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IC 9 ° 75 
 
 Bureau of Mines Information Circular/1986 
 
 Field Tests of a Model Health and Safety 
 Program for the Mining Industry 
 
 By Robert H. Peters and Louis Schaffer 
 
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
 
Information Circular 9075 
 U 
 
 Field Tests of a Model Health and Safety 
 Program for the Mining Industry 
 
 By Robert H. Peters and Louis Schaffer 
 
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
 
 Donald Paul Hodel, Secretary 
 
 BUREAU OF MINES 
 Robert C. Horton, Director 
 

 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
 
 Peters, Robert H. 
 
 Field tests of a model health and safety program for the mining 
 industry. 
 
 (Information circular ; 9075) 
 
 Bibliography: p. 29 
 
 Supt. of Docs, no.: I 28,27; 9075. 
 
 1. Miners-Diseases and hygiene. 2. Mine safety. I. Schaffer, Louis. 
 
 I. Title. III. Series: Information circular (United States. Bureau of Mines) ; 9075. 
 
 TN295.U4 
 
 [RC965.M48] 
 
 622 s [363. 1'19622] 
 
 85-600313 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Page Page 
 
 Abstract 1 Field evaluation of the model program 19 
 
 Introduction 2 Mining company E 20 
 
 Background research 2 Mining company W 22 
 
 Definition of the model program 5 Work force comparisons 26 
 
 Criteria 5 Work-related illnesses 27 
 
 Fundamental conditions 5 Project overview 28 
 
 Field evaluation plan 7 Conclusions 29 
 
 Participating mining companies 8 References 29 
 
 Mining company E 9 Appendix A. -Excerpts from tailored model pro- 
 Mining company W 12 gram, company E 30 
 
 The participation agreements 12 Appendix B. -Excerpts from tailored model program, 
 
 Implementation of the model program 13 company W 32 
 
 Mining company E 16 Appendix C. - Job performance sampling 34 
 
 Mining company W 17 
 
 ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 1 . Company E organization, beginning of 1982 10 
 
 2. Company E organization, end of 1982 10 
 
 3. Production operations of company E 11 
 
 4. Company W organization, beginning of 1982 12 
 
 5. Production operations of company W 13 
 
 6. Reducing "unsafe conditions" 18 
 
 7. Distribution of loss-control management effectiveness 19 
 
 8. Distribution positions of companies E and W 20 
 
 9. Proportion of jobs sampled at company E in which deficiency types P.,, P|„ P,., and P, were observed 21 
 
 10. Job-deficiency 95-pct confidence limits for T at company E 21 
 
 11. Monthly MSHA reportable injuries and illnesses at company E, 1982 22 
 
 12. Monthly workdays missed by company E Employees because of work-related injuries, 1982 22 
 
 13. Proportion of jobs sampled at company W in which deficiency types P.,, P|„ P,., and P, were observed 23 
 
 14. Job-deficiency 95-pct confidence limits for T, at company W 23 
 
 15. Monthly MSHA reportable injuries and illnesses at company W, 1982 24 
 
 16. Monthly workdays missed by company W employees because of work-related injuries, 1982 24 
 
 17. Equipment and/or facility damage accidents at company W, 1982 25 
 
 TABLES 
 
 1 . Sales needed to offset accident cost 16 
 
 2. Simplified expected value calculation 16 
 
 3. Job performance sampling results, company E 20 
 
 4. Recommendations in tailored model for company E 21 
 
 5. Job performance sampling results, mining company W 23 
 
 6. Recommendations in tailored model for company W 23 
 
 7. Accidents resulting in equipment and/or facility damage company W 25 
 
 8. Expectation computation to add hydraulic pick and shovel to company W crusher 26 
 
 9. Payback-period computation for hydraulic pick and shovel for company W crusher 26 
 
 10. Overall absentee rates, 1982 27 
 
 11. Work force turnover, 1982 27 
 
 12. Claimed job-related illnesses, companies E and W 1982 27 
 
UNIT OF MEASURE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT 
 
 ft foot mt/h 
 
 metric ton per hour- 
 
 h hour oz 
 
 ounce 
 
 in inch oz/mt 
 
 ounce per metric ton 
 
 Ibf pound (force) pet 
 
 percent 
 
 min minute yr 
 
 year 
 
 mt metric ton 
 
 
FIELD TESTS OF A MODEL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAM 
 
 FOR THE MINING INDUSTRY 
 
 By Robert H. Peters 1 and Louis Schaffer 2 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
 The objective of the project descibed in this report was to design and field test a 
 model health and safety program at a coal mining company and a gold mining company. 
 The model program was implemented primarily by providing training on loss control, ac- 
 cident investigation, and the operation of mobile equipment; and by providing technical 
 assistance to help solve health and safety problems. Data were obtained from company 
 records on occupational injuries, illnesses, accidents, and "near misses"; and through 
 direct observation of employees performing a large number of randomly selected jobs. 
 At the coal mine, employees were observed five times over a 15-month period. At the 
 gold mine, employees were observed six times over a 16-month period. During the study, 
 the percentage of sampled jobs containing one or more safety deficiencies decreased 
 from 74.3 pet to 36.6 pet at the coal mine and from 86.4 pet to 19.1 pet at the gold mine. 
 Work on this project was performed by Woodward Associates, Inc., under a Bureau of 
 Mines contract. 
 
 1 Research psychologist, I'ittsburgh Research Center, Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
 ; ' Research program manager. Carson Consultants, Genoa. NV. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 During the past 20 yr, significant progress has been 
 made in the improvement of health and safety conditions in 
 mining. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Acts 
 were established in 1969 and 1977, and the mining industry 
 has greatly increased its emphasis on health and safety. 
 Nevertheless, mining is still recognized as an industry that 
 has a high incidence of accidents and injuries. 
 
 According to the National Safety Council (7), 3 the min- 
 ing industry experienced 8.68 work injuries per 200,000 
 employee-hours worked, compared to a 1979 all-industry 
 average of 7.76. The incidence rate for bituminous coal was 
 8.83, and for metal mining the rate was 12.27. 
 
 These statistics show that further improvements must 
 be made if mining is to be removed from the list of high-risk 
 industries. More effective methods for reducing occupa- 
 tional injuries and illnesses are needed. Therefore, the ob- 
 jective of this research effort was to develop and field test a 
 model health and safety program that will assist mine 
 managers in concerted efforts to reduce accidents and 
 health hazards in the mining industry. 
 
 Most mining companies practice some form of accident 
 prevention or reduction. The 1977 Health and Safety Act 
 sets mandatory training standards for miners and requires 
 mining companies to administer federally approved health 
 and safety training programs, but there are no Federal 
 guidelines for establishing and maintaining formal, com- 
 prehensive health and safety programs. Many different 
 methods and approaches are being used throughout the 
 mining industry to reduce accidents, depending upon the 
 size of the company, its labor force, and other available 
 resources; type of mining technology and product; and 
 management's attitude toward safety. However, little infor- 
 mation exists as to which specific methods and approaches 
 are effective. It was because of this lack of information that 
 the Bureau of Mines contracted for the research described 
 in this report. One of the overall goals was to better define 
 the essential features of effective health and safety pro- 
 grams for the mining industry. Therefore, the initial phase 
 of this research was directed toward reviewing existing ac- 
 cident reduction methods and approaches available in min- 
 ing and other similarly hazardous industries, evaluating 
 
 those methods or program elements, and recommending a 
 comprehensive model program that could be used to im- 
 prove health and safety throughout the mining industry. 
 The intent was to identify and correctly define only those 
 health and safety program elements that have proven to be 
 successful and have the potential for universal application 
 throughout the mining industry. The final phase of the 
 research was to field test the model health and safety pro- 
 gram at two mines. 
 
 The project began in September 1980 and was com- 
 pleted in April 1983. It consisted of a sequence of four 
 research tasks, as follows: 
 
 Task 1 . Generation of baseline data 
 
 Task 2. Assessment of existing health and safety prac- 
 tices 
 
 Task 3. Development of a model health and safety pro- 
 gram 
 
 Task 4. Implementation and validation of the model 
 health and safety program. 
 
 Although the most salient results of tasks 1 and 2 are 
 described in the next section, this report deals primarily 
 with the results of tasks 3 and 4. For a complete account of 
 the literature review and field observations that preceded 
 the development of the model (tasks 1 and 2), see the final 
 report on this project (2). 
 
 This report includes a presentation of the most impor- 
 tant findings from the literature review and field observa- 
 tions, a description of the model program and a plan for 
 evaluating it, an explanation of how the model program was 
 implemented at two mining companies, a description of the 
 results of more than a year of program evaluation, and 
 recommendations and conclusions. The appendixes contain 
 excerpts from the model programs tailored to each of the 
 two mining companies and some examples of the job per- 
 formance sampling data. 
 
 This report is based on work performed by Woodward 
 Associates, Inc., under Bureau contract HO308076. 
 
 BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
 
 This section describes the preliminary research that was 
 conducted to gather background information prior to the ac- 
 tual field implementation of the model health and safety 
 program. 
 
 The background research included - 
 
 Several types of literature searches seeking material 
 related to mining health and safety programs and recom- 
 mended practices. 
 
 Discussions with recognized experts in the mining safe- 
 ty and health fields. 
 
 Examination of available data on results acheived 
 through various safety policies and practices. 
 
 Observation anil assessment of health and safety 
 management in mining and in two other industries with 
 some similar equipment and job hazards. 
 
 i nderlined numbers in parentheses refer in items in the list of references 
 preceding appendix A. 
 
 These activities are discussed in detail in the final report (2). 
 Here, only the findings that had a significant influence on 
 the definition of model program are briefly discussed. 
 
 The majority of safety management books reviewed, 
 and many of the articles by safety experts in professional 
 journals, emphasize that workplace safety and work force 
 health are management responsibilities like all other respon- 
 sibilities related to the business enterprise. Petersen (.>') 
 notes that one principle is perhaps more important than any 
 of the others: Safety should be managed like any other com- 
 pany function. The field observations made by the resear- 
 chers as part of task 1 affirmed this principle. The mining 
 operations that had the safest working conditions and the 
 greatest degree of worker conformance to safe work prac- 
 tices were those operations in which safety was managed 
 like any other company function and all of the company 
 functions were managed well. There were a few operations 
 in which safety and all other company functions were 
 managed poorly. The majority of the operations observed 
 
did not treat safety and health in the same way as other 
 functions. Usually these matters had a lower management 
 priority and seemed to be viewed as a cost of doing business, 
 like taxes, or as ways to comply with government regula- 
 tions, rather than as opportunities to improve productivity 
 and profit. 
 
 If safety and health are to be managed in the same man- 
 ner as other company functions, it follows that safety and 
 health rules and procedures should be defined and enforced 
 in the same way as other kinds of rules and procedures that 
 regulate the company's activities. Some of the safety 
 literature emphasizes this point. Chapman (4), a safety 
 engineer for Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., has stated this 
 point clearly: "Let's stop thinking about 'how to do the job' 
 and 'safety' as separate processes. Think only of 'how to do 
 the job the right way,' and be sure the safety rules for that 
 job are fully integrated into all training and are enforced no 
 differently than other procedure rules." 
 
 Although some of the mining companies observed had 
 taken small steps in the direction of fully integrated work 
 and safety rules and procedures, most had taken no steps at 
 all. Several had no written rules other than the safety rules. 
 The idea of fully integrated work and safety rules is not 
 reflected in the policies commonly found in the mining in- 
 dustry. In contrast, fully integrated work and safety rules 
 are accepted as "the only way" in industrial and governmen- 
 tal organizations for jobs in which an accident could produce 
 disastrous results. Space; nuclear power; air transportation; 
 military air, undersea, and missile operations; and surgery 
 and medicine are among the industries and activities in 
 which there are many jobs with fully integrated safety rules 
 and procedures. Hammer (5), a well-know aerospace safety 
 expert, has identified certain criteria to be observed in the 
 preparation of safety rules. One criterion is that "safety 
 rules for a particular operation and for the workers involved 
 should be included in the procedures for the conduct of that 
 operation." Examination of several aerospace operator's 
 manuals indicated that this criterion was satisfied. Ex- 
 amination of job procedure manuals prepared by a few 
 large, progressive mining companies indicated that this 
 criterion was also satisfied in those manuals. However, 
 among the operations observed, the usual situation was that 
 work procedures and safety rules were separately 
 developed and separately taught. Only in enforcement was 
 full integration observed -and then only at the job super- 
 vison or section supervisor level. 
 
 Both field observations and the research literature sug- 
 gest that one of the fundamental conditions for an effective 
 health and safety program is full integration with all work 
 procedures and rules. Without such integration, truly effec- 
 tive management of safety and health is unnecessarily dif- 
 ficult- perhaps impossible. 
 
 Among. the companies observed, some had good safety 
 and health conditions and no safety officer. Some had poor 
 safety and health conditions and no safety officer. Some had 
 good conditions and a safety officer, and some had poor con- 
 ditions and a safety officer. It was evident that the presence 
 of a safety officer, by itself, had very little to do with the 
 safety and health results achieved. In the context of total 
 loss control management, the safety office itself would have 
 to be considered a loss at a few of the mining companies 
 visited. Money was being spent for something that was not 
 being received. 
 
 Partlow (6) notes that 25 or 30 years ago it was not 
 unusual to find that the safety practitioner had the job 
 because he or she had been injured on his or her previous 
 
 job. At one mining company, the employee relations 
 manager was asked how the company's safety official was 
 selected. He replied that the employee had been hurt in an 
 accident and that "there wasn't any other job he could do 
 here." This suggests that management was not handling 
 well the management functions of planning, organizing, 
 staffing, direction, and control with respect to safety and 
 health. Furthermore, the top manager was doing a poor job 
 of demonstrating his interest in, and commitment to, job 
 safety - a commitment he had announced publicly in a policy 
 letter several months earlier. Other responses to questions 
 about how the safety official was chosen included the follow- 
 ing: 
 
 He had some spare time in his job as supply clerk, and 
 he had served as a sergeant in the military service. 
 
 He used to be a policeman. 
 
 We wanted to keep him as a junior geologist, but he 
 wasn't satisfied with his pay. We were able to increase his 
 pay by assigning him additional responsibilities in safety. 
 
 We decided to have a safety man and to fill the job inter- 
 nally. He was the best of the three who were considered. 
 
 We hired him as kind of a management trainee. The 
 safety job is a good place for him to get an overall view of 
 the operation. 
 
 He was a security guard who did a good job. He wanted 
 to improve himself so he asked to be promoted to safety. 
 He's really not our safety officer because we don't have one 
 authorized. He's called a "safety technician." 
 
 He has some college and he speaks Spanish, so he can 
 talk to some of our miners who can't speak English. 
 
 It is of fundamental importance to the attainment and 
 maintenance of good safety arid health conditions that the 
 top managers regularly show subordinate supervisors and 
 workers that safety and health are among the primary 
 management concerns. Management can demonstrate in- 
 terest and commitment in many ways; however, any way 
 chosen must satisfy a basic criterion: It must be convincing 
 to the supervisors and workers. How these people perceive 
 management's concern is important. If the manifestations 
 of management interest and commitment are perceived as 
 artificial or insincere, their effect on the attitudes and 
 behavior of the work force is negative rather than positive. 
 Sometimes, well-intentioned and customary ways of 
 demonstrating management concern fail. Chapman (4) il- 
 lustrates this point with an anecdote about three teenagers 
 at a National Safety Congress session: 
 
 When asked if they would read a safety rule 
 pamphlet given to them by their boss, these 
 young people said probably not. If the boss 
 wanted them to understand and follow the 
 rules, they should be explained face to face. If 
 no more interest in their safety was shown than 
 just handing them a pamphlet, they wouldn't 
 think their boss regarded safety as very impor- 
 tant, so neither would they. 
 
 One of the most convincing ways a top manager can 
 manifest concern for effective safety and health manage- 
 ment is to have all subordinate supervisors properly 
 educated in safety and health management. Why then is it 
 that most of the supervisors in the mines observed were not 
 so educated? The probable explanation is that most of the 
 top managers were not themselves formally prepared to 
 
manage safety and health matters. The majority of them 
 were mining engineers or graduates in some other engineer- 
 ing discipline. Interviews with them about their 
 backgrounds in safety and health indicated that they had 
 very limited education, and no direct experience, in these 
 matters. In light of the importance of health and safety to 
 productivity and profits in mining ventures, it appears that 
 the training of most mining industry professionals in these 
 matters is insufficient. As a result, safety officers often 
 have poorly defined duties and, as previously indicated, are 
 selected with little regard for qualifications. Supervisors 
 under such managers generally do not seek to acquire 
 special skills in the health and safety area on their own ini- 
 tiative. 
 
 If the top manager has properly executed the planning, 
 organizing, and staffing functions related to safety and 
 health, the direction and control functions are made much 
 easier. This is especially true if the organizational arrange- 
 ment makes all supervisors fully accountable for safety and 
 health in their departments. This arrangement was a promi- 
 nent feature of the mining operations that were observed to 
 have the best safety and health conditions. 
 
 In the discussion above, the phrase "good safety and 
 health conditions" is used several times without defining 
 what "good" means in this context. Specific evaluative con- 
 siderations are discussed in the "Field Evaluation Plan" sec- 
 tion. It is sufficient here to note several points that are basic 
 to the selection of a rreasurement for determining the 
 "goodness" of health and safety conditions: 
 
 A measurement designed to record personal injury ex- 
 perience is not necessarily a sound way to measure safety 
 performance. 
 
 The occurrence of accidents is a probabilistic 
 phenomenon. Management actions that reduce the prob- 
 ability of accident occurrence cannot reduce the probability 
 to zero. 
 
 Accidents that produce personal injuries do not 
 necessarily result in a larger total cost to a mining enter- 
 prise than those that do not. In most mining operations, the 
 noninjury accidents are far more numerous and their total 
 cost is larger. 
 
 As much or more can be learned about accident reduc- 
 tion from accidents that "almost occurred" - that is, "near 
 misses" -as can be learned from accidents that actually oc- 
 curred (those that are required to be reported to the govern- 
 ment). 
 
 Contrary to popular belief, it is not true that "unsafe 
 acts" are the cause of 80 to 90 pet of all accidents in mining. 
 The reasons for accident occurrence are much more com- 
 plex. 
 
 The literature review and discussions with experts 
 brought forth a great many ideas that might be candidates 
 for inclusion in a model health and safety program. Nearly 
 every safety practicioner and author had some favorite 
 technique to which he gave credit for whatever accident 
 reduction had been achieved. Often data were presented to 
 show that a reduction in the "MSHA 4 incidence rate" had 
 been experienced during a specified period. Aside from 
 questions about the statistical accuracy and significance of 
 the data, the precise relationship of the data to the variable 
 under consideration could not be determined. It is a rare 
 case when only one element of a company's safety program 
 is altered and the program then remains unchanged for 
 even as long as a year. Nearly every program element 
 
 Mine Safety and Health Administration. 
 
 alteration or innovation is accompanied by a great many 
 other changes, both obvious and subtle, during its im- 
 plementation. Even when the variable can be "isolated," 
 there may still be questions about the phenomenon that pro- 
 duced the result. For example, was it the physical improve- 
 ment of a work area that reduced accidents or was it the so- 
 called "Hawthorne effect"? That is, did the specific physical 
 improvements induce the recorded improvements in work 
 behavior, or did the work behavior results occur because of 
 the workers' response to management's increased attention 
 to them and their workplace conditions? That is, might the 
 results have been the same with entirely different physical 
 improvements? 
 
 For almost every safety improvement method ad- 
 vocated by some practicioner, expert, or author, there could 
 be found someone else with apparently equal credentials to 
 impugn the method. For example, there are many advocates 
 of safety contests. Crapnell (7) declares that "safety contests 
 and promotions can make safety fun -no small accomplish- 
 ment in itself." He also quotes a remark concerning "safety 
 bingo" made by a manager of industrial relations: "(It) 
 creates tremendous peer pressure for workers to perform 
 their jobs safely." These statements are representative of 
 many made by persons who use and endorse safety contests. 
 Others raise some questions that the contest advocates 
 usually do not address. Gilmore (8) observes that the per- 
 formance of a plant or work group "cannot really be com- 
 pared" to that of another plant or work group. Instead, the 
 plant or work group "can show improvement only as it im- 
 proves its own experience." Of course, contests can be 
 designed so that winning requires the greatest improve- 
 ment in the group's own experience record. Accurate 
 measurement is necessary, but difficult to achieve. Gilmore 
 points out that "meaningful measurement depends on the 
 sincere desire to learn the truth and is hindered by the 
 desire to appear safer than someone else in a contest situa- 
 tion." Hampton (9) observes that, although contests often 
 achieve the intended result, they also produce many 
 unintended results. After citing several actual example, he 
 states, "Neglect, conflict and dishonesty are among the prin- 
 cipal side effects of contests. Through defects in design and 
 implementation, contests can implicitly reward activities in- 
 consistent with organizational goals." 
 
 The use of safety committees is another practice that 
 some safety experts recommend and others discourage. 
 Mims (10) writes, "I have found worker safety committees 
 the most practical way to foster genuine grassroots con- 
 cerns with safety -the 'they is us' attitude ... it spreads this 
 feeling of responsibility and safety awareness to every 
 worker who is serving on it or has served on it in the past." 
 However, DeReamer (70) opposes the use of safety commit- 
 tees, arguing, "Their basic principle -dispersing respon- 
 sibility -simply does not work where safety and health is 
 concerned. Employee participation in safety is essential, but 
 there are better ways than committees to achieve it." 
 
 In the early part of the background research it seemed 
 appropriate to attempt to select for the model program 
 those practices that were favored by the preponderance of 
 available experience, information, evidence, and opinion or 
 supported by especially impressive data. However, soon it 
 became evident that this was not appropriate because - 
 
 However successful a given safety improvement is for 
 one or several mining enterprises, it will not necessarily be a 
 sound method in all. 
 
 Field observations indicated that very different sets of 
 methods produced similar results at different mines, if both 
 sets were carefully managed. 
 
Interviews with experts and field observations led to the 
 conclusion that no single improvement method was essen- 
 tial in a model program to attain and maintain good safety 
 and health conditions. 
 
 What is essential in a model health and safety program for 
 mines is for management to create and sustain a few fun- 
 damental conditions. 
 
 DEFINITION OF THE MODEL PROGRAM 
 
 This section describes the criteria established for a 
 model health and safety program and then defines the 
 model program in terms of five fundamental conditions. 
 
 CRITERIA 
 
 The background research work suggested that the 
 model program should satisfy the following criteria in order 
 to be effective and acceptable to mining industry managers: 
 
 1 . The model must be readily adaptable to all types and 
 sizes of mines in the coal, metal, and nonmetal mining in- 
 dustries. 
 
 2. The model should identify all of the essential features 
 for illness and injury reduction effectiveness. All of the 
 essential features are required so that the scope of the 
 model is well known at the beginning of implementation and 
 so that the evaluation does not show an unfavorable result 
 because of program incompleteness. Nonessential features 
 should not be included in the model; they can make the 
 model less acceptable to mine management and the evalua- 
 tion confusing. 
 
 3. The model program must be manageable in ways that 
 are compatible with the management concepts that are 
 customary in the United States. This criterion addresses 
 especially the avoidance of "intervention mechanisms" that 
 require the services of specialists or alter the accountability 
 structure of an organization. The reason for this criterion is 
 primarily to improve the probability of obtaining the 
 cooperation of mining companies in evaluating and, later, 
 adopting the model. 
 
 4. The loss reductions attainable through the model pro- 
 gram implementation must exceed the cost of the implemen- 
 tation. In 1981-82, the state of the national economy and of 
 the mining economy in particular was such that few mining 
 companies would have been likely to consider any new pro- 
 gram unless there was an expectation of a reasonable return 
 on any investment required to implement the program. 
 Safety and health matters are more likely to be dealt with 
 effectively if increased profit is the expected result. 
 
 5. The model program should be acceptable to manage- 
 ment and labor on its merits alone. No inducement to adopt 
 the program should be necessary, other than the expecta- 
 tion of reduced losses due to accidents and illness. Model 
 program acceptance should be entirely voluntary. 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS 
 
 There are many ways in which a model program might 
 be described or defined. The way chosen was to define the 
 model program in terms of a small number of fundamental 
 conditions. All of the conditions can be created and main- 
 tained by competent managers in the performance of the 
 normal functions of management. 
 
 In framing the model, the research team considered 
 rather carefully what "normal functions of management" 
 
 means. There are hundreds of management and business 
 administration textbooks and articles that list and explain 
 management functions. One of the most useful lists is 
 presented by Dale (11). Dale identifies and discusses seven 
 functions of management: 
 
 Planning 
 
 Organizing 
 
 Staffing 
 
 Direction 
 
 Control 
 
 Innovation 
 
 Representation 
 
 Dale's list is especially appropriate to mining management 
 because it includes the functions of innovation and represen- 
 tation-functions not included in many other management 
 function listings. Innovation is especially important in min- 
 ing. Dale notes that management is "a creative rather than 
 adaptive task" - a concept entirely consistent with the model 
 program concepts. 
 
 Some methods of defining the model that were con- 
 sidered created problems in satisfying one criterion or 
 another. Satisfying the first and third criterion required the 
 rejection of several ideas for model program features 
 because the ideas were too specific to be acceptable (or 
 useful) to small mines. For examples, many of the experts 
 interviewed advocated a particular organizational pattern 
 for the mine safety office, including a full-time safety of- 
 ficial. A typical small mine management would not feel that 
 it could afford the arrangement advocated or that the ar- 
 rangement was needed. In other words, the small mine 
 management could not foresee a satisfactory return on the 
 investment. The managements of some medium-size mines 
 (say, 50 to 100 miners), and some larger ones as well, might 
 also oppose the arrangement on the grounds that a same, or 
 better, return would be available through a smaller invest- 
 ment. 
 
 Another example relates to a proposed model program 
 feature that called for regularly scheduled safety meetings 
 at all levels. It was rejected because it was inconsistent with 
 the first fundamental condition (explained below) and 
 because of a particular finding during the field observations. 
 A mine shift foreman expressed his strong opposition to 
 safety meetings, saying that they were largely a waste of 
 time that they were "rituals" which "gave safety a bad 
 name," and that they dealt publicly with matters which, in 
 his opinion, could be dealt with effectively only in private, 
 one-on-one, supervisory actions. Later it was observed that 
 this foreman had superior safety performance on his shift, 
 as well as an excellent production record. He never con- 
 ducted formal or informal safety meetings; and some of his 
 subordinates, with a mixture of amusement and admiration, 
 said they had never heard him use the word "safety." Safety 
 meetings were not essential in this operation. There are 
 many ways to deal effectively with safety training and safe 
 work performance. 
 
No Separation of Production and Health and 
 Safety 
 
 There must be no separation of production and safety 
 and health in the management of the mining operations. The 
 best "safety program" is none at all -that is, there is no 
 management activity that is separate and distinct from pro- 
 duction management. "Built-in" safety and health should be 
 evident in every work aspect at every level. 
 
 Probably the best way to assure that safety and health 
 are integral to all production tasks is to prepare complete 
 written work descriptions, or "safe job procedures," that 
 define the right way to do each task. These are developed 
 through job safety analyses, methods engineering, worker's 
 suggestions, various industrial standards, and equipment 
 manufacturer's recommendations. They are designed to 
 guide the training and supervision of workers. If they are to 
 be effective, these descriptions cannot be mere "read-and- 
 sign" documents designed primarily to "prove" that the 
 worker was trained in case of an accident. 
 
 The most important prerequisite for attaining this fun- 
 damental condition is that each employee must be provided 
 with precise and comprehensive instructions concerning the 
 proper performance of his or her job, with the instructiions 
 taking into account safety as well as other issues. Assuming 
 that employees accept and follow these instructions, and 
 that management is properly performing its other normal 
 functions (i.e., planning, organizing, and directing), the 
 achievement of this fundamental conditions should require 
 no additional investments. 
 
 Honest Commitment to Health and Safety 
 
 There must be an honest commitment by the top 
 managers to constantly improve the operation's health and 
 safety performance. This commitment must not only exist, 
 it must be regularly demonstrated. Lippert (12) states, ". . . 
 to the extent that the chief executive perceives that 'a safe 
 operation' is important in fulfilling his role, to that extent 
 will safety have importance in the perception of the lower 
 levels of management and supervision." Frequently the 
 safety literature cites the need for the top manager to sup- 
 port the safety department, but such support is not an im- 
 pressive manifestation of the manager's commitment in the 
 eyes of the workers. The safety department should be 
 devoted to supporting the top manager, who should be 
 leading the way by precept, encouragement and example. 
 With regard to leading by example, Shaw (13) writes, "If, on 
 an underground inspection, a manager or supervisor passes 
 an unsafe condition with no comment and then raises cain 
 over production, no amount of later talking about safety is 
 going to convince the workers that he or she is really com- 
 mitted to safety. Therefore, step one in getting safety is the 
 commitment from management." 
 
 Several authors have pointed out that failure of upper 
 level managers to effectively demonstrate their commit- 
 ment to safety, as perceived by the first-level supervisor, 
 will result in the failure of a safety program. Walters (U) 
 writes: 
 
 The firstline supervisor tries to do what is 
 requested by his supervisor, but if the 
 secondline supervision and other supervision at 
 higher levels do not act in a manner that sup- 
 ports what they say, then the firstline super- 
 visor soon notes this and governs himself accor- 
 dingly. As a result, the time and expense 
 
 devoted to any program is often wasted. In 
 many cases it is the second level of supervision 
 on up that causes the failure of the otherwise 
 successful and well designed policy. 
 Every manager and supervisor must accept that he or 
 she is perforce the principal safety official for those ac- 
 tivities under his or her supervision and that he or she must 
 constantly act in a manner that reflects dedication to proper 
 performance of that responsibility. Representation, direc- 
 tion, and control are the key management functions perti- 
 nent to this fundamental condition. 
 
 Management Health and Safety Training 
 
 Managers and supervisors at all levels must receive basic 
 training in safety and health (more broadly, loss control) 
 management and additional periodic courses to update and 
 upgrade their training in more advanced management 
 techniques. All managers and supervisors must thoroughly 
 understand the costs of occupational illnesses and injuries, 
 and accidents that result in equipment and facility damage. 
 They must be able to correctly relate these costs to produc- 
 tivity and profit losses in the operations for which they have 
 responsibility. A working knowledge of countermeasures to 
 reduce the probability of these losses is necessary, including 
 mastery of simple analyses of cost-to-loss reduction relation- 
 ship. They must learn to view accidents and job-related ill- 
 nesses and injuries as failures of management to adequately 
 perform one or more of the management functions. In par- 
 ticular, they must recognize that properly training their 
 subordinates is always a major part of the management 
 functions of direction and control. Many task training needs 
 (identified as part of establishing the first fundamental con- 
 dition) require careful supervisory planning and innovation. 
 These essential training activities are usually done properly 
 only by managers who are themselves properly trained. 
 However, training, no matter how intensive and thorough, 
 cannot by itself reduce the probability of accidents to accept- 
 able levels. Counter-measure training of managers must in- 
 clude demonstrations and practice in the reduction of 
 workplace safety and health hazards -that is, the 
 technology as well as analyses of alternatives in cost-versus- 
 benefit terms. Management training also must show the 
 manager that the Federal 30 CFR standards and State 
 standards should not consitute a set of management goals, 
 but rather, in general, only a minimum foundation. Finally, 
 the manager must understand that there are some 
 (although few) attractive safety practices or counter- 
 measures that are simply too expensive to implement. There 
 are sometimes advantages in accepting risks -but this will 
 never be true if the degree of risk being accepted is not 
 accurately known. 
 
 Management Emphasis on Health and Safety in 
 Organizing and Staffing Functions 
 
 Managers must include special emphasis on health and 
 safety in their performance of the organizing and staffing 
 functions. Job-selection processes should include thorough 
 evaluation of employment experience, accident and injury 
 history, physical condition, and learning disabilities and any 
 other handicap. Safety and health risks to handicapped per- 
 sons and to their employer should be controlled by identify- 
 ing handicaps accurately and defining training, job 
 assignments, and appropriate performance restrictions ac- 
 cordingly. Periodic performance evaluation (a control activi- 
 ty within the staffing function) must include a loss control 
 
component commensurate with loss control elements that 
 should be included in work descriptions such as those men- 
 tioned in the discussion of the first fundamental condition. 
 Employees unable to meet sensible performance standards 
 after corrective retraining, closer supervision, and counsel- 
 ing must be reassigned or discharged. Periodic organiza- 
 tional analysis should be conducted to evaluate the organiza- 
 tional structure and the jobs that comprise it in terms of the 
 current and near-future goals and standards of the mining 
 enterprise. Organization should be dynamic. Like the people 
 in it, it needs correction and redirection from time to time. 
 
 Reliable Feedback Mechanisms 
 
 There are several reliable feedback mechanisms that 
 have reliable and readily detectable safety and health com- 
 ponents. One of the most important of these is the investiga- 
 tion of all accidents and "near misses" using a method 
 designed to identify all factors that may have contributed to 
 the event. ("Accident" is defined as any event that produces 
 an unplanned cost.) Information from such investigations 
 provides management with knowledge about the effective- 
 ness of training, hazard removal, and any other actions that 
 may have been taken to improve safety. It also identifies ac- 
 tions that need to be taken in the future. The "near miss" is 
 an equal, or better, information source than an accident. 
 Palisano (15) reports that Exxon Corp. has very successfully 
 
 used a near-miss investigation program to reduce accidents. 
 The near-miss information is published in newsletters and 
 used to reenact some of the near-misses for video taping in- 
 struction material. 
 
 Another very valuable feedback or control mechanism is 
 the safety and health inspection. These inspections may be 
 done in many ways. Jones (16) reports on a safety audit 
 technique used by Allied Chemical Corp. It measured 
 employee compliance with safety rules; unsafe acts, condi- 
 tions, and equipment; and the health and safety environ- 
 ment of the plant. The top manager, superintendent, super- 
 visor, and safety officer took part in a twice-monthly audit 
 of the 3,000-employer plant. The audit technique, like the 
 near-miss investigations, provides information about the 
 status of earlier safety and health improvements and the 
 need for new improvement actions. 
 
 There are many other feedback methods that produce 
 good results in some mines (job-performance sampling, 
 which is discussed later, is an example), but the two 
 methods discusssed above can be effective in any mining 
 operation -especially if they include the participation of ap- 
 propriately selected members of the work force. Whatever 
 the methods, they must incorporate accurate records, main- 
 tained with care and available for examination by anyone in 
 the workforce. This last fundamental condition is essentially 
 an element of the control function, but it also involves the 
 planning, organizing, staffing, and representation func- 
 tions. 
 
 FIELD EVALUATION PLAN 
 
 Gilmore (8) notes that "... loss control is the art of at- 
 taining the optimum balance of loss potential, loss probabili- 
 ty and profit." The fundamental conditions discussed in the 
 previous section describe, collectively, the management en- 
 vironment that makes practice of the art of loss control 
 most effective. It would have been desirable, if it had been 
 possible, to evaluate the model health and safety program in 
 terms of objective measurements of loss potential, loss prob- 
 ability, and profit. However, for a variety of reasons, such 
 direct measurements were not possible. 
 
 It was decided that the evaluation plan should include con- 
 siderations such as - 
 
 Ease of implementation and administration- A 
 
 measure of the simplicity, or lack of it, in setting up the pro- 
 gram and running it on a continuing basis. 
 
 Cost effectiveness - A measure of both the initial installa- 
 tion costs and ongoing costs as compared to the program's 
 effectiveness in reducing accidents and injuries. 
 
 Acceptability- A measure of the willingness of labor and 
 management to use the new program. > 
 
 Compatibility -A measure of how well the program fits 
 into the existing overall mine situation. 
 
 Some comments about these considerations will help the 
 reader relate them to the evaluation methods planned for 
 actual use in the field. 
 
 It was concluded that there would be no way to measure 
 acceptability except in a subjective way -that is, by using 
 anecdotal data from the mining companies that agreed to 
 allow field implementation and evaluation in their opera- 
 tions. The fact that they agreed indicates acceptability by 
 management, and an expectation that the work force would 
 find the model program acceptable too. Although some min- 
 ing companies declined the invitation to participate in this 
 
 study, none of them gave as reasons anything that sug- 
 gested management found the model unacceptable. 
 
 The compatibility measure, it was decided, would also 
 have to be made from anecdotal data -or perhaps from the 
 lack of such data. Since, as several mining executives noted, 
 the model program dealt with "getting managers to do what 
 they should have been doing all along," it was believed that 
 compatibility would not be a problem except with respect to 
 those managers who might simply resist change -any 
 change. 
 
 The ease of implementation and administration 
 measurement could be made satisfactorily by compiling a 
 list of recommended actions to implement the model pro- 
 gram, discussing them with the top manager and recording 
 his or her decision concerning each action, and observing 
 and rating the progress made over a reasonable period of 
 time. This technique is explained in more detail in the sec- 
 tion on program implementation and appendixes A and B. 
 
 The cost effectiveness measure was more difficult, 
 especially the determination of accident and injury reduc- 
 tion effectiveness. During the field observations, it ap- 
 peared that only about 5 pet of the mining operations visited 
 recorded and reported accidents and injuries exactly as re- 
 quired by 30 CFR 50. Based on the field observations, it was 
 judged that the mining companies that agreed to participate 
 in the evaluation might not have good records of accidents 
 and injuries (as those terms are defined in 30 CFR 50) and 
 would not have reported as required by 30 CFR 50. In other 
 words, it was anticipated that there would be no suitable 
 baseline data available. (There was a high correlation be- 
 tween good record keeping and correct reporting and the 
 quality of safety and health management. The companies 
 with good records and correct reports probably would not 
 be candidates for participation in the model program, since 
 
they would not see a need for improvement.) It is a part of 
 the last fundamental condition that accurate records be kept 
 of all injuries and all accidents, not just those defined in 30 
 CFR 50, and of near misses as well. If this condition was in- 
 troduced during program implementation and maintained 
 during evaluation, it was considered very likely that more 
 accidents would be recorded and reported than in the 
 previous year, even if fewer actually occurred. In addition, 
 the probabilistic nature of accidents makes it possible that 
 there could be more accidents in one short period of time 
 than in a second similar period, even though the first period 
 has a lower mean probability of accidents. However, a sus- 
 tained reduction of the mean probability of accidents (and 
 illnesses) will reduce the long-term accident risk. 
 
 One very useful way to judge whether the mean prob- 
 ability of accidents is being reduced is to use a job perfor- 
 mance sampling technique. The sampling procedure is a 
 form of inspection. If conducted properly, it not only pro- 
 vides feed back, but also an opportunity for a management 
 person to demonstrate concern for safety and health in a 
 very favorable setting: one-on-one communication at the 
 employee's usual workplace. A job performance sampling 
 procedure was designed expressly for the model program 
 evaluation. Through observation of a randomly selected 
 sample of jobs, the procedure provided a basis for 
 estimating the proportion of the work force that was work- 
 ing with- 
 
 Individual job performance deficiencies that could be 
 corrected by the employee alone (P A ), or 
 
 Individual job performance deficiencies that could be 
 corrected only through employer action beyond the control 
 of the individual employee (P B ), or 
 
 Deficiencies that were common to several jobs of the 
 same kind, or various kinds, and correctable only through 
 substantial changes by the employer in the mining plan, 
 operating policies, or job structuring (P c ). 
 
 The sampling process is explained in more detail in the sec- 
 tion on implementation and in appendix C. 
 
 A second measure related to cost effectiveness is the 
 change in the slope of the cumulative cost of accidents, ill- 
 nesses, and injuries curve, from the beginning of the pro- 
 gram implementation through the evaluation period. 
 
 Decreases in the slope indicate that losses are costing less. 
 Unfortunately, it was not expected that all loss data would 
 be available at the beginning. It was estimated that several 
 months of training and other management actions would be 
 necessary before all losses could be estimated with 
 reasonable accuracy. However, there is one element of loss 
 data that seemed likely to be available for all the mines from 
 the payroll records: records of work days lost due to work 
 injuries or illnesses. This statistic is certainly not an ac- 
 ceptable surrogate for the total cost of accidents, injuries, 
 and illnesses or even for the total cost of work injuries and 
 illnesses, but it is likely to be a dependable indicator of the 
 trend in those statistics. 
 
 A third measure related to cost effectiveness is the "ex- 
 pectation calculation for various health and safety manage- 
 ment improvements. It can be used to evaluate the "worth," 
 that is, expected return on investment, of hazard 
 countermeasures, production practice changes, and injury 
 or severity reduction methods. The "expectation" is a 
 representation of the fact that if two or more possible, 
 mutually exclusive events or outcomes can be expressed as 
 numerical values, and each can be assigned a probability of 
 occurrence, the "expected value" of a trial is the sum of the 
 value of each event multiplied by its probability. In short, 
 the "expectation" of the outcome of a chance process is the 
 weighted average of all values of the variable, that is, the 
 arithmetic mean. The "expectation" can be expressed 
 mathematically as follows: 
 
 E(x) = E Xi r, 
 
 where 
 
 and 
 
 E(x) = expectation, 
 n = number of outcomes, or "eventualities," 
 Xj = cost of eventuality i, 
 Pi = probability of eventuality i. 
 
 Application of this calculation is explained in the section on 
 program implementation. 
 
 PARTICIPATING MINING COMPANIES 
 
 Consideration of possible sites for model program im- 
 plementation and evaluation began during the field research 
 observations (task 2). The following conditions for evalua- 
 tion mines were established: 
 
 Two mine sites should be evaluated, an underground 
 coal mine and mine of a different type in a different part of 
 the country. 
 
 The minimum employment at each mine should be approx- 
 imately 100 persons. 
 
 The mines should have significant, but not atypical, safety 
 problems. 
 
 There was another condition that took precedence over all 
 of the others: The managements of the candidate mines 
 would have to be willing to participate in the model program 
 evaluation. 
 
 Fifteen mines were identified as candidate evaluation 
 sites. These were either mines that were known to members 
 
 of the research team through work on other projects or 
 mines that were recommended by MSHA mine inspectors 
 who knew about the model program and whose recom- 
 mendations had been sought by the researchers. From the 
 15 candidate mines, the researchers chose 8 to be invited 
 and encouraged to become participants in the field evalua- 
 tion processes. Each of these eight mines received a detailed 
 explanation of the model program and the implementation 
 and evaluation plans. Each also received a formal letter that 
 defined the cooperative arrangement proposed and re- 
 quested a favorable response. Two mines never responded 
 at all. Two others responded with polite, detailed explana- 
 tions of their reasons for declining to participate. The 
 reasons had to do mostly with programs of their own, or of 
 their parent companies, which had been recently introduced 
 to improve their health and safety performance. The re- 
 searchers withdrew the invitation to one mine when they 
 learned of some management problems that appeared to 
 make an agreeable arrangement unlikely. After 2 months. 
 
the total number of mines still considering participation, 
 and being considered by the researchers, had been reduced 
 to three. Finally, agreements were made with two com- 
 panies, a coal mining company in the East and a metal min- 
 ing company in the West. They are referred to in this report 
 as company E and company W and are described in the next 
 two sections. The third company was, by mutual under- 
 standing, left as a "standby" in the event there were unan- 
 ticipated serious implementation problems at company E or 
 company W. 
 
 MINING COMPANY E 
 
 The offices and mines of company E are in eastern Ken- 
 tucky. The nearest city with emergency medical service and 
 a hospital is Pineville, approximately 15 miles distant. 
 
 The company's product is steam coal. The mining opera- 
 tions include both underground and surface mines and, 
 since 1982, a contractor-operated thin-seam miner. 
 
 There are two underground mines within a mile or so of 
 the company offices. The newest began production in 1982. 
 Both are "low coal" drift mines using continuous miners and 
 working a seam that has an average thickness of approx- 
 imately 40 in. There are two surface mining locations (but 
 only one MSHA identification number for both). Mountain- 
 top removal characterizes most of company E's surface min- 
 ing. 
 
 All coal hauling from the mines to the crusher, prepara- 
 tion plant, or holding area is done by a contractor. 
 
 Company E operates a preparation plant, a clean coal 
 crusher, and a tipple, at which unit trains, usually of about 
 70 cars, are loaded for shipment. 
 
 The principal production machines in use at the begin- 
 ning of 1982 are listed below. 5 
 
 Underground 
 
 4 Joy 14 CM4-11 AH continuous miners 
 
 5 Long Airdox LRB-15A roof bolters 
 
 3 Galis 300 roof bolters 
 
 1 Wilcox WRDA-5500 roof bolter 
 
 4 Joy 21 SC2 shuttle cars 
 
 4 Joy 18 SC-7HE shuttle cars 
 
 2 NMS rock dusters 
 
 6 S and S rock dusters 
 
 4 MSA Bantam 400 rock dusters 
 
 6 S and S 74SS mine scoops 
 
 3 S and S BM-100 mine tractors 
 
 7 Kersey BJD mine tractors 
 2 Rail Runner locomotives 
 
 4 Stamler BF-17 feeder breakers 
 4 Long-Airdox conveyors 
 
 10 Kersey 600 CTT supply trailers 
 
 ■Id Tcrt'iiee in specific products dues nol imply endorsement hy ihr Bureau 
 if Mines. 
 
 Surface 
 
 1 Bucyrus-Erie 480W dragline 
 
 1 Galion 125 crane 
 
 5 Caterpillar D9H tractor-bulldozers 
 
 1 Caterpillar D9G tractor-bulldozer 
 
 1 Caterpillar D8K tractor-bulldozer 
 
 1 Caterpillar D7G tractor-bulldozer 
 
 3 Komatsu D355A tractor-bulldozers 
 
 2 Komatsu D85E tractor-bulldozers 
 
 2 Caterpillar 992B loaders, rubber tired 
 
 3 Caterpillar 992C loaders, rubber tired 
 3 Caterpillar 988B loaders, rubber tired 
 
 2 Caterpillar 980B loaders, rubber tired 
 
 3 Caterpillar 966C loaders, rubber tired 
 1 Caterpillar 955 loader, crawler 
 
 1 Deere 700A tractor 
 
 1 Deere 510 backhoe 
 
 1 Caterpillar 637 scraper 
 
 1 Caterpillar 16G motor grader 
 
 2 Caterpillar 14G motor graders 
 2 Wabco 85C rock trucks 
 
 8 Caterpillar 773 rock trucks 
 
 2 Euclid R50 rock trucks 
 
 1 Caterpillar 769 water wagon 
 1 Mack DM685S water wagon 
 
 3 Ingersoll Rand T-4 drills 
 
 1 Ingersoll ECM 250 Air Trac drill 
 
 1 Ingersoll D150 compressor 
 
 1 Robbins RR10HD drill 
 
 2 Powder trucks 
 
 4 ANFO trucks 
 
 In 1982, company E's total salable production of coal 
 was nearly 800,000 mt, of which 65 pet was from surface 
 operations. Approximately 12 million mt of overburden was 
 moved. 
 
 The organization of company E at the beginning of 1982 is 
 shown in figure 1. In May of 1982, some major organiza- 
 tional changes were made. The principal one, in terms of ef- 
 fect on the model health and safety program, was the crea- 
 tion of an additional level of management: a production 
 manager, a maintenance manager, and a safety and loss 
 control foreman, all reporting directly to the top manager. 
 The new organization is shown in figure 2. 
 
 At the beginning of 1982, the total number of company 
 E employees was 362. At the end of the year, the total was 
 318. The change was due primarily to layoffs in the under- 
 ground mines as the number of sections was decreased. 
 Average employment was 340. All of the hourly employees, 
 except the security guards, are represented by a union local. 
 
 Figure 3 diagrams the major production operations of 
 company E. Not shown are the pond construction and main- 
 tenance activities and other pollution controls. Also not 
 shown is the thin-seam miner, which is provided and 
 operated by a second contractor. 
 
10 
 
 Underground 
 
 master 
 
 mechanic 
 
 General 
 manager 
 
 Assistant 
 general manager 
 
 and 
 mining engineer 
 
 Engineering 
 
 and 
 survey crews 
 
 Purchasing 
 agent 
 
 Drill 
 foreman 
 
 Underground 
 superintendent 
 
 Office 
 manager 
 
 Safety 
 office 
 
 Blasting 
 foreman 
 
 General crew 
 foreman 
 
 Surface mine 
 foreman 
 
 General 
 foreman 
 
 General 
 foreman 
 
 Shift 
 foreman 
 
 Shift 
 foreman 
 
 Surface mine 
 foreman 
 
 Shift 
 foremon 
 
 Shift 
 foreman 
 
 Surface 
 
 master 
 
 mechanic 
 
 Shift 
 foreman 
 
 Fuel 
 
 and 
 
 lubrication 
 
 FIGURE 1.— Company E organization, beginning of 1982. 
 
 Chief 
 engineer 
 
 Production 
 manager 
 
 General 
 manager 
 
 Maintenance 
 manager 
 
 Office 
 manager 
 
 Safety and loss 
 control foreman 
 
 Underground 
 engineering 
 
 Surface 
 engineering 
 
 Survey 
 crew 
 
 Underground 
 superintendent 
 
 Surface 
 superintendent 
 
 Preparation 
 
 plant 
 
 foreman 
 
 Outside 
 foreman 
 
 Underground 
 maintenance 
 
 Surface 
 
 maintenance 
 
 superintendent 
 
 Administration — 
 
 Purchasing — 
 
 Office 
 services 
 
 FIGURE 2.— Company E organization, end of 1982. 
 
 Sampling 
 
 — Training 
 
 Security 
 
11 
 
 Engineering 
 and surveying 
 
 Underground mine (2) 
 
 L 
 
 
 Development 
 
 
 \' 
 
 
 
 Mining 
 
 1 
 
 ' 
 
 
 Roof control 
 
 
 i 
 
 r 
 
 
 Underground 
 hauling 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 ' 
 
 
 Feeding 
 
 and 
 breaking 
 
 
 1 
 
 ' 
 
 
 Conveyor 
 
 hauling 
 
 to surface 
 
 
 1 
 
 ' 
 
 
 Loading 
 
 I Coal hauling | — 
 I i 
 
 l I 
 
 ■~i r 
 
 r" 
 
 LJl£ 
 
 Scale 
 
 Crusher 
 
 Stockpile 
 
 Tipple 
 
 -Surface mine (2)- 
 
 Pioneering 
 
 Pioneering 
 
 Blast hole 
 drilling 
 
 Blast hole 
 drilling 
 
 Blasting 
 
 Blasting 
 
 Loading 
 
 Waste 
 hauling 
 
 Reclamation 
 
 Dragline 
 operation 
 
 Loading 
 
 r— * n 
 
 I I 
 
 -| Coal hauling h- 
 
 l i 
 
 I I 
 
 Plant coal 
 storage 
 
 i 
 
 .jr_ 
 
 r— *~ i 
 
 i i 
 
 —\ Coal hauling | 
 
 ' I 
 
 L "-T ' 
 
 1 Coal hauling | 
 
 i i 
 
 I i 
 
 '1 
 I 
 
 Reclamation 
 * 
 
 Preparation 
 plant 
 
 Waste 
 hauling 
 
 Stockpile 
 
 KEY 
 
 ] Company operations 
 
 1 Contractor operations 
 
 Product shipping 
 (railroad) 
 
 FIGURE 3.— Production operations of company E. 
 
12 
 
 MINING COMPANY W 
 
 Located in central Nevada, approximately 210 miles 
 southeast of Reno and 90 miles northeast of Tonopah, NV, 
 company W's product is dore (alloy of gold and silver), 
 poured in bars of 500 to 1,000 oz each. The operation was 
 originally planned to yield approximately 18,000 oz Au and 
 59,000 oz Ag annually. The ore lies at an elevation of 9,000 
 ft under 200 to 300 ft of over burden. It assays at only about 
 0.06 oz/mt Au; thus, the recovery system uses a low-cost, 
 heap-leaching method. 
 
 Ore is mined by power shovels and trucked to a crusher 
 at the mine site. There it is reduced to particles of about 0.5 
 in diam and trucked to a processing area. Crushed ore is 
 piled uniformly on thick plastic sheeting. A dilute cyanide 
 solution is sprinkled on the ore to leach out gold and silver. 
 (Later, spent ore is covered in place with topsoil and seeded 
 with native grasses.) A network of pipe under the ore drains 
 the gold- and-silver-bearing fluid by gravity into a storage 
 pond. From the pond the fluid flows to tanks containing ac- 
 tivated charcoal. The charcoal attracts gold and silver par- 
 ticles and removes them from solution. The metals are then 
 stripped from the charcoal by a chemical process. (The char- 
 coal is cleaned and recycled in a closed system.) The metals- 
 bearing solution is fed into an electrolytic cell, where gold 
 and silver adhere to a steel wool electrode. After removal of 
 gold and silver, the solution is returned to the circuit. The 
 gold- and-silver-bearing steel wool is melted, and the im- 
 purities are removed. The remaining precious metals are 
 poured into bars and sold to dealers or Government agen- 
 cies. 
 
 The principal mining machines in use in 1982 are listed 
 below. 
 
 1 Chicago Pneumatic T650SS drill 
 
 1 Gardner-Denver Air Trac drill 
 
 2 Caterpillar 245 hydraulic shovels 
 2 Caterpillar 992B loaders 
 
 4 Wabco 50 haul trucks 
 
 2 Wabco 50B haul trucks 
 
 1 Caterpillar D9H tractor-dozer 
 
 1 Caterpillar D8H tractor-dozer 
 
 1 Caterpillar 16G grader 
 
 1 Wabco 555 grader 
 
 Six model 353 Peterbilt tractor and end-dump trailer 
 units haul crushed ore approximately 9 miles from the 
 crusher at the mine to the leach pads near the mill. A Cater- 
 pillar D6C dozer is used to construct the leach heaps. Two 
 Fiat-Allis 945 B loaders feed the crushing plant and load 
 crushed ore into the ore trailers. (A contractor supplements 
 the mine's crushed ore hauling capability with five Ken- 
 worth tractor and bottom-dump trailer units.) 
 
 Although production began in May 1981, the operation 
 was still considered to be in the development phase, and 
 thus 1982 was the first full year of operation. In 1982, this 
 single mine of company W moved approximately 2.203 
 million mt of overburden and other waste and 0.743 million 
 mt of ore. 
 
 The organization of company W at the beginning of 
 1982 is shown in figure 4. During 1981, the average number 
 of employees was 63; yearend strength was 101. In 1982, 
 the average was 1 13 and the total varied from 102 to more 
 than 120. There is no union. Organizing efforts in 1981 
 resulted in a National Labor Relations Board election, but 
 the union was rejected by a margin of more than 2 to 1. 
 
 
 Resident 
 manager 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 J 
 
 
 Engineering 
 
 and 
 surveying 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Administrative 
 superintendent 
 
 
 Mine 
 superintendent 
 
 
 Maintenance 
 superintendent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Office 
 manager 
 
 
 
 Shift 
 foreman 
 
 
 Shift 
 foreman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Night 
 watchman 
 
 
 
 Shift 
 foreman 
 
 
 Shift 
 foreman 
 
 
 
 
 Assay 
 
 laboratory 
 
 foreman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Shift 
 foreman 
 
 ADR plant 
 foreman 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chief 
 electrician 
 
 
 
 Crusher 
 foreman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Purchasing 
 
 and 
 warehousing 
 
 
 
 FIGURE 4.— Company W organization, beginning of 1982. 
 (ADR— adsorption, desorption and refining.) 
 
 Nearly 65 pet of the company W's employees are in the 
 Mine and Maintenance Departments. (In mid-1982, follow- 
 ing the resignation of the maintenance superintendent, the 
 Maintenance Department became a responsibility of the 
 Mine Department. The company's production operations are 
 shown in figure 5. 
 
 THE PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS 
 
 The nature of the agreements with the managers who 
 allowed their mines to be evaluation sites has a bearing on 
 the validity of the data obtained. For that reason, the follow- 
 ing brief explanations of the agreements and how they were 
 reached are included here. The agreement conditions, as 
 listed at the end of this section, also constitute a description 
 of the model program implementation procedure (which is 
 discussed in detail in the next section.) 
 
 The research team had some knowledge of company E 
 from two earlier research projects in which company E's 
 parent company had a role. The safety and training 
 manager of the parent company is an unusually far-sighted 
 safety official who gives a lot of attention to new ideas, 
 methods, and equipment intended to improve productivity 
 and safety. When he heard about the model health and safe- 
 ty program research, he asked for additional information. 
 He then expressed his interest in it and invited the research 
 team to make a presentation on the subject to the top 
 
13 
 
 Mine 
 engineering 
 and surveying 
 
 Blast hole 
 drilling 
 
 Topsoil 
 loading 
 
 Topsoil 
 hauling 
 
 Topsoil 
 
 dump 
 
 maintenance 
 
 Blasting 
 
 I3Z 
 
 Reclamation 
 1 
 
 Loading 
 
 _^ Waste 
 hauling 
 
 Dump 
 maintenance 
 
 Ore 
 hauling 
 
 I 
 
 KEY 
 I Mine department function 
 
 Crusher 
 loading 
 
 I Maintenance department function 
 
 Crushing 
 
 i Assay I 
 J laboratory j 
 i I 
 
 Ore 
 loading 
 
 Product 
 shipping 
 
 Ore 
 hauling 
 
 I Recovery | 
 
 Leach pad 
 maintenance 
 
 -»j plant j- 
 I operations I 
 
 i 1 
 
 I I 
 
 >i Leaching l_ 
 
 I ' 
 
 1 
 ter n 
 
 J 
 
 Water reuse 
 
 i i p 
 
 FIGURE 5.— Production operations of company W. 
 
 manager of company E. That presentation was made early 
 in 1981, before the model program was defined. The 
 Bureau's objectives were reviewed, and work progress up to 
 that time was discussed. The top manager (the general 
 manager) spoke favorably about the research objectives and 
 agreed to participate in the study. Work at company E 
 began on November 9, 1982, with a safety and health audit 
 of company E's four mines and a job performance sampling. 
 Company W was known to the research team through 
 some work done for its parent company in February 1981. 
 At that time, company W was just completing construction 
 of its facilities, procuring its equipment, and hiring its initial 
 production work force. Its one mine was in the development 
 phase. In August 1981, the researchers approached the 
 manager of safety of company W's parent company. He was 
 informed of the model program and requested to consider 
 company W as an evaluation site. He expressed much in- 
 terest and arranged for the researchers to meet with the 
 mine manager and his three subordinate managers, the ad- 
 ministrative superintendent, the mine superintendent, and 
 the maintenance superintendent. (Company W had no safe- 
 ty official and has no plans to have one in the near future.) 
 
 These managers expressed willingness to participate in the 
 study, and by December a written model program tailored 
 to company W's circumstances and needs had been 
 developed. 
 
 The agreements with companies E and W had the same 
 basic conditions: 
 
 1. The top company manager (at the mine or mines) 
 stated that he fully understood the fundamental conditions 
 on which the model program was based. He accepted the 
 program as conceptually sound and agreed to put the pro- 
 gram into effect in his company. 
 
 2. The researchers agreed to complete an initial health 
 and safety audit of the company's operations and, from the 
 information obtained, to define a model program tailored to 
 the company's circumstances and needs. It was agreed that 
 the model program would contain specific recommendations 
 for management action. 
 
 3. The top company manager agreed to consider each 
 recommendation carefully and advise the researchers of his 
 decision regarding acceptance. If the decision was to not ac- 
 cept a recommendation, he would inform the researchers of 
 the reason so they could record the information for use in 
 the final evaluation of the program. 
 
 4. The researchers agreed to assist the manager in im- 
 plementing the model program by: (a) training subordinate 
 managers, supervisors, and foremen in loss-control fun- 
 damentals using an 8-h course created specifically to 
 prepare supervisory people for implementation of model 
 program concepts; (b) providing 8 h of training to super- 
 visors and workers selected by the top manager in the use of 
 an accident investigation methodology recently developed 
 by the Bureau; (c) furnishing available materials for training 
 mobile equipment operators and assisting in course develop- 
 ment, to improve the company's task training; (d) providing 
 health and safety technical literature and other information 
 related to the company's loss-control problems and fur- 
 nishing advisory service and administrative assistance as 
 desired by the manager, within the scope of the model pro- 
 gram; (e) visiting the company's operations once a month for 
 a calendar year, or longer, to assist in program implementa- 
 tion and obtain evaluation data (and the manager agreed to 
 permit the researchers unrestricted access to all elements of 
 the operation for observation and to all available informa- 
 tion related to occupational injuries, illnesses, accidents, 
 near misses, and incidents of any other kind that produce 
 loss, that is, unplanned cost; (f) providing the company 
 management periodically with an oral report on observa- 
 tions made, additional management actions recommended, 
 and countermeasure options suggested for consideration, 
 and; (g) at the end of the evaluation period, presenting an 
 oral report covering all of the model program research at 
 the company's operations. 
 
 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODEL PROGRAM 
 
 This section describes how the model program im- 
 plementation activities were accomplished at the two 
 cooperating mines. The implementation procedure, which 
 
 had been worked out during the definition of the model pro- 
 gram, was designed to be the same at company E and com- 
 pany W. It had several definite, sequential steps. These 
 
14 
 
 were outlined in the previous section ("The Participation 
 Agreements") and are further discussed in the paragraphs 
 below. 
 
 Step 1 
 
 The top manager has accepted the concepts on which 
 the model program is based. The first step is to prepare for 
 the top manager the information that may be needed to im- 
 plement the program at his or her operation. This will be 
 done in two ways. First, there will be a safety and health 
 audit of the operation. This audit will not necessarily be 
 comprehensive in every area but it will be sufficiently com- 
 plete to provide the manager with recommended actions of 
 significance in relation to each of the five previously de- 
 scribed fundamental conditions. Pictures to illustrate the 
 discussion of each recommendation should be used 
 whenever possible. The audit report format will be the 
 model health and safety program, tailored to address the 
 specific needs of each operation. Second, there will be an ini- 
 tial job performance sampling at the operation. A sample of 
 60 to 70 jobs, chosen through a random selection process, 
 without replacement, will be observed for periods of 10 to 20 
 min each (depending on the nature of the job). Deficiencies 
 in three categories will be recorded in order to calculate the 
 proportion of the sample in which each category of deficien- 
 cies exists. The sample proportions will be used as the 
 estimators for the corresponding proportions of all jobs 
 done by the work force. 
 
 The first proportion :P A ) will deal with deficiencies the 
 worker could correct without assistance from his employer 
 or from fellow employees. Some examples of these "type A" 
 deficiencies are failure to wear safety shoes, safety hat, or 
 safety glasses or goggles (as required by the specific work); 
 failure to maintain good housekeeping in work area; and 
 loss or damage to property through deliberate actions or 
 carelessness. 
 
 The second proportion (P B ) will deal with deficiencies 
 that cannot be corrected by the worker alone. Some ex- 
 amples of the "type B" deficiencies are incorrectly installed 
 seat safety belt, inappropriate tools provided for assigned 
 tasks, and reported machine defects not corrected. 
 
 The third proportion (P c ) will deal with environmental, 
 procedural, mining plan, and other general deficiencies 
 which affect several jobs and require management policy ac- 
 tion for correction. Examples of the "type C" deficiency are 
 failure to maintain prescribed airflow at the face, poor queu- 
 ing procedures at a loading point, and failure to maintain 
 necessary area lighting at dump points or congested areas. 
 
 From the three sample proportions, a fourth propor- 
 tion, P T , will be calculated. P T is the proportion of jobs in the 
 sample in which at least one of the three types of deficiences 
 could be observed. A mathematical definition of the four 
 proportions is 
 
 Pa = 
 
 Pb = 
 Pc- 
 
 P T = 
 
 n 
 
 n b 
 n 
 
 n 
 
 "(a »r b or c) 
 
 n 
 
 where n = sample size 
 
 and n x = number of jobs with type x deficiency, where 
 x = a, b, or c (corresponding to A, B, and C). 
 
 Step 2 
 
 The next step is to give the tailored-program report and 
 the job performance sampling results to the top manager 
 and discuss them with him or her. The top manager will be 
 asked to state his or her decision about each recommenda- 
 tion and, for those accepted, to indicate a priority in terms 
 of time to complete the action. The decisions and times to 
 complete each action will be recorded. The top manager will 
 be asked to consider the tailored program as (1) a plan for 
 implementation, to which additions will be made from time 
 to time, and (2) a record of recommendations and decisions 
 made, which the research team will review periodically for 
 program evaluation purposes. 
 
 The manager will be asked to explain his or her reasons 
 for any decision not to accept a recommendation so that this 
 information can be recorded for program evaluation pur- 
 poses. A point value will be assigned to each accepted 
 recommendation (100, 50, or 25). Based on observations of 
 the operation, the research team will periodically assign 
 points indicating the degree to which each recommended 
 change has been made. The top manager will not be in- 
 formed of the "point system" unless he or she asks specifical- 
 ly how the evaluation is to be done. In that case, he or she 
 will be given an accurate explanation, but the points assign- 
 ed to each recommended aetion will not be revealed unless 
 the manager insists. It is very important for the manager to 
 understand that the evaluation methods employed are to 
 evaluate the program, not the top manager. (Neither of the 
 top managers of the two cooperating companies, nor any of 
 the subordinate managers, asked about the evaluation 
 details; no mention was made of the evaluation methods or 
 results until the final oral report.) 
 
 Step 3 
 
 The research team will provide the training and other 
 assistance desired by the top manager, as reflected by his or 
 her decisions about the tailored program, or as specifically 
 requested. However, it is very important that all assistance 
 provided be in terms of showing people how to do things, not 
 doing things for them. 
 
 There are certain elements of the researchers' im- 
 plementing assistance that are of special significance. 
 Perhaps the most important of these is the management 
 training. It is through this training that the concepts on 
 which the model program is based will be explained to the 
 people who must understand them if the program is to be 
 acceptable and effective. 
 
 The management training was delivered in four 2-h ses- 
 sions and addressed the 15 topics listed below. 
 
 1. Types of losses in mining. Why some of them are not 
 "counted" and do not receive management attention. 
 
 2. The functions and responsibilities of management. 
 How the functions of planning, organizing, staffing, direc- 
 tion, control, innovation, and representation relate to health 
 and safety management. 
 
 3. Workmen's compensation and disability costs. How 
 they can be controlled. The "experience modifier" used for 
 rate setting. Self-insurer's cost control. 
 
 4. Employee motivation through creating a desirable 
 work situation. Maslow's (18) hierarchy of needs. Positive 
 supervisory action. 
 
 5. Heinrich's (19) "accident pyramid" and how it relates 
 to today's mining industry. The need to examine noninjury 
 
15 
 
 accidents and near misses to determine "preaccident" cor- 
 rective actions. The near miss as a "harbinger of things to 
 come." 
 
 6. Definition of "accident" as any event that produces 
 unplanned cost or loss. Procedures for reporting all ac- 
 cidents and analyses of related events in a fact-finding, 
 rather than fault-finding mode. Accepting the concept that 
 every accident represents some failure in management of 
 the production system. 
 
 7. The futility -and risk -of reliance on common sense. 
 The need to define in writing all of management's expecta- 
 tion for each job, and to train and supervise accordingly. 
 
 8. Who are the "loss producers"? How are they iden- 
 tified? What should be done about them? Typically, about 
 one-third of the accidents involve only about 5 pet of the 
 workers. Aside from their accident experience, what other 
 factors characterize the 5 pet? 
 
 9. The myth that the majority of accidental injuries 
 result from "unsafe acts." The need to reduce or remove 
 hazards in the workplace. Some practical, inexpensive 
 hazard reduction examples. 
 
 10. The cost of accidents in company sales terms. How 
 much more product does your company have to sell to pay 
 for a "$500 accident," if the planned profit on operations is 
 to be maintained? Examples to show, for example, "how 
 many extra ore (coal) trucks have to come down the moun- 
 tain." 
 
 11. Evaluating potential countermeasures on the basis 
 of their return on investment (ROI). The logic of investing 
 so long as the ROI exceeds the cost of capital. 
 Countermeasures against accidents, injuries, and inefficient 
 job performance due to poor job design. 
 
 12. Analyzing a training problem, using the Mager 
 method of identifying the actual need. How to train for the 
 best results at lower cost. A second look at "task {raining." 
 
 13. Absenteeism and its effects. What the supervisor 
 can do to reduce absenteeism. "Short crew" operating pro- 
 cedures to improve safety and health. 
 
 14. The importance of the workers' perception of 
 management's interest in their safety and health, and in loss 
 control generally. How management people, from super- 
 visors to the top manager, must demonstrate their interest, 
 concern, and commitment. 
 
 15. Some examples of accidents and near misses, each 
 having many contributing factors. What are the production 
 system management failures? What are the 
 countermeasures? Many countermeasures do not require 
 additional investment. 
 
 Because topics 10 and 11 may not be clear from infor- 
 mation in earlier sections of this report, the following brief 
 discussion explains them further. Assume that for a certain 
 workplace task there exists a relatively high probability, P^ 
 of an accident, as evident from the history of accidents over 
 a period of a couple of years. No countermeasure actions 
 have been taken except to explain the accidents to the 
 workers and to tell them to "exercise care." Then several 
 changes are made: Better procedures for doing the task are 
 developed, thorough training is given, and closer supervi- 
 sion is provided. 
 
 Typically, each of the first few countermeasure actions 
 (assuming that they are properly planned and implemented) 
 will produce a substantial reduction in the probability of an 
 accident -and at relatively low cost. The return on the 
 countermeasure investment will be readily apparent. The 
 accident probability is reduced to P 2 . However, as other 
 countermeasures are applied, the reduction in accident 
 
 probability may be less and the cost of each countermeasure 
 may be relatively greater (unless there is a substantial 
 technological change in the process design and the character 
 of the task in question is changed very substantially). The 
 actual value of additional countermeasures may not be evi- 
 dent unless a careful analysis is done. Without such 
 analysis, an organization may invest in countermeasures 
 that produce very little accident probability reduction 
 benefit. In other words, P 2 should have become an accepted 
 level of risk. Conversely, without analysis, the organization 
 might not invest in countermeasures that would produce a 
 return significantly greater than the cost. Analyses of 
 countermeasure actions should not consider one hazard 
 alone, but simultaneously all of those extant which are "com- 
 peting" for countermeasure investment. All organizations 
 have some degree of capital rationing. The logic of "oppor- 
 tunity cost" should be applied in countermeasure action 
 analyses. That is, the choice of a given countermeasure in- 
 vestment must include consideration of other foregone 
 countermeasure investment opportunities that would have 
 yielded a return greater than the cost of capital. 
 
 A very simple illustration of one of the several uses of 
 the expectation model as a tool for analysis follows. Table 1, 
 a tabulation of National Safety Council data (20), shows the 
 amount of sales in various industries necessary to produce 
 $500 of pretax profit. For the purpose of illustration, 
 assume that a given mine's required sales are somewhere 
 between the amounts shown for "metal mining," $3,335, and 
 "Stone, clay products," $10,870, perhaps $5,000, the amount 
 for "Quarrying mining." Thus, to pay for $45 in unplanned 
 cost (accidental loss), $450 in additional sales will be needed 
 to maintain the planned profit from operations. What may 
 seem to be small risks may actually be quite large in overall 
 profitability terms. To continue the illustration, assume the 
 following: 
 
 1. It is estimated that, in a year of operation, there is 1 
 chance in 20 that a particular accident will occur, based on 
 accident history over several years. 
 
 2. If the accident should occur one or more times, the 
 minimum cost (or loss) will be about $5,000. 
 
 3. It is estimated that an expenditure of $200 for a 
 given countermeasure would reduce the probability of oc- 
 currence of the accident in a year from 1 chance in 20 to 1 in 
 1,000. Actually, supervisors estimate that the 
 countermeasure will reduce the probability to zero, but 
 0.001 is taken to be the lowest probability allowed in the 
 analysis. 
 
 A simplified expected value calculation is shown in table 
 2. Two alternative actions are considered. Action Ai is to 
 take no countermeasure action. The expectation, E(A,), is 
 that this course of action, give the 0.05 probability of an ac- 
 cident, will cost $250 each year. Action A 2 is to install a 
 countermeasure for $200, and thereby greatly reduce the 
 probability that the accident will occur (to 0.001). If that 
 course of action is taken, the expectation, E(A 2 ), is that ac- 
 tion A 2 will cost $250 per year, or $45 less than action A,. 
 Again, the $45 represents $450 in sales. 
 
 Suppose that, to go further with the illustration, MSHA 
 issues a citation and imposes an assessment of $ 1 00 because 
 there is no corrective action for a hazard as required by a 30 
 CFR standard. For one year at least (the penalty could be 
 increased if the corrective action is not taken), the estimated 
 net cost increases to $5,100 if there is an accident and $100 
 if there isn't. (See table 2.) The expectation for Ai becomes 
 $350, and the difference between E(Ai) and E(A 2 ) becomes 
 
16 
 
 TABLE 1.— Sales needed to offset accident cost 1 
 
 (Sales necessary to produce $500 profit, by industrial group) 
 
 Sales 
 
 Industry needed 
 
 Aerospace $16,665 
 
 Air transport 16,655 
 
 Amusements 7,81 5 
 
 Autos, trucks 11 ,365 
 
 Automotive parts 11 ,905 
 
 Baking 17,855 
 
 Brewing 10,870 
 
 Building, heating, plumbing equipment 12,195 
 
 Cement 9,260 
 
 Chemical products 7,575 
 
 Clothing, apparel 13,515 
 
 Common carrier trucking 13,890 
 
 Construction 11,630 
 
 Dairy products 16,130 
 
 Department, specialty stores 16,130 
 
 Distilling 9,805 
 
 Drugs, medicines 5,050 
 
 Electrical equipment, electronics 10,205 
 
 Electric power, gas 5,050 
 
 Farm, construction-materials handling equipment 8,195 
 
 Food chains 50,000 
 
 Food products 12,195 
 
 Furniture, fixtures 13,515 
 
 Glass products 7,935 
 
 Hardware, tools 9,615 
 
 Household appliances 10,640 
 
 Instruments, photo goods 6,755 
 
 Iron, steel 14,285 
 
 Lumber, wood products 8,185 
 
 Machinery 9,435 
 
 Mail order business 10,870 
 
 Meat packing 33,335 
 
 Metal mining 3,335 
 
 Metal products 13,160 
 
 Nonferrous metals 10,635 
 
 Office equipment, computers 5,495 
 
 Paint, allied products 20,000 
 
 Paper, allied products 8,335 
 
 Petroleum products, refining 9,615 
 
 Printing, publishing 8,065 
 
 Quarrying, mining 5,000 
 
 Railroads 33,335 
 
 Restaurants, hotels 11,365 
 
 Rubber, allied products 20,835 
 
 Shoes, leather goods 12,820 
 
 Soap, cosmetics 7,245 
 
 Soft drinks 7,145 
 
 Stone, clay products 10,870 
 
 Sugar 17,855 
 
 Telephone, telegraph 4,715 
 
 Textile products 17,855 
 
 Tobacco products 9,615 
 
 Variety store chains 16,665 
 
 Wholesale houses 20,000 
 
 'Dollar value of goods and services required to produce $500 pretax 
 profit. Profit margins are the most recent published by Citibank of New 
 York for leading corporations reporting sales or gross income figures. 
 
 Source: National Safety Council. 
 
 TABLE 2.— Simplified expected value calculation 
 
 Eventuality Probability of Annual net cost 
 
 occurrence Normal With penalty 
 
 Action A, (no corrective 
 action): 
 
 Accidents occur 0.05 $5,000 $5,100 
 
 No accidents occur .95 100 
 
 E(A,)' NAp 250 350 
 
 Action A, (corrective action): 
 
 Accidents occur .001 5,200 NAp 
 
 No accidents occur .999 200 NAp 
 
 E(A,)' NAp 205 NAp 
 
 NAp Not applicable. 
 
 'Expectation, E(A) = (Probability ol occurrence) (annual net cost) tor situation 
 where accidents occur plus (probability ot occurrence) (annual net cost) tor situa- 
 tion where no accidents occur. 
 
 $145, or $1,450 in sales. Generally, the cost of an MSHA 
 assessment is but a fraction of the cost of an accident. This 
 is often true even if the internal costs of discussing, 
 disputing, and protesting an assessment are added, 
 although these kinds of internal costs may subtantially in- 
 crease E(Ai). 
 
 The research team also provided training in accident in- 
 vestigation methods. Further information about this train- 
 ing can be found in the final report for a prior Bureau con- 
 tract (17). 
 
 MINING COMPANY E 
 
 Work to implement the model program at Company E 
 began in November 1981 with (1) a health and safety audit 
 that would later be the basis for the tailored program and (2) 
 the initial job performance sampling. The job performance 
 sampling produced the following results: 
 
 P A = 0.676. The most frequent deficiency was failure to 
 wear prescribed personal protection equip- 
 ment, especially safety hats. Several super- 
 visors were among those who did not wear 
 safety hats. Many haul trucks had 
 unauthorized reading material and other 
 "extraneous materials" in the cab, in viola- 
 tion of 30 CFR 77.1607(d). 
 
 P B = 0.284. The most frequently deficiency was the 
 absence of or incorrect installation of seat 
 safety belts in mobile machines. 
 
 P c = 0.257. The most frequent deficiency was very poor 
 area housekeeping. There were inadequate 
 berms along some haul roads. 
 
 P T = 0.743. Of the jobs sampled, 74.3 pet were being 
 performed with one or more of the three 
 types of deficiency. 
 
 In March, the top manager notified the research team 
 that all the recommendations contained in the tailored 
 model had been accepted and that implementation of the 
 program was to be coordinated by the company's safety of- 
 ficer. 
 
 In April, the top manager was discharged for reasons that 
 had nothing directly to do with the model program. The new 
 top manager was a mining engineer with several years of 
 experience as the mine manager at a large underground 
 coal mine in a nearby State. The pace of the model program 
 implementation increased immediately following his ar- 
 rival -especially the training and workplace hazard removal 
 activity. He set an excellent example for other supervisors 
 and workers. However, progress in a few areas was slow, 
 particularly in the use of personal protection equipment. 
 The reason had to do primarily with the top manager's 
 desire to avoid actions that might cause "labor trouble" at 
 company E. The manager said he agreed with the model 
 program recommendations and intended to put them into 
 effect, but he preferred to do so with the full ap- 
 proval - perhaps even at the initiative - of the union local of- 
 ficials and some of the senior supervisors who were 
 forecasting "trouble" if changes were made too rapidly. This 
 process would "take some time," he said. He was correct. 
 Some of the personal protection equipment rules would not 
 have become effective as soon as they did had the parent 
 company (new owner) not ordered them at all of its proper- 
 ties. To demonstrate the parent company's commitment 
 
17 
 
 persuasively, two vice-president-level officials visited Com- 
 pany E several times and during each visit made clear to 
 managers and workers that safety and health were matters 
 of great concern and high priority. By the time this hap- 
 pened, the new top manager of Company E had, through 
 discussion, example, and considerate suggestion, developed 
 an atmosphere of acceptance and cooperation. 
 
 The implementation assistance provided by the research 
 team included training nearly every month through January 
 1983. The courses for managers were given to groups of 
 three to eight, usually for 4 h during one month and 4 h dur- 
 ing the next. Thirty-one managers completed the "Introduc- 
 tion to Loss Control Management" course, and 32 com- 
 pleted the "Accident Investigation Methods" course. Other 
 implementation assistance by the researchers included - 
 
 Assisting the safety official (designated "Safety and 
 Loss Control Foreman" in April 1982) in setting up an im- 
 proved accident reporting and records system. 
 
 Acquiring sets of climbing lines (webbing with 
 carabiners on each end) for use by persons who must climb 
 drill masts and demonstrating the use of the equipment to 
 the safety and loss control foreman, drill foreman, surface 
 superintendent, and drill workers. 
 
 Assisting the safety and loss control foreman and 
 maintenance superintendent in acquiring expanded metal 
 ladder treads, and constructing from them and used con- 
 veyor belting lower suspended steps (two or three steps) for 
 haul truck ladders and ladders of other large surface 
 machines; and setting up evaluation of the step units with 
 driver participation. 
 
 Assisting the safety and loss control foreman to plan, 
 prepare, and narrate two audio-visual hazard training pro- 
 grams, one for surface mine visitors and new employees and 
 one for underground mine visitors and new employees. 
 
 Coaching selected shift foremen and the safety and loss 
 control foreman through approximately 20 accident and 
 near miss investigations, using the method taught in the ac- 
 cident investigation course. 
 
 Instructing the safety and loss control foreman and 
 three other people in operation of the Terex 33-1 1C (85-mt) 
 haul truck, using training materials and simulator equip- 
 ment developed under a prior Bureau contract (21); and 
 coaching these people in the use of the materials and the 
 simulator to train others. 
 
 Assisting underground mine superintendents in plan- 
 ning and implementing "absentee controls." 
 
 Providing for trial by roof bolter machine operators a 
 new type of safety glasses which provides better eye protec- 
 tion with less interference with, or distortion of, vision. 
 
 Coaching the safety and loss control foreman and two 
 other persons in use of the job performance sampling 
 method used for evaluation (following a company decision to 
 use the method in the regular monthly mine inspections). 
 
 Providing the safety and loss control foreman with a 
 large number (30 or more) of technical references to answer 
 questions he asked and provide authoritative sources of in- 
 formation for training materials he prepared. 
 
 Discussing with superintendents; shift, section, and job 
 foremen; the wash plant foreman; the tipple foreman; and 
 the "deadwork" foremen problems in training, supervision, 
 and hazard removal, and other loss-control areas they iden- 
 tified and asked to discuss. 
 
 Assisting, as requested, in completing actions necessary 
 to implement the recommendations in the tailored program. 
 
 Appendix A of this report contains some excerpts from 
 the tailored program document for mining company E, 
 
 which was based on the health and safety audit of November 
 1981. The excerpts will enable the reader to see the form 
 and content of typical recommendations. The management 
 decision and priority (which in the case of company E, was 
 usually set by the safety and loss control foreman) are given. 
 The points assigned by the research team are also listed, 
 although, as mentioned earlier, these were not known to 
 management. 
 
 MINING COMPANY W 
 
 The health and safety audit for company W, the basis 
 for the tailored program, was performed in October 1981. 
 The initial job performance sampling was also done at that 
 time. Sixty-six jobs were included in the sample. The results 
 were as follows: 
 
 P A = 0.818. The most frequent deficiences were failures 
 to wear safety hats, safety shoes, and other 
 prescribed personal protection equipment; 
 and poor housekeeping in mobile machine 
 cabs. 
 
 P B = 0.409. The most frequent deficiencies were lack of 
 seat safety belts in mobile machines, in- 
 operative backup alarms, and inadequate 
 hearing protection in high-noise areas 
 (crushing plant). 
 
 P c = 0.591. The most frequent deficiencies were poor 
 area housekeeping and assignment of inap- 
 propriate machines to some tasks. 
 
 P T = 0.864. Of the jobs sampled, 86.4 pet were affected 
 by one or more of the three types of job per- 
 formance deficiences. 
 
 The safety and health audit, the "tailored program," and the 
 job sampling results were discussed with the top manager 
 (resident manager) in December. He accepted the majority 
 of the recommendations for implementation and requested 
 that the courses in loss control management and accident in- 
 vestigation methods begin immediately. 
 
 The manager preferred that each course be limited to 2 
 h per month. Thus, 4 months passed before the manage- 
 ment course was completed by the resident manager and 
 the other five managers (superintendents and mine shift 
 foremen). The accident investigation course was completed 
 by nine people: the resident manager, the three 
 superintendents, and five workers (elected from the five 
 major work groups to serve as members of a labor- 
 management committee). 
 
 The pace of the initial implementation work was aided 
 by two fortuitous events not anticipated by the research 
 team. These events were fortuitous in that they noticeably 
 increased management's interest in, and concern about, the 
 consequences of safety and health deficiencies. The first of 
 the events was a safety inspection by company W's parent 
 company safety staff. It reported 70 deficiencies, both large 
 and small. The report came "through channels," with direc- 
 tives for action, many of which were the same ones recom- 
 mended in the researchers' tailored model. The second event 
 was that an MSHA mine inspector gave advisory com- 
 pliance notices to management concerning many of the defi- 
 ciencies that were also in the parent company's report and 
 the model program recommendations, and some which were 
 not. His work was especially helpful in calling attention to 
 some air contamination problems in the mill. He was very 
 
18 
 
 helpful, and also very firm, in his recommendations to com- 
 pany management. 
 
 There was no safety position (this is, no safety official) 
 at company W and no intention to create one. Thus, unlike 
 company E, where much of the research team's implementa- 
 tion assistance came from the safety official, implementa- 
 tion at company W was directed primarily by the three 
 superintendents. (See figure 4). In addition to conditions ad- 
 dressed in the specific recommendations of the tailored pro- 
 gram (excerpts from which are given in appendix B), there 
 were several unsafe conditions in the operations for which 
 each superintendent was responsible. Some of these were 
 identified in the MSHA and parent company reports. Some 
 were not. The research team believed it would be ap- 
 propriate to address all unsafe conditions aggressively as 
 part of management training. This belief was strengthened 
 by the defensive reactions of two of the three supervisors 
 during some "walkarounds" to point out the hazards. Some 
 of the common reaction were as follows: 
 
 "No one has ever been hurt." 
 
 "If a worker gets hurt, it'll be caused by human error." 
 
 "It hasn't been cited by MSHA." 
 
 The general approach used to "coach" the managers 
 through eliminating or reducing unsafe conditions is in- 
 dicated in figure 6. The two actions shown closest to the box 
 labeled "Unsafe conditions" in figure 6 could be taken im- 
 mediately. Usually the needed personal protection equip- 
 ment was on the property or could be obtained within a day 
 to two. Closer supervision usually amounted to instructing 
 foremen about the hazard and precautions that could be 
 taken, in addition to requiring use of personal protection 
 
 equipment. Prohibiting a worker from doing a task alone 
 was a frequent countermeasure. Establishing sound work 
 procedures is best accomplished through participation of 
 workers as well as supervisors, and reference to industrial 
 standards and practice documents. As indicated in figure 6, 
 employees must be trained in the new procedures. 
 Establishing procedures takes time, typically 2 to 4 weeks. 
 Removing unsafe conditions is the most effective way to 
 reduce risk, but may require the most time to complete and 
 some additional investment. Suggestions from workers who 
 perform the task are often of great value in defining alter- 
 natives. Removing the unsafe condition must be the 
 management goal; however attaining that goal is not always 
 possible. On the other hand, it is often possible to ac- 
 complish this goal with surprising ease, once management 
 reluctance to take action has been overcome. This is the 
 principal lesson of the special training for the 
 superintendents. 
 
 A second area that required special training emphasis at 
 company W was compliance with 30 CFR 50. It is not 30 
 CFR 50 recording and reporting per se that is important, 
 but the entire subject of accurate accident, injury, and near- 
 miss records. It was found at the beginning of the model 
 program that not one of the superintendents or foremen 
 understood the 30 CFR 50 requirements accurately. As at 
 the majority of the mines visited during the background 
 research, the decision about what to report on the MSHA 
 form 7000-1 (mine accident, injury, and illness report) was 
 left to a clerical person who did not understand the 30 CFR 
 50 requirements either. Furthermore, the clerk could report 
 to MSHA only what was recorded by the supervisors, that is 
 to say, very little. The research team's first training attempt 
 produced very unimpressive results. When tested, the 
 
 Personal 
 
 protection for 
 
 worker 
 
 ?t. 
 
 conditions 
 
 Remove by process 
 or task redesign 
 
 Sound work procedures 
 and thorough training 
 on those procedures 
 
 Close, careful 
 supervision 
 
 
 FIGURE 6.— Approach used to reduce unsafe conditions. 
 
19 
 
 supervisor's understanding of 30 CFR 50 was shown to be 
 very little better after the training than before. It was clear 
 that the training method needed improvement. The problem 
 of getting people to understand the rules was discussed one 
 day with some MSHA mine inspectors. One of them has a 
 "flow diagram" that depicted the rules for investigating and 
 reporting injuries (but not accidents). The research team 
 took his idea and expanded it to create a guide. The guide 
 and about 30 "example cases" were used in subsequent 
 training with good results at company W. (Similar results 
 were produced with the same training later at company E). 
 Other implementation assistance activities of the 
 research team at company W included - 
 
 Obtaining technical information from MSHA and instru- 
 ment manufacturers about methods of sampling the plant 
 air for mercury vapor content. 
 
 Assisting the maintenance superintendent in evaluate- 
 ing several types of available jib and gantry cranes for use in 
 a maintenance shop bay that had no bridge crane installed. 
 (The shop was using a front-end loader or a forklift truck to 
 lift engines and transmissions out of machines in a manner 
 that was both hazardous and expensive.) 
 
 Acquiring for the mine superintendent a copy of a 
 Power Shovel and Crane Association manual titled 
 "Hydraulic Excavators and Telescoping Boom Cranes" and 
 assisting him in instructing workers who would become 
 authorized operators of two truck-mounted cranes. 
 
 Making copies of 29 CFR 1910.184, which deals with 
 slings on truck-mounted cranes for the maintenance 
 superintendent; giving instruction and conducting 
 demonstrations for selected mechanics on the correct ways 
 to rig loads for crane lifts, based on the 29 CFR 1910 stand- 
 ards. 
 
 Preparing, at the request of the mine superintendent, a 
 reference book containing the manufacturers' operating 
 manuals for every type of mobile machine used at the mine. 
 (There had been no operating manuals at the mine.) 
 
 Preparing a haul truck operator training guide for in- 
 structors who trained new employees on Wabco 50 and 50B 
 trucks. 
 
 Preparing a hazard training program, using slides and 
 audio tape, for visitor and employment applicants. 
 
 Arranging for training films to be loaned to company W 
 for showing at safety meetings. 
 
 Contacting another mine (a mercury mine), at the sug- 
 gestion of MSHA, to obtain for company W some user's ex- 
 perience information regarding air monitoring instrumenta- 
 tion. 
 
 Providing a copy of a slide and audio tape training pro- 
 gram on preshift inspection of off-highway diesel trucks 
 developed under a prior Bureau contract (22). 
 
 Preparing, for the drilling and blasting foreman, a task 
 training guide for new employees assigned to drill or 
 blasting crews (based on 30 CFR 55 standards; U.S. Army 
 Corps of Engineers general safety requirements as listed in 
 section 25 of reference 23; and the "Excavation Handbook," 
 by Horace K. Church (24)). 
 
 Participating in the monthly meetings of the 
 management-employee committee (at the invitation of the 
 resident manager). 
 
 Conferring with individual workers, as requested by the 
 resident manager or a superintendent, to encourage their 
 acceptance of new safety rules (for example about using 
 safety seat belts in bulldozers, about dust masks and ear 
 protection in the crushing facility, or about forced ventila- 
 tion in confined areas when welding). 
 
 FIELD EVALUATION OF THE MODEL PROGRAM 
 
 This section discusses the field evaluation, the final 
 research task in this project. Following the initial job perfor- 
 mance sampling at both of the participating mining com- 
 panies, the research team made some estimates about how 
 the companies compared to others in the mining industry 
 and the degree of improvement that could be attained 
 through implementation of the model program. The 
 estimates were based on trial experiences with the job per- 
 formance sampling technique and some subjective observa- 
 tions at 60 operations, including those visited during the 
 background research phase of this project. It was judged 
 that the 60 were a reasonably representative sample of the 
 industry, at least for the purpose of the desired estimates. 
 
 "Loss control management effectiveness" is used rather 
 than "health and safety management effectiveness" because 
 the sampling nearly always included some things usually not 
 considered to be health and safety matters. Loss control 
 management effectiveness is inversely proportional to the 
 amount of loss risk tolerated in an operation. The samples 
 taken in the 60 operations suggest that if mining operations 
 were placed in an array according to degree of loss risk ac- 
 ceptance and the distribution plotted, the resulting graph 
 would be approximately a normal distribution with large 
 variance, that is, one with a characteristic shape like that 
 shown in figure 7. In figure 7 approximately 68 pet of all 
 operations in the distribution are included within ± 1 stan- 
 dard deviation (± la) from the mean, and 95.5 pet are within 
 
 ±2a. The various levels of risk may be defined as follows 
 (from right to left in the graph in figure 7): 
 
 "Very high loss risk": Operations judged to have an 
 overall loss risk that is more than 2a above the mean. Very 
 poor loss control management. Approximately 2.3 pet of all 
 operations will be in this group. 
 
 "Well above average loss risk": Operations judged to 
 have an overall loss risk that is more than la above the 
 mean, but less than 2a. Poor loss control management. Ap- 
 proximately 13.6 pet of all operations will be in this group. 
 
 "Above average loss risk": Operations with overall loss 
 risk above the mean, but less the la above it. Below average 
 
 Effective 
 
 loss 
 
 control 
 
 Ineffective 
 
 loss 
 
 control 
 
 FIGURE 7.— Distribution of loss control management effec- 
 tiveness. 
 
20 
 
 loss control management. Approximately 34.1 pet of all 
 operations will be in this group. 
 
 "Below average loss risk": Operations with overall loss 
 risk below the mean, but less than la below it. Above 
 average loss control management. Approximately 34.1 pet 
 of all operations will be in this group. 
 
 "Well below average loss risk": Operations with overall 
 loss risk more than la below the mean, but less than 2a 
 below it. Excellent loss control management. Approximate- 
 ly 13.6 pet of all operations will be in this group. 
 
 "Very low loss risk": Operations with overall loss risk 
 more than 2a below the mean. Outstanding loss control 
 management. Approximately 2.3 pet of all operations will be 
 in this group. 
 
 Figure 8 shows the estimated positions of companies E 
 and W in the distribution prior to model program implemen- 
 tation. The estimate was that their loss risk positions were 
 better than those of approximately 20 to 25 pet of the 
 mining operations. They had above average loss risk and 
 below average loss control management. 
 
 A realistic goal of 1 yr of serious implementation of the 
 model program, the research team estimated, would be to 
 improve loss control management so that a followup evalua- 
 tion made in the same way would put the companies in the 
 top 10 to 15 pet of the distribution. Their loss risk positions 
 would then be "well below average," indicating excellent loss 
 control management. The shaded area in figure 8 graph, to 
 the left of - la, indicates the region they would occupy in 
 the distribution. Another way of stating the same "goal" is 
 to say that the job performance sampling results would 
 show 
 
 and 
 
 The research team judged that a P T of 0.05 or less would 
 surely place a mine in the top 10 to 15 pet of the distribution 
 of loss control management effectiveness ratings. Not one 
 of the 60 operations at which the job performance sampling 
 technique was tried had a P T value as low as 0.05, but one of 
 them came close. The P T values corresponding to the 
 distribution "tail," beyond - la, were not at all clear. It may 
 be that a P T value of 0.05 corresponds to - 2a, that is, the 
 top 2.3 pet of operations in terms of loss control manage- 
 ment effectiveness. In any case, there seemed to be no 
 reason to think that a P T < 0.05 could not be achieved, pro- 
 vided that the model program was implemented effectively. 
 It was judged that "effective implementation" would be the 
 attainment of a total score of 80 pet or more of the points 
 assigned to the recommendations in the tailored program 
 accepted by management. 
 
 Effective 
 
 loss 
 
 control 
 
 Ineffective 
 
 loss 
 
 control 
 
 Pa 
 
 < 
 
 0.05, 
 
 Pb 
 
 < 
 
 .05, 
 
 Pc 
 
 < 
 
 .05, 
 
 Pt 
 
 < 
 
 .05. 
 
 -2<r / -lo- 
 
 H- 
 
 +l<r 
 
 +2<r 
 
 Low / 
 
 AVERAGE 
 
 
 High 
 
 1-yr goal 
 
 
 
 
 (both companies) 
 
 
 
 
 FIGURE 8.— Loss control effectiveness positions of com- 
 panies E and W. 
 
 As previously stated, none of the managers knew 
 anything about the evaluation method except that they were 
 told the values of the four proportions from the initial 
 sampling and the deficiencies that were observed. The 
 research team did not want the managers to concern 
 themselves with "scorekeeping," lest they get into a "contest 
 frame of mind." Had that happened, the fifth criterion for 
 the model (acceptability on its merit alone) probably could 
 not have been evaluated. 
 
 MINING COMPANY E 
 
 The iesults for the five job performance samples taken 
 at company E are given in table 3 and shown on the graph in 
 figure 9. Note that the high initial P T (0.743) was mostly due 
 to the high P A (0.676). Company E had poor employee per- 
 formance with respect to personal protection equipment, 
 partly because the local rules were merely restatements of 
 MSHA standards and partly because little had been done to 
 encourage compliance with the rules. The substantial 
 change in P A between March 1982 and January 1983 was 
 due primarily to improved workplace housekeeping; 
 machine operators keeping cabs, windows, and mirrors 
 clean and observing speed limits; welders wearing proper 
 protective gear more frequently; and more underground 
 miners using eye protection. 
 
 The change would have been much greater except that 
 the top manager did not believe that two new personal pro- 
 tection rules could be uncompromisingly enforced during 
 the period without difficult problems involving the union 
 and some supervisors. Near the end of the period, directives 
 from company E's parent company made the two rules man- 
 datory at all of the parent company's operations. These 
 rules required (1) the wearing of safety helmets ("hard 
 hats") by all persons on the property except office workers 
 while in their offices and (2) the wearing of seat safety belts 
 by operators and authorized passengers in all mobile mining 
 machines and personnel vehicles. These rather fundamental 
 safety rules had been operative only to the extent that the 
 
 TABLE 3— Job performance sampling results, company E 
 
 
 
 
 Sample 
 
 size (n) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Proport 
 
 on of jobs with deficiencies. 
 
 by type' 
 
 
 
 
 Month 
 
 
 
 Pa 
 
 
 
 Pb 
 
 
 Pc 
 
 
 
 Pt 
 
 
 
 "a 
 
 
 Factor 
 
 % 
 
 Factor 
 
 "c 
 
 
 Factor 
 
 "t 
 
 
 Factor 
 
 November 1981 
 
 
 
 74 
 
 76 
 64 
 70 
 52 
 
 
 50 
 51 
 39 
 35 
 16 
 
 
 0.676 
 .671 
 .609 
 .500 
 
 308 
 
 21 
 24 
 20 
 20 
 
 13 
 
 0.284 
 .316 
 .313 
 .286 
 .250 
 
 19 
 
 19 
 14 
 14 
 9 
 
 
 0.257 
 .250 
 .219 
 .200 
 .173 
 
 55 
 56 
 44 
 39 
 19 
 
 
 743 
 
 March 1982 
 
 
 
 737 
 
 June 1982 
 
 
 
 688 
 
 September 1982 
 
 
 
 557 
 
 January 1983 
 
 
 
 366 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■*- + 
 
 P B = 
 
 n 
 
 
 Pc 
 
 
 "c 
 n 
 
 
 P T = ^ 
 
 a or b or c) 
 n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 0.8 
 
 Sy 
 
 OLL. 
 -UJ 
 r~ O 
 
 O LU 
 
 6/82 9/82 1/83 
 
 FIGURE 9.— Proportions of jobs sampled at company E in 
 which deficiency types P A , P B ,Pc. ar| d Pj were observed. 
 
 safety and loss control foreman and other cooperating 
 foremen had been able to influence workers through exam- 
 ple, training, and persuasive discussion. Had the rules been 
 established and enforced in say, September 1982, the 
 January P A would likely have been approximately 0.190, 
 rather than 0.308. This statement is made with some con- 
 fidence because the research project manager had the op- 
 portunity to visit company E in late March 1983 in connec- 
 tion with another project, and a job performance sampling 
 done at that time showed a decrease of nearly 0.120 in P A 
 since January 1983. (The sampling also showed decreases of 
 approximately 0.07 in P B and 0.05 in P r .) 
 
 The small decreases in P B and P c between March 1982 
 and January 1983 indicate, as noted earlier, a relatively 
 slow start in correcting deficiencies of types B and C and a 
 longer time to complete implementation than was originally 
 estimated. The degree to which management was able to 
 put into practice the recommendations in the tailored model 
 may also be reflected in the relatively low rate of decrease in 
 P B and P c . (These recommendations are listed and discussed 
 later in this section.) The increase in P B from November 
 1981 to March 1982 was very likely due primarily to 
 unusually harsh weather in January and February. For 
 several weeks it took all of the available maintenance 
 capability do the work necessary to keep the surface 
 machines moving so that surface production could be sus- 
 tained. There was no time available for what was regarded 
 as "nonessential" work. In other words, the management 
 felt it was necessary to accept an extra short-term risk in 
 order to satisfy contractual commitments and keep coal 
 moving to the customers. 
 
 The discussion in this section has been about sample pro- 
 portions. P T is the proportion of the sample in which some 
 job performance deficiency was observed. In the population 
 of all jobs in company E, the job performance deficiency pro- 
 portion is termed n T . The best estimator of n T is P T . The 
 population proportion is made with certain confidence 
 limits. Figure 10 shows the 95-pct confidence limits for each 
 estimate of ir T , where the 7r T curve was plotted from the P T 
 values shown in figure 9. (The scales of the ordinated and 
 abscissa were changed to make the confidence intervals 
 easier to visualize.) 
 
 1/83 
 
 FIGURE 10.— Job-deficiency 95-pct confidence limits for ir T 
 at company E. 
 
 Table 4 is a list of the recommendations that were in- 
 cluded in the tailored model for company E. The points 
 assigned to each recommendation by the research team (for 
 
 TABLE 4.— Recommendations in tailored model 
 for company E 
 
 Assigned Attained 
 
 Recommendations points' points 
 
 Train and stress loss control management . . . 100 75 
 
 Integrate safety and production in each job 
 
 definition 100 25 
 
 Identify job for full-time safety person, if 
 
 desired 100 95 
 
 Improve visitor control and training 100 90 
 
 Stop practice of loading private coal in pit ... . 100 100 
 
 Better housekeeping: 
 
 Plant 50 40 
 
 Surface shops 50 10 
 
 Underground shops 50 40 
 
 Surface mine 50 25 
 
 Proper parking of private vehicles 50 30 
 
 Get extraneous materials out of machine 
 
 cabs 50 40 
 
 Correct safety guide re: ROPS and seat belts .50 15 
 
 Stop welding, drilling, or cutting ROPS 50 30 
 
 Institute end-of-shift inspection require- 
 ments 50 40 
 
 Keep windows and mirrors clean 50 30 
 
 Improve hopper closing on railroad cars 50 
 
 Check "panic bar" operation daily (on roof 
 bolters, shuttle cars, and continuous 
 
 miners) 100 90 
 
 Make certain adequate fire extinguishers 
 
 are provided and serviced 100 90 
 
 Secure all blasting material at end of shift .. . 100 85 
 
 Top managers to- 
 Set example 100 75 
 
 Budget safety time 100 20 
 
 Review investigations 100 50 
 
 Observe and give reinforcement 100 50 
 
 Require near-miss investigation and 
 
 discussions 100 50 
 
 Improve ladders on mobile machines 100 10 
 
 Correctly install and maintain seat safety 
 
 belts 100 90 
 
 Require all workers and supervisors to wear 
 
 safety hats, except in offices 100 70 
 
 Establish and enforce a clear, safe personal 
 radio policy for mobile machine 
 
 operators 50 25 
 
 Establish and enforce road-width and berm- 
 
 dimension policy 100 50 
 
 Remove hazards noted at tipple 100 75 
 
 Create requirement for noninjury accident 
 
 reporting 100 80 
 
 Create safety committee that includes 
 
 workers 100 60 
 
 Create emergency responsibility plan for 
 
 weekends and holidays 100 75 
 
 Provide guard at surface mine with land 
 line or radio communication with main 
 
 gate 50 
 
 Improve method of providing and servicing 
 
 personal safety equipment 50 
 
 Improve recordkeeping and reporting 100 80 
 
 Improve task training 100 80 
 
 'Points assigned by research team as basis for evaluations. 
 
22 
 
 evaluation purposes) and the points attained during the im- 
 plementation and evaluation periods are also shown. The 
 maximum attainable score was 3,000. As noted earlier, the 
 research team had judged that attainment of 80 pet of the 
 points, or 2,400, would represent effective program im- 
 plementation. The actual attainment by company E was 
 1,890, or 63 pet of the total assigned points. 
 
 Most of the recommendations in table 4, although stated 
 in very brief form, are self-explanatory. A few require addi- 
 tional explanation. 
 
 "Correct safety guide re: ROPS and seat belts" referred 
 to rules in Company E's safety rule book. The rules were: 
 "Vehicles driven with doors open must have the operator 
 secured with seat belts," and "Roll bars (ROPS) and 
 canopies must be provided on equipment such as front-end 
 loaders and bulldozers for the operator's protection in the 
 event of capsize." 
 
 The recommendation was to make clear to workers, 
 through training and supervision, (1) that the seat safety 
 belt must be worn in every vehicle any time it is operated, 
 (2) that the use of the seat belt is essential to protect the 
 operator in mobile equipment equiped with ROPS, and (3) 
 that 30 CFR 77.403a requires the use of seat belts on ROPS- 
 equipped mobile equipment. The recommendation also call- 
 ed for incorporating the seat safety belt rules into every 
 work procedure involving vehicles on mobile equipment and 
 modifying the safety rule book appropriately if management 
 wished to continue its publication. 
 
 "Create safety committee that includes workers" re- 
 ferred to a need to encourage cooperative effort on safety 
 and health matters. The union contract had a provision for 
 action by an elected safety committee in the event that 
 serious safety hazards were allowed to occur in a mine. 
 There was a company safety committee that consisted en- 
 tirely of management people. There was more than a hint of 
 hostility in the operation of the union safety committee, and 
 the company committee's mode of operation seemed to do 
 little to encourage the adversaries to become cooperating 
 participants in the processes of hazard identification and 
 removal. These are management processes, but they are 
 done best when the ideas of the workers are solicited and 
 considered. Some of the other recommendations are ex- 
 plained by the examples in appendix A. 
 
 Figure 11 shows the number of injuries and work- 
 related illnesses at company E in each month of 1982 that 
 was required to be reported to MSHA under 30 CFR 50 pro- 
 visions. Accident, injury, and illness recordkeeping and 
 reporting improved greatly during this period (program im- 
 plementation and evaluation). However, the number of 
 "reportables" per month had a small downward trend during 
 the period. This is evident from the solid-line curve in figure 
 11 and the decreasing slope of the cumulative curve. Still, 
 the total for 1982 was unacceptably high. A check on ac- 
 cidents through much of 1983 indicated that the downward 
 trend continued. The first-quarter total of reportables in 
 1983 was less than half the first-quarter- 1982 total. 
 
 Figure 12 shows a more impressive loss reduction 
 trend, in the number of "lost-time" days due to accidental, 
 work-related injuries for each month of 1982. The solid line 
 that connects the monthly data points has a definite 
 downward trend, and the slope of the cumulative curve 
 decreases greatly after midyear. Only about one-fourth of 
 the lost days for the year occurred in the last half of the 
 year. This does not mean that injuries were becoming less 
 "seven 1 " in terms of physical damage, but it does mean that 
 the actions of the safety and loss control foreman and the 
 
 Q 
 
 ■z. 
 
 < 
 
 c/>cn 
 
 LULU 
 
 5uj 
 
 < 
 O 
 
 May July Sept 
 
 FIGURE 11.— Monthly MSHA reportable injuries and il- 
 lnesses at company E, 1982. 
 
 
 700 
 
 
 600 
 
 (/> 
 
 
 :>. 
 
 
 
 500 
 
 UJ 
 
 400 
 
 r- 
 
 300 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 rr 
 
 
 o 
 
 200 
 
 £ 
 
 
 
 IOO ( 
 
 Jan Mar May July Sept Nov Jan 
 
 FIGURE 12. — Monthly work days missed by company E 
 employees because of work-related injuries, 1982. 
 
 general manager to control post-injury events produced 
 substantial reductions in the "severity measure" defined in 
 30 CFR 50. 
 
 MINING COMPANY W 
 
 The results for the six job performance samples taken at 
 company W are given in table 5 and shown on the graph in 
 figure 13. The initial P T was very high (0.864). In nearly 9 
 out of every 10 jobs sampled, the employee was working 
 with 1 or more of the 3 types of deficiencies. Substantial im- 
 provements began immediately upon implementation, in Pg 
 and P ( . as well as in P A . The rate of improvement increased 
 greatly after July 1982. In July and August, the resident 
 manager established several new rules about personal pro- 
 tection equipment use and housekeeping practices. The en- 
 forcement of these rules accounted for much of the increas- 
 ed rate of improvement in P.. The small increase in P„ bet- 
 ween January and April was likely due largely to very harsh 
 February and March weather. The very large decrease in P ( . 
 was a result of almost continuous improvements in the work 
 environment at the crushing facility, the mill, and the 
 maintenance shop; coupled with improvements in the haul 
 road and maintenance yard in the last half of 1982. 
 
 Figure 14 shows the approximate 95-pct confidence 
 limits for each estimate of the work force population propor- 
 tion n T Again, the solid line (n T ) is the same as P T in figure 
 13 except that the scales of the abscissa and ordinate have 
 been changed. 
 
23 
 
 Table 6 lists the recommednations included in the 
 tailored model for company W, the point value assigned to 
 each, and the points attained. The maximum attainable 
 score was 3,200. The 80-pct attainment level, previously 
 established as the criterion for judging effective implemen- 
 tation, was 2,560 points. The actual attainment by company 
 W was 2,305 points, or 72 pet of the total attainable. 
 
 The recommendations are self-explanatory as listed or 
 are explained in the examples in appendix B. One, however, 
 may deserve additonal explanation because it relates to a 
 safety committee: "Create and use management- worker 
 safety committee." The safety committee concept was not a 
 specific feature of the model because it was not regarded as 
 essential to effective health and safety management. 
 
 TABLE 5.— Job performance sampling results, Company W 
 
 
 Sample 
 size (n) 
 
 
 
 Proportion of jobs with deficiencies, by type 1 
 
 
 
 Month 
 
 
 Pa 
 
 Pb Pc 
 
 
 Pt 
 
 n a 
 
 Factor 
 
 n b Factor n c Factor 
 
 r»t 
 
 Factor 
 
 October 1981 
 
 January 1982 
 
 April 1982 
 
 July 1982 
 
 October 1982 
 
 January 1983 
 
 ,p .. n a p _ n b 
 
 66 
 70 
 56 
 60 
 58 
 68 
 
 54 
 
 0.818 
 
 52 
 
 .743 
 
 34 
 
 .607 
 
 31 
 
 .517 
 
 12 
 
 .207 
 
 8 
 
 .118 
 
 . n c 
 
 
 n 
 
 
 27 
 
 
 0.409 
 
 24 
 
 
 .343 
 
 20 
 
 
 .357 
 
 19 
 
 
 .317 
 
 13 
 
 
 .224 
 
 12 
 
 
 .176 
 
 _ n (a 
 
 or 
 
 b or c) 
 
 39 
 32 
 20 
 21 
 11 
 7 
 
 0.591 
 .457 
 .357 
 .350 
 .190 
 .103 
 
 57 
 54 
 39 
 36 
 15 
 13 
 
 0.864 
 .771 
 .696 
 .600 
 .259 
 .191 
 
 TABLE 6.— Recommendations in tailored model 
 for company W 
 
 IO/8I I/82 4/82 8/82 IO/82 I/83 
 
 FIGURE 13.— Proportions of jobs sampled at company W in 
 which deficiency types P A , P B , P c , P T were observed. 
 
 I.O 
 
 8«/> 
 
 oy 
 
 oy 
 zo 
 
 OIL 
 
 UJ 
 
 Q 
 
 I0/8I 
 
 I/82 4/82 8/82 IO/82 I/83 
 
 Assigned 
 points' 
 
 100 
 100 
 
 100 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 45 
 
 100 
 
 95 
 
 100 
 100 
 
 FIGURE 14.— Job-deficiency 95-pct confidence limits for ,- T 
 at company W. 
 
 Recommendations 
 
 Train and stress loss control management . . . 
 Integrate safety and production in each job 
 
 definition 
 
 Identify and require superintendent respon- 
 sibilities in safety and health 
 
 Improved supervision of correct tool use in 
 
 shop 
 
 Acquire tool and require haul truck driver to 
 
 remove rocks between dual tires . '. 
 
 Prohibit Peterbilt dumping in jackknife posi- 
 tion 
 
 Install seat belt correctly on forklift trucks . . . 
 Keep gate to cyanide storage area closed .... 
 
 Improve storage of blasting materials 
 
 Acquire and use machines to clear jams in 
 
 crusher and hopper 
 
 Require safety hat use by supervisors and 
 
 workers 
 
 Top managers to — 
 
 Set example 
 
 Budget safety time 
 
 Review investigations 
 
 Observe and give reinforcement 
 
 Require near-miss investigations and dis- 
 cussions 
 
 Install bumper blocks at crusher hopper 
 
 Install backguard on crusher hopper 
 
 Provide and use machine seat safety belts . . . 
 Improve housekeeping: 
 
 Mill 
 
 Laboratory 
 
 Crusher 
 
 Shop 
 
 Remove extraneous material from machine 
 
 cabs 
 
 Improve roads, berms, and dumps 
 
 Redesign and maintain runaway ramps 
 
 Add apron to shop 
 
 Construct machine "ready line" 
 
 Add bridge crane to shop 
 
 Create and use management-worker safety 
 
 committee 
 
 Train and direct: No pushing of machines with 
 
 loader bucket teeth 
 
 Train supervisors and worker members of 
 
 safety committee in accident investigation . 
 Stop low flying of airplane over mine building . 
 Provide communications, transportation, and 
 
 water supply for security man 
 
 Improve methods of providing and servicing 
 
 personal protection equipment 
 
 Improve visitor control and training 
 
 Improve recordkeeping and reporting 
 
 Improve task training 
 
 'Points assigned by research team as basis for evaluation. 
 
 100 
 50 
 
 Attained 
 points 
 
 75 
 25 
 
 65 
 40 
 
 30 
 
 100 
 85 
 
 100 
 
 80 
 
 100 
 
 30 
 
 100 
 
 60 
 
 100 
 
 50 
 
 100 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 100 
 
 80 
 
 50 
 
 40 
 
 100 
 
 80 
 
 100 
 
 80 
 
 50 
 
 40 
 
 100 
 
 90 
 
 100 
 
 20 
 
 50 
 
 40 
 
 100 
 
 70 
 
 100 
 
 80 
 
 80 
 20 
 
 100 
 
 90 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
 100 
 
 75 
 
 100 
 
 70 
 
 100 
 
 90 
 
 100 
 
 40 
 
 100 
 
 60 
 
24 
 
 However, in the case of company W, there were several fac- 
 tors which led to a safety committee recommendation. They 
 were, in approximate order of importance: 
 
 1. A short time before the model program implementa- 
 tion began, the company had a union representation elec- 
 tion. Among the workers complaints, during the union 
 organizing effort, were those related to inadequate safety 
 and poor management-labor communications. These com- 
 plaints persisted after the election (in which union represen- 
 tation was defeated). At least two of the leaders of a group 
 highly critical of managment were advocates of a 
 management-worker committee. 
 
 2. Three of the supervisors subordinate to the resident 
 manager were clearly managers of the autocratic type. The 
 research team hoped, through training, to encourage the 
 supervisors to try a supportive style. The management- 
 worker safety committee would serve as a workshop for 
 developing such a style. 
 
 3. The resident manager was interested in developing 
 any feedback mechanism that would help him understand 
 the concerns of the workers. 
 
 He accepted the recommendation for a committee with safe- 
 ty responsibilities, but as it developed, it became a 
 management-worker committee with several other kinds of 
 responsibilities as well. 
 
 Figure 15 gives the number of work-related injuries and 
 illnesses in each month of 1982 that were reported as re- 
 quired by 30 CFR 50. In 1981, company W did a very poor 
 job of recordkeeping and reporting. Recordkeeping was ad- 
 dressed early in the model implementation training, but the 
 responsible superintendent did not take followup control ac- 
 tion. The majority of the reports were not submitted until 
 long after the 10-day reporting period specified in 30 CFR 
 50. There was no downward trend of significance in the in- 
 cidence rate; ten "reportables" occurred in the first half of 
 the year and nine in the last half. 
 
 Figure 16 shows the number of "lost time" days in 1982 
 due to work-related injuries. The days lost for a given month 
 on the graph are not the days lost during the month, but the 
 total days lost at any time due to an injury in that month. 
 For example, there was only one injury in June (fig. 15), but 
 it resulted in more than 100 lost days -obviously not all in 
 June. Clearly the last half of the year was an improvement 
 over the first half. Only approximately one-third of the lost 
 days for the year were in the last half. This is apparent from 
 the cumulative curve. Some of the reason, undoubtedly, was 
 management actions to control post-injury events, as at 
 company E. But how much that effort contributed to the im- 
 provement depicted by the graph cannot be determined. 
 
 It has been noted earlier in this report that the oc- 
 curence of accidental injuries is a probabilistic matter. It is 
 also appropriate to view the severity of injuries as a pro- 
 babilistic matter. During the evaluation process at company 
 W, the research team recorded several instances of manage- 
 ment action to track the post-injury events with a view to 
 getting employees back to work as soon as possible. Actions 
 of this type were not common previously -management had 
 accepted almost without question an "excusal note" from 
 any person with a medical profession title, or even an oral 
 statement from the injured person. The new control pro- 
 cedures certainly did what they were intended to do in some 
 cases: They got people back to work and off worker compen- 
 sation sooner. "Severity," as measured by the 30 CFR 50 
 method, was reduced, and the employer's loss due to injuries 
 
 _1 
 < 
 H 
 O 
 r- 
 
 Jan Mar May July Sept Nov Jan 
 
 FIGURE 15.— Monthly MSHA reportable injuries and il- 
 lnesses at company W, 1982. 
 
 
 350 
 
 
 300 
 
 If) 
 
 
 o 
 
 250 
 
 TJ 
 
 
 uJ 
 
 200 
 
 S 
 
 
 \- 
 
 I 50 
 
 *: 
 
 
 o 
 
 100 
 
 50 
 
 ! I I I I 
 
 1 1 I 1 1 1 
 
 
 • 
 
 Cumulat 
 
 ^9 
 
 
 2v*^ 
 
 •-- 
 
 
 / 
 
 - 
 
 / 
 
 
 / 
 
 
 / 
 
 
 / • 
 
 
 ^.^ A 
 
 _ 
 
 •^ / \ 
 
 
 / / \ 
 
 
 /jk / \ 
 
 
 j/ ^J 
 
 k Jto 
 
 ^ «--•/ • 
 
 
 T T I I 1 
 
 \r\ r i i i 
 
 Jan 
 
 Mar May July Sept Nov. Jan 
 
 FIGURE 16.— Monthly work days missed by company W 
 employees because of work-related injuries, 1982. 
 
 was reduced. Whether the actual physical severity of in- 
 juries was reduced is not known. 
 
 The research team tried, as part of its model program 
 implementation assistance, to stimulate supervisory in- 
 terest in careful investigation and recording "noninjury" ac- 
 cidents and near misses. However, the results fell short of 
 expectations. Two of the superintendents appeared initially 
 to regard proper investigation and reporting of injuries as 
 onerous tasks that detracted from their ability to supervise 
 their subordinates. In time, the utility of proper investiga- 
 tion and reporting became apparent to managers, but the 
 superintendents seemed reluctant to extend their accep- 
 tance to noninjury accidents. Several months passed before 
 reliable accident information began to flow to the resident 
 manager -and this occurred only after he had made the 
 matter a special subject at management meetings and had 
 issued several written directives. Thus, the recorded data 
 about equipment and facility damage accidents are not com- 
 plete. However, working from the records that were made 
 and from information collected informally and confirmed of- 
 ficially, it was possible to prepare graphs and tables. About 
 56 "noninjury" accidents occurred in 1982; this number was 
 certainly the majority of the total accidents. Figure 17 
 shows the number of accidents by month of occurrence, ex- 
 cept that the number shown for February (15) is actually for 
 
25 
 
 en 
 
 60 
 
 UJ 
 Q 
 
 50 
 
 O 
 
 
 O 
 
 
 < 
 
 40 
 
 UJ 
 
 
 o 
 
 
 < 
 
 30 
 
 .■> 
 
 
 < 
 
 
 n 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 >- 
 
 
 \- 
 
 
 rr 
 
 
 UJ 
 
 10 
 
 0_ 
 
 
 O 
 
 
 cr. 
 
 
 a. 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 ' ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
 ^^r 
 
 " 
 
 X 
 
 
 s 
 
 
 ,• 
 
 
 S 
 
 
 ,• 
 
 - 
 
 Cumulative—^ 
 
 _ 
 
 „• 
 
 
 ,*" 
 
 - 
 
 J* 
 
 
 _s 
 
 _ 
 
 • 
 
 
 • 
 
 - 
 
 • 
 
 - 
 
 .Vr-t-^r-r-rr^ : 
 
 Jan 
 
 Mar May July Sept Nov Jan 
 
 FIGURE 17.— Accidents resulting in equipment and/or 
 facility damage at company W, 1982. 
 
 January and February. There were several accidents for 
 which the exact date could not be determined with certain- 
 ty. The monthly average for March through December was 
 approximately four accidents. For the year, there were at 
 least three times as many noninjury accidents as there were 
 injury-producing accidents. 
 
 Table 7 gives some cost information about the 56 ac- 
 cidents represented in figure 17. The "minimum direct cost" 
 is the lowest available estimate of the cost of parts and labor 
 to make necessary repairs. The minimum direct costs were 
 provided by the maintenance superintendent, who obtained 
 them from maintenance records which identified time 
 charges for mechanics and parts withdrawn from, shop stock 
 or acquired from the warehouse for each repair job. The 
 minimum direct costs do not include direct supervisory 
 labor costs, the wages of operators paid for periods of 
 idleness due to accidents, or the value of lost production 
 when machines were not available for production use. Also, 
 no "indirect costs" appear on the table. Examples of these 
 are indirect supervisory labor; loss due to partial use of 
 machines because of poor line balancing, as when a shovel is 
 damaged and its haul trucks are assigned to another shovel 
 that already has enough trucks; and the cost of delays in the 
 mining plan, as when blast hole preparation is delayed for 
 several shifts because accidental damage to a drill has taken 
 the drill out of service. An effort was made to determine a 
 reliable estimate of the total accountable costs of the 56 ac- 
 cidents. There were detailed discussions of the accidents 
 and their consequences with supervisors and workers. The 
 estimate finally developed was $235,950 of uninsured loss 
 (not covered or deductible). 
 
 TABLE 7.— Accidents resulting in equipment and/or facility 
 damage, 1982 
 
 Noninjury Minimum Production 
 Machine type accidents direct cost' shifts lost 
 
 Rock trucks 10 $ 5,050 4 
 
 Ore haulers 8 11,925 26'/i 
 
 Shovels 4 38,250 33 
 
 Loaders 4 7,300 14 
 
 Graders 4 3,325 8 
 
 Bulldozers 4 750 Vh 
 
 Drills 7 7,500 10 
 
 Compressor-generator .... 2 250 
 Pickup trucks and adminis- 
 trative vehicles _ 13 5,350 
 
 Total 56 $79,700 97 
 
 'Operator wages and lost production value not included. 
 
 Following the reasoning used in the management train- 
 ing, it could be said that if company W was to achieve a 
 planned profit of, say, 15 pet on operations in 1982, there 
 would have to be an increase in the planned product sales of 
 approximately $1,573,000 to "pay for" the unplanned costs 
 of the accidents. (This reasoning is explained in the previous 
 section, "Implementation of the Model Program.") 
 The expectation model mentioned earlier (also in the im- 
 plementation section) was used extensively in instruction 
 and demonstration at company W. (It was used at company 
 E also, but less frequently.) Two examples based on this 
 model, one simple and one rather complex, are discussed in 
 the following paragraphs. 
 
 Early in the implementation, during a management 
 training session, a foreman asked how a simple expectation 
 calculation might be used to bolster the effort to encourage 
 wearing of safety hats. Several of the supervisors attending 
 the course were asked to give examples, from their own ex- 
 periences, of injuries that probably would* have been 
 prevented if the worker had been wearing a safety hat. A 
 list of several such injuries was made, and estimates of the 
 cost of each were discussed. A consensus estimate of the 
 minimum cost (C) of such accidents at company W during a 
 year was developed, along with a consensus estimate of the 
 probability (p) of their occurrence. These estimates, C = 
 $2,650 and p = 0.4, were used to calculate the expected cost 
 if no corrective action (Aj) were taken (some workers not 
 using hard hats) as follows: 
 
 No corrective action, injuries occur 0.4 
 
 No corrective action, injuries do not occur 6 
 
 E(A,) = 0.4($2,650) + 0.6($0) = $1,060 
 
 $2,650 
 
 
 The costs to purchase additional safety hats was deter- 
 mined, and $120 was added for "promotion costs." The total 
 cost of the corrective action was estimated to be $600. A 
 consensus estimate of the probability of head-related ac- 
 cidents after taking the corrective action was developed (p 
 = 0.01). Therefore, the calculation of the expected cost if 
 corrective action (A 2 ) were taken was as follows: 
 
 Corrective action taken, injuries 
 occur 
 
 Corrective action taken, no 
 injuries occur 
 
 0.1 $2,650 + 600= $3,250 
 
 .9 600 
 
 E(A ; ) = 0.1 ($3,250) + 0.9($600) = $865 
 
 Thus, the expectation was that it would cost company W 
 $l,060-$865,or$195more each year if no corrective action 
 were taken. This $195 cost was equivalent to $1 ,300 in sales. 
 The expected annual return of $195 on the $600 investment 
 represents a 32.5-pct ROI. The payback period would be 
 slightly more than 3 yr. These are all different ways of say- 
 ing the same thing, but saying the same thing differently 
 often stimulates interest and supportive discussion. 
 
 The second example was a case of eliminating a safety 
 problem by solving a production problem - that is, by "doing 
 the job right." The ore mined by company W is crushed in a 
 plant near the mine before it is hauled approximately 9 miles 
 down the mountains to the leach pad area. The crushing 
 facility is a choke point in the production process. If ore 
 jams the bin or the primary crusher, there can be no ore 
 flow until the jam is corrected. The scheduled crushing 
 facility production is the facility's capacity of 300 mt/h. 
 
26 
 
 Stoppages due to jams mean that some ore will not reach 
 the leach pads as scheduled. Because the leaching process 
 takes a long time, ore delays mean that the final product, 
 dore, may not be produced at the rate projected. Thus, pro- 
 duction is lost. 
 
 During the initial safety and health audit and job perfor- 
 mance sampling, it was observed that crushing facility jams 
 were frequent and that the methods used to clear them were 
 extremely dangerous. For example, a laborer, straddling 
 the jaw crusher mouth while the crusher was operating but 
 not actually crushing, lowered loader bucket teeth on a rope 
 into the jaw through an opening in the jammed ore made by 
 the laborer with a bar. The teeth helped the crusher jaws to 
 "bite into" the large blocks of ore. The laborer did not wear a 
 safety line and often worked alone. If the bucket teeth 
 method did not work, a truck crane was moved into posi- 
 tion, and slings were put around the large rocks that would 
 not go through the crusher so they could be lifted out. There 
 were ways to prevent this hazard, by keeping oversize rocks 
 from reaching the crusher. These ways were being studied 
 by company engineers, but they required major new con- 
 struction. Another way to deal with the hazard was to pro- 
 vide a machine that could clear the crusher and bin. Such 
 machines are readily avalable. The basic design is a 
 hydraulic arm with a hydraulic pick, a bucket, a spade, or 
 claw at the end. 
 
 An expectation analysis was based not on the safety 
 problem, but on the production problem. Available records 
 showed that at least 20 h of crusher production time was 
 being lost monthly because of jams 5 months out of 7 and 
 that approximately 10 h was being lost during each of the 
 other 2 months. At 300 mt/h, 20 h of production represented 
 6,000 mt of crushed ore, which would yield approximately 
 $86,400 in final product, dore. In a year's time, the value of 
 final product lost could be $1,036,800. It was estimated that 
 a hydraulic cleaning machine would reduce the "20-lost-hour 
 months" to 1 in 12, with the other 11 being "10-lost-hour 
 months." Two machines, one for the jaw crusher and one for 
 the feed bin, would cost $99,800. The expectation computa- 
 tion is shown in table 8. E(A 2 ) is lower than E(A X ) by 
 $227,311, suggesting that the $99,800 investment would 
 pay for itself in 1 yr, and also result in a $127,511 gain in 
 production. And not incidentally, the risks associated with 
 the hazard would be removed. (The ore mined by company 
 W contains more silver than gold, but the silver was not in- 
 cluded in these conservative expectation computations.) The 
 hydraulic machines were purchased and installed in 
 September 1982, not because of the analysis in table 8, but 
 because the resident manager and parent company produc- 
 tion engineers were working on a very similar production 
 improvement. 
 
 TABLE 8.— Expectation computation to add hydraulic pick and 
 shovel' to company W crusher 
 
 Probability of Annual 
 Eventuality occurrence net cost 
 
 Action A, (no corrective action): 
 
 20 h/month lost 0.714 $1,036,800 
 
 10 h/month lost ,286 518 400 
 
 E(A,)' NAp 888,538 
 
 Action A, (corrective action): 
 
 20 h/month lost .083 1,136,600 
 
 10 h/month lost .917 618 200 
 
 E(A,)' NAp 66l!227 
 
 NAp Not applicable. 
 
 'Cost of hydraulic pick and shovel: $99,800. 
 
 'Expectation, E(A) = (probability of occurrence) (annual net cost) for 
 situation where 20 h/month are lost to jams plus (probability of occur- 
 rence) (annual net cost) for situation where 10 h/month are lost to jams. 
 
 The research project manager made the last formal field 
 trip to company W in March 1983. In connection with some 
 training being done for new management people, the 
 "payback" computation in table 9 was made. By that time, 
 there were "before" and "after" data available that could be 
 compared with the estimates used in the earlier expectation 
 model. The computation helped to illustrate the use of the 
 expectation model and to demonstrate a general truth: Fre- 
 quently a safety problem can be solved by solving a produc- 
 tion problem. The payback period in this case was less than 
 2-V2 months. 
 
 TABLE 9.— Payback-period computation for hydraulic pick and 
 shovel for company W crusher 
 
 Total time 
 crusher inoperable 
 due to rock jams, h 
 
 Prior to installation of pick and shovel: 
 
 Feb. 1982 20.65 
 
 Mar. 1982 20.35 
 
 Apr. 1982 24.95 
 
 May 1982 22.45 
 
 June 1982' 11.38 
 
 July 1982' 14.67 
 
 Aug. 1982 23.23 
 
 Total, Feb-Aug. 1982 137.68 
 
 Av, Feb-Aug. 1982 19.67 
 
 After installation of pick and shovel 
 (Sept. 13, 1982): 
 
 Sept. 1982 8.68 
 
 Oct. 1982 13.07 
 
 Nov. 1982 10.40 
 
 Dec. 1982 13.64 
 
 Jan. 1983 5.02 
 
 Feb. 1983 7.00 
 
 Total, Sept. 1982-Feb. 1983 57.81 
 
 Av, Sept. 1982-Feb. 1983 9.64 
 
 Hours "saved" after installation (compared with 
 Feb. -Aug. 1982 av hours inoperative): 
 
 Sept. 1982 10.99 
 
 Oct. 1982 6.60 
 
 Nov. 1982 9.63 
 
 Total, Sept.-Nov. 1982 27.22 
 
 Cost (in production hours) of hydraulic 
 
 machinery 2 23.10 
 
 'Tonalite ore. 
 
 'Hours of production = cost of hydraulic machines ($99,800)/value of 
 production ($4,320/h). Value of production = scheduled production (300 
 mt/h) x gold content (0.06 oz/mtAu) x gold price ($400/ozAu). Since the 
 average number of hours of production lost per month was 9.64, and the 
 cost of the hydraulic equipment was equivalent to 23.10 h of production, 
 the payback period = 23.10 h ■=■ 9.64 h/month = 2.40 months. 
 
 WORK FORCE COMPARISONS 
 
 The evaluation results are somewhat more meaningful 
 if one understands some of the differences in the 
 characteristics of the two work forces. Almost all of the 
 company E employees grew up in the region of the mine and 
 live less than 50 miles from their work, but only a very small 
 fraction of the comapny W employees are natives of the 
 region where that company is located. Nearly all of the com- 
 pany E employees call themselves miners -their chosen oc- 
 cupation. Most of the company W employees do not call 
 themselves miners. They are machine operators, construc- 
 tion workers, ranchers, laborers, etc., who happen to be 
 working in a mine. The company E employees generally 
 plan to work there as long as they can. Many of the company 
 W employees have plans to go elsewhere at some specific 
 time, usually within a year or two. Several of them are col- 
 lege students, working as miners to get money to use to 
 return to school. 
 
 The conventional wisdom is that absentee rates and 
 turnover rates go hand in hand; that is, a mine with a higher 
 
27 
 
 turnover rate will have a correspondingly high absentee 
 rate. A common explanation is that absenteeism is a symp- 
 tom of job dissatisfaction and that quitting (turnover) is but 
 a stronger manifestation of that dissatisfaction. In the case 
 of companies E W, the company with the higher turnover 
 rate had the lower absentee rate. The absentee data for both 
 companies in 1982 are given in table 10. The overall 
 absentee rates would have been very nearly the same in 
 both companies had it not been for two union-related 
 phenomena at company E: strikes and "paid personal leave." 
 The labor contract for company E contains a provision that 
 each worker is authorized 3 days a year of paid absence, 
 called "personal leave." These are really three additional 
 vacation days, although they are not thought of in that way 
 by the workers. As one would expect, every hourly worker 
 takes the three paid leave days. These days are included in 
 the "absent" line in table 10. They represent nearly as many 
 hours absent (approximately 7,400 h) as the grievance 
 strikes. Together these two phenomena accounted for ap- 
 proximately 15,500 h absent, or nearly IVz worker-yr. 
 
 TABLE 10.— Overall absentee rates, 1982 
 
 Company W Company E 
 
 Hours: 
 
 Scheduled 233,925 760,150 
 
 Worked 226,804 722,812 
 
 Absent, total ' 7,121 37,347 
 
 Absent due to strikes 3 NAp 8,120 
 
 Percent of scheduled hours absent . . . 3.04 4.91 
 
 NAp Not applicable. 
 
 'Includes all reasons except holidays and vacations. 
 
 illegal grievance strikes. 
 
 Figure 12 showed the "lost days" due to work-related in- 
 juries in company E. The 1982 total was 639 days', or 5,112 
 h. This number is only 13.7 pet of the total hours absent in 
 1982 for company E (table 10). Figure 16 showed the "lost 
 days" due to work-related injuries in company W. The 1982 
 total was 329 days, or 2,632 h. This number is 37 pet of the 
 total hours absent shown in table 10 for company W. 
 
 Table 11 gives the 1982 turnover data for both com- 
 panies. Company W, with only one-third the number of 
 employees in company E, replaced 80 pet more employees 
 during 1982. Company E replaced approximately 1 
 employee in 10. Company W replaced nearly 6 in 10. Com- 
 pany E's turnover rate was mostly a result of involuntary 
 termination: the company was discharging people who had 
 the poorest job performance and reliability records. Com- 
 pany W's turnover rate was related more to voluntary ter- 
 minations, although that company was also discharging 
 many employees who had poor job performance and 
 reliability records (more than 2 out of every 10 employees). 
 
 TABLE 11.— Work force turnover, 1982 
 
 Company W Company E 
 
 Average total employment 340 113 
 
 Turnover' 35 63 
 
 Total turnover rate pet. . 10.3 55.8 
 
 Voluntary turnover rate pet.. 1.5 34.5 
 
 Involuntary termination rate ... .pet. . 8.8 21.2 
 
 'Number of persons whose employment was terminated and for 
 whom replacements were hired. 
 
 The turnover in management positions was high at both 
 companies. By mid- 1982, all company W supervisors on the 
 payroll at the time (the resident manager, the three 
 superintendents, and four key foremen) had received some 
 of the model program training. Less than a year later, only 
 
 the resident manager and one foreman who had been 
 demoted to a nonsupervisory job remained on the payroll. 
 Excepting the top manager, there had been 100-pct turn- 
 over in management. At company E, the management turn- 
 over was not as large, but was still significant. The top 
 manager, the preparation plant foreman, and the surface 
 drilling foreman were discharged in April 1982, when model 
 program implementation was just getting "up to speed." 
 The surface maintenance supervisor (master mechanic) 
 resigned a few months later. It is tempting to speculate that 
 the model programs at both companies would have been 
 even more effective if management turnover had not been 
 so high. 
 
 WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES 
 
 Before the model program was introduced, neither com- 
 pany E nor company W devoted much attention to keeping 
 records of illnesses that may have been job related. Atten- 
 tion to these records was still lacking during the model im- 
 plementation and evaluation. The data the research team 
 was able to acquire came mostly from two sources: workers 
 compensation claims and interviews with workers who had 
 been absent or had required medical attention, or both, 
 due to an alleged job-related illness. 
 
 Tables 12 lists all of the illness cases at both companies 
 about which information was obtained. The cases are placed 
 in the codes given in 30 CFR 50.6(b)(7) for reporting on the 
 MSHA form 7000-1. The three columns in table 12 titled 
 "Claimed," "Verified," and "Reportable per 30 CFR 50" 
 reflect actions taken to sort out those claimed illnesses that 
 should be reported to MSHA. 30 CFR 50.2(b) reads, (" 'Oc- 
 cupational illness' means an illness or disease of miner which 
 may have resulted from work at a mine or for which an 
 award of compensation is made." The part about an award 
 of compensation is clear enough, but the phrase "may have 
 resulted" is more difficult to work with. The first thing 
 management must do is determine whether the illness or 
 disease claimed actually exists. If a medical authority 
 verifies the illness or disease, or if the miner is observed to 
 
 TABLE 12.— Claimed job-related illnesses, companies E and 
 W, 1982 
 
 Reportable 
 Claimed Verified per 30 CFR 50 
 
 Code 21, occupational skin 
 diseases or disorders: 
 
 Chemicals 1 1 1 
 
 Coal 1 
 
 Fuels and lubricants 1 1 
 
 Codes 22 and 23, dust disease of 
 the lungs and respiratory 
 conditions due to toxic agents: 
 
 Dust (other than coal) 2 
 
 Coal dust 1 
 
 Chemicals 1 1 1 
 
 Welding fumes 3 1 1 
 
 Code 24, poisoning: 
 
 Lead 2 
 
 Mercury 2 
 
 Cyanide and other 2 
 
 Code 26, disorders associated 
 with repeated trauma: 
 
 Pain' 2 1 
 
 Personal protection equip- 
 ment irritation 1 1 
 
 Code 29, all other occupational 
 illnesses: 
 
 Alcoholism' 4 4 
 
 Stress' 5 5 
 
 'Possibly noise related. 
 
 'Not usually considered job-related illnesses. Not covered in 30 CFR 
 50.20-6. 
 
28 
 
 be ill or in pain, there is seldom any further question. If 
 neither a medical opinion nor information from direct obser- 
 vation is available, management usually assumes that the ill- 
 ness or disease is ficticious. Sometimes, even with verifica- 
 tion and acknowledgment that the illness may be work- 
 related, there remains a question about the reporting re- 
 quirement. An example is the "fuel and lubricant" case in 
 table 12, under code 21. On a Friday, a mechanic was work- 
 ing with some special lubricant. An hour or so later he 
 developed a rash on his hands, arms, and parts of his face. 
 The container for the lubricant carried a warning about the 
 possibility of skin irritation. First aid was administered. The 
 mechanic continued to work through the shift. Saturday and 
 Sunday were not scheduled workdays for him. He returned 
 to work on Monday. The rash had almost cleared up. The ill- 
 ness was not reported on MSHA form 7000-1, although 
 there was some argument among managers about whether 
 it should have been. 
 
 The six code-24 poisoning cases were the subject of ex- 
 tensive medical analyses which concluded that the illnesses 
 did not exist. Company management wanted very much to 
 know the truth so that the health protection procedures 
 could be changed if necessary. It is possible that the workers 
 may simply have feared that they had, or were about to 
 have, medical problems and were seeking the truth, too. The 
 claims occurred very soon after some health training for 
 mill and laboratory workers had been completed and 
 management had begun a rather elaborate environmental 
 monitoring procedure. Not long before, MSHA had cited the 
 company for lack of adequate controls, protection equip- 
 ment, and monitoring. Several workers had made alarmed 
 inquiries about their health risks to MSHA. 
 
 The several cases of alcoholism and stress were included 
 under code 29, although there were many differences of 
 opinion about that, too. One of the participating companies, 
 and its parent company, sent two of the alcoholics to receive 
 
 special treatment for several weeks each. The treatment 
 was very expensive, but apparently also very successful. 
 One of these treated workers retired because of heart 
 disease a couple of months after he returned. The other one 
 was working well, through the end of the model program 
 evaluation. The other two reported alcoholics have never 
 received any treatment, as far as is known. Their 
 employers, the participating companies, did not offer them 
 help apparently because they never acknowledged that they 
 had a disease and never asked for treatment. 
 
 The five stress cases were verified by observation and the 
 statements of the affected employees, although only one of 
 them ever used the word "stress." One haul truck operator 
 had two minor equipment-damage accidents on a single 
 night shift. The safety official, who knew him well, rode 
 with him for an hour or two following the second accident. 
 The operator rather suddenly "blurted out," "I can't keep my 
 mind on the job." He then told of several serious family 
 problems and how his work obligations affected his ability to 
 deal with them. Another equipment operator was 
 distraught to the point of sobbing and vomiting. After a long 
 talk he said, "I am making myself sick with worry." The 
 operator said he worried about his relationship with his 
 supervisor and the possibility that the company would be 
 sold and the supervisor would get a promotion that would 
 make his situation even worse. (The parent company had 
 publicly announced an intent to sell the company if an ac- 
 ceptable offer was received. It was also true that the super- 
 visor had threatened the employee with discharge if the 
 supervisor received the promotion he was trying to get.) 
 During the research, it was observed that where the 
 autocratic style of management was practiced, there 
 seemed to be a higher incidence of stress and stress-related 
 health problems than where the supportive style was prac- 
 ticed. 
 
 PROJECT OVERVIEW 
 
 Much time was devoted to understanding each com- 
 pany. More than 90 worker-days of the researchers' time 
 were spent at company W; this was approximately 
 equivalent to one person's presence every working day for 
 4.3 months. More than 170 worker-days were spent at com- 
 pany E, the equivalent of one person's presence every work- 
 ing day for 8 months. The employees of both companies 
 cooperated fully with the researchers. There were no 
 restrictions of any kind on where or when the research proj- 
 ect manager went about the property, what he did, what he 
 photographed, or to whom he talked. Any record requested 
 was promptly made available. Thus, the researchers have a 
 great deal of confidence in the validity of their findings. 
 
 Implementation Time Requirements 
 
 Although the model program may seem quite ordinary 
 and simple, its implementation represented a very substan- 
 tial change in management style and emphasis at the two 
 part icipating companies. This may explain why it took much 
 longer to put the concepts into practice and to achieve a 
 reasonable semblance of the five previously described fun- 
 damental conditions than the research plan allowed. The 
 
 time required was much greater than either the research 
 team or the company managers estimated. The managers of 
 companies were well educated, capable, diligent, and stable 
 people, but they were not thoroughly trained in manage- 
 ment. It took them more than 6 months to put the model 
 program concepts into practice. Nine to twelve months 
 would probably be the minimum time required for full im- 
 plementation in most mines, large or small. 
 
 Using a Reifier 
 
 The word "reifier" relates to materializing ideas, that is, 
 making them real. The preferred mode of performance for 
 person acting as a reifier is to bring up questions, assemble 
 and report facts to management, facilitate communication, 
 and teach. Although it is not essential that a reifier be used 
 to help implement the model program, there are several ad- 
 vantages to using one. A major advantage of using a reifier 
 is that the program will probably be implemented 
 significantly sooner than if a reifier is not used. The 
 minimum amount of time a refier would be needed to assist 
 the top manager with program implementation is about 60 
 h. However, generally, the reifier would be very helpful to 
 most managers for the full period of implementation. 
 
29 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The model program described in this report is a very 
 basic program about managment. It deals with essential 
 conditions only. As stated in the introduction, the intent of 
 this project was to identify and correctly define only those 
 health and safety program elements that have potential for 
 universal application throughout the mining industry. 
 
 The costs of implementation are low because implemen- 
 tation mostly involves getting management people to do bet- 
 ter what they are already being paid to do. It is not harder 
 work that is required, but "smarter work." Because im- 
 plementation is inexpensive and the loss reduction is very 
 substantial, the benefit-to-cost ratio is quite favorable. 
 
 Not all of the improvements reported herein were made 
 solely because of the model program implementation. Many 
 
 of the improvements unquestionably would have occurred in 
 the absence of the model program. Management's own ini- 
 tiative, the parent companies' influence, MSHA activities, 
 and employee suggestions and criticisms all contributed in 
 varying degrees. In the view of the researchers, it did not 
 matter how an action got started. What mattered for 
 evaluation purposes was whether the action was compatible 
 with the model program concepts and what the result was. 
 The dramatic improvements observed at both com- 
 panies during the course of this study strongly suggest that 
 if the model program described herein is thoroughly 
 understood and conscientiously implemented, it will 
 significantly reduce injuries, illnesses, equipment damage, 
 production losses, and other unplanned costs. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
 1. National Safety Council. Accidents Facts. 1980, 97 pp. 
 
 2. Woodward Associates, Inc. Research To Improve Health and 
 Safety Programs in the Mining Industry (contract H0308076). 
 BuMines OFR 6-85, 1983, 197 pp. 
 
 3. Petersen, D. Techniques of Safety Management. McGraw- 
 Hill, 2e ed., 1978, 298 pp. 
 
 4. Chapman, L. P. How Do We Get Workers More Involved in 
 Safety? Natl. Saf. News, v. 120, Sept. 1979, pp. 49-50. 
 
 5. Hammer, W. Occupational Safety Management and 
 Engineering. Prentice-Hall, 1976, 156 pp. 
 
 6. Partlow, H. Today's Safety Professional. Prof. Saf., v. 22, 
 Sept. 1977, pp. 40-42. 
 
 7. Crapnell, S.G. Awards and Incentives Add Zest to Safety 
 Performance. Occup. Hazards, v. 42, Aug. 1980, pp. 33-36. 
 
 8. Gilmore, C. Accident Prevention and Loss Control. Am. 
 Manage. Assoc, 1970, 207 pp. 
 
 9. Hampton, D. Contests Have Side Effects, Too. CA Manage. 
 Rev., v. 12, No. 4 1979, pp. 286-294. 
 
 10. Mims, A., and R. DeReamer. Are Safety Committees 
 Useful? Job Saf. and Health, v. 4, Mar. 1974, pp. 22-23. 
 
 11. Dale, E. Management Theory and Practice. McGraw-Hill, 2d 
 ed., 1969, 786 pp. 
 
 12. Lippert, F. The Importance of Upper Management's Com- 
 mitment to Safety. J. Am. Soc. Saf. Eng., v. 13, May 1968, pp. 
 14-19. 
 
 13. Shaw, C. Personal Responsibility for Mine Safety. Min. Con- 
 gr. J., v. 66, Nov. 1980, pp. 49-52. 
 
 14. Walters, C. Management of the Safety and Health Function 
 To Help Attain Productivity Objectives. J. Am. Soc. Saf. Eng., v. 
 19 Sept. 1974, pp. 39-43. 
 
 15. Palisano, P. For Added Dimension in Accident Prevention 
 Analyze the Near-Miss. Occup. Hazards, v. 42, Aug. 1980, pp. 
 51-53. 
 
 16. Joens, D.W. Implementing a Safety Audit. J. Am. Soc. Saf. 
 Eng, v. 18, Nov. 1973, pp. 20-23. 
 
 17. Woodward Associates, Inc. Research Study To Determine 
 the Applicability of New Methodologies in Mine Accident Investiga- 
 tions. Ongoing BuMines contract JO308008; for inf., contact J.M. 
 Peay, TPO, Ind. Saf. and Training Systems Group, BuMines, Pitt- 
 sburgh, PA. 
 
 18. Maslow, A. Motivation and Personality. Harper & Row, 
 1954, 276 pp. 
 
 19. Heinrich, H.W. Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific 
 Approach. McGraw-Hill, 1959, 267 pp. 
 
 20. National Safety Council. One Measure of Work Accident 
 Cost: Lost Profits. Coal Min. News., v. 16, May 1979, p. 3. 
 
 21. Woodward Associates, Inc. Haulage Truck Training 
 System. Ongoing BuMines contract J0387221; for inf., contact W. 
 J. Wiehagen, TPO, Ind. Saf. and Training Systems Group, 
 BuMines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
 
 22. Development of Materials and Strategies for 
 
 Pre-Shift Equipment Inspection (contract HO377101). Volume 2. 
 Appendixes. BuMines OFR 139(2)82, 1977, 242 pp.; NTIS PB 
 82-259227. 
 
 23. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Safety and Health Re- 
 quirements Manual. 1981, 342 pp. 
 
 24. Church, H. Excavation Handbook. McGraw-Hill, 1981, 878 
 pp. 
 
30 
 
 APPENDIX A.— EXCERPTS FROM TAILORED MODEL 
 PROGRAM, COMPANY E 
 
 1. Comment: The majority of the (mining company E) people with whom there were discussions reflected views of safety 
 
 (and loss control generally) as a consideration distinctly separate from, and sometimes in conflict with, pro- 
 duction. 
 
 Recommendation: Such views should be changed through top management direction, loss control training of super- 
 visors, and regular discussions of the cost and other productivity-related facts of accidents and near misses 
 at management meetings. 
 
 Management decision: Recommendation accepted. 
 
 Priority: 1 yr 
 
 Points: 100 
 
 2. Comment: The jobs at both worker and working foreman levels are not clearly and fully defined in writing, with health 
 
 and safety aspects integrated with other performance expectations. It is apparent that the present 
 management policy is to integrate production and safety considerations in each job. The introduction to the 
 (mining company E) "Safety Guide" states, "It is not our intent to place the well-being of our employees 
 secondary to production considerations. Rather, it is our objective to incorporate good work procedures 
 and practices into each work phase." 
 
 Recommendation: It is essential that supervisors define exactly the performance expectations of each job. Make 
 plans to prepare a written job definition for every job. For mobile machine operators, the manufacturer's 
 operating instruction manual serves well as a foundation. But these manuals must be supplemented by local 
 production procedures, State and MSHA standards, company policies, and other related information. For 
 other jobs, a job description should be prepared with the participation of workers and supervisors. 
 
 Management decision: Recommendation accepted. 
 
 Priority: 1 yr. 
 
 Points: 100 
 
 3. Comment: Several (mining company E) supervisors appeared to believe that the safety officer has the primary respon- 
 
 sibility for safety and health matters, and that their own responsibilities (the supervisors') are primarily for 
 production. 
 Recommendation: A safety officer position, full or part-time, should - 
 
 • Be filled by a person qualified by experience, training, personality, and interest in the work. (The pre- 
 sent part-time safety officer appears to be so qualified). 
 
 • Report directly to the general manager. (The present safety officer position reports in this way, accord- 
 ing to the organizational chart). 
 
 • Have a title such as "assistant for loss control" or "assistant for safety, health, and security," indicating 
 a direct relationship with the responsibilities commonly assumed to be a "safety officer's job". 
 
 • Have a written job description that makes clear that the primary responsibility for safety, health, and 
 loss control rests with line supervisors; that the duties of this job are those which augment the top 
 manager's capability to deal with loss control policy and supervision; and that the official provides 
 technical assistance to the line managers in carrying out their responsibilities. 
 
 • Be clearly defined in terms of the percentage of time that will be devoted to safety, health, and loss and, 
 if not full-time, have clearly defined additional duties and related reporting channels. 
 
 • Have a salary range that reflects the top management expectations with respect to productivity and 
 profitability contributions. 
 
 Management decision: Recommendation accepted. 
 Priority: 3 months 
 Points: 100 
 
 4. Comment: There were some work practices observed at (mining company E) that had a high probability of producing 
 
 personal injury or other losses. Their existence provides evidence that supervisors (and workers) do not 
 have highly developed safety awareness and that safety is not always given the same emphasis as "getting 
 on with the job." In most cases, job production would be improved if the job was done in a better (safer) 
 way. 
 
 Recommendation: The specific work practice examples A, B, and C, described below, should be corrected by ap- 
 propriate supervisors. In addition, these examples should be used in training sessions, not to criticize in- 
 dividual actions, but to emphasize the risks of poor work practices and the need for careful job definition 
 and close supervision. 
 
 Management decision: Recommendation accepted. 
 
 Priority: Example A, 100 
 Example B, 100 
 Example C, LOO 
 
 Example A: 30 CFR 75.523-2 requires that self-propelled electric face equipment be equipped with a bar or lever for 
 quick de-energizing of the tramming motors. The bar or lever can move only 2 in, with no more than 15 lbf 
 necessary to cause de-energizing. The bar or lever is commonly called the panic bar. 
 
31 
 
 On three of the five electric underground machines checked during the safety audit, the panic bar did 
 
 not 
 
 de-energize the machine. The primary reason was bending or other distortion of the bar assembly, which 
 
 rendered it incapable of depressing the panic button. 
 
 It is a very dangerous practice to fail to maintain emergency equipment. Emergency devices should 
 
 function reliably on those infrequent occasions when they are needed if serious consequences are to be 
 
 avoided. All such equipment should be inspected and tested by the operator at the start of each shift, and 
 
 repaired as necessary. 
 
 Example B: The company "Safety Guide" has the following rule on page 4: "Fire fighting equipment shall 
 be maintained at all times on heavy equipment. Extinguishers which have been discharge should be 
 reported to the foreman." During the safety audit, several fire extinguishers on machines were observed to 
 be partially discharged. Apparently machine operators are not inspecting and reporting regularly. 
 
 Example C: Arc-welding operations were being conducted in a room that contained flammable refuse and liquids. 
 The welding was not well ventilated or shielded, a violation of 30 CFR 77.408, as well as generally recom- 
 mended industrial practice and the parent company's "Safety Rule Book." 
 
 5. Comment: 
 
 Most subordinate supervisors have not received specific training in loss control management or otherwise 
 devoted time to study or think about this subject. Generally, subordinate supervisors will emulate the ex- 
 ample set by the top manager. They may be induced to not merely support, but to lead health, safety, and 
 general loss control management activities through a combination of training and repeated encouragement 
 by the top manager. 
 
 Recommendation: Schedule loss control training for salaried and hourly supervisors. All supervisory personnel 
 should participate. The top manager's participation is especially important. He can provide reinforcing and 
 clarifying comments, especially those related to his own plans for operations. His active role in discussions 
 will encourage others to participate, thereby enchancing the learning experience for everyone, including 
 the instructor. 
 
 Management decision: Recommendation accepted. 
 
 Priority: 6 months 
 
 Points: 100 
 
 Several other excerpts from company E's tailored model program are given in the final project report (2). 
 
32 
 
 APPENDIX B.— EXCERPTS FROM TAILORED MODEL PROGRAM, COMPANY W 
 
 1. Comment: The jobs at both worker and working foreman levels are not clearly and fully defined in writing, with health 
 
 and safety aspects integrated with other performance expectations. 
 
 Recommendation: Make plans to prepare written job definitions for every job. For mobile machine operators, the 
 manufacturer's operating instruction manual serves well as a foundation, but these manuals must be sup- 
 plemented by local production procedures, State and MSHA standards, company policies, and other related 
 information. For other jobs, a job description should be prepared with the participation of workers and 
 supervisors. 
 
 Management decision: Agree with recommendation. The research team will prepare drafts, working from 
 references, comments of workers on what they perceive their jobs to be, and comments of working 
 foremen. The draft will be reviewed and supplemented or otherwise modified as appropriate by 
 superintendents. The final drafts will be reviewed and approved by the resident manager. 
 
 Priority: 9 months 
 
 Points: 100 
 
 2. Comment: A formal policy statement of the manager's commitment to safe operations is a necessary, but not suffi- 
 
 cient, manifestation of such commitment. Subordinate supervisors and workers judge the manager's true 
 concern for health, safety and general loss control primarily from observation of his actions. 
 Recommendation: The resident manager should influence the "safety climate" (at mining company W) through the 
 following actions: 
 
 • Always wearing personal protection equipment (hard hat, safety glasses, safety shoes, and hearing pro- 
 tection, in high-noise areas) whenever he is outside of his office. 
 
 • Budgeting his time so that he devotes at least 10 pet of his normal work week (4 h) to participation in 
 loss control activities. Specifically, he should - 
 
 a. Conduct periodic health and safety "spot" inspections. 
 
 b. Lead at least one departmental worker safety meeting each month. Explain policy changes and 
 future plans and discuss recent accident and near misses. Encourage comments and suggestions 
 from the workers, write them down, and report later what action was taken on each. 
 
 c. Visit the scene of every accident and discuss the circumstances with those involved in a "fact- 
 finding, not fault-finding" mode. 
 
 d. Observe workers performing their duties, compliment those who are working safely and acting to 
 reduce losses (positive reinforcement). Suggest or demonstrate changes in work practices to those 
 who are not working safely and acting to reduce losses. 
 
 Management decision: Agree with the recommendation and will implement immediatly. 
 
 Priority: 1 month 
 
 Points: Set example, 100 
 
 Budget safety time, 100 
 
 Review investigations, 100 
 
 Observation and reinforcement, 100 
 
 Near miss investigations, 100 
 
 3. Comment: The most obvious, and perhaps the most serious, hazards are at the crushing plant. Two, for example, are 
 
 related to the design of the primary crusher feed hopper and its grizzly, which stops some rocks that should 
 pass and passes some that should not be passed. Thus, there is a rock removal task and a crusher clearing 
 task, which are hazardous. On two occasions, workers were observed clearing a jam in the primary jaw 
 crusher at the crushing plant. Each time the task took nearly 2h-2h during which no ore moved through 
 the plant. The task was done by a laborer straddling the operating crusher mouth and using a bar and 
 bucket teeth on ropes as his tools. He wore no safety line. This is not only a very dangerous way to clear the 
 crusher, but also a very inefficient one. Several serious injuries were inflicted on workers using a bar in an 
 operating crusher in 1980, and at least one of them was at an installation of company W's parent company. 
 This is an example of a very hazardous work practice made "necessary" by poor facility design and failure 
 to provide proper tools for the task. There is no "bumper block" or other restraint to keep the loader from 
 being driven into the grizzly. There is no back guard or rear apron on the hopper to reduce the possibility of 
 rocks bouncing off the grizzly and onto equipment and workers below in the primary crusher area. (The 
 area is roped off at ground level to discourage trespass some of the time). 
 
 Recommendation: Management should make removal or reduction of the obvious hazards a top priority. (Mining 
 company W) and (parent company) engineers were working on crushing plant production problems in 
 November. Detailed discussions with the engineers indicated that they understood the hazards described 
 and would include plans for their removal or reduction in their overall facility improvement plans. This is a 
 case in which sound solutions to the production problems will also solve many of the safety problems. 
 
 Priority: 9 months 
 
 Points: 100 
 
33 
 
 4. Comment: Some machines require seat belt maintenance before actions to encourage seat belt use can have any mean- 
 ing. For example, (one truck) has the seat belt improperly mounted (to the frame rather than to the spring 
 seat). (Another truck) has a seat belt only on the passenger seat. Several machines have installed belts 
 which are very dirty and in very poor condition. 
 
 Recommendation: Inspect all machines for properly installed seat safety belts. 
 
 Management decision: Agree with recommendation. 
 
 Priority: 1 month 
 
 Points: 100 
 
 5. Comment: Dump areas and haul roads need good berms to reduce dumping and hauling hazards. Less stable dump 
 areas, such as on recently dumped top soil, need higher and wider berms than more stable dump areas. 
 Steep haul roads require good "runouts," or deceleration ramps (soft or hard), for emergencies such as 
 brake failure. Generally, waste dump maintainers were observed to maintain berms well, but there were 
 several exception. The top soil dump berm was not as wide or high as it should be in some places. Several 
 short sections of steep haul road are without berms. Some of the deceleration ramps on the main road be- 
 tween the crusher and leach area are of questionable design (too steep, too short, etc.), and a few had the 
 approach obstructed by the results of grader or snow plow work. 
 
 Recommendation: State in writing, a clear policy on berm construction and maintenance on dumps and haul roads. 
 Have an engineering analysis of the deceleration ramps done. Make any design and contruction changes in- 
 dicated by the analysis. 
 
 Assure that all bulldozer, grader, and loader operators who construct berms are trained to make them at 
 least as high as the axle of the largest truck at (mining company W). 
 
 Management decision: Agree with recommendations. 
 
 Priority: 6 months 
 
 Points: Berms, 100 
 
 Redesign ramps, 100 
 
 Several other excerpts from company W's tailored model program are given in the final project report {2). 
 
34 
 
 APPENDIX C— JOB PERFORMANCE SAMPLING 
 
 The job performance sampling procedure, one of the means used to evaluate the model health and safety program, is 
 discussed in several sections of this report. This appendix is intended to give the reader more details about the procedure. 
 The next page contains the form used to record observations. On it are given short explanations about how the samples were 
 selected and what information was recorded. Sample entries are given on the right side of the form. On the pages following 
 the sample form are examples of each of the three types of deficiencies that were recorded during the sampling. 
 
 Job information 
 Sample No. 
 
 Job 
 
 A 
 Personal preparation 
 
 B 
 
 Equipment and tools 
 
 Work procedures 
 
 Comment 
 
 Job Performance Sampling Form 
 
 Observer's instructions 
 
 (Systematic sampling used: every kth worker, with a random 
 start. Note time.) 
 
 (The job title and the type, model, and company number of the 
 machine operated, if job is machine operator.) 
 
 (Deficiencies in things for which the worker has sole respon- 
 sibility. For example, proper clothing; safety shoes, safety 
 hat, safety glasses, ear protection, and other special protec- 
 tion items required by the job, including safety belt use; clean 
 windows and mirrors, clear cab, etc.) 
 
 (Deficiencies in things that worker alone cannot correct. Im- 
 proper tool or equipment and machine condition. Preshift in- 
 spection checklist items plus others of special interest. Ac- 
 tions indicating poor task training, assignments, or supervi- 
 sion.) 
 
 (Observe work 5 to 10 min, or cycle of machine operation. 
 Note deficiencies in environment, procedures, practices, 
 work sequences, and especially hazards - things called unsafe 
 acts and unsafe conditions, and not included in A and B. 
 Generally, poor methods and conditions which relate to more 
 than one job.) 
 
 (Preliminary evaluation of importance of deficiency not 
 previously noted or noted but not corrected, and action that 
 should be taken and by whom. Optional for all except "immi- 
 nent danger" items.) 
 
 Sample entry 
 #8 10:20 a.m. 
 
 Truck driver, CAT 777, 
 #60351 
 
 Hard hat in poor condition; 
 needs replacement soon. 
 
 1 - Lenses on right and 
 center white backup lights 
 broken. 
 
 2 -Fire extinguisher oh deck 
 needs repair; extinguisher on 
 floor of cab. 
 
 1- Backed into loading point 
 before loader had indicated 
 desired position. 
 
 2-Berm along haul road to 
 upper waste area C inade- 
 quate -too low and not con- 
 tinuous. 
 
 Cl: Corrected on spot by 
 foreman. 
 
 C2: Foreman told 
 motorgrader operator to cor- 
 rect by end of shift. 
 
 and 
 
 Bl and B2: Maintenance 
 scheduled repair of lenses 
 and extinguisher mount for 
 night shift. 
 
 A foreman to arrange issue 
 of new hard hat next day 
 shift. 
 
 Examples of Type A Deficiencies (Employee Correctable) 
 
 1 . Wearing improper clothing on the job. 
 
 2. Failure to wear safety shoes in good repair. 
 
 3. Failure to wear safety helmet in good condition. 
 
 4. Failure to wear safety glasses where required. 
 
 5. Failure to wear seat safety belt. 
 
 6. Failure to use a safety line where required. 
 
 7. Failure to wear hearing protection where required. 
 
 8. Failure to have self-rescuer on belt underground. 
 
 9. Failure to keep operator station and deck of underground machine clear and clean. 
 L0. Failure to use installed lights on mining machine. 
 
35 
 
 11. Failure to use water spray at face. 
 
 12. Failure to move trailing cable correctly. 
 
 13. Failure to use correct tool or part. 
 
 14. Using machine incorrectly (for example, pushing another vehicle with bucket teeth). 
 
 15. Speeding. 
 
 16. Failure to yield right of way to loaded trucks. 
 
 17. Failure to follow any task performance rule posted or included in training or direction. 
 
 18. Keeping hand on roof drill while turning drill. 
 
 19. Moving truck with body raised. 
 
 20. Dumping truck with wheels turned or body not level. 
 
 21. Unsafe handling of batteries. 
 
 22. Improper use of compressed air. 
 
 23. Improper care of welding lines and hoses. 
 
 24. Opening acetylene cylinder valve more than one turn. 
 
 25. Failure to keep compressed-gas cylinders upright and secured. 
 
 26. Improper use of wire rope clamps and thimbles. 
 
 27. Poor housekeeping in workplace. 
 
 28. Improper use or storage of ether-based starting fluid. 
 
 29. Improper disposal of salvagable items. 
 
 30. Improper disposal of pressurized containers. 
 
 31. Smoking in prohibited area. 
 
 32. Carrying smoking materials underground. 
 
 33. Drinking alcoholic beverages on property. 
 
 34. Using recreational drugs on property. 
 
 35. Failure to wear special protection equipment required for task. 
 
 36. Operating a machine for which not trained and qualified. 
 
 37. Unauthorized reading material in machine cab or other workplace. 
 
 38. Failure to cut power and lock out before working on circuits. 
 
 39. Failure to conduct proper inspection of machine each shift. 
 
 40. Failure to report machine or equipment defects. 
 
 41. Failure to keep windows, light lenses, and other glass clean. 
 
 42. Tardiness in reporting to job. 
 
 43. Failure to report an accident or near miss. 
 
 44. Misuse of tools, equipment, or emergency supplies. 
 
 45. Failure to block machines raised by jacks for repair. 
 
 46. Failure to conduct a proper shutdown check. 
 
 47. Moving ahead of supported roof. 
 
 48. Loading or unloading moving mantrip or supply cars. 
 
 49. Failure to stop conveyor and lock out before working on it. 
 
 Examples of Type B Deficiencies (Employer Correctable) 
 
 1. Failure to provide safety hat. 
 
 2. Failure to provide suitable safety glasses. 
 
 3. Failure to fit, repair, and replace personal protective equipment. 
 
 4. Failure to install seat safety belts correctly. 
 
 5. Failure to replace damaged or very dirty seat belts. 
 
 6. Failure to maintain ladders on surface machines. 
 
 7. Failure to provide ear protection and hygiene training. 
 
 8. Failure to provide safety lines and belts. 
 
 9. Failure to repair reported machine defects. 
 
 10. Failure to provide correct tools or parts. 
 
 11. Assigning worker to task for which he or she has not been trained. 
 
 12. Directing worker to use incorrect tool, defective machine, or badly demaged equipment. 
 
 13. Failure to post traffic rules. 
 
 14. Failure to maintain workplace lighting. 
 
 15. Failure to train worker for tasks specifically part of job. 
 
 16. Failure to provide appropriate hazard training (for example: in use of compressed air and ether-based starting 
 
 fluid). 
 
 17. Allowing short cuts not permitted in job definition. 
 
 18. Failure to perform required workplace and machine inspections. 
 
 19. Failure to report and act on tardiness or absence. 
 
 20. Ignoring accident or near miss reports. 
 
 21. Ignoring evidence that worker is ill, "hung over," or otherwise partially incapacitated. 
 
 22. Failure to correct improper performance of task. 
 
 23. Failure to provide, and check periodically, lock out devices. 
 
36 
 
 24. Allowing workers to move under unsupported roof. 
 
 25. Failure to require proper preparation for underground welding (with respect to fire extinguisher, rock dust, etc.). 
 
 26. Permitting welding, drilling, or cutting ROPS supports. 
 
 27. Permitting work on live electrical circuits. 
 
 Examples of Type C Deficiencies (Common to Several Jobs; Employer Correctable) 
 
 1. Failure to monitor noise level in suspect area. 
 
 2. Failure to install noise suppression or require hearing protection in high-noise area. 
 
 3. Failure to check escape tunnels, etc., regularly. 
 
 4. Failure to require berms at dumps and along haul roads. 
 
 5. Allowing deviations from approved roof control plan. 
 
 6. Failure to conduct appropriate air contamination measurements. 
 
 7. Permitting hazardous practices to be specified as normal practice in work procedure definition. 
 
 8. Inappropriate truck queuing procedure at load points. 
 
 9. Inadequate fire-suppression and emergency medical capability available. 
 
 10. Inadequate policy for emergency management on holidays and weekends. 
 
 11. Failure to specify proper personal protective equipment for every job in the work procedures. 
 
 12. Failure to fully and correctly inform workers of any existing environmental or atmospheric conditions which may repre- 
 sent hazards to their health or safety. 
 
 13. Failure to provide proper security for workers' personal property and autos. 
 
 14. Failure to provide safe man trips. 
 
 15. Failure to provide adequate area lighting. 
 
 US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1986-605 017/40.0026 INT.-BU.OF Ml N E S.P GH., P A. 28 278 
 

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