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INSTINCT AND REASON 
 
 THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OE 
 HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 By SIR GEORGE RAMSAY, Bart., 
 
 Acthob of " An Essay on the Distribution op Wealth,' 
 
 " Principles of Psychology," 
 
 "A Classification of the Sciences," etc. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 
 
 WALTON AND MABERLY, UPPER GOWER STREET, 
 AND IVY LANE, PATERNOSTER ROW. 
 
 MDCCCLXII. 
 

CONTENTS. 
 
 PAET FIRST. 
 
 INSTINCT. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Page. 
 Of Knowledge in general, 1 
 
 CHAPTER n. 
 
 Of different kinds of Knowledge, 7 
 
 CHAPTER HI. 
 Of Instinctive Knowledge, . * 9 
 
 Section First. 
 Of Instinctive Knowledge in general, 9 
 
 Section Second. 
 Of Personal Identity and of Memory, 12 
 
 Section Third. 
 Knowledge of Matter, 18 
 
 Section Fourth. 
 Knowledge of Uniformity in Nature, 24 
 
 Section Fifth. 
 Knowledge of our own Free Will, 29 
 
 Section Sixth. 
 Belief in Human Testimony, 40 
 
VI CONTENTS. 
 
 PAET SECOND. 
 
 REASON. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Of Rational Knowledge in general, 44 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of Simple Intuitive Knowledge, 50 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of Complex Intuitive Knowledge, 85 
 
 Section First. 
 Of Reasoning in general, . . . , 85 
 
 Section Second. 
 On different kinds of Reasoning, 93 
 
 I. Of Reasoning a priori, 94 
 
 II. Of Reasoning a posteriori, 110 
 
 CHAPTER. IV. 
 
 Of the Reason of Animals, 134 
 
INSTINCT. 
 

PART FIRST. 
 
 INSTINCT. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 
 
 1. Locke has said, " Since the mind in all its thoughts 
 and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its 
 own Ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate ; it 
 is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about 
 them." i 
 
 2. If this sentence be understood in its obvious mean- 
 ing, it certainly gives a very inadequate view of human 
 knowledge ; for it seems to embrace nothing but the 
 knowledge of ideas, or the science of mind, 2 which, 
 though the most important, is by no means the only de- 
 partment of knowledge with which we are conversant. 
 
 1 Essay concerning Human Understanding. Book IV. chap. 1. 
 
 2 I here suppose that by Ideas Locke meant simply mental pheno- 
 mena in general, not ideas in that peculiar sense, which has been attri- 
 buted to him, (especially by Sir William Hamilton), as something 
 immaterial, yet distinct from the mind, and existing even out of consci- 
 ousness. That Locke did not hold that opinion, I have, I think, proved. 
 See Principles of Psychology, supplement to chapter " Of Perception.*' 
 
2 INSTINCT. 
 
 3. This much is certain, that nothing is immediately 
 present to the mind but its own Feelings or its own 
 Thoughts, 1 and consequently; that all our knowledge must 
 be either of them or through them. How it comes to 
 pass that by means of mental phenomena we become 
 acquainted with things totally different, is, no doubt, a 
 a great mystery ; but, unless we deny the existence of 
 matter, the fact is indisputable. 
 
 4. All our knowledge, then, is either immediate or 
 mediate ; either the knowledge of our own feelings and 
 thoughts, or of other things through the medium of 
 these. The importance of Psychology is hence appar- 
 ent ; for mental phenomena are not only interesting in 
 themselves, but they are the channel of communication 
 with every thing else. 
 
 5. Since the knowledge of our own feelings and 
 thoughts is alone immediate, we ought to be much better 
 acquainted with them than with other things. And, no 
 doubt, we are in one sense, though, possibly, not in an- 
 other. "We know the particular feelings and thoughts 
 perfectly, as they arise successively in our minds ; but we 
 may be very ignorant of their composition, connection, 
 and origin ; in other words, we know them practically, 
 but not scientifically. Here, as elsewhere, it is true that 
 what is nearest to us is often least comprehended as a 
 whole. The very interest we take in the particulars, 
 their engrossing nature, clouds our general view. More- 
 over, it is difficult for the mind, even with intention, to 
 turn round and examine its own phenomena ; and the 
 very act of examination may modify them. Lastly, the 
 
 1 See the Author's " Principles of Psychology." Part I., chap. 2. 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 3 
 
 phenomena are fleeting, and liable to change, and there- 
 fore cannot long be examined at one time. For these 
 reasons, Psychology is one of the most difficult of 
 sciences ; though, from our immediate knowledge of the 
 subject thereof, it seems susceptible of a great advance 
 towards perfection. 
 
 6. From the above it follows that all men are more or 
 less Psychologists ; they must know something of their 
 own minds, their own feelings, and thoughts, they cannot 
 prevent themselves from so knowing ; for those feelings 
 and thoughts press upon them at every turn. Conse- 
 quently, the opinions of untutored men in reference to 
 Psychology are entitled to more respect then their 
 opinions on any other subject. In Natural Philosophy, 
 for instance, the views of untaught men are of no value 
 whatever, they are often the very reverse of the truth ; for 
 they judge mostly by appearances, and these are deceit- 
 ful. Judging by appearances, men long thought that the 
 earth was the centre of the universe, round which the 
 sun, planets, and fixed stars performed a daily revolution. 
 And how could they think otherwise? To assert the 
 contrary must have seemed at first a violent paradox, 
 in opposition, it might be said, to our very senses. Do we 
 not see the sun rise and set as well as the stars ? It re- 
 quired no little Philosophy to prove that* we see no such 
 thing ; that we only see phenomena, changing phenomena, 
 from which we infer motion of the sun and stars, while 
 we ought to infer from the same phenomena motion of 
 the earth. This one thing is certain, the phenomena ad- 
 mit of two explanations ; and why should untaught men 
 necessarily stumble upon the right ? The senses give us 
 
4 INSTINCT. 
 
 directly no information with respect to external objects ; 
 they furnish us only with sensations. Of these we can- 
 not doubt, but our inferences therefrom may or may not 
 be correct. It is not then our senses that deceive us, 
 but the thoughts which we build thereupon. 
 
 7. Another corollary from the above is, that startling 
 paradoxical opinions on the subject of Psychology ought 
 to be looked upon with peculiar suspicion ; as opposed 
 to the common opinions of mankind on a matter strict- 
 ly within their competence. Psychological paradoxes 
 are prima facie self-condemned ; and though they may 
 obtain a hearing, they must expect to be silenced at last 
 by the indignant clamour of unlearned metaphysicians. 
 Thus the daring opinions of an ingenious writer of the 
 present day, confounding subject with object, self with 
 non-self, mind with matter, are scouted universally, as 
 opposed to our intimate conviction, which nothing can 
 overthrow or even weaken, that the things thus confound- 
 ed are really distinct. 
 
 8. From what precedes it further appears that all our 
 knowledge begins with that of Self, obtained through con- 
 sciousness. This is the fons et origo of all our acquire- 
 ments, how various soever they may be ; and this must 
 exist with the knowledge of every thing which is not 
 self, for through self alone can the non-self be reached. 
 Moreover, though the information about other things 
 obtained through consciousness may be very defective 
 or utterly wrong ; yet the immediate knowledge which 
 consciousness effects is free from all doubt. To doubt 
 that we think is a contradiction, for the very doubt is 
 itself a thought, and by the very nature of feeling, we 
 
OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 5 
 
 must know whether we feel or not. It is satisfactory to 
 be thus assured that the source and the condition of all 
 our knowledge is itself free from cavil. 
 
 9. Before preceeding further it may be well to inquire 
 whether the word knowledge admit of any ambiguity, 
 and consequently any explanation. By Locke the term 
 knowledge is limited to certainty, and other knowledge 
 commonly so called is designated probability. This it 
 must be allowed is an unusual meaning of the word, 
 unwarranted either by popular usage or by philosophical 
 authority, which generally treats of knowledge as either 
 certain or probable. By far the greater part of what we 
 commonly call knowledge is of the latter sort. A man 
 of great knowledge means one whose mind is stored with 
 facts, most of which are not of undoubted certainty. At 
 the same time, mere suggestion, mere supposition, are not 
 called knowledge. Unless the probability be in favour 
 of any fact, that term is never applied. When we say, 
 I do not merely think so, / know it, we mean that we 
 have, if not a certain, at least a very strong assurance of 
 the truth of the fact, founded on evidence powerful if not 
 demonstrative. Thus, unless we limit with Locke the 
 meaning of the word to certainty, it is impossible to say 
 where knowledge begins or ends ; because the degrees of 
 probability are infinite ; and what seems probable to one, 
 and is therefore esteemed knowledge, may seem impro- 
 bable to another, and consequently no knowledge at all. 
 Even Locke, who restricts knowledge to certainty, is 
 somewhat doubtful whether sensitive knowledge, as he 
 calls it, be properly entitled to the name, and he begs it 
 to be admitted under the category, as if by courtesy. We 
 
6 INSTINCT. 
 
 must not then attempt to fix the boundaries of knowledge 
 very strictly ; just as we cannot always say whether a 
 certain shade of colour be light or dark ; but we must 
 bear in mind that by its very nature knowledge is some- 
 what indefinite. Strong belief in any event past or pre- 
 sent is often called knowledge, though the event may not 
 be true. To knowledge of the future we more seldom 
 pretend, because our belief is less firm ; though Job does 
 say, "I know that my Kedeemer liveth, and that he shall 
 stand at the latter day upon the earth/' 1 
 
 1 Chap. xix. ver. 25. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 1. Haying ascertained the nature of Knowledge in 
 general, as well as the case admits, for we have seen 
 that it cannot be strictly defined ; and having seen not 
 only that Knowledge begins with the feelings and 
 thoughts of our minds, but that these, the latter at 
 least, are an indispensable condition of all knowledge, 
 at all times ; we have next to enquire whether there be 
 not different kinds thereof. That there are different 
 degrees we have already seen, varying from absolute 
 certainty to a small excess of probability. Certainty 
 admits not of degrees, but the degrees of probability are 
 infinite. 
 
 2. Knowledge may be divided into kinds in different 
 ways, upon different principles. First, we may divide 
 it, according to the evidence upon which it rests, into 
 the certain and the probable, including under the latter 
 a degree of probability which commonly passes for cer- 
 tainty. That the sun will rise to-morrow we cannot 
 
8 INSTINCT. 
 
 doubt; but according to this division it is an event 
 highly probable only. We must allow it to be possible 
 that the sun shall not rise again ; and therefore possibly 
 not to-morrow. 
 
 3. Again, knowledge may be divided into the original 
 and the derivative, words which sufficiently explain 
 themselves. If we possess any knowledge at all, some 
 portion of it at least must be original, for whatever is 
 derived, is derived from something, and that something, 
 if not itself derived, must be original. If itself derived, 
 it must proceed from something earlier, which is either 
 original or built upon what was original. Therefore, 
 that some portion of our knowledge is original, is a 
 necessary consequence of the admission that we possess 
 any knowledge at all. It is possible that all our know- 
 ledge is original ; but impossible that all is derivative. 
 To ascertain what knowledge is original and what not, 
 may be a difficult task; but this difficulty does not 
 effect the reality of this distinction. As there can be no 
 reasoning without premises granted, so without primitive 
 knowledge none could be acquired. 
 
 4. Lastly, knowledge may be divided into the instinc- 
 tive and the rational; according to the source whence it 
 springs, from Instinct or from Keason. As this seems 
 to be the distinction which cuts most deeply into the 
 human mind, we shall adopt it as the ground of our 
 future observations. 
 
CHAPTEK III. 
 
 OF INSTINCTIVE KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 SECTION FIKST. 
 OF INSTINCTIVE KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 
 
 1. Accurately to distinguish the boundaries of Instinct 
 and Eeason is no easy task. Popular language, however, 
 and popular opinion, acknowledge the distinction ; and 
 these, as we have seen, are not to be despised in questions 
 of mental philosophy. We cannot, indeed, expect any 
 great accuracy in the notions and discourses of daily 
 life ; but philosophy without precision is unworthy of 
 the name. Let us then endeavour clearly to distinguish 
 between instinct and reason. 
 
 2. Eeason is commonly supposed to be that faculty 
 whereby Man is especially distinguished from the lower 
 animals, which are said to be mere creatures of Instinct. 
 Whether this be or be not true, we shall see presently; but 
 were it granted, it still would not tell us what reason and 
 what instinct is, and how they differ. If man alone have 
 
10 INSTINCT. 
 
 reason, he has instinct also ; so that instinct, at least, is 
 common to him and the rest of the animal creation. 
 Those who consider man as the only rational animal, at 
 the same time allow that he is not all rational, that he 
 has instinct also. This question, then, concerns man as 
 well as the other families of animated nature. 
 
 3. The word instinct is often applied to the emotions 
 as well as to the intellectual part of our nature. All the 
 primary desires are instincts, that is, they arise without 
 any effort, whether we will or not, by the original con- 
 stitution of our minds, without meditation, without any 
 view to consequences, without any thought beyond that of 
 the wished-for object. Such are desire of life, of power, 
 of glory, of affection. Such desires may be encouraged 
 or discouraged, they may grow into passions or decline 
 into indolent longings ; but they must exist before they 
 can be cultivated or depressed, before they can rise into 
 dignity or sink into insignificance. They are a part of 
 the original furniture of the mind, furniture that may 
 or may not be polished and adorned, that may get very 
 old, but which never can quite wear out. To these pri- 
 mary desires the term instinct is constantly applied ; as 
 when we talk of the instinct of self-preservation. 
 
 4. This use of the word in the case of the emotions 
 may help us to fix the sense of instinct when applied 
 to the intellect. Instinctive knowledge, like an instinc- 
 tive emotion, must, in the first place, be original, not 
 derived from previous knowledge; it must be got without 
 effort, whether we will or not ; without meditation ; 
 without any wish for it ; it must rush into our minds, 
 we know not how ; and must be held to, we cannot tell 
 
OF INSTINCTIVE KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 11 
 
 why ; it must be firmly relied on, but not discerned to 
 be true. Where all these characteristics meet, there is 
 instinctive knowledge. 
 
 5. The characteristics of instinctive knowledge may 
 more methodically be summed up thus : — 
 
 First, — It must be original, not derived from pre- 
 vious knowledge. From this it follows, as a corollary, 
 that it is got without effort, whether we will or not ; 
 without seeking, without meditation ; that it neither de- 
 mands nor admits of logical proof. 
 
 Secondly, — It must be universal, held by all men with- 
 out exception ; even by those who profess to doubt it. 
 
 Thirdly, — It must be irresistible, proof against all 
 sceptical arguments, though unanswerable. 
 
 Fourthly, — It must not be self-evident, like the axi- 
 oms of mathematics; in other words it must not be 
 discerned to be true. The corollary from this is, that 
 the denial of instinctive truth, however perverse, is still 
 admissible ; for such denial is, strictly speaking, not 
 absurd, that is, not directly opposed to reason. 
 
 These four characteristics, with their corollaries, suffi- 
 ciently determine what is instinctive knowledge. 
 
12 INSTINCT. 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AND OF MEMORY. 
 
 1. Let us now take specimens of such knowledge, and 
 let us see how the above characteristics apply. 
 
 2. All our knowledge begins with Consciousness, con- 
 sciousness of some feeling or thought actually present ; 
 and of which, therefore, as we have seen, we cannot 
 doubt. This is the foundation of all knowledge, but 
 taken alone, it is not knowledge ; for, had our mental 
 life been merely a succession of feelings and thoughts 
 without any conscious connection between them, we 
 should have remained for ever ignorant of all things. 
 Such a supposition is possible ; and it is enough to show 
 that the knowledge of self is not necessarily involved in 
 consciousness, that we might have had feelings and 
 thoughts innumerable in constant succession, without 
 any acquaintance with self. The supposition is ten- 
 able because it is not inconsistent, one part does not 
 contradict another ; and consequently the knowledge of 
 our Identity is not self-evident or necessary. 
 
 3. This, however, must be allowed, that knowledge, 
 properly so called, does necessarily suppose some know- 
 ledge of self; for, how could I be said to know any- 
 thing beyond the feeling or thought of the present mo- 
 ment, unless I myself were somehow known. This 
 knowledge is clearly implied in every other. In this 
 sense, and in this sense alone, we may admit the first 
 proposition of an ingenious writer of the present day, as 
 
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AND OF MEMORY. 13 
 
 contained in bis " Theory of Knowing and Being," that 
 " Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, 
 as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some 
 cognisance of itself J 3 Yes, along with whatever any 
 intelligence knows; but this does not prove that self- 
 knowledge is a necessary article of belief, but only, like 
 memory, necessary to all other knowledge. We might 
 have had a succession of feelings and thoughts, without 
 memory, without a knowledge of self ; but such a suc- 
 cession would not be knowledge. 
 
 4. The above Proposition, as thus understood, seems 
 to be true, and consequently harmless at least, if not 
 fruitful ; but Proposition Second, which the author de- 
 duces from the First, is paradoxical in the extreme, 
 being opposed to the universal intuitive reason of man- 
 kind. This Proposition contains the whole of his sys- 
 tem ; and if it be upset, the whole must fall. It is as 
 follows : — " The object of all knowledge, whatever it may 
 be, is always something more than what is naturally or 
 usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must 
 be, the object with the addition of oneself, — object plus 
 subject — thing, or thought, mecum. Self is an integral 
 and essential part of every object of cognition. 
 
 " Demonstration. 
 
 u It has been already established as the condition of all 
 knowledge, that a thing can be known only provided the 
 intelligence which apprehends It knows itself at the same 
 time. But if a thing can be known only provided one- 
 self be known along with it, it follows that the thing (or 
 thought) and oneself together, must, in every case, be the 
 
14 INSTINCT. 
 
 object, the true and complete object of knowledge, in 
 other words, it follows that that which we know always 
 is, and must be, object plus subject, object cum alio — 
 thing or thought with an addition to it, — which addition 
 is the me; Self, therefore, is an integral and essential 
 part of every object of cognition." 1 
 
 5. Now, let us observe, in the first instance, that the 
 author allows in the enunciation of the Proposition that 
 the object of knowledge, as understood by Mm, differs 
 from what is naturally and usually regarded as the object, 
 differs by containing something not commonly compre- 
 hended under it. Why, then, it may be asked, do you 
 call it an object ? why attach a new meaning to an old 
 and well-understood word ? Your object, it is allowed, 
 is not the object of other men. Accordingly, in the de- 
 monstration we are told that " if a thing can be known 
 only provided oneself be known along with it, it follows 
 that the thing (or thought) and oneself together must, 
 in every case, be the object, the true and complete object, 
 of knowledge." Now this is the very inference which we 
 deny. Self is not, and cannot be, a part of the object, 
 so long as these two are distinguished by all men under 
 heaven. No one can confound the two. The attempt 
 to confound them is an insult to the universal intuitive 
 reason of mankind. The author himself allows that 
 they are " naturally and usually" distinguished. It is, 
 in fact, only by giving a new meaning to the word object, 
 by enlarging it, that the inference can be maintained. 
 Because a thing can be known only provided oneself be 
 
 1 " Theory of Knowing and Being," by Professor Ferrier. Proposi- 
 tion II. 
 
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AND OF MEMORY. 15 
 
 known along with it, it does not follow that self is an 
 object of knowledge, as that word is usually understood. 
 The condition of all knowledge is not necessarily an ob- 
 ject of knowledge. It may and must co-exist along with 
 the object, but only the slightest reflection, or rather 
 none at all, is required to distinguish them. To say 
 that " Self is an integral and essential part of every 
 object of cognition/' is a monstrous paradox, a contradic- 
 tion in terms, a contradiction to the meaning of the word 
 object Sometimes, indeed, self may be an object to self, 
 as when we reflect on the operations of our own minds ; 
 but this very case, by its difference from other cases, 
 proves that self is not always, not necessarily, an object, 
 or a part of an object. In this particular case, and in 
 this alone, self is both subject and object. This Second 
 Proposition, the first inference from the Primary Pro- 
 position, contains, as we have said, all that is peculiar to 
 the " Theory of Knowing and Being ;" and that infer- 
 ence being shown to be fallacious, the whole system 
 must perish. 
 
 6. It thus appears that the startling and paradoxical 
 air which pervades the whole of the " Theory of Know- 
 ing and Being/' arises from giving a new and enlarged 
 sense to the word object, a sense different from the na- 
 tural or usual, as the author himself allows. But, as 
 the writer cannot get rid of the old sense of the word, 
 he immediately applies to it what holds good of the 
 term in its new signification only ; and, so applied, the 
 system becomes paradox and nonsense. If, on the other 
 hand, the new sense be constantly held to, the " Theory" 
 is frivolous, a mere change of nomenclature. Paradox 
 
16 INSTINCT. 
 
 or insignificance, absurdity or nothing, u choose your 
 horn." I have elsewhere said, " No error is more com- 
 mon in Philosophy than by changing the meaning of a 
 word to arrive at conclusions which wear the air of no- 
 velty, while nothing may be really new but the altered 
 signification of a term." 
 
 In knowing any thing I cannot but know myself also. 
 True. But that thing is either self or non-self. Let it 
 be non-self, then the knowledge of the non-self is not the 
 same as the knowledge of self; or the object differs from 
 the subject. It is impossible to evade this argument but 
 by denying that there is any thing in the word but 
 self. If a non-self be allowed, the reasoning is irresis- 
 tible. 
 
 7. An acquaintance with the past which we obtain by 
 memory, and an acquaintance with self, are two instinc- 
 tive and fundamental articles of knowledge, which arise 
 together, and are for ever inseparable. We cannot re- 
 member any thing past, that is, in the first instance, 
 some past state of consciousness, and through it some 
 outward event, without knowing, in other words, believ- 
 ing without doubt, that the subject who then was con- 
 scious, and he who now remembers, is the same, the 
 same, not merely similar, really One and Indivisible. So, 
 we cannot believe in self without the remembrance of 
 something before the present moment, some prior state 
 of consciousness, belonging to that self. " I am the same 
 man as I was yesterday," predicates sameness and supposes 
 memory ; u and I remember the events of yesterday," 
 precludes memory and supposes sameness of the subject. 
 Thus knowledge of Personal Identity and knowledge of 
 
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AND OF MEMORY. 17 
 
 the Past are inseparably and necessarily bound up to- 
 gether. 
 
 8. These two articles of knowledge, Personal Identity, 
 and some acquaintance with the Past, are fundamental, 
 because they are the ground- work of all other knowledge. 
 It is clearly impossible to know any thing beyond the 
 present moment unless we know that we who now learn 
 and we who formerly learnt are the same ; and it is also 
 impossible to know what we formerly learnt without 
 memory. Consequently, these two articles of knowledge 
 are strictly fundamental. 
 
 9. If there be any exception to the above truth it is 
 in the case of intuitive knowledge, to be afterwards dwelt 
 upon. When we assent to any self-evident maxim, such 
 as " if equals be added to equals the wholes are equal/' or 
 " two straight lines cannot enclose a space ;" it may be 
 doubted whether any exercise of memory, any knowledge 
 of self, be necessary. The mind appears to embrace the 
 maxim at once without any reference to the past. This 
 being allowed, it would follow that, strictly speaking, 
 knowledge of self is not indispensable to all knowledge, 
 that it does not always even co-exist with the knowledge 
 of an object, much less form a part of that object, as 
 Professor Ferrier maintains. 
 
 10. These two co-existent and contemporaneous articles 
 of knowledge are not only fundamental but instinctive ; 
 as will readily appear by reference to our Criteria (Sec- 
 tion I. 5). 
 
 (1.) Knowledge of Self, and its concomitant Memory, 
 are certainly original, not derived from any previous 
 knowledge. They are got without effort, whether we 
 
18 INSTINCT. 
 
 will or not, without seeking, without meditation ; they 
 neither demand nor admit of logical proof. 
 
 (2.) They are universal, held by all men without ex- 
 ception, even by those who profess to doubt them. 
 
 (3.) They are irresistible , proof against all sceptical 
 arguments, though unanswerable ; for such arguments, 
 however puzzling, are not demonstrative. We must 
 yield to demonstration. 
 
 (4.) They are not strictly self-evident like the axioms 
 of mathematics, in other words, they are not discerned 
 to be true. The contrary supposition involves no con- 
 tradiction, and is therefore admissible ; it is no outrage 
 to reason. Our sameness may be a delusion ; memory 
 may deceive us ; though we cannot so believe. Eeason 
 must allow the supposition to be just possible, but In- 
 stinct forbids us to doubt. 
 
 SECTION THIRD. 
 
 KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER. 
 
 1. Next in order to the knowledge of Self, and of past 
 states of Consciousness, may be ranked the knowledge of 
 Matter. Hitherto we have been acquainted only with 
 our own minds, with the present and the past states 
 thereof, and with that something which remains perman- 
 ent amidst all modifications. So far, all is of a similar 
 nature, all is immaterial, and though at the bottom every 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER. 19 
 
 thing is mysterious, and imperfectly comprehensible, yet 
 there appears no peculiar mystery in passing from one 
 state of Consciousness to another. My own Being, the 
 only one which I intimately know, is spiritual ; there 
 may therefore be other spiritual Beings similar to myself 
 in all respects ; there may be other spiritual Beings 
 superior to myself; there may be One Great spiritual 
 Being above all. These inferences are natural, nay, un- 
 avoidable. The world of Spirits, then, is the one first 
 open to us, through our own Consciousness, and by infer- 
 ences therefrom, so far as we are able to make them. It 
 is the first world revealed to us by Instinct, and the last 
 which Beason should give up ; for we cannot abandon it 
 without denying ourselves. If we be not spiritual, we 
 are nothing. The world of Spirits, then, is the one of 
 which we have the greatest certainty. 
 
 2. But the world of spirits is not all. We are next 
 introduced to a world of a very different sort, not only 
 different, but opposed, the qualities of the one being a 
 negation of the other. The one is material, the other 
 immaterial ; that is, the one is extended, solid or im- 
 penetrable, or occupying space, moveable, and infinitely 
 divisible ; the other unextended, penetrable, or occupy- 
 ing no space, consequently incapable of movement in 
 space, and indivisible. 
 
 3. Now, the great question is, how came we to know 
 a thing so different from ourselves ? This does seem the 
 mystery of mysteries ; and so it has appeared to thought- 
 ful men ; for, while by some, theories have been formed 
 to lessen the difficulty ; by others, the existence of matter 
 has been called in question or even flatly denied. Ke~ 
 
20 INSTINCT. 
 
 ferring to another work 1 for an account of the various 
 theories framed to meet the difficulty, by softening down 
 the distinction between Mind and Matter, by material- 
 izing mind, or by immaterializing matter, or by inter- 
 posing Deity, theories which complicate the mystery 
 without removing it, we shall be content here to refer 
 to those who profess to doubt or to disbelieve the exist- 
 ence of the material world. 
 
 4. Considering the wide and deep distinction between 
 Mind and Matter, the awful gulph which lies between 
 them, and hence the impossibility of an immediate 
 knowledge of the latter ; these doubts seem at first not 
 unreasonable. As soon as we begin to think upon the 
 subject at all, we must see that all we know immediately 
 is some state of our own Minds ; and how, from such a 
 state, we get at something else utterly opposed in nature, 
 does seem peculiarly incomprehensible. In vain do we 
 attempt to throw a bridge over the chasm by means of 
 sensible species or Ideas, whether those ideas pass directly 
 from the object to us, or through the medium of the 
 divine Mind ; we must at last leap the gulph which we 
 had laboured to cross with ease. A very ingenious au- 
 thor of the present day, already alluded to, has endea- 
 voured to get over the abyss by filling it up, by effacing 
 the distinction between Mind and Matter, but the ravine 
 was too broad and too deep. 
 
 5. But why must we leap the chasm which we cannot 
 otherwise cross ? Why not remain on this side and 
 refuse to trust ourselves to an unknown land, beset with 
 
 1 See the Author's " Principles of Psychology." Part III., chap. 
 III., Sect. 3, Of Perception. 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER. 21 
 
 clouds and thick darkness ? Here, all is comparatively 
 clear, there, all is mysterious, unlike to any thing which 
 we intimately know. Myself I know, my thoughts and 
 feelings I know ; but what is that which neither thinks 
 nor feels ? Why believe in something without, which 
 contradicts all within ? Surely this is too great a call 
 on my credulity. A Spirit I am, and, without some 
 powerful reason to the contrary, I will believe only in 
 the world of spirits. 
 
 6. But can you believe only in the world of spirits ? 
 That I deny. Do what you will, strive against the belief 
 with all your power, fortify your doubts by every con- 
 ceivable argument, still the belief cannot really be shaken, 
 certainty cannot be overthrown. You may assume a 
 philosophic air, you may pride yourself on your superi- 
 ority to vulgar prejudices, you may laugh at the credulity 
 of the common herd ; but all this is mere pretence, a 
 sham, a robe of state to cover a common garment. It is 
 fine cambric concealing coarse linen. The fine cambric 
 may be worn on days of ceremony, but the common linen 
 cannot be dispensed with. The one is too frail for ordi- 
 nary use, too cold for every day life ; it is but an ornament, 
 a badge, to distinguish the wearer from the multitude. 
 
 7. And what prevents me from doubting or disbeliev- 
 ing the existence of the material world, which you allow 
 is so foreign to my nature, so remote from Self ? to this 
 there is but one answer, Instinct, Instinct, Instinct. A 
 famous school of philosophy, the Scottish, has founded 
 our belief in matter on common sense ; but, in no signi- 
 fication that these words will bear, can this explanation 
 or justification of the Belief be admitted. The word 
 
2£ INSTINCT. 
 
 sense cannot here be used in its proper meaning, it must 
 signify intellect in some form, not sensation. If it imply 
 reason, then common sense will be that degree of reason 
 which is common to all reasonable beings. But belief 
 in the material world is not founded on reason, nor can 
 it be justified thereby ; for it is held by the lowest ani- 
 mals which have never been allowed to possess reason ; 
 and reason can never show why the mental affections 
 which I experience prove the existence of something 
 totally different. To introduce reason, then, as at first 
 a cause, and afterwards a justification of the belief, shows 
 a total misconception of the subject. The Belief in 
 question is not reasonable, but instinctive, and it has all 
 the characteristics thereof. 
 
 8. First, this belief, and the knowledge therein im- 
 plied, is original, not derived from previous knowledge ; 
 it is got without effort, whether we will or not, without 
 seeking, without meditation; it neither demands nor 
 admits of logical proof. 
 
 Secondly, it is certainly universal, held by all men, 
 even by those philosophers who profess to doubt, nay, 
 by all animals without exception. 
 
 Thirdly, it is irresistible, proof against all sceptical 
 arguments, though unanswerable ; arguments, however, 
 that are not demonstrative, and which, therefore, may 
 be fallacious. 
 
 Fourthly, it is not self-evident, not necessary, not 
 discerned to be true ; and, therefore, it may be disputed 
 without absurdity. 
 
 This article of knowledge differs from Self knowledge 
 in this, that the latter is essential to all knowledge, 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER. 23 
 
 whereas the former is essential only to a knowledge of 
 Matter and to physical science. 
 
 If the above statement be correct, if the belief in 
 matter be founded on an Instinct universal and irresis- 
 tible, it necessarily follows that all expressed doubt thereof 
 is merely verbal or nominal, not mental or real. Why 
 then waste words, why endeavour to expel what has no 
 hold in the breast ? Why attempt to prove what no 
 one really questions ? A bond fide doubt we may meet, 
 but a nominal doubt we should utterly disregard. The 
 belief in the material world, like all instinctive beliefs, 
 neither demands nor admits of logical proof; and to 
 require such is at variance with that First Philosophy, 
 which shows us the foundation of human knowledge, 
 and the evidence proper to each department. Instinct 
 is as imperative as Eeason ; we can no more resist the one 
 than the other, though they act upon the mind differ- 
 ently. Philosophia prima, the first philosophy, shows 
 us that to doubt the evidence of instinct, is not, indeed, 
 absurd, but impossible ; and if it is impossible, we must 
 submit, though in words we seem to rebel. Better 
 then is it, and more philosophic, openly to yield to our 
 nature, than to do violence to our convictions, and glory 
 in our scepticism at the expense of our sincerity. We 
 believe, then, in the existence of the material world, we 
 cannot help believing in it; and it is mere philoso- 
 phical trifling to call in question what we never can 
 really doubt. True, as this belief is not founded on 
 reason, reason must allow that it may be groundless, 
 but this thought can shake our conviction hardly for a 
 passing moment. 
 
24 INSTINCT. 
 
 SECTION FOURTH. 
 KNOWLEDGE OF UNIFOBMITT IN NATUBE. 
 
 1. Our knowledge of the material world could serve 
 us but little, were we not, at the same time, impressed 
 with the Belief of some uniformity in nature, that things 
 which have once been conjoined, in space or in time, will 
 be found conjoined again and again. 
 
 2. This Belief, though truly instinctive, differs from 
 the former in this respect, that it requires some experi- 
 ence for its development ; for, unless we have seen one 
 instance, at least, of such conjunction of phenomena, in 
 space or in time, we cannot possibly expect another. 
 This expectation, then, is an inference from Experience 
 in each particular case ; but the tendency to draw such 
 inferences is an Instinct of our nature, ready to show 
 itself on the first occasion. It cannot be maintained 
 that we are sufficiently acquainted with the nature of 
 things to be able to show any reason for such uniform 
 conjunction, whether of co-existence or of succession, 
 whether in space or in time ; and children believe in 
 uniform conjunction even from their earliest years. For 
 ought we can see to the contrary, nature might have 
 been a chaos, and the events of one day totally different 
 from those of another. The ready tendency to believe 
 in uniformity is shewn by this, that one instance of 
 conjunction is enough. The child who has burnt his 
 fingers once, will be more cautious about fire another 
 time. We are, in fact, credulous in the extreme, and 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF UNIFORMITY IN NATURE. 25 
 
 believe many conjunctions to be invariable, which are 
 only casual. This is a main and deep-seated source of 
 error. 
 
 3. Sometimes Instinctive Knowledge is supposed where 
 there is really none. Thus, because some animals avoid 
 food injurious to them, wild plants, for instance, prior to 
 all experience of their effects, they are said to avoid them 
 by Instinct. But we cannot suppose it is from any fore- 
 knowledge of the effects that those animals shun them, 
 but merely from something disagreeable in the smell or 
 taste. On the other hand, Knowledge is often attributed 
 to Experience, while Experience was only the spark that 
 set the train on fire. A match from the lantern of Gruy 
 Fawkes might have sent the Houses of Parliament into 
 the air, but the gunpowder must first have been com- 
 pounded and set in order. So, had there not been an in- 
 stinctive tendency to believe in uniformity, Experience 
 would have been in vain. 
 
 4. The word Experience is in everybody's mouth ; and 
 it admits of great latitude of meaning. Strictly speaking, 
 our experience is limited to the phenomena of our own 
 minds, for these alone we know immediately, intimately, 
 thoroughly. Hence, by an extension of meaning, we are 
 said to have experience of things ontward, which we 
 actually perceive, or have perceived, that is of particu- 
 lar bodies, or particular changes in bodies, presented to 
 the senses ; though such knowledge be not immediate, 
 but obtained through certain phenomena of mind, by 
 inference either instinctive or rational. By a farther 
 extension of the term, a man of Experience comes to mean 
 one who has not only perceived much and accurately, 
 
26 INSTINCT. 
 
 but who has drawn many general conclusions from his 
 perceptions. In Philosophy, the term Experience ought, 
 certainly ; to be limited to the first two senses, if not to 
 the first alone ; and in neither of these senses can the 
 inference of permanent uniformity, which we draw from 
 a particular instance of conjunction in space or in time, 
 be attributed to Experience. Neither can it be ascribed 
 to Eeason ; for why should nature be uniform ; why 
 might it not be a chaos ? Can we pretend to know 
 enough of the secrets of things to affirm the absurdity 
 of the latter proposition. And if the inference be owing 
 neither to Experience nor to Eeason, it must be attri- 
 buted to Instinct. 
 
 5. That the instinct in question often leads us 
 astray, that it often conjoins things permanently which 
 have only been united casually, is not disputed. Here, 
 then, is the use of Experience. It serves either to 
 correct or to confirm the Instinct. When our expecta- 
 tions have been deceived, when phenomena once con- 
 joined are found together no longer, we of course must 
 give up our belief in the particular uniformity, and this 
 correction may be attributed to Experience. On the 
 other hand, when we have found the same phenomena 
 conjoined again and again, Instinct is fortified, and 
 Belief confirmed. Kepetition has a power of its own, it 
 strengthens, but does not originate. A habit must 
 begin in something which is not habit, but natural ten- 
 dency; and so, Eepetition fortifies the tendency to believe 
 in uniformity, supposing such tendency already to exist. 
 
 6. Belief of uniformity in nature being not only highly 
 important, but even indispensable to our existence, we 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF UNIFORMITY IN NATURE. 27 
 
 cannot suppose that its origin should have been left to 
 the slow growth of Eeason. But for this belief, the child, 
 with all the care of his nurse and parents, never could 
 have attained the age of manhood, never could have 
 reached that age when Eeason is developed. It was 
 then necessary for the continuance of the species that 
 this knowledge should be instinctive. 
 
 7. Does, then, this knowledge possess the character- 
 istics of Instinct? First, this Belief and the Know- 
 ledge therein implied certainly arises after a single in- 
 stance of conjunction of phenomena ; and though this 
 instance be matter of Experience, yet the Belief in the 
 constant recurrence of such conjunction is Original, not 
 derived from previous knowledge ; it is got without 
 effort, whether we will or not, without seeking, without 
 meditation ; it neither demands nor admits of logical 
 proof. Were it true, as Hume supposes, that several 
 instances of conjunction were necessary to create the 
 Belief in future unvaried uniformity, still such belief 
 could by no means be attributed to Eeason ; for Eeason 
 can see no connection between past uniformity, however 
 frequent, and constant uniformity in time to come ; and, 
 consequently, some other principle, as Custom, must be 
 called in to solve the difficulty. On this supposition, 
 the Belief in question would be the result merely of 
 Custom or constant association. But we have seen that 
 one instance alone of conjunction suffices to create the 
 Belief; and, therefore, neither Custom nor Eeason can 
 explain the mystery. 
 
 8. Secondly, Belief in certain uniformities in nature 
 is universal, held by all men, even by those whose rea- 
 
28 INSTINCT. 
 
 son is subverted, and by all animals. It is a remarkable 
 corroboration of our doctrine, that Belief in the material 
 world, and in the uniformity of nature, clings close even 
 to those unhappy persons whose reason is clouded or 
 extinguished. Persons in this situation are often quite 
 able to take care of themselves so far as to avoid any 
 obstacle or imminent danger ; and those who do destroy 
 themselves, do so intentionally, proving by this very act 
 that they know the common effects of common things. 
 Nothing can show more clearly the distinction between 
 Instinct and Keason. Of this distinction I have myself 
 been a melancholy witness, 
 
 9. Thirdly, the Belief in uniformity is in many cases 
 irresistible, "irresistible as well as instantaneous upon 
 the phenomena. 
 
 10. Fourthly, this Belief is not self-evident, not ne- 
 cessary, the fact is not discerned to be true ; and there- 
 fore it may be called in question without absurdity 
 No one can rightly affirm that it is absurd to say that 
 the course of nature may change. Thus, Belief of unifor- 
 mity in nature has all the characteristics of Instinctive 
 Knowledge. 
 
 11. This Belief is the foundation of all Science, that 
 is of all general knowledge ; for science deals not in 
 particulars, like Civil History, and Topography, but in 
 general facts ; and, without the Belief of uniformity in 
 the constitution and course of nature, all Knowledge 
 would be particular, there could be no general results. 
 Simple observation upon passing events would still give 
 us information, but this information would be of no use, 
 for it could tell nothing as to the future. It is the 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 29 
 
 Mind, by an original and untaught power, which turns 
 this information to account, that adds to the phenomena 
 something entirely its own, something entirely distinct 
 from sensation, distinct from perception, which believes, 
 and cannot help believing, that the future will always 
 be like the past. Thus, particular and barren informa- 
 tion becomes general and useful knowledge ; observations 
 once made are available for ever ; Experience becomes 
 the guide of life ; and Observation with experiments 
 raises up a body of science, to delight, adorn, and benefit 
 mankind. We may say, then, with truth, that all useful 
 knowledge with respect to matters of fact rests ulti- 
 mately upon Faith, a Belief for which we can assign no 
 reason. 
 
 SECTION FIFTH. 
 KNOWLEDGE OF OVE OWN FEEE WILL. 
 
 1. Closely connected with the knowledge of our Per- 
 sonal Identity is that of our own Free Will, which is 
 really a part of the Knowledge of Self. We cannot 
 know ourselves at all without knowing that we are free 
 agents, at least without the firm belief that we are such, 
 which may well be called Knowledge, as much as our 
 belief in the existence of the material world, and our 
 belief in the uniformity of nature. 
 
 2. In the material world we believe that every change 
 may be traced to some antecedent change as its cause, 
 
30 INSTINCT. 
 
 and having once found that cause we believe that it 
 will always be followed by the same effect, if no other 
 cause intervene. Hence the anticipations of physical 
 science are in numberless cases confident in the extreme. 
 Every almanack is full of such anticipations, and they are 
 always verified, generally with the nicest exactness. Not so 
 in the case of human agency. We may guess, we may 
 conjecture, we may even infer with much probability, how 
 a person in a certain situation will act, but we never can 
 be quite sure. Nay we never can predict with certainty 
 how we ourselves shall act on any occasion. Whence 
 this difference between the anticipations of Physical and 
 of Moral Science ? The difference depends on this, that 
 we believe ourselves and all other men to be endowed with 
 a power of originating change, a power therefore which 
 may baffie all our attempts at calculation founded on the 
 causes which most commonly act upon the Will. The 
 nice and endless differences of individuals, the whim, the 
 caprice of the moment, never can be calculated; the 
 power of originating never can be brought under the ex- 
 act uniformity of a Law of Causation ; Mind can never 
 be assimilated to Matter. Matter originates nothing, at 
 least so we implicitly believe ; it only continues and 
 propagates change everlastingly ; but Mind begins mo- 
 tion and mental changes ; and this power is so wound up 
 with our notion of Mind, that we cannot, if we would, 
 separate the one from the other. 
 
 3. That we all firmly believe ourselves and all other 
 men to have Free Will, to be endowed with a power of 
 orginating, not to be mere links in the chain of cause 
 and effect, or simple instruments in the hands of a supe- 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 31 
 
 rior power, is proved by the facts of Conscience in our 
 own case ; and by the sentiments wherewith we regard 
 the actions of others. Conscience, indeed, is not what 
 some represent it, an infallible monitor and instructor, 
 informing us of what is right and wrong in every case, 
 a supreme judge or arbiter from whom there is no appeal ; 
 for, it is unquestionable that some, like Eavaillac, and I 
 may add Calvin, have done atrocious acts with the full 
 approbation of Conscience, glorying in the deed, while 
 many others have treated and do still treat their enslaved 
 fellow-creatures worse than the brutes, without compunc- 
 tion. But when we ourselves have done what we al- 
 ready know, or at least fully believe to be right or wrong, 
 there is that within us which always creates self-satisfac- 
 tion or dissatisfaction on the retrospect, and this is Con- 
 science, not an infallible instructor or guide, but a never- 
 failing sanction of morality, tending to keep our acts in 
 accordance with our notions, perfect or imperfect, of Duty. 
 In like manner, when we review the actions of others we 
 feel approbation or disapprobation, we praise or blame. 
 Now what can Conscience, what can approbation or dis- 
 approbation, praise or blame, mean, if men have no Free 
 Will ? They certainly imply belief that we can do or 
 not do as we please, that in a certain case we might have 
 acted otherwise, that we are something more than consti- 
 tuted parts of a machine, something more than levers, 
 wheels, axles, or hydraulic rams, that we have the god- 
 like power of originating change. And as Conscience in 
 our own case, approbation or disapprobation, praise or 
 blame, in that of others, are facts notorious as the sun, 
 
32 INSTINCT* 
 
 extensive as the human race, so also must be the belief 
 in the free agency of man. 
 
 4. That the doctrine of Free Will is liable to great 
 difficulties, is not disputed, but for our present purpose 
 these difficulties are unimportant, if they do not interfere 
 with the universal Belief of mankind. That is the only 
 point which we are at present concerned to establish. 
 For answers to these objections, sufficient, I think, though 
 of course not demonstrative, I must refer to the chapter 
 on the Will in my Principles of Psychology. There the 
 subject is discussed in full. Our only object here is to note 
 and confirm the fact of the universality of the Belief in our 
 free agency, for this is required to prove the Instinctive 
 Nature of that Belief. The question then now is, do the 
 above difficulties really destroy the Catholic character of 
 the doctrine ? 
 
 5. That the freedom of Man's Will has been often 
 disputed among philosophers, and that some have main- 
 tained the opposite doctrine of Necessity, there is no 
 doubt ; but the existence of the material world has also 
 been doubted and even denied ; and yet we must allow 
 that scepticism on this point does not in the least inter- 
 fere with the real universality of the Belief. The amount 
 of Belief bears to that of doubt an infinite ratio, as one 
 to zero. Moreover, we are certain as to the Belief, but 
 we never can be sure of the reality of the doubt ; for we 
 know well that opinions are often broached by philoso- 
 phers more from a love of singularity, a desire of dis- 
 tinction, a contempt of the vulgar, than from conviction. 
 It is natural for those, " who cannot add anything to 
 Truth, to seek for eminence through the heresies of 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 33 
 
 paradox." And they often succeed, for men are caught 
 by the new and the startling, while they turn with in- 
 difference from the old and the true. We may well 
 doubt whether all the excellence of the Recherche de la 
 verite would have obtained for Malebranche a due re- 
 ward of renown, had it not contained the astonishing 
 theory of seeing all things in God; or whether all the 
 acuteness and all the charm of Berkeley would have 
 gained for him a never-dying celebrity, had he not 
 denied the outward existence of Matter. So, Hume rose 
 into notoriety by denying that miracles ever could be 
 credible. 
 
 Besides, those very philosophers, even the most scep- 
 tical, talk and act, and seem to think, on all ordinary 
 occasions, just like other men. When they quit their 
 closet they leave their doubts behind them. What pa- 
 tron of Necessity ever expressed himself in practical cases 
 of morality differently from other people ? Who ever 
 ceased to feel approbation or disapprobation, or to assign 
 praise or blame to certain actions, because he denied 
 freedom to the Will? Thus, professed doctrine and 
 conduct were in open contradiction, Philosophy and Na- 
 ture, Eeason and Instinct constantly opposed. Nay, an 
 eminent metaphysician, who has lately propounded a 
 startling theory, maintains that Philosophy ought not to 
 leave the closet, that it is for private meditation only, not 
 for the world at large, for speculation not for use, and 
 that out of his sanctum the philosopher is a pedant and a 
 bore. He must pass his speculative life in a world of his 
 own — a world of enchantment no doubt ; for woe to him 
 if he carry his illusions abroad. He will be gazed and 
 
34 INSTINCT. 
 
 laughed at if lie merely enounce his opinions, but if he 
 act upon them, he will be clapped into Bedlam. Or, he 
 will have the fate of Alnaschar, who, lost in reverie, 
 kicked all his glass and crockery into the street. 
 
 6. What seems a more weighty objection to the doc- 
 trine of the universality of the belief in Free Will, is the 
 fact that certain religious sects, and even whole nations, 
 have adopted a contrary opinion. Thus, while the Sad- 
 ducees, according to Josephus, 1 held the doctrine of Free 
 Will in all its integrity, the Pharisees combined it with a 
 belief in destiny; and other sects, as the rigid Calvinists, 
 and even a whole people, as the Turks, maintain the 
 doctrine of Fatalism. In these instances, we see, to a 
 remarkable extent, the effect of reason, right or wrong, 
 in overcoming instinct, so far as to establish an opinion 
 in direct contradiction to the latter ; but it is only an 
 opinion, and an opinion inconsistent with every-day sen- 
 timent, speech, and action ; for, what individual, what 
 sect, what nation, because they believed in predestina- 
 tion, ever ceased to feel, speak, and act like other people ? 
 Could a few instances be produced of individuals who, 
 in some period of unusual excitement, have stifled the 
 instincts of nature in obedience to a favourite theory, 
 these instances must be regarded as extraordinary phe- 
 nomena, occasioned by extraordinary causes, forming no 
 exception worth speaking of to the countless sum of con- 
 trary facts. The power of Instinct is eminently shown 
 in this, that it acts even when the Eeason is convinced 
 to the contrary, that it triumphs over false theories, and 
 though it cannot stop speculation, renders it utterly at 
 1 Wars of the Jews, Book II. chap. 12. 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 35 
 
 variance with practice. Are rigid Calvinists, are Turks, 
 free from the stings of conscience because they believe in 
 predestination ? Do they feel, do they express no indig- 
 nation against the betrayer or the oppressor ? Do they 
 cease to believe themselves accountable for their words 
 and actions ? If not, then their whole moral life is at 
 war with their reason. 
 
 7. That certain individuals, and even sects, should 
 endeavour to persuade themselves, in opposition to In- 
 stinct, that the Will is not free, and that man is subject 
 to Necessity or Fate, is not surprising. How agreeable 
 to the natural depravity of human nature to suppose 
 that we are not accountable for our actions ! how plea- 
 sant to think that we are predestined to everlasting hap- 
 piness ! how gratifying to believe that we are the especial 
 favourites of Heaven ! What can feed pride more than 
 the latter supposition ? It is not our real deserts that 
 minister to pride so much as our supposed advantages 
 over others, even those of a frivolous nature. Keal merit 
 is its own reward; it gives that inward and heartfelt 
 satisfaction which requires no fictitious support ; while 
 doubtful and petty superiority needs to be propped up by 
 pride. Thus, virtuous actions do not make men arro- 
 gant ; but belief in the favour of heaven, independently 
 of our own doings, engenders spiritual pride, the bane of 
 true religion. To be the predestined favourite of heaven 
 is of course a great superiority, but it can always be 
 questioned by others, and must at times seem doubtful 
 even to the individual. Therefore it must be openly 
 assumed and dwelt upon in order to impose upon the 
 world as well as upon self. The Jews looked upon them- 
 
36 INSTINCT. 
 
 selves as the chosen people of God, and nothing could be 
 more mortifying to them than the doctrine of Christianity, 
 which put all mankind upon an equality. No wonder 
 then that they shut their ears to the truth of the gospel, 
 and even persecuted to the death those who maintained 
 that there was no longer any distinction between Jew 
 and Gentile. 
 
 8. The universality of the belief in the free and there- 
 fore accountable agency of man is proved by the lan- 
 guage of all people in all ages. All languages abound in 
 words of praise and blame, proving belief in merit and 
 demerit, and consequently in free-will, for, take away 
 free-will, and praise and blame are utterly misapplied. 
 To this it may be replied, that though there be no such 
 thing in reality as merit and demerit, yet praise and 
 blame have their use by acting as motives to the Will, 
 encouraging useful and discouraging noxious actions. 
 No doubt such is the final cause or purpose of Moral 
 Sentiment ; but to deny the existence of merit and de- 
 merit is to belie the universal sentiment of mankind, 
 (against which in morals it is vain to appeal,) and to 
 suppose that we are the fools and dupes of nature, which 
 has made us such that we can no more get rid of the 
 notion of merit and demerit, than we can change our 
 skin. Cl These sentiments are so rooted in our constitu- 
 tion and temper that, without entirely confounding the 
 human mind by disease or madness, it is impossible to 
 extirpate and destroy them/' 1 Praise and blame serve, no 
 dotibt, a great moral purpose, they are useful in the 
 highest degree ; but without the belief in merit and 
 1 Hume, " Treatise of Human Nature," Book III, Sect. 2. 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 37 
 
 demerit, and consequently in free agency, we could nei- 
 ther praise nor blame. 
 
 9. It must then be allowed, after a due consideration 
 of all objections, that no amount of real disbelief in the 
 Free Will of man exists, worthy to be set against the 
 overwhelming sum of belief, so as to make any material 
 deduction from the latter. Therefore, one character- 
 istic of Instinctive Knowledge, universality, belongs to 
 the belief in the free agency of man. 
 
 Secondly, This belief is certainly irresistible; for we 
 have seen that it is proof against all arguments addressed 
 to the reason, how ingenious, how powerful soever they 
 may be. These arguments, though never demonstrative, 
 may stagger us ; they may be difficult to answer ; they 
 may make converts to a philosophical tenet, but they 
 have little or no influence on our moral sentiments and 
 actions ; and, therefore, we may infer that they do not 
 really convince. They may please a speculative mind ; 
 they may gratify a love of singularity and notoriety; 
 they may raise up a philosophical master and give a 
 name to his disciples ; but they must bow to the power 
 of Nature ; and Eeason in all its pride, with all its wiles, 
 must yield to the simplicity of Instinct. 
 
 Thirdly, Belief in our Freedom of Will is assuredly 
 original, not derived from any previous knowledge, 
 neither learnt by experience, nor inferred by reason, not 
 developed by years, but as strong in infancy as in age. 
 All that reason has done is to endeavour to shake the 
 belief; and this endeavour has signally failed, even with 
 those who maintained the adverse opinion. Their sen- 
 
38 INSTINCT. 
 
 tirnents, words, and actions, at every moment belied 
 their speculative dogma. 
 
 Fourthly , The belief in question is not self-evident to 
 reason, not necessary, not discerned to be true; and, 
 therefore, it may be, and often has been, called in ques- 
 tion, not only without absurdity, but even with much 
 show of plausible argument. 
 
 Thus, Belief in the Free Will of man has all the cha- 
 racteristics of Instinctive Knowledge. 
 
 10. As knowledge of Self and trust in Memory are the 
 foundation of all knowledge, faith in the uniformity of 
 nature the base of all science, and belief in the material 
 universe the ground of all physical science, so the cer- 
 tainty of Free Will lies at the bottom of all morality. 
 All ethics suppose men to be free ; that he can do or not 
 do certain actions at his good pleasure, proprio motu 7 
 without being subject to any inexorable law ; that certain 
 acts have therefore merit or demerit, are virtuous or 
 vicious, worthy of praise or blame ; that consequently men 
 ought to be rewarded for the one, punished for the other. 
 These sentiments are indisputable and universal. The acts 
 deemed virtuous or vicious may vary a little in different 
 ages and countries, that is, the object of the sentiment 
 may vary, but the sentiment is everywhere to be found. 
 Now, do away with man's Free Will, and the sentiment is 
 nonsense. To award praise or blame to one who cannot 
 regulate his own actions is simply absurd. Freedom of 
 the Will is then the foundation of ethics. 
 
 11. Accordingly, those who upset the liberty of man 
 have demolished ethics along with it. Thus Hobbes, 
 the necessitarian pure, the nominalist par excellence, 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 39 
 
 boldly affirms that might is right, which means that 
 morality, properly and usually so called, is a delusion or 
 a sham. Hobbes cannot be said to have any system of 
 ethics, but only a system of policy, and his policy anni- 
 hilates ethics. Yet even he is constrained to write like 
 other people, whenever his theory is not actually before 
 him, nor could he have done otherwise without creat- 
 ing a language for himself. It is impossible to talk of 
 men and their actions without using words which imply 
 merit or demerit, or express praise or blame, not a mere 
 intellectual decision as to the tendency of these actions. 
 It has been well said by Bentham, " right or wrong, in a 
 good cause, or in a bad, nothing is so rare as consistency/' 
 Having annihilated ethics, it might naturally be sup- 
 posed, and it has been supposed, that Hobbes has de- 
 molished religion along with them. But this would be a 
 rash conclusion. One half of the Leviathan is taken up 
 with Christian politics and the Christian religion, nor 
 does there seem to be any reason to doubt the sincerity 
 of the author, except that his other opinions seem incon- 
 sistent with religious belief ; but according to the dictum 
 of Bentham this is no sure ground of inference. Hobbes 
 was an immoral Theist, not an Atheist ; and he may have 
 been even a Christian. Certainly, one half of his great 
 work is taken up with fixing the principles of Christian- 
 ity, and the respectful terms in which he uniformly men- 
 tions the Holy Scriptures are a better proof of his faith 
 than any argument drawn from his inconsistency is of 
 the contrary. Hobbes was a bold man in the expression 
 of his opinions, he promulgated the most startling doc- 
 trines without reserve or limitation ; in Metaphysics the 
 
40 INSTINCT. 
 
 doctrine of necessity, in Morals that of might as the foun- 
 dation of right, in Politics the unlimited power of one 
 as the best possible government ; can we therefore sup- 
 pose that he would have concealed his religious opinions, 
 had they been hostile to Christianity ; nay, that he would 
 have devoted one half of his Leviathan to the exposition 
 of its principles ? But so it is ; opinions are often attri- 
 buted to men, not that they have actually maintained 
 them, but because they are supposed to be legitimate 
 conclusions from other opinions which they are known to 
 hold. The reader will pardon this digression, for it 
 seemed of some importance to show that irreligious opi- 
 nions had been erroneously attributed to Hobbes, and 
 that so deep a thinker was no disbeliever in Christianity. 
 
 SECTION SIXTH. 
 BELIEF IN HUMAN TESTIMONY. 
 
 1. The last original source of knowledge to be here 
 mentioned is that of Belief in Human Testimony, This 
 knowledge differs from the foregoing inasmuch as it comes 
 to us second-hand, through others, and not by the native 
 powers of our own mind, unlike the knowledge of self, 
 of facts remembered, of the material universe, of uni- 
 formity in nature, and of our own Free Will. For these 
 we require no voucher, no confirmation by others; our 
 own mind gives us all the certainty we can desire. But 
 
BELIEF IN HUMAN TESTIMONY. 41 
 
 the present belief, from its very nature, hangs upon 
 others, and without others can have no existence. 
 
 2. Though the knowledge thus obtained may be said 
 to be not indigenous but of foreign growth, not original, 
 but derived, yet the tendency to believe, on which it is 
 founded, is truly instinctive. 
 
 First, this tendency is certainly original, not derived 
 from any previous knowledge, not the result of experi- 
 ence, for the child at first believes implicitly, without 
 hesitation, whatever he is told. Doubt in testimony, on 
 the contrary, is of slow growth, feeble at the commence- 
 ment, easily crushed, but gradually strengthening as ex- 
 perience proves that men do not always speak the truth, 
 either through ignorance or design. 
 
 Secondly, Belief in Human Testimony is in early child- 
 hood universal, for no one can point out a child who 
 began by doubting what was told him. Credulity is the 
 never failing accompaniment of our tender years. 
 
 Thirdly, this Belief is at first irresistible as well as 
 instantaneous. The child cannot help believing what 
 his parents or his nurse may tell him, and that too at the 
 moment, without demur, without hesitation. 
 
 Lastly, this Belief is not self-evident, not necessary, 
 not discerned to be well founded, and therefore it may 
 be, and as we get older, very frequently is called in ques- 
 tion, without absurdity. Consequently, Belief in Human 
 Testimony has all the characteristics of Instinct. 
 
 3. And this Instinct is necessary to the well-being, 
 nay, to the preservation of the human race. As a long 
 time must elapse before the child can judge for himself, 
 it is essential that he place entire reliance on all that is 
 
42 INSTINCT. 
 
 told him ; for though this may not always be true, yet 
 it is generally intended for his benefit, and some guid- 
 ance must be better than none. What would become 
 of human life if Doubt, not Belief, were the first law of 
 our nature ? All early education is built upon an un- 
 reasoning Belief or Faith in the pupil, for Eeason is not 
 yet sufficiently awake to distinguish the true from the 
 false; so that, without Faith, education could do nothing. 
 Thus, no doubt, error may be inculcated, and prejudice, 
 at all events, there must be ; but prejudice and even error 
 are preferable to a total blank, and to the absence of all 
 rules of life. Education always aims at what is good, 
 and teaches what is believed to be true ; and that it does 
 not always achieve good, or propagate truth, is the result 
 of our fallible nature. What would a child be without 
 prejudice? His intellect would be stunted, his moral 
 nature depraved, from a want of some food for the under- 
 standing, of some guide to the emotions. Even a man 
 without prejudice, that is, without some blind partiality 
 for certain opinions and persons, will be a heartless in- 
 dividual, without warmth, without sincerity, without 
 energy. " Savez-vous," dit M. de Talleyrand, "pourquoi 
 j'aimeassezMontrond? c'est parce qu' il a peude prejuges." 
 " Savez-vous/' dit M. de Montrond, " pourquoi j'aime 
 M. de Talleyrand ? c'est parce qu' il n'en a point du tout." 
 Just so ; Talleyrand was a specimen of a man without 
 prejudice, attached to nothing but his own interest. 
 What is called national sentiment must in the majority 
 be a prejudice, or rather an assemblage of prejudices ; 
 but without such a sentiment, there may be a collection 
 of individuals, but there is no nation. Loyalty is a pre- 
 
BELIEF IN HUMA^T TESTIMONY. 43 
 
 judice in favour of a particular family ; but in a mon- 
 archy, how important, how salutary is that prejudice ! 
 What a bar to rivalry and civil war ! What a source 
 of security ! The politically degraded are unprejudiced 
 enough, they care only for him, be he Bourbon or Bona- 
 parte, who will ennoble or enrich them ; they hoist, as 
 it suits their turn, the white flag, the tricolor, or the 
 red ; yet they still may have some national sentiment. 
 In the last stage of degradation this also disappears, and 
 each man sees clearly, and cares not to conceal, the vices 
 and misery of his own countrymen. 
 
 4. These then are the six grand articles of Belief, to 
 be attributed to Instinct not to Beason, which are before 
 all the lessons of Experience, though some of them may 
 subsequently be confirmed or modified thereby ; which 
 themselves form the most important part of our know- 
 ledge, and are indispensable to all future progress ; which 
 precede and prepare the growth of Beason, the other 
 grand source of Knowledge, and afterwards, hi conjunc- 
 tion with Beason, enable the now mature mind to profit 
 by Experience. For it is notorious that many, even of 
 full age, profit little by Experience, because they do 
 not reflect. Experience alone is of no avail, it is the 
 mind which supplies what is wanting to make Experi- 
 ence fruitful, either by means of some instinctive belief, 
 or some exercise of Beason. Thus, in reality, Instinct 
 and Beason are the only sources of Knowledge. The 
 sources of Knowledge must be in the Mind itself. 
 
PART SECOND. 
 
 REASON. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 
 
 1. In the second chapter of the former part of this 
 work, we divided Knowledge into the Instinctive and 
 the Rational ; and, accordingly, the first part has been 
 given up to the consideration of Instinct, one of the 
 two grand sources of all knowledge. We have now to 
 treat of the other source, of Reason, that divine eman- 
 ation whereby man rises far above all the rest of the 
 animal creation, by superiority in degree, if not by ex- 
 clusive possession ; a superiority so great as to establish 
 him as it were God of this lower world, as much raised 
 above the brutes as he is below his Great Creator. That 
 man can rise to the conception of one Great Being, Maker 
 of Heaven and Earth, and of all that therein is, is itself 
 the greatest proof of his superiority, the indisputable 
 evidence of his own grandeur, in the midst of all his 
 misery and littleness. This magnificent conception the 
 Atheist treats as a delusion ; he plumes himself on his 
 
OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 45 
 
 positive knowledge, much of which is merely instinctive, 
 and rejects the grandest fact which reason has made 
 known to us, showing thus a perversion of Intellect as 
 well as a poverty of Soul. l 
 
 2. At the opening of his Chapter " Of Reason," Locke 
 makes the following statement : " The word Reason, in 
 the English language, has different significations ; some- 
 times it is taken for true and clear principles, — sometimes 
 for clear and fair deductions from those principles, — and 
 sometimes for the cause, and particularly for the final 
 cause. But the consideration I shall have of it here is 
 in a signification different from all these ; and that is, 
 as it stands for a Faculty in man, that faculty whereby 
 man is supposed to be' distinguished from beasts, and 
 wherein it is evident he much surpasses them/' 1 
 
 3. The nature of this faculty it is now our task to 
 determine. Throughout the chapter, of which the above 
 sentence is the commencement, Season is constantly 
 taken to be synonymous with reasoning, or nearly in 
 the second sense above stated. It is clear, therefore, 
 that Locke does not accomplish what he promised, that 
 he fixes no meaning to the term different from those 
 meanings before enumerated, that he tells us not what 
 Keason is but Reasoning. This is particularly clear 
 from Sect. 17. of the above chapter, where Intuitive is 
 distinguished from Rational Knowledge. Now Reason- 
 ing is a part, or rather one of the functions of Reason, 
 but not the whole ; and, therefore, an account of the 
 one cannot serve for the other. 
 
 4. Since Reasoning is universally allowed to belong 
 1 Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book IV. chap. 17. 
 
46 REASON. 
 
 to Season, and is properly the most complex form 
 thereof, by examining the nature of Seasoning, and by 
 eliminating what is peculiar to it, we may rise to the 
 conception of Eeason in general. Now, in all Season- 
 ing, of whatever kind it may be, some connection is seen 
 between one proposition and another, so that if the one 
 be true, the other will be true also, or false, true or false, 
 certainly or probably, as the case may be. Such is the 
 essence of all Seasoning; two Propositions at least, 
 mentally comprehended, if not stated in words, and a 
 seen connection between them, so that the one establishes 
 or upsets the other. But how do we see the connection ? 
 How ? That is a question to which no one can give an 
 answer, for it admits of none. The understanding must 
 begin somewhere, must have a native force, a power of 
 distinguishing one thing from another, of discerning 
 incompatibilities, or it never could acquire any know- 
 ledge. All teaching supposes a mind already capable 
 of learning, endued with an original energy; and we 
 could as well teach a blind man to distinguish colours, 
 as a man without Eeason to reason. The proper name 
 for this mental clearsightedness is Intuition. In all 
 reasoning then we have the comprehension of two pro- 
 positions at least, and intuition of a relation between 
 them. 
 
 5. But Intuition is not confined to the discerning of 
 relation between one proposition and another; it also 
 sees at once a relation, whether of agreement or disagree- 
 ment, between one Notion and another, and so between 
 the Things made known to us through our notions. Thus 
 does the mind see intuitively that Subject and Object, 
 
OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 47 
 
 Self and Non-self, the Material and the Immaterial, are 
 different. Whatever may be the principles or causes of 
 Mental Phenomena, we cannot confound thought and 
 emotion with a thing extended and solid. So, we must 
 allow that the notion of two straight lines is incompa- 
 tible with that of space enclosed, for which three, at least, 
 are indispensable. These and innumerable other agree- 
 ments and disagreements we see at once, intuitively, by 
 Keason, but without reasoning. 
 
 6. From the foregoing scrutiny it appears, that Intui- 
 tion is the faculty of discerning agreement or disagree- 
 ment between notions or conceptions and so between 
 things conceived, as well as between propositions ex- 
 pressive of the relations of notions or of things ; and this 
 Intuition is the very essence of Keason. 
 
 7. But to this Intuition two other faculties are sub- 
 sidiary, the faculty of Conception, and that of Compre- 
 hension. It is evident, that, without clear conceptions 
 we cannot discern at once the agreement or disagree- 
 ment of one conception, or of one thing conceived, with 
 another ; and without distinctly comprehending the 
 meaning of a proposition, we cannot see whether it be 
 true or false, and whether it agree with another or not. 
 Now the faculty of Conception, though subsidiary and 
 indispensable to Eeason, may exist without it, and 
 actually does exist without it, in the insane and the 
 fatuous; but Comprehension of a relation, or the un- 
 derstanding of the words in which it is expressed, as 
 embracing a certain knowledge of Eelation, must be 
 attributed to Eeason. That we can comprehend a pro- 
 position or understand its meaning without forming any 
 
48 SEASON. 
 
 decision as to its truth or falsehood, is evident from this, 
 that we may understand all the enunciations of Euclid, 
 before we study the proof. Thus I can comprehend 
 that the three angles of every triangle may be equal to 
 two right angles, whether I know them to be so or 
 not. 1 
 
 7. This only must be noted, it is only where pro- 
 positions not self-evident are concerned, that Compre- 
 hension can be distinguished from Intuition as to truth 
 or falsehood ; where propositions are self-evident, the 
 two are inseparably blended. Thus, if I understand the 
 proposition, " two straight lines cannot enclose a space/' 
 I must also see that it is true ; but I may comprehend 
 the enunciation, "in every right angled triangle, the 
 square of the side opposite to the right angle is equal 
 to the squares of the two containing sides," without being 
 convinced of its certainty. So, if I am told that the 
 Nile is larger than the Danube, I can perfectly compre- 
 hend the assertion, though I know not whether it be 
 well founded. Thus, comprehension of relation, and 
 intuition as to agreement or disagreement, whether of 
 notion with notion, of things with things, or of relation 
 with relation, seems to be the whole of Eeason. 
 
 8. Seeing then that Comprehension is essential to 
 every act of Eeason, and that it may even exist without 
 Intuition as to truth or falsehood, it may be called 
 Reason in embryo, leading on to the perfect plant, which 
 combines Intuition with bare Comprehension. Eeason, 
 in its developed state, may be divided into simple and 
 
 1 See more on this subject in the Author's " Principles of Psych- 
 ology." Part III., chap. 7. 
 
OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 49 
 
 complex Intuition, (each of course embracing Compre- 
 hension) the former discerning relations between No- 
 tions and Notions, or Things and Things, the latter dis- 
 cerning the Relations of Eelations, and consequently em- 
 bracing the former and something more, and commonly 
 called Reasoning. Milton talks of Reason as either 
 Intuitive or Discursive, meaning by the latter Reason- 
 ing, and this distinction agrees with the above ; yet the 
 words fail to note that a mental condition, properly called 
 Intuition, is common to both ; that a discerning of the 
 connection between one Proposition and another is akin 
 to the discerning of the connection of one Notion or of 
 one Thing with another ; and that in both cases the pro- 
 per name for this native mental clearsightedness is In- 
 tuition. 1 But these two phases of Reason must be 
 treated separately. Though the full moon embraces the 
 half-moon, yet the half-moon differs from the full. 
 
 1 The passage in Milton is as follows, being part of the speech of the 
 angel to Adam : — 
 
 " Whence the soul 
 Reason receives, and Reason is her being, 
 Discursive or intuitive ; discourse 
 Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours, 
 Differing but in degree, of kind the same." 
 
 Paradise Lost, Book V., line 487 
 
CHAPTEK II 
 
 OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 1. The knowledge which we obtain by simple Intui- 
 tion is, like knowledge in general, either Certain or Pro- 
 bable, but in all cases it is original, not derived from any- 
 previous knowledge. Simple Intuition is therefore strictly 
 a source of knowledge, as Instinct is another, and the two 
 are quite different. By instinct we believe, and firmly be- 
 lieve many things, so firmly that we can say and do say 
 that we not merely believe but know them ; but we can- 
 not tell why we believe ; we can see no connection be- 
 tween the notions or the things which we unite, though 
 from long custom we think them inseparable, and can 
 with difficulty be brought to allow that there is no neces- 
 sary connection between them: but by Intuition we 
 mentally discern that two notions, or two things, are re- 
 lated, in other words, our Keason is satisfied. It is evident 
 that Keason, like Instinct, must begin with truths which 
 support themselves, as a building must rest on self-sus- 
 taining ground ; that there cannot be a perpetual sue- 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 51 
 
 cession of proofs any more than of bases, and therefore 
 that there are first truths which we either blindly be- 
 lieve or rationally discern. The former admit of no 
 proof, and the latter require none. The first we have 
 already considered, the last we shall now investigate. 
 
 2. Simple Intuitive knowledge, as we have said, is 
 either Certain or Probable, To the former category be- 
 long, in the first place, what are called the Axioms of 
 Mathematics or the Science of Quantity, such as " Things 
 which are equal to the same, are equal to one another." 
 " If equals be added to equals, or subtracted from equals, 
 the wholes, or the remainders, will be equal." " If unequals 
 be added to equals the whole will be unequal," and many 
 more such, as well as that axiom proper to geometry 
 " two straight lines cannot enclose a space." These and 
 other similar axioms we discern at once to be true, as soon 
 as the terms are understood ; we discern them to be true 
 certainly, to be true absolutely, independently of time and 
 circumstance, to be true for ever ; and all this without 
 any teaching except the meaning of the words, by the 
 native power of the mind, in a word by Eeason. All 
 the arguments in the world could neither shake nor in- 
 crease our conviction of these truths, which are not only 
 self-evident, but necessary, that is independent of time 
 or change of circumstances. Without such a conviction 
 mathematical science could not advance one step, it must 
 remain for ever an ingenious supposition, like the ma- 
 chines of Archimedes without a fulcrum; but given the 
 conviction of those simple truths, the system of the world 
 may be discovered, though it cannot be moved from its 
 course. 
 
52 KEASON. 
 
 3. The self-evident and necessary nature of the pro- 
 positions above-mentioned and of others similar, depends 
 upon this, that they express the relations of abstract no- 
 tions, and are independent of actual matter of fact. All 
 that is required is to have clear and complete notions of 
 the Universals which these notions represent, and as in 
 matter of Quantity such clear and complete notions are 
 attainable, the agreement or disagreement of any two 
 such notions is at once apparent. Here, Simple In- 
 tuitive knowledge, as far as it goes, is perfect. 1 
 
 4. But there other primary propositions, where mat- 
 ter of fact is introduced, and where, accordingly, on the 
 ground of our ignorance, there may be some room for 
 doubt. So long as our attention is confined to those 
 abstract notions which the mind makes for itself, and 
 which it can perfectly conceive, so long our intuitions 
 concerning them are free from all source of error ; but 
 when we look beyond the mind itself to the world with- 
 out, we embark at once upon a sea where we may readi- 
 ly lose our way. What is purely mental the mind can 
 thoroughly know ; but what is without, it can never know 
 but imperfectly. Therefore Mathematics, or the Science 
 of Quantity, which treats of the modes or modifications of 
 time and space, and their relations, without any reference 
 to the material world, and Psychology, or the science of 
 mind and its phenomena, are susceptible of the nearest 
 
 1 It may create surprise that a vast system of Natural Philosophy 
 and Astronomy should be raised on abstractions : but Natural Philoso- 
 phy, as well as Mental, is based upon facts, observed and generalised, 
 and Mathematics come in merely as a handmaid or assistant, as a ma- 
 chine for calculating Quantity ; without which, however, no progress in 
 Natural Philosophy could have been made. 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 53 
 
 approach to perfection, how far soever the latter may at 
 present fall short of that high position. Difficulties 
 arising from the fleeting nature of mental phenomena, 
 their indistinctness, their endless variety, their multifari- 
 ous combinations, and the ambiguity of terms, may long 
 retard the advance of psychology, but the subject of the 
 science is clearly within our ken. 
 
 5. But when we turn to the world without, to the mate- 
 rial universe, we soon see that our knowledge is imperfect, 
 and must always remain so. What Matter is we can 
 know only as it affects us, or through mental phenomena, 
 that is mediately, not immediately as we know those phe- 
 nomena themselves ; and what is known but mediately can 
 be known but imperfectly. What changes the object may 
 undergo in passing through the medium, and what never 
 transpires through that medium, we cannot tell. There- 
 fore, from the very nature of the subject, not from the 
 difficulties attending the study, Physical Science, in spite 
 of its tangible results, in spite of its positive pretensions, 
 is, and always must be, imperfect. We may know a 
 great deal more, and more accurately ; but we never can 
 raise the veil which separates Matter from Mind. 
 
 6. Besides, when we look beyond ourselves, abroad and 
 around, if we think at all, we must be struck with the 
 depth of our ignorance. Nothing but what is out of the 
 common course of things strikes the unthinking mind, 
 and rouses wonder ; but that common course itself stupi- 
 fies the man of reflection. The thought of the world we 
 inhabit revolving in space with perfect regularity, and 
 maintaining an uninterrupted succession of seasons, es- 
 sential to every thing that has life, while but a slight ir- 
 
54 KEASON. 
 
 regularity would be total ruin; the consideration of 
 vegetable and animal life, in all its forms and varieties, 
 past and present, historical and actual, fossil and ex- 
 isting ; the reflection that of all the multitudes of men 
 and of other animals born upon the face of the earth, 
 few, very few, comparatively, are maimed or imperfect, 
 each bearing a near resemblance, in all important partic- 
 ulars, to others of the same kind ; the fact that there are 
 kinds or species, always alike, always different from other 
 kinds or species ; these and innumerable other facts are 
 enough to overwhelm the Intellect, to confound the Eea- 
 son. To the questions, how did these things begin ? 
 how are they maintained ? what answer can we give. 
 We must confess that all nature, every thing around, is 
 an inscrutable mystery. 
 
 7. Such being our general Ignorance, and our igno- 
 rance of Matter in particular, how can we venture to say 
 what is, and what is not impossible ? 
 
 8. But, besides our ignorance, which incapacitates us 
 from judging at all with respect to possibility or impos- 
 sibility, there is a principle in the mind which tends to 
 mislead us in regard to what is, and what is not, possible. 
 This is the tendency to suppose that the world without 
 is an exact counterpart of the world within us ; that 
 things constantly associated in our minds are necessarily 
 joined in reality ; that what we can conceive is possible, 
 what we cannot, impossible. This has even been carried 
 so far as to raise up as the Criterion of possibility the 
 power of representing things in the mind as visible 
 objects. On this ground, even a great class of mental 
 phenomena has been called in question, and because we 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 55 
 
 cannot form a mental picture of General Notions, they 
 have been declared impossible. 
 
 9. It is remarkable that even Hume, with all his ac- 
 uteness, should have fallen into this trap. The sceptical 
 philosophy of his Treatise of Human Nature is entirely 
 grounded on two assumptions. 1. That every Idea, at 
 least every simple idea, is the copy of an Impression. 2. 
 That our Ideas or Conceptions are a sure criterion of the 
 reality of things, that what we cannot conceive cannot 
 exist. Starting from these premises, Hume infers that 
 we have no separate independent Ideas of Substance, 
 Time, and Space, because we have no Impressions there- 
 of ; and if we have no Ideas of these, they do not exist. 
 Thus Substance, including Mind and Matter, Soul and 
 Body, is got rid of. On the same grounds he denies the 
 infinite divisibility of matter supposing it to exist. " It 
 is evident," says he, "'that as no Idea of Quantity is 
 infinitely divisible, there cannot be imagined a more 
 glaring absurdity than to endeavour to prove that Quan- 
 tity itself admits of such division/' 1 Here the fallacy 
 comes out to the light of day. 
 
 10. It is not a little curious that the two fundamental 
 assumptions of Hume above mentioned embrace two 
 fallacies of a nature diametrically opposed. By the one 
 which we have already considered, the world within is 
 made the criterion of the world without, the standard of 
 what is possible, and this may be called an Immaterial 
 or Spiritual system ; by the other, according to which 
 
 1 Treatise of Human Nature. Book I., Part II., Sect. 2, 3, 4. Hume 
 may have modified his opinions afterwards, but these were his first 
 views. 
 
56 REASON. 
 
 every Idea is the copy of an Impression, that is of a Sen- 
 sation, the mind is subjected to matter to such a degree 
 as to destroy all independent action, all formation of gen- 
 eral notions or of relations, all conception of Matter, of 
 Mind, of Deity. This, then, is a system of Materialism. 
 The system is somewhat improved, if Impression be 
 taken to mean not simply Sensation but Perception ; 
 yet, even then, it is a miserably narrow one, and binds 
 the mind too much to outward things. If Impression 
 embrace not only Sensation and Perception, but also Emo- 
 tion, the improvement is greater, for Emotion has no 
 necessary connection with things outward, and therefore 
 the system departs farther from materialism. And, in 
 justice to Hume, it must be admitted that he took Im- 
 pressions in this wider sense, for he divides them into 
 those of Sensation and those of Reflection^ meaning by 
 the latter, as he tells us, " desire and aversion, hope and 
 fear/' •' passions, desires, and emotions," derived, as he 
 states, not directly from the impressions of Sense, but 
 from the ideas of those impressions by Keflection, and so 
 removed from matter. 1 Thus Hume does allow to the 
 mind a native power, which he calls Keflection, whereby 
 Emotions arise ; though he denies that it can form any 
 notion of things about which we are constantly thinking 
 and talking, Matter, Mind, Body, Soul, Spirit, and 
 Deity. 
 
 11. Though it is well to be convinced of the depth of 
 our ignorance, and to be on our guard against the fal- 
 lacy of assimilating the world without to the world within, 
 or of taking the one as the counterpart of the other ; yet, 
 
 1 Treatise of Human Nature. Book I., Part I., Sect. 2. 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 57 
 
 we must not so abuse the doctrine of ignorance as to 
 infer that nothing can be known, or, at most, nothing 
 beyond what we feel and perceive through the Senses, 
 and generalizations from them; falling thus into uni- 
 versal, or, at least, a modified Scepticism, which degrades 
 human nature by lowering Eeason, and denying its hea- 
 venly birth. Thus is man brought down to grovel in 
 the dust, to limit his view to the present scene, and con- 
 tent himself, like the brutes, with sensual delights. 
 
 12. Are there then no simple intuitive truths cogniz- 
 able by Keason, except those which relate to the pheno- 
 mena of our own minds in general, or to abstract notions 
 of quantity in particular ? Can we determine nothing 
 as to the origin of ourselves and all around us ? whence 
 we come, whither we are going, wherefore we are here ? 
 These are the three momentous questions which embrace 
 all that most concerns us. It is clear that unless we have 
 some simple intuitions with respect to these questions, we 
 can learn nothing about them by reasoning ; for reason- 
 ing must have premises, must have a starting point 
 whence it may press on to the goal. Still less, if pos- 
 sible, can we know about them by experience ; for they 
 are clearly beyond its reach; and besides, experience 
 without a mind prepared to draw inferences from it is 
 of no avail. Now, inferences from experience must be 
 drawn either instinctively or rationally, and as the above 
 questions evidently cannot be solved by Instinct, they 
 must be solved, if at all, by Eeason, and if by Eeason, 
 then there must be simple Intuitions from which Eeason 
 may start. 
 
 13. The first question relates to the origin of ourselves 
 
58 
 
 KEASON. 
 
 and others, and of all around us, animate and inanimate. 
 Can we give any answer to this question ; can we deter- 
 mine any thing concerning it, with probability at least, if 
 not with certainty ? Or, must we give it up as insol- 
 uble, and limit our view to the present scene? That 
 man will never acquiesce in this utter ignorance of the 
 past and the future is almost certain, for he never has so 
 acquiesced hitherto, in any state of society with which 
 we have become acquainted ; but whether savage or 
 civilized, learned or unlearned, he has never entirely se- 
 parated his present from his past and his future. To 
 sceptical philosophers alone has been reserved the at- 
 tempt to induce him to limit his view to what he sees ; 
 but an attempt so opposed to human nature is not likely 
 ever to be very successful. 
 
 14. What view then, if any, does Intuitive Keason 
 open up to us with respect to the origin of ourselves and 
 all things around us ? 
 
 Here we see at once that there are but two alterna- 
 tives ; .either the course of nature, such as we observe it, 
 has gone on from eternity, or it has not ; either it had 
 not, or it had a beginning. Now, to affirm that the 
 course of nature has gone on much as at present from all 
 eternity, is at once to confess that we can assert or even 
 conjecture nothing about its origin, that as far as we can 
 see, it had none. We proclaim our ignorance, and pro- 
 nounce it incurable. But the mind will not rest in 
 this ignorance ; it will entertain suggestions and form 
 theories as to the origin of things, and thereby it ever- 
 lastingly confesses that they had an origin. This, then, 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 59 
 
 is the first truth of Intuitive Keason, that ourselves and 
 all without and around us arose from something. 
 
 15. But what is that something? It must either 
 have existed from all eternity, or have arisen from some- 
 thing else, and so on for ever without any beginning. 
 But the supposition of an endless chain, of a perpetual 
 cycle, is one, as we have already seen, in which the 
 mind cannot rest, which it never seriously entertains, 
 which it can barely comprehend, and never can believe. 
 Therefore it must believe that something has existed 
 from all eternity. Observe we do not say that it is ab- 
 solutely certain, like a proposition in geometry, that 
 something has existed from all eternity, but only that 
 we cannot help believing it. The truth is intuitive, 
 but not strictly self-evident. The contrary involves no 
 manifest contradiction. 
 
 16. Something, then, exists from all eternity. But 
 here an objection presents itself. If, after all, we are 
 obliged to allow that something has existed from all 
 eternity, why may not that something be the world as it 
 now is ? What do we gain by maintaining that some- 
 thing different from the world has so existed ? Do we 
 not then merely remove the difficulty one step ? And 
 what can our limited Eeason do but remove difficulties 
 one step? Gravitation, or the tendency of matter to 
 matter, may be the cause which keeps the earth together, 
 and maintains the planets in their orbits, but what is 
 the cause of gravitation ? Here we are stopped short. 
 So it is in all our speculations about things existing ; we 
 never can go far. But what then ? Are we to do no- 
 thing because we cannot do all ? Are we to be content 
 
60 REASON. 
 
 with our ignorance because we never can be all-know- 
 ing ? Are we never to advance because there will 
 always be something beyond which we may not reach ? 
 Do what we will, ultimate causes will be involved in 
 mystery; but proximate causes are within our ken. 
 That our present difficulty is removed but one step by 
 the belief in the eternal existence of something distinct 
 from the world around, is then no valid objection, but 
 an imperfection common to all our researches. Simple 
 Intuition requires no reasoning to arrive at this result ; 
 but reasoning may be afterwards employed, as here, to 
 remove objections. In addition to the above, we may re- 
 mark that the researches of modern geology have proved 
 that the course of nature as it now is, has not gone on 
 from all eternity, that very great changes, changes which 
 we now would consider miraculous, have taken place ; 
 that there was a time when man did not exist upon the 
 earth, when quadrupeds did not exist, when birds did 
 not exist, when there was nothing but reptiles or amphi- 
 bious animals, or mollusca, and even no animal life; and 
 consequently there seem to have been successive acts of 
 creative power, proving a Creator distinct from the crea- 
 tion. 
 
 17. Finally, then, something exists from all eternity. 
 But of what nature is that something ? To answer this 
 we have only to consider what we are ourselves. We 
 are not mere creatures extended, and solid or impene- 
 trable, but we are feeling and thinking beings, endowed 
 with sensation, emotion, and thought ; things totally 
 different from what we call matter, nay, directly opposed 
 to whatsoever bears that name, inasmuch as they are 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 61 
 
 neither extended, solid, moveable, divisible, nor limited 
 to space. They exist not in space, but in time ; whereas 
 all material objects exist both in space and in time. 
 Now can we believe, can we even for a moment seriously 
 entertain the supposition, that what feels not, thinks not, 
 foresees not, contrives not, may have formed a man? 
 Is not this in reality to suppose that what thinks not 
 may think, what foresees not may foresee, what contrives 
 not may contrive ? and if this be not a contradiction, 
 what is? 1 
 
 18. To maintain, as has been maintained, that a man 
 may have been formed by a fortuitous concourse of atoms 
 moving from all eternity, is almost too absurd to deserve 
 notice ; but let us entertain the supposition for a moment 
 in order to see to what it amounts. In the first place it 
 sets up a mere possibility, allowing it to be a possibility, 
 against the very strong probability, to say the least, that 
 a thinking intelligent being can have proceeded from one 
 of like nature only. Secondly, even allowing the possi- 
 bility that, in countless ages of time, one man may have 
 been so created, in spite of hundreds of millions of 
 chances to the contrary, yet how do you account for the 
 existence of the race of mankind, of millions of human 
 beings, past and present, and probably to come, and of 
 the races of animals of all kinds now upon the face of 
 the earth, or buried beneath its surface ? Is each in- 
 dividual of those races supposed to have sprung from 
 a fortuitous concourse of atoms ? Thus the hundreds 
 
 1 " He that planted the ear shall he not hear ? he that formed the 
 eye shall he not see?" he that made the thoughtful mind, shall he not 
 think.— Psalm xciv. 9. 
 
62 KEASOK. 
 
 of millions of chances are encreased to hundreds of mil- 
 ions of quintillions to the contrary. 
 
 19. We see then, intuitively, and all reasoning con- 
 firms the simple intuition, not only that something has 
 existed from all eternity, but something that thinks, 
 foresees, contrives, an intelligent Being, in short, similar 
 to ourselves as possessing intellect, how superior soever 
 in degree, in a word, that there is a God. 
 
 20. Let us rest for a moment on this sublime truth. 
 Though it requires a cultivated mind to rise to the con- 
 ception of One Almighty Being, Maker of the Earth, the 
 Heavens, and all that therein is, yet the notion of some 
 Being or Beings similar though superior to man in in- 
 telligence and power, has existed among all men in all 
 stages of civilization. And how ennobling is such a 
 thought ! ennobling, as proving the power of the human 
 mind which can soar beyond this present scene, and 
 as showing that man is made in the image of God, " a 
 little lower than the angels, and crowned with glory and 
 honour :" and how consoling ! if our Maker be also our 
 governor and protector. Could any thing that this 
 world might bestow make amends for disbelief or scep- 
 ticism on this fundamental point ? Could riches, and 
 power, and fame, and knowledge ; could health of body 
 and activity of mind, fill up the cheerless blank of 
 Atheism ! Those who deny that man can find out God, 
 not only deprive him of a deep source of consolation, and 
 so directly diminish his happiness, but they rob him of 
 a magnificent conception, a sublime object of thought, 
 and degrade his Keason by limiting it to the visible, 
 the tangible, and the perishable. " I had rather/' says 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 63 
 
 Bacon, " believe all the fables of the Legend, and the 
 Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame 
 is without a Mind. And therefore God never wrought 
 a miracle to convince atheism, because his ordinary works 
 convince it/' — " They that deny God destroy man s nobi- 
 lity ; for certainly man is of kin to the beasts by his body ; 
 and if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base 
 and ignoble creature : It destroys, likewise, magnanim- 
 ity, and the raising human nature ; for, tako an example 
 of a dog, and mark what a generosity and courage he 
 will put on when he finds himself maintained by a man, 
 who to him is instead of a God, or melior natura, which 
 courage is manifestly such, as that creature without the 
 confidence of a better nature than his own, could never 
 attain to. Man when he resteth and assureth himself 
 upon divine protection and favour, gathereth a force and 
 faith which humane nature in itself could not attain. 1 " 
 
 21. The first argument of the ancient atheists against 
 the being of a God was, that we have no Idea of Him, 
 and therefore can have no evidence of his existence ; an 
 argument similar to that whereby Hume exploded Space, 
 Time, Substance, Mind, and Body. Now an argument 
 which, pushed to its legitimate consequences, goes so far, 
 has no peculiar force against Theism. If Atheism en- 
 tail universal scepticism, it is already half refuted. But 
 is it true that we have no idea, no conception of God, 
 or of those things just mentioned? The reason why 
 Hume denied that we have no idea of Time, Space, 
 Mind, and Body, etc., was that we have no impression 
 of them ; but he ought rather to have concluded, as we 
 
 1 Essays; Of Atheism. 
 
64 REASON. 
 
 have ideas of these, his theory, which requires an im- 
 pression for every idea, was false. Can any one sup- 
 pose that we can be continually thinking and talking of 
 things, talking so as to be understood by every one, 
 without having any conception of what we are saying ? 
 When the words, Body, Spirit, and God, occur in con- 
 versation or in writing, are we obliged to stop at every 
 moment to ask what they mean, or can no one inform 
 us? The supposition is a contradiction, it takes for 
 granted that we can understand and not understand at the 
 same time. We have then conceptions of those things, 
 imperfect no doubt, but sufficient for reasonable dis- 
 course ; and therefore this atheistical argument falls to 
 the ground by our denial of the premises. 
 
 22. The other arguments of the atheists of old all 
 depend upon the confounding of Mind with Body, and 
 upon the denial of the former, except as a modification of 
 the latter. This is the perpetual assumption. But the 
 system of Materialism had four varieties. 
 
 Thus there were : — 
 
 (1.) The Atomic or Democritical System of Materi- 
 alism and Atheism. 
 
 (2.) The Hylopathic 1 or Anaximandrian. 
 
 (3.) The Hylozoic 2, proper, or Stratonical. 
 
 (4.) The Cosmo-plastic 3 or Stoical. 
 
 Of these four, the first or Atomic System, called also 
 Democritical from its founder, was purely material, it 
 admitted of nothing but Matter, moved by blind chance^ 
 and supposed life and every thing beside vhrj Slttoios, 
 
 1 From vXvjj matter, and «ra0«s, affection. 2 From tfow, and ?«>?, life. 
 3 From xoo-pos, order, and tf-Xaov*/, to form. 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 65 
 
 bare matter or resisting bulk, to be merely accidental, 
 perishable, and corruptible. 
 
 The second system, the Hylopathic or Anaximandrian, 
 so far modified the above as to admit of the incorrup- 
 tible existence of certain affections in matter, and thus 
 departed a little from pure materialism. 
 
 The third system, the Hylozoic proper or Stratonical, 
 and the fourth, the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical, agreed in 
 introducing a principle of Life and Order into matter, 
 and made that principle to be ingenerable and incor- 
 ruptible, thus departing further from materialism pure ; 
 but the Stoics, in this respect, went beyond the followers 
 of Strato, Thus, these four systems rise gradually from 
 materialism pure to a doctrine approximating to im- 
 rnaterialism. 1 
 
 23. Since all we know of Matter as well as of Mind is 
 their qualities, and as the qualities of Mind, Sensation, 
 Emotion, and Thought, are totally different from those 
 of Matter, Extension, Solidity, Mobility in Space, and 
 
 1 Leucippus, Democritus, Protagoras, were the three most ancient 
 atheists, of whom the first lived before the time of Plato, the two others 
 about that time. Epicurus came long after. Democritus was a pupil 
 of Leucippus, and Protagoras a pupil of Democritus, and all were of 
 Abdera. On the ancient systems of Atheism, at large, see Cudworth's 
 Intellectual System, Chap. III. 
 
 It is curious and instructive to see how often old and exploded errors 
 are reproduced. Could it have been believed that the Hylozoic or the ' 
 Cosmo-plastic system of Atheism, one or the other, should be promul- 
 gated anew in our day, under the significant phrase of the self-evolving 
 powers of nature ? Nay, that a clergyman of the Church of England 
 should endorse the bill ! See Oxford Essays and Reviews, 1860. Es- 
 say 3. In the same place, we are told that either development or 
 spontaneous generation must be true. Would Democritus himself have 
 spoken otherwise ? 
 
66 REASON. 
 
 Divisibility, how absurd is it to give the same name to 
 things having qualities not only dissimilar, but actually 
 opposed ! But this absurdity belongs to all systems of 
 Materialism, and hence to all systems of Atheism founded 
 on Materialism. Those who, to avoid the introduction 
 of Mind, gave Life and Order to Matter, and made it 
 ingenerable and incorruptible, created something of their 
 own, something widely different from the common con- 
 ception of Matter, a heterogeneous compound of Mind 
 and Matter, a union of contradictory elements. 
 
 24. There is probably no variety of modern Atheism 
 which had not its prototype in antiquity. Thus the 
 recent theory of gradual development, as it is called, 
 whereby Matter is supposed of itself to have gradually 
 assumed new forms, from the most simple state of animal 
 being up to the most complicated, bears a strong resem- 
 blance to the Cosmoplastic or Stoical system of Life and 
 Order inherent in Matter. But this theory is not only 
 liable to the unanswerable objections common to all sys- 
 tems of Materialism, but it is opposed to all we know 
 of animal life, actual and extinct. It is confidently af- 
 firmed by the greatest zoologist that ever lived, the in- 
 defatigable Cuvier, that there is not the slightest ground 
 to believe that, since the beginning of authentic history, 
 a single instance can be produced of the conversion of 
 one species into another. The researches of geologists 
 lead to the same conclusion. The species of fossil ani- 
 mals seem to have been as distinct as those that now 
 exist ; and if the same species sometimes, though rarely, 
 occur in different formations, new ones also appear, dif- 
 fering widely from those of more ancient date. Thus 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 67 
 
 the theory of gradual development is refuted by facts ; 
 and we are irresistibly led to believe in successive crea- 
 tions of animals, and hence in successive exertions of 
 Creative Power. Geology has amazingly increased the 
 field of our knowledge ; it lifts us out of the present 
 scene, and places us beside the wonders of an infinite 
 past ; it shows us that before the earth and its inhabi- 
 tants existed, as they exist now, many changes occurred 
 which we would term miraculous ; and thus it forces upon 
 us a Creative Mind, and refutes the argument against 
 miracles drawn from the invariable course of nature. 
 
 25. When a system has become thoroughly discredited, 
 antiquated, and obsolete, it may sometimes be revived 
 with advantage by giving it a new name. Thus the 
 doctrine of Materialism, as old as Democritus, reappears 
 in our days under the title of Positive Philosophy. The 
 name is well-chosen in this respect that it tells nothing, 
 and so rouses curiosity, and leads us to expect novelty. 
 But what is positive philosophy ? The positive philo- 
 sopher professes to cling to the visible and the tangible 
 and the material, and to reject all besides. He al- 
 lows the uniform course of Nature, and says that we 
 can trace the invariable sequences of phenomena ; but he 
 denies Causation ; for Causation is a relation, and a re- 
 lation is not material. And if he admit not Causation 
 in things finite, of course he rejects a Cause infinite. 
 Yet he does not boldly assert with Democritus that the 
 world and all that therein is, animate and inanimate, 
 arose from a fortuitous concourse of atoms ; for that 
 would be too dogmatic ; but he maintains that the sub- 
 ject is quite beyond our ken, that we never can know 
 
68 REASON. 
 
 anything about our origin, and therefore we ought not 
 to waste one thought thereon. Psychology, the Science 
 of Mind, he treats with great contempt, except as a 
 branch of Physiology ; and Emotion and Thought are 
 with him mere bodily phenomena. Still, he does not 
 deny the existence of intelligent finite beings, other 
 than himself, though in this he seems inconsistent, for 
 how do these become known to him ? Does he not see 
 them ? does he not feel them ? it will be answered. 
 He certainly may see and feel their bodies ; but can he 
 see or feel their intelligence ? Assuredly not. There- 
 fore, in reality, he has, according to his own system, no 
 more proof of the existence of finite intellectual beings, 
 than he has of an infinite spirit. From the phenomena 
 of his own mind, and certain bodily appearances in those 
 around him, he infers the existence of Intellect in other 
 men, as from the phenomena of our own minds, and 
 from the instances of design in the material world, we 
 infer the existence of a Being of Intelligence supreme. 
 The positive philosopher, to be consistent, ought to deny 
 both God and Man ; for our senses alone reaveal to us 
 neither. To this it may be replied, that it is not from 
 bodily appearances only that we infer the existence of 
 other intelligent beings, but from their speech, their 
 rational discourse. True, from rational discourse we 
 infer a rational being; but from written discourse, with- 
 out the presence of a person in bodily shape, we should 
 draw the same inference ; and is not design, is not con- 
 sistency, is not wisdom, as distinctly marked by the 
 works of nature, as by the writings of men ? 
 
 26. That God is not present to us in a bodily shape, 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 69 
 
 tells nothing. Were I to fall in with a complicated 
 structure, such as I had never seen made, such as I had 
 never beheld before, but in which I could detect a plan, 
 and various contrivances all tending towards the carry- 
 ing out of that plan, I should as certainly conclude that 
 Man or some other intelligent being was its author, as 
 if I had witnessed him at work. To this, perhaps, it- 
 may be objected, how can I tell what is plan or contriv- 
 ance, if I have never been witness to the carrying it out? 
 Must I not have had experience of some such work going 
 on under my eyes before I can say that any purpose was 
 really meant ? To this I answer that the mere sight of 
 a man at work does not prove design ; he may be only 
 amusing himself, and exercising his body without any 
 definite end, like workmen in Ireland during the famine, 
 who were employed to remove heaps of earth from one 
 place to another, merely to keep them doing something. 
 It is not then because I see a man at work that I detect 
 design in what he is doing, but it is because I, with 
 the eye of Eeason, detect design in any thing, that I 
 infer that Man, or some other intellectual Being, has 
 been there. The discovery of design is thus, in the first 
 instance, truly Intuitive, though, no doubt, early intuit 
 tion may be cultivated and improved by a close atten- 
 tion to the structure of a machine, of a plant, of an 
 animal; but, without a previous mental susceptibility, 
 such study would be fruitless. We might have a 
 thorough knowledge of all the parts of an animal, as 
 mere anatomists we might be perfect ; merely by the 
 use of our senses, by our perceptions, and by manual 
 dexterity ; but by Reason alone can we determine Func- 
 
70 REASON. 
 
 tion ; and if there be no intuitive Eeason, there can be 
 none whatsoever. 
 
 27. Design necessarily supposes a designer. From 
 this there is no escape ; for the one without the other 
 is a contradiction. He then who allows design must, 
 in logic, allow an intelligent author of that design, be he 
 Man, Angel, or God. Therefore every physiologist who 
 shows the uses of any part of the body, the purpose it 
 serves, by the very employment of the ^oxA. purpose im- 
 plicitly confesses Deity. 
 
 28. Thus we arrive at the grand conclusion, that the 
 Being of a God is one of the earliest truths of Intuitive 
 Eeason ; derived, first, from the thought that I exist,, 
 therefore something has existed from all eternity; se- 
 condly, from the thought that I am an intelligent being, 
 therefore something Intelligent has existed from all eter- 
 nity ; thirdly, from the intuition of design in myself and 
 in all nature, as necessarily implying a Designer. It is 
 not pretended that all these propositions are in general 
 clearly comprehended, much less that they are formally 
 stated in words ; but that in some form or other they do 
 unavoidably arise in the human mind, mixed up perhaps 
 with many whimsies, but leading irresistibly, without 
 conscious effort, to the one grand belief, belief in an 
 Intelligent Being superior in wisdom and power to man. 
 It is the business of the metaphysician to bring to light 
 the latent processes of thought, and state them openly 
 and clearly ; and if these be true to nature each mind 
 will respond to their accuracy. 
 
 29. Let us rejoice then in the reflection that the being 
 of a God rests on the first principles of human Eeason ; 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 71 
 
 that so long as that Eeason exists it must acknowledge a 
 great Creator ; that all the ingenuity of atheists, all the 
 sneers of scoffers, can never materially shake this deep 
 conviction ; nay, that all the absurdities of Paganism, 
 all the intolerance of Islamism, all the atrocities com- 
 mitted in the name of Eeligiori, while they show the 
 weakness of man, bear testimony to his belief in a God. 
 It is this sublime belief, the glory and the consolation of 
 man in all ages, the glory of his intellect, the consolation 
 of his soul, which lifts our minds from earth and enables 
 them to soar to heaven, fills the thoughts, warms the 
 emotions, opens up a scene beyond this life, and glad- 
 dens and dignifies the present by hopes of the future. 
 
 30. In the beginning of the present century, there 
 arose in England a sect, which, in the genius and self- 
 confidence of its founder, in the talents and the almost 
 fanatical zeal of his followers, in rigidity of system, con- 
 sistency of views, and fearless adoption of logical conse- 
 quences, resembles more one of the philosophical sects 
 of antiquity than any that has sprung up in modern 
 times. The first blast which called this sect into being 
 sounded forth from Crichoff in White Eussia, whence, in 
 the month of January 1787, Bentham uplifted his voice 
 against the usury laws and law taxes. The French 
 Eevolution was then just beginning; and no doubt 
 the young English philosopher had drunk deeply of 
 those intoxicating draughts which soon turned the 
 heads of a whole nation. Indeed, the whole of his sys- 
 tem is deeply impregnated with the then prevailing 
 philosophy of France. This he transported to English 
 ground, supported by all the powers of his acute mind, 
 
72 REASON. 
 
 and added enough of his own to make him the Idol of a 
 large and highly-gifted circle. Like Socrates, he is bet- 
 ter known through the writings of his followers than by 
 his own ; for his early and best works were never finished 
 by himself, and appeared only in a foreign dress, edited 
 from rough materials, and translated into French, by Du- 
 mont, a citizen of Geneva. His own style, at first pure 
 and simple, became afterwards almost unreadable, full 
 of long parentheses, one within another, and stuffed with 
 words of his own coining. Partly, then, from his own 
 writings, but more from those of his followers, as well as 
 from oral communication, we arrive at a knowledge of 
 his system. 
 
 31. The avowed end and object of the whole was the 
 greatest possible happiness of the greatest number, and 
 the rule whereby to estimate any thing was Utility. 
 The spring of all human actions was Self-interest, and 
 consequently on the proper direction of this grand mov- 
 ing power, all good, all happiness, social and individual, 
 must depend. Such was the end, such the rule, such 
 the active principle of the system. It was a system of 
 universal philanthrophy, founded on a total disbelief in 
 benevolence, or, at least, a total omission of that element 
 in all calculations ; and it was a system of human enjoy- 
 ment, based on a rejection of many things, in which men, 
 blindly perhaps, but obstinately, persist in placing their 
 happiness. Thus, to limit our thoughts to the scene 
 before us was the only way to arrive at the perfection of 
 human society on earth, and to deprive men of all hope 
 in the future was the best expedient for delight in the 
 present. The aphorism of a French philosopher was thus 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 73 
 
 adopted and inculcated: "les idees d'un autre monde 
 font a celui-ci plus de tort qu on ne pense." 1 Keligion, 
 accordingly, made no part of the system, neither natural 
 nor revealed. I have by me at this time a publication 
 by one of the sect showing the baneful influence of na- 
 tural Eeligion on the temporal happiness of mankind ; 
 and by natural religion was meant all religion. 
 
 32. But God, religion, and all the hopes and consola- 
 tions of religion, though the greatest, were not the only 
 sacrifices which men were called upon to make to secure 
 their temporal felicity. Art, elegant literature, especi- 
 ally poetry, were to be offered up on the altar of a mer- 
 ciless utility. According to Bentham, poetry was a 
 noxious production, and the Iliad should have been 
 thrown into the fire. In ethics, the sect were lenient 
 towards sexual immoralities, partly because they were 
 pleasureable, partly because they tended to discourage 
 marriage, and so to check population. Outward actions, 
 more than the disposition, were the proper object of the 
 moralist ; a principle diametrically opposed to that of 
 the gospel. In politics, the opinions of the sect were 
 democratical in the extreme, and rigidly systematic, re- 
 sembling in this respect the principles of the French 
 revolutionary legislators, despising all compromise, all 
 attention to the particular circumstances of different 
 countries. Thus the chief himself wrote a Project of a 
 Constitutional Code for any country. His genius bore 
 a strong likeness to that of the systematic Sieyes, the 
 principal author of the uniform division of France into 
 Departments, who thought to make Napoleon the well 
 
 1 Say : Petit volume. 
 
74 KEASON. 
 
 paid but powerless head of his grand Constitution. 1 In 
 metaphysics, the sect were sensationalists, holding the 
 material doctrines of Condillac in all their purity ; that 
 thought, intellect, reason, are only transformed sensa- 
 tions ; that the Mind is a mere recipient of impressions, 
 adding little or nothing to what comes from without ; 
 that it is nearly akin to matter, and perishes with the 
 body. That many really benevolent, many superior men 
 belonged to the sect, cannot be disputed ; but a system 
 must be judged by itself, not by the character of its sup- 
 porters, much less of a few of them ; and that system 
 (as we have seen) was Epicurean, hostile to literature 
 as opposed to science, materialist in the utmost de- 
 gree, and irreligious. Such a system could scarcely 
 have appeared but in a country like England, where the 
 low doctrines of the French philosophers, combining with 
 the matter of fact character of the people, produced a 
 compound wherein real deformity and repulsiveness were 
 concealed by no drapery, embellished by no graces, raised 
 by no sentiment. Sentiment was laughed at, ornament 
 abjured, grace unknown ; but an iron, unbending, yet 
 narrow utility, guided by a pitiless logic, was henceforth 
 to mould the world. 
 
 33. Some of this sect were excellent logicians, and 
 logic was to be followed at any price ; but logic teaches 
 consistency only, not truth, and if the premises be erro- 
 neous, or equivocal, or true only with limitations not stated 
 and taken into account, the inferences may be all correct, 
 the system harmonious and perfect in all its parts, and 
 
 1 In Napoleon's own emphatic words, " un cochon a l'engrais de 
 quelques millions." 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 75 
 
 yet the conclusions may diverge widely from the truth. 
 One other characteristic of the Benthamic sect remains 
 then to be stated, it was a sect of Rationalists, a name 
 from its etymology too complimentary, but the import of 
 which is thus given by Bacon : a Bationale enim genus 
 philosophantium ex experientia arripiunt varia et vul- 
 garia, eaque neque certo comperta, nee diligenter exam- 
 inata et pensitata ; reliqua in meditatione atque .ingenii 
 agitatione ponunt." This kind of false philosophy he 
 also calls Sophistica} Thus from the single principle 
 of Self-interest, understood in the grossest sense, and in 
 this sense not true to nature, the Benthamites deduced 
 all their conelusions in Morals, Politics, and Legislation. 
 The same species of false philosophy is again characterised 
 in the De Augmentis Scientiarum : — "Alius error fluit 
 ex nimia reverentia, et quasi adoratione intellectus hu- 
 mani, unde homines abduxere se a contemplatione 
 naturae, atque ab experientia, in propriis meditationibus 
 et ingenii commentis susque deque volutantes. Coeterum 
 praeclaros hos opinatores, et (si ita loqui licet) Intellec- 
 tualistas, qui tamen pro maxime sublimibus et divinis 
 philosophis haberi solent, recte Heraclitus perstrinxit. 
 Homines, inquit, qucerunt veritatem in Microcosmis suis, 
 non in mundo majori. 2 
 
 34. Among the Idola Tribus, or the source of errors 
 common to the whole human race, we must include the 
 tendency to be too much taken up with the material, the 
 tangible, the visible, and too little with the immaterial, 
 the intangible, the invisible. From this source springs 
 Materialism and Atheism. That it is an Idol is clear, 
 
 1 Novum Organum, Aph. LXII. 2 Liber I. 
 
76 EEASON. 
 
 for the spiritual world, as we have seen, is at least as 
 certain as the material, nay more so, and without doubt 
 the most important. In fact, the material world is to 
 us of consequence only as it affects our spiritual being. 
 There is something, unquestionably, in the permanence 
 of the qualities of matter, as opposed to the fleeting phe- 
 nomena of mind, which suggests the idea of the reality 
 of the former, the absence thereof in the latter ; but this 
 is a mere delusion, for the Mind remains, though the 
 phenomena change ; and while they last, these pheno- 
 mena are as truly real, as positive if you will, as any 
 thing can be. In strictness, the only thing of which we 
 cannot doubt is the present phenomenon of our mind, 
 whatever that may be ; on every thing else we may be 
 sceptical without contradiction, but on this we cannot. 
 Therefore the immaterial is beyond controversy, the 
 material not; and consequently, it is unreasonable to 
 believe in the latter more strongly than in the former, a 
 mistake to be more occupied about it, an unpardonable 
 blunder to confound the one with the other, and the 
 climax of error to admit the material alone. 
 
 35. When the special occupation favours the general 
 tendency, then the effect is seen in all its intensity. Such 
 is the case with anatomists and medical men, who in the 
 exercise of their calling are constantly employed in ex- 
 amining or in treating the body. That nothing more 
 forcibly proves the existence of design and a Great 
 Designer than the structure of the human body, is beyond 
 doubt; yet so bad was the religious character of the 
 medical profession, that ifc became an adage, ubi tres 
 rnedici ibi duo Athei. Here we see the above tendency 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 77 
 
 in all its power. In spite of contrivances, so numerous, 
 so complicated, so beneficial, so evident, that Keason 
 must acknowledge them, and their bounteous Author, 
 the universal tendency to be too much taken up with 
 matter, added to the custom, peculiar to anatomists and 
 physicians, of attending specially to the body, are more 
 powerful than Keason. Thus materialism and irreligion 
 are engendered, the strongest evidence to the contrary 
 notwithstanding. For what evidence could we imagine 
 stronger than the evidence of design, and hence of a 
 designing mind, afforded by the human body ? Were 
 Grod to appear in a personal shape, the proof of his exist- 
 ence would be no greater. What work could we sup- 
 pose Him to perform that would more plainly indicate 
 his Intelligence and Power? Unless he were always 
 present to our senses, Sceptics might doubt, and positive 
 philosophers would deny, that he ever had really appeared, 
 as they now doubt and deny the Kesurrection of Jesus 
 Christ. Some would say that it was a phantom, like the 
 Docetes of old, a delusion, or a fraud, or might turn a 
 deaf ear to the proper evidence, maintaining that all mir- 
 acles were incredible. Nothing of this sort can be said 
 against the evidence of a designing mind in the human 
 body, and in the innumerable other beings around us, 
 and truly may it be affirmed that he who is not convinced 
 by these would not be persuaded though one rose from 
 the dead. 
 
 36. Thus it appears that Materialism, or under its 
 new name, positive Philosophy, is nothing more than a 
 notable exhibition of an Idol common to the whole human 
 race, propped up, in certain occupations especially, by the 
 
78 KEASON. 
 
 power of constant Custom. These lower principles of 
 our nature are continually at war with Reason, and some- 
 times quite overcome it. They impair the faith of all ; 
 or almost all, in the invisible world, whatever Keason 
 and Kevelation may suggest to the contrary; but in 
 the Materialist and Atheist they obtain a complete 
 victory. 
 
 37. It is a maxim of Bacon that Nature is best seen 
 in extremes. Thus the extreme case of anatomists and 
 medical men shows what a tendency to materialism there 
 is in human nature ; and how readily it can be increased 
 even in the face of the strongest possible evidence to the 
 contrary. We may be sure then that the same tendency 
 exists, though in a less degree, in other and ordinary 
 cases. The influence of anatomy on the mind was well 
 understood by the late Dr Arnold, who therefore con- 
 sidered it a very dangerous study. Anatomy a dangerous 
 study ! which, to use an anatomical phrase, demonstrates 
 the being of a God. Yet he was right, for Custom soon 
 deadens our sensibility to the wonders of design before 
 us, which at first exercise Keason and rouse Emotion ; 
 while the same custom more and more impresses matter 
 on our senses. It is a combat between the higher and 
 the lower principles of our nature, wherein, so long as 
 novelty exists, the advantage is in favour of the former, 
 but as that wears off, the latter obtain the ascendancy. 
 And this result is facilitated by the natural tendency of 
 all men towards materialism. We deem it extremely 
 important to keep this tendency in view, for it shows us 
 the origin of many false systems, and warns us against 
 what we ought to struggle. To dethrone this Idol, is the 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 79 
 
 grand object of a pure and spiritual religion, the religion 
 of the G-ospel, which contains the noblest philosophy, 
 the philosophy of Mind as opposed to the philosophy of 
 Matter. 
 
 38. While the Belief, and hence the Philosophy of 
 man tends so readily to materialism, his feelings and his 
 sentiments often show his better nature. Thus the more 
 man advances in civilization, the more is the material 
 kept out of sight, covered with a veil, and surrounded 
 with a multitude of adventitious circumstances to mask 
 the gross reality. All the pomp of the world is paraded 
 before our eyes to blind them to what lies behind the 
 scenes ; and nobody must even hint at what every body 
 knows. The pleasures of sense may be mentioned, only 
 if moderate, and in any case they must be briefly dis- 
 missed. To talk much even of eating and drinking is 
 thought bad manners, and to eat voraciously is disgust- 
 ing. Drinking is more tolerated because it is not a mere 
 pleasure of sense. There are I believe a few philoso- 
 phers, and I hope but a few, who consider this natural 
 modesty as a prejudice, for, according to them, one 
 kind of pleasure is as good as another ; but the feeling 
 is deeply seated in human nature ; it exists even in sav- 
 ages, but much more in civilized life ; and it proves that 
 man, though he cannot forget his body, is ashamed of 
 its wants and its enjoyments, for he knows of something 
 higher. Why this shame, if the body be not felt to de- 
 grade the mind ? 
 
 39. We have said that the more a people advances 
 in civilization, the more the wants of the body are con- 
 cealed. It is this which constitutes refinement, and refine- 
 
80 REASON. 
 
 ment is the very soul of civilization. Many, very many ele- 
 ments, no doubt, enter into the complex idea of civilization ; 
 but the principal element is a modesty and delicacy about 
 the body and its wants, in a word, refinement. One 
 people may be inferior to another in wealth and political 
 importance, even in science, literature, and general acute- 
 ness, but if they be more refined, they will still be at the 
 head of civilization. Such is the case with Great Britain. 
 Though in many respects France and other continental 
 nations may equal or surpass us, yet in refinement we 
 are before them all, and on this account we stand the 
 first of the civilized world. We cannot walk through 
 Paris or any other large continental city, we cannot 
 travel along a foreign railway, without being struck with 
 the want of refinement to which we are accustomed at 
 home. It may seem to some that in England this is 
 carried to an excess, but fastidiousness is better than 
 grossness. You are invited to a dinner where every lux- 
 ury is placed before you, but you must seem to care for 
 nothing. You may eat what is offered you, but sparingly, 
 and slowly, without avidity ; you must by no means 
 praise any thing and say how good, and you must not 
 even ask to be helped twice to the same dish, for you 
 would seem to like it too well. In short, whatever your 
 appetite, whatever you relish, you must show the utmost 
 indifference to every delicacy, if you would not transgress 
 the laws of refined society. There may be some excess 
 in all this, and foreigners feel it irksome, but it is a good 
 excess, it is a triumph of mind over matter. 
 
 40. Nothing shows more clearly the progress of refine- 
 ment in England, and our superiority over the nations of 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 81 
 
 the continent, than our literature. The drama of the 
 present day is certainly very inferior in general talent, 
 especially in wit, to the plays of Congreve, Farquhar, 
 Vanbrugh, Wycherly, and Cibber ; but these, in spite 
 of their brilliancy, are now unreadable in company, and 
 cannot be acted. The same may be said of not a little of 
 Shakspeare, and all the dramatists of his time. Modern 
 English novels may be read even by young ladies with- 
 out a blush, but would you put Tom Jones, or Joseph 
 Andrews, or Amelia into their hands ? Yet these were, 
 and in talent still are, the first of English novels. And 
 compare our present novels with those of France, the 
 writings of Bulwer with those of Eugene Sue, Pelham 
 with the My steres de Paris, In talent, in brilliancy, 
 we must yield to the novelists of France ; but in morality, 
 in refinement, we surely may bear the palm. Eefine- 
 ment itself is highly moral ; it is an homage paid to mind 
 by mind. 
 
 41. Keligion, which raises our minds above the fogs 
 of sense, and fixes them on the brightness of the invisible 
 world, is, and must be, the greatest source of refinement. 
 Those who have mixed with the lower ranks of life are 
 aware that persons of the most humble station, deeply 
 imbued with religious belief, are refined to a degree far 
 above the ordinary standard to which they belong. What 
 a triumph of Eeligion is here, which, amidst pressing 
 bodily wants and privations, can purify and refine the 
 mind and raise it above matter ! 
 
 42. The principal active powers of nature are hidden 
 from our view ; so that if we disbelieve in the invisible, 
 the intangible, and the inaudible, we must disbelieve 
 
82 REASON. 
 
 those powers also. The needle turns to the pole, but 
 who can see, touch ; or hear the magnetic fluid? The 
 telegraphic wire carries our messages with the rapidity 
 of lightning, but who can perceive the galvanic current ? 
 Heat the effect is sensible, but the cause Caloric is con- 
 cealed. These agents cannot be detected even by the 
 most delicate balance, and hence they have been called 
 imponderable ; and we are called upon to believe in mat- 
 ter without weight, at least without sensible weight. 
 And every philosopher does believe in them, though he 
 knows not what they are in themselves, whether a pecu- 
 liar sort of matter, or a modification of ordinary matter. 
 But, if we are to disbelieve in God because we cannot see, 
 touch, or hear him, then ought we to disbelieve also in 
 those imponderable agents, and Eeligion and Philosophy 
 must fall together. 
 
 43. We have shown that Materialism in all its varieties 
 is nothing more than an exhibition of a grand idol of the 
 human mind, the tendency to be too much struck with 
 objects of sense, and too little with those of reason. This 
 tendency is shown in every thing. Hence, for instance, 
 the belief, almost universal, that changes of weather de- 
 pend upon certain changes of the moon, upon the new, the 
 full, the quarter-moon, though there is no more reason 
 for the belief than for the superstition once attached to 
 eclipses, a superstition which cost the Athenians their 
 whole force in Sicily. A rather remarkable change of 
 weather having occurred about the time of the last great 
 eclipse of the sun, (March 15, 1858), the eclipse be- 
 came the ready cause, though it scarcely 
 
OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 83 
 
 "Disastrous twilight shed 
 On half the nations." 
 
 The same tendency was grossly shown in the philosophy 
 of the Kentish clown, who maintained that Tenterden 
 Church steeple, then newly built, was the cause of the 
 Goodwin sands. In fact, the tendency is universal, the 
 instances thereof are innumerable. Any thing that strikes 
 the senses will do for a cause. 
 
 44. This power of the material and the palpable over our 
 mind is greatly assisted by another, the force of Custom. 
 We have shown elsewhere 1 that some of the most impor- 
 tant opinions of the mass of mankind are mainly owing 
 not to reason but to custom ; and if such be the power 
 of custom over important opinions, its influence on minor 
 matters will scarcely be disputed. We believe, in short, 
 that a great deal commonly attributed to reason is ow- 
 ing only to custom ; and that many actions, of the lower 
 animals especially, which look rational, are, in truth, only 
 customary. When two things, and two phenomena 
 have frequently been observed conjoined in time or in 
 space, whenever we remark the one we are sure to expect 
 the other. There is a tendency to this expectation even 
 after one conjunction, as we have already seen ; but 
 this tendency is much strengthened by repetition. Such 
 is the power of custom, and by it we may explain a mul- 
 titude of facts without having recourse to reason. It is 
 thus that we expect that the sun will rise and set in 
 future as in times past, that the seasons will succeed each 
 other in their customary order, that spring and summer, 
 
 1 See the Author's " Principles of Psychology." Part III., chap. 
 VI1L, sect. 19, 20, 21, 22. 
 
84 REASON. 
 
 autumn and winter, will never fail ; that no earthquakes, 
 no volcanic eruptions, no deluge, no fire will destroy us ; 
 and that everything will go on much as usual. So, the 
 man of uninterrupted good health cannot believe that he 
 shall ever be an invalid ; but when he falls ill he antici- 
 pates the worst ; while he who has long been an invalid 
 can scarcely believe that he shall ever die. The same 
 holds true, more or less, of every man, and is no doubt 
 a great cause of courage, even in imminent danger. We 
 are so accustomed to life that we cannot realize death ; 
 but when death does strike beside us, much more when 
 the body is consigned to the tomb, we are so impressed 
 by tbe blank, by the disappearance of the bodily presence, 
 that our faith in the invisible world is rudely shaken, 
 and melancholy contends with grief. But this doubt, 
 this despondency, is not rational; it is not caused by any 
 new fact, any new reasonable ground of disbelief, but sim- 
 ply by the violent interruption of Custom, which produces 
 an effect quite independent of Keason. The body is gone, 
 and with it all appearance of life, all outward signs of 
 mental existence ; our senses are no longer impressed, 
 our blind belief in continuity is dispelled ; but, in all this, 
 there is no reasonable ground for despondency. That 
 all men die we knew very well before, and if the fact did 
 not prevent faith when the king of terrors was far off, 
 neither should it drive us to despair when he is close at 
 hand. But the further consideration of Custom must be 
 reserved for the following chapter. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 SECTION FIEST. 
 OF SEASONING IN GENERAL. 
 
 1. Since Simple Intuition can go but a little way. we 
 are obliged to have recourse to a series of Intuitions, each 
 depending upon that which went before, and thus all 
 hanging together, and this is called Beasoning. There is 
 thus nothing peculiarly mysterious in reasoning, nothing 
 more mysterious then in the Simple Intuitions of which 
 it is made up, and as simple intuition is either certain or 
 probable, so is Eeasoning demonstrative or otherwise. 
 There are then two distinct hinds of reasoning, generically 
 the same, specifically different ; but how many varieties 
 there may be of each, no one can say. This only we may 
 affirm with tolerable confidence, that, although there 
 must be something common to all Reasoning, or the same 
 name would not have been given to the process in all 
 cases, yet as there are two distinct kinds thereof, and as 
 
86 KEASON. 
 
 simple intuitions are various, so must reasonings be vari- 
 ous, and not reducible to one type by any legitimate exer- 
 cise of ingenuity. To suppose for instance, as it has 
 been supposed, and on high authority, that all reasoning 
 can be reduced to the form of the Scholastic Syllogism, is 
 contrary to what we should expect from the nature of the 
 case j or a priori; as well as utterly at variance with 
 facts, that is, with real instances of reasoning drawn from 
 different sources. 1 
 
 2. Since the mind of man is exceedingly diversified, 
 fertile and ingenious in finding out relations between 
 things, we must suppose that reasoning which traces those 
 relations is no less diversified, and that the attempt to 
 reduce all reasoning to one type is as violent, as opposed 
 to nature, as that whereby the bed of Procrustes was made 
 to fit all guests. Nothing is gained by this excessive sim- 
 plification but a specious uniformity concealing a real di- 
 versity, a starched and stiff appearance, like a man in a 
 straight waistcoat. These unnatural generalizations are 
 the bane of science, for they give it an air of perfection 
 which it really has not, and so prevent further inquiry. 
 The scholastic syllogism has acted like the swaddling 
 clothes of children, within which they may exercise their 
 puny limbs, but out of which they cannot escape. 
 
 3. We have seen that Eeasoning is a substitute for 
 Simple Intuition ; and if our faculties were greatly en- 
 larged we might see many things at once which now we 
 can find out only by a process of reasoning. When we 
 
 1 See on this subject the Author's " Principles of Psychology," Part 
 III., chap. X., section 2., where the nature and value of the Scholastic 
 Syllogism are thoroughly discussed. 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 87 
 
 have thoroughly mastered a subject, the truths become 
 so familiar and so evident, that we seem to know them 
 instantly by simple Intuition, though at first we may 
 have been long in acquiring them. One difficulty in 
 distinguishing between Simple and Complex Intuition 
 or Reasoning, is the excessive rapidity of the mental 
 process in many cases, and the consequent oblivion of 
 the intermediate steps. Many facts prove the wonder- 
 fully rapid flow of ideas in dreams ; and the difficulty of 
 remembering them may be owing chiefly to this cause. 
 Whatever is very transient can leave but little impres- 
 sion. This difficulty of distinguishing between Simple 
 Intuition and Eeasoning is a strong proof of their simi- 
 larity. 
 
 4. Where two things cannot be compared directly so 
 as to determine the relation between them, we must have 
 recourse to some medium, the relation of which to each 
 of the things in question is either apparent or can easily 
 be ascertained. Thus, if I wish to prove the respective 
 heights of two trees far apart, the difference between them 
 not being great, I cannot tell from sight merely which 
 is the taller, but, on applying a measuring line to each, 
 I learn what I want. So it is with Reasoning. The 
 whole art or ingenuity of Reasoning consists in finding 
 out media by which the unknown relations of things may 
 be discovered ; and the whole science of reasoning con- 
 sists in knowing when reasoning is valid and when not. 
 The former cannot be taught by any known rules, it 
 depends upon a fertility of mind, natural or acquired by 
 long practice ; but the latter may be promoted by certain 
 rules, especially relating to the fallacies and sophisms 
 
88 KEAS0N. 
 
 into which men are apt to fall. These rules, then, teach 
 us rather what to avoid than what to seek, how to shun 
 sophistry rather than how to reason conclusively ; and 
 so it is with all the rules of Logic, which is a practical 
 science, not one of pure speculation. The knowledge of 
 the process of Seasoning belongs to pure Psychology, 
 the rules to avoid sophistical reasoning appertain to 
 Logic. 
 
 5. Since the object of Eeasoning is to prove one pro- 
 position by means of another, it necessarily follows that 
 Eeasoning must start from something not proved but 
 given, some datum to lead us on to something else ; and, 
 therefore, on the soundness of this datum, as well as on 
 the accuracy of the reasoning, the truth of the conclusion 
 will depend. Where the data are self-evident, the con- 
 ceptions perfectly clear and distinct, as in pure geometry, 
 the reasoning only can be in fault ; but on most subjects, 
 in all where pure quantity is not concerned, the data are 
 not strictly self-evident, and the conceptions not defined 
 with perfect accuracy. Therefore, in all these cases, the 
 premises as well as the reasoning may be wrong, and 
 though the latter be without a flaw, the conclusion may 
 Be unsound. Now Logic, properly so called, pure Logic, 
 does not teach us how to arrive at the knowledge of pre- 
 mises ; and therefore perfect dialectics may coincide with 
 the grossest errour. 
 
 6. Where pure Quantity is concerned, there is no dif- 
 ficulty in finding the premises, and when found, they are, 
 beyond all question, universal, without exception or 
 limitation; but where Quality is introduced, there at 
 once enters restriction, reservation, a want of determina- 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 89 
 
 tion ; and hence the necessity of looking on all sides to 
 see where different qualities agree or clash. Without 
 this comprehensive view we produce systems beautifully 
 consistent, but deceitful ; for professing to embrace all, 
 they give only half the truth. Thus on the Self-interest 
 of the Benthamic school was raised an edifice of perfect 
 symmetry, though on a narrow basis, pleasing to behold, 
 but unsafe to inhabit. It is on this account that Mental 
 Philosophy, pure and mixed, affords so much better an 
 exercise than Mathematics, which employ the reasoning 
 faculty alone, and require no circumspection, no sugges- 
 tion of the opposite sides of a question, no balancing of 
 arguments for and against, no allowance for circumstan- 
 ces, no limitations in the conclusions. 
 
 7. These things being considered, we shall be disposed 
 to believe that errour arises more from a deficiency in 
 data than from inaccuracy in reasoning. Inconclusive rea- 
 soning any one may detect, but to supply what has been 
 omitted in the premises is a far more difficult task. For 
 this purpose comprehensiveness of mind and impartiality 
 are both required; a combination of intellectual and moral 
 qualities which no rules of art can teach. It is this 
 comprehensiveness of mind which peculiarly distinguishes 
 Bacon, not the subtlety of his reasoning. In the latter 
 he would have been no match for some of the school 
 logicians. Now this comprehensiveness is not at all 
 required in pure Mathematics, where the data are few 
 and simple, and where none can be overlooked. The 
 certainty of the conclusions depends, no doubt, upon this 
 simplicity, but the same simplicity is unfavourable to 
 any varied exercise of thought. 
 
90 REASON. 
 
 8. Something similar may be said of pure Logic. 
 Pure Logic, works in a nut-shell, but within those limits 
 it works securely. It makes no account of the truth or 
 falsehood of the premises ; but it determines by unerring 
 rules whether the conclusions be accurately drawn or- 
 not. Thus it favours acuteness but not comprehensive- 
 ness, a facility for detecting errours rather than for mak- 
 ing discoveries, a love of disputation and victory more 
 than a love of truth. Still this is a mental exercise of 
 no mean value, which sharpens though it may narrow, 
 producing a pleader rather than a philosopher. Dialec- 
 tics is the proper education for a lawyer, especially an 
 English lawyer, who, assuming for premises the most 
 whimsical fictions, bends the whole force of his mind to 
 reason consistently with these. The legislator, on the 
 other hand, should establish sound general principles, 
 which the lawyer must receive and adopt, be they bad 
 or good. The frame of mind proper to the one is, there- 
 fore, but ill-suited to the other. 1 
 
 9. As the intellectual qualities of the lawyer and those 
 of the legislator are very different, so are those of the 
 critic and commentator on the one hand, and of the 
 independent thinker on the other. The object of the 
 philosophical critic is to detect errours, — that of the 
 independent thinker to strike out something new ; the 
 former pores over the works of others, the latter consults 
 more his own mind ; the one delights in showing that the 
 supposed discoveries of the other are as old as Aristotle 
 
 1 " Unfit with great affairs to mix 
 His little nisi prius tricks." 
 — See Moore's " Epitaph on a Lawyer." 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 91 
 
 and Plato ; that is a scholar, a learned antiquarian, a 
 practised logician, this cares little for authority, reads 
 only to think, reasons only to discover, and propounds 
 theories ingenious, original if not new, startling, perhaps 
 even paradoxical. Each has his vocation, though of 
 unequal dignity ; and each may degenerate, the one into 
 a pedant, the other into a day-dreamer. 
 
 10. We must never forget that although reasoning be 
 one grand engine for the discovery of truth, yet it is only 
 a substitute for Simple Intuition ; that there is then a 
 Reason which transcends all reasoning ; nay, that there 
 is an Instinct which transcends a great part of reasoning, 
 being before it in time, immoveable, the point on which 
 the reasoning depends, without which the chain, however 
 compact, must fall to the ground. Eeasoning, then, in 
 opposition to Simple Intuition, as well as to Instinct 
 clearly ascertained, is utterly thrown away, is worthless, 
 and worse than worthless, for it is unnatural, a war of 
 the child against the parent. One of the most ingenious 
 works of the present day, which professes to make Meta- 
 physics a demonstrative science, errs in this very parti- 
 cular that it sets up reasoning in opposition to a higher 
 Eeason, to Simple Intuition. 
 
 11. All reasoning consists in drawing intuitive infer- 
 ences ; but all inferences are not intuitive, and therefore 
 all inferences are not cases of reasoning. Instances of 
 the latter kind of inferences, which may be called non- 
 intuitive, are innumerable, but in many cases they are 
 so closely connected with the fact from which the infer- 
 ence is drawn, that the one is seldom distinguished from 
 the other. When the heavens are covered with clouds, 
 
92 REASON. 
 
 and therefore the sun invisible, I readily infer from the 
 light that it is above the horizon, and so with the moon. 
 When I see the print of a horse's foot and of wheels, I 
 infer that a horse and carriage have passed that way ; 
 and when I observe a horse saddled, I infer that some 
 one has ridden, or is about to ride upon it. When I 
 enter a room and feel it warm, I infer that there is a fire 
 before I see it ; and when I perceive a fire-screen in front 
 of the chimney, I infer that it is placed to protect from 
 heat. In short, most of those convictions as to the cause 
 or the effect of every-day occurrences, convictions un- 
 attended with any effort, and supposed indisputable, are 
 really inferences drawn without reasoning from facts 
 observed. Nay, the very existence of outward objects is 
 learnt only by inference from certain sensations which 
 suggest those objects, and create a belief in their inde- 
 pendent existence. On what principle these non-intuitive 
 inferences are drawn, and how they may be distinguished 
 from intuitive or rational inferences, we shall afterwards 
 enquire ; enough for the present to have pointed them 
 out. 
 
 12. This much, however, we may at present remark, 
 that these non-intuitive inferences are of two kinds, the 
 one kind purely instinctive, the other depending partly 
 on Instinct or original tendency, partly on Custom. 
 Thus, our belief in the material world is an inference 
 from certain sensations, and is purely instinctive, for it 
 cannot be learnt or acquired from any previous know- 
 ledge ; and so is the belief in memory, and in our own 
 identity, from consciousness. Our belief in the ordin- 
 ary succession of causes and effects depends, in the 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 93 
 
 first instance, no doubt, also upon an Instinct which 
 prompts us to expect uniformity in nature; but this 
 instinctive tendency is greatly modified afterwards by 
 Custom. Besides, however great the tendency may be 
 to expect uniformity in nature, this tendency is shown 
 only after some one conjunction of events has been 
 observed, not before ; and therefore the belief is not 
 purely instinctive as in the above cases. Certainly one 
 instance of conjunction is not Custom, but it is experi- 
 ence, and one experience is necessary to develope the 
 tendency to believe in future uniformity. Subsequently, 
 frequent repetitions of the conjunction lead us to pass 
 rapidly from the one event to the other, from the observed 
 to the non-observed, and Instinct and Custom combine 
 to fix our belief. Consequently, there are sufficient 
 grounds for subdividing non-intuitive inferences into two 
 kinds, of which the one may be called purely Instinctive, 
 the other Inferences from Experience. 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 ON DIFFEBENT KINDS OF SEASONING. 
 
 1. Though there is a general resemblance in all Sea- 
 soning, yet there are differences sufficient to constitute 
 different kinds or species. Thus we continually hear 
 Seasoning designated as Demonstrative, Probable, In- 
 ductive, Deductive, and so forth, a specific epithet being 
 
94 REASON. 
 
 added to the general name, according to that natural 
 mode of classification and nomenclature which Science 
 has adopted and improved. Every kind of plant, every 
 kind of animal, is designated by two words, one pointing 
 out the Genus, the other the Species, as Ehamnus fran- 
 gula, Felis tigris; and this is a natural system, borrowed 
 from daily use, as when we talk of the moss rose, the dog 
 rose, the Chinese rose, the brown, the black, and the white 
 bear. In like manner, the common use of language sup- 
 poses different kinds of Seasoning, or at least varieties, 
 and these we must now endeavour to fix, and to ascer- 
 tain whether they be real kinds, or only varieties. 
 
 2. We have seen that all Reasoning, properly so 
 called, is based on simple Intuition. But a great deal of 
 what commonly passes under the name of Eeasoning is 
 based, not on Intuition, but on Instinct. Thus, our belief 
 in uniformity of nature is an Instinct, and from that 
 Instinct we draw many inferences which are said to be 
 the result of reasoning, or more properly, instances of 
 reasoning. We must, therefore, either enlarge our de- 
 finition of Eeasoning, or deny that inferences from In- 
 stinct are entitled to that name. Allowing for the 
 present that they are so entitled, then, at all events, there 
 will be a clear distinction between Eeasoning from In- 
 tuition, and Eeasoning from Instinct. To the former of 
 these we shall first turn our attention. 
 
 I. Of Reasoning a priori. 
 
 3. This distinction between Eeasonings based on 
 Simple Intuition, and those based on Instinct, seems to 
 coincide with that between a priori and a posteriori 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 95 
 
 reasoning ; for, in the former, by the light of the mind, 
 we discern a connection between the propositions ; while, 
 in the latter, we only suppose instinctively that there is 
 a connection because some similar conjunction has for- 
 merly been observed. The Instinctive belief that nature 
 is uniform in her operations, in her constitution and 
 course, lies at the bottom of all such inferences. 
 
 4. Beginning, then, with Eeasoning properly so called, 
 Complex Intuition, a priori reasoning, or Ratiocination, 
 which all mean the same thing, we observe in the first 
 place, that this also is of two kinds, according as it is 
 founded on Intuitive truths, simple and certain, requiring 
 no previous knowledge; or otherwise, on supposed truths, 
 the result of previous inquiry. These being granted, the 
 connection between them and the conclusion drawn is 
 no doubt intuitive, but the Premises are not so, and they 
 may even be false. In this case, previous inquiry being 
 supposed necessary, the whole proof leading to the con- 
 clusion is not a priori, though the ultimate reasoning 
 be ; and therefore this may be called a priori mixed, in 
 opposition to the former, which is a priori pure. Thus, 
 all the propositions of Euclid are a priori reasoning pure, 
 for they are founded on a few simple self-evident truths 
 requiring no previous knowledge, and generalized thus, 
 " Two straight lines cannot enclose a space/' " If equals 
 be added to equals the wholes are equal/' &c. ; while all 
 arguments about matters of fact contingent, such as 
 trade ought to be free, therefore the corn trade ought to 
 be free, are founded on propositions, the result of previous 
 inquiry, not self-evident, and possibly not even true. 
 
 5. A priori reasoning pure is but of one sort. The 
 
96 REASON. 
 
 matter whereof it treats is all necessary, the reasoning 
 demonstrative, and the conclusion therefore infallible. 
 But a priori reasoning mixed is of two sorts, according 
 as the reasoning is demonstrative or only probable ; 
 though in either case, the conclusion is not infallible, 
 because the premises are only contingent. And this 
 seems to exhaust the divisions of Eeasoning properly so 
 called, or Katiocination. 
 
 6. Pure a priori reasoning is confined to the relations 
 of Quantity ; for in these alone the matter is necessary, 
 the inferences demonstrative, and the conclusions infal- 
 lible. This kind of reasoning, therefore, is limited to 
 pure Mathematics, which is the science of abstract quan- 
 tity, that is, of quantity separate from the material 
 universe. Pure Geometry, Arithmetic, and Algebra, do 
 not suppose the existence of the material world, and 
 they would be true, though that world had no reality. 
 This is the reason why the matter in pure Mathematics 
 is necessary, for wherever the material world is intro- 
 duced, there enters contingency. Thus all the truths of 
 mixed Mathematics are contingent, for in them the 
 material universe and the laws thereof form the subject 
 of inquiry, the existence of that universe being taken 
 for granted, and those laws supposed to be proved some- 
 how, but not by pure a priori reasoning. Mechanics, 
 including statics and dynamics, hydrostatics and hy- 
 draulics, pneumatics, and optics, all suppose the exist- 
 ence of the material world, either as a solid, a liquid, an 
 air, or as light, and, in all these, the science of abstract 
 quantity is applied to quantity concrete in these various 
 modifications of the world without. Now, as the funda- 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 97 
 
 mental laws of the material world form in these sciences 
 the basis of all the inferences, and as these are by no 
 means intuitive and certain, but supposed truths, the 
 result of previous inquiry, therefore all these sciences 
 belong to the mixed a priori class. 
 
 7. Pure a priori reasoning, then, is confined to the 
 relations of abstract quantity, called by Hume relations 
 of ideas. Nothing can be more simple, more easily com- 
 prehended, than this kind of reasoning. It admits of no 
 debate, no doubt, no hesitation ; we either assent to it 
 entirely or not at all ; and we must master it ourselves, 
 for no one else can make it plainer. This necessarily 
 follows from its nature, based upon simple Intuition, 
 and raised by other intuitions equally simple. The fol- 
 lowing is a type of all pure a priori reasoning. 
 
 A is equal to B, and B equal to C ; 
 
 therefore A is equal to C. 
 This type will apply to geometry, arithmetic, and alge- 
 bra alike, to all reasoning about pure quantity, whether 
 continuous or discrete, whether of Space, Time, or Num- 
 ber. Take the following as a type of geometrical rea- 
 soning : — 
 
 A D G 
 
 bAc eAf hAk 
 
 The triangle A B C is equal to the triangle DEF, and 
 the triangle D E F to the triangle 6HK, therefore the 
 triangle ABC is equal to the triangle G-HK. If a 
 person do not at once assent to this conclusion, his 
 case is hopeless. 
 
 8. If these be correct specimens of mathematical 
 reasoning, then all such reasoning consists of three pro- 
 
98 REASON. 
 
 positions. And so it must from the nature of the case. 
 If we could draw an infallible conclusion from one Pro- 
 position only, then the second or inferred proposition 
 could be only a repetition of the first in another form ; it 
 could not contain anything really new. Were there any 
 thing new except the phraseology, then the conclusion 
 could not be infallible, for it would not be comprehended 
 in the premises. Consequently, three propositions, at 
 least, are essential to every step of mathematical reason- 
 ing. Every such step must comprise premises and a 
 conclusion, the former containing two propositions. 
 
 9. From the above it appears that there is no differ- 
 ence in any one respect between the two propositions of 
 the mathematical premises, except in this, that the 
 middle oi^e may be compared directly with both the ex- 
 tremes. The first is not more important, not more ge- 
 neral, than the second ; and if we chose to call it the 
 major proposition because one of the terms is contained 
 in the conclusion, where it may be made the Predicate, 
 well and good; but let us not suppose that the word 
 major, in mathematical reasoning, means anything more 
 than this. 
 
 10. We thus see that in mathematical reasoning 
 there is no descent, no inference from the general to par- 
 ticulars. All the propositions which compose the rea- 
 soning are equally general, or equally particular. When 
 we prove, for instance, that the angles at the base of an 
 isosceles triangle are equal, we have no doubt a particular 
 diagram, a particular triangle before us ; and so far all 
 the propositions of the reasoning may be considered as 
 particular ; but the mind instantly generalizes and ap- 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 99 
 
 plies them to all similar triangles ; that is, to all triangles 
 with two equal sides. And this it does with certainty, 
 for nothing else than the equality of two sides is assumed 
 in the course of the reasoning. Mathematical reasoning 
 may therefore be called reasoning on a plain, in opposi- 
 tion to that whereby we descend from generals to par- 
 ticulars, or to the less general. 
 
 11. The only doubt that can now remain as to this 
 reasoning is, on what it is founded. Books of Geometry 
 usually set out with definitions, axioms, and postulates, 
 and it is commonly supposed that from these the Season- 
 ing proceeds. Now all discourse supposes that the terms 
 made use of are understood, otherwise it would be mere 
 gibberish. Therefore, in every discourse, definitions are 
 either given or are considered unnecessary, and we have no 
 reason to say that mathematical reasoning is based on de- 
 finition, more than any other. Many of the definitions of 
 geometry are in reality unnecessary, for every one knows 
 what is a triangle, a circle, and a square ; but they are 
 given pro forma, and to obviate the possibility of a 
 mistake. 
 
 12. Is, then, mathematical reasoning based upon 
 axioms and postulates ? Now what is an axiom ? It is 
 the generalization of a simple, certain, and intuitive, or 
 self-evident truth. Now, as particulars are known be- 
 fore generals, the truth must have been discerned in parti- 
 cular cases before it was generalized; just as the theorems 
 of geometry are proved by means of particular diagrams 
 before they are seen to be true universally. It is, then, 
 on a self-evident truth exemplified in a particular case 
 that mathematical reasoning is founded, not on an axiom 
 
100 REASON. 
 
 or generalization thereof which comes afterwards. Thus, 
 in the reasoning, the triangle ABC is equal to the 
 triangle DEP, and the triangle D E F to the triangle 
 6HK, therefore the triangle A B is equal to the tri- 
 angle GHK,we have no occasion for an axiom to prove 
 this, though reference to one may be made on the mar- 
 gin, but the mind, attentive only to the particular data 
 before it, leaps at once to the conclusion. Axioms then 
 are not necessary ; they are only neat and comprehen- 
 sive expressions to show what is taken for granted in 
 many particular instances, and the reasoning would be 
 perfectly conclusive without them. 
 
 13. The same may be said of postulates. It is surely 
 unnecessary to tell us, generally, that a line may be drawn 
 from one point to another, and a circle described about 
 a given centre, for every one allows, and, by the laws 
 of thought, cannot help allowing, that such a thing is 
 conceivable, that is, involves no contradiction, and this 
 is all that is required in a geometrical problem ; for in 
 pure geometry we deal not with material, but with ideal 
 lines and circles. Postulates, then, are unnecessary; 
 they tell us nothing ; they merely state, generally, what 
 by the fundamental laws of thought we cannot but ac- 
 knowledge in every particular instance. 
 
 14. On what, then, is mathematical reasoning found- 
 ed ? It is founded on simple, certain, and intuitive, or 
 self-evident truths, discerned at first in particular in- 
 stances, and generalized afterwards. It is, then, on the 
 truth as comprehended by the mind in a particular in- 
 stance, not on the subsequent generalization, that the 
 reasoning is based. 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 101 
 
 15. Pure a priori or mathematical reasoning is valu- 
 able as a type of perfect ratiocination, starting from cer- 
 tain and intuitive or self-evident truths, proceeding by 
 unerring and intuitive inferences from these, and arriv- 
 ing at last at conclusions entirely new, which, without 
 reasoning, could never have been known or hardly sus- 
 pected. Who, prior to demonstration, could ever have 
 supposed that, in a right angled triangle, the square of 
 the side opposite the right angle should be equal to the 
 squares of the two sides containing the right angle? 
 Such conclusions as these are arrived at only after a very 
 long chain of reasoning, and are real discoveries, not 
 merely explicit statements of something implied in the 
 premises and therefore really known beforehand, as in 
 the syllogism of the schools. 
 
 16. Mixed a priori reasoning differs from pure in this, 
 that the bases on which it rests are not self-evident nor 
 even certain; so that were the reasoning unassailable, 
 the conclusion might still be false. Thus all the reason- 
 ings of mechanical philosophy start from a few general 
 laws of motion which are assuredly not self-evident, 
 and are only arrived at by generalization a posteriori, 
 that is by experience, which can never give infallible re- 
 sults. So all general reasonings about morals and politics 
 rest on certain facts in human nature supposed to be 
 known from experience, though they may not be univer- 
 sally true, and may have many limitations. At the best, 
 they are neither self-evident nor certain. But this kind 
 of enquiry admits of subdivision, according as the rea- 
 soning is demonstrative or only probable. 
 
 17. Demonstrative mixed a priori reasoning is again 
 
102 REASON. 
 
 of two sorts, as it is employed about quantity, or 
 about other things. When employed about quantity it 
 raises the whole structure of mechanical philosophy — 
 that is the philosophy which treats of sensible rest and 
 motion, whether in solids, liquids, or gaseous matter, 
 comprehending statics, dynamics, hydrostatics, hydrau- 
 lics, pneumatics, and optics. Celestial mechanics, or 
 physical astronomy, is only an application of the gene- 
 ral principles of mechanics to the motions of the hea- 
 venly bodies. In all these sciences the reasoning is 
 strictly demonstrative, though the ground on which they 
 rest may be shaken. Thus the law of gravitation has 
 been and may still be assailed, and the Copernican sys- 
 tem of the universe may still be called in question. We 
 may even doubt about the laws of motion. Moreover, 
 the conclusions of theory are not always found correct in 
 practice ; not because the reasoning has been incorrect 
 from the data, but because the data have been insuffi- 
 cient. 
 
 18. This is the sort of reasoning which contributes 
 most to the self-complacency of man, for it has raised 
 the most secure, the most spacious, and the most lofty 
 fabric, the glory and the crown of human efforts. By 
 means of this reasoning we have not only directed all 
 the powers of nature at our will, and turned them to our 
 use by the aid of machinery ; we have not only abridged 
 Time and Space upon earth ; but we have measured the 
 distances of the heavenly bodies, weighed them in the 
 balance, determined their movements, calculated their 
 return to any spot in the sky, nay, announced the exist- 
 ence of planets before they were apparent to mortal sight. 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 103 
 
 Such achievements, not to be contested, may swell the 
 pride of man and induce him to look down with pity and 
 contempt upon sciences open to doubt, full of noise and 
 controversy ; but these, if they teach us humility, may 
 be more profitable, morally, than the others. If me- 
 chanical philosophy shows the strength, moral philoso- 
 phy testifies to the imperfection of the human intellect ; 
 and we ought to be aware of both. The worst tendency 
 of Mathematics is to make us discard every thing which 
 admits not of demonstration ; but this is mere narrow- 
 ness of mind, which knows nothing beyond its own 
 sphere. The most important quality of a truly philoso- 
 phic mind is comprehensiveness. 
 
 19. But may not demonstrative mixed a priori rea- 
 soning be applied to other subjects than quantity? 
 That is a great question. Quality differs from Quantity 
 in this, that the differences of the latter are fixed and 
 determinate, even the smallest, while those of the former 
 are indeterminate, one quality gradually, and often in- 
 sensibly, passing into another. How can such differ- 
 ences be the subject of demonstration ? 
 
 20. This fundamental difference between Quantity 
 and Quality seems to me decisive of the question. Now 
 morals treat of Qualities, and therefore morals do not 
 admit of demonstration. When then we do meet with 
 reasonings about relations other than those of Quantity 
 which bear a demonstrative air, we may fairly suspect 
 that they are demonstrative only in appearance, in form, 
 not in vitality ; that is, they contain in the conclusion 
 nothing really different from the premises ; what is stated 
 in general in the one, being stated in particular in the 
 
104 REASON, 
 
 other. Now this Is the whole secret of that specious sort 
 of demonstration, the Syllogism of the Schools ; which 
 never did, and never can lead to any discovery, to any 
 thing not already known, because the universal propo- 
 sition, which forms one of the premises of the Syllogism, 
 must comprehend the conclusion, or there is no formal 
 proof. This mock sort of demonstration, though lab- 
 oured by the most subtle of men for many ages, has pro- 
 duced nothing, while real demonstrative reasoning has 
 raised a mighty fabric reaching even to the stars. 1 
 
 21. But mixed a priori reasoning may be probable 
 only, not demonstrative ; and to this class by far the 
 greater part of our ordinary ratiocination belongs. Most 
 of our every day reasonings are not about Quantity, and 
 therefore, in general, they are not demonstrative. They 
 cannot then be subject to the strict rules of the Schol- 
 astic Syllogism, which is demonstrative in form at least, 
 and consequently is certainly conclusive, or certainly 
 inconclusive, according as these rules have or have 
 not been observed. Probable reasoning, as the word 
 enounces, has no such certainty, and therefore no certain 
 rule whereby it may be tested. Still, that part of Logic 
 which treats of fallacies tends to guard against error in 
 probable reasoning, and to detect it, though not infal- 
 libly. 
 
 22. Probable mixed a priori reasoning agrees with 
 that mock species of demonstration called the Syllogism 
 in this, that both start from general propositions to arrive 
 
 1 For a full inquiry into the nature and value of the Scholastic 
 Syllogism, see the Author's "Principles of Psychology." Part III., 
 chap. 10. 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 105 
 
 at conclusions less general ; but the difference is that in 
 the Syllogism the proposition is universal, in Prob- 
 able reasoning, general only. When a proposition is 
 true universally, or at least allowed to be so, of course 
 every less general proposition comprehended under it 
 must be true also; no reasoning is required to prove 
 that; but when a proposition is true only in general, 
 then reasoning is required to prove that any proposition 
 is comprehended under it. Thus if we assert that all 
 trade ought to be free, no doubt the trade in slave-grown 
 sugar ought to be free ; but if we merely assert that 
 trade in general ought to be free, the question may still 
 arise whether the trade in slave-grown sugar should or 
 should not be an exception. And this may create a long 
 discussion wherein all the arguments are not on one 
 side, as they are in demonstration, but where one must 
 be balanced against the other till we see which side shall 
 on the whole preponderate. And though in this case 
 the conclusion after all is only probable, yet the inquiry 
 is a far more improving intellectual exercise than the 
 uniform certainty of demonstrative reasoning. 
 
 23. When a proposition is universal, of course there 
 is no room for limitation or exception ; but when it is 
 only general, other general principles may come into 
 play, and conflict one with another. Thus, when we 
 assert, in general, that trade ought to be free, this may 
 be true as far as wealth is concerned ; but it is also true 
 that slavery ought by all means to be discouraged, and 
 these two propositions are conflicting. Which do we 
 think most important, a slight fall in the price of sugar, 
 or a blow struck at slavery ? This sort of suspense can 
 
106 BEASON. 
 
 never occur in demonstrative reasoning, which prevents 
 all distressing doubt, satisfies the intellect by its certainty, 
 flatters us by its infallibility, and throws undue discredit 
 on mere probability. No doubt it was this longing after 
 certainty which led to the invention of the Scholastic 
 Syllogism, and rendered it so popular, for it presents the 
 phantom, at least, if not the reality of a demonstration, 
 a phantom which has deluded many all their lives, a 
 will o' the wisp which leads to nothing. To the School 
 Logician, as well as to the Mathematician, probability is 
 a poor thing, unworthy of the name of Philosophy, un- 
 worthy even of the name of Science, which should deal 
 in strict demonstration. What can come of rigid de- 
 monstration in Metaphysical Science may be judged of 
 by a modern publication professedly founded and raised 
 thereupon, which, after a laboured inquiry and proposi- 
 tion on proposition, ends in nothing. Such must ever 
 be the case where demonstration is introduced into sub- 
 jects not its own ; the demonstration is a sham, and the 
 result disappointment. Probability and doubt, which go 
 together, may be unsatisfactory, distressing, humiliating, 
 but they are, for the most part, the condition of man on 
 earth ; and though infallible reasoning may be as com- 
 fortable as an infallible church, yet we seldom can have 
 the one, and never the other. 
 
 24. We have shown that all real demonstrative rea- 
 soning must consist of three propositions at least ; but 
 probable reasoning may have only two. That mode of 
 speech which possesses the form without the reality of 
 reasoning, namely, the Scholastic Syllogism, is also always 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 107 
 
 stated in three propositions ; though sometimes one of 
 them is superfluous. Thus in the Syllogism, — 
 
 All trade ought to be free ; 
 
 The trade in slave-grown sugar is a trade ; 
 
 Therefore the trade in slave-grown sugar ought to be 
 free. 
 The second proposition is manifestly a tautology, re- 
 dundant and useless ; and the inference, such as it is, 
 may be drawn directly : 
 
 All trade ought to be free, 
 
 Therefore the trade in slave-grown sugar ought to be 
 free. 
 If this be worthy of the name of reasoning, then demon- 
 strative reasoning may consist of only two propositions ; 
 but here, it is evident, no new truth is elicited, nothing 
 not evidently comprehended under the first proposition, 
 and therefore the reasoning is purely formed, not real. 
 This then is no exception to the rule, that all real de- 
 monstrative reasoning, all which teaches us something, 
 must have three propositions. But in probable reason- 
 ing it is otherwise. There, an inference may be drawn 
 directly from a general proposition, and as it is not evi- 
 dently and necessarily comprehended under that pro- 
 position, the proof is entitled to the name of reasoning. 
 
 Thus, trade, in general, ought to be free ; 
 
 Therefore, the trade in slave-grown sugar ought to be 
 free, 
 may be allowed to be reasoning, not in form only, but in 
 reality, for it teaches us something new, something not 
 identical with the first proposition, and consequently it 
 contains a real inference, though only a probable one, 
 
108 REASON. 
 
 and so liable to dispute. And tlie inference is only 
 probable, because it is drawn only from a general propo- 
 sition, which, as such, does not exclude other general 
 propositions, which may modify or reverse the conclu- 
 sion. In like manner, the long series of inferences 
 drawn by Bentham and his followers from their favourite 
 proposition that all men are governed by their interests 
 admits of numerous exceptions, if the universality of the 
 proposition be denied, or if it be so understood as to 
 be true indeed, but a barren truism, such as, that all 
 men are moved by some desire or other, desire of some- 
 thing which they like. 
 
 25. Though the connection between the general pro- 
 position and the conclusion, in probable mixed a priori 
 reasoning, be not necessary, yet, such as it is, it is seen 
 intuitively, 1 or not at all. A long series of propositions 
 maybe required to arrive at the final conclusion, but the 
 connection between each premiss and each conclusion 
 rests upon its own inward evidence, not upon anything 
 without ; it must strike the mind by its own power, not by 
 any borrowed force ; it may be discerned, but cannot be 
 proved. Thus the connection between the general pro- 
 position, " Trade ought to be free/' and the conclusion, 
 "the trade in slave-grown sugar ought to be free," is 
 seen at once, is seen to be a probable connection, but 
 not a necessary one, unless we begin by assuming that 
 
 1 The word Intuition, as understood throughout this work, does not 
 necessarily imply self-evident certain knowledge, but any knowledge, 
 certain or probable, which the mind discerns at once without the inter- 
 vention of proof. And even where proof is necessary, each step in that 
 proof, each separate inference, is discerned intuitively. 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 109 
 
 " all trade ought to be free," a proposition which would 
 justify even the slave trade. 
 
 26. Is there, then, no form of probable reasoning but 
 that which proceeds from a general principle to infer one 
 less general, comprehended under it ? This we cannot 
 maintain without contradicting the plain evidence of facts. 
 Other relations than that of comprehension are traced 
 by probable reasoning. Take the following instance : — 
 
 A is greater than B, and B is probably greater than 
 C, therefore A is probably (only) greater than 0. 
 
 Or A is probably greater than B, 
 
 And B is certainly greater than C, 
 
 Therefore A is probably greater than C. 
 Here we have the relation of Quantity ; but the reason- 
 ing is probable only ; and there is no descent from a 
 general proposition to one less general. 
 
 In Blunt's "Undesigned Coincidences," (Appendix, 
 xv,) 3 I find the following sentence : "From this pass- 
 age it appears that a pavement was near the Castle of 
 Antonia ; but we have already seen that the Castle of 
 Antonia was near the palace (or Pilate's hall) ; there- 
 fore this pavement was near Pilate's hall." All will 
 allow that this is legitimate reasoning, though there is 
 here no descent from general to particular or to less 
 general, all the propositions being alike in this respect, 
 on a plain, as it were, as in pure Mathematics, all, in 
 fact, being singular propositions; but the reasoning is 
 not demonstrative, on account of the indeterminate word 
 near, which may mean six yards or sixty. 
 
 Again, A is similar to B, 
 
 And B is similar to C ; 
 
110 SEASON. 
 
 Therefore A is probably (only) similar to ; 
 for though A and be both similar to B, the points of 
 similarity between each of them and B may be different, 
 so that between A and C there may be little or no re- 
 semblance. The eyes of one man may be like to those 
 of another, and the mouth of the second to that of a 
 third ; but the eyes and mouth of the first and the third 
 person may be unlike. Here there is the relation of 
 Besemblance ; and the reasoning is probable, yet we do 
 not start from a general proposition to arrive at one less 
 general comprehended under it. This may serve as an 
 instance of the impossibility of reducing Quality to de- 
 monstration. Probable reasoning, then, no more than all 
 reasoning, can be reduced to one common form or type ; 
 it assumes a variety of shapes according to the multitude 
 of subjects to which it is applied, and the diversity of 
 relations which it traces ; it cannot be crarnpt within the 
 limits of a narrow system, and rebels against our love of 
 uniformity ; though in this all a priori reasoning agrees, 
 that from one or more propositions known, or at least 
 allowed, we infer some other proposition not previously 
 known or allowed, infer intuitively, without foreign aid, 
 by the native force of the mind, in a word, by pure 
 Beason. 
 
 II. Of Seasoning a posteriori. 
 
 1. In the opening of this inquiry, while we divided 
 all reasoning into two kinds, the a priori and the a pos- 
 teriori^ we at the same time remarked, that, so great was 
 the difference between them, it might well be questioned 
 whether the latter were entitled to the name of Beason- 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. Ill 
 
 ing or not, but, in compliance with established usage, 
 we should, provisionally, at least, allow it that title. 
 We have now to inquire into the nature of this sort of 
 Seasoning, and to determine whether it can ; with phil- 
 osophical accuracy, be so called. 
 
 2. All reasoning of this kind proceeds upon the fun- 
 damental assumption that from a number, more or less, 
 of well- chosen examples of certain facts of co-existence 
 or of succession, known by experience, we may safely 
 infer that a similar co-existence or a similar succession 
 will hold good in all cases apparently alike, though in 
 these cases the fact of co-existence or of succession has 
 not been actually observed. Thus, having dissected one 
 horse, and learnt his structure, we believe that all animals 
 bearing the outward marks of a horse are similarly 
 framed within ; and having observed that fire will con- 
 sume wood to-day, we doubt not that it will consume 
 wood to-morrow. That we are constantly drawing 
 such inferences, sometimes without hesitation, without 
 effort, almost without consciousness of any inference ; at 
 other times, in more complicated and obstruse cases, 
 after deliberation, and doubtingly, is certain ; but the 
 question still remains ; are these inferences instances of 
 Eeasoning or not, are they rational or instinctive ? 
 
 3. If these inferences are rational, than are they intui- 
 tive, that is, the mind by its own force, without any ex- 
 traneous aid, discerns the connection and draws the 
 inference. But can this be affirmed in the present case ? 
 Why must all horses be alike internally ? Why must 
 fire which consumed wood yesterday consume other 
 wood to-day ? for neither the fire nor the wood is the 
 
112 REASON. 
 
 same as that of yesterday ? Most persons probably will 
 consider these questions too simple to require an answer. 
 We do not easily allow a difficulty where none has ever 
 been suspected ; we require no reason for that which has 
 constantly been taken for granted. Common inferences 
 from experience have been made so often, so long, so 
 rapidly, and so surely, that to doubt them seems absurd, 
 irrational ; but the doubt is not contrary to Keason, it is 
 only contrary to Instinct. Turn the question over and 
 over, probe it to the bottom, and still you will find no 
 reason for your belief in the uniformity of nature, which 
 all your inferences suppose ; and if your belief be not 
 rational, it must be instinctive. To doubt of this unifor- 
 mity seems indeed monstrous, it shocks us extremely, not 
 only because it is opposed to instinct, but also to Custom ; 
 for though the belief begins with instinct, it is afterwards 
 so fortified by custom that doubt becomes next to im- 
 possible. When similar phenomena have been observed 
 to recur in similar circumstances over and over again, a 
 habit is formed of expecting one phenomenon as soon as 
 another appears, a habit which becomes irresistible, which 
 precludes all doubt, silences all objections, and makes us 
 stare at the man who would interrupt it, as one would 
 at a madman or a fool. But Instinct and Custom or 
 Association are here the sources of our belief, and the 
 man who is bold enough to oppose these is thought to 
 oppose reason. 
 
 4. It is to this force of custom, and not to reason, that 
 we ought to attribute many of those actions of the lower 
 animals which appear rational. Animals can be taught 
 many things. The pointer dog is taught to drop after 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 113 
 
 fire, not to bark, not to chase hares and rabbits, all con- 
 trary to his nature ; but is reason his teacher ? To explain 
 the result we need not call in so lofty a faculty, for a 
 lower one will suffice. The dog has memory, for with- 
 out that he could learn nothing, and he can remember 
 the flogging which followed any transgression of the rules 
 of sporting, at least after several repetitions of the offence 
 and punishment, till the one becomes indissolubly associ- 
 ated with the other, and every new occasion of misconduct 
 suggests the former penalty. In this there is no necessity 
 for Seasoning, or even for Eeason at all, since mere asso- 
 ciation of a certain action with pain, founded on memory, 
 will account for the phenomena. When I put on my hat, 
 and take up my stick, my dog leaps up for joy, because 
 these acts are associated in his mind with going out, in 
 which he delights. 
 
 5. That the lower animals should be so much led by 
 Custom need not surprise us, when we know that man 
 himself is subject to the same influence. In him, no 
 doubt, it is counterbalanced by Reason, more or less in 
 particular instances, but the force of custom though 
 weakened is never destroyed. Reason and custom are 
 always at war, and sometimes the one gains the mastery, 
 sometimes the other. In the unthinking, the latter of 
 course bears sway ; in reflecting minds, the former has 
 greater, but not undivided, influence. No one knows 
 how much he is led by custom. Custom may have ori- 
 ginated in Reason, but in the course of time the reason 
 is often forgotten while the custom still remains. Thus, 
 the annual promenade along the Champs Elysees to the 
 Bois de Boulogne, in Passion week, arose out of a reli- 
 
114 REASON. 
 
 gious procession to the convent of Longchamp ; and the 
 promenade remains, though any religious, or indeed any 
 idea whatsoever connected with it, has totally vanished. 
 At present, the promenade is senseless, but it continues. 
 Hallowe'en is still observed in Scotland, though, as the 
 vigil of All Saints' day, it is quite forgotten ; but were it 
 remembered as such, it no doubt would excite the pious 
 indignation of Presbyterians. Burns has written a poem 
 on Hallowe'en, but certainly no religious idea connected 
 with it can there be discovered. The year in Scotland 
 is still divided by four terms, known as Candlemas, 
 Whitsuntide, Lammas, and Martinmas; though the 
 procession of the candles is now only seen in St Peter's, 
 and the Descent of the Holy Grhost, the Assumption of 
 the Blessed Virgin, and the Feast of St Martin, are 
 blotted out of the Presbyterian calendar. 
 
 6. Affection to a ruling dynasty, so important a poli- 
 tical element, often denied and ridiculed by superficial 
 declaimers, liable no doubt to excess and misdirec- 
 tion, but, on the whole, most beneficial ; the source of 
 internal peace, of security, and hence of lenity in the 
 prince, of repose in the people, of present prosperity and 
 future progress, is owing almost entirely to Custom. The 
 people are attached to a dynasty not because it is good 
 to be so attached, not from Eeason, but because the 
 dynasty is old. For the same cause do they respect old 
 families, families whom they and their fathers have been 
 accustomed to see in high place, to look up to, and to 
 love. No doubt respect for old families depends also 
 upon respect for continuity, for continuity supposes some 
 virtue, some moral excellence. Wealth possessed by the 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 115 
 
 same family for many generations certainly argues some- 
 thing in its favour. The privileges of primogeniture 
 may or may not be wise, but where they have long been 
 established, they are fondly cherished by all, even by 
 those who seem to lose by them. Few younger sons in 
 Great Britain would have the right of the elder abolished. 
 And what a hold on our reverence has the supposed 
 continuity of the clerical line from Christ to the existing 
 ministry through the Apostles ! 
 
 7. The powerful influence of Custom on both our 
 opinions and actions being a fact indisputable, generally 
 allowed, though not to the full extent, it will the more 
 readily be admitted as probable that many conclusions 
 supposed to be reached by Reasoning are really owing to 
 Instinct fortified by Custom. Our every day inferences 
 regarding matters of fact cannot surely be traced to 
 Reasoning. What reasoning is required to believe, or 
 what reasoning could prove that fire will always burn, 
 water drown, or that the sun will rise and set to-morrow ? 
 In these and innumerable such instances, there is mani- 
 festly no occasion for reasoning, and no grounds for it, 
 because uniformity in time past, were it ever so perfect, 
 and ever so well known, could never prove uniformity in 
 time to come. And reasoning is here not only imprac- 
 ticable but unnecessary, for we believe, and firmly believe 
 such uniformity long before we can reason. But all in- 
 ferences from experience, however remote, however diffe- 
 rent from ordinary facts, were founded on the same blind 
 belief, common to the clown and the philosopher, and, 
 therefore, their basis, at least, is not Reasoning, nor any 
 form of Reason. 
 
116 REASON. 
 
 8. If this doctrine be correct, if our belief in the 
 uniformity of nature be founded not on Keason but on 
 Instinct fortified by Custom, then can our disbelief in 
 exceptions to this uniformity have no other foundation 
 than this, that we are unaccustomed to them. Few have 
 the presumption to deny the possibility of such excep- 
 tions, or of miracles, thus arrogating to themselves an 
 intimate acquaintance with the secrets of nature ; but 
 the extreme improbability of exceptions is maintained by 
 many, an improbability, according to Hume, as good as 
 a demonstration. That philosopher was the first, how- 
 ever, to broach the opinion that all our inferences from 
 experience are based on Custom, not on Eeasoning, or 
 more properly, are not instances of reasoning, not based 
 upon Keason, and, consequently, our Belief in Uniform- 
 ity, and disbelief in want of Uniformity, or in miracles, 
 rest, according to him, on Custom alone. If then, as 
 Hume asserts, the argument against miracles from the 
 invariable course of nature, be " as entire as any argu- 
 ment from experience can possibly be imagined/' let us 
 remember that the argument, allowing it entitled to the 
 name, rests entirely upon Custom, according to him, 
 upon Instinct afterwards fortified by Custom, according 
 to us, not upon Keason. Custom, or Instinct and Cus- 
 tom together, are the causes, the metaphysical causes of 
 our Belief or our disbelief, but they -are not logical 
 causes or reasons which justify such belief or disbelief. 
 Powerful causes no doubt they are, and influence us they 
 always will ; but, being independent of Reason, they can- 
 not, without prejudice, be brought to silence all argu- 
 ments derived from that higher faculty. 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 117 
 
 It is necessary to insist upon this power of Custom. So 
 strong is it, so insidious, so little known to ourselves, tliat 
 any deviation from Uniformity appears to us monstrous, 
 and all belief in want of uniformity seems opposed to com- 
 mon sense, that is, to common Keason. We shall admit 
 with difficulty that Eeason is here not concerned, that the 
 mind is shocked, not by a violation of rational thought, but 
 by a breach of what is usual, Thus is Custom mistaken 
 for Eeason, and receives that homage due only to a 
 higher power. 
 
 9. Innumerable answers have appeared to Hume's 
 famous Essay on Miracles, but hitherto the true philoso- 
 phical answer has never, I believe, been given. He is 
 refuted on his own principles ; and those principles, with 
 the modification above suggested, seem to me sound. 
 If all our inferences from Experience be founded on 
 Custom alone, or on Instinct fortified by Custom, then 
 these inferences are not founded on Keason ; and there- 
 fore cannot be brought forward as arguments, much less 
 as infallible arguments, against any rational conclusion. 
 Our incredulity to miracles depends then not on Eeason, 
 but on the interruption to what is usual ; and our Belief 
 in the same is opposed, not to the rational faculty, but 
 to the power of Custom. Properly speaking, we have no 
 reason to give against miracles ; but we believe them with 
 difficulty because they are unusual. The argument of 
 Hume, then, thoroughly probed, amounts only to this, not 
 that our experience of the laws of nature, were it even 
 hitherto unalterable, as he assumes, is any argument, 
 much less an unanswerable argument, against an occa- 
 sional violation of those laws, of the secret causes of 
 
118 REASON. 
 
 which we know nothing ; but only, that the great uni- 
 formity hitherto observed forces us to believe in continued 
 uniformity. The cause, the metaphysical cause, of our 
 Belief or Disbelief, is here truly stated, but that cause is 
 not a logical one, not a Keason. This seems the true 
 answer to Hume's Essay, and its importance cannot be 
 over-rated. As St Paul said to King Agrippa, " Why 
 should it be thought a thing incredible with you, that 
 God should raise the dead ?" It was incredible, simply 
 because unusual, not irrational. 
 
 These observations will enable us to determine what 
 is to be thought of those who deny the possibility of 
 miracles ; possibility " of any modifications whatever in 
 the existing condition of material agents, unless through 
 the invariable operation of a series of eternally-impressed 
 consequences following in some necessary chain of orderly 
 connection/' x Well might Hamlet say to such, 
 
 " There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, 
 Than are dreamt of in your philosophy." 
 
 That a creature like man, with intelligence enough in 
 some degree to appreciate the wonders of creation, enough 
 to see how very little he does know, or is ever likely to 
 know, how inexplicable ever thing ultimately is, should 
 presume to talk of the impossibility of any change in 
 the ordinary course of nature, shows a degree of ignor- 
 ance and presumption, ludicrous, if not pitiable. Before 
 pronouncing, dogmatically, on this point, man must be 
 as Grod, he must know all, the first springs or principles 
 of everything. Religious dogmatism may be excused, 
 when built upon any believed revelation, and though not 
 1 Oxford " Essays and Reviews. " 1860. Essay III. 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 119 
 
 shared it may meet with sympathy, for in religion all 
 doubt is distressing ; but irreligious dogmatism has no 
 excuse, either in Philosophy or in Sentiment. 
 
 10. What are we then to think of Inductive Season- 
 ing commonly so called ? Is this a misnomer, or is it 
 not ? It is quite certain, and indeed is generally ad- 
 mitted, that a great part of the process which goes under 
 the name of Induction, is unconnected with Seasoning 
 proper. First there is the observation of facts, facts of 
 Co-existence or of Succession ; then the scrutiny of these 
 facts, in order to determine whether there be any constant, 
 or only a casual co-existence or succession; next comes the 
 separation of the variable from the invariable elements, 
 for there are always some of the former ; and the latter 
 being ascertained, there is really nothing else to do. No 
 doubt, we infer from thence that what has hitherto been 
 invariable will so continue ; but no reasoning is required 
 for this, no effort of mind whatever, scarcely an act of 
 consciousness, so rapid, so unavoidable is the conse- 
 quence. If past uniformity be established, we want no- 
 thing more, and we should be surprised if any one should 
 suppose anything more to be required ; not that uni- 
 formity in future is really proved, but that no proof is 
 thought to be necessary. And no proof is thought to 
 be necessary because an Instinct of our nature prevents 
 all doubt. We should as soon doubt the existence of 
 the material world, as that past uniformity should not 
 be reproduced. We must conclude, then, that in Induc- 
 tion there is no place for Eeasoning, properly so called, 
 and that the attempt to bring it into logical form by sup- 
 plying, in all cases, a Major Premiss, such as " Nature 
 
120 REASON. 
 
 is uniform in her operations/' or some one similar, is 
 only one of the many instances where nature has been sac- 
 rificed to the spirit of system, to the love of regularity. 
 Nature is uniform in her operations. But there is a great 
 deal of variety as well as of uniformity in nature, and 
 this general proposition tells us not where to expect the 
 one, and where the other. Nothing can be more vague 
 and undefined, and consequently nothing less fitted for 
 a Logical Premiss. Because there is a great deal of 
 uniformity in nature, no one can thence infer that there 
 will be uniformity in any particular case. As a logical 
 Premiss, therefore, the proposition is useless. 
 
 This mistake bears some resemblance to that whereby 
 General Axioms were considered as the foundation of 
 Mathematical reasoning. Particular cases of axiomatic 
 truths must have been discerned before the general 
 axiom was formed, and these are sufficient for the rea- 
 soning, which need not wait till axioms be framed to 
 establish its validity ; and so, conjunctions of phenomena 
 were observed over and over again, and on that account 
 alone expected in future, long before any general propo- 
 sitions relative to uniformity were framed, and conse- 
 quently without any reference to such a proposition. 
 These propositions, like the axioms of Mathematics, are 
 digests of our knowledge, convenient formulas in which 
 much previous knowledge is summed up, not the ground 
 of our knowledge. 
 
 It is generally allowed that there are few finer speci- 
 mens of a posteriori reasoning than Butler s Analogy. 
 But to what does this reasoning amount ? The whole 
 object of the writer is to trace a similarity between the 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 121 
 
 doctrines of Natural Keligion and the constitution and 
 course of Nature ; and again between the doctrines of 
 Eevealed and those of Natural Eeligion. These two 
 similarities being established, the whole case is made out. 
 No Seasoning is required to prove from thence that the 
 Author of Nature is the God of Nature, as well of Ee- 
 vealed Eeligion. This conclusion is no doubt irresistible, 
 but it is not arrived at by reasoning. A sort of logical 
 form might no doubt be given, as this — 
 
 Like Effects spring from like Causes ; 
 The doctrines of Natural and Eevealed Eeligion are like 
 to each other, and to the constitution and course of 
 Nature ; they are all like effects ; therefore they had all 
 the same cause or Author. This argument, however, 
 such as it is, is of no avail, is of no logical value ; for 
 the words like or similar, are too vague to admit of any 
 legitimate inference. Likeness admits of innumerable 
 degrees. But there is a degree of likeness in the effect 
 from which we infer without hesitation likeness in the 
 cause ; though the inference is not logical. The at- 
 tempt, then, to rest an Inductive conclusion on Pre- 
 mises such as these, tends to diminish rather than to 
 increase their certainty. 
 
 11. Though, in Induction, Seasoning, properly so 
 called, does not come into play, yet, in difficult cases, the 
 highest powers of Eeason are required. In simple and 
 every-day cases of inference from experience, Eeason is 
 scarcely, if at all necessary ; the natural tendency guided 
 and strengthened by Custom suffices. Thus animals, 
 possibly not devoid of Eeasoning, though certainly pos- 
 sessing it in a very small degree as compared with man, 
 
122 
 
 HEASON. 
 
 are quick enough to avoid impending danger, Still, no 
 animal but man is capable of patient and long-continued 
 Induction. Here, not only high intellectual, but also 
 rare moral qualities are necessary ; keenness of discrim- 
 ination, a clear insight into the fundamental elements of 
 a sequence, patience and dexterity in making experi- 
 ments, no impatience of doubt, but long forbearance in 
 coming to a conclusion. In all this, the only difficulty 
 is to determine what is, and what is not invariable ; and 
 for this purpose many rules and canons have been drawn 
 up, especially by Bacon, in the second part of the No- 
 vum Organum, by Dr Whewell in his Philosophy of the 
 Inductive Sciences, and by Mr Mill in the inductive por- 
 tion of his work on Logic. These are quite different 
 from the common rules of Logic, which do not depend 
 at all upon experience, but are necessary laws of thought, 
 laws which bring their own evidence along with them, 
 the proof of which is within and not without. If, then, 
 we still talk of Inductive Logic, we must remember that 
 the term Logic is here used in a far wider sense than 
 that of pure Logic or Logic proper, that it must com- 
 prehend all science which professes to direct the under- 
 standing in the pursuit of Truth, a scope far beyond that 
 of Logic proper, which aims not at Truth directly, but 
 only at consistency. Pure Logic is unique, its limits are 
 narrow but definite ; while that Logic, which would 
 embrace Induction, is vast, but of uncertain boundary. 
 The former demands no original knowledge, only natural 
 subtlety ; while Induction rests upon facts learnt by ex- 
 perience, and the more the better. The best reasoner 
 will be the best logician, however false his conclusions ; 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 123 
 
 but if conclusions be false, Induction must be bad. If 
 the premises be false, or, though not utterly false, par- 
 tial, the finest reasoning will lead to errour ; nay, if the 
 reasoning be faultless, errour is inevitable; but good 
 Induction must lead to truth. Good Induction consists 
 in observing a sufficient number of facts, and in 
 thoroughly sifting them, in order to discover what in 
 these facts is casual and what invariable ; and that as- 
 certained, there is no occasion for reasoning ; for we 
 believe instinctively that the future will be like the past, 
 that like causes will be followed by like effects, and that 
 like effects will indicate like causes. 
 
 The pure logician may be the most ignorant of men, 
 though very subtle ; but the Inductive Philosopher must 
 be informed, though not an acute reasoner. There were no 
 more subtle reasoners than the Schoolmen, though they 
 knew nothing ; but the followers of Bacon have observed 
 much, and reasoned little. Pure Logic is an admirable 
 mental exercise, though liable to abuse and often barren, 
 while induction is fruitful in results, but of less value as 
 a whetstone to the intellect. There is the same differ- 
 ence between them as between Geometry and Analy- 
 tics ; the former is the more improving, the latter the 
 more manageable and expeditious, — the one makes acute 
 mathematicians, the other determines the Mechanism of 
 the Heavens. The doctrine of proportion affords an 
 excellent example of the two processes. The fifth Book 
 of Euclid, which treats of proportion, is lengthy, diffi- 
 cult, and laborious, but on that very account an excel- 
 lent exercise ; while the same truths may be reached 
 
124 REASON. 
 
 Analytically, shortly, easily, and quickly, and therefore, 
 to the mind, unprofitably. 
 
 12. There seems to be a natural antagonism between 
 Observers and Eeasoners. The former stigmatize the 
 latter as theorists, system-builders, dreamers, perhaps 
 metaphysicians ; while these hurl back upon their adver- 
 saries the names of dull plodders and laborious pioneers, 
 useful perhaps in their way, but of slow parts, and no 
 originality. The one upholds the mind itself and its 
 processes, as chiefly, if not alone worthy of regard ; he 
 boldly proclaims, that, " In nature there is nothing great 
 but Man, in man nothing great but Mind f he looks to 
 individual development of intellect rather than to the 
 general and material result, to search after truth rather 
 than to truth itself ; nay, he may consider our masters 
 of modern science, with all their acquirements, no better, 
 for the most part, than u intellectual barbarians/' when 
 compared with Aristotle or Plato. 1 The other points to 
 results ; he shows the progress of Physical Science, the 
 numerous applications thereof to the wants of men, the 
 diffusion of comfort, the increase of power over nature, 
 and these, he exclaims, are my doing. While you were 
 syllogizing, while you were straw-splitting, while you 
 were reasoning yourselves out of every thing, and at last 
 confessing that " nought is everything, and every thing 
 is nought/' I was laboriously, painfully, and persever- 
 ingly observing and experimenting, and I, accordingly, 
 have reaped a rich harvest, while you were reaping the 
 winds. While you were doubting about the existence 
 
 1 See Sir William Hamilton s " Discussions on Philosophy." Art. II. 
 p. 39. 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 125 
 
 of matter, I moulded it to my wishes ; and while you 
 called in question the things near and around us, I dis- 
 covered other worlds, and made known the system of the 
 universe. Such is the contrast, such the disagreement 
 between Eeasoning and Observation, a contrast which will 
 never end, because it is founded in nature, and neither 
 side can ever be destroyed, neither antagonist ever 
 silenced. 
 
 13. This doctrine, that there is no such thing, properly 
 speaking, as Inductive Eeasoning, may be new, and 
 therefore it will be attacked, and if it cannot be strictly 
 refuted, it may still be depreciated as a mere play upon 
 words. But underneath the question of words lies one 
 of things, the question whether Induction embrace any 
 mental process so similar to other reasoning as to be 
 properly called by the same name, for names would be 
 utterly useless did they not stand for things similar. 
 This is a real psychological question, and according as it 
 is determined, the name will or not be given. 
 
 14. Mr Mills System of Logic embraces two parts, 
 the Eatiocinative and the Inductive ; whence it ought 
 to follow that Induction is not ratiocination, — is not 
 a process of reasoning. Though this be true, and Induc- 
 tion is not reasoning, does not contain reasoning, yet it 
 may be the foundation of reasoning ; for, from the general 
 facts or general principles arrived at by Induction, reason- 
 ings may follow. And, no doubt, from this mixture, the 
 opinion has been derived that Induction itself is a reason- 
 ing process. These general facts or principles, when 
 allowed, may serve as the foundation of an argument as 
 well as an Intuitive Truth; but ; however cogent the 
 
126 REASON. 
 
 argument, the conclusion can never be more sure than 
 the principle from which it is deduced, 
 
 15. Though Experience be at the bottom of these 
 rational inferences, as well as of those wholly emanating 
 from experience, yet the difference between them in the 
 evidence may be great. Thus, when we infer that all 
 ruminating animals have cloven feet, because all hitherto 
 observed have them, we draw an inference from experi- 
 ence, directly and instinctively, which commands con- 
 siderable belief; but could we show that, according to 
 principles long and well established, the one was con- 
 nected with the other, we should be thoroughly convinced. 
 The one conclusion is purely empirical, the other rational, 
 though based upon experience. It is thus that the great 
 Cuvier was able to determine rationally the habits of 
 many extinct species of animals. A certain form of 
 bone proves a certain form of muscle, and a certain form 
 and size of muscle prove that the animal was carnivorous 
 and savage, or graminivorous and mild. In the practice 
 of medicine those whose rule is direct experience only 
 are stigmatized as Empirics, in opposition to such as 
 reason from general principles which arose out of long 
 experience. Thus, Induction and Eeasoning, though 
 different, and often cultivated pretty exclusively by dif- 
 ferent persons, are real auxiliaries and friends the one to 
 the other. 
 
 16. How indistinctly this doctrine as to the non-reason- 
 ing nature of Induction has hitherto been seen by philo- 
 sophers, appears from the inconsistency of their language 
 on the subject. For while, at one time, they assert that 
 inferences from experience are not " effects of reasoning/' 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 127 
 
 or, are not " founded upon reasoning/' they, at another, 
 talk of experimental or inductive as a branch of probable 
 reasoning. No one ever saw more clearly than Hume 
 that conclusions from experience were not founded on 
 reasoning. " I say then, that even after we have experi- 
 ence of the operation of cause or effect, our conclusions 
 from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or 
 any process of the understanding/' — " These two proposi- 
 tions are far from being the same, I have found that 
 such an object has always been attended ivith such an 
 effect, and I foresee that other objects which are in ap- 
 pearance similar will be attended with similar effects. 
 I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may 
 be justly inferred from the other : I know, in fact, that 
 it is always inferred. But if you insist, that the infer- 
 ence is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to pro- 
 duce that reasoning. The connection between these 
 propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medi- 
 um which may enable the mind to draw such an infer- 
 ence, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. 
 What this medium is, I must confess, passes my com- 
 prehension ; and it is incumbent on those to produce it 
 who assert that it really exists, and is the origin of all 
 our conclusions concerning matter of fact/' 1 Nothing can 
 be more explicit than this language, yet the u Treatise of 
 Human Nature" by the same author, is designated as 
 u An attempt to introduce the experimental Method of 
 Reasoning into Moral subjects." This, it may be said, 
 was a juvenile work, afterwards disowned by the Author ; 
 but the same uncertainty, the same contradiction, which 
 
 1 Hume's Essays : Sceptical Doubts. 
 
128 REASON. 
 
 appears on this subject in Part III. Sect. XVI., of the 
 "Treatise of Human Nature/' reappears in the corres- 
 ponding Section IX. of the Essays, " Of the Seasoning of 
 Animals." In the following sentence, the contradic- 
 tion comes out in bold relief. " But our wonder will, 
 perhaps, cease or diminish when we consider that the 
 experimental reasoning itself which we possess in com- 
 mon with beasts, and on which the whole conduct 
 of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or 
 mechanical power that acts in us unknown to our- 
 selves, and in its chief operations is not directed by 
 any such relations or comparisons of ideas as are the 
 proper objects of our intellectual faculties." Here what 
 was reasoning at the opening of the sentence becomes 
 instinct before the close. Mr Bailey, in his able work, 
 " The Theory of Keasoning," divides all reasoning into 
 the Demonstrative and the Contingent, meaning by the 
 latter Inductive, which, as he suggests, might also be 
 called Instinctive, as opposed to the Intuitive. Here, 
 again, the errour of the common opinion with respect to 
 Induction comes prominently forward, for that errour 
 leads to the inconsistency of coupling together Instinct 
 and Seasoning, which are perfectly distinct, and cannot 
 amalgamate. 
 
 17. Having exposed the errours and inconsistencies 
 of others, I shall not conceal my own. In the " Prin- 
 ciples of Psychology" I started the question, " If these 
 inferences from experience be not reasoning, why do we 
 talk of Inductive Seasoning at all P" 1 and this question I 
 answered by endeavouring to show that " in simple cases 
 1 Chap. x. P. 85. 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 129 
 
 of inferences from experience, the natural tendency to 
 associate phenomena once found in conjunction requires 
 little guidance, while, in the more complicated, judg- 
 ment and reasoning are necessary." At the same time, 
 I pointed out the radical difference between Inductive 
 Eeasoning and the other, and called the one set of infer- 
 ences non-intuitive, the other intuitive. But the mis- 
 take lay in supposing that non-intuitive inferences could 
 ever be Eeasoning. The simple statement is a contra- 
 diction; for Eeasoning is essentially intuitive. Some 
 inferences from experience are made without deliberation, 
 without hesitation, nay, without consciousness that they 
 are inferences ; while others are not drawn till after long 
 observation and examination, many difficulties suggested, 
 and doubts arisen and dispelled : but in neither case is 
 the conclusion drawn by Eeasoning. The difference is, 
 that, in the former case we entertain no doubt of past in- 
 variability, in the latter much doubt ; but remove this 
 doubt, and the inference follows immediately in both 
 cases. Was the Law of Gravitation discovered by 
 Eeasoning, or with the aid of Eeasoning ? By no means. 
 From a simple occurrence, the fall of an apple, as com- 
 monly said, the idea first entered into the mind of New- 
 ton, and this idea was afterwards confirmed by long ob- 
 servation, that so it had always been and now was ; and 
 this once settled, though no reasoning could prove, none 
 was required to prove, that so it ever would be. 
 
 18. That all Eeasoning, properly so called, is a priori, 
 is proved from the very nature of Logic, pure Logic, 
 which treats of Eeasoning, and which is an a priori 
 science requiring no knowledge foreign to the mind itself, 
 
130 EEASON. 
 
 only an intuition of consistency in thinking, no knowledge 
 of the world without, its constitution or its course. It 
 is only by an extension of the term beyond its proper 
 limits that we talk of Inductive Logic, and, by the same 
 extension, of Inductive Seasoning. But this similarity 
 of name must not lead us to confound things, in spite 
 of some resemblance, very different in reality, pure or 
 Eatiocinative, and applied or Inductive Logic ; a priori 
 or Deductive, and a posteriori or Inductive Eeasoning. 
 
 19. It has long been supposed that Man is peculiarly 
 distinguished from the lower animals by the faculty of 
 Eeason — that this is the differentia whereby the species 
 is separated from the other species of the Genus Animal; 
 that man, in short, according to the old definition, is 
 Animal rationale. But it would be hard to prove that 
 all other animals are destitute of Eeason, and it seems 
 improper to adopt as a characteristic what is at least 
 doubtful. It is more correct to say that man is a Eea- 
 soning Animal. As far as we know, Eeasoning is, in- 
 deed, peculiar to man. We cannot believe that other 
 animals are capable of reasoning ; and we must suppose 
 that God is above it, that he discovers at once by simple 
 Intuition, without reasoning, truth from errour. Eeason- 
 ing, then, seems to be characteristic of such a being as 
 man, " a little lower than the angels/' yet far above the 
 brute creation ; immeasurably inferior to Deity, yet made 
 in the image of God and "crowned with glory and 
 honour/' The very uncertainty of reasoning is charac- 
 teristic. The instincts of animals are invariable, un- 
 erring ; the wisdom of God is so likewise. Man alone is 
 reasoning and fallible. On every question, except ques- 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 131 4 
 
 tions of quantity, different sides may be taken, and each 
 may be supported by ingenious, if not powerful argu- 
 ments, proving both the force of Keason and the uncer- 
 tainty of Reasoning. How brightly does Reason shine 
 in the reasonings of conflicting barristers, though on one 
 side or the other they are fallacious ! 
 
 20. The very perfection and triumph of Reasoning is 
 Mathematics. In pure mathematics, by reasoning alone, 
 without any knowledge of the universe and its laws, in 
 complete ignorance of the facts of common life, and of 
 everything around and without us, we arrive at innumer- 
 able and irresistible conclusions ; and in mixed mathe- 
 matics, on a foundation of facts known by experience, 
 and assumed to be true universally, we build a vast 
 superstructure of demonstrated inferences relative to the 
 material world in which we live, and to the system of 
 the universe. Here, then, we have reasoning in perfec- 
 tion, and the results are truly imposing, sure, as well as 
 useful. Is, then, Mathematics our best instructor, the 
 safest nurse and tutor of our Reason? This by no 
 means follows. As a specimen of reasoning it is perfect, 
 but on that very account it is a treacherous guide. 
 It accustoms us to think that questions are to be deter- 
 mined by reasoning alone, and by reasoning in one line 
 alone, for in mathematics there is but one ; whereas all 
 other subjects can be viewed on many sides, and admit of 
 many and diverging lines of argument. The tendency of 
 Mathematics, then, is to narrow the mind, to improve 
 the power of ratiocination no doubt, but to destroy com- 
 prehensiveness, and so to unfit the Reason for the settle, 
 ment of nice and complicated questions where much is 
 
132 SEASON. 
 
 to be said on both sides. The exclusive cultivation of a 
 science which admits of no doubt, no balancing of argu- 
 ments, cannot be the best preparation for the affairs of 
 common life, or even for other sciences abounding in dif- 
 ficulties and subtle distinctions. What more opposed 
 than Mathematics and Law ? In the mechanical arts, 
 improvements in implements and machinery make less 
 skill in the workman necessary ; and, in like manner, 
 improvements in the language and method of reasoning 
 diminish the necessary acuteness of the reasoner. Thus, 
 Analytics is a much more powerful instrument, but a less 
 intellectual exercise, than Geometry. 
 
 21. Logic, pure Logic, that of the schools, for in- 
 stance, so independent of information, so barren of results, 
 was the finest whetstone of the reasoning powers, gave 
 the keenest edge to the weapons of controversy ; though 
 these weapons were often employed only in splitting straws. 
 Never was the saying of Moliere more applicable — 
 
 Raisonner est l'emploi de toute ma maison, 
 Et le Raisonnement en bannit la raison ; 
 
 &jeu d' esprit containing a profound truth, the possible 
 divorce, or at least the temporary separation, of Keason 
 and Eeasoning. 
 
 22. Very different is Induction. There, as we have 
 seen, the reasoning process is nil, but the results grand 
 and fruitful, full of physical discoveries and material 
 application. In the original inquirer, Induction must call 
 into play some of the highest qualities of mind, rare 
 powers of Keason, though not of reasoning ; but in the 
 learner, Induction, while it informs, does not greatly im- 
 prove the intellect. He acquires a knowledge of facts, 
 
OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 133 
 
 no doubt, facts of the highest interest and importance, 
 but he learns these facts too easily, with too little effort 
 of his own. His head may be crammed with knowledge, 
 while the higher powers of mind are little exerted. He 
 may be a walking Cyclopaedia, but incapable of solving 
 any original problem, of settling any disputed question. 
 Physical Science, therefore, which rests upon Induction, 
 cannot be the best means of education. 
 
 23. Upon the whole, it appears that the sciences most 
 fertile in results, as Analytical Mathematics and the In- 
 ductive Sciences, afford the least training to the intellect, 
 to the reasoning powers especially; while those more 
 barren of fruit, as Geometry and Logic, give the best 
 intellectual exercise. Metaphysics or Psychology is pro- 
 bably the best training of all, for it requires the subtlety 
 of logic, combined with a greater compass of thought. 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS. 
 
 1. That animals possess Instinct is universally allowed ; 
 that they are endowed with Keason is generally denied. 
 In order to answer the question whether animals possess 
 Keason, we must first agree as to the meaning of the 
 term Beason, and afterwards we may determine whether 
 the lower animals be endowed with it or not. 
 
 2. In chapter first, Par. 7 of this Part II., we arrived 
 at the conclusion that " Comprehension of Relation, and 
 Intuition as to the agreement or disagreement, whether 
 of Notion with Notion, of Thing with Thing, or of 
 Relation with Relation/' was the whole of Reason ; that 
 Comprehension alone might be called Reason in embryo; 
 and when united to Intuition, the perfect plant. 
 
 3. That animals soon come to know the common con- 
 sequences of things around them, that they avoid fire and 
 other dangers, there is no doubt ; and, therefore, they 
 must draw inferences from experience, general inferences 
 for their conduct in particular cases. All this, however, 
 as we have seen in the instance of man, they can do 
 merely by Instinct, the instinctive tendency to associate 
 phenomena once conjoined, a tendency afterwards con- 
 firmed by Custom. So, the various accomplishments and 
 tricks acquired by dogs and other animals, particularly 
 
OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS. 135 
 
 pointer and shepherd dogs, may be traced to custom 
 alone. In all this there is no place, no occasion for 
 Reason. 
 
 4. The essence of Reason is Intuition, or the power of 
 distinguishing one thing from another. But Reason is 
 not required for every distinction, for distinguishing, for 
 instance, between our Perceptions, for even the mad and 
 the fatuous have that power. The madman runs into 
 danger on purpose to destroy himself, not because he is 
 ignorant of the danger, and the feeblest intellect will not 
 confound a man with a horse. So, no Reason is required 
 in animals to enable them to distinguish one object of 
 perception from another. 
 
 5. Animals, undoubtedly, have Memory, but Memory 
 is independent of Reason, and they may have Imagina- 
 tion, as in their dreams, but this alone is not a function 
 of Reason. It is an intellectual, but not a rational 
 faculty. Animals must also generalize to a certain ex- 
 tent, or they could learn nothing from experience ; but 
 this degree of generalization, confined to objects of per- 
 ception, requires no effort of mind, no exercise of reason. 
 It is, like Perception itself, unavoidable. If, then, all 
 these powers, undoubtedy possessed by animals, may exist 
 without Reason, and are sufficient for them, why confer 
 upon them this noble faculty ? 
 
 6. Can it be shewn that animals are capable of com- 
 prehending any proposition the least abstract? Can 
 they even conceive any abstract idea, any abstract idea 
 of number, for instance? General ideas of Objects of 
 Perception sufficient to distinguish a man from a horse, 
 a dog from a cat, w r e allow that they possess; but of 
 
136 REASON. 
 
 abstract ideas they seem to have none ; much less can 
 they comprehend the relations of those ideas, or any pro- 
 position formed concerning them. They can certainly 
 comprehend that one object of present perception is 
 larger than another, so that one fence, for instance, can 
 be leapt with ease, another not, that a smaller animal 
 may be attacked with impunity, another with risk ; but 
 their comprehension seems limited to what is imme- 
 diately in presence, and extends not to the distant or the 
 abstract. And if the power of comprehension, which we 
 have called Reason in embryo , be in them so low, how 
 can we look for Keason in its higher development ? 
 
 7. At the same time, the above examples suffice to shew 
 & faint glimmering of Reason, enough for the condition 
 of animals ; for the horse, when he takes one fence and 
 declines another beyond his power, evinces a slight de- 
 gree of judgment, as also the dog when he pounces upon 
 a rat but avoids a badger. This, then, seems • to be the 
 most which we can accord to animals, Comprehension of 
 the difference between one object of Perception and an- 
 other, and a judgment founded thereon which regulates 
 their conduct. Should we see a small dog attack a large 
 one, we would naturally say, What a fool he is, shewing 
 that we believe the species to be capable of some reason ; 
 for where there is no reason there can be no folly. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 H. & J. Pillars, Printers, Edinburgh. 
 
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