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 WILLIAM BUEL FRANKLIN 
 
 February 27, 1823 
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 WILLIAM BUEL FRANKLIN 
 
 [Reprinted from the Hartford Courant, March 9, 1903.] 
 
 Major-General William Buel Franklin, U. S. V., one 
 of Hartford's best known men, died yesterday morning 
 at his home. No. 144 Washington street. He had been 
 failing for several years and consequently his death was 
 not unexpected. He began to sink Saturday afternoon, 
 gradually lost consciousness during the night, and died 
 at 7.45 A. M. without any suffering. Charles Weiser, a 
 nephew, and Miss Emily M. Brace, were with him when 
 he died. General Franklin leaves two brothers, Samuel 
 Rhoades Franklin, rear-admiral of the United States 
 Navy, retired, of Washington, D. C, and Colonel Walter 
 Simonds Franklin of Baltimore, who served with dis- 
 tinction in the Union Army in the Civil War, and was on 
 the staff of General Sedgwick and was by his side when 
 the latter was killed. Another nephew, William Weiser, 
 by General Franklin's deceased sister, lives in York, Pa., 
 and there are six other nephews and nieces, children of 
 Colonel Franklin. 
 
 Rev. George T. Linsley, rector of the Church of the 
 Good Shepherd, made a brief announcement of General 
 Franklin's death at the morning service yesterday, and 
 spoke of the general's long connection with the church. 
 Rev. Rockwell Harmon Potter, pastor of the Center 
 
Church, and a neighbor of General Franklin's, also re- 
 ferred to his death in prayer at his church at the morning 
 service. 
 
 General Franklin's funeral will be attended at the 
 Church of the Good Shepherd at 3.30 o'clock Wednesday 
 afternoon. There will be prayers for the members of 
 the family at General Franklin's late home, No. 144 
 Washington street, at 2.30 o'clock, and the body will be 
 taken to York, Pa., for interment on Thursday morning. 
 
 General Franklin selected this city as his future home 
 after his resignation from the army in 1866 and was 
 chosen vice-president and general manager of Colt's Pat- 
 ent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company, a position 
 which he held until April, 1888. In 1886 he became 
 president of the board of visitors of the United States 
 Military Academy, and he was elected president of the 
 commission which built the Capitol, in 1872, his record 
 as an officer of engineers in the Mexican War peculiarly 
 fitting him for the position. He was the consulting en- 
 gineer of the commission from 1873 to 1877 and superin- 
 tendent from 1877 to 1880. He was a member of the 
 board of water commissioners of the city of Hartford 
 from 1868 to 1878 and was chairman of the committee 
 of judges on engineering and architecture at the Cen- 
 tennial Exposition at Philadelphia in 1876. 
 
 General Franklin was one of the presidential electors 
 from this state who nominated Samuel J. Tilden as the 
 democratic candidate for President, and from 1877 to 
 1879 was adjutant-general on the staff of Governor Hub- 
 bard. In July, 1880, he was chosen president of the 
 board of managers of the National Home for Disabled 
 Volunteer Soldiers, a position to which he gave the 
 
greater part of his time until about three years ago. In 
 June, 1888, he was appointed commissioner-general from 
 the United States to the International Exposition at Paris, 
 and in the following year received the decoration as a 
 grand officer of the French Legion of Honor, being the 
 only American citizen at that time who held that dis- 
 tinction. 
 
 General Franklin was for several terms commander 
 of the New York Commandery of the Loyal Legion 
 of the United States, in which he always retained his 
 membership. He was a member of the Society of the 
 Cincinnati, the Sons of the American Revolution, the 
 Army and Navy Club of Connecticut, and of Robert O. 
 Tyler Post, No. 50, G. A. R., of which he was a charter 
 member. The general was formerly a director in the 
 Colt's Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company and 
 was, until about a year ago, when he resigned, a director 
 of the Panama Railroad Company. He was a director 
 of the National Fire Insurance Company and until com- 
 paratively recently attended the meetings of the board ; 
 vice-president of the Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection 
 & Insurance Company, and a director in the Connecticut 
 Mutual Life Insurance Company. 
 
 General Franklin was an Episcopalian in faith and a 
 Democrat in politics. He became a member of the Church 
 of the Good Shepherd when he came here to live and had 
 frequently served in the positions of senior warden and 
 vestryman. General Franklin was married on July 7, 
 1852, to Miss Annie L, Clark of Washington, D. C. She 
 died in this city July 17, 1900. They had no children, 
 and the general failed perceptibly after her death. 
 
COLONEL GREENE'S SKETCH. 
 
 A REVIEW OF THE CAREER OF THE GREAT 
 COMMANDER. 
 
 Brevet Major-General, late U. S. A. Major-General, U. S. V. 
 Elected August i, 1866, resigned December 6, 1882; restored 
 April 4, 1888, 1st class. Insignia 789. U. S. Army : 
 
 Cadet, U. S. Military Academy, July i, 1839. 
 
 Brevet Second Lieutenant, Corps of Topographical Engineers, 
 U. S. Army, July i, 1843; Second Lieutenant, September 21, 
 1846; First Lieutenant, March 3, 1853; Captain, July i, 1857. 
 
 Colonel, I2th U. S. Infantry, May 14, 1861, resigned, March 
 15, 1866. 
 
 Brevet First Lieutenant, U. S. Army, February 23, 1847, " for 
 gallant and meritorious conduct at the battle of Buena Vista, 
 Mexico." 
 
 Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, June 30, 1862, " for 
 gallant and meritorious conduct in the battles before Richmond, 
 Virginia." 
 
 Brevet Major-General, U. S. Army, March 31, 1865, "for gal- 
 lant and meritorious services in the field during the war." 
 
 U. S. Volunteers : 
 
 Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, May 17, 1861 ; Major- 
 General, July 4, 1862 ; resigned, November 10, 1865. 
 
 Survey of Northwestern Lakes. General Kearney's Expedi- 
 tion to South Pass of Rocky Mountains. Assistant in Topo- 
 graphical Bureau at Washington, D. C. Survey of Ossabaw 
 Sound, Ga. Mexican War, battle of Buena Vista. Assistant 
 Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy at Military 
 Academy. Survey of Roanoke Inlet, N. C. In charge of Oswego 
 
(N. Y.) Harbor Improvements. Lighthouse Inspector, First 
 District. Superintending Engineer of Portland (Me.) Custom 
 House and Marine Hospital. Lighthouse Engineer, First and 
 Second Districts. Engineer-Secretary of Lighthouse Board, 
 Washington, D. C. Member of Board to construct bridge across 
 the Mississippi at Rock Island, 111. Charge of Extension of 
 Capitol and General Postoffice, Washington, D. C. Chief of 
 Construction, Bureau of U. S. Treasury Department, and Treas- 
 ury Building extension. Manassas Campaign ; battle of Bull 
 Run, Va. In command of Alexandria, Va., and a division in the 
 defenses of Washington, D. C. Peninsular Campaign; com- 
 manded a division, and Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac. 
 Maryland and Antietam Campaign; Rappahannock Campaign; 
 commanded Left Grand Division (First and Sixth Corps), Army 
 of the Potomac. Department of the Gulf. Commanded troops 
 in and about Baton Rouge, La. Expedition to Sabine Pass, Tex. 
 Nineteenth Army Corps, and Western Louisiana. Red River 
 Expedition. Captured, July ii, 1864; escaped, July 12, 1864. 
 President of Board for Retiring Disabled Officers, at Wilmington, 
 Del. 
 
 Wounded, April 8, 1864, at Sabine Cross Roads, La. 
 
 So Stands the bare record in the archives of the Loyal 
 Legion of one of its most distinguished members, of one 
 of the country's most gallant and competent soldiers, of 
 one of her noblest sons ; a mere memorandum as it reads, 
 but each item of which he, in the doing, filled with his 
 own rare intelligence, accomplishment, integrity, bravery, 
 and devotion, and made it a story of a worthy deed well 
 done, and the whole a history of great services, in great 
 exigencies. 
 
 William Buel Franklin was born at York, Pa., Febru- 
 ary 27, 1823. His father, Walter S. Franklin, was clerk 
 of the House of Representatives in Congress ; his great- 
 grandfather was a soldier of the Revolution, and his 
 
great-grandmother, Mary Rhoads, was the daughter of 
 Samuel Rhoads, a Pennsylvania member of the first Con- 
 tinental Congress. His mother was the daughter of Dr. 
 William Buel of Litchfield, a descendant of Peter Buel of 
 Windsor, Conn. All the heritable virtues of such stock 
 met in this descendant. 
 
 WEST POINT AND MEXICAN WAR. 
 
 In 1839 he was appointed a cadet at the Military Acad- 
 emy at West Point, where he graduated in 1843 at the 
 head of his class and with unusual distinction. He was 
 assigned to the Topographical Engineers, and entered at 
 once upon the field work of that department on the lakes 
 and in the Rocky Mountains ; after two years of this 
 duty and a year in the topographical office at Washing- 
 ton, he was made second lieutenant, having hitherto held 
 only brevet rank, so small was the army organization and 
 so slow the promotion. The Mexican War brought him 
 the serious duties of topographical engineer on the staff 
 of General Taylor, in the discharge of which he distin- 
 guished himself, as he also did on the field of battle, 
 being brevetted for gallantry at Buena Vista. For two 
 years after the Mexican War he was assistant professor 
 of natural and experimental philosophy at West Point. 
 For the next two years he was engaged in the construc- 
 tion of coast defense works ; then followed four years of 
 constructive work for the lighthouse and customs ser- 
 vices. In March, 1857, he was appointed secretary of 
 the lighthouse board, and in October following he 
 reached the grade of captain in the corps of topographical 
 engineers. In November, 1859, he was charged with the 
 
10 
 
 superintendence of the Capitol and postoffice buildings, 
 and in March, 1861, he was assigned to duty as super- 
 vising architect of the treasury department, 
 
 CIVIL WAR. 
 
 The outbreak of the Civil War laid such accomplish- 
 ment as his under instant contribution, and on the 12th of 
 May, 186 1, he was made colonel of the Twelfth United 
 States Infantry, and on the 14th was appointed brigadier- 
 general of volunteers. He was assigned to the command 
 of a brigade in Heintzelman's division of the army under 
 McDowell's command, which first came into collision 
 with the enemy at Bull Run, which Sherman says was 
 the best planned and worst fought battle of the war. 
 Beauregard with his forces menaced Washington in 
 front; Johnston at Winchester threatened its rear. Pat- 
 terson was relied on to keep Johnston busy while Mc- 
 Dowell dealt with Beauregard, whom he found in posi- 
 tion at Manassas on the line of the Run. McDowell's 
 plan of attack was to first demonstrate so strongly against 
 the enemy's right as to lead to his concentration there, 
 and then strike his weakened left with a heavy column 
 from his own right which should turn his position and 
 take it in the rear. Johnston had, however, eluded Pat- 
 terson and added his force to Beauregard's just in time, 
 and, by one of those curious coincidences not in- 
 frequent in military operations and occurring sev- 
 eral times in our Civil War, the two were preparing 
 and had actually begun the movements for an attack by 
 their right on McDowell's base at Centerville, which was 
 in rear of his left as his lines were formed. Franklin's 
 brigade had consisted of four regiments of short term 
 
II 
 
 men. The term of enlistment of one Pennsylvania regi- 
 ment expired at midnight before the battle, and they 
 marched to the rear to the sound of the enemy's guns. 
 Their gallant colonel, Hartranft, reported to Franklin 
 and served as an aide during the day — a presage of his 
 devoted service during the war. Franklin's brigade, with 
 the famous Ricketts Battery attached, was a part of the 
 turning column, and came upon the position on the Henry 
 House plateau on the Sudley new road, which was the 
 critical point in both the actions of the day. It was at 
 this point McDowell's flanking force struck the Confed- 
 erate left, and made an entirely successful attack, in which 
 Franklin's command was heavily engaged at the center 
 of things. As soon as this attack was well under way, 
 McDowell ordered the troops in front of the Confederate 
 center to attack with all vigor, which would at least have 
 prevented any assistance being sent to the defeated left. 
 But the attack was tardy and feeble, the only real fighting 
 being done by Sherm.an's brigade, which crossed the Run 
 and got to McDowell. But as soon as the heavy firing 
 warned Beauregard and Johnston of what was going on, 
 they had promptly abandoned the movement on Center- 
 ville and sent their troops to the left, undelayed by the 
 faint Federal attack on their center, and effected the 
 changes of position which enabled them in the action of 
 the afternoon to bring their combined weight to bear so 
 unexpectedly and effectively on McDowell's right. The 
 center of this later action also was at the Henry House, 
 and Franklin's command bore its full part of the brunt 
 of this as of the morning's battle and lost very heavily. 
 The desperate fighting of his artillery by the gallant 
 Ricketts was one of the brilliant features of the day. 
 
 LcFC. 
 
12 
 
 REORGANIZING. 
 
 When the army fell back on Washington, Franklin 
 rendered especially valuable services in the reorganiza- 
 tion and preparations which followed, and was assigned 
 to the command of a division in McDowell's Corps in the 
 defense of Washington. An interesting incident of this 
 long period of much necessary preparation and of much 
 hesitation was a conference between President Lincoln 
 and Generals Franklin, Meigs, and McDowell. The de- 
 lays in action of the general-in-chief were followed by 
 his illness, and, to be prepared for action in the contin- 
 gency of his death, Mr. Lincoln called together Franklin 
 and McDowell as among the most competent commanders 
 and Meigs as quartermaster-general and a most compe- 
 tent officer, and submitted to them a statement of the 
 essential facts of the situation as known to him, the 
 forces in hand, their positions, the state of public senti- 
 ment, and the political conditions, and asked their judg- 
 ment as to the plan of movement which could be most 
 speedily undertaken and the time at which they could be 
 prepared to move if ordered. The next day they sub- 
 mitted a written recommendation embodying a plan 
 which, unknown to them then and until long afterwards, 
 Mr. Lincoln had already suggested to General McClellan 
 and which had been by him set aside. 
 
 PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 
 
 During the winter of 1862 it was decided that Mc- 
 Clellan should operate against Richmond by way of the 
 Peninsula, his troops being moved by water to Fortress 
 Monroe. From this point there were two lines of ap- 
 
13 
 
 proach: the one by the James River (afterward taken by 
 Grant, and preferred by McClellan, but then closed by 
 Confederate gunboats and batteries), and the other by 
 the York and Pamunkey Rivers as a line of supply. On 
 the 6th of April he had landed on the Peninsula over 
 102,000 men present for active duty. McDowell's Corps, 
 in which Franklin had a division, was at Fredericksburg 
 en route by land, but here it was halted to avoid uncover- 
 ing Washington. At McClellan's urgent request, Frank- 
 lin's division was put on transports and sent him, arriv- 
 ing April 22, but it was left chafing on board until May 5, 
 when, getting his orders at last, Franklin moved up to 
 the mouth of the Pamunkey, and landing at Eltham, re- 
 ceived a fierce attack by Longstreet's troops, where he 
 was covering Johnston's left in his deliberate withdrawal 
 from Yorktown to Richmond. This attack he repelled, 
 and firmly established himself on the Confederate left, 
 near the point which was to become the base of supply 
 for the Army of the Potomac, whose movement up 
 the Peninsula had been very gradual. On the 9th of 
 May the Confederate ironclad Virginia, or Merrimac, had 
 been destroyed by her commander, leaving the James 
 open to the Federal Navy; but its line of advance was 
 not available to McClellan, even if he still desired it, 
 since the authorities at Washington would not hear to 
 the uncovering of that city and required that McDowell's 
 strong corps should, if McClellan were to have it at all, 
 so move as to keep in its front, and connecting with Mc- 
 Clellan, form his right to the north of Richmond and 
 menacing the enemy's left. It was also necessary for 
 McClellan to place his main force on the westerly or 
 Richmond side of the Chickahominy, which was the only 
 
14 
 
 considerable natural obstacle to his approach. This com- 
 pelled him to advance along and astride the Chickahom- 
 iny, with a strong force on its easterly side both to reach 
 out toward McDowell and also to protect the base at 
 White House. He now formed his troops into pro- 
 visional corps, and Franklin was placed in command of 
 the Sixth Corps on the i8th of May with Smith and 
 Slocum as division commanders. The corps of Franklin 
 and Porter formed McClellan's right on the northeasterly 
 side of the Chickahominy, and after some fighting took 
 positions reaching north of Richmond to await the ar- 
 rival of McDowell, when they were expected to cross by 
 bridges to the southwesterly side and join in the attack 
 on that city. On the 24th of May McClellan was thus 
 in position waiting for McDowell, without whom he did 
 not consider himself strong enough to attack, and Mc- 
 Dowell had been ordered to march from Fredericksburg 
 on the 26th, and on that day he did march out eight use- 
 less miles. 
 
 AT FAIR OAKS. 
 
 For Johnston was in command at Richmond, well un- 
 derstanding the situation and the man he was dealing 
 with. Jackson was in the upper part of the Shenandoah 
 Valley with a strong force, and early in May he began 
 to move. After a series of long marches and several 
 engagements, on the 24th of May, just when McClellan's 
 plans seemed at last going to his mind, Jackson appeared 
 at Winchester; Washington was alarmed; McDowell's 
 advance from Fredericksburg was countermanded, half 
 his troops sent up to the valley to help catch Jackson, 
 and thenceforth McClellan must get on without him. It 
 
15 
 
 behooved him to fight Johnston before Jackson could 
 come to his help. But only two of his five corps were on 
 the fighting side of the Chickahominy, and only Bottom's 
 bridge was available for crossing. By the 28th Sumner, 
 who lay nearest the river and was the center of the army, 
 had built two bridges for his command, but the two 
 bridges prepared for Franklin and Porter, who were at 
 Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill, were not yet laid, and 
 the army was divided by a treacherous stream, without 
 crossing which it could not sustain such an attack as 
 could be delivered, and in rear of its cut off right wing 
 was its vast accumulation of supplies which must be pro- 
 tected. Johnston considered that it behooved him to 
 strike the left wing of McClellan's army while yet it was 
 divided, and on the 30th of May his preparations were 
 made. That night came the torrential rain which put the 
 Chickahominy in flood and made its borders a morass. 
 Early next morning Johnston attacked at Fair Oaks or 
 Seven Pines, and pressed the Federal troops back, until 
 Sumner, hearing the guns, without waiting for his or- 
 ders, marched his columns to his bridges, which were 
 kept in place in the torrent by the weight of the men, 
 crossed, and struck the blow which saved the day and 
 recovered the lost positions. Johnston was wounded, 
 and Lee took his place, which he kept till Appomattox. 
 
 GAINES' MILLS. 
 
 And now came a month of delay in which McClellan 
 seems to have halted between two opinions, calling, on 
 the one hand, for more troops, and promising to cross 
 the Chickahominy and attack as soon as the waters fell 
 
i6 
 
 and the mud dried ; on the other, he meditated transfer- 
 ring his army and supply Hne to the James; but nothing 
 decisive was done until Lee settled the question. This 
 great general planned to leave Magruder and Huger with 
 about twenty-five thousand men between McClellan's 
 left wing and Richmond while he took the rest of his 
 force to the north side of the Chickahominy, called Jack- 
 son to join him, and then swept down that bank of the 
 river, crushing McClellan's right, and planting himself 
 in his rear and on his line of supply. To deceive all con- 
 cerned and keep any reinforcements to McClellan from 
 the front of Washington, he ostentatiously sent a division 
 from Richmond to Jackson, but at the same time order- 
 ing him to move secretly and swiftly by interior lines to 
 the proper point on the Federal right. He left Port Re- 
 public on the 17th of June, and not a Federal officer 
 knew of his march until on the 25th he reached Ashland, 
 twelve miles from Richmond, the very day McClellan was 
 advancing his pickets on the Williamsburg road. On the 
 26th Lee struck Porter's Corps at Beaver Dam Creek. 
 Porter held Longstreet in check, but Jackson turned his 
 flank. And now McClellan decided to transfer Porter, 
 as he had done Franklin, to the south side of the Chicka- 
 hominy and his whole army to the James. But it was 
 necessary to gain time to move guns and supplies, and for 
 this Jackson must be held in check. Porter with his 
 corps of twenty-seven thousand was assigned the task, 
 and next morning the battle of Gaines' Mills began ; but 
 it presently appeared that he had two-thirds of Lee's 
 army pressing him, and Franklin sent Slocum's division 
 of his corps to his aid. That day saw one of the bloodi- 
 est battles of the war. During the day Franklin also sus- 
 
17 
 
 tained and repulsed an attack on Smith's division at Gold- 
 ing's farm. During the night the troops were crossed 
 over, the bridges destroyed, and the march to the James 
 began. The day before the battle of Gaines' Mills Frank- 
 lin occupied the right of the Federal line on the Rich- 
 mond side of the river, at Golding's farm. Besides send- 
 ing Slocum to Porter's aid, when the latter fell back to 
 the bridges, Franklin placed his artillery in position to 
 command the opposite bank and used it with such effect 
 that the enemy fell back to find another line of attack. 
 The day following Gaines' Mills, the enemy made a 
 furious assault on Franklin's right, where Hancock of 
 Smith's division was posted, but was handsomely re- 
 pulsed. 
 
 On the 28th the retrograde movement began and 
 Franklin was its rear guard. During the day he was 
 again attacked by some Georgia regiments, many of 
 whom were captured, among them Colonel — afterward 
 Justice — Lamar. The day following, June 29th, Frank- 
 lin ascertained that the enemy had repaired some of the 
 bridges across the Chickahominy and was advancing in 
 strong force on Savage's Station. Slocum's division, 
 having suffered severely at Gaines' Mills, had been sent 
 across White Oak Swamp. By some misunderstanding, 
 Heintzelman's Corps had gone on, leaving a gap of a mile 
 between Franklin and Sumner, neither of whom knew of 
 its departure until the enemy began to appear where it 
 should have been. Franklin promptly put his remaining 
 division. Smith's, in position and notified Sumner, who 
 formed for his support. At four in the afternoon the 
 Confederates attacked and fought stubbornly until night 
 fell, but were completely driven from the field. That 
 
i8 
 
 night Franklin crossed the White Oak Swamp by the one 
 road then known, and took position to prevent its passage 
 by the Confederates. The next day, June 30, was a criti- 
 cal one in this movement to change base. The trains 
 were still on the way to Harrison's Landing, and the 
 marching columns were converging on Malvern. 
 
 Lee, perplexed at first, had discovered the true char- 
 acter of McClellan's movement, and now sought to con- 
 centrate his whole force on the latter's line of march, while 
 it was yet in progress. Longstreet, Magruder, and Huger 
 were sent hurrying south from Richmond by the several 
 roads leading thence. Jackson was making for the pass 
 of the White Oak Swamp. The natural meeting point 
 of Lee's columns was at or near Glendale, in Franklin's 
 rear and directly on McClellan's route. Could Long- 
 street have established himself at Glendale or on the 
 neighboring roads, he would have cut McClellan's line 
 and compelled him to fight at great disadvantage, and 
 would probably have compelled Franklin, placed between 
 two fires, to let Jackson through. Could the latter have 
 crossed the White Oak Swamp in force, he would have 
 forced a junction with Longstreet and Magruder, and 
 Lee's army would have been united and in a position to 
 make trouble. And this was what he strenuously es- 
 sayed to do. With nearly half the Confederate Army 
 and a great number of guns, Jackson came to the cross- 
 ing. With Smith's division of his own corps and Rich- 
 ardson's division of Sumner's and Nagle's brigade, 
 Franklin was ordered to defend it to the last, he having 
 already put Slocum's division in position at Glendale, 
 where it was heavily engaged in that most important 
 action by which Longstreet was held in check until Frank- 
 
19 
 
 Hn should be ready to fall back after seeing all the rest 
 safe. Under screen of the forests lining the swamp, 
 Jackson massed his troops and his artillery, and opened 
 a heavy bombardment on Franklin's position ; but he 
 could make no impression. As often as he tried to push 
 across Franklin swept him back, and stood immovable 
 throughout the day and until the last of his great rear 
 guard work was done and the rest of the army was al- 
 ready in its wisely chosen position at Malvern Hill, where 
 it was necessary to give battle to the Confederates who 
 had concentrated upon this point, both to give them the 
 severe check which McClellan was now fully prepared 
 to do, and also under its cover to allow the last of the 
 trains to reach the new base on the James. To this po- 
 sition Franklin now fell back by a short road General 
 Smith had explored during the day, and took his station 
 on the right, where he bore his part in the great battle 
 that followed; the weight of which, however, fell on the 
 center and left of McClellan's lines. And here ended 
 the serious fighting on the Peninsula. 
 
 While McClellan had been operating on the Penin- 
 sula the troops disposed for the defense of Washington 
 especially and in West Virginia were collected, and 
 formed a second army under the command of General 
 John Pope, who, at the time McClellan's troops were 
 transferred from the Peninsula north, was fronting 
 toward Richmond and toward the passes of the Shenan- 
 doah with his base at Centerville. As McClellan's 
 troops came north they were ordered to report at once to 
 Pope, and became a part of his command. Early in July 
 Franklin had been made a major-general, and in the re- 
 organization of the Army of the Potomac he was as- 
 
20 
 
 signed to the command of the Sixth Corps, with which 
 he landed at Alexandria July 26, 1862. Pope was at 
 this time making that confused series of movements 
 which preceded the second battle of Bull Run, in his at- 
 tempt to ascertain the precise whereabouts of Lee's 
 forces, which were rapidly pushing north with Jackson 
 in the valley, of whose whereabouts there was no doubt 
 when he struck Pope's rear and line of supply at Manas- 
 sas Junction. Hal leek ordered Franklin to camp and 
 refit, expressing the opinion that no apprehension need 
 be felt regarding Pope, and doubting if Franklin's Corps 
 would be needed by him ; but on the 27th, parties of the 
 enemy having appeared at Centerville, Franklin was or- 
 dered to prepare with all haste for a forward movement, 
 for which he required animals for his artillery and trains, 
 and on the 29th he started with his entire corps for Cen- 
 terville, soon meeting fugitives from Pope's command. 
 With a correct apprehension of the possible developments 
 of Pope's retrograde movement, he sent a brigade and 
 battery under Colonel Torbert to take position at the in- 
 tersection of the Little River and Warrenton pikes. He 
 passed through Centerville, and three miles out he met 
 Pope falling back, who ordered him to return to Center- 
 ville, where he remained through the 30th, and from the 
 time of meeting Pope was his rear guard until two days 
 later his forces were in the defenses of Washington. On 
 the night of the 30th Stuart with his cavalry made an at- 
 tempt to strike Pope's trains in the neighborhood of Fair- 
 fax Court House, destroy them, and plant himself be- 
 tween Pope and Washington. But here he came upon 
 the brigade and battery under Torbert, which Franklin 
 had posted at the right point, and after a brisk night 
 
21 
 
 fight was driven off, and an all-important position was 
 saved and held. On the 2d of September Franklin with 
 his corps re-entered Alexandria. 
 
 Lee moved steadily northward, and on the 3d of Sep- 
 tember crossed the Potomac, Jackson in the advance, 
 near Leesburg. Pope had been relieved and McClellan 
 placed in command, and on the 5th he started to locate 
 Lee and bring him to stand and fight. He moved out 
 from the defenses of Washington upon five parallel roads, 
 covering both Washington and Baltimore and giving a 
 front which was reasonably certain to touch Lee's line of 
 march at some point. 
 
 Franklin moved on the road nearest the Potomac, and 
 his command constituted the left wing of McClellan's 
 force. The latter fully believed that Lee intended to 
 strike into Pennsylvania, but Halleck feared that his ad- 
 vance in that direction was a mere ruse to draw Mc- 
 Clellan far from Washington, and then, turning his left, 
 slip in behind him. The movement, and especially that of 
 Franklin's column, was much hampered in its progress 
 by this apprehension. Lee was moving steadily north 
 behind the screen of the range of South Mountain, toward 
 which McClellan was cautiously advancing with a con- 
 stant lookout to his left and rear. 
 
 WINS Lincoln's thanks. 
 
 The principal passes through this north and south 
 range were Turner's Gap at the north and Crampton's 
 at the south, both strong positions and strongly occupied. 
 Reno's column was directed against Turner's Gap, which 
 he carried after a severe and brilliant action. Franklin's 
 
22 
 
 column was directed against Crampton's Gap, and about 
 noon of September 14th his advance came upon the 
 enemy strongly occupying a most advantageous position. 
 He immediately made his dispositions and attacked in a 
 most brilliant manner, and won the " completest victory 
 gained up to that time by any part of the Army of the 
 Potomac." A distinguishing feature of Frankhn as a 
 commander was his broad grasp and thorough compre- 
 hension of the nature and of the magnitude of the work 
 he found before him, and then the unhesitating employ- 
 ment of enough force, acting at once and together, to ac- 
 complish his purpose. He studied his conditions care- 
 fully and with profound military intelligence, calculated 
 the necessary weight of his blow and delivered it in all 
 its instant might. Perhaps nothing will convey a more 
 complete illustration of the man in free and wholly re- 
 sponsible action, of his soldierly qualities, his mental 
 clearness, his modest reserve, and his lucid conciseness of 
 style, than the following extract from his official report 
 of this engagement: 
 
 " The enemy was strongly posted on both sides of the 
 road, which made a steep ascent through a narrow defile, 
 wooded on both sides and offering great advantages of 
 cover and position. Their advance was posted near the 
 base of the mountain, in the rear of a stone wall, stretch- 
 ing to the right of the road at a point where the ascent 
 was gradual and for the most part over open fields. 
 Eight guns had been stationed on the road and at points 
 on the sides and summit of the mountain to the left of 
 the pass. It was evident that the position could be car- 
 ried only by an infantry attack. Accordingly, I directed 
 Major-General Slocum to advance his division through 
 
23 
 
 the village of Burkittsville and commence the attack 
 upon the right. Wolcott's First Maryland Battery was 
 stationed on the left and to the rear of the village, and 
 maintained a steady fire on the positions of the enemy 
 until they were assailed and carried by our troops. 
 Smith's division was placed in reserve on the east side of 
 the village, and held in readiness to cooperate with Gen- 
 eral Slocum or support his attack as occasion might re- 
 quire. Captain Ayres' Battery of this division was 
 posted on a commanding ground to the left of the re- 
 serves, and kept up an uninterrupted fire on the principal 
 battery of the enemy until the latter was driven from its 
 position. 
 
 " The advance of General Slocum was made with ad- 
 mirable steadiness through a well-directed fire from the 
 batteries on the mountain, the brigade of Colonel Bartlett 
 taking the lead, and followed at proper intervals by the 
 brigades of General Newton and Colonel Torbert. Upon 
 fully determining the enemy's position, the skirmishers 
 were withdrawn and Colonel Bartlett became engaged 
 along his entire line. He maintained his ground steadily 
 under a severe fire for some time at a manifest disadvan- 
 tage, until reenforced by two regiments of General New- 
 ton's brigade upon his right, and the brigade of Colonel 
 Torbert and the two remaining regiments of Newton's 
 on his left. The line of battle thus formed, an immediate 
 charge was ordered, and most gallantly executed. The 
 men swept forward with a cheer, over the stone wall, dis- 
 lodging the enemy, and pursuing him up the mountain- 
 side to the crest of the hill and down the opposite slope. 
 This single charge, sustained as it was over a great dis- 
 tance, and on a rough ascent of unusual steepness, was 
 
24 
 
 decisive. The enemy was driven in the utmost con- 
 fusion from a position of strength and allowed no oppor- 
 tunity for even an attempt to rally, until the pass was 
 cleared and in the possession of our troops. 
 
 " When the division under General Slocum first be- 
 came actively engaged, I directed General Brooks' brig- 
 ade, of Smith's division, to advance upon the left of the 
 road and dislodge the enemy from the woods upon Slo- 
 cum's flank. The movement was promptly and steadily 
 made under a severe artillery fire. General Brooks oc- 
 cupied the woods after a slight resistance, and then ad- 
 vanced, simultaneously with General Slocum, rapidly and 
 in good order, to the crest of the mountain. The victory 
 was complete, and its achievement followed so rapidly 
 upon the first attack that the enemy's reserves, although 
 pushed forward at the double-quick, arrived but in time 
 to participate in the flight and add confusion to the rout. 
 Four hundred prisoners, from 17 different organizations, 
 700 stand of arms, i piece of artillery, and 3 stand of 
 colors were captured." 
 
 Franklin fully earned the personal thanks so cordially 
 given him a few days later by President Lincoln. Had 
 Franklin's advance to this point been unhampered by the 
 apprehensions of the authorities in respect to matters on 
 his left and rear, he would have been in abundant time to 
 relieve Harper's Ferry; but this was now out of the 
 question. While he was breaking through to its relief 
 it was surrendered. 
 
 AT ANTIETAM. 
 
 West of the wall of the South Mountain range An- 
 tietam Creek runs southerly into the Potomac, and here 
 
25 
 
 Lee was brought to a stand by the Federal successes at 
 Crampton's and Turner's Gaps. Taking his defensive 
 position on the west side of the creek, which was crossed 
 in his front by four bridges, McClellan on the east side 
 made his dispositions for attack, placing strong com- 
 mands in position to cross at each of these bridges, Burn- 
 side being at the lower bridge opposite Lee's right. The 
 plan of battle involved Burnside's strong attack at that 
 point, while Sumner and Hooker were to move up the 
 stream and cross at the fifth bridge, above Lee's left, 
 which was under Jackson. Sumner and Hooker executed 
 the movement assigned them and came upon Jackson 
 near the Dunker Church, and here the fight raged heavily 
 and long. In spite of repeated and peremptory orders, 
 Burnside did not attack for many hours, and so long was 
 his movement delayed that Lee, becoming confident, 
 moved a considerable force from his right, which Burn- 
 side had not engaged, to his left under Jackson, so that 
 at this point he was able to quite hold his own against 
 Sumner and Hooker. Meanwhile Franklin, moving with 
 great promptness and rapidity, had come up from below 
 McClellan's left from Crampton's Gap, and was ordered 
 to cross by the upper bridge and reinforce Sumner and 
 Hooker. When he reached their position their troops 
 were exhausted by their long struggle, had suffered 
 heavy losses, were somewhat disorganized, and matters 
 were at a standstill. Franklin sensed the situation and 
 at once put his entire command in a better position on 
 commanding ground, in formation for attack with his 
 whole force, and placed his artillery where it most ef- 
 fectually commanded Jackson's position. As Sumner 
 ranked Franklin, and McClellan was not on that part of 
 
26 
 
 the field, Franklin was necessarily under his orders, and 
 when he reported that he was ready to advance, and ex- 
 pressed his confidence of promptly and thoroughly rout- 
 ing the enemy, Sumner, from the severity with which he 
 had been made to suffer, had become so doubtful of the 
 result of any attack that he forbade Franklin's advance. 
 The latter at once sent to McClellan, stating his readiness 
 to attack and his belief in its success, and urging Mc- 
 Clellan to come in person and examine the situation for 
 himself. McClellan came; but no urgency or assurance 
 on Franklin's part availed to secure him the magnificent 
 opportunity which he clearly saw, and which from his 
 position and from the at least equal exhaustion of Jack- 
 son's troops with that of Sumner's he felt certain must 
 be successful, and he had the chagrin to be condemned 
 to comparative inactivity during the remainder of the 
 day, with victory, as he believed, at his hand. 
 
 Meantime Burnside had finally gotten into action, and 
 effected a lodgment opposite Lee's right on the west side 
 of the stream, but after severe fighting he practically only 
 held the position. His advances had been thrown back. 
 Lee's troops from Harper's Ferry arrived. The next 
 morning Franklin was urgent to be allowed to make his 
 proposed attack, but McClellan was apprehensive that he 
 was much outnumbered, and, hoping for a reinforcement 
 of Pennsylvania militia next day, ordered Franklin to 
 wait, promising that on the arrival of the expected rein- 
 forcements he should make his attack. The troops did 
 not arrive, but " next day " Lee had gone. It was never 
 Franklin's fashion to send in his troops in driblets, and 
 his plan here was to mass his forty guns on a command- 
 ing ground, thoroughly sweep Jackson's position with 
 
27 
 
 their sufficient fire, and then to deliver his blow with his 
 whole force at once. Later knowledge fully justified 
 his apprehension of the situation and the undoubted 
 efficacy of the attack as he proposed to make it. When 
 it was ascertained that Lee had retired, Franklin again 
 urged that he be allowed to pursue with all vigor, as his 
 troops were all in good condition; but here again he was 
 overruled. 
 
 Lee fell leisurely back across the river and moved 
 southward. McClellan followed, and the two armies 
 maneuvered for position until McClellan had his head- 
 quarters at Warrenton with his army massed so as to 
 threaten both the Shenandoah passes and the more east- 
 erly lines to Richmond. Lee was uncertain of Mc- 
 Clellan's design, and kept Jackson in strong force in the 
 Shenandoah, while Longstreet was at Culpepper, his two 
 wings being thus divided by long marches. McClellan's 
 view was that Lee's army was the proper objective, and 
 that its destruction or complete defeat was of far greater 
 importance than the capture of even Richmond. Noth- 
 ing could be sounder. It was the theory which, applied 
 by the always ready fighting qualities of Grant and his 
 generals, won the day at last. Richmond was important 
 to them mainly because Lee had to care for its safety. 
 McClellan was now in position to place himself between 
 Lee's wings and strike each in turn with his whole force 
 before it could be helped by the other, than which no 
 better plan could be devised. But while preparing for 
 this movement he was again relieved from the command 
 of the Army of the Potomac, which was turned over to 
 Burnside, who turned his back upon McClellan's line of 
 action and began to consider what line of advance he 
 
28 
 
 would take on Richmond. His views were not in favor 
 at Washington, but he was allowed to take his way, and 
 he began his movements for an advance by way of Fred- 
 ericksburg. McClellan's plan ultimately included an ad- 
 vance on Richmond after he should have delivered a 
 crushing blow to Lee's army, either by way of Fred- 
 ericksburg or by transfer again to the Peninsula, if 
 the Fredericksburg line proved bad for supplies. Burn- 
 side took command the 7th of November. For the pur- 
 poses of his campaign, he organized the army into three 
 grand divisions. The right grand division, under Sum- 
 ner, marched to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, 
 where it arrived November 17th. There was but a slight 
 force of the enemy posted near the town, and Sumner 
 could easily have crossed and desired to do so. His 
 orders did not contemplate it, and, on asking permission, 
 he was ordered to remain on the north side of the river 
 until all the troops were in their positions — an inaction 
 of which Lee took the promptest advantage. Hooker 
 commanded the center grand division, and moved to take 
 position at Sumner's left. Franklin commanded the left 
 grand division, composed of the First and Sixth Corps, 
 commanded by Reynolds and W. F. Smith, and took 
 position at Hooker's left below the town and opposite 
 the heights, which, curving forward toward their right, 
 end at the Massaponax. And here they waited for the 
 pontoons to arrive for bridging the stream, which was 
 now rising from recent rains. Presently Longstreet's 
 Corps occupied the heights back of Fredericksburg and 
 to the right, where he had abundant leisure to completely 
 fortify chosen positions until they were no longer assail- 
 able in front. Jackson was moved down to Longstreet's 
 
29 
 
 right, and occupied the heights below the town to Massa- 
 ponax River. After some consideration of a crossing 
 at Skinker's Neck, some twelve miles below, Burnside 
 gave up any idea of flanking Lee out of Fredericksburg, 
 and determined to attack in front in the alleged belief 
 that his attack would be unexpected, the enemy surprised 
 and unprepared, and his positions readily carried — a 
 view in which few competent soldiers concurred, 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG.* 
 
 On the loth of December Franklin was ordered to 
 have his command at a point a mile and a half below 
 Fredericksburg ready to begin crossing at daylight on 
 the nth on the bridges to be already prepared. Smith's 
 Sixth Corps, being the strongest, was to take the advance. 
 The heads of his columns promptly reached the river 
 before daylight; but only a few pontoons of each bridge 
 had been placed. They were not finished until after noon. 
 Smith's Corps was crossed rapidly, but, the bridges di- 
 rectly opposite Fredericksburg for the crossing of Sum- 
 ner's troops not having been completed, Franklin was 
 ordered to draw back all of his force but one brigade to 
 keep the bridge heads, and await the completion of the 
 arrangements in front of the town. The last hope of a 
 surprise was gone. What was to be gained now must 
 be fought for against 78,000 men admirably posted in 
 
 * The writer of this sketch has dealt in complete detail with 
 FrankHn's part in this battle in a small volume: 
 
 General William B. Franklin and the operations of the Left 
 Wing at the Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862. With 
 a map. 
 
 Belknap & Warfield, Hartford, Conn., 1900. 
 
30 
 
 strong and well fortified positions. On the 12th of De- 
 cember Franklin crossed his entire force and disposed it 
 most judiciously. He at once made a careful personal 
 examination of his entire front, and he knew the im- 
 possible work cut out for Sumner. Franklin soon per- 
 ceived the one reasonable possibility of the situation, to 
 wit: that the only chance of Burnside's success lay in 
 such an attack on Lee's left and in Franklin's front as 
 should break through and take him on the hills in his 
 rear. Franklin had Jackson in front of him with 30,000 
 or more men and good artillery. But if he could have 
 his bridges properly cared for, so as to have free use of 
 his force, he could prepare his attack with the fire of 80 
 guns and launch his mighty blow with 40,000 men. It 
 seemed the plain common sense of the situation if the 
 battle must be delivered. Smith and Reynolds, than 
 whom were no better corps commanders, wholly agreed 
 with his view. At 5 o'clock that day Burnside rode with 
 Franklin over his lines, and then, in the presence of 
 Smith and Reynolds, Franklin carefully explained his 
 plans and urged his attack as the one hope of success. 
 He asked that two divisions from one of Hooker's corps, 
 which were on the north side near his bridges, should be 
 sent at once to relieve Smith in guarding the bridges, 
 leaving him free to attack with his entire corps. Smith 
 and Reynolds both fully understood that Burnside fully 
 assented. Franklin meant to attack at daylight, and it 
 was necessary that the additional troops asked should be 
 crossed and placed as early as possible during the night, 
 that his formations might be duly made. He was urgent 
 for immediate orders. Burnside promised he should 
 have them in two or three hours, as soon as he returned 
 
31 
 
 to his headquarters, or at any rate before midnight, but 
 forbade action until he had received them in writing. 
 Franklin at once gave his necessary preparatory instruc- 
 tions to Smith and Reynolds, notified Hooker's division 
 of the orders they were about to receive and to be pre- 
 pared to move, and then awaited his promised orders. 
 But Burnside went to bed and wrote no orders till morn- 
 ing. Franklin was " sleepless with anxiety " and sent 
 repeated requests for his orders. No orders came, and at 
 midnight he sent an aid to Burnside asking for his orders ; 
 he was told they were in preparation and would be sent 
 forthwith; other messages were sent, but none of them 
 reached Burnside until morning, although their due re- 
 ceipt at headquarters was properly acknowledged. At 
 7.30 next morning Franklin received by the hand of 
 General Hardie of Burnside's staff — not an order to put 
 Stoneman at the bridges and in support and to hurl his 
 whole force at a chosen point in front and go through, 
 but : " Keep your whole command in position for a 
 rapid movement down the old Richmond road; and you 
 will send out at once a division at least, to pass below 
 Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain 
 Hamilton's on this side of the Massaponax, taking care 
 to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open." 
 Franklin was tied up. Smith's Corps was in line on his 
 right and guarding the bridges, which it could not leave 
 until relieved or Lee's center and left had retreated. He 
 was to send one division to attack, support it, and keep 
 its retreat assured, and yet hold his '' whole command in 
 readiness for a rapid movement down the old Richmond 
 road." There was no smashing of Lee's right in these 
 directions. Franklin and both his corps commanders 
 
32 
 
 could construe this order as directing nothing more than 
 a reconnoissance in force, and in this General Hardie 
 agreed. There was nothing for it but to leave Smith in 
 his position, send a division out of Reynolds' Corps at his 
 left to seize Hamilton's heights, support it, keep its way 
 out open, and wait for that unknown event which was to 
 require his rapid movement on the road; all of which is 
 explicable only on the theory that Burnside believed or 
 hoped that, instead of more than half Lee's army, Frank- 
 lin had in front of him no force that would undertake to 
 disturb him; that, therefore, after seizing Hamilton's 
 heights with a division, his whole command would re- 
 main disengaged and ready to move swiftly down the 
 road. It would seem as if Burnside expected to rout 
 Lee's left out of its position on the heights in rear of the 
 town, and then have Franklin pass his right and fall upon 
 his rear and his retreating troops, seizing a point mean- 
 time which should put him in a position to make this 
 rapid movement the more readily and speedily. 
 
 Franklin's troops were necessarily in the extended 
 order in which Burnside had found and left them the day 
 before; the only order which was at once defensive and 
 from which any formation could readily be made for at- 
 tack or movement in any direction. The divisions of 
 Stoneman's Corps of Hooker's grand division which he 
 had asked to have ordered over the evening before to 
 replace Smith's Corps, which was to be formed for the 
 grand attack, were still on the north side of the river, 
 and Smith could not leave his position without uncover- 
 ing the bridges over against which lay the fiery Hood. 
 Reynolds' corps was in line at Smith's left, and in his 
 front were Jackson's divisions, and to his left and formed 
 
33 
 
 across his flank was Stuart. Franklin promptly obeyed 
 his orders. Meade's division of Reynolds' corps, being 
 nearest the point indicated, was ordered to make the at- 
 tack, supported by Gibbon's division on his right and 
 Doubleday's on his left. At 7.40 General Hardie wired 
 his chief that the enemy was advancing to attack the left. 
 As Meade moved toward the heights where Jackson lay 
 waiting in the woods, Stuart's artillery opened upon his 
 left so severe an enfilading fire with eighteen guns that 
 he had to halt until Doubleday deployed his division to 
 the left, to face Stuart, silence his fire and prevent a 
 threatened assault from that direction, both on the flank 
 and on the bridges. Advancing again until near the 
 slopes, Meade suddenly received the crossing fire of 
 twenty-one guns on the heights on his right and five bat- 
 teries on his left front. And now everyone understood 
 that the woods in front were full of waiting infantry 
 holding their fire for close range. Therefore the bat- 
 teries must be silenced, the enemy's lines pounded with 
 the guns, and reenforcements brought up to closely sup- 
 port his thrust into the strong lines in front. Gibbon's 
 division deployed for attack on Meade's right, Smith's 
 left being advanced to connect; Birney and Stoneman, 
 for whom Franklin had asked in vain the night before, 
 were at last ordered over the river. After a severe artil- 
 lery duel of an hour and a half, Franklin silenced the 
 Confederate batteries, and Meade at once advanced in 
 most gallant style, under a tremendous fire, broke the 
 first line after desperate fighting, and would not be denied 
 until they struck the second line and were being pressed 
 on both flanks by the mass into which they had ploughed. 
 Doubleday to the left was holding Stuart off, Gibbon to 
 3 
 
 ^-- 
 
34 
 
 the right had made a gallant attack, but was unable to 
 advance as far, Smith's corps at his right was deployed 
 against the enemy covering his entire front and pressing 
 to find a weak spot to cut the army in two and destroy its 
 bridges, the reenforcing troops from over the river were 
 not yet up and available to take Meade's place and carry 
 on the attack, and Meade had to fall back. And now the 
 Confederates took the offensive and made a vigorous on- 
 slaught, but were checked after stubborn fighting. 
 
 Meade's attack and its results clearly demonstrated 
 several things: the success he gained showed that had 
 Franklin's plan of the day before been adopted and exe- 
 cuted as planned, Stoneman's and Birney's divisions 
 brought over the night before and so placed that Franklin 
 could put both his corps in formation for a simultaneous 
 attack prepared by his well-placed batteries, he would 
 probably have broken and turned Lee's right. Accidents 
 aside, this seems reasonably certain. The desperate fight- 
 ing of the divisions employed, the failure of the attack as 
 ordered by Burnside, and the number of the Confederate 
 troops making the counter attack, and the stubborn fight- 
 ing necessary to repel it, showed that no less an attack 
 and in no other manner than that proposed by Franklin 
 had a chance of success. The smashing of Lee's right 
 of near half his army required something very different 
 both in the dispositions of troops and the weight of attack 
 from sending one division to seize a point if it could, keep- 
 ing its line of retreat secure, and the " whole command " 
 in readiness for a rapid movement on the road. And the 
 ordering an attack by but one division, with instructions 
 to support it and keep its line of retreat open, meant and 
 could mean only one of two things ; that the man order- 
 
35 
 
 ing it wanted a reconnoissance in force, to find a weak 
 spot if he could, and then act according to circumstances; 
 or else that he believed the enemy's line so weakly held 
 that no greater force would be necessary; and it also 
 indicated that in case the assault were unsuccessful he 
 should not employ more of his forces at that point, but 
 depend for results on operations elsewhere. Sumner, 
 who was assaulting Fredericksburg directly in front, had 
 been ordered to seize a similar position in his front by a 
 similar force. The occupation of the one by Franklin 
 and the other by Sumner Burnside hoped would " compel 
 the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these 
 points." But the attack as he ordered it could have suc- 
 ceeded only against a comparatively weak force. Cer- 
 tainly the attack as he ordered it must have been a purely 
 tentative operation, subordinate to and while waiting for 
 other chief operations, to wit: the direct attack on Fred- 
 ericksburg. 
 
 General Hardie of Burnside's staff, who brought 
 Franklin his order at 7.45 in the morning, remained on 
 the field with him throughout the day, sending his chief 
 frequent messages by wire completely descriptive of the 
 situation, and getting no reply, no order or suggestion 
 until the middle of the short winter afternoon. At 2.15 
 p. M., he wired Burnside that Aleade and Gibbon had been 
 driven back, that Jackson was attacking, that " things do 
 not look well on Reynolds' front, still we'll have new 
 troops in soon." At 2.25, while engaged all along his 
 lines, Franklin received a message from Burnside saying: 
 " Your instructions of this morning are so far modified 
 as to require an advance upon the heights immediately 
 in your front." What was the situation? Franklin, in 
 
36 
 
 the extended order in which Burnside had left him the 
 day before, and in such formation that he could have put 
 his troops in column for the " rapid movement down the 
 old Richmond road," had made the attack ordered and 
 as ordered, which had been repulsed after long and hard 
 fighting, and was now fully engaged in repelling a counter 
 attack, 
 
 burnside's course. 
 
 Burnside had made his main great assault on the 
 heights in rear of Fredericksburg and been utterly de- 
 feated. Division upon division, under the most experi- 
 enced and gallant soldiers of the army, had flung them- 
 selves against that position with devoted bravery simply 
 to be swept away. Just at the moment when Franklin's 
 attack with Meade's division had failed and he was stop- 
 ping Jackson's rush, the survivors of that fearful slaugh- 
 ter had fallen back from their impossible task in utter ex- 
 haustion. Any competent man would have known that 
 what these men and their dead comrades, who lay so near 
 the goal, could not do, could not be done. But Burnside 
 was determined to repeat the trial. He ordered " Fight- 
 ing Joe Hooker," commanding his center grand division, 
 to take Butterfield's corps and carry the heights. He 
 promptly formed for the attack, but when he saw the work 
 before him, the difficult line of approach, and learned 
 from Hancock and French the nature of the ground over 
 which they had led their men that morning, he knew any 
 attack was doomed. He sent a staff officer to Burnside 
 to state his views and to ask a counter order. Burnside 
 refused. And now Hooker did one of the bravest acts 
 of his brave life : so sure was he of the useless slaughter, 
 
37 
 
 he imperiled his reputation for courage by going in 
 person to Burnside to dissuade him from the further at- 
 tempt. His only reply was : " That height must be 
 carried this evening." Hooker returned, and the scenes 
 of the morning were repeated ; the same gallant assault, 
 the same desperate struggle, the same annihilating fire 
 from positions which could not be reached, until Hooker 
 having, in his own words, lost " about as many men as 
 he was ordered to sacrifice," drew back from the slopes 
 where in a few hours had been lost seven thousand six 
 hundred and twenty men. 
 
 It was when Burnside ordered Hooker to the second 
 assault that he sent Franklin the order at 2.25 to advance 
 on the heights in his immediate front. Franklin's ex- 
 perience of the morning had shown that no advance on 
 his part could succeed unless made in the manner he had 
 asked and been denied ; an effective advance required an 
 entire new disposition of his troops and a proper formation 
 of those told off for the attack ; but they were all engaged 
 in fighting as they stood. If Burnside meant his order to 
 initiate any such efifective attack as Franklin had planned 
 the day before, it was too late by many hours. Such an 
 attack required time and freedom from the pressure of 
 the enemy to prepare. If he meant it for a general ad- 
 vance of Franklin's line to exert a general pressure, he 
 was already pressing against or being pressed by an out- 
 numbering force strongly posted. Only ten minutes be- 
 fore receiving this order General Hardie had wired his 
 chief of Meade's and Gibbon's defeat and of Jackson's 
 counter, and that " things do not look well on Reynolds' 
 front." But on receipt of the new instruction he wired: 
 " Dispatch received. Franklin will do his best. New 
 
38 
 
 troops gone in — will report again soon." Franklin at 
 once conferred with his corps commanders, and they were 
 unanimous that under the conditions of time and the 
 sharp pressure of the enemy no effective attack could be 
 then organized, and that all that could be done was being 
 done, and that their hands were full. At 3 p. m. Hardie 
 wired : " Reynolds seems to be holding his own. Things 
 look somewhat better." About the same time an aid 
 came from Burnside saying Sumner was hard pressed 
 on the right, and requesting Franklin to make a diversion 
 in his favor if he could. Franklin replied that he would 
 do his best. At 3.40 Hardie wired : " Gibbon's and 
 Meade's divisions are badly used up, and I fear another 
 advance on the enemy on our left cannot be made this 
 afternoon. Doubleday's division will replace Meade's as 
 soon as it can be collected, and if done in time of course 
 another attack will be made. The enemy are in force on 
 our left towards Hamilton's and are threatening the 
 safety of that portion of our line. . . . Just as soon 
 as the left is safe, our forces here will be prepared for a 
 front attack, but it may be too late this afternoon. In- 
 deed, we are engaged in front anyhow." At 4.30 he 
 wired : " The enemy is still in force on our left and 
 front. An attack on our batteries in front has been re- 
 pulsed. A new attack has just opened on our left, but 
 the left is safe, though it is too late to advance either to 
 the left or front." At this moment Jackson had deter- 
 mined to put in his whole force against Franklin in the 
 hope of driving him back on his bridges, and had already 
 put Stuart and D. H. Hill in motion against Doubleday, 
 which was the new attack on the left referred to in Gen- 
 eral Hardie's dispatch, and began advancing his artillery, 
 
39 
 
 but the late hour and Franklin's heavy fire caused Jack- 
 son to countermand his orders : " A wise determination," 
 says the Count de Paris. And soon the night ended the 
 day. FrankHn had lost 4,962 men, and had inflicted on 
 Jackson a loss of 5,364. 
 
 Franklin's plans, the orders under which he acted, his 
 actions, and Burnside's constant knowledge of them have 
 been given in so much detail because of what followed 
 some weeks later, and also because they give a clear pic- 
 ture of a great force, an important part of an army, set 
 against a greater force of the enemy, with a commander 
 who wholly understood his situation and also the con- 
 trolling part of his force might and should have had in 
 the whole day's work, who thoroughly planned the only 
 possible and fully adequate attack, which he was not al- 
 lowed to make, and, in executing the orders he received, 
 was compelled to attempt with an inadequate force, a 
 single division, the real substance of what he had planned 
 to do with no less than six divisions, supported by at least 
 two others, compelled to keep to his original extended 
 line, and ready to move rapidly at any moment down the 
 road. This man, who in his own way, properly sup- 
 ported, could probably have broken Lee's right and sent 
 him out of Fredericksburg, was made to stand ready for 
 something else all day, and his real use was to prevent 
 Lee from swinging his right around, and perhaps from 
 sending troops from his right to Marye's heights had they 
 been needed — as they were not. Longstreet's artillery 
 and four brigades of his infantry sufficed to hold them 
 against Sumner's and Hooker's grand divisions succes- 
 sively. 
 
 Shortly after the battle General Burnside said to Gen- 
 
40 
 
 erals Smith and Reynolds, Franklin's corps commanders : 
 "I made a mistake in my order to Franklin; I should 
 have directed him to carry the hill at Hamilton's at all 
 hazards." 
 
 Burnside was still determined to carry Marye's 
 heights and ordered an attack by the Ninth Corps on 
 the same stone walls the next day, to be led by himself in 
 person. But he was fortunately dissuaded by his grand 
 division and corps commanders, and the army fell back.* 
 Franklin recrossed his command on the night of the 15th. 
 Burnside brought back to the north side of the river a de- 
 feated and despondent army : men who had done the ut- 
 most of human endeavor against impossible positions 
 and seen life sacrificed to no reasonable purpose. He was 
 not long in being made to feel the want of confidence in 
 his ability to command which ran through from highest 
 to lowest — the same want which he had felt in himself 
 and avowed at the outset. He projected a movement to 
 turn the Confederate left by crossing some seven miles 
 below Fredericksburg, and had already sent a cavalry 
 column to cut their communications, when the Washington 
 authorities, advised of the distrust, which they doubtless 
 appreciated if they did not share, ordered him to make 
 no movement without advising the President. The raid 
 was stopped and the scheme abandoned. Feeling the dis- 
 trust on the one hand and the pressure of public demand 
 for results, he resolved on another wager of battle, cross- 
 ing at Bank's Ford, six miles above Fredericksburg, and 
 taking it in rear. As all the fords were well watched 
 
 * General Rush B. Hawkins seems to have been the first to 
 openly oppose General Burnside's purpose. 
 
41 
 
 and the ground open, secrecy was impossible, and to con- 
 ceal his intended point of crossing he feinted on several 
 both above and below. On the 19th of January, 1863, 
 the grand divisions of Franklin and Sumner took posi- 
 tion near Banks' Ford, the artillery was put in position, 
 the pontoons brought up, Couch with his corps was sent 
 to demonstrate below the town, and all was made ready 
 for the attempt. But on the night of the 20th a furious 
 storm came on, the physical conditions brought matters 
 to a stand, Lee had not been deceived, and stood waiting 
 in order on the other side. The army floundered back to 
 its camp, and the " Mud Campaign " was over. 
 
 And now it would seem as if, all hope of successful 
 action in the near future being gone, the consciousness of 
 distrust and the demoralization of the army made the 
 position of the commanding general intolerable to him- 
 self, and he resolved upon a step so extraordinary under 
 the circumstances as to indicate a condition bordering on 
 desperation. For six weeks he had accepted the respon- 
 sibility for the ill-planned, ill-managed, desperate attack 
 at Fredericksburg, and recognized the undoubted ability 
 and faithfulness with which his subordinates had exe- 
 cuted his orders, and the magnificent courage and steadi- 
 ness of his troops in their repeated hopeless assaults. He 
 had assured Franklin of his confidence and expressed his 
 gratitude for his soldierly loyalty; he declared that he 
 alone " had held up his hand " ; that he was going to 
 resign the command and recommend Franklin as his suc- 
 cessor. Suddenly all was changed. His first act on 
 getting back to camp was to prepare an order dismissing 
 from the army Generals Hooker, Brooks, Cochrane, and 
 Newton, and relieving from their commands Generals 
 
42 
 
 Franklin. W. F. Smith, Sturgis, Ferrero, and Colonel 
 Taylor. He took this in person to the President and de- 
 manded its approval or the acceptance of his resignation. 
 He made no charge of incompetency or disobedience or 
 failure in duty, but only of a lack of confidence in him- 
 self: a reason which would have dismissed or relieved 
 pretty much all the officers of the Army of the Potomac. 
 His resignation was accepted, and Hooker, whose name 
 led the list of dismissals, was put in his stead; but as he 
 was junior in rank of Franklin, the latter was as a matter 
 of course relieved from his command. 
 
 The day after the Mud Campaign ended. General 
 Franklin and his close friend, and one of his corps com- 
 manders. General W. F. Smith ("Baldy"), addressed 
 a most interesting letter to the President, pointing out in 
 the clearest manner the great difficulties of the plan of 
 advance on the Fredericksburg line, the great length of 
 the route, the great numbers of troops required for its 
 protection, its vulnerability at every point, the scattering 
 of forces for guarding the enormous trains should the 
 line be abandoned as the army advanced, carrying all its 
 supplies with it ; then the essentials of a successful ad- 
 vance : 
 
 " I. All the troops available in the east should be 
 massed. 
 
 " 2. They should approach as near to Richmond as 
 possible without engagement. 
 
 " 3. The line of communication should be absolutely 
 free from danger of interruption. 
 
 " A campaign on the James River enables us to fulfill 
 all these conditions more absolutely than any other, for: 
 
 " I. On the James River our troops from both north 
 
43 
 
 and south can be concentrated more rapidly than they 
 can be at any other point. 
 
 " 2. They can be brought to points within twenty 
 miles of Richmond without risk of an engagement. 
 
 " 3. The communication by the James River can be 
 kept up by the assistance of the navy without the slightest 
 danger of interruption." 
 
 Then follows the outline scheme of details, all with an 
 equal clearness, comprehensiveness, and simplicity. 
 
 It is refreshing to find amid all the confusion of mind 
 and method of those days a piece of work so thorough, 
 so sound, so completely thought out. It is a study by a 
 master not only of theory but of practice. 
 
 And now befell General Franklin one of those cruel- 
 ties born of many motives, weaknesses, afterthoughts, 
 prejudices, partialities, personal and political, from which 
 such times are never free. 
 
 The congressional committee on the conduct of the 
 war appeared to investigate the causes of the defeat at 
 Fredericksburg, summoning before them General Burn- 
 side and many of his officers. 
 
 Six days after the battle Burnside had written Hal- 
 leck a description of his plan of the action as it was 
 fought: " I discovered that he (the enemy) did not an- 
 ticipate the crossing of our whole force at Fredericks- 
 burg, and I hoped, by rapidly throwing the whole com- 
 mand over at that place to separate, by a vigorous 
 attack, the forces of the enemy on the river below from 
 the forces behind and on the crest in the rear of the town, 
 in which case we could fight him with great advantage in 
 our favor. For this we had to gain a height on the ex- 
 treme right of the crest which commanded a new road 
 
44 
 
 lately made by the enemy." This " height on the ex- 
 treme right of the crest " was Marye's heights, which 
 were exceedingly difficult of approach and had been made 
 impregnable. They were separated from the line of 
 heights below the town by Hazel Run ; these latter heights 
 were occupied by Longstreet's men as far as Deep Run, 
 below which and down to the Massaponax Jackson's di- 
 visions were massed, with Stuart formed across the left 
 of Franklin's line of battle. The plan given General 
 Halleck by Burnside is the plan on which the battle was 
 fought, and it accounts for his order of 7.30 a. m. to 
 Franklin as a subordinate feature of the plan. In order 
 to divide the enemy's troops on the crest in rear of the 
 town from those on the hills below, he delivers a tre- 
 mendous assault on Marye's heights, and orders Franklin 
 to send one division to seize Hamilton's heights at the 
 extreme left of these heights, in the hope that the seizure 
 of these two points would " compel the enemy to evacuate 
 the whole ridge between these two points." It was in 
 view of this hoped for contingency doubtless that he or- 
 dered Franklin to keep his entire command in readiness 
 for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, 
 which would have brought him on the rear of the dis- 
 lodged enemy. The two series of heavy assaults on 
 Marye's heights failed disastrously. The division sent 
 to seize Hamilton's heights was met with overwhelming 
 force, while the rest of Franklin's divisions were held in 
 place aHke by the constant pressure of the enemy and by 
 his orders to have all in readiness for a rapid movement 
 down the road. 
 
 But to the Committee on the Conduct of the War 
 General Burnside said : " The enemy had cut a road 
 
45 
 
 along in the rear of the Hne of heights where we made 
 our attack, by means of which they connected the two 
 wings of their army and avoided a long detour around 
 through a bad country. ... I wanted to obtain pos- 
 session of that new road, and that was my reason for 
 making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend 
 to make the attack on the right until that position had 
 been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy, 
 cutting their line in two ; and then I proposed to make a 
 direct attack on their front and drive them out of their 
 works." General Palfrey well says of this statement: 
 " It cannot be true." 
 
 From 7.30 in the morning until night fell, General 
 Burnside knew constantly from his own staff officer, who 
 carried the order to and remained all day with Franklin, 
 observing and reporting every act done by him, every- 
 thing going on in that part of the field. If he did not 
 mean to attack on the right until Hamilton's heights were 
 carried, why did he attack? If he meant to cut the en- 
 emy's line in two and stagger him before trying Marye's 
 heights, why did he not allow Franklin to do precisely 
 that thing which he had begged to be allowed to do : mass 
 his own men for the assault, supported by Stoneman's 
 divisions and Hancock, and deliver the blow which 
 Meade's attack showed would have gone through so 
 delivered ? 
 
 But the letter to General Halleck was not shown to 
 the committee, nor known to them until long after. 
 
 When Franklin was summoned before them he asked 
 Burnside if they were aware of his order of 7.30 a. m. 
 of the 13th, or if he should give them a copy. Burnside 
 replied that he had already given them a copy of that 
 
46 
 
 order and it was then in their hands. Franklin relied, as 
 he had a right, on the word of his commander and of the 
 man who had assured him that he was only one of all his 
 generals who had held up his hands ; and he was be- 
 trayed. The committee never heard of the order until 
 months afterward. Between the new plan of the battle, 
 which none but the committee had ever heard of and the 
 success of which was made to hinge on Franklin's attack, 
 and the suppression of the orders under which he acted, 
 he was in an utterly false light and false position before 
 the committee, and he was in complete ignorance of the 
 mischief and how it had been wrought. He became con- 
 scious of a great prejudice, but was unable to fathom it 
 or its cause. The committee refused to hear some of his 
 witnesses. General Hardie among them. He was not 
 confronted with Burnside's statements. But the commit- 
 tee published to the world their verdict that Franklin 
 was responsible for the loss of the battle through dis- 
 obedience of orders. 
 
 This most undeserved blow could have fallen on no 
 man more sensitive to its fullest import. To use his own 
 words : " If this be true, I have been guilty of the high- 
 est crime known to military law, for the commission of 
 which my life is forfeit and my name consigned to in- 
 famy." 
 
 And so, without a trial, without that responsible judg- 
 ment of his companions in arms and his peers to which 
 every man charged with military default is entitled, this 
 man of oft tried ability and proven strength, to whom 
 honor and loyalty were the breath of his life, and upon 
 whom every superior had relied as on a rock, stood 
 charged by an irresponsible, Star-Chamber Committee, 
 
47 
 
 " of the highest crime known to military law." No court- 
 martial was ever even suggested. To all men who knew 
 men and facts the charge was preposterous. 
 
 Franklin at once published a reply to the Committee's 
 Report, which was a complete refutation, and by which 
 they were first made aware both of the real plan on which 
 the battle was fought and which Burnside had already 
 given in his letter to Halleck, and also of the order under 
 which Franklin acted during the day. Not until the com- 
 mittee had received his reply quoting that order was 
 Franklin aware that they had never before seen it. Not 
 until a second edition of the reply was published with 
 additional notes and correspondence was the full iniquity 
 of the matter made clear. 
 
 His reply and the correspondence which followed fully 
 cleared his record with the War Department and left the 
 responsibility where it belonged. But the poison of the 
 committee's charge, caught up and exploited by the press 
 with a public eager to fix final blame somewhere, wrought 
 him great prejudice, and Hay, in his life of Lincoln, says: 
 " Franklin's undoubted talents never again had an op- 
 portunity for exercise in a field worthy of them." His 
 great talents, his professional skill, his judgment, his 
 courage, his methods, his services, and his rank pointed 
 to him as the proper commander of the Army of the 
 Potomac. But the cloud overshadowed him. Smarting 
 under the great wrong and " in perfect darkness of soul," 
 Franklin asked for any assignment whereby he might in 
 some way serve his country. And in July he was sent to 
 New Orleans to take command of the Nineteenth Corps, 
 which had formed a part of Banks' command at Port 
 Hudson. 
 
48 
 
 WITH BANKS. 
 
 After Grant captured Vicksburg he purposed to use 
 his entire army at once for the capture of Mobile, using 
 that point as a base for new operations on the heart of 
 the enemy's country, and began his arrangements accord- 
 ingly, a part of which was the concentration of an army 
 at New Orleans. But Halleck, who was still general-in- 
 chief, sent away a strong force under Steele to Little 
 Rock, and set a new task for the New Orleans contingent. 
 Maximilian, supported by a French army, was emperor 
 of Mexico, and it was deemed necessary to cut off Con- 
 federate traffic in supplies across the border and keep 
 watch over the newcomers. These operations were in 
 charge of General Banks, who decided on Sabine Pass 
 as his advanced base. This point was occupied and forti- 
 fied by the Confederates. Franklin was ordered to pro- 
 ceed thither with 5,000 men on transports, escorted by 
 four gunboats, which were to reduce the batteries and 
 prepare the landing. The outfit of the expedition was 
 miserably unfit and inadequate, but no time was allowed 
 to remedy deficiencies to provide necessities. The trans- 
 ports carrying the troops arrived outside the bar, the 
 gunboats entered the channel and engaged the batteries 
 with disastrous results. Two of the vessels were imme- 
 diately disabled and surrendered, the third ran aground, 
 and the fourth and last put to sea, returning, however, 
 to convey the transports back to New Orleans, where 
 they arrived September nth. 
 
 The next day Franklin, with the Nineteenth and two 
 divisions of the Thirteenth Corps, took up his march to 
 ascertain if it was practicable to reach the Sabine River 
 
49 
 
 on a line parallel to the coast. He skirmished his way to 
 Vermillionville when Banks abandoned further attempt 
 on that line. Here he made demonstrations in aid of the 
 naval expedition sent by Banks to the western coast, and, 
 on the success of the latter, moved to New Iberia. Sev- 
 eral engagements took place, but the enemy avoided seri- 
 ous conclusions. And now came the Red River expedi- 
 tion. 
 
 Kirby Smith, with the troops of Price and Taylor, 
 occupied the Red River valley, with headquarters near 
 Shreveport. Halleck was determined to rout him out of 
 the valley and take possession. To which end he designed 
 to send Banks against him on the south while Steele sup- 
 ported him from the valley of the Arkansas on the 
 north. But it took at least two weeks for these widely 
 separated commanders to communicate. At this junc- 
 ture, the winter weather having put a stop to Grant's 
 operations, Sherman lent Banks 10,000 men under A. J. 
 Smith for a month, escorted by the best part of Porter's 
 fleet and Ellet's Marine Brigade, to report to Alex- 
 andria, which was the rendezvous, March i6th. Frank- 
 lin was in command of the troops of Banks' army proper, 
 and Banks commanded the joint forces. Steele was ex- 
 pected to proceed down the Washita until within com- 
 municating distance. The troops of Franklin and Smith 
 were to proceed on roads parallel with and near the river, 
 accompanied by the fleet. On the 27th of March they 
 set forth with Franklin in the advance. On the 31st of 
 March his cavalry occupied Natchitoches, the enemy re- 
 tiring, and two days later his infantry arrived. Here, 
 in order to give his columns better roads, Banks diverged 
 so far from the river as to be entirely out of touch with 
 4 
 
50 
 
 the fleet and without its invaluable support. In place of 
 supplies from the transports, he had to organize a large 
 wagon train, and to weaken his forces by detaching a 
 division to guard the fleet, whose progress up the narrow 
 and shoaling river was becoming more difficult. The 
 route chosen led through Pleasant Hill, a strong position 
 with good water, where the enemy was in some force, to 
 Sabine Cross Roads and Mansfield, a point commanding 
 several important routes and where Taylor was concen- 
 trating. While awaiting the supply trains, Franklin's 
 cavalry reconnoitered the roads and by several spirited 
 skirmishes located the enemy. On the 6th of April 
 Franklin resumed his march to Pleasant Hill, where his 
 cavalry had taken position. On the 7th his cavalry under 
 Lee advanced, fighting steadily and pressing back a bri- 
 gade of Taylor's cavalry, until at a branch of the Bayou 
 St. Patrice he was brought to a stand by the entire cavalry 
 force of the enemy under Green. The same day Frank- 
 lin reached Pleasant Hill and made his dispositions for 
 an advance with a brigade of cavalry in front to clear the 
 way until the main body of the enemy was reached. 
 Banks joined him during the day and overruled his dis- 
 positions, and ordered a combination advance guard of 
 cavalry, infantry, and artillery, which, with their large 
 trains, made, as events proved, an awkward force to 
 handle. 
 
 SABINE CROSS ROADS. 
 
 Taylor decided to make the fight at Sabine Cross 
 Roads, three miles from Mansfield, and made his dis- 
 positions. On the morning of the 8th the advance guard 
 
51 
 
 moved slowly forward. Franklin followed with his ad- 
 vance division to the Bayou St, Patrice and halted to 
 allow his columns to close up and concentrate. Banks 
 joined the advance guard, and soon sent back for another 
 brigade of infantry. Franklin sent the division com- 
 mander, Ransom, with it, with orders not to allow both 
 brigades to become engaged ; his purpose being to keep 
 in touch only with the enemy until Emory's division could 
 close up and A. J. Smith's ten thousand should have come 
 in supporting distance, a matter of some time with so 
 large a body in column on a single road. But Banks was 
 at the front and assumed the command, and, forgetful of 
 the conditions in rear, determined to push ahead. Lee's 
 first attempt to advance on Taylor's position was met in 
 such fashion that he at once realized the situation and 
 urged Banks to wait until proper concentration could be 
 had. But Banks sent orders to Franklin to push forward 
 his Thirteenth Corps, and ordered Lee to maintain his 
 position until it arrived. When Ransom's second brigade 
 arrived, he put the two in line, and hearing that Frank- 
 lin was coming in person with the advance division 
 (Cameron's) of the Thirteenth Corps, he decided to at- 
 tack at once in spite of Lee's endeavor to dissuade him. 
 But Taylor, having made thoroughly ready, now did the 
 attacking himself in such force at all points and with such 
 vigor that he swept Banks back with heavy loss and with- 
 out check until he reached the woods, where Franklin 
 met him at the head of Cameron's division, which had 
 double-quickened nearly the entire distance from Bayou 
 St. Patrice. There were but fifteen hundred with him, 
 and these he put in at once, but they were powerless to 
 check the attack. Lee's batteries, unable to fire or ma- 
 
52 
 
 neuver in the woods, were abandoned by their drivers, 
 who took to the trains which vainly endeavored to flee. 
 The Confederates reached the rear of Banks' right, and 
 the retreat was general. Franklin and Ransom were 
 both badly wounded while trying to rally the troops, but 
 the retreat was not stayed until it reached Emory's di- 
 vision. 
 
 When Franklin started with Cameron's division for 
 Sabine Cross Roads he sent back an order to Emory to 
 come forward in all haste. As soon as he discovered 
 that Banks had gotten the advance guard into an unsup- 
 ported fight with Taylor's army, he sent an order back to 
 Emory to halt immediately as soon as he could find a 
 good defensive position and establish himself. Emory 
 reached a stream just in time to form while the retreat 
 went by, and here he received the assault so firmly and 
 with such a heavy fire that it was repulsed, and could not 
 be renewed until the lines were reformed, and it was now 
 night. The defeated troops halted in Emory's rear; but 
 the position was too precarious for an offensive move- 
 ment, and during the night the whole force fell back to 
 Pleasant Hill, where it joined A. J. Smith's ten thousand 
 on the morning of the 9th. Careful preparation was at 
 once made on advantageous ground to receive the re- 
 newed assault of Taylor's troops, which did not come 
 until four o'clock, and resulted in their complete defeat 
 and their retreat. 
 
 Banks no longer felt himself able to pursue his great 
 undertaking, and retreat was decided upon. Franklin, 
 disabled by his wounds, was unable to exercise any further 
 command, though his professional skill and judgment 
 were in frequent requisition, and especially in the extrica- 
 
53 
 
 tion of Porter's fleet from the shallow water of the Red 
 River at Alexandria. But for his advice, Bailey's dam 
 would probably never have been built. 
 
 Franklin now returned to Washington. While still 
 weakened and suffering from his wound he was sum- 
 moned to the City Point to confer with Grant, who pro- 
 posed to consolidate the four departments of the Susque- 
 hanna, Middle, and Western Virginia, and Washington, 
 in which Early was already threatening the Capitol, and 
 put Franklin in command. His strength did not then 
 permit it, and the arrangement was never consummated. 
 
 On his return from this visit, landing early in the 
 morning at Baltimore, he found that city in great excite- 
 ment in the momentary expectation of an attack by 
 Early's troops. It was thought that an early train to 
 Philadelphia would have time to pass the danger point 
 undisturbed, and General Franklin boarded the train. 
 Not far out, however, the train was stopped by a cavalry 
 force under the famous Harry Gilmore, and Franklin was 
 made a prisoner. That night he managed a shrewd escape, 
 and hid himself for two days and nights in woods and 
 cornfields, so near the parties searching for him as often 
 to overhear their conversation, but unable to move any 
 distance because of his wound. Toward the last, from 
 pain and weakness and from want of food he became 
 delirious. He found his cornfield filled with warriors 
 clad in armor and carrying ancient weapons. Although 
 fully realizing that he was the victim of illusions, he could 
 not dispel his feverish fancies until he grasped their pikes 
 and found them cornstalks. He finally reached the house 
 of a Union man, who hid and fed him until he could send 
 word to General Lew Wallace, then in command at Balti- 
 
54 
 
 more, who sent out a squadron of cavalry and two regi- 
 ments of infantry to escort him to the city. 
 
 LIFE IN HARTFORD. 
 
 In the following autumn General Franklin was as- 
 signed to duty as President of the Retiring Board, in 
 which capacity he served until he resigned and took up 
 his residence in Hartford. 
 
 In 1889 General Franklin was appointed United 
 States Commissioner to the Paris Exposition held that 
 year. He discharged his duties with singular efficiency. 
 The French Government testified its appreciation of his 
 services by making him an officer of the Legion of Honor. 
 
 Less conspicuous, perhaps, in the public eye, but of 
 great value to the disabled soldiers and to the country 
 which cares for them, was the service rendered in the 
 management of the National Soldiers' Homes throughout 
 the country as president of the board since 1880 until his 
 resignation in January, 1900, and for many years its 
 treasurer as well ; a work for which he was especially 
 fitted by his wise sympathy for the men and his prudence, 
 sound judgment, careful economy, and strict and thor- 
 oughly intelligent attention to the multitude of details, 
 involving the expenditure of many millions. 
 
 The State of Connecticut profited very largely by his 
 professional knowledge and skill and his fearless integrity 
 in the construction of its present capitol. 
 
 ESTIMATE OF HIS CHARACTER. 
 
 There are men whose influence upon their times and 
 whose impress on men's memories come from the un- 
 
55 
 
 usual development and activity of certain specific but 
 limited abilities, or from special traits of character. An 
 unusually energetic exhibition of even a moderate amount 
 of these may make their possessor strikingly prominent 
 under favorable circumstances, the more so perhaps for 
 their onesidedness. There are those, again, whose mark 
 is made, not by a few strong points of either mind or 
 character standing out from the background of an other- 
 wise commonplace personality, but by mental powers of 
 unusual breadth and force and traits of character of un- 
 usual value, and yet all so full rounded and balanced, so 
 harmonious in blending and in exercise, so free from de- 
 fect in structure and from noise in action, that not until 
 by long opportunity men have measured them and their 
 work with other standards of being and doing, do their 
 strength and beauty stand revealed in full and impressive 
 majesty. 
 
 General Franklin was distinctly of this type. Physi- 
 cally, intellectually, and spiritually, he was built upon a 
 magnificent model. As a scholar of the first order in his 
 chosen lines of study, and sympathetic with all intel- 
 lectual life and effort, as a man of action, clear in insight 
 and in thought, broad and strong in his grasp, certain in 
 judgment, definite, direct, prompt and vigorous in action, 
 peculiarly diligent in attention to duties of whatever 
 magnitude, pure and highminded, with an integrity that 
 never left his vision at fault and a courage that never 
 hesitated, wise, prudent and strong, simple, kindly, of 
 perfect but unconscious dignity, he presented a rare bal- 
 ance of great gifts. He graduated from West Point at 
 the head of a class remarkable for its membership of men 
 who made themselves famous later on. Among those 
 
56 
 
 intimate with his professional capacity and attainments 
 there was never a question that these were of the highest 
 grade. He was one of the few men deemed entirely com- 
 petent to the highest military command, while his char- 
 acter as a man rendered complete the trust reposed in 
 him. All his qualities marked him for a great com- 
 mander. Added to those already mentioned he had — 
 what so few possess — coupled with a perfect sense of 
 responsibility, that confidence which is not born of con- 
 ceit nor of any undue consciousness of power and often 
 goes with the humblest spirit : the confidence that, having 
 done all possible to prepare for the issue, one can trust 
 his courage and integrity to spend might to the uttermost 
 and life itself, and to face defeat unflinching, in its final 
 hazard : the calm intelligence that knows when the hour 
 of supreme trial has fully come, and the courage that 
 rises to its entire responsibility and to take and, if need 
 be, suffer all consequences. Less happy in his assign- 
 ments to duty than many lesser men, his was often the 
 hard honor of saving their wreckages instead of leading 
 them to the victories they knew not how to win. Jeal- 
 ousy, intrigue, and complaint were each alike impossible 
 to him. His great soul was patient and steadfast. His 
 patriotism was untouched by any personal considerations. 
 And so he took the duties which the ambitions of others 
 and the diverse influences of the troubled times left for 
 his employment, and went his straightforward way, true 
 man, true knight, and true lover of his nation. Few men 
 of his time could have contributed more from a military 
 point of view to its inner history of influences, measures, 
 and actions. It must be always a matter of profound 
 regret that he has not left such knowledge behind him. 
 
57 
 
 So quietly and unostentatiously was all his work 
 done that only upon a full and detailed survey can the 
 great magnitude of it all, and the great importance of its 
 many parts and the invariable high standard of its excel- 
 lence, be appreciated. But those who knew the strength 
 and uprightness of his mind and character, the kindliness 
 of his heart, his noble simplicity and personal dignity, 
 his ready devotion to every patriotic interest and duty, 
 the loyalty of his nature and the purity and unaffected 
 piety of his life, know that one of the bravest of gentle- 
 men, one of the purest of patriots, one of the most cher- 
 ished of friends, and one of the knightliest of men, has 
 answered to his name. 
 
58 
 
 [Editorial from the Hartford Courant, March 9, 1903.] 
 
 PATRIOT, SOLDIER, AND CHRISTIAN 
 GENTLEMAN. 
 
 Hartford bids good-bye to Major-General Franklin 
 as she bade good-bye to Rear Admiral Bunce — with 
 sorrow, but also with a great pride. The story of his 
 services and battles is told in other columns of The 
 Courant. Our simpler but harder task here is to say a 
 few words about the general himself. There have been 
 famous commanders of men who did not look the part. 
 William Buel Franklin filled it superbly, to the eye as 
 well as to the judgment. West Point had splendid ma- 
 terial to work with in his case, and turned out a very not- 
 able product. The towering old soldier of two wars re- 
 mained a personage in the after time of peace. His was 
 one of the presences that dignify the streets of the town 
 through which they move, and leave a memory there. 
 That form and face, which all Hartford knew, were the 
 outward and visible signs of the manliness within — the 
 integrity without a stain, the single-hearted, inflexible de- 
 votion to duty. His loyalty to his church, to his business 
 associates, and to his friends was off the same piece as 
 his loyalty to his country. 
 
 He was one of the group of trained soldiers — West 
 Pointers — in the war of 1861-65, who fell for a time 
 
59 
 
 under suspicion, on the part of some vehement editors, 
 of being callous to the woes of the slave and skeptical as 
 to the military genius of this or the other popular favorite 
 of the hour. Some sprinkles of the aspersion that em- 
 bittered Fitz John Porter's life for years fell in General 
 Franklin's direction, but they did him no permanent 
 harm. His soldierly record was as clear as his soldierly 
 conscience. There will be nothing but laurel, as pro- 
 fusely heaped as nobly earned, for the grave of as true a 
 patriot and gentleman as ever breathed American air. 
 
6o 
 
 The following minute was adopted at a meeting of 
 the Rector, Wardens, and Vestry of the Church of the 
 Good Shepherd, held on Tuesday evening, March 17, 
 1903: 
 
 WILLIAM BUEL FRANKLIN, 1823 — 1903. 
 
 The Rector, Wardens, and Vestry of the Church of 
 the Good Shepherd, meeting but a few days after the 
 death of General William Buel Franklin, U. S. A., place on 
 record a tribute of their affection and esteem for one, who, 
 as long as the state of his health allowed, shared the coun- 
 sels and responsibilities of their body, and during all the 
 years of his residence in Hartford, was a member of the 
 parish. For twenty years, from 1870 to 1890, he was 
 Senior Warden, and at a later date he was made for the 
 rest of his life an honorary vestryman. Others have borne 
 testimony to his faithfulness and bravery as a soldier, his 
 diligence and success as a student of military science, his 
 integrity in business, and his ready and helpful labors for 
 the commonwealth; we gladly testify to the simplicity 
 and truthfulness of his Christian life, the reality and 
 earnestness of his faith, his constant attendance on public 
 worship and the Holy Communion, and the readiness 
 with which he rendered to the Church, and in particular 
 to this parish, every service in his power. We give God 
 thanks for his life among us and for his constantly good 
 example and pray that our lot may be with his among the 
 saints. 
 
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 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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