upper part of their sides, so that the grapnels might slip and find no hold. When all was ready, Gylippus and the other generals exhorted their men in the following words : — "That our recent actions have been glorious, and that β6. in the coming conflict we shall be fisrhtino• for a o-jorious o^vpast ^ ο ο & victories are prize, most of you, Syracusans and allies, seem to be^P^^^s^ 532 SPEECH OF GYLIPPUS TO HIS MEK B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. ~ ~ yil. aware : what else would have inspired you with so much sucTess^a?''^ energy ? But if any one is not so qaick in apprehending ihlenemy'iS^t^ese things as he ought to be, he shall hear of them gag^meSts ^^m me. The Athenians came hither intending to of h^riS enslave first of all Sicily, and then, if they succeeded, came hither^ Pelopoiinesus and the rest of Hellas, they having already wifhtS"^^ ttie largest dominion of any Hellenic power, past or thJpo^er^oT present. But you set mankind the example of with- depSted^^ standing that invincible navy ; which you have now de- to^S.*^^^ feated in several engagements at sea, and which you will probably defeat in this. For when men are crippled in what they assume to be their strength, any vestige of self-respect is more completely lost than if they had never believed in themselves at all. When once their pride has had a fall they throw away the power of re- sistance which they might still exert. And this we may assume to be the condition of the Athenians. 67. "Far otherwise is it with us. The natural courage, fuses?ou?age. wMch evcu in the days of our inexperience dared to ??utioSsIr?' I'isk all, is now better assured, and when we go on to tiSns^fours, reflect that he is the strongest who has overcome the Sinot^S strongest, the hopes of every one are redoubled. And a??wel|hfed ίπ all enterprises the highest hopes infuse the greatest iightirj\nen. couragc. Their imitation of our modes of fighting will sinfjiy^^ bc usclcss to them. To us they come naturally, and we espera e. q[^c^[i readily adapt ourselves to any arrangement of ours which they have borrowed. But to them the employment of troops on deck is a novelty ; they will be encumbered with crowds of hoplites and of javelin-men, Acarnanians and others, who are mere awkward landsmen put into a ship, and will not even know how to discharge their darts when they are required to keep their places. Will they not imperil the ships ? And their own movements will . be so unnatural to them that they will all fall into utter confusion. The greater number of the enemy's ships will be the reverse of an advantage to him, should any of you fear your inequality in that respect ; for a large fleet con- fined in a small space will be hampered in action and far THE EVE OF THE CONFLICT. 533 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. more likely to sufler from om* devices. And I would ΥΠ. have you know what I believe on the best authority to be the simple truth. Their misfortunes paralyze them, and they are driven to despair at finding themselves helpless. They have grown reckless, and have no con- fidence in their own plans. They will take their chance as best they can, and either force a way out to sea, or in the last resort retreat by land ; for they know that they cannot in any case be worse off than they are. "Against such disorder, and against hateful enemies 68. whose good-fortune has run away from them to us, let ^T^^ j^J^^f^, us advance with fury. We should remember in the first [s^"^|'s^'eet? place that men are doing a most lawful act when they thiifgsf^^ take vengeance upon an enemy and an aggressor, and hav?aiready. that they have a right to satiate their heart's animosity ; ifemls they secondly, that this vengeance, Λvhich is proverbially the doni^iSI^ sweetest of all things, will soon be within our grasp. I ^|r?thin£"^ need not tell you that they are our enemies, and our iS^ Suck.* worst enemies. They came against our land that they might enslave us, and if they had succeeded they would have inflicted the greatest sufferings on our men, and the worst indignities upon our wives and children, and would have stamped a name of dishonor upon our whole city. Wherefore let no one's heart be softened towards them. Do not congratulate yourselves at the mere prospect of getting safely rid of them. Even if they conquer they can only depart. But supposing that we obtain, as we most likely shall, the fulness of our desn'es, in the punishment of the Athenians and in the confirmation to Sicily of the liberties Λνΐήΰΐι she now enjoys, how glorious will be our prize ! Seldom are men exposed to hazards in which they lose little if they fail, and win all if they succeed." When Gylippus and the other Syracusan generals had, 69. like Mcias, encouraged their troops, perceiving the Athe- The peril nians to be mannino; their ships, they presently did the nearer and c5 1 ' ./ 1 J nearer, and same. Nicias. overwhelmed by the situation, and see- i^'icias once "^ ^ ^ more re- ino^ how e-reat and hoΛV near the peril was (for the ships p^.f^t^ t<\tii« t5 c ^ r- \ 1 trierarchs were on the very point of rowing out), feeling too, as 534 NiciAs ca;n^not say enough. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. VII. the old tale of freedom and country, wives and children, and their fathers' gods. They then go on board. 70. Disposition of the Syracusau fleet. The Athe- nians rush to the mouth of the harbor. The Syra- cusans bear doAvn upon them. Fury and disorder of the conflict. men do on the eve of a great struggle, that all which he had done ivas nothing, and that he had not said half enough, again addressed the trierarchs, and calling each of them by his father's name, and his own name, and the name of his tribe, he entreated those who had made any reputation for themselves not to be false to it, and those whose ancestors were eminent not to tarnish their hereditary fame. He reminded them that they were the inhabitants of the freest country in the world, and how in Athens there was no interference with the daily life of any man.^ He spoke to them of their wives and children and their fathers' Gods, as men w^ill at such a time ; for then they do not care whether their common- place phrases seem to be out of date or not, but loudly reiterate the old appeals, believing that they may be of some service at the awful moment. When he thought that he had exhorted them, not enough, but as much as the scanty time allowed, he retired, and led the land- forces to the shore, extending the line as far as he could, so that they might be of the greatest use in encouraging the combatants on board ship. Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who had gone on board the Athenian fleet to take the command, now quitted their own station, and proceeded straight to the closed mouth of the har- bor, intending to force their way to the open sea where a passage was still left. The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with nearly the same number of ships as before. A de- tachment of them guarded the entrance of the harbor ; the remainder were disposed all round it in such a man- ner that they might fall on the Athenians from every side at once, and that their land-forces might at the same time be able to co-operate wherever the ships retreated to the shore. Sicanus and Agatharchus commanded the Syracusan fleet, each of them a wing ; Pythen and the Corinthians occupied the centre. When the Athe- nians approached the closed mouth of the harbor the 1 Cp. ii. 37. FIK"AL STRUGGLE IK THE HARBOR. 535 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. violence of their onset overpowered the ships which VII. were stationed there ; they then attempted to loosen the ^J'^^J^JJ''^^ fasteninofs. Whereupon from all sides the Syracusans courage 'of & J- ^ tlie manners, and their allies came bearing down upon them, and the ^^fs'^^'s^^J^f'^ conflict was no longer confined to the entrance, but ^«JJJJfj^'^^g extended throughout the harbor. No previous engage- |fe,*t^i|§'/ra- ment had been so fierce and obstinate. Great was the glOTy.^ wm eagerness with Avhich the rowers on both sides rushed hmne^imong upon their enemies \vhenever the word of command was wni the^y fly given ; and keen was the contest between the pilots as aS?^^ they manoeuvred one against another. The marines too were full of anxiety that, when ship struck ship, the service on deck should not fall short of the rest ; every one in the place assigned to him Avas eager to be fore- most among his fellows. Many vessels meeting — and never did so many fight in so small a space, for the two fleets together amounted to nearly two hundred — they were seldom able to strike in the regular manner, because they had no opportunity of first retiring or breaking the line ; they generally fouled one another as ship dashed against ship in the hurry of flight or pursuit. All the time that another vessel was bearing down, the men on deck poured showers of javelins and arrows and stones upon the enemy ; and when the two closed, the marines fought hand to hand, and endeavored to board. In many places, owing to the want of room, they who had struck another found that they were struck iselves : often two or even more vessels weiv. uii^ivoidaoly en- tangled about one, and the pilots had to make plans of attack and defence, not againso one adversary only, but ao'ainst several comino^ from different sides. The crash of SO many ships dashing against one another took away the wits of the sailors, and made it impossible to hear the boatswains, Λvhose voices in both fleets rose high, as they gave directions to the roΛYers, or cheered them on in the excitement of the struggle. On the Athenian side they were shouting to their men that they must force a passage and seize the opportunity now or never 536 AGONY OF THE SPECTATORS. B.C. 413; 01.91,4. VII. of returning in safety to their native land. To the Syracusans and their allies was represented the glory of preventing the escape of their enemies, and of a victory by which every man would exalt the honor of his OAvn city. The commanders too, when they saw any ship backing water without necessity, would call the captain by his name, and ask, of the Athenians, whether they were retreating because they expected to be more at home upon the land of their bitterest foes than upon that sea which had been their own so long ; i on the Syracusan side, whether, when they knew perfectly well that the Athenians were only eager to find some means of flight, they Avould themselves fly from the fugitives. 71. While the naval engagement hung in the balance the Fearful anxi- two amiics Oil shorc had OTeat trial and conflict of soul. ety of the _ ο men drawn j^i^q Sicilian soldicr Avas animated by the hope of in- up on snore, *^ ^ whlithe^at- creasing the glory which he had already won, Avhile TheylTccom- ^^® invader was tormented by the fear that his for- flfcTwith^^^" tunes might sink lower still. The last chance of the movements of ^t^cnians lay in their ships, and their anxiety was leigih'the ^* dreadful. The fortune of the battle varied ; and it was drlvl?^"^^^^ not possible that the spectators on the shore should a?my s'eeSg^ ^11 rcceive tlic samc impression of it. Being quite close kiiowthem-* and having difierent points of view, they Avould some lost.^iiS^he of them see their own ships victorious ; their courage nfanftr'"''" would thciTi revivc and they would earnestly call ^^^^^' upon the gods not to take from them their hope of deliverance. But others, Avho saw their ships \vorsted, cried and shrieked aloud, and were by the sight alone more utterly unnerved than the defeated combatants themselves. Others again, Λvho had fixed their gaze on some part of the struggle which was undecided, were in a state of excitement still more terrible ; they kept swaying their bodies to and fro in an agony of hope and fear as the stubborn conflict Avent on and on ; for at every instant they were all but saved or all but lost. ^ Or, reading πόι^ον after όλΙγου: ''which by the labor of years they had made their own." 'i THE 15AT DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIAiiS. 537 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. And while ^y d^'^^^ife hung in the balance you might YII. hear in the Au/ . aan army at once lamentation, shouting, cries of victory or defeat, and all the various sounds which are wrung from a great host in extremity of danger. Not less agonizing were the feelings of those on board. At length the Syracusans and their allies, after a protracted struggle, put the Athenians to flight, and triumphantly bearing down upon them, and en- couraging one another with loud cries and exhortations, drove them to land. Then that part of the navy which had not been taken in the deep Λvater fell back in confusion to the shore, and the crews rushed out of the ships into the camp.^ And the land-forces, no longer now divided in feeling, but uttering one universal groan of intolerable anguish, ran, some of them to save the ships, others to defend what remained of the wall ; but the OTcater number beo^an to look to themselves and to their own safety. Never had there been a greater panic in an Athenian army than at that moment. They now suffered what they had done to others at Pylos. For at Pylos the Lacedaemonians, when they saw their ships destroyed, knew that their friends who had crossed over into the island of Sphacteria were lost with them.^ And so now the Athenians, after the rout of their fleet, knew that they had no hope of saving themselves by land unless events took some extraordinary turn. 72. Thus, after a fierce battle and a o^reat destruction of nemosthenes ' ^ desires to re- ships and men on both sides, the Syracusans and their g?^[ *^^J^^^- allies gained the victory. They gathered up the wrecks ^^irifyzedalld and bodies of the dead, and sailing back to the city, [,^λ^^ soTtVs erected a trophy. The Athenians, overwhelmed by their partly lind!' misery, never so much as thought of recovering their wrecks or of asking leave to collect their dead. Their intention was to retreat that very night. Demosthenes came to Nicias and proposed that they should once more man their remaining vessels and endeavor to force the passage at daybreak, saying that they had more ships 1 Cp. vii. 41 init., 74 fin. 2 Cp. iv. 14 iuit. 538 THE DEYICE OF HERMOCRAi B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. VII. fit for service than the enemy. For thnd• .n'enian fleet still numbered sixty, but the enemy had less than fifty. Nicias approved of his proposal, and they would have manned the ships, but the sailors refused to embark ; for they were paralyzed by their defeat, and had no longer any hope of succeeding. So the Athenians all made up their minds to escape by land. 73. Hermocrates the Syracusan suspected their intention, SiTiSpat?n|^' ^1^^ dreading what might happen if their vast army, re- waits^th?^' treating by land and settling somewhere in Sicily, should who^wirT^' choose to renew the war, he went to the authorities, dayftoliter- ^ud represented to them that they ought not to allow bu^* the mag- the Athenians to withdraw by night (mentioning his 3S5fgthe own suspicion of their intentions), but that all the Syra- s?bTe^ lis per- cusaus and their allies should march out before them, Athe1?ianl Wall up the roads, and occupy the passes with a guard. delay their They thought vcry mr ' ns he did, and wanted to carry ' out his plan, but doubted Λvhether their men, who were too glad to repose after a great battle, and in time of festival — for there happened on that A^ery day to be a sacrifice to Heracles — could be induced to obey. Most of them, in the exultation of victory, were drinking and keeping holiday, and at such a time how could they ever be expected to take up arms and go forth at the order of the generals ? On these grounds the authorities de- cided that the thing w^as impossible. Whereupon Her- mocrates himself, fearing lest the Athenians should gain a start and quietly pass the most difficult places in the night, contrived the following plan: when it was gi'owing dark he sent certain of his own acquaintances, accompanied by a few horsemen, to the Athenian camp. They rode up within earshot, and pretending to be friends (there were known to be men in the city λυΙιο gave information to Nicias of what went on) called to some of the soldiers, and bade them tell him not to withdraw his army during the night, for the Syracusans were guarding the roads ; he should make preparation at leisure and retire by day. Having delivered their THE BEATEN HOST BEGINS TO MO YE. 539 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. message they departed, and those who had heard them YJl informed the Athenian generals. On receiving this message, which they supposed to be 74. genuine, they remained during the night. And having once given up the intention of starting immediately, they decided to remain during the next day, that the soldiers might, as ivell as they could, put together their baggage in the most convenient form, and depart, taking with them the bare necessaries of life, but nothing else. Meanwhile the Syracusans and Grylippus, going forth and so give before them with their land forces, blocked the roads in sans time to . TIT block the the country by which the Athenians were likely to pass, roads. guarded the fords of the rivers and streams, and posted themselves at the best points for receiving and stopping them. Their sailors rowed up to the beach and dragged away the Athenian ships. The Athenians themselves burnt a few of them, as they had intended, but the rest the Syracusans towed away, unmolested and at their leisure, from the places where they had severally run aground, and conveyed them to the city. On the third day after the sea-fight, when Nicias and 75. Demosthenes thought that their preparations were com- JJ^^^^^^^ plete, the army began to move. They were in a dread- ^^e^^e'^aVe ful condition ; not only was there the great fact that ^^^^^^ ^^ry- they had lost their whole fleet, and instead of their ^|J^^'|^^^® expected triumph had brought the utmost peril upon ai°eTeft^ Athens as well as upon themselves, but also the sights cSsiifg which presented themselves as they quitted the camp comiades; were painful to every eye and mind. The dead were amiyTs* unburied, and Λvhen any one saw the body of a friend iuelSiU of lying on the ground he was smitten with sorroΛV and tie^wS dread, Avhile the sick or wounded who still survived and tht' but had to be left were even a greater trial to the betVe^n living, and more to be pitied than those who were amithefr^ gone. Their prayers and lamentations drove their com- quuTo^er- panions to distraction ; they would beg that they might theml be taken with them, and call by name any friend or relation whom they saw passing ; they would hang upon 540 THE UTTER MISERY OF THE ARMY. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. VII. Tet more overwhelm- ming is tlie thought of the future. their departing comrades and follow as far as they could, and Avhen their limbs and strength failed them and they dropped behind many were the imprecations and cries which they uttered. So that the whole army was in tears, and such was their despair that they could hardly make up their minds to stir, although they Avere leaving an enemy's country, haA^ng suffered calamities too great for tears already, and dreading miseries yet greater in the unknown future. There was also a o-eneral feelins: of shame and self-reproach, — indeed they seemed, not like an army, but like the fugitive population of a city captured after a siege ; and of a great city too. For the whole multitude Avho were marchins^ tosfether numbered not less than forty thousand. Each of them took with him anything he could carry which was likely to be of use. Even the heavy-armed and cavalry, contrary to their practice when under arms, conveyed about their persons their own food, some because they had no at- tendants, others because they could not trust them ; for they had long been deserting, and most of them had gone off all at once. Nor was the food which they carried sufficient ; for the supplies of the camp had failed. Their disgrace and the universality of the misery, althouo^h there mioht be some consolation in the very community of suffering, was nevertheless at that moment hard to bear, especially when they remembered from Avhat pomp and splendor they had fallen into their present low estate. Never had an Hellenic army ^ experienced such a reverse. They had come intending to enslave others, and they were going aAvay in fear lest they would be themselves enslaved. Instead of the prayers and hymns with which they had put to sea, they were now departing amid appeals to heaven of another sort. They were no longer sailors but landsmen, depending, not upon their fleet, but upon their infantry. Yet in face of the great danger which still threatened them all these things appeared endurable. * Omitting τώ. I LAST WOKDS OF NICIAS. 541 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. Nicias, seeing the army disheartened at their terrible VII. fall, went along the ranks and encouraged and consoled 76. them as well as he could. In his fervor he raised his Address of voice as he passed from one to another and spoke louder and louder, desiring that the beneiit of his Λvords might reach as far as possible. " Even now, Athenians and allies, we must hope : men 77. have been delivered out of worse straits than these, and }^e|iavesuf- ' lei'ea more I would not have you judge yourselves too severely on geJiy^aud i account either of the reverses which you have sustained |ηίϊ1??•^^ or of your present undeserved miseries. I too am as Se^ifas^len weak as any of you ; for I am quite prostrated by my ΒαΓΛτίηι'αγ disease, as you see. And although there Avas a time gods-Sifnmv when I might have been thought equal to the best of up^nS^ you in the happiness of my private and public Hfe, I am o^^nSnbSs, now in as great danger, and as much at the mercy of bJ^Sthere fortune as the meanest. Yet my days have been passed i-lfuge^or^he in the performance of many a religious duty, and of e?eryViiere many a just and blameless action. Therefore my hope we mSst^JIi' /.,!_£., . 11 Τ Ί•χ•Ί to the Sicels 01 the future remains unshaken, and our calamities do at once, for not appall me as they might. ^ Who knows that they more food. may not be lightened ? For our enemies have had their niaiis\>e, ^' ^~^ -A^tliGiis lives full share of success, and if our expedition provoked the jealousy of any God,^ by this time we have been punished enough. Others ere now have attacked their neighbors ; they have done as men will do, and suffered what men can bear. We may therefore begin to hope that the Gods will be more merciful to us ; for we now invite their pity rather than their jealousy. And look at your own well-armed ranks ; see how many brave soldiers you are, marching in solid array, ^ and do not be dismayed; bear in mind that wherever you plant yourselves you are a city already, and that no city of Sicily will find it easy to resist your attack, or can dislodge you if you choose 1 Or, taking κατ' άξίαν closely with φοβονσΐ: "and our calamities do not appall me, as if they were deserved; " or, " although our calam- ities, imdeserved as they are, do certainly appall me." 2 Cp. vii. 50 fin. 3 Cp. vi. 68 init. ; vii. 6i fin. 542 THE WAT BARRED. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. yil. to settle. Provide for the safety and good order of your own march, and remem])er every one of you that on whatever spot a man is compelled to fight, there if he conquer he may find a home and a fortress. We must press forward day and night, for our supplies are but scanty. The Sicels, through fear of the Syracusans, still adhere to us, and if Λve can only reach any part of their territory we shall be among friends, and you may con- sider yourselves secure. We have sent to them, and they have been told to meet us and bring food. In a w ord, soldiers, let me tell you that you must be brave ; there is no place near to which a coward can fly.'^ And if you now escape your enemies, those of you w^ho are not Athenians may see once more the home for which they long, while you Athenians will again rear aloft the fallen greatness of Athens. For men, and not walls or ships in which are no men, constitute a state." 78. Thus exhorting his troops Mcias passed through the ^t^nfmove ^^my, and wherever he saw gaps in the ranks or the men dfvi?ioiis%iie dropping out of line, be brought them back to their ^d tiie itSer pfopcr placc. Demosthcues did the same for the troops thenl^^^Thej uudcr his commaud, and gave them similar exhortations. passS!g the The army marched disposed in a hollow oblong : the i!id pTOcteS division of Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes fol- soutMva^d. lowing; the hoplites enclosed Avithin their ranks the sa^s o^rtake baggagc-bearcrs and the rest of the army. When they cip^a steep arrived at the ford of the river Anapus they found a force r?uteT ^^ of the Syracusans and of their allies drawn up to meet them; these they put to flight, and getting command of the ford, proceeded on their march. The Syracusans continually harassed them, the cavalry riding alongside, and the light-armed troops hurling darts at them. On this day the Athenians proceeded about four and Second day. a half milcs and encamped at a hill. On the next day they started early, and, having advanced more than two miles, descended into a level plain, and encamped. The country Avas inhabited, and they were desirous of 1 Cp. vi. 68 med. and fin. THE ATHENIANS ARE TURNED BACK. 543 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. obtaining food from the houses, and also water Λvhich YII. they might carry with them, as there ivas little to be had for many miles in the country which lay before them. Mearnvhile the Syracusans had gone on before them, and at a point Λvhere the road ascends a steep hill called the Acraean height, and there is a precipitous ravine on either side, Avere blocking up the pass by a wall. On the Third day. next day the Athenians advanced, although again im- peded by the numbers of the enemy's cavalry who rode alongside, and of their javelin-men who threw darts at them. For a long thne the Athenians maintained the struggle, but at last retired to their own encampment. Their supplies were now cut off, because the horsemen circumscribed their movements. In the morning they started early and resumed their Fourth day. march. They pressed onwards to the hill where the way 79. Avas barred, and found in front of them the Syracusan TiieAthe- ^ mans make infantry drawn up to defend the wall, in deep array, ^^o ί^^^β^^^^^^ for the pass was narrow. Whereupon the Athenians ad- ψ^^ po^i- vanced and assaulted the barrier, but the enemy, who were numerous and had the advantage of position, threw missiles upon them from the hill, Tvhich was steep, and so, not being able to force their way, they again retired and rested. During the conflict, as is often the case in the fiill of the year, there came on a storm of rain and thunder, whereby the Athenians were yet more dis- heartened, for they thought that everything was con- spiring to their destruction.^ While they Avere resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans despatched a division of their army to raise a wall behind them across the road by which they had come ; but the Athenians sent some of their own troops and frustrated their intention. They then retired with their whole army in the direction of the plain and passed the night. On the folloAving day they Fifth day. again advanced. The Syracusans now surrounded and attacked them on every side, and wounded many of them. If the Athenians advanced thej^ retreated, but charged ^ * Cp. vi. 70 init. 544 CHANGE OF EOUTE AND MIDNIGHT PANIC. B.C. 413 ; Ol. 91, 4. YII. them when they retired, falling especially upon the hindermost of them, in the hope that, if they could put to flight a few at a time, they might strike a panic into the whole army. In this fashion the Athenians struggled on for a long time, and having advanced about three- quarters of a mile rested in the plain. The Syracusans then left them and returned to their own encampment. 80. The army was now in a miserable plight, being in The condition want of cvcry ucccssary ; and by the continual assaults wSInT^ of the enemy great numbers of the soldiers had been ηΓεΜίΐι^*^ wounded. Nicias and Demosthenes, perceiving their iout?Ind|O condition, resolved during the night to light as many sea!^^ A panic watch-fircs as possiblc and to lead ofi* their forces. They Nic?as crosses intended to take another route and march towards the pa?is.^^^' sea in the direction opposite to that from which the Syracusans were watching them. Now their whole line of march lay, not towards Catana, but toivards the other side of Sicily, in the direction of Camarina and Gela, and the cities, Hellenic or Barbarian, of that region. So they lighted numerous fires and departed in the night. And then, as constantly happens in armies,^ especially in very great ones, and as might be expected when they were marching by night in an enemy's country, and with the enemy from whom they were flying not far off, there arose a panic among them, and they fell into con- fusion. The army of Nicias, which led the way, kept together, and was considerably in advance, but that of Demosthenes, which was the larger half, got severed from the other division, and marched in less order. Sixth day. At daybreak they succeeded in reaching the sea, and striking into the Helorine road marched along it, in- tending as soon as they arrived at the river Cacyparis to follow up the stream through the interior of the island. They were expecting that the Sicels for whom they had sent would meet them on this road. When they had reached the river they found there also a guard of the Syracusans cutting ofl" the passage by a 1 Cp. iv. 125 init. ONE DIYISION IS SURROUNDED. 545 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. wall and palisade. They forced their Λvay through, and VH. crossing the river, passed on towards another river which is called the Erineus, this being the direction in which their guides led them. When daylight broke and the Syracusans and their 81. allies saw that the Athenians had departed, most of Thesyracu- them thouo'ht that Gylippus had let them go on pur- overtake the C^ . . . division of pose, and were very angry with him. They easily found Demosthenes, 1 ' J ^ J J ,j which IS sur- the line of their retreat, and quickly following, came up Jg^^^^^^ with them about the time of the midday meal. The troops of Demosthenes Avere last ; they Λvere marching slowly and in disorder, not having recovered from the panic of the previous night, when they were overtaken by the Syracusans, who immediately fell upon them and fought. Separated as they Λvere from the others, they were easily hemmed in hy the Syracusan cavalry and driven into a narrow space. The division of Nicias was as much as six miles in advance, for he marched faster, thinking that their safety depended at such a time, not in remaining and fighting, if they could avoid it, but in retreating as quickly as they could, and resisting only when they were positively compelled. Demosthenes,on the other hand, who had been more incessantly harassed throughout the retreat, because marching last he was first attacked by the enemy, ηοΛν, when he saw the Syracusans pursuing him, instead of pressing onward, had ranged his army in order of battle. Thus lingering he Avas surrounded, and he and the Athenians under his command were in the greatest danger and confusion. For they were crushed into a walled enclosure, having a road on both sides and planted thickly with olive- trees, and missiles were hurled at them from all points. The Syracusans naturally preferred this mode of attack to a regular engagement. For to risk themselves against desperate men would have been only playing into the hands of the Athenians. Moreover, every one was sparing of his life ; their good fortune was already assured, and they did not want to fall in the hour of victory. Even 35 The are wor 546 DEMOSTHENES SUEEENDEES. B.C. 413 : 01. 91, 4. yil. by this irregular mode of fighting they thought that they could overpower and capture the Athenians. 82. And so when they had gone on all day assailing them troops with missiles from every quarter, and S'aw that they ivere s^orn out ; J η ^ j oilers of free- quite worn out with their wounds and all their other dom to the ^ erafwJ-^^^' sufleriugs, Gylippus and the Syracusans made a proc- at*asttS^* lamation, first of all to the islanders, that any of them is ddveS to^ who pleased might come over to them and have their capitulate, freedom. But only a few cities accepted the oifer. At lenoth an ao^reement was made for the entire force under Demosthenes. Their arms ivere to be surrendered, but no one was to suifer death, either from violence or from imprisonment, or from want of the bare means of life. So they all surrendered, being in number six thousand, and gave up what money they had. This they thre^v into the hollow^s of shields and filled four. The captives were at once taken to the city. On the same day Nicias and his division reached the river Erineus, which he crossed, and halted his army on a rising ground. Seventh day. On the following day he was overtaken by the Syra- 83. cusans, Avho told him that Demosthenes had surrendered, Nieiasheing and bade him do the 'same. He, not believing them, the°smrender procurcd a trucc while he sent a horseman to go and theneftries scc. Upoii the rctum of the horseman bringing as- Ifejotilt? surance of the fact, he sent a herald to Gylippus and pis. Heat- the Svracusans, sayino- that he would agree, on behalf tempts to , . , . 'J '■^ 1 • 1 ii steal away by of the Athenian state, to pay the expenses which the night, but , . τ . 1 τ J ^i j. fails. Three Svracusans had incurred m the w^ar, on condition that hundred -^ .i i • j escape^in the they should let his army go ; until the money w^as paid he ΛνοιιΜ give Athenian citizens as hostages, a man for a talent. Gylippus and the Syracusans w^ould not accept these proposals, but attacked and surrounded this division of the army as well as the other, and hurled missiles at them from every side until the evening. They, too, Avere grievously in want of food and neces- saries. Nevertheless they meant to Avait for the dead of the night and then to proceed. They were just re- suming their arms, when the Syracusans discovered them SLAUGHTER AT THE ASSINARUS. 547 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. and raised the Paean. The Athenians, perceiving that YII. they were detected, laid down their arms again, with the exception of about three hundred men who broke through the enemy's guard, and made their escape in the dark- ness as best they could. When the day dawned Nicias led forward his army. Eighth day. and the Syracusans and the allies again assailed them g4. on every side, hurlins^ Ravelins and other missiles at The troops of "rr^i * 1 . 1 • 1 . .1 • Λ • Nicias huri'y them. The Athenians hurried on to the river Assi-outothe narus. They hoped to srain a little relief if they forded narus ; they •^ ■"- ^ "^ rush in pell- the river, for the mass of horsemen and other troops men ; they ■*• are attaclted overwhelmed and crushed them ; and they were worn by ti^e enemy, out by fatiofue and thirst. But no sooner did they runs biood, «/ σ «^ and the livmg reach the water than they lost all order and rushed in ; ^^Ι^ζ^^^^'^ every man was trying to cross first, and, the enemy ^^^ξ^^ *^® pressing upon them at the same time, the passage of the river became hopeless. Being compelled to keep close together they fell one upon another, and trampled each other under foot : some at once perished, pierced by their own spears ; others got entangled in the baggage and were carried down the stream. The Syracusans stood upon the further bank of the river, which was steep, and hurled missiles from above on the Athenians, who were huddled together in the deep bed of the stream and for the most part were drinking greedily. The Peloponnesians came down the bank and slaughtered them, falling chiefly upon those who were in the river. Whereupon the water at once became foul, but was drank all the same, although muddy and dyed with blood, and the crowd fought for it. At last, when the dead bodies were lying in heaps 85. one upon another in the water and the army was nicias at ^ «^ last sur- utterly undone, some perishing in the river, and any who ^"f^^'ug^ escaped being cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered hund^Sflre to Gylippus, in whom he had more confidence than in ^reltnei"' the Syracusans. He entreated him and the Lacedae- g^^ughter. monians to do Λvhat they pleased with himself, but not piig" ners to go on killing the men. So Gylippus gave the word 548 NICIAS SURKENDEES. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. yil. to make prisoners. Thereupon the survivors, not in- p?operty of cludiiig however a large number whom the soldiers con- and^mny'^^' cealed, Avere brought in alive. As for the three hundred escape. ^y-j^^ j^g^^j broken through the guard in the night, the Syracusans sent in pursuit and seized them. The total of the public prisoners when collected Avas not great ; for many were appropriated by the soldiers, and the whole of Sicily was full of them, they not having capitulated like the troops under Demosthenes. A large number also perished ; the slaughter at the river being very great, quite as great as any Avhich took place in the Sicilian war ; and not a few had fallen in the frequent attacks which were made upon the Athenians during their march. Still many escaped, some at the time, others ran away after an in- terval of slavery, and all these found refuge at Catana. 86. The Syracusans and their allies collected their forces The public and returned with the spoil, and as many prisoners as prisoners are -i ' ./ r the^utn-fes- ^^^^ could take w^ith them, into the city. The captive Demostheies Athenians and allies they deposited in the quarries, dSth!* ^^ which they thought Avould be the safest place of confine- ment. Nicias and Demosthenes they put to the sword, although against the will of Gylippus. For Gylippus thought that to carry home ivith him to Lacedaemon the generals of the enemy, over and above all his other successes, would be a brilliant triumph. One of them, Demosthenes, happened to be the greatest foe, and the other the greatest friend of the Lacedaemonians, both in the same matter of Pylos and Sphacteria. For Nicias had taken up their cause, i and had persuaded the Athe- nians to make the peace Avhich set at liberty the prisoners taken in the island. The Lacedaemonians Avere grateful to him for the service, and this was tlie main reason why he trusted Gylippus and surrendered himself to him. But certain Syracusans, who had been in communica- tion with him, were afraid (such was the report) that on some suspicion of their guilt he might be put to the torture and bring trouble on them in the hour of their Ϊ Cp. V. 16 med. FATE OF THE PEISONERS. 549 B.C. 413 ; Ol. 91, 4. prosperity. Others, and especially the Corinthians, feared VII. that, being rich, he might by bribery escape and do them further mischief. So the Syracusans gained the consent of the allies and had him executed. For these or the like reasons he suffered death. No one of the Hellenes in my time was less deserving of so miserable an end ; for he lived in the practice of every virtue. T^o?e who were imprisoned in the quirries were at 87. the beginning of their captivity harsnly treated by the l^e^pil^^^ei Syracusans. There were great numbers of them, and ^'^^^^^^J/^^^^ they were crowded in a deep and narroiv place. At SiowancTSF first the sun by day was still scorching and suffocating, ^^att?.^^ for they had no roof over their heads, while the autumn nSmbe^r°of nights were cold, and the extremes of temperature selS^*^^^* engendered violent disorders. Being cramped for room *^°^^^^• they had to do everything on the same spot. The corpses of those who died from their Avounds, exposure to the weather, and the like, lay heaped one upon another. The smells \vere intolerable ; and they were at the same time afflicted by hunsfer and thirst. Durino' eio-ht months they were allowed only about half a pint of water and a pint of food a day. Every kind of misery which could befall man in such a place befell them. This was the condition of all the captives for about ten weeks. At length the Syracusans sold them, with the exception of the Athenians and of any Sicilians or Italian Greeks who had sided with them in the war. The whole number of the public prisoners is not accurately known, but they were not less than seven thousand. Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this Thus ended war, or indeed of all the Hellenic actions which are on of^iiifel• record, this was the greatest — the most glorious to the victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished; for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and their suf- ferings ^vevQ prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth ; nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home. Thus ended the Sicilian expedition. 550 THE NEWS AT ATHENS. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. BOOK ym. Vin. 1. The news was brought to Athens, but the Athenians At first the could uot believe that the armament had been so com- wiiinotbe- pletelj annihilated, although they had the positive as- trnth, and surances of the very soldiers who ^ had escaped from are furious ^ . a i i i when they the sceiie 01 actiou. At last they knew the truth; Their pros- aiid then they were furious Λyith the orators who had pects are ..,. . ,.. • η τ λ -, hopeless. joiiied 111 promoting the expedition — as if they had not they deter- Λ^oted it themselves ^ — and with the soothsayers, and mine not to . yield. They prophets, aiid all who by the influence of relioion had appoint a ■'■■'- ^ ^ ^ •^ ^ «^ council of at the time inspired them with the belief that they would eiders, and -'■ «^ are disposed conqucr Sicilv. AYhichever way they looked there was to economize j. ./ j j weu?*^^^^^ trouble ; they were overwhelmed by their calamity, and were in fear and consternation unutterable. The citizens mourned and the city mourned ; they had lost a host of cavalry and hoplites and the flower of their youth, and there were none to replace them.^ And when they saw an insufficient number of ships in their docks, and no crews to man them, nor monej' in the treasury, they despaired of deliverance. They had no doubt that their enemies in Sicily, after the great victory which they had already gained, would at once sail against the Piraeus. Their enemies in Hellas, whose resources were now doul)led, would likewise set upon them with all their might both by sea and land, and would be assisted by their own revolted allies. Still they determined under any circumstances not to give way. They ΛνοηΜ procure * Or, taking η6.νυ with στρατΜοτώ^ : "trustworthy soldiers who." 2 Cp. ii. 60 med., 61 med. ^ Cp. vii. 64. ALL HELLAS UP IN AEMS. 551 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. timber and money by whatever means they might, and VIII. build a navy. They would make sure of their allies, and above all of Euboea. Expenses in the city were to be economized, and they were to choose a council of the elder men, who should advise together, and lay before the people the measures which from time to time might be required. After the manner of a democracy, they were very amenable to discipline while their fright lasted. They proceeded to carry out these resolutions. And so the summer ended. During the following winter all Hellas was stirred 2. by the o-reat 0Λ^erthlΌΛv of the Athenians in Sicily. The Tiie neutral states which had been neutral determined that the time Lacedae- had come Λvhen, invited or not, they could i^o longer ^^^tj^^enian ^^^ stand aloof from the war ; they must of their own accord g^ve iSe"" attack the Athenians. They considered, one and all, ^j^^^h^p- that, if the Sicilian expedition had succeeded, they would glJ^iy at'ln sooner or later have been attacked by them. The war fnv1)iTe'^no would not last long, and they might as well share in the Ho^p^eTof the glory of it. The Lacedaemonian allies, animated by a ^ο*21μ". common feeling, were more eager than ever to make a speedy end of their protracted hardships. But none shoAved greater alacrit}' than the subjects of the Athe- nians, who were e\^ery where willing eΛ"en bej^ond their power to reΛ'Όlt ; for they judged by their excited feelings,^ and ΛνοηΜ not admit a possibility that the Athenians could survive another summer. To the Lace- daemonians all this was most encouraging ; and they had in addition the prospect that their allies from Sicily would join them at the beginning of spring with a large force of ships as well as men ; necessity having at last compelled them to become a naval power. Everything looked hopeful, and they determined to strike promptly and vigorously. They considered that by the successful termination of the war they would be finally delivered from dangers such as would have surrounded them if the Athenians had become masters of Sicily .^ Athens once 1 Cp. iv. 108 med. 2 Cp. vi. 90. • 552 AGIS AT DECELEA. B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. yiii. 3. Agis carries away the cattle of the Oetaeans, and exacts money from the Achaeaus of Phthia. The Lacedae- monians and allies are to build a hvm- dred ships. 4. The Athe- nians build a fleet and for- tify Sunium. They cut down expense and keep an eye upon their allies. 5. First the Euboeans ; then (2) the Lesbians, Avho are supported by their Boeotian kinsmen, negotiate overthrown, they might assure to themselves the midis- puted leadership of Hellas. At the begimiing therefore of this winter, Agis the Lacedaemonian king led out a body of troops from Decelea, and collected from the allies contributions towards the expenses of a navy. Then passing to the Malian Gulf, he carried ofl' from the Oetaeans, who were old enemies,^ the greater part of their cattle, and exacted money of them ; from the Achaeans of Phthia, and from the other tribes in that region, although the Thessalians to Λvhom they Avere subject were very Λvroth and pro- tested, he likewise extorted money and took hostages, whom he deposited at Corinth, and tried to force upon them the Lacedaemonian alliance. The whole number of ships which the allies were to build was fixed at a hundred ; twenty-five were to be built by the Lacedae- monians themselves and twenty-five by the Boeotians, fifteen by the Phocians and Locrians, fifteen by the Corinthians, ten by the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Si- cyonians, ten by the Megarians, Troezenians, Epidau- rians, and Hermionians. Every sort of preparation was made, for the Lacedaemonians were determined to pros- ecute the war as soon as the spring set in. The Athenians also carried out their intended prep- arations during this winter. They collected timber and built ships ; they fortified Sunium for the protec- tion of their corn-ships on the voyage to Athens ; also they abandoned the fort in Laconia Λvhich they had erected while sailing to Sicily ,2 and cut down any expenses which seemed unnecessary. Above all, they kept strict watch over their allies, apprehending revolt. During the same Λvinter, Λvhile both parties viQve as mtent upon their preparations as if the war were only just beginning, first among the Athenian subjects the Euboeans sent envoys to negotiate Λvith Agis. Agis accepted their proposals, and summoned from Lace- daemon Alcamenes the son of Sthenelaidas, and Melan- 1 Cp. iii. 92 foil. 2 Cp. vii. 26 med. STATES WANTING TO EEYOLT. 553 B.C. 413 ; 01. 91, 4. thus, that they might take the command in Euboea. VITI. They came, accompanied by three hmidred of the Neo- ^jJJi^^f ^^ore damodes. But while he was making ready to convey g^e^'home^'^ them across the strait, there arrived envoys from Lesbos, government. which was likcAvise anxious to revolt ; and as the Boeo- tians ^ were in their interest, Agis was persuaded to defer the expedition to Euboea Avhile he prepared to assist the Lesbians. He appointed Alcamenes, Λνΐιο had been designed for Euboea, their governor; and he further promised them ten ships, the Boeotians promising ten more. All this was done without the authority of the Lacedaemonian government ; for Agis, λυΙιΙ^ he Λvas with his arnw at Decelea, had the right to send troops whithersoever he pleased, to raise levies, and to exact mone}^ And at that particular time he might be said to have far more influence over the allies than the Lacedaemonians at home, for he had an army at his disposal, and was dreaded wherever he went. ^ While he Avas supporting the Lesbians, certain Chians C3) The - ^ 1N11 Cliians and and Lrythraeans (who were also ready to revolt ) had Erythraeans assisted tv recourse, not to Ao^is, but to Lacedaemon ; they were Tissapiiemes ' . ο ' . 'J ask aid from accompanied by an envoy from Tissaphernes, whom |Ρ»^*^. The Kino^ Darius the son of Artaxerxes had appointed to be tribute in ^ ^^ question. governor of the provinces on the coast of Asia. Tissa- phernes too Λvas inviting the assistance of the Lacedae- monians, and promised to maintain their troops : for the king had quite lately lieen demanding of him the revenues due from the Hellenic cities in his province, Avhicli he had been prevented by the Athenians from col- lecting, and therefore still owed. He thought that if he could weaken the Athenians he would be more likely to get his tribute ; he hoped also to make the Lacedaemonians allies of the king, and l)y their help either to slay or take alive, in accordance with the king's orders, Amorges the natural son of Pissuthnes, who had revolted in Caria. AVhile the Chians and Tissaphernes were pursuing 6. their common obiect, Callio^eitus the son of Laophon, w Phama- •^ *- bazus, who 1 Cp. iii. 2 fin., 5 med., 13 init. ; viii. 100 med. nesian fleet. 554 TISSAPHEENES AND PHAENABAZUS. B.C. 413; 01.91,4. YIII. a Megarian, and Timagoras the son of Athenagoras, a m^nlyr^"^ Cjzicene, both exiles from their own country, who were SJedlemo- I'esiding at the court of Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces , fhrHenes-'' came to Lacedaemon. They had been commissioned by Ens having Phamabazus to bring up a fleet to the Hellespont ; like AicSder^* Tissaphernes, he Avas anxious, if possible, to induce the Sefvedinto citics in his province to revolt from the Athenians, that Se promS^ ^e might obtain the tribute from them ; and he wanted of a pliSpiu-^ the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and the king to come from himself. The two parties — tho-t is to say, the envoys of Pharnabazus and those of Tissaphernes — were acting independently ; and a vehement contest arose at Lacedaemon, the one party m'ging the Lace- daemonians to send a fleet and army to Ionia and Chios, the other to begin with the Hellespont. They were themselves far more favorable to the proposals of the Chians and Tissaphernes ; for Alcibiades was in their interest, and he was a great hereditary friend of Endius, one of the ephors of that year. Through this friendship the Lacedaemonian name of Alcibiades came into his family ; for Alcibiades was the name of Endius' father. ^ Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians, be- fore giving an answer, sent a commissioner, Phrynis, one of their Perioeci, to see Avhether the Chians had as many ships as they said, and whether the power of the city was equal to her reputation. He reported that Λvhat they had heard was true. Whereupon they at once made alliance with the Chians and Erythraeans and voted them forty ships — there being at Chios already, as the Chians informed them, not less than sixty. Of the forty ships they at first intended to send out ten themselves under the command of Melancridas their admiral ; but an earthquake occurred ; so instead of Melancridas they appointed Chalcideus, and instead of the ten ships they prepared to send five only, \vhich they equipped in 1 Literally, " for Endius was called Endius, the son of Alcibiades;" implying that in the family of Endius the names Endius and Alci- biades alternated. CHIOS, LESBOS, AKD THE HELLESPONT. 555 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. Laconia. So the winter ended, and with it the nine- YIII. , teenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucy- dides wrote the history. At the beginning of the next summer the Chians 7. pressed the Lacedaemonians to send the fleet at once. ^J^^Yo^Jp^ For their proposals, like those of the other allies, had ^fjl^^^J^y been made secretly, and they were afraid that the Athenians would detect them. Thereupon the Lace- daemonians sent to Corinth three Spartans, who were to give orders that the ships then lying at the Isthmus should be as quickly as possible dragged over from the Corinthian gulf to the coast on the other side. They were all to be despatched to Chios, including the ships which Agis had intended for Lesbos. The allied fleet then at the Isthmus numbered in all thirty-nine. Calligeitus and Timagoras, who represented Pharna- 8. bazus, took no part in the expedition to Chios, nor did Agis, who had ^ i- i- originally they ofier to contribute towards the expenses of it the L^sboi money Λvhich the ν had brouo-ht with them, amountinof i^cqmesces •J ^ ο ' & mtne ex- to twenty-flve talents ; ^ they thought of sailing later l^^^^"" ^"^ with another expedition. Agis, Avhen he saw that the Lacedaemonians Λvere bent on going to Chios first, offered no opposition ; so the allies held a conference at Corinth, and after some deliberation determined to sail, first of all to Chios, under the command of Chalci- deus, >vho was equipping the five ships at Laconia, then to proceed to Lesbos, under the command of Alca- menes, whom Agis had previously designed to appoint to that island, and finally to the Hellespont; for this last command they had selected Clearchus the son of Ehamphias. They resolved to carry over the Isthmus half the ships first ; these were to sail at once, that the attention of the Athenians might be distracted between those which were starting and those which were to follow. They meant to sail quite openly, taking it for granted that the Athenians were powerless, since no navy of theirs worth speaking of had as yet appeared, 1 £6000. 556 THE CHIAN CONSPIRACY DETECTED. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. vm. 9. The Corin- tliiaus are de- layed by their Isthmian games. Meanwhile the Athenians detect the treason of the Chians and exact pledges of them. 10. The first Peloponne- sian squadron is driven by the Athenians into Pei- raeum and the com- mander, Alcamenes, slain. In pursuance of their plan they conveyed twenty-one ships over the Isthmus. They were in a hurry to be off, but the Corinthians were unwilling to join them until the conclusion of the Isthmian games, which Λvere then going on. Agis was prepared to respect their scruples and to take the re- sponsibility of the expedition on himself. But the Corinthians would not agree to this proposal, and there ivas delay. In the meantime the Athenians began to discover the proceedings of the Chians, and despatched one of their generals, Aristocrates, to accuse them of treason. They denied the charge ; whereupon he de- sired them to send back with him a fcAv ships as a pledge of their fidelity to the alliance ; and they sent seven. They could not refuse his request, for the Chian people were ignorant of the whole matter, while the oligarchs, λ\Ιιο Λvere in the secret, did not want to break with the multitude until they had secured their ground. And the Peloponnesian ships had delayed so long that they had ceased to expect them. Meanwhile the Isthmian games were celebrated. The Athenians, to whom they had been formally notified, sent representatives to them ; and ηοΛν their eyes began to be opened to the designs of the Chians. On their re- turn home they took immediate measures to prevent the enemy's ships getting away from Cenchreae unperceived. When the games Λvere over, the Peloponnesians, under the command of Alcamenes, with their twenty-one ships set sail for Chios ; the Athenians, with an equal number, first sailed up to them and tried to draw them into the open sea. The Peloponnesians did not follow them far, but soon turned back to Cenchreae : the Athenians like- wise retired, for they could not depend on the fidelity of the seven Chian ships which formed a part of their fleet. So they manned some more ships, making the whole number thirty-seven, and Λyhen the Peloponne- sians resumed their voyage along the coast they pur- sued them into Peiraeum, a lonely harbor, the last FIEST ATHENIAN SUCCESS AT SEA. 557 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. in the Corinthian territory before you reach Epidauria. ΥΙΠ. One ship was lost by the Peloponnesians at sea, but they got the rest together and came to anchor in the harbor. Again the Athenians attacked them, not only on the water, but also after they had landed ; there was a fierce struggle, but no regular engagement ; most of the enemy's ships ^vere damaged by the Athenians on the beach, and their commander, Alcamenes, was slain. Some Athenians also fell. When the conflict was over, the conquerors left a suffi- 11. cient number of ships to Avatch the enemy, and with the '^toc&aedhy remainder they lay to under a little island not far off, SJInt^^'Sis- where they encamped, and sent to Athens, requesting ο?ΐΕΞ* reinforcements. For on the day after the battle the fvlTseem"^' Corinthians had come to assist the Peloponnesian ships, fauure*!^^ and the other inhabitants of the country quickly fol- lowed them. Foreseeing how great Avould be the labor of keeping guard on so desolate a spot, the Pelopon- nesians knew not what to do ; they even entertained the idea of burning their ships, but on second thoughts they determined to draw them high up on shore, and with their land-forces stationed near to keep guard over them•, until some good opportunity of escape should occur. Agis ivas informed of their condition, and sent Thermon, a Spartan, to them. The first tidings which had reached Sparta were to the eff*ect that the ships had left the Isthmus (the Ephors having told Alcamenes to send a horseman announcing the fact), and immediately they determined to send out the five ships of their own which they had ready, under the command of Chalcideus, who was to be accompanied by Alcibiades. But when they were on the point of departure, a second messenger re- ported that the other squadron had been chased into Peiraeum ; and then, disheartened by finding that they had begun the Ionian war with a failure, they deter- mined to give up sending the ships from Laconia, and even to recall some others which had already sailed. Alcibiades, seeing the state of affairs, advised Endius 12. 558 ALCIBIADES AKD HIS FEIEKD ENDIUS, B.C. 412 ; 01. vm. They are going to do nothing ; bat Alcibiades in- sists that the Lacedaemo- nian con- tingent shall at once put to sea. 13. Return of some ships from Sicily. 14. (1) Chios, then (2) Ervthrae, (3) Clazo- menae, are Induced to revolt by Chalcideus and Alci- biades. and the Ephors to persevere in the expedition. They would arrive, he said, before the Chians had heard of the misadventure of the ships. He ΛνοηΜ himself, as soon as he reached Ionia, represent to the cities the weakness of the Athenians and the alacrity of the Lace- daemonians, and they would revolt at once ; for they would believe him sooner than any one. To Endius he argued in private that he would gain honor if he were the instrument of eifecting a revolt in Ionia, and of gaining the alliance of the king ; ^ he should not allow such a prize to fall into the hands of Agis. Now Agis was a personal enemy of Alcibiades. Endius and the other Ephors were persuaded by him. So he put to sea with the five ships, accompanied by Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian, and hastened on his way. About this time sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had remained with Gylippus to the end of the Sicilian war were returning home. They were caught in the neighborhood of Leucadia and roughly handled by twenty-seven Athenian vessels, under the command of Hippocles the son of Menippus, which were on the watch for ships coming from Sicily ; but all except one of them escaped the Athenians and sailed into Corinth. Chalcideus and Alcibiades on their voj^age seized every one whom they met in order that their coming might not be reported. They touched first at the prom- ontory of Corycus on the mainland, and there releas- ing their prisoners, they held a preliminary conference with certain of the Chians, Avho were in the plot, and who advised them to give no notice of their intention, but to sail at once to the city. So they appeared sud- denly at Chios, to the great wonder and alarm of the people. The oligarchs had contrived that the council should be sitting at the time. Chalcideus and Alci- biades made speeches and announced that many more ships were on their way, but said nothing about the ^ Or, " that he λυοπΙγΙ win honor by effecting a revolt in Ionia and gaining the alliance of the king; Alcibiades would help him." CHIOS, ERYTHKAE, CLAZOMENAE KEVOLT. 559 BC. 412 ; 01. 92. VIII. blockade of Peiraeum. So Chios first, and afterwards Erythrae, revolted from Athens. They then sailed Λvith three vessels to Clazomenae, which they induced to re- volt. The Clazomenians at once crossed over to the mainland and fortified Polichne, intending in case of need to retreat thither from the little island on Avhich Clazomenae stands. All the revolted cities were occu- pied in raising fortifications and preparing for war. The news of the revolt of Chios soon reached Athens ; 15. and the Athenians realized at once the maonitude of the τ^^ Athe- ~ mans, alive dano'er λυΙιΙοΙι now surrounded them. The o-reatest city ^? t^^ir c> ο i/ situation, of all had gone over to the enemy, and the rest of their Sfowluitu? allies were certain to rise. In the extremity of their J^'^oneT aid alarm they abrogated the penalties denounced against |re^iy*°sid. any one who should propose or put to vote the em- t^slnd^^^^ ployment of the thousand talents which throughout the Ag^|^^®®**^ war they had hitherto jealously reserved.^ They now passed a decree permitting their use, and resolved to man a large number of ships ; also to send at once to Chios eight ships Avhich had been keeping guard at Peiraeum, and had gone away under the command of Strombichides the son of Diotimus in pursuit of Chal- cideus, but not overtaking him had returned. Twelve other ships, under the command of Thrasycles, were to follow immediatel}^ ; these too were to be taken from the blockading force. They also withdrew the seven Chian ships which were assisting them in the blockade of Peiraeum ; and setting free the slaves in them, put the freemen in chains. Other ships were then quickly manned by them and sent to take the place of all those which had been subtracted from the blockading squadron, and they proposed to equip thirty more. They were full of energy, and spared no effbrt for the recover}^ of Chios. Meanwhile Strombichides with his eight ships arrived 16. at Samos, and thence, takins^ with him an additional stromM- Samian vessel, sailed toTeos and warned the inhabitants Teos. against revolt. But Chalcideus with twenty-three ships rowiy 1 Cp. ii. 24. 560 MILETUS JOINS IjS" THE KEYOLT. B.C. 412; 01.92. ΛαίΙ. escapes Chal- cideus and Alcibiades, by wliom he is chased into Samos. (4) Teos revolts. 17. Chalcideus and Alci- biades raise revolt in (5) Miletvxs, in their turn narroAvly escaping Strombi- chides and Thrasycles, who anchor at Lad6. was on his way from Chios to Teos, intending to attack it ; he was assisted by the land-forces of Clazomenae and Erjthrae, which folloΛved his movements on the shore. Strombichides saw him in time, and put out to sea before he arrived. When fairly away from land he observed the superior numbers of the fleet coming from Chios, and fled towards Samos, pursued by 'the enemy. The land-forces were not at first received by the Teans, but after the flight of the Athenians they admitted them. The troops waited a little for the return of Chalcideus from the pursuit, but as. he did not come they proceeded without him to demolish the fort which the Athenians had built for the protection of Teos on the land side. A few barbarians under the command of Stages, a lieutenant of Tissaphernes, came and joined in the ivork of demolition. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides to Samos, gave heavy arms to the crews of the ships which they had brought from Peloponnesus, and left them in Chios. Then, having manned their own vessels and twenty others with Chians, they sailed to Miletus, intending to raise a revolt. For Alcibiades, Avho Λvas on friendly terms with the principal Milesians, wanted to gain over the place before any more ships from Peloponnesus arrived, and, using the Chian troops and those of Chalcideus only, to spread revolt far and wide among the cities of Ionia. Thus he would gain the chief credit of the expedition for the Chians, for himself, for Chalcideus ; and, in fulfilment of his promise,^ for Endius, who had sent him out. They were not observed during the greater part of their voyage, and, although narrowly escaping from Strombichides, and from Thrasycles Avho had just arrived Avith tΛvelve ships from Athens and had joined Strombichides in the pursuit, they succeeded in raising a revolt in Miletus. The Athenians followed close behind them with nine- teen ships, but the Milesians would not receive them, 1 Cp. viii. 12. FIEST TREATY WITH PERSIA. 561 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. and they came to anchor at Lad^, the island opposite Λ^ΠΙ. the town. Immediately after the revolt of Miletus the Lacedaemonians made their first alliance with the King of Persia, which was negotiated by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus. It ran as follows : — " The Lacedaemonians and their allies make an alliance 18 • with the king and Tissaphernes on the following terms : — aic?%^that "I. All the territories and all the cities Avhich are in ^^^^Τ^ο'^Γ^" possession of the King, or were in possession of his fore- pSfia*^iiiaii lathers, shall be the King's, i and whatever revenue or ^^ *^®^' '^^^^• other advantages the Athenians derived from these cities, the King, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, shall combine to prevent them from receiving such revenue or advantage. " II. The King, and the Lacedaemonians and their al- lies, shall carry on the war against the Athenians in com- mon, and they shall not make peace with the Athenians unless both parties — the King on the one hand and the Lacedaemonians and their allies on the other — agree. "III. Whosoever revolts from the King shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and whosoever revolts from the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall be the enemy of the King in like manner." * Such were the terms of the alliance. Shortly afterwards the Chians manned ten more 19. ships and sailed to Anaea, v^Γanting to hear whether the §^f^ns *^The attempt on Miletus had succeeded, and to draw fresh 4*ke^four of cities into the revolt. A message however w^as brought ^evJits o?(6) from Chalcideus, bidding them return, and warning them Jf)Erae!^'^^ that Amorges was coming thither by land at the head of an army. So they sailed to the Temple of Zeus,^ Avhere they caught sight of sixteen Athenian ships which Diomedon, following Thrasycles, was bringing from Athens. They instantly fled ; one ship to Ephesus, the remainder towards Teos. Four of them the Athe- nians took empty, the crews having got safe to land ; ^ Cp. viii. 43 med. 2 A place so called between Lebedus and Colophon. 36 562 REYOLUTIOX IN SAMOS. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. VIII. the rest escaped to Teos. The Athenians then sailed away to Samos. The Chians with their remaining ships put to sea, and, assisted by the land-forces of their allies, ^ caused first Lebedus, and afterwards Erae, to revolt. Both the army and the fleet then returned home. 20. About the same time the twenty Peloponnesian ships Escape of tiie whichhadbcen chascdintoPeiraeum, and were now block- aded at aded by a like number of Athenian ships, made a sally, Peiraeum. They prepare defeated the Athenians, and took four ships : they then to start for ^ -, τ τ -i Chios. got away to Cenchreae, and once more prepared to sail to Chios and Ionia. At Cenchreae they were met by Asty- ochus, the admn-al from Lacedaemon, to whom the whole of the Peloponnesian navy was to be entrusted. Teos once By this time the land-forces of Clazomenae and more receives '^ τ rr^• i i theAthe- Erythrae had retired from Teos, and Tissaphernes, who mans. «^ . . ^ had led a second army thither in person and OΛ^erthrown what was left of the Athenian fort, had retired also. iN^ot long after his departure, Diomedon arrived with ten ships, and made an agreement with the Teans, who promised to receive the Athenians as well as the Pelo- ponnesians. He then sailed to Erae, which he attacked without success, and departed. 21. About the same time a great revolution occurred in The people of Samos. The people, aided by the crews of three Athe- Samos rise ^ '- "^ against the j^jan vcsscls which happened to be on the spot, rose nobles and ^ ^ ^ set up a demo- ao-aiust the uoblcs, slew in all about two hundred of them , cracy. The ο ' Athenians ^ud banishcd four hundred more ; they then distributed grant them ν encl^^""^' ^^^"^^ ^'"^^^ ^^^^ houses among themselves. The Athenian people, now assured of their fidelity, granted them inde- pendence ; and henceforward the city was in the hands of the democracy. They denied to the former landed proprietors all the privileges of citizenship, not even alloAving them to contract marriage Λvith any family be- longing to the people, nor any of the people with them. 22. The zeal of the Chians did not abate. They had The Chians already begun to go out with armies and raise revolts toLesbol?* independently of the Peloponnesians,^ and they wished » Cp. viii. 16 init. ^ Cp. viii. 19. EEYOLT AND RECOYERT OF MITTLENi:. 563 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92, to draw as many cities as they could into their own Λ^ΠΙ. danofer. Durins: the same summer they sent out a ^ ^^"^ ^^^7, OS *^ operates Λνιΐα Chian fleet numbering thirteen ships. The expedition l^^^^^^ P^^' was directed first against Lesbos, the Lacedaemonians ?9)'5^ethvmifa having originally instructed their officers to proceed from *° ^®^°^*• Chios to Lesbos, and thence to the Hellespont.^ It was placed under the command of Deiniadas, one of the Chian Perioeci. JNIeanwhile the infantry of the Pelopon- nesians and of the neio-hborinsr allies, under Evalas, a Spartan, moved along the shore towards Clazomenae, and C^^m^. The fleet sailed to Lesbos, and first induced Methymna to rebel ; there lea\4ng four of their ships, with the remainder they raised a revolt in IMitylend. Meanwhile Astyochus the Lacedaemonian admiral, 23. with four ships, set forth, as he intended, from Cen-'^^-^*®: ■t ' ' ' mans tirst, chreae, and arrived at Chios. On the third day after ^^^|/^|^-y^ his arrival a division of the Athenian fleet, numbering newiVlirivel twenty-five ships, sailed to Lesbos under the command cSTaeTaiito of Leon and Diomedon ; Leon had arrived from Athens Μϊίνί?ήέ is re- later than Diomedon with a reinforcement of ten ships. ϊ£ιίιη3,^^ On the same day, towards evening, Astyochus put to sMps^lp-^^^° sea, and taking with him one Chian ship, sailed to Auempt to Lesbos, that he might render any assistance which he Metiij-mna, could to the Chian fleet. He came to PjTrha, and on Ske^aii til support Metlij-m; which fails, like all the the folloAving day to Eresus, where he heard that iYtyi^hus in JNlitylene had been taken by the Athenians at the first τ£ Itiie- blow. The Athenian ships had sailed right into the the\hoie of harbor when they were least expected, and captured ami aft'er- the Chian vessels ; the men on board had then landed, zomenae. and defeating in a battle a ISIitylenean force which came out to meet them, had taken possession of the city. Astyochus heard the news from the Eresians, and from the Chian ships which had been left with Eubulus at Methymna. They had fled when INIit^'lene was taken, and had now fallen in with him ; but only three out of the four, for one of them had been captured b}' the Athe- nians. Upon this, instead of going on to Mitylene, he 1 Cp. viii. 18 med. 564 DECLINE OF LACEDAEMONIAN AFFAIES. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. YIII. 24. The Athe- nians at Lade make a descent upon Mi- letus. Chalcideus is slain, The Athe- nians at Lesbos carry on the war against the Chians, who are defeated in three battles and undergo great suf- ferings. Yet they had been very rich, and their government was Avise and mod- erate. raised a revolt in Eresus, and armed the inhabitants : he then disembarked the heavy-armed from his ships and sent them by land to Antissa and Methymna under the command of Eteonicus ; and with his own and the three Chian ships coasted thither himself, hoping that the Methvmnaeans would take couras^e at the sio'ht of them and persevere in their revolt. But eΛ■ery thing went against him in Lesbos ; so he re-embarked his trooj)s and sailed back to Chios. The land-forces from the ships which were intended to go to the Hellespont also returned to their several homes. Not lono: afterAvards six ships came to Chios from the allied forces of the Peloponnesians now collected at Cenchreae. The Athe- nians, when they had re-established their influence in Lesbos, sailed away, and having taken Polichne on the mainland, which the Clazomenians were fortifying, ^ brought them all back to their city on the island, except the authors of the revolt, who had escaped to Daphnus. So Clazomenae returned to the Athenian alliance. During the same summer the Athenians, who were stationed with twenty of their ships at the island of Lade, 2 and were watching the enemy in Miletus, made a descent upon Panormus in the Milesian territory. Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian general w4th a few fol- lowers came out to meet them, but was killed. Three days later they again sailed across and set up a trophy which the Milesians pulled down, because the Athenians were not really masters of the ground at the time when they erected it. Leon and Diomedon, w^ho were at Lesbos with the rest of the Athenian fleet, stationed their ships at the islands called Oenussae which lie in front of Chios, at Sidussa, and Pteleum, which were forts held by them in the Erythraean territory, and at Lesbos itself, and carried on the war by sea against the Chians. The marines w^hom they had on board Λvere hoplites taken from the roll and compelled to serve. They made descents upon Cardamyl^ and Bolissus, and having 1 Cp. viii. 14 fin. ^ Cp. viii. 17 iin. THE DOWNFALL OF CHIOS. 565 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. defeated with heavy loss the Chians who came out to VIII. meet them, they devastated all that region. In another aiy ^pri-^'^^ battle 'at Phanae they defeated them again, and in a rlvoft."^Bu? third at Leuconium. Henceforward the Chians remained folSf l^rlai within their walls. The Athenians ravaged their country, in%S Ss which was well stocked, and from the Persian War pre^sed.^ until that time had never been touched by an invader. No people as far as I know, except the Chians and Lacedaemonians (but the Chians not equally with the Lacedaemonians) , have preserved moderation in pros- perity, and in joroportion as their city has gained in power have gained also in the stability of their govern- ment. In this revolt they may seem to have shown a Avant of prudence, yet they did not venture upon it until many brave allies were ready to share the peril with them, and until the Athenians themseh^es seemed to confess that after their calamity in Sicily the state of their affairs was hopelessly bad. And, if they were deceived through the uncertainty of human things, this error of judgment was common to many ivho, like them, believed that the Athenian power would speedily be overthrown. But now that they were driven off the sea and saw their lands ravaged, some of their citizens undertook to bring back the city to the Athenians. The magistrates perceived their design, but instead of acting themselves, they sent to Erythrae for Astyochus the admiral. He came with four ships which he had on the spot, and they considered together by what means the conspiracy might be suppressed with the least violence, whether by taking hostages or in some other way. The Lacedaemonians were thus eno^ao:ed in Chios 25. when towards the end of the summer there came from Athenian remiorce- Athens a thousand Athenian hoplites and fifteen hun- "^^P^^ i arrive. dred Argives, of Λvhom five hundred were originally light- ^ki"\®a armed, but the Athenians gave them heavy arms ; also ^«^^^'^ ^^^ takes place before the walls of a thousand of the allies. They were conveyed in forty- fn'which the eight ships, of which some were transports, under the deSiil command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides. 566 THE ATHENIANS AT MILETUS. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. yiii. Peloponne- siaus and the Argives are defeated by the Milesians, Alcibiades is fighting in the Milesian army. Attempt to invest Mile- tus. 26. Approach of thirty- three Pelo- ponnesian and twenty- tAvo Sicilian vessels, under Her- mocrates. Alcibiades advises them to go instantly to the relief of Miletus. Sailing first to Samos they crossed over to Miletus, and there took up a position. The Milesians with a force of eight hundred heavy-armed of their own, the Pelopon- nesians who came with *Chalcideus, and certain foreign mercenaries of Tissaphernes, who was there in person with his cavalry, went out and engaged the Athenians and their allies. The Argives on their own wing dashed forward, and made a disorderly attack upon the troops opposed to them, whom they despised ; they thought that, being lonians, they would be sure to run away.^ But they were defeated by the Milesians, and nearly three hundred of them perished. The Athenians first overcame the Peloponnesians, and then forced back the barbarians and the inferior troops. But they never en- gaged the Milesians, who, after routing the Argives, when they saw their other wing defeated, returned to the city. The Athenians, having won the day, took up a position close under the Avails of Miletus. In this engagement the lonians on both sides had the advantage of the Dorians ; for the Athenians vanquished the Pelopon- nesians who were opposed to them, and the Milesians vanquished the Argives. ^ The Athenians now raised a trophy, and prepared to build a wall across the isthmus which separates the city from the mainland, thinking that, if they could reduce Miletus, the other cities would quickly return to their allegiance. But meanwhile, late in the afternoon , news was brought to them that a fleet of fifty-five ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily was close at hand. Hermocrates the Syra- cusan had urged the Sicilians to assist in completing the overthrow of Athens . Twenty ships came from Syracuse , tivo from Selinus, and with them the Peloponnesian ships which had been in preparation. ^ The two squadrons were entrusted to Theramenes, who was to conduct them to Astyochus the admiral. They sailed first to Eleus,^ ^ Cp. i. 124 init. ; v. 9 init. ; vi. 77 med. ; vii. 5 fin. 2 Cp. iv. 12 fin. 3 Cp, yju. q fin. * Or, according to the reading of the Yatican MS. adopted by Bekker, "Leros:" cp. infra, 27 init. PHKYIilCHUS INSISTS ON RETREATING. 567 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. an island lying off Miletus. Thence, finding that the YIII. Athenians were at Miletus, they sailed away to the lasian Gulf, wanting to ascertain the fate of the town. Alcibiades came on horseback to Teichiussa in the Milesian territory, the point of the gulf at ivhich the fleet had passed the night, and from him they received news of the battle. For he had been present, and had fought on the side of the Milesians and Tissaphernes. And he recommended them, if they did not mean to ruin their cause in Ionia and everywhere else, to assist Miletus at once, and break up the blockade. They determined to go at daybreak and relieve the 27. place. But Phrynichus the Athenian o^eneral had cer- They agree; ^ ^ ^ ^ *^ ^ ^ and the Athe- tain information from Leros of their approach, and, al- "ί^^,^β^^^""^ thouo^h his colleao^ues wanted to remain and risk a battle, pioachonthe C5 Ο ' evening of he refused and declared that he would neither himself ί^^^^ S^^J^^" H tory, by the |l fight, nor allow them or any one else to fight if he J:,^^^^^.^J^g '■ could help it. For when they might discover the exact ^{^"βοΓ"''^'^^'^^ number of the enemy's ships and the proportion \vhich ^^^J5.raw to their own bore to them, and, before engaging, make ^^^^^• adequate preparations at their leisure, he would not be so foolish as to risk all through fear of disgrace. There Avas no dishonor in Athenians retreating before an enemy's fleet when circumstances required. But there would be the deepest dishonor under any circumstances in a defeat ; and the city would then not only incur dis- grace, but would be in the utmost danger. Even if their preparations were complete and satisfactory, Athens after her recent disasters ought not to take the offensive, or in any case not without absolute nece? "γ ; aud now, when they were not compelled, why shoula they go out of their Λvay to court danger? He urged them to put on board their Λvounded, and their infantry, and all the stores which they had brought with them, but to leave behind the plunder obtained from the enemy's country, that their ships might be lighter ; they should sail back to Samos, and there uniting all their forces, they might go on making attacks upon Miletus when opportunity 568 THE PELOPOiiNESIANS AT MILETUS. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. VIII. offered. His advice was followed. And not on this ??Ph?y-^ occasion only, but quite as much afterwards, whenever Dichus. Phiyiiichus had to act, he showed himself to be a man of great sagacity.^ — So the Athenians departed that very evening from Miletus without completing their victory, and the Argives, hurrying away from Samos after their disaster, Λγent home in a rage. 28. At dawn the Peloponnesians sailed from Teichiussa, The Peiopon- and ou their arrival at Miletus found that tlie Athenians nesians at the sugges- J^ad left : after remainino' one day, on the morrow they tion of Tissa- ο J ' J tick an/take ^^^^ ^^® Chiau ships which under the command of Amorces is Chalcidcus had previously been chased into Miletus, ^ Sifei ^Peda- ^^^ rcsolvcd to go back to Teichiussa and fetch the naA^al ioichios ^o? stores of which they had lightened the ships. There they been^ppo^nt^ fouiid Tissaphemcs, who had come with his infantry ; he ed governor, pgrguadcd them to sail against lasus, in which his enemy Amorges lay. So they attacked lasus, which they took by a sudden assault ; for it never occurred to the inhab- itants that their ships were not Athenian. The Syracu- sans distinguished themselves greatly in the action. The Peloponnesians took captive Amorges the natural son of Pissuthnes, who had rebelled, and gave him to Tissa- phernes, that, if he liked, he might convey him to the King in obedience io the royal command.^ They then plundered lasus, and the army obtained a great deal of treasure ; for the city had been rich from early times. They did no harm to the mercenaries of Amorges, but received them into their own ranks ; for most of them came from Peloponnesus. The town, and all their prisoners, whether bond or free, were delivered by them into the hands of Tissaphernes, who engaged to give them a Daric stater ^ for each man ; they then returned to Miletus. Thence they despatched by land as far as Erythrae Pedaritus the son of Leon, whom the Lacedae- monians had sent out to be governor of Chios ; he Λvas escorted by the mercenaries λυΙιο had been Ji the service 1 Cp. viii. 68 med. ^ Cp. viii. 5 fin. 2 Cp. viii. 17 fin. * Twenty Attic drachma, about 16s. TISSAPHERNES REDUCES THE PAY. 569 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. of Amorges. Philip, who was on the spot, was to remain VIII. and take charge of Miletus. So the summer ended. During the following winter, Tissaphernes, after he 29. had put a garrison in lasus, came to Miletus. There he ρίγ.^^τΐϊα-^ distributed one month's pay among all the ships, at the Jgre"s^to give rate of an Attic drachma ^ a day per man, as his envoy SeTeiffiv? had promised at Lacedaemon ; in future he proposed to ratheV^more give half a drachma only until he had asked the King's obSis^idly to leave, promising that if he obtained it he Avould pay the ^^«^sanor. entire drachma. On the remonstrance, however, of Her- mocrates the Syracusan general (Theramenes not being himself admiral, but only taking charge of the ships which he was to hand over to Astyochus, took no interest in the matter of the pay), he promised to each man a payment of somewhat more than three obols, reckoning the total sum paid to every five ships. For he offered to every five ships, up to the number of fifty- five, ^ three talents a month, and to any ships in excess of this number he asfreed to sfive at a like rate. During the same winter there arrived at Samos from 30. Athens thirty-five ships, under the command of Char- A^'^^i of re- «^ ■»• ^ miorcements. minus, Strombichides, and Euctemon. Whereupon the gi^^^og^' ^i^j generals assembled their whole fleet, including the ships of^tJe^SS^ engaged at Chios, ^ their purpose being to make a distri- ThSty-three bution of their forces by lot. The principal division was chufs^•^^^ *^ to continue watching Miletus, while a second force of rlmaiifat^ ships and soldiers was to be sent to Chios. Accordingly ^^^°s• Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty ships, besides transports in which they conveyed a por- tion of the thousand heavy-armed who joined the army at Miletus, "* sailed away to Chios, the duty which the lot assio^ned to them. The other o-enerals remaininsr at Samos with seventy-four ships, and having the mastery of the sea, prepared to make a descent upon Miletus. Astyochus was at Chios selecting hostages as a pre- 31 i caution against the betrayal of the island to Athens,^ fSlnS^au 1 9%d. 2 Retaining, witli the MSS., καΐ πεντήκοντα after νανς, 3 Cp. viii. 24 init. * Cp. viii. 25 init. & Cp. viii. 24 fin. 570 ILL-FOETUNE OF ASTYOCHUS. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. yni. but when he heard of the reinforcements which Thera- ptSeuSfand i^^nes had brought, and of the improA^ed prospects of Tife weather ^^® allics, he dcsistcd, and taking with him his own agaiSsihim. Pelopomiesian ships, ten in number,^ and ten Chian, he put to sea. Failing in an attack upon Pteleum he sailed on to Clazomenae, and demanded that the Athenian party should settle at Daphnus ^ on the mainland, and come over to the Peloponnesians : Thames, one o^the Persian lieutenants of Ionia, joined in the demand. But the Clazomenians would not listen to him ; whereupon he assaulted the city (which was unwalled), but being unable to take it, sailed away with a strong wind. He was himself carried to Phocaea and Cym^, and the re- mainder of the fleet put into the islands, Marathussa, Pel^, and Drymussa, which lie ofi" Clazomenae. There, being detained eight days by the weather, they spoiled and destroyed part of the property of the Clazomenians which had been deposited in the islands, and, taking part on board, they sailed away to Phocaea and Cym^, where they rejoined Astyochus. 32. While Astyochus was there, envoys came to him from The Lesbians Lcsbos : the Lesbiaus were once more eao^er to revolt, are again de- ' ο ' sirous to and he was willins: to assist them ; but the Corinthians revolt. & ' wimu?t?^^ and the other allies were disheartened by the previous peYantu^the ί^ί^ι^ΐ'©• So he put to sea and sailed back to Chios. His So7of^cwos ships Avere scattered by a storm, and reached Chios from chia?st re- various places. Soon afterwards Pedaritus and his army ,3 fuse to join, j^^ving coiiie by land from Miletus to Erythrae, where he crossed the channel, arrived in Chios. On his arrival he found at his disposal the sailors w^hom Chalcideus had taken from his five ships ^ and left in Chios fully armed, to the number of five hundred. Some of the Lesbians reneΛving their proposal to revolt, Astyochus suggested to Pedaritus and the Chians that they should go with the fleet to Lesbos and raise the country ; they would thus increase the number of their allies, and, even if the 1 Cp. viii. 2 init. and fin. 2 Cp. viii. 23 fin. 8 Cp. viii. 28 fin. ^ Cp. viii. 17 init. HIS NARKOW ESCAPE. 571 B.C. 412 ; 01. attempt did not wholly succeed, they would mjure the YIII. Athenians. But they would not listen, and Pedaritus refused to let him have the Chian ships. So Astyochus took n\e Corinthian ships ^ and a sixth 33. from Meffara, one from Hermion^, and the Lacedae- Astyocims σ ' ' ^ ^ sets sail for monian ships which he had brouo^ht with him,^ and set Miietus to as- ^ » ' sume the sail for Miletus in order to assume his command. He command of tae fleet. He threatened the Chians, again and again, that he would eg^^faSHiie certainly not help them when their time of need came. £^,^^£^52 Touching at Corycus in Erythrae he passed the night cSS? *Trick there. The Athenian ships from Samos were now on thrieln^'^" their way to Chios ; they had put in at a place where Prisoners. they were only divided from the Peloponnesians by a hill, and neither fleet knew that the other Avas so near. But that night there came a despatch from Pedaritus in- forming Astyochus that certain Erythraean prisoners had been released by the Athenians from Samos on con- dition of betraying Erythrae, and had gone thither with that intention. Whereupon Astyochus sailed back to Erythrae. So narrowly did he escape falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pedaritus sailed over to meet him. They then inquired about the supposed traitors, and found that the whole matter was a trick which the men had devised in order to get away from Samos ; so they acquitted them of the charge, and Pedaritus re- turned to Chios, while Astyochus resumed his voyage to Miletus. In the meantime the Athenian fleet, sailino- round the 34. promontory of Corycus towards Arginus, lighted upon Ji^nliiip^tn three Chian ships of war, to which they gave chase. A ^j^^leCMan great storm came on, and the Chian ships with difficulty f^Vstorm.*^ escaped into their harbor, but of the Athenian ships the three which were most zealous in the pursuit were dis- abled and driven ashore near the city of Chios ; the crews were either lost or taken captive. The remainder of the fleet found shelter in the harbor called Phoenicus, lying under Mount Mimas, whence again setting sail 1 Cp. viii. 23 fin. 2 Cp. viii. 23 init. 572 THE ATHEXIAKS AT CNIDUS. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. Λ III. they put in at Lesbos, and made preparations for build- ing the fort which they meant to establish in Chios. 35. During the same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedae- (10) cnidus, monian sailed fiOm Lacedaemon Λγith one Laconian, one wmcn nas ' Atti'iS'^ia^ Syracusan, and ten Thurian ships ; of these last Dorieus AtYeniins!^^^ the SOU of Diagoras a.nd two others were the commanders. S^iwiy-Srivid They put in at Cnidus, which under the influence of Infi.^aud'Jre Tissaphcmes ^ had already reΛ^olted from Athens. The Sot qSite sue- Peloponnesian authorities at Miletus, when they heard Sing^he of their arri\^al, ordered one half of these ships to pro- *°^^• tect Cnidus, and the other half to cruise oflf Triopium and seize the merchant-vessels which put in there from Egypt. This Triopium is a promontory in the district of Cnidus on which there is a temple of Apollo. The Athenians, hearing of their intentions, sailed from Samos and captured the six ships which were keeping guard at Triopium ; the crews escaped. They then sailed to Cni- dus, and attacking the town, which was unwalled, all but took it. On the following day they made a second attack, but during the night the inhabitants had improved their hasty defences, and some of the men who had escaped from the ships captured at Triopium had come into the city. So the Athenian assault was less destructive than on the first day ; and after devastating the territory of Cnidus they departed and sailed back to Samos. 36. AVhen Astyochus came to Miletus and took the com- The Milesians mand of the fleet he found the Peloponnesians still are m earnest. ^ The spoils of abundantly provided with all requ'.I^es. They had lasus mam- ^ a χ >j tain the army, sufficient pay; the great spoils taken at lasus Avere in the hands of the army, and the ]Milesians carried on the warΛyithawill. The Peloponnesians ho weΛ^er considered the former treaty made betΛveen Tissaphernes and Chal- cideus defective and disadvantageous to them ; so before the departure of Theramenes they made new terms of alliance, which were as follows : — 37. " The Lacedaemonians and their allies make agreement In this ^ith Kino^ Darius, and the sons of the Kins^, and with treaty the Ο ' Ο ' 1 Cp. viii. 109 init. The Pelopon- nesians re- pent of their fir.st treaty A\'ith Persia and make another. SECOKD TREATY WITH PERSIA. 573 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. Tissaphernes, that there shall be alliance and friendship ΥΠΙ. hetAveen them on the followins: conditions : — ^Ψ'^'^^ «f the ο king are less "I. Whatever territory and cities belong to King ^j^^cuy^^^^ ^^ Darius, or formerly belonged to his father, or to his ^^® ^°^^®^• ancestors, against these neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies shall make war, or do them any hurt, nor shall the Lacedaemonians or their allies exact tribute of them. Neither Darius the King nor the subjects of the King shall make war upon the Lacedaemonians or their allies, or do them any hurt, " II. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies have need of anything from the King, or the King have need of anything from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, Avhat- ever they do by mutual agreement shall hold good. " III. They shall carry on the war against the Athenians and their allies in common, and if they make peace, shall make peace in common. " lY . The King shall defraj^ the expense of any num- ber of troops for Avhich the King has sent, so long as they remain in the King's country. " Y. If any of the cities who are parties to this treaty go against the King's country, the rest shall interfere and aid the King to the utmost of their power. And if any of the inhabitants of the King's country or any country under the dominion of the King shall go against the country of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall interfere and aid them to the utmost of his power." After the conclusion of the treaty , Theramenes , having 3 8 . delivered over the fleet to Astyochus, sailed away in aTheciuans ΓΤΊΐ * 1 • ^^® reduced small boat and was no more heard of. The Athenians, to inaction. The conspira- who had now crossed over with their troops from Lesbos tors are exe- ■^ cuted, and the to Chios, and had the upper hand both by land and sea, government ■'■■'■ *^ ■ becomes a began to fortify Delphinium, a place not far distant from ^j^^jf^^^^^^^" the town of Chios, which had the double advantao-e of Pedaritus ^ ο complains to being strong by land and of possessing harbors. The ^^JyociJ^ Chians meaiiAvhile remained inactive ; they had been already badly beaten in several battles, and their in- ternal condition was far from satisfactory ; for Tydeus 574 MISERABLE STATE OF CHIOS. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. yiii. 39, The Lace- daemonians resolve to aS' sist Pharna- bazus at the Hellespont. They send eleven assess- ors to control Astyochus. the son of Ion and his accomplices had been executed by Pedaritus on a charge of complicity with Athens, and the city was reduced by the strong hand to a mere oligarchy. Hence they were in a state of mutual dis- trust, and could not be persuaded that either they or the mercenaries 1 brought by Pedaritus were a match for the enemy. They sent however to Miletus and re- quested the aid of Astyochus, but he refused. Where- upon Pedaritus sent a despatch to Lacedaemon, com- plaining of his misconduct. So favorable to the Athe- nians was the course of affairs in Chios. The main fleet, Λvhich they had left at Samos, from time to time made threatening movements against the enemy ai Miletus, but as they would never come out, the Athenians at length retired to Samos and there remained. During the same winter, about the solstice, twenty ships which Calligeitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus, the agents of Pharnabazus, had persuaded the Lacedaemonians to fit out in his interest, ^ sailed for Ionia : they were placed under the command of Antis- thenes, a Spartan. The Lacedaemonians sent at the same time eleven Spartans to act as advisers ^ to Astyo- chus, one of whom was Lichas the son of Arcesilaus. * Besides receiving a general commission to assist in the direction of aifairs to the best of their judgment, they were empoAvered on their arrival at Miletus to send on, if they saw fit, these ships, or a larger or smaller number, to Pharnabazus at the Hellespont under the command of Clearchus ^ the son of Khamphias, who sailed with them. The eleven might also, if they thought good, deprive Astyochus of bis command and appoint Antis- thenes in his place, for the despatch of Pedaritus had excited suspicion against him. So the ships sailed from Malea over the open sea until they came to Melos. There they lighted on ten Athenian ships ; of these 1 Cp. viii. 28 fin. ^ Cp. viii. 6 init. 3 Cp. ii. 85 init. ; iii. 69 med. ; v. 63 fin. < Cp. V. 50 med. ^ Cp. viii. 8 med. ASTYOCHUS A.OT) THE CHIANS AGAIN. 575 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. they took three without their crews and burned them. YIII. But then, fearing that the remainder which had escaped would, as in fiict they did, give information of their ap- proach to the fleet at Samos, tliey took the precaution of going by a longer route. And sailing round by Crete they put in at Caunus in Asia. They thought that they were now safe, and sent a messenger to the fleet at Miletus requesting a convoy. Meamvhile the Chians and Pedaritus continued to 40. send messengers to Astyochus, Avho continued to delay, ^i^^^ock-^ They implored him to come to their help with his whole ^^^^^^^ deceit. fleet, saying that they were blockaded, and that he should ^^aUaS^^ not allow the chief ally of Sparta in Ionia to be cut ofl" go^iif thei? from the sea and overrun and devastated by land. Now ^^^• the Chians had more domestic slaves than any other state Avith the exception of Lacedaemon, and their offences were always more severely punished because of their number; so that when the Athenian army appeared to be firmly settled in their fortifications, most of them at once deserted to the enemy. ^ And they did the greatest damage, because they knew the country. The Chians pressed upon the Lacedaemonians the necessity of coming to their assistance while there was still hope of interfering to some purpose ; the fortification of Delphinium, though not yet completed, was in prog- ress, and the Athenians were beginning to extend the lines of defence which protected their army and ships. Astyochus, seeing that the allies were zealous in the cause, although he had fully meant to carry out his threat, now determined to relieve the Chians. But in the meantime he received a message from 41. Caunus, informing him that the twenty-seven ships and ζξ^^^^^ his Lacedaemonian advisers had arrived. He thouo^ht *^« twenty- & seven ships that everything should give way to the importance of J5jg"|jnf convoying so large a reinforcement Λvhich w^ould secure f^ifm i?acl- to the Lacedaemonians greater command of the sea, and ^^''coasts that he must first of all provide for the safe passage of » Cp. vii. 27 fin. 576 SHIPS OF ASTYOCHUS IN THE MIST. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. VIII. the commissioners who were to report on his conduct. mSSfem.**' So he at once gave up his intended expedition to Chios Sadedbythe ^^^^l Sailed for Caunus. As he coasted along he made Siijafust a descent on the island of Cos Meropis. The city was nlaSits^^ unfortified and had been overthrown hy an earthquake, watctdSg^for the gTcatcst which has ever happened within our memory. ^™* The citizens had fled into the mountains ; so he sacked the town and overran and despoiled the country, but let go the free inhabitants. From Cos he came by night to Cnidus, and was prevailed upon by the importunity of the Cnidians, instead of disembarking his men, to sail at once, just as he was, against twenty Athenian ships with Λvhich Charminus (one of the generals at Samos) was watching for the twenty-seven ships expected from Pelo- ponnesus, being those which Astyochus was going to escort. The Athenians at Samos had heard from Melos of their coming, and Charminus was cruising off the islands of Syme, Chalet, and Khodes, and on the coast of Lycia; he had by this time discovered that they Avere at Caunus. 42. So Astyochus sailed at once to Sym^ before his arrival His ships lose ^ag reported, in the hope that he mio-ht come upon the their -way m . . . his^iStSvh? Athenian squadron in the open sea. The rain and in?defS?ed ^loudy state of the atmosphere caused confusion among nfaiS?^hS hi ^^^ ships, which lost their way in the fog. When dawn at the*sud(Sa broke, the fleet was dispersed and the left wing alone the rSSf the ^'^s visiblc to the Athenians, Avhile the other was still ^®®*• strasfS'lins: off the shore of the island. Charminus and the Athenians put out to sea with less than their twenty ships, supposing that these were only the squadron from Caunus for which they were watching. They at once attacked them, sank three of them, disabled others, and ΛΥβτβ gaining the victory, when to their surprise there appeared the larger part of the Lacedaemonian fleet threatening to surround them. Whereupon they fled, and in their flight lost six ships, but with the rest gained the island of Teutlussa, and thence Halicarnassus. The Peloponnesians touched at Cnidus, and there uniting LICHAS DENOimCES THE TREATIES. 577 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. with the twenty-seven ships from Caunus, they all sailed VIII. to Syme and raised a trophy ; they then returned and put into port again at Cnidus. As soon as the Athenians heard the result of the sea- 43. fight they sailed from Samos to Syme with their whole '^^^^^^^^ξ^^ fleet. They did not attack the Peloponnesians at Cnidus, gnldus'^c^oV nor the Peloponnesians them; but they carried away the slpj^j^ne?^' stores of their own ships which had been left at Syme, and οίΐ^Κοϊ-^ touching at Lory ma, a place on the mainland, returned yo^vldSUe" to Samos. The Peloponnesians were now all together SSaptiernes at Cnidus, and were making the repairs necessary after f^rfgl^^^ "^ the battle, while the Lacedaemonian commissioners con- ferred with Tissaphernes (who was himself on the spot) as to any matters in his past dealings Avith them at which they were displeased, and as to the best manner of securing their common interests in the future conduct of the war. Lichas entered hito the inquhy with great energy ; he took exception to both the treaties ; that of Chalcideus and that of Theramenes were equally objection- able. For the khig at that time of day to claim power over all the countries which his ancestors had formerly held was monstrous . If either treaty were carried ο ut , the inhabitants of all the islands, of Thessaly, of Locris, and of all Hellas, as far as Boeotia, would again be reduced to slavery; instead of giving the Hellenes freedom, the Lacedaemonians would be imposing upon them the yoke of Persia. So he desired them to conclude some more satisfoctory treat}^, for he would have nothing to say to these ; he did not Λyant to have the fleet maintained upon any such terms. Tissaphernes was indignant, and with- out settling anything went away in a rage. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians had been receiving 44. communications from the chief men of Ehodes, and re- ThePeio- ' ponnesians solved to sail thither. They hoped to gain over an fiYN^^^o^^g island which was strong alike in sailors and in infantry ; tge^Ytie' if successful, they might henceforward maintain their ^^|?J ^p navy by the help of their own allies without asking ^^^„ Tissaphernes for money. So in the same Λvinter they 37 578 THE LACEDAEMOOTANS AT EHODES. B.C. 412 ; 01. Yin. for eleven weeks. The Athenians, who ari'ive too late to hinder the revolt, make descents upon the island. 45. Alcibiades, in fear of his life from the Spartans, re- tires to Tissa- phernes, whom he sup- plies with arguments against the Peloponiie- sians and in- structs in various ways. By his ad- vice the pay is curtailed, and the re- volted cities who beg for money are refused. sailed from Cnidus against Ehodes, and first attacked Cameirus with ninety-four ships. The inhabitants, who were in ignorance of the plot and dwelt in an unfortified city, were alarmed and began to fiy. The Lacedae- monians reassured them, and assembling the people not only of Cameirus, but of Lindus and lalysus, the two other cities of Rhodes, persuaded all of them to revolt from the Athenians. Thus Ehodes went over to the Peloponnesians. Nearly at the same time the Athenians, who had heard of their intentions, brought up the fleet from Samos, hoping to forestall them ; they appeared in the ofiing, but finding that they were just too late, sailed to Chalce, and thence back to Samos. They now fought against Ehodes, making descents upon it from Chalet, Cos, and Samos, while the Peloponnesians, having col- lected thirty-two talents^ from the Ehodians, dvew up their ships, and did nothing for eleven weeks. Before the Peloponnesians had removed to Ehodes aflairs took a neAv turn. After the death of Chalcideus and the engagement at Miletus,^ Alcibiades fell under suspicion at Sparta, and orders came from home to Astyochus that he should be put to death. For he was hated by Agis, and generally distrusted. In fear he retired to Tissaphernes, and soon, by working upon him, did all he could to injure the Peloponnesian cause. He was his constant adviser, and induced him to cut down the pay of the sailors from an Attic drachma to half a drachma,^ and this was only to be given at irregular intervals. Tissaphernes was instructed by him to tell the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, with their long experience of naval afiairs,gave half a drachma only, not from poverty, but lest their sailors should be demoralized by high pay, and spend their money on pleasures Avhich injured their heujib, and thereby impaired their efficacy ; * the payment, too, was made irregularly, that the arrears, w^hich they Avould forfeit by ' £7680. ' Cp. viii. 24 init., 25. ^ About 5d. * Others translate (omitting "the payment, too, was made irregu- ALCIBIADES ADYISES TISSAPHERKES. 579 B.C. 412 : 01. 92 desertion, might be a pledge of their continuance in the service.* He also recommended him to bribe the trierarchs and the generals of the allied cities into con- senting. They all yielded with the exception of the Syracusans : Hermocrates alone stood firm on behalf of the whole alliance. When the allies who had revolted came asking for money, Alcibiades drove them away himself, saying on behalf of Tissaphernes that the Chians must have lost all sense of shame ; they were the richest people in Hellas, and now, when they were being saved by foreign aid, they wanted other men, not only to risk life, but to expend money in their cause. To the other cities he replied that, having paid such large sums to the Athenians before they revolted, they would be inex- cusable if they Λvere not willing to contribute as much and even more for their οΛνη benefit. He represented further that Tissaphernes was now carrying on the w^ar at his ΟΛνη expense, and must be expected to be careful. But if supplies should come from the King he \vould restore the full pay, and do whatever was reasonable for the cities. Alcibiades also advised Tissaphernes not to be in a hurry about putting an end to the war, and neither to bring up the Phoenician fleet which he was preparing, nor to give pay to more Hellenic sailors ; he should not be so anxious to put the whole power both by sea and land into the same hands. Let the dominion only remain divided, and then, whichever of the two rivals was troublesome, the King might always use the other against him. But if one defeated the other and became supreme on both elements, who would help Tissaphernes to overthroAv the conqueror? He would have to take the field in person and fight, which he might not like, at great risk and expense. The danger would be easily averted at a fraction of the cost, and at no risk to himself, if he wore out the Hellenes in mutual strife. Alcibiades larly"), " also lest they should get away from their ships too freely, leaving the pay still owing them as a pledge." ΥΠΙ. 46. Tissaphernes should bal- ance the con- tending powers against one another and finally get rid of both. The Athenians are the more natural allies of the King because they only desire empire at sea, and do not profess to be the liberators of Hellas. 580 THE BALANCE OF POWER. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. yni. Tissaphernes approves, and at once be- gins to pur- sue the policy indicated to him. 47. Alcihiades intrigues with the leading men at Samos for his o-vTO restoration. He Avould make Tissa- phernes the friend of Athens. also said that the Athenians would be more suitable partners of empire, because they were less likely to encroach by land, and both their principles and their practice in carrying on the war accorded better A\dth the King's interest. For if he helped them to subject the element of the sea to themselves, they would gladly help him in the subjugation of the Hellenes who were in his country, whereas the Lacedaemonians came to be their liberators. But a power which was at that very moment emancipating the Hellenes from the dominion of another Hellenic power like themselves would not be satisfied to leave them under the yoke of the Barbarian if they once succeeded in crushing the Athenians. ^ So he advised him first to Avear them both out, and when he had clipped the Athenians as close as he could, then to get the Peloponnesians out of his country. To this course Tissaphernes was strongly inclined, if we may judge from his acts. For he gave his full confidence to Alcibiades, whose advice he approved, and kept the Peloponnesians ill-provided, at the same time refusing to let them fight at sea, and insisting that they must wait until the Phoenician ships arrived ; they would then fight at an advantage. In this manner he ruined their aflfairs and impaired the eflSciency of their navy, Avhich had once been in first-rate condition. There were many other Avays in which he showed openly and unmistak- ably that he was not in earnest in the cause of his allies. In giving this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, ηοΛν that he had passed over to them, Alcibiades said what he really thought to be most for their interests. ^ But he had another motive ; he was preparing the way for his own return from exile. He knew that, if he did not destroy his country altogether, the time would come when he would persuade his countrymen to recall him ; and he thought that his arguments would be most » More literally: " unless they failed at some time or other to crush the Athenians." ^ Cp. v. 43 init. ALCIBIADES AND THE ATHENIANS. 581 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. effectual if he were seen to be on intimate terms with YIII. Tissaphernes. And the result proved that he Avas right, one condt"^^^ The Athenian soldiers at Samos soon perceived that he iifj'democ-'^^ had great influence with him, and he sent messages to the ^'^'^^' chief persons among them, whom he begged to remember him to all good men and true, and to let them know that he would be glad to return to his country and cast in his lot with them. He would at the same time make Tissaphernes their friend ; but they must establish an oligarchy, and abolish the villainous democracy which had driven him out. Partly moved by these messages, but still more of their own inclination, the trierarchs and leadins: Athenians at Samos were now eao^er to over- throw the democracy. The matter was stirred in the camp first of all, and 48. introduced into the city afterwards. A few persons went ^ugaTcifs con- over from Samos to Alcibiades, and conferred with him : bladli^They to them he held out the hope that he would make, first spimey ki^the of all Tissaphernes, and secondly the King himself, their Si's pay^ friend, if they would put down democracy ; the King fnJl?gS-*^^^' would then be better able to trust them. And so the ?h?ynichus nobles, on whom the heaviest burdens are apt to fall,^ dlStV/thei^^ conceived great hopes , not only that they would overcome does^Aic?^*^ their enemies, but that they would get the government abou^o^if-^^ into their ΟΛνη hands. Eeturning to Samos, the envoys what do the 1 η 1 ΊΊ•ιι τ •ί allied cities drew all such as seemed desirable accomplices into a caie? And conspiracy, while the language held in public to the main the^King^sud- body of the army was that the King Avould be their friend fnen^rSf hie and would supply them ivith money if Alcibiades was the Athe- restored and democracy given up. Now the multitude ^ were at first dissatisfied with the scheme, but the prospect of the King's pay was so grateful to them that they offered no opposition ; and the authors of the movement, after they had broached the idea to the people, once more considered the proposals of Alcibiades among themselves and the members of their clubs. Most of them thought the matter safe and straightforward enough. Phrynichus, » Cp. viii. 63 fin. 582 OLIGAECHY AND THE ALLIES. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. Vlll. who was still general, was of another mind. He main- tained, and rightly, that Alcibiades cared no more for oligarchy than he did for democracy, and in seeking to change the existing form of government was only con- sidering how he might be recalled and restored to his country at the invitation of the clubs ; whereas their one care should be to avoid disunion. Why should the King go out of his Wiiy to join the Athenians whom he did not trust, when he would only get into trouble Λvith the Peloponnesians, who were now as great a naval power, and held some of the most important cities in his dominion? — it would be much easier for him to make friends with them, who had never done him any harm. As to the allies, to whom they had promised the blessings of oligarchy which they were ηοΛν about to enjoy themselves, he would be bound that the revolted cities would not return to them, norAvould their old allies be a Avhit more loyal m consequence. The form of government was indifferent to them if they could only be free, but they did not Avant to be in subjection either to an oligarchy or to a democracy. And as for the so-called nobility, the allies thought that they would be quite as troublesome as the people ; they were the persons who suggested crimes to the popular mind ; who provided the means for their execution ; and who reaped the fruits themselves. As far as it rested with the oligarchy the punishment of death would be inflicted unscrupulously, and Avithout trial, whereas the people brought the oligarchs to their senses, and were a refuge to which the oppressed might always have recourse. Experience had taught the cities this lesson, and he was well aware of their feelings. He was therefore himself utterly dissatified with the proposals of Alcibiades, and disapproved of the whole affiiir. 49. But the conspirators who were present were not at all shaken in their opinion. They accepted the plan and prepared to send Peisander and other envo^^s to Athens,, that they might manage the recall of Alcibiades and the The con- spirators are unshaken. Peisander sent to Athens. them ASTUTENESS OF PHRYNICHUS. 583 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. overthrow of the democracy, and finally make Tissa- Λ^ΙΙΙ. phernes a friend of the Athenians. Phrynichus now knew that a proposal would be made 50. for the restoration of Alcibiades, which the Athenians SJ'i^Mn^to' ΛνοηΗ certainly accept ; and having opposed his return ^i^iSr/es to he feared that Alcibiades, if he were recalled, would do ^imseffbi-^^ him a mischief, because he had stood in his way. So he £m*bitii. had recourse to the following device. He secretly sent i^^make"'^^^ a letter to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who propSs to was still at Miletus, informing him that Alcibiades was gaining over Tissaphernes to the Athenians and ruining the Peloponnesian interests. He gave full particulars, adding that Astyochus must excuse him if he sought to harm an enemy even at some cost to his country.^ Now Astyochus had no idea of punishing Alcibiades, who moreoΛ^er no longer came within his reach. On the contrary, he went to him and to Tissaphernes at Mag- nesia, and, turning informer, told them of the letter which he had received from Samos. (He was believed to have sold himself to Tissaphernes, to whom he now betrayed everything ; and this was the reason why he w^as so unwilling to bestir himself about the reduction of the pay.^) Alcibiades immediately sent a despatch denouncing to the leaders of the army at Samos the treason of Phrynichus, and demanding that he should be put to death. Phrynichus wsis confounded, 3 and in fact the revelation placed him in the greatest danger. However he sent again to Astyochus, blaming him for having violated his former confidence. He then pro- ceeded to say that he was ready to give the Pelopon- nesians the opportunity of destrojdng the whole Athe- nian army, and he explained in detail how Samos, which was unfortified, mio-ht best be attacked ; addino^ that he was in danger of his life for their sakes, and that he need no longer apologize if by this or any other means he could save himself from destruction at the hands of his * Cp. vi. 92 for a similar excuse. ^ Qp^ ^[[[^ 45 med. 3 Placing the comma after Φρύνιχος. 584 ALCIBIADES AND PHKYNICHUS. B.C. 412 : 01. 92. VIII. 51. of whiicli he also gives in- formation to the Athe- nians. Thus he is purged of his trea- son, and outwits Alcibiades, who is thought to have acted from spite. 52. Tissaphernes under the in- fluence of Alcibiades would have liked to join the Athe- nians. For he had al- ready quar- relled Avith the Pelopon- nesians at Cnidus. and the protest of Lichas confirmed the warning which he had received worst enemies. Again the message was communicated by Astyochus to Alcibiades. Now Phrynichus Λvas well aware of his treachery, and he knew that another letter from Alcibiades o^ivino: fur- ther information Avas on the point of arriving. Before its arrival he himself Avarned the army that, Sanios being unwalled and some of the ships not anchoring within the harbor, the enem}^ were going to attack the fleet ; of this he had certain knowledge. They ought therefore to fortifj^ the place as quickly as they could, and to take every precaution. As he ivas in command he could execute his proposals by his own authority. So they set to work, and in consequence Samos, which would have been fortified in any case, was fortified all the sooner. Not long afterwards the expected letter came from Alcibiades warning the Athenians that the army was being betraj^ed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy Avere going to make an attack. But Alcibiades was not trusted ; he was thought to have attributed to Phrynichus out of personal animosity complicity in the enemy's designs, with which he Avas himself acquainted. Thus he did him no harm, but rather strengthened his position by telling the same tale. Alcibiades still continued his practices with Tissa- phernes, whom he noAv sought to draAv over to the Athenian interest. But Tissaphernes was afraid of the Peloponnesians, Avho had more ships on the spot than the Athenians. And 3^et he Avould have liked, if he could, to have been persuaded ; especiallj^ when he saAv the oppo- sition Avhich the Peloponnesians raised at Cnidus to the treaty of Theramenes.^ For his quarrel Avitli them had broken out before the Peloponnesians Avent to Rhodes, Avhere they Avere at present stationed ; ^ and the Avords of Alcibiades, Avho had previously Avarned Tissaphernes that the Lacedaemonians Avere the liberators of all the cities of Hellas, Avere verified by the protest of Lichas, who declared that " for the Kinir to hold all the cities » Cp. viii. 43. 2 Cp. viii. 45 init. SHALL ALCIBIADES BE RECALLED? 585 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. which he or his ancestors had held was a stipulation Vm. not to be endured." Alcibiades, who Λvas playino^ for fro™ ^ici- \ , Γ J ο blades. But a great stake, was very assiduous in paying his court to ^^^ afraid. Tissaphernes. Peisander and the other envoys who had been sent 53. from Samos arrived at Athens and made their proposals Peisander and ^ ^ ^ his colleagues to the people. They said much in few Avords, insisting ^"jje^g^^nd above all that if the Athenians restored Alcibiades and insist on the recall of modified their democracy they might secure the alliance aidijfe'^^^odi- of the King and gain the Λdctory over the Pelopon- demoSacy*^^ nesians. There was great opposition to any change in ^^gnation the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades ivere loud is aroused. in protesting that it would be a dreadful thing if he were permitted to return in defiance of the law. The Eumol- pidae and Ceryces called heaven and earth to witness that the city must never restore a man who had been banished for profaning the mysteries. Amid violent expressions of indignation Peisander came forward, and having up the objectors one by one he pointed out to them that the Peloponnesians had a fleet ready for action as large as their own, that they numbered more cities among their allies, and that they Avere furnished with money by Tissaphernes and the King ; whereas the Athenians had spent everything : he then asked them Λvhether there was the least hope of saving the country unless the King could be Λνοη over. They all acknowledged that there Λvas none. He then said to them plainly : — ^'Eut this alliance is impossible unless we are governed in a wiser manner, and office is confined to a smaller number: then the King will trust us. Do not let us be dwelling on the form of the constitution,^ Λvhich we may hereafter change as we please, when the very existence of Athens is at stake. And we must restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living capable of saving us." The people were very angry at the first suggestion 54. of an oligarchy ; but when Peisander proved to them that ^^*^^^ 1 Eeading βονλεύωμεν with most MSS. 586 THE SUCCESS OF PEISANDER. B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. VIII. alternative ? It is at last agreed that Peisander shall go and nego- tiate with Alcibiades. 55. The Athe- nians com- mand Ehodes from Chalcfe. The blockade of Chios. The Chians make a sally, in ■which after a partial suc- cess they are defeated and Pedaritus is they had no other resource, partly in fear, and partly in hope that it might be hereafter changed, they gave way. So a decree was passed that Peisander himself and ten others should go out and negotiate to the best of their judgment with Tissaph ernes and Alcibiades. Peisander also denounced Phrynichus, and therefore the people dismissed him and his colleague Scironides from their commands, and appointed Diomedon and Leon to be admirals in their room. Peisander thought that Phry- nichus would stand in the way of the negotiations with Alcibiades, and for this reason he calumniated him, al- leging that he had betrayed lasus and Amorges. Then he went, one after another, to all the clubs which already existed in Athens fqr the management of trials and elections, and exhorted them to unite, and by concerted action put down the democracy. When he had com- pleted all the necessary preparations and the plot was ripe, he and his colleagues proceeded on their voyage to Tissaphernes. During the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had now entered upon their command, made a descent upon Rhodes. They found the Peloponnesian fleet drawn up out of their reach, but they landed, and defeated the Rhodians who came out to meet them. From Rhodes they retired to Chalet, ^ which henceforth they made their base of operations rather than Cos, because they could there better command any move- ment Λvhich might be made by the Peloponnesian fleet. About this time Xenophantidas, a Lacedaemonian, brouo^ht word to Rhodes from Pedaritus, the Governor of Chios, that the Athenian fortification was now com- pleted,^ and that if the Peloponnesians with their Avhole fleet did not at once come to the rescue Chios would be lost. So they determined to send help. Meanwhile Pedaritus in person with his mercenaries ^ and the whole Chian army attacked the lines which protected the > Cp. viii. 44 fin., 60 fin. ^ Cp, ^^ 40 fin. 8 Cp. viii. 28 fin., 38 med. THE ATHEiaANS AND TISSAPHEENES. 587 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. Athenian fleet ; he took a part of the wall and obtained YIII. possession of certain ships which were drawn up on shore. But the Athenians rushed out upon them, and first putting to flight the Chians, soon defeated the rest of his forces. Pedaritus himself was slain, together Λvith many of the Chians, and a great quantity of arms was taken. The Chians were now blockaded more closely than 56. ever both by sea and land, and there was a e'reat famine Peisander . Ί 1 • η Soes to Tissa- in the place. Meanwhile Peisander and ms coUeapfues phemes, who ^ "-^ does not want came to Tissaphernes and proposed an agreement. But *^^^|^§^^^;;^^^ Alcibiades was not as yet quite sure of Tissaphernes, ^i^^doeinot' who was more afraid of the Peloponnesians than of the ^^^U*^^® Athenians, and was still desirous, in accordance with the jj^rsSadlng^ lesson which he had been taught by Alcibiades himself, ^^^ dfmand to wear them both out. So he had recourse to the device andThe Ath&. of making Tissaphernes ask too much, that the negotia- fiJve^^n^J^^ tions might be broken ofi*. And I imagine that Tissa- i^^kiof^"^ phernes himself equally wanted them to fail ; he was ^<^^^^^*^^s• moved by his fears, while Alcibiades, seeing that his reluctance was insuperable, did not wish the Athe- nians to think that he was unable to persuade him — he wanted them to believe that Tissaphernes was already persuaded and anxious to make terms but could not because they themselves would not grant enough. And so, speaking on behalf of Tissaphernes who was himself present, he made such exorbitant demands that, although for a time the Athenians were willing to grant anything which he asked, at length the responsibility of breaking off" the conference was thrown upon them. He and Tissaphernes demanded, first the cession of all Ionia to the King, then that of the neighboring islands ; and there were some other conditions. Thus far the Athe- nians ofiered no opposition. But at last, fearing that his utter inability to fulfil his promise ΛνοηΜ be exposed, at the third interview he demanded permission for the King to build ships, and sail along his own coast wherever and with as many vessels as ho pleased. This was too much ; 588 TISSAPHERKES AND THE ALLIES . B.C. 412; 01.92. yill. the Athenians now perceived that matters were hopeless, and that they had been duped by Alcibiades. So they departed in anger to Samos. 57. Immediately afterwards, and during the same winter, SiS^gtS^"' Tissaphernes came down to Caunus Avishing to bring mnksthar ^^^^ ^^^^ Peloponnesians to Miletus, and once more to comftomake ^^^^^ ^ treaty with them on such terms as he could get ; trTaty^Ui ^^ ^^'^^ wiUiug to maintain them, for he did not want to moa•^^^^' become wholly their enemy, and was afraid that if their large fleet were at a loss for supplies they might be compelled to fight and be defeated, or their crews might desert ; in either case the Athenians ΛνουΜ gain their ends without his assistance. Above all he feared lest they should ravage the adjoining mainland in search of food. Taking into account all these possibilities, and true to his policy, which was to hold the balance evenly between the Uvo contending powers, he sent for the Lacedaemonians, furnished them with supplies, and made a third treaty with them, Avhich ran as follows : — 58. «^ In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius the nmdelTthe King, whcu Alexippidas was Ephor at Lacedaemon, a SIpiernes, treaty Λvas made in the plain of the Maeander between bShail^dSIs^ the Lacedaemonians and their allies on the one hand, therecogni- and Tissaphcmes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Phar- khi^'s rights naces on the other, touching the interests of the King, TiS*ob- ^' and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies. ciause"is "I. All the King's country which is in Asia shall continue to be the Kino-'s, and the Kins: shall act as he pleases in respect of his own country. "II. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not go against the King's country to do hurt, and the King shall not go against the country of the Lacedaemonians and their allies to do hurt. If any of the Lacedaemonians or their allies go against the King's country and do hurt, the Lacedaemonians shall interfere ; and if any of the dwellers in the King's country shall go against the country of the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and do hurt, the King shall interfere. THIKD TEE AT Υ WITH PERSIA. 589 B.C. 412 ; 01. 92. "III. Tissaphernes shall provide food for the number ΥΠΙ. of ships Avhich the Lacedaemonians have at present, according to the agreement, until the King's ships arrive. When they have arrived, the Lacedaemonians and their allies may either maintain their own ships, or they may receive the maintenance of their ships from Tissaphernes. But in this latter case the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall at the end of the ivar repay to Tissaphernes the money Λvhich they have received. "' TV. When the King's ships have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and of their allies and of the Kinof shall carry on the war in common, as may seem best to Tissaphernes and to the Lacedaemonians and their allies : and if they wish to make peace with the Athe- nians both parties shall make peace on the same terms. Such ivas the treaty. Tissaphernes now prepared to 59^ bring up the Phoenician ships, as he had promised, and to fulfil his other pledges. He was anxious at all events to be seen makino' a beoinnino:. ο c ο Towards the end of the winter, Oropus, which ivas 60. occupied by an Athenian garrison, Λvas betrayed to the ^iJhei' ^Jf Boeotians. Certain of the Eretrians and of the Oropians Sns^jfbt- themselves, both having an eye to the revolt of Euboea, Boeotla^s^^^ were concerned in the enterprise. For Oropus, facing loin?to^^ Eretria, while held by the Athenians could not be other Peiop!f^ie-^ than a serious annoyance, both to Eretria and. to the S to ίΙ-' whole of Euboea. Having now possession of Oropus IJSraii'hfn- the Eretrians came to Ehodes, and invited the Pelopon- appetSiceof nesians to Euboea. They were however more disposed fl^et^X°tS" to relieve the distress of Chios, and thither they sailed to'thelfSi- from Rhodes with their whole fleet, is^ear Triopium samofand af they descried the Athenian ships in the open sea sailing ' ' ® ^' from Chalce : neither fleet attacked the other, but both arrived safely, the one at Samos, and the other at Miletus. The Lacedaemonians ηοΛν saw that they could no longer relieve Chios without a battle at sea. So the winter ended, and with it the twentieth year in the Pelopon- nesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history. 590 PELOPONNESIANS AT THE HELLESPONT. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. Yin. 61. The Chians, assisted by their ϋβΛΥ governor, Leon, the Spartan, ^\ith twelve ships, make a saiiy "ndth thirty- six ships and gain an ad- vantage over thirty-two Athenian ships. 62. Dercyllidas arrives at the Hellespont and induces (12) Abvdos and (13) Lampsacus to revolt. Stromhi- chides pur- sues him and recovers Lampsacus, but not Abydos. 63. Tn the absence of Strombi- At the beginning of the following spring, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, was sent at the head of a small army along the coast to the Hellespont. He was to effect the revolt of Abydos, a Milesian colony. The Chians, while Astyo- chus was doubting whether he could assist them, were compelled l)y the pressure of the blockade to fight at sea. IVhile he was still at Ehodes they had obtained from Miletus, after the death of Pedaritus, a new governor, Leon, a Spartan, who had come out as a marine Avith Antisthenes ;^ he brought with him twelve ships, five Thurian, four Sj^racusan, one from Anaea, one iMilesian, and one which was Leon's own ; they had been employed in guarding Miletus. The Chians made a sally with their whole force, and seized a strong position ; their ships at the same time, to the number of thirty-six, sailed out and fought with the thirty-two of the Athenians. The eno^ao^ement was severe ; the Chians and their allies had rather the advantage, but evening had come on ; so they retired to the city. Soon afterwards Dercyllidas arrived at the Hellespont from ]\iiletus ; Abydos, and two days later Lampsacus, revolted to him and Pharnabazus. Strombichides, having intelligence, hastened thither from Chios with twenty- four Athenian ships, of which some were transports con- veying hoplites. Defeating the Lampsacenes who came out ao-ainst him, he took Lampsacus, which was unforti- fied, at the first onset. He made a seizure of the slaves and property Avhich he found there, and, reinstating the free inhabitants, went on to Al)ydos. But the people of Abydos would not yield, and though he attempted to take the place by assault, he failed ; so he crossed over to Sestos, a city of the Chersonese opposite Abydos, which the Persians had formerly held. There he placed a garrison to keep watch over the entire Hellespont. MeanΛvhile the Chians regained the command of the sea, and Astyochus and the Peloponnesians at Miletus, hearinof of the naval ens^aofement and of the withdrawal i Cp. viii. 39 init. OLIGARCHY AT SAMOS. 591 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. of Strombichides and his ships, took courage. Sailing YIII. to Chios with two ships, Astyochiis fetched away the ^^j^^^g- *^|^.„ fleet which Ava^ there, and wdth his united forces made a sea,^and°^ ^^^ demonstration against Samos. But the Athenian crews, ^£ bkuie who were in a state of mutual distrust, did not go out Athenians. to meet him ; so he sailed back again to Miletus. For about this time, or rather sooner, the democracy Theconspira. . Ίΐ'Λπ *°^'^ ^* Samos at Athens had been subverted, r'eisander and his leliow give up am- biades, but, envoys, on their return to Samos after their visit to Tissa- with the help ■^ ' ^ of some of the phernes, had streno'thened their interest in the army, and samians, re- *■ ^ σ ^ ^ ./ ? solve to per- had eΛ^en persuaded the chief men of Samos to ioin them severe in ^ ^ ^ their plan. in setting up an oligarchy, although they had lately risen against their own countrymen ^ in order to put down oli- o^archv. ^ At the same time conferrino^ amons; themselves, the Athenian leaders at Samos came to the conclusion that since Alcibiades would not join they had better leave him alone ; for indeed he Avas not the sort of person Avho was suited to an oligarchy. But they determined, as they were already compromised, to proceed by them- selves, and to take measures for carrying the movement through ; they meant also to persevere in the w^ar, and w^ere w^illing enough to contribute money or any- thing else which might be w^anted out of their own houses, since the}^ would now be laboring, not for others, but for themselves.^ Having thus encouraged one another in their purpose 64. they sent Peisander and one-half of the envoys back to They want to Athens. They were to carry out the scheme at home, democracy m and had directions to set up an oligarchy in the subject- citle^^^ B?t cities at w^hich they touched on their voyage. The other especiafiy the half Avere despatched different wajs to other subject- h?vh!g"gained cities. Diotrephes, ivho Avas then at Chios, was sent to ernmSitfdo' assume the command in Chalcidice and on the coast of iStah^their Thrace, to Avhich he had been previously appointed. On w^th Athens. arriving at Thasos he put down the democracy. But Avithin about two months of his departure the Thasians 1 Or, '' although there h d just been an insurrection in Samos itself." 2 Cp. viii. 21, 73 init. 3 q^^ y^ 43 init. 592 OLIGARCHY AT ATHENS. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. Yin. began to fortify their city ; they did not want to have an aristocracy dependent on Athens when they were daily expecting to obtain their liberty from Lacedaemon. For there were Thasian exiles who had been driven out by the Athenians dwelling in Peloponnesus, and they, with the assistance of their friends at home, were exerting themselves vigorouoly to obtain ships and effect the revolt of Thasos. The recent change was exactly what they desired ; for the government had been reformed without danger to themselves, and the democracy, who would have opposed them, had been overthroAvn. Thus the result in the case of Thasos, and also, as I imagine, of many other states, was the opposite of Avhat the oli- garchical conspirators had intended. For the subject- cities, having secured a moderate form of government, and havini? no fear of beino' called to account for their proceedings, aimed at absolute freedom ; they scorned the sham independence proffered to them by the Athenians. 65 . Peisander and his colleagues pursued their voyage and , ^^isanderre- ^g they had agreed, put down the democracies in the dif- wiie?e lie ferent states. From some places they obtained the as- afreldy^Iif^ sistaucc of hcavy-amied troops, which they took with Sliont?''^' them to Athens.^ There they found the revolution more the'inemy of t^au half accomplishcd by the oligarcbical clubs. Some pJog^anirae of the youiigcr citizens had conspired and secretly assas- pirty! "^"^ sinated one Androcles, a great man with the people, who had been foremost in procuring the banishment of Alci- biades.2 Their motives were twofold : they killed hi^xx because he was a demagogue ; but more because they hoped to gratify Alcibiades, whom they were still ex- pecting to return, and to make Tissaphernes their friend. A few others Avho were inconvenient to them they made aAvay with in a like secret mannerc Meanwhile they declared in their public programme that no one ought to receive pay who Avas not on military service ; and that not more than five thousand should have a share in the » Cp. viii. 69 med. 2 Cp. vi. 89 fin. THE EEIGN OF TERROK AT ATHENS. 593 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. government ; those, namely, who were best able to sen^e YIII. the state in person and with their money. These were only pretences intended to look well in the ββ, eyes of the people ; for the authors of the revolution fully The conspira- meant to retain the new government in their own hands, time reigu The popular assembly and the council of nve hundred tSey^put Out Λvere still convoked; but nothing was brought before secretly any , . ,-, ^ . iucouYenieiit them 01 which the conspirators had not approved ; the peidous ; the η Λ ' Ίΐι• 1 •Ί pe'^ple, from speakers were oi their party and the thino-s to be said mutual tear 11 η ΊΊ-ιΐρΐ 1 -χ-^ and mistrust, had been all arrano^ed by them beforehand. jSo one any cannot com- . . . . bine and lonofer raised his voice ao'ainst them ; for the citizens retaliate. were afraid Λvhen they saw the strength of the conspiracy, and if any one did utter a word, he was put out of the way in some convenient manner. No search was made for the assassins ; and though there might be suspicion, no one was brought to trial ; the people were so de- pressed and afraid to mo\^e that he who escaped violence thought himself fortunate, even though he had never said a Avord. Their minds were cowed by the supposed num- ber of the conspirators, which they greatly exaggerated, having^ no means of disco verinsr the truth, since the size of the city prevented them from knowing one another. For the same reason a man could not conspire and re- taliate, ^ because he was unable to express his sorrow or indignation to another ; for he could not make a con- fidant of a stranger, and he would not trust his acquaint- ance. The members of the popular party all approached one another with suspicion ; every one was supposed to have a hand in what Avas going on. Some were con- cerned whom no one would ever have thought likely to turn oliofarchs ; their adhesion created the worst mis- trust among the multitude, and by making it impossible for them to rely upon one another, greatly contributed to the security of the few. Such was the state of affairs when Peisander and his 67. colleagues arrived at Athens. They immediately set to Theiinai stroke. Or, taking έπιβουλεύσαί'τα as the object: "could not defend him- self against the wiles of another." 38 594 THE NEW COii"STITUTIOX. B.C. 411 ; Ol. 92, 2. vin. First tLe "graphe pa- rauomon " is repealed ; then, on the proposal of Peisander, all existing mag- istracies are abolished and replaced by a board of five, which creates another of four hundred. The leading intellect of the revolution was An- tii)hon, who had hitherto led a re- tired life ; he was the best adviser of clients, and when his own turn came made the best defence of himself. Phrynichus and The- ramenes were also men of great ability, and work and prepared to strike the final hlo^v. First, they called an assembly and proposed the election of ten com- missioners, who should be empowered to frame for the city the best constitution which they could devise ; this was to be laid before the people on a fixed day. When the day arrived they summoned an assembly to meet in the temple of Poseidon at Colonus without the walls, and distant rather more than a mile. But the commis- sioners only moved that any Athenian should be allowed to propose whatever resolution he pleased — nothing more ; threatening at the same time with severe penal- ties anybody who indicted the proposer for unconsti- tutional action, or otherwise oflfered injury to him. The whole scheme ηοΛν came to lio-ht. A motion was made to abolish all the existing magistracies and the payment of magistrates, and to choose a presiding board of five ; these five were to choose a hundred, and each of the hundred was to co-opt three others. The Four Hundred thus selected were to meet in the council-chamber ; they Avere to huxe absolute authority, and might govern as they deemed best ; The Five. Thousand were to be summoned by them whenever they chose. The mover of this proposal, and to outward appearance the most active partisan of the revolution, Avas Peisander, but the real author and maturer of the whole scheme, λυΙιο had been longest interested in it, Avas Antiphon, a man inferior in virtue to none of his contemporaries, and possessed of remarkable powers of thought and gifts of speech. He did not like to come forward in the as- sembly, or in an}^ other public arena. To the multitude, Avho were suspicious of his great abilities, he was an object of dislike ; but there was no man who could do m-ore for any who consulted him, whether their business lay in the courts of justice or in the assembly. And when the government of the Four Hundred Avas overthrown and became exposed to the vengeance of the people, and he being accused of taking part in the plot had to speak in his own case, his defence Avas AKTIPHOK — PHRYNICHUS — THERAMETSTES. 595 B.C. 411; 01.92,2. undoubtedly the best ever made by any man tried on YIII. a capital charge down to my time. Phrynichus also JJe^^JJ^o" showed extraordinary zeal in the interests of the oli- theTrSSs garchy. He was afraid of Alcibiades, whom he knew *^^^• to be coofnizant of the intrio:ue which when at Samos he had carried on with Astyochus,i and he thought that no oligarchy would ever be likely to restore him. Havinof once set his hand to the work he was deemed by the others to be the man upon whom they could best depend in the hour of danger. Another chief leader of the revolutionary party was Theramenes the son of Hagnon, a good speaker and a sagacious man. ISio wonder then that, in the hands of all these able men, the attempt, however arduous, succeeded. For an easy thing it certainly was not, one hundred years after the fall of the tyrants, to destroy the liberties of the Athe- nians, who not only were a free, but during more than one half of this time had been an imperial people. The assembly passed all these measures without a dis- 69. sentient voice, and was then dissolved. And now the ^.i^eoidcoun- ■' cil 01 tlie five Four Hundred were introduced into the council-chamber, ^"οΐβ^ ^p. The manner was as follows :-The Tvhole population were dip^aTifisthey always on service, either manning the walls or draΛvn up Sin^their at their places of arms, for the enemy were at Decelea.^ ^^J^^^'*^ On the day of the assembly those who w^ere not in the conspiracy were allowed to go home as usual, while the conspirators were quietly told to remain, not actually by their arms, but at a short distance ; if anybody opposed what was doing they were to arm and interfere. There wxrealso on the spot some Andrians and Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the Athenian colonists from Aegina,^ who received similar instructions ; they had all been told to bring with them from their homes their own arms for this especial purpose.'^ Having dis- posed their forces the Four Hundred arrived, every one with a dagger concealed about his person, and Avith them 1 Cp. viii. 50, 51. s Cp. ii. 27. 2 Cp. vii. 28 init. * Cp. viii. 65 init. 596 DISSOLUTION OF THE FIYE HUNDRED. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. Yin. 70. They are I'eplaced by the Four Hundred, Avho govern despotically and try to make peace with Lace- diiemon. 71. Agis, think- ing that the city is now at his mercy, re- fuses to treat with them. But ap- proaching too near the wall, he is un- deceived. The Four Hundred by his advice send an a hundred and tAventy Hellenic youth, whose services they used for an}' act of violence which they had in hand. They broke in upon the council of five hundred as they sat in the council-chamber, and told them to take their pay and begone. They had brought with them the pay of the senators for the remainder of their yearly term of office, which they handed to them as they went out. In this manner the council retired without offering any remonstrance ; and the rest of the citizens kept perfectly quiet and made no counter movement. The Four Hundred then installed themselves in the council- chamber ; for the present they elected by lot Prytanes of their own number, and did all that was customary in the way of prayers and sacrifices to the gods at their entrance into office. Soon however they wholly changed the democratic system ; and although they did not recall the exiles, because Alcibiades was one of them, they gOΛ^erned the city with a high hand. Some few Λτhom they thought would be better out of the way were put to death by them, others imprisoned, others again exiled. They also sent heralds to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, who was at Decelea, saying that they desired to conclude a peace with him ; and that they expected him to be more ready to treat with them than with the perfidious democracy. But he, thinking that the city must be in an unsettled state and that the people would not so quickly yield up their ancient liberty, thinking too that the appearance of a great Lacedaemonian army would increase their ex- citement, and fixr from convinced that civil strife was not at that very moment raging among them, gave unfavor- able answers to the envo}'s of the Four Hundred. He sent to Peloponnesus for large reinforcements, and then, with the garrison at Decelea and the newly-arrived troops, came down in person to the very walls of Athens. He expected that the Athenians, distracted by civil strife, would be quite at his mercy ; there would be such a THE FIYE THOUSAND A GOOD PEETENCE. 597 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. panic created by the presence of enemies, both within VIII. and without the walls, that he might even succeed in l^^^g^^^le-*^ taking the city at the first onset; for the Long AValls^^^• would be deserted, and he could not fail of capturing them. But when he drew near there was no sign of the slightest disorder within ; the Athenians, sending out their cavalry and a force of heavy and light-armed troops and archers, struck down a few of his soldiers who had ventured too far, and retained possession of some arms and dead bodies ; ivhereupon, having found out his mistake, he w^ithdrew to Decelea. There he and the garrison remained at their posts ; but he ordered the newdy-arrived troops, after they had continued a few days in Attica, to return home. The Four Hundred resumed negotiations, and Agis was now more ready to listen to them. By his advice they sent envoys to Lacedaemon in the hope of coming to terms. They also sent ten commissioners to Samos, who were 72. to pacify the army, and to explain that the oligarchy ^iifdai^era- was not established with any design of injuring Athens samos%iio or her citizens, but for the preservation of the whole tn\*poS5y^ state. The promoters of the change were five thousand, ^°'^*^®"^• not four hundred ; but never hitherto, OAving to the pressure of war and of business abroad, had so many as uvG thousand assembled to deliberate even on the most important questions. They instructed them to say anything else which Avould have a good efiect, and sent them on their mission as soon as they themselves were installed in the government. For they ^veYG afraid, and not without reason as the event show^ed, that the Athe- nian sailors would be impatient of the oligarchical system, and that disafiection would begin at Samos and end in their own overthrow. At the very time when the Four Hundred were estab- 73. lishino^ themselves at Athens, a reaction had set in^^ta ao^ainst the olisrarchical movement at Samos. Some ?,et in at «^ ^ Samos. Samians of the popular party, Avhich had originally Ji-\f.J™g'^" risen up against the nobles, changed sides again >vhen ^^^ ^^ ' 598 DEMOCRACY AT SAMOS. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. yill. Peisander came to the island, ^ and, persuaded by him themselves and his Athenian accomplices at Samos, they formed cnanged -"• ' «^ sj^des^ begin a bodj of three hundred conspirators and prepared H^-^ertoiiis ^^ attack the rest of the popular party who had L^i^^l'^^i'l^"' previously been their comrades. There was a certain thSifaiid^^^ Hyperbolus, an Athenian of no character, who, not for Sin acorn- ^^1 ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ power and influence, but for his villany, saiiOTs o?the ^^^^ bccausc the city was ashamed of him, had been pnftillm^^^ ostracized. This man was assassinated by them, and down. |.|^gy were abetted in the act by Charminus, one of the generals, and by certain of the Athenians at Samos, to whom they pledged their faith. They also joined these Athenians in other deeds of Λdolence, and were eager to fall upon the popular party. But the people, discoΛ^ering their intention, gave information to the generals, Leon and Diomedon, who were impatient of the attempted oligarchy because they were respected by the multitude, to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, one of whom was a triararch and the other a private soldier, and to others who were thought to be the steadiest opponents of the oligarchical movement. They entreated them not to allow the Samian people to be destroyed, and the island of Samos, without which the Athenian empire would never have lasted until then, to be estranged. Thereupon the generals went to the soldiers, one by one, and begged them to interfere, addressing themselves especially to the Parali, or crew of the ship Paralus, all free-born Athenians, who were at any time ready to attack oligarchy, real or imaginary. Leon and Diomedon, whenever they sailed to any other place, left some ships for the protection of the Samians. And so, Λvhen the three hundred began the attack, all the crews, especially the Parali, hastened to the rescue, and the popular party gained the victory. Of the three hundred they slew about thirty, and the three most guilty Avere banished ; the rest they forgave, and henceforward all lived together under a democracy. » Cp. viii. 21, 63 med. OLIGARCHY AT ATHENS. 599 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. Chaereas the son of Archestratus, an Athenian, who VIII. had been active in the movement, was quickly de- 74^ spatched by the Samians and the army in the ship The Paraii, Paralus to Athens, there to report the defeat of the the report bf Samian oligarchy, for as yet they did not know that the tion to fi^overnment was in the hands of the Four Hundred, very coidiy^ ^j received No sooner had he arrived than the Four Hundred chaereas, 11• their leader, imprisoned two or three 01 the Faraii, and takmo^ awav escapes to ^ Λ 1 Samos, and their ship, transferred the rest 01 the crew to a troop- teiisaiiman- ^ ' -•• ner oi lies ship Avhich was ordered to keep o^uard about Euboea. about the t^ i- ο Oligarchs. Chaereas, seeino^ in an instant how matters stood, had contrived to steal away and get back to Samos, where he told the soldiers with much aggravation the news from Athens, how they were punishing everybody Avith stripes, and how no one might speak a word against the government ; he declared that their wives and children were being outraged, and that the oligarchy were going to take the relations of all the men serving at Samos who were not of their faction and shut them up, intending, if the fleet did not submit, to put them to death. And he added a great many other falsehoods. When the army heard this report they instantly 75 . rushed upon the chief authors of the olio^archies Λvho were P® army at i- ~ Samos are present, and their confederates, and tried to stone them, gefves *^Bi!t" But they were deterred by the warnings of the moderate taMnivioient party, who begged them not to ruin everything by thtyTil per- violence Avhile the enemy Avere lying close to them, Thlisyiiis prow threatening prow. Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, bSiusto^pJo- and Thrasyllus, who were the chief leaders of the swear Int- reaction, now thought that the time had come for the dlmocrScJl^^ open proclamation of democracy at Samos, and they iSfte^tS^^ bound the soldiers, more especially those of the oligar- oath!^"*^^ chical party, by the most solemn oaths to maintain a democracy and be of one mind, to prosecute vigorously the war with Peloponnesus, to be enemies to the Four Hundred, and to hold no parley with them by heralds. All the Samians who were of full age took the same oath, and the Athenian soldiers determined to make 600 THE PATKIOTISM OF THE FLEET. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. yiii. 76. Thrasyllus and Thrasy- bulus are elected gen- erals. Tlie sailors en- courage one another. They are few, we are many. They have re- volted from us, not we from them. We receive the tribute ; we hold Samos ; we guard Pi- raeus ; Ave can drive them off the sea. They are no loss ; they have neither money nor sense nor vir- tue. And Alcibiades Avill gain over the King. common cause with the Samians in their troubles and dangers, and invited them to share their fortunes. They considered that neither the Samians nor themselves had any place of refuge to which they could turn, but that, Λvhether the Four Hundred or their enemies at Miletus gained the day, they Λγere doomed. There was now an obstinate struggle ; the one party determined to force democracy upon the city, the other to force oligarchy upon the fleet. The soldiers proceeded to summon an assembly, at which they deposed their former generals, and any trierarchs whom they sus- pected, and chose others. Among the neΛV generals Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus naturally found a place. One after another the men rose and encouraged their comrades by various arguments. "We ought not to despond," they said, " because the city has revolted from us, for they are few and we are many ; they have lost us and not Λνβ them, and our resources are far greater. Having the whole navy with us Λνβ can compel the subject states to pay us tribute as well as if we sailed forth from the Piraeus ; Samos is our ΟΛνη — no weak city, but one Λvhich in the Samian Avar all but wrested from Athens the dominion of the sea ; and the position which we hold against our Peloponnesian enemies is as strong as heretofore. And again, with the help of the fleet we are better able to obtain supplies than the Athenians at home. Indeed, the only reason Avhy the citizens haA^e so Ion»• retained the command of the Piraeus is that we who are stationed at Samos are the advanced guard of the Piraeus itself. And ηοΛΥ if they Avill not aoTee to i^ive us back the constitution, it λυΙΙΙ come to this — that we shall be better able to drive them oflf the sea than they us. The help which the cit}^ gives us against our enemies is poor and worthless ; and we have lost nothing in losing them. They have no longer any money to send" (the soldiers were supplying themselves). *^They cannot aid us by good counsel ; and yet for Avhat other reason do states exercise authority over armies? TROUBLES OF THE PELOPOITNESIANS. 601 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. But in this respect too they are useless. They have YIII. gone altogether astray, and overthrown the constitution of their country, which we maintain and will endeavor to make the oligarchy maintain likewise. Our advisers in the camp then are at least as good as theirs in the city. Alcibiades, if we procure his recall and pardon, will be delio'hted to obtain for us the alliance of the Kino^. And above all, if these hopes fail entirely, yet, while we have our great navy, there are many places of refuge open to us in Λvhich we shall find city and lands." Having met and encouraged one another by these and 77. similar appeals, they displayed a corresponding energy ^^rcMcen- in their preparations for war. And the ten commissioners ^t Deios^^^ whom the Four Hundred had sent out to Samos, hearing when they reached Delos how matters stood, went no further. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Miletus 78. had likewise troubles anion o' themselves. The sailors Tiie Peiopon- ^ ^ nesian sailors complained loudly to one another that their cause Avas J^^Pif^of ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes. " Astyochus," ^nSs^ they said, '^ refused to fight before, ^ while we Avere strong piiemes. and the Athenian navy Aveak, and ivill not fight now Avhen they are reported to be in a state of anarchy, and their fleet is not as yet united. We are kept waiting for Tissaphernes and the Phoenician ships, which are a mere pretence and nothing more, and we shall soon be utterly exhausted. Tissaphernes never brings up the promised reinforcement, and he destroys our navy by his scanty and irregular payments : the time has come when we must fight." The Syracusans were especially vehement in the matter. Astyochus and the allies became aware of the outcry, 79. and had resolved in council to fight a decisive battle. Astyochus This resolution was confirmed when they heard of the hundred . ni Λ . 1 η 1 • and twelve confusion at bamos. bo they put to sea with all their siiipsotfers , . . 1111 battle to the ships, in number a hundred and twelve, and ordering!: the Atheuiaiis. . . ® They prefer Milesians to march along the coast toΛvards My cald, *o await the 60 fin. 602 moye:ments of the fleets. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. VIII. sailed thither themselves. But the Athenians with their stromb? fi^®^ ^^ eighty-two ships, which had come out of Samos ships arii^nl ^^^ werc just then moored at Glauce on the promontory nimVe^'^toa ^f Mycale, a point of the mainland not far off, saw the ei^hty^They Pelopoiinesians bearing down upon them, and returned, otfeibattie ΐο thinking that with their inferior numbers they were not n^sini who justified ill risking their all. Besides, having previous dechne it. information from Miletus that the Peloponnesians were anxious to fight, they had sent a messenger to Strom- bichides at the Hellespont, and were waiting for him to come to their aid with the ships from Chios which had gone to Abydos.^ So they retreated to Samos, and the Peloponnesians sailed for Mycald and there established themselves, together with the land-forces of Miletus and of the neighboring cities. On the following day they were on the point of attacking Samos, Avhen news came that Strombichides had arrived wn'th the fleet from the Hellespont; Avhereupon the Peloponnesians immediately retired towards Miletus, and the Athenians themselves, thus reinforced, sailed against Miletus Avith a hundred and eight ships. They had hoped to fight a decisive battle, but no one came out to meet them, and they returned to Samos. 80. The Peloponnesians had not gone out because they ThePeiopon- thouoflit that cvcu with their united force they could not nesians, dis- ο ^ «^ gustedAYith ^isk a battle.'^ But not knowino^ hoAv to maintain so Tissaphernes, '-' ^iftatioifof i^^o'^ ^ fleet, especially since Tissaphernes never paid ?nd tht^^^"^' tiiem properly, they at once Avhile the summer lasted ?nd sSm^^' s^^^^ Clearchus the son of Rhamphias Λvith forty ships th?Hei\S **^ ^^ Pharnabazus, this being the commission Avhich he had them aSve^^ originally received from Peloponnesus.^ Pharnabazus ??vo?t^of α*ίΓ ^^^ ^^^^'^ inviting them to come, and promised to main- Byzantiuni. ^^j^^ them ; the Byzantians likewise had been sending envoys to them proposing to revolt. The Pelopon- nesian squadron put out into the open sea that they J Cp. viii. 62. 2 Or, " that they were not a match for the now united forces of the enemy." ^ Cp. viii. 8 raed. ALCIBIADES AT SAMOS. 603 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. might not be seen on their voyage by the Athenians. YIII. They were caught in a storm ; Clearchus and most of his ships found refuge at Delos, and thence returned to Miletus. He himself proceeded later by land to the Hellespont and assumed his command. But ten ships under Helixus of Megara arrived safely, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Samos, re- ceivinof information of these movements, sent a naval force to guard the Hellespont ; and off Byzantium a small engagement was fought by eight ships against eight. Ever since Thrasybulus restored the democracy at 81. Samos he had strongly insisted that Alcibiades should Aicibiades be recalled ; the other Athenian leaders were of the same the Athenians TTT, f, , τ ' -I ^^ Samos the mmd, and at last the consent oi the army was obtained sad misunder- standing at an assembly which voted his return and full pardon, which has ^ ^ arisen about Thrasybulus then sailed to Tissaphernes, and brouo-ht himself and «^ 1 ' ο mspires the Alcibiades to Samos, convinced that there was no help ^^^^^ ^^«* for the Athenians unless by his means Tissaphernes ^^ victory. witli hopes of victory. Tissaphernes could be drawn Siway from the Peloponnesians. An as- i^Jig^foi'^" sembly was called, at which Alcibiades lamented the cruel *^^°^• and unjust fate which had banished him ; he then spoke at length of their political prospects ; and bright indeed were the hopes of future victory Λvith which he inspired them, while he magnified to excess his present influence over Tissaphernes. He meant thereby first to frighten the oligarchy at home, and effect the dissolution of their clubs ; and secondly, to exalt himself in the eyes of the army at Samos and fortify their resolution ; thirdly, to widen the breach between Tissaphernes and the enemy, and blast the hopes of the Lacedaemonians. Having these objects in view, Alcibiades carried his fulsome assurances to the utmost. Tissaphernes, he said, had promised him that if he could only trust the Athenians they should not want for food while he had anything to give, no not if he were driven at last to turn his own bed ' into money ; that he would bring up the Phoenician ships (which were already at Aspen dus) to assist the 604 GREAT HOPES m THE ATHEIilAK FLEET. B.C. 411 ; Ol. 92, 2. yni. Athenians instead of the Peloponnesians ; but that he could not trust the Athenians unless Alcibiades were restored and became surety for them. 82. Hearing all this, and a great deal more, the Athe- They want nians Immediately appointed him a colleague of their are restrained ^^^®^ gcucrals, and placcd everything in his hands ; no bL^s?" ™^^ among them Avould have given up for all the world the hope of deliverance and of vengeance on the Four Hundred which was now aroused in them ; so excited were they that under the iixiiuence of his words they despised the Peloponnesians, and were ready to sail at once for the Piraeus. But in spite of the eagerness of the multitude he absolutely forbade them to go thither and leave behind them enemies nearer at hand. Having been elected general, he said, he would make the conduct of the war his first care, and go at once to Tis- saphernes. And he went straight from the assembly, in order that he might be thought to do nothing without Tissaphernes ; at the same time he wished to be honored in the eyes of Tissaphernes himself, and to show him that he had now been chosen general, and that a time had come when he could do him a good or a bad turn. Thus Alcibiades frightened the Athenians with Tissa- phernes, and Tissaphernes with the Athenians. 83. The Peloponnesians at Miletus, who had already con- tie^peio^on? ^^^^^^ ^ mistrust of Tissaphcmes, when they heard of TtsS^hSnes ^^^ rcstoratioii of Alcibiades were still more exasperated ίϊοΓβϊηά against him. About the time of the threatened attack siiiOTs^e^ of the Athenians on Miletus, Tissaphernes, observing mutoy? that the Peloponnesians would not put out to sea and fight with them, had become much more remiss in paying the fleet ; and previously to this a dislike of him, arising out of his connection with Alcibiades, had gained ground. He Avas ηοΛν more hated than ever. As before, the soldiers began to gather in knots and to express discontent ; and not only the soldiers, but some men of position complained that they had never yet received their full pay, and that the sum given was too small, ASTTOCHUS AlTD HIS SAILORS. 605 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. while even this was irregularly paid ; if they did not VIII. fight, or go Λvhere they could obtain food, the men would desert. All these grievances they laid to the charge of .Astyochus, who humored Tissaphernes for his own gain. While these thoughts were passing in their minds the 84. behavior of Astyochus o^ave occasion to an outbreak. Their discon- ^ c5 tent bi-eaks The Syracusan and Thurian sailors were for the most "V^V^^^ °p®^ ^ violence part free men, and therefore bolder than the rest in against as- ^ ' tyochus. assailino^ him with demands for pay. Astyochus answered V^^ ^^^^-,., ο i. ./ t/ sians m a like them roughly and threatened them ; he even raised his ouithe^It-ri- stick against Dorieus of Thurii who was pleading the ph"emes^^^^^" cause of his oivn sailors. When the men saw the action re^iikeTby they, sailor-like, lost all control of themselves, and rushed ίβρ^ο;^ Siiy^^ upon him, intending to stone him; but he, perceiving *^®®^^^ '^'®^®^*• what was cominof, ran to an altar, where takino^ refuofe he escaped unhurt, and they were parted. The Milesians, who were likewise discontented, captured by a sudden assault a fort which had been built in Miletus by Tissa- phernes, and drove out the garrison which he had placed there. Of this proceeding the allies approved, especially the Syracusans ; Lichas, however, was displeased, and said that the Milesians and the inhabitants of the King's country should submit to the necessary humiliation, and manage to keep on good terms with Tissaphernes until the Λvar was well over. His conduct on this and on other occasions excited a strong feeling against him among the Milesians ; and afterwards, when he fell sick and died, they would not let him be buried Avhere his Lacedaemonian comrades would have laid him. A¥hile the Lacedaemonians Avere quarrelling in this 85. manner Avith Astvochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus ^lindarus arrived from Lacedaemon ; he had been appointed to Astyochus, succeed Astyochus, who surrendered to him the com- p^emes •^ sends an mand of the fleet and sailed away. Tissaphernes sent |"^J[*^ , with him an envoy, one of his own attendants, a Carian jsto^iefend «^ ' nun against named Gaulites, who spoke both Greek and Persian. ^ SS°and He Λvas instructed to complain of the destruction of the 1 Cp. iv. 109 med. 606 ENVOYS OF THE OLIGARCHY AT SAMOS. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. B.C. 410 ; 01. 92, 3 VIII. fort by the Milesians, and also to defend Tissapliernes Mlifiii/^of ■ ^g™st their charges. For he knew that Milesian envoys toward^^^^^^ wcrc going to Sparta chiefly to accuse him, and Hermo- Hermocrates. cratcs witli them, who would explain how he, aided by Alcibiades, was playing a double game and ruining the Peloponnesian cause. JSTow Tissaphernes owed Hermo- crates a grudge ever since they quarrelled about the payment of the sailors.^ And when afterwards he had been exiled from Syracuse, and other generals, Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus, came to take the command of the Syracusan ships at Miletus,^ Tissaphernes attacked him Λvith still greater violence in his exile, declaring amons: other thino-s that Hermocrates had asked him for money and had been refused, and that this w^as the reason of the enmity which he conceived ^ against him. And so Astyochus, the Milesians, and Hermocrates sailed away to Lacedaemon. Alcibiades had by this time returned from Tissaphernes to Samos. 86. The envoys Avhom the Four Hundred had sent to theVoJiHui P'^cify the army and give explanations left Delos^ and dredcometo came to Samos after the return of Alcibiades, and an Samos after ^ ' AiciMad™^^ asscmbly was held at which they endeavored to speak. ?oughfy re- ^^ ^^'^^ ^^^® soldicrs would uot listeii to them, but mStitudef ^ shouted " Death to the subverters of the democracy." sln^'aTonc'e to ^^^^6ϊΐ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^'^^^^ difficulty restored, the But^h?y are ^nvoys told them that the change was not meant for Aiclbiides,^^ the destruction but for the preservation of the state, and tfe^envSys^^^ that thcrc was no intention of betraying Athens to the ^ΟΓ^^Γ' A^^ enemy, which might have been effected by the new fice^iSVer^" govemmcnt already if they had pleased during the Sens. recent invasion. They declared that all the citizens were in turn to become members of the Five Thousand, and that the families of the sailors Λvere not being out- raged, asChaereas slanderously reported, or in anyway molested ; they were living quietly in their respective homes. They defended themselves at length, but the ί Cp. viii. 45 med. ^ Or, " displayed." 2 Cp. Xen. Hell., i. 1. 27 foil. * Cp. viii. 77. FIVE THOUSAND, NOT FOUR HUNDRED. 607 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. more they said, the more furious and unwilling to listen VIII. grew the multitude. Various proposals were made ; above all they wanted to sail to the Piraeus. Then Alcibiades appears to have done as eminent a service to the state as any man ever did. For if the Athenians at Samos in their excitement had been allowed to sail against their fellow-citizens, the enemy would instantly have obtained possession of Ionia and the Hellespont. This he prevented, and at that moment no one else could have restrained the multitude : but he did restrain them, and with sharp Λvords protected the envoys against the fury of individuals in the crowd. He then dismissed them himself with the reply that he had nothing to say against the rule of the Five Thousand, but that the Four Hundred must be got rid of, and the old council of Five Hundred restored. If they had reduced the expendi- ture in order that the soldiers on service might be better oif for supplies, he highly approved. For the rest he entreated them to stand firm, and not give way to the enemy ; if the city was preserved, there was good hope that they might be reconciled amongst themselves, but if once anything happened either to the army at Samos or to their fellow-citizens at home, there Λvould be no one left to be reconciled with. There were also present envoys from Argos, who prof- TheParaii lered their aid to the Athenian people at bamos. Alci- escaped from Athens bring blades complimented them, and requested them to come envoys from • 1 1 • 7• τ 1 Argos offer- with their forces when they were summoned ; he then i^g aid. dismissed them. These Argives came with the Parali who had been ordered by the Four Hundred to cruise ofi" Euboea in a troop-ship f they Avere afterwards employed in conveying to Lacedaemon certain envoys sent by the Four Hundred, Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias. But Avhen they were near Argos or. their voyage the crew seized the envoys, and, as they were among the chief authors of the revolution, delivered them over to the Argives ; Λvhile they, instead of returning to Athens, 1 Reading ngmog. 2 Cp. viii. 74 med. 608 WHY TISSAPHEEiTES WENT TO ASPENDUS. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. YIII. Avent from Argos to Samos, and brought with them in their trireme the Argive ambassadors. 87. During the same summer, and just at the time when Tissaphernes the PeloOomiesians were most offended with Tissa- goes to fetch. ••• thePhoeni- phemes on various s^rounds, and above all on account cian sliips. ^ . SuntS!- ^^^ ^'*^' ^^^ restoration of Alcibiades, which finally proved tion? There j^jj-q ^q be a partisan of the Athenians, he, as if he Λvere TEySdes wanting to clear himself of these suspicions, prepared that hi' w^?i to go to Aspendus and fetch the Phoenician ships ; and he hisL^utmMz-^ desired Lichas to go with him. He also said that he ing pohcy. ^vould assigu the charge of the army to his lieutenant Tamos, who would provide for them during his absence. Why he went to Aspendus, and having gone there never brought the ships, is a question not easy to answer, and which has been answered in various ivays. For the Phoenician fleet of a hundred and forty-seven ships came as far as Aspendus — there is no doubt about this ; but why they never came further is a matter of conjecture. Some think that, ingoing to Aspendus, Tissaphernes was still pursuing his policy of wearing out the Pelopon- nesians ; at any rate Tamos, who was in charge, supplied them no better but rather worse. Others are of opinion that he brought up the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus in order to make money by selling the crews their dis- charge ; for he certainly had no idea of using them in actual service. Others think that he was influenced by the outcrj^ against him which had reached Lacedaemon ; and that he wanted to create an impression of his honesty : " N^ow at any rate he has gone to fetch the ships, and they are really manned." I believe beyond all question that he wanted to wear out and to neutralize the Hellenic forces ; his object was to damage them both while he was losing time in going to Aspendus, and to paralyze their action, and not strengthen either of them by his alliance. For if he had chosen to finish the war, finished it might have been once for all, as any one may see : he would have brought up the ships, and would in all probability have given the victory to the Lacedae- THE OLIGARCHY BEGmS TO BEEAK TIP. 609 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. monians, who lay opposite to the Athenians and were YIII. fully a match for them already. The excuse which he gave for not bringing them is the most conclusive evi- dence against him ; he said that there was not as many collected as the Eang had commanded. But if so, the King would have been all the better pleased, for his money would have been saved and Tissaphernes Λvould have accomplished the same result at less expense. Whatever may have been his intention, Tissaphernes came to Aspendus and conferred with the Phoenicians, and the Peloponnesians at his request sent Philip, a Lacedaemonian, with two triremes to fetch the ships. Alcibiades, when he learned that Tissaphernes was 88. going to Aspendus, sailed thither himself with thirteen knowS^^hat ships, promising the army at Samos that he would not J^^yeThf-^^^^ fail to do them a great service. He would either bring i^twupVe the Phoenician ships to the Athenians, or, at any rate, fl^e^ttiiom- make sure that they did not join the Peloponnesians. back.*^ ^^^^ '* He had probably known all along the real mind of Tissaphernes, and that he never meant to bring them at all. He wanted further to injure him as much as possible in the opinion of the Peloponnesians^ when they observed how friendly Tissaphernes Λvas towards himself and the Athenians ; their distrust would compel him to chanofe sides. So he set sail and went on his voyage eastward, making directly for Phaselis and Caunus. The commissioners sent by the Four Hundred re- 89. turned from Samos to Athens and reported the words ^^^^^w"' of Alcibiades — how he bade them stand firm and not JfiJfSes^* give way to the enemy, and what great hopes he enter- tSe'morl *° tained of reconciling the army to the city, and of over- S^the^*^ coming the Peloponnesians. The majority of the oli- a ρϊ^ ol garchs, who were already dissatisfied, and would have fSa- gladly got out of the whole affair if they safely could, Soc^L were now much encouraged. They began to come toge- tiS"boat ther and to criticise the conduct of affairs. Their leaders TifousSd. were some of the oligarchical generals and actually in 39 610 THE MALCONTENT OLIGAKCHS. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. VIII. They see an- other revolu- tion coming, and each man wants to take the lead iu it. 90. Phrynichns, Aristarchus, Peisander, and Anti- phon, the thorough- going oli- garchs, are ready to hetray office at the time, for example, Theramenes the son of Hagnon and Aristocrates the son of Scellius. They had been among the chief authors of the revolution, but now, fearing, as they urged, the army at Samos, and being in good earnest afraid of Alcibiades, fearing also lest their colleagues, who were sending envoys to Lace- daemon,^ might, unauthorized by the majority, betray the city, they did not indeed openly profess^ that they meant to get rid of extreme oligarchy, but they nrnin- tained that the Five Thousand should be established in reality and not in name, and the constitution made more equal. This was the political pretext of which they availed themselves, but the truth was that most of them were given up to private ambition of that sort which is more fatal than anything to an oligarchy succeeding a democracy. For the instant an oligarchy is established the promoters of it disdain mere equality, and everybody thinks that he ought to be far above everybody else. Whereas in a democracy, when an election is made, a man is less disappointed at a failure because he has not been competing with his equals. The motives which most sensibly aifected them were the great power of Alcibiades at Samos, and an impression that the oli- garchy was not likely to be permanent. Accordingly every one was struggling hard to be the first champion of the people himself. The leading men among the Four Hundred most violently opposed to the restoration of democracy were Phrynichus, who had been general at Samos, and had there come into antagonism with Alcibiades,^ Aristarchus, a man who had always been the most thorough-going enemy of the people, Peisander, and Antiphon. These and the other leaders, both at the 1 Cp. viii. 90 init. 2 Or, retaining Μττεμπον: "and now fearing, as they urged, the army at Samos, and being in good earnest afraid of Alcibiades, they joined in sending envoys to Lacedaemon, but only lest, if left to themselves, the envoys should betray the city. They did not openly profess," etc. ^ Cp. viii. 48. THE LACEDAEMONIAN PAKTY AT ATHENS. 611 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. first establishment of the oligarchy,^ and again later YIII. when the army at Samos delared for the democracy ,^ 4*JmTi?the? sent envoys of their own number to Lacedaemon, and otra^powei^^'^ were ahvays anxious to make peace; meanΛvhile they JJ^^Ji^^fj.^^'^^'^ continued the fortification which they had begun to^^l^^^®"^" build at Eetioneia. They were confirmed in their pur- tSviTon'^itu poses after the return of their own ambassadors from v;Jo?The for- Samos ; for they saΛv that not only the people, but even EetSneia.^^ those who had appeared steadfast adherents of their own party, were now changing their minds. So, fearing what might happen both at Athens and Samos, they sent Anti- phon, Phrynichus, and ten others, in great haste, authoriz- ing them to make peace with Lacedaemon upon anything like tolerable terms ; at the same time they proceeded more diligently than ever with the fortification of Eetio- neia. The design was (so Theramenes and his party averred) not to bar the Piraeus against the fleet at Samos should they sail thither with hostile intentions, but rather to admit the enemy with his sea and land-forces when- ever they pleased. This Eetioneia is the mole of the Piraeus and forms one side of the entrance ; the new fortification Avas to be so connected with the previously existing wall which looked towards the land, that a handful of men stationed between the two walls might command the approach from the sea. For the old wall looking towards the land, and the new inner wall in process of construction facing the water, ended at the same point in one of the two forts which protected the narrow mouth of the harbor. A cross- wall was added, taking in the largest storehouse in the Piraeus and the nearest to the new fortification, which it joined ; this the authorities held themselves, and commanded every one to deposit their corn there, not only what came in by sea but what they had on the spot, and to take from thence all that they wanted to sell. For some time Theramenes had been circulating whis- 91. pers of their desis^ns, and when the envoys returned from ^^^ ®^^°ys ■*• ο -' J are unsuc- 1 Cp. viu. 71 fin. 2 Cp. viii. 86 fin. 612 THE FORT OF EETIOKEIA. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. the de- Vni. Lacedaemon without having effected anything in Lacidiemo- ^ ^^^^^^ of a treaty for the Athenian people, he hov^??ii^g^*^^^^ clared that this fort was likely to prove the ruin of coas?s?emsto ^thcus. Now the Euboeaus had requested the Pelo- coifcUiliSi ponnesians to send them a fleet, and just at this time partpi'^"^ ^wo and forty ships, including Italian vessels from Taren- tum and Locri and a few from Sicily, were stationed at Las in Laconia, and were making ready to sail to Euboea under the command of Agesandridas the son of Age- sander, a Spartan. Theramenes insisted that these ships were intended, not for Euboea, but for the party who Tvere fortifying Eetioneia, and that if the people were not on the alert they would be undone before they knew where they were. The charge was not a mere calumny, but had some foundation in the disposition of the ruling party. For what ΛνοηΜ have best pleased them would have been, retaining the oligarchy in any case, to have preserved the Athenian empire over the allies ; failing this, to keep merely their ships and walls, and to be independent ; if this too proved impracticable, at any rate they would not see democracy restored, and themselves fall the first victims, but would rather bring in the enemy and come to terms with them, not caring if thereby the city lost walls and ships and everything else, provided that they could save their ΟΛνη lives. So they worked diligently at the fort, which had entrances and postern-gates and every facility for intro- the enemy, and did their best to finish the in time. As yet the murmurs of discontent had been secret and confined to a few ; when suddenly Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lace- daemon, in a full market-place, having just quitted the council-chamber, was struck by an assassin, one of the force employed in guarding the frontier, and fell dead. The man who dealt the blow escaped ; his accomiplice, an Argive, was seized and put to the torture by order of the Four Hundred, but did not disclose any name or say who had instigated the deed. All he ΛνουΜ confess 92. Plirynichus is assas- sinated. The ene- mies of the oligarchy, secretly instigated by Thera- menes, now frow older. The soldiers who were building the fort seize the oligarch Alexicles. Thera- menes ducing buildino: THERAMENES THE TRIMMEK. 613 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. was that a number of persons used to assemble at the YIII. house of the commander of the frontier 2:uard, and in promises the ^ Four Hun- other houses. No further measures were taken ; and so died to go and release Theramenes and Aristocrates, and the other citizens, i^^^i• Hepre- ' ' tends to rate whether members of the Four Hundred or not, who were ^^, soldiers out m reality of the same mind, were emboldened to take decided Jheir'Jonduct steps. For the Peloponnesians had already sailed round o/tu^muifin from Las, and having overrun Aegina had cast anchor parSes^nlaiiy at Epidaurus ; and Theramenes insisted that if they had b?ows*tiie been on their Λvay to Euboea they would never have gone 5hed\o1;he^" up the Saronic gulf to Aegina and then returned and ^^'letthe anchored at Epidaurus, but that some one had invited ^^a rule?'» them for the purposes which he had always alleged; it was impossible therefore to be any longer indifferent. After many insinuations and inflammatory harangues, the people began to take active measures. The hop- lites who were at work on the fortification of Eetioneia in the Piraeus, among whom was Aristocrates with his OAvn tribe, ivhich, as taxiarch, he commanded, seized Alexicles, an oligarchical general who had been most concerned with the clubs, and shut him up in a house. Others joined in the act, including one Hermon, who commanded the Peripoli stationed at Munychia ; above all, the rank and file of the hoplites heartily approved. The Four Hundred, who were assembled in the council- house when the neΛvs was brought to them, were ready in a moment to take up arms, except Theramenes and his associates, who disapproved of their proceedings ; to these they began to use threats. Theramenes protested, and offered to go with them at once and rescue Alexicles. So, taking one of the generals who was of his own faction, he went down to the Piraeus. Aristarchus and certain young knights came also to the scene of conflict. Great and beΛvildering was the tumult, for in the city the people fancied that the Piraeus was in the hands of the insurgents, and that their prisoner had been killed, and the inhabitants of the Piraeus that they were on the point of being attacked from the city. The elder men with 614 THE FORT IS DEMOLISHED. B.C. 411 ; 01. 2. Yin, 93. The soldiers inarch from the Piraeus to the city. The Four Hundred send depu- ties to difficulty restrained the citizens, who Λvere running up and down and flying to arms. Thucydides of Pharsalus, the proxenus of Athens in that city, happening to be on the spot, kept throwing himself in every man's way and loudly entreating the people, when the enemy was lying in wait so near, not to destroy their country. At length they were pacified, and refrained from laying hands on one another. Theramenes, who Λvas himself a general, came to the Piraeus, and in an angry voice pretended to rate the soldiers, while Aristarchus and the party opposed to the people were furious. No effect was produced on the mass of the hoplites, who were for going to work at once. They began asking Theramenes if he thought that the fort was being built to any good end, and whether it would not be better demolished. He answered that, if they thought so, he thought so too. And immediately the hoplites and a crowd of men from the Piraeus got on the walls and began to pull them doΛvn. The cry addressed to the people was, " Whoever wishes the Five Thousand to rule and not the Four Hundred, let him come and help us." For they still veiled their real minds under the name of the Five Thousand, and did not venture to say outright " Whoever wishes the people to rule ; " they feared that the Five Thousand might actually exist, and that a man speaking in ignorance to his neighbor might get into trouble. The Four Hundred therefore did not wish the Five Thousand either to exist or to be known not to exist, thinking that to give so many a share in the government would be downright democracy, while at the same time the mystery tended to make the people afraid of one another. The next day the Four Hundred, although much dis- turbed, met in the council-chamber. Meanwhile the hoplites in the Piraeus let go Alexicles whom they had seized, and having demolished the fort went to the theatre of Dionysus near Munychia ; there piling arms they held an assembly, and resolved to march at once to APPEAKANCE OF A SPARTAN FLEET. 615 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. the city, which they accordingly did, and again piled VIII. arms in the temple of the Dioscuri. Presently deputies them and try -I ΤΛ Tx 1 1 rm negotiatiOD, appeared sent by the Four Hundred. These con- They promise ^*^ *^ ' to pubhsh the versed with them singly, and tried to persuade the ^f^^J^^^^® more reasonable part of them to keep quiet and re- «and ; out of •c ■'•-'- whom the strain their comrades, promising that they would pub- Jr^g^'^^g ^o lish the names of the Five Thousand, and that out of ^^ elected. these the Four Hundred should be in turn elected in such a manner as the Five Thousand might think fit. In the meantime they begged them not to ruin everything, or to drive the city upon the enemy. The discussion became general on both sides, and at length the whole body of soldiers grew calmer, and turned their thoughts to the danger which threatened the commonwealth. They finally agreed that an assembly should be held on a fixed day in the theatre of Dionysus to deliberate on the restoration of harmony. When the day arrived and the assembly was on the 94. point of meeting in the theatre of Dionysus, news came ^i;!^,"^®^^- that Ao^esandridas and his forty-two ships had crossed Lacedaemo- ^ vf 1 man squadron over from Meo^ara, and were sailine: alono- the coast of approaches & ' σ c nearer, and Salamis. Every man of the popular party thought t^^^^e^is ^^^^ that this was what they had been so often told by sternation. Theramenes and his friends, and that the ships were sailing to the fort, happily now demolished. Nor is it impossible that Agesandridas may have been hovering about Epidaurus and the neighborhood by agreement ; but it is equally likely that he lingered there of his own accord, with an eye to the agitation which prevailed at Athens, hoping to be on the spot at the critical moment. Instantly upon the arrival of the news the whole city rushed down to the Piraeus, thinking that a conflict with their enemies more serious than their domestic strife ^ was now awaiting them, not at a distance, but at the very mouth of the harbor. Some embarked in * Omitting η with one MS. Otherwise, retaining ^ witli a great majority of MSS. : *' thinking that a conflict among themselves more serious than tlie attack of their enemies," etc. volts (15). 616 EEYOLT AT EFBOEA. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. Vlll. the ships which were lying ready ; others launched fresh ships ; others manned the walls and prepared to defend the entrance of the Piraeus. 95. The Peloponnesian squadron, however, sailed onward, SSomvLd doubled the promontory of Sunium, and then, after aSipStiSat putting in between Thoricus and Prasiae, finally pro- ^Sritiit- ceeded to Oropus. The Athenians in their haste were foSithSnf^' compelled to employ crews not yet trained to Λvork constrained together, for the city was in a state of revolution, and ifedf:Jl*^air' the matter was vital and urgent ; Euboea was all in all to feated^aitd thcm uow that they were shut out from Attica.^ They SSin^ob-^" despatched a fleet under the command of Thymochares sfoSoflSr to Eretria; these ships, added to those which were at whfch re-^" ' Euboca bcforc, made up thirty-six. No sooner had they arrived than they were constrained to fight ; for Agesan- dridas, after his men had taken their midday meal, brought out his own ships from Oropus, which is distant by sea about seven miles from the city of Eretria, and bore down upon them. The Athenians at once began to man their ships, fancying that their creΛvs were close at hand ; but it had been so contrived that they were getting their provisions from houses at the end of the town, and not in the market, for the Eretrians inteux tionally sold nothing there that the men might lose time in embarking; the enemy would then come upon them before they Λvere ready, and they would be compelled to put out as best they could. A signal was also raised at Eretria telling the fleet at Oropus when to attack. The Athenians putting out in this hurried manner, and fiofhtino^ off* the harbor of Eretria. nevertheless resisted for a little while, but before long they fled and were pursued to the shore. Those of them who took refuge in the city of Eretria, relying on the friendship of the inhabitants, fiired ΛYorst, for they were butchered by them ; but such as gained the fortified position which the Athenians held in the Eretrian territory escaped, and also the crews of the vessels which reached Chalcis. » Cp. vii. 27 fin., 28 init. I PAISIC AT ATHENS. 617 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. The Peloponnesians, who had taken twenty-two Athe- Mill, nian ships and had killed or made prisoners of the men, erected a trophy. Not long afterwards they induced all Euboea to revolt, except Oreus of which the Athenians still maintained possession. They then set in order the affairs of the island. When the news of the battle and of the defection of 96. Euboea was brouo^ht to Athens, the Athenians w^ere TteAthe- o ^ mans nave panic-stricken. Nothing which had happened before, '"^^^^^^^ for not even the ruin of the Sicilian expedition, however aimy^revoiS overwhelming at the time, had so terrified them. The ^g^ nSmore army at Samos was in insurrection ; they had no ships InSiVafi tut in reserve or crews to man them ; there was revolution JJis.^^Bit^" at home — civil war might break out at any moment : savecSy the and by this new and terrible misfortune they had lost tS^Sedu* not only their ships, but what was worse, Euboea, on ™°^^^^• Avhich they were more dependent for supplies than on Attica itself. Had they not reason to despair? But what touched them nearest, and most agitated their minds, was the fear lest their enemies, emboldened by victory, should at once attack the Piraeus, in which no ships were left ; indeed they fancied that they were all but there. And had the Peloponnesians been a little more enterprising they could easily have executed such a plan. Either they might have cruised near, and would then have aggravated the divisions in the city ; or by remaining and carrying on a blockade they might have compelled the fleet in Ionia, although hostile to the oli- garchy, to come and assist their kindred and their native city ; and then the Hellespont, Ionia, all the islands be- tween Ionia and Euboea, in a word, the whole Athenian empire, Avould have fallen into their hands. But on this as on so many other occasions the Lacedaemonians proved themselves to be the most convenient enemies whom the Athenians could possibly have had. For the two peoples ivere of very different tempers ; the one quick, the other slow ; the one adventurous, the other timorous ;^ and the 1 Cp. i. 70. 618 DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. YUI. 97. They imme- diatelj• de- pose the Four Hundred, and establish a new govern- ment (the best which Thucydides had known) of Five Thou- sand, being the citizens who supplied themselves with arms. Pay for ofaces abolished. Alcibiades recalled. 98. Betrayal of Oenoo to the Peloponne- sians by Aristarchus. Lacedaemonian character was of great service to the Athenians, the more so because the empire for which they were fighting Λvas maritime. And this view is confirmed by the defeat of the Athenians at Syracuse ; for the Syracusans, who were most like them,^ fought best against them. When the news came the Athenians in tlieir extremity still contri\^ed to man twenty ships, and immediately summoned an assembly (the first of manj^) in the j)lace called the Pnyx, where they had always been in the habit of meeting ; at which assembly they deposed the Four Hundred, and voted that the government should be in the hands of the Five Thousand ; this number was to include all who could furnish themseh^es with arms. Xo one was to receive pay for holding any office on pain of falling under a curse. In the numerous other assem- blies which were afterwards held they re-appointed No- mothetae, and by a series of decrees established a con- stitution. This government during its early days Avas the best which the Athenians eΛ^er enjoyed within my memory. Oligarchy and democracy were duly attem- jDered. And thus after the miserable state into which she had fallen, the city was again able to raise her head. The people also passed a vote recalling Alcibiades and others from exile, and sending to him and to the army in Samos exhorted them to act vigorously. When this neΛV revolution began, Peisander, Alexi- cles, and the other leaders of the oligarchy stole aAvay to Decelea ; all except Aristarchus, who, being one of the generals at the time, gathered round him hastily a few archers of the most barbarous sort and made his way to Oenoe. This was an Athenian fort on the borders of Boeotia which the Corinthians,^ having called the Boeo- tians to their aid, were now besieging on their own ac- count, in order to revenge an overthroΛV inflicted by the ί Cp. i. 141 med. ; vii. 55. 2 Or, "which Corinthian volunteers,' account." omitting " on their own THE TRAITOR ARISTARCHUS. 619 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. garrison of Οβηοέ upon a party of them who were going VIII. home from Decelea. Aristarchus entered into communi- cation with the besiegers, and deceived the garrison by telling them that the Athenian government had come to terms Λvith the Lacedaemonians, and that by one of the conditions of the peace they were required to give up the place to the Boeotians. They, trusting him, whom they knew to be a general, and being in entire ignorance of what had happened . because they were closely in- vested, capitulated and came out. Thus Oeno^ was taken and occupied by the Boeotians ; and the oligarchic cal revolution at Athens came to an end. During this summer and about the same time Min- 99. darus transferred the fleet of the Peloponnesians to the No sign of the , -m r 1 Pnoenician Hellespont. They had been waitms: at Miletus. But sMps. The ■"- \ ^ ^^ Peloponne- none of the commissioners whom Tissaphernes on o:oino' sians now be- , ■•■ σο come aware to Aspendus appointed to supply the fleet gave them *^|*^es^|" anything ; and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissa- ^^g^SSfS?^ phernes himself had as yet made their appearance ; fi'^i^eTt^to Philip, who had been sent with Tissaphernes, and aSe HefSt Hippocrates a Spartan, then in Phaselis, had informed ^r^detaiiSd the admiral, Mindarus that the ships would never ^*^^°^• come, and that Tissaphernes was thoroughly dishonest in his dealings with them. All this time Pharnabazus was invitino' them and was easrer to secure the assistance of the fleet ; he wanted, like Tissaphernes, to raise a revolt, whereby he hoped to profit, among the cities in his own dominion ivhich still remained faithful to Athens. So at length Mindarus, in good order and giving the signal suddenly, lest he should be discovered by the Athenians at Samos, put to sea from Miletus with seventy-three ships, and set sail for the Hellespont, whither in this same summer a Peloponnesian force had already gone in sixteen ships, and had overrun a portion of the Chersonese. But meeting with a storm Mindarus was driven into Icarus, and being detained there five or six days by stress of weather, he put in at Chios. When Thrasyllus at Samos heard that he had started 100. 620 THE ATHENIANS AT LESBOS. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. vin. The Athe- nians pursue them. Observing that they are at Chios, tliey stop at Lesbos to watch them, and during their stay besiege Eresus (16) which has revolted. 101. from Miletus he sailed away in all haste with fifty-five ships, fearing that the enemy might get into the Helles- pont before him. Observing that Mindarus was at Chios, and thinking that he could keep him there, he placed scouts at Lesbos and on the mainland oppo- site, that he might be informed if the shij)s made any attempt to sail away. He himself coasted along the island to Methymna and ordered a supply of barley- meal and other provisions, mtending, if he were long detained, to make Lesbos his headquarters, while at- taking Chios. He wanted also to sail against the Lesbian town of Eresus, w^hich had revolted, and, if possible, to destroy the place. Now certain of the chief citizens of Methymna w^ho had been driven into exile had conveyed to the island about fiftj^hoplites, partisans of theirs, from Cym^, besides others wdiom they hired on the mainland, to the number of three hundred in all. They w^ere commanded by Alexander, a Theban, w^ho was chosen leader because the Lesbians were of Theban descent. 1 They first of all attacked Methymna. Li this attempt they were foiled by the timely arrival of the Athenian garrison from Mitylend, and being a second time repulsed outside the walls, had marched over the mountains and induced Eresus to revolt. Thither Thra- syllus sailed, having determined to attack them with all his ships. He found that Thrasybulus had already reached the place, ha\ing started from Samos with five ships as soon as he heard that the exiles had landed. But he had come too late to prevent the revolt, and was lying ofl' Eresus. There Thrasyllus was also joined by two ships which were on their way home from the Helles- pont, and by a squadron from Methymna. The Avhole fleet now consisted of sixty-seven ships, from the crews of which the generals formed an army, and prepared by the help of engines and by every possible means to take Eresus. MeauAvhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at * Cp. iii. 2 fin., 5med., 13 init. ; viii. 5 init. LACEDAEMONIANS AT THE HELLESPONT. 621 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. Chios, having spent two days in provisioning, and having VIII. received from the Chians three Chian tesseracosts^ for The Peiopon- iiesian fleet each man, on the third day sailed hastily from Chios, fsaimg away ' J J ^ before dawTi not o:oino^ throuo-h the open sea, lest they should fall in from cmos, i5 i5 σ Jr ' J on the eveu- with the ships blockading Eresus, but making directly gefo^nddL for the mainland and keeping Lesbos on the left. They Henespont^^ touched at the harbor of the island Carteria, which belongs to Phocaea, and there taking their midday meal, sailed past the Cumaean territory, and supped at Argennusae on the mainland over against Mitylen^, They sailed away some time before dawn, and at Harmatus, which is opposite Methymna on the main- land, the ν again took their midday meal ; they quickly passed by the promontory of Lectum, Larissa, Hamaxi- tus, and the neighboring towns, and finally arrived at Ehoeteium in the Hellespont before midnight. Some of the ships also put into Sigeium and other places in the neighborhood. The Athenians, who lay with eighteen ships at Sestos,^ 102. knew from the beacons which their scouts kindled, and The Athenian squadron at from the sudden blaze of many watch-fires which ap- \^^^^^^^^^^ peared in the enemy's country, that the Peloponnesians J^"^ some were on the point of sailing into the strait. That very night, getting close under the Chersonese, they moved towards Elaeus, in the hope of reaching the open sea before the enemy's ships arrived. They passed unseen the sixteen Peloponnesian ships^ which were at Abydos, and had been told by their now approaching friends to keep a sharp look-out if the Athenians tried to get away. At daivn of day they sighted the fleet of Min- darus, which immediately gave chase ; most of them escaped in the direction of Imbros and Lemnos, but the four Λvhich were hindermost were caught off Elaeus. One which ran ashore near the temple of Protesilaus Ϊ A small Chian coin of which the exact value is unknown ; if it amounted to ^^Q-th of the gold stater (20 drachmae) it would be worth 3 obols, nearly 5d. 2 Cp. viii. 80 fin. s Cp. viii. 99 fin. 622 THE ATHEOTANS FOLLOW. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. VIII• the Peloponnesians took, together with the crew ; two others Λvithout the crews ; a fourth they burnt on the shore of Imbros : the crew escaped. 103. For the rest of that day they blockaded Elaeus with theresro?tiie ^^® ships from Abydos which had now joined them ; the fleeif^vMch ^^^^i^ed fleet numbering eighty-six; but as the town thatth?^ would not yield they sailed away to Abydos. Sans^had^ The Athenians, whose scouts had failed them, and waM^bii" ^^^ ^^^ never imagined that the enemy's fleet could p^Sued*^^^ pass them undetected, were quietly besieging Eresus ; them. 1^^^^ Qjj finding Qut their mistake they instantly set sail and followed the enemy to the Hellespont. They fell in with and took two Pel oponnesian ships, which during the pursuit had ventured too far into the opea sea. On the following day they came to Elaeus, where they re- mained at anchor, and the ships which had taken refuge at Imbros joined them ; the next five days were spent in making preparations for the impending engagement. 104. After this they fought, and the manner of the battle c^ioYsema ^^^ ^^ follows. The Athenians began to sail in column efoSy-eight ^losc aloug the shorc toΛvards Sestos, when the Pelo- SanaSd"^" poiiiiesians, observing them, likewise put to sea from αΞ^π^ Abydos. Perceiving that a battle was imminent, the Siopon^e- Athenians, numbering seventy-six ships, extended their lifiSfup^iSir lii^e along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani, tieSS.^ and the Peloponnesians, numbering eighty-eight ships, moT^ent' from Abydos to Dardanus. The Syracusans held the buSs,^which right wing of the Peloponnesians ; the other ^ving, on Sre^iVthe which were the swiftest ships, was led by Mindarus him- neariy^ proVes sclf. Thrasyllus Commanded the left wing of the Athe- fataitothem. ^.^^^^ and Thrasybulus the right; the other generals had their several posts. The Peloponnesians were eager to begin the engagement, intending as their left Aving extended beyond the right of the Athenians, to prevent them, if possible, from sailing again out of the straits, and also to thrust their centre back on the land, which was near. The Athenians, seeing their intention, advanced from the land the wing on which the enemy wanted to BATTLE OF CYNOSSEMA. 623 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. cut them off, and succeeded in getting beyond them. ΥΠΙ. But their left wing by this time had passed the prom- ontory of Cynossema, and the result was that the centre of their line was thinned and weakened — all the more since their numbers were inferior and the sharp projection of the shore about Cynossema hindered those who were on one side from seeing what was taking place on the other. So the Peloponnesians, sailing upon the centre of the 105. Athenian fleet forced their enemies' ships back on the niomen?Jf beach, and having gained a decisive advantage, dis- peio^Jonie- embarked to follow up their victory. Neither Thrasy- ^ίίΓοοϊΐα- bulus on the right wing, who was pressed hard by le^f^^tef^Jy^a superior numbers, nor Thrasyllus on the left, was able to of*Thi^asy-^^ assist them. The promontory of Cynossema hindered ^^^^• the left wing from seeing the action, and the ships of the Syracusans and others equal in number to their own, kept them fully engaged. But at last, while the victo- rious Peloponnesians were incautiously pursuing, some one ship, some another, a part of their line began to fall into disorder. Thrasybulus remarked their con- fusion, and at once left off extendins: his wmg- : then turning upon the ships which were opposed to him, he repulsed and put them to flight ; he next faced ^ the conquering and now scattered ships of the Pelopon- nesian centre, struck at them, and threw them into such a panic that hardly any of them resisted. The Syra- cusans too had by this time given way to Thrasyllus, and were still more inclined to fly when they saΛV the others flying. After the rout the Peloponnesians effected their 106. escape, most of them to the river Meidius first, and then Effect of ■^ ' the battle to Abydos. Not many ships were taken by the Athe- «nthe r- Ί TT^ Μ mind of the mans ; for the Hellespont, beins^ narrow, afforded a Athenians. ^ c) ' They can retreat to the enemy within a short distance. Never- Jjaniiy theless nothing could have been more opportune for *^^Jj[J^°^ them than this victory at sea : for some time past they * Or, ''intercepted." 624 RETUEN OF ALCIBIADES TO SAMOS. B.C. 411 : 01. 92, 2. yrii. Twenty-one ships of the enemy -were taken and fifteen of their own lost. 107. Eight more Peloponne- sian ships captured by the Athe- nians. They recover Cyzicus (17) which has revolted. 108. Alcibiades returns from Tissa/- phernes. whom he had feared the Peloponnesian navy on account of their disaster in Sicily, as well as of the various smaller defeats which they had sustained.^ But now they ceased to depreciate themselves or to think much of their enemies' seamanship. They had taken eight Chian vessels, uyq Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and of the Leucadians, Lacedaemonians, Syracusans, and Pelle- nians one each. Their ΟΛνη loss amounted to fifteen ships. They raised a trophy on the promontory of Cynossema, and then collecting the wrecks, and giving up to the enemy his dead under a flag of truce, sent a trireme carrying the news of the victory to Athens. On the arrival of the ship the Athenians could hardly believe their good fortune, and, after the calamities which had befallen them in Euboea and during the revolution, they were greatly encouraged. They thought that their afiairs were no longer hopeless, and that if they were energetic they might still win. The Athenians at Sestos promptly repaired their ships, and were proceeding against Cyzicus, which had revolted, wdien, seeing the eight Peloponnesian ships^ from Byzantium anchored at Harpagium and Priapus, they bore down upon them, and defeating the land- forces Λvhich were acting with them, took the ships. They then went and recovered Cyzicus, which was un walled, and exacted a contribution from the in- habitants. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus, and recovered as many of their own captured vessels as were still seaworthy ; the rest had been burnt by the Elaeusians. They then sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to bring up the ships which were there. About the same time Alcibiades sailed back with his thirteen ships ^ from Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, announcing that he had prevented the Phoenician fleet from coming to the assistance of the enemy, and that he » Cp. viii. 95, 102. 3 Cp. viii. 88 init. Cp. viii. 80 fin. ABSACES AND THE DELIANS. 625 B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. had made Tissaphernes a greater friend of the Athe- VIII. nians than ever. He then manned nine additional ships, professes to ••• ' have made a and exacted large sums of money from the Halicarnas- Jjjf^jf^^ ^^ sians. He also fortified Cos,^ where he left a governor, ^^^ns. and towards the autumn returned to Samos. When Tissaphernes heard that the Peloponnesian Tissaphernes fleet had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he broke to^^iuS^The up his camp at Aspendus and marched away towards ZeLherjot Ionia. Now after the arrival of the Peloponnesians at Arsaces in- the Hellespont, the Antandrians, who are Aeolians, had Antandrians , , to obtain a procured from them at Aby dos a force of infantry, which garrison from they led through Mount Ida and introduced into their nesians. city. They were oppressed by Arsaces the Persian, a lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This Arsaces, when the Athenians, wishing to purify Delos, expelled the in- habitants and they settled in Adramyttium,^ professing to have a quarrel which he did not wish to declare openly, asked their best soldiers to form an army for him. He then led them out of the town as friends and allies, and, taking advantage of their midday meal, surrounded them with his own troops, and shot them down. This deed alarmed the Antandrians, who thought that they might meet with some similar violence at his hands ; and as he was imposing upon them burdens which were too heavy for them, they expelled his garrison from their citadel. Tissaphernes, who was already offended at the ex- 109. pulsion of his o^arrison from Miletus,^ and from Cnidus,'* Tissaphernes where the same thing had happened, perceived that this i^gf^^^J^nne^^ new injury was the work of the Peloponnesians. He f^^^^^^'"''' felt that they were now his determined enemies, and was y^ie excus- '^ ' mg himself. apprehensive of some further injury. He was also dis- gusted at discovering that . Pharnabazus had induced the Peloponnesians to join him, and was likely in less time and at less expense to be more successful in the war with the Athenians than himself. He therefore * Cp. viii. 41 med. 3 Cp. viii. 84 med. 2 Cp. V. 1. 1 Cp. viii. 35 init. 40 626 TISSAPHERNES. B.C. 411 ; 01. 92, 2. yill. determined to go to the Hellespont, and complain of He stops on their conduct in the affair of Antandrus, offerino^ at the liis way at ' ο Ephesus, and same time the most plausible defence which he could sacriiices to ^ Artemis. conccming the non-arrival of the Phoenician fleet and their other grievances. He first went to Ephesus, and there offered sacrifice to Artemis. [With the end of the Avinter which follows this sum- mer the twenty-first year of the Peloponnesian War is completed.] INDEX. The compilation of this Index has been greatly assisted by the Geographi(;al and Historical Index prepared by Mr. Tiddeman for the later editions of Arnold's Thucydides. The subdivision of the chapters not agreeing in different editions, each chapter is referred to in three parts, marked, init., med., fin. Abdera, situation of, ii. 97 init. ; Nymphodorus of Abdera, ii. 29. Abydos, a Milesian colony, viii. 61 init. ; revolts to the Lacedaemo- nians, ib. 62; Strombicliides re- called from, ib. 79 med. ; the Pelo- ponnesian headquarters, ib. 102- 108. Acamantis, an Athenian tribe, iv. 118 fin. Acanthus, an Andrian colony, iv. 84 init. ; revolts from Athens, ib. 84- 88; provision respecting, in the treaty between Lacedaemon and Athens, v. 18, vi. ; speech of Brasi- das at, iv. 85-87, 114 med., 120 med. ; Acanthian troops with Brasidas, ib. 124 init. Acanthus, a Lacedaemonian, swears to the Treaty of Peace and the Alliance, v. 19 med., ib. 24 init. Acarnan, eponymous hero of Acar- nania, ii. 102 fin. Acarnania, named after Acarnan, ii. 102 fin. ; opposite to Cephal- lenia, ii. 30 fin. ; invaded by the Ambraciots, ib. 80-82; the Acar- nanians always carry arms, i. 5 fin. ; skilful slingers, ii. 81 fin. , vii. 31 fin. ; their common council, iii. 105 init. ; allies of Athens [except Oeniadae, ii. 102 init.], ii. 7 fin., 9 med., 68 fin., iii. 95 med., 102 med., iv. 77 med., 89, 101 med., vii. 57 fin. , 60 fin. , 67 med. ; expedition of Phormio against Oeniadae, ii. 102 ; request as their commander a relation of Phormio, iii. 7 ; attack Leucas, iii. 94 init. med. ; defeat the Ambraciots, ib. 105-113; con- clude a treaty with Ambracia, ib. 114 med. ; colonize Anactorium, iv. 49. Acesines, a river in Sicily, iv. 25 med. Achaea [in Peloponnesus], restored by the Athenians, i. 115 init. [cp. i. Ill fin.]; redemanded from the Lacedaemonians by Cleon, iv. 21 med. ; resettled by the Lace- daemonians, V. 82 init. ; Achae- ans, the original Hellenes, i. 3 med. ; founders of Zacynthus, ii. 66; found Scione on their return from Troy, iv. 120 init. ; allies of the Athenians, i. Ill fin. ; at first neutral in the war, except the Pellenes, ii. 9 init. ; not allowed to join in the foundation of He- raclea, iii. 92 fin. ; support the Peloponnesians in the engagement off Erineum, vii. 34 init. Achaea [Pthiotis], iv. 78 init.; sub- ject to the Thessalians, viii. 3 med. Acharnae, the largest of the Athe- nian Demes, ii. 19 fin., ib. 21 fin., 23 init. ; ravaged by the Pelopon- nesians, ib. 19 fin. Achelous, ii. 102 med., iii. 7 med., 106 init. ; description of its Delta, ii. 102 med. Acheron, a river in Thesprotis, i. 46 fin. Acherusian lake, in Thesprotis, i. 46 med. Achilles, followers of, the original Hellenes, i. 3 med. Acrae, founded by the Syracusans, vi. 5 init. Acraean height, in Sicilj^, vii. 78 fin. Acragas, a river in Sicily, vi. 4 med. Acragas, see Agrigentum. Acropolis of Athens, ii. 13 med., 15 med.; taken by Cylon, i. 126; anciently called PoUs, ii. 15 fin.; preserved from occupation in the plague, ii. 17 init.; treaties of peace recorded on tablets there, 628 INDEX. V. 18, xi. 23, iv. 4Y fin. ; inscription in commemorating the oppression of tlie tyrants, vi. 55 init. Acrothous, in Acte, iv. 109 med. Acte, ttie peninsula of, iv. 109. Actium, the Corinthian fleet met by a Corcyraean herald at, i. 29 med. ; the Corinthians encamp near, il•. 80 fin. Adeimantus, father of Aristeus, a Corinthian, i. 60 med. Admetus, King of Molossians, pro- tects Themistocles, i. 136, 137. Adramyttium settled by the Delians, V. 1 fin., viii. 108 fin. Aentides, son-in-law of Hippias the tyrant, \i. 59 fin. Aegaleos, Mount, in Attica, ii. 19 fin. Aegean Sea, i. 98 med., iv. 109 med. Aegina, on the direct route from Athens to Argos, v. 53 fin. ; colo- nized from Athens, ii. 27, vii. 57 init. , viii. 69 med. ; Corcyraean envoys deposited in, iii. 72 init. ; the settlers in Aegina at Man- tinea, V. 74 fin. ; at Syracuse, vii. 57 init. ; aid in the oligarchical conspiracy at Athens, viii. 69 med. ; the Sicilian expedition races as far as, vi. 32 med. ; the reinforcements stay at, vii. 20 fin., 26 init.; rav- aged by the Peloponnesians, viii. 92 med. ; former naval power of the Aeginetans, i. 14 fin. ; first war between the Aeginetans and Athe- nians, lb. 14 fin., ib. 41 init.; second, ib. 105; come to terms with the Athenians, ib. 108 fin. ; the Aeginetans secretly urge on the war, ib. 67 med. ; the Lace- daemonians demand their inde- pendence, ib. 139 init., 140 med.; expelled by the Athenians, ii. 27 init. ; settled by the Lacedaemo- nians at Thyrea, ib. med. ; assist the Lacedaemonians in the war of Ithome, '/7), fin. ; attacked by the Athenians in Thyrea, iv. 56 fin., 57 init. ; the survivors put to death, ib fin. Aegitium, in Aetolia, iii. 97 med. Aeimnestus, a Plataean, father of Lacon, iii. 52 fin. Aeneas, a Corinthian, iv. 119 med. Aenesias, Ephor at Sparta, ii. 2 init. Aenianians, in Malis, v. 51 init. Aenus, in Thrace, iy. 28 med. ; founded from Boeotia, vii. 57 med. ; tributary to Athens, ib. Aeoladas, a Theban, father of Pa- gondas, iv. 91 med. Aeolian countries and cities, Boeo- tia, vii. 57 med. ; Lesbos, ib [cp. iii. 2 fin., 5 med., 13 init., viii. 4 med., 100 med.]; Tenedos, vii. 57; Aenus, ib. ; Cume, iii. 31 init. ; Antandros, viii. 108 med. Aeolian Islands, see Liparaean Islands. Aeolian subjects of the Athenians at Syracuse, vii. 57 med. Aeolians, ancient occupants of Cor- inth, iv. 42 med. 'Aeolis, former name of Calydon and Pleuron, iii. 102 med. Aesimides, a Corcyraean commander, i. 47 init. Aeson, an Argive envoy to Lacedae- mon, V. 40 fin. Aethea, Lacedaemonian Perioeci of, i. 101 init. Aethiopia, plague said to have begun in, ii. 48 init. Aetna, eruption of, iii. 116; the third since the Hellenic settlements of Sicily, ib. Aetolia, customs of the Aetolians, i. 5 fin., iii. 94 fin.; disastrous cam- paign of the Athenians in, ib. 94 med. -98 [cp. iv. 30 init.]; the Aetolians persuade the Lacedae- monians to send an expedition against IS'aupactus, ib. 100 ; join in the expedition, ib. 102 init. ; Aeto- lians before Syracuse, vii. 57 fin. Agamemnon, power of, i. 9; pos- sessed a great navy, ib. Agatharchidas, a Corinthian com- mander, ii. 83 fin. Agatharchus, a Sicilian commander, vii. 25 init., 70 init. Agesander, father of Agesandridas, a Spartan, viii. 91 med. Agesandridas, a Spartan commander, viii. 91 med., 94, 95. Agesippidas, a Lacedaemonian com- mander, V. 56 init. Agis, King of Lacedaemon, iii. 89 init., iv. 2 init.; invades Attica, ib. 2 init., 6; swears to the Treaty of Alliance, v. 24 init.; marches towards Argos, but retires, 27). 54: attacks Argos, ib. 57; surrounds the Argives, ib. 58, 59; makes a truce with the Argives, ib. 60 init. : blamed for his conduct, and threat- ened with punishment, ib. 60 med., 63 ; nearly commits a second error, ib. 65 init. ; draws the Argives into the plain, ib, fin. ; surprised by the enemy before Mantinea, ih. 66 init., defeats the enemy, ib. 70-74 ; leads INDEX. 629 a new expedition to Argos, ib. 83 init. ; inyades Attica, and fortifies Decelea, vii. 19 init., 27 med. raises money for a navy, viii. 3 init. ; bis great powers, viii. 4 fin. ; rejects tlie peace proposals of the Atlienian oligarchs, ib. 70 fin. ; re- pulsed from the walls of Athens, ib. 71; advises the Four Hundred to send ambassadors to Sparta, ib. fin. ; an enemy of Alcibiades, viii. 12 fin., 45 init. Agraeans, in JEtolia, ii. 102 med., iii. 106 med., ib. Ill fin., 114 med. ; forced into the Athenian alliance, iv. 77 fin. ; employed in a descent upon Sicyon, ib. 101 med. Agrianians, in Paeonia, ii. 96 med. Agrigentum, founded from Gela, vi. 4 med. ; gained over by Phaeax to the Atlienian alliance, v. 4 fin. ; re- mains neutral in the war between Syracuse and Athens, vii. 32 med. , ib. 33 init., ib. 58 init. ; falls into revolution, vii. 46 ; victory of the anti-Syracusan party, ib. 50 init. Alcaeus, Archon at Athens, v. 19 init., ib. 25 init. Alcamenes, a Lacedaemonian com- mander, viii. 4; ordered to Lesbos by Agis, ib. 8 med. ; driven into Piraeum by the Athenians and slain, ib. 10 fin. Alcibiades, the name Lacedaemo- nian, viii. 6 med. ; his extravagant character, vi. 12 fin. ; had a great share in the ruin of Athens, ib. 15 ; • his victories at Olympia, ib. 16 init.; head of the" war party at Athens, v. 43 init., vi. 15 init.; irritated by the contempt of the Lacedaemonians, v. 43 med.; ne- gotiates an alliance witli Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, ib. 44, 46 ; de- ceives the Lacedaemonian envoys, ib. 45; his activity in Peloponne- sus, ib. 52 fin., 53, 55 [cp. vi. 16 fin.] ; persuades the Athenians to declare the treaty broken and re- settle the Helots at Pylos, ib. 56 med. ; ambassador at Argos, ib. 61 med., 76 med. ; seizes a number of suspected Argives, ib. 84 init. ; appointed one of the generals in Sicily, vi. 8 med.; speech of, ib. 16-18; accused of mutilating the Hermae and celebrating the mys- teries in pri\^ate houses, ib. 28 init. ; begs in vain to be tried be- fore sailing, ib. 29 ; opinion of, in home, ib. 53 init., 61; escapes at Thurii, ib. fin.; condemned to death, ib. ; causes the failure of a plot to betray Messina, ib. 74 init. ; goes to Lacedaemon, ib. 88 fin. ; his speech there, ib. 89-92; per- suades the Lacedaemonians to for- tify Decelea, vii. 18 init. ; supports the Chians at Sparta, viii. 6 med. ; persuades the Spartan government not to give up the Chian expedition, viii. 12; sent to Ionia with Chal- cideus, ib. 12 fin. ; induces tlie re- volt of Chios, Ei-ytlirae, Clazome- nae, ib. 14; chases Strombichides into Samos, ib. 16 ; causes tlie re- volt of Teos, ib. fin. ; and of Mile- tus, ib. 17: present at an engage- ment before Miletus, ib. 26 fin. ; falls into disfavor with the Lacedaemonians, ib. 45 init. ; retires to Tissaphernes, and en- endeavors to ruin the Pelcponne- sian cause, ib. med. ; repulses the revolted cities when they beg money, ib. fin. ; instructs Tissa- phernes to balance the Athenians and Lacedaemonians against each other, ib. 46; conspires with seme Athenians at Samos to overthroΛV the democracy, ib. 47-49; op- posed by Phiynichus, ib. 48 fin. ; whom he endea\"ors unsuccessfully to ruin, ?5. 50, 51; seeks to dravv^ Tissaphernes over to the Athenian cause, ib. 52 init. ; persuades Tissaphernes to demand impossi- ble terms from Peisander, ib. 56; recalled by the Athenians at Sa- mos, ib. 81 init. ; encourages them with extravagant hopes, ib. 81; re- strains them from sailing to the Piraeus, ib. 82; made command- er-in-chief, ib. ; goes to Tissaplier- nes, ib. ; again restrains tlie peo- ple from sailing to the Piraeus, and thus performs an eminent ser- vice, ib. 86 med, ; sails to Aspen- dus, promising to keep the Phoe- nician fleet back, ib. 88; recalled by the Athenians at home, ib. 97 fin. ; returns from Caunus, profess- ing to have secured Tissaphernes' friendship for Athens, ib. 108 init. ; returns to Samos, ib. med. Alcidas takes command of the Pelo- ponnesian fleet sent to Lesbos, iii. 16 fin., 26 init. ; arrives too late, ib. 29; determines to return, ib. 31 ; slaughters his captives, ib. 32 ; is chased to Patmos by the Athe- 630 INDEX. nians, ib. 33, 69 init. ; sails to Cor- cyra, ib. 69, 76 ; engages the Athe- nians, ib. 77,78; retires, ib. 79-81; helps in the foundation of Hera- clea, ib. 92 iin. Alcinadas, a Lacedaemonian, swears to the Treaty of Peace and the Alliance, v. 19 med. ; ib. 24 init. Alcinous, Temple of Zeus and Alci- nous at Corcyra, iii. 70 med. Alciphron, an Argive, makes terms with Agis, V. 59 iin., 60 init. Alcisthenes, an Athenian, father of Demosthenes, iii. 91 init., iv. 66 med., vii. 16 fin. Alcmaeon, the story of, ii. 102 fin. Alcmaeonidae, aid in the deposition of Hippias, vi. 59 fin. Alexandria, the father of Perdiccas, King of Macedonia, i. 57 init., ib. 137 init. ; of Argive descent, ii. 99 init. Alexarchus, a Corinthian command- er, vii. 19 med. Alexicles, an Athenian general of the oligarchical party, seized by the popular party, viii. 92 med. ; released, 93 init. ; flees to Decelea, 98 init. Alexippidas, Ephor at Lacedaemon, viii. 58 init. Alicyaei, in Sicily, vii. 32 med. All things have their times of growth and decay, ii. 64 med. Allies [of the Athenians], ii. 9 fin.; character of the league, i. 19 ; used to meet at Delos, i. 96 fin. ; for- merly independent, ib. 97 init. ; their gradual subjugation, ib. 99 [cp. iii. 10, 11, vi. 76] ; those pres- ent before Syracuse, vii. 57; ad- mired in Hellas for their adoption of Athenian language and man- ners, vii. 63 med. Allies [of the Lacedaemonians], ii. 9 init. ; formation of the league, i. 18; its character ib. 19; allies summoned to Sparta, i. 67; again summoned, ib. 119 ; vote for war, ib. 125. Almopia, in Macedonia, ii. 99 fin. Alope, in Locris, ii. 26 fin. Altar of Apollo the Founder, at Naxos, vi. 3 init.; the Pythian Apollo, erected by Pisistratus at Athens, ib. 54 fin. ; [Athene] in the Acropolis, i. 126 med.; the awful Goddesses at Athens, ib. ; the tΛvelve Gods at Athens, vi. 54 fin.; Olympian Zeus, v. 50 init. Altars, a sanctuary and refuge, iv. 98 fin. ; viii. 84 med. Alyzia, in Acarnania, vii. 31 init . Ambracia, a Corinthian colony, ii. 80 med., vii. 58 med.; an ally of the Lacedaemonians, ii. 9 init. ; the Ambraciots, the most warlike of the Epeirots, iii. 108 med. ; they send troops to Epidamnus, i, 26 init. ; furnish ships to Corinth, ib. 27 fin., ib. 46 init., 48 fin. ; defeated in the engagement off Sybota, ib. 49 * med. ; attack the Amphilochian Argives, ii, 68 ; invade Acarnania, ib. 80; retire, ib. 82; send rein- forcements to Alcidas, iii. 69; persuade the Lacedaemonians to attack the Amphilochian Argos, ib. 102 fin, ; join the Lacedaemonians in the expedition, ib. 105, 106 ; de- feated by the Acarnanians. under Demosthenes, ib. 107, 108; de- serted by the Peloponnesians, ib. 109, 111: total destruction of their reinforcements, ib. 112, 113 ; great- ness of the calamity, ib. 113 fin.; conclude a treaty with the Acar- nanians, ib. 114. med. ; receive a garrison from Corinth, ib. fin. ; assist Gylippus with ships, vi, 104 med., vii. 4 fin., 7 init., 58 med.; present at Cynossema, viii. 106 med. ; Ambraciot envoys sent by the Syracusans to the Sicilian cities after the capture of Plem- myrium, vii. 25 fin. ; slain by the Sicels, ib. 32. Ambracian gulf, i. 29 med., 55 init. Ameiniades," Athenian ambassador to Seuthes, ii. 67 med. Ameinias, a Lacedaemonian envoy, iv. 132 fin. Ameinocles, the Corinthian ship- builder, i. 13 init. Ammeas, a Plateau commander, iii. 22 med. Amorges, the bastard son of Pis- suthnes, revolts in Caria, viii 5. fin., 19 init.; captured by the Pel- oponnesians, and handed over to Tissaphernes, ib. 28 med. ; said by Peisander to have l)een betrayed by Phrynichus, ib. 54 med. Ampelidas, a Lacedaemonian envoy to Argos, V. 22 med. Amphiaraus, father of Amphilochus, ii. 68 init.; of Alcmaeon, ii. 102 med. Amphias, an Epidaurian, Iv. 119 med. Amphidorus, a Megarian, iv. 119 med. INDEX. 631 Amphilocliia, colonized by Amphi- loclms, ii. 68 init. : the Amphi- locliians barbarians, ib. med. iii. 112 fin. ; learnt Greek from the Ambraciots, ii. 68 med. ; expelled by the Ambraciots, ii. 68 med. ; reinstated by Athenian aid, ib. fin. ; attacked by the Ambraciots and Lacedaemonians, iii. 10.5; join Demosthenes at Olpae, ib. 107 init. ; defeated, 108 med. ; destroy the Ambraciot fugitives from Ido- mene, ib. 112 ; make a treaty with Ambracia, ib. 114 med. Amphilochian Hills, iii. 112 init. Amphipolis, formerly called ' The Nine Ways,' i. 100 fin., iv. 102 med. : origin of the name, iv. 102 fin. ; attempted colonization of, by Aristagoras, iv, 102 init. ; unsuc- cessful settlement of, by the Athe- nians, i. 100 fin. , iv. 102 init. ; colo- nized by Hagnon, iv. 102 med., v. 11 init. , ' Thracian gates' of, v. 10 init. , med. ; temple of Athene at, ib. ; captm-ed by I3rasidas, iv. 102- 106: battle of, v. 6-11, 12 fin.; or- dered to be surrendered under treaty, v. 18. v; not sm'rendered, ib. 21, 35, 46; abandonment of an Athenian expedition against, v. 83 fin. ; unsuccessfully attacked by the Athenians, vii. 9 ; the Ami^hi- politans make Brasidas their foun- der, V. 11 init. Amphissa, in Ozolian Locris, iii. 101 init. Amyclae, temple of Apollo at, v. 18, xi: ib. 23, iv. Amyntas, son of Philip, ii, 95 fin., ib. 100 med. Amyrtaeus, the Egyptian king in the fens, i. 110 init., ib. 112 med. Anactorium, i. 29 med. ; sends aid to Corinth, ib. 46 init,, ii. 9 init.; hostile to the Acarnanians, iii. 114 fin. ; held by the Corinthians and Corcyraeans in common, i. 55 init. ; captured by the Corinthians ib. ; betrayed to the Athenians, iv. 49 init. : colonized by the Acarna- nians, ib. fin. ; occupied by the Athenians, vii. 31 init, ; not sur- rendered in the treaty of peace, v. 30 med. ; Anactorians assist in the invasion of Acarnania, ii. 80 med. ; 81 med. Anaea, viii. 19 init. ; occupied by Samian refugees, iii, 19 fin,, iv. 75 med. ; the Anaeans destroy an Athenian army under Lysicles, iii. 19 ;fin. ; remonstrate with Alcidas for the slaughter of his captives, ib. 32; aid the Chians, viii. 61 med. Anapus, river in Acarnania, ii. 82 init. Anapus, river in Sicily, vi. 96 fin., vii. 42 fin., 78 init.; bridge over, vi. 66 med. Anaxander, a Theban commander, viii. 100 med. Anaxilas, tyrant of Ehegium, vi. 4 fin. ; founder of Messene, ib. Andocides [the orator], commands the reinforcements sent to Cor- cyra after Sybota, i. 51 med. Androcles, an Athenian popular leader, viii. 65 init, ; active in pro- curing the banishment of Alcibi- ades, ib. ; murdered by the oli- garchical conspirators, ib. Androcrates, the shrine of, at Pla- taea, iii. 24 init. Andromedes, a Lacedemonian en- voy, V. 42 init. Andros, island of, ii, 55 ; the Andri- ans subjects and tributaries of the Athenians, iv. 42 init, , vii. 57 init. ; Andrians employed by the oli- garchs at Athens, viii. 69 med. ; Andrian colonies: Acanthus, iv. 84 init.; Argilus, ib. 103 med.; Sane, iv. 109 med. ; Stageira, ib. 88 fin. Androsthenes, Olympic victor, v. 49 init. Aneristus, Lacedaemonian ambas- sador to Persia, ii. 67 init. Antagonism, a condition of inde- pendence, iv. 92 med. Antandrus, an Aeolian town, viii. 108 med. ; captured by the Les- bian refugees, iv. 52 fin. ; recap- tured by the Athenians, ib. 75 med. ; introduces a Lacedaemo- nian garrison, expelling the Per- sians, viii. 108 med. Anthemus, in Macedonia, ii. 99 fin., 100 med. Anthene, on the borders of Argos and Lacedaemon, v. 41 init. Anthesterion, the Attic month, ii. 15 fin. Anticles, an Athenian commander, i. 117 med. Antigenes, father of Socrates, an Athenian, ii. 23 med. Antimenidas, a Lacedaemonian en- voy, V. 42 init. Antimnestus, father of Hierophon, an Athenian, iii. 105 fin. 632 INDEX. Antiochus, King of the Orestians, ii. 80 fin. Antiphemus, joint founder with En- timus of Gela, vi. 4 med. Antiphon, the soul of the oligarchi- cal conspiracy at Athens, νάϋ. 68 init., 90 init;, his abihties and vir- tue, ib. ; disliked by the people, ib. ; afterwards tried for his share in the plot, ib. ; sent to make peace with Lacedaemon, ib. 90 med. Antippus, a Lacedaemonian, swears to the Treaty of Peace and the alliance, v. 19 med., ic. 24 init. Antiquity, inferiority of, i. 1 fin. ; poverty of, i. 11 fin. Antissa, in Lesbos, viii. 23 med. ; the Antissaeans defeat the Methym- naeans, iii. 18 init. ; Antissa taken by the Athenians, ib. 28 fin. Antisthenes, a Spartan, viii. 39 med., 61 med. Aphrodisia in Laconia, iv. 56 init. Aphrodite, Temple of, at Eryx, vi. 46 med. Aphytis, in Pallene, i. 64 fin. Apidanus, river in Thessaly, iv. 78 fin. Apodotians, in Aetolia, iii. 94 fin. Apollo, Polycrates dedicates Rhe- neia to, i. 13 fin. , iii. 104 init. ; temple of, at Actium, i. 29 med. at Amyclae v. 18, xi; 23, iv; at Argos, ib. 47 fin. ; opposite Cythera, vii. 26 med. ; at Delium, iv. 76 med., 90 init., 97 init.; at Lucas, iii. 94 med. ; at Naupactus, ii. 91 init. ; on Triopium, viii, 35 med. ; of the Pythian Apollo, at Athens, ii. 15 med.; at Delphi, iv. 118, i; V. 18, ii; of Apollo Pythaeus, at Argos [?], iv. 53 init.; altar of, Apollo ' the Founder ' at iiaxos, in Sicily, vi. 3 init. ; of the Pythian Apollo in the Athenian Agora, vi. 54 fin. ; festival of Apollo Maloeis, iii. 3 med. ; shrine of Apollo Tem- enites at Syracuse, τι. 75 init., 99 fin. , 100 fin. : ancient oracle of Apollo to Alcmaeon, ii. 102 fin. ; Homeric Hymn to Apollo quoted iii. 104 med. Apollodorus, father of Charicles, an Athenian, vii. 20 init. Apollonia, a colony of Corinth, i. 26 init. Arcadia, did not change its inhabit- ants anciently, i. 2 med. ; portion of, subjected by the Mantineans, V. 29 init. ; Arcadians supplied by Agamemnon with ships for the Trojan War, i. 9 fin.; Arcadian mercenaries at Notium, iii. 34; in the Athenian service before Syracuse, vii. 57 med. ; on the Syracusan side, vii. 19 fin., 58 med. ; Arcadian allies of the Lace- daemonians join them m invading Argos, ib. 57 med., 58 fin., 60 med. ; summoned by the Lacedaemoni- ans to Tegea, ib. 64; present at Mantinea, ib. 67 med., 73 init.; furnish ships to the Lacedaemoni- ans, viii. 3 fin. ; war between some Arcadian tribes and the Lepreans, v. 31. [See also Heraeans, Mae- nalia, Mantinea, Orchomenus, Parrhasians, Tegea.] Arcesilaus, father of Lichas, a Lace- daemonian, V. 50 med., 76 med., viii. 39 init. Archedice, daughter of Hippias the tyrant, vi. 59 med. ; her epitaph, ib. Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, King of Macedonia, ii. 100 init. Archers, at Athens, numbers of the horse and foot archers, ii. 13 fin. ; horse archers sent to Melos, v. 84 med. ; to Sicily, vi. 94 fin. ; bar- barian archers, viii. 98 init. Archestratus, an Athenian com- mander, i. 57 fin. ; father of Chae- reas, viii. 74 init. Archetimus, a Corinthian com- mander, i. 29 init. Archias, the founder of Syracuse, vi. 3 med. ; [of Camarina] betrays Camarina to the Syracusans, iv. 25 med. Archidamus, King of Lacedaemon, i. 79 fin. ; father of Agis, iii. 89 init. ; his prudent character, ib. fin. ; friend of Pericles, ii. 13 init. ; speech of, i. 80-85; leader of the first expedition into Attica, ii. 10 fin. ; second speech, ib. 11 ; sends a herald to Athens, ib. 12; leads the army to Oenoe, ib. 18 init.; blamed for delay, ib. med. ; enters Attica, ib. 19 init. ; halts at Achar- nae, ib. 20 ; retires, ib. 23 fin. ; in- vades Attica a second time, ib. 47 init., 55-57; attacks Plataea, ib. 71 init. ; offers terms to the Plataeans, ib. 71-74; invades Attica a third time, iii. 1. Archippus, father of Aristides, an Athenian, iv. 50 init. Archonides, a Sicel king, friend of the Athenians, vii. 1. fin. INDEX. 633 Archons, their former power at Athens, i. 126 med. ; Pisistratus, vi. 54 fin. ; Themistocles, i. 93 init. ; Pythodorns, ii. 2 mit. ; Alcaeus, v. 19 init. , 25 init. ; Arclionsliip kept by tlie Pisistratidae in their own family, vi. 54 fin. Arcturus, rising of, ii. 78 init. Ares, Temple of, at Megara, iv. 67 init. Argennusae, a town opposite Mity- lene, viii. 101 med. Argilus, a colony from Andros, iv. 103 init. ; provision respecting, in the treaty of peace, v. 18, vi ; the Argilians assist Brasidas in his attempt on Ampliipolis, iv. 103 med. ; the Argilian servant of Pausanias, i. 132, 133; Cerdylium in Argilian territory, v. 6 med. Arginus, Mount, opi^osite Chios, viii. 34 init. Argos [the Amphilochian], iii. 102 fin., 105 init,, 107 init.; founded by Ampliilochus, ii. 68 init. [See also Amphi lochia.] Argos [in Peloponnesus], residence of Themistocles there, after his ostracism, i. 135 med,, 137 med,; forms alliance with the Athenians, i. ] 02 fin, ; the Corinthians warned from Argos of the intended Athe- nian iuA^asion, iv. 42 med, ; liostile to Lacedaemon, i. 102 fin,, γ. 22 med, ; truce for 30 years between Lacedaemon and Argos, v. 14 fin. ; magistrates of Argos, ib. 47 fin. ; its democratical constitution, v. 29 med., 44 med. ; temple of Here at Argos, iv. 133 init, ; time reckoned there by the succession of higli priestesses, ii. 2 init. ; kings of Macedonia originally from Ar- gos, ii. 99 init. ; Argives used as a general name for the Hellenes by Homer, i. 3 med. ; Argives assist the Athenians at Tanagra, i, 107 fin. ; neutral at the beginning of the war, ii. 9 init. ; refuse to renew the peace with Lacedaemon, v, 14 fin, , 22 med. ; head a confederacy Against the Lacedaemonians, ib. 27, 28 foil.; aspire to lead Pelo- ponnesus, lb. 28 med. [cp. 69 med.] ; ally themselves with the Man- tineans, ib. 29; Eleans, ib. 31; Corinthians and Chalcidians, ib. 31 fin. ; the Lacedaemonians seek tlieir alliance, ib. 36; the Argives fail in attempting an alliance with the Boeotians, ib. 37, 38; are com- pelled to make terms with Sparta, ib. 40, 41 ; send envoys to Athens at Alcibiades' invitation, ib. 43, 44; ally themselves to Atliens, ib. 46 fin., 47; aid the Eleans to ex- clude the Lacedaemonians from the Olympic games, ib. 50 med. ; aid Alcibiades in organizing the affairs of the confederacy, ib. 52 med, ; make Avar on Epidaurus, ib. 53, 54 fin,, 55 fin,, 56 fin, ; take the field against the Lacedaemo- nians, ib. 58 init, ; surrounded by the Lacedaemonians, ib. 59 med. ; miaware of their danger, ib. ; obtain through Thrasyllus and Alciphron a truce, ib. 59 fin., 60 init, ; blame them for tlieir conduct, 60 fin,, 61 init.; cap- ture Orchomenus, ib. 61 fin. ; pre- pare against Tegea, ib. 62 fin.; again attacked by the Lacedae- monians, ib. 64; dissatisfied with their generals, ib. 65 ; found by the Lacedaemonians unexpectedly in battle array, ib. QQ, 67; defeat^ by the Lacedaemonians at Man- tinea, ib. 70-74; make peace and alliance with the Lacedaemoni- ans, ib. 76-80; renounce their al- lies, ib. 78; have their government changed by the Lacedaemonians and the oligarchical party, ib. 81 fin. ; the popular party defeat the oligarchs and renew the Athenian alliance, ib. 82; the thousand se- lect Argives trained by the city, ib. 67 fin., 72 med., 73 fin,; begin the Long AYalls, 82 fin, ; ravage Philiasia, ib. 83 med., again, ib. 115 init, ; three hundred Argives of the Lacedaemonian party deported by Alcibiades, ib. 84 init, ; given up to the Argives for execution, vi. 6 1 med, ; the Argives suspect some of their citizens of instigat- ing a Lacedaemonian invasion, V. 116 init, ; treaclierously attack and capture Orneae, vi. 7 med. ; induced by Alcibiades to join the Sicilian expedition, vi. 29 med,, 43 fin., vii, 57 med, ; present in the various engagements before Syra- cuse, vi, 67 init., 70 med,, 100 fin., vii, 44 fin, ; cause confusion in the night attack on Epipolae by their Doric Paean, vii. 44 fin. ; invade the Thyraean territory, vi. 95 med. ; have their lands wasted by the Lacedaemonians, ib. 105 init. ; aid the Athenians in ravaging the 634 ESTDEX. Lacedaemonian coast, ih. med. ; ravage Phliasia, ih. fin. ; reinforce the Athenians before Miletns, viii. 25 init. ; defeated by the Milesians, ib. med. ; go home in a rage, ib. 27 fin. ; send envoys to the Athenians at Samos, ib. 86 fin. ; an Argive one of the murderers of Phiyni- chus, lb. 92 init. Arianthidas, a Theban Boeotarch at DeHum, iv. 91 med. Ariphron, father of Hippocrates, an Athenian, iv. 66 med. Aristagoras, of Miletus, attempts to found a colony at Enoea Hodoi, iv. 102 init. Aristarchus, a conspicuous leader of the oligarchical party, viii. 90 init. ; endeavors vainly to pre- vent the destruction of the fort Eetioneia, ib. 92 fin. ; betrays Oenoe to Boeotia, ib. 98. Aristeus, son of Adeimantus, a Cor- inthian, takes command of the forces sent from Corinth to Poti- ^daea, i. 60; made general of the Chalcidian forces, ib. 62 init. ; en- gages the Athenians, ib. fin. ; fights his way into Potidaea, ib. 63 init. ; sails out of Potidaea, ib. 65 med. ; defeats the Sermylians, ib. fin. ; sent as ambassador to the king, ii. 67 init. ; given up by the Thracians to the Athenians, ib. med. ; put to death, ib. fin. Aristeus, son of Pellichus, a Corin- thian commander, i. 29 init. Aristeus, a Lacedaemonian envoy, iv. 132 fin. Aristides, son of Archippus, an Athenian general captures Arta- phernes at Eion, iv. 50 init. ; re- covers Antandrus, ib. 75 init. Aristides, son of Lysimachus, goes on an embassy to Sparta, i. 91 init. ; settlement of Athenian trib- ute in his time, v. 18, vi. Aristocleides, fatlier of Hestiodorus, an Athenian, ii. 70 init. Aristocles, brother of Pleistoanax, accused of bribing the Delphian priestess, v. 16 med. Aristocles, a Spartan polemarch, v. 71 fin. ; banished for cowardice at Mantinea, ib. 72 init. Aristocrates, an Athenian, swears to, the treaty of peace and the alliance, v. 19 fin. , 24 med. ; sent to inquire into the suspected treachery of the Chians, viii. 9 med. Aristocrates, son of Scellius, a chief author in the oligarchical revolu- tion, viii. 89 init. ; heads a moder- ate party in the oligarchy, ib. 89 ; aids in the destruction of Eetion- eia, ib. 92 med. Aristogiton, slays Hipparchus, 1. 20 med., vi. 54 init. ib. 56-58. Ariston, a Corinthian, the ablest pilot in the Syracusan fleet, vii. 38 med. Aristonous, joint founder with Py stilus, of Agrigentum, vi. 4 med. Aristonous, of Larissa, a Thessalian commander, ii. 22 fin. Aristonymus, an Athenian, one of the ambassadors sent to proclaim the one year's truce, iv. 122; re- fuses to admit Scione, ib. Aristonymus, father of Euphamidas, a Corinthian, ii. 33 med., i. v. 119 med. Aristophon, an envoy from the Four Hundred, to Sparta, viii. 86 fin. Aristoteles, an Athenian commander, iii. 105 med. Arms, custom of carrying arms once common to all Hellenes, i. 5 fin., 6 init. ; the custom first aban- doned by the Athenians, ib. 6 init. Arnae in Chalcidice, iv. 103 init. Arne, Boeotians expelled from, i. 12 med. Arnissa, in Macedonia, iv. 128 med. Arrhiani, in the Thracian Cherson- nese, viii. 104 init. Arrhibaeus, King of the Lyncestians, iv. 79 fin. ; attacked by Perdiccas, ib. 83; defeated, ib. 124; Perdiccas, Illyrian troops desert to him, ib. 125 init. ; the pass into his coun- try, ib. 127 fin. Arsaces, a lieutenant of Tissapher- nes, viii. 108 med. ; massacres the Delians, ib. fin. Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, sent by Xerxes with letters to Pausa- nias. i. 129 init., 132 fin. Artaphernes, a Persian ambassador to Sparta, intercepted by the Atlie- nians, iv. 50. Artas, an lapygian prince, furnishes javelin men to the Athenians, vii. 33 med. Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, King of Persia, i. 104 init. ; succeeds to the throne, ib. 137 med. ; his reception of Themistocles, ib. 138; his death, iv. 50 fin. ; the father of Darius Nothus, viii. 5 init. INDEX. 635 Artemis, Temple of, at Rhegium, vi. 44 fin. ; at Epbesiis, viii. 109 fin. Artemisium, a month at Sparta, v. 19 init. Artemisium, battle of, iii. 54 med. Arts : in the arts, as in politics, the new must prevail over the old, i. 71 init. Artynae, the magistrates at Argos, V. 47 fin. Asia: the Barbarians of Asia wear girdles in wrestling and boxing matches, i. 6 fin. ; Pelops brought his wealth from Asia, ib. 9 init. ; no single nation, even in Asia, could compare with the Scythians, if united, ii. 97 fin. ; Magnesia in Asia, i. 138 fin. ; the Thracians of Asia, iv. 75 fin. "the king's coun- try in Asia," viii. 58. Asine, a city in Laconia, iv. 13 init., 54 fin., vi. 93 med. Asopius, father of Phormio, an Athe- nian, i. 64 med. Asopius, son of Phormio, ravages the Laconian coast, iii. 7 init. ; attacks Oeniadae, ib. med. falls m a descent upon Leucas, lb. fin. Asopolaus, father of Astymachus, a Plataean, iii. 52 fin. Asopus, river in Eoeotia, ii. 5 init. Aspendus, viii. 81 fin., 87 med., 88 init., 99 init., 108 med. Assembly, the Athenian, summoned by a general, ii. 59 fin. ; forms of, iv. 118 fin. ; usually held in the Pnyx, viii. 97 init. ; Peisander summons an assembly at Colonus. ib. 67 med. ; the assembly sum- moned to the temple of Dionysus in Munychia f or the "restoration of harmony," ib. 93 fin., 94 init.; the oligarchs pretend that so many as 5000 citizens never met in one assembly, ib. 72 med. Assembly, the Lacedaemonian, mode of voting at, i, 87 init. Assinarus, river in Sicily, capture of Nicias' division at, vii. 84. Assyrian character, used by the Per- sians, iv. 50 med. Astacus, in Acarnania, captured by the Athenians, who expel the tyrant Evarchus, ii. 30 med. ; the town is retaken, and Evarchus restored by the Corinthians, ib. 33 init. ; landing of Phormio near Astacus, ib. 102 init. Astymachus, a Plataean, one of those chosen to plead before the Lacedaemonians, iii. 52 fin. Astyochus, a Lacedaemonian, ad- miral, viii. 20 med. ; entrusted with the command of the whole navy in Asia, ib. ; arrives at Les- bos, ib. 23 init. ; fails to save Les- bos from the Athenians, ib. med., fin. ; summoned to Chios to avert a revolution, ib. 24 fin., ib. 31 init. ; fails to recover Clazomenae and Pteleum, ib. 31 med. ; enraged Avith the Chians for refusing to assist in the revolt of Lesbos, ib. 32 fin., 33 init., 38 fi.n., 39 med. ; narrowly escapes the Athenians, 33 med. ; he is complained of to Sparta by Pedaritus, ib. 38; the Spartans send out commissioners to him, ib. 39 fin, ; at last deter- mines to aid the Chians, ib. 40 fin. ; hearing that reinforcements were coming, goes to meet them, ib. 41 ; defeats an Athenian squadron, ib. 42 ; receives orders from Sparta to put Alcibiades to death, ib. 45 init. : betrays Phrynichus to Alci- biades, ib. 50; believed to have sold himself to Tissaphernes, ib. 50 med., ib. 83 fin.; sails to Mile- tus with a view to relieve Chios, ib. 60 fin. : offers battle to the Athenians, ib. 63 init. ; excites by his conduct great dissatisfaction in the fieet, ib. 78 ; offers battle to the Athenians, but declines when they offer afterwards, ib. 79; stoned by the sailors for offering to strike Dorieus, ib. 84 init. ; su- perseded by Mindarus, ib. 85 init. Atalante, island off Locris, fortified by the Athenians, ii. 32 ; inunda- tion of the sea there, iii. 89 med. ; ordered to be surrendered by the treaty, v. 18, viii. Atalante, in Macedonia, ii. 100 med. Athenaeus, a Lacedaemonian, iv. 119 init., ib. 122. Athenagoras, a popular leader at Syracuse, vi. 35 fin. ; speech of, ib. 36-40. Athenagoras, father of Timagoras of Cyzicus, viii. 6 init. Athene of the Brazen House, curse of, i. 128; temple of, at Lecythus, iv. 116; at Amphipolis, v. 10 init. ; at Athens, v. 23 fin. ; image of, in the Acropolis at Athens, ii. 13 med. Athenian empire, foundation of, i. 14 fin., ib. 18 med., ib. 74 med., ib; 93; rise of, i6. 19, 89-118, ib. 118. 636 INDEX. character of, ib. 19: justification of, ib. 75, vi. 82, 83. Athens, once inhabited by Tyrrhe- nians, iv. 109 fin. [cp. ii. 17 med.] ; formed by Theseus from the ancient communes, ii. 15 init. ; small extent of ancient Athens, ib. 15 med. ; largeness of the popula- tion, i. 80 med. ; appearance of, compared to Sparta, i. 10 init. ; destruction of, in the Persian war, i. 89 fin.; building of the City Walls, i. 90, 91, 93; of the Long Walls, ib. 107 init., 108 med.; plague of Athens, ii. 47-54, 58, iii. 87: resources of Athens, ii. 13 ; the revolution at Athens, viii. 47-72; restoration of the democ- racy, ib. 73-77, 86, 89-93, 97; the government immediately after the restoration the best within Thucy- dides' recollection, viii. 97 fin. ; " the school of Hellas," ii. 41 init. ; freedom of life in, ii. 37, vil. 69 med. [See also Attica.] Athenians, of Ionian race, vi. 82 init. , vii. 57 init. ; have always inhabited the same land, i. 2 fin. ; their colonies to Ionia and the islands, i. 2 fin., 12 fin.; the first Hellenes to adopt luxurious habits, i. 6 med. ; their ignorance of their own history, ib. 20 init., vi. 53 tin., 54, 55; their activity and restless- ness, especially in contrast with the Lacedaemonian character, i. 69, 70, 102 med., iv. 55 med., vi. 87 med,, viii. 96 fin. ; treatment of their allies, i. 19, 76, 99, iii. 10, vi. 76, 84, 85; general detestation of them in Hellas, i. 119 med., ii. 8 fin., 11 init., 63 init.; their wealth and military resources, ii. 13 med. ; their fondness for a coun- try life, ib. 15 init. ; become sail- ors, i. 18 med. [cp. iv. 12 fin., vii. 21 med.]; assured of empire by their naval superiority, ii. 62; willing to face any odds at sea, 88 fin. ; perfection of tlieir navy, iii. 17; mode of burying the dead in the war, ii. 34; their great- ness and glory, ii. 37-41, 63, 64; for half a century an imperial people, viii. 68 fin. ; maintain the children of the fallen at the public expense, ii. 46; their mistakes in the war, ib. 65 ; their love of rhet- oric, iii. 38 med., 40 init.; their over cleverness and suspicious- ness, ib. 43; their fickle temper- ament, vii. 48 med. ; their ela- tion at success, iv. 65 fin.; their impatience of discipline, vii. 14 init. fin. ; ' ' never retired from a siege through fear of another foe," V. Ill init. ; the most experienced soldiers in Hellas, vi. 72 med., vii. 61 fin. [b. c. 510] ; the Athenians governed by tyrants, i. 18 init.. vi. 53 fin.-59; the tyrants put down by the Lacedaemonians, 2. 18 init., vi. 53 fin. ; the Athenians make war on the Aeginetans [b. c. 491], i. 14 fin. ; their services in the Per- sian war, ib. 73, 74, ii. 36 med.; the Athenians build their walls and the Piraeus, i. 91, 93 [b. c. 480-B. c. 439] ; the Athenians join in the capture of Byzantium and Cyprus, ib. 94; obtain the leader- ship of the allies, ib. 95, 96, 99 [cp. ib. 18, 19] ; subject Eion, Scyros, Carystus, iSTaxos, ib. 98; conquer the Persians at the Eurymedon, ib. 100 init. ; subdue the revolted Tha- sians, ib. 100, 101; fail in an at- tempt to colonize Amphipolis, ib. 100 fin.; called in by the Lace- daemonians during the siege of Ithome, ib. 101, 102; dismissed by the Lacedaemonians, ib. 102 med. ; offended at the Lacedaemonians and form alliance with Argos, ib. fin. ; settle the Helots at ISfaupactus, ib. ; 103 med. ; make alliance with the Megarians, ib. 103 fin. : occupy Nisaea, ib. ; aid the revolted Egyp- tians, ib. 104; defeated by the Corinthians and Epidaurians at Halieis, ib. 105 init. ; defeat the Peloponnesians off Cecryphaleia, ib. ; go to war again with the Aeginetans [b. c. 459], ib. 105; de- feat the Aeginetans at sea, ib. init. ; gain a slight advantage over the Corinthians, ib. fin. ; inflict a severe defeat on them, ib. 106; build their Long Walls, ib. 107 init. , 108 med. ; are defeated by the Lacedaemonians at Tanagra, ib. 107 fin., 108 init.; defeat the Boeotians at Oenophyta, ib. 108 med. ; compel Aegina to surrender, ib. 108 fin. ; take Chalcis and de- feat the Sicyonians, ib. tin, ; driven out of Memphis, ib. 109; their re- inforcements destroyed, ib. 110; unsuccessfully attack Pharsalus, ib. Ill init. ; defeat the Sicyonians and make an attempt on Oeniadae, ib. fin.; send ships to Egypt, ib. INDEX. 637 112 init. ; fight in Cyprus, ib. med. ; take Chaeronea but are defeated at Coronea, ib. 113; their garrison in Megara is slaughtered, ib. 114 init. ; first invasion of Attica, ib. med. ; Euboea revolts, ib. init. ; is reduced, ib. fin.; the Athenians make a truce with the Lacedaemonians, ib. 115 init. ; establish a democ- racy at Samos, ib. med.; the Sa- mians and Byzantines revolt, ib. the Athenians defeat the Samians, ib. 116 med. ; blockade Samos, ib. fin. ; send reinforcements to Sa- mos, ib. 117; capture Samos, ib. fin. ; [cp. i. 40 fin., 41 init.] [The Peloponnesian War] ; the Athe- nians enter into alliance with Corcyra, ib. 44; send assistance to Corcyra, ib. 45 ; fight with the Corcyraeans at sea against the Corinthians, ib. 49 fin.'; send re- inforcements, ib. 50 fin.. 51; order the Potidaeans to raze their walls, ib. 56 med.; quarrel with Perdic- cas, ib. 57 init.; despatch troops to Potidaea. ib. 57 fin.. 61 init., 64 med., come to terms with Perdic- cas, ib. 62 med. ; defeat the Chalci- dians, ib. 62, 63; invest Potidaea. ib. 64; ill-feeling of, against the Corinthians, ib. 66, 103 fin.; ex- clude the Megarians from their harbors, ib. 67 fin., 139 init. [cp. iv. 66 init.] ; speech of at Sparta, ib. 72-78; desire the Lacedaemonians to take away the curse of Taenarus and of Athene, ib. 128, 135 init. ; discuss the demands of the Lace- daemonians, ib. 139; make a final offer of arbitration to the Lacedae- monians, ib. 145; seize the Boeotians in Attica and garrison Plataea, ii. 6; meditate sending an embassy to the king, ib. 7 init. ; send ambassadors to places ad- jacent to Peloponnesus, ib. fin.; their allies, ib. 9 med. ; refuse to hear a messenger from Archi- damus, ib. 12 init. ; collect into the city by Pericles' advice, ib. 14-16; send an expedition round the Pel- oponnese, ib. 17 fin., 23, 25, 30; are angry with Pericles for not leading them out, ib. 21; defeated at Phrygia, ib. med. ; receive aid from the Thessalians, ib. 22 fin. ; set apart a reserve for the war, ib. 24 [cp. viii. 15 med.]; send a fleet to Locris, ib. 26; expel the Aegine- tans, ib. 27 init. ; make Nympho- allies of Sitalces, ib. 29; invade Megara, ib. 31; fortify Atalante, ib. 32 ; celebrate the funeral of the fallen, ib. 34; suffer from the plague, ib. 47-54, 58; again re- strained by Pericles from sallying out against the Lacedaemonians, ib. 55 fin. ; send an expedition round Peloponnese, ib. 56; un- successfully attack Potidaea, ib. 58; send envoys to Sparta, ib. 59 med. turn upon and fine Pericles, ib. 59-65 init.; elect him general, ib. 65 init. ; capture Aristeus of Cor- inth and other envoys to Persia, and put them to death, ib. 67 ; send Phormio to aid the Amphilochians, ib. 68; send Phormio with a fleet round Peloponnese, ib. 69 init. ; despatch ships to collect money in Asia, ib, fin.; capture Potidaea, ib. 70 init. ; blame their generals, ib. med. ; send colonists to Poti- daea, ib. fin. ; encourage the Pla- taeans to resist, ib. 73 ; send an ex- pedition to Chalcidice, * i6. 79; are defeated, ib. ; defeat the Pelopon- nesians at sea, ib. 83, 84; gain a second victory, ib. 86, 92 ; thrown into a panic by the news of Bras- idas' landing in Salamis, ib. 93, 94; make an expedition into Acar- nania, ib. 102 ; receive warning of the Lesbian revolt, iii. 2; attempt to surprise Mitylene, ib. 3; suc- cessfully engage the Lesbians, ib. 4; blockade Mitylene by sea, ib. 6; send an expedition round Pelopon- nese, ib. 7, 16 med,; send another expedition, ib. 16 ; their great ex- penditure on the war, ib. 17; the perfection of their navy. ib. ; de- spatch reinforcements to Mitylene, ib. 18 fin. ; complete the blockade, ib. ; raise a property tax, ib. 19 init. ; attempt to collect money from the allies, ib. fin. ; gain pos- session of Mitylene, ib. 27, 28; take Notium, ib. 34 ; reduce Pyrrlia and Eresus, ib. 35; put Salaethus to death and order the slaughter of all the groAvn-up citizens of Mitylene, ib. 36 init.; repent, ib. med. ; summon a second assembly, ib. fin. ; send a ship in to save Mit- ylene, ib. 49; put to death the Les- bians judged most guilty, ib. 50 init. ; divide tlie island among Athenian colonists, ib. med. ; oc- cupy Minoa, ib. 51 ; arrest envoys 638 INDEX. from Corcyra, ib. 72 init. ; send a fleet to Corcyra, ib. 75; engage at sea with the Peloponnesians, ib. 77, 78; send twenty ships to Sicily, ib. 86 init. ; tlie plague reappears, ib. 87: the Athenians ravage the Aeolian islands, ib. 88; proceed- ings in Sicily, ib. 90, 99, 103, 115, iv. 24, 25; send a fleet round the Peloponnese, iii. 91 init. ; land at Oropus, and win a battle at Tana- gra, ib, med., fin.; terrified by the founding of Heracleia. ib. 93 init. ; attack Leucas, ib. 94 init., med.; disastrous expedition of, into Aeto- lia, ib. 95-98 ; purify Delos and re- store the festival, ib. 104; send re- inforcements to Sicily, ib. 115; for- tify Pylos, iv. 4; take and lose again Eion, ib. 7; repulse the Spartans, ib. 11, 12; defeat the Spartans in the harbor, ib. 14; cut off the troops in Sphacteria, ib. 15 ; grant a truce to the Lacedae- monians, ib. 16; demand impos- sible terms, ib. 21, 22; renew the blockade, ib. 23 ; find the blockade difficult, ib. 26; despatch Cleon with reinforcements, ib. 27, 28 ; at- tack Sphacteria and compel the surrender of the Lacedaemonians, ib. 31-38; again reject the peace proposals of the Lacedaemonians, ib. 41 fin, ; invade the Corinthian territory, etc., ib. 42-45; aid the Corcyraeans to capture Istone, ib. 46; deliver the prisoners to the Corcyraeans, ib. 47; proceed to Sic- ily, ib. 48 fin. ; aid the Acarnanians to capture Anactorium, ib. 49; capture a Persian ambassador to Sparta, ib. 50 init. ; send him back with an embassy of their own, ib. fin. ; order the Chians to disman- tle their walls, ib. 51 ; capture Cythera, ib. 53, 54; ravage the Lacedaemonian coast, ib. 54 fin., 55; capture Thyrea, ib. 57; quit Sicily, ib. 65 med. ; punish their generals, ib. ; unsuccessfully at- tempt Megara, ib. 66-68; capture Nisaea, ib. 69; engage the Boeo- tian cavalry, ib. 72; unwilling to fight with Brasidas, ib. 73; recap- ture Antandrus, ib. 75 med. ; plan an invasion of Boeotia , ib. 76, 77 declare Perdiccas an enemy, ib. 82; defeated at Delium, ib. 90-96; the Boeotians refuse to give up the dead, ib. 97-99; the Athenian gar- rison in Delium is captured by the Boeotians, and the dead are then given up, ib. 100, 101 init. ; re- pulsed by the Sicyonians, ib. 101 med. ; lose Amphipolis, ib. 102- 106; Thucydides saves Eion, ib. 104; driven from the long walls of Megara, ib. 109 init.; lose Acte, ib. med., fin.; Torone, i&. 110-113; Lecytheus, ib. 114-116; make a truce for a year with the Lacedae- monians, ib. 117-119; Scione re- volts, and the Athenians exclude it from the treaty, ib. 150, 122 init. ; they decree its total destruc- tion, ib. fin. ; defeated by the Men- daeans, who also revolt, ib. 129; capture Mende, ib. 130 fin. ; invest Scione, ib. 131; come to an un- derstanding with Perdiccas, ib. 132 init. ; again purify Delos, v. 1 ; send Cleon to Chalcidice, ib. 2; capture Torone, ib. 3; send an em- bassy under Phaeax to Sicily, ib. 4, 5; defeated at Amphipolis, ib. 6- 12; become eager for peace, ib. 14 init. ; make a treaty with the Lace- daemonians, ib. 17-19; conclude an alliance with the Lacedaemo- nians, ib. 22 fin.-24; release the prisoners from the island, ib. 24 fin. ; take and destroy Scione, ib. 32 init. ; replace the Delians in Delos, ib. ; refuse a ten days' ar- mistice to the Corinthians, ib. med. ; begin to mistrust the Lace- daemonians, ib. 35; withdraw the Helots from Pylos, ib. 35 fin. ; send ambassadors to Sparta, ib. 36 init. ; negotiate uselessly with the Lace- daemonians, ib. 39 init. ; indignant at -the destruction of Panactum, ib. 42 fin. ; the war party at Athens intrigue for the abrogation of the treaty, ib. 43 ; the Athenians make alliance with the Argives, ib. 46 fin., 47; replace the Helots at Pylos, ib. 56 med. ; solemnly re- cord that the Lacedaemonians had broken their oaths, ib. ; send a force to Argos, ib. 61 init. ; share in the battle of Mantinea, ib. 69, 72-74; invest Epidaurus, ib. 75 fin. ; their alliance is renounced by the Argives, ib. 78 ; withdraw their troops from Epidaurus, ib. SO fin. ; the Dians revolt, ib. 82 init. ; the Argives renew their alliance, and, with Athenian help, build their Long Walls, ib. fin.; the Athe- nians blockade Perdiccas, ib. 83 fin.; carry off 300 Argives whom INDEX. 639 they suspect, ib. 84 init. ; attack Melos, ib. med. ; hold a conference with the Melian authorities, ib. 85-113; blockade Melos, ib. 114, 115 fin., 116 med.; capture Melos, destroy or enslave the inhabitants, and colonize the island, ib. ; spoil, from Pylos, the Lacedaemonians, ib. 115 init. ; the Corinthians de- clare war upon them, ib. ; the Athenians determine to send an expedition to Sicily, vi. 1, 6 init. ; send envoys to Egesta, ib. 6 fin. ; decide on war, ib. 8 ; assist the Ar- gives in the capture of Orneae, ib. 7 med. ; ravage Macedonia, ib. fin. ; the envoys return from Sicily, ib. 8 init. ; debate in the assembly, ib. 9-23; seized with enthusiasm for the expedition, ib. 24; greatly disturbed by the mutilation of the Hermae, ib. 27 fin. ; Alcibiades is accused, and the Athenians are persuaded by his enemies to decree his immediate departure for Sic- ily, ib. 28,29; the expedition starts for Sicily, ib. 30-32 ; review of the troops at Corcyra, ib. 42; the Athenians arrive at Ehegium, ib. 43, 44; deceived by the Egestians, ib. 46 ; the generals hold a council of war, ib. 47-49 ; Alcibiades' opin- ion prevails, i 6. 50; the Athenians sail to Syracuse, ib. 50 ; obtain pos- session of Catana, ib. 51; not re- ceived at Camarina, ib. 52 ; the ex- citement about the mutilation of the Hermae continues, ib. 53, 60; the Athenians send to arrest Alci- biades, ib. 53, 61 init. ; condemn him to death, ib. 61 fin. ; proceed- ings of, in Sicily, lb. 62, 63; cap- ture Hyccara, ib. 62 init. ; sail to Syracuse, ib. 64, 65; defeat the Syracusans, ib. 66-71 ; fail in an attempt on Messene, which Alci- biades betrays, ib. 74; send home for money and cavalry, ib. fin. [cp. 93 fin. , 94 fin] ; send an embassy to Camarina, ib. fin., 75; Euphemus' speech, ib. 81-87; fail to win over the Camarinaeans, ib. 88 init. ; negotiate with the Sides, ib. med. ; winter at Catana and prepare for a spring campaign, ib. fin.; receive aid from home, ib. 93 fin. , 94 fin. ; prosecute the campaign, ib. 94; capture Epipolae and fortify Lab- dalum, ib. 96, 97; receive Sicilian reinforcements, ib. 98 init. ; begin to build a wall of circumvallation, and defeat the Syracusans in vari- ous engagements, ib. 98-101; re- pulse the Syracusans from Epipo- lae ib. 102; begin a double wall from Epipolae to the sea, ib. 103 init. , vii. 2 fin. ; openly violate the peace with the Lacedaemonians, vi. 105; Athenian ships arrive at Ehegium too late to stop Gylippus, vii. 1 init. ; return no answer to Gylippus' demand that they shall quit Sicily, ib. 3 init. ; are driven out of Labdalum, ib. fin. ; repulse an attack on their lines, ib. 4 init. ; fortify Plemmyrium, ib. ; defeat the Syracusans, ib. 5 med. ; defeated by the Syracusans, ib. 6; the Athenians, aided by Perdiccas, make an attempt upon Amphipolis, ib. 9; the Athenians at home receive the de- spatch of Mcias, ib. 10-15 ; send a second expedition to SicUy under Demosthenes, ib. 16; send a fleet round Peloponnese, ib. 20; conquer the Syracusans at sea, but lose Plemmyrium, ib. 22, 23; skir- mish with the Syracusans in the harbor, ib. 25 med. ; raA^age the Laconian coast, and fortify an isth- mus there, ib. 26 ; resolve to send back some Thracians Λvho have come too late to join the reinforce- ments to Sicily, ib. 27 init. [who sack Mycalessus on their way, 29, 30]; suffer terribly from the oc- cupation of Decelea by the Lace- daemonians, ib. 27, 28; Demos- thenes meets Eurymedon with news from Sicily, ib. 31 init. ; De- mosthenes and Emymedon collect troops in Acarnania and Corcyra, ib. fin. ; the Athenians in Sicily induce the Sides to destroy rein- forcements on their way to Syr- acuse, ib. 32; Demosthenes arrives at Thurii, ib. 33; the Athenians at Xaupactus fight an indecisive en- gagement at sea with the Corin- thians, ib. PA; consider themselves defeated because not signally the victors, ib. fin. ; defeated at sea by the Syracusans, ib. 37-41 : re- pulsed in a night attack on Epip- olae, ib. 43-45; the Athenian gen- erals hold a council, ib. 47-49 init. ; Nicias wishes to delay and Demos- thenes yields, ib. 49 fin. ; Xicias at last consents to move, but terrified by an eclipse remains another 27 days, ib. 50; the Athenians are 640 INDEX. again defeated at sea by the Syra- cusans, ib. 52; gain a slight ad- vantage by land, lb. 53; give them- selves up to despair, ib. 55; the list of their allies before Syracuse, ib. 57; determine to fight their way out, ib. 60; Meias addresses the troops, ib. 61-64; and the tri- erarchs, ib. 69 ; the Athenians are completely defeated at sea, ib. 70, 71 ; overwhelmed by misery refuse to renew the struggle, ib. 72; are misled by false information and delay their retreat three days, ib. 78, 7-4; their misery and terror when commencing the retreat, ib. 758 encouraged and consoled by Nicias, ib. 76, 77; during four days are harassed and at length con- fronted by the enemy, ib. 78, 79; fall back, ib. 69 fin. ; recommence retreat, changing their route, ib. 80 init. ; seized with a panic, ib. med. ; the second division is over- taken and compelled to surrender, ib. 81, 82 ; the first meets the same fate on the Assinarus, ib. 83-85; three hundred escape, ib. 83 fin. ; but are captured, ib. 85 med. ; Kicias and Demosthenes are put to death, ib. 86; the prisoners are cruelly treated by the Syracusans, ib. 87; the Athenians at home in fmy and terror, but determined not to yield, viii. 1; suspect the Chians of treason, ib. 9, 10 init. ; defeat a Peloponnesian squadron and blockade them in Peiraeum, ib. 10, 11 init. ; intercept, but do not succeed in capturing, a Pelo- ponnesian fleet, ib. 13; on the news of the revolt of Chios pass a decree allowing the use of their reser^-e fund and ships, ib. 15 init. ; prepare a great fleet for Asia under Strombichides and Thra- sycles, ib. fin. ; Strombichides is chased from Teos, ib. 16; arrives at Miletus too late to stop a revolt, ib. 17; captures four Chian ships, ib. 19; the Athenians at Peiraeum lose four ships in a sally of the Peloponnesian fleet, ib. 20 init. ; Diomedon recovers Teos, but fails to take Erae, ib. fin. ; the Athe- nians grant the Samians indepen- dence after a democratic revolu- tion, ib. 21; reconquer Lesbos which had revolted, and Clazo- menae, ib. 23; win a slight advan- tage at Miletus, ib. 24 Init. ; fight three successful battles against the Chians, ib. med. ; win a victory before Miletus, ib. 25 ; withdraw to Samos on the approach of a Pelo- ponnesian fleet, ib. 27 fin. ; receive reinforcements from home, ib. 25 init. , 30 init. ; prepare to attack Miletus, *. 30 fin. ; lose three ships in a storm, ib. 34 init. ; fail to take Cnidus which had revolted, ib. 35 ; blockade Chios, ib. 38 init., 40; cannot induce the Peloponnesians at Miletus to fight, ib. 38 fin. ; de- feated at sea, ib. 41, 42, 43 init. ; Ehodes revolts, the Athenians at- tack it from Chalce, Cos, and Sa- mos, ib. 44; the oligarchical party at Samos, by Alcibiades' investi- gation, prepare the way for a rev- olution, ib. 47, 48 init. ; Phryni- chus resists, ih. 48 med. ; Peisander is sent to Tissaphernes, ib. 49; Phr^-nichus out-manoeuvres Alci- biades, who seeks to ruin him, ib. 50, 51; those at home agree to change the government, ib. 53, 54; send Peisander to negotiate with Alcibiades, ib. 54 init. ; remove Phrynichus and appoint Leon and Diomedon generals, ib. med. ; Leon and Diomedon make a de- scent upon Ehodes, ib. 55 init. ; the Athenians at Chios defeat the Chians and press on the blockade, ib. 55 fin., 56 init.; Peisander's embassy fails through Alcibiades' unreasonable demands, ib. 56 med. ; Oropus is betrayed to the Boeotians, ib. 60 init. ; the Athe- nian fleet retire to Samos for the winter, passing in sight of the Peloponnesians, ib. fin. ; they are worsted at sea by the Chians, ib. 61 fin. ; Lampsacus and Abydos revolt, ib. 62 init. ; Strombichides retakes Lampsacus but fails at Abydos, ib. med. ; the Athenians at Samos decline Astyochus' offer of battle, ib. 63 init. ; the conspir- ators at Samos give up Alcibiades, but prosecute their plan, ib. 63 fin. ; order Peisander to put down de- mocracy in the cities, ib. 64; the conspirators at home declare for a pretended government of 5000, ib. 65; crush opposition by terrorism, ib. 66; repeal the graphe parano- mon, ib. 67 init. ; propose a gov- ernment of 400, ib. 67 fin. ; descrip- tion of the leaders of the conspir- acy, ib. 68 ; they instal the 400 in INDEX. 641 the place of the senate, ib. 69, 70; send heralds to Agisat Decelea, ib. 70 fin. ; despatch envoys to Sparta, ib. 71 fin, ; and to Saraos, ib. 72 ; the Athenians at Samos defeat an oligarchical conspiracy, ib. 73; send Chaereas in the Paralus to Athens, ib. 74 ; on his return with an imfavorable report the army and the Samians swear allegiance to the democracy, ib. 75 ; the army appoints Thrasyllus and Thrasy- bulus generals, ib. 76 init. ; the men encourage each other, ib. med. ; the commissioners sent by the 4'jO do not venture beyond Delos, ib. 77; the Athenians at Sa- mos refuse battle with Astyochus, but afterwards offer it, ib. 79; re- call Alcibiades, ib. 81 init. ; the army eager to sail to the Piraeus, Alcibiades restrains them, ib. 82 init. ; the envoys of the Four Hun- dred now come to Samos, ib. 86 [cp. 72 init. , 77] ; they are roughly received by the army, ib. 86 init. ; Alcibiades again dissuades the army from sailing to Athens, ib. med. ; the Argives offer assist- ance, ib. fin. ; the Four Hundred in alarm send envoys to Lacedaemon for peace on any terms, ib. 90 med. ; fortify Eetioneia, ib. fin. ; the envoys return unsuccessful, ib. 91 init. ; Theramenes begins to withdraw from the oligarchs, ib. passim ; the hoplites under his in- stigation destroy Eetioneia, ib. 92; panic in the city, ib. med.; the Four Hundred induce the peo- ple to fix a day for an assembly "to restore harmony," ib. 9S; a Lacedaemonian squadron ap- proaches and the Athenians hurriedly equip a fleet, ib. 94; utterly defeated at sea and lose Euboea, ib. 95; panic-stricken by their defeat, ib. 96 init. ; depose the 400, ib. 97; recall Alcibiades, ib. fin. ; the leaders of the oligarchs retire to Decelea, ib. 98 ; the Athe- nian fleet sails to the Hellespont, ib. 100 ; attacks Eresus on the way, ib. fin. ; the Athenian squadron at Sestos is chased by the Lacedae- monian fleet, ib. 102; the fleet at Lesbos at once sails from Eresus to Elaeus, ib. 103 ; they defeat the Lacedaemonians at sea oif Cynos- sema, ib. 104, 105; almost incred- ulous of their good fortune, ib. 106; capture eight Peloponnesian ships, ib. 107; recover Cyzicus, which had revolted, ib. 107 med. ; Alcibiades returns to Samos, pro- fessing to have secured Tissapher- nes' friendship for them, ib. 108 init. Athletes, used to wear girdles in gymnastic contests, i. 6 fin. ; honors paid to, iv. 121 med. Athos, Mount, iv. 109 med., v. 3 fin., 35 init., 82 init. Atintanians, a people in Epirus, ii. 80 fin. Atreus, son of Pelops, i. 9 passim. Attica, early history of, 1. 2 fin. ; Ionia colonized from, ib., ib. 12 fin. ; ii. 15 fin. ; anciently divided into communes, ii. 15 init. ; in- vaded by the Lacedaemonians, i. 114 med. ; ii. 21 init. ; invasion in first year of the "War, ii. 18-23 ; in the second year, ib. 47, 55, 56; in the fourth year, iii. 1; in the fifth year, ib. 26; in the sixth year averted by an earthquake, ib. 89 init. ; in the seventh year, iv. 2 init., 6; in the nineteenth year, vii. 19 init. Aulon, in Chalcidice, iv. 103 init. Autociiaridas, a Lacedaemonian gen- eral, V. 12. Autocles, son of Tolmaeus, an Athe- nian general, iv. 53 init., 119 fin. Axius, river in Macedonia, ii. 99 med. B. Barbarians, term not used in Homer, i. 3 med. ; carry arms in daily life, lb. 6 init. ; various barbarous races: the Aetolians iii. 94 fin.; the Amphilochians, ii. 68 init. ; in Athos, iv. 109; the Epirots, ii. 80- 82 ; the lllyrians, iv. 126 med. ; in Sicily, vi. 2; ib. 11 fin.; the Tau- lantians, i. 24 init. ; the Thracians, ii. 96-98, 101; iv. 75 fin.; vii. 27; Xerxes called "the Barbarian." i. 14 fin., 18. Battus, a Corinthian commander, iv. 43 init. Bells, use of, by sentinels, iv. 135 med. Beroea, in Macedonia, i. 61 med. Bisaltia, in Macedonia, ii. 99 fin. Bisaltians [in Athos], iv. 109 fin. Bithynian Thracians, iv. 75 fin. Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, ii. 2 med. ; Diemporus, ib. ; Pagondas, iv. 91 642 INDEX. med. ; Arianthidas, ib. ; Scirphon- das, vii. 30 fin. ; their powers, v. 37, 38. Boeotia, early history, i. 2. med. , iii. 61 med. ; formerly called Cad- meis, i. 12 med. ; fertility of, ib. 2 med. ; bordered on one side by Pliocis, iii. 95 init. ; the Four Councils of Boeotia, v. 3S; earth- quakes in Boeotia, iii. 87 fin. Boeotians, the, expelled from Arne by the Thessalians, i. 12 med. ; ail but the Plataeans joined the Persians, iii. 62 init. [cp. viii. 43 fin. ] ; subdued by the Athenians after Oenophyta, i. 108 med. ; become allies of the Athenians, ib. Ill init. ; regain their freedom at Coronea, ib. 113 fin., iii. 62 fin., 67 med., iv. 92 fin.; the Boeo- tians in Attica seized after the attempt on Plataea, ii. 6 med. ; furnish cavalry to the Lacedae- monians at the opening of the AVar, ib. 9 med., 12 fin.; ravage Plataea, io. 12 fin. ; worst the Athenians in a cavalry skirmish at Phrygia in Attica, ib. 22 med. ; supply half the besieging force at Plataea, ib. 78 med. ; invaded by the Athenians, iii. 91 ; assist Bra- si das to save Megara from the Athenians, iv. 70, 72; the demo- cratic party in Boeotia concert an Athenian invasion, ib. 76, 77; the plot is betrayed, ib. 89; the Athenians under Hippocrates arrive and fortify Delium, ib. 90; the Boeotians defeat the Athe- nians at Delium, ib. 91-96; quib- ble with the Athenians about giving up the dead, ib. 97-99; capture Delium, ib. 100; the Lacedaemonians promise to in- vite the Boeotians to join the truce, ib. 118 init.; Panactum is betrayed to the Boeotians, v. 3 fin. ; refuse to join in the fifty years' peace, ib. 17 fin. ; had only a ten- days' armistice Λvith the Athe- nians, ib. 26 med., 32 med.; re- fuse to join the Argive alliance, i6. 31 fin.; 32 med.; fail to gain from the Athenians a ten- days' armistice for the Corin- thians, ib. fin. ; the Lacedaemo- nians promise to try to bring the Boeotians into the treaty, ib. 35 fin.; the new Lacedaemonian ephors propose to the Boeotians that they should enter the Argive alliance, ib. 36; the Boeotians at first agree, ib. 37; the Boeotian Councils reject the oifer, ib. 38; the Boeotians form a separate alliance with Lacedaemon, surren- dering Panactum and their Athe- nian prisoners to them, ib. 39; take possession of Heraclea, ib. 52 init. ; take part in the Lacedae- monian invasion of Argos, ib. 57 fin. -60; summoned by the Lace- daemonians to Mantinea, ib. 64 med. ; invite a small body of Lace- daemonian troops to the Isthmus, and thus raise suspicion at Athens against Alcibiades, vi. 61 init.; send aid to Sicily, vii. 19 med., 58 med. ; these engaged against their Plataean countrymen, ib. 57 init. ; make the first stand against the Athenians on Epipolae, ib. 43 fin. : sack of Mycalessus by the Thra- cians, ib. 29, 30; the Boeotians furnish the Lacedaemonians with ships, viii. 3 fin. ; aid the revolt of Lesbos, ib. 4 fin. ; Oropus is be- trayed to the Boeotians, ib. 60 init. ; Oenoe is betrayed to the Boeotians, ib. 98; the Boeotians lose two ships at Cynossema, ib, 106 med. Boeum, in Doris, i. 107 init. Bolbe, Lake, in Macedonia, i. 58 fin., iv. 103 init. Bolissus, in Chios, viii. 24 med. Bomieans, in Aetolia, iii. 96 fin. Boriades, an Aetoiian envoy, iii. 100 init. Bottiaea, ii. 100 med.; the Bot- tiaeans expelled from, by the Macedonians, ii. 99 med. Bottice revolts from Athens, i. 56- 58; devastated by Phormio, ib. 65 fin. ; ravaged by Sitalces, ii. 101 ; the Bottiaeans defeat the Athe- nians, ib. 79; aid the Chalcidians to expel the Athenians from Eion, iv. 7. Brasidas, saves Methone, ii. 25 med. ; the first Spartan to gain distinc- tion in the War, ib. ; sent out as adviser of Cnemus, ib. 85 init. ; concerts with the other command- ers an attack on the Piraeus, ib. 93; sent as adviser of Alcidas, iii. 69 med. , ib. 76 med. ; advises Alcidas to attack Corcyra, ib. 79 fin. ; distinguishes himself at Py- los, iv. 11 med. ; Avounded, ib. 12 init.; saves Megara, ib. 70-73; marches through Thessaly to Chal- INDEX. 643 cidice, ib. 78; favorable impres- sion produced by him, ib. 81, 108 med. ; a good speaker, ib. 84 fin. ; his army, Peloponnesian merce- naries and Helots, ib. 80 fin. [cp. ib. 70 med.]; allies himself with Perdiccas, ib. 83 init. ; quarrels with him, ib. fin. ; gains over Acanthus and Stageirus, ib. 84-88; speech of, at Acanthus, ib. 85-87; captures Amphipolis, ib. 103-106; repulsed from Eion, ib. 107 init.. ; brings over Myrcinus, Galepsus, and Aesyme, ib. fin. ; takes Torone and Lecythus, ib. 110-116; receives honors from the Scionaeans, ib. 121; refuses to smTender Scione under the truce, ib. 122; receives the Mendaeans in defiance of the truce, ib. 123 init. ; garrisons Mende and Scione, ib. fin. ; defeats the Lyncestians, ib. 124; deserted by the Macedonians, ib. 125; his speech to his soldiers, ib. 126; de- feats the Illyrians, ib. 127, 128; receives commissioners from Lace- daemon, ib. 132 fin. ; attempts Potidaea, ib. 135 ; defeats the Athe- nians at Amphipolis, v. 6-10; speech of, ib. 9; his death, ib. 10 fin. ; buried in the Agora of Amphi- polis, ib. 11 init. ; receives the honors of a foimder from the Amphipolitans, ib. 11 med. ; a great enemy to peace, ib. 16 init. ; his Helot soldiers settled at Lep- reum, ib. 34 med. ; his old soldiers present at Mantinea, ib. 67 init., 71 fin., 72 med. Brauro helps in the assassination of her husband, Pittacus, King of the Edonians, iv. 107 fin. Bridge over the Strymon, iv. 103 fin. ; over the Anapus, vi. 66 med. Brilessus, Mount, in Attica, ii. 23 init. Bromerus, father of Arrhibaeus, the King of the Lyncestians, iv. 83 init. Bromiscus, in Chalcidice, iv. 103 init. Brycinniae, in Leontine territory, v. 4 med. Bucolium, in Arcadia, iv. 134 fin. Budorum, a station in Salamis from which the Athenians used to watch Megara, ii. 94 fin., iii. 51 med. Buphras, in Laconia, iv. 118 med. Burial, Carian mode of, i. 8 init. Byzantimn, captured by Pausanias, and entrusted to Gongylus, i. 94, 128 med., 129 med.; expulsion of Pausanias from Byzantium, ib. 131 init. ; insignificant engagement at sea off Byzantium, viii. 80 fin. [cp. ib. 107 Init. ] ; the Byzantines revolt from Athens, i. 115 fin. ; submit, ib. 117 fin.; revolt again, viii. 80. Cacyparis, river in Sicily, vii. 80 fin. Cadmeis, old name of Boeotia, i. 12 med. Caeadas, a chasm into which male- factors were flung at Sparta, i. 134 med. Caecinus, a river of Locris, in Italy, iii. 103 fin. Calex , a river near Heraclea on the Pontus, iv. 75 fin. Callias, father of Callicrates, a Co- rinthian, i. 29 init. [Athenians] (I) son of Hyperechides, father-in-law of Hippas the tyrant, vi. 55 init. ; (II) father of Hipponieus, iii. 91 med.; (Ill) son of Calliades, an Athenian commander, i. 61 init., ib. 62 med. ; killed at Potidaea, ib. 63 fin. Callicrates, a Corinthian commander, i. 29 init. Callieans, an Aetolian tribe, iii. 96 fin. Calligeitus, a Megarian exile at the Court of Phamabazus, viii. 6 init. ; goes as envoy to Sparla, ib., ib. 8 init. , 39 init. Callimachus, father of Learchus, an Athenian, ii. 67 med. ; father of Phanomachus, an Athenian, ii. 70 init. Callirrhoe, ancient name of the foun- tain Enneacrounos at Athens, ii. 15 fin. Calydon, name given to the ancient Aeolis, iii. 102 med. Camarina, founded from Syracuse, vi. 5 med. ; recolonized by Hip- pocrates, ib. fin. ; by Gela, ib. ; in alliance with Leontini, iii, 86 init. ; plan to betray it to Syracuse, iv. 25 med. ; Camarinaeans make a truce with Gela, ib. 58. init. ; receive Morgantine from the Syracusans, ib. 65 init.; refuse to receive the Athenian expedition, vi. 52; send a small force to the Syracusans, ib. 67 fin. ; receive and hear embassies both from Athens and Syracuse, ib. 75-87; resolve on neutrality, 644 INDEX. ib. 88 init. ; send aid to Syracuse after the capture of Pleinmyriuni, vii. 33 init., 58 init. Cambyses, son of Cyrus, King of Persia, the lonians in liis time masters of the sea about their own coast, i. 13 fin. Cameirus, in Ehodes, revolts from Athens, viii. 44 med. Canal cut by the Persians across the Isthmus of Athos, iv. 109 init. Canastraeum, promontory of, in Pallene, iv. 110 fin. Capaton, father of Proxenus, an Italian Locrian, iii. 103 fin. Carcinus, an Athenian commander, ii. 23 med. Cardamyle, in Chios, viii. 24 med. Caria, Carians expelled by Minos from the Cyclades, i. 4; addicted to piracy, ib. 8 init. ; their mode of burial, ib. mit. ; the Athenians send lookout ships to the Carian coast in the Samian insurrection, ib. 116 init. ; maritime Caria sub- ject to the Athenians, ii. 9 fin. ; the Athenians send a squadron to the Carian coast to protect their Phoenician trade, ib. 69 med. ; Carians destroy an Athenian ex- pedition, iii. 19 fin.; Amorges in Caria revolts from the king, viii. 5 fin, ; Gaulites, a Carian speaking Greek and Persian, ib. 85 init. Carnea, feast at Lacedaemon, v. 75, 76 init. Carneus, sacred month among the Dorians, v, 54 med, Carteria, a Phocaean island, viii, 101 med, Carthage, ambitious plans of Alci- biades for attacking Carthage, vi. 15 med., 90 init.; ahvays in fear of an Athenian invasion, ib. 34 init. ; relations of the Phoenician colonies in Sicily to Carthage, ib. 2 fin. ; Carthaginians defeated at sea by the Phocaeans, i. 13 fin. Caryae,.in Laconia, v. 55 med. Carystus, in Euboea, of Dryopian origin, vii. 57 med. ; subjected by the Athenians, i, 98 med, ; the Carystians become allies of the Athenians, iv. 42 init,, vii, 57 med. Casmenae, founded by the Sj'^ra- cusans, vi. 5 med. Castle, the White, a portion of Memphis, i. 104 fin. Catana, founded by Thucles and Evarchus, vi. 3 fin. ; lies under Mount Aetna, iii. 116 init. ; at first refuses to receive the Athenian expedition, vi. 50 med. ; after the entry of some Athenian soldiers votes an alliance with Athens, ib. 51 fin., vii. 57 fin., 85 fin. ; becomes the Athenian station, vi. 51 fin., 52 fin., 62 fin.; the Svracusans eager to attack Catana, ib. 63 fin. ; the Athenians by a false message draw the Syracusans to Catana while they sail to Syracuse, ib. 64, 65; the Athenians retire to Catana at the beginning of winter, ib. T2 init. ; start from Catana on an expedition against Messene, ib. 74; the Syracusans destroy the Athenian encampment at Catana, ib. 75 med. ; the Athenians rebuild their camp, ib. 88 med. ; start from thence on various expedi- tions, ib. 94; abandon Catana, ib. 97 init. ; are supplied Avith horses from Catana, ib. 98 init, ; Catana and Naxos mentioned by Is^icias as unable to support the Athenian forces, vii, 14 med. ; Demosthenes on his arrival thinks the winter spent at Catana a mistake, ib. 42 med. ; after Epipolae wishes to re- tire to Catana, ib. 49 med.; the Athenian army at Syracuse fed from Catana, ib. 60 init. ; at first wish to retreat by sea to Catana, ib. med., 72; the Athenian line of retreat in the opposite direction to Catana, ib. 80 init, ; the Athenian fugitives find a refuge at Catana, ib. 85 fin, Caulonia, in Italy, vii, 25 init. Caunus, in Caria, called " Caunus in Asia," viii. 39 fin,; Pericles sails towards Caunus in the Samian revolt, i, 116 fin,; the Lacedaemo- nian commissioners to Astyochus put in at Caunus, viii, 39 fin, [cp, 42 med,]; Astyochus sails for Caunus, ib. 41 init, ; Tissaphernes comes to Caunus, ib. 57 init. ; Alcibiades sails for Caunus, ib. 88 fin. [cp. 108 init.] Cecalus, father ofNicasus, a Mega- rian, iv. 119 med. Cecrops, state of Attica in his time, ii. 15 init. Cecryphaleia, victory of the Athe- nians off, i. 105 init. Cenaeum, in Euboea, iii. 93 init. Cenchreae, the port of Corinth, the Corinthians leave half their troops at Cenchreae to guard Crommyon, iv. 42 fin., 44 med. ; a Lacedaemo- i INDEX. 645 nian fleet starting for Chios from Cenclireae is driven into Peiraeum, viii. 10 init. ; escapes and returns to Cenehreae, ib. 20 init. ; Asty- ochus starts from Cenehreae, ib. 23 init. Centoripa, a Sicel to\vn, captured by the Atlienians, vi. 94 med. ; allied to Athens, vii. 32 med. Ceos, the Ceans subjects of the Athe- nians, vii. 57 init. Cephallenia, repulse of the Corin- thians in a descent upon Cephal- lenia, ii. 33 fin. ; an important station to the Atlienians, ib. 80 init. [cp. 7 fin.]; the Cephallenians [of Pale] furnish a convoy to the Corinthians, i. 27 fin. ; become allies of the Athenians, ii. 7 fin., 30 fin., iii. 94 init., 95 med., vi. 85 med., vii. 31 init., 57 med.; the Messenians from Pylos settled by the Athenians at Cranii in Ceph-Uenia, v. 35 fin. ; withdrawn, ib. 56 med. Ceramicus, at Athens, vi. 57 init., 58 init. Cercine, Mount, in Macedonia, ii. 98 init. Cerdylium, Mount, near Amphipolis, V. 6-10. Ceryces, the, at Athens, protest against the return of Alcibiades, viii. 53 med. Cestrine, in Epirus, i. 46 fin. Chaereas, an Athenian, sent as en- voy from the army at Samos, viii. 74 init. ; escapes from Athens and brings an exaggerated report to Samos, ib. fin., 86 init. Chaeronea, in Boeotia, its situation, iv. 76 med, ; a dependency of the Boeotian Orchomenus, ib. ; taken by the Athenians under Tolmides, 1. 113; Orchomenian exiles plot its betrayal to the Athenians, iv. 76 med. ; the plot fails, ib. 89. Chalaeans, a tribe of Ozolian Lo- crians, iii. 101 fin. Chalce, island of, near Rhodes, viii. 41 fin., 44 tin., .55 init., 60 fin. Chalcedon, a Megarian colony, iv. 75 fin. ^' Chalcideus, a Spartan admiral, viii. 6 fin., 8. init. ; sent to Ionia with Alcibiades, ib. 11 fin., 12 fin; is pur- sued by the Athenians on his way, ib. 15 med. ; induces the revolt of Chios, Erythrae, Clazomenae, ib. 14; chases Strombichides into Sa- mos, ib. 16; causes the revolt of Teos, ib. fin.; and of Miletus, ib. 17; garrisons Chios, ib. 17 init. [cp. 32 med. J; negotiates a treaty between the king and Sparta, ib. 18, 36, 43 med. ; falls in a skirmish at Panonnus, ib. 24 init. ; his forces afterwards engaged before Miletus, ib. 25 med. Chalcidian cities, the, of Sicily, founded from Chalcis in Euboea, vi. 3-5; akin to the Athenians, iv. 61 med. , 64 med. ; the Chalci- dian dialect, vi. 5 init. ; invite the Athenians to Sicily, iii. 86 med., iv. 61 med. Chalcidice [on the coast of Thrace], revolts from Athens, i. 56-58; devastated by Phormio, ib. 65 fin. ; by Sitalces, ii. 95 init., 101; Cleon's expedition against Chalcidice, v. 2- 11; Thucydides in command there, iv. 104 fin. ; the Chalcidians pull down their cities and retire to Olynthus, i. 58 fin. ; defeat the Athenians, ii. 79; retake Eion from the Athenians, iv. 7; invite Brasidas, ib. 79, 80 init. ; Chalci- dian ambassadors accompany Brasi- das in his Macedonian campaign, ib. 83 med. ; the Chalcidians insti- gate the revolt of Amphipolis, ib. 103 med. ; aid in garrisoning Mende and Scione, ib. 123 fin. ; supply Brasidas with troops against Arrhi- baeus, ib. 124 init. ; the Chalcidian prisoners taken in Torone are sent to Athens, and afterwards ex- changed, V. 3 fin. ; Chalcidian forces at the battle of Amphipolis, ib. 6 fill. ; pursue the reti-eating Athenians, ib. 10 fin. ; provisions respecting the Chalcidian cities in the treaty of peace, ib. 18, v.-vii. ix. x; the Chalcidians refuse to accept the treaty, ib. 21 med. ; join the Argive alliance, ib. 31 fin. ; renew the alliance with Lacedaemon, ib. 80 med. ; receive the Dians who had revolted from the Athenians, ib. 82 init. ; main- tain a ten days' armistice with the Atlienians, vi. 7 fin. Chalcis, in Aetolia, taken by the Athenians, i. 108 fin., ii. 83 med. Chalcis, in Euboea, vii. 29 init. ; the mother city of the Chalcidian cities in Sicily, vi. 3-5; of Cyme in Italy, ib. 4 fin. ; war between Chalcis and Eretrla, i. 15 fin. ; Chalcis subject to the Athenians, vi. 76 init., vii. 57 init. ; the Atlie- 646 INDEX. nians retreat to Chalcis after the sea-fight off Eretria, viii. 95 fin. Chance, to chance men ascribe what- ever beUes their calculation, i. 140 init. Chaones, a people in Epirus, are barbarians, ii. 68 fin. ; have no king, ib. 80 fin. ; their military reputation, ib. 81 med. ; assist in the invasion of Acarnania, ib. 80 fin. ; defeated by the Stratians, ib. 81. Charadrus, scene of military trials at Argos, V. 60 fin. Charicles, an Athenian commander, vii. 20, 26. Charminus, an Athenian com- mander, viii. 30 init., 41 fin.; de- feated by the Lacedaemonians, ib. 42; abets the murder of Hyperbo- lus, lb. 73 med. Charoeades, an Athenian commander in Sicily, iii. 86 init. ; killed in ac- tion, ib. 90 init. Charybdis, the whirlpool of, iv. 24 fin. Cheimerium, In Thesprotia, i. 30 fin. ; situation of, ib. 46 med. ; Co- rinthian fleet anchors there, ib. Chersonesus, in Corinthian territory, iv. 42 init., 43 init. Chersonnese, the Thracian, culti- vated by the Greek armament at Troy, i. 11 med. ; ravaged by the Lacedaemonians, viii. 99 fin.; na- val operations off its coast, ib. 102• -105. Children, a man without children has no stake in the countiy, ii. 44 fin. Children of the fallen maintained at the public charge in Athens, ii. 46 fin. Chionis, a Lacedaemonian, swears to the treaty of peace and the Alli- ance, V. 19 med. ; 24 init. Chios, its moderate and stable govern- ment, viii. 24 med. ; its naval power, ib. 6 fin. [cp. i. 19 init., ii 9 fin., 56 med.]; its riches, viii. 24 med. ; great number of slaves there, ib. 40 med. ; Chios and Lesbos the only free allies of Athens, iii. 10 med., vi. 85 med., vii. 57 init. ; Homer at Chios, iii. 104 fin. ; the Chians assist the Athenians against the Samians, i. 116, 117; furnish ships in the siege of Potidaea, ii. 56 med., vi. 31 init. ; Alcidas puts some Chian prisoners to death, iii. 32 init. ; re- leases the remainder on a remon- strance from the Samian exiles, ib. fin. ; Chians aid the Athenians at Pylos, iv. 13 med. ; ordered by the Athenians to dismantle their walls, ib. 51 ; furnish ships against Mende and Scione, ib. 129 init.; against Melos, v. 84 init. ; aid the Athenians at Syracuse, vi. 43 init., 85 med., vii. 20 med., 57 init.; ne- gotiate Avith the Lacedaemonians about revolting, viii. 5 init. ; re- ceived into alliance, ib. 6; send the Athenians ships as a pledge of fidelity, ib. 9 med. ; revolt, ib. 14 med. ; employed by Alcibiades to raise revolt in Ionia, beginning with Miletus, ib. 17 ; four of their ships are taken by the Athenians, ib. 19 init. ; induce Lebedus and Erae to revolt, ib. fin. ; then Me- thymna and Mitylene, ib. 22; lose a few ships oif Lesbos, ib. 23 med. ; defeated in three battles by the Athenians, ib. 24 med. ; their suf- ferings lead some to negotiate with the Athenians, ib. 24 fin., 31 init., 38 med. ; aid in tbe capture of lasus, ib. 28 init. ; the Athenians prepare to attack them, ib. 30; the Chians refuse to assist Astyochus in procuring the revolt of Lesbos, ib. 32 fin. ; three Chian ships are chased by the Athenians into Chios, ib. 34 init. ; have their government changed by tlie Lace- daemonians, ib. 38 med. ; com- pletely blockaded, ib. 40; implore the aid of Astyochus, ib. 38 fin., 40 init. ; defeated by the Athe- nians and more closely blockaded, ib. 55 fin., 56 init. ; gain an advan- tage at sea over the Athenians, viii. 61 fin. ; regain the command of the sea, on the withdrawal of a part of the Athenian fleet, ib. 62 init. , 63 init. ; the Athenians plan a fresh attack on Chios, on the arrival of a Lacedaemonian fleet under Mindarus, ib. 100; the Lace- daemonians slip aAvay, ib. 101; the Chians lose eight ships at Cynos- sema, ib. 106 med.; Chian tessera- costs, viii. 101 init. Choenix, an Athenian measure, iv. 16 med. [See note.] Choerades, lapygian islands, vii. 33 med. Choruses, once sent by the Athe- nians to the festival at Delos, iii. 104 fin. INDEX. 647 CliiOmon, Demosthenes' Messenian guide in Aetolia, iii. 98 med. Clii'ysippus, mur4ered by Atreus, i. 9 med. Chrysis, priestess of Here at Argos, ii. 2 init., iv. 133 med.; causes the conflagration of the temple, iv. 133 med. ; flees to Phlius, ih. Chrysis, father of Eumachus, a Cor- intliian, ii. 33 med. Cihcians: tlie Cihcians and Phoeni- cians defeated at Salamis [in Cy- prus] by tlie Atlienians, i. 112 med. Cimon, son of Miltiades, captures Eion, i. 98 init.; conquers the Persians at the Eurymedon, ib. 100 init. ; commands the Atlienian reinforcements at the siege of Ithome, ib. 102 init. ; dies in Cy- prus, ib. 112 med. Cimon, father of Lacedaemonius, an Athenian, i. 45. Cithaeron, Mt., ii. To init., iii. 24 init. Cities, ancient cities small, i. 2 med. ; resembled scattered villages, ib. 10 init. ; at first built inland, after- wards on the sea-shore, ib. 7 ; the cities of Ionia unfojtified, iii. 33 med.; "The City," name for Acropolis at Athens, ii. 15 fin. Citium, in Cyprus, i. 112 med. Citizen, the citizen must be sacrificed to the state, ii. 60 init., 61 fin. Citizenship, the Lacedaemonians de- prive those who had been prisoners at Sphacteria of citizenship, v. 34 fin. Clarus, in Ionia, iii. 33 init. Classes of the citizens at Athens, iii. 16 init., vi. 43 med. Clazomenae, built on an island, viii. 14 fin.; the Clazomenians revolt from Athens, ib. ; fortify Polichne, ib. ; aid in the revolt of Teos, ib. 16; the Peloponnesian infantry march towards Clazomenae, ib. 22 fin. ; they are subdued by the Athe- nians, ib. 23 fin. ; repulse a Pelo- ponnesian attack, ib. 31 med. Cleaenetus, father of Cleon, an Athe- nian, iii. 36 fin. Cleandridas, father of Gylippus, a Spartan, vi. 93 med. Clearch\is, a Lacedaemonian com- mander, viii. 8 med, ; appointed to the Hellespont, ib. 39 nied., 80. Clearidas,. a Lacedaemonian, made Governor of Amphipolis, iv. 132 fin. ; commands with Brasidas at the battle of Amphipolis, v. 6-11 ; refuses to surrender Amphipolis, ib, 21 med. ; brings home the troops of Brasidas, ib. 34 init. Cleinias, the father of Alcibiades, an Athenian, v. 43 init. ; another, father of Theopompus [?J, ii. 26; another, father of Cleopompus, ib. 58. Cleippides, an Athenian commander, iii. 3 med. CleobulUs, ephor at Sparta, v. 36 init. ; favors the war party, ib. ; negotiates with the Boeotians and Corinthians, ib. 36-38. Cleombrotus, father of Pausanias, a Lacedaemonian, i. 94 init.; of Ni- comedes, ib. 107 init. Cleomedes, an Athenian general in the attack on Melos, x. 84 fin. Cleomenes, King of Sparta, expels the "accursed persons" from Athens, i. 120 fin. Cleomenes, the uncle of King Pau- sanias, iii. 26 med. Cleon, a great popular leader, iii. 36 fin., iv. 21 med.; hostile to Nicias, iv. 27 fin. ; a great enemy to peace, V. 16 init.; his arrogance, ib. 7 med. ; carries the decree condemn- ing the Mitylenaeans to death, iii. 30 fin. ; his speech against its re- peal, ib. 37-40; moves and carries the slaughter of 1000 Mitylenaean captives at Athens, ib. 50 init. ; causes the breaking off of negotia- tions with Sparta, iv. 21, 22; is sent in place of Nicias to Pylos, ib. 27, 28; selects Demosthenes as his colleague, ib. 29 init. ; makes Avith Demosthenes an attack on Sphac- teria, ib. 31-37; compels the sur- render of the Lacedaemonians, ib. 38; carries a decree for the de- struction of Scione, ib. 122 fin, ; captures Torone, v. 2, 3; takes Galepsus, and attempts Stageirus, ib. 6 init.; defeated and slain at Amphipolis, ib. 6-11. Cleon ae, in Acte, iv. 109 med. Cleonae, in Argolis, in alliance with Argos, V. 67 fin. ; sends troops to Mantinea, ib. T2 fin., 74 med.; a Lacedaemonian army invading Argos tiu-ns back at Cleonae in consequence of an earthquake, vi. 95 init. Cloanymus, father of Clearidas, a Lacedaemonian, iv. 132 fin. Cleopompus, an Athenian com- mander, ii. 58 init. Cleruchi, in Lesbos, iii. 50 med. 648 INDEX. Clubs, the, at Athens, viii. 48med., 54 fin., 81 ined. [cp. iii. 82 med.] Cnenius, a Lacedaemonian com- mander, ravages Zacynthus, ii. 66; invades Acarnania, ib. 80-82; de- feated by Phormio, ib. 83, 84; re- ceives Brasidas and two other commissioners from Lacedaemon, ib. 85 init. ; second defeat of, ib. 86 -92; concerts with Brasidas an attack upon the Piraeus, ib. 93, 94. Cnidis, father of Xenares, a Lace- daemonian, V. 51 fin. Cnidus, revolts from Athens, viii. 35 init. ; attacked by the Athe- nians, ib. fin. ; the Cnidians per- suade Astyochus to attack the Athenians under Charminus, ib. 41 fin. ; fleet of the Lacedaemo- nians assembles at; their commis- sioners confer with Tissaphernes, ib. 42-44 init. [cp. 52 init.] ; Tissa- phernes' garrison expelled from, ib. 109 init. ; Lipara a Cnidian colony, iii. 88 init. ; Triopium in Cnidian territory, viii. 35 med. Colonae, in the Troad, i. 131 init. Colonies, how anciently founded, i. 4 init., 24 init.; honors given by colonies to their mother city, ib. 25 fin, [cp. ib. 34, 38] ; shares in a colony secured by a deposit, with- out immediately quitting home, ib. 27 init. ; magistrates sent by the mother city, ib. 56 fin. ; laws given by the mother city, iii. 34 fin, [cp. vi. 4, 5] ; foundation of the Lace- daemonian colony, Heraclea, iii. 92, 93; the honors of the founda- tion of Amphipolis transferred to Brasidas, v. 11 init. ; leaders chosen from the mother city, viii. 100 med. ; the Hellenic colonies of Sicily, vi. 3-5. Colonus, near Athens, temple of Poseidon at, viii. 6T med. Colophon, taken by Paches, iii. 34 init.; made an Athenian colony, ib. fin. Colophonian Port, near Torone, v. 2 med. Columns, an inscription recording the oppression of the tyrants in- scribed on a column at Athens, vi. 55 init. ; treaties ordered to be in- scribed on columns, v. 18, xi. ; 23, iv. ; 47 fin. ; the infraction of the treaty inscribed on the same column by the Athenians, ib. 56 med. Commanders, speech of the Pelo- ponnesian, ii. 87. Commissioners sent by the Lacedae- monians as advisers to their officers, ii. 85 init., iii. 69 med., 76; v. 63 fin. ; viii. 39 init. Common places, of speeches at criti- cal moments, vii. 69 med. Confederacy, a confeiji ψ '. ..M ; V'^ • H.'X' ■Ji^ ^- >'■'/ I ■^:: •1 *'i. ', •> ,'.ίλ.αν