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 1 No. 323 
 
 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 
 
 AN ADDRESS 
 
 DELIVERED ON THE OCCASION OF THE NINETY-SEVENTH 
 
 CONVOCATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
 DECEMBER 21. 1915, AND BEFORE THE 
 
 INDUSTRIAL CLUB OF CHICAGO 
 
 ON JANUARY 27. 1916 
 
 BY 
 
 HON. WALTER L. FISHER 
 
 FORMER SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 
 
 PRESENTED BY MR. LA FOLLETTE 
 
 Febbuary 14, 1916.— Ordered to be printed 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 
 1916 
 

 D, of D„ 
 MAR H 1916 
 
f 
 
 0^^ 
 
 ft PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE.' 
 
 Walter L. Fishek, fox'mer Secretary of the Interior. 
 
 Half truths are dangerous because the element of truth which 
 they contain carries conviction and easily leads to its application far 
 beyond the real significance to which it is entitled. We are at 
 present in grave danger of just such a misconception of one of the 
 most prevalent statements with regard to military preparation. The 
 sentiment of this country is undoubtedly opposed to militarism. 
 Our ideals and purposes are peaceful. No imperialistic propaganda 
 could hope to succeed if its character and purposes were understood. 
 The agitation for increasing our military forces is as a whole 
 genuinely peaceful in its purpose. Certainly it makes its great ap- 
 peal upon the ground that preparation for war is essential for the 
 preservation of peace. The proverbs of the ancients and the utter- 
 ances of our early Presidents are the mottoes it repeats : Si vis pacem 
 para helium^ " If you wish peace prepare for war." 
 
 And undoubtedly in a world where selfishness and greed and lust 
 of power still move the mass and the rulers of men to the extent 
 they do to-day, where force is still believed to constitute a necessary 
 if not a proper means of advancing national interests and national 
 ideals, military preparation against war is an essential for securing 
 peace. But there is real danger that we shall be misled — or may 
 deceive ourselves — into believing that preparation for war is the 
 most important thing for us if we desire to secure our own peace 
 and to promote the peace of the world. Nothing, it seems to me, 
 could be more unfortunate than such a result. If we wish peace, the 
 most important thing is not to prepare for war — although that we 
 should do. If we wish peace^ the most important — the all-impor- 
 tant — thing is to prepare for peace; to do the things that make for 
 peace and that promote peace, not the things that make for war and 
 promote war. And yet these peaceful measures are the things that 
 are receiving scant attention. 
 
 I am led to present to you some thoughts upon this subject because 
 the significance of the great war in which the larger part of the 
 civilized world is now engaged is the one absorbing interest of our 
 Avhole intellectual life. I have no thought that I shall say things 
 that have not been better said by others — that I have anything 
 original to impart. I am moved by a deep conviction that mankind 
 is struggling with destiny as it has seldom struggled before, and that 
 it is the duty of every man and woman — and especially of every 
 educated man and woman — to think of this world war, its causes, 
 and its probable results; and, as his thoughts become at all definite, 
 to express them, if it be only in confirmation of, or dissent from, the 
 
 ^^ Delivered (in part) as an address on the occasion of the Ninety-seventh Convocation 
 of the University of Chicago held in I.eon !Mandel Assemhly Hall, December 21, 1915. 
 Delivered on January 27, 1916, before the Industrial Club of Chicago. 
 
4 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 views expressed by others which are likely to affect public opinion 
 and public action. It is a time for each human being, in humility 
 and sincerity, to ask himself: "What do I think? What is the ex- 
 planation of this appalling catastrophe and what is to follow it? 
 What should and what can I, in my tiny circle of possible action, do 
 to help, if ever so little, toward a right solution of the problems it 
 presents ? •' 
 
 What might be called its purel}' academic interest is greater than 
 any other interest of the student. It pervades the library and the 
 laboratory, the classroom and the lecture hall, and the quiet cloisters 
 of the university. What a compelling stimulus to intellectual activity 
 it is; what a zest it adds to all our studies in physical, political, social, 
 and economic science; to what fierce tests it is subjecting our theories 
 of human progress and social evolution ! 
 
 There is nothing, indeed, so instructive, so absorbing, so essential 
 for us — as individuals and as a nation — to understand as the mighty 
 conflict that is now going on ; its causes and its consequences, its 
 horrors and its folly. It is important for all of us to appreciate the 
 reality of its horror. But I am not qualified to picture this horror if 
 I would, and this is not the place or the occasion. It is fitting, how- 
 ever, for us to consider its folly, and how we in the future may 
 escape such folly. " Wisdom is the principal thing ; therefore get 
 wisdom : and Avith all thy getting get understanding." 
 
 There is a call for the public service of educated men and women 
 such as has not been heard in the world since the French Revolution. 
 For we must go back to France and the Napoleonic era for any such 
 epochal events as are happening in the world to-day. It is quite pos- 
 sible, perhaps it is exceedingly probable, that the actual consequences 
 upon our whole intellectual, social, political, and economic outlook 
 that will follow and result from this war will be greater than those 
 that followed even that great upheaval of civilized society. It is 
 only as we understand how fundamental are the issues that are forced 
 upon us that we shall meet those issues intelligently and wisely. Our 
 danger, and the danger of Europe, is that we shall see its causes and 
 effects superficially and shall devise superficial remedies and adopt a 
 superficial settlement. There are so many essentially superficial 
 phases of the situation that are nevertheless so important and so com- 
 pelling in their interest that we can all be forgiven for misconceiving 
 their relative importance compared with the deeper issues; but it 
 is only as we find and face these deeper issues of transcendent conse- 
 quence that we shall work good out of this awful evil that has fallen 
 on mankind. 
 
 Already the danger of one great folly from a superficial view of 
 this war has become apparent, and that is that we shall think of it as 
 due to and as an exhibition of ruthless military power; that it is due 
 to what is called Prussianism, and that if we could just curb and 
 destroy Prussianism the world could go on quite satisfactorily, upon 
 the whole, and without any serious or fundamental disturbance of the 
 established social, political, economic, and intellectual order. No 
 mistake could be made so disastrous to the future peace and progress 
 of mankind as this. Even if the Prussian war god sits the saddle in 
 Germany to-day, waging war with a ruthlessness that appalls man- 
 kind and an efficiencv that compels its admiration, nevertheless, how 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 5 
 
 pitiful would be the conclusion that what appalls us is not war, but 
 merely the ruthlessness and efficiency with which it is made. 
 
 It was an American thinking of war in America wiio said that 
 " War is hell ! " — not German war or English war or Russian war, 
 but war, wherever waged or by wdiatever nation. There was never 
 a great war waged that did not produce all the atrocities of this war, 
 on one side or on both. The scale of the atrocities may be greater, as 
 the scale of this war is greater. Even the doctrine of f rightfulness is 
 a doctrine that has been defended and practiced by every nation, even 
 our own, within such limits and under such conditions as each nation 
 has determined for itself at the time and according to its exigency 
 as it saw it. There are few" follies equal to the folly of imagining 
 that war can be made humane. 
 
 Our own " Instructions for the government of armies of the United 
 States in the field" (General Orders, No. 100, 1863), issued under 
 Abraham Lincoln, the most humane of Presidents, and again issued 
 without modification during the War with Spain in 1898, announced : 
 
 To save the country is paramount to all other considerations. 
 
 And— 
 
 IS. When the conunander of a besieged place expels the uonconibatants in 
 order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is 
 lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the 
 surrender. 
 
 19. Conuuanders, whenever admissible, should inform the enemy of their 
 intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the 
 women and children, may be removed befoi*e the bombardment commences. 
 But it is no infraction of the common law of war to omit thus to inform the 
 enemy. Surprise may be a necessity. 
 
 No matter how clear the evidence may seem to some of us to-day, 
 we are too near the event to be sure of our perspective. We must not 
 forget how often " knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers." Even if 
 we make certain that Servia was the occasion, not the cause, of this 
 war: that Germany had prepared for "the day" and that she chose 
 the day which she thought was most favorable to her; that she. and 
 no other, precipitated this horrible cataclysm of cruelty and destruc- 
 tion — even if we spare whatever nation is responsible, no part of the 
 just condemnation of mankind for touching the match to the powder 
 that had been so assiduously laid throughout Europe and that needed 
 only the match — how blind, howqoitifully and perversely blind, we 
 should be not to recognize that the fundamental error consisted in 
 having a state of international relations that was prepared for the 
 match ; that the fundamental responsibility, deeper than Prussian- 
 ism, was w^ith the nations that built and maintained their civiliza- 
 tions over a powder magazine ! Without now discussing whether any 
 other basis of internationalism is practicable than the basis of na- 
 tional armament and of military force, how foolish, how unfair, to 
 say that in a society of nations based on force that nation which 
 acquires and uses the greatest and the most efficient force is exclu- 
 sively to blame for an explosion that leads to a test of force! The 
 matured and distant judgment of mankind will be little concerned 
 with awarding praise or blame on the basis of the relative extent or 
 officiency of military preparation, or even of the relative ruthlessness 
 with which military force was used in a state of societv based on 
 
6 PREPARATIOXS FOR PEACE. 
 
 force and on the use of force to secure or to retain the right to exploit 
 other lands and peoples. 
 
 The truth is that the really great differences between the warring 
 nations are only differences of degree — degrees of militarism, degrees 
 of democracy, degrees of political and economic intelligence. I do 
 not minimize these differences. So gigantic is the scale on which the 
 world movement proceeds that these differences of degree become 
 of huge dimensions and importance when the diverging lines are 
 projected into the expanded Held of action. In war, international 
 differences are centrifugal. Chasms widen as the circumference of 
 the conflict expands and the conflict becomes more intense. War 
 distorts and exaggerates and intensifies every difference of national 
 feeling, every national misunderstanding. If. however, it be true 
 that Germany is more militaristic than England or France or Russia 
 or Italy, it is true only as a statement of the degree in which each of 
 these nations has been and is militaristic. If it be true that Germany 
 believes that she has a national ideal and peculiar national interests — 
 political, economic, intellectual — which can be advanced by military 
 force, the same thing is true of each of her rivals. If it be true that 
 militarism in Germany is a menace to the world, it is also true that 
 militarism in the rest of Europe is a menace to the world. Does Ger- 
 many believe that she has a peculiar mission to perform in the un- 
 folding of civilization, that her form of political organization, her 
 economic and intellectual processes, offer the greatest assurance of 
 human progress, and that it is her duty as well as her right to impose 
 this hiiltur on the world? England has been obsessed by the same 
 megalomaniac folly. So have we. If, happily, we are less sure that 
 we are the people, anel that wisdom is in clanger lest it die with us, 
 can we claim anything more than that we have seen the futility of 
 such egotism, ever so little sooner and ever so little more clearly than 
 some others? Are John Bull and Brother Jonathan types of modest 
 self-effacement and humility before the slowly unfolding secrets of 
 the universe? 
 
 We have been reading much of the lords and prophets of war in 
 Germany; but have they uttered anything more frankly militaristic 
 than Lord Roberts, " Little Bobs," the military idol of Great Britain ? 
 
 How was tliis Eiiipiri' of r>i"itain founded? \<\w foiiiulod this Empire — war 
 and conquest ! When we, therefore, masters hy war of one-tliird of the liabit- 
 able slobe, when ire propose to Gernumy to disarm, to curtail her navy or 
 diminish her army, Germany naturally refuses ; and pointing not witliout 
 justice to the road by which England, sword in hand, lias climbed to her un- 
 matched eminence, declares openly or in the veiled lannuase of diplomacy, that 
 by the same path, if by no other, Germany is determined also to ascend! Who 
 amongst us, knowing the past of this nation, and the past of all nations and cities 
 that have ever added the luster of their name to luunan annals, can accuse Ger- 
 many or regard the utterance of one of her greatest a year iind a half ago |or 
 of General Rernhardi three months agol with any feelings except those of 
 respect ? 
 
 Norman Angell, in his recent book on America and the New 
 World State, has collected this and many other quotations which 
 demonstrate that there is an " Anglo-Saxon Prussianism " which 
 differs only from German Prussianism in the extent to which it has 
 attained popular support or official power. And yet it was the bitter 
 complaint of Bernhardi and Trietschke that their ideas had so little 
 influence among the people or in official circles. The most interesting 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACK. 7 
 
 to me of all Angell's quotations is that from the Belgian author, 
 Doctor Sarolea, who, in his book on The Anglo-German Problem, 
 says : 
 
 What is even more serious and ominous, so fur jis the prospects of peace are 
 concerneil, the German who knows that lie is right from his own point of view, 
 l<nows that lie is also right from the English point of view; he knows that the 
 premises on which he is reasoning are still accepted by a large section of the 
 English people. Millions of English people are actuated in their policy by 
 those vei-y imperialistic principles on which the Germans take their stand. 
 After all German statesmen are only applying the political lessons which Eng- 
 land has taught them, which Mr. Kudyard Kipling has sung, and Mr. Chamber- 
 lain has pi'oclaimed in speeches innumerable. Both the English Imperialist and 
 the German Imperialist believe that the greatness of a country does not depend 
 mainly on the virtues of the people, or on the resources of the home country, 
 but largely on the capacity of the home country to acquire and to retain large 
 tracts of territory all over the world. Both the English Imperialist and the 
 German Im]ierialist have learned the doctrine of Admiral ]Mahan, that the 
 greatness and prosperity of a country depend mainly on sea power. Both 
 believe that efficiency and success in war is one of the main conditions of 
 national prosperity. 
 
 Now as long as the two nations do not rise to a saner political ideal, as long 
 as both English and German people are agreed in accepting the current political 
 philosophy, as long as both nations shall consider military power not merely as 
 a necessary and temporary evil to submit to, but as a permanent and noble 
 ideal to strive after, the German argument remains unanswerable. War is 
 indeed predestined, and no diplomatists sitting round a great table in the 
 Wilhelmstrasse or the Ballplatz or the Quai d'Orsay will be able to ward off the 
 inevitable. It is only, therefore, in so far as both nations will move away from 
 the old political philosophy that an understanding between Germany and 
 England will become possible. * * * jj- j^ ^i^g ideas and the ideals that 
 must be fundamentally changed : " Instauratio facienda ab imis fundamentis." 
 And those ideals once changed, all motives for a war between England and Ger- 
 many would vanish as by magic. But alas ! ideas and ideals do not change by 
 magic or prestige — they can only change by the slow operation of intellectual 
 conversion. Arguments alone can do it. 
 
 Let US turn from the war lords of England and Germany to those 
 who do not speak under the influence of military training or military 
 occupation. We are told by the translator of Dr. Paul Rohrbach's 
 book, The German Idea in the World, that it — 
 
 probably inspired more Germans tlian any other book published since 1871, for 
 everybo<ly felt that it presented a generally true pictui-e of the Fatherlan<l 
 and indicated the paths which the Germans had resolved to follow. 
 
 This opinion I have had substantial!}' confirmed by most compe- 
 tent authority. I think it gives us a real insight into the ideas that 
 have moved the German people. You will note that the author does 
 not hesitate to praise the Anglo-Saxon or to criticize the German, 
 and that his underlying and dominating purpose is peaceful ex- 
 pansion. 
 
 The markets of the world ! We need them to-day for oui* existence as posi- 
 tively as we need our own land, and the day is approaching with irrevocable 
 certainty when we shall need them even more. We can be nationally healthy 
 only so long as our share in the business of the world continues to grow, 
 and only if this is the case shall we be able to foster the innei- values which 
 spring from our national idea, and let them take part with the other factors 
 in the shaping of the culture of the world. * * * 
 
 The German idea, therefore, can only live and increase if its material founda- 
 tions, viz, the number of Germans, the prosperity of Germany, and the number 
 and size of our world interests continfle to increase. As these foundations 
 continue to gi-ow they compel the Anglo-Saxons to make their decision between 
 the following two propositions : 
 
8 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 Will they reconcile themselves to seeing onr interests in the world maintain 
 themselves by the side of their own and come to an agreement with us con- 
 cerning them? Or will they fight, with force of arms, to remain the sole mis- 
 tress of the world? If they choose the latter, it will depend on our strength 
 whether we conquer or surrender or hold our own. * * * 
 
 We have progressed within a generation with a rapidity which creates the 
 belief that we can wipe out within a decade the losses of a century. But we 
 urov/ dizzy when we contemplate our political economy shooting up to steep 
 heights and resting only on the small support of Eui'opean Germany, especially 
 when we compare it with the much wider security across oceans and continents 
 which England and America have built. It is here where the abyss is lurking 
 into whicli our new grandeur may be hurled imless we secure it with stronger 
 props than are luade of iron or gold. We have now reached the point which 
 illustrates a fact which no one can view too seriously, namely, that the world 
 |)Ovver of the Anglo-Saxons does not rest solely on external support, such as 
 wealth, colonies, dominion over the seas and flourishing industries, but that 
 corresponding to these material possessions a growth of character and of 
 inner worth and an increase in the breadth of the Anglo-Saxon idea have 
 actually justilied the people possessing them in reaching out for the dominion 
 of the world. * * * 
 
 The true attitude of England toward our navy and commerce is revealed by 
 such comments as were contained in the famous article in the Saturday Review 
 of September. 1897, which made a great stir in England and the whole world, 
 and frankly stated that England's prosperity could only be saved if Germany 
 were destroyed. " England," the article says in part, " with her long history 
 of successful aggression, with her marvelous conviction that in pursuing her 
 own interests she is spreading light among nations ilwelling in darkness, and 
 Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a lesser will 
 force, but perhaps with a keener intelligence, coiupete in every corner of the 
 globe. In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the East, 
 the islands of the Southern Sea, and in the far Northwest, wherever — and 
 where has it not? — the flag has followed the Bible and trade has followed the 
 rtag there the German bagman is struggling with the English peddler. Is there 
 a mine to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to 
 tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the German and the Englishman 
 iire struggling to be first. A luillion petty disputes build up the greatest cause 
 of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, 
 the day after to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would 
 not be richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succes- 
 sion. Must they not fight for two hundred fifty million pounds of conunerce?" 
 
 Doctor Rohrbach says: 
 
 We know very well that it does n(»t i-eflect the feelings of the whole of Eng- 
 land, but nevertheless of a considerable portion of the English Nation. * * * 
 
 The two jiolitical catch words, "reaction" and "government by feudal 
 classes," which foreign public opinion frequently uses to describe German 
 conditions, are not calculated to bring success to the German idea in the world. 
 But they are not the oidy obstacles. liike other people, we suffer from the 
 defects of our virtues. The reverse and unfortiuiate complement of that sense 
 of duty and industry, which we call the positive poles of our character, are 
 an offensive superiority and awkwardness of behavior, which are constantly 
 putting us at a disadvantage. * * * Between these two observations there 
 is so much German awkwardness, indolence, and ignorance of the national 
 idea in its highest sense that we can explain the progress abroad which we 
 have made only by the one thing in which we excel all other people : our exact 
 and conscientious labor and our remarkable diligence. 
 
 Tlic i-eal evil lies in the docti-ine of i)olitical and economic im- 
 perialism conunon to so many nations- — the doctrine that holds that 
 the economic welfare and prog'ress of every nation and of its people 
 depend upon securing constantly exi)anding markets and sources of 
 supply, constantly expanding opji)ortunities for trade, and that such 
 opportunities are only to be found, or at least are best to be found, 
 by acquiring political dominion over or sj)heres of influence in other 
 i.'ountries, especially in coiuiti'ies relati\ely backwai'd in industrial 
 
PEEPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 9 
 
 development but capable of such development. If this is sound doc- 
 trine economically, if it really is enlightened selfishness, if it is not 
 to be restrained by the sense of moral obligation to respect the rights 
 of other nations, if, indeed, the whole theory is to be gilded and dis- 
 guised by a supposed moral obligation to uplift the relatively back- 
 ward peoples and develop the relatively undeveloped lands — the 
 theory of the white man's burden — it would seem an irresistible 
 conclusion that force must continue to rule the world and that peace- 
 ful civilization can go forward only under a dominant nation or 
 under a balance of power between several dominant nations. 
 
 I do not believe that this doctrine will indefinitely continue to con- 
 trol politics and international relations. It is not morally sound. 
 It is not economically sound. It is not even enlightened selfishness. 
 It must and will disappear with the demonstration of its futility. 
 This doctrine and civilization, as the masses of mankind are coming 
 to conceive of civilization, are irreconcilably opposed. Force as a 
 means of promoting economic interests or of advancing intellectual 
 ideals is certain to diminish and to disappear, just as certainly as 
 human slaverv and the imposition of theological or religious dogma 
 by force have already disappeared. The rapidity of the process will 
 depend chiefly, if not entirely, upon the progress of education and 
 intelligence among the mass of mankind. If, therefore, we desire 
 to reduce the chance of war, either because it is right for the world 
 that it shall be reduced, or because we are thinking only of ourselves 
 and wish to escape its horrors, if our desire is to prepare for peace, 
 the surest w^ay to accomplish this result is, first, by seeing that our 
 own national purposes and methods are not based upon tlie desire for 
 economic expansion by means of political dominion or special privi- 
 lege, or any sort of sphere of influence that discriminates in favor of 
 our people as against those of any other nation; and secondly, by 
 doing everything in oui' ]:iower to biing other nations to this same con- 
 clusion, including active cooperation witl) other nations to produce 
 this result. 
 
 Our peace depends upon ourselves and upon the peace of the world; 
 and one of the greatest steps toward the establishment of the world 
 peace upon which our peace so largely depends is a sympathetic and 
 effective cooperation between the Anglo-Saxon and the German and 
 Scandinavian nations, to which Earl Grey has refen-ed as " nearest 
 to us in mind and sentiment." 
 
 We are told that at the end of the war our potential enemies will 
 certainly be exhausted and unable or disinclined to take up a quarrel 
 with us. I wish I could have the assurance upon this score that some 
 of my fellow" pacifists entertain : but I can not forecast either our own 
 wisdom or the degree of human emotion and human folly that will 
 survive — that possibly may be born of— the greatest exhibition of 
 human emotion and human folly that the world has ever seen. Our 
 first duty, our most enlightened selfishness, is to do everything in our 
 power now and at .the close of hostilities. to remove the causes of war, 
 to create alternatives for war; but as we can not hope to remove every 
 cause for war, as we can not be sure that effective alternatives for 
 war will be devised or will be accepted, we have ourselves no sane 
 alternative but to be prepared for effective defense. We have seen 
 too clearly the realities of war to risk its coming or its consequences. 
 
10 pr?:parations fok peace. 
 
 Our defense must be real or it will only add to our danger. Within 
 the limits of what is strictly necessary for defense our preparation 
 must be made as though it were certain to be needed. No fear that 
 other nations will be led by our example to increase their armament 
 unnecessarily can stand for one moment against the possibility of our 
 need. What is incumbent upon us is to make it as clear as possible 
 that the character and the extent of our military preparation are 
 strictly defensive; indeed, our first inquiry should be into the possi- 
 bilities of a military policy that will be on its face and in its essential 
 characteristics defensive. 
 
 With the greatest deference, and subject to correction by demon- 
 stration and not by assertion, I venture to suggest that there is such 
 a thing as a defensive military polic3^ which is essentially different 
 in important particulars from an aggressive military policy, and that 
 the plans for military and naval preparedness which are being pre- 
 sented to lis either by the President and his political advisers, or 
 by the General Board of the Navy, or the General Staff of the Army, 
 do not recognize or apply the distinction. 
 
 I am not discussing these things as an expert, nor do I assume that 
 my audience is composed of experts. I am. however, not without the 
 support of expert opinion, although it has not been allowed much 
 public expression. And I assume that the great audience of our 
 ordinary fellow citizens, as inexpert but as intensely and vitally con- 
 cerned as we are, will in the end settle our military policy on sea 
 and land, for this is necessarily the way of democracy. Admiral 
 Mahan says : 
 
 .Tustly api^iccijited. inilitiirx jiffiiirs iire one siilc of the politics of ;i nation and 
 therefore concern the individual who l)as an interest in tlie liovernnient of the 
 state. They form part of a <-losel.v relate<l whole, and imttin;;" aside the purely 
 professional details * * * military i»i-eparations sh<mld he determined chiefly 
 by those broad political considerations \\hich afYect the relations of states one 
 to anotlier or of several part.s of the same state to the common defense. 
 
 Eobert Wilden Neeser, whose book. Our Navy and the Next War, is 
 an argument for greater naval strength, nevertheless says: 
 
 In the last analysis it i.s the peojile who jiovern. it is the people who must be 
 informed of their military condition. TIk' regulations wliich forbid military and 
 naval men writinir for inihlication for the puri)ose of discussion .should be re- 
 written. The freest discussion on all military and naval to])ics by officers of 
 both services should be encouraged, such writiuirs to be slfjned by the authors, 
 for which they would jissume the entire responsibility. When this privilege 
 has been jiiven. then the peojtle will have a means of j,'ettinji at the truth and 
 the authoi-ity in each case will lie known. By .sealiiiij: the liiis of those capable 
 of Kivini;- the trtitli we have encoura.y:ed scarebead artich^s upon ()ur naval pre- 
 paredness which carry little weii,dit and make no lasf'ni;- imjiression upon the 
 minds of the people. 
 
 Major-General Francis Vinton Greene has also called attention to 
 the fact that Germany permits publicaticm of fi-ank discussions of 
 military subjects — several thousand military books in a year as 
 against several scores at the most in English-speaking countries. 
 
 At all events. Avhether they like it or not, the exi)erts must convince 
 us, untrained as we are. What we want and what we are entitled to 
 have is candor and the fullest, freest opportunity for the expression 
 of every sincere and intelligent judgment that has been or is being- 
 formed within our military and naval service. We are dealing with 
 what is alleged to be and what we believe is matter of life and death. 
 
PREPAEATIONS FOR PEACE. 11 
 
 On such a matter the order prohibiting officers in our military estab- 
 lishment from ntterino- and publishing opinions upon military pol- 
 icy ^ seems especiall.y unwise and leaves the country altogether too 
 dependent upon the officials or official boards (hat for the moment 
 control the administration of our military and naval service. In 
 that service jire experienced and serious students of the problems of 
 military and naval policy whose views upon fundamentals and upon 
 important details disagree Avith the views of both the military and 
 the i^olitical heads of our military and naval establishments. These 
 differences of opinion are not being given to the public. We are 
 thus being led to the unwarranted conclusion that there is unanimity 
 among our experts as to the kind and extent of military preparation 
 we should have. 
 
 I am a convinced advocate of securing and utilizing expert advice 
 in the administration of public affairs. I have the highest regard 
 jjnd respect for the officers in our naval and military service. I 
 attach the greatest importance to their opinions with respect to the 
 things that wall produce the most efficient military preparation for 
 war and that Mill produce the greatest results in actual warfare. 
 But what we are deciding is not the sort of an army or navy that 
 W'ill be most powerful in war, but what sort of an army or navy will 
 be most effective for securing peace. And that is a question which 
 involves issues of national policy that are not exclusively military — 
 in which, indeed, the military motive is of secondary importance. 
 
 We must tell the Navy Board and the General Staff — not have 
 them tell us — what it is we want an arm}' and a navy to do ; what are 
 the purposes for which we wish to use an army and a navy. Then 
 and then only can they tell us what kind of an army and navy will 
 be best adapted for our purpose. Otherwise their opinions and esti- 
 mates must necessarily be based on the assumption that Ave want a 
 military establishment adequate to defend all our outstanding pos- 
 sessions and obligations, and to maintain all our supposed national 
 policies and interests, and in the event of war, in the language of the 
 recent report of the War College, " to insure a successful termination 
 of the Avar in the shortest time." 
 
 All this may sound somcAvhat captious and theoretical, of little 
 practical value, but I am not without knowledge that there exists 
 among military experts — and in our oAvn military service — a recog- 
 nition of the fact that there is a substantial difference betAveen a 
 defensive and an offensive military policy and that it is not being 
 recognized in the plans which are officially recommended for our mili- 
 tary preparation. We are being urged to support a military program 
 which we are assured is intended only for defense; but it is not an 
 exclusively defensive program. I do not intend to impugn in any 
 degree the sincerity of its advocates — I think they believe that they 
 are advocating a defensive policy ; but they have not defined nor had 
 defined for them what it is we Avish to defend, nor have they aban- 
 doned that hoary maxim of military science that a strong offense is 
 the best defense. 
 
 1 " Officers! of the Army will refrain, until further orders, from giving out for publi- 
 cation any interview, statement, discussion, or article on the military situation in the 
 United States or abroad, as any expression of their views on this subject at present Is 
 prejudicial to the l)est interests of the service." — War Department, Oeneral Order No. 10. 
 
12 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 We shall make a serious mistake in all that we do toward military 
 preparedness against war and for peace unless we tell our military 
 experts, and tell them in a Avay that they will understand and accept, 
 that we want a military establishment planned and prepared for de- 
 fense and not for offense, even though offense may help defense — 
 that we consciously and definitely intend to abandon and to have 
 them abandon whatever military advantage there may be in having 
 an army and a navy prepared to take the aggressive and to seek out 
 and attack in force an enemy away from our own boundaries and 
 waters. Only in this way can we convince the world that our object 
 is pacific, that we are not merely repeating the hollow assurances 
 of other nations that have built great navies and trained great armies 
 in the name of peace only to use them for aggression when the op- 
 portunity and the temptation came. Only in this way can we be sure 
 that we shall not yield to temptation wdien it comes. AVhat is there 
 in our national history to justify the claim that we will not use force 
 to extend our boundaries or our dominion over the lands of weaker 
 nations, no matter how sincerely at this time we intend not to do so? 
 What right have we to thank God that we are not as other men, 
 especially those Prussians? With an army and a navy designed for 
 and substantially limited to the defense of our own lands and shores, 
 we can with some confidence and effectiveness advocate those prin- 
 ciples and agencies of international policy that are best adapted to 
 reduce the chances of war. 
 
 To illustrate what I have in mind, and not I alone, but others 
 whose military experience and training give greater weight to their 
 opinions, let me ask you Avhether it is not clear that a real substantial 
 clarification of the Monroe Doctrine, adopting and extending the 
 suggestions of President Wilson's message, would not in itself do 
 more to make war against this country unlikely than all the increase 
 we are likely to make in our army and our navy? We hear much of 
 possible war wdth Japan. Should we not do more toward the pre- 
 vention of such a war by discussing with Ja])an the issues sur- 
 rounding Japanese immigration and the Open Door in China man 
 fashion and in a way and with results that would do justice to our 
 interests and to Japanese interests and to that self-respect which 
 Japan has earned her right to entertain ? If we really intend to give 
 national independence to the Philippines, should we not remove a 
 great menace to our peace if Ave could secure international guar- 
 anties of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Filipino 
 nation? If we should open the Panama Canal to the warships of all 
 nations under international guaranties of the safety of the Canal 
 itself and of our peaceful ownership and operation of it, should we 
 not make it a prize less likely to excite the cupidity of other nations 
 and less likely to lead to war Avith us? If Ave did these things, 
 should Ave not need an army and a navy quite different in character 
 and size fi-om those Ave should need if Ave do not do them? Can Ave 
 intelligently determine Avhat sort of an army and a navy Ave need 
 without considering Avhat it is we propose to defend? If Ave retain 
 all these possessions and interests and international policies, Avhere 
 can Ave stop in our military ])rei)aration ? What folly to retain 
 them if Ave do not propose to make serious and adequate preparation 
 to defend them, and could not make really adequate preparation if 
 Ave would. 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 13 
 
 It may be said that these matters really make no difference in the 
 sort of military preparation we ought to make — that it will require 
 the same sort of an army and the same sort of a navy. to defend our 
 own lands and Avaters that we should need to defend the Philippines 
 and the Panama Canal and to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. No 
 doubt some military authorities would make precisely this claim; 
 but I venture to assert that excellent military authority is of quite 
 a different opinion, and that it is supported by many considerations 
 that appeal and should appeal to that great public which under our 
 democratic government must and should decide the fundamental 
 questions of policy directly involved. 
 
 We are at least entitled to ask questions. If our navy is intended 
 on4y to defend our own shores from invasion, could we not enor- 
 mously increase the number of our submarines for the same money 
 that it is proposed to spend on dreadnaughts; and Avould not the 
 result give us a far more effective navy for purely defensive pur- 
 poses^ Does not a single superdreadnaught cost as much as many 
 submarines, depending on the types selected? If modern war — if 
 this war — has taught us anything, it is that a navy of the dread- 
 naught class is of little if any practical value against a stronger 
 navy of the same sort. The weaker navy is inevitably bottled up. 
 It dare not come out into the open unless it is prepared to risk all 
 upon the result of its unequal contest with a stronger force. Unless 
 we are prepared to enter the endless competition in naval expendi- 
 ture, is not the navy of the era that ended with this war a waste of 
 money and a self-deception as an efficient instrument of defense? 
 Is not this confessed by the insistence of those who cling to this 
 tj'pe of navy that the United States must increase its navy until 
 it equals the navy of any other nation? Some say any other nation 
 except England, either because they are appalled at competition in 
 naval expenditure with England, whose existence as a world power 
 depends upon predominance at sea, or because they think we should 
 assume that war will never occur between England and the United 
 States. Some insist that we must have a navy equal in aggressive 
 strength to the combined navies of any two other nations except 
 England; and that anything less than this will leave us without 
 adequate protection for the very reasons that are given as underlying 
 the dreadnaught naval theory. Has not this war demonstrated that 
 a navy composed chiefly of great numbers of submarines, supple- 
 mented by the torpedo boat, the destroyer, and the aeroplane, would 
 be of immense defensive value against the most powerful dread- 
 naught navy afloat? Is not a single submarine an effective fighting 
 imit against any fleet, while a single dreadnaught is of practically 
 no value Avhatever? Might not a few submarines encounter and 
 destroy a mighty fleet, while a dreadnaught navy outclassed in 
 strength by an invading squadron would lie impotent in the harbor? 
 Are we not about to commit this nation to a program of dread- 
 naughts that need yet more and more dreadnaughts to make them 
 useful? Is it not wise to delay this program at least until we can 
 know more than is now possible as to the place of the dreadiuiught 
 in the future navies of the world? Secretary Daniels says that ex- 
 pert opinion on this subject has undergone great fluctuations within 
 the past few months. He has himself substantially increased the 
 number of submarines for which the Navy Department is asking 
 
14 ' PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE, 
 
 over the number recommended by the Navy Board. Why not spend 
 our dreadnaught money, at least for the present, on submarines and 
 other defensive agencies? Even Neeser asks the question: "With 
 the offensive submarine now a certainty, should we continue to 
 build battleships?" And his answer is an evasion and is also based 
 upon the premise that " the ultimate aim of war is to command the 
 sea." Having already called the offensive submarine "a certainty," 
 lie says: "The new cruising submarine, if a success, may become a 
 serious menace to a battleship fleet; but it does not seem a sufficient 
 menace to stop the construction of those ships which have so long 
 and in the face of all challengers held command of the sea." 
 
 But it may be said that such a navy as I am discussing could not bo 
 used so effectively as the dreadnaught in foreign waters away from*its 
 base. Precisely so; and is not this one of its chief advantages to us? 
 Could we do anything that would so effectively stamp our military 
 polic}'^ as intended only for defense as to create a navy that, while 
 powerful for defense would by its very character have less power for 
 aggression? If we wish only to defend ourselves, do we need any 
 other navy? Can we do anything that will so completely convince 
 the world that we mean what we say when we declare that we are 
 arming only for peace? Can we do am^thing that will so increase our 
 poAver to influence other nations to adopt the policies and the agencies 
 that make for peace? Even if we had to concede that a defensive 
 navj'^ would lack some of the aggressive power that we might desire 
 in actual warfare, can we not well afford to make this sacrifice for the 
 immense gain in making war less likely to occur? 
 
 Is it not a choice betw^een this policy and the race for naval suprem- 
 acy which alone will enable us "to command the sea"? Norman 
 Angell may be urging some propositions about which there may well 
 be difference of opinion, but he has at least convincingly demon- 
 strated one fallacy : 
 
 Mr. Churchill lays it clown as an axiom that the way to be sure of peace is to 
 be so much stronger than your enemy that he dare not attack you. One wonders 
 if the Germans will take his advice. It amounts to this : Hei-e are two likely to 
 quarrel; how shall they keep the peace? Let each l)e stronger than the ot'hej", 
 and all will be well. This " axiom " is, of course, a physical al)surdity. On this 
 basis there is no such thing as adequate defense for either. If one party to the 
 dispute is safe, the other is not, and is entitled to try and make itself so. 
 
 Is there not a distinctively defensive policy applicable to the army 
 just as to the navy? The arguments for increased land forces and 
 reserves seem entirely sound. But this does not relieve us — even us 
 laymen — from the necessity of considering what they should be and 
 how they should be obtained. I do not propose to discuss details of 
 military organization. It is important, however, for the public to 
 understand that there are differences of opinion and of interest in 
 the army as to what branches of the service should be increased. I 
 am expressing no opinion, except that there should be complete free- 
 dom in the service for the public discussion of the issues. 
 
 All the military opinion about which I know anything is agreed 
 that for a defensive policy we need trained officers, trained infantry, 
 trained artillery, adequate equipment, and both an adequate supply 
 of munitions and provision for increasing and maintaining an ade- 
 quate supply of the things for which modern war makes such insa- 
 tiate demands. Does the program of preparedness that has been pre- 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 15 
 
 pared for us contemplate these things? We are tokl that our prepa- 
 ration must be a genuine and a serious thing, that at tlie close of this 
 war some victorious nation or combination of nations may decide to 
 use its trained and veteran troops against us in resentment, or envy 
 or lust of power or hope of loot, and that we must be ready and re- 
 main ready, that Ave must keep our powder dry. We are told that 
 only thorough training and the verj' best equipment for an army in the 
 leash would avail for our defense. And how is it proposed to secure 
 such an army? Make a small increase in our regular troops and give 
 a citizen soldiery annually a feAV months' intensive training that will 
 not interfere too seriously Avith their business and professional occu- 
 pations. Is there then no serious need for preparing against the 
 possibility of a real invasion? 
 
 The truth is that at and for some time after the close of this Avar 
 the United States may be in less danger from attack than at any time 
 in its history. We all hope Avith differing degrees of confidence that 
 out of the horrors and destruction of this war Avill come a real ad- 
 vance toward some form of international relations and international 
 arrangements that Avill reduce the burdens of armament and the 
 probabilities of war. If our hopes Avere really more than hopes, this 
 nation might well aAvait the outcome Avithout increasing at this 
 time its military establishment — not that we might not then take Avise 
 precautions to meet the actual situation that Avill then be disclosed, 
 but that we could be so much wiser then than Ave possibly can be 
 now. It is because our hopes are only hopes, and not certainties, 
 that we are urged to prepare noAv against a possibility that might be 
 so unspeakably disastrous to this country, to its men, and especially 
 to its Avomen and its children, that we are not justified in delaying at 
 least adequate preparation to resist attack. But if Ave are really to 
 prepare against a real attack, wdiat folly it is to be less than ade- 
 quately prepared. We should analyze the situation that is at all 
 likely to confront us and meet that situation. What is the situation ? 
 
 It seems clear that we need anticipate no attack from Great 
 Britain or indeed from any of her allies for some time after this 
 war, no matter Avhat its outcome, unless Ave ourselves furnish some 
 new and gratuitous occasion for a quarrel. For a hundred years we 
 have settled amicably every issue Avith Great Britain, and many of 
 the issues have been peculiarly irritating and important to both na- 
 tions. Our substantive i-elations w^ere never more sympathetically 
 friendly, and new causes Avould have to arise to strain them. Our 
 diplomatic relations were never so assured by treaties providing for 
 the peaceful settlement of issues upon which we may disagree. Cer- 
 tainly this is true of Great Britain; and with her friendship and 
 the already increased and growing appreciation of the reality and 
 value of the Anglo-Saxon tie, a Avar betw^een the tAvo great Anglo- 
 Saxon nations is practically unthinkable. I mention Great Britain 
 because it seems not Avorth while to discuss the effect of our prox- 
 imity to Canada in the event of Avar. Canada is probably a hostage 
 in our reach against Avar Avith England; but let us assume that it 
 Avould be a military asset for Great Britain. No other first-class 
 power except England has any foothold in North America from 
 Avhich land forces could be drawn or in Avhich they could be landed. 
 Any other formidable enemy Avould be compelled to transport its 
 
16 PREPAEATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 invading army across the ocean. I have had no opportunity to 
 examine or to discuss with military officers in whose judgment I 
 have confidence the recent report of the War College Division of the 
 General Staff. We are all, however, entitled to question its sound- 
 ness or its availability, as the President and the Secretary of War 
 have questioned them. They are civilians like ourselves. 
 
 General Greene, however, has discussed at some length the prob- 
 lems presented to us in the event of such invasion and has advised 
 us of the conclusions of such military students as Freiherr von 
 Edelsheim in the service of the German General Staff. His con- 
 clusion is that our initial problem would be to prevent the landing, 
 or to defeat after it landed, a force of 240,000 infantry with the 
 ordinary normal complement of cavalry, artillery, stores, etc., and 
 that this is the largest force that it would be practicable to transport 
 to our shores as a single expedition. The War College now makes a 
 larger estimate. Germany has permitted the public discussion of 
 military problems of this sort. We have refused or restricted it. 
 The weight of availaljle military authority, however, seems agreed 
 that we should have 500,000 trained soldiers to meet an invasion, 
 and that this number of really trained men adequately equipped 
 would successfully repel the invasion. It may be that, considering 
 the disadvantages attending disembarkation, substantially less than 
 this number would suffice for effective defense, provided they are 
 trained soldiers, and not half-trained militia or national guardsmen. 
 I speak in no terms of disrespect of our militia — quite the contrary. 
 I merely insist upon the fact, recognized by the intelligent militia 
 officers themselves, that men in active civil life who give all the time 
 they can to military training can not successfully oppose regular 
 troops. The militia can quickly become an army, but it can not be 
 an army; and what we should need if an invasion threatened us 
 would be an army. Then let us have an army — no larger than we 
 need for the purpose of manning our defenses and repelling an in- 
 vasion, but a real army of real soldiers adequate for this purpose 
 and a militia adequate to fill the ranks as they need filling. I do not 
 say 500,000 men ; I say what number we need for the defensive pur- 
 pose which we intend to accomplish. 
 
 The suggestion of universal military service in this country can be 
 intelligently determined only by considering separately each of the 
 objects for which it is alleged to be desirable. Its main — its real — 
 purpose is military. If it is not necessary or at least desirable for 
 strictly military purposes, it will never be adopted because of its 
 alleged pliysical or disciplinary benefits. And for what conceivable 
 purpose of military defense should we train to arms millions of the 
 3'^oung men of the United States? From a military point of view 
 this surely would be a senseless waste of time, energy, and money. If 
 w^e are to have an army, let us have a real army, trained and efficient 
 for its purpose. Let us have no superficial training of millions of 
 schoolboys, no amateurish conscription of the adult manhood of the 
 nation, creating a paper force immensely greater than any possible 
 need for any purjiose that we ought to entertain, only to demonstrate 
 its inefficiency if a test of strength should come, to disseminate 
 through the nation a false feeling of security, and to encourage the 
 natural tendency toward brag and bluster to which Brother Jonathan 
 has been unfortunately susceptible. 
 
PEEPAKATIONS FOR PEACE. 17 
 
 There is undoubtedly a strong feeling in the United States that, no 
 matter what we should do in the way of military preparation, we 
 should be in no danger of imperialistic ambition or that aggressive 
 militarism which precisely the same policy has undoubtedly tended 
 to create elsewhere. There is far greater clanger from these sources 
 than our people realize. This false assumption of a superior resist- 
 ing power of Americans to the allurements of imperialism and 
 national expansion only makes the danger more real. Human nature 
 is essentially the same "in Prussia and in the United States. 
 
 It is not in Germany alone that the Nietzschean exaltation of the 
 Will to Power stirs the atavistic savage that lingers in most of us 
 and in some of us to an exceptional degree. Few Americans may 
 believe that war is a biological necessity, but many are easily per- 
 suaded that it is a necessity on other grounds, and its exhibition of 
 primitive virtues and barbarian vigor distracts attention from its 
 hideous cruelties and its senseless waste. We need to be constantly 
 reminded that mankind is not degenerating because it is finding less 
 use for some superb qualities of the animal and the savage, that 
 evolution is out of the jungle, not back into it. 
 
 If German blood or German training makes men more prone to 
 exalt force in international affairs, it will be well for us to remember 
 that in 1910 there were in the United States 8,282,618 people wdio 
 were born in Germany, or one or both of whose parents were born 
 in that country. This takes no account of more than 2,000,000 of 
 our population similarly derived from Austria. 
 
 If the United States is to have increased military forces — and it 
 seems essential that we shall — let us not be blind to the dangers that 
 are inseparable from military training and military strength. Let 
 us endure with patience the taunts of the militant pacifist whose 
 motto is " Speak softly and carry a big stick." I try sometimes to 
 visualize that peace-loving and peace-seeking community in which 
 that motto is carried into practical effect, as its distinguished author 
 illustrates it in his own delightful way. Picture to yourselves the 
 citizens of Chicago leaving their homes in the morning, each armed 
 with a big stick, suited to his taste — one with beautifully polished 
 knobs on the heavy end of the stick and one with nails carefully dis- 
 posed upon its surface, to emphasize the value of the weapon as a 
 deterrent of force and an incentive to peace — each swinging his little 
 pacifier jauntily as he trudges sturdily or saunters leisurely along, 
 speaking softly to those he passes about mollycoddles, cowards, and 
 the Ananias Club. How certain it would be that no thought of 
 violence would disturb the peaceful serenity of such a happy com- 
 munity. It is an excellent motto, but hard to live up to, and we shall 
 do well not to underestimate the difficulty. Nations, like individuals, 
 when they carry big sticks, seem predisposed to raise their voices. 
 
 It is said that the disbandment of our armies after the Civil War 
 demonstrates that military training will not create a militaristic 
 sentiment in the United States, but it is not from those who have had 
 actual experience in war and have gone through the pit of hell, or at 
 least looked into its mouth, that we need fear militaristic sentiment 
 so much as from the man who has merely worn the trappings and 
 studied the manual of arms. It is the little knowledge that is the 
 dangerous thing. 
 
 S. Doc. 323, 64-1 2 
 
18 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 Has consideration been given to the political dangers of an organ- 
 ized citizen soldier}' containing millions of men, who would not 
 regard the military work seriously because war would not really 
 seem imminent? 
 
 The suggestion of a new sort of army — a continental army — -is 
 obviously due to the desire to meet the difficulty of putting the 
 militia under direct Federal control, for it i)roposes nothing but a 
 partially trained force of volunteers. Does it not seem far wiser to 
 extend Federal support to the militia upon condition that the train- 
 ing shall compl}^ with Federal requirements? 
 
 Has not Scharnhorst shown us our true military policy, w^hen by 
 transferring every man to the reserve as soon as he had been trained, 
 the active army of 42.000 men, to which he was restricted b}' the 
 Peace of Paris, became the army of 150.000 that contributed so 
 powerfully to the defeat of Napoleon? Why should we not adopt 
 the polic}' of training our soldiers as intensively as possible and then 
 transfer them, as soon as they are trained, to a reserve i-eceiA'ing 
 proper pay from the Government and subject to be called to the 
 colors whenever needed? Would not such a plan give us a vastly 
 superior army to that available in any other way? Would it be any 
 less a citizen soldiery because it had one year's continuous training 
 instead of three months' training for each of four years? Woidd 
 not the interference Avith business or professioijal activity be far less 
 and the cost to the country far less than under the plans proposed i 
 
 If some mechanical training accompanied tlie military training, 
 it might extend the period of active service, but might it not equip 
 the soldier for a more useful citizenship and make enlistment more 
 attractive? The same thought applies to the education of the reserve 
 of trained officers that should be provided. 
 
 Universal military service would undoubtedly distribute the mili- 
 tary burden, but it would create the burden for the sake of distribut- 
 ing it. It is not "' shirking " to oppose the imposition on our people 
 of a burden which it is both unnecessary and unwise for them to 
 assume. By nuiking service in the army and in the militia of real 
 value to those who enlist, as Avell as to the nation, we should create a 
 military s,ystem that would justify itself, and that would secure forces 
 amply sufficient for our defense. There should be no illusicm as 
 to the effect — if not the purpose — of doing more than this. Our 
 ■sons, once trained, would be available for war beyond our borders, 
 and even statutory declarations against using them there would not 
 remove the ccmsequences of their availability.' 
 
 It may well be questioned whether the agitation for uui\ersal mili- 
 tary training or any other form of ('onscripti(Ui does not tend to dis- 
 credit and to prevent a degree of actual military preparation which 
 might otherwise receive popular support. 
 
 It is said that what we lack in the United States is discipline, and 
 that military discipline will supply the need. We do want civic 
 
 1 On .Tanuary 4, 1016, the Associated Press sent out from Washington a dispatch for 
 which it claimed exceptionally reliable information, stating that : " a navy equal in 
 strengtli fo those of any two world powers except Great Britain, and an army prepared 
 to fight for the integrity of the Pan-American idea anywhere in Pan-America is the ulti- 
 mate aim of the plans of the military experts." 
 
 On .January ti. 1016. Secretary Garrison said before the Military Committee of the 
 House of Representatives : " We have determined and announced that tlie sovereignty of 
 the other republics of tliis hemisphere shall remain inviolable and must therefore at all 
 times stand ready to make good our |)osition in this connecticm." 
 
PKKI'ARATIONS FOR PEACE. 19 
 
 discipline, the conscious and willing subordination of iuuuediate in- 
 dividual freedom of action to concerted and cooperative control for 
 the good of the comnumity, a control in determining the extent and 
 character and purpose of which the disciplined shall have a voice. 
 Shall we get this from a training that consists chietiy if not wholly 
 in obedience to orders? No military discipline in or out of the 
 schools can be made much more than this for the great mass under 
 the practical limitations that must prevail. Few, indeed, will be the 
 individuals Avho will be trained to direct others, and these few will 
 learn chiefl}' to direct the others in a routine essentially arbitrary 
 and mechiinical. 
 
 Theirs iiol to reason wli.v. 
 
 Tlieirs but to do and die, 
 
 is the ideal of military discipline, the quality we are called upon to 
 praise and admire in the soldier. It is an admirable ideal for mili- 
 tary piu-poses, but not so good for civic purposes, and what Ave are 
 now discussing is the alleged civic advantage of military discipline 
 upon the young manhood of the country. 
 
 As to the suggestion that military drill in the public schools would 
 be justified on the ground of physical development. President Lowell, 
 of Harvard, says that his experience on the Boston School Hoard 
 convinced him that military drill in the public schools is a mistake: 
 that the boys tired of drill, and were disinclined later to join the 
 militia. He thinks other kinds of physical training are better, and 
 that while his objection does not apply to colleges, drill should be a 
 very small part of military training. 
 
 Former President Elliot says: 
 
 I feel strongly anotiier objection to military drill in secondary scliools, namely, 
 tbat it fiives no {)reiiaration whatever for the real work of a soldier. In the 
 Boston High Schools military drill includes nothing but the manual of arms, 
 company movements on even surfaces, and a few very simple battalion move- 
 ments, mostly those of parade. The real work of a soldier is to dig in the 
 ground with pick and shovel ; to carry a burden of about tifty pounds on long 
 marches; to run very sliort distances carrying a similar bunien : and to shoot 
 accurately with a rille; throw hand grenades; and use rapidly and v/ell machine 
 guns and artillery. IMilitary drill in schools has no tendency to prepare boys 
 to do the real work of a soldier. The Swiss do not begin to train their young 
 men for their army until they are about twenty years of age. except that they 
 (Micourage voluntary ritle clubs for i)rac1ice in sjiooting. 
 
 Assuming, however, that there would be both physical and dis- 
 ciplinary advantages in military training, it would not follow that 
 we should obtain these advantages by compulsory military service. 
 
 It is said that military training would increase res]>ect for law 
 and order, and the proof of this is said to be the comparative sta- 
 tistics of ci-imes of A'iolence in Switzerland and the United States. 
 HoAv about the comparative respect for law in England and in the 
 Ignited States, although E^ngland has not adojjted universal military 
 training ? 
 
 If Ave were situated as is Switzerland, where any war or serious 
 threat of Avar is certain to require the military service of every able- 
 bodied citizen, and Avliere, even then, every unit in the small popula- 
 tion nnist have the very highest military efficiency ])racticable. Ave 
 might justify universal military training, in and out of the scliools. 
 We may be sure that any attemi)t Avith us to train a citizen soldiery 
 
20 PEEPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 under the Swiss system would almost certainly be perfunctory, be- 
 cause it would not be taken seriously. We must never forget that the 
 discipline which German}'' has given her citizens is a discipline which 
 is not confined to their service in the army. The German people are 
 trained to regard the state as the instrumentality through and by 
 Avhich they — each of them individually and all of them collectively— 
 can best advance their interests — can best secure for themselves the 
 necessities and the pleasures of life. Behind even the verboten is a 
 larger consciousness of the advantages of communal action, a Lirger 
 practical realization of those advantages, than obtains in any other 
 great nation to-day. 
 
 Germany's industrial and social progress has been attained in spite 
 of, and not because of, her system of enforced military training and 
 service. Undoubtedly the conviction which has existed in Germany 
 that Avar was a real and constantly impending probability has had an 
 influence, perhaps a determining influence, in securing the adoption 
 of certain policies, such as the government ownership and operation 
 of railroads, and the development of waterways in connection with 
 the railroads as a "coordinated" and interdependent transportation 
 system. The same conviction of the imminence of war has perhaps 
 had its influence in securing some of the social and industrial legis- 
 lation which sound views of public policy justify and demand w^ith- 
 out the slightest regard to their military value. There is no evidence, 
 however, that these social and industrial results in Germany were 
 due to the military training of German citizens. Prussia is not the 
 portion of the German Empire in wiiich we find the most inspiring 
 examples of peaceful progress. Again I find Paid Rohrback instruc- 
 tive when he points out the antagonism of " the material provincial- 
 ism of the small state and the old individualism of the German races, 
 Avhich in this case has been hardened and quickened by the long 
 political separation." He says: 
 
 But we Germans of the ICiuiiiiv (>i-i- if \v(> lliink rliat this exphinatiou settles- 
 the question. An equal share of the responsibility for the existin.^ estran.wmont 
 'should he hiid at the door (rf the North German element, which has trained 
 he.i?emony in the new Empire, and which shows its iiu'.hility to aeliieve in the 
 woi'ld what one may call mor.al conquests. The shoiisishted inflexibility of the 
 North German, and most especially of the I'russian ('hara<-ter, which can pro- 
 duce i^rent tlnn.trs only anionjz; its own peoiile, is easily exi>lained by the course 
 oi its history. It deserves Ki'eat. and perliaps even the .sole, credit for the 
 arowth of I'russin to the state of u woi-ld powei-, and theref{>re. indirectly, 
 for the union of the greater number of integral parts of the old Empire intf> 
 the new Empire. Nevertheless, this .special side of the Prussian character i.'? 
 developing; more and more into an actual source of danirer for our national 
 future, especially in its modern inipleasant variations. 
 
 No; German social and industrial progi-ess is not due to military 
 training, but, as Paul Rohrback says, to Germany industry, and to 
 the fact that Germany has made more progress toward having her 
 government perform the true functions of government in its internal 
 and peaceful relations to its citizens than has been made by other 
 governments, especially our own. I^nless our preparation is not only 
 planned for defense, and is, as far as practicable, unadapted for 
 aggression, the preparation itself Mill add to the possibilities of war, 
 because we shall be less afraid of the consequences of mistake and 
 less on our guard against those who from ignorance or self-interest 
 seek to persuade us to maintain unsound national ideals or purposes. 
 
I'KKPAKATlOxNS FOIt PEACE. 21 
 
 Other nations may, of conisc, make the same sort of mistake; may 
 permit themselves to assert against lis interests that are not their true 
 interests or that they have no right to assert. We may have to defend 
 ourselves against aggression born of their mistakes, but so far as 
 actual war is concerned Ave are in far less danger from the selfishness 
 or muddled thinking of other nations than we are from the selfishness 
 or muddled thinking of our own people. We are defended, not only 
 by our geographical separation from Europe and Asia, but by the 
 character of our country itself, its extent and physical conformation, 
 and. more than all this, by the conflicting interests of our possible 
 enemies. The balance of power in Europe has always been more of 
 a defense to us than even our isolation. The conquest of the United 
 States has been impossible — the attempt unthinkable — except by land 
 and naval forces too large to be spared from Europe. It was largely 
 because of this condition that we succeeded in the war of the Revo- 
 lution, and got off with a little humiliation in 1812. Only the 
 creation in Europe as a result of this war of new conditions in which 
 one or other of the contending parties is left so completely crushed 
 as to destroy all fear from that nation in the mind of the victor or 
 victors can possibly threaten us, and then the victor must have some 
 motive, must see some advantage, in making war upon us. 
 
 No European nation can have any real motive to attack the United 
 States except to prevent us from asserting claims or exercising rights 
 in other countries which are not in accordance with its interests. 
 There can be no motive of conquest, and it is equally unthinkable that 
 any European nation would make war on us to impose discrimina- 
 tory commercial or political conditions upon us, or merely to punish 
 us or to loot us or force from us a money payment as the price of 
 peace. Theoretically, any of these things might happen ; practically 
 they can be dismissed from serious consideration. 
 
 If the United States becomes involved in war it will be because it 
 asserts some right or claims some privilege outside of its own terri- 
 tory, the assertion of Avhich right or privilege runs counter to the 
 interests of some foreign pow^er, or it will be because some foreign 
 power asserts a similar right or privilege against us. We can not 
 of ourselves control the motives or the actions of other poAvers 
 except by international agreement, backed by force or by measures 
 short of force which may be equally effective for the purpose. Our 
 first concern, however, is v^ith our own attitude toward these matters. 
 What are the rights or privileges we claim or wish to claim outside 
 of our own territory ? Are we claiming or are we likely to claim any 
 rights or privileges that are likely to be challenged by other nations? 
 What are the foundations for such claims? Are they sound in 
 principle and in law? How^ important to us is their assertion if 
 challenged? Are they important enough to fight for? Are there 
 other remedies than war available to us if they are challenged? 
 What are they? Is our claim similar in character to that of other 
 nations, and should we take steps to unite all nations w'ho are in- 
 terested in the same essential claims for its defense against a possible 
 aggressor? Should we unite North and South America in the de- 
 fense of our common interests, and if this seems desirable, why 
 should we draw^ an artificial line excluding agreements with Euro- 
 pean nations in matters where our common interests are as clear as, 
 or clearer than, our Pan American interests? 
 
22 PEEPAEATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 To reach right answers to these questions we must above all clear 
 our minds of the false doctrine that enduring economic interests can 
 be promoted by force. TTndoubtedly temporary advantages can be 
 secured by the exploitation of other nations, especially — perhaps 
 exclusively — undeveloped peoples and undevelojied lands; but in the 
 long run the commercial interests of the world are mutual. Our 
 pros])erity is dependent u])on ])rosperity elsewhere. Every nation 
 obtains materials or goods from others and sells to others its own 
 surplus of materials or goods. Every nation has most to gain by 
 helping to advance the trade of the world ; to make all nations pros- 
 perous while fostering its own commerce by every means consistent 
 with sound economic laws. So far as the happiness of the mass of 
 mankind or of the masses of any particular nation is concerned the 
 adjustment of world commerce to the natural laws of commerce 
 wholly overbalances the temporary advantages of exploitation. Oth- 
 erwise it would be to the economic interest of this nation to encour- 
 age the continuation of the Avar in Europe so that we might continue 
 our artificial trade in munitions. We ov^^e much to Norman Angell 
 for his convincing presentation in effective popular form of the 
 economic fallacy that world commerce follows national lines and 
 that im]5erialism is commercially profitable. 
 
 The imperialistic theory is built upon the history of the British 
 Empire and upon a misunderstanding of that history, especiallj^ 
 upon a failure to comprehend that economic conditions are now so 
 radically and irrevocablv different that the British Empire itself 
 is commercially and politically revolutionized. The history of Eng- 
 land can not be repeated any more than can the history of Rome, 
 and wise men would not desire to repeat either if they could. We 
 can not ignore the ]')rocess by wdiich the world has been convinced 
 that the Avelfare of the mass of the people is the real test of national 
 success. Privilege may gain from exploitation, but not democracy: 
 and democracy has come to stay as the economic, social, and intel- 
 lectual ideal of civilization even more tlian as a political ideal. This 
 will be clearer to mankind after this war. and we mav suspect that 
 it is becoming clearer and clearer during the war. Right now in the 
 trenches no i:>ower can keep the soldier from thinking and thinking 
 about the state and his relation to it. Even if he is led to macnif'.' 
 the value of organization and efficiency, he intends to ask for organi- 
 zation and efficiency in his interest and not in the interests of privi- 
 lege or class. 
 
 The very first thing that we Americans should consider to-day is 
 the relation which we wish our Government to assume tovrard us as 
 individuals and toward other nations. Our whole attitude toward 
 this war and its results dej^ends upon our conception of tlie function 
 of the state. What are our ideals of the individual life and of com- 
 munitv life? Do we conceive that the most desirable life for. our- 
 selves — for individual men — is the life in which there is the least 
 possible restraint upon individual freedom of action, not only the 
 action of each man in those thinfrs that concern him alone — if. in- 
 deed, there are any such things — Imt also in those things that affect 
 others, leaving the result of the conflict ])etween individuals to be 
 decided by the relative strength or cunning of the individu.al ? There 
 are those who, consciously or otherwise, really desire a world in 
 Avhicli the strong, the astute, the .intellectually and physically su- 
 
I'RKPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 23 
 
 perior are to iune the fullest freedom to enjoy eveiy advantage 
 which they can ol)tain over their inferiors. If they are shrewder, if 
 more farseeing, if they are stronger, more vigorous physical^ and 
 intellectually, they contend that it is their right to anticipate those 
 who are less alert, less farseeing, less cunning, in seizing the things 
 or the ]:>ositions that are available, and that, having seized them, it is 
 their vested right to hold them. e\en when it Iiecomes clear that these 
 things and these ])oints of vantage are essential to the community as 
 a Avliole and to the general mass of mankind. Men who hold this 
 \iew regard it as a merit, as a demonstration of worth, that they fore- 
 saw Avhat some day the community would need, some natural re- 
 source, some particular piece of property, the potential value of 
 Avhich Avas not generally ap])reciated at the time, and that they ac- 
 quired it so that in the day of need they could profit from the needs 
 of their fellows. We shall have to get rid of this idea in our indi- 
 vidual and national life if Ave are to get rid of the most prolific source 
 of war in the field of international relations. 
 
 Let us not confuse creatiAe industry Avith mere shreAvdness or fore- 
 sight or superior mental or physical capacity. Superiority of this 
 kind should have no rcAvard for itself, but only for its exercise for 
 the benefit of others, for the connnunity as a Avfiole. AVhen it con- 
 fines itself to forecasting the future and seizing now^ those things 
 that are to be valuable hereafter it has no real claim to the grati- 
 tude or the respect of others. It has added nothing to the Avealth or 
 the Avelfare of mankind. It may be difficult to draAv the line, but it 
 is none the less certain that there is a line of distinction betAveen 
 creative and predatory Avealth: and the duty of the community is 
 to clraAv the line as rapidly as it can discern Avhere it really lies and 
 to approximate it eAen Avhen its exact location is not entirely clear. 
 It is the business of the community to protect community interests 
 and to promote community Avelfare. If there is anything clear in 
 our philosophy or our history it is that civilization is deA'eloping in 
 this direction : 
 
 With thousanrl shocks that come and jio. 
 With agonies, with energies, 
 Witli overthrowings, an(l AA'ith crie.s, 
 
 And undulations to and fro. 
 
 We knoAv noAv that success in Avar depends, after the first shock, 
 on social and indu.strial solidarity far more than upon the nmnber of 
 trained soldiers that can be placed in the field. It is easier to enlist 
 men and to train them if the front can be held for a time — in our 
 case if the first invading expedition can be held off or seriously crip- 
 pled — than it is to organize the national economic and industrial 
 forces to support the troops if they are to be successful under the 
 conditions of modern Avarfare. In his annual message of December 
 7 President Wilson emphasized our dut}'^ in this regard : 
 
 While we speak of the pi-ejiaration of the Nation to make sure of lier security 
 and lier effective power we nnist not faU into the patent error of supjiosing tliat 
 lier r«^al strengtli comos from armaments and mere saf(>guards of written law. 
 It comes, of course, from her people, their energy, their success in their under- 
 takings, their free oiii)ortunity to use the natur;>,l rp'<f>urces of our gr(>at liome- 
 land and of tlie lands outside our continental bonh-rs which loolv to us for pro- 
 tection, for encouragement, and for assistance in their devehipment. from the 
 organization and freedom and vitality of our economic life. 
 
 The domestic questions which engaged the attention of the last Congress are 
 more A'ital to the Nation in this its time of test than at any other time. We can 
 
24 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE, 
 
 not adequately make ready for any trial of our streugh unless we wisely and 
 promptly direct tlie force of our laws into- these all-important fields of domestic 
 action. 
 
 He then proceeds to select one pressing economic problem to which 
 to direct particular attention. He says : 
 
 In the meantime may I make this suggestion? The transportation prohlem is 
 an exceedingly serious and pressing one in this country. There has from time 
 to time of late been reason to fear that our railroads would not much longer be 
 able to cope with it successfully as at present equipped and coordinated. I 
 suggest that it would be wi.se to provide for a commissh)n of inquiry to ascer- 
 ttiin by a thorough canvass of the whole question v.iiether our laws as at pres- 
 ent framed and administered are as serviceable as they might be in the solu- 
 tion of the problem. It is obviously a problem that lies at the very foundation 
 of our efficiency as a people. Such an inquiry ought to draw out every circum- 
 stance and opinion worth considering, and we need to know all sides of the 
 matter if we mean to do anything in the field of Federal legislation. 
 
 The issue thus raised will be found to go far deeper than mere 
 changes in " the process of regulation." No lesson of the war has 
 been more clearly taught than that efficient transportation is of the 
 very essence of military efficiency and strength. It is equally true, 
 as President Wilson says, that the transportation problem in peace 
 " lies at the very foundation of our efficiency as a people." Our pres- 
 ent method of dealing with it is increasingly unsatisfactory to the 
 private interests involved, and it is not satisfactory to the public. 
 We have secured many improvements by adopting public regulation, 
 but as this regulation proceeds it becomes more and more api)arent 
 that the transportation system of the country is essentially one inter- 
 related and interdependent whole. There may always be a rivalry 
 in economy and efficiency of service, but competition for traffic is 
 moderated by a division of territory, or a gentlemen's agreement, 
 while competition in rates has almost disappeared. 
 
 Governmental regulation has served to bring out clearly the essen- 
 tially monopolistic character of our railroad system as a whole and 
 the necessity of that " coordination " to which President Wilson re- 
 fers. The question is whether coordination in the public service can 
 be obtained so long as our railroads do not have a common financial 
 interest as among themselves, but onl}^ a common financial interest 
 as against the public. Can a public service which is essentially 
 monopolistic be satisfactorily performed as a competitive enter- 
 prise ? Are we not losing the benefits of competition without obtain- 
 ing the advantages of regulated monopoly? We are certainly irri- 
 tating and discouraging private enterprise based on competitive 
 profits. So unsatisfactorily is the result that some of our leading 
 railroad officials regard public ownership as the only escape from 
 what the}^ consider destructive regulation. The question is whether 
 " coordination " can be obtained without public ownership. 
 
 Germany has owned and operated her railroads, from the point of 
 view of public service, in peace and in war, not from the point of 
 view of profits, although the profits have been large. The probabili- 
 ties seem to be that after the close of this war every railroad in 
 Europe will be nationalized. Military reasons may be the determin- 
 ing factors in this result, but it may well be questioned whether any 
 satisfactory solution of the transportation problem can be reached 
 in any other way. AVhether our government should take over our 
 railroads and when and upon what conditions may raise many ques- 
 tions of expediency, but if we are to treat the issue with open mind 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 25 
 
 it is important that \Ye should understand that if, in the public 
 interest, the government should do so, it will not be invading the 
 domain of private enterprise, but will merel}^ be taking back to itself 
 a function of government which, for what seemed sulKcient reasons 
 of expediency, it had previously delegated to private agencies. 
 
 I take it we shall all agree that if there is something Avhich it is the 
 true function of government to perform, that thing will never be per- 
 formed as it should be until the government performs it. We may 
 disagree about what is the true function of government, but once it is 
 determined that on principle the performance of a particular service 
 is a function of government, that means, if it means anything, that 
 under right conditions of government it will be better. performed by 
 the government than if left to pinvate enterprise. If a government is 
 not performing all of the functions of government it is to that extent 
 a failure as a government. The results must continue to be less satis- 
 factory and less efficient than they should be and can be if the gov- 
 ernment is performing all of its functions, is qualified to perform 
 them, and is performing them properly. Now, nothing is more 
 clearly settled in the law of this country and in the principles upon 
 which that law is based than that railroads as common carriers are 
 performing a function of government. The Supreme Court of the 
 United States and many other courts have so held. (See United 
 States V. Joint Tariff Association, 171 U. S., 605, 570; Talcott v. 
 Pine Grove, 23 Federal Cases, 652, etc.) Indeed, the construction 
 and control of the public highway is historically and on principle 
 one of the first of the functions of government, and a railroad is a 
 public highway. My purpose in discussing this matter has been to 
 indicate how deep the issues of industrial mobilization go. In Eng- 
 land it already in\-olves the relations of the trade unions to the 
 government. 
 
 Ifc is insisted b)^ some that the abolition of war or even its sub- 
 stantial diminution is an idle dream; that we may be reasonably cer- 
 tain that for one reason or another this country, will be involved in 
 war within a comparatively short time. Very well. It is now clear 
 that industrial mobilization is as essential to modern war as is mili- 
 tary mobilization, and such mobilization can not be effectively made 
 after hostilities occur unless the government already has the powers 
 and is exercising the acti^■ities essential to effective mobilization. It 
 is even more difficult to agree upon the principles and to create the 
 machinery for industrial mobilization than for military mobilization, 
 and lack of actual experience in applying the principles and operat- 
 ing the machinery may be disastrous in the one case as in the other. 
 Do the prophets of war propose to face now the problems of eco- 
 nomic and industrial mobilization? If they do it will be necessary 
 to abandon some dogmatic assumptions which have heretofore 
 formed and still form so large a part of our political thinking. 
 
 One of the most significant things in the development of all 
 modern thought has been the decline in the acceptance of dogma. 
 Outside of the exact sciences, like mathematics, we have learned to 
 look with suspicion and distrust on dogmatic statement of laws or 
 principles. William G. Sumner says: "If you want war, nourish a 
 doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever 
 are subject, because doctrines get inside of a man's own reason and 
 betray him against himself." Consciously and unconsciously, the 
 
26 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 pragmatic philosophy is succeeding the dogmatic in science as it is 
 in theology. Experiment is succeeding assumption as the sure 
 foundation of human j^rogress. In no field is this so important as 
 in the field of political and social science — of nothing is it so true as 
 of government. In the United States we have been particularly in 
 danger of dogmatic error because of the wide acceptance of the 
 proposition that that government is best which governs least, a dog- 
 matic principle as vicious and unsound as the opposite dogma upon 
 which socialism is based: for the dogma that the state should directly 
 cover the whole field of human industry is equally fallacious. The 
 truth, as usual, lies l)etween. Government is not best when it gov- 
 erns least, nor is it best when it governs most. (Tovernmoni is best 
 when it is doing well whatever will promote the welfare of the com- 
 munity most if done by the community than if left to be done by 
 part of the community. And .yet, progress is unquestionably in the 
 direction of the extension of governmental activities into fields 
 heretofore left to private enterprise, and we must be open minded 
 toward further movement in that direction. Germany is strong to- 
 day in war, not <mly because she is prepared for war, but because 
 she has gone further than other nations in the assumption bv her 
 government of those social and industrial responsibilities which gov- 
 ernment should assume whenever it is apparent that, by so doing, 
 the welfare of the nation — the greatest good to the greatest number — 
 will be promoted. She has not accepted socialism, but she has been 
 hampered by no dogma that the state must govern as little as pos- 
 sible. To the extent to which she has accepted and acted upon the 
 principle that it is the true function of government to do whatever 
 will promote the interest of the community better if undertaken by 
 the ctmmunity than if left to private enterprise, just to that extent 
 has she strengthened herself and secured the grateful loyalty of her 
 people. So we, too, must proceed, if we would prepare for the con- 
 structive uses of peace that grateful recognition of the value of the 
 nation to its people, and that patriotic support of the people for the 
 nation, which we are being exhorted to prepare for the destructive 
 purposes of war. 
 
 In the hmg retrospect we shall find nothing clearer than that the 
 evoluti(!n of government is steadily toward the assumi)tion of new 
 functions in the service of the i:>eople. Slowly but surely the move- 
 ment has steadily gone forward in this direction, and always over 
 the protests of those who have insisted that each advance was an 
 unwarranted invasion of the field of private enterprise, of the rights 
 and liberties of the individual. 
 
 Even tlie collection of taxes for the support of the state was once 
 farmed out to those who found in it an opportunity for private profit. 
 The ]:)ractice found its justification in the claim that an army of 
 tax collectors would be a public menace, and that the government 
 could n(!t jiossibly collect the taxes as economically and efficiently as 
 private individuals. To-day it Avould be a rare individual indeed 
 who would conceive that it is not the function of the state directly 
 to collect the taxes necessary for its own support. 
 
 Time will not permit even the enumeration of other functions once 
 supposed to be peculiarly private in their character, but which are 
 now exercised bv the government almost as a matter of course. It is 
 
PRKPAKATKINS FOR PEACE. 27 
 
 aliiiost axiomatic that the government shall conduct the Post Office, 
 shall supply Mater, and shall extinguish fires. xVll of these things 
 were once regarded as peculiarly sacred to priA'ate enterprise. I once 
 represented a client who owned and operated as a private profit- 
 making enterprise the sewer system of a thriving middle western 
 town which was prevented by financial limitations in its charter from 
 |)erforming this primary municipal function. In reading Ferrero I 
 was amused and instructed by his account of the sources of the wealth 
 and political power of Crassus in 69 B. C. Feri-ero says : 
 
 Since the houses at lloine were mostly built of wood, and the .Ediles had so 
 far failed to organize efiieient measures of prevention, fires were at this time 
 exceedingly frequent. This suggested to him a very ingenious idea. He organ- 
 ized a regular lire brigade from amongst his slaves, and established watch 
 stations in every part of Kome. As soon as a fire broke out the watch ran to 
 give notice to the brigade. The firemen turned out, but accompanied by a 
 representative of Crassus, who bought up, practically for nothing, the house 
 which was on fire, and sometijnes all the neighboring houses which happened 
 to be threatened as well. The bargain once concluded, he had th.e fire j)ut out 
 and the house rebuilt. In this way he secured i^ossession of a large numl)er of 
 houses at a trifling cost, and became one of the largest landlords at Rome, both 
 in houses and land, which he was then able, of course, to exchange, to sell, and to 
 buy up again almost as he chose. Having become in this way one of the richest, 
 if not the richest man in Rome, his power steadily increasing with every rise 
 in the price of money, Crassus soon became a dominating figure in the Senate 
 and the electorate, and indeed among all classes of the connnunity. 
 
 Indeed, when later, an ajdile who sprang from the common people 
 extended the function of government in Rome to include the oper- 
 ation of a fire brigade, his activities were very much resented, and 
 the j)rivileged classes found it difficult to explain and impossible to 
 justify his popularity with the people. I have no doubt that Rome 
 I'ang with the same arguments about the invasion of the field of 
 private enterprise with which the public ownership of railroads and 
 other public utilities is received in this country to-day. 
 
 I am far from suggesting that in any given community, at any 
 given time, it would be axiomatic, or even expedient, for the govern- 
 ment to undertake all or any of these enterprises. I am merely assert- 
 ing that it is by no means true that it should not do so solely because 
 it VN'ould conflict Avith some dogmatic conception of the state. It is a 
 ([uestion of wise expediency inider existing conditions in every case, 
 remembering always that the inexorable law of social evolution is 
 moving steadily toward the assumption of community functions b,y 
 the community. 
 
 The argument that the goveinment has been too weak, too ineffi- 
 cient, or too corrupt to be trusted with functions which might be 
 performed by a better government is only a confession of the indict- 
 ment against our government and us. It is quite true that, in deter- 
 mining the ultimate interests of the community we must look for 
 the long result. We must not destroy the incentives that are es.sen- 
 tial to ])rogre.ss. The whole fabric of existing civilization is based 
 upon the institution of private property, upon the conception that 
 in the existing stage of human development the best and most effec- 
 tive way in which to advance the well-being of mankind is by an 
 appeal to the self-interest or the necessities of individuals; but even 
 if we are entirely sui-e that necessity and financial gain are the most 
 effective incentives to industrv for the mass of mankind, ai-e we not 
 
28 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 all coming to see that there is a point at which we o^ eiload the lure i 
 Once we rise above the pinch of poverty and attain physical comfort 
 and intellectual opportunity, are there not other incentives besides 
 money that will stimulate and attract the ver}^ highest talent and the 
 very greatest industry? Is not this demonstrated by the financial 
 sacrifices made by so many of the verj' best men in our public service? 
 You know what the desires, the hopes, the aspirations that ani- 
 mate you. What is it that you think would prove most satisfying 
 and would call out the best there is in you ? Is it not the conscious 
 and effective use of your faculties for the accomplishment of things 
 which you think are worth while? Is not the basis of real happiness 
 obscured by false standards of success? There are dangers in democ- 
 racy, just as there are dangers in privilege, but mankind lias defi- 
 nitely discarded the old ideal of aristocracy. The purpose of civi- 
 lization is not to produce an efflorescence, but to elevate the mass. 
 The aristocracy of the future is to be an aristocracy of service, not 
 of privilege; of achievement, not of acquisition. 
 
 The very first and most essential of all our preparation must be 
 to make our government — local, state, and national — what it should 
 be. This is the service for Avhich we need universal training and a 
 patriotism that is nobler and more useful than all the patriotism of 
 war. 
 
 It is suggested that we already respond to the ci\ic appeal more 
 easily than to the appeal for military sacrifice, but Hir;ini ^laxim 
 says. 
 
 I Avoiuior why it is that wo are not as enthusiastic- in this social service work 
 as we are in attacking the problem of war. Is it that there is more glory and 
 more that appeals to the martial imagination in attacking vs'ar and warriors 
 than tliere is in the prosaic, tame, and glamorless enterprise of simply saving 
 human life in p.eaceful pursuits for the mere sake of saving it? 
 
 Senator Root has recently made an eloquent appeal for military 
 preparation, in which he said : 
 
 Do not let us deceive ourselves. Adecpiate pre])aration for the preservation 
 of our liberty means a va.st expenditure, Imt it means more than that; it means 
 a willingness for self-sacrifice, a spirit among our people, the length and br(\adth 
 of the land, among the rich and the poor, among the highly educated and the 
 graduates of the common school, among professional men, mejvhants and 
 bankei-s, farmers and laborers — a national spirit among the people of the land, 
 and a determination to preserve the liberty and justice of the American- Repub- 
 lic and to make a sacrifice of means and convenience, comfort, and, if need be, 
 of life, in the cause. 
 
 To every word of this we should subscribe. But I wish the 
 Senator had gone on to demonstrate — as he could do so well— that 
 the patriotism and self-sacrifices of peace are of uiore transcendent 
 importance, even as a preparation for war. than any present reso- 
 lution of Avillingness to sacrifice " means and convenience, comfort, 
 and, if need be, of life," upon the field of battle. I am not detract- 
 ing in the least from the importance of making defensive military 
 preparations; but a determination to preserve the liberty and justice 
 of the American Republic, and to make some sacrifice of means and 
 convenience and comfort in the piping times of peace will be our best 
 preparation for war and our most likely insurance against it. 
 
 Do not let us deceive ourselves. The United States of America, 
 as a nation, is worth preserving, is entitled to our loyalty and de- 
 votion, only to the extent that it is an agency to promote the moral. 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 29 
 
 intellectual, and physical well-being of its people, not some of its 
 people, but aW of its people— onl}^ to the extent that, in very truth, 
 in the realities of the everyday life of the men, the women, and the 
 children who inhabit it, its conscious ideal is the greatest good to the 
 greatest number. To carry out that ideal means a vast expenditure, 
 willingly and intelligently made; it means a preparedness for self- 
 sacrifice in times of peace quite as much as in times of war — nay, a 
 greater self-sacrifice, because the progress of civilization is measured 
 by the extent to which peace supersedes and supplants Avar. It means 
 a spirit among our people the length and breadth of the land, among 
 the rich and the poor-, among the highly educated and the graduates 
 of the common school and those to whom fortune unhappil}^ has given 
 no schooling at all, among professional men, merchants and bankers, 
 farmers and laborers — a national spirit cletermined to make the 
 American Republic an agency of liberty and justice at home and 
 abroad. 
 
 In the service of this ideal, let us destroy every special privilege 
 and be prepared to sacrifice means and convenience and comfort and, 
 if need be, life itself to protect that government and the people it 
 governs against every assault by force or cunning, whether from 
 within or from without. Let us make social justice and social 
 service our national ideal; and to this end let us control and develop 
 our national resources in times of peace, not only that they may be 
 mobilized in time of war, but because a government which is per- 
 forming this sort of service to its people will be thus most effectively 
 organized for peace. By all means, let us have an army and a navy 
 adequate for the defense of such a nation, but let us realize that far 
 more imporant than armies and navies are our national purposes 
 and policies. 
 
 Are Ave really Avithout the desire and the hope that the United 
 States may acquire exceptional advantages in the commercial dcA^el- 
 opment of other countries — let us say, in this hemisphere or parts of 
 it, in Cuba and the "West Indies, in Mexico and Central America? 
 Are we entirely free from the subconscious thought that here is our 
 sphere of influence? Hoav far is this thought at the bottom of the 
 modern development of the Monroe Doctrine, especially as conceived 
 by Secretary Olney Avhen he declared that " the United States is 
 practically soA^ereign on this continent "? Is it because of its hoped- 
 for economic advantages to us that we insist upon a doctrine which 
 seems no longer to haA'e any political justification? Certainly Ave 
 are no longer in apj^rehension that our republican form of gOA^ern- 
 ment would seriously be jeopardized if any European nation should 
 acquire political dominion over, or should plant its colonies in. South 
 America. Those countries repudiate and resent our assumption of a 
 benevolent protectorate over their national interests. They look 
 with suspicion upon all our declarations of disinterestedness and 
 point to our dealinizs Avith Mexico in the acquisition of Texas and 
 California and to other incidents in our history as proof of the justice 
 of their fears. Even the declaration of President Wilson, that this 
 country will neA^er again seek to acquire a foot of territory by force 
 of arms, is regarded merely as the expression of a personal opinion, 
 or as in the same class Avith the diplomatic assurance of pacific inten- 
 tion which has usually preceded the extension of the" British or the 
 French or the German or the Italian domains. 
 
30 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 There is a clearer mutual understanding and a closei' community 
 of political and commercial interest between the principal countries 
 of South America and the great nations of Europe than between 
 those countries and oui'selves. The ties of race and language and 
 religion are closer. Few of our people understand how the eastward 
 trend of the southern portion of this hemisphere brings South 
 America into as close or closer proximity to Europe than to the 
 United States, especialW wdien available trade routes are taken into 
 consideration. South American development has been financed in 
 Europe, not in the United States, and to attempt to expand our com- 
 merce in that direction without assuming the large financial obliga- 
 tions that are essential to it is merely to work against the natural 
 laws of trade. 
 
 Pan Americanism exalts physical geography, which is important; 
 but commercial, intellectual, and racial geography is more important. 
 Pan Americanism must be based on and be measured by real mutu- 
 ality of interest and obligation. We should recognize and strengthen 
 our mutual interests with Latin America, but we should not forget 
 other e(|ually or more important interests in Canada or Europe. 
 The preservation of existing political geography to the south of us 
 against change by violence should tend to increase stability where 
 this is especially desirable; but why should we insist that the Amer- 
 icas are a separate international unit over which the United States is 
 to maintain a benevolent protectorate at its own risk and without 
 control over their domestic conditions or foreign policies? 
 
 To assert that the Monroe Doctrine is essential to our national 
 safety has become an absurdity. Monarchical institutions no longer 
 threaten our Republic. We have lived to see a republican form of 
 government firmly established in France and to see constitutional 
 monarchy develop steadily toward the essentials of representative 
 democracy. We have lived for more than a century in immediate con- 
 tact with a great self-governing colony of England, with the result 
 that w^e have influenced its institutions far more than it has influ- 
 enced ours. The whole purpose of President Monroe's famous dec- 
 laration and the whole justification for making it have undergone 
 a transformation so complete that nothing but the lack of intelligent 
 discussion of the question can explain the extent to which it is 
 regarded as something as lioly as the Ark of the Covenant by so 
 man}' of the American people. 
 
 It is safe to say that we believe in something called the Monroe 
 Doctrine because we do not understand it and are making no attempt 
 whatever to define it or to appraise its value to us. Let us not con- 
 fuse it with that doctrine which is practically recognized by all the 
 great nations of the world. \iz, that wherever a nation is in fact so 
 situated that the acquisition or control of inniiediately adjacent 
 countries by great and povrerful rivals would jeo[)ardize its peace 
 and security, that nation, in the exercise of its right of self-detcMise, 
 can justly insist upon its rival refraining from such an extension of 
 its domain. The ])oint is well illustrated by the declaration of Paul 
 Kohrbach with reference to the possible absorption of Holland by 
 (lermany. He says: "The resulting disturbance of the political 
 eijuilibrium in Euroj)e would be so distinctly in favor of (Germany 
 that all the other States would be justified in rising in protest against 
 it." The right of a nation to ])rote('t its vital interests has been uni- 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 31 
 
 versally recognized, subject always to the possible exercise of suj^erior 
 force to override the objection. No nation has questioned the right 
 of another nation to assert its vital interests, although it may have 
 questioned its power to maintain them. The issue is an issue of fact. 
 Does the particular thing which is threatened jeopardize the vital 
 interests of the protesting nation'^ 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine has never been accepted by other nations as 
 sound in principle, although the acquiescence of Great Britain has 
 prevented it from being challenged ; but if we Avere frankly to assert 
 that the acquisition of Mexico by a European nation would be re- 
 garded as an unfriendly act because it threatened the vital interests 
 of the United States it is exceedingly unlikely that there would be 
 any attempt to deny that we were justified in interfering. Whether 
 we slioidd assert such an interest in the future of Mexico would de- 
 pend upon the question of fact as to its influence upon our national 
 security. Whether our interest weald be admitted would depend 
 upon tile (juestion of fact as to the etl'ect of the proposed action upon 
 the vital interests of this nation. It might depend upon our military 
 ability to sustain our i)osition; but what I am trying to make clear 
 is that the validity of the INIonroe Doctrine depends upon principles 
 of universal international application and not upon principles 
 peculiar to us or to the American continents. 
 
 In the interests of national security we should ourselves confine 
 the Monroe Doctrine to these limits. In its present vague form it is 
 a menace to our peace and to the peace of the world — all the more 
 dangerous because we have iu)t now, and we do not propose to have, 
 militai'v force sufficient to maintain it if it should be seriously ques- 
 tioned. Nothing is so dangerous to peace as the assertion of a right 
 vx'hicli is oli'ensive to others, which they believe to be unjustified, and 
 which we are not, and do not expect to be, prepared to defend. It 
 is in sui)]>ort of the broader Monroe D( ctrine and incidentally to get 
 the support of the Pacific Coast that the Navy League is insisting 
 that we should have a navy on the Pacific stronger than Japan's 
 and another navy on the Atlantic stronger than the navy of any other 
 nation except England — a policy which, fortunately, there seems to 
 be no probability whatever of the United States being persuaded to 
 adopt. .Vnd yet. if we do uvX have such a navy, I must agree with 
 Homer Lea when he says that " the Monroe Doctrine, if not supported 
 by naval and mility power sufficient to enforce its (;bservance by all 
 nations singly and in coalition, becomes a factor more provocative 
 of war than any otlier national polic.y ever attempted in modern or 
 ancient times."' 
 
 Our greatest duty, theref ( re, is not to build fleets to maintain the 
 Monroe Doctrine, but it is to consider v.hether the Moni'oe Doctrine, 
 in any < ther sense than the protection of our vital national interests, 
 is worth the risk of war and the cost of preparing for it. It it can 
 not be ju..-tified ujxm the ground of defense, can it be justified upon 
 the ground of self-interest^ The Mcmroe Doctrine may have helped 
 drive Maximilian out of Mexico. It may have served us in some 
 indeterminate directions during the first half of our national exist- 
 ence, but if it has profited us in any other way the evidence does not 
 seem to be available. Certainly we can show'no financial \)voi\t and 
 no prosjxvt in this direction. 
 
32 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 It may not be clear that our trade in Latin America would have 
 been substantially greater if it had been colonized by European na- 
 tions and developed under their flags, but it certainly is not clear that 
 this would net have been the case. Our total trade wqth South 
 America for the year ending June 30, 1913 (unaffected by war), 
 was a little over '$360,000,000. Our trade with Canada the same 
 year w^as over $535,000,000. Approximately $162,000,000 of our 
 South American trade was with Brazil alone, the greater portion 
 being imports of coffee, which Ave may safely assume would have 
 sought a market in this country no matter under what flag the coffee 
 had been raised. It seems equally true that our sales of agricultural 
 implements to South America Avould doubtless have been as great if 
 the flag of England or Germany or France or Ital}^ or Spain had 
 been flying in the southern portion of the liemisphere. 
 
 I am not regretting the political independence of the South Ameri- 
 can republics. On the contrary, I share in the feeling of pride in 
 their achievements, which is perhaps not justified by our contribution 
 to that result. I am merely pointing out that the further assertion 
 of the Monroe Doctrine w^ould seem to have no justification in the 
 commercial results obtained by it; and the extension of our trade 
 in the future will depend upon considerations with which the Monroe 
 Doctrine has nothing whatever to do. But even if it were true that 
 its abandonment would result in some diminution of our commerce, 
 wdiich I do not believe, the loss would be utterly insignificant in com- 
 parison with the expenditure we shall have to make if the Monroe 
 Doctrine is to be anything but a source of w^eakness and of danger. 
 
 There is a widespread popular impression that Germany has ulte- 
 rior designs on South America, and that, if successful in the present 
 war, she will restrict the trade of other nations and discriminate 
 against this country. I find no justification for this opinion. I have 
 no doubt that Germany resents and disagrees with the doctrine of 
 Monroe. I have no doubt that, whether successful or unsuccessful in 
 the war, she will seek to push her trade and commerce in South 
 America. But all of the indications are that Germany has been look- 
 ing to the Near and Middle East as the field peculiarly adapted for 
 her political and commercial expansion. It is the Bagdad Railroad 
 and the ancient Babvlonian empire upon which she seems to have 
 fixed her desires, and with respect to which she so bitterly resents 
 the restrictions for which she holds England responsible. There is 
 much misunderstanding about German colonization in South 
 America. It is estimated that the total German immigration now in 
 Argentina, for instance, is only 30,000, while there are 950.000 
 Italians and 150,000 French.^ I have been unable to obtain the total 
 figures for Brazil, but in 1910 the immigration was 30,857 Portu- 
 guese, 20,843 Spanish, 14,163 Italians, 3,902 Germans, etc. 
 
 I shall refer to only one other matter of this character, and that is 
 our relations with Japan; and I select them because we are supposed 
 by many to be in greater danger of a collision with Japan than with 
 anj^ other nation, unless it be Germany. It is said that Japan is likely 
 to attack us, because we offer an enticing opportunity for loot, because 
 
 1 The oflicial immigration ligures in Argentina for the period from 1857 to 1908 are as 
 follows : 
 
 Italian. l,700,42:i ; Spanish, 7nr),243 ; French, 188, .S16; English, 42,705; Austro-Hun- 
 garian, .''.9,800 ; German, 40,055 ; Swiss, 28,:U4 : Belgian, 20,008 ; other, 203.242. The 
 emigration was a little less than half the immi.^vation. 
 
PRKPARATIONS F0I5 I'KACMO. 33 
 
 Japan wishes to .acquire the Philippines, and because she wishes to 
 force us to accept her people as immigrants and to treat them on a 
 parity with the immigrants from other countries. 
 
 I think we may dismiss, as unAvorthy of our own intelligence, the 
 suggestion that Japan would make a wanton attack upon this country 
 merely in the hope of exacting an indemnity or of pilaging our 
 Pacific coast. Japan has done nothing that would justify the assump- 
 tion that she would be influenced by such a motive, even if she could 
 be persuaded that she would succeed. No nation in the history of the 
 world has so clearly earned the right to have its motives, its intelli- 
 gence, and its achievements treated with respect than has Japan. 
 Her ambition is clearly to secure the respect of the civilized world 
 and to deserve it. In my judgment she will be more punctilious in 
 respect to international morals than many nations that boast a 
 broader civilization. But if nothing else Avould restrain her she is 
 too intelligent not to know that all she could secure in the way of 
 pecuniary advantage would have to be returned manyfold in the 
 competition of armaments that would inevitably ensue, until this 
 country had made her atone for every wrong that she had done to 
 us. The day of the international marauder on any such scale as this 
 is over. 
 
 The Open Door in China is one of the issues which are thought to 
 be provocative of trouble with Japan. Hiram Maxim says a Japa- 
 nese diplomat asked him by what logic we can proclaim America 
 for the Americans and disclaim Japan's right equally to proclaim 
 Asia for the Asiatics. What is the answ^er^ Baron Shibusawa re- 
 cently said in my hearing that Japan was especially desirous of 
 cordial relations with the United States for three reasons : First, be- 
 cause Japan recognized many obligations of gratitude to the United 
 States for our conspicuous part in the acceptance and development of 
 modern conditions and institutions by Japan ; secondly, because one- 
 fourth of Japan's foreign commerce was with the United States, and 
 Japan was anxious to retain and increase it; thirdly, because the 
 greatest w^orld problem was the adjustment and mutual understand- 
 ing of oriental and occidental civilization, and that Japan believed 
 the two nations best adapted to bring this about were Japan and the 
 United States working sympathetically together for this purpose. 
 Such speeches may be only international compliments, but they de- 
 serve thoughtful consideration. 
 
 As to the Philippines, there is no evidence that Japan desires them 
 at this time, when her hands are fiill to overflowing with opportuni- 
 ties in Korea and China. And what is our policy in the Philippines? 
 Do we really intend to establish there an independent nation? Do 
 we propose to retain control over its international policies after we 
 .have given it independence? If we do not control, do we none the 
 less propose to protect the Philippine nation against the consequences 
 of its own policies or to guarantee its sovereignty or territorial in- 
 tegrity? If we seek to retain no special advantages over other 
 nations in the commercial development of the Philippine Islands and 
 •are animated by sincerely benevolent motives, should we not seek to 
 secure international guaranties that would be far more effective than 
 anything that we alone can do to assui-e independence of the nation 
 
 .S. Doc. 323, G4-1 3 ' ,... 
 
34 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 for whose existence we are to be responsible? Is it at all clear that 
 Japan would not gladly join in such an arrangement? 
 
 The remaining source of future trouble with Japan is the policy 
 which we adopt toward her with respect to immigration and the 
 rights of her people while residing in this country. There can be no 
 question that Japan resents the manner in which her people are being 
 treated on the Pacific coast. Whether California is justified or not 
 in the substance of what she seeks by restricting the rights of the 
 Japanese to acquire and hold land is entirely outside the point. The 
 citizens of the United States are under restriction with respect to 
 land ownership in Japan, and this subject is susceptible of diplomatic 
 adjustment on a basis that will recognize the mutual self-respect of 
 both countries. Japan has given evidence of the most substantial 
 character of her desire to meet and treat this issue in a broad-minded 
 and practical way. She asks merely that it shall be so treated. If 
 we treat her thus, and have California treat her thus, we shall do 
 more to reduce the probability of friction with Japan than all the 
 naval and military preparations we shall make against her. 
 
 It is said, however, that we must enormously increase our Navy 
 if we are to protect our interests .in the Panama Canal. Before the 
 Canal was constructed the argument ran quite the other way. The 
 construction of the Canal was so to facilitate the passage of our fleet 
 from the Atlantic to the Pacific, or the reverse, that it would double 
 the efficiency of the fleet, and constitute an asset of incalculable value 
 in the event of war. Now, hovever, it has become merely an exten- 
 sion of our coast line, a vulnerable point which it is essential to take 
 extraordinary precautions to protect. If this is true, we have gained 
 only a military liability by the construction of the Canal, having 
 admitted the merchant vessels of all nations to the Canal on a parity 
 with our own. Proximity to the Canal is our only advantage over 
 other nations so far as our foreign commerce is concerned. If it 
 is to take a huge navy to protect it so that it may be used for the 
 passage of our fleets in time of war, there would seem to have been 
 little net gain from a military point of view. Should we not be far 
 better off if, having made this splendid contribution to the commerce 
 of the world, we should now completely neutralize the Canal, under 
 international guaranties, in which we should invite all civilized 
 nations to join? The basis of the agreement might be either the 
 closing of the Canal to the warships of belligerent nations, or the 
 opening of the Canal to all belligerents alike, upon the condition that 
 no encounter should be permitted to take place within a specified 
 distance from either entrance. The practicability of this plan would 
 necessarily depend upon the extent to which the Canal could be 
 secured from injury or a surprise attack from some belligerent who 
 did not respect its obligations. Either plan would prooably result 
 in greater protection of our interests in the Canal than any security 
 derived from the size of the fleet available for its defense in the event 
 of war 1 etween the United States and anv first-class naval power. 
 
 But the necessity of naval protection for the Canal must be con- 
 sidered in the light of Gen. Goethals's testimony before the sub- 
 committee of the Committee on Approprintions of the House of 
 Representatives. Gen. Goethals testified that on the assumption 
 that the naval contest had been ended, and that the control of the 
 sea rested with the enemy, so that the enemy's transports were free 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 35 
 
 and able to land troops, a force of 25,000 men with proper land de- 
 fenses would be able to hold off an invading expedition against the 
 Panama Canal at least as long as the time that was necessary for the 
 capture of Port Arthur. If this be true, it would seem clear that 
 the defense of the Panama Canal would necessitate no departure 
 from the defensive naval policy in which the submarine would 
 largely replace the dreadnaught and the battle cruiser. The Canal 
 is perculiarly adapted for defense by submarines, and there is a dif- 
 ference of expert opinion as to whether its land defenses should not 
 be confined to defense against raids. 
 
 It will naturally be said that even if we abandon the policy of ex- 
 tending our commercial interests by force or by the show of force 
 other nations will not do so, and unless we are prepared to assert our 
 rights in foreign lands our financial interests will suffer, our pride 
 be humbled, and our people be humiliated and abused. There are 
 cases in which we must be prepared to send warships into foreign 
 seas to enforce respect for the flag of the United States and for 
 those who are entitled to its protection. The policies I am suggest- 
 ing would never leave this country without a Navy containing suffi- 
 cient warships to compel the respect of or to punish those inferior 
 nations from which we need have any apprehension of wanton in- 
 sult or ill treatment of our nationals. No civilized nation of conse- 
 quence would in time of peace refuse atonement for insult or injury 
 to any of our people. We may conclusively assume that every repa- 
 ration would be made, and every precaution would be taken against 
 the repetition of such an incident. Nothing but the willingness of 
 the offending nation to proceed to war would call for a larger Navy 
 than we should have ; and our naval policies in the event of war 
 would depend upon, and be determined by, the larger considerations 
 to which I have referred. Assuming that we were protected at home 
 against invasion, we might effectively resort to other weapons than 
 the use of force. There are some conceptions of national honor and 
 of what is essential for its vindication that are reminiscent of the 
 code duello; but they can not long survive that discredited institution. 
 
 To the contention that we must have a navy adequate to protect 
 our foreign trade and keep open the highways of commerce, it seems 
 sufficient to reply that unless we develop a real merchant marine our 
 foreign commerce would be carried on neutral ships ; that no blockade 
 of our extensive coasts could be made effective ; and that nothing but 
 the dominion of the seas could give us an assurance of uninterrupted 
 foreign trade if private commerce is not to be safe under the sanctions 
 of international law. General Greene has aptly said : 
 
 We do not need and will not have in this country an army of seven hundred 
 thousand men, as some ill-balanced enthusiasts demand; we are not compelled 
 to and we will not enter the battleship race of England and Germany. England 
 must run this race or die. We are not so situated, and it would be supreme 
 folly for us to waste our resources or our thoughts on any such contest. 
 
 But a defensive military policy dees not assume a policy of inter- 
 national isolation. If there is anything which this war and the 
 issues arising out of this war have made clear, it is that no nation 
 can longer live unto itself, and least of all that a great commercial 
 nation like the United States can refrain from active and direct par- 
 ticipation in the determination of those policies and the creation of 
 those agencies by which law is to be substituted for war and the 
 
36 PREPAEATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 peaceful development of the Avorld is to be assured. The peaceful 
 development of the United States is indissolubly linked with the 
 peaceful development of Europe and the world. We can no longer 
 refrain frcm alliances because they may involve us in issues from 
 which, thus far, we have happily been free. We must take our place 
 in the family of nations and assume our full measure of responsibil- 
 ity. Nor need we despair of making substantial progress toward 
 the substitution of peaceful means for the settlement of international 
 differences by force of arms. 
 
 The declaration of President Wilson with regard to Pan Amer- 
 icanism in his annual message should serve the useful purpose of 
 directing public attention to the inapplicability of the old conceptions 
 of the Monroe doctrine to existing conditions. If this nation is really 
 definitely to abandon the role " which it was always difficult to main- 
 tain without offense to the pride of the peoples whose freedom of 
 action we sought to protect, and without provoking serious miscon- 
 ceptions of our motives," and is to interpret the Monroe Doctrine as 
 an invitation to " a full and honorable association, as of partners, 
 between ourselves and our neighbors, in the interest of all America, 
 north and south," it marks a tremendous forward step in the national 
 policies of the United States. It, must not be forgotten, however, 
 that the invitation has not 3^et been accepted, and, above all, that it 
 has not yet been embodied in any internaticnal undertakings that can 
 be regarded as a substitute for the doctrine of Monroe. 
 
 The President's message is admirable so far as it goes, but it leaves 
 unanswered the question as to what this country would propose to 
 do in any of the contingencies to which I have referred. Are we to 
 have a defensive alliance with the Latin- American nations, and if so, 
 upon what mutual terms and conditions? Can we, and shall we, 
 make a real start toward " the parliament of man, the federation of 
 the world." by a Pan American alliance in the interests of peace? 
 Undoubtedly there never was an opportunity so favorable as this; 
 and why should we not press home our opportunity by inaugurating 
 that League to Enforce Peace, which is the most practical of all the 
 suggestions that have thus far been made for the substitution of law 
 for Avar by international agreement? 
 
 I trust that the Chamber of Commerce of the United States will 
 seize the opportunity which is peculiarly within its grasp. Never, it 
 seems to me, was anything more timely than the referendum which is 
 now being taken by that great national association of the business 
 interests of America. I think it is safe to assume that few, indeed, 
 in this audience are aware of an event which is almost epochal in 
 its importance. 
 
 On the 2d day of September, 1915, a Special Committee of the 
 Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, composed of 
 men of large business experience, representing commercial institu- 
 tions of the highest and most conservative standing, unanimously 
 reccmmended that Congress and the President be called uj^on to do 
 all in their power to pronute the establishment of: 
 
 1. A more comprehensive and better-defined sea law. 
 
 2. An International Court. 
 
 n. A (/oniK'il of Conciliation. 
 
 4. Intornntional Conferences for the better establishment and progressive* 
 umendment of International Law. 
 
 1 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 37 
 
 5. The organization of a System of Commercial and Financial Non-Inter- 
 course, to be followed by military force, if necessary, to be applied to tliose 
 nations entering into tlie foregoing arrangements and tlien going to war with- 
 out first submitting their differences to an agreed-iipon tribunal/ 
 
 The first four of these recommendations are regarded as based 
 upon considerations so convincing that the committee appointed to 
 formulate arguments against the recommendations involved, so 
 that all phases of the question should be presented on the taking of 
 the referendum, said : 
 
 It is assumed that the first four proposals of the conmiittee are directed to 
 conditions so well understood thai: the agreement about the answers to them 
 is so nearly universal as to render unnecessary any attempt to formulate ob- 
 jections to them. 
 
 As to the fifth proposal, the committee which is in charge of the 
 referendum vote states that 'it involves the adoption of a new prin- 
 ciple " which, however moderate in its immediate form, may be re- 
 garded as a departure from accepted rules of conduct in international 
 law " ; and it sets forth a number of objections, which it says " may 
 be deserving of attention." 
 
 All of these objections, however, were met in advance in the 
 unanimous report of the special committee. Having already pointed 
 out that "the problem of securing peace and justice among nations 
 is simply an extension of what we have successfully solved in the 
 national and municipal realms," and that international conferences 
 have already secured results of the greatest importance for the peace 
 and progress of the world, the committee expresses the opinion that — 
 
 This movement toward international agreement and law was gaining In 
 strength each year. Stopped by the war, there is little doubt that it will re- 
 vive stronger, and pursue its course in a more regular and systematic way 
 v.'hen the war is over. Business men perhaps more than others should be anx- 
 ious to support such endeavors for a better understaitcling among nations, 
 establishing more firmly enlightened standards to govern their interrelations 
 and furnishing a more elaborate and organic body of international public and 
 administrative law. The present war has again incontrovertibly shown the 
 fundamental need for this. The problem is, then, not new or novel, but needs 
 only to be broadened and organized to yield all the desired benefits. * * * 
 There is a difiierence of opinion as to the employment of force to compel any 
 signatory nation to submit its cause to an international tribunal l^efore going 
 to war." Your Committee, liowever. believes that tlie great majority of the 
 practical men of the United States ^^'ho hold themselves responsil)le for reason- 
 able progress see the necessity of the employment of an adequate pressure or 
 force to compel signatory nations to bring their cause before an International 
 Court or Council of Conciliation before going to war; because however desir- 
 able it may be, theoretically, not to use force, yet the history of the last 100 
 years, the many wars during that time, and the events of the present war have , 
 made apparent the fundamental need of an international power to enforce 
 the submission of international disputes to a court. The alternative is con- 
 stantly recurring wars, and, in the interval between these wars, the increasing 
 absorption in preparation for war of the resources of the principal nations of 
 the world. 
 
 The committee demonstrates the wisdom and the practicability of 
 the use of economic pressure as a preliminary to the use of force, and 
 point out that, while such pressure involves economic loss to the 
 
 1 The preliminary count of the votes of the constituent members of the national chamlier 
 on this referendum, announced or January 5, 1916. showed the following results: Propo- 
 sition 1 : Tfio in favor. L'9 opposed ; proposition 2 : 7.5:? in favor, 21 opposced : proposition 
 3: 744 in favor, 2S opposed; proposition 4: 769 in favor, IH opposed; proposition 5(a): 
 55G In favor, 157 opposed (economic pressure) ; proposition 5(6) : 452 in favor, 249 
 opposed (military force). 
 
38 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 
 
 nations that apply it, " war, too, is costly and self -injurious to the. 
 nations which essay it." 
 
 Your Committee has studied sympathetically the arguments of those who, on 
 principle, oppose all force, even to enforce law instead of war ; likewise, the 
 argument of those who respect the tradition that the United States should 
 " keep free of entangling alliances." It muse he conceded that the lattei- de- 
 scribed a past policy inider which our nation has grown in prosperity and hap- 
 piness. But your Committee is forced to see that our country is already di- 
 rectly involved in the present war, because the lives and prosperity of Ameri- 
 can citizens have been involved, and because the future peace and prosperity 
 of our country will be involved in the settlement of the war. 
 
 Your Committee believes that American citizens, realizing the world's im- 
 perative need of the substitution of law for war, if militarism is not to dominate, 
 are ready, nay, feel it the clear call of duty, to take their share of the work 
 find responsibility necessary to establish this substituiion. We can not escape 
 if we would, we would not if we could ; the call of women and children, of 
 the helpless and the weak, suffering indescribably from needless war, is an 
 irresistible compulsion to all Americans, and, not least, to American business 
 men. * * * 
 
 Knowing that civilization is made up of the work and suffering and martyr- 
 doms of the past, we are willing, yes, anxious, to "pay back," in kind if neces- 
 sary, what we are enjoying, if thereby we can help on this greatest forward 
 step of civilization — the substitution of law for war. I'our Committee believes 
 that the time is ripe, as never before, for the fundamental advance in civiliza- 
 tion that the establishing of an International Court and Council represents. 
 * * * Your Committee believes that it is practically possible that the time 
 has arrived, if the United States will but do its share of the work. There is 
 little real hope for success if the United States is not a part of it. * * * 
 If, at the close of the war there exists the legalized purpose of the United States 
 to join in the work needed too enforce peace, there will be a most practical 
 reason to expect success for this so necessary step forward. In fact, the begin- 
 ning of the necessary organization may be in existence at that time, by reason 
 of the agreement between the United States and some of the neutral nations 
 of South America and Europe. It is a great opportunity, perhaps the greatest 
 that has ever come to any nation. It is a great adventure practically within 
 our power to promote — an enterprise that appeals to all that is best in us — an 
 opportunity we will not miss. 
 
 Remember these are not the words and this is not the action of a 
 body of visionary enthusiasts; it is the unanimous recommendation 
 of a special committee of the greatest commercial body in this coun- 
 try, appointed "to examine into the relations between the present 
 war and business, and submit suggestions as to the future." Nor is 
 it the only indication of the progress of higher ideals in international 
 relations. 
 
 There is a dispatch which was sent by Sir Edward Grey to Sir 
 Edward Goshen, British Ambassador at Berlin, at the very crisis of 
 the diplomatic interchanges which preceded the war, which I have 
 read and reread with mingled feelings of sadness and hope. It has 
 always seemed to me the most tragic of all the official documents 
 which have been published by the Avarring nations, and, at the same 
 time, the most encouraging. Just as it seemed inevitable that the 
 explosion would occur, that the catastrophe must happen, after the 
 suggestions and countersuggestions, the complaints and countercom- 
 plaints had been discussed under the forms and usages of diplomacy, 
 Sir Edward Grey struck a new note that went straight to the heart 
 of the underlying cause of all the difficulty. On July 30, 1914, he 
 authorized Sir Edward Goshen to say to the German Chancellor: 
 
 If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, 
 my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement, to which Germany could 
 be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 39 
 
 would be pursued against her or her allies, by France, Russia, and ourselves, 
 jointly or separately. I liave desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, 
 through the last Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object, 
 our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to 
 form the subject of definite i>roposals ; but if this present crisis, so much more 
 acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, 
 I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible 
 some more definite rapprochement between the powers than has been possible 
 hitherto. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey did not indicate exactly what he had in mind, 
 but with the fate of Europe trembling in the balance, Utopia seemed 
 nearer and more practically available than had seemed possible be- 
 fore. It was to be " some more definite rapjyrochement between the 
 powers than has been possible hitherto " — some arrangement to which 
 Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no 
 aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies 
 " by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately." Oh, the 
 pity that Utopia had not seemed nearer a little while before; that 
 this dispatch should have waited for " this present crisis, so much 
 more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations." 
 What a tragedy that it should have been received by a chancellor 
 who heard it without comment " because His Excellency was so 
 taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier." 
 
 That dispatch has not yet been answered. The German Chancellor 
 asked for and received a copy as a memorandum, as " he would like 
 to reflect on it before giving an answer." He has had much time and 
 much occasion to reflect. That dispatch Avill be unanswered at the 
 close of the war. The future of mankind depends upon the spirit in 
 which its discussion is resumed, and upon the conditions which then 
 exist. After this present conflict, so much more destructive and 
 appalling than any that Europe has gone through, why should not 
 the United States hold open a road that will at least lead toward 
 Utopia by adopting the suggestions on which the members of the 
 national Chamber of Commerce are now voting — by having in ex- 
 istence the beginning of a League to Enforce Peace by agreements 
 then already made between the United States and some of the neutral 
 nations of South America and Europe? Si vis pacem para pacern. 
 If we wish peace let us prepare for peace. 
 
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