u 55- i IRR&RY OF CONGRESS ■■■■I 015 819 614 1 54th Congress, ) SENATE. ( Beport 2d Session. \ } No. 1160. 1786 >5 »y 1 EECOGNtTION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. / December 21, 1896.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Cameron, from the Committee on Foreign Belations, submitted the following REPORT. [To accompany Senate Joint Kes. 163.] Congress, at its last session, after long and patient consideration, adopted with practical unanimity the view expressed by your commit- tee that the time had come for resuming intervention with Spain for the recognition of the independence of Cuba. Spaiu having declined to listen to any representation founded on an understanding between herself and the insurgents, and Congress having pledged itself to friendly intervention, the only question that remains to be decided is the nature of the next step to be taken, with proper regard to the cus- toms and usages of nations. Before deciding this question, your committee has preferred to exam- ine with some care all the instances which have occurred during this century of insurgent peoples claiming independence by right of revolt. The inquiry has necessarily led somewhat far, especially because the right of revolt or insurrection, if insurrection can be properly called a right, seems, in every instance except one, to have carried with it a corresponding intervention. For convenience, we have regarded both insurrection and intervention as recognized rights, and have attempted to ascertain the limits within which these rights have been exercised and their force admitted by the general consent of nations. The long duration of the French revolutionary wars, which disturbed the entire world for five and twenty years, and left it in a state of great confusion, fixed the beginning of our modern international systems at the year 1815, in the treaties of Vienna, of Paris, and of the Holy Alliance. The settlement of local disturbances, under the influence of the powers parties to these treaties, proceeded without serious disa- greement until 1821, when the Greeks rose in insurrection against the Sultan. The modern precedents of European insurrection and inter- vention, where independence was the issue involved, began with Greece. 1. GREECE, 1821-1827. The revolution broke out in Greece at the end of March, 1821. Within a month the rebels got possession of all the open country and all the towns, except so far as they were held by Turkish garrisons. The Sultan immediately called all Mussulmans to arms; the Greek Patriarch was hanged at the door of his own church at Constantinople; several hundred n- 2 RECOGNITION OP CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. merchants were massacred; several hundred Christian churches were destroyed, and the Russian ambassador was insulted. Russia was then the head of the "Holy Alliance," the union of Rus- sia, Austria, and Prussia-, which had crashed Napoleon and guaranteed the peace of Europe. The Greek revolution was the work of liberal forces which had produced the disturbances of 1789, and which the Holy Alliance existed chiefly to combat. No government in Europe sympathized with the Greek rebels. Austria was entirely hostile. Eng- land and Prussia followed the same impulse. France feared interven- tion on account of her royalist dynasty. Even Russia, the only power which must profit by weakening Turkey, was interested in revolution- izing the principalities, but not in revolutionizing Greece. This universal fear of innovation caused no small part of the interest suddenly developed in the practice of international law and its limi- tations for the advantage of legitimate Governments. The neutrality acts of the United States and of England took shape in 1818 and 1819. The great powers of Europe held congress after congress for the inter- national settlement of political and even social difficulties; at Aix in 1818; at Carlsbad in 1819; at Vienna in 1820; at Troppau, October- December, 1820; at Laibach from January to May, 1821; and subse- quently at Vienna and Verona in the last six months of 1822. At Troppau, in November, 1820, the three powers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia united in signing a protocol expressly intended to assert the right of intervention in all cases where a European power "should sutler, in its internal regime, an alteration brought about by revolt, and the results of which are menacing for other States." The language of this protocol had much to do with the subsequent course of events. Faithful to the principles they have proclaimed and the respect due to the authority of every legitimate Government, as well as to every act which emanates from its free will, the Allied Powers will engage to refuse their recognition to changes consum- mated by illegal methods. When States where such changes shall have been effectu- ated shall cause other countries to fear, by their proximity, an imminent danger, and when the Allied Powers can exercise in regard to them an efficacious and beneficent action, they will employ, in order to restore them to the bosom of the Alliance, at first friendly processes ; in the second place, a coercive force, if the exercise of that force becomes indispensable. England and France did not join in this declaration, or in the inter- vention in Naples which was its immediate object; but the Alliance acted systematically on the principle thus laid down, which was in the full energy of its operation, when, four months afterwards, the Greeks broke into revolt. For these reasons the Greek insurrection assumed great importance in the eyes of all the civilized world and in the history of international relations. Other revolts were directed merely against a local authority, and aimed to subvert a dynasty or an oppressive rule. The Greeks fought for independence, and since the Declaration of Independence by the United States in 1776, no new nationality, based on successful insurrection, had been recognized by Europe. Russia almost instantly began by calling the attention of the allies to her claim that the whole Greek race, whether in Greece proper, or in the islands, or in the principalities, were of right under Russian protection. This declaration was made June 22, 1821, within three months of the out- break of the revolution, and two years before the Monroe doctrine took shape. It was coldly received by all the powers except Prussia, while the Turkish Government rejected with indignation a simultaneous warning from Russia in the form of an ultimatum, dated June 28, that the further coexistence of Turkey with other European States would '•■' J2-6 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 3 v ^depend on her conduct in this matter, which was a European and uni- versal interest that Russia claimed the peculiar right to defend. Under these circumstances the Russian ambassador left Constantinople, N August 10, 1821. The concessions demanded by Russia in her ultimatum did not then V V include any settlement of the Greek insurrection. They chiefly con- cerned the principalities. An entire year passed before the other pow- ders succeeded in bringing Turkey to concessions that opened a possi- bility of restoring her diplomatic relations with Russia and dealing with the subjects in dispute. Only when at last the powers induced Turkey to consent to allow her affairs to be discussed in a general conference did Russia insist that the Greek insurrection should be included among the subjects of mediation. The Turkish Government declared in the most energetic language that it would never admit of such interference, or consent to make the affairs of Greece a subject of negotiation with Rus- sia. In the face of this declaration, made in July, 1822, the other pow- ers, led by Austria and supported by England, under the horror roused by the massacre of Chios, abandoned their jealousy of Russia and their dread of insurrection so far as to join in insisting that Turkey should yield, and that the affairs of Greece should be made the subject of joint intervention; but in spite of this pressure, Turkey did not yield, and the powers held new conferences at Vienna and at Verona, which lasted till December, 1822, and which, while deciding on intervention in Italy and Spain, ended by yielding to Turkey an indefinite postponement of the Greek dispute. In this postponement Russia seemed cordially to acquiesce. The dread of revolution overcame for the moment the other interests of the Russian people. In the whole discussion, from March, 1821, until January, 1823, the right of intervention was never disputed, except by Turkey. On that point the whole law was stated in conversation between the British ambassador and the Turkish minister. The Turk took the ground that everything had been done by Turkey if she had satisfied her treaty obligations. "Everything as against Russia," replied Strangford, the British ambassador, " but not as regards the allies and friends of the Porte. According to Turkish law, it was not allowed to leave a house in a condition that endangered a neighbor's safety. The Turkish Gov- ernment believed it had restored the old solidity of the wall, but he (Lord Strangford) feared they were mistaken." "God forbid!" said the Turk; "but in any case this would be our affair, not yours !" " God forbid !" repeated Lord Strangford; "for this is our affair as well as yours." This was the situation when Lord Castlereagh died, and George Canning became prime minister of England. Down to that moment the British Government had identified itself with the Turkish Government, and had overstepped the line of neutrality in order to assist the Turkish campaigns by sea and land. Lord Castlereagh and Lord Strangford avowedly considered the Greeks as a worthless and mongrel race, inca- pable of self-government, whose claims were to be wholly rejected. George Canning held that the greater danger to the peace and welfare of Europe was the Holy Alliance and its system of political interfer ence; but in the case of Greece, where the Holy Alliance had refrained from interfering, while it was actively repressing disturbances in Spain and Italy, Canning held that intervention was proper and that the duties and interests of England required her to intervene. His chief anxiety was to bring about his object without war between any of the parties. 4 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. He began by recognizing Greek belligerency. The Greeks issued a proclamation declaring a strict blockade of the ports of Patras and Lepanto; and thereupon the Ionian high commissioner, on the 17th of November, 1824, recognized this "communication from persons exercis- ing the functions of government in Greece," and ordered "all ships and boats of whatever description, bearing the Ionian flag 'to respect the same in the most strict and exact manner.' " This seems to have been the step which led to Canning's somewhat famous definition of the nature of belligerency, in 1825. "The Turkish Government," we are told, "complained that the British Government allowed to the Greeks a belligerent character, and observed that it appeared to forget that to subjects in rebellion no national character could properly belong." To this remonstrance Canning replied, through the British resident at Constantinople, that "the character of belliger- ency was not so much a principle as a fact; that a certain degree of force and consistency acquired by any mass of population engaged in war entitled that population to be treated as a belligerent, and, even if their title were questionable, rendered it the interest, well under- stood, of all civilized nations so to treat them." This proposition must have seemed somewhat broad, even to Canning, for in applying it to the special case of Greece he added that " a power or community, call it which you will, which was at war with another and which covered the sea with its cruisers, must either be acknowledged as a belligerent or dealt with as a pirate." At that time no other power than England, and Turkey, least of all, admitted the necessity of this alternative, since the war had then lasted four years without producing it; but what no other power was ready to admit in 1825 became the accepted law of all Europe in 1861 in a form much more pronounced. Although this dictum of Canning's was never, so far as we know, officially published, it was quoted by Lord John Bussell, then Her Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, in the speech which he made in the House of Commons May 6, 1861, as his single and sufficient authority to justify the step upon which he and his colleagues in the Government had decided, of recognizing the belligerency of the "power or community," which he officially called "the Southern Con- federacy of America," and which at that time had not a ship at sea or an army on land, and which had given as yet no official evidence of a war to the British Govermnent. Simultaneously the same action was adopted by the Government of France, which "concurred entirely in the views of Her Majesty's Government," and whose concurrence, in the absence of protest or objection by any other power, made Eussell's view the accepted practice of Europe. Canning's recognition of Greek belligerency in 1825, as well as the joint recognition of "the Southern Confederacy of America" in 1861. was only the first step toward an anticipated system of intervention. To this subject we shall be obliged to return, after the further story of the Greek precedent has been told. Canning followed up the recogni- tion of belligerency by making a direct offer of assistance to the Greeks- Early in the year 1824 a paper purporting to be a plan of pacification for Greece, drawn up by the Court of St. Petersburg, had appeared in the European Gazettes, and, although no one knew from what source the Gazettes had received it, no one seriously disputed its authenticity. The plan suggested the division of Greece into three Principalities, under Turkish garrisons, with an internal organization to be guaranteed by the combined, powers. The Greek Government, alarmed at this sug- gestion, wrote to Canning a strong remonstrance and an appeal to the RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 5 help and protection of England. The letter reached Canning Novem- ber 4, jnst at the moment when he was considering the Greek blockade. His reply, dated December 1, 1824, contained a paragraph which invited the Greeks to place their interests in his hands : If they should at any time hereafter think it fit to solicit our mediation, we should be ready to tender it to the Porte; and, if accepted by the Porte, to do our best to carry it into effect, conjointly with other powers. * * * This appears to the British Government all that can reasonably be asked of them. The Greeks, whose military position was desperate, at length decided not only to act on Canning's suggestion, but to place themselves abso- lutely in the hands of Great Britain. This they did by a formal act in June, 1825. The trust was declined, but Canning, strengthened by this authority, was enabled to draw Eussia away from Austrian influ- ence, and to negotiate in St. Petersburg, in the form of a protocol, dated April 4, 1826, an agreement for a joint offer of mediation to Turkey for the pacification of Greece. Upon this protocol rests the diplomatic value of the subsequent intervention. His Britannic Majesty, having been requested by the Greeks to interpose his good offices in order to obtain their reconciliation with the Ottoman Porte, having in con- sequence offered his mediation to that power, and being desirous of concerting the measures of his Government with His Majesty the Emperor of all the Kussias, and His Imperial Majesty, on the other hand, being equally animated by the desire of putting an end to the contest of which Greece and the archipelago are the theater by an arragement which shall be consistent with the principles of religion, justice and humanity, have agreed — 1. That the arrangement to be proposed to the Porte, if that Government should accept the proffered mediation, should have for its object to place the Greeks toward the Ottoman Porte in the relation hereafter mentioned: Greece should be a dependency of that Empire, etc. * * * Canning wished to save Turkey from Eussian aggression, but Turkey refused to be saved. The Sultan would listen to no mediation between himself and his revolted subjects, least of all at a moment when his military position warranted him in feeling sure of success in subduing the revolt. Another year passed without bringing the issue to a point. Then France joined with England and Eussia, and the three powers, on the 5th of July, 1827, united in a formal treaty signed in London, which committed them to armed intervention in case the Sultan should still reject their proffered mediation, within the space of one month. The preamble to this treaty set forth the motives which led the three sovereigns to intervene: Penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to the sanguinary contest which, by delivering up the Greek provinces and the isles of the archipelago to all the dis- orders of anarchy, produces daily fresh impediments to the commerce of the Euro- pean States and gives occasion to piracies which not only expose the subjects of the high contracting parties to considerable losses, but besides render necessary burdensome measures of protection and repression, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the King of France and Navarre, having besides received on the part of the Greeks a pressing request to interpose their mediation with the Ottoman Porte, and being, as well as His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, animated by the desire of stopping the effusion of blood and of arresting the evils of all kinds which might arise from the continuance of such a state of things, have resolved to unite their efforts and to regulate the operation thereof by a formal treaty, with a view of reestablishing peace between the contending parties by means of an arrangement which is called for as much by humanity as by interest of the repose of Europe. The treaty proceeded to bind the three parties to offer their media- tion immediately on the basis of Turkish suzerainty and Greek self- government, and in case Turkey should not accept within one month the proposed mediation the powers should prevent further hostilities by ordering their squadrons to interpose. 6 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE The Turkish Government August 30 reiterated its decided, uncon- ditional, final, and unchangeable refusal to receive any proposition on behalf of the Greeks. The next day the ambassadors sent the neces- sary orders to their squadrons, and in attempting to carry out these orders the admirals, much to the regret of the British Government, brought on the battle of Navarino, October 20, 1827. 2. BELGIUM, 1830. The next European nation that claimed its independence on the ground of the right of revolution was the Belgian. By a provision of the general European settlement of 1815 Holland and Belgium were united in one kingdom, known as that of the Neth- erlands, over which was placed the son of the last Stadtholder of Hol- land, as King William I of the Netherlands. When the French Revolution of July, 1830, occurred, it spread instantly to the Netherlands. Toward the end of August, 1830, dis- turbances began, and soon became so serious as to threaten grave com- plications abroad as well as at home. King William sent a formal note, dated October 5, to the British Government, identical with notes to Prussia, Austria, and Bussia, the four contracting parties to the treaty of 1815, calling on them to restore order, since all were bound "to support the Kingdom of the Nether- lands and the actual state of Europe." Representatives of the four powers, and with them the representative of Prance, met in London, November 4, 1830, and adopted a protocol : His Majesty the King of the Netherlands having invited the courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, in their quality of powers signatory to the treaties of Paris and Vienna, which constituted the Kingdom of the Nether- lands, to deliberate in concert with his Majesty on the best means of putting an end to the troubles which have broken out in his states ; and the courts above-named having experienced, even before receiving this invitation, a warm desire to arrest with the shortest possible delay the disorder and the effusion of blood, have con- certed. * * * This protocol at once set aside the King of the Netherlands, ignoring his exclusive claim to support, and "to deliberate in concert." With- out concerting with or supporting King William, the five powers imposed an immediate armistice on both parties. Naturally the Belgian rebels then declared themselves independent. With such encouragement their safety was guaranteed almost beyond the possibility of risk. The claim of independence was made November 18, 1830, and was recognized one month later by the powers in their seventh conference, December 20. The representatives of the five powers, whose names were among the most famous in diplomacy — Tal- leyrand, Lieven, Esterhazy, Palmerston, Bulow — adopted, without the adhesion or even an invitation to be present of the Netherlands min- ister, a protocol which announced intervention pure and simple, begin- ning with the abrupt recognition of the revolutionary government: The plenipotentiaries of the five courts, having received the formal adhesion of the Belgian Government to the armistice proposed to it, and which the King of the Netherlands has also accepted, * * * the conference will occupy itself in discuss- ing and concerting the new arrangements most proper to combine the future inde- pendence of Belgium with the interests and the security of the other powers, and the preservation, of the European equilibrium. The Netherlands minister immediately recorded, December 22, a formal protest, and a reservation of King William's right to decide on "such ulterior measures as should be taken in the double interests of his own dignity and the well-being of his faithful subjects." A few days later, January 4, 1831, Holland entered a still more RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 7 formal protest. lu this strong and dignified paper the King's Govern- ment pointed out to the five powers the extreme importance of the uew precedent they Lad established in international law. As King, called to guard the well-being of a fraction of the European population, His Majesty has been deeply concerned to remark that the complications arisen in Europe have appeared so grave that it has been thought proj>er, as the only remedy, to sanction the results of a revolt which was provoked by no legitimate motive, and thus to compromise the stability of all thrones, the social order of all States, and the happiness, the repose, and the prosperity of all peoples. Independent of the solidarity established between the different members of the European system, His Majesty, as sovereign of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, has seen in it an attack directed against his rights. If the treaty of Paris of 1814 placed Belgium at the disposition of the high allies, these, from the moment they fixed the lot of the Belgian provinces, renounced, accord- ing to the law of nations, the faculty of returning on their work, and the dissolu- tion of tho bonds formed between Holland and Belgium under the sovereignty of the Mouse of Orange Nassau, became placed beyond the sphere of their attributes. The increase of territory assigned to the united provinces of the Netherlands was, more- over, acquired under burdensome conditions, for valuable consideration, requiring tho sacrifice of several of their colonies, the expense required to fortify several places of the southern provinces of the Kingdom, and other pecuniary charges. The conference assembled, it is true, at the request of the King, but that circum- stance did not confer on the conference the right to give its protocols a direction at variance with the object for which its assistance had been asked, and, instead of cooperating in the establishment of order in the Netherlands, to make them tend to the dismemberment of the Kingdom. Without noticing this protest, the conference proceeded on January 27, 1831, to fix the boundaries and other conditions of the new State. The Belgians, on the 4th of June, elected a king who was instantly recognized by the powers. On the 26th of June the conference adopted another series of eighteen articles. The King of Holland replied, July 12, that these new articles were very important changes, wholly in the interests of Belgium and to the injury of Holland. The Belgians meanwhile continued to organize their Government on a basis, diplomatic and territorial, that assumed in their favor all the points in dispute. The King of Holland, therefore, put an end to the armistice and marching forward routed the Belgian forces, August 11, and moved on Brussels. Belgium was then at his mercy. The King of the Belgians meanwhile wrote directly to the King of France request- ing the immediate succor of a corps of French troops, and without wait- ng for concert with other powers the French Government marched 40,000 men across the frontier. (Granville to Palmerston, August 4, 1831. British State Papers, 1833.) Thus within less than a year, after rebellion had broken out and without waiting for evidence of the right or the military force of the insurrection, every sort of intervention took place — diplomatic and military, joint and separate. Nor did the intervention stop with the measures taken for the succor of Belgium. As King William of Holland continued to reject the conditions imposed by the powers and held Antwerp as a pledge for more favorable conditions of peace, the Governments of France and England, abandoning the European concert, announced that they should put their naval and military forces in motion, and accordingly the British Govervment, November — , 1832, embargoed Dutch ships and blockaded the Dutch coast, while the French army, November 14, formally laid siege to Antwerp. 3. POLAND, 1831. While the Belgian revolution was going on a rebellion broke out in the ancient Kingdom of Poland, and on January 25, 1831, the Polish Diet declared the Czar Nicholas no longer King of Poland, and elected 8 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. a regency of five members, with Prince Adam George Ozartoriski at its head. The Czar instantly gave notice to the minister of the new French King, Louis Philippe, that he would tolerate no intervention in Poland. Louis Philippe, who owed his own crown to the right of revolution, was the only sovereign in Europe who could be supposed likely to inter- pose; but, for the moment, his interest in France and Belgium absorbed all his energy. Much popular sympathy was felt for the Poles, and Lafayette, then near the end of his life, founded a Polish committee, and raised money for their assistance. Before the question could acquire diplomatic importance by establishing a claim founded on the power of the rebels to maintain themselves, the Russian armies crushed the rebellion, and on September 8 regained possession of Warsaw. The entire struggle lasted barely nine months, and from the first its result was universally regarded as inevitable, or in the highest degree unpromising to the success of the revolution. As a diplomatic prece- dent, it seems to have no value, except as far as it offered an example of the power of Russia as the Belgian insurrection had shown the power of England and France when in union. 4. HUNGARY, 1849. The next European people who claimed recognition as an independent member of the family of nations seems to have been the Hungarians. On the 14th of April, 1849, the Hungarian Diet formally declared Hungary an independent State, and the Hapsburg dynasty forever deposed from the throne. The next day the Diet elected Louis Kos- suth provisional president. In regard to history, geographical importance, population, and mili- tary resources, this people had no occasion to excuse or explain their claims or their rights. Hungary was not a new country. Its govern- ment existed from time immemorial, and its right to change its sovereign was as complete as that of England or of France. The provisional government had nearly 150,000 men in arms at that moment. The Aus- trian Emperor could hardly dispose of a larger force for the purpose of conquest. The young Emperor (Francis Joseph) instantly appealed for aid to the Czar (Nicholas) of Russia, who instantly intervened. The Czar issued a manifesto April 27, stating the facts and the grounds on which his intervention was believed to be legitimate. This paper founded the right of intervention, not on the weakness of the belligerent, but on his strength. Russia asserted as a principle that she must inter- vene because if she did not intervene Hungary would establish her independence: The insurrection in Hungary [began the manifesto of April 27, 1849] has of late made so much progress that Russia can not possibly remain inactive. * * * Such a state of things endangers our dearest interests, and prudence compels us to antici- pate the difficulties it prepares for us. The Austrian Government being for the moment unable to oppose a sufficient power to the insurgents, it has formally requested His Majesty the Emperor (Nicholas) to assist in the repression of a rebel- lion which endangers the tranquillity of the two Empires. It was but natural that the two cabinets should understand one another on this point of common interest, and our troops have consequently advanced into Galicia to cooperate with Austria against the Hungarian rebellion. We trust the Governments that are equally inter- ested in the maintenance of tranquillity will not misunderstand our motives of action. The Emperor (Nicholas) is sorry to quit the passive and expectant position which he has hitherto maintained, but still he remains faithful to the spirit of his former declarations; for, in granting to every State the right to arrange its own political constitution according to its own mind and refraining from interfering with RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 9 any alterations of their form of government which such States might think proper to make, His Majesty reserved to himself his full liberty of action in case the reac- tion of revolutions near him should teud to endanger his own safety or the political equilibrium on the frontiers of his Empire. 1 This precedent tended to establish the right of every Government to intervene in the affairs of foreign States whenever their situation should "tend to endanger its own safety or the political equilibrium on its frontier." As far as is known, every other Government in the world tacitly acquiesced in the establishment of this precedent. If any Government recorded a protest, it was that of the United States, but even the United States protested only by inference from the acts and language of the President. On March 4, 1849, the admin- istration of President Taylor began, and the Eussian intervention in Hungary took place a few weeks aftewards, before the new President had time to consult other Governments in regard to possible action in European affairs. Without alliance or consultation, President Taylor instantly appointed an agent to inquire into the situation in Hungary. Secretary Clayton signed his instructions June 18, 1849, six weeks after the Russian troops had been ordered to enter Hungary. The language of these instructions was as emphatic and as decisive as that of the Czar's circular: Should the new government prove to be, in your opinion, firm and stable, * * * you might intimate, if you should see fit, that the President would, in that event, be gratified to receive a diplomatic agent from Hungary to the United States by or before the next meeting of Congress, and that he entertains no doubt whatever that, in case her new government should prove to be firm and stable, her independence would be speedily recognized by that enlightened body. The Russian intervention brought the Hungarian war so quickly to an end that before October all resistance was over, and when Con- gress met, early in December, 1849, President Taylor's annual message could only proclaim what would have been American policy : During the late conflict beween Austria and Hungary there seemed to be a prospect that the latter might become an independent nation. However faint that prospect at the time appeared, I thought it my duty, in accordance with the general sentiment of the American people, who deeply sympathized with the Magyar patriots, to stand prepared upon the contingency of the establishment by her of a permanent govern- ment, to be the first to welcome independent Hungary into the family of nations. For this purpose I invested an agent, then in Europe, with power to declare our willingness promptly to recognize her independence in the event of her ability to sustain it. The powerful intervention of Russia in the contest extinguished the hopes of the struggling Magyars. * * * To this paragraph, and to some expressions in the instructions, the Austrian minister was ordered to take exception. He protested accord- ingly. Daniel Webster had then become Secretary of State, and replied to the protest in a paper known as the Hulsemann letter, in which he declared what he believed to be the American policy and the law in regard to new nationalities claiming recognition : Of course, questions of prudence naturally arise in reference to new States brought by successful revolutions into the family of nations; but it is not to be required of neutral powers that they should await the recognition of the new government by the parent State. No principle of public law has been more frequently acted upon within the last thirty years by the great powers of the world than this. Within that period eight or ten new States have established independent Governments within the limits of the colonial dominions of Spain on this continent, and in Europe the same thing has been done by Belgium and Greece. The existence of all these Gov- ernments was recognized by some of the leading powers of Europe, as well as by the United States, before it was acknowledged by the States from which they had. separated themselves. If, therefore, the United States had gone so far as formally 1 Annual Register, 1849, p. 333. 10 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. to acknowledge the independence of Hungary, although, as the event has proved, it would have been a precipitate step, and one from which no benefit would have resulted to either party, it would not, nevertheless, have been an act against the law of nations, provided they took no part in her contest with Austria. Secretary Webster's view of the rights of intervention did not cover ground so wide as that taken by the Czar in his circular of April, 1849, but the attitude of President Taylor seems to have been intended as a counteraction, or a protest, as far as the influence of America extended, not so much to the claims of right or law asserted by the Czar, as to the object of his intervention. The instructions of June 18, 1849, expressly said that Eussia " has chosen to assume an attitude of inter- ference, and her immense preparations for invading and reducing the Hungarians to the rule of Austria, from which they desire to be released, gave so serious a character to the contest as to awaken the most painful solicitude in the minds of Americans." Thus, on both sides the right to intervene, both for and against the Hungarians seems to have been claimed and not expressly denied by either ; and no other power appears to have offered even so much oppo- sition as was shown by President Taylor to the principles or to the acts of Eussia, which settled the course of history. 5. STATES OF THE CHURCH, 1850. Besides the four precedents of Greece, Belgium, Poland, and Hun- gary, where new nationalities were in question, a much larger number of interventions occurred in Europe in the process of disruption or con- solidation which has, on one hand, disintegrated the ancient empires of the Sultan, of Spain, of the Church; and on the other, concentrated the new systems of Germany, Eussia, and Italy. Interventions have occurred most conspicuously in Spain, by France, in 1823; in Portugal, by England, in 1827 ; again in Spain and Portugal in 1836, by England and France, under what was called the quadruple treaty; in Piedmont and Naples, by the Holy Alliance, in 1S21; and in so many instances since 1848 that the mere enumeration would be long and difficult; but none of the disturbed countries claimed permanent independence under a form of revolution, unless it were perhaps the States of the Church, or Eome, which, on February 8, 1849, declared the Pope to be deposed, and set up a provisional government under a revolutionary triumvirate. The National Assembly of France, which was then a Eepublic, hastened to adopt, March 31, 1849, a resolution that if, "in order better to safeguard the interests and honor of France, the Executive should think proper to support its negotiations by a partial and temporary occupation in Italy, it would find in the assembly the most entire agreement." The assembly doubtless intended to inter- vene in Italy in order to protect the revolutionary movement there from the threatened intervention of Austria. The French Executive, Louis Napoleon, gave another direction to the policy of France. He immedi- ately sent a French army to Civita Yecchia, which landed there April 26, and after a bloody struggle drove the republican government out of Eome. The French entered Eome July 3. Pope Pius IX returned there in April, 1850, and during the next twenty years Eome remained under the occupation of a French army. The only reason given by France, in this instance, for intervention was that the occupation of Eome was necessary in order to "maintain the political influence of France." This was the ground taken by President Louis Napoleon in explaining his course to the Chambers in 1850. RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 11 The British G-overnraent acquiesced in this rule of European law or practice. On May 9, 1851, Lord Palinerston, then foreign secretary, said in Parliament, in reply to a formal inquiry, that the occupation of Kome was " a measure undertaken by France in her own discretion and in the exercise of her own judgment. The British Government had been no party to this measure. France had exercised her own rights in regard to it, and it was not at all necessary that the previous con- currence of the British Government should have been obtained in this matter. The British Government had been no party to this aggression and could not therefore be said to have concurred in it. It was a mat- ter on which they might have an opinion, but in which they had no particular right, by treaty or otherwise, to interfere." 6. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1878. Since the year 1827 intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire has been so constant as to create a body of jurisprudence, and a long series of treaties on which the existence of all political systems of south- eastern Europe seems now to be more or less entirely based. Not only Greece, Montenegro, Boumania, Bulgaria, Boumelia, Servia, and Egypt have been the creations of such intervention, or the objects of its restraints, but also Samos, Crete, and even the Lebanon owe their legal status to the same source. An authority so great must assume some foundation in law, seeing that the entire world acquiesced not only in the practical exercise of the force but also in the principle on which it rested, whatever that principle was. The treaty of Berlin in 1878 was a broad assertion of the right of the European powers to regulate the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, but the treaty contains no statement of the principle of jurisprudence on which the right rests. The preamble merely declares that the powers, "being desirous to regulate, with a view to European order, the questions raised in the East by the events of late years and by the war terminated by the pre- liminary treaty of San Stefano, have been unanimously of opinion that the meeting of a congress would offer the best means of facilitating an understanding." In effect, the treaty of Berlin reduced the Ottoman Porte to tutelage, extinguished its sovereignty over certain large portions of its domin- ions, and restrained its rights over other portions. It recognized the independence of Servia, Koumania, and Montenegro, and fixed their boundaries. It established Bulgaria as "an autonomous and tributary principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan." It created the prov- ince of Eastern Boumelia "under conditions of administrative auton- omy." It stipulated an organic law for Crete. It interfered in all directions with the internal arrangements of the Ottoman Empire. Perhaps the most typical instance of assumption of power by the com- bined governments was Article XXV of the treaty, which began : "The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and adminis- tered by Austria-Hungary." So liberal a use of the right of intervention has seldom been made, but the principle of jurisprudence on which it rested has never been offi- cially declared. Xothing in the treaties expressly limits to the Otto- man Empire the right of intervention which was exercised in its case. The only principle jealously insisted upon, seemed to be that of joint, as against separate, intervention by the European powers. With this 12 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. implied restriction, the right of intervention " with a view to European order " appears to be the only foundation for the existing status of southeastern Europe, and equally applicable to the rest of the world. These six precedents include, as far as is known, every instance where a claim to independence has been made by any people whatever in Europe since the close of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. Other suc- cessful revolutions, such as those of Tuscany and the States of the Church in 1859, were the immediate results of intervention, and that of Naples in 1860 was, from first to last, perhaps the most striking example of intervention in modern times, although Naples hardly thought necessary to pass through any intermediate stage of recognition as an independent authority. The six precedents, therefore, constitute the entire European law on the subject of intervention in regard to European peoples claiming independence by right of revolution. There is no other authoritative source of the law; for the judicial courts of Europe were bound to fol- low the political decision ; and the opinions of private j>erSons, whether jurists or politicians, being without sanction, couldnot beaccepted as law. From this body of precedent it is clear that Europe has invariably asserted and practiced the right to interfere, both collectively and sep- arately, amicably and forcibly, in every instance, except that of Poland, where a European people has resorted to insurrection to obtain independ- ence. The right itself has been based on various grounds : " Impediments to commerce," "Burdensome measures of protection and repression," " Requests " of one or both parties " to interpose," " Effusion of blood," and "Evils of all kinds," "Humanity" and "The repose of Europe" (Greek treaty of 1827) ; "A warm desire to arrest, with the shortest pos- sible delay, the disorder and the effusion of blood" (Protocol of Novem- ber 4, 1830, in the case of Belgium) ; " His own safety or the political equilibrium on the frontiers of his Empire" (Bussian circular of April 27, 1849, in the case of Hungary;) "To safeguard the interest and honor" and to "Maintain the political influence" of the intervening power (French declarations of 1849-50 in regard to the States of the Church). Finally, in the latest and most considerable, because abso- lutely unanimous act of all Europe, simply the " desire to regulate" (Preamble to the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, covering the recognition of Servia, Eoumania, Montenegro, and Bulgaria). ASIA. There remains the experience of Asia and America. In regard to Asia, probably all authorities agree that the entire fabric of European supremacy, whether in Asiatic Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, India, Siam, or China, rests on the right of intervention. The exercise of this right constitutes another large but separate branch of public law which, by common consent, is not regarded as applicable to nations of European blood. Furthermore, although many governments in Asia have been extin- guished by means of the right of intervention, none is known to have claimed independence founded on the right of insurrection. Certainly none has been recognized by Europe or America on that ground. RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 13 AMERICA, 1822-23. America, both North and South, has always aimed to moderate European interventon and to restrict its exercise. On this point we have the evidence of George Canning in a celebrated speech on the foreign-enlistment act in 1823 : We have spent much time [said Canning] in teaching other powers the nature of a strict neutrality, and generally speaking we found them most reluctant scholars. * * If I wished for a guide in a system of neutrality I should take that laid down hy America in the days of the presidency of Washington and the secretary- ship of Jefferson. In fact, the British Government did take that guide. The American neutrality act of 1794, revised and reenacted in the act of April 20, 1818, served as the model for the British foreign-enlistment act in 1819. The cause of that act of 1819 was stated by Canning in the speech just cited : When peace was concluded between this country and Spain in 1814, an article was introduced into the treaty by which this country bound itself not to furnish any succors to what were then denominated the revolted colonies of Spain. In process of time, as those colonies became more powerful, a question arose of a very difficult nature, to be decided on a due consideration of their de jure relation to Spain on the one side, and their de facto independence of her on the other. The law of nations was entirely silent with respect to a course which, under a circumstance so peculiar as the transition of colonies from their allegiance to the parent state, ought to be pursued. It was difficult to know how far either the statute law or the com- mon law was applicable to colonies so situated. It became necessary, therefore, in the act of 1818, to treat the colonies as actually independent of Spain. * * * Apparently Canning did not consider that the revolt of the American colonies in 1776 offered a precedent for "a circumstance so peculiar as the transition of colonies from their allegiance." He regarded the situ- ation as so peculiar that it needed to be met by measures in regard to which "the law of nations was entirely silent." He seemed to regard the foreign-enlistment act as a recognition of independence. The Government of the United States was not so much perplexed in regard to the steps by which colonies achieved independence; but in the actual condition of Europe, where the Holy Alliance held entire control and intervened everywhere against claims based on the right of insurrection, the President had the strongest reasons for moving slowly, and, if possible, only in concert with England. The disturbances in the Spanish colonies in America had begun as a consequence of the overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty by Napoleon and the establishment of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain in 1808; but the movements for independence took serious form at a much later time. In Mexico, the first national congress met at Chilpancingo in 1813, and formally declared the independence of Mexico on the 6th of Novem- ber of that year. It was practically suppressed by the execution of Morelos, December 22, 1815, and did not revive until Iturbide, in Jan- uary, 1821, joined Guerrero in the so-called plan of Iguala. Iturbide made his triumphal entry into the City of Mexico September 27, 1821. Venezuela first declared independence on July 15, 1811, but the Spanish forces continued the war until General Bolivar drove them from the interior in 1821, and General Paez captured Puerto Cabello in 1823. Chile began her revolution in 1810, but did not declare independence until January 1, 1818, and then only by proclamation of the executive authority, "the actual circumstances of the war not permitting the convocation of a national congress." 14 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. Buenos Ayres also began her revolution in 1810, but did not declare independence and claim recognition until October 25, 1816. The question of intervention began in 1817. The Spanish Govern- ment appealed to the European powers for aid. The Czar openly took sides with Spain, and when, in September, 1817, the Spanish Govern- ment asked permission to build several ships of war in the Eussian dockyards, the Czar suggested that Spain should buy five ships of the line and three frigates belonging to the Eussian navy. This was done, and the ships were sent to the seat of war. At the same time, in October, 1817, the Eussian Government instructed its ambassador in London to press on the British Government the great importance of European intervention. Great Britain declared energetically that she would have no part in trying to force back the subjects of Spain under the domination of an oppressive Government. In fact, Lord Castlereagh had already assured President Monroe that if Great Britain intervened at all it would be on a system of perfect liberality to the Spanish provinces, and the President decided, as early as April, 1818, to discourage Euro- pean mediation and to take the ground that there could be no rational interference except on the basis of the independence of the South Americans. In August he made a formal proposal to the British and French Governments for a concerted and contemporary recognition of Buenos Ayres, whose de facto independence made that country the natural object of a first step toward the establishment of a general policy. In December he notified both Governments that he had patiently waited without interfering in the policy of the allies, but as they had not agreed upon anything, and as the fact of the independence of Buenos Ayres appeared established, he thought that recognition was necessary. In January, 1819, he announced to them that he was actually considering the measure. Thus, all parties had agreed, as early as 1817 and 1818, upon the pro- priety of intervention between Spain and her colonies. Both the United States and Europe asserted that the time had come; they disa- greed only as to the mode. When Lord Castlereagh, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in October, 1818, proposed to the four other powers "to intervene in the war between Spain and her American colonies by addressing offers of mediation to the two belligerents," Eussia ener- getically opposed and rejected the scheme, not because it was interven- tion, but apparently because it was mediation, and to that extent recog- nized rights in the insurgents. When President Monroe interposed his fiat that no interference could be countenanced by him except on the basis of independence, he dictated in advance the only mode of inter- vention which he meant to permit. If he waited before carrying it out it was only because in the actual balance of European and American power he felt that isolated action might injure the cause he had deter- mined to help. He waited in vain. Neither England nor any other power moved again. No information came from Europe. No further attempt to sub- ject the revolted colonies was probable, and even the declaration of the Congress of Troppau in November, 1820, which announced a general and active intervention against all " illegitimate" authorities, caused little alarm as long as England and France were not parties to it. Delay was not dangerous. The system which Monroe aimed to estab- lish could not be firm or broad as long as it rested on the recognition of a single country like Buenos Ayres or on the isolated action of the United States. That system included all American communities which RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 15 rejected foreign authority; it was to be taken as a whole, and referred to every part of the contest, from the recognition of the flag at the outset to the recognition of independence at the close. Therefore, Monroe waited until the effect of his action should settle the whole question and cover all the ground. After a delay of four years from the time when he began his policy, the Greek revolt in Europe and the military successes of Bolivar and Iturbide in America gave the desired opportunity, and Monroe sent to Congress his celebrated message of March 8, 1822, recommending the recognition of all the revolted "colo- nies of Spain — Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Buenos Ayres. These countries asked no more. They based their claim on their independence de facto, and Monroe admitted its force. " The prov- inces," he said, " which have declared their independence and are in the enjoyment of it, ought to be recognized." He added that "the measure is proposed under a thorough conviction that it is in strict accord with the law of nations." In reality, it created the law, so far as its action went, and its legality was recognized by no European power. All waited in open or tacit disapproval of Monroe's course. England herself, even after Canning succeeded Castlereagh, refused to approve. Spain protested vigorously; and, as far as concerned objec- tions, the Spanish minister in Washington offered them in great num- bers and with sufficient energy. He instantly protested, not only on grounds of morality and fact, but also of policy. " Buenos Ayres," he said, was " sunk in the most complete anarchy;" in Peru, "near the gates of its capital," a rebel and a Spanish army divided the inhabitants ; in Chili, "an individual suppresses the sentiments of its inhabitants;" "on the coast of Terra Firma, also, the Spanish banners wave; " "in Mexico, too, there is no government;" and he concluded, with force: "Where then are those governments which ought to be recognized?" The question was not without difficulties, as Monroe knew; and on this point all Europe supported the Spanish contention. Although Congress unanimously approved and adopted the President's views, and immediately appropriated $100,000 for diplomatic expenses; and although Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Buenos Ayres were in conse- quence admitted into the family of nations by the sole authority of the President of the United States, with the approval of Congress, two years passed before the British Government consented even to discuss the" subject in Parliament as a serious measure of policy. Then, on June 15, 1821, a motion was made by Sir James Mackin- tosh, and Canning replied. His speech made no allusion to the action of the United States ; it denied the de facto right of recognition so far as to say that "we ought not to acknowledge the separate and inde- pendent existence of any government which is so doubtfully established that the mere effect of that acknowledgment shall be to mix parties again in internal squabbles if not in open hostilities." Canning still thought " that, before we can act, information as to matters of fact is necessary." Nevertheless, Monroe's act, which extinguished the last hopes of the Holy Alliance in America, produced the deepest sensation among Euro- pean conservatives, and gave to the United States extraordinary con- sideration. England used it as a weapon at the Congress of Verona to threaten the other powers when they decided on intervention in Spain. Slowly Canning came wholly over to the side of Monroe as France and Austria forced his hands in Spain. As early as October, 1823, he sent consuls to all the chief cities in rebellion throughout Mexico and Cen- tral and South America. Immediately after his speech in Parliament 16 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. of June 15, 1824, he authorized his consul at Buenos Ayres to negotiate a commercial treaty with that Government. On the 1st of January, 1825, he notified other powers that England had determined to recog- nize the independence of Colombia, Mexico, and Buenos Ayres. In a speech in Parliament on the 15th of February, 1825, he explained and defended his conduct, blaming the United States, by implication, for pursuing "a reckless and headlong course," and claiming credit for fol- lowing one "more strictly guarded in point of principle." "The whole question was one of time and mode." Not withstanding Canning's explanation, the principle of intervention on which he acted was not clear. Nothing in his act of recognition revealed a rule of any general value. He considered that " any other period or mode than that chosen would have been liable to some objec- tion." Yet the period and mode he chose were strongly objected to throughout Europe, and met with energetic protest from Spain. Nearly two years more passed before he cleared up the mystery. Then, when driven to armed intervention in the affairs of Spain and Portugal, be made, on the 12th of December, 1826, a speech in Parliament which was perhaps the most celebrated of his life. At the very end of this speech he explained the "principle" on which he had acted in regard to the independence of the Spanish colonies, and the "time and mode" of recognition. It was the moment when a French army took posses- sion of Spain : If France occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid the consequences of that occupation, that we should blockade Cadiz ? No ! I looked another way. I sought materials of compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain "with the Indies." I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old. The principle thus avowed by Canning added little to the European law of intervention ; but the principle avowed by Monroe created an entire body of American jurisprudence. As an isolated act it meant little, but in Monroe's view it was not an isolated act ; it was part of a system, altogether new and wholly American ; and it was to be justified on grounds far wider than itself. The European law and practice of intervention, extending, as it did, its scope and energy with every new step in European development, could be met only by creating an American law and practice of intervention exclusive of the European within the range of its influence. This Monroe did not hesitate to do. With boldness which still startles and perplexes the world, he lopped off one great branch of European intervention and empire and created a new system of international relations. His opportunity was given by Canning, who, in the midst of his European difficulties in 1823, intimated that England would be well pleased to see the United States take ground even more advanced than in the recognition of the South American revolted States. Monroe lost no time in doubts or hesita- tions. In his annual message of December, 1823, he announced the principle that the new nations which his act alone had recognized as independent were by that act placed outside of the European system, and that the United States would regard any attempt to extend that system among them as unfriendly to the United States. With the Governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. * * * It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 17 political system to any portion of either continent without endangering onr peace and happiness. * * It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. So sweeping- a right of intervention bad never been claimed unless by Russia in regard to tbe Greeks in 1821, and has never been exercised by any other single power; but the claim rested on the same general ground as that of the innumerable interventions of Europe. "Danger to our peace and happiness" was not essentially different from "danger to peace, honor, political power, and interests" which European nations had alleged as just reasons for intervention, and while the right of intervention on this ground was so energetically maintained, the right of deciding absolutely as to the time and mode of intervention was as energetically exercised by Monroe. From that day to this the American people have always, and unan- imously, supported and approved the Monroe doctrine. They needed no reasoning to prove that it was vital to their safety. The enormous and rapidly increasing force developed by Europe in her system of joint action, from the treaty of Verona to the overwhelming authority, hitherto unknown to mankind, which was exhibited in the treaty of Berlin; the rapid extension of her system over the rest of the world y and the inevitable pressure of its expansion; her immense superiority in wealth and mechanical resources; the irresistible energy of her enormous naval and military armaments when concentrated, as under the Berlin treaty, in a single mass, left no doubt that America must abandon the hope of independence if she could not maintain a system of her own. Europeans, indeed, sometimes expressed fear of America, but their fears rested only on the assumption that America could stand apart. Even the celebrated historian Niebuhr complained because the Czar did not conquer the Turkish Empire and found Christian states in Asia Minor in order to balance the growing power of America. Europe did not, it is true, adopt Mebuhr's advice and colonize Asia Minor, but she conquered, or subdued under her system, all the rest of Asia, and used this accession of strength for her common objects. She spread her system over all Asia, all Africa, all Australasia, and all Polynesia. America made no contest, even within America, except in regard to those countries or communities which expressly declared their will and their power to be American. Within that limited range President Monroe attempted to build up an American system. He disclaimed the right or the intention to interfere with actual European possessions in America, so long as these communities were contented to remain European; but he claimed and exercised, under the broadest principle, the right to intervene in favor of communities that plainly displayed their wish and their power to be American; and, what was vital to the exercise of his claim, he asserted and used in its fullest extent the right to judge for himself, and finally, both as to " time and mode," — both when and how — any par- ticular community had proved its will and its right to claim admission into the American system. Against the opposition of all Europe, and at the risk of many and serious embarrassments, Monroe took and sue cessfully held ground which his successors have struggled with vary- ing fortune to maintain. The right of intervention lay necessarily at the bottom of the strife of forces, and the United States exercised it freely, although usually striving to exercise it for the common good of an American system. In the case of Texas, the United States Government, as is notorious, exer- cised the whole right of intervention against an American power; but S. Rep. 1160 2 18 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. the case of Texas did not differ in principle from that of Colombia, except in being wholly an American and domestic affair. In both instances the intervention rested on the claim of the Executive and the Legislature to be absolute and final judge of the "time and mode" of interference. In no case were other governments expected to sanc- tion the decision in order to give it validity. In the case of Texas, however, we have to call attention to a subject on which the proposed action of Congress necessarily depends. In a report made June 18, 1836, by Mr. Clay, from the Senate Committee on For- eign Relations, in respect to the recognition of the independence of Texas (Senate Doc. 406, Twenty-fourth Congress, first session), are the following passages: The recognition of Texas as an independeut power may he made by the United States in various ways : First, by treaty ; second, by the passage of a law regulating commercial intercourse between the two powers; third, by sending a diplomatic agent to Texas with the usual credentials; or, lastly, by the Executive receiving and accrediting a diplomatic representative from Texas, which would be a recognition as far as the Executive only is competent to make it. In the first and third modes the concurrence of the Senate in its executive character would be necessary, and in the second in its legislative character. The Senate alone, without the cooperation of some other branch of the Govern- ment, is not competent to recognize the existence of any power. The President of the United States, by the Constitution, has the charge of their foreign intercourse. Regularly he ought to take the initiative in the acknowledg- ment of the independence of any new power, but in this case he has not yet done it, for reasons which he, without doubt, deems sufficient. If in any instance the Presi- dent should be tardy, he may be quickened in the exercise of his power by the expression of the opinion, or by other acts, of one or both branches of Congress, as was done in relation to the Republics formed out of Spanish America. But the committee do not think that on this occasion any tardiness is justly imputable to the Executive. About three months only have elapsed since the establishment of an independent government in Texas, and it is not unreasonable to wait a short time to see what its operation will be, and especially whether it will afford those guaranties which foreign powers have a right to expect before they institute relations with it. Taking this view of the whole matter, the committee concluded by recommending to the Senate the adoption of the following resolution: Iicsolved, Thatthe independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged by theUnited States whenever satisfactory information shall be received that it has in successful operation a civil government capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power. President Andrew Jackson, in his Texas message of December 21, 1836, began by calling attention to these resolutions passed by " the two Houses at their last session, acting separately, l that the independ- ence of Texas ought to be acknowledged by the United States when- ever satisfactory information should be received that it had in successful operation a civil government capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power. 7 " After treating shortly the principles of recognition, President Jackson con- tinued : Nor has any deliberate inquiry ever been instituted in Congress, or in any of our legislative bodies, as to whom belonged the power of recognizing a new State — a power the exercise of which is equivalent, under some circumstances, to a declara- tion of war; a power nowhere expressly delegated, and only granted in the Consti- tution, as it is necessarily involved in some of the great powers given to Congress; in that given to the President and Senate to form treaties with foreign powers, and to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, and in that conferred upon the President to receive ministers from foreign nations. In the preamble to the resolu- tion of the House of Representatives it is distinctly intimated that the expediency of recognizing the independence of Texas should be left to the decision of Congress. In this view, on the ground of expediency, I am disposed to concur, and do not therefore consider it necessary to express any opinion as to the strict constitutional right of the Executive, either apart from or in conjunction with the Senate over RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 19 the subject. It is to be presumed tbat on no future occasion will a dispute arise, as none bas heretofore occurred, between the Executive and the Legislature in the exer- cise of the power of recognition. It will always be considered consistent with the spirit of the Constitution and most safe that it should be exercised, when proba- bly leading to war, with a previous understanding with that body by whom war can alone be declared, and by whom all the provisions for sustaining its perils must be furnished. Its submission to Congress, which represents in one of its branches the States of this Union and in the other the people of the United States, where there may be reasonable ground to apprehend so grave a consequence, would certainly afford the fullest satisfaction to our own country and a perfect guaranty to all other nations of the justice and prudence of the measures which might be adopted. The initiative thus asserted by Congress and couceded by President Jackson to Congress in the case of the recognition of Texas was fol- lowed in the case of Hungary by President Taylor in the instructions already quoted, which authorized his agent to invite the revolutionary government of Hungary to send to the United States a diplomatic rep- resentative, since the President entertained no doubt that in such case at the next meeting of Congress "her independence would be speedily recognized by that enlightened body." Until now no further question has been raised in regard to the powers of Congress. So much space has been taken by this historical summary that the case of Texas must be passed over without further notice, and the cases of Haiti and Santo Domingo may be set aside as governed by peculiar influences. The record shows that in every instance except Poland down to 1S50 where any people has claimed independence by right of revolt the right of intervention has been exercised against the will of one or the other party to the dispute. In every instance the oidy ques- tion that has disturbed the intervening powers has regarded neither the right nor the policy so much as the "time and mode" of action. The only difference between the European and American practice was that the United States aimed at moderating or restricting the extreme license of European intervention, and this was the difference which brought the United States nearly into collision with Europe in 1861 and 1862. Lords Palmerston and Russell, as well as the Emperor Napoleon and his ministers, entertained no doubt of their right to inter- vene even before our civil war had actually commenced, and accord- ingly recognized the insurgent States as belligerents in May, 1861, although no legal question had yet been raised requiring such a deci- sion. The United States Government never ceased to protest with the utmost energy against the act as premature and unjust, and this last and most serious case of interference, in which the United States was concerned as an object of European intervention, revealed the vital necessity of their American s} 7 stem at the same time that it revealed the imminent danger of its destruction. THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1861-1866. Allusion has been already made to the declaration of Lord John Rus- sell on the part of the British Government in the House of Commons May 6, 1861. in which he announced that the law officers of the Crown had already "come to the opinion that the Southern Confederacy of America, according to those principles which seem to them to be just principles, must be treated as a belligerent." This astonishing promise of belligerency to an insurrection which had by the latest advices at that time neither a ship at sea nor an army on land, before the fact of war was officially known in England to have been proclaimed bj' either party, was accompanied by a letter of the same date from Lord Johu 20 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. Eussell to the British ambassador at Paris, in which he said that the accounts which had been received from America were "sufficient to show that a civil war has broken out among the States which lately composed the American Union." Other nations have therefore to consider the light in which, with reference to that war, they are to regard the Confederacy into which the Southern States have united themselves; and it appears to Her Majesty's Government that, looking at all the circumstances of the case, they can not hesitate to admit that such Confederacy is entitled to be considered as a belligerent, invested with all the rights and preroga- tives of a belligerent. Under these circumstances, Lord John Eussell invited the Emperor of France to cooperate with England in " a joint endeavor" to obtain " from each of the belligerents " certain concessions in favor of neutrals. On May 8 the French minister "concurred entirely in the views of Her Majesty's Government" and pledged himself to the joint action. On May 13 the British Government issued its formal proclamation of neutrality between the United States and "certain States styling them- selves the Confederate States of America." Lord John Eussell justified this action on the ground of " the size and poiralation of the seceding States" and "the critical condition of our (British) commerce." He denied that the British Government had any thought of giving assistance to the South. Nevertheless, the language of Lord John Eussell showed that he con- sidered the issue as decided in advance and that his measures were shaped on that assumption. His speech of May 6 characterized the insurgents without qualification as " the Southern Confederacy of Amer- ica." In his official correspondence with his official agents he used the term "Northern or Southern confederation of North America," or "the Confederate States of America," as though their independence were fully established. All his expressions and acts warranted the belief that the recognition of belligerency was in his mind only a preliminary step to the recognition of independence as an already accomplished fact, and that he had hurried the declaration of belligerency in order to avoid the remonstrances certain to be made by the new American min- ister about to arrive. More serious still as a symptom of European temper was the joint action concerted between England and France, which soon proved that England, while waiting for the dissolution of the Union, meant, in recognizing the independence of the Southern Con- federacy, to revive her old belligerent claims of 1812, which had never been expressly abandoned. This threatened wreck of all American rights was even more immi- nent than our highest officials supposed. Only by slow degrees have we learned how narrow an escape we made, and even at this day much remains to be revealed. We know that as early as March, 1861, the French minister at Washington advised his Government to recognize the Confederate States, and in May he advised it to intervene by for- cibly raising the American blockade. Mercier's recommendation was communicated to Eussell, who entertained no doubts as to the right of intervention, either diplomatic or military, even at that early moment when the serious operations of war had hardly begun. There is much good sense in Mercier's observations [wrote Russell to Palmerston, October 17]. But we must wait; I am persuaded that, if we do anything, it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England and France to break a blockade for the sake of getting cotton; but in Europe powers have often said to belligerents : "Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you accept them, well and good. But if your adversary accepts them, and if you refuse them, our mediation is at an end, and you must expect to see us your enemies." RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 21 France would be quite ready to bold tins language with us. If sucb a policy were to be adopted, tbe time for it would be tbe end of tbe year, or immediately before tbe meeting of Parliament. Already (on May 6) Eussell Lad officially announced the Greek prece- dent as his rule of law. In October he was ready to take the last step but one in the line of the Greek example. The five years of 1821 counted as five months in 1861. Palmerston was not yet ready. And the concession of the United States in the Trent affair, in the follow- ing winter, made an aggressive movement less popular in England. But in the autumn of 1862 Palmerston also thought the moment had arrived. Neither of these two powerful statesmen, the highest English authorities of their times on the subjects of foreign relations, doubted the right or the expediency of intervention after the second campaign iu Virginia. On September 14, 1862, Palmerston wrote to Russell suggesting a joint offer by England and France of what is diplomati- cally called "good offices," as in the Greek protocol of 1826. Russell eagerly approved : Whether the Federal Army is destroyed or not [replied Eussell to Palmerston, September 17, 1862] it is clear that it is driven back to Washington aud has made no progress in subduing the insurgent States. Such being the case, I agree with yon that tbe time is come for offering mediation to the United States Government with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree, further, that in case of failure we ought ourselves to recognize the Southern States as an independent State. For the purpose of taking so important a step I think we must have a meeting of the Cabinet. The 23d or 30th would suit me for the meeting. We ought then, if we agree on such a step, to propose it first to France, and then, on the part of England and Frauce, to Russia and other powers, as a measure decided upon by us. We ought to make ourselves safe in Canada. * * * In this scheme of intervention Russell once more advanced beyond the Greek precedent. Canning would move only in concert with Russia. Eussell proposed to move in concert with France alone. Palmerston replied September 23 : Your plan of proceedings about the mediation between the Federals and Confed- erates seems to be excellent. Of course the offer would be made to both the contend- ing parties at the same time, for, though the offer would be as sure to be accepted by the Southerns as was the proposal of the Prince of Wales to the Danish princess, yet in the one case, as in the other, there are certain forms which it is decent and proper to go through. A question would occur whether, if the two parties were to accept mediation, the fact of our mediating would not of itself be tantamount to an acknowledgment of the Confederates as an independent State. Might it not be well to ask Russia to join England and France in the offer of mediation! * * * We should be better without her in the mediation, because she would be too favor- able to the North ; but, on the other hand, her participation in the offer might render the North the more willing to accept it. The middle of October was the time suggested by Palmerston for action. If the Federals sustain a great defeat they may be at once ready for mediation, and the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and see what may follow. Fortunately for the United States, Russell and Palmerston found their serious difficulties not in France or in the law, but in the political division of their own party. These two powerful statesmen, who had been both honored with the position of prime minister of England, had united their influence to create the exising ministry. They seem to have supposed that their united authority was sufficient to control the ministry they had created, but the moment Russell opened the subject to others he received a check. He persevered ; he issued a confidential 22 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. memorandum suggesting his idea; lie brought the subject before a cabi- net meeting October 23, 1862, and the division of opinion proved to be so serious that the subject was postponed. The question became one of internal politics, social divisions, and party majorities. The scheme of intervention was embraced by the Emperor of France as seriously as by Eussell and Palmerston. Long before the two English statesmen decided to act, Napoleon III had given his first interview to the Confederate agent accredited to his Government. News of the defeat of the Union army before Richmond reached Paris on the 15th of July, 1862, and the next day Mr. Slidell asked and received an interview. The Emperor talked with exceeding frankness, accord- ing to the report made by Mr. Sliclell to Mr. Benjamin: The Emperor received me with great kindness and [said] * • * that he had from the first seen the true character of the contest, and considered the reestablish- ment of the Union impossible and final separation a mere question of time; that the difficulty was to find a way to give effect to his sympathies; that he had always desired to preserve the most friendly relation with England, and that in so grave a question he had not been willing to act without her cooperation; that he had several times intimated his wish for action in our behalf, but had met with no favorable response, and that, besides, England had a deeper interest in the question than France; that she wished him to draw the chestnuts from the fire for her benefit; * * * that he had committed a great error which he now deeply regretted ; France should never have respected the blockade ; that the European powers should have recognized us last summer when our ports were in our possession and when we were menacing Washington, but what, asked he, could now be done? Napoleon's language was not official, but he had committed himself beyond recall by the policy he described, for hardly had the civil war broken out than he had plunged into a scheme of armed intervention in Mexico. Perhaps the ultimate salvation of America, in this crisis, was due to the mistake of judgment which led Europe to attack the Monroe doctrine and the American system in Mexico instead of attack- ing its heart. He made no secret of his wish to substitute French influence on the Gulf of Mexico in the place of American. This had been the dream of every great French ruler, and Napoleon III had a 11 doctrine" of his own, far more ancient than that of Monroe and backed by more formidable military force. Europe did intervene by arms in the American civil war, but fortunately she attacked our ally and only indirectly ourselves. Fortunately, too, in betraying his ulti- mate objects in Mexico, Napoleon alienated England and did not conciliate Spain. Yet the attack was made, violently in Mexico, more cautiously at Washington, and as systematically as the mutual jealousies of Europe permitted. At the moment when Russell and Palmerston brought their scheme of intervention before the British cabinet, Napoleon sent reen- forcements of 35,000 men to his force in Mexico, with orders to occupy the country, and simultaneously sent a formal invitation to England and Russia to intervene in the American civil war. These papers have not been published, and we do not know the express grounds on which the invitation was offered or declined. To the fact that Russia was avowedly friendly, and that the two most powerful British prime ministers of their time were outvoted in their own cabinet, America owed her escape from European domination. Mexico, indeed, suffered severely, but only while our civil war was in doubt. From the moment the authority of the Union was wholly restored in 1865, the entire influence of the United States Government was exerted to reestablish also the authority of the Monroe doctrine. The life of the one was dependent on the life of the other. RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 23 CUBA. Into this American system, thus created by Monroe in 1822-23, aud embracing- then, besides the United States, only Buenos Ayres, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, various other communities have since claimed, and in most cases have received admission, until it now includes all South America, except the Guianas ; all Central America, except the British colony of Honduras, and the two black Bepublics of Spanish Santo Domingo and Haiti in the Antilles. No serious question was again raised with any European power in regard to the insurrection or independence of their American posses- sions, until in 1S69, a rebellion broke out in Cuba, and the insurgents, after organizing a government and declaring their independence, claimed recognition from the United States. The Government of the United States had always regarded Cuba as within the sphere of its most active and serious interest. As early as 1825, when the newly recognized States of Colombia and Mexico were supposed to be preparing an expedition to revolutionize Cuba and Puerto Bico, the United States Government interposed its friendly offices with those Governments to request their forbearance. The actual condition of Spain seemed to make her retention of Cuba impossible, in which case the United States would have been obliged, for her own safety, to prevent the island from falling into the hands of a stronger power in Europe. That this emergency did not occur may have been partly due to the energy with which Monroe announced "our right and our power to prevent it," and his determination to use all the means within his competency "•to guard against and forefend it." ' This right of intervention in matters relating to the external relations of Cuba, asserted and exercised seventy years ago, has been asserted and exercised at every crisis in which the island has been involved. When the Cuban insurgents in 1869 appealed to the United States for recognition, President Grant admitted the justice of the claim, and directed the minister of the United States at Madrid to interpose our good offices with the Spanish Government in order to obtain by a friendly arrangement the independence of the Island. The story of of that intervention is familiar to every member of the Senate, and was made the basis of its resolution last session, requesting the President once more " to interpose his friendly offices with the Spanish Govern- ment for the recognition of the independence of Cuba." The resolution then adopted by Congress was perfectly understood to carry with it all the consequences which necessarily would follow the rejection by Spain of friendly offices. On this point the situation needs no further comment. The action taken by Congress in the last session was taken "on great consideration and on just principles," on a right of intervention exercised twenty-seven years ago, and after a patient delay unexampled iu history. The interval of nine months which has elapsed since that action of Congress, has proved the necessity of carrying it out to completion. In the words of the President's Annual Message: "The stability two years 1 duration has given to the insurrection; the feasibility of its indefinite prolongation in the nature of things, and as shown by past experience; the utter and imminent ruin of the island unless the pres- ent strife is speedily composed" are, in our opinion, conclusive evidence that "the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that the sovereignty is 24 RECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, * * * a hopeless struggle for its reestablishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict." Although the President appears to have reached a different conclu- sion from ours, we believe this to be the actual situation of Cuba, and, being unable to see that further delay could lead to any other action than that which the President anticipates, we agree with the conclusion of the message, that, in such case, onr obligations to the sovereignty of Spain are "superseded by higher obligations which we can hardly hesi- tate to recognize and discharge." Following closely the action of Presi- dent Monroe in 1818, Congress has already declared in effect its opinion that there can be no rational interference except on the basis of inde- pendence. In 1822, as now, but with more force, it was objected, as we have shown, that the revolted States had no governments to be recognized. Divisions, and even civil war, existed among the insurgents them- selves. Among the Cubans no such difficulty is known to exist. In September, 1S95, as we know by official documents printed on the spot, the insurgent government was regularly organized, a constitution adopted, a president elected, and, in due course, the various branches of administration set in motion. Since then, so far as we are informed, this government has continued to perform its functions undisturbed. On the military side, as we officially know, they have organized, equipped, and maintained in the field, sufficient forces to baffle the exertions of 200,000 Spanish soldiers. On the civil side they have organized their system of administration in every province for, as we know officially, they "roam at will over at least two- thirds of the inland country." Diplomatically they have maintained a regularly accredited representative in the United States for the past year, who has never ceased to ask recognition and to offer all possible information. There is no reason to suppose that any portion of the Cuban people would be dissatisfied by our recognizing their representative in this country or that they disagree in the earnest wish for that recognition. The same thing could hardly be said of all the countries recognized by Monroe in 1822. Greece had no such stability when it was recognized by England, Russia, and France. Belgium had nothing of the sort when she was recognized by all the powers in 1830. Of the States recognized by the treaty of Berlin in 1878, we need hardly say more than that they were the creatures of intervention. The only question that properly remains for Congress to consider is the mode which should be adopted for the step which Congress is pledged next to take. The Government of the United States entertains none but the friend- liest feelings toward Spain. Its most anxious wish is to avoid even the appearance of an unfriendliness which is wholly foreign to its thought. For more than a hundred years, amidst divergent or clash- ing interests, and under frequent and severe strains, the two Govern- ments have succeeded in avoiding collision, and there is no friendly office which Spain could ask, which the United States, within the limits of their established principles and policy, would not be glad to extend. In the present instance they are actuated by an earnest wish to avoid the danger of seeming to provoke a conflict. The practice of Europe in regard to intervention, as in the instances cited, has been almost invariably harsh and oppressive. The practice of the United States has been almost invariably mild and forbearing. KECOGNITION OF CUBAN INDEPENDENCE. 25 Among the precedents which have been so numerously cited there can be no doubt as to the choice. The most moderate is the best. Among these, the attitude taken by President Monroe in 1822 is the only atti- tude which can properly be regarded as obligatory for a similar situation to-day. The course pursued by the United States in the recognition of Colombia is the only course which Congress can consistently adopt. We recommend, therefore, the joint resolution, with amendments to read as follows: " Resolved by the Senate mid House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the independence of the Republic of Cuba be, and the same is hereby, acknowledged by the United States of America. u Be it further resolved, That the United States will use its friendly offices with the Government of Spain to bring to a close the war between Spain and the Republic of Cuba." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 015 819 614 1