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 COEKRIGHT DEPOSIT. 
 
THE CAUSES OF WAR 
 
 INCLUDING AN OUTLINE AND 
 STUDY OF THE WORLD WAR AND 
 OFFICIAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 BY 
 ROBERT EARL SWINDLER 
 
 Author of "Methods and Suggestive Outlines in History." 
 
 Head of the Department of History, Humboldt State Normal School, 
 
 Areata, California 
 
 BOSTON 
 RICHARD G. BADGER 
 
 THE GORHAM PRESS 
 
Copyright, 1920, by Richard G. Badger 
 
 All Rights Reserved 
 
 •SS75 
 
 JAN 17 1920 
 
 Made in the United States of America 
 
 The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A. 
 
 ©CU 561 499 
 
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 ri 
 
 TO 
 LIEUTENANT ORAN L. RABER 
 
 MY ONE-TIME CLASSMATE IN COLLEGE 
 
 AND EVER A SYMPATHETIC 
 
 FRIEND 
 
PREFACE 
 
 WE believe we are justified in starting out in this volume 
 upon the fundamental and scientific basis that, if 
 we are to cure a malady, we must understand its cause, — 
 we must properly diagnose the case; that in order to find 
 a remedy for war and build securely on the foundation for 
 a lasting peace, we must understand the underlying causes 
 of conflict. Accordingly, the first part of this work is the 
 outgrowth of the author's interest in, and study of, the 
 causes of war, — with particular reference to the wars of 
 the past half-century. This study naturally and fittingly 
 led to a more intensive study of the European background 
 of the World War, its remote and fundamental as well as 
 its immediate causes. 
 
 There was also recognized the need, well nigh universal 
 up to the very present, of a brief suggestive course in book 
 form, for the study of the Great War, — its background, 
 progress and issues, and the peace outlook, which would be 
 suitable for the busy student and the busy citizen, who are 
 simply bewildered in the great mass of unorganized material 
 that confronts them, — and that this should be adapted to 
 the schoolroom as well as the home. Hence the second and 
 third parts of this work. 
 
 For the most part, in following out the two-fold plan 
 just mentioned, the author presented his material in his 
 original articles for the schools and the public, year by 
 year and month by month, as the Great War progressed. 
 Necessarily therefore, the chronology and subject-matter 
 as continued in the present treatise are largely as they were 
 written then. This accounts for present-tense verbs and 
 descriptions occurring in a number of places where, if writ- 
 
 5 
 
6 Preface 
 
 ten from the present field of view, they would occur in the 
 past tense, etc. But these matters do not materially alter 
 the nature or the accuracy of the book. On the contrary, 
 they show points of view and problems of the recent past 
 that it is well to keep in mind, in our attempt to understand 
 and interpret the present world status, and to follow the 
 tremendous work before the peace conference, in the adjust- 
 ment of the pending momentous and multitudinous issues of 
 reconstruction. 
 
 As mentioned a number of times in the body of this work, 
 the treatment of our subject herein presented is not in- 
 tended to be exhaustive. Already too much of such ma- 
 terial is presented to the ordinary reader. There is a very 
 great amount of information, covering all phases of this 
 war: its causes, the peace movements and propaganda dur- 
 ing the war; diplomatic relations of the various govern- 
 ments ; international movements of various sorts and inter- 
 national law, with its violations ; official "books" of the war- 
 ring and other nations ; the tools, implements, inventions, 
 provisions, regulations, etc., of war; the issues of the war; 
 forms, theories, ideals and practices of the different govern- 
 ments and peoples involved in the war ; finances and financial 
 problems; possibilities in peace terms and arrangements, 
 including the much discussed League of Nations and the 
 Bolshevist movement and danger, — and so on. But in all 
 this there is for the general reader absolutely no systematic 
 organization or uniformity of plan for study or teaching. 
 The author's plan, therefore, is to present as adequately as 
 may be, in a very brief treatment like this, the essential 
 points, so that they may be better grasped and understood 
 by the average reader, and to suggest a wider reading and 
 study for those who may have a little more time. 
 
 R. Earl Swindler. 
 Areata, California 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I .Introduction — Our Schools and a New Patriotism . . . 11 
 
 II General Statement 17 
 
 III Classification and Comment 23 
 
 IV Fundamental Causes 81 
 
 V Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions ... 40 
 
 VI The Immediate Background of the War in Europe . 51 
 
 VII Causes of the Present War 58 
 
 VIII Causes of the Balkan Wars (1911-1913) 74 
 
 IX Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (1904) 81 
 
 X Causes of the British-Boer War 91 
 
 XI Causes of the Spanish-American War (1898) 105 
 
 XII Causes of the Franco-Prussian War (1870) 115 
 
 XIII The United States 121 
 
 XIV German Diplomacy and Strategy 128 
 
 XV Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 135 
 
 XVI Official Peace Discussion and Negotiations .... 160 
 
 XVII Peace Negotiations (continued) 168 
 
 XVIII Official Peace Negotiations (concluded) 176 
 
 XIX The League of Nations 186 
 
 XX The Constitution of the League of Nations .... 202 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 I President Wilson's Address at Paris 215 
 
 II President Wilson's Address at Boston 223 
 
 III President Wilson's Address at New York 233 
 
 IV Final Draft of the League Covenant 245 
 
 Bibliography 263 
 
 Index 265 
 
THE CAUSES OF WAR 
 
THE CAUSES OF WAR 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION OTJR SCHOOLS AND A NEW PATRIOTISM * 
 
 YOU will recall readily the famous poster for the Sec- 
 ond Liberty Loan, with the picture of the statue in 
 New York harbor, of "Liberty Enlightening the World." 
 The lady artist who designed this poster received a splendid 
 prize from the United States Government, and she deserved 
 it, for that poster went a long way in raising nearly $5,000,- 
 000,000, to help make the world "safe for democracy.'' The 
 appeal that "Liberty must enlighten the world" had its ef- 
 fect. But let me tell you, recent convulsions, as in Russia, 
 are teaching us that not only must liberty enlighten the 
 world, but intelligence must enlighten liberty, in order to 
 save the world. Our schools must save the democracy "for 
 which we fight. Our students, by making the most of their 
 education and their American ideals, are to help gain and 
 preserve the blessings of liberty to mankind. 
 
 Many of the nations which, up to the present, have been 
 taking leading places in the affairs and problems of the 
 world, can do so no more. The war is sapping their man- 
 hood and retarding their institutions that train for greatest 
 worth and usefulness to their fellowmen. Other nations, in 
 their new-found freedom, know not how to use it, because of 
 past oppressions and inexperience in self-government. Never 
 did the world need leaders as it does today ; never did it so 
 need men of vision and of high ideals, men of incorruptible 
 
 1 Written February, 1918. 
 
 11 
 
12 The Causes Of War 
 
 moral fiber and integrity, men of sacrifice and of unfaltering 
 determination in the arduous paths of service. The youth 
 of America should be made to realize that here at once is 
 their rich heritage and their unexampled opportunity. Not 
 with one speck of pride or of superiority should they look 
 upon this situation, but as a privilege to serve unequaled in 
 the history of man. Out of this vision and this great op- 
 portunity is to come a new patriotism that has no bounds 
 less than the planet itself. 
 
 We must become more familiar with our country's most 
 cherished ideals. We must see to it that our youth are in- 
 telligently imbued with those ideals. Only by so doing are 
 we to vitalize our teaching and our training for citizenship 
 in our schools. The principles of democracy are at stake 
 in the world today; and if the major portion of the stu- 
 dent's education in these trying times is not the gaining 
 and putting into practice of these principles of patriotism 
 and SERVICE, his education, costly as it is, is a failure. 
 To the extent that his science, his art and his philosophy of 
 history and of life fail to serve these ideals, just to that 
 extent our educational system is serving the same base end 
 as has Germany's in the past generation. Many of our 
 students and teachers do not need this warning; yet there 
 are many others that do, for to be asleep to the real needs 
 and vital test of democracy in this time, is to be playing 
 with our destiny as a free people. The supreme test of 
 mankind today is a test of ideals, of moral and spiritual 
 principles and standards of conduct; and everything ma- 
 terial on earth must serve one or the other of these two 
 opposing ideals. The one we hope America will be as ready 
 to stand for as her patriots have always professed for her ; 
 the other we know autocratic powers have always stood for, 
 and have made the lovers of freedom pay the price in suf- 
 fering and blood. The clearer these principles are held 
 before the younger generation, the safer are American de- 
 mocracy and world liberty to be. 
 
Introduction 13 
 
 The provincialism in many circles, and the still prevalent 
 ignorance of the present world conflict afford most con- 
 vincing evidence of the universal need of enlightenment. And 
 we know whence that training, to be effective, must come — 
 it must come through the education of the youth of our 
 land. We should never forget that it was from the enlight- 
 ened walls of schools throughout the nations that liberty 
 was born — both religious and political freedom — and this 
 fact answers the question why the schools of the nations 
 have furnished the first martyrs in every great struggle for 
 liberty. 
 
 It is truthfully said, that in a democracy, where the peo- 
 ple themselves rule, they should always know, before they 
 embark on any great project, why they are going into it. 
 Yet, even today, after the United States has witnessed this 
 titanic world struggle for four and one-half years, not one 
 boy in one hundred can give the essential causes of the war. 
 This is not the student's fault, but the fault of aimless and 
 indefinite teaching and training, for which we are all to 
 blame — even the government of the United States (for it 
 simply reflected the general disinterestedness of the masses 
 of the people) which should have kept us better informed of 
 the facts, from the beginning of the war. 
 
 What are these American ideals, for which we now stand 
 and stake our all? What is this liberty and democracy of 
 which we rather flippantly speak in this generation, the self- 
 ish side of which we have appropriated so well, but which, 
 nevertheless, is the message of our great republic to the 
 world? The answer has come over and over again in the 
 lives of our great American patriots, in their fervent 
 speeches and their earnest devotion and invaluable service 
 to their country. Their conduct is our creed, and we should 
 therefore study their lives with a new purpose. The an- 
 swer must likewise come in the present crisis. The war has 
 brought out what sacrifice there is in the great heart of 
 France. It has enabled England to find her soul, and with 
 
14* The Causes Of War 
 
 it a truly new England is born. Likewise must Columbia 
 find her heart and her soul if she would realize her high mis- 
 sion in the world. As never before our citizens must be filled 
 with the conviction that America's lesson is an abiding faith 
 in humanity, and in the growing principles, the institutions 
 and the final triumph of democracy among men; that here 
 we worship principles, not personages, but have the highest 
 regard and greatest reverence for our statesmen who have 
 so nobly embodied those principles — a Washington and a 
 Lincoln, not "sacred majesties" to be bowed down unto, but 
 citizens enshrined in the hearts of their countrymen because 
 of the service they have rendered free government in the 
 hours of its utmost need. Let our boys and girls feel a new 
 thrill of pride in our magnificent Stars and Stripes, because 
 in them they see a new meaning, whether floating in home 
 breezes o'er the peaceful institutions of a free-born people, 
 on the great marts of trade, or on the blood-stained and 
 treacherous field of battle, unfolding to the oppressed peo- 
 ples of the earth the foundation tenets of American free- 
 dom, and giving to all the assurance that true representa- 
 tive democracy, by the grace of God, shall no longer be an 
 experiment, but a triumphant realization, destined to pre- 
 serve to the nations government by the initiative and consent 
 of the governed. 
 
 How much in this day do we really appreciate the coun- 
 try in which we live? How much thought do we give to the 
 blessings she affords us? Does it often come to our minds, 
 that for every pleasure that is ours today, some one in the 
 past has dared to sacrifice comfort and life to give us that 
 pleasure? For centuries our forefathers have been fighting 
 the battles of liberty and pouring out their life-blood that 
 we might be secure in that liberty. They did it, as one has 
 said, that these priceless heritages "might not perish in 
 the graves of the fathers." 
 
 How much we owe our ancestors for all that, and how 
 much we are in debt to our country ! God pity the boy or 
 
Introduction 15 
 
 girl who, when knowing this, would give nothing in return. 
 It is no idle dream that Uncle Sam is urging us to do our 
 part. Would we curse the generations yet to come by 
 failing to uphold liberty in this crisis ? The words of Patrick 
 Henry are still as applicable as they are eloquent, "Is life 
 so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price 
 of chains and slavery?" From all over the world comes the 
 statement that never did America fight in a juster cause 
 than she has just been fighting. And that cause she must 
 still uphold. In failing to do our part now, we should be 
 recreant Americans. Rather let us pause in our mad rush 
 for the perishing things of life, to appreciate the compli- 
 ment the world is today paying to American citizenship. 
 
 But our schools must hasten to give to this citizenship 
 a vision which comprehends not only its own state and na- 
 tion, but is world-wide. Indeed, Columbia's highest resolve 
 must be to be true to the principles that gave her birth, and 
 gave to the world the inspiration of liberty. For it is her 
 privilege, in this "age of ages telling" to move under the 
 impelling conviction that this world cannot remain perma- 
 nently half free and half enslaved by privileged autocracy; 
 and that the God of human destiny has decreed that it shall 
 become free — that the faith in which American citizenship 
 was born and has been nurtured, the faith in which other 
 peoples have come to believe, and which is now the only hope 
 of the race, shall be realized in fact — and that "govern- 
 ment of the people, by the people, for the people," cannot 
 "perish from the earth." 
 
 Citizens of America: it is your duty to know the justice 
 of your country's cause. And, you who have not gone to 
 war, it is your privilege and opportunity to serve your coun- 
 try in the highest sense. All this and more, you have the 
 opportunity to stand for those principles that have made 
 America what she is, and so honored throughout the world. 
 Yours is the leadership in these great movements whose 
 watchword is service and whose task is to keep our people 
 
16 The Causes Of War 
 
 at home and at the front true American patriots and citi- 
 zens, through all the grime and mud and fire and terror of 
 war, and until they all come home. 
 
 Only when she realizes that it was in a righteous cause, 
 can a mother be comforted for the loss of her son in France. 
 Only when a father sees that the liberty he holds so dear 
 was at stake, and might have been lost for generations to 
 come, if the enemy had won, can he be reconciled to have 
 sacrificed his valiant son on the altar of war. It is because 
 of these things that the writer, though late as it now is to 
 learn, is attempting to give you the causes of this mighty 
 conflict. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 GENERAL STATEMENT 
 
 WITHIN the last generation there has been a world- 
 wide uneasiness and expectancy that has never been 
 equalled in the past. The decade before the present war 
 witnessed the greatest unrest the world had ever known. 
 Statesmen and seers everywhere felt that something was 
 going to happen, but no one knew just what. Now we 
 have learned what was imminent. The recent revolution in 
 Russia and the entrance of United States into this war will 
 prove to be the greatest events of the World War period. 
 It is but the continuation of the fight of the peoples of the 
 earth for their liberties from oppression. It is another 
 powerful link in the mighty chain of which the English revo- 
 lutions of 1642 and 1688, the American Revolution and the 
 French Revolution were the first links. And men will see, 
 as never before, that the French Revolution of 1789, with 
 the single exception of the present conflict, is the greatest, 
 most tremendous event of modern times. 
 
 If there is one thing above all else that the study of his- 
 story teaches, it is that there is a unity or continuity, in 
 human events and purposes and that man's true progress is 
 through evolution. In this truth is found the explanation 
 of the fundamental causes of war. The revolutions referred 
 to above are a few of the many examples of this fact. It is 
 equally true that revolutions of the people never go back- 
 ward, ultimately; every one spells progress in the end. We 
 should therefore in view of this fact, keep our faith in 
 democratic Russia, for like France she will recover from 
 her period of anarchy and severe trial — her deception and 
 
 17 
 
18 The Causes Of War 
 
 spoliation by German perfidy — and will come out all right 
 in the end, although it may be generations before she is 
 fully recovered. The very means of oppression, such as abso- 
 lute monarchies, the "armed peace," under which the nations 
 have groaned, ambition of rulers and of governments, and 
 often war itself — are but the means by which the people may 
 rise. At a terrible cost, it is true; yet, progress is always 
 costly, and in its truest sense the survival of the fittest holds 
 even unto the last. 
 
 Whether recognizing this evolutionary principle or not, 
 we know that there has been for years, and still is, among 
 the most intelligent and best classes everywhere, a great 
 cry and longing for world peace — not simply a cessation of 
 military warfare, but an era of peace for weary mankind. 
 This, however, is not to be confused with the present social- 
 istic and pacifist movement, which is wholly abortive, and 
 would be in the interest of the autocratic central powers, 
 and not in the interest of democracy. Yet, despite all we 
 have heard and been taught in recent years concerning 
 peace and the end of warfare, we are learning, what the 
 American people have been slow to learn hitherto, that there 
 are times in the history of nations when, in order to enjoy 
 peace, they must be prepared for war. It would be suicide 
 for any great nation at the present time to act otherwise. 
 One people, in its philanthropic enthusiasm, cannot bring 
 peace to the world, much less any little group of peace advo- 
 cates. Nor can it guarantee its own peace — it cannot adopt 
 a policy of peace, and say it will have it, whether others 
 will or no. We see this in our own experience now. Indeed, 
 the realization of this fact is one of the reasons why the 
 President and Congress plunged this peace-loving country 
 and non-aggressive American people into the mighty world 
 conflict that rages today. France has been confronted with 
 such a situation in the past, and other examples are not 
 wanting. It amounts to this — as, I have believed for years 
 — that, instead of diminishing the chances of war, the anti- 
 
General Statement 19 
 
 preparedness peace tendency may augment these chances, 
 may invite conquest, or as in the case of the United States, 
 because of the aggressions of others, may help to drag an 
 unwilling people into war. There are several nations fight- 
 ing today that not only did not want war, but did not 
 expect it, and those least prepared have suffered most. 
 War was thrust upon them ; there was really no choice. 
 The nations of the world are so close together and so in- 
 terdependent in our day that one cannot have peace when 
 others are determined upon oppressive war. The allied 
 nations were unwillingly dragged into war, let me repeat, 
 but thanks to the people's instinct for human liberty, they 
 are in the war heart and soul now, and are in it to crush 
 the inhuman and merciless beast of autocratic and bigoted 
 oppression ! Pity it is that many of us have not seen until 
 now that autocracy has always been the arch-enemy of free- 
 dom and human rights, and never could be trusted. Its 
 whole foundation, as history shows, has been laid in hypo- 
 critical presumption and class privilege and selfishness, play- 
 ing upon the innocence and ignorance of its unfortunate and 
 incapable victims. 
 
 The trouble with the peace advocates before the war (and 
 all honor to them — God forbid that the teachers of the 
 young should be aught else) it seems to me, has 
 largely been this: they have observed particularly the ef- 
 fects of war, but have done little along the practical line of 
 studying its causes and proposing effective remedies. Not 
 until the present gigantic conflict has there been anything 
 like concerted and serious action on the prevention of war; 
 and still less is the understanding of its causes. Many peo- 
 ple, indeed, declare useless any study of the causes of war. 
 With this view, the writer cannot at all agree; it is but 
 blind fatalism, dangerous and utterly helpless in the face of 
 the world situation and of most wars. How are we to apply 
 the remedy — How are we to have peace — if we do not under- 
 stand the cause? As in the study of medicine and disease, 
 
20 T\e Causes Of War 
 
 so in this field, the search for causes is no less indis- 
 pensable than the search for remedies; and certainly, the 
 scientific method of treatment requires that we find the 
 causes before we apply the remedy. The failure to do this, 
 I maintain, is just the reason why so much that has been 
 said and attempted in the past has been fruitless and dis- 
 appointing. Men have not made a careful and systematic 
 search into the causes of war. It is remarkable how little 
 space is given to the causes of war in our histories. Gen- 
 erally speaking, they have been examined most superficially 
 — have been strangely neglected. With one breath history 
 instructors are teaching that causes and results are more 
 important than wars themselves, and in the next breath they 
 are hurrying their classes on from the causes to the wars 
 and their results. Better not know the names of battles 
 and leaders than not understand, in some degree at least, 
 why the armies are fighting. 
 
 Those who oppose an intensive study of the causes of 
 war, because they think it would increase the warlike spirit 
 from the mere thinking upon the subject, have, it seems to 
 me, a most peculiar and illogical method of reasoning. It 
 is the people's not knowing the causes of wars that has often 
 enabled their rulers to plunge them into conflicts and keep 
 them there. This is true to some extent in the present war, 
 as most of us know, particularly with the central powers. 
 The search for the truth is dangerous only to its enemies. 
 An acquaintance with the causes of war, even modern con- 
 flicts in civilized countries, can but lead the people to hate 
 it more! When they see all the greed, the haughtiness, the 
 selfishness, the blasphemous presumption of "divine right" 
 monarchs and privileged classes, and sometimes the igno- 
 rance, misunderstandings and honest differences of peoples, 
 that are back of war, they will certainly be greater lovers 
 of peace, and more intelligent workers for it. 
 
 Moreover, it must be understood that there can be no 
 real progress toward the peace we covet if we deny that 
 
General Statement £1 
 
 there is such a thing as a righteous war. The liberty of 
 American democracy rests on that foundation stone. God 
 has so willed it, and we cannot change it, although we 
 believe it is God's will that some day wars shall cease from 
 the earth. War has often rendered a great service in the 
 past, and even today it must be seen that in the struggle 
 for political and economic independence, as well as that for 
 physical existence and comfort, the necessities and ambi- 
 tions of the strong will be satisfied at the cost of the weak. 
 We say this should not be. Christianity and our finer in- 
 stincts are trying to lead us away from it. Nevertheless, it 
 is the physical law of nature, has all our past history as a 
 race back of it, and is the "survival of the fittest," one of 
 the greatest of all biological laws ; and, as Emerson says, 
 the student of history may become more reconciled to this 
 "copious bloodshed of ages past" — bloodshed often, too, 
 in the name of the Prince of Peace — when he reflects 
 that it is a temporary and preparatory state — age- 
 long though it be — and has actively forwarded the cul- 
 ture of man. Nor is this any argument in favor of war 
 as such, today ; it is only a recognition of the service of war 
 in the past. It is folly, it is a manifestation of ignorance 
 of the history of mankind's development, to try to get away 
 from or ignore the benefit of wars in the past. They are 
 the price man has paid for his civilization, whether they be 
 against kings on their "divine right" thrones, autocratic 
 governments, religious bigotry and intolerance, or what not. 
 Civilization has been destroyed by these conflicts, it is true, 
 and is being destroyed; yet, more still of civilization has 
 been preserved and gained, else we could not have democracy 
 and enlightenment today; for man's normal condition 
 throughout the ages, almost up to the present, has been a 
 state of warfare and strife. Through the countless ages of 
 the past these wars have raged. From it all there has come 
 an evolution into the present state; and our faith can but 
 repeat, "as was said three thousand years ago, so still 
 
22 The Causes Of War 
 
 it must be said, the judgments of the Lord are true and right- 
 eous altogether." In spite of the fact that wars have taken 
 the physically best in all ages, they have sifted humanity, 
 both physically and intellectually, and have found the best 
 for its leaders. War has brought different races and na- 
 tions of the earth together — at first to blows; but from 
 blows to truce, to trade, to inter-marriage, and finally to 
 peace. 
 
 Considerations of this kind help to bring us to a true 
 view of the nature and function of war. We became con- 
 scious of the fact that it is mingled with everything, that 
 it is the subject of the greater part of historical treatment, 
 if we take the human race as a whole; that it has, until 
 very recent times, been the chief occupation or employment 
 of the most conspicuous men of the world's long history ; and 
 that, in one form or another, it is the law of nature. With 
 this view, we may study the causes of war intelligently, 
 without prejudice, and be better able in consequence to 
 utilize the knowledge thus gained in applying it to the 
 remedies for war and the "fight for peace." So, the rela- 
 tionship of the causes to the ends of war must never be lost 
 sight of. Also, on the severity of wars, on the degree of 
 their necessity, on the extent to which they go in violating 
 the laws of civilized warfare and outraging the sense of hu- 
 manity, will depend the opportunity of modifying their 
 character and the probability of an evolution into a world 
 peace. "Civilized" warfare, as practiced by Germany in the 
 present conflict, has become so horrible as to generate one 
 of the most powerful reactionary influences against it. On 
 the other hand, the measure in which wars are inevitable, 
 or have been (and this can be found only by a close study 
 of their causes) will furnish the character and limits of 
 remedial measures. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 CLASSIFICATION AND COMMENT 
 
 IT is manifestly true that in the present day there are 
 only two classes of wars that are justifiable, namely, 
 those for defense or self preservation, and those for liberty 
 or freedom from oppression. Yet, the attempt to classify 
 the causes of war, past and present, is difficult, and results 
 are more or less inaccurate and uncertain. For convenience, 
 however, and for the sake of discussion, they may be grouped 
 as follows: 
 
 1. Dynastic affairs. (Have ceased to be fundamental 
 causes.) 
 
 2. Religion. (No longer exists as a leading cause.) 
 
 3. Love of a people for war. (Becoming rarer.) 
 
 4. Colonial expansion. (Recent, but has lost its attrac- 
 tion, except perhaps for Germany.) 
 
 5. Racial predominance — tendency to domination by one 
 race in a composite nation, as in Austria-Hungary. (Still 
 a cause for strife.) 
 
 6. National or race hatred. (Still strong, as in Ger- 
 many vs. France and vice versa — inherited from the past, 
 with distrust and misunderstanding.) 
 
 7. Growth of nationality — to secure national unity. 
 (Chief cause of most wars in latter part of nineteenth cen- 
 tury, and some today.) 
 
 8. "Balance of Power," in Europe. (Still a contribu- 
 ting cause.) 
 
 9. Imperfection of government — weakness, anarchy, as 
 in Mexico and a few small states in Europe today. (Still a 
 cause and excuse.) 
 
 23 
 
24 The Causes Of War 
 
 10. Territorial adjustment — tendency to secure natural 
 boundaries. 
 
 11. Trade rivalry and commercial motives. (Many of 
 England's petty wars in the past century, also other Euro- 
 pean countries.) 
 
 12. Conquest — ambition of leaders. (Napoleon Bona- 
 parte best modern example.) 
 
 13. Great navies and standing armies of Europe — the 
 "armed peace." 
 
 14. Suppression of democratic and revolutionary move- 
 ments of the people, by autocratic governments. (Ever a 
 leading cause, but especially 1820-50.) 
 
 15. Desire for political freedom and democracy, na- 
 tional, world-wide, against autocratic governments. (Most 
 recent, and greatest now.) 
 
 16. To uphold the principles of international law. 
 (More or less connected with several above.) 
 
 We can get some idea of the multiplicity and complexity 
 of the causes of the present war when we note that nearly 
 all of the foregoing causes — all except possibly three — con- 
 tributed to the conflict. It might be well also to state in 
 passing that this all foreshadows greater problems of read- 
 justment when the fighting ceases and even more complex 
 than the problems of the war, the peace negotiations taking 
 perhaps a longer period than the war itself, for the whole 
 world will be vitally interested and must take part. 
 
 One reads in a good many historic works and treatises 
 on peace that wars usually have very trifling causes. This 
 has sometimes been true; and some people think by this 
 means alone to discredit war. Others, on the contrary, are 
 partisans of great causes, and they likewise are sometimes 
 right. Both these tendencies, however, lead to erroneous 
 conclusions, for neither represents the facts of history. So 
 many times the writer has heard men say that the present 
 world war is without cause; from the pulpit, from the lecture 
 platform, from the press — from all ranks of life comes this 
 
Classification and Comment 25 
 
 statement; also, that it is useless, and serving no purpose. 
 If so then the United States has erred and most grievously 
 sinned in going into it. But let us remember that things 
 do not happen in this world without cause, be that cause 
 good or bad. The laws of nature and of God — which are 
 one and the same — teach us that just as sure as there 
 are events, these events have causes and results. Then, just 
 as sure as there are wars, these wars have causes and re- 
 sults. Here again we get back to the fundamental proposi- 
 tion that to understand wars we must become familiar with 
 their causes. The American people would do well today to 
 read less about the details of what is happening, and the 
 continual conjecturing that gets nowhere (leave that to 
 the experts and those whose duty it is to give their atten- 
 tion to it) and devote more time to a study into why the 
 great world tragedy has come. We could then be more use- 
 ful and ready to do our part when peace finally comes. We 
 are in the war, and are called upon for untold sacrifices. We 
 should know why these things are necessary and what really 
 is at stake. It is no credit to the American people that 
 when this mighty conflict began in 1914, they stood aghast, 
 and in their ignorance of world problems and conditions 
 said: "What are they fighting for over there, anyway?" 
 "I don't believe they themselves know ;" "It is only a family 
 quarrel between King George and the Kaiser," etc. We have 
 been too self-contained and selfish, and have not realized 
 how much their problems are ours, how the whole world is 
 one brotherhood, and how close and interdependent all peo- 
 ples are. At last we are being brought to realize that we 
 must be citizens of the world, not alone of our state or 
 nation, and that as citizens of the world we have obliga- 
 tions no less binding upon us than are those of our country. 
 It is idle to talk of a world peace without an intelligent 
 world understanding. And once again, this goes to show 
 how poor students of history we have been. It is not ex- 
 aggerating to say that a few farseeing statesmen were 
 
26 The Causes Of War 
 
 • 
 trembling at the prospect of this war, and were trying to 
 tell us the signs of the times, that in 1898, when the Span- 
 ish-American war broke out, in 1908-10, when Austria an- 
 nexed Bosnia and Herzegovina without their consent; in 
 1912-18, the period of the Balkan wars — we persistently 
 refused to listen, because indeed, we thought we were still 
 living in an age of isolation, and had no concern in the prob- 
 lems of the old world. We have continued to refuse to listen 
 until it has all come home to us, with an outlook that is by 
 no means a reassuring one. We should be given a few facts 
 to disabuse our minds. 
 
 For instance, it is not right for teachers and text-books 
 to build up prejudice against England, even though it be 
 done through ignorance, by representing her as the England 
 of George III, when she was an aristocracy, instead of the 
 Britain of toda}^, which in all but name is as much of a 
 democracy as our own. We should know that England alone 
 prevented Germany from going to war with us in 1898. 
 The children should know that England's fleet has a num- 
 ber of times kept us out of war. Moreover, it is not right 
 to teach our youth that our own Revolutionary war was the 
 only nor the first nor the greatest revolution of a people 
 against their oppressors. Justice to the troubled history 
 of France demands that we be brought to see that it was 
 France that saved what democracy there is in Europe, 
 though she may have taken courage from our example a 
 few years before, that it was France who, single-handed, for 
 years fought for liberty against the combined autocratic 
 thrones of Europe (England at that time being one of 
 them), and that a chastened France at last survived even 
 the heartless Napoleon, who would have ruined her, because, 
 recognizing his first service, she was too faithful to him. 
 The youth should likewise know that the Kaiser and the 
 autocratic government of Germany (the same kind of gov- 
 ernment that England had a hundred years ago) have had 
 designs on the United States— her Monroe Doctrine, her 
 
Classification and Comment 27 
 
 democracy, her influence in the direction of liberty for a full 
 generation. We should not be deceived about the character 
 of the Kaiser and his government. He was too autocratic 
 even for a Bismarck to support. Single-handed he has di- 
 rected the policy of the Empire. His ministers have always 
 been only his servants. As the historian West says, "He 
 believes thoroughly in the 'divine right' theory, and he has 
 repeatedly stated it in as striking a form as ever did James 
 I of England or Louis XIV of France, two or three cen- 
 turies ago." Whether he believes in that theory personally 
 or not, he has certainly tried to get his people to accept it, 
 and has acted upon it. Read this statement of his to the 
 city of Munich : "The will of the king is the supreme law." 
 And again, to a body of teachers upon the proper teaching 
 of history: "You must teach that the French Revolution 
 is an unmitigated crime against God and Man !" Address- 
 ing a body of military recruits in 1891 he said: "You are 
 now my soldiers. You have given yourselves to me, body 
 and soul. There is but one enemy for you and that is my 
 enemy. In these times of socialistic intrigue, it may hap- 
 pen that I shall call upon you to fire upon your brothers 
 and fathers * * * in such a case you are to obey me with- 
 out a murmur!" In 1897 he referred to himself as the "Vice- 
 regent of God." His relatives and friends have preached 
 the same gospel everywhere they have gone, and especially 
 in the Oriental countries and Turkey — they knew they did 
 not dare to do so openly in America; but they did just as 
 bad a thing — they deceived us as to the purpose of their 
 visits here. A nominal friendly visit was nothing less than 
 the perfecting of a knowledge of our military conditions and 
 resources and of the German spy system in America. And 
 this august mission was headed by no less distinguished a 
 personage than the brother of the Kaiser himself! They have 
 relied on that impression of the American people as proof 
 that we would not go to war with Germany. The German 
 government and Kaiser have little understood the true spirit 
 
28 The Causes Of War 
 
 of American democracy ! Why should we not fight with all 
 our might the power that would wipe democracy from the 
 face of the earth? We have seen the fruits of liberty and 
 democracy so bountiful all about us in the world that we 
 have not understood nor appreciated this mighty counter- 
 current that still survives out of a medieval age. It is 
 high time that our eyes were opened, and that we see the 
 greatest of all causes, for which we are fighting. 
 
 We need also to distinguish carefully between real causes 
 and pretended ones. The little things which are spoken of 
 as causes, and are generally given by the parties engaging 
 as causes, are usually but pretexts, or mere occasions, and 
 not efficient causes. A king may lead a, country into war 
 on a slight pretext, as in Austria in 1914 ; but the ideas and 
 principles that are back of such acts — the type of govern- 
 ment that they stand for — are the causes, and are not 
 trifling. They represent a system, whose earmarks are op- 
 pression, whose gospel is greed. The fundamental cause for 
 Austria's plunging the nations of Europe into this war were 
 her designs upon the Balkan states and her fear lest Rus- 
 sia might gain or control them, and with them Constanti- 
 nople. And Russia, with her Czar, was equally culpable, 
 except that the Balkan states had a racial sympathy with 
 Russia that they did not have with Austria. But now, thank 
 God, the Russia of the. Czar is no more. And America's 
 greatest obligation, next to saving her own liberties, is to 
 help that struggling New Russia. 
 
 Often a long standing and vital cause of conflict is hid- 
 den behind such pretexts, or excuses, and is revealed only 
 by the results of the war. This is one of the curses of auto- 
 cratic governments and of ambitious, powerful monarchs. 
 This leads us to say that while a war cannot be without 
 causes, the cause may be unjust, or even useless, though 
 the war itself cannot be, to the side that is wronged. If 
 both sides have real grievances, as is often the case, the 
 reason for each going to war must be understood, else we 
 are partisans of the one and unfair to the other. On this 
 
Classification and Comment 29 
 
 point, here in America, many a student and teacher, both 
 North and South has misunderstood and misrepresented the 
 Civil War and its causes, in the United States. We have 
 therefore been unable to reconcile the causes with the re- 
 sults of the war. There are usually at least as many causes 
 of war as there are parties engaged in it. Ruin and sorrow 
 for a lost cause was the price that the South had to pay for 
 not understanding why the North and those devoted to the 
 national cause should fight for the Union and liberty, for 
 the negro. The "crime of reconstruction" is the reproach 
 that the South can lay at the feet of the North with a radi- 
 cal Congress, for not understanding why the South fought 
 and sacrificed and suffered so long, having been taught by 
 masters of thought to distrust a strong central government, 
 as did their forefathers the government of King George. This 
 is one of the many instances that go to show that peoples' 
 ignorance of each other and their misunderstandings are 
 one of the most potent causes of trouble. 
 
 Now, let us return to a brief discussion of a few of the 
 causes grouped above. Wars of religion have ceased to exist ; 
 but religious prejudice has been taken into account in re- 
 cruiting for the present war in those countries where "holy 
 war" has been declared, as in Russia and Turkey, with 
 slight traces of religious appeal otherwhere. Dynastic af- 
 fairs in themselves can no longer cause war. Men's intelli- 
 gence in times of peace has triumphed over their love for 
 mar. Hence but for the others we could dispense with the 
 first three causes entirely. Yet, it is not out of place to dis- 
 cuss the love of people for war in the past. It helps us to 
 understand what the war passion and loyalty let loose on 
 the battlefield means today. 
 
 Man has inherited the fighting instinct from his remote 
 ancestors, who lived in a state of nature, with the lower 
 animals. In that environment war is the effect of a need — 
 the need to exist, to survive. It is the instinct to live, which 
 is the greatest of all instincts. The farther we go back in 
 the history of man and the nearer we find him to nature, and 
 
30 The Causes Of War 
 
 the more he is under the control of his animal nature — why, 
 the more we find that war with him has been the effect of a 
 human need, and its end the satisfaction of that need. 
 
 There are hundreds of cases on record of wars of con- 
 quest due to the migrations of peoples who had outgrown 
 their native valleys, plains or desert pastures. The pinch 
 of hunger and famine drove them on, and the more satisfied 
 and peaceful peoples whom they invaded became their vic- 
 tims and slaves, or were pushed on, to struggle for existence, 
 or fight for it elsewhere. Again, it is nature's law of the 
 survival of the fittest. We recognize this principle in all 
 animal life in nature. The big fish devours the smaller one ; 
 the forest giant makes the smaller beast its prey, as it does 
 the still smaller; the eagle's mighty strength was developed 
 in order that he might prey upon more helpless creatures. 
 The same law rules the plant kingdom. The large sturdy 
 plant crowds out and kills its weaker, more delicate com- 
 petitor. The more warlike plant, as the thistle and the 
 thorn, "chokes out" the tenderer stem. So, savage man took 
 his lessons from nature and from necessity, since he had no 
 religion of the higher life and of unselfishness to guide him, 
 except as his imagination slowly and feebly led him to "the 
 gods" as arbiters of human destiny and judges of his deeds. 
 It is only the religion of one God, a God of mercy as well 
 as of judgment upon mankind, that can save the race from 
 its animal instincts and from war. And were it not for that 
 in man that is spiritual, and above nature, the principle that 
 "might makes right" would still hold undisputed sway. The 
 warlike instinct is therefore inherent in human nature, and 
 man has to conquer it with his reason, else he is no better 
 essentially than the brute. The war spirit we have inherited 
 from generations for countless ages past, and it is only the 
 long process of man's evolution into a higher state that can 
 save that civilization for which we fight. Not until the 
 spirit of Jesus of Nazareth has met its response in the spirit 
 of man and has supplanted the beast in nations, will war- 
 fare cease. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES 
 
 BECAUSE of their close relationship, we may treat com- 
 mercial causes and those of colonial expansion together. 
 There are those who hold to the materialistic conception of 
 history, and claim that at bottom the real causes of war 
 are economic in nature — that they even go back to a basic 
 wrong in society — namely, the production and distribution 
 of wealth in the capitalistic form. This is so far from the 
 truth of the history of wars, however, that it may be dis- 
 missed as altogether too narrow a view. Yet, the economic 
 factor, and greed for gain, cannot be ignored. To a cer- 
 tain extent in the recent past, society has had an economic 
 basis in much the same way that in medieval times and in 
 the ancient world men sought through war to secure mines 
 and treasures, as for example, the ancient Romans and 
 Carthagenians, as well as other peoples. It is true that 
 military politics, built upon an economic basis, still domi- 
 nates to a large extent in some countries. Some of the 
 latest and best examples are Germany, Austria and Russia. 
 This evil, however, has been no less true of international re- 
 lations. The opium war between China and England was 
 inspired by the very basest cupidity on England's part, and 
 remains one of the black pages on English history. In fact, 
 colonial wars have sought primarily and generally the em- 
 ployment and security of capital, the monopoly of com- 
 merce, or the exclusive use of the shortest and most lucrative 
 trade routes. It is an earnest of better things, however,, 
 that now most of the greatest world powers are seriously 
 considering the neutralization of the strategic commercial 
 
 31 
 
32 The Causes Of War 
 
 points, such as Constantinople, Gibraltar, the Suez and Pan- 
 ama canals, etc. That these places be dismantled and in- 
 ternationalized is one of the strong demands that will be 
 brought upon the parliament of the world at the conclusion 
 of this war. This all is a gigantic task, however, and may 
 not be accompanied in the near future. 
 
 There has also been a certain degree of necessity in these 
 economic wars, especially on the part of some peoples. Re- 
 peatedly have nations felt it necessary, because of the over- 
 weening ambitions of others, to engage in war, under pain 
 of being reduced to an inferior position among the states of 
 the world. Besides Belgium in this war, Denmark, China, 
 some of the Barbary States, and the South African repub- 
 lics may be cited as examples in recent times. Under pre- 
 text of defending its flag, its citizens or its interests, a Euro- 
 pean nation has taken advantage of the occasion to estab- 
 lish itself and extend its power and control gradually. It 
 was indeed a surprise to the world that the United States 
 did not do this thing in the case of Cuba in 1898, and again, 
 in Mexico more recently. The general result, however, has 
 been to supplant a backward and most unprogressive civil- 
 ization with a progressive, more enlightened, sanitary and 
 democratic one ; and this result is at least gratifying. It is 
 remarkable, for instance, that the Boers of South Africa 
 have so loyally and with so very little friction supported 
 England in this war, against their kindred, the Germans. 
 The explanation lies in the fact that Great Britain has given 
 them self-government, with more efficient administration, has 
 taught them democracy, and they are far more prosperous 
 than they were under the old regime. This is not to argue, 
 however, that the end justifies the means. We may add in 
 passing also, that we have been guilty of the same conduct 
 toward the American Indians that the European nations 
 have been toward the untutored and backward peoples of 
 the Old World. 
 
 With regard to our fifth cause, racial domination m a 
 
Fundamental Causes 33 
 
 composite union, we may say that it is one of the greatest 
 crimes of which governments and rulers have been guilty 
 in the past. In most instances it is one of the basest forms 
 of slavery, and has scarcely any justification whatever. 
 There can never be world peace so long as an alien race or 
 nationality, with different ideas, ideals and political instincts 
 and institutions, lords it over a subject people, simply be- 
 cause chance and might, or physical force, have triumphed 
 over justice and humanity. The world can never breathe 
 freely until the Polish people get their freedom and inde- 
 pendence, as do the various peoples of Austria-Hungary — 
 and are free to gravitate to those states or confederations 
 to which they by race and right belong. Turkey must leave 
 Europe, where she never has had a right to be. Turkey 
 is not a nation in the true sense, anyway, and never has been. 
 She has no right to exist, for she has ever existed unnatu- 
 rally, by criminal subjection of peoples who otherwise would 
 long have been free, and arbiters of their own destinies. If 
 there ever was a chimerical state it has been the Ottoman 
 Empire. Its whole history has been one of cruelty, rapine 
 and murder. 
 
 Our sixth cause, national or race hatred may also be dis- 
 posed of rather briefly. To the desire for revenge has been 
 attributed by many, and perhaps justly, the greater part 
 of wars. The German kaiser was right in part at least, 
 when he said that this present conflict has its basis in the 
 Europe of the past centuries. Nations, no more than indi- 
 viduals can violate the laws of justice and right without 
 at later times having to pay most dearly for these viola- 
 tions. Like individuals, "the sins of the fathers are visited 
 upon the children to the third and fourth generation," and 
 on, and on, until the wrongs inflicted are fully atoned for. 
 It is hard to forgive and forget great crimes. Nor is there 
 so much virtue in forgetting as we are sometimes wont to 
 believe. It is Christian and wise to forgive, but it is not 
 always wise to forget. Particularly is this true in interna- 
 
34 The Causes Of War 
 
 tional affairs. To forget the past is to fail to understand 
 the present and to read the future. In the study of the 
 history of mankind, this distinction needs to be made clear 
 and appreciated. We can safely forget only when to for- 
 get is to further the cause of liberty, as in the case of our 
 past relations with England, and the troubles of our own 
 civil conflict. We can forget in the case of England because 
 we know that the England of a powerful aristocracy and 
 "divine right" monarchs is no more. For the same reason 
 we should have known and remembered the principles and 
 conduct of the present kaiser and government of Germany. 
 It is a sad fact that in the past the nation that has not 
 been able to return evil for evil has been doomed to disap- 
 pear from among the independent nations of the world. Let 
 us hope that such a thing in the future cannot be. It is a 
 terrible test of our faith, in the midst of the. present whirl- 
 pool of horror ; but when faith is lost, all is lost. In ancient 
 times, among the uncivilized peoples, even by scriptural in- 
 junction, it was "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"; 
 but when the world is "made safe for democracy" the prin- 
 ciples of Christ can reign in the nations as well as in the 
 hearts of men. Poor Belgium, poor Belgium ! What a com- 
 ment on our Christian civilization! The time must come 
 when the innocent cannot be made to suffer for the sins of 
 the plunderers of justice and virtue, for the crimes of the 
 privileged parasites of the human kingdom. 
 
 In considering our seventh cause, i. e., the growth of 
 nationality, we note that the present German empire was 
 built upon a series of wars none of which was really justi- 
 fiable, and Germany today is paying the price of her past 
 perfidy — that of the founders of her empire. The union of 
 Germany would indeed have been delayed to a later genera- 
 tion, but who dare say she would not have been better for 
 the delay? It would have been a Germany of democracy, no 
 matter how long delayed, if it had been allowed the natural 
 course of development. In taking Schleswig-Holstein Bis- 
 
Fundamental Causes 35 
 
 marck was thinking of German imperial interests, not of the 
 true interests of those provinces, much less of the interests 
 of Denmark whom he robbed of them. Shortly after, he 
 showed his perfidy by driving Austria out of Germany and 
 German affairs, in the "Six Weeks War" just after he had 
 persuaded her to help him conquer Denmark and take from 
 her the two provinces, with the tacit understanding that the 
 booty was to be divided between the two victors, Austria 
 to have her full share. It is likewise well known that Bis- 
 marck was courting war with Louis Napoleon of France, in 
 1870, and that his mutilization of the telegram of the king 
 of Prussia to France was the occasion of France declaring 
 war. In other words, he tricked Napoleon and the gov- 
 ernment of France into declaring the war which he (Bis- 
 marck) desired. Nor did the "Iron Chancellor" conceal 
 to his people the fact that he proposed to create a German 
 empire on the principle of "blood and iron." That was 
 his gospel for Germany. We know how dangerous to the 
 peace and safety of the world it is for the government or 
 people of a great country to revert to the war instinct, to 
 become militaristic, in the sense that Germany has been since 
 the time of Frederick the Great. The war spirit is the 
 most violent of emotions, and in its desperation is much 
 akin to insanity! On the pretext of nationality there have 
 always been certain nations that have had a predilection 
 for the life of war — different peoples (led by their rulers) 
 at different times. At one time it was Rome; at another, 
 Spain; at another time France, under Louis XIV; at an- 
 other, Italy. For more than fifty years it has been Ger- 
 many, led by Prussian autocracy. How well, how thorough- 
 ly, how efficiently have the German people obeyed that gos- 
 pel! Even their most wonderful arts of peace have been 
 made to contribute to that end, instead of to the far nobler, 
 disinterested end of charity for the whole world. "Gott 
 straffe England" is the gospel of hate, not of patriotism — 
 of hate in its most malignant form, and obedience to that 
 
36 The Causes Of War 
 
 gospel is the explanation of the many outrageous acts of 
 barbarism — the atrocities of Germans — of which we hear so 
 much, and with which we are so familiar, today. But "Gott 
 straffe England" was only the beginning. "Gott straffe de- 
 mocracy" is the true purpose and watchword today; and 
 that means the United States of America, first and fore- 
 most of all, for America is first and foremost in democracy. 
 
 The other great struggle for nationalism in the past 
 century, namely, the unification of Italy, which is still 
 going on, we need comment upon but very briefly. While it 
 has not been unmixed with injustice on Italy's part, no such 
 crimes can be laid at the feet of Victor Emmanuel, Cavour 
 and Garibaldi as at the feet of the leaders for an imperial 
 Germany. On the other hand the history of Austria, the 
 arch-enemy of Italian freedom in the past century, is even 
 worse than that of Germany. And now, that the whole world 
 is reaping the fruits of these past wrongs, it must be a lib- 
 erty washed in blood that is to rise upon the ruins of the 
 past. One of the fondest hopes of the best servants of the 
 world at present is, that this great catastrophe may be 
 bringing near the end of the era of selfishness and of might. 
 
 In considering the "balance of power" as a cause of war, 
 we find that it has contributed to wars in Europe for cen- 
 turies past; that it has its weight in the present war, and 
 is dangerous for the future until, or unless the results of the 
 present conflict and coming peace give guarantees that will 
 obliterate the natural distrust of states and peoples for 
 each other, together with the disturbance of peace and pros- 
 perity throughout the world. 
 
 Our ninth cause, imperfection of government is so evi- 
 dent that it may be passed over with but a word of com- 
 ment. It is in general only small and weak nations, or those 
 in a more or less violent state of transformation of govern- 
 ment, that are prey to the exploitation of war. Portugal 
 and perhaps Spain have happily recovered from that state 
 within the past and present generations, but there is no 
 
Fundamental Causes 37 
 
 immediate hope for Mexico, nor for the new Russian states. 
 The present allied intervention will bring its political re- 
 sults only after years. The military object, of course, may 
 be gained soon and Russia saved from Germany, but, after 
 that, it will take her generations to find herself. 
 
 The desire to secure natural boundaries, always strong, 
 but more so if those boundaries have once been held, is one 
 of the great causes for several countries engaging in war, 
 even in the present war — as in the case of Italy, Russia, 
 Bulgaria, Serbia and to some extent others. Not that this 
 was the only cause with any of them ; but it was a great, if 
 not controlling, motive. After France was plunged into the 
 strife, of course she desired Alsace-Lorraine, as a better 
 natural barrier against Germany, together with other rea- 
 sons which are well known, chief among them being the race 
 hatred, national feeling, and the keenest desire for revenge 
 upon Germany for taking those provinces in 1871. Many 
 unnatural boundaries must be wiped out at the conclusion 
 of this world conflict, and a new map of the Eastern world 
 made in the adjustment. 
 
 Wars arising from trade rivalry in their essentials have 
 already been discussed above, and may be passed over here. 
 Wars of conquest and of the ambition of leaders next 
 claim our attention. Facts already considered make it ap- 
 pear that the nations in the past have lived chiefly on the 
 principle that might makes right. The study of wars of 
 conquest makes this conviction all the stronger. By this we 
 are able to see how far as nations, up to the present war 
 at least, we have been from the principle of peace and honor 
 that we have been accustomed so much to talk about. With 
 this realization many illusions, and many theories and fond 
 hopes vanish. We are just beginning to take the world as 
 it is — to understand it and frame our future plans upon 
 that basis. It is a striking thing to note that, until recent 
 times the right of conquest was never brought in question. 
 That it has been condemned in modern times, however, is 
 
38 The Causes Of War 
 
 proof of the value of our civilization. In these dark hours 
 of trial we should keep this fact in mind ; it carries a mes- 
 sage of hope for mankind. Until recently, the act of con- 
 quering was appreciated as one of the very highest of human 
 activities, and the greatest warriors were the greatest states- 
 men. The literature, particularly the poetry, of the middle 
 ages, was replete with the exploits of the military heroes. 
 Force was desired by the state, with very few exceptions 
 among the ancient and medieval peoples, above everything 
 else. Let us be thankful we have gotten beyond that stage, 
 and that the disturbers of the world's peace, notwithstand- 
 ing their frantic efforts to justify their actions and to shift 
 responsibility, nevertheless stand condemned before the 
 judgment bar of humanity ! The ambition of a leader singly, 
 can never again bring on a great war, nor has one ruler 
 alone been able to, for a hundred years past. 
 
 Great navies and standing armies are contributing causes 
 only when other causes are back of them. Yet, we must see, 
 as a result of this war, that great standing armies are abol- 
 ished forever. This is imperatively necessary, not only to 
 guarantee peace, but to enable the nations to pay off their 
 tremendous war debts. At the rate that the armies and 
 navies were building in Europe previous to this war, the 
 whole continent would have been bankrupt in another gen- 
 eration, even without war. How necessary it is then, that 
 those expensive and crushing burdens upon the peoples be 
 done away with, or lowered to the very minimum — to the 
 extent that their expense shall be small, as compared with 
 the arts of peace! 
 
 The fourteenth cause listed above, namely, the suppression 
 of democratic and revolutionary movements of the peoples, 
 which has been a leading cause in the past, and has proven 
 the perfidy of princes, is bound to decrease and vanish, as the 
 cause of democracy grows and finally triumphs throughout 
 the world. The long and patient struggle of the people is 
 at last to be rewarded. It has taken thousands of years 
 
Fundamental Causes 39 
 
 to develop democracy on earth, but now she is coming to 
 her own, and the days of kingly power and oppression are 
 numbered. To appreciate this fact, and to remember the 
 principle for which we struggle — to keep our patience in this 
 generation, it is necessary that we see events in terms of 
 centuries, and great movements in terms of the great ages 
 and stages of evolution of man's civilization, in eras as God 
 counts them, in their true perspective and as they are. 
 
 The desire for political freedom and democracy on the 
 part of the people, is of course the other side of the struggle 
 represented by the cause given immediately above, and can- 
 not be considered wholly apart from it. Suffice it to say 
 here that this struggle has been going on in modern times 
 from the outbreak of the English revolution of 164& to the 
 present time, is now at its greatest height, and will continue 
 for ages to come, though unaccompanied in its last stages, 
 we fondly hope, by the maelstrom of war. 
 
 The last cause — to uphold the principles of international 
 law and justice and the solemn obligations and treaties of 
 nations — is, with the last above named, the greatest con- 
 tribution of the United States of America to the world. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 PRETEXTS AND EXCUSES FOB, WAR SOME ILLUSIONS 
 
 \TATIONAL honor is sometimes made a pretext for war; 
 -*■ ▼ it is also sometimes a real cause. The civilized world 
 has never expected a nation to suffer the outrages of a for- 
 eign State, — especially if they occur repeatedly. The 
 United States has only followed a long-standing precedent 
 in this respect. The American government and people 
 showed a forbearance that was remarkable before entering 
 the war against Germany. Critics of our government's course 
 would do well to remember this fact. Several other nations 
 would have refused to suffer what they have suffered, and 
 would have gone to war, if they had been strong enough. 
 The fate of Belgium, Montenegro, Serbia and Roumania has 
 terrorized them into maintaining a technical peace. Noth- 
 ing is more precious to a State than the respect for her 
 personality, her honor, her sense of fair play. It is with 
 nations as with individuals in this particular. If the United 
 States, after her stand for the right of neutrals and for 
 humanity, had done less than follow up her professions by 
 war, she would have been considered the world over as vas di- 
 lating and cowardly, as materialistic and selfish, and would 
 have hindered rather than encouraged the cause of democ- 
 racy throughout the world; the revolution in Russia would 
 not have had her powerful aid, and democracy would be 
 staggering o'er the whole earth. Belgium accepted Ger- 
 many's challenge, rather than slavishly submit, because of 
 the God-given right of all honorable people to govern them- 
 selves and maintain their national integrity and honor. Like 
 all free peoples, she would rather die than submit to the 
 
 40 
 
Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions 41 
 
 vassalage of the inhuman strutting "lord of destiny" — she 
 would preserve her honor before the world, though she might 
 lose her existence, as the penalty. For this, Belgium has an 
 immortal name in history, as has many an individual martyr, 
 for like conduct. 
 
 Despite the above, and numerous other instances, however, 
 national honor has often been a mere pretext of ambitious 
 States and covetous princes and worldlings, for waging war 
 against a weaker people. 
 
 During long centuries, up to the present, Europe has been 
 rending herself, each group trying to make itself greater 
 through the dependency of its neighbors, — all this under 
 the pretext of succession to power, political equilibrium, and 
 sometimes, "balance of power." This has kept alive among 
 the nations the Machiavelian principle that might makes 
 right. But, we must remember that of the many wars thus 
 waged, the alleged causes were only pretexts, the real causes 
 being deeper and more selfish. This point cannot be too 
 strongly emphasized. Text books often lead us astray here, 
 giving these excuses as the causes, rather than the motives 
 back of them. On such pretexts Rome and Carthage con- 
 tended for no less stakes than the "dominion and exploita- 
 tion of the Mediterranean world." Later, Genoa and Venice, 
 of the Italian city States, likewise fought for predominance 
 in commerce and navigation; then Spain and Portugal, for 
 their colonial empires ; then England, Holland and France, 
 following the countries of the Iberian Peninsula. The real 
 motive, however, was chiefly commercial, as the nature of 
 these contests testifies. 
 
 This was all done under the old-time conviction that, in 
 order to have prosperity, a nation must gain a monopoly on 
 trade and treasure, a monopoly of exchange and exploita- 
 tion. Consequently, this era was followed up and completed 
 by the conquests and wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
 centuries. It had its revival, again, in the wars of colonial 
 expansion in the past century. If a State could not secure 
 
42 The Causes Of War 
 
 a monopoly, it felt that it must at least "turn the balance 
 of commercial power" in its favor. Even modern and pres- 
 ent day warfare is somewhat of a commercial enterprise in 
 this sense. This is an astounding fact, once we come to 
 reflect upon it. The nations still are jealous rivals; they 
 desire to monopolize certain trade zones, and they still do 
 business with each other on the old suspicious competitive 
 basis — an economical theory of capitalism that for internal 
 industry in the various countries was exploded long ago. For 
 instance: the railroads of this country went through (1), 
 the stage of competition of small roads, with much duplica- 
 tion, extra cost, and poor service. They soon learned they 
 were violating an economic principle — that this did not pay. 
 So, (2), the next step was consolidation, wherein a few large 
 corporations came to own and control all the former small 
 roads, leaving the business in the form of a few great sys- 
 tems. Next (3), came the period of cooperation, when pool- 
 ing began. The rates and traffic in general were so ma- 
 nipulated for the benefit of the railroads as a result, that 
 the States and the national government were constrained 
 to take up the problem of the regulation of the railroads. 
 But the point is, the railroads doing business with one 
 another, or former rivals, came to the principle of coopera- 
 tion as the best and most satisfactory and feasible plan. 
 This record can be duplicated, for many other industries. 
 
 Today, as the war problem has developed, the efficiency 
 of cooperation is manifest in every industry, and in all the 
 industries of our whole national life, as they aid one an- 
 other, for a common end. The world war has made co- 
 operation and efficiency the two greatest words of the busi- 
 ness world. The cooperation of the allies is bringing victory 
 to them, while without it they were floundering in defeat. 
 On no important undertaking along any line whatsoever, do 
 they launch forth without the cooperation of all. Interna- 
 tional commerce should long ago have been put upon this 
 same basis, — should have been operated on the friendly and 
 
Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions 43 
 
 cooperative plan, instead of the suspicious and restrictive 
 competition that still prevails. The old competitive theory, 
 with first the "navigation laws" (as those of Spain, England, 
 France and Holland), now, the protective tariff restrictions 
 — ignores the truth that the well-being of one State is not 
 incompatible with that of its neighbors, but almost always, 
 the opposite. It has an interest in their prosperity, and 
 their well-being contributes to its own. As we all know the 
 "navigation laws" helped to cause many wars between na- 
 tions or peoples. The protective tariff, that companion in- 
 strument of the privileged classes, has likewise caused much 
 trouble, especially internal, for all the great nations. Thus 
 we see, it is privilege, selfishness and greed that are at the 
 bottom and back of the usual pretended causes of war. 
 
 Accordingly all European States have actually been es- 
 tablished and consolidated by force. If one condemns this 
 selfish conquest (as the world is condemning it today) it 
 can no longer be a question of restoring that which was un- 
 justly gained, of a revision and general transfer of titles. 
 This would result in a complete overthrow of the political 
 chart, and would return without profit to the parceling out 
 of nations and to the disorder and anarchy of the middle 
 ages. The present condition (previous to 1914) in the main 
 has been confirmed by a long possession, and has been con- 
 solidated by general consent of the powers of the world. 
 As all nations, somewhere along their course, have proceeded 
 in much the same manner, no one can criticise and condemn 
 another unsparingly without reflecting discredit upon itself. 
 This truth by no means argues, however, that there should 
 be no territorial readjustments to right wrongs of the past, 
 as a result of this present war. It is to help us to see, on 
 the other hand, that many pretended arguments for free- 
 dom of peoples and restoration of former conditions, that 
 are advanced by Germany, her allies and sympathizers, are 
 besides the point, and not at all parallel cases to those con- 
 ditions of subject and unfortunate peoples whom she and 
 
44 The Causes Of War 
 
 the other autocratic governments (including Russia in the 
 past) have criminally oppressed, rather than enlightened 
 politically and otherwise. For instance, the England of 
 1917 is not responsible for a former England's crimes 
 against Ireland. Since 1911 England has offered her "home 
 rule," but civil differences and strife in Ireland would not 
 have it so. It is all an Irish question now, not an English 
 question, and the factions in Ireland are wholly responsible 
 for its fall. England would gladly be rid of the thing alto- 
 gether. It is what it has always largely been, — a religious 
 question, a strife between Catholics and Protestants, of the 
 Protestant Ulster counties and the greater Ireland, which is 
 overwhelmingly Catholic. That is not the only difficulty at 
 present, but it is by far the most important one. Ireland 
 certainly ought to accept Home Rule, as England now of- 
 fers it, rather than hold out for independence, as the radicals 
 and lawless element are doing. Ireland alone is too weak 
 to protect herself. She has not the wealth nor power to 
 maintain an army and a navy, to guard an independent 
 status, and without these she would be a prey to any power 
 that might seek to enthrall her. The Germans are beside 
 the mark when they demand that England give up Ireland, 
 India, South Africa and Egypt, — all of which are as demo- 
 cratically and self-governed as their people will accept — 
 before they demand that Germany restore Belgium, Poland, 
 Alsace-Lorraine, and the recently ravished Balkan States 
 and Russia — all of which were exploited, and still are, sole- 
 ly for the Teutonic race's benefit, not their own. Those 
 nations and parts of nations, however, that are oppressed 
 by foreign rulers and governments, such as Poland, Bo- 
 hemia, Hungary (largely), the various Balkan peoples with- 
 in the Dual Monarchy and the Italians in the Trentino and 
 Triest regions— which once were free peoples, or joined to 
 their own nationalities, must be restored, to work out the 
 destiny of their own nationalities under democratic forms 
 of government, if Europe is to have peace in the future. 
 
Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions 45 
 
 Of the weaker and less distinct types, such as Finland and 
 several of the African and other colonial possessions, per- 
 haps autonomy, or a gradual growth in self-government is 
 best. The conditions seem to warrant this solution, even in 
 the case of the Philippine islanders. To give them their in- 
 dependence in the very near future, with their ignorance of, 
 and inexperience in self-government, is mere folly, and would 
 leave them the prey of the ambitious despoiler. It would 
 be more charitable, if not more honorable, to sell them out- 
 right, to the highest bidder, than thus to cast them adrift. 
 
 Again, the difference we would point out is this ; when 
 subject peoples are in the hands of liberal democratic gov- 
 ernments they are relatively safe ; but wherever they are 
 under autocratic rulers, they are continually in danger. 
 History has abundantly proved the maxim, "Put not your 
 trust in kings." 
 
 We have already noted that, under pretense of defend- 
 ing its flag, its interest or its citizens, many a nation has 
 taken advantage of the occasion to establish itself and ex- 
 tend its power gradually, over less able or less fortunate 
 countries. These things have been so carried out at times 
 that it has been impossible to chastise the aggressor, or pre- 
 vent them. But happily, that age is passing. The latest 
 example of the above cause, previous to the present war, 
 was Italy, in her war with Turkey for North African pos- 
 sessions, just before the outbreak of the first Balkan war, 
 a few years ago. Yet, there are those who justify this type 
 of war on the ground that it is necessary, as in the case of 
 Hindus, Africans, etc., to make them subjects first, in order 
 to transform them for the better afterwards. But at best, 
 this is a very doubtful position to take, and is a mere excuse 
 for war. The question is, does the end justify the means? 
 
 For wars they have waged in the past on pretext chiefly, 
 and not for sufficient cause, all the great nations of Europe 
 are paying dearly today. England, for example, is suffering 
 and paying the penalty in this war for troubles she engen- 
 
46 The Causes Of War 
 
 dered and wars she helped to promote in her own selfish in- 
 terests as late as the nineteenth century. The toll of 100,- 
 000 brave men in the Dardanelles campaign was (in large 
 part at least) the price she paid for upholding Turkey, "the 
 Sick Man of Europe," a couple of generations ago. For 
 less than fifty years ago England was still in much the same 
 position that Germany was in 1914, with motives very simi- 
 lar (under Disraeli) both with regard to her international 
 policies and her allies. But England's democracy, the voice 
 of her people, has saved her in the present generation from 
 the condemnation that the world heaps upon Germany. 
 Likewise, Germany can be saved from this condemnation 
 in the future only, when democracy there, as in England, 
 comes to her rescue. Moreover, one of the certain results 
 of this war for Germany, whether it come soon, before the 
 present war is over, or after years of internal struggle, will 
 be the triumph of democracy over the Kaiser, the haughty 
 Crown Prince and the autocratic princes and governments 
 of the several States of the Empire. We should not be sur- 
 prised also, to see Austria-Hungary dismembered, its vari- 
 ous peoples reverting to the nationalities to which they be- 
 long. The Czech movement in Bohemia shows the drift 
 of affairs in that polyglot empire. 
 
 This spirit of democracy, — of individual and social jus- 
 tice — is responsible for the cooperation among the liberal 
 governments that is to win the fight of the people of the 
 earth for freedom. As we said in our introductory article 
 of the present series, this is the culmination of the Political 
 Revolution, and is the greatest and most glorious develop- 
 ment of the modern age. The reactionary powers of Eu- 
 rope have far underrated this great movement, and hence 
 have miscalculated its strength and effect, all through the 
 past decade and the present war. Similarly, many of us 
 have little realized the magnitude and meaning of this great 
 liberal wave in the present generation. On this fact Mr. 
 John B. Winslow, chief justice of the Supreme Court of 
 
Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions 47 
 
 Wisconsin, has the following to say, — "The future historian 
 will find many things of surpassing interest when he comes to 
 review the opening decades of the twentieth century, but he 
 will find nothing more interesting or significant than the 
 great wave of democracy which is now sweeping over the 
 earth. . . . This remarkable world movement must be ap- 
 parent to the most superficial present day observer of the 
 signs of the times. Let any such observer take the world's 
 map and put his finger where he will, he will find some phase 
 of it. In Great Britain it takes the form of nullifying the 
 powers of the House of Lords and curbing the privileges 
 of birth; in France and Germany it appears in the garb of 
 socialism ; in China a republic supplants the rule of the 
 Manchu dynasty, and in other countries it appears in vari- 
 ous movements, all directed with greater or less wisdom to 
 the wiping out of one form or another of privilege. ... In 
 our own country the democratic drift is, perhaps, more 
 marked than anywhere else. . . . Unless every sign fails, 
 we shall have democracies . . . before many years such as 
 the world has never seen on any scale before ; at least, we 
 shall experiment with them." Greater weight attaches to 
 this statement of Judge Winslow from the fact that it was 
 made before democracy over the world made itself so po- 
 tently felt in the present conflict. 
 
 We can better understand the illusions of the German 
 people and their ignorance of the true science of govern- 
 ment (an ignorance or incapacity which many of their own 
 statesmen have avowed) when we note the character of their 
 leaders, no matter how great statesmen they may have been. 
 The people of the whole empire practically have been nur- 
 tured politically on illusions, false principles and pretexts, 
 not on principles of justice in State and world affairs. Fred- 
 erick the Great furnishes a case in point. In his memoirs he 
 makes this statement: "My troops being always ready to 
 act, my treasury well filled, the vivacity of my character, 
 my ambition, the desire to have myself spoken of, — were the 
 
48 The Causes Of War 
 
 reasons that I went to war with Marie Therese," — i. e., when 
 he took the Austrian province of Silesia away from her by 
 force and involved all Europe in war. Many German mili- 
 tarists, both in the army and the navy, several great Ger- 
 man authors of political science texts, as well as responsible 
 heads of the great commercial concerns, — have persistently 
 held forth this same soulless principle to the German nation. 
 These things are perhaps too well known to need specific 
 instances given here. It is true that other European gov- 
 ernments acted upon quite similar theories a century ago ; 
 but that the German Kaiser and government still cling to 
 it, — is their peculiar crime in our day. Napoleon Bona- 
 parte, after his campaign of 1812, made this remark con- 
 cerning his own aggressiveness: "Alexander (of Russia) 
 and myself were like two cocks, ready to go into battle with- 
 out knowing why" — a statement which was false as to Na- 
 poleon's designs- — but which nevertheless acknowledges that 
 neither sovereign had just cause for precipitating that ter- 
 rible year of conflict. Ambition, wholly selfish, was the real 
 cause, of course. Napoleon's desire was that all kings might 
 assist at his final imperial coronation. He took the world- 
 conqueror, Alexander the Great, as his model. And today, 
 the German Crown Prince, it seems, is not so far removed 
 from the same folly as we were content to believe a couple 
 of years ago. That the ambition of monarchs and leaders 
 no longer plays the part in war that it once did, however, is 
 a distinct step in the progress of the people's rule. 
 
 As a final word let me repeat: the important; differences 
 between fundamental causes of war, and the immediate causes 
 and pretexts cannot be too strongly emphasized. The writer 
 doubts if the present generation will bring elimination of 
 the fundamental causes. A great deal, on the other hand, 
 may be done to eradicate the immediate causes and pretexts. 
 Secretary Bryan did a noble thing along this line, in secur- 
 ing the twenty-odd arbitration treaties between the United 
 States and other countries, to prevent wars until at least a 
 
Pretexts and Excuses for War — Some Illusions 49 
 
 year's consideration is made. Another instance a few years 
 ago was the agreement between Argentine and Chili that 
 they would not go to war for five years over boundary dis- 
 putes that were about to lead to a clash of arms. They kept 
 their agreement. Eradication of the vital causes, however, 
 we may well question coming, except by the long, gradual, 
 but sure process of political evolution. Stricter regulations 
 may be made and enforced through international law and 
 agreement, backed by the "League to Enforce Peace." But, 
 like the "Balance of Power," to which it is similar, this can- 
 not be permanent, in itself — it can serve only for a time. 
 Yet, it is true that the coming peace is fraught with great 
 possibilities in this direction, while revulsion at the present 
 horrors leads many to "faintly trust the larger hope" of 
 permanent peace hereafter. Do not such persons forget, 
 however, that the whole process of civilization has been a 
 development through continuous conflict toward compara- 
 tive peace? This condition has been brought about by a 
 slow process of education of the minds and conscience of 
 men; and this we must realize in its final consummation be- 
 fore there can be lasting peace for mankind. That the pres- 
 ent tragedy of nations may lend impetus to and hasten the 
 day of peace is the reasonable hope of most men, though 
 many doubt its realization in the near future. 
 
 The Europe of 1920 will little resemble that of 1914, just 
 as the Europe of 1914, little resembled that of a century 
 earlier. Greece was the first in the nineteenth century to 
 recover her national life ; and now she is recovering it anew. 
 Belgium was separated in 1830 from her unnatural incor- 
 poration with Holland ; now, she must be resurrected to a 
 newer, greater life, and guaranteed a free existence and de- 
 velopment. Hungary received a constitution of her own, in 
 the dual monarchy in 1848, if she did not gain the indepen- 
 dence the patriot Kossuth dreamed for her; she must now 
 be given an even freer hand, if not complete independence. 
 Bohemia at that time struggled for self government; she 
 
50 The Causes Of War 
 
 must be given complete "home rule," if not more this time. 
 The Bohemians have already raised their voice in a men- 
 acing way toward German Austria. Poland more than once 
 rose in revolt against those who destroyed her independence. 
 As President Wilson so timely pointed out in his war mes- 
 sage, last year, the Poles must once more breathe as an in- 
 dependent people. The great crime of partitioning in the 
 eighteenth century must be atoned for, and the penalty paid 
 and loss sustained, by her despoilers. The peoples of the 
 world, — with friendly help and oversight in some instances 
 of course, — must be left to work out their destinies and 
 "the world must be made safe for democracy." The in- 
 fluence of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs must be 
 made as harmless as that of the Hanovarians in England 
 today, or like them, must turn their influence into the cur- 
 rent of democracy. 
 
 War, we have said, assumes the survival of the fittest, the 
 most apt, the best. But, the best for what? The fittest for 
 what? That is the capital question now. It is not easy for 
 one people to modify the wish, the interests, and still less 
 the national characteristics of another. The failure at many 
 efforts at it ha,s helped to bring on this colossal war. Once 
 it could be done by war and the conqueror after the war; 
 but in so far as this transformation is possible today, 
 it is not by war and force that it is to be accomplished. Free 
 intercourse between nations, social and commercial, is per- 
 haps the most powerful pacifying influence. When nations 
 and races come to mingle with each other more vitally, like 
 individuals they will come to understand and appreciate one 
 another better, and will at last learn to heed that most cost- 
 ly and precious lesson, that peace, and not war, is to be the 
 true and only rational basis of civilized human society. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN EUROPE 
 
 TO a considerable extent the conditions that brought 
 about the great European conflict in 1914, of the pres- 
 ent century, can be traced to the work of the Congress of 
 Vienna, at the end of the Napoleonic era, a century before. 
 The present decade, consequently, has often been compared 
 and contrasted with the Napoleonic period, a little over a 
 century ago. And in no other respect, perhaps, has the con- 
 trast been so sharply drawn as in the difference of motive 
 that actuated Prince Metternich and his autocratic congress 
 of princes and their minions, on the one hand, and the mo- 
 tives which have been the impelling force in the liberal na- 
 tions in the World War of 1914-1918, on the other; and 
 the contrast continues in the spirit and work of the peace 
 conference at Versailles. 
 
 Since the above is true, in our brief review of the imme- 
 diate background of the great World War we cannot stop 
 short of the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) and its imme- 
 diate outgrowth, the Holy Alliance, a hundred years agone. 
 There were two cardinal principles of this notorious Vienna 
 congress that were responsible in so large a degree for the 
 terrible woes of the present time, namely (1), the bargain- 
 ing about of territories and nationalities as if they were 
 "mere chattels and pawns in a game," and (2), the restora- 
 tion of oppressive and autocratic kings upon their thrones, 
 against the flame of democracy enkindled by the French 
 Revolution, and the repression of all democratic aspiration 
 of the people of the nations. One needs but to examine the 
 history of the first half of the nineteenth century and recall 
 
 61 
 
52 The Causes Of War 
 
 the origin of our Monroe Doctrine to satisfy himself as to 
 this fact. 
 
 Despite the strength of the peoples' revolutions of 1830 
 and 1848, which came so near overthrowing once for all this 
 medieval tyranny, enough of it remained on the continent 
 of Europe to make possible the next great step in violation 
 of the rights of man, — the crime of Bismarck and the Prus- 
 sian war-lords in their wars for the union of the German 
 peoples in a great empire. This story is too well known to 
 warrant its repetition here. But what was the consequence 
 of this type of unification? That is what is all-pertinent to 
 our subject in hand. It was simply this: Bismarck's im- 
 perialistic and "blood and iron" policy soon arrayed a 
 group of nations in bitter, distrustful and hostile feeling 
 against himself, his sovereign and the new German Empire. 
 To meet this menace to his dream of a "Deutschland uber 
 Alles" the greater part of the remaining years of his life 
 were spent. The astute Imperial Chancellor sought con- 
 stantly an alliance to meet this growing hostility with an- 
 other threat, or application, of "blood and iron." He 
 would sow discord (divide et impera), — as has frequently 
 been practiced by Germany since, — and bring in jealous 
 rivalry, if possible, his threatening opponents, while he would 
 seek an alliance with one or more of them. And this alliance 
 would safeguard the interests of Germany in the future. 
 Thus arose the Triple Alliance, Bismarck's famous "Drei- 
 bund" of Germany, Austria and Italy, in 1881. Italy, con- 
 trary to her natural interests and past experience, was in- 
 duced to join in this "unholy" alliance with the Teutonic 
 powers because of France's aggressive movements at this 
 time in Algeria, northern Africa, — which territory was 
 coveted by Italy and was adjacent to Tunis, which had 
 already been appropriated by France and which in turn 
 adjoined Tripoli which the Italians in 1911 fought with 
 Turkey for. The Italian people, however, soon became 
 aware that their age-long enemies, Austria and Germany, 
 
The Immediate Background of the War in Europe 53 
 
 were more of a menace to them than was France. Hejice, at 
 an early date Italy showed that she could not be depended 
 upon in an offensive war as a partner of the Teutonic 
 countries, — as many German writers pointed out years be^ 
 fore the fateful outbreak of war in 1914. 
 
 And now, to go back for another thread of our narrative. 
 After the humiliation of France in 1871 Bismarck had hoped 
 that his neighbor to the west had been so completely crushed 
 that she could never again be a real obstacle to the ambi- 
 tions of Germany. He was therefore astonished, and not a 
 little alarmed, to witness the rapid recovery of France from 
 her losses in this war. By 1875 he was planning another 
 war with France, — one of the "sperlos versenkt" kind. But 
 he had already sown the dragon's teeth. Great Britain and 
 Russia both called a halt upon him. He was constrained to 
 forego this war; but he must make up for this failure in 
 some way. Then followed his constant effort until he se- 
 cured the Triple Alliance referred to above. 
 
 But before the "Dreibund" was accomplished the war- 
 cloud had lowered over the Balkans, and in this both Ger- 
 many and Austria were deeply interested. The Balkan 
 provinces (as we bring out in Chapter VII of this work), 
 stung to madness by the "Bulgarian Massacres" and other 
 atrocities, led by Bulgaria, were planning a revolution and 
 war to drive the abominable Turk out of Europe. And they 
 looked to Russia for aid. The Czar was more than willing, 
 since he had his heart set on Constantinople and the Medi- 
 terranean trade. Upon the pretext of interfering in be- 
 half of persecuted Christians he joined the Balkans, 
 marched upon the Turk, and soon won a complete victory 
 over the Sultan. In this Russo-Turkish war of 1878 the 
 Ottoman rule in Europe would have ended, but for the jeal- 
 ous intervention of the other great powers of Europe, led 
 by Austria and Great Britain. This time they feared that 
 Russia, rather than Germany (and Germany was with them, 
 strongly seconding Austria) would break the "balance of 
 
54 The Causes Of War 
 
 power" and threaten their expansion, if not their empires. 
 Then, upon the close of this war, which only partly emanci- 
 pated the Balkans from the Turk, came the famous Con- 
 gress of Berlin. Bismarck was playing a grand role in 
 securing this congress for Berlin, and he was the domi- 
 nating figure in it. But the real significance of this Treaty 
 of Berlin for our purposes is, that Russia considered Ger- 
 many as one of the chief nations that had robbed her of her 
 conquests of the war, and hence Russia was later willing to 
 listen to the overtures of Germany's most watchful adver- 
 sary, France. 
 
 After the movements described in the preceding para- 
 graphs had culminated for Bismarck and Germany in the 
 Triple Alliance of 1881, France was the first to sense the 
 larger meaning of it all, and sought an alliance to counter- 
 act the "Dreibund." This led to the Dual Alliance between 
 France and Russia; for Russia, as we have just seen, had 
 had a forecast of Bismarckian diplomacy in the Congress of 
 Berlin, and next to France, was most endangered by the new 
 militant Germany. 
 
 Great Britain so far, had kept aloof from both alliances. 
 Relying upon her great fleet and upon her isolation by water 
 from the Continent, she, like the United States for a cen- 
 tury, felt for a time that she could steer an independent 
 course. Both nations have since been disillusioned. (This, 
 by the way, is a strong argument in favor of some sort of 
 a league of nations, to take the place for a time at least, 
 if not to develop finally into a permanent one, — of the "Bal- 
 ance of Power," which will never remain "balanced"). It 
 was the immense increase of standing armies on the Conti- 
 nent, as against Britain's "contemptible little army" of 
 volunteers, and the German feverish rush to build a great 
 navy, that opened the eyes of Englishmen and, coupled with 
 the reapproachment efforts of King Edward VII, led Great 
 Britain about 1905 into the "friendly understanding — En- 
 tente Cordiale — with France, and then with Russia. This 
 
The Immediate Background of the War in Europe 55 
 
 Triple Entente amounted to a three-fold alliance against the 
 Triple Alliance of the Teutonic powers and Italy, with the 
 distinct advantage that England was able secretly to culti- 
 vate a friendly feeling with Italy, for reasons that we have 
 already stated. 
 
 It is significant that this Triple Entente was consum- 
 mated in spite of the Fashoda incident of 1898, which had 
 threatened war between England and France, and in spite 
 of some conflicting interests of these two nations in the 
 Near East. Moreover, this Entente was maintained through- 
 out the next decade (1905-1915) despite the difficulties that 
 Great Britain and Russia encountered over "spheres of in- 
 fluence" in Persia and boundaries in the Himalayas. These 
 facts serve to show that Great Britain, France and Russia 
 all distrusted the bold and unscrupulous policy of Germany, 
 and would compromise their own differences in order to have 
 each other's aid against this common danger, whenever the 
 test should come. This explains the continuance of the 
 Triple Entente to the very hour of war in 1914. 
 
 Meanwhile Germany and Austria-Hungary were showing 
 unmistakable signs of a determination to control all cen- 
 tral Europe and also the Gateways to the East, by their 
 Mittel-Europa-Berlin to Bagdad railway scheme, and Aus- 
 tria's aggressiveness in the Balkans. Let us not forget that 
 Austria had been instrumental in robbing Russia of the 
 Balkan victories, 1878, and now (1908), while Russia as a 
 result of the Russo-Japanese war and internal conflict was 
 powerless to aid her Balkan kindred, annexed the Serbian 
 provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This she did without 
 any nations' consent except her own (and encouragement 
 of her ally Germany), and contrary to the wishes of her 
 own inhabitants. 
 
 The German Emperor had urged Austria to proceed with 
 this seizure of the two Balkan provinces, promising her that 
 with his "shining sword" he would stand by her side. Thus 
 had Austria, at the risk of a great war in Europe, changed 
 
56 The Causes Of War 
 
 by main force the status of a couple of Balkan provinces 
 that had been assigned to her for protection at the Congress 
 of Berlin, from a weak protectorate for administrative pur- 
 poses, into a part and parcel of her empire. This is one 
 of the five instances in which Germany and Austria in the 
 decade 1905-1915, by their "brazen aggressions" threatened 
 the peace of Europe and the world. These five instances the 
 author has referred to in another chapter. But a little ex- 
 planation is in place here. The first instance was when the 
 Kaiser, after announcing that no changes of territory must 
 be made anywhere in the world without his consent, in the 
 first Moroccan crisis in 1905, after France, backed by Great 
 Britain and Spain had informed the sultan of that country 
 that he must submit to order and decency, — made a per- 
 sonal visit to this sultan and informed him that he did not 
 have to do anything of the kind. Although the Kaiser was 
 finally obliged to retreat from this position through the in- 
 ternational finding of the Algeciras conference, the French 
 minister Delcasse, to assuage the wrath of Germany and the 
 Kaiser's wounded pride, was forced to resign, to keep the 
 peace. The second instance was the annexation of Bosnia- 
 Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908, just mentioned 
 above. The third crisis was precipitated by the Kaiser send- 
 ing his warship the Panther to the Moroccan port of Agidir, 
 on the occasion of violent disorder breaking out there and 
 France's sending troops, upon the advice of Spain and with 
 the backing of England to restore order in that country. 
 France was now upheld by the powerful assurance of Great 
 Britain and Russia, which had recovered considerably from 
 the results of the Russo-Japanese war. Yet, France yielded 
 sufficiently to grant the Kaiser considerable territory on 
 the Congo, as a counterpoise for what she was getting in 
 Morocco, and thus again she helped to avoid a war with 
 Germany. It was with very ill grace, however, that Ger- 
 many acceded to peace at all on this occasion. Her great 
 army expansion was not yet completed, else she would not 
 
The Immediate Background of the War in Europe 57 
 
 have, as our German authorities tell us. This occurred in 
 1910-1911. The fourth came in connection with the Balkan 
 wars, 1911-13, when the German and Austro-Hungarian 
 governments backed the Turks (German officers had been 
 drilling Turkish troops since 1888, and in 1896 Wilhelm II 
 had visited Turkey, sealed a strong bond of friendship with 
 the Turkish government, and joined with the Turks as a 
 promoter of their "holy religion," and trade with Germany) 
 and were upon the point of going to war with the Balkan 
 states. Great Britain more than any other European na- 
 tion sought to prevent this threatened general European 
 war, and should be given credit for the same. Had the En- 
 tente been as aggressive as Germany and Austria, no doubt 
 the World War would have broken out two or three years 
 sooner. The fifth and last instance was the German Imperial 
 Government's deliberately launching the greatest tragedy 
 of history, in 1914. Since the precipitation of this fatal 
 crisis is quite extensively treated in other portions of this 
 book a further exposition of it here is unnecessary. 1 
 
 1 For a further treatment of the above five crises the reader is referred 
 to the International Year Book, 1914 to 1918 numbers. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR 
 
 THE writer has been encouraged by friends to make a 
 separate statement of the causes of the present World 
 War, before concluding the series of articles on the Causes 
 of War. Such a statement is all the more pertinent at this 
 time, since teachers and students, as well as the public gen- 
 erally, are more vitally interested in the conflict so recently 
 raging than in any former war, — as is natural they should 
 be; moreover, a good deal of the opposition in this country 
 to the war has been due to ignorance of its causes, — of why 
 America is in it, — and of the issues at stake. Still another 
 reason for the following treatise is, that nowhere have we 
 found anything that approaches a complete and accurate 
 statement of the vital causes as they have affected all the 
 powers engaged, — either collectively or individually. And 
 finally now that the war is over, if we are to be of service 
 to the bringing of a just peace that we have been in waging 
 a just war, we must understand the causes in order to help 
 intelligently in applying the remedy for war. 
 
 Two distinctions made in a former chapter I wish to re- 
 peat at the outset, — namely, (1) that remote and funda- 
 mental causes must be carefully distinguished from imme- 
 diate causes and from pretexts; and (2) that there are dif- 
 ferent causes for different nations, or groups of nations, 
 and usually as many causes at least as there are peoples 
 engaged in conflict. In this connection it is well to repeat 
 that it is difficult to classify the causes fully and accurately, 
 to do which requires great pains, as well as familiarity with 
 every important detail of the life, government and ambitions 
 
 58 
 
Causes of the Present War 59 
 
 of each State. The treatment which follows, however, the 
 author feels, is essentially just and reasonably accurate. 
 
 We need spend but little time with the mere pretexts for 
 this war, such as the Austrian forty-eight-hour ultimatum 
 to Serbia for the assassination of the Austrian archduke 
 and wife, — the twenty-four-hour demands and the ultima- 
 tums of Germany to France and England, together with her 
 demand that Russia immediately demobilize her vast army; 
 — or Germany's excuse in the case of her invasion of Bel- 
 gium, that England or France, or both, would have invaded 
 that country, and thus broken their solemn treaties, as Ger- 
 many did, if the Germans had not gone first. Most of the 
 above excuses were premeditated lies, as the facts have since 
 shown, and all were mystified, presumptuous, and wholly self- 
 ish pretexts for war. It is worse than stupidity for a per- 
 son to believe that England or France would have invaved 
 Belgium, — no matter what irresponsible individuals may 
 have said or imagined, — in order to break through into Ger- 
 many, when England had only 50,000 troops ready in those 
 first days, as against the vast army of a million superbly 
 equipped men which Germany had ready for instant action 
 on the Belgian frontier, to say nothing of Belgium's army 
 of defense, also, in face of the fact that it took England two 
 years to raise an army large enough to have the slightest 
 hope of striking through Belgium., against Germany, had 
 the British even desired it. It is equal folly to claim that 
 France would have invaded Belgium, since she had prac- 
 tically all her army concentrated on the Alsace-Lorraine 
 border, at the other extremity of the country, a fact which 
 proves that even after the German ultimatum (which 
 amounted to a declaration of war) — France did not expect 
 such dishonorable conduct by Germany ; and without the aid 
 of England's little army, she would not have been able 
 to save her own capital, Paris, in the battle of the Marne, 
 in her extremity, throwing in, as she did, tens of thousands 
 of young men, unarmed, to face certain death, in order to 
 
60 The Causes Of War 
 
 fill up the lines and check the onrush of the Germans. These 
 are the facts of history. The German government's per- 
 sistent falsifying to the German people and to the world 
 constitutes another of the long list of its atrocities and 
 barbarous crimes, that are prolonging the suffering and 
 horrors of war, even now. 
 
 We shall now proceed to the consideration of the vital 
 causes of the conflict. We shall take (1) those of the En- 
 tente allies and (2) those of the Central Powers. This gen- 
 eral and natural separation of the causes into two groups is 
 necessary because, as stated above, there are different causes 
 for different countries, and as many causes (or more), as 
 there are nations engaged in combat. Let us take the indi- 
 vidual States of the allies first. 
 
 England's Causes for Going to War 
 
 (1) Protection of her colonial possessions and main- 
 tenance of her supremacy on the sea and in commerce. 
 
 (2) Democratic principles vs. autocracy, and opposi- 
 tion to the militarism of the German imperial government. 
 
 (3) Germany 9 s invasion of Belgium and England's 
 treaty obligation in guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality. 
 (The same solemn treaty that Germany violated.) 
 
 (4) Maintenance of the "balance of power" in Europe, 
 threatened by the rapid development and the ambitions of 
 Germany. 
 
 France 
 
 (1) Maintenance of treaty obligations and their protec- 
 tion (Russia and England in particular). 
 
 (&) Fear of Pan-German dominance and conquests in 
 Europe, with their dangers to France. 
 
 (3) Revenge, for Germany's taking Alsace and Lor- 
 raine in 1871, with race-hatred engendered by that act. 
 
 (4) Democracy (France a republic) vs. military autoc- 
 racy. 
 
Causes of the Present War 61 
 
 (5) Distrust (as in England) of the colonial policy and 
 ambitions of Germany. 
 
 (6) German invasion compelled France to fight, in self- 
 defense. 
 
 Russia 
 
 (1) Desire for control in Balkans and possession of 
 Constantinople, with access to the Mediterranean, as against 
 Austria-Hungary's ambitions in the same region (involving 
 conquest). 
 
 (2) Racial sympathy with Serbia and other Slavic 
 States. 
 
 (3) Distrust and hatred of Germany (by the Russian 
 people especially). 
 
 (4) Democracy vs. power of kings (recent factor). 
 
 Italy 
 
 (1) Hatred of Austria, an enemy of Italian freedom 
 and unity. 
 
 (2) Spirit of nationality — completion of unification of 
 Italy, by securing Italian provinces still held by Austria. 
 
 (3) Fear of the growing power and ambition of Ger- 
 many, i. e., Italy wished to maintain the "Balance of Power" 
 in Europe, which Germany was about to overthrow. 
 
 (4) Desire for more Italian influence and commercial 
 advantages in the Balkans. 
 
 The Balkan States — Serbia, Montenegro, Roumania, Greece 
 
 (1) Desire to work out their own destinies (spirit of 
 nationality) and be free from Turkish and Austro-Hun- 
 garian menaces — a sequel to the Balkan wars of 1912-13. 
 
 (2) Securing of natural and national boundaries (race 
 cohesion) as fruits of their conquests of 1911-13, which 
 Austria deprived them of in the moment of victory. 
 
 (3) Growth of spirit of democracy (resulting in recent 
 action of Greece). 
 
62 The Causes Of War 
 
 Japan 
 
 (1) Fear of commercial power of Germany in the far 
 East and in the Pacific. 
 
 (£) Spirit of expansion and nationality. 
 
 (3) Economic needs arising from great population with 
 little room to expand. 
 
 (4) The Japanese "Monroe Doctrine" — similar to posi- 
 tion of U. S. with respect to Latin America. 
 
 Small States of Europe, Asia and America, such as Portu- 
 gal, Cuba, Slam, and semi-belligerent attitude of 
 several other countries in Eastern 
 and Western Worlds 
 
 (1) Democracy vs. Autocracy. 
 
 (£) Violation of international law and rights of neu- 
 trality by Germany and other Central powers. 
 
 (3) Treaty obligations with larger nations, with pro- 
 tection they afford (as in Cuba with United States, Por- 
 tugal with England, etc.). 
 
 (4) Sufferings and hardships caused by the German 
 submarine blockade and destruction of neutral commerce 
 (so strong as to warrant separation from the four causes 
 above — in fact, the leading cause for war with several of the 
 small States referred to). 
 
 Belgium 
 
 ( 1 ) Invasion by Germany, which carries with it : 
 
 (a) Fight for national honor and for existence — purely 
 a case of self-defense. 
 
 (b) Maintenance of her solemn treaty obligations with 
 England and France (the same obligation that Germany 
 had with these same countries and Belgium, and which Ger- 
 many so contemptuously broke, as "mere scraps of paper"). 
 
Causes of the Present War 63 
 
 THE CENTRAL POWERS 
 
 Austria-Hungary 
 
 (1) Desire for control of the Balkans (conquest) with 
 Constantinople, and predominating influence in the near 
 East, particularly the Mediterranean countries and com- 
 merce. 
 
 (2) Growth of nationality among the Slavic and other 
 peoples of the Austrian Empire, with its consequent peril to 
 the oppressive, autocratic government of the Dual Mon- 
 archy — (well may she fear it!) 
 
 (3) Growth of democracy among the several peoples of 
 the Empire (the companion to national feeling and desire 
 for independence). 
 
 (4) Pan-Germanism — philosophy of imperialism. 
 
 Germany 
 
 (1) Militarism, — the doctrine of "blood and iron." 
 
 (2) Jealousy of England's commercial power and deter- 
 mination to wrest from her the supremacy on the sea, and 
 in colonial commerce. 
 
 (3) Pan-Germanism — imperialism, the dream of a Teu- 
 tonic "Mittel-Europa," with German domination on the con- 
 tinent of Europe. (Berlin to Bagdad Railroad and coun- 
 
 try.) 
 
 (4) Autocracy's struggle with the growing spirit of de- 
 mocracy throughout the world — the curse of "divine right" 
 kings. 
 
 (5) Domineering German diplomacy (one of the great- 
 est immediate causes). 
 
 Turkey 
 
 (1) Hope of regaining lost provinces in Europe. 
 (£) Revenge upon the Balkan States for their conquests 
 of Turkish territory in the Balkan wars, 1912-13. 
 (3) German influence and propaganda. 
 
64 The Causes Of War 
 
 Bulgaria 
 
 (1) Revenge upon the other Balkan States for depriv- 
 ing her of much of her conquests in the First Balkan war, 
 1912. 
 
 (2) Hope of regaining her conquests of 1912. 
 
 (3) German influences and sympathies, particularly of 
 the ruling house in Bulgaria. 
 
 U. S. REASONS FOR GOING TO WAR WITH 
 
 GERMANY 
 
 (1) To uphold the principles of international law, the 
 sacred obligations of treaties, and the rights of neutrals, 
 and of small States. 
 
 (2) The moral ground of humanity, in the scale against 
 barbarism. 
 
 (3) To uphold her own honor and respect among the 
 powers of the earth, and to prove the sincerity of her pro- 
 fessed principles. 
 
 (4) To cast in her powerful resources with the liberal 
 governments of the world with the cause of democracy vs. 
 autocracy, — to help make the world "safe for democracy. 
 
 >? 
 
 Explanation of Causes 
 
 And now, to discuss the above causes briefly. We shall 
 follow the order given in our outline, and take England, of 
 the allies first. 
 
 (1) Protection of colonial possessions and maintenance 
 of supremacy on the sea and in commerce. It has been 
 claimed by Germany that she has as good right to a colonial 
 empire and supremacy on the sea as England has, which 
 would be true if she gave her colonies the same freedom and 
 self-government that England does hers. But just the oppo- 
 site is the case, as Germany's colonies in Africa have shown. 
 True enough it is that Great Britain got many of her cola- 
 
Causes of the Present War 65 
 
 nial possessions and much of her consequent commercial 
 power unjustly and by methods of oppression and force. 
 But this nearly all happened before England became the 
 democracy she is today ; and she has done as much as any 
 nation on earth could do in recent years to right those 
 wrongs of "kings and aristocracies" — in fact so much that 
 her colonies are allowed more freedom than those of any 
 other country (as England has always done on colonial lib- 
 erties among the powers of Europe) ; while on the other 
 hand, Germany's government and exploitation of her col- 
 onies has been so oppressive generally speaking, and so 
 feudalistic, that the colonists hate her, and welcomed the 
 chance of war to remedy their condition. Again, Great Brit- 
 ain's fleet and commerce threaten the world in no such man- 
 ner as Germany's do, but have repeatedly been a protection 
 to other countries from diabolical intrigues and aggressions 
 by the German government and its agents. It was Germany 
 above all others that worked and plotted to throw China 
 into anarchy and disruption, at the same time extorting 
 concessions from that helpless government that were most 
 humiliating and embarrassing to the Chinese, as though 
 China were vassal to the Kaiser, — all through a process that 
 exhibited a deliberate policy of atrocity that rivaled in every 
 respect the more recent ravages of Belgium. The Kaiser 
 set these crimes afoot with the injunction to his agents that 
 they should make the power of Germany felt in China, that 
 the Chinese should be impressed by it. It is the German gov- 
 ernment that has upheld and been chiefly responsible for the 
 continuation of the horrible, ghastly murders, starvation 
 and practical annihilation of the Armenian Christians in 
 Turkey. By his mere word the Kaiser could easily have put 
 an end to this butchery, any time in these recent years ; but 
 instead, a few months ago, after one of the greatest mas- 
 sacres of wholly innocent people was perpetrated, the Kaiser 
 sent the congratulation to the Sultan, "God bless you for 
 your noble victory," etc., etc. 
 
66 The Causes Of War 
 
 (£) Democracy versus autocracy. We have already 
 called attention to the fact that Great Britain as a whole 
 is a democracy practically as much as our own. In fact it 
 is more so, in several particulars (though not in others), 
 especially, since 1900. On the other hand, we need only to 
 read any historical account of the form and workings of the 
 Prussian and German imperial governments to realize that 
 they were practically absolute monarchies, — each in its 
 sphere, and the Kaiser being at the head of both — veiling to 
 the people their feudalistic character (a scheme of Bis- 
 marck's, but followed more extensively since) only by pa- 
 ternalistic reforms. 
 
 (3) Germany's invasion of Belgium, besides breaking 
 faith with England, presented a direct menace to that coun- 
 try, from across the Channel, greater than any danger that 
 has confronted her since the period of the early career of 
 Napoleon Bonaparte, before the battle of Trafalgar, more 
 than a century ago. Autocracy so near a growing democ- 
 racy was not to be tolerated. 
 
 (4) As to maintenance of the "balance of power" in 
 Europe, we may say that the development of Germany in 
 the present generation, — agriculturally, commercially, scien- 
 tifically, financially and otherwise industrially — has been phe- 
 nomenal, and has astonished the world! Add to this fact 
 that her militarism and Machiavellianism in politics have 
 kept pace with all this growth, and you have the "Teutonic 
 menace" to Europe and to the world. 
 
 Next France, with her causes. France, of course, was 
 more directly menaced than England. Although France had 
 compulsory and universal military service she was more dem- 
 ocratic and therefore less prepared for immediate action 
 than was Germany, and was a year — a fateful year — behind 
 Germany in her military program. A democracy cannot 
 mould a people into a perfect military machine so quickly 
 as an absolute power above them can drive them into it. 
 Yet, France saw that once more she must fight for liberty, 
 
Causes of the Present War 67 
 
 fraternity and equality against the foe that would crush 
 these foundation principles of democracy. This considera- 
 tion for France explains both (1) her course for mainte- 
 nance of treaty obligations with her allies and, (2), her fear 
 of Pan-Germanism as causes of war for her. Her democ- 
 racy and existence were both at stake. 
 
 (3) Revenge for the exaction of Alsace-Lorraine from 
 her by Prussia in 1871 was, naturally, a strong incentive 
 for war on France's part. She has since that fatal year 
 been the leading power in Europe to warn the world against 
 the ambitions of Germany and the Hohenzollerns, and to 
 counsel preparedness for the "inevitable day." 
 
 Third, Russia. Russia's desire for control of the Balkans 
 and possession of Constantinople, with access to the Medi- 
 terranean sea was due chiefly to two causes, namely, (1) 
 Growth of a national consciousness and pride among the 
 most intelligent and influential elements in the State, and 
 (£) the ambition of the Russian monarchs and privileged 
 nobility to expand (east, south and southwest — and at an 
 early time, west also, and north) to ice-free and unhampered 
 ports on the seas. Constantinople as the capital of a new 
 and greater Russi'a had been the'dreams of her czars since 
 the time of Peter the Great. In this, of course, the Russia 
 of the Czar was equally guilty with Germany and Austria 
 in stirring up strife and precipitating the greatest of all 
 conflicts. Russia's aggressions in Manchuria, contrary to 
 her solemn pledges to Japan, with Port Arthur as the ter- 
 minus of her great Trans-Siberian railroad and coveted port 
 on the Pacific, it is well known, was the chief cause of the 
 Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. 
 
 Russia's other causes are so similar to those of other 
 countries of the allies that they may be passed over here. 
 
 Fourth, Italy. Of all the allies so far considered — and 
 perhaps of all of them, without exception — Italy has been 
 most guilty. She is less democratic than the others — (ex- 
 cept Russia at first), though far more so than either Ger- 
 
68 The Causes Of War 
 
 many or Austria-Hungary — and has allowed her strong 
 spirit of nationality and Italian unity to lead her into two 
 wars of conquest within a decade, i. e., her war with Turkey 
 in 1911, and the present war. Yet, Italy at heart is demo- 
 cratic, her local government being patterned after that of 
 France and her causes for war are most natural ones and 
 emanate from the people themselves. 
 
 Fifth, the Balkan States. These have been sufficiently 
 commented on in a former article, and need not be sepa- 
 rately treated here. The above outline of their causes will 
 suffice. 
 
 Sixth, Japan. Japan's motives are also sufficiently clear- 
 ly given in the above outline of her causes, as are also those 
 in the seventh (g), and eighth (h) groups of the outline, 
 and to save space we omit further consideration of them at 
 this point. 
 
 The above discussion of the allies' causes with the rather 
 full outline of the causes for the Central Powers will per- 
 haps give the situation as affecting the European nations in 
 themselves as complete consideration as is needed. It re- 
 mains for us to go somewhat more into detail concerning our 
 own country's causes for entering the conflict, and finally, 
 to make a brief summary of causes in general, so as to fix 
 the great weight of responsibility for the world tragedy 
 where it rightfully belongs. 
 
 Keeping in mind our classification of America's motives 
 in this war, as a concise working basis, we could do no bet- 
 ter in elaboration and in exposition of our case against Ger- 
 many, than to consider thoughtfully the following para- 
 graphs from President Wilson's noted Flag Day Speech of 
 last year. 
 
 "It is plain enough how we were forced into the war. The 
 extraordinary insults and aggressions of the Imperial Ger- 
 man government left us no self-respecting choice but to take 
 up arms in defense of our rights as a free people and of 
 our honor as a sovereign government. The military masters 
 
Causes of the Present War 69 
 
 of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They filled 
 our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and con- 
 spirators and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people 
 in their own behalf . . . their agents diligently spread sedi- 
 tion amongst us and sought to draw our own citizens from 
 their allegiance, — and some of those agents were men con- 
 nected with the official embassy of the German government 
 itself here in our own capital. They sought by violence to 
 destroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried 
 to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw 
 Japan into a hostile alliance with her, — and that by direct 
 suggestion from the foreign office in Berlin, . . . They re- 
 peatedly executed their threat that they would send to their 
 death any of our people who ventured to approach the 
 coasts of Europe. And many of our own people were cor- 
 rupted. Men began to look upon their own neighbors with 
 suspicion and to wonder in their hot resentment and surprise 
 whether there was any community in which hostile intrigue 
 did not lurk. What great nation in such circumstances 
 would not have taken up arms? Much as we had desired 
 peace, it was denied us, and not of our own choice. This 
 flag under which we serve would have been dishonored had 
 we withheld our hand. 
 
 "But this is only part of the story. . . . The war was 
 begun by the military masters of Germany, who proved to 
 be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. These men have 
 never regarded nations as peoples, men, women and children 
 of like blood and frame as themselves. . . . They have re- 
 garded them merely as serviceable organizations which they 
 could by force or intrigue bend or corrupt to their own pur- 
 pose. They have regarded the smaller States in particu- 
 lar, and the people who could be overwhelmed by force, as 
 their natural tools and instruments of domination. Their 
 purpose has long been avowed. . . . The rulers of Germany 
 themselves knew all the while what concrete plans, what well 
 advanced intrigues lay back of what the professors and the 
 
70 The Causes Of War 
 
 writers were saying, and were glad to go forward unmo- 
 lested, filling the thrones of the Balkan States with German 
 princes, putting German officers at the service of Turkey 
 to drill her armies . . . developing plans of sedition and 
 rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in Persia. 
 The demands made by Austria upon Servia were a mere sin- 
 gle step in a plan that compassed Europe and Asia, from 
 Berlin to Bagdad. They hoped that their demands might 
 not arouse Europe, but they meant to press them whether 
 they did or not, for they thought themselves ready for the 
 final issue of arms. 
 
 "Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military 
 power and political control across the very center of Eu- 
 rope and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia. 
 . . . The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had 
 a heart nowhere else ! . . . The choice of peoples played no 
 part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial 
 and political units which could be kept together only by 
 force. 
 
 "And they have actually carried the greater part of that 
 plan into execution! . . . The so-called Central Powers are 
 in fact but a single power. . . . The Turkish armies, which 
 Germans trained, are serving Germany, certainly not them- 
 selves, and the guns of German warships lying in the har- 
 bor of Constantinople remind Turkish statesmen every day 
 that they have no choice but to take their orders from Ber- 
 lin. From Hamburg to the Persian gulf, the net is spread. 
 
 "Is it not easy to understand the eagerness for peace that 
 has been manifested from Berlin ever since the snare was set 
 and sprung? ... It wishes to close its bargain before it is 
 too late. . . . 
 
 "If they fail, their people will cast them aside; a gov- 
 ernment accountable to the people themselves will be set up 
 in Germany as it has been in England, in the United States, 
 in France, and in all the great countries of the modern time 
 
Causes of the Present War 71 
 
 except Germany. If they succeed, America will fall within 
 the menace. We and all the rest of the world must remain 
 armed, as they will remain, and must be ready for the next 
 step of aggression. . . . 
 
 "Do you not now understand the new intrigue, the in- 
 trigue for peace? . . . Their present particular aim is to 
 deceive all those who throughout the world stand for the 
 rights of peoples and the self-government of nations ; for 
 they see what immense strength the forces of justice and 
 liberalism are gathering out of this war. They are employ- 
 ing liberals in their enterprise. They are using men, in Ger- 
 many and without, as their spokesmen for their own de- 
 struction, — socialists, the leaders of laborers, the thinkers 
 they have hitherto sought to silence. . . . 
 
 "The sinister intrigue is being no less actively conducted 
 in this country than in Russia and in every country in Eu- 
 rope to which the agents and dupes of the imperial German 
 government each gets access. . . . They proclaim the lib- 
 eral purposes of their masters ; declare this a foreign war 
 which can touch America with no danger to either her lands 
 or her institutions ; set England at the center of the stake 
 and talk of her ambition to assert economic dominion 
 throughout the world; appeal to our ancient tradition of 
 isolation in the politics of the nations ; and seek to under- 
 mine the government with false professions of loyalty to its 
 principles. . . . 
 
 "The great fact that stands out above all the rest is that 
 this is a great people's war, a war for freedom and justice 
 and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, 
 a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon 
 it and have made it their own, the German people themselves 
 included; and with us rests the choice to break through all 
 these hypocrisies . . . and help set the world free, or else 
 stand aside and let it be dominated as long ago, by ... a 
 power to which the world has afforded no parallel and in 
 
72 The Causes Of War 
 
 the face of which political freedom must wither and perish. 
 "For us there is but one choice, we have made it. . . . 
 We are ready to plead at the bar of history." . . . 
 
 Summary and Conclusion 
 
 A brief survey of the causes catalogued and discussed in 
 the foregoing articles with the study of the subject they 
 imply, shows the following clear divisions and contrasts : 
 
 (1) All the Allied powers and those fighting with them 
 have democracy, with its attendant liberties as one of their 
 leading causes; while none of the "Central Powers" were 
 democracies, but were fighting for the principles ©f despot- 
 ism. This is so universally true that the World War has 
 become, above all else combined, a struggle of democracy 
 with despotic power, and those two causes are truly in the 
 balance. This fact alone brands Germany — her kaiser and 
 imperial government, who have been the soul and masters 
 of the Central States — as the chief culprits in this war and 
 the arch-enemies of mankind, 
 
 (2) The Central Powers, led by Germany, have been in 
 the present generation (since 1905) the only exponents and 
 defenders of the principle that "might makes right," and 
 have since that time been in the grip of the "war-lords" Bern- 
 hardt Treitschke, "Herr" Ballin, and such like, with the 
 whole leadership of the German army and navy to preach 
 that doctrine, a doctrine so welcome and sweet to the palate 
 of the kaiser and imperial government of Germany. Here I 
 cannot refrain from quoting a few characteristic statements 
 of Berahardi : "War is the father of all things ; . . . a mor- 
 al obligation, an indispensable factor in civilization . . . Ger- 
 many is the fittest to survive. . . . The Germans have proved 
 themselves . . . one may say, the civilized nation. . . . Ab- 
 solutely the most important task of a modern State consists 
 in making its armed force as powerful as possible." 
 
 (3) In the decade between 1905 and 1915 five times Eu- 
 
Causes of the Present War 73 
 
 rope was brought to the verge of a general war — every time 
 by the brazen aggressions of the German and Austro-Hun- 
 garian governments. Four times one or all of the allied 
 States and the small nations they were protecting yielded, to 
 save Europe from the devastation of war; but in 1914 they 
 did not yield— THEY COULD NOT YIELD and remain 
 free and honorable, treaty-abiding nations. 
 
 (4) Finally, with respect to the United States' particu- 
 lar case and cause, we wish it to be borne in mind that, al- 
 though for two years England violated international law and 
 our right to be neutral through her seizing, holding as con- 
 traband and disposing of our cargoes, as well as rifling our 
 mail, — yet she appropriated only property, and did not de- 
 stroy even that; while on the other hand Germany by her 
 submarine warfare utterly destroyed (and Germany set her 
 submarine blockade in action first) not only our ships and 
 cargoes, but also human lives, the lives of our citizens (who 
 had a perfect right to be on the high seas — never before in 
 the history of civilization were people absolutely denied the 
 use of the open sea) — then boasted of her achievement and 
 celebrated these murders with holidays and rejoicing! Is 
 not the case sufficiently plain? The Judge of all has told 
 us that "Life is more than meat, and the body more than 
 raiment." 
 
 We have omitted treatment of some of the lesser and im- 
 mediate causes of this war, as well as several of the pretexts 
 and excuses, but we feel they are not important enough to 
 demand further space and consideration in this work. 
 
 In our next month's article we shall begin an outline and 
 suggestions by which the war may be studied in our schools, 
 — after which the questions of peace will be taken up and 
 studied carefully. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 CAUSES OF THE BALKAN WARS (1911-1913) 
 
 THE Turko-Italian war of 1911, in which the Italians 
 so readily overcame the Turks, opened the eyes of the 
 Balkan nations, and convinced them that the time was oppor- 
 tune for a concerted movement to drive the "unspeakable 
 Turk" out of Europe, and especially, out of Balkan affairs. 
 Turkey had proven herself much weaker than was generally 
 anticipated, and her once tributary states in Europe were 
 now confident of victory and the fruits of victory, in the 
 rounding out of their own nationalities and patriotic as- 
 pirations. Thus did the Italians' victory over the Turks in 
 1911 lead directly and immediately to the greater victory of 
 the little Balkan states the next year. They knew that their 
 triumph would eliminate the rule of the Ottoman entirely 
 from Europe, if only the great European powers would leave 
 them alone. As the great powers had a number of times in- 
 tervened in their struggles with Turkey previously, however, 
 they knew that possibility of intervention still existed. But 
 their chance to win was such that they would run the risk 
 anyway, in the hope that the justice of their cause would 
 stay the meddling hand. And so war came. 
 
 As indicated above, the First Balkan war came as a result 
 of the universal conviction of the Balkan states that the 
 time had come to throw off the last remnants of Turkish 
 tyranny, and drive the monster out of Europe. Their strong 
 national feeling and ambition to rule over all the people of 
 their own blood fed the flame. 
 
 The Second Balkan war was a fight over the division of 
 the spoils of victory, of which Bulgaria had hardly received 
 
 74 
 
Causes of the Balkan Wars (1911-1913) 75 
 
 her just share. This was unfortunate, but it was natural, 
 as the victors had come to no previous conclusion as to their 
 respective claims in the region conquered. This trouble was 
 aggravated by Austria-Hungary's intervention at the close 
 of the First war, backed by the "shining sword" of the 
 German Kaiser. 
 
 Before the Balkan wars of 1911-13 historians were ac- 
 customed to include in the Balkan states Serbia, Montenegro, 
 Roumania, Bulgaria, and sometimes Greece. After the First 
 Balkan war a separate state, Albania, was set up, due to the 
 jealous intervention of Austria. That made six. And 
 since Greece received part of the region fought for and has 
 also played an important role in the Balkans in the great 
 World War, it is right that she be included in the Balkan 
 group, as she is, geographically, in the peninsula. Accord- 
 ingly, the writer, whenever referring to the Balkan states as 
 a whole will include Greece. 
 
 The Balkan question has been for three quarters of a cen- 
 tury, and still is, a most complicated and intricate one. As 
 already observed in an earlier chapter of this work, the wars 
 of the nineteenth century, and particularly of the latter part 
 of the century, have been mostly wars of nationality. It 
 was to be expected, therefore, that this spirit would mani- 
 fest itself strongly in the Balkans and prove a strong moral 
 force toward victory. Nevertheless, all the world was sur- 
 prised, and little less than astonished at the swift and ter- 
 rible defeats that these little states inflicted upon the country 
 that but a short time before had held them under its despotic 
 sway of crime and massacre. 
 
 The story of the unification of Italy and Germany we 
 need not recount here, although they had their remote and 
 indirect bearings on the recent Balkan troubles, — especially, 
 since they paved the way for the ambitions of Italy along 
 the Adriatic, and the mutual jealousies and intrigues of the 
 Teutonic and Russian governments in the Near East. And 
 the Crimean war (1853-56) needs little more than passing 
 
76 The Causes Of War 
 
 mention. This war meant for Turkey (a), the abolition of 
 Russia's protectorate over the Danubian Principalities and 
 of the Czar's claim to special right of intervention in behalf 
 of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, (b) closing of the 
 Straits to the warships of all nations, and (c), the formal 
 admission of Turkey into the family of European powers. 
 It marked also a distinct step on the part of several of the 
 small Balkan principalities toward freedom from Turkish 
 rule, the setting up of independent governments, or their 
 protection, control, or annexation by European powers. 
 The chief significance of this all is that these small states 
 and principalities have ever since remained a continual men- 
 ace to the "balance of power" and peace of Europe. So they 
 will continue to be if an effective League *of Nations is not 
 formed as an immediate outcome of the World war. 
 
 Bulgaria was the last of the original Balkan states to ob- 
 tain independence of Turkey. The Bulgarian Exarchate was 
 established as a separate religious community March 10, 
 1870. This struggle resulted in a movement toward nation- 
 ality. Bulgarian insurrections against Turkey broke out 
 in 1875-6, and these led in turn to the Russo-Turkish war 
 and the virtual loss of Bulgaria to Turkey, in 1878. Since 
 that time the Bulgarians have looked to Russia repeatedly 
 for aid, and have considered her their best friend and pro- 
 tector, until the period immediately before the Balkan wars, 
 when their German rulers began to veer them toward the 
 Central powers. Bulgaria's defeat in the Second Balkan 
 war, 1913, at the hands of the other Balkan states sealed 
 her alliance with the Teutonic powers and Turkey ; and that 
 explains her line-up in the World War. She had gained her 
 final independence from Turkey in 1908. 
 
 By the Congress of Berlin, concluded in July 1878, at the 
 close of the Russo-Turkish war alluded to above, Bosnia, 
 Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Eastern Roumelia and Montenegro 
 were severed from direct rule by the Sultan. Montenegro, 
 Serbia and Roumania achieved their complete independence 
 
Causes of the Balkan Wars (1911-1913) 77 
 
 at this time, while Bulgaria was a Turkish protectorate in 
 name at least, until 1908, as stated above. 
 
 From the remote past the different peoples of the Balkan 
 peninsula have inherited racial animosities and political 
 troubles and confusion. The Bulgarians resented the "ty- 
 ranny" of the Greeks in ecclesiastical and educational mat- 
 ters. The Albanians have always been wild and ungovern- 
 able and unable to assimulate the benefits of ordered govern- 
 ment and society. The Roumanians prided themselves in 
 their Roman stock and traditions and held apart from the 
 other peoples of the peninsula. As is stated in the Rand- 
 McNally Atlas (p.4&): 
 
 For 1000 years the Balkan Peninsula has suffered from political con- 
 fusion due in part to its geographical position, which made it the meet- 
 ing-ground of conflicting races and religions. In ancient times it was 
 occupied by various branches of the Aldan stock, the Thracians in the 
 northeast, the Illyrians in the northwest, and the Greeks in the south, 
 whose commingling gave rise to the mixed Macedonian type inhabiting 
 the northern central part of the peninsula. Under Roman, and espe- 
 cially under Byzantine rule, it attained its highest development, Con- 
 stantinople becoming the chief center of the world's civilization and 
 commerce. In the seventh century, A.D., the Servians and Bulgarians, 
 of Slavonic stock, pressed southward into the peninsula, driving the 
 Greeks before them to the south, the Illyrians (ancestors of the present 
 Albanians) to the southwest, and the Romans back toward the north- 
 west. The introduction of Christianity in the ninth century marked the 
 transition from barbarism to civilization. For a time the Bulgarians 
 were masters of the peninsula, but in the fourteenth century the Servians 
 established a short-lived supremacy which by the defeat of their army 
 in 1389, followed by the fall of Constantinople in 1453 gave way before 
 the irresistible advance of the Turk. Four centuries of retrogression 
 ensued, during which the peninsula, with the exception of Dalmatia in 
 the northwest, which continued under Venetian and later passed under 
 Austrian rule, was abandoned to almost hopeless barbarity. It was not 
 until the nineteenth century that the almost smothered germs of national 
 vitality were quickened again under Russian influence, and that the 
 Balkan peoples were aroused to struggle for freedom from the yoke of 
 the "unspeakable" Turk. 
 
 Coming back to recent years, we find that Bulgaria's de- 
 sire to annex neighboring parts of European Turkey in- 
 habited by Slav, especially Macedonia, was widely cherished, 
 and more or less tension existed with Serbia, Greece and 
 Austria even before the first Balkan war. It was also realized 
 
78 The Causes Of War 
 
 that strategically Roumania 9 s position was one of command- 
 ing importance. This can easily be seen by a glance at the 
 map, which will show the peculiar shape and frontiers of 
 Roumania. She has stood in the pathway of both Teuton 
 and Russian advance toward the regions beyond the Black 
 Sea, and, second only to Serbia, in these same powers' path 
 to the eastern Mediterranean, Asia Minor and the Orient. 
 Thus, the security of Roumania, like the other small states 
 of this region, depended upon a delicate tension of inter- 
 national relations that has justly been called the "powder- 
 box" of Europe. And even now, let me repeat, only a strong 
 League of Nations can guarantee peace in this troublesome 
 region in the future. 
 
 As Bulgaria was the last of the Balkan states (save only 
 Albania) to gain her complete independence of Turkey, so 
 Serbia was the first (save only Greece). But that did not 
 make hers a stable government. She virtually gained her in- 
 dependence in 1829, immediately after Greece became free 
 from Turkey. And complete independence was given her by 
 the treaty of Berlin, 1878. Her progress, considering her 
 opportunity has been disappointing, — the most so of all the 
 Balkan states ; and this has made her all the more a prey to 
 Austrian and German intrigues. The new Jugo-Slav state, 
 however, with a greater Serbia as the nucleus, gives promise 
 of better things for the future. 
 
 It was a general conviction of the students of the Balkan 
 affairs just previous to the World War that, in case of a 
 breakout of war in this region, the Central Powers and 
 Russia would each attempt to seize as big a slice of the Bal- 
 kan regions as possible ; the Russians would make for Con- 
 stantinople, the Austrians for Serbia, Macedonia and the 
 Saloniki coast ; the English would make for the Dardanelles, 
 to protect their Eastern possessions ; the French for Rhodes, 
 parts of Asia Minor and Syria, and the Italians for Albania 
 and the entire eastern coast of the Adriatic. They were not 
 very far wrong when the World War came. Said M. Berard: 
 
Causes of the Balkan Wars (1911-1913) 79 
 
 "The outcome cannot be anything but a general European 
 war of the most terrible kind." (See Victor Berard, "The 
 Balkan Question," Villari volume, with Introduction by 
 James Bryce.) 
 
 Italy's interest and part in the Balkan question in this 
 period was summed up by an Italian as follows : — "Italy has 
 every interest in preventing the influence of Austria and 
 Russia in Macedonia from extending and being gradually 
 converted into a more or less effective dominion." — (By an 
 Italian deputy.) This feeling and interest explains the 
 tenacity with which the Italian delegates to the peace con- 
 ference cling to their shadowy claim to Albania and the 
 southern Adriatic coast. 
 
 While studying the Balkan situation just previous to the 
 First Balkan war in 1911 the author of the present volume 
 made this statement : "The idea prevails in Europe that 
 the time has come for the solution of this most perplexing 
 problem. England seems most anxious that this be speedily 
 accomplished. According to Mr. Bryce there are two solu- 
 tions. One is the absorbing of the existing nationalities into 
 the great dominions and great nations which border upon 
 Turkey. The other is the growth of these nationalities, or 
 some of them, into nations and states. The latter, I think is 
 the more satisfactory solution, and will prove the more likely, 
 providing the great powers do not injustly intervene. Mr. 
 Bryce concludes his chapter ('Introduction to the Eastern 
 Question') with these words: 'He who, looking above and 
 beyond the dust of current politics, will try to fix his eyes, 
 as Mr. Gladstone did, upon the heights of a more distant 
 landscape, will find reason to think that the development of 
 these nationalities has in it more promise for the future than 
 the extension of the sway of one or two huge military em- 
 pires, and will believe that to encourage and help them to 
 grow into nations is an aim to which such great and en- 
 lightened peoples as those of England, France and Italy 
 may fitly direct their efforts.' " This is ample evidence to the 
 
80 The Causes Of War 
 
 writer's mind, of Great Britain's more liberal policy in inter- 
 national politics in recent years, under the wise tutelage and 
 leadership of such men as Gladstone and Lord Bryce. And 
 as a sequel to this statement that I made eight years ago, 
 let me say that the present Jugo-Slav movement has been 
 made acceptable to the Allied nations through such earlier 
 championship as that mentioned in the above quotation. It 
 is not a new movement, born of the War, but is now, because 
 of the World War, realizable beyond the fondest hopes of 
 its early champions. 
 
 We have omitted at this point of our study of the causes 
 of war in recent years, any separate treatment of the causes 
 of the Turko-Italian war of 1911, because we gave rather a 
 detailed statement of the underlying cause and the meaning 
 of this war in our chapter in which we treated wars of nation- 
 ality of which this one between Italy and Turkey is (on 
 Italy's part) the most prominent one of the twentieth cen- 
 tury, previous to the World War. We may add in passing, 
 however, that there was a good deal of sentiment, the vision 
 and memory of the glories of ancient Rome and her sway over 
 the land of the Carthagenians, — in the zeal with which the 
 Italians fought the Turks and their subjects in northern Af- 
 rica. Then too, this war meant one of the final steps in the 
 unification of Italy, as the Italians conceived a united Italy 
 to be, — the same thing that led them to enter the World War 
 against Austria, for the provinces of the Trentino and 
 Trieste. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 CAUSES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904) 
 
 THE cause of the war for Japan was mostly economic 
 rather than political. 1 It goes back to the enormous 
 increase in Japan's population, the growth of her industries 
 and commerce, and on the other hand to the inadequateness 
 of her agriculture to supply a living for her growing popu- 
 lation or to produce sufficient raw material for her manu- 
 factures. For these very reasons, Japan has felt that she 
 could not allow any other nation to secure a controlling in- 
 fluence in any part of the Chinese Empire, much less in 
 Korea. 2 
 
 With Russia, the cause was primarily political rather than 
 economic. It was therefore less vital than that of Japan. 
 Economically, Russia had no such reason for bringing on 
 such a conflict as had Japan. She is able to take care of 
 herself for a long time to come, in that respect. 
 
 Russia's great political aim, as Professor Hershey states, 
 was to gain access to the sea in four directions, viz. : Black 
 Sea and Mediterranean, Baltic Sea, Persian Gulf, Pacific 
 Ocean. 3 This has been her vision and ambition ever since 
 the time of Peter the Great. She is still actively striving 
 for all but the northern one of these. (And in passing it 
 may be observed that this desire to secure such outlets helps 
 to explain, to a considerable degree, many of the nineteenth 
 century wars in these regions and is no small contributory 
 cause to those conflicts.) 
 
 1 Hershey, "Int. Law and Diplomacy of Russo-Japanese War," p. 2. 
 
 1 "The Japanese people have grown to such numbers that they need an 
 outlet beyond the sea and cannot resign into strong hands their nearest 
 field for colonization and expansion"; Lawrence, p. 2. 
 
 •Hershey, p. 3. 
 
 81 
 
82 The Causes Of War 
 
 Expansion in the direction of the Pacific has seemed to 
 Russia to involve the least resistance as well as being of im- 
 mense importance to her in Oriental politics and commer- 
 cial influence. 
 
 Her great efforts of recent years have been directed toward 
 securing an ice-free port on the Pacific. This was directly 
 her reason for the occupation of Korea. 
 
 While the relations of Russia with the Far East go back 
 to the conquest of Siberia and even farther, we are par- 
 ticularly concerned here only with her advances in the latter 
 part of the 19th century. 4 
 
 In 1867 Russia got a strong hold on the island of Sag- 
 halien. She exercised joint sovereignty with Japan over the 
 island. In 1875 she found means to oust Japan and appro- 
 priated the whole island to herself. This is an excellent ex- 
 ample of Russian unscruplousness that was bound, sooner or 
 later, to be met by the desperate revenge of the Japanese. 
 Such action of Russia only helped on the Europeanizing of 
 Japan to meet her hated rival in the Far East. 
 
 The events which finally brought Russia and Japan into 
 collision, arose from Russia's construction of the Trans- 
 
 4 The history of Russian politics in Manchuria may be divided into 
 four periods: 
 
 (1) From the beginning (three centuries back) to the "Cassini Con- 
 
 vention," 1896, which conceded to her first privileges in the 
 North of this province, — principally the right to build the 
 Trans-Siberian Railway across the Chinese territory to Vlad- 
 ivostock. 
 
 (2) From 1896 to the Boxer Uprising, 1900. During this period 
 
 Russia obtained the cession on lease of Port Arthur and the 
 right to prolong the Railroad to this port by a branch which 
 traverses all Manchuria. 
 
 (3) From 1900 to the agreement for the evacuation of Manchuria, 
 
 1902. Boxer uprising gave Russia the pretext and occasion 
 to conquer Manchuria and establish herself there firmly. 
 
 (4) From 1902 to the outbreak of War (Feb., 1904). Convention 
 
 signed with China for evacuation of Manchuria — followed by 
 period of negotiations — in which Japan distinguishes herself 
 by her opposition to Russia and brings on the War. — Ac- 
 cording to M. Rey, on Causes of Russo-Japanese War in 
 Revue General de Droit International Public, V, XII, 215-ff. 
 
Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (1901/,) 83 
 
 Siberian Railway to the Pacific, with the end in view (her 
 long cherished hope) of securing an ice-free port on the 
 Pacific. 
 
 Railroads in the Far East have been the forerunners and 
 occasions of war. Russia was trying to grasp a port that 
 was not hers. She under-estimated the fatal consequences 
 of such an action. 
 
 If Russia had confined her aggressive movements to Man- 
 churia alone, the present history of the Far East would 
 doubtless have been far different. But, to secure her ends, 
 she made similar encroachments in Korea, particularly in 
 interfering in this peninsula after the China-Japanese War. 5 
 
 Korea had been tributary to both China and Japan for 
 centuries. She claimed independence at various times. In 
 1875, the Koreans fired upon a Japanese man-of-war and 
 in redress were forced to open trade with Japan and re- 
 ceive a Japanese minister at the Korean Court. 
 
 China unwillingly gave up her suzerainty over Korea, 
 1875-85. She now agreed with Japan that if events should 
 necessitate Chinese or Japanese troops in Korea and either 
 sent troops, the other should be notified. In 1894 on the 
 abduction and assassination of a Korean rebel, Chinese and 
 Japanese troops were sent. Reforms in the Korean govern- 
 ment were now urged by Japan. 6 China refused to consent 
 to these reforms. Japan gave her ultimatum, following 
 up with the capture of the Korean capital and king. 7 Both 
 empires then prepared for war and in July, 1894, the con- 
 
 6 See Hershey, "Int. Law & Dip. of Rus.-Jap. War, p. 36. 
 
 8 In 1868 Japan, making up from feudalism to the modern type of 
 government determined to reassert her former claims upon Korea. The 
 Koreans insolently refused this vassalage. Japan recognized Korea's 
 independence in 1876 but new ports were opened to Japanese trade in 
 1880. 
 
 1 1t was Korea's opposition to the "open door" policy which led to the 
 intervention of Japan and China and the stationing of Chinese and 
 Japanese troops in Korea. Another insurrection in Korea in 1894, 
 brought Chinese and Japanese troops face to face again and was fol- 
 lowed by the Chino-Jap. War in 1895. 
 
84 The Causes Of War 
 
 flict began. 8 Peace was made in March, 1895. China ceded 
 Liaotung Peninsula and Formosa to Japan. 
 
 The terms of peace of the Chino-Japanese War having 
 given Japan the Liaotung Peninsula with an important ice- 
 free port, the outcome of the war afforded Russia an op- 
 portunity to administer a severe blow to Japan and in- 
 gratiate herself with China. This was accomplished by Rus- 
 sia leading in a Russo-French-German "recommendation" 9 
 to Japan not to take possession of the Liaotung Peninsula. 
 Backed by France and Germany, she intervened with a 
 threat, saying that Japan's possession of the peninsula 
 would be a "perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the 
 Far East." 10 Japan, under this pressure, gave up the 
 peninsula to China. She relinquished all her claim Novem- 
 ber 8, 1895, for a consideration of 30,000,000 taels. This 
 was one of the causes of the Russo-Japanese War — It was 
 another wound to Japanese pride that was to be avenged 
 later at the expense of Russia. It simply hastened the 
 struggle, however, for war, sooner or later, was inevitable. 
 
 8 As Hazen gives it, "The immediate cause was the relations of the 
 two powers to Korea." 
 
 "The Recommendation is as follows: "The imperial Russian Govern- 
 ment having examined the terms of peace demanded by Japan of China, 
 consider the contemplated possession of the Liaotung peninsula by 
 Japan will not only constitute a constant menace to the capital of China, 
 but will also render the independence of Korea illusory, and thus jeop- 
 ardize the permanent peace of the Far East. Accordingly, the Imperial 
 Government, in a spirit of cordial friendship for Japan, hereby counsel 
 the Government of the Emperor of Japan to renounce the definitive 
 possession of the Liaotung peninsula. Lawrence, p. 11. 
 
 10 "The insincerity of the powers in talking about the integrity of 
 China and the peace of the East was not long in manifesting itself. 
 The intervening powers immediately set about reaping their reward. 
 Russia secured the right to run the eastern end of the Trans-Siberian 
 railroad across Manchuria, a province of China, to Vladivostock, and 
 to construct a branch line south from Harbin into the Liaotung penin- 
 sula, with a terminus at Talienwan. At the end of a certain time, and 
 under certain conditions this railroad was to pass into the possession 
 of China, but meanwhile Russia was given the right to send her own 
 soldiers into Manchuria to guard it. This was the beginning of Russian 
 control of Manchuria. She poured tens of thousands of troops into that 
 Chinese province and gradually acted as if it were Russian. She also 
 acquired extensive mineral and timber rights in the province. Hazen, 
 "Europe Since 1815," p. 697. 
 
Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (WOJ^) 85 
 
 The establishment of the Russo-Chinese bank was another 
 event which offended Japan. The treaty of 1896 between 
 China and Russia opened up all the harbors of China to 
 Russia. 
 
 In January, 1898, she got control of the Liaotung Penin- 
 sula for twenty-five years through pressure and a threat of 
 war on England if England refused it. In the words of Mr. 
 Rose, "Port Arthur was to become the Gibraltar of the Far 
 East." u What did this mean? 12 It meant that the Czar 
 of Russia had compelled China to cede to his already enor- 
 mous empire the very peninsula whose acquisition by "little 
 Japan," had been pronounced by the European powers to 
 be an unwarrantable disturbance of the balance of power in 
 the East. No greater insult could have been given the 
 Japanese government and people. 13 There is no questioning 
 the fact that mis-government in Korea was a real menace to 
 the peace of the East. By the natural course of events it 
 would offer a ready prey to Russia whenever she should 
 choose to lay hands on it. 
 
 For a long time in Japan there had been a strong war 
 party in favor of overrunning Korea and repeatedly with 
 difficulty it was kept down. 
 
 The Queen of Korea, in 1895, believed that the welfare 
 of her country depended on continued association with China 
 and the preservation of Chinese standards of civilization. 
 
 The Japanese became complicated in her murder, October, 
 1895. The king took refuge in Russian legation at Seol 
 
 "Rose, II, p. 317. 
 
 u "That Russia did not look upon her possession as merely a short 
 lease, but as a permanent one, was unmistakably shown by her conduct. 
 She constructed a railroad south from Harbin, connecting with the 
 Trans-Siberian. She threw thousands of troops into Manchuria; she 
 set about immensely strengthening Port Arthur as a fortress, and a 
 considerable fleet was stationed there. To the Japanese all this seemed 
 to prove that she supposed ultimately to annex the immense province of 
 Manchuria, and later probably Korea, which would give her a large 
 number of ice-free harbors and place her in a dominant position on the 
 Pacific, menacing, the Japanese felt, the very existence of Japan." — Rose. 
 
 18 Rose, II, p. 317. 
 
86 The Causes Of War 
 
 and Japan had a terrible indemnity to pay, for the Russo- 
 Japanese war had this murder as a remote cause. Russian 
 influence had taken the place of the Japanese and all that 
 Japan had done in the past was undone. Korea was rapidly 
 becoming a Russian possession when the Russo-Japanese war 
 broke out and Japan thus recovered her control over 
 Korea. 14 
 
 Japan now realized, if never before, the ultimate object 
 of Russia and that war was the only recourse left to the 
 island nation, if she was to be an important factor in Oriental 
 affairs. 15 
 
 "In 1898 an agreement was signed by Russia and Japan which put 
 Japan on an equal footing with Russia and Korea. But rivalry between 
 the two nations, Russia and Japan, continued and Russia undoubtedly 
 was the aggressor. Russia pressed continually for further leases in the 
 country. This was a source of great anxiety to Japan. Russian soldiers 
 were actually occupying the country, not simply protecting Russian 
 interests. "The unconditional and permanent occupation of Manchuria 
 by Russia would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and 
 interests of Japan. If Russia was established on the flank of Korea it 
 would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that empire. 
 Korea is an important outpost of Japan's line of defense, and Japan 
 considers her independence absolutely essential to her own repose and 
 safety." Hershey, pp. 52-3, quoting from correspondence between Japan 
 and Russia, translated by Asakawa, p. 29. 
 
 15 As Lawrence remarks, "It is a matter of life and death for Japan 
 to keep Korea out of the hands of any strong and aggressive state. 
 F. J. Lawrence, "War and Neutrality in the Far East," p. 1. 
 
 Russia was disposed to maintain that the question of negotiation 
 between her and China concerning Manchuria and Korea were not of a 
 nature to be submitted to other nations. In fairness to her it must be 
 conceded that there was some ground for Russian position and attitude 
 in the Far East, and for her delay in withdrawing her troops from 
 Manchuria. This, however, does not excuse her for repeated breaches 
 of trust with China and the other powers concerned. The Russian posi- 
 tion is perhaps nowhere better stated than by Count Lansdorff (on 27th 
 of January, 1902), Sec. Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 929. He says: "The 
 imperial government of Russia has no intention of dealing a blow to 
 the principle of the 'open door' as she understands it, and Russia has 
 not the least intention, at this moment to modify her political stand on 
 this point. If the Russo-Chinese Bank should obtain concessions in 
 China, the agreement of a private character relative to those concessions 
 would not be different from those concluded at other times by many 
 other foreign corporations. But, would it not be truly strange if the 
 Door which is opened to certain nations were closed to Russia, whose 
 
Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (1904) 87 
 
 Articles were now prepared by the Japanese Govern- 
 ment as the basis of understanding. The essential features 
 were: 
 
 1. A mutual engagement to respect the independence 
 and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires, 
 and to maintain the "open door" in these countries, and 2, a 
 reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in 
 Korea and of Russia's special interests in Manchuria. 
 
 Russia's reply after eight weeks was substantially as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 1. The mutual engagement to respect the independence 
 and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire. 
 
 2. Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating 
 interest in Korea. 
 
 3. Recognition of the right of Japan to send troops to 
 Korea. 
 
 4. Mutual engagement to consider that part of the ter- 
 
 frontiers join those of Manchuria, when she has been forced by recent 
 events to send her troops into this province to reestablish order in the 
 evident and common interest of all nations? It is true that Russia has 
 conquered Manchuria, but she maintains her firm determination to 
 restore it to China and to recall her troops as soon as the necessary 
 measures are taken to avoid an outbreak of trouble in the neighboring 
 territories. It is impossible to deny that an independent state has the 
 right to accord to others such concessions, and I have some reason to 
 believe that the demands of the Russo-Chinese Bank do not exceed — 
 those which have been so often formulated by other foreign Societies. 
 I judge that, in these circumstances, it would not be easy for the im- 
 perial government to refuse to Russian societies — that which is given 
 by other governments to Societies and syndicates of their own nation- 
 ality." — M. Rey, in Causes of Russo-Japanese War in Revue General 
 De Droit International Public, XII, 267. 
 
 "Russia was not disposed to abandon Manchuria and it was manifest 
 that she was seeking only pretexts for putting off the date of evacua- 
 tion."— Rey, p. 276. 
 
 La Russe h'a pas le droit d'abandonner ses interests en Manchourie 
 et ne peut sortir de la voie qu'elle s'est trac'ee. Elle ne pourra retirer 
 ses troupes de Manchourie que lorsqu elle sera convaincue qu'il n'existe 
 plus de danger pour ses possessions et commencera le peuplement de la 
 zone de son cheinen de fer guand elle le jugera a propor. — Rey, p. 216, 
 French translation of one of the many official Russian statements on 
 this affair. 
 
88 The Causes Of War 
 
 ritory of Korea lying to the north of the thirty-ninth parallel 
 as a neutral zone into which neither of the contracting 
 parties shall introduce troops. 
 
 5. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral 
 as in all respects outside her sphere of interests. 
 
 In the meantime, Russia's aggression, both in Manchuria 
 and Korea, was increasing daily. 
 
 The Boxer uprising in China in 1900 "added fresh causes 
 of quarrel to those already in existence." The Chinese 
 authorities in Manchuria attacked the "foreign" Russian 
 officials and settlers there. In a very short time the whole 
 province was in Russian military occupation. 
 
 "It will thus be seen that in these counter-proposals Rus- 
 sia not only reduced Japan's demands regarding Korea, but 
 imposed new conditions upon Japan in that country. But — 
 most significant of all — she quietly ignored the most im- 
 portant part of Article I of the Japanese proposals, viz., 
 that part which stipulated for a mutual agreement to re- 
 spect the independence and territorial integrity of the 
 Chinese Empire and to maintain the 'open door' in China and 
 Korea," 16 . . . "if not indeed to preserve her status as an 
 independent state for the future. 
 
 "It became to her as clear as daylight that the new po- 
 sition she had acquired in the Orient by her victory over 
 China could be maintained and even her independence must 
 be guarded only by an armament powerful enough to give 
 her a voice among the first powers of the world." 17 
 
 Russia's methods were practically without scruple. Neither 
 the 'Russian Court nor the officials and army in Manchuria 
 and Korea could be relied on for the fulfillment of their 
 promises to China, Japan, Korea or any of the European 
 nations. She withdrew her troops from the southwest of 
 Mukden province by October 8, 1902. On the date set for 
 
 le Hershey, International Law and Diplomacy of Russo-Japanese War, 
 p. 56. 
 
 "Idem, p. 9. Quoted from Asakana's "The Russo-Jap. Conflict," pp. 
 79-80. 
 
Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (190£) 89 
 
 her withdrawal from the remainder of the province, how- 
 ever, April 8, 1903, she was still in full occupancy and it 
 was evident that not even a nominal withdrawal was in- 
 tended." 18 
 
 Russia's persistent failure in the face of repeated promises 
 to withdraw her troops from China after the Boxer upris- 
 ing led directly, we may say, to the outbreak of hostilities 
 with Japan. 19 
 
 "The inspiring force which moved some 40,000 men gladly 
 to lay down their lives on the hills around Port Arthur was 
 the feeling that they were helping to hurl back in the face 
 of Russia, the gauntlet which she had there so insolently 
 flung down as to an inferior race." 20 
 
 Russia's demands of China in 1903, among other things, 
 included the closing of Manchuria against the economic en- 
 terprises of all foreigners except Russians and the opening 
 of no new treaty-ports without Russia's consent. 21 
 
 The final year of negotiation (1904) had come. After 
 three successive overtures of the Japanese government to 
 Russia, the views of the two governments were apparently 
 as irreconcilable as ever. Japan made still a fourth at- 
 tempt to obtain a favorable reply from Russia, and its pro- 
 visions were as follows: 
 
 1. Suppression of the clause (in Article 5) requiring 
 Japan not to use any part of Korea for strategical pur- 
 poses. 
 
 £. Suppression of the whole Article (6) concerning the 
 establishment of a neutral zone. 
 
 3. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral 
 as being outside her sphere of interest, provided that Rus- 
 sia will engage (a) to respect the territorial integrity of 
 China and Manchuria, (b) to recognize the treaty rights, 
 including those of the settlement of Japan and other Powers 
 
 18 Hershey, Int. Law & Dip. of Russo-Jap. War, pp. 33-4. 
 "See Rose, pp. 318-19. 
 "Rose, p. 319. 
 a Idem, p. 35. 
 
90 The Causes Of War 
 
 in Manchuria, (c) to recognize Korea and its littoral as be- 
 ing outside her sphere of interest. 
 
 4. Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in 
 Manchuria, and of the right of Russia to take measures 
 necessary for the protection of those interests. 
 
 The Russian reply to this last proposal of Japan was not 
 returned until Feb. 7, 1904, the day after diplomatic rela- 
 tions between the two countries had ceased. Thus we see 
 that Russia's persistent delay in withdrawing her troops 
 from Chinese territory in the year after the Boxer uprising 
 led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. 
 
 Japan "had expended much blood and treasure in order to 
 secure a predominating interest in the Korean peninsula. 
 . . . The rapid growth of Russian power in the Pacific 
 coasts, the enforced cession of Saghalien in 1875, and of the 
 Liaotung Peninsula with the hard-won Port Arthur 20 
 years later, had aroused profound distrust of Russian poli- 
 cies in the minds of Japanese statesmen." 22 
 
 Without attempting to give all the factors that bore upon 
 the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Japan, we 
 may reduce the fundamental causes of the war to two, viz. : 
 (1) Russia's determination to secure if possible, an ice-free 
 port on the Pacific, with Russian control of Manchuria and 
 Korea — mainly a political interest; (£) Japan's equal de- 
 termination that this should not be accomplished — mainly 
 an economic interest and question of ultimate self-preserva- 
 tion. 
 
 28 C. M. Hist., XII, p. 577. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 CAUSES OF THE BRITISH-BOER WAR 
 
 THE American press and people in general have been 
 inclined to lay the blame of this war almost entirely on 
 the British. 1 They have done this more or less blindly, 
 
 1 British occupation of South Africa began in 1806, when Cape Town 
 was surrendered to the English. In the London Convention of 1814, the 
 Dutch surrendered to the English Crown their claims to Cape Colony 
 and some other adjacent territory, for a consideration of £6,000,000 ster- 
 ling. British immigration to South Africa began about the year 1819. 
 In 1825 an Executive Council was appointed to assist the Governor of 
 the colony. In 1828 the Hottentots received equal rights in the law 
 (courts) with the Europeans. In the years 1833-5 the abolition of 
 slavery was accomplished. This was accompanied by disturbances that 
 assumed serious proportions. Discontent with the British rule had not 
 been wholly lacking before; as a result of the liberties given them in 
 1828, the Hottentots had broken loose from several restraints imposed 
 upon them formerly, by the English administration; there had been 
 considerable friction before the Dutch were ready to surrender Cape 
 Colony, in 1814; but these were as nothing compared with the storm that 
 arose in 1834. "The great wrong which stirred the Dutch to the depths 
 was the abolition of slavery by Great Britain in 1834." Green: "Causes 
 of South African War," p. 5. And Doyle, who has written perhaps the 
 best account of the causes and events leading up to the final war, says: 
 "The emancipation of slaves in 1834 fanned the smouldering discontents 
 into a flame." Doyle: "The War in South Africa," p. 5. 
 
 There were two reasons for this outburst, (1) A very inadequate sum 
 was appropriated for the slave-owners in return for the loss of their 
 slaves. (2) The money was paid over in London, and because of this 
 fact, the colonists received but little of it. This worked a real hardship 
 to the Boer farmers. It meant beggary to a number of them. The war 
 of 1834-5, waged by the British against the Kaffirs, was very unjust to 
 the latter, and they were almost immediately restored to their former 
 homes. Many of the Boer farmers now determined to leave the colony, 
 and migrate farther inland, away from the domination of the British. 
 The first trek was in 1836. The long journey, with its perils and hard- 
 ships, broke up all local self-government and the science of cooking, etc., 
 and put these Boers back into their medieval ancestral type of govern- 
 ment and individual liberty. This backward step in civilization is no 
 small factor in explaining the failure of the British to conciliate the 
 Boers, and the gradual growth of a hostile spirit that was to culminate 
 in war of the two races. 
 
 In 1848 Sir Harry Smith was sent out as Governor of the Colony. He 
 
 91 
 
92 The Causes Of War 
 
 through prejudice, or without a sufficient knowledge of the 
 facts. There are not lacking, however, in this country as well 
 as in England, eminent authorities who justify for the most 
 part, if not altogether, England's action and policy in South 
 Africa. Indeed, opinion seems to be pretty evenly divided, 
 among those who are in a position to judge wisely and im- 
 partially. Green, in his "Causes of the War in South 
 Africa," is decidedly favorable to Great Britain. He con- 
 tends and rightly, that the rule of Great Britain was a 
 distinct advance and uplift for the Boers as well as the 
 natives ; that the Boer and not the English administration 
 was the oppressor of the natives, and that it was liberty only 
 for himself that the Boer sought ; Doyle, 2 who can hardly be 
 denied the merit of making a studied attempt to be fair and 
 unprejudiced in his account, feels that it is his duty as 
 well as his right, to defend his country against much of the 
 abuse that has been heaped upon it, and to vindicate for the 
 most part, her policy. Among other things he says : "That 
 to no one of the British states has she ever had a more 
 
 declared the area between the Orange and Vaal rivers British Territory. 
 This led to war. England was victorious, but had to give up the Orange 
 River Sovereignty, because the Home government did not sufficiently 
 support the Governor. Sir Geo. Grey was the next governor, 1854-9. 
 His was a wise rule. The franchise was made liberal and representative 
 government was established. Meanwhile, the Boer government in the 
 Transvaal had become very chaotic. Finances were in a deplorable 
 condition. The people were oppressively taxed. However, in 1857 the 
 Transvaal Republic was launched. This was followed by civil war, 
 which dragged on for some time. In 18T1 the discovery of diamonds 
 and the foundation of Kimberly opened a new era for this troublesome 
 and disputed territory. The year 1872 marks the beginning of respon- 
 sible government in the original Cape Colony of South Africa. Cecil 
 Rhodes came over in 1871. 
 
 Diamond region (around Kimberly) was claimed by (1) Orange Free 
 State; (2) Transvaal Republic; (3) an individual, named Waterboer. 
 Waterboer placed himself under the British government, which pres- 
 ently erected the country into a crown colony (in 1871). Later investi- 
 gations found that Waterboer had never enjoyed any right to the terri- 
 tory. The British government, claiming that a strong power was neces- 
 sary to preserve the peace and govern the people offered the Free State 
 £90,000 sterling for its claim to the colony. This was accepted, and 
 the controversy was closed, although a sense of un justice continued to 
 rankle in the breasts of many of its citizens. Bryce, pp. 148-49. 
 
 3 Doyle, A. C: "The War in South Africa." 
 
Causes of the British-Boer War 93 
 
 incontestible right," than to this, both by the right of con- 
 quest and the right of purchase ; that England had the same 
 kind of a problem the United States would have had if the 
 Dutch of Pennsylvania had moved West and set up a differ- 
 ent form of government from that of the United States, and 
 United States had come in contact with this foreign govern- 
 ment in her westward expansion. Mr. James Bryce, whose 
 opinion always carries weight and merits the greatest con- 
 sideration, while admitting on the one hand evils of the Eng- 
 lish rule, her many mistakes and blunders, on the other hand 
 in the general policy and administration of the English 
 rule, justifies his government. He states that the Boers had 
 gone backward in civilization; were separated for two cen- 
 turies from European culture and political systems ; that 
 they would not work the gold when they found it, had an 
 aversion for commerce, industrial pursuits, and finance, and 
 absolute incapacity for such pursuits ; that into this con- 
 dition it was that there came the swarm of gold-seekers after 
 1884. Sanderson, another English author, while excusing his 
 country still less than Bryce, still cannot lay the blame of 
 the war upon his government, although he does hold Cecil 
 Rhodes somewhat responsible. 
 
 On the other hand, there are both moderate and violent 
 partisans of the Boers' cause and actions. Of the former 
 class the French author Despagnet is a good example. He 
 dismisses from the very first any of the alleged grievances 
 of the British as real causes of the war. On what he con- 
 siders as the fundamental cause, he comments as follows : 
 
 "It is in the general schemes of English politics for several 
 years that we are to seek the true motives of the war and 
 this war itself is only one manifestation, the most grave it is 
 true, of the end pursued by Great Britain since she has 
 become dominated by aspirations of quasi-universal su- 
 premacy disguised under the name of imperialism." This 
 very expression is used by another Frenchman (Peyronnard) 
 in his "Des Causes de la Gueire, quoted fr. R. G. C. I, 
 
94 The Causes Of War 
 
 VII, p. 85, It is his opinion that the war was not 
 only not justified by any of the alleged grievances, but not 
 even explained by them. Continuing, he says : "Is it, then, 
 a war of races : — that of the Anglo-Saxon against the Dutch 
 in South Africa?" "No!" answers Mr. Westlake: "It is a 
 war for an ideal." That ideal is the English policy of lib- 
 eral government, of equality of rights to all as against the 
 Boer regime of domination and privilege. 3 (The author 
 [Despagnet] gives it as his view that it can hardly be be- 
 lieved that England would go into such a war merely for an 
 ideal.) 
 
 Another claim of some English authors is — according to 
 Despagnet — that, Great Britain, having once acquired au- 
 thority in certain regions, finds herself obligated to de- 
 fend the interests which she has developed there, and it is 
 natural and just that the neighboring districts become tribu- 
 tary to her, because they will grow normally or naturally 
 into the sphere of her influence. 
 
 The real policy he insists is found in the triumph of the 
 imperialistic idea in England and the principal cause of the 
 war is the pressure of financiers and speculators engaged in 
 the gold mines. He holds D'Israeli chiefly responsible for the 
 imperialism-political evolution as he designates it, of Eng- 
 land, that brought on her conquests in South Africa. 
 
 The German press and people, as we would naturally ex- 
 pect, were rather violently opposed to Great Britain in this 
 war. The extreme sentiment is voiced by the historian, Theo- 
 dore Monsen, in giving what he considers as the feeling in 
 Germany toward England, and particularly on the British- 
 Boer War. Among other things he says: 
 
 "The radical defects of the English system, the trampling 
 on nations subjugated and despised, and the prevalence of 
 money interests . . . has become too evident .... As far 
 as I know, every German is at heart with the Boers, and 
 that not because their cousinship is a little closer than the 
 
 8 See Westlake, The Transvaal War, pp. 1 to 5. 
 
Causes of the British-Boer War 95 
 
 English, but partly because the hate against your country- 
 men has reached fearful . . . dimensions ; partly because 
 this war is not only a calamity . . . but an infamy." What 
 a joke this statement is, considering Germany's treatment 
 of her colonies ! 
 
 In our study of the motives and immediate and remote 
 causes of this war, we find that there is quite a complexity 
 of interests and provocations, some quite vague and flimsy 
 and others more clearly manifest and certain. 
 
 It is Mr. Doyle's opinion that it was a dangerous ven- 
 ture for Great Britain to change the habits of this most 
 conservative Teutonic stock of people. If she had not 
 tried this, conciliation might have succeeded (beginning with 
 1814.) He holds England responsible for the war in the 
 following respects: 
 
 1. Severe and injudicious punishment of Dutch farmers. 
 Dutch could not forget it. 
 
 2. Emancipation of slaves, 1834, "fanned the smolder- 
 ing discontents into a flame." 
 
 3. The Boers moved into Natal to get away from the 
 British, but when they got there, they found that the English 
 had preceded them in occupation — by sea. An unwelcome 
 information indeed. (In leaving Natal, the Boers left what 
 they had fought the fierce Zulus to gain and could not leave 
 it but with a sense of deep injury to themselves.) 
 
 4. Delay in promised reforms after the annexation (in 
 1877) and an unsuitable governor, 4 — Sir Owen Lanyon. 
 
 Montague White, former Consul General of South Afri- 
 can Republic in London, classifies the causes of the English- 
 Boer War substantially as follows: 
 
 1. Discontented and irreconcilable element in Johannes- 
 burg — one of the most important factors. 
 
 £. Conservative Dutch farmers intensified in their re- 
 
 4 On the conduct of the Boers as a republic, he says: "Can it be won- 
 dered at, that South Africa has been in a ferment ever since, and that 
 the British Africander has yearned with an intensity of feeling unknown 
 in England for the hour of revenge?" 
 
96 The Causes Of War 
 
 sistance by 65 years of bitter experience with Great Britain. 
 
 3. Sudden inrush of a mining, commercial and speculative 
 community. 
 
 4. Clumsy diplomacy. 
 
 5. Greed for gold-capitalism. 
 
 6. Lust for empire (yellow press of London its mouth- 
 piece). 
 
 7. Thirst of revenge — remembering defeats and outrages 
 upon Englishmen. — N. A. Rev. 170 : 225-ff. 
 
 Captain Mahan, U. S. N. (N. A. Rev. 170, pp. 313-4), 
 in discussing the causes of the English-Boer War, holds Eng- 
 land responsible in two respects, viz. : 
 
 1. Her insistence that a large alien population in the 
 Transvaal be relieved from grievous political and social 
 wrongs. 
 
 2. England's claim of the right of suzerainty in this 
 matter. 
 
 Causes of the war in South Africa are classified by Mr. 
 Green as follows: 
 
 British rulers in various ways annoyed the old inhabitants, 
 as for example — 
 
 1. The injudicious introducing of English language 
 prematurely into the courts and public offices before the 
 people were able to understand it. 
 
 2. Their early military rule was sometimes arbitrary. 
 
 3. Missionaries were a constant source of trouble to 
 the Boers because they taught the natives the equality of 
 all men before the law, and since they were the only friends 
 the poor blacks had, they made it a point of conscience to 
 report to London every act of injustice which came to their 
 knowledge. 
 
 4. The g*eat wrong which stirred the Dutch to the 
 depths was the abolition of slavery by Great Britain in 
 1834— 
 
 a. Insufficient compensation for them. 
 
 b. Paid over in London so that colonists received 
 
Causes of the British^Boer War 97 
 
 but little of it and this meant beggary to many of the 
 colonists. 
 
 The Boers held that emancipation was the crowning 
 wrong, that slavery was sanctioned by the Old Testament 
 and that people might as well take away their oxen as their 
 slaves. This emancipation and squandering of the slave- 
 holders money in London led to the "Great Trek" in 1836. 
 
 5. Lack of tact of Great Britain in annexing Transvaal 
 republics in 1877. Great Britain was too hasty in her ac- 
 tion. 
 
 6. Finally the indiscretion of Britain with regard to 
 Transvaal independence. Krugar had been in England and 
 had heard Gladstone condemn the high-handed annexation 
 of the Transvaal. When Gladstone came into power, how- 
 ever, he allowed the annexation to remain as an accomplished 
 act. The Boers were bitterly disappointed in his action and 
 an insurrection followed, in which the Boers won many noted 
 victories. 5 On the other hand we have the Boer injus- 
 tices. . . . 
 
 7. Their denial of fundamental and necessary rights and 
 privileges to outlanders such as water-supply, sewerage, 
 street lights, pavements and proper police; independent 
 courts of justice ; rights to plead in English ; English schools, 
 etc. These Outlanders, already a majority ruled by a tyran- 
 nical and ignorant minority of Boers, thus led to the for- 
 mation of the Transvaal National Union, the object of which 
 was to agitate reform in 1892. 
 
 8. The Jameson raid in 1895 was a capital blunder. This 
 
 5 Internal independence was restored to the people of the Transvaal 
 in 1881 and reaffirmed in 1884. The British in South Africa were indig- 
 nant at this action which they called surrender to the Boers. They 
 urged complete conquest and control to all South Africa by England. 
 This the mother country had scruples against doing, and seemed in the 
 ever-increasing probability of a European war, to be unwilling to do. 
 The Boers saw nothing in this action but cowardice and from this time 
 on they treated the British government as infamous, planned to be 
 wholly independent of them and to drive them and their language out 
 of all South Africa. 
 
98 The Causes Of War 
 
 gave Kruger the pretext to say that the Union and even 
 the British Cabinet sought to gain its end by force and 
 not by reason. It alienated the sympathies of all Dutch 
 descent throughout South Africa. 
 
 9. Green is very emphatic in stating that this was a 
 war of race opposition and the clash of the two civilizations. 
 He says, "It was as if two centuries had run against each 
 other." The African Dutchman lived a different life from 
 the Europeans — and as a consequence there was no fusion 
 in the Transvaal. 
 
 Professor Naville of Geneva considers the corrupting ef- 
 fect of a flood of wealth that came without labor to be the 
 chief cause of the war. It was, at least, the final cause, 
 though not the greatest. If the cause just mentioned might 
 have been eliminated, there would not have been the two 
 bitter contending forces to fly at each other. There might 
 have been a blending of German and English, as there was 
 in New York. 
 
 The Causes of the Final Quarrel 
 
 After the discovery of gold in abundance in 1886, there 
 was "not a wrong which had driven the Boer from Cape 
 Colony which he did not now practice upon the Uitlanders. 
 The Pretoria government^ for example, became a most cor- 
 rupt oligarchy. 
 
 The wrongs of the Uitlanders he sums up as follows : 
 
 1. Heavily taxed, they provided seven-eighths of the 
 revenue of the country. 
 
 2. Despite this prosperity they had brought, they were 
 deprived of the right to vote and could by no means influ- 
 ence the disposal of the great sums which they were pro- 
 viding. 
 
 3. Had no voice in choice or payment of officials. Men 
 of the worst private character might be placed with com- 
 plete authority over valuable interests. 
 
Causes of the British-Boer War 99 
 
 4. Had no control over education — though paid the 
 taxes. 
 
 5. No power of municipal government — very unsanitary 
 and corrupt cities. 
 
 6. Despotic government in the matter of the press and 
 the right of public meetings. 
 
 7. Disability from service upon a jury. 
 
 8. Continual harassing of the mining interests by vexa- 
 tious legislation. 
 
 (a) Dynamite monopoly. 
 
 (b) Liquor laws — Kaffirs habitually drunk. 
 
 (c) Incompetence and extortions of State-owned 
 railroads. 
 
 (d) Surrounding Johannesburg with tolls from 
 which the towns had no profits, etc. 6 
 
 Distinct from all the former definite wrongs, it was a con- 
 stant irritation to freeborn and progressive men, accus- 
 tomed to liberal institutions that they should be despotically 
 ruled by corrupt, narrow-minded bigots and buffoons, as 
 eighty per cent of their rulers were. 
 
 In defense of the Boers it may be said that if they had 
 allowed the Uitlanders privileges and citizenship they would 
 soon have usurped the government and they themselves would 
 again have been obliged to leave their homes or become mere 
 dependents. 
 
 The argument of the Boers would be more valid if they 
 had received no benefit from the incomers. The foreigners' 
 thrift made the Boers, themselves, rich. "Had President 
 Kruger given the franchise generously to the Uitlander, his 
 pyramid would have been firm upon its base and not balanced 
 upon its apex." 
 
 It was a settled animosity of Kruger and the leading Boers 
 against the Uitlanders and the British in general that pre- 
 
 •The salary list had become twenty-four times what it was when Uit- 
 landers arrived, and five times the total revenue then in 1899. 
 
100 The Causes Of War 
 
 vented any compromise or understanding with them. No 
 little part of this was due moreover to sheer ignorance on 
 the part of the Boers. 
 
 Everyone must admit that Cecil Rhodes, in his zeal for 
 the growth of the British power in South Africa, was some- 
 what unscrupulous in the use of means to gain that power. 
 "He would rather carry a strong position by storm than 
 trust to the slower and safer methods of investing and starv- 
 ing out the foe." 7 He was responsible for the Jameson Raid, 
 in 1895, which is the blackest spot on English rule in South 
 Africa, and did more than anything else to turn all the 
 Dutch descent against the British and determine to drive 
 them out of Africa. While no doubt Jameson went in (at 
 that moment) without his authority, Jameson's work was a 
 part of Rhodes' larger plan. 
 
 Dr. Jameson took matters into his own hands, it is true. 
 This action, however, only revealed Rhodes' deeper scheme 
 of taking away the independence of the Transvaal Republic. 
 This incident "stopped all prospects of voluntary reform in 
 Transvaal, led Orange Free State into active sympathy with 
 her and plunged all South Africa into a turmoil of race 
 hostility which culminated finally in the British-Boer War. 
 
 The grievances of the Uitlanders became heavier than ever 
 after the Jameson raid. 
 
 A petition to the Queen of England, signed by 21,000 Uit- 
 landers, was now gotten up. The petition was answered 
 and the war and final crisis came. This petition reads as 
 follows : 
 
 "The condition of your Majesty's subjects in this State 
 has indeed become well-nigh intolerable. 
 
 "The acknowledged and admitted grievances of which your 
 Majesty's subjects complained prior to 1895, not only are 
 not redressed, but exists today in an aggravated form. They 
 are still deprived of all political rights, they are denied any 
 voice in the government of the country, they are taxed far 
 7 Sanderson, p. 284. 
 
Causes of the British-Boer War 101 
 
 above the requirements of the country, the revenue of which 
 is misapplied and devoted to objects which keep alive a con- 
 tinuous and well-founded feeling of irritation, without in 
 any way advancing the general interest of the State. Mal- 
 administration and peculation of public moneys go hand-in- 
 hand, without any vigorous measures being adopted to put a 
 stop to the scandal. The education of Uitlander children is 
 made subject to impossible conditions. The police afford no 
 adequate protection to the lives and property of the in- 
 habitants of Johannesburg; they are rather a source of 
 danger to the peace and safety of the Uitlander population. 
 
 "A further grievance has become prominent since the be- 
 ginning of the year. The power vested in the Government by 
 means of the Public Meetings Act has been a menace to 
 Your Majesty's subjects since the enactment of the Act in 
 1894. This power has now been applied in order to deliver 
 a blow that strikes at the inherent and inalienable birth- 
 right of every British subject in, namely, his right to peti- 
 tion his Sovereign. Straining to the utmost the language 
 and intention of the law, the Government has arrested two 
 British subjects who assisted in presenting a petition to 
 Your Majesty on behalf of four thousand fellow-subjects. 
 Not content with this, the Government, when Your Majesty's 
 loyal subjects again attempted to lay their grievances be- 
 fore Your Majesty, permitted their meeting to be broken 
 up, and the objects of it to be defeated, by a body of Boers, 
 organized by Government officials and acting under the pro- 
 tection of the police. By reason, therefore, of the direct as 
 well as the indirect act of the Government, Your Majesty's 
 loyal subjects have been prevented from publicly ventilating 
 their grievances, and from laying them before Your Ma- 
 jesty. 
 
 "Wherefore Your Majesty's humble petitioners humbly be- 
 seech Your Most Gracious Majesty to extend Your Ma- 
 jesty's protection to Your Majesty's loyal subjects, resident 
 in this State, and to cause an inquiry to be made into 
 
102 The Causes Of War 
 
 grievances and complaints enumerated and set forth in this 
 humble petition and to direct Your Majesty's representative 
 in South Africa to take measures which will insure the speedy 
 reform of the abuses complained of, and to obtain substantial 
 guarantees from the Government of this State for the rec- 
 ognition of their rights as British subjects." 8 
 
 With regard to the government of South Africa by the 
 British, it is a fair statement of the situation to say that 
 while a few of the governors were arbitrary and narrow and 
 bigoted, most of them were not. The local administration on 
 the whole was quite efficient. In 1877, the South African Re- 
 public was annexed to the British Crown by Sir Theophilus 
 Shepstone. The majority of the Boers were against this, but 
 seeing its advantages, would have become reconciled, had not 
 the English government followed it up, as Mr. Bryce says, 
 with three "capital blunders": (1) Failure to grant the 
 local autonomy Shepstone had promised. (The Volksraad 
 was never convoked, the constitution was never promul- 
 gated.) (2) The selection of a successor to Shepstone, — a 
 military officer who was personally very unpopular, would 
 not "mix" with the Boers, and was wholly incapable of 
 dealing with the delicate political work at hand. (3) Re- 
 moval of the two native dangers the Boers had feared: (a) 
 Extinguishing of the Zulu Kingdom; (b) Reduction of 
 Sikuhum's strongholds and establishment of peace in the 
 northeast. 
 
 8 All over South Africa was heard the one cry of oppression by the 
 Boer government, and that those who would be free must themselves 
 strike the first blow. That war was at hand, that arms were stored away 
 for that purpose and the visitor invited to see them was a matter of 
 common knowledge. The Marquis of Loure in an article in the North 
 American Review, March, 1900, rather sides with the British. While ad- 
 mitting that the thirst for gold will lead any people to extremes, he 
 says that the Boers had an ancient and narrow form of government 
 with a hateful intolerance of all free institutions of the Anglo-Saxon 
 type. The conflict is only the inevitable one between progress and stag- 
 nation. He says, "We who are sowers of freedom have a right to reap 
 the harvest and we prefer to have the envy and malice rather than the 
 contempt of those who have not plowed the straight furrows we have 
 made." P. 311. 
 
Causes of the British-Boer War 103 
 
 "Against the wish of every wise Boer, against the wish 
 of every loyal colonist, in spite of addresses, in spite even 
 of deputies sent to London, the English government insisted 
 wantonly and wilfully in 1852-4 on founding two independent 
 Boer States to mar the unity of one African dominion and 
 built up with deliberate carefulness all the pain, anxiety and 
 danger that we have to face today; such was the beginning 
 of our trouble in South Africa." 9 
 
 This is only one example of the numerous administrative 
 blunders that the English government made in South Africa, 
 Mr. Curt (quoted above) further remarks: "Democratic in 
 principle the Boer republics are, in fact, limited oligarchies" 
 — and says that today (1900) it is "the clash between that 
 most modern of all communities, a gold-field population and 
 the most antique and intolerant government in the world." 
 
 Now, after considering these different views and opinions, 
 some of them, indeed, all but absurd, what conclusion are we 
 to come to ! It is evident, to begin with, that we cannot ac- 
 cept without modification the statements of either the Eng- 
 lish on the one hand, or of the Germans on the other. The 
 Germans and French charge the whole trouble to English im- 
 perialism and greed for gold. The British insist that they 
 had to protect the rights of their subjects in South Africa, 
 and that the discovery of gold, and the consequent inrush of 
 immigrants, an event which could not be foretold, was respon- 
 sible for the war. Now, laying aside all the little events, pre- 
 texts, and grievances, and admitting that the Boer control in 
 South Africa in the period 1877-1900 was mediaeval, tyranni- 
 cal, and wholly uncalled for and unjust, the real causes of 
 the war, it seems to us, may be summed up as follows : 
 
 (1) Colonial expansion policy of Great Britain. (And 
 she has more of an excuse for this policy than any other 
 nation except possibly Japan, because it has been, and its 
 maintenance is, vital to her existence as a great world 
 power. ) v 
 
 9 Henry Curt, in North American Review. 170, p. 205. 
 
104 The Causes Of War 
 
 (&) The incompatibility of the English liberal political 
 system with the oligarchical government and rude, unpro- 
 gressive social life and customs of the Boers. (This seems to 
 me the great fundamental cause of the whole struggle. But 
 for this, a great South African nationality might have de- 
 veloped, blending together all the discordant elements, with- 
 out war, and without the race antagonism that prevailed.) 
 
 (3) The discovery of gold, and the consequent exploita- 
 tion of the mines by English capitalists and financiers. This, 
 however, was more the nature of a mere event, than an under- 
 lying cause. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 CAUSES OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898) 
 
 THE causes of the Spanish- American War, like those of 
 all other wars between different races or systems of 
 government, can be understood and explained only by a 
 study of the diplomatic relations of the two countries along 
 with their political and economic (especially commercial) 
 systems, as well as the essential inherent characteristics and 
 peculiarities of each people. 
 
 Admiral Chadwick, in his excellent volume, "Relations of 
 United States and Spain-Diplomacy," characterizes these 
 relations as "the story of more than a hundred years of 
 what has been really a racial strife." He says, "The chief 
 cause was in the absolute racial unlikeness itself, and this 
 racial temperament still has an influence over the relations 
 of men — more potent — than any other force in humanity." x 
 The war was but a final episode in a century of diplomatic 
 ill feeling. 2 There was a great difference in the civilizations 
 and the political traditions of the two countries ; but, "it 
 was more than antiquity, more than an old civilization, which 
 produced the differences which made it impossible for the 
 North- American Anglo-Saxon to live near his Spanish neigh- 
 bors without friction." 3 
 
 The author's hypothesis that this hundred years of diplo- 
 matic struggle between the United States and Spain "was 
 really a racial strife" is not altogether correct. It does not 
 explain all. It is unquestionably true that lack of mutual 
 sympathy and understanding contributed in "no slight de- 
 
 1 Introduction, p. 4r. 
 
 a Ibid., p. 3. 
 
 • Introduction, p. 3. 
 
 105 
 
106 The Causes Of War 
 
 gree" to the outcome, but economic considerations are also 
 very important (e. g., the struggle over the right to navi- 
 gate the Mississippi River and the "greed of American 
 and Spanish protectionists" which was at one time at the 
 bottom of the Cuban revolt) in 1895. 
 
 Professor Hershey, in his review of Mr. Chadwick's book, 
 observes that it is justly pointed out (in Mr. Chadwick's 
 volume) . . . that at the time this message (McKinley's 
 final war message to Congress) was sent in, Spain had prac- 
 tically yielded to all the American demands which were offi- 
 cially presented to her. She had revoked the order of re- 
 concentration, and had, at the eleventh hour, granted the 
 required armistice to the Cuban insurgents. In short, Presi- 
 dent McKinley surrendered to the war advocates at the 
 very moment he had won an apparent victory for peace. Mc- 
 Kinley's weakness was not in his failure to yield to those 
 demanding peace, but in not insisting on "the absolute inde- 
 pendence of Cuba as the sine qua non of peace." 4 Mr. 
 Chadwick deals with the causes of the war, as we would ex- 
 pect, from the standpoint of diplomatic relations. But the 
 reviewer observes that "diplomatic relations do not tell the 
 whole story of the causes of any war." 5 He indicates that 
 a study must also be made of the "economic, social and gen- 
 eral political relations between the two peoples or races." 5 
 
 The reviewer agrees with Chadwick that it was a good 
 and wise thing "to cut this Gordian knot" with the sword; 
 and adds — "what misery and bloodshed might have been 
 avoided if it had been cut by General Grant in 1873, or, per- 
 haps better still, by Sec. Webster in 1850." 
 
 Why did not Cuba gain her liberty from Spain in 1825, 
 along with the continental Latin- American states ? The an- 
 swer is, the United States prevented her. That the United 
 States interfered in the Latin-American attempt to help 
 Cuba to independence in 1825 and prevented that action, is 
 
 * Hershey in N. A. Review, 16 ; pp. 148-50. 
 "Hershey in Review of Chadwick's Book. 
 
Causes of the Spanish-American War (1898) 107 
 
 explained by the fact that there was in this country the fear 
 that the freedom of slaves in Cuba, following her inde- 
 pendence from Spain, would set the South on fire; — which, 
 indeed it would have done. To quote Berrien, of Georgia, in a 
 debate in Congress at this time : "When we look to the situa- 
 tion of those islands, to the commanding position they oc- 
 cupy with reference to the commerce of the West Indies, we 
 cannot be indifferent to a change in their condition. But 
 when we reflect that they are in juxtaposition to a portion of 
 the Union where slavery exists — that the principle of uni- 
 versal emancipation must march in the van of the invading 
 force, and that all the horrors of a servile war will too 
 surely follow in its train — these merely commercial consid- 
 erations sink into insignificance. . . . We cannot allow 
 their (European) principle of universal emancipation to be 
 called into activity in a situation where its contagion from 
 our neighborhood would be dangerous to our quiet and 
 safety." 6 And Chadwick sums up the situation in these 
 words : "American slavery was thus the bulwark of what 
 remained of Spanish dominion in the Americas." 7 Henry 
 Cabot Lodge goes so far as to say that "the War of 1898 
 was the price the United States paid for having kept Cuba 
 in bondage at the dictates of our own slave power." 8 
 
 Far be it from us to underestimate the high and noble 
 purposes of the people of this country, and their sympathy 
 for the suffering Cubans; yet, it is not altogether without 
 justice that Europeans look upon this war as one of aggres- 
 sion on the part of the United States, with the ultimate 
 end in view of annexing Cuba, or at least, of so controlling 
 her government and destiny as to best secure the interests of 
 the United States. We are not prepared to say nor do we 
 believe, that the action of our government and people was 
 due mainly to a motive of self-interest. But let us re- 
 
 • See Benton, Abridgement of Debates, VIII, 421 & ff. 
 
 'Chadwick, p. — . 
 
 •Lodge, "War with Spain," p. 6. 
 
108 The Causes Of War 
 
 count a bit of American history, with the opinions of some 
 noted Americans on this subject, and let them speak for 
 themselves. J. Q. Adams, than whose opinions on such sub- 
 jects no American's are more important, once said: "There 
 are laws of political as well as physical gravitation and if 
 an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot 
 choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from 
 its own unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of 
 self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American 
 Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cart her off 
 from its bosom." The View of Jefferson in his time is very 
 interesting: "Do we wish to acquire to our own confederacy 
 any one or more of the Spanish provinces? I candidly con- 
 fess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interest- 
 ing addition which could ever be made to our system of states 
 . . . yet, as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, 
 but by war, ... I have no hesitation in abandoning my first 
 wish to future chances" 9 
 
 Buchanan, Secretary of State, made this statement in 
 1848 : "If Cuba were annexed to the United States, we should 
 be relieved from the apprehensions which we can never cease 
 to feel for our own safety and the security of our commerce. 
 . . . Human foresight cannot anticipate the beneficial conse- 
 quences which would result to every portion of the Union." 10 
 This was in the administration of Polk. "Successive later 
 administrations pushed the project of purchase to the very 
 eve of the Civil War." Buchanan was the chief advocate. 11 
 In 1875 (President Grant) the situation was similar to that 
 of 1898. Had Grant yielded to Congress, there would have 
 been war 12 (due largely to Spanish outrages such as Vir- 
 ginius affair). And in 1876: "The President . . . desires 
 ... to express the desire of the United States to maintain a 
 firm, solid and enduring peace with Spain and to remove 
 
 9 Jefferson's writings, X, 315. 
 "See Chadwick, p. 221. 
 "Chadwick, p. 233. 
 "See Chadwick, p. 80. 
 
Causes of the Spanish- American War (1898) 109 
 
 every disturbing question . . . desires to disabuse the mind 
 of the Government and people of Spain of the existence of 
 any desire on the part of the government of the United 
 States for the acquisition of Cuba." 13 
 
 Several wrote that the United States "have constantly in- 
 dulged in the belief that they might hope some day to acquire 
 those Islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) by just and lawful 
 means, with the consent of their sovereign." Thus we see 
 that the annexation of Cuba to the United States has been 
 looked upon as an ultimate probability by most prominent 
 American statesmen ; but they have been content to wait for 
 its realization. Jefferson believed Cuba would finally "give 
 herself to us." Popular disapproval of the "Ostend Mani- 
 festo," however, proved that Cuba was not to be taken by 
 force of arms with the will and consent of the American peo- 
 ple as a whole. 14 
 
 The incapable administration of the government by the 
 Spanish officials in Cuba was the cause of most of the fric- 
 tion between the United States and Spain with regard to 
 Cuba. If Spain had granted Cuba a liberal government, all 
 the moral support that the Cubans got from the United 
 States would have been much more difficult, if not impossible 
 to secure. The Spanish government, at home, however, came 
 at least to see the futility of the officials' arbitrary means 
 of punishment. But the officials in Cuba could never be 
 brought to that realization. "It was their tenacious hold- 
 ing to this view of sudden and severe vengeance 15 which . . . 
 more than all else — the effects of reconcentration excepted, 
 finally brought on war in 1898." 16 The Spanish govern- 
 
 13 See Chadwick, p. 389. 
 
 "The United States government, in the course of the 19th century, 
 repeatedly made it understood that this nation would intervene to pre- 
 vent Spain transferring Cuba to any other European power. See Moores 
 Digest of Int. Law, VI, p. 450. Also p. 464, on the American opinion 
 on annexation of Cuba to U. S. and p. 83, Vol. VI, on unselfish motives 
 of U. S. 
 
 15 An immediate cause. 
 
 "Chadwick, p. 473. 
 
110 The Causes Of War 
 
 ment could not control these officials. Conditions were in 
 quite as deplorable a state at home as in Cuba. In the in- 
 competence of Spain to deal with revolted Cuba and her own 
 officials there undoubtedly was one of the causes of the war. 
 The distracted and anarchical condition of Spain for sixty 
 years made efficient government in Cuba impossible. The 
 United States had been on the point of intervention in 1875, 
 as we have seen. The Spanish character, however, had much 
 to do with this. It is characteristic of the Spaniard to pro- 
 ceed to immediate and summary punishment without a resort 
 to trial or jury. 17 
 
 We all know the story of the blowing up of the Maine. It 
 cannot be denied that this incident was one of the immediate 
 causes of the war, and that the American people were in- 
 flamed against Spain as never before. But it cannot justly 
 be claimed that the Spanish government was responsible for 
 or connived at, this deed of horror. It is more likely that it 
 was the work of irresponsible Spanish individuals incited per- 
 haps, by Spanish officials in Cuba. 18 The Spanish govern- 
 ment expressed deep sympathy for this disaster, as also did 
 the Spanish navy department. We have no valid reason to 
 question the sincerity of this action. 
 
 There was unquestionably an uncontrollable desire for 
 war in the United States. (But it was Congress which really 
 forced the country into war.) 19 The Spanish government 
 
 "Admiral Chadwick takes the position that the suffering in Cuba 
 (1896-8) was due as much to the insurgents themselves as to the Span- 
 iards. He says that especially was unemployment due to the Cubans 
 themselves; that the great error of the Spanish government in connection 
 with the reconcentration was its "disregarding precautions which should 
 have been taken to feed the people thus herded together," that it was 
 this that caused the rapid growth in the United States of a hostile feel- 
 ing to Spain. That, "there is no denying the force of the Spanish argu- 
 ment" (charging responsibility for the suffering mainly to the insurgents) 
 — and adds, "nor could mere injury to commerce be made a just ground 
 for intervention." Dr. Hershey, in his review of this book, takes excep- 
 tion to this statement, and says that there is no question but that the 
 Spanish were far more to blame for these sufferings tlran were the 
 insurgent forces of the island. 
 
 18 See Benton, Int. Law & Diplomacy. Spanish- American War, p. 76, 
 and Chadwick's "Diplomacy" on this. 
 
 19 Benton, pp. 92-3 for the stated causes for going to war. 
 
Causes of the Spanish- American War (1898) 111 
 
 was slowly but surely receding from her hostile position and 
 war would have been averted but for the Maine disaster and 
 the publication of the letter of the Spanish minister. 
 
 Woodford, the United States minister in Spain, was con- 
 fident that we could have peace if the United States would 
 wait a little, that all her and Cuba's demands would be 
 granted. Every reason leads to the belief that all just claims 
 could have been readily adjusted . . . yet "this (blowing 
 up of the Maine) was without doubt the very event which 
 was regarded by the masses of the Americans as justifying a 
 resort to war out of pure revenge." 20 
 
 The United States' grounds for intervention were: 
 
 1. In the cause of humanity. 
 
 2. For the protection of the lives and property of Ameri- 
 can citizens in Cuba. 
 
 3. In defense of commercial and financial interests in- 
 volved. 
 
 4. For self-preservation. 
 
 5. For the Maine disaster. 
 
 The movement of the American squadron gave the Spanish 
 government much concern. "The display and concentration 
 of naval forces near Havana in the waters of the Peninsula 
 (Spain) and the persistency with which the Maine and the 
 Montgomery remained in the Greater Antilles are causing 
 increasing anxiety and might, through some mischance, bring 
 about a conflict," are the words of Senor Gullon of the 
 Spanish government, to Senor Duprey de Leme, Spanish 
 Minister to the United States. (Feb. 8, 1898). 21 
 
 The more distant and remote causes are summed up by 
 Lebrand as follows: 22 
 
 1. Cuban's desire for freedom, autonomy, like the other 
 Latin-American countries. 
 
 2. The desire of the United States to own or control 
 Cuba — a natural desire. 
 
 20 Benton, p. 106. 
 
 "See Chadwick, p. 538. 
 
 22 Le Brand's "Spanish- American War and the Law of Nations," p. 19. 
 
112 The Causes Of War 
 
 S. The nature of the Spanish government of Cuba and 
 the Cuban insurrections. 
 
 4. Geographical situation of Cuba, including her com- 
 mand of the Carribean and Gulf Sea-coasts. 
 
 Spanish statesmen felt that Spain could not renounce 
 Cuba — Cuba and the Philippines, the last of her great colo- 
 nial empire (in the Occident and in the Orient). Without 
 these they felt that Spain could not long exist — they said as 
 much. 23 
 
 Mr. Lodge notes the following causes : — 
 
 1. Sympathy for the oppressed and suffering Cubans. 
 
 2. American resentment against dominion of Europe in 
 the New World. 
 
 3. Case of the Virginius (1873). An American vessel 
 captured in high seas, taken to a Cuban port and about fifty 
 of her crew shot. The United States accepted money and 
 war was avoided, but the question of moral insult was un- 
 settled. 
 
 Captain Mahan asserts that "the avowed purpose and 
 cause" of the United States* action was not primarily for 
 "redress of grievances (such as blowing up of Maine and exe- 
 cutions of American citizens) against Spain, but to enforce 
 the departure of the latter from Cuba. But, we may well ask, 
 what motives led us to wish to drive Spain from the Western 
 world? Was not the United States, after all, looking largely 
 to her own ultimate interests ? Did we not need the control, 
 if not the actual possession, of Cuba in order to make com- 
 plete the chain of United States predominance (in command- 
 ing the key to the Carribean Sea and Gulf region) in the 
 New World?" 
 
 Mr. Lodge's opinion coincides almost exactly with Cap- 
 tain Mahan's, on the purpose of the war. He says that what 
 the United States desired above everything else — her purpose 
 in going to war, was to drive Spain out of Cuba, and Con- 
 gress was very careful to frame its resolution so as to make 
 that point explicit. 
 
 83 See Le Brand, p. 19. 
 
Causes of the Spanish- American War (1898) 113 
 
 Summing up, then, we may say that the causes of the 
 Spanish-American war in 1898 were: 
 
 1. Remote and fundamental. 
 
 2. Immediate (which approached from some points of 
 view but not in all respects, mere pretexts). 
 
 (a) The remote and one of the two fundamental or 
 underlying causes was unquestionably the incompatibility of 
 the Spanish and American race temperaments, and political 
 institutions and ideals. It was impossible that the two ever 
 should become blended or reconciled. Other considerations 
 and events, such as the United States intervention in Cuba, 
 with the slave problem of that time, the grievances the United 
 States had against Spain on account of the outrages on 
 Americans by the Spanish officials in Cuba, particularly the 
 Virginius affair, were only occasions for bringing to the 
 front this incompatibility of the two races, or were of the 
 nature of mere pretexts for hostility. All these differences 
 and difficulties could ultimately have been settled by peace- 
 ful means, and would have been, had the United States been 
 dealing with another such nation as England or Germany. 
 
 (b) The economic situation in Cuba undoubtedly con- 
 tributed its share in causing this war; but important as it 
 was, it was by no means the fundamental cause. It cannot 
 be separated from the other causes. 
 
 (c) The incompetence and inability of the home gov- 
 ernment in Spain made possible the abuses of her officials 
 in Cuba, and these two things together were important fac- 
 tors in the United States' intervention. This cause is more , 
 or less blended, however, with the first, or fundamental cause ' 
 above mentioned. 
 
 (d) The sympathy of the American people for the suf- 
 fering Cubans — the cause of humanity. This was indeed an 
 important cause — it swept away the whole American people 
 in a great flood of enthusiasm for the war, and was indeed, a 
 fundamental as well as an immediate cause of the war. 
 
 (e) The attitude of the McKinley administration (not at 
 first as Secretary Alger observes, but after the pulse of the 
 
114 The Causes Of War 
 
 nation had been felt, and the war fever detected) with its 
 almost utter disregard of genuine diplomacy. 
 
 (f ) The blowing up of the Maine, after all has been said, 
 can be taken as little more than an occasion or mere pre- 
 text. 
 
 (g) The long desire of at least a portion of the Ameri- 
 can people to see Cuba become a part of the United States 
 no doubt added no inconsiderable momentum to the rising 
 tide of war spirit in the United States. Nor can we say that 
 the United States was greatly to blame for this. It was 
 (1) a natural self-interest; (£) it was seen that Cuba would 
 be better off under our flag. 
 
 (h) In connection with the necessary interests of the 
 United States in Cuba as Lebrand observes, there is, of 
 course, the geographical cause. Cuba is "only a few hours 
 sail from the United States, but several days from Spain; 
 it is to the interest of the United States to possess or at 
 least control an island which is so prominent at the entrance 
 to the enclosed waters of the Gulf." This interest was soon- 
 er or later bound to clash with that of Spain. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 CAUSES OF THE FRANCO-PEUSSIAN WAR (1870) 
 
 SHELDON AMOS (in his book on Remedies for War) 
 sums up the causes of the Franco-Prussian War as 
 follows : 
 
 1. Growth of Prussia and Germany with Bismark's de- 
 termination to secure a United Germany. 
 
 2. Alleged intervention of France in nominating Hohen- 
 zollern as successor to the Spanish crown. 
 
 3. Political schemes of the Emperor Napoleon III. 
 
 4. Antipathy existing between French and German 
 people. 
 
 5. Territorial acquisition on both sides. 
 
 6. Enormously developed military institutions. 
 
 7. Alleged ill-treatment of the French Ambassador of 
 Berlin. 1 
 
 Among these, however, he recognizes only three important 
 causes: "In some cases, as in the Franco-German War of 
 1870, it is difficult even for contemporaries to decide to 
 which of the three causes — that is, (1) natural efforts after 
 increased liberty and security proportioned to the growth 
 and the consolidation of the internal resources of one of the 
 Belligerent States, or resistance, by anticipation, to future 
 aggressions or direct ambition and political acquisitiveness — 
 the war is to be attributed." 2 
 
 Writers differ materially in giving the causes and ex- 
 
 1 This certainly is as complete a list of causes for this war as could 
 be found by anyone, no matter how much study he should put on an 
 investigation of the causes; but it is true and sound despite its com- 
 plexity. 
 
 •Amos, pp. 70-71. 
 
 115 
 
116 The Causes Of War 
 
 planations of this war. Saliers, a French author, claims 
 that France had been "caught in 1870 in the dream of uni- 
 versal peace," and that that explains her being wholly unpre- 
 pared for the war with Germany. 3 The English historian, 
 Rose, on the other hand, says that French feeling against 
 Prussia had been growing for years before 1870, and that 
 France's counting on Austria as an ally against Prussia 
 (in revenge for the events of 1866) explains, in part at least, 
 the Franco-Prussian War. 4 Signobos avers that for such 
 "unforeseen" facts (as war of 1870) no general cause can be 
 discerned in the intellectual, economic, or political condition 
 of the continent of Europe." 5 Another historian gives these 
 causes : 
 
 1. Bismark's policy of a United Germany — made this 
 war necessary — naturally raised the apprehensions of Na- 
 poleon III, and caused the French to prepare for and ex- 
 pect war. 
 
 £. Question of succession to the throne of Spain stirred 
 France into a ferment rapidly as news could fly. A Hohen- 
 zollern (Leopold von Hohenzollern) had been elected, and 
 had given his consent. France could not possibly allow the 
 government of Spain to fall into the hands of Prussia, which 
 her acceptance of this ^election would mean. 6 
 
 We will here give the causes the historian. Rose, assigns 
 for this war: 
 
 1. France counting on Austria as an ally against Prus- 
 sia. 
 
 2. Bismark realized that it would take war to solve the 
 problems of reunion, which was impossible in time of peace. 
 
 3. The question of the Spanish succession now furnished 
 this casus belli. 
 
 Mr. Rose here gives Gramont's (the French Minister) 
 statement in the Chamber of Deputies, which is as follows: 
 "We do not think that respect for the rights of a neighbor- 
 
 8 Saliers, pp. V and VI in Preface, "La Guerre." 
 
 4 See Rose, I, Chap. I. 
 
 5 Signobos, p. 847. 
 °C. M. H., XI. 
 
Causes of the Franco-Prussian War (1870) 117 
 
 ing people (Spain) obliges us to allow an alien Power (Prus- 
 sia) by placing one of its princes on the throne of Charles 
 V to succeed in upsetting to our disadvantage the present 
 equilibrium of forces in Europe, and|imperil the interests and 
 honor of France. We have the firm hope that eventually it 
 will not be realized. To hinder it, we count both on the 
 wisdom of the German people and on the friendship of the 
 Spanish people. If that should not be so, strong in your 
 support and in that of the nation, we shall know how to 
 fulfill our duty without hesitation and without weakness." 7 
 
 The statements of various prominent men on this war 
 are significant and throw light on the different views : 
 
 "The war of 1870 was the personal work of Bismark, pre- 
 pared by Napoleon Ill's personal policy." 8 
 
 "The responsibility rests for the most part on one man — 
 Bismarck himself. The nation was not back of such aggres- 
 siveness, though, when once committed to war, it could be 
 depended on to carry it through. 9 At least, he caused these 
 wars (1866-71) to occur when they did." 10 
 
 "The occasion was the purchase of the Belgian railroads 
 by the French Eastern Company in February, 1869. The 
 Belgian government forbade the sale. The French govern- 
 ment attriuted this check to Bismark." n 
 
 The proposition made to the Reichstag, Feb. 24, 1870, to 
 admit the Grand Duchy of Baden into the northern Confed- 
 eration, renewed the agitation against Prussian and German 
 unity. 
 
 "The story of the Franco-German dispute is one of na- 
 tional jealousy, carefully fanned for four years by news- 
 paper editors and popular speakers until a spark sufficient 
 to set Western Europe ablaze. This was true alike on the 
 part of Germany and France." 12 
 
 'Rose, "The Devel. of the European Nations, 1870-1900," p. 46. 
 •Signobos, "Political History of Europe Since 1814," p. 847. 
 9 C. M. Hist., XI, p. 432. 
 10 Ibid., p. 434. 
 "Signobos, p. 806. 
 "Rose, I, 56. 
 
118 The Causes Of War 
 
 The immediate cause, however, all must agree, was due 
 to Prince Bismarck. The French Minister Daree, who 
 favored peace, was replaced early in 1870 by Gramont, an 
 enemy of Prussia. Napoleon's plan for the invasion of 
 Southern Germany which had been discussed with Archduke 
 of Austria, fell through and peace seemed assured, when 
 Bismarck's publishing of the telegram from King William 
 set everything on fire and caused France to declare war on 
 Prussia. 
 
 A note had been addressed from Paris to the Prussian 
 government saying that the coming of Hohenzollern to 
 Spain was regarded by France as a provocation and menace 
 from Prussia and that France could not "suffer the empire 
 of Charles V to be restored." 13 The French minister at 
 Berlin was ordered to press for an immediate renunciation 
 of Prince Leopold's claims. He was informed that the 
 matter was one for Prince Leopold and the Spanish people, 
 but that the King would communicate with Leopold's father 
 on the subject. An explicit order from King William to 
 Prince Leopold was demanded by France; in the meantime, 
 it was announced from Madrid that Leopold had withdrawn 
 his candidature. The matter seemed again settled, but 
 this did not satisfy Napoleon. He demanded that Prussia 
 promise to guarantee that no such attempt in favor of a 
 Hohenzollern should ever again be made. King William ab- 
 solutely refused to so bind himself. The French ambassador 
 was finally informed that he could not be received by the 
 King. 
 
 The telegram published by Bismarck, shortened by him 
 for the purpose, conveying the impression that King William 
 had treated the French ambassador with disrespect, aroused 
 all France. This led immediately to the French declaration 
 of war against Prussia. The telegram cut down was as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 "After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary 
 ^ 8 See Signobos, p. 807-11. 
 
Causes of the Franco-Prussian War (1870) 119 
 
 Prince of Hohenzollern had been officially communicated to 
 the Imperial Government of France by the Royal Govern- 
 ment of Spain, the French ambassador at Ems further de- 
 manded of his Majesty the King that he would authorize 
 him to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty the King bound 
 himself for all future time never again to give his consent if 
 the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. His Ma- 
 jesty the King thereupon decided not to receive the French 
 ambassador again, and sent to tell him through the aide-de- 
 camp on duty that his Majesty had nothing further to com- 
 municate to the ambassador." 
 
 The French people could see in this action of Bismarck 
 nothing but the basest insult, notwithstanding that historians 
 who have carefully examined the dispatch and compared it 
 with the original telegram of King William of Prussia have 
 claimed that it was not at all such — that the abbreviated 
 form had not the incendiary language in it that the original 
 had. 14 A perusal of the two shows that there is some basis 
 for this claim. 1 " 5 There is no question, however, that 
 Bismarck wanted war, and that the French government 
 were almost as eager. Both the German and French people, 
 
 "See Rose, p. 49-50. 
 
 "The original telegram is as follows: "His Majesty writes to me: 
 'Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order to demand 
 from me, finally in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize 
 him to telegraph at once that I hound myself for all future time never 
 again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candi- 
 dature. I refused at last somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor 
 possible to undertake engagements of this kind a tout jamais. 
 
 " 'Naturally I told him that I had as yet received no news, and as he 
 was earlier informed about Paris and Madrid than myself he could see 
 clearly that my Government once more had no hand in the matter.' His 
 Majesty has since received a letter from the Prince. His Majesty, hav- 
 ing told Count Benedetti that he was awaiting news from the Prince, has 
 decided, with reference to the above demand, upon the representation of 
 Count Eulenburg and myself, not to receive Count Benedetti again, but 
 only to let him be informed through an aide-de-camp: 'That his Majesty 
 had now received from the Prince confirmation of the news which Bene- 
 detti had already received from Paris, and had nothing further to say 
 to the ambassador.' His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency whether 
 Benedetti's fresh demand and its rejection should not be at once com- 
 municated both to our ambassadors and to the press." 
 
120 The Causes Of War 
 
 on the other hand, shuddered to think of the horrors of such 
 a war between the two great powers. 
 
 Prussia's monster crime, however, was not the war, — it 
 was the stealing of the French provinces of Alsace and Lor- 
 raine. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 THE UNITED STATES 
 
 Fundamental and Immediate Causes of Our Conflict xvith 
 
 Germany 
 
 IN our series "The Causes of War," we have dealt with 
 man's motives for war in the past; the European back- 
 ground of the great conflict just closed; the causes of this 
 war for each of the individual nations involved ; — in the 
 meantime showing the nature of recent German diplomacy; 
 the autocratic government and military caste that were re- 
 sponsible, in the Kaiser's dominions, for the universal devas- 
 tation and bloodshed; and finally, in a general way, with 
 America's reasons for entering the cause of the free nations 
 in the supreme struggle of democracy and right against au- 
 tocracy and might. Now, in our series of articles on the 
 "Outline and Study of the World War" we shall state our 
 own cause more specifically, and follow up with the study of 
 the military and other events of the war, the preliminary 
 peace problems of the peace conference — all with the view 
 to making this material most available and suitable to the 
 needs of our readers, as they deal with the war and current 
 history. 
 
 It is to be hoped that the lively interest in the reading and 
 study of current history which has been stimulated by the 
 war will continue in these equally critical and unsettled times 
 of world reaction and reconstruction, and that the great 
 services of the leading weekly and monthly magazines and 
 periodicals will not be forgotten. 
 
 Following is an outline on the United States and her causes 
 
 121 
 
122 The Causes Of War 
 
 and interests in the world war. This outline has been used 
 throughout the schools of Fort Smith as a basis for the study 
 of this war, as our government urges upon our schools today, 
 — and is recommended by teachers and school officials in a 
 good many systems. Practically all references are available 
 in any community. 
 
 WAR STUDY OUTLINE FOR SCHOOLS 
 
 /. Why We Were At War With Germany 
 
 A. Fundamental Causes. 
 
 1. Democracy versus autocratic power. (This world 
 
 cannot remain permanently half free and half en- 
 slaved by autocratic power.) 
 
 2. The moral ground of humanity versus the principle 
 
 that "might makes right" with Germany's conse- 
 quent cruelties and barbarous warfare. 
 
 3. U. S. championship of international law, the sacred 
 
 obligations of treaties, the rights of neutrals, and 
 of small states. 
 
 4. U. S. has also gone to war to uphold her own honor 
 
 and respect among the powers of the earth, and to 
 prove the sincerity of her professed principles. 
 
 B. Immediate Causes. 
 
 1. Germany's domineering diplomacy and attitude 
 toward our Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 a. Admiral Diederich and Admiral Dewey in Ma- 
 
 nila harbor in 1898. (See World's Work, 
 June, 1916.) 
 
 b. The Samoan incident. (See World's Work, 
 
 June, 1916.) 
 
 c. The Kaiser, Roosevelt, and Venezuela, 1902. 
 
 d. Utterances of the Crown Prince and others with 
 
 regard to U. S. and Monroe Doctrine. (See 
 "Out of Their Own Mouths.") 
 
The United States 123 
 
 e. German spy system in America. (Pres. Wilson's 
 
 Speeches.) 
 
 f. Germany's aggressions in South America and 
 
 Mexico. 
 
 g. Von Zimmerman's proposal to Mexico and 
 
 Japan for partitioning U. S. among them. 
 
 2. German submarine blockade. 
 
 a. Interference with legitimate American com- 
 
 merce. 
 
 b. Destruction of American lives and property. 
 
 c. Shameless violation of our rights as neutrals, 
 
 (rights she had solemnly promised to respect, 
 but whose violation she now celebrated pub- 
 licly in numerous places). 
 
 d. Great loss of food needed for suffering peoples. 
 
 3. Atrocities in Belgium, Poland, Northern France, Ser- 
 
 bia, Roumania — showing Germany's deliberate 
 policy toward her helpless, innocent victims. 
 
 4. Similar effect on American opinion was caused by the 
 
 Zeppelin raids on the unprotected and innocent in 
 London and other English towns. 
 
 5. Nefarious plotting of German agents in the U. S. with 
 
 working men, banks, anarchists, bombs, traitors, 
 pan-Germans, etc. (Hundreds of cases unearthed 
 by U. S. secret service, showing millions of dollars 
 spent in this country by Germany to foment strife 
 and influence our neutrality while Germany was 
 still professing friendship and peaceful relations 
 with the U. S.) 
 
 II. Danger of Failure to This Coimtry 
 
 1. Germany threatened to make us pay for all the cost 
 of the war to her. (A staggering indemnity, just 
 as she had already collected from every country 
 she had conquered.) 
 
124 The Causes Of War 
 
 % The Kaiser, Crown Prince and Princes of Germany 
 have scoffed at the idea of democracy (have 
 boasted of the submarine as the "argument of 
 kings" against democracy). 
 
 3. The Kaiser claims to be king by divine right, and to 
 
 be God's agent on earth. (Read from his addresses 
 to soldiers, history teachers, — in Munich, etc., etc., 
 1891, 1897, 1900, 1909, 1914, 1916, 1917. See 
 Teacher's Journal^ June, 1917, World's Work, 
 June, 1917. Review of Reviews' December, 1917. 
 "Out of Their Own Mouths," etc.) 
 
 4. The German police system was more severe than ever 
 
 were the quartering of the British soldiers of King 
 George on the American colonies. (We did not 
 stand it then, we must not run the risk of it now.) 
 See West's Modern World. 
 
 5. Germany curbed freedom of speech and of the press, 
 
 and suppressed the individual, and made him just 
 a link in the machinery of the government, which 
 was controlled by a privileged autocratic class 
 above him. In Prussia, men voted according to 
 wealth, not universal suffrage. In one district in 
 Berlin three men paid one-third of the taxes, had 
 one-third the vote of all the district of the city. 
 
 6. If we had lost this war, we should have lost the guar- 
 
 antee of everything that Washington and his com- 
 patriots fought for, and "government of the 
 people, by the people, for the people," would have 
 perished "from the earth," for generations to come, 
 if not for centuries. 
 
 III. The Duty of Every American to Support the War 
 
 1. It is our duty to know, first of all, the justice of our 
 
 country's cause. 
 
 2, We should have the courage to hold up that cause 
 
 wherever it is assailed for — 
 
The United States 185 
 
 3. Sedition and treason are continually being sown 
 
 throughout our land, and must be met and put 
 down. — This is still true. 
 
 4. To be worthy of the country that has given us the 
 
 blessing of liberty, we must support with a will all 
 the movements among the people to aid in this 
 work, such as — 
 
 a. The War Y. M. C. A. work. 
 
 b. The Red Cross Work. 
 
 c. The food production conservation campaigns. 
 
 d. The Liberty Loans. 
 
 e. Every other war agency with which we come in 
 
 contact. 
 An equal duty now devolves upon us to support with all 
 our power the principles for a just and lasting peace, that 
 our peace delegates are striving for at Versailles. 
 
 IV. Some Reliable References On the War and Its Issues 
 
 A. Magazines and Periodicals. 
 
 a. World's Work, June, 1917. "Germany's Long 
 
 Road to Democracy." 
 
 b. World's Work, June, 1916. "The Mailed Fist 
 
 in American History." 
 
 c. Review of Reviews, December, 1918. Editorials. 
 
 d. Everybody's (continuing throughout 1918). 
 
 Brand Whitlock's Story of Belgium. 
 
 e. World's Work (continuing throughout 1918). 
 
 Mr. Rathom's exposals of the working of the 
 German spy system in U. S. French Strothier 
 on same. 
 
 f. Independent, October 20, 1918. "Peace with 
 
 Victory." Ex-President Taft. 
 
 g. History Teachers' Magazine, January, 1918. 
 
 Critical outline, notes and references on the 
 causes, issues and events of the Great War, by 
 Professor Harding, of Indiana University. 
 
126 The Causes Of War 
 
 B. Books. 
 
 a. "Evidence in the Case," J. W. Beck, Assistant 
 
 Attorney General, U. S. 
 
 b. "Ambassador Morganthau's Story," in book 
 
 form. 
 
 c. "Out of Their Own Mouths." From German 
 
 sources. 
 
 d. "The German Terror in France." 
 
 e. "My Four Years in Germany," Ambassador 
 
 Gerard. 
 
 f. "With the Turks in Palestine," Alexander 
 
 Aaronsohn. 
 
 g. "England and Germany," by Cramb, written be- 
 
 fore the war. 
 h. "Germany and the Next War" — Bernhardi. 
 
 C. Library Pamphlets and Booklets. 
 
 a. "Plain Words From America," Prof. Johnson, 
 
 of Columbia University. 
 
 b. Speeches of General Smuts, formerly Boer Gen- 
 
 eral against England. 
 
 c. "Why the War Must Go On." 
 
 d. "List of Neutral Ships Sunk by Germans." 
 
 e. "Deportation of Belgian Women." 
 
 f. "The New German Empire." 
 
 g. "The Red, White and Blue Book," U. S. Official 
 
 Documents. 
 
 h. The U. S. Official Bulletin. 
 
 i. "Sixteen Causes of War," Prof. A. C. McLaugh- 
 lin, University of Chicago. 
 
 j. "The Great War." 
 
 k. "Democracy Today," Lake Classic Series, Scott 
 Foresman Co. 
 
 1. "Ireland and Poland." 
 
 m. "When the Prussians Came to Poland," by an 
 American woman who lived at the time of the 
 German invasion. (Good sized volume.) 
 
The United States 127 
 
 n. "Their Crimes." 
 
 o. "Microbe-Cultures in Bukharest." 
 
 p. "Why Italy is with the Allies." 
 
 q. "Character of the British Empire." 
 
 r. French, English, Russian and Italian "Official 
 
 Books." 
 s. "The Union of Two Great Peoples," W. H. 
 
 Page, U. S. Minister to England. 
 
 The above references are not meant to be complete, nor 
 the only reliable ones, but they form a working basis for the 
 proper study of the war, and for that reason were selected. 
 The military events will be outlined and commented on later. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGY 
 
 THE foregoing outline is not exhaustive, — it is not in- 
 tended to give all the good material that may be found 
 and read with profit ; but it is intended as a brief guide and 
 course for the ordinary student and the busy teacher who 
 may not have time for a more extensive study. For the 
 person who wishes to supplement this reading by a further 
 study, there is an excellent collection of noteworthy and 
 authentic volumes to be found in the average public library, 
 or the library of any first rate college or university. For 
 a list of these books see Prof. Harding's outline and bibli- 
 ography in the January (1918) numb«r of the History 
 Teachers' Magazine, — the article that we have referred to 
 once or twice previously. This article is also one of the 
 "War Information Series," published by the Committee on 
 Public Information. 
 
 Let us now take up the Imperial German government's 
 policy and plan of conquest in the beginning of the war, as 
 shown by our previous study of the causes of the war. The 
 first acts of the Imperial German government, in conjunction 
 with the prearranged plan of her military general staff, were 
 in accord in every particular with her policy as instigator of 
 the war. (Here again I would refer the readers to Mr. 
 Beck's excellent volume, "The Evidence in the Case.") A 
 new verification of this fact is found in the recent publication 
 of the German Prince Lichnowsky's arraignment of the Ger- 
 man government in the years immediately preceding the war, 
 and particularly, the Kaiser's responsibility for the catas- 
 trophe. (Prince Lichnowsky's complete diary may be found 
 
 128 
 
German Diplomacy and Strategy 129 
 
 in "Current History" magazine, published by the New York 
 Times ; also in U. S. "War Information Series" is similar 
 positive proof. See "Conquest and Kultur," January, 1918, 
 pp. 133-35. 1 
 
 Apparently the German government's original plan was 
 to localize the war, if possible, between Austria-Hungary and 
 Serbia, if by threats it could prevent Russia — before Rus- 
 sia's great army expansion was completed — from coming to 
 the aid of her Serbian fellow-Slavs. Greater importance at- 
 taches to this demonstration of militant Pan-Germanism at 
 this particular time, from the fact that Russia was still 
 staggering from the effects of the Russo-Japanese War and 
 the seething revolution in her empire. If not successful in 
 localizing the conflict, then the Kaiser and his lords would 
 proceed to bring on a general European conflict, — which 
 they knew was most likely in any event — for every one knew 
 that a general conflagration would then be inevitable. Really, 
 however, the Kaiser and his government desired a war with 
 Russia, and that speedily, in order that they might forever 
 crush the eastern empire's military strength and threat to 
 German expansion. Thus would the Teuton war lords rea- 
 lize their dream of near-Eastern supremacy. So, in spite of 
 the Czar's earnest and sincere attempt to avoid war, and his 
 unbroken pledge not to be the aggressor, Germany forced 
 war upon Russia. And if Russia, then France would be in- 
 volved, as a matter of course, because of her treaty obliga- 
 tions. The military plan was to crush France in the very 
 first weeks of the war, then turn upon Russia and prostrate 
 her before her great, unwieldly army and empire could be 
 harnessed for effective combat. In order to be doubly sure 
 of speedy success in the west, the Kaiser would take France 
 by surprise by striking through Belgium — this to be a wholly 
 unexpected movement, because of the French, German and 
 
 1 Reference to the Prince's revelations is also found in April 4, 1918, 
 number of the Nation. All who have not should read this amazing rev- 
 elation from a German source. 
 
130 The Causes Of War 
 
 English solemn agreement to respect the neutrality of Bel- 
 gium. And that France was wholly surprised is shown by the 
 fact that her army was concentrating on the Alsace-Lorraine 
 front, where alone a German attack might be anticipated. 
 Then, with their initial success, perhaps the Germans could 
 frighten off unready England for a while, and dictate the 
 terms of a victorious Teuton peace before Great Britain 
 should be ready to fight. England's honorable entry into the 
 war, however, was a disappointment to Germany, and her 
 "contemptible little army," like Belgium's resistance to tyr- 
 anny, helped in the delay to German arms that made the 
 first battle of the Marne a defensive victory, and a victory 
 for democratic civilization. Despite German protests of sur- 
 prise, however, even the British nation's entry into the con- 
 flict was not altogether unexpected, for the Kaiser's plans 
 had deep roots, and had provided for England's entry — so 
 confidently in fact, and in so many ways, — that William II 
 with his military lords had counted, in that event, upon 
 crushing his traditional enemy of the seas, and becoming 
 master of Europe just that much sooner. To assure our- 
 selves of this let us recall the constant German toasts to the 
 "inevitable day" — the day when the German navy should 
 dominate the seven seas, instead of the Union Jack. Al- 
 though this general plan was kept from the German people 
 it was universally known and its execution awaited by the 
 army and navy officials. 
 
 These new enemies might prolong the war for six months 
 or even a year, to be sure, but what of that? So much sooner 
 would "Kultur," by force of arms, be realized as the guid- 
 ing force of mankind. Welcome, even, if the net of war 
 should be spread beyond the seas, as well as involving other 
 European nations. The German army was invincible and 
 the German people disciplined, ready and unconquerable, in 
 the eyes of the military masters. Let us not forget the Teu- 
 ton slogan : "In Paris within three weeks, in London within 
 three months, and in New York within three years !" There 
 
German Diplomacy and Strategy 131 
 
 are varying versions of the dates set by the military authori- 
 ties of the Kaiser for the above victories, but these state- 
 ments come too directly, and from too many sources for it 
 to be doubted that such expressions were common among the 
 officers of the German army and navy and high, responsible 
 government officials. This plan, with the policy and doctrine 
 it involved, therefore, comprehended even the United States 
 of America, should we champion international law against 
 the lawless submarine, or dare uphold the rights of humanity, 
 of small states or even uphold our own honor or dignity as a 
 nation. German victory was a necessity, and "necessity 
 knows no law!" Or, again, as one official put it, "The Ger- 
 man people are right because they number 87,000,000 souls !" 
 Yet William II of Germany thought he understood President 
 Wilson and the peace-loving American people well enough to 
 be safe in acting on the presumption that we would never 
 be counted among his active enemies in war. Our entry into 
 the struggle was his greatest surprise and disappointment. 
 Uncle Sam did not give him his chance to demonstrate that 
 (in his own words) "I will stand no nonsense from Uncle Sam 
 after this war," or that, with a stronger fleet he "would take 
 Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck," as he once told a mem- 
 ber of the American embassy in Berlin. 
 
 One other major part of the Teuton plan must not be over- 
 looked, and that is, the "Hun policy of f rightfulness." That 
 this policy was a part of the German military doctrine even 
 before the war has been abundantly proven. With a con- 
 stantly increasing ferocity it had been developing since before 
 1900. The first exhibition to the world on a large scale was 
 in the Boxer uprising incident (1900), wherein the Kaiser 
 charged his troops to make the German name feared and the 
 German sword felt, as was that of Atilla and the Huns 1,500 
 years ago. The following statement from that speech might 
 well have made the whole world shudder with apprehension: 
 "Quarter will not be given, no prisoners will be taken. Use 
 your weapons in such a way that for a thousand years no 
 
132 The Causes Of War 
 
 Chinese shall dare to look upon a German askance! Be as 
 terrible as the Huns !" — William II, to the German Chinese 
 expeditionary force, July 27, 1900. 
 
 The Kaiser and the German people instead of resenting 
 this characterization "Hun" by the allied world, should ac- 
 cept and love it, for their "beloved majesty" himself invented 
 the phrase and applied it literally to his own troops ; and we 
 may be sure, it will last with them a thousand years, as the 
 Kaiser predicted ! 
 
 With the ordinary "Hun" practice of frightfulness the 
 reader is too familiar to warrant us in an exposition of them 
 here. I will merely mention them in passing. 
 
 1. Submarines. 
 
 (a) Firing upon helpless survivors in the water. 
 
 (b) Sinking neutral merchant and passenger ships, 
 with their crews, without warning. 
 
 (c) Shelling undefended town (larger ships also 
 did so). 
 
 (d) Sinking hospital and Red Cross ships, with 
 wounded, etc. 
 
 2. Airships and Airplanes. 
 
 (a) Bombing undefended towns and cities, and 
 murdering non-combatants — innocent women, 
 old men and children. 
 
 (b) Bombing Red Cross hospitals, Y. M. C. A. 
 huts, etc., back of the lines — contrary to all 
 former practices in war. 
 
 3. Artillery. 
 
 (a) Utter destruction of churches, cathedrals and 
 other buildings of non-military character ex- 
 empt by the usages of war from mutilation 
 and destruction. These contain many of the 
 most priceless treasures of civilization. 
 
 (b) The long-range guns firing on Paris — of no 
 military advantage to Germany, but the 
 
German Diplomacy and Strategy 133 
 
 frightfulest suffering, grief and apprehension 
 on civilians in their defenseless condition. (75 
 deaths at Easter worship, etc.) 
 
 4. Infantry. 
 
 (a) Treachery in the ordinary practices of war- 
 fare. 
 
 (b) Driving women and children in front of them 
 in advance upon enemy, so that enemy must 
 fire upon its own people, if it would check Ger- 
 man onrushes. 
 
 (c) Wearing Red Cross insignia, to obtain ad- 
 vantage of unsuspecting foe — concealing ma- 
 chine guns, etc., on army stretchers. 
 
 5. Army in Retreat. 
 
 (a) Utter destruction of everything — desolation, 
 and poisoning wells, etc. 
 
 All the above, however, are small and merciful in compari- 
 son with the Hun policy of starvation. Few American citi- 
 zens realize to what extent, and with appalling results, this 
 terrible weapon has been wielded by the German military 
 command in the occupied region of the countries overrun by 
 the Teuton armies. I shall not attempt to describe this mon- 
 ster crime upon humanity, but merely mention the facts that, 
 (1) in the past four years Germany has starved to death, in 
 conjunction with her allies, more enemies than they all have 
 killed in war; (2) the greater percentage of these victims 
 are women and children, the hope of the future generation; 
 (3) after thus bringing these peoples face to face with star- 
 vation, she has used this extremity as an excuse before the 
 world for deporting the ablebodied, men and women, into 
 Germany, there to be forced to work in support of the Hun 
 armies against their own people; (4) The German officers 
 and troops deliberately took the food out of the mouths of 
 these starving people, and used it to their own hearts' con- 
 tent; (5) it was hunger, starvation, that forced Roumania 
 
134* The Causes Of War 
 
 to make peace with the Central Powers; (6) most of the 
 factories of the occupied districts were stripped of their ma- 
 chinery, m order to force starvation and non-resistance upon 
 the industrial classes, the best citizens; (7) this all has vir- 
 tually crushed most of the small nations of Europe; (8) this 
 devitalization is bound to affect the off-spring of the sur- 
 vivors for generations to come; and (9) there are 30,000,000 
 of these innocent victims of Teuton greed and lust for power, 
 — think of it, 30,000,000 ! This is the greatest suffering the 
 world has ever known, and may justly be considered the 
 "darkest page in human history . . . wrought deliberately 
 by a single nation to further its own ends !" 2 
 
 2 For a more detailed statement of this "food war" of "Kultur" against 
 humanity, see the article "Forerunners of Famine," by Frederick C. 
 Walcott, of the United States Food Administration, in the April (1918) 
 number of the National Geographic Magazine. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 OUTLINE OF THE WAR AND ARMISTICE TERMS 
 
 OUTLINE of the World War 19U-1918 
 I. The Year 19U m the War. 
 
 A. Declarations of war and beginnings of hostilities. 
 
 1. After assassination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, 
 
 heir-apparent to the Austrian throne (June 28, 
 1914), and Austrian ultimatum to Serbia (July 
 28), Austria declares war on Serbia (July 28). 
 
 2. Germany, in support of Austria, declares war on Russia 
 
 (Aug. 1). 
 
 3. Germany begins war on France (Aug. 3). 
 
 4. Germany invades Belgium (Aug. 4). 
 
 5. Following German violation of Belgian territory, Great 
 
 Britain declares war on Germany (Aug. 4). 
 
 6. Montenegro joins Serbia against Austria-Hungary 
 
 (Aug. 8). 
 
 7. Japan declares war on Germany (Aug. 23). 
 
 8. Turkey declares war on Russia (Oct. 30). 
 
 9. France and Great Britain declare war on Turkey (Nov. 
 
 5). 
 
 B. Military events. 
 
 1. In the Balkans. 
 
 (a) Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia — suc- 
 cessfully resisted by Serbians (Aug.-Dec, 
 1914). 
 
 2. In the West. 
 
 (a) Invasion of Belgium, Luxemburg and Lorraine 
 by Germany (mentioned above), with Paris 
 as the immediate objective (Aug. 3-Sept. 5). 
 135 
 
136 The Causes Of War 
 
 (b) First Battle of the Marne (Sept. 6-10), saves 
 Paris, Joffre and Foch gaining a defensive 
 victory, and hurling the right wing of the 
 German army back from the Marne to the 
 Aisne (with aid of Gen. French's English 
 army). 
 
 (c) Entrenchments, followed by first battle of the 
 Aisne (Sept. 15-28), and the first battle of 
 Ypres, for the Channel ports (Oct.-Nov»). 
 
 3. In the East. 
 
 (a) Russian invasion of Austrian Galicia (success- 
 ful) and German East Prussia (the latter 
 shattered by Hindenburg's victory at Tannen- 
 burg, Aug. 25-31). 
 
 (b) German-Austrian invasion of Russian Poland. 
 
 (c) Turkish expeditions against Russians in Black 
 Sea regions and against Great Britain in 
 Egypt (Nov.-Dec), the latter a complete fail- 
 ure. 
 
 4. In the Orient. 
 
 (a) Japanese siege and capture of Tsing-Tau 
 (Sept. 1-Nov. 6). German isles in Pacific 
 taken by Japanese and British fleets. 
 
 5. In Africa. 
 
 (a) Togoland and Kamerun occupied by English 
 and French troops (fall and early winter of 
 1914). 
 
 (b) German Southwest Africa invaded, and Ger- 
 man East Africa attacked, by British and 
 other colonial troops. 
 
 C. Naval engagements. 
 
 1; German Cruisers seek safety in Dardanelles (Goeben 
 and Bresleau). Turks forjed to buy them — Ger- 
 many leads Turkey into war. 
 % Battle of Heligoland (really a British victory). 
 3. Battle off Chile, S. A. — Admiral von Spee (Ger.) sinks 
 Admiral Craddock's (Eng.) little fleet (Nov. 1). 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 137 
 
 4. Battle off Falkland Islands — Admiral Sturdee (Eng.) 
 sinks Von Spee's fleet (Dec. 8). 1 
 
 II. The Year 1915 m the War. 
 
 A. Declarations of War. 
 
 1. Italy breaking away from triple alliance with Austria 
 
 and Germany, declares war on Austria (May 23). 
 
 2. Bulgaria (entering on Germany's side) declares war 
 
 on Serbia (Oct. 14). 
 
 3. England declares war on Bulgaria (Oct. 14), as result 
 
 of Bulgaria's move against Serbia. 
 
 4. Russia and Italy declare war on Bulgaria (Oct. 19). 
 
 B. Military campaigns. 
 
 1. In West. 
 
 (a) Allied offensive in France (Jan.-April) dead- 
 lock, unbroken by battles of Neuve Chapelle, 
 Champagne, the Labyrinth, and Lens, in 
 Artois. 
 
 (b) German offensive — second battle of Ypres: — 
 in the Argonne — (May-July) — deadlock un- 
 broken. 
 
 2. In the East. 
 
 (a) Austro-German invasion of Poland checked 
 before Warsaw by Russians (Feb.). 
 
 (b) After reaching Carpathians Russians expelled 
 from Galicia by Von Mackensen; Germans 
 having come to the aid of worsted Austrians 
 (May- June). 
 
 (c) Von Hindenburg's drive through Poland and 
 northern Russia, to swamps before Riga — 
 Russian ammunition and other supplies give 
 out (Aug.-Sept.). 
 
 3. In the Balkans. 
 
 (a) Austro-Bulgarian invasion of Serbia — Serbia 
 crushed, overrun, and occupied (Oct.-Nov.). 
 
 *Long before this time German commerce had been driven from the 
 ocean. 
 
188 The Causes Of War 
 
 (b) Allies fail at Gallipoli, and establish base at 
 « Saloniki, in Greece (Feb. -Dec.). 
 
 4. In Asia. 
 
 (a) Turks invade Persia — opposed by Russians — 
 German plan of "Mittel Europa," Berlin to 
 Bagdad control clearly revealed. 
 
 (b) British expedition in Mesopotamia frustrates 
 the realization of this plan. 
 
 5. In Africa. 
 
 (a) All Germany's colonies in Africa taken by 
 Allies, except part of German East Africa. 
 
 (b) Egypt and Suez canal safe from capture by 
 Turks or Germans. 
 
 C. Naval Engagements. 
 
 1. Dogger Bank (Jan. 24), German squadron badly 
 
 crippled, in attempt to surprise British fleet. 
 
 2. British and French naval attack on Dardanelles (Mar. 
 
 18-May 27), in conjunction with Allied army, fails. 
 This failure was a surprise to the Germans and 
 Turks as well as to the Allies, and Ambassador 
 Morganthau tells us, could have succeeded, if the 
 Allies had only known the condition of defense at 
 this early stage. Later, when their armies tried 
 so hard, it was impregnable, due to guns, fortifica- 
 tions and other supplies that had come from Ger- 
 many. 
 8. Small Russian victories on Baltic and Black seas. 
 
 4. Internment (in neutral ports) or destruction of Ger- 
 
 man commerce destroyers. (The Emden and other 
 commerce destroyers had wrought great havoc 
 with neutral and Allied shipping.) 
 
 5. German submarine sinkings become a menace to Allies. 
 
 III. The Year 1916 in the War. 
 A. Declarations of War. 
 
 1. Germany declares war on Portugal (Mar. 9). 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 139 
 
 2. Austria declares war on Portugal (Mar. 15). 
 
 3. Italy declares war on Germany (Aug. 27). 
 
 4. Roumania declares war on Austria-Hungary (Aug. 
 
 27) — thus coming in finally with the Allies. 
 
 5. Germany, Turkey, Bulgaria, declare war on Roumania 
 
 (Aug.-Sept.). 
 B. Military Operations. 
 
 1. In the Balkans. 
 
 (a) Montenegro and northern Albania overrun by 
 Bulgarian and Austrian armies ( Jan.-Feb.). 
 
 (b) Allied army at Saloniki, Greece, takes offensive 
 
 and captures Monastir, in Southern Serbia, 
 from Bulgarians (Nov.) — checked from fur- 
 ther advance by subsequent downfall of Rou- 
 mania and Russia. (Italian, French, Serbian, 
 Albanian, English all in this army.) 
 
 (c) Roumania (after espousing cause of Allies) 
 rashly attempts to overrun Transylvania- 
 Austrian territory claimed by Roumania — is 
 invaded and crushed by the combined drives 
 of Von Mackensen and Von Falkenhayn 
 (Aug.-Dec). Her complete prostration, how- 
 ever, would not have occured but for the 
 treacherous betrayal by the Russian pro-Ger- 
 man war minister Stunner. This, indeed, was 
 the major cause of Roumanians downfall. 
 
 2. In the East. 
 
 (a) Russian (Grand Duke Nicholas) attack upon 
 Turks in Armenia, and capture of Erzerum, 
 Trebizond and Erzingan (Jan. -July). 
 
 (b) Second Russian invasion of Galicia (June 4- 
 Aug. 15) — after capture of 350,000 Teutons 
 Russians are halted before Halicz, having ex- 
 hausted their ammunition and other supplies. 
 
 3. On Italian front. 
 
 (a) Austrian invasion of Italy (May- June) — Aus- 
 
140 The Causes Of War 
 
 trian territory in Trentino recovered, and 
 2S0 sq. mi. of Italian territory captured, but 
 Austrians fail to gain Venetian plain, 
 (b) Italian counter-offensive (June-Aug.) — re- 
 gains most of territory just captured by Teu- 
 tons and reaches Gorizia, only a few miles 
 from Trieste; but is definitely checked on 
 Carso plateau. 
 
 4. In Asia. 
 
 (a) After an expedition undertaken without suf- 
 ficient support, Gen. Townshend's (Br.) army 
 surrenders to Turks at Kut-el-Amera, al- 
 though it had advanced to within 18 miles of 
 Bagdad (April 28). 
 
 (b) Three separate Russian expeditions against 
 Bagdad routed by Turks (Jan.-May, July 
 and Aug.). 
 
 5. In the West. 
 
 (a) First battle of Verdun (Feb.- July) — German 
 Crown Prince sacrifices 500,000 men, but fails 
 to take Verdun. "Ills ne passerent pas!" 
 
 (b) Anglo-French offensive on the Somme (July- 
 Nov.). Only slight gains of territory by 
 Allies. 
 
 (c) French counter-offensive at Verdun (Oct.- 
 Dec). Recapture in a few days, territory 
 that the Crown Prince had fought desperately 
 for months to obtain. 
 
 6. In Africa. 
 
 (a) All but a small mountainous part of German 
 East Africa, the last German colony in Af ricay 
 overrun by British and Belgian colonial 
 troops. 
 C. Naval Operations. 
 
 1. Battle of Jutland (May 31) — German attempt at sur- 
 prise of British fleet fails, but both sides lose sev- 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 141 
 
 eral vessels. Germany more cautious with her fleet 
 after this. 
 % German submarines and commerce raiders inflict great 
 damage on British, French and neutral shipping, 
 and involve Germany in trouble with U. S. Ger- 
 many promises (with some reservations) not to 
 sink American ships without warning (a hollow 
 promise, as afterward shown). 
 
 IV. The Year 1917 in the War. 
 
 A. Entry of United States into the war (April 6, 1917). 
 
 1. Causes (see Chapters VII and XIII). 
 
 2. Vast Preparations by United States. 
 
 (a) Army and navy programs. 
 
 (b) Selective draft (June 5). 
 
 (c) Airplane program. 
 
 (d) Merchant shipping program. 
 
 3. Financing the War. 
 
 (a) Liberty loans — Loans to the Allies. 
 
 (b) Taxes. 
 
 (c) War Savings Stamp campaigns, prepared for 
 the year 1918. 
 
 4. President Wilson's leadership and War messages. 
 
 5. The President's fight for unrestricted powers of ad- 
 
 ministration. 
 
 6. Effect on Allies of United States' entry into the War. 
 
 7. Fighting German propaganda and spies in United 
 
 States. 
 
 B. Other declarations of war. 
 
 1. United States declares war on Austria-Hungary (Dec. 
 7). 
 
 8. Cuba declares war on Germany (April 7). 
 
 3. Panama virtually enters war against Germany (April 
 
 V- 
 
 4. Brazil declares war on Germany (Oct. 26). 
 
 5. China declares war on Germany and Austria (Aug. 14). 
 
142 The Causes Of War 
 
 6. Greece, after deposition of King Constantine, declares 
 
 war on Germany and Bulgaria (July 2). 
 
 7. The following nations, in addition to all the Allied and 
 
 associated states, either broke off diplomatic rela- 
 tionship with Germany or declared war on her: 
 Argentina (Pres. of Argentina refused to sign the 
 break voted by the national legislature), Bolivia, 
 Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru, Uru- 
 guay, Ecquador. 
 C. Military Operations. 
 1. In the West. 
 
 (a) Second battle of the Somme. (British ad- 
 vance to within range of Bapaume (Jan.- 
 March), followed by German withdrawal to 
 "Hindenburg line," from Somme to Rheims, 
 the French joining with British in driving the 
 Germans back to this line. Teutons had thus 
 abandoned one-fourth of the territory they 
 had held in France). 2 
 
 (b) Battle of Arras (April- June) British threaten^ 
 the coal city of Lens, but fail to capture it. 
 Only a few sq. mi. of territory won. 
 
 (c) Battle of the Aisne — French offensive — Sois- 
 sons to Rheims (April-No v.) — drives the Ger- 
 mans back beyond Chemm-de-Dames, with 
 about 35,000 prisoners. 
 
 Most wanton destruction marked the path of the Germans 
 in retreat. Much as had been heard before, and witnesses, 
 in Belgium and France, of the German atrocities, this fiendish 
 desolation was a shock to the civilized world. 
 
 (d) Messines ridge, blown up and occupied by 
 
 British, in Belgium, near Ypres (June). 
 
 2 This reversal taught the Allies the absolute necessity of unity of com- 
 mand and unity of counsel among the Allies, and led directly to the 
 Inter-Allied Council at Paris and to the appointment of Gen. Foch as 
 Generalissimo of all the Allied armies on the West and Italian fronts. 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 143 
 
 (e) German attack on Ypres (July) — captured 
 only about 1,200 prisoners. 
 
 (f) Battle of Flanders — around Ypres — (July- 
 Dec). English and French take all the high 
 ground beyond Ypres. 
 
 (g) French second counter-thrust at Verdun 
 (Aug.-Sept.) — gains back remainder of ter- 
 ritory German Crown Prince had taken at 
 such cost the year before. 
 
 (h) Battle of Cambrai (Nov.-Dec). 
 
 (1) General Byng (Br.), without artillery 
 preparation, advances on 35 miles front, 
 capturing many villages, and advancing 
 from 10 to 20 miles. 
 
 (2) German similar counter-stroke gains back 
 half the territory Gen. Byng had just 
 captured. 
 
 (i) American expeditionary force, under Gen. 
 Pershing — 
 
 (1) First United States troops land June 
 26-27. 
 
 (2) First American troops in action, October. 
 
 (3) No heavy righting in 1917 on American 
 sectors. 
 
 2. In the East. 
 
 (a) Russian winter offensive — checked by Germans 
 (Jan.). 
 
 (b) Russian summer offensive — under Kerensky 
 and the new Russian republic. Captures 
 Halicz and threatens Lemburg, when part of 
 Russian forces mutiny, and break the power of 
 the Russian drive. Followed by Russian de- 
 mobilization and rule of the Bolsheviki. 
 
 3. In Italy. 
 
 (a) Italian campaign (July-Oct.). Progressing 
 successfully, if slowly, when abruptly stopped 
 by- 
 
144 The Causes Of War 
 
 (b) Austro-German counter campaign (Oct. -Dec). 
 By tactics similar to those used against Ser- 
 bia and Roumania, with the additional vicious 
 campaign of "propaganda" which disconcert- 
 ed one of the Italian armies, the Teutons were 
 able to drive the Italians back to the Piave 
 river and take nearly 300,000 prisoners. But 
 with speedy help from the British and French, 
 with Gen. Foch in command, Italy was saved 
 from threatened disaster. 
 
 4. In Asia. 
 
 (a) British Mesopotamian campaign (Feb.-Oct.). 
 British recapture Kutel-Amera (Feb.) and 
 capture Bagdad (March). 
 
 (b) Russian aid to British in this sector stopped 
 by Russian revolution. 
 
 (c) Hejaz revolts, and declares independence of 
 Turkey. 
 
 (d) General Allenby (Br.) captures Jerusalem 
 (Dec. 10). 
 
 5. In the Balkans. 
 
 (a) Complete collapse of Roumania (Jan.-Feb.), 
 due to betrayal of Roumanians by Russia's 
 Pro-German war minister Sturmer. 
 
 (b) Saloniki armies of Allies powerless because 
 of Russian revolution in hands of Bolsheviki ; 
 but an army of 300,000 Greeks being trained 
 to aid Allies in 1918. 
 
 6. In Africa. 
 
 (a) German East Africa, last German colony com- 
 pletely overrun by Allies. 
 
 7. Naval Operations. 
 
 (a) Battles in Gulf of Riga — inconclusive. 
 
 (b) Submarines — German renewal of unrestricted 
 submarine warfaVe (Feb. 1) brings United 
 States into the War, while it threatens in the 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 145 
 
 spring and early summer months to starve 
 England and France into surrender. 
 
 V. The Year 1918 in the War. 
 A. Military operations. 
 
 1. In the East. 
 
 (a) While Brest-Litovsk peace treaty is being 
 made by Germany and the Bolsheviki, German 
 invasion of Russia in violation of the treaty 
 continues. ( Jan.-March.) 
 
 (b) Finland, after declaring independence of Rus- 
 sia, fights Bolsheviki "Reds," to gain it. 
 Later Fins helped by German troops. 
 
 (c) At least five civil wars going on in Russia: 
 Fins vs. Bolsheviki; Ukraine vs. Bolsheviki; 
 Bolsheviki and nobility of Esthonia ; Cossacks 
 and Bolsheviki on the Don; Bolsheviki and 
 Tartar on the Volga. (Feb.-March.) 
 
 2. On Italian front. 
 
 (a) Italians hold against repeated assaults of 
 Austro-Germans (Jan.-Feb.), on Piave. Aid 
 is given Italians by British and French, and 
 finally, by American troops. 
 
 3. On Western front. 
 
 (a) Great German offensive (made possible by sur- 
 render of Russia and release of half a mil- 
 lion German troops from the Eastern front) 
 begins against British in the West. (March 
 21.) In 10 days Germans advance on an aver- 
 age of 15 miles and reach a point within 12 
 miles of Amiens — Battle front from Arras to 
 La Fere. In last days of battle French come 
 to aid of British. Germans had advanced to 
 within 60 miles of Paris, and captured about 
 1,000 sq. mi. of territory. Disaster to Brit- 
 ish fifth army. 
 
146 The Causes Of War 
 
 German long range gun bombards Paris 
 (March 23, for week). 
 
 (b) Second phase of German drive. 
 
 (1) Battle of Amiens. With reinforcements 
 of men and guns Germans renew drive 
 upon Amiens. Allies drenched with poi- 
 son gas from new, more deadly German 
 shell. Americans (probably 100,000) — 
 participate in this fight, and save Amiens 
 (April 30). 
 
 (c) Third phase of German offensive. 
 
 (1) Battle line shifts further north, and Ger- 
 mans advance and occupy Armentieres in 
 Belgium and Messines ridge, near Ypres. 
 (Broke Portugese line here.) Mt. Kem- 
 mel falls to Germans. 
 
 (d) Fourth phase (on the Aisne), (May 27-June 
 
 i). 
 
 (1) Germans cross Aisne, May 27. 
 
 (2) Germans cross Vesle, May 28. 
 
 (3) Germans reach Soissons, May 29. 
 
 (4) Germans reach the Marne, May 30. 
 
 (5) Americans halt Germans at Marne (June 
 1 ) — Cross Marne and bring back German 
 
 prisoners (June 19). 
 
 (e) Fifth phase— (between Montdidier and Noy- 
 on (June 9). 
 
 (1) Germans achieve only slight gains on 60 
 mile front. 
 
 (f) Final German drive (Soissons to Rheims, July 
 15-18). 
 
 (1) Germans definitely halted within three 
 days. 
 4. Great Allied counter-offensive (started by Americans 
 July 15). Americans captured Chateau-Thierry 
 and drove Germans back across Marne. 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 147 
 
 (a) Americans strike apex of German Rheims- 
 Soissons pocket. 
 
 (b) French and Americans drive in sides of 
 German pocket (July 18 through month of 
 August), until the whole salient is obliterated. 
 Fought Germans back continuously for seven 
 weeks. 
 
 (c) French, British and Americans launch ter- 
 rific offenses in quick succession, all the way 
 from Rheims to the North Sea (Aug.-Sept. 
 10). A few of the details of their speedy suc- 
 cesses are: 
 
 (1) Australians occupy Perronne (Sept. 1). 
 
 (2) British and French advance on 90 mile 
 front, from Cambrai to Soissons, cap- 
 turing Ham, Guiscard, Chauny, as some 
 of leading objectives. 3 
 
 (3) The first all-American army under ex- 
 clusive American command in a dashing, 
 brilliantly executed offensive completely 
 wipes out the St. Mihiel salient (which 
 the Germans had held for four years) in 
 twenty- seven hours (Sept. 12-13). 
 
 (d) British and French drive forward on both 
 sides of St. Quentin and capture 10,000 pris- 
 oners Sept. 18. — French take St. Quentin Oct. 
 1. 
 
 (e) American army assigned the difficult Argonne 
 region begins (Sept. 26) the great final battle 
 of the Argonne forest and country — advance 
 continually until the very last hour of the 
 war, on Nov. 11. 
 
 (f) Similar Allied and American successes are 
 
 •Allied armies capture 112,000 Germans in July and August. For 
 complete account of the American participation in the war, July 15 to 
 Nov. 11, see General Pershing's report to the Secretary of War in Jan., 
 1919, number of Review of Reviews. 
 
148 The Causes Of War 
 
 achieved all way north to region of the Bel- 
 gian coast. (Oct.) 
 
 (Here things were happening so rapidly over the various 
 fields of conflict and in so many different departments of 
 activity that we leave the Western front for a short time, 
 to chronicle some of the major events in these other fields.) 
 
 5. On the Eastern Front. 
 
 (a) Germans advance toward Petrograd (Feb.). 
 
 (b) Turks take Trebizond (Feb. 25). 
 
 (c) Germans complete their conquest in Finland 
 (May 3). 
 
 6. In the Balkans, — Greeks attack Turks in Macedonia, 
 
 (May 30) ; 1,700 prisoners. 
 
 7. On Italian front, — Italians begin beating back Austro- 
 
 Germans beyond Piave (Jan.), soon followed by 
 Austrian offensive 1,000,000 strong which crossed 
 the Piave, but is soon driven back (June- July). 
 
 8. In Asia. 
 
 (a) British take Jerico (Feb. 22), Damascus, 
 and destroy Turk army (Sept.-Oct.). 
 
 (b) Japanese, British and American (marines) 
 troops land at Vladivostok (April 5-7), to 
 oppose Germans and Bolsheviki. 
 
 (c) British, in 700 mile march from Bagdad take 
 Baku (oil fields.) 
 
 B. Naval Operations. 
 
 (a) British bombard and sink Goeben and B res- 
 lean in Dardanelles (Jan. 20). 
 
 (b) British attack Zeebrugge and Ostend sub- 
 bases (April 23), effectively dam up one and 
 all but destroy the other. 
 
 C. In northern Europe (Russia), Allied and American 
 
 troops land at Archangel, against Germans and 
 Bolsheviki. 
 
 D. In the Orient — American troops from Philippines land 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 149 
 
 at Vladivostok (Aug. 15), to cooperate with Jap- 
 anese and other Allies. 
 E. Serbian (reorganized army) drive in Balkans defeats 
 Bulgars and advances 60-70 miles — other Allies co- 
 operate, and straighten line (Sept.-Oct.). 
 
 WAR AND PEACE 
 
 I. (1918) Concluded. (We shall go back to the first week 
 in October, so as to connect up the last allied movements in 
 the field better than we were able to the last month, before 
 hostilities ceased.) 
 
 A. The Crushing allied Drive (Oct. -Nov. 11). 
 
 1. Germans evacuate Lens (coal center in France) (Oct. 
 
 3. Austrian naval base at Durazzo destroyed by 
 Italian, British and American ships (Oct. 3). 
 
 2. French fleet take Bierut, Syria (Oct. 7). 
 
 3. Cambrai falls (Oct. 7) to British. 
 
 4. Americans clear Argonne forest of enemy (Oct. 11). 
 
 Serbs occupy Nish same day. 
 
 5. French take Laon and La Fere (Oct. 12). 
 
 6. Belgians take Roulers (Oct. 13). 
 
 7. Italians enter Durazzo, Albania (Oct. 14). 
 
 8. Germans evacuating Brussels (Oct. 15); Bohemia in 
 
 hands of revolutionists. 
 
 9. Americans take Grand Pre. British enter Lille (last 
 
 important stronghold of Germans in northern 
 French except Valenciennes) (Oct. 16). 
 
 10. Ostend, Zeebrugge and Thiult (sub-bases of Germans) 
 
 occupied by Allies (Oct. 17). 
 
 11. German army driven to border of Holland, — 15,000 
 
 Germans cut off are interned in Holland (Oct. 21). 
 
 12. British take Valenciennes (Oct. 22). 
 
 13. Italian drive on Piave started — one of the greatest 
 
 offensives of the war. Continues for only ten days y 
 when 500,000 Austrians are taken prisoners and 
 
150 The Causes Of War 
 
 250,000 horses and $1,000,000,000 fall into hands 
 of Italians. Italians had only one regiment of 
 Americans and five divisions of British and French, 
 to help them; so the Italians must be given the 
 credit for the biggest single military victory of the 
 war. Half the Austrian forces of 1,000,000 men, 
 were captured. This overwhelming disaster ex- 
 plains Austria-Hungary's immediate suit for an 
 armistice and speedy surrender (Nov. 4). 
 
 14. British take Aleppo (in Turkey) and U. S. first army 
 
 completes capture of 20,000 Germans (Oct. 26). 
 
 15. British take Kerkuk (155 miles northwest of Bag- 
 
 dad) (Oct. 27). 
 
 16. Turks evacuate Baku (Oct. 29). 
 
 17. French and Serbian cavalry reach Belgrade, thus 
 
 freeing Serbia of Teutons (Nov. 1). 
 
 18. Revolt of German sailors and soldiers at Kiel (Nov. 
 
 6) presages revolution in Germany. 
 
 19. U. S. troops take Sedan (Nov. 7), — where the Prus- 
 
 sian army took prisoner the Emperor Napoleon 
 III, with 200,000 troops, in 1870, and sealed their 
 triumph of that year over France. 
 
 20. Belgians reach Ghent; British, Mons; French reach 
 
 Belgium (Nov. 11.) 4 
 
 B. We shall now take up the armistice terms as imposed upon 
 the chief Central Powers, Austro-Hungary and Germany, 
 with a brief prelude of the political events that followed in 
 rapid succession in the Central Powers during October and 
 the first days of November. 
 
 1. (a) Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria abdicates (Oct. 4), 
 after Bulgaria's collapse in Macedonia. His 
 son Boris takes throne. 
 
 4 The allied advances continued everywhere along the Western front, 
 with increasing speed, until the hour of 11:00 a. m., November 11, when 
 the German military command had agreed to accept the Allied terms 
 for an armistice as finally directed by the authority of Marshal Foch. 
 Practically all of France and western Belgium was cleared before hos- 
 tilities ceased. 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 151 
 
 (b) Bulgaria in revolution — King Boris quits 
 (Nov. 2). 
 
 (c) Turkish (War) cabinet resigns (Oct. 8). 
 
 (d) Emperor Charles attempts reforms in Austria- 
 Hungary, to save his empire (Oct. 18), but 
 is too late. (Collapse of Austria-Hungary 
 comes as result of Italian successes in last 
 week of October.) Abdicates Nov. 11. 
 
 (e) Von Hertling, last war chancellor of Germany, 
 falls from Power (Oct. 3), and is replaced by 
 Prince Maximilian, a man of peace (Oct. 4). 
 
 (f) Kaiser consents to electoral reform (Sept. 
 30), but too late. 
 
 (g) During October German states carry out 
 sweeping reforms, weakening Kaiser's war 
 powers, granting suffrage reform, etc., but all 
 too late. 
 
 2. (a) New German Chancellor (Maximilian of Ba- 
 
 den) asks for armistice and peace negotia- 
 tions (Oct. 4). 
 
 (b) President Wilson replies to German note of 
 Oct. 4, on Oct. 7, refusing peace by negotia- 
 tion. 
 
 (c) Karl Liebnecht (anti-war Socialist), pardoned 
 by Kaiser (Oct. 9). 
 
 (d) Wilson calls for independence of Czechs and 
 Jugo-Slavs from Austria-Hungary, as reply 
 to Austria's plea for peace (Oct. 19). 
 
 (e) German note accepts Wilson's terms of peace 
 (Oct. 21). 
 
 (f) Wilson refers German note of Oct. 21 to 
 Allies (Oct. 28). 
 
 (g) Turkey signs armistice (Oct. 31) ; Allied fleet 
 sails for Constantinople. 
 
 (h) Armistice with Austria-Hungary signed (Nov. 
 
 3). 
 (i) Kaiser refuses to abdicate (Nov. 8), but is 
 
152 The Causes Of War 
 
 shown he must, and renounces Imperial and 
 Prussian crowns (Nov. 9). 
 (j) Germany (under Socialist ministry) accepts 
 Allied terms of armistice, and hostilities cease 
 (Nov. 11). By this date all four of the 
 Central Powers had surrendered to Allies, on 
 Allied terms. 
 
 ARMISTICE TERMS 
 
 II. Armistice Terms. 
 
 1. Bulgaria. Surrenders to Allies on Sept. 30. 
 
 (a) Bulgarian army to demobilize immedi- 
 ately. 
 
 (b) Arms, ammunition and supplies to be 
 turned over to Allies. 
 
 (c) All Greek and Serbian territory to be 
 evacuated by Bulgarian troops. 
 
 (d) All means of transportation, including 
 the Danube, be opened to Allies for op^ 
 erations against Austria and Germany. 
 (By this action Turkey was completely 
 cut off from her two remaining allies, 
 Austria and Germany, and with con- 
 tinued defeats, was soon upon her knees 
 begging for peace.) 
 
 8. Turkey surrenders to Allies (Nov. 1). Terms 
 similar to those imposed on Bulgaria. 
 
 3. Austria-Hungary surrenders to Allies (Nov. 
 4). 5 
 
 (a) Demobilize her armies and call home all 
 Austria's troops helping Germany. 
 
 (b) Withdraw all Austrian forces from in- 
 vaded territories, leaving all war sup- 
 plies, and even coal, to be disposed of by 
 Allies. 
 
 8 Because of their importance, and the relation they are certain to bear 
 to the final peace terms we give the conditions that were imposed upon 
 Austria-Hungary and upon Germany more in detail. 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 153 
 
 (c) Virtually one-half Austrian artillery and 
 equipment on Austrian soil to be sur- 
 rendered. 
 
 (d) All Germans in Austria to leave within 
 fifteen days or be interned. (Bulgaria 
 had acted similarly with Germans and 
 Austrians at earlier date.) 
 
 (e) Allied and U. S. forces to take possession 
 of all military points which they consid- 
 ered needful. 
 
 (f) Allies to have use of Austrian railroads 
 to operate against Germany. 
 
 (g) Austria surrendered all German submar- 
 ines in Austrian waters, together with 
 fifteen best Austrian submarines, three 
 Austrian battleships, three cruisers, nine 
 destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, and 
 other naval vessels to be selected by the 
 Allies. 
 
 (h) All war vessels not surrendered to Allies 
 to be concentrated and disarmed under 
 Allied direction. 
 
 (i) Austria-Hungary returns all Allied pris- 
 oners of war, but Allies not to return 
 Austrian prisoners. 
 
 (j) Austria must not destroy property in her 
 retreat. 
 
 (k) Allied war and merchant vessels to have 
 free navigation of all Austrian waters, 
 including Danube (Allies to take pos- 
 session of Danube fortresses, to guaran- 
 tee its free navigation), for use against 
 Germany. 
 
 (1) Allied blockade of Austria and her allies 
 subject to will of Allies. 
 
 (m) All aircraft of Austria and her allies 
 
154 The Causes Of War 
 
 left in Austria to be put out of commis- 
 sion, and kept by Allies until after war 
 ends with Germany. 
 
 (n) All Austrian naval bases to be occupied 
 by Allies, and all naval supplies or craft 
 of Allies held by Austria to be sur- 
 rendered. 
 
 (o) Austria-Hungary to keep no army except 
 as a police force to maintain order. 
 
 (p) Italian claims (that which Italy went to 
 war to gain) provinces held by Austria- 
 Hungary before the war to be returned 
 to Italy. Here the exact boundary mas 
 laid out, with great precision, evidently, 
 to mark out the boundary settlement in 
 the final peace terms. 
 
 (q) Local government (civil) to be reinstated 
 in Austrian countries, but under Allied 
 oversight and control. 6 
 4. Germany's Terms of Armistice. (Surrendered 
 
 to Allies, November 11.) 
 I. Military clauses on Western Front. 
 
 1. Immediate evacuation by Germany of in- 
 
 vaded countries — Belgium, France, Al- 
 sace-Lorraine, Luxemburg — to be com- 
 pleted within fifteen days days from sig- 
 nature of armistice. German troops not 
 out by that time become prisoners of war. 
 Allies to occupy territory as Germans re- 
 treat. 
 
 2. Repatriation, to be completed within four- 
 
 teen days, of all inhabitants of above 
 
 •The seventeen armistice points given above show how complete was 
 the surrender of the Austro-Hungarian government. These armistice 
 terms, which are not yet a peace, are more complete and humiliating than 
 the "unconditional surrender" of any previous sovereign nation in mod- 
 ern times. 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 155 
 
 mentioned countries, including hostages 
 and persons under trial or convicted. 
 
 3. Surrender of 5,000 guns; 30,000 machine 
 
 guns ; 3,000 minen-werfers ; 2,000 aero- 
 planes. 
 
 4. Evacuation by German armies of all terri- 
 
 tory on left bank of Rhine — these coun- 
 tries to be administered by local authori- 
 ties under Allied and U. S. control, or 
 armies of occupation. A neutral zone 
 east of Rhine to an average of about 35 
 kilometers, from borders of Holland all 
 the way to Switzerland, to be reserved, 
 as safeguard, until peace. Germans have 
 19 days from Nov. 11, to evacuate Rhine 
 territory. 
 
 5. Civilians in above territory to be left un- 
 
 disturbed, with no damage to property or 
 persons. Military establishments of all 
 kinds to be turned over to Allies intact. 
 Stores of food, etc., to be left for 
 civilians. 
 
 6. Five thousand locomotives, 50,000 wagons, 
 
 10,000 motor lorries to be delivered to Al- 
 lies, together with all railways of Alsace- 
 Lorraine. All barges taken from Allies 
 to be restored to them. 
 
 7. Allied and U. S. armies to have right of 
 
 requisition in all occupied territory. Up- 
 keep of troops of occupation in 
 Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) 
 charged to Germany. 
 
 8. German command must reveal all mines, 
 
 fuses, etc., and assist in finding and 
 destroying them ; also all poisoned wells, 
 etc. 
 
156 The Causes Of War 
 
 9. Immediate return of all allied and U. S. 
 
 prisoners of war without reciprocity on 
 Allies' part. 
 
 10. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed 
 
 from evacuated territory to be cared 
 for by Germans, who will be given medical 
 material required for same. 
 
 II. Eastern German Front, 
 
 1. Immediate evacuation by all German troops 
 
 and German agents, of any territory 
 which before the war belonged to Russia, 
 Roumania or Turkey, and withdrawal 
 within borders of Germany. 
 
 2. German troops to cease all requisitions 
 
 and seizures for German use, from said 
 territories. 
 
 3. Abandonment of treaties of Brest-Litovsk 
 
 and Bucharest and supplementary treat- 
 ies. 
 
 4. Allies to have free access to territories 
 
 evacuated by Germans on eastern front, 
 in order to convey supplies of food, etc., 
 to population, or for any other purpose. 
 
 III. Unconditional Capitulation in East Africa 
 within one month. 
 
 IV. General Clauses. 
 
 1. Repatriation of all allied and U. S. citi- 
 zens whatsoever, not included in clause 9 
 above. 
 
 % Reparation for all damages done. Imme- 
 diate restitution of the cash deposit of the 
 National Bank of Belgium, restitution 
 of Russian and Roumanian gold taken by 
 Germany, same to be held in trust by 
 Allies until final peace. 
 
 V. Naval Conditions. 
 
 1. Notification to neutrals by Germany that 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 157 
 
 freedom of navigation in all territorial 
 waters is given to naval and mercantile 
 marines of allied powers. 
 8. All naval and marine prisoners of war of 
 Allied and associated powers to be re- 
 turned, without reciprocity. 
 
 3. Surrender to Allies and U. S. of 160 sub- 
 
 marines. All other submarines to be 
 paid off, disarmed and placed under su- 
 pervision of U. S. and Allies. 
 
 4. The following surface vessels to be surren- 
 
 dered: six battle cruisers, ten battleships, 
 eight light cruisers, fifty destroyers of 
 most modern type. All other surface 
 warships to be concentrated in German 
 naval bases designated by Allies, and 
 placed under supervision of Allies and U. 
 S. All vessels of auxiliary fleet to be 
 disarmed. 
 
 5. All mines and obstructions laid by Ger- 
 
 mans outside German territorial waters 
 (this means the German war zone) to be 
 swept away by help of Germans. 
 
 6. Freedom of access to Baltic sea to be given 
 
 to naval and merchantile marine of Allies 
 and U. S., with their right to occupy 
 German fortifications to guarantee same, 
 and right to sweep all German territorial 
 waters, with German aid. 
 
 7. Allied blockade of Germany to continue 
 
 and all German ships at sea liable to cap- 
 ture. 
 
 8. All naval aircraft to be concentrated and 
 
 immobilized in German bases specified by 
 Allies and U. S. 
 
 9. In evacuating Belgian coast and ports Ger- 
 
 many shall abandon all merchant ships, 
 
158 The Causes Of War 
 
 tugs, lighters, cranes and harbor ma- 
 terials, and inland navigation materials, 
 stores and supplies of all kinds. 
 
 10. All Black Sea ports to be evacuated by 
 
 Germany, all Russian war vessels seized 
 by Germany to be handed over to Allies 
 and U. S. 
 
 11. All Allied merchant vessels to be restored 
 
 No destruction of ships or materials be- 
 fore evacuation, surrender or restoration. 
 
 12. German notification to world (especially 
 
 Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland) 
 that all restrictions on trading with Al- 
 lies and associated countries, are re- 
 moved. 
 
 13. No transfer of German shipping to any 
 
 neutral after signature to armistice. 
 
 VI. Duration of armistice, 30 days, with option 
 
 to extend. 
 
 VII. Limit for German reply to armistice terms 
 — 72 hours. 7 
 
 The above, therefore, were the conditions that Germany 
 accepted to gain an armistice, — a mere cessation of hostili- 
 ties — not peace. 
 
 A brief perusal of the above, and a comparison of the 
 armistice terms imposed upon the Central Powers indi- 
 vidually will reveal the fact that those Germany was obliged 
 to meet were the most drastic of all, as indeed they should 
 be. Moreover, they were the most specific and humiliating 
 in all history ; and came only four months after the Kaiser 
 boasted last July of German victory and the "shining Ger- 
 man sword," as he was sacrificing 500,000 more of his sub- 
 
 7 Slight changes were made in several of these armistice conditions 
 before they were finally signed by the official German delegates, but were 
 of a technical and very minor character, and did not at all alter the 
 nature or severity of their application. 
 
Outline of the War and Armistice Terms 159 
 
 jects in a struggle that every people but his own by that 
 time realized was a hopeless one for him and all he stood for. 
 Thus ends the "divine right" rule of the Hohenzollerns, and 
 the "divinity that doth hedge about a king." 
 
 The peace problem is quite a different issue. We shall 
 take it up in our next chapter, and continue, as the 
 peace conference sits. Yet, there are several clauses in the 
 armistice terms that are meant to be permanent, such for 
 example, as the giving up of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, 
 the boundary marked out between Italy and the former 
 States of the Austrian empire, the renunciation of Constan- 
 tinople by Turkey, reparation for damages done, abandon- 
 ment of all German official propaganda in Russia and the 
 Brest-Litovsk treaty, etc. The exactness of the armistice 
 terms and the permanent character of several of them, as 
 well as the promptness with which they were submitted to the 
 German commissioners after their application for them on 
 November 7, shows that the men who framed them and the 
 responsible statesmen back of them, had been shaping them 
 for some time before hostilities ceased. Their effect there- 
 fore was instant. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 OFFICIAL PEACE DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 WHILE we are awaiting the final consummation of the 
 armistice conditions and the preliminaries of peace, 
 we may well give our attention at this time to the study of 
 the movements for peace up to the present. Accordingly, we 
 shall take up these developments, as shown by the statements 
 of war aims of the belligerents by the official representatives 
 of those belligerents, or from semi-official sources. This will 
 also include peace proposals from neutrals, as well as the 
 principles of peace and peace terms, set forth from time to 
 time by the United States and the allied nations, and by the 
 Central Powers. 
 
 Aside from the above movements there have been various 
 efforts at peace, it is true, such as the peace propaganda by 
 the Socialists, certain German-Americans, the Pan-German 
 peace campaign, the "peace at any price" clique, etc. ; but 
 these latter have all been so ill-advised, so absurd, or so un- 
 American and abortive, that we need not consider them in this 
 connection. Moreover, the crises in which they figured have 
 all passed, and we may let that phase of the subject rest in 
 oblivion. There is one outgrowth of these factors that will 
 not rest, however, but has constantly become more menacing, 
 — and that is, the Bolshevik movement in Europe and the 
 principles of the I. W. W. in America. This condition 
 among a considerable portion of the earth's people today is 
 nothing less than a mental state and the philosophy of an- 
 archy, and as such it must be met and put down. This state 
 of anarchy is the other extreme from autocracy, and because 
 it is actually being accomplished in governmental affairs in 
 
 160 
 
Official Peace Discussions and Negotiations 161 
 
 Russia and threatening the other nations, must be met, if 
 necessary, by force, and speedily suppressed. We shall have 
 more to say of this lawless element later, but at present, let 
 us return to our subject in hand. 
 
 We are all rejoicing beyond our fondest hopes, at the 
 happy termination of the war, the armistice conditions, and 
 the political revolution in Germany since November 11, as it 
 is natural and right we should be. But a word of warning 
 is still in place, and indeed necessary, from the very fact 
 that the war was over before many of us had fully grasped 
 what it meant. There are still so many of us who have not 
 realized the true nature of this war, and the significance of 
 the issues involved, and the character of the government and 
 political ideals of our chief adversary, that there is still 
 danger of this country settling back into pre-war condi- 
 tions and habits of thinking, and yielding up important in- 
 ternational prestige and guarantees that alone can safe- 
 guard the principles of democracy in the future. The war 
 for democracy as intelligent Americans understand it, is 
 not yet won, despite the defeat of the military masters of 
 Germany. No greater mistake could be made than to think 
 so. The real fight that affords the opportunity for the 
 demonstration of democracy to the world, has just begun. 
 
 We can, we must, make our final peace only with the legally 
 and justly constituted representatives of the German people, 
 not with any temporary revolutionary faction. We must 
 know that these representatives have the unquestioned right 
 and the unquestioned power to speak for the German nation 
 as a whole, whatever that may prove to be. And the only 
 way to be sure of that, is to act for final peace when, and not 
 untilwhen,theGermanpeople,in a legal and democratic man- 
 ner, have elected and established a democratic government 
 with duly chosen delegates to speak for them in the peace 
 conference of the nations. This demand is not vengeance on 
 a defeated foe, it is simply justice and common sense. Ger- 
 many has done much since the close of hostilities to further 
 
162 The Causes Of War 
 
 the settlement of peace, but what she does with herself in 
 the next few months will determine very largely the period 
 and nature of peace deliberations at Versailles. 
 
 It shall be our plan in this article to discuss the peace ad- 
 vances and proposals in connection with our own govern- 
 ment's part in them, and with President Wilson's speeches 
 and diplomatic notes as a basis; for in studying his com- 
 munications directly or indirectly, with the various belliger- 
 ents, and their answers, and vice versa, we are taking note of 
 all the important official action in the direction of peace 
 on either side of the conflict. 
 
 The President's first public utterance on the subject of 
 peace after this war, is found in his address "America First," 
 delivered before the Daughters of American Revolution, at 
 Washington, D. C, October 11, 1915, and is as follows: 
 "Peace can be rebuilt only upon the ancient and accepted 
 principles of international law, only upon those things which 
 remind nations of their duties to each other and deeper than 
 that, of their duties to mankind and to humanity." This 
 was said a year and a half before the United States entered 
 the war. Thus early did the president speak out for a peace 
 that would guarantee justice and the principles of humanity. 
 From the first he was far more certain and consistent in his 
 conception of the part America should take in the peace 
 problems than he was as to the stand we were to take in the 
 war; and that but proves that he was more a man of peace 
 than he was of war, — as the average American was, — until 
 the very last minute of neutrality. 
 
 His first approach to a detailed statement of peace terms 
 is found in his address before the United States Senate (Jan. 
 22, 1917), on "A World League for Peace," still two months 
 and a half before our entry into the war. After stating 
 that "in every discussion of the peace that must end this 
 war it must be taken for granted that a world league to 
 enforce peace shall be formed, making impossible such a 
 
Official Peace Discussions and Negotiation* 163 
 
 world catastrophe again," he continues. "It is inconceiv- 
 able that the people of the United States should play no part 
 in that great enterprise (peace) .... To take part in such 
 a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought 
 to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of 
 their policy and the approved practices of their government 
 ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high 
 and honorable hope that it might . . . show mankind the 
 way to liberty ... to add their power to the authority 
 and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice 
 throughout the world. 
 
 "The treaties and agreements which bring it (the war) to 
 an end must embody terms which will create a peace .... 
 that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace 
 that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of 
 the nations engaged. 
 
 "If the peace presently to be made is to endure it must be 
 a peace made secure by the organized major force of man- 
 hind. 
 
 "No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recog- 
 nize and accept the principle that Governments derive their 
 just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no 
 right anywhere exists to hand people about from one sov- 
 ereignty to another as if they were property. 
 
 "... There should be a united, independent and au- 
 tonomous Poland. . . . 
 
 "So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now 
 struggling toward a full development of its resources and 
 powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great high- 
 ways of the sea. . . . No nation need be shut away from free 
 access to the open paths of the world's commerce. 
 
 "And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be 
 free. The freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of peace, 
 equality and cooperation. 
 
 "... And the question of limiting naval armaments 
 
164 The Cannes Of War 
 
 . . . opens up the question of the limitation of armies and 
 of all programs of military preparation. . . . There can 
 be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great 
 preponderating armies are henceforth to continue here and 
 there to be built up and maintained." 
 
 By an analysis of the above statements we find that Presi- 
 dent Wilson before the United States entered the war de- 
 clared indispensable the following conditions of peace: 
 
 1. A peace must be built up on the principles of interna- 
 
 tional law and of humanity. 
 
 2. There must be a World League to enforce peace. 
 
 3. The United States must play a part in this peace. 
 
 4. The peace must not be in the interest of any particular 
 
 nation or group of nations, but must win the ap- 
 proval of mankind. 
 
 5. This peace must be built upon the principle that gov- 
 
 ernments derive their just powers from the consent 
 of the governed — a democratic peace. 
 
 6. Poland must be reunited and given independence. 
 
 7. There must be freedom of the seas for all nations. 
 
 8. There must be a limitation of military and naval 
 
 preparations and "all programs of military prepa- 
 ration." 
 
 Let us keep these points in mind, and see, as we proceed, 
 how President Wilson has explained, enlarged upon and sup- 
 plemented them, since January, 1917. We should ako note 
 whether he has remained consistent in all essentials with his 
 first utterances on this subject. 
 
 On the occasion of his first war message to Congress 
 (April £, 1917), the President made it clear that he still 
 had the same ideas as to our part in and demands concern- 
 ing the terms of peace and agreements of the nations in 
 their league to enforce peace after the war. These are his 
 words: "My own thought has not been driven from its 
 habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the 
 
Official Peace Discussions and Negotiations 165 
 
 last two months (February and March, 1917), and I do 
 not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered 
 or clouded by them. I have exactly the same thing in mind 
 now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the 
 22nd of January, last." 
 
 He throws further light upon his idea of the League to 
 Enforce Peace, however, by this further statement: "A 
 steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except 
 by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic gov- 
 ernment could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe 
 its covenants." 
 
 Thus he adds one more condition to the eight listed above, 
 namely : 
 
 9. It must be a league of democratic nations. 
 
 This of course implies that if the Central Powers are to 
 join this league they must be genuinely transformed into 
 democratic nations and governments. 
 
 In his Flag Day address (June 14, 1917), the President 
 makes this statement concerning the nature and purpose of 
 the war and the peace that is to follow: "The great fact 
 that stands out above all the rest is that this is a People's 
 War, a war for freedom and justice and self-government 
 amongst all the nations of the world . . . the German peo- 
 ple included." This is abundant proof that if the President 
 abides by his former conviction we shall never make a final 
 peace with Germany until we are certain it is a democratic 
 Germany with which we deal. And that, let me repeat, and 
 no less the American people must demand, if this war is not 
 to be in vain. 
 
 We shall next give our attention to President Wilson's 
 reply to the Pope's peace proposals (Aug. 27, 1917). The 
 Pope's proposals as the President summarizes, are substan- 
 tially as follows : 
 
 1. That the nations "return to the status quo ante bellum" 
 — (political condition before the war). 
 
166 The Causes Of War 
 
 % That there be a "general condonation, disarmament, 
 and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the 
 principle of arbitration." 
 
 3. That by a similar concert freedom of the seas be es- 
 tablished. 
 
 4. That the territorial claims of France and Italy, prob- 
 lems of the Balkan States, restitution of Poland, etc., "be 
 left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible," 
 after the war. 
 
 The President then proceeds with convincing force to 
 point out that : 
 
 (1) It is manifest that no part of this (Pope's) program 
 can be successfully carried out unless the restitution of the 
 status quo ante furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it ; 
 
 (2) The status quo ante is not a basis upon which a firm 
 and just peace can be established, for: 
 
 (a) The object of this war is to deliver the free people 
 of the world from the condition it was put in by the status 
 quo ante of Germany before the war. The scathing indict- 
 ment of Germany follows : "a vast military establishment 
 controlled by an irresponsible Government which, having 
 secretly planned to dominate the world, . . . delivered its 
 blow fiercely and suddenly ; stopped at no barrier either of 
 law or of mercy ; swept a whole continent within the tide of 
 blood, not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of inno- 
 cent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and 
 now stands . . . the enemy of four-fifths of the world." 
 
 (b) To deal with such a power according to the Pope's 
 plan would "involve a recuperation of its (the German gov- 
 ernment and military system) strength and a renewal of its 
 policy," and compel a permanent hostile combination of na<- 
 tions against it. 
 
 These were plain, blunt words, but they were as true and 
 convincing as they were plain, and they have helped much to 
 revivify the Allies and to defeat Germany, and make the vic- 
 torious peace of freedom's cause triumphant. 
 
Official Peace Discussions and Negotiations 167 
 
 In this speech there is just one more condition of peace 
 that President Wilson contends for, — and it is the tenth 
 one we have, before the great official peace communications 
 and notes came to the United States from the Central Pow- 
 ers after the United States entered the war. It is this : 
 10. There should be no exclusive economic leagues against, 
 or in favor of, any nation or group of nations after 
 the war. There must be equal economic opportune 
 ity for all nations. 
 Next, we shall take up the "peace drives" of 1917, by 
 the Central Powers, the Bolsheviki, and certain elements in 
 some of the Allied countries. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 peace negotiations (Continued) 
 
 r t 1HE German ambassador informed me that a confer- 
 •*■ ence had been held in Berlin m the early part of 
 July, (19H), at which the date of the war was fixed. This 
 conference was presided over by the Kaiser; the Baron Wan- 
 genheim was present to report on conditions in Turkey. 
 Moltke, the Chief of Staff, was there, and so was Grand Ad- 
 miral Von Tirpitz. With them were the leaders of German 
 finance, the directors of the railroads, and the captains of 
 industry. . . . Each was asked if he were ready for the 
 war. All replied in the affirmative, except the financiers, who 
 insisted that they must have two weeks in which to sell for- 
 eign securities and arrange their loans. (Two weeks more 
 would make it the last of July, as actually happened.) 
 
 "The Italian Ambassador at Constantinople announced 
 that Baron Wangenhevm said the same thing to him, Italy, 
 at that time being a member of the Triple Alliance. . . . 
 All the details of the meeting were still (Aug. 26, 1914) fresh 
 in Baron Wangenkeim\s mind." — Henry Morgenthau, for- 
 mer American Ambassador to Turkey, in the New York 
 World, Oct. 14, 1917. 
 
 The above quotation from an official source is worth read- 
 ing again and again, and fixing definitely in mind. Once 
 more let me repeat, most assuredly we cannot admit Ger- 
 many into the League of Nations until she has a genuine con- 
 stitutional government and has repudiated everything that 
 her former imperial and militaristic government has stood 
 for — until she repents in sackcloth and ashes for the colossal 
 weight of crime that she has heaped upon suffering humanity, 
 
 168 
 
Peace Negotiations (Continued) 169 
 
 under the leadership of her war lords and lords of trade and 
 industry, who, as above shown in 1914, are still the real 
 masters of Germany. 
 
 There is as much reason to study the causes and nature 
 of the war now as there has been at any time during its 
 progress, for the simple reason, as we pointed out once be- 
 fore, that we must know the cause of a disease in order to 
 apply the remedy. And now, as the Supreme Council of the 
 Nations is preparing the remedy, it is incumbent upon them 
 and upon the peoples to whom they are responsible and whom 
 they represent, to have the causes clearly and constantly in 
 mind, if broken humanity is to be healed of its wounds in the 
 future. At one and the same time we are face to face with the 
 world's greatest opportunity and its greatest danger. That is 
 why today witnesses the world's greatest crisis, and a great 
 forward or great backward step is inevitable. Because of 
 these facts the writer is adding a number of additional war 
 study pamphlets to the list given a few months ago. Some 
 have been referred to before, others have not, but none as 
 definitely as they are now. 
 
 Published by the Committee on Public Information : 
 
 I. War Information Series 
 
 No. 21 "America's War Aims and Peace Program." — 
 Carl L. Becker, Cornell University. 1 
 
 No. 14. "The War for Peace."— Arthur D. Call, Secre- 
 tary American Peace Society. 
 
 No. 13. "German Militarism and Allied Ideals." — Stuart 
 P. Sherman, University of Illinois. 
 
 No. 13. "The War Message and Facts Behind It."— 
 Annotated text of President Wilson's War Message, April 
 2, 1917. 
 
 No. 14. "Why America Fights Germany." — John S. P. 
 Tatlock, Stanford University. 
 
 1 All quotations in this article without names of authors mentioned are 
 taken from "America's War Aims and Peace Program." 
 
170 The Causes Of War 
 
 No. % "The Nation in Arms," — Secretaries Lane and 
 Baker. 
 
 No. 16. "Study of the Great War." — Topical Outline, 
 
 Samuel B. Harding, Indiana University. 
 
 II. The "Red, White and Blue" Series 
 
 January, 1918. "Conquest and Kulture." — Notestein 
 and Stoll. 
 
 March, 1918. "German Treatment of Conquered Terri- 
 tory." 
 
 January, 1918. "German War Practices." 
 
 March, 1918. "War, Labor and Peace," — President 
 Wilson. 
 
 September, 1917. "The President's Flag Day Address." 
 
 , 1917. "The Battle Line of Democracy." — Prose 
 
 and Poetry of the World War. 
 
 , 1918. "War Cyclopedia." — Reference Hand-book 
 
 on the War. 
 
 Germany' s First Peace Proposal 
 
 At the close of our last chapter we were dealing with the 
 Pope's peace message of the summer of 1917 and President 
 Wilson's answer, rejecting the papal terms. The reader 
 will recall that we proposed a consideration of the peace 
 moves of the Central Powers next, and United States official 
 negotiations with them. 
 
 "The first official proposal for peace came from Germany, 
 at the close of the year 1916, at a time when, in Germany's 
 eyes, victory for her army was already at hand. In the west 
 the Allies had no more than held the German line; while in 
 the east the Central Powers had gained the aid of Turkey 
 and Bulgaria, had overrun Poland, Serbia, Roumania, and 
 had inflicted serious reverses upon the British in Mesopo- 
 tamia. . . . During the first two years then closing, the 
 fortunes of war were decidedly with Germany and her allies. 
 
Peace Negotiations (Continued) 171 
 
 Under these circumstances the German government offered to 
 discuss peace, confident that if the Allies accepted the offer 
 she could get what she wished; while if they refused it, it 
 could be made to appear that they were responsible for pro- 
 longing the conflict." This was the offer contained in the 
 German note of Dec. 12, 1916, and forwarded to the belliger- 
 ents through the neutral powers. The substance of Ger- 
 many's proposals at this time was as follows: 
 
 (1) Though ready to continue the war (forced upon 
 them), yet "prompted by the desire to avoid further blood- 
 shed and make an end to the atrocities of war," all the Cen- 
 tral Powers "propose to enter forthwith into peace nego- 
 tiations." 
 
 (2) These propositions "have for their object a guaran- 
 tee of the existence, honor and freedom of the development" 
 of the Central Powers and are "appropriate terms for the 
 establishment of a lasting peace." 
 
 (3) Germany is carrying on a war of defense against her 
 enemies, which aim at her destruction. 
 
 It was not an offer of terms, but an offer to stop the war 
 if the Allies would agree to Germany's terms, whatever they 
 might be. For the Allies to have accepted this proposal and 
 a peace conference at that time would have been nothing 
 less than an unconditional surrender to Germany. 
 
 Reply of the Entente Governments 
 
 The French denounced the proposal as a trap, and Lloyd 
 George, speaking for Great Britain, stated that it would 
 be nothing less than "putting our heads into a noose with the 
 rope end in the hands of the Germans." Quoting Lincoln's 
 words, he further stated, "We accepted the war for an ob- 
 ject, a worthy object. The war will end when that object is 
 attained. Under God I hope it will never end until that 
 time." In his speech Lloyd George also spoke of "complete 
 restitution, full reparation and effective guarantees," and 
 
172 The Causes Of War 
 
 that the Allies "refuse to consider a proposal which is empty 
 and insincere.'' 
 
 The Allied answer amounted to this: 
 
 (1) "Reparation for violated rights and liberties." 
 
 (2) "Recognition of the rights of nationality." 
 
 (3) "Free existence of small states." 
 
 In this it will be seen that Great Britain and France were 
 championing the rights of nationality and of small states 
 as early as 1916 in the war, as sine qua non of peace. 
 
 It was about this time (December 18, 1916, to be exact) 
 that President Wilson addressed his first feeler and peace 
 note to the belligerent powers. The main features of this 
 communication are: 
 
 (1) Each side professes to be fighting defensive war. 
 
 (2) Each side professes to be the champion of small na- 
 
 tions, and — 
 
 (3) Each side professes to be "ready to consider the for- 
 
 mation of a League of Nations to insure peace and 
 justice throughout the world;" and therefore, 
 
 (4) "The objects for which both sides are fighting, stated 
 
 in general terms, seem to be the same" ; therefore, 
 
 (5) Each side might state in definite terms what would 
 
 satisfy them and their people, or in other words, 
 what they are fighting for. 
 
 (6) The President is justified in making this request be- 
 
 cause the United States is "as vitally interested as 
 the Governments now at war," in the "measures to 
 be taken to secure the future peace of the world." 
 So, we see, in his first general communication to the war- 
 ring countries President Wilson declared that the United 
 States must have a part in the settlement of world peace. 
 This, we must remember was four months before our entry 
 into the war. But the emphasis the President put upon the 
 part United States must play in the determination of peace 
 was lost sight of in the violent criticism that was voiced in 
 Great Britain and France, as well as in some portions of our 
 own country, from the fact that he did not distinguish in 
 
Peace Negotiations (Continued) 17S 
 
 this note between the different aims and states of the Allied 
 and Central Powers in the war. And many still believe that 
 in stating that in general terms the objects of both sides 
 seem to be the same, President Wilson was justly offending 
 the Allied powers and stretching the attitude of neutrality to 
 wholly unjustifiable bounds. However that be, this note of 
 inquiry elicited answers from the Allies that were far more 
 definite terms than had ever been stated before. 
 
 The Central Powers in their united reply merely stated 
 that they were "ready to meet their antagonists in confer- 
 ence to discuss terms of peace." This was conclusive proof 
 that the Central Powers did not desire the world and much 
 less their own people to know for what aims of conquest and 
 domination] their autocratic governments were sacrificing 
 them by the millions. Such always is the secret diplomacy 
 of irresponsible kings and greedy, unscrupulous militarists. 
 
 The Entente (Allied) Powers, as President Wilson pointed 
 out, "have replied much more definitely, and have stated, in 
 general terms indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply 
 details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of repara- 
 tion which they deem to be indispensable conditions of a 
 satisfactory settlement." To quote further from this ad- 
 dress to the Senate (January 22, 1917), "We are that much 
 nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the 
 present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the 
 international concert which must hereafter hold the world 
 at peace." And as the President here stated, he had brought 
 the peace settlement just that much nearer, by revealing to 
 the world the essential democracy of the Allies' cause as 
 against the sinister, secret, Machiavellianism of the Central 
 Powers. And just to that extent, also, he was preparing 
 the United States for the day soon to come, when she must 
 vindicate her right to be called a democracy by throwing 
 in her powerful aid with the other liberal governments of the 
 world to save to the world the cardinal American principle of 
 "government by the consent of the governed." 
 
 This speech of President Wilson (Jan. 22, 1917), as weD 
 
174 The Causes Of War 
 
 as his reply to the Pope (Aug., 1917), was treated in last 
 month's article, and therefore will not be further analyzed 
 here. 
 
 "The general effect of these events was to bring into 
 clearer light the fundamental issues of the war," especially, 
 after the Russian revolution which overthrew the Czar 
 (March, 1917), and the entry of the United States into the 
 war (April 6, 1917). Sixteen more states now declared 
 war on Germany or severed diplomatic relations with her. 
 This all brought on an internal crisis in Germany, with the 
 upshot that the Reichstag on July 11 refused to vote war 
 credits for the time being, and repudiated the annexationist 
 scheme of the war party (which was in power). Bethmann- 
 Hollweg resigned the imperial chancellorship, and the Reichs- 
 tag resolutions were published to the world. They are 
 worth noting in this connection: 
 
 (1) Germany fights in self-defence, to preserve her ter- 
 
 ritories. 
 
 (2) The Reichstag is for peace and "lasting reconcilia- 
 
 tion among the nations." 
 
 (3) It is against "forced acquisitions of territory, and 
 
 political, economies and financial violations." 
 
 (4) It rejects all plans for an economic blockade and 
 
 the stirring up of enmity among the peoples after 
 the war. 
 
 (5) The freedom of the seas must be assured. 
 
 (6) The Reichstag will work for international arbitration 
 
 — "jurisdictional organizations." 
 From the above points it is easily seen that the Reichs- 
 tag was moving for peace; it was answering to the world 
 what the Kaiser and his government and army disdained to 
 answer. It was the voice of the German people that the 
 Reichstag had heard, — their reaction to the democratic 
 peace terms that President Wilson and the peoples and gov- 
 ernments of the Allies had forced upon their attention. But 
 what did the voice of the German people or the resolutions 
 
Peace Negotiations (Continued) 175 
 
 of the Reichstag amount to, at that stage of the war? 
 Kaiser Wilhelm with his war lords rode rough-shod and 
 defiantly over the German people and their representatives, 
 brandished again his "shining sword," and with God's help, 
 promised a German junker's peace. And the people and the 
 Reichstag were not again heard from until the last days of 
 the war. The "shining sword" had so dazzled them that 
 they were again ready to follow their "God's anointed"; 
 and the collapse of Russia confirmed their belief in victory. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 OFFICIAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (Concluded) 
 
 IN our last chapter we gave some space to a consideration 
 of the German-Bolshevik peace developments and their 
 effects on peace negotiations throughout the world. A fur- 
 ther examination of this conspiracy is necessary to a proper 
 conception of its nature and results, especially, upon Russia 
 and upon German honor before the world. 
 
 Brest-Litomk Conference and Peace Treaty 
 
 Winning support, as it did, among Socialists and certain 
 labor and pacifist elements everywhere, this abortive peace 
 offensive of the Bolshevists and Germans constituted for 
 months a distinct danger and threat to the Allies and the 
 cause of democracy. Tremendous pressure was brought to 
 bear upon the Allied governments to "negotiate peace" 
 with their enemies. But the defiant refusal of the heads of 
 the Allied and American governments to surrender the 
 principles for which they fought soon brought all effective 
 opposition to an end, as their peoples became aware of the 
 nature of these German-Anarchist schemes. 
 
 The exact nature of the Russian surrender to the German 
 government is revealed in the following statement in the 
 introduction to "War Information Series" No. 20, (Oct., 
 1918): "The documents show that the Bolshevik revolu- 
 tion was arranged for by the German Great General Staff 
 and financed by the German Imperial Bank and other Ger- 
 man financial insitutions. 
 
 "They show that the treaty of B rest-Lit ovsk was a be- 
 
 176 
 
Official Peace Negotiations (Concluded) 177 
 
 trayal of the Russian people by the German agents, Lenine 
 and Trotsky; that a German-picked commander was chosen 
 to 'defend' Petrograd against the Germans ; that German 
 officers have been secretly received by the Bolshevik govern- 
 ment as military advisers, as spies upon the embassies of 
 Russia's allies, as officers in the Russian army and direc- 
 tors of the Bolshevik military, foreign and domestic policy. 
 They show, in short, that the present Bolshevik government 
 is not a Russian government at all, but a German govern- 
 ment acting solely in the interests of Germany and betray- 
 ing the Russian people, as it betrays Russia's natural al- 
 lies, for the benefit of the Imperial German government 
 alone." 
 
 Not only did the Allied countries and United States sus- 
 pect all this treachery and later find it out for a fact, but 
 there were even Germans who admitted it. "A German 
 politician, writing in the Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung of Aug. 
 27, 1918, stated: 'We have brought about treaties of peace 
 at Brest and Bucharest (with Roumania) which correspond 
 to our interest, but not to our principles as we presented 
 them in the peace offer.' 9 — War Information Series £1, p. 26. 
 
 The Final Developments Before the Armistice 
 
 On July 4, 1918, President Wilson reiterated his state- 
 ment that there could be no peace while the Imperial Ger- 
 man Government, which was responsible for the war, re- 
 mained in power. And he laid down the "ends for which the 
 associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must 
 be conceded them before there can be peace: 
 
 (1) "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere 
 that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice dis- 
 turb the peace of the world ; or, if it cannot be presently 
 destroyed, at least its reduction to a virtual impotence. 
 
 (2) "The settlement of every question, whether of terri- 
 tory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of politi- 
 
178 The Causes Of War 
 
 cal relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that 
 settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not 
 upon the basis of material interest or advantage of any 
 other nation or people which may desire a different settle- 
 ment for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery. 
 
 (3) "The consent of all nations to be governed in their 
 conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor 
 and respect for the common law of civilized society that 
 governs the individual citizens of all modern states in their 
 dealings with one another; to the end that all promises and 
 covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or 
 conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impun- 
 ity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foun- 
 dation of a mutual respect for right. 
 
 (4) "The establishment of a League of Nations that will 
 check every invasion of right-^-affording a tribunal — to 
 which all must submit, and by which every international re- 
 adjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the 
 peoples directly concerned, shall be sanctioned." 
 
 In his New York address of Sept. 27 (1918), the Presi- 
 dent once more declared that he could not make peace with 
 the governments of the Central Empires on any sort of 
 bargain or compromise whatsoever, since we cannot accept 
 their word for anything. In this address he speaks more 
 definitely and in detail on the matter of a League of Nations. 
 Without reserve he declares that the League must be formed 
 — not before nor after the peace is made, but in the peace 
 council itself; also, that the League is the "most essential 
 part of the peace settlement itself." And, as we all know, 
 he won his point in the Peace Council at Versailles by hav- 
 ing the constitution of the League drawn up as the very first 
 permanent work of the Conference. Whether the necessary 
 two-thirds majority of the United States Senate ratifies 
 this constitution or not, the evidence throughout the world 
 at present is, that the peoples of the nations are looking 
 
Official Peace Negotiations (Concluded) 179 
 
 forward with confidence that the League of Nations will be 
 established as a remedy for war in the future. 
 
 The President throws still further light upon his concep- 
 tion of the League of Nations by the following "particulars" 
 which he states in this same (Sept. 27) speech: 
 
 (1) "The impartial justice meeted out must involve no 
 discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and 
 those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a jus- 
 tice that plays no favorites 
 
 (2) "No separate or special interest of any single nation 
 or group of nations" can be made if such "is not consistent 
 with the common interest of all. 
 
 (3) "There can be no leagues or alliances or special cove- 
 nants and understandings within the general and common 
 family of the League of Nations. 
 
 (4) " . . . No special, selfish, economic combinations 
 within the League and no employment of any form of boycott 
 or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by ex- 
 clusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the 
 League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and con- 
 trol. 
 
 (5) "All international agreements and treaties of every 
 kind must be made known to the rest of the world." 
 
 As has been pointed out by several students of President 
 Wilson's speeches, his program for the peace of the world is 
 found in his fourteen points of January 8, 1918, his four 
 points of July 4, and his five points of September 27, 1918, 
 (just noted above). These three pronouncements, taken 
 together, are known as his twenty-three peace points. 
 
 Analysis of President Wilsons Program 
 
 We shall now make a brief analysis of the above twenty- 
 three points, as enunciated by President Wilson. Some he 
 has repeated, expounded, or enlarged upon a number of 
 
180 The Causes Of War 
 
 times. Others he has modified somewhat, due to fundamental 
 political changes in the governments or political condi- 
 tions in the Central Powers ; but, in their spirit and in their 
 essentials these points remain the same. We may state 
 their essence as follows : 
 
 1. A peace must be built up on the principles of interna- 
 
 tional law and of humanity. 
 
 2. There must be a World League to enforce peace. 
 
 3. The peace must not be in the interest of any particu- 
 
 lar nation or group of nations, but must be in 
 the common interest of all, large and small states 
 alike. 
 4s. This peace must win the approval of the people of the 
 nations — of the major force of mankind. 
 
 5. It must be built upon the principle that governments 
 
 derive their just powers from the consent of the 
 governed — a democratic peace. 
 
 6. There must be freedom of the seas for all nations, great 
 
 and small. 
 
 7. There must be a limitation of military and naval arma- 
 
 ments, "of all kinds of military preparation." 
 
 8. There must be a reunited and independent Poland — 
 
 along the line of nationality. 
 
 9. Alsace-Lorraine must be returned to France. (His 
 
 statements amount to this.) 
 
 10. Italy must receive Italian provinces of the Trentino 
 
 and Trieste (Italia Irredenta), in so far as these 
 regions are unquestionably Italian. 
 
 11. All German occupation and political domination in 
 
 any part of former Russia must cease (i. e. as 
 Russia was in 1914). 
 
 12. There should be no exclusive economic leagues in 
 
 favor of, or against, any nation or group of na- 
 tions, after the war. 
 
 13. There must be absolutely no secret treaties, covenants 
 
Official Peace Negotiations (Concluded) 181 
 
 or international agreements between any nations 
 or group of nations, but all treaties, etc., must 
 be published to all the world. 
 
 14. Open minded and impartial adjustment of all colonial 
 
 claims must be secured, with the interests of the 
 peoples concerned uppermost in mind. (This de- 
 veloped into a mandatory for the German colonies, 
 and perhaps others, in the League of Nations.) 
 
 15. Restoration of Belgium, with full sovereignty, and 
 
 reparation, by Germany. 
 
 16. Peoples of Austria-Hungary must be given autonomy 
 
 — self-government. (This was changed later to 
 complete independence for Czecho-Slavs and Jugo- 
 slavs, after President Wilson recognized their in- 
 dependence ; and he made the acceptance of this 
 change a condition of acceptance of an armistice 
 with Austria-Hungary.) 
 
 17. Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro must be left to 
 
 determine their own future, and Serbia must be ac- 
 corded "free and secure access" to the Adriatic. 
 All the Balkan states' differences must be settled 
 along "historically established lines of allegiance 
 and nationality." 
 
 18. Turkish portions of the Ottoman empire should be 
 
 left for the Turks, unmolested ; but in parts where 
 non-Turkish populations predominate such peo- 
 ples should be given complete self-government 
 within their provinces. 
 
 19. Specifically, there must be no bargaining of nations 
 
 at the peace table, — one nation granting another 
 some such advantage in order to secure a corres- 
 ponding advantage for itself, etc., but each part 
 of final settlement based on the "essential justice of 
 that particular case," 
 
 20. That all well-defined national aspirations be accorded 
 
 the utmost satisfaction possible without adding new 
 
182 The Causes Of War 
 
 elements of discord, as well as (in 19 above) "abso- 
 lutely no handing about or division of peoples as 
 if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game" 
 (such as in division of Poland in eighteenth cen- 
 tury). 
 21. The relationship of nations with one another to be 
 governed by exactly the same code of morals and 
 principles of conduct as that which obtains between 
 individuals in all modern civilized society. (Just 
 the opposite to Gen. Von Bernhardi's German doc- 
 trine in his "Germany and the Next War.") 
 
 A consideration of the above twenty-one more or less 
 separate propositions will show that President Wilson has 
 set forth (notwithstanding the many criticisms of their "in- 
 definiteness," valid criticisms to a degree) the most complete, 
 definite and comprehensive peace program that has come 
 from any source, despite the fact that the details in many 
 respects are lacking. Moreover, since all the Central Pow- 
 ers accepted President Wilson's peace program as a basis 
 for an armistice and peace negotiations, it was certainly 
 imperative that the author of this program, above all others, 
 be present at the Congress of Versailles, to interpret his own 
 propositions. Such a consideration should silence once for 
 all the opposition to and criticism of, his leaving the United 
 States in the interest of humanity and peace — for his own 
 country and the world alike. Opposition to some of his 
 principles is valid, and the inalienable right of his fellow- 
 citizens; but opposition to the part he is playing in the 
 peace negotiations is a totally different thing, and is in- 
 excusable, from every point of view. It is right, and it is 
 to be hoped that such action may react disastrously upon 
 these critics. 
 
 There are three of the abo^e propositions, however, that 
 the writer would call the reader's attention to, in particular. 
 One is the demand for "absolute freedom of the seas." No 
 
Official Peace Negotiations (Concluded) 183 
 
 one knows just what that means, and there are conflicting 
 opinions as to what it might mean in the League of Na- 
 tions. An able statement of the difficulties involved in this 
 point — as well as others — is given by Joseph H. Odell, in 
 Nov. 6, 1918, issue of the Outlook. ("The President's Four- 
 teen Points.") 
 
 The second point is the President's plan for the disposal 
 of Turkey. In an early chapter of the series on the Causes 
 of War the writer made this statement (in 1917) : "Turkey 
 must leave Europe, where she has never had a right to be. 
 Turkey is not a nation in the true sense, anyway, and never 
 has been. She has always existed unnaturally, by a criminal 
 subjection of peoples who otherwise would long since have 
 been free, and arbiters of their own destinies. If there ever 
 was a chimerical state, it has been the Ottoman Empire. 
 Her whole history has been one of cruelty, rapine and mur- 
 der." All evidence and disclosures of her action during the 
 war, which have recently been thoroughly exposed, serve only 
 to justify this demand and make it doubly insistent. The 
 writer would refer the reader especially to Ambassador Mor- 
 ganthau's story, just published in book form — the part deal- 
 ing with Armenia, Syrian and Greek massacres and cruel- 
 ties, as well as the nature of the Turkish Government. 
 
 The third point is concerning the "breaking down of 
 economic barriers." What shall this "breaking down of all 
 economic barriers" between nations include? Does it in- 
 volve the doing away with all protective tariff between na- 
 tions? If so what about war materials? The present 
 League of Nations Constitution urges government owner- 
 ship or control of all war materials or their production. 
 Certainly, unless the League of Nations becomes a permanent 
 preventive of war, the United States cannot be dependent, 
 upon any foreign power for war materials and manufactures. 
 It must protect these industries sufficiently to build them 
 up to a safe war basis, in readiness for any time of danger. 
 Tremendous difficulty will also be experienced in bringing 
 
184 The Causes Of War 
 
 all the protective tariff nations to the point of giving up this 
 commercial privilege in favor of their own industries. This 
 point presents a veritable Chinese puzzle ; and it may prove 
 to be a puzzle that is unsolvable. Yet, something along 
 this line should by all means be done, to prevent the benefits 
 of a great portion of the world's commerce going to certain 
 great commercial nations and privileged classes in those na- 
 tions, to the detriment of all others — small, non-commercial 
 nations in particular. Part of the difficulty may be over- 
 come by a free commercial rivalry among the nations ; but 
 great international "trusts" and monopolies must also be 
 regulated. Something toward a solution might be obtained 
 by government ownership of those industries that might need 
 protection. Certainly this last is one possible solution, since 
 government ownership is one of the biggest industrial issues 
 the world over, to-day. 
 
 The above situation, while presenting difficulties for the 
 League of Nations, on the other hand is only one of the 
 many instances that demand this effective League as the only 
 alternative to a virtual race-suicide through war in the fu- 
 ture. It is scarcely worth while discussing an international 
 court of arbitration if there is to be no League of Nations 
 behind it. The present League may not be permanent, may 
 not include all the world — and may not be satisfactory in a 
 number of respects — so. much can scarcely be expected from 
 it — but it must lead finally to a permanent league of the 
 nations of the earth. No other outcome is thinkable. This 
 final League may not be realized in our day, but our day 
 must make it possible and start it on its way. This is the 
 supreme duty and privilege of the present generation. I 
 shall have more to say of this League in a later chapter. 
 
 There is one feature of the final negotiations between the 
 German Government and President Wilson, leading directly 
 to the Armistice and German surrender of Nov. 11 that is 
 very significant — in the light of political development in 
 Germany since. And that is, that President Wilson by his 
 
Official Peace Negotiations (Concluded) 185 
 
 unshakable demand that the German people must speak for 
 peace rather than the Imperial German Government alone, 
 whose word he could never take for sincerity — that the 
 President himself in this demand in Germany's hour of disas- 
 ter, drove the Kaiser from his throne, and the German 
 princes from theirs. In other words, it was President Wil- 
 son, together with the overwhelming victories of Allied arms 
 in the last days of the war, and not the German people as a 
 democracy, that drove the Hohenzollerns from power. And 
 for that very reason the German nation cannot yet be ac- 
 cepted as a true democracy. Nations do not change their 
 fundamental ways of thinking so soon, and never primarily 
 by force. Germany has a splendid chance to develop a great 
 democracy ; but let us not be too hasty in receiving her with 
 open arms, as a regenerated criminal. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 AFTER so much has been written and said on the sub- 
 ject of the "League of Nations," and especially, as it 
 is being so widely discussed pro and con, at present, the 
 writer would hardly feel justified in adding a chapter on this 
 question to the present treatise on the War, were it not for 
 two phases of the momentous peace problem which have not 
 been so widely discussed, and which have been more or less 
 neglected or ignored. These two phases are: (1) the Ger- 
 man attitude and point of view on the matter of a League 
 of Nations or International Arbitration, and (2) the 
 progress of this League idea among the Allied Powers in the 
 years just preceding the War. 
 
 And now, to take up the German attitude first. Few per- 
 sons, among those who have not given the matter close study, 
 realize how thoroughly the great German teachers and writ- 
 ers, political and military, dominated the thought and molded 
 the convictions of the German nation. True, we have been 
 told in our War Information campaign, that the German 
 people had no will of their own, followed blindly their leaders, 
 because they had been taught and felt that they had to fol- 
 low them, etc. But, not until we begin to investigate this 
 phenomenon for ourselves do we realize how the leaders, 
 as those mentioned above, furnished the very moral, political 
 and military gospel for the nation — and that not alone 
 because they molded the thought of the people, but because 
 they worked and thought along with the nation, and in some 
 instances took counsel of the people and their temper. That 
 there was a very strong undercurrent of the common people 
 
 186 
 
The League of Nations 187 
 
 against all this new militant doctrine, is true; but such an 
 undercurrent did not and could not mold the character of the 
 German nation. 
 
 Because of the almost unlimited influence of these literary 
 and political "lights," therefore, we shall examine briefly 
 their teachings and attitude toward peace and a "society 
 of nations" as the best means of answering our first question 
 above. Note these quotations : 
 
 "They (Governments) usually employ the need of peace 
 as a cloak under which to promote their own political aims. 
 This was the position of affairs at the Hague Congresses, 
 and this is also the meaning of the action of the United 
 States of America, who in recent times have earnestly tried 
 to conclude treaties for the establishment of arbitration." — 
 (von Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War.") 
 
 "Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the ef- 
 forts of President Taft a great step forward in the path to 
 perpetual peace." (Idem. p. 17.) 
 
 "This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations 
 anemic, and marks a decay of spirit and political courage. 
 ... It has always been the weary, spiritless, and exhausted 
 ages that have played with the dream of perpetual peace." 
 — (H. von Treitschke, greatest German historian.) 
 
 Frederick the Great, who is very much quoted in recent 
 years in Germany and considered as the greatest of the Ger- 
 man rulers, and is idolized as no other among his people, 
 once said : "In matters of state, when a man stops to con- 
 sider he is a Christian, he is lost." 
 
 "War is a biological necessity of the first order." — (Von 
 Bernhardi.) 
 
 "So long as there are men who have human feelings and 
 aspirations, so long as there are nations who strive for an 
 enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interests 
 come into being, and occasions for making war arise." — 
 (Bernhardi.) 
 
 "The extra-social and super-social structure which guides 
 
188 The Causes Of War 
 
 the eternal development of societies, nations and races, is 
 war" — (Claus Wagner.) 
 
 "War is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in 
 nature." — (A. W. Von Schlegel.) 
 
 "Between states the only check upon injustice is force, and 
 in morality and civilization each people must play its own 
 part and promote its own ends and ideals. No power exists 
 which can judge between states and make its judgment pre- 
 vail." — ( Bernhardi. ) 
 
 "Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new 
 territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its pos- 
 sessors — that is to say, by conquest, which thus becomes a 
 law of necessity. — (Ibid.) 
 
 "Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as 
 to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War 
 gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on 
 the very nature of things." — (Ibid. p. 23.) 
 
 "The knowledge therefore, that war depends on biological 
 laws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it 
 from international relations must be demonstrably unten- 
 able"— (Ibid, p. 24.) 
 
 "To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, 
 and thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individ- 
 ual leads to error, since in a human race conceived as a 
 whole, struggle, the. most essential vital principle, would 
 be ruled out. Any action in favor of collective humanity 
 outside the limits of the State and Nationality is impossi- 
 ble. Such conceptions belong to the wide domain of Uto- 
 pias. " — (From Schleiermacher, quoted by Bernhardi.) 
 
 "Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State 
 from social petref action and stagnation." — (Kuno Fischer.) 
 
 "War is elevating, because the individual disappears be- 
 fore the great conception of the State What a per- 
 version of morality to wish to abolish heroism among men!" 
 — (Treitsche. Trietsche is referred to by scores of German 
 writers and speakers as their great historian-philosopher.) 
 
The League of Nations 189 
 
 "States which from various considerations are always ac- 
 tive in this direction (peace) are sapping the roots of their 
 own strength. The United States of America in June, 
 1911, championed the ideas of universal peace m order 
 to be able to devote their undisputed attention to money- 
 making and the enjoyment of wealthy and to save the three 
 hundred million dollars which they spend on their navy; they 
 thus incur a great danger, the loss of all chance of contest 
 with opponents of their own strength. . . . If they ad- 
 vance farther on this road, they will one day pay dearly for 
 such a policy." — (Bernhardi.) 
 
 "This law (the law of Christian love) can claim no sig- 
 nificance for the relations of one country to another, since 
 its application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. 
 . . . Christian morality is personal and social, and in its 
 nature cannot be political." — (Ibid.) 
 
 "Proposals are made from time to time — to settle the dis- 
 putes which arise between the various countries by Arbitra- 
 tion Courts, and to render war impossible. The politician 
 who — honestly believes in their practibility must be amaz- 
 ingly short-sighted. . . . Where does the power reside 
 which insures the execution of this judgment when pro- 
 nounced ?" — (Bernhardi. ) 
 
 "In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, 
 declared in 1908 that the High Court of International Jus- 
 tice established by the Second Hague Conference would be 
 able to pronounce definite and binding decisions by virtue of 
 the pressure brought to bear by public opinion. The pres- 
 ent leaders of the American peace movement seem to share 
 this idea. A general arbitration treaty between two coun- 
 tries affords no guarantee of permanent peace. . . . If these 
 relations change . . . then every arbtriation treaty will burn 
 like tinder and end m smoke.** — (Chancellor von Bethmann- 
 Hollweg, in a speech to the Reichstag, March 30, 1911.) 
 
 "The efforts directed toward the abolition of war must 
 not only be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must 
 
190 The Causes Of War 
 
 be stigmatized as unworthy of the human race." — (Bern- 
 hardt "Germany and the Next War," p. 34.) 
 
 "By Courts of Arbitration . . . the weak nation has the 
 same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation. The 
 whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on the 
 natural law of development, which can lead only to the most 
 disastrous consequences for humanity generally." — (Ibid.) 
 
 "A people can only hope to take up a firm position in the 
 political world when national character and military tradi- 
 tion act and react upon each," says Bernhardi. "These are 
 the words of Clauswitz, the great philosopher of war, and he 
 is incontestably right" — (Ibid.) 
 
 "God will always see to it that wars recur as a drastic rem- 
 edy for the human race," says Treitschke; and like him, 
 Bernhardi declares, "Our people must learn to see that the 
 maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a 
 policy." 
 
 "The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's 
 power by successful and deliberately planned wars," says 
 Bernhardi ; and with regard to Frederick the Great the same 
 author, agreeing with Treitschke, declares that "None of the 
 wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of 
 them did he postpone as long as possible. He had always 
 determined to be the aggressor." 
 
 "The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a 
 political means has always led to happy results. . . . The 
 lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which 
 have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have 
 had the happiest results." — (Bernhardi, p. 43.) 
 
 "The end-all and be-all of a State is power, — and he who 
 is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not 
 meddle with politics" — (Treitschke.) 
 
 Kaiser Wilhelm II repeatedly remarked that his army 
 and navy, and not parliamentary bodies and negotiations 
 with other countries, were his main reliance and the hope of 
 Germany ; and when he made the historic statement that "Ger- 
 
The League of Nations 191 
 
 many's future lies upon the water," he was counting the years 
 until the "inevitable day" that was the toast of many a Ger- 
 man drink in high naval, military, and governmental circles. 
 What faith could such characters have in a true "freedom of 
 the seas"? 
 
 "The State is itself the highest conception in the wider 
 community of man . . . for there is nothing higher than 
 it in the world's history. . . . The verdict of history will 
 condemn the statesman who was unable to take the responsi- 
 bility of a bold decision, and sacrifice the hopes of the future 
 to the present need of peace." — (Bernhardi, referring es- 
 pecially to the German reverses in the Moroccan crisis, 1909- 
 1911.) 
 
 "While on the one side she (United States) insists on the 
 Monroe Doctrine, on the other she stretches out her own 
 arms toward Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her 
 fleets. . . . The United States' aim at the economic, and 
 where possible, the political command of the American conti- 
 nent, and at the naval supremacy in the Pacific. Their 
 interests, both political and economic, notwithstanding all 
 commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically with those 
 of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter 
 this. . . . Again, the principle that no State can ever 
 interfere in the internal affairs of another State is repugnant 
 to the highest rights of the State. . . . No one stands above 
 the State ; it is sovereign. . . . In no case, therefore, may a 
 sovereign State renounce the right of interfering in the 
 affairs of other States." — (Bernhardi.) (How, then, can it 
 enter into a League of Nations, to enforce peace or justice?) 
 
 In hinting at the turn of affairs of "the next war," Gen- 
 eral Bernhardi made the following comment on Germany's 
 justification should she break her treaty and violate Belgian 
 neutrality: "This argument (in favor of breaking the neu- 
 trality treaty) is the more justifiable because it may safely 
 be assumed that, in event of a war of Germany (notice he 
 puts Germany first) against France and England, the two 
 
192 The Causes Of War 
 
 last mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Bel- 
 gium" (a thing which they did not do, but which Germany 
 did do, in violation of her pledged word). — (Bernhardi.) It 
 is highly significant that this suggestion was published to the 
 German nation three years before the deed actually happened 
 in August, 1914. It is easy from this evidence of purpose 
 to trace whence originated that German fiction that England 
 and France both had attacked, or would immediately, attack 
 Germany through Belgium, on the 1st of August, 1914. 
 (The German versions of the story varied from day to day, 
 you will recall.) We have always heard that an evil-minded 
 person thinks evil of others. 
 
 And again, "That England would pay much attention to 
 the neutrality of weaker nations when such a stake ( a general 
 naval and continental war was at issue is hardly credible." 
 — (Bernhardi, Ibid, p. 158.) 
 
 "It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists 
 merely for defense." — (Ibid, p. 228.) 
 
 "We must also devote our full attention to submarines, 
 and endeavor to make them more effective in attack." — 
 (Ibid, p. 234.) 
 
 "We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty 
 towards civilization than the Great Asiatic power (Japan). 
 We, like the Japanese, can fulfil it only by the sword." — 
 (Ibid.) 
 
 "In one way or another we must square our account with 
 France, if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. 
 . . . This is the first and foremost condition of a sound 
 German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all 
 cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be 
 settled by force of arms. France must be so completely 
 crushed that she can never again come across our path!' 9 — 
 (Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," p. 106.) Pray, 
 reader, does this not explain the terrible German terror in 
 France during the War? — in Belgium, and in all sections 
 that might be of any strength against Germany should they 
 not "be so completely crushed"? 
 
The League of Nations 193 
 
 The above quotations are but a fraction of the declara- 
 tions among leading Germans that serve to show their atti- 
 tude toward a League to Enforce Peace, and toward inter- 
 national conciliation by means of Arbitration Courts. The 
 temper of the whole German policy, up to the very hour of 
 their final defeat last November, is strongly opposed to a 
 League of Nations, whose fundamental purpose is to estab- 
 lish lasting peace for mankind. They, — and the leaders of 
 the German Government at the time of the armistice are the 
 same as its leaders today, — gave sanction to the League of 
 Nations idea in President Wilson's fourteen points only be- 
 cause of military and political necessity. The German peo- 
 ple I dare say had hardly entertained the idea of a League to 
 enforce peace until it was forced upon them in the last days 
 of the war. Just another incident to illustrate the spirit 
 that was abroad among the people in Germany in the years 
 before and leading up to the War, which unmistakably shows 
 the effect of such teaching as we have noted above. The 
 writer has an intimate friend, an English professor of music. 
 His family had friends in Germany, whom they were visiting 
 a few years ago, i. e., German friends. Although on very 
 intimate and friendly terms, the matron of the German house- 
 hold remarked to the English Professor's sister-in-law one 
 day in casual conversation : "Germany and England are go- 
 ing to have a war one of these days, because we hate your 
 people, and England had better look out !" 
 
 The preceding examples are given simply because they 
 readily come to mind, and because Gen. Von Berhardi's 
 book is on my desk at the present moment. Among other 
 high German authorities who have given like utterances are 
 the ex-Crown Prince of Germany, Maximilian Harden, the 
 famous Tannenburg, Admiral Kirchhoff, Werner Sombat, 
 Ernest Jackh, Ernest Hasse, Gen. von Schellendorf, Fried- 
 erick Lange, A. Sprenger, Paul Rohrbach, Rudolph Theuden, 
 and a great number of the now notorious group of German 
 professors. The book, "Out of Their Own Mouths," also 
 contains a number of quotations from Germans that have 
 
194 The Causes Of War 
 
 a bearing on this subject. Now, what shall we say of all 
 this? Can the authors of such statements be at heart in 
 accord with the principles of the League to Enforce Peace? 
 And there is no evidence as yet that any fundamentally dif- 
 ferent voice than theirs is the voice of Germany today. We 
 are therefore forced to conclude that Germany has been, and 
 to all intents and purposes still is, the arch-enemy to the 
 peace movement, as well as foremost in her war-mindedness 
 and militarism. Else why does she not confess her wrongs? 
 Why does she not repudiate her methods? Why does she 
 not cast aside her war-lords ? Why does she not voluntarily 
 return many of the precious relics of Europe's best civiliza- 
 tion that her Vandal hands seized upon ? Why does she not 
 fall on her knees and in contrition beg forgiveness for the 
 crimes of Rheims, Louvain, Dinant, — of her Zeppelins, her 
 submarines, her "super-gun," her murderous raids over the 
 unprotected English and French towns, her deportations of 
 workmen and women into slavery, her deliberate and syste- 
 matic starvation of peoples in portions of her occupied dis- 
 tricts? — and a hundred other questions we might ask. 
 
 Now, let us give our attention briefly to the second phase 
 listed in the opening of this chapter — the attitude of the 
 Allied countries on the same subject. We shall begin with 
 Great Britain, because there, next to our own country, we 
 find the leadership in the peace movement. Not least sig- 
 nificant among the German remarks above are the specific 
 references to the efforts of the United States and Great 
 Britain toward international peace and arbitration in the 
 last two decades before the War. These references help to 
 bring into relief, as I have just stated, the fact that despite 
 the British-Boer war of 1899-1901 and the still more recent 
 Persian incident with Russia, Great Britain, both as a gov- 
 ernment and as a people, has been, among the nations of 
 the earth, the greatest, most hopeful and sincere champion 
 of universal peace, save only the United States of America. 
 The utterances of such statesmen as Gladstone and James 
 
The League of Nations 195 
 
 Bryce, and the readiness of her foreign ministers to enter 
 into arbitration treaties for the settlement of international 
 difficulties, and even the limitation of armaments, as well as 
 the remarkable backing by the English people of the League 
 of Nations at the present hour, — attest to this fact. Also, 
 history, — Gen. Bernhardi's statements to the contrary not- 
 withstanding, — will be glad to acknowledge that Foreign 
 Minister Gray, with the aid of other British statesmen, 
 fought for peace and not for war; that months before the 
 war, if not years before, he publicly championed the idea of 
 a League of Nations ; that he held out against hope, for 
 peace, in the days just before the outbreak of hostilities, up 
 to the very last moment, indeed, — and had the ear of every 
 great Government of Europe (even that of the German Am- 
 bassador to England) save only the war-bent, blood-thirsty 
 German Imperial Government. Even after the Great War 
 had been raging for more than a year, Mr. Gray remarked 
 what a pity it was that the League, which was so near to 
 realization, could not have been made a fact before the ca- 
 tastrophe came. 
 
 Of what virtue is it that Kaiser Wilhelm II, as Mr. Arthur 
 Bullard tries to make the deduction, was not converted to the 
 War Party's plan until after the Moroccan crisis in 1911? 
 It was with him merely a matter of expediency and not of 
 principle, that he opposed war before that time. It was 
 simply that the Kaiser felt the time had not yet come. So 
 many times in his speeches in the two decades between 1888 
 and 1909 did he refer to this subject, that there can be no 
 doubt of his constant anticipation of this war and the glori- 
 ous part he, as the emulator of Frederick the Great, was to 
 play in it. 
 
 France also was listening attentively to the idea of the 
 League, though naturally more distrustful than England, on 
 account of the direct German menace. Still, she was hope- 
 ful that war would not come, even though she felt that she 
 must increase her period of military service in 1913 from two 
 
196 The Causes Of War 
 
 to three years, because of the alarming military program 
 and unmistakable threat of Germany. 
 
 The United States of America can well be proud of the 
 fact that she has led in all this movement for Arbitration as 
 a check upon war (though not at all proud of what many 
 of her pacifists, before and during the war, have done; 
 and it is but natural, therefore, that she should occupy the 
 leading position in the present supreme fight, — for fight it 
 is, — for peace. Whether the constitution of the League as 
 now drawn up is accepted in its entirety or not, those Ameri- 
 can statesmen and would-be statesmen, — whether from con- 
 viction or for political reasons — who oppose the principle of 
 the League of Nations to Enforce Peace, not only are com- 
 mitting an illogical act in the light of America's position so 
 far, but will also find themselves running counter to the great 
 statesmanship of the world by their wilfulness ( as did the 
 "wilful twelve" in the beginning of the war) and at the same 
 time lowering the confidence of the great common peoples of 
 the world in the unselfish charity and utter sincerity of the 
 people of the United States of America. A great spectacle 
 indeed, will it present to the world, should the United States, 
 the chief champion of the League, and without whom it could 
 never have been formed, cast off her own product, and with 
 it the present hope of the world for the solution of its great- 
 est problem ! 
 
 It boots but little that men may argue that this League 
 cannot abolish war. Most thinking men perhaps do not 
 claim so much for it in the immediate future. But it can 
 prevent another world struggle such as the one we have just 
 passed through, or put it off until the coming governments 
 of the people make war a thing of the past. Nor is there 
 any more strength to the argument that the League consti- 
 tution would conflict fundamentally with the Constitution of 
 the United States. Personally, I do not believe the February 
 draft does, or that another one adopted by the Peace Con- 
 ference would. But if it did, by implication, on some one 
 
The League of Nations 197 
 
 or more minor points (in a major sense it cannot, as now 
 drawn up, or possible to be drawn up, or passed upon by the 
 democracies of the nations) there are two sufficient reasons, 
 to the writer's mind, why we need not be alarmed over the 
 prospect, namely: (1), Enough democratic nations with con- 
 stitutions or fundamental laws similar to ours will be mem- 
 bers of the League, having the same problem to face, that 
 amendments to remedy such defects will be forthcoming > 
 and (2), No great constitution was ever entered into without 
 compromise and sacrifice of some degree or sort, real or 
 imaginary, by all parties to the compact. Trusting to its 
 future (and often a very few years of experience sufficed) 
 and in its fundamental justices, each party has looked for- 
 ward to the future to remedy the defects and guarantee that 
 party's liberties or rights. We should apply the lesson of 
 our own early national history in this respect. The Consti- 
 tution of the United States did not prevent trouble, it is true ; 
 it did not even prevent a civil conflict ; but it did survive all 
 conflict, and has made a great civil war again impossible. 
 Likewise will the constitution of the League of Nations have 
 to be tested; but its fundamental democracy and justice will 
 prove its salvation. Likewise also, its democratic principles 
 will save its various members from participation in a for- 
 eign conflict unless they see, as in the case of the war just 
 closed, that it is a life and death struggle between right and 
 wrong, — in which case any people would be proud to fight. 
 How very true was this in the case of our own Constitu- 
 tion of 1787, the greatest written governmental document on 
 the face of the earth. So will time and the spirit of fairness 
 and justice to all remedy by amendment all really objection- 
 able features of the constitution of the League of Nations. 
 Certainly today the world as a whole is more democratically 
 minded than were the people of the United States in 1787; 
 and if the people could be trusted then, with the United 
 States' Constitution in their hands, verily the peoples of the 
 world, who have just concluded a mighty war to prove that 
 
198 The Causes Of War 
 
 there is no master above them, can be depended upon to suc- 
 cessfully administer the international relationship of the na- 
 tions in the future. If not, then as well admit that de- 
 mocracy throughout the earth is doomed, and Lincoln's idea 
 but a dream. 
 
 It is not in fine legal and constitutional distinctions that 
 mankind's security in the future is to rest, but in the good- 
 will and fairmindedness of its peoples, one toward another. 
 Let us see to it that no vain quibblings and obstructions of 
 words is put in their way. It is not so much the letter as 
 the spirit of the law, as expressed in the League of Nations 
 that is to guarantee peace in the future. Away with that 
 type of politician and statesman who still thinks the world 
 is so small and isolated that he need not look beyond the 
 boundaries of his own country, and has no vital concern out- 
 side of it ! Such persons helped to make this war possible. 
 Henceforth America's final safety is the safety of the world, 
 and vice versa. 
 
 In 1911 (repeated in an early chapter of this book) the 
 writer made this statement: "One nation, in its philan- 
 thropic enthusiasm, cannot bring peace to the world ; it can- 
 not adopt a policy of peace and say it will have it, whether 
 others will or no." We all realize this now, though so many 
 of us doubted it at that time that we were unprepared for war 
 when it came. Now, if one nation cannot adopt such a 
 policy, then there is only one way under heaven that peace 
 can come, and that is by its joint adoption by the govern- 
 ments representing the overwhelming majority of mankind. 
 What other than this is the League of Nations? The for- 
 mer isolation and peace is forever impossible; the latter, 
 then, must come, else Bernhardi is right; might is right in 
 the political and moral world, as well as in the realm of na- 
 ture, and the War-god rules forever and aye. 
 
 Summing up then, we may say that the governments of the 
 Allied nations, and their peoples, led by the United States 
 and Great Britain, through their program of Arbitration 
 
The League of Nations 199 
 
 treaties and good-will were rapidly preparing the way for an 
 initial hopeful experiment of a League of Nations or "Fed- 
 eration of the World," when the Machiavellian Teutonic gov- 
 ernments launched the world suddenly upon the greatest of 
 all wars. This was because these selfsame Teutonic govern- 
 ments were rapidly drifting in the opposite direction to the 
 Allied or democratic countries, and more and more were con- 
 sidering war as their birthright and the manna of their 
 future existence. 
 
 What, therefore, is our conclusion? Does our champion- 
 ship of the League of Nations contradict our earlier stand to 
 the effect that a League of Nations could not be the final 
 remedy for war? If the reader will examine carefully the 
 author's whole treatment in this work he will find that no- 
 where have we objected to a League of Nations, or hinted 
 that we would not support it ; we have only doubted its abil- 
 ity to "abolish war in the near future." We have said that 
 such a league, if formed at the time we were writing, "could 
 last only for a time," and we believe that probably is still 
 true, even though two momentous years have passed since 
 the above statement was made. Does our (and by "our" I 
 mean a considerable number of men everywhere) recent claim 
 that "it is only the spirit of Christ" in the "hearts and con- 
 sciences of men" that can "save us from our animal instincts 
 and from war," and that peace for weary mankind cannot 
 come until the "beast in nations" is conquered, and until 
 governments must abide by the same principles of conduct 
 and honor as obtain between individuals, — does this all con- 
 flict with our present stand on the League of Nations? I 
 think not. Certainly, the spirit of Christ has advanced far 
 into the council chambers of the great nations of the world 
 within the past two years ; certainly the "beast in nations" 
 is not the ruling power today, the "beasts" being for the 
 most part removed, — interned in neutral countries, or in 
 ignominious hiding (except the Bolsheviki, another type of 
 beast, that is even worse) ; certainly the world on the eve of 
 
200 The Causes Of War 
 
 the adoption of the League is much nearer to the "same 
 principles of conduct and honor as obtain between individ- 
 uals" — since this code forms one of the articles of the League 
 constitution. In looking upon the whole matter of war and 
 peace in the historical, biological, or evolutionary light, such 
 as we have consistently followed in this work, we have come 
 to an intelligent and intelligible interpretation of the present 
 world status. We have been obliged at times to recognize 
 accelerating and reactionary currents, as we pointed out in 
 the beginning. The terrible, the astounding, the wonderful 
 and glorious events of the years 1914-1919 have lent an un- 
 foreseen and tremendous impetus to the onward sweep of 
 democracy and to the idea of a world society as a remedy for 
 war. We have stated more than once in our earlier treat- 
 ment of the War and its issues, that "the coming Peace 
 Conference" possesses momentous and almost unlimited possi- 
 bilities along this line ; but no one could foresee what magni- 
 tude these possibilities should actually assume at the end 
 of hostilities, and what gigantic political changes were im- 
 mediately in store for the world. (We could, we did, 
 prophesy some of them.) The World War has simply has- 
 tened for generations the slow transformation which we were 
 justified in feeling was coming surely, if slowly, in the evolu- 
 tion of the race. 
 
 Moreover, there were those among us who felt already, 
 before the fateful year of 1914, that we had come to the 
 parting of the way, and the old order no longer sufficed. On 
 this point the author made the following statement (found 
 in an earlier chapter of this book) : "War, we have said, 
 assumes the survival of the fittest, the best. But, the best for 
 what? The fittest for what? That is the capital question 
 now. It is not easy for one people to modify the wish, the 
 interests and, still less, the national characteristics of an- 
 other. ' The failure of many efforts as it has helped to bring 
 on this colossal war. (Here I was thinking especially 
 of Germany's attempts to Germanize Alsace-Lorraine and 
 
The League of Nations 201 
 
 Poland, Russia's similar attempts at times, and Austria-Hun- 
 gary's race problems in her polyglot Empire.) Once it 
 could be done by war, and the conqueror after the war ; but 
 in so far as this transformation is possible today, it is not 
 by war and force that it is to be accomplished. Free in- 
 tercourse between nations (another principle of the League 
 of Nations), social and commercial, is perhaps the most 
 powerful pacifying influence. When nations come to mingle 
 with each other more vitally, like individuals they will come 
 to understand and appreciate one another better, and will at 
 last learn to heed that most costly and precious lesson, that 
 peace, and not -war is to be the true and only rational basis 
 of civilized human society." (Chapter 5.) 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 As read by President Wilson before the Peace Conference at 
 Paris, France, February 14, 1919. 
 
 PREAMBLE 
 
 /N order to promote international cooperation and to se- 
 cure international peace and security by the acceptance 
 of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of 
 open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the 
 firm establishment of the understandings of international law 
 as the actual rule of conduct among governments and by the 
 maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all 
 treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with 
 one another, the Powers signatory to this covenant adopt 
 this constitution of the League of Nations: 
 
 ARTICLE I 
 
 The action of the high contracting parties under the terms 
 of this covenant shall be effected through the instrumental- 
 ity of a meeting of a body of delegates representing the high 
 contracting parties, of meetings at more frequent intervals 
 of an executive council and of a permanent international 
 secretariat to be established at the seat of the league. 
 
 ARTICLE II 
 
 Meetings of the body of delegates shall be held at stated in- 
 tervals and from time to time as occasion may require for 
 
 202 
 
The Constitution of the League of Nations 203 
 
 the purpose of dealing with matters within the sphere of 
 action of the league. Meetings of the body of delegates shall 
 be held at the seat of the league or at such other places 
 as may be found convenient, and shall consist of representa- 
 tives of the high contracting parties. Each of the high con- 
 tracting parties shall have one vote, but may have not more 
 than three representatives. 
 
 article in 
 
 The executive council shall consist of representatives of 
 the United States of America, the British Empire, France, 
 Italy and Japan, together with representatives of four other 
 States, members of the league. The selection of these four 
 States shall be made by the body of delegates on such prin- 
 ciples and in such manner as they think fit. Pending the 
 appointment of these representatives of other States repre- 
 sentatives of (blank left for names) shall be members of 
 the executive council. 
 
 Meetings of the council shall be held from time to time 
 as occasion may be required and at least once a year, at 
 whatever place may be decided on, or, failing any such de- 
 cision, at the seat of the league, and any matter within the 
 sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the 
 world may be dealt with at such meetings. 
 
 Invitations shall be sent to any Power to attend a meet- 
 ing of the council at which such matters directly affecting 
 its interests are to be discussed, and no decision taken at any 
 meeting will be binding on such Powers unless so invited. 
 
 ARTICLE IV 
 
 All matters of procedure at meetings of the body of dele- 
 gates or the executive council, including the appointment of 
 committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regu- 
 lated by the body of delegates or the executive council, 
 
204 The Causes Of War 
 
 and may be decided by a majority of the States represented 
 at the meeting. 
 
 The first meeting of the body of delegates and of the 
 executive council shall be summoned by the President of the 
 United States of America. 
 
 article v 
 
 The permanent secretariat of the league shall be estab- 
 lished at , which shall constitute the seat of the 
 
 league. The secretariat shall comprise such secretaries 
 and staff as may be required, under the general direction and 
 control of a scretary-general of the league, who shall be 
 chosen by the executive council ; the secretariat shall be ap- 
 pointed by the secretary-general subject to confirmation by 
 the executive council. 
 
 The secretary-general shall act in that capacity at all 
 meetings of the body of delegates or of the executive coun- 
 cil. 
 
 The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the 
 States members of the league in accordance with the ap- 
 portionment of the expenses of the international bureau of 
 
 the Universal Postal Union. 
 
 i 
 
 ARTICLE VI 
 
 Representatives of the high contracting parties and of- 
 ficials of the league when engaged in the business of the 
 league shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, and 
 the buildings occupied by the league or its officials or by 
 representatives attending its meetings shall enjoy the bene- 
 fits of extraterritoriality. 
 
 ARTICLE VII 
 
 Admission to the league of States not signatories to the 
 covenant and not named in the protocol hereto as States 
 to be invited to adhere to the covenant requires the assent of 
 
The Constitution of the League of Nations 205 
 
 not less than two-thirds of the States represented in the 
 body of delegates, and shall be limited to fully self-govern- 
 ing countries, including dominions and colonies. 
 
 No state shall be admitted to the league unless it is able 
 to give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to ob- 
 serve its international obligations and unless it shall con- 
 form to such principles as may be prescribed by the league 
 in regard to its naval and military forces and armaments. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII 
 
 The high contracting parties recognize the principle that 
 the maintenance of peace will require the reduction of na- 
 tional armaments to the lowest point consistent with national 
 safety and the enforcement by common action of interna- 
 tional obligations, having special regard to the geographical 
 situation and circumstances of each State, and the executive 
 council shall formulate plans for effecting such reduction. 
 
 The executive council shall also determine for the consid- 
 eration and action of the several governments what military 
 equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in propor- 
 tion to the scale of forces laid down in the program of dis- 
 armament, and these limits, when adopted, shall not be ex- 
 ceeded without the permission of the executive council. 
 
 The high contracting parties agree that the manufacture 
 by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war 
 lends itself to grave objections, and direct the executive 
 council to advise how the evil effects attendant upon such 
 manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the 
 necessities of those countries which are not able to manufac- 
 ture for themselves the munitions and implements of war 
 necessary for their safety. 
 
 The high contracting parties undertake in no way to con- 
 ceal from each other the conditions of such of their indus- 
 tries as are capable of being adapted to warlike purposes 
 or the scale of their armaments, and agree that there shall be 
 
206 The Causes Of War 
 
 full and frank interchange of information as to their mili- 
 tary and naval programs. 
 
 article rx 
 
 A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise 
 the league on the execution of the provisions of Article 
 VIII, and on military and naval questions generally. 
 
 article x 
 
 The high contracting parties shall undertake to respect 
 and preserve as against external aggression the territorial 
 integrity and existing political independence of all States 
 members of the league. In case of any such aggression or 
 in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the ex- 
 ecutive council shall advise upon the means by which the 
 obligation shall be fulfilled. 
 
 ARTICLE XI 
 
 Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting 
 any of the high contracting parties or not, is hereby de- 
 clared a matter of concern to the league and the high con- 
 tracting parties reserve the right to take any action that 
 may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of 
 nations. 
 
 It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly 
 right of each of the high contracting parties to draw the at- 
 tention of the body of delegates or of the executive council 
 to any circumstance affecting international intercourse which 
 threatens to disturb international peace or the good under- 
 standing between nations upon which peace depends. 
 
 ARTICLE XII 
 
 The high contracting parties agree that should disputes 
 arise between them which cannot be adjusted by the ordinary 
 
The Constitution of the League of Nations £07 
 
 processes of diplomacy they will in no case resort to war 
 without previously submitting the questions and matters in- 
 volved either to arbitration or to inquiry by the executive 
 council and until three months after the award by the ar- 
 bitrators, or a recommendation by the executive council, 
 and that they will not even then resort to war as against a 
 member of the league which complies with the award of 
 the arbitrators or the recommendation of the executive 
 council. 
 
 In any case under this article the award of the arbitra- 
 tors shall be made within a reasonable time, and the recom- 
 mendation of the executive council shall be made within six 
 months after the submission of the dispute. 
 
 ARTICLE XIII 
 
 The high contracting parties agree that whenever any 
 dispute or difficulty shall arise between them which they 
 recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and 
 which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy they 
 will submit the whole matter to arbitration. For this pur- 
 pose the Court of Arbitration to which the case is referred 
 shall be the Court agreed on by the parties or stipulated in 
 any convention existing between them. The high contracting 
 parties agree that they will carry out in full good faith 
 any award that may be rendered. In the event of any fail- 
 ure to carry out the award the executive council shall pro- 
 pose what steps can best be taken to give effect thereto. 
 
 ARTICLE XIV 
 
 The executive council shall formulate plans for the es- 
 tablishment of a permanent court of international justice 
 and this court shall, when established, be competent to hear 
 and determine any matter which the parties recognize as 
 suitable for submission to it for arbitration under the fore- 
 going article. 
 
208 The Causes Of War 
 
 ARTICLE XV 
 
 If there should arise between States' members of the 
 league, any dispute likely to lead to rupture, which is not 
 submitted to arbitration as above, the high contracting 
 parties agree that they will refer the matter to the executive 
 council; either party to the dispute may give notice of the 
 existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will 
 make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and 
 consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties agee to 
 communicate to the Secretary-General as promptly as pos- 
 sible statements of their case with all the relevant facts and 
 papers, and the executive council may forthwith direct the 
 publication thereof. Where the efforts of the council lead 
 to the settlement of the dispute a statement shall be pub- 
 lished indicating the nature of the dispute and that of set- 
 tlement, together with such explanations as may be appro- 
 priate. 
 
 If the dispute has not been settled a report by the coun- 
 cil shall be published, setting forth with all necessary facts 
 and explanations the recommendations which the council 
 thinks just and proper for the settlement of the dispute. If 
 the report is unanimously agreed to by the members of the 
 council other than the parties to the dispute the high con- 
 tracting parties agree that they will not go to war with any 
 party which complies with the recommendations and that, if 
 any party shall refuse so to comply, the council shall pro- 
 pose measures necessary to give effect to the recommenda- 
 tions. 
 
 If no such unanimous report can be made it shall be the 
 duty of the majority and the privilege of the minority to 
 issue statements indicating what they believe to be the 
 facts and containing the reasons which they consider to be 
 just and proper. 
 
 The executive council may in any case under this article 
 
The Constitution of the League of Nations £09 
 
 refer the dispute to the body of delegates. The dispute 
 shall be so referred at the request of either party to the 
 dispute, provided that such request must be made within 
 fourteen days after the submission of the dispute. In a 
 case referred to the body of delegates all the provisions of 
 this article and of Article XII, relating to the action and 
 powers of the executive council shall apply to the action 
 and powers of the body of delegates. 
 
 ARTICLE XVI 
 
 Should any of the high contracting parties break or dis- 
 regard its covenants under Article XII, it shall thereby ipso 
 facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against 
 all the other members of the league, which hereby undertakes 
 immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or 
 financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between 
 their nations and the nationals of the covenant breaking 
 State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or per- 
 sonal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant 
 breaking State, and the nationals of any other State, whether 
 a member of the league or not. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the executive council in such case 
 to recommend what effective military or naval force the 
 members of the league shall severally contribute to the armed 
 forces to be used to protect the covenants of the league. 
 
 The high contracting parties agree further that they 
 will mutually support one another in the financial and eco- 
 nomic measures which may be taken under this article in 
 order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from 
 the above measures and that they will mutually support one 
 another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of 
 their number by the covenant breaking State, and that they 
 will afford passage through their territory to the forces 
 of any of the high contracting parties who are cooperating 
 to protect the covenants of the league. 
 
210 The Causes Of War 
 
 ARTICLE XVH 
 
 In the event of disputes between one State member of the 
 league and another State which is not a member of the 
 league, or between States not members of the league, the 
 high contracting parties agree that the State or States not 
 members of the league shall be invited to accept the obliga- 
 tions of membership in the league for the purposes of such 
 dispute upon such conditions as the executive council may 
 deem just, and upon acceptance of any such invitation the 
 above provisions shall be applied with such modifications as 
 may be deemed necessary by the league. 
 
 Upon such invitation being given the executive council 
 shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances 
 and merits of the dispute and recommend such action as may 
 seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. 
 
 In the event of a Power so invited refusing to accept the 
 obligations of membership in the league for the purposes 
 of the league which in the case of a State member of the 
 league would constitute a breach of Article XII, the pro- 
 visions of Article XVI, shall be applicable as against the 
 state taking such action. 
 
 If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to 
 accept the obligations of membership in the league for the 
 purpose of such dispute the executive council may take such 
 action and make such recommendations as will prevent hos- 
 tilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute. 
 
 ARTICLE XVHI 
 
 The high contracting parties agree that the league shall 
 be intrusted with general supervision of the trade in arms 
 and ammunition with the countries in which the control of 
 this traffic is necessary in the common interest. 
 
The Constitution of the League of Nations 211 
 
 AETICLE XIX 
 
 To those colonies and territories which as a consequence 
 of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of 
 the States which formerly governed them and which are in- 
 habited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves un- 
 der the strenuous conditions of the modern world there 
 should be applied the principle that the well being and 
 development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civili- 
 zation, and that securities for the performance of this trust 
 should be embodied in the constitution of the league. 
 
 The best method of giving practical effect to this prin- 
 ciple is that the tutelage of such peoples should be intrusted 
 to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their 
 experience or their geographical position can best undertake 
 this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised 
 by them as mandatories on behalf of the league. 
 
 The character of the mandate must differ according to 
 the stage of the development of the people, the geographical 
 situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other 
 similar circumstances. 
 
 Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish 
 Empire have reached the stage of development where their 
 existence as independent nations can be provisionally recog- 
 nized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and 
 assistance by a mandatory Power until such time as they are 
 able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must 
 be a principal consideration in the selection of the manda- 
 tory Power. 
 
 Other peoples, especially those of central Africa, are at 
 such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the 
 administration of the territory subject to conditions which 
 will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only 
 to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibi- 
 tion of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and 
 
21 % The Causes Of War 
 
 the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of 
 fortifications or military and naval bases and of military 
 training of the natives for other than police purposes and 
 the defence of territory, and will also secure equal oppor- 
 tunities for the trade and commerce of other members of 
 the league. 
 
 There are territories such as southwest Africa and cer- 
 tain of the South Pacific isles which, owing to the sparse- 
 ness of their populations or their small size or their remote- 
 ness from the centers of civilization or their geographical 
 contiguity to the mandatory State, and other circumstances, 
 can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory 
 State as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards 
 above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous popula- 
 tion. 
 
 In every case of mandate the mandatory State shall ren- 
 der to the league an annual report in reference to the terri- 
 tory committed to its charge. 
 
 The degree of authority, control or administration to be 
 exercised by the mandatory State shall, if not previously 
 agreed upon by the high contracting parties in each case, 
 be explicitly defined by the executive council in a special 
 act or charter. 
 
 The high contracting parties further agree to establish 
 at the seat of the league a mandatory commission to receive 
 and examine the annual reports of the mandatory powers, 
 and to assist the league in insuring the observance of the 
 terms of all mandates. 
 
 ARTICLE xx 
 
 The high contracting parties will endeavor to secure and 
 maintain fair and human conditions of labor for men, women 
 and children both in their own countries and in all countries 
 to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, 
 
The Constitution of the League of Nations 213 
 
 and to that end agree to establish as part of the organiza- 
 tion of the league a permanent bureau of labor, 
 
 ARTICLE XXI 
 
 The high contracting parties agree that provision shall 
 be made through the instrumentality of the league to se- 
 cure and maintain freedom of transit and equitable treat- 
 ment for the commerce of all States members of the league, 
 having in mind, among other things, special arrangements 
 with regard to the necessities of the regions devastated dur- 
 ing the war of 1914-1918. 
 
 ARTICLE XXn 
 
 The high contracting parties agree to place under the 
 control of the league all international bureaus already es- 
 tablished by general treaties if the parties to such treaties 
 consent. Furthermore they agree that all such international 
 bureaus to be constituted in future shall be placed under 
 control of the league. 
 
 article xxni 
 
 The high contracting parties agree that every treaty or 
 international engagement entered into hereafter by any 
 State, member of the league, shall be forthwith registered 
 with the secretary-general and as soon as possible published 
 by him, and that no such treaty or international engage- 
 ment shall be binding until so registered. 
 
 ARTICLE XXIV 
 
 It shall be the right of the body of delegates from time 
 to time to advise the reconsideration by States, members 
 of the league, of treaties which have become inapplicable, 
 
214 The Causes Of War 
 
 and of international conditions, of which the continuance 
 may endanger the peace of the world. 
 
 ARTICLE XXV 
 
 The high contracting parties severally agree that the 
 present covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations 
 inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and 
 solemnly engage that they will not hereafter enter into any 
 engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case 
 any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted 
 to the league shall, before becoming a party to this covenant, 
 have undertaken any obligations which are inconsistent with 
 the terms of this covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power 
 to take immediate steps to procure its release from such 
 obligations. 
 
 ARTICLE XXVI 
 
 Amendments to this covenant will take effect when rati- 
 fied by the States whose representatives compose the execu- 
 tive council and by three-fourths of the States whose repre- 
 sentatives compose the body of delegates. 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 president wilson's address at paris 
 
 On February 14, 1919, Before the Peace Conference, at the Reading 
 of the Constitution of the League of Nations 
 
 MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor, and assume it a 
 very great privilege, of reporting in the name of the 
 commission constituted by this conference on the formulation 
 of a plan for the League of Nations. I am happy to say 
 that it is a unanimous report, a unanimous report from the 
 representatives ,of fourteen nations — the United States, 
 Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Brazil, China, 
 Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, and 
 Serbia. 
 
 "I think it will be serviceable and interesting if I, with 
 your permission, read the document, as the only report we 
 have to make." 
 
 After having read the entire document, President Wilson 
 continued as follows : 
 
 "It gives me pleasure to add to this formal reading of 
 the result of our labors that the character of the discussion 
 which occurred at the sittings of the commission was not only 
 of the most constructive but of the most encouraging sort. 
 It was obvious throughout our discussions that, although 
 there were subjects upon which there were individual differ- 
 ences of judgment with regard to the method by which our 
 objects should be obtained, there was practically at no 
 point any serious differences of opinion or motive as to the 
 objects which we were seeking. 
 
 "Indeed, while these debates were not made the oppor- 
 tunity for the expression of enthusiasm and sentiment, I 
 
 215 
 
216 The Causes Of War 
 
 think the other members of the commission will agree with 
 me that there was an undertone of high respect and of en- 
 thusiasm for the thing we were trying to do, which was 
 heartening throughout every meeting, because we felt that in 
 a way this conference did intrust unto us the expression of 
 one of its highest and most important purposes, to see to 
 it that the concord of the world in the future with regard to 
 the objects of justice should not be subject to doubt or 
 uncertainty, that the co-operation of the great body of na- 
 tions should be assured in the maintenance of peace upon 
 terms of honor and of international obligations. 
 
 "The compulsion of that task was constantly upon us, 
 and at no point was there shown the slightest desire to do 
 anything but suggest the best means to accomplish that 
 great object. There is very great significance, therefore, 
 in the fact that the result was reached unanimously. 
 
 "Fourteen nations were represented, among them all of 
 those powers which for convenience we have called the great 
 powers, and among the rest a representation of the greatest 
 variety of circumstances and interests. So that I think we 
 are justified in saying that the significance of the result, 
 therefore, has the deepest of all meanings, the union of 
 wills in a common purpose, a union of wills which cannot 
 be resisted, and which, I dare say, no nation will run the 
 risk of attempting to resist. 
 
 "Now as to the character of the document. While it has 
 consumed some time to read this document, I think you will 
 see at once that it is very simple, and in nothing so simple 
 as in the structure which it suggests for a League of Nations 
 — a body of delegates, an Executive Council, and a perma- 
 nent secretariat. 
 
 "When it came to the question of determining the charac- 
 ter of the representation in the body of delegates, we were 
 all aware of a feeling which is current throughout the world. 
 Inasmuch as I am stating it in the presence of the official 
 representatives of the various Governments here present, in- 
 
Appendix I 217 
 
 eluding myself, I may say that there is a universal feeling 
 that the world cannot rest satisfied with merely official gui- 
 dance. There has reached us through many channels the 
 feeling that if the deliberating body of the League of Na- 
 tions was merely to be a body of officials representing the 
 various Governments, the peoples of the world would not be 
 sure that some of the mistakes which preoccupied officials 
 had admittedly made might not be repeated. 
 
 "It was impossible to conceive a method or an assembly 
 so large and various as to be really representative of the 
 great body of the peoples of the world, because as I roughly 
 reckon it, we represent, as we sit around this table, more 
 than twelve hundred million people. You cannot have a rep- 
 resentative assembly of twelve hundred million people, but 
 if you leave it to each Government to have, if it pleases, one 
 or two or three representatives, though only with a single 
 vote, it may vary its representation from time to time, not 
 only, but it may [originate] the choice of its several rep- 
 resentatives. [Wireless here unintelligible.] 
 
 "Therefore, we thought that this was a proper and a 
 very prudent concession to the practically universal opinion 
 of plain men everywhere that they wanted the door left open 
 to a variety of representation, instead of being confined to a 
 single official body with which they could or might not find 
 themselves in sympathy. 
 
 "And you will notice that this body has unlimited rights 
 of discussion — I mean of discussion of anything that falls 
 within the field of international relations — and that it is 
 especially agreed that war or international misunderstand- 
 ings, or anything that may lead to friction or trouble, is 
 everybody's business, because it may affect the peace of the 
 world. 
 
 "And in order to safeguard the popular power so far as 
 we could of this representative body, it is provided, you will 
 notice, that when a subject is submitted, it is not to arbitra- 
 tion, but to discussion by the Executive Council. It can, 
 
218 The Causes Of War 
 
 upon the initiative of either of the parties to the dispute, be 
 drawn out of the Executive Council into the larger forum 
 of the general body of delegates, because through this in- 
 strument we are depending primarily and chiefly upon one 
 great force, and this is the moral force of the public opinion 
 of the world — the pleasing and clarifying and compelling 
 influences of publicity, so that intrigues can no longer have 
 their coverts, so that designs that are sinister can at any 
 time be drawn into the open, so that those things that are 
 destroyed by the light may be promptly destroyed by the 
 overwhelming light of the universal expression of the con- 
 demnation of the world. 
 
 "Armed force is in the background in this program, but it 
 is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will 
 not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that 
 is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of 
 peace, not as a league of war. 
 
 "The simplicity of the document seems to me to be one 
 of its chief virtues, because, speaking for myself, I was un- 
 able to see the variety of circumstances with which this 
 League would have to deal. I was unable, therefore, to plan 
 all the machinery that might be necessary to meet the differ- 
 ing and unexpected contingencies. Therefore, I should say 
 of this document that it is not a strait jacket, but a vehicle 
 of life. 
 
 "A living thing is born, and we must see to it what clothes 
 we put on it. It is not a vehicle of power, but a vehicle in 
 which power may be varied at the discretion of those who 
 exercise it and in accordance with the changing circum- 
 stances of the time. And yet, while it is elastic, while it is 
 general in its terms, it is definite in the one thing that we 
 were called upon to make definite. It is a definite guarantee 
 of peace. It is a definite guarantee by word against ag- 
 gression. It is a definite guarantee against the things which 
 have just come near bringing the whole structure of civiliza- 
 tion into ruin. 
 
Appendix I . 819 
 
 "Its purposes do not for a moment lie vague. Its pur- 
 poses are declared, and its powers are unmistakable. It is 
 not in contemplation that this should be merely a league to 
 secure the peace of the world. It is a league which can be 
 used for co-operation in any international matter. That 
 is the significance of the provision introduced concerning 
 labor. There are many ameliorations of labor conditions 
 which can be effected by conference and discussion. I antici- 
 pate that there will be a very great usefulness in the Bureau 
 of Labor which it is contemplated shall be set up by the 
 League. Men and women and children who work have been 
 in the background through long ages, and sometimes seemed 
 to be forgotten, while Governments have had their watchful 
 and suspicious eyes upon the manoeuvres of one another, 
 while the thought of statesmen has been about structural 
 action and the larger transactions of commerce and finance. 
 
 "Now, if I may believe the picture which I see, there 
 comes into the foreground the great body of the laboring 
 people of the world, the men and women and children upon 
 whom the great burden of sustaining the world must from 
 day to day fall, whether we wish it to do so or not, people 
 who go to bed tired and wake up without the stimulation of 
 lively hope. These people will be drawn into the field of 
 international consultation and help, and will be among the 
 wards of the combined Governments of the world. There is, 
 I take leave to say, a very great step in advance in the mere 
 conception of that. 
 
 "Then, as you will notice, there is an imperative article 
 concerning the publicity of all international agreements. 
 Henceforth no member of the League can claim any agree- 
 ment valid which it has not registered with the Secretary- 
 General, in whose office, of course, it will be subject to the 
 examination of anybody representing a member of the 
 League. And the duty is laid upon the Secretary-General 
 to publish every document of that sort at the earliest pos- 
 sible time. 
 
220 The Causes Of War 
 
 "I suppose most persons who have not been conversant 
 with the business of foreign affairs do not realize how many 
 hundreds of these agreements are made in a single year, and 
 how difficult it might be to publish the more unimportant of 
 them immediately, how uninteresting it would be to most of 
 the world to publish them immediately, but even they must 
 be published just as soon as it is possible for the Secretary- 
 General to publish them. 
 
 "Then there is a feature about this covenant which, to 
 my mind, is one of the greatest and most satisfactory ad- 
 vances that has been made. We are done with annexations 
 of helpless peoples, meant in some instances by some powers 
 to be used merely for exploitation. We recognize in the most 
 solemn manner that the helpless and undeveloped peoples of 
 the world, being in that condition, put an obligation upon 
 us to look after their interests primarily before we use 
 them for our interests, and that in all cases of this sort 
 hereafter it shall be the duty of the League to see that the 
 nations who are assigned as the tutors and advisers and 
 directors of these peoples shall look to their interests and 
 their development before they look to the interests and 
 desires of the mandatory nation itself. 
 
 "There has been no greater advance than this, gentlemen. 
 If you look back upon the history of the world you will see 
 how helpless peoples have too often been a prey to powers 
 that had no conscience in the matter. It has been one of 
 the many distressing revelations of recent years that the 
 great power which has just been, happily, defeated, put in- 
 tolerable burdens and injustices upon the helpless people 
 of some of the colonies which it annexed to itself, that its 
 interest was rather their extermination than their develop- 
 ment, that the desire was to possess their land for Euro- 
 pean purposes and not to enjoy their confidence in order that 
 mankind might be lifted in these places to the next higher 
 level. 
 
 "Now, the world, expressing its conscience in law, says 
 
Appendix I £21 
 
 there is an end of that, that our consciences shall be settled 
 to this thing. States will be picked out which have already 
 shown that they can exercise a conscience in this matter, 
 and under their tutelage the helpless peoples of the world 
 will come into a new light and into a new hope. 
 
 "So I think I can say of this document that it is at one 
 and the same time a practical document and a human docu- 
 ment. There is a pulse of sympathy in it. There is a com- 
 pulsion of conscience throughout it. It is practical, and 
 yet it is intended to purify, to rectify, to elevate. And I 
 want to say that so far as my observation instructs me, this 
 is in one sense a belated document. I believe that the con- 
 science of the world has long been prepared to express itself 
 in some such way. We are not just now discovering our 
 sympathy for these people and our interest in them. We are 
 simply expressing it, for it has long been felt, and in the 
 administration of the affairs of more than one of the great 
 States represented here — so far as I know, all of the great 
 States that are represented here — that humane impulse has 
 already expressed itself in their dealings with their colonies, 
 whose peoples were yet at a low stage of civilization. 
 
 "We have had many instances of colonies lifted into the 
 sphere of complete self-government. This is not the dis- 
 covery of a principle. It is the universal application of a 
 principle. It is the agreement of the great nations which 
 have tried to live by these standards in their separate ad- 
 ministrations to unite in seeing that their common force and 
 their common thought and intelligence are lent to this great 
 and humane enterprise. I think it is an occasion, therefore, 
 for the most profound satisfaction that this humane decis- 
 ion should have been reached in a matter for which the world 
 has long been waiting and until a very recent period thought 
 that it was still too early to hope. 
 
 "Many terrible things have come out of this war, gentle- 
 men, but some very beautiful things have come out of it. 
 Wrong has been defeated, but the rest of the world has been 
 
%9£ The Causes Of War 
 
 more conscious than it ever was before of the majority of 
 right. People that were suspicious of one another can now 
 live as friends and comrades in a single family, and desire 
 to do so. The miasma of distrust, of intrigue, is cleared 
 away. Men are looking eye to eye and saying, 'We are 
 brothers and have a common purpose. We did not realize 
 it before, but now we do realize it, and this is our covenant 
 of friendship.' " 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
 president wilson's address at boston 
 
 On February 24, 1919, on the Subject of the Constitution of the 
 
 League of Nations 
 
 GOVERNOR COOLIDGE, Mr. Mayor, Fellow Citizens: 
 I wonder if you are half as glad to see me as I am to see 
 you. It warms my heart to see a great body of my fellow cit- 
 izens again, because in some respect during the recent months 
 I have been very lonely indeed without your comradeship and 
 counsel, and I tried at every step of the work which fell to 
 me to recall what I was sure would be your counsel with re- 
 gard to the great matters which were under consideration. 
 
 I do not want you to think that I have not been apprecia- 
 tive of the extraordinarily generous reception which was 
 given to me on the other side. In saying that it makes me 
 very happy to get home again I do not mean to say that 
 I was not very deeply touched by the cries that came from 
 the great crowds on the other side. But I want to say to 
 you in all honesty that I felt them to be a call of greeting 
 to you rather than to me. 
 
 I did not feel that the greeting was personal. I had in 
 my heart the overcrowning pride of being your representa- 
 tive and of receiving the plaudits of men everywhere who 
 felt that your hearts beat with theirs in the cause of liberty. 
 There was no mistaking the tone in the voices of those 
 great crowds. It was not a tone of mere greeting; it was 
 not a tone of mere generous welcome; it was the calling of 
 comrade to comrade, the cries that come from men who 
 say, "We have waited for this day when the friends of liberty 
 should come across the sea and shake hands with us, to see 
 
 223 
 
224? The Causes Of War 
 
 that a new world was constructed upon a new basis and 
 foundation of justice and right." 
 
 I can't tell you the inspiration that came from the senti- 
 ments that came out of those simple voices of the crowd, 
 and the proudest thing I have to report to you is that this 
 great country of ours is trusted throughout the world. 
 
 I have not come to report the proceedings or the results 
 of the proceedings of the Peace Conference; that would be 
 premature. I can say that I have received very happy im- 
 pressions from this conference; the impression that while 
 there are many differences of judgment, while there are some 
 divergencies of object, there is nevertheless a common spirit 
 and a common realization of the necessity of setting up new 
 standards of right in the world. 
 
 Because the men who are in conference in Paris realize as 
 keenly as any American can realize that they are not the 
 masters of their people ; that they are the servants of their 
 people and that the spirit of their people has awakened to 
 a new purpose and a new conception of their power to realize 
 that purpose, and that no man dare go home from that con- 
 ference and report anything less noble than was expected 
 of it. 
 
 The conference seems to you to go slowly; from day to 
 day in Paris it seems to go slowly; but I wonder if you 
 realize the complexity of the task which it has undertaken. 
 It seems as if the settlements of this war affect, and affect 
 directly, every great, and I sometimes think every small, 
 nation in the world, and no one decision can prudently be 
 made which is not properly linked in with the great series of 
 other decisions which must accompany it, and it must be 
 reckoned in with the final result if the real quality and char- 
 acter of that result is to be properly judged. 
 
 What we are doing is to hear the whole case ; hear it from 
 the mouths of the men most interested; hear it from those 
 who are officially commissioned to state it; hear the rival 
 claims ; hear the claims that affect new nationalities, that 
 
Appendix II 225 
 
 affect new areas of the world, that affect new commercial 
 and economic connections that have been established by the 
 great world war through which we have gone. And I have 
 been struck by the moderateness of those who have repre- 
 sented national claims. 
 
 I can testify that I have nowhere seen the gleam of pas- 
 sion. I have seen earnestness, I have seen tears come to 
 the eyes of men who plead for downtrodden people whom 
 they were privileged to speak for; but they were not the 
 tears of anguish, they were the tears of ardent hope. 
 
 And I don't see how any man can fail to have been sub- 
 dued by these pleas, subdued to this feeling, that he was not 
 there to assert an individual judgment of his own but to 
 try to assist the case of humanity. 
 
 And in the midst of it all every interest seeks out first of 
 all, when it reaches Paris, the representatives of the United 
 States. Why? Because, and I think I am stating the most 
 wonderful fact in history — because there is no nation in 
 Europe that suspects the motives of the United States. 
 
 Was there ever so wonderful a thing seen before? Was 
 there ever so moving a thing? Was there ever any fact 
 that so bound the nation that had won that esteem forever 
 to deserve it? 
 
 I would not have you understand that the great men who 
 represent the other nations there in conference are dises- 
 teemed by those who know them. Quite the contrary. But 
 you understand that the nations of Europe have again and 
 again clashed with one another in competitive interest. It 
 is impossible for men to forget those sharp issues that were 
 drawn between them in times past. 
 
 It is impossible for men to believe that all ambitions have 
 all of a sudden been foregone. They remember territory that 
 was coveted; they remember rights that it was attempted to 
 extort; they remember political ambitions which it was at- 
 tempted to realize, and, while they believe that men have 
 come into a different temper they cannot forget these things, 
 
226 The Causes Of War 
 
 and so they do not resort to one another for a dispassion- 
 ate view of the matters in controversy. They resort to that 
 nation which has won the enviable distinction of being re- 
 garded as the friend of mankind. 
 
 Whenever it is desired to send a small force of soldiers 
 to occupy a piece of territory where it is thought nobody 
 else will be welcome they ask for American soldiers, and 
 where other soldiers would be looked upon with suspicion and 
 perhaps met with resistance the American soldier is welcomed 
 with acclaim. 
 
 I have had so many grounds for pride on the other side 
 of the water that I am very thankful that they are not 
 grounds for personal pride, but for national pride. If they 
 were grounds for personal pride I'd be the most stuck up 
 man in the world, and it has been an infinite pleasure to me 
 to see those gallant soldiers of ours, of whom. the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States made me the proud commander. 
 
 You may be proud of the Twenty-sixth Division, but I 
 commanded the Twenty-sixth Division, and see what they 
 did under my direction, and everybody praises the American 
 soldier with the feeling that in praising him he is subtract- 
 ing from the credit of no one else. 
 
 I have been searching for the fundamental fact that con- 
 verted Europe to believe in us. Before this war Europe did 
 not believe in us as she does now. She did not believe in us 
 throughout the first three years of the war. She seems 
 really to have believed that we were holding off because we 
 thought we could make more by staying out than by going 
 in. And all of a sudden, in a short eighteen months, the 
 whole verdict is reversed. 
 
 There can be but one explanation for it. They saw what 
 we did — that without making a single claim we put all our 
 men and all our means at the disposal of those who were 
 fighting for their homes, in the first instance, but for a cause, 
 the cause of human rights and justice, and that we went in 
 not to support their national claims but to support the 
 great cause which they held in common. 
 
Appendix II 227 
 
 And when they saw that America not only held ideals 
 but acted ideals they were converted to America and became 
 firm partisans of those ideals. 
 
 I met a group of scholars when I was in Paris — some 
 gentlemen from one of the Greek universities who had come 
 to see me, and in whose presence, or rather in the presence 
 of whose traditions of learning, I felt very young indeed. I 
 told them that I had one of the delightful revenges that 
 sometimes come to a man. All my life I had heard men 
 speak with a sort of condescension of ideals and of idealists, 
 and particularly those separated, encloistered persons whom 
 they choose to term academic, who were in the habit of utter- 
 ing ideals in the free atmosphere when they clash with nobody 
 in particular. 
 
 And I said I have had this sweet revenge. Speaking 
 with perfect frankness in the name of the people of the 
 United States I have uttered as the objects of this great war 
 ideals, and nothing but ideals, and the war has been won by 
 that inspiration. Men were fighting with tense muscle and 
 lowered head until they came to realize those things, feeling 
 they were fighting for their lives and their country, and 
 when these accents of what it was all about reached them 
 from America they lifted their heads, they raised their eyes 
 to heaven, when they saw men in khaki coming across the 
 sea in the spirit of crusaders, and they found that these were 
 strange men, reckless of danger not only, but reckless because 
 they seemed to see something that made that danger worth 
 while. 
 
 Men have testified to me in Europe that our men were 
 possessed by something that they could only call a religious 
 fervor. They were not like any of the other soldiers. They 
 had a vision, they had a dream, and they were fighting in the 
 dream, and fighting in the dream they turned the whole tide 
 of battle and it never came back. 
 
 One of our American humorists, meeting the criticism that 
 American soldiers were not trained long enough, said : "It 
 takes only half as long to train an American soldier as any 
 
228 The Causes Of War 
 
 other, because you only have to train him one way and he 
 did only go one way, and he never came back until he could 
 do it when he pleased." 
 
 And now do you realize that this confidence we have es- 
 tablished throughout the world imposes a burden upon us — 
 if you choose to call it a burden. It is one of those burdens 
 which any nation ought to be proud to carry. Any man who 
 resists the present tides that run in the world will find him- 
 self thrown upon a shore so high and barren that it will 
 seem as if he had been separated from his human kind for- 
 ever. 
 
 The Europe that I left the other day was full of something 
 that it had never felt fill its heart so full before. It was 
 full of hope. The Europe of the second year of the war, 
 the Europe of the third year of the war was sinking to a 
 sort of stubborn desperation. They did not see any great 
 thing to be achieved even when the war should be won. They 
 hoped there would be some salvage; they hoped that they 
 could clear their territories of invading armies ; they hoped 
 they could set up their homes and start their industries 
 afresh, but they thought it would simply be the resumption 
 of the old life that Europe had led — led in fear, led in anx- 
 iety, led in constant suspicious watchfulness. They never 
 dreamed that it would be a Europe of settled peace and of 
 justified hope. 
 
 And now these ideals have wrought this new magic, that 
 all the peoples of Europe are buoyed up and confident in 
 the spirit of hope, because they believe that we are at the 
 eve of a new age in the world when nations will understand 
 one another, when nations will support one another in every 
 just cause, when nations will unite every moral and every 
 political strength to see that the right shall prevail. 
 
 If America were at this juncture to fail the world, what 
 would come of it? I do not mean any disrespect to any 
 other great people when I say that America is the hope of 
 the world; and if she does not justify that hope the results 
 
Appendix II 229 
 
 are unthinkable. Men will be thrown back upon the bitter- 
 ness of disappointment not only but the bitterness of de- 
 spair. 
 
 All nations will be set up as hostile camps again ; the men 
 at the peace conference will go home with their heads upon 
 their breasts, knowing that they have failed — for they were 
 bidden not to come home from there until they did something 
 more than sign a treaty of peace. 
 
 Suppose we sign the treaty of peace and that it is the most 
 satisfactory treaty of peace that the confusing elements of 
 the modern world will afford and go home and think about 
 our labors, we will know that we have left written upon the 
 historic table at Versailles, upon which Vergennes and Ben- 
 jamin Franklin wrote their names, nothing but a modern 
 scrap of paper; no nations united to defend it, no great 
 forces combined to make it good, no assurance given to the 
 downtrodden and fearful people of the world that they shall 
 be safe. Any man who thinks that America will take part 
 in giving the world any such rebuff and disappointment as 
 that does not know America. 
 
 I invite him to test the sentiments of the nation. We set 
 this up to make men free and we did not confine our concep- 
 tion and purpose to America, and now we will make men 
 free. If we did not do that the fame of America would be 
 gone and all her powers would be dissipated. She then would 
 have to keep her power for those narrow, selfish, provincial 
 purposes which seem so dear to some minds that have no 
 sweep beyond the nearest horizon. 
 
 I should welcome no sweeter challenge than that. I have 
 fighting blood in me, and it is sometimes a delight to let it 
 have scope, but if it is a challenge on this occasion it will 
 be an indulgence. Think of the picture, think of the utter 
 blackness that would fall on the world. America has failed! 
 America made a little essay at generosity and then withdrew* 
 America said: "We are your friends," but it was only for 
 today, not for tomorrow. America said: "Here is our 
 
230 The Causes Of War 
 
 power to vindicate right," and then the next day said : "Let 
 right take care of itself and we will take care of ourselves." 
 America said: "We set up a fight to lead men along the 
 paths of liberty, but we have lowered it ; it is intended only 
 to light our own path." We set up a great ideal of liberty 
 and then we said: "Liberty is a thing that you must win 
 for yourself. Do not call upon us," and think of the world 
 that we would leave. Do you realize how many new nations 
 are going to be set up in the presence of old and powerful 
 nations in Europe and left there, if left by us, without a dis- 
 interested friend? 
 
 Do you believe in the Polish cause, as I do? Are you 
 going to set up Poland, immature, inexperienced, as yet un- 
 organized, and leave her with a circle of armies around her ? 
 Do you believe in the aspiration of the Czecho-Slovaks and 
 the Jugo-Slavs as I do? Do you know how many Powers 
 would be quick to pounce upon them if there were not the 
 guarantees of the world behind their liberty? 
 
 Have you thought of the sufferings of Armenia? You 
 poured out your money to help succor the Armenians after 
 they suffered ; now set your strength so that they shall never 
 suffer again. 
 
 The arrangements of the present peace cannot stand a 
 generation unless they are guaranteed by the united forces 
 of the civilized world. And if we do not guarantee them 
 cannot you not see the picture ? Your hearts have instructed 
 you where the burden of this war fell. It did not fall upon 
 the national treasuries, it did not fall upon the instruments 
 of administration, it did not fall upon the resources of the 
 nation. It fell upon the victims' homes everywhere, where 
 women were toiling in hope that their men would come back. 
 
 When I think of the homes upon which dull despair would 
 settle were this great hope disappointed, I should wish for 
 my part never to have had America play any part whatever 
 in this attempt to emancipate the world. But I talk as if 
 there were any question. I have no more doubt of the ver- 
 
Appendix II 231 
 
 diet of America in this matter than I have doubt of the 
 blood that is in me. 
 
 And so, my fellow citizens, I have come back to report 
 progress, and I do not believe that the progress is going to 
 stop short of the goal. The nations of the world have set 
 their heads now to do a great thing, and they are not going 
 to slacken their purpose. And when I speak of the nations 
 of the world I do not speak of the governments of the world. 
 I speak of the peoples who constitute the nations of the 
 world. They are in the saddle, and they are going to see 
 to it that if their present governments do not do their will 
 some other governments shall, and the secret is out and the 
 present governments know it. 
 
 There is a great deal of harmony to be got out of com- 
 mon knowledge. There is a great deal of sympathy to be 
 got of living in the same atmosphere and except for the 
 differences of languages, which puzzled my American ear 
 very sadly, I could have believed I was at home in France or 
 in Italy or in England when I was on the streets, when I was 
 in the presence of the crowds, when I was in great halls 
 where men were gathered together irrespective of class. 
 
 I did not feel quite as much at home there as I do here, 
 but I felt that now, at any rate, after this storm of war had 
 cleared the air, men were seeing eye to eye everywhere and 
 that these were the kind of folks who would understand what 
 the kind of folks at home would understand and that they 
 were thinking the same things. 
 
 I feel about you as I am reminded of a story of that ex- 
 cellent witness and good artist, Oliver Herford, who one day, 
 sitting at luncheon at his club was slapped vigorously on the 
 back by a man whom he did not know very well. He said: 
 "Oliver, old boy, how are you?" He looked at him rather 
 coldly. He said, "I don't know your name, I don't know 
 your face, but your manners are very familiar." And I must 
 say that your manners are very familiar, and let me add, 
 very delightful. 
 
%%% The Causes Of War 
 
 It is a great comfort for one thing to realize that you all 
 understand the language I am speaking. A friend of mine 
 said that to talk through an interpreter was like witnessing 
 the compound fracture of an idea. But the beauty of it is 
 that, whatever the impediments of the channel of communi- 
 cation the idea is the same, that it gets registered, and it 
 gets registered in responsive hearts and receptive purposes. 
 
 I have come back for a strenuous attempt to transact 
 business for a little while in America but I have really come 
 back to say to you, in all soberness and honesty, that I have 
 been trying my best to speak your thoughts. 
 
 When I sample myself I think I find that I am a typical 
 American, and if I sample deep enough and get down to 
 what is probably the true stuff of a man, then I have hope 
 that it is part of the stuff that is like the other fellow's at 
 home. 
 
 And, therefore, probing deep in my heart and trying to 
 see the things that are right without regard to the things 
 that may be debated as expedient, I feel that I am inter- 
 preting the purpose and the thought of America; and in 
 loving America I find I have joined the great majority of 
 my fellowmen throughout the world. 
 
APPENDIX III 
 
 president wilson's address at new york 
 On March 4, 1919, in Further Explanation of the League of Nations 
 
 ]\/TY Fellow Citizens: I accept the intimation of the air 
 *Vl just played; I will not come back "till it's over, over 
 there." And yet I pray God, in the interests of peace and 
 of the world, that that may be soon. 
 
 The first thing that I am going to tell the people on the 
 other side of the water is that an overwhelming majority of 
 the American people is in favor of the League of Nations. 
 I know that that is true; I have had unmistakable intima- 
 tions of it from all parts of the country, and the voice rings 
 true in every case. I account myself fortunate to speak here 
 under the unusual circumstances of this evening. I am 
 happy to associate myself with Mr. Taft in this great cause. 
 He has displayed an elevation of view and a devotion to 
 public duty which is beyond praise. 
 
 And I am the more happy because this means that this is 
 not a party issue. No party has the right to appropriate 
 this issue, and no party will in the long run dare oppose it. 
 
 We have listened to so clear and admirable an exposition 
 of many of the main features of the proposed covenant of 
 the League of Nations that it is perhaps not necessary for 
 me to discuss in any particular way the contents of the 
 document. I will seek rather to give you its setting. I do 
 not know when I have been more impressed than by the con- 
 ferences of the commission set up by the Conference of Peace 
 to draw up a covenant for the League of Nations. The rep- 
 resentatives of fourteen nations sat around that board — not 
 young men, not men inexperienced in the affairs of their own 
 
 233 
 
234. The Causes Of War 
 
 countries, not men inexperienced in the politics of the world ; 
 and the inspiring influence of every meeting was the concur- 
 rence of purpose on the part of all those men to come to 
 an agreement and an effective working agreement with regard 
 to this League of the civilized world. 
 
 There was a conviction in the whole impulse; there was 
 conviction of more than one sort; there was the conviction 
 that this thing ought to be done, and there was also the con- 
 viction that not a man there would venture to go home and 
 say that he had not tried to do it. 
 
 Mr. Taft has set the picture for you of what a failure of 
 this great purpose would mean. We have been hearing for 
 all these weary months that this agony of war has lasted of 
 the sinister purpose of the Central Empires, and we have 
 made maps of the course that they meant their conquests to 
 take. Where did the lines of that map lie, of that central 
 line that we used to call from Bremen to Bagdad ? They lay 
 through these very regions to which Mr. Taft has called 
 your attention, but they lay then through a united empire, 
 the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose integrity Germany 
 was bound to respect, as her ally lay in the path of that line 
 of conquest; the Turkish Empire, whose interests she pro- 
 fessed to make her own, lay in the direct path that she in- 
 tended to tread. And now what has happened ? The Austro- 
 Hungarian Empire has gone to pieces and the Turkish Em- 
 pire has disappeared, and the nations that effected that great 
 result — for it was a result of liberation — are now respon- 
 sible as the trustees of the assets of those great nations. 
 You not only would have weak nations lying in this path, but 
 you would have nations in which that old poisonous seed of 
 intrigue could be planted with the certainty that the crop 
 would be abundant; and one of the things that the League 
 of Nations is intended to watch is the course of intrigue. 
 Intrigue cannot stand publicity, and if the League of Na- 
 tions were nothing but a great debating society it will kill 
 intrigue. 
 
Appendix HI 235 
 
 It is one of the agreements of this covenant that it is the 
 friendly right of every nation a member of the League to call 
 attention to anything that it thinks will disturb the peace 
 of the world, no matter where that thing is occurring. There 
 is no subject that may touch the peace of the world which 
 is exempt from inquiry and discussion, and I think every- 
 body here present will agree with me that Germany would 
 never have gone to war if she had permitted the world to 
 discuss the aggression upon Serbia for a single week. The 
 British Foreign Office suggested, it pleaded, that there might 
 be a day or two delay so that the representatives of the na- 
 tions of Europe could get together and discuss the possibili- 
 ties of a settlement. Germany did not dare permit a day's 
 discussion. You know what happened. So soon as the world 
 realized that an outlaw was at large, the nations began one 
 by one to draw together against her. We know for a cer- 
 tainty that if Germany had thought for a moment that 
 Great Britain would go in with France and with Russia she 
 never would have undertaken the enterprise, and the League 
 of Nations is meant as a notice to all outlaw nations that 
 not only Great Britain, but the United States and the rest 
 of the world will go in to stop enterprises of that sort. And 
 so the League of Nations is nothing more nor less than the 
 covenant that the world will always maintain the standards 
 which it has now vindicated by some of the most precious 
 blood ever spilled. 
 
 The liberated peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
 and of the Turkish Empire call out to us for this thing. It 
 has not arisen in the council of statesmen. Europe is a 
 bit sick at heart at this very moment, because it sees that 
 statesmen have had no vision, and that the only vision has 
 been the vision of the people. Those who suffer see. Those 
 against whom wrong is wrought know how desirable is the 
 right and the righteous. The nations that have long been 
 under the heel of the Austrian, that have long cowered before 
 the German, that have long suffered the indescribable agonies 
 
236 The Causes Of War 
 
 of being governed by the Turk, have called out to the world, 
 generation after generation, for justice, for liberation, for 
 succor; and no Cabinet in the world has heard them. Pri- 
 vate organizations, pitying hearts, philanthropic men and 
 women have poured out their treasure in order to relieve 
 these sufferings ; but no nation has said to the nations re- 
 sponsible, "You must stop; this thing is intolerable, and we 
 will not permit it." And the vision has been with the people. 
 My friends, I wish you would reflect upon this proposition; 
 the vision as to what is necessary for great reforms has sel- 
 dom come from the top in the nations of the world. It has 
 come from the need and the aspiration and the self-assertion 
 of great bodies of men who meant to be free. And I can 
 explain some of the criticisms which have been leveled against 
 this great enterprise only by the supposition that the men 
 who utter the criticisms have never felt the great pulse of 
 the heart of the world. 
 
 And I am amazed — not alarmed, but amazed — that there 
 should be in some quarters such a comprehensive ignorance 
 of the state of the world. These gentlemen do not know 
 what the mind of men is just now. Everybody else does. 
 I do not know where they have been closeted, I do not know 
 by what influence they have been blinded; but I do know 
 that they have been separated from the general currents of 
 the thought of mankind. 
 
 And I want to utter this solemn warning, not in the way 
 of a threat; the forces of the world do not threaten, they 
 operate. The great tides of the world do not give notice 
 that they are going to rise and run; they rise in their maj- 
 esty and overwhelming might, and those who stand in the 
 way are overwhelmed. Now the heart of the world is awake, 
 and the heart of the world must be satisfied. Do not let 
 yourselves suppose for a moment that the uneasiness in the 
 populations of Europe is due entirely to economic causes or 
 economic motives ; something very much deeper underlies it 
 all than that. They see that their Governments have never 
 
Appendix III 237 
 
 been able to defend them against intrigue or aggression, and 
 that there is no force of foresight or of prudence in any mod- 
 ern Cabinet to stop war. And therefore they say, "There 
 must be some fundamental cause for this," and the funda- 
 mental cause they are beginning to perceive to be that na- 
 tions have stood singly or in little jealous groups against 
 each other, fostering prejudice, increasing the danger of 
 war rather than concerting measures to prevent it ; and that 
 if there is right in the world, if there is justice in the world, 
 there is no reason why nations should be divided in the sup- 
 port of justice. 
 
 They are therefore saying if you really believe that there 
 is a right, if you really believe that wars ought to be stopped, 
 stop thinking abojut the rival interests of nations, and think 
 about men and women and children throughout the world. 
 Nations are not made to afford distinction to their rulers by 
 way of success in the manoeuvres of politics ; nations are 
 meant, if they are meant for anything, to make the men and 
 women and children in them secure and happy and prosper- 
 ous, and no nation has the right to set up its special inter- 
 ests against the interests and benefits of mankind, least of all 
 this great nation which we love. It was set up for the benefit 
 of mankind ; it was set up to illustrate the highest ideals 
 and to achieve the highest aspirations of men who wanted 
 to be free ; and the world — the world of today — believes that 
 and counts on us, and would be thrown back into the black- 
 ness of despair if we deserted it. 
 
 I have tried once and again, my fellow citizens, to say to 
 little circles of friends or to larger bodies what seems to be 
 the real hope of the peoples of Europe, and I tell you frankly 
 I have not been able to do so because when the thought tries 
 to crowd itself into speech the profound emotion of the 
 thing is too much; speech will not carry. I have felt the 
 tragedy of the hope of those suffering peoples. 
 
 It is tragedy because it is a hope which cannot be realized 
 in its perfection, and yet I have felt besides its tragedy, its 
 
238 The Causes Of War 
 
 compulsion — its compulsion upon every living man to exer- 
 cise every influence that he has to the utmost to see that as 
 little as possible of that hope is disappointed, because if men 
 cannot now, after this agony of bloody sweat, come to their 
 self-possession and see how to regulate the affairs of the 
 world, we will sink back into a period of struggle in which 
 there will be no hope, and, therefore, no mercy. There can 
 be no mercy where there is no hope, for why should you spare 
 another if you yourself expect to perish? Why should you 
 be pitiful if you can get no pity? Why should you be just if, 
 upon every hand, you are put upon? 
 
 There is another thing which I think the critics of this 
 covenant have not observed. They not only have not ob- 
 served the temper of the world, but they have not even ob- 
 served the temper of those splendid boys in khaki that they 
 sent across the seas. I have had the proud consciousness of 
 the reflected glory of those boys, because the Constitution 
 made me their Commander-in-Chief, and they have taught 
 me some lessons. When we went into the war, we went into 
 it on the basis of declarations which it was my privilege to 
 utter, because I believed them to be an interpretation of the 
 purpose and thought of the people of the United States. 
 And those boys went over there with the feeling that they 
 were sacredly bound to the realization of those ideals ; that 
 they were not only going over there to beat Germany; they 
 were not going over there merely with resentment in their 
 hearts against a particular outlaw nation; but that they 
 were crossing those three thousand miles of sea in order to 
 show to Europe that the United States, when it became neces- 
 sary, would go anywhere where the rights of mankind were 
 threatened. They would not sit still in the trenches. They 
 would not be restrained by the prudence of experienced con- 
 tinental commanders. They thought they had come over 
 there to do a particular thing, and they were going to do 
 it and do it at once. And just as soon as that rush of spirit 
 as well as rush of body came in contact with the lines of the 
 
Appendix HI 239 
 
 enemy, they began to break, and they continued to break 
 until the end. They continued to break, my fellow citizens, 
 not merely because of the physical force of those lusty 
 youngsters, but because of the irresistible spiritual force of 
 the armies of the United States. It was that they felt. It 
 was that that awed them. It was that that made them feel, 
 if these youngsters ever got a foothold, they could never be 
 dislodged, and that therefore every foot of ground that they 
 won was permanently won for the liberty of mankind. 
 
 And do you suppose that having felt that crusading spirit 
 of these youngsters, who went over there not to glorify 
 America but to serve their fellow men, I am going to per- 
 mit myself for one moment to slacken in my effort to be 
 worthy of them and of their cause? What I said at the 
 opening I said with a deeper meaning than perhaps you have 
 caught ; I do mean not to come back until it's over over there, 
 and it must not be over until the nations of the world are 
 assured of the permanency of peace. 
 
 Gentlemen on this side of the water would be very much 
 profited by getting into communication with some gentlemen 
 on the other side of the water. We sometimes think, my 
 fellow citizens, that the experienced statesmen of the Euro- 
 pean nations are an unusually hard-headed set of men, by 
 which we generally mean, although we do not admit it, that 
 they are a bit cynical, that they say "This is a very prac- 
 tical world," by which you always mean that it is not an 
 ideal world; that they do not believe that things can be 
 settled upon an ideal basis. Well, I never came into intimate 
 contact with them before, but if they used to be that way, 
 they are not that way now. They have been subdued, if that 
 was once their temper, by the awful significance of recent 
 events and the awful importance of what is to ensue; and 
 there is not one of them with whom I have come in contact 
 who does not feel that he cannot in conscience return to his 
 people from Paris unless he has done his utmost to do some- 
 thing more than attach his name to a treaty of peace. Every 
 
S40 The Causes Of War 
 
 man in that Conference knows that the treaty of peace in 
 itself will be inoperative, as Mr. Taft has said, without this 
 constant support and energy of a great organization such 
 as is supplied by the League of Nations. 
 
 And men who when I first went over there were skeptical 
 of the possibility of forming a League of Nations admitted 
 that if we could but form it it would be an invaluable in- 
 strumentality through which to secure the operation of the 
 various parts of the treaty; and when that treaty comes 
 back, gentlemen on this side will find the covenant not only 
 in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the covenant 
 that you cannot dissect the covenant from the treaty with- 
 out destroying the whole vital structure. The structure of 
 peace will not be vital without the League of Nations, and 
 no man is going to bring back a cadaver with him. 
 
 I must say that I have been puzzled by some of the criti- 
 cisms — not by the criticisms themselves ; I can understand 
 them perfectly, even when there was no foundation for them ; 
 but by the fact of the criticism. I cannot imagine how these 
 gentlemen can live and not live in the atmosphere of the 
 world. I cannot imagine how they can live and not be in 
 contact with the events of their times, and I particularly 
 cannot imagine how they can be Americans and set up a doc- 
 trine of careful selfishness, thought out to the last detail. 
 I have heard no counsel of generosity in their criticism. I 
 have heard no constructive suggestion. I have heard nothing 
 except, "Will it not be dangerous to us to help the world?" 
 It would be fatal to us not to help it. 
 
 From being what I will venture to call the most famous 
 and the most powerful nation in the world we would of a 
 sudden have become the most contemptible. So, I did not 
 need to be told, as I have been told, that the people of the 
 United States would support this covenant. I am an Ameri- 
 can and I knew they would. What a sweet revenge it is upon 
 the world. They laughed at us once, they thought we did 
 not mean our professions of principle. They thought so 
 
Appendix III 241 
 
 until April of 1917. It was hardly credible to them that 
 we would do more than send a few men over and go through 
 the forms of helping, and when they saw multitudes hasten- 
 ing across the sea, and saw what those multitudes were eager 
 to do when they got to the other side, they stood at amaze 
 and said: "The thing is real, this nation is the friend of 
 mankind as it said it was." The enthusiasm, the hope, the 
 trust, the confidence in the future bred by that change of 
 view are indescribable. Take an individual American and 
 you may often find him selfish, and confined to his special 
 interests ; but take the American in the mass and he is willing 
 to die for an idea. The sweet revenge, therefore, is this, that 
 we believed in righteousness, and now we are ready to make 
 the supreme sacrifice for it, the supreme sacrifice of throwing 
 in our fortunes with the fortunes of men everywhere. Mr. 
 Taft was speaking of Washington's utterance about en- 
 tangling alliances, and if he will permit me to say so, he put 
 the exactly right interpretation upon what Washington said, 
 the interpretation that is inevitable if you read what he said, 
 as most of these gentlemen do not. And the thing that he 
 longed for was just what we are now about to supply; an 
 arrangement which will disentangle all the alliances in the 
 world. 
 
 Nothing entangles, nothing enmeshes a man except a self- 
 ish combination with somebody else. Nothing entangles a 
 nation, hampers it, binds it, except to enter into a combina- 
 tion with some other nation against the other nations of the 
 world. And this great disentanglement of all alliances is 
 now to be accomplished by this covenant, because one of the 
 covenants is that no nation shall enter into any relationship 
 with another nation inconsistent with the covenants of the 
 League of Nations. Nations promise not to have alliances. 
 Nations promise not to make combinations against each 
 other. Nations agree that there shall be but one combina- 
 tion, and that is the combination of all against the wrong- 
 doer. 
 
242 The Causes Of War 
 
 And so I am going back to my task on the other side with 
 renewed vigor. I had not forgotten what the spirit of the 
 American people is, but I have been immensely refreshed by 
 coming in contact with it again. I did not know how good 
 home felt until I got here. 
 
 The only place a man can feel at home is where nothing- 
 has to be explained to him. Nothing has to be explained to 
 me in America, least of all the sentiment of the American 
 people. I mean about great fundamental things like this. 
 There are many differences of judgment as to policy — and 
 perfectly legitimate — sometimes profound differences of 
 judgment; but those are not differences of sentiment, those 
 are not differences of purpose, those are not differences of 
 ideals. And the advantage of not having to have anything 
 explained to you is that you recognize a wrong explanation 
 when you hear it. 
 
 In a certain rather abandoned part of the frontier at one 
 time it was said they found a man who told the truth; he 
 was not found telling it, but he could tell it when he heard 
 it. And I think I am in that situation with regard to some 
 of the criticisms I have heard. They do not make any im- 
 pression on me, because I know there is no medium that will 
 transmit them, that the sentiment of the country is proof 
 against such narrowness and such selfishness as that. I com- 
 mend these gentlemen to communion with their fellow citizens. 
 
 What are we to say, then, as to the future? I think, my 
 fellow citizens, that we can look forward to it with great 
 confidence. I have heard cheering news since I came to this 
 side of the water about the progress that is being made in 
 Paris toward the discussion and clarification of a great many 
 difficult matters and I believe that settlements will begin to 
 be made rather rapidly from this time on at those confer- 
 ences. But what I believe, what I know as well as believe, is 
 this: That the men engaged in those conferences are gath- 
 erning heart as they go, not losing it ; that they are finding 
 community of purpose and community of ideal to an extent 
 that perhaps they did not expect; and that amidst all the 
 
Appendix HI 243 
 
 inter-play of influence — because it is infinitely complicated 
 — amidst all the inter-play of influence, there is a forward 
 movement which is running toward the right. Men have at 
 last perceived that the only permanent thing in the world 
 is the right, and that a wrong settlement is bound to be a 
 temporary settlement — bound to be a temporary settlement 
 for the very best reason of all, that it ought to be a tem- 
 porary settlement, and the spirits of men will rebel against 
 it, and the spirits of men are now in the saddle. 
 
 When I was in Italy a little limping group of wounded 
 Italian soldiers sought an interview with me. I could not 
 conjecture what it was they were going to say to me, and 
 with the greatest simplicity, with a touching simplicity, they 
 presented me with a petition in favor of the League of Na- 
 tions. Their wounded limbs, their impaired vitality were the 
 only argument they brought with them. It was a simple re- 
 quest that I lend all the influence that I might happen to 
 have to relieve future generations of the sacrifices that they 
 had been obliged to make. That appeal has remained in my 
 mind as I have ridden along the streets in European capitals 
 and heard cries of the crowd, cries for the League of Na- 
 tions, from lips of people who, I venture to say, had no par- 
 ticular notion of how it was to be done, who were not ready 
 to propose a plan for a League of Nations, but whose hearts 
 said that something by way of a combination of all men 
 everywhere must come out of this. As we drove along coun- 
 try roads weak old women would come out and hold flowers 
 up to us. Why should they hold flowers up to strangers 
 from across the Atlantic? Only because they believed that 
 we were the messengers of friendship and of hope, and these 
 flowers were their humble offerings of gratitude that friends 
 from so great a distance should have brought them so great 
 a hope. 
 
 It is inconceivable that we should disappoint them, and we 
 shall not. The day will come when men in America will look 
 back with swelling hearts and rising pride that they should 
 have been privileged to make the sacrifice which it was neces- 
 
244 The Causes Of War 
 
 sary to make in order to combine their might and their moral 
 power with the cause of justice for men of every kind every- 
 where. 
 
 God give us the strength and vision to do it wisely ! God 
 give us the privilege of knowing that we did it without count- 
 ing the cost and because we were true Americans, lovers of 
 liberty and of the right ! 
 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 REVISED DRAFT ADOPTED AT PARIS, APRIL £8, 1919 
 
 IN order to promote international co-operation and to 
 achieve international peace and security, by the accept- 
 ance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescrip- 
 tion of open, just and honorable relations between nations, 
 by the firm establishment of the understanding of interna- 
 tional law as to actual rule of conduct among governments, 
 and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect 
 for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peo- 
 ples with one another, the high contracting parties agree to 
 this covenant of the League of Nations. 
 
 (In the original preamble the last sentence read: "Adopt 
 this constitution," instead of "Agree to this covenant") 
 
 Article One 
 
 The original members of the League of Nations shall be 
 those of the signatories which are named in the annex to this 
 covenant, and also such of those other states named in the 
 annex as shall accede without reservation to this covenant. 
 Such accessions shall be affected by a declaration deposited 
 with the secretariat within two months of the coming into 
 force of the covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all 
 other members of the league. 
 
 Any fully self-governing state, dominion or colony not 
 named in the annex may become a member of the league if 
 its admission is agreed by two-thirds of the assembly, pro- 
 vided it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere inten- 
 tion to observe its international obligations and shall accept 
 
 245 
 
246 The Causes Of War 
 
 such regulations as may be prescribed by the league in re- 
 gard to its military and navel forces and armaments. 
 
 Any member of the league may, after two years' notice of 
 its intention so to do, withdraw from the league, provided 
 that all its international obligations and all its obligations 
 under this covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of 
 its withdrawal. 
 
 {This article is new, embodying with alterations and ad- 
 ditions the old article seven. It provides more specifically 
 the method of admitting new members and adds the entirely 
 new paragraph providing for withdrawal from the league. 
 No mention of withdrawal was made in the original docu- 
 ment.) 
 
 Article Two 
 
 The action of the league under this covenant shall be ef- 
 fective through the instrumentality of an assembly and of a 
 council, with permanent secretariat. 
 
 (Originally this was a part of Article One. It gives the 
 name "assembly" to the gathering of representatives of the 
 members of the league, formerly referred to merely as "the 
 body of delegates.") 
 
 Article Three 
 
 The assembly shall consist of representatives of the mem- 
 bers of the league. 
 
 The assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time 
 to time as occasion may require, at the seat of the league, or 
 at such other places as may be decided upon. 
 
 The assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter 
 within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the 
 peace of the world. 
 
 At meetings of the assembly, each member of the league 
 shall have one vote, and may have not more than three rep- 
 resentatives. 
 
 ( This embodies parts of the original articles one, two and 
 
League of Nations 247 
 
 three with only minor changes. It refers to "members of the 
 league" where the term "high contracting parties" originally 
 was used, and this change is followed throughout the revised 
 draft.) 
 
 Article Four 
 
 The council shall consist of representatives of the United 
 States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of 
 Italy and of Japan, together with representatives of four 
 other members of the league. These four members of the 
 league shall be selected by the assembly from time to time in 
 its discretion. Until the appointment of the representatives 
 of the four members of the league first selected by the as- 
 sembly, representatives of (blank) shall be members of the 
 council. 
 
 With the approval of the majority of the assembly the 
 council may name additional members of the league, whose 
 representatives shall always be members of the council; the 
 council with like approval may increase the number of mem- 
 bers of the league, to be selected by the assembly for repre- 
 sentation on the council. 
 
 The council shall meet from time to time as occasion may 
 require, and at least once a year, at the seat of the league, 
 or at such other place as may be decided upon. 
 
 The council may deal at its meetings with any matter 
 within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the 
 peace of the world. 
 
 Any member of the league not represented on the council 
 shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member 
 at any meeting of the council during the consideration of 
 matters specially affecting the interests of that member of 
 the league. 
 
 At meetings of the council each member of the league rep- 
 resented on the council shall have one vote, and may not 
 have more than one representative. 
 
 (This embodies that part of the original article three 
 
248 The Causes Of War 
 
 designating the original members of the council. The para- 
 graph providing for increase in the membership of the coun- 
 cil is new.) 
 
 Article Five 
 
 Except where otherwise expressly provided in this coven- 
 ant, decisions at any meeting of the assembly or the council 
 shall require the agreement of all the members of the league 
 represented at the meeting. 
 
 All matters of procedure of meetings of the assembly or 
 of the council, the appointment of committees to investigate 
 particular matters, shall be regulated by the assembly or by 
 the council, and may be decided by a majority of the mem- 
 bers of the league represented at the meeting. 
 
 The first meetings of the assembly and the first meeting 
 of the council shall be summoned by the President of the 
 United States of America. 
 
 (The first paragraph requiring unanimous agreement in 
 both assembly and council except where otherwise provided 
 is new. The other two paragraphs originally were included 
 m article four.) 
 
 Article Six 
 
 The permanent secretariat shall be established at the seat 
 of the league. The secretariat shall comprise a secretariat- 
 general and such secretaries and staff as may be required. 
 
 The first secretary-general shall be the person named in 
 the annex; thereafter the secretary-general shall be ap- 
 pointed by the council with the approval of the majority of 
 the assembly. 
 
 The secretaries and the staff of the secretariat shall be 
 appointed by the secretary-general with the approval of the 
 council. 
 
 The secretary-general shall act in that capacity at all 
 meetings of the assembly and of the council. 
 
 The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the 
 
League of Nations 249 
 
 members of the league in accordance with the apportion- 
 ment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Uni- 
 versal Postal Union. 
 
 (This replaces the original article five. In the original 
 the appointment of the first secretary-general was left to the 
 council, and approval of the majority of the assembly was 
 not required for subsequent appointments.) 
 
 Article Seven 
 
 The seat of the league is established at Geneva. 
 
 The council may at any time decide that the seat of the 
 league shall be established elsewhere. 
 
 All positions under, or in connection with the league, in- 
 cluding the secretariat, shall be open equally to men and 
 women. 
 
 Representatives of the members of the league and officials 
 of the league when engaged on the business of the league 
 shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. 
 
 The buildings and other property occupied by the league 
 or its officials, or by representatives attending its meetings, 
 shall be inviolable. 
 
 (Embodying parts of the old articles five and six, this 
 article names Geneva instead of leaving the seat of the league 
 to be- chosen later and adds the provision for changing the 
 seat in the future. The paragraph opening positions to 
 women equally with men is new. ) 
 
 Article Eight 
 
 The members of the league recognize that the maintenance 
 of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the 
 lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforce- 
 ment by common action of international obligations. 
 
 The council, taking account of the geographical situation 
 and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for 
 
£50 The Causes Of War 
 
 such reduction for the consideration and action of the sev- 
 eral governments. 
 
 Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revi- 
 sion at least every ten years. 
 
 After these plans shall have been adopted by the several 
 governments, limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be 
 exceeded without the concurrence of the council. 
 
 The members of the league agree that the manufacture by 
 private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open 
 to grave objections. The council shall advise how the evil 
 effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, 
 due regard being had to the necessities of those members of 
 the league which are not able to manufacture the munitions 
 and implements of war necessary for their safety. 
 
 The members of the league undertake to interchange full 
 and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, 
 their military and naval programmes and the condition of 
 such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike pur- 
 poses. 
 
 ( This covers the ground of the original article eight, but 
 is rewritten to make it clearer that armament reduction 
 plans must be adopted by the nations affected before they 
 become effective.) 
 
 Article Nine 
 
 A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the 
 council on the execution of the provisions of article 1 and 8 
 and on military and naval questions generally. 
 
 {Unchanged except for the insertion of the words "Article 
 One: 9 ) 
 
 Article Ten 
 
 The members of the league undertake to respect and pre- 
 serve as against external aggression the territorial integrity 
 and existing political independence of all members of the 
 league. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any 
 threat or danger of such aggression, the council shall ad- 
 
League of Nations 251 
 
 vise upon the means by which this obligation shall be ful- 
 filled. 
 
 ( Virtually unchanged. ) 
 
 Article Eleven 
 
 Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting 
 any of the members of the league or not, is hereby declared 
 a matter of concern of the whole league, and the league shall 
 take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to 
 safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency 
 should arise, the secretary-general shall, on the request of 
 any member of the league, forthwith summon a meeting of the 
 council. 
 
 It is also declared to be the fundamental right of each 
 member of the league to bring to the attention of the assem- 
 bly, or of the council, any circumstances whatever affecting 
 international relations which threatens to disturb either the 
 peace or the good understanding between nations upon which 
 peace depends. 
 
 {In the original it was provided that the "high contract- 
 ing parties reserve the right to take any action," etc., where 
 the revised draft reads, "the league shall take any action" 
 etc.) 
 
 Article Twelve 
 
 The members of the league agree that if there should arise 
 between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they 
 will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by 
 the council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until 
 three months after the award by the arbitrators or the re- 
 port by the council. 
 
 In any case under this article the award of the arbitrators 
 shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the 
 council shall be made within six months after the submission 
 of the dispute. 
 
 {Virtually unchanged, except that some provisions of the 
 original are eliminated for inclusion in other articles.) 
 
252 The Causes Of War 
 
 Article Thirteen 
 
 The members of the league agree that whenever any dis- 
 pute shall arise between them which they recognize to be 
 suitable for submission to arbitration, and which cannot be 
 satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the 
 whole subject matter to arbitration. Disputes as to the in- 
 terpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international 
 law, as to the existence of any fact which if established 
 would constitute a breach of any international obligation, 
 or as to the extend and nature of the reparation to be made 
 for any such breach, are declared to be among those which 
 are generally suitable for submission to arbitration. For 
 the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitra- 
 tion to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed 
 on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any conven- 
 tion existing between them. 
 
 The members of the league agree that they will carry out 
 in full good faith any award that may be rendered and that 
 they will not resort to war against a member of the league 
 which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to 
 carry out such an award, the council shall propose what 
 steps should be taken to give effect thereto. 
 
 (Only minor changes in language.) 
 
 Article Fourteen 
 
 The council shall formulate and submit to the members of 
 the league for adoption plans for the establishment of a per- 
 manent court of international justice. The court shall be 
 competent to hear and determine disputes of an international 
 character which the parties thereto submit to it. The court 
 may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or ques- 
 tion referred to it by the council or by the assembly. 
 
 (Unchanged except for the addition of the last sentence.) 
 
League of Nations 253 
 
 Article Fifteen 
 
 If there should arise between members of the league any 
 dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to 
 arbitration as above, the members of the league agree that 
 they will submit the matter to the council. Any party to 
 the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of 
 the existence of the dispute to the secretary-general, who 
 will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation 
 and consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties to 
 the dispute will communicate to the secretary-general, as 
 promptly as possible, statements of their cases, all the rele- 
 vant facts and papers ; the council may forthwith direct the 
 publication thereof. 
 
 The council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of any 
 dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall 
 be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding 
 the dispute, terms of settlement thereof as the council may 
 deem appropriate. 
 
 If the dispute is not thus settled, the council, either unani- 
 mously or by a majority vote, shall make and publish a re- 
 port containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and 
 the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in 
 regard thereto. 
 
 Any member of the league represented on the council may 
 make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of 
 its conclusions regarding the same. 
 
 If a report by the council is unanimously agreed to by the 
 members thereof other than the representatives of one or 
 more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league 
 agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dis- 
 pute which complies with the recommendations of the report. 
 
 If the council fails to reach a report which is unanimously 
 agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representa- 
 tives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the mem- 
 bers of the league reserve to themselves the right to take 
 
254 The Causes Of War 
 
 such action as they shall consider necessary for the main- 
 tenance of right and justice. 
 
 If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of 
 them, and is found by the council to arise out of a matter 
 which by international law is solely within the domestic jur- 
 isdiction of that party, the council shall so report, and shall 
 make no recommendation as to its settlement. 
 
 The council may in any case under this article refer the 
 dispute to the assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at 
 the request of either party to the dispute, provided that 
 such request be made within fourteen days after the submis- 
 sion of the dispute to the council. 
 
 In any case referred to the assembly all the provisions of 
 this article and of article twelve relating to the action and 
 powers of the council shall apply to the action and powers 
 of the assembly, provided that a report made by the assem- 
 bly, if concurred in by the representatives of those members 
 of the league represented on the council and of a majority 
 of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of 
 the representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have 
 the same force as a report by the council concurred in by all 
 members thereof other than the representatives of one or 
 more of the parties to the dispute. 
 
 (The paragraph specifically excluding matters of "domes- 
 tic jurisdiction" from action by the council is new. In the 
 last sentence the words "if concurred in by the representa- 
 tives of those members of the league represented on the 
 council" etc., have been added.) 
 
 Article Sixteen 
 
 Should any member of the league resort to war in disre^ 
 gard of its covenants under Articles Twelve, Thirteen or 
 Fifteen, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an 
 act of war against all other members of the league, which 
 hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance 
 
League of Nations 255 
 
 of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all in- 
 tercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the 
 covenant-breaking state and the prevention of all financial 
 intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking 
 member of the league and the nationals of any other state, 
 whether a member of the league or not. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the council in such case to recom- 
 mend to the several governments concerned what effective 
 military or naval forces the members of the league shall 
 severally contribute to the armaments of forces to be used 
 to protect the covenants of the league. 
 
 The members of the league agree, further, that they will 
 mutually support one another in the financial and economic 
 measures which are taken under this article, in order to min- 
 imize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above 
 measures, and that they will mutually support one another 
 in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their num- 
 ber by the covenant-breaking state, and that they will take 
 the necessary steps to afford passage through their terri- 
 tory to the forces of any of the members of the league which 
 are co-operating to protect the covenants of the league. 
 
 Any member of the league which has violated any coven- 
 ant of the league may be declared to be no longer a member 
 of the league by a vote of the council, concurred in by the 
 representatives of all the other members of the league repre- 
 sented thereon. 
 
 {Unchanged except for the addition of the last sentence.) 
 
 Article Seventeen 
 
 In the event of a dispute between a member of the league 
 and a state which is not a member of the league, or between 
 states not members of the league, the state or states not 
 members of the league shall be invited to accept the obliga- 
 tions of membership in the league for the purpose of such 
 dispute, upon such conditions as the council may deem just. 
 
256 The Causes Of War 
 
 If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of articles 
 twelve to sixteen, inclusive, shall be applied, with such modi- 
 fications as may be deemed necessary by the council. 
 
 Upon such invitations being given the council shall imme- 
 diately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the 
 dispute, and recommend such action as may seem best and 
 most effectual in the circumstances. 
 
 If a state so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations 
 of membership in the league for the purpose of such dispute, 
 and shall resort to war against a member of the league, the 
 provisions of article sixteen shall be applicable as against 
 the state taking such action. 
 
 If both parties to the dispute, when so invited, refuse to 
 accept the obligations of membership in the league for the 
 purpose of such dispute, the council may take such measures 
 and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities 
 and will result in the settlement of the dispute. 
 
 ( Virtually unchanged. ) 
 
 Article Eighteen 
 
 Every convention or international engagement entered into 
 henceforward by any member of the league shall be forth- 
 with registered with the secretariat and shall, as soon as 
 possible, be published by it. No such treaty or international 
 engagement shall be binding until so registered. 
 
 (Same as original article twenty-three.) 
 
 Article Nineteen 
 
 The assembly may from time to time advise the reconsid- 
 eration by members of the league of treaties which have be- 
 come inapplicable, and the consideration of international 
 conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of 
 the world. 
 
 (Virtually the same as original article twenty-four.) 
 
League of Nations 257 
 
 Article Twenty 
 
 The members of the league severally agree that this cov- 
 enant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or under- 
 standings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms 
 hereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter 
 enter into any engagements, inconsistent with the terms 
 thereof. 
 
 In case members of the league shall, before becoming a 
 member of the league, have undertaken any obligations in- 
 consistent with the terms of this covenant, it shall be the 
 duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its 
 release from such obligations. 
 
 {Virtually the same as original article twenty-five.) 
 
 Article Twenty-one 
 
 Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the 
 validity of international agreements such as treaties of arbi- 
 tration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine 
 for securing the maintenance of peace. 
 
 {Entirely new.) 
 
 A rticle Twen ty- two 
 
 To those colonies and territories, which, as a consequence 
 of the late war, have ceased to be under the sovereignty of 
 the states which formerly governed them and which are in- 
 habited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves un- 
 der the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there 
 should be applied the principle that the well-being and de- 
 velopment of such peoples from a sacred trust of civilization 
 and that securities for the performance of this trust should 
 be embodied in this covenant. 
 
 The best method of giving practicable effect to this princi- 
 ple is that the tutelage of such peoples be entrusted to ad- 
 
258 The Causes Of War 
 
 vanced nations, who, by reasons of their resources, their ex- 
 perience or their geographical position, can best undertake 
 this responsibility and who are willing to accept it, and that 
 this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on 
 behalf of the league. 
 
 The character of the mandate must differ according to 
 the stage of the development of the people, the geographical 
 situation of the territory, its economic condition and other 
 similar circumstances. 
 
 Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish 
 Empire have reached a stage of development where their ex- 
 istence as independent nations can be provisionally recog- 
 nized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and 
 assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able 
 to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a 
 principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory. 
 
 Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at 
 such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the 
 administration of the territory under conditions which will 
 guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to 
 the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition 
 of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the 
 liquor traffic and the prevention of the establishment of for- 
 tifications or military and naval bases and of military train- 
 ing, of the nations for other than police purposes and the 
 defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities 
 for the trade and commerce of other members of the league. 
 
 There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and cer- 
 tain of the South Pacific islands, which, owing to the sparse- 
 ness of their population or their small size or their remote- 
 ness from the centers of civilization or their geographical 
 contiguity to the territory of the mandatory and other cir- 
 cumstances can be best administered under the laws of the 
 mandatory as integral portions of its territory subject to 
 the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the in- 
 digenous population. In every case of mandate, the manda- 
 
League of Nations 259 
 
 tory shall render to the council an annual report in reference 
 to the territory committed to its charge. 
 
 The degree of authority, control or administration to be 
 exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed 
 upon by the members of the league, be explicitly defined in 
 each case by the council. 
 
 A permanent commission shall be constituted to receive 
 and examine the annual reports of the mandatories and to 
 advise the council on all matters relating to the observance 
 of the mandates. 
 
 (This is the original article 19, virtually, except for the 
 insertion of the words "and who are willing to accept" in de- 
 scribing nations to be given mandatories.) 
 
 Article Twenty-three 
 
 Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of inter- 
 national conventions existing, or hereafter to be agreed 
 upon, the members of the league (a) will endeavor to secure 
 and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, 
 women and children, both in their own countries and in all 
 countries to which their commercial and industrial relations 
 extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the 
 necessary international organizations; (b) undertake to se- 
 cure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories 
 under their control; (c) will entrust the league with the gen- 
 eral supervision over the execution of agreements with re- 
 gard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in 
 opium and other dangerous drugs; (d) will entrust the 
 league with the general supervision of the trade in arms and 
 ammunition with the countries in which the control of this 
 traffic is necessary in the common interest; (e) will make 
 provision to secure and maintain freedom of communication 
 and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of 
 all members of the league. In this connection the special 
 necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914- 
 
260 The Causes Of War 
 
 1918 shall be in mind; (f) will endeavor to take steps in 
 matters of international concern for the prevention and con- 
 trol of disease. 
 
 (This replaces the original article twenty and embodies 
 parts of the original articles eighteen and twenty-one. It 
 eliminates a specific provision formerly made for a bureau 
 of labor and adds the clauses (b) and (c).) 
 
 Article Twenty-four 
 
 There shall be placed under the direction of the league all 
 international bureaus already established by general treaties 
 if the parties to such treaties consent, All such interna- 
 tional bureaus and all commissions for the regulation of 
 matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall 
 be placed under the direction of the league. 
 
 In all matters of international interest which are regu- 
 lated by general conventions, but which are not placed under 
 the control of international bureaus or commissions, the 
 secretariat of the league shall, subject to the consent of the 
 council, and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute 
 all relevant information and shall render any other assist- 
 ance which may be necessary or desirable. 
 
 The council may include as part of the expenses of the 
 secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which 
 is placed under the direction of the league. 
 
 (Same as article twenty-two in the original, with the mat- 
 ter after the first two sentences added.) 
 
 Article Twenty- five 
 
 The members of the league agree to encourage and pro- 
 mote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorized 
 voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as pur- 
 poses improvement of health, the prevention of disease and 
 the mitigation of suffering throughout the world. 
 
 (Entirely new.) 
 
League of Nations 261 
 
 Article Twenty-six 
 
 Amendments to this covenant will take effect when ratified 
 by the members of the league, whose representatives compose 
 the council and by a majority of the members of the league 
 whose representatives compose the assembly. 
 
 No such an amendment shall bind any member of the 
 league which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case 
 it shall cease to be a member of the league. 
 
 (Same as the original, except that a majority of the 
 league instead of three-fourths is required for ratification of 
 amendments with the last sentence added.) 
 
 Annex to Covenant 
 
 One — Original members of the League of Nations. 
 
 Signatories of the treaty of peace: 
 
 United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Brit- 
 ish Empire, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, 
 India, China, Cuba, Czecho-Slovakia, Ecuador, France, 
 Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, 
 Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Ru- 
 mania, Serbie, Siam, and Uruguay. 
 
 States invited to accede to the covenant: 
 
 Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Nether- 
 lands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, 
 Switzerland, Venezuela. 
 
 Two — First secretary general of the League of Nations 
 (blank). 
 
 {The annex was not published with the original draft of 
 the covenant.) 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 General 
 
 1. Lagorgette, Jean: Le Role de la Guerre, Paris, 1906. 
 ^ 2. Amos, Sheldon: Political and Legal Remedies for War (57-130). 
 Cassel, Petter, Galpin & Co., London. 
 
 3. Anitchkow: War and Labor (1900), Part II, page 189. Archibald 
 
 Constable & Co.— Westminster— 1900. 
 
 4. Peyronnard: Des Causes de la Guerre (1901). 
 
 5. Salieres: La Guerre, ses causes ses resultats. Paris, 1879. 
 
 6. Laveleye: Des Causes Actuelles de la Guerre en Europe et de 
 
 l'arbitrage. 
 
 7. Richet: La Passe de la Guerre et PAvenir de la Paix. Parii, 1907. 
 
 8. D'Eichthal: Guerre et Paix, 1909. 
 
 9. Letorneau, Ch.: La Guerre dans Les Diverses Races Humaines. 
 
 Paris, 1906. 
 10. Mahan, Captain A. T.: Some Neglected Aspects of War. Little, 
 Brown & Co., Boston, 1907, 
 
 SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 
 
 1. Chadwick, French Ensor: Relations of the United States and 
 
 Spain — Diplomacy. Scribners, New York, 1909. 
 
 2. Lebraud, Elie: La Guerre Hispano-Americaine et le Droit Des 
 
 Gens. Paris, 1904. 
 
 3. Benton, E. J.: International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish- 
 
 American War. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1908. 
 
 4. Lodge, Henry Cabot: The War with Spain: Harper's, N. Y., 
 
 1899. 
 
 5. Mahan, Captain Alfred T.: Lessons of the War with Spain. Little, 
 
 Brown & Co., Boston, 1899. 
 
 6. Mahan, Captain A. T.: Some Neglected Aspects of War. Little, 
 
 Brown & Co., Boston, 1907. 
 jjgf 7. Alger, R. H.: The Spanish-American War. Harper's, New York, 
 1901. 
 8. Moore, John Bassett: Digest of International Law, Vol. VI (es- 
 pecially) on Documents and Diplomacy. (Government Printing 
 office, Washington, 1906.) 
 
 WARS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 / 1. Doyle, A. Conan: The War in South Africa, Its Cause and Con- 
 duct. McClure, Phillips & Co., N. Y., 1902. 
 
 t: ' 2. Green, James: Causes of the War in South Africa, Worcester, 
 Mass. June, 1900. 
 
 263 
 
864 Bibliography 
 
 3. D'Espagnet, La Guerre: Sud-Africane. Paris, 1902. 
 
 4. Bryce, James: Impressions of South Africa, The Century Co., 
 
 N. Y., 1897. 
 
 5. Sanderson, Edgar: Africa in the 19th Century. Scribners, N. Y., 
 
 1898. 
 
 6. Schreiner, Olive: The South African Question. C. H. Sergei Co., 
 
 Chicago, 1899. 
 
 7. Hillegas, Howard C: Oom Paul's People. Appleton's, N. Y., 1899. 
 
 8. Holland, Thos. Erskine: The European Concert in the Eastern 
 
 Question, Oxford, 1885. 
 
 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 
 
 1. Rev. M. Francis: Chronique des Faits Internationaux. In Vol. 
 
 XII, Revue Generale de Droit International Public, 1905, pp. 
 215 ff. 
 
 2. Asakawa: The Russo-Japanese Conflict, 1904. 
 
 3. Hershey, A. S.: International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo- 
 Japanese War. McMillan Co., New York, 1906. 
 
 4. Lawrence, T. J.: War and Neutrality in the Far East. McMil- 
 
 lan & Co., New York, 1904. 
 
 5. Rose, J. Holland: Development of the European Nations, 1870- 
 y 1900. Two Vols. Putnam's, N. W. 1905. 
 
 6. Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 12. 
 
 7. Hazen, Chas. Downer: Europe Since 1815. Chapter XXX. Henry 
 
 Holt & Co., New York, 1910. 
 
 8. Cordier: Histoire des relations de la Claine avec les Puissances 
 
 Occidentales, Paris, 1902, 3 Vol. in 8. 
 
 9. Gairal de Serezin: Autour du Conflict d'Extreme Orient. Paris, 
 
 1905, I Vol. in 8. 
 
 10. Stead, A.: Japan's Position in the Far East. Fortnightly Re- 
 
 view, 1903. 
 
 11. The Conflict in the Far East. Edinburgh Review, 1904. 
 
 12. Mackray, R.: The Crisis in the Far East. Monthly Review, 
 
 Feb., 1904. 
 
 13. Vickers, E. H.: The Eastern Crisis and Its Origin, The Nation, 
 
 Feb., 1904. 
 
 HISTORIES 
 
 1. Rose, J. Holland: Development of European Nations (Vol. I, 
 Ch. I), (Vol. I, Chs. VII-IX). On Balkan situation and Russo- 
 Turkish War, Putnam's, New York, 1905. 
 > 2. Seignobos: Political History of Europe Since 1814. (McVane 
 ' translation.) Henry Holt & Co., 1899. 
 
 - 3. The Balkan Question: Ed. by Luigi Villari (Published by John 
 ' Murray, London, 1905). 
 
 4. Cambridge Modern History, Vols. XI and XII. 
 
 5. Robinson and Beard: Development of Modern Europe, Vol. II. 
 
 6. Hazen, Chas. D.: Europe Since 1815. Henry Holt & Co., New 
 
 York, 1910. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Aaronsohn, "With the Turks in 
 Palestine," 126 
 
 Agidir, incident, 56 
 
 Algeciras, conference, 56 
 
 Alsace-Lorraine, recovery of, a 
 motive of France, 37; Germany's 
 selfish motive concerning, 44 ; a 
 cause for war en part of the 
 French, 60, 67; Prussia's mon- 
 ster crime in 1871, 120; French 
 army concentrated, not expect- 
 ing German advance through 
 Belgium, 130; armistice terms, 
 154-5; Pope's proposal concern- 
 ing (p. 4), 166; President Wil- 
 son's statement concerning, 180 
 (point 6) 
 
 Allenby, General, captures Jeru- 
 salem, 144 
 
 Allepo, capture of, 150 
 
 Argonne, battle of, Americans in, 
 147, 149 
 
 Armistice, terms for Germany, 
 154-8; for Austria-Hungary, 
 152-4; for Bulgaria, 152; Tur- 
 key, 152 
 
 Assassination, of Franz-Ferdinand, 
 135 
 
 Austria-H un g ary, fundamental 
 cause for war, 28; arch-enemy 
 of Italian freedom and unity, 
 36; revolution of her peoples 
 certain, 33; "Dreibund," 1881, 
 52; intervention in Russo-Turk- 
 ish war, 1878, 53; imperial de- 
 signs, 55, 56, 57; causes for war 
 in 1914, 63, 70; aggressions since 
 1900, 75, 78, 79; terms of armis- 
 tice (see Armistice above) 
 
 Bagdad, railway, 63, 70; city cap- 
 tured by Turks, 140; recaptured 
 by British, 144 
 
 Baker, Secretary, "The Nation in 
 Arms," 170 
 
 Baku, evacuated by Turks, 150 
 
 Balkan States, causes for war, 
 1914-16, 61; troubled past, 76-8 
 
 Balkan Wars, 1912-13, causes of, 
 73 
 
 Bank, German Imperial, finances 
 Bolsheviki, 176 
 
 Bapaume, in Second battle of the 
 Somme, 142 
 
 Belgium, causes of war, 1914, 62; 
 invasion by Germany planned, 
 59, 192; armistice terms, 154; 
 Brand Whitlock's "Story of," 
 125 
 
 Belgrade (Serbia), captured by 
 Austro-Bulgarian armies, 137 
 
 Berard, Victor, prophecy of War, 
 79 
 
 Bernhardi, General, principles, 72, 
 187-92; quotations from, 187-92 
 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, von, speech in 
 Reichstag, 189; resignation, 174 
 
 Bismarck, policies, 34-35; at Con- 
 gress of Berlin, 52-53-54 
 
 Bolsheviki, rise of, 143; effect on 
 Russian army, I43, 145; and on 
 Russia, 145, 176-7; danger of, 
 159 
 
 Boris, of Bulgaria, succeeds to 
 throne, 150; abdicates, 151 
 
 Boxer, uprising, 131-2 
 
 Brest-Litovsk, treaty, nature of, 
 176-7; German violation of, 
 145 
 
 Breslau, German warship, enters 
 Dardanelles, 136; sunk by Brit- 
 ish, 148 
 
 Bryan, W. J., treaties, 48 
 
 Bryce, James, on the Balkan ques- 
 tion, 79, 80 
 
 Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexation, 
 26, 55-6 
 
 Bulgaria, and Turkey, 76, and oth- 
 er Balkans, 53, 76-8; causes of 
 war, 64; Armistice terms, 152 
 
 265 
 
266 
 
 Index 
 
 Byng, General, advance, lJfi\ re- 
 verses, 143 
 
 Cambrai, falls to British, 149 
 
 Carthage, commercial struggle, 31, 
 41 
 
 Chadwick, Admiral, on Spanish- 
 American War, 105-6 
 
 Chateau-Thierry, American ad- 
 vance, 146 
 
 China, declares war, I4I 
 
 Commercial causes of war, 24, 30, 
 SI 
 
 Congress, of Berlin, 54, 76 
 
 Conquest, wars of, 37-8 
 
 Constitution of League of Nations, 
 202-14; of United States, 197 
 
 Crown Prince, German, 46, 48 
 
 Cuba, why not independent in 
 1825? 106-7; American interests 
 in, 107-8, 112, 114 
 
 Czar of Russia, not the aggressor 
 in 1914, 129; guilt of his gov- 
 ernment, 67; overthrow, 174 
 
 Dardanelles, neutralization of, SI- 
 S', British and French at, #>, 
 1S8 
 
 Denmark, war with Prussia and 
 Austria, 35 
 
 Doyle, A. C, on British-Boer war, 
 92, 95 
 
 Economic wars, 31-2 
 
 Ecquador, 142 
 
 England, Causes of war in 1914, 
 60; causes of war with Boers, S'. 
 Africa, 103-4; Opium War with 
 China, 31; England and Ireland, 
 44 ; colonial expansion, 32, dv, 4® » 
 Great Britain and the Triple Al- 
 liance, 53-4-5-6; Nature of Brit- 
 ish government, 26, 32, 34, 44> 
 46, 47, 60, 64-5; Great Britain 
 and the "League of Nations," 
 194-5 
 
 European War, 1914, causes of, 
 58-64; background of, 51-7 
 
 Falkenhayn, Gen. von, in Rou- 
 
 mania, 139 
 Ferdinand, of Bulgaria, resigns, 
 
 150 
 
 Finland, reference to, lfi\ and Bol- 
 sheviki, 145; German conquest 
 of, 148 
 
 Foch, General, in battle of Marne, 
 136, allied commander-in-chief, 
 142; in Italy, 144 
 
 Formosa, ceded to Japan, 84 
 
 France, confronted with danger of 
 war, 18, 26, 35, 37, 58, 56, 60, 66, 
 116-18; causes of war, 1914, 60; 
 causes of Franco-Prussian war, 
 115; military program, 59, 66; 
 treaty relation, 54-5, 59, 60; Ger- 
 man invasion, 61, 135; General 
 Bernhardi's statement concern- 
 ing, 192 
 
 Franz-Ferdinand, Archduke, assas- 
 sination, 59, 135 
 
 Frederick the Great, his principles 
 and wars, 47, 187; Bemhardi, a 
 German authority on these wars, 
 190 
 
 Gerard, Ambassador, book on Ger- 
 many, 126 
 
 Germany, causes of war, 1914, 63; 
 ultimatums, 39, 59; invasion of 
 Belgium, 34, 39, 59, 62, 66, 135, 
 154, 191-2; atrocities and policy 
 of frightfulness, 22, 34, 63 (mili- 
 tarism) 52-3, 60, 62, 64, 65, 69, 
 131-4, 170; starvation in con- 
 quered territory, 132-4 
 
 German ideals and political prac- 
 tices, 17-18, 27, 31, S4-6, 44, 46, 
 53, 55, 59, 63, 65, 66, 69-72, 131- 
 2; treaty obligations broken, 58, 
 60, 62, 66, 145-177; ("necessity 
 knows no law") 131, 191-2; 
 Propaganda in United States, 
 27, 69-71, 123, 125; progress in 
 industries, 66; in militarism, 27, 
 35, 66, 131, 186-7, 187-93 
 
 Goeben, enters Dardanelles, 136; 
 sunk by British, I48 
 
 Great Britain (see England) 
 
 Greece, causes of war, 1914, 61; 
 declaration of war, 142; strug- 
 gles for liberty and union of her 
 peoples, 49, 77 
 
 Guatemala, war on Germany, 142 
 
 Heligoland, Battle of, 136 
 Hershey, A. S., on Spanish-Ameri- 
 
Index 
 
 267 
 
 can War, 106 ; on Russo-Japan- 
 ese War, 81-83, 88 
 
 Hindenburg, Gen. von, stops Rus- 
 sian advance, 136; drive in Po- 
 land, 137 
 
 "Hindenburg Lin*," 142 
 
 Hindus, 45 
 
 Holy Alliance, 51 
 
 Hoover, Herbert, and U. S. food 
 administration (testify to starva- 
 tion by Germans) 133-4 
 
 Hungary, revolution of 1848, 49; 
 freedom, 4$ 
 
 Huns, reason for name, 131-2 
 
 India, 44 
 
 Italy, war with Turkey, 68, 73, 80; 
 causes of war, 1914, 61; Italian 
 unity and nationality, 35, 37, 45, 
 52, 67-8; Declares war on Aus- 
 tria, 137; on Germany, 139; in- 
 terest in Adriatic and Balkans, 
 61, 79; Great victory in close of 
 war, 149-50 
 
 Jameson Raid, 97, 100 
 
 Japan, causes of Russo-Japanese 
 war, 81, 90; causes of war, 1914, 
 62; war with China, 83, 84; in 
 Korea, 82-4-7, 88-9-90; in Man- 
 churia, 83, 86, 87-89, 90; Ger- 
 man proposals to, 69, 123 
 
 Jerusalem, captured by British, 
 144 
 
 Jutland, battle of, 140 
 
 Kaiser, the German, claims to di- 
 vine right, 27, 124; speeches and 
 character of rule, 27, 48, 56-7, 
 59, 60, 63, 65, 131; threats to 
 peace of Europe, 55-7, 128-30; 
 visits to Turkey, and responsibil- 
 ity for Turkish massacres, 57, 
 65; abdication, 152 
 
 Karl, Emperor, leaves Austria, 
 151 
 
 Kemmel, Mt., captured by Ger- 
 mans, 146 
 
 Korea (see Japan) 
 
 Kossuth, 49 
 
 Kruger, Paul, in S. Africa, 99- 
 100 
 
 League of Nations, a discussion, 
 186-201; German attitude, 187- 
 
 League of Nations ("to enforce 
 
 peace") 49, 76, 162, 164-5, 178, 
 
 ISO, 184 
 League Covenant, text of February 
 
 draft, 202-214; final draft, 244- 
 
 261 
 Lens, coal city, siege by British, 
 
 137, 142; evacuated, 149 
 Liberia, declares war on Germany, 
 
 m 
 
 Lille, evacuated by Germans, 149 
 Lloyd-George, answer to German 
 
 peace proposal, 171 
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, on Spanish- 
 American war, 107, 112 
 
 Mackensen, Gen. von, expels Rus- 
 sians, 136; in Roumania, 139 
 
 Mahan, Capt., on Spanish-Ameri- 
 can war, 112 
 
 Marne, first battle of, 59, 130, 136; 
 second battle of, 146-9 
 
 Messines Ridge, 142, I46 
 
 Mexico, German intrigues in, 69, 
 123 
 
 Mihiel/St, battle of, 147 
 
 Monastir, taken by Allies, 139 
 
 Monroe Doctrine, 26, 52, 122; Gen. 
 Bernhardi on, 191 
 
 Morganth.au, Henry, Ambassador's 
 "story," 126, 183 
 
 Nationality, growth of, as cause 
 
 for war, 23, 34-6, 61-3, 67-8 
 Navigation Laws, 43 
 Neuve Chapelle, battle, 137 
 Nicaragua, declares war, 142 
 Noyon, battle line, 146 
 
 Ostend, Sub-base, British attack 
 on, 148 
 
 Panama, canal and neutralization, 
 32; war on Germany, 141 
 
 Paris, German Super-gun fires on, 
 132, 146 
 
 Peronne, capture of, 147 
 
 Poland, partitions, 50, 182; must 
 be restored 50,164,180; "When 
 the Prussians Came to Poland," 
 126; German government in, 44* 
 123 ("Ireland and Poland"), 
 126; efforts to Germanize, 200 
 
 Portugal, revolution in, 36; ally of 
 England, 62; in Belgium, 146 
 
268 
 
 Index 
 
 Prussia, and Bismarck, 35; Triple 
 Alliance, 52; War with France, 
 115-20; militarism, 35, 168 (war 
 lords), 193 
 
 Quotations, from Pres. Wilson's 
 Flag Day Address, 68-72; from 
 Jan. 22, 1917 speech, 162-4; Re- 
 ply to Pope, 166; "Four points" 
 from July 4, 1918 speech, 177- 
 178; "five points" from Sept. 27, 
 1918 speech, 179; from German 
 leaders on war, and arbitration, 
 187-92 
 
 Red Cross, hospitals fired upon by 
 Germans, 132 
 
 Religion, wars of, 23, 29 
 
 Rheims, shelling by Germans, 132 
 (cathedral) ; German attack in 
 Rheims salient, 146; French and 
 Americans wipe out salient, lift 
 
 Roulers, recaptured by Belgians, 
 149 
 
 Roumania, historical sketch, 76-8; 
 declares war on, 139; Germany, 
 Turkey, Bulgaria declare war 
 on, 139; overrun by armies of 
 Central Powers, 139 
 
 Russia, member of Triple Entente, 
 54-5; Crimean War, 75-6; war 
 with Turkey, 1878, 76; and Con- 
 gress of Berlin, 53, 76-7, and 
 Constantinople, 28, 61, 67; access 
 denied to Mediterranean, 76; 
 causes of war in 1914, 61; 
 causes of Russo-Japanese war, 
 81, 90; revolution, and overthrow 
 of Czar, 11, 17, 28, 174, US 
 
 Russo-Japanese War, causes of 
 (see Russia above) 
 
 Selective Service Draft, in U S., 
 141 
 
 Serbia, causes of war, 1914, 61 ; 
 historical sketch, 75, 77-8; Aus- 
 tria declares war upon, 135; re- 
 sists Austrians, 135; crushed by 
 Austro-Bulgarian invasion, 137; 
 nucleus of new Jugo-Slav state, 
 78 
 
 Spain, negotiations with U. S. over 
 Cuba, 106; revolution in, 110-36; 
 Moroccan crisis, 56; war with 
 
 U. S., 1898 (causes), 118-14 
 Spanish-American War, causes of, 
 113-14; Chadwick on, 105-6; 
 Lodge on, 107, 112; Capt. Ma- 
 han on, 112 
 
 Tannenburg, battle of, 186; junker, 
 
 193 
 Tarif, protective, 43, 183-4 
 Turkey, character of government, 
 33, 183; war with Italy, 80; First 
 Balkan war, 74; Crimean War, 
 76; with Russia, 1878, 76; causes 
 of war, 1914, 63; in thrall of 
 Germany, 65, 70; declares war 
 on Russia, 135; Great Britain 
 and France declare war on, 135; 
 declares war on Roumania, 139; 
 armistice terms, 152; fortifica- 
 tions at Dardanelles, 138 
 
 United States, interest in Cuba, 
 107-9, 114; causes of war, 1914, 
 64, 68-72, 122-8; part in League 
 of Nations, 196-8; importance of 
 entry into World War, 17; Ger- 
 man hatred toward, 36; greatest 
 contribution to the world, 39; 
 military program in 1917, 141 
 
 Uruguay, 142 
 
 Valenciennes, capture of, 149 
 
 Venezuela, Roosevelt and the 
 Kaiser, 122 
 
 Verdun, first battle of, 140; French 
 counter-stroke at, 14O; second 
 counter-thrust by French, 143 
 
 Versailles, congress of, 51; Pres. 
 Wilson at, 182 
 
 Vienna, Congress of, 51; responsi- 
 bility for this war, 51 
 
 War, an instinct, 29-30; classifica- 
 tion of causes, 23-4; funda- 
 mental causes, 31-9; pretexts 
 and excuses, 28, 35, 40, 4U 43-4> 
 45; Austrian and German pre- 
 texts, 59-60; nature and func- 
 tion of, 22; causes of World 
 War, 58-64; outline for study of, 
 in U. S. A., 135-59; immediate 
 causes for U. S., and fundamen- 
 tal (outline), 121-27, 
 First year of, 135 
 
Index 
 
 269 
 
 Second year of, 137 
 Third year of, 138 
 Fourth year of, 141 
 Fifth year of, 145 
 Last events, 149 
 Balkan Wars, causes of, 73-ff 
 British-Boer War, causes of, 
 
 91-fS 
 Franco-Prussian War, causes of, 
 
 115-ft 
 Russo-Japanese War, causes of, 
 
 87-fP 
 Spanish-American War, causes 
 
 of, 105-8 
 
 No longer same necessity for war, 
 50, 199-201; war and the League 
 of Nations, 49, 76, 196-201; war 
 the political gospel of the Ger- 
 man government, 187-92 
 
 Y. M. C. A., duty to support, 125; 
 treatment by Germans, 132 
 
 Zimmermann, German foreign min- 
 ister, notes to Mexico and Japan, 
 69, 123 
 

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