,5^"-. . -11. c" o V t ,/V^), s^^._'-v ^ N ^""^ * ^ ^^. '^_ ^^. * '^o^ :%: .-?- ^^'.•^»"/ CvV Blue Jackets of '98 Blue Jackets of '98 A History of the Spanish -American War By Willis John Abbot Author of " Blue Jackets of '76," " Blue Jackets of 181 2," "Blue Jackets of '61," The Battlefields Series ** The Life of Carter Henry Harrison " It New York Dodd, Mead and Company 1899 Liorary cf CcTigrfe«% Office of \}it Register of Copyright*, Copyright, 1899, By Dodd, Mead and Company. Ali rights reserve J. 0'^ ' ., SECOND COPY, Enibtrsitg ^Prrss : John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A. i3>^t;.v\^<^*i Contents CHAPTEE I Pagb The Far-reaching Causes of the War with Spain — How THE Spanish Empire in America was Founded AND Forfeited — The United States as Spain's Guardian — The Diplomacy of the Cuban Ques- tion — The Views of Jefferson and Monroe — The Ostend Manifesto — The Threat of the Holy Alliance — The United States Saving Cuba for THEIR Own ° 1 CHAPTEE II Why Spain and the United States Clashed — The Island of Perpetual Kevolutions — The " Soles DE Bolivar " and the " Black Eagle " — Lopez AND his Filibusters — How a Kentuckian died — The Ten Years' War — The Compromise of Zanjon AND ITS Repudiation — The Execution of the " Vir- ginius " Prisoners — Jose Marti and his Conspira- cies — The New Revolution of 1895 — Campos again and his Failure — Weyler, " the Butcher," and his Failure — Character of the Cuban Leaders — What Reconcentration meant — The Appoint- ment of Blanco — American Aid to the Starving — The Complications that led to the Visit of the " Maine " 13 CHAPTEE III The Disaster to the " Maine " — Captain Sigsbee's Despatch — The State of Public Opinion — Why THE " Maine " was sent to Havana — Her Recep- vi Contents Pasb TION THERE — PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ATTACK — ThE Explosion — Frightful Loss of Life — Personal Narratives of Survivors and Eye-Witnesses — The Official Investigations — Attitude of the Spaniards — The Finding of the Court of Inquiry — " Remember the ' Maine ' " 41 CHAPTER IV At the National Capital — The Course op the Cuban Question in Congress — Its Treatment by President Cleveland — It Confronts President McKiNLEY — The Mission of General Stewart L. Woodford — Fair Promises op the Spanish Min- istry — The Failure of Autonomy — The De Lome Letter and its Result — Preparations for War — Congress Votes a $50,000,000 Extraordinary Credit for Purposes of National Defence — The Report of the "Maine" Court of Inquiry. . . 67 CHAPTER V The Navies op Spain and the United States — The Gloomy Estimates of the Experts — Ship Hunt- ing in Europe — Why a Navy cannot be Extem- porised — Yachts and Auxiliary Vessels — The Blockade of Cuba — Lieutenant Rowan's Expedi- tion—The First Capture— Hot Work at Matan- zas — The Attack on Cardenas — Death of Bagley — The Fight at CiENFUEGOS 89 CHAPTER VI Spain's Possessions in Asia — Unexpected Scene of American Naval Activity— The Philippine Isl- ands AND THEIR PeOPLE — RENDEZVOUS OF THE Asiatic Squadron at Hong Kong — Commodore George Dewey — The Departure for the Philip- pines — The Spanish Fleet at Manila — The Battle and Complete Victory of the Americans — No Men Lost — Dewey Made an Admiral — Contents vii Paob Aguinaldo and the Insurgents — Trouble with Germany — A Vigorous Message — The Friend- liness OF England 117 CHAPTEK VII Spain's Cape Verde Fleet — The Coasts of the United States Menaced — How the Naval Force of the United States in the Atlantic was Employed — The Search for Cervera — Bombardment of San Juan de Porto Rico — Entrapped in Santiago de Cuba — The Sampson-Schley Controversy — The Voyage of the " Oregon " — The Blockade of Cervera • . . 141 CHAPTER VIII Santiago de Cuba — The Plan to bottle up Cervera — The Volunteers — Preparations for the Sacri- fice — The Stations of the Men — Under Fire — The Steering Gear Disabled — The Torpedoes Shot away — Sinking of the " Merrimac " — Surrender of Hobson and his Men — Admiral Cervera's Courtesy — In Morro Castle — The Bombardment 162 CHAPTER IX The Army in the War — Prejudice against a Stand- ing Army — Regulars and Militiamen — Charac- ter OF THE United States Soldier — The Calls for Volunteers — The Rough Riders — The " Sons of Somebody" — Mobilisation of the Troops — The Fifth Corps at Tampa — The " Gussie " Expedi- tion—Preparing FOR the Invasion of Cuba — The Delays and the Start — Arrival at Santiago — Conference of Shafter, Sampson, and Garcia — The Landing .... 17? viii Contents CHAPTER X Paob [ The Landing at Daiquiri — Flight of the Enemy — Good Fortune attending the Invaders — Diffi- ; CULTY OF LANDING StORES — ThE ADVANCE INTO THE ; Interior — Conference at Siboney — March of the Rough Riders — Fight at Guasimas — Bravery and Heavy Loss of the Americans — The Regulars IN Action — The Losses and the Value of the ^ Victory 199 L CHAPTEE XI I San Juan, El Caney, and Aguadores — Waiting for I Supplies — The Position at El Caney — General I Lawton's Dispositions — Effect of Mauser Bul- lets — Stories OF the Battlefield — The Capture OF El Caney — The Attack on San Juan — Plan OF the Battle — The Slaughter in the Sunken | Road — The Charge on the Hill — Exposed Posi- tion of the Americans — The Question of Retreat — The Scenes at Bloody Bend — The Demand for the Surrender of Santiago — News of Cervera's Defeat 218 CHAPTER XII Rigidity of the Blockade — The Bombardments — The Marines at Guantanamo — Cervera's Dash FOR Liberty — The Fleet Alert — Absence of the Flagship and the Admiral — The Controversy OVER THE Honours — Destruction of the " In- fanta Maria Teresa " — Capture of Admiral Cer- vera — Gallant Figut of the "Gloucester" — The Annihilation of the Torpedo Destroyers — The "Almirante Oquendo " Beached — The End of the " Vizcaya " — Magnificent Work of THE "Oregon" and "Texas" — The "Cristobal Colon's " Fight for Life — The End of the Spanish Squadron — Effects of American Gunnery — The Disposal of the Prisoners 248 Contents ix CHAPTER XIII Pa&b Closing in — The Sufferings op Beleaguered Santi- ago The Lagging Negotiations for Surrender — The Outpouring of Refugees — The Bombard- ment — Surrender of the Spaniards — The Stars and Stripes above Santiago — The Wrecking of THE Army by Sickness — The Flight to the North — The Infamy of the Transports — MoN- TAUK Point and Camp Wikoff — Fever Camps in THE United States 292 CHAPTER XIV The Porto Rico Campaign — Troops Employed — The Bombardment of Nipe — Landing at Guanica — Plan of the Campaign — Capture of Ponce — Friendliness of the Inhabitants — Capture of Guayamo, Coamo, and Mayaguez — The Enemy's Stand at Aboncito — The News of Peace — Com- plete Success of the Campaign — The Peace Negotiations — The Protocol — Evacuation Com- missioners 309 CHAPTER XV The Philippines again — Dewey's Position in Manila Harbour — His Work in Diplomacy and War — The Part played by Aguinaldo — The Coming OF the American Troops — The Quarrel with the Germans — The Capture and Occupation of Manila — Growing Discontent op the Filipinos and their Final Revolt — The Problems pre- sented TO the United States by the Situation rN the Philippines 325 X Contents CHAPTER XVI Paqb The Peace Commission at Paris — The Completion OF TUE Treaty — The Stkdggle in the American Senate — Some Lessons of the War — The Work OF the Torpedo Boats — The Need for a Perma- nent Staff Organisation — The Part plated by the Militia — The Future of the Army .... 355 Blue Jackets of 98 CHAPTEE I The Far-reaching Causes of the War with Spain — How THE Spanish Empire in America was Founded and Forfeited — The United States as Spain's Guardian — The Diplomacy of the Cuban Question — The Views OF Jefferson and Monroe — The Ostend Manifesto — The Threat of the Holy Alliance — The United States Saving Cuba for their Own. THE Spanish war of 1898 was the result of inexorable causes which had their manifestations as early as the opening of the nineteenth century. The phrase " mani- fest destiny " has been sorely abused and degraded to a partisan cry, but half a century ago the destiny of the Spanish possessions in this hemisphere was manifest. The • causes which impelled a peace-loving nation to declare war upon Spain in April, 1898, existed even in the time of Pizarro and of Cortez. Spanish cruelty and rapacity have ever been at odds with the dominant spirit of our western hemisphere, and the decree for Spain's expulsion from the "West Indies was writ large in the history of the nineteenth century long before the destruction of the " Maine " and the starvation of the reconcentrados hastened its execution. A free and enlightened republic and a mediaeval despotism are inevitably quarrelsome neighbours. To the Cuban victims of Spanish tyranny the United States offered always an example of the blessings of a democracy and of the fruits of successful revolution, while to the people of the great republic the condition of Cuba was a constant irritant, resulting in repeated unlawful 1 2 Blue Jackets of '98 but well-meant private expeditions planned to overthrow Spain's authority in that island. One hundred years ago the Spanish authority was supreme over all South America except Brazil and Guiana. In North America, the Floridas and all that vast expanse of territory west of the Mississippi and extending to the golden shores of California were recognised by all nations as Spanish. In twenty-five years this noble domain had dwindled to the islands of Cuba and Porto Eico, with a few near-by islets. To-day even that pitiful remnant of the empire which Columbus won for Spain is lost. With everytliing in its favour, with its customs, its language, and its sons still dominating more than half of the western hemisphere, Spain can no longer exercise authority over one foot of American soil. The sons of Spaniards threw off the Spanish yoke, for the free air of America stimu- lated their ambition and taught them that the political and social ideas of the Dark Ages have no place among the nation builders of to-day. The pathetic phase of the obliteration of Spain as a world power is justly obscured by the fact that Spanish power has always stood for oppression, cruelty, rapacity, and ignorance. When Spain has been great the progress of the world in science, art, and industry has stood still until the fighting men could administer a check to Spanish aggressions. In our own hemisphere, Cortez and Pizarro destroyed civilisations more advanced than any which Spain has founded in their stead. The ravaged fields and burned cabins of " paci- fied" Cuba are but the latest evidences of that national spirit of savagery which three hundred years ago left a like impress on Peru in ruined palaces and obliterated cities. The story of the foundation and the overthrow of Spanish power in America, the narrative of the series of successful revolutions which resulted in the establishment of the galaxy of republics in Central and South America is not to be told here. It demands volumes of its own — volumes of which page after page will necessarily be Blue Jackets of '98 3 given over to stories of such revolting cruelty as stain the annals of no other people. The bigotry of the Inquisition accompanied the greed of the spoliator. The fagot and the stake awaited such of the aborigines as refused to yield up their simple beliefs, while the sword or the tor- ture was the portion of the chiefs who stubbornly clung to their treasures demanded by the men of Velasquez, Cortez, or De Soto. The Indian chief bound to a stake by Velasquez, and awaiting the fiery death decreed by a remorseless couquerer, expressed bitterly the hatred with which the Spaniards had inspired his people : " Do not you wish to go to Heaven ? " asked the priest who stood at his elbow. " Are there Spaniards there ? " asked the victim. " Certainly." " Then let me go somewhere else," cried the unhappy savage, who could conceive of no hell more cruel than that which Spanish cruelty had ordained for his people on earth. I have said that the United States and Spain were by the very antagonism of their institutions quarrelsome neighbours, but had it not been for the United States, Spain would have been deprived of her West Indian pos- sessions long before the event did actually occur. It has long been the conviction — usually unexpressed — of our leading statesmen that Cuba was naturally a part of our territory and would inevitably become a part of the United States. Thomas Jefferson more than seventy-five years ago discerned this fact and declared of that island that " her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanted to round out our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest." And John Quincy Adams, when Sec- retary of State, wrote in a letter to the United States minister at Madrid that, " It is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself." 4 Blue Jackets of '98 But though the question of the control of Cuba and the relations of the United States to the nation owning the island have furnished themes for the state papers of almost every President and Secretary of State since the times of Jefferson, the actual question of annexation either by force or by purchase has seldom had frank treatment. Eeading between the lines, we may well discern that it was in the mind of every public man, but international comity, for one reason, prevented its utterance. Moreover, the ques- tion of slavery came in later days to complicate the prob- lem and to divide public opinion. If there was to be annexation, how would Cuba enter the Union ? The North vowed as a free state only ; the South insisted that the existing institution of slavery — it was destroyed m Cuba only as lately as 1886 — should be accepted with the island. This radical difference between the sections of the United States long prevented annexation, though more than one President urged such a policy upon Con- gress. In 1848, when Europe had its hands full, trying to repress a wave of republicanism which seemed likely to sweep all thrones away before it. President Polk in- structed the minister at Madrid to offer one hundred million dollars for the sovereignty of the island. It is characteristic of the Spanish temperament that the offer was not only refused, but treated as an affront, though even then the Cubans were in revolt, as indeed they have been, with but brief intermissions, ever since. And again Presidents Pierce and Buchanan urged upon Congress the wisdom of annexation by purchase, but were unable to enlist the favourable attention of the national legislature, which feared the slavery issue involved. " It is required,'' wrote President Buchanan in his message of 1859, "by manifest destiny that the United States should possess Cuba, not by violence, but by purchase at a fair price." This President spoke from a knowledge of his subject based on careful and prolonged study, for in 1854 James Buchanan, then minister to England, joined with the Blue Jackets of '98 5 ministers to Spain and France in the celebrated " Ostend Manifesto." This document, prepared by the three diplo- mats after a conference at Ostend, declared that if Spain should stubbornly refuse to sell Cuba, national prudence and national self-preservation would make it imperative for the United States to conquer and annex the island, lest it be made by successful negro revolt a second San Domingo. Notwithstanding this vigorous representation, the Congress to which the Ostend manifesto was sent was as unwiUing to authorise Cuban annexation as was that of six years later, when Minister Buchanan had become President. It is apparent that however favourably the Presidents have looked upon the project of annexation, — and many have either recommended or discussed it, — Congress has always regarded it with suspicion or even with hostihty. The annexation of Cuba to the United States has, there- fore, never become a matter of international discussion. However earnestly it may have been desired by individual statesmen, it never attained such force as a national move- ment as to compel the attention of foreign governments. But the relations of the United States to Cuba, and to Spain in her capacity of owner of Cuba, have been the matter of grave diplomatic consideration abroad, and have more than once threatened serious complications. The position assumed by the United States until the year 1898 was much that of the fabled dog in the manger. As a nation, we have persistently declared that we did not want Cuba, but that, under no circumstances, would we ever permit any nation other than Spain to acquire it. More than this, and more indefensible unless on the ignoble ground of national selfishness, we have at all times, until after our own civil war, frowned upon the efforts of the Cubans to win independence. The antagonism of the governing powers of the United States to the aspiration of the Cubans for independence sprung, of course, from the consciousness that a repubhc in which slavery was pro- 6 Blue Jackets of '98 hibited, despite the presence of great numbers of blacks, would be an annoying neighbour to the slave states of the Union. This opposition to Cuban independence dis- appcEired with slavery in the United States, and it is per- haps fair to say that if the South was so long potent in delaying Cuban freedom, its representatives far outdid the spokesmen of our Northern communities in urging action in behalf of the patriots in 1898. To-day, by the act of the United States, Cuba is offered an opportunity to essay self-government. Whether the trial shall end in that annexation to the United States which Jefferson hoped for and Buchanan foresaw, immediate history will tell. It will not take another century to determine the final con- stitution of Cuba. American opposition to the independence of Cuba — opposition which it must be remembered was that of prudent statesmen rather than of the masses of the people — ended with our own civil war and the destruction of slavery. But antagonism to the acquirement of sov- ereignty by any other power was more deeply rooted and, having its first expression in a famous state paper by President Monroe, has continued until the present day. This feature of the relations of the United States to its island neighbour has been of such supreme importance in the national code of the United States that it merits special attention from all who would understand the motives and principles which have animated and still direct the United States in its dealings with neighbouring powers. It is the story of the origin and development of a clause in our national creed scarcely less revered than the preamble to the Declaration of Independence itself, — the story of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1815 Europe, having crushed Napoleon, vmdertook the task of undoing the work of the French Eevolution, and extirpating what the despotic monarchs were pleased to consider the pestilential germs of democracy from all European lands. Eussia, Austria, and Prussia formed a r Blue Jackets of '98 7 coalition to this end, giving it a title which would be blasphemous if it were not ridiculous, — " The Holy AUiance." In 1818 France, being again under the rule of the Bourbons, joined the coalition, and England secretly approved its purposes, though without giving open ad- herence to it. The embers of the fire of republicanism which had blazed so fiercely during the opening years of the nineteenth century were still smouldering. In Naples and Piedmont the people were in revolt, and in 1821 Austria performed her part of the " holy " agreement by suppressing with the sword these embryonic efforts for popular government. In 1823 France joined in taking away from the Spanish people the small measure of liberty which a constitutional monarchy secured for them, and restored absolutism in the Iberian peninsula. Nor was the Holy Alliance content to confine its endeavours to its own side of the Atlantic. Its intervention in Spain suggested to its members that in the Spanish-American colonies there were menacing signs of the republican spirit which should engage the thoughtful and forceful attention of a league devoted to the protection of all the divine rights of kings, — and all rights of kings must be divine, else they cannot be rights at all, as the people have no share in granting them. Throughout the Span- ish states of South America, revolution was at that time in the high tide of successful accomplishment. Bolivar, the Washington of South America, was at the most glori- ous period of that wonderful career of agitation and generalship by which so much of South American terri- tory was wrested from European control. Cuba was honeycombed with republican conspiracies, though no open revolt was then in progress. The secret association of the " Soles de Bolivar " had enlisted the sympathies and co-operation of the best and most patriotic of the white natives of the island. A correspondence with Bolivar was in progress, his sympathy and aid assured, and a day set for striking the first blow. The blow was 8 Blue Jackets of '98 not struck, however, for treachery betrayed the leaders, and the conspiracy went to pieces ; but the investigation that followed alarmed the champions of absolutism by the evidence it gave of the extent and force of the democratic heresy in Cuba. It occurred, therefore, to the zealous servitors of mon- archy in Europe that Cuba offered a point of vantage whence to conduct the war upon democracy in America. An allied army there would effectually discourage any further spread of the pernicious doctrines of Washington, Jefferson, and Bolivar in that island, and thence expedi- tions might be despatched to regain the ground lost in South America. A hint of this plan reached our depart- ment of state as early as July, 1818, when Richard Rush, the American minister at the Court of St. James, was told by Lord Castlereagh of a proposition made by Spain for the mediation of England, in association with the Holy Alliance, with the rebelhous Spanish colonies. " Mediation," being a milder word than coercion, is much in favour with diplomats ; but the real essence of the proposition was that the Spanish colonies should be reconquered for Spain, and the purpose of Lord Castle- reagh's communication was to find out what the United States thought of the project. The answer of Rush, which was that the United States would have no part in the afiair unless its purpose was to secure the inde- pendence of the colonies, suggests that the habit of frank- ness, which in the latter end of the nineteenth century has been described as diplomacy in shirt-sleeves, is not wholly a new development of American diplomatic methods. That the United States would neither permit other nations to strengthen the hands of Spain in the western hemisphere, nor allow the Spanish colonies to be trans- ferred to stronger sovereignty, may have been a doctrine new to European diplomatic circles, but it had been definitely determined upon at home. In the Jefferson Blue Jackets of '98 9 manuscripts, preserved at the national capital, is a memo- randum of action taken at a cabinet meeting in 1808. The cabinet then, wrote Jefferson, " unanimously agreed in the sentiments which should be unauthoritatively expressed by our agents to influential persons in Cuba and Mexico ; to wit : ' If you remain under the dominion of the kingdom and the family of Spain, we are con- tented ; but we should be extremely unwilling to see you pass under the dominion or ascendancy of France or England. In the latter case, should you choose to declare independence, we cannot now commit ourselves by say- ing we would make common cause with you, but must reserve ourselves to act according to the then existing circumstances ; but in our proceedings we shall be in- fluenced by friendship to you, by a firm feeling that our interests are intimately connected, and by the strongest repugnance to see you under subordination to either France or England, either politically or commercially ! " This, it will be noted, was the determination of Jeffer- son's cabinet, not openly declared in any state paper. It clearly holds the germ which after various stages of evo- lution finally developed into the Monroe Doctrine. In 1822 Lord Castlereagh, who had been rebuffed by Eush in the matter of " mediation " with the Spanish colonies, committed suicide. His successor. Canning, a more adroit diplomat, approached ]\Iinister Eush anew, but with vastly more skill. The story of the diplomatic advances by which the British minister sought to ingrati- ate himself with the American diplomat is an amusing one. No social art, no warmth of flattery, no professions of admiration for republican principles and for the men who were giving them effect in America was left untried. But at the end came the same proposition, " Would the United States join England in a European Congress to determine what should be done with Spain's rebellious American people ? " Eush declined, declaring that the United States had already recognised the independence lo Blue Jackets of '98 of the South American states, and had, furthermore, no intention of entangling itself in European politics. " You could not have met Canning's proposals better," wrote President Monroe to the envoy, on learning of this colloquy, " if you had had the whole American cabinet at your right hand." But having posted this despatch to the American minister at London, Monroe wrote to Jefferson and Madison to ask them what they thought of Great Britain's proposition and of Eush's reply. Madison replied cautiously. Jefferson sent a letter, parts of which have been incorporated in what may be caUed our code of national political wisdom. " Our first and fundamental maxim should be," he wrote, " never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to meddle in cis- Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and distinct from those of Europe. While the last is labour- ing to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavour should surely be to make our hemisphere that of free- dom." Nevertheless Jefferson, a man of inconsistencies as varied as his talents, was w^illing to make an exception to his sweeping declaration against foreign entangle- ments in behalf of Great Britain which he was popularly supposed to regard with especially distrust and aversion. " Cuba alone," he wrote in another letter to Monroe, "seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calam- ity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do so." Shortly after this President Monroe sent to Congress his Blue Jackets of '98 1 1 famous message in which, referring to the supposed designs of the Holy Alliance upon the integrity of the new or embryonic states of South America, he declared that, " We should consider any attempt (of the allied powers) to extend their system to any portion of our hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." Thereafter the position of the United States toward Cuba and the Spanish domination therein was clear and easily to be understood. We were ready to defend Spain's au- thority against all interlopers — did indeed defend it against Mexico and Colombia, which in 1825 formed a project for the invasion of Cuba. In 1830 Van Buren, Secretary of State under President Jackson, gave formal notice that Mexico would not be allowed to acquire Cuba. In 1825 Henry Clay, in a circular to the American ministers in Europe, said : " You will now add that Ave could not consent to the occupa- tion of these islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) by any other Euro- pean power than Spain, under any contingency whatever." Five years later, as though to show that the aversion of the United States to any change in the governmental con- ditions of Cuba wr.s not directed against European aspi- rants for conquest alone, Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State under Andrew Jackson, warned off Mexico with a curt notification that the United States would not permit her to acquire Cuba. And so, year after year, and admin- istration after administration, the word went forth to all the peoples and courts of the world that the United States would defend the title of Spain to Cuba against all comers. But it made no pledge to protect Spain against her own subjects, nor did it promise to abstain from taking the island for itself. Edward Everett, Secretary of State in 1852, in restating the American position, announced frankly that the United States would not bind itself not to take the island if, because of the evils of Spanish rule, this should become necessary or prudent. " But," he wrote, " the Presi- 12 Blue Jackets of '98 dent would consider its acquisition by force, except in a just war with Spain (should an event so gravely to be deprecated ever take place), as a disgrace to the civili- sation of the age." With this final word from Edward Everett, we may well let the story of diplomatic discussion in which our Spanish neighbour has involved the United States rest. Our national course in this matter has been singularly straightforward and consistent since the days of Jefferson. The latter half of the century brought no change in the policy which had been formulated in its youth. Our civil war and the prob- lems growing out of it quieted Cuban agitation for thirty years ; but when it became acute once more, and the war which Everett more than hinted at became inevitable, the despatch of the Secretary of State in 1852 might have been put in the preamble of the resolutions by which war was declared, without in any degree misrepresenting the popu- lar sentiment which compelled that challenge to Spain. CHAPTEE II Why Spain and the United States Clashed — The Island OF Perpetual Revolutions — The '' Soles de Bolivar " and the " Black Eagle " — Lopez and his Filibusters — How A Kentuckian died — The Ten Years War — The Compromise of Zanjon and its Repudiation — The Exe- cution OF the " ViRGINIUS," PRISONERS — JoSE MaRTI AND HIS Conspiracies — The New Revolution of 1895 — Campos Again and his Failure — Weyler, " the Butcher," and his Failure — Character of the Cuban Leaders — What Reconcentration meant — The Appointment of Blanco — American Aid to the Starving — The Compli- cations that led to the Visit of the "Maine." THERE are many kinds of bad neighbours. The ag- gressive and quan-elsome fellow who intrudes upon the rights of those who live about him may be the worst, but he is not the only undesirable one. There are the family that maintains a constant nuisance, the family that quarrel perpetually among themselves to the dis- turbance of peace and the scandal of the neighbourhood, and the family whose children are untrained and undisci- plined, a terror to neighbouring young people and a menace to everything breakable in the vicinity. The policy of the United States was successful in preventing a neighbour of the aggressive sort from settling down in Cuba ; but by pro- tecting Spain there we submitted ourselves to every other species of annoyance that a neighbour could inflict. From the beginning of the century, Cuba was m revolt. Spanish misrule and extortion made rebellion the normal condition of the island, and compelled the sympathy of Americans, even if considerations of state did make the active inter- vention of the government impossible. A colony which is 14 Blue Jackets of '98 regarded only as a mine to be worked, a cow to be milked, a field from which all produce is to be taken and nothing returned for fertilising, a slave whose portion is all hard work and lashes, — such a colony is naturally rebellious and justified in rebellion. It was upon such principles that Spain administered her colonies, and particularly Cuba. Never was there more biting irony than the confer- ring upon Cuba of the title " The Ever Faithful Isle." The phrase had its origin in 1808, when Napoleon drove the Bourbon dynasty from Madrid. In Havana then the Spanish officials met and declared their loyalty to the exiled sovereign, and defied the conqueror, — things perhaps not very audacious when done at 4,000 miles distance from the seat of war. But even at that moment a conspiracy for the overthrow of Spanish author- ity was in progress, and they who affirmed their loyalty to the exiled Bourbons were not Cubans but Spanish officials, — carpet-baggers, as we should call them in the United States, whose protestations meant only that they would be unflinchingly loyal to the power which had con- ferred upon them their positions. This distinction between the Spanish office-holders, mostly in Havana, and the Cubans should be kept con- stantly in mind. One of the great reasons for the persis- tence of the Cuban dissatisfaction with the Spanish govern- ment has been that the officials, even to the administrative clerks, have usually been Spaniards sent out to the colony and animated only by a desire to get rich and go home again. In 1823 the first serious attempt to overthrow the authority of Spain was made. Prior to that year the Cuban uprisings, such as they were, had originated with negroes, and had sprung from the agitation for the abolition of slavery. But it was the very flower of the young Cuban whites who joined in the plot of tlie " Soles de Bolivar" in 1823, having for its purpose the independence of the island Blue Jackets of '98 15 and her enrolment among the free republics which the genius of Bolivar had created on the great continent to the south. The conspiracy, as I have already noted, was short lived. Betrayed by traitors, the conspirators were appre- hended, and many of them executed. The spirit that ani- mated these young patriots, however, was not destined to perish. In three years, a new rebellion was planned, the ring-leaders being men who had figured in the abortive conspiracy in the name of Bolivar. This, too, was short lived, but it appears to have spread sufficiently to affright the Madrid government, which took steps to strengthen the hands of the colonial governor against future con- spiracies, by giving him unc|ualified power to put the island, or any part of it, under martial law whenever he saw fit. At any time he could order the arrest and trial by court- martial of any citizen or body of citizens whom he might suspect, and the courts were powerless to protect them. He could exert the right of search and seizure in time of absolute peace, as though the country were a town in a state of siege. Of course the effect of this grant of power, which was freely exercised, was to increase the dissatis- faction of the people with Spanish rule and to multiply conspiracies. It has ever been that the effort of des- potism to stifle discontent by becoming more despotic has failed. In Cuba, citizens who had held aloof from all previous revolutionary movements now joined in the plots against the Spanish power. The third of the organised conspiracies which quickly followed, was that of the order of the " Aguila Negra," or Black Eagle, and it met the same fate as its predecessors. It is perliaps not too early in tliis chronicle to say that from the first the Cubans showed themselves better at conspiring than in giving their conspiracies effect, better at rebelling against authority than in overthrowing that authority. In proportion to the number of Cubans who sympathised with Gomez, Maceo, and Garcia in the re- bellion which by the aid of the United States became 1 6 Blue Jackets of '98 finally the revolution, the army was surprisingly small. And in proportion to the size of the army, the number of men who actually appeared in battle was even more disappointing. We may pass hastily over the successive riots and revolts which kept Cuba in a turmoil for half a century. By 1840 the discontent of the islanders had come to be so general that adventurous persons in the United States, taking seriously the Cuban ambition for freedom, began to consider whether some advantage might not be gained by taking to the island armed bodies of men and inciting the Cubans to successful revolt. In the main these fili- busters, as they came to be called, were animated by selfish and mercenary motives. They were true soldiers of for- tune, attracted no doubt in part by the romantic notion of helping to build up a new nation, but not at all blind to possible profit for themselves in the government of it. The first of these expeditions was that of Narciso Lopez, in 1848. Lopez had made his essay at rebellion in Cuba with the usual results, and after escaping to the United Ftates, organised there a society of Cuban refugees. Among the members of this society, and among Americans who were actuated by motives as various as men have mental char- acteristics, Lopez organised a filibustering expedition. The United States authorities got wind of it, and sup- pressed it, as was clearly the duty of a nation friendly to the government de facto in Cuba. That was the begin- ning of the war of the United States government on men v.-ho were trying to make Cuba free, — a warfare which the practices of civilised nations made compulsory, but which was repugnant to the officials who directed it, the officers who were actively engaged in it, and the people who paid the bills. Undaunted by his first failure, Lopez made preparations for another effort. He gathered together some six hun- dred men at an island near Yucatan. Thence by steamer the expedition, well armed and provisioned for a cam- Blue Jackets of '98 17 paign, proceeded to Cardeuas, where it landed and threw up entrenchments. Lopez was a visionary, — a man of the John Brown type in some respects. Like the hero of Harper's Ferry, he thought that a people suffering under tyranny would rise and fight for freedom. He did not know his own people. Instead of flocking to his stand- ard, they left him severely alone. They had neither cour- age for the fight, nor manliness enough to brave the martial law which they knew would be declared on the news of the landing of the expedition. Havana was full of sol- diers, and a railroad ran thence to Cardenas. If some patriot had destroyed a section of this road, Lopez might have had time to rouse the country and begin a Fabian warfare like that which Garcia and Gomez afterward made effective. But the patriots were all in the cafes, and two thousand and five hundred Spanish soldiers went down the railroad to attack the invaders. They retreated prac- tically without resistance, and the United States govern- ment seized Lopez's steamer and put him on trial, but failed to convict him of any punishable offence. Juries were not much moved by the crime of filibustering then. We must admire the persistence of Lopez, though his actual accomplishments were inconsequential. In 1851 he was again equipped with a steamer, arms, provisions, and an army of four hundred and fifty men. This time he had a company of more formidable soldiers. Forty- nine were Americans, adventurous men from the West and South who knew how to fight and, as they proved, how to die. Several Hungarians, Germans, and Poles, flotsam from the European revolutions of '48, were in the party, one General Pragay being second in command. Bungled from the first, the expedition perished miserably. The pilot intrusted with the task of finding a landing place nearly took the filibusters into the lion's jaws at Havana, but, escaping this peril, landed them at Bahia Honda. As usual, the force of Cubans which had been expected to join failed to appear, and Lopez committed the fundamen- 1 8 Blue Jackets of '98 tal error of dividing his force in the face of the enemy. At the coast were left one hundred and fifty men under command of Colonel Crittenden, a Kentuckian of distin- guished family. Lopez, with the main body, pushed on into the interior, hoping to rally the natives to the banner of free Cuba. The Spanish soldiery were quickly on the heels of both parties. Crittenden's party, after a running fight in the woods in which they suffered severely, were captured. In accordance with the inhuman practice of the Spaniards, the survivors, some fifty in all, were sentenced to be shot. Blindfolded and kneeling with their backs to their exe- cutioners, they died wretchedly. Crittenden met his end with a flash of defiance on his tongue. " A Kentuckian never turns his back on an enemy and kneels only to his God," he said, when ordered to prepare like the others for death, and he faced his fate like a brave man. Lopez was overtaken by the pursuers at Las Pozas, where he repelled an attack of the enemy, but was so sorely weak- ened that in his retreat he was compelled to leave his wounded to be murdered by the Spaniards. At Las Frias, soon after, in another battle the filibusters fought bravely and won a second victory. But their little tri- umphs were without avail. In every fight they lost heavily, and no recruits came to their standards, while the Spaniards, re-enforced daily, kept up the pursuit. Gradu- ally the invaders were reduced to mere scattered bands of miserable fugitives, fleeing through the woods and in- capable of further resistance. Lopez and some of his companions were captured and died by the garrote at Havana. The fate of the rest is known only to the im- penetrable jungles of Cuba and to the hideous land crabs and loathsome vultures that rend the flesh of the helpless and the dead lying there. Too many Americans had fallen in the ill-fated Lopez expedition for its fate to be thought of with indifference in the United States, and the gallant words of Crittenden stirred the blood of many who thought such a youth too Blue Jackets of 98 19 fine a type to be a victim to Spanish bloodtliirstiness. Henceforward the irritation of the United States was great whenever Spain offended in any degree, and offence was constant. Spain began suspecting a filibuster in every American ship in Cuban waters. The constant challenge of our merchantmen angered our sailors, and every inci- dent of this kind was made the most of by the anti- Spanish party, which was coming to be a recognised force in the United States. By firing upon United States ships, opening mail-bags at Havana consigned to this country, detaining merchantmen unlawfully, and seizing them on frivolous allegations of fraud upon the customs, Spain made herself obnoxious to an extent that threatened war. The Ostend Manifesto, abeady referred to, which frankly discussed the wisdom of taking Cuba from Spain by force, grew out of the irritation these repeated aggressions aroused among our people. But our own war between the States saved Spain for a time. In 1868 the discontented Cubans rose again in revolt, and this time proclaimed boldly the Cuban Eepublic. The island was full of soldiers, both the Spanish regulars and the so-called volunteers recruited carefully among the Spanish sympathisers. Nevertheless a lawyer of Bay am o, one Carlos M. de Cespedes, with the knowledge of all the rebellions that had miserably failed, took the field with one hundred and twenty-eight men, half-armed, and bade Spain defiance. But this time the Cubans who had so often disappointed those who strove to free them were readily roused. The years of comparative immunity from armed revolt had been employed by Spain only in making existence more intolerable for the people of the island. Taxes had been increased to a point bordering on confiscation, and the carpet-bagging tax-gatherers swindled the government as they fleeced the tax-payers. The force of " volunteers " was a heavy burden upon the colony. Though a militia body, its members were paid for service. It was recruited largely among the families 20 Blue Jackets of '98 of those holding office under the home government, and was carefully limited to men of whose loyalty to Spain there could be no question. Besides their military duties, the volunteers quickly began to assume political functions. They became what we call in the United States a machine, dictating nominations for the few electoral offices and monopolising for themselves all the offices of emolument. The native Cuban was practically denied all share in the government of his own provinee. He was the tax-payer ; the Spaniards, the tax-eaters. As the appetites of the latter were voracious, and as the government at Madrid was not without a zest for spoils, the debt of Cuba mounted up until its interest alone was $6.39 per capita, and the amount of revenue which it was sought to extract from the island for 1868 was 840,000,000. This was more than the people could raise, and payment was not made easier by the spectacle of enormous salaries paid to cor- rupt officials. A Captain-General with a salary of $50,000 a year, when the President of the United States was get- ting $25,000, and two archbishops at $18,000 each, with other salaries of like extravagance, made the Cuban planter see that he was being impoverished for the enrichment of an office-holding aristocracy. Touched in the pocket, he responded more forcefully to this new appeal for action against the Spanish oppression than he had when the " Soles do Bolivar " had appealed to his desire for freedom, or when the brave and unfortunate Lopez had sought to set up an independent state. The war that followed was one of endurance rather than of action. The insurgents were confined mainly to the forest clad hills of the interior whence they descended on frequent forays, attacking some Spanish post, capturing and often burning some little town, desolating a province or killing at wholesale men known to be in league with the Spaniards. All the evils of guerrilla warfare were suffered by the unhappy islanders for ten years. The Cubans were weak, ill-armed, and poor. Their chief Blue Jackets of '98 21 weapon was the machete, — a heavy sword-like knife. They knew that to give pitched battle to the enemy would be to invite annihilation, so they maintained an irregular warfare in the hope of exhausting Spain's re- sources of men and money. The Spaniards for their part did not push hostilities with any vigour. To Spanish gen- eral officers a war has always meant great profits, and the long duration of the Ten Years War is believed to have been due in part to the willingness of some officers in high command to make money in contracts and by falsified pay-rolls. But as it dragged along the cost to Spain be- came tremendous, while to the people of the island it meant ruin. Spanish statistics are notoriously incomplete, but not less than 150,000 men were sacrificed in this effort to make Cuba submissive. The Cubans suffered in pro- portion, and were made the victims of peculiarly cruel orders and murderous outrages at the hands of the Span- ish troops. In 1898 what was known as the " reconcen- tration policy " of General Weyler had much to do with producing the inhuman conditions which led to the inter- vention of the United States ; but Weyler was anticipated in 1869 by General Balmaceda, whose reconcentration pro- clamation included such cruel ordinances as this : " Every man from the age of fifteen years upw^ards found away from his habitation who does not prove a proper reason therefor will be shot." In the effort to crush the Cuban by cruel and murderous methods the volunteers of Havana took an active and infamous part. In 1871 they seized a number of school-boys accused of defacing the glass on a tomb containing the body of a Spanish soldier, tried them by a court-martial which had no official character, — a ver- itable mock court, — and shot eight dead the following morning in execution of the sentence. For these whole- sale murders the members of the politico-military organ- isation were never punished. They were indeed superior ! to the law and had just forced a regularly appointed Captain-General to return to Madrid. 22 Blue Jackets of '98 In this insurrection, as in all others, the sympathy of the people of the United States was earnestly with the Cubans. Pressure was brought to bear on the adminis- tration from many sources for the recognition of the insursrents and for active intervention in their behalf. But then, as thirty years later, the insurgents suffered from being unable to show an organised government which could command respect, or a capital that could be reached by an envoy. These facts President Grant pointed out in his message of 1869, but shortly afterward the distressing situation in Cuba compelled him to send in to Congress a special message detailing the unhappy condition of the island and noting that if the insurgents had made no pro- gress in winning liberty, Spain had made none toward suppressing the revolt. There were then the same reasons for intervention that recurred in 1898, and the arguments against it employed by President Grant were almost literally those used later by Presidents Cleveland and McKmley. Not even the one great crime against the lives of Americans which, in the sinking of the "Maine," in 1898, had so potent a share in bringing on war, was without a prototype in 1873. Filibustering expeditions havmg for their purpose the supplying of arms, recruits, and muni- tions of war to the insurgents were common during the earlier revolt as in the days of the later one. In October, 1873, an American side- wheel steamer, the " Virginius," was engaged in one of these expeditions. Off the southern coast of the island, she was sighted by a Spanish gunboat, and despite all efforts to escape was overhauled and cap- tured. One hundred and sixty-five men were taken pris- oners, and with the ship were taken in to Santiago de. Cuba. Then began a series of unlawful and cruel execu- tions which were in fact assassinations, and which should have resulted in an instant declaration of war by the United States. Within three days of their capture, three Cubans and one American were taken from amons their Blue Jackets of 98 23 fellows in prison and shot, — not after trial, but summarily, upon order of the Spanish commander, General Burriel. Again three days, and thirty-seven more, including the ship's commander. Captain Frey, were lined up, blindfold and kneeling before a company of marines, and shot dead. Against this execution the consuls of both the United States and England protested in vain. Several of the victims were British subjects, but the Spaniards, with the fatuous indifference which has ever characterised them, gave as little heed to the nationality of the men they slaughtered, as they did to the international law bear- ing upon their cases. In the face of the combined pro- test of the consuls, twelve more men were shot on the day following. Then the executions abruptly ceased, for the captain of the British man-of-war " Lorraine " ran into San- tiago harbour with shotted guns and men at quarters, threat- ening to bombard the town if another prisoner was slain. Then followed diplomacy and delay, until the blood of the American people, roused rightly to the fighting point by these murders, had time to cool. In the end Spain agreed to surrender the " Virginius" — and did it by deliver- ing her in a filthy and sinking condition ; to punish the officials engaged in the massacre , — and did it by promot- ing Captain Burriel ; and to pay a small indemnity for the victims of the massacre, — as though lives could be paid for. There was hot indignation at the termination of the affair then, and it is not pleasing reading now, even after the bloody annihilation of Spain's proudest squadron within sight of the spot where the men of the " Virginius " were slain has in some degree atoned for the crime. In 1873, however, the nation had no navy, and before a Spanish tribunal no cause not backed with show of force seemed to meet with justice. It cannot be maintained, however, that any considerations of fighting strength could have made the course of the United States in deal- ini,f with the government responsible for the " Virginius " outrage wise or prudent. The duty neglected then had to 24 Blue Jackets of '98 be performed thirty years later. It was necessary that at some time Spain should be taught to observe the customs of civilised peoples and to treat her neighbours with re- spect. It is a curious coincidence, by the way, that the public wish for the recognition of the insurgents, which naturally was very strong immediately after the " Virginius " affair, was balked by the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, whose grandson, bearing the same name, was the first man shot dead on Cuban soil in the Spanish war of 1898. When even the affair of the " Virginius " failed to result in intervention by the United States, the rebellion lagged. Then as in later years the Cubans recognised that their one hope of winning freedom lay in the possibility that their great neighbour would make their caiise its own. Disappointed in this hope, they fell to bickering among themselves, and at the same time the disordered conditions in Spain which had contributed much to the advantage of the insurgents were cleared up by the firm re-establish- ment of the Bourbon dynasty on the throne. With peace at Madrid, the suppression of the Cubans was believed to be easy, and a distinguished soldier. General Martinez Campos, was sent to the island with 25,000 veteran troops and the unqualified authority of the Captain-General. Campos was astonished at the magnitude of the task committed to him. The Cubans were as elusive as foxes in the thickets, and as fierce and unexpected in their at- tacks as panthers. With ambushes, night assaults, sud- den raids, the harrying of the country and the destruction of provisions, they demoralised the regulars, who were aU unused to guerriUa warfare. After a year of this sort of hostilities, finding the island no nearer pacification than at the outset, Campos determined to try the methods of compromise. The first Cubans with whom he commu- nicated and who undertook to present his overtures to their comrades were promptly killed by their fellows, who con- strued even a willingness to carry proposals from the enemy as a sort of treachery. In the end, however, an Blue Jackets of '98 25 a'Treement was reached known as the treaty of Zanjon, which ended the Ten Years War. It promised on behalf of Spain radical reforms, a large measure of self-govern- ment, and immunity to aU who took part in the rebellion. It is unnecessary to enumerate in detail all the provisions of this treaty, for almost without exception they were vio- lated by Spain either in letter or in spirit. One clause provided that any persons who had participated in the recent insurrection who desired to leave the island might do so at the expense of Spain. This was taken advantage of by several of the leaders, including some of whom the world was destined to hear more, — Maximo Gomez and Antonio and Jose Maceo. Those who remained soon dis- covered that the blood shed in the Ten Years War had been wasted, for Spanish perfidy nullified all the conces- sions which had been exacted from the Madrid ministry. It was the recollection of the deception practised at this time which made the Cuban patriots and their friends in 1898 absolutely deaf to the engaging promises of autonomy and reform with which the Spaniards sought to quiet the last revolution. A tricked and humiliated people will never rest quietly under the domination of their deceivers. Plans for a new Cuban revolution were under way before the wounds in- curred in the Ten Years War were fairly healed. Spain was quick to furnish the excuse. She sent out hordes of Spanish office-holders bent only on spoliation. She or- ganised anew the Spaniards in Cuba, making them a class apart from the Cubans and giving them all the profitable places. Spanish manufacturers were given a virtual rimnopoly of the trade of the island, and the bread of ( 'nban children was made dear that Spanish millers might 1)0 rich. Taxes went up again to the point of extortion, and indeed all the conditions which had led to the earlier revolt were renewed and made more burdensome. The patriots who had left the island under the provis- ions of the treaty of the Zanjon were the active organisers 26 Blue Jackets of '98 of the new outbreak. They formed revolutionary dubs in the United States, the West Indies, and South America. Funds were raised, an active correspondence maintained, arms purchased. Jose Marti, a graduate of the University of Madrid, was the active organiser in this work. He chartered ships, penetrated Cuba in disguise, — he would have been hanged if caught — went over to San Domingo to see the veteran Gomez and to Costa Kica to meet the Maceos. By February, 1895, his plots were sufficiently matured for the first blow to be struck. On the 24th of that month it was reported at Havana that another re- bellion had begun. A small band of rebels had appeared at Ybarra, in Matanzas, and the other sections of the island reported the defiance of authority by parties of armed men. " Only a negro uprising," said the Spanish \ authorities. It was preposterous to suppose that the authority of Spain, supported as it was by 20,000 regular troops and 60,000 enrolled volunteers, could be seriously menaced by a few bands of ragamuffins. But before that insignificant revolt had enlisted the aid of the United States, Spain, in the effort to suppress it, had put about 200,000 men in the field, and had lost by death, wounds, and sickness not less than 105,000 of them, while the expense in money of the war had reduced the nation to the verge of bankruptcy. The story of this war, which within three years com- pelled the intervention of the United States, is much like that of its predecessor. The insurgents grew rapidly in , numbers and in confidence. The exiles of the Ten Years War returned enthusiastically to join in the new effort for free Cuba. First to come was Antonio Maceo, an educated mulatto and a born soldier, the only leader in the old days who had refused to concur in the treaty of Zanjon, but kept in the field for two months after all others had submitted. Soon after came Marti, and Maximo Gomez from San Domingo, the former to fall in the very first skirmish, the latter to fight to the end and to march Blue Jackets of '98 27 proudly into Havana, the hero of the assembled Cubans, when that capital was entered by the soldiers of the United States and their allies. Third in importance among these devoted leaders, was Calixto Garcia, another veteran of the Ten Years War, a man of seventy years, whose soldierly bearing compelled the respect of all the trained soldiers who in later days met him. These leaders of high character and of long experience gave to the new movement for free Cuba a more impressive appearance in the eyes of the world. They remembered the weakness of their earlier effort, springing from the lack of a govern- ment and a capital, so they called a constitutional conven- tion, adopted a form of government, and elected a ministry of which Salvador Cisneros was president. In form the government was all that could be asked, in fact it was mainly on paper, and the capital was as elusive as a will-o'-the-wisp. No seaport town could be held by the Cubans for lack of a navy, nor could they establish them- selves permanently in any interior city which was easy of access to an enemy which outnumbered them. Skirmishes and raids made up the military history of this war as of the earlier one. The Spanish government, quickly taking alarm, recalled Captain-General Calleja, and sent in his place Martinez Campos, the negotiator of the repudiated compromise of 1878. This appointment did not tend to allay the irritation of the Cubans ; but Campos brought with him 25,000 Spanish regulars, a force which it was thought would suppress all disorder. Before the year had ended thrice as many more had come from Spain, and the rebellion was stronger than ever. Gomez, who was supreme in command of the insurgents, early adopted a general plan of campaign by which the innumerable bands of insurgents were to be guided. It was a plan of avoidance of pitched battles and of constant irritation to the Spaniards. All small posts were to be attacked to the end that arms might be captured, and every Spaniard who delivered up his arms was to be set free. Eailroad 28 Blue Jackets of 98 and telegraph lines were to be cut wherever found. All crops of sugar-cane and all cane mills were to be destroyed unless the owners contributed to the Cuban campaign fund. As in the latter event the Spaniards destroyed crops and mills, the making of sugar soon came to an end in Cuba. Finally the farmers were to be prevented from sending food to the city imless they paid a tax to the in- surgent treasury. Above all things, no band of insurgents was to risk a battle in which the odds were against them. A policy which would starve and weary the Spaniards, and so harass the country that it would become unendur- able was the Cuban plan of campaign, — the only one which with their limitations the insurgents could have made effective. Accordingly, we look unavailingly for battles. Even when considerable forces met, the fighting was not stubborn. Early in the war, Campos and ]\Iaceo came into conflict near Bayamo with from 1500 to 2500 men each. An inconclusive battle was fought. " The enemy suffered severely," wqis the report of each side, for the statistical methods of both Spaniard and Cuban were alike in their endeavour to minimise their own losses and multiply those of the foe. The most notable thing about the accounts of the battles of the insurrection, from which- ever side emanating, is their complete inaccuracy. Major Grover Flint, a young American who joined Gomez, tells a story which fairly indicates the Spanish method of find- ing " victories " to chronicle. " There had been a court- martial in Lacret's camp the morning of the skirmish," writes Major Flint. " A mulatto lieutenant named Sanchez — a brave man, too, they told me — had been found guilty of assault on a negro girl of the neighbourhood and condemned to death. He was hung under the porch of a deserted cottage, with a placard on his breast giving his I name, the offence, and the finding of the court. I saw the] body and the Spaniards saw it too. A week later, in a I bundle of Havana newspapers that came to us, we read that the cabecilla (or chieftain) Sanchez had fallen in Blue Jackets of '98 29 battle and had been left dead on the field by Lacret's re- treating bands." The mcident is of value, too, as showing how drastic was the discipline in the insurgent camps. They were rebels but not ruffians. Though outlawed by Spain, they were obedient to the laws which civihsed people impose. It is unhappily too well established that Spain judged her soldiers more leniently for the offence for which the rebel Sanchez was hanged. By the end of 1895 the revolution had spread to all parts of the island, and the Spaniards were secure in possession only of the large cities. The imported soldiers from Spain sickened and died in the deadly summer chmate, and the repeated drafts were beginning to make the Spanish people impatient. It was determined at Madrid that the policy of Campos lacked force and vigour, and General Valeriano Weyler y Nicalau, Marquis of Teneriffe, was commissioned in his place. Weyler was a man of infamous record. A professional soldier, he had made war murderous under the plea of making it deci- sive. He was notorious equally for the cold brutality of his nature and for his rapacity. He was no less a robber than a murderer.' In the previous war in Cuba he had gained an execrable name by the commission of unname- able barbarities. In the Philippines he had not only appalled the people by his utter indifference to the plain- est dictates of humanity, but had robbed the government by wholesale. His appointment to Cuba meant that the war would be conducted with the utmost barbarity, but did not promise speedy peace. Weyler found his profit in a state of war, and could not be expected to make haste to end it. In fact it was soon seen that the boasted energy of the new Governor-General was without results. The insur- gents continued as before harrying the country, checking all production, and thus cutting off Spanish revenues. Maceo burned Batabano and terrorised the province of Pinar del Eio after the Governor-General had pronounced 30 Blue Jackets of '98 it pacified. Gomez, at Camaguey, defeated General Castil- lanos, though the Spaniards outnumbered him four to one. Then Weyler adopted the celebrated device of the " trocha," a line of defence composed of trenches, barbed wire, and blockhouses extending across the island from Mariel to Majana. Two months were spent in building this trocha, and 15,000 men employed. The theory of it was that it would cut the insurgent forces iu two, that they could never cross it to unite, and that thus severed they would be easily defeated. As a matter of fact the troops both of Gomez and Maceo crossed it repeatedly. But m one of his expeditions, a most audacious one ex- tendincr into Havana Province itself, Maceo fell into an ambush and was killed. A surgeon on his staff, Dr. Zertuccha, is charged with having betrayed him, but of this there is doubt. A gallant soldier, a strict discipli- narian, a man of a high sense of honour and one who struggled unceasingly to prevent the revolution degen- erating into a mere outbreak of lawlessness, Maceo was a sore loss to the Cuban cause. He had been second in command to Gomez, and upon him the leader of the revo- lution had relied implicity. His place was to some degree taken by General Calixto Garcia, who reached Cuba soon after. While the warfare of General Weyler on the insurgents gave not the slightest promise of a suppression of the insurrection, it was his methods which hastened the end^ in the way it came. Upon the manner of warfare whicl came to be described as Weylerism, the people of the! United States looked with indignation and growing wrath| In the field his men were murderers more than soldiersJ Neither women nor children were spared on their raidsj and the desolate thickets of Cuba witnessed many scene of revolting cruelty that vied in horror with the incidents of our early Indian wars. But chief of all thej offences accredited to Weyler, and most potent in rousing the United States to action, was the policy of reconcen-^ Blue Jackets of '98 31 tration which formed the subject of his first order on reaching Havana. The theory of this pohcy was simple. Weyler saw that certain provinces were held by the insurgents, who lived on the country. They refused battle except when in such numbers that their victory was certain. Lurking in the forests, they would dash out, strike, and disappear. Months of ordinary campaigning made no impression upon them, and there seemed to be no reason why they could not prolong this species of warfare indefinitely. It must be admitted that the problem which confronted General Weyler was one not easily solved. His method of treating it was to make the country in which the insur- gents were operating a desert, to destroy its crops and its homes, to remove its peaceable inhabitants to the neigh- bouring towns, to prohibit any further farming or cattle- raising until the rebels were starved out and ready to surrender. The results of this policy were shocking to the civilised world, but in itself it was not a new device in warfare. To ravage a country upon which the enemy is living is a primary proposition in strategy. Our own General Sheridan once reported that he had so desolated the Shenandoah Valley, " that a crow flying over it would have to take his rations with him." But the effect of this policy in Cuba was only to cause the deaths from starvation and disease of tens of thousands of unoffending people. The weak and aged, the women and children were the sufferers, while the insurgent ranks were swelled doubly by the men who had seen their fields laid waste and their roofs burned. The decree would have been cruel had it merely ordered the destruc- tion of homes ; but it went further and compelled the " pacificoes " thus brutally dispossessed to gather in the nearest towns, where there was no way for them to earn a living nor any methods, save those of mendicancy, for getting either shelter or food. One clause of the order, which was a mere invitation to murder, prescribed that 32 Blue Jackets of '98 all pacificoes who did not within eight days come into the towns would be treated like enemies, — that is, be outlawed and killed wherever found. The blood of Maceo, the life-long planning of Marti, the gallant service of Garcia and Gomez with all their followers did less for free Cuba than this one decree. From the moment the effects of reconcentration began to be apparent, the fortunes of the insurgents in the field were of no importance. They kept the field, for in a country so rich in vegetation as Cuba a persistent force of men willing to endure hardships cannot be starved out, and the Cuban patriots lived patiently on fruits and roots and fought on. But the people gathered in the cities died miserably, and soon the newspaper correspondents from the United States, instead of sending vague accounts of battles between the Spaniards and the Cubans, with a paucity of details and a loud claim on the part of the former that each had been a glorious victory, began visit- ing towns where the reconcentrados were gathered and telhng of their condition to the people at home with only too much detail. Babies starving to death in their mothers' arms, the bodies of starved women and little children lying in the filthy street where they had fallen in their last agony, helpless people by the thousand crowded together in filthy corrals without shelter, without food, and destitute of the ordinary decencies of life — condi- tions such as these, " in the very dooryard of the United States," as the phrase went, were intolerable. Our people were incredulous for a long time. Such barbarity was incredible in these days of civilisation, but the evidence multiplied day by day. To the testimony of the corre- spondents was added that of unprofessional observers who went to Cuba to satisfy themselves that the newspapers lied, and came back white with horror and with rage. The growing perfection and wide use of photography added materially to the volume of proof of Spain's barbari- ties. The camera does nut take things that do not exist, Blue Jackets of '98 33 and the pictures of emaciated children showed one jDhase of the Weyler policy, while other photographs of pacificos tied hand and foot and bleeding from fatal wounds of the machete inflicted while they were thus helpless denoted another. Even in the enormous mass of exaggerated and often wholly imaginative stuff sent out from Cuba in the guise of news, there was enough which bore unmistakably the stamp of truth and which related stories of outrage, barbarity, and murder to inflame public opinion in the United States to the point of war. General Weyler saw the danger and tried to avert it characteristically, not by reforming his course, but by imprisoning and expelling from Cuba the correspondents who had exposed it. This was of no avail. Put on their mettle, the journalists re- doubled their activity, and by this time their reports had ample authentication from official sources. The endeav- ours of the charitable to care for the destitute gave convinc- ing indication of the extent of destitution. The Spaniards themselves were forced to join in the work of mercy. Early in the war the Spanish army, probably under com- pulsion, raised a fund for this purpose, Campos giving $2,000 and each soldier contributing one day's pay. After Weyler's departure. General Blanco, his successor, secured a fund of $100,000 for the starving, and the city of Havana by taxation raised nearly as much for the same end. In every considerable city of Cuba committees were formed for the relief of the reconcentrados, but the situation soon became too much for the utmost endeavours of private charity to cope with. When 400,000 people are beggared and starving, when all industry and commerce in the nation are wrecked by war, the few who have a livelihood left to them are neither numerous enough nor rich enough to re- lieve the unfortunate. There was but one way to restore even a semblance of prosperity to the island, and that was to permit the reconcentrados to return to their farms. That Weyler would not do, and when his successor, General Blajico, repealed the reconcentration order it was too late. 3 34 Blue Jackets of '98 By that time the survivors had not means to procure seed for a new crop nor to support themselves while making it. Nor had many of them enough strength left to take up the tasks of life again even if permitted. Of about 400,- 000 reconcentrados more than half had died when the United States intervened. How many perished thereafter cannot be told, perhaps never will be. Anticipating somewhat the course of the narrative, it may be said that the effort of the United States to rescue the reconcentra- dos from their impending fate was absolutely unsuccess- ful. We found it as impossible to wage war without inflicting suffering on innocent people as had Weyler himself. The first act of our war was to declare a block- ade of Cuba which lasted four months, thus literally in- creasing the difficulty of getting food for the unfortunates. Just prior to the beginning of the war some relief was effected by charitable contributions from the United States, from Spain secured through the urgency of the United States, and from the people of the United States acting through the Ked Cross society. But the declaration of war stopped this at once. In a succeeding chapter the progress of the Cuban question through Congress is traced. Here it is necessary to note only certain of the incidents which created and kept alive that public sentiment wliich impelled Congress to act. Chief of all these was the visit of Senator Eedfield Proctor, of Vermont, to Cuba and his report, delivered in a speech in the senate, of the scenes he had witnessed there. Other men had seen like horrors and had told of them. Journalists had been recounting tales Hke his for months ; a number of gentlemen representing both houses of Congress had made a trip to the " pacified " provinces as the guests of the owner of the " New York Journal " and had told of what they saw ; the consuls in various Cuban cities had described as graphically as the deportment of the state department would permit the agonies of the people. But Senator Proctor's speech carried more weight Blue Jackets of '98 35 than all. He had been Secretary of "War, he was a man of substance in the nation, and had not been held a violent Cuban sympathiser. So when in the Senate he expressed himself in words like those herewith quoted, not only his colleagues but the whole people felt the time had come for action. Quoting Weyler's reconcentration order, the Senator said : ' ' Many doubtless did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. It was left largely to the guer- rillas to drive in all who did not obey, and I was informed that in many cases a torch was applied to their homes with no notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the guerrillas. When they reached the town they were allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the troclias, and left to live if they could. Their huts are about ten by fifteen feet in size, and for want of space are usually crowded together very closely. They have no floor but the ground, no furniture, and after a year's wear, but httle clothing except such stray substitutes as they can extemporise, and with large families or with more than one in tins little space, the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Con- ditions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food, or none, what wonder that one half have died, and that one quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved. A form of dropsy is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children are still walking about with arms and chests terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless. "Deaths in the streets have not been uncommon. I was told by one of our consuls that they have been found dead about the markets in tlie morning, where they had crawled, hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market, surrounded by food. These people were independent and self-supporting before Weyler's order. They are not beggars even now. There are plenty of professional 36 Blue Jackets of '98 beggars in every town among the regular residents, but these country people, the reconcentrados, have not learned the art. Rarely is a hand held out to you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them makes an appeal stronger than words." This condition was the fruit of Weyler's regime, but it continued long after the Spanish government, alarmed at the outcry against the " butcher," recalled him and sent the more humane General Blanco in his stead'. It must be remembered, too, that this state of indescribable misery and suffering existed at a time when the Spanish govern- ment insisted that there was no war in Cuba, nothing but a slight rebelKon which would speedily be suppressed, and declared that for our government to recognise a state of war and concede to the Cubans the rights of belliger- ents would be an unfriendly act. By December of 1897 the actual warfare between the Spaniards and the insurgents had ceased to be a matter of interest in the United States. In comparison with the colossal crime of starving a whole people into subjection, the raids and skirmishes which were dignified by the name of battles were regarded as of no importance. The Weyler regime too had been fruitful of actual outrages upon the persons and property of citizens of the United States. The most celebrated of these cases was that of the so-called " Com- petitor " prisoners, a number of men whom the Spaniards had captured on a filibustering vessel of that name, and whom Weyler proposed to shoot after their condemnation by a court-martial organised to convict. The stout protest of Fitzhugh Lee, the United States consul-general at Havana, saved the prisoners from this fate, but they were kept imprisoned for months without opportunity to see counsel for their defence, despite General Lee's vigorous protests. More unlawful still was the Spanish treatment of Dr. Ruiz, a naturalised American who for some sus- pected offence was thrown into prison and there brutally murdered by his guards. This case was so heinous that Blue Jackets of '98 '^^^ the United States government made of it a grave issue, with the result that thereafter Americans suspected of political offences were turned over to General Lee, who sent them forthwith to the United States. It is just to note here that so large a proportion of these Americans bore Cuban names and spoke English with difficulty it was apparent many had taken advantage of our liberal natu- ralisation laws to secure American protection in their enterprises against Spain. In August, 1897, Weyler was recalled. The assassina- tion of the Spanish premier Canovas had led to a change of ministry, and the new government determined to try methods of concession with the Cubans. But the time for concessions had passed. The evil that Weyler had done could no more be undone than the dead he had starved could be brought to life. General Blanco promptly cancelled the reconcentration order, but, as has been ex- plained already, the starving and dying multitude was in no condition to profit by this belated clemency. As Consul- General Lee said, " In the first place these people have no place to go to ; their houses have been burned down ; there is nothing but the bare land left, and it would take them two months before they could raise the first crop. In the next place they are afraid to go out from the lines of the towns, because the roving bands of Spanish guerrillas, as they are called, would kill them. So they stick right in the edges of the town, just like they did, with nothing to eat except what they can get from charity." Nor was the aid belatedly provided by Spain and the government of Cuba properly employed in alleviating the sufferings of the reconcentrados. There is only too much evidence that some of this money, and some of the provisions sent by cliaritable people of the United States, was diverted to the uses of the Spanish soldiery. General Blanco also endeavoured in good faith to check the growing antagonism between the United States and the Spanish in Cuba. The efforts for the amelioration of the 38 Blue Jackets of '98 reconcentrados were part of this effort. The release of the " Competitor" prisoners was a second step in the pro- gramme, but it came too late. Curiously enough, the effort to feed the starving had much to do with making the rela- tions of the two nations more critical, for the Spaniards in Havana — uncompromising and haughty at all times — looked upon the acceptance of contributions from the United States and the permission to the Red Cross Society to engage in relief work as a sort of implied admission of American right of intervention. They manifested their disapproval by riots in the streets of Havana and by threats of mobbing the American consulate. Out of this grew the visit of the " Maine " and the calamity that made war inevitable. Chief, however, of the features of the new policy upon which Blanco relied to avert the impending conflict was the offer to Cuba of a system of autonomy. This was in some degree a concession to American demands, as will be seen, but the concession, however pleasing to the adminis- tration at Washington, was received with suspicion and positive hostility in Cuba. There was complaint that a mere semblance of home rule was offered and that the whole purpose of the revolution would be lost if the over- tures were accepted. But more effective even than this argument was the appeal of the insurgent leaders to his- tory. Garcia and Gomez both had fought in the Ten Years War. Both had accepted then in good faith the promise of reforms with which Spain had purchased peace. Both had seen the promise violated, the reforms withdrawn or de- prived of all beneficial effect by the methods of adminis- tering them. With this bitter knowledge fresh in their memory these Cuban leaders did not waste time in discus- sing the apparent merits of the plan of autonomy which Spain proffered, but rejected it at once. " Nothing but absolute independence " was their cry, and they declared that for a member of the insurgent army to discuss autonomy would be equivalent to treason. They declined Blue Jackets of '98 39 to receive envoys from Blanco, and announced that anyone sent to offer a compromise based on the new concessions would be treated as spies. It was difficult for the Spanish authorities to believe that this threat was seriously meant, but the insurgents soon proved they were in deadly earnest. Colonel Joaquin Euiz was selected to make the first effort to win over an insurgent band to peace and autonomy. Under a flag of truce he proceeded to the camp of the Cuban leader, Aranguren, choosing him because of a personal friendship dating back to before the war. In spite of the old-time friendship, in spite of the flag of truce, the messenger was seized and shot in accordance with the general order which had been given pubHcity, and which Euiz had ignored. " A savage murder," cried the anti-Cuban party in the United States. " A justifiable act of war," responded the Cuban sympathisers. Which- ever it was, it at least showed that Spain's belated offer of autonomy had no chance of acceptance. Events such as these, occurring day by day, kept the attention of the people of the United States riveted on Cuba. Every day the popular demand for recognition of the insurgents or for actual armed intervention grew more forceful. It was seen that Spain could never suppress the revolt, and it was evident that while the effort continued, the United States navy would be employed in chasing fihbusters, our interests in the island, which were heavy, would go more and more to ruin, our citizens would be jexposed to insult and actual injury at the hands of iSpanish soldiers, and above all, the inhuman and intoler- jable spectacle of a whole nation being wantonly starved to [death at our very doors without protest on our part would be presented to the world. The voice of the people arose almost as that of one man in the demand that this condi- jtion should be remedied, cost what it might. Only from a tvery few, and tliose mostly men who were controlled by the ignoble influences of the stock-market, did there rise a sound of dissent. A group of men of enormous wealth. 40 Blue Jackets of '98 and of corresponding political influence, fought strenuously against any action which might " unsettle values " — their conception of the one unbearable thing. Long they held the Washington government back from the plain discharge of its duty to man and to God. But in the end, they fell back, and the American people marched on in an unbroken column to fulfil its mission — to purge the new world of the last vestige of Spanish power and Spanish brutality. / CHAPTEE III The Disaster to the " Maine " — Captain Sigbee's Despatch — The State of Public Opinion — Why the " Maine " was SENT TO Havana — Her Reception there — Precautions AGAINST Attack — The Explosion — Frightful Loss of Life — Personal Narratives of Survivors and Eye- Wit- nesses — The Official Investigations — Attitude of the Spaniards — The Finding of the Court of Inquiry — " Remember the ' Maine.' " THE American newspapers of the morning of February 16, 1898, blazed with news that stirred the hearts of the people as had no intelligence since the first shot was fired at Fort Sumter ; news of a calamity so great as to plunge a nation in mourning — a disaster so un- precedented, so mysterious, surrounded with so many suspicious circumstances as inevitably to suggest to the most judicial mind the instant thought of treachery blacker and more infamous than any of which Cortes or Pizarro was guilty. The official information, hurriedly given out by the Washington authorities in order that its more restrained tone might counteract the wrathful sur- mises of the press, was given in this despatch to the Navy Department from Captain Sigsbee, commanding the United States battle-ship " Maine " : " ' Maine ' blown up in Havana harbour at nine-forty to- night and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more hilled or drowned. Wounded and others on hoard Span- ish man-of-war and Ward Line steamers. Send light- house tenders from Key West for crew and the few pieces of equipment above water. None has clothing other than that upon him. Public opinio7i shoidd be sus2iended until further report. All officers believed to be saved. Jenhins 42 Blue Jackets of '98 and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, including representative of General Blanco, now with me to express sympathy. Sigsbee." Captain Sigsbee's appeal for a suspension of judgment, greatly as it redounded to his credit as a cool and prudent man in an hour of awful strain, was but partly acceded to. There was suspension of action but not of opinion. In Congress, while all men were discussing in private conversation the frightful deed, official utterances were confined to resolutions of sympathy and regret. The executive authorities, beyond making the necessary ar- rangements for saving whatever of value remained on the wreck, caring for the survivors, burying the dead, and providing for a searching inquiry into the cause of the disaster, showed no sign of recognising in the event a new and potent factor in the Spanish-American problem. But the masses of men were swift to judge, and to-day there are but few to question the righteousness of their judg- ment. They recalled the nature of the Spaniard, cruel and treacherous from all historic times. They told each other that never in the history of the United States navy had a ship been destroyed by the accidental discharge of her own magazine, and they grimly suggested that the coincidence of a superheated magazine operating for the first time in a Spanish harbour was a little too much for credulity. And as day after day the newspapers, search- ing indcfatigably for clews, unearthed this or that sus- picious circumstance, the public conviction hardened in the form that it took instantly upon getting the news — a stubborn, ingrained belief that the battle-ship had been destroyed and her crew assassinated by the deliberate and prearranged plan of a Spaniard. A popular navy officer, Captain Evans, widely known as " Fighting Bob," was credited in the newspapers with a remark which well expresses the public sentiment. He was said to have been talking to the Secretary of the Navy. Blue Jackets of '98 43 " If I had been in command of the fleet at Key West instead of Admiral Sicard," said he, " I would have taken my entire squadron into Havana harbour the next morning, and then I would have said to them, ' Now we '11 investi- gate this matter and let you know what we think about it at once.' " " If you had done that you would have been severely reprimanded," responded Secretary Long. " Perhaps so," was the response, " but the people would have made me President at the next election." Possibly the story is apochryphal. At any rate the officer referred to has always refused to authenticate it. But it serves its turn in showing what was the popular feeling at the time of the destruction of the " Maine," for it was told and retold with hearty approval all over the land. Let us go back now a little and consider the reasons for the presence of the " Maine " in Havana harbour and the foundation for the general belief, which probably will never be changed, that she was blown up by the enemy. In an earlier chapter some reference has been made to the increasing friction between the Spanish authorities and the Americans whose business interests kept them in Cuba. It has been the custom of civilised nations since the earhest days of international relations to send war- ships to protect their citizens resident in foreign lands whenever a disordered state of society or the collapse of gov- ernment makes protection by the local authorities impos- sible or improbable. The United States, by reason of their comparative freedom from foreign complications, have seldom had this duty to perform, though occasionally revolutions in South American states have compelled the sudden despatch of a protecting man-of-war. At no time has such a precaution as this been regarded as indicative of hostility toward the established government of the state to which the vessel has been sent. It is probable 44 Blue Jackets of 98 that no montli passes without the employment of a British or French man-of-war to protect the interests of the citi- zens of that nation in some foreign land, yet the event is not held to suggest unfriendliness of any kind. In the case of Cuba, however, peculiar conditions made the stationing of a war-ship at Havana take on a special and unusual significance. That which did most to produce this unfortunate result was the prolonged delay in taking this action. Either President Cleveland or President McKinley, in the early days of his administration, might have sent a ship to Havana and kept one there continu- ously without awakening the resentment of the Spaniards, had the act been done promptly and quietly. As it was, newspaper clamour was aroused by the delay, the American papers most hostile to Spain being most noisy in their demands for the presence of a ship at Havana. What should have been merely a perfunctory and conventional precaution was made to take on the proportions and char- acter of an act of hostility and defiance. The diplomats were involved. Spain protested. The President hesitated. The newspapers shrieked. And so, when popular pres- sure and the real vital necessities of the case compelled the President to act, the sending of the ship was hailed by American jingoes and most Spaniards as an actually un- friendly act. The very precautions taken to divest it of this air only strengthened the popular conviction. The Spanish government was consulted and gave its formal acquies- cence to an act which perhaps never before in the history of nations had been made the subject of diplomatic nego- tiations. The correspondence between the State Depart- ment and the Spanish minister was made public to show how thoroughly friendly was the episode, and arrange- ments were made to have a crack Spanish cruiser, the " Vizcaya," visit New York as an offset to the American ship at Havana. The ship finally selected to undertake the mission was the second class battle-ship " Maine." Built in 1895, this Blue Jackets of '98 45 ship was one of the most modern and ef&cient vessels in the navy at the time of her assignment to this service. She was 324 feet long, of 6650 tons displacement, with a trial speed of 17.45 knots and armoured with twelve inches of steel on the hull, and eight inches on the turrets. In each turret were two ten-inch rifles and in addition she had six six-inch rifles, seven six-pounders and eight one- pounders. She carried a crew of 26 officers, commissioned and warranted, and 330 men. For some weeks before her actual despatch to Havana the " Maine " had been stationed at Key West, her commander, Captain Sigsbee, being in constant cable communication with Consul-General Lee and under orders to proceed immediately to Havana if sum- moned by that official. It was well known at Key West and at Washington that the situation at the Cuban capital was grave and that at any moment some outbreak of mob violence might put the lives of the many Americans in jeopardy. Day after day Captain Sigsbee and General Lee exchanged cable messages on the most trivial topics, the purpose being to keep the cable constantly tested for in- terruptions. The understanding between the two officers was that on the receipt of the message " two dollars " Cap- tain Sigsbee should have his ship ready to sail within two hours, or on the receipt of another pre-concerted despatch. In his own story of the events leading up to the loss of his ship Captain Sigsbee says that this prehminary message did in fact come one night and that, after ordering all hands to report aboard at the sound of a gun, he went ashore with a number of his officers to attend a dance, that all suspi- cion of the possible movement of the night be averted. The second message did not come, however, and the destiny of the " Maine " worked itself out in a different way. Not until late m January when the battle-ship was at sea with the squadron of Admiral Sicard, did the order to go to Havana come, and then it came from Washington. On the 25th of that month the ship steamed into the harbour of the Cuban capital. Even more than the ordinary ceremony 46 Blue Jackets of '98 of courtesy was observed. The officers were clad in semi- dress uniforms and the crew in blue. A local pilot took the vessel to the buoy selected by the harbour master, and as soon as she was moored a Spanish lieutenant arrived to make the customary visit of ceremony. From him Captain Sigsbee satisfied himself that a salute fired to the Spanish flag would be returned, and accordingly salutes both to the flag and to Admiral Manterola were fired and speedily ac- knowledged. The next day Captain Sigsbee, accompanied by General Lee, paid his visit of ceremony to the Governor- General. It is worthy of record now that the American officer has said : " All visits were made without friction and with courtesy on both sides, and apparently with all the freedom of conversation and action usually observed." Even in the demeanour of the people on shore Captain Sigs- bee noticed nothing out of the way. "I thought the people stolid and sullen, so far as I could judge from an occasional glance. I noted carefully the bearing of the various groups of Spanish soldiers I passed. They saluted me, as a rule, but with such an appearance of apathy that the salute really went for nothing. They made no demonstration against me, however, not even by look." It was hardly to be expected, however, that there should not be some resentment in the Spanish mind against the naval representatives of a nation which was notoriously in sympathy with the efforts of the insurgents to win their freedom, and that some expression of this resentment should not occasionally break forth. Captain Sigsbee's own story of the events of his stay inspires rather wonder that the Spanish temperament, always impetuous and passionate, did not result in more open insults to the Americans during the short time that was to elapse before the destruction of the ship. He relates that no Spanish officers visited the ship except on calls of ceremony ; that the bumboat men in the harbour did not seem to wish the custom of the " Maine's " sailors ; that at a bull-fight he " de- tected glances at himself (me) that were far from friendly," Blue Jackets of '98 47 and that from passing ferries in the harbour derisive shouts and whistles were sometimes raised at sight of the " Maine." These are but trifles, less important by far than the dis- courtesy with which a mayor of New York treated Cap- tain Eulate, of the "Vizcaya," when that officer made his visit of ceremony. ISTor was the circular thrust into the hands of Captain Sigsbee one day, a translation of which follows, much more significant. SPANIARDS 1 XONG LIVE SPAIN WITH HONOUR ! What are you doing that you allow yourselves to be insulted in this way ? Do you not see what they have done to us in withdrawing our brave and beloved Weyler, who at this very time would have finished with this unworthy, rebellious rabble who are tramp- ling on our flag and on our honour ? Autonomy is imposed on us to cast us aside and give places of honour and authority to those who in- itiated this rebellion, these low-bred autonomists, ungrateful sons of our beloved country ! And, finally, these Yankee pigs who meddle in our affairs, humiliating us to the last degree, and, for a still greater taunt, order to us a man-of-war of their rotten squadron, after insulting us in their newspapers with articles sent from our own home I Spaniards ! the moment of action has arrived. Do not go to sleep. Let us teach these vile traitors that we have not yet lost our pride, and that we know how to protest with the energy befitting a nation worthy and strong, as our Spain is, and always will be ! Death to the Americans ! Death to autonomy ! Long live Spain ! Long live Weyler I Notwithstanding the comparative courtesy with which they were treated and the efforts made to preserve at least an appearance of amity with the Spanish authorities and 48 Blue Jackets of '98 people, the Americans understood that they were in what was practically a hostile port. On the " Maine " most of the precautions against attack which would have been taken in time of war were observed. To patrol the harbour, or to use search-lights would be to give offence, but the less obvious precautions were taken. An extra watch was kept on deck at night. Sentries were posted at every point of vantage on the ship and the most minute reports were made to the commander. Ammunition was kept ready for the rapid-fire guns and an extra supply of shells for the six-inch guns, while double steam was kept up in order that the turrets might be at all times movable. Though visitors to the ship were encouraged without reference to their nationality, a careful eye was kept on each, and particular attention was given to such as brought parcels aboard, lest dynamite or an infernal machine might be left in some vital part of the ship. The court of inquiry which examined into the cause of the explosion found, as we shall see later, that every imaginable precaution had been taken to guard against treachery. It was the night of February 15th. The harbour of Havana, always beautiful despite the miasmatic ooze with which it is bottomed, was never more enchanting to the senses. The soft tropic air just stirring with the westerly trade wind barely ruffled the surface of the water in which were reflected the brilliant stars of the southern heavens. An arc of shining lights against a dark background told where the city with its thronged caf^s and its starving reconceutrados lay. The harbour was dotted with ships. The " Maine" at her moorings had swung around broadside to the city — " in the position in which she would have been sprung to open her batteries on the shore fortifica- tions," is the significant way Sigsbee afterwards described it. A little distance astern was an American liner, the " City of Washington," while to the starboard were the two Spanish men-of-war " Alfonzo XII " and " Legazpi. " On the I Blue Jackets of '98 49 decks of all the ships men were sitting and the quays of the city were thronged with people seeking the open air. Captain Sigsbee was sitting in his cabin writing, as he tells us, to his wife, apologising for having carried a letter of hers in his pocket for a year — how curiously do some of the little things of life jostle the great events that determine the course of history and make or unmake nations ! As he was putting the letter into its envelope there came a terrifying explosion and about the ship all was darkness. To him " it was a bursting, rending, crash- ing sound or roar of immense volume, largely metallic in character. It was followed by a succession of heavy, ominous, metallic sounds probably caused by the over- turning of the central superstructure and by falling debris. There was a trembling and a lurching motion of the vessel and a list to port, and a movement of subsidence. The electric lights, of which there were eight in the cabin where I was sitting, went out. Then there was intense blackness and smoke." Eushing through the darkness to reach the deck the captain encountered a man. In the impenetrable gloom he could not see whom he had met, but it proved to be his orderly, Wilham Anthony, who reported the ship blown up and sinking. In the contemporaneous accounts of the disaster Anthony was described as having given a formal salute, come to attention, and said, " Sir, I have to report the ship blown up and sinking." Amplified with much picturesque detail, this story went the rounds of the newspaper press, made Anthony a hero of melodrama, and might have passed into history had not Captain Sigsbee himself demohshed it with the remark that if a salute had been made it could not have been seen in the intense blackness of that compartment. But the captain goes on to say that no salute nor any melodrama was needed to add to the heroism of this private of marines who kept his head and did his duty with calmness and efficiency. It was at nine-forty P. M. the explosion occurred. Writ- 4 5o Blue Jackets of '98 ing long after the fact, and with the full testimony taken by the board of inquiry available, we know now much that to Captain Sigsbee when he reached the flame-lighted deck was unknown and problematical. Despite the smoke which hung over all the ship like a pall he could see that the forward part of the " Maine " was shattered to pieces, that flames were leaping up amidships and that the wreck was sinking. He found about him most of his officers, though cries of agony from the water and from the fast sinking berth-deck gave melancholy certainty that among the crew great loss of life must have occurred. He has recorded that his first order was to post sentries about the wreck to guard against attack, for he instantly be- lieved what in due course of time was proved, that the " Maine " had been blown up from outside, and he ascribed it to an enemy. It was but a few moments before discipline and the habit of command and obedience asserted themselves among the survivors. The magazines were flooded lest any remaining explosives should be discharfjed. Boats were lowered to search for survivors in the water, in which task they were aided by boats from the Spanish man-of-war and the American liner. Slowly to the captain on the still tenable quarter-deck came reports showing the terrible extent of the disaster. Officers reported the machinery wrecked, the bow under water, the fire gaining on the after magazines and the great body of the crew lost — nobody knew how many until that dreadful night was far spent. The ship settled slowly until the deck on which Sigsbee and the executive officer, Lieutenant Wainwright, stood was level with the water. Then, as the fire still threatened the magazines all stepped into a boat, the captain being last to leave, and were rowed away to the " City of Washington " whence Captain Sigsbee sent the despatch to the Secretary of the Navy which heads this chapter. There too he received the report of the first muster which showed that only eighty-four or eighty-five survivors could be found, and Blue Jackets of '98 51 thither General Lee hurried when news of the disaster reached him. Not until the hospitals had time to tell their stories of painful recoveries and pitiful deaths was the full measure of the disaster taken. In all on that fatal night 254 men were killed outright, while thirteen others died long after in hospital. In this one dis- aster — or as it may fairly be said, by this one crime — more than seventeen times as many men were kiUed as fell in the United States navy during the whole course of the war. The official inquiry mto the causes of the explosion, which was begun shortly after the disaster, not only sifted thoroughly all obtainable facts bearing on the de- struction of the " Maine " and resulted in a verdict which accorded with the first instinct of the people, but it brought out from survivors and eye-witnesses of the disaster picturesque and graphic accounts of the occur- rences of that dreadful night. Some of the testimony in this hearing may be quoted in part, showing as it does how instantaneous and complete was the calamity, and how the discipline among both officers and men asserted itself even before the extent of the ruin could be imagined. Peihaps most interesting of all the testimony given was that of Lieutenant John Hood, of the " Maine," who was on deck at the time of the explosion. In part it follows : " I was sitting on the port side of the deck, with my feet on the rail, and I both heard and felt — felt more than I heard — a big explosion, that sounded and felt like an underwater explosion. I was under the impression that it came from for- ward, starboard, at the time. I instantly turned my head, and the instant I turned my head there was a second explosion. I saw the Avhole starboard side of the deck, and everything above it as far aft as the after-end of the superstructure, spring up in the air, with all kinds of objects in it — a regular crater- like performance, with flames and everything else coming up, I immediately sprang myself behind the edge of the super- structure, as there were a number of objects flying in my 52 Blue Jackets of '98 direction, for shelter. I ran very quickly aft, as fast as I could, along the after-end of the superstructure, and climbed up on a kind of step. I went under the barge, and by the time I went up on the superstructure this explosion had passed. The objects had stopped flying around. Then I saw on the starboard side there was an immense mass of foaming water and wreckage and groaning men out there. It was scattered around in a circle, I should say about a hundred yards in diameter, off on the starboard side. I immediately proceeded to lower the gig, with the help of another man. After I got that in the water several officers jumped in it, and one or two men. In the meantime somebody else was lowering the other boat on the port side. I heard some groans forward, and ran forward on the quarter-deck down the poop-ladder, and I im- mediately brought up on an immense pile of wreckage. I saw one man there, who had been thrown from somewhere, pinned down by a ventilator." The Court. "May I interrupt Mr. Hood a moment? He said several officers jumped into the gig. He does not say for what purpose or what they did. That might leave a bad im- pression unless he states what the object was." Answer. " They jumped into the gig, commanded to pick up these wounded men whom we heard out in the water. The orders had been given by the captain and the executive officer to lower the boats as soon as they came on deck. I spoke of lowering the gig because I was on the deck before they got up there, and began to lower it anyway, to pick up these men. As I was saying a minute ago, I found this one man lying there on the quarter-deck in this wreckage, pinned down by a ventilator. With Mr. Blandin's help Ave got him up just in time before the water rose over him. The captain and the executive officer ordered the magazines to be closed [flooded]. We all saw at once that it would be no use flooding the maga- zines. We saw that the magazines were flooding themselves. Then the captain said he wanted the fire put out that was starting up in the wreckage. I made ray way forward through the wreck and debris, up to the middle superstructure, to see if anything could bo done toward putting out this fire. When I got there I found nothing could be done, because the whole thing was gone. Blue Jackets of '98 53 " When I climbed up on this wreck on the superstructure I saw similar piles of wreckage on the port side which I had not seen before, and I saw some men struggling in that, in the water; but there were half a dozen boats there, I suppose, picking them up and hauling them out; and after pulling down some burning swings and things that were starting to burn aft, to stop any fire from catching aft, I came aft again out of the wreckage. There was no living thing up there at that time. Shortly after that we all left the ship. There were two distinct explosions, — big ones, — and they were followed by a number of smaller explosions, which I took at once to be what they were, I suppose — explosions of separate charges of the blown-up magazine. The instant this first ex- plosion occurred I knew the ship was gone completely, and the second explosion only assisted her to go a little quicker. She began to go down instantly. The interval between the two was so short that I only had time to turn my head and see the second. She sank on the forward end — went down like a shot. In the short time that I took to run the length of that short superstructure aft, the deck canted down, showing that her bow had gone at once. " At the same time the ship heeled over considerably to port, I should say about ten degrees the highest amount, and then the stern began to sink very rapidly, too; so rapidly that by the time I got that gig lowered, with the assistance of another man or two, the upper quarter-deck was under water, and the stern was sinking so quickly that when I began to pick this man up, whom I spoke of on the quarter-deck, the deck was still out of Avater. Before I got this ventilator off him — it did n't take very long, as Mr. Blandin assisted to move that to get him up — the water was over my knees, and just catch- ing this fellow's head, the stern was sinking that quickly. Two officers only went down with the " Maine," for the explosion occurring directly under and in the forward part of the ship left the officers' quarters and their stations on the quarter-deck almost intact. Lieutenant Friend W. Jenkins, unhurt by the first explosion, was rushing for- ward to his post of duty when the second eruption of steel and giant explosives occurred, and in it he met his 54 Blue Jackets of '98 death. Assistant Engineer D. R Merritt was sitting in the junior officers' quarters in the steerage with Naval Cadet D. F. Boyd when the infernal roar broke upon them. The steerage, being forward of the ward-room, or officers' mesS; was nearer the seat of the explosion and suffered more accordingly. Cadet Boyd, in his testi- mony, tells the story of Merritt's death: " Assistant Engineer D. E.. Merritt and I were sitting in the steerage when I heard a dull report, followed by the crash- ing of splinters and falling of the electric light fixtures over- head. The lights were extinguished at the first report. I ■was struck by a small splinter and dazed for a moment. I grasped Mr. Merritt by the arm, exclaiming : ' Out of this ! Up on deck ! ' Together we groped our way out of the steer- age, and along the bulkhead in the after torpedo room, where we met a cloud of steam and tremendous rush of water. The force of the water separated us, and as I was lifted off my feet I caught a steam-heater pipe, and reached for the steerage ladder. It was gone. I worked my way along the steam- pipe until I reached the port side of the ship. Water was rushing through the air-ports, and as I reached the side, I heard some one cry : ' Grod help me ! God help me ! ' I think it must have been Merritt. At that moment I found the two torpedoes that were triced up under the deck-beams, and, twin- ing my legs around them, I worked my way inboard. The water was then at a level of about one foot from the deck- beams. At that moment some burning cellulose flared up, and I was able to reach the hatch-coaming and work my way up on deck, I rushed on the poop, and there found Cap- tain Sigsbee, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, Lieutenants , Holman and Hood, and Naval Cadet Cluverius. The remain- ing boats were away, picking up these men in the water. Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright and I then went on the quarter-deck awning and on the middle superstructure to help out any wounded." About the death of Lieutenant Jenkins there has been some mystery, cleared up only in part by the testimony Blue Jackets of '98 55 at the inquiry. At the moment of the explosion he was sitting with three other officers in the ward-room, far from the actual seat of the explosion. His companions were saved, but of him, or of his body, nothing has been seen since. It has been made apparent, however, that in following the path of duty he met death. The coloured waiter of the officers' mess, who was in the pantry ad- joining the mess-room when the shock occurred, tells of the last seen of Lieutenant Jenkins in homely but graphic phrases : "I met Mr. Jenkins in the mess-room, and by that time the water was up to my waist, and the water was running aft. It was all dark in there, and he hollered to me, and he says : ' Which way 1 ' I don't know what he meant by that. I says : • I don't know which way.' He hollered again : ' Which way ? ' I says, 'I don't know, sir, which way.' And he hollered the last time ; he says : ' Which way 1 ' I says : ' I don't know, sir.' Then I was groping my way, and the water was up to my breast. Mr. Jenkins started forward, and then the whole compartment lit right up. That whole compartment where the torpedoes were lit right up, and I seen Mr. Jenkins then throw up both hands and fall, right by the steerage pantry. Then I groped my way aft, and got to the captain's ladder — the ladder coming out of the ward-room — just as you come I out of the ward-room to go up in the cabin. When I got i there the ladder was carried away, and somehow or other the manrope kept fast upon the deck, but the ladder got adrift from it down below in the water. By that time the water was right up even with my chin. Then I commenced to get scared, and in fooling around it happened that a rope touched my arm, and I commenced to climb overhand and got on deck." Immediately above the magazine which was exploded nearly three hundred men swung sleeping in their ham- mocks. More than two hundred and fifty of these were slain instantly or drowned by the rapid sinking of the ship. Some were blown to atoms as they slept, never 56 Blue Jackets of '98 recognising the abrupt transition from life to death. Some were so stunned that after regaining consciousness in the hospital at Key West they had no recollection of the disaster, and thought themselves still on board the good ship then deep in the foul ooze of Havana harbour. Those immediately above the roaring crater were oblit- erated. Captain Sigsbee relates that on the roof of the berth-deck there was the impression of two human bodies ground to powder against it by the force of the blast. The report of the court of inquiry is full of the narra- tives of those who escaped with their full faculties un- dimmed, but to most of the men the shock came so suddenly and out of such a peaceful environment, that the memory of a roar and the sense of finding themselves strugfrlincr in the water were all that remained. A fire- man, William Gartrell, told a story of escape that seems almost miraculous. He was, at the moment of the disaster, in the steam steering-room, two decks below the officer's mess-room. That is as if, taking the gun-deck of the ship as the first floor of a building, he was three stories under ground. To get as far up as the officers' mess-room, or the steerage, whence as we have seen officers and men escaped only with the greatest difficulty owing to the inrushing water, " he had to run forward about twenty feet, spring across to a ladder, climb up two flights of ladders, and pass through another doorway " — thus Captain Sigsbee describes his path to life and goes on to say of it that it " was a narrow and difficult route under the best of conditions." But Fireman Gartrell followed it to safety and thus tells the story of his flight. " I could see tlirough the door, sir. It was a kind of a blue flame, and it came all at once. The two of us jumped up, and I went on the port side up the engine-room ladder, and Frank Gardiner he went up the starboard side — at least, he did n't go up, because he hollered to me. He struck the door right there where the partition separates the two doors, and he must have struck his head. He hollered to me ; he says : ' Blue Jackets of '98 57 Jesus, Billy, I am gone.' I didn't stop then, because the water was up to my knees. I made a break as quick as I could up the ladder, and when I got up the ladder into the steerage-room the ladder was gone. Everything was dark. I couldn't see nothing; everything was pitch-dark, and I gave up, or I started to give up. There was a coloured fellow with me ; I did n't know his name until afterward. His name was Harris. We got hold of each other. I says, ' Let 's give up ; there is no hope.' I started in to say a prayer the best I knew how, and I heard a voice. It must have been an officer; it could n't have been a man's voice, because he says, ' There is hope, men.' I knew from that that he was an officer. After that I seen a little light. It looked like an awful distance from me, but I made for that light, and when I got there it seemed like I could see the heavens. I got jammed in the ladder. My head was right up against the deck. I seen the ladder, and I caught hold of Harris, and the two of us hugged each other. . . . The ladder was hung crossways on top. There was n't no ladder that we could walk up. The ladder was up above us. ... I don't know whether I got out first, or this coloured fellow, but when I did get out I tried to say a prayer. I looked where I was, and I saw the heavens and every- thing, and I tried to say a prayer or something, and I fainted away. I felt some one picking me up, and they thro wed me overboard." From the principal sleeping place of the crew on the berth-deck forward only two men escaped, for it was directly above the magazine that was exploded by the external shock — whatever that may have been. That any should have come alive from that spot is no whit short of miraculous, for the deck above and below them was rent as by a volcanic shock, great masses of steel were lifted high in air and turned jagged edges on every side to tear the flesh of men thrown against them. One of the men who came still living through that fiery furnace explained his escape with the remark : " I think I must be an armour-piercing projectile." The other, Charles Bergman, boatswain's mate, gave to the court of inquiry 58 Blue Jackets of '98 a somewhat incoherent but still interesting account of his experience. He was sleeping in his hammock, he said, when he heard a terrible crash. "Something fell, and then after that I got thrown some- where in a hot place. Wherever that was I don't know. I got burned on my legs and arms, and got my mouth full of ashes and one thing and another. Then the next tiling I was in the water — away under the water somewhere, with a lot of wreckage on top of me that was sinking me down. After I got clear of that I started to come up to the surface of the water again, and I got afoul of some other wreckage. I got my head jammed in, and I couldn't get loose, so I let myself go down. Then it carried me down farther. I suppose when it touched the bottom somewhere it sort of opened out a bit, and I got my head out and started for the surface of the water again. I hit a lot of other stuff with my head, and then I got my head above the water. I got picked up by a Spanish boat, one of these shore boats, I think." The testimony of officers and passengers on merchant ships lying in the harbour also throws some light on the appearance of the ship at the moment of the explosion. The captain of a British bark, lying from a quarter to a half a mile away, said that he was writing in his cabin at the moment, and the shock was so great that he thought his ship had come into collision. The transoms of his cabin doors were knocked out of place, and the concussion affected his head painfully. That was with the first shock. Eushing on deck, he arrived just in time to see the second explosion. " The d(5bris ascended," he said, " one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty feet up in the air. It seemed to go comparatively straight until it reached its highest point of ascent ; then it divided and passed off in a kind of rolls or clouds. Then I saw a series of lights flying from it again. Some of them were lights, — incandescent lights. . . . The colour of the smoke I should say was a very dark slate-colour. There were fifteen to twenty of those lights that looked like incan- Blue Jackets of '98 59 descent lights. The smoke did not seem to be black, as you would imagine from an explosion like that. It seemed to be more a slate-colour. Quantities of paper and small fragments fell over our ship, and for some time after." The American steamship " City of Washington " was lying at anchor about a quarter of a mile from the " Maine," and at the moment of the explosion several of her passengers were sitting on deck enjoying the tropical night. One of these, Mr. Sigmund Eothschild, delivered very important testimony at the inquiry. In the brief excerpt here printed, his insistence upon the resemblance of the sound of the first explosion to that of a shot is very noticeable : " I had brought my chair just about in this condition [indi- cating], and had not sat down, when I heard a shot, the noise of a shot. I looked around, and I saw the bow of the ' Maine' rise a little, go a little out of the water. It could n't have been more than a few seconds after that noise, that shot, that there came in the centre of the ship a terrible mass of fire and ex- plosion, and everything went over our heads, a black mass. We could not tell wliat it was. It was all black. Then we heard a noise of falling material on the place where we had been, right near the smoking-room. One of the -life-boats, which was hanging, had a piece go through it, and made a big hole in it. After we saw that mass go up, the whole boat ['Maine '] lifted out, I should judge, about two feet. As she lifted out, the bow went right ■ down. . . . We stood spell- bound, and cried to the captain [of the ' City of Washington ']. The captain gave orders to lower the boats, and two of the boats, which were partly lowered, were foimd broken tlirough with big holes. Some iron pieces had fallen through them. Naturally, that made a delay, and they had to run for the other boats, or else we would have been a few minutes sooner in the water. Then the stern stood out like this, in this direc- tion [indicating], and there was a cry from the people : ' Help ! ' and ' Lord God, help us ! ' and ' Help ! Help ! ' The noise of the cry from the mass of human voices in the boat ['Maine '] did not last but a minute or two. When the ship was going down, 6o Blue Jackets of '98 there was the cry of a mass of people, but that was a murmur. That was not so loud as the single voices which were in the water. That did not last but a minute, and by that time we saw somebody on the deck in the stern of the ship, and it took about a few minutes when the boats commenced to bring in the officers." When day dawned after that night so full of horror and of death, the Americans on shore and on the ships could see only a shapeless mass of twisted and blackened steel where twenty-four hours earlier had been one of the proudest of the United States battle-ships. A cloud of smoke hung over the wreck, for the cellulose with which the sides were packed, and the wood in such portions of the cabin as were still above water, were slowly burning. All that was recognisable as a part of a ship was the after military mast, which, with its fighting-top and the national flag floating at half-mast, protruded above the scene of disaster. Boats crowded the harbour. Sightseers were out in swarms, patrol boats from the Spanish ships guarded the wreck, and the surviving American sailors were out in craft of all kinds on the solemn duty of recovering the dead as they slowly came to the surface. During the day, the United States despatch boat " Fern," and the lighthouse tender " Mangrove," came into the harbour from Key West, bringing supplies and surgical aid. It is worth noting, in passing, that while Captain Sigsbee urged a suspension of judgment on the part of the people as to the cause of the explosion, he was swift to form his own conclusions. He asked that lighthouse tenders, rather than a man-of-war, be sent him, because he believed that the " Maine " had been deliberately blown up, and he did not wish the nation to risk losing another ship in the same way on the eve of a war that had now become inevitable. Events now proceeded rapidly toward the final submis- sion of the issues between the two peoples to the arbitra- ment of the sword. Investigations into the causes of the explosion of the " Maine " were set on foot by Spain and Blue Jackets of '98 61 the United States both. The Spaniards were promptest with their inquiry, beginning it within an hour after the disaster ; but as it proceeded it was apparent that it was undertaken less to find the real cause of the explosion than to clear the Spaniards of any complicity in it. In default of proof of incompetence or negligence on the part of the officers of the wrecked ship, the responsibility for the disaster rested with the Spaniards, for among all civil- ised people a ship in a foreign port is supposed to be enti- tled to police protection by the local authorities. The " Maine " lay at a buoy selected for her by the Havana har- bour master. The port was, technically at least, a friendly one. If the discipline and system aboard were such as to make it impossible that she had been destroyed by the acci- dental explosion of one of her own magazines, the responsi- bility for the disaster — which under such circumstances would be a crime — would necessarily rest with the Span- iards. This responsibility would be all the heavier for the fact that the city and port were in fact under military rule. For months no explosives of anything like the power necessary to set off the magazines of an armoured battle- ship had been in the possession of, or obtainable by, any private person in the city. Some years earlier, in the port of New York, an adventurous swimmer, to advertise a species of aquatic suit he had invented, swam out at night and affixed a dummy torpedo to the hull of a British man-of-war lying at anchor. Such an exploit might have been possible at Havana at other times, though the sus- picion with which the officers and men of the " Maine " regarded their surroundings and their hosts made it impos- sible at this moment. But the theory that the act was one of private malice only is shaken by the fact that mar- tial law strictly prohibited to any private citizen the pos- session of explosives. The feeling of resentment against the Spanish which naturally grew out of this calamity was not a little increased by the attitude and utterance of the people of 62 Blue Jackets of '98 Havana, including many of the high officers in the Spanish army. It is proper to say here that the Spanish navy officers, hving up to the traditions of courtesy which seem to characterise that branch of the armed service of every nation, did not offend in this regard, but, on the contrary, were punctilious in their avoidance of anything which might seem like gloating over the misfortune of the Americans, or criticism of the methods of discipline on the " Maine." But the very night of the wreck, while our men were still fightmg for Hfe in the engulfing waters, the cafds of Havana were crowded with Spanish army offi- cers drinking deep draughts of champagne to the downfall of the Yankees. When the cruiser " Vizcaya " reached Havana shortly afterwards, her captain called on Captain Sigsbee and showed something more than official and per- functory sorrow for the calamity which had befallen the American sailor, but the cry from the docks as the Spanish cruiser entered the harbour was, " Down with the Ameri- cans ! " and the sunken " Maine " was contrasted with the trim Spanish ship, as if the difference between the two nations was thereby typified. Calmly however, while the work of recovering and burying the dead was in progress the United States proceeded with the task of inquiring into the causes of the disaster. A court of inquiry composed of Captain (afterwards Admiral) William T. Sampson, Captain French E. Chadwick, Lieutenant Commander William P. Potter, and Lieutenant Commander Adolph Marix, judge-advo- cate, was appointed and convened at Havana in the cabin of the " Mangrove " on the 21st of February. Divers were then at work on the " Maine," and had been for some time gathering evidence for the court and striving to recover the bodies of the dead. In this work in and about the wreck the Americans were systematically hampered by the Spanish authorities, who at one time went so far as to attempt to prescribe to Captain Sigsbee the times and manner in which he should visit the wreck of his own Blue Jackets of '98 67, ship. This, and the persistence with which the Spaniards, by innuendo or direct charge, advanced the theory that the ship had been blown up through the fault of her own ofiScers, added to the tension between the representatives of the two countries. Into the details of the evidence submitted to the court of inquiry it will not be necessary to go. That portion of it other than the accounts of eye-witnesses to the tragedy, some of which we have quoted, was of a scientific and technical character intended to determine whether the ship had been blown up from without or by an internal explosion. It is obvious that had the latter been the case, the keel and bottom would have been bent out and down- ward. Upon the divers who examined the wreck deter- mination of this all-important problem rested, and in recognition of its importance several navy officers, though untaught in the art of diving, volunteered to don the sub- marine armour and go down into the mud and darkness to study the question for themselves. Permission was, how- ever, refused them, and rehance was placed upon the re- ports of the professional divers, some of whom were enlisted men in the navy. The manner in which evi- dence was deduced from their reports was interesting. Serving on the " Fern " at the time was a young navy offi- cer. Ensign W. V. N. Powelson. His training had been that of a scientific naval constructor, and his life had been given to the study of the structure of ships. With a set of detailed drawings of the " Maine " before him, he would have the divers measure pieces of the frame which were affected by the explosion. Comparison of these measure- ments with the drawings would show exactly the place in the ship at which the plate belonged, though when found it might have been blown many yards from its proper position. After painstaking work in the collation and comparison of evidence occupying one month, the court presented its report, which was in effect that the bottom of the ship had been forced up some 35 feet in a way that 64 Blue Jackets of '98 could only have been possible by the employment exter- nally of some powerful explosive. It declared that there were two explosions with an appreciable space of time between them and distinctly different in character. " The first explosion was more in the nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second was more open, pro- longed, and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial ex- plosion of one or more of the forward magazines of the " Maine.' " The court went on to declare that the condition of the bottom of the ship as disclosed by the divers " could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine at about frame 18 and somewhat on the port side of the ship." It further declared that " the loss of the ' Maine ' was not in any respect due to fault or neglect on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel," but that " the ' Maine ' was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines." The report of the Spanish board of inquiry ascribed an internal cause to the explosion, and inferentially accused the American officers of faulty discipline and incorrect methods. But this document, though published widely in the United States, did not shake the public conviction that the act was that of a Spaniard, though there was no inclination to charge the Spanish authorities with com- plicity in the execrable crime. Great as was the wrath and hot the hatred bred of the destruction of the " Maine," it was in no sense the cause of the war which speedily followed. It is not easy to say whether it hastened or delayed the inevitable conflict. The slow deliberation of the court of inquiry, and the fact that all felt that a declaration of war before the findings of that court were complete would be something in the nature of " snap judgment," deferred for a month acts which probably would have been more hastily taken otherwise. Public sentiment had become pretty gen- Blue Jackets of '98 65 erally fixed in the opinion that the inhuman conditions prevailing in Cuba could only be remedied by the inter- vention of the United States, and political conditions in Spain were such that such intervention would have led infalhbly to war. There were, it is true, people and pub- licists in the United States who were so strongly of the opinion that the " Maine " and the " Maine " alone brought on hostilities that they even went the length of accusing the Cuban patriots of committing the crime in order to inflame Americans against Spain. This unjust and in- credible suspicion, however, was held only among those known as " the peace at any price men," and it was scarcely the most discreditable opinion enunciated by them during the general public discussion that preceded the war. It is probable that history in coming ages will concede what the public men who urged on the war claimed, that it was a struggle entered upon for the most unselfish pur- poses ; that it was a war for humanity, a war undertaken to free a neighbouring people from a rule which was offen- sive to every civilised instinct ; a war from which could come no profit, and which would necessarily be costly, both in blood and treasure. The unexpected and possibly un- desirable fruits of the victory which the diplomats and politicians held for the nation at the end of hostilities may obscure but do not disprove the entire unselfishness with which the nation entered upon the struggle. It was not a war of revenge, any more than it was intended to be a war of conquest. Though the newspapers harped continually upon the fate of the " Maine," and the impression was created that the battle signal in the American navy was, " Eemem- ber the ' Maine,' " the thought of revenge was far distant from the minds of American commanders. No United States vessel went into action flying that signal. It was hoisted but once, without authority, by an enlisted man of the coast signal service, and he was promptly reprimanded for it. As Captain Sigsbee well said, " I should like to 5 66 Blue Jackets of '98 make the point . . . that this great and free country, with its education, good intention, and universal moral influ- ence, may go to war to punish but not to revenge. Im- properly applied, the motto, 'Eemeniber the "Maine,"' savours too much of revenge, too much of evil for evil." CHAPTER IV At the National Capital — The Course of the Cuban Question in Congress — Its Treatment by President Cleveland — It Confronts President McKinley — The Mission of General Stewart L. Woodford — Fair Promises of the Spanish Ministry — The Failure of Autonomy — The De Lome Letter and its Result — Preparations for War — Congress Votes a $50,000,000 Extraordinary Credit for Purposes of National De- fence — The Report of the " Maine " Court of Inquiry. WHILE the court of inquiry was holding its sessions at Havana and Key West, the tide of events at Washington was setting slowly but irresistibly toward war. In both Houses of Congress, even before the destruc- tion of the battle-ship, the war party was strong. The feeling that upon the nation rested a solemn duty to in- terfere in behalf of suffering humanity at its very doors was too forceful for party ties, and Eepublicans vied with Democrats in urging upon the administration a vigorous and immediate policy of intervention. The student of contemporaneous history as set forth in the newspapers of the day will discern a seeming party division ; but it was more apparent than real. The Executive, being charged with the heavy responsibility of determining upon war or peace, naturally and properly proceeded with the utmost deliberation, as though desirous of exhausting the last peaceful remedy before accepting the final arbitra- ment of the sword. As the President was a Eepublican, the great majority of the Senators and Piepresentatives of that party were in loyalty bound to uphold his policy and await his pleasure. It appeared then, that the Democrats were urging on the war and the EepubHcans holding back ; 68 Blue Jackets of '98 but when the President gave the signal, both parties were as one in their response. It was a war in which political differences were forgotten and sectional antagonisms obliterated. The date of the beginning of the active agitation which finally resulted in war may be set at December, 1896, when President Cleveland in his last message to Congress reviewed at some length the situation in Cuba growing out of the insurrection, recapitulated the various proposi- sions that had been made for securing to the Cubans relief from their intolerable ills, and referred, though without approval, to the demand for armed intervention. He went on to inform Congress that the Executive had suggested to Spain a plan for home rule in Cuba, and had offered to guarantee its execution if accepted This guar- antee was regarded as essential, since the perfidy of Spain in failing to fulfil the reforms by the promise of which it had quelled the last prior revolution made it unlikely that the insurgents would again trust to Spanish good faith. Though the message was addressed to Congress, one phrase in it was evidently intended as a hint to Spain. " It cannot be reasonably assumed," said the President, " that the hitherto expectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely maintained. ... By the course of events we may be driven into such an unusual and unprecedented condition as will fix a limit to our patient waiting for Spain to win the contest either alone, and in her own way, or by our friendly co-operation." And, continuing, he said that a situation might be presented "in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spam will be super- seded by higher obligations which we can hardly hesitate to recognise and discharge." Spain was not deaf to the hint of the President, but the threat aroused her antagonism and increased her stub- bornness rather than stimulating her government to seek an honourable and practicable way out of the hopeless sit- uation in which the nation was placed. The Prime Miu- Blue Jackets of '98 69 ister, Canovas, responded at once with an interview which sounded the note of defiance. " No concession of any kind," said he, " will be made until the insurrection in Cuba is put under control. Spain is strong enough to carry on the campaign in Cuba and the Philippine Islands until peace is restored, no matter how long the struggle may last." And so the Cleveland administration went out of office leaving the Cuban trouble as a legacy to its successor. Meanwhile the agitation of the question grew in volume throughout the nation. A great section of the American press, comprising the newspapers of the largest circulation, if not of the greatest influence, made the cause of the Cubans its own. Havana was filled with American cor- respondents who telegraphed to their papers graphic descriptions of the cruelty of the Spanish soldiery and the wanton destruction of property to the permanent im- poverishment of the island. Some of these correspondents joined the insurgent forces and made the American people familiar with the character of such patriot leaders as Gomez, Garcia, and Maceo. Others fell foul of Spanish authority in Havana, and were cast into Morro castle, whence they were released only after long diplomatic negotiations. No campaign for the Presidency was ever fought by American newspapers with more persistence than the fight for recognition of the Cuban repubUc. In official circles at Washington the incoming of a new administration gave brief pause to discussion of Cuba. Among the practical politicians, the distribution of post- offices and consulships then took first place. But the administration undertook immediately the work of secur- ing the release of all Americans in Cuban jails, and pressed it with such zeal that by the end of April all were free. The Senate, on the 20th of May, passed a joint resolution recognising the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents, a measure which had it been given effect would have done away with the friction resulting from filibustering expedi- JO Blue Jackets of '98 \ tions. It was, however, left to die in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. A day or two later, however, the Cuban question appeared again in Congress, being brought up by a special message from the White House. The President said that from special reports obtained from the American consuls in different parts of the island, it was learned that many American citizens were suffering as the result of the reconcentration policy of the Spanish military authorities. He asked that an appropriation of $50,000 be made for their relief, which was accordingly done. The discovery that, in order to check the rising ambition for liberty in Cuba, Spain was starving not only her own people, but our citizens as well, did not tend to allay the growing abhorrence of Spanish methods in the United States. At this juncture, General Stewart L. Woodford was ap- pointed United States minister to Spain, and given in- structions to pursue a most diplomatic and amicable course, keeping ever in view the end of restoring peace and settled conditions in Cuba, but exhausting every resource of diplomacy in the endeavour to accomplish it by peaceful methods. For a time it seemed that fate smiled on the purpose of the mission. Before General Woodford reached his post, an assassin struck down the Prime Minister, Senor Canovas, a man of the Bismarckian type, a man of blood and iron. To him succeeded Sagasta, and the liberal party, which was believed to be more ready to pursue a conciliatory policy toward the Cubans, came into office. The change in the attitude of the Spanish government was immediate. General Woodford presented the demands ^ of the United States to the new ministry, receiving instead ll of the cold rebuff with which Canovas had met all repre- sentations from this government, an assurance that Spain would consider and act upon them. The essential part of Mmister Woodford's instructions were to demand the re- call of General Weyler and the abandonment of the policy of reconcentration. He was also directed to inform the Blue Jackets of '98 71 Spanish government that the war should have been ended long before, and to ask that a date be set prior to Decem- ber, 1897, when it would be stopped. The representations of the United States envoy were met with diplomacy more characteristic of Spain than the direct, if brusque and haughty, methods of Canovas. The policy of procrastina- tion and evasion was at once brought into play. Weyler was indeed recalled, returning to his country, there to become a popular hero and a menace to the ministry that recalled him, but, despite the most plausible promises, the system of reconcentration was not abandoned, and the work of starving Cuba into subjection continued. To the demand that a date be set for the close of the war, Spain replied that such action would be impossible ; and, as a return concession for the recall of Weyler, time was asked to put into operation in the island a new system of autonomy. It is enough to say of this project that it failed wholly of fruition. The Cubans had gone too far on the path to complete freedom to be coaxed back into allegiance to Spain by any device of home rule, however alluring, and the system of autonomous government for the island proffered by the Sagasta ministry was on its face hollow and unsatisfactory. In the early days of the war, much was made by the peace party in the United States of the apparent concessions wrung from Spain by Minister Woodford, and the assertion was generally made that a continuance of diplomatic negotiations would have secured for Cuba all that was won by the barbaric and expensive method of war ; but the facts cannot be said to bear out the argument. The Woodford mission was in all essentials a failure. The one thing accomplished was the recall of General Weyler, and his successor. General Blanco, varied little from his methods, though he succeeded in inspiring less antagonism in pursuing them. The hand of iron still held the Cubans in a grip no less remorseless because the glove of velvet had been donned. In Congress and by the people at large the slow progress 72 Blue Jackets of '98 of General Woodford's diplomacy was regarded with general impatience. Day after day the news from Cuba was of women and children slowly starving to death under the merciless operation of the reconcentration system. A plague, like that which appears in India at the time of famines, broke out among the unhappy islanders, and the scenes described by travellers and correspondents shocked the sense of humanity of our whole people. Our navy was kept busy at heavy expense in defeating the efforts of Americans to land arms and munitions of war for the use of the insurgents, and the courts sentenced to imprison- ment two ship captains found guilty of commanding such expeditions. This use of the new navy bitterly offended the nation, which saw the ships built to carry to all lands the emblem of liberty and popular government made the effective aids to the maintenance of as corrupt and bar- baric a despotism as the world has ever seen, while the sentence to the penitentiary of men convicted of aiding a neighbouring people in a struggle for hberty, however much in accord with the strict letter of the law it may have been, caused a cry of protest, indignation, and reproach to arise from every part of the republic. And so when Congress met in December ready to receive the President's message, the whole country looked with chief interest for that part of it which should treat of the Cuban question and the attitude of the new administration toward the patriots who were trying to do for Cuba what Washington and his men did for the colonies of North America. There was universal disappointment when it appeared that the whole sum and substance of the advice of the Chief Executive was, " Wait." The message was one of information rather than of suggestion. The intolerable situation in Cuba was described in detail, and with caustic comments upon the Weyler administration. But there was no suggestion of immediate action by the United States, but rather a plea for delay. The autonomy plan which few, either in the United States or Cuba, had taken I'RKSIDKX r McRlNM.F.V i Blue Jackets of '98 "j-^^ seriously, seemed to have impressed Mr. McKinley favour- ably, and he apparently expected a great change for the better under General Blanco. Only in so far as it set forth unmistakably the President's conviction that the United States possessed the right to intervene in Cuba when the proper time should arrive, did the message satisfy the American people. But as it did not declare that time ar- rived, it was disappointing on this side of the water, while in Spain the very enunciation of the right of intervention at any time added to the hostility felt for the United States. The President himself was speedily undeceived as to the condition of the people of Cuba, for on Christmas Eve, he issued an appeal to the country for contributions in aid of the starving Cubans, — unhappy reconcentrados who were starving as fast under the " humane " Blanco as under the cruel Weyler. The first month of the new year saw little official action in any branch of the United States government bearing upon the fast growing quarrel with Spain. Between the people of both countries the antagonism was fast becoming more bitter under the influences of the causes which I have detailed in an earlier chapter, but the President was still fighting for delay and the House of Eepresentatives, under the masterful domination of the speaker, Mr. Thomas B. Eeed, systematically held without action all resolutions sent thither by the more radical Senate. To- ward the end of January, the executive took the significant step of sending to Key West and the Dry Tortugas, within six hours steaming of Havana, the ships of the North Atlantic squadron, — so plain a menace that many high authorities have declared it equivalent to a declaration of war. February had hardly come in when an event occurred that ruffled the calm that seemed to be settling over of- ficial circles at Washington, and gave the diplomats of the world something to talk about. The very day when Presi- dent McKinley was penning his appeal to the American 74 Blue Jackets of '98 people for aid for the suffering Cubans, the Spanish min- ister at Washington, Senor Dupuy De Lome, was writing a letter to a Spanish journalist in which he described the President of the United States as a " low politician who wishes to leave a door open for himself, and to stand well with the jingoes of his party." The President was further accused of catering to " the rabble." This letter was stolen by an emissary of the Cuban Junta in New York, and given to the American press. Now the people of these United States are not always observant of the proprieties in speaking of their Presidents, and it is entirely probable that in more than one news- paper which printed with condemnatory headlines the De Lome letter, there may have been editorial comments on the President quite as disrespectful as those which the Spanish envoy permitted himself. Just about that time a great section of the American press was berating Mr. McKinley very vigorously for what seemed to be his lethargy in taking up the Cuban question. He was accused of being dominated by the financial interest of the country, and of being more alive to the sound of the Wall Street stock ticker than to the bitter cry of starving Cuba. But while Americans said these things of their President, and read them in their own journals with entire complacency, they experienced quite another sensation when they discovered a minister from Spain putting forth so very unfavourable an estimate of the qualities of the nation's chief magis- trate. The outcry against De Lome was immediate and noisy, and that hapless individual, quick to recognise the extent of his offence, forestalled the penalty which he knew would be inflicted, by cabling his resignation to Madrid before Minister Woodford could deliver the Presi- dent's request for his recall. This was regarded by the Spaniards as a diplomatic triumph on his part, and as Spain refused to apologise for his letter on the ground that it was purely a private communication, the affair ended without any formal reparation having been made for the Blue Jackets of '98 75 affront. De Lome was neither recalled, ordered out of the country by our government, nor was apology made for his letter. On February 15th, the day of the explosion of the " Maine," the appointment of Seuor Luis Polo y Bernabe as minister to succeed De Lome was announced by the Spanish ministry. Naturally this incident did not tend to allay the grow- ing aversion with which the American people regarded the Spaniards, and the agitation for swift action in Cuba's behalf was greatly aided by some frank and illuminative passages in this same letter which showed that the promises of autonomy so ghbly made to Minister Wood- ford were meant only to deceive and to gain time. It was remembered too that the employment of the best ships of the United States navy to check filibustering, that so irritated our people, had been conducted practically under the directions of this envoy who was thus convicted of insulting and deceiving our government. But the De Lome incident was swept out of the mind of the people while it was still fresh in their memory by news of the awful and murderous destruction of the " Maine." Strangely enough the assassination of this noble ship produced a calm rather than a storm in the National Legis- lature. A distinguished United States Senator, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, who was himself foremost in the fight for Free Cuba, has well \vi-itten : " Scarcely a word was said in either House or Senate, and for forty days the American people and the American Congress waited in silence for the verdict of the board of naval officers ■who had been appointed to report on the destruction of the 'Maine.' To those who understood the American people, this grim silence, this stern self-control, were more threatening than any words of public sorrow or anger could possibly have been." This reticence of Congress, this unwillingness to appear to prejudge in any way the report of the court of inquiry justifies the assertion that the disaster to the " Maine " de- 76 Blue Jackets of '98 layed rather than hastened war. One single instance gives striking illustration of the care which was taken to avoid anythmg which might seem like acting under the influence of the natural wrath and indignation which the destruction of the war-ship aroused. The very day before news of the disaster arrived, Congress had called for information as to the state of affairs in Cuba, having particular reference to the condition of the reconcentrados and other peaceful victims of a cruel, cruel war. The President had this information at hand, it having been prepared by the American consuls in Cuba in response to instructions from the state department. It told a sad story of suffering, spoliation, and starvation, but the President withheld it from Congress until the first hot fire of wrath over the destruction of the " Maine " had been given time to cool. In the midst of this silence on the immediate matter of the disaster, however. Congress took definite action in preparation for the war which all but the most short- sighted could see now was sure to come. On the 9th of March both Houses, without a dissenting vote, appropri- ated as an emergency fund to be placed at the disposal of the President, S50,000,000. Thus provided with needed funds, the executive de- partments began the work of preparing for war. It was evident from the first that the brunt of the conflict would fall upon the United States navy. For Spain to invade the United States with any considerable army was obvi- ously impossible, and equally so was any invasion of the Iberian peninsula by the American forces. Whatever land fighting there was to be, would occur in Cuba and Porto Rico, and it was not to be expected that any very great army would be necessary for the establishment of American supremacy in those islands. Indeed the com- manding general of the army estimated that 90,000 men would suffice. But the vast coast line of the United States, dotted with rich and populous cities, offered a rich i Blue Jackets of '98 77 and tempting field for Spanish naval operations, and it was of prime importance that the navy should be suffi- ciently reinforced to be equal to any emergency that mio-ht arise. Accordingly, experienced officers were sent abroad to purchase such war-ships as might be found in the market and to secure additional supplies of munitions of war. It was necessary that this work should be done with the utmost expedition, for immediately upon the formal declaration of war it would become the duty of all neutral nations to prevent by all methods in their power the sale of war material to either of the beUigerents. There is a notable lesson for the future in the very slender success which our representatives abroad had in their efforts to purchase ships. They had practically un- hmited means and more than a month in which to con- duct negotiations, yet they secured only one ship which was a really considerable addition to our navy. This was the cruiser " Amazonas," built in England for Brazil, a pro- tected cruiser, with a disj^lacement of 3,600 tons and a speed of twenty knots. In her armament this wms a notable vessel, for she mounted Armstrong guns which possess a greater muzzle velocity and a greater striking energy than ours of the same class, — the six-inch Arm- strong being, in fact, equal in efficiency to our eight-inch rifles. The ship was also provided with smokeless powder, something that the American navy was without and the lack of which seriously affected the efficiency of our forces by land and sea. The " Amazonas " on being put into commis- sion under the Stars and Stripes was renamed the " New Orleans." With her was bought a sister ship, the " Abrou- ail," but this vessel, which was renamed the " Albany," was caught unfinished by the declaration of war, and pinned up in a British ship-yard during the continuance of the conflict. A very good torpedo boat destroyer — a class of vessel in which the United States navy is exceedingly deficient — was trapped in the same way. We secured, however, a 78 Blue Jackets of ^98 little sLxty-foot torpedo boat, and an 1,800 ton gun-boat built in England for Portugal, which we renamed the " Topeka." From Brazil was also purchased the " Nicthe- roy," an American merchant ship, bought by the Brazilians years ago and remodelled for naval purposes. She was hardly a valuable addition to the American navy. This virtual failure to materially strengthen the navy by purchase abroad, though money was plenty, time ample, and all the rest of the world at peace with no immediate need for men-of-war, should not be forgotten by the people of the United States. Had our quarrel been with a well-equipped nation, and one disinclined to delay the beginning of hostilities until we had ransacked the ship-yards of Europe, even this slender measure of re-enforcement would have been lacking. At home the purchase of vessels proceeded with more satisfactory results. In the great passenger ships of the American line the navy department had ready to its hand four swift liners easily convertible into cruisers. This luie enjoys from the United States government a large and most remunerative contract for the carriage of the trans-Atlantic mails, in consideration of which its ships are to be held subject to the government's right of charter in time of war. Two of the vessels, the " St. Paul " and " St. Louis " were built in American ship- yards and specially designed for conversion into cruisers. All four vessels were chartered, at an average cost of more than $2,000 a day apiece, and hurriedly remodelled. The British-built ships were renamed " Yale " and " Harvard," and were speedily presented with colours and machine- guns by the delighted students of those colleges. The best of the coast-wise steamships of other lines were also bought by the government and converted into cruisers, transports, or hospital ships, while a great number of slim and speedy yachts were bought for torpedo boats. In all, more than 50 vessels were thus purchased, ranging from the great 16,000 ton Atlantic liners down to trim and Blue Jackets of '98 79 pigmy yachts hardly big enough to carry a one-pouuder rapid-fire gun. While the navy department was thus busy, the war department was not idle. The sites for camps had to be examined with reference to their hygienic condition, their propinquity to strategic points, and their railroad facilities. Contracts with railroads for the carriage of troops and munitions of war were to be prepared, and preliminary arrangements with the great purveyors of food products to be made for army rations. While Congress seemed to be hesitating, and the people were getting impatient with the prolonged delays of diplomacy in the face of certain war, the days seemed to those charged with the duty of preparation to fly all too fast. That the nation was not pre- pared was matter of current notoriety. In the United States the government is too constantly under the search-light of the press for the nation ever to be deceived, as were the French in 1870 with the famous report that the army was ready " to the last button on the last gaiter." We knew we were short of ammunition, of artillery and rifles, and of men, but in spirit the people were ready. For the military capacity of Spain there was a general contempt, which the subsequent events showed to be not unjustified. Towards the end of March the war party in Congress began to show renewed activity. On the 17th of that month the speech of Senator Proctor, recounting what he had seen in Cuba, was made in the Senate, and in both Houses of Congress at about the same time the members of a commission sent to the devastated island by the proprietor of the " New York Journal," described the scenes of starvation and horror there. Senator Proctor's speech was particularly effective, as he had been at an earlier period Secretary of War, and had not prior to the time of his address been prominently identified with the pro- 1 Cuban party. His impassioned appeal for action made the pressure of Congress on the President more forceful 8o Blue Jackets of '98 than ever. On the 28th, the report of the " Maine " Court of Inquiry came in, accompanied by a message from the President still pleading for delay. A day earlier he had submitted to Spain a proposition by the terms of which the United States would undertake to conduct negotia- tions with the insurgents for peace, and a reconciliation with the mother country, Spain meanwhile declaring an armistice to continue until October 1st. It was also requested that the reconcentrados be permitted to return to their farms, while the United States would look after their immediate wants. The proposition met with cold rejection from Spain, — most happily ; for it is apparent now that, had the President succeeded in that or any of his well meant but unwise efforts to avert war, the suffer- ings of the Cubans would have been indefinitely prolonged and the war only deferred, not avoided. But the " Maine " report put an end to Congressional patience. A majority of the Senate had been for months openly at odds with the President on account of his dilatory policy, but with- out the concurrence of the House could not resort to compulsion. The parliamentary usage in the House is such that the speaker can absolutely dictate what business shall be done, and almost what matters shaU be spoken of. Speaker Keed was avowedly opposed to any action on the Cuban question. Even to the day of the declara- tion of war, he was at least a passive opponent of the pro-Cuban party, while in the earlier days of the discus- sion his power was sufficient to block all that the Senate wished done. Party discipline for a lung time kept even those Eepublicans who believed m the justice of the Cuban cause docile under the speaker's masterful domination, but after the report on the " Maine " there were threats of a revolt which he could not ignore. The country had forced Congress into line, and the representatives saw clearly that they must compel the speaker to cease ob- struction, or Eepublican candidates before the people at the next election would encounter public disapproval and Blue Jackets of 98 81 defeat. Speaker Keed saw that the moment for his capit- ulation had come, and the President recognised that with- out the power of the speaker to defend him he would be at the mercy of a Congress which had long been hungry for more drastic measures. Accordingly he prepared a messao-e in which he virtually turned the determination of the whole policy of the government toward Spain over to Congress. But though news of the immmence of this message was conveyed to the capital, the document itself was held until the American consuls could be with- drawn from Cuba, lest its publication should provoke the Spaniards there to riot and perhaps to murder. It was the 11th of April when the message finally reached Congress. Pending its transmission, the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, the Kussian charge d' affairs, and the Austrian minister waited upon the President and presented him a joint note appealing " to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the Presi- dent and the American people in their existing differences with Spain," and expressing a hope that further negotia- tions will lead to an agreement, which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for ]the re-estabhshment of order in Cuba." There was some criticism among public men of the action of the President in receiving the diplomats, as it seemed to give an inferential acquiescence to the theory that our national quarrel was fit subject for the interference of European governments. But the President's reply, prepared care- fully in advance, was so worded as to avoid this construc- tion, making it clear that the United States regarded the communication as one in the interests of humanity only, and expressing confidence that " equal appreciation would (will) be .shown for its own earnest and unselfish en- deavours to fulfil a duty to humanity by ending a sit- uation, the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable." At noon on the 11th of April, the long expected mes- 6 82 Blue Jackets of 98 sage on the condition of affairs in Cuba was sent to Consrress. The galleries in both chambers were crowded and every Eepresentative and Senator who was able to be out was in his seat. From Maine to Alaska, the nation was on the alert for what was expected to be a historic document, the iirst formal step toward the entrance of the United States upon its first war with a nation of con- tinental Europe, — a war that would be epoch-making in all history for the lofty purposes for which it had been undertaken. The message was long, with an infinity of detail and without effort at oratorical style. After rehearsing the history of Spanish rule in Cuba, and describing the con- ditions which the United States had at last determined to correct, the President went on to enumerate the reasons which justified the intervention of the United States. These were fourfold: First. Humanity, or the duty of checking the wanton sacrifice of human life in Cuba. Second. The obligation of the United States to protect the lives and interests of its citizens resident in Cuba, or the property on that island owned by citizens and residents of the United States. Third. The necessity of putting an end to the damage to American commerce caused by the existing state of disorder and war. Fourth. The wisdom of terminating a situation which was a constant menace to our national peace, and which involved the nation in heavy expense in its effort to preserve the laws of neutrality. In the presence of these considerations, therefore, the President declared that the time for intervention had at last come. He declined to recommend the recognition of the Cubans as belligerents, and made an elaborate ar- gument against the recognition of the Cuban EepubHc, but asked of Congress authority to take such steps as seemed to him wisest to the end of restoring a stable Blue Jackets of '98 83 government in Cuba, and insuring peace and protection to its people and to our own citizens there resident. And he asked that he be empowered to employ the army and navy of the United States in giving effect to his plan. The well-disciplined administration majority in the House passed within twenty-four hours, and almost without debate, the resolution which the President had asked ; but in the Senate there was more delay. There the President's unwillingness to accord recognition to the Cuban Eepublic caused much dissatisfaction and an acrimonious debate, at the end of which a resolution was adopted which, besides conferring upon the executive the authority re- quested, declared the Island of Cuba free, recognised the Eepublic, and demanded the withdrawal of Spain's troops and the relinquishment of Spanish authority. The House then passed this resolution, with the proviso for the recog- nition of the Eepublic stricken out. That necessitated sending the resolution to a conference committee, whence it emerged in the following form, and was adopted on the 19th of April by both Houses : " Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain rehnquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect. " Whereas, The abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilisation, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle-ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbour of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited ; therefore be it resolved, 84 Blue Jackets of '98 " First — That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent. " Second — That it is the duty of the United States to de- mand, and the government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. " Third — That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the act- ual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these re- solutions into effect. " Fourth — That the United States hereby disclaims any dis- position or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people." The Cuban question was thus rapidly passing into the Spanish war. At home and abroad recognition of this fact was almost universal. Friends of peace and devotees of the stock market continued despairingly their efforts to avert the conflict, but it was apparent to the most san- guine that all hope of a peaceful adjustment was ended. Political conditions in both Spain and the United States forced the unwilling executives into war. The activity of the Democrats in this country in urging on the war, and the evident determination of the people that humane con- ditions should be restored in Cuba, even though by force of arms, caused some of the strongest influences about the President to be exerted in favour of immediate hostilities. In Spain the ministry saw that to yield to the demands of the United States would be to invite overthrow, even if it did not give supporters of Don Carlos, a pretender to the throne, a chance to embark upon a successful revolution. The signature by the President of the resolutions the day following their passage put an end to all doubt, and in- Blue Jackets of '98 85 stantly upon this action an ultimatum was sent to Minis- ter Woodford at Madrid for presentation to the Spanish government. In this document the substance of the con- gressional resolutions was restated, and the demand made that Spain at once relinquish its authority in Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces thence. Three days were given for an answer to this demand, and a copy of the document was given to the Spanish minister at Washington. To the ultimatum of the United States, no answer was ever returned other than the very insufficient ones offered by the guns of Montojo and Cervera at Manila and San- tiago. One of those diplomatic " triumphs " so dear to the hearts of the Spaniards was accomplished by the ministry at Madrid. Swift upon the passage of the resolutions by Congress, the watchful Spanish minister at Washington cabled the news to his government. Before Minister Woodford had an opportunity to present the ultimatum cabled him from Washington, he received from Pio GuUon, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, his passports, with a note informing him that diplomatic relations be- tween the two nations must be considered at an end, be- cause Congress had passed a resolution which " denies the legitimate sovereignty of Spain and threatens immediate armed intervention in Cuba, — which is equivalent to a declaration of war." This was on the 21st of April. The day before at Washington Minister Polo had been notified by a messenger from the State Department of the charac- ter of the resolutions passed by Congress, and of the nature of the instructions sent to Minister Woodford. He at once responded by a demand for his passports, saying that " the resolution is of such a character that my per- manence in Washington becomes impossible." That very night he took a train for Canada, while Minister Woodford, no less prompt in abandoning a hostile coun- try, took train from Madrid to the French frontier. The Spaniards, like all Latin peoples, are more fond of 86 Blue Jackets of '98 the picturesque and romantic than we, and attach vastly more importance to the trivialities of etiquette than do any Anglo-Saxon people. To them the fact that Minis- ter Woodford had never been able to present the ultima- tum of the United States was a matter of prime impor- tance. Taken in connection with the Spanish minister's voluntary departure from the United States, while the American minister was ordered out of Madrid, it took al- most the proportions of a great victory, and when to these two incidents was added the further diplomatic triumph won by Dupuy De Lome in resigning before the Presi- dent of the United States could ask for his recall, the sum was as inspiring as a successful war. The contrast between the Spanish and the American character is strikingly shown by the difference in the treatment of the departing minis- ters. Senor Polo left Washington unattended, except by a crowd of newspaper reporters. General Woodford was escorted to the railway station at Madrid by the mayor of the city, who treated him with the gravest courtesy .until the train started, then turned and led the assem- bled crowd in a cheer for Spain. But Minister Polo reached the Canadian frontier without insult or assault, while the train of the American envoy was stoned at Valladolid. So ended the political and diplomatic preliminaries to the war. It is true that the formal declaration of war by the United States Congress was not made until the 25th of April, but the 19th may be taken as the date of the ac- tual beginning of hostilities. It was so regarded by Spain, for it was tlie act of that day that impelled the Spanish ministry to send Minister Woodford his passports and to withdraw Minister Polo from Washington. Indeed the United States navy committed the first overt act of war without awaiting the formal declaration by Congress, for four days prior to the declaration of war the blockade of Cuba was begun, and the first capture on the high seas effected. Blue Jackets of '98 87 Before closing the account of the political events lead- ing up to the war, some account of the manner in which the statesmen of Spain met the fateful issue is necessary. Looking back upon the ease with which the United States won the victory in the conliict, and remembering that even before the issue was joined cool observers in either country must have been able to discern the great disparity of force between the two, one thinks that there must have been great trepidation among responsible leaders in Spain as to the outcome of the conflict. It is just to say, however, that if any doubt existed among the ministry or the lead- ers of the Opposition of the perfect ability of Spain to meet and honourably resist her giant adversary it was man- fully suppressed. The Spaniards bore themselves as a brave, if not a prudent people. Madrid met the news of the outbreak of hostilities with enthusiasm. The Queen Eegent, accompanied by the boy King, Alfonzo XIII, being then but fourteen years old, went to the Senate chamber, cheered as they passed along the streets of Old Madrid by an enthusiastic throng. The boy wore full military uni- form, the regalia of the Cadets with the insignia of the Golden Fleece. As they entered the great hall, the as- sembled multitude broke into frantic cheering. Probably no man there was ignorant, if he but stopped to think, of the immense superiority of the antagonist that Spain was about to meet, but there was no sign of trepidation. Na- tions are always self-confident, — happily so, else the best fights that ever have been fought for human liberty would have been left untried. Nor is any nation often doubtful of the entire justice of the cause it defends, nor harassed by any doubt that the divine favour is especially bestowed upon it. So the Queen Eegent, standing at the threshold of a war destined to deprive her country of its most cher- ished colonial possessions, announced to the Cortes the " in- domitable purpose which inspires my government to defend our rights," and professed confidence that the support of Heaven would be given to so just a cause. Three days 88 Blue Jackets of 98 later war was an accomplished fact, and with a final appeal to the Great Powers of Europe for sympathy and aid in this struggle against aggressive democracy, Spain entered upon a confiict from which she was destined to retreat crippled financially, bleeding from a score of deadly wounds, and stripped of her most precious colonial possessions in two hemispheres, — possessions won for her by the two great explorers who, though neither of them was a Spaniard, under the patronage of Spain's greatest monarchs, Ferdi- nand and Isabella, and the Emperor Charles V, made the name of Spain glorious, — the lands won by Christopher Columbus in the Atlantic and Ferdinand Magellan in the Pacific. CHAPTEK V The Navies of Spain and the United States — The Gloomy Estimates of the Experts — Ship Hunting in Europe — Why a Navy cannot be Extemporised — Yachts and Auxiliary Vessels — The Blockade of Cuba — Lieutenant Rowan's Expedition — The First Capture — Hot Work at Matanzas — The Attack on Cardenas — Death of Bagley — The Fight at Cienfuegos. AMONG the people of the United States the navy- has always been held in high favour. Perhaps this sentiment had its origin in the War of 1812, when the frigates commanded by Hull, Bainbridge, and Porter won stirring victories on the sea, and in some degree obliterated the memory of the shameful disasters to the American arms on shore. Or perhaps the ancient aver- sion of the fathers of the repubhc to a standing army has concentrated upon the navy all the popular affection that in other nations is divided between the two branches of the armed service. At any rate the American people have always shown to the navy a favour denied to the army, and if they have not been as liberal in their appro- priations to its support as navy officers might wish, they were not, in the decade preceding the Spanish-American war, at any rate niggardly. For this reason, when the war with Spain was fairly upon us, the naval prepara- tions of the United States may be said to have been adequate. Some slight outhne and comparison of the respective strength on the water of the combatants will be useful here, thoucch to so into detail would be of little service to the civilian reader. So many factors go to make up the sum of a warship's efficiency that a comparison perfectly 90 Blue Jackets of '98 lucid to a naval expert is only confusing to the lands- man. The number of guns, the weight of the broadside, the proportion of rapid-firing rifles, the torpe.do equip- ment, the weight of armour or other protection, the speed of the ship, the character of the powder, and a host of other considerations combine in a technical estimate of a warship's power. Such an estimate may well be omitted here. The sea power of Spain at the breaking out of the war may be broadly indicated by the following facts : In battle-ships Spain was decidedly ill-equipped, but two vessels of her navy coming in this class. One was of antiquated type, the other, the " Pelayo," was a modern steel battle-ship of 9900 tons, with a strong armament. In first-class cruisers Spain was strong. Of these she had seven, ranging in size from the " Emperador Carlos V " of 9235 tons to the " Cristobal Colon " of 6840 tons. The 11-inch Hontoria rifles, which formed the main batteries of these ships, are regarded by navy officers as ex- ceptionally efficient ordnance. Of second-class cruisers Spain had eight, and of smaller cruisers and gunboats some thirty or more, a few of them being wooden and antiquated. In torpedo boats and torpedo destroyers Spain was vastly superior to the United States, and at the opening of the waa- this fact created something like a panic among Americans. The efficiency of the torpedo boat, having never been subjected to the actual test of war, was universally overrated, and most dolorous pre- dictions of the disaster which awaited our ships in the encounter with the waspish pygmies were common in the American newspapers. Of torpedo-boat destroyers Spain had six, ranging from 220 to 255 feet, and from 380 to 400 tons displacement. These were really formidable vessels, uniting the qualities of a torpedo boat with those of a gunboat, and useful therefore on the blockade and on service requiring a greater coal capacity than any Blue Jackets of '98 91 torpedo boat possesses. The United States was wholly without any of this class of vessels. Of torpedo boats proper, Spain had ten of the first class, six of the second class, and seven of a mongrel type, but thoroughly service- able. It may be pertinent to note at this juncture that throughout the war not one United States ship was destroyed, touched, or even seriously menaced by a torpedo. Let us consider now, in equally general terms, the navy of the United States at the outbreak of the war. The report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1897 showed that the United States had in effective condition four battle- ships of the first class, two of the second class (one of these was the ill-fated " Maine "), two armoured cruisers, sixteen cruisers, fifteen gunboats, six double-turreted moni- tors, one ram, one dynamite gunboat, one despatch boat, and five torpedo boats. There were at the time of the secre- tary's report under construction five battle-ships of the first class, sixteen torpedo boats, and one submarine boat. None of these was completed in time to be of service during the war. In connection with the effective strength of the navy should be considered the so-called auxiliary fleet, or merchant ships under subsidy and liable to naval service. In all, twenty of these were borne on the navy rolls. The great number of swift yachts owned by citi- zens of the United States and readily convertible into torpedo or patrol boats was also an element in the naval supremacy of the United States. Apparently, therefore, the navy of the United States was vastly more powerful than that of Spain. But to skilled students of naval affairs the disparity of the two adversaries did not appear so great. Captain Alfred T. Mahan, admittedly the greatest living expert on " Sea Power," refers to the comparative strength of the com- batants in an article written after the war had demon- strated the superiority in fact of the United States navy, thus: 92 Blue Jackets of ^98 " The force of the Spanish navy — on paper, as the expres- sion goes — was so nearly equal to our own that it was well within the limits of possibility that an unlucky incident, the loss for example of a battle-ship, might make the Spaniard decisively superior in nominal, or even in actual, available force. An excellent authority told the writer that he consid- ered the loss of the ' Maine ' had changed the balance ; that is, that, whereas with the 'Maine' our fleet had been slightly superior, so, after her destruction, the advantage, still nominal, was rather the other way." Captain Mahan charitably refrains from making public the name of the " excellent authority " whose estimate of the nominal strength of the United States navy proved so sadly at fault when its actual power came to be ex- erted. He was not alone, however, in his error. The English reviews printed many articles signed by men of supposed authoritative position among naval experts, depicting the struggle that was to come between the navies of the United States and Spain as a very close one, and in many cases giving all the elements of superi- ority to Spain. Our ships were described as imseaworthy, and our sailors, because of the admixture of nationalities which the whole people of the United States represent, were expected to lack that sense of national pride and patriotism which would enable them to stand fire. If the masses in the United States were a little bra^crart and flamboyant in their certainty of American superiority, the expert proved that the academic estimate is not the one necessarily correct. Moreover, the outcome of a naval war is not wholly dependent upon the comparative numbers of vessels in the hostile navies, for brilliant strategy may enable the weaker power to still outnumber the enemy in some decisive battle, or to reduce to impotence the fleet of its adversary by menacing manoeuvres without offering battle at all. In the accounts of the great naval battles of the war, I wiU contrast more fully the comparative strength of the two Blue Jackets of '98 93 adversaries. It is proper to note here two elements of strength for Spain, and of weakness for the United States. The proximity of Cuba to the United States made it certain that the theatre of war would be on our coast. This being the case, it was highly advantageous for Spain that her colonial possessions in the West Indies supplied her with coaling stations and bases of supplies. If the United States had been compelled to press an offensive war on the coast of Spain, our commanders would have been handicapped from the very first by the lack of such facihties. The efficiency of a modern man-of-war is abso- lutely limited by its coal capacity. A battle-ship sent from our coast to Spain would exhaust two-thirds of its coal supply in crossing the Atlantic, Until that was made good, its condition would be most perilous, and as the tendency of modern custom is to declare coal contra- band of war, the bunkers of a United States ship in war- time could not be replenished in any foreign port, except under such limitations as would prohibit further offensive operations. The difficult and perilous device of coaling at sea from colliers sent from home ports would have to be relied upon, and would offer to an alert enemy most prom- ising opportunities for an eff'ective attack. Again, our long coast-line, plentifully dotted with flourishing cities, was difficult to guard, and tempting to the audacious and dar- ing naval commander, while Spain's coast is almost desti- tute of large cities. Our exposed coast cities, though never in fact attacked, or even menaced, still compelled the employment of a certain number of vessels as scouts and for harbour defence, reducing the force available for active operations against the enemy. Such a coast-line as ours adds immensely to the eff'ectiveness for an enemy of what the naval authorities call a " fleet in being." That IS, a fleet, organised and in commission, and which may at any moment strike at any one of a number of points. Such a fleet the Spaniards maintained at Cadiz through the greater part of the war, and because of it our govern- 94 Blue Jackets of '98 ment was at all times apprehensive of an attack on some one of our northern coast cities. Doubtless had the Spanish character been more adventurous, our coastwise towns would not have got off scot free as they did. Effi- cient as were our scouts, and alert as our intelligence department was, it is certain a seaman of the Paul Jones type, with a swift cruiser and a roving commission, would have found somewhere between Portland, Maine, and the Gulf of Mexico a spot to strike and flee from before a superior enemy could be called to give him battle. But Spain had no Paul Jones. J On the afternoon of the 21st of April, the harbour of Key West off the southwestern point of the Florida penin- sula was full of ships of war. There lay the North Atlan- tic squadron, under command of Eear Admiral William T. Sampson, who was appointed to this all-important com- mand upon completing his duty as President of the" Maine" court of inquiry. In his fleet were the " New York," which flew the admiral's flag, the battle-ships " Iowa " and " Indi- aria," the double-turreted monitors "Puritan," "Terror," " Miantonomah," and " Amphitrite," the cruisers " Marble- head," "Montgomery," "Detroit," and "Cincinnati," the gun- boats " Helena," " Castine," " Newport," " Nashville," and "Machias," the torpedo boats " Foote " and "Porter," and a number of colliers, despatch boats, supply boats, and other plebeians of a naval column. The little town, deadly dull usually and given over to Cuban cigar-makers and the native " conchs " who lead an amphibious life, had enjoyed three months of such life as it had not seen since the ■ days of the civil war. Its streets were crowded with i' officers, seamen, and alert newspaper correspondents. . These enforced visitors found less pleasure in the situa- • tion than did the natives, for Key West is, at the best, a dreary stopping-place for men accustomed to the activi- ties of the great world, and for weeks, from the officers and followers of the fleet, fervent prayers had daily Blue Jackets of '98 95 arisen for action. No community in the whole land watched more impatiently the slow progress of Con- gress, and the suspense was increased by the difficulty with which full and prompt information of what was doing at the capitol was received. The Northern papers were two days old by the time they reached the sandbar on which some two thousand navy officers and men, with an army of civilians, were marooned, and the meagre details which the managing editors at home telegraphed for the guidance of the correspondents with the fleet only whetted the appe- tite for more. Nevertheless, it was from one of these cor- respondents that the admiral commanding first learned of the action of Congress, and that his fleet was to be ordered at once to begin the blockade of Cuba. Swiftly following the despatch to the correspondent came a long communication from the Secretary of the Navy, Hon. John D. Long, to Ad- miral Sampson, containing an order to sail, and with it the full text of the President's proclamation of blockade. Then there was stir in Key West. All officers and men were recalled to the ships, and the wharves were crowded with supplies bought by the ward-room stewards in anticipation of a long tour of sea service. The newspaper boats, of which there were a dozen or more, were darting nervously about the harbour, visiting one ship after another in search of elusive news. When night fell, the masts of the vessels glowed with winking parti-coloured eyes, that silently, but with infinite meaning, transmitted messages from one com- mander to the other. The great battle-ships lying farthest out toward the mouth of the harbour swept sea and land with the long, bright beams of their search-lights, vigilant ever lest some hostile torpedo boat should slip in to the destruction of some American vessel. At daylight, the smoke began rising, first in faint wreaths, and then in roll- ing clouds, from the stacks of the vessels, and the sun was not yet risen when a line of bright-coloured flags flying from the signal mast of the flagship told the watchers on shore that some order was being delivered. The signal was g6 Blue Jackets of '98 answered instantly by the piping of the boatswain whistles on all the ships, and the clanking of heavy chains as the anchors were dragged up from their sandy beds. Soon the whole fleet was under way, in two parallel columns, and moving out to sea in perfect silence. Not a gunshot signalised this first movement of an American fleet against a European foe, no bugle-call noted the opening act of an epoch-making war. Not even a cheer told the men on ship and shore that a new page in history was being turned by a people long renowned for the victories of peace rather than those of deadly conflict. The scene was wholly peace- ful. The yachts employed by the newspapers as despatch boats gave even a festal air to the squadron, while a number of fishing smacks and merchantmen plied, as in ordinary days, about the harbour. For some of the merchantmen, however, the ordinary days were past and the era of war-time disaster at hand. The fleet had hardly left Key West below the horizon when a wreath of smoke on the sky-line showed a steamer approaching. She was watched, as everything afloat is watched from a man-of-war, but little heed was given to her, nor would have been, perhaps, except for the mistaken courtesy of her captain. " I saw that fine fleet of American warships," he said afterwards, gloomily recounting his tale to the newspaper correspondents, " and said I to the mate : * Pedro, get the colours, and we will salute those beautiful ships.' " So, in the innocence of his heart, and wholly ignorant of the fact that his country was at war with the United States, Captain Lazaraga, of the steamer " Buena Ventura," bound from Pas- cagoula, Mississippi, to Bilboa, Spain, with a cargo of lumber, ran up his best Spanish flag and dipped it thrice in seamanly courtesy to the fleet he so much admired. The answer was hardly what he expected, nor can it be termed chival- ric. None of the warships dipped its colours, but to the foretop of the leadmg one ran up a number of little balls of bunting, breaking out into some kind of a signal which Blue Jackets of '98 97 Captain Lazaraga could not understand. Immediately he saw one of the American vessels, which he afterwards learned to be the " Nashville," turn aside from the column and steam towards him. Soon she fired a blank cartridge towards the " Buena Ventura." " A curious way of saluting, those Yankees have," said the captain, and kept his ship on a course. Then came another shot, this time sending a shell screaming before the bows of his ship. At this juncture he concluded to stop and see what the affair meant, and his vessel was presently boarded by an ensign and a prize crew, from whom he learned of the war, and that his ship, in pursu- ance of a barbaric custom still in vogue on the high seas though abandoned on land, was a prize to the American navy. The ship was sent into Key West, where she was received with great enthusiasm, and the newspapers of the nation, just then being in hysterical mood, made as great ado over taking this hapless merchantman as if some deed of unparalleled valour had been done. From time immemorial it has been the usage of nations to hold private property at sea in the ship of an enemy fit subject for capture, and navy officers have been enriched by the prize-money thus obtained. Yet civilised nations respect private property of an enemy on shore, and an army traversing an enemy's country will even punctiliously pay for supplies taken from the inhabitants for its support. Why this distinction should be drawn cannot be satisfac- torily explained. As the better natures of men have been developed, — and there is no doubt that man grows better as the world becomes more civilised, — effort has been made to do away with this practice of capture at sea. Though the poverty of Spain's merchant marine resulted in making the prizes of the American navy very few and of very little value, there was evident among the American people a feeling of aversion to the whole system of marine spoliation. Had an American army invaded Spain, our soldiers would not have looted the houses and shops and 98 Blue Jackets of 98 divided the booty. Why, then, asked our people, should a Spanish property afloat be less sacred than that ashore ? Could the salt water wash out the stain of the theft ? This sentiment was so very general among the people that it is probable the movement to exempt private property, not contraband of war, from capture at sea will receive a great impetus as a result of the Spanish war. The duty upon which Admiral Sampson's squadron was now despatched by the President to undertake was the most arduous and the least stimulating that ever falls to the lot of a navy officer. To maintain a blockade is to be a sentry with a beat at sea, and with no relief. Steaming slowly up and down, near enough to a shore to be in dan- ger should a sudden hurricane burst upon the sea, but unable ever to land ; close enough to the enemy to be in constant danger from torpedoes or other methods of stealthy attack, but without hope of a fair battle, ship to ship and man to man, the blockaders suffer stupid monot- ony without relief from constant apprehension of disaster, and have all the routiae and work of warfare without hope of glory. In this service, so thankless yet all-impor- tant, the United States navy has made a record that chal- lenges the admiration of the world. During the long years of the war between the States the navy kept the ports of the Confederacy locked like a bank's vaults. Bound in that circle of steel and iron, the South was fairly starved into subjection. Europe said it could not be done. The best naval authorities of the Old World scoffed at the idea of making an effective blockade of a coast more than two thousand miles long and full of practicable harbours. Nevertheless it was done, and though Europe, angered by interrupted trade, watched vigilantly for even a day's break in the blockade, such as would permit it to be de- clared ineffective, the break never came. In the war with Spain the problem before the navy was almost as great, though as no nation showed any great desire to have the Cuban ports reopened the diplomatic difficulties were less Blue Jackets of '98 99 grave. The island has a coast-line of two thousand miles, but the harbours are comparatively few, and the dense undergrowth that made an impassable wall along the water front made the use by blockade runners, of any except the improved and recognised inlets, impossable. But the task of the navy was not to be confined to the maintenance of a blockade. A landing place for the American army that was to invade Cuba had to be prepared, and the Spanish fleet was to be found and destroyed. For many weeks, however, owing to the slow preparation of the army and the dilatory poKcy of the administration, the blockade alone engaged the attention of Admiral Sampson. All blockades are monotonous — this one was deadly dull. The prizes were few and of little value. The most notable one of these was the steamship " Panama," of Barcelona, a large steamer mounting two 14-pound guns and one machine gun. This vessel fell a prey to the " Manorove," a httle lighthouse tender, hastily fitted up for blockading duty, and far inferior to the " Panama " in armament, in the size of the crew, and in tonnage. So small was the " Mangrove's " crew that a prize-crew had to be borrowed from the " Indiana," which lay in the offing, to take the prize into port, while the boarding officer had to borrow a re- volver to overawe the captives. Beyond doubt, had the "Panama" shown fight she might have beaten off the audacious pygmy that made her heave to ; but the fleet of huge ships of war in the distance gave to the mandate of the " Mangrove's " captain an authority that under other circumstances the Spaniard might have been more willing to disregard. Another prize of considerable value, taken by the torpedo boat " Terror," was the " Bolivar," with about ,000 in silver aboard. While the blockading fleet was steaming up and down before Havana in plain sight of the lights of the town by night, and the steeples and chinmeys by day, the people of the city were being urged by General Blanco to hold loo Blue Jackets of '98 themselves loyal to Spain, and to resist the invaders to the death. Havana was full of Cuban sympathisers, but as the official class, with whom all authority rested, were strongly pro-Spanish, the patriots dared not express them- selves. Not until after the war was over, and the gallant Cuban General Gomez entered Havana with the American troops, did the feeling of Cuban patriotism break out in wild enthusiasm. Until American authority was there established, an expression of sympathy for the insurgents was likely to land the citizen in Morro, if indeed it did not end in his lying dead by the sea-wall as the firing squad marched away. So when war was declared. General Blanco met with what was, ostensibly at least, a hearty response to his appeals to the loyalty of the citizens. The town was decked with the Spanish colours, and a great body of citizens marched in procession to the Army headquar- ters, where their spokesmen pledged to General Blanco their lives and fortunes in defence of the Spanish crown. The general responded in a speech of characteristic Span- ish quality. He described in terrifying phrase the bar- barity of the foe, and called upon them to save all that they held dear — their lives, their property, and the honour of their women — by repelHng the invaders, who were even then at the very walls of Morro. As for himself, he swore that death only could put an end to the stubborn resistance he intended to offer. Unhappily for General Blanco the war was ended, and Spain expelled from Cuba without his ever seeing the American lines, or having any opportunity to perform any of the deeds of valour he promised the citizens of Havana. While the American fleet was standing guard at the : doorway to the Cuban capital and the military authorities in that city were fighting the war with volleys of eloquence, an officer of the United States army was prowling through Cuba, gathering topographical information for the expected army of invasion, and making arrangements with the Cuban insurgents for co-operation. The officer was Lieu- Blue Jackets of '98 loi tenant Andrew S. Eowan, who had entered Cuba the day of the declaration of war. Avoiding all the frequented lines of travel, he had crossed in an open boat from Jamaica, guided by a boatman who was half fisherman, half smuggler, and all outlaw. Eludmg the Spanish patrols, who would have promptly hanged him as a spy had they caught him, Eowan made his way to a camp of insurgents, by whom he was taken through the forests to General Garcia at Bayamo. He was the first official visitor from the United States to the camps of the patriots, and his arrival awakened the wildest enthusiasm. Through the Junta — or Cuban revolutionary committee — in New York, leaders like Garcia and Gomez had been kept in- formed of the generous interest which the people of the United States took in the Cuban struggle for hberty, and of the efforts making in Congress to aid them in their aspirations. This young officer, a soldier every inch, brought to the veterans of the revolution the first assur- ance that the long fight was won — for all knew that the aid of the great republic meant victory, certain and in- evitable. They did not know, nor did Eowan, that when the visitor entered their camp, war was already existing, and the Americans had begun making captures ; but the visitor was able to assure them that when he left Wasli- ington the breach between the two countries was certain, and the formal beginning of hostilities only a matter of days. And if the coming of Eowan was an encourage- ment to the revolutionists, the circumstances in which he found them offered justification for his mission and all that lay behind it. They occupied the ancient city of Bayamo, a place of 30,000 inhabitants. On every side were the smouldering ruins of forts, whence the Spaniards had but recently been driven. Through the gates of the city poured in a returning throng of its inhabitants, who had been driven from home by the barbarities of Spanish occupation, but for whom the victorious patriots had opened a way again to their homes and firesides. The I02 Blue Jackets of '98 scene gave the lie to all the Spanish assertions of the col- lapse of the revolution, and offered to the messenger from the United States a picture of patriotism triumphant, of a great victory in a good fight for liberty. All day Eowan spent with Garcia, of whose high qualities as man and soldier he, like all who met that life-long champion of Cuban liberty, speaks in terms of admiration. Plans were interchanged, maps for the guidance of an invading army prepared, and the military situation carefully can- vassed. Doubtless the stories Eowan brought of the doings of the world beyond the blockaded coasts w^ere of surpassing interest to the general so long condemned to life in the Cuban thickets, but Garcia was a soldier, and in deadly earnest. He wasted no time, and gave his guest but a brief resting-space. " At five o'clock," says Eowan, " lie said he had his despatches ready, and asked if I could start North at once, as he wished to get his replies to the United States government as soon as possible. He detailed General Callazo, Colonel Hernandez, and Dr. Dietas an expert on the diseases of that section, to accompany me." The four started after nightfall, and threading the woods with the greatest care, travelled through jungles and across rivers and swamps for two days, when they reached a large town in ruins, but surrounded by fortifica- tions which were held by about 500 Cubans. This was Vittoria de las Tunas. Pressing on again through the dense forest, and at one time scaling a lofty peak whence they enjoyed a view of the ocean, which for them meant safety, they came at last to the coast. There they found a flourishing salt works, conducted for the Cuban army and manned by men under arrest for some breach of army discipline. A little boat, not big enough for the whole party, but the best obtainable, was here put at Lieutenant Eowan's service, and with sails made of hammocks, and a mere makeshift for a mast, they put to sea — Dr. Dietas : having been sent back for lack of room. In the distance, soon after setting sail, Eowan discerned the fleet of Blue Jackets of '98 103 Admiral Sampson, then on its way to Porto Eico, for it was then the 5th of May. But without halting the fleet, the party continued its course for the coast of the United States, and, having by good fortune overhauled a spong- ing schooner, its crew of negroes were with some diffi- culty, and after many threats, persuaded to take them to Nassau. To reach home from that point was easy. In :the course of this perilous expedition. Lieutenant Eowan ihad crossed Cuba from south to north. He had discovered ithat a province which the Spaniards claimed to control was, in fact, in the hands of the revolutionists ; he had fseen for himself that the Cuban army was organised, [disciplined, ready to fight, and confident ; he had found jthe territory laid waste and depopulated, giving only too Istriking evidence of the fact that the war was making of Cuba a desert. All this he had done at the hourly risk of his life, at the peril indeed of a death commonly held to be ignommious, for in military law he was a spy, and would have been hanged within a few hours of his cap- ture. Yet, for all his bravery, he holds no unique posi- ttion among his fellows. The annals of the United States army are full of such deeds of courage as his exploit. And now to return to the blockade. When the navy bad fairly set itself to the task assigned it, the conviction became general that very insufficient tools had been fur- lished for a very hard job. Monitors with a speed of ten knots are not the most efficient engines with which to 3lose a number of ports against merchantmen that make ifteen knots under easy steam ; and torpedo boats that 3arry coal enough for perhaps three days' steaming are p-pt to be a source of embarrassment on a blockade where I coal capacity sufficient for a month's stay outside the blockaded port is a great desideratum. Nevertheless, the blockade was made effective, though no doubt that was largely due to the comparatively small temptation which Juban commerce offered to those who otherwise might go I04 Blue Jackets of '98 in for the exciting and profitable sport of blockade nm- nin<7. Not only was every considerable mercliautman that came within suspicious distance of Havana or ad- jacent ports captured or warned off, but wretched little fishing smacks and boats with garden stuff for the be- leaguered town were sternly sent about their business, while a Yankee tug once fiercely tried to bring to the British man-o"f-war " Talbot " with a blank cartridge. Offi- cers and correspondents with the fleet report that so accustomed had the islanders and the Spaniards them- selves become to the murderous system of warfare which had been practised under Weyler that the prisoners taken by the navy could hardly comprehend their cTood fortune in not being at once shot, and the amaze- ment of a Spanish officer who was captured as he was CToing off on a leave of absence to be married, when he was released on parole, was picturesque and almost laugh- able in its eff"usiveness. But the occasional captures were not of sufficient importance to relieve the tedium of the blockade, and once or twice the sight of a warship on the horizon was hailed with enthusiasm by officers and men as seeming to promise a fight. But it always turned out to be the ship of a friendly nation — once an Italian, whose nationality was not made out until she began to salute the admiral's flag, and again the British ship " Tal- bot." The latter vessel, an armoured cruiser of 5600 tons, was twice zealously pursued as a possible enemy, once by the gunboat "Nashville," 1371 tons, and once by the " Scorpion," a converted yacht. Once in awhile two or three of the ships would run a little bit inshore and throw a few shells at some earth- work over which the Spanish flag was flying. As a rule little damage was done on either side, for the Spanish were not good marksmen, and while the shooting of the Blue Jackets was true, it was shown early in the war, and not disproved during its continuance, that earthworks cannot be reduced nor silenced for long by fire from ships. '-V '^ " - 1 ' I'.ATTI.KSHT? "IOWA" IN DRY-DOCR. Blue Jackets of '98 105 But at home in the cities the news of these inconclusive affrays was eagerly read and commented upon as if a I battle had indeed been fought. The newspapers of New York gave almost as much space to the first event of this sort, the bombardment of Matanzas, as in 1861 they did ' to the battle of Bull Run. Yet it was an affair only I worthy of a place in history, because it was the first attack with really modern naval weapons upon a fort. ! The attacking vessels were the " New York," " Puritan," i and the " Cincinnati." The batteries were uncompleted earthworks, and it was to prevent their completion, and perhaps to afford his men a little relief from the boredom ' of the blockade, that Admiral Sampson concluded to throw a few tons of iron and explosives at them. The " New York" opened fire at about 4000 yards, and the officers [Watching from the bridge saw the yellow dust fly. But I from the ports of the ship, from every turret, sponson, and shield in which there was a gun in action the yellow powder smoke flew too, and it was very quickly evident to those who sighted the guns and who watched the effect of the shots, that the great weakness of the United States Navy in the war was going to be the lack of smoke- less powder. The whole ship was wreathed in hot, stifling smoke. It choked and scorched the lungs of the gun- ners, and it hid the enemy from their sight. Though the batteries were worked with furious speed, much of the shooting was necessarily at random, for through the smoke was no vision possible, and there was no waiting for it to clear away before the next shot was fired. The officers in charge of the turret guns would run from the turret to a point on deck where the vapour was less dense, and there getting their bearings would rush back to train their .guns. The firing continued for twenty minutes, and at 'the end the batteries, though silenced, were still effective. One shot from the big 12-inch gun of the "Puritan" was seen to strike immediately under one of the Spanish cannon, which rose in the air out of the cloud that at- io6 Blue Jackets of '98 tended the exploding shell, but the rest of the projectiles, so far as could be seen, stirred up the dust and frightened the defenders, but did no damage that a gang of men with spades and wheelbarrows could not repair in an afternoon. When the news of this bombardment reached the United States it was hailed as a great victory. When the American ships stopped firing and drew off, the Span- iards on their part claimed a great victory, and celebrated it with oratory and fireworks. " Our loss, one mule," was the Spanish bulletin cabled to Madrid. It was in fact httle more than half an hour's target practice. Not one of the ships engaged was hit. There were several incidents of this sort, all largely celebrated in the American newspapers, but none of which had other than a passing and merely journalistic interest. On the 29th of April the batteries at Cienfuegos, on the southern coast of the island, were engaged by the " Marblehead," and the day after, the forts at Cabanas near Havana were attacked and materially injured by the cruiser "New York." It was good target practice for the Yankee gunners, and perhaps it played its part in the great denouement that came at Santiago on July 3d, but for the immediate moment it was a prodigious use of powder and shot for a pygmy result. As the days wore on and the purpose of the United States developed, the tedium of the blockade was relieved by opportunities for service of a more dashing character — service for employment in which the officers of the squadron vied eagerly with each other, and in which a few found both glory and death. On the northern coast of Cuba, some seventy-five miles from Havana, lies the little town of Cardenas. It pos- sesses a picturesque and difficult harbour, and was well fortified by tlie Spaniards in the days preceding the declaration of war. Within the harbour, protected partly by the batteries but more by the fact that the channels Blue Jackets of '98 107 were too shallow to permit the entrance of the larger United States cruisers, were a number of Spanish gun- boats of light draught, which every now and then would run out, inspect the blockading fleet, and then dash back into their safe retreat. There was little harm in this, as none of the enemy's ships was big enough to menace even the smallest ship the Americans had on that part of the blockade, but there was an air of defiance, of bravado, about the Spanish procedure which irritated the men on the blockading squadron, and it was determined to teach them a lesson. The process of education proved expensive. The next time the Spaniards came out the torpedo boat " Foote " made a dash at them. The guns she mounted were of course no match for those on the enemy, but the American sailors had already become contemptuous of Spanish markmanship, and it was thought that the ' Foote " could get within torpedo range, let slip her pro- jectile, and get away unscathed. The attack was hardly begun, however, before it was found that these Spaniards had learned to shoot, and the " Foote " withdrew, for the game was not worth risking a torpedo boat for. On the 11th of May, the gunboat "Wilmington" joined the ves- sels on this part of the blockade. As her draught was light enough to permit her to enter the bay it was deter- mined to explore the entrance, and if possible inflict some damage on the enemy. All buoys had been removed from the harbour, and it was believed that the channel had been mined, but with the help of a Cuban pilot, the " Wilmington," torpedo boat " Winslow," and the auxiliary tug " Hudson," picked their way in toward the city, which was soon in plain sight, its red roofs, white walls, and green trees presenting a beautiful prospect. At the wharves could be seen two large, square-rigged vessels, and a trim white steamer, which the men on the three war vessels already looked upon as prizes. Nothing could be seen of the gunboats, which had evidently found some hiding-place close to the shore. To lure them from io8 Blue Jackets of '98 their retreat the little " Winslow," armed only with one- pounders, steamed gallantly in towards the wharves. The bay was perfectly clear, and the water calm. In the city there seemed to be no sign of excitement, and the stillness of a summer's day hung over land and sea, over nature and the homes of men alike. Suddenly the peace was broken. From behmd the corner of a wharf, where no battery appeared nor any menace of danger, came a flash and sharp report, and a shell whizzed past the " Winslow." Hastily her helm was put hard down, but before she could turn shots came from three or four other places, with increasing precision. No smoke be- trayed the position of the batteries, and the noise made by the shells, no less than the obvious precision of the arms employed, showed that the enemy was equipped with the most modern ordnance. The Americans an- swered swiftly and vigorously, even the little " Winslow " banging away with her one-pounders. But about the ships of war hung dense clouds of yellow smoke, obscur- ing their aim, and making it impossible for them to discern each other's signals, while the Spanish use of smokeless powder concealed the location of their batteries and made the task of the navy gunners doubly hard. It was soon demonstrated that the attack proceeded from the Spanish gunboats, which were shielded behind solid wharves, and therefore made almost impregnable. From their retreat they directed their fire almost exclusively against the " Winslow." She was nearest in shore, more vulnerable than the "Wilmington" and more valuable than the " Hudson." The Spaniards determined to make the best of their opportunity. One of their first shots struck and partly disabled her, but she fought on in the midst of a rain of shot and shell, until at last, with her steering gear cut and nearly unmanageable, her commander, Lieutenant J. B. Bernadou, determined to take her out of action. The " Hudson " coming near at this moment, he informed her commander of his purpose. Blue Jackets of '98 109 " Do you need any help ? " shouted the commander of the tug, seeing the battered state of the torpedo boat. " No, only plenty of room to work in," responded the commander of the " Winslow." " We are crippled, and she does not mind her helm well." The " Hudson " then drew off and returned to her en- gagement with the enemy, but in a few moments saw that the " Winslow " was drifting helplessly toward the shore, while a signal man was vigorously wigwagging some message to the flagship. Again the " Hudson " ran down upon the torpedo boat, and this time a heavy line was thrown across to her. At the first cast it fell short. A brisk breeze had by now sprung up, and the drift of the disabled vessel toward the shore grew more rapid, while as she drifted the accuracy of the enemy's aim improved until she was in a position fairly murderous. Again the rope was thrown. A shot knocked a great splinter of steel from the deck, which buried itself in Bernadou's groin, inflicting a painful and dangerous wound ; but wrapping a towel about it to stanch the blood, the plucky officer ran aft to get the hand-steering gear to work, as by this time the steam gear had been hopelessly wrecked. Before the necessary changes could be made the hand gear too was shot away, and the last vestige of hope for saving the craft under her own gear was destroyed. Meanwhile the "Hudson" drew near again. On her rail was perched an officer swinging the line he was about to throw. Amid- ships on the " Winslow " were a group of men in charge of Ensign Bagley, a boyish young officer just out of the naval academy. " Hurry up," cried Bagley, laughingly ; " it 's getting too hot for comfort here." The words had scarcely left his mouth when with a deafening crack a shell exploded just above his head. In- stantly the group of men that a moment before had stood there, alert, cool, expectant, inspirited by the calm and cheerful demeanour of the boy who commanded them, van- I lo Blue Jackets of '98 ished. Five were instantly killed. One, sorely mutilated, ! was blown almost overboard, and died as his comrades i) were drawing him back. Ensign Bagley was struck in the head by a bit of the shell and instantly killed — the first officer to fall in the war. Meanwhile the Spaniards were not slackening their fire in any degree. Though the full measure of the destruction done by their shells on the torpedo boat could not be dis- cerned from their position, they could see through their , glasses that the " Winslow " was disabled, that the " Hud- I son " was handicapped by having to care for her, and that their range was accurate. Accordingly they redoubled their efforts. It was said after the battle that certain buoys in the harbour which our men took to mark the course of the channel were in fact planted by the Spaniards to indicate the range, and that this accounts for a precision of aim, which was equalled by their artillery or naval gunners in no other battle of the war. The hawser being at last made fast, the " Hudson " ] started out of the harbour, towing the sorely shattered tor- pedo boat with her freight of dead and wounded. From the town flames and smoke were beginning to rise, and weeks after deserters from the Spanish army coming off to the ships reported that had the attack been kept up a few minutes longer, town, gunboats, and shipping must have surrendered. A story told by Lieutenant Ernest Mead, the navigating officer of the " Hudson," shows something : of the spirit of the men that manned the " Winslow " that May morning : "While securing the 'Winslow ' the second time, an incident occurred which forces itself through the crush of sad memories and causes a smile. One of the ' Winslow's ' crew was con- spicuous for his quickness, knowledge, and adaptabihty. He knew where everything was, and how to do everything, and he was usually there to do it. But, from the time the first line was made fast until we were miles out of range of the shore, his sole idea was to get another shot at the Spaniards. The Blue Jackets of '98 11 1 minute he could drop the work before him he would jump to a gun, throw in a shell, elevate the gun as far as it would go, and let drive, caring nothing of where the shot landed so long as it went in the direction of the shore." It seemed as though the death of Ensign Worth Bagley brought home to the people of the United States for the first time the conviction that it was a real war upon which the nation had entered, and that war meant death, and sorrowing homes, and desolated hearts. To his widowed mother in her North Carolina home came the expressions of regret and sympathy from a whole nation. The neigh- bours and boyhood friends of the dead lad paid to his body the honour of a hero's funeral, and a noble monument marks his resting-place. And even before the final ratification of the treaty of peace put a definite end to the war, the Congress of the United States, without dissenting voice, adopted a resolution creating five additional cadetships at the national naval academy in order that one might be given to the younger brother of the brave officer slain at Cardenas. Eepublics are not wholly ungrateful, nor surely could any nation not wholly lost to a sense of admiration for patriotism fail to reward with honour the sacrifice of a mother who meets the loss of her first son in warring for his country by consecrating her second to the very service in which the elder met his untimely though heroic death. While the guns were roaring at Cardenas, American sea- men and Spanish soldiery were engaged in hot conflict on the other side of the island of Cuba. On that southern coast one port only, that of Cienfuegos, was blockaded. In its configuration this harbour was not unlike the one where Bagley went to his death. The town, completely hidden from the sea by high hills, lay back some distance from the ocean, and was reached by a chaimel full of tortuous turnings. Its importance from a military standpoint arose from the fact that two cables had their ground connection 1 12 Blue Jackets of '98 there — one extending to Santiago de Cuba and another to Batanabo. It was determined to cut these cables, and the task fell upon the men of the blockading squadron, then composed of the " Marblehead," the " Nashville," and the revenue cutter " Windom." The work of cutting cables in order to isolate General Blanco from the world had been actively pressed on the northern side of the islands, and it was believed that by severing the lines at Cienfuegos he would be shut off from all outside communication. This proved to be an erroneous expectation, for never during the war was the Spanish general in Havana without full and speedy communication with his home government. In view of the complete information which our govern- ment had of the location of these cables and the facilities which we possessed for cutting them, it seems inexplicable that Blanco should have retained this privilege unless for some reason it was the policy of our government to leave him in communication with Madrid. At the final sur- render the terms were made by stipulation with the Madrid ministry, and it seems probable that had the commanding general at Santiago been left to act upon his own respon- sibility, his defence might have been more stubborn and protracted. As we shall see, the order which sent Cervera to his destruction came from the Spanish capital, and was insisted upon despite the admiral's protest. In fact, there- fore, it was a fortunate thing that all communication between the generals in Cuba and the governing authorities in Spain was not interrupted ; but whether its continuance was due to prevision on the part of our government or a mere failure to find and cut the cables cannot as yet be determined. To the men on the ships steaming up and down before Cienfuegos none of these considerations was of any im- portance whatever. They were ordered to find and cut the cables leading into that city, and they set about doing it. The point of attack was clearly indicated by the little house on the beach to which the cables led. To make the Blue Jackets of '98 1 13 attack effective it had to be made from small boats, as on that coast the water shoals very gradually, and the large vessels could not approach the shore. Accordingly, early in the morning of May 11th, just as the ships at Cardenas were getting ready to enter the harbour, the three vessels outside Cienfuegos steamed as near to the shore as their draft would permit and let slip their launches and boats. Two steam launches, two smaller ones, and half a dozen boats were quickly crowded with men, who swarmed down the sides of the men-of-war, eager for action. On the launches were machine guns, the row-boats being unarmed. The plan was for the men in the small boats to go as near inshore as might be necessary to pick up the cables. They were to do no fighting, but give their attention wholly to the work in hand. If there should be an at- tack from the shore, the launches with their machine guns were to protect the workers and drive away their assail- ants. It was quite evident at the very outset that the Spaniards were entirely alive to the importance of their cables and intended to fight stubbornly for their defence. As the vessels came nearer the shore rifle pits could be made out, and bodies of infantry and cavalry could be seen forming about the cable-house. In command of the expedition was Lieutenant C. M. Winslow, a son of the man who sunk the " Alabama," with Lieutenant E. A. Anderson as second. The men were all volunteers, but not all of the volunteers, for when the word of the expedition was passed along the decks of the ships every man offered to go, and the process of selecting the fortunate ones almost bred a riot. As the boats drew off from the ships the latter opened a heavy fire with shell upon the line of bushes along the shore in which the enemy were thought to be concealed. There was silence for a time on shore, save for the burst- ing of our own shells, for the Spaniards fled from the heavy fire without response ; but when the line of boats came within two hundred feet or so of the sand, the ships 8 1 14 Blue Jackets of '98 were obliged to cease firing. Then the enemy crept back to his line of low earthworks concealed in the bushes, and presently opened fire with rifles and machine guns. The position of the Americans was a most desperate one. Each boat, crowded with men, lying on a tranquil sea only a few hundred feet from a sheltered and unseen enemy, was an easy target. The row-boats were within ninety feet of the shore, within point-blank range of over a thou- sand Spaniards armed with modern weapons. About the little craft the water was lashed into fury by a storm of bullets, the jets springing up on every side as they do when some summer hail-storm pelts the surface of a quiet lake. Winslow stood quietly in his boat, a conspicuous target, urging on his men. Their task was one that re- quired deliberation and care. The cable had first to be found, as it lay on the bottom, with grappling irons, then hauled across a boat, and a section, usually about the width of the boat, chopped out of it with axes and chisels. The men engaged in this task had to suffer the fire of the enemy without responding. For them was all the peril of battle, without any of the stimulus and excitement which the act of fighting brings. They were as helpless as a pigeon before the gun of a noted trap-shooter. Out a hundred feet or so beyond them the launches were fighting manfully, with their one-pounders and rapid fire guns, to drive the Spaniards away ; but the latter had the advantage of cover and of numbers and stuck to their work. The ships in the distance joined in the affray, taking such positions and choosing such targets as enabled them to fire without endangering their own men. A light- house on the shore was filled with Spaniards, who were firing from its windows. "Cut it down," said Captain McCalla to the gunners of the " Marblehead," and soon down it came in ruins. The cable-house collapsed when a shell from the " Nashville " exploded in it. A block-house near by tumbled to pieces under the hot fire. How many of the Spaniards fell is not known now, perhaps it never jpW^ay^ig ■. ^^^ J ''K 4 « %i " iii''-' %;-; ^ 11 ■''•'' ,'*'■ «E>l: -^' P-T* Blue Jackets of '98 115 will be, for Spain will not take pains to publish the records of a war in which she won no glory. But hot as was the fire from the sea, that from the land never slackened. The bullets still sung in the air above the busy workers at the cables, and splashed in the water in seemingly un- diminished numbers ; but the sailors noticed that the enemy seemed to be getting the range. The thud of the striking bullet and the groan of the stricken man began to be heard too often. Lieutenant Winslow was hit in the hand, but tied up his wound and went on with his work. Men were seen to topple over in the boats. Eight were seriously wounded, one of them dying on the way to the ship. One brave fellow sitting at his oar attracted the attention of a neighbour by his singular silence. Be- neath him was discovered a great pool of blood, and he was found to have borne a grave wound silently lest com- plaint might interrupt the progress of the work. Two hours and a half this fierce fire was endured, and then, two cables being cut, the signal was given from the flag- ship to withdraw. One man killed, two wounded seri- ously, one of whom died, and six slightly wounded was the official report. A curious hurt was sustained by Captain Maynard of the " Nashville," who was struck on the chest by a bullet which had already passed through the shoulder of an ensign. Trivial affairs, of course, as viewed in the great theatre of war, were these two battles of the 11th of May, 1898, but to the men engaged in them, to those who imperilled their lives and perhaps lost them, to those who as a result of their service to their country and to humanity through her met cruel wounds, these battles were as great as any Waterloo. If too the loss was light, so was it throughout the war to the Americans. One shell at Cardenas slew, on the little torpedo boat " Winslow," one third of the men killed afloat in the whole war. More fell there than died with Dewey at Manila and Schley at Santiago combined. 1 1 6 Blue Jackets of '98 In the two fights of the 11th of May, there fell more men than were lost elsewhere by the navy during the whole war; more navy men than fell either afloat or ashore, savincr only the six marines who died at Guantanamo. As Bagley was the first, so he remained the last com- missioned navy officer to die in battle during the war for the freedom of Cuba ; and so, if the importance of battles be, like most other things, relative, we mvist concede something more than mere passing importance to the good fights well fought by the United States navy at Cardenas and Cienfuegos on the same day. CHAPTER VI Spain's Possessions in Asia — Unexpected Scene of Amer- ican Naval Activity — The Philippine Islands and their People — Rendezvous of the Asiatic Squadron AT Hong Kong — Commodore George Dewey — The De- parture for the Philippines — The Spanish Fleet at Manila — The Battle and Complete Victory of the Americans — No Men Lost — Dewey Made an Admiral — Aguinaldo and the Insurgents — Trouble with Ger- many — A Vigorous Message — The Friendliness of England. DURING the lagging days of debate and diplomacy that preceded the declaration of war, there was of course eager discussion among the people of the prob- able strategy of the impending conflict and of the point at which the first blow would be struck. All agreed that Havana would be the first objective. That taken, some thought that in the event of continued resistance by the enemy our fleets might even be ordered to the coast of Spain. Hardly anywhere was there the shghtest idea that the first crushing blow of the war would be delivered in Asiatic waters, where the flag of the United States was seldom seen, and where Spain had a populous and rich colony, then almost an unknown land to Enghsh- speaking peoples. When the news came that Admiral Dewey had run into the harbour of Manila, May 1st, and destroyed a Spanish fleet, the nation was first dumb with astonishment, and then hilarious with joy. Little was known about Manila or the Phihppine Islands and less about Dewey, but a decisive victory won within ten days of the declaration of war, and in an unexpected quarter. ii8 Blue Jackets of '98 stirred the nation as it was perhaps not stirred again dur- ing the course of the war. The Philippine Islands were won for Spain by the famous explorer Magellan under the patronage of the great Emperor Charles V in 1521, in the course of a voyage which ended in the circumnavigation of the earth. The colony had suffered more than three hundred years of Spanish domination, and showed all the signs of arrested development, and even decay, that characterise Spanish provinces wherever they may be placed. The usual rebellion had been in progress there for years, fought on the part of the insurgents as they fought in Cuba, with raids, skirmishes, and the avoidance of battles, and on the part of the Spaniards with wholesale execu- tions, torture, and barbarity. In the Philippine Archi- pelago are 1400 islands, most of them wholly uncivilised and never brought under the control of any government. In all some eight million people, mostly savages, some having a rudimentary civilisation, were ruled by the Span- iards, who applied to them the methods which had driven Cubans to beggary first, and then to desperation. The " carpet-bag official " was there in all his inefficiency and rapacity. The collection of taxes was farmed out, with the result that the maximum amount was exacted from the people and the minimum paid in to the government. There was absolutely no pretence at applying the revenues to pubhc improvements. Such things were unknown. Bridges once burned were not rebuilt, roads were mere trails, most of the towns were mere aggregations of huts with unpaved streets and only a big church to suggest the presence of any European authority. Out of the presence and the power of the church sprang many of the evils of which the Filipinos justly complained. The priests were in effect part — and a very powerful part — of the government. The Archbishop of Manila exerted more authority than the Governor-General. This would have been less hurtful had the tone of the church been Blue Jackets of '98 119 as high, and its influence exerted as positively for good as is usual in civilised countries. But, far away from the central authorities, the church functionaries in the Philip- pines too generally forgot the duties imposed upon them by their priestly functions. They were often immoral, rapacious, cruel, and dishonest. The misdeeds of the friars, who were scattered all through the islands, formed one of the chief counts in the revolutionists' indictment of Spain. At the moment of the declaration of war with the United States no revolution was in active progress in the Philippines. In December, 1897, Spain had applied to the insurgents there the methods which had proved suc- cessful under Campos in Cuba in 1869, and had effected a compromise by promising reforms and paying a large sum of money to the insurgent leaders, chief among whom was a young man. General Emilio Aguinaldo, in consider- ation of their leaving the islands. As usual, the promises of the Spaniards were not kept. The reforms were in- solently repudiated, and such of the revolutionary leaders as had trusted in Spanish honour and remained in the islands were cruelly put to death. Aguinaldo and his colleagues, who had gone to Hong Kong, noted these infamies from afar, and, having at their command the very considerable sum which Spain had paid them, began preparations for a new revolt. In Hons Kong at this same moment was a man des- tined to do more toward freeing the Filipinos from the domination of Spain than could any junta of revolution- ists. This was Commodore George Dewey, U. S. K, who had with him a fleet, not of prodigious strength it is true, but which exceeded in power anything the United ■States had ever before had in those far away waters. I Not by accident was Dewey there, nor was it by accident ' that he was so " well heeled," as the fighting phrase goes. In war, the unexpected ought not to be permitted to happen, and nothing occurred in those far-away Pacific ■waters which was unexpected to the authorities at Wash- I20 Blue Jackets of '98 ington, however surprising it may have been to the people of the United States. The selection of Commodore Dewey to command the Asiatic squadron, which was made in January, was in no sense an accident. If the people overlooked the fact that Spain had a fleet and colonies in Asiatic waters, the Navy Department did not, and a man of proved gallantry and skill in battle was chosen to direct the United States forces there. Dewey had graduated in two good schools — at Annapolis in 1854, and under Farragut on the Mississippi Eiver in 1862. A veteran and a fighter, he was selected for the Asiatic squadron as soon as the probability of war was unmistak- able, and it is said that he was bitterly disappointed at the choice, expecting that all the sea fighting would be done on the Atlantic. The Navy Department, however, thought otherwise, and begun hurrying ships to the Asiatic station weeks before the rupture between the nations became imminent. By the eighteenth of April Commodore Dewey had his full squadron assembled in the British port of Hong Kong. These six fighting-ships comprised the fleet : " Olympia " : protected cruiser ; armament, four 8-in., ten 5-in., twenty-four rapid fire ; complement, 466. " Balti- more " : protected cruiser ; armament, four 8-in., six 6-in., ten rapid fire ; complement, 395. " Boston " : partly pro- tected cruiser ; armament, two 8-in., six 6-in., ten rapid fire; complement, 272. "Ealeigh": protected cruiser; armament, one 6-in., ten 5-in., fourteen rapid fire ; com- plement, 200. " Concord " : gunboat ; armament, six 6-in., nine rapid fire; complement, 150. "Petrel": gunboat; armament, four 6-in., seven rapid fire; complement, 100. " McCulloch " : revenue cutter ; armament, four 4-in. ; complement, 1.30. Several colliers, purchased with their cargoes at Hong Kong before the declaration of war shut off this method of securing supplies, completed the fleet. Warned day by day by cable from Washington of the progress of the ADMIRAL GKUKGt JJKWKV. Blue Jackets of '98 121 quarrel, Dewey put his ships in war paint, sent ashore all movables, instructed his officers in his plans, and was ready to strike when the word should come. The first official warnins; came from the authorities of Hong Koncr War had been declared, and Great Britain had issued its proclamation of neutrality. Even without orders from Washington, that fixed the only course that Commodore Dewey could take. Under the law of nations he was compelled to leave Hong Kong within twenty-four hours. Whither should he go ? The nearest United States port was San Francisco, seven thousand miles away. To enter another foreign port meant another brief resting space of twenty-four hours, and then a polite request to leave. And coal? That prime essential of a modern ship was construed as contraband of war, and accordingly no neutral power would permit him to take in any of its harbours more than a sufficient supply to carry his ships back to the United States by the most direct route. Evidently one course only was open to the American fleet — the orders from Washington could be of only one tenor. A Spanish harbour somewhere in Asiatic waters must be captured and made a naval base. First, however, it was necessary to heed the British note of warning and leave Hong Kong. Accordingly, anchors were hove up and the fleet, with flags flying and bands playing, steamed out to sea. The British residents of the city made no secret of their sympathy with the Americans thus going out to early battle, but crowded the quays and shipping, cheer- ing and saluting as the warships passed. This first voyage of the fleet was hut short. Mirs Bay, a Chinese harbour only a few miles to the northward had been selected as the anchorage where orders from home would be awaited, and the " McCuUoch " was left behind to fetch them when they should arrive. The delay was but short, for the next day the revenue cutter steamed up to the new rendezvous bearing this message, dated Wash- ington, April 24th : 122 Blue Jackets of '98 ^^ Dewey ^ Asiatic Squadron: War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavours. Long." For this, Admiral Dewey had been waiting and planning ever since his arrival on the station in January, and there was now no delay. A short conference with the captains on board the flagships filled out the evening, and shortly after midnight the fleet sailed on its errand of battle. Prows were turned south towards the Philippine Islands, lying 620 miles away. Speedy ships were in the squadron, but so too were slow ones, and the latter — the " Petrel " with a speed of barely seven knots holding the unenviable distinction — fixed the speed of all. Three days passed before the line of the coast — the Island of Luzon — was made out. Then Subig Bay, where it was reported the enemy might be found, was carefully reconnoitred, but without success. The fishermen plying their calling about the harbour's mouth had seen no Spanish fleet, and in none of the nooks or corners of the bay was there so much as a gunboat. So on to Manila thirty miles away. It was clear that the Spaniard had taken refuge there, preferring to fight with the aid of shore batteries. What was this enemy for whom Dewey sought ? In naval strength unequal to him,- it was true, but not so much so as to make the issue of the battle a foregone certainty. The Spanish ships were comparatively anti- quated, but they were not, as a London weekly insisted, wooden. Their guns were as good as those earned by the American ships. They outnumbered the Ameri- cans materially — to Dewey's six fighting-ships Admiral Montojo had ten, and two torpedo boats besides. The " Olympia " outclassed anything the Spaniards had, but in skilled hands the numbers of the enemy might be ex- pected to more than make up for this. In batteries the Blue Jackets of '98 123 Americans had the advantage, but not overwhelmingly. To their 57 big guns, the Spaniards had 52 ; and to their 74 rapid-fire and machine guns, the enemy had 70. These figures eliminate the " McCulloch," which did not go into action, and the Spanish torpedo boats, which were sunk before their guns would bear. But the Ameri- can big guns were heavier, for the Spaniards had nothing but 6.2-inch cannon to Dewey's 10-inch. When the battle was fought the first hour showed the immense superiority of the Americans in everything that goes to win victory ; but as Commodore Dewey led his fleet along the coast of Luzon toward the harbour where he knew the enemy lay in waiting, he had noth- ing to expect but a desperate battle with a fleet not greatly his inferior. It must be remembered that the Spanish ships were anchored in a harbour protected by shore batteries. To get at them the Americans had to pass down a channel guarded on either side by powerful forts armed with modern rifles. The harbour to be trav- ersed before reaching the enemy was sixteen miles long, and it was only to be expected that it was plentifully be- sprinkled with mines. With these facts before him, and with the reasonable expectation that the Spanish fleet would receive his attack at a point where the fire of the forts would be effective. Commodore Dewey could only antici- pate a hard fight, with a result subject to the fortunes of war. The measure of a commander's gallantry is fixed by the probable perils he braves, not by the result of the combat. One seems to read in Dewey's first decision the effects of his training under the great Admiral Farragut. His fleet arrived off the mouth of Manila Bay at night. There was no stop to reconnoitre, no suggestion of " bottling up " the enemy after the Santiago fashion, no waiting until day- light might make it easier to run the gantlet of mines and batteries, no delay of any kind, but a quiet and im- mediate attack on the enemy. Only a brief wait for the 124 Blue Jackets of '98 moon to set, and then on, in single file, the " Olympia " leading, the " McCuUoch " brmging up the rear, with all lights out except one lantern at the stern of each ship for the next to steer by. Seemingly the Spaniards had no idea that an enemy was at their door. The great light that marked the entrance to the harbour gleamed as though to welcome the grim procession of ghostly gray ships stealing unaware upon their prey. The forts were as silent as though all defenders were dead. To the men on the ships it seemed that their progress was attended with the tumult of a thousand railroad trains. They walked with muffled tread and spoke in whispers lest Spaniards miles away might hear them, and marvelled that the rush of the vessels through the water ■ and the white foam breaking away from the cleaving prows did not attract the attention of the enemy. Yet there came no sound of can- non, nor did any mine rend the plates of any stout ship. The last ship of the column, the " McCuUoch," gave the first alarm. From its smoke-stack, when coal was flung on the furnaces below, there flared up a red flame lighting up the waters and the rigging of the ships ahead. AU turned expectantly toward the batteries in anticipation of a shot, but no sound came. Again the unlucky beacon flared, and again, and after the third illumination the darkness to starboard was pierced by the flash of a gun on a rock called El Fraile. The shell went wild and the " Con- cord " responded with the fierce bellow of a 6-inch gun. There was no longer any attempt at secrecy, and cannon roared from the "Boston," the "McCuUoch," and the " Concord," the big ships at the head of the line passing on in silent dignity. The shot from El Eraile had done much more good than harm. It gave to the commodore, who with a Filipino insurgent by his side stood on the bridge of the " Olympia " piloting in the fleet, a clear idea of how the shore lay. That battery once passed, all the de- fences of the harbour's mouth were left behind, and there was nothing more to apprehend until the city, with its Blue Jackets of '98 125 forts at Cavite, was reached, — nothing, that is, except mines, against which no skill could avail and which might therefore be ignored. " Perhaps they '11 make it all the hotter for us when they do begin," said Dewey, commenting on the quiescence of the Spaniards. So the ships steamed sullenly on up the bay, the tension measurably lessened by the little spurt of fire, but with every man alert for the next development of the morning — for by this time the sudden dawn of the tropics was breaking. Nothing but the undeniable facts of the case could make credible the amazing inefficiency which characterised the Spaniards, not only at Manila but at other points attacked by American fleets. Thus early in Dewey's advance on Manila the defenders had sacrificed one ad- vantage without effort to make use of it. The mouth of the bay which the Americans entered without resistance was well fortified. A strait about five miles wide is broken by the islands Corregidor, Caballo, and El Fraile — ■ all fortified, and armed with Krupp guns. On the main- land Limbones and San Jos^ points on either hand bear more forts and more steel rifled cannon. Nevertheless, all were passed within easy range and with only an ineffective fire from one battery. If there were contact mines in the channel, they failed to explode. If there were electric mines, the officers intrusted with their discharge failed to wake up. In the hands of a power of ordinary military attainments the defence of the entrance of Manila Bay would have cost the invader a ship or two. The swift coming of day discovered to the eager gazers from the American ships not only the old town of Manila with its clustering low roofs and towering cathedral, but a sight which they had come all this way to see — the Spanish fleet — ten great ships with military tops showmg across a low neck of land — lying at anchor under the batteries at Cavite, a suburb of the city where the navy yard, arsenal, and other military and naval establishments were placed. There was silence on the ships as the stir- 126 Blue Jackets of '98 ring spectacle was presented, and the men, many of whom had slept on the run in from the harbour's mouth, crowded to the points of vantage to gaze on it. With a glass, the roofs and quays of the city could be seen to be crowded with spectators; so it was evident that the short engage- ment with the battery at El Fraile had alarmed the city. As the men gazed, others passed up and down the decks of the men-of-war, distributing cups of hot coffee and biscuit by orders of the commodore, who had no intention of having his sailors go into action hungry. The plan of the battle had been worked out already, and only a few signals from the flagship were necessary to place the fleet in the formation agreed on. As the signals fluttered from the gaff, black balls mounted to every peak on all the vessels, and breaking out displayed the great battle-flags. At that the enemy growled out a word of warning with the 9-inch guns of Fort Lunetta, and the attacking column moved suddenly on to closer quarters. " Hold your fire," was the word passed on from the flagship, and save for two shots from the " Concord " no answer was made to the forts. Onward toward the Spanish fleet, which was main- taining a like silence, the fleet sped. A sudden muffled roar and a great volume of mud and water springing into the air right before the flagship told that the dreaded mines were near, and in an instant another exploded. Neither did any hurt, and with the explosion of the two the Spanish resources of that sort seemed to be exhausted. By this time the fleet was approaching the enemy nearly. On the bridge of the " Olympia " stood Commodore Dewey, Captain Gridley and Flag-Captain Lambert at his side. Though the Spanish ships now joined the forts in pouring a fire on the advancing foe, there was still no response. Just as the sun rose, red and glaring with midsummer heat, the commodore turned to the oflficer at his side and said, quietly, " You may fire now, Gridley, when ready." Gridley was ready, and almost on the instant an 8-inch shell hurtled out through the yellow smoke toward the enemy, now Blue Jackets of '98 127 about 4500 yards away. Presently a signal from the flag- ship conveyed to all the vessels a like permission, and the whole fleet was soon enfjased. On the flagship, before opening action, Dewey had assembled his men and given them this final word : " Keep perfectly cool, and pay attention to nothing but orders." This was the watchword throughout the American fleet that morning, and, as the result, the fire was deliberate and deadly. The column — " Olympia," " Baltimore," "Ealeigh," "Petrel," "Concord," and "Boston," in the order named — steamed along parallel to the Spanish ships, working every gun that- could be brought to bear, and receiving the fire of ships and forts in return. The fire of the enemy was, as Dewey put it in his report, " vigorous, but generally ineffective." It was a succession of brilliant misses, of shots that came so near hitting that it was a constant marvel that the American ships were escaping destruction. One shell struck the bridge grat- ings of the "Olympia ; " one narrowly missed the com- modore himself. The fire became so hot that Captain Gridley, who stood exposed by the commodore's side, was directed to go into the conning tower in order that both might not be killed or disabled at once. On the " Boston," a shell burst in a stateroom setting it afire. Through both sides of the " Baltimore's " unarmoured hull a shell sped, happily hitting no one in its course. A 6-inch gun was disabled, and a box of ammunition was exploded on the same ship. Down past the Spanish line the squadron moved, the port side of every ship a mass of flame and smoke, then circling around in a grand sweep — that made the Spaniards think for a moment they were pulling out of action — the column returned again on its course, and the men of the starboard batteries had a chance to try their skill while their fellows rested. Each turn brought them nearer the enemy ; each broadside found the Ameri- can gunnery improving. Five times the circuit was made, and then a signal fluttered from the yard of the 128 Blue Jackets of '98 " Olympia," and the fleet turned away to the other side of the harbour, where the "McCuUoch" and the colliers had been lying. The Spaniards raised a resounding cheer at the sight of what they supposed to be a retreat, and a telegram was instantly sent off, that the enemy had been compelled to haul off for repairs. On the American ships, where the purpose of the order was not understood, there was much grumbling. "Breakfast," growled one of the gunners, who had been told that was the purpose of the intermission ; " who the wants any breakfast ? Why can't we finish off the Dons, now we Ve got them going ? " Breakfast, however, was not the object of the delay. A misinterpreted signal had caused the commodore to be- lieve that ammunition for the 5-inch guns was running short, and as the smoke made it difficult, if not impossible to ask each ship-captain by signal how much he had, it was determined to haul off and redistribute the ammuni- tion if it was required. In the end, however, no necessity was found for this, and as there was time then for break- fast, the meal was served. In the portion of the engagement prior to the inter- mission, the " first round," it might be called, the Spaniards had suffered heavily. The American fire had been both rapid and accurate. With the glasses, the shots could be seen striking the thin iron hulls of the Spanish ships, and by the time the third circuit had been made three were in flames. Stung into fury by the losses inflicted on his squadron. Admiral Montojo, just as the Americans were turning to begin their third circuit, slipped the cables of his flagship, and under full steam darted out as if with the intention of ramming the " Olympia," or at any rate coming to close quarters. The dash was magnificent, but it was futile. As the " Reina Cristina " swung away from her fellows, the fire of the whole American fleet was con- centrated upon her. As she clung stubbornly to her course, the storm of projectiles swept down upon her, pierced her hull like paper, swept her decks, and, bursting, Blue Jackets of '98 129 spread death and fire of every side. Her bridge was shot away, her engines wounded. Superhuman gallantry could bear the punishment no longer, and, responding with difficulty to her helm, she turned to seek her former position. Just as her stern was presented to the Ameri- can fire, an 8-inch gun on the " Olympia " was trained upon her, and its projectile sped forth on a murderous errand. It struck the Spaniard full in the stern, tore its way forward, killing men, shattering guns, exploding ammunition, piercing partitions and tearing up decks, until it exploded in her after-boiler. The wound was mortal. With flames leaping from her hatches, and the shrill screams of agonised men rising above the thunder of the battle, the " Eeina Cristina " staggered back. One hundred and fifty of her men lay dead, and nearly a hun- dred wounded, — most of them sacrificed in Montojo's gallant effort to rush the American flagship. Another heavy loss fell upon the Spaniards while this act in the drama of battle was progressing. Thinking, no doubt, that the attention of the " Olympia," would be wholly centred upon the " Cristina," the two Spanish torpedo boats slipped out, and made a run for the American fleet. One headed for the supply -ships, but was caught by the " Petrel," which first drove her ashore, and then pounded her with rapid- fire guns until' she blew up. The other, advancing on the " Olympia," was struck amidships by a shell, broke in two, and disappeared like a broken bottle. So at Manila, as later at Santiago, it was demonstrated that torpedo boats are not the dangerous engines of war that had been thought, — at least not when they are in Spanish hands. Three hours' intermission was taken by the American sailors after that first round. A leisurely breakfast, a critical examination of all guns and machinery that had been under strain, and the work of preparing an ample supply of fresh ammunition occupied the time. Then out fluttered the signals again, the crews went to their q^uarters, the great screws began to revolve, and once more 9 130 Blue Jackets of '98 the fighting ships bore down upon the unhappy enemy. This was to be the wind-up. Before those ships returned again to their anchorage it was the intention of the quiet little man on the " Olympia's " bridge to comply literally with the orders he had received from the Secretary of the Navy and destroy or capture the Spanish fleet. He took up the task just where he had left it, and in the same manner. Again the fleet revolved in a great circle of smoke and fire, though at closer range than before. The Spaniards, whose hopes had been roused by the stop- page of the action, were demoralised by its renewal. Their fire was wild, their resistance half-hearted. The " Eeina Cristina" — no longer the flagship, for Montojo had trans- ferred his flag to the " Isla de Cuba" — was blown up by the shells of the " Baltimore." After her, speedily fol- lowed the " Don Juan de Austria," her coup de grace being administered by the " Kaleigh." The little " Petrel " ran into the shoal water and set fire to the " El Correo," the " Marques del Duero," the " Don Juan de Austria," " Isla de Luzon," " Isla de Cuba," and " General Lezo," all of which had been disabled by the fire of the fleet, and most of which had been run ashore after surrendering. Admiral Montojo with great gallantry fought his second flagship until her guns were silenced and the flames were making her decks untenable. Then he abandoned her to her fate and escaped to the city, whence, it is said, a great con- course of people had come out that morning to see the " pigs of Yankees " annihilated. Finally, the " Don An- tonio de Ulloa," the last ship left fighting, sunk with her flag still nailed to her mast, and a well-placed shot entered the magazine at Cavite, ending the resistance of the shore batteries. Then the signal was flung out from the flag- ship " The enemy has surrendered," the hot, weary, and smoke-begrimed men swarmed cheering out of turrets and up from the bowels of the ships, the flagship's band broke out with the " Star Spangled Banner," and the victory of Manila, the first victory in the war with Spain, Blue Jackets of '9S 131 was won. And at how light a cost ! The story told by- Mr. E. W. Harden, who was on the " Olympia " and wit- nessed that he tells of, recounts perhaps the most remark- able occurrence in naval warfare up to that time ; it was repeated at Santiago : — " As each captain came over the ' Olynipia's ' side, he replied to the eager query ' How many killed ? ' in a manner that indicated a very much mixed state of mind. Mingled with satisfaction at having lost no man, was an evident desire to have it understood that the lack of loss was no proof of an absence of danger. "'Only eight wounded,' replied Captain Dyer of the ' Baltimore ' — ' none seriously. But six shells struck us, and two burst inboard without hurting any one.' " ' Not a dashed one ! ' was the rollicking way the next captain reported, " 'None killed and none wounded,' was the apologetic reply of the next one ; ' but I don't yet know how it happened. I suppose you fellows were all cut up ! ' " 'My ship wasn't hit at all,' was the next report, made with a sort of defiant air, as if the speaker would like to hear it insinuated that he had had any part in keeping his men in a safe place. " AVhen the ' Boston's ' captain came alongside it was feared that he for certain would have a serious list of casualties, for it was known that his ship had been on fire. And when he announced neither killed nor wounded, the news quickly spread through the flagship, and the men cheered vociferously." The description of the course followed by one shot which struck the " Baltimore " makes this complete im- munity of our men seem miraculous. This was a 60- pound armour-piercing projectile, fired from a land battery. It struck the ship about two feet above the upper deck between two guns which were being served ; pierced two plates of steel one quarter of an inch thick each ; then ploughed through the wooden deck, striking and breaking a heavy beam by which it was turned upwards ; passed 132 Blue Jackets of ^98 through a steel hatch-combing; disabled a 6-iiich gun; hurtled around the semicircular shield which surrounded the gun, missing the men at it ; reversed its course and travelled back to a point almost opposite that at which it had entered the ship, and thus passed out. It had passed between men standing crowded at their quarters and had touched none, but it exploded some loose ammunition by which eight were wounded. For the Spaniards there was no such immunity as attended the Americans. No miracles interposed between them and the American shells, perhaps because the latter were more skilfully directed. The exact losses in Admiral Montojo's squadron are not known. His ten ships and two torpedo boats were totally destroyed, and the report of General Augustin, the Governor-General, put the number of killed and wounded at about 618, though there is reason to believe it was nearer a thousand. The ships lost and their armament are summed up in the following table : Rsina Criatina . . . CastUla Don Antonio de Illloa Don Juan de Austria Isla de Luzon . . . Isla de Cuba . . . Velasco Marques del Duero . General Lezo . . . Argos Description. Steel cruiser. Wooden cruiser. Iron cruiser. Iron cruiser. Steel protected cruiser. Steel protected cruiser. Iron cruiser. Gunboat. Gunboat. Gunboat. Six 6.2-in., two2.7, 13 R. F. Four 5.9, two 4.7, two 3.4, two 2.9, 12 R. F. Four 4.7, 5 R. F. Four 4.7, two 2.7, 21 R. F. Six 4.7, 8 R. F. Six 4.7, 8 R. F. Three 6-in., two 2.7, 2 R. F. One 6.2, two 4.7, 1 R. F. One 3 5, 1 R. F. 352 349 159 179 156 156 147 96 115 87 1796 The official report of the battle by the Spanish admiral gives a graphic picture of the accuracy and effect of the American fire. After describing the fleets and the cir- cumstances under which the battle opened, he says : " Tho Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon ua nimiberless projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves almost entirely to fight the ' Cristina. ' Blue Jackets of '98 133 my flagship. A short time after the action commenced one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of tho forward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge. In the meantime another shell exploded in the orlop, setting fire to the crew's bags, which they were fortunately able to control. The enemy shortened the distance between us, and rectifying his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. "At half-past seven one shell destroyed completely the steering-gear, another exploded on the poop, and put out of action nine men. Another destroyed the mizzen-mast head, bringing down the flag and my ensign. A fresh shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroy- ing the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in the ammunition-room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand steering- gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode. " Amidships, several shells of smaller calibre went through the smoke-stack, and one of the large ones penetrated the fire- room, putting out of action one master-gunner and twelve men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the starboard bow gun. "While the fire astern increased, fire was started forward by another shell which went through the hull and exploded on the deck. " The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there were only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them. " The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, the lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master-gunners, and seamen-gunners, the inaptitude of some of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of rapid-fire cannon, the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected charac- ter of the greater part of our vessels, all contributed to make more decided the sacrifice Avhich we made for our country. " Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to three hundred and eighteen men killed and wounded." 134 Blue Jackets of '98 Ordinarily after so signal a victory as this, a com- mander might reasonably expect relief from responsibil- ity and a respite from perplexing problems. Commodore Dewey's situation was not so comfortable. He held Ma- nila at the mercy of his guns, but to bombard it would be to kill scores of innocent people, many citizens of friendly nations. If he compelled the city to surrender by a threat of bombardment, he had no troops with which to hold it. If he drove out the Spanish troops, he had no means of preserving order and protecting property. All this doubt- less occurred to him as he watched the final scenes iu the annihilation of the enemy's fleet, and soon thereafter it was formally presented for his consideration by the British consul, who came off in a boat to ask that the city should not be bombarded. After consideration the commodore contented himself with sending word to the Captain-Gen- eral that the town would not be harmed unless the fleet was fired upon. This convention was scrupulously ad- hered to, and the fleet lay long in the harbour, with the Spanish flag floating in plam view and in easy range over the city. Cavite, however, with its arsenal and forts, was surrendered on the 2d of May, under threat of bombard- ment. The same day the cable connecting Manila with Hong Kong was cut, though Admiral Dewey offered to spare it and permit the Spaniards to use it in communi- cating with Spain if they would allow him to use it in communicating with Washington. This offer Augustin refused, happily for Dewey, perhaps, for he was thereby freed in great measure from the control of a Board of Strategy at Washington and of an Administration which was rather a clog than a spur to the operations of the army and navy on the Atlantic coast. As a result of the destruction of the cable, the people of the United States received their first news of the victory from Madrid, in- complete and garbled of course, as coming through Span- ish sources. Dewey was not in haste to send word of his achieve- Blue Jackets of '98 135 ment, but waited until everything that could be done at that moment was completed. Monday morning the httle " Petrel " ran in near Cavite, and Captain Lambert went ashore to receive the formal surrender of the fort, which had hauled down its flag the day before. There was some Spanish quibbling, and an effort made to disprove that the flay C. (I. Kockwood. N. Y. HON. THKODOKK ROOSEVELT. Blue Jackets of '98 183 armed than the majority of the volunteer regiments, and composed of men most of whom were inured to hardship and trained in the use of weapons, this command had most of the good qualities of a regiment of regulars. When it is remembered that many of the volunteers, even those who had been long in service in the national guard, had never fired a gun up to the time they were brought to the camps of concentration, it is easy to appreciate the immense value of a regiment of trained hunters and pistol- shooters such as this. It is worth noting, by the way, that though nominally a cavalry regiment, this command was never furnished with sabres, as it was thought the time employed in teaching the use of an unfamiliar arm would be wasted. It is not improbable that in future warfare this example will be widely followed. Colonel Mosby, the celebrated " rough rider " of the Confederacy, has left his opinion that the sabre is a handicap to the cavalryman when two or more pistols can be carried. The troops thus gathered from the great cities and from the farms, from workshops, counters, class-rooms, and fields, were gathered together as speedily as might be in great camps, for instruction, drill, and all the processes of mak- ing a soldier out of a raw recruit. These camps were scattered about the country, the largest beuig at Chicka- mauga, Tennessee, where some thirty-five years earlier the fathers of many of these men now going to fight shoulder to shoulder for the nation had met in deadly battle. But the most important of the great camps was at Tampa, a small settlement on the gulf coast of Florida, convenient to a harbour near the coast of Cuba. Here, by the end of May, were concentrated about 16,000 men, constituting the Fifth Corps, under command of Major-General Shafter. In the main this corps was composed of regulars, for it was intended for the first invasion of Cuba, and the most efficient troops were naturally selected for it. The great body of volunteers was scattered over the country at 184 Blue Jackets of '98 Chickamaiiga, Mobile, Fernandina, Jacksonville, Camp Black, on the wind-swept plains of Long Island, and other points of rendezvous, where officers of the regular army were diligently endeavouring to make the militiaman into a disciplined automaton. In all, before midsummer the army rose to a strength of 274,717 men, of whom 58,688 were regulars. Up to the time of the cessation of hostilities in Cuba less than one-fifth of this army had seen active hostilities, and many regiments were mustered out without having left their camps of instruction. The actual fighting of the war, in the West Indies at least, was done mainly by the little regular army. The camp of the Fifth Corps at Tampa was unique in many respects among the military posts of history. The chief figure of the little town was a great winter-resort hotel, of those Brobdignagian proportions and that bar- baric splendour which characterise the resorts of Florida. Ordinarily it is closed at the season of the year correspond- ing to that which saw Tampa transformed suddenly into an armed camp, but in 1898 it was open in all its gor- geousness through the glaring summer days. Here con- gregated the vast array of begilded officers, the swarming correspondents, the observant foreign attaches, artists looking for material, sightseers and the vast army of womankind who flocked to the spot as soon as it appeared that the movement upon Cuba was not to be immediate. War was declared, and the guns of the navy were thunder- ing against the coast of Cuba; but at Tampa the cool drink on spacious porches, the dance in brightly lighted ballrooms to the strains of music from New York, and the quiet flirtation in shady walks were the most martial occupations of the officers. It was the " sound of revelry by night," like that which Byron describes as ushering in the battle of Waterloo. But in the midst of all the gaiety those whose duties were to prepare for the movement of the troops were busy, anxious, and alert. Indeed, General Shaf ter and his headquarters staff at Blue Jackets of '98 185 Tampa had confronting them a problem which had never before been presented for solution in the army of the United States. For the first time in the history of the nation a foreign country was to be invaded in force. For the first time all the details of an expedition by sea had to be worked out with due regard to the possibility of interference by the enemy's navy, and the difficulties of subsisting in a hostile and already desolated lan.d. Dur- ing the war with Mexico a small military force was moved by sea against the enemy's coast, but neither then nor during the war with the Southern Confederacy was there any hostile navy to be reckoned with. And so, when the problem came to be solved in 1898, it was dis- covered that if all essential technical knowledge was at hand, which is by no means certain, the tools were surely lacking. Not in thirty years had a brigade of the United States army been moved in a body, and as for mobilising and transporting a whole army corps, that was a thing about which our officers might know from their researches in books, but only old fellows who had had general com- mand in the Civil War possessed any practical experience of it. The very earliest days of the war indicated what the later experience proved, that while the line of the army was efficient, while officers and men were good marchers and good fighters, in the staff departments, in the bureaus of commissary and of transportation, we were wofully deficient. Nor was this situation materially improved, as the young and inexperienced men, owing their appointments to political favour, began to appear at the various camps, and take up the tasks of feeding, hous- ing, and transporting the soldiers. It is related of the great Von Moltke, that during the years of peace which preceded the Franco-Prussian War, he laboured incessantly, preparing plans for the mobilisa- tion of the Prussian army on any frontier that might be menaced. Plans of the most elaborate detail were drawn up and corrected day by day. The location of every i86 Blue Jackets of '98 Prussian regiment was noted, the distance and route to the place of rendezvous, the amount of rations necessary on the way, the time it would take to reach the point of mobilisation, and all the myriad particulars of vast im- portance in the aggregate, but each in itself seemingly insignificant, were connoted, and all emergencies prepared for. The story goes, and it is true in substance if not in detail, that, war being declared at midnight, an aide was sent to Von Moltke's quarters to inform him of the fact. The general was in bed. He listened to the officer's tidings in silence. " Very well," said he tranquilly, when the situation was explained. " Look in the third pigeon- hole of the left-hand side of my desk," and therewith returned to his slumbers. This done, there were dis- covered in perfect form, and with the greatest amplitude of detail, the plans for mobilisation of the army on the French frontier, even to the orders to the various corps commanders, so that while Von Moltke slept the de- spatches went winging forth, and the troops began to move to the battle-ground. Nothing so systematic as this was perhaps possible in the United States, since detailed plans for the mobilisation of an army can hardly be prepared without knowledge of the size and disposition of the army, and our army was, in the main, created after the declaration of war was promulgated. Yet it is impossible to doubt that prudent forethought might have obviated many of the difficulties which arose at Tampa, and much of the resulting suffer- ing. The probability of war with Spain had been suffi- ciently great for a year before the actual event to justify the War Department, which is never overpressed with business, in preparing several alternative plans for the mobilisation of the array and the invasion of Cuba. In that event camps would not have been established in spots destitute of water and of shade, like Hempstead Plains, Long Island, nor in localities naturally unhealth- ful, like Chickamauga. And had the difficulty of embark- Blue Jackets of '98 187 ing an expedition of 16,000 men been properly studied, it is not likely that the port chosen would have been one reached by only one line of single-track railroad, almost destitute of yard and shipping switching facilities, — a port where good drinking water was a marketable com- modity, and where the burning sun sapped men's vitality and quickly ruined supplies. The Secretary of War, Hon. Eussell A. Alger, himself said in June : " I do not be- lieve that there ever was a nation on earth that attempted to embark in a war of such magnitude, while so utterly unprovided with everything necessary for a campaign." The Secretary of War went on to extol his department and the army for the manner in which the initial dis- advantages had been met and overcome, and indeed notably good work was done in repairing the faults re- sulting from a notable failure to take precautions when time was plenty. We may note and condemn the obvious faults of the War Department without in any degree un- derestimating the worth of its many successes ; we may show the weakness of our army without forgetting the fact that, despite all weakness, it accomplished speedily and thoroughly the task set it. Criticism of the military methods of the United States in 1898 does not imply a quarrel with success, but rather an indication of the lessons that may be learned from the conduct of this war for the good of the nation should it ever unfortunately be forced into another. While the soldiers of the United States by the tens of thousands were sweltering under the burning sun of southern Florida, clad in uniforms designed for service on the wind-swept plains of Dakota, the military authorities concluded to send arms and munitions of war to the Cuban insurgents, — a body of patriots of whom much was hoped, but from whom little was realised during the progress of the war. It is true that at this moment our own army was so badly equipped as to be the scoff and 1 88 Blue Jackets of '98 jest of the foreign attaches at Tampa. There were regi- ments without uniforms and without arms, regiments in which seventy-five per cent had never fired a gun, and one hundred per cent had never shot at an enemy. There were volunteers and regulars going into service side by side, armed with entirely different types of rifles, so that there could be no interchange of ammunition. The great body of volunteers were equipped with rifles that were use- less within easy range of the Spanish Mausers. All this was known of all men; but the Cubans were in still worse condition, so, turning from the phght of our own people, we undertook to supply the needs of our allies. For this purpose a steamer was obtained — the " Gussie," perhaps the most antiquated vessel then on the Gulf of Mexico. She was a side-wheeler, hence an easy target with all her vital machinery exposed. Her speed was such as to make a monitor seem swift in comparison. This craft, being freighted with several thousand rifles, fifty mules, a number of horses, a quantity of ammunition, and other things useful to a people at war, took on 100 men of the First United States Infantry under command of Captain Dorst, and three members of the insurgent commission, who were to aid in opening communication with the Cubans. Then she set forth to seek a landing- place on the enemy's coast, but not before all the corre- spondents had learned of her mission, and telegraphed about it to their papers, whence it speedily reached Gen- eral Blanco via Madrid. As the ship made first for Havana, before disembarking her cargo, and there steamed about in full view of the observers on shore, it was but natural that the Spaniards thereafter kept a sharp watch on her movements. Up and down the coast her progress was signalised by the quick flashes of the heliographs on the hills, and much of the way bodies of cavalry attended her down the beach. It was therefore not extraordinary that when, on the 12th of May, she cast anchor near i z Blue Jackets of '98 189 Mariel aud prepared to lower boats, a considerable force of Spaniards appeared on the beach ready to oppose any landing. The two auxiliaries which accompanied the " Gussie " cracked away with their one-pounders at the troops on shore until they took to flight, but the expedi- tion moved on to another spot near the entrance of the harbour of Cabanas before landing. Here again failure attended its effort, for the utter lack of secrecy that had characterised the methods of the expedition from the very start had put the Spaniards all along the coast on their guard. Mr. Zogbaum, the well-known artist, had accompanied the expedition as a correspondent for " Har- per's Weekly," and tells of the scene as witnessed from the deck of the ship thus picturesquely : " It is Avell on in the afternoon as we near the entrance to Cabanas Bay, and it is decided to attempt a landing on Arbolitos, the point on the western side. Sounding con- stantly, the big red hulk of our ship creeps closer and closer in towards the reef. With a roar of chain and upward splash of spray the anchor takes the ground, and we swing slowly abreast the beach — in sea parlance, ' close enough to sby a biscuit on shore.' The gunboat, with gentle, easy dip and roll, lies just off our quarter ; a little further out to sea the graceful lines of a diminutive cruiser, the United States gun- boat ' Wasp, ' show up in a gray mass on the unbroken surface of the sea. Of course the ' Gussie ' is short-handed, — who ever knew of a hired transport that was n't ? — and it takes some time to lower the boats. Amid some confusion, for there seems to be no one aboard experienced in such matters to direct their movements, two of the boats are filled and manned by the soldiers, the boat first ' shoved off ' moving up the reef, as if seeking an opening, the second pulling direct for the shore. As it nears the reef the swell begins to lift it, sending it in quick-succeeding leaps rapidly forward, until in a burst and smotlier of foam it plunges right into the surf, almost disap- pearing from view. For a moment we on the ship hold our breath in anxious expectation ; then, as we see one blue-clad form after the other boldly plunge overboard and rush through I go Blue Jackets of '98 the water, stumbling, falling full length, picking themselves up again, in eager emulation to reach the land, while others grab the gunwales of the boat on either side, and shoving it along between them, carry it bodily up on the strand, an enthusiastic shout bursts out, as cheer on cheer goes up for the first American soldiers to set foot on Cuban soil. " Meanwhile the first boat seems to be hard and fast on the reef, teetering up and down in the swell like the 'Gussie's' walking-beam ; but the fine athletic fellows are out of her in a jiffy, and soon, strung out in long skirmish-line on the beach alongside their comrades, move forward into the bush. The Cubans are quickly landed, and the task of setting the horses ashore begins. . . . On the hurricane-deck of the ship, lined up under cover of the hay-bales, the men who form the cover- ing party have been watching the proceedings with anxious interest. Suddenly some way up the beach, right on the edge of the brush, we see something moving. Two or three blue figures emerge partly, and are running forward, arms at a ' trail ; one drops on knee ; with quick, jerky movement up goes " rifle to shoulder, and we see the flash of the discharge, ' By God, they 're attacked ! ' speaks a voice at my side, and simultaneously the air about us is filled with a whirring, humming sound, followed by a distant pattering noise, like; fire-crackers on Independence day. Zip! hum! buzz! the; angry bullets come flying, and a thin blue haze floats over thel brush just beyond where one of the boats has been hauled up; on the shore. * Tenshun ! ' The hardy figures behind the \ hay-bales become rigid. * With magazines, load ! ' A mo- mentary rattling and clicking of steel on steel. ' Aim just the right of the boat on the shore ! Steady ! Fire ! ' and like the discharge of a single piece the volley hits back at the] attacking enemy. Again and again, quietly and as on drill,! the men respond to the orders. The fire on shore rolls here and there, now falling, now rising again, slacking finally to few scattering shots, then dying away. The enemy's attact is repulsed, and he has retired, leaving behind him the bodie| of an officer and two soldiers, victims of the first encounte^ between American and Spanish soldiers on Cuban shoresJ But, victorious as are our men for the time being, tlieir posi-j tion on shore is exceedingly precarious. Our morning's worl Blue Jackets of '98 191 has shown us that the country is swarming with Spanish soldiery. Cabanas is not far distant, the enemy knows our force, and it will not be long before he can confront us in overwhelming numbers. We must try to make the woods too hot to hold him, and so word is sent to our friends of the gunboats with request to shell and drive him away, while dispositions are made to re-embark. " It is a pretty sight to witness as the two gunboats move slowly broadside to the beach. Their fire sweeps the entire length of the jungle, and the boom of the guns, the whir of the projectiles, and the sharp burst of the shells as they plunge in among the trees mingle in one continuous roar, and are added to by the rumi)le of the storm over the land yonder. Time presses, the afternoon is waning, the tide is falling, and the roar of the surf strikes heavier and heavier on tlie ear. Lieutenant-Colonel Dorst, the officer in command of the ex- pedition — his boat upset on landing, casting him and all its occupants into the sea — stands with the Cubans by the trees where the horses are. ^ " Word had been brought off to the ship that our allies, alarmed by the presence of the enemy, hesitated to carry out the mission for which they had been put ashore ; but now we see them saddling the horses, and soon they mount and ride off up the shore, picturesque figures in their wide-brimmed hats and loose cotton garments. Our men have gone forward into the bush again, ready to repel the enemy should he renew the attack ; but now the bugle sounds the recall, and we see them emerging from the trees and gathering in squads on the beach. It is going to be more difficult to re-embark even than it was to land. The boats have to be shoved out to the reef, Avhere the water deepens abruptly, and the surf is angry and growing more violent every moment as the swells run in from the open sea. The men wade into the water, pushing the boat before them, until the reef is reached, and scramble in ; some, up to their necks in tlie water, throw their rifles into the boat, and clinging to the gunwales as the light craft is driven out over the swells, are dragged in by their comrades. A boat from the 'Manning,' as close in to the reef as it can get, lies on its oars waiting to take Dorst off, and I own to a grateful feeling of relief when, after struggling neck-deep through the surf, I 192 Blue Jackets of '98 see him safe in the stern-sheets of the ' Manning's ' boat, the last to leave the shore." At Tampa, in the long dull days of preparation for the start, the air was full of rumours. No one knew where the American attack would be delivered, but the general opinion was that Havana would first be taken. That was the natural expectation, though we know now that from the first the authorities at Washington had decided against besieging the Cuban capital. Captain Sigsbee and General Lee, both of whom had exceptional opportunities to judge of the strength of the defences, have left on record the opinion that it could have been taken easily at the be- ginning of the war. Every day's delay, however, was diligently improved by the Spaniards in extending the fortifications, and as they undoubtedly expected the American attack would be delivered against that city, it was no doubt the part of military wisdom to strike some- where else. Where that would be was the subject of hourly conversation at Tampa ; and Porto Eico, Cienfuegos, Santiago, and Matanzas had each its partisans. The secret was, however, well kept until the last minute. Being destitute of facts on which to base criticism of the plan of campaign, the disapproval of the idlers at Tampa was therefore directed against the wearying delay which con- tinued day after day and week after week. For that criticism there was abundant justification. Swift action might have lodged an invading force in Cuba before Cervera's fleet could get across the Atlantic to menace it. That golden moment gone, it was still essential that action should be immediate in order that the campaign — which all knew would be short — might be ended before the Cuban rainy season with its attendant pestilence should set in. But the Spanish weakness for procrastina- tion seemed to have infected the War Department, and the orders to move were delayed time and again, until the nation began to growl ominously. Early in May the Blue Jackets of '98 193 plan was for a reconnaissance in force to the southern coast of Cuba to establish communication with General Gomez. That was abandoned when the news of Cervera's departure from the Cape Verde Islands was received. Then a month of drill and monotony followed, the com- missary department meanwhile trying to catch up with the work before it. "Even as late as May 21st," writes General Shafter, " some of the regiments were without arms or uniforms." May 30th the moment for action seemed to have arrived. News came from Washington of the blockade of Cervera at Santiago, and the Fifth Corps was ordered to proceed to Santiago and assist in capturing the town and fleet. At the same time came word from General Nelson A. Miles, the major-general commanding the army, that he would take train for Tampa at once. Then began the work of preparing the expedition for its departure. The United States had never seen such a spectacle, nor had the officers of its army ever had such a problem to grapple with. The point of embarkation was Port Tampa, nineteen miles from the camp. A single- track railroad connected the two points, and at the port ran out on a long pier which extended into navigable water, so that the great transports could lie easily by its side. The first plan was to sail on the 8th of June with 10,000 men, and all were embarked, after heart-rend- ing confusion and delays, and some of the transports were well out to sea, when a telegram arrived from Washington ordering a halt. Somebody had seen some vessels out in the St. Nicholas channel which were suspected of being Spanish men-of-war, and the loaded transports were hurried back to the safe shelter of Port Tampa. We know now that no Spanish cruisers were at large at that moment, but the precaution was nevertheless a wise one. Even a single hostile torpedo boat might do dire damage in a fleet of crowded transports. Again on the 10th the fleet started only to turn around and steam ignominiously 13 194 Blue Jackets of '98 back to its moorings, with all the good-byes to be said over again, the cheering and the patriotic airs with which the troops were bidden Godspeed by those left behind all expended untimely. These repeated delays could not but have a tendency to demoralise the men, and they cer- tainly put a heavy strain on the quartermaster's depart- ment. The troops were provided with rations for the voyage to the point of landing, which a few knew to be Santiago, but they were not fitted out for a week's stay in port and then a voyage on top of that. The single- track railroad which connected the long pier with civili- sation and markets was overtaxed by this new and unex- pected demand. In a sandy country hemmed in by salt water potable water was scarce and precious — two cents a gallon was the price the owner of the only considerable supply demanded for his fluid. Accordingly the water on the ships was stale, ill-smelling, and unhealthful. Colonel Astor offered to buy enough for all the ships at this price if it would be accepted ; but General Shafter, feeling doubtless that there was a limit to the amount of financial assistance that soldiers of the nation should accept from even the most patriotic millionaire, declined the offer. So drinking doubtful water, most scantily fed, cooped up on ships, with little shade and less room for exercise, the men waited most impatiently for the order which should really mean " Forward." It came June 14th. By this time the fleet and the army had grown in size. An army of 17,000 men was embarked on thirty-two troop ships, convoyed by four- teen men-of-war. The troop ships were great floating barracks with berths in tiers, built of pine, and men by day swarming over every part of the ship. At night — the hot calm nights of the tropics — all who could slept on deck, so that there was scarcely room for the seamen to pass amid the recumbent forms. Circling about the flotilla were swift torpedo boats and converted yachts, like cowboys riding about a herd keeping all in place, while Blue Jackets of '98 195 the great battleship " Indiana " and the other heavier vessels of the convoy kept pace with the flotilla and watched cautiously for any sign of an enemy. The light-heartedness with which the American people had embarked on this war characterised their method of con- ducting some of the most vital movements in it. Thousfh within fiity miles of a hostile coast, this great flotilla of ships went steaming along night after night, with all lights burning, men singing lustily, and often a band play- ing to while away the time. True, the convoy was vastly superior to any Spanish naval force that could by any possibility be in those waters, but the opportunity for a dash by a torpedo boat or even an auxiliary fitted with rapid-fire guns was such as has seldom been offered a belligerent. Ordinarily the fleet was so extended that the vessels in the rear were lost to sight for hours at a time, while at one point the contour of the channel was such that the forty-eight large ships were crowded into a strait only seven miles across. But perfect weather and an absolute quiescence on the part of the Spaniards contributed to make the voyage absolutely uneventful It was another opportunity lost to the enemy, — another instance of such entire lack of audacity or even ordinary naval alertness on the part of the Spaniards as to make it clear that the United States, because of their easy victory over that power, must not feel themselves ready to grapple at a moment's notice with a really first-class military and naval nation. June 20th the great fleet arrived off Santiago, and the blue jackets of the blockading squadron climbed on the rails of the great steel ships and cheered for the coming army. Admiral Sampson made haste in his launch to call on General Sh after, and arrangements were at once made for a joint visit to the Cuban General Garcia, whose camp was not far away. Boats put ashore the admiral, the general, and a small army of newspaper corres- . pendents alert for this historic interview. A ride of two 196 Blue Jackets of '98 miles up the hills into the interior brought the party to the patriot camp. On either side ragged native soldiery lined the road, well armed, showing signs of discipline, and of course intensely interested in the arrival of the Ameri- cans who were to win for them the liberty for which they had so long and manfully striven against heavy odds. General Garcia himself was absent w^hen the camp was reached, and his of&cers vied with each other in their efforts to contribute to the comfort of the visiting officers until he could be summoned. They had little in their scanty commissary stores to offer, but all they had was pressed upon the visitors with almost pathetic insistence. Cocoanuts, limes, pineapples, mangoes, and coffee w^ere about the scope of the list of Cuban delicacies in Garcia's camp, and while the new arrivals were devouring these in a hut thatched with palm-trees and looking down to the sea, there was a stir without, and Garcia came. The Cuban general was straight and gaunt of frame, dark and grizzled of face, with white hair, a flashing eye, and, carved deep in his forehead, a bullet wound marking his effort to kill himself once when, a prisoner in Spanish hands, he sought rather certain death than the mercy of his captors. His dark face was set off by a heavy white moustache and imperial, giving him a pronounced resemblance, one of the spectators noted, to Caprivi, the German chancellor and successor to Bismarck. He wore a linen uniform and high military boots, with a slouch hat. However uncouth the exigencies of a starvehng commissary might make his troops appear, Garcia was always in dress the officer and the gentleman. It may be said that this scrupulous neatness in dress was a char- acteristic as well of most of the Cuban officers of elevated rank. Contrasted with the spare form of the Cuban leader was the ponderous Shaffer, a very leviathan of a man in the sober blue garb of a United States major- general. Admiral Sampson, in immaculate white duck, slight and turning gray, made the third in a trio of figures Blue Jackets of '98 197 destined to become historic in the annals of the western hemisphere. Garcia had with him about 4000 Cuban soldiers, moderately well armed, but sadly destitute of rations and clothing. They had some cattle on the hoof, but in the main subsisted on fruits and roots. His pres- ence at that point was the first useful result of the mis- sion of Lieutenant Eowan, some account of which has been given in an earher chapter. He instantly put himself and his men at the disposal of the American commanders, saying that he regarded this moment as the culmination of his long struggle for liberty, and that he believed victory now assured. General Shafter replied that he was without authority to conclude any arrangement with the Cubans other than to accept their aid if freely offered, but he wished particularly the benefit of Garcia's superior knowledge of the topography of the country and the numbers and disposition of the Spanish forces. On these subjects the three commanders talked for some hours, the Cuban generals Eabi and Castillo being summoned to the conference, with the result that at the end a plan of campaign was determined upon and formulated in the following memorandum : "About 12,000 Spanish soldiers at Santiago and vicinity. Spaniards can concentrate at any moment about 4000 on the west. Proposal made of a feint of 3000 or 4000 men at some point west of Santiago de Cuba, and then land expedition at Daiquiri and march on Santiago, Plan proposed for General Castillo to have about 1000 men at Daiquiri, while navy bom- bards, and will capture escaping Spaniards. General Shafter then proposed a plan that on the morning of the 22d he would have the navy bombard Daiquiri, Aguadores, Siboney, and Cabanas, as a feint, and land whole expedition at Daiquiri. About 5000 Spanianls between city and Daiquiri. General Garcia says Daiquiri is the best base, and General Shafter accepts it. The following numbers of Spaniards were then , given by General Castillo : force at Daiquiri, near wharf, 300 men; at Siboney, 600 men; Aguadores, 150 men; Jutici, 150 198 Blue Jackets of '98 men; Sardinero, 100 men. It was then decided that General Castillo will take on board the transports 500 men from Aser- raderos, to be landed at Tajababo and joined to his command now there and 500 strong ; with this 1000 men he will be at Daiquiri, and assist at landing on the morning of the 22d. General Rabi will, on 22d, make a demonstration at Cabanas (to the west) with 500 men, while navy shells. It was then decided by General Garcia to bring his men, about 3000 or 4000 strong, from his camp near Palma to Aserraderos, and be ready to embark on the transports the morning of the 24th, and then be taken to Daiquiri, to join General Shafter. To-mor- row (the 21st) navy will make transfer of 500 men to Tajababo, under General Castillo; 500 men under General Kabi will make demonstration on Cabaiias on the morning of the 22d." The interview terminated, the guests, followed by the retinue of correspondents and foreign attaches who had been industriously taking notes and making snapshot photographs the while, started for the coast. Garcia mounted his horse, and rode along, while the ragged army was drawn up in double lines along the road to do the i new allies honour. Once back at the ships, immediate steps were taken to give the plan of campaign effect. ^ Two thousand rations were sent to the Cuban camp, and the next day 500 Cubans were carried by the navy to join ; the 500 under command of General Castillo at Tajababo. Then some of the transports steamed down towards Cabaiias, as if to threaten a landing there, while the navy made demonstrations at divers points along the shore in order to divert the attention of the Spaniards from the real landing-point, which was to be at Daiquiri. ThsDi there was rest of a sort on the crowded transports, ioi, every man knew that the next morning at six o'clock th(i work would begin of landing through the rolling surf or a beach probably lined with hostile sharpshooters. • | J CHAPTEE X The Landing at Daiquiri — Flight of the Enemy — Good Fortune attending the Invaders — Difficulty of land- ing Stores — The Advance into the Interior — Con- ference AT Siboney — March of the Rough Riders — Fight at Guasimas — Bravery and Heavy Loss of the Americans — The Regulars in Action — The Losses and the Value of the Victory. ^"^HE merits of the campaign of Santiago, judged from the view-point of the military critic, will probably be long the subject of controversy. To begin with, there is at least a reasonable doubt whether or not the army should have been called upon at all. The town was of import- ance to the United States only because in its harbour lay the Spanish fleet. That fleet once destroyed, Santiago was of the very least value to us. As the effect of the tactics employed by our forces, the Spanish fleet was compelled to leave the harbour, and instantly fell into the clutches of Sampson and Schley, who suffered not one ship to escape. But this triumph, though won at slight expense to the navy, cost the army dear ; and the question arises why the army should have been called upon to perform a task which seems to have been naturally that of the navy. It is true that Cervera lay under protecting batteries, but so did Montojo at Manila. It is possible that the harbour was mined, but so was the harbour of Mobile on that hot afternoon of August when Farragut shouted, " Damn the I torpedoes ! Go ahead ! " Looking back upon the opera- tions about Santiago, and counting their cost, it seems that the part of common-sense would have been for the ships to go in after the enemy instead of waiting a month for the army to painfully force him out. However, the latter 200 Blue Jackets of '98 was the course determined upon at Washington, and the war was fought from Washington, — an innovation which a distinguished British admiral remarked is ominous for the future of naval tactics. The task that the strategists at Washington set for General Shafter and his army was to land near Santiago, secure, and intrench a position commanding the city, and finally take it by assault or siege. Already an American force was intrenched at Guantanamo Bay, where the marines from the squadron landed and established Camp McCalla. But this was too far from the objective point, and a nearer landing-place was sought. Daiquiri, twelve miles east of the entrance of Santiago Bay, was selected, chiefly because there was there a small pier, and roads ran thence through the dense thickets into the interior. June 22d, the morning of the landing, was clear and scorching hot. On every transport the men were up early, and eagerly scanning the mysterious shores that held for them all the possibilities of war. They saw a mountainous coast sloping abruptly to the beach, cut at two points down to the water-level by narrow slots, at the mouth of which little villages could be dimly made out, — villages for the most part of thatched huts scarcely distinguishable from the dense forest surrounding. A few red-tiled roofs peeped out from the trees, and clouds of smoke rising into the still hot air from each little set- tlement told that the Spaniards were burning their houses as they fled to the woods. Those woods were menacing. Thick and impenetrable, they afforded the best possible cover for sharpshooters, and the steep hills suggested many a point of vantage for a battery to contest the right to land, or to cut to pieces any marching column that should attempt one of the narrow roads leading off towards Santiago. One village was about five miles dis- tant from the group of transports. That was Siboney. Immediately in front of the anchored ships a little pier extended some 500 feet into the water. This was Dai- GENKRAI, WIl.I.IA.M R. SIIAKIF.R Blue Jackets of '98 201 qiiiri, where a very considerable mining-industry had been conducted by Americans before the revolution ended peaceful industry in Cuba. Through the quiet air, quivering vv^ith heat, came the sound of distant cannonades, for the navy had been asked to attack fiercely several small harbours in the neighbour- hood, that the Spaniards might be kept busy and their attention diverted from the actual point of landing. But the men on the ships had little time to study the tropical landscape presented to their view, nor to speculate concerning the possibilities latent in the jungles along- shore, for the command soon came to pack and prepare to land. The smaller vessels of the navy ran close inshore and searched the bushes with insistent shells, while from the larger ships strings of boats, with a launch at the head of each to tow, could be seen making for the transports. The facilities for landing other than those supplied by the navy were exceedingly inadequate. General Shafter had ordered three tugs and two barges brought for this pur- pose, but only one tug and one barge arrived; but the friendly aid of the navy made good the lack. By and by the men on the crowded decks began to show themselves, girt about with rolls carrying their slender luggage — there was little enough of it, for they thought they under- stood the Cuban climate ; but four hours after the roads about Daiquiri were strewn with the little they did take, and the army went stripped to its shirt, trousers, and shoes. The Eighth Infantry was the first to land, and the First, General Shafter's old regiment, followed. Those still on the ships looked eagerly after the vanguard. All expected a fierce fight at the water's edge. From the " Seguranca," the headquarters ship, the correspondents and foreign at- taches who had not been permitted to land watched through their glasses for the volley which all felt sure awaited the first boat when it should reach the surf. " They are waiting to see the whites of their eyes," said some one, reminiscent of colonial tactics at Bunker HilL 202 Blue Jackets of '98 On the high ground commanding the beach was a Spanish block-house, so there could be no doubt that the ground was known to the enemy. But the boats drew up to the pier without a sound from the shore, and hung there bobbing up and down in the heavy surf, while the men clambered out and catching up their rifles made for the beach as fast as possible. Still no sign of an attack. Some blue-coated figures disappeared in the forest, and in a minute there resounded the crack of rifles. Was the expected battle open at last ? Apparently not, for immediately the Ameri- cans were seen clustering about the block-house, and pres- ently a small United States flag rose and fluttered above it, while all the whistles in the fleet shrieked shrilly, men cheered hoarsely, and the foreign attaches who had come across the Atlantic and the Pacific to see a real war settled disappointedly down to the conviction that the Spaniards would not fight at all. It is needless to say that this erroneous opinion was corrected at San Juan and El Caney a day later. It being apparent that no resistance was to be appre- hended at the moment, the work of landing proceeded apace. The spot was not the best imaginable. The pier at Daiquiri was so high above the water that the men liad to throw their rifles on it first, and then clamber up the piles from a boat which was bobbing up and down in a high rolling surf. The terrible execution which Spanish sharpshooters in the woods could have done during this deliberate operation shocks the imagination. At Siboney was no pier at all, and at neither landing-place was there any anchorage, so that the transports were compelled to steam up and down to prevent being blown out to sea or on shore. Fortune favoured the invaders here again, for though iu was the season of hurricanes and even a moder- ate storm would have cut the army in two, half being carried out to sea and the rest left to the mercy of a su- perior force of Spaniards on shore, the weather remained calm and the Spaniards were as quiet as the winds. It Blue Jackets of '98 203 must be remembered, too, that the landing of the men and the horses was the easiest part of the undertaking. The former, with the quick adaptability of the American sol- dier, devised means for overcoming the difficulties of the situation, while the latter were landed by the simple pro- cess of being thrown overboard and compelled to swim for their lives. The mules, long trained to follow a mare hung with a bell, were guided in their swim by men who walked the beach ringing a dinner-bell with might and main, while the horses responded readily to the word of command. About twenty animals were lost in the process of landing, and two men who fell from the boats while trying to scale the pier were carried down by their heavy equipments and drowned. So light a loss in so large an expedition silences criticism of the plan. It was another of the many cases in our war with Spain in which good luck took the place of good management. The lack of facilities for quick and safe landing proved more serious, however, when the stores came to be put on shore. An army of 16,000 men on land with one day's rations in their packs and everything else — artillery, am- munition, rations, ambulances, medical stores, and the like — on thirty ships afloat without anchorage on an unpro- tected and dangerous coast in a season of high winds, is in a serious position. Freight cannot under the best circum- stances be landed from small boats with expedition, and many circumstances combined to make the landing of the stores unusually slow. To begin with, there was a great shortage of boats. One big scow towed from Tampa was the main reliance, and to it for awhile were added several old lighters which the chief quartermaster had found on the beach. But the management of these vessels was put in the hands of soldiers, landsmen all, with the result that the lighters were speedily stove against the pier or swamped in the surf. Then the small rowboats of the transports were employed to land tons of freight — nat- urally a slow and difficult task. It was not made easier 204 Blue Jackets of '98 by the captains of the transports, who, not being enlisted men but merely hired with their ships, conceived their first duty to be to the owners of their craft, and with an excess of caution lay from three to ten miles out at sea, often out of reach of any signal and never able to com- prehend the wigwagging of the navy code. This could have been remedied had General Shafter exerted the authority he undoubtedly possessed, and put every captain under military authority ; but he did not do it, and much of the time of the boats was spent in chasing steamers over miles of sea for another load of needed munitions. Another grave weakness, discovered of course when dis- covery cost most, was the fact that in loading the ships no effort had been made to put the things likely to be needed first where they could be most easily come at. Moreover, articles belonging to the same branch of the service, as for example medical stores, were scattered among twenty vessels, so that each would have to be ran- sacked to find a given thing. This led to the gravest results. When fever broke out in the trenches before Santiago, it was almost impossible to get medical stores. Cots for the sick, surgical instruments, medicines, and disinfectants were least obtainable when most wanted, and the frantic surgeons who rode through the woods to the shore to seek for themselves could not even get boats in which to go to the ships in search of what they needed. It is probable that, though there was never a sufficiency of medical stores on the field, large quantities were carried back to the United States in the returning transports, simply because they had not been found in season to be of use. Certainly an immense quantity of miscellaneous !| stores were thus sent back. As for the difficulty of keep- ing the army supplied with rations, General Shafter in hia i| report admits that " it was not until nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible to place on shore three days' supplies in excess of those required for daily consumption." Blue Jackets of '98 205 The strategic plan of campaign is less open to criticism than the details of the arrangements for landing the army, nor, indeed, can an unprofessional student of military events presume so justly to comment upon it. The sub- stance of General Shafter's plan was to attack Santiago from the landward side. It has been urged since that a wiser strategy would have been to proceed down the rail- way which runs along the coast to Aguadores, and thence proceed westward along the coast, under cover of the guns of the fleet, to Morro at the mouth of Santiago Bay. At that point, without attempting to storm or reduce the castle, he could go inland to the shore of Estrella Bay, and seize the shore station from which the submarine mines were operated. With this once in the hands of friends, the fleet could enter the harbour and aid the army in fighting its way up to the city. This plan viewed superficially seems to be admirable. The aid of the fleet, which could concentrate upon any point in the front of the advancing army a fire of 100 projectiles a second, would have made resistance almost impossible ; the trans- ports could have kept pace with the troops, and the sup- plies would therefore have been at all times near at hand, and the proximity of the open sea might have averted those malarial diseases which, as we shall see later, almost destroyed the army in its pestilential trenches. Two objec- tions to the plan suggest themselves. Much of the railroad line to Aguadores passed over a long trestle which the Spaniards burned, and the other roads were even worse than the direct ones to Santiago which the troops followed. Furthermore — and this is General Shafter's own explana- tion of his plan — the orders to the army directed the capture of the Spanish forces. An advance by the coast would have left General Linares, who commanded in Santi- ago, ample opportunity to abandon the city and retreat into the interior with all his army, in case of serious reverses. Should he do so, the war would be prolonged for another year at least, for in the rainy season, tlien 2o6 Blue Jackets of '98 approaching, no American force could follow him. By attacking the city from its landward side, all opportunity for retreat was denied the enemy. It is true that the event showed the Spaniards not at all anxious to take to the forests and prolong the war. When opportunity came to surrender, not only the force caught in Santiago was dehvered up, but all the troops in that military district, thus indicating an entire willingness to submit to the inevitable after Spanish honour had been satisfied. How- ever, this dispositioa on the part of the enemy could not have been foreseen, and the wisdom of General Shafter's course depends upon the question whether the advantage derived from capturing the enemy was a fair set-off to the loss to his own campaign due to the selection of a difficult and miasmatic line of attack. The plan actually adopted by the general took the men into the interior as fast as they were landed. Cubans were employed as scouts, while back of them were small detachments of our own men deployed on either side of the road and keeping closely in touch all along the line. By night of the first day of the disembarkation, 6000 men were ashore and trudging along the narrow road, walled in by almost impenetrable banks of foliage, in which poisonous, thorny, saw-edged, and matted greenery made the progress of the pickets slow and painful, and clattering land-crabs scuttled about, startling the soldiers with their hideous looks. The army was one of regular soldiers almost wholly; the Second Massachusetts, the Seventy-first New York, and the First Volunteer Cavalry or Eough Eiders, being the only volunteej organisations in the corps. The cavalry regiments fought on foot, for no horses had been brought except for pack trains. On the first two days, as the commands made their way from the landing-places at Siboney and Daiquiri to the villages of the same names a few miles in the interior, there was little resistance offered. Both towns had been held by the enemy, but from both they had discreetly retreated as Blue Jackets of '98 207 news of the American advance preceded the column, and such of the houses as were not burned by the navy's shells or the torches of the fugitives served as quarters for men who had been crowded on stifling transports for a week, — a utihsation of doubtful value, as the huts harboured the germs of more than one epidemic disease. On the 23d the Cubans in advance of General Young's division, slipping through the jungle toward the threatened city, had come upon a body of Spaniards, clearly the rear- guard of the retreating army. Eifles had flashed, and bullets flew ; but neither party was eager for a fight, and the Spaniards continued their flight, while the scouts re- turned to Siboney to notify General Wheeler, who was in command there, as General Shafter was still aboard ship, that the enemy was in the front. There was a consultation that night between Wheeler, General Young, Colonel Wood, and General Castillo, whose Cubans brought the news. The latter described the country to his col- leagues. From Siboney two roads perforated the forest toward Santiago. One, a mere trail, useful for pack- horses, but impassable to anything on wheels, runs straight up over a high ridge to the north of the town and turns west to a point about four miles away, where it joins the other, a wagon-road which has reached the same spot by a more circuitous route around the base of the hills. The junction is called Guasimas. Colonel Wood was ordered to take his Rough Eiders over the hill. In General Shafter's original plan the Eough Eiders had no business to be there in the van at all ; but that restless body, instead of loafing about the beach on landing and letting others take the road ahead of them, had made a forced march at night and reported at the rendezvous at Siboney ahead of many commands which landed before them. While these eager volunteers were to scale the hills, the regulars, consisting of four troops each of the First and Tenth Cavalry, with four Hotchkiss guns were to take the wagon trail. Both parties started about sunrise. 2o8 Blue Jackets of '98 A Cuban guide led the way, and immediately behind him came Sergeant Hamilton Fish, of Captain Capron's troop, a young New Yorker of an historic and wealthy family, a mighty athlete in college, and a famous " man-about- town " since his graduation. Under him were four men, as scouts. Then followed Capron's troop, chosen for the difficult post of vanguard because of the experience and courage of their commander. Then a gap, after which came General Wood, Colonel Eoosevelt, aides, and two newspaper correspondents. Then the body of the Rough Riders in single file, for the trail was narrow and steep. Usually in the advance of a column through a hostile country, men are thrown out on either side as flankers, to see that none of the enemy are passed and left in the rear, but in this march this was impossible. The thickets on either side were too dense for men to make their way through. At one point a log spanned a stream, and over it the men filed one by one. The column advanced steadily without anything in the demeanour of officers or men to suggest that the first serious battle of the war was at hand. Tlie men talked of the novel country through which they were passing, and discussed its hunting possi- bilities until the word came from the head of the column to keep silence in the ranks. Then a halt and an order to fill magazines. That meant fight, but no excitement was manifested in the ranks. " The men," says Colonel Roose- velt, "were totally unconcerned. ... I could hear the group nearest me discussing in low murmurs, not the Spaniards, but the conduct of a certain cow-puncher in quitting work on a ranch and starting a saloon in a New Mexican town." Edward Marshall, a correspondent who was shot down early in the fight, writes : " These volunteers had been so long in preparation, so many weary days liad elapsed since they first buttoned tlieir uni- forms over hearts beating with tremendous primary patriotic en- thusiasm, that now they were taking things calmly, and talk- ing about dogs and the imperfections of army shoes. One (;KNKRAI, I.KOiVARI) WOOD. Blue Jackets of '98 209 man persistently blew paste balls at his neighbours. (Two hours later I saw him lying livid and dead in the high grass. He had been hit by a diHerent kind of missile.) Spaniards and fighting seemed as far away to them as the cities of Asia Minor do to the school-boy studying geography, they had been carrying idle guns and ammunition so long. Indeed, it was hard for any of us to realise the actuality of the enemy. " ' ! Would n't a glass of cold beer taste good ? ' said one, whereupon others threw pebbles and sand at him for sug- gesting such an impossible ecstasy. There was much good- humour. " The halting-place was one of the few points on the trail at which the surrounding underbrush gave way so that a view of the neighbouring country could be had. On the right of the column the tropical foliage sprung up thick and impenetrable to a height of fifteen feet. On the left was a stout wire fence shutting off broad fields of high grass, into which here and there the jungle foliage cut in little islets and peninsulas of denser green. Wood and Capron dismounted here, and went cautiously down the trail ahead. The men in the ranlcs began to grow more serious, and those of Capron's troop brought their guns to a ready and knelt by the side of the fence, peering across the fields to the thickets beyond, as though suspecting danger. Presently the officers returned. Signs of the Spaniards were plentiful, a dead body being discovered in the road just ahead, presumably at the point of yesterday's skirmish with the Cubans. So the main force of the Rough Riders was deployed in line of battle to the left of the road where the open fields lay. Lieutenant-Colonel Roose- velt with three troops was ordered into the dense forest on the right. Capron continued down the trail. The men had hardly secured the positions to which they had been ordered when the storm burst with a rattle of Mauser rifles and a singing of bullets through the trees. " The noise of the Mauser bullet," writes Edward Marshall, who not only heard many but felt one, " is not impressive 14 2IO Blue Jackets of '98 enough to be really terrifying until you have seen what it does when it strikes. It is a nasty, malicious little noise, like the soul of a very petty and mean person turned into sound." It was an irritating sound, however, and at it and the sight of leaves cut away about them by the flying bullets, some of the men began to swear. " Don't swear, men," growled out Wood ; " SHOOT ! " That raised a laugh, and restored self-possession to any who might have been about to lose it. The fire was a galling one, the more so because the absolute freedom of the Spanish powder from smoke made it impossible to tell whence came the stinging darts that struck men down. The high penetrating power of the Mauser bullets made them doubly deadly. They would cut through a palm-tree without losing anything of their murderous force, and many instances are recorded of two or more men struck down by the same vicious bolt. The attack fell first on Capron's men. Sergeant Fish fell at the first fire, shot through the heart. " It would be just my luck to get put out in the first fight and see nothing of the war," he had said at Tampa. Captain Capron, a gallant young soldier of a family of soldiers, found in that volley his death- warrant. Next day his father left for a brief time his battery before the Spanish lines, and came over to where the body of his son lay on the rank grass. He looked a moment on the still features, then stooped and kissed the icy face. " Well done, boy, well done ! " was all he said as he went back to the battle. The men in the road were being cut to pieces, and it was evident that the Spaniards knew the topography of the region perfectly, so accurate was their fire. Though not more than eighty yards away, they could not be seen by any of the Americans. The troops with Eoosevelt in the bushes were suffering less, partly because the men were more widely deployed and offered a less conspicuous target, partly because the foliage that made progress difficult also impeded the enemy's aim. What was going on in the J m Blue Jackets of '98 21 1 other parts of the field they could only guess by the sounds. Once the hum of machine guns was heard. All supposed that the Hotchkiss cannon, of which Lieutenant Tih'any had charge, had been brought up and were open- ing on the Spaniards. " Poor fellows ! Now will they be good ! " were the cries arising from the American lines ; but it was not till night that they learned that it was the Spanish Gatlings opening on the men in the road the deadly fire that struck down Capron and Fish. For the men in the woods the advance was almost a matter of individual dh-ection. If one could keep in touch with the man to the right and the one to the left of him, it was the utmost possible ; farther down the line the palms, the softly waving vines, the gay flowers hid all in a vernal shield. The opportunity was tempting for skulking, but few yielded. In the main the line pressed on, men crawl- ing under boughs where the limbs hung low, dropping to the ground when the fire was heavy, and running eagerly forward when some open space invited a dash. The diffi- culty of the ground and the impossibility of maintaining communications with all parts of the army caused some costly confusion. At one point in the battle an officer came running, crying to the men to stop firing, that they were shooting down their own comrades. Of course they stopped, horror-struck at the thought ; but after the battle a Spanish captive taken on that part of the line com- mented on the curious custom of American soldiers of advancing without firing. At another moment a column of the enemy passed within easy range of the men with Eoosevelt, but it was so absolutely impossible to determine that they were not Cuban allies that the fire of the troop- ers was withheld. At last the men on the right broke from the thickets and came in view of the Spanish posi- tion. A ravine separated tlie enemy from the Eiders, and on a ridge beyond the Spanish lines were fixed in a sort of obtuse angle, the apex of which extended towards the gap which lay between Wood's lines and those of General 212 Blue Jackets of '98 Young. Here was a large red-tiled building, whicli seemed to harbour an enemy ; so with a cheer and a rush — the very sensation of being in the open where a rush was possible was invigorating — it was charged and taken. It was found deserted, but with great heaps of empty car- tridge shells, showing that earlier in the tight it had shel- tered a considerable and active body of the enemy. The battle was by this time approaching its end. Meanwhile the column of regulars under General Young had swung along down the wagon-road until they too encountered the enemy. That day the doubt whether the Spaniards would fight or whether they could shoot was effectually dispelled. The route was more open than that which the Eough Eiders had followed, and the enemy was discovered at a greater distance. A row of battered straw hats appearing over a stone wall a quarter of a mile away was the enemy's first appearance to General Young, and after examining the phenomenon a few moments he ordered up the Hotchkiss cannon, and sent word for the troops to follow in ten minutes. It was more like civilised fighting — if any fighting is truly civilised — on that front, and less like bushwhacking, than the tactics to which the Eiders were reduced. There was a pause after the guns came up, for General Young did not wish to go into action until the men with Wood and Eoosevelt on the other road should be engaged. But when the first cannon opened the response was so swift and accurate that one of the artillerymen fell where he stood beside his piece. The Spaniards evidently had the range of that position accu- rately. Then the First Cavalry rushed forward, and the fight began. It is probable that no troops in the world are superior to the American regulars in action. Our army is so small that recruiting officers are enabled to be exclusive, and the men enlisted are picked men of their class. As the term of enlistment is short, those who are not fit for a soldier's life or who have a distaste for it quickly drop out, and the Blue Jackets of '98 213 American soldier who re-enlists is apt to do so for the love of a calling for which he has special aptitude. This campaign against Santiago was fought in the main by regulars, and this battle at La Guasimas was the first engagement of regular troops against a foreign foe since the war with Mexico. But these men, particularly those whose shoulder-straps or chevrons showed sign of long service, were veterans nevertheless. They had fought Indians on the arid plains of the Southwest and the bleak and wintry prairies of the North, and had seen serv'ice against bandits on the Mexican frontier. The business of war was no new thing to them, and they went about it in the unaccustomed surroundings of a tropical forest with professional calmness. They moved forward coolly, losing heavily, it is true, but driving the enemy from one posi- tion after another. After a few minutes the sound of guns on the left gave tidings that the volunteers were engaged as well, and now and then a shout and once a guidon waved from a tree told where the Rough Riders were pressing the foe. Finally a charge up a hill sent the Spaniards fleeing down the road to Santiago, the left of the Tenth Cavalry and the right of the First Volunteer Cavalry were joined, and thus the coloured regulars and the cow-punching, club-haunting volunteers in happy har- mony dashed madly off in fruitless pursuit. The field of La Guasimas was won, and to the phrase which gained currency in the Civil War, " The coloured troops fought nobly," was added a new one, — " Cowboys, dudes, and football players make good soldiers." Somebody has said of the campaign against Santiago that it was fought and won by the individual soldiers. The purport of the phrase is that the generals' plans had little to do with the victory. This may be, and doubtless is, an overstatement ; but the battle at Guasimas was, beyond doubt, one in which the devotion and intelligence of the private soldier were all important. The difficul- ties of the ground and the impossibility of detecting the 2 14 Blue Jackets of '98 Spanish positions because of the smokeless powder, threw upon the men who carried rifles the duty of winning the fight by sheer tenacity of purpose, advancing as seemed to them best, and trusting to break the Spanish lines when they were encountered. Because of the great part that in- dividual valour played on this field, the many illustrations of it told by eye-witnesses are as important as interesting. Captain Capron, being struck down early in the action with a wound he knew to be mortal, called to a man near bv '^ and now and then a pack train with ammunition, spatter- ing with mire the plodding men as they passed. In those patient, toiling columns were the dismounted cavalry regi- ments under Generals Sumner and Wood, including the Eough Riders, and six regiments of regular infantry under General Kent. Their task for the first day was to march to the edge of the woods fronting the Spanish position at San Juan. There they were to bivouac for the night, and in the morning attack, when they heard Lawton's guns at El Caney. It was expected, when the plan of Blue Jackets of '98 229 battle was formulated, that the little stone fort on the hill would delay Lawton only briefly, and when he had run over El Caney the troops before San Juan were to swing in behind him, and completely invest the city on the north. But both at El Caney and at San Juan the enemy's stand was unexpectedly plucky, the headquarters plan was smashed, and, but that the soldiers and regimental commanders took authority into their own hands and adopted the t;^ctics that the situation on the field of battle dictated, the day might have been lost. The men who saved the day were ill fed, half clothed, left by the ineffi- ciency of their superiors without food to maintain their health or medicines to restore it when lost. The utterly insufficient methods of maintaining communication with the base of supplies at Daiquiri had resulted in the troops being kept on half rations during the days of the heaviest fighting, — a time when, if ever, a soldier should be supplied with everything needed to keep his physical strength at the highest point. The cheerfulness of the army under these circumstances was the mar\^el of the foreign attaches. The men accepted half rations or no rations at all, with only a little good-natured grumbling, and the loud cheers which greeted the arrival of a wagon train supposed to be rations changed but little in their note of enthusiasm when the load proved to be ammunition, or even, as in one case, an observation balloon, which in the end served only as a means of making the enemy's fire more accurate and murderous. San Juan was a typical Spanish stronghold. Along a ridge ran lines of earthworks connecting block-houses which stood on little peaks rising above the general crest of the hill. Before the trenches were entanglements of barbed wire to catch and hold an assailant while the deadly Mausers from the heights beyond did their work. For some hundreds of yards the ground sloped away in front, largely denuded of trees and brush but covered with grass waist deep. The road from Siboney debouched on 230 Blue Jackets of '98 this clearing at a point in full command of the Spanish guns. To either side of the road extended heavy thickets, through which shells and Mauser bullets could indeed make their way easily, but the passage for men was pain- ful and slow. The attacking force had spent the night in the vicinity of El Poso. From there to Santiago it was about three miles, and from the place of bivouac the soldiers could see the lights glittering in the streets of the city which was to be their goal. How heavy a toll of human life was to be exacted for passage over that short stretch of quiet country road ! Half-way to Santiago was San Juan. Dawn found the troops turning out, cooking a hasty and insufficient breakfast and preparing for the advance. Through the rising mist, ominous foreteller of malarial ills to come, they could look across to the enemy's works, see the Spanish flag floating proudly, and mark the morning smoke rising gently above the red roofs of San Juan. Wheeler's cavalry division — then in command of General Sumner, Wlieeler being ill — lay on the hill of El Poso about the guns of Grimes's battery. Kent's division had bivouacked near the road farther back. The task of the morning for these commands was to proceed down the road to a speci- fied point in the enemy's front, there deploy to right and left until Sumner's right should join Lawton's left — the latter officer being expected to have run over the little fort at El Caney by that time — and Kent's left touch the right of Duffield, who was expected to drive the Span- iards from a position they held at Aguadores. Thus com- pleted, the line was to sweep over San Juan and on to Santiago. The first and chief obstacle to the complete fulfilment of the plan was the stubbornness of the Spanish defence at El Caney, where Lawton was held until late in the afternoon instead of being ready to co-operate with Sumner and Kent by nine o'clock, as was hoped. A second obstacle was the failure of Duffield to carry his objective point at all. This did not, however, materially Blue Jackets of '98 231 affect the final result, though, had the Spaniards been as aggressive as they were plucky in defence, they might have taken advantage of Duffield's failure to outflank our lines on the left with possibly disastrous results. Grimes opened fire at sunrise. A great cloud of smoke indicated his position with precision to the enemy, who responded at once with well-aimed shells. The effect showed the onlookers the unwisdom of stationing un- sheltered troops near a battery in action, for the enemy's fire fell heavily upon the Rough Riders and other cavalry commands on the hill. They speedily deserted that posi- tion and swung into the road, where already the men of Kent's command were trudging manfully along toward the front. The road was choked with marching men, among whose ranks the spiteful bullets were searching insistently for victims. At the head of the column the troops were deploying out into the fields and forest on either side of the road and forming the line of battle. General Shafter, far in the rear, had defined the night before the exact limit of the advance, and had directed that, that spot attained, the army should wait for further orders. The difficulty with this arrangement was that the spot indicated was exposed to the fire of the enemy, who had the range exactly, and the further orders never came. General Shafter says, however, that his plan of the night before was disarranged by the delay at the fort of El Caney, and that when it was found that Lawton would not be able to lead the attack on San Juan, Kent and Sumner were ordered to go on without waiting for him. " They understood," continues the general, " that they were to assail the Spanish block-houses and trenches as soon as they could get into position, for there was no longer any intention of waiting until Lawton should come up on the right." There seems to be some doubt whether Kent and Sumner did understand that they were to make an assault. At any rate, the misunderstanding was such that for a long time the troops were halted under a heavy 232 Blue Jackets of '98 fire from the enemy, many of them being m the crowded road where a bullet or a shell did double execution. From the long line of Spanish breastworks, from the block-houses on the hill, and from sharpshooters in the bushes and trees came a deadly fire. The rattle of machine guns rose above the din of battle, and their streaming bullets sped down the road, leaving rows of wounded and dead men behind. No wreath of smoke gave a hint of the position of any Spanish gun. A sharp- shooter might be perched in a tree within fifty yards of our lines, and if he kept his body hidden he could pick off our men in entire safety. It appeared that many of these sharpshooters had secured hiding-places in the rear of our troops, — a condition always galling and demoralis- ing to the men who suffer. This General Shafter doubts, saying that the long range of the Mausers gave the drop- ping and almost spent bullets the appearance of coming from the rear; but this explanation seems hardly plau- sible. There had been so little reconnoitring or skirmish- ing in the neighbourhood that it is entirely probable an army advancing by night down a single narrow road might have left hundreds of concealed sharpshooters on its flanks and rear. Under the most advantageous circumstances the ad- vance of a large body of troops along a narrow road is but slow. On this scorching July day, when the sun seemed as pitiless as the bullets, the advance seemed to be at a snail's pace. Well disciplined as the men were, the dropping of a man checked for a brief moment the advance of those behind him, and men were dropping fast. There was no stopping to care for the wounded. The utmost that could be done was to lay them to one side of the road, where they remained until the hospital stewards came along and painfully carried them to the shore of the little brook where the field hospital was established, — " Bloody Bend," the soldiers dubbed it. As the opening of the road into the fields before San Juan Blue Jackets of '98 233 was approached, the men defiled through gaps in the fences into the woods on either side, where they spread out to right and left. They were invisible to the Spaniards there, but their position was well enough known, and the fire was pitiless. Every shot from an American rifle furnislied tlie enemy with a target, and many a man on the field cursed the lack of prevision in the department at Washington which had left to the soldiers of a nation boasting itself the most progressive, the old-fashioned and dangerous black powder, while antiquated Spain — " poor old Spain," this Spain which we described as old- fogy, " moss-backed," everything that expressed lack of progress and enterprise — had the best smokeless powder, the best rifles, and plenty of both. But we had some modern engines of war — or at least we flattered our- selves we had. With the Kough Pdders was an engine of destruction called the dynamite gun. Its name suggested terrifying possibilities, and its appearance, being unlike any form of artillery known to soldiers, stimulated the imagination of men. But its accomplishments were dis- appointing. In the hands of a body of picked men of unusual intelligence, enthusiasm, and energy, it still failed to perform any feats of carnage. It was too heavy to get into effective position, its range was limited, and from some fault in construction it was continually getting choked and put out of action. There was also a balloon that was expected to be of inestimable service in recon- noitring. This was not a wholly new idea, as balloons were often employed during the Franco-Prussian war; but it may be said that our use of the balloon with Shafter's army was entirely novel. For on this day of hard shooting and heavy loss, when our lines were within almost point-blank range of the enemy and enjoying only a little immunity from loss because the thickets hid them, the balloon was sent up some fifty yards imme- diately above a road packed with soldiers. Some of the enemy's marksmen intelligently reasoned that at the point 234 Blue Jackets of '98 where the controlling cord of the balloon touched the earth there must be men, so they fired there with results profitable to them and disastrous to us. Others let fly at the great ball of silk itself, and their bullets dropping to earth behind fell among our men far back on the road. As an invitation to effective musketry that balloon has not been equalled in military history, and an eye-witness avers that when it had at last been happily disabled by a shot, the oihcer descending it reported, as the sole fruit of his observations, that he had seen " men over on those hills firing upon our lines," — a fact already suffi- ciently established by the testimony of our dead and wounded. A fearful sight was that road after the tide of battle had swept on. Lined on either side with blankets, coats, ponchos, belts, food, and the various impedimenta which the men rushing into battle had thrown aside ; the soft soil trampled into mud and soaked at many a spot with a redder and warmer liquid than ever fell from the skies or gushed from the lush stems of tropical plants ; dotted all too often with dead men, — some, calm of face, lying on extended backs gazing up into the blue mystery of the heavens, others frightfully distorted as though death had come amidst excruciating pains ; here and there a dead horse, or, more pitiful still, a sorely wounded one with a look of dumb suffering and patient wonder in his eyes ; the bushes on the side scarred by flying bullets, and even the larger trees shot through and through, — all formed a picture which could never be forgotten by him who be- held it, a picture of war at its deadliest, a picture which showed how the fairest face of nature could be made frightful when man and his hatreds had their way with it. For hours the devoted soldiers stood in the road of death or lay firing ineffective volleys from the cover of the woods. No order to advance came. The sound of battle coming across the country from El Caney gave no indica- Blue Jackets of '98 235 tion that Lawton had carried that point. The bullets cut savagely through the grass, and snipped the leaves from the trees and bushes as fast as though expert wielders of a sickle were there at work. Men whose duty compelled them to expose themselves erect to the enemy's lire were falling fast. Captain O'Neill — " Bucky," most picturesque of the Eough Eiders — received a bullet fair in the forehead just as he had boasted, " There is no Spanish bullet made that can kill me." It became plain to the rawest soldier in the ranks that to remain still under that fire meant ob- literation. To retreat was not to be thought. A trooper lying flat on his face in a row of his fellows put the feel- ings of all in a phrase when he grunted, " Boys, I have got to go one way or the other pretty damned quick." But there was only one way for American soldiers in the face of the enemy to go, and suddenly it appeared that all along the line this conclusion was reached at the same moment, and all sprung forward in a desperate charge. By whom the advance was ordered is a matter not made clear by either the official reports or the accounts of observers on the field. It was seemingly much such a spontaneous act of all on the line as was the capture of Lookout Mountain by Grant's troops, not only without, but in defiance of, the general's orders. Inspector-General Breckinridge in his report says only : " About one o'clock, after a delay of nearly two hours waiting for the troops to reach their positions, the whole force advanced, charged and carried the enemy's first line of intrenchments." General Wheeler in his report says : " It was evident that we were as much under fire in forming the line as we could be by an advance, and I therefore pressed the com- mand forward from the covering under which it was formed." General Kent, whose report gives the best of- ficial account of the action, describes the charge as simply part of the general forward movement ordered by him. Some correspondents were inclined to ascribe the assault as due to the sudden initiative of comparatively subordi- 236 Blue Jackets of '98 nate officers ; thus in the story as told by one appears this description of Colonel Eoosevelt's part : " Colonel Roosevelt, on horseback, broke from the woods behind the line of the Tenth, and finding its men lying in his way, shouted : ' If you don't wish to go forward, let my men pass, please.' Captain Bigelow and the other junior officers of the Tenth, with their negroes, instantly sprang into hue with the Rough Riders, and charged at the blue block-house on the right." Another saw, or thought he saw, General Hawkins wave his hand toward the breastworks, and set that tide of men in blue to rising slowly but irresistibly up the hill. The matter is immaterial. However the order came, the men were ready and eager for it, and the hills were won by the men who carried guns. The charge was not spec- tacular. The troops advanced by rushes, one platoon running a few yards forward, then falling on its face while at its right another platoon would rise, dash beyond it, and in turn sink to earth. The dismounted cavalry, Roosevelt's men and the Tenth, or coloured cavalry, who supported them on their left, went up almost as individu- als ; the colonels in the front, Roosevelt mounted and " yelling like an Indian," as one admirer telegraphed home, the men following, stooping low, sending a shot ahead when occasion offered, falling to earth when the enemy's fire grew too hot, and running when there seemed a chance to make a few yards. They fell fast indeed, and the slope behind them was dotted thickly with writhing men or bodies strangely silent, but the advance was uninterrupted. On the left could be seen General Hawkins going up at the head of his brigade of infantry, his erect stalwart figure and determined mien giving his white hair the lie. To his support went speedily the Third Brigade under Colo- nel Wikoff, wlio fell ere the crest was reached. Lieu- tenant-Colonel Worth succeeded him in command, and quickly in death too. So also of Colonel Liscum, the third Blue Jackets of '98 237 in command. The Spaniards were firing in volleys, and their machine guns were rolling with devilish zeal from every block-house. Now the point of interest is on the right, where the watchers can see that the Spanish fire from the San Juan fort, as one block-house was called, is slacken- ing. Through glasses the defenders can be seen strag- ghng out of the trenches there and running down the hill, and our men with a new burst of speed swarming around the ends and into trenches and house. It is the cavalry that has been victorious there, for first the yellow flag and then the bright-coloured guidons of the different troops can be seen fluttering on the hill. It can be seen, too, that the end is not yet reached. In the midst of the cheering the victors falter and seem to fall back, as though they had taken a position they were not strong enough to hold. But they quickly pulled themselves together and returned. Mean- while on the rest of the line the men were rapidly near- ing the crest. Here and there a bugle sung notes of encouragement and command. Officers moved along among the men, fairly pushing them forward. To the men left be- hind, that rising line seemed to be growing perilously thin as it neared the top. Sometimes it seemed about to disap- pear altogether, broken up into fragments as a great wave is shattered among rocks. It lagged, and the men who still struggled on could be seen to be sorely tired, while the little heaps of dead and wounded grew more numerous minute by minute. In the very front strode a young lieutenant of the Sixteenth Infantry, and by him, shoulder to shoulder, up the slope marched the standard-bearer of the regiment proudly bearing a great flag, while on the other side marched a private and a flute-player, the latter a boy of sixteen who looked years younger. Near the crest the private fell. Lieutenant Ord turned in answer to a faint cry from him. The wound was clearly mortal, and the officer was about to turn away, when the soldier said painfully : " I 'm done for. Lieutenant. But you had better take my steel nippers. There may be another wire 238 Blue Jackets of '98 fence beyond the hill, and I won't be there to cut it for | you." The little musician struggled on with his com- mander, marched by him until in the hour of victory a Spanish prisoner whom he was about to help shot the young officer dead. And still the boy sat by the body. " I was going back," said the little flute-player, when asked how he, so weak and so useless, had joined in that fierce charge. " I wanted to go back to the hospital and look after Colonel Egbert when he fell wounded, and I was doing no good at the front, for my flute is ruined with the mud and rain. But just as I started I heard Mr. Ord say, ' Now, all the boys who 's brave will follow me ; all the boys who 's brave, follow me ; ' and then he rushed ahead, and kept that up about half an hour, resting a little while and then rushing ahead. And every time he started up he would shout back, ' Now, all the boys who 's brave will follow me.' So all the boys followed him, and as I was lighter I got farther ahead than most." " Were n't you afraid, sonny ? " asked an officer. Stephen Bonsai tells the story. " I was very fearful, sir, but I was n't afraid." Soon the Americans were established along the crest which had formed the advanced line of the Spanish posi- tion. The enemy retired to a second line, and kept up a vicious fire while our men intrenched themselves as well as might be with their bayonets and hands while awaiting the arrival of intrenching tools from the rear. The glory of the day had been won by the regulars, the Rough Eiders alone of the volunteer organisations having any share in it. An unfortunate feature of the day's work was the action of the Seventy-first New York Volunteers, out of which a bitter controversy afterwards arose. It can best be described here in the words of General Kent's official report. After detailing the situation on the road near the ford, he says : "I hastened to tlie forks made by this road, and soon after the Seventy-first New York Regiment and Hawlcins's brigade came up. I turned them into the bypath indicated by Lieu- Blue Jackets of '98 239 tenant-Colonel Derby, leading to the lower ford, sending word to General Hawkins of this movement. This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the first battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in disorder on the troops in the rear. At this critical moment tlie officers of my staff practically formed a cordon be- hind the panic-stricken men, and urged them to again go for- ward. I finally ordered them to lie down in the thicket, and clear the way for others of their own regiment who were com- ing up behind. This many of them did, and the Second and Third battalions came forward in better order, and moved along tlie road toward the ford. One of my staff officers ran back, waving his hat to hurry forward the Third Brigade, who upon approaching the forks found the way blocked by men of the Seventy-first. There were other men of this regiment crouch- ing in the bushes, many of whom were encouraged by the advance of the approaching column to rise and go forward. . . . The head of Wikoflf's brigade reached the forks at 12.20 p. m., and hurried to the left, stepping over the prostrate forms of men of the Seventy-first." It was unfortunate for the good name of this regiment of volunteers — one of the " swell " regiments of New York City — that the first fire fell upon officers unused to war, and who seemed to be without the cool courage which would enable them to meet the situation. The men were demoralised by the failure of their leaders. Among them were many who keenly felt the disgrace which they saw coming upon their regiment, and who took their guns and fell in with other commands which were more fortunately led. But the defection of the Seventy-first as a body left the field of San Juan one which was won by regulars almost without aid. The Eough Eiders alone carried the standard of the volunteer army high and proudly. Mid-afternoon found our men in position all along the ridge. The enemy's retreat had been precipitate, but there was no effort at pursuit. General Wheeler reports 240 Blue Jackets of '98 of his men that after having carried the ridge " they were absolutely unable to proceed farther." Moreover, the question of holding the position won was one which took precedence over any possible pursuit. The enemy had only retired to another line nearer the city, and from thence continued the fire upon the unprotected captors of the hill. The victors had possession of long rows of rifle-pits, facing the wrong way, and several block-houses pierced for firing toward our own lines, but blank on the side of the enemy. The Spanish artillery quickly showed how little shelter the block-houses would offer, and sug- gested that the fight for possession might have been less bloody had the American troops been as well supplied with cannon. The men lay flat on the crest of the hill, panting with their exertion, and wondering what next. They could not rise to retreat ; it would have been mad- ness to go forward. A rush of Dillenback's battery to the crest of the hill gave promise of support, and the men cheered wildly, as the heavy guns came rumbling up the slope, the bright guidons flying, horses galloping, whips cracking, and all swung into position and let fly with a roar. But it was a brief diversion. In full view from the Spanish trenches the artillery men were easy targets for the Mausers, and they fell too fast for their fire to be effective. Limbering up again, the battery rushed back to the spot whence it had come. The Mauser rifle makes artillery useless at the old close range. It vras mid-afternoon, and since dawn the men had had nothing to eat, nor was there anything now available, for no rations had come from the rear, the mule trains being busy hurrying ammunition to the front. Later in the day General Wlieeler arrived among the rifle-pits which held the men of his cavalry division. He had risen from a bed of sickness to hasten to the sound of the firing, and now went up and down the lines speaking words of en- couragement to the men. It was on this day that the wiry veteran of the Civil War delighted his men by climb- Blue Jackets of '98 241 ing a tree despite his sixty-odd years, and shouting from its top : " They 're running ! They 're running ! See the Yanks — no, no, I mean the Spaniards, run." When the guns were roaring, the memories of the days when he fought with Lee against the forces of the Union some- times confused the gallant defender of the Stars and Stripes in Cuba. General Shafter, too, was drawn from his cot by the news of the battle, and from the hill at El Poso sent orders to the front to intrench, and to the rear to hurry forward the intrenching tools. He expected the Span- iards would attack furiously in the morning, and every nerve was strained to prepare for them. The men who had fought all day worked in relays all night digging trenches. About midnight Bates's brigade, wliich had fought at El Caney, came up, after a hard march, and was sent in on Kent's extreme left. Lawton, after settling the affair at Caney, had started at once for the scene of battle in the centre, but encountering unexpected resist- ance, had retraced his steps, and come up from the rear. The march took him until noon of the 2d. General Shafter tells a story illustrative of the tireless patience of the soldiers who fought and marched on those two bloody days. A correspondent, as the Tenth Cavalry was coming into position on the 2d, noticed one of the ser- geants, a tall muscular black, carrying a little dog, the regimental mascot, in his arms. " Sergeant," he asked, " did n't you march all night before last ? " " Yes, sah." " And did n't you fight all day yesterday at El Caney ? " " 'Deed, I did." " Did n't you march all night last night too ? " " Yes, sah." " Then why are you carrying that dog ? " " Why, boss, the dawg 's tired." But while the men to whom the battle left strength and high spirits were working with pick and shovel, or dragging guns into new position, or bringing up more ammunition, or foraging for food, there were sorry sights in the hospitals, and in the spots where the dead were 16 242 Blue Jackets of '98 brought for identification and burial. The day had been one of heavy losses. That ridge which now displayed the tattered flags of the victorious regiments had cost dear. Of the infantry, 12 officers and 77 men were killed, 82 officers and 463 men were wounded. Of the cavalry, 6 officers and 40 men were slain, and 223 men wounded. That night there was grave discussion among the American officers whether the position so gallantly won should not be abandoned. The heavy losses of the day were depressing ; the fact that between the heights and the town lay the very strongest point on the Spanish line of defence, the apparent activity of the enemy in preparing to attack in the morning, and the knowledge that not far away were 5000 Spaniards marching to reinforce Santiago, with only the Cubans to keep them out, all combined to make even the stoutest-hearted doubt whether the San Juan ridge could be held, or was worth the holding. It may be noted here that the Cubans failed to cut off the Span- ish reinforcements, as indeed throughout the operations before Santiago they failed signally to be of service to our forces. During the night following the action, General Duffield's failure to carry the Spanish works at Aguadores became known, and the officers recognised that the American army occupied the perilous position known in military technology as " resting its left flank in the air." But while these doubts and these problems harassed the minds of the general officers, the company officers and men were working sturdily at the trenches, and the morn- ing of the 2d found the troops on the ridge safely in- trenched. The east was just turning gray when the Spaniards opened a heavy fire on our works. Our men withheld their fire except when some especially rash Spaniard offered a target that could not be ignored. Not a cannon sounded from our lines. It was seen that there might be long work and hot work before the city nestling snugly in its nost of hills could be taken, and the word was passed to be saving of ammunition. On the night Blue Jackets of 98 243 before, indeed, there had for a time been grave apprehen- sion lest ammunition might actually give out, and our sol- diers in this new war for liberty be left as defenceless on the crest of San Juan hill as were the patriots on Bunker Hill a century and a quarter ago. Frederick Eemiugton, the well-known war artist, tells of the enthusiasm with which a pack-train coming from the rear with ammuni- tion was hailed by men who were half starved and who knew well enough that a road crowded with ammunition trains would not get through any rations that night : " The wounded going to the rear, cheered the ammunition, and when it was unpacked at the front, the soldiers seized it like gold. They lifted a box in tlie air and dropped it on one corner, which smashed it open. " 'Now we can hold San Juan hill against them garlics — hey, son ! ' yelled a happy cavalryman to a doughboy. " 'You bet — until we starve to death.' '• ' Starve nothin' — we '11 eat them gun-teams.' " With cartridge belts filled anew, the defenders of the hill crouched all day in the trenches, watchful for an as- sault and keeping up just enough of a response to compel the enemy to be cautious. Far away on the southwest the deep thunder of the navy's guns could be heard. The fleet was engaging the Socapa battery. In the harbour the hapless Cervera was getting ready to make his dash the next day, and at the rear of our lines General Shafter was considering whether a retreat would be necessary. At half-past nine at night the Spaniards made a vigorous sortie, and drove our men for a few minutes from several points on the line. The positions were retaken, however, iand the Spaniards driven back with heavy loss. Shortly afterwards at El Poso a council of war was held to dis- cuss the wisdom of withdrawing to a more protected position. General Shafter had cabled to the United States that the enemy had been driven from his works, but that the American lines were so thin that he might be com- 244 Blue Jackets of '98 pelled to take a position farther to the rear. The situation was so abruptly changed the next day by the news of the destruction of Cervera that the general was bitterly con- demned for his despatch, and even for considering a retreat at all. The facts seem to show this criticism to be unjust. Many of the officers at the front, including General Wheeler, whose course throughout the campaign came in for the most generous laudation, are said to have advised retreat on the afternoon and night of the 1st. General Shafter himself, so far from being the originator of the plan to withdraw, opposed it. That his cable message was unwise is doubtless true, for it needlessly alarmed the officials at Washington, and would have greatly alarmed the people, and correspondingly have encouraged the Spaniards, had it been published by itself. Happily, however, when the newspapers secured the despatch, the news of Cervera's annihilation was made pubhc as well. It is enough to say of the controversy over the proposition for a withdrawal, that whatever may have been the individual opinions of the division commanders on the afternoon and night of July 1st and through the day of the 2d, when they came to ex- press themselves officially on the night of the 2d, each with one accord voted to stick to the trenches on the ridge. Perhaps the greeting of a .=oldier whom Shafter passed on his way to the conference, and whose bleeding wounds suggested the price paid for that ridge, even as his words indicated the pride of the men who took it in their achievement, may have had something to do with General Shafter's determination to stick. " They gave us a hell of a fight, General," said the poor fellow, in a weak voice, " but we drove them out." The general saluted and rode on, visibly affected, says one who rode by him. No battle-field of history, perhaps, has had its incidents, stirring, pathetic, or ridiculous, so fully commemorated in story as this of Santiago. In an age when all men write, and a multitude write well, it was the hunting-ground of Blue Jackets of '98 245 an army of correspondents, magazinists, and novelists who dressed with more or less skill the incidents they saw and tiie anecdotes they heard. The horrors of the held hospital at Bloody Bend have been described by many skilled pens, until behind them the service of those who suffered there that human hberty might make a new and a giant stride seem almost hidden. There had been no expectation of such a great number of wounded as fell at Santiago, and the inevitable cruelties of a field hospital were multiplied threefold. For lack of ambulances, rough wagons, desti- tute of either springs or cushions, were employed in bringing the sufferers to the hospital. On the hard board floors of these jolting vehicles they slid helplessly about, often jolting down into one bleeding, suffering, screaming mass at the end. At the hospital where the Red Cross flag waved, often without proper respect from the enemy, the surgeons worked all night by fitful, spluttering lamps. The wounded came faster than the swiftest knives could work, and they lay in long rows waiting for attention. For those whom a glance showed to be beyond aid there was little care given, — brutal it seemed to pass them by with a hopeless gesture which too surely told the dying his hopeless state, — but mercy to those whom mercy might aid compelled it. There was dearth of anaesthetics, dearth even of surgical instruments. There was, as at Bingen- on-the-Rhine, ". . . lack of woman's nursing, There was dearth of woman's tears." But there was courage amid all the suffering, manliness in the midst of death in its most cruel form. The lives that were yielded up in that hospital were lives mankind could ill afford to spare, for they were the lives of men who had been ready to die for their country. The next morning, July 3d, General Shafter sent by a flag of truce into the lines of the Spanish a demand for the surrender of Santiago. " I have the honour to inform, 246 Blue Jackets of '98 you," said the American commander in this communica- tion, " unless you surrender, I shall be compelled to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please instruct the citizens of all foreign countries, and all women and children, that they should leave the city before ten A. M. to-morrow." An audacious demand this, considering that it followed within a few hours a serious consideration on the part of the Americans whether they could hold the line they had won. Audacious too for the fact that, despite the threat of a bombardment, Shafter had really but few heavy siege- guns, and the bombardment by the navy had proved wholly ineffective. It is noticeable that in reporting the de- spatch of his demand for a surrender General Shafter says he informed all the division and brigade commanders of the fact. It may be presumed justly that the demand was made quite as much to restore the morale of the American troops as in any hope that it would be fruitful. But the flag of truce had been gone but two or three hours when along the lines passed suddenly a rumour that the Spanish fleet had gone to destruction, and Santi- ago's chief defence was demolished. The news came to General Shafter from Lawton's lines. He sent out at once this bulletin, — a phrase of which adds to the evidence that he felt need of cheering the men in the trenches in every possible way : " Lieutenant Allen, Second Cavalry, from our extreme right where he overlooked the bay, states that Admiral Cervera's fleet steamed out this morning and engaged our fleet. The French consul who came into our lines yesterday informed General Garcia that Admiral Cervera said yesterday that it was better to die fighting than to sink liis sliips. Rush this information all around our lines at the front." The mere news that the Spaniards had gone out to fight was hailed by our men as though it were the tidings of a victory, and when later in the evening the actual intel- ligence of Schley's glorious triumph aiTived, there was Blue Jackets of '98 247 pandemonium on the lines. Men leaped to their feet and executed wild war-dances on the crest of the Spanish trenches in full view of the sulking Spaniards, for the truce was still on and no jealous sharpshooter could cut short the rejoicing of any. The bands played patriotic airs, and especially a music-hall ditty which had come to be almost the official air of the army in Cuba, — " There '11 be a hot time in the old town to-night." Bonfires blazed, salutes were fired, — most of them without the connivance of the commanding officers, for there was still a likelihood that graver use might be found for all the available ammunition. Though the response of General Toral, who had succeeded linares in command of the Spanish forces, came in the midst of the rejoicing, and though it bore a refusal to surrender, it checked the celebration not a whit. The foreign consuls in the city asked that the armistice then in force should be continued longer than had been offered by General Shafter, in order that the women and children might be moved to places of safety. This was agreed upon, and a temporary peace settled down over the battle-scarred field. Both sides employed the lull in strengthening their works. General Shafter moved reinforcements to the front, put mortars and siege-guns in place, brought up reserve rations, and prepared for a long wait. From Washington came orders to consider no terms except unconditional surrender. CHAPTEK XII Rigidity of the Blockade — The Bombardments — The Ma- rines AT GUANTANAMO — CeRVERA's DaSH FOR LIBERTY — The Fleet Alert — Absence of the Flagship and the Ad- miral — The Controversy over the Honours — Destruc- tion OF THE "Infanta Maria Teresa" — Capture of Admiral Cervera — Gallant Fight of the " Gloucester " — The Annihilation of the Torpedo Destroyers — The "Almirante Oquendo " Beached — The End of the " Vizcaya " — Magnificent Work of the "Oregon" and "Texas" — The "Cristobal Colon's" Fight for Life — The End of the Spanish Squadron — Effects of American Gunnery — The Disposal of the Prisoners. OUTSIDE the entrance to the harbour of Santiago de Cuba the men on the great steel ships had been sweltering in enforced idleness, while their brethren of the army had been enjoying and enduring so much. Life on a battle-ship in the latitude of the south side of Cuba in the months of June and July is not like summer yachting. The great ships in their war-paint absorbed instead of radiating the heat, and the atmosphere in the crowded berth-deck and even in the compact little state- rooms of the officers was stifling. Happy were they who could get permission to sleep on the superstructure, where some air at least found passage. The daily routine for both officers and men was quite as arduous as if it were not wholly destitute of anything Like glory. Night and . day the mouth of the harbour had to be watched. From every ship a certain number of alert eyes were at all times ' riveted on that point. Columbus in those West Indian waters peered no more eagerly from the bow of his caravel for the first sight of land, than did fifty pairs of keen American eyes gaze toward that gap in the hilly Blue Jackets of '98 249 coast of Cuba, looking for the first sight of the advancing vessel that should give signal for a battle by which all that Columbus did for Spain would be undone. The blockade established by Admiral Sampson was iron in its inflexibility. A 350-foot channel was to be watched, and he closed the doors on it effectually. " I . . . main- tained the blockade [at night] as follows," he says in his report : " to the battle-ships was assigned the duty, in turn, of hghtmg the channel. Moving up to the port at a dis- tance of one or two miles from the Morro, dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere, they threw a searchlight beam directly up the channel and held it there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel for half a mile inside of the entrance so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the searchlight ship was always a matter of surprise to me, but they never did." This, by the way, was also a matter of surprise to the foreign naval attaches upon our flagship. Captain Paget, the British attach^, standing once on the deck of the " New York " when this performance was going on, gazed on the broad shaft of light penetrating the enemy's harbour, and then on the battle-ship lying within easy range of the guns in Morro, and exclaimed fervently, " What d d impertinence ! " " Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three picket launches, and at a little distance farther out three small picket vessels, usually converted yachts, and, when they were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrange- ment there was at least a certainty that nothing could get out (if the harbour undetected. After the arrival of the army, wlien the situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battle-ship was placed alongside the searchlight sliip with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear." 2 so Blue Jackets of ^98 Early in the days of the blockade, before knowledge of Spanish marksmanship or experience with the unwilling- ness of the defenders of the fort to provoke a conflict had inspired contempt, Admiral Sampson ordered a bombard- ment in the expectation of so damaging the enemy's works that the ships might he well in shore without danger. It was this bombardment that Hobson watched from his cell, and in which he came near meeting his end from a shell that struck within a few feet of his window. June 6th was set for the attack, which began shortly before seven in the morning. The fleet attacked in two parallel columns, the works on the east side of the harbour's mouth being bombarded by the column under Admiral Samp- son, in which were the " New York," the " Iowa," the "Oregon," the "Yankee," and the "Dolphin," — two battle-ships, one armoured cruiser, one auxiliary, and one despatch boat. This squadron delivered its fire against Morro, the most imposing but not the most formidable of the harbour defences, the batteries at Estrella Point, and those on Gorda Point. Commodore Schley, in the " Brooklyn," led the second squadron, which included the " Massachusetts," the " Texas," the " Suwanee," and the "Vixen," — two battle-ships, one armoured cruiser, and two auxiliaries. Later in the engagement the " New Orleans," the British-built ship bought from Brazil, went into the action with her smokeless powder, to the envy of all the other ships, and the cruiser " Marblehead " was permitted a short taste of the pleasures of action. The morning was hot and wet, with frequent gusts of rain and wind, the showers sometimes falling so heavily that the ships were hid from the batteries and from each other. The ships steamed directly in toward the harbour, firing from their bow guns as they advanced, and turning to east and west as they came within a range of from 2000 to 2500 yards, letting fly their broadsides as they made the turn. The fire was deliberate, the greatest attention being given to accuracy of aim. Indeed, the affair had Blue Jackets of '98 25 i its chief value, as appeared later, in being a sort of target practice under fire. The attack was kept up for about two hours and a half, the batteries of the enemy being silenced early in the action. But here, as so often in the war, our seamen discovered how empty a triumph it is to "silence" a battery. Looking eagerly from his cell in Morro, Lieutenant Hobson had an excellent opportunity to watch the effect of the American fire, and his story is very convincing on this point. After describing the terrifying eff'ect of the stroke of a 13-inch shell, — "it would raise a great yellow cloud of earth and debris, sending forked shafts of gas out and up for a hundred feet, while for many seconds afterward the fragments would continue to drop about Morro and in the water," — he writes : " The fire seemed to slacken for a moment ; then the enemy opened, and again the fire set in strong against the Socapa sea battery, and I came out, and climbed to the window once more, in time to see the crews of the enemy's guns leave them and run to a pit in the rear. Then I watched for the next lull. Sure enough, up they came again, and fired away. Then our guns reopened in full force, and again the crews retreated to the pit. " This occurred over and over ; and then I realised, even more than in the bombardment of San Juan, that sliips cannot destroy shore batteries without coming into machine-gun range. It is necessary actually to strike the gun itself in order to put it out of action. I saw some of our sliells literally bury guns with dirt and yet do virtually no injury. Our marksmanship was excellent, — splendid line shots, that tore up the shrubs and earth along the whole front of the battery, — but I did not see a single gun disabled, and every time we would slacken, the Spaniards would come up and fire away. I understood how they could thus make the vaunted ' last shot.' " In the main the bombardment was fruitless so far as any injury to the batteries was concerned. One or two heavy guns are said to have been destroyed, but most were 252 Blue Jackets of '98 simply dismounted and quickly replaced after the fleet withdrew. Lieutenant Staunton, assistant chief of staff on the flagship, notes that "a 12-inch shell from the ' Texas ' exploded under a 6-inch gun in the Socapa battery, blew it into the air and capsized it, and, it is said, killed all of its crew. Two days afterward that gun was again remounted and ready again for service." The Spanish cruiser " Eeina Mercedes," which came gallantly to the strait at the harbour's mouth to aid in the defence, suffered more severely. A shell burst under her forward turret, and killed one officer. Captain Acosta — who had been particularly courteous to Hobson when that officer was a prisoner on the ship — and sixteen men, and wounded another officer and eleven sailors. Some of our shells fell in the streets of the city, but seem to have done no damage. Mr. Frederick W. Eamsden, the British con- sul in the city, who by the way made a noble record for self-sacrificing and arduous labours in the cause of humanity during the siege and died shortly after of exhaustion, says in his diary of that date : " Many shells fell in the bay about three-quarters of a mile distant from our office. ... I can't say how many shots have been fired, but firing was continuous from eight to half-past ten, and a lot of powder has been wasted. . . . The first lieu- tenant of the ' Reina Mercedes, ' Acosta, has been killed. A shell took ofi" his right leg, but he continued to give orders for the care of the other wounded until lie died. The ship . . . caught fire three times. . . . Emma wanted to know what the sound like a railway moving in the air was, and was consid- erably surprised to find it proceeded from the shells flying about." The ships drew off virtually unhurt by the Spanish response to their fire. On the 14th of June and for a day or two thereafter the attack was renewed in the same deliberate manner. To those on the vessels it was only a more exciting variety of target practice. The men in Blue Jackets of '98 253 the forts have not recorded the emotions excited in their breasts by the storm of projectiles, grading from 13-inch shells downward, but Consul Eamsden in his diary describes the striking of one shell in the water which threw up a column of spray as high as the mast of a ship, and further notes the very disquieting fact that "any quantity of shells of all calibres are being picked up intact." He instances one 13-inch shell which he saw himself unexploded. But despite the noise and the prodigious expenditure of ammunition, the batteries that kept guard over Santiago were as strong after the several bombardments as they were before. The bombardments, however destitute of results, were an excellent expedient for keeping up the spirits of the men, and steadying nerves sorely strained by the ceaseless watchfulness and apprehension of the blockade. Though the inexplicable inertness of the Spaniards resulted in a month of absolute immunity from attack, the ships were at all times exposed to danger, and the nervous strain was almost as great as if a more active enemy had been con- fronted. Most of the time the ships were within easy rifle-range of the batteries, and while the armoured hulls were impervious to small projectiles, the upper works, where because of the heat many men slept, were vulner- able to :Mauser bullets. The men who operated the searchlights, too, were absolutely without protection from any form of firearm the Spaniards might see fit to employ against them. Night after night the most conspicuous thing on the coast was the great eye, gleaming white, and sending a long beam of fierce light straight into the harbour. Ko armour protected the dehcate apparatus of this beacon, nor the men who served it ; but not once did the Spaniards try with Mauser or with great guns to demolish it, though it was within easy range of either weapon. But the men in the tops of the searchlight ship did not know how long the gunners on shore would resist what must have been a temptation to any expert artillerist, and 254 Blue Jackets of '98 they expected a shot at any minute. Of course the small boats plying close in shore as pickets, particularly charged with watching out for torpedo attacks, kept their officers and crews under a continual strain. On them the Span- iards did indeed try their marksmanship, with negative results as a rule, but with a sufficient percentage of hits to keep the targets alert. The knowledge that in the harbour lurked the much dreaded torpedo boats was also a continual source of anxiety. Not only the danger to the picket boat should one slip out unperceived, but the certainty that any failure in watchfulness might result in the loss of a great battle-ship, kept the commanders of the scouts keyed up to the highest pitch. A torpedo boat at night is a phantom object, and many a phantom has been taken for a torpedo boat by even cool officers when charged with heavy responsibility. Men who are constantly looking for something are apt to find it, even if it is trouble ; and so now and then some officer, after peering anxiously through a pitchy-black night for hours at a time in expectation of a Spanish torpedo boat, would see one coming perfectly distinctly, and then all the small guns on that ship would roar, and the signal to look out for a torpedo attack would flash high up in the air, and all the other vessels would move anxiously and begin to spit fire and bellow noisily like a herd of elephants when a mouse runs across the floor. One night a railroad train running along the road bordering the sea caused the alarm, and the shot-riddled cars were shown next morning in Santiago in evidence of Yankee barbarity. Another night the b ack hollow of a cave, with the white breakers tumbling on the rocks at its entrance, suggested to a picket boat well in shore that a dark torpedo boat was coming out at full speed with a tremendous bone in her teeth. These things were humorous in the telling after- wards, but at the time they were deadly earnest, and the men who went through them found the blockade any- thing but unexciting. Blue Jackets of '98 255 In the naval service of every nation is a body of amphibious soldiery who serve aboard ship — the marines described by Kipling as " soldier and sailor too/' and the butts of many a Blue Jacket's scoff and story. In the earlier days of naval warfare the chief duty of the marine was to act as a sort of ship's pohceman, keeping order aboard in time of peace and serving as a rifleman in battle. To some degree these functions are still filled by the marine corps ; but it has become more of a martial organisation than of old, serving at rapid fire-guns during battle, and always the first to be landed when a shore party is needed. For weeks a detachment of marines had been stewing in the hot confines of the transport "Pan- ther" at Key "West, awaiting the discovery of some point at which they could be of service. When the news that Cervera was cooped up at Santiago reached Sampson, they were hurriedly sent for, and had no sooner reached the fleet than a task was assigned them which tested all their quahties of individual bravery and discipline. Xot quite forty miles east of Santiago lies the bay of Guantanamo, with a small town of the same name at its upper end. It is an excellent harbour, then not at all formidably fortified, and offering a safe shelter for war- ships and an easy landing-place for troops if such were needed. In the early days of June Admiral Sampson thought that such a landing-place would be needed. He knew that the army was painfully and slowly mobilising at Tampa, and that a great fleet of transports was gather- inc,^ there to bring General Shafter's corps to the neighbour- hood of Santiago. It occurred to the admiral to prepare the way at Guantanamo. If the army did not like that landing-place, possession of the harbour would still be use- ful to the navy, for coaling and repairing. So the " Panther " had hardly reached the blockade with her 600 marines aboard before they were ordered to Guantanamo, where the cruiser " ]\Iarblehead " and the auxiliary " Yankee " had been preparing for their reception by diligently shelling the 256 Blue Jackets of ^98 earthworks the Spaniards had thrown up on the shore. It was impossible to tell how vigorous a resistance the enemy would offer to the landing-party ; so the " Oregon," the " Yankee," the " Yosemite " — with a crew of naval militiamen clear from Michigan — the " Scorpion," the " Dolphin," and the supply-ship " Supply " were sent along. They were not needed. The Spaniards made no resistance — indeed, throughout the war they never fought our troops at exactly the moment when resistance would have been most effective, namely, when we were landing from boats. With hardly a rifle-shot, and while the band played cheerily " There '11 be a hot time in the old town to- night," the marines landed, pitched their tents, and went into camp. It was as peaceful as a picnic. The Span- iards, when driven away by the fire from the " Marblehead " and the " Yankee," had left a flagstaff standing, and there the Stars and Stripes were run up, while the marines stood in line at a " present," and the ships in the bay fired a salute and cheered the colours. That was really the first land- ing of our troops on the south side of Cuba, for this was on the 10th of June, — twelve days before Shaffer began landing his troops. The camp was named Camp McCalla, in honour of the commander of the " Marblehead," and the men set to work making it tenable for a long stay by burning infected Cuban huts in the vicinity, landing pro- visions, and fixmg the camp kitchens. The spot seemed so peaceful that about evening many of the men, hot and wearied with a long day's work, stripped and went down to the beach to bathe. Wliile they were disporting themselves, a Cuban came running into camp closely pur- sued by Mauser bullets. From the brush on the hills sounded the crack of rifles, and the vicious whistle of the bullets rung in the air. Naked men caught up rifles and cartridge-belts, and ran to where the officers were form- mg the companies and sending company after company out to the firing-line. They were absolutely green men, most of these marines, and the attack was a complete Blue Jackets of '98 257 surprise ; but they responded like veterans to the word of command, and poured their volleys into the bush with coolness and precision. The fighting was not long that afternoon, for the enemy soon drew off; but two of our men had fallen, — the first to lose their lives on Cuban soil, — James McColgan, and WiUiam Dunphy, privates both. At night the enemy returned to the attack, not charging or attempting to carry the American position in any way, but lurking in the bushes and potting away at the tents and the dark figures of our men outlined against the sky. All night this was kept up, effectually preventing the marines from getting any rest after their hard day's work. About midnight Surgeon John B. Gibbs was killed, the first United States officer killed in action in Cuba. The next morning Colonel Huntington concluded to move his camp to lower ground, where the men would not form such conspicuous targets. The task was a wearing one. Never had the tropic sun been hotter than it was while the marines were painfully carrying tents, boxes, and bedding down the blazing hillside, while the Spaniards in the bushes popped away with their Mausers. Crouching in the bushes, with palm-leaves tied about them and using smokeless powder, the assailants were literally invisible to the Americans. Though the ships joined with the men on shore in shelling the bushes, the aim was at random, and if it did any execution did not check the Spanish fire. Neither did two raidiug-parties sent out through the bush put an end to the persecution. It was like fighting a lot of gnats. All day of the llth and the 12th this fighting went on. At night the Span- ish fire slackened but little. Not even the American burial-parties were sacred to them, and their bullets poured quite as fiercely upon the men who drew up be- side the chaplain at the grave of the dead as upon those on the firing-line. The marines dug trenches and landed their three field-guns, but to little effect. The " Marble- 17 258 Blue Jackets of '98 head" ransacked the bushes by night with searchlight and shell, but still the nagging stream of bullets flew from the thickets. Machine guns had as little effect. It be- gan to look as if the marines would have to learn to ignore Mauser bullets altogether or take to the ships again. However, a scouting-party learned that the Spaniards had a sort of base not far from the camp, where there was a reservoir of drinking-water, the only supply in the neighbourhood, and a heliograph for communication with the fort at Caimanera at the head of the bay. With a small company of Cubans, who fought bravely, a force of marines marched against this post, and destroyed it, burning the block-house, smashing the water-tank, and capturing the heliograph. Seventeen Spaniards and one officer were taken, and sent aboard the " Dolphin," which had followed the expedition along the coast. It was learned that the Spaniards had 2000 men in the vicinity, and people wondered why they had not swooped down on the 600 marines and gobbled them up. But, as General Garcia said in a conference on the " New York," " The Spaniards never attack. Eemernber that. The Spaniards never attack." How many they had lost in the four days of fighting was never known. The Cubans claim to have counted the bodies of fifty dead. This much having been accomplished towards making the camp at the mouth of Guantanamo Bay tenable, the navy concluded to finish the job by running up to Cai- manera at the head of the bay and smashing the Spanish forts there. The " Texas," " Marblehead," and " Suwanee " undertook this task, and after a three hours' bombardment silenced the fort in the traditional way. The garrison ran away promptly, some rushing down to a train for Santiago which was in full view of tlie ships, and at which the " Texas " sent a 6-inch shell as it pulled out. At the end the forts were still formidable had the gar- rison chosen to return to the defence, but apparently the I'.A'I'II.KSHIP " MASSAC HUSK/ITS. Blue Jackets of '98 259 commander of that district was content to abandon the neighbourhood, for thereafter the navy used Guantanamo Bay without molestation and the marines' camp was not disturbed. It is interesting to note that in their way up the bay both the " Texas " and the " Marblehead " fouled contact mines with their propellers. Neither mine ex- ploded, though, when hauled on deck and dissected, each was seen to be powerful enough to sink any ship under which it should be discharged. On all the ships about Santiago harbour were now heard the two questions, " When will the army come ? " and " When will Cervera come out ? " All lingering doubt about Cervera's presence — though, indeed, there was little left — was ended by the daring reconnaissance around Santiago of Lieutenant Victor Blue, undertaken on the 13th of June. This young navy officer had already distinguished himself by slipping through the Spanish lines on a mission to General Gomez. In his second ex- pedition he crawled through dense thickets, infested with guerrillas, passed through the Spanish lines where if taken he would have been instantly hanged as a spy, found a spot on the crest of a hill whence he could look down on the harbour and count all the Spanish ships that were known to have sailed from Cape Verde, with the excep- tion of the torpedo destroyer " Terror," and then returned to the sea west of the city, having made a complete circuit of Santiago. The exploit was one of the most daring of the war. Its success makes all the more inexplicable the apparent lack of just such expeditions in front of the army before it advanced on Santiago. On the morning of the 20th fleet tugs came up to the blockade, bringing news of the presence of the army expedition in the offing, and a few minutes later the "Detroit," one of the convoying ships, came up with the same tidings. Admiral Sampson went down in a cruiser 26o Blue Jackets of '98 to meet the incoming armada, and the hills of Cuba re- sounded with the salutes of the warships to the general and the cheers exchanged by sailors and soldiers. It was a historic moment, this meeting of the two wings of the armed service of the United States on that distant foreign coast. It was the beginning of the end of Spanish mis- rule in Cuba ; that was patent to all beholders of the monster armament there gathered. Sampson in a launch went off to call on General Shafter, and shortly afterwards the headquarters ship, " Seguranca," came up to the blockade, and the admiral and the general made that visit to Garcia's camp which has been described already. There- after for a day or two the navy was employed in shelling the coast defences preparatory to the landing of the troops and in assisting the actual disembarkation. The one incident of interest in this extended bombardment was the explosion on the " Texas " of a 6-inch shell, one of the few hits scored by the Spaniards in the war and the cause of the death of the first man killed afloat in the Santiago campaign. The " Texas " was bombarding the enemy's works at Cabanas, and ten transports lay in the offing as though awaiting an opportunity to land their cargoes. So vigorous and well directed was the Spanish fire that the affair which was intended as a mere feint developed into a fierce duel between the ship and the artillerists on shore. The range was about 5000 yards, and while the aim of the navy gunners was good, their lack of explosive shells enabled the enemy to stick to his guns. At last a 6-inch shell struck the battle-ship on the port bow about five feet below the main deck. It pierced the steel plate, at that point about an inch and three quarters thick, and exploded in the forward com- partment, where fifteen men were standing at quarters. The steel-clad room was instantly filled with flying bits of iron. A great steel stanchion was cut in two, a 4-inch hawser and the oaken core on which it was wound were cut as with axes. The side of the ship opposite that by Blue Jackets of '98 261 which the shell entered was bulged out three inches, and bolt-heads, gun-fittings, ribs, everything that came in the way of the storm of steel disappeared in general ruin. A man who was directly in the path of the missile was blown to atoms, and eight others were wounded ; but the wonder is that any in that pent-up room with bits of steel and iron flying Hke grape-shot escaped alive. It was natural that when the officers came to gaze upon the scene, the first opportunity any of them had had to view the effect of a big modern shell in a warship, they should remember that projectiles twice as large were fired from every battle-ship on that station. " Well, if that is the work of a 6-inch shell," said Captain Philip of the " Texas," " I wonder what a 13-inch would do ? " The drama which was being enacted around Santiago was now rapidly approaching its denouement. The men on the great gray ships that clung so closely to the nar- row entrance to the harbour knew that before many days the Spaniards must come out and fight, unless they in- tended to await the capture of the city by the American troops, and be compelled to blow up their vessels at their berths. But they did not know that during these very days the cable, which no American ship had been able to find and cut, was bringing from Madrid orders to Admiral Cervera to make the dash for freedom. Cervera had in- deed protested. None knew better than he how inade- quate were his ships to meet the storm of fire that lay in wait for them beyond the shelter of Morro. The days that he had lain quietly at anchor had been to him as the period in jail before the day of execution is to the con- victed criminal. He is said to have wept, when he en- .tered Santiago, knowing that his squadron would never escape ; and he received now, as July was ushered in, the orders of General Blanco to make the dash, with resigna- tion and without hope. s On paper the fleet which Admiral Cervera had under his command was a formidable one, but its actual strength 262 Blue Jackets of '98 was materially less than that with which it was credited in the naval manuals. Instead of the speed of from 18 to 20 knots with which his ships were credited, they proved when put to the test, to be slower than our 16- knot cruisers. His flagship, "Cristobal Colon," was without the 11-inch guns for which she was fitted, but which the Spanish navy authorities, though war had been imminent for more than a year, had never had mounted. The discipline of the crews was of the most slovenly, and their marksmanship, as was proved later, was beneath contempt. It had never been the practice in the Spanish navy to buy powder and shot just to shoot away in target practice. Notwithstanding all weaknesses, however, the squadron was the strongest body of modern men-of-war that had up to that time been despatched from any European port on a mission of war. The flagship, the " Cristobal Colon," was an Itahan-built armoured cruiser. The armour belt on her hull was six inches thick, on her barbettes five inches. Her complement was 500 men; her armament, in the main battery, two 9.84-inch and ten 5.9-inch rapid-fire rifles ; secondary battery, six 4.7-inch rifles, ten 6-pounder and ten 8-pounder rapid-fire, and two Maxim guns. The displacement of the "Colon" was 6800 tons, or about that of the "Texas." The three cruisers that followed the flag of the "Colon" — the " Vizcaya," " Almirante Oquendo," and " Maria Teresa " — were sister ships, so alike in proportions and appearance that in Havana harbour Captain Eulate of the "Vizcaya" told Captain Sigsbee that his ship could only be distin- guished from the others by some trifling differences in the gilding on the stern, and the carving of the woodwork. The description of these magnificent ships was : displace- ment, 7000 tons ; length, 364 feet ; speed, 18.5 knots ; com- plement, 500 men. Guns: main battery, two ll-incl Hontoria, ten 5.5-inch Hontoria rapid-fire guns ; second- ary battery, eight 6-pounders, ten 1-pounder rapid-fire and several machine guns. Added to this squadron o Blue Jackets of '98 263 fighting craft were two torpedo destroyers, " Furor " and " Pluton," sister ships, of 380 tons, manned by 67 men each, carrying two 14-pounders, two 6-pounders, two 1.45-inch automatic guns, and two torpedo tubes each. All the Spanish ships had the usual complement of tor- pedo tubes. On paper — that phrase must constantly be returned to, for the estimated qualities of the Spanish ships differed so greatly from their actual accomplish- ments in battle — on paper there were in this squadron elements of actual superiority over their foes. It was equipped with smokeless powder, a great advantage. The Hontoria guns were regarded by naval experts, the world over, as better, weight for weight, than the American guns, being more rapid in action, and of greater muzzle velocity. In speed — again on paper — the Americans had only two ships equalling the Spanish vessels. On the day of battle one of these ships, the " New York," was absent from the blockade, and the other, the " Brooklyn," had one engine uncoupled and useless. What in more daring hands would have been a notable element of supe- riority in the Spanish fleet were the two torpedo-boat destroyers, splendid vessels of their class, and unmatched by anything in the United States navy. The American fleet that engaged Cervera on his ap- pearance at the harbour's mouth was notably superior in weight of metal, besides outnumbering the Spaniards. The " New York " may be left out of the calcalation, as she was absent from the blockade when Cervera made his dash, and came up only after the surrender. The fleet actually engaged was composed of three first-class battle- ships, one second-class battle-ship, one armoured cruiser, and a converted yacht. The descriptions of the ships engaged are as follows : Iowa, battle-ship, 11,340 tons; complement, 505 men. Armour : belt, 14 inches ; barbettes, 15 inches ; turrets, 15 inches. Guns : main battery, four 12-inch, eight 8-inch, six 4-inch rapid-fire ; secondary, twenty 6-pounders, four 264 Blue Jackets of '98 l-pounders, four Colts. Two torpedo tubes. Speed, 17.1 knots. Commander, Captain Robley D. Evans. Indiana, battle-ship, 10,288 tons; speed, 15.5 knots; complement, 473 men. Armour : belt, 8 inches ; deck, 2| inches ; barbettes, 17 inches ; turrets, 15 inches ; case- ments, 6 inches. Guns: main battery, four 13-inch, eight 8-inch, four 6-inch slow-fire ; secondary rapid-fire battery, twenty 6-pounders, six l-pounders, four Catlings. Tor- pedo tubes, two. Commander, Captain Henry C. Taylor. Okegon, battle-ship, 10,288 tons ; speed, 16.8 knots ; complement, 473 men. Armour: belt, 18 inches ; deck, 2 1 inches; barbettes, 17 inches; turrets, 16 inches; case- ments, 6 inches. Guns : main battery, four 13-inch, eight 8-inch, four slow-fire 6-inch ; secondary rapid-fire battery, twenty 6-pounders, six l-pounders, four Catlings, and two field-guns. Torpedo tubes, three. Commander, Captain Charles E. Clark. Texas, second-class battle-ship : displacement, 6,315 tons ; speed, 17.8 knots ; complement, 389 men. Armour : belt, 12 inches ; deck, 2 inches ; turrets, 12 inches. Guns: main battery, two 12 -inch, six 6 -inch slow-fire ; second- ary rapid-fire battery, six l-pounders, four 37-millimeter Hotchkiss, two Catlings. Torpedo tubes, two. Com- mander, Captain John Philip. Brooklyn, flagship of Commodore Schley : displace- ment, 9215 tons; speed, 21.9 knots; maximum coal-: supply, 1461 tons; complement, 516 men. Armour:' belt, 3 inches ; deck, 3 to 6 inches ; barbettes, 8 inches ; I turrets, 5| inches. Guns: main battery, eight 8-inch,' twelve 5 -inch ; secondary battery, twelve 6-pounders, four' l-pounders, four Colts, and two field-guns. Torpedo tubes, four. Commander, Captain F. A. Cook. The " Gloucester " and " Vixen," which completed the roster of the vessels available for meeting Cervera, were converted yachts. The former mounted four 6-pounders. Under the command of Captain Richard Wainwright, who had been with Sigsbee on that dreadful night when' Blue Jackets of '98 265 the " Maine " was assassinated in the harbour of Havana, she did gallant service in the day of battle. To the layman the American squadron seems vastly superior, — an impression which is, of course, strengthened by the completeness of the victory it won. But just as the naval experts, even in our own service, at the begin- ning of the war thought the Spanish and United States navies very equally matched, so students who made their estimates of the comparative strength of the two squad- rons at Santiago from the data set down in the books were not inclined to attribute any overwhelming superior- ity to the Americans. Mr. H, W. Wilson, a well-known English authority on naval affairs, writing after the battle, declares that the Spaniards were not so very deficient in anything except the skill to fight their ships. He makes an interesting comparison of the number of shots each squadron could deliver in five minutes, which shows that if the Americans had more guns, the Spaniards, by virtue of having more of the rapid-firing type, could discharge more projectiles in a given time. The exact figures for the space of five minutes, leaving out of the question the very small guns of the secondary batteries, are : Ameri- cans, 290.5 shots, with a total weight of 39,400 pounds ; and Spaniards, 367.5 shots, with a weight of 31,200 pounds. Nor was the difference in the weight of metal hurled so great an advantage to the Americans as might appear, as it proceeded chiefly from their possession of more heavy guns, — the 12-inch and 13-inch calibres. As a matter of fact, only two shells from cannon of these great calibres hit their marks, so that the possession of these guns to the Americans was of but slender value. It is worth while to consider these comparisons before taking up the story of the battle, because they are the sort of estimates our officers had been making for days and weeks before the crucial time of battle came. With access to all the latest naval statistics they were able to figure out exactly — so far as calculations in which the 266 Blue Jackets of '98 comparative gallantry of men must remain an unknown factor can be exact — the chances of the battle that was coming. "When it was over, and won so completely and with so little loss, there was a tendency on the part of many to think it had been a most unequal atfair, after all. It was unequal only because the Yankee seamen had planned to fight it as if they were meeting an enemy act- ually their superior. It was easily won, not because of the heavier guns of our ships, but by the better shooting of our gunners. We suffered little, not because our armour was thickest, but because every man from captain to powder-boy gave force and effect to Farragut's maxim, " The best defence against an enemy's fire is the fire of your own guns." It was Sunday morning, July 3d, and on all the ships, as they floated heavily in their great half-circle, eight miles long, about the mouth of Santiago harbour, the men could be seen swarming out on the decks, clad in fresh, clean white clothes for general muster. The iron ring was not drawn as tightly as usual, for about nine o'clock the " New York " had hung out the signal " Disregard flagship's movements," and steamed off toward the east. She had gone to take Admiral Sampson to a conference with Gen- eral Shafter, for which the general, whose troops that morn- ing were just resting after the bloody assault on San Juan hill and El Caney, had long been asking. The absence of the " New York " made the blockading line west of the harbour ragged and weak. The little picket boat " Vixen " was there, and the " Brooklyn " lay to the southwe'^it of the harbour. The " Texas " was directly south, and the three big battle-ships, " Iowa," " Oregon," and " Indiana," made a curve from the " Texas " inshore east of the Morro, with the " Gloucester " farthest east and nearest inshore. It was, perhaps, the most ragged appearance the blockading line had presented since the cordon was drawn nearly five weeks before. None of the ships had full steam up, the Blue Jackets of '98 267 " Iowa " and " Indiana " had both reported some trouble with their forward turrets, and the " Brooklyn's " forward engines were uncoupled. It is not probable that there was any conscious relaxation of watchfulness, but it is evident that conditions were about as favourable as they could be for an effort to break the blockade. Probably the general expectation was that when Cervera did make his dash he would make it at night, but he has himself said that the blockade seemed more impenetrable at night than by day. This morning saw the one ship which was supposed to be able to compete with the Spaniards in speed absent, and a broad gap in the blockading Kne. Cervera, under peremptory orders to sail, doubtless figured that he could leave the heavy battle-ships behind, and if the " Brooklyn," which alone was supposed to have a chance m a race, should pursue him, he could turn and overwhelm her with his superior force. All the nif^ht before the lookouts on the fleet had re- ported fires burning on the hills, and this morning Com- modore Schley, who had command in Admiral Sampson's absence, had signalled to the " Texas," " What is your theory about the burning of the block-houses on the hill last night?" The commodore sat on the deck of the " Brooklyn " awaiting an answer to his signal, and in- cidentally watching a cloud of smoke which was rising from the interior of the harbour behind the hills. It was a phenomenon to be watched, but it did not necessarily mean anything serious, for about that time in the morning a tug was apt to make a visit to the Estrella battery. There had been so many other hot and quiet Sundays that all hands concluded that another one was there, with attention to general muster the most serious business for the of- ficers, and the danger of being caught at inspection in a badly washed jumper the gravest peril to the Jackies. But nevertheless the smoke was watched, and presently, when the quartermaster on the forward bridge said quietly to the navigating officer, " That smoke 's moving, sir," that 268 Blue Jackets of '98 officer thought it worth while to take a peep himself. What he saw nearly made him drop the glass. The mo- ment for which the fleet had waited five weeks, the hour of trial for which some of those blue and white clad men had been educating themselves for a quarter of a century, was at hand. " After-bridge there," he bellowed through a megaphone, " tell the commodore the enemy is coming out." No need to repeat the message. It was heard all over the ship, and not only the commodore but the powder- boys were rushing for their stations. The cry rung out, " Clear ship for action," and the gongs and bugles which call to general quarters clanged and pealed on the quiet air. From the other ships, so lately peaceful in the Sab- bath calm, came echoes of the same martial sounds. The signal " The enemy is escaping " ran to the masthead of the " Brooklyn," the " Texas," and the " Iowa " at the same moment, for on all three ships keen eyes were fixed on that suspicious smoke. Apparently all the vessels on the blockade caught the alarm at the same time. Down came that signal from the flagship, and up went another, " Clear ship for action." Vain trouble ! On every ship the men were rushing to quarters, without waiting for the com- modore's commands. On every ship men were running to their places, dropping off the white clothes in which they had been prepared for general muster. Everything wooden was tumbling overboard all along the line, water-tiglit compartments were rumbling shut, battle-hatches were being lowered, hose was being coupled up and strung along the decks to fight fire, ammunition hoists were going, and — greatest of all miracles — while all this was accom- plished in the midst of deafening turmoil in less time than it takes to tell of it, at the sudden blast of a bugle the men stood silent at their posts — 500 and more men to a ship, and each one where he would be most needed in battle and each as silent as a mute. A huge black hull appeared thrust forth from beyond Blue Jackets of '98 269 Estrella Point. It came out far enough to show a turret, and from the turret came a flash and then the boom of a heavy shot. Almost at the same moment a 6-pounder runcr out from the " Iowa." The battle was on, and " FiwhtinCT Bob " Evans had fired the first shot. There has been some discussion as to the commander to whom credit for the victory won at Santiago should be awarded. Zealous partisans of Admiral Sampson have contended that though he was absent at the moment of battle it was his plan that was followed in the combat, and that to him therefore attaches the glory. On the other hand, adherents of Commodore Schley have insisted that as the flag officer present at the battle he should reap all the honours. But at the risk of ignoring naval etiquette and of descending beneath the dignity of history, which should perhaps painstakingly judge the merits of this controversy and award the guerdon, I will express the opinion that to no flag officer, present or absent, does there attach any especial and peculiar glory except in the purely formal and perfunctory way that a superior is given credit for the work of his subordinates, even though he has not actively directed it. For the plan of battle that Admiral Sampson had decreed in the event of a dash by the enemy was simply for each ship to make for the harbour's mouth and engage the enemy as they came out. Surely that was a plan not requiring any notable tactical skill to devise, — a plan which left to the individual ship commanders the real responsibility for the outcome of the action. As for Commodore Schley, his greatest glory proceeded, not from any commands which he gave the fleet, but rather from the gallant way in which he rushed the " Brooklyn " to the front, although she alone was weaker than any two of the vessels coming out. It was a day when the fleet com- mander was effaced and the captains were in their glory. Even the signal that the enemy was coming out was made from at least two of the battle-ships as soon or sooner than from the flagship, and the commodore's signals to clear 270 Blue Jackets of '98 ship for action and to close in and attack the enemy were in both instances anticipated by every ship in the squad- ron. For these reasons the acrimonious controversy be- tween the friends of Schley and of Sampson which, as these pages are being written, is raging in the newspapers and in tiie halls of Congress with such fierceness that de- serving navy officers are being deprived of well-earned advancement because of it, will be ignored here. It will be forgotten while the victory off Santiago is still fresh in the memory of man. The officers and men will not be soon forgotten. As Schley well said, " There was glory enough for all." The first ship out was the " Maria Teresa." Behind her came the " Vizcaya," the " Cristobal Colon," and the " Almi- rante Oquendo." To meet them all the ships of the block- ading fleet were standing in toward the harbour, firing rapidly from every gun that could be brought to bear. According to the plan of the blockade, the American vessels were lying still and had to get under way, — a slow process for a 10,000-ton battle-ship when the enemy is forging past under full headway. Which way the Spaniards would turn when they passed beyond the shoals that extend for half a mile beyond the harbour's mouth, was the vital ques- tion then. If they turned eastward, they would have to run into the midst of the most formidable ships of the squadron. If they went directly west, they might outrun the battle-ships and escape. The " Brooklyn," which was fastest of the ships on the blockade, was also in the best position to head off the enemy should they take this course. She was no match for the number of the enemy's ships that would be in a position to engage her when she came up to them, but Schley showed no sign of hesitation. It was possible that his ship would be lost — he says that the contingency entered very clearly into his calculations — but in sinking the " Brooklyn " the Spaniards would be delayed long enough for the battle-ships to come up with them, and once in the clutch of these monsters there was Blue Jackets of '98 271 no reason to fear their escape. The difficulty with the " Brooklyn's " manoeuvre was that, as it brought her up with the Spaniards on a parallel course and going in a directly opposite direction, she was compelled to make a complete circle in order to chase them. Had they pos- sessed the speed with which they were credited in the naval manuals, this would have put the " Brooklyn " out of the fight, for one of her engines was uncoupled and her speed was greatly reduced. As a matter of fact, however, the Spaniards fell so far behind their estimated speed that not only was the " Brooklyn " able to circle about and still overhaul the fleetest of them, but the " Texas," our slowest battle-ship, was able to hold its own in the race. The "Maria Teresa" rounded the shoals and turned west. That settled the first problem of the day so far as she was concerned. But was the whole Spanish fleet going to take the same course ? Might not Cervera, knowing that in a fleet action we were too strong for him, scatter his ships, in the hopes that the fortunes of war might enable one to defeat her adversary, or at least to slip away through the American lines ? That was the next anxiety, and professional students of the battle have since agreed that that was the best course the Spaniards could have pursued. The fortune that overcame Cervera that day, however, impelled him to take his whole line of ships to the west, and the situation for the Americans was cleared of all perplexities. " Close in and engage the enemy," was quite as explicit an order as any captain had need of that day. The little " Vixen," which lay near the " Brooklyn," let fly with her 6-pounders when she saw the huge bulk of the " Maria Teresa " turn towards her, and then prudently slipped away. But the rest of the American ships, with funnels belching black smoke, and turrets, hulls, and tops spurting out red flame and yellow smoke, came rushing down towards the enemy. Noble work was done by the men whose most important but not spectacular duty it is 272 Blue Jackets of '98 to feed the roaring fires that drive the great floating forts. In the engine-rooms and stoke-holes of those men-of-war that scorching July day, men worked naked in fiery heat. They could hear the thunder of the guns above them, and feel the ship tremble with the shock of her broadsides. How the battle was going they could not see. Deep in their fiery prison, far below the lapping waves that rushed along the armoured hull, they only knew that if disaster came they would suffer first and most cruelly. A success- ful torpedo stroke would mean death to them, every one. The clean blow of an enemy's ram would in all probability drown them like rats in a cage, even if it did not cause them to be parboiled by the explosion of their own boilers. A shot in the magazine would be their death-warrant. All the perils which menaced the men who were fighting so bravely at the guns on deck threatened the sooty sweating fellows who shovelled coal and fixed fires down in the hold, with the added certainty that for them escape was impossible, and the inspiration which comes from the very sight of battle was denied them. They did their duty nobly. If we had not the testimony of their com- manders to that effect, we still should know it, for they got out of every ship not only the fullest speed with which she was credited under the most favourable circumstances, but even more — notably in the cases of the " Texas " and " Oregon," which, despite bottoms fouled from long service in tropical waters, actually exceeded their highest recorded speed in the chase. On the " Oregon," wlien she was silently pursuing the " Colon " at the end of the battle, Lieutenant Milligan, who had gone down into the furnace- room to work by the side of the men on whom so much depended, came up to the captain to ask that a gun might be fired now and then. " My men were almost exhausted," said Milligan, " when the last 13-incli gun was fired, and the sound of it restored their energy; and they fell to work with new vigour. If you will fire a gun occasionally, it will keep their enthusiasm up." On most of the ships Blue Jackets of '98 273 the great value of the work the men in engine and boiler rooms were doing was recognised by the captains' send- ing down every few minutes to them an account of how the fight progressed. Each report was received with cheers and redoubled activity. On the " Brooklyn," when the " Colon " was making her final race for life, Commo- dore Schley sent orderhes down to the stoke-holes and engine-rooms with this message : " Now, boys, it all de- pends on you. Everything is sunk except the ' Colon,' and she is trying to get away. We don't want her to, and everything depends on you." The " Colon " did not get away. As the enemy came rushing out of the harbour, the American vessels to the eastward steamed down as fast as possible, maintaining a fierce fire the while from everything that could be brought to bear. The batteries on shore turned loose at the Americans, but no attention was paid to them. Nearest the shore was the " Indiana," and she, too, was nearest the leading ship of the enemy at the moment of beginning the battle. The water about this battle-ship fairly boiled with the flood of projectiles that poured down from Morro and sped from the broadside with which the " Maria Teresa " opened. The " Indiana" scored more than one hit on the " Teresa," as that ship was mak- ing her turn to the west, and then gave her attention to the " Vizcaya." All the American ships were engaged by this time, and it was almost impossible, in the dense smoke and the storm of projectiles, to make out the success that attended the efforts of any single vessel; but Commander Eaton, who was watching the fight from the tug " Eeso- lute," says : "As the ' Vizcaya ' came out, I distinctly saw one of the ' Indiana's ' heavy shells strike her abaft the fun- nels, and the explosion of this shell was followed by a burst of flame, which for a time obscured the afterpart of the stricken ship." Straight toward the fleeing enemy steamed the " Iowa " and " Oregon," belching forth great clouds of smoke until they looked like huge yellow clouds 18 2 74 Blue Jackets of '98 on the water. Then came the time when a cool head and a clear eye were necessary fur the captain of an American ship. As the battle-ships closed in on their prey, they overlapped each other, and careless use of the guns or a failure to make out accurately the target might have resulted in one of our ships firing into another. But so skilfully were our ships handled that at no time were they put in jeopardy from either the guns or the rams of each other, though at one time the " Oregon " was firing right across the decks of the " Texas." The hapless " Maria Teresa " was the first ship to leave the harbour, and her end was swift and frightful. Upon her for a time the fire of all the American squadron was concentrated. The shells from the great turret-guns for the most part went wild, but the 5-inch and G-iuch shells and the storm of smaller projectiles searched out every part of the doomed ship, spread death and ruin on every hand, and soon had her woodwork ablaze. Her gunners for a time stood manfully to their guns, and the scarlet flames jetted viciously from her sides like snakes' tongues. Little smoke hung about her, and she stood out bold and black against the green background of the hills, a perfect target. A shot from the " Brooklyn " cut her main water- pipe ; a shell, supposed to be from the " Oregon," entered her hull and exploded in the engine-room ; a 6-inch shell from the " Iowa " exploded in her forward turret, kilUng or wounding every man at tlie guns; while the tempest of smaller projectiles made the decks untenable, and by the din of their bursting silenced the officers' commands. Admiral Cervera himself was on this devoted ship. " He expected to lose most of his ships," said one of his officers afterwards, "but thought the 'Cristobal Colon' might escape. That is why he transferred his flag to the ' Maria Teresa,' that he might perish with the less fortunate." Anotlier officer who stood by the admiral's side that mur- derous morning, told an American journalist afterwards some stories of the effect of the American fire. Of a Blue Jackets of '98 275 shell from the " Brooklyn " he said : " It struck us iu the bow, ploughing down amidships ; then it exploded. It tore down the bulkheads, destroyed stanchions, crippled two rapid-fire guns, and killed fifteen or twenty men." And of a shell from the " Iowa " he says : "It struck the 11-inch gun in the forward turret of the cruiser, cutting a furrow as clean as a knife out of the side of the gun. The shell exploded half-way in the turret, making the whole vessel stagger and shake in every plate. When the fumes and smoke had cleared away so that it was possible to enter the turret, other gunners were sent there. The survivors tumbled the bodies which filled the wrecked turret through the ammunition hoist to the lower deck. Even the machinery was clogged with corpses. . . . All our rapid- fire guns aloft soon became silent, because every gunner had been either killed or crippled at his post and lay on the deck where he fell. . . . There were so many wounded that the surgeons ceased trying to dress the wounds. Shells had exploded inside the ship, setting fire to the woodwork, and even the hospital was turned into a fur- nace. The first wounded who were sent there had to be abandoned by the surgeons, who fled for their lives from the intolerable heat." The " Teresa " had come within the zone of the Amer- ican fire at about 9.35 a. m. Within fifteen minutes smoke was rising from her ports and hatches, indicating that she had been set afire by the American shells. The shot from the " Brooklyn " that had cut her water-main made it impossible to extinguish the flames, and, the fire from the American ships growing more accurate and more deadly every minute, she was beached at 10.15 and her flag hauled down. On the " Texas " the men raised a shout of joy. " Don't cheer, men," said Captain Philip from the bridge ; " those poor fellows are dying." Admiral Cervera's own race for life and liberty lasted less than forty minutes. Clad in underclothes only, he tried to escape to the shore on a raft, directed by his son, but was 276 Blue Jackets of '98 captured and taken to the "Gloucester," where he was received with honours due his rank. His voyage away from Santiago covered exactly six miles and a half, and his brief experience with American gunnery cost nearly half his officers and crew. Behind the " Maria Teresa," at an interval of about 800 yards, came the " Vizcaya," — that crack cruiser which had been sent to New York as an offset to the " Maine's " visit to Havana, and from the decks of which in the har- bour of the Cuban capital Spanish officers had looked down with idle curiosity and careless indifference upon the sunken wreck of that gallant battle-ship. We may well believe that when the prow of Captain Eulate's ship came ploughing out from the bay, Wainwright, late of the " Maine," on the little " Gloucester " aimed some shots at her with a special ill-will. But his particular game was of another sort, as we shall see, and the " Vizcaya " under gathered headway rushed on to the west, passing the heavier battle-ships "Iowa" and "Indiana," but receiv- ing terrible punishment from their guns. In a newspaper interview on his arrival as a prisoner in the United States, a lieutenant of the " Vizcaya " spoke of the murderous effect of the shells from the "Indiana." He thought them the 13-inch shells, but it is more probable that they were the 8-uich missiles. " They appeared to slide along the surface of the water and hunt for a seam in our armour," he said. " Three of these monster projectiles penetrated the hull of the ' Vizcaya,' and ex])loded there before we started for the shore. The carnage inside the ship was something horrible and beyond description. Fires were started up constantly. It seemed to me that the iron bulkheads were ablaze. Our organisation was perfect. We acted promptly, and mastered all small outbreaks of llame until the small ammunition magazine was exploded by a shell. From that moment the vessel became a furnace of fire. Wliile we were walking the deck headed shoreward, we could hear the roar of the Blue Jackets of '98 277 flames under our feet above the voice of artillery. The ' Vizcaya's ' hull bellowed like a blast furnace. Why, men sprang from the red-hot deck straight into the mouth of sharks." But the " Vizcaya " lasted longer than the " Almirante Oquendo," which followed her out of the harbour. While the former ship made her turn at the harbour's mouth and headed west on the coast, with the " Brooklyn," " Oregon," and " Texas " in full pursuit, the latter fell an immediate prey to the fire of the " Indiana " and " Iowa." Though accredited with speed equal to that of her sister ships, she lagged that day of all times, and received a fiercer baptism of fire than fell to the lot of any of her ill-fated comrades. She bore the punishment five minutes longer than the " Teresa ; " then, with flames pouring out of every opening in her hull, she made for the beach, hauhng down her flag in token of submission, while men were dropping from her red-hot decks to the water. Two great Spanish war-vessels were thus destroyed in the first three-quarters of an hour, and the American fleet, as though hungry for more victims, was concentrating its fire now on the two that were left. From the conning- tower of the " Iowa," " Fighting Bob " Evans passed the word through the speaking-tubes to the men in the bowels of the ship, telling them of the victorious progress of tlie fight thus far ; and the cheers that came from below were followed by the forward leap of the ship, as she responded to the increased pressure of steam the willing and enthusiastic stokers coaxed out of the boilers. Leaving the " Teresa " and the " Oquendo " flaming and smoking on the beach, the chase swept on. The " Viz- caya " was still making a gallant running fight, and the greatest of all the Spanish ships, the magnificent " Cristo- bal Colon," named after the man who had given to Spain this western domain she was now in process of losing, the ship which alone Admiral Cervera had hoped to save from the wreck he foresaw, v/as racing along the coast 278 Blue Jackets of '98 near the shore, and protected from the American vessels in some degree by the " Vizcaya." While she fled, dis- aster fell upon the two torpedo-boat destroyers, " Pluton " and " Furor." And the story of the destruction of these vessels is also the story of the cool judgment and mag- nificent courage of Eichard Wainwright, late executive officer of the " Maine," then commander of the converted yacht " Gloucester." As the cruisers came out, Wainwright joined in the general cannonade with his little six- and four-pounders, but he did not join in the chase. With quick compre- hension of the situation, he determined that the torpedo destroyers were his fair game, and he determined to await their appearance, meanwhile letting steam accumulate in his boilers in order to have plenty of speed when the crucial moment should arrive. The destroyers were slow to come out. For some reason, yet unexplained, Cervera, schooled tactician as he was, failed to handle them in the only way in which they might be made of service. In- stead of bringing them out of the harbour on the lee, or protected, side of the heavier vessels, and letting them slip out when our ships were nearest, he left them to make their appearance alone and undefended. As if this were not enough to insure their impotence and their certain destruction, the destroyers themselves were manoeuvred with an entire lack of that audacity and even desperation which alone can make one of these vulnerable craft for- midable. Instead of dashing at the nearest American ship, and trusting to the rapidity of their progress and the small target they offered for their safety, both the " Plu- ton " and the " Furor " followed the example of the cruisers, and turned along the shore to the westward. A torpedo boat is often likened to a serpent, because of its sinister method of attack and of the deadly hurt which it can inflict. But, like the serpent, it is least dangerous in flight. Coiled and ready for a spring, a rattlesnake is a thing of deadly potentialities. Extended at full length, Blue Jackets of '98 279 with its long, slender vertebrae exposed, and brittle to the lightest blow, it is easily slain. So with the torpedo boat. Coming head on, at a speed of twenty-five knots, with two deadly missiles ready to let fly, either one of which striking will end the stoutest warship, it is an enemy to unsettle the aim of opposing gunners. Eunning away, it is only an animate and interesting target. Cervera's torpedo de- stroyers ran away. The gunners on the larger American cruisers sent a storm of projectiles from the secondary batteries after them, but the real, serious attack was left to the little " Gloucester " and Wainwright. In a cloud of smoke from her own guns, the former yacht sped for- ward, receiving and ignoring shots from the batteries and the nearer Spanish cruisers. One 6-inch shell would effectually terminate her career, and many were fired at her ; but her captain had eyes only for the two destroyers, and only one desire, to come to close quarters with them be- fore they could either be sunk by our battle-ships or strike our vessels a blow. Either of the destroyers was more than a match for the " Gloucester." Their batteries alone were of twice the power, without considering at all the engines of destruction which they could let slip from their torpedo tubes. In a few minutes from the moment the enemy was sighted, Wainwright was engaged with the two destroyers at short range, and under the fire of the "Socapa" battery. The battle-ships which had been firing at them from their secondary batteries soon saw that the " Gloucester " was equal to the task, and desisted. In a very few minutes both destroyers began to smoke ominously, and the rapidity of their fire fell off. Then the " Furor " became erratic in her course, as though her steering-gear had been cut. Wainwright closed in sav- agely, and his men at their unprotected guns redoubled their efforts. Suddenly, amidships on the " Pluton," there shot up a prodigious cloud of smoke and flame, with a deafening roar and shock that could be felt across the water despite the thunders of the guns. A shell from 28o Blue Jackets of '98 one of the battle-ships — three afterwards disputed for the honour — had struck her fairly, and exploded either the magazines or the boilers, or both. Broken in two by the rending blast, she sank hke a stone. Balked of half his chosen prey, Wainwright pursued the other craft the more relentlessly. She was already clearly crippled, and made pathetic efforts to escape. At last, fairly shot to pieces, she hauled down her flag, and ran for the line of breaking surf, where her men leaped overboard to escape the fierce flames that were sweeping resistlessly from bow to stern below. Changed in an instant from a relentless enemy to a succouring friend, Wainwright manned his boats, and went to the rescue of the survivors on the burning ship. Many were saved, and the Americans had barely left the smoking mass of scorching steel and iron, when it blew up with a resounding roar, and the Spanish torpedo destroyers had vanished. They lasted just forty minutes under the American fire, and at no time had been a serious menace to any American ship. An officer on the " Pluton " afterwards told of the plans and the fate of the destroyers in an interview, some part of which may be quoted here : " The two torpedo-boat destroyers were to stay behind the armoured cruisers until the American ships closed in, and then they were to dart out, heading straight for the nearest enemy. That was the plan, but see how it failed! We were shot to pieces before we got within half the torpedo-striking distance of the American ships. We found ourselves riddled, and could not strike a blow in return. . . . Our vessel, without armour, offered no place of refuge. On one of the armour-clads a man feels somewhat safer on the lee side of a turret, or with the conning-tower between him and the enemy ; but our men were just as safe on the open deck, safer indeed than below, for the shots soon shattered our steampipes, and escaping steam scalded to death the stokers and engineers. . . . We had prepared our torpedo tubes, but before the 'Texas,' now the nearest enemy, was within 1500 yards of us — much too far to use a Blue Jackets of '98 281 torpedo against her — our steering-gear was crippled, half of our crew were killed, and our engines were mortally hurt. We steered for a time by the twin screw. We then tried to get behind the ' Oquendo, ' not to save our lives, but to save our torpedoes until we could use them. But before we could take the position we intended, the ' Pluton ' became unmanageable. The ' Oquendo ' used smoke-producing powder at the begin- ning of the battle, solely to enable the ' Pluton ' and ' Furor ' to hide. But the smoke did not lie on the water. It rose in fleecy clouds that rendered our position all the plainer to the enemy in the clear strip of the blue, clean water below. . . . The biggest shells were fired so as to ricochet along the water. We could see them coming at us by the enormous splashes they made, and they came straight. Finally, a shell from the ' Brooklyn, ' I think, literally stove the torpedo boat to splint- ers. It passed through the boiler-room, splitting the boiler itself, and letting out steam and scalding water upon the crew to stab them like sword-blades." The action had now continued for about three-quarters of an hour. The " Infanta Maria Teresa " and the " Oquendo " were blazing on the beach with their colours struck. The two torpedo destroyers were annihilated. The battle-ship " Indiana," which had been distanced by the enemy in his rush to the eastward, had been signalled to turn in toward the shore, and give aid to the survivors on the burning ships. Two Spaniards only were still afloat, — the " Vizxaya," running and fighting Ijravely in a hopeless struggle for life, and the great " Cristobal Colon," which was rushing, with the momentum of a planet in its course through space, down the coast to the westward. In the chase of these two vessels, the " Brooklyn " held the place of honour. Her station on the blockade when the enemy came out was such as to give her a command- ing position, and her speed kept her well to the front throughout. Next to her at the outset was the " Texas," a battle-ship which for years the newspapers had been de- scribing as unlucky and " hoodooed," but which in this battle developed marvellous speed and fought with reck- 282 Blue Jackets of '98 less gallantry. The " Oregon," third in the race at first, by a dash which no one thought possible for a ship of her weight and structure, passed the " Texas," and actually came up with the " Brooklyn," whose tars turned out on deck and turrets to cheer the wonderful fighter from a Pacific coast dockyard. The fire of these three vessels as they sped along, and that of the " Iowa," which was only a short distance in the rear, was concentrated on the un- happy " Vizcaya." She had passed inside the " Oquendo " and the " Teresa " when those two doomed ships were receiving the attention of the entire American fleet, and had, until they were sunk, escaped serious injury, but now with the fire of four of the biggest and best fighting- machines in the world concentrated upon her, the stanch and beautiful vessel began to go to pieces. Her great frame quivered under the repeated blows of the heavy shells that struck it and rung like a boiler-shop in full operation with the incessant clangor of the smaller pro- jectiles. An hour had passed. Of the American ships that started in the chase, only the " Brooklyn," " Texas," and " Oregon " were hanging like hounds on the flank of the quarry. The " Indiana " had been left behind. The " Iowa," too, had stopped to give aid to the burning and drowning men on the two blazing warships. The " Colon " was steaming ahead with no sign of weakness, but the " Vizcaya " seemed like a ship in distress. On her the fire of the three pursuers was concentrated. Admiral Schley, peering around the lee of the conning-tower on the " Brooklyn," said to his captain, " Get in close, Cook, and we '11 fix her." The range was then about 1 400 yards. A moment before Commodore Schley had asked George H. Ellis, a ship's yeoman who was assisting the navi- gator, what was the range. The shells were flying fast, but Ellis stepped unhesitatingly from behind the lee of the forward turret, where he was sheltered, and adjusting his stadimeter, turned with the report, "Fourteen hundred yards to the ' Vizcaya,' sir." There was a low moaning Blue Jackets of '98 283 sound in the air as a shell came on, a vicious spat, and the man's headless body fell heavily to the deck. " Too bad," said Schley, sorrowfully ; but there was time for no regrets. It had been George Ellis's lot to be the one man to offer up his life in exchange for the victory of Santiago. The word was passed to the turrets and tops of the " Brooklyn " to aim at the " Vizcaya " only. The ship was carried in until the range was less than 1000 yards, or little over half a mile, and the effect of the shots at that distance began to tell. " I don't see any of the shots dropping into the water," complained one of the gunners to the lieutenant in charge of that turret. " Well, that 's all right," was the reply ; " if they don't drop into the water, they are hitting." And hitting they were. Inside the " Vizcaya " the beautiful woodwork, which had awakened the admiration and at the same time the professional disapproval of Captain Sigsbee when he visited her at Havana, was all in a blaze. The turrets were full of dead and wounded men, the machinery shattered, and the hull pierced below the water-line. Eeluctantly abandoning the fight, for he was a brave officer and a gentleman. Captain Eulate turned his ship's prow toward that rocky and inhospitable shore on which already lay piled the wrecks of the " Teresa," the " Oquendo," and the " Furor." As the ship swung about, a shell from the " Oregon " struck her fairly in the stern. The enormous mass of steel, charged with explosives of frightful power, rushed tlirough the steel framework of the ship, shattering every- thing in its course, crashed into the boilers, and exploded. Words are inadequate to describe the ruin that resulted. Men, guns, projectiles, ragged bits of steel and iron splinters and indescribable debris were hurled in every direction, while flames shot up fiercely from every part of the ship. Between decks she was a raging hell of fire, and when she struck the beach the watchers from the American men-of-war could see what looked like a white 284 Blue Jackets of ^98 line reaching from her bow to the water, which was in fact the naked men dropping one after another over the side to seek the cool rehef of the ocean from the fiery torment they were enduring, So the " Vizcaya " dropped out of the fight. Anticipating a little the course of our narrative of the fight, we may tell of the final death- struggle of the ship as it was described in conversation by Captain Evans after the war : " "We had put in toward the * Vizcaya ' after she was beached, " said " Fighting Bob, " " thinking that since the ' Colon ' was in the hands of our fellows we would see what we could do to save some of the poor devils of Spaniards who were grilling there in the burning ship. I had the boats lowered away, and the men went over to the ' Vizcaya ' and took off all the Spaniards they could reach. Some of them had almost to be pried off the ship, they were so panic-stricken. In one of the first boats that came to the ' Iowa ' was Captain Eulate. He was about half clothed, and had been wounded a little — nothing serious at all, a mere scratch. Why, the Spanish surgeon who ten- derly assisted him up our ladder was twice as badly hurt, — had his whole arm shot away, — but was sticking to his commander with dog-like fidelity. Well, Eulate was depressed, of course; but I tried to cheer him up, told him he 'd made a good fight, and had our surgeon look after him. But he was persistently gloomy. Finally I asked him to come down to my cabin and take a drink. He acquiesced, and just as he turned to leave the deck, stopped, looked over to where his ship was smoking and flaming away, and raising his whole arm in the air, said, in a sort of theatrical fashion, ' Adios, " Vizcaya " ! Adios, adios ! ' Well, sir, at that very instant the whole hull of that ship seemed to be lifted in the air by a most tremendous explosion, and she fairly vanished in a cloud of smoke and flying debris. I suppose her main magazine had been reached by the fire, but the event could not have occurred at a more dramatic moment if it had been timed and the explosion regu- lated by a stage-manager." Thus the "Vizcaya" dropped out of the fight, at 11.06 according to the timekeeper on the " Brooklyn." One Blue Jackets of '98 285 hour and a half had been the period of her endurance of the American shells. The " Colon " was now left alone. Thus far her career had not been glorious, for she had simply run away, not making any effort to stand and give battle to her pursuers, and not even keeping up a very fast fire from her guns. In her speed was her one hope of es- cape, and her captain trusted to it wholly. From the very first shot of the battle the Spaniards had done nothing but run. Their fire, such as it was, was only intended as an aid to their escape. Had Cervera come out of Santiago intent upon fighting a desperate battle, he might indeed have lost all his ships, but in all probability he would have taken at least one of the American vessels to the bottom with him. His running fight only resulted in the loss of all his ships without inflicting the slightest loss upon the Americans. The " Colon " adhered strictly to the plan which had thus far characterized the Spanish tactics. It was quickly evident to those on the foremost of the pursuing ships that there could be no escape for the fugitive. Even had not the Americans developed un- expected speed, the course of the ships was such that the " Colon " would inevitably be cut off. A cape jutted out into the ocean at some distance before her, which she would have to round. The " Brooklyn," being farther out to sea, was headed for that headland in a direct line, while the doomed " Colon " had a long curve to make to reach it. Commodore Schley saw that the prize was his, and began to lighten the strain on his men, who had fought so well. Firing was stopped, and the men were called out on the superstructure to see what had been done by the guns of the fleet and to watch the chase. Out of the turrets, up from the magazines and engine-rooms, poured the stalwart fellows, smoke-begrimed and sweaty. Far astern they could see the smoking wrecks of the " Oquendo " and " Teresa." Almost abeam was the " Vizcaya," with men dropping from every port. Ahead on the right was 286 Blue Jackets of ^98 the " Colon " fleeing for dear life, while the " Brooklyn," responding to the work of men below for whom there was yet no rest, rushed after relentlessly. As the men crowded on turret top and along the decks to see the wonderful spectacle, they all of a sudden and spontane- ously set up a cheer for Admiral Schley. The admiral's eyes moistened as he looked down upon them from the bridge. " They are the boys who did it," he said to one who stood beside him, and he spoke truly. Then the men cheered the " Oregon," which was coming up gal- lantly, and from that ship the cheers were returned. Signals of a social and even jocular character were ex- changed between the three ships that were still in the chase, for now all felt that not even the last of Cervera's ships could escape. A signal from the " Brooklyn " sug- gested to the " Oregon" that she try one of her 13-inch guns on the chase. The great cannon flashed and roared from the forward turret, and the shell, which rushed past the " Brooklyn " with a noise like a railway- train, fell short. On they sped a little farther, the " Oregon " visibly gaining on the fastest ship of the Spanish navy, a battle-ship built for weight and solidity overhauling a cruiser built for speed. Presently another shell was tried. It fell nearer the fugitive, near enough for the captain of the fleeing foe to read in its splash in the water the death-warrant of his ship. At such a moment some men would turn fiercely and sell their lives as dearly as might be, but that instinct was lacking to the Spaniard. Instead he turned his almost uninjured ship toward the shore and beached her, hauling down his flag as she struck. Either before the surrender or after, her engineer's crew opened and broke the sea valves so as to destroy the ship. If this was done before the flag was hauled down, it was a legitimate and proper act ; if after, it was dishonourable and treacherous. Captain Cook went in a boat to take possession of the prize, his crew being ordered not to Blue Jackets of '98 287 cheer or exult over the vanquished. The ship had been struck but eight times, and not by shells of large calibre, and she would have been a useful prize but for this sly work below. There were plain indications that officers and men had been drinking heavily. An effort was made to save her by the " New York," which came up just after the surrender. Captain Chad wick, seeing the ship beached and fearing that she would slip off and sink in deep water, laid the nose of the " New York," up against her stern and pushed her gently but firmly up the shelving strand. The manoeuvre was useless. Be- fore another day the great cruiser had filled and rolled over on her side and lay a perfect wreck on the desolate and uninhabited shore of Cuba at the mouth of Eio Tarquino. It was the exact spot where the ill-fated " Virginius " expedition tried to land. More scores against Spain than that set down on account of the " Maine " were wiped out that day. So ended, after less than four hours' fighting, — for the "Colon" surrendered at 1.15 P. m., — a naval battle that possesses many extraordinary and unique qualities. It completed the wreck of Spanish naval power which had been in slow and interrupted progress since our Anglo- Saxon progenitors strewed the Channel with the wrecks of the Invincible Armada. It dealt the decisive stroke in the war which deprived Spain of her last remnant of American colonies. It was of absorbing interest to naval experts in all parts of the world, because it was the only considerable battle in which heavy men-of-war of the modern type and with modern armament had ever been pitted against each other on anything like equal terms. And it was unique in that while the defeated fleet lost six ships, more than 600 men killed and drowned, and 1800 prisoners, many of them wounded, the victors had but one man killed and one wounded. Small wonder was it that when the flag of the " Cristobal Colon " went down 288 Blue jackets of '98 and the decks of the American ships were covered with men cheering in a very delirium of joy, gallant Captain Philip of the " Texas " called his officers and crew about him, and, baring his head, said in reverential tone : " I want to make public acknowledgment here that I be- lieve in God, the Father. I want you all to lift your hats and from your hearts offer silent thanks to the Almighty." Much that was picturesque in the story of this most remarkable naval battle of modern times must be passed over hastily. The gallant effort of the " New York " to catch up with the fighters and retrieve her ill-luck in having been absent when the battle began, merits a passing word. Though technically in command, Admiral Samp- son was by bad fortune absolutely out of the battle from beginning to end, near enough to see the fighting but too far away to join in it. He reached the leading ships just as they were closing in about the beached " Colon." Much might be said too of the gallantry shown by men of the " Iowa," " Indiana," " Gloucester," " Vixen," and " Erics- son " in rescuing the Spanish from their burning ships. Never perhaps in the history of war has such dreadful suffering fallen on defeated seamen. Scores were literally roasted alive, for the whole interior of the ships " Vizcaya," " Oquendo," and " Teresa," became like iron furnaces heated white hot. The wounded burned where they lay, for even the decks were red-hot. Men caught below, in engine or furnace room, by the jamming of the battle gratings were condemned to a slow and frightful death. The sight of the carnage and agony crazed men who were otherwise unhurt and in possession of their faculties, so that they were unable to intelligently respond to efforts for their rescue. Men clinging to a ladder on the side of a scorching hot ship had literally to be dragged away before they would loose their hold and drop into a boat below. The American Blue Jackets worked amid flames, Blue Jackets of '98 289 on blistering decks, amid piles of ammunition continually being exploded by the heat, and under guns which might at any moment send out a withering blast. It is not too much to say that in their work of mercy the Blue Jackets encountered dangers quite as deadly as those they had met in the fury of the battle. The poor gunnery of the Spaniards saved our ships from any serious test of their shell-resisting qualities. The " Brooklyn," according to Commodore Schley's report, was struck by shells about twenty-five times, and bore in all some forty scars of the combat. But she was ready to continue, or to begin all over again, when the " Colon " turned over on the shore. The " Iowa " received two wounds, that did not imperil her structure at all, but which it seems impossible could have been sustained without loss of life. One shell exploded on the berth- deck and ripped things up in wholesale fashion. Another entered the coffer-dam, but fortunately did not explode. The " Texas " was hit three times, one shell smashing her chart-house and another puncturing her smoke-stack. The injuries to the other ships were even more trivial. When the complete destruction of the Spaniards is con- trasted with this comparative immunity of the American ships, the measure of our superiority in gunnery and our better fortune is suggested. An officer on the " Vizcaya " asserts that shots struck that doomed ship at the rate of one a second. But superior as our gunnery was, a table of hits compiled by an expert for the " Scientific American " from the official report of the Survey Board, shows how far we fell short of that ideal gunnery which figures so generally in newspaper accounts as " making every shot tell." After coimting with the utmost care all the shot- holes on the wrecks that were above water or visible, the Board reported the following " palpable hits," classified according to the size of the calibre of the striking shells: 19 290 Blue Jackets of '98 Niimber of Hiti on each Vessel. d 3 J3 ^1 15 'i;^ « Size of Gun. f! W 13 •0 t a (55 1^1 S % U "3 ^§^ a 3 H > t> H iz; ^ 6-pounder . . 17 43 13 4 77 42 1.83 1-pounder . . 2 2 13 15 4-inch .... 1 7 4 2 12 3 4.00 5-inch .... 3 3 7 15 6 2.50 6-inch . . . . 1 1 3 7 0.43 8-inch .... 3 3 5 12 18 0.67 12-inch .... 2 2 6 0.33 13-inch .... 8 0.00 Totals . . . 29 57 29 8 123 103 The impressive facts shown by this table are, first, that our 13-inch guns did no execution at all, and our 12-inch guns scored only two hits ; second, out of at least 6000 shots fired, only about 300 were effective. Allowance must be made for shots beneath the water-mark that could not be identified by the investigators and for those that did execution by bursting above the decks. But they change the results little, and the statistics of the wounds in the defeated ships demonstrate that, good as the Yankee gunnery was, it took many a shot to make a hit. It shows, too, that the maximum of execution was done by the rapid-fire and small-calibre guns. The slaughter on the Spanish ships and the flames which made them untenable came from the storm of small pro- jectiles which relentlessly searched out every part of their structures. So completely were they riddled by these projectiles, and so destructive was the work of the flames they kindled, that, despite the eagerness of the Americans to save and repair one ship as a trophy, the only one which seemed to offer the slightest hope that the endeavour could be made successful was the "Teresa." She was Blue Jackets of '98 291 raised by Lieutenant Hobson after costly and tireless efforts, but on her way North to be refitted she encountered a storm and was abandoned by her commander as sinking. Nevertheless she floated sixty miles and went ashore on Cat Island, where after another survey it was thought inexpedient to try to raise her. So of the more than SI 2,000,000 worth of Spanish ships and fittings destroyed that day, the Americans were unable to save anything. For them is only the remembrance of a victory so com- plete and so extraordinary that no trophy is needed to keep it fresh in the minds of the people. The almost 2000 prisoners were kept humanely and kindly cared for on the American ships until a great ocean-liner could be sent from the North to take them to their prison camp on an island in the harbour of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the officers going to Annapolis. In their captivity they fared better, as we shall see, than the soldiers of General Shaftei's army in their hour of victory. CHAPTEK XIII Closing in — The Sufferings of Beleaguered Santiago — The Lagging Negotiations for Surrender — The Out- pouring OF Kefugees — The Bombardment — Surrender of the Spaniards — The Stars and Stripes above San- tiago — The Wrecking of the Army by Sickness — The Flight to the North — The Infamy of the Transports — Montauk Point and Camp Wikoff — Fever Camps in the United States. MEANWHILE about the beleaguered city the Ameri- can Hues were being drawn tighter and tighter. Reinforcements were landing at Siboney, and hurrying forward to the front. The news of the complete success of the navy so encouraged the men in the trenches that they stood ready to defend their positions at all hazards. The one moment when the Spaniards might have regained their lost ground — the afternoon of July 2d — passed without effort on their part, and thereafter the capture of the city became merely a matter of patience. In the city was dire distress among non-combatants. Food was scarce and dear, and the poorer classes were reduced to devouring the most revolting scraps. The sanitary condition of the town was most alarming. To the effects of starvation was added the terror of a bom- bardment. Before Cervera went out to destruction. Gen- eral Toral threatened that if the Americans should take the city by assault, he would turn upon it the guns of the ships, regardless of the thousands of women and children in its streets. This peril was averted by the result of the naval battle; but immediately thereafter came General Shafter's warning, that he intended to bombard the city Blue Jackets of '98 293 from his trenches. Two days were given to the people to leave, — an act of humanity for which the general has been most unjustly condemned. It is true that the departure of the non-combatants left more food for the defenders and to that degree strengthened them ; but the time has never been, when American soldiers wantonly bombarded a city full of women and children without giving them an opportunity to escape, and it is to be hoped it never will come. Consul Ramsden describes as heart-rending the scenes on the roads leading out of the city the morning set for the departure of the people. Toral had ordered that no carts or other vehicles should be taken, so the ways were packed with young and old, sick and feeble, plodding along on foot. " The scene was terrible," wrote Eamsden in his diary ; " people flocking out, sick carried in chairs or as they could, children getting lost by the way, etc." Shelter was difficult to find, food still more so. El Caney, to which 18,000 to 20,000 fugitives flocked, was foul with the effluvium from unburied mules and horses, and even human victims of the battle. In the houses was not room enough for the people to lie down, and the nights were passed in sitting position on the floor. Food was scarcer than in the deserted town, and as the refugees had travelled on foot, none had more than three days' rations. The Red Cross Society, which had its agents on the ground, could not get its provisions up from the coast for lack of transportation, nor for that matter could the army. Small biscuits sold for $2 each, and $7 was refused for a chicken. On every hand children died for lack of food. General Shafter did all that could be done to alleviate the distress, though his first care was for the :army. Like distress was reported from Guavitas, Dos Bocas, and other neighbouring villages. In all, about '35,000 people had left Santiago, mostly, of course, women, children, or helpless persons. In a war-racked, impover- ished, and desolate country their sufferings were such that they soon began to appeal to the American commander 294 Blue Jackets of '98 for permission to return, preferring the perils of a bom- bardment to the slow agonies of starvation. The bombardment, indeed, had gone on but slowly. A few shots, and then a flag of truce, with renewed negotia- tions for a surrender, was about the daily routine. Some of the soldiers grew impatient. " Now that we 've got those dagoes corralled, why don't we brand them ? " in- quired one of the Eough Eiders in the language of the cattle camp. The almost hourly interchange of notes under flags of truce was jeered at from the trenches, where the hot, hungry, and water-soaked men were natur- ally anxious for a conclusion to their efforts and relief from their discomforts. General Shafter, however, pursued a course which was at once cautious and humane. To assault would have cost heavily in human life, the more so since Garcia and his Cubans had failed to head off the expected reinforcements from Manzanillo, and 4000 fresh troops under General Escario had entered the city on the night of the 3d. To push the bombardment with the as- sistance of the navy, would perhaps have hastened the surrender, but the American general was assured by the foreign consuls that Toral was eager to surrender already, and was actively urging such a course upon Madrid by cable. Shafter accordingly determined to wait a reason- able time, in hope of taking the town without further sacrifice of life. On the 6th of July the impatient men in the trenches saw that one of the flags of truce, at least, had borne fruit. Up a narrow trail from the city came a cavalcade of men, at the sight of the first of whom the crowd of soldiers who had been gathered there waiting in the heat for hours, went mad with joy. It was a throng of yelling, dancing, laughing, ay, and weeping, men that greeted Lieutenant Hobson and his seven comrades of the " Merrimac " exploit, when they came into the army's lines, after having been exchanged for seven prisoners taken at San Juan. As the band on the very foremost line struck up "The Star- ^ y^ Blue Jackets of '98 295 Spangled Banner," all the new-comers, and those who had gathered to welcome them, stood silent at a salute, but when the music died away bedlam broke forth. To crowd about the heroes, to make the tropical forests rin^ with cheers, to shake each one by the hand, seemed to be the dearest wish of every man in blue uniform that day. From the ambulance in which they held their triumphal progress, the seven happy Blue Jackets yelled words of compliment and congratulation to the tattered and dirty soldiers, who shouted back applause. It was a glorious episode in the lives of these men, and its culmination came when, reaching the fleet after dark, they found the ships' companies turned out as though an admiral, at least, were coming to visit ; and as their launch was seen ad- vancing from the shore, the cheers of their messmates made the hills of Cuba ring almost as had the thunderino- fire that Morro and Estrella had levelled against them nearly six weeks before. Day by day the American lines were growing stronger. The right had been extended until the city was bound in an iron ring, and men could get neither in nor out. The navy, freed from any apprehension of an enemy afloat, was able to give its undivided attention to the Spanish works, and on the 6th arrangements were made for the ships to bombard the town, while the troops did the same from their trenches. Every day, guns were placed in position along the American lines, which were now within three hundred yards of the Spanish position, and easily in range of the city. Three new batteries, twelve mortars, and the dynamite gun were thus trained on the belea- guered town, ready for the bombardment. On the 6th General Toral asked for terms of capitulation. The bom- bardment had been planned for this day, but at his urgent request for time to communicate with Madrid, it was de- ferred. The second day thereafter, he offered to surrender the city, but not his troops. They, according to the terms he suggested, were to be permitted to march away with 296 Blue Jackets of '98 their arms and unmolested, as far as Holguin. It seems strange, in view of the unconditional surrender of three days later, that this offer was favoured by General Shafter and all his division commanders. But by this time the continued rains and the pestilential climate were beginniag to tell upon the soldiers, and the gravest apprehensions of an epidemic in the trenches were felt. If yellow fever, the ally so long of the Cubans against the Spaniards, should now turn against the American invaders, the army might be sacrificed and Santiago lost, after all. So reasoned the commanders in the field ; but the authorities at Washing- ton, convinced that Spain was about ready to sue for peace, refused to consider the proposition, and Toral was so noti- fied, and warned to prepare for a resumption of hostilities at 4 P. M. on the 10th. Reinforcements continued to come from the United States. General Randolph, with the regular artillery, which would have been of the greatest service earlier, arrived, but was delayed at Siboney. The Ninth Massachusetts, Thirty-fourth Michigan, Eighth Ohio, First Illinois, and First District of Columbia volun- teers came, all eager to see some active service. On the afternoon of the 10th the bombardment began from shore and sea, and continued until noon the next day. Singu- larly, little injury was done. Some few houses were de- stroyed, and others badly damaged ; but the soldiers in the trenches suffered little. From the fleet the dynamite cruiser "Vesuvius" sent some of her monster explosive projectiles, but beyond making huge holes in the ground, and naturally shaking the nerves of the Spaniards, she accomplished little. The bombardment indeed was rather without spirit, since the idea had become firmly rooted in the minds of the commanding officers that the Spaniards intended to surrender. Both belligerents were suffering heavily from causes other than bullets and shells. In the American ranks malarial fever had made its appearance, and spread like wild-fire. In the hospitals were more than 3000 men, i Blue Jackets of '98 297 down with wounds or fever. Men died for lack of medi- cines which were abundant eighteen miles away. Every day new cases were reported, and the surgeons began to look grave. The defenders of the town were in even more desperate condition. General Linares, who was still nomi- nally the Spanish commander, though prevented by a wound from active service in the field, in a despatch to Madrid advising surrender, said : " Troops weak ; sick in considerable proportions not sent to hospitals, owing to the necessity of keeping them in the intrenchments. Horses and mules without the usual allowance of forage ; in the wet season with twenty hours' daily fall of rain, in the trenches which are simply ditches dug in the ground, without any permanent shelter for the men, who have nothing but rice to eat and no means of changing or drying their clothing." He closed his pic- ture of the wretchedness of the troops with a recom- mendation for a surrender. The United States meanwhile had offered that if the Spaniards would surrender they should be returned to Spain at the expense of this government. General Miles, the major-general commanding the whole army, had by this time reached Siboney. A story which indicates something of the conditions under which the men in the trenches were existing, is told of his visit to the front. At one point a battalion of naked men turned out solemnly and saluted. Somewhat startled, the general inquired the meaning of this remarkable spectacle. He learned that as it rained every day and the men had no change of clothing nor any place in which to dry it, they had become accustomed to strip at the first shower, putting their clothes under the shelter tents and going in nature's garb until the downfall was over. The fact too that the clothing supplied the troops was intended for winter use in Nortli Dakota had something to do with their readiness to discard it. There was no change in the command of the army, owing to General Miles's visit. He had come 298 Blue Jackets of '98 simply on a visit of inspection, and left General Shafter's plans undisturbed. In company with the latter he rode out to a tree in the valley between the lines, where by appointment General Toral met them to discuss terms of surrender. The Spaniard quibbled so much on little points, and was so insistent upon time to consult Madrid, that General Miles impatiently told General Shafter he believed the whole discussion was for the purpose of gaining time, and recommended that an assault be ordered immediately. General Shafter, however, had been convinced, by conversa- tions with the foreign consuls, that the Spaniards really wished to yield, and he accordingly agreed to a final armis- tice until the next day at noon. For once the Spaniards were not dilatory. At nine in the morning came a flag of truce to say that Toral was ready to surrender, and at two Generals Wheeler and Lawton and Captain Miley, as com- missioners for the United States, met General Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel Fortan, and Albert Mason, the British vice-consul, who acted in a like capacity for Spain. The task of drawing up the articles of capitulation was a tedious one, consuming all that day and the better part of the next ; but the reward was greater than had been ex- pected, for it appeared the Spaniards were ready to sur- render not only Santiago, but all the troops in Eastern Cuba, thus including in the surrender at least 12,000 men against wh^m not a gun had been fired. By evening of the next day, July 16th, the details of the surrender were all formulated, and approval of the terms fixed came from Madrid. The city was to be turned over to General Shafter and the American forces the day following. The Spanish officers were to be permitted to keep their side arms, and all soldiers were to retain their personal prop- erty. The United States government assumed the task of transporting the surrendered troops, in all about 24,000, back to Spain. As General Shafter justly said in his de- spatch to the President announcing the surrender, this ended the war. There was not another battle worthy of Blue Jackets of '98 299 the name, nor any further serious opposition to the Ameri- can arms in Cuba. The surrender took place, July 18th, on a level spot between the opposing lines. With General Shafter to the meeting-place went the general officers with their staffs and a detacliment of 100 men. General Toral brought out with him a similar escort. On the ridges crested by the American lines our army was drawn up under arms, — about 20,000 men. General Toral, who looked broken and worn, announced his surrender in the briefest formula that would express the idea. He did not deliver his sword, as the articles of capitulation had expressly protected the officers of the defeated army from this humiliation, but with his adherents he stood at " present arms " while making his brief address. There was no cheering on the ridges where stood the American troops watching this act in the tragedy in which they had played so great a part. This interview over, the official party rode into the city, past the ragged Spanish soldiers who lined the roads, and look- ing pityingly upon the groups of haggard half-starved Cubans who had barely managed to survive the privations of the siege. At noon, in the presence of a crowd that was rather stoHd than hostile, the Stars and Stripes were raised over the governor's palace, while the band played "The Star-Spangled Banner." There was but little ex- citement, even in the American lines. Perhaps the men knew that with victory won the hardest and most costly part of their service was yet to come. By this surrender a city of about 70,000 inhabitants in time of peace was won for the United States, — or rather for the Cubans, for whom the United States took up arms, — with a territory contiguous and surrendered with it of 5000 square miles. Nearly 24,000 troops with their arms and accoutrements, saving those of the officers, were also delivered to the conquerors. Had our array been able to retire at that moment, the loss in proportion to the extent of the triumph would have been light. Examination of 300 Blue Jackets of '98 the enemy's line of defence showed how wise had been the action of General Shafter in postponing from day to day an assault in hopes of the surrender which finally came. The Spaniards seemed to have a genius for devis- ing defensive works. The whole territory before the American lines was cut with trenches and enmeshed with barbed wire extending in every imaginable direction. Dur- ing the days of battle the defenders had given abundant evidence of their bravery in the trenches. They lacked that quality which impels soldiers to the assault, but in a defensive fight they won the admiration of their foes. Had the American army been compelled to take the city by assault, 5000 lives at least would have been the price paid. Nor would the navy have been able to round out its victory of the 3d of July by an entrance to the bay without heavy loss. A reconnaissance made by Admiral Schley and Captain Cook as soon as the flag was hauled down over Morro showed that the fortifications were practically uninjured by all the shot that had been hurled at them. After a careful examination of the ground which they had so long and so fiercely pounded, the navy officers reported that " over two million dollars' worth of ammunition thrown at the batteries defending Santiago harbour was absolutely harmless in its effect, so far as the reducing of the batteries was concerned, and simply bore out the well-known fact that it is a waste of time and money to bombard earthworks." The mines in the channel were found intact and well placed. It is just to set down the fact that the Spaniards were still equipped for a vigorous and costly defence, for in the newspapers and in some of the books of military history published at the time General Shafter was severely criticised for having waited so patiently for Toral to consult his home govern- ment. It was thought that for the American army to march into Santiago at any time after July 3d would have been a mere promenade. The fact is, it would have meant a battle bloodier than any fought in Cuba. Blue Jackets of '98 301 With the Spaniards disarmed and pacified, it might have been expected that the condition of the American troops about Santiago would at once become tolerable if not wholly comfortable. So, at any rate, the people at home thought, and they were not prepared for the stories of suf- fering, of dire sickness, and of death that began to come North from a camp supposed to be the scene of rejoicing over a complete victory. The pestilential climate which had enabled the hardened Cubans to stand out for so many years against the fresh troops sent by Spain to sicken and die, was beginning to tell upon our men. The rainy season had set in, and that meant that the trenches in which the men had been sleeping and living since the beginning of the siege were wet ditches, sodden and malarial. When the army embarked for Cuba, the most explicit scientific instructions were given to the soldiers for the preservation of their health against the ills of a tropical climate. They were to boil all water before drinking it, but they who of- fered the rule did not give the soldiers anything to boil the water in, nor suggest any way of building a fire where matches were scarcer than snowballs in Cuba, nor any method of keeping it going in constant rain without cover. So the men drank the water as they could find it, often from open brooks into which the offal of the camp drained; and as their rations were largely salted food, they drank a great deal. And the food! That was another subject upon which the prudent authorities on army hygiene had given explicit directions. The men were to eat only wholesome things ; but the commissary department some days left them with nothing at all to eat, and then sup- phed them with beef preserved in such a revolting way that the commanding-general of the army referred to it as embalmed beef. Vegetables bought for the army spoiled before they were delivered. Especially were the soldiers warned against the fruits of the country, but there were days when they could get nothing else. So, too, the caution against sleeping directly on the ground affected 302 Blue Jackets of 98 men little who were given no opportunity to make floors for their tents, and who furthermore slept in wet trenches most of the time. As for the warning against wet clothes, it was met in many instances by wearing no clothes at all, — the only way it could be heeded. Under ordinary circumstances Santiago is subject to the epidemic diseases of the tropics. At the time of the siege it was in a particularly unhealthful condition, its streets filthy beyond description and the air burdened with disease. For days during the negotiations leading up to the surrender, refugees from the city passed through our lines, leaving infection behind them. In Siboney and along the route of the army were the huts and houses of Cubans in which case after case of fatal yellow fever had occurred. These pest-houses, instead of being burned down, were used as headquarters, offices, and even hos- pitals, and frequently visited by our soldiers. Apropos of this fact, the superior caution of the navy may be noted. "When the marines were landed at Guantanamo, every house on the beach was burned with all its con- tents, and barrels of Spanish wine which were found there were spilled. All water was distilled, and every tent was floored. The navy commanders took no risks, and the marines stayed in camp in a region naturally as unhealthy as that about Santiago without one case of yellow fever in the thirty-five days of their occupation. But in the lines of the army the dread disease, and a virulent malarial fever akin to it, made their appearance even before Santiago fell. At that time the fever w^as making such headway in our ranks that had the Span- iards been well informed they might have held out with the certainty that a week's delay would put the army hors du combat. As a matter of record, in less than one week after the surrender there were 5000 men in the Fifth Corps ill with fever, and Colonel Eoosevelt reported that of his hardy troops not more than one-fifth were fit for duty. Not all the sick men were in the hospitals, of Blue Jackets of '98 303 course, but their illness was none the less grave because they tried to suppress it. The malady spread until at last the number of new cases reported reached 850 in one day. Early in August eight general officers in the Fifth Corps joined in a " Eound Eobin," in which they declared that illness had so enfeebled the army that it was without strength, that an epidemic of yellow fever was in sight which would surely destroy it, and that unless moved to the United States it must inevitably perish. In contemporary publications the unusual and unmilitary character of this document was construed as an attack on General Shafter,but he has said that it was drawn up with his knowledge and with his hearty acquiescence as a more emphatic protest against the proposition of the War Department that the army should spend the summer in Cuba. So unqualified was the opinion of the officers on this subject that one even urged that the general should ignore the Washington orders, seize all ships that were available, and start forth- with for the North. The " Kound Eobin," however, proved sufficient. With the accounts sent in by correspondents of men dying like sheep amid an utter lack of the neces- sary surgical attention, and deprived of the food and dainties which alone could build up their wasted consti- tutions, it roused the whole nation to irresistible indigna- tion, and the management of the department under which ' such a condition could arise, and which in the face of it j \ could seriously propose keeping the army in Cuba until • the few well soldiers should become sick and the sick should die, was bitterly condemned. A situation in the i camp which held the flower of the American army such I as was disclosed by General Shafter's own admission that r on August 8th, barely six weeks after landing, seventy- ii|' five per cent of his troops were unfit for service, was an \ intolerable, an inexcusable thing. So said every one with 'i opportunity to give public expression to his views, and in 4 the face of such general and just wrath the War Depart- ment could no lonij^er hesitate. The regiments at the 304 Blue Jackets of '98 front were ordered relieved as fast as transports could be sent to bring them home and the shipment of the Span- ish prisoners made a reduction of the force at Santiago safe. To hasten the latter condition, regiments of im- munes were sent to serve as a garrison for the city. According to General Shafter's published statement, the losses of the army — of 20,000 men — up to this time were, "13 officers, 296 men, and 9 civilian employees died of disease; 24 officers and 226 men were killed, 83 officers and 1214 men were wounded, only 13 deaths re- sulting from wounds received in action." But now the flames of public indignation lighted by the revelations of inefficiency in those who directed the commissary and surgical arrangements of the Santiago campaign were fanned higher by the stories of suffering on the transports and hospital ships. It had been bad enough for the field hospitals to be inadequately supplied with medicines and surgical appliances, but much of that failure was excused on the plea of faulty transportation. So, too, the lack of proper food at the camps, though re- garded as an evidence that somewhere there had been incapacity, was condoned in view of the magnificent re- sults of the campaign. But when the transport "Seneca" came into New York from Santiago, a story was told that seemed to show incredible indifference to the health of the men who had fought for the country. She carried 100 sick and wounded. The limited quantity of medical supplies she had was obtained from the Eed Cross ship at Santiago, as the authorities had supplied none for the transport. Her condensers were inadequate to supply the fresh water needed, and wounds had to be washed in salt water. There were no bandages aboard ; and when wounds were opened by the rolling of the ship, passengers tore up their clothing to supply bandages. An operation was necessary at one time during the voyage, and the surgeon, having no instruments, performed it with his pocket- knife. The cry of righteous wrath which this almost Blue Jackets of '98 305 incredible story of official neglect aroused, had not died away, when the ship " Concho," saihng from Siboney, July 29th, with 175 convalescents, arrived. She was lit- erally a pest-ship. Her drinking-water was that shipped at Tampa when the Santiago expedition sailed early in June, and it had been stagnating in her tanks ever since. She had no ice. The conditions prevailing on the " Sen- eca" existed in equal barbarity on this ship. People began to ask whether Secretary of War Alger or the Spanish Mausers were the more deadly enemy of the American soldier. Events such as this, and the ever-increasing volume of testimony from Siboney, that the situation there was growing worse daily, at last stung the War Department into belated activity. At the eastern end of Long Island, where the fresh ocean breezes blow unceasingly across the narrow strip of land between the Atlantic and the Sound, a great camp was laid out for the reception of the home- coming soldiers. The spot was well chosen, — its one weakness being a lack of a natural water supply, though that was easily met by stationing a condeusing-ship in the harbour while wells were being driven. But the same incapacity that had decimated the army in Cuba by failure to plan transportation, commissary and medical service in proper proportion to the size of the problem involved, was manifested at Camp Wikoff. It was known, when the first load of lumber was placed on the ground, that this was to be a camp for sick and enfeebled soldiers. Nothing should have been permitted to stand in the way of havmg it ready in season and perfectly adapted to its purpose. But a contractor was allowed to quarrel with his workmen over a question of wages until a hospital was so much delayed that men sick with typhoid fever had no place to sleep. Departmental red tape so com- plicated the issue of supplies that within a hundred miles of the best market in the United States, sick soldiers were forced to eat bacon, hard tack, and worse than 20 3o6 Blue Jackets of '98 doubtful beef, because all the rations issued for use in Cuba had not been consumed, and fresh rations could not be issued until these were eaten. When the transports bearing the shattered remnants of General Shafter's army- began to arrive, it was found that they were as over- crowded as the earlier ships that had come into New York. The most populous section of the United States thus had the horrors of war brought home to it, and the efforts of the people to remedy the stupid and positively criminal blunders of the War Department were at once noble and pathetic. Eich men and women sent great consignments of fresh vegetables to the camp where sick men were being fed on the coarse fare of stevedores. Whole neighbourhoods clubbed together to buy dainties for the soldiers. The people along the New England coast volunteered by hundreds to take the sick into their own homes, — a method of relief which, of course, army red tape prohibited. All that pfrivate initiative could do to correct official incompetence was done, but to the last the history of the War Department's management of Camp Wikoff was a record of stupidity and brutality. Pages could be filled with evidence of the justice of this char- acterisation. It is enough to close with a reference to the fact that the last act in the history of Camp Wikoff showed as little comprehension of the necessities of the case as the first. The troops were sent home by rail, the whole length of Long Island, over a notoriously uncom- fortable railroad, in the burning hot days of September, although there is an excellent harbour at Montauk Point, and New York was full of comfortable vessels that might have been chartered for transports. INIany of these troops were from seaboard States, and might have been taken to their own doors by water. For months after Camp Wikoff had become but a memory, men were dying at their homes from the result of the treatment there ac- corded them. I have referred to the superior skill and intelligence Blue Jackets of '98 307 manifested by the navy in dealing with its problems of sanitation and hygiene. The contrast between its methods and those of the army could not better be drawn than by placing in close juxtaposition with this outline of con- ditions at Camp Wikoff the description, by Dr. Carroll Dunham, of the method by which the Navy Department prepared to take care of the prisoners taken from Cervera's fleet: " At Portsmouth, on less than two days' notice, barracks were built and every preparation made to receive 1100 Spanish prisoners of war sent up from Santiago, where they had been captured at the time Cervera's fleet was destroyed. When the prisoners arrived, their barracks had been built, roofed in, and furnished — barracks, not tents — the kitchens were not quite done, but the cooking-ranges were in place and ready for use. These Spaniards have been kept there for some two months in a comfort which would have saved many lives if our own soldiers could have fared as well as these captives of the navy." Not at Santiago or at Montauk Point alone did the men of the army pay a heavy price in health and life for the incompetence with which the bureaus of the War Depart- ment were honeycombed, — incompetence in some cases bred of long years of official idleness, in others the fruit of the appointment by the President of inexperienced and often notoriously inefficient persons to important offices as a reward for political services rendered by them or by their relatives. Many of the camps in which were kept the more than 200,000 volunteers who never saw active service nor ever left the borders of the nation, developed into pest-holes. Such notoriously was the case at the greatest camp of all, — that at Chickamauga. Lack of water, company camps improperly laid out so that conta- gion was spread by insects and even by the breeze, bad food, — the offscourings of Chicago packing-houses with which millionaires to increase their fortunes poisoned the soldiers of the nation, — unfit clothing furnished by con- 3o8 Blue Jackets of '98 tractors chosen through political favoritism and conscience- less in their zest to make money at the expense of the army, — all these conditions united to drag down to sickness and incapacity men who were picked out of thousands for their physical health. At Camp Alger, near Washington, like conditions obtained. Open sewers ran down the aisles between the tents in which the men slept, polluting the air and spreading the germs of typhoid fever everywhere. The story of the sanitary misman- agement of the war demands a volume to itself. It is summed up by the fact that ten times as many men were killed by disease as by the enemy. CHAPTER XIV Thk Porto Rico Campaign — Troops Employed — The Bom- bardment OF NiPE — Landing at Guanica — Plan of THE Campaign — Capture of Ponce — Friendliness of THE Inhabitants — Capture of Guayamo, Coamo, and Mayaguez — The Enemy's Stand at Aboncito — The News of Peace — Complete Success op the Campaign — The Peace Negotiations — The Protocol — Evacuation Commissioners. SANTIAGO having fallen, the people of the United States looked for the attack on Havana which all had supposed would be one of the first strokes of the war. But again it was postponed — this time in order that General Miles might invade and subdue Porto Rico. This island is the most easterly of the Lesser Antilles, and had at the time of the Spanish war a population of about 900,000. The last official census prior to the war was taken in 1887, and showed a population of 437,933 whites, 246,647 mulattces, and 76,905 negroes. As in Cuba, the aboriginal population had wholly disappeared before the civilising methods of the Spaniards. In area the island is of about 3600 square miles. Its population is about as dense as that of Connecticut and a little more dense than that of Delaware. The climate, though hot, is more salubrious than that of Cuba, and the higher parts of the island are healthful for persons of northern birth. The principal city is San Juan, which it will be remembered was bombarded by Admiral Sampson during the search for Cervera. It will be remembered that the resolutions of Congress which preceded the war contained a paragraph expressly disavowing any purpose to make of the struggle an excuse 3 lo Blue Jackets of '98 for seizing the territory of Spaia. The United States declared themselves animated by motives of the purest philanthropy, and denied any ulterior plans for territorial aggrandisement. But as the war progTessed, there grew up among those in power in Washington a feeling that when victory was won and peace re-established the nation should have something to show for its sacrifices. Ethi- cally and in entire honour a free and contented Cuba would have been a sufficient exhibit ; but the Administra- tion thought the people wanted a slice of the spoils after the fashion of the land-grabbing nations of Europe, and the Porto Eico expedition was expressly planned to gratify this desire. The word was given out semi-officially that this island when captured -would not be handed over to its people for self-government, but would be kept by the United States as a nucleus for a colonial system. General Miles had taken with him to Siboney the material and the greater part of the personnel of his expedition. July 21st he sailed. He had with him an army made up largely of volunteer troops — the Sixth Illinois, Sixth Massachusetts, four light batteries of the Third and Fourth artillery (regulars), 275 recruits who had been sent for the Fifth Corps and arrived after the need for them was past. Battery B of the Fifth Artillery, 60 men of the Signal Corps, and the Seventh Hospital Corps — in all, 3415 men. By way of transports and convoy he had the " Massachusetts," " Dixie," " Glouces- ter," " Cincinnati," " Annapolis," " Leyden," " Wasp," "Yale," and " Columbia." From Charleston about 3000 men had already sailed to join the expedition, and General Schwan's brigade set out from Tampa. These forces were to unite under command of General John R. Brooke, who sailed from Newport News about a week later with about five thousand men, including cavalry troops A and C of New York, the historic Philadelphia City Troop, and the Gov- ernor's Troop of Pennsylvania General Schwan's brigade was made up wholly of regular troops. It comprised Blue Jackets of '98 311 batteries, troops, and companies from the Seventh Artil- lery, the Second Cavalry, and the Eleventh and Xineteenth Infantry. It was the plan to send 35,000 men to Porto Eico, — almost twice as many as were given to Shafter, although there were fewer Spaniards to be encountered and the country was not so difficult. The arrangements for engineers, surgeons, and supplies were also vastly more perfect and comprehensive than they had been for the Santiago expedition. Whether this seeming improvement in the methods of the "War Department was due to an iutelhgent profit from lessons hard learned, or whether it was that the major-general commanding the army was able to exact more of the authorities at "Washington than a mere junior major-general. could, is a question that was hotly debated at the time. Certainly General Miles went to Porto Eico equipped for any emergency. That the temper of the island people and the speedy negotiation of peace made his expedition a mere pleasure-jaunt, does not detract from the wisdom nor the skiU manifested in planning it. It had at first been planned to establish a base on the coast of Cuba. The port of Xipe, on the northern coast nearly opposite Santiago, had been selected for this pur- pose, and a naval expedition made up of the " Topeka," " Annapolis," " Wasp," and " Ley den," was despatched to take it. They engaged the batteries and one gunboat, the " Jorge Juan," which defended the bay, and very' speedily silenced aU opposition. The gunboat was sunk after a gaUant resistance occupying but fifteen minutes, and the fort showed a white flag after the second shell fell among its defenders. In the end Xipe was not used for the purpose planned, and the engagement, which took place on the 21st of July, has interest and importance only because it was the last naval battle off the coast of Cuba. On the 25th of July, after a voyage of four days, the portion of the Porto Eican expedition which had sailed 312 Blue Jackets of '98 from Sibouey with General Miles entered the port of Guanica and prepared to land. This was a surprise to every one on board except the few in the General's con- fidence, and it was a surprise to the people at Washington too when they heard of it, for the expectation had been that the expedition would be landed on the north side of the island near San Juan, while the point selected was as far from that city as possible. It is probable that General Miles concluded that the practice of following to the letter an elaborately formulated programme which had been in the hands of the enemy for some weeks, might properly be abandoned. Certainly the people of Guanica were quite as much surprised as any one could be when the fleet steamed into their quiet little post and the " Gloucester " let fly a terrific three-pounder at the only Spanish flag in sight. There was no defence to speak of, for there was no artillery at the point, and a landing-party from the " Gloucester," after a lively brush with some Spanish soldiers in the streets, soon occupied the town, building a barricade in the main street. When the American flag appeared over the one block-house, the transports came into the harbour, and the work of land- ing began. The town was found to be a picturesque little village of one street, lined with red-roofed and party- coloured houses. The people were amiable ; nothing was further from their minds than manifesting any hostilities to the invaders, and the volunteers for their part let their imagination run riot in inventing tales of the vast benefits which were to accrue to the people of Guanica when they became part of the United States. Among the many advantages which the army in Porto Eico enjoyed that had been denied to the army in Cuba, was a very exact topographical knowledge of the country. In May, Lieutenant H. H. Whitney of the Fourth Artil- lery had travelled through the island in many disguises, studying the land and the harbours, mapping out roads and gathering data that would be useful to an invading GKNERAL NKLSON A. MII.KS. Blue Jackets of '98 313 army should the time for invasion come. All the material he had gathered was in the hands of General Miles, and the campaign could be, and was, planned with the exact- ness of a game of chess. The first point to be struck after the landing at Guanica was complete, was Ponce, a small town fifteen miles due east. Ponce had importance be- cause of its excellent harbour, and because from it a broad, level, and hard military road extended 85 miles to the metropolis of the island, and the chief seat of Spanish power, San Juan. Ponce fell a prey to the navy, Com- mander Davis with the " Dixie," " Gloucester," "Annapolis," and "Wasp," taking it on the 28th without resistance. Indeed, the habit of surrendering without resistance was found to be pleasingly prevalent in Porto Eico. There is a picturesque story that a beardless navy officer just out of the Academy compelled the surrender of Ponce by telephone from the port, making fierce threats of bom- bardment by the ponderous cannon of the " Gloucester ; " but the official record denies this glory to Ensign Curtin, and gives to Commander Davis of the "Dixie" the honour of receiving the surrender of the town. It was a bloodless victory in either case ; and when the troops came march- ing over from Guanica to occupy the town, they discov- ered that the inhabitants saluted them with volleys of flowers instead of bullets, and that there was not such a thing as a Spanish flag in the place. After a few days spent in devising a military govern- ment for Ponce and in getting the affairs of the city in orderly progress once more, General Miles began the seri- ous work of his campaign. This campaign was never finished, but so far as it did progress before the news of the armistice interrupted it it was successful, and con- ducted without varying a hair's breadth from the plan as originally formulated. The objective was the city of San Juan, at the other side of the island. But to take the city alone would not complete the purposes of the invasion, else it might have been done from the sea. 314 Blue Jackets of '98 or at any rate from a landing-place much nearer than Ponce or Guanica. The Spaniards all through the island had to be killed, captured, or pacified. Few were killed, many captured, more invited pacification. To have pos- session of a seacoast town while the enemy held the interior would be unprofitable ; hence the plan of cam- paign. This involved, briefly, the division of the army into four columns which should swing out to right and left of Ponce and converge on San Juan, driving the Spaniards before them into that city. There was no danger that the army thus divided would be beaten in detail, for the Spaniards had not force sufficient for the purpose, and the interior lines of communication would enable our troops to concentrate at the word of danger in sufficient force to meet any probable attack. It was clear that the enemy could expect no aid or even sym- pathy from the inhabitants. On the 31st General Miles cabled to Washington, " Volunteers are surrendering them- selves with arms and ammunition. Four-fifths of the people are overjoyed at the arrival of the army. Two thousand from one place have volunteered to serve with it. They are bringing in transportation, beef, cattle, and other needed supplies. The custom-house has already yielded $14,000. As soon as all troops are disembarked they will be in readiness to move." Every effort was made to maintain the friendship so freely proffered by the people. The customs regulations of the port were revised so as to encourage trade, and burdensome restrictions and taxes levied by the Spaniards were repealed. The natives were hired at good wages, and their property purchased when needed for army use at fair prices. The people found that the American troops brought order and prosperity, and the news pre- ceded the columns advancing through the island, with the result that everywhere the resistance met was only that made perfunctorily by the Spanish regulars. The military road from Ponce to San Juan passed Blue Jackets of '98 315 through a point in the mountains called Aboncito, where the Spaniards, taking advantage of the nature of the ground, prepared to resist the American advance. General Miles's plan of advancing by separate but parallel roads furnished exactly the right method of meeting and overcoming this resistance, for as the columns to right and left of the centre advanced, the Spaniards would find themselves outflanked and would be compelled to retreat. The advance on the right was led by General Brooke, who went by sea to Arroyo, where he lauded with 1200 men and pressed northward into the interior. At a little town called Guayama they encountered 500 Spaniards, who fled after a show of resistance by which one officer and four men were killed. At the other extreme of the American line the regulars of General Schwan's division fought a skirmish with the enemy in the outskirts of the considerable town of Mayaguez, losing two men and capturing fifty. In the centre General Eoy Stone worked his way along to the northward, carrying Adjuntas in a midnight skirmish, and preparing for greater things by keeping 500 natives at work behind him changing the wretched trail over which his troops had advanced into an admirable road, — for in his own country this volunteer general and veteran of the Civil War was widely known as an expert road-builder. The town of Coamo on the road to San Juan was taken by the Sixteenth Pennsyl- vania Volunteers after a defence that was little more than perfunctory. Indeed the Spanish retreat was so precipi- tate that four unarmed correspondents entered the town and received the submission of its Alcalde before the American troops came up. A block-house in the suburbs engaged the attention of tlie artillery for a time, but soon burst into flames, whereupon the Spaniards fled. One detachment in an earthwork fought stubbornly enough to check the American advance until their commander — a brave man who rode about disdaining cover — was killed, when they promptly surrendered. There was 3 16 Blue Jackets of '98 little fight in the enemy at any stage of the Porto Eico campaign. What the Americans might have sujffered at Aboncito cannot be told. That was evidently the spot at which the Spaniards had planned to make their most determined resistance. From friendly natives came warnings of mines in the road, and torpedoes hidden in the bushes by the wayside. Toward this stronghold the converging columns took their way. General Wilson's men felt the enemy's sting first, coming into a zone of fire from artil- lery and rapid-fire guns posted on the mountain-sides about three miles in advance of the city. Wilson set his artillerists to drive the enemy out. The Spaniards were intrenched. Major Lancaster's battery went into position in an open field, and opened fire at a range of 2000 yards. The duel was lively, for the gunners on each side could see their enemy without glasses ; but comparatively little damage was done, and the sun went down with the Span- iards still in position. August 13th bade fair, when the sun rose, to see some hard fighting in Porto Ptico. General Wilson had drawn his lines in preparation for a sharp attack on the enemy at Aboncito. General Brooke confronted a strong force at Pablo Vasquez, near Guayama, and intended to assault the hill held by the enemy, knowing that it was vital to the plans of General Miles that he break through and effect a junction with Wilson. At Cape San Juan forty American sailors, with the help of shells from the ships off shore, were holding their ground against the assaults of eight hundred Spaniards. Near Guayama, B Battery of the Pennsylvania artillery was about to open the day's fighting with a shot at the line of earthworks faintly discernible on a distant hill. The guns were shotted and aimed ; the gunner of one stood with lanyard in hand awaiting the command to fire. There was a sound of a galloping horse on the road to the rear, and an officer came into view shouting something and waving his hand Blue Jackets of '98 317 emphatically. " Cease firing ! Cease firing ! " the artil- lerists heard him shout as he came nearer. " What for ? " inquired the captain of tlie battery with natural curiosity. "Peace has been declared," was the response, which the soldiers of that particular command, who were just getting into action and desired to see what their fine new cannon could do in the field, did not receive with proper enthu- siasm. Carlyle says that if there is one thing more incredible than all others, it is that governments should be able to find men willing to give up their entire lives to studying the art of killing other men and getting ready themselves to be killed. In war the philosopher would have found a thing more incredible yet ; namely, that a sudden interposition of peace in time to prevent a battle which promised to be desperate and bloody is often hailed with disappointment by men who stand an excellent chance of falling in the fight they courted. The peace of August 13, 1898, came suddenly upon men in the act of battle on the American lines at many points. At Man- zanillo in Cuba the navy was vigorously bombarding the town. At Havana the batteries were engaging the blockading fleet, and one shell struck the " San Francisco." At far-off Manila, though of course the fact of the armistice was not known for days after its conclusion, the Spanish forces were engaged and defeated the day after the peace protocol was signed at Washington. So the expedition to Porto Ptico was ended abruptly by the interposition of diplomacy, yet not so abruptly as to deny to the American invaders ample opportunity to demonstrate their power to drive the Spaniards from the island. The plans of the commanding-general were being executed like clock-work when the end came. The commissary and medical departments showed no sign of that collapse which made the Santiago campaign disastrous even in the face of its success. General Miles summed up the whole in a paragraph of his report thus: 3i8 Blue Jackets of '98 " During nineteen days of active campaign on the island of Porto Rico a large portion of the island was captured by United States forces and brought under our control. Our forces were in such a position as to make the Spanish positions untenable, outside of that of the garrison of San Juan. The Spaniards had been defeated or captured in six different engagements which took place, and in every direction and position they had occupied up to that time. The success of the enterprise was due largely to the skill and good general- ship of the officers in command of the different divisions and brigades. Strategy and skilful tactics accomplished what might have occasioned serious loss in any other way. The loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and captured was nearly ten times our own, which was only 3 killed and 40 wounded. Thus the island of Porto Eico became a part of the United States." The campaign in Porto Eico was long enough, too, to demonstrate that the United States would have only a thoroughly friendly people to deal with in establishing its authority over the island. The towns in which there were no Spanish garrisons surrendered with such prompti- tude and were so eager to hoist the American colours that General Miles was compelled to telegraph to Washington for a fresh supply of flags. Everywhere there was haste to assume American airs. At Ponce one of the newspapers rubbed out its record of the past, and appeared with a new name, "volume one, number one," the day after the surrender. Every endeavour was made to encourage this feeling among the people, and the work done in establish- ing orderly conditions, in framing a military government, in building roads and enforcing h vgienic conditions, and in reforming the custom-house methods so as to encourage trade was even more important and quite as arduous as the work done with rifle and cannon. But the story of the reformation and development of Porto Eico is something distinct from this short chronicle of its conquest. Blue Jackets of 98 319 The peace which came thus suddenly to the men at the guns in Porto Kico and Cuba had been a matter of current discussion at Washington and Madrid for nearly a month. Kumours that it might be sought by Spain filled the columns of the newspapers of the world, but were of course strenuously denied by the Spanish authorities. To the people of Spain, and particularly to the commercial and financial classes having interests beyond the borders of the country, the hopelessness of the conflict became apparent immediately alter the destruction of Cervera and the fall of Santiago. The government still clung to the forlorn hope of dragging some other European country into the quarrel with the United States, but with notable prudence and justice all held aloof, — a result that was by many ascribed to the avowed friendship of Great Britain for the United States at that time. It was evident that whatever nation came to the aid of Spain would have England also to deal with. As for the wishes and hopes of the United States, they were frankly enough for a speedy end to the conflict. President McKinley said immediately upon the news of the fall of Santiago, "I hope for a speedy peace now." It was not as speedy as it might have been, for that very delicate sentiment " Spanish honour " had to be handled most tenderly, and moreover there were political conditions in Spain which made the ministry desirous of proceeding somewhat cautiously. Negotiations were opened through the French Ambapsador at Washington, M. Cambon, who from the beginning of hostilities had acted for the Spaniards in this country. Just an after- noon call on the President by this gentleman with the remark that Spain had requested him to suggest that it was ready to open the question of a treaty, was enough to send Spanish securities upon all the bourses of Europe, and when a day or two later M. Cambon announced that he had been formally authorised by the government of Spain to represent it in the discussion of the conditions 320 Blue Jackets of '98 upon which peace should be resumed, everybody saw that the end of the war was at hand. The Spaniards were anxious that during the discussion of the preliminaries an armistice should be declared, and their papers bitterly berated the United States government for not agreeing to this ; but it was evident to the authorities at Washington that at the moment M. Cambon made his first overtures on the part of Spain — on the 26th of July — there was every reason to prosecute the war with energy. To stop pending diplomatic negotiations meant that the expedition of General Miles to Porto Eico would be paralysed, and if the negotiations failed it would be doubly hard to resume it. Accordingly they insisted that before the declaration of an armistice a protocol preliminary to an actual treaty should be agreed upon by the representatives of the two governments. This protocol should enumerate the con- ditions of peace which the United States would be wilUng to accept and which Spain would be willing to consider, — for it was made clear, by implication at least, that Spain, as the party suing for peace, would be the one compelled to make concessions and sacrifices. This protocol, after repeated conferences between members of the President's cabinet and the French Ambassador, was finally formulated and sent to Spain for the consideration of the Ministry. There was brief discussion there. By the 7th an answer sugsesting some slight changes in the document was received at Washington, and five days later in the President's room at the White House the commissioners for the two nations, Judge William R. Day, Secretary of State, and M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of France, affixed their signatures to the document which ended the war in fact, though not formally. The substance of this document, shorn of its oflBcial redundancies, will be sufficient here. It was drawn in six clauses : First. Spain renounced all claim to sovereignty or other rights in Cuba. Second. Spain to cede to the United States Porto Rico TORI'Kl)') i;i)Ar ■"KKU^SUN. Blue Jackets of '98 321 and all other Spanish islands in the West Indies and one island in the Ladrone Archipelago, to be selected by the United States. Third. The United States to occupy Manila, its bay and harbour, until a treaty of peace should determine the disposition of the Philippines. Fourth. Spain to immediately evacuate Cuba and other West Indian islands. Fifth. Both nations to appoint peace commissioners to meet at Paris not later than October 1st to negotiate a treaty of peace. Sixth. Hostilities to be suspended on the signing of the protocol. The alterations in this protocol which Spain had unavailingly pleaded for included an article which would have relieved her of all debt incurred on account of Cuba and Porto Eico, a provision which would have saddled the people of the former island with a debt of $550,000,000 incurred in the effort to make them submit to mis- government ; an article permitting her to retain possession of Luzon, the largest of the Philippine islands, and an article granting to her troops the right to leave Cuba and Porto Eico with the honours of war, and to remove all war material from those islands. To all of these pro- posed amendments the United States returned an em- phatic negative, and the protocol as finally signed was, in effect, that first suggested by the American government. Immediately upon the completion of the protocol, in- deed before the commissioners left the White House, the President affixed his signature to the proclamation announc- ing an armistice, and telegrams were sent to the com- manders in the field. How sudden a check they put on the operations of the army under Miles has already been related. The despatch to Admiral Dewey was cabled to Hong Kong, and thence carried to Manila by a fleet steamer, but it reached the seat of war only after a de- cisive battle had been fought. In that case, as in others, 21 32 2 Blue Jackets of '98 Dewey profited by the slow coinmunication with Wash- ington. If the President's order had reached him on the 13th instead of on the 16th, he would have been checked in the very act of taking Manila, and the political diffi- culties of his situation, which in any case became most perplexing, would have been multiplied fivefold. Very significant was the order sent at this time to Admiral Sampson. He was directed to abandon the blockade, and to take to New York the ships " New York," " Brooklyn," " Indiana," " Oregon," " Iowa," and " Massachusetts." The heaviest fighting-ships of the navy were thus ordered withdrawn from Cuban waters. The monitors were to be left in a safe harbour in Porto Ptico, and the marines were relieved from the post at Guanta- namo they had stuck to so persistently, and sent North. By a later order the " Texas " was added to the list of vessels ordered to New York, and when the fleet reached the entrance to the noble harbour of that port, they found a magnificent ovation awaiting them. At the first news that the ships and men by whom the great victory over Cervera had been won were to visit the harbour of the metropolis, the people of New York and all the neigh- bourhood cried out that there should be such a triumph as ancient Rome decreed to her home-coming conquerors. The Navy Department was persuaded to order the vessels to proceed in column up the broad expanse of the North Paver to a point opposite the stately tomb erected on the hill for the body of General Ulysses S. Grant. There they were to fire a salute, and turning, return to the navy anchorage at Tompkinsville. This insured to the millions of people who live within a few minutes' ride of the great city an opportunity to see the fleet of veterans, and right eagerly they availed themselves of it. New York was crowded the night before, until there seemed not roofs enough to cover the guests. The streets were gay with bunting, the docks and piers early in the morning were black with people, while on distant city roofs other crowds Blue Jackets of '98 323 hung to precarious perches, and watched eagerly for the ships. Never, perhaps, in history, since the days of the gorgeous Roman pageants, did conquerors have a more brilliant reception. The air throbbed with the crash of cannon, the roar of cheering multitudes, and the shriek of steam whistles. Every imaginable craft was pressed into service by sight-seers, and about the ships, as they made their stately way up the river, crowded a fleet of yachts, tugs, great excursion steamers, trim launches, steam canal- boats, every imaginable thing that would float and move, all packed by a cheering throng. At night officers were banqueted, and the success of the navy drunk in brim- ming bumpers. For days thereafter, the Blue Jacket was the guest by common consent of the people of New York, and in doors and out the best of everything was freely forthcoming to any who wore the uniform of the United States navy. The first duty under the protocol was to provide for the immediate evacuation of Cuba and Porto Eic'o. To ac- complish this, commissions were named by each nation. The commissioners appointed on the part of the United States to effect the evacuation of Cuba were Major-Gen- eral James F. Wade, an officer who had been in command of the great camp at Tampa, during the war ; Eear Admiral William T. Sampson ; and Major-General Matthew C. Butler, a civil appointee to the army, but a veteran of the Confederate service, and a former United States Senator. The Porto Eico board was composed of Major-General John E. Brooke, who was already in service on that island ; Eear Admiral Schley, and Brigadier-General William W. Gordon, another Confederate veteran. The task was no easy one in either case, and the work of the Cuban commission was made additionally difficult by the action of the Spanish government, which threw repeated ob- stacles in the way of a prompt and peaceable evacuation of the island. It was well into January, 1899, before the last of the Spanish troops left Cuba, though before theii 324 Blue Jackets of '98 final departure the island was under the domination of the United States, and General Ludlow in Havana and General Wood in Santiago were struggling with the prob- lems presented by a people reduced to the point of starva- tion, communities in which the first essentials of sanitation were unknown, and a business situation which combined almost complete lack of money with almost equal lack of opportunities for employment. CHAPTEK XV Thk Philippines again — Dewey's Position in Manila Harbour — His Work in Diplomacy and War — The Part played by Aguinaldo — The Coming of the American Troops — The Quarrel with the Germans — The Capture and Occupation of Manila — Growing Discontent of the Filipinos and their Final Revolt — The Problems presented to the United States by the Situation in the Philippines. AT anchor in the harbour of Manila, with the Spanish fleet destroyed, the Spanish fortifications at Cor- regidor and Cavite demohshed or in the possession of his marines. Admiral George Dewey found himself at once master and victim of the situation. Without troops there was nothing more of a warlike sort for him to do. He could reduce the city, but he could not hold it, and a bombardment under such conditions would have been but wanton slaughter of the innocent. The Spanish military authorities gave prudent heed to the admiral's warning, that if his ships were fired upon, he would de- stroy the town, and no provocation was given. But the Spanish flag still floated defiantly from the corner of the bastion of the walled town, and Manila was still a Spanish city, though it lay at the mercy of the American com- mander. As for the country behind, that was the spoil alternately of the Spaniards and the insurgents. As the admiral himself described it, his authority extended just as far as one of his ships could throw a shell, and no farther. This situation was necessarily irksome, and the pro- longed delay in sending troops, which irritated even the people at home, must have been almost unbearable to the 126 Blue Jackets of '98 admiral. With notable patience and self-restraint, how- ever, he held his peace, making neither appeals nor com- plaints, and doing the best with the material at hand. The insurgents for a time seemed to offer a means for opening the way to Manila to our troops when they should arrive, and Aguinaldo was permitted to arm his men as fast as they were enrolled from the store of cap- tured arms in the Cavite arsenal This fact formed one of the counts in the insurgent indictment of the United States for bad faith when the relations between Aguinaldo and the American commanders reached the point of open war. Not for more than three weeks after the victory of May 1st did the first detachment of United States troops sail from San Francisco to Dewey's relief. The voyage consumed more than a month, so that for exactly two months the admiral was left with a hostile city under his guns, a force of undisciplined insurgents operating in the surrounding country, with at least a colour of counte- nance from him, and the warships of several European nations, some of which had openly expressed sympathy for Spain, anchored by his side, their commanders watching eagerly for the first sign of weakness, or the first disaster of which they could take advantage to intervene. Months after, when Manila was occupied by American troops and the United States flag was everywhere displayed and respected, Admiral Dewey said to a friend, looking con- templatively upon the wrecks of the Spanish ships, " That was the least of my troubles down here." The story of Dewey's diplomacy in Manila harbour during the long period of suspended war will, when it is fully told, be one of the most creditable chapters in the history of the American navy. In these later days of cables and telegraphs the commander seldom has an opportunity to display much individual initiative. To Dewey a great opportunity was given, and by him it was greatly improved. Against the persistent nagging of the Blue Jackets of '98 327 German commander he set up a frankly expressed readi- ness to defend the rights and the dignity of his country's liag in distant waters at the mouth of the cannon, even though by his act the two nations should be plunged into war. His treatment of the insurgents, though sympa- thetic, stopped short of formal recognition, while in his relations with the Spanish authorities of Manila he bore himself with the firmness of one who knows that the victory is his, though he may have to wait patiently for its fruits. Nor was there any relaxation of the admiral's attention to strictly naval details amid all these puzzling diplomatic duties. Though his men could not get asliore, their daily regimen was so carefully watched that the health of the squadron remained perfect. Though the Spaniards were pledged to respect the ships on penalty of the destruction of the city, there was never a moment, night or day, when a single ship in the squadron could have been caught unaware by a torpedo attack. The two months' vigil of the American Blue Jackets in Manila harbour must ever stand as one of the finest achievements of naval history. I The grand strategy of war has so often been compared to a game of chess on a monster scale that the expres- sion has become stale, but one situation during the war with Spain so strikingly illustrates the analogy that it is impossible not to call attention to it. That in a war waged over the comparatively narrow territory of a single nation, or indeed over a single continent, the movement of every considerable force on either side would at once liave its effect in determining the action of an opposing force, even at a considerable distance, is only a common- place, but the swift thrust and parry that went on through- out this war between the very antipodes has never before been paralleled in the history of strategy. That the movements of a fleet in the Mediterranean Sea should be properly chronicled as a part of the operations in the 328 Blue Jackets of '98 Philippines seems at first sight incredible, but how just it is to award such a place to the story of the manoeuvres of Camara perhaps nobody is better able to testify than Admiral George Dewey. When Cervera sailed on his ill-fated voyage to the West Indies, there was left to guard the coasts of Spain what came to be known as the Cadiz fleet. Its most formidable ships were the " Pelayo," a battle-ship of the first class, and the " Carlos V," an armoured cruiser. A large number of cruisers, gunboats, torpedo boats and destroyers made up the squadron, which was under com- mand of Admiral Camara. On paper — that qualifying term must always be used in speaking of the Spanish navy — this fleet was formidable, and its presence at Cadiz compelled the retention along our northern coast of several cruisers even during the days when the block- ade of Cuba made the demand for ships in West Indian waters continually pressing. It was, as the naval phrase goes, " a fleet in being," and as such had ever to be reckoned with. Its influence upon the tactics of the American fleets extended not only to those in the Atlantic, but to the fleet in the far-away waters of the Philippines as well ; for by passing through the Suez Canal Admiral Camara could have brought his fleet into action against Dewey's squadron long before any reinforcements from our Atlantic coast could have reached jVIanila, and even before any ships from our Pacific seaboard could have made the long passage. Camara had, in short, the advan- tage of what is known in military terminology as an in- terior line of communication, and accordingly his fleet menaced both Dewey and Sampson at once. His first move, however, freed the latter from apprehen- sion, though for the time it added materially to the burden of worry upon Dewey's mind. Just as our forces imder General Shafter were landing at Daiquiri, news came that Camara had left Cadiz, and swiftly upon the heels of the first intelligence came the tidings that an Blue Jackets of '98 329 English merchantman had seen the squadron steammg east in the Mediterranean. That meant, of course, that the Suez Canal was to be passed and the blow delivered against Dewey. The first effect of this discovery was to relieve the ships which had been guarding our northern coast, and to strengthen by so much the blockade of Cuba. But this advantage was more than offset by the apprehen- sion of disaster to Dewey, whose fleet, wholly destitute of armoured ships, was not — on paper — equal to that of the Spaniards. The coast-defence monitor " Monterey " was at the time on the way from San Francisco to re- inforce the American squadron at Manila ; but her speed being slow, like that of all ships of her class, the proba- bilities were that the Spaniards would arrive before she did. As a matter of fact, while the Board of Strategy was anxiously discussing this danger in Washington, word came that the " Monterey " had been compelled to put back into Honolulu to repair. The utmost that could be done then by the navy authorities at Washington was to hastily prepare another fleet to go in hot pursuit of the Spaniards. The organisa- tion and despatch of such a fleet had two advantages. As its course to the Suez Canal would take it past the coast of Spain, which had been stripped of all naval defence by the departure of Camara, apprehension of bombardment of their seaport towns might impel the Spaniards to recall their squadron. Even if this did not result, the American vessels, being faster than those of the enemy, could reach Asiatic waters so soon after Camara that Dewey, being duly warned, might avoid battle until a juncture could be made. Accordingly Com- modore Watson, with the flagship " Newark," was directed to form the squadron of relief, and the widest publicity was given to the purpose of the government to send a powerful fleet through the Mediterranean in pursuit of Camara. How far the mere announcement of the American plan 330 Blue Jackets of '98 of campaign affected the Spanish purpose cannot be told. Camara's expedition, threatening at first, soon became ridiculous, and ended in an almost inexplicable display of folly and vacillation. Arriving at Port Said, the squadron lay at anchor for several days, — difficulty in getting coal was the Spanish explanation of the delay, but later occur- rences suggest that there was never any serious purpose to make the voyage. Finally the ships were coaled, the heavy canal tolls paid, and the armada — a really formi- dable squadron of fifteen ships including torpedo boats and transports — majestically entered the great water-way. That was the day before Cervera's fatal dash at Santiago. The result of that action in West India waters was to free all our battle-ships for operations on the coast of Spain or for pursuit of Camara, and the work of supply- ing them with ammunition was rushed forward in order that they might be ready for this service ; but before it could be completed the amazing news came from Port Said that Camara had turned about and was coming back again, having paid the tolls both ways, $200,000, for no imaginable purpose. To this day it is not known what strategic end this singular and costly excursion through the canal was expected to serve. Meanwhile Dewey in Manila Bay had been studying the problem presented by the reported approach of Camara. Without cable facilities he was not as well informed as the Washington authorities of the vacillations of that remarkable commander. For several days all he knew was that a Spanish fleet outnumbering his, with two armoured vessels where he had none, with a formidable force of torpedo destroyers was steaming toward him. He knew the " Monterey " was on her way to reinforce him, and that the " Monadnock " would follow ; but he was aware of the extreme sluggishness of these vessels, and figure it as he would he was convinced that the Spaniards would arrive first. The commander, who had all the strategy of his attack on Montojo planned long Blue Jackets of '98 331 before war was declared, was not the man to leave a problem of the importance of this unstudied. General Francis V. Greene, wdio accompanied the second army expedition to Manila, tells how the admiral purposed coping with the situation, which was complicated by the fact that at this time there were 2500 American soldiers landed on the shores of Manila Bay. Dewey was con- vinced that to meet the " Pelayo" without any battle-ships of his own would be suicidal. Accordingly he planned to abandon the harbour and take his fleet and the trans- ports which had then arrived around to the north of the island of Luzon, and thence cruise eastward to meet the " Monterey." That ship once added to his squadron, he would come back to Manila and give battle to the Span- iards. In the meantime the American troops thus left without naval support in a hostile country were to be taken up into the hills, and there intrenched to maintain themselves until the ships should return. The news of Camara's retreat reached Dewey only July 22d, or just as he was about to put this plan into effect. The Filipinos very early became a source of some ap- prehension to Admiral Dewey, who it must be remembered was absolutely without any information as to the policy of the United States government in dealing with the territory which he had brought to the point of conquest, or the insurgents who were making so gallant a fight for freedom. When Congress declared war for the purpose of re-establishing humane and civilised conditions in Cuba, no revolution was in progress in the Philippines. The leaders of the former insurrection were, as has been already noted, living in Hong Kong, watching, no doubt, for a favourable opportunity to reopen the struggle, but meantime making no sign. For this reason Congress did not put into the resolutions instructing the President to employ the armed forces of the United States any such disavowal of any purpose to acquire territory in the ;^;^2 Blue Jackets of '98 Philippines or any such promise of aid in the establish- ment there of an independent government as was em- ployed in treating of the situation in Cuba. In its relations to the Filipinos the United States was bound by no prom- ise, expressed or implied. Only the principles of national ethics and the dictates of expediency could affect its action. As there was, and is, some radical difference of opinion concerning alike the ethics and the advantages of the situation, it was impossible for the admiral to con- jecture what attitude the President and the country would assume towards the insurgents. Accordingly, as they became stronger, he became more cautious. It is impos- sible to free him wholly from responsibility for their presence in the field, for he brought them their most capable leader and he furnished them with most of their arms ; but he speedily came to doubt the wisdom of his own course and treated his wliilom allies with studied coolness. Before the arrival of the first expedition from the United States, Aguinaldo had made such progress in arm- ing and organising the natives that in a series of engage- ments around Manila the Spaniards were worsted, losing heavily and being driven into the lines immediately sur- rounding the city. Aguinaldo captured 1800 prisoners and an immense store of arms, including two batteries of artillery. By the last of May the exultant insurgents were within seven miles of the city, which their lines completely encircled, and their prisoners numbered almost 3000. Then the first damper was put upon their enthusi- asm by Admiral Dewey himself. Fearing that if the city should be taken by the insurgents, there would result a sack and massacre which would compel the intervention of the other armed forces in the harbour, he sent word to Aguinaldo that the advance must be stopped. Between the Filipino front and the town lay the Malolele Eiver. This stream they were forbidden to cross. " If you do," said Dewey, " I will send the ' Petrel ' into the stream to Blue Jackets of '98 333 bombard your lines and to shoot down your men." The order was for the time obeyed, but naturally it created great bitterness. But even thus checked, Aguinaldo kept up an active warfare, most harassing to the Spaniards, and resulting in greatly increasing his store of captives, whom he treated well and held for ransom. The Spanish gov- ernor. General Augustin, was at his wits' end. In the harbour was a fleet of American warships holding the city at their mercy. On the hills and in the forests completely surrounding the town were nearly 30,000 natives, desper- ate with the memory of centuries of wrong and drunken with the sense of victory within their grasp. There was no communication with the interior, — no hope of help from either sea or shore, nor any chance, however desper- ate, of escape. The water supply was stopped by the insurgents. Food shipments were stopped. The de- spatches sent to Madrid by General Augustin tell how fatal he felt his position to be, and show incidentally how considerable an ally the Americans had in the young insurrectionary leader, Aguinaldo. The first military expedition to Dewey's aid set sail from San Francisco May 25th, — an unconscionable delay which might have led to the most serious complications had a less capable commander than Dewey been holding the position in Manila. The cruiser " Charleston " con- voyed the expedition, which was composed chiefly of volunteer troops from Oregon and California, and a por- tion of the Fourteenth United States Infantry, all under command of Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson. Prior to this time Major-General Wesley Merritt, a West Pointer and a veteran of the Civil War, had been given command of the department of the Pacific, including all mihtary forces which were to take part in the Philippine expeditions ; but he did not accompany the first expedition. The plans of the administration for pressing the campaign in the Philippines involved the ultimate despatch thither of 20,000 men, — a colossal task for an army establish- 334 Blue Jackets of '98 ment which but a few months before had scarcely exceeded that number in its total enrolment. The difficulty of getting troops to Manila was further increased by the lack of suitable ships on the Pacific seaboard, and by the fact that war in Asiatic waters was so far from the minds of the Washington authorities, at the beginning of the conflict, that they had stripped the Pacific coast States of their volunteers. Once be^i^un, however, the despatch of military forces to Dewey's aid proceeded apace. General Greene with the second expedition — four transports carrying 3500 men, all volunteers except eight companies from the Eighteenth and Twenty -third United States Infantry — - sailed June 15th and reached Manila July 17th. The third expedition, under command of Brigadier-General Arthur McArthur, sailed June 27th and arrived July 31st. It comprised about 4000 men, mostly volunteers. Indeed, it may be noted here that if the campaign in Cuba was fought mainly by the regulars, the conquest of the Phihppines — both in the war with the Spaniards and the later sanguinary fighting with the insurgents — was effected by that vol- unteer army which has ever been the great military reli- ance of the people of the United States. The three expeditions thus far enumerated, comprised in all about 10,000 officers and men. Other detachments of troops followed, — indeed the persistence of the insurrection re- sulted in compelling the United States government to exceed materially its first estimate of 20,000 for the Phil- ippines, but the capture of Manila was effected before any more troops reached the scene. Only the first of these expeditions from San Francisco was convoyed bj a ship of war, — a fact which, had the Spaniards been as enterprising as they were brave, might have resulted in disaster. All, however, reached Manila without even an incident to relieve the monotony of the long voyage, except General Anderson's expedition, which, by virtue of its naval force — the unarmoured cruiser (.KM I; \ 1, \\ K.SI.KV Ml'.i;i;l 1' I' Blue Jackets of '98 335 " Charleston " — stopped on the way to capture a Spanish colony. The story is a curious one, and strikingly illus- trative of the slovenliness of the Spanish colonial system. In the western Pacific, ten days' moderate steaming from Manila and rather more than twenty days' from San Francisco, lie the Ladrone Islands, a dependency of Spain. The principal island is called Guam, and its chief town is known as St. Ignacio de Agano. Here were ancient and decrepit fortifications, and here, too, the Spanish colonial governor had his residence in a pictur- esque if somewhat dilapidated official palace. Into this harbour steamed the " Charleston," and let fly a six-pound shot at the Spanish flag that floated over the opera-bouffe fort. There was no response, nor was there any excite- ment. Presently a boat was seen coming from the shore and made for the " Charleston's " gangway. Out of it climbed the Spanish governor, and with great dignity asked to be presented to the commander of the " Charles- ton." He had come at once with a welcome and an apology, he said. The salute which the Americans had been so polite as to fire he knew should be returned, but unhappily his home government had neglected him and he had no powder with which to return it. He was highly sensible of the honour done his little colony by this call of a fine warship from the great American na- tion, and quite desolated by the sense of his inability to discharge the formal courtesies of the occasion, but would the captain not accept his apologies and do him the honour to dine at the palace ? All this and much more to the same ingenuous effect the Spanish governor said to his amazed auditors, who could hardly believe that he was ignorant of the existence of the war, and that he had mistaken their shotted guns for a formal salute. The luckless governor was soon undeceived, and with his offi- cials was carried off to Manila, while a force was left to hold the island. By the terms of the treaty which closed the war, Guam became an American possession, and will 336 Blue Jackets of '98 be turned into a naval station where, it may be presumed, enough powder will be kept on hand for saluting or other uses. A correspondent who was on the American flagship when the white flag was hoisted over the defences of Manila on August 13th reports that Admiral Dewey said at the moment, " I feel that I have won a greater victory to-day than that of May 1st." Perhaps to the men of the army who for weeks had been living in water-soaked trenches, alternately baked by the sun and drenched by heavy tropical showers, the while maintaining a sputter- ing warfare with the Spaniards, the assumption that the victory was won by the navy may be irritating, but to a great degree it was just. Much of the immunity from serious loss enjoyed by the troops was due to the moral influence of the ship's guns looking down on a helpless city, and the surrender, finally made after an almost bloodless contest, was the direct result of negotiations carried on between the defenders and the admiral. When General Merritt reached Manila, July 25th, and assumed command of the troops, he found this situation existing : In Manila were supposed to be about 12,000 men. The city was beginning to suffer for both food and water, as supplies of each had been interrupted by the insurgents, who had completely hemmed in the town. The American forces — other than the navy — then on the ground numbered about 6000, and occupied the ground along the bay shore from Cavite toward Manila. The insurgents, as first on the ground, were in possession of the most advantageous positions for an attack on the Spanish lines, and completely shut off the American troops from the city. There had been no fighting except be- tween the insurgents and the Spaniards, for the enemy had carefully refrained from giving the admiral any cause to fulfil his threat of bombarding the town if the American ships or lines were fired upon. Blue Jackets of '98 337 After reconnoitring the field, General Merritt agreed with Admiral Dewey that the attack on the city sliould be postponed until the arrival of the " Monterey " and the third expedition from San Francisco, which was then almost due. But it was held desirable to get the insur- gents out of the way, and to accomplish it if possible by diplomacy, for by this time Aguiualdo had become sen- sible of his strength and resentful of his grievances, real or fancied. To General Greene, whose line was " blank- eted " by the Filipinos, this task was assigned, and by him it was accomplished without much difificulty, by explaining to Aguinaldo that the heavier artillery of the Americans in the trenches occupied by his men would be vastly more effective against the common enemy than the antiquated guns which he had mounted there. The insurgent chief acceded to the suggestion, and on the 31st of July the Filipinos withdrew that portion of their lines which had rested on the bay shore, and their places were taken by Greene's brigade, which, not content with the advanced position thus gained, pushed still farther forward and brought on an engagement in which ten men were killed and thirty-three wounded. The engagement was at night, and was fought with a furious fire of musketry. The Americans, becoming convinced that the enemy was ad- vancing, fired 60,000 rounds of ammunition. The next day General McArthur's command arrived and was landed, and the work of pushmg forward the trenches continued. The country was a most difficult one either for intrench- ing or for marching, being given over mostly to the culti- vation of rice, which necessitates submerged fields. The roads are few and narrow, and the best line of approach to the enemy's position was along the beach, even though it was much of the time under water. From the 1st to the 7th of August the troops worked persistently at rec- tifying and advancing their lines, a sputtering fire being kept up meanwhile by the enemy. General Greene de- clares that at no time after the first of the month would 22 338 Blue Jackets of '98 the issue of the conflict have been in doubt had the Americans charged the Spanish lines, but Admiral Dewey insisted that the attack should be deferred until the arrival of the " Monterey," and accordingly the time was occupied with preparations far more elaborate than the task really demanded. On the 7th all of General Mc- Arthur's troops were landed, the " Monterey " had arrived and completed the slight repairs necessary to fit her for active service, and the moment for bringing the long wait to a close seemed to have come. Of the issue of the con- flict there could be no possible doubt. The batteries of the ships enfiladed the Spanish trenches on the right, so that the advance of the Americans along the beach and the few narrow roads would be in a great measure covered. Seeing this clearly and hoping that the Spaniards possessed an equally correct appreciation of the situation, Admiral Dewey and General Merritt strove to avert bloodshed by sending to the Governor-General a summons to surrender, with a warning that in forty-eight hours the attack would be made if he refused. He was cautioned, furthermore, that if the night assaults on the American troops con- tinued the attack might be precipitated even before the expiration of the time set, and he was urged to send the women and children in the city away to places of safety. The response of the Governor-General showed that he appreciated the hopelessness of his position, but dared not surrender without at least a show of resistance. He pointed out that with the city surrounded by half-savage insurgents there was no place of safety to which he might send the women and children, and he asked that the time before the assault be extended to give him time to communicate with the government at Madrid. This was promptly refused, and the preparations for the attack began, the Spaniards meanwhile abandoning their practice of night attacks on the American lines lest the day of reckoning be hastened. It was during the preparations for the attack that the Blue Jackets of '98 339 British squadron in the bay gave another of those frank expressions of good-fellowship for the Americans that have done so much to break down the ancient hostility between the two nations. The harbour was busy with shipping moving to anchorages out of reach of the ex- pected bombardment. The foreign consuls were actively engaged in embarking people of their nationalities on transports and taking them to places of safety out in the bay — and by the way an eye-witness notes that the number of German citizens thus cared for was ridiculously disproportionate to the powerful fleet which the Kaiser had thought it necessary to maintain there for their protection. A few hours before the time set for the attack, the British squadron of four ships, which had been anchored far across the bay from the Americans, weighed anchor and steamed over toward Cavite, where Dewey was moored. As the British flagship " Immortalite " steamed under the stern of the " Olympia," her band crashed out the strains of the " Star-Spangled Banner " and her men cheered the Yankees lustily. The American band re- sponded with " God Save the Queen " and equally hearty cheers, and then, perhaps by accident only, the British took up an anchorage directly between the American ships and the Germans. The incident was one move — a trivial one — in the diplomatic game which went on concurrently with the game of war in Manila harbour. The attack was not begun on that day, however. Some difficulty in securing an advantageous position for the troops under General McArthur compelled another delay. The time was not wholly lost, for before another forty-eight hours had passed Admiral Dewey had learned, through the Belgian consul, who was his intermediary in communicat- ing with the Spaniards, that the city would be surrendered as soon as there had been enough of an attack and a defence to satisfy " Spanish honour," and incidentally to save the commander from a court-martial when he reached home. It was arranged, accordingly, that the 340 Blue Jackets of '98 ships should not fire upon the town, but should confine their attack to Fort San Antonio and the trenches im- mediately in the American front. The United States troops meanwhile were to be gathered under cover in their trenches, ready for an assault if one should be necessary. After a short bombardment the admiral with the " Olympia " was to move up close to the city walls and display the international code signal " Sur- render." The response to this was to be a white flag on the corner of the Malate, the most advanced of the walls of the city. Should the Spaniards fail to display this sicrnal, then the Americans were to advance to the attack ; but if it was shown they would merely have to enter the city and take possession. While this pro- gramme was thoroughly understood by General Merritt, he nevertheless prudently made his dispositions for a real battle, apprehending that the Spanish officers might not be able to control their men, or that in some other way the arrangement might miscarry. The point in the Spanish line of defence menaced by the American attack was directly south of the city, where the Spaniards had a line of earthworks and barbed wire extending from Fort San Antonio on the beach to a block-house on the bank of a small stream which ran parallel with the sea-shore and about a mile away from it. From that point the Spanish lines turned sharply north- ward, enveloping the city and confronted at every point by the insurgents. The United States forces concerned themselves only with that part of the enemy's hue between the fort and the block-house. That was the most vulnerable point of attack, because the fort itself could have been demolished in half an hour by the fire of any of the men-of-war, and the whole line to the stream was within easy range of the cannon of the fleet. With this position carried, Manila would be at the mercy of the invaders, since nothing would remain to bar their advance except the antiquated walls of Malate. Blue Jackets of '98 341 The day of battle came gusty and showery. The soil, already waterlogged, was made even more difficult for the passage of troops, and the frequent showers of ram hid from the gunners of the ships the targets offered them. About nuie o'clock in the morning the ships blossomed out with battle-flags at every point. With the " Olympia " in the lead, they steamed slowly down toward Fort San Antonio, the blare of the band from the British flagship, which accompanied them at a safe distance, lending an air of festivity to the scene. Soon the " Olympia," " Ealeigh," and " Petrel " opened on the fort, quickly enshrouding themselves in a cloud of yellow smoke, which hung heav- ily about them in the damp and sultry air. The " Mon- terey " had steamed nearer to the city, and confronted in silence the central battery, where were mounted four for- midable Krupp rifles. If the Spaniards held to their agreement, that battery would not open fire ; but the "Monterey," with her heavy armour and 12-uich guns was stationed there to attend to it if the Spaniards proved forgetful. The " Concord " was north of the walled town, her guns commanding the fort at the mouth of the Pasig Eiver, which intersects the city. Her part in the conflict, like that of the " Monterey," was destined to be a merely silent and precautionary one. The little gunboat " Callao," captured from the Spanish, lay close inshore, raking the enemy's trenches with her machine guns and preparing the way for the American troops who were to make the assault. For more than half an hour the bombardment continued without any answer from the shore. The American ships were putting in their heaviest shells, and great clouds of dirt could be seen thrown high in the air as the "Olympia's" 8-inch shells exploded fairly within the fort. The battle was as harmless and almost us unexciting to the sailors as target practice, for the de- fenders of the fort clung sullenly to their earthwork bombproofs and made not the slightest reply. At last there was a rattle of musketry from the shore, and after 342 Blue Jackets of '98 allowing the smoke to clear away, the men on the ships could see a column of men advancing up the beach toward the fort, in water up to their waists part of the time, but pressing forward with cheers, with colours waving, and with a band stoutly plodding along in their rear, from which there came faintly over the water the strains of that novel battle-song, " There '11 be a hot time in the old town to-night." This was the First Colorado Infantry, sent forward under orders from General Merritt of the night before to make a feint, or, if the Spaniards showed resistance, a real attack. Either because the understanding between the governor-general and the American commanders had not been communicated to the men in the fort, or because the Spanish officers were unable to control their men, a vigor- ous fire was opened on this column, but without checking its advance in the least. The Coloradans pressed on, throwing themselves flat to rest when they came to a piece of dry beach, and wading stubbornly through the surf that at points covered their sandy pathway. Now and then a man fell, but not many, for the Spanish aim was bad, and apparently only a part of the Spanish forces were firing. A small stream in front of the fort was promptly forded, and soon the watchers in the ships could see the Spaniards streammg out of the back of the fort, while the Colorado men with loud cheers rushed up and over the front. Almost instantly the Spanish flag came fluttering down, and a great American flag was run up to the top of the staff and saluted with cheers from the ships and the trenches. On the right of the American line, out of sight of the ships and with httle aid from their guns, the assailants were meeting a more serious resistance. There General McArthur's brigade was engaged. Massed in trenches, behind stone houses, and taking advantage of everything that off"ered protection, these troops waited until tliey saw the flag come down from Fort San Antonio. Then the Blue Jackets of '98 343 guns of the Astor battery and a Utah volunteer battery were turned on the most formidable work in their front — a stone block-house — and quickly riddled it, after which the troops charged the Spanish lines and soon car- ried them. The Spaniards retreated before the advancing Americans, who did not stop in the captured trenches, but pressed ou toward the city, sustaining meanwhile a heavy fire from the woods that bordered the road and from every farm-house or other covert they encountered. By the time the Spaniards had been driven from every halting- place the brigade had lost 7 men killed and 37 wounded. Meanwhile the Colorado men with the First California and part of the Twenty-third Regulars had left Fort Anto- nio behind, and were pushing into the suburb of Malate, where they met a heavy fire from house windows and roofs. The situation was then a most anomalous one. In pursuance of the agreement with Admiral Dewey, the Spaniards had displayed a white flag on the corner of the wall of the old town, but directly under this flag the Spanish soldiers were continuing the fight, and the Ameri- can troops were responding with heavy volleys. The navy had ceased firing, and at this very moment oSicers representing Admiral Dewey and General Merritt were on their way to the city hall to meet, by prearrangement, the Spanish officials and formulate the terms of capitulation; yet there was fighting in the streets of Malate, and large bodies of Spanish troops were standing irresolute, with arms in their hands, uncertain whether to reopen the con- flict or not. The insurgents, who had not been much in evidence during the day, as the fighting was not on their lines, now began to crowd toward the breach in the Span- ish position, and announced their intention of entering the city with the victors, — a purpose which General Merritt promptly interdicted, instructing his brigade commanders to keep them out at any cost. By night, however, these complications were all untangled. The Spaniards everywhere were informed of the surrender, the 344 Blue Jackets of '98 last Spanish flag in tlie city was hauled down, American troops garrisoned every fort, and patrolled all the principal streets of the city, and the insurgents, nursing a not un- justifiable resentment, were left in their trenches, confront- ing not only their enemies the Spaniards, but their friends the Americans. The sufficient justification for the restraint put upon the insurgents is the fact, that had they been admitted to the city before the American authority was complete, and arrangements for the protec- tion of life and property perfected, they woidd beyond a shadow of a doubt have sacked and looted the town. The terms of capitulation were arranged the following day. In effect they granted to the Spaniards the honours of war. Manila and its suburbs were surrendered to the United States forces, together with all pubhc property, arms, and munitions of war. The Spanish officers were to be permitted to retain their side arms, horses, and personal property of every sort. The Americans charged them- selves for the present with the subsistence of the prisoners pending the decision of the Washington authorities as to shipping them back to Spain. The duty of policing the city, protecting private property, and reopening the port to commerce was also assumed by the conquerors. The details of the surrender thus completed, Governor-General Augustin made a hasty flight from Manila on the Ger- man flagship " Kaiserin Augusta " — an incident that for a time added to the bitterness felt against Germany in the army, but it afterwards appeared that the flight was with Dewey's knowledge and connivance. "When the German ship reached Hong Kong, however, her officers assured the American consul there that the situation at Manila was unchanged, although they had seen the American flag raised over the city some hours before their departure. Seemingly the German policy of unfriendli- ness could not stop short of petty falsehoods. The capture of Manila is almost unprecedented in the history of warfare, for the great value of the prize and the Blue Jackets of '98 345 small expenditure of human life in the winning of it. A city of 300,000 inhabitants, heavily fortitied, was taken with a loss of twenty killed and 105 wounded, after a leisurely campaign covering 24 days. On the American side, exclusive of the navy, scarce 9000 men had been en- gaged, and they had taken 13,000 prisoners. Of arms and munitions of war there were captured 22,000 small arms, ten milhon rounds of ammunition, about 70 pieces of modern artillery, and several hundred antiquated bronze pieces. In the vaults of the city was about $900,000, — fair spoil of war. Nor was the extent of the triumph the greatest of the American achievements at Manila. Almost instantly conditions of peace were restored in the city. The strong hand of authority restrained alike the eager insurgents and the sullen Spanish soldiery. The custom-house was reopened, and shops took down their shutters. After the first moment of terror the inhabitants discovered that while the American occupation meant martial law it meant also protection to every man in the pursuit of his business. General Greene, who was most active in this work, writes : ' ' Witliin one week from the time the articles of capitula- tion were signed every branch of the government except civil courts was in operation. The police stations were open, and American soldiers Avere on duty as patrolmen. , Police court was held every morning, and petty offenders were tried, and either acquitted, or convicted, sentenced, and sent to jail. The streets Avere being cleaned ; the prisoners of war were quartered and fed; public property was inventoried and counted ; pnhlic funds were secured and placed in the custody of officers under bonds ; the custom-house was doing a large business ; the streets were lighted ; water was delivered through the pipes ; the markets were open, and food in ample quantity was coming in from the country on one side and by sea on tlie other. . . . The day we entered the city all shops and buildings were closed, and they remained so the following day, which was Sunday. But on Monday a few venturesome shopkeepers 346 Blue Jackets of '98 threw open their doors, and finding that they were fully pro- tected, the others followed their example on Tuesday. That afternoon the newspapers made their appearance, and the tramways resumed operations. On Wednesday morning the banks opened their doors, under a guard of soldiers to preserve order, which, however, was withdrawn two days later as being no longer necessary." A curious fact about the capture and occupation of the city by the American troops is that it took place after the peace protocol had been formally concluded at Washing- ton, resembling therein the famous victory of New Orleans which was won by General Jackson several days after the signing of the treaty of Ghent which concluded the War of 1812. Had the cable to Hong Kong been intact, it is doubtful whether Manila would ever have been taken, for it would have been the duty of the authorities at Wash- ington to notify the forces in the Philippines immediately of the end of the war. There would have been a sorry time for the soldiers and sailors who had been working and waiting so patiently to put the finishing touch upon Dewey's victory of ]\Iay 1st, and the map of the world might have escaped a radical change. Certainly the United States would in that event have been freed from grave problems and heavy responsibilities which have come to them as the result of their new possessions in the Philippines. It is possible to give here only the most cursory account of the deplorable revolt of the Filipinos under Aguinaldo against the authority of the United States in the captured territory contiguous to Manila. As I have already pointed out, the insurgents became restive very early in the Manila campaign. As they gained in numbers and in confidence, they assumed authority which they could not maintain. During the long days when Dewey was waiting for troops from home it became only too clear that Aguinaldo thought the admiral greatly dependent upon him for Blue Jackets of 98 347 support on shore. In more than one instance the insur- gent chief attempted to assert his power in a way annoy- ing to the admiral, but in every instance he was summarily rebuked. It was perhaps this tendency to independence shown by the Filipino leader that led the admiral to re- vise materially his first declaration, " These people [the Filipinos] are ten times better fitted for self-government than the Cubans." However that may be, the extreme care taken by Ad- miral Dewey and later by General Merritt to avoid any- thing which would seem like recognition of the Filipino leader in his official capacity — he had proclaimed himself Dictator — undoubtedly suggested to Aguinaldo that the bright hopes he had formed of a native republic under the protection of the United States were doomed to disap- pointment. Through his envoy Agoncillo he was kept informed of the progress of the peace negotiations at Paris, and saw the American commissioners there calmly bar- gaining for the sovereignty of the Phihppines, with ap- parently no thought of the rights or the wishes of their people. Against the terms of the treaty Agoncillo the diplomat filed a protest. Aguinaldo the soldier contin- ued to co-operate with the Americans against Manila, but manifested suspicion and resentment by studiously avoiding any communication with the United States commanders. Men who have known this remarkable leader have given the most conflicting reports of his character, and perhaps it is no more than natural that the estimates proceeding from American sources should have been almost uniformly eulogistic until the moment of his revolt, and thereafter almost invariably to his discredit. It is undeniable, however, that he is a man of marked native ability, which he has improved by arduous study of all that pertains to the tasks of the soldier or the statesman. He has power over men, and has ruled his followers with an iron hand. He has courage, and that lofty tempera- 348 Blue Jackets of '98 ment which enables its possessor to go down cheerfully for an idea. He is imbued with the spirit of national freedom, else he would not have staked all on a hopeless revolt against the power of the United States. It would be idle to deny that Aguinaldo and his follow- ers had some excuse for feeling themselves betrayed when they learned that the opportunity to form a government of their own was to be denied them. They were at the out- set treated with the utmost friendliness by the official rep- resentatives of the United States. The consul at Hong Kong was in constant communication with the Filipino leader, and furthered his plans for again taking the field against Spain. One of Dewey's ships brought him to Manila. His men were armed with rifles captured by the Americans. When a German ship checked a body of the insurgents in the act of capturing a Spanish post in Subig Bay, an American man-of-war took the post and delivered it over to the Filipinos. Perhaps in all this the representatives of the United States did not overstep the line between mofficial friendliness and official recognition, but the Filipinos can hardly be blamed for believing themselves an important factor in the Manila problem, — one that could not be ignored in the solution. The treaty of peace by which the United States paid Spain $20,000,000 to relinquish sovereignty in the Philippines gave to the revolutionists their first rude shock. A procla- mation in the form of a letter from the President to General Elwell S. Otis, who succeeded General Merritt after the capture of Manila, only converted into certainty the sus- picion of the insurgents that they were to be denied self- government. The President declared that the United States had succeeded to the sovereignty of Spain in the islands, announced that the Americans came, " not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights," and further announced that the " mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, GKXKRAI, 1,1. WEI. 1. S. OTIS. Blue Jackets of '98 349 substituting the mild sway of justice aud right for ar- bitrary rule." In this was no word of comfort for the Filipino republic, which had been duly formed with Aguinaldo as President. The natives were prepared to admit that in exchanging the sway of Spain for the rule of the United States they had made a notable bargain, but they still cherished a hope that they, like the Cubans, might secure at least the opportunity to try a government of their own. Out of this sentiment grew inevitably an antagonism to the United States as bitter as any that had been felt for Spain. Feeling themselves deceived and outraged, unable with their limited horizon to discern the many reasons which had compelled the Americans to as- sume the position they had, the natives prepared to give battle to their new masters. The first serious defiance of the authority of the United States occurred at Iloilo, the second commercial port of the Philippines. It had been held by the Spaniards dur- ing the armistice, but on the 24th of December was evacuated. Immediately a force of Filipinos entered the town and occupied its fortifications, refusing to evacuate them at the demand of a detachment of American troops which had been sent as soon as notice of the evacuation was received. A week later Aguinaldo issued a procla- mation protesting against the American occupation of Manila, and calling upon all native Filipinos to continue the battle for liberty. Meanwhile Manila was honey- combed with plots. In one instance a Filipino in the service of the United States was noticed diligently organ- ising clubs in all parts of the town. " To help maintain American supremacy," he explained when questioned ; but a little investigation showed that they were revolutionary and designed to aid Aguinaldo. Outside the city the insurgents occupied the same trenches they had when they hemmed in the Spaniards and cut off their food and water. Now it was the Americans who were hemmed in, though a semblance of peace was preserved and the most 350 Blue Jackets of '98 imperative orders given to avoid a conflict. But the con- flict was as inevitable as fire when inflammable materials are exposed to heat. On the night of the 5th of February- there was a shot on the lines. From which side it was fired cannot be told with certainty, but as if it was a signal, it was followed by volleys and the United States, not yet fairly out of war with Spain, was at war with the Filipino insurgents. The outbreak was not unexpected, and the American commanders, by sea and shore, inflicted upon the new enemy such punishment as showed the insurgents that they no longer had Spaniards to deal with. As soon as day dawned the ships opened on the insurgents in the trenches. The " Monadnock," the " Charleston," the " Concord " and two captured gunboats were engaged, and their fire, with that of General Otis's troops, did cruel execution among the half-armed Fili- pinos. The enemy's loss was heavy. Though not defi- nitely reported, it is known to have extended into the thousands, and Aguinaldo was driven from his lines about Manila. But he was far from being crushed. At this time there were in the island of Luzon — the only one thus far affected by the revolt — about 30,000 Filipinos under arms. In discipline and in equipment the different commands varied widely, some being mere bands of savages armed with bows and arrows, others having a semblance of European organisation and carrying the Mausers captured by the Americans from the Span- iards. The force was a formidable one, nevertheless, vastly superior to that with which Garcia and Gomez had kept the Spanish in Cuba in check for three years. With perfect knowledge of the country, with acclimated troops and holding possession of everything outside a narrow belt around Manila, Aguinaldo threatened to make grave trouble for the United States in establishing its authority over the new domain. Very quickly, however, the American commanders demonstrated to the insurgent general that he had men Blue Jackets of '98 351 of a type very different from the Spanish to deal with. There was no building trochas, no clinging to the cities, no effort to subdue men under arms by starving women and children. The troops took up the new contest as if they had expected it. Blow followed blow, and the in- surgents were forced back away from the city and into the interior. Five days after the outbreak at Manila, the insurgent stronghold at Caloocan was taken, and the day following Iloilo was captured. There was fighting every day, the enemy's forces being diligently sought and attacked fiercely wherever found. Either because of a lack of self-control or through pure bravado, Aguinaldo failed to adopt the Fabian tactics which the Cuban insur- gents had employed so effectively. Confident of the strength of his forces, he seldom attempted to avoid battle, and accordingly his troops were pushed back day after day, losing heavily in every encounter. Early in February much of the sympathy which had been felt for him as a sincere and able if mistaken leader was alienated by the discovery of a plot among the Filipinos in Manila, to assassinate all foreign residents, regardless of sex, age, or nationality. The plot had progressed so far that the date for its execution was fixed, and its details were worked out with the utmost circumstance. Nations are not builded upon wholesale massacres, and a new St. Bartholomew would form but a sorry inauguration of an enlightened republic in the East. The discovery of this plot had immediate effect in strengthening the determination of the Americans to put down the revolt without mercy ; and the completion of the treaty of peace which soon followed, removed certain embarrassments in the way of the conquerors. Before the treaty the Tagals were rebellous Spanish subjects ; there- after they were in rebellion against the United States. Prior to the treaty General Otis could not negotiate with the insurgents, nor did he feel justified in waging a really aggressive campaign against them. The treaty once 352 Blue Jackets of '98 completed, however, the American forces took the field in earnest. By the middle of March all plans were ready for an advance into the interior of the island. On the 13th the town of Pasig, which is on the river of the same name, was captured, and during the two weeks fol- lowing the fighting was continuous and deadly. By the 1st of April it became apparent that the United States had encountered in the Philippines a situation more grave than had ever confronted the nation, except at the outbreak of the Civil War. Expedition had followed expedition to the far-off islands, until, instead of the 20,000 soldiers which had been thought enough to cope with the problem, we had nearly 45,000 there, including many regiments of regulars and a heavy fleet. To our people, unused to colonial wars and distrustful of a large army, this seemed a heavy price to pay for territory of doubtful value. It was, indeed, an expenditure of men in foreign warfare which might appall nations of a wider military experience than ours. The expedition of Lord Kitchener through the desert, which attracted the attention of all military Europe, numbered only about 8000 white troops, and some 12,000 natives. In their prolonged war on the frontiers of Afghanistan, the British employed only 32,000 troops, of whom only about 10,000 were white. The French put only 15,000 men into Madagascar, and the British subjugated the Zulus with a scant 7000. Even the Spaniards held the Philippines with fewer soldiers than we found necessary, for when Dewey entered Manila Bay there were not more than 20,000 Spanish troops in all the islands. This condition naturally bred the greatest anxiety in the United States. The relatives of volunteers who had enlisted for 'the war with Spain bitterly denounced the policy which compelled these soldiers to remain in service months after that war was over, fighting a fight for which they had not volunteered and for which many had no sympathy. The so-called " anti-expansionists " or people Blue Jackets of '98 353 who held that the United States should confine themselves within the natural continental boundaries, hailed each new embarrassment in the Philippines as additional proof of the justice of their contention that only disaster could follow the adoption of a colonising policy by the United States. About Manila the war was fought with bullets, at home it was waged scarcely less bitterly with pamph- lets, speeches, and editorials. The administration with- held any definite declaration of its policy beyond a declaration of purpose to first put down the revolt and then consider what should be done with the Philippines. While the army and navy were intrusted with the primary duty, a commission was appointed to proceed to the scene and consider the political methods which would best serve to give the islands an orderly and civilised govern- ment. The members of this commission were men of notable attainments and high character. President Jacob Gould Schurman, of Cornell University ; Professor Dean C. Worcester, of the University of Michigan, who had travelled extensively in the islands before the war ; Colonel Charles Denby, long the Minister of the United States to China, made up the commission, together with Admiral Dewey. The commissioners arrived at Manila on the 4th of March, and great hopes were expressed that they would speedily affect an arrangement with the insurgents ; but the pertinacity of the enemy again disappointed Ameri- can expectations. Though beaten whenever brought to battle, they shifted their positions and fought on week after week, deaf to any suggestions of peace which in- volved their first laying down their arms. Though driven from their capital, Malolos, their villages burned, their ranks decimated in the most merciless fighting in which American soldiers have ever engaged, they stubbornly maintained their hopeless resistance ; and as these lines are being written, the subjugation of Aguinaldo and his fol- lowers, though promised for an early date, is still a thing to be accomplished. More men by far were lost in the war 23 354 Blue Jackets of '98 against the insurgents than in that against the Spaniards, if the losses from disease be excepted ; more troops have been employed, the fighting has been fiercer, and to-day the results are almost barren. Of the outcome there can be no doubt. In the end the limitless resources of the great Republic and the discipline of its army and navy will prove too much for Aguinaldo's half-clad soldiery; but the contest has been costly and not wholly glorious, the civil problems which will follow it will be harassing and difficult, and the profit, either material or moral, attending all is more than problematical. CHAPTEK XVI The Peace Commission at Paris — The Completion of the Treaty — The Struggle in the American Senate — Some Lessons of the War — The Work of the Torpedo Boats — The Need for a Permanent Staff Organisa- tion — The Part played by the Militia — The Future OF the Army. IN outlining the course of events in the Philippines after the declaration of the armistice on the 13th of August, 1898, 1 have to some extent anticipated the course of the historical narrative. While Merritt and Dewey were advancing upon Manila, the civil authorities in Washington were busily engaged in negotiating the pro- tocol which resulted in preliminary peace ; and while the earlier lighting between the insurgents and the Americans in Luzon was in progress, the peace commissions of the two nations at war were meeting in Paris to formulate a treaty, which in its effect upon the distribution of national power is second in importance to scarcely any instrument of the sort ever negotiated. To all intents and purposes, the agreement upon the protocol ended the war except in the Philippines, where the news was slow to arrive. The armistice passed with- out incident into a permanent peace. Much in the way of formality had to be gone through with before the war could be declared at an end ; but the fighting stopped that 13th day of August, and what remained to be done was the work of the diplomats. In an era of short wars this was one of the briefest. The Franco-Prussian war lasted five days over six months The Turco-Russian war of 1877 had a duration of nine months. The war between Japan and China ended with the ignominious defeat of ^S^ Blue Jackets of '98 the latter in eight months. Our own struggle with Spain reached its conclusion in less than four months, though already — May, 1899 — the sharp conflict with the Fili- pino insurgents has occupied a like period and seems likely to continue months longer. It is to be borne in mind that this period of four months is that of active hostilities only. Formally and of record the war is pre- sumed to have continued until the interchange of ratifica- tions of the treaty, which took place at Washington, April 11, 1899. The treaty as finally agreed to by the United States Senate and the Queen Eegent of Spain, who ratified it in the recess of the Cortes, followed closely the lines of the protocol. To formulate it, both governments appointed commissioners, who met in Paris in October. The United States commission included Mr. W. E. Day, who resigned the post of Secretary of State to undertake this task ; Mr. Whitelaw Eeid, editor of the " New York Tribune ; " United States Senators Gray, Frye, and Davis, and Mr. John B. Moore, secretary. For Spain appeared Senor Eugene Montero Eios, president. General E. Cerero, and Senors de Garnoca, Arbazuza, and de Villaurrutia. Into the details of the prolonged discussion it is unnecessary to go. The determination of the United States government to insist upon Spain's renunciation of all sovereignty over the Philippine Islands led to the most violent disagree- ment, and would doubtless have broken off the negotia- tions had not Spain's case been so obviously helpless. The Spaniards urged, with some measure of justice, that the protocol, which was supposed to cover all the demands of the United States, did not demand the actual abandon- ment of the islands by Spain ; but by this time public opinion in the United Stq-tes had so clearly signified the desire of the people that the Philippine Archipelago should at least be freed from Spanish dominion, that the American commissioners were unyielding. A prolonged and brilliant effort was also made by the Spaniards to Blue Jackets of '98 357 saddle upon Cuba that part of the Spanish debt which was supposed to have been incurred for the good of the island, including the money spent and the money stolen in the various efiforts to put down Cuban rebellions. Against this, too, the American commissioners made a determined and successful resistance. It may be re- marked here that the peace commissioners — like any diplomats accredited to foreign countries in this era of swift cable communication — were, in fact, supernumerary fimctionaries. Their instructions were cabled from day to day, and they had but the shadow of personal authority So wholly were they a representative body, expressing only the will of the central authority at Washington, that their instructions were radically changed after a Western journey had convinced the President that the sentiment of the country favoured a plan for the Philippines different from the one he had originally contemplated. Diplomacy is a very difierent art in the end of the nineteenth century from what it was at the beginning. An ambassa- dor now, even a special one with so important a mis- sion as the negotiation of a treaty of peace, is but a mouthpiece. After weeks of hagghng, the peace commission formu- lated a treaty, signed it December 10th, and adjourned. The essentials of the treaty followed closely the lines laid down in the protocol, its chief differences being in the clauses deaUng with the Philippines. All claim to sov- ereignty in those islands was relinquished by Spain, and, in consideration of that action, the United States was bound to pay Spam 820,000,000. The future of the islands was left to the determination of the United States. Porto Eico was ceded to the United States, as were also all other West Indian islands then in Spain's posses- sion, excepting Cuba, which was given freedom, and in addition the island of Guam in the Ladrones. The cus- tomary clauses securing civil rights to the residents of the territories ceded, and providing for special privileges ^S^ Blue Jackets of '98 to the vessels of the ceding nation in the ports of the countries relinquished, completed the treaty. , After a bitter fight in the United States Senate, growing out of the opposition of many Senators and public men to what seemed to portend the actual annexation of the Philippine Islands to the United States, the treaty was ratified and signed by the President, February 10, 1899. In Spain the Cortes was not in session, and indeed there was some doubt whether a ratification would have passed that body. Accordingly, the Queen Eegent affixed her ^signature to the document March 17th, and it became eifective. An historic document, indeed, is this Treaty of Paris, — one that marks an epoch in the development of the United States, one that signalises a day of disaster in the history of Spain. To Spain it is the final decree of expulsion from the western hemisphere. The enormous territory which the Spanish had held as the fruit of the endeavours of their hardy explorers was at last dissipated. First the great Louisiana Territory ceded to France had passed into the ownership of the United States. Then by purchase, though almost at the cannon's mouth, the United States freed themselves from a troublesome neighbour, and Spain lost Florida. Next, by successful revolution, Mexico broke away from the control of Madrid, and by war the United States acquired much of the territory which Spain thus lost. Followed then, in swift succession, the revolu- tions by which the flag of blood and gold was dragged from its places of authority in the States of South America. At last Cuba and Porto Rico alone were left to hapless Spain, and these, as we have seen, were held by her largely by grace of the United States, until her sins grew so intolerable that the very power which had long protected her in occupation of American territory was compelled by considerations of humanity to sweep her out of it. If to Spain the end of the war of 1898 seemed to mean Blue Jackets of '98 359 submission to spoliation and the sacrifice of her historic possessions in two distant seas, to the United States it means new problems, new responsibilities, new duties, and perhaps new evils. The event marked our first acceptance of territory beyond seas — for Hawaii had been taken during the war, and Porto Rico by the very terms of the treaty became a part of the United States. The relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and the Phihppines meant for the United States a grave and perplexing problem. For both countries we became thereby responsible. Though pledged to give the Cubans a chance to govern themselves, duty commanded that we should maintain such a supervision over their first at- tempts at self-government as to assure the continuance of order and the permanence of the government. Should the Cubans prove unfit for self-government, — a most improbable supposition, — or should they prefer annexa- tion to the United States, the graver question of our acceptance of the island as a State or a Territory would come up. But all the problems presented by the situation in the West Indies are dwarfed by those which the Phil- ippines present. Those huge and undeveloped islands, 6000 miles from our nearest port, peopled by 11,000,000 natives, mostly savages skilled in warfare and loving it, pestilential in climate, and of little profit in trade, were by a stroke of a pen, following an unexpected development of the war, made wards of the United States. For years their people had been in revolution against Spain, and with alacrity they revolted against their new rulers. For the first time in its history the nation foimd itself con- fronted with the necessity of sending its sons to a far distant and alien land to fight naked savages in a jungle. People began to ask, " Is it worth while ? " and the terri- tory which Dewey won from the Spaniards was described as another shirt of Nessus, very gay and beautiful in appearance, but which gave to him who put it on a fatal disease. The doubt was generally expressed whether 360 Blue Jackets of '98 Spain had not received $20,000,000 for ridding herself of a province which she could not govern and which brought her no profit, and whether the United States had not paid that sum for the doubtful privilege of suppressing a revolution. But in response, the question was asked, " Would you have us return the Fibpiuos to Spain, to extortion, to torture, and to death?" Only one answer to that question could be returned ; but as yet the final response has not been made to the more important query, which grows more insistent daily, " What shall we do with the Phihppines ? " A nation which enters upon a war braves the unknow- able. The issue of the conflict may perhaps be predicated with some certainty from an exact knowledge of the rival armaments, but the collateral results of the struggle de- velop most unexpectedly, and often in shapes which the most far-sighted statesman could not have foreseen, nor the most vivid fancy imagine. The United States em- barked on the war with Spain formally disavowing any purpose of territorial aggrandisement. It emerged the possessor of Porto Rico, Guam, and the populous Philip- pines. It went to war to save the starving reconcentra- dos, and the exigencies of the struggle compelled a blockade which only made their condition more pitiful. It entered upon the conflict denouncing Spain for attempt- ing to enforce an alien and hateful rule upon the Cubans, and it ended by enforcing upon the unwilling Filipinos a rule equally alien, and supported by cannon and rifles. Among the unexpected results of the war was the annexa- tion to the United States of the Hawaiian Islands. This fertile and beautiful archipelago in the Pacific had been for years knocking at the door of the Union, to which, indeed, it belonged by interest, by the character of its population, and by its geographical position. Constitu- tional scruples in the minds of certain Senators had re- sulted in the defeat or indefinite postponement of every Blue Jackets of '98 361 effort to ratify an annexation treaty. But Dewey's victory gave the Hawaiian Islands a new importance. They afforded the only sheltered spot between San Francisco and the Asiatic islands where a ship could put in for coal or repairs, the only rendezvous in the Pacific for the expeditions which it was foreseen would soon he following one another to the new dominion. Accordingly, con- stitutional procedure was stretched until, in the minds of some, it broke. By means of a resolution of both houses of Congress, the annexation of the islands was ordered, and on the 16th of July the President signed the resolu- tions giving them legal effect. The cruiser " Philadel- phia " was despatched to the islands with the news, and on the 12th of August — the day the peace protocol was signed — the Hawaiian flag came down, and the Stars and Stripes went up over the government building in Honolulu for ever. There, as in the Philippines, the natives grieved over the downfall of their own govern- ment, but no resistance was made. For years the islands had been in form a republic, in fact a little oligarchy, all power being held by a few Americans who had seized the government by force from the hands of the native queen, Liliuokalani. Beyond the shadow of a doubt the administration of affairs by the United States will be to the advantage, both material and moral, of the islands and their people. The war taught its lessons, military, naval, and political, not only to the nations concerned in it, but to all con- siderable powers. Perhaps the naval operations and combats were watched with the greatest interest, since this was the first opportunity ever presented for studying the value in combat of the complicated and delicate fight- ing-machines which compose modem navies. It is proba- ble that one result of the war will be to destroy the favour — manifested it must be said only in the United States — in which ships of the monitor type are held. 362 Blue Jackets of '98 Admiral Sampson curtly says that in his operations in the West Indies he was only hampered by the " Amphitrite " and " Terror." Captain Mahan, in his review of the naval lessons of the war, aptly points out that, however useful the monitors might be for harbour defence, they cannot be held for that purpose only ; and as soon as they have to move, their slowness and small coal capacity make them a source of anxiety to the fleet commander who is burdened with them. It is true that the " Monadnock " and the " Monterey " crossed the Pacific safely ; but they did so at so sluggish a pace that, as we have seen, Admiral Dewey was all but compelled to abandon his hard-won position lest the armoured vessels of Camara might arrive first. The thorough efficiency of the battle-ship for every use to which a monitor could be put was as fully demonstrated as was the inefficiency of the monitors when assigned tasks normally belonging to battle-ships. The work of the torpedo boats and destroyers during the war left the efficiency of that arm of the naval ser- vice in grave doubt. The Spanish torpedo boats accom- plished nothing. Perhaps it was because they were handled without either intelhgence or dash, but the fact of their impotence remains. The one instance in which a Spanish vessel of this type made a really determined effort to torpedo an American ship was at San Juan, June 22d, when the " Terror " attempted to destroy the auxiliary " St. Paul " commanded by Captain Sigsbee. Although the threatened vessel afforded a huge target and was armed only with comparatively light guns, the torpedo boat was unable to get into effective distance of it, and was driven back to port in a sinking condition without an opportunity to let fly one of its deadly mis- siles. In this case there were dash and bravery in the Spanish attack, but not intelligence. Had the attempt been made at night, a different story might be told. At any rate, this was the nearest approach to the use of a torpedo boat for the purpose for which it was designed Blue Jackets of '98 363 during the war. At Santiago repeated efforts were made to take the " Furor " out of the harbour at night, to break Sampson's rigid blockade ; but the glare of the American searchlight defeated the purpose, and when the two destroyers came out with the other ships on the 3d of July, they fled like their companions, and like them died impotently. On the part of the Americans constant use of torpedo boats was made for every purpose except that for which they were designed. They served as messengers and as blockaders ; they bombarded fortifications, as in the case of the " Winslow " at Cardenas, and the " Porter" at San Juan ; they helped in cable cutting, and they examined rivers and harbours under the enemy's fire. The United States was not rich enough in vessels to employ each class on the service for which it was especially designed, and accordingly work was put on the torpedo boats for which they were not fitted, and the performance of which exposed their officers and crews to the greatest discom- fort and danger. But if on neither side did the torpedo boat prove in action the reason for its existence, a sort of moral proof was afforded by certain incidents of the war. The officers of the ships about Santiago harbour will bear testimony to the nervous strain which the mere knowledge of the existence of the torpedo destroyers with Cervera caused. One night a train gliding along the line close to the water's edge called out a furious fire from the fleet, because an officer thought it was a torpedo boat lurking in the shadows. Another night the white foam breaking on a ledge of rocks was similarly honoured for the same reason. If these errors show how constant is the menace in the possession of torpedo boats by the enemy, a graver blunder, narrowly averted, came near giving a sorrowful demonstration of the murderous power of the weapons of these midgets when rightly used. It was during the first week of the blockade of 364 Blue Jackets of '98 Havana, and the torpedo boat " Porter," commanded by Captain John C. Fremont, was acting as a picket. Out of the darkness there loomed up the form of a big ship, obviously from her outline a man-of-war. It was early in the war, and neither Fremont nor any of his officers had any definite knowledge where the Spanish squadron might be. The little low-lying leaden-hued " Porter " was invisible from the big ship. The cruiser lay at her mercy. But the vital question with which the minds of the men on the torpedo boat was charged was whether it was an enemy or a friend they saw before them. They pushed forward to within one hundred and twenty yards, and at eight hundred yards their torpedo would have been effective. Then they flashed the signal that all American men-of-war understand, and to which all usually speedily reply. There came no answer. Seemingly the men on the greater ship neither saw the little boat almost submerged in the water, nor did they catch sight of the glowing lamp which offered friendship or threat- ened danger according to the response returned. The torpedo boat drew nearer and nearer. Captain Fremont repeated his signal and still received no return. Had he let slip a missile, the ship before him would have gone to the bottom as went the " Maine." But being prudent and well informed as to the course of the war, he felt con- vinced that the enemy could have no ship of such great bulk in those waters. Therefore he held his fire, and swinging his craft around so that the stranger would come between him and the famt glow of the stars in the sky, he saw that she had three smoke-stacks. No Spanish ship had more than two, so that the question whether it was an enemy they confronted was thereby immediately settled. As it turned out in the end, the ship was the " New York," and with all her 500 men she had been for an hour almost absolutely at the mercy of a httle craft that carried only thirty-two. This incident shows what might have been accomplished Blue Jackets of '98 365 by boats of this class had occasion arisen. The occasion did not arise, and so they did whatever service came first to hand, their officers with true American adaptability forcing the little vessels into the performance of duties for which they were but httle fitted. It is not likely, how- ever, that the fever for torpedo boats will again reach the point at which it stood before the Spanish war. It was clearly demonstrated that by day none of these craft could approach near enough to a ship of war to deliver an effective blow, and the modern devices for illuminating the neighbourhood of a warship at night seem to have made the chances for successful torpedo attack very small. If the war had ended with the signing of the peace protocol, it is probable that the people would have felt it had demonstrated the grave weakness of the militia in time of actual hostilities. In the Santiago campaign the victories were won almost wholly by the regular troops. Of the three volunteer regiments engaged, the " Eough Eiders " alone acquitted themselves with credit. There was noticeable, immediately after the close of this cam- paign, a very general inclination to underestimate the worth of volunteer forces, and to urge that the regular army establishment be largely increased. The hard fight- ing against the Filipino insurgents changed that national attitude. There the volunteers were in the vast majority, and they fought with a steadiness and gallantry that no regular troops could outdo. It is still too early to write the history of the war against the Tagals, but when it is written it will crown the American volunteer with such glory as he has had no opportunity to win since the dark days of the Civil War. But if the volunteers failed at Santiago, the regular army in two of its most important branches proved itself far from impeccable. The transportation and commissary departments of the army approached as near absolute 366 Blue Jackets of '98 failure as could be possible without disaster. It is need- less to recount here the story of the delays in getting troops and supplies to the points of rendezvous, or to rehearse the pitiful narrative of the wrecking of the army by bad food and faulty sanitation. It is enough to note that the one great mihtary lesson of the war was the need for a permanent and highly trained staff, able to cope swiftly with all the details of the mobilisation, equipment, and subsistence of great bodies of troops. This should be distinctively the function of the regular army ; the miHtia being trained rather in the less technical branches of mili- tary science. In some such device for dividing between the national guard and the regular army establishment the duties and responsibilities of military organisation in war-time probably hes the solution of the army problem in the United States. The antagonism of the people to a large standing army is ineradicable. Even in the glow of triumph over Spain Congress refused to accede to the Presi- dent's request for a regular establishment of 100,000 men. It is unquestionable, therefore, that the course for those who are interested in the development of our military resources to pursue is to plan systematically for a closer co-operation between the militia and the regular army. By the terms of the army bill passed in the last days of the congressional session, the President is authorised to maintain a regular army of about 65,000 men for two years to come, and to enlist new volunteers to the number of 35,000. At the end of the time fixed, in default of new legislation, the regular army will be reduced to its normal peace footing, and all volunteers will be discharged. When the people of the United States, unwillingly and after long and earnest consideration, turned aside from the paths of peace to take up the sword, to which for almost half a century their hands had been strangers, they de- clared they were going to war in the cause of humanity. They knew they were about to make heavy sacrifices, and Blue Jackets of '98 367 in some ways the sacrifice has been greater than the most apprehensive among them imagined. But in the end the great purpose of the war will be amply fulfilled. If terri- tory has come to us unexpectedly, its tenants — whether in Porto Eico or the Phihppines — will be far better off than under the almost barbarous rule of Spain. If the inevitable savageries of war have inflicted upon Cubans and Fihpinos sufferings more poignant even than they endured before our intervention, it has been such suffer- ing as the surgeon inflicts to perform a radical cure. There need be no fear of a recurrence or continuance of the evil, as was inevitable under Spanish rule. The people whom we have rescued from Spain, and even the half-civilised people whom we are now striving to rescue from themselves, wiU find nothing but profit in their new situation. Whether to the citizens of the United States the results of the war will prove so unmixed a blessing, cannot be said with equal certainty. We have entered upon a new national pohcy, and its fruits will be slow to ripen. Distant colonies, in lands already densely populated with alien races, and in a zone which has never been the scene of successful nation-building, offer problems which may weU daunt even the indomitable American spirit. The story of the war with Spain is only the least important part of the narrative of the results of our inter- vention in Cuba. The history of what we have done and shall do in our new possessions to justify our entrance upon them, and the record of the effect, if any, upon our home institutions, will be the more important chapter of the historical narrative. Loyal Americans will not fear that the chapter, when written, will be other than a glorious part of our national annals. THE END K' X 1 78 ■^ -^^0^ •'"^¥". %,s^* /■'* -^0^ .*1°<. 'oV O *.«o^ 0^ '^^ "... ■ ff-