I THE EEAL CHICKAIATJ&A. J^EPRINT OF ARTICLES BY W. S. FURAY, WAR CORRE- SPONDENT CINCINNATI GAZETTE, AND COL. G. C. KNIFFIN, CHIEF COMMISSARY TWENTY. FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. (W. S. FuRAY in Columbus State Journal, September, 1888) ORIGINAL WAR SKETCHES. THE REAL CHIOKAMAUGA. We are rapidly approaching the anniversary of one of the Tuost imj'ortant battles of the war ; many of its survivors are •still in tie city ; and before some of them reach their homes tiiat anniversary will have rolled around. On September 19 and 20, 1863, was fought the awful bat- tle of Chickaniauga, in many respects the weirdest, wildest, fiercest conflict of all tbose that took place between the Na- tional and the Confederate armies. It was in the West as decisive in its way as Gettysburg in the East. If the latter put an end forever to the Confederate dream of Northern in- vasion, conquest, and plunder, the former extinguished the last rebel hope of overthrowing and destroying the Union -army which in the central West was being driven into the very heart of the Confederacy, and which threatened it as vitally as poised spear held in stalwart liand ever threatened the life of an individual. Nashville, Vicksburg, New Orleans, Charleston, Knoxville, Williamsburg, were but outposts of the Confederate power. The successive fall of each marked an encouraging progress of the national arms but affected only incidentally and minutely the general result. The possession of neither of them either touched or /fa £-f75 SI menaced a vital point. Even Richraond was but an outpost until the success of the Union armies in the center of the Confederacy left the legions of Lee once expelled from Rich- mond literally nowhere else to go. The campaign of Chicka- mauga was directed against a city which was the very key to the interior of the Confederacy, the crossing point of its greatest lines of railroad from all directions, the citidal of Georgia and the whole interior South. So long as Chat- tanooga remained in Confederate hands the enemy's power was practically unbroken, the great slave empire untouched. General Loring, one of the most sagacious of all the offi- cers that wore the gray, said to the writer of this article, near the close of the war and before he had heard of the sur- render at Appomattox: "Our cause is probably lost, but your temporary victories up to the latter part of 1863 had little to do with it. Not a man in the Southern Confederacy felt that you had really accomplished anything until Chat- tanooga fell." " You do not mean to say, general, that Vicksburg and Gettysburg Avere nothing." " The loss of Vicksburg," he replied, " weakened our prestige, contracted our territory, and practically expelled us from the Mississippi River, but it left the body of our power unharmed. As to Gettysburg, that was an experiment ; if we had won that battle the government at Washington would, perhaps, have tendered peace with a recognition of the Confederacy. Our loss of it, except that we could less easily spare the slaughter of veteran soldiers than you could, left us just where we were." " But in the latter part of 1863 some of your people lost hope?" I asked. " Not exactly that," said he, " but they experienced then for the first time a diminution of confidence as to the final result." "And may T ask what it was that occurred then which occasioned this change of feeling?" "It was the fall of Chattanooga," he replied, "in conse- quence of the Chickamauga campaign, and the subsequent total defeat of General Bragg's efforts to recover it." " Why did you regard Chattanooga as of such impor- tance ?" I asked. "As long as we held it," he replied, "it was the closed doorway to the interior of our country. When it came into- your hands the door stood open, and however rough your progress in the interior might be, it still left you free ta march inside. I tell you," continued he, with a vehemence which, in so modest and quiet a gentleman, greatly im- pressed me, " that when your Dutch General Rosecrans commenced his forward movement tor the capture of Chat- tanooga we laughed him to scorn ; we believed that the black brow of Lookout Mountain would irown him out of existence ; that he would dash himself to pieces against the many and vast natural barriers that rise all around Chat- tanooga ; and that then the Northern people and the gov- ernment at Washington would perceive how hopeless were their efforts when they came to attack the real South." " But the capture of Chattanooga convinced you that even the real South was vulnerable, did it? " "Yes," said he, '*it was then only a question as to whether we could beat back your armies by sheer force of desperate fighting, and as you largely outnumbered us and our resources were every day diminishing, the prospects to the thinking part of our people looked gloomy indeed." " But, general," I said, "there are people in the North who regard the Chickamauga campaign as a failure for the Union arms." " Ah ! " he replied, "we would gladly have exchanged a dczen of our previous victories for that one failure." This conversation took place in the month of April, 1865, on board a steamer bound to New Orleans, the day after the battle of Blakely, in which G-eneral Loring commanded the Confederate forces, and he and his entire force that survived the battle, rank and file, were made prisoners by the Union Army under General Can by. I had approached the distin- guished prisoner, who, by the way, with a comparatively mere handful of men, had bravely held the approaches to Mobile against us for a good many days, had introduced my- self as war correspondent of one ol the leading journals of the North, and had asked him to give me tlie exact relative posi- tion of the different bodies of troops under his command in the battle of the previous day. This he very courteously did, and authorized me to make use ot the information in the account of the battle which 1 was preparing while hastening northward to the home office. Then I gave him the latest information I possessed as to the progress being made by Grant in Virginia and of the ad- vance of Sherman through the Carolinas toward Richmond. It was upon this that he made the first remark in the conver- sation 1 have just detailed, and in which I mentally noted every word he said with an absorbing interest which the reader will readily understand. Half an hour afterward I was seated flat on my haunches on the deck of the steamer, writing for dear life, when Gen- eral Loring approached and accosted me. "What are you writing now?" he inquired. He had been so courteous under adverse circumstances to me, that I felt I could not be otherwise than entirely frank with hira. "I am writing out your remarks concerning the eflfect of the Chickamauga campaign," said I, "every word of which 1 well remember." "It struck me," said he, "that you might be doing that. But I think you will see that the publication of those remarks while the war continues might be seriously misunderstood by my compatriots in arms, and might subject me to heavy cens- ure. I did not intend them for publication, and regarded tliem as part of a private conversation we were having after the public portion was closed. I cannot take back the re- marks now, and I have no power to prevent you from print- ing them. I can only ask you as a gentleman to withhold them from publication until the war is over." It was a hard request to comply with. If the struggle were to go on, General Loring's views would make a sensa- tion, and be a great encouragement to the loyal people of the land. I felt that in printing them I should make a big hit both as a journalist and a patriot. But with that courteous, sad-eyed, mild-mannered, and unfortunate gentleman stand- ing over me, helpless as a prisoner of war who had given me his confidence, there was only one thing to do. " Your wishes shall be respected, general," said I. "I .sliall finish my notes while our talk is fresh in my mind; but they will never see the light until I feel sure that their pub- lication will discredit you with no one." " Thank you," said he; " however the war may end, print what I said if you choose, and if you think it worth printing any time after the conflict is closed." More than twenty-three years the notes of that conversa- tion have remained in my hands, and the}'^ see the light for the first time to-day. 1 should probably never have given them to the press if the whole American people had done immediate justice to the noble Army of the Cumberland, which took and held Chattanooga at the awful cost of Chick- amauga, and had given to the great soldier who led our army in that struggle the credit which his ability, his genius, his patriotism, his heroism, and his success demand. But strange, sad, and terrible as it may seem, a portion of our people — I trust tlie nninber is small indeed — have persist- ently misunderstood the vast achievement which Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland accomplished during the Chickamauga campaign. Envy, jealousy, and malice threw a clnid over the achievement in the first place, took from Rosecrans the palm which justly belonged to him, and sent an order relieving him of command — an order that reached him while in that very citadel of Chattanooga, that vital point of the Southern Confederacy which his genius and the valor of his soldiers had wrested from the enemy's hands. It was the same malice, jealousy, and envy which afterward cast their evil eyes upon the great Thomas, and tried to re- lieve him also while he was literally annihilating the last Confederate army in the West. And so it has happened that a small portion of the American people have ever since labored under the cruelly false conception that in some way the campaign of Chickamauga was a failure, and that Rose- crans, who never lost a battle during his entire career, Aad in some way fallen short of the requirements of able general- ship. It is with the hope of contributing my mite toward remov- ing this false impression that I have concluded to give this long-past conversation with General Loring to the public. It shows, as perhaps nothing else could so conclusively show, the impression made upon the Confederate mind by the bat- tle of Chickamauga and the fall of Chattanooga. It shows that they knew what and who hurt them, even if we didn't know. I am all the more anxious to add my humble effort to those of others in doing full justice to " Old Rosey" and his gallant army, because I myself, writing' more than twenty - five years ago an account of the battle of Chickamauga from notes that were taken amidst the very flame and thunder of that awful field, exaggerated somewhat the losses of the Union forces, and failed to give full credit to the all-know- ing soldier who was able to look at all the aspects of the field, and after partial misfortune to build up a barrier which the enemy next day did not dare assail. I wrote even then with what seems to me a boundless appreciation of the valor of our army, but I failed duly to appreciate the fact that the prize for which the battle was fought, the city of Chatta- nooga, remained in our hands, making the whole campaign a wondrous triumph of genius, patience, strategy, energy, and skill, and the battle itself a victory decisive as that which compelled Lee to abandon Richmond. 6 OJd soldiers of the Array of the Cumberland ! Let no one go unrebuked who denies your vast success in the campaign of Chickamauga. It was there that your valor and the gen- eralship of your great commander loosened the foundations of the rebel confederacy and opened the door of the structure; and although awful work still remained in pulling that struct- ure down, its fate, in the opinion of the most thoughtful Confederates themselves, was definitely sealed when Chicka- mauga gave you Chattanooga, and when, on the afternoon of September 21, General Bragg, advancing cautiously to view your new lines at Rossville, did not dare assail them. W. S. FURAY. [Cincinnati C )mmercial Gazette, Sept. 8, 1888.] ON THE TENNESSEE. ADDITIONAL FACTS ABOUT ROSECRANS STRATEGIC MOVEMENTS IN TENNESSEE — WHY BURNSIDB FAILED TO EXECUTE HIS ORDERS TO JOIN "ROSEY" — PRESIDENT LINCOLN APPRECIATES THE SITUA- TION — HIS ORDER TO BURNSIDE A MASTERLY, IMPARTIAL REVIEW OF THE TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. Washington, August 2, 1888. To the Editor of the Commercial Gazette : 1 have just finished reading General Boynton's vivid de- scription of General Rosecrans's unparalleled strategic move- ment upon Chattanooga and its attendant battle of Chicka- manga, and am more than impressed with a sense ot" the injustice inflicted upon him by tlie War Department. Although the subject has been treated with such thorough- ness as to leave nothing to add as regards the operations of the Army of the Cumberland, the failure of the Army of the Ohio to re-enforce General Rosecrans is a theme which may interest the student of the joint campaigns made by those armies. I leave to the Army of the Tennessee, the survivors of which have usually proved themselves equal to any emer- gency, to explain the inactivity of that army at a time when the appearance of even one corps at Rome, Ga., would have held back re-enforcements to Bragg's army from the South. General Boynton says : " There had been time enough, after General Rosecrans's explanation of his proposed })lan, to force Burnside with twenty thousand men down from East Tennessee, and to have brought all needed strength for the other flank from the Army of the Tennessee on the Missis- sippi." Leaving to others to rise and explain why one hundred tliousand men were permitted to be idle on the banks of the Mississippi while the Army of the Cumberland was engaged in a death grapple on Chickaraauga Creek, not only with its old antagonist, but with Confederate troops withdrawn from the front of both Meade and Grant, I shall ask the atten- tion of your readers while 1 quote from the record the dis- patches that passed to and fro between the commander of the U. S. Army and his subordinates in command of the Army of the Ohio. Weighed in the balance of common justice, at this distance^ from the scene of conflict, with all the strife, jealousy, and political enmity thrown out of the scales, it seems incredible that the commander of the array who won not only the ob- jective point of his own campaign, but of the fruitless cam- paigns of his predecessor, was dishonored by his Government, .while the commander of the other army in the joint cam- paign, who, by persistent disobedience of orders, placed in jeopardy the success of the expedition, was loaded with hon- ors by the same Government. The East Tennessee camgaign of August and September,. 1863, under the light of the record, embraces not only the movements of General Rosecraus, but to an equal extent those of General Burnside. The Army of the Ohio on duty in Kentucky consisted of the Ninth Corps, commanded by Major-General J. D. Park, and the Twenty-third Corps, un- der command of Major-General George L. Hartsuif. The first of these corps numbered, on August 30, " present for duty, equipped, 5,965 ; artillery. 208 ; total, 6,173. The Twenty-third Corps, composed of three divisions, numbered, infantry, 14,279; cavalry, 6,073; artillery, 1,468; total, 21,814. The first division of this corps, under command of General Boyle, 6,357 men of all arms, was required for duty in guarding various military posts in Kentucky, leaving the- remainder, 15,457, for offensive operations. The total effect- ive strength of both corps was 21,630. The advance into* East Tennessee commenced August 20. General Hascall's division moved from Crab Orchard, crossing the Cumberland at Smith's Ford ; General White's division crossed at James- town, the cavalry and mounted infantry, Generals Carter and Shackelford and Colonels Foster and Wolford, moving in advance of each column. The two columns were ordered to concentrate after cross- ing the Cumberland Mountains near Huntsville, and move upon Montgomery, in East Tennessee. From there the move- ments, as Burnside telegraphed Halleck, would be " accord- ing to circumstances, but probably upon Kingston and Lou- don, as these seem to be the places to which General Rosecrans desires us to go, in order to co-operate fully ivith him. At all events, our final destination will be Knoxville. We have had very serious difficulty to contend with in bad roads and short forage ; in fact, the country is about destitute. V/e shall have still greater difficulties in that way to overcome, but if Rosecrans occupies the enemy fully and no troops are al- lowed to come down the road from Richmond from the East- 9 ern army, I think we will be successful." The army arrived at Montgomery on the 1st of September, having encountered no opposition. There was nothing there to oppose it. Gen- eral Carter's cavalry division moved thence in three columns, one under General Shackelford on Loudon Bridge, one under Colonel Byrd on Kingston, and one under Colonel Foster on Knoxville. Major-General Buckner, in command of the Department of East Tennessee, had, in obedience to orders from the Confed- erate War Department, gathered up all his available force, with the exception of two thousand men under command of Brigadier General John B. Frazer, who was left in defense of Cumberland Gap, and a few isolated detachments at Knoxville and other places under command of Brigadier General Jackson, and formed a junction Avith Bragg's army at Chattanooga. Previous to leaving Knoxville, General Buckner wrote Major General Sam Jones, in command of the Department of West Virginia, requesting him to look after his department during his absence. Jones's head- quarters were at Dublin, Va. He had his hands full taking care of Generals Averill and Scammon, who had on several occasions pushed their commands across the mountains from the north and the Kanawha Valley, and he was unable with troops at his command to do much besides look after his own department. In compliance with Buckner's request, how- ever, he came down the road as far as Abingdon, when, on the 6th of September, he wrote General Frazer directing him to hold Cumberland Gap as long as possible, as re-enforce- ments were then on the way from the East. The long line extending from Staunton, Va., to the Salt-works, over two hundred miles, comprised in the Department of Western Virginia, rendered it out of the power of General Jones to re-enforce him with his own troops. In compliance with his request. General Lee returned to him one of his own brigades, commanded by Brigadier Gen- eral Wharton, which had been for several months on duty in the Army of Northern Virginia, and later another under command of Brigadier General Corse. General Jones's mes- senger reached General Frazer too late to prevent his sur- render, and two thousand men were thus subtracted from the little force left to oppose the occupation of East Tennessee by the troops under General Burnside. The following extract from the returns of the army of Western Virginia and East Tennessee will show the troops actually on duty in East Tennessee from the 16th of Septem- ber, at which date the brigade last mentioned arrived: 10 INFANTRY BRIGADES. Brigadier General Corse (sent by General Lee) — Fifteenth, Twenty-ninth, and Thirtieth Virginia. Brigadier General Jackson (Buckner's corps) — Thomas's legion, Walker's battalion. Brigadier General Wharton (at Salt-works) — Fifty-first Virginia, Thirtieth Virginia battalion, Forty-fifth Virginia. CAVALRY BRIGADES. Brigadier General W. E. Jones (made up from fragment- ary commands) — Twenty-first Virginia Cavalry, Twenty- seventh, Thirty- fourth. Thirty-sixth, and Thirty-seventh Virginia Cavalry Battalions. Brigadier General John S. Williams (one-half of them mounted) — Sixth-fourth Virginia Detached Cavalry, First Tennessee Cavalry, Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, May's Ken- tucky Cavalry Battalion, Tenth Kentucky Cavalry Batta- lion, Sixteenth Georgia Cavalry Battalion. ARTILLERY. J. Floyd King — Otey's Battery, Lowry's Battery, Ring- gold's Battery, Davidson's Battery. The efiective total of the above command was, up to the ICth of September, about 4,000. Corse's brigade increased it to 5,180, and Wharton's brigade, 1,852 strong, was sta- tioned at the Salt-works. The force with which General Burnside confronted that of General Jones, above mentioned, was as follows. Present for duty (equipped) — TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS, Infantry 6,559 Mounted Infantry .3,123 Cavalry 3,436 Artillery 1,341 14,459 * NINTH ARMY CORPS. Infantrv 6,222 Artillery Ill Total 20,792 The cavalry expeditions from Montgomery were all suc- cessful. Kingston and Knoxville were taken without op- position, but at Loudon Bridge Buckner's rear guard was strongly posted. Alter a brisk skirmish they were driven back by Shackelford's command. The railroad bridge over 11 the Holston, a fine structure, had been saturated with tur- pentine, and the guard no sooner retreated across it than it was committed to the flames. Colonel Byrd captured at Kingston a steamboat in process of construction, and com- municated with Colonel's Minty's pickets of General Rose- <;rans's army. Leaving Byrd's brigade at Loudon, and White's division at Athens, General Burnside pushed the remainder of the Twenty-third Corps on to Knoxville. Buckner had left Knoxville, the day before Colonel Foster's arrival, leaving behind him a small force to guard a considerable quantity of quartermaster's stores, the Government work-shops and a large quantity of salt, whicli fell into Foster's hands. Gen- eral Burnside reached the city on the 3d. Major Genfral Sam Jones, in command of the department of West Virginia, was directed by the Confederate War De- partment to extend a protectorate over the district of East Tennessee. Arriving upon the scene of operations too late to prevent the surrender of Frazer at Cumberland Gap, he turned his attention to the formation of a command which should pre- vent the advance of Burnside' s troops eastward, while by a show of force he should be able to hold his antagonist from participation in the straggle then impending near Chat- tanooga. The value of the salt-works at Saltville, fourteen miles east of Abingdon, was inestimable to the Southern army. Their destruction would inflict an irreparable loss upon the Confederacy. Although the capture and destruction of those works seemed never to have entered the calculations of Gen- eral Burnside or the War Department, the head of General Burnside's column had no sooner turned in that direction from Cumberland Gap than General Jones at once conject- ured the objective point to be the precious salt-works, which it had been his especial duty to guard. On the 14th the Union troops were reported to be moving from Cumberland Gap on the Salt-works. General Whar- ton was placed in command of the defenses and Otey's bat- tery ordered to report to him. Majors Chenoweth and Prentice were ordered to send out scouts and ascertain the truth of the report. Colonel J. E. Carter, in command of the First Tennessee Cavalry Brigade, was directed to move via Reedy Creek and Moccasin Gap, and " if the enemy moves toward Saltville, get in his rear and harass him." It will be observed that the mind of General Jones had become impressed with two ideas, both of which were erroneous. 12 One, that General Burnside had hut a portion of his force in East Tennessee, having sent the greater portion of his troops to co-operate with Rosecrans below Chattanooga ; the other, that General Burnside had designs upon the Salt-works. Both ideas were precisely those which would naturally occur to the mind of an intelligent antagonist, conversant with the importance of both movements, and that he was wrong in his surmises reflects less credit upon his antagonist than upon himself. General Lee, whose mind embraced in its comprehensive grasp the operations of the Confederate army throughout the whole arena of war, and having little occupation along his front, had already responded to the call of General Bragg for re-enforcements by detaching one of his strongest corps, under Longstreet, for service at Chattanooga, and now finding the salt-works upon which his army depended threatened, he had promptly supplied to General Jones an additional brigade under command of Brigadier-General Corse. Wharton's brigade was encamped at Glade Springs, within supporting distance of the artillery in defense of the salt-works. Corse was brought to the front and preparations made to defend the line of road leading into the valley of the Upper Tennessee, and if possible prevent Burnside from advancing upon the salt-works and also from detaching any considerable portion of his force to re-eniorce Rosecrans. In response to a telegram from President Davis, asking the strength and position of his forces, General Jones replied as follows : "JoNESBORO, September 15, 1863. ^ ^ His Excellency Jefferson Davis , Richmond, Va. : "^Your telegram of yesterday received last night. I shall withdraw the troops from this to the Watauga and Holston to await the re-enforcements and be in better position to meet an advance on Saltville. No reliable information of the movements of the enemy from Cumberland Gap. Pickets skirmishing in front everyday; our pickets behaving well. "Sam Jones, Major-General." General Jones says in his report: "Under all the circumstances of the case I thought the best service I could render with the small force under my command would be to check and detain the superior force in my front until the battle which I supposed was impending near Chattanooga should be decided." The following telegrams were sent by Rosecrans to Hal- leck : 13 "Trenton, Ga,, September 7 — Midnight, " Tour dispatch yesterday received with surprise. Yoii have been often and fully advised that the nature of the coun- try makes it impossible for this array to prevent Johnston from combining with Bragg. When orders for an advance of this army were made it must have been known that those two rebel forces would combine against it, and to some ex- tent choose their place for fighting us. This has doubtless- been done, and Buckner, Johnston, and Bragg are all near Chattanooga. The movement on East Tennessee was inde- pendent of mine. Your apprehensions are just and the legit- imate consequences of your orders. The best that can now be done is for Burnside to close his cavalry down on our left^ supporting it with his infantry." " Chattanooga, 12.15 P. M., September 12. " I think it would be very unwise for General Burnside, in present attitude of affairs, to make any move in the direction of North Carolina. It would leave my left flank entirely un- protected all the way into Kentucky. All forces should be- concentrated in this direction. I trust I am sufficient for the enemy now in my front, but should he fall back to the line of the Coosa the roads from there are short and compara- tively good to the Tennessee, while it is necessary for me to- cross two ranges of mountains over very narrow, rough, and difiicult roads to reach Tennessee, and thence move from thirty to fifty miles to reach the flankof a column moving from Gun- ter's Landing, or Whitesburg, on Nashville. It is desirable to have the avenue shut up. Can not you send a force from the army to do it? '' On the 9th of September Burnside telegraphed Halleck from Knoxville : " My forces in East Tennessee are now distributed as fol- lows : A division of infantry at Loudon, with a mounted brigade in the direction of Athens." * * * And on the 17th: " In my last dispatch I told you of a force I have at Lou- don and Athens, the advance connecting with Rosecrans. It will be left as it was there, and the remainder of our force concentrated at Greenville." The General of the Army appears to have been equally un- successful in procuring re-enforcements from the Army of the Tennessee, which had been for two months resting upon the laurels of Vicksburg, while their paroled prisoners were flocking to the standard of Bragg. 14 He received the following dispatch from Rosecrans, dated Chattanooga, September 12, 1863: " Hurl but dispatches that the- country south of Corinth is full of irregular cavalry. He is induced to believe that a general movement of all the available force of the enemy is bein i made on this army. Hurlbut ought to cover that flank. It is reported from several sources that even Loring's divis- ion has been moved up and is at Atlanta. " Burnside ought to send his infantry down in this direc- tion. The enemy has concentrated at Lafayette, and has at- tacked one of Thomas's columns in the Chickamauga valley, wext of Dug Gap, compelling it to fall back to Stevens's Oap." And on the 13th he telegraphed: ■"7b Generals Grant or Sherman, Vick'^burg : "It is quite possible that Bragg and Johnston will move through Alabama and Tennessee to turn Rosecrans's right and cut off communication. All of G-rant's available forces should be sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth and Tuscum- bia, to co-operate with Rosecrans should the rebels attempt that movement." The same dispatch was sent to Hurlbut, at Memphis, and again September 14: " There are good reasons why troops should be sent to 'assist Rosecrans's right with all possible dispatch. Commu- nicate with Sherman to assist you and hurry forward re- en fbrceraents as previously directed." On the 9th of September General Burnside reported the capture of Cumberland Gap and two thousand prisoners and the occupation of East Tennessee from Jonesboro on the northeast to Athens in the southwest. To this report Gen- eral Halleck lesponded on the 11th, congratulating him upon his success, directing him to hold the gaps in the North Car- olina mountains, and to connect with General Rosecrans, at least with his cavalry, notifying hira that the latter would occupy Dalton or some point on the railroad, to close all ac- cess from Atlanta. On the 13th Halleck telegraphed Burn- side as follows : " It is important that all the available forces of your com- mand be pushed forward into East Tennessee. All your scat- tered forces should be concentrated there. So long as we hold Tennessee, Kentucky is perfectly safe. 3Iove down your infantry as rapidly as possible towards Chattanooga to connect ivith Rosecrans. Bragg may merely hold the passes in the mountains to cover Atlanta, and move his main array through 15 "Northern Alabama to reach the Tennessee River and turn Rosecrans's right, cutting off his supplies. In that case he will turn Chattanooga over to you and move to intercept Bragg." Here is a positive order, as explicit as any given to Rose- crans, for Burnside to move his infantry down t6ward Chat- tanooga to connect with Rosecrans. The same order liad been given on the 5th of August and had formed a part of the plan of expedition. It was reiterated on the 5th of September_, when he was directed to keep Rosecrans informed of his movements and arrange with him for co-operation. On September 11, when he was notified of Rosecrans's posi- tion and need of re-enfbrcements, and again on the 13th, as seen in the above dispatch, he had in Tennessee a division of cavalry and mounted infantry whose efiective strength, as shown by the field returns of September 20, was : '' Present for duty, equipped, 6,700, with thirty-four pieces of artillery." His infantry and artillery under Hartsuff numbered : "Pres- ent for duty, equipped, 6,586, with thirty-two pieces of artillery." One has but to imagine the grand results of the Chattanooga campaign if these orders had been obeyed. Burnside entered Knoxville with an army often thousand men on the 6th of September, leaving a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry and mounted infantry at Loudon and Athens. He found supplies abundant, besides which he had crossed the mountains with two thousand beef cattle. His advance, under Foster, captured at Knoxville five loco- motives, over twenty cars, and a large quantity of provis- ions. After capturing the force and subsistence stores at Cumberland Gap and opening the route to and from Ken- tucky, and arming the East Tennesseeans with five thousand stand of arms brought with him for that purpose, he had ample time and opportunity in which to have dispatched at least ten thousand troops to report for duty to General Rose- crans, On the 18th he acknowledged the receipt of Halleck's dispatch of the 13th, above quoted, and also of one dated on the. 14th, which read as follows : " There are reasons why you should re-enforce General Rosecrans with all possible dis- patcli. It is believed the enemy will concentrate to give him battle. You must be there to help him." To this ur- gent appeal he replied on the 18th from Knoxville : "Orders to go below will be obeyed as soon as possible. I go to Greenville to-night (in the opposite direction). Dispositions for attacking the enemy at Jonesboro' made. I will lose no time in doing as you order. No direct telegraphic communi- cation as yet. Hope to get it to-morrow." The next .day, while Rosecrans, after the brilliant flank movement which compelled the evacuation of Chattanooga, 16 found his army on the eve of a terrible battle, Burnside tele- graphed from Greenville: "Will obey your directions \n reference to Rosecrans. Our troops occupy Jonesboro'. Ene- my retiring to Abingdon. Our cavalry in pursuit. Am now sending every man that can be spared to aid Rosecrans. I shall go on to Joneshoro\ As soon as I learn the result of our movements to the east will go down by railroad and direct the movements of re-enforcements for Rosecrans. I have di- rected every available man in Kentucky to be sent here." On the 20th he received a dispatch irom Halleck stating that General Meade did not believe that any of E well's troops had gone west, as Burnside had feared ; that Long- street, Johnston, and Bragg had concentrated against Rose- crans, who was on the Chickaraauga River^ twenty miles south of Chattanooga, closing thus : "He is expecting a bat- tle and wants you to sustain his left. Every possible effort must be made to assist him." To this Burnside replied from Knoxville on the 20th: "You may be sure I will do all I can for Rosecrans. Arrived here last night and am hurrying troops in his direction. I go up the road to-night for a day."^ The following dispatch received by Rosecrans on the bat- tlefield on the 19th, and that which follows on the 20th, shows that Halleck fully expected a junction of the two ar- mies : "I have no direct communication with Burnside or Hurlbut. On the 15th Hurlbut says he is movinsf towant Decatur. I hear nothing of Sherman's troops ordered from Vicksburg. A telegram from Burnside on the 17th, just re- ceived, says my orders to move down to re-enforce you will be obeyed as soon as possible. * * * Burnside's cavalry ought to be near you by this time." That on the 20th is as follows: "General Burnside's instructions before he lel't Kentucky were to connect with your left. These instructions have been repeated five or six times, and he has answered that he was moving with that object. I think his advance cannot be far from you." On the 21st: "Nothing heard from Burnside since the 19th. He was then sending to your aid all his available force. It is hoped that you will hold out until he reaches you. He was directed to connect witl» you ten days ago. lean get no reply from Hurlbut or Sherman . " So the correspondence went on from day to day, and not a man was sent to Rosecrans. The battle of Chickamaug.u was fought on the 19th and 20th. The noble Army of the Cumberland, struggling against terrible odds, held its posi- tion even after the fatal blunder, as shown by General Boyn- ton, which opened its lines and admitted Longstreet's vic- torious legions upon its flanks. Obedience to the positive order of General Halleck would have brought^the infantry of the Twenty-third Corps upon the field in ample time to 17 retrieve the disaster, if not to have prevented it. The force that required only a small portion of Burnside's troops to