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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
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UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS STUDIES 
 
THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 BY 
 
 FRANK BURR MARSH, Ph.D. 
 
 Adjunct Professor of Ancient History in the University of Texas 
 
 PUBLISHED BY 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 
 
 AUSTIN 
 
 University of Texas Press 
 1922 
 

 Copyright, 1922 
 
 By 
 
 The University of Texas 
 
 DEC -1*22 
 
 CU690457 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The first chapter of this work was originally read as a 
 paper before the American Historical Association and was 
 published in their proceedings for 1913. It has, however, 
 been extensively revised and in part rewritten. 
 
 The general purpose of the work will, I hope, be suf- 
 ficiently clear, but there are one or two matters to which it 
 might be well to call attention. My quotations from Cicero's 
 letters are all taken from Shuckburgh's translation. Not 
 only is this version the work of an eminent scholar, but it 
 seems to me especially excellent for the manner in which 
 it has reproduced in English the style and flavor of Cicero's 
 Latin. A few experiments convinced me that I could not 
 improve on Shuckburgh's rendering, and I have therefore 
 been content to adopt it. Needless to say, I have carefully 
 compared the translation with the original text and In a 
 few cases I have ventured to differ from Shuckburgh and 
 to modify his rendering of the passage in question. Where 
 such changes have been made, I have called attention to it 
 in the notes, except in one or two cases where the alterations 
 were very slight and trivial, or such as will necessarily arise 
 in quotation. There are one or two other cases where I have 
 quoted from modern translations for special reasons. For 
 example, in the quotation from Hirtius on the siege of 
 Uxellodunum I have taken the English version of Edwards 
 because he holds the same view as to the date intended as 
 Holmes, from which view I am inclined to dissent. 
 
 There are a number of disputed points where I have ad- 
 hered to the conventional view without comment. Thus, 
 for example, Boak has recently argued (in the American 
 Historical Review for 1918) that after the time of Sulla 
 the senate assumed the right to confer the imperium. I find 
 myself unable to accept this view, and I note that its author 
 has himself abandoned one of his supposed instances in the 
 
History of Rome which ho has just published. If any such 
 power was claimed by the senate no attempt was made to 
 use it against Caesar. In connection with the proconsular 
 impcrium o( Augustus I have taken account of the views 
 advanced by IVlham (in his Assays o)i Roman History), 
 but the criticism o( Hardy (in his Roman Studies) seems 
 to me io leave the question very much .s-^/> jud%C9 t to say the 
 least, and it has appeared safer to adhere to the commonly 
 received interpretation. Should either the views of l>oak 
 or Pelham be accepted it would require only slight verbal 
 changes in the text. I am also aware that doubts have been 
 raised as to the province assigned to Caesar by the senate 
 before his election as consul, but they do not appear to me 
 to be o( sufficient weight to justify an amendment to the 
 text o( Suetonius. 
 
 It remains only to acknowledge my indebtedness to several 
 o\ my colleagues. I have to thank Professors Barker, Pun- 
 calf, and Hat tie o( this University for their kindness in 
 reading my manuscript and for valuable suggestions. I am 
 especially under obligation to Dr. 1\ M. Ratchelder of the 
 Mathematics Department for very valuable assistance in 
 preparing the manuscript for the press and in reading the 
 proof. 
 
 Frank Burr marsh. 
 
 Austin, Texas. May 1. liVj-j. 
 
 VI 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Chapter I. The Adminiatrathre Ptohlem of the Republic... 3 
 
 Chapter II. The Development of the Military System 23 
 
 Chapter III. The Supremacy of Pompey 52 
 
 Chapter IV. The First Triumvirate 84 
 
 Chapter V. Caesar l20 
 
 Chapter VI. The Destruction of the Republican* 164 
 
 Chapter VII. The Triumph of Octavian 192 
 
 Chapter VIII. The Restoration of the Republic 219 
 
 Chapter IX. The Transformation of the Principate 237 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 The Lex Vatinia 271 
 
 The l>x Pompeia-Licima * ,v 
 
 Chronological List of Consuls 2<n 
 
 List of Consulars Active in the Imperial Service 294 
 
 Analysis of the Consular Fasti 297 
 
 Alphabetical List of Consuls 305 
 
 List of Books Referred to in the Notes 314 
 
 T . 319 
 
 Index 
 
 VII 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 The Administrative Problem of the Republic 
 
 No part of Ancient History has possessed greater fascin- 
 ation for the imagination than the story of the rise of the 
 Roman republic from an insignificant town of Latium to a 
 position of world empire and the destruction of the civil lib- 
 erty of the Romans in the moment of their triumph. That 
 the two things were intimately connected is obvious upon 
 the surface, and historians have agreed that it was Rome's 
 conquest of the Mediterranean world that proved fatal to 
 republican institutions. Two main explanations have been 
 advanced of why this should have been the case. One of 
 these is that, assailed by the new temptations which the em- 
 pire brought with it, the Romans themselves deteriorated 
 in character ; the other is that, having begun her career as a 
 city-state, Rome found her machinery of government inad- 
 equate to perform the work which world dominion imposed 
 upon her. Both these explanations are quite obviously true 
 and quite as obviously insufficient. The corruption and de- 
 generacy of a people do not always lead to a change of 
 government, and it should be shown why it did so in this 
 instance. That a city-state could not govern an empire may 
 be true, but it leaves open the question as to precisely why 
 it could not. In what particular respects was the Roman 
 republic unequal to its task? Just where and why did the 
 machine break down? When the government did finally 
 collapse why did not the entire fabric go to pieces? If the 
 degeneracy of the Roman people will explain the fall of the 
 republic, how shall we account for the fact that this same 
 people continued to rule the world ? How did it happen that 
 the Roman world emerged from the chaos of the civil wars, 
 transformed indeed into an empire, but still Roman as dom- 
 inantly as before? By what steps had the empire been de- 
 veloped out of the republican machine? — for it is surely 
 incredible that it had no more solid foundation than the 
 astute hypocrisy of Augustus. A survey of the last century 
 
4 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 of the republic, even if only in brief outline, ought to pro- 
 vide some definite answer to such questions, and such a sur- 
 vey is the purpose of the present work. Its object will, 
 therefore, be to show in some detail just how and why the 
 republic failed and fell and in what way the empire was 
 gradually evolved to meet the imperative needs which the 
 old system could no longer satisfy. 
 
 It was not entirely because the Roman state was munic- 
 ipal in its origin that it proved unequal to the task of gov- 
 erning a widely extended empire; the peculiar character 
 of the Roman constitution had much to do with its failure. 
 The Roman republic possessed a very intricate and deli- 
 cately adjusted organization wherein each part was fitted 
 to every other, and this complexity was one of the causes 
 which led to the breakdown of the machine. With the very 
 beginning of Rome's extra-Italian conquests the difficulty 
 began. The problem which the administration of the prov- 
 inces presented exercised a marked influence on the foreign 
 policy of the republic — an influence generally ignored, but 
 one which will repay a brief consideration. This is the more 
 true because the problem, in one shape or another, lasted 
 throughout the last century of the republic and exerted a 
 transforming influence upon the institutions of the early 
 empire. It will be well, therefore, at the start to see 
 clearly the precise nature of this administrative problem 
 for which the statesmen of the day were striving to find a 
 satisfactory solution. 
 
 A glance at the history of the growth of Rome's imperial 
 power will at once reveal some curious features which would 
 seem to call for explanation. The first of these is the inter- 
 mittent character of Roman expansion. In a relatively 
 short space of time Rome annexed several provinces, and 
 then for a number of years no additions were made to her 
 empire. A brief table will perhaps make this clearer. 
 From 241 to 197 B.C., a period of forty-four years, Rome 
 annexed four provinces. Then from 197 to 146 B.C., a 
 period of fifty-one years, no new territories were acquired. 
 From 146 to 121 B.C., a period of twenty-five years, four 
 more provinces were annexed. Then from 121 to 63 B.C., 
 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 5 
 
 a period of fifty-eight years, there was no further increase 
 of the Roman dominions. Thus it will be seen that the 
 Roman empire expanded rapidly for forty-four years, then 
 stood still for fifty-one years, then advanced again for 
 twenty-five years, then remained stationary for fifty-eight 
 years. 
 
 A second peculiarity is that in the periods of rest, if they 
 may be so termed, the republic not only did not annex new 
 provinces but strove earnestly to avoid doing so. It is not 
 that opportunities were lacking but that Rome refused to 
 take advantage of them. One or two illustrations will suf- 
 fice to make this evident. As has been said above, in the 
 fifty-one years between 197 and 146 Rome acquired no new 
 territory. Yet, during this time, Rome carried on several 
 important and successful wars. From 200 to 196 she was 
 engaged in the Second Macedonian War, the result of which 
 was to place Greece and Macedon completely at her mercy. 
 On this occasion Rome contented herself with curtailing 
 the power of Macedon and withdrew her forces. Hardly 
 had the Roman legions departed than in 192 Antiochus of 
 Syria invaded Greece, and Rome was forced into a, war 
 with him. The result of that war was to leave Rome mis- 
 tress of Greece and Asia Minor. Instead of using her op- 
 portunity, she gave up her conquests and withdrew her 
 forces without adding even a single district to her empire. 
 In 171 Perseus, king of Macedon, began a war of revenge 
 on Rome. He was crushed at the battle of Pydna in 168 
 and his kingdom lay helpless at the feet of the conqueror. 
 Instead of annexing Macedon, Rome contented herself with 
 abolishing the Macedonian monarchy, divided the country 
 into four republics, and retired across the seas. Nineteen 
 years after Pydna, the Macedonians revolted under a pre- 
 tender and this time Rome finally yielded to the inevitable, 
 and there being no other way of keeping Macedon quiet, 
 she annexed it as a province at the beginning of the second 
 period of expansion. 
 
 Another instance of this same aversion to conquest is 
 furnished by the province of Narbonensis, or Transalpine 
 Gaul. After Rome had acquired possessions in Spain it 
 
X 
 
 6 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 was, as historians have often pointed out, inevitable that 
 she should seek to gain a land connection between Italy 
 and Spain. In ancient times the Mediterranean could only 
 be navigated at certain seasons and it would thus be unsafe 
 for Rome to rely wholly on the sea for her communications 
 with the Spanish provinces. All modern historians have 
 felt the force of these considerations. What has not been 
 explained is why Rome remained blind to them for seventy- 
 six years. This, however, seems clearly a part of the gen- 
 eral anti-expansionist policy which prevailed from 197 to 
 146. As soon as a forward policy was resumed Trans- 
 alpine Gaul was promptly annexed and land communica- 
 tion with Spain assured. 
 
 As has been pointed out, this second period of expansion 
 lasted for twenty-five years and came to art end in 121 B.C. 
 Of Roman policy after this time Professor Tenny Frank 
 has admirably said : "A careful examination of the behavior 
 of the home government . . . reveals the significant 
 fact that a complete indifference to expansion, at times 
 verging upon a positive aversion, existed at Rome. The 
 Asiatic province and Cyrene constitute the only consid- 
 erable territorial additions, and these were gifts, accepted 
 in both cases with certain restrictions. In Africa, Gaul, 
 and Cilicia, Rome took charge of the least rather than the 
 largest possible portion of territory at her disposal. The 
 senate was, of course, the center of the anti-imperialistic 
 sentiment, discouraged, it would seem, by its experiences 
 in Spain, and wholly out of sympathy with the military de- 
 velopments necessitated by foreign possessions." 1 The facts 
 here stated are entirely correct, but the explanation of the 
 senate's attitude seems hardly adequate. Another explan- 
 ation that has been offered of this attitude is that the senate 
 was jealous of the power of the governors of the provinces 
 
 a Frank, Roman Imperialism, 274. Of the two provinces here mentioned the an- 
 nexation of Asia really dates from the preceding period since it was then that the 
 first steps were taken for making it a Roman dependency; the other, Cyrene, seems 
 not to have been administered as a separate province for a considerable time. 
 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 7 
 
 and found them difficult to control. 2 This motive was doubt- 
 less present, yet it can hardly be the whole explanation, 
 since this motive would be likely to be felt as strongly at 
 one time as at another, while the opposition of the senate 
 to new annexations is clearly greater at certain periods 
 than at others. Why should the senate have been more re- 
 luctant to extend the territories of the republic before 146 
 B.C. than after that year? 
 
 If we turn, however, to the constitutional problem which 
 the administration of provinces presented to the Romans, 
 an explanation is readily forthcoming. Previous to 146 
 this problem involved greater difficulty than it did after that 
 date, owing to certain new developments in constitutional 
 usage. This explanation, moreover, will apply equally at 
 another point. The growth of the empire was again ar- 
 rested in 121 B.C., but it so happens that the administrative 
 problem had again become difficult of solution at about that 
 time. 
 
 The key to the senate's attitude may, perhaps, be found 
 in its composition and its position in the Roman state. In 
 early times the duty of making out the list of the 300 sena- 
 tors had been intrusted to the censors. Very soon, how- 
 ever, their freedom of choice began to be limited by custom, 
 if not by law. Certain persons — namely the ex-magistrates 
 — came to be regarded as having a moral, if not a legal, 
 right to be placed upon the roll. This right seems to have 
 been established by the Ovinian law, which probably di- 
 rected the censors to fill the vacancies in the senate by des- 
 ignating the most worthy of the ex-magistrates, including 
 the tribunes and quaestors. 3 The number of these last two 
 
 z For example Heitland (The Roman Republic, ii, 187-88) says: "That the senate 
 was anything but eager to annex provinces is clear enough, and was no doubt 
 mainly due to the known difficulty of controlling distant governors." He also points 
 out some other considerations such as the influence of the "old Roman" party and 
 the wealth or poverty of the province in question, but he seems to regard the reason 
 quoted as the chief cause of the senate's attitude. Mommsen has also emphasized 
 the fear of the vast power which must have been intrusted to the governor as the 
 reason for the refusal of the senate to accept the gift of Egypt under the will of 
 one of the last Ptolemies. History of Rome, iv, 319. 
 
 3 The exact provisions of the Ovinian law have been disputed. The arguments in 
 favor of the view taken in the text are very strong and are fully set forth in 
 Willems, Le senat de la republique romaine, i, 153-73. 
 
8 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 classes must have been more than sufficient for the purpose, 
 so that under ordinary circumstances the censors would 
 have little, if any, opportunity to go outside their ranks. 
 Whatever the provisions of the Ovinian law, the account 
 which Livy gives of the filling up of the senate after the 
 disastrous battle of Cannae strongly suggests that by 216 
 B.C. the rule was clearly established in practice that the ex- 
 tribunes and ex-quaestors should be preferred to citizens 
 who had not held office. 
 
 When the problem of administering dependencies first 
 presented itself it was comparatively easy of solution. The 
 earliest provinces acquired by the Roman people were Sar- 
 dinia and Sicily, which were taken from Carthage at the 
 end of the First Punic War primarily for the purpose of 
 keeping her at a safe distance from southern Italy and se- 
 curing the safety and control of the Italian seas. Having 
 annexed them, Rome was obliged to provide in some fashion 
 for their government. A brief experience sufficed to con- 
 vince the Romans that the tranquility and safety of these 
 islands required the presence in them of a Roman governor 
 armed with the imperium, 41 that is one of the higher Roman 
 magistrates. But all the magistrates were then fully oc- 
 cupied in Italy, and Rome had none to spare for her extra- 
 Italian possessions. Under these circumstances the obvious 
 course to follow was to increase the number of magistrates 
 with the imperium and send the newly created ones across 
 the seas. As it was out of the question to increase the num- 
 ber of the consuls, the praetors were selected for this pur- 
 pose and their number was raised from two to four. At 
 the same time, as it was customary for a magistrate holding 
 an independent command to be accompanied by a quaestor, 
 the number of the quaestors was increased to meet the new 
 demands. This successfully solved the problem for the 
 
 *The term imperium signified the power of command. It was applied to the sum 
 total of the powers conferred upon the higher magistrates. The Roman made no 
 clear distinction between civil and military, executive and judicial functions, but 
 included them all in the one term. In a broad sense the imperium thus meant 
 the power of governing and whoever had received it from the people could act as 
 an executive magistrate, sit as a judge, or command an army The only regular 
 magistrates possessing the imperium were the consuls and praetors. 
 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 9 
 
 time being, and when, at the close of the Second Punic War, 
 Rome annexed two new provinces in Spain, the same method 
 was again resorted to in order to secure governors. The 
 number of the praetors was now raised to six and that of 
 the quaestors to twelve. At this point, however, a halt was 
 called and for the next 51 years a steadily anti-expansionist 
 policy was followed by the senate. One reason for this 
 must certainly be found in the fact that there existed defi- 
 nite obstacles to any further increase in the number of the 
 magistrates, and hence that it was difficult, or impossible, 
 to administer more territory. The precise nature of these 
 obstacles will repay a brief consideration. 
 
 During the period of Roman history that closed in 197 
 B.C. two important developments had been taking place. 
 In the holding of the offices a definite sequence had been 
 gradually established by which it was customary to hold the 
 quaestorship before the praetorship and the praetorship be- 
 fore the consulship. The quaestorship had thus been made 
 the first step in a Roman's official career, even the tribunes 
 being usually ex-quaestors. While this was happening there 
 had been another development of great importance going 
 on. Little by little a new aristocracy was taking shape and 
 was becoming all the time more and more clearly defined 
 and more and more powerful. From the earliest days of 
 Rome there had been a close association between nobility 
 and the holding of office. One of the outstanding marks of 
 the old patrician aristocracy had been their monopoly of 
 office. When the long conflict between the patricians and 
 the plebeians had at last ended in the victory of the people 
 and the magistracies had been thrown open to all the citi- 
 zens, much of the old feeling still remained. Thus it speed- 
 ily happened that those plebeian families whose members 
 had been elected to office by their fellow citizens began to 
 take their place side by side with the old patrician families 
 to form a new nobility. As early as 217 B.C. one of the 
 tribunes had denounced this tendency, saying that the new 
 plebeian nobles had begun to despise the people the moment 
 they had ceased to be despised by the patricians. The denun- 
 ciation was without effect and the new nobility continued 
 
10 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 to develop without check. This new aristocracy was com- 
 posed of all those families which had attained to any of 
 the curule offices. 5 As the holding of these offices thus came 
 to confer distinction, not only on the man who held them 
 but on his descendants as well, it was entirely natural that 
 the families so ennobled should feel themselves a class apart 
 and should exert themselves to keep the offices in the hands 
 of members of their class as far as possible. Such an at- 
 tempt coincided far too well with the aristocratic and con- 
 servative temper of the Roman people not to meet with a 
 large measure of success, and the outstanding fact about the 
 Roman republic, from the end of the Great Wars on, is the 
 contrast between its theoretical and its actual government. 
 In point of law, the republic was a democracy and its offices 
 open to all citizens without distinction of birth, while in 
 point of fact, they were almost entirely monopolized by a 
 ring of noble families. After 197 B.C. it may reasonably 
 be assumed that this nobility was so far developed and had 
 become sufficiently class-conscious to begin to view the broad 
 problems of Roman policy from the standpoint of aristo- 
 cratic interests. 
 
 It is evident that a nobility like that of Rome could not 
 regard with indifference an indefinite increase in the num- 
 ber of the offices. If this were permitted a point must ulti- 
 mately be reached when the number would become too great 
 for the existing aristocracy to fill, and since the holding of 
 the higher offices conferred nobility, an undue increase in 
 their number was equivalent to a creation of peers. An 
 aristocracy tends naturally to exclusiveness ; the English 
 House of Lords has twice stooped to profound humiliation 
 to avoid the cheapening of their rank that must come with a 
 large addition to their number. A similar attitude on the 
 part of the Roman nobles might safely be inferred. It 
 would mean, in point of fact, that they would seek to check 
 the increase in the number of the offices as soon as this 
 
 5 The curule offices were the consulship, praetorship, and two of the four aedile- 
 ships. Of the aediles two were known as curule aediles and the other two as 
 plebeian aediles. The curule offices were those which had once been exclusively 
 patrician and were distinguished by certain special marks and privileges. 
 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 11 
 
 threatened to bring about any considerable augmentation 
 of their class. By 197 this point had actually been reached, 
 and it is consequently at that time that the increase in the 
 number of the magistrates was checked. But if this were 
 done it was evident that the state could not be permitted 
 to assume new administrative responsibilities, and thus the 
 Roman nobility was forced to adopt an anti-expansionist 
 policy abroad as a necessary means of securing its exclusive- 
 ness at home. 
 
 So satisfactory was the existing system to the nobility 
 that they prevented any alteration in the number of the 
 magistrates for over a century and contented themselves 
 with strengthening those features of it which worked most 
 directly to their advantage. In regard to the magistrates 
 a brief consideration will suffice to show that any change 
 must have been to the disadvantage of the aristocracy. 
 There were during this time 6 praetors and 12 quaestors. 
 Custom, if not positive law, had imposed the rule that the 
 quaestorship should be the necessary preliminary to all 
 other offices — even in most cases, to the tribuneship. In 
 the case of this last office the quaestorship seems never to 
 have been required, but it was very generally held and it is 
 probable that few of the tribunes who had not held it were 
 admitted to the senate. More and more the quaestorship 
 became the path that led, not only to all the higher offices, 
 but to the senate as well. As the traditional number of the 
 senate was fixed at 300 it would seem that the number of 12 
 quaestors a year would somewhat more than suffice to fill 
 its ranks. 6 It was quite clearly to the interest of the nobles 
 
 6 Willems (i, 161-164 and 404-406) has attempted to fix the average duration of life 
 of the ex-quaestors and has estimated it at 30 years or slightly less. The size of the 
 senate as reorganized by Sulla was certainly between 500 and 600, which, based as it 
 was on 20 quaestors a year would give the average life at from 25 to 30 years. 
 On the basis of 25 years 12 quaestors a year would give 300, while with 30 years the 
 number would be 360. Before the last increase in the number of the quaestors they 
 probably numbered 10, which, on the basis of 30 years average life, would give 300. 
 It may not be unreasonable to infer that very probably before this last increase the 
 quaestors were not quite numerous enough to fill the vacancies in the senate and that 
 after the increase the number was slightly larger than was required. The nobility, 
 in that case, would seem to have stopped the increase as soon as the number became 
 obviously too large to serve their purpose and this was, perhaps, as soon as the 
 position of the nobility became sufficiently strong and well defined to enable them 
 to act successfully. 
 
12 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 to maintain this office as an indispensable first step in an 
 official career and not to permit an undue increase in its 
 numbers. It must have served as an excellent means of 
 preserving the supremacy of the aristocracy at once in the 
 magistracies and in the senate. It was almost always held 
 at an early age, at 30 or thereabouts, and under the condi- 
 tions of Roman public life so young a man had rarely been 
 given any opportunity to impress his personality on the 
 voters, unless, perhaps, in the law courts. In general the 
 candidates for the office would be comparatively unknown 
 men and the nobles would have little difficulty in securing 
 the return of the members of their families who might 
 stand. Now and then a new man might be chosen, but the 
 Roman voter called on to decide between two candidates who 
 were both personally but little known to him would nearly 
 always vote for the one who bore an historic name. The 
 quaestorship could thus be made to serve the purpose of the 
 aristocracy if the senate and the higher magistracies were 
 made to depend upon it. The greater the number of the 
 quaestors in proportion to the number of the noble families 
 the less efficiently it could be employed in this way. The 
 stationary number of the quaestors seems therefore readily 
 intelligible. To increase the number would simply have 
 meant admitting so many more inconvenient rivals for the 
 higher offices from outside their ranks. 
 
 The objections to any change in the number of the prae- 
 tors are even more obvious. The holding of this office in 
 itself conferred nobility and 6 was quite as large a number 
 as the aristocracy desired to have. It was, indeed, upon this 
 office that the size of the nobility ultimately depended. It is 
 true that both the consulship and the curule aedileship en- 
 nobled their holders, but the praetorship invariably preceded 
 the one and almost invariably followed the other. In the 
 earlier days of the repulic this had not been true. In former 
 times there had been but two consuls, two praetors, and two 
 curule aediles, so that at this period the offices must have 
 been held more or less independently of each other. There 
 were therefore at first six offices which conferred noble rank. 
 It may be only a coincidence, but it is, at least, suggestive 
 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 13 
 
 that the Roman aristocracy stopped the increase in the num- 
 ber of the praetors at precisely this same number. It would 
 seem that they had no great objection to the increase so long 
 as it kept within the limits of the already existing noble fam- 
 ilies. When that point had been reached and any further in- 
 crease must have resulted in the creation of more noble fam- 
 ilies, a halt was promptly called. Yet if new provinces were 
 to be governed it was necessary to increase the number of 
 the praetors. Experience had clearly shown that the govern- 
 ors must possess the imperium which meant that they must 
 be either praetors or consuls. Their class interests as an 
 aristocracy therefore impelled the Roman nobles to set them- 
 selves against imperialism and foreign conquest. 7 
 
 The only solution of the difficulty that would permit of 
 new annexations was to create a new office which should not 
 confer nobility, or a seat in the senate, and use this new mag- 
 istracy for the government of the provinces. This would 
 have meant the direct election of the provincial governors 
 in the assembly, since only the people could confer the 
 imperium. This plan, which would seem so obvious and 
 natural to a modern mind, was open to grave objections 
 from the standpoint of the senate and of the nobility who 
 used that body as an instrument of government. 
 
 In the first place, a large part of the power and influence 
 of the senate sprang directly from the fact that it concen- 
 trated in itself the whole official experience of the Roman 
 world. Consuls and praetors must inevitably treat with 
 respect the deliberate judgment of a body in which sat every 
 Roman who had led an army or governed a province. Once 
 let official knowledge and experience accumulate outside the 
 senate and much of its influence would be gone. This was 
 
 7 In a recent volume by Ferrero this point is stated in general terms but with great 
 clearness. On a aujourd'hui de la peine a comprendre pourquoi Rome, mime 
 a I'apogee de sa puissance, hesita si souvent a itendre ses conquetes et a agrandir 
 son Empire. Mais une aristocratie est un corps fermS, qui ne s'improvise ni ne se 
 diveloppe a volonte comme peut s'improviser et se developper une bureaucratie 
 recrutee dans toutes les classes et dans toutes les nations; c'est pourquoi Rome dut 
 veiller toujours a ne pas Uendre I'Empire de telle sorte que le nombre d'administra- 
 teurs et d' off icier s superieura que pouvait fournir son aristocratie devint insuffisant; 
 et c'est egalement pourquoi elle s'efforga toujours d'administrer I'Empire avec le 
 moins de fonctionnaires possible. Ferrero, La ruine de la civilisation antique, 120-21. 
 
14 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 a consideration absolutely vital to a body which, like the 
 senate, ruled far more by influence than by legal right. 
 
 Indirectly, too, such a proposal would have been injurious 
 to the nobles. In the Roman mind there was a very close 
 association between the magistrates, the senate, and the no- 
 bility. Office-holding and a seat in the senate were among 
 the badges of the noble. Once create important offices which 
 did not confer nobility or a senatorship and there was bound 
 to arise a new order to rival the existing nobles. Such a 
 development could not but appear dangerous to those nobles 
 and could not be expected to find favor at their hands. 
 
 Still further, a considerable part of the senate's control 
 over the provincial governors lay in the fact that they were 
 ipso facto senators, and the opinion of their order, spoken 
 through that body of which they were themselves a part, 
 could not but weigh heavily with them. Break this connec- 
 tion, let the people name governors who had no direct in- 
 terest in the supremacy of the senate, and a blow would 
 be struck at its power. If the senate already found its 
 control over the provinces too weak, it would not be likely 
 to consent to a change which would have weakened it still 
 more. 
 
 Hence, from whatever side the problem of providing more 
 governors for new provinces might be approached, it was 
 impossible of any solution agreeable to the nobles. It is, 
 therefore, not surprising that the senate, which was dom- 
 inated by the aristocracy, took the stand that there should 
 be no new provinces to require governors, and that it di- 
 rected the foreign policy of Rome with that end in view. 
 The senate permitted the extension of the empire as long as 
 the existing system could be so expanded as to meet the ur- 
 gent needs of government. When that point was reached 
 and when any new annexations would require extensive re- 
 adjustments, the senate called a halt. 
 
 Yet, although the expansion of Rome could be, and was, 
 stopped for some fifty years, the existing system could not 
 be made permanent. On the one hand, new annexations 
 could not be forever avoided, and on the other, the system 
 broke down from within. 
 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 15 
 
 The growth of judicial business at Rome ended by de- 
 manding the retention there of more than two praetors, 
 especially after the establishment of the standing court 
 de repetundis in 148 B.C.; and the senate's Macedonian 
 policy having ended in utter failure, that turbulent country 
 was finally annexed at the same time that the destruction 
 of Carthage placed Africa in Roman hands. Thus the num- 
 ber of the provinces was increased to six, while but three 
 praetors were available as governors. Faced by this situa- 
 tion, the senate threw the system of governing by praetors 
 overboard and worked out a new plan. This was rendered 
 possible by a new and most significant development in the 
 Roman constitution, namely, the rise of the promagistracy. 
 
 The origin of this new institution was simple. In the 
 early days of the republic, when the number of the magis- 
 trates with the imperium was very restricted, the state oc- 
 casionally needed a larger number than was regularly pro- 
 vided. Under these circumstances the imperium of some 
 one of the magistrates who were about to quit office was 
 prolonged and he continued to exercise his powers after he 
 had laid down his magistracy. As he was no longer consul 
 or praetor, as the case might be, but was yet exercising the 
 powers of that office, he was said to be acting pro praetore 
 or pro consule, that is, in place of a praetor or a consul. 
 The right to prolong the imperium in this fashion belonged 
 at first to the people in their assembly, but during the period 
 of the Great Wars the senate assumed it, as it assumed so 
 many other powers of government. 
 
 The convenience, and even the necessity, of this power 
 for the conscript fathers in arranging for the administra- 
 tion of the provinces was obvious from the start. Indeed, 
 without it the government could not have been carried on. 
 The Roman republic was equipped with only eight magis- 
 trates with the imperium — the two consuls and the six prae- 
 tors. Normally two praetors were kept in Rome and four 
 sent to the four provinces then existing. But it often hap- 
 pened that a magistrate with the imperium was impera- 
 tively needed somewhere else. In this case the senate dis- 
 patched one of the praetors and to replace him left one of 
 
16 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 the provincial governors in office for a second year as a 
 propraetor. This usage was the easier to establish as it 
 was a regular rule of the constitution that a governor con- 
 tinued in office till his successor arrived to take over the 
 government. Now, as each year the senate settled what 
 provinces should be distributed by lot among the praetors, 
 if they failed to designate one of the four regular provinces 
 for this purpose, the praetor there in charge could not be 
 superseded for another year. 
 
 Thus the power which the senate had assumed of contin- 
 uing in office at its discretion a consul or a praetor beyond 
 his regular term supplied the element of elasticity required 
 to make the rigid system workable. Since it was clearly a 
 necessity, no serious objection seems to have been made to 
 this assumption of power on the senate's part. Once estab- 
 lished as a legitimate part of the machinery of government 
 to meet exceptional emergencies it came to be employed with 
 increasing frequency. The more the steadily growing needs 
 of the Roman state pressed upon the heavily burdened reg- 
 ular magistrates, the greater the temptation to relieve the 
 pressure by making use of the promagistracy. 
 
 By the year 146 B.C. the promagistrate had come to 
 be a frequent visitor in the Roman government. But up 
 to that time he had always remained a visitor. That is, the 
 use of a proconsul or propraetor had been looked upon as 
 something exceptional — a temporary expedient to meet an 
 unusual situation. About 146 the senate solved the problem 
 of governing the increased number of provinces by turning 
 the exception into the rule. Henceforth the promagistracy, 
 instead of being a special device intended to meet an emer- 
 gency, was a regular part of the ordinary constitution, and 
 the provinces were governed not by magistrates but by pro- 
 magistrates. The new system was not, of course, intro- 
 duced abruptly, nor was the old system given up at once. 
 What happened was that after 146 the magistrate became 
 rarer in the provinces and the promagistrate more frequent. 
 We now begin to meet with instances of a praetor who had 
 served his year of office in Rome being sent out as a pro- 
 vincial governor in the following year. Those praetors who 
 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 17 
 
 had gone directly to a province were more and more often 
 left there for a second year. It is, however, likely that the 
 new system of using the promagistrate as a governor did 
 not become a matter of ordinary administrative routine 
 until the time of Sulla. 8 
 
 This new method of administering the provinces had, from 
 some standpoints, little to recommend it. It made directly 
 for poor administration and this for a very simple reason. 
 If a man is elected to fill a given office he can be chosen with 
 some reference to his fitness for that office. But if he is 
 elected to fill one position, and when his term is over, is then 
 sent to fill some other and quite different one, this becomes 
 impossible. Every year the Roman people elected praetors 
 to serve as judges in Rome; when their year of judicial 
 service there expired, the senate shipped them off to gov- 
 ern provinces and command armies. They were necessarily 
 chosen with but the very slightest reference to their qualifi- 
 cations for these new duties. Of course some of them, like 
 Julius Caesar, were men of so versatile a genius that they 
 could do almost anything and do it well ; but such men were 
 rare, and it inevitably happened that a very large number 
 were ill-adapted to the posts which the fortunes of the lot 
 assigned to them. As a result the provincial administration 
 suffered and Rome suffered in consequence. 
 
 Yet, whatever the demerits of the system from the stand- 
 point of political science, from that of the nobles it had 
 signal advantages. It solved all the problems of adminis- 
 tration and solved them in a way entirely agreeable to the 
 senate. Its advantages may be summed up as four in num- 
 ber. It enabled the senate to relieve the congestion of busi- 
 ness at Rome by keeping most of the six praetors there dur- 
 ing their term of office. At the same time it furnished 
 enough governors to meet the increased demands, as all six, 
 together with the two outgoing consuls, were available for 
 provincial governorships. It did both these things without 
 increasing the number of the magistrates, and hence of the 
 nobles, and in the fourth place, it did so without disturbing 
 any of the existing rules and regulations. 
 
 8 For a discussion of this point see Willems, ii, 566-67. 
 
18 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 The year 146 B.C. may be taken, then, as marking the be- 
 ginning of a new form of provincial administration. Hence- 
 forth the consuls and praetors were to serve their year of 
 office in Italy, and when that was over, were to go out for a 
 second year as proconsuls and propraetors to govern the 
 provinces. But the year is significant for another reason. 
 It marks the beginning of a second period of expansion, and 
 this, in part at least, because of the new system. If we have 
 been justified in concluding that from 197 to 146 B.C. the 
 senate was seriously opposed to annexing new provinces be- 
 cause it had no governors to put in charge, after 146 this 
 reason ceased to apply. While, under the old system, the 
 senate had at most only four praetors to send out as govern- 
 ors, under the new there were at least eight promagistrates 
 available for service. As after 146 there were only six 
 provinces the senate had no longer the same motive for re- 
 sisting expansion. Yet the expansion which was possible 
 under the new arrangement was distinctly limited. The 
 new system would provide for the government of eight prov- 
 inces, and then a halt must be called or the system would 
 break down. 
 
 Yet the new limit of growth imposed by the number of 
 available governors was not quite so rigid as in the case of 
 the former system. The same power which extended the 
 imperium of a magistrate for one year could as easily ex- 
 tend it again. If some of the governors were allowed to 
 serve for two years in their province instead of one, a num- 
 ber of provinces somewhat in excess of eight could be pro- 
 vided for. Yet such an extension of the governor's term 
 must have appeared, from the senate's standpoint, to involve 
 some danger. Two years' service in a province might give 
 time for a bad or incompetent governor to do serious mis- 
 chief and for an able one to become unduly strong. In a 
 single year a governor could hardly inaugurate and carry 
 far a policy contrary to the wishes of the senate, whereas 
 in two he would be in a far more independent position and 
 might irrevocably commit the state. Moreover, it tended 
 directly to make the governor less responsible for his 
 actions. It was an established principle of the republican 
 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 19 
 
 constitution that a magistrate could not be called to answer 
 for his conduct while he remained in office. It was, there- 
 fore, a sound constitutional principle which insisted upon 
 an interval between offices so that the magistrate should 
 become again a private citizen, and as such liable to pros- 
 ecution for any illegal acts. To secure this the rule had 
 grown up that two years must elapse before a man who had 
 held one office should be eligible for another. If he were 
 allowed to spend both years as the governor of a province 
 this rule would be practically annulled. A month or two 
 spent in Rome in the canvass for the next office would not 
 be sufficient, since his province was at a considerable dis- 
 tance from the city and it would, therefore, require some 
 time to collect the evidence and forward it to Rome. This 
 work, moreover, could rarely be begun until the governor 
 had left the province and consequently, unless he remained 
 in private life for a considerable time, it would in most 
 cases be impossible to bring him to trial for anything he 
 might have done. If the governor remained only one year 
 in his province ample time would be secured for any prose- 
 cution, but, if he were allowed to stay for a second year, 
 this became very doubtful. 
 
 From these considerations it will appear that, while the 
 senate might have no grave objection to an increase in the 
 number of the provinces to eight, it would be unwilling to 
 see the number increase much beyond that point. What- 
 ever its motive may have been, this was actually its policy. 
 Though not exactly imperialistic, the conscript fathers of- 
 fered little opposition to expansion between 146 and 121 
 B.C. During these years, besides the two provinces of Mace- 
 don and Africa, annexed at the beginning of the period, 
 two other provinces, Asia and Transalpine Gaul, were 
 acquired. At this point the limits of the new system had 
 been reached, and from this time on the senate was again 
 strongly opposed to expansion. That body had offered 
 little opposition when Asia was annexed under the will of 
 Attalus of Pergamum, but it promptly rejected Egypt when 
 it was offered them under the will of Ptolemy Alexander. 
 
 x, 
 
20 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 For the fifty-eight years following the annexation of Trans- 
 alpine Gaul the growth of the empire was practically ar- 
 rested. Indeed, if the existing system was to be main- 
 tained, the senate had little choice, since it had at its dis- 
 posal only eight governors. Yet situations continually arose 
 to call for one or more of these in places which did not 
 normally require a resident governor. When this happened 
 some of the governors had to be given a second year in their 
 provinces, and if this practice were once allowed to spread 
 and to become the regular usage of the constitution, serious 
 consequences might follow. In fact, the number of the 
 provinces already amounted to ten. Neither Cisalpine Gaul 
 nor Cilicia seems to have been regarded at first as among 
 the regular provinces, yet they ended by making themselves 
 such. A word concerning them may not be out of place. 
 The conquest of Cisalpine Gaul was a long and gradual 
 process. It was begun as far back as 200 B.C., but the 
 Gauls offered a prolonged though somewhat intermittent 
 resistance. The surviving books of Livy furnish fairly 
 complete information as to the regular annual assignments 
 of provinces from 198 to 167 B.C. The regular method at 
 that time of governing a province was by a praetor, yet 
 during these thirty-one years praetors were sent to Gaul 
 only five times, with three years for which Livy gives us no 
 information. On seven occasions consuls were dispatched 
 to Gaul, so that in all there were not more than twelve or 
 fifteen years during which a regular magistrate was sta- 
 tioned in the province. The inference from this would 
 seem to be clear. When Gaul was quiet it was not thought 
 to require a special governor, and when it was turbulent 
 a praetor or consul was sent to deal with it. This was prob- 
 ably rendered easier by the troubles in Liguria, which called 
 for the presence in the north of Italy of one or both of the 
 consuls with a good deal of regularity. If there was a 
 consul in Liguria, he could doubtless keep an eye on the 
 Po valley and see that all went well. This was the case in 
 eight years at least when no magistrate was sent to Gaul it- 
 self. Thus we may reasonably doubt whether the senate 
 viewed the Cisalpine province as a regular charge on its 
 supply of governors. This seems the more reasonable as the 
 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OF THE REPUBLIC 21 
 
 Romans planted numerous colonies in the Po valley, some- 
 thing not done in any of the other provinces. 
 
 The province of Cilicia presents a somewhat similar case. 
 In 103 B.C. the Romans established a military post in this 
 region. It may well be doubted if they had at that time 
 any idea of acquiring a province, since the territory was 
 very restricted in extent. Yet here, too, it gradually be- 
 came evident that conditions were such as to make the 
 presence of a governor necessary during the greater part of 
 the time. 
 
 If Cisalpine Gaul and Cilicia were made part of the reg- 
 ular provincial empire, the limits of the promagistracy were 
 already exceeded. This difficulty was removed by Sulla, 
 who, during his dictatorship, increased the number of prae- 
 tors to eight, thus making the number of promagistrates 
 available each year balance the number of the provinces. 
 This policy of increasing the number of the magistrates 
 was possible to Sulla since, in the first place, he was clothed 
 with irresistible power, and in the second, because, disre- 
 garding the feelings of the nobility, he created peers whole- 
 sale by increasing the size of the senate. 
 
 In spite of Sulla's masterful recasting of the republican 
 constitution the same problems continued to confront it. 
 The whole policy of the senate, as he reorganized it, was 
 anti-expansionist. No doubt the career of Sulla himself 
 had made the senate more suspicious than ever of the mili- 
 tary power, but the old motives had by no means disap- 
 peared. The state had no more governors available to send 
 out to new provinces, and hence the senate was resolved not - 
 to assume new burdens. Yet in spite of the senate's re- 
 sistance new responsibilities could not forever be evaded. 
 A series of complications which the conscript fathers failed 
 to deal with satisfactorily led to the intervention of the 
 Roman people. Their method of solution was to confer 
 sweeping powers on some popular general. For such action 
 on the part of the assembly the incompetent administration 
 which was the necessary result of the existing , system of 
 provincial administration furnished an ample excuse and 
 even a direct provocation. Thus with the death of Sulla 
 we enter on the period of the great commands, extending 
 
22 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 over several provinces and assigned for a term of years to 
 some prominent leader of the day. This system ended, and 
 could end, only in the empire, which in its essential features 
 was simply the adoption of the great command as a regular 
 part of the republican machine. 
 
 From what has preceded it will be seen that for the 
 Koman republic the task of governing provinces outside of 
 Italy presented serious constitutional difficulties. This was 
 not chiefly because the institutions of Rome were municipal 
 in their origin, but rather because of their peculiar char- 
 acter and the way in which nobility, the magistracy, and the 
 senate had become associated. It has been shown that the 
 problem of administering extra-Italian territory had first 
 been met by increasing the number of the magistrates with 
 the imperium. As long as this method could be followed 
 without disrupting the governing machine the Roman do- 
 minions expanded somewhat rapidly, but when this limit 
 had been reached there came a pause. Then the senate 
 successfully opposed all further expansion, until finally 
 such expansion could no longer be resisted. By that time, 
 however, the promagistrate had become so far familiar 
 to the Roman mind that his use as a regular part of the 
 machinery of government was possible. This device of 
 substituting the promagistrate for the magistrate opened 
 up another period of expansion, and for a time the senate 
 ceased to offer any very serious objection to it. But when 
 the new system had in its turn been carried to the limit 
 which the rigid rules of the constitution imposed, the senate 
 sought to call a halt and to avoid all further annexations. 
 When, at length, a new policy of imperialism was forced 
 upon the state the problem of administration could only be 
 met by means that proved speedily fatal to the republic. 
 As long as the complex republican institutions could, in 
 some fashion, be adjusted to meet the crying needs of the 
 day they could continue to exist. When, however, such ad- 
 justment had become impossible, or at any rate too difficult 
 for the statesmen of the time, the republican government 
 broke down and, in spite of the protests of idealists and 
 patriots, a new system of government was inevitably evolved 
 to take over the burden which the republic could no longer 
 bear and yet from which it was unable to escape. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 The Development op the Military System 
 
 If the administrative needs of a world empire proved em- 
 barrassing to the Roman government, the military demands 
 which such an empire made inevitable presented a difficulty 
 no less serious. The two problems were very closely bound 
 together, since the Roman made no clear distinction between 
 military and civil affairs and was accustomed to deal with 
 both through the same agents. Nevertheless, although the 
 two were thus united, it will make for clearness to consider 
 them separately, bearing in mind that they presented them- 
 selves to the Roman as different phases of a single intricate 
 and complex problem. 
 
 In early days Rome was essentially a city-state, and like 
 the city-states of Greece, fought her battles with a citizen 
 militia. The so-called Servian constitution reveals the army 
 as practically identical with the whole body of Roman citi- 
 zens. The muster of the people for war was, at the same 
 time, the assembly of the people for political purposes. In 
 these primitive times the whole matter of war was ex- 
 tremely simple. The citizens assembled at the call of a 
 magistrate to decide upon all questions of peace or war. 
 If the decision was in favor of war, the people who had 
 voted it marched forth at once under the command of the 
 magistrate who had presided over their deliberations in 
 the assembly, or of his colleague. The battle over, the sol- 
 diers returned to their customary occupations, in the case 
 of the majority to their farms. The campaigns on which 
 they were engaged were neither carried on at any great dis- 
 tance nor did they last for any great length of time. Ag- 
 gressive wars, at any rate, were usually so timed as to fall 
 within the slack season of agriculture when the farmer could 
 very well leave his land to the care of his wife and children 
 for a week or two, and the whole campaign was generally 
 finished before serious harm had been done by the neglect 
 of the daily work. Nor was the absence of the magistrate 
 
24 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 from the city a matter of much consequence in these rude 
 and simple days. If the courts of justice were closed for a 
 week or two, or if the ordinary work of the government was 
 suspended for a short time, no great amount of damage 
 could result. In case of need the number of magistrates 
 with the imperium was sufficient so that one could usually 
 be left in Rome to act, if action was imperatively called for 
 by the circumstances. 
 
 Thus, at first, the military and political machinery was 
 entirely adequate to the needs of the small city-state. The 
 army was simply the citizen body, leaving its routine work 
 for a few days and campaigning in the near neighborhood 
 under the command of the ordinary magistrates of the city. 
 Such a system could not long continue in the face of the 
 rapidly changing conditions. The very success of Rome in 
 conquering her immediate enemies soon led to alterations 
 in her methods of warfare. Once master of the immediate 
 vicinity, her armies were compelled to march ever farther 
 and farther afield and the burden which was imposed upon 
 the soldier became greater with each added mile. Nor was 
 it only the soldier who felt the increasing burden ; the longer 
 the march to and from the fighting, the longer the magis- 
 trate was obliged to be absent from his post in the city. 
 Thus the success of Roman arms, coupled as it was with the 
 steady growth in the size of the city and the extent of ter- 
 ritory subject to its authority, imposed an ever increasing 
 burden of civic business on the officials of the state; and 
 while the armies were forced to make longer and more dis- 
 tant campaigns with each advance of the eagles, the incon- 
 venience caused by the absence from Rome of the magis- 
 trates would be felt with a steadily increasing force. An- 
 other factor should also be noted in this connection : as the 
 boundaries of the state expanded, the length of the frontier 
 to be guarded increased in due proportion. In the beginning 
 of the republic Rome probably did not often find herself en- 
 gaged in more than one war at a time. When all central 
 Italy had come under Roman control the occurrence of sev- 
 eral simultaneous wars must have become more and more 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 25 
 
 common, and this fact imposed another and heavy burden 
 upon the political machinery of the state. 
 
 The increasing demands of the army were, no doubt, very 
 gradually felt, and for a considerable time the primitive 
 system of government and command could bear the added 
 strain. Moreover, in those early days the republican ma- 
 chine possessed considerable elasticity, and it was no very 
 difficult matter to adjust it to meet the new needs whenever 
 they had made themselves sufficiently felt. Such readjust- 
 ments are found from a very early period, although, in the 
 accounts we have of them, they are connected rather with 
 the early political and social struggle between the patricians 
 and plebeians than with the increasing demands of the 
 growing state. Still it may well be suspected that these 
 had their part in the early changes that were made. When 
 the republic was first established its constitution provided 
 for but two magistrates with the imperium, namely the two 
 consuls. But in the course of the struggle between the 
 orders, the dominant patricians had suspended the appoint- 
 ment of the consuls and had replaced them by a board of 
 six consular tribunes. The motives for this change were, 
 doubtless, chiefly to be found in the political exigencies of 
 the struggle with the plebeians who were demanding a full 
 equality with the privileged class. Yet, whatever the mo- 
 tive, it served to increase the staff of officials available to 
 meet the needs of the state and of the army, and this fact 
 may have been one reason for the rather protracted use of 
 this somewhat clumsy political evasion. 
 
 In the course of time the pressure on the dominant patri- 
 cians became irresistible and they were finally forced to con- 
 cede at once the restoration of the consulship and the ad- 
 mission of the plebeians to that office. It was, however, 
 clear that the old arrangement no longer provided an ad- 
 equate staff for the management of affairs. When, there- 
 fore, the consular tribunes were replaced by the two con- 
 suls a new office, the praetorship, was invented which in- 
 creased the number of the magistrates with the imperium 
 to three. 1 No doubt the patricians were intending by this 
 
 ^eitland, i, 99. 
 
26 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 device to diminish to some extent the scope of the concession 
 which they had been forced to make, but, it may be confi- 
 dently surmised, it was the obvious and undeniable needs of 
 the state that induced the plebeians to accept this lessening 
 of the completeness of the victory which they had won by 
 the passage of the Licinian laws. 
 
 With the internal conflict settled, and as the event proved 
 permanently settled, Rome found herself equipped with 
 three magistrates with the imperium. It is probable that 
 one reason for the new office of praetor was the frequent 
 absence of both consuls from the city at the head of the le- 
 gions. The new system was one which, as things stood, ad- 
 mitted of considerable expansion. There was no serious 
 objection, at first, to a further increase in the number of 
 the praetors and it was not long in taking place; by the 
 outbreak of the First Punic War, the number had been 
 raised to two. Thus Rome entered on her mighty struggle 
 with Carthage with four magistrates capable of carrying 
 on the business of government and commanding her armies. 
 This staff of officers had proved sufficient for her needs in 
 the conflicts which had resulted in making her the head of 
 an Italian confederacy embracing the whole of the penin- 
 sula south of the Apennines. The conduct of the first great 
 war outside of Italy did not call for any increase in the 
 number of the magistrates, but its successful issue brought 
 new responsibilities. With the close of the war Rome an- 
 nexed the islands of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. Annex- 
 ation was soon found to imply government, and to meet the 
 new requirements the Romans, as was shown in the preced- 
 ing chapter, increased the number of the praetors from two 
 to four. This proved sufficient for a time, but events soon 
 compelled further changes. 
 
 The Second Punic War led directly to two important de- 
 velopments in the Roman governmental machinery. In the 
 first place the acquisition of two new provinces in Spain 
 forced a new increase in the size of the praetorian college, 
 this time to six members, which number remained unal- 
 tered until the reorganization of the constitution by Sulla. 
 In the second place the terrible struggle with Hannibal, 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 27 
 
 which taxed to the utmost the stern pride and unyielding 
 patriotism of the Romans, gave rise to a new and most sig- 
 nificant institution. When the great invader had been 
 turned from central Italy into the south and stood there at 
 bay, Rome found herself compelled to resort to warfare 
 of a kind and on a scale which she had never yet attempted. 
 It was no longer a question of one or two armies for a short 
 campaign. A number of armies operating continuously 
 were now necessary to wear out and overcome the revolted 
 peoples of southern Italy and the mighty Carthaginian wno 
 had induced them to rise against the Roman supremacy. 
 Little by little Rome succeeded, but to do so called for more 
 commanders than the state possessed ready to hand in its 
 annual magistrates and this made necessary the expedient 
 of the proconsulship. It is probable that the device was 
 not a wholly new one, but the circumstances of the war 
 against Hannibal led to a great development of it and made 
 it a regular part of the machinery of the state. The Romans 
 had no leisure in the midst of such a struggle to undertake 
 elaborate constitutional adjustments, and the use of the pro- 
 consul met the immediate needs of the hour with the least 
 change possible in the formal requirements of the law. 
 
 Originally a proconsul was simply a consul who remained 
 in charge of his army after his year of office had expired. 
 Such a practice was probably rendered easier of adoption 
 by the obvious impossibility of insisting that a general 
 should lay down his imperium at the precise moment that 
 his term as magistrate terminated, since this would often 
 happen before his successor had come to take over the com- 
 mand. It was only natural to avoid such a lapse m re- 
 sponsible leadership by allowing the man in charge to con- 
 tinue to act until the new general arrived. But since the 
 senate had the power to determine what functions, of a 
 special sort, should be assigned to the annual magistrates, 
 it might easily happen that, if the new consuls were em- 
 ployed elsewhere, one of the retiring consuls would be left 
 at the head of the army which he had been commanding and 
 that no successor could arrive to supersede him. When he 
 was expected to remain in charge for any length of time it 
 
X 
 
 28 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 was, at first, felt necessary that the people should extend 
 his imperium by a formal vote. Since, however, the senate 
 created the situation and since the commander could con- 
 tinue in his functions for some time without such formal 
 action, the senate soon assumed the right to prolong the 
 imperium for another year without consulting the assembly 
 in the matter. What was done in the case of the consul 
 was equally possible in the case of the praetor, and the 
 senate thus acquired the right to prolong indefinitely the 
 imperium once it had been conferred by the Roman people. 
 This new power made it possible for the senate to increase 
 its staff of officers with the imperium without making any 
 addition to the number of the magistrates. 
 
 While these changes were taking place in the command 
 of the armies, their composition was also being modified. 
 In early days, when the campaigns were short, the Roman 
 citizen could leave his work and serve without any very 
 serious loss or inconvenience. When circumstances re- 
 quired a longer time of service this was no longer possible, 
 and it became necessary to make up to the soldier in some 
 way the losses he incurred by the service. Livy expressly 
 tells us that it was at the siege of Veii that the army was left 
 in active service for so long a time that the payment of the 
 soldiers became necessary. It is quite probable that at first 
 this was regarded as a very exceptional thing, but as the 
 range of Rome's military operations grew constantly wider 
 it was not long before it became a regular custom. 
 
 With the introduction of pay into the army it became pos- 
 sible to lengthen the time of service without serious diffi- 
 culty, and this seems to have been done without particular 
 protest. When, as a result of the victory over Hannibal, 
 Rome found herself involved in the task of conquering and 
 holding Spain and the legions were sent across the seas, the 
 term of service was of necessity extended far beyond any- 
 thing that had previously been known and those citizens 
 who were conscripted for the Spanish war were expected 
 to serve with the legions for six years. 
 
 By the time of the Spanish wars, then, the military sys- 
 tem of Rome had changed its character in almost every 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 29 
 
 particular. Instead of citizens serving without pay, as a 
 part of their civic duty, under the annual magistrates of the 
 city, we have now citizens serving continuously for years at 
 a time, and often under the command of a proconsul or pro- 
 praetor rather than one of the regular magistrates. The 
 use of the promagistrate as a commander was not as yet 
 regarded as regular, nor was it the usual method until some 
 time after the close of the Second Punic War. Neverthe- 
 less, once introduced, it rapidly extended itself, becoming 
 constantly more common as the needs of the administration 
 grew relentlessly greater and the difficulty of providing 
 more regular magistrates began to be felt. Why this diffi- 
 culty should develop has been already shown and likewise 
 why the difficulty, once it began to make itself apparent, 
 was met by the rapid development of the promagistracy. 
 At< first a special expedient to meet an exceptional case, the 
 promagistracy became gradually, but somewhat rapidly, a 
 normal and regular part of the constitution. 
 
 From a purely military point of view the use of the pro- 
 magistrate had certain real advantages in that it made pos- 
 sible a greater continuity of command. A competent gen- 
 eral could now be given the command of an army for two 
 years — one as magistrate and the second as promagistrate — 
 and in case of special need or difficulty, for an even longer 
 time, since if the imperium could be held beyond the legal 
 term for which it was originally conferred there was no 
 essential reason why it could not be indefinitely prolonged. 
 Moreover, as has been seen already, the new system relieved 
 the pressure on the regular corps of magistrates and pro- 
 vided the men needed to meet the increasing demands of 
 provincial administration. 
 
 There can be small wonder, therefore, that the Roman 
 state resorted with increasing frequency to a device so 
 simple, and at the same time so well adapted to meet the 
 growing demands of the state with so little disturbance to 
 the formal constitution. No sweeping changes were neces- 
 sary, only a slight modification of existing and established 
 practices which, having gradually grown up, were now a 
 
30 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 well understood and accepted part of the governmental 
 machinery. 
 
 Could the expansion of Rome's empire and its heavy re- 
 sponsibilities have been restricted within the narrow limits 
 which Rome originally set for herself, the new machinery 
 might have worked with little difficulty or change, but this 
 was quite impossible. Whatever the desire of the senate 
 and the ruling statesmen, the fall of Carthage had made 
 Rome, whether she would or no, a world power. Sooner 
 or later she would be forced to meet the obligations of her 
 new position. Her reluctance might avail to make her slow 
 and half-hearted in assuming these responsibilities but could 
 not enable her to escape them. That Rome lusted for con- 
 quest and sought the empire of the Mediterranean, no one 
 who views the actual circumstances of her history can for 
 a moment believe. Rather her empire was a penalty im- 
 posed upon her by the defeat of Hannibal, a penalty which 
 she strove desperately to avoid paying, but which fate in- 
 exorably enforced despite all her struggles. 
 
 While Hannibal had stood at bay in the south of Italy, 
 he had striven by every means in his power to find the re- 
 sources which he needed to crush Rome by drawing into the 
 conflict some outside power. To prevent this Rome had 
 been obliged to interfere in both the East and the West. 
 She had dispatched armies to Spain to prevent her foe from 
 using the resources of that peninsula against her, and she 
 had met his attempts to get help from Macedon by entering 
 into close diplomatic alliances with the various states of 
 Greece. 
 
 When the war ended in the destruction of the power of 
 Carthage, Rome found, to her dismay, that she had in effect 
 signed a number of blank checks which others had the power 
 of filling in, and which, whatever her reluctance, she was 
 bound in honor and in prudence to redeem. The ambitious 
 schemes of Philip of Macedon and his partner, Antiochus 
 of Syria, forced her to reluctant intervention in the East, 
 while, at the same time, her fears of a possible revival of the 
 power of her vanquished rival, Carthage, involved her in 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 31 
 
 the formidable task of conquering the warlike Spanish 
 tribes. 
 
 Instead of bringing peace, the end of the long contest 
 with Hannibal served merely as a starting point for a 
 whole series of wars. Yet few peoples have shown them- 
 selves less anxious for conquest than the Romans. After 
 the fierce struggle for their very existence as a state, the 
 people of Rome were passionately longing for an end of 
 battles and campaigns, a chance to cultivate their fields 
 and pursue their ordinary avocations in quiet and tran- 
 quility. So intense was this desire for peace among the 
 common people that the senate was only able to induce the 
 popular assembly to vote the declaration of war against 
 Macedon by the false pretense that Philip intended an 
 actual invasion of Italy. Deceived by this misrepresenta- 
 tion, the citizens, weary as they were of war, allowed the 
 constitutionally necessary vote to be wrung from them. 
 The war thus brought about was, indeed, necessary, though 
 not for the reasons that the senate alleged. It was impos- 
 sible for Rome, without dishonor for the present and danger 
 for the future, to abandon the Greek allies who had served 
 her so well during her time of deadly peril. Doubtless 
 when the senate first dispatched the legions to the East, 
 it was both hoped and believed that it was only for a single 
 brief campaign. But fate overruled the will of people and 
 senate alike and the war with Philip proved to be but the 
 first of several eastern wars. In the West, as well, the an- 
 nexation of Spain was found to be the beginning of many 
 long years of hard fighting. Thus the defeat of Hannibal 
 was very far from bringing peace to Rome. Instead of 
 peace the downfall of Carthage led directly to a new series 
 of wars in both the East and the West which were fought 
 under such new conditions as to affect profoundly the mili- 
 tary system of the republic. Hitherto the wars of Rome 
 had been waged in Italy or near at hand in Sicily. The 
 legions had, indeed, crossed over into Africa and Spain, 
 but these expeditions had been too brief to leave any per- 
 manent effects. Now for the first time the Romans found 
 themselves engaged in long wars at a great distance. Under 
 
32 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 these circumstances they began to develop the system of 
 the great commands. This called for three distinct inno- 
 vations in the military system of the republic. In the first 
 place, armies of exceptional size were now sent out, and 
 in the second place, they were intrusted to the command of 
 a single general who remained in charge for the entire 
 war, and in the third place, the theatre of operations was 
 so far from Italy that any real control by the Roman gov- 
 ernment was impossible. No one of the three was alto- 
 gether new, but the frequent combination of all three is 
 only met with after the Second Punic War. That such 
 powers as the great command implied were a possible dan- 
 ger to the republic was as obvious to the Romans as it can 
 be today, yet they had little or no choice. It is difficult, 
 if not impossible, to see how Rome could have defeated 
 Antiochus and conquered Macedon and Spain without in- 
 trusting her generals with exceptional powers. Whatever 
 the potential dangers which such powers might involve, 
 men could devise no substitute that promised any hope of 
 victory and success. 
 
 While thus the Roman generals were growing stronger 
 to the possible danger of the state, a social and political 
 crisis was passing over Italy which contributed to make 
 the peril all the greater. Like many other changes in his- 
 tory, this one had its roots in economic causes. The ex- 
 tension of Rome's sovereignty outside the boundaries of 
 the Italian peninsula had serious consequences for the health 
 and prosperity of the Roman people. As the empire grew, 
 the character of the Roman citizens began to undergo a 
 change which her statesmen viewed with grave misgiving 
 and alarm. With the annexation of provinces beyond the 
 seas Italian agriculture fell on evil days and rapidly de- 
 clined. For this there were many reasons but among the 
 most important must be ranked the introduction into the 
 Italian markets of the cheap grain of Sicily. Hitherto the 
 raising of grain had been the characteristic feature of 
 Italian agriculture, and now the markets where this crop 
 was sold began to be flooded by imported grain sold at a 
 price with which the farmer of Italy, for all his sturdy 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 33 
 
 frugality and rough simplicity of life, could not compete. 
 That grain could be grown more cheaply in Sicily than in 
 many parts of Italy was by no means the whole difficulty ; 
 other factors contributed to make the matter much more 
 disastrous than a simple economic competition need have 
 been. 
 
 When first the Romans took control of Sicily they found 
 a revenue system in existence which collected the taxes 
 levied on the inhabitants of the rural districts in kind — 
 chiefly in grain, which formed the staple product of the 
 island. This system the Romans, being little blessed with 
 new or original ideas, retained and merely adapted to their 
 own immediate needs. The farmers of Sicily were still 
 to pay their tribute as they had been accustomed to do, 
 only now to the Roman government instead of their former 
 masters. Since Rome had no machinery at hand for col- 
 lecting her revenues, she resorted to the simple expedient 
 of selling the right to collect the taxes to the highest bidder. 
 As a consequence of this the Roman capitalist found open 
 to his enterprise a new field for investment. Thus, too, it 
 came about that there were in Rome influential capitalists 
 with quantities of grain to dispose of, which they had ac- 
 quired, not by purchase from the producer, but by purchase 
 from the Roman state. This grain they could afford to 
 sell without reference to the cost of its production, but 
 solely on the basis of the bargain they had made with a 
 government in which the influence of wealth was such that 
 they were likely to have made a very easy contract. Hence 
 when, as usually happened, the Roman capitalist bought 
 cheap, he could afford to sell at a price utterly ruinous to 
 the Roman farmer. The state itself made matters worse. 
 A considerable part of its revenues was paid in grain and 
 such portion of this as was not needed for the army was 
 thrown upon the market to be disposed of for whatever it 
 would bring. Moreover, since it was considered a duty of 
 the government to keep down the cost of living, the state 
 usually met any serious rise in the price of food by selling 
 its surplus stock of grain at a low figure. Thus the annex- 
 ation of Sicily came to mean to the Roman farmer a per- 
 manent lowering in the price of his principal crop. 
 
34 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 The time when the old type of agriculture was ceasing 
 to be profitable was just the time when the farmer needed 
 help for other reasons. The war with Hannibal had been 
 fought on the soil of Italy and had desolated that fair land, 
 turning some parts into a veritable wilderness. When the 
 invader was finally driven out of the peninsula, the farmer, 
 in but too many cases, found his little plot of land in a state 
 of utter ruin. Buildings, domestic animals, tools were 
 gone; to make a new beginning he was forced to borrow. 
 Now at the very time when he was struggling to get upon 
 his feet, the price of his chief crop began to decline rap- 
 idly. Under such conditions the outcome could not be a 
 matter of doubt. For a time the small farmer might battle 
 against the adverse tide, but in the end he was usually 
 driven to shipwreck. Sooner or later he lost his farm and 
 drifted to the city to pick up a precarious livelihood as best 
 he might ; most often, probably, as a client or dependent of 
 some wealthy house, or, when this was impossible, as a 
 member of the idle mob subsisting by odd jobs and the 
 largess of the various candidates for office. 
 
 The small farmer had still other troubles. The domin- 
 ions of Rome were growing, and as they grew, called con- 
 stantly for more soldiers. Nor could the soldiers any longer 
 be sent home after a brief campaign. The wars now being 
 waged by Rome were far across the seas and the men who 
 went out in the service were obliged to stay for years. The 
 drain of these new military needs can not have been other 
 than a serious matter to the already overburdened agri- 
 cultural class of Italy. 
 
 In considerable degree the very causes which were push- 
 ing the small farmer to the wall were, at the same time, 
 preparing a substitute for him. Both the speculations of 
 the capitalist in the grain of Sicily and the wars and con- 
 quests of the republic abroad brought in a flood of wealth 
 to those individuals or classes so placed as to take advan- 
 tage of the oportunities. Thus while many landowners 
 were ready in despair to sell their property, much surplus 
 wealth was seeking investment. At first glance it might 
 seem strange that capital should go into agriculture under 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 35 
 
 the depressing conditions then prevalent, but there were 
 some causes at work which served to make the situation of 
 the large landowner very different from that of the small 
 farmer. The wars had glutted the Roman market with 
 slaves with the natural result that their price had fallen 
 very low. A rich man therefore, who could acquire a large 
 tract of land for a trifle, could also provide himself with the 
 slave labor necessary to cultivate it cheaply. Large scale 
 farming made possible various economies, and the slave 
 labor available on the market was by no means crude or 
 unskilled. The eastern wars of Rome had resulted in a 
 flood of slaves drawn from the Orient, which was the home 
 of scientific and improved agriculture, and the Carthaginian 
 captives were of much the same character. Thus it hap- 
 pened that large scale production could often be carried on 
 by new and better methods than the small farmer knew, or 
 could employ if he did know. 
 
 In addition to this the capitalist found himself less ham- 
 pered in the matter of his crops. He did not need to con- 
 fine himself to raising grain, but could turn to olives or the 
 vine, a thing less possible to the small farmer since they 
 were not immediately productive. When no form of agri- 
 culture could be made to pay, there was ranching to fall 
 back upon. The ships of ancient times, though they could 
 carry grain with ease, sometimes using it as ballast and so 
 reducing the cost of transportation to practically nothing, 
 were quite inadequate to handle either animals or meat on 
 a commercial scale. Hence sheep and cattle raised in Italy 
 had no competition from abroad to fear, and all through 
 southern Italy ranching began to take the place of agri- 
 culture. So rapid was this change that one man's life wit- 
 nessed its beginning and completion. The elder Cato as a 
 young man practiced farming for profit, but in his old age 
 confessed that it was an amusement rather than a gainful 
 occupation. Asked what was the best form of investment 
 for capital, the old man promptly answered, "Good ranch- 
 ing land." When the questioner inquired what came next 
 he answered, "Fair ranching land," and, when pressed still 
 
36 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 farther, he gave as the third most profitable investment, 
 "Poor ranching land." 2 
 
 Rome's wars and conquests had, therefore, produced a 
 striking change in the economic aspect of the peninsula. 
 In the North, in Etruria especially, great plantations worked 
 by slave labor had replaced the small farms of earlier times. 
 In passing through this part of Italy, Tiberius Gracchus 
 was horrified at the dearth of population and the absence 
 of free laborers. 3 While this transformation was taking 
 place in the North, the South was being given over in a 
 similar manner to great livestock ranches whose herds of 
 cattle and sheep were tended by slaves. In both quarters 
 the small proprietors had largely disappeared, being driven 
 from the land to swell the idle rabble in the towns, especially 
 in Rome. 
 
 These changes did not, of course, affect the whole pen- 
 insula equally and in many places they were hardly felt at 
 all. The ravages of Hannibal had fallen most heavily on 
 the South. The cheap grain from across the seas, while 
 easily transported by water, could not travel far by land, 
 and was quite unable to disturb the market prices in the 
 mountainous parts of central Italy. In Umbria and Sam- 
 nium conditions remained much the same as in the past, 
 and the rich and fertile valley of the Po was very slightly 
 affected. 
 
 Yet, making all allowance for the regions where the new 
 conditions were felt but little, if at all, the change was far- 
 reaching, and in the eyes of thoughtful Romans, sinister 
 and ominous. This was inevitably so for many reasons. 
 The Roman mind was hard and practical in its texture, and 
 was stubbornly conservative in type. Not readily did the 
 conqueror of the world take in a new idea, and all the old 
 traditions which he cherished combined to teach him that 
 the small farmer, tilling his own little plot of ground by his 
 own labor and that of his family, was the very backbone of 
 the Roman state. Hence the Roman could not view with- 
 out the gravest misgivings the rapid and relentless decay of 
 
 'Cicero, De Officiis, ii, 25. 
 3 Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus, 8. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 37 
 
 the very class which he had been taught to regard as so 
 vitally important. Even had the Roman's mind been free 
 from any preconception as to the value of the small farmer 
 to the state, the military system would have brought the 
 problem home to him in a manner at once plain and un- 
 avoidable. Service in the legions had always been bound 
 up intimately with the ownership of land. It was the land- 
 owner alone who had hitherto furnished the recruits for the 
 army. It was on the small farmer that Rome depended for 
 her soldiers. The landless rabble in the city, the urban 
 mob, played little part in the conscription which was used 
 to fill the ranks. Now, at the very moment when the state 
 was calling for soldiers to an extent unknown before, the 
 class from which, by all established usages and customs, 
 they were drawn was shrinking every day. With each new 
 war the task of filling up the ranks grew more difficult and 
 the class who gave no military service to the state grew 
 visibly larger. Here was a problem which no Roman could 
 entirely ignore. No candidate for office could shut his eyes 
 to the rapid growth of the city rabble and no general could 
 fail to perceive the increasing difficulty of recruiting. 
 Neither could avoid the conviction that, while Rome was 
 victorious abroad, things were alarmingly out of joint at 
 home, and that, although the empire grew and flourished 
 across the seas, the state was sick, and dangerously so, at 
 its very heart. 
 
 Yet it was much easier to see and feel the malady than to 
 devise a remedy. The mind of the ancient world had given 
 little thought to economic causes. In this sphere the Greek 
 saw but dimly and the Roman, with his slower wits and 
 duller imagination, was most unlikely to discover truths 
 which the subtle Hellene had not been able to perceive. 
 Even had the Roman been more clear sighted than he was, 
 his vision could have been of little use. The character of 
 the Roman government forbade the application of a really 
 effective cure. The Roman assembly was so constituted 
 as to give a disproportionate weight to that part of the 
 citizen body which dwelt within the city. The disastrous 
 effects of the cheap grain could have been met only by some 
 
38 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 form of protection and this was something which the mob 
 of Rome could never be induced to accept, since it would 
 have increased the cost of living and thereby threatened the 
 daily bread of a large number of the voters. This being so, 
 no Roman statesman ventured to suggest the measure which 
 would seem to modern eyes the obvious solution of the prob- 
 lem. Yet, though they could not reach the root of the evil, 
 the Romans were not without remedies of their own, al- 
 though it may be questioned whether, in this case, the cure 
 proposed was not worse than the disease. 
 
 It was Tiberius Gracchus who first tried to remedy these 
 conditions. As has just been implied, it is no reflection 
 upon his sagacity that he completely failed to grasp the 
 economic factors in the case. What he saw was the. simple 
 fact that Rome was suffering from a decrease in the num- 
 ber of small farmers; and the remedy which he proposed 
 was simply to increase the class whose threatened disap- 
 pearance constituted a danger to the commonwealth. The 
 problem which arose from too few farmers he would solve 
 by making more. His plan for accomplishing this was to 
 distribute land in small allotments to the poor. For this 
 purpose it was obvious that he required a large amount of 
 land, and as it happened, the Roman law furnished him with 
 a good technical pretext for obtaining it. While the con- 
 quest of Italy was in progress the state had declared great 
 tracts of land in every part of the peninsula the property of 
 the Roman people. From ft the people had not hitherto 
 received much benefit. Owing to the policy of the wealthy 
 nobles who controlled the government, this land had passed 
 in practice into the hands of private individuals who held 
 and used it, although the title remained vested in the state. 
 The state, however, dominated by the class who had the land 
 in their possession, had allowed many years to pass — some- 
 times as long a time as two centuries — without making any 
 effort to assert its ownership. As a result of this long lapse 
 of time the possessors had come to regard the land they oc- 
 cupied as theirs, but, as the Roman law in this matter had 
 no statute of limitations, it was still within the legal rights 
 of the government to revive its claims and act upon them 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 39 
 
 in whatever way it chose. Whether such a course was con- 
 sistent with moral right and equity might be open to ques- 
 tion, but it was undoubtedly within the strict letter of the 
 law. Tiberius now proposed that the state should reassert 
 its rights and should eject the possessors from the bulk of 
 the public land they held and that the land so acquired 
 should be distributed in small allotments to the poorer citi- 
 zens. This would break up many of the large estates and 
 replace them with small peasant holdings. How the new 
 farmers were to make a living where the old had failed 
 Tiberius did not stop to ask himself, though some faint sus- 
 picion that here might be a difficulty seems to have crossed 
 his mind, since he proposed to make the new holdings in- 
 alienable. This feature of his proposal may well have been 
 intended to prevent his new peasants from giving up their 
 farms and returning to the city. 
 
 The success of such a scheme in solving the agrarian 
 problem must be considered doubtful at the best, and the 
 advantages of the measure can hardly be regarded as suffi- 
 cient to compensate for all the trouble and confusion which 
 it caused. Tiberius, however, saw but one great evil to be 
 cured and was supremely confident of the necessity and 
 value of the remedy he had devised. Yet his bill was scarcely 
 drafted when he found himself confronted by difficulties 
 and obstacles which he had not at all foreseen. Quite nat- 
 urally the possessors raised an outcry at being called upon 
 to give up property which long years of actual use had led 
 them to regard as theirs. Strangely enough Tiberius seems 
 not to have anticipated this, and he had likewise failed to 
 notice that this very class possessed an enormous influence 
 in the government. The accepted usage of the constitution 
 gave them the power to block the reform at the very out- 
 set. By the theory of the Roman law the magistrates ruled 
 supreme. The senate, by the letter of the law, had no power 
 to do more than advise the magistrate in case he called upon 
 it for advice. Its decrees when passed had only an advisory 
 force and the magistrate might disregard them if he chose. 
 The magistrate possessed the constitutional right to lay any 
 measure that he pleased before the people in their assembly, 
 
40 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 and if their approval was given, it became a law regardless 
 of the wishes of the conscript fathers. However, the actual 
 practice of the constitution had for many years required 
 that every bill should be brought first before the senate and 
 that, if it failed to gain the approval of that body, it should 
 quietly be dropped. Yet this was a matter rather of usage 
 than of law, and if the magistrate dared to disregard this 
 custom, there was no legal obstacle to hinder him from 
 bringing any bill he chose before the people. In Tiberius 
 Rome found at last a magistrate so confident in his own 
 righteousness and wisdom that he was ready to set tradi- 
 tion at defiance and to use his legal prerogative to the utter- 
 most. Ignoring the senate he brought his agrarian bill di- 
 rectly before the people. But the conscript fathers, though 
 they could not interfere directly, were by no means power- 
 less. Few constitutions have ever been better provided 
 with the means of obstruction and delay than that of Rome. 
 If Tiberius, as tribune of the people, had a legal right to 
 lay his bill before the assembly, any one of the nine other 
 tribunes had a legal right to stop its progress by the inter- 
 position of his veto. The occasions were few and far be- 
 tween when the senate could not find one among the ten who 
 was willing to take its side and put a check upon obnoxious 
 legislation. On this occasion such a tribune was promptly 
 found and Tiberius was at once confronted with the veto 
 of his colleague Octavius. Opposition from this quarter 
 seems to have been quite unexpected by the reformer, and 
 in face of it he lost his head. Determined at all costs to 
 pass his bill, and that immediately, he had the assembly 
 remove Octavius from office and then proceeded to enact 
 his agrarian law. He seemed for the moment to have suc- 
 ceeded in his aim, but the deposition of Octavius was of 
 very doubtful legality, and the passions he had roused by 
 his legislation and by the methods he had resorted to in 
 order to pass it were of the most violent. The natural, if 
 not the inevitable, end was the outbreak of a riot in which 
 the bold reformer perished by violence. 
 
 But, though Tiberius Gracchus died, his work survived. 
 His great agrarian law was not repealed, and under it a 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 41 
 
 commission set to work to seize and redistribute the soil of 
 Italy. In the next few years more than 70,000 of the poor 
 received allotments of land. In so far as Tiberius Gracchus 
 had aimed simply to create more farmers, his law had been 
 a success. How far this result was permanent is, of course, 
 another matter. The economic causes that lay at the root 
 of the problem were untouched and must soon have brought 
 about the ruin of the new farmers as they had that of the 
 old. 4 No doubt there were many of the new allotments that 
 accomplished the reformer's purpose, when they chanced 
 to fall in some region of the peninsula into which the cheap 
 grain did not penetrate, or where other forms of agricul- 
 ture were possible besides the cultivation of grain. But 
 such partial success as may have been achieved can hardly 
 have been upon a scale great enough to relieve the situation 
 for any length of time. 
 
 But if the social and economic effects of the agrarian bill 
 were temporary, it was otherwise with its political results. 
 In carrying his law the reformer had broken once for all the 
 usages and traditions of the Roman government. He had 
 given a conspicuous demonstration of what a magistrate 
 who dared to stand upon his legal rights and to defy the 
 senate could accomplish, and this lesson was not lost upon 
 his contemporaries. It was the less likely to be neglected 
 because of the changes in the popular assembly which re- 
 sulted from the economic crisis. The success of Gracchus 
 was visible evidence that the people were no longer dom- 
 inated as they had been in the past by the ring of noble 
 families who controlled the senate. Each of these families 
 gathered round it a group of voters, clients or freedmen, 
 of whose votes it could dispose at pleasure, and collectively 
 they seem to have been able for a long time to keep the as- 
 sembly well in hand. Now, however, the growth of the urban 
 rabble, due, in large part at least, to the decline in agri- 
 cultural prosperity, had greatly weakened their influence. 
 
 *The right to sell the allotments was soon given to the new farmers, about the 
 time of the overthrow of Gaius Gracchus. Greenidge, A History of Rome, 285. 
 
 For the number of new farmers see the census returns given in the Epitome of 
 Livy. These figures have generally been interpreted in the sense in which they are 
 here taken. See for example Greenidge, 150 and Mommsen, iii, 335. 
 
42 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 The crowds who came to the city were too great to be 
 absorbed into the groups of dependents of the aristocratic 
 houses, and as a consequence, the assembly was escaping 
 from the control of the governing oligarchy. From this 
 time on the people became more and more unmanageable 
 until their power perished with the republic itself. 
 
 The death of Tiberius Gracchus left the senate master of 
 the state, but its supremacy did not remain undisputed for 
 any length of time. In a few years the younger brother of 
 the reformer took his place as the leader of the party of 
 opposition and protest. The career of Gaius Gracchus as a 
 reformer and popular leader need not be considered in de- 
 tail, since the constructive part of his program was largely 
 unfulfilled. Two things, however, he did that should be 
 noted. He set the capitalist class, or knights, against the 
 senate, and by the establishment of the corn dole, he still 
 further freed the mob of Rome from the domination of the 
 oligarchy. While he defied the senate and courted the 
 knights he found enthusiastic support, but when, confident 
 in his popularity, he attempted to carry through some real 
 reforms, his supporters turned against him, and like his 
 brother, he perished in a riot. After his death the senate 
 resumed its control of the government, but its power was 
 weakened and undermined. The antagonism which Gaius 
 had striven hard to create between the senate and the 
 knights deprived that body of the support of a large and in- 
 creasing part of the propertied class, while the corn dole, 
 by making the poorest voters depend directly on the state 
 instead of on the great aristocratic families for their daily 
 bread, weakened the influence of the senate over the as- 
 sembly. 
 
 The measures of the democratic party under the Gracchi 
 had proved quite unavailing to solve the military problem. 
 The agrarian bill may have augmented the number of the 
 small land owners, but it did not do so on a scale that would 
 relieve the pressure. The state still needed armies and still 
 found it difficult to raise them; and since political reform 
 was powerless to meet the difficulty, it only remained to try 
 the effect of a direct reform of the military system itself, 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 43 
 
 and especially of the methods of recruiting. This change 
 the war against Jugurtha was destined to bring about. 
 This war, in and of itself, was trivial enough, but circum- 
 stances combined to give it an importance far beyond its 
 military merits. The manner in which the senate had 
 drifted into the war in the first place had created a uni- 
 versal suspicion of corruption. Starting thus, the senate's 
 generals had failed to fulfil the popular expectation of a 
 speedy victory over the petty African king. No doubt the 
 Roman populace ignored the difficulties of north African 
 geography, but in any case the dragging out of the war 
 year after year exasperated the mob. If the senate could 
 not, or would not, end the war, the people resolved to take 
 matters into their own hands; and if the generals of the 
 senate were incompetent or corrupt, they were ready to try 
 what a popular general could accomplish. It was under 
 such conditions that a blunt soldier like Marius, uncon- 
 nected with the ruling oligarchy except by marriage, came 
 forward as a candidate for the consulship, and in spite of 
 the fact that he was a new man, was triumphantly elected 
 on a pledge to end the Numidian war with a speedy victory. 
 In the election of Marius the senate had sustained a ser- 
 ious defeat, since he had won on the plain platform of tak- 
 ing out of the senate's hands the conduct of a war which 
 they had shamefully mismanaged. The conscript fathers 
 would not, however, accept the adverse verdict of the as- 
 sembly. It was still the prerogative of the senate to deter- 
 mine the provinces for which the magistrates drew lots and 
 the senate sought, by the use of this power, to retain their 
 general, Metellus, in command in Africa. But Marius and 
 his supporters were not to be thus diverted from their ob- 
 ject. The war against Jugurtha was what Marius wanted 
 and what the people were determined he should have. When 
 the senate would not yield to the people's will, the assembly, 
 on the motion of a tribune, passed a law conferring the 
 command in Africa upon their favorite, superseding Metel- 
 lus. All that remained was for Marius to provide himself 
 with an army and the senate gleefully hoped that in at- 
 tempting this he would make a shipwreck of his sudden 
 
X 
 
 44 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 popularity. As soon as he resorted to conscription to ob- 
 tain his soldiers a revulsion of the popular feeling might be 
 expected. 5 But Marius met the situation with a measure 
 at once simple and daring, and accomplished a revolution 
 in the military system of Rome of which he did not in the 
 least foresee the consequences. Instead of forcing the re- 
 luctant farmers into the ranks, he called for volunteers, 
 and forthwith found himself with all the men he needed 
 without trouble. Nothing could be more simple in appear- 
 ance, yet few measures have been fraught with larger con- 
 sequences. By thus making the Roman army a volunteer 
 force, instead of one resting on conscription, Marius changed 
 its character fundamentally. Hitherto the soldier had been 
 a man possessed of some property, but the men who flocked 
 to join the new consul were almost all to be found among 
 the poverty-stricken rabble in the towns. Henceforth the 
 legionary owned only his weapons, his plunder, and what- 
 ever his general could obtain for him from the state. Be- 
 fore this time the men were drafted to fight under whom- 
 soever the republic might see fit to place in command of the 
 army ; now they were men who had come forward to serve 
 under a particular man, and who had chosen to serve be- 
 cause of the confidence which they felt in the man and his 
 ability to lead. Henceforth, too, their fortunes were inti- 
 mately bound up with his. If, when the campaign ended, 
 their leader failed to remain a power in the state, he could 
 not procure for them the rewards to which they looked for- 
 ward. From this time on, therefore, the army was bound 
 to its commander by a tie that replaced the former loyalty 
 to the state and to its constitution; and an army could no 
 longer be transferred from one general to another at the 
 pleasure or convenience of the government. If the power 
 of the men who led the legions had already grown to a de- 
 gree that was ominous for the future by the development 
 of the proconsulship, this change in the composition of the 
 army increased the peril many times and led straight to the 
 predominance of the soldier in the state. 
 
 "Heitland, ii, 355. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 45 
 
 To all of this it is quite probable that Marius was blind. 
 He needed soldiers and he wished to get them without loss 
 of popularity. By taking volunteers he accomplished both 
 his objects and he could hardly do so in any other way. 
 His success went far to justify his innovation, nor is it 
 easy to see how the change could have been very long post- 
 poned. If Marius had never lived, some other man would 
 surely have met a pressing need by a measure of reform 
 so obvious. It could not have been very long before a state 
 which needed soldiers would have been forced to abandon 
 an unpopular conscription when volunteers were to be had 
 for the asking by any man who had the reputation of a 
 competent commander. 
 
 The volunteer army of Marius achieved a rapid victory 
 in Africa, and he returned to save the state from a much 
 more serious danger. While he was occupied with finishing 
 the war against Jugurtha, two mighty hordes of barbarians 
 had begun to menace Italy from the north. The incapable 
 generals whom the normal working of the constitution had 
 put in charge, instead of averting the peril, had contrived 
 to make it worse by leading the Roman armies to over- 
 whelming disaster. The people turned naturally to their 
 favorite and reelected Marius consul on his return and sent 
 him out to save the state. Again he justified their confi- 
 dence and the Cimbri and the Teutons were completely 
 crushed. After this victory it might have been expected 
 that the rough soldier would retire; but his own vanity and 
 the character of his army alike forbade this course. To at- 
 tract the necessary recruits to his standard he had given a 
 promise that the soldiers should be rewarded with lands at 
 the close of their service. 6 The time had now come when 
 he must fulfil his pledges to his men. As he could hope for 
 no assistance from the senate, which had been steadily hos- 
 tile to him from the start, he turned of necessity to the mob 
 who had been throughout the basis of his power. He formed 
 a close alliance with the ruling demagogues of the moment 
 and tried his hand at politics. Unluckily for him his part- 
 ners, Saturninus and Glaucia, were violent and reckless, and 
 
 "Frank, 270. 
 
46 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 he himself, efficient as a general, was quite incapable in the 
 struggles of the forum. 7 The almost inevitable result of 
 such a combination was a swift and utter failure. Marius 
 supported his allies till their proceedings had goaded the 
 conservatives to fury, then, frightened by their wild career, 
 he abandoned them, to the unbounded rage of the democrats. 
 Thus in a short space of time he fell from the summit of 
 glory to complete political insignificance. Yet he had done 
 great things for Rome in the field and he had taught his con- 
 temporaries two lessons which were not destined to be for- 
 gotten. He had shown that a popular soldier could obtain 
 the men he needed for an army simply by asking for them, 
 and also that a leader with the assembly at his back could, 
 by a law of the people, take command of any war or any 
 province that he pleased, regardless of the wishes of the 
 senate. 
 
 Marius and his party had fallen from power and the sen- 
 ate was again in control in Rome. It was not he but an- 
 other who was the first to grasp the meaning of the military 
 changes he had made. The twelve years that followed the 
 retirement of Marius were filled with agitations ending in 
 a furious civil war. This war, due to the demand of the 
 Italian allies for full Roman citizenship, involved all Italy 
 and brought back Marius once more to the command of a 
 Roman army, but brought also to the front his formidable 
 rival, Sulla. The Italian uprising, suppressed more by con- 
 cessions than by arms, served as a prelude to a crisis which 
 revealed for the first time, but once for all, the essential 
 character of the new army. While Rome was paralyzed by 
 the Italian revolt, war had broken out in the East. The 
 King of Pontus, Mithridates, taking advantage of the situa- 
 tion, had overrun all Rome's possessions in that quarter, 
 and as soon as the crisis in Italy had passed, she found 
 herself forced to dispatch a large army under a competent 
 
 7 In several respects there is an obvious likeness between the career of Marius 
 and that of Pompey. Both were good soldiers but neither was a capable politician. 
 Both were forced by the character of their armies to take a hand in politics and 
 neither was successful. Pompey, however, had better fortune and his partners, 
 Caesar and Crassus, were men of a very different stamp from Saturninus and 
 Glaucia. This was Pompey's luck rather than his merit, however. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 47 
 
 commander to recover the lost ground and punish the bold 
 oriental who had made use of her difficulties. For this new 
 task there were two rival candidates, Marlus and Sulla. 
 By the normal working of the constitution the task was as- 
 signed to Sulla, one of the consuls for the year. But 
 Marius was not disposed to acquiesce in his defeat. As 
 once before he had deposed a general of the senate from 
 his command by virtue of a law passed in the assembly, 
 so now he determined to repeat his performance. With 
 the help of the leading demagogue of the moment, a certain 
 Siilpicius Rufus, he accordingly procured an enactment of 
 the people transferring the command of the war with Mith- 
 ridates to himself. But he had overlooked the change he 
 had himself made in the army. Sulla had no thought of 
 submitting to the law, and Sulla's soldiers belonged no 
 longer to the state, but to their general. Realizing this the 
 consul gathered up his forces and marched rapidly on 
 Rome. The mob were powerless to back up their decree 
 by force, and Sulla occupied the city and undid at pleasure 
 the acts of his opponents. For the first time a Roman gen- 
 eral had turned the swords of his soldiers against his coun- 
 try and his government, and for the first time the army 
 had overruled the decision of the forum. Horror and con- 
 sternation must have reigned in Rome at such a sacrilege, 
 but power was with the aspiring general, and for the mo- 
 ment, at any rate, his will was law. For the time being 
 he was content to impose on Rome the supremacy of the 
 senate, to which he owed his command, and this done, he 
 departed to fulfil his eastern task. He must have known 
 when he set sail from Italy that what had been accom- 
 plished by violence could be undone by the same means. 
 He may have thought that he had left the senate with suffi- 
 cient force to meet its enemies, but if so he miscalculated. 
 Perhaps he did the best he could and trusted to his luck. 
 In any case, he was scarcely gone when the reaction came; 
 the democrats seized possession of power as violently and 
 lawlessly as he had done, and after a short struggle gained 
 control. As Sulla had outlawed Marius and Sulpicius Rufus, 
 so now he was in turn declared a public enemy. His friends 
 
>< 
 
 48 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 were murdered, or sought refuge in his camp in Greece, 
 and Marius and Cinna reigned in Rome. But the demo- 
 crats had learned the lesson which Sulla had so plainly 
 taught. Possession of the forum and the magistracies was 
 nothing if not sustained by force. In Italy there was no 
 power to challenge their supremacy, but in the East were 
 Sulla and his army, engaged for the moment in a struggle 
 with Rome's enemies, but, once released from the clutches 
 of the war with Mithridates, quite capable of turning their 
 attention to their enemies in Rome. That Sulla's soldiers 
 would follow him even against the government of his coun- 
 try none could doubt, and the entire time of his absence was 
 a long nightmare to his foes in Italy, haunted forever with 
 the question of what he might and would some day do when 
 the time came for his return. The largest army in the 
 Roman world belonged to him, and their sole hope of safety 
 lay in getting in their hands a stronger army to protect them 
 from the reckoning he would, late or soon, be in a position 
 to exact. They therefore spent the years which his cam- 
 paigns against the King of Pontus gave them in desperate 
 attempts to form an army to support their government. 
 But unfortunately for them they were woefully weak in 
 generals who could make a strong appeal to the common 
 soldier. They were unable to provide themselves with any 
 force which could hold its own with Sulla's veterans, and 
 when he did at last return to Italy, he rapidly beat down 
 their forces, and once again, at the head of his legions, oc- 
 cupied the city. 
 
 For the second time Sulla was the armed master of Rome, 
 but now his position was quite different from what it had 
 been on the first occasion. Then his soldiers had probably 
 followed him chiefly in order that the eastern war might re- 
 main in his hands. Of this they were as desirous as he 
 could be himself. The war against Mithridates promised 
 rich spoil and plunder, and Sulla was a general in whom 
 they trusted and under whom they were confident of vic- 
 tory. If the command had been transferred to Marius, 
 other soldiers would have reaped the rich rewards which 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 49 
 
 were the certain fruits of success. Now that they had re- 
 turned victorious, they backed their general because, if he 
 were proscribed, they could not hope to get the land allot- 
 ments he had promised them. They were well pleased to 
 see him master of the state, since the greater his power the 
 more easily he could fulfil his pledges. Nor was a tem- 
 porary control enough to safeguard them. They could only 
 hope to keep what he might give them if his enemies, and 
 theirs, were rendered powerless, for if the defeated demo- 
 crats should get the upper hand again they might reason- 
 ably be expected to undo all Sulla's acts. His army was, 
 therefore, willing to see him made dictator, and to have 
 him protect them by a thorough reorganization of the con- 
 stitution. And Sulla, on his part, dared not stop short of 
 this. 
 
 So in 82 B.C. Sulla was named dictator with full power 
 to amend and change the laws. Whether public opinion 
 would have acquiesced in a permanent autocracy may be 
 questioned, but Sulla had no desire for such a role. He 
 meant to reorganize the republic so as to secure his own 
 safety, and to accomplish that, the steps to take were clear 
 and unmistakable. Sulla was himself, no doubt, a sincere 
 aristocrat ; even if he had not been, he had no choice. The 
 irresistible pressure of circumstances had bound him to the 
 senate by ties he had no power to break. Between him and 
 the popular assembly no accommodation was possible, even 
 if he had desired it. The only course left open was to re- 
 organize the state under the sole control of the senate, and 
 to destroy every power that might threaten that control. 
 No doubt such convictions as he had pointed this way and 
 made the path of interest coincide with that of duty. The 
 constitutional reform of Sulla, therefore, took the shape of 
 a senatorial restoration. His purpose, through all his leg- 
 islation, stood out clear and plain — to reorganize the senate 
 so as to secure the control of that body to his friends, and 
 to make it absolute master of the Roman government. 
 
 If Sulla had but little choice in the work, at any rate he 
 did it as well as circumstances rendered possible. He en- 
 larged and increased the senate, and chained down every 
 
7 
 
 50 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 power that could interfere with its supremacy. The trib- 
 unes and the assembly he completely gagged. No more 
 should the turbulent mob-leaders be permitted to use the 
 legislative power of the people to modify or to upset the 
 arrangements of the conscript fathers. No law could be 
 submitted to a vote of the Roman citizens until it had re- 
 ceived the sanction of the senate. That body was thus left 
 in unchallengeable control of laws, provinces, wars, and 
 armies. Never again should a Marius intrude himself 
 where the conscript fathers did not desire his presence ; no 
 more should tribunes of the people dispose, as Sulpicius 
 had tried to do, of armies and of provinces. Whatever 
 arrangements the senate might see fit to make should stand. 
 
 But if the senate was to govern, it must have at its com- 
 mand the means of government. So Sulla provided it with 
 a staff of magistrates adequate to deal with the affairs of 
 the empire. He increased the number of the praetors, so 
 as to give the senate a supply of promagistrates sufficient 
 to administer the provinces and to dispatch the business of 
 the state at home. To give the senate yet another means 
 of controlling the governors, he entrusted to that body the 
 exclusive right to try those who were accused of maladmin- 
 istration. That Sulla, in transferring this function from 
 the knights to the senate, aimed principally to weaken the 
 influence of the capitalist class upon the administration 
 is no doubt true, but the change would, nevertheless, 
 strengthen the hold of the senate on the provincial govern- 
 ment both directly by making the governor effectively re- 
 sponsible to the senate, and indirectly by shutting out all 
 possibility of outside interference. 
 
 The senate was thus placed in a position of supreme au- 
 thority and fortified on every side. From a purely legal 
 point of view there was only one weak point in the sena- 
 torial fortress. That was that the magistrates, who were 
 still the executives of the state, were chosen by the vote of 
 the people. Thus the senate might find itself compelled to 
 carry on the government through officers who were polit- 
 ically hostile to it. This Sulla could not prevent without 
 an almost unthinkable breach with Roman customs and 
 ideas. Nor is it likely that he regarded the danger on this 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM 51 
 
 side as serious. The interference in the past had come 
 mainly from the tribunes, who were now effectually silenced. 
 Consuls and praetors had not usually given the senate much 
 trouble. Nor were they likely, under Sulla's constitution, 
 to be strong enough to do much harm. Even if a demo- 
 cratic consul should be elected, Sulla had tied his hands ef- 
 fectively and he would find himself so restricted and con- 
 fined that nothing of importance could be accomplished. 
 
 When Sulla, having finished his reforms, retired to 
 enjoy the fruits of his successful eastern war, he left 
 the senate in a position that was legally impregnable. No 
 move could be made against it without a violation of the 
 law. But could the law be trusted as an adequate protec- 
 tion? If the military system by which Sulla had risen to 
 the dictatorship remained unchanged, what guarantee was 
 there that others might not follow in his footsteps and that 
 the constitution he had set up with the sword might not be 
 overthrown by it? Yet Sulla left the military system as 
 it was, either because he did not fully appreciate the danger, 
 or because he had no substitute to put in its place. He 
 seemed uneasily aware that here was the weak link in the 
 chain by which he sought to bind the Roman people, but 
 he was unable to strengthen it. 8 The armies must still be 
 commanded and the provinces governed by the promagis- 
 trates, and the state must find its soldiers where it could. 
 If in the future ambitious proconsuls should find themselves 
 in conflict with the senate and with powerful armies at 
 their backs, the conscript fathers must meet the situation 
 as they could. While Sulla lived the danger was not likely 
 to arise, and by his temperament he may have been disposed 
 to anticipate Louis XV, and say, "After me the deluge!" 
 At any rate, when Sulla died in 78 B.C., the new military 
 and the new political systems stood side by side in harmony. 
 Hardly, however, had he departed from the scene than the in- 
 compatibility between the two was obvious in all men's eyes, 
 and his elaborate constitution fell crashing to the ground. 
 
 s He enacted strict laws against a governor who defied the senate, but with his 
 own career in mind it is hard to believe that he can have had much faith in their 
 value. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 The Supremacy of Pompey 
 
 At this point it may be desirable, even at the risk of some 
 repetition, to sum up the outstanding features of the ad- 
 ministrative and military system of the Roman republic. 
 The government of Italy itself need not detain us now. Here, 
 in the environment which had created them and conditioned 
 and shaped their early growth, the institutions of the city- 
 state could work after a fashion, and had the growth of 
 Rome been limited to the peninsula, she might, perhaps, 
 have gone on indefinitely under her ancient and traditional 
 forms. The problems which proved fatal to the liberty of 
 Rome came from without. It was in attempting to govern 
 provinces across the seas and under the burden of the wars 
 that came inevitably with the empire of the Mediterranean 
 world that the republic actually broke down. 
 
 In Italy the government remained still vested in the peo- 
 ple, magistrates, and senate as before. The older theory 
 of the constitution had placed these powers in the order 
 named above. Sulla in his great reforms had changed the 
 order of importance to senate, magistrates, and people. The 
 citizens in their assembly still chose the magistrates each 
 year and they, under the direction and by the advice of the 
 senate, administered affairs at home. Long since they had 
 ceased normally to go abroad during their term of office. 
 When the year was up the senate dispatched those possessed 
 of the imperium abroad as governors in the provinces. It 
 was here that serious difficulties arose. 
 
 When Sulla reorganized the state he estimated the num- 
 ber of the provinces requiring governors as ten. These 
 were as follows : Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, the two prov- 
 inces of Spain, the two Gauls, Africa, Macedon, Asia, and 
 Cilicia. To meet the needs of these ten provinces he gave 
 the state two consuls and eight praetors every year, making 
 the ten promagistrates required. Each year the senate fixed 
 the provinces for the ensuing year, specifying which should 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 53 
 
 be consular and which praetorian, and the out-going consuls 
 and praetors then distributed the provinces among them- 
 selves by lot. To each would normally be assigned a term 
 of one year as governor in some part of the empire across 
 the mountains or the seas> beyond the sacred soil of Italy in 
 any case. If circumstances were not normal, however, the 
 senate could meet the case in either of two ways. As it 
 had the sole right to determine what the provinces should 
 be, and as it had long since assumed the right to prolong the 
 imperium after it had been conferred by the vote of the as- 
 sembly, it could, by simply omitting one of the ordinary 
 provinces from the list for which the lots were to be drawn, 
 leave in control for another year the governor whose prov- 
 ince was omitted, since, as the province could not be drawn 
 by any magistrate, no successor could appear to supersede 
 the incumbent then in office. The magistrate who was not 
 assigned one of the ordinary provincial commands remained, 
 under these circumstances, available for service elsewhere, 
 and could be given an extraordinary command put down for 
 that particular occasion in the list of provinces submitted 
 to the chances of the lot. The same result could be attained 
 if at any time the senate should see fit to unite under one 
 governor two provinces which were usually kept separate 
 and distinct, should send for example but one governor to 
 have charge of both Spains or of both Gauls. Sulla might 
 reasonably have thought that he had thus provided the sen- 
 ate with an administrative staff equal to its needs and that 
 it had ready at hand the means for such readjustment as 
 might be rendered necessary by temporary circumstances. 
 This supposition was indeed the truth, but it was so only 
 on the assumption that the extension of the Roman empire 
 was to cease and that Rome was henceforth to pursue a 
 purely defensive policy. Such a policy the senate was not 
 only willing, but even eager to adopt, but fate willed other- 
 wise and the machine which Sulla had made broke down in 
 consequence. 
 
 The military system likewise was built upon the theory 
 of peace as the normal state of things, and it likewise broke 
 down under the strain of constant and serious warfare. It 
 
54 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 may seem strange that a people so continuously engaged in 
 war as the Romans should have constructed their whole 
 army for the day of peace that never came. Such is, never- 
 theless, the fact. The Roman republic had no standing 
 army. It persistently refused to regard war as a normal 
 condition. Unlike the modern Germans it consistently re- 
 fused to think in terms of militarism and regarded every 
 campaign as an exceptional necessity to be met by measures 
 of a temporary character. Perhaps it is too much to say 
 that the Romans expected perfect peace and complete tran- 
 quility. Small wars with turbulent and barbarous peoples 
 on the frontiers were, no doubt, a thing which they antici- 
 pated and with which the state could deal with ease, but pro- 
 longed and serious wars requiring large armies the Roman 
 world did not contemplate as a thing likely to occur at fre- 
 quent intervals. Hence the standing army, the force that 
 stood in constant readiness for action, was extremely small. 
 Adequate for the ordinary needs of frontier warfare, it was 
 quite unequal to a campaign upon other than a petty and 
 restricted scale. This standing army consisted only of the 
 small forces stationed in the provinces and under the com- 
 mand of the provincial governors, a force not larger than 
 was absolutely needed to maintain order and protect the 
 frontier from the restless border tribes. If the republic 
 found itself at war with any foe of greater power than these 
 tribes it set to work and raised an army for the campaign 
 in question. Once the campaign had been brought to a 
 conclusion by the triumph of the Roman arms the victorious 
 army was disbanded, since the state had now no further use 
 for it. Thus the real military power of Rome rested wholly 
 upon armies raised for each occasion and disappearing as 
 soon as the need had passed away. The idea of keeping a 
 great force under arms in time of peace was wholly alien 
 to the Roman mind. Why keep an army when there was no 
 need for it? Why burden the state with legions for which 
 there was no immediate use? If circumstances required, 
 a new force could always be raised, though this took time 
 and the republic was like to have paid dear more than once 
 for its persistent unreadiness to act. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 55 
 
 When all was tranquil, therefore, the Roman world had 
 no soldiers under arms in Italy, and in the provinces only 
 small forces under the governors. In such of the overseas 
 possessions as had no dangerous neighbor, as for example 
 Sicily, these forces amounted to little more than a handful. 
 Where a turbulent frontier, or restless tribes within the 
 border, made a more dangerous situation, as in Spain or 
 Gaul, a larger force was stationed, yet in no case did the 
 governor have at his disposal a powerful army capable of 
 taking the field against a really formidable enemy. 1 
 
 Dangerous insubordination from the ordinary governor 
 was not, therefore, a danger which was greatly to be feared. 
 He had no force sufficient to enable him to march on Italy, 
 or overawe the government, without a risk far greater to 
 him than to the state. Nor were his troops likely to be 
 willing to follow him in any perilous adventure. Appointed 
 as he was by lot, he had no close or vital connection with!V~ 
 either his province or his troops and his term of office was/ 
 normally too short to permit him to acquire a dangerous 
 popularity with either. When his successor should arrive 
 he could do nothing but surrender his command and return 
 to Rome as a private citizen liable to be called to account 
 before the courts for any act of his that might have over- 
 stepped the law. The court before which, in such a case, he 
 had to appear for trial was, after Sulla's dictatorship, com- 
 posed exclusively of senators, and while they might be care- 
 less, or corrupt, if the charge related only to the plunder or 
 oppression of the provincials for whom the conscript fath- 
 ers cared but little, yet it can scarcely be supposed that if 
 he had been guilty of insubordination to the senate, his 
 judges would have been too much disposed to leniency. Thus 
 it would seem quite clear that the independence from control 
 on the part of the ordinary provincial governor was not a 
 serious danger to the state, nor one that needed to concern 
 the senate overmuch. If dangerous men were chosen by 
 
 a When Caesar went to Spain as propraetor, he found there a force of two legiona 
 (Dodge, Caesar, 44). When he assumed command of the two Gauls, he found at his 
 disposal four legions or about 20,000 men (Rice Holmes, Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, 
 42). In both cases his first measure was to increase his forces. With a force of 
 four legions only he could hardly have ventured on the civil war. 
 
56 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 the people to be consuls or praetors, they could do little 
 during their year of office and the senate could often by a 
 little manipulation of the provinces for the following year 
 contrive to eliminate them as factors to be feared or 
 dreaded. 2 
 
 The danger to the state arose from those extraordinary 
 conditions, as the Roman viewed them, which yet contrived 
 to keep recurring with such frequency. It was when a war 
 arose calling for one of those large armies which the state 
 only raised in time of need and for a specific campaign that 
 the military system involved an element of real and serious 
 peril. When the necessity arose for a force greater than 
 was normally under arms in the provinces, the Roman 
 policy of never going in advance to meet a danger made the 
 peril all the more intense. An army, when the circum- 
 stances called for it, must be improvised, and since the state 
 quite usually delayed as long as possible its preparations, 
 it must be improvised at once and in hot haste to meet the 
 need which statesmen had refused to see afar. When this 
 was the case the state, depending as it did after the reform 
 of Marius on volunteer enlistment, found itself obliged to 
 have recourse to the men of established military reputation 
 who could attract recruits. Thus arose a small group of 
 indispensable generals, the men who could raise an army, 
 whenever it might be required, by the might of their repu- 
 tation and personal popularity. 
 
 With armies thus brought together by the personal pres- 
 tige of a successful general a change in the commander was 
 no easy or simple matter. The character of the wars which 
 called such generals to the front would have made frequent 
 changes dangerous even if the character of the army had 
 
 2 An illustration may be found in the case of Caesar. The senate regarded him as 
 dangerous and foresaw the probability of his election as consul. The conscript 
 fathers, therefore, named as the consular provinces for the year of his proconsul- 
 ship the charge of the roads and forests in Italy. Caesar was not to be thus put 
 aside however, and, as the assembly had by that time been freed from the restrictions 
 which Sulla had put upon it, he succeeded by its help in setting aside the arrange- 
 ments of the senate. In addition to its power of fixing the provinces, the senate had 
 also the right to determine the number of the troops and the amount of the funds 
 at the disposal of a governor. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 57 
 
 not rendered them impossible except under exceptional con- 
 ditions. Not only did the state find itself compelled to call 
 upon the general of popularity and repute in order to obtain 
 an army for its wars but, once selected, it had no real choice 
 except to leave him in command until the war was finished 
 and his army could be dispensed with. Thus practical per- 
 manence of command was grafted on the Roman system, 
 and that command was more and more disconnected from 
 the annual magistracies. It would rarely happen that a 
 crisis would arrive at the precise moment when one of the 
 few who, under the new conditions, was capable of taking 
 up the task chanced to be among the men just ready to de- 
 part for their provincial duties, and even if he were, the 
 lot by which these duties were assigned gave no assurance 
 that he could be employed where he was wanted. It neces- 
 sarily follows, that the normal machinery could not be used 
 in case of any serious war and that, whenever the state was 
 confronted by any work of large importance, it was driven 
 to create an extraordinary command in order to meet it. 
 That is to say, the constitution of Rome, while adequate 
 to meet what Roman statesmen regarded as a normal situ- 
 ation, was helpless in a case of greater difficulty. The an- 
 nual magistrates were average Roman leaders and poli- 
 ticians and the annual governors of the provinces were nec- 
 essarily the same. But such men could not handle any sit- 
 uation that involved a serious responsibility. That the great 
 commands might be fraught with danger to the state was 
 clear enough to men of very moderate foresight, but to 
 realize this was useless unless a remedy could be provided, 
 and this was just what the Romans were unable to supply. 
 Whenever the senate attempted to carry on a serious cam- 
 paign by means of the ordinary machinery, disaster fol- 
 lowed promptly as a result and a great command had to be 
 resorted to in order to retrieve a situation which delay had 
 only made more critical. Whatever the reluctance of the 
 senate, the state could wage successful war on a large scale 
 only by this means and such wars it found itself unable to 
 avoid. 
 
 It was this fact that caused the failure of Sulla's work 
 
 / 
 
58 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 of reorganization. All that he found it in his power to do 
 was so to entrench the senate in control of things that it 
 could govern the Roman world in relatively tranquil times. 
 His really vital failure lay in this, that he was unable to 
 create a world in which the military and administrative ma- 
 chine, such as he found or made it, could work successfully. 
 For this failure he was not responsible. He was dictator 
 of Rome but his autocracy stopped at her frontiers. He 
 could not rule at once his country and the rest of the world. 
 He had been forced to leave his eastern enemy, beaten but 
 still unconquered, while he fought for mastery at home. 
 Once master in his own house, he reorganized the state as 
 best he could, but he could not so reshape that state that it 
 could stand in face of the difficulties which it had to meet 
 once he was gone. Hardly was the reformer in his grave 
 when his constitution broke down under the strain of de- 
 mands which it could not meet and which he had not been 
 able to avert. The mechanism was unequal to the work the 
 world required. 
 
 When Sulla died, the senate was, perhaps, adequate for 
 peaceful days but dangerously weak for troubled times. 
 This weakness has sometimes been laid to the charge of the 
 successive massacres which had decimated the governing 
 nobility. While these contributed their part, the essential 
 weakness was not that the average senator lacked courage 
 or conviction for the task of holding the fortress which 
 Sulla had ingeniously contrived to fashion. That many of 
 the senate did lack these qualities is true and had probably 
 been true long before his time. Yet if this had been its only 
 weakness, it is difficult to see how the position of the senate 
 could have been successfully assailed. What really mattered 
 was that it lacked men of established military reputation 
 who were at the same time thoroughly loyal to the constitu- 
 tion which Sulla had devised. Some there were, indeed, but 
 not enough for the troubled times the state had to confront, 
 and this could only mean that sooner or later the senate 
 would find itself driven by necessity to place strong armies 
 in the hands of men it could not trust and take the chance 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 59 
 
 that they would show an unexpected loyalty to those who 
 had reluctantly intrusted them with power. 
 
 Sulla had left behind him when he died but four really 
 competent generals, namely Lucullus, Metellus, Pompey, and 
 Crassus. The first two were devoted partisans upon whose 
 loyalty the senate could rely ; the others had been regarded 
 by Sulla himself with something of suspicion. If he had 
 not wholly trusted them, the senate could have even less of 
 confidence, for the awe which the dictator inspired and the 
 thought of his veterans would probably have kept them 
 loyal to him, while the senate was much less likely to in- 
 spire a salutary fear. Upon the military side, therefore, 
 the senate was dangerously weak if stormy weather should 
 confront the state. Even in Sulla's lifetime the clouds had 
 been gathering upon the horizon. In the East a renewal 
 of the war with Mithridates was an obvious possibility, 
 while the civil war in Italy had led directly to a new and 
 serious war in Spain. In this last region Sertorius, the 
 governor appointed by the democratic regime which Sulla 
 had overthrown, had rallied around him the remnants of his 
 party that had escaped the vengeance of Sulla and was wag- 
 ing open war against the government that Sulla had set up 
 at Rome. So grave had the situation become in Spain that 
 the dictator had dispatched Metellus to take charge and 
 crush the rebels. This task soon proved to be no easy one 
 and the war there dragged on with varying fortunes. Thus, 
 at the moment of Sulla's death, the senate, which he had 
 restored to power, had ready at hand in Italy only one gen- 
 eral, Lucullus, in whom it had entire confidence. Unfort- 
 unately for the conscript fathers his reputation as a com- 
 mander was yet to make, for, though he had done good serv- 
 ice in the East, he had borne no part in the civil war in Italy 
 and his eastern service had been chiefly with the fleet. He 
 was probably but little known at home, and in spite of his 
 capacity as a general, he never possessed the gift of making 
 himself popular with his men. In an emergency which 
 called for instant action he was likely to be of little use, and 
 the senate might be forced to fall back upon the services of 
 Pompey and of Crassus, however little it might trust them. 
 
60 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Scarcely had Sulla's death occurred in 78 B.C. than the 
 senate found itself facing a crisis. Lepidus, one of the 
 consuls for the year, began an agitation which threatened 
 to undo all Sulla's recent work. Taking advantage of the 
 discontent then seething throughout Italy, he made a bar- 
 gain with the democrats and sought to repeat the revolu- 
 tion that had placed Cinna in power when Sulla had set 
 out for Greece to fight against Mithridates. After some 
 preliminary skirmishes in Rome he put himself at the head 
 of an open rebellion in Etruria. We need only to recall 
 what Sulla had done to realize that Italy was full of com- 
 bustible material. He had confiscated immense quantities 
 of land and penalized numerous Italian municipalities that 
 had taken the other side in the civil war. Add to this the 
 children of the proscribed and the discontented democrats 
 and all the other classes who were injured by his reforms 
 and it is evident that a revolt had excellent chances of get- 
 ting strong support. The advantage of the senate lay in 
 the fact that Sulla's victory had been so recent and so 
 crushing that many who sympathized with the movement 
 were inclined to wait till it should be well started before 
 they joined it openly. The best hope, if not the only one, 
 of averting a dangerous civil war lay in prompt and vig- 
 orous action. Of these things the senate was well aware 
 and it was clear enough to the conscript fathers that the 
 safety of the state required that Lepidus should be sup- 
 pressed before his insurrection had a chance to spread. If 
 time were given him to arouse and organize the elements 
 of unrest, all Italy would soon be in flames. To save itself 
 the senate had to act at once, and that it might do so, it 
 required a man whose name would be enough to call in vol- 
 unteers. One such man there was ready to hand and what- 
 ever their opinion of his soundness in the faith, the con- 
 script fathers had no choice but to place Pompey at the 
 head of their forces. This they did, and the rebellion of 
 Lepidus was swiftly crushed : but the victory left the state 
 facing a new peril less menacing, indeed, but not less real 
 than that which had just passed harmlessly away. 
 
 The youth to whom the conscript fathers had been forced 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 61 
 
 to turn for safety, although not yet thirty years of age, 
 was already a well-known and popular soldier. His father 
 had been a general distinguished for his very dubious loy- 
 alty rather than for any striking military achievements. 
 At the time of the elder Pompey's death the son had been 
 too young to attract the attention of the then dominant 
 democrats and so had lived to witness the return of Sulla 
 from the East. Then, boy as he still was, he had hastened 
 to join Sulla at the head of a considerable body of volun- 
 teers. In the civil war he rendered services of importance 
 to the future dictator and displayed a military capacity 
 which led to his being intrusted with the task of destroy- 
 ing the remnants of the Marian party in Africa and Sicily 
 and so securing the food supply of Rome. For his victo- 
 ries, which, though of vital significance to the dictator, 
 were scarcely wonderful in themselves, he demanded the 
 unprecedented honor of a triumph, something never before 
 conferred on anyone not a regular magistrate of the re- 
 public, and the right to use the title of Magnus, or the 
 Great, as a family name. Sulla, although astonished at his 
 presumption, granted his demands, but, having done so and 
 thus disarmed his vainglorious lieutenant, retired him forth- 
 with from public life. It seems reasonably clear that this 
 retirement was due to the dictator's understanding of the 
 man and to a perception of the fact that he could not be 
 relied upon to put the interests of the senate before the 
 promptings of his own vanity and ambition. Still Pompey 
 had contrived to impress his contemporaries with a sense 
 of efficiency and to acquire the reputation of a general who 
 could win the hearts of his men. When Lepidus menaced 
 the state with a counter-revolution the senate in its terror 
 called upon him to use his popularity to crush the rebel. 
 His success in this task was rapid and complete. His name 
 brought men to fill the ranks and his real gifts as a com- 
 mander, joined to the incompetence of his opponents, did 
 the rest. 
 
 The danger from Lepidus once averted, the senate found 
 itself confronted with the problem of dealing with its own 
 general. The victorious Pompey was at the head of a 
 
62 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 strong force in Italy which he refused to disband and the 
 senate had at hand no soldiers to resist any demands he 
 might be pleased to make. As it happened, what he de- 
 sired at the moment was not very distasteful to the senate. 
 The war in Spain was still dragging on and Metellus, the 
 general in charge there, was calling loudly for reinforce- 
 ments. Pompey requested that he and his army might be 
 employed on this mission and the senate yielded its consent. 
 He and his troops departed for the Sertorian war and for 
 the next few years he was too far away and much too busy 
 to cause further trouble to the government he served. Still 
 the first downward step had been taken, and the armies of 
 the state were no longer in the hands of men thoroughly 
 loyal to the new constitution. 
 
 Pompey had hardly departed for Spain when war blazed 
 up again in the East. For this the senate itself seems to have 
 been largely responsible. Nicomedes, the king of Bithynia, 
 died, and by his will bequeathed his kingdom to Rome. The 
 conscript fathers, probably under the pressure of the 
 knights, accepted the legacy, although they must have known 
 that this would mean a war with Mithridates, who could 
 not accept the annexation of Bithynia by Rome without ab- 
 dicating his place as an independent sovereign. Lucullus, 
 at the moment, was one of the two consuls and after consid- 
 erable maneuvering and intrigue he succeeded in having 
 himself dispatched to take charge of the war. 3 With his 
 departure for the East the senate was left without a single 
 loyal general of established reputation in Italy. The danger 
 of such a situation was not long in making itself felt, and 
 that in the peculiarly sinister form of a great servile insur- 
 rection in the peninsula. A band of gladiators under the 
 leadership of Spartacus, breaking from their barracks, 
 raised the standard of revolt and speedily aroused the coun- 
 try districts of Italy which were crowded with slaves whom 
 the hard conditions of their life had rendered desperate. 
 
 s Reinach, Mithridate Eupator, 318-20. Lucullus obtained the command by resign- 
 ing the province that had already been assigned to him by lot under the Sempronian 
 law of C. Gracchus. Having done this the senate had the legal power to appoint him, 
 without the use of the lot, to a new command. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 63 
 
 In a short space of time the original band of gladiators had 
 grown into a formidable force and seemed to the Romans to 
 be a menace, not to this party or that, but to organized so- 
 ciety itself. The danger was made worse by the incom- 
 petence of the ordinary annual magistrates to deal with it. 
 Consuls and praetors were driven from the field in head- 
 long disgraceful flight by the revolted slaves till the lesson 
 was at length fully learned that the average Roman politi- 
 cian could not handle one of the new armies with the small- 
 est chance of success. When, at length, the senate dared 
 no longer trifle with the situation, it reluctantly called in the 
 help of yet another general of tried capacity but doubtful 
 loyalty to anybody except himself. With the support of the 
 oligrachy Crassus was named as praetor for 71 B.C., and 
 given the command against Spartacus and his servile rebels. 
 Like Pompey he had been one of Sulla's able lieutenants, and 
 like him had been retired from command. Now, once more 
 at the head of an army, he speedily restored discipline which 
 had gone to pieces in the inefficient hands of his predeces- 
 sors and soon was pressing his foes with energy. For a time 
 he seemed unable to crush the uprising completely, and in 
 spite of his successful campaign the gladiators still kept the 
 field. As Pompey had now brought the war in Spain to a 
 triumphant close, the senate called him home with his vic- 
 torious army to help their praetor finish the rebellion once 
 for all. Before he could arrive, however, Crassus, furious 
 at the thought of dividing the glory with one whom he re- 
 garded with an envious jealousy, had made an end. Never- 
 theless, obeying with alacrity the summons of the senate, 
 Pompey arrived in Italy with his devoted soldiers at his 
 back. 
 
 Thus by the inexorable pressure of necessity the senate 
 had been forced to place in doubtful hands two armies, both 
 of which were now in Italy itself. The loyal generals were 
 powerless to help. Lucullus was absent in the East and 
 Metellus was unable or unwilling to offer any serious as- 
 sistance. Ready to hand there was no force that could op- 
 pose Crassus and Pompey, and the senate was quite helpless 
 to resist them if they should unite. If they should fight each 
 
64 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 other there might be a chance of safety for the conscript 
 fathers, yet this they did not do, although for a time men 
 seem to have anticipated some such event. The two quite 
 cordially and sincerely disliked each other, yet neither was 
 prepared to pay too high a price to gratify his jealousy and 
 envy of the other. Pompey had the stronger army, and if 
 it came to open war would probably have won. This Crassus 
 knew and consequently he was desirous to come to terms 
 with his rival rather than to fight him. Pompey, even though 
 victory was probable, had no wish for a civil war, if he could 
 get what he sought without it. Neither wanted anything 
 which the other could not grant and so, setting their private 
 feelings on one side, they came to terms. The senate, which 
 Sulla had thought to make the supreme power in the state, 
 could only look on helplessly and humbly ratify a bargain 
 in the making of which they were in no respect consulted 
 and of every stipulation of which they strongly disapproved. 
 The elaborate safeguards with which Sulla had surrounded 
 the conscript fathers were useless and all because the Italy 
 he left behind could not be managed by the average politi- 
 cian, even though he came of an old family. He might be 
 an able speaker in the forum and a skilful vote getter, but 
 he could not in a time of stress command the services of 
 volunteers of the kind on whom Rome now relied to fight 
 her battles and thus the power inevitably passed to the ex- 
 ceptional men who, under the new conditions, could raise 
 and lead the armies that the state required. 
 
 The terms on which Pompey and Crassus formed their 
 combination were dictated in the main by vanity and per- 
 sonal ambition. Pompey desired the consulship and Crassus 
 wished to stand as high as he. Pompey preferred Crassus 
 as a colleague to a civil war with him. They therefore 
 speedily agreed that they should be the consuls for the en- 
 suing year although by Sulla's laws neither was eligible for 
 this dignity. Pompey had never held the minor offices re- 
 quired of a candidate for what was still the highest post in 
 the republic, while Crassus was actually praetor and a three 
 year interval between offices was demanded by the law. But 
 legal technicalities were nothing to men with armies at their 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 65 
 
 backs; they had but to ask and no one would dare to 
 say them nay. Nor was such a demand a thing unknown 
 to Roman constitutional tradition. From time to time the 
 Eoman people had exempted some favored candidate from 
 the requirements of the law and made him magistrate 
 though legally disqualified. This Pompey and Crassus now 
 combined to demand for themselves, and the senate, men- 
 aced by the swords of their armies and having no swords 
 at hand to answer force with force, saw itself compelled to 
 yield a sullen consent to their joint candidacy. 
 
 That consent given, with whatever of reluctance, the path 
 of the two ambitious generals seemed to be quite clear. 
 They deemed it wise, however, to take ample precautions 
 against possible obstacles. With the senate and its parti- 
 sans overawed, there was but one chance of their plans mis- 
 carrying. Perhaps the people in their assembly might re- 
 fuse to do their part. To obviate the danger of any such 
 mishap they struck a bargain with the democrats and thus 
 made all secure. The demand of the democrats was that, 
 once in office, they should undo Sulla's work and put the 
 constitution back where it had been previous to his dicta- 
 torship. To this they readily agreed, Pompey desirous of 
 popularity and Crassus perhaps approving, but in any case 
 unable to resist and probably quite content with the satis- 
 faction of his personal ambition. For the senate, whose 
 exclusive control they pledged themselves to destroy, neither 
 cared at all. They must have known that it distrusted them 
 and that it had called on them for help only because a dire 
 necessity had left it no real choice. For the future they 
 could hope for very little from the conscript fathers, except 
 under such pressure, but the mob stood ready to applaud 
 and trust. There seems no reason to suppose that any 
 qualms of conscience troubled them at tearing down what 
 both of them had recently fought valiantly to raise. Cer- 
 tain elements in the character of each of the two men will 
 go far to explain the apparent contradiction. 
 
 Pompey was not by any means destitute of scruple, but 
 throughout his life he was quite unable to perceive the 
 larger aspects of a political problem. He was capable of 
 
66 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 sacrificing his personal ambition to the interests of the 
 state, only he was too short-sighted and purblind a states- 
 man to discern a conflict between the two unless it was 
 particularly glaring. Thus it came about that, well inten- 
 tioned as he was, he struck deadly blows at the republic 
 without realizing it, and set invaluable precedents for an 
 empire of which he did not dream. In this particular case 
 it is not necessary to charge him with any great incon- 
 sistency. It was true that he had fought for Sulla, but, 
 when he joined his standard, the policy of the future dicta- 
 tor was still involved in much uncertainty. That Sulla, if 
 victorious, would favor the senate and the aristocracy was 
 obvious to all; but it was by no means clear what precise 
 measures he would take for this purpose, or to what lengths 
 he would go in this direction. At the beginning of the civil 
 war he used language of studied moderation without giving 
 the slightest hint of many of the things he later did. Pom- 
 pey may very well have joined him as the only hope of de- 
 livering Rome from the tyranny of the discredited demo- 
 cratic regime then in power; but such an alliance did not 
 bind him to approve of the violent and drastic fashion in 
 which Sulla used his victory. It is not impossible that 
 Pompey, like many other men of moderate views, supported 
 Sulla in the civil war only to be disgusted by many of the 
 laws which, as dictator, he enacted in his endeavor to en- 
 trench the senate securely in power. If this were so, he 
 might, without conscious inconsistency, now use his oppor- 
 tunity to repeal some of the measures to whose too narrow 
 partisanship he had always been opposed. The oligarchy 
 which the dictator had set up might seem too weak and 
 founded on too sudden a break with the traditions of the 
 Roman constitution to hope for permanence. An attempt 
 at some sort of compromise by which, while it retained 
 all its ancient rights and its former position in the state, 
 the senate should be forced to give up its recently ac- 
 quired monopoly of power, might seem to Pompey a wise 
 precaution against future violence and in no way to demand 
 a surrender of the principles for which he had fought in 
 the past. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 67 
 
 Crassus, on his side, was less endowed with scruple, and 
 in the enforced leisure from politics which Sulla's disfavor 
 had procured for him he had been busily engaged in amass- 
 ing wealth. In this pursuit he would naturally be drawn 
 into close and active relations with the equestrian class 
 who were the financiers and capitalists of Rome. Sulla in 
 his reorganization of the state had striven systematically 
 to weaken the knights and consequently the destruction of 
 some parts of his work would be pleasing to a class with 
 whom Crassus must, by this time, have been on intimate 
 and even cordial terms. The chief role in the task to which 
 the two had pledged themselves fell outwardly to Pompey, 
 but Crassus may reasonably be assumed to have had no 
 wish, except the promptings of his personal jealousy and 
 dislike, to thwart the work. 
 
 In this wise was formed a triple combination of Pompey, 
 Crassus, and the democrats which in 70 B.C. proceeded to 
 undo the constitutional reforms of Sulla. The new consuls 
 could not legally bring any bill before the people without 
 the approval of the senate, but, while their armies remained 
 camped without the city, that body, venerable and august as 
 it might be, dared not refuse its consent to the proceedings 
 of the two. Their first important act was to restore to the v, 
 tribunes of the people the powers of which Sulla had de- /^ 
 prived them. The requirement of the senate's preliminary 
 consent to bills was thus annulled and any tribune, with the 
 support of the assembly, could once more legislate at will, 
 regardless of the opinions or the wishes of the conscript 
 fathers. This was the one really vital point because the 
 cancelling of the control of the senate over legislation made 
 possible all manner of changes in the future. The other 
 rights and privileges of the tribunes were also restored, 
 but in removing the restrictions which Sulla had put upon 
 the popular assembly the really decisive blow was struck. 
 The courts, too, were remodeled and the knights recovered, 
 if not the complete monopoly which Gaius Gracchus had 
 conferred upon them, at least a powerful influence which 
 fell little short of absolute control. Thus the hold of the 
 senate over the provincial governors was weakened and the 
 
*. 
 
 >> 
 
 68 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 capitalist class was given a weapon with which to push 
 their interests in the empire at large. 
 
 Beyond these two great measures, great if tested by their 
 influence upon the future, Pompey and Crassus accom- 
 plished little in their consulship. But what they did, al- 
 though it fell short of a complete repeal of Sulla's laws, de- 
 stroyed their essential meaning and their purpose and thus 
 pulled down the edifice their author had constructed. The 
 senate's exclusive power and control over the state, as es- 
 tablished by the dictator, had fallen under the stress of 
 military necessities which he had been unable to foresee or 
 to avert. But though the supremacy of the senate was de- 
 stroyed, for the moment its overthrow seemed to make little 
 difference with the working of the government. The people 
 were too ill organized to exert continuously their newly re- 
 covered power of interference, and at this moment, per- 
 haps because of the grim thoroughness of Sulla's bloody 
 proscription, they were lacking in strong and purposeful 
 leaders, capable of heading an attack upon the clique of 
 noble families who still continued to monopolize the offices. 
 It was also true that just then there seemed no adequate 
 reason for any interference. Few, even among Roman 
 democrats, had ever gone so far as to imagine that the ma- 
 chinery of the state could run without the nobles as the 
 usual holders of the offices or had dreamed of the democracy 
 as capable of more than an occasional intervention when 
 things went seriously amiss. Gaius Gracchus seems, in- 
 deed, to have cherished the design of substituting the as- 
 sembly for the senate as the constantly directing and con- 
 trolling power of the state, but no other leader can be found 
 to whom such large and far-reaching designs can reason- 
 ably be ascribed. The others had put forward individual 
 reforms or attacked this or that detail of the administra- 
 tion of the senate but without giving any indication of a 
 broadly conceived plan of replacing it. When things were 
 running quietly, when no grievance was acutely felt, it 
 seemed to most Romans that there was no occasion for pop- 
 ular action, and in the year 70 B.C. there were no leaders 
 on the democratic side possessed of such wide influence as 
 
THE SUPREMACY OP POMPEY 69 
 
 to be capable of making their ambition a sufficient excuse 
 for legislation. Thus it came about that when the popular 
 party had demolished the essential work of Sulla, a pause 
 ensued as if with that accomplished there remained no more 
 to do. 
 
 The two consuls who had done so much, once they had 
 fulfilled their pledges to their supporters, allowed their per- 
 sonal dislike for each other to dominate their conduct. What- 
 ever thing one wished the other could be trusted to oppose. 
 Crassus, as the weaker of the two, could hardly venture on 
 any initiative himself, but was content to thwart his ambi- 
 tious colleague whenever possible. Pompey, on his side, cast 
 longing eyes toward the East, where he desired to super- 
 sede Lucullus in the expectation of winning new laurels 
 for himself. Such a design met with but little favor from 
 Crassus, who was bitterly opposed to anything that prom- 
 ised additional glory for his rival. In alliance with the 
 senate he succeeded in checking Pompey, and the latter, dis- 
 daining an ordinary proconsulship, announced that at the 
 close of his year of office he would retire into private life. 
 Crassus promptly followed the example thus set and like- 
 wise declined a governorship, partly, no doubt, for financial 
 reasons, but partly also because he wished to remain in 
 Rome where he could more easily continue to thwart Pom- 
 pey. 
 
 The next two years passed by without conspicuous events, 
 but then new troubles arose. While Rome's attention had 
 been turned in other directions a new enemy had grown to 
 menacing proportions. The Romans had never loved the 
 sea and had become a naval power only under the compul- 
 sion of the war with Carthage. Her African rival once de- 
 stroyed, Rome had given little attention to her fleet. The 
 policing of the seas, which was the duty of the dominant 
 Mediterranean power, had been neglected during many years, 
 and piracy had again become a formidable scourge. At 
 last the senate could no longer shut its eyes to the necessity 
 of action, but the commanders placed in charge failed mis- 
 erably to accomplish anything. The seas remained unsafe 
 and the pirates plundered far and near along the coasts. 
 
> 
 
 70 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 How long the Roman government might have tolerated this 
 condition and the manifest incapacity of the ordinary au- 
 thorities under the direction of the senate to do anything 
 worth while to meet it, is matter for speculation merely. 
 The pirates by a stroke of folly stirred the people to action. 
 Grown too bold from long impunity, they ventured finally 
 to intercept the grain ships on which the Roman mob de- 
 pended for its dole of food. The misery of their subjects 
 had not moved the populace of Rome particularly, but the 
 prospect of famine for themselves was a very different 
 thing. Indifference immediately gave place to anger. The 
 mob was united in demanding swift and effective action, and 
 since the lack of bread was in itself a clear demonstration 
 of the incapacity of the senate's commanders, the people de- 
 termined to appoint one of their own. Nor was the choice 
 a matter of the slightest difficulty. Pompey was popular 
 and bore the reputation of a general who had never failed. 
 Whatever task had been assigned him he had successfully 
 performed and his record was in no wise injured in the eyes 
 of the rabble by the fact that so far fortune had always 
 favored him; for example, the ending of the war against 
 Sertorius had been due more to that leader's murder by 
 some of his own followers than to any skill of Pompey. 
 The feeling of the people was too strong and too unanimous 
 not to find prompt expression, and one of the tribunes, 
 Gabinius by name, availed himself of the newly restored 
 powers of his office to bring a bill dealing with the situation 
 before the assembly. 
 
 The Gabinian Law was sufficiently sweeping in its pro- 
 visions. Pompey was not mentioned by name, but every 
 one knew well enough that he was meant. The purpose of 
 the bill was to create, by popular action, a new great com- 
 mand. In general terms it provided that some man of con- 
 sular rank should be selected by the assembly and intrusted 
 with the sole charge of the war against the pirates. It 
 clothed the man so chosen with wide and even extravagant 
 powers for the intended campaign. He was authorized to 
 raise a fleet and an army for the war, and was given power 
 to call upon the treasury for ample funds. Ships, men, and 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 71 
 
 money were all placed at his disposal on a scale which far 
 surpassed the actual requirements of the occasion. This 
 may have been due to a desire to flatter the man on whom 
 the choice of the assembly was certain to fall, or it may have 
 been that the excited feeling of the streets had vastly over- 
 estimated the difficulty of the task. The most startling fea- 
 ture of the bill was not the resources it assigned to the 
 commander but the jurisdiction which it gave him. His 
 authority was to extend over the whole Mediterranean and 
 over its coasts for fifty miles inland. This would give prac- 
 tical control of all the provinces of Rome since but little of 
 her empire lay farther from the sea than fifty miles. To 
 exercise his far-reaching imperium the commander was au- 
 thorized to select a number of legati, or lieutenants, from 
 the higher ranks of the senate. The term for which he 
 was to hold his powers was fixed at three years. 
 
 The bill amounted to a practical dictatorship for Pompey ; 
 yet the situation could be made to justify its main provi- 
 sions. To crush the pirates a fleet was obviously neces- 
 sary, and its exact size could hardly be determined in ad- 
 vance. An army was equally necessary, for if the pirates 
 were permitted to retire into their strongholds, they could 
 there await in safety the first favorable opportunity to re- 
 new their depredations. To destroy them effectively they 
 must be tracked down at once by land and sea, and for this 
 purpose an army of uncertain size and the control of the 
 coasts to an indefinite extent were required. The neces- 
 sary operations might well last for a considerable time and 
 three years were allowed by the bill. The Roman people 
 meant to make an end, once for all, of the enemy who threat- 
 ened their supply of food and to accomplish this they did 
 not hesitate to set up a possible master for themselves. The 
 senate and the nobles could not be expected to submit quite 
 tamely to a bill which thus handed over all the power and 
 resources of the state to a man whom they neither liked nor 
 trusted. They resisted bitterly but in vain; the clamor 
 of the streets bore down all opposition. When a fellow 
 tribune tried to stop Gabinius by interposing his veto, the 
 precedent of Tiberius Gracchus was at once revived and the 
 
72 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 obstructive tribune removed from office. The legality of 
 such a step was no clearer now than in the past, but in the 
 face of the popular anger and enthusiasm the senate did 
 not dare resort to legal technicalities. 4 The hostile tribune 
 having been deposed, the bill was voted in the assembly and 
 solemnly declared a law of Rome. Thus Pompey entered 
 on a new command, and the wisdom, for himself, of his 
 policy of emancipating the people from senatorial control 
 was completely justified. What the senate would have re- 
 fused the people had given eagerly, and he, for his part, 
 must have rejoiced in private that by virtue of his acts as 
 consul the people had recovered the power to give. The 
 hostile senate was forced to look on helplessly while Pom- 
 pey gathered in the due reward of popularity. 
 
 From the day the bill was passed in 67 B.C. till Pompey 
 disbanded his army in 61, he was the Emperor of Rome in 
 all but name. The task the people had assigned him was 
 soon discharged and the popular choice was justified by his 
 extraordinary success. In a campaign far shorter than 
 any one had dreamed of, he swept the pirates from the sea, 
 and by a judicious combination of severity and mercy, he 
 brought about the surrender of their strongholds on the 
 coast. By assembling overwhelming force, by showing his 
 foes that if they fought to the bitter end they could expect 
 no mercy, and then tendering reasonable terms as a reward 
 for prompt surrender, the task was soon achieved, and 
 Pompey found himself at the head of an army in Cilicia, 
 the great pirate center, with his task fulfilled. But a force 
 that was overwhelming against the freebooters was equally 
 so against the state that had commissioned him. Even in 
 Cilicia, with his fleet and army at his beck and call, he had 
 but to ask what he would and the government in Rome was 
 powerless to refuse. It thus followed that Pompey had 
 scarcely finished the work intrusted to him when his com- 
 mand was extended and enlarged. For this the situation 
 in the East furnished the pretext. 
 
 In Asia Rome had been engaged for some years in a new 
 struggle with her old foe, Mithridates. This war had been, 
 
 *Frank, 314. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 73 
 
 and at the moment still, was, in the charge of Lucullus. At 
 first that general had been brilliantly successful, and hith- 
 erto Pompey had seen his efforts to supersede him foiled. 
 Now, however, the situation had changed; the war, which 
 had opened so successfully for Lucullus, had ended in a 
 dismal failure and disgrace. His generalship had been com- 
 pletely adequate; he was, perhaps, as good a soldier as 
 Rome had, but one vital quality he lacked : he could not gain 
 or hold the devotion of his men. In spite of the victories 
 to which he led them, his soldiers hated him and at last 
 refused to follow him any longer. His last campaigns had 
 failed by reason of the mutiny and insubordination of his 
 own army. In face of this complete breakdown on his part 
 the senate had decided on his recall 5 and had voted to 
 intrust the final settlement of the East to new commanders 
 of the ordinary stamp. But their very action in removing 
 him had been a signal for a fresh crisis. The war, which 
 had seemed practically ended, flamed out again and the men 
 designated by the senate were quite obviously unequal to 
 the new situation. It was necessary to make a change in 
 the arrangements and but one change was possible. A new 
 and serious war required a commander superior to the ord- 
 inary promagistrate and such a one was already actually 
 upon the scene. Pompey, the ever victorious, was there at 
 hand in the very region where the war would be fought out. 
 His name and popularity would quiet the mutinous soldiers 
 of Lucullus and the forces he had raised to fight the pirates 
 would serve to reinforce their ranks. He had previously 
 been known to desire the command, and if it should be now 
 refused to him, what might he not do? If he embarked 
 his legions on his fleet and sailed for Italy, who could be 
 
 5 Another factor in procuring the recall of Lucullus was the attitude of the Roman 
 capitalists or knights. Lucullus had not originally been named as governor of the 
 province of Asia, but he was later given full authority there for war purposes. In 
 the exercise of his power he contrived to quarrel with the knights. The province was 
 overwhelmed with debt and Lucullus undertook a drastic reduction of it. This in- 
 furiated the Roman capitalists who saw their extortionate profits thus curtailed and 
 they neither forgot the measure nor forgave the author (Heitland, iii, 35-36). 
 Ferrero has pictured Lucullus as an imperialist, but it appears to the present writer 
 that Frank has conclusively disproved this. It was partly because he adhered to the 
 older traditions of Roman policy that the knights desired his recall and Pompey's 
 appointment. See Frank, Roman Imperialism, 307-14. 
 
74 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 found to offer any resistance ? Rome had at hand no army 
 to oppose him and quite naturally preferred to give with 
 outward spontaneity what it was dangerous to refuse. 
 
 The Gabinian Law thus found a successor in the Manilian 
 Law. This, we are told, was unexpectedly proposed by an 
 obscure tribune of the people. The unexpectedness can 
 only have lain in the man who gave his name to the meas- 
 ure, for Roman politicians can scarcely have failed to an- 
 ticipate some such proposal. At any rate, the bill when 
 laid before the people for their vote encountered little op- 
 position. Whatever eloquence could do to make its passage 
 easy was well done by two young men just rising into prom- 
 inence. Caesar and Cicero both spoke in favor of it. 
 Though oratory might be right and seemly in the enactment 
 of a Roman law, in this case it was hardly necessary. No 
 one dared to offer open opposition except those who knew 
 themselves so definitely set down as enemies of Pompey that 
 they had nothing much to lose. If the great general should 
 be provoked into invading Italy, none cared to offer them- 
 selves as marks for a proscription except such as felt that 
 they were certain of inclusion. So men's tongues were tied 
 by fear, and whatever they might say in private, in public 
 they kept silent or approved. The powerful speech of 
 Cicero may have done something to make compliance easier 
 for some and may have rallied a few waverers, but can 
 scarcely have influenced the inevitable result. That was 
 determined not by flowing periods or balanced sentences 
 but by the military situation of the state which left it help- 
 less. The bill was easily passed and added to the powers 
 Pompey already held under the Gabinian Law the sole 
 charge of the war against Mithridates and the other eastern 
 foes of Rome. It vested in him the proconsular command of 
 Cilicia, Bithynia, and Asia and it authorized him to make 
 war and conclude peace in the name of the republic as he 
 might deem expedient. This bill added to the already irre- 
 sistible power which he held the last fragments of military 
 force which the state possessed. From this time on till he 
 might be ready to dismiss his troops, he was the master of 
 the Roman world. Yet the law procured a breathing space 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 75 
 
 for the Roman politicians none the less. Just now, and for 
 an uncertain time to come, the new war would so tie his 
 hands that his mastery must remain potential merely. For 
 a year or two he could not interfere in Italy, and in that 
 space of time something might yet be done to arm the state 
 against the day when new victories would leave him free to 
 turn his attention to affairs in Rome. 
 
 Such a conception of the situation is fully borne out by 
 the course of events in Rome following the passage of the 
 Manilian Law. Of those who remained in the capital there 
 were many who both feared and hated the absent proconsul 
 and who fully meant to take advantage of the respite which 
 their eastern enemy was giving them. In the front rank of 
 such men was to be found the rich and active Crassus, a 
 prey for long to bitter jealousy of his former colleague. 
 He was one of the few who had openly opposed the Manilian 
 Law and he now set himself to work to save the state, and 
 incidently himself, from Pompey. This was a task which 
 obviously involved considerable difficulties, yet one which 
 did not seem impossible of achievement. At any rate, if 
 Crassus failed, it can not be attributed to any lack of effort. 
 
 The political affiliations of Crassus were of the most 
 doubtful kind. A lieutenant of Sulla, he had fought for 
 the aristocracy only to become a partner in Pompey's bar- 
 gain with the democrats in 70 B.C. To thwart his colleague's 
 eastern ambitions he had joined the senate once again, leav- 
 ing the democrats to rally around Pompey. The passage 
 of the two great laws in favor of the latter convinced him 
 that this was a mistake and he now sought to use the pop- 
 ular party for his own ends. Yet he could hardly flatter 
 himself that he could eclipse his rival in a frank contest for 
 the favor of the mob. Accordingly he set to work by indi- 
 rect means and by the use of other men. His vast wealth 
 made this course the easier and the more promising. So 
 rich a man as Crassus could manage to pull many wires 
 without appearing in the open. His millions made him a 
 strong power in the financial world and among the Roman 
 politicians there were many whom he could control. For 
 
76 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 many years Crassus had been spending money freely to se- 
 cure influence and had not spent in vain. It was his com- 
 mon practice, we are told, to loan money freely to any one 
 who had, or seemed likely to acquire, the least importance. 
 Nor was the generous lender in a hurry for repayment. 
 He was content to bide his time until the moment came when 
 he could use his debtor. In this way, among many others 
 doubtless, it gradually came about that many of the senators 
 could scarcely venture to displease him greatly and that 
 many of the demagogues of the forum could be likewise 
 brought into line when he might choose. If to all these 
 we add the numbers of the rabble whose votes were so much 
 property for sale, the influence which the millionaire could 
 exert was truly formidable. True, it was not by any means 
 omnipotent, but by clever management and profuse expend- 
 iture he might accomplish much. 
 
 Accordingly in 65 B.C., the year after the passage of the 
 Manilian Law, with Pompey fully occupied in Asia, he suc- 
 ceeded in having himself elected censor for the year and in 
 securing the services of the ablest of the rising men of 
 ^Rome, no less a person than Gaius Julius Caesar. The later 
 greatness of this man has served to cast a glamour over his 
 earlier career which it can hardly be held to have merited. 
 By birth and marriage allied to the popular party, although 
 sprung from an old patrician family, Caesar had narrowly 
 escaped from Sulla's proscription by the intercession of his 
 aristocratic relatives and friends. He had escaped, how- 
 ever, and as soon as quieter times permitted he had entered 
 politics upon the democratic side. His private fortune was 
 soon spent and he found himself a bankrupt demagogue. 
 His splendid genius was his only asset, but it was enough, 
 for Crassus had the necessary means and needed someone 
 to carry out his schemes. A bargain was thus easily con- 
 cluded between the two, and for the next few years the fu- 
 ture conqueror of Gaul acted as the henchman and political 
 manager of the great financier. For the year of Crassus' 
 censorship his partner was one of the aediles and the two 
 set busily to work. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 77 
 
 Both men were gifted with too clear an insight not to dis- 
 cern wherein lay Pompey's power and to perceive the only 
 means by which it could be met. Even if Crassus had been 
 far more stupid than he was his own career would have en- 
 lightened him. He must have been perfectly aware that in 
 70 B.C. Pompey would never have selected him as his col- 
 league in the consulship but for the army with which he 
 had been ready to enforce his claims. It was that army 
 and that alone which had induced the conqueror of Serto- 
 rius to agree to a compromise. If when Pompey should re- 
 turn from Asia as the conqueror of Mithridates, Crassus 
 was to hope for favorable terms he must be able to appeal 
 to a similar argument. His primary purpose, therefore, 
 during the next few years was to obtain, by any means that 
 offered, a military power to balance that which the final 
 crushing of the king of Pontus would set free. But where 
 and how and by what pretext could he obtain it? 
 
 This question seemed comparatively easy to answer be- 
 cause of the circumstances of the moment. The recent 
 shortage of grain in Rome had fastened the attention of the 
 people upon the sources of supply. Some years before a 
 worthless Alexandrian king had been murdered by the mob 
 of his capital. 6 It was reported that he had left a will be- 
 queathing Egypt to the Roman people. Whether the will 
 was genuine or not no one had troubled to inquire, nor had 
 the senate hitherto accepted or rejected the legacy in any 
 formal manner. It now appeared to Crassus that this cir- 
 cumstance might furnish the opportunity he sought. The 
 annexation of Egypt might be made popular by being repre- 
 sented as a means of securing to the mob an ample supply 
 of grain and would furnish a pretext for raising an army. 
 Crassus and Caesar, therefore, promptly brought the matter 
 forward with some hopes of success. To help in the forma- 
 tion of their army by securing for themselves popularity in 
 that part of the peninsula where the recruiting was the best, 
 Crassus, as censor, proposed to extend citizenship to the in- 
 habitants of the province of Cisalpine Gaul. This project 
 
 "The king was Ptolemy XII Alexander II. BouchS-Leclercq, Histoire des Lagids, 
 ii. 118-21. 
 
78 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 was blocked by his colleague in the censorship, but this can 
 hardly have displeased the millionaire. Gratitude in poli- 
 tics is apt to be of short duration and a favor gained is 
 speedily forgotten. As matters were people of the Po val- 
 ley had not yet obtained the privilege they coveted and they 
 would continue to look to Crassus as their champion for the 
 future. 
 
 Admirably conceived as was the Egyptian plan, it was 
 none the less a failure. The prompt victory of Pompey over 
 the pirates had removed the immediate scarcity, and now 
 that food was plenty the mob no longer felt any interest in 
 the source of the supplies. Moreover, Pompey was still the 
 idol of the populace and an expedition to Egypt was too ob- 
 vious a blow at him. An army in that country would hold 
 a powerful position on his flank, a strategic fact which had 
 doubtless commended the scheme all the more strongly to 
 its authors. Pompey could by this means be menaced with- 
 out being named, and under cover of anxiety about the peo- 
 ple's food, an army could be placed precisely where it could 
 threaten him if he attempted to return. Unfortunately for 
 Crassus the threat was just a little too obvious and the 
 Roman mob, with abundant food assured for the present, 
 were not disposed to affront a man who was still their fa- 
 vorite. The senatorial party, likewise, though with little 
 confidence in Pompey, had yet no greater faith in his would- 
 be rival. If they needed a savior they were not disposed 
 to welcome Crassus in that role, however eager he might 
 be to play it. The dread, too, of increased responsibilities 
 was strong, since the state already had as many provinces 
 as it could govern with the existing machinery. Caesar 
 and Crassus therefore encountered opposition on all sides 
 and despite all their efforts could not get their enterprise 
 so much as fairly launched. Finding themselves unable to 
 carry out their plan, they dropped it and turned their at- 
 tention to new schemes. 
 
 Their design on Egypt having failed, they hoped to ac- 
 complish some part of their purpose by gaining control of 
 the government. If they could secure the election of friendly 
 magistrates for the next year, they might with them hope 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 79 
 
 either to revive the Egyptian scheme or devise and carry- 
 out some other plan, it mattered little what, so that it in- 
 volved the raising of an army under their control. Accord- 
 ingly, in 64 B.C. they made a desperate effort to carry the 
 elections. Of the candidates for the consulship for the en- 
 suing year they strenuously supported two, Catiline and 
 Antonius by name. So energetic was their campaign in 
 favor of these two that the aristocrats were frightened to 
 the point of swallowing their pride. Catiline was a des- 
 perate and reckless adventurer ready for anything, while 
 Antonius was a pliant tool of those behind him. If these 
 two became consuls the nobles knew not what they might 
 do, but could be reasonably certain that it would be highly 
 objectionable. Of the candidates to whom in normal times 
 they would have given their support none had much hope 
 of winning. They were thus forced to throw their whole 
 support to the least objectionable man who seemed to have 
 a chance and this man happened to be Cicero. The strong 
 dread of Crassus and his schemes and those who were, or 
 seemed likely to be, his agents thus combined to force the 
 aristocrats of Rome to make a new man their champion 
 and to support him for the highest office in the state, high- 
 est in dignity if no longer in real power. The result of 
 the election with the issues thus confused was, on the face 
 of it, ambiguous; Catiline was defeated and Antonius and 
 Cicero elected. The nobles had thus won half the battle. 
 But in such a contest half a loaf was the equivalent of the 
 whole. The plans of Crassus and of Caesar required action 
 and one consul could prevent his colleague from doing any- 
 thing at all. The program he had been elected to put 
 through having thus become impossible, Antonius went 
 over to the winners and allowed himself to be bought off 
 by Cicero, who ceded him the lucrative province of Mace- 
 donia on his pledge to remain quiet during his year of 
 office. It happened, therefore, that for 63 B.C. Cicero was 
 the sole consul, in fact if not in name, and the control of 
 the chief magistracy thus rested entirely in the hands of 
 the conservatives. 
 
 Caesar and Crassus had again been defeated in their 
 
80 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 plans. But before they finally admitted the checkmate 
 they fell back on one last design and made a farewell effort. 
 Rullus, a tribune known to be their tool, brought forward 
 an agrarian bill. The very name of such a measure might 
 be popular with the mob and the bill was framed with con- 
 siderable ingenuity. Its purpose, not of course avowed, 
 was to place an army at the disposal of its real authors, 
 who were keeping in the background. On the surface it 
 proposed a mighty benefaction to the poor by directing that 
 the state should purchase and assign them lands in Italy. 
 To get the money which this transaction would require, the 
 bill directed that the state should sell its properties lying 
 outside the peninsula. To direct the sale and purchase and 
 assignment, an agrarian commission was to be elected and 
 to enable its members to perform the duties delegated to 
 them they were invested with the imperium. This would 
 enable them to sit as judges to determine what property 
 was public and what private and to raise troops to carry 
 out the sentences which they might render. The signifi- 
 cance of these provisions would seem clear. Crassus, and 
 perhaps Caesar, were to be members of the commission. 
 Acting in their judicial capacity they could declare the will 
 of the late Ptolemy valid and Egypt the property of the 
 Koman people. To obtain possession an army would be 
 needed, and this the bill empowered them to raise and to 
 command. Under cover of an innocent-looking agrarian 
 bill the Egyptian enterprise could be resumed and finally 
 carried out. 
 
 In spite of its apparent plausibility the scheme possessed 
 one capital defect. To make it possible to carry it out, the 
 clauses of the bill had to be framed in such general terms 
 as to cause perturbation and alarm. No art could quite 
 conceal the singular disproportion between the machinery 
 which it was proposed to set up and the avowed ends it 
 was to serve. Suspicion was inevitable that the intention 
 of the bill was other than alleged. Besides, the Roman mob 
 was no longer so land-hungry as in the past. The longer 
 they lived in Rome upon the public bounty in the shape of 
 the corn-dole, the less they cared for hard work on a farm. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 81/ 
 
 The largess of the state by relieving them of anxiety for 
 their daily bread had taken away all serious desire for al- 
 lotments of land. If they had sought for land at all, it 
 would in most cases have been simply in the hope of selling 
 it, and even if the bill should pass, and if it should be car- 
 ried out in its professed spirit, it would be some years be- 
 fore they could hope to get anything. As a bribe to the 
 mob, therefore, it was not particularly attractive. Yet the 
 old tradition, which made the very name of agrarian bill 
 suggest a measure for the people and against the rich, might 
 have sufficed to carry it along, backed as it was by powerful 
 friends and patrons, had it not met with resolute and vig- 
 orous opposition. This, however, was exactly what it did. 
 Cicero, bent on discharging his obligations to the party that 
 had raised him to power, employed all his eloquence to tear 
 the bill to rags. He brought home to the people in con- 
 vincing fashion the discrepancy between the purpose of 
 the measure and the machinery provided to attain it. He 
 showed the people that it could be of no real benefit to them 
 and last, but by no means least, he stripped away the spe- 
 cious disguise and showed it to the people for what it was 
 ■ — a direct blow at Pompey. The effect of Cicero's crushing 
 exposure was decisive and the bill was allowed to drop. 
 
 Crassus and Caesar had scored another failure and in dis- 
 couragement they retired from the game. There was noth- 
 ing further for them to do but to wait on Pompey and see 
 what his course would be. But there were some in the 
 democratic ranks who could not afford to wait. Of these 
 Catiline was the chief. Seeing his last hopes foiled he now 
 turned to conspiracy and violence. It is most unlikely that 
 either Crassus or Caesar had a hand in this ; to suppose that 
 they were partners in the plot requires us to suppose that 
 they were fools. In its essence the conspiracy of Catiline 
 seems to have aimed simply at the seizure of the govern- 
 ment by force. The more atrocious parts of the project 
 may reasonably be regarded as simply the oratorical em- 
 bellishments of Cicero, It was plainly thus that his con- 
 temporaries viewed them; this is clearly shown by the 
 simple fact that Crassus was suspected of complicity. 
 
82 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Surely no man who really believed that Catiline intended to 
 burn down the city could imagine that he had as partner, 
 even in the background, the greatest owner of tenements in 
 Rome. Nor could any one believe that the greatest capital- 
 ist and creditor of his day was risking treason to abolish all 
 debt. In short, no man who suspected Crassus can pos- 
 sibly have taken Cicero's speeches without a large amount 
 of salt. If we assume that the aim of the conspirators was 
 rather to seize possession of power by force than merely 
 massacre and conflagration, the case presents itself in a 
 new light. Such an attempt was not without fair chances 
 of success. A year or two before Crassus and Caesar might 
 well have been objects of suspicion, but now? The war in 
 the East was ended and the hands of Pompey were now 
 free. A tumult in Italy could do nothing, even if it suc- 
 ceeded, but furnish him a pretext to return at the head of 
 his legions to restore order. Pompey, with his army be- 
 hind him, the armed master of Italy, this was exactly what 
 Crassus with the help of Caesar had been striving desper- 
 ately to prevent. Can it be imagined that now in sudden 
 blindness he played with treason just to bring about the 
 very thing he dreaded ? His former relations with Catiline, 
 his desperate plots and intrigues, more or less known ana 
 suspected, would suffice to account for the suspicion of con- 
 temporaries without the need of our believing them well 
 founded. 7 
 
 In any case the energy of Cicero effectually crushed the 
 conspiracy and Rome could wait in peace till Pompey chose 
 to come. That the latter was not well pleased with this 
 turn of affairs there is ample evidence to show. To Cicero 
 it seems never to have occurred that in suppressing the 
 conspiracy without Pompey's help he was deeply disoblig- 
 ing the great general. Nor was this merely a matter of 
 
 'The conspiracy of Catiline has enjoyed a fame beyond its just deserts by reason 
 of the speeches of Cicero. Those who suspected Crassus must have taken some such 
 view as that suggested in the text. The actual intentions of the conspirators are not 
 of much importance. Probably they did intend to cet some fires in Rome, very 
 likely for the purpose of creating confusion. Probably they did intend to murder 
 some high officials, such as Cicero, in order to disorganize the government. With so 
 much for foundation, Cicero's eloquent tongue or pen could readily do the rest. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF POMPEY 83 
 
 vanity on the part of one who thought of himself as indis- 
 pensable. If only Catiline had developed a little more 
 strength, as he might easily have done had Cicero been a 
 little less vigilant and energetic, the senate must have called 
 him home with his army as they had done in the days of 
 Spartacus. His experience in 70 B.C. can not have failed 
 to teach him how much the presence of an army simplified 
 Roman politics. Now, thanks to Cicero's unwelcome suc- 
 cess, ambition and patriotism, which had seemed about to 
 coincide, were thrust asunder and he found himself obliged 
 to choose between them. He could not take his army into 
 Italy without a clear violation of the law, and for this viola- 
 tion he had neither pretext nor excuse. True, one of the 
 tribunes, known to be Pompey's man, made frantic efforts 
 to provide him with a semblance of justification, but the de- 
 vice was too transparent to serve the turn. He could not 
 ask his army to follow him to avenge the insults which the 
 senate had not yet offered him. And even if his men would 
 have supported him, he shrank from open illegality. Hith- 
 erto, however much he had trampled on the spirit of the 
 law, he had been able to keep within its letter. Now that 
 he had to choose between his own ambition and the consti- 
 tution of his country, he had sufficient conscience to take 
 the better part. 
 
 For a year he lingered on in the East, hoping against hope 
 that circumstances might yet play into his hands, and mean- 
 while answering the self -laudations of Cicero with a cold- 
 ness which filled that brilliant consular with amazement and 
 alarm. Yet nothing came of the delay, and finally, aband- 
 oning his faint hopes, he dismissed his army, as the law re- 
 quired, and returned to Rome a private citizen. If, in such 
 a cause as he could have provided, his army would have fol- 
 lowed him, a question the answer to which must be con- 
 jectural, he might have said that the empire of the world 
 had been within his grasp and that he had "made the great 
 refusal." 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 The First Triumvirate 
 
 From the position of dominance which he occupied in 
 62 B.C. Pompey fell swiftly. Cicero's words as to his 
 headlong descent from the stars, 1 though used in another 
 connection, would have been appropriate at this time. The 
 change in his position is so significant that it deserves a 
 somewhat careful consideration. It revealed the complete 
 helplessness of Pompey as soon as he had laid aside the 
 sword and thus contained a lesson which the future could 
 hardly fail to read. Remembering what had befallen him 
 at this time, the proconsuls of the future would be far less 
 willing to disarm. As his predominance in 62 pointed 
 out clearly the path to power, so his humiliation in 60 in- 
 dicated just as clearly the essential condition of that power's 
 stability. 
 
 Returning to Rome in 61 B.C., Pompey dismissed his 
 army in obedience to the law. Henceforth as a private 
 citizen, eminent indeed, but only one among many, he must 
 seek to carry out his policy. The nature of the position he 
 had held and the character of the army he had led alike con- 
 tributed to force a policy upon him. He could not retire 
 entirely from politics and let things take their course, but 
 was compelled to try to direct and control that course in 
 some particulars. It was because of this that he en- 
 countered his intolerable humiliation and saw himself driven 
 to employ means from which he shrank and to combine with 
 men whom he loathed to gain the ends which circumstances 
 imposed upon him. Under the sweeping provisions of the 
 two great laws, especially the Lex Manilla, he had carried 
 out a general settlement of eastern affairs ; to keep his army 
 loyal he had made promises of future rewards to his sol- 
 diers. His men were no longer of the same class that had 
 once filled the legions. In the past they had, in the main, 
 
 ^Letters, i, 117. Att., ii, 21. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 85 
 
 been farmers taken from the plow but having still their 
 little plots of ground sufficient to support them after the 
 campaign as they had done before. While this was true 
 the disbanding of an army was a comparatively simple 
 matter. The men could be mustered out and sent back to 
 their homes since they had homes to which they could re- 
 turn. After the reforms of Marius, however, the legions 
 had been filled with volunteers possessed of no property. 
 To disband such an army meant to turn loose on society a 
 horde of men without home or occupation and with nothing 
 but their pay and what had fallen to their share from the 
 spoils of victory. Such men quite naturally demanded some 
 provision from the state whose battles they had fought, and 
 looked to their general to see that it was duly made. The 
 habits of the Roman mind, and perhaps the financial neces- 
 sities of the state as well, combined to point to land allot- 
 ments as the form which this provision should take rather 
 than pensions, as modern usage would suggest. With 
 armies of this type, each and every general was forced to 
 hold out to his men the promise that, when their task was 
 achieved and the victory was won, they should be rewarded 
 by a grant of land, and if the general saw himself compelled 
 to promise this, the soldiers quite naturally looked to him 
 to see that it was done. Retirement was no longer possible 
 to one who had held a great command since, when he laid 
 down the imperium, he must still persuade the state to 
 redeem his pledges to his men. Thus after his army was dis- 
 banded Pompey found himself obliged to take an active part 
 in politics. All through the East were princes and com- 
 munities that had concluded peace with Rome trusting in 
 Pompey's word, and that word he felt himself in honor 
 bound to make good by inducing the senate to give its 
 formal sanction to his arrangements and so pledge the state 
 to respect them in the future. On the other hand he must 
 secure for his soldiers the land allotments which he had 
 promised them. Both these demands, which Pompey found 
 himself obliged to make, seemed to him quite reasonable and 
 such as Rome could grant without the slightest hesitation. 
 
86 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 To his angry disgust he soon discovered that this was not 
 the case but that, on the contrary, both his aims were wholly 
 unattainable. To reach his ends he was obliged to resort 
 to political rather than military methods and his ability as 
 a politician was unequal to the task. This may have been 
 no great reflection upon him, since in the existing state of 
 Koman politics success was almost impossible. Even 
 Caesar, the most astute statesman and shrewdest manager 
 of men the age could show, failed equally when he under- 
 took the same task. 2 However that may be, the lesson of 
 Pompey's failure was quite unmistakable; a Roman gen- 
 eral imperatively needed a control of politics, and nothing 
 but the secure possession of military force could give him 
 that control. The whole history of Rome from 62 to 54 
 B.C. served to make this fact obvious to all. 
 
 Pompey began his political campaign in the natural and 
 obvious way: he came before the senate with the request 
 that that venerable body should ratify his eastern settle- 
 ment, and he procured the help of a tribune to introduce a 
 bill making provision for his veterans. Instead of ready 
 acquiescence in his wishes, he found himself face to face 
 with a settled opposition and a persistent obstruction which 
 he was unable to overcome. The conscript fathers viewed 
 the matter in a very different light and they had no difficulty 
 in finding plausible pretexts for refusing, or at any rate 
 not granting, his demands. 
 
 The opposition of the senate may have turned out to be 
 unwise, but it is quite intelligible, as a brief consideration 
 of the implications of Pompey's policy will show. In the 
 senate two sets of motives influenced the action of the mem- 
 bers, neither of which alone might have been strong enough 
 to defeat him but which combined were sufficiently power- 
 ful for the purpose. The first of these was the jealousy 
 and dislike of Pompey, long kept in check by fear, but now 
 released from all restraint. Pompey had many private 
 enemies, foremost among whom were Crassus and Lucullus. 3 
 
 2 When consul Caesar was unable to carry Pompey's bills by legal means. 
 3 Dio, xxxvii, 49. Appian, ii, 9. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 87 
 
 His former colleague in the consulship had never made the 
 least concealment of his bitter animosity and naturally 
 seized this opportunity to annoy and humiliate his rival. 
 Lucullus had returned to Rome embittered by his failure 
 in the East, furious that another should have reaped the 
 glory of his victories, and especially angry at Pompey for 
 the arrogant manner in which that general had replaced 
 him in command. Never an adept in the art of courtesy 
 and consideration for others, Pompey had made no effort to 
 spare the feelings of the unfortunate man whom he was 
 sent to supersede, but, on the contrary, had seemed to seek 
 for opportunities of affronting him. Lucullus now saw a 
 chance of which he eagerly availed himself to pay the score. 
 With such men as these were others who had no personal 
 grudge, but who regarded the predominance of Pompey with 
 genuine apprehension. He had risen to a height which the 
 constitution did not contemplate, and to check him seemed 
 to them a public duty. Hitherto he had ignored the senate 
 all too much in his career, and, as a lesson to others, it was 
 time to teach him his mistake. Now was a good occasion 
 to show proconsuls in the field that they must finally answer 
 to the senate and that they should conduct themselves 
 accordingly. If Pompey were permitted to settle the affairs 
 of half the world as if that body were a negligible factor 
 in the government, the lesson for the future would run in 
 a very different fashion from what they thought desirable. 
 On public grounds they were anxious to teach the general 
 his place and now he offered them the opportunity they 
 sought. Nor was it necessary that such motives should be 
 avowed too openly : there were abundant grounds for oppo- 
 sition that could be put forward. 
 
 Quite aside from any jealousy of Pompey's past great- 
 ness, or any desire to humiliate him in the present, there 
 were many plausible pretexts of which his opponents could 
 make use. It was true that he had received wide powers 
 from the people, but these were not in any sense unlimited. 
 Had he the right because of his exceptional command to 
 lay before the senate a large number of treaties and demand 
 
88 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 their immediate sanction by a single vote? His enemies 
 might urge with much show of reason that the senate was 
 morally bound to examine his acts one by one, if only to 
 make sure that he had not exceeded his powers. In so far 
 as he had only done what the Roman people had authorized 
 him to do well and good, but it was the obvious duty of the 
 senate to ascertain the fact before it pledged the Roman 
 state to observe his engagements for all future time. This 
 it could do only by a careful examination of his various 
 arrangements, and for this purpose it was indispensable 
 that they should be taken up separately and not acted upon 
 in one indiscriminate mass. To Pompey this seemed to 
 foreshadow very clearly that some of his agreements would 
 be rejected, but the conscript fathers refused to yield to 
 his objections. 
 
 Perhaps the opposition was the stronger because some of 
 Pompey's arrangements affected seriously another depart- 
 ment of public affairs, and one that had hitherto been almost 
 a monopoly of the senate, namely the provincial administra- 
 tion. Pompey had added two new provinces to the empire, 
 Bithynia-Pontus and Syria. To the annexation of Bithy- 
 nia the senate had given its approval, but Syria was a 
 new and perhaps unwelcome addition. It seemed not un- 
 reasonable, since it lay with the senate to provide governors 
 for these new possessions, that it should be consulted in the 
 matter and given an opportunity to discuss the question of 
 whether it could meet the added burden. This was the more 
 plausible because the increase in the number of provinces 
 had far-reaching consequences. Sulla had left the senate 
 a staff of magistrates just large enough to administer the 
 territories which Rome then held. If any additions were 
 made the senate would inevitably find itself short-handed. 
 The situation could be met by only two expedients, to either 
 of which there existed obvious objections. The term of two 
 of the governors might be prolonged for a second year ; but 
 this diminished their effective responsibility, since the pros- 
 ecution of a governor who remained beyond the usual term 
 in his province was no easy task, and there was therefore 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 89 
 
 a real danger that, by leaving him in office for a second year, 
 the senate would destroy all serious accountability for his 
 acts. Nor could the other method, that of uniting two 
 provinces under a single governor, be resorted to without 
 grave risks, since this would really amount to tne creation 
 of a great command. The new annexations would thus en- 
 tail formidable administrative problems throughout the Ro- 
 man world, and hence many of the senators viewed the ex- 
 tension of the empire with genuine alarm. Some, no doubt, 
 were swayed by blind prejudice and loyalty to inherited 
 tradition, but such considerations as the above must have 
 reinforced them powerfully. Whatever the motives of the 
 conscript fathers, Pompey soon found that the majority 
 were not disposed to accept without question the burdens 
 he had placed upon their shoulders. When his eastern set- 
 tlement was brought before the senate and he demanded its 
 ratification by one sweeping vote, Cato, a man of unbending 
 principle and conviction if there were any such in Rome, 
 took the lead in insisting that his measures should be con- 
 sidered one by one. If his arrangements were discussed 
 separately, it was clear that the conscript fathers might 
 accept some and reject or modify others, and Pompey felt 
 that his honor was affected by the smallest alteration in his 
 settlement. 
 
 While Pompey thus found himself unable to secure the 
 prompt ratification of his eastern acta, he had no better 
 success in his efforts to reward his veterans with land. In 
 consultation with a tribune he had a bill prepared and 
 brought forward for discussion. This measure, intended 
 to provide for his disbanded soldiers, encountered bitter op- 
 position which could justify itself on broad and general 
 grounds without proclaiming enmity to Pompey as its 
 source. Of all the public lands once held by Rome but one 
 important tract had survived the various agrarian bills. 
 This was situated in Campania and had hitherto been leased 
 by the state to syndicates of capitalists. This was the last 
 considerable source of revenue still left in Italy itself ; aside 
 from this Rome lived upon the income of her provinces 
 across the seas. To redeem his promises to his men Pompey 
 
90 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 proposed to allot this Campanian domain, along with other 
 lands, to his veterans. To this it was objected that it would 
 be unsafe to leave the government entirely dependent on 
 revenues which might be cut off by war or rebellion at any 
 moment. The dislike of Pompey, covering itself with such 
 excuses, flared up in a moment and proved to be so strong 
 that even Cicero, good friend of Pompey as he thought him- 
 self, joined with the opposition. The great orator himself 
 describes his action in the matter and the general situation 
 in these words: "The agrarian law is being vehemently 
 pushed by the tribune Flavius, with the support of Pom- 
 pey, but it has nothing popular about it except its sup- 
 porter. From this law I, with the full assent of a public 
 meeting, proposed to omit all clauses which adversely af- 
 fected private rights. I proposed to except from its opera- 
 tion such public land as had been so in the consulship of 
 P. Mucius and L. Calpurnius (the Campanian land). I 
 proposed to confirm the titles of those to whom Sulla had 
 actually assigned lands. I proposed to retain the men of 
 Volaterrae and Arretium — whose lands Sulla had declared 
 forfeited but had not allotted — in their holdings. There 
 was only one section in the bill that I did not propose to 
 omit, namely, that land should be purchased with this money 
 from abroad, the proceeds of the new revenues for the next 
 five years. But to this whole agrarian scheme the senate 
 was opposed, suspecting that some novel power for Pompey 
 was aimed at. Pompey, indeed, had set his heart on get- 
 ting the law passed." 4 Yet Cicero imagined that Pompey 
 would be satisfied with his proposals. 5 That the general 
 showed no immediate displeasure may be accounted for by 
 
 ^Letters, i, 54-55. Att,, i, 19. 
 
 5 Strachan-Davidson thinks Cicero was simply trying to make Pompey's plan work- 
 able. (See his Cicero 182.) This seems hardly reasonable in view of Cicero's own 
 language. The bill must have been badly drawn indeed if it could only be made work- 
 able by the omission of all except one clause. That the bill as drafted included the 
 Campanian domain seems clear, and Caesar's later legislation seems to show that thia 
 was necessary for the purpose. The essential difference between Pompey and Cicero 
 may have lain in this, that while Cicero was ready to support a scheme for the pur- 
 chase of land, Pompey desired an immediate distribution of some of the public land, 
 accompanied by a plan for purchase to be carried out later. He would thus be able 
 to do something for his men at once, instead of confining himself wholly to promises 
 for the indefinite future. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 91 
 
 the attitude of the senate. If that body was opposed to 
 any sort of agrarian bill, Pompey might not think it wise 
 to quarrel with an influential member who was willing to 
 agree to something. But Cicero's half-hearted and lim- 
 ited support soon proved to be of little use, and even as 
 amended by him the agrarian bill was seen to have no 
 chance of gaining the approval of the senate. 
 
 Since Pompey's consulship the sanction of the conscript 
 fathers was no longer indispensable for the enactment of a 
 law. The great general, unable to accomplish anything in 
 the senate, turned to his old friends the people. He had 
 vainly offered the optimates his alliance, but in the past he 
 had several times obtained his wishes, over the head of the 
 senate, by the action of the popular assembly. He now de- 
 termined to attempt it once again. Unfortunately for him 
 his influence over the people had been materially weakened 
 during his absence. While he was in the East Crassus had 
 been actively engaged in seeking to acquire the leadership 
 of the democrats, and whatever crude party machinery ex- 
 isted was largely in his hands. All that his gold could buy, 
 or Caesar's genius win, had been effectually gained by the 
 great financier, and Pompey could no longer count on the 
 united support of the popular party. Crassus had not been 
 active in thwarting his rival in the senate merely to oblige 
 him in the forum, and when Pompey tried to override the 
 senatorial obstruction through the action of the assembly, 
 he found that the supporters of the senate joined to the 
 followers of Crassus were too strong. The result of these 
 conditions was that the general, victorious abroad, was 
 powerless at home. Well might Dio say that he repented 
 of having let his legions go too soon and having put himself 
 at the mercy of his enemies. 6 He still controlled his vet- 
 erans, and if he had been prepared to resort to force, he 
 might have called on them to rally round him. But this 
 would have been open treason and his conscience held him 
 back. Thus he could do nothing but accept defeat and stand 
 helplessly aside, humiliated and, as he felt, dishonored. But 
 
 6 Dio, xxxvii, 50. 
 
92 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 it was not to be for long. It soon appeared that there was 
 still a way out of his difficulties. 
 
 Ancient writers point to Caesar as the author of the 
 startling combination that now took place, and this is wholly 
 in line with all the probabilities. The enemies of Pompey 
 seem never to have thought of the possibility of a com- 
 bination between him and Crassus, since the two were 
 open foes. Their feud had grown more bitter since 70 B.C. 
 when they had held the consulship together. Yet the situa- 
 tion had some points of analogy with that which had ex- 
 isted when they had previously joined hands. Each was 
 now at odds with the senate and each was helpless by him- 
 self. Pompey was furious at his humiliation and Crassus 
 likewise found his plans thwarted by the conscript fathers. 
 With singular shortsightedness the senate had chosen the 
 moment of the breach with Pompey to open up a quarrel 
 with the equestrian class. The friction in this case arose 
 from two separate matters. A bill had been brought for- 
 ward making the knights. serving on juries in the courts 
 liable to prosecution for accepting bribes. This measure 
 the senate favored in spite of Cicero. The other question 
 was one concerning the farming of the taxes. The syndi- 
 cate which had contracted for the taxes of Asia demanded 
 that the terms of their bargain should be reduced by the 
 senate. Cicero, though he was disgusted at the impudence 
 of the demand, urged strongly that it was advisable to 
 yield since he feared that otherwise the senate might alien- 
 ate the powerful capitalist class. He himself tells us that 
 it was Crassus who induced the knights to bring forward 
 their demand. 7 The senate, however, led by Cato, rejected 
 his counsels and Crassus thus added another to his already 
 long list of failures and stood still further discredited in 
 men's minds. 
 
 Thus neither Crassus nor Pompey had at the moment any 
 reason to love the senate and neither could use that body to 
 advance his aims. Each controlled a fragment of the pop- 
 ular party, but neither fragment by itself was large enough 
 
 ''Letters, i, 47-48, 52, 65. Att., i, 17, 18; ii, 1. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 93 
 
 to enable its owner to accomplish anything. Yet if they 
 should unite their forces the situation woulo^ be very differ- 
 ent. Their followers combined could reasonably be ex- 
 pected to dominate the assembly and they could then enact 
 whatever measures they might choose, if only they could 
 get one of the magistrates to bring forward their proposals. 
 The motives for an agreement between them were therefore 
 strong, and against such a combination there was nothing 
 but their mutual jealousy and dislike. Caesar was not the 
 man to let such feelings stand in his way and set himself 
 to bring about a coalition. 
 
 At the time of Pompey's return to Rome, Caesar had de- 
 parted to Spain to serve his term there as propraetor. He 
 had now returned and was a candidate for the consulship. 
 In his canvass for this office he could count on the bitter 
 opposition of the optimates, and he not unnaturally desired 
 the united backing of the democrats. This he could only 
 get by bringing Pompey and Crassus together as his sup- 
 porters. To Crassus he was heavily in debt, while a com- 
 bination of the followers of Pompey with the senate against 
 him might be fatal. His task as a peacemaker was thus 
 marked out for him and even, in a sense, imposed upon him. 
 Accordingly he set about his work, and with the ground 
 prepared by the senate's failure to make a friend of Pompey 
 and its simultaneous quarrel with Crassus and the knights, 
 he speedily attained his object, although it was one which 
 previously had not occurred to anyone as within the sphere 
 of practical politics. Neither of the two turned a deaf 
 ear to his persuasions and he was able to obtain the open 
 support of both in his canvass for the consulship. In this 
 way was brought about the first triumvirate, which was des- 
 tined to dominate the politics of Rome for several years to 
 come. In the eyes of contemporaries Caesar was a minor 
 figure in the combination and was regarded as little more 
 than the agent who carried out the orders of his great part- 
 ners. The former campaign manager of Crassus was not 
 yet the conqueror of Gaul and his military genius was as 
 yet unsuspected by his fellow countrymen. 
 
 At first the triumvirate was less successful than its 
 
94 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 organizer may have hoped. The threat which such a com- 
 bination involved frightened the senate into something 
 closely akin to desperation. They probably did not yet know 
 the full scope of the alliance, but they feared Caesar, espe- 
 cially when backed by such men as the two who were openly 
 supporting him as a candidate for the consulship. 8 His 
 election they had little prospect of preventing, but they were 
 determined that he should have a colleague from their own 
 party. To gain this end they raised a large corruption fund 
 and exerted all their efforts. 9 Under these circumstances 
 the election resulted in the return of Caesar and a strong 
 conservative by the name of M. Bibulus. This failure of 
 the three to win more than a half victory was the equivalent 
 of a defeat, since one consul had the legal power to stop 
 every act of his colleague. Thus from the very start Cae- 
 sar's consulship was predestined either to fail completely 
 or to snatch success in plain defiance of the law. 
 
 Although he can not have been blind to the difficulties in 
 his path, Caesar began his consulship in a conciliatory fash- 
 ion. Before taking office he had made some overtures to 
 Cicero with a view to securing his support. 10 These had 
 failed of their purpose and the optimates, whom he may 
 have hoped to divide, were not only certain to be united 
 against him, but they would have as their leader his fellow 
 consul. He tried at first to meet this situation by a con- 
 ciliatory attitude. He treated Bibulus with studied court- 
 esy and sought to appease the hostility of the senate by a 
 moderate policy. He soon discovered that his efforts were 
 without result. His promises to his partners included the 
 securing of land for Pompey's veterans and this was the 
 first task to which he set his hand. An agrarian bill was 
 framed in very moderate terms and laid before the senate 
 for consideration. In proposing the bill Caesar invited the 
 conscript fathers to cooperate with him in the matter and 
 
 8 Dio says expressly that the combination of the three was not known till later. 
 (Dio, xxxviii, 5.) Yet in the preceding book (xxxvii, 54) he makes both Pompey 
 and Crassus support Caesar as a candidate. The two statements are easily reeon-- 
 cilable, I think, as above. 
 
 •Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 19. 
 
 ^Letters, i, 69. Att., ii, 3. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 95 
 
 declared his willingness to make such alterations in his 
 project as they might desire. 11 There was little to object 
 to in the provisions of the bill but the senators, perhaps be- 
 cause of a blind confidence in Bibulus and an equilly blind 
 detestation of Caesar, refused to yield an inch. Lacking 
 reasonable criticisms they resorted to obstruction, and under 
 Cato's leadership they showed themselves resolved to talk 
 the bill to death. Caesar tried in vain to force the matter 
 to a vote. To put a stop to endless discussion he went the 
 length of ordering the arrest of Cato in the hope that, if the 
 chief obstructionist were once removed, some action would 
 be possible. But the attempt to reach a decision in this way 
 broke down before the attitude of the conscript fathers. 
 When Cato was being led out under arrest so many of the 
 senators rose to follow him that Caesar was obliged to aban- 
 don his purpose and release his prisoner. 12 It was now 
 abundantly clear that nothing whatever could be done with 
 the senate and Caesar turned to the assembly. 
 
 When the agrarian bill was brought before the people 
 Bibulus promptly interposed his veto. Caesar tried in vain 
 to argue the question and asked his colleague to point out 
 the objectionable features of the measure. The only an- 
 swer of the optimate consul was the declaration that there 
 should be no innovations during that year. Caesar besought 
 him to yield to the manifest wishes of the people and called 
 upon the crowd to back his plea, declaring that Bibulus alone 
 stood in the way of the bill. But Bibulus was not to be in- 
 fluenced by such appeals and merely replied that the bill 
 should not be passed that year even if everybody favored it. 13 
 
 Caesar thus found himself brought to a full stop. He 
 was unable to act through either the senate or the assembly 
 unless he were prepared to ignore or override the law. 
 This, if his two partners would give him their support, he 
 was in fact quite ready to attempt. To defy his opponents 
 and to declare the bill carried in spite of legal technicalities 
 would have been easy enough, but such a line of action could 
 
 ^Dio, xxxviii, 2. 
 "Dio, xxxviii, 3. 
 U8 Dio, xxxviii, 4. 
 
96 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 only be successful if it were backed by force. A coup d'etat 
 of this nature would be highly dangerous unless its authors 
 were well assured that the defenders of the constitution 
 would be powerless to act with any sort of energy. It had 
 been attempted in the past, but the results had hardly been 
 encouraging. 14 If Caesar broke the law the senate could 
 direct Bibulus to restore order, and if his colleague could 
 find the means to act, the results might be disastrous to 
 Caesar. Even if the senate did not go so far as this it had 
 the power to cancel as illegal any measure passed in viola- 
 tion of the technical and constitutional requirements. To 
 ignore the law and to declare his bills carried in defiance of 
 the constitution was neither safe nor worth while unless 
 Caesar was backed by such armed force that his opponents 
 could not resist with anything but words and that the senate 
 would not dare to annul his enactments. The force essential 
 to their purpose the triumvirs determined to provide under 
 the guise of a law concerning the province to be assigned 
 to Caesar for his proconsulship. 
 
 By the Sempronian law of Gaius Gracchus the senate was 
 obliged to name the provinces to be assigned to the consuls 
 at the close of their term of office before their actual election 
 by the people. The conscript fathers, foreseeing that 
 Caesar would probably be chosen, had sought to provide a 
 safeguard for the future by naming as the provinces for 
 the consuls for 59 the charge of the roads and forests of 
 Italy. 15 If this arrangement were allowed to stand, Caesar 
 would be completely shelved as soon as his year of office had 
 expired. Not only would he have no army under his com- 
 mand but his province would be one where it would be im- 
 possible for him to free himself from the load of debt that 
 still hung over his head. He could hardly be expected to 
 submit to this without a struggle, and it may safely be as- 
 sumed that he had stipulated with his partners for their 
 backing in an attempt to upset the senate's arrangements. 
 The three now determined to carry out their understanding 
 
 "Saturninus and Glaucia had attempted much the same thing. They lost their lives 
 and failed to accomplish anything besides. Lepidus was a more recent case in point. 
 15 Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 19. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 97 
 
 and to do it in such a way that success would furnish 
 them the means of putting through the remainder of their 
 program. 
 
 As soon therefore as the agrarian bill had been completely 
 blocked by Bibulus, a new measure was brought forward. 
 The nominal proposer was a tribune by the name of Va- 
 tinius who was a tool of the triumvirs. He laid before the 
 assembly a bill which conferred on Caesar the province of 
 Cisalpine Gaul for a term of five years dating from March 
 1, 59. This would make Caesar's consulship and proconsul- 
 ship run concurrently for nearly a year. The motive of 
 this arrangement is easy to guess in the light of what had 
 gone before and what was soon to follow. 16 Under cover 
 of his governorship of Gaul, Caesar would have the right 
 to enlist troops and to keep them in the vicinity of Rome 
 until such time as he might choose to set out for his prov- 
 ince. While he remained in Rome as consul his army at 
 the gates of the city would serve to overawe all opposition 
 and would thus enable him to put through whatever 
 measures he and his partners might have agreed upon, re- 
 gardless of constitutional obstacles. Moreover his province 
 had been so selected that, even after his consulship should 
 have expired, he could continue to threaten Rome and so 
 prevent the senate from attempting to annul his legislation. 
 Of all the provinces of the republic, Cisalpine Gaul was 
 nearest to the capital, and Caesar at the head of a strong 
 army in the valley of the Po would have Rome at his mercy. 
 
 That such a law as this would meet with opposition was, 
 of course, to be expected. Even if the conscript fathers 
 had not seen the danger to themselves which it involved, 
 there were still ample reasons for bitter hostility. The 
 measure violated several of their cherished principles at 
 once. They were averse to a long term for a provincial 
 governor and the bill gave Caesar a term of unprecedented V 
 length. In addition to this it constituted an encroachment 
 of the popular assembly on a field of administration which 
 
 **For a discussion of the Vatinian law the reader is referred to the Appendix. 
 
98 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 the senate regarded as their own in a peculiar and especial 
 sense. But the Roman assembly cared little or nothing for 
 considerations of this kind. It had already been shown by 
 the Gabinian law that the people were quite ready to confer 
 V sweeping powers for a term of years upon a general who 
 x possessed their confidence and favor. At the moment 
 Caesar was popular with the rabble and the mob was rein- 
 forced by Pompey's veterans who were with him to a man. 
 Under these circumstances argument was clearly useless 
 and the only hope of the conservatives lay in obstruction. 
 This they attempted but they had a less favorable oppor- 
 tunity than in the case of the agrarian bill. Then they had 
 been able to act under the leadership of Caesar's colleague 
 in office, but as Vatinius was a tribune, Bibulus could no 
 longer interfere. Some of the tribunes were, indeed, op- 
 posed to the bill, but they did not venture to employ their 
 veto to stop its progress. The reason for this it is not dif- 
 ficult to guess. The veto had to be interposed in person 
 and the attitude of the mob was hardly reassuring. They 
 found, however, another way in which they hoped to defeat 
 the hated measure. This was by a resort to religious forms 
 and omens which under the existing law made any action 
 by the assembly impossible, or, if it should be attempted, 
 illegal. This had the advantage that it did not require 
 their presence in the assembly and three of the tribunes 
 now "resorted to this means of stopping Vatinius. But 
 neither Vatinius nor his employers intended to be checked 
 by omens and the bill was promptly voted by the people. 
 That it was constitutionally null and void cannot be doubted 
 but that proved to be a matter of very minor consequence. 
 It had been put upon the statute book, and until the senate 
 cancelled it, Caesar had the right to recruit troops. With 
 Pompey's veterans thronging the streets he was not likely to 
 have any difficulty in finding men and it cannot have been 
 long after March 1, when the bill was finally passed, before 
 he had a considerable force camped near the city. 
 
 As soon as he was thus effectually armed, Caesar took 
 up the agrarian bill again. The triumvirs had now 
 
 > 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 99 
 
 definitely embarked upon the enterprise of setting up in 
 Rome a military dictatorship and they had thoroughly made 
 up their minds to put their measures through regardless 
 of either law or constitution. To destroy any lingering 
 hopes of a successful resistance on the part of the con- 
 servatives, and to make clear the impossibility of any seri- 
 ous attempt to defend the republic by deeds, Caesar called 
 both Pompey and Crassus before a meeting of the people. 
 The triumvirate was now for the first time openly avowed 
 and Caesar's two partners proclaimed their firm support of 
 the agrarian bill. This was not quite enough and Caesar 
 put to Pompey the blunt question of what course he would 
 take if force were resorted to against the bill. To this 
 Pompey replied with the explicit declaration that if any 
 one dared to draw the sword he would snatch up his shield." 
 The wrath of the conservatives at this speech was un- 
 bounded since it destroyed their only hope of successful 
 resistance to any violation of the constitution which Caesar 
 might intend. Pompey was the one man in Italy who could 
 raise an army on the spur of the moment. In spite of his 
 support of Caesar's candidacy for the consulship they may 
 have felt some hope that in the last resort they could obtain 
 his help if Caesar went too far. Once before he had given 
 his backing at the elections to a consul who had attempted 
 to carry through a revolution; but when the crisis came 
 and Lepidus resorted to violence, Pompey abandoned his 
 protege, and rallying to the side of the senate, suppressed 
 the rebellion. The conservatives may have thought that 
 what had happened once might happen again and this is the 
 more likely if the real scope of the coalition of the three was 
 yet unknown. The formal declaration of Pompey put an 
 end to all such calculations since by that act the one man 
 who might have held Caesar in check despite his troops out- 
 side the city openly declared himself on Caesar's side. 
 
 "Di©, xxxviii, 5. Plutarch, Caesar, 14 and Pompey, 47. The public avowal of the 
 triumvirate may very well have taken place before the passage of the Vatinian law. 
 It has been placed at this point in the narrative quite arbitrarily. The significance 
 would be the same whenever the incident occurred. 
 
100 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 In view of this new situation Bibulus, unable for tech- 
 nical reasons to convene a regular session of the senate, 
 called a meeting of the senators at his own house. After 
 due discussion it was resolved to make no attempt to meet 
 a violation of the law by force but to resist by every legal 
 means that could be found. 18 In pursuance of this decision 
 Bibulus appeared upon the scene when Caesar tried to put 
 his bill to a vote in the assembly. He was supported in his 
 veto upon this occasion by no less than three tribunes, but 
 Caesar was no longer to be stopped or hindered by the con- 
 stitution. The would-be obstructors of his legislation were 
 driven from the forum and so roughly handled that they 
 were glad to escape with their lives. After this the 
 agrarian bill was solemnly declared duly passed and en- 
 acted into law. 
 
 The violence and illegality of these proceedings are self- 
 evident. Bibulus and the tribunes had at least succeeded 
 in stripping off every pretense of constitutional action and 
 making Caesar's contempt of law both obvious and flagrant. 
 No doubt the optimates — and many men who were not ad- 
 herents of the senate — shuddered and were filled with rage 
 and consternation. But what were they to do? The ques- 
 tion of whether a bill purporting to be a law had really been 
 enacted in a valid way was for the senate to determine. 
 Accordingly Bibulus convened the conscript fathers the next 
 day and laid the matter before them. This was logical 
 enough, but in the existing circumstances it was futile in 
 the extreme. If the senate desired to annul the law, it must 
 obviously be prepared to deal with Caesar and his soldiers. 
 Theoretically this was easy. The senate should declare mar- 
 tial law and Bibulus should then proceed to restore order. 
 Unfortunately he had no troops to cope with those of his 
 colleague, and while that was so, the senate had too much 
 discretion to attempt to act. No doubt the conscript fathers 
 sympathized deeply with Bibulus and raged at heart over 
 his wrongs, but when he called for action not a voice was 
 raised and not a motion offered. 19 Whether the agrarian 
 
 18 Appian, ii, 11. 
 
 19 Dio, xxxviii, 6. Suetonius, 20. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 101 
 
 bill was really a law or not — and it was clearly not — both 
 it and the Vatinian law were on the Roman statute book 
 and the senate dared not make a move to take them off. 
 
 After this defeat Bibulus in despair shut himself up in 
 his house for the remainder of the year and refused to ap- 
 pear in public or to discharge any of the duties of his office. 
 One thing, however, he could do even in retirement. He 
 could find a way to invalidate whatever his lawless col- 
 league might undertake to do in the way of legislation. By 
 the Roman law, when one of the consuls was engaged in 
 observing the heavens for omens no legal meeting of the 
 assembly could be held. Of this device Bibulus availed 
 himself, since it did not require his personal presence in 
 the forum. From the seclusion of his house he issued 
 edicts declaring that he was occupied with this theological 
 astronomy. Caesar, of course, paid no attention to the 
 edicts, but the stubborn optimate had none the less gained 
 his essential object. He had provided the senate with a 
 pretext for declaring all Caesar's laws null and void if ever 
 in the future that step should become possible. 
 
 With his colleague and the hostile tribunes driven from 
 public life, Caesar's course was quieter and smoother, 
 though not more legal, than before. Since moderation and 
 conciliation were now obviously useless, he at once proposed 
 a second agrarian bill which provided for the allotment of 
 the Campanian and other land still held by the state which 
 the first bill had not touched. The conservatives might 
 rage but they were too completely cowed to offer any oppo- 
 sition except the edicts of Bibulus. Cicero put the situation 
 in a sentence when on hearing of the new proposal he rep- 
 resented Pompey as meeting all opposition and criticism 
 with the brief retort "I shall coerce you by means of Caesar's 
 army." 20 This, as Cicero was well aware, closed all dis- 
 cussion. For the moment Caesar was a dictator and he 
 proceeded to put through the entire program of the three. 
 Not only was the second agrarian bill passed rapidly, but 
 all Pompey's eastern acta were ratified, while Crassus and 
 
 Vn 
 
 ^Letters, i, 106. Att., ii, 16. 
 
102 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 his equestrian friends were gratified by a generous reduction 
 of the terms of their bargain for the taxes of Asia. 
 
 Caesar had thus attained his objects and those of his part- 
 ners, but only by means of violence and sedition. The re- 
 public had been overturned and in its place a military des- 
 potism had been set up in Rome. This triumph of the three 
 rested on force and on that alone — the force of Caesar's 
 soldiers and his mobs. A revolution such as that which had 
 just been accomplished could not but inspire the bitterest 
 anger and dismay in all who felt a real attachment to the 
 supremacy of law. To the intensity of these feelings the 
 letters of Cicero to Atticus throughout this year bear elo- 
 quent testimony. Nothing but terror held tne opposition 
 quiet. So far the three had been content with driving their 
 opponents from the forum, but would they stop with that? 
 Already in April, before the law dealing with the Campan- 
 ian land had been announced, Cicero avowed his fears that 
 Pompey "finding himself belaboured by the tongues of all, 
 and seeing these proceedings easy to upset, should begin 
 striking out." 21 For himself he declares that he has so com- 
 pletely lost all energy that he prefers to submit to the exist- 
 ing tyranny rather than fight. In May he is apprehensive 
 that trouble is brewing worse than has yet happened. lie 
 writes that Pompey "is getting up a disturbance. We (the 
 conservatives) have everything to fear. He is preparing a 
 despotism and no mistake." 22 In June or July he says bit- 
 terly "We are bound hard and fast on every side, and are no 
 longer making any difficulty as to being slaves, but fearing 
 death and exile as though greater evils, though they are in 
 fact much smaller ones . . . you see the citizens allowed to 
 express their sentiments, but debarred from carrying them 
 out with any vigour. And to omit details, the upshot is there 
 is now no hope, I don't say of private persons, but even of 
 the magistrates being ever free again. Nevertheless, in 
 spite of this policy of repression, conversation, at least in 
 
 ^Letters, i, 102. Att., ii, 14 The words which Shuckt*urgh translates "begin strik- 
 ing out" are mere incipiat. Winstedf s version "may run amuck" seems to me bet- 
 ter. The proceedings must be the Vatinian and agrarian laws. 
 
 22 Letters, i, 108. Att., ii, 17. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 103 
 
 society and at dinner tables, is freer than it was. Indigna- 
 tion is beginning to get the better of fear, though that does 
 not prevent a universal feeling of despair." 23 In July he 
 wrote to his friend "About politics I will write briefly : for 
 I am now afraid lest the very paper should betray me. Ac- 
 cordingly, in future, if I have anything more to write to you, 
 I shall clothe it in covert language. For the present the state 
 is dying of a novel disorder; for although everybody dis- 
 approves of what has been done, complains, and is indignant 
 about it, and though there is absolutely no diff erence of opin- 
 ion on the subject, and people now speak openly and groan 
 aloud, yet no remedy is applied : for we do not think resist- 
 ance possible without a general slaughter, nor see what the 
 end of concession is to be except ruin." 24 
 
 Although the triumvirs had accomplished their immediate 
 purpose and all opposition had to confine itself to dinner 
 tables and letters, one of the all-powerful three was de- 
 cidedly unhappy. Pompey was glad, no doubt, to gain the 
 things on which he had set his heart, but he shrank from 
 paying the price. Perhaps he found the cost much greater 
 than he had expected. When he agreed to the program of 
 Caesar he may not have foreseen the lengths to which it 
 would be necessary to go, and may quite well have thought 
 that the threat contained in the Vatinian Law would be 
 enough to frighten the conscript fathers into a more rea- 
 sonable mood. Perhaps the rage and fury of the upper 
 class was greater than he had anticipated. At any rate 
 he found the resentment of his opponents hard to face and 
 all the more so, probably, because his conscience was ill at 
 ease. At first he sought to evade the responsibility and to 
 throw the blame on others, and Cicero has given a vivid 
 picture of him while attempting this. Hitherto, the orator 
 wrote, Pompey has fenced with these questions. " 'He ap- 
 proved Caesar's laws, but Caesar must be responsible for 
 his proceedings in carrying them' ; 'he himself was satisfied 
 with the agrarian law'; 'whether it could be vetoed by a 
 tribune or no was nothing to do with him' ; 'he thought the 
 
 ^Letters, i, 109-10. Att., ii, 18. 
 ^Letters, i, 115. Att., ii, 20. 
 
104 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 time had come for the business of the Alexandrine king to 
 be settled'; 'it was no business of his to inquire whether 
 Bibulus had been watching the sky on that occasion or no' ; 
 'what was going to happen if Bibulus came down to the 
 forum at that time he could not have guessed.' " 25 
 
 If Pompey was troubled in conscience, Caesar must have 
 felt the need of binding him all the more closely to himself. 
 It must be kept in mind that Caesar, at this time, would 
 certainly have been ruined had Pompey turned against him. 
 Had this occurred and the great general joined hands with 
 the conservatives, Caesar would have shared the fate of 
 Lepidus. He was not likely, therefore, to leave any means 
 untried to keep the waverer firm. With this object in view 
 Caesar arranged a marriage between his daughter Julia 
 and Pompey. The news of this marriage, coming to Cicero 
 in May, filled the orator with dire misgivings, since it fore- 
 shadowed the continuance of that unholy alliance which 
 had subverted the republic. 26 
 
 By this arrangement Caesar strengthened his hold upon 
 the all-important Pompey, but it did not make the three 
 partners any the more popular. As the summer advanced 
 the opposition grew — not stronger — but more general. A 
 reason for this is easy to conjecture. Rome had more than 
 once before seen laws rushed through the assembly with 
 more or less illegality and violence. Many Romans had at 
 the start regarded Caesar merely as another Gracchus or 
 Saturninus. As the year wore on it became more and more 
 apparent that while these leaders had passed some partic- 
 ular law, or laws, in disregard of technicalities, Caesar had 
 done something much beyond this. What he had done was 
 nothing less than to destroy the constitution of the republic. 
 As this became clearer and clearer it would be only natural 
 that many who had supported him at first should begin 
 to fall away. By July even the knights so far forgot the 
 favor Caesar had done them in the matter of the eastern 
 taxes as to join in demonstrations against the masters of 
 the city. The three at once dropped ominous hints that both 
 
 ^Letters, i, 106. Att., ii, 16. 
 ^Letters, i, 108. Att., ii, 17. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 105 
 
 the knights and the populace had better mend their man- 
 ners. 27 Even the mob was turning against Caesar. In 
 July Cicero had declared to Atticus that nothing was now 
 "so popular as the dislike of the popular party." 28 In an- 
 other letter he says that the three "feel that they do not 
 possess the cordial goodwill of any section." 29 In a third 
 he repeats that "all on that side, whether promoters or mere 
 hangers-on, are falling out of fashion, though no one op- 
 poses them : there never was a greater unanimity of feeling 
 or talk everywhere." 30 Still no one dared to move and 
 Cicero is forced to conclude that although "everybody en- 
 tertains the greatest detestation for those who are the mas- 
 ters of everything" yet "there is no hope of a change." 31 
 As the feeling against the triumvirate grew, the edicts of 
 Bibulus, drawn up in bitter and scathing language, were 
 immensely popular. Pompey, at least, was roused to fury 
 by them. 32 Cicero viewed this state of things with genuine 
 alarm. "I fear," he wrote to his friend, "they have been 
 exasperated by the hisses of the crowd, the talk of the re- 
 spectable classes, and the murmurs of Italy." At first the 
 orator admits that the despotism had been popular with the 
 multitude, but now he declared that "they have become so 
 universally hated, that I tremble to think what will be the 
 end of it." 33 For the information of his friend Cicero de- 
 scribes at some length the unhappy position in which Pom- 
 pey found himself. "Accordingly," he wrote, "that friend 
 of ours, unaccustomed to being unpopular, always used to 
 an atmosphere of praise and revelling in glory, now dis- 
 figured in body and broken in spirit, does not know which 
 way to turn; sees that to go on is dangerous, to return a 
 betrayal of vacillation; has the loyalists his enemies, the 
 disloyal themselves not his friends. Yet see how soft- 
 hearted I am. I could not refrain from tears when, on the 
 
 ^Letters, i, 112-13. Att., ii, 19. The knights were threatened with the loss of their 
 special seats at the theatre and the populace with some restriction of the corn dole. 
 ^Letters, i, 115. Att., ii, 20. 
 ^Letters, i, 117. Att., ii., 21. 
 ^Letters, i, 120. Att., ii, 23. 
 ^Letters, i, 119-20. Att., ii, 22. 
 ^Letters, i, 114. Att., ii, 19. 
 ^Letters, i, 116. Att., ii, 21. 
 
106 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 25th of July, I saw him making a speech on the edicts of 
 Bibulus. The man who in old times had been used to bear 
 himself in that place with the utmost confidence and dignity, 
 surrounded by the warmest affection of the people, amidst 
 universal favour — how humble, how cast down he was 
 then ! How ill-content with himself, to say nothing of how 
 unpleasing to his audience ! Oh, what a spectacle ! No one 
 could have liked it but Crassus — no one else in the world! 
 Not I, for considering his headlong descent from the stars, 
 he seemed to me to have lost his footing rather than to have 
 been deliberately following a path." 34 But the plight of 
 Pompey inspired Cicero with fear as well as sorrow. "I 
 fear," he wrote frankly, "lest one so impulsive and so quick 
 to strike, and so unaccustomed to personal abuse, may, in 
 his passionate resentment, obey the dictates of indignation 
 and anger." 35 
 
 Caesar must have felt that Pompey was wavering. Cicero 
 wrote to Atticus to tell him that the general "is exceedingly 
 dissatisfied with his position, and desires to be restored to 
 the place from which he has fallen ; that he confides his an- 
 noyance to me, and is without disguise seeking for a rem- 
 edy." 36 The orator did not think one could be found, and 
 he was right, but Caesar can hardly have been blind to such 
 feelings on the part of his indispensable ally or have viewed 
 them without alarm. If the rule of the triumvirate was 
 losing what popular support it had once had, and if the 
 most important member of the combination desired, even 
 vaguely, to break away, it was essential to take precautions. 
 Pompey's leanings toward a reconciliation with the conser- 
 vatives must be checked at once and Caesar must place him- 
 self in a position where he could dispense entirely with the 
 favor of the mob. It seems likely that this double motive 
 lay behind the dubious incident which followed. Suddenly 
 an informer by the name of Vettius was produced to testify 
 that he had been employed by the conservatives to murder 
 Pompey. On examination his story broke down hopelessly, 
 
 ^Letters, i, 116-17. Att., ii, 21. 
 ^Letters, i, 117. Att. t ii, 21. 
 ^Letters, i, 120. Att., ii, 23. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 107 
 
 however, and he was shortly afterwards murdered in prison. 
 With his death the charge was allowed to drop. Whether 
 Pompey was frightened or not it is impossible to say, but 
 the incident furnished a pretext to have the assembly vote 
 Caesar the protection of a guard. 37 With troops within the 
 city itself the last step had been taken in the consolidation 
 of the despotism. 
 
 It still remained for the masters of Rome to take precau- 
 tions lest the end of Caesar's term as consul should mark their 
 overthrow. To guard against this they must secure friendly 
 magistrates for the next year who, backed in case of need 
 by Caesar's army in Gaul, could hold the senate and its par- 
 tisans in check. Bibulus succeeded in postponing the elec- 
 tions, but they were finally held in October and two con- 
 suls were declared returned on whom the three could count. 
 As an added safeguard it was resolved to remove the men 
 most capable of leading the opposition. These men were 
 Cato and Cicero. The first was sent off to Cyprus on a 
 special mission the acceptance of which would debar him 
 in the future from questioning the validity of Caesar's laws. 
 Cicero proved more difficult to deal with. Caesar tried to 
 induce him to accept some position which would close his 
 mouth in a similar fashion, but was met by a refusal. The 
 three at length made up their minds that, if the orator 
 would not go quietly, he — and others — should be taught a 
 lesson. They decided to banish him from Rome, and for 
 this purpose they had conveniently at hand both a pretext 
 and an instrument. The pretext was the execution of the 
 Catilinarian conspirators, which the popular party had al- 
 ways contended was illegal, and the instrument was a trib- 
 une who was a bitter personal enemy of Cicero. No sooner 
 were the new tribunes installed in office in December than 
 Clodius, acting as he boasted at the suggestion and with the 
 approval of the three, 38 brought in a bill of which the pur- 
 port was to banish Cicero because as consul he had put 
 Roman citizens to death without a trial. Before the bill 
 was carried Caesar had laid down the consulship, but his 
 
 37 Appian, ii, 12. 
 
 ^Cicero, Respecting the Answers of the Soothsayers, 22. 
 
108 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 army was still camped outside the city, and Clodius called 
 a meeting of the people without the walls of Rome in order 
 that Caesar might attend. As might have been expected, 
 he spoke out in condemnation of the execution of the con- 
 spirators, though he professed sympathy for Cicero per- 
 sonally. The legal scruple on Caesar's part is certainly a 
 touch of irony, but with the army there at hand and Caesar 
 openly approving, resistance was quite clearly hopeless and 
 Cicero bowed before the storm, and broken-hearted, left 
 his native country for the East. 
 
 With matters in Rome secured against an immediate re- 
 action, Caesar was free to depart for his province, where 
 his presence was urgently required. That province had, 
 however, undergone a considerable extension, and one of 
 vast importance, since the Vatinian law was passed. The 
 measure of Vatinius had given Caesar Cisalpine Gaul and 
 Illyricum for the period of five years, but after its passage 
 the sudden death of Metellus Celer, the proconsul of Trans- 
 alpine Gaul, had left that province vacant and Caesar had 
 induced, or compelled, the senate to assign it to him. This 
 measure, urged by Pompey, had been accepted by the con- 
 script fathers because they feared that if they should re- 
 fuse, Caesar would seize the province by a second Vatinian 
 law. 39 If this were done he would receive the added dis- 
 trict for a term of years, but if it came to him by the action 
 of the senate it would be held for one year only, though 
 the appointment might be renewed from time to time. It 
 was therefore obviously to the interest of the senate, if 
 Caesar could not be prevented from getting the province, 
 to forestall popular action by conferring it themselves. 
 
 Though the motives of the senate are easy enough to un- 
 derstand, those of Pompey are somewhat less obvious. In 
 later years Cicero reproached him for having armed Caesar 
 against himself. It seems quite evident that the governor- 
 ship of Transalpine Gaul had been no part of the original 
 bargain between the three. Had it been so it is difficult 
 to see why both Gauls had not been assigned at once by the 
 
 39 Suetonius, 22. The part played by Pompey is clear from Cicero's later reproaches. 
 Bee Letters, ii, 281. Att., viii, 3. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 109 
 
 law of Vatinius. There can have been no thought of pla- 
 cating the optimates by a show of moderation, and the most 
 probable explanation is that the Vatinian law gave Caesar 
 all that had been agreed upon at that time. Had the orig- 
 inal intention been allowed to stand unaltered, Caesar could 
 never have begun the conquest of Gaul at all. It was his 
 possession of the Transalpine province that made his mili- 
 tary achievements possible. It seems quite evident that the 
 conquest of Gaul was not a thing that Pompey intended in 
 the least. Perhaps, if he had foreseen its possibility, he 
 would not have consented to the addition of the new province 
 to his father-in-law's command. If conquests were to be 
 made, Pompey was very much of the opinion that he and 
 not another was the one to make them. In agreeing to the 
 extension of Caesar's power he may have had no further 
 motive than to prevent the sending of an adherent of the 
 senate to that province. A war in Gaul was possible, if not 
 imminent, which might call for a large army, and the three 
 would naturally wish to keep that army in safe hands. If 
 the situation should grow serious it is quite possible that 
 Pompey expected to take over the command. It may be 
 confidently affirmed that if he fostered Caesar's greatness 
 to the point where it was a danger to himself, he did so quite 
 unintentionally. 
 
 If the conquest of Gaul was in no wise a part of the pro- 
 gram of the triumvirate, it is by no means certain that it 
 was a part of that of Caesar. It is quite possible that it 
 was not until he was actually in his province that he fully 
 realized the opportunity. It is very likely that he meant 
 to go to war with some of the independent tribes, since, even 
 if he were not anxious for martial glory, a war offered the 
 best chance of paying off his debts. There is no evidence, 
 however, that he went to Gaul with any settled plans of 
 conquest. 
 
 Whatever the original purpose of Caesar may have been, 
 he was no sooner in his province than war broke out, and 
 that without any act of his. The migration of the Helve- 
 tians was obviously a movement which a Roman governor 
 would be bound to stop, and from this as a beginning the 
 
110 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 rest followed easily. Within the next few years the pro- 
 consul of the Gauls found himself launched upon a career 
 of conquest which his partners had never intended. They 
 had, however, little choice but to accept his policy whatever 
 it might be. Crassus was probably well pleased to see 
 Pompey's prestige as the only great general of Rome dimin- 
 ished by the rising reputation of Caesar. On his side Pom- 
 pey, whether he liked it or not, could not venture to act 
 without the support of either Crassus or the senate. Against 
 Caesar the millionaire would give him no assistance, and the 
 events of Caesar's consulship had left Pompey at open war 
 with the senate. He could, therefore, do nothing to stop 
 Caesar even if he wished, and it is not likely that for some 
 time he felt any great apprehension or jealousy of the man 
 who was to overthrow him. He may well have feared that 
 he might yet have to depend on Caesar's army to protect him 
 from his foes, and in such an event a certain amount of 
 glory and success would give Caesar a stronger hold upon 
 his soldiers. 
 
 The real danger to Caesar lay not in the possibility that 
 his two partners would try to call a halt but in their in- 
 ability to work together after he had left Rome. It is a 
 mistake of modern historians to view the triumvirate as a 
 sort of coalition government. The facts seem clearly to re- 
 veal it as a temporary combination for limited and definite 
 ends. After those ends had been achieved the combination 
 ceased to have a program except in a purely negative sense. 
 The means by which Caesar had put through their measures 
 made it essential to his partners to prevent the return of 
 the conservatives to power lest all the Julian laws by which 
 they profited should be annulled. Beyond that they seem 
 to have had no common program whatever, and both Pom- 
 pey and Crassus resumed their freedom of action and 
 straightway began to quarrel again. Under these circum- 
 stances Rome began to drift rapidly toward veritable an- 
 archy since the forces of disorder were no longer under any 
 strong control. Crassus and Pompey would not permit the 
 senate to resort to any energetic measures, and while they 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 111 
 
 were at odds with one another they were unable to replace 
 that body in any effective way. 
 
 The immediate question which precipitated the troubles 
 was the recall of Cicero. Pompey seems to have consented 
 to the orator's exile with reluctance and he now demanded 
 that the banished consular should be permitted to return. 
 Perhaps Pompey hoped to pave the way to some reconcilia- 
 tion with the senate, perhaps his conscience reproached him 
 for his desertion of his friend and he wished to make 
 amends. Crassus had no desire to humor his colleague, 
 whom he had never ceased to hate, and he had not the slight- 
 est love for Cicero. Though he did not care to take a place 
 in the front ranks of the opposition to his partner he was 
 quite prepared to use his influence in secret. The leader- 
 ship of the resistance to Cicero's recall thus fell to Clodius, 
 who entered on this task as a labor of love. The reckless 
 tribune had already quarreled with Pompey on other mat- 
 ters, but the proposal in regard to Cicero roused him to 
 actual fury. He had the mob of Rome well organized and 
 he turned his rabble loose on Pompey. In doing this he ran 
 but little risk as long as the great general and the senate 
 should remain apart. Caesar's army was no longer at the 
 gates of Rome and there was no force at hand to keep the 
 peace. It is true that troops could readily be raised, but this 
 required a commission from the state. As a mere private 
 citizen Pompey could not recruit soldiersi, nor could the con- 
 suls without the sanction of the senate. As the consuls for 
 the year were tools of the triumvirs the conscript fathers 
 were unlikely to decree a revival of the military despotism 
 of the year before solely in order to accommodate a man 
 whom they detested as much as they did Pompey at this 
 moment. While they were in this frame of mind Pompey 
 did not dare permit them to arm anybody else for fear that 
 they might use the forces so obtained against him. If, 
 therefore, Clodius abstained from a direct attack upon the 
 senators he would have little to fear. 40 He saw this clearly 
 
 40 Heitland (The Roman Republic, iii, 172.) thinks that Pompey could easily have 
 put an end to the anarchy if he had wished. He blames him for not acting and calls 
 him solemn and irresolute. It is not easy to see just what Pompey could do. He 
 
112 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 and acted upon it boldly regardless of consistency. To keep 
 the senate quiet he repudiated Caesar and declared his laws 
 invalid, while with his rioters he drove Pompey to the 
 shelter of his house. 41 The turbulent tribune can hardly 
 have intended to go so far as actually to annul Caesar's leg- 
 islation, for this would have entailed the cancelling of all 
 his own acts including the law that banished Cicero. By 
 raising the question, however, he could effect a sort of truce 
 with the conservatives, 42 and under cover of this he could 
 harry Pompey at his pleasure. 
 
 Pompey could find no way to meet this situation except 
 to call in the help of a counter-rioter. One of the tribunes 
 for the next year, Milo by name, was selected for this task, 
 and quickly raised a gang of gladiators and cut-throats to 
 fight the mobs of Clodius. He succeeded in getting the upper 
 hand so far that in August of 57 B.C. Cicero's recall was 
 finally voted by the assembly, and the orator returned in 
 triumph to his country. The rioting did not end with this, 
 however. Clodius out of office proved quite as turbulent 
 as in, and he and Milo between them made the streets of 
 Rome a veritable pandemonium. The senate had cooper- 
 ated with Pompey to bring back Cicero, but the nobles had 
 by no means forgiven him his share in recent events. Cicero 
 might hate Clodius, but the conservatives had probably little 
 wish to see him crushed and none at all to accomplish this 
 by making Pompey virtually dictator. In vain Cicero, who 
 felt himself bound by ties of gratitude to the general who 
 had procured his return, tried to bring about an under- 
 standing between his patron and the senate. The time had 
 not yet come for such a project to succeed, and the failure 
 of the attempt could only prolong the day of anarchy and 
 riot. 
 
 could not raise troops without the sanction of the senate unless he were prepared to 
 violate the law. But his attitude during Caesar's consulship had clearly shown that 
 he had his scruples about breaking the law in person. Moreover i£ he had dared a 
 breach of the law would he have been successful? According to Cicero all Italy was 
 against him at the time. Certainly the mob and the conservatives were. Action 
 might well, therefore, seem both dangerous and illegal. 
 
 41 Cicero, For his House, 15. 
 
 ^Dio attributes to some such motive the laws proposed by Clodius. xxxviii, 12. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 113 
 
 A shortage in the grain supply occurred at this time to 
 add fuel to the flames. Pompey hoped to make use of this 
 to obtain a new army, or at least new glory. The senate, 
 urged by Cicero, and probably fearing that the mob would 
 turn upon themselves, passed a decree giving the charge 
 of the grain supply to Pompey. This, however, fell short 
 of what the general desired. Cicero plainly intimates as 
 much in a letter to Atticus. "A second law," he wrote, 
 "is drawn up by Messius (one of the tribunes), granting 
 his power over all money, and adding a fleet and army, and 
 an imperium in the provinces superior to that of their gov- 
 ernors. After that our consular law seems moderate in- 
 deed: that of Messius is quite intolerable. Pompey pro- 
 fesses to prefer the former ; his friends say that he prefers 
 the latter." 43 The vital difference in the two bills probably 
 lay in the fact that one provided for an army and the other 
 did not. On this occasion Pompey's wishes were not grati- 
 fied and he was able to obtain only what he said he wanted, 
 namely the consular bill which gave him authority and 
 honor, indeed, but left him still without an army and there- 
 fore still at the mercy of the mob of Clodius, except for such 
 protection as Milo could afford him. Nominally pleased but 
 really disappointed, he turned at once to a new scheme for 
 accomplishing his purpose. The king of Egypt had been de- 
 throned and the question of his restoration was now before 
 the senate. Pompey was anxious that the conscript fathers 
 should commission him to replace the fallen monarch in 
 power, and hoped in this way to find an excuse to get an 
 army. But the senate had no wish to give him one, and 
 found in religion a convenient pretext to avoid it. A pass- 
 age in the Sibylline books was found and was interpreted 
 to fit the case. Cicero put it plainly when he wrote : "The 
 senate supports the trumped-up religious scruple, not from 
 
 43 I have here altered Shuckburgh's translation slightly. Cicero wrote Pompeius Mam 
 velle se dicit, familiares hanc. Shuckburgh renders it "Pompey professes to prefer 
 the former; his friends the latter." This version is ambiguous, like the Latin, but 
 the passage seems to me to mean rather that Pompey's friends said that he favored 
 the bill of Messius rather than that they did, as Shuckburgh's version might imply. 
 The implication is much the same whatever reading is adopted. Letters, i, 188. 
 Att., iv, 1. 
 
114 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 any respect to religion, but from ill-feeling towards him, 
 and disgust at the king's outrageous bribery." 44 
 
 While the Alexandrian business was still under discussion 
 the meetings of the people grew steadily more turbulent and 
 disgraceful. Crassus had no desire to see his old rival gain 
 any new success and Clodius was eager to humiliate him. 
 The shortage of grain furnished the mob leader with a good 
 ground of attack, as Pompey had not yet been able to re- 
 lieve the situation. He availed himself of this to the utmost 
 while taking further advantage of the great general's half- 
 concealed ambitions in the Egyptian matter. One meeting 
 of the people as described by Cicero will be sufficient for the 
 present purpose. "Pompey spoke, or rather wished to speak. 
 For as soon as he got up Clodius's ruffians raised a shout, 
 and throughout his whole speech he was interrupted, not 
 only by hostile cries, but by personal abuse and insulting 
 remarks. However, when he had finished his speech — for 
 he showed great courage in these circumstances, he was 
 not cowed, he said all he had to say, and at times had by his 
 commanding presence even secured silence for his words — 
 well, when he had finished, up got Clodius. Our party re- 
 ceived him with such a shout — for they had determined to 
 pay him out — that he lost all presence of mind, power of 
 speech, or control over his countenance. This went on up 
 to two o'clock — Pompey having finished his speech at noon 
 — and every kind of abuse, and finally epigrams of the most 
 outspoken indecency were uttered against Clodius and 
 Clodia. Mad and livid with rage Clodius, in the very midst 
 of the shouting, kept putting questions to his claque : 'Who 
 was it that was starving the commons to death?' His ruf- 
 fians answered, Tompey.' 'Who wanted to be sent to Alex- 
 andria?' They answered, 'Pompey.' 'Whom did they wish 
 to go?' They answered, 'Crassus.' . . . About three 
 o'clock, as though at a given signal, the Clodians began spit- 
 ting at our men. There was an outburst of rage. They 
 began a movement for forcing us from our ground. Our 
 men charged : his ruffians turned tail. Clodius was pushed 
 
 "Letters, i, 203. Fam., i, 1. 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 115 
 
 off the rostra : and then we too made our escape for fear of 
 mischief in the riot." 45 
 
 Amid such scenes as this Pompey might well feel that he 
 had fallen into the depths once more. He told Cicero that 
 Clodius and his other enemies were being backed by Crassus 
 and that plots were being formed against his life. To pro- 
 tect himself he called in his friends from the country as an 
 offset to the Roman mob. 46 But in spite of them he was 
 unable to obtain the commission to Egypt which he sought. 
 The triumvirate seemed to have gone completely to pieces. 
 Caesar was away in Gaul while at home Pompey and 
 Crassus had abandoned all pretence of friendship or co- 
 operation and Clodius, the irresponsible mob leader, held the 
 streets, checked only by the rival gangs of Milo. Under 
 these circumstances a revival of the senate's power seemed 
 not only possible but probable. Already the conservatives 
 had secured the control of the chief magistracy of the 
 republic since the two consuls for 56 B.C. were both of their 
 party 47 and largely under the influence of Cato. 4s The con- 
 script fathers could thus dominate the executive branch of 
 the government and they had looked on well content while 
 the consul Marcellinus signalized his year of office by sup- 
 porting Cicero against Clodius and by thwarting Pompey's 
 unavowed ambition to be dispatched to Alexandria. As the 
 year went by their hopes rose higher and they dreamed that 
 the senate's supremacy might be entirely restored. They 
 began to talk of putting an end to Caesar's career of con- 
 quest in Gaul and of undoing his laws. Domitius Aheno- 
 barbus, who was now a candidate for the consulship, de- 
 clared openly that he would deprive Caesar of his com- 
 mand, 49 and Cicero announced that he would raise the ques- 
 tion of the Campanian lands in the senate. The optimates 
 
 >^ 
 
 ^Letters, i, 213-14. Q. Fr., ii, 3. 
 
 ^Letters, i, 215. Q. Fr., ii, 3. 
 
 *'The determination of the triumvirs that neither of the consuls should preside at 
 the election for the next year when Crassus and Pompey were to be candidates is 
 evidence of the party standing of the two consuls. It confirms the references in the 
 next note. 
 
 ^Plutarch Cato Minor, 39. That the consuls acted in harmony is shown by Cicero. 
 Letters, i, 220. Q. Fr., ii, 6. 
 
 49 Suetonius, 24. 
 
116 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 were soon to find that they had made a tactical mistake. 
 Their threats served only to drive the three together again. 
 The prospect of a conservative revival led straight to a re- 
 newal of the triumvirate. 
 
 However great their personal hostility, neither Pompey 
 nor Crassus had any wish to see the senate again in con- 
 trol. The millionaire had had his imagination fired by 
 Caesar's victories and was ardently desirous of military 
 glory for himself. Great as was his influence among the 
 needy nobles in the senate, he must have realized that this 
 body would never give him an army of its own free will. 
 Pompey on his side saw the provision for hiy veterans, that 
 had caused him so much trouble, threatened by the nobles. 
 The senate had indeed given him the charge of the grain 
 supply, but they had given less than he wished, though all 
 for which he dared openly to ask, and they had refused him 
 the Egyptian command he had wanted. It was plain that 
 they neither liked nor trusted him and that, if he were 
 again to command an army, he must look elsewhere. Both 
 men were prepared to realize that they had allowed their 
 personal dislike to carry them too far, and both were ready, 
 if their personal ambitions were gratified, to patch up their 
 coalition once more. Caesar, on his side, was no less anx- 
 ious to renew the combination that had gone to pieces. The 
 senate's animosity he must have realized very fully. If it 
 could get control of the government in Rome, he could 
 cherish few illusions as to what he might expect. Already 
 they had shown their hands quite openly as a result of their 
 overconfidence. The question of the consular provinces for 
 54 B.C. was then before the house. The senate could not, 
 indeed, revoke the Vatinian law or interfere with its pro- 
 visions. But it will be remembered that under this law 
 Caesar was given the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul and 
 Illyricum only. His most important province, Transalpine 
 Gaul, from which as a base he was actually carrying on his 
 great campaign, he held only from year to year by the vote 
 of the senate. The conscript fathers could legally dispose 
 of this province with entire freedom, and if they chose, 
 could supersede Caesar there at the close of 55 B.C. and 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE H7 
 
 could thus bring his military career to an abrupt close. 
 Unless he were prepared to begin a civil war there and 
 then, which was not by any means the case, it was vitally 
 important to him that his command in Transalpine Gaul 
 should not be interfered with. This he could hope for only 
 if his former partners would come to his assistance, and if 
 they were to do so, he must be prepared to pay them what- 
 ever they demanded for their help. Thus for the second 
 time the necessities of his position forced him to play the 
 part of peacemaker and to employ all his talents to reconcile 
 Pompey and Crassus with each other. In this he was en- 
 tirely successful. It was arranged that his two partners 
 should visit him at Luca, a small town near the frontier 
 of his province, and here the triumvirate was renewed and 
 its program for the immediate future settled. 
 
 The terms of the agreement were not at once made public, 
 and when they were, the triumvirate was found to be a very 
 different thing from what it had been at the start. In the 
 first combination Caesar had reaped the greater part of the 
 profits. Now his partners claimed their share. It was too 
 much to expect that they would consent to leave all the 
 armed strength of the coalition to one of its members, even 
 if they had not each had military ambitions of their own. 
 If their power was to be based upon an army, they de- 
 termined that the military forces of the coalition should be 
 increased and that each of the three partners should have 
 his share. Accordingly it was resolved that Pompey and 
 Crassus should both hold the consulship again, and that at 
 the expiration of their year of office both should receive 
 important proconsular commands. What these should be 
 was likewise decided in advance. Pompey was assigned the 
 two provinces of Spain with an army to command, and 
 Crassus was to receive Syria with another army. These 
 commands were to be held for the term of five years, and 
 to balance these concessions Caesar's term in Gaul was to 
 be extended for the same length of time. For giving his 
 consent to these arrangements, which armed his partners 
 for a possible future struggle with himself, Caesar has been 
 blamed by some modern critics. Yet that the conditions 
 
118 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 which he granted to his colleagues turned out to be danger- 
 ous to himself was something which he could not well have 
 foreseen. He could be certain that the two would never join 
 their forces against him. As long as they both lived he might 
 feel himself secure. Just how secure, one can appreciate 
 by trying to imagine what would have been the course of 
 events when he and Pompey came to the final struggle for 
 supremacy if the East had been occupied by Crassus with a 
 strong army under his command. It is obvious that in such 
 circumstances, if Pompey had dared to draw the sword at 
 all, he must have surrendered almost at once to one or the 
 other of the two. With Caesar rushing at him from the 
 north, he could not, as he did, elude his adversary by re- 
 treating to Greece. If he had ventured on the attempt, the 
 forces of Crassus would have come upon him before his 
 hastily raised army had been hammered into shape. As 
 long as both his partners lived, therefore, Caesar was 
 reasonably safe, and even the death of one of them might 
 not prove disastrous if his army remained powerful and 
 could be kept in friendly hands. What Caesar did not an- 
 ticipate was just what actually occurred. The one event 
 which could make the terms agreed upon at Luca involve a 
 serious element of risk was the very thing that speedily be- 
 fell. This was not merely the death of Crassus in the East, 
 but his death in the midst of such an overwhelming disaster 
 that his army was destroyed as a striking force. 
 
 We may conclude, therefore, that Caesar made no great 
 mistake as things stood, or as their future development could 
 be reasonably forecast. The immediate effect of the re- 
 newal of the combination left little to be desired by the 
 three. As soon as it was known at Rome that they had 
 come to terms, the opposition which had lately seemed so 
 confident collapsed. The men who had been attacking them 
 made haste to sue for peace. Cicero, who had declared his 
 intention of bringing before the senate the question of the 
 Campanian lands, made haste to eat his words and set to 
 work composing what he himself described as his recanta- 
 tion. All men in silence waited to see what the three would 
 do, for no one knew exactly on what terms they had renewed 
 
THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 119 
 
 their league. The uncertainty was not of long duration, 
 for Pompey and Crassus soon announced themselves as 
 candidates for the consulship. The only man who tried to 
 stand against them was prevented by mob violence from 
 entering his candidacy, and the two were chosen without 
 the slightest open contest. All that remained was to pro- 
 pose and enact the laws that gave effect to their arrange- 
 ments for the provinces, and the compact of Luca had been 
 carried out in all essential particulars. The attempt at a 
 senatorial reaction had failed and the command of the army 
 and the Roman world had been divided among the tri- 
 umvirs. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 Caesar 
 
 The renewed triumvirate which seemed all-powerful in 
 55 B.C. was not destined to endure for any length of time. 
 The close personal ties which bound two of its members 
 together were loosened when in 54 Julia, the daughter of 
 Caesar and the wife of Pompey, died suddenly. In the 
 next year a still more serious blow of fate destroyed it 
 entirely. 
 
 As a part of the bargain concluded at Luca the province 
 of Syria had been assigned to Crassus for the term of five 
 years. The millionaire had been a capable soldier in his 
 youth and had long been seeking an opportunity for mil- 
 itary glory. His chance had now come and he seized it with 
 eagerness. As governor of Syria he would have sole charge 
 of Rome's relations with the rising power of Parthia. In 
 the East he dreamed that he might rival the achievements 
 of Caesar in Gaul and return to Rome with all the glory 
 of a splendid conquest. A war with Parthia he found it 
 easy to contrive, but the campaign, on which he embarked 
 light-heartedly enough, proved far more difficult than he 
 had anticipated. The Parthians were a new people with 
 whom the Romans had but recently come in contact, and 
 Crassus knew them no better than his fellow countrymen. 
 He failed to realize in advance of actual experience the true 
 nature of Parthian warfare, and he paid for his misunder- 
 standing with his life. The strength of his adversaries lay 
 in their light cavalry, and pitched battles formed no part 
 of their strategy; their plan was to retreat before the foe 
 and draw him ever farther from his base of supplies until 
 a favorable opportunity should offer to cut off his com- 
 munications and surround his army in a hostile country. 
 Crassus fell into this trap, and as a consequence his army 
 was destroyed and he himself treacherously slain, while 
 attempting to negotiate with his foes. 
 
 The defeat and death of Crassus put an immediate end 
 
CAESAR 121 
 
 to the triumvirate and left Caesar and Pompey face to face. 
 The question of supremacy was one which could no longer 
 be evaded or disguised. While the masters of the world 
 were three in number one of the three could yield to the 
 wishes of his two partners without too great humiliation. 
 This was no longer possible; whoever yielded now must 
 definitely take the second place himself and openly concede 
 the leadership to the other. With the death of Crassus 
 either Pompey or Caesar must be admittedly supreme. Not 
 only so, but the practical destruction of the army of Crassus 
 removed a potent check on Pompey which might have pre- 
 vented him from resorting to arms. It is unlikely that 
 Pompey would have challenged both Caesar and Crassus, 
 but against Caesar alone he dared to make a stand. 
 
 Besides the dissolution of the triumvirate, other forces 
 were also tending in the direction of a struggle for 
 supremacy. Pompey would hardly have ventured to oppose 
 even Caesar alone without the support of the senate and its 
 party. Such a combination, which at one time would have 
 seemed almost impossible, was now fast becoming more or 
 less inevitable. The chief cause for this was the growing 
 fear of Caesar. The Roman nobles may not yet have 
 known the exact nature of Caesar's plans for the future, 
 but they knew, or suspected, quite enough to fill them with 
 apprehension and alarm. His wonderful conquest of Gaul 
 had not only given him a splendid military reputation but 
 a powerful and devoted army as well. During his term as 
 consul he had shown clearly his contempt for the constitu- 
 tion of the republic, and to many the most vital problem of 
 the day seemed to be the devising of some way to save the 
 state from his dictatorship. If Caesar were to be resisted, 
 it was clear that Pompey must lead the opposing party. 
 Indeed without Pompey resistance was so hopeless that it 
 might well be called impossible. There seemed but two 
 alternatives open: either to submit to Caesar and permit 
 him to become supreme without a struggle, or to seek an 
 alliance with Pompey and to make him the leader of the 
 party which was seeking to defend the republic against the 
 
122 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 unscrupulous ambition of the great proconsul of the Gauls. 
 Neither alternative was pleasant to the Roman aristocracy, 
 but there was little hesitation as to which was the less bad. 
 The nobles neither loved nor trusted Pompey and they 
 cherished many deep resentments against him, but these 
 feelings were much weaker than the fear and hatred with 
 which they regarded Caesar. As the menace from Caesar 
 seemed to them to grow more and more ominous, the sen- 
 atorial party grew more and more ready for an alliance 
 with his rival. 
 
 It was the mob of Rome that gave the final impulse to the 
 reconciliation. From the close of 55 B.C., when Pompey and 
 Crassus laid down the consulship, the city had been left to 
 all intents and purposes without a government. The tri- 
 umvirs, having gotten what they wanted for themselves, 
 were satisfied to let matters drift, but so long as their com- 
 bination existed it was strong enough to prevent the senate 
 from taking any vigorous or efficient action. Meanwhile 
 the three were occupied with their own interests: Caesar 
 was absent in Gaul, Crassus departed for Syria even before 
 his year as consul had expired, Pompey remained in Italy, 
 it is true, but made no move to interfere in politics. As 
 proconsul of the Spains he should have gone at once to his 
 province, but he did not choose to do so. Instead he stayed 
 in Italy recruiting troops for Spain and governing his 
 provinces by legates. This was no doubt within the letter 
 of the law, but it was clearly a violation of its spirit. There 
 was no fixed rule as to when a governor should set out for 
 his province, but it had certainly never been intended that 
 a proconsul of Spain should remain in Italy for any length 
 of time, or indeed for longer than was necessary to make 
 the needful preparations for taking over his command. 
 Pompey, however, chose to linger near Rome and also chose 
 to keep near him ready for action a considerable body of his 
 newly recruited troops. Perhaps he foresaw that the grow- 
 ing disorder would finally force the senate to call on him 
 for help and wished to be ready when the time came. He 
 was coming to fear the greatness of his partner, and he 
 
CAESAR 123 
 
 had always shown some inclination toward an alliance with 
 the conservatives. 1 Hitherto his advances had been repulsed, 
 but if the nobles had at length learned their mistake and 
 were now ready to accept him as their chief, he was not 
 likely to reject their overtures. In the meantime he fell 
 back upon a policy of "watchful waiting." 
 
 With the government paralyzed Rome was soon plunged 
 in utter anarchy. The two triumvirs had hardly laid down 
 the consulship when the turbulence broke out. The whole 
 of 54 B.C. was a time of disorder and disturbance, and it 
 was found impossible to hold the regular consular elections. 
 The next year opened without consuls, and when at last 
 they could be chosen in a moment of temporary quiet, they 
 were unable to relieve the situation. Clodius and Milo 
 were both candidates for office and each was backed by 
 a riotous mob. Their personal hatred of each other en- 
 venomed their political hostility and their perpetual clashes 
 turned the Roman streets into a pandemonium. Pompey 
 was the one man in Italy who had physical force behind 
 him and he could— or at least would— do nothing without 
 some show of legal right. This the senate alone could give 
 him, but that body was not yet ready for such a step. In 
 such a state of things elections were again impossible and 
 the year 52 B.C. opened without magistrates in office. At the 
 beginning of the year a climax was suddenly reached in the 
 disorders. Clodius and Milo met by accident outside the 
 city and Milo seized the unexpected opportunity to murder 
 his opponent. The news of this event precipitated a final 
 riot in Rome, where the followers of Clodius rose in fury on 
 learning of the death of their favorite and burned his body 
 and the senate house together. The situation was now felt 
 to be quite unendurable. Fear of the mob, combined with 
 the dread of Caesar, swept away the scruples of the con- 
 script fathers and they decreed that Pompey should be 
 
 a Pompey had shown himself very ill at ease during Caesar's consulship, and his 
 conduct afterwards in bringing Cicero back from exile and in other matters at that 
 time seems to show an attempt on his part to come to terms with the senate. 
 The conscript fathers, however, could not be induced to give him what he wanted 
 and he turned again to Caesar and renewed the triumvirate at Luca. 
 
124 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 named as sole consul to restore order. Even the rigid Cato 
 yielded to the obvious necessity of the case and frankly 
 owned that the constitution must bend if it were not to 
 break entirely. Pompey's policy of watchful waiting had 
 thus been justified by the result and he entered the city, 
 dictator in all but name, and this at the invitation of his 
 former foes. 
 
 With the troops' at his disposal Pompey had little trouble 
 in restoring order and quieting the mob. it was clear, 
 however, that the unexampled honor that had come to him 
 went far beyond the terms of the compact agreed upon at 
 Luca. Though from the moment of his election as sole 
 consul Pompey began to draw near to the conservatives, he 
 was far from ready for a definite break with Caesar. To 
 placate his partner and probably to fulfil his pledges, 2 
 Pompey used all his influence to pass a law proposed by the 
 ten tribunes granting to Caesar the privilege of becoming 
 a candidate for the consulship without coming to Rome in 
 person. With this concession Caesar was satisfied, and 
 Pompey was left free to deal as he might choose with other 
 matters. As soon as he had restored order he proceeded to 
 hold the elections in due form and set to work with vigor to 
 punish the most flagrant of the recent offenders. The juries 
 were remodelled and the courts now met under the pro- 
 tection of Pompey's soldiers. Milo, in spite of his former 
 services to Pompey, was promptly brought to trial and 
 banished for the murder of Clodius. Many others shared 
 his fate and stringent laws were passed against violence and 
 corruption at elections. These laws applied not only to the 
 future but were made retroactive as well, and every public 
 man in Rome was thus brought potentially within their 
 scope. Means were thus found to expel from Italy the 
 most turbulent of the Roman politicians and incidentally 
 those most obnoxious to the senate, with which body Pom- 
 pey's alliance grew constantly more close. As if to make 
 his change of policy more evident, Pompey contracted a new 
 marriage and this time chose his wife from one of the old 
 
 2 It is not improbable that such a measure had been definitely agreed upon at Luca. 
 
CAESAR 125 
 
 aristocratic families identified with the conservative party. 
 Soon after this he made his new father-in-law, Caecilius 
 Metellus, his colleague in the consulship. This took from 
 his position its unprecedented character but at the same 
 time ranged him definitely upon the side of the senate. 
 
 The fears which the conservatives had long felt of 
 Caesar's future action had been increased by recent events. 
 The law of the ten tribunes, which conferred on him the 
 right to be elected consul in his absence, had revealed his 
 plans with an unmistakable clearness. Before this law 
 was passed his intentions may have been suspected, but 
 doubt was now impossible. Caesar planned to become 
 consul without leaving his province and hence without giv- 
 ing up his army. But though they now knew his design, 
 was it possible for the conservatives to prevent him from 
 carrying it out? This very law of the ten tribunes served 
 to create a legal tangle of such a sort that there seemed no 
 way in which he could be stopped. In order to under- 
 stand what followed it will be necessary to examine this 
 curious legal situation at some length. 
 
 As the law stood, Caesar's command in Gaul would 
 terminate in 50 B.C. 3 and yet, in spite of this, it would be 
 impossible to supersede him before January 1, 48. The 
 legal complications which brought about this singular result 
 were not accidental but were rather the result of a delib- 
 erately contrived plan for Caesar's advantage. Caesar 
 meant to be elected consul for the second time in the course 
 of 49, and he was fully determined not to give up his 
 provinces and army till he was ready to assume the consul- 
 ship in Rome at the beginning of 48. He had carefully 
 worked out his arrangements for this purpose and seemed 
 
 s The date usually given by English historians is March 1, 49. The question as 
 to the time when Caesar's proconsular command expired has given rise to much 
 discussion. A number of different dates have been suggested and at present most 
 German scholars seem inclined to favor 50. The matter is discussed in the article 
 on the Lex Pompeia-Licinia in the Appendix, where references are given to the 
 various views on the subject. For the purpose of this chapter the difference between 
 the two years is not very important. Whether Caesar's term ended in 50 or extended 
 to March 1, 49, it is certain that he meant to stay beyond it and that Pompey was 
 determined to prevent this. The events that followed must be interpreted in much 
 the same fashion whichever date may be selected. 
 
126 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 certain of success. As proconsul of Gaul he had a perfect 
 right to remain in his province till his successor arrived to 
 take over the government, and under the existing legal 
 system, it would be impossible for the senate to send a 
 successor before the beginning of 48, when Caesar would 
 be quite ready to leave, if he had not already left, for Rome. 
 The reasons for this may be rather briefly stated. Under 
 the Vatinian Law Caesar's command would have expired 
 March 1, 54 B.C., but in 55 his term had been prolonged by a 
 law proposed by Pompey and Crassus, the two consuls for 
 that year. This second term was for five years, like the first, 
 and the new quinquennium was to be counted from the date 
 of the passage of the law, that is from some time early in 
 55. The law, however, contained a peculiar clause which 
 forbade any discussion of a successor to Caesar before 
 March 1, 50. 4 Now since the Sempronian law required that 
 the senate should select the consular provinces before the 
 election of the consuls who were to receive them, this clause 
 would make it impossible for the senate to assign the Gauls 
 to the consuls for 50. The first consuls to wnom Caesar's 
 provinces could be assigned would be those for 49, but they 
 would not be able to take over their commands till the end of 
 the year, owing to their duties in Rome. The only way to 
 supersede Caesar before 48 was, therefore, to make the Gauls 
 praetorian rather than consular provinces. Against this 
 Caesar had another weapon ready to his hand. The Sem- 
 pronian law had deprived the tribunes of the power to veto 
 the assignment of the consular provinces, but that right 
 still held good in the case of the praetorian. If the senate 
 should attempt to send out a propraetor to supersede 
 Caesar, any one of the ten tribunes could interpose a veto, 
 and Caesar fully intended to have at least one tribune always 
 ready in Rome to protect his interests. With this legal 
 tangle to protect him, Caesar could feel reasonably certain 
 that if his candidacy in absentia were admitted, he could 
 retain his provinces till the time arrived for him to go to 
 
 4 This may be considered as practically certain from the following passages: Cicero, 
 Letters ii, 78. Fam., viii, 8; and Caesar (or better Hirtius), Gallic War, viii, 53. 
 
CAESAR 127 
 
 Rome as consul, and that he would not be obliged to lay- 
 down one office before he was ready to take up the other. 
 
 In this situation what Caesar could do, and meant to do, 
 was clear enough. Quitting Gaul at the last moment to 
 assume the consulship in Rome, he would be able, during his 
 year of office, to provide himself with a new proconsular 
 command for any term he chose, and for this purpose he 
 could take his pick among the provinces. No one could 
 imagine for a moment that he would allow any legal or 
 constitutional forms to stand in his way. The experience 
 which Rome had had of his methods was amply sufficient to 
 dispel any such illusions. In all probability Cicero simply 
 reflected the general opinion when he wrote to Atticus: 
 "Imagine him consul a second time after our experience of 
 his former consulship! 'Why, comparatively weak as he 
 was then,' you say, 'he was more powerful than the whole 
 state.' What, then, do you think will be the case now?" 5 
 If Caesar once became a candidate, it seemed impossible to 
 prevent his election, 6 and once in office there was no hope 
 of restraining him. That such a prospect should have made 
 the blood of many senators run cold may easily be under- 
 stood. Pompey alone could help them, and this he was 
 ready to do since he had begun to share their apprehensions. 
 It is quite unlikely that at this time he had any thought of 
 war, but he had made up his mind that Caesar's plan of 
 passing directly from one office to the other must be 
 thwarted. He was firmly determined that Caesar should 
 give up his army before he became consul, and on this point 
 at least he was ready to join hands with the conservatives. 
 In the correspondence of Cicero there are various indications 
 of Pompey's attitude during the next two years that serve 
 to make it fairly clear. While Cicero was absent in Cilicia 
 his friend, Caelius Rufus, wrote to him the news in Rome. 
 From these letters it is clear that in the course of 51 Pompey 
 had resolved that Caesar must give up his army before he 
 
 B Letters, ii, 232. Att., vii, 9. The words were written in December, 50, but the 
 sentiment expressed must have been felt much earlier. 
 
 6 The whole conduct of the conservatives makes this clear. Cicero never seems to 
 have doubted Caesar's election if he stood for the office. 
 
128 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 became consul. 7 Later, by the end of 50, the letters of 
 Cicero himself to Atticus show that Pompey had come to 
 fear the second consulship of Caesar, regardless of his 
 army, declaring openly that it would mean the overthrow 
 of the constitution. 8 It is possible that the change was due 
 to the increasing influence of the conservatives, with whom 
 Pompey's alliance grew constantly more close. 
 
 It is probable that the events of Caesar's first consulship 
 in 59 B.C. had left a deep impression on the mind of Pompey. 
 Caesar had then governed Rome as a dictator in defiance of 
 law and constitution alike. True, he had owed his power 
 largely to Pompey and had used it largely for Pompey's 
 benefit; that did not modify in the least Pompey's determi- 
 nation that Caesar should not be dictator of Rome again. 
 In 59 Caesar had overawed all opposition, because he had an 
 army to support by force his lawless acts as consul, and 
 Pompey was resolved that he should not be a consul with 
 an army a second time. If Caesar became consul while he 
 still kept his province he might bring his troops to Rome 
 under the pretense of a triumph — as Pompey had done in 70 
 B.C. — and restore the essential conditions of his dictatorship 
 in 59. The only safeguard was to force him to surrender 
 the command of his army before he became consul. This did 
 not remove all danger, but it was the least that Pompey 
 would consider. All this did not mean that Pompey clearly 
 foresaw a war with Caesar. It was by no means certain 
 that some compromise could not be agreed upon by which 
 Caesar would give up his army while Pompey would concede 
 him his second consulship. Perhaps in 52 Pompey would 
 have consented to even more favorable terms to Caesar. 
 At any rate neither Pompey nor the Roman world in gen- 
 eral recognized as a fact that Caesar would fight rather 
 than accept any terms that Pompey would grant. The civil 
 war was yet hidden in the future. 9 
 
 ''Letters, ii, 51, 177, 196. Fam., viii, 9, 11, 14. 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 230. Att., vii, 8. See also to the same effect Letters, ii, 232. Att,, 
 vii, 9. 
 
 9 As late as December, 50, Pompey thought, or pretended to think, that Caesar 
 would submit rather than fight. Cicero Letters, ii, 230. Att., vii, 8. 
 
CAESAR 129 
 
 While Pompey was effecting his reconciliation with the 
 conservatives Caesar's hands were tied by the last desperate 
 revolt of the Gauls under Vercingetorix. This gave Pompey 
 ample leisure to make his arrangements without serious in- 
 terference. The first necessity was to break down effec- 
 tively the legal safeguards by which Caesar had defended 
 his position. To accomplish this Pompey, during his con- 
 sulship in 52, proposed a new law regulating the whole 
 matter of the administration of the provinces. By this it 
 was provided that there should henceforth be an interval 
 of five years between the holding of a magistracy in Rome 
 and the governorship of a province. Thus a consul or a 
 praetor at the end of his year of qffice would become a pri- 
 vate citizen for five years and would then be assigned a prov- 
 ince to govern as a proconsul or propraetor. For the first 
 few years after the passing of this law there would be a 
 shortage of governors, and this Pompey proposed to meet by 
 the assignment of governorships to such of the ex-magis- 
 trates as had not hitherto held a province. This law of Pom- 
 pey's repealed the Sempronian law which had hitherto been 
 in force and which protected Caesar so effectually. By the 
 new system it would be possible for the senate to name a 
 successor to Caesar as soon as his legal term should expire. 
 
 Under the existing conditions in Rome, with Pompey 
 master of the city, the new law concerning the provinces 
 was passed without the least difficulty. The purpose was 
 not openly avowed, of course, but the law was justified as 
 a means of checking the furious competition for the offices 
 which had been recently convulsing Rome. 10 In spite of 
 such disguise the real object could hardly be doubted, espe- 
 cially when Pompey introduced and carried another law, 
 one clause of which required that a personal canvass should 
 be made by all candidates for office. This directly repealed 
 the special privilege just given Caesar and he naturally pro- 
 tested. Pompey, perhaps not yet sure of the conservatives, 
 gave way and added a provision exempting Caesar, but as 
 
 10 Dio says that the law had been proposed by the senate in the preceding year 
 with this object. Dio, xl, 46. 
 
130 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 he made this change in his bill after it had been voted by the 
 people its legal force was somewhat doubtful. 11 
 
 By these two laws Caesar's position was completely 
 changed. He could no longer count with certainty on going 
 directly from the proconsulship to the consulship. He might 
 be superseded and find himself during some months a pri- 
 vate citizen. The danger of this was clear enough. Under 
 the Roman law a man could not be prosecuted in the courts 
 while he retained the imperium, but the moment that he 
 laid it down he could be called on to answer for his acts. 
 Now some of Caesar's enemies were firmly resolved to bring 
 him to trial as soon as he became a private citizen. For 
 this his career, whether in Rome or Gaul, would furnish 
 ample grounds. His trial would take place before courts 
 controlled by Pompey, or the senate, and even if he should 
 win an acquittal, the mere fact of prosecution would debar 
 him from becoming a candidate for office until the trial was 
 finished. That Caesar feared this we have contemporary 
 evidence. During the year that Cicero was absent in Cilicia 
 Caelius Rufus wrote to him that "Caesar is fully persuaded 
 that he can not be safe if he quits his army." 12 Asinius 
 Pollio, one of Caesar's officers, has left on record the story 
 that after the battle of Pharsalia, as Caesar gazed upon the 
 field of his great victory, he exclaimed, "They would have 
 it so. After so many great deeds, I, Gaius Caesar, would 
 have been condemned if I had not sought the help of my 
 army." 13 It may be considered certain that Caesar was fully 
 convinced that for him to become a private citizen would not 
 only mean the end of his career, but that he would be in great 
 danger unless protected from his enemies by an official po- 
 sition. Moreover, it was much more than his personal 
 
 "Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 28. Marcellus in 51 argued that Caesar's privilege 
 had been cancelled, but Cicero seems to regard it as still in force. See Letters, 
 ii, 228. Att., vii, 7 and also Letters, iii, 121. Fam., vi, 6. 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 196-97. Fam., viii, 14. 
 
 13 The exclamation of Caesar is quoted from Pollio by both Plutarch and Suetonius. 
 (Plutarch, Caesar, 46. Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 30.) There is also evidence 
 that threats of prosecution were openly made against Caesar. It should be noted 
 that the law of Pompey against corruption at elections was made retroactive and all 
 persons who had been candidates for office in Rome since 70 B.C. were liable under it. 
 This looks very much as if the conservatives feared that they could not get evidence 
 from Gaul in time to use against Caesar and devised the provisions of this law so 
 
CAESAR 131 
 
 fortunes that was involved. Even if Caesar had been ready 
 to sacrifice his own career and run the risk of being made 
 a victim of the fierce resentment of the Roman nobles, it 
 would still have been almost impossible for him to sub- 
 mit. He had the interests of his army to consider. His 
 veterans would certainly expect such an allotment of lands 
 as Pompey's soldiers had received. Pompey's experience 
 had made it clear enough that if Caesar should lay down 
 the sword and retire to private life, his men would remain 
 unrewarded for their years of service. The senate hated 
 Caesar far more intensely than they had Pompey when he 
 returned from the war against Mithridates, and if Pompey 
 had been unable to get anything from the conscript fathers, 
 Caesar could hardly expect more generous treatment. In 
 addition to his personal ambition and apprehensions, the 
 pressure of his army and his obligations to his soldiers 
 would compel Caesar to fight for his position if necessary. 
 Hence, in all the negotiations that followed, Caesar clung 
 desperately to this one point : he must succeed to the consul- 
 ship without becoming, even for a short time, a private citi- 
 zen. But this was just the one thing that his opponents 
 would not yield. Because of this, the later attempts at com- 
 promise were futile and amounted to little more than play- 
 ing for position, each party trying to cast upon the other 
 
 that they could prosecute him on a charge for which the evidence was available in 
 Rome. Did Pompey intend to make such a use of the law? Some have held that 
 he had no clear understanding of the law but had merely passed what his conserva- 
 tive friends asked for without seeing the real significance of the clauses in Question. 
 Meyer (Caesars Monarchic 243 note 1) thinks that this theory credits Pompey with 
 a degree of naivite that is incredible. This seems reasonable, but there is one ob- 
 jection. Cicero in his letters ignores this danger to Caesar. From this we can 
 hardly help inferring that the orator did not take it very seriously. If Pompey had 
 any intention of using the law against Caesar, it is highly probable that Cicero would 
 have known it. The great general was no adept at concealment, and the description 
 of Caelius Rufus had much truth when he wrote that Pompey "is accustomed to think 
 one thing and say another, and yet is not clever enough to conceal his real aims." 
 (Letters, ii, 16. Fam., viii, 1). Perhaps the explanation is that Pompey had no 
 intention of using the law against Caesar himself, but did mean to employ it to get 
 rid of a number of politicians, some of them Caesar's partisans. It would obviously 
 be much easier to persuade Cicero of the sincerity of such an attitude than it would 
 Caesar. Whatever the solution of the difficulty, it seems clear that Cicero was very 
 little concerned about any risk that Caesar might run from a prosecution. Even 
 if Caesar could have been convinced as to Pompey's intentions, he might reasonably 
 doubt whether Pompey could control the conservatives once the menace of the Gallic 
 legions was removed by Caesar's laying down the command of his army. 
 
132 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 the odium of striking the first blow and appearing in the 
 light of the aggressor. 
 
 While providing himself with a legal weapon against 
 Caesar, Pompey was not likely to leave his own position 
 weakened by any doubts or questions which a little legisla- 
 tion could remove. By entering the city he had, according 
 to the Roman law, forfeited his proconsular imperium. 
 He had no intention of giving up his provinces and he was 
 shrewd enough to wish to avoid any legal difficulties in the 
 future. He, therefore, took the precaution of having his 
 Spanish command extended for some years, which would 
 prolong his powers for some time beyond those of Caesar. 
 Thus his rival might be driven into private life while he 
 would still retain a powerful army. The future thus se- 
 cured, Pompey was ready to lay down the consulship and to 
 resume his former practice of governing Spain from the 
 country towns around Rome and in other parts of Italy. 
 He doubtless felt confident that, when the time came, he 
 could force Caesar either to renounce the second consul- 
 ship altogether, or to take it on conditions which would de- 
 prive his tenure of the office of its dangers. If Pompey 
 kept an army ready at hand in Italy while Caesar was ob- 
 liged to surrender the legions of Gaul, it might be possible 
 to hold him within such limits as Pompey should see fit 
 to impose. 14 
 
 By the beginning of 51 B.C. Pompey had completed his 
 arrangements, and Caesar, on his side, was free to act. The 
 latter, like his rival, had no desire to force an immediate 
 crisis. Whatever feelings might actuate reckless and vio- 
 lent partisans, the Roman world at large shrank back from 
 civil war. Whoever struck the first blow would have to 
 bear a heavy responsibility, and if he seemed to act on 
 slight or frivolous pretexts, he would find public opinion 
 
 14 On the eve of the civil war Pompey threatened to go to Spain if Caesar became 
 consul. However, by that time Pompey had committed himself much further than at 
 the beginning of 51 and he was trying to frighten the conservatives into supporting 
 him more vigorously than some of them wished to do. The letters of Cicero show 
 that he had then come to object to the second consulship of Caesar on any terms. 
 The earlier plan of Pompey may have been, as suggested above, to let Caesar have 
 the second consulship and to remain in Italy at the head of an army. See Cicero, 
 Letters, ii, 232. Att., vii, 9. 
 
CAESAR 133 
 
 strongly in favor of his adversary. It was true enough 
 that public opinion had lost much of its former weight, 
 but it was still a force that neither of the rivals cared to 
 disregard. As a consequence they temporized and sought 
 to put each other in the wrong. Caesar could not have 
 marched on Rome as he did if Italian opinion had been 
 decidedly against him, as might have been the case if he 
 had struck in 51. Pompey, on his side, not only needed to 
 gain public sympathy as completely as possible, but he was 
 still too ill at ease among his new allies to be in haste. He 
 had no desire to attack Caesar by attempting to recall him 
 before his term expired, and that would not occur for some 
 time to come. 
 
 The difficulties of Pompey in dealing with the conserva- 
 tives are made sufficiently clear in Cicero's letters. It is 
 probable that while the revolt of Vercingetorix rendered 
 Caesar powerless to strike, the whole conservative party 
 had supported Pompey in breaking down the legal defenses 
 of the common enemy. That did not mean that they were 
 ready to go the length of civil war. When an armed strug- 
 gle seemed imminent many hesitated and would gladly have 
 drawn back. At the last moment there was a considerable 
 section of the party which wished to come to terms rather 
 than fight. Some, no doubt, feared the strength of Caesar's 
 army, others distrusted Pompey and felt that his success 
 in a war would not save the republic but would merely 
 make him its master in place of Caesar. This was Cicero's 
 conviction and it was plainly shared by many in the senate. 
 This division among his supporters must have occasioned 
 Pompey much anxiety, and there were probably times when 
 he doubted how far he could trust to the wavering support 
 of the conservatives. But in fact the senate had very 
 little choice in the matter and the decision lay with Pom- 
 pey; if he had sufficient confidence in his own strength to 
 force a crisis the conscript fathers could do nothing except 
 follow him, however reluctant they might be, or however 
 much they might condemn his policy. Cicero expressed 
 these sentiments more than once to Atticus. The orator 
 
134 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 dreaded a civil war beyond all things and would have pre- 
 ferred any other solution. He distrusted Pompey and feared 
 his victory almost as much as his defeat. In the critical 
 December of 50 B.C. when the negotiations reached the 
 breaking point he wrote frankly, "The political situation 
 gives me greater terror every day. For the loyalists are not, 
 as people think, united. . . . What we want is peace. From 
 a victory, among many evil results, one, at any rate, will 
 be the rise of a tyrant." 15 " 'Fight,' say you, 'rather than 
 be a slave.' To what end ? To be proscribed, if beaten : to 
 be a slave after all, if victorious? 'What do you mean to 
 do, then ?' say you. Just what animals do, who when scat- 
 tered follow the flocks of their own kind. As an ox follows 
 a herd, so shall I follow the loyalists or whoever are said 
 to be loyalists, even if they take a disastrous course." 16 
 After the war had begun he declared bitterly, "There is now 
 no question of the constitution. It is a contest of rival 
 kings." 17 
 
 Yet whatever he might feel, however great his fear that 
 war could only prove the ruin of the republic, however 
 much he might prefer to do "anything rather than fight" 
 as he himself declared, he knew that he was powerless. 
 No eloquence of his could any longer alter, or even in- 
 fluence, the course of events. He was reduced to advising 
 peace at any price in private while acquiescing publicly in 
 any policy which Pompey might adopt. He saw this clearly 
 and expressed it candidly when he told his friend : "What 
 is to happen when the consul says : Your vote, Marcus Tul- 
 lius ? I shall answer in a word : T vote with Gnaeus Pom- 
 peius.' Nevertheless, in private, I shall exhort Pompey to 
 keep the peace." 18 
 
 Under such conditions Pompey would hardly have dared, 
 even if he had wished, to launch a direct attack on Caesar. 
 His obvious policy was to thwart Caesar's plans by strictly 
 legal means, and if Caesar refused to accept the check, to 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 224-25. Att., vii, 5. 
 ^Letters, ii, 228. Att., vii, 7. 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 374 and also to the same effect 219 and 293. Att., x, 7 and vii, 3 
 and viii, 11. 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 219-20 and also 226 and 229. Att., vii, 3, 6 and 7. 
 
CAESAR 135 
 
 throw on him the odium of a resort to arms. On his side 
 Caesar was equally determined not to be outmaneuvered in 
 this easy fashion. In spite of Pompey's new legislation, 
 intended chiefly, if not entirely, to accomplish his defeat, 
 he meant to defend himself with every legal weapon at his 
 disposal, seeking to thrust the responsibility of violating 
 the constitution and so provoking war upon his adversary. 
 
 As soon as he had disposed of Vercingetorix, Caesar be- 
 gan the diplomatic game. At the beginning of 51 B.C. he 
 made his first demands upon the senate. Probably in this 
 first move he had little hope of a complete success, but he 
 may have aimed at forcing Pompey to come out in the open 
 and abandon his ambiguous attitude. Hitherto Pompey had 
 disclaimed any hostility to Caesar, and the latter may have 
 thought it possible by a bold play to break up the alliance 
 between Pompey and the conservatives before it became 
 firmly cemented. Whatever his expectations were, Caesar 
 put forward the demand that the potential menace to his 
 position in the recent laws of Pompey should be removed 
 by an extension of his imperium in Gaul until the end of 
 49. If this were granted, then Pompey's recent legislation 
 would lose all force against Caesar, but would still accom- 
 plish what Pompey had claimed was its sole object. Caesar 
 justified his demand by arguing that the law of the ten 
 tribunes had extended his imperium by implication. 19 On 
 the face of it this law had merely given Caesar the right to 
 become a candidate for the consulship in his absence. But 
 he could urge with some show of reason that this concession 
 was clearly meaningless if he were to become a private citi- 
 zen and therefore able to make a personal canvass for the 
 office. Reasonable or unreasonable, this request brought 
 no result. 
 
 While Caesar may have wished to draw Pompey into the 
 open, the conservatives on their part were no less eager to 
 accomplish the same result. One of the consuls, Marcellus, 
 
 19 Cicero recognized the justice of Caesar's claim when he wrote to Atticus, "Do I 
 approve of votes being taken for a man who is retaining an army beyond the legal 
 day? For my part, I say no; nor in his absence either. But when the former was 
 granted him, so was the latter." Letters, ii, 228. Att., vii, 7. 
 
136 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 who was an ardent partisan of the senate, brought the ques- 
 tion forward. He proposed to supersede Caesar in his 
 provinces at once before his term of office had expired. But 
 this was going much too fast for Pompey, and the matter 
 was allowed to drop. The conservatives were still uncer- 
 tain of their leader's attitude, and Cicero was asked to try- 
 to discover his intentions. The orator was then on his way 
 to take up the governorship of Cilicia under Pompey's new 
 law. He had an interview with Pompey in the south of 
 Italy and wrote back the cheering information that Pompey 
 was an admirable citizen, prepared to meet any emergency. 
 Doubtless his correspondent, Caelius Rufus, well knew the 
 meaning of the phrase and could read between the lines 
 when he added, "For he takes the same view, as we ever 
 do, as to who are good and bad citizens." 20 
 
 Encouraged by this and other similar reports, the nobles 
 were ready to renew the proposal to supersede Caesar. 
 They put it this time in a much more moderate form. In 
 September the senate voted that the question of appointing 
 a successor to Caesar should be brought before that body 
 on the first of March of the following year. Caesar's trib- 
 unes offered no objection to this, but when his opponents 
 sought to go further than a mere discussion and to prevent 
 the use of the tribunes' veto in the future, they promptly 
 interposed. The chief result of the debate was the declara- 
 tion which was drawn from Pompey. He spoke in favor 
 of the discussion of the question of a successor to Caesar 
 and when asked what he would do if the resolutions of the 
 senate were vetoed by the tribunes, he replied that it made 
 no difference whether Caesar refused to obey the senate, or 
 secured someone to prevent the senate from passing a de- 
 cree. This certainly amounted to a threat, though he still 
 refused to treat the suggestion of war seriously, and when 
 asked what he would do if Caesar should determine to keep 
 his army and to be consul both, he answered only with the 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 33. Fam., ii, 8. 
 
CAESAR 137 
 
 query, "What if my son should choose to strike me with 
 his stick?" 21 
 
 By his declaration as to his attitude in case one of Caesar's 
 tribunes tried to use his veto, Pompey had joined hands 
 with the conservatives in an unmistakable manner, but 
 still with a half-hearted effort to leave open a retreat. 
 Enough had now been said to render such a retreat im- 
 probable, and though Pompey perhaps did not yet wish to 
 face the fact, Caesar must henceforth have reckoned him 
 an open enemy. His union with the conservatives had, 
 moreover, been very skilfully executed; he had allied him- 
 self with them, yet without giving Caesar a decent pre- 
 text to draw the sword. Though the proconsul of Gaul 
 was well enough aware of the real meaning of his rival's 
 course, all that the public saw was that the senate was re- 
 solved to do its duty by taking under its consideration a 
 grave public question and that Pompey, like a patriotic 
 citizen, would protect its freedom of discussion. The con- 
 clusion to which the debate would lead was not yet known, 
 and Caesar could not venture to begin a civil war on the 
 ground that he might in the future be adversely affected 
 by decrees which the senate had not yet passed, and so far 
 as the public probably could see, might never pass. The 
 temper of the senate had not yet been openly shown and 
 was in fact uncertain. Caesar might very well distrust 
 it, and though he could not fight on the issue of its probable 
 future action, he would very naturally seek to arm himself 
 against it. 
 
 In the elections for 50 B.C. two opponents of Caesar had 
 been returned as consuls, but in the elections for the tribunes 
 he had been successful. This difference in the results in the 
 two cases may readily be understood if it is borne in mind 
 in what manner the voting was conducted. The votes in 
 the Roman assembly were not counted by individuals but 
 by groups. In the choice of the consuls the group by which 
 the vote was taken was the century; this was based on 
 
 "These details are from a letter of Caelius Eufus to Cicero, then absent in Cilicia. 
 Letters, il, 76-78. Fam., viii, 8. 
 
138 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 property in such a way that the wealthy class enjoyed an 
 influence out of proportion to their number. Tn the 
 tribunician elections on the other hand the voting was by 
 tribes, and in the division of the people into tribes property 
 was not considered. 22 On this occasion the result was 
 modified when the conservatives contrived to set aside the 
 election of one of the tribunes and to replace him by one of 
 their supporters in the person of C. Scribonius Curio. They 
 doubtless thought that they had gained a point, but in 
 reality they had played directly into Caesar's hands. Prob- 
 ably they expected Curio to block any action of the other 
 tribunes in favor of Caesar, and they had not considered 
 what might happen if he should turn against them. Pom- 
 pey in the senate had recently uttered a warning against 
 any action by a tribune known as Caesar's partisan. That 
 astute leader, therefore, determined to avail himself of the 
 services of an enemy. Such action would leave Pompey 
 helpless to follow up his threat, for it would be absurd to 
 hold Caesar responsible for what his adversaries did. Thus 
 Curio was in a position to be of much greater use to Caesar 
 than an avowed supporter could have been. The reckless 
 life of the new tribune had left him overwhelmed with debt, 
 while Caesar had the plunder of Gaul at his disposal. A 
 bargain was soon struck and Curio for an enormous bribe 
 agreed to play Caesar's game, but to refrain as long as 
 possible from coming out openly upon his side. By this 
 unexpected move Caesar was able to block Pompey's plans, 
 and all the better because of Pompey's own law concerning 
 the provinces. By that measure Pompey had repealed the 
 Sempronian law so that the senate might be able to send out 
 a successor to Caesar as soon as his term should have ex- 
 pired. In doing this, he overlooked the fact that he had 
 also repealed the limitation which the Sempronian law had 
 placed upon the tribunes' veto. That limitation had de- 
 barred the tribunes from all interference with the assign- 
 ment of the consular provinces by the senate. This clause 
 had been repealed along with the rest of the law, and Curio 
 
 2J Cicero plainly regards the lower classes as favorable to Caesar. 
 
CAESAR 139 
 
 was thus armed with the power to stop any provincial ap- 
 pointments, whether consular or praetorian, a point which 
 Pompey was soon destined to discover and regret. 
 
 Curio began his tribuneship by making various bids for 
 popularity. He still posed as an enemy of Caesar but began 
 more and more to assume the tone of an independent patriot 
 and to harass Pompey with specious proposals which the 
 latter could not very well refuse and yet was wholly un- 
 willing to accept. The discussion of the provinces which 
 had been set for March failed to reach any conclusion. 
 Curio and one of the consuls whose neutrality Caesar had 
 secured with gold were probably in part responsible for this. 
 When other means seemed likely to fail, Curio came forward 
 to propose, as a solution of all difficulties, the simultaneous 
 retirement of both Caesar and Pompey. When this sugges- 
 tion was brought forward Pompey was ill in southern Italy. 
 He wrote at once to the senate saying that he was ready to 
 lay down his command in Spain whenever those who had 
 bestowed it on him might request. This sounded well but 
 Curio found it much too vague. On his side Pompey made 
 an offer of compromise, and intimated that he would consent 
 that Caesar should remain in Gaul until November 13. 
 This, from Caesar's point of view, was of course valueless, 
 and Curio resolutely opposed this solution while pressing 
 his own demand of a joint resignation. Cicero's corres- 
 pondent in Rome, Caelius Rufus, summed up the situation 
 in these words : "Pompey as yet seems to have thrown all 
 his weight on the side of the senate's wish that Caesar 
 should leave his province on the 13th of November. Curio 
 is resolved to submit to anything rather than allow this: 
 he has given up all his other proposals. 23 Our people, whom 
 you know so well, do not venture to push matters to ex- 
 tremes. The situation turns entirely on this: Pompey, 
 professing not to be attacking Caesar, but to be making an 
 arrangement which he considers fair to him, says that Curio 
 is deliberately seeking pretexts for strife. However, he is 
 strongly against, and evidently alarmed at, the idea of 
 
 23 Perhaps the various bills he had brought in as bids for popularity. 
 
140 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Caesar becoming consul-designate before handing over his 
 army and province. . . Mark my words — if they push their 
 suppression of Curio to extremes, Caesar will interpose in 
 favor of the vetoing tribune; if, as it seems they will do, 
 they shrink from this, Caesar will stay in his province as 
 long as he chooses." 24 
 
 On the main question the senate came to no conclusion, 
 since it would not put pressure on Curio to compel him to 
 withdraw his veto of any decrees concerning the provinces. 
 They did, however, pass one decree that Pompey and Caesar 
 should each contribute one legion for a campaign against 
 Parthia. To meet this demand Pompey withdrew a legion 
 which he had loaned to Caesar and Caesar had to furnish one 
 of his own. Both thus came from Caesar's army and the 
 proposal had the effect of weakening his forces. 
 
 In August the elections for the ensuing year were held; 
 Caesar's candidate for the consulship was defeated, while 
 two of his opponents were chosen. Among the tribunes he 
 was more successful and secured the return of two of his 
 supporters, namely Cassius and Mark Antony. The exist- 
 ing deadlock seemed likely, therefore, to be indefinitely 
 prolonged. This very fact rendered the extreme con- 
 servatives more desperate, and, at the same time, some base- 
 less rumors gave them greater boldness. When the legions 
 for the Parthian war arrived, a report began to circulate 
 that all was not well with Caesar's army ; it was said that 
 the men were weary of his never-ending wars and that they 
 would fight for him no more. These rumors, credited by 
 many, led the conservatives to force the issue. Accordingly 
 in December the question of his successor was again brought 
 up. The consul, Marcellus, demanded that Caesar be de- 
 clared an outlaw if he failed to surrender his army and 
 province on a fixed day. The senate voted the decree while 
 Curio sat silent in his place. Proceeding further, the consul 
 made the proposal that Pompey should give up his command 
 in Spain. As thus put, it seemed a direct affront to Pompey 
 and the senate promptly rejected it. Then, and not till then, 
 
 2i Letters, ii, 176-77. Fam., viii, 11. 
 
CAESAR 141 
 
 did Curio arise. He did not attempt to use his veto, but 
 demanded a vote upon the motion that both men should lay- 
 down their extraordinary powers. Perhaps the senators 
 were frightened when they realized that the decree, as it 
 had just been voted, was an open declaration of war; prob- 
 ably most of them were eager to grasp at what appeared 
 a chance of compromise. Whatever the motive, in spite of 
 seeming inconsistency, the senate now by a vote of 370 to 
 22 accepted Curio's resolution. Thus by the venal tribune's 
 clever move Pompey was practically defeated and placed in 
 an embarrassing position. If he refused to comply, he, 
 and not Caesar, was in revolt against the senate. If he 
 agreed, he would disarm himself before his enemy. Nor 
 could he see an exit from the trap into which his new allies 
 had led him. There seemed no legal means left him of 
 checking Caesar's plans. The play for position had ended 
 in a victory for his rival, and if the latter could make use 
 of his advantage, public opinion might be ranged upon his 
 side. From the dilemma in which Pompey found himself 
 only the sword could extricate him, and so at last he nerved 
 himself for the resort to war. The magistrates in office 
 were his friends, as against Caesar at least, and they pre- 
 pared to try to find some fragment of legal justification for 
 their chief. Marcellus a few days later made a strong effort 
 to induce the senate to declare Caesar a public enemy, and 
 failing in this, he left Rome and went to join Pompey, then 
 in Naples, calling on him to take up arms and save the state. 
 Pompey promptly accepted the invitation and proceeded 
 to Luceria to assume command of the two legions destined 
 for the war with Parthia and temporarily stationed at that 
 point. As proconsul of Spain he had no legal authority 
 over them, and the senate had passed no formal decree as- 
 signing them to him. His rights in the case rested wholly 
 on the consuls' declaration of martial law and summons to 
 himself to act. He thus cast in his lot with the extremist 
 element in the senate which was bent on war, and this at the 
 very moment when his violence and haste would stand out in 
 the most striking contrast to the moderate and conciliatory 
 
142 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 bearing of his opponent. For Caesar had been quick to 
 take advantage of the skilful move of Curio. The latter 
 had left Rome as soon as his term of office had expired on 
 the 10th of December and had hastened to Caesar's head- 
 quarters in Cisalpine Gaul. From here he hurried back 
 bearing a letter from Caesar to the senate. In this Caesar 
 recounted his services and professed himself quite willing 
 to lay down his command if Pompey would but do the same. 
 In brief he announced himself as prepared to render due 
 obedience to the vote of the senate. What would have hap- 
 pened had his offer been accepted we can only guess. Prob- 
 ably Pompey was too deeply committed to draw back and 
 Caesar was quite well aware of it before he wrote his letter. 
 Certainly nothing less than such an attitude on his part 
 could have enabled him to reap the full advantage of Curio's 
 victory in the senate. 
 
 There are clear indications that Pompey's hasty violence 
 had produced a reaction in the public mind. In that critical 
 December after Pompey had taken arms, Cicero wrote to 
 Atticus: "The political situation gives me greater terror 
 every day. For the loyalists are not, as people think, united. 
 How many Roman knights, how many senators, have I seen 
 prepared to inveigh against the whole policy, and especially 
 the progress through Italy now being made by Pompey." 25 
 In another letter he declares that he knows of no class that 
 can be called loyalists and expresses doubts as to the 
 knights. 26 . In yet another he affirms that he has met 
 scarcely anyone who does not think it better to yield to 
 Caesar's demands than to fight. 27 After Caesar's last offers 
 were rejected, Cicero speaks of his party's most insane deci- 
 sion, 28 and after the war had begun, when he notes the re- 
 vulsion of feeling in Caesar's favor, he exclaims, "What 
 grave mistakes and vices on our side are accountable for this 
 I cannot think of without sorrow." 29 The feeling to which 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 224. Att., vii, 5. 
 ^Letters, ii, 227-28. Att., vii, 1. 
 ^Letters, ii, 225. Att., vii, 6. 
 ^Letters, ii, 241. Att., vii, 10. 
 ^Letters, ii, 304. Att., viii, 13. 
 
CAESAR 143 
 
 the orator thus bears witness cannot have been wholly lost 
 upon even the most reckless of the partisans of war, but 
 they were all the more determined to drag the senate after 
 them and so to gain some better legal standing for their 
 leader. 
 
 Pompey was now fully committed to the side of war. In 
 that same December Cicero reported a long conversation 
 with him to Atticus, declaring that Pompey had no wish for 
 peace, having become convinced that if Caesar became consul 
 even after giving up his army, it would mean the overthrow 
 of the constitution. 30 All that remained, therefore, was for 
 Pompey to force the senate to declare itself upon his side. 
 
 The last stormy sessions of the conscript fathers need not 
 be recounted at length. Timid senators still shrank back, 
 Caesar's tribunes interposed and forced the reading of his 
 letter mentioned above against the wishes of the consuls. 
 On the senate it seems to have produced little effect. Al- 
 though conciliatory in tone it ended with a threat which 
 may have angered the hesitating members. In any case, in 
 view of Pompey's attitude, the proposal of a joint resigna- 
 tion could lead to no result, since the senate had no means of 
 forcing Pompey to accept. In addition to his letter Caesar 
 seems to have instructed his friends to make still other 
 offers to the senate in case those in his letter were rejected. 
 Of his provinces he consented to give up all except Cisalpine 
 Gaul and Illyricum and of his army all except two legions. 
 In return he demanded only that he be permitted to retain 
 these until he should have been elected consul. Pompey 
 seems to have been more or less inclined to accept these 
 offers, but the consuls rejected them. 31 All efforts at com- 
 promise having thus failed, nothing was left the senate but 
 to take a final decision. Pompey threatened, urged, and 
 encouraged, the wavering were intimidated, and so, at last, 
 the final vote was passed ; Caesar's proposals were rejected 
 and war was declared against him. Caesar's tribunes vetoed 
 the decree, and the senate having declared martial law, they 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 230. Att., vii, 8. 
 
 ^Appiari, ii, 32. Cicero, Letters, iii, 121. Fam., vi, 6, may refer to these offers. 
 
144 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 left the house and fled to join their master in the disguise 
 of slaves. 32 
 
 So finally, after long drawn out negotiations and pro- 
 tracted political intrigues, the inevitable war had come, but 
 the manner of its coming was a blow to Pompey and his 
 cause. His attempts to drive Caesar into open illegality 
 had failed, and as a result the champions of the constitution 
 were compelled to begin the struggle against its enemy by 
 breaking it themselves. 33 Their disregard of the veto of 
 Caesar's tribunes was, perhaps, justified by the passage of 
 the "last decree," but even so it gave a popular pretext to 
 their opponent of which he made prompt use. More sig- 
 nificant was the paradoxical position in which, as a result 
 of Caesar's tactics, they found themselves. The conscript 
 fathers had by a very large majority passed a vote directed 
 against both rival generals. After this they had, almost at 
 once, declared war on the one who offered to obey and had 
 intrusted the command of all their forces to the one who 
 had refused to comply with their decision. The defenders 
 of the senate had themselves defied it and were now attack- 
 ing Caesar as a traitor for having ventured to submit to its 
 authority. Such must have been the way in which the 
 events in Rome would strike many Italians who were not 
 closely in touch with the inside realities of things, and that 
 they should be given such an appearance was a victory for 
 Caesar at the very beginning of the war, not yet a victory 
 in the field but soon to be translated into one. 
 
 In January of 49 B.C., when the sword was actually 
 drawn, neither party to the struggle was well prepared for 
 war. While the negotiations were still in progress it was 
 impossible for either side to take any step which would have 
 been too obvious a menace to the other. When hostilities 
 
 32 They appeared thus before his army, but it was probably only a theatrical device. 
 Cicero does not suggest that they had been in danger (Letters, ii, 234. Fam., xvi, 11), 
 nor does Caesar in his own account allege real violence. 
 
 33 Meyer contends that the action of the consuls in appointing Pompey to command 
 was legal. This may have been the case but it was nevertheless unconstitutional, 
 just as a sudden wholesale creation of peers would be in England. To take the steps 
 they did without the authority of the senate for their action was directly counter to 
 the professed principles of the optimate party. See Meyer, Caesars Monarchic, 274- 
 275. 
 
CAESAR 145 
 
 began the bulk of Caesar's forces were upon the farther 
 side of the Alps, 34 and Pompey's army in Italy had yet to 
 be recruited. Though both the rival leaders were unready, 
 there were shrewd observers in Rome, Cicero's friend 
 Caelius Rufus among them, 35 who reckoned Caesar's army 
 as the stronger of the two. Pompey, however, seems to 
 have entered on the contest full of hope and confidence. 
 A short time before the outbreak of the war Cicero had a 
 long conversation with him and was much encouraged by 
 Pompey's calm assurance of success and contempt for 
 Caesar's power. 36 Later, when the course of events had 
 disillusioned him, the orator spoke bitterly of his leader's 
 blindness and folly. That Pompey misjudged the whole 
 situation is obvious enough, but it is possible to understand 
 his blunder. In the first place he had reason to believe that 
 Caesar's army was not entirely loyal to its chief. Such 
 rumors had been spread in Rome by the officer who brought 
 the two legions into Italy for the Parthian war, and in ad- 
 dition to such reports, the ablest of all Caesar's lieutenants, 
 Labienus, was now in communication with the senate and 
 was soon to desert to Pompey's side. Even if Caesar's 
 army did support him, it was far away in the Transalpine 
 province and the newly conquered parts of Gaul. A revolt 
 of the recently subdued territories might be expected if 
 Caesar withdrew his troops, and such a rising might im- 
 peril his whole army and must terribly handicap him. If 
 he dared to run the risk at all and if his soldiers should 
 consent to follow him, it would require time to bring them 
 across the Alps and this would give Pompey an opportunity 
 to make the necessary preparations. It seems probable that 
 Pompey took it for granted that Caesar would be unable to 
 
 34 Ferrero thinks that the presence of only one legion in Cisalpine Gaul shows that 
 Caesar did not look upon war as possible. Yet to have brought his army across the 
 Alps without a reasonable excuse would have been a direct provocation to Pompey 
 and would have thrown the responsibility for the war on himself. If it was worth 
 while to carry on negotiations at all it would have been folly to throw away all 
 possible advantage from them. See Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, ii, 181. 
 
 35 See his letter to Cicero, illuminated by his conduct during the war. Letters, ii, 
 197. Fam., viii, 14. 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 230-31. Att., vii, 8. 
 
146 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 assume the offensive, but would be obliged to wait in Gaul 
 for the attack of his enemies. If he did this, Pompey could 
 hope to crush him between the Spanish army and the army 
 to be raised in Italy. 37 If the possibility of a sudden dash 
 on Rome by Caesar occurred to Pompey at all, he doubtless 
 dismissed it as absurd. If Caesar should try such a move, 
 he would be stopped before the walls of the first Italian 
 town. Pompey was supremely sure that the Italians were 
 with him heart and soul ; for this the demonstrations which 
 took place when he was ill in Naples were in part to blame. 38 
 In his confidence he lost sight of the disastrous effect of his 
 diplomatic defeat and the illegal violence of his party's 
 recent acts. But his antagonist was fully alive to the turn 
 in public opinion which these things had provoked. He had 
 succeeded in putting his opponent in the wrong, and Caesar 
 was not the man to lose the fruits of a hard earned success 
 for lack of daring or initiative. Without waiting for the 
 bulk of his army he gathered up such forces as he had at 
 hand and boldly crossed the Rubicon, a little river which 
 formed the southern boundary of Cisalpine Gaul. 
 
 Had Italy been strongly upon Pompey's side the crossing 
 of the Rubicon would have been followed by an immediate 
 check. The first important town could have held up Cae- 
 sar's insufficient force by an energetic resistance till Pom- 
 pey could have come to its relief. But the senate had al- 
 lowed itself to seem in the wrong and public sentiment had 
 veered toward Caesar. Town after town threw open its 
 gates to him without the least resistance, nowhere did any 
 one attempt to make a stand, and Pompey's recruiting of- 
 ficers fled from his advancing cohorts. As he came swiftly 
 on, Caesar caught the bewildered recruits gathered for 
 Pompey's army and enrolled them in his own. Without 
 serious opposition he pushed on into the heart of Italy. 
 
 The prompt offensive of Caesar fell like a thunderbolt 
 
 37 0n the strategic situation see Meyer, Caesars Monarchic, 289-90, and Kromayer 
 in Hartmann and Kromayer, Romische Geschichte, 141-42. Kromayer thinks that 
 Caesar was beaten in the diplomatic negotiations, but this seems to the present writer 
 clearly an error. His discussion of the general military situation is admirable though 
 brief. 
 
 ^Plutarch, Pompey, 57. 
 
CAESAR 147 
 
 upon the senate and the nobles. Their forces were neither 
 organized nor ready and the recruits did not pour in as 
 they had expected. Cicero had been dispatched to Capua 
 to assist the levy and there, in the very district where Caesar 
 had settled the veterans of Pompey, he confides to Atticus 
 that "the settlers do not make a very eager response." 39 On 
 the side of the conservatives there was only disorganization 
 and confusion and a bitter disillusionment with Pompey. 
 Cicero wrote to his friend: "How utterly incapable our 
 general is you yourself observe, in having had no intelli- 
 gence of the state of affairs even in Picenum : and how de- 
 void of any plan of campaign, the facts are witness. . . . 
 Everyone agrees that he is in a state of abject alarm and 
 agitation." 40 But in the midst of the chaos among his ene- 
 mies Caesar relentlessly advanced and their complaints and 
 bitter words were impotent to arrest his progress. 
 
 Pompey seems early to have seen that it was useless to try 
 to save the capital, and accordingly he gave the order to 
 abandon it. This order, unexpected, by his supporters, 
 moved them to fury at what they thought his cowardice, but 
 he knew his own weakness far too well to risk a battle. 
 Besides his raw recruits he had at hand only the two legions 
 so recently obtained from Caesar that he did not dare to 
 trust their loyalty too far. He hurriedly retreated to the 
 south and the nobles had no choice but to follow their leader 
 in what some, if not most, of them regarded as a disgraceful 
 flight. The senate and the magistrates left the city, for- 
 getting in their frantic haste a large amount of money in 
 the public treasury, and sought refuge in the camp of Pom- 
 pey. Caesar was thus left free to occupy Rome whenever 
 he might choose. The retreat of Pompey filled Cicero with 
 the utmost indignation. "As to our leader Gnaeus," he ex- 
 claimed, "what an inconceivably miserable spectacle ! What 
 a complete breakdown ! No courage, no plan, no forces, no 
 energy ! I will pass over his most discreditable flight from 
 the city, his abject speeches in the towns, his ignorance not 
 
 3t Letters, ii, 251. Att., vii, 14. 
 ^Letters, ii, 247. Att., vii, 13a. 
 
148 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 only of his opponent's, but even of his own resources — but 
 what do you think of this?" 41 and he proceeds to tell Atticus 
 of the forgotten money left in Rome. A little later he writes 
 more calmly but with almost as much bitterness : "As to my 
 remark . . . that I preferred defeat with Pompey to vic- 
 tory with those others, it is quite true : I do prefer it — but 
 it is with Pompey as he was then, or as I thought him. But 
 with a Pompey who flies before he knows from whom he is 
 flying, or whither, who has betrayed our party, who has 
 abandoned his country, and is about to abandon Italy — if I 
 did prefer it, I have got my wish : I am defeated." 42 
 
 But though to Cicero, and doubtless to many others like 
 him, the occupation of Rome by Caesar seemed the end of 
 all things, the contest was by no means really settled by it. 
 Pompey was still in arms in Italy, though with but the one 
 desire of escaping across the sea as soon as possible. He 
 had the raw recruits from whom in time an army might be 
 made, but he was too experienced a soldier to dream that 
 they were capable of meeting Caesar's veterans at once. 
 His plan was to seek safety in the East till he could put his 
 levies into shape. Accordingly he turned his flight to 
 Brundisium, the chief port of southern Italy, from which 
 he could transport his forces into Greece. Caesar, on his 
 part, was bent on cutting off his flight and ending the whole 
 war in one short campaign. It thus became a race between 
 the two with Brundisium as its goal, but rapid as were 
 Caesar's movements, when he reached the port he found 
 his rival there ahead of him and safe behind the walls. 
 
 Caesar's first campaign had been at once a brilliant suc- 
 cess and a failure. He had driven Pompey out of Italy, but 
 he had not been able to end the war. Now he could hope 
 for nothing but a long and doubtful struggle. His position, 
 far from being secure, was really critical. Public opinion, 
 won over to his side by his success in the negotiations, had 
 begun to turn against him. The flight of Pompey, carrying 
 with him the magistrates and many, if not most, of the 
 
 ■"■Letters, ii, 263. Att., vii, 21. 
 ^Letters, ii, 288. Att., viii, 7. 
 
CAESAR 149 
 
 senators, seemed to place the whole machinery of legal gov- 
 ernment in his hands. Whoever might have been the ag- 
 gressor at the start, Pompey could now pose as the cham- 
 pion of the law. Appian expressly states that after Pom- 
 pey sailed from Brundisium public opinion turned in his 
 favor. 43 Cicero had noted the change in feeling even ear- 
 lier, as soon indeed as Pompey fled from Rome. On Jan- 
 uary 19 he had written to Atticus : "There is an extraord- 
 inary outcry — I don't know what people are saying with 
 you, but pray let me know — at the city being without mag- 
 istrates or senate. In fact, there is a wonderfully strong 
 feeling at Pompey's being in flight. Indeed, the point of 
 view is quite changed : people are now for making no con- 
 cessions to Caesar." 44 
 
 The change in sentiment was, no doubt, fostered by the 
 expectations men had entertained as to what Caesar would 
 do if he should gain control. Most seem to have anticipated 
 that he would imitate Sulla and proscribe his opponents. 
 In December of 50 Cicero had said of him that he would not 
 be "more merciful than Cinna in the massacre of the no- 
 bility, nor less rapacious than Sulla in confiscating the prop- 
 erty of the rich." 45 After the war broke out Atticus ex- 
 pressed his fears of Caesar's probable cruelty and Cicero 
 agreed with him that Caesar would "spare no form of 
 brutality." 46 Later, when Caesar's course seemed to belie 
 these apprehensions, Cicero grew sufficiently hopeful to 
 doubt what kind of a tyrant Caesar would prove to be: 
 "whether he will copy Phalaris or Pisistratus." 47 Never- 
 theless, he found it very difficult to feel much confidence in 
 Caesar's clemency, and when Atticus expressed hopes of 
 Caesar's moderation, he retorted : "How can he help behav- 
 ing ruthlessly? Character, previous career, the very nature 
 of his present undertaking, his associates, the strength of 
 the loyalists, or even their firmness, all forbid it." 48 A 
 
 4S Appian, ii, 40. 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 242-43. Att., vii, 11. 
 ^Letters, ii, 228. Att., vii, 7. 
 ^Letters, ii, 243. Att., vii, 12. 
 ^Letters, ii, 262. Att., vii, 20. 
 ^Letters, ii, 316. Att., ix, 2a. 
 
150 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 personal interview with Caesar did little to increase his 
 confidence, since the charm and courtesy of the leader was 
 balanced by the sight of his partisans and followers. Of 
 them Cicero wrote to Atticus in deep disgust : 'Tor the rest, 
 good heavens! What a crew! what an inferno! to use your 
 word. . . . What a gang of bankrupts and desperadoes !" 49 
 
 Yet Cicero had already discerned clearly that a policy of 
 moderation and mercy might be to Caesar's advantage. He 
 had confessed this to his friend when he wrote : "By heaven, 
 if he puts no one to death, nor despoils anyone of anything, 
 he will be most adored by those who had feared him most. 
 The burgesses of the country towns, and the country people 
 also, talk a great deal to me. They don't care a farthing 
 for anything but their lands, their poor villas, their paltry 
 pence. And now observe the reaction: the man in whom 
 they once trusted they now dread: the man they dreaded 
 they worship." 50 A part of this feeling may have been due 
 to the threats which Pompey's party were breathing forth 
 against all who did not join them. Apart from any consid- 
 erations of personal temperament, Caesar might think it 
 well worth while to calm the frightened public and to make 
 the contrast between himself and his opponents stand out 
 as sharply as possible. In March Cicero had written that 
 "Pompey has set his heart to a surprising degree on imi- 
 tating Sulla's reign. I am not speaking without book, I 
 assure you. He never made less of a secret of anything." 
 From such a policy Cicero shrinks in horror, but fears the 
 same thing from Caesar. 51 
 
 Though Caesar displayed great magnanimity from the 
 start, it was but slowly that even his supporters came to put 
 faith in his continuing this policy. In April Curio told Cicero 
 that "Caesar was not by taste or nature averse from blood- 
 shed, but thought clemency would win him popularity: if, 
 however, he once lost the affection of the people, he would be 
 cruel." 52 Only two days after this conversation with Curio, 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 353-54. Att., ix, 18. 
 ^Letters, ii, 304. Att., viii. 13. 
 ^Letters, ii, 325-26. Att., ix, 7. 
 B2 Letters, ii, 365. Att., x, 4. 
 
CAESAR 151 
 
 Cicero received a letter from Caelius Rufus, who had joined 
 Caesar at the outbreak of the civil war, in which the deserter 
 told the hesitating consular frankly, "If you think that 
 Caesar will maintain the same policy in letting his adversa- 
 ries go and offering terms, you are mistaken. His thoughts, 
 and even his words, forebode nothing but severity and 
 cruelty." 53 Such expressions might be intended to frighten 
 Cicero so as to prevent his joining Pompey in the East, but 
 they may very well have meant that Caesar perceived the 
 drift of public sentiment toward his rival and was irritated 
 by it. Certainly he did not change his policy of clemency 
 and moderation, although he may have uttered threats. 
 
 The task that faced Caesar in Italy was one of serious 
 difficulty. He was compelled to improvise a government 
 of some sort and to do this with such materials as Pompey 
 had left behind. With most of the senate and the magis- 
 trates gone this problem was very far from simple, since to 
 serve the ends for which it was designed it was essential for 
 Caesar to give his government as much as possible the ap- 
 pearance of legality. A senate, or some body which could pass 
 as such, was necessary for his purpose. He set to work at 
 once to gather at Rome as many of the senators as possible. 
 There were some few of the conscript fathers who were his 
 partisans, and there were more who, either disgusted with 
 Pompey or convinced that his cause was lost, now came over 
 to his side. Yet among them all there was a woeful lack 
 of names that could command the popular respect. It 
 would have been a real gain to his cause if he could have 
 persuaded Cicero to join him. The orator, sent by Pompey 
 to Capua, had remained there a prey to indecision and bit- 
 ter misgivings until Caesar's advance had cut him off from 
 Brundisium. On his way to Rome, after Pompey's flight 
 to Greece, Caesar endeavored to gain his support, or at 
 least his presence at the meeting of the senate which he in- 
 tended to call. But though at a personal interview Caesar 
 pressed the orator with the greatest urgency, Cicero re- 
 fused to lend the sanction of his name to what he regarded 
 
 ss Letters, ii, 367. Fam., viii, 16. 
 
152 THE FOUNDING OP THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 as a mockery of the senate. 54 So Caesar had to do the best 
 he could without him. That best was only to establish a 
 sort of provisional government at Rome under one of the 
 praetors, while he himself prepared to fight the contest to a 
 finish in the field. 
 
 As matters stood, Caesar was still between the armies 
 of his foe. Pompey had a large, though untrained, force in 
 Greece, while he retained the legions under his command in 
 Spain. Caesar thus faced the danger that he would find 
 himself attacked upon both sides at once. Unable to follow 
 Pompey because of the lack of ships, he resolved to deal 
 with Spain, confident that the lack of training on the part 
 of Pompey's men would render him powerless to take the 
 offensive for some time to come. 
 
 In Spain Caesar was successful in one swift campaign. 
 Indeed no success, unless it were rapid, would have been 
 of much avail, since his aim was simply to crush Pompey's 
 forces there before his army in the East was ready for 
 action. As it was, the generals of Pompey played into his 
 hands and were defeated, and their forces were reenlisted 
 under Caesar or disbanded. The western army of his rival 
 ceased to exist and the ground was cleared for the final duel 
 between the two. 
 
 The military events of the campaign that ended at Phar- 
 salia it is not necessary to study in detail. Several times 
 Caesar seemed in imminent danger of complete defeat and 
 ruin but each time fortune, or Pompey, intervened to save 
 him. His crowning mercy came when Pompey, unable to 
 withstand the clamors of his officers and of the senate that 
 encumbered him, yielded his better judgment to their over- 
 confidence and leaving an impregnable position in his camp, 
 offered battle in the open plain of Pharsalia. There the 
 superiority of Caesar's men could make itself felt and the 
 splendid veterans of the Gallic war crushed the newly im- 
 provised army of his foes. For the first time in his life 
 Pompey fled from the field of battle defeated, and the Roman 
 
 64 For an account of the interview see Letters, ii; 353. Att., ix, 18 and also 
 Letters, ii, 358. Att., x, 1. 
 
CAESAR 
 
 153 
 
 world lay now at Caesar's feet. It is true there still re- 
 mained much fighting to be done. Pompey, seeking refuge 
 in Egypt, was murdered there, but his followers, rallying in 
 Africa, prolonged the struggle. Defeated here, they made 
 a last stand in Spain, and after a moment when they seemed 
 to have some prospect of success, their military power was 
 finally crushed at Munda. That they were able to rally at 
 all after Pompey's overthrow was due in large part to the 
 fact that Caesar found himself involved in a petty war in 
 Egypt at the critical moment and could not follow up his 
 victory with sufficient energy. 55 Though the Egyptian epi- 
 sode thus served to prolong the war, it could not affect its 
 final outcome. Still the very fact that the struggle had been 
 so protracted enhanced its bitterness and greatly increased 
 Caesar's difficulties when he undertook the task of recon- 
 struction. 
 
 The work of reorganizing the Roman state which fell to 
 Caesar after the victory over Pompey he was forced to un- 
 dertake in the midst of his further campaigns in Africa and 
 Spain. This may, in part, serve as an. explanation of its 
 imperfect character, for Caesar's government bore to the 
 end very much the appearance of a temporary expedient. 
 This the wars in which he found himself involved would 
 serve at once to explain and justify. It was only after his 
 last victory at Munda that he began to indicate his perma- 
 nent intentions, and then the time allowed him by his ene- 
 mies was too short and the steps that he had as yet taken 
 at the time of his death too few to make it possible to deter- 
 mine what he would ultimately have done. Yet the main 
 lines of his policy are unmistakable, and the questions in 
 dispute have to do largely with matters of name, of title, 
 and of outward forms. 
 
 When, after Pharsalia, a very large section of the Pom- 
 peian party laid down its arms and submitted to the con- 
 queror, he could at last proceed to organize a government 
 upon a better basis than had been possible so far. Yet the 
 difficulties were still great, and circumstances served but 
 
 65 This seems clear from the course of the events. It was also Cicero's opinion. 
 See Letters, iii, 55. Fam., xv, 15. 
 
154 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 to accentuate them. Had the war ended with Pompey's 
 defeat, public opinion would probably have run strongly in 
 Caesar's favor, but when it dragged on and flared up again 
 in Africa, the tide turned against him. Those of the van- 
 quished party who had yielded to the victor now drew back, 
 fearing that they had made their peace too soon and alarmed 
 lest the party they had deserted in its adversity might even 
 yet prevail. When Caesar ended the African war by the 
 battle of Thapsus, he stained his triumph, in the eyes of 
 the old nobility, by the execution of some of his most bitter 
 foes. When he returned to Rome in 46 B.C., he found the 
 state of public feeling far less favorable than it had been 
 immediately after Pharsalia, and this, as will appear quite 
 shortly, materially complicated the task of establishing a 
 stable government. 
 
 Some of the difficulties which confronted Caesar in the 
 task of reconstruction may readily be seen. The history 
 of Rome, since the military reforms of Marius, had made 
 visible to all men the supremacy of the military power. 
 Only a government which held the sword could hope to 
 stand. But if the career of Sulla demonstrated the power 
 of the soldier, the career of Pompey had served to demon- 
 strate as clearly the dependence of a victorious general upon 
 the civil power. When the conqueror of Mithridates had 
 disbanded his troops without assuring himself of some 
 means of controlling the republican machine, he had stepped 
 at once from the height of glory into the valley of humilia- 
 tion. His descent had been too sudden and dramatic and 
 its underlying causes too plainly visible for Caesar not to 
 read the lesson of his fall. Thwarted and powerless, Pom- 
 pey had seen himself obliged to enter the first triumvirate. 
 Both he and his two partners in that combination had seen 
 the need of grasping again the sword which he had laid 
 aside, and thus the proconsulship of Caesar had been 
 brought about. Events had led the three to divide the com- 
 mand of the army among themselves, and this division had 
 resulted in the civil war just ended. The outcome of that 
 final struggle had left Caesar as a military autocrat in Rome. 
 The whole course of events combined to show that he could 
 
CAESAR 
 
 155 
 
 not safely lay aside, or share with others, even if that had 
 been possible, the command of the army. But it was no 
 less obvious that he must have some kind of civil govern- 
 ment to assist him in his work. No great community has 
 ever yet been permanently ruled by martial law, and Caesar 
 could not have imagined that such a government was ade- 
 quate for the whole civilized world. But the traditions of 
 the past had made the republic the only form of civil gov- 
 ernment of which men had any clear " conception. Cicero 
 had written to his friend that "when laws, jurors, law 
 courts, and senate are abolished" there could be no se- 
 curity. 56 Though the orator wrote thus in a moment of 
 excitement, there can be little doubt that such feelings were 
 general. Caesar's task was to restore enough of the old 
 constitutional forms to pacify public opinion while retain- 
 ing adequate authority in his own hands. It was thus es- 
 sentially the same problem that Augustus had later to meet, 
 but circumstances made it far more difficult for Caesar 
 than it was for his adopted son. 
 
 The very policy which Caesar had pursued contributed 
 to increase the complication of the situation. When he 
 first advanced on Rome many looked for a reign of terror 
 after the model of Sulla. Caesar, however, had chosen other- 
 wise and had surprised the world by his moderation and 
 clemency. That this was partly due to the natural dis- 
 position of the man need not be doubted, but it was also 
 in some degree a matter of policy. One motive for the adop- 
 tion of that policy may have been his clear perception of 
 his future needs. If Pompey were vanquished, Caesar 
 would be forced to govern, and he can have had but little 
 confidence in the greater part of his own party. It is un- 
 necessary to take literally all Cicero's bitter words respect- 
 ing Caesar's followers, yet the suspicion can hardly be 
 avoided that they were as a class hardly the sort of men to 
 administer an empire. Many of them were reckless bank- 
 rupts or men with dubious pasts. It would seem that Cicero 
 had some basis in fact for his words when he wrote to 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 326. Att., ix, 7. 
 
156 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Atticus : "Of what sort, again, will he find his confederates 
 or subordinates, whichever you please to call them, if those 
 are to rule provinces, of whom not one could manage his 
 own estate two months? I need not enumerate all the 
 points, which no one sees more clearly than yourself. 
 Still, put them before your eyes: you will at once under- 
 stand that this despotism can scarcely last six months." 57 
 In the bitterness of his feelings, Cicero may have painted 
 his picture in unduly somber colors, but there was some 
 foundation for his words. Several of Caesar's partisans 
 did turn out badly when he sought to use them in his gov- 
 ernment. Curio had been eminently serviceable as a trib- 
 une, but when he was entrusted with a military command 
 he lost his life and his army by his rashness. Q. Cassius, 
 another useful tribune, when sent as governor to Hither 
 Spain, succeeded by his misconduct in stirring up trouble 
 and finally lost his life after laying the foundation for a 
 formidable rebellion against his master. Whenever Caesar's 
 back was turned, there was disorder in Rome fomented by 
 his own partisans. From all of which it seems sufficiently 
 clear that there was much rotten material in his party and 
 a decided lack of men of the right sort, since, although he 
 is accounted a shrewd judge of men, Caesar promoted so 
 many of the unworthy to positions where they were able to 
 do harm. In spite of all their faults and vices, the repub- 
 lican nobility still had almost a monopoly of official exper- 
 ience and training for public affairs and still possessed a 
 very powerful hold upon the imagination of mankind. 
 Without them it was a difficult, if not an impossible, task 
 to govern the Roman world. A perception of this fact may 
 have had something to do with Caesar's adoption of a policy 
 of clemency. He spared no pains to win over the aristoc- 
 racy which had supported Pompey in the civil war, and he 
 conferred important offices upon his pardoned foes. It is 
 significant to note that at the time of his death so many of 
 those who had fought against him were holding high office 
 in his government, or had been selected by him to hold such 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 382. Att., x, 8. 
 
CAESAR 157 
 
 office in the near future. The number of such men is over- 
 whelming evidence that the dictator was, for some reason, 
 deeply anxious to use his former enemies to rule his em- 
 pire. 58 
 
 But Caesar's policy of clemency was not without its draw- 
 backs. One of these his murder revealed with startling 
 clearness. Another, and one that has been less frequently 
 perceived, was that as a result of it the senate contained 
 a majority belonging to the opposition. Caesar might trust 
 the individual nobles to the extent of giving them high 
 offices ; it was another matter to trust the conscript fathers 
 as a body. They were, to a large extent, his vanquished 
 and pardoned enemies who continued to nurse their bitter- 
 ness in secret. 
 
 But this body, which was sullenly hostile to the dictator 
 at heart, was a necessary wheel in the republican machine. 
 No restoration of the old constitution was in the least pos- 
 sible without the cooperation of the senate, and this was 
 just what Caesar, despite his clemency, was unable to se- 
 cure. Thus when he undertook to construct a civil gov- 
 ernment he found a senate which he dared not trust, yet 
 with which he could not entirely dispense. It was impos- 
 sible to give the conscript fathers a serious share in the 
 control of affairs without the danger that they would use 
 the power thus conceded to make his position untenable, in 
 other words without the risk of finding himself in the situa- 
 tion of Pompey when he consented to disarm; and yet, if 
 Caesar did not take the senate into partnership, he could 
 not gain the support of public sentiment. 
 
 An obvious way to meet this difficulty would have been to 
 reorganize the senate in such a fashion as to make it a safe 
 
 58 Heitland suggests some of these considerations. In connection with Caesar's cor- 
 dial treatment of Cicero after Pharsalia he says : "To win the adhesion of a man so 
 distinguished and of so high a character in civil life was just what Caesar wanted. 
 None knew better than he that most of his chief associates were men of dubious 
 character and damaged reputation. They might serve his purpose in the war, but 
 men of a more respectable type would be needed in the work of peace." (The Roman 
 Republic, iii, 323.) Perhaps the Anticato was due to a desire on Caesar's part to 
 check the spread of a cult for the stern republican which might make it more difficult 
 to use the nobles in his government. 
 
158 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 partner in the state. But this was in no wise an easy thing 
 to do. If the Pompeian party was spared, its members 
 could not very well be excluded from the senate, since with- 
 out them that body would have lost all moral weight in 
 Roman eyes. If they remained, they formed a majority 
 secretly hostile to Caesar. If he sought to overcome this 
 majority by a wholesale creation of new peers — to borrow 
 English terminology — he would enrage the old nobility and 
 at the same time bring the senate into popular contempt, 
 which would go far to render it useless for his purpose. 
 He tried the experiment of appointing new senators till 
 these dangers became manifest. 59 Only one way remained 
 and that was to bring about a gradual transformation of 
 the senate through the magistracies. Under the pretext 
 of the increased needs of the imperial administration the 
 number of the magistrates could be decidedly augmented 
 and new men thereby introduced among the conscript fath- 
 ers. The provinces, whose number Sulla had fixed at ten, 
 had been increased by Pompey to twelve, and Caesar's con- 
 quest of Gaul would now add several more. Taking ad- 
 vantage of this the dictator raised the number of the prae- 
 tors to sixteen and of the quaestors to forty. This would 
 create a considerable number of new senators each year, 
 and if the selections were made with care these new addi- 
 tions would in time decidedly alter the political complexion 
 of the senate. The transformation would take place some- 
 what slowly, since there were many noble families to whose 
 younger members Caesar could not very well refuse the 
 honor of the quaestorship. In spite of this, the increase in 
 the number of the quaestors was so great that it would not 
 require many years to make a marked change in the com- 
 position of the senate. Until this had been accomplished 
 Caesar's position must remain substantially what it then 
 was and he must perforce continue his dictatorship. If 
 he did so, it was natural that he should seek some sort of 
 
 59 The new senators whom Caesar appointed were the jest of Rome. 
 
CAESAR 159 
 
 justification in men's minds for the retention of his extra- 
 ordinary powers. 
 
 Such a justification Caesar sought in new wars and con- 
 quests. Perhaps, like Napoleon, his head was turned by 
 military glory and astonishing success so that he came to 
 love war for itself. But, like Napoleon, he may also have 
 seen in war a plausible excuse for his autocracy and in vic- 
 tory the means to blind his subjects to the loss of their 
 freedom. Whatever may have been his motive, he had 
 scarcely ended the war at home before he began to plan 
 a new campaign for the conquest of Parthia. No doubt 
 the wish to rival Alexander the Great had something to do 
 with this design, but another motive must surely have been 
 the hope that such a war would serve to solve, or at least 
 to help in solving, the difficulties at home. While Rome 
 was at war, his military dictatorship would not be nearly 
 so open to attack, and if he could return from the East with 
 the added laurels of a conqueror of Parthia, all opposition 
 might be overcome and the way smoothed for a permanent 
 settlement such as was for the present beyond his powers. 
 
 While Rome was thus kept in a turmoil of war and rumors 
 of war, Caesar's position as a temporary autocrat admitted 
 of excuse. He had taken this position at the start as a 
 matter of obvious necessity. Later it was consolidated and 
 extended. When he first occupied the city with his forces, 
 he had been named dictator for the purpose of holding the 
 elections. He held the office for only eleven days, just long 
 enough to fulfil the purpose for which it was conferred, but 
 it was voted to him again after Pharsalia. The second 
 grant of the dictatorship was for ten years, and after Munda 
 it was given to him for life. Along with the dictatorship 
 other powers were conferred upon him which made him 
 absolute master of the Roman state, and reduced all other 
 factors of the government to utter insignificance. Not only 
 was Caesar dictator for life with all the vast authority 
 which that title implied, but he possessed as well the powers 
 of the tribune and the censor. The first were given him, 
 like the dictatorship, for life, the second for three years 
 with the title of Praefectus morum. As pontifex maximus 
 
160 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 he was the head of the Roman religion, and lastly he was 
 one of the two consuls for each year. Yet even this it 
 seemed was not enough, and the power was voted to him to 
 name most of the annual magistrates without the need of 
 a popular election. Still further, since he was intending to 
 set out upon a Parthian campaign, he was allowed to 
 designate the consuls and half the praetors for five years in 
 advance. Thus the entire government was centered in his 
 hands. The assembly was powerless to intervene, whether 
 by means of its legislative or electoral functions. The 
 senate was quite helpless, since by his censorial power he 
 could control its membership, as consul could determine 
 what matters should come before it for discussion, and by 
 his tribunician power could prevent it from passing any 
 decree of which he disapproved. The magistrates were his 
 nominees and that same tribunician power in his hands 
 made any attempt at independent action on their part im- 
 possible. With such a concentration of powers in his hands 
 he could have used the famous phrase "Petat c'est moi" in 
 sober seriousness. 
 
 Did Caesar intend the position thus briefly summarized 
 to be a permanent one ? In substance yes, but whether pre- 
 cisely in this form it is impossible to say. If his life had 
 been spared, he might on his return from the Orient have 
 exchanged his title of dictator for some other name. But 
 that he meant to keep the substance of his power in some 
 form, his contemporaries were convinced, and it can scarcely 
 be doubted that in this they were entirely correct. It was 
 in this sense that they interpreted his oft-repeated saying 
 that he would never imitate Sulla. At first they seem to 
 have taken this to signify that he would not resort to a 
 proscription. Gradually, however, they came to construe 
 it to mean that he would never abdicate. As this convic- 
 tion grew and deepened, it paved the way for the tragedy 
 that followed. Romans might submit to be governed by 
 the sword in an emergency, but they were not yet ready to 
 accept it as a permanent regime. They had regarded 
 Caesar as a second Sulla without the stain of blood. They 
 
CAESAR 161 
 
 had assumed that as soon as peace was restored he would 
 use his power to establish a settled government. They did 
 not see that they themselves had rendered this impossible, 
 and when Caesar gave no sign of fulfilling their anticipa- 
 tions, they angrily attributed it to his insatiable and crim- 
 inal ambition. Such a hope and such a disappointment we 
 see clearly enough in Cicero, and events soon showed that 
 his feelings were shared by many others. When the victory 
 of Munda had put the seal on Caesar's mastery, the orator 
 had striven to approach him with advice. He had addressed 
 the autocrat a long treatise on the subject of his future 
 policy, but on learning from those who composed Caesar's 
 court that it was quite unacceptable he had laid his still- 
 born work away and in his public attitude revealed his 
 growing bitterness and disillusionment. Even Caesar, 
 though surrounded by flatterers, could not fail to see the 
 growth of hostile sentiment. On learning that Cicero had 
 been kept waiting in his antechamber for an audience, he 
 had exclaimed: "Can I doubt that I am exceedingly dis- 
 liked, when Marcus Cicero has to sit waiting and cannot 
 see me at his own convenience? And yet if there is a good- 
 natured man in the world it is he ; still I feel no doubt that 
 he heartily dislikes me." 60 
 
 Yet though these words would show that he was by no 
 means blind to his danger, he took no precautions. Per- 
 haps he overestimated the intelligence and insight of his 
 enemies. He had so long been face to face with the realities 
 and problems of empire that he may have failed to appreciate 
 that much that was clear enough to him was hidden by a 
 haze of custom and tradition from the eyes of others. He 
 must have known that his death could not really serve his 
 foes, and very probably he did not fully grasp the fact that 
 this was not by any means so clear to them. Disdaining to 
 protect his person, he spent the last months of his life busy 
 with work and plans for future conquest and heedless of 
 the conspiracy which was taking shape around him. 
 
 The personal motives that influenced the murderers of 
 
 ^Letters, iv, 6. Att., xiv, 1. 
 
162 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Caesar matter little, but the public considerations by which 
 they justified their act to themselves and others are of sig- 
 nificance. They hoped that by killing Caesar they would 
 restore the republic, and there were certain appearances 
 which gave a color of plausibility to such a hope. The 
 republic had not been in any sense abolished. Magistrates, 
 people, senate all existed, but while the dictator stood above 
 them clothed with such powers as he then held, they were 
 powerless to move except at his command. Yet they were 
 there and Caesar seemed the only obstacle to their working. 
 If he were gone, the magistrates, senate, and people would 
 once more be free to act independently. All that was neces- 
 sary to set Rome free was to strike down the tyrant who 
 alone stood in the way of liberty. Such a view did, indeed, 
 fail utterly to take account of some of the most serious fac- 
 tors in the case. It took the outside show of constitutional 
 forms for the realities. It assumed that the dictator, who 
 was an obvious obstacle to the senate's independence and 
 control was the only obstacle, forgetting that for many 
 years past the conscript fathers had been quite unable to 
 dominate the state. All this the conspirators overlooked, 
 and thus it was that, when their purpose was accomplished, 
 the blow was struck at Caesar alone and no plans whatever 
 were made as to what was to follow. The murderers seem 
 to have been quite confident that with Caesar removed the 
 constitution would automatically resume its normal opera- 
 tion. "When this result failed to follow Caesar's death, 
 their surprise and bewilderment were at once ludicrous and 
 tragic. 
 
 Of the moral aspect of the deed no Roman could feel any 
 doubt, if once he were convinced that Caesar was a tyrant. 
 Rome had taken over the ethical thinking of the Greeks 
 without serious question or criticism. In that morality they 
 found it laid down as an axiom that the slaying of a tyrant 
 was not only the right but the positive duty of the citizen. 
 By tyrant the Greeks had designated any ruler, no matter 
 what his character, who had seized power illegally and who 
 ruled against the constitution of the state. In the eyes of 
 
CAESAR 163 
 
 his opponents, Caesar could not fail to be regarded as a 
 tyrant under this definition, and in so far as they regarded 
 him as such, they felt no question that his murder was a 
 righteous act. Its expediency they might and did see sub- 
 sequent reason to doubt bitterly, but its morality never. 
 The fact that Caesar was dealing boldly, and yet wisely 
 and successfully, with many of the pressing problems of 
 the moment could not avail to excuse in their eyes his failure 
 to find a constitutional settlement which they could accept. 
 His projects for the conquest of Parthia only filled them 
 with keener alarm and made them feel the need of haste. 
 If Caesar hoped by eastern victories to win acceptance of 
 his rule at home, this prospect only inspired his defeated 
 foes with added fear. If he were allowed to depart for the 
 East, all chance of striking such a blow was lost till his 
 campaign was finished. When he returned, the lapse of 
 time and his new glory might have made all hope of regain- 
 ing liberty or shaking off his despotism an idle dream. 
 They resolved therefore to act before the opportunity was 
 gone and while they still could delude themselves with the 
 hope that their action would be fruitful of results. 
 
 Moved by such considerations, in addition to their per- 
 sonal motives, the plot against the dictator was formed, 
 and for these same reasons, many in the senate welcomed 
 the deed, although they had no part in the actual conspiracy. 
 Caesar's neglect of all precautions and his refusal to pro- 
 tect himself by a strong military guard made the design 
 comparatively easy. On the Ides of March the conqueror 
 of Pompey was murdered in the senate and a new chapter 
 of Roman history was opened. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 The Destruction of the Republicans 
 
 The murder of Caesar fell like a thunderbolt upon the 
 Roman world. The suddenness of the event stunned men, 
 leaving them dazed and bewildered. The conspirators seem 
 to have expected that the death of the tyrant would be 
 hailed with acclamations and rejoicings by the liberated 
 people, but instead of this the only greeting was an ominous 
 silence. The senators, dismayed and terrified by the 
 tragedy, had fled from the senate-house and the populace 
 outside had scattered to their homes, so that the triumphant 
 murderers found themselves in the midst of a sudden 
 solitude. 
 
 The panic and the silence filled the conspirators with 
 surprise and consternation. They had no plan of action, 
 never having dreamed that action would be necessary. Now 
 they saw nothing better to do than to withdraw to the 
 Capitol and send out hasty messages to their friends and 
 those upon whose sympathy they felt that they could count. 
 If the constitution was to resume its regular working, now 
 that the tyrant was dead, the first step was to assemble the 
 senate, and the proper person to do this was the surviving 
 consul, Mark Antony. It was therefore necessary to com- 
 municate with him at once. He had been one of Caesar's 
 trusted lieutenants and was not likely to command the con- 
 fidence of the conspirators. In fact they had deliberated 
 long and earnestly whether they should not murder him at 
 the same time as Caesar. Ultimately it had been decided 
 to spare him, apparently on moral grounds. Caesar's life 
 was forfeit because he was a tyrant, but it did not appear 
 clearly that Antony was one. So one of the conspirators 
 had detained Antony at the door of the senate-house while 
 the murder was committed. From that tragic scene he 
 had fled precipitately to his own house for safety. Once 
 there and reassured for the moment, he, like the assassins 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 165 
 
 in the Capitol, spent the night in hurried consultation and 
 uncertainty. Before he dared to act in any way he wished 
 to know precisely who the men were who had done the deed 
 and what forces were behind them. When envoys of the 
 conspirators approached him the next day they found him 
 willing to convoke the senate, but unwilling to trust himself 
 in the power of the assassins. The usual meeting place of 
 the conscript fathers was near the Capitol, much too near 
 to suit the taste of Antony, and he accordingly convened 
 them in the Temple of Tellus, which was near his own house. 
 Here the conspirators did not venture to attend, but their 
 friends turned out in force, Cicero among them. 
 
 The attitude of the great orator is so instructive that it 
 may be well to interrupt the narrative for a moment to con- 
 sider it. He had no part in the conspiracy, but he heartily 
 welcomed and cordially approved the deed. This was only 
 what might have been expected from his past. When the 
 civil war broke out his sympathies were with Pompey and 
 the senate, but circumstances, or his own cowardice and 
 hesitation, prevented him from joining his leader very 
 promptly. However, he had finally followed him to the 
 East where the battle of Pharsalia seemed to him the end 
 of the war. 1 Returning to Italy, he was readily pardoned 
 by Caesar, but from this time on he took no active part in 
 public affairs, occupying himself instead with literary work. 
 As the hope of any sort of republican restoration at the 
 hands of Caesar grew fainter and the dictatorship seemed 
 more and more a permanent fact of Roman life, Cicero 
 grew steadily more bitter and despondent. After the Ides 
 of March his only feeling was a savage exultation at the 
 tyrant's death, and he made eager haste to range himself 
 among the friends and supporters of the murderers. Hence- 
 forth all his efforts were concentrated on the one aim of 
 restoring the republic. That republic he identified com- 
 pletely with the senate, and this fact furnishes a clue to 
 
 1 See his letter to Cassius, Letters, iii, 55. Fam., xv, 15. 
 
166 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 much that followed. Now that Caesar was dead, the ques- 
 tion that confronted the Roman world was just the ques- 
 tion of who should govern in his place. Not many years 
 before, a proud aristocracy had ruled Rome and had used 
 the senate as their instrument of government. The first 
 triumvirate had thrust them out of power for a time. When 
 Caesar and Pompey had begun to drift apart the nobles had 
 seen a chance to take advantage of the rivalry between the 
 two and had made Pompey their leader, but only to be de- 
 cisively defeated in the war. Caesar's dictatorship had 
 effectually barred the way against any recovery of power 
 by the aristocracy, whom he had beaten and pardoned but 
 whom he could not be persuaded to restore. His refusal 
 led to the tragedy of the Ides of March, and now the van- 
 quished nobility prepared to make a desperate effort to 
 regain their lost control. The senate was now — as always 
 — their instrument, and the republic was the name by which 
 they designated and sought to consecrate their supremacy. 
 Those who opposed them in the struggle were not con- 
 sciously aiming at some other form of government, but 
 were simply fighting to prevent the authority of the state 
 from passing into the hands of their recently defeated 
 enemies. Caesar's reforms had not yet had time to change 
 the political complexion of the senate, where the old Pom- 
 peian party was still dominant. In this struggle Cicero 
 was heart and soul with the aristocracy, and in this he was 
 simply following the convictions of his whole life. In mod- 
 ern times some critics have seen in this attitude only the 
 servility of a parvenu seeking at any cost to gain admit- 
 tance to the ranks of an old and proud nobility. There is, 
 however, another and more creditable explanation. The 
 senate must have seemed the only practical alternative to a 
 military despotism. In the days of C. Gracchus men might 
 dream that a democracy was possible in Rome, but the 
 course of events since then had been sufficient to dispel the 
 illusion. One after another of the popular leaders had 
 failed ignominiously in the attempt to govern. How was it 
 possible for Cicero, or any of his contemporaries who had 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 167 
 
 any vision of reality, to imagine that the rabble of the 
 Roman streets could rule the world ? It was not a question 
 of ruling well : how could anyone believe that the rival mobs 
 of Clodius and Milo were capable of governing at all? The 
 army and the senate might govern, but the Roman people 
 had demonstrated their utter incapacity. If Cicero could 
 not bring himself to accept a military despotism, he had no 
 choice but to support the senate. That the conscript fathers 
 were by no means perfect he was well aware from personal 
 experience. He saw clearly that their rule left much to be 
 desired, but in spite of all he clung to them as the only pos- 
 sible instrument of government under which the things he 
 prized most highly could exist. Freedom, government by 
 discussion and by law — in his view these were only to be 
 secured under the senate's rule. Caesar had represented 
 nothing but violence and arbitrary force, and these he 
 deeply hated. Now that the tyrant was dead, the only hope 
 of freedom lay with the senate, and the cause of the senate 
 was bound up with that of the conspirators. It was as 
 their ardent friend and champion that he attended the ses- 
 sion of the senate on that memorable 17th of March. 
 
 The conscript fathers, when they assembled in the Temple 
 of Tellus, found themselves confronted with formidable dif- 
 ficulties. The obvious and logical thing to do was to de- 
 clare Caesar a tyrant if they approved the murder, as the 
 majority actually did. Such a step would have freed the 
 conspirators from all blame, but it would also have an- 
 nulled all Caesar's acts by declaring that his government 
 had been illegal. It could readily be seen that the conse- 
 quences of such a declaration were likely to be serious in 
 the extreme. Caesar had been so long in power that vast 
 numbers of people were affected by his acts. Within the 
 Temple of Tellus itself were many senators who held their 
 seats by virtue of his appointment, or through some office 
 that he had conferred, and many others had received pro- 
 motion in rank from him. If he were declared a tyrant, 
 many senators would have to quit the house and many 
 more would have to step down a grade or two in rank. To 
 this they were quite naturally averse, and this was only a 
 
168 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 beginning of the consequences. If Caesar had been a tyrant, 
 the elections held under him had not been valid and neither 
 Rome nor the provinces possessed legal magistrates or gov- 
 ernors. 2 In fact the whole machinery of the state would 
 be utterly disorganized. Of this the assassins never seem 
 to have thought at all. The senate might, of course, pass 
 a decree authorizing the existing provincial governors to 
 continue to exercise their functions for the time being, but 
 in Rome itself new elections must be held at once. The 
 attitude of the people had not yet been clearly shown, and 
 no party could feel sure of how elections under present cir- 
 cumstances would result. The men then holding office 
 might easily fail to be returned and all those to whom 
 Caesar had promised the various magistracies during his 
 absence in the East would run a risk of losing them. There 
 was thus a powerful group of senators who were unwilling 
 to see Caesar declared a tyrant, and even the friends of the 
 conspirators might well be doubtful of the wisdom of such 
 a course. If there were reasons for hesitation in the sen- 
 ate-house itself, the situation out-of-doors in Rome and 
 Italy was even more ominous. How the murder would be 
 received by Caesar's soldiers was sufficiently doubtful in 
 any case, but if the news came coupled with a declaration 
 which annulled their title to the lands they held from him 
 an explosion was a certainty. The dead dictator had dis- 
 banded many thousands of his veterans and had assigned 
 them lands in various parts of the peninsula, and many 
 others were even then in Rome awaiting their rewards. 
 
 2 Appian attributes to Antony a speech setting forth these considerations. Antony 
 is represented as saying : "Those who are asking for a vote on the character of 
 Caesar must first know that if he was a magistrate and if he was an elected ruler 
 of the State all his acts and decrees will remain in full force ; but if it is decided 
 that he usurped the government by violence, his body should be cast out unburied 
 and his acts annulled. These acts, to speak briefly, embrace the whole earth and 
 sea, and most of them will stand whether we like them or not, as I shall presently 
 show. Those things which alone belong to us to consider, because they concern us 
 alone, I will suggest to you first . . . Almost all of us have held office under Caesar ; 
 or do so still, having been chosen thereto by him ; or will do so soon, having been 
 designated in advance by him ; for, as you know, he had disposed of the city offices, 
 the yearly magistracies, and the command of provinces and armies for five years. 
 If you are willing to resign these offices (for this is entirely in your power), I will 
 put that question to you first and then I will take up the remaining ones." Appian, 
 ii, 128. The translation is that of Horace White in the Loeb Library. 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 169 
 
 The only troops in the city were his, and while the senate 
 deliberated, many of these soldiers and of his disbanded 
 veterans thronged around the place of meeting with press- 
 ing demands that Caesar's promises should be redeemed. 
 Under these conditions the conscript fathers could not shut 
 their eyes to the danger of ill considered action, however 
 logical. 
 
 Since the senate did not dare to repudiate Caesar's acts, 
 it was impossible to brand him as a tyrant. Yet if this 
 were not done, then obviously his death was murder and 
 logically the conscript fathers were bound to punish the 
 assassins. In this dilemma Cicero came forward to pro- 
 pose a compromise. He advised that Caesar should not be 
 declared a tyrant and that his acts and promises should be 
 alike confirmed. This would reassure the veterans and would 
 provide the state with a legal government. To protect the 
 conspirators he urged the senate to pass an act of amnesty 
 and in this way silence all question in regard to the dic- 
 tator's death. That tragic event was to be treated as some 
 great natural calamity, in face of which the long-divided 
 parties of Rome might join hands in a reconciliation. All 
 animosities were to be laid aside and all the past was to be 
 covered by a general oblivion. The senate would accept 
 all Caesar's laws without inquiring how they had been 
 passed, the partisans of Caesar would accept the fact of his 
 death without question of how, or through whom, it had 
 come about. 3 The conscript fathers welcomed the advice 
 of the great orator, which seemed to open up the only pos- 
 sible way out of their difficulty. 
 
 After much discussion, therefore, Cicero's suggestion was 
 adopted. The amnesty was voted and the acts of Caesar 
 ratified. As to the disposition of his body, the senate voted 
 for a public funeral. This last was no part of Cicero's 
 policy, though he may not at the time have seen its full 
 danger. Atticus warned him that all was over if the public 
 funeral was allowed, 4 but the warning was probably too late 
 
 3 Dio, xliv, 32. 
 
 *Letters, iv, 29. Att., xiv, 14. 
 
170 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 to alter the result. In all likelihood the motive of the senate 
 was simply trying to carry out consistently the view they 
 wished to have taken of the murder. If Caesar died a consul 
 of Rome, it seemed only natural that he should be buried as 
 such. If no inquiry was to be made into the past, on what 
 grounds could the customary honors be refused ? And would 
 such a refusal strike his soldiers as consistent with the 
 ratification of his acts? Whether for these or other rea- 
 sons, the senate sanctioned the customary honors and gave 
 permission to the surviving consul to speak at the funeral 
 of his colleague. 
 
 Thus Antony obtained a chance to test the feeling of the 
 populace. The speech which he delivered has not been pre- 
 served and even its exact nature is a matter of some doubt. 
 Probably it consisted chiefly of the reading of the various 
 decrees of the senate and the people in the dead man's 
 honor, with comments on them by Antony himself. Cae- 
 sar's will was also read and produced a deep impression, 
 partly because of several legacies to the Roman people, but 
 perhaps as much because of a clause in which one of the 
 leading conspirators, Decimus Brutus, was named among 
 the heirs. It seems evident that Antony avoided saying 
 anything which would amount to a final break with the 
 senate, 5 but nevertheless he managed to provoke an outburst 
 of popular fury. The people were stirred to a frenzy of 
 rage and grief, and having burned Caesar's body in the 
 forum, the mob swept through the city seeking to wreak 
 vengeance on the murderers. To save themselves the 
 "demi-gods," as Cicero called the conspirators, were forced 
 to flee from Rome, while the senate, terrified by the dis- 
 order, looked on helplessly. With the republicans thus scat- 
 tered and intimidated, Antony was left free to shape his 
 course as he might choose. 
 
 What Antony's ultimate choice would be could hardly be 
 a matter of much doubt. His private interests pointed out 
 
 5 This seems clear from the uncertainty of the senate as to Antony's attitude for 
 some time after the funeral oration. Varying accounts have come down to us as to 
 the character of the oration itself. 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 171 
 
 as an obvious necessity that he should seek to rally the part- 
 isans of the dead dictator, if that were possible, and put him- 
 self at the head of a strong Caesarian party. He was a lieu- 
 tenant of Caesar and had risen solely by the favor of his 
 master. To the old nobility he had long been odious, and 
 if the aristocracy, vanquished on the battlefield, should re- 
 gain their power by the dagger, he could hope for nothing 
 better than to be permitted to retire into private life. That 
 the men against whom he had fought would forgive him 
 their defeat, or suffer him to continue in high office, was 
 more than he could reasonably expect. Whatever he ob- 
 tained from the conscript fathers he must gain by working 
 on their fears, or by taking advantage of their difficulties. 
 This he could do far more easily at the head of a strong 
 party than in any other way. Nor was Antony's position 
 in this respect unique. Caesar had gathered about him a 
 large number of officers and politicians who could hope for 
 no advancement — some, perhaps, hardly even for safety — 
 in a Rome dominated by the senate. Antony, by virtue of 
 his consulship, was the natural leader of such men, and if 
 he made a move, he might confidently hope that they would 
 rally around him. 
 
 If there were leaders in abundance for a Caesarian party 
 in opposition to the senate and its claims to rule the state, 
 the rank and file of such a party was equally ready to the 
 hand. ., The decree of the senate ratifying Caesar's acts had 
 not by any means quieted the apprehensions of his veterans. 
 Setting aside all considerations of passion and of sentiment, 
 though these were very powerful forces, there were very 
 obvious reasons for distrust. The senate had promised 
 much, but how far would it be safe to trust such promises? 
 Could it be expected that the Roman nobles would really re- 
 ward their enemies for having beaten them? If they did 
 so, they would be condemning themselves, for if Caesar's 
 soldiers were meritorious servants of the state for having 
 vanquished Pompey, what must the latter's partisans have 
 been ? No matter what were the real intentions of the sen- 
 ate, it would have been little short of a psychological miracle 
 
172 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 if Caesar's men had put much faith in their promises. 
 Cicero saw this clearly enough when he wrote to Atticus, 
 "I return to the case of the veterans ... Do you suppose these 
 men feel any confidence in retaining their grants so long as 
 our party have any footing in the state?" 6 In a later letter 
 he declared that the Caesarians kept repeating that the acts 
 of Caesar would be set aside the moment that the senate 
 ceased to be afraid. 7 
 
 The materials for a Caesarian party were thus obviously 
 in existence, and its power was likely to be out of all pro- 
 portion to its numbers. At the moment of the dictator's 
 tragic death the military forces throughout the Roman 
 world were entirely Caesarian. The legions under arms 
 had all been recruited by him, and his disbanded veterans, 
 all seasoned soldiers, were the best available material from 
 which to form new legions in a short space of time. No- 
 where could the senate look for the support of regular 
 troops, and though the republicans had many partisans, 
 they would be mostly raw recruits who could not face his 
 veterans immediately. The power of the army had not 
 been broken by Caesar's death, and that army was not in 
 the least prepared to acquiesce in the restoration of the 
 aristocracy to full control. The real issue in the events 
 that followed the Ides of March was not whether the senate 
 should take over the government, but whether the Caesarian 
 soldiery would find a single leader around whom they could 
 unite. Would Antony succeed to Caesar's place, or would 
 the army of the dictator divide its allegiance among several 
 rival chiefs ? If this last should happen, would these chiefs 
 join hands against the senate as a common foe, or would 
 they fight among themselves ? If they fought among them- 
 selves, would the struggle be sufficiently prolonged to give 
 the senate time to organize new armies upon whose devotion 
 it could really count? These questions were the true ones 
 that confronted the Roman world, and the constitutional 
 issues that were raised only served to mask and to disguise 
 
 ^Letters, iv, 18. Att., xiv, 10. 
 ''Letters, iv, 47. Att., xiv, 22. 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 173 
 
 them. In its essence the new struggle was simply the old 
 battle between Caesar and Pompey fought over again under 
 new leaders. 
 
 Antony had very quickly seen the situation as it was. 
 Although the vision of others might be as keen, he alone 
 was in a position to act. His aims were dictated by the cir- 
 cumstances in which he found himself, but at the start he 
 followed the path marked out for him with an appearance 
 of hesitation and uncertainty. This may, at first, have been 
 real enough, since even after his own purposes were clearly 
 formed, prudence might well have counseled a certain mod- 
 eration and reserve. It was wise to make sure of the army 
 before he declared irreconcilable war upon the senate and 
 its supporters. It was possible that Caesar's veterans, even 
 though they feared the restoration of the senate, might not 
 be willing to accept Antony as their leader. If he could 
 not obtain an adequate support from them, it might be ad- 
 vantageous to come to terms with the conspirators. An- 
 tony's vacillating conduct at the beginning seems to indi- 
 cate that he had no desire to burn the bridges behind him 
 until he had made certain that the road in front was open. 
 As a consequence he mingled bids for the leadership of the 
 Caesarians with concessions to the other side. It was not 
 long, however, before he threw aside the mask, since his 
 success was all that he could wish and the game seemed 
 wholly in his hands if he possessed the necessary courage 
 to play it boldly. 
 
 The decree of the senate had ratified all Caesar's acts and 
 even his intentions, and this proved of immense assistance 
 to Antony. All Caesar's papers had fallen into his hands 
 after the Ides of March, and he proceeded without scruple 
 to avail himself of the opportunity which was thus pre- 
 sented. Under the authority of the senatorial decree he 
 was in a position to do whatever he might choose, alleging 
 as his warrant that such had been the intention of the dead 
 dictator as was shown by some note or memorandum that 
 he had left behind. The resulting situation was paradox- 
 ical and filled the republicans with anger and dismay. In 
 name Caesar remained the master of the state and the 
 
174 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 conscript fathers were so far removed from any effective 
 power that the conspirators, whom they honored and wished 
 earnestly to protect, dared not show themselves in Rome. 
 "Good God," Cicero exclaimed in his exasperation and dis- 
 illusionment, "the tyranny survives though the tyrant is 
 dead ! We rejoice at his assassination, yet support his acts !" 8 
 "Can it be true?" he wrote bitterly in another letter to 
 Atticus, "Is this all that our noble Brutus has accomplished 
 — that he should have to live at Lanuvium, and Trebonius 
 should have to slink to his province by by-roads ? That all 
 the acts, memoranda, words, promises, and projects of 
 Caesar should have more validity than if he were still 
 alive?" 9 "Yes in truth," he summed the matter up deject- 
 edly, "we have been freed by heroic champions with the re- 
 sult that we are not free after all!" 10 
 
 Instead of improving, the situation grew rapidly worse as 
 Antony became bolder. Before long he began to find the 
 genuine memoranda of Caesar ill adapted to his purposes, 
 and when this was the case, he remedied the difficulty by 
 more or less extensive forgeries. If Cicero had bitterly re- 
 sented his subjection to Caesar's notebooks, he felt it still 
 more keenly when he found himself the slave of Antony's 
 fabrications. In view of this new posture of affairs he 
 wrote to one of the conspirators : "We seem not to have been 
 freed from a tyranny — only from a tyrant : for though the 
 tyrant has been killed, we obey his every nod. And not only 
 so, but measures which he himself, had he been alive, would 
 not have taken, we allow to pass on the plea that they were 
 meditated by him. And to this indeed I see no limit: de- 
 crees are fastened up; immunities are granted; immense 
 sums of money are squandered; exiles are being recalled; 
 forged decrees of the senate are being entered in the aera- 
 rium (treasury). Surely then nothing has been accom- 
 plished except to dispel the indignation at our slavery and 
 the resentment against an unprincipled man : the Republic 
 still lies involved in the confusions into which he brought it. 
 
 ^Letters, iv, 15. Att., xiv, 9. 
 ^Letters, iv, 16. Att., xiv, 10. 
 ^Letters, iv, 29. Att., xiv, 14. 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 175 
 
 . . . Up to the present it has avenged its injuries by the 
 death of the tyrant through your hands: nothing more. 
 Which of its dignities has it recovered? Is it that it now 
 obeys the man in his grave whom it could not endure in his 
 life-time ? Do we support the rough drafts of a man, whose 
 laws we ought to have torn down from the walls?" 11 From 
 all of which Cicero drew the obvious moral that much still 
 remained to be done. 
 
 Such laments, though well founded, were of very little use. 
 Antony had taken advantage of the disorders in the city fol- 
 lowing the funeral to obtain a body-guard, and with his sol- 
 diers around him was in secure control. The conspirators 
 were destitute of any means of action, and could only nurse 
 their rage and wait impatiently for Antony's consulship to 
 end. With the new year other men must come to the front, 
 and the consuls whom Caesar had designated for 43 B.C. 
 were by no means friendly to Antony. As soon as they took 
 office the republicans might hope to find some chance for 
 action. But this possibility was quite as clear to Antony as 
 to his enemies, and he naturally undertook to guard himself 
 against the danger. The best available protection would be 
 a province and an army held for a term of years, a great 
 command, in short, such as had saved Caesar from being 
 called to answer for his acts when consul. By the arrange- 
 ments of the dead dictator Antony was to receive Macedonia 
 as his proconsular command, but this appeared unsatisfac- 
 tory under the changed conditions. If Antony were to go 
 across the seas, the senate would have an opportunity to 
 raise an army in Italy with which to attack him. The ex- 
 ample of his master had not been entirely wasted on Antony 
 who determined to establish himself in the valley of the Po 
 at the head of a strong army. To do this he proposed to 
 transfer the legions assembled in Macedonia for the Par- 
 thian war to Cisalpine Gaul and to take immediate posses- 
 sion of that province for himself. Not only would this 
 strengthen him, but it would weaken his opponents. The 
 province which he meant to seize had been assigned by 
 Caesar to Decimus Brutus, in whose hands it might be very 
 
 ^Letters, iv, 36-37. Fam., xii, 1. 
 
176 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 dangerous to leave it. Cisalpine Gaul was one of the best 
 recruiting grounds in Italy, and even if he had not wished 
 it for himself, Antony would hardly have dared to let his 
 enemies obtain control there. Established in the Po valley 
 within an easy march of Rome and with a strong army 
 under his command, he might be able to dominate the situa- 
 tion. The only difficulty in the way of these arrangements 
 was that they were directly contrary to those of Caesar. In 
 this matter, however, Antony could not afford to be con- 
 sistent, and he resolved to overrule Caesar's acts where this 
 was necessary. The constitutional sovereignty of the 
 Roman people had not been in any way abridged, and in the 
 eyes of the law, the acts of the assembly were still the final 
 authority. Accordingly Antony brought before the as- 
 sembly a bill transferring the Macedonian army to Cis- 
 alpine Gaul and giving him the government of that prov- 
 ince for six years. With his body-guard about him he 
 had little difficulty in passing any bill which he might choose 
 to propose, and this one was enacted with great prompt- 
 ness. The republicans looked on helplessly and in despair, 
 for this arrangement meant quite obviously the indefinite 
 prolongation of Antony's dictatorship. While his suprem- 
 acy had seemed only a temporary accident they had found 
 it almost unendurable, and now it seemed likely to con- 
 tinue for years to come. Rather than submit to that they 
 were ready to do anything, but at first there did not appear 
 to be anything that they could do. Just when the situation 
 seemed the blackest hope suddenly came to them from a 
 wholly unexpected quarter; the Caesarian party, hitherto 
 a unit, began suddenly to split to pieces. 
 
 The attempt of Antony to rally the whole body of vete- 
 rans under his leadership had for a time seemed likely to be 
 entirely successful, but now a rival appeared upon the 
 scene in the person of Caesar's adopted son. With the 
 death of the dictator the male line of his family became ex- 
 tinct, and his nearest relative was his sister's grandson, 
 Gaius Octavius by name. In the last days of his life 
 Caesar had shown marked favor to this youth, and by his 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 177 
 
 will adopted him and made him heir to his personal for- 
 tune. His political position Caesar could not of course be- 
 queath, though had he lived it is quite possible that he 
 would have found a way to designate his grandnephew as 
 the successor to the throne. The Ides of March destroyed 
 any such prospect, and Octavius could only claim to inherit 
 Caesar's name and private property. Even this legacy was 
 beset with serious danger, and the family of Octavius were 
 strongly opposed to his acceptance, but the young man, who 
 was then about nineteen years of age, rejected their advice 
 without the slightest hesitation. The news of the assassin- 
 ation reached him at Apollonia, where he had been sent to 
 complete his education. This town was near the spot where 
 the legions intended for the Parthian war were encamped, 
 and this proximity had enabled Octavius to make friends 
 with many of the officers, who were destined to be of emi- 
 nent service to him in the future. They now came forward 
 with offers of protection, but Octavius, rightly divining that 
 he had little need of it at the moment, hastened to Rome to 
 claim his perilous inheritance. 
 
 The appearance on the scene of an adopted son of Caesar 
 was not a pleasing development to Antony, although at first 
 he attached small importance to it, not dreaming that 
 Octavius, whom he regarded as a mere boy, was a person 
 whom he need consider seriously. It was not long, however, 
 before he was forced to modify this estimate, since the in- 
 sistence of Octavius upon his rights was something that 
 could not be entirely ignored. When Caesar died there ex- 
 isted a great deal of confusion between his private fortune 
 and the money of the state which happened to be in his 
 hands at the time. The problem of distinguishing between 
 the two might have been difficult at best, but, as matters 
 stood, neither party to the case was in a mood to be im- 
 partial. Antony, now as always, found himself in want of 
 funds, and was disposed to stretch the claims of the state 
 to the utmost, while Octavius, already angered by many 
 public slights, was in no humor to submit quietly to being 
 cheated of what he could with any show of reason regard as 
 
178 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 his just rights. It was not long before Octavius was claim- 
 ing large sums which Antony could not, or would not, pay, 
 and the two became open enemies. Causes of quarrel rap- 
 idly multiplied when once hostilities had been begun. Al- 
 though Octavius had been adopted by the will of Caesar, 
 certain legal formalities remained to be completed before 
 the adoption was valid in point of law. These Antony 
 found the means to thwart, and though Octavius assumed 
 the name of the dictator and began to style himself C. Julius 
 Caesar Octavianus, his right to this designation was open 
 to dispute. The matter proved to be of little practical im- 
 portance, since the name was popularly used, and the name 
 of Caesar, if borne with any shadow of right, was a power 
 with the veterans. 
 
 In open conflict with Antony, Octavian, as he should now 
 be called, watched the consul's juggling with the provinces 
 in undisguised alarm. If Antony succeeded in carrying out 
 his plans, the youthful Caesar could not hope to play a part 
 in Roman affairs. As it had become quite clear that the 
 senate could not check his rival, Octavian resolved to ap- 
 peal to the veterans for support. For such a step he had 
 already received much encouragement ; on his way to Rome 
 the veterans had flocked around him eagerly, and he doubt- 
 less knew that many among them, disliking Antony, would 
 welcome the appearance of some other leader. The consul 
 was a dashing soldier, not without political insight and 
 ability, but he was reckless, self-indulgent, and dissolute. 
 Hence there was an under-current of opposition, even 
 among Caesar's veterans, to his assumption of control. 
 While Antony was still in Rome his enemies did not dare 
 to make a move, but when, after the passage of his pro- 
 vincial law, he left the city to take command of the Macedo- 
 nian legions, an opportunity presented itself. No sooner 
 had his rival gone than Octavian hastened to Campania and 
 called on Caesar's veterans, many of whom had been as- 
 signed lands in that region, to join him. Liberal financial 
 inducements were added to the magic of his name, and the 
 appeal met with an enthusiastic response. Although he 
 had no legal right whatever to recruit soldiers, he soon 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 179 
 
 found himself at the head of a considerable force. While 
 gathering troops in Campania he also made effective use of 
 his friends in the Macedonian army. By his provincial law 
 Antony was authorized to bring over four legions from 
 Greece to Italy, and to his great dismay half this force 
 on their arrival refused to obey his orders and went over 
 to Octavian. This desertion was a very unexpected blow 
 to Antony. The boy whom he had despised was splitting 
 up the army on which he had confidently counted, but he 
 could not stop to deal with this unforeseen development. 
 Decimus Brutus had established himself in the Cisalpine 
 province, and so far from having any intention of sur- 
 rendering it, he was now busily engaged in strengthening 
 himself there. Antony was determined to dispossess him 
 at once, and for this purpose he resolved to neglect the 
 young Caesar for the moment. He therefore gathered up 
 his sadly diminished forces and hastened to the valley of 
 the Po. 
 
 With Antony's departure for the north Octavian was left 
 to pursue his course unchecked, but he was well aware that 
 he had received a respite, not a pardon. When Antony had 
 disposed of Decimus, Octavian could not doubt that his own 
 turn would come. In truth his position was extremely 
 precarious. He was at the head of an army without a com- 
 mission from the state and was, therefore, in the eyes of the 
 law a rebel and a traitor. If he must fight Antony, he was 
 anxious to gain some legal standing, and the senate and its 
 party alone could give it to him. Besides this, his forces 
 were hardly strong enough to enable him to face his rival 
 single-handed. It was obviously to his advantage to come to 
 terms with the conservatives, for the time being at any 
 rate, and he eagerly offered the senate the protection of his 
 sword. On their side the conscript fathers, led by Cicero, 
 were anxious to avail themselves of his services. The policy 
 of Cicero in forming a combination with Octavian has been 
 subject to much censure, then and since. Nevertheless it 
 seems to admit of a very simple justification. In times of 
 crisis one can not choose his friends with too great nicety; 
 had Cicero rejected the aid of the young Caesar, he would 
 
180 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 only have ruined the senate's cause a few months earlier. It 
 is unnecessary to assume that he was duped or deceived in 
 the matter. When he first met Octavian it was with quite 
 enough suspicion, and if he finally cast his distrust aside, it 
 was not until it would have been madness to have nursed it 
 further. Once convinced that it was necessary to trust 
 Octavian, it was only common sense to try to persuade him- 
 self and others to trust fully ; to accept Octavian's services 
 and then to alienate him by perpetual suspicion would have 
 been a stupid blunder. The one chance of retaining his 
 loyalty was to treat him with apparent confidence, and if 
 no precautions could be taken against his possible treachery 
 nothing was to be gained by brooding on it. As to an al- 
 liance with Octavian the senate had practically no choice. 
 It was necessary to check Antony and save Decimus Brutus, 
 and the only way open of accomplishing this was to make 
 use of the young Caesar for the purpose. Decimus was mak- 
 ing desperate efforts to raise an army in Gaul, but his forces 
 were not yet in a condition to face the troops of Antony 
 unaided. In the East, Marcus Junius Brutus and Cassius 
 were likewise hard at work recruiting armies, but they were 
 much too far away to give any effective help immediately. 
 If Decimus was to be rescued the means must be found in 
 Italy, and without Octavian they were not to be had. Both 
 the new consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, designated by Caesar 
 to hold the office during 43 B.C., were hostile to Antony, but 
 they had no armies before their entry on their office and 
 they could not at once thereafter gather an adequate force. 
 The only material from which an army could be formed 
 immediately was to be found in Caesar's veterans, and 
 among the partisans of the senate there was no one who 
 could appeal to them. Under these circumstances when 
 Octavian, having gathered a considerable force, offered his 
 sword to the senate, Cicero could see no alternative but to 
 accept his services. He could and did write earnestly to 
 the East to urge upon the senate's champions there the 
 need of coming with all possible haste to Italy with all the 
 troops that they could bring, but till they arrived he must 
 use such soldiers as were at hand. Thus a coalition was 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 181 
 
 brought about between Octavian and the murderers of 
 Caesar. Whatever differences the future might bring to 
 light, for the immediate present they had a common enemy 
 in Antony. Suppressing his misgivings, Cicero declared 
 himself Octavian's friend and persuaded the senate to ac- 
 cept him as its general and to vote him the necessary 
 powers. This done, Octavian joined his forces to those 
 which the two consuls had succeeded in raising and set out 
 to meet the common foe. 
 
 While the forces of the senate were being strengthened 
 by the swords of Caesar's veterans, Antony pushed his oper- 
 ations against Decimus with vigor and succeeded in shutting 
 him up in the town of Mutina. The first task of the senate's 
 army was to raise the siege of this place and deliver Decimus 
 from the hands of his enemy. The brief campaign there- 
 fore centered around Mutina and Antony sustained a sharp 
 reverse. Finding himself unable to hold his lines longer, 
 he hastened to release his prey and sought to make his es- 
 cape across the Alps into Transalpine Gaul, where he hoped 
 to find support from the armies which were stationed in that 
 region. The news of his retreat elated the senate beyond 
 measure. Cicero tells us that the first reports were that 
 "Antony had fled with a small body of men, who were with- 
 out arms, panic-stricken, and utterly demoralized." 12 Had 
 this been true, he would have been doomed to speedy de- 
 struction, and even though the first reports exaggerated 
 his plight, he might, perhaps, have been completely crushed 
 had the pursuit been pushed with energy. This was not 
 done, however. The forces of Decimus, just released from 
 a long siege, were, as he himself says, "most woefully re- 
 duced and in the very worst condition from want of every 
 kind of necessary." 13 They were quite incapable of acting 
 with vigor against their retreating foe, and Octavian could 
 not be persuaded to follow up his victory. Why he refused 
 to move cannot be said with certainty. Perhaps he had no 
 wish to free the senate too completely from all danger. He 
 
 12 Letters, iv, 242. Fam., xi, 12. 
 13 Letters, iv, 236. Fam., xi, 13. 
 
182 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 must have realized that the republicans did not give him 
 their entire confidence and that nothing but necessity had 
 forced them to accept his services. If all such pressure 
 were removed, they might be but too ready to discard him, 
 and he may therefore have felt that a decisive victory would 
 be his own undoing. Another explanation is suggested in 
 a letter from Decimus to Cicero in which he wrote : "But if 
 Caesar had listened to me and crossed the Apennines, I 
 should have reduced Antony to such straits, that he would 
 have been ruined by failure of provisions rather than 
 by the sword. But neither can anyone control Caesar, nor 
 can Caesar control his own army — both most disastrous 
 facts." 14 
 
 This last suggestion may well have been near the truth, 
 for after all, the soldiers of Octavian were veterans of Julius 
 and it would hardly seem likely that they would have been 
 eager to defend the murderers. They had their own plain 
 reasons for a profound distrust of the senate which they 
 were serving, and if Octavian had presumed too far on their 
 obedience, he might well have found himself deserted by his 
 men. It is improbable that they felt any enthusiasm for a 
 war against their former comrades and it seems quite pos- 
 sible that they would have refused to hunt down one of the 
 ablest of Caesar's lieutenants even at the bidding of Oc- 
 tavian. If such was, in any degree, the sentiment of his 
 army, it can only have strengthened the doubts and hesita- 
 tions of the leader. 
 
 The senate in its folly gave Octavian little chance to 
 hesitate. Misled by the first and much exaggerated re- 
 ports of a great victory, the conscript fathers showed them- 
 selves quite blind to the realities. Octavian had saved them, 
 as Cicero freely confessed, but they had no real confidence in 
 him and little or no gratitude. Now that they thought him 
 no longer necessary, they made haste to cast him aside. 
 The war had cost both consuls their lives and new ones 
 must be chosen. A suggestion was made that Cicero and 
 Octavian should be elected, but it found little favor with 
 
 u Letters, iv, 230. Fam., xi, 10. 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 183 
 
 the nobles and was dropped. The senate transferred the 
 forces of the late consuls to the command of Decimus, thus 
 pointedly ignoring Octavian. Freed from the fear of An- 
 tony, the senate hastened to appoint a commission of ten 
 members to review the acts of his consulship. This was 
 certain to affect the interests of the veterans, but neither 
 Octavian nor any other in whom the soldiers had confidence 
 was named among the ten. By these ill advised measures 
 the senate contrived both to slight Octavian and to enrage 
 his men. The youthful Caesar could no longer hope for 
 anything from the senate, and his army was ready to back 
 him up in whatever action he might choose to take. 
 
 For a brief moment Octavian still pretended to negotiate. 
 He was already feeling his way toward a compromise with 
 Antony and he also wished to save appearances. Accord- 
 ingly he let the senate blunder on until, when action came, 
 it should seem that of the army rather than of himself. The 
 soldiers, as might have been foreseen, refused to serve un- 
 der the command of Decimus Brutus, stained as he was with 
 Caesar's blood, and sent an angry deputation to Rome to 
 demand the rewards that had been promised them and the 
 consulship for Octavian as well. The conscript fathers at- 
 tempted to evade their demands and by doing so they threw 
 away their last chance, if any still remained. Octavian had 
 assured himself that terms were possible with Antony and 
 he was now ready to let the army act. Without further 
 delay the soldiers broke up their camp in the north and 
 marched swiftly upon Rome. 
 
 While in Italy the senate and its general were thus drift- 
 ing into open war, Antony was recovering his power and in 
 truth becoming more formidable than ever. In the Trans^ 
 alpine province and the newly conquered parts of Gaul were 
 stationed important armies under the command of Lepidus 
 and Plancus. When Antony, escaping from his defeat be- 
 fore Mutina, crossed the Alps, his fate depended upon the 
 action of these two. Cicero had long seen their potential 
 importance and all that his pen could do to insure their 
 loyalty to the republic had been done. But letters, however 
 
184 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 eloquent, could not determine their decision. In truth they 
 were not the masters of their own course but were dragged 
 along by their armies. Perhaps they were quite willing 
 to follow the lead of their men, but in any case they could 
 hardly have resisted. Neither Lepidus nor Plancus had 
 any strong hold on their soldiers, and it was quite safe for 
 Antony to appeal to the latter over their heads. Lepidus 
 made no attempt to prevent the appeal, probably because 
 he wished it to succeed. As he had doubtless expected, his 
 troops declared for Antony and Lepidus promptly combined 
 his forces with those of the fugitive. Such a combination 
 was far too strong for Plancus to resist, even if he wished, 
 and he made a virtue of necessity and threw in his lot with 
 the other two. As a consequence all the troops on the further 
 side of the Alps were united under the actual control of 
 Antony, who thus found himself at the head of a large 
 army and in a position to invade Italy whenever he might 
 choose. 
 
 While Antony was thus regaining his power in the North, 
 Octavian had ended his alliance with the senate by his rapid 
 march on Rome. In vain the conscript fathers sought to 
 renew negotiations and offered to concede all his demands. 
 If he still felt any lingering inclination to accept their offers 
 a final act of folly on the part of the nobles must have swept 
 it away. The frantic appeals for help which Cicero had 
 long been sending to the provincial governors brought a 
 response which completed the ruin of the senate. Neither 
 of the republican leaders in the East made the slightest 
 move, but the propraetor of Africa dispached some troops 
 to Italy. Two legions arrived at Rome just after the 
 sweeping concessions had been offered to Octavian. With 
 this unexpected support at hand, the senate's hopes suddenly 
 revived and hurried preparations were begun for a defense. 
 But the new confidence of the conscript fathers only lasted 
 for a moment. Octavian merely hastened his advance, and 
 when he reached the city the African legions came over to 
 his side without striking a blow. The senate's power was 
 broken utterly and Rome was at his feet. 
 
 Taking possession of the city, Octavian caused himself 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 185 
 
 to be at once elected consul. This done he gratified military 
 sentiment, and doubtless his own, by passing a law to 
 punish the murderers of the great dictator. Few of the 
 conspirators were within his reach at the moment, but 
 they were all solemnly condemned to death in their absence. 
 No voice could be raised in their favor while the troops of 
 Octavian dominated the city, and the people and the juries 
 registered his will without the slightest opposition. Hav- 
 ing in this manner thrown down the gauntlet to the re- 
 publicans, Octavian left the capital and marched north to 
 encounter Antony. This time the meeting was to be a 
 friendly one, however. The previous negotiations had pre- 
 pared the way for an agreement and all that remained was 
 to arrange the final terms. The motives of Octavian in 
 forming a coalition with Antony seem fairly clear. Perhaps 
 he had never meant to fight for the senate longer than would 
 suffice to bring the overbearing and arrogant Antony to 
 terms. If he had been sincere in his alliance with Cicero, 
 recent events had taught him that any real friendship with 
 the republicans was impossible. By continuing on their 
 side he could achieve nothing but his own ruin. In the 
 event of victory they would certainly cast him aside, and 
 by fighting their battles for them he might easily forfeit 
 the loyalty of his army. Besides all this, Antony was much 
 the stronger of the two since he had gained the legions of 
 Gaul, and in a war had every chance to win. Octavian had, 
 therefore, little choice but to accept terms if decent ones 
 were offered. 
 
 On his side Antony had equally strong motives for com- 
 promise. Although he had the stronger army, he could 
 not afford to overlook the fact that in the East large forces 
 were gathering under the command of Marcus Junius 
 Brutus and Cassius. If Caesar's veterans should fight 
 among themselves, Antony might crush Octavian, but it was 
 very probable that he would find his army so much weakened 
 by the victory that he in turn would fall an easy victim to 
 the republicans. Even had he been entirely sure of his 
 men, he might well think a contest under such conditions 
 too dangerous. But would his men have been ready to 
 
186 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 follow him? Now that Octavian had broken with the sen- 
 ate and had proscribed the conspirators, would Caesar's 
 veterans have been willing to fight against his adopted son, 
 the bearer of his name, supported as he was by followers 
 who were their former comrades? We may well suspect 
 that the pressure of the army was added to the other con- 
 siderations and that all combined to point in the direction of 
 some compromise which should unite the Caesarians against 
 their common foes. 
 
 Both Antony and Octavian were, therefore, in a mood for 
 compromise, and Lepidus served as a convenient mediator. 
 The three met upon an island in the Po and there agreed to 
 the formation of the second triumvirate. Unlike the first 
 this was to be a legal institution. They resolved to pass a 
 law creating a triple dictatorship for themselves and to 
 combine their armies for a war with the republicans. The 
 East they had yet to conquer, but the West they could and 
 did divide among themselves. Lepidus was to keep his 
 provinces of Spain and Narbonensis, 15 Antony took the 
 newly conquered parts of Gaul together with the Cisalpine 
 province, and Octavian got only Africa and the islands of 
 Sardinia and Sicily. Italy itself was to be kept under the 
 joint rule of the three, but while the other two should be 
 absent in the East Lepidus was to act as their representative 
 there. 
 
 One other measure was decided on at the conference 
 which has left a lasting stain on the triumvirs. They de- 
 termined to revert to Sulla's methods and to open their ad- 
 ministration by a sweeping proscription of their enemies. 
 The motives which they avowed in public have been pre- 
 served in Appian. In their proclamation they dwelt much 
 upon their wrongs and pointed out that while they marched 
 against their open foes they could not safely leave their ene- 
 mies at home to strike them from behind. They called at- 
 tention to the disastrous results of Caesar's clemency and 
 sought to cover their own deeds with a specious appearance 
 
 15 Narbonensis was the old province of Transalpine Gaul. After the conquests of 
 Caesar it had lost its old importance, since it was no longer a frontier province. 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 187 
 
 of indignation at his murder. 16 Beneath the surface there 
 were other motives which could not be avowed with decency. 
 All three had been making lavish promises to their soldiers 
 and now the time had come to pay. From the treasury of 
 the state they could not hope to meet their obligations, and 
 the confiscations which accompanied the proscription were 
 necessary to enable them to satisfy the most pressing of 
 their men's demands. Cupidity and vengeance thus joined 
 hands, and while they struck down their personal and po- 
 litical foes, they took into account the rich as well. Each 
 of the three gave up those of his friends who had incurred 
 the resentment of his partners, and thus Octavian was ob- 
 liged to sacrifice Cicero to Antony. But the death of the 
 great orator was only one of many; some 300 senators and 
 2000 knights perished in the massacre. The republicans 
 in Italy were thus wiped out in blood. Their refusal to 
 accept the dictatorship of Caesar was paid for by their 
 complete destruction at the hands of men, not one of whom 
 had rendered to the state even a small fraction of his ser- 
 vices. If Caesar had ignored their prejudices and scruples, 
 those who followed him did infinitely worse. Of those who 
 had slain Caesar and of those who had approved and con- 
 doned the act, only such survived as found their way as 
 fugitives to the camp of their last remaining champions in 
 the East or with Sextus Pompey in the West. 
 
 In later years, when Octavian had become the emperor 
 Augustus and had reverted to a policy of clemency, it was 
 his natural course to try to shift the blame for the proscrip- 
 tion to the shoulders of the vanquished Antony. This ver- 
 sion of events, although official, is in no way impossible. 
 The blame, indeed, must rest in greatest measure on the 
 older and stronger of the partners. Without the consent 
 of Antony there could have been no such massacre. But 
 there is also a tradition that Octavian, though reluctant 
 at the start, was far more ruthless than his colleagues after 
 
 16 Appian, iv, 8-11. 
 
188 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 the decision had been made. This would be highly character- 
 istic, at any rate ; from boyhood he displayed a cool astute- 
 ness and a calm, deliberate policy which contrasted strongly 
 with the recklessness of Antony. He was less likely to sac- 
 rifice expediency to passion or to pity than was the im- 
 pulsive and not ungenerous soldier, and he was far too able 
 not to see clearly that a proscription which failed to destroy 
 the party at which it was aimed would be not only a crime, 
 but what was worse, a blunder. 
 
 The thorough destruction of the republicans in Italy had 
 two immediate results : all danger of revolt was at an end, 
 and means were found to quiet temporarily the clamors of 
 the soldiers. The three could now turn to meet the armies 
 which their opponents had gathered in the East. Leaving 
 Lepidus in charge of Italy, Antony and Octavian embarked 
 their legions for Greece, where Cassius and M. Brutus were 
 awaiting them. These two conspirators, fleeing from Rome 
 while Antony was dominant there as consul, had taken pos- 
 session of nearly all the East without having, or needing, 
 the slightest legal right. 17 Brutus had seized Macedonia 
 after the bulk of the troops had been withdrawn by Antony, 
 while Cassius had gained complete control of Syria. They 
 had succeeded in raising large forces but had taken no part 
 in the decisive events in Italy. Turning a deaf ear to Cic- 
 ero's frantic appeals for help, they had stood passive during 
 the last agony of the republic to restore which they had 
 murdered Caesar. The cause of their inaction can not be 
 fully known. Cassius was probably too far away to act 
 in time and it is on M. Junius Brutus that the chief respon- 
 sibility must fall. It is just possible that the condition of 
 his army was such as to prevent any other course, but the 
 impression given by his letters to Cicero is rather that 
 narrow-minded obstinacy was the explanation. He had a 
 profound distrust of Octavian and was bitterly opposed to 
 the alliance with him. He disapproved of extreme meas- 
 ures against Antony and Lepidus, and was firmly convinced 
 that he in Macedon could judge the situation better than the 
 
 17 See the article by Schwartz in Hermes, xxxiii. 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 189 
 
 men in Rome. When the break between Octavian and the 
 senate began, he answered Cicero's appeals with a compla- 
 cent "I told you so." Quite probably he did not appreciate 
 the full extent of the danger, or anticipate the proscription 
 till it was too late, but seemingly he held aloof from Cicero's 
 policy because it was not his and left his party to be ruined 
 because it would not follow his advice. Apparently what 
 he desired was that the senate should abandon Rome to take 
 refuge in his camp, as had been done in Pompey's day. 18 
 Then, in due time, he hoped to bring them back and re- 
 establish the republic again. As things turned out it would 
 have mattered very little in the end, and Cicero was right in 
 feeling that if the republic could not be saved in Italy it 
 was lost beyond recall. 
 
 Now that the tragic end had come in Rome, nothing re- 
 mained for the two tyrannicides in the East but to unite 
 their armies and fight a last battle for their lives. In 
 reality the nobility who had murdered Caesar, or approved 
 the deed, had perished, and with them the republic they had 
 thought to preserve or to restore. The future government 
 must be one resting upon the swords of the soldiers and not 
 upon the votes of the senate. A victory for Brutus and 
 Cassius might change the personnel of that government but 
 could not change its character. Whichever party won, in 
 the pass to which things had now come, their power would 
 have no basis but the sword. If Brutus and Cassius had 
 prevailed, they might have undertaken to restore the re- 
 public, but the wishes of the senate would have counted for 
 little in the decision. Their rule would have been set up 
 by the legions and would have depended for its existence 
 upon their support. The senate might have been revived 
 and reorganized and given nominal supremacy again, but 
 this was destined to be the policy of Octavian in the years 
 to come after the fall of Antony had left him sole master of 
 the Roman world. There is no reason to suppose that the 
 senate as reconstituted by Brutus and Cassius would have 
 been in any way more capable of governing than was the 
 
 18 Meyer, 548-44. 
 
190 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 senate of Augustus. Underneath the surface its position 
 would have been much the same in the one case as in the 
 other. Placed in nominal control by a successful general, it 
 could have retained that control only so long as its restorer 
 kept possession of the sword for its defense. If once the 
 author of its authority should let slip the command of the 
 army, the conscript fathers would be at the mercy of some 
 new military chief. Eeal power the senate could not have 
 unless some means could be devised to give it a serious hold 
 upon the loyalty of the legions. The army had paid little 
 heed to the conscript fathers since the reforms of Marius, 
 and to alter this condition of affairs a reorganization of the 
 military system was required. It seems impossible to 
 imagine that such sweeping changes could have come from 
 the conspirators. The murder itself is conclusive evidence 
 of their narrow pedantry. The war which ended at Phil- 
 ippi was, therefore, in no real sense a struggle for the old 
 republic; in its essence it was only a battle between rival 
 pretenders to the throne. Such a struggle, while important 
 for individuals, hardly matters for history except as one 
 or the other of the rival claimants may be judged the better 
 fitted for the task of government. 
 
 The issue was not long in doubt. The battle of Philippi 
 crushed forever the hopes of the great party which had 
 followed Pompey and after Caesar's death had made a last 
 effort to regain control of the state. That this result was 
 fortunate for the world there can be little doubt. Nothing 
 that we know of Brutus or of Cassius would seem to indicate 
 that they possessed better qualifications for the task of re- 
 organization than did either of the victors. Octavian must 
 be accounted a great statesman and Antony displayed a 
 far clearer insight into realities than was shown by the con- 
 spirators. The men who killed Caesar without a thought 
 of what their next step was to be had shown themselves so 
 blind to obvious consequences, so unable to look beneath the 
 surface of things, that it cannot be a matter of regret that 
 the work of restoring order to the world should have fallen 
 into other hands. Even Antony was better qualified to 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICANS 191 
 
 rule than men who combined such violence and such short- 
 sightedness. Their fate is hardly likely to provoke much 
 sympathy ; their crime was atoned for with their lives, and 
 in their ruin they dragged down their whole party. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 The Triumph of Octavian 
 
 Although the battle of Philippi destroyed the last serious 
 foes of the triumvirs, the task which confronted them was, 
 nevertheless, one of extreme difficulty. The whole world had 
 been thrown into confusion and now urgently demanded 
 peace and reorganization at their hands. Their soldiers 
 were clamorous for pay and the treasury of the three 
 was empty. In the West the silence and submission showed 
 that the proscription had succeeded in its purpose, but the 
 war with the republicans had produced chaos throughout 
 the East. The triumvirs found themselves obliged to deal 
 at once with two separate and distinct problems. The 
 West must be kept quiet and their soldiers pacified by being 
 paid a part, at least, of their demands ; and while this was 
 being done, the East must be reorganized and set to rights. 
 It was obvious that the soldiers could not safely be ignored, 
 and it was equally essential to deal promptly with the East. 
 Caesar's experience warned them that to neglect a thorough 
 settlement of regions which the republicans had held might 
 lead to a renewal of the war. It was Caesar's delay in 
 making an end of his opponents after Pharsalia that had 
 prolonged the contest. The victorious triumvirs had no 
 desire to fight a Thapsus or a Munda, and so they promptly 
 determined to divide the difficult task between them. 
 
 In making the arrangements after Philippi, Antony 
 showed himself decidedly the predominant partner. The 
 credit of the victory belonged to him rather than to Octa- 
 vian, and he could safely impose his will in the division of 
 responsibility. He took for himself the lion's share of the 
 spoils and the more alluring of the tasks before the two. 
 The East was the richest part of the Roman world, and 
 the settlement of its affairs promised to present few diffi- 
 culties and enormous profit. The triumvirs hoped to fill 
 their exhausted treasury in this region, and to have this 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 193 
 
 money in his own hands might easily prove of great ad- 
 vantage to Antony. In the West the task of settling condi- 
 tions abounded in difficulties, owing to the demands of the 
 army and the bankruptcy of the three. The confiscations 
 which had accompanied the proscription had been but a 
 drop in the bucket, and new confiscations would be neces- 
 sary to satisfy the troops. Whoever undertook this was 
 certain to rouse the bitter resentment of those whom he 
 despoiled, and it was not by any means sure that he would 
 be able to content the army. It seemed not unlikely that 
 he might alienate all parties and every class, while his col- 
 league in the East would be engaged in the easy work of 
 settling the affairs of the richest provinces of the empire, 
 in doing which he might possess himself of an immense 
 sum of ready money. If the triumvir in the West should 
 fail, as it was probable he might, all parties would turn 
 with one accord to his partner in the East, those who were 
 being robbed as the only man who could save their property 
 or compensate them for its loss, the soldiers as the only 
 man who could pay them the rewards so often promised. 
 These considerations were so obvious that there can be lit- 
 tle wonder that Antony selected the East as his share of 
 the world and turned over to the weaker Octavian the dan- 
 gerous problems of the West. It is possible that Antony 
 already dreamed of carrying out Caesar's plan for the con- 
 quest of Parthia, but such an enterprise, if successful, would 
 only serve to make his advantages the greater by giving 
 him new military glory and the immense plunder of the 
 Farther East. Appian represents Octavian as choosing 
 the West of his own accord on account of his health, 1 but 
 this seems hardly credible. It is quite true that Octavian 
 had been seriously ill at the time of the battle of Philippi 
 and that he was still far from strong, but it is not easy to 
 see why the task awaiting him in Italy was any better 
 adapted to the delicate health of an invalid than that in 
 the East would have been. Even if the statement of Ap- 
 pian be accepted, it would still be certain that the other 
 
 1 Appian, v, 3. 
 
194 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 arrangements were such as Octavian would never have ac- 
 cepted voluntarily. Antony not only assumed full authority 
 over all eastern affairs, but he retained control of a large 
 part of the West as well. He decided to keep what he had 
 held under the first division and to add to it a portion of the 
 share of Lepidus. The latter had been from the start the 
 weakest of the three and his two partners now determined 
 to despoil him. Antony took for himself the province of 
 Transalpine Gaul, and Octavian received the two provinces 
 of Spain. If Lepidus objected and it should seem danger- 
 ous to set him aside entirely, it was agreed that he should 
 be given Africa and Numidia in exchange for the prov- 
 inces which he was required to surrender. These arrange- 
 ments were distinctly favorable to Antony. He held all 
 Gaul across the Alps as well as the Cisalpine province, and 
 though Octavian was given all of Spain, this was far less 
 valuable in every way than Gaul, and was moreover com- 
 pletely cut off from Italy by the regions held by Antony. 
 Besides all this the army of Antony was to be the larger, 
 and while a portion of it would follow him to the East, 
 strong forces under his generals would remain behind in 
 Gaul and even in Italy itself. Such a dispersal of his le- 
 gions might prove dangerous in the future, but at the mo- 
 ment he undoubtedly occupied a far stronger position than 
 Octavian. 
 
 As soon as the triumvirs had completed these arrange- 
 ments each set about the work allotted to him. Octavian 
 returned to Rome with empty hands and clamorous vete- 
 rans in his train to undertake the formidable task of satis- 
 fying them without entire ruin to himself. He was not 
 long in realizing the difficulties of his position. The sol- 
 diers demanded land and none was available without some 
 fresh spoliation. Octavian, in no wise anxious for more 
 unpopularity than had already fallen to his lot, sought to 
 make his new demands as moderate as possible. In this 
 endeavor he very nearly fell between the two horns of the 
 dilemma by rousing to fury those who felt their property 
 in danger, while leaving the army, on which he must rely 
 for power and safety, still unsatisfied. He had scarcely 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 195 
 
 set about his task when the inevitable discontent began to 
 show itself in a particularly menacing form because of the 
 leaders around whom it gathered. These were none other 
 than the brother and the wife of his own colleague. De- 
 claring that the new acts of plunder were contrary to the 
 absent triumvir's wishes, Lucius Antony and Fulvia put 
 themselves at the head of a violent agitation against Octa- 
 vian and his policy. 
 
 In the face of this opposition the latter hesitated at first, 
 fearing to act with decision lest Antony's generals should 
 come to the support of his relatives. However when his 
 own men began to desert him, he dared no longer temporize 
 but struck boldly as his only chance of saving himself from 
 shipwreck. Mustering his troops, he shut his foes up in 
 the city of Perusia and there besieged them, while casting 
 many anxious glances around him to see if Antony's forces 
 would march to their relief. Fortunately for him the offi- 
 cers of his colleague hesitated in great perplexity. Both 
 sides in Italy claimed Antony's sanction for their course, 
 and each could do so with some show of reason. It would 
 have seemed quite natural to trust his wife and brother, 
 if it had not seemed equally so to trust his partner who 
 produced a written agreement with him duly signed and 
 sealed. This might have been decisive if men could have 
 felt quite sure how Antony would take the defeat of his 
 two relatives. Such an event might rouse his resentment, 
 agreement or no agreement. Thus Antony's officers found 
 themselves uncertain how to act, and fearful of the respon- 
 sibility, they hesitated and did nothing. Another factor in 
 the situation was that the forces of Antony were divided 
 among several generals who were without a common plan. 
 Thus it came about that no one of them ventured to make a 
 stand against Octavian single-handed, and there was no 
 concert whatever between them. Under these circum- 
 stances Fulvia and Lucius failed to obtain any assistance 
 and were finally compelled to surrender. 
 
 While the crisis was still acute and immediately after the 
 fall of Perusia, Octavian made earnest efforts to detach 
 some of the Antonian armies from their allegiance. Two 
 
196 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 legions commanded by Plancus came over to him, but the 
 rest rejected his offers. 2 Fate, however, suddenly gave him 
 an unexpected but welcome advantage. Fufius Calenus, 
 the general whom Antony had left in command of Gaul 3 
 with a considerable army, died and Octavian, hastening 
 there in person, succeeded in taking over both the provinces 
 and the army from the son of Calenus, whom he found in 
 charge. 4 Thus circumstances had enabled him to upset 
 the unfavorable arrangements made after Philippi and to 
 gain the control of practically the entire West. Yet his 
 position was by no means free from anxiety, since Antony 
 still had considerable forces in Italy. After the fall of 
 Perusia these had hastened to the coast to await the coming 
 of their leader or the arrival of definite orders from him. 
 Octavian had gained the army in Gaul, but seems to have 
 been doubtful of its loyalty. 5 A war with Antony was 
 something which he could not contemplate without misgiv- 
 ings and which he did his best to avert. When Perusia 
 surrendered, he was careful to avoid giving his colleague 
 any cause for complaint by treating with gentleness and 
 courtesy the relatives and particular friends of Antony. 
 If vengeance was taken upon any, he took care to let it 
 fall on none whose fate would rouse his absent partner's 
 resentment. Fulvia and Lucius were allowed to depart un- 
 harmed for Greece, there to lay their complaints before 
 Antony, while Octavian prepared to stand on the defensive 
 if a break should come. For a time war seemed probable 
 enough. It appeared unlikely that Antony would permit 
 the wrongs of his relatives, and especially the seizure of 
 his provinces and legions, to go unavenged and Octavian 
 prepared gloomily for the struggle that seemed inevitable. 
 Yet the inevitable did not happen, and this for several 
 reasons. Antony cared little for the wrongs of his wife 
 and brother and seemed disposed to believe those who af- 
 firmed that they had brought them on themselves by their 
 
 2 Appian, v, 50. 
 
 3 Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, iv, 58. 
 
 4 Appian, v, 51. Dio, xlviii, 20. 
 
 5 Appian, v, 66. The fact might be inferred in any case. 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 197 
 
 own recklessness and folly. The policy of Octavian had 
 only been what he had agreed to in advance, and he could 
 not with decency protest against it. These reasons for 
 moderation might have been overborne by resentment at 
 the action of Octavian in Gaul, but they were reinforced 
 by other motives which he dared not disregard. In the 
 Perusine war the sympathies of the soldiers must have been 
 with Octavian rather than with his enemies. His difficul- 
 ties must have seemed to the army to be due to his well- 
 meant efforts to provide for his troops, and Fulvia and 
 Lucius can not have been regarded with much sympathy 
 by the veterans whose rewards they were trying to hold 
 back. In such a cause his soldiers were not likely to sup- 
 port Antony with any enthusiasm against their former com- 
 rades. The influence of the army was, therefore, exerted 
 strongly in favor of some compromise which would maintain 
 the peace. The sentiment of the legions was something that 
 neither of the two triumvirs could venture to disregard, 
 even if they had been otherwise desirous of war. But both 
 had private reasons for avoiding it if possible. Octavian 
 was at the head of a large army, but a considerable part of 
 it was composed of troops whom he had just taken away 
 from his rival and of whose loyalty he was very doubtful. 
 So anxious was he to avoid hostilities that he had sought 
 earnestly to refrain from any act which would make the 
 break irreparable, and he now dispatched friends to his 
 colleague to explain and justify his course. On his side, 
 Antony was by no means ready for a decisive conflict. The 
 East was still so far from settled that ominous clouds were 
 gathering in that quarter where the Parthians were threat- 
 ening an invasion of Syria, and under these circumstances 
 he was reluctant to involve himself in a war in the West. 
 The news of the Perusine war had reached him in Alex- 
 andria, but he displayed no eagerness to return to Italy. 
 Instead of hastening home to settle with Octavian, he lin- 
 gered in Egypt until the eastern situation itself compelled 
 him to return. The forces he had with him in the East 
 were inadequate to deal with the Parthians so that it was 
 necessary to bring up reinforcements, and a large part of 
 
198 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 his army was in Italy itself. Moreover, though he showed 
 little sympathy with the complaints of Fulvia, he was not 
 disposed to overlook the seizure of his legions and his prov- 
 inces. 
 
 When Antony arrived in Italy, his future course of action 
 was still so uncertain that Octavian prevented him from 
 landing at Brundisium. Yet in spite of this a peaceful set- 
 tlement was finally reached. The influence of the soldiers 
 who were reluctant to fight each other prevailed, and when 
 at length Antony landed, it was to negotiate rather than to 
 fight. An agreement was soon brought about and a treaty, 
 known as the treaty of Brundisium, was arranged between 
 the two triumvirs. The terms of peace could hardly fail 
 to be greatly to the advantage of Octavian. He was, in- 
 deed, obliged to hand back to Antony the legions he had 
 taken from Calenus, but he was able to keep the provinces 
 of Gaul which he had seized at the same time. Perhaps 
 his colleague agreed to this the more readily since, if he re- 
 mained for any length of time in the East, Gaul could be 
 of comparatively little use to him. As soon as he had 
 sailed for Italy the Parthians had invaded Syria, and a 
 serious war with them was unavoidable. For this Antony 
 required soldiers and not provinces too remote to be of 
 much importance in the conflict. Accordingly he insisted 
 that his legions should be restored to him, and in addition 
 he reserved the right to recruit soldiers in Italy on an equal 
 footing with Octavian. 6 By this new division of the prov- 
 inces Antony retained the East while giving up nearly all 
 the West to his partner. Lepidus, who can hardly be con- 
 sidered as a partner though he bore the name of one, was 
 to keep Africa. To make the treaty seem more binding to 
 the soldiers, who had largely dictated it, Antony married 
 Octavia, the sister of Octavian. This was possible, or at 
 any rate easier, since Fulvia had just died, rumor said of 
 a broken spirit because of her husband's indifference to her 
 wrongs. 
 
 The peace concluded, Antony visited Rome, but made 
 only a short stay in the city. The affairs of the East were 
 
 6 Appian, v, 65. 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 199 
 
 calling for his attention, and with his new wife he soon set 
 out for Greece. Here news arrived that the Parthians had 
 been disposed of by his officers, at least for the moment, 
 and he remained for a considerable time in Greece, busy with 
 preparations for the conquest of Parthia, which he intended 
 to attempt. 
 
 In the West Octavian was soon confronted with a new foe 
 in the person of a son of the great Pompey, who had turned 
 pirate and become dangerously strong. After the battle of 
 Pharsalia had overthrown his father's party in the field, 
 the young Sextus Pompey had succeeded in making his 
 escape to Spain. After Munda he had taken to the sea and 
 gathered around him a large number of reckless men. At 
 first no one had thought him worthy of serious attention, 
 but while the world was occupied with other matters his 
 power had grown steadily, recruited from all sides. To 
 him had fled runaway slaves, pirates, refugees from the 
 proscription and their like, until at length his forces be- 
 came so strong that he was able to play a part of greater 
 dignity. He seized the islands of Sicily and Sardinia and 
 ravaged the western seas at pleasure. At the time of the 
 treaty of Brundisium he had been in alliance with Antony, 
 but that leader abandoned him without hesitation in order 
 to come to terms with Octavian. The latter had at first 
 intended to proceed at once to war against him, but the 
 pressure of popular feeling at Rome, and doubtless that of 
 Antony as well, led him finally to agree to a peace with 
 Sextus. This peace, known as the treaty of Misenum, 
 proved to be only a brief truce, and hostilities soon flamed 
 out again. It matters little which of the two was the more 
 to blame. In truth, the position which Sextus held was 
 one that Octavian could not tolerate permanently. Master 
 at once of Sicily and of the sea, the food supply of Rome 
 was at his mercy. Neither party to the treaty could trust 
 the other very far, and Sextus had but an imperfect control 
 over his own followers. Under such conditions war was 
 sure to come before long, and Octavian resolved to crush 
 an enemy who was potentially so dangerous. Antony 
 
200 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 promised help in ships, but they failed to come at the ex- 
 pected time, so Octavian resolved to build a fleet of his 
 own and put the work in charge of his ablest lieutenant, 
 Agrippa. After much difficulty and delay that capable 
 officer was finally in a position to take the sea against the 
 foe and in a naval battle he broke the maritime power of 
 Sextus forever. It now remained only to stamp out the 
 last remnants of the young Pompey's forces in Sicily, and 
 to assist in this Octavian called on Lepidus to bring his 
 legions from Africa. Lepidus did so, but he came filled 
 with resentment at the way in which his nominal colleagues 
 had set him aside and looking for an opportunity to reassert 
 himself. His forces, joined to those of Octavian, were 
 speedily successful in reducing Sicily, and Sextus Pompey, 
 escaping from the ruin of his power, sought refuge in the 
 East with Antony, where he was put to death not long 
 afterwards. Meanwhile the conquerors had been left face 
 to face in Sicily, and Lepidus, taking advantage of the cir- 
 cumstance that he had a large army under his command, 
 attempted to regain his old position of an equal partner in 
 the triumvirate. But he had not been so long ignored 
 without good reason. Instead of meeting him with the 
 concessions which he demanded, Octavian appealed to his 
 soldiers. On them Lepidus had little influence, and they 
 were readily prevailed upon to abandon their general. 
 Deserted by his men, the unfortunate Lepidus found him- 
 self entirely helpless. Octavian spared his life but sent 
 him into exile, and from this time he disappears from his- 
 tory. Thus the last independent power in the West was 
 eliminated and that part of the Roman world passed wholly 
 into the hands of Octavian. From this time on, not before, 
 the East and West were face to face and a final struggle 
 between them was inevitable. 
 
 While his rival, potential if not actual, was gaining the 
 control of the Occident, Antony was pursuing his oriental 
 policy. Just what that was has not always been clearly 
 seen, and it is worth a brief consideration. This is the 
 more true because the real nature of that policy and the 
 reasons for its failure were not without a serious lesson 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 201 
 
 for Octavian. From modern eyes the underlying causes of 
 the downfall of Antony at Actium have been in part con- 
 cealed by the glamor of romance, but the astute statesman 
 who had seen and profited by his rival's blunders can 
 hardly have been deceived. It was not the beauty of Cleo- 
 patra that ruined Antony, except in so far as this was one 
 of the factors that lured him into a fatal policy. It was 
 the political errors which she persuaded him to commit 
 that destroyed him and not the mere fact of his connection 
 with her. His personal vices or infatuation were of im- 
 portance only as they led him into blunders of statesman- 
 ship. 
 
 When Antony first chose the East after the battle of 
 Philippi, he probably already dreamed of completing 
 Caesar's work by carrying out that war against Parthia 
 which the dictator would have undertaken had his life been 
 spared. All Caesar's plans for that vast enterprise had 
 come into the hands of Antony after the Ides of March, and 
 he believed that he could execute the designs formed by his 
 master. For such a task he needed first of all to secure his 
 hold upon the East by a thorough reorganization of that 
 region. He was busily engaged in this when the Perusine 
 war interrupted him. In all probability this fact played 
 an important part in persuading him to make peace with 
 Octavian. If the war which he was planning resulted in 
 the conquest of Parthia, the loss of the provinces of Gaul 
 would be a comparatively small matter, and Antony was 
 very confident of victory. He returned from the compact 
 of Brundisium to continue his career of glory in the East. 
 
 As has been seen, the Parthians had not waited till their 
 would-be conqueror was ready to attack. During his ab- 
 sence in Italy, they invaded Syria and Antony had dis- 
 patched against them an officer by the name of Ventidius 
 Bassus, who successfully routed them and drove them back. 
 This victory procured a breathing space, if nothing more, 
 and enabled Antony to proceed at leisure with the prepara- 
 tions for his projected war. The treaty of Brundisium was 
 concluded in the autumn of 40 B.C., and it was not till the 
 
202 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 next summer that Antony left Italy. He spent the re- 
 mainder of that year and all the next with Octavia in 
 Greece. During this time the war between Octavian and 
 Sextus Pompey had broken out and Ventidius had been 
 winning victories in Syria. In the early part of 37 B.C. 
 Antony made a hurried visit to Syria, his critics said be- 
 cause he was jealous of the glory which his lieutenant was 
 gaining. He accomplished little there, as Octavian's ap- 
 peals for help called him back again to the West. Another 
 reason for his return was doubtless that the law appointing 
 the triumvirate was on the point of expiring and that this 
 circumstance necessitated a new understanding with his 
 partner. In any case he returned to Italy with a large 
 fleet and at Tarentum concluded his last compact with 
 Octavian. By the terms of this agreement the two decided 
 to renew the triumvirate (Lepidus was not deposed till the 
 next year) for a period of five years, and effected an ex- 
 change of resources by which Antony was to furnish ships 
 for the war against Sextus Pompey and in return was to 
 receive a force of 20,000 Italian soldiers for his projected 
 war with Parthia. As soon as this bargain was concluded, 
 Antony sailed at once for Syria, leaving Octavia in Rome 
 with her brother. 7 
 
 Up to this time Cleopatra had played very little part in 
 Antony's career. After the battle of Philippi, he had met 
 her at Tarsus, where she had been summond to appear be- 
 fore him. He had then accompanied her to Alexandria and 
 had spent some time there in 40 B.C. The Perusine war 
 had forced him to return to Italy, where he had married 
 Octavia, and he paid no further attention to the Queen of 
 Egypt until, in 36 B.C., he set about the Parthian war in 
 earnest. Up to this time she cannot be said to have exerted 
 any influence upon his policy. As soon as he assumed the 
 command of his army in Syria, almost his first act was to 
 summon her to meet him in Antioch. For this step there 
 were political as well as personal reasons. For such a war 
 as he was planning he needed ample funds which he could 
 
 7 Appian, v, 95. Dio, xlviii, 54. 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 203 
 
 not hope to get from his bankrupt partner. Such sums as 
 he had so far been able to extort in the East had melted 
 away and he still needed money. In all the East the richest 
 district was the kingdom of Egypt, which still remained 
 nominally independent of Rome. Toward Egypt and its 
 wealth the eyes of Antony naturally turned. He wanted 
 gold, and as it happened, the government of Egypt was in 
 need of military force, though well supplied with money. 
 The triumvir might have seized the kingdom, but he did not 
 care to take a violent way to reach his ends, since, if he 
 did, it was quite possible that the country would revolt as 
 soon as he had gone, or would require to be held down with 
 a large force of men. If, however, he respected the legit- 
 imate government, the peace could be maintained with a 
 much smaller force and with a much better chance of success. 
 The Egyptian government desired his support to keep itself 
 in power and could readily be induced to pay the price he 
 might demand. An alliance with the reigning queen of 
 Egypt seemed the wisest course and such a policy he now 
 adopted. When Cleopatra, responding to his summons, met 
 him in Antioch, there seems to have been little difficulty in 
 arranging terms. She was to furnish money for the 
 Parthian war, and in return was to receive the recognition 
 and support of Antony. In addition he ceded to her the 
 island of Cyprus and a district in Coele-Syria. 8 Both had in 
 former times been dependencies of Egypt and their cession 
 does not seem to have aroused any great opposition, al- 
 though Cyprus was then a Roman province. If Antony 
 had fallen in love with the queen, his passion had not yet 
 betrayed him into any very serious political error. 
 
 Having supplied himself with funds, Antony set out on 
 his carefully prepared campaign. But in the war that fol- 
 lowed the plans of Caesar broke down in the hands of his 
 disciple. A single year of fighting served to shatter all 
 Antony's dreams of conquest, and his invasion of Parthia 
 ended in a masterly retreat. One can not altogether escape 
 the question of whether Caesar would have failed in the 
 
 8 Bouche-Leclercq, ii, 254-55. 
 
204 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 same way. A definite answer is of course impossible, but 
 it is easy to see that he would have had advantages which 
 his successor lacked. Caesar had allotted five years to the 
 task, but Antony could not afford so long a time. He dared 
 not turn his back upon his brother-in-law, who had already 
 shown himself astute and ready to take prompt advantage 
 of any favorable circumstances. If Antony allowed him- 
 self to be drawn into a long and difficult campaign in Par- 
 thia, he might find the East slipping through his hands as 
 completely as the West had done. To succeed at all it was 
 necessary that he should succeed at once, and this he failed 
 to do. Part of the failure must be attributed to disasters 
 which the far greater Caesar might have avoided. In any 
 case the result of the expedition was that Antony returned, 
 not as a laureled conqueror laden with the spoils of the 
 remoter East, but rather as an unsuccessful general who 
 had saved his army from entire destruction by a brilliant 
 retreat. To this new situation he had now to adjust him- 
 self and his policy. 
 
 To understand the policy which Antony now adopted re- 
 quires but a brief consideration of the circumstances, yet 
 there are one or two preliminary considerations to be borne 
 in mind. The first of these is the unquestionable fascina- 
 tion which the East possessed for that generation of Ro- 
 mans. The countries of the eastern Mediterranean were 
 at that time not only richer and more populous than those 
 of the West, but they represented a far older, more luxu- 
 rious, and subtler civilization. Within their borders, and 
 especially in Egypt, the ancient civilizations of the inhabi- 
 tants, dating back for milleniums before the foundation of 
 Rome, had, after the conquest of Alexander, taken on a 
 veneer of Greek culture which made them singularly at- 
 tractive to the ruder and more practical Roman. In the 
 fields of art and of the intellect the peoples of Italy admit- 
 ted themselves inferior to the Greeks, and had long been 
 accustomed to accept the superiority of that highly gifted 
 race as a matter of course. Though Rome had conquered 
 Greece, she in her turn had been vanquished by the weapons 
 of the spirit, by the fascination of Greek thought and litera- 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 205 
 
 ture. The greatest minds of Rome were well content to 
 imitate and popularize in Latin form the products of the 
 East. The average Roman of the upper class was sent to 
 finish his education at the famous schools of Greece and 
 returned with more or less enthusiasm for the Hellenistic 
 culture of the East. While this was happening, the influ- 
 ence was deepened by the wars which had flooded Italy 
 with eastern slaves, who filled the households of the great. 
 With them there came strange gods whose cults began to 
 take root in the West. 
 
 In addition to the fascination of the oriental world for 
 the Romans, the political structure of the eastern states 
 should also be kept constantly in mind. When first the 
 Roman legions crossed the Adriatic, the states with which 
 they came in contact were for the most part kingdoms that 
 had arisen out of Alexander's empire and had taken shape 
 in the period of confusion that followed his death. There 
 is a striking analogy between the conditions which followed 
 the death of the great Macedonian conqueror and those 
 which resulted from the Ides of March. In both cases a 
 great soldier had been suddenly struck down, leaving be- 
 hind him a legacy of war. In both cases the strongest 
 power then in existence was to be found in the now leader- 
 less army. The vital question in both cases was soon seen 
 to be whether these armies could unite in choosing any one 
 successor to their dead general. This in both cases proved 
 to be impossible and several chiefs arose, each able to secure 
 the support of a portion of the veterans and so to claim some 
 part of the inheritance. This in both cases led to strug- 
 gles between the rival generals before a final solution could 
 be reached. In the wars which followed Caesar's death, 
 however, the cause of unity was destined finally to prevail 
 and his entire empire passed to his adopted son. The bit- 
 ter struggle between the successors of Alexander had an 
 opposite result. No one of the pretenders was strong 
 enough to overcome all rivals, and in the end the empire of 
 the Macedonian was divided among his generals. Thus 
 arose three important kingdoms in the East which still con- 
 trolled the greater part of that region when Rome appeared 
 
206 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 upon the scene. They were the kingdom of the Antigonids 
 in Macedonia, that of the Seleucids in Syria, and that of the 
 Lagids or Ptolemies in Egypt. Of these Macedon stood 
 somewhat apart, much smaller in size than the others but 
 more compact and homogeneous. The other two were em- 
 pires, rich and extensive indeed, but without natural unity- 
 Their structure was very similar and was the natural result 
 of the circumstances which had given them birth. Those 
 circumstances and the peculiar conditions which they cre- 
 ated will repay a moment's consideration. 
 
 Both Ptolemy and Seleucus were generals of Alexander 
 who after his death had gained the support of an important 
 section of his now disrupted army. Both depended for 
 their power upon their Greek soldiers and were completely 
 at their mercy. Neither could venture without the cer- 
 tainty of ruin to offend his troops beyond a certain point. 
 Both, therefore, although able to seize rich and populous 
 provinces, were forced to rule them as Greek sovereigns 
 and to depend for the stability of their thrones upon Greek 
 mercenaries. Yet in both cases an enormous majority of 
 their subjects belonged to other races. Each, therefore, 
 was compelled by his position to seek to gain and hold some 
 districts which could serve as a recruiting ground for the 
 army on which his power rested. Thus the Seleucids strove 
 to annex Asia Minor and even to push their conquests into 
 Greece itself, while the early Ptolemies, realizing that they 
 could not afford to remain cooped up in the valley of the 
 Nile, sought to acquire an empire outside. 
 
 In the case of the Ptolemies, who alone concern us here, 
 these efforts met with a large measure of success, and they 
 were able not only to hold Egypt firmly, but to gain exten- 
 sive provinces beyond its borders. To numerous posses- 
 sions among the islands of the Mediterranean and on the 
 coasts of Asia Minor they added the important district of 
 Coele-Syria. Such an empire furnished them a fairly stable 
 basis for their power. Egypt supplied the money to fill 
 their treasury, while the outlying provinces furnished the 
 soldiers for their army and Coele-Syria contributed the ma- 
 terials for the fleet on which they must depend to bind the 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 207 
 
 rest together. But their success was destined to be tem- 
 porary in its nature. Reverses soon arrived and the seem- 
 ingly solid structure fell to pieces. A naval battle served 
 to break their maritime supremacy, and before they had re- 
 covered from this blow, another fell upon them. In the last 
 days of the Second Punic war the two chief rivals of the 
 Ptolemies, Antiochus of Syria and Philip of Macedon, tak- 
 ing advantage of a regency at Alexandria, united to despoil 
 them. Antiochus seized Coele-Syria and Philip threw him- 
 self upon their other outlying possessions. The unexpect- 
 edly sudden defeat of Carthage enabled Rome to intervene 
 in favor of the Ptolemies, who had previously shown them- 
 selves her friends. She now protected Egypt from attack, 
 and crossing into Greece she easily crushed the power of 
 Philip and forced him to give up his plunder. The Ptole- 
 mies, however, gained nothing by his defeat, for, whether 
 from craft or from a failure to understand their importance 
 to her Alexandrian ally, Rome did not restore to Egypt the 
 places seized by Philip. Thus the Ptolemaic empire passed 
 away and with it the real strength of the Lagid dynasty. 
 The later members of that house were suffered to remain 
 as kings at Alexandria, but their military power was broken 
 and the stability of their throne was undermined. Shut up 
 in the valley of the Nile, their army rapidly rotted away. 
 They had from the first relied on foreign troops. The 
 greater part of these had been provided for by lands as- 
 signed to them in Egypt, upon whose soil they were thus 
 quartered. The result of this was that they soon became a 
 militia and lost more and more their military character and 
 effectiveness. 9 For a real standing army the Ptolemies 
 maintained a force of royal guards. In time of war they 
 trusted to recruiting mercenaries. This was easy enough 
 so long as they were in close communication with all the 
 ports of the Aegean and while the Greek world had an 
 abundant supply of soldiers of fortune ready to take service 
 with whosoever could pay them. 10 The native Egyptians 
 
 e Bouche-Leclercq, iv, 2-3. See also Ferguson, Greek Imperialism for an admirable 
 discussion of the Ptolemies. 
 10 Bouche-Leclercq, iv, 10. 
 
208 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 were only employed in time of crisis and under pressure of 
 necessity. 11 With the destruction of their empire and the 
 changed conditions due to the advent of Rome in the east- 
 ern Mediterranean, an effective army could no longer be 
 created by these means, and they found themselves depend- 
 ent on a handful of Greek guards who proved unable to hold 
 even the mob of their turbulent capital in awe. If Eome 
 had not given them a certain measure of support they must 
 have fallen long before they did. As it was, the last rulers 
 of the dynasty tumbled off their throne at intervals, but 
 upon each occasion found themselves restored by Rome — 
 for a consideration. The senate, having no desire to annex 
 Egypt, was on the whole content to see it in the hands of a 
 line of rulers too weak to stand alone. 
 
 Thus when Cleopatra mounted the unstable throne at 
 Alexandria, her house had long enjoyed little but the shadow 
 of its former greatness. It was wholly natural that a young 
 and ambitious queen should dream of the possibility of re- 
 viving the faded glories of her ancestors and of making her 
 gilded mockery of rule once more a thing of solid reality. 
 Nor did such a dream seem in the least impossible of real- 
 ization. The cause of the present weakness of her house 
 was so plain that the remedy might well be obvious. The 
 Lagid power had declined with the loss of the empire out- 
 side of Egypt and it might revive if that could be restored. 
 But to make such a revival possible she clearly needed force. 
 The troops at her disposal were hardly able to hold in check 
 the mob of Alexandria, and she had at hand no means of 
 creating an efficient army. She had money, it is true, but 
 Rome now controlled the regions from which in the past her 
 ancestors had drawn their mercenaries. Even if the troops 
 could be obtained, how could she hold off Roman interven- 
 tion until the raw recruits had been turned into disciplined 
 soldiers? In any plans which she might form she must 
 allow for Rome, and she boldly resolved to use Rome as an 
 instrument by which to realize her ambition. If she could 
 
 u At the battle of Raphia Ptolemy IV had employed a large number of Egyptians 
 successfully, but this had resulted in a series of rebellions on the part of the natives. 
 Bouche-Leclercq, iv, 5-7. 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 209 
 
 gain the support of the Roman legions the restoration of 
 the glories of her house would present few difficulties. The 
 queen therefore spared no pains to win the help she stood 
 in need of. She had wooed Caesar when he came to Egypt 
 in pursuit of Pompey and she now wooed Antony. Nor 
 had her wiles been without success in either case. Tradi- 
 tion and popular rumor believed that even the great Julius 
 had so far yielded to her charms as to meditate giving effect 
 to the policy she urged. At Rome before his murder he 
 had been credited with the design, after his conquest of 
 Parthia was completed, of making Alexandria his capital 
 and ruling the world from there. There may have been, 
 there probably was, no truth in such reports, but their ex- 
 istence is enough to show that the idea was in the air, that 
 men had guessed the policy which the Queen of Egypt in- 
 carnated. 
 
 But if it seems clear enough why rumor should have at- 
 tributed such a policy to her, it may be asked why men 
 should deem a Roman likely to adopt it. This too was not 
 without some show of reason. If, as men were coming to 
 believe, Caesar had dreams of making himself a king in 
 name as well as in fact and laying the foundations of a 
 dynasty, it might well seem that Alexandria was a better 
 stage for such a scheme than Rome. The royal name, so 
 odious to Italy with its republican habits and customs, was 
 natural in the East, where monarchical traditions had pre- 
 vailed for centuries. If Caesar seriously meant to take the 
 title, it did not seem incredible that he would assume it in 
 Egypt. If any such design was in his mind, his murder 
 ended it before he had taken any clear or definite step to- 
 ward its realization, and Cleopatra found herself no stronger 
 as a result of her influence over the dictator, whatever that 
 influence may have been. 
 
 Then came Mark Antony, and the queen perceived in him 
 another who might play the part which she, perhaps, had 
 once assigned to Caesar in her imperial dream. She set 
 herself to win him to her purpose and to obtain from him 
 the force she needed to make her policy prevail. She must 
 secure his sanction and consent, the support of his military 
 
210 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 power, if she was to regain the lost possessions of her house 
 across the seas. With the wealth of Egypt at her disposal 
 and recruiting grounds in her control, she might in time 
 create a powerful army and her empire might grow strong 
 enough to stand by its own strength. 
 
 To the Roman she could offer not only herself but a 
 grandiose dream of oriental empire. That vision might be 
 made to seem alluring in itself and could be presented as the 
 only possible way out of the difficulties which were crowding 
 upon Antony. After the failure of his Parthian expedition 
 that general found himself in a position of real peril. The 
 disaster had been costly of men, and the means of replenish- 
 ing the shattered and depleted ranks of his legions were not 
 ready to his hand. Under the treaty of Brundisium he had 
 reserved the right to recruit troops in Italy on an equal 
 footing with his fellow triumvir, but a short experience 
 undeceived him as to the value of this stipulation. It 
 proved easy enough for Octavian to prevent recruits from 
 reaching him upon a dozen plausible pretexts; so, at Tar- 
 entum, he sought to bind his slippery colleague by a defi- 
 nite bargain. By the treaty of Tarentum he had agreed 
 to furnish Octavian with ships for his war on Sextus Pom- 
 pey in return for 20,000 Roman soldiers. But the young 
 Caesar promptly found excuses for not delivering the men, 
 and without waiting for them Antony marched against the 
 Parthians. Returning from that expedition defeated, he 
 looked anxiously for the 20,000 men to reinforce his army. 
 But when at length, in 35 B.C., Octavian bestirred himself 
 to redeem his engagement, instead of the promised soldiers 
 he sent back the borrowed ships accompanied by his sister 
 and a paltry force of some 2,000 men. The meaning of this 
 was clear enough, and it is not to be wondered at that 
 Antony in anger ordered Octavia to return to her brother. 
 But this left the need for the men no less vital than before, 
 and if Antony could not get them from Italy, he must seek 
 them somewhere else. His rival plainly hoped to starve 
 his army by cutting off recruits, and war had been declared 
 between them in everything but name. Under these cir- 
 cumstances Antony was compelled to turn to the East for 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 211 
 
 men to fill his ranks, and the imperial dreams of Cleopatra 
 might seem to offer the best means of obtaining them. If 
 he should adopt her policy it might be possible to arouse 
 the East to rally round his standard. Orientals were not 
 likely to be enthusiastic for the weaker party in a war, and 
 he might believe that the best way to overcome their hesita- 
 tion would be to place by his side the one remaining Hel- 
 lenistic sovereign. Besides this, if disaster came and he 
 were beaten by his rival, Egypt was the easiest of all the 
 eastern lands to defend against a foe. Sheltered behind the 
 deserts he might hope to hold the valley of the Nile in any 
 event, and this would be the easier if the rightful queen to 
 whom the people had long been accustomed to look up as a 
 goddess reigned by his side. 12 
 
 To all these varied influences Antony at length yielded, 
 and his downfall was the consequence. For in the policy 
 of Cleopatra there lay one element of weakness that proved 
 fatal in the end. To create the eastern empire of which 
 she and her lover dreamed the Roman legions were indis- 
 pensable ; but Roman soldiers would not consent to play the 
 part marked out for them. The vital defect of the whole 
 plan was, not that what Cleopatra proposed was obviously 
 impossible, but that to realize her design it was necessary 
 to employ forces which would not knowingly support it. 
 The visions of oriental empire that fascinated the general 
 made no appeal to the common soldier. The men in the 
 ranks were Italians, and throughout their service they 
 looked forward to an allotment of land in Italy as the 
 ultimate reward of victory. 13 This, if he lost control of the 
 West, their general would be powerless to give. More than 
 this, his eastern policy would make necessary the prolonged 
 sojourn of his men in the East and postpone indefinitely 
 their return to their native country. While thus he de- 
 manded the sacrifice of their interests, he offended their 
 
 12 For Antony's final policy and his campaign against Octavian see the brilliant ar- 
 ticles by Kromayer in Hermes, xxxiii and xxxiv: and Strack's article on Cleopatra 
 in the Historiche Zeitschrift, cxv. 
 
 "Antony made it one of his grievances against Octavian that the latter had dis- 
 tributed all the available Italian land to his own men and so left none for the army 
 of the East. Plutarch, Antony, 55. 
 
212 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 sentiment as well. There was in them enough of the stern, 
 rigid pride of the old Roman character to prevent them 
 from viewing with any degree of favor a scheme which 
 would separate the eastern lands from Rome. To them 
 the very thought of an eastern empire independent of the 
 West was repugnant, and any idea of making Alexandria 
 supreme over Italy unthinkable. To carry out Cleopatra's 
 plan by means of such an army was difficult at best, and 
 would be clearly impossible if the purpose in view were 
 frankly set before the soldiers. The only chance of suc- 
 cess was for Antony to conceal as much as possible his real 
 aims from his men. This would involve grave contradic- 
 tions and the danger of a sudden collapse if the course of 
 events should at any time reveal the secret intentions of 
 their leader too clearly to his troops. These difficulties were 
 so obvious that Antony did not yield until his rival's 
 measures had left him little choice. It may reasonably be 
 assumed that Cleopatra had tried to persuade him to adopt 
 her policy from the very first, but for a long time she met 
 with small success. The only concessions she had been able 
 to obtain were made on the eve of the Parthian expedition 
 and these were not of great importance. It was only when 
 hope of reinforcements from the West was gone that Antony 
 came over completely to her side. Already he had been in- 
 duced to marry her and so become legitimate king of Egypt. 
 This had taken place in Syria just before the war with 
 Parthia, but he had carefully avoided taking the royal title 
 lest he should alienate his men. Nevertheless Cleopatra 
 had issued coins in Alexandria bearing his head side by side 
 with hers. 14 After the Parthian disaster he took his place 
 more openly as sovereign of Egypt, but still refrained from 
 styling himself king in any official way, at least to Romans. 
 Neither did he divorce his Roman wife Octavia. His posi- 
 tion was thus highly ambiguous. At war with the young 
 Caesar in all but name, he seized the occasion when his rival 
 was involved in a war in Pannonia to launch a swift and 
 successful campaign against Armenia in order to secure 
 
 14 Bouche-Leclercq, ii, 256. 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 213 
 
 his rear from danger in the coming struggle. Returning 
 victorious to Alexandria, he took the last decisive step, and 
 after celebrating a splendid triumph for his victories, he 
 solemnly proclaimed a new distribution of the eastern lands. 
 To Cleopatra and her eldest son Caesarion he assigned the 
 territories of Cyprus, Libya, and Coele-Syria; to his own 
 children by her he gave kingdoms formed from his new 
 conquest and from the Asiatic provinces of Rome. To one 
 he handed over Armenia and Media with the promise of 
 Parthia when it should be conquered, and he bestowed upon 
 the other Syria, Phoenicia, and Cilicia. "All this," Mahaffy 
 says quite truly, "was evidently suggested to Cleopatra by 
 the traditions of her house ; she only claimed in the Greek 
 world what had formerly, and had long, belonged to 
 Egypt." 15 The Ptolemaic empire was thus boldly revived 
 under the sovereignty of Antony, although he did not dare 
 to assume the crown himself. 
 
 The new empire created by these measures, known as the 
 Donations of Alexandria, could hardly be viewed by 
 Romans with any feeling but alarm. Rome was not likely 
 to surrender quietly her provinces of Cyprus, Cilicia, and 
 Syria to the Ptolemies. Octavian eagerly seized the oppor- 
 tunity to turn the sentiment of the West against his rival. 
 At first, however, he was far less successful than might 
 have been expected. In spite of his recent acts Antony 
 retained the loyalty of his soldiers and that of many par- 
 tisans in Italy. This may have been due to the unpopularity 
 of Octavian, or it may have been that men had not yet come 
 to regard Antony as an eastern monarch. That he was the 
 tool of Cleopatra was naturally insisted on by his rival, but 
 the world seems not to have been entirely convinced. It was 
 indeed just possible to construe his policy in a Roman sense, 
 and to argue that it had relieved Rome of a heavy burden 
 while leaving her such of her eastern possessions as were 
 really valuable. Thus the province of Asia, so dear to 
 Roman financiers, was still hers, and if Syria was ceded to 
 Egypt, that province had never been of much advantage, 
 
 "Mahaffy, History of Egypt, 249-50. See also to the same effect Bouche-Leclercq, 
 ii, 278-79. 
 
214 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 but had merely served to involve Rome in a war with 
 Parthia. It might prove cheaper in the end to hold the 
 Parthians in check by creating a strong buffer-state between 
 them and the Roman provinces. 
 
 Perhaps the Romans excused Antony on some such 
 grounds as these, or they may have hoped that once in Italy 
 he could be induced to modify his policy. In any case the 
 Donations were received in Rome far more quietly than 
 might have been expected. 16 Antony had numerous par- 
 tisans in the senate, and to that body he addressed a long 
 letter professing his desire to restore the republic and re- 
 questing the senate's sanction for his new arrangements. 
 This Octavian would not, of course, allow, but he was not 
 strong enough to prevent the consuls and large numbers of 
 the nobles from leaving Italy to join Antony in the East. 
 Nevertheless the Donations of Alexandria produced a deep 
 impression and one disastrous to Antony; 17 they had not 
 been greeted by any outburst of anger, but the tide of public 
 sentiment ran more and more in favor of Octavian. Even 
 in the ranks of Antony's army a deep distrust was forming 
 in the minds of his soldiers. Under these circumstances, 
 if Antony was to retain his hold upon his Roman supporters 
 for any length of time, it was essential to dispel the 
 suspicions that had been aroused. Unfortunately for him- 
 self he did the exact opposite, and Octavian found his 
 strength daily increased by the blunders of his rival. The 
 first great blunder, and the source of all the rest, was that 
 Antony permitted Cleopatra to accompany him upon the 
 campaign. While she was with him in his camp it was 
 difficult for Antony to pose as a Roman general and it 
 would have pleased his Roman supporters far better if she 
 had been left behind in Egypt. This, however, was not at 
 all what she desired. It is clear that she feared the in- 
 fluence over Antony of his Roman officers and partisans, 
 
 "Octavian found it necessary to seize and publish Antony's will in order to heighten 
 the effect. 
 
 17 Antony's partisans tried to prevent the reading of that part of his letter to the 
 senate dealing with the Donations ; evidently they feared the effect on public opinion. 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 215 
 
 whom she well knew to have no sympathy with her am- 
 bitions. Not only did she insist upon accompanying him, 
 but she made every effort to isolate him from his supporters 
 and to surround him wholly with counselors on whom she 
 could rely. In this she was successful, and her success was 
 all to the advantage of Octavian, for it furnished a visible 
 justification of all his charges against Antony, which many 
 had hitherto been reluctant to believe. 
 
 At the outbreak of the war the position of Octavian was 
 most precarious. His legal status was obscure and difficult, 
 neither his fleet nor his army was ready for the struggle, 
 and Italy was seething with mutinous disaffection. 18 If 
 Antony had taken the offensive and invaded Italy at once 
 he might have won the war, but this he failed to do. His 
 delay has been attributed to Cleopatra, in whose company 
 he squandered the precious time in luxurious idleness, but 
 a closer study does much to clear his fame. To concentrate 
 his army and to transport it to the West was a task of such 
 magnitude that it seems very doubtful if Antony could have 
 struck more quickly than he did. 19 In any case the op- 
 portunity slipped by, and when at last he led his forces 
 into Epirus, Octavian was prepared to meet him there. 
 
 Into the details of the campaign it is unnecessary to enter. 
 In the end the two armies found themselves face to face on 
 the shores of the bay of Actium, directly across the Adriatic 
 from Italy. For some time neither side was ready to risk 
 a battle, at any rate on such terms that the other side would 
 accept the challenge. Antony's land forces outnumbered 
 those of Octavian, but his fleet was the weaker of the two. 
 As the days passed without a battle the position of Antony 
 grew steadily worse ; his fleet was blockaded in the bay and 
 his army was so far cut off by land that its supplies began 
 to fail. More ominous still, the dissensions among his fol- 
 lowers grew constantly more violent. The Roman officers 
 in the camp waged a bitter struggle with the partisans of 
 
 18 For the difficulties of Octavian see Ferrero, iv, 69-86. See also the article of 
 Caspari in the Classical Quarterly, v, 230-35. 
 
 19 Kromayer in his articles on the campaign of Actium has shown that the things 
 that Antony is known to have accomplished were enough to occupy his time fully. 
 
216 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Cleopatra. Disgusted beyond measure at her influence over 
 the general, his supporters began to slip away to join his 
 rival. Under these circumstances his position was fast be- 
 coming untenable, and his officers advised him to fall back 
 from the coast so as to draw his adversary after him, as 
 Caesar had done not many years before. This would have 
 entailed the sacrifice of the fleet, which must have been 
 abandoned, and to this Cleopatra was strongly opposed. 
 Influenced by the Queen, Antony decided that his ships 
 should make a desperate effort to break through the block- 
 ade, and that he and the Queen should sail for Egypt, while 
 the army attempted to retreat by land. 
 
 That this was the strategic plan behind the battle of 
 Actium Kromayer has shown beyond all reasonable doubt. 20 
 But the battle proved a decisive defeat for Antony. In the 
 first place his plan miscarried, and instead of breaking 
 through his fleet was defeated and almost utterly destroyed. 
 Only a small squadron bearing Antony and Cleopatra with 
 their treasures succeeded in passing through the hostile 
 lines and sailed away to Egypt. This flight has been tra- 
 ditionally ascribed to faint-heartedness, or treachery, on the 
 part of the Queen and to a love-sick infatuation on the part 
 of Antony. The facts, however, furnish an overwhelming 
 refutation of this interpretation. That the flight was pre- 
 meditated is made clear beyond dispute by the preparations 
 for the battle. Dio, indeed, expressly states as much 21 and 
 adds that Octavian was fully informed of the design in ad- 
 vance by deserters from Antony's camp. 22 But though the 
 flight to Egypt was carefully planned beforehand, the cir- 
 cumstances under which it happened were quite other than 
 Antony intended and its results were wholly unforeseen. 
 Instead of finding himself at the head of the greater part of 
 his fleet with a large force of men on board sailing for Egypt 
 after having triumphantly broken through the blockade of 
 his enemies, he found himself a fugitive who had succeeded 
 
 20 See his articles in Hermes, xxxiii and xxxiv. 
 ^Dio, 1, 15. 
 ^Dio, 1, 23. 
 
THE TRIUMPH OF OCTAVIAN 217 
 
 in escaping from a disastrous battle. This in itself irre- 
 trievably shattered his prestige in the East. 
 
 While thus his hold upon the orientals was broken, his 
 army in Greece promptly abandoned him. In forming his 
 design Antony had allowed himself to overlook the senti- 
 ments of his Roman soldiers and had failed to take account 
 of the psychological effect upon them of his acts. His de- 
 parture with the Egyptian squadron and the Queen opened 
 the eyes of his men to his real policy. After a brief hesi- 
 tation his army surrendered to his rival. So far as can be 
 seen it was quite able to obey his orders and retreat to the 
 East. It was not merely the disgrace of his flight that de- 
 cided his men to abandon him, for they rejected during 
 seven days the offers of Octavian, alleging that their gen- 
 eral was absent on some military business. This seems to 
 show that if he had returned promptly to his army and sep- 
 arated himself from Cleopatra, his men would still have 
 followed him. Probably one reason for his blunder was his 
 failure to realize how deeply his soldiers resented the pres- 
 ence of the Queen in his camp and his manifest yielding to 
 her influence. For this she was in some part to blame, 
 since she had made a consistent effort to surround him with 
 her partisans, while keeping all unfriendly counselors at a 
 distance, and as a result Antony had in some degree lost 
 touch with his men. When his army learned that he had 
 fled with her to Egypt, their loyalty to him broke down. 
 It was no longer possible to entertain a doubt as to his 
 policy ; he was not a Roman general, fighting to restore the 
 republic as he had pretended hitherto, but a king of Egypt, 
 fighting for an eastern empire against Rome. If his men 
 should still follow him, they must renounce their nationality 
 and give up all hope of seeing Italy again. They must ac- 
 cept their residence in the East, not as a temporary exile, 
 but as a permanent fact. Face to face with realities that 
 could no longer be misunderstood, they soon reached a de- 
 cision. The powerful army of Antony, unbeaten in the 
 field, laid down the sword without another blow. Octavian 
 
218 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 had only to accept its surrender and his rival's power was 
 broken forever. 
 
 Antony for a time cherished a hope that it might be pos- 
 sible to hold Egypt even yet. He sought to rally round him 
 such forces as had been left in the East when he started on 
 his fatal campaign. But Roman loyalty to Antony was 
 gone, and they no longer felt an interest in his fate. The 
 legions in the East followed the example of the army in 
 Epirus and deserted at the earliest opportunity. Octavian, 
 as he advanced, encountered no resistance. With all their 
 hopes in ruins, Antony and Cleopatra had no recourse but 
 death. The battle of Actium, which from a military point 
 of view was wholly inconclusive, 23 had none the less by its 
 political consequences given the world to Octavian. The 
 problems of that world the victor had now to face. Above 
 all the problem which had baffled even the great Julius must 
 be met, that of providing a government for the world which 
 men could accept without too keen a sense of degradation. 
 
 23 It has been suggested that Antony's army was forced to capitulate after Actium. 
 The account of Dio does not give this impression ; it is expressly stated that no 
 battle occurred. It seems incredible that an army which outnumbered its opponents 
 should have allowed itself to be cut off and should have surrendered without a blow 
 if it had had any real desire to fight. Its retreat may have been blocked, but the 
 absence of any effort to break through can only be explained by the supposition 
 that it no longer felt any wish to support Antony. The flight of that general from 
 Actium to Egypt had made it all too clear what his real purpose was. The account 
 in Plutarch is in harmony with this. Like Dio he makes no mention of any fighting 
 but implies that the army of Antony surrendered voluntarily. Kromayer, whose views 
 have in general been accepted in the text, seems to adopt the view here dissented 
 from as to the surrender. See Hartmann and Kromayer, Romische Geschichte, 156. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 The Restoration of the Republic 
 
 As a result of the fall of Antony and Cleopatra the whole 
 East had been thrown into confusion, and Octavian found 
 himself obliged to undertake a general reorganization of 
 that part of the Roman world. As soon as this was finished, 
 he returned to Italy to face the task of establishing a regular 
 and stable government. What actually existed was little 
 better than an organized confusion. The triumvirate had ex- 
 pired in 32 B.C. and had not been renewed, but Octavian con- 
 tinued to exercise the dictatorial powers which he had held 
 as triumvir, and to gain some semblance of legal justification 
 for this, he had himself elected consul year by year. Yet 
 it was obvious to all that the powers which he exercised 
 were greatly in excess of those of an ordinary consul, and 
 that all constitutional forms were more or less completely 
 in abeyance. 
 
 Whatever the obscurity of the legal situation might be, 
 no one could doubt that Octavian was in fact the sole com- 
 mander of the legions, however little the constitution rec- 
 ognized any such position. All considerable forces in the 
 Roman world not subject to his authority had been crushed, 
 and all the soldiers under arms acknowledged themselves 
 subject to his imperium. Now that peace had come the 
 proper course would have been to disband the army until 
 such time as a new war broke out. In the actual condition 
 of things this was no longer possible, nor could Romans, 
 even if attached to the customs of their ancestors, desire 
 to see it tried. Recent events must have convinced all but 
 the most short-sighted that the conquests of the last thirty 
 years had created a new situation. 
 
 Since the destruction of Carthage it had been the singular 
 good fortune of the republic to have on its frontiers no 
 enemy it needed very seriously to dread. In the East the 
 weak and declining power of the successors of Alexander, 
 
220 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 so far from being dangerous, had long served Rome as a 
 shield against the restless forces of Asia ; while in the West 
 the tribes of Spain and Gaul and Africa were too ill organ- 
 ized to cause serious apprehension. The frontiers could 
 be protected against any probable enemy by a comparatively 
 small force, and Rome no longer needed to fear a formidable 
 revolt within her borders. The last uprising of the 
 Spaniards had been suppressed and as much of Gaul as 
 Rome essayed to hold was reasonably quiet. In such cir- 
 cumstances men might persuade themselves that a large 
 army was superfluous. A small force of men stationed in 
 the provinces could deal with ordinary conditions well 
 enough, and if the situation should become serious at any 
 point, reinforcements could be raised and hurried to the 
 spot under special commanders. 
 
 Now, however, conditions had materially changed. When 
 Pompey annexed the province of Syria, he not only extin- 
 guished the Seleucid dynasty, which had grown too weak 
 to serve any longer as an adequate protection, but he brought 
 the Roman frontier into direct contact with a new and 
 dangerous foe. The Parthians, now immediate neighbors, 
 were a menace that Rome could not afford to ignore, and 
 they must be held in check by a strong force stationed in the 
 East. It may be doubted if the people of Italy fully realized 
 this, for Syria was remote and conditions there may not 
 have been clearly understood by men who stayed at home. 
 They heard vague rumors from afar, but very probably 
 these made little impression on the popular mind. Nearer 
 at hand was another peril to which men could not shut their 
 eyes. The conquest of Gaul had created a new situation 
 on the northern frontier of the empire. The vast terri- 
 tories which Caesar had added to the empire were still too 
 new to Roman sovereignty for any confidence to be felt in 
 their loyalty to their new rulers. If the military forces 
 there were too much diminished, a revolt was likely to 
 occur. The annexation had, moreover, entailed respons- 
 ibilities from which the Romans could not escape. If the 
 newly conquered Gauls were allowed to retain their arms, 
 
THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 221 
 
 they would in all probability use them against their con- 
 querors at the earliest opportunity. If they were disarmed, 
 then the duty of protecting them against their enemies was 
 plain, and along the Rhine frontier the restless Germans 
 could be kept off only by a powerful army. No one could 
 reasonably propose to strip the great river of defenders and 
 to wait till the invaders had made havoc in the newly ac- 
 quired provinces before beginning preparations for defense. 
 Under the circumstances it must have been quite clear to all 
 that the great force then under Octavian's command could 
 not safely be disbanded, but that a considerable part must 
 remain under arms for an indefinite period. That at some 
 future day Rome could dismiss her soldiers and return to a 
 peace footing may have been the dream of many, but they 
 could not so far delude themselves with ancient maxims as 
 to imagine that that time had yet arrived. The Romans, 
 therefore, found themselves compelled to accept a standing 
 army as a necessity of the present, at least, and the only 
 question open for discussion among reasonable men was that 
 of the command. Nor did the situation that confronted 
 them admit of much uncertainty on this point. Octavian 
 was the actual commander and no one could suggest a sub- 
 stitute. 
 
 Public opinion seems to have been unanimous in calling 
 on Octavian to remain at the head of the army. His 
 problem did not lie in reconciling men to that necessity, but 
 rather in finding some means of retaining his position with- 
 out offending too deeply such other sentiments as had a 
 strong hold on their minds. If the world was eagerly de- 
 manding peace and quiet, it was no less insistent on a re- 
 vival of the old republic. The force of this demand was 
 such that Octavian could not safely ignore it. Even if he 
 had been far less astute than he was, the course of events 
 within the whole space of his memory would have sufficed 
 to convince him that public opinion was still a force to be 
 reckoned with, and one that no leader, if he hoped to possess 
 stable power, could venture to despise. 
 
 The story of Caesar's life must have been full of mean- 
 ing to his adopted son. He must have known how Caesar 
 
 v^ 
 
222 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 and Pompey at the outbreak of the civil wars had 
 maneuvered to put each other in the wrong. He could not 
 be blind to the fact that Caesar's victory in the negotiations 
 had gone far to make his march on Rome successful. His 
 strategy in the first part of the war would have been quite, 
 impossible if the sentiment of Italy had been resolutely 
 hostile to his cause. Had the towns of the North resisted 
 his advance, Pompey might have rallied his forces and have 
 defended Italy. If the peninsula had been seething with 
 discontent, Caesar would not have dared to take his army 
 off to Spain as he had done. If Pompey's diplomatic defeat 
 had thus influenced the first part of the war, so in his last 
 days when the world was at his feet Caesar had found him- 
 self embarrassed and perplexed. It proved impossible for 
 him to organize a government that men were willing to ac- 
 cept, and this led directly to the Ides of March. That 
 tragedy showed clearly that the Roman world would not 
 consent to be long governed by the sword alone, and that 
 the man who tried to rule it thus would walk in daily peril 
 of his life, trembling at the shadow of conspiracy on every 
 hand and depending for his safety on nothing but the con- 
 stant presence and continued fidelity of his armed guards. 
 Although the control of the legions might be the only 
 thing that mattered at the moment, Octavian might well 
 feel the need of building on some more stable foundation 
 for the future. This was only made the clearer since the 
 war, from which he had just returned victorious, had shown 
 that even the legions could not be depended on to act in- 
 definitely against the sentiment of the world around them. 
 Subject though they were to an iron discipline, the soldiers 
 were yet Romans drawn from the ranks of the common 
 people, and it was impossible that in the long run any 
 strong drift of sentiment should fail to make itself felt 
 even in the army. That this was true the sudden collapse 
 of Antony's power after Actium had placed beyond all 
 doubt. Octavian could hardly miss the moral of his rival's 
 downfall. Antony's ruin had been due to the fact that he 
 had adopted a policy for which Roman soldiers would not 
 fight. Octavian cannot have imagined that he possessed 
 
THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 223 
 
 a stronger hold upon the loyalty of his men than Antony had 
 had in earlier years. Plutarch has borne eloquent testimony 
 to the passionate devotion of Antony's soldiers, even in the 
 midst of the Parthian disaster, declaring that their loyalty 
 had never been surpassed and that the approval of their 
 general was valued more than life itself by officers and men 
 alike. 1 Yet even this loyalty had failed in the end because 
 the object of it had blindly ignored the drift of public senti- 
 ment. If the victor at Actium should venture to defy the 
 strong and deeply rooted feelings of the Roman world, he 
 too might see his power suddenly collapse. The very circum- 
 stances under which he became the master of the Roman 
 world constituted a warning that he must find a way to per- 
 suade men to accept his authority if it was to be permanent. 
 If the position of Octavian was such as made compromise 
 appear more or less necessary, this policy was wholly con- 
 genial to his temperament. By nature cautious and averse 
 to extremes, he had a real sympathy with the feelings of his 
 subjects and a strong love for the old Roman customs and 
 traditions. The world was now demanding a return to 
 regular government and this, to Roman minds, implied of 
 necessity a restoration of the old republic. It was not 
 liberty in the modern sense for which men yearned so much 
 as law. The great mass of the Roman people had never had 
 a voice in public affairs except in abstract theory. The vot- 
 ing on all questions had always taken place in Rome and 
 the vast majority of the citizens, who lived scattered about 
 in Italy, could never hope to cast a ballot in an election or 
 to vote upon a law. The decision had been in the hands of 
 the rabble of Rome and of the handful of voters from the 
 country towns of Italy who might chance to be there on the 
 appointed day, or who were rich enough to make a journey 
 there for the purpose. As a consequence under the republic 
 the greater part of the people had never taken any serious 
 or active share in the government. It would hardly seem 
 
 'Plutarch, Antony, 43. Plutarch was not a contemporary, of course, but he 
 doubtless drew from contemporary sources. In any case his testimony is borne out 
 by all we know of Antony's career up to the last campaign. 
 
224 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 that they can now have been deeply interested in the restora- 
 tion of privileges which they had never used in the past and 
 could not hope to use in the future. But to bring back the 
 reign of law was a very different matter. By its nature 
 the law was essentially a public thing in which the whole 
 people must have a certain share. Under the law men knew 
 what acts were held permissible and what acts were for- 
 bidden. If the statutes were transgressed they knew the 
 consequences that would follow. They could demand, as 
 an unquestionable right, a public trial in which they had 
 an opportunity to plead their cause and where definite ev- 
 idence of a definite offense must be presented and weighed 
 according to known rules. To this the only alternative was 
 the arbitrary action of individual men. In the days of the 
 triumvirate, during the proscription, men were put to death 
 without any public charge being brought against them, were 
 condemned on vague and general grounds, were sentenced 
 without trial, on no one knew what evidence, and with no 
 chance whatever to reply to the unknown accusation. While 
 such things were done no man could feel himself secure in 
 either person or property. All men were anxious that 
 government by arbitrary force and individual caprice should 
 now give place to the known processes of law. 
 
 But the entire body of Roman law had grown up under 
 the republic and presupposed that form of government at 
 every turn. If the law were to be restored to its supremacy, 
 it would entail the restoration of the republic as well. 
 This was the more true because the Roman system had 
 bound the military, administrative, and judicial functions 
 together in one body of institutions. It was impossible to 
 return to legality without reviving the old system of which 
 the courts were but one part. It was useless to attempt to 
 meet the universal demand for law and justice by devising 
 some new system, however excellent, since what the world 
 passionately craved was precisely a return to beaten tracks 
 which had the supreme merit of familiarity. It was, per- 
 haps, this feeling which caused the Romans to regard the 
 name of king with such intense aversion. The word rex 
 seemed the symbol of arbitrary power and hence the 
 
THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 225 
 
 negation of all law. The future was to show that they felt 
 no such violent hatred for a monarch who could contrive to 
 bring his supremacy within the known forms of the Roman 
 law. They slew Caesar, whom they suspected of aiming at 
 the crown, but they submitted to Augustus quietly enough. 
 
 Nor could Octavian afford to ignore the immense force 
 of the sentimental associations which clustered around the 
 old republic. Whatever its defects had been, all that was 
 glorious in Rome's past was closely bound up with its tra- 
 ditional forms; the newer institutions, dictatorships and 
 triumvirates, were alike odious and discredited. Although 
 the military power had seized the control of the state, 
 thrusting aside the old nobility, the circumstances which 
 had attended the predominance of the army had produced 
 a revulsion of feeling in favor of the vanquished aristocracy. 
 Just as in England the execution of Charles I threw a halo 
 around the memory of that king and did much to bring 
 about the restoration of his son, so in Rome the proscription 
 had produced a strong reaction. The Romans were a people 
 of an eminently conservative and aristocratic temper, and 
 the massacre of the old nobility had filled them with pity 
 and with horror. They had found it difficult to submit 
 patiently to a government of upstarts stained with the 
 blood of the great houses, and they turned with all the more 
 deference and honor to such of the old families as still sur- 
 vived, desiring earnestly to see them restored to a position 
 of dignity and honor in the state. 
 
 If Octavian hoped to build a stable government he must 
 take into account these demands of public opinion, and must 
 discover some way of meeting the necessities of the present 
 without doing too much violence to the traditional usages 
 of the past. In particular he must effect a reconciliation 
 with the old nobility and persuade them to lend to his 
 authority the lustre of their names. In his struggle with 
 Antony he had made repeated professions of his desire to 
 restore the republic, and the world was now demanding 
 that he should make good his promises. Accordingly in 
 27 B.C., having carefully set the whole machine in order, he 
 proclaimed the restoration. His own description of that 
 
 X 
 
226 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 event is worthy of quotation. On the monument at Ancyra 
 is recorded his view — or at least the view which he wished 
 men to take — of his career. To his establishment of the 
 principate, as his government has come to be called, he 
 alludes in these words: "In my sixth and seventh consul- 
 ships, when I had extinguished the flames of civil war, 
 being by universal consent the master of all things, I trans- 
 ferred the commonwealth from my power to that of the 
 senate and the Roman people. For which service of mine 
 I was called Augustus by a decree of the senate, laurels were 
 placed upon the door-posts of my house, a civic crown wa» 
 fixed above the door, and a golden shield was placed in the 
 Curia Julia on which was an inscription testifying that it 
 was given to me by the senate and the Roman people be- 
 cause of my valor, clemency, justice, and piety. After 
 that time, while excelling all others in dignity, I possessed 
 no greater power than did those who were my colleagues in 
 the magistracy." 2 
 
 There is here no suggestion of any new constitution for 
 the Roman world, but rather it is implied that the old re- 
 public was set up again without serious change. That this 
 view of the case does not accurately represent the facts the 
 whole history of the early empire bears emphatic witness. 
 Even in the reign of Augustus — as Octavian should be called 
 after 27 B.C. — the lack of harmony between his theory and 
 his practice became sufficiently glaring. From this the con- 
 clusion has sometimes been drawn that he was simply a 
 hypocrite playing the leading role in an elaborate farce. 
 On the face of it this seems too simple an explanation; it 
 can hardly have been the truth that a political settlement 
 that lasted for several centuries had no better foundation 
 than the whim of one man. But even if it be accepted, 
 there is still a problem to be solved in explaining why the 
 farce should have been so well received and so successful; 
 
 2 The text of the Ancyra monument has often been reprinted. A convenient edi- 
 tion is published by Fairley in the University of Pennsylvania Translations and 
 Reprints. The passage cited is from chapter 34 of the text; Fairley's translation 
 has not been followed though that given above does not differ materially from it. 
 
THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 227 
 
 it must seem strange that the world could be so readily de- 
 ceived by a few phrases which were obviously devoid of 
 truth. In considering the government established by Octa- 
 vian in 27 B.C. there is one fallacy against which it is essen- 
 tial to guard, and it is one into which the historian is 
 especially liable to fall. Knowing what did actually result 
 from any given act, it is easy to assume that it was part of 
 the conscious purpose of the act, which is not always the 
 case. Even though it is true that the restoration of the 
 republic was unreal, this is not of itself an adequate proof 
 that Augustus meant it to be unreal or was entirely to 
 blame for its unreality. Indeed it can be shown that to a 
 large degree the unreality was due to causes for which he was 
 not in any way responsible. The critics of Augustus have 
 sometimes demanded of him the impossible; thus Gardt- 
 hausen, his chief modern biographer, asks bitterly why he 
 did not restore the republic in a real sense, if he had any 
 desire to do so, and concludes that his professions of re- 
 publican sentiment were wholly hypocritical. 3 But this 
 seems hardly fair to Augustus, since much was involved in 
 the matter besides his personal will, The republic had fallen 
 long before he was born, and whether he could restore it or 
 not would obviously depend upon the underlying causes of 
 its fall. To all the Romans of that day the terms republic 
 and senate were almost synonymous. The vital weakness 
 of the senate since the time of Marius had been the fact 
 that it had no real hold upon the loyalty of the army ; such 
 a hold no mere imperial edict could give, and without it the 
 supremacy of the senate could never be much more than 
 nominal. What Augustus had it in his power to restore to 
 the conscript fathers he did in fact restore, and more than 
 that could hardly be demanded. The Romans were more 
 reasonable than some of his modern judges, and accepted 
 what he offered them as a satisfactory solution. 
 
 The really vital point in the new settlement was obviously 
 
 3 Meyer has argued in favor of the sincerity of Augustus in his essay on that em- 
 peror published originally in the Historische Zeitschrift for 1903, but now included 
 in his Kleine Schriften. Gardthausen replied in the Neue Jahrbiicher fiir klassiches 
 Altertum, for 1904 and reprinted his answer in his Augustus, vol. i, pt. 3, 1334-49. 
 
228 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 the command of the army. Here there was little room for 
 discussion as to the course to be pursued ; it was clear that 
 a powerful standing army was necessary for the present 
 and Rome had but one method of dealing with such an army. 
 Since the republic had first become engaged in distant wars, 
 the great command had been an essential part of its ma- 
 chinery. This device was not, as has been sometimes 
 thought, in any way peculiar to the democrats at Rome; it 
 was rather the only means that existed for carrying on war 
 on any large scale, and it was therefore used by both parties 
 equally. The senate, no less than the people, created great 
 commands, but the manner in which it was done differed in 
 the two cases. Since the senate ordinarily had control of 
 both foreign and provincial affairs, that body was able to 
 create a great command by a manipulation of the pro- 
 vincial assignments from year to year. This process did 
 not entail the necessity of any startling or unusual pro- 
 cedure ; for example, when the second war with Mithridates 
 broke out and the senate wished to send Lucullus to take 
 charge of it, it was comparatively easy to arrange the mat- 
 ter. Lucullus was consul at the time and had already been 
 assigned a province under the Sempronian law. This he 
 straightway resigned and the senate was then free to allot 
 him a new province in Asia, which was promptly done. 
 Once he had been placed in command of the war it was a 
 simple matter for the senate to keep him there as long as 
 might be thought desirable. All that was necessary for this 
 purpose was for the senate to omit the Asiatic provinces 
 each year from the list of those to be assigned by lot and to 
 prolong the imperium of their general. When, however, 
 the people wished to send Pompey to supersede Lucullus, 
 they could only do so by passing the Manilian law. Such a 
 law, although perfectly constitutional, was unusual and was 
 thus open to criticism; moreover, it attracted much more 
 attention, both then and since, than did the annual assign- 
 ment of the provinces by the senate. It is this that has 
 given rise to the impression that it was the people who 
 were responsible for the development of the great command. 
 In fact the Manilian law did not create such a command, for 
 
THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 229 
 
 it already existed ; all that it did was to transfer the com- 
 mand from one general to another. The only question 
 between the parties was not how the war should be carried 
 on, but simply who should have charge of it. 
 
 That the great command involved a possible peril to the 
 commonwealth was obvious enough to Roman eyes ; it had 
 been often found that it met one emergency by creating an- 
 other. The general who won an important war was almost 
 as serious a problem to the state as the enemy whom he had 
 defeated. Yet though the Romans were alive to the 
 dangers of the great command, no Roman regarded it as 
 an institution which was in any way inconsistent with the 
 existence of the republic. Such commands had been re- 
 peatedly created without any very serious result. In the 
 days of Cicero, Pompey had held one of vast extent, and yet, 
 if men were to believe the most eloquent of republican ora- 
 tors, the republic had continued to flourish. 
 
 If the Romans admitted the need of a strong army, the 
 only method of controlling it was by creating a new great 
 command. No party had any alternative to propose, since 
 it was plainly impossible for the legions to be distributed 
 equally among the provinces, as circumstances required 
 their concentration along the frontiers. The only point 
 that was open for discussion was whether there should be 
 several great commands or only one. On this matter it was 
 hardly possible for Romans to hesitate a moment; exper- 
 ience, dearly bought by two long civil wars, had shown the 
 probable result of several simultaneous commands. All 
 men were ready to concede at once that, if a large standing 
 army must be maintained, the army as a whole should re- 
 main subject to the imperium of Octavian. What public 
 opinion demanded was not that he should lay down his 
 command, but that he should exercise it in accordance with 
 the old republican forms. 
 
 To the Roman the republic without the senate was un- 
 thinkable, and unless the senate included among its mem- 
 bers the great noble families of Rome, it could not claim 
 his veneration or respect. But membership in the senate 
 had always been closely connected with the magistracies of 
 
230 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 the republic, and so a revival of the republic, if it were to 
 have enough reality to be deceptive, must entail a return ro 
 power — in some degree at least — of the aristocracy. On 
 this point there was little room for hypocrisy; Augustus 
 could not persuade the Roman world that the republic ex- 
 isted at all unless what survived of the republican nobility 
 took a large apparent part in the government. It was nec- 
 essary for him to associate the senate with himself, at least 
 in name, and to allow the old families to hold many of the 
 high positions in the state. In the last analysis his sov- 
 ereignty might rest upon the swords of his legions, but only 
 if he gave it such a form as this would the world accept it 
 willingly. 
 
 If a reconciliation with the aristocracy was thus imposed 
 upon Augustus, recent events had gone far to make it pos- 
 sible. It was, indeed, much easier for him than it had been 
 for Caesar. In the case of the latter the defeat of the nobles 
 had been too recent for them to forgive the victor, and it 
 was still possible for them to dream that the yoke of the 
 army could be shaken off and that the senate could again 
 grasp the supreme control. What followed Caesar's death 
 had proved this to be impossible, and the greater part of the 
 generation that had known the days of freedom had 
 perished. The great families which had survived the 
 proscription and the civil wars were broken and impover- 
 ished, and were ready now to accept with gratitude a system 
 which restored them, at least outwardly, to their former 
 splendor. 
 
 Circumstances and the weight of public opinion, there- 
 fore, clearly imposed upon Augustus the general form his 
 settlement must take. He was to be commander of the 
 Roman army, but the senate was to be a partner in the 
 government and the nobility was to be given a prominent 
 place in the state. It only remained to work out the details 
 by which this general result could be most readily attained. 
 Here Augustus was very careful to follow republican prec- 
 edents in all particulars where this was possible, and so to 
 make his government seem as familiar as might be to the 
 Roman. The principate was intended to appear in all 
 
THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 231 
 
 respects a continuation of the old republic and not in any- 
 way a new constitution. According to the usage of the 
 past, if Augustus was to be the head of the army he should 
 be given the governorship of the provinces where that army 
 was stationed ; this was the case because the Romans made 
 no distinction between the civil and the military functions. 
 It seemed, therefore, entirely natural when a law was passed 
 by the assembly conferring on Augustus the proconsular 
 imperium for ten years over the principal frontier provinces 
 of the empire. The position thus created for him was not 
 materially different from that held by Pompey under the 
 Manilian law. 4 It is true that the army given to Augustus 
 was larger, but since the military power intrusted to Pompey 
 had been practically irresistible, this could hardly seem im- 
 portant. It is also true that so many provinces had never 
 before been subject to one man, but the provinces counted 
 for little except for the legions stationed there. A Roman 
 might, therefore, regard the position of Augustus as sub- 
 stantially the same as that of the republican leader in the 
 civil war. 
 
 There were many obvious differences in detail in the two 
 cases, but they would hardly strike a contemporary as of 
 vital significance. This is the more likely since in most 
 cases this significance lay chiefly in the future, which the 
 contemporaries of Augustus, unlike the historian, did not 
 know. They were bound to judge by their own past ex- 
 perience and this alone; and judging thus, the changes can- 
 not have seemed of much importance. For example, the 
 provinces assigned to Augustus were widely separated, and 
 instead of residing in them, he found it convenient to remain 
 in Rome and from this point to carry on their administration 
 by means of deputies. This could hardly be called an innova- 
 tion, since Pompey had governed Spain from Italy with the 
 
 4 Meyer is right in saying that Augustus was rather the heir of Pompey than of 
 Julius Caesar (Caesars Monarchic 548). It might be questioned, however, whether 
 he has not attributed too definite a design and too clear a purpose to Pompey. 
 If he had been successful, the position of Pompey in the Roman world would have 
 been very similar to that afterwards held by Augustus. This does not mean 
 necessarily that Pompey had any notior, of what he was seeking to gain or of the 
 inevitable consequences of his acts. 
 
232 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 sanction of the senate. But if this were to be done it must 
 have seemed childish in the extreme to try to prevent Augus- 
 tus from coming within the city limits, as Pompey had been 
 prevented. It would surely be absurd for the senate to 
 meet in the suburbs every time Augustus wished to attend 
 the session, and no one could reasonably object to permitting 
 him to come within the city while retaining the imperium. 
 
 Serious discussion only became possible when it came to 
 determine the precise relations that should exist between the 
 princeps, as the holder of the new great command came to 
 be called, and the restored republic of which he was to be 
 nominally one of the magistrates. If it had been possible 
 for the two to work independently of each other, it would 
 have simplified the matter very greatly, but this was out of 
 the question. If their functions could have been clearly 
 separated, the princeps might have administered his prov- 
 inces, while the republican magistrates and promagistrates 
 under the advice and direction of the senate governed the 
 remainder of the Roman world according to the old repub- 
 lican tradition. In actual fact the princeps found himself 
 so vitally concerned in the working of the republic beside 
 him that he was inevitably driven to seek to direct and con- 
 trol it. In the first place he derived his own authority from 
 the senate and the people, and what they gave they could 
 take back again. Then too, like all other Roman generals, 
 he was forced to promise rewards to his soldiers, and to 
 secure the redemption of his pledges he was compelled to 
 interfere in politics. Moreover, many of his acts required 
 formal sanction from the senate and assembly, and might, 
 in theory, be reversed or modified by them. Perhaps the 
 most important point of all, however, was the fact that he 
 drew many of his officers from the ranks of the republican 
 nobility, which necessarily gave him a keen interest in the 
 results of the elections ; if he wished one of his deputies to 
 have consular rank, he must see to it that the man in question 
 was duly elected consul. In a word, the princeps was so 
 closely concerned in the working of the republican machine 
 
THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 233 
 
 that he could not permit it to work freely, but was obliged 
 to some extent to direct and control it. 
 
 The Romans had already had abundant experience of the 
 fact that the holder of a great command could not remain 
 a mere spectator in politics. Pompey was certainly no 
 politician, yet he had never been able to let politics alone, 
 not because of any personal desire to meddle, but because of 
 his position. While he was engaged in the war with Mith- 
 ridates Pompey had been forced to keep an eye on Rome, 
 because measures were constantly brought forward there 
 which were certain to affect him. He had been obliged to 
 seek for some convenient weapon with which to ward off 
 the blows aimed at him by his enemies ; this he found in the 
 tribunate. If he could secure the election of one or more 
 of his trusted agents to this office, they could protect his in- 
 terests by the use of their veto. Such tribunes could also 
 be employed to bring forward any new proposals which he 
 might desire to have made. This connection between the 
 general invested with a great command and the tribunes 
 had been carried even further by Caesar during his term as 
 proconsul of the Gauls, and it must have been an association 
 very familiar by that time to Roman minds. 
 
 That past experience had shown the necessity for some 
 connection between the princeps and the machinery of the 
 republican government could neither be denied nor over- 
 looked. This connection could be established in two ways. 
 Indirectly it could be obtained by allowing the princeps to 
 select some of the regular magistrates and use them as his 
 agents, as had been the method of Pompey. The other way 
 of accomplishing the same result was to allow the princeps 
 to act in person rather than by deputy, since he intended to 
 reside in Rome the greater part of the time. For this pur- 
 pose Augustus could be given one of the regular offices of the 
 republic, or the special powers which he wished to have 
 could be conferred upon him without his holding such an 
 office. Both methods were at first resorted to. In view 
 of the recent precedents of Pompey and of Caesar it was 
 natural that men should think of the tribunate for this pur- 
 pose. Since Augustus was a patrician (by adoption though 
 
234 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 not by birth) he could not hold this office directly, and hence 
 he had the tribunician power, detached from the office, con- 
 ferred upon him. This can hardly have struck the Romans 
 as a very important innovation ; it must have seemed little 
 more than a means of allowing Augustus to do in person, 
 what preceding holders of a great command had been in 
 the habit of doing by deputy. 
 
 The conditions of the case required more than this, how- 
 ever. In order to control the republic more easily, es- 
 pecially in the first days of its restoration, Augustus had 
 himself elected one of the consuls every year. He was thus 
 at the same time the holder of a great command (his pro- 
 consular imperium), was invested with the tribunician 
 power, and was one of the two chief regular magistrates. 
 This, in brief, was what may be called the first draft of the 
 imperial constitution ; but to all the Romans of that day it 
 seemed a first partial and imperfect restoration of the old 
 regime. 
 
 Augustus soon found that the arrangement he had made 
 was unsatisfactory. The stricter republicans still held 
 aloof and insisted that the republic was not yet restored, and 
 that they could take no part in public affairs. It is of in- 
 terest to note the precise point of their attack. They felt 
 that while a single man thus held the consulship year after 
 year, the state of affairs was little better than a tyranny, 
 and that under these circumstances all talk of a restoration 
 of the republic was a mockery. In addition to such opposi- 
 tion as this, Augustus had doubtless become conscious of 
 several less apparent objections to the practice. If he held 
 the consulship, a large amount of routine business would 
 necessarily devolve upon him. His health was feeble, and 
 he may very well have regarded this as a serious waste of 
 the time and energy which were sorely needed elsewhere. 
 Another inconvenience lay in the fact that if he held the 
 consulship each year, he would be forced to deny to many 
 men a distinction which they had come to claim almost as a 
 right, and would thus give bitter offense to those old families 
 that survived and to the public that had come to look upon 
 them with a sentimental affection. Partly to rid himself 
 
THE RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC 235 
 
 of a troublesome burden, and probably even more to con- 
 ciliate the republicans, Augustus in 23 B.C. suddenly laid 
 down the consulship and refused to hold it any longer. 
 This concession won over to his side the last of the obstinate 
 upholders of the past, and their chief leaders accepted office 
 under the new regime. With this event the reconciliation 
 of the republic and the principate might well have seemed 
 to be final and complete. 
 
 But when Augustus laid down the consulship and so di- 
 vested himself of any of the regular magistracies, the need 
 for some close connection between the princeps and the re- 
 public still existed and even acquired an added force. This 
 difficulty was promptly solved in a new fashion. Augustus 
 began to lay greater stress upon the tribunician power 
 than he had hitherto done, but something more than this was 
 necessary. Accordingly he had certain of the consular 
 powers which he desired to retain conferred upon him by 
 special laws. These accorded him the right to summon 
 the senate and to bring matters before that body. He could 
 do both these things by virtue of the tribunician power, but 
 only subject to annoying restrictions. If he convened the 
 senate in this way the summons of the consuls had preced- 
 ence over his, and when the senate met, it was the consuls 
 who presided and controlled the order of business. This 
 would offer ample opportunities for vexatious obstruction 
 and delay, which the powers now conferred upon Augustus 
 would remove. Another special law gave him the right to 
 preside over the elections ; this would furnish him a chance 
 to influence their results without too great a break with the 
 traditional forms. He was furthermore permitted to re- 
 tain his imperium even within the city of Rome. When he 
 renounced the consulship he could not otherwise have en- 
 tered the city without forfeiting the imperium, and must 
 have spent his time in the suburbs and country villas round 
 about as Pompey had formerly been obliged to do. 5 These 
 
 5 It has usually been held that at this time the imperium of Augustus was declared 
 maius and extended to include the senatorial provinces. McFayden in an able article 
 in Classical Philology for January, 1921, has shown — conclusively as it seems to the 
 present writer — that this is a mistake. If Augustus received any right to interfere 
 in the senatorial provinces, he made practically no use of it, and such control as he 
 had over them he obtained in other and less direct ways. 
 
236 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 changes involved no actual change in the position of af- 
 fairs, since while he held the consulship he had possessed all 
 these powers by reason of his office. All that was done 
 was to permit him to lay down that office and yet retain 
 some of its rights and privileges which seemed more or less 
 necessary to secure the smooth and convenient transaction 
 of the public business. No alarm seems to have been felt 
 at these extensions of his power, or rather at these reserva- 
 tions on his surrender of the consulship. The popular 
 clamor was in quite the opposite direction. The fear of 
 anarchy was still strong, and men were disposed to quarrel 
 with the princeps because he took so little, rather than be- 
 cause he asked too much. Confident that what he had 
 gained was ample for his purpose, he steadfastly refused 
 the still more sweeping powers that were offered him. 
 
 With the changes made in 22 B.C. the principate was 
 given its final form in point of legal theory. Throughout 
 the early empire this theory was destined to undergo scarcely 
 any alteration. It is true that the actual working of the 
 government was speedily and radically transformed, but for 
 this Augustus was by no means wholly responsible. The 
 pressure of circumstances and the necessities of the ad- 
 ministration were forces which no one man's will was able 
 to control; after a brief vision of a restored republic, the 
 drift toward monarchy overwhelmed the constitution. 
 Even in his lifetime the principate had been profoundly 
 modified in point of fact, and when Augustus died he had 
 come to be, not the first citizen of a republic, but an em- 
 peror in the modern sense. This transformation was 
 brought about by causes far deeper than his personal voli- 
 tion. In the main it was not his fault that the republic 
 that he had restored failed to maintain itself. Its vital 
 weaknesses were not those that any single man could remedy, 
 and it was far less the conscious choice of Augustus than the 
 irresistible pressure of imperial necessities that led to the 
 development of the principate in the direction of a despotism. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 The Transformation of the Principate 
 
 The settlement toward which Augustus had been feeling 
 his way ever since the battle of Actium may be regarded as 
 complete in 22 B.C. In that year a sort of partnership, 
 sometimes called a dyarchy, had been arranged between the 
 republic (officially restored in 27) and the princeps, as 
 Augustus now began to be styled. In theory there was no 
 suggestion of a monarchy or of a monarch; the emperor 1 
 was simply a general of the republic to whom certain ex- 
 ceptional powers had been intrusted for a term of years. 
 Although no formal change was ever made in this legal 
 theory, yet before his death Augustus had come to be an 
 emperor in the modern sense and the absolute ruler of the 
 entire Roman world. The purpose of the present chapter 
 is to call attention to some hitherto neglected causes for 
 this striking transformation. 
 
 Although in point of law a general of the republic, the 
 powers conferred upon the princeps were so sweeping as to 
 make him a partner of the senate rather than a subordinate 
 officer in the government. To his sole control had been 
 committed a number of provinces, and over these he ruled 
 supreme by virtue of a formal law of the Roman people. 
 These provinces embraced the greater part of Spain and all 
 of Gaul in the West, while in the East they included Syria, 
 Cilicia, Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Egypt. Great as were the 
 powers thus given, the charge of these regions involved yet 
 other responsibilities. The provinces of the princeps had 
 been so selected that they carried with them the control of 
 the army and of the foreign policy of the empire. The great 
 majority of the Roman legions were stationed in his 
 provinces and by his proconsular imperium Augustus had 
 sole command of them. It is true that the governors of the 
 
 lEverything that could suggest monarchy to the Roman was carefully avoided by 
 Augustus. The title imperator, from which our word emperor is derived, was one 
 bestowed on any victorious general of the republic. 
 
238 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 senatorial provinces enjoyed an imperium which was legally- 
 independent of the princeps, but they seldom found them- 
 selves possessed of a sufficient number of troops for military 
 operations except upon a very petty scale. The proconsuls 
 of Africa alone were an exception, since they sometimes 
 had to undertake campaigns of some importance against the 
 tribes of that region, and if victorious they were allowed 
 the honor of a triumph. This in itself is evidence that they 
 commanded the forces stationed there, not as officers of the 
 princeps, but by a commission direct from the state and 
 independent of him. Their armies were too small, how- 
 ever, to make them a serious factor in the situation; it 
 was to the emperor that nearly the entire army looked up 
 as its commanding general. It is, therefore, correct to 
 characterize Augustus as the war-lord of the Roman stand- 
 ing army. 2 It should be borne in mind, however, that he 
 held this position indirectly and by virtue of the particular 
 provinces subject to his proconsular imperium. With these 
 provinces there went also the control of foreign policy. The 
 relations of Rome with other states were largely in the 
 hands of the governors of the frontier provinces. Whether 
 there was war or peace with Parthia would be determined, 
 at least in so far as it rested with Rome to decide the matter, 
 by the course pursued by the governor of Syria who was 
 now the deputy of Augustus, removable at his pleasure, and 
 bound to carry out his orders. 
 
 Yet, though a large extent of territory and powers of 
 great importance were thus committed to the sole charge 
 of the new commander-in-chief, he did not by any means 
 control the entire Roman world; the republic stood by his 
 side and retained the management of all the older and more 
 settled provinces. To govern these the old machinery was 
 resorted to without change except that Pompey's law, fix- 
 ing a five year interval between the magistracy and pro- 
 magistracy, was now enforced, and that Caesar's practice 
 of allowing the proconsul to remain for two years in his pro- 
 vince was likewise observed. By the division of 27 B.C. 
 
 'Gardthausen, vol. ii, pt. 1, 522. 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 239 
 
 ten provinces had been reserved as senatorial, and this was 
 almost as large a number as the republic could provide with 
 governors. In 22 B.C., when the final settlement was made, 
 two other provinces, Narbonensis and Cyprus, were ceded to 
 the senate by the princeps and at about the same time the 
 number of the praetors was increased by two. 3 Approx- 
 imately half the empire was thus subject to the conscript 
 fathers, at least in theory, and the responsibility was, per- 
 haps, as great as they could undertake. 
 
 The policy which Augustus followed in his portion of the 
 Roman world was in the main a peaceful one. At first sight 
 it seems almost paradoxical that Rome should have ceased 
 to be a conquering power as soon as she was really organized 
 for war. Without a genuine standing army she had won the 
 world, yet now, with a permanent war-lord, the legions 
 halted and stood still. The paradox, though striking, is not 
 difficult of explanation. Many of the motives which have 
 led modern states to adopt a policy of expansion were of 
 little weight in the empire of Augustus. The world he 
 governed was not overpopulated and stood in no need of new 
 territories for purposes of colonization. It was not indus- 
 trial, at least in any modern sense, and had no need to seek 
 new sources of raw materials or new markets for its goods. 
 Even if these needs made themselves felt, the system of land 
 transportation was so clumsy that markets were of little use 
 to the manufacturer unless they could be reached by sea, and 
 all the markets of this kind Rome already held. Such sur- 
 plus capital as was available could find an ample field for 
 profitable investment in the newly annexed regions of Gaul 
 or in the older provinces. Thus none of the causes which 
 have led to the imperialism of our days exerted much in- 
 fluence in Rome. In the last years of the republic there had 
 been little desire for expansion on the part of the Roman 
 government; the chief conquests had been made by the 
 over-great proconsuls whom the senate was unable to con- 
 trol. Caesar and Pompey had extended the empire, but both 
 
 3 Making ten in all. The two new praetors were the praetores aerarii added in 
 23 B.C. With the five year interval there were doubtless some ex-magistrates who 
 could not take provinces. 
 
240 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 had consulted their own will and pleasure rather than the 
 wishes of the conscript fathers. The possibility of such 
 aggressive wars as they had waged was now abolished. 
 The princeps who was now in control of the frontiers had 
 no intention of permitting his officers to act in any way 
 contrary to his policy. That policy was essentially the 
 same as that of the senate, but with the vital difference that 
 Augustus could enforce his wishes and the senate could not. 
 In addition to lacking most of the modern motives for 
 expansion, the emperor had strong reasons of his own for 
 desiring to keep the peace as far as possible. By tempera- 
 ment and natural ability a statesman and administrator 
 rather than a soldier, Augustus felt little inclination for 
 military adventure. New conquests would require large 
 armies, and he hesitated to intrust too great a power to any 
 man whose loyalty was not above suspicion; generals on 
 whom he cared to rely were none too common in his service. 
 Moreover, war would entail heavy expenses. In the past 
 when Roman arms had been directed against civilized or 
 semi-civilized peoples the plunder had not infrequently been 
 more than sufficient to defray the cost. Now, however, 
 there were upon the frontiers only rude and barbarous 
 tribes from whom such profits could not be expected. There 
 was but one quarter where a successful campaign might be 
 remunerative and that was in the East. The conquest of 
 Parthia might have yielded a large amount of treasure, but 
 experience had shown the Romans that this would prove a 
 difficult and perilous venture. If Augustus undertook it, 
 he must either lead his armies in person or intrust them to 
 a deputy. If he assumed the active command, defeat might 
 easily cost him his throne; if he sent one of his generals, 
 failure would diminish his prestige and glory, while success 
 would inevitably create a most embarrassing situation. The 
 conqueror of Parthia would be a dangerous subject and 
 might readily become a rival. It was natural that the 
 princeps should avoid an enterprise where success or failure 
 seemed almost equally damaging to his position and should 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 241 
 
 prefer, if possible, to keep the peace upon the eastern 
 frontier. 
 
 Even if Augustus put aside dreams of conquest, he still 
 had work enough before him to task his energies. Spain 
 had never been completely conquered, and the turbulent and 
 restless tribes there gave constant trouble. In Gaul the 
 work of organization was still far from finished; Caesar 
 had begun the task of setting up a systematic administra- 
 tion, but the civil war had interrupted him. To the settle- 
 ment of the West Augustus turned his attention as soon 
 as he had restored order in the East. In this he found a 
 vast and necessary task, and one entirely adapted to his 
 temper and abilities. Hardly had he officially restored the 
 republic in 27 B.C. than he set out for Gaul and Spain, leav- 
 ing his colleagues in the consulship to manage affairs in 
 Rome during his absence. He did not return to the city till 
 the end of 24, after having completed the provincial organ- 
 ization of Gaul and quieted Spain, where serious fighting 
 was found necessary. 
 
 Experience may have convinced Augustus that his first 
 arrangement of the constitution was unsatisfactory, for he 
 employed his sojourn in the city to revise the settlement of 
 27 B.C. and make the changes in the principate that have al- 
 ready been discussed. After giving to his government what 
 was destined to be its final form, he turned his attention 
 once more to the East. In 21 he left Rome and remained 
 away about two years, during which time his trusted 
 general Agrippa represented him in the capital. After the 
 princeps returned to Italy in 18 he had his proconsular 
 powers renewed for five years and in 16 set out again for 
 Gaul, where he remained for the next three years. 
 
 The work of organizing and pacifying the West had been 
 fairly well completed by 16 B.C., so that the princeps could 
 devote his attention to another phase of the problem com- 
 mitted to his care. The northern frontier of the empire 
 was in a most unsatisfactory condition; everywhere it 
 bordered on turbulent and warlike tribes and for much of 
 its length it rested on no natural barriers. If peace and 
 security were to be obtained for the Roman world, this 
 
242 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 boundary must be rounded out and rendered easy of de- 
 fense. From Macedonia to Gaul Rome held only a thin strip 
 along the shores of the Adriatic, and from the mountain 
 fastnesses of the interior the barbarians swept down in 
 constant raids upon the settled districts. If any sort of 
 durable peace was to be established here the Romans must 
 either withdraw from the coast or push their conquest in- 
 land to some natural frontier. The first really defensible 
 line that they could reach, if they chose the latter course, 
 would be the Danube. In Gaul, too, there were frontier 
 difficulties. Caesar had carried his conquests to the Rhine, 
 but the Germans on the other side of that river gave con- 
 tinual trouble, and the best method of dealing with them 
 was still an open question. In both these regions Augustus 
 decided to consolidate the Roman possessions by an advance. 
 The Germans were to be conquered and Gaul protected from 
 their raids by pushing the frontier to the Elbe, while farther 
 East, by the addition of Pannonia and Moesia, the boundary 
 was to be brought forward to the Danube. These lines 
 would be much easier to defend than the old ones. The 
 wars which this rounding out of the frontiers would entail 
 might have a political as well as a military value to the 
 princeps. His office was in theory a temporary one, and it 
 might be a matter of shrewd policy to silence all objection 
 to its continuance. The commander-in-chief could hardly 
 be dispensed with in the midst of war, and an aggressive 
 policy on the frontiers might make the renewal of his powers 
 seem more necessary and less open to dispute by the stern 
 republicans. This is suggested, at least, by the fact that in 
 18 B.C. Augustus had had his imperium prolonged for only 
 half the original term and when this time expired had taken 
 it again for but five years. As soon, however, as the new 
 policy was inaugurated on the frontiers he reverted to the 
 earlier precedent and in 8 B.C. had his powers renewed for 
 ten years as at first. 
 
 While he was thus occupied with the organization of his 
 provinces and the rectification of the frontier, Augustus ex- 
 ercised his proconsular imperium largely through his own 
 immediate family circle. At the start he shared his burden 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 243 
 
 with his general Agrippa. In 23 B.C. he dispatched this 
 trusted officer to Syria and gave him charge of all — or most 
 — of the eastern part of the empire. When he himself un- 
 dertook a journey to the East he recalled the general to 
 Rome and put him in charge there during his own absence. 
 Upon the return of Augustus to the city, Agrippa, after sup- 
 pressing a revolt in Spain, went back to Syria in 17 and re- 
 mained in charge there until 13 B.C. In the early years of 
 the principate Augustus and his ablest lieutenant thus di- 
 vided the responsibility for the management of the imperial 
 provinces between them. The fidelity of a general so trusted 
 was naturally a matter of concern to the emperor. To make 
 doubly sure of his loyalty, Augustus sought to bind him as 
 closely as possible to the imperial family, and with this end 
 in view a marriage was arranged between Agrippa and the 
 only child of the emperor, his daughter Julia. Augustus 
 then conferred upon his general powers second only to his 
 own and recognized him as his heir and probable successor. 
 
 For such other officers as he needed to administer his 
 provinces and lead his armies Augustus made but sparing 
 use of the old nobility. Among his officers whose names 
 are preserved the majority — previous to 16 B.C. — were men 
 whose rank had been acquired since the civil wars. During 
 this time the higher republican aristocracy played only an 
 insignificant role in the imperial provinces. 4 
 
 Augustus made use of his sojourn in Gaul from 16 to 13 
 B.C. to inaugurate his new policy on the frontiers. Several 
 incidents combined to furnish an excuse for the change. On 
 
 4 A list of the known officers of Augustus from 30 to 16 B.C. may be of interest. For 
 further details concerning some of these see the tables in the Appendix. 
 T. Statilius Taurus (cos. 37 and 26), Dalmatia 33-28. A new man. 
 Sex. Appuleius (cos. 29), Spain before 26. On his father's side of no distinction, 
 
 but on his mother's a nephew of Augustus. 
 C. Antistius Vetus (cos. 30), Spain 26. A member of a praetorian family. 
 C. Furnius (cos. 17), Spain 22. His father was given consular rank by Augustus. 
 M. Vinicius (cos. 19), Germany 25. The son of a knight. 
 P. Silius Nerva (cos. 20), Spain after 25. A member of a praetorian family. 
 M. Lollius (cos. 21), Germany 16 and in Thrace before. A new man. 
 T Carisius — never consul — Spain 25-22. A new man. 
 L. Aemilius Paullus Lepidus (cos. 34), Spain 24. Noble. 
 M. Licinius Crassus (cos. 30), Macedonia 29. Noble. 
 M. Tullius Cicero (cos. 30), Syria 27. Noble. 
 M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus (cos. 31), Gaul before 27. Noble. 
 
244 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 the Rhine the legate of the emperor, M. Lollius, had been 
 defeated by the Germans and at about the same time the 
 tribes of Noricum and Pannonia had made an attack on 
 Istria. The senatorial governor of Illyricum, P. Silius, met 
 the incursion of the barbarians successfully and Marquardt 
 is probably right in supposing that the conquest of Noricum 
 was the direct outcome of the raid and its repulse. 5 The 
 situation on the frontier was, perhaps, dangerous, and could 
 in any case furnish an excuse for a more vigorous policy in 
 dealing with the barbarian neighbors to the north. Under 
 these circumstances Augustus set out for Gaul, taking with 
 him his two stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus. It was the 
 intention of the emperor to give the two young princes a 
 trial, and if they displayed capacity, to place the solution 
 of the frontier difficulties in their hands. In Gaul he could 
 easily keep a close watch upon the course of events. His 
 stepsons were first employed in the minor task of subjugat- 
 ing the mountainous region known as Rhaetia. In this 
 they were successful and demonstrated their fitness for com- 
 mand. More serious responsibilities were at once laid upon 
 them, and they were placed at the head of the aggressive 
 defensive on which Augustus had resolved. When the em- 
 peror returned to Rome in 13 B.C. he left Drusus to carry on 
 the campaign against the Germans, while Tiberius took 
 charge in Illyricum and undertook the definite conquest of 
 Pannonia. Thus when Augustus set about the task of se- 
 curing natural frontiers for the empire he was able to place 
 the active management of his share of the Roman world very 
 largely in the hands of his immediate relatives. Agrippa, 
 his son-in-law, controlled Syria and the East and his two 
 stepsons had charge of almost the whole northern frontier. 
 Up to 13 B.C. he had made little use of the higher republican 
 nobility. As if by way of compensation the latter had been 
 permitted to control the republic and the portion of the 
 empire assigned to the senate. 
 
 While the princeps was occupied in the ways that have 
 been indicated the restored republic was functioning in 
 
 5 Marquardt, Romische Staatsverwaltung, i, 290. 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 245 
 
 Rome. A brief examination of such scanty facts as have 
 been preserved will serve to show that during this time the 
 restoration had considerable reality and that the republican V 
 machine was working with some degree of freedom. It is true 
 that by the settlement of 22 B.C. the princeps had acquired 
 — or retained — powers which gave him a very important 
 opportunity for interference. He had the right to summon 
 the senate and to preside at the elections, and his tribunician 
 power gave him a sweeping veto which he could employ to 
 check at once any policy that might seem dangerous to his 
 position in the state. Of these powers the right to preside 
 over the elections carried with it a vast indirect influence, 
 since by the Roman system the magistrate who presided at 
 the polling had the duty of determining the eligibility of the 
 candidates. 6 Such a power placed the career of every 
 politician more or less at his mercy and so gave him a potent 
 means of influencing their conduct. He could in addition to 
 this recommend to the people any candidate in whose suc- 
 cess he felt an especial interest, and such an indication of 
 his will was always followed by the voters. Yet there seems 
 no reason to think that Augustus availed himself of these 
 powers to interfere with the freedom of the republic more 
 than was strictly necessary. Political life certainly revived 
 in Rome and ran a sometimes turbulent course. In 21, while 
 the princeps was absent, the consular elections were so hotly 
 disputed that disorders broke out in the city. 7 It was this ' 
 that led Augustus to send Agrippa to Rome to act as his 
 representative there during his sojourn in the East. In 
 spite of this, when in 19 the emperor returned from Asia, 
 he was met by news of further troubles at the consular 
 elections, and deputies waited on him in Greece to ask him 
 to settle the dispute. 8 These recurrent difficulties led him 
 
 6 That the presiding magistrate had such a power and responsibility has been gen- 
 erally held. Willems argues in favor of some restriction of this right, but his view 
 would hardly touch the point here involved. That such a right was recognized under 
 the empire is shown by the conduct of Sentius Saturninus in 19 B.C. as reported by 
 Velleius, ii, 92. See Willems, Le Droit public romain, 221 and Destarac, La Brigua 
 electorate a Rome, 25-32. 
 
 7 Dio, liv, 6. 
 
 8 Dio, liv, 10. 
 
246 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 in the next year to enact a new law against the bribery of 
 voters, and another law to the same effect was found neces- 
 sary in 8 B.C. 
 
 The impression given by these disorders and the resulting 
 legislation is confirmed by an examination of the consular 
 fasti for the period. These fasti are simply tables of the 
 consuls for each year. As the Romans commonly indicated 
 the year by the names of the consuls it was of great im- 
 portance to preserve such lists, and it is still possible to 
 reconstruct them in a practically complete form. A study 
 of them in the reign of Augustus reveals several very sug- 
 gestive facts. As has been pointed out, one of the insistent 
 demands of the public opinion which the restoration of the 
 republic was designed to satisfy had been for a return to 
 aristocratic government. The significance of this needs to 
 be clearly understood. The aristocracy under the later 
 republic was essentially a nobility of office. Every man 
 who attained a curule office became by virtue of that fact a 
 noble himself and ennobled his descendants after him. The 
 precise rank of the family depended upon the dignity of the 
 office he had held ; among the nobles there were thus consular 
 and praetorian families. Such rank was not hereditary in 
 point of law, but popular sentiment and the strong class 
 spirit of the aristocracy combined to make it so in fact. 
 From this it came about that a member of one of the noble 
 houses felt himself entitled to hold in his turn the magis- 
 tracies which his ancestors had held and in this claim the 
 Roman voter acquiesced entirely. The natural consequence 
 was the formation of a ring of noble families who practically 
 monopolized the offices in the last century of the republic. 
 It was only very rarely and under special circumstances 
 that a new man could force his way to the consulship. The 
 praetorship was somewhat more open to talent apart from 
 birth, but the consulship was almost wholly confined to the 
 aristocracy. The civil war and the second triumvirate had 
 \7 rudely shattered the monopoly of the noble families, but with 
 N;he restoration of the republic, combined with the popular 
 reaction in their favor, they were bound to come to office. 
 Men were wearied of seeing upstarts receive the highest 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 247 
 
 dignities and longed to bestow the honors of the state on 
 such of the old families as had survived the storm. Augus- 
 tus, safely intrenched in his own provinces, had little need 
 to quarrel with this feeling even if he did not share it. He 
 could well afford to let the nobles dominate the republic and 
 administer the senatorial provinces while he concerned him- 
 self with his own special problems. 
 
 An examination of the fasti for the purpose of estimating 
 the position of the nobles is unfortunately attended with 
 some difficulty. The Roman system of family names was 
 so uncertain and irregular that in some cases a son did not 
 bear the same family name as his father; thus Pompeius 
 Magnus was the son of Pompeius Strabo and Asinius Gallus 
 of Asinius Pollio. Moreover, the gentile name was often 
 borne by several unconnected families. In addition to this, 
 while the fasti usually indicate the given name of the father 
 and often of the grandfather, the storm and stress of the 
 civil war and the proscription make such a break that it is 
 not always possible to pick up the links. Yet enough can 
 be gathered to show the general character of the govern- 
 ment sufficiently. 
 
 The administration of the triumvirate had exhibited a 
 marked preference for new men in the consulship. Even 
 counting as a noble every man who bore a gentile name 
 that had appeared in the fasti for two hundred years before 
 Actium, the new men formed a majority. 9 It was not until 
 after the victory over Antony that Augustus turned de- 
 cidedly to the old nobility. The proscription had shattered 
 the aristocracy, and the old families were doubtless as a 
 whole too deeply injured and too profoundly alienated for 
 the triumvirs to trust them. Here and there a noble who 
 had adhered to their side or had made his peace with them 
 was advanced, but in the main they relied on men of undis- 
 tinguished birth. When, however, Augustus sought to 
 
 s 0f the 45 men who held the consulship after Octavian marched on Rome only 12 
 were certainly nobles ; of the rest 24 were certainly new men and the remaining 9 
 were doubtful. These 9 bore gentile names that had occurred in the fasti in the last 
 200 years, but their family names were new to the highest office. Some of them may 
 have been members of old families under a new name, but it seems unlikely that they 
 vere all so connected. 
 
 X 
 
248 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 establish a permanent and stable regime he found so marked 
 a reaction in favor of the fallen nobility that he at once at- 
 tempted to come to an understanding with them. This 
 policy was doubtless congenial to his temperament and in 
 accord with his convictions, but it was attended with some 
 difficulty and he reached his goal only gradually. 
 
 In the years from 30 to 23 B.C. the aristocratic names be- 
 come more frequent in the fasti. During these eight years 
 Augustus himself held the consulship each year and as- 
 sociated with him in the office thirteen other men. Of these, 
 seven were members of noble families or had been prominent 
 among the republicans, five were officers of Augustus or 
 sons of officers of the triumvirs, and one may have been a 
 new man, but may also have been a son of a senator men- 
 tioned by Sallust and a member of the lower ranks of the 
 old nobility. When the emperor laid down the consulship 
 in 23 he named two prominent republicans to the office, and 
 this event may be taken as indicating that the reconciliation 
 was now complete. 
 
 In 22 B.C. the restored republic began to function with com- 
 parative freedom and the nobility took prompt possession. 
 From 22 to 13 B.C. a period of ten years elapsed, and during 
 this time some twenty-one persons held the office. Of these, 
 seven were certainly members of consular families, 10 while 
 the names of five others suggest a connection with the old 
 houses, although their exact relationship remains uncertain. 
 Of the rest, two were members of families of praetorian 
 rank and three were adherents of the republican party who 
 had been proscribed by the triumvirs. The imperial family 
 furnished two consuls, of whom one, Tiberius, was also by 
 birth a member of an old aristocratic house. Among the 
 consuls for this period there were but three who seem to be 
 new men, and they were all soldiers who had served under 
 Augustus and whose promotion to the highest honor was 
 probably a reward for such service. It will thus be seen 
 
 10 One was a son of a supporter of Antony to whom Augustus gave the consular 
 rank without the actual consulship. This man was C. Furnius, and he had served 
 Augustus as legate in Spain in 22. He was consul in 17 B.C. For details see the 
 tables in the Appendix. 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 249 
 
 that the old nobility was distinctly predominant. Of the 
 twenty-two consuls thirteen belonged to families of consular 
 rank, either certainly or probably, while three others had 
 been so identified with the aristocratic party and had suf- 
 fered so greatly for the cause that it may reasonably be con- 
 jectured that the nobles regarded them as members of their 
 class. Of the remaining six consuls, half were men pro- 
 moted from the lower ranks of the senatorial aristocracy. 
 Some such result as this is precisely what might be expected 
 if the princeps allowed the republican institutions to work 
 freely. The effects of the proscription and the years of 
 furious civil strife would amply account for the promotions 
 and uncertainties that actually occur. 
 
 While thus the restored republic was functioning with 
 comparatively little interference from the princeps, the 
 latter was carrying on his own department of the state 
 with the help of his immediate family, as has been shown. 
 Under these conditions he had no strong motive for meddling 
 with affairs in Rome, as long as order was preserved there 
 and the regular authorities could carry on the work of the 
 government without his help. All that was necessary was 
 for him to protect himself against any acts which might 
 injuriously affect his own peculiar task and to reward a 
 competent officer from time to time, or to give a fitting and 
 appropriate rank to some one of whose ability he was 
 anxious to make use. These latter needs he probably found 
 it easy to provide for in the depleted state of the old aris- 
 tocracy ; the known facts give no reason to assume any con- 
 tinuous, or even frequent, interference on the part of the a, 
 emperor. Moreover, such interference would be clearly to 
 his disadvantage. Even if he were simply playing a comedy, 
 the part which he had chosen was plainly futile unless it 
 were well acted ; there could be little gain in restoring the 
 republic if the princeps by his own conduct openly pro- 
 claimed it a farce. If Augustus thought it worth while to 
 pose as a constitutional magistrate, he must have felt it 
 desirable to act the part with care and make the comedy 
 succeed. Such facts as are available would seen to show 
 that this was actually his course ; he busied himself with the 
 
250 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 work assigned to him and allowed the nobles to manage 
 their republic very much as they pleased. 
 
 Yet the conditions which made it possible for the emperor 
 to restore some sort of liberty to Rome were essentially un- 
 stable. The Romans were a people of strong aristocratic 
 feeling and were little likely to look with favor on men pos- 
 sessed of neither birth nor high official standing in im- 
 portant posts, even in the imperial service. This mattered 
 little while the princeps could conduct his administration 
 through his near relatives. If these should fail him, 
 Roman sentiment would force him to call in the help of the 
 nobility to govern his share of the Roman world, and this 
 necessity would give him a far stronger interest in the 
 working of the republican government. A time might come 
 when the pressing demands of his own administration would 
 compel more frequent interference and would oblige him 
 to diminish in fact the liberty which he had ostentatiously 
 restored. The transformation of the principate into a 
 slightly veiled despotism was due to many causes, but among 
 ^X/ftie most direct, although hitherto almost ignored by his- 
 /Horians, was the close dependence of the emperor on the re- 
 publican machine. He could not permit it to work freely 
 when its working came to affect seriously his own adminis- 
 tration. Then he saw himself forced to interfere, and by 
 so doing he was bound in the long run to reduce the restored 
 republic to a sham. 
 
 The aggressive frontier policy, inaugurated after 16 B.C., 
 led directly to such a transformation in the government. 
 When the work of consolidating the borders of his empire 
 was undertaken by Augustus he could intrust the bulk of it 
 to his own family ; in the East his son-in-law was in charge 
 of affairs, while in the West his stepsons carried on the wars 
 which were the inevitable result of the new policy. At first 
 everything went well and the Elbe-Danube frontier was suc- 
 cessfully reached, after some hard fighting, indeed, but with- 
 out any very formidable obstacles presenting themselves. 
 Then fortune seemed to turn against the princeps and the 
 situation grew rapidly more difficult. The hand of death 
 fell heavily and unexpectedly upon the imperial house, and 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 251 
 
 the management of the republic became steadily less easy 
 for the emperor. Both of these factors deserve a brief con- 
 sideration. 
 
 In 13 B.C. the family circle of the princeps began to fail 
 him. In that year Agrippa left Syria to take command on 
 the Danube where revolt was threatening; he was not 
 destined to see active service, however, for early in the 
 following year he died in Italy. This event compelled the 
 emperor to find governors to replace his son-in-law in the 
 East, and for them he turned to the senatorial nobility. 
 But the death of Agrippa was only the first blow; three 
 years later — in 9 B.C. — Drusus, the younger Of his stepsons, 
 died in Germany and in 6 B. c. the other, Tiberius, resigned 
 his position and retired into voluntary exile at Rhodes. 
 
 This rapid narrowing of his family circle was rendered 
 all the more serious by the new responsibilities which 
 Augustus had assumed. To furnish a convenient base for 
 his aggressive operations on the Danube he had taken over 
 the province of Illyricum from the senate, and the very 
 success of his campaigns on the frontier had left in his 
 hands a vastly increased extent of territory to administer. 
 His need of officers was thus greater than ever, while the 
 number of his relatives diminished. The consequence of 
 this was that he found himself depending on the republican 
 aristocracy much more than in the past. At the beginning 
 of his reign as princeps, the emperor had but two consular 
 provinces (Tarraconensis and Syria) among those assigned 
 to him, but by the time of his death three others had been 
 added (Pannonia, Dalmatia, and Moesia), and in addition 
 to these the command of the army along the German frontier 
 usually called for several important generals of consular 
 rank. Under these circumstances the retirement of Ti- 
 berius, by forcing a sudden increase in the number, brought 
 the problem, already becoming serious, to a crisis. Augus- 
 tus must now face the situation and devise a method by 
 which it could be met. It was this forcing of the issue that 
 serves, in part at least, to explain the anger of the emperor 
 at the "desertion" of Tiberius. Unable to persuade his 
 stepson to renounce his purpose, 'Augustus saw himself 
 
 X 
 
252 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 obliged to undertake a readjustment of Ms relations with 
 the republic and its aristocracy. 
 
 The more extensive employment of the senatorial nobility 
 in the imperial service which the changed situation made 
 necessary was not without its difficulties. If Augustus 
 could have found a way to manage his provinces without 
 regard to distinctions of birth or rank he might have per- 
 mitted the republic to go on working freely, but this he did 
 not do. Probably he shared the general feeling of the 
 world in which he lived, or else he thought this sentiment 
 too strong to be ignored. At any rate, from whatever mo- 
 tive, as his own family failed him the emperor replaced 
 them by men taken from the highest rank in the senate. 
 To understand the consequences of this policy of the prin- 
 ceps, it must be borne in mind constantly that while the 
 Roman nobility was essentially one of office, it had acquired 
 
 >,a hereditary character in fact. A man became a noble as 
 soon as he held an office of a certain grade of dignity and 
 liis descendants after him claimed in their turn, as a matter 
 of natural right, to hold the same office; such claims met 
 with general support throughout the Roman world. Thus 
 every new man elevated to high office might become the 
 founder of a new noble house, and his son in due time would 
 come forward to demand that he should be advanced to the 
 same position that his father had attained. In this way the 
 aristocracy, even though badly torn and shattered at the 
 beginning of the reign, would soon renew itself and the 
 princeps, before many years had passed, would find himself 
 surrounded by a group of claimants numerous enough to fill 
 all the offices. It would be inevitable that many of these 
 nobles should be men who inherited the distinguished rank 
 of their ancestors rather than their personal ability, and to 
 such men the emperor would be reluctant to intrust his 
 armies or his provinces. If he desired to use new men in 
 these positions he felt it necessary to give them standing by 
 elevating them to the nobility. If the emperor wished the 
 chief posts in his service to be held by men of consular rank 
 — as in actual fact he did — he found himself compelled to 
 take a keener interest in the consular elections. In the first 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 253 
 
 years of the reign he had met with little difficulty since he 
 needed but few consulars, and the ranks of the aristocracy 
 had been so depleted that he could readily find a place for 
 such men as he desired to reward or use. But by the middle 
 of his reign the matter became decidedly less simple, and as 
 time went on he faced a serious dilemma. The number of 
 noble claimants had increased so much that new men could 
 be advanced only by the exclusion of a corresponding num- 
 ber of nobles. Such an exclusion was certain to be angrily 
 resented and Augustus, whether from temperament, or 
 policy, or both, was most unwilling to offend the aristocracy. 
 Yet, on the other hand, he was equally unwilling to restrict 
 his choice of officers solely to the great families of the past. 
 It was this problem which the retirement of Tiberius in 6 
 B.C. had made acute. 
 
 The increasing dependence of the emperor on the sen- 
 atorial nobility is fully attested by such records as have been 
 preserved. Unfortunately the lists of the imperial officials 
 are incomplete and most of the information that is now 
 available has to be gathered from such narrative histories 
 of the period as have survived. In these the interest is 
 centered on the imperial princes and the court, and the 
 provinces are treated only incidentally. Unquestionably 
 many of the princeps' officers have failed of record, es- 
 pecially when their service was attended by no striking in- 
 cidents. But making all due allowance for this, the facts 
 which can be gleaned from an examination of the sources 
 seem obviously significant. From 22 to 13 B.C. only three 
 men of consular rank are mentioned as serving in the im- 
 perial provinces ; of the three, two were new men and only 
 one was connected with the old nobility. From 12 B.C. to 
 3 a.d. the names of nine such consulars are found, 11 who 
 
 u The names of the active consulars in the two periods may be of interest. They 
 were as follows : 
 
 From 22 to 13 B.C. 
 
 M. Lollius (cos. 21), Legate in Germany in 16 and in Thrace just before. 
 M. Vinicius (cos, 19), in Pannonia 13. 
 
 L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi (cos. 15), in Pamphylia in 13 and in Thrace 13-11. 
 From 12 B.C. to 3 a.d. 
 
 L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, as above. 
 
254 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 appear upon the scene as the members of the imperial family 
 drop out. Thus the death of Agrippa leads — after a short 
 gap in the list of governors — to the appointment of six con- 
 sulars, one after the other, as legates in Syria ; while on the 
 northern frontier Drusus and Tiberius had to be replaced 
 a little later. Of the men thus called into the imperial ser- 
 vice only three were members of old families of high rank, 
 and of these three, but one held a position of the first im- 
 portance. 12 It may be worth noting that this one was 
 connected with the emperor by marriage. Augustus ev- 
 \7 idently preferred to fill the most important posts with men 
 /xwhose nobility was recent and who owed their rise to him. 
 As the emperor's need for men of high rank thus steadily 
 increased, he could no longer look on indifferently at the 
 consular elections. He might not care particularly who had 
 the honor of presiding over the republic in Rome, but when 
 the holding of the consulship became a qualification of his 
 officers, that magistracy acquired a new and serious im- 
 portance in his eyes. If he were to govern Syria by means 
 of consulars, it was essential that the men he wished to send 
 out to that province should be successful in the Roman elec- 
 tions. It is not surprising, therefore, that the consular 
 fasti for this period contain some indications of an increased 
 
 L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 16), in Pannonia and Germany, perhaps, 
 
 from 9 on. 
 M. Vinicius (cos. 19), in Germany 1 b.C-2 a.d. 
 M. Titius (cos. 31), in Syria 9. 
 C. Sentius Saturninus (cos. 19), in Syria 8-6. 
 P. Quinctilius Varus (cos. 13), in Syria 6-4. 
 P. Sulpicius Quirinius (cos. 12), in Syria 3-2 and in 2 a.d. 
 C. Caesar, in Syria 1 B.c-4 a.d. with 
 C. Marcius Censorinus (cos. 8), 
 M. Lollius ( cos. 21 ) , and perhaps 
 P. Sulpicius Quirinius as counselors. 
 It may be noted that C. Caesar seems to have left Syria at the end of 3 A.D. 
 12 Domitius seems to have taken over the command on the northern frontier from 
 the emperor's stepson. He was married to Antonia Major, the daughter of Augustus' 
 sister. The other nobles of old families were L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, who con- 
 tinued to command in Thrace from the preceding period and Marcius Censorinus in 
 Syria. Piso can hardly have had an army at all comparable to that commanded by 
 Tiberius in Pannonia at the same time. Censorinus wast only one of the counselors 
 of C Caesar. With him were associated M. Lollius and perhaps Sulpicius Quirinius, 
 both new men. 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 255 
 
 interference by the princeps with the working of the repub- 
 lican machinery. 
 
 In the thirteen years preceding Agrippa's death (25-13 
 B.C.) there seem to have been but five new men and men 
 from praetorian families advanced to the consulship, if three 
 men closely identified with the republican party are con- 
 sidered nobles. In the thirteen years which followed that 
 event there were at least nine such ; 13 not only was the num- 
 ber nearly twice as great, but they were advanced in spite of 
 the increasing pressure of aristocratic claims upon the office. 
 This pressure is clearly attested by the fasti. In the thir- 
 teen years in question there were at least six consuls whose 
 families had acquired nobility since the outbreak of the civil 
 war between Caesar and Pompey. 14 To satisfy the claims 
 of this nobility and of the ancient aristocratic houses that 
 survived, and at the same time to promote the new men 
 whom he needed, Augustus was forced to find some way of 
 increasing the number of the consuls. A method of ac- 
 complishing this was ready to his hand. In the days of the 
 republic it had sometimes happened that a consul died dur- 
 ing his term of office ; when this occurred a consul suffectus 
 had been elected for the remainder of the year. During the 
 government of the triumvirate the resignation of consuls 
 had been rather frequent, and extra consuls had been ap- 
 pointed to fill the vacancies thus made. After 28 B.C., when 
 Augustus began the attempt to establish a stable govern- 
 ment, there had been but three occasions when such extra 
 consuls were chosen, and one of these was in 23 when the 
 emperor laid down the office. As the need of consulars and 
 the pressure of aristocratic claims increased, Augustus re- 
 verted to the precedents of the triumvirate, though with 
 apparent caution. In the year of Agrippa's death the em- 
 peror induced the consuls to resign in the middle of the year 
 and thus made place for two consules suffecti. Of the 
 
 13 In Liebenam's edition of the Fasti a tenth new man is given, namely C. Fufius 
 Geminus, in 2 B.C. For names see the tables in the Appendix. 
 
 14 The number should perhaps be eight rather than six; two consuls, C. Marcius 
 Censorinus and M. Herennius Picens, bear gentile names that had occurred in the 
 fasti in the last century, but in each case the family name is new. 
 
256 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 consuls for the year two were afterward active in the im- 
 perial service; one of these was a new man and the other 
 a member of a praetorian family. 15 In 9 B.C. the death of 
 Drusus, who was one of the consuls for the year, enabled 
 Augustus to promote another new man destined to hold high 
 office in his provinces without any break with the republican 
 tradition. The retirement of Tiberius in 6 B.C. rendered 
 the situation more acute. Of the four years from 9 to 6, 
 inclusive, there were three when — if members of the im- 
 perial family are excluded — only one noble of the highest 
 rank held the consulship. The claims of the aristocracy 
 were, perhaps, becoming pressing, for the emperor himself 
 assumed the office for 5 B.C. on the ground of giving greater 
 splendor to his grandson's assumption of the toga virilis, 
 and made use of the occasion to share the consulship with 
 four members of the high nobility. In 2 B.C., when his sec- 
 ond grandson became of age, Augustus held the consulship 
 for the last time and again with a larger number of col- 
 leagues than was normal, though on this occasion two of his 
 three associates were new men. 16 In this way the emperor 
 was able to increase considerably the number of consuls in 
 the period under discussion. So far he had done so only 
 tentatively and under circumstances that might seem more 
 or less exceptional; the difficulty was a permanent one, 
 however, and he needed to find a permanent solution. There 
 were four such solutions possible: Augustus might govern 
 without the help of consulars ; or he might take his officers 
 exclusively from families already of the highest rank; or 
 he might advance new men while excluding a corresponding 
 number of nobles ; or he might increase the number of the 
 consuls in some regular and systematic fashion. Of the four 
 the emperor chose the last; beginning with 2 A.D., for the 
 remainder of his reign one or both of the consuls regularly 
 
 15 The death of one of the consuls made another vacancy, which was filled by a 
 new man. 
 
 w One of them, M. Plautius Silvanus, was of praetorian family. C. Caesar was 
 consul in 1 a.d. but as he was absent in Syria his consulship was honorary and it 
 may be doubted if the appointment of two consuls in Rome seemed a break with the 
 republican tradition. 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 257 
 
 resigned in the middle of the year and thus made place for 
 one or two consules suffecti. 
 
 The dilemma which had led to the new system can be 
 most clearly seen in the last thirteen years of the reign. 
 Under the old practice there would have been but twenty-six 
 consuls during this time. Excluding one member of the 
 imperial house, the office was held by twenty-six men who 
 belonged to consular families, either certainly or probably. 
 There would thus have been no opportunity to promote a 
 single new man without refusing the coveted honor to a 
 noble. But during this period Augustus advanced a num- 
 ber of new men whom he afterwards used in his provinces 
 and army. There are no less than six or seven such men 
 whose names have been preserved. 17 These promotions 
 alone required either a considerable increase in the number 
 of the consuls or a rather extensive exclusion of the aris- 
 tocracy. If extra consuls were to be introduced, however, 
 it might be well to go beyond the strict necessity of the case. 
 It would be desirable to have at hand a few capable men 
 of high rank to use if an emergency arose. It was usual 
 too to allow a few years to elapse between the consulship 
 and active service in the provinces. Thus it happened 
 sometimes that the emperor advanced a man to the consul- 
 ship intending to employ him in the imperial service with- 
 out actually doing so. There can also be little doubt that a 
 number did serve in his provinces whose names have failed 
 of record. In addition it was necessary to have a consider- 
 able number of consulars in Rome to give distinction to the 
 deliberations of the conscript fathers, and to assist the prin- 
 ceps with their advice and (what he probably wanted far 
 more) the support of their names and their exalted rank. 
 Thus in 6 A.D., when the finances and the food supply were 
 both in difficulties, the emperor was assisted in the task of 
 
 "They were C. Poppaeus Sabinus, L. Aelius Lamia, L. Nonnius Asprenas, C. 
 Vibius Postumus, L. Apronius, Q. Junius Blaesus, and Sex. Aelius Catus. The last 
 named held an active command in Thrace but whether before or after his consul- 
 ship is uncertain. An eighth consular, C. Ateius Capito, held an important admin- 
 istrative post in Home, that of curator aquarum, under the emperor in the last year 
 of the reign. Of the new men three, including Capito, were from families of prae- 
 torian rank. 
 
> 
 
 258 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 supervising the expenditures by three consulars, and at the 
 same time he appointed others — though how many is un- 
 known — to take charge of the situation in respect to grain 
 and bread. Under these conditions it would seem prudent 
 to make the number of the consulars somewhat greater than 
 was called for by the immediate needs of the administra- 
 tion. 
 
 The increase in the number of the consuls was accom- 
 panied by a tightening of the emperor's control over the 
 elections, as is made evident in several ways. No more is 
 heard of disorderly campaigns, and the last law against 
 electoral corruption was enacted in 8 B.C. This would seem 
 to mean that as the interference of Augustus increased the 
 motive for either riot or bribery disappeared. At first he 
 seems to have availed himself of his right to preside over 
 the elections to influence their results, but as he grew older 
 / he found this troublesome, and in 8 A.D. he had the power 
 conferred on him to act by an official notice and assumed 
 the further right to recommend candidates for all the vacant 
 places instead of for half of them, as had hitherto been the 
 rule. With this change the voting in the comitia became 
 an empty form, and Augustus was planning to transfer this 
 form to the senate at the time of his death. 
 
 The motives for this increasing control of the elections, 
 which ended by depriving the populace of all real share in 
 the government, have been already indicated. As the em- 
 peror depended more and more upon the consulars for his 
 chief officers, he had a keener interest in the results of the 
 elections. Not only must he make sure that the men he 
 wished to use received the qualifying office from the people, 
 but he must see to it that they did so at the time required. 
 As evidence of this it is only necessary to note the marked 
 increase in the number of men who are found in the imperial 
 service very shortly after their consulship. 18 In the case 
 
 18 A brief table may be of interest. The records which have been preserved merely 
 show that at a given time a man was in a certain province, not when he went 
 there, which must always have been earlier (sometimes perhaps a year or two 
 earlier) than the casual mention which reveals him there. Before the Christian era 
 we find only two men in the imperial service in less than five years after their 
 consulship ; after the Christian era we find three who are in the imperial service 
 in the year after their consulship, three who are so active in two years, and four in 
 four years. For further details see the tables in the Appendix. 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 259 
 
 of the senatorial provinces an interval of at least five years 
 was insisted on between the holding of a magistracy in Rome 
 and a provincial command. In the imperial service such 
 an interval, though it often occurred, was in no way oblig- 
 atory, and in the latter part of his reign Augustus came 
 frequently to hurry men from Rome to important posts in 
 his administration. This made the strict control of the elec- 
 tions all the more necessary. A single illustration of this 
 will, perhaps, suffice. In 3 a.d. the consulship was held by 
 L. Aelius Lamia, a member of a praetorian family, and in 
 the following year he was an officer in the imperial army in 
 Illyricum. If he had been defeated in 2 a.d. he must either 
 have waited a year before beginning active service, or else 
 have held his command without the prestige of consular 
 rank. The emperor had, therefore, an obvious motive for 
 making sure of his success at that particular election. 
 
 The deaths of Lucius and Gaius Caesar, the two young 
 grandsons of Augustus, led to the return of Tiberius to 
 public life, but made no essential change in the situation. 
 The emperor had again a general of his immediate family 
 to place in high command, and in the young Germanicus a 
 second prince was soon available for service, but one or 
 two members of his house were not enough. The soldiers 
 had become accustomed to being led by officers of the highest 
 grade of the aristocracy, and the princeps deemed it wise to 
 adhere to this tradition. Although he placed his relatives 
 at the head of his chief armies, their immediate subordinates 
 were mostly consulars. Perhaps the seriousness of the wars 
 had something to do with this. The Elbe-Danube frontier 
 proved much easier to reach than to hold, and in the last 
 years of the reign a furious revolt broke out in the newly 
 annexed regions. From 4 to 13 a.d. hard campaigning was 
 almost continuous in Pannonia and Germany. It was at this 
 time that the imperial arms met their greatest disaster in 
 the overwhelming defeat of Varus and the loss of Germany 
 which followed it. Faced with military operations of so 
 serious a character, Augustus made greater use than ever of 
 the senatorial nobility. If from 12 B.C. to 3 a.d. he had 
 
>< 
 
 260 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 employed nine consulars, from 4 to 14 a.d. there were no 
 less than eighteen in his service. The principate was now 
 hopelessly entangled in the republican machine, and the re- 
 sult was the rapid destruction of the republic's independence, 
 accompanied by an inevitable drift of the government in the 
 direction of despotism. 
 
 The final form of the imperial government of Augustus 
 may be said to have been reached in 2 a.d. The legal and 
 constitutional basis remained unchanged, but in the actual 
 working of its institutions several important modifications 
 were to be found. Thus most of the consuls now held office 
 for a term of six months only, and the control of the elec- 
 tions had passed wholly into the hands of the princeps. 
 Both these changes could not but have far-reaching conse- 
 quences. The control of the elections not only diminished 
 the part played by the Roman people in the state, but was 
 fatal to the independence of the senate as well. Since every 
 senator was classed according to the dignity of the office he 
 had held, it followed that whoever had the least ambition to 
 rise in rank must court the favor of the man upon whom, 
 more and more, his promotion would depend. Ambitious 
 men were little inclined to oppose the emperor under such 
 conditions, and men destitute of ambition were not likely 
 to give trouble. 
 
 If the control of the elections was bound to make the 
 senate less independent, this effect was emphasized by the 
 increased employment of consulars. In the early days of 
 the reign a senator's career was likely to lie wholly within 
 the republican machine; only in rare instances could he 
 look forward to receiving an appointment in the emperor's 
 service. The average noble could expect to rise through 
 the regular round of the republican magistracies, with an 
 occasional term as governor of one of the senatorial prov- 
 inces, and when this was finished, to a dignified retirement 
 from active service in the highest rank of the nobility. For 
 success in such a career it would no doubt be well not to 
 offend the emperor too seriously, but some degree of inde- 
 pendence might reasonably be ventured. The outlook was 
 now profoundly altered ; numerous attractive and important 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 261 
 
 posts in the imperial service were within the reach of the 
 senator who could gain the imperial favor. A purely re- 
 publican career was not to be compared with that which 
 opened out in the imperial provinces. Nor was a senator 
 required to make a choice between them ; he could enjoy all 
 the honors the republic could bestow, and yet if he pleased 
 the princeps he might receive imperial distinctions in addi- 
 tion. A remark of Dio shows the situation in a flash; 
 speaking of the imperial as contrasted with the senatorial 
 provinces, he tells us that in the former the emperor could 
 name a man as governor whenever he pleased and that many 
 praetors and consuls secured such appointments during 
 their term of office. 19 Under these circumstances the con- 
 script fathers and the magistrates grew steadily more and 
 more subservient to the princeps. Nor was this change dis- 
 pleasing to the senators ; if they lost in freedom they gained 
 in the splendid careers now opened up to them. That they 
 welcomed the changes in the government there can be little 
 doubt. Dio expressly says that in his latter years Augustus, 
 growing milder with age, became more reluctant to offend 
 the senators or to incur their enmity. 20 This change in the 
 emperor's character has often been commented upon, and 
 has been variously explained, sometimes as burned out 
 cruelty : a study of his administration in its practical work- 
 ings suggests another motive. In proportion as he drew his 
 officers more and more from the nobility, the emperor grew 
 more and more reluctant to quarrel with them. 
 
 Another consequence of the new system was an obvious 
 decline in the efficiency of the republican government. With 
 the chief magistrates in office for so short a term, anything 
 like a continuous policy became impossible and the adminis- 
 tration of affairs was bound to suffer. Where this could not 
 safely be allowed to happen, the only course open was to 
 invoke the help of the princeps. Thus in the last years of 
 the reign several important departments of the public busi- 
 ness in the city of Rome itself were transferred from the 
 
 19 Dio, liii, 14. 
 ^Dio, lv, 12, 
 
262 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 republic to the emperor. To him was given charge of the 
 police and the maintenance of order as well as the food and 
 water supply of the capital. In this way the really vital 
 , matters passed into the hands of the monarch and the re- 
 )\ public more and more became a thing of pageantry and 
 empty honor. Not all the powers thus transferred were 
 taken directly from the consuls, but the weakening of that 
 office must have made encroachment easier because it took 
 away any possible alternative. If affairs were badly man- 
 aged the senate and the magistrates could obviously 
 provide no remedy, and nothing was left but to have recourse 
 to the emperor. This undermining of the republic has been 
 pointed out as furnishing the explanation of Augustus' pol- 
 icy. But this seems hardly adequate since for nearly thirty 
 years he had tolerated the show of freedom, and he had no 
 apparent reason for wishing to make a change. In the re- 
 quirements of his own administration, however, may be 
 found another motive ; the pressing need of consulars was 
 something he must meet, no matter at what cost to the re- 
 public. That he may have foreseen the consequences is 
 quite possible, but he was by temperament an opportunist 
 and was inclined to meet a difficulty in the way which gave 
 the least amount of trouble at the moment. He was little 
 likely to seek to save the republic by quarreling with its 
 guardians ; if it declined, the nobility must bear their share 
 of the responsibility. 
 
 While thus the power of the princeps grew steadily 
 greater, the view men took of the office was also slowly 
 changing. Little by little the world came to look upon it 
 as a permanent part of the government. In point of law it 
 had at first been nothing more than a great command, 
 created to meet a special and exceptional condition. In 
 strict accord with precedent this command had been con- 
 ferred only for a fixed term of years, but as time slipped by 
 it grew more and more evident that it must continue. If 
 the Romans had ever cherished any dreams of disbanding 
 their army, the repeated wars on the frontier would have 
 dispelled the illusion. It must have become gradually clear 
 beyond dispute that the legions could not be dispensed with 
 
 X 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 283 
 
 save at the price of immediate disaster. But if a great 
 standing army must be maintained, the state required a 
 war-lord to take charge of it. The principate could only be 
 abolished if a substitute could be found, and the only sub- 
 stitute was to appoint another princeps. If the senate and 
 people shrank from making the selection they merely left 
 the choice to the arbitrament of civil war. If death re- 
 moved one commander-in-chief, a successor must be found, 
 and the emperor might reasonably feel that it was a part of 
 his duty to give the Roman people the benefit of his ex- 
 perience by helping them to determine in advance a matter 
 of such vast importance. Better than any other man he 
 knew the situation on the frontiers and could judge the real 
 capacity of any general. The question of the imperial suc- 
 cession came, therefore, naturally to engross a large part of 
 Augustus' time and attention. By the theory of the constitu- 
 tion his death should have left the senate and the Roman 
 people free to consider whether they had any further need 
 of a war-lord in their government. They might abolish the 
 office altogether, or if this was impossible, they might in- 
 trust such powers as they saw fit to any person they might 
 choose. In spite of this, Augustus could find means to de- 
 termine their decision. He might content himself with 
 pointing out the man he thought most worthy of the place, 
 but it was also in his power to make the acceptance of his 
 nominee inevitable. He could induce the senate and the 
 people to confer such powers on the man of his choice that 
 nothing short of revolution could keep him from the throne. 
 Such a colleague might obviously be dangerous to the reign- 
 ing emperor, and it was natural that Augustus should seek 
 to minimize the risk by making his selection from the circle 
 of his own family. Family pride and affection had no 
 doubt a part in this, but he may well have believed that 
 such a choice was more likely to prove successful than any 
 other he could make. The republican aristocracy had lost 
 none of its haughty exclusiveness, and while the nobles ac- 
 quiesced in the supremacy of Augustus and accorded a cer- 
 tain deference to his family, they might have been extremely 
 reluctant to see one of their own number raised above their 
 
\ 
 
 264 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 heads. The house of the Caesars had been so long upon 
 the throne that its continuance in power would arouse less 
 jealous resentment than would the advent of a new dynasty. 
 Thus the emperor might feel that the choice of a near 
 relative was almost a necessity of the situation in which he 
 found himself, and that any other solution of the problem 
 of the succession was an invitation to a new civil war. 
 From the beginning of his reign Augustus was occupied 
 with the question, but the hand of death on several occasions 
 thwarted his designs. Marcellus, Agrippa and Gaius 
 Caesar all preceded him to the grave, and in the end, he was 
 forced to fall back upon his surviving stepson, Tiberius, as 
 his heir. All he could do to secure the ultimate succession 
 to his own blood was to have Germanicus marry his grand- 
 daughter and to cause Tiberius to adopt this prince as his 
 son. In this way his descendants would inherit the throne 
 and he would thus give a dynasty to Rome. When this 
 prospect had become fully apparent, the principate had be- 
 come a monarchy in everything but name. 
 
 Whatever the establishment Of the empire may have 
 meant in Rome and Italy, it conferred vast benefits upon 
 the world at large. That the republic had shamefully op- 
 pressed the provinces is a fact beyond all possibility of dis- 
 pute. From this misgovernment the empire to a consider- 
 able extent relieved them since the princeps could not afford 
 to shut his eyes to tyranny and pillage as the senate had too 
 often been inclined to do. If the provinces were misgov- 
 erned they might be impoverished, or goaded to revolt, and 
 either result would create difficulties for the emperor. If 
 for no other reason than to avoid trouble, the monarch was 
 inevitably a champion of decency and justice. Even the 
 senate had feebly striven in the same direction, but the 
 princeps had better means of making felt his good inten- 
 tions. It had been one weakness of the republic that while 
 it might occasionally punish an exceptionally bad governor, 
 it had no reward to offer to a good one. His conduct in the 
 provinces seems to have counted little, either for or against 
 a candidate, in the eyes of the Roman voter. But with 
 Augustus in power the situation was at once altered; good 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 265 
 
 government in the provinces was distinctly to the emperor's 
 advantage, and by the very fact that he presided at the 
 elections, he could exert a powerful influence in its favor. 
 The princeps could reject the name of any candidate for 
 office, and so had means of stopping the career of any man 
 who made a bad record for himself. Moreover, as the use 
 of consulars in the imperial service increased, the rewards 
 of just and efficient administration became splendid and 
 alluring. Thus the establishment of the principate was an 
 enormous gain to the provincials quite apart from any 
 definite reforms. Such reforms were made and were of 
 great value to the empire, but the mere existence of the 
 monarch may very possibly have been well worth them all. 
 
 The improvement which the principate brought with it 
 in the government of the provinces has long been recognized, 
 but it is often said that this gain was purchased at the price 
 of Roman liberty. That the part of the people in the gov- 
 ernment became a farce has been already shown ; but to the 
 bulk of Roman citizens this was no real loss, because they 
 never had possessed a voice. All voting was done in Rome, 
 and those who lived at any distance from that city had 
 always been disfranchised in practice. The populace of 
 Rome might lose their bribes and riots, but the citizen at a 
 distance merely lost in theory what he had never had in 
 fact. The tightening grip of the princeps on the republic 
 deprived him of nothing which he can have valued very 
 highly. The sort of liberty which he really prized remained 
 untouched, the right to control the affairs of his own munic- 
 ipality. Italy was a great confederacy of towns with whose 
 self-government the emperor had no desire to interfere, and 
 in which a vigorous local life went on quite undisturbed 
 for many years. When at length this form of liberty died 
 out, it was from causes with which the imperial government 
 had comparatively little to do, and whose consequences a 
 genuine republic, if one could have been preserved, would 
 probably have been unable to avert. 
 
 It may be objected that the early empire soon degenerated 
 into a gloomy tyranny, and that under such sovereigns as 
 came after Augustus the imperial despotism weighed like a )<. 
 
266 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 nightmare on the world. While partially true, such a 
 criticism overlooks some fundamental features in the case. 
 Let the reigns of Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, and Domitian be 
 painted in the darkest colors, yet their oppression was re- 
 stricted within very narrow limits; their tyranny fell al- 
 most exclusively upon the senatorial nobility in Rome and 
 did not touch the great mass of their subjects. Their 
 courtiers may have gone in terror of their lives, but the 
 ordinary citizen was not in any way disturbed. Hence the 
 personal character of the emperors mattered very little to 
 the world at large, and there is no reason to doubt that under 
 the worst of the Caesars mankind in general was better off 
 than under the republic. 
 
 In conclusion it may be well to mention a reform which 
 Augustus considered, but which he finally rejected. This 
 was a scheme to extend the franchise in an effective way to 
 \/ all the Roman citizens in Italy. To do this the ballot, instead 
 /\pf being taken exclusively in Rome, would have been cast 
 simultaneously in all the towns of the peninsula ; the votes 
 were then to be sent to Rome and counted there. At first it 
 might appear as though this was a promising reform and 
 one that might have kept alive some elements of genuine 
 popular government. There were, however, serious objec- 
 tions to the change. Unless the new system of conducting 
 the elections proved an empty form, it would have made it 
 far less easy for the princeps to control them. This would 
 have made the task of governing more difficult if the close 
 connection between the republican offices and rank in the 
 nobility were permitted to continue. It was probably not 
 this consideration, however, which had most weight with 
 Augustus. In the restoration of the republic he was seeking 
 to conciliate public opinion, and he found a conservative re- 
 
 action in full swing. The reform would very likely have 
 been unpopular just because it was a violation of usage and 
 tradition; the world could be most readily satisfied by the 
 simple restoration of the old forms, and the emperor was 
 probably wise to lay the scheme aside. To have preserved 
 the republic as a reality would have required far more 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPATE 267 
 
 sweeping reforms than a mere modification of the machinery 
 of voting. The whole system which made rank depend on 
 office must be done away with, and the sentiment of the 
 Roman world which called for men of exalted rank in all 
 the greatest positions, even in the imperial service, must 
 have been modified. Above all the character of the army 
 must have been profoundly altered so that the common sol- 
 dier would have remained a citizen. For such sweeping 
 changes the Romans were quite wholly unprepared, even if 
 Augustus had possessed the genius and originality to think 
 of them. Had he conceived such designs it is extremely un- 
 likely that he could have carried them out in the face of the 
 opposition of all classes of his subjects. What was possible 
 he did. He conciliated public opinion by setting up again 
 the old machinery of government with such slight modifica- 
 tions as men in general were willing to accept. This ma- 
 chinery, when once it had been set up, he worked with a 
 minimum of friction. The fact that he was able to rule the 
 world for forty-four years in peace and tranquillity and 
 even after death to live on in men's memories as a saintly 
 and resplendent figure is a striking testimony to the skill 
 and tact with which he had met the world's most pressing 
 needs while satisfying its dominant desires. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
THE LEX VATINIA 
 
 The view of the Vatinian law taken in the text differs in some 
 particulars from that usual among historians, and it seems desirable 
 to state briefly the reasons for it. 
 
 It is generally held that the language of Cicero in his oration 
 on the consular provinces proves beyond serious question that by the 
 Vatinian law Caesar was given the province of Cisalpine Gaul for 
 a term of five years beginning March 1, 59. 1 This date is explained 
 as that on which the bill was passed by the assembly. But these 
 facts, which may be taken as established, raise at once two ques- 
 tions: why was the law passed so early in Caesar's consulship, and 
 why did it make his governorship in Gaul begin during his year of 
 office in Rome? The two problems here stated seem obvious once 
 they are raised, but Ferrero was apparently the first to feel their 
 full force and to attempt a solution. The explanation which he 
 gave has met with considerable favor 2 and is therefore deserving of 
 consideration. He accounts for the Vatinian law on the ground that 
 the sudden' death of Metellus Celer left the governorship of Cisalpine 
 Gaul vacant and that Caesar took prompt advantage of the opening 
 thus provided to seize the province and thus to forestall any possible 
 intrigues on the part of the conservatives. This explanation en- 
 counters serious difficulties, however. 
 
 In the first place, the probable date of the passage of the agrarian 
 bill 3 does not fit the theory. Ferrero and the others are forced to 
 assume that the bill was passed in February; the evidence of the 
 sources is against this, however, and — unless some of the evidence 
 is rejected — is decisively against it. We are expressly told by Dio 
 that the law imposed an oath on all the senators and that Metellus 
 was one of the last to take this oath. He did finally take it, how- 
 ever, after much hesitation. 4 Now it is certain from Cicero's letters 
 that Metellus was dead by the middle of April. 5 So far the facts 
 would agree well enough with the theory of Ferrero. But Dio and 
 Suetonius make Bibulus retire to his house immediately after the 
 
 ^Guiraud has questioned this, but has met with no apparent support. 
 
 2 Ferrero, i, 290 note. Heitland has adopted the theory of Ferrero in his work 
 The Roman Republic, iii, 135 and note 2. Jullian appears to accept it somewhat 
 tentatively in his Histoire de la Gaule, iii, 166 note 4. It has finally been adopted 
 in the latest text-book on Roman history: Boak, A History of Rome, 166. 
 
 3 There has been some discussion of whether there were two agrarian laws or 
 only one. Ferrero, Heitland and Meyer (to name only the latest writers) hold 
 that there were two ; Drumann maintains that there was one only. I believe the 
 evidence is overwhelming in favor of two. It has not seemed necessary to discuss 
 the point, however, since unless there were two laws the theory of Ferrero falls 
 at once. 
 
 *Dio, xxxviii, 7. 
 
 ^Letters, i, 90. Att., ii, 5. That the passage refers to the death of Metellus is 
 made certain by passages elsewhere. See Letters, i, 98. Att., ii, 9 and the Oration 
 against Vatinius, 8. The first two passages rather suggest that the death of 
 Metellus was very recent. 
 
272 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 passage of the agrarian law 6 and Plutarch says explicitly that he 
 did not appear in public during the remaining eight months of his 
 year of office. 7 If this statement is true, his retirement must have 
 taken place in April and not in February. If it did take place in 
 April, then Metellus must have lived till then and the agrarian law 
 must have been passed early in April. If so the death of Metellus . 
 can have had nothing to do with the Vatinian law, which was carried 
 in March. 
 
 Even if this difficulty should be cleared away, and it can only be 
 done by the rejection of Plutarch's statement, there remains another 
 difficulty. It is not by any means certain that Metellus had the 
 province of Cisalpine Gaul, in fact the probability is that he did not. 
 In the preceding year the senate, alarmed by the news of an impend- 
 ing war in Transalpine Gaul, directed the two consuls for that year, 
 Metellus and Afranius, to draw lotsi for the two Gauls. 8 In all 
 probability they first resigned the provinces previously assigned them 
 under the Sempronian law, though there is no definite statement to 
 that effect. Unfortunately, we do not know how the lots fell, but 
 later in the year Cicero speaks of Metellus as greatly disappointed 
 at the peaceful news then arriving from Gaul because he was de- 
 sirous of a triumph. 9 Since the war that had been threatening was 
 in the Transalpine province, this suggests strongly that this was the 
 province drawn by Metellus. Of course a very serious war might 
 involve the governors of both Gauls, but this is certainly not the 
 natural implication of the passage. Hitherto all scholars have held 
 that Metellus received the Transalpine province, and this seems 
 much the more probable supposition. 
 
 The data furnished by the sources, therefore, fail to support the 
 theory of Ferrero either as to the date of Metellus' death or as to the 
 province which he held. There is still another objection to it. 
 Although intended to explain the Vatinian law, it fails to achieve 
 its purpose. Even if it be granted that Metellus died in February 
 and that he had the Cisalpine province, his death does not adequately 
 explain the haste with which the Vatinian law was carried or the 
 reason for making Caesar's proconsulship begin early in his year 
 of office as consul. Ferrero thinks that both were due to a desire 
 to forestall possible intrigues of the conservatives, but it is difficult 
 to see what they could do. After the agrarian law was passed 
 and Bibulus was shut up in his house, the opposition was cowed. 
 It is not clear that a formal meeting of the senate would have been 
 possible without Caesar's consent, but even if it were legally as- 
 sembled, what was there that it could do? The conscript fathers 
 
 6 Dio, xxxviii, 6. Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 20. 
 
 7 Plutarch, Pompey, 48. Meyer, Caesars Monarchie, 71 and note 3, accepts thia 
 as fixing the date of April for the passage of the agrarian bill. 
 
 8 Cicero, Letters, i, 54. Att., i, 19. 
 
 ^Letters, i, 60. Att., i, 20. Metellus never left Rome, but died there after an 
 illness of only three days. See Die xxxvii, 50 and Cicero, Oration for M. CoeU 
 ius, 24. 
 
APPENDIX 273 
 
 could only assign the vacant province to one of the consuls or 
 praetors of that year. The consuls were out of the question, since 
 Bibulus was needed at home to watch the heavens and so invalidate 
 Caesar's acts in the future. If they decided to do without his 
 services it seems probable that they could have been stopped by the 
 veto of Caesar or his tribunes. Even if they were able to put the 
 assignment through, the tribunes could prevent his leaving Rome. 
 The assignment of the province to one of the praetors was out of 
 the question, since here the veto of the tribunes would certainly 
 hold good and Caesar had Vatinius ready for that or any other 
 purpose. 10 In spite of all this, if the senate did succeed in getting 
 through an arrangement contrary to Caesar's interest, he could set 
 it aside at any time by an act of the assembly. Why then did he 
 show so much anxiety to forestall intrigues which could not, as it 
 would appear, do him the slightest harm? 
 
 Groebe suggests that the reason for making the governorship of 
 Gaul and Caesar's consular term run concurrently was to enable 
 Caesar to assume the command during the year 59 if circumstances 
 should require. 11 This might do as an explanation if the province 
 assigned to Caesar by the Vatinian law had been Transalpine Gaul. 
 So far as we know there was no likelihood of war in the Cisalpine 
 province and it is difficult to see any reason why Caesar should 
 suppose that he might be obliged to hurry to the valley of the Po 
 before his term of office had expired in Rome. 12 It seems certain 
 that, even if he did think it possible that he might wish to leave the 
 city before the year was up, he can not have intended to do so for 
 several months after the Vatinian law was passed. He was then in 
 the midst of his legislative program, even if it be granted that the 
 agrarian law had been carried, and it seems quite clear that he 
 would not dare to leave, nor would his partners dare to let him do 
 so, till the elections had been held. Why then did he bring in the 
 Vatinian law so early? If the purpose was to take advantage of 
 the disorganization and discouragement of the conservatives after 
 his first great victory over them in the agrarian law, why did he 
 make his term as proconsul begin so early? It was surely possible 
 to make the proconsulship of Caesar begin at any date that might be 
 specified, and unnecessary to fix a date months before Caesar could 
 
 10 The tribunes could not veto the assignment of the provinces under the Sem- 
 pronian law ; but this had been made and Bibulus had received, along with Caesar, 
 the care of the roads and forests in Italy. This assignment the senate could only 
 alter if the consuls, or one of them, resigned the province so assigned. If this were 
 done a new province could be decreed for him by the senate. It seems probable 
 that this decree could be vetoed by the other consul, and there is no reason to 
 think that the tribunes did not have a veto against such a special assignment. 
 The praetorian provinces were always subject to the veto of the tribunes. As to 
 leaving Rome, see Dio, xxxvii, 50. 
 
 u Drumann, Geschtchte Roms, edition revised by Groebe, iii, 720. 
 
 12 It should be borne in mind that the governor of the province was probably 
 Afranius. He was a competent soldier, at least he was one in whom Pompey felt 
 confidence, since he served as Pompey's legate both before and after this time. 
 It is not unlikely that his military reputation was quite as good as Caesar's. 
 With Pompey it was probably better. 
 
274 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 take advantage of it. It seems impossible to explain in any such 
 way why Caesar should have been authorized to assume command 
 of a province where there was no particular danger at a time several 
 months earjier than he can have had the slightest intention of acting 
 upon the permission. 
 
 It seems to me that the only real explanation of the Vatinian law 
 is to be found in the political conditions in Rome. From this point 
 of view one of its main purposes was to provide Caesar with a mili- 
 tary force with which he could overawe the conservative opposition 
 and prevent them from attempting to defend the constitution, which 
 he was planning to violate. To this supposition there are two 
 obvious objections; the first is the comparative ease with which 
 the law was carried, and the second is the absence of any explicit 
 statement of such a purpose in the sources. Neither of these will 
 be found upon examination to be as serious as it may at first appear. 
 
 As to the first point, there was opposition, but it' seems to have 
 contented itself with rendering the law technically invalid by re- 
 ligious obstruction; this was the only way in which Bibulus could 
 act, since he had no veto as against a tribune. Three of the tribunes 
 were conservatives and joined Bibulus in his attempt to stop Caesar 
 by raising religious obstacles to the meeting of the assembly. We 
 get this information from Cicero's oration against Vatinius, 13 and 
 from the silence of the orator as to any actual violence we must 
 conclude that none was offered to the hostile tribunes. This seems 
 to show quite clearly that on this occasion they did not appear in 
 the forum, but contented themselves with announcing unfavorable 
 omens. Later, when the agrarian bill was carried, these same three 
 did interpose a veto and were nearly killed in consequence. It is 
 not unreasonable to conclude that they feared to try direct inter- 
 vention at first from fear of the mob, and perhaps also they had 
 faith in the effect of the obnuntiatio. When it had been made 
 clear that religious scruples would not check Caesar, they tried to 
 interpose their veto with the support and backing of the other 
 consul. So far as the records show, Cato alone had the courage 
 to resist the Vatinian law in person and he warned the people 
 that by their own votes they were setting up a tyrant in their 
 citadel.! 14 This utterance is entirely in harmony with the con- 
 jecture here offered as to the purpose of the law. 
 
 As to the second objection, if the Vatinian law were used as a 
 means of establishing in Rome a military tyranny, why was not the 
 point brought out explicitly by ancient writers? It does not seem 
 impossible to suggest a reason. In the case of Cicero it would be 
 natural that he should refrain from writing to his friend what the 
 latter already knew; the facts of Caesar's rule were as familiar 
 to Atticus as to Cicero. Under these circumstances what we should 
 
 13 Oration against Vatinius, 6-7. 
 "Plutarch, Cato Minor, 33. 
 
APPENDIX 275 
 
 expect to find would be allusion and implication rather than plain 
 statement in definite language. This is exactly what we do find; in- 
 deed, he makes the case quite reasonably clear if we will only take his 
 language at its face value as will be shown presently. In his ora- 
 tions he could not speak out because of the risk involved in offending 
 Caesar and Pompey. In the case of the later writers, such as Dio, 
 Appian, Plutarch, and Suetonius, they all wrote after the empire 
 had been established for a considerable time. It would be quite 
 natural that they should fail to grasp the full significance of a 
 body of troops camped at the gates of Rome, since they were thor- 
 oughly familiar with such a situation. They do concur in represent- 
 ing Caesar's consulship as a period of violent usurpation, but they 
 do not see any occasion to emphasize this particular point in his 
 method. If that was not grasped, it would be natural for them to 
 treat the Vatinian law as they do and discuss it in connection with 
 the end of Caesar's consulship and as looking toward his future 
 career in Gaul rather than his present position in Rome. Dio, in- 
 deed, places his account of the law in the middle of his narrative of 
 Caesar's consulship, but he discusses it from this point of view, and 
 his arrangement is clearly logical and not chronological. He deals 
 first with the legislation and then takes up the other events of the 
 year. Under the head of legislation he places first the laws intro- 
 duced by Caesar himself — the Julian laws — and then those that he 
 instigated and inspired but which were brought forward by others. 
 
 When these considerations are borne in mind neither of the objec- 
 tions will seem decisive, and the positive evidence which the sources 
 contain that the Vatinian law was actually used for the purpose 
 indicated is fully as strong as could be reasonably expected. Our 
 only contemporary source is Cicero; his letters show plainly that 
 after the law was passed he regarded the government of Caesar 
 as a military despotism. It is not a question merely of mob violence 
 overriding technicalities of the constitution, for he twice refers ex- 
 plicitly to Caesar's army. Once he represents Pompey as meeting 
 all criticism of the triumvirate's measures by saying "I shall coerce 
 you by means of Caesar's army." 15 This was written at the begin- 
 ning of May. Again, sometime between July and October, he pic- 
 tures Clodius as rushing wildly about threatening now this party 
 and now that: "When he sees how unpopular the present state of 
 things is, he seems to intend an attack upon the authors of it; but 
 when he again recalls their power and armies, he transfers his hos- 
 tility to the loyalists." 16 
 
 Moreover, Cicero applies to Caesar's government the Greek term 
 tyranny and the Latin term regnum,. 17 It is hardly likely that he 
 
 ^Letters, i, 106. Att., ii, 16. 
 
 ^Letters, i, '118. Att., ii, 22. 
 
 17 He uses the term tyranny in Att., ii, 14 and 17 and the term regnum in 
 Att., ii, 12 and 13. He uses a quotation calling the three kings in. Att., ii, 8 ; 
 in a letter to his brother he calls them kings' himself (Q. Fr., i, 2.). 
 
276 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 would have used these terms on several occasions unless he meant 
 them, and if they were seriously intended, they can mean nothing 
 but an illegal despotism resting on force. Was the force in this case 
 merely that of the mob reinforced by Pompey's veterans? The 
 orator's references to Caesar's army show quite clearly that it was 
 more than this. If the power of the triumvirate had depended on 
 the populace, the conservatives might have rallied if the three lost 
 the favor of the mob in any marked degree, but this was not the 
 case. Unless Cicero was egregiously deceived the three did lose the 
 popularity with which they began and even the rabble turned against 
 them. A single quotation in addition to those given already in the 
 text will suffice to illustrate the point. In July Cicero wrote to 
 Atticus, "They hold no one by affection, and I fear they will be 
 forced to use terror . . . The feeling of the people was shewn as clearly 
 as possible in the theatre and at the shows. For at the gladiators 
 both master (dominus) and supporters were overwhelmed with 
 hisses." The younger Curio "received an ovation such as used to be 
 given to Pompey when the constitution was still intact (ut salva re 
 publico, Pompeio plaudi solebat) . . .They are at war with everybody." 
 But Cicero does not imagine that their unpopularity will make any 
 difference. "Men are indignant at what nevertheless must, it seems, 
 be put up with. The whole people have indeed now one voice, but 
 its strength depends rather on exasperation than anything to back 
 it up . . . What else is there to say? What else? This, I think: 
 I am certain that all is lost. For why mince matters any longer?" 18 
 If we are to regard Caesar as a popular leader who simply brushed 
 aside senseless technicalities and obstinate obstruction, Cicero's evi- 
 dence must, at the start, be thrown out of court. 
 
 If the only contemporary writer is thus clear in testifying to a 
 military tyranny, this view is supported by two of the four later 
 authorities. Plutarch confirms the evidence of Cicero, though he is 
 inaccurate in the details. He states explicitly that Pompey — and it 
 should be borne in mind that to contemporaries he was the real head 
 of the triumvirate — filled the city with soldiers and carried Caesar's 
 laws with a high hand. 19 He also quotes the warning of Cato in 
 regard to the Vatinian law, 20 and he narrates the story of Con- 
 sidius, an aged senator, who replied to Caesar's question as to why 
 the conscript fathers did not meet by saying that they were in 
 fear of his soldiers. 21 Appian asserts that at the very beginning 
 of their year of office both Caesar and his colleague Bibulus pro- 
 ceeded to arm secretly. He interprets the conciliatory bearing of 
 Caesar at the first as intended simply to throw Bibulus off his 
 guard, and says that Caesar had gathered a large band of soldiers 
 
 ^Letters, i, 112-13. Att., ii, 19. 
 "Plutarch, Pompey, 48. 
 ^Plutarch, Cato Minor, 33. 
 
 2 >Plutarch, Caesar, 14. Cicero refers to the incident but does not quote the 
 remark of Considius. Letters, i, 124. Att., ii, 24. 
 
APPENDIX 277 
 
 before he presented his agrarian bill to the senate. When Bibulus 
 appealed to the senate against Caesar, Appian says that the con- 
 script fathers did nothing to oppose the preparations and force of 
 Caesar. 22 It is quite true that Appian does not show how Caesar 
 used the force he had gathered, but it can hardly be doubted that 
 both Appian and Plutarch drew upon sources wherein the consulship 
 of Caesar was represented as a military tyranny. Neither makes the 
 mechanism of that tyranny very clear and neither connects it with 
 the Vatinian law, but both bear witness to its existence. The other 
 two sources are much less definite. Suetonius is very brief and 
 merely says that Bibulus was expelled from the forum by Caesar, 
 who resorted to arms. 23 This might mean no more than simple riot- 
 ing which undoubtedly played a part, and a large part, in the first 
 days of Caesar's consulship. Dio does not imply military violence. 
 Neither of these writers, however, asserts anything inconsistent with 
 the interpretation of the Vatinian law adopted in the text. 
 
 In the discussion of the Vatinian law it has so far been taken 
 as established that it was passed in March. This can not be said to 
 be entirely certain. The date of March 1 has been treated as that 
 on which the law was passed by the assembly. It is possible, how- 
 ever, that March 1 may have been named in the bill as the time at 
 which it was to take effect. This would leave us free to fix some 
 other day as that on which the law was finally voted by the people. 24 
 It is hardly possible to place its enactment earlier than March 1; 
 and if |it was passed later and yet this date was specified in the 
 bill, we should have to suppose that Caesar's proconsulship was de- 
 liberately dated back and made to begin at a time then already past. 
 The account in Appian would serve to suggest a possible motive for 
 this. If Caesar began gathering troops before he had a legal right 
 to do so, he might think such a retroactive statute worth while. 
 Appian, indeed,, states that the recruiting began at the very begin- 
 ning of the year, but he may have thrown it back two months too 
 early, or it may have been that up till March the recruiting had not 
 involved any definitely illegal act that could be proved in court. 
 One question will at once suggest itself, however. Why did Caesar 
 suddenly become scrupulous at some time during his stormy consul- 
 ship and that apparently upon this single point? It seems not im- 
 possible that the somewhat erratic conscience of Pompey was the 
 source of the scruple. Pompey had shown himself extremely care- 
 ful to disclaim any responsibility for Caesar's acts, but he may have 
 felt the accusation that he was supporting and sanctioning a military 
 
 ^Appian, ii, 10-11. 
 
 ^Suetonius, The Deified Julius, 20. 
 
 ^It can not have been carried later than July, when Caesar offered Cicero a 
 legateship in his army (Letters, i, 113. Att., ii, 19). It was almost certainly 
 passed before the end of April, since in the first days of May Cicero speaks 
 of Caesar's army (Letters, i, 106. Att., ii, 16). See also Letters, i, 91-92. 
 Att., ii, 6. 
 
278 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 tyranny. All ancient moralists regarded resistance to a tyrant 
 as a duty of the citizen, and if Caesar was becoming something very 
 like one, Pompey may not have been able to quiet his conscience with 
 evasions and quibbles. If this were so the Vatinian law, whenever 
 passed, may have relieved his troubled mind by dating back the 
 beginning of Caesar's proconsulship and so legalizing ex post facto 
 Caesar's acts. Such a conjecture would not, as it seems to me, 
 matter greatly. The purpose of the Vatinian law is practically the 
 same and it is intended to cover the high handed and despotic acts of 
 Caesar with a show of legality. Whether those acts were past or 
 future makes very little difference, since it would still be true that 
 his consulship was a military tyranny. 
 
 It may be worth while to say in conclusion that I am far from 
 holding a brief against Caesar. That the republic had become un- 
 workable is, I believe, entirely true, and one main purpose of this 
 book is to point out some of the reasons why this was so. Neverthe- 
 less, it is an obvious duty of the historian to try to understand the 
 point of view of those whom he holds to have been in the wrong. 
 It was natural that the Roman conservatives should fail to see 
 that the republican machine was unequal to the task imposed upon 
 it, and this especially since they had ready to hand a plausible ex- 
 planation of the obvious breakdown of the constitution. The republic 
 had managed to work after a fashion up to the moment when the 
 triumvirs threw a wrench into the machinery. The disorders that 
 followed, the anarchy of the next few years — for these they had 
 a very simple explanation. The three held the military force of the 
 state in their hands, and while they did not themselves employ it 
 to keep the peace, they would not permit the senate to take any 
 vigorous action. In the days of Catiline the propertied classes, 
 under the leadership of Cicero and the senate, had had little real 
 difficulty in putting down the disturbers of the peace. Under the 
 triumvirate they were not allowed to try, and they might very well 
 think, and perhaps rightly, that the same thing could be done again. 
 Under such circumstances they would naturally feel that the repub- 
 lican constitution was not seriously wrong in any part, but that it 
 had been stopped by lawless violence, and that this same violence 
 was all that stood in the way of its working again. There seems 
 to me so much of justice in this view that, while I do not believe 
 that the republic could have continued for any length of time, yet 
 it seems impossible to prove that it would have broken down in 
 59 B.C. had it not been for the action of the triumvirs. Cato was 
 literally right when he laid the ruin of the constitution, not to the 
 civil war, but to the combination of Caesar and Pompey. 
 
THE LEX POMPEIA-LICINIA 
 
 As the question of the exact date at which Caesar's proconsulship 
 of Gaul came to an end has given rise to much controversy, a brief 
 consideration of the matter and an indication of the chief contending 
 views may be of interest. It was long supposed that Mommsen's study 
 on the subject had definitely settled the date as March 1, 49. Gui- 
 raud in 1878 disputed this view and propounded another, but it met 
 with little or no favor, and it is only within comparatively recent 
 years that the controversy can be said to have been really begun. 
 The date supposedly established by Mommsen held the field till 1904, 
 when it was attacked by Hirschfeld, who contended that the renewal 
 of Caesar's imperium in 55 by the lex Pompeia-Licinia was for no 
 definite period, and that the only limits set by that law to his pro- 
 consulship were indirect and such as were involved in the clause 
 that forbade the discussion of a successor before March 1, 50. This 
 new theory gained very considerable acceptance in spite of opposi- 
 tion, until in 1913 Judeich advanced another, namely that Caesar's 
 term as renewed in 55 ended in December of 50. In general, German 
 scholars have accepted the year 50 while English scholars have ad- 
 hered to the view of Mommsen, which has recently been very ably 
 defended and the arguments of Hirschfeld and Judeich answered by 
 Holmes and Hardy. 1 
 
 In this controversy it appears to me that both sides have estab- 
 lished some of their contentions. The view of Hirschfeld that no 
 date was fixed for the end of Caesar's proconsulship seems to have 
 been shown by his opponents to be untenable, and the date fixed by 
 Judeich seems to have been equally disproved. So much the adher- 
 ents of the view of Mommsen have accomplished and I, at least, 
 feel that they have done this convincingly. Does this, however, es- 
 tablish their date of March 1, 49, in full possession of the field? 
 For myself this does not seem to be the case, and the reasons given 
 by the Germans for holding that the command of Caesar terminated 
 in 50 appear to have great weight. Some points, at least, have 
 emerged from the discussion that seem to be very solidly established, 
 either admitted by all sides to the controversy, or proved beyond 
 much doubt. These points may be briefly summarized as follows: 
 
 1. The lex Vatinia conferred the governorship of Gaul on Caesar 
 
 1 Mommsen, Die Rechtsfrage zwischen Caesar und dem Senat. 
 
 Guiraud, Le differend entre Cesar et le senat. 
 
 Hirschfeld in Klio, iv and v, with answers by Holzapfel in the same. 
 
 Judeich in Rheinisches Museum, lxviii. 
 
 Holmes, in Classical Quarterly, x. 
 
 Hardy, in Journal of Philology, xxxiv. 
 
 I regret keenly that circumstances have prevented my having access to the 
 articles of Hirschfeld and that I have been obliged to depend upon the answers 
 of his critics for my knowledge of his views. I sincerely hope that I have done 
 him no serious injustice as a result. 
 
280 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 for five years beginning March 1, 59. Under this law Caesar's term 
 would expire March 1, 54. 
 
 2. The lex Pompeia-Licinia extended his imperium for a second 
 period of five years. 
 
 3. This law contained a clause forbidding any discussion of a 
 successor to Caesar till after March 1, 50. As long as the Sempro- 
 nian law remained in force this clause made it impossible to assign 
 the Gauls as consular provinces and supersede Caesar there before 
 48, when he intended to be consul in Rome. 
 
 4. In pursuance of the design implied in 3, Caesar demanded and 
 Pompey helped to pass a special law in 52 by which Caesar was 
 allowed the privilege of being elected consul without a personal 
 canvass for the office. 
 
 5. But Pompey, who had begun to fear Caesar and to ally himself 
 with the senate, also passed a law in 52 which repealed the Sempro- 
 nian law and made it possible for the senate to supersede Caesar as 
 soon as his legal term expired. 
 
 6. Taking 4 and 5 together, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
 the right of Caesar to be elected consul in his absence had been 
 definitely agreed upon at the conference at Luca, and that in allowing 
 the law of the ten tribunes to be passed Pompey was simply keeping 
 his word to his partner. Having kept his promise according to the 
 strict letter, Pompey tried by repealing the whole Sempronian law to 
 render the concession which he found himself obliged to make quite 
 worthless for the purpose for which it was intended. 
 
 7. Whatever the precise date when Caesar's legal term in Gaul 
 would expire, there was a considerable interval between that date 
 and the time when Caesar could be elected consul and a still longer 
 interval before he could assume office if elected. If he were super- 
 seded during this time he would become a private citizen and as 
 such he would be open to a prosecution in the courts for any illegal 
 act he had committed. Such a prosecution some of his enemies 
 were determined to bring against him and he was equally determined 
 to avoid. 
 
 8. The only way in which he could avoid prosecution was to 
 remain proconsul of Gaul up to the very time when he would 
 assume the consulship. It was, therefore, necessary that he should 
 hold his province for a considerable time after his legal term ex- 
 pired. The only way in which he could do this was by preventing 
 the appointment of a successor to take over the command until the 
 beginning of his second consulship on January 1, 48. 
 
 9. Under the Sempronian law Caesar was amply safeguarded 
 and could continue in Gaul for the required time. After Pompey 
 repealed the Sempronian law this was wholly doubtful; the senate 
 now had the power to supersede him before he had been elected 
 consul and still more before he had actually taken office. 
 
 10. Caesar, as his one means of safety, strove to prevent the 
 
APPENDIX 281 
 
 appointment of a successor and found in the veto of the tribunes an 
 effective weapon for his purpose. Under the Sempronian law the 
 tribunes had been deprived of the veto in connection with the assign- 
 ment of the consular provinces. When Pompey repealed the Sem- 
 pronian law he inadvertently repealed this restriction on the veto 
 along with the rest of the law. Curio made use of this fact to block 
 all action in the senate, and Pompey was able to break the resulting 
 deadlock only by methods of dubious legality. 
 
 Of these points only the second has been seriously questioned. 
 Here it seems to me that the advocates of Mommsen's view have 
 proved their case completely, and that the language of Cicero leaves 
 practically no doubt that the lex Pompeia-Licinia extended Caesar's 
 proconsulship for a definite period of five years. The orator fre- 
 quently refers to Caesar's term in Gaul as lasting for ten years 2 
 and he states explicitly that it was prolonged for five years. 3 The 
 suggestion has been put forward that Caesar meant to stand for the 
 consulship in 50 and to hold that office in 49 , 4 or at least that he 
 was eligible to do so. 5 This seems to me untenable; the whole course 
 of the negotiations appears to show clearly that the older view is 
 correct on this point. 
 
 The principal question that is left open is that of the precise date 
 at which Caesar's command, as extended by the lex Pompeia-Licinia, 
 terminated. I am inclined to think, though tentatively, that the 
 weight of the evidence available tends to show that it expired in 50 
 and probably early in the year. The issue really narrows down to 
 the single question of when the second quinquennium began. Did it 
 start, as Mommsen held, with the end of the first, that is with 
 March 1, 54; or with the end of 55, as Judeich maintains; or with 
 the actual passage of the lex Pompeia-Licinia? In the first case 
 Caesar's command would end March 1, 49; in the second, December 
 29, 50; in the third, in the early part of 50, though on what precise 
 day is uncertain. 6 This last conclusion seems to me upon the whole 
 the most probable of the three for the reasons which follow. 
 
 1. At Luca it was determined to give each of the triumvirs a 
 province and an army. This would place the three upon an osten- 
 sibly equal footing, since each of them would now be invested with 
 a great command. Moreover it was agreed that these commands 
 should all be held for the same length of time; Crassus and Pompey, 
 
 2 Att., vii, 5, 7, 9, for example. 
 
 *Att. r vii, 6. 
 
 *Hirschfeld maintained this view in his articles. 
 
 6 Mispoulet, La vie parlementaire a Rome, 353-54, offers this suggestion. The 
 instances which he cites, however, seem to me wholly inconclusive. They are all 
 cases of second consulships that occurred before the time of Sulla, who revived an 
 old law requiring a ten year interval. The only ground for thinking that Caesar 
 had any intention of becoming a candidate in 50 is an expression in a letter of 
 Caelius Rufus to Cicero, for which see the final note at the close of this section. 
 
 6 The lex Trebonia and the lex Pompeia-Licinia were passed with no great in- 
 terval between them, and from a letter of Cicero (Att., iv, 9) it is clear that the 
 first of these had been passed, or at least published, by April 27, 55. The view 
 of Meyer (Caesars Monarchic, 158 note 1) is the same as the one here accepted. 
 
282 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 therefore, were assigned the provinces of Syria and Spain for five 
 years and Caesar's proconsulship in Gaul was prolonged for the 
 same period. Now it seems clear that the command of Crassus in 
 Syria and that of Pompey in Spain began at once on the passage of 
 law (lex Trebonia) conferring these provinces upon them. 7 It would 
 seem natural, under these circumstances, that Caesar's command 
 should be prolonged in such a way that it would not appear on the 
 surface to outlast the others. This would be accomplished if his 
 second five years were counted in the same way as those of his 
 colleagues, namely from the date of the passage of the law extend- 
 ing his term. But while willing to put himself on a footing of 
 nominal equality with his partners, Caesar was determined to safe- 
 guard his second consulship. To do this without making any obvious 
 distinction between the three he inserted the special clause forbidding 
 any discussion of a successor before March 1, 50, and very probably 
 exacted a pledge that at a later time he should be given permission 
 to stand for the consulship in absentia. While the Sempronian law 
 stood, this arrangement safeguarded Caesar's interests perfectly, 
 though rather indirectly. The only reason for such indirection that 
 I can see is the desire to avoid as far as possible the appearance 
 of giving Caesar any more than was given to his partners. If his 
 imperium would outlast theirs by practically a year the- whole ar- 
 rangement seems useless, since the clause forbidding discussion of a 
 successor before March 1, 50 was quite unnecessary if Caesar's 
 term was prolonged till March 1, 49; the fractional part of a year 
 would prevent his being superseded during the remainder of 49 
 in any case. The speech of Cicero shows that the Gauls could not 
 be assigned to any of the magistrates for 50, because they could 
 only be given provinces of which they could take immediate pos- 
 session. 8 Thus the Gauls could only be assigned to one of the mag- 
 istrates for 49, who could not take over their provinces till January 
 1, 48. If Caesar's term expired in 50, however, the clause was neces- 
 sary to prevent the Gauls being assigned to the consuls for 50, who 
 would be able to take over the provinces at the beginning of 49, 
 a full year before Caesar meant to leave. The presence of this 
 special clause in the bill seems to me, therefore, a strong argument 
 in favor of 50. 
 
 2. The only explicit statements which we have in ancient writers 
 as to the time when Caesar's command expired point to 50 as the 
 year. Dio gives this date and is so sure of it that he shortens the 
 
 7 Judeich bases his theory on the supposition that the terms of Crassus and 
 Pompey began January 1, 54 ; this he says there is no reason to doubt. In 
 reply Hardy points out that Crassus left Rome for Syria early in November 
 (Att., iv, 13). The answer seems to me conclusive and to prove that the_ lex 
 Trebonia, like the lex Vatinia, made the proconsulship begin immediately. Cicero 
 makes it clear that the Romans would not have tolerated the idea of a proconsul 
 wandering about the empire for nearly two months waiting for a _ province to 
 become vacant, possessed of the imperium but unable to exercise it anywhere. 
 
 s On the Consular Provinces, 15. 
 
APPENDIX 283 
 
 second quinquennium to three years to make it fit. 9 This shortening 
 is made necessary by an error of two years in Dio's computation. 
 He counts Caesar's first five years as beginning with his actual ar- 
 rival in Gaul (March, 58) and not from the true date of a year 
 earlier (March, 59). The second five years is then reckoned from 
 the end of the first, so that if it expired in 50 it could have had a 
 duration of only three years. Dio is plainly aware that the state- 
 ment had been made that Caesar's term was renewed for a second 
 five years, but he sets this aside because of his certainty that his 
 term did in fact end in 50. The language of Appian is in accord 
 with that of Dio, though it is not quite so explicit; in his narrative 
 of the events of 51 he says that Caesar's term was about to expire, 10 
 which is strange if it had more than a year still to run. The other 
 writers use language which it seems to me will fit either date. It 
 is a fact that ought not to be ignored, however, that the only two 
 writers who make definite statements as to the date both affirm that 
 it was 50, and that there is no equally clear statement of 49 to be 
 found anywhere. 
 
 3. The contemporary evidence of the letters of Cicero and those 
 of his friend Caelius Rufus seems to me to imply 50. The expres- 
 sions to be found here can be, and have been, interpreted to fit the 
 date of 49, but such an interpretation involves a rather forced con- 
 struction and compels the conclusion that the writers did not say 
 what they meant. It will be sufficient to cite one or two of the most 
 important passages and I take those that seem to me the most de- 
 cisive. 
 
 In June, 50, while Cicero was in Cilicia, Caelius wrote to him: 
 "As for politics, every controversy centers on one point — the prov- 
 inces. In this matter Pompey as yet seems to have thrown all his 
 weight on the side of the senate's wish that Caesar should leave 
 his province on the 13th of November. . .The situation turns entirely 
 on this: Pompey, professing not to be attacking Caesar, but to be 
 making an arrangement which he considers fair to him, says that 
 Curio is deliberately seeking pretexts for strife. However, he is 
 strongly against, and evidently alarmed at, the idea of Caesar be- 
 coming consul-designate before handing over his army and province." 
 Quod ad rem pitblicam attinet, in unam causam omnis contentio con- 
 lecta est de provinciis; in quam adhuc incubuisse cum senatu Pompeius 
 videtur, ut Caesar Id. Nov. decedat; . . .Scaena rei totius haec; Pom- 
 peius, tamquam Caesarem non inpugnet, sed, quod Mi aequum putet, 
 constituat, ait Curionem quaerere discordias, valde autem non vult 
 et plane timet Caesarem cos. desig. prius, quam exercitum et prov- 
 inciam tradiderit. 11 As the date stands it would mean November 13, 
 50, and the proposal favored by Pompey was that Caesar should be 
 
 ?P} ' . xxxiii > 33 J xl > 59 - Guiraud has shown clearly how Dio gets his three years. 
 
 10 Appian, n, 26, 27. 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 176-77. Fam., viii, 11. 
 
284 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 superseded on that date. If Caesar's term had not then legally ended 
 it would seem impossible that such a proposition could be represented 
 as fair in any sense of the words. Hardy maintains that the date 
 should be November 13, 49, and that Caelius writing in haste did 
 not take the trouble to make this clear, knowing that Cicero would 
 not be in the slightest doubt as to what year he meant. This 
 sounds reasonable in itself, but it makes nonsense of the last sentence 
 of the passage quoted. If the November in question was in 49, what 
 about the fears attributed to Pompey? In November, 49, Caesar 
 would already have been elected consul while still holding his army. 
 Hardy meets this difficulty by assuming that the final sentence in- 
 dicates Pompey's real feelings and not his professions. That is to 
 say, Pompey is pretending to support the proposal of the senate that 
 Caesar shall stay in Gaul till November, 49, but in reality he is 
 opposed to it because he is afraid of Caesar's becoming consul while 
 still retaining his army. But this is not what Caelius says; the 
 Latin reads quite clearly and in a different sense. Its obvious mean- 
 ing is that Pompey supports the proposal of the senate and pretends 
 that he is trying to be fair to Caesar, but in his heart he is afraid 
 to let Caesar be elected until he has given up his army. In the 
 clause beginning valde autem the autem connects what follows with 
 what precedes, not with what comes several lines before. If we take 
 the passage as it stands and read it in the natural sense of the Latin 
 it is fatal to the date of 49. Pompey could not pretend that it was 
 fair to supersede Caesar before his legal term had expired, but if it 
 had already expired in the early part of 50, then he could very well 
 represent a date which allowed Caesar several months extra as a fair 
 and even friendly arrangement. It will be noted that the language of 
 Caelius is just as fatal to the theory of Judeich as to that of 
 Mommsen. 
 
 In his letters written during 50 Cicero also uses language that 
 seems on the face of it to imply that Caesar's term has expired. 
 In December of that year he wrote to Atticus concerning Caesar's 
 demands, "Could anything be more impudent? 'You have held a 
 province for ten years, a time not granted you by the senate, but 
 assumed by yourself with the help of violence and sedition: this 
 period — not assigned by the law, but by your own caprice — has 
 passed. Let us, however, grant that it was by the law: a decree 
 is made for naming your successor: you cry halt and say, 'Take 
 my candidature into consideration.' Rather do you take us into 
 consideration. Are you to have an army (against the will of the 
 senate) longer than the vote of the people gave it you?' " Nam quid 
 impudentius? Tenuisti provinciam per annos decern,, non tibi a, 
 senatu, sed a te ipso per vim et per f actionem datos; praeteriit 
 tempus non legis, sed libidinis tuae, fac tamen legis; ut succedatur, 
 decernitur; impedis et ais: "Habe meam rationem," Habe tu nostram. 
 
APPENDIX 285 
 
 Exercitum tu habeas diutius, quam populus iussit, invito senatu? 12 
 It has been argued that here Cicero is placing himself in imagi- 
 nation in the near future and is picturing what will happen two 
 or three months hence. This seems possible, but the context sug- 
 gests rather that he is speaking of the past and present; the demands 
 are those that Caesar was then making and all that Cicero says 
 was true of the past; the senate had tried to pass a decree pro- 
 viding a successor for Caesar, and Caesar had objected on the 
 ground that in granting him the right to be a candidate in absentia 
 the people had extended his term by implication. It is therefore 
 possible that in the whole passage Cicero meant exactly what he said, 
 and if he did it is clear that Caesar's term had expired at the 
 time he wrote. An argument in favor of 49 has been based on the 
 expression, both in this passage and elsewhere, of ten years as the 
 length of Caesar's term. It seems to me, however, that such lan- 
 guage is wholly natural and need not be taken too literally; Gaul 
 was granted to Caesar for five years by the Vatinian law and then 
 for a second five years by the law of Pompey and Crassus. This 
 being so, if Cicero washed to speak of the entire term for which 
 Caesar held his province it would be very natural for him to add 
 the two grants together and describe the command of Caesar under 
 the two laws as ten years. Cicero can not be taken too literally, 
 since when he wrote Caesar had not held Gaul for ten years, even 
 if we assume that Cicero is speaking from the point of view of 
 March 1, 49. Caesar's proconsulship in Gaul began March 1, 59 
 under the Vatinian law, but he did not leave Rome till March, 58. 
 During this year Afranius had been left undisturbed as proconsul 
 of the province and therefore Caesar had actually been in possession 
 only from March, 58. Thus on any interpretation of the passage 
 Cicero must be held to have in mind the legal term and not the actual 
 possession, and from this standpoint he might very naturally speak 
 of two grants of five years each as ten years. 
 
 Another passage to which reference should be made is found in 
 a letter to Atticus written in January, 49, after Caesar had invaded 
 Italy. Cicero is boiling over with indignation against Caesar and 
 he writes, after mentioning the news of his advance, "Madman! 
 Miserable wretch, that has never seen even a shadow of virtue! 
 And he says that he is doing all this 'to support his honour'! How 
 can there be any 'honour' where there is no moral right? Can it be 
 morally right to have an army without commission from the state? 
 To seize cities inhabited by one's fellow citizens, as a means of at- 
 tacking one's own country? To be contriving abolition of debts, 
 restoration of exiles, hundreds of other crimes . . . ?" The Latin of 
 the critical part of this passage reads: Atque haec ait omnia facere 
 se dignitatis causa. Ubi est autem dignitas nisi ubi honestas? 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 232-33. Att., vii, 9. Shuckburgh omits the invito senatu which 
 I have inserted in parenthesis. 
 
286 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Honestum igitur habere exercitum nullo publico consilio, occupare 
 urbes civium, quo facilior sit aditus ad patriam . . . ? 13 Here Cicero 
 seems to say clearly that Caesar has no right to have an army. 
 But if his command did not end till March 1, 49, he did at that 
 time have a perfect legal right to it. It is true that he had no right 
 to bring his army into Italy, and perhaps this was what Cicero 
 meant, but if so he failed to say this in his excitement. If Caesar's 
 term had expired sometime in 50 and if Caesar had since that date 
 been holding on in Gaul by blocking the action of the senate through 
 his tribunes, then Cicero wrote exactly what he meant. To him it 
 seemed preposterous for Caesar to talk about his honor being in- 
 volved when he was trying to retain possession of something to 
 which he had no legal right. 
 
 One more passage in Cicero's letters should be cited because it 
 has been made to figure in the controversy. In December, 50, Cicero 
 wrote : "Well then ! Do I approve of votes being taken for a man who 
 is retaining an army beyond the legal day? For my part, I say no; 
 nor in his absence either. But when the former was granted him, 
 so was the latter." Quid ergo? exercitum retinentis, cum legis dies 
 transierit, rationem haberi placet? Mihi vero ne absentis quidem; 
 sed, cum id datum est, illud una datum est. 14 For my part I can 
 not see that much can be made of this. Cicero is clearly thinking of 
 Caesar as a candidate, and the passage may mean: Do I approve of 
 giving a special privilege to a man who is now (50) holding an 
 army beyond his legal term? or it may equally well mean: Do I 
 approve of letting a man receive votes who will be keeping an army 
 then (when he becomes a candidate, in 49) ? 
 
 The passages cited above seem to me the decisive ones. If it is 
 held that these passages will fit the date of March 1, 49, I can not 
 see any difficulty in construing the other expressions to be found in 
 the correspondence of Cicero to fit it. If it be assumed that Caesar's 
 term ended in 50, it does not seem to me that there is anything in 
 the language of Cicero that conflicts with it, at least on the surface, 
 except his reference to the ten years of Caesar's proconsulship. 
 Whatever theory is adopted, there will remain a few expressions 
 whose interpretation will offer some difficulty, but these expressions 
 fail to fit any theory and the difficulty is no greater for one than 
 for the other. 
 
 4. Finally, it seems to me that the policy of Pompey becomes more 
 readily intelligible if the date be taken as 50. There seems no ad- 
 equate reason for bringing up the question of appointing a successor 
 to Caesar in March, 50, if his term had still a year to run. Hardy 
 explains this by assuming that it was still doubtful whether or not 
 Pompey's new law in regard to the provincial governors had actually 
 
 13 Letters, ii, 241. Att., vii, 11. 
 ^Letters, ii, 228. Att., vii, 7. 
 
APPENDIX 287 
 
 repealed the Sempronian law, 15 and Meyer holds that the provisions 
 of the latter which required the assignment of the consular provinces 
 to take place eighteen months before the governor appointed took 
 possession remained in force. 16 Both writers seem to have over- 
 looked the fact that the Sempronian law was ignored at the assign- 
 ment of the provinces in 51. Cicero was then given the province of 
 Cilicia and he left Rome for the East in May, 51. He could not 
 possibly have received this province eighteen months before, since 
 this would have been before the law of Pompey was passed, and 
 under the Sempronian law he was not eligible for a proconsulship. 
 It is evident from this that at the beginning of 51 the whole Sem- 
 pronian law was regarded as repealed, and if this was true, there 
 seems no very good reason for taking up the matter of the succession 
 to the Gauls so long in advance of the possibility of effective action. 
 Taken in connection with Pompey's pretence of fairness in support- 
 ing the proposal to extend Caesar's term till November 13, the whole 
 matter is most readily understandable on the supposition that Cae- 
 sar's term expired early in 50. The date of March 1, 49, not only 
 leaves us in the dark as to why the question should have been brought 
 forward so early, but also forces us to put a rather strained inter- 
 pretation upon the language of Caelius. 
 
 To sum up briefly my own impressions of the controversy, the 
 explicit statement of Dio that Caesar's term expired in 50, which is 
 supported by the testimony of Appian, seems evidence not to be 
 lightly set aside. In this case it is reinforced by contemporary testi- 
 mony. The letters of Caelius Rufus confirm Dio strongly and can 
 only be made to fit any other date by a rather strained interpretation. 
 Cicero is somewhat less definite, but he too uses language which, if 
 read according to its obvious natural meaning, implies that Caesar's 
 term had expired in 50. Unless his words as to the ten years of 
 Caesar's government are thought to imply 49, Cicero never uses 
 language which on the face of it points to that date. Under these 
 circumstances I can see no adequate reason for rejecting the author- 
 ity of Dio — though he was certainly far from infallible — and for 
 interpreting the language of Caelius and Cicero in any other than the 
 obvious and natural way. This conclusion seems all the more rea- 
 sonable because the date thus given is the one which might be ex- 
 pected a priori from the conditions under which the triumvirate was 
 renewed at Luca, and because it is strongly implied by what we know 
 of the peculiar clause forbidding the discussion of a successor before 
 March 1, 50, and lastly because this date fits the details of the 
 diplomatic struggle between Pompey and Caesar at least as well 
 as any other, if not better. 
 
 Whatever date is accepted, it does not appear to me to make any 
 great difference. Caesar certainly meant to retain his command in 
 
 15 Hardy, Jour, of Phil., xxxiv, 178. 
 "Meyer, 256 note 2. 
 
288 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Gaul after his legal term had expired, and Pompey certainly was 
 determined that he should be superseded between that date (when- 
 ever it was) and the time when he would take office as consul in 
 Rome at the beginning of 48. To make this possible, Pompey cer- 
 tainly repealed the Sempronian law, and to ward off the new danger 
 which this created, Caesar certainly made use of the veto of his 
 tribunes. In this way Caesar was able to hold Pompey in check and 
 to prevent any decisive action by the senate. Unable to overcome 
 these tactics by any other means, Pompey at length resorted to force 
 and precipitated the civil war. Whether Caesar's term had actually 
 expired, or whether Pompey was simply trying to take such steps 
 that he could be superseded immediately after it should expire, is 
 after all a question which can hardly affect materially our judgment 
 of the actors. 
 
 FINAL NOTE 
 
 In conclusion it may be well to notice two special points that have 
 figured in the controversy but to which I am unable to attach any 
 decisive importance. One of these is a passage in the eighth book of 
 the Gallic War, written by Caesar's friend Hirtius, and the other is 
 a passage in a letter of Caelius Rufus. 
 
 In describing the siege of Uxellodunum, Hirtius says of Caesar 
 that on learning the steadfast purpose of the townsfolk — "though he 
 disregarded their small numbers, he judged nevertheless that their 
 obstinacy must be visited with a severe punishment, for he feared 
 that the Gauls as a whole might suppose that what had been lacking 
 in them for resisting the Romans was not strength, but resolution; 
 and that the rest of the states might follow this example and rely 
 on any advantage offered by strong positions to reassert their liberty. 
 All the Gauls were aware, as he knew, that there was one more 
 summer season in his term of office, and that, if they could hold out 
 for that, they had no further danger to fear." Quorum etsi pauci- 
 tatem contemnebat, tamen pertinaciam magna poena esse adficien- 
 dam iudicabat, ne universa Gallia non sibi vires defuisse ad re- 
 sistendum Romanis, sed constantiam putaret, neve hoc exemplo 
 ceterae civitates locorum opportunitate fretae se vindicarent in 
 libertatem, cum omnibus Gallis notum esse sciret reliquam esse unam 
 aestatem suae provinciae, quam si sustinere potuissent, nullum, ultra 
 periculum vererentur. 1 ? Hirschfeld makes the unam aestatem refer 
 to that summer, namely the summer of 51. Holmes denies the pos- 
 sibility of this since only a part of the summer was then left and in 
 another connection Caesar speaks of a part of a summer as exigua 
 parte aestatis (Gallic War, iv, 20). This does not seem to me very 
 conclusive. In the first place, Hirtius is not Caesar, and his use of 
 
 "Caesar, Gallic War, viii, 39. I have taken the translation from that of Edwards 
 in the Loeb Library edition, since he interprets the passage in the same fashion 
 as Holmes and thinks that the unam aestatem refers to the summer of 50. 
 
APPENDIX 289 
 
 words might differ from that of his friend. 18 In the second place, 
 the context is quite different in the two cases and would in itself 
 explain a different form of expression. Lastly, the sense of the 
 passage seems much better if Hirschfeld's interpretation is followed. 
 Caesar made an example in this case for fear that otherwise the 
 other Gauls would prolong their resistance, since they knew that 
 that summer was the last of his term. If they thought that they 
 had only to hold out a few months, one can readily understand the 
 matter, but if the summer referred to is that of 50, as Holmes holds, 
 it does not seem so clear; they would in this case have to hold out 
 not only for the rest of that summer but for the whole summer of 
 50 as well. Under these circumstances it would hardly seem that 
 their knowledge of the date when Caesar's proconsulship ended can 
 have had any very great influence on their conduct. However, if 
 the point be conceded and it be admitted that the summer in question 
 was that of 50, does that prove that Caesar's term ended in 49? 
 For my part I can not see that it does. The Gauls may not have 
 been well informed as to the technicalities of Roman law, but they 
 must surely have known something of the plans of Caesar, if only 
 because his whole army must have known them. Now Caesar's plan 
 was to stay in Gaul till the end of 49 so that he expected to spend 
 two more summers there. However, since in the summer of 49 he 
 would be a candidate for the consulship, he would of necessity have 
 to pass the summer in the Cisalpine province and could not under- 
 take military operations on the other side of the Alps. They might 
 therefore reason that 50 was the last summer which they had to 
 fear, because it was the last in which their conqueror would be able 
 to take the field against them. In short, I do not see that this 
 passage can be regarded as decisive either way, and it seems to me 
 quite possible to reconcile it with either date. 
 
 In a letter of Caelius Rufus, written in October, 51, he tells Cicero 
 among other things that Caesar has made up his mind not to be a 
 candidate this next year, neque hoc anno sua ratio habeatur. 19 If 
 this passage stood alone we should have no hesitation in deciding 
 that hoc anno meant 50. An attempt has been made on the basis 
 of it to maintain that Caesar meant to be a candidate in that year 
 and hence meant to hold the consulship in 49. I can not think that 
 this attempt has met with any success, and it must, I believe, be 
 taken as established that Caesar did not mean to be a candidate in 
 50. But what then are we to do with the remark of Caelius? Two 
 explanations of it have been suggested, one by Hardy and the other 
 
 18 To me the force of Holmes' argument from the usage of Caesar is very greatly 
 weakened, if not entirely destroyed, by his admission that Caesar never uses the 
 word provincia in the sense here given to it. If Hirtius did not use single words 
 in the same sense as Caesar, I really can not see why he was bound to use phrases 
 in the same way. See Holmes, Caesar de Belio Gallico, 389 note. 
 
 ^Letters, ii, 78. Fam., viii, 8. 
 
290 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 by Meyer. Hardy thinks that the words hoc anno should be under- 
 stood to mean this year, that is, the year that we both have in mind. 
 Meyer thinks that the passage probably refers to some compromise 
 proposal that had been put forward of which one provision was that 
 Caesar should be given a special dispensation to permit of his election 
 as consul in 50. So far as I can see the words of Caelius are equally 
 difficult for all theories, and therefore nothing can be made of them 
 in favor of any one. 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF CONSULS CLASSIFIED ACCORD- 
 ING TO THEIR RANK 
 
 In the following list the names of the consuls who held an active 
 command in the imperial army or provinces, either before or after 
 their consulship have been printed in italics. A list of consulars 
 who were so employed, with indications as to time and place, is given 
 separately. Those consuls whose names are inclosed in parentheses 
 died in office. Republicans (in the column headed Republicans and 
 Nobles from praetorian families) are marked by an asterisk. A 
 more complete knowledge of the praetors would undoubtedly transfer 
 some names from the third column to the second. 
 
 Date 
 
 Nobles from consular 
 families 
 
 Republicans and nobles from 
 praetorian families 
 
 New men 
 
 30 B.C. 
 
 Imp. Caesar IV 
 M. Licinius Crassus 
 M. Tullius Cicero 
 
 C. Antistius Vetus 
 L. Saenius Balbinus 
 
 
 29 B.C. 
 
 Imp. Caesar V 
 
 M. Valerius Messalla 
 Potitus 
 
 
 Sex. Appuleius 1 
 
 28 B.C. 
 
 Imp. Caesar VI 
 
 
 M. Vipsanius Agrippa 1 
 
 27 B.C. 
 
 Imp. Caesar VII 
 
 
 M. Vipsanius Agrippa 1 
 III 
 
 26 B.C. 
 
 Imp. Caesar VIII 
 
 
 T. Statilius Taurus 
 II 
 
 25 B.C. 
 
 Imp. Caesar IX 
 M. Junius Silanus 
 
 
 
 24 B.C. 
 
 Imp. Caesar X 
 
 C. Norbanus Flaccus 
 
 
 
 23 B.C. 
 
 Imp. Caesar XI 
 
 (A. Terentims Varro 
 
 Murena) 
 Cn. Calpurnius Piso Frugi 
 
 *L. Sestius Quirinus 
 
 
 22 B.C. 
 
 M. Claudius Marcellus 
 Aeserninus 
 
 *L. Arruntius 
 
 
 21 B.C. 
 
 Q. Aemilius Lepidus 
 
 
 M. Lollius 
 
 20 B.C. 
 
 
 P. Silius Nerva 
 
 M. Appuleius 1 
 
 19 B.C. 
 
 
 *Q. Lucretius Vespillo 
 *C. Sentius Saturninus 
 
 M. Vinicius 
 
 l A relative of Augustus. 
 
292 
 
 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Date 
 
 Nobles from consular 
 families 
 
 Republicans and nobles from 
 praetorian families 
 
 New men 
 
 18 B.C. 
 
 P. Cornelius Lentulus 
 
 Marcellinus 
 Cn. Cornelius Lentulus 
 
 
 
 17 B.C. 
 
 C. Furnius 
 
 C. Junius Silanus 
 
 
 
 16 B.C. 
 
 L. Domitius Ahenobarbus 2 
 P. Cornelius Scipio 
 
 
 L. Tarius Rufus 
 
 15 B.C. 
 
 M. Livius Drusus Libo 
 L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi 
 
 
 
 14 B.C. 
 
 M. Licinius Crassus 
 Cn. Cornelius Lentulus 
 Augur 
 
 
 
 13 B.C. 
 
 Ti. Claudius Nero 2 
 
 P. Quinctilius Varus 2 
 
 
 12 B.C. 
 
 ( M. Valerius Messalla 
 
 Barbatus Appianus ) 2 
 (C. Caninius Rebilus) 
 
 L. Volusius Saturninus 
 
 P. Sulpicius Quirinius 
 C. Valgius Rufus 
 
 11 B.C. 
 
 Paullus Fabius Maximus 
 
 Q. Aelius Tubero 
 
 
 10 B.C. 
 
 C. Julius Antonius 
 Q. Fabius Maximus 
 Africanus 
 
 
 
 9 B.C. 
 
 ( Nero Claudius Drusus ) 2 
 T. Quinctius Crispinus 
 Sulpicianus 
 
 
 A. Caecina Severus 
 
 8 B.C. 
 
 C. Marcius Censorinus 
 C. Asinius Gallus 
 
 
 
 7 B.C. 
 
 Ti. Claudius Nero IP 
 Cn. Calpurnius Piso 
 
 
 
 6 B.C. 
 
 C. Antistius Vetus 
 
 
 D. Laelius Balbus 
 
 5 B.C. 
 
 Imp. Caesar XII 
 L. Cornelius Sulla 
 L. Vinicius 
 Sex. Pompeius 
 Ser. Sulpicius Galba 
 
 
 
 4 B.C. 
 
 C. Calvisius Sabinus 
 
 
 L. Passienus Rufus 
 
 3 B.C. 
 
 L. Cornelius Lentulus 
 M. Valerius Messalla 
 Corvinus 
 
 
 
 2 B.C. 
 
 Imp. Caesar XIII 
 L. Caninius Gallus 
 
 M. Plautius Silvanus 
 
 Q. Fabricius 
 
 C. Fufius Geminus 
 
 1 B.C. 
 
 Cossus Cornelius 
 
 Lentulus 
 L. Calpurnius Piso 
 
 Augur 
 
 
 
 
 a A relative of Augustus. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 293 
 
 Date 
 
 Nobles from consular 
 families 
 
 Republicans and nobles from 
 praetorian families 
 
 New men 
 
 1 A.D. 
 
 C. Caesar 3 
 
 M. Herennius Picens 
 
 L. Aemilius Paullus 
 
 
 
 2 A.D. 
 
 T. Quinctius Crispinus 
 
 Valerianus 
 P. Alfenus Varus 
 P. Vinicius 
 P. Cornelius Lentulus 
 
 Scipio 
 
 
 
 3 A.D. 
 
 L. Volusius Saturninus 
 P. SUius 
 
 L. Aelius Lamia 
 
 M. Servilius Nonianus 
 
 4 A.D. 
 
 C. Sentius Saturninus 
 Cn. Sentius Saturninus 
 
 
 C. Clodius Licinus 
 Sex. Aelius Catus 
 
 5 A.D. 
 
 L. Valerius Messalla 
 
 Volesus 
 Cn. Cornelius Cinna 
 
 Magnus 
 
 C. Ateius Capito 
 
 C. Vibius Postumus 
 
 6 A.D. 
 
 M. Aemilius Lepidus 
 L. Arruntius 
 
 L. Nonius Asprenas 
 
 
 7 A.D. 
 
 A. Licinius Nerva 
 
 Silianus 
 Q. Caecilius Metellus 
 
 Creticus Silanus 
 
 
 . . . Lucilius Longus 
 
 8 A.D. 
 
 M. Furius Camillus 
 
 Sex. Nonius Quinctili- 
 anus 
 
 L. Apronius 
 
 A. Vibius Habitus 
 
 9 A.D. 
 
 
 
 C. Poppaeus Sabinus 
 Q. Sulpicius Camerinus 
 M. Papius Mutilus 
 Q. Poppaeus Secundus 
 
 10 A.D. 
 
 P. Cornelius Dolabella 
 C. Junius Silanus 
 Ser. Cornelius Lentulus 
 Maluginensis 
 
 
 Q. Junius Blaesus 
 
 11 A.D. 
 
 M\ Aemilius Lepidus 
 L. Cassius Longinus 
 T. Statilius Taurus 
 
 
 
 12 A.D. 
 
 Germanicus Caesar 3 
 C. Fonteius Capito 
 
 
 C. Visellius Varro 
 
 13 A.D. 4 
 
 L. Munatius Plancus 
 C. SUius Caecina Largus 
 
 
 
 14 A.D. 
 
 Sex. Pompeius 
 Sex. Appuleius 
 
 
 
 3 A relative of Augustus. . . . . 
 
 *In 13 a.d. there was another consul whose name is lost except for the iasx 
 three letters namely, cits. 
 
A LIST OF CONSULARS ACTIVE IN THE IMPERIAL SERVICE 
 
 From 30 B.C. to 23 B.C. 
 
 T. Statilius Taurus. Cos. 37 and 26 B.C. In Spain 29 B.C. 
 
 A new man. 
 M. Licinius Crassus. Cos. 30 B.C. Macedonia 29 B.C. 1 A 
 
 grandson of the triumvir. Of an old and distinguished 
 
 family. 
 M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus. Cos. 31 B.C. In Gaul 28-27 B.C. 
 
 Of an old and distinguished family. 
 Sex. Appuleius. Cos. 29 B.C. In Spain 27 B.C. A nephew 
 
 of Augustus through his mother. His father is unknown. 
 M. Tullius Cicero. Cos. 30 B.C. In Syria 27 B.C. A son of 
 
 the orator. A noble. 
 C. Antistius Vetus. Cos. 30 B.C. In Spain 25 B.C. Of a 
 
 praetorian family. 
 L. Aemilius Paullus Lepidus. Cos. 34 B.C. In Spain 24 B.C. 
 
 Of an old and distinguished family. 
 
 From 22 B.C. to 13 B.C. 
 
 M. Lollius. Cos. 21 B.C. In Germany 16 B.C. and in Thrace 
 
 shortly before this. A new man. 
 M. Vinicius. Cos. 19 B.C. In Pannonia 13 B.C. A new man. 
 L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi. Cos. 15 B.C. In Pamphylia 13 B.C. 
 
 A noble. 
 
 From 12 B.C. to 3 a.d. 
 
 L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi. Cos. 15 B.C. In Thrace from 13 to 
 
 11 B.C. A noble. 
 L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. Cos. 16 B.C. In Germany 9 and 2 
 
 B.C. A noble. 
 M. Titius. Cos. 31 B.C. In Syria 9 B.C. A new man. 
 C. Sentius Saturninus. Cos. 19 B.C. In Syria 8 to 6 B.C. A 
 
 member of the old republican party but not apparently of 
 
 high birth. 
 P. Quinctilius Varus. Cos. 13 B.C. In Syria 6 to 4 B.C. Of 
 
 a praetorian family. 
 P. Sulpicius Quirinius. Cos. 12 B.C. In Syria 3 to 2 B.C. He 
 
 probably remained as a counselor of C. Caesar perhaps till 
 
 4 a.d. A new man. 
 C. Marcius Censorinus. Cos. 8 B.C. In Syria as a counselor of 
 
 C. Caesar 1 B.C. to 2 a.d. A noble. 
 
 Macedonia was not an imperial province but the division was not made till 
 27 B.C. and as Crassus commanded a considerable force he should probably be 
 reckoned a lieutenant of Augustus. 
 
APPENDIX 295 
 
 M. Lollius. Cos. 21 B.C. In Syria as a counselor of C. Caesar 
 
 I B.C. to 2 A.D. A new man. 
 
 M. Vinicius. Cos. 19 B.C. In Pannonia and afterwards in Ger- 
 many 1 B.C. to 2 A.D. A new man. 
 
 From 4 a.d. to 14 a.d. 
 
 C. Sentius Saturninus. Cos. 19 B.C. In Germany 4 to 6 A.D. 
 
 A member of the republican party but not apparently of 
 
 high birth. 
 L. Aelius Lamia. Cos. 3 A.D. In Illyricum 4 to 6 A.D. Of a 
 
 praetorian family. 
 L. Volusius Saturninus. Cos. 12 B.C. In Syria 4 to 5 A.D. Of 
 
 a praetorian family. 
 P. Sulpicius Quirinius. Cos. 12 B.C. In Syria 6 A.D. A new 
 
 man. 
 A. Caecina Severus. Cos. 9 B.C. In Moesia 6 a.d. A new man. 
 M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus. Cos. 3 B.C. In Pannonia 6 A.D. 
 
 Of an old noble family. 
 M. Plautius Silvanus. Cos. 2 B.C. In Pannonia 6 to 9 A.D. Of 
 
 a praetorian family. 
 L. Nonius Asprenas. Cos. 6 A.D. In Germany 7 to 9 A.D. 
 
 Perhaps of a praetorian family. 
 P. Quinctilius Varus. Cos. 13 B.C. In Germany 6 to 9 A.D. 
 
 Of a praetorian family. 
 C. Vibius Postumus. Cos. 5 A.D. In Dalmatia 9 a.d. A new 
 
 man. 
 A. Licinius Nerva Silianus. Cos. 7 A.D. In Germany probably 
 
 before 9 a.d. Of a family raised to consular rank by 
 
 Augustus. 
 M. Aemilius Lepidus. Cos. 6 A.D. In Pannonia 8 A.D. and in 
 
 Spain 14 A.D. Of an old noble family. 
 Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Silanus. Cos. 7 A.D. In Syria 
 
 II to 17 a.d. Of an old noble family. 
 
 C. Poppaeus Sabinus. Cos. 9 a.d. In Moesia 11 to 35 A.D. A 
 
 new man. 
 P. Cornelius Dolabella. Cos. 10 A.D. In Dalmatia 14 a.d. Of 
 
 an old noble family. 
 L. Apronius. Cos. 9 a.d. In Germany 14 a.d. A new man. 
 Q. Junius Blaesus. Cos. 10 a.d. In Pannonia 14 A.D. A new 
 
 man. 
 C. Silius Caecina Largus. Cos. 13 a.d. In Germany 14 A.D. 
 
 Of a family raised to consular rank by Augustus. 
 
 There are three cases which remain doubtful. They are as follows: 
 
 Cn. Cornelius Lentulus. Cos. 18 B.C. We know from Florus 
 
 that he inflicted a defeat upon the Dacians and checked the 
 
 barbarians who were making attacks across the Danube. 
 
296 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 The date, however, is uncertain but it may well have been 
 after his consulship and in connection with a legateship in 
 Illyricum. It is possible that his service was before he 
 attained consular rank, or it may have been while he was 
 serving in the senate's province of Macedonia. He was 
 probably of an old noble family. 
 
 Gn. Calpurnius Piso. Cos. 7 B.C. It is clear from Tacitus that 
 Piso had governed Spain but the time is uncertain. It 
 seems not unlikely that it was shortly after his consulship, 
 or at least within the limits of the period from 12 B.C. to 
 3 a.d. He was probably of an old noble family. 
 
 Sex. Aelius Catus. Cos. 4 a.d. We know from Strabo that he 
 was in command in Thrace but the time is uncertain. It 
 may well have been that it was after his consulship and 
 that he should be counted among the consulars of the period 
 from 4 to 14 a.d. He was probably a new man. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE CONSULAR FASTI 
 
 A somewhat more detailed analysis of the consular fasti from 
 22 B.C. to the end of the reign than that given in the text, where 
 only the general results have been cited, may be desirable. In the 
 ten years from 22 B.C. to 13 B.C., inclusive, there were in all twenty- 
 two consuls. Of these one was Tiberius, the stepson of the emperor, 
 destined to succeed him on the throne, but not at that time re- 
 garded as his heir. Another was a certain M. Appuleius, who was 
 probably a nephew of Augustus through the emperor's sister Octavia 
 Major. The remaining twenty include some seven who were cer- 
 tainly members of families of consular rank. These seven were as 
 follows, the date of their consulship preceding their names: 
 
 21 B.C. Q. Aemilius Lepidus. Son of the triumvir. 
 
 18 B.C. P. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus. Grandson of cos. 
 
 56 B.C. 
 
 17 B.C. C. Furnius. Son of a man given consular rank by 
 
 Augustus. 
 16 B.C. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. Son of cos. 32 B.C. 
 16 B.C. P. Cornelius Scipio. Son of cos. 38 B.C. 
 15 B.C. L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi. Son of cos. 58 B.C. 
 14 B.C. M. Licinius Crassus. Son of cos. 30 B.C. or perhaps 
 grandson of triumvir. 
 In addition to the seven named above, two men were given the 
 consulship who belonged to families of praetorian rank; they were 
 20 B.C. P. Silius Nerva. 
 13 B.C. P. Quinctilius Varus. 
 Three men were advanced to the consulship who, without belong- 
 ing to families of high rank in the nobility, had adhered to the re- 
 publican cause and had been proscribed by the triumvirs; they were 
 
 22 B.C. L. Arruntius. 
 
 19 B.C. Q. Lucretius Vespillo. 
 19 B.C. C. Sentius Saturninus. 
 
 There remain to be considered a certain number of doubtful names. 
 In a period of such confusion as that which had just closed it would 
 not be strange if many men of high rank had perished leaving no 
 trace behind; this would be especially likely in the case of the younger 
 men of rank. After such a period we might expect to find a number 
 of men whose names suggest relationship to some of the great houses 
 of the aristocracy, but whose descent can not be determined with 
 certainty. This is actually the case; no less than five such names 
 occur in the consular fasti for these ten years. These five were as 
 follows : 
 
 22 B.C. M. Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus. 
 
 18 B.C. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus. 
 
298 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 17 B.C. C. Junius Silanus. 
 
 15 B.C. M. Livius Drusus Libo. 
 
 14 B.C. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Augur. 
 Of these, M. Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus was certainly related 
 to the Cornelii Lentuli Marcellini and was very probably connected 
 with the Claudii Marcelli, who were of consular rank. His exact 
 connection with the Claudii is uncertain, so that it can not be said 
 positively that any of his direct ancestors had held the consulship. 
 The next case, that of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, is typical of several 
 others. The Cornelii Lentuli were an old and distinguished family, 
 and it seems likely that the Lentulus in question was a member of 
 this house. Positive proof is unfortunately lacking, as the indica- 
 tion of his father's name which is furnished by Dio is not sufficient 
 to connect him definitely with any known member of the family; the 
 Lucius whose son he was might have been the son of any one of 
 several of the Lentuli who figure at an earlier period. It is of 
 course possible that there was no connection between the consul for 
 18 B.C. and the noble family bearing the same name. Among the 
 Romans family names were sometimes duplicated, and the name of 
 Cornelius was a common one. However, since the policy of Augustus 
 was distinctly favorable to a revival of the old nobility, it seems more 
 probable that the man in question was a member of the noble house 
 and owed his promotion, at least in part, to that fact, despite our 
 inability to trace his descent with certainty. The same considerations 
 apply to the cases of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Augur and C. Junius 
 Silanus. There remains for consideration only the name of M. Livius 
 Drusus Libo, concerning whom there has been some controversy. 
 Borghesi thinks he was an adopted son of the father of the empress 
 Livia; if so he would have been the descendant (by adoption) of the 
 consular family of the Livii Drusi. Mommsen has questioned this 
 conjecture, 1 but it seems probable that he was connected with the 
 consular family in question, though precisely in what way remains 
 somewhat uncertain. It would seem a not unreasonable conclusion 
 that all five of the men here set down as doubtful were nobles belong- 
 ing to families of consular rank. 
 
 In the period under consideration there occur but three names that 
 suggest no connection whatever with the aristocracy. These new men 
 were 
 
 21 B.C. M. Lollius. 
 
 19 B.C. M. Vinicius. 
 
 16 B.C. L. Tarius Rufus. 
 
 Of these it may be said briefly that the fasti show no such name 
 as Lollius for the previous two hundred years, while we are expressly 
 informed that neither Vinicius nor Rufus was of noble birth. It 
 may also be of interest to note that all three of the new men were 
 soldiers. 
 
 1 B'oth opinions are quoted in the Prosopographia. 
 
APPENDIX 299 
 
 To summarize the results of this analysis for the period, it may 
 be said that of the consuls for this decade two were connected with 
 the imperial house, seven were taken from families o? consular rank, 
 five were probably from such families, two were nobles descended 
 from families of praetorian rank, three were men of marked re- 
 publican affiliations, and only three were new men representing mili- 
 tary distinction rather than birth. 
 
 In the period from 12 B.C. to 1 a.d., inclusive, it is possible to 
 identify a larger number of the consuls as taken from the highest 
 rank of the nobility. The waste of the civil wars had now been to 
 some degree repaired and a new aristocracy was forming, composed 
 of those old families that had survived the period of storm and the 
 descendants of those who had come to the front in the confusion. 
 It will be noted that the number of consuls belonging to these more 
 recently ennobled families was much greater in this period than in 
 the one preceding. In the decade just passed there was but one 
 consul representing this recent nobility, namely C. Furnius. In this 
 period of thirteen years there were at least six and probably seven; 
 namely, C. Caninius Rebilus, A. Asinius Gallus, C. Antistius Vetus, 
 C. Calvisius Sabinus, L. Caninius Gallus, L. Vinicius and probably 
 M. Herennius Picens. In the last case the doubt arises from the 
 fact that, while the family name is new, the gentile name had oc- 
 curred before in the fasti, a certain M. Herennius having been consul 
 in 93 B.C. 
 
 In the thirteen years in question there were thirty-five consuls — 
 
 besides the emperor himself, who held the office on two occasions. 
 
 Of the thirty-five, three were members of the imperial family; 
 
 namely, Nero Claudius Drusus, Tiberius, who held the office a second 
 
 time, and C. Caesar. 
 
 Of the remaining thirty-two, there were at least seventeen who 
 were nobles belonging to families of consular rank; they were as 
 follows: 
 
 12 B.C. C. Caninius Rebilus. Son of cos. 45 B.C. 
 11 B.C. Paullus Fabius Maximus. Son of cos. 45 B.C. 
 10 B.C. C. Julius Antonius. Son of the triumvir. 
 10 B.C. Q. Fabius Maximus Africanus. Son of cos. 45 B.C. 
 8 B.C. C. Marcius Censorinus. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 
 8 B.C. C. Asinius Gallus. Son of cos. 40 B.C. 
 7 B.C. Cn. Calpurnius Piso. Son of cos. 23 B.C. 
 6 B.C. C. Antistius Vetus. Son of cos. 30 B.C. 
 5 B.C. L. Vinicius. Son of cos. 33 B.C. 
 5 B.C. Ser. Sulpicius Galba. Descended from cos. 108 B.C. 
 4 B.C. C. Calvisius Sabinus. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 
 3 B.C. M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus. Son of cos. 31 B.C. 
 2 B.C. L. Caninius Gallus. Son of cos. 37 B.C. 
 1 B.C. Cossus Cornelius Lentulus. Son of cos. 18 B.C. 
 
300 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 1 B.C. L. Calpurnius Piso Augur. Son of cos. 23 B.C. 
 
 1 A.D. M. Herennius Picens. Son of cos. 34 B.C. 
 
 1 A.D. L. Aemilius Paullus. Son of cos. 34 B.C. 
 In addition to these seventeen, there were five others who were 
 probably nobles of consular descent, though their fathers can not 
 be identified so certainly; these five were 
 
 12 B.C. M. Valerius Messalla Barbatus Appianus. 
 
 9 B.C. T. Quinctius Crispinus Sulpicianus. 
 
 5 B.C. L. Cornelius Sulla. 
 
 5 B.C. Sex. Pompeius. 
 
 3 B.C. L. Cornelius Lentulus. 
 Of these, Valerius Messalla has been thought to be a son of the 
 consul for 38 B.C. adopted by the consul for 53 B.C. In any case 
 he was connected by marriage with the imperial family, his wife 
 being Claudia Marcella, the daughter of Augustus' sister Octavia. 
 L. Cornelius Sulla was probably descended from a brother of the 
 dictator and from the Sulla who was elected consul in 66 B.C. but 
 whose election was set aside by the senate. L. Cornelius Lentulus 
 may have been a brother of the consul for 18 B.C.; in any case it 
 seems reasonable to suppose that he was a member of the noble house 
 of the Cornelii Lentuli. T. Quinctius Crispinus Sulpicianus is some- 
 what more doubtful. There was an old patrician family at Rome 
 bearing the name of Quinctius Crispinus; the last of this name to 
 gain the consulship held the office in 208 B.C. However, in 55 B.C. 
 there was a quaestorian senator of this name who may have been the 
 father of the consul for 9 B.C. by adoption. Willems conjectures 
 that the senator in question may have held the praetorship at a later 
 date, 2 and while this seems very probable it can not be called certain. 
 On the whole it seems likely that the consul for 9 B.C. was a member 
 of an old consular family which had not risen above the praetor- 
 ship for many years. Sex. Pompeius also presents some difficulty. 
 It has been suggested that he was a son of the consul for 31 B.C.; 
 if this is correct he was probably a descendant of the consul for 
 88 B.C. and his ancestors had borne the name of Pompeius Rufus. 
 His grandfather's name as given by Klein is inconsistent with this, 
 but the name is very doubtful. If the name be taken as established 
 as Sex. Pompeius Cn.f.Sex.n., then it would seem very possible that 
 he was the son of a younger brother of the consul for 35 B.C. Such 
 a relationship would make him a member of the same family as the 
 great Pompey, he being a descendant of a brother of the triumvir's 
 father. Whatever the exact descent of the consul for 35 B.C., it seems 
 likely that he belonged to a family of consular rank. 
 
 Among the consuls for this period there were three who came from 
 praetorian families; they were 
 
 2 Willems, i, 508. 
 
APPENDIX 301 
 
 12 B.C. L. Volusius Saturninus. 
 
 11 B.C. Q. Aelius Tubero. 
 
 2 B.C. M. Plautius Silvanus. 
 Of these three the case of Aelius Tubero is the most doubtful. A 
 certain L. Aelius Tubero held the praetorship between 66 B.C. and 
 60 B.C. 3 and this consul may have been his descendant. The grand- 
 father of Plautius Silvanus was praetor in 51 B.C., but it is just 
 possible that the family had consular rank, since there was a 
 M. Plautius Hypsaeus who was consul in 125 B.C. However, it 
 would seem rash to assume that there was any relationship between 
 this consul and the M. Plautius Silvanus who held the office in 
 
 2 B.C. 
 
 Among the consuls for the period there occur names of seven men 
 who seem to have been new to the highest office; they were 
 
 12 B.C. P. Sulpicius Quirinius. 
 12 B.C. C. Valgius Rufus. 
 
 9 B.C. A. Caecina Severus. 
 
 6 B.C. D. Laelius Balbus. 
 
 4 B.C. L. Passienus Rufus. 
 
 2 B.C. C. Fufius Geminus. 
 
 2 B.C. Q. Fabricius. 
 Of these seven, five bear gentile names which do not occur in the 
 consular fasti for the preceding two centuries. There had been a 
 consul of the name of Laelius in 190 B.C., but there seems no reason 
 to connect him in any way with the consul for 6 B.C. The Sulpicii 
 were an old and aristocratic family in Rome, but Tacitus expressly 
 informs us that the consul for 12 B.C. was not connected with it. 4 
 To sum up the results of the analysis for this period, it may be said 
 that three of the consuls were members of the imperial family, 
 seventeen were members of noble families of consular rank, five 
 others were probably members of such families, three were probably 
 nobles belonging to families of praetorian rank, and seven were 
 new men. 
 
 In the period from 2 a.d. to 14 a.d. there is a decided increase 
 in the number of new men, but, as the number of the consuls was 
 increased at the same time, it is not accompanied by any decrease 
 in the number of consuls who were taken from the highest rank of 
 the aristocracy. Of the consuls for the period (ignoring one whose 
 name has perished except for the last three letters) we find no less 
 than twenty-two who certainly belonged to consular families, includ- 
 ing one member of the imperial house. These twenty-two were as 
 follows : 
 
 2 a.d. P. Alfenus Varus. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 
 
 2 a.d. P. Vinicius. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 
 
 2 a.d. P. Cornelius Lentulus Scipio. Son of cos. 14 B.C. 
 
 3 Willems, i, 468-69. 
 *Tacitus, iii, 48. 
 
302 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 3 A.D. L. Volusius Saturninus. — Son of cos. 12 B.C. 
 
 3 a.d. P. Silius. Son of cos. 20 B.C. 
 
 4 A.D. C. Sentius Saturninus. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 
 
 4 a.d. Cn. Sentius Saturninus. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 
 
 5 A.D. L. Valerius Messalla Volesus. Son of cos. 29 B.C. 
 
 5 A.D. Cn. Cornelius Cinna Magnus. Grandson of cos. 87 B.C. 
 
 and of the great Pompey. 
 
 6 a.d. M. Aemilius Lepidus. Son of cos. 34 B.C. 
 
 6 a.d. L. Arruntius. Son of cos. 22 B.C. 
 
 7 A.D. A. Licinius Nerva Silianus. Son of cos. 20 B.C. adopted 
 
 by a Licinius Nerva. 
 
 7 A.D. Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Silanus. Adopted son of 
 
 a grandson of cos. 69 B.C. 
 10 a.d. P. Cornelius Dolabella. Grandson of cos. 44 B.C. 
 M\ Aemilius Lepidus. Son of cos. 21 B.C. 
 T. Statilius Taurus. Grandson of cos. 26 B.C. 
 Germanicus Caesar. Member of imperial family. 
 C. Fonteius Capito. Son or grandson of cos. 33 B.C. 
 L. Munatius Plancus. Son of cos. 42 B.C. 
 C. Silius A. Caecina Largus. Son of cos. 20 B.C. 
 Sex. Pompeius. Son of cos. 5 B.C. or grandson of cos. 
 
 B.C. 
 
 Sex. Appuleius. Son of cos. 29 B.C. 
 In addition to these, there were five consuls whose relationships 
 are somewhat doubtful, but who were probably of noble and even of 
 consular descent. These five were the following: 
 2 A.D. T. Quinctius Crispinus Valerianus. 
 
 8 A.D. M. Furius Camillus. 
 10 A.D. C. Junius Silanus. 
 
 10 a.d. Ser. Cornelius Lentulus Maluginensis. 
 
 11 a.d. L. Cassius Longinus. 
 
 Of these five, Quinctius Crispinus has been thought to be an adopted 
 son of the consul for 9 B.C., 5 which from the names seems very 
 likely. Furius Camillus is expressly said by Tacitus to be a de- 
 scendant of the ancient dictator. 6 No member of the family had 
 held the consulship for more than 300 years, however. Just how the 
 Romans would view the revival of claims to nobility so long dormant 
 can not be regarded as quite certain, though from the general temper 
 of the times one might surmise that a man representing so old a 
 house would be welcomed rather than otherwise. Junius Silanus was 
 probably a member of the noble family of that name, but his descent 
 can not be traced with certainty. Cornelius Lentulus Maluginensis 
 was certainly of patrician descent, as is made quite clear by Tacitus, 7 
 and he was probably descended from the old patrician house of that 
 
 11 
 
 A.D. 
 
 11 
 
 A.D. 
 
 12 
 
 A.D. 
 
 12 
 
 A.D. 
 
 13 
 
 A.D. 
 
 13 
 
 A.D. 
 
 14 
 
 A.D. 
 
 
 35 
 
 14 
 
 A.D. 
 
 B Prosopographia. 
 e Tac, ii, 52. 
 7 Tac, iv, 16. 
 
APPENDIX 303 
 
 name. Perhaps he stood in somewhat the same case as Furius 
 Camillus. Cassius Longinus bears a name which seems to connect 
 him with a noble house of plebeian origin. Tacitus says of him :hat 
 he was of a plebeian, but old and respected family. The son of the 
 present consul was banished by Nero because he had among the 
 images of his ancestors one of Cassius the conspirator. 8 This does 
 not make his descent entirely clear, however, since the father of the 
 murderer of Caesar is unknown. At any rate there was a family 
 of the name which had furnished a number of consuls to Rome and 
 the conspirator may very well have been descended from one cf 
 them. Even if this were not the case, a relationship to the "last of 
 the Romans" might seem sufficient claim to noble rank in the eyes of 
 the republican aristocracy, if not in those of Augustus. 
 
 In addition to the nobles mentioned above, there were four consuls 
 who came from families of praetorian rank, namely, 
 3 a.d. L. Aelius Lamia. 
 
 5 a.d. C. Ateius Capito. 
 
 6 a.d. L. Nonius Asprenas. 
 
 8 a.d. Sex. Nonius Quinctilianus. 
 
 Of the remaining consuls, all thirteen should probably be regarded 
 as new men. There is some possible doubt in the case of four of 
 them, however. These four were as follows: 
 
 3 A.D. M. Servilius Nonianus. 
 
 4 a.d. Sex. Aelius Catus. 
 
 9 A.D. Q. Sulpicius Camerinus. 
 10 A.D. Q. Junius Blaesus. 
 
 In the case of the first of these, there was an old gens bearing 
 the name Servilius to which the consul may have belonged, but his 
 relationship is doubtful. The other three all bear gentile names of 
 distinction, but their family names are new to the consular fasti. 
 
 The remaining nine, who were almost certainly new men, were as 
 follows : 
 
 4 a.d. C. Clodius Licinus. 
 
 5 a.d. C. Vibius Postumus. 
 
 7 a.d. Lucilius Longinus. 
 
 8 a.d. L. Apronius. 
 
 8 a.d. A. Vibius Habitus. 
 
 9 a.d. C. Poppaeus Sabinus. 
 
 9 A.D. Q. Poppaeus Secundus. 
 9 a.d. M. Papius Mutilus. 
 12 a.d. C. Visellius Varro. 
 Not only is the family name of these men strange to the consular 
 fasti, but the gentile name as well. The only exceptions to this state- 
 ment would be in case Clodius Licinus were a member of the great 
 Claudian house, with which there seems to be no reason to connect 
 
 8 Tac, vi, 15 and xvi, 7. 
 
304 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 him, or in case the two Vibii were descendants of C. Vibius Pansa, 
 cos. 43 B.C., which it would be rash to assume, but which is just 
 possible. Even if the Vibii in question were so related, it still seems 
 doubtful whether they should be considered nobles. Pansa was not 
 a member of the higher aristocracy and only obtained the consul- 
 ship by virtue of Caesar's appointment. Since then about fifty years 
 had passed and during this time his family had made no particular 
 mark. Under these circumstances it may be doubted whether his 
 descendants would be regarded by the nobles as really belonging 
 to the aristocracy. 
 
 To sum up the results of the analysis for this period, it may be 
 said that twenty-two of the consuls were almost certainly nobles 
 belonging to families of consular rank, including one member of the 
 imperial house, five others were probably nobles of the same rank, 
 or what was regarded as its equivalent, four were members of fami- 
 lies of prateorian rank, and thirteen were new men. 
 
A LIST OF THE CONSULS FROM 30 B.C. TO 14 a.d. ARRANGED 
 ALPHABETICALLY UNDER THEIR GENTILE NAMES 
 
 In the following list the attempt has been made to give such facts 
 as are pertinent to the purposes of the present work concerning each 
 consul. In general the list is based upon the Prosopographia Imperii 
 Romani, but in some few cases facts have been added which are not 
 there given. In these instances a reference has been appended giving 
 the authority for the statement. Where no such indication occurs 
 the facts stated will be found in the Prosopographia with full in- 
 formation as to the original sources. 
 
 For a discussion of the reasons for considering a consul as a noble 
 or a new man, where they are not obvious from the information in 
 this list, the reader is referred to the Analysis of the Consular Fasti 
 in this Appendix. 
 
 Aelius. 
 
 Sex. Aelius Q.f.L.n. Catus. Cos. 4 a.d. Transported 50,000 
 Getae across the Danube into Thrace but at what time is 
 uncertain. 
 
 L. Aelius L.f.L.n. Lamia. Cos. 3 a.d. Fought in Illyricum under 
 Tiberius 4-6 a.d. His father was of praetorian rank. 
 
 Q. Aelius Q.f. Tubero. Cos. 11 B.C. The son of a distinguished 
 jurist. A certain L. Aelius Tubero held the praetorship be- 
 tween 66 and 60 B.C. (Willems, i, 468). 
 Aemilius. 
 
 Q. A6milius M.f.M.n Lepidus. Cos. 21 B.C. Son of the triumvir. 
 
 M'. Aemilius Q.f.M.n. Lepidus. Cos. 11 A.D. Son of the preced- 
 ing. 
 
 M. Aemilius Paulli f.L.n. Lepidus. Cos. 6 a.d. Serving under 
 Tiberius in Pannonia in 8 A.D. Maintained order in Spain 
 14 a.d. Son of cos. 34 B.C. 
 
 L. Aemilius L.f.L.n. Paullus. Cos. 1 a.d. Married the grand- 
 daughter of Augustus. Son of cos. 34 B.C. 
 Alfenus. 
 
 P. Alfenus P.f.P.n. Varus. Cos. 2 A.D. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 
 Antistius. 
 
 C. Antistius Vetus. Cos. 30 B.C. An officer of both Caesar and 
 Augustus. Served as legate in Spain 25 B.C. His father 
 had been propraetor of Spain. 
 
 C. Antistius C.f. Vetus. Cos. 6 B.C. Son of the preceding. 
 Antonius. 
 
 C. Julius Antonius M.f.M.n. Cos. 10 B.C. Son of the triumvir 
 by Fulvia. 
 
306 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Appuleius. 
 
 Sex. Appuleius Sex.f.Sex.n. Cos. 29 B.C. Proconsul in Spain 
 and celebrated a triumph for his victories there in 26 B.C. 
 Son of Octavia, sister of Augustus. Of his father nothing 
 is known beyond the name. 
 M. Appuleius Sex.f. Cos. 20 B.C. Before his consulship, in 
 23 B.C., an officer in the army. His father's name suggests 
 that he was probably a brother of the preceding. 
 Sex. Appuleius Sex.f. Cos. 14 a.d. Son of cos. 29 B.C. 1 
 Apronius. 
 
 L. Apronius C.f.C.n. Cos. 8 A.D. Served under Drusus in Pan- 
 nonia 6-9 a.d. Lieutenant of Germanicus in Germany 14- 
 15 A.D. 
 Arruntius. 
 
 L. Arruntius L.f.L.n. Cos. 22 B.C. Proscribed by the triumvirs 
 he fled to Sextus Pompey but was pardoned by the treaty of 
 Misenum. Commanded part of Octavian's fleet at Actium. 
 L. Arruntius L.f.L.n. Cos. 6 a.d. Tiberius regarded him with 
 suspicion as worthy of the throne. He married a grand- 
 daughter of Pompey (Drumann). Son of cos. 22 B.C. 
 Asinius. 
 
 C. Asinius C.f. Gallus. Cos. 8 B.C. He married Vipsania, the 
 divorced wife of Tiberius. Augustus called him ambitious 
 of the throne but unworthy. Son of C. Asinius Pollio, cos. 
 40 B.C. 
 Ateius. 
 
 C. Ateius L.f.L.n. Capito. Cos. 5 A.D. An eminent jurist he 
 was curator aquarum 13-22 a.d. His father was of prae- 
 torian rank. 
 Caecilius. 
 
 Q. Caecilius Q.f.M.n. Metellus Creticus Silanus. Cos. 7 a.d. 
 Governor of Syria 11-17 a.d. He was probably a descendent 
 by adoption of Q. Metellus Creticus, cos 69 B.C., who was a 
 member of an old consular family. 
 Caecina. 
 
 A. Caecina Severus. Cos. 9 B.C. Governor of Moesia 6 A.D. 
 Legate in Germany 14 A.D. 
 Calpurnius. 
 
 Cn. Calpurnius Cn.f.Cn.n. Piso. Cos. 7 B.C. Governor of Spain 
 
 but at what time is unknown. Son of cos. 23 B.C. 
 L. Calpurnius Cn.f. Piso Augur. Cos. 1 B.C. Another son of 
 
 cos. 23 B.C. 
 Cn. Calpurnius Cn.f.Cn.n. Piso Frugi. Cos. 23 B.C. A bitter 
 republican. He fought against Caesar and later joined 
 Brutus and Cassius. 
 
 1 The Prosopographia and Drumann agree on this relationship. In Klein's edition 
 of the Fasti the name is given Sex. Appuleius Sex. f. Cn. n. which is inconsistent 
 with it. 
 
APPENDIX 307 
 
 L. Calpurnius L.f. Piso Frugi. Cos. 15 B.C. Legate in Pam- 
 phylia 13 B.C. and in Thrace 13-11 B.C. Son of cos. 58 B.C. 
 According to Drumann a brother of Caesar's last wife. 
 Calvisius. 
 
 C. Calvisius C.f. Sabinus. Cos. 4 B.C. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 
 Caninius. 
 
 L. Caninius L.f.L.n. Gallus. Cos. 2 B.C. Son of cos. 37 B.C. 
 
 C. Caninius C.f.C.n. Rebilus. Cos. 12 B.C. Son of cos. 45 B.C. 
 Died in office. 
 Cassius. 
 
 L. Cassius L.f. Longinus. Cos. 11 A.D. His son was banished 
 by Nero because he had an effigy of Cassius, the conspirator, 
 among the imagines of his ancestors. Tacitus says of this 
 consul that he came of a plebeian, but ancient and respected 
 family. 
 Claudius. 
 
 M. Claudius M.f. Marcellus Aeserninus. Cos. 22 B.C. The 
 Claudii Marcelli were an old and distinguished family. 
 
 Ti Claudius Nero. Cos. 13 and 7 B.C. The future emperor 
 Tiberius. Stepson of Augustus. 
 
 Nero Claudius Drusus. Cos. 9 B.C. Younger stepson of Au- 
 gustus. Died in office. 
 Clodius. 
 
 C. Clodius C.f.C.n. Licinus. Cos. 4 A.D. A Roman writer. 
 Cornelius. 
 
 Cn. Cornelius L.f. Magni Pompei n. Cinna Magnus. Cos. 5 
 A.D. Fought against Octavian in the civil war, but was 
 pardoned. In 4 A.D. he conspired against Augustus, but 
 was not only pardoned but given the consulship. A grand- 
 son of Pompey and a descendant of the consul 87-84 B.C. 
 
 P. Cornelius P.f.P.n. Dolabella. Cos. 10 a.d. Governor of Dal- 
 matia 14-18 A.D. Grandson of cos. 44 B.C. 
 
 Cn. Cornelius L.f. Lentulus. Cos. 18 B.C. Legate against the 
 Dacians. With the army in Illyricum in 14 A.D. 
 
 L. Cornelius L.f. Lentulus. Cos. 3 B.C. 
 
 Cossus Cornelius Cn.f. Lentulus. Cos. 1 B.C. Son of cos. 18 B.C. 
 
 Cn. Cornelius Cn.f. Lentulus Augur. Cos. 14 B.C. The word 
 Augur seems to have been a family name and not a title. 
 
 Ser. Cornelius Cn.f. Cn.n. Lentulus Maluginensis. Cos. 10 A.D. 
 A member of a patrician family. (Tacitus, iv, 16). 
 
 P. Cornelius P.f. Lentulus Marcellinus. Cos. 18 B.C. Accord- 
 ing to Drumann a grandson of cos. 56 B.C. 
 
 P. Cornelius Cn.f.Cn.n. Lentulus Scipio. Cos. 2 A.D. Possibly 
 a son of cos. 14 B.C. 
 
 P. Cornelius P.f.P.n. Scipio. Cos. 16 B.C. Son of cos. 38 B.C. 
 His mother was Scribonia, the first wife of Augustus. 
 
308 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 L. Cornelius P.f.P.n. Sulla. Cos. 5 B.C. He was probably de- 
 scended from a brother of Sulla the dictator. 
 Domitius. 
 
 L. Domitius Cn.f.Cn.n. Ahenobarbus. Cos. 16 B.C. Governor 
 of Dalmatia in 9 B.C. He probably succeeded Tiberius in 
 Germany in 6 B.C. and in any case he was in charge there 
 in 2 B.C. He married Antonia Major. Dio (liv) gives his 
 grandfather's name as Gnasus, but this is certainly a mis- 
 take. He was undoubtedly the son of cos. 32 B.C. and grand- 
 son of cos. 54 B.C. 
 Fabius. 
 
 Paullus Fabius Q.f. Maximus. Cos. 11 B.C. Served as legate in 
 Spain before his consulship. A member of a distinguished 
 family. His name would suggest that he was a son of cos. 
 45 B.C. 
 Q. Fabius Q.f. Maximus Africanus. Cos. 10 B.C. A brother of 
 the preceding. 
 Fabricius. 
 
 Q. Fabricius Q.f. Cos. 2 B.C. Perhaps a grandson of Q. Fab- 
 ricius, tribune of the people in 57 B.C. (Willems, i, 493). 
 Fonteius. 
 
 C. Fonteius C.f.C.n. Capito. Cos. 12 a.d. Perhaps a son, or 
 a grandson, of cos. 33 B.C. 
 Fufius. 
 
 C. Fufius Geminus. Cos. 2 B.C. His name is inserted in the 
 fasti for this year by Liebenam, Fasti Consulares. A cer- 
 tain Fufius Geminus was an officer in Pannonia in 35 B.C. 
 Furius. 
 
 M. Furius P.f.P.n. Camillus. Cos. 8 A.D. Tacitus makes him a 
 descendant of the ancient dictator. No member of the family 
 had held the consulship in 300 years. 
 Furnius. 
 
 C. Furnius C.f. Cos. 17 B.C. Before his consulship, in 22 B.C., 
 he served as legate in Spain. His father had been a sup- 
 porter of Antony who was given consular rank by Augustus. 
 Herennius. 
 
 M. Herennius M.f.M'.n. Picens. Cos. 1 A.D. Probably a son of 
 cos. 34 B.C. 
 Junius. 
 
 Q. Junius Blaesus. Cos. 10 a.d. Legate in Pannonia 14 A.D. 
 
 An uncle of Sejanus. 
 M. Junius M.f.D.n. Silanus. Cos. 25 B.C. Proscribed by the 
 triumvirs he fled to Sextus Pompey, but was pardoned by 
 the treaty of Misenum. Later he abandoned Antony for 
 Octavian. Perhaps a grandson of cos. 62 B.C. 
 
APPENDIX 309 
 
 C. Junius C.f. Silanus. Cos. 17 B.C. Perhaps a relative of cos. 
 25 B.C. Smith's Dictionary of Clas. Biog. makes him a 
 cousin. 
 
 C. Junius C.f.M.n. Silanus. Cos. 10 a.d. Perhaps related to 
 
 the preceding. 
 Laelius. 
 
 D. Laelius D.f.D.n. Balbus. Cos. 6 B.C. 
 Licinius. 
 
 M. Licinius M.f.M.n. Crassus. Cos. 30 B.C. Sided at first with 
 Sextus Pompey, then with Antony. Deserting to Octavian 
 he was raised to the consulship without having held the 
 praetorship. Governor of Macedonia in 29 B.C. he con- 
 quered Moesia. A grandson of the triumvir. Groebe makes 
 him a descendant of another branch of the family. 
 M. Licinius M.f. Crassus. Cos. 14 B.C. Son of cos. 30 B.C. 
 The Prosopographia considers this doubtful. Drumann ac- 
 cepted it, but Groebe expressed doubts on the ground of the 
 dates and thought it more likely that he was a grandson of 
 the triumvir. 
 A. Licinius A.f.A.n. Nerva Silianus. Cos. 7 a.d. An officer in 
 the army he died young. Son of P. Silius Nerva (cos. 20 
 B.C.) adopted into another family. 
 Livius. "] 
 
 M. Livius L.f. Drusus Libo. Cos. 15 B.C. Perhaps a descend- 
 ant by adoption of cos. 112 B.C. If so he was the adopted 
 son of the father of the Empress Livia. 
 Lollius. 
 
 M. Lollius M.f. Cos. 21 B.C. Propraetor in Galatia 25 B.C. 
 Legate in Germany in 16 B.C. He had conquered the Bessi 
 in Thrace shortly before (Dio, liv, 20). Accompanied C. 
 Caesar to the East 1 B.C. to 2 a.d. 
 Lucilius. 
 
 Lucilius Longus. Cos. 7 a.d. An intimate friend of Tiberius, 
 he was the only senator who accompanied him to Rhodes. 
 Tacitus (iv, 15) calls him a new man. 
 Lucretius. 
 
 Q. Lucretius Q.f. Vespillo. Cos. 19 B.C. He followed Pompey 
 in the first civil war and was later proscribed by the trium- 
 virs. He was descended from the aedile for 133 B.C. His 
 father was an orator and jurist proscribed by Sulla. (Ap- 
 pian, iv, 44.) 
 Marcius. 
 
 C. Marcius L.f.L.n. Censorinus. Cos. 8 B.C. One of those who 
 accompanied C. Caesar to the East, he died in Asia in 2 
 a.d. Son of cos. 39 B.C. 
 
310 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Munatius. 
 
 L. Muntius L.f.L.n. Plancus. Cos. 13 a.d. Son of cos. 42 B.C. 
 Nonius. 
 
 L. Nonius L.f.L.n. Asprenas. Cos. 6 A.D. A nephew of Varus, 
 he served under him in Germany 7-9 A.D. According to 
 Willems (i, 471) there was a praetor named Nonius Aspre- 
 nas in 62 B.C. 
 Sex. Nonius L.f.L.n. Quinctilianus. Cos. 8 a.d. Perhaps a 
 brother of the preceding. 
 Norbanus 
 
 C. Norbanus C.f.C.n. Flaccus. Cos. 24 B.C. Probably a son of 
 cos. 38 B.C. who had been an officer of the triumvirs. 
 Papius. 
 
 M. Papius M.f.N.n. Mutilus. Cos. 9 a.d. 
 Passienus. 
 
 L. Passienus Rufus. Cos. 4 B.C. 
 Plautius. 
 
 M. Plautius M.f.A.n. Silvanus. Cos. 2 B.C. Served with dis- 
 tinction in Pannonia 6-9 a.d. His grandfather was praetor 
 in 51 B.C. 
 Pompeius. 
 
 Sex. Pompeius Cn.f.Sex.n.? Cos. 5 B.C. Probably son of cos. 
 31 B.C. His grandfather's name is inconsistent with this 
 but it is given only by Klein who regards it as doubtful. 
 If it is correct he might be descended from the father of 
 cos. 35 B.C. 
 Sex. Pompeius Sex.f.Sex.n. Cos. 14 a.d. Drumann made him 
 a son of cos. 35 B.C. Groebe thought him a son of cos. 5 B.C. 
 He was related to Augustus. The length of time would 
 suggest a grandson of cos. 35 B.C. 
 Poppaeus. 
 
 C. Poppaeus Q.f.Q.n. Sabinus. Cos. 9 a.d. Governor of Moesia 
 for twenty-four years, 11-35 a.d. A man of humble birth 
 (Tacitus, vi, 39). 
 Q. Poppaeus Q.f.Q.n. Secundus. Cos. 9 a.d. A brother of the 
 preceding. 
 Quinctilius. 
 
 P. Quinctilius Sex.f. Varus. Cos. 13 B.C. Legate of Syria 6-4 
 B.C. Legate of Germany 6-9 a.d. Grandson of praetor for 
 57 B.C. He was related to Augustus by marriage. 
 Quinctius. 
 
 T. Quinctius T.f. Crispinus Sulpicianus. Cos. 9 B.C. There was 
 an old family named Quinctius Crispinus a member of which 
 had held the consulship in 208 B.C. but they had not been 
 prominent since that time. A certain T. Quinctius Crispinus 
 was a patrician member of the senate in 55 B.C. (Willems, 
 i, 508). 
 
APPENDIX 311 
 
 T. Quinctius T.f.T.n. Crispinus Valerianus. Cos. 2 a.d. Per- 
 haps an adopted son of the preceding. 
 Saenius. 
 
 L. Saenius L.f. Balbinus. Cos. 30 B.C. Perhaps a son of the 
 senator mentioned by Sallust. No one of this gentile name 
 had held the consulship for over two hundred years. 
 Sentius. 
 
 C. Sentius C.f.C.n. Saturninus. Cos. 19 B.C. Proscribed by the 
 triumvirs he fled to Sextus Pompey, but was restored by the 
 treaty of Misenum. Legate of Syria 8-6 B.C. Legate of 
 Germany 4-6 A.D. 
 
 C. Sentius C.f.C.n. Saturninus Cos. 4 a.d. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 
 
 Cn. Sentius C.f.C.n. Saturninus. Cos. 4 a.d. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 
 Servilius. 
 
 M. Servilius M.f. Nonianus. Cos. 3 a.d. Perhaps connected with 
 the senator named Nonnius proscribed by Antony. 
 Sestius. 
 
 L. Sestius P.f.L.n. Quirinus. Cos. 23 B.C. A republican noted 
 for his devotion to Brutus. The son of a senator of prae- 
 torian rank (Willems, i, 481). 
 Silius. 
 
 P. Silius P.f. Nerva. Cos. 20 B.C. Legate in Spain before his 
 consulship. In 16 B.C. he was governor of Illyricum, then 
 a senatorial province, and conquered the Pannonians. His 
 father was of praetorian rank (Willems, i, 473-74). 
 
 P. Silius P.f.P.n. Cos. 3 a.d. Commanded an army in Thrace 
 shortly before his consulship. Son of cos. 20 B.C. 
 
 C. Silius P.f.P.n. A. Caecina Largus. Cos. 13 a.d. Legate in 
 Germany in 14 A.D. and for seven years at the head of 
 the army there. Son of cos. 20 B.C. Why he assumed the 
 additional names is uncertain. 
 
 A. Licinius Nerva Silianus. See Licinius. 
 Statilius. 
 
 T. Statilius T.f. Taurus. Cos. 37 and 26 B.C. A distinguished 
 general of Augustus. Velleius (ii, 127) calls him a new 
 man. 
 
 T. Statilius T.f.T.n. Taurus. Cos. 11 a.d. Grandson of the 
 preceding. 
 Sulpicius. 
 
 Q. Sulpicius Q.f.Q.n. Camerinus. Cos. 9 A.D. 
 
 Ser. Sulpicius C.f. Galba. Cos. 5 B.C. Father of the emperor 
 Galba. The family had been of consular rank since 144 B.C. 
 
 P. Sulpicius P.f. Quirinius. Cos. 12 B.C. He was not related to 
 the old patrician Sulpicii. Born in a municipal town, he 
 rose by military and business talent. Governor of Syria 3-2 
 B.C. He was one of the advisers of C. Caesar in 2 a.d. 
 Governor of Syria again in 6 a.d. (Liebenam, Forschungen) . 
 
312 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Tarius. 
 
 L. Tarius Rufus. Cos. 16 B.C. Of an insignificant family he 
 rose by military merit. Served as an officer at Actium. 
 Terentius. 
 
 A. Terentius A.f. Varro Murena. Cos. 23 B.C. He commanded 
 in the army before his consulship. During his term as 
 consul he was charged with conspiracy against Augustus 
 and was put to death. Perhaps a son of L. Licinius Murena, 
 cos. 62 B.C. adopted by a Terentius Varro. 
 Tullius. 
 
 M. Tullius M.f.M.n.M.pron. Cicero. Cos. 30 B.C. Governor of 
 Syria 27 B.C. Son of the orator. 
 Valerius. 
 
 M. Valerius M.f. Messalla Barbatus Appianus. Cos. 12 B.C. 
 Perhaps a son of Appius Claudius Pulcher, cos. 38 B.C., 
 adopted by M. Valerius Messalla, cos. 53 B.C. He married 
 Claudia Marcella, daughter of Augustus' sister Octavia. 
 He died in office. 
 
 M. Valerius M.f. Messalla Cbrvinu's. Cos. 3 B.C. Governor 
 of Pannonia 6 a.d. Son of cos. 31 B.C. A member of a very 
 distinguished family. His father had held several import- 
 ant posts. 
 
 M. Valerius Messalla Potitus. Cos. 29 B.C. Perhaps a brother 
 of Messalla Corvinus, cos. 31 B.C. If so he was a member 
 of a very distinguished family. 
 
 L. Valerius Potiti f.M.n. Messalla Volesus. Cos. 5 A.D. Son of 
 cos. 29 B.C. 
 Valgius. 
 
 C. Valgius C.f. Rufus. Cos. 12 B.C. A poet and friend of 
 Horace. 
 Vibius. 
 
 C. Vibius C.f.C.n. Postumus. Cos. 5 a.d. Conquered the Dal- 
 matians and received the triumphal ornaments 9 A.D. 
 
 A. Vibius C.f.C.n. Habitus. Cos. 8 a.d. Perhaps a brother of 
 the preceding. 
 Vinicius. 
 
 M. Vinicius P.f. Cos. 19 B.C. Before his consulship he com- 
 manded in Germany in 25 B.C. Afterwards he commanded 
 in Pannonia in 13 B.C. and in Germany in 1 B.C. and 2 A.D. 
 His father was a knight. 
 
 L. Vinicius L.f.M.n. Cos. 5 B.C. Son of cos. 33 B.C. The 
 father of the cos. 33 was a knight (Willems, i, 527). 
 
 P. Vinicius M.f.P.n. Cos. 2 a.d. Served in Thrace shortly be- 
 fore his consulship. Son of cos. 19 B.C. 
 
APPENDIX 313 
 
 Vipsanius. 
 
 M. Vipsanius L.f. Agrippa. Cos. 37 and 28 and 27 B.C. The 
 ablest of the generals of Augustus and later his son-in-law 
 and intended successor. He was a new man. 
 Visellius. 
 
 C. Visellius C.f.C.n. Varro. Cos. 12 A.D. 
 Volusius. 
 
 L. Volusius Q.f. Saturninus. Cos. 12 B.C. Governor of Syria 
 
 4-5 a.d. His family was of praetorian rank. 
 L. Volusius L.f.Q.n. Saturninus. Cos. 3 a.d. Served as a legate 
 of Augustus but where is unknown. Son of the preceding. 
 
LIST OF BOOKS REFERRED TO IN THE NOTES 
 
 In the following list no attempt has been made to enu- 
 merate all the works which have been used in the prepara- 
 tion of this book, still less to make a complete bibliography 
 of the subject. All that has been intended is to give ade- 
 quate information concerning the works referred to in the 
 notes and by this means to avoid frequent repetition of 
 titles without inconveniencing the reader who may wish to 
 verify a statement. 
 
 THE SOURCES 
 
 As the sources referred to have all been published in 
 numerous editions an enumeration of them is unnecessary 
 and it will be sufficient to say that all reference to Appian 
 are to the books on the Civil Wars and all those to Tacitus 
 are to the Annals. Where references have been made to 
 any particular edition this has been included in the list be- 
 low under the name of the editor or translator. 
 
 MODERN WORKS 
 
 Boak, A. E. R. — The Extraordinary Commands from 80 to 
 
 A8 B.C. in the American Historical Review, xxiv. New 
 \ York, 1918. 
 «oak, A. E. R. — A History of Rome to 565 A.D. New York, 
 
 1921. 
 Bouche-Leclercq, A. — Histoire des Lagids. 4 vols. Paris, 
 
 1903-1907. 
 Caspari, M. 0. B. — On the Juratio Italiae of 32 B.C. in the 
 
 Classical Quarterly, v. London and Boston, 1911. 
 Destarac, J. — La Brigue electorate a Rome a la fin de la 
 
 republique. Toulouse, 1908. 
 Dodge, T. A.— Caesar. New York, 1894. 
 Drumann, W. — Geschichte Roms. 2nd. edition edited by 
 
 P. Groebe. Of this edition only 4 vols, have appeared. 
 
 Berlin, 1899. 
 
APPENDIX 315 
 
 V 
 
 V 
 
 Edwards, H. J. — Caesar, The Gallic War. Text and Eng- 
 lish translation in the Loeb Library. New York, 1917. 
 
 Fairley, W. — Monumentum Ancyranum. The Deeds of Au- 
 gustus. Edited by Wm. Fairley in the University of 
 Pennsylvania Translations and Reprints. Philadelphia, 
 1898. 
 
 Ferguson, W. S. — Greek Imperialism. New York, 1913. 
 
 Ferrero, G. — The Greatness and Decline of Rome. 5 vols. 
 London, 1907-1909. 
 V Ferrero, G. — La Ruine de la civilisation antique. Paris, 
 1921. 
 
 Frank, T. — Roman Imperialism. New York, 1914. 
 
 Hartmann, L. M. and Kromayer, J. — Romische Geschichte 
 (Hartmann, L. M. — Welt geschichte in gemeinverstdnd- 
 licher Darstellung) . Gotha, 1919. 
 
 Gardthausen, V. — Augustus und seine Zeit. 3 vols. Leip- 
 zig, 1891-1904. 
 
 Goyau, G. — Chronologie de Vempire romain. Paris, 1891. 
 
 Greenidge, A. H. J. — A History of Rome during the Later 
 Republic and Early Principate. New York, 1905. 
 
 Groebe. — See Drumann. 
 
 Guiraud, P. — Le Differend entre Cesar et le senat. Paris, 
 1878. 
 
 Hardy, E. G. — The Evidence as to Caesar's Legal Position 
 in Gaul, in Journal of Philology, xxxiv. London, 1918. 
 S/Hardy, E. G. — Studies in Roman History. 2 vols. Vol. i, 
 2nd edition. London, 1910-1909. 
 
 Heitland, W. E. — The Roman Republic. 3 vols. Cambridge, 
 1909. 
 
 Hirschfeld, O. — Articles in Klio, iv and v. Leipzig, 1904- 
 1905. 
 
 Holmes, T. R. — Caesar de Bello Gallico. Oxford, 1914. ' 
 
 Holmes, T. R. — Caesar's Conquest of Gaul. 2nd. edition. 
 Oxford, 1911. 
 
 Holmes, T. R. — Hirschfeld and Judeich on the Lex Pompeia- 
 Licinia in the Classical Quarterly, x. London ^and 
 Boston, 1916. 
 
 Holzapfel, L. — Article in Klio, v. Leipzig, 1905. 
 
316 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Sjudeich, W. — Das Ende von Caesars Gallischer Statthalter- 
 
 schaft und der Ausbruch des Biirgerkrieges in the 
 
 Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie, lxviii. Frankfurt, 
 
 1913. 
 Jullian, C. — Histoire de la Gaule. 6 vols, the first three in 
 
 the 3rd. edition. Paris, 1914-1920. 
 Klebs, Dessau, and de Rohden. — Prosopographia. See that 
 
 title. 
 Klein, J. — Fasti Consulares inde a Caesaris Nece usque ad 
 
 Imperium Diocletiani. Leipzig, 1881. 
 Kromayer, J. — Die Vorgeschichte des Kriegs von Actium in 
 
 Hermes, xxxiii and xxxiv. Berlin, 1898-1899. 
 Lange, L. — Romische Altertumer. 3 vols. 2nd. edition. 
 
 Berlin, 1863-1876. 
 Liebenam, W. — Fasti Consulares Imperii Romani. Bonn, 
 
 1909. 
 Liebenam, W. — Forschungen zur Verwaltungsgeschichte 
 
 des romischen Kaiserreichs. I. Die Legaten in den 
 
 romischen Provinzen von Augustus bis Diocletian. 
 
 Leipzig, 1888. 
 McFayden, D. — The Princeps and the Senatorial Provinces 
 
 in Classical Philology^, xvi. Chicago, 1921. 
 Mahaffy, J. P. — A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic 
 
 Dynasty. New York, 1899. 
 Marquardt, J. — Romische Staatsverwaltung. 4 vols, in 
 
 Marquardt and Mommsen, Handbuch der romischen 
 
 Altertumer. 2nd. edition. Leipzig, 1881-1886. 
 Meyer, E. — Caesars Monarchic und das Principat des Pom- 
 
 peius. 2nd. edition. Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919. 
 Meyer, E. — Kleine Schriften. Halle, 1910. 
 Mispoulet, J. B. — La Vie parlementaire a Rome sous la 
 
 republique. Paris, 1899. 
 Mommsen, T. — The History of Rome. New edition. New 
 
 York, 1903. 
 Mommsen, T. — Die Rechtsfrage zwischen Caesar und dem 
 
 Senat. Breslau, 1857. 
 \j ^elham, H. F. — Essays on Roman History. Oxford, 1911. 
 
APPENDIX 317 
 
 Prosopographia Imperii Romani. Vol. i, edited by E. 
 Klebs. Vol. ii, edited by H. Dessau. Vol. iii, edited 
 by P. de Rohden and H. Dessau. Berlin, 1897-1898. 
 
 Reinach, T. — Mithridate Eupator, roi de Ponte. Paris, 
 1890. 
 
 Schwartz, E. — Die Vertheilung der romischen Provinzen 
 nach Cdsars Tod in Hermes, xxxiii. Berlin, 1898. 
 y Shuckburgh, E. S.—The Letters of Cicero. Translated 
 into English by E. S. Shuckburgh. 4 vols, in the 
 Bohn Library. 
 
 Smith, W. (editor). Dictionary of Greek and Roman 
 Biography and Mythology. 3 vols. London, 1880. 
 
 Strachan-Davidson, J. L. — Cicero and the Fall of the Roman 
 Republic. In the Heroes of the Nations series. New- 
 York, 1894. 
 
 Strack, M. L. — Kleopatra in the Historische Zeitschrift, 
 cxv. Munich and Berlin, 1916. 
 
 White, H. — Appian's Roman History. Text and English 
 translation in the Loeb Library. 4 vols. New York, 
 1912-1913. 
 
 Willems, P. — Le Droit public romain. 7th. edition. Lou- 
 vain, 1910. 
 
 Willems, P. — Le Senat de la republique romaine. Sa com- 
 position et ses attributions. 2 vols. Louvain, 1885- 
 1883. 
 
 Winstedt, E. 0.— Cicero, Letters to Atticus. Text and Eng- 
 lish translation in the Loeb Library. 3 vols. New 
 York, 1912-1918. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Actium, campaign of, 215f. 
 
 L. Aelius Lamia, cos. 3 A.D., 259. 
 
 Aemilius, see Lepidus. 
 
 L. Afranius, cos. 60 B.C., in Cisalpine Gaul, 272, 285. 
 
 Africa, annexation of, 15 : province of, 52 ; campaign of Pompey in, 61 ; civil war 
 in, 153, 154 ; governor sends troops to Rome, 184 ; assigned to Lepidus, 194 ; 
 governors hold independent imperium, 238. 
 
 Agrarian commission, of Ti. Gracchus, work of, 40. 
 
 .Agrarian bills — 
 of Flavius, 90f. 
 of RuUus, 80f. 
 
 Agrarian laws — 
 
 of Caesar, 94ff., 271f. ; oath of senators, 271f. ; second agrarian law, 101. 
 of Gracchus, 38f. 
 ^Agriculture, crisis in Italian, 32ff. ; Roman views of, 36f. 
 
 Agrippa, M. Vipsanius, crushes Sex. Pompey, 200 ; represents Augustus in Rome, 
 241, 245 ; sent to Syria, 243 ; in Spain, 243 ; marries Julia, 243 ; recognized as 
 successor of Augustus, 243, 264 ; in Syria, 244 ; death of, 251, 254, 255. 
 
 Ahenobarbus, L. Domitius, see Domitius. 
 /•Alexander the Great, Caesar's wish to rival, 159 ; conquest of East, 204 ; conditions 
 after his death, 205f. ; kingdoms arising from the division of his empire, 205f. 
 
 Alexandria, Caesar in, 153 ; Antony in, 197, 202 ; regency in, 207 ; mob of, 208 ; 
 Donations of, 213f. 
 
 Amnesty, voted by senate after Caesar's death, 169. 
 
 Anarchy in Rome, in 57 B.C., HOff. ; in 54-52 B.C., 122f. 
 
 Ancyra, monument at, quotation from, 226. 
 
 Antigonids, kingdom of, 206. 
 
 Antioch, Antony and Cleopatra at, 202f. 
 
 Antiochus of Syria, 5, 30, 32, 207. 
 
 C. Antonius Hybrida, cos. 63 B.C., 79. 
 
 L. Antonius, brother of the triumvir, in the Perusine war, 195f. 
 
 M. Antonius, triumvir, elected tribune, 140 ; vetoes decrees of senate, 143 ; flees to 
 Caesar's camp, 144 ; spared by conspirators, 164 ; convenes senate, 165 ; speech 
 in senate, 168 note 2 ; funeral oration, 170 ; position of, 171f. ; rallies Caesarians, 
 172f. ; use of Caesar's papers, 173f. ; forgeries of, 174 ; provincial arrangements 
 of, 175f. ; quarrel with Octavian, 177f. ; Macedonian legions desert, 179 ; war 
 around Mutina, 181 ; escapes to Gaul, 183 ; Lepidus and Plancus join, 184 ; 
 coalition with Octavian, 185f. ; second triumvirate, 186 ; share in the proscrip- 
 tion, 187 ; division of empire after Philippi, 192f. ; Perusine war 1 , 196f. ; returns 
 to Italy, 197f., 202 ; treaty of Brundisium, 198 ; marriage with Octavia, 198, 202 ; 
 in Greece, 199, 202 ; war with Parthia, 193, 199, 201, 203f. ; oriental policy, 
 200ff. ; results of Parthian failure, 210 ; adopts policy of Cleopatra, 211 ; marriage 
 with Cleopatra, 212 ; Donations of Alexandria, 213f. ; Roman partisans of, 214 ; 
 letter to senate and will, 214 ; campaign of Actium, 214ff. ; ruin of, 218, 222f. ; 
 devotion of soldiers to, 223. 
 
 Antony, see Antonius. 
 
 Apollonia, Octavian at, 177. 
 
 Appian, his translation of the proscription, 186 ; on health of Octavian, 193. 
 
 L. Appuleius Saturninus, see Saturninus. 
 
 Armenia, conquest of, by Antony, 212 ; ceded to Ptolemies, 213. 
 ^Army 1 , standing, Romans lack, 219f. ; necessity for, 220f., 262f. ; command of, 221, 
 229, 237f. See Military System. 
 
 Aristocracy, see Nobility. 
 
 Arretium, lands of the men of, 90. 
 
320 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Asia, annexation of, 6 note 1, 19 ; province of, 52 ; policy of Lucullus in, 73 note 5 ; 
 assigned to Pompey, 74 ; taxes of, 92, 102 ; retained by Rome under Donations 
 of Alexandria, 213. 
 
 Asia Minor, desire of Seleucids for, 206. 
 
 C. Asinius Gallus, son of C. Asinius Pollio, 247. 
 
 C. Asinius Pollio, see Pollio. 
 
 Assembly, Roman, dominated by urban citizens, 37f. ; 223 ; effect of agricultural crisis 
 on, 41f. ; effect of corn dole on, 42 ; deprived of electoral functions, 258. 
 
 Attalus of Pergamum, will of, 19. 
 
 Atticus, T. Pomponius, warns Cicero of danger of public funeral for Caesar, 169. 
 
 Augustus, restoration of republic, 221ff. ; name of Augustus given to Octavian, 226 ; 
 question of his sincerity, 226f. ; reconciliation with nobility, 229ff., 248 ; com- 
 mander-in-chief of army, 229, 237f. ; proconsular imperium, 231 ; did not extend 
 to senatorial provinces, 235 note 5 ; first form of principate, 234 ; final form of 
 principate, 235f. ; special powers given to, 235 ; avoidance of monarchical forms, 
 237 ; frontier policy, 239ff., 242ff. ; work of organization, 241, 243f ; government 
 of imperial provinces, 242f., 250 ; use of his family in the government, 242f., 
 250 ; use of new men, 244, 255, 257 ; control of elections, 245, 252ff., 260 ; con- 
 sequences, 258, 260 ; policy toward republic, 249ff . ; deaths in imperial family, 
 
 251, 259 ; retirement of Tiberius, 251 ; use of consulars in government, 251, 
 
 252, 253, 254, 259f., 265 ; changes in imperial provinces, 251 ; increase in number 
 of consuls, 255ff. ; last consulships of, 256 ; plan to transfer elections to senate, 
 258 ; final form of government, 260 ; unwillingness to offend senators, 260 ; en- 
 croachments on republic, 260f. ; question of succession, 243, 263f. ; rejects plan of 
 electoral reform, 266 ; achievements, 267. See also Octavian. 
 
 Bassust, P. Ventidius, see Ventidius. 
 
 Bibulus, M. Calpurnius, cos. 59 B.C., elected consul, 94 ; opposes Caesar, 95 ; driven 
 
 from forum, 100 ; convenes senate, 100 ; retires to his house, 101 ; edicts of, 101, 
 
 105 ; date of his retirement, 271f. 
 Bithynia, annexation of, 62 ; assigned to Pompey, 74. 
 Bithynia-Pontus, province of, organized by Pompey, 88. 
 Brundisium, treaty of, 198, 199, 201. 
 Brutus, Decimus Junius, named as heir in Caesar's will, 170 ; province of Cisalpine 
 
 Gaul assigned to, 175 ; establishes himself there, 179f. ; besieged in Mutina, 181 ; 
 
 explanation of Antony's escape, 182 ; soldiers refuse to serve under, 183. 
 Brutus, M. Junius, forced to live at Lanuvium, 174; in the East, 180, 185, 188; 
 
 fails to aid Cicero, 188f. ; defeat and death, 190f. 
 
 Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer, cos. 60 B.C., death of, 180 ; date of death, 271f. ; province 
 assigned to, 272. 
 
 Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, cos. 109 B.C., commands against Jugurtha, 43. 
 
 Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, cos. 80 B.C., sent against Sertorius, 59, 62 ; unable to 
 assist senate, 63. 
 
 Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, cos. 52 B.C., father-in-law and colleague of Pompey, 
 125. 
 
 M. Caelius Rufus, letters to Cicero, 127, 130, 136, 139, 151, 283f., 287, 289f. ; char- 
 acterization of Pompey, 131 note 13 ; joins Caesar, 151. 
 
 C. Caesar, grandson of Augustus, assumes toga virilis, 256 ; death of, 259, 264. 
 
 L. Caesar, grandson of Augustus, assumes toga virilis, 256 ; death of, 259. 
 
 Caesar, C. Julius, propraetor in Spairi, 55 note 1, 93 ; supports Manilian law, 74 ; 
 manager for Crassus, 76 ; early career of, 76 ; supports Catiline, 79 ; agrarian 
 bill of Rullus, 80 ; conspiracy of Catiline, 81ff. ; unable to pass Pompey's bills 
 legally, 86 ; first triumvirate, 93 ; elected consul, 94 ; tries to secure alliance of 
 Cicero, 94 ; his consulship, 94ff., 275ff. ; sanctions banishment of Cicero, 108 ; 
 conquest of Gaul, 109f. ; attacks on, 115 ; renewal of triumvirate at Luca, 116ff. ; 
 death of Crassus, 121 ; fear of nobles of, 94, 96, 121 ; given right to be a candidate 
 in absentia, 125 ; date when his proconsulship ended, 125, 279ff. ; plans for future, 
 
INDEX 321 
 
 125ff., 280f. ; fears of prosecution, 130 ; obligations to army, 131 ; question at 
 issue between him and Pompey, 131 ; demands extension of his proconsulship, 
 135 ; Pompey's threat against, 136 ; elections for 50 B.C., 137 ; buys Curio, 
 138 ; policy of Curio, 139f. ; last offers of compromise, 143 ; war declared 
 on, 143f. ; unprepared for war, 145 ; invasion of Italy, 146 ; Cicero's view 
 of him and his party, 149ff., 156f. ; clemency of, 149ff., 156ff. ; threats 
 against opponents, 150f. ; government of, provisional, 151, 153 ; interview 
 with Cicero, 151 ; expedition to Spain, 152 ; battle of Pharsalia, 152 ; Alex- 
 andrian war, 153 ; campaigns in Africa and Spain, 153, 154 ; problem confront- 
 ing, 154ff. ; character of his party, 155f. ; policy toward senate, 157f. ; increase 
 in number of magistrates, 158 ; plans for conquest of Parthia, 159, 193, 199, 
 201, 203f. ; position and powers, 159f. ; intentions for future, 160 ; resentment 
 of nobles, 161, 230 ; reasons for conspiracy against, 161ff. ; murder of, 163 ; 
 senate dares not declare him a tyrant, 167ff. ; funeral of, 169f. ; will of, 170; 
 conditions after his death, 205 ; relations with Cleopatra, 209 ; suspected of 
 intending to take title of king, 209 ; his use of tribunes, 233. 
 
 Caesarion, son of Cleopatra, 213. 
 
 Calenus, Q. Fufius, general of Antony, 196 ; legions of, 198. 
 
 Caligula, reign of, 266. 
 
 M. Calpurnius Bibulus, see Bibulus. 
 
 L. Calpurnius Piso, cos. 133 B.C., 90. 
 
 Campanian lands, 89f., 101, 115, 118. 
 
 Carthage, destruction of, 15, 30. 
 
 Q. Cassius Longinus, elected tribune, 140 ; vetoes decree of senate, 143 ; flees to 
 Caesar's camp, 144 ; misgovernment in Spain, 156. 
 
 Q. Cassius Longinus, the conspirator, in the East, 180, 185, 188 ; fails to help 
 Cicero, 188 ; defeat and death, 190f. 
 
 Catilina, L. Sergius, candidate for consulship, 79 ; conspiracy of, 81ff. 
 
 Catiline, see Catilina. 
 .jSato-, M. Porcius, the Censor, views on agriculture and ranching, 35f. 
 JZraXo, M. Porcius, character, 89 ; opposes Pompey, 89 ; quarrel with the knights, 92 ; 
 obstructs Caesar's agrarian bill, 95 ; sent to Cyprus, 107 ; influence over con- 
 suls, 115 ; supports sole consulship of Pompey, 124 ; cult of, and Anticato, 157 
 note 58 ; opposition to Vatinian law, 274 ; quoted, 278. 
 
 Censor, power over senate, 7f. ; Crassus as, 76f. ; censorial powers conferred on 
 Caesar, 159. 
 
 Cicero, M. Tullius, supports Manilian law, 74 ; elected consul, 79 ; defeats agrarian 
 bill of Rullus, 81 ; conspiracy of Catiline, 81ff. ; speech on Pompey's agrarian 
 bill, 90 ; refuses to join first triumvirate, 94 ; attitude toward first triumvirate, 
 102ff., 275f. ; banishment of, 107f. ; recall of, lllf. ; attacks Julian laws> 115 ; 
 abandons opposition, 118 ; fear of Caesar's second consulship, 127 ; governor of 
 Cilicia, 127, 130, 136, 287 ; desire for peace, 133f. ; interviews with Pompey, 
 136, 143 ; disapproves of the conduct of the optimates, 142 ; disillusionment with 
 Pompey, 147f. ; fears of a proscription, 149f. ; interview with Caesar, 150, 151 ; 
 opinion of Caesar's party, 150, 155f. ; advantages to Caesar of clemency, 150 ; 
 remark of Caesar concerning, 161 ; attitude toward Caesar, 165 ; conception of 
 the republic, 165ff. ; supports conspirators, 167 ; proposes compromise, 169 ; dis- 
 illusionment of, 174 ; alliance with Octavian, 179ff. ; failure of Brutus and 
 Cassius to support, 1 188f. ; proscribed by triumvirs, 187. 
 
 Cilicia, annexation of, 20, 21 ; province of, 52 ; Pompey in, 72, 74 ; Cicero in, 127, 
 130, 136, 287 ; ceded to Ptolemies, 213 ; imperial province, 237. 
 
 Cimbri and Teutons, conquered by Marius, 45. 
 
 Cinna, L. Cornelius, cos. 87-84 B.C., master of Rome, 48 ; Lepidus tries to imitate, 
 60 ; cruelty of, 149. 
 
 Cisalpine Gaul, annexation of, ,20 ; unaffected by agricultural crisis, 36 ; Crassus at- 
 tempts to extend citizenship to, 77 ; assigned to Caesar, 97, 271 ; importance of, 
 176 ; assigned to D. Brutus, 175 ; transferred to Antony, 176 ; war in, 179ff. ; 
 held by Antony, 184, 194 ; seized by Octavian, 196, 198 ; Afranius governor of, 
 272, 285. 
 
322 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Civil and military functions, union of, 224. 
 
 Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, 201 ; meets Antony, 202 ; makes terms with Antony, 
 
 203 ; policy of, 208ff. ; relations with Caesar, 209 ; marriage with Antony, 212 ; 
 revival of Ptolemaic empire, 213 ; campaign of Actium, 214ff. ; death of, 218. 
 Claudius, see Marcellus. 
 P. Clodius Pulcher, elected tribune, 107 ; banishment of Cicero, 107 ; attacks Pompey, 
 
 111, 114; rivalry with Milo, 123; death of, 123; fears armies of triumvirs, 276. 
 Coele-Syria, ceded to Cleopatra, 203 ; acquired by Ptolemies, 206 ; seized by Antiochus, 
 
 207 ; ceded to Caesarion, 213. 
 Confiscations, necessary to satisfy army, 187, 193, 194. 
 Conscription, for Roman army, 37 ; abandoned by Marius, 44. 
 Conservatives, see Optimates and Nobility. 
 Conspirators against Caesar, retire to Capitol, 164; flee from Rome, 170; senate 
 
 powerless to protect, 174 ; helpless against Antony, 175 ; revival of their hopes, 
 
 176 ; proscribed by Octavian, 185. 
 Consulars, use of, in imperial service, 253ff., 260, 265. 
 Consular tribunes, appointment of, 25. 
 Consules suffecti, 255ff. 
 Consuls, character of, under second triumvirate, 247 ; from 30 to 23 B.C., 248 ; from 
 
 22 to 13 B.C., 248f. ; from 12 B.C. to 1 A.D., 255f. ; from 2 to 14 A.D., 256f. ; term 
 
 shortened, 256ff. 
 -Corn dole, effect of its establishment on the Roman assembly, 42. 
 L. Cornelius,! Cinna, see Cinna. 
 
 Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, see Marcellinus. 
 L. Cornelius Sulla, see Sulla. 
 Corruption at elections, law of Pompey against, 124 ; laws of Augustus against, 
 
 246 ; no legislation after 8 B.C., 258. 
 Corsica, annexation of, 26. 
 Courts, de repetundis, 15 ; composition of, under Sulla, 55 ; knights regain control 
 
 of, 67. 
 Crassus, M. Licinius, general, 59 ; named praetor with command against Spartacus, 
 
 63 ; combines with Pompey and the democrats, 64f. ; character of, 67 ; elected 
 
 consul with Pompey, 67 ; declines proconsulship, 69 ; opposition to Pompey, 75 ; 
 
 political connections, 75 ; censorship of, 76 ; Egyptian project of, 77ff ., 80 ; 
 
 supports Catiline, 79 ; agrarian bill of Rullus, 80 ; conspiracy of Catiline, 81ff. ; 
 
 enmity to Pompey, 86, 87, 106 ; relations with the democrats and knights, 91f. ; 
 
 joins first triumvirate, 92f. ; supports Caesar publicly, 99 ; attitude toward the 
 
 conquest of Gaul, 110; quarrels with Pompey, HOff. ; renewal of triumvirate at 
 
 Luca, 116 ; Syria assigned to, 117, 120 ; second consulship with Pompey, 119 ; 
 
 Parthian war, 120 ; defeat and death, 120. 
 Curia Julia, 226. 
 Curio, C. Scribonius, elected tribune, 138 ; bought by Caesar, 138 ; policy of, 138f. f 
 
 283 ; warning to Cicero, 150 ; death of, 156 ; ovation given to, 276. 
 Cyprus, annexation of, 107 ; ceded to Cleopatra, 203 ; given to Caesarion, 213 ; im- 
 perial province, 237. 
 Cyrene, annexation of, 6 note 1. 
 
 Dalmatia, consular province, 251. 
 
 Danube, natural frontier, 242 ; threatened revolt on, 251. 
 
 Democrats, failure under Gracchi, 42 ; election of Marius, 43 ; Saturninus and 
 Glaucia, 45f . ; Sulpicius Rufus, 47 ; overthrown by Sulla, 47 ; regain power, 47f. ; 
 defeated by Sulla, 48 ; combination with Pompey and Crassus, 65f. ; Crassus 
 seeks leadership of, 75f. ; divided between Pompey and Crassus, 91 ; condemn 
 execution of Catilinarian conspirators, 107 ; incapable of governing, 166f. 
 
 Despotism, tendency toward, under Augustus, 239, 250, 260. 
 
 Dictator, Sulla appointed, 49 ; Caesar appointed, 159. 
 
 Dio Cassius, on imperial provinces, 261 ; on reluctance of Augustus to offend the 
 senators, 261. 
 
INDEX 323 
 
 Domitian, reign of, 266. 
 
 L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, candidate for consulship, 115. 
 
 Donations of Alexandria, 213, 214. 
 
 Drusus, stepson of Augustus, in Rhaetia and Illyricum, 244 ; death of, 251, 254, 256. 
 
 Dyarchy, 237. 
 
 East, fascination for Romans, 204f. ; political structure of its states, 205ff. 
 
 Egypt, bequeathed to Rome, 19, 77, 80 ; senate rejects bequestt 7 note 2, 19 ; designs 
 of Crassus on, 77ff., 80 ; Pompey desires a commission to restore king, 113, 114, 
 116 ; Ptolemies in, 206ff. ; easy of defense, 211 ; imperial province, 237. 
 
 Elbe river, natural frontier, 242 ; reached by Romans, 250f. 
 
 Elbe-Danube frontier, reached by Romans, 250 ; troubles on, 259. 
 
 Elections, for 53 B.C., 123; for 52 B.C. impossible, 123; for 50 B.C., 137; difference 
 between those for consul and for tribune, 137f. ; for 49 B.C., 140 ; right of 
 princeps to preside at, 235 ; power of princeps over, 245, 252ff., 258, 260 ; plan 
 to transfer them to senate, 258; plan for electoral reform, 266f. 
 
 Electoral corruption, see Corruption. 
 
 Electoral reform, plan of, rejected by Augustus, 266f. 
 
 Emperor, derivation of title, 237 note 1 ; see Augustus and Princeps. 
 
 Empire, improvement in provincial government under, 264f . ; liberty under, 265 ; 
 tyranny under, 265f. 
 
 Epirus, Antony and Octavian meet in, 215. 
 
 Etruria, economic changes in, 36 ; rebellion of Lepidus in, 60. 
 
 Expansion, intermittent character of Roman, 4f. ; opposed by senate, 5f.> 13ff. ; 
 opposed by Augustus, 239ff. 
 
 Fasti, consular, 246f. ; see also tables in Appendix. 
 
 Ferrero, opinion on civil war, 145 note 34; explanation of Vatinian law, 271ff. 
 
 First Punic War, see Punic wars. 
 
 First Triumvirate, see Triumvirate. 
 
 L. Flavius, tribune, agrarian bill of, 90. 
 
 Foreign affairs, control of, by princeps, 238. 
 
 Frontier policy of Augustus* 241ff., 250ff. 
 
 Q. Fufius Calenus, see Calenus. 
 
 Fulvia, wife of Antony, part in Perusine war, 195f. ; death of, 198. 
 
 Gabinian law, 7 Off., 74, 98. 
 
 A. Gabinius, tribune, 70, 71f. 
 
 Gardthausen, criticism; of Augustus, 227. 
 
 Gaul, provinces of, 52 ; conquest of, 109f. ; Caesar's proconsulship in, prolonged, 126, 
 
 279ff. ; assigned to Antony, 186, 194 ; seized by Octavian, 196, 198 ; consequences 
 
 of conquest of, 220f. ; organization of, 241. See also Cisalpine and Transalpine 
 
 Gaul. 
 Germanicus, 264. 
 Germans, threaten Gaul, 221, 242 ; campaign of Drusus against, 244 ; defeat of 
 
 Varus by, 259. 
 Glaucia,, C. Servilius, 45, 96 note 14. 
 Governors* see Provincial governors. 
 Gracchus, C. Sempronius, career of 42 ; law concerning juries, 55 ; aims of, 68, 166 ; 
 
 law concerning the consular provinces, see Sempronian law. 
 Gracchus, Ti. Sempronius, horrified at conditions in Etruria, 36 ; agrarian law of, 
 
 38f. ; opposition to, 40ff., 71 ; death of, 40 ; results of his career, 41. 
 Great commands, 21f., 32, 56 ; only method of carrying on important wars, 228 ; 
 
 danger to state, 229. 
 Greece, Rome involved in, 31 ; Antony in, 199. 
 
 Hannibal, war with, 26fJ, 30. 
 
 Helvetians, migration of, 109. 
 
 A. Hirtius, cos. 43 B.C., 180 ; death of, 182 ; quotation from, 288f. 
 
324 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Illyricum, assigned to Caesar, 108 ; Silius governor of, 244 ; Tiberius in, 244 ; trans- 
 ferred to emperor, 251. 
 Imperator, titles 237 note 1. 
 
 Imperium, meaning of term, 8 note 4 ; see Proconsular imperiwm. 
 Italian allies, obtain citizenship, 46. 
 
 Jugurtha, war against, 43. 
 
 Julia, daughter of Augustus, 243. 
 
 Julia, daughter of Caesar, 104, 120. 
 
 C. Julius Caesar, see Caesar. 
 
 C. Julius Caesar Octavianus, see Octavian and Augustus. 
 
 Junius, see Brutus. 
 
 King, Caesar suspected of desiring title, 209 ; Roman hatred of name, 224. 
 
 Knights, ranged against senate by C. Gracchus, 42 ; deprived of courts by Sulla, BO ; 
 regain control of courts, 67 ; quarrel with Lucullus, 73 note 5 ; breach with sen- 
 ate, 92 ; turn against triumvirs, 105 ; victims of proscription, 187. 
 
 Kromayer, view of campaign of Actium, 216f., 218 note 23. 
 
 T. Labienus, deserts Caesar, 145. 
 
 Lagids, see Ptolemies. 
 
 Lamia, L. Aeliusi, see Aelius. 
 
 Lanuvium, town in Latium, 174. 
 
 Law, martial, senate dares not declare, 100 ; declared by consuls, 141 ; reign of law 
 demanded by public opinion, 224f. 
 
 Laws, of Antony concerning the provinces, 176 ; of Augustus concerning elections, 246 ; 
 Gabinian, 70ff., 74, 98 ; Manilian, 74, 84, 228, 281 ; Ovinian, 7 ; of Pompey concern- 
 ing elections, 124 ; of Pompey concerning the magistrates, 129 ; of Pompey con- 
 cerning the provinces, 129 ; effect of Pompey's laws on Caesar, 130 ; of Pompey 
 and Crassus prolonging Caesar's proconsulship, 226, 279ff. ; of Octavian against 
 murderers of Caesar (Lex Pedia) , 185; Sempronian, concerning the consular 
 provinces, see Sempronian ; of ten tribunes, 125, 280 ; Trebonian, 282 ; see also 
 Agrarian laws and Vatinian law. 
 
 Lepidus, M. Aemilius, cos. 78 B.C., 60 ; revolt of, 60, 96 note 14, 99. 
 
 Lepidus, M. Aemilius, triumvir, commands army in Gaul, 183 ; joins Antony, 184 ; 
 second triumvirate, 186 ; left in charge of Italy, 188 ; forced to exchange prov- 
 inces, 194 ; in Africa, 198 ; called to Sicily and deposed, 200, 202. 
 
 Lex Manilla, see Manilian law. 
 
 Lex Pompeia-Licinia, 226, 279ff. 
 
 Lex Trebonia, 282. 
 
 Lex Vatinia, 271ff. ; see also Vatinian law. 
 
 Liberty, Romans not desirous of, in modern sense, 223f. ; under empire, 265. 
 
 Libya, ceded to Caesarion, 213. 
 
 M. Licinius Crassus, see Crassus. 
 
 L. Licinius Lucullus, see Lucullus. 
 
 Liguria, troubles in, 20. 
 
 M. Lollius, legate of Augustus, 244. 
 
 Luca, renewal of triumvirate at, 117ff., 120, 280, 281f. 
 
 Lucullus, L. Licinius, cos. 74 B.C., early career, 59 ; given command against Mith- 
 ridates, 62, 228 ; war with Mithridates, 72f. ; quarrel with knights, 73 note 5 ; 
 enmity to Pompey, 86, 87. 
 
 Macedonia, annexation of, 5, 15 ; province of, 52 ; Cicero cedes province to Antonius, 
 79 ; assigned to Antony by Caesar, 175 ; seized by M. Brutus, 188 ; kingdom of 
 Antigonids in, 206. 
 
 Macedonian legions, transferred to Gaul, 176 ; desert Antony, 179. 
 
 Mahaffy, on Donations of Alexandria^ 213. 
 
 Manilian law, 74, 84, 228, 231. 
 
INDEX 325 
 
 Marcellinus, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, cos. 56 B.C., 115. 
 
 Marcellus, C. Claudius, cos. 50 B.C., 140; action in senate, 140; declaration of martial 
 
 law, 141. 
 Marcellus, M. Claudius, cos. 51 B.C., 130 note 11, 135f. 
 Marcellus, M. Claudius, destined successor of Augustus, 264. 
 C. Marius, elected consul, 43; military reforms of, 44, 85; conquers Cimbri and 
 
 Teutons, 45; political career, 45; in social war, 46; attempt to supersede Sulla, 
 
 47 ; regains power in Rome, 47. 
 Martial law, see Law. 
 Media; given to Ptolemies, 213. 
 Mercenaries, Greek, used by Ptolemies, 207f. 
 C. Messius, tribune, bill of, 113. 
 Metellus, see Caecilius. 
 Military system, early, 23 ; changes in, 24f., 32 ; reforms of Marius in, 44, 85 ; after 
 
 Sulla, 53f. ; union of civil and military functions, 224. 
 Mile, T. Annius, tribune, leads riots against Clodius, 112ff. ; rivalry with Clodius, 123 ; 
 
 murder of Clodius, 123; trial and banishment, 124. 
 Misenum, treaty of, 199. 
 
 Mithridates, king of Pontus, wars with, 46, 62, 72, 228. 
 Moesia, conquest of, 242 ; consular province, 251. 
 P. Mucius Scaevola, cos. 133 B.C., 90. 
 L. Munatius Plancus, see Plancus. 
 Munda, battle of, 153, 192, 199. 
 Mutina, war around, 181f. 
 
 Names, Roman family, 247. 
 
 Narbonensis, see Transalpine Gaul. 
 
 Nero, reign of, 266. 
 
 New men, Marius one, 43; Cicero one, 79; rarely reach consulship under republic, 
 
 246 ; common in consulship under triumvirs, 247 ; use in government under 
 
 Augustus, 244, 255, 257. 
 Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, 62. 
 Nobility, development of, 9ff. ; control of assembly, 41 ; weakened by Gracchi, 41ff. ; 
 
 seek to regain power after Caesar's death, 166ff. ; reaction in favor of, 225, 246ff. '; 
 
 character of, 246, 252 ; reconciliation with Augustus, 229ff ., 248f. ; little used by 
 
 Augustus, 243, 253f. ; compensations for decline of republic, 260f. 
 Noricum, conquest of, 244. 
 Numidia, assigned to Lepidus, 194. 
 
 Octavia, sister of Augustus, marriage with Antony, 198, 199, 202 ; remains in Italy, 
 202 ; sent back to Italy, 210 ; failure of Antony to divorce, 212. 
 
 Octavian, relationship to Caesar, 176; adopted in Caesar's will, 177; quarrel with 
 Antony, 177f. ; assumes name of Caesar, 178 ; raises army, 178 ; Macedonian 
 legions join, 179 ; alliance with Cicero, 179 ; war around Mutina, 181f. ; brealc 
 with senate, 182ff. ; elected consul, 185 ; combines with Antony, 185 ; second tri- 
 umvirate, 186 ; share in the proscription, 187f. ; division of empire after Philippi, 
 192ff. ; returns to Italy, 194 ; Perusine war, 195f. ; seizes Gaul, 196 ; tries to avoid 
 war with Antony, 197; treaty of Brundisium, 198; relations with Sex. Pompey, 
 199f. ; deposition of Lepidus, 200 ; treaty of Tarentum, 202 ; evades terms of 
 treaty, 210 ; Pannonian campaign, 212 ; Donations of Alexandria, 214 ; position 
 of, 215 ; campaign of Actium, 215ff. ; problems confronting, after Actium, 219ff. ; 
 sole commander of army, 219, 221 ; character, 223 ; restoration of republic, 225 ; 
 name of Augustus given to, 226. See also Augustus. 
 
 C. Octavius, see Octavian and Augustus. 
 
 M. Octavius, tribune 133 B.C., 40. 
 
 Optimates, fear of Caesar, 94, 96, 121 ; anger against Pompey, 99, 122 ; alliance 
 with Clodius, 111, 112 ; Pompey's attempt to conciliate, 113f. ; overconfidence of, 
 115 ; alliance with Pompey, 121ff. ; opposition to war, 133f. ; favor compromise 
 with Caesar, 141 ; flee from Rome, 147 ; majority in senate under Caesar, 157. 
 
 Ovinian law, 7. 
 
326 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Pannonia, campaign of Octavian in, 212 ; conquest of, 242, 243, 244 ; consular prov- 
 ince, 251 ; revolt in, 259. 
 
 Pansa, C. Vibius, cos. 43 B.C., 180 ; death of, 182. 
 
 Parthia, war of Crassus with, 120 ; threatened war with, 140 ; Caesar's plans for 
 conquest of, 159, 193, 199, 201 ; Antony's campaign against, 202ff. ; promised 
 to Ptolemies, 213 ; danger from, 220 ; policy of Augustus toward, 240. 
 
 Parthian legions, withdrawn from Caesar's army, 140 ; Pompey takes command of, 
 141 ; untrustworthy, 147. 
 
 Parthians, invade Syria, 197, 198, 201 ; checked by Antony's officers, 199. 
 
 Patricians, struggle with plebeians, 25. 
 
 Perseus, king 1 of Macedon, 5. 
 
 Perusia, city in Italy, 195, 196. 
 
 Perusine war, 195f., 201, 202. 
 
 Phalaris, Greek tyrant, 149. 
 
 Pharsalia, battle of, 152, 153, 154, 199 ; Cicero regards it as decisive, 165. 
 
 Philip V of Macedon, 30 ; war witbi 31 ; seizes possessions of Ptolemies, 207. 
 
 Philippi, battle of, 190, 192, 202. 
 
 Phoenicia, ceded to Ptolemies, 213 ; imperial province, 237. 
 
 Pirates, growth of, 69 ; stop grain ships, 70 ; war of Pompey with, 72. 
 
 Pisistratus, Greek tyrant, 149. 
 
 Plancus, L. Munatius, commands army in Gaul, 183 ; joins Antony, 184 ; two legions 
 desert, 196. 
 
 Plebeians, struggle with patricians, 25. 
 
 Plutarch, testimony of, as to devotion of Antony's soldiers, 222f. 
 
 Po, valley of, see Cisalpine Gaul. 
 
 Pollio, C. Asinius, quoted, 130 ; father of Asinius Gallus, 247. 
 
 Pompeia-Licinia, Lex, 226, 279ff. 
 
 Pompeian party, see Optimates. 
 
 Cn. Pompeius Magnus, general, 59 ; crushes revolt of Lepidus, 60f ., 99 ; early career 
 of, 60f . ; sent against Sertorius, 62 ; recalled to Italy, 63 ; coalition with Crassus 
 and the democrats, 64f. ; character of, 65f. ; joint consulship with Crassus, 67 ; 
 Gabinian law, 70 ; war with pirates, 72 ; Manilian law, 74 ; disbands his army, 
 83, 84 ; policy of, 84ff. ; ratification of his eastern acta, 85ff., 101 ; opposition of 
 senate, 86ff. ; agrarian bill, 90 ; joins first triumvirate, 92f. ; threatens force in 
 support of Caesar's measures, 99 ; attitude of, during Caesar's consulship, 103ff. ; 
 marriage with Julia, 104 ; affair of Vettius, 106 ; supports assignment of Trans- 
 alpine Gaul to Caesar, 108f. ; attitude toward Caesar's conquest of Gaul, 110 ; 
 quarrel with Crassus, 110 ; recall of Cicero, 111 ; quarrel with Clodius lllff. ; 
 employs Milo, 112 ; charge of grain supply, 113 ; designs on Egypt, 113 ; position 
 in Rome, 115 ; renewal of triumvirate at Luca, 117 ; Spain assigned to, 117 ; 
 elected consul for second time with Crassus, 119 ; death of Julia, 120 ; effect of 
 Crassus' death on his position, 121 ; alliance with optimates, 121f. ; governs Spain 
 from Italy, 122, 231 ; sole consul, 123f. ; measures of, 124 ; marries again, 124f. ; 
 chooses father-in-law as colleague, 125 ; law of ten tribunes, 125 ; fear of Caesar, 
 127f., 283 ; laws of, 129f. ; intention of prosecuting Caesar, 130 note 13 ; question 
 at issue between Caesar and, 131 ; renews command in Spain, 132 ; difficulties 
 with optimates, 133f. ; attitude uncertain, 136 ; declares attitude, 136f. ; attitude 
 in 50 B.C., 139f. : illness of, 139, 146 ; desires war, 143 ; plan of campaign, 145f. ; 
 abandons Rome, 147 ; retreats to East, 148 ; threatens a proscription, 150 ; battle 
 of Pharsalia, 152 ; death of, 153 ; position under Manilian law 1 , 229 ; Augustus his 
 heir, 231 note 4 ; use of tribunes, 233 ; conquests of, 239f. ; son of Pompeius 
 Strabo, 247. 
 
 Sex. Pompeius Magnus, son of Pompey, 199 ; early career, 199 ; seizes Sardinia and 
 Sicily, 199; overthrow and death, 200, 202, 210. 
 
 Cn. Pompeius Strabo, father of Pompey, 247. 
 
 Pompey, see Pompeius. 
 
 T. Pomponius Atticus, see Atticus- 
 
 Pontifex Maximus, office held by Caesar, 159. 
 
INDEX 327 
 
 Porcius, see Cato. 
 
 Praefectus morum, censorial powers given Caesar under 1 title of, 159. 
 
 Praetors, increase in number, 8ff. ; objections to further increase, 12; increase under 
 
 Sulla, 21 ; establishment of, 25f . ; increase in number under Caesar, 168 ; under 
 
 Augustus, 239. 
 Princeps, meaning of term, 232 ; relations to republic, 232ff. 
 
 Principate, meaning of term, 226 ; first form of, 234 ; changes in, 234f. ; trans- 
 formation of, 236f. 
 Proconsul, meaning of term, 15, 26 ; term of office lengthened to two years by 
 
 Caesar, 238. 
 Proconsular imperium of Augustus, conferred on him, 231, 235; powers implied 
 
 in, 237f. ; renewals of, 241, 242. 
 Promagistracy, origin of, 15 ; used to govern provinces, 16f. ; defects of system, 17 ; 
 
 advantages, 17f., 29. 
 Propraetor, meaning of term, 15. 
 Proscription, fears of, from Caesar, 149f. ; threatened by Pompey, 150; of second 
 
 triumvirate, 186f., 224, 247. 
 Protection, impossible in Rome, 37f. 
 Provinces, under early republic, 4-22; arrangements of Sulla for their government, 
 
 52; problem presented by new provinces, 88f. ; increase in number under later 
 
 republic, 158 ; division between senate and emperor, 237 ; changes in division, 
 
 239 ; improvement in government of, under empire, 264f. 
 Provinces, consular, increase in number under Augustus!, 251; see also Sempronian 
 
 law. 
 Provinces, imperial, names of, 237. 
 Frovinces, senatorial, 239. 
 Provincial governors, objections to direct election of, 13; objections to prolonging 
 
 term of, 18f., 88f. 
 Ptolemies, character of their empire, 206ff. ; military weakness of, 207f ; revival of 
 
 their empire, 213. 
 Ptolemy I, general of Alexander, 206. 
 Ptolemy XII Alexander II, will of, 19,, 77, 80. 
 Public opinion, against civil war, 132f. ; turns in favor of Caesar, 144, 146; effect 
 
 of Pompey's flight on, 148f. ; leads to peace of Misenum, 199 ; turns in favor of 
 
 Octavian, 214; influence of, 221f. ; demands of, after Actium, 221f. ; reaction in 
 
 favor of nobility, 225. 
 Punic warsi First, 26; Second, 26f., 207. 
 Pydna, battle of, 5. 
 
 Quaestors, increase in number, 8f. ; place of office in Roman public life, 9; mem- 
 bership in senate, llf. ; objections to increase in number, 12 ; increase in number 
 under Caesar, 158. 
 
 P. Quinctilius Varus, see Varus. 
 
 Republic, Roman, aristocratic in fact, 10 ; Cicero's conception of, 165f. ; popular de- 
 mand for restoration of, aften Actium, 221ff . ; Roman law bound up with, 224 ; 
 restoration of, by Augustus, 225f. ; great commands not inconsistent with, 229; 
 relation of, to princeps, 232f., 245, 250 ; reality of restoration, 245 ; decline of, 
 under Augustus, 260ff. 
 
 Republicans, promoted by Augustus, 249. 
 
 Rex, Roman hatred of word; 224. 
 
 Rhaetia, conquest of, 244. 
 
 Rhine frontier, insecurity of, 221, 242. 
 
 Rubicon, crossing of, 146. 
 
 Rullus, P Servilius, tribune, agrarian bill of, 80. 
 
 Samnium, unaffected by agricultural crisis, 36. 
 
 Sardinia, annexation of, 8, 26 ; province of, 52 ; assigned to Octavian, 186 ; seized 
 by Sex. Pompey, 199. 
 
328 THE FOUNDING OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Saturninus, L. Appuleius, 45, 96 note 14. 
 C. Scribonius Curio, see Curio. 
 Second Macedonian War, 5. 
 Second Punic War, see Punic. 
 Second triumvirate, see Triumvirate. 
 Seleucids, dynasty of, 206. 
 Seleucus, general of Alexander, 206. 
 
 Sempronian law concerning the consular provinces, 62 note 3, 96, 228, 273 ; protects 
 Caesar in Gaul, 126, 280; repealed by Pompey, 129, 138, 280f., 286f. ; veto of 
 tribunes under, 273 note 10. 
 Sempronius, see Gracchus. 
 
 Senate, opposed to expansion, 5f., 13f . ; composition of, in early times, 7f. ; right to 
 prolong imperium, 15f. ; assignment of provinces by, 16, 52f., 56 note 2 ; size 
 increased by Sulla, 21 ; position of, in government, 39 ; control of courts by, 
 55, 67 ; quarrel with Pompey, 86ff. ; breach with knights, 92 ; opposition to 
 Caesar's agrarian law, 95 ; favors, compromise between Caesar and Pompey, 141 
 declares war on Caesar, 143f. ; flees from Rome, 147 ; hostile to Caesar, 157 
 identified with republic by Cicero, 166 ; session of, after Caesar's murder, 167ff. 
 powerlessness of, 174 ; alliance with Octavian, 181 ; breach with Octavian, 182f. 
 vital weakness of, 227 ; creation of great commands' by, 228 ; see also Optimates 
 and Nobility. 
 Senators, average duration of life of, 11 note 6 ; reluctance of Augustus to offend, 261. 
 L. Sergius Catilina, see Catilina. 
 Q. Sertorius, war with, 59, 62, 63^ 70. 
 C. Servilius Glaucia, see Glaucia. 
 P. Servilius Rullus, see Rullus. 
 'Sicily, annexation of, 8, 26; revenue system in, 33; province of, 52; Pompey in, 61; 
 assigned to Octavian, 186 ; seized by Sex. Pompey, 199 ; war in, 200. 
 P. Silius, governor of Illyricum, 244. 
 Soldiers, payment of, 28 ; extension of term of service, 28 ; attitude toward Antony's 
 
 eastern policy, 21 Iff. ; influenced by public opinion, 222 ; see also Veterans. 
 Spain, annexation of, 9 ; wars in, 28f., 153 ; provinces of, 52 ; military force stationed 
 in,* 55 note 1 ; revolt of Sertorius in, 59, 62, 63, 70 ; Caesar propraetor in, 93 ; 
 assigned to Pompey, 117 ; retained by Lepidus, 186 ; transferred to Octavian, 
 194 ; Sex. Pompey in, 199 ; pacified by Augustus, 241 ; Agrippa suppresses revolt 
 in, 243. 
 Spartacusi, revolt of, 62f. 
 
 Special powers conferred on Augustus, 235, 245, 262. 
 Succession, imperial, question of, 243, 263f. 
 
 Sulla, L. Cornelius, reforms of, 21 ; early career of, 46 ; marches on Rome, 47 ; war 
 with Mithridates, 48 ; civil war, 48 ; dictator, 49 ; constitutional reforms; 50f., 52f., 
 58f. ; death of, 51, 59, 60 ; weakness of his constitution, 58f. ; its overthrow, 63ff. ; 
 lands confiscated by, 90 ; rapacity of, mentioned by Cicero, 149. 
 P. Sulpicius Rufus, 47. 
 
 Syria, annexation of, 88 ; assigned to Crassus, 117 ; seized by Cassius, 188 ; Parthians 
 invade, 197f., 201 ; Antony in, 202 ; Seleucid dynasty in, 206 ; consequences to 
 Rome of its annexation, 213f., 220 ; ceded to the Ptolemies, 213 ; imperial prov- 
 ince, 237f. ; Agrippa in, 243, 244 ; consular province, 251. 
 
 Tarentum, treaty of, 202, 210. 
 
 Tarraconensis, consular province, 251 ; see Spain. 
 Tarsus, Cleopatra summoned to, 202. 
 Tellus, Temple of, meeting of senate in, 165, 167ff. 
 Teutons, see Cimbri. 
 Thapsus, battle of, 154, 192. 
 
 Tiberius, stepson of Augustus, in Rhaetia and Illyricum, 244 ; consul, 248 ; retire- 
 ment to Rhodes, 251, 254, 256 ; return to public life, 259 ; reign of, 266. 
 
INDEX 329 
 
 Transalpine Gaul, annexation of, 5f. ; assigned to Caesar by senate, 108 ; Caesar's 
 
 position in, 116f. ; held by Lepidus, 186 ; transferred to Antony, 194 ; Metellus 
 
 Celer governor of, 272. 
 Trebonian law, 282. 
 
 C. Treboniua, one of the conspirators, travels to his province by by-roads, 174. 
 Tribunes, deposition of, 40, 71 ; powers restricted by Sulla, 50 ; restored by Pompey 
 
 and Crassus, 67 ; used by Pompey and Caesar to protect their interests, 233. 
 Tribunician power, conferred on Caesar, 169 ; conferred on Augustus, 234 ; limitations 
 
 on, 235 ; receives increased stress, 235. 
 Triumvirate, first, formation of, 93ff. ; character of^ 110 ; temporary break up of, 
 
 HOff. ; renewal of, at Luca, 117ff., 120 ; break up of, 120f. 
 Triumvirate, second, formation of, 186 ; proscription, 186f. ; problems confronting, 
 
 after Philippi, 192f. ; division of empire, 193f. ; Lepidus deposed, 200 ; renewal of, 
 
 202; end of, 219. 
 M. Tullius Cicero, see Cicero. 
 
 Umbria, unaffected by agricultural crisis, 36. 
 Uxellodunum, siege of, 288. 
 
 Varus, P. Quinctilius, defeat of, 259. 
 Vatinian law, 97f., 108, 109, 126, 271ff. 
 P. Vatinius, tribune, 97, 98. 
 Veii, siege of, 28. 
 
 P. Ventidius Bassus, officer of Antony, repels Parthians, 201, 202. 
 Vercingetorix, revolt of, 129, 133, 135. 
 
 Veterans of Pompey, agrarian bill for the benefit of, 89ff. ; Caesar proposes bill 
 y" for, 94 ; support Caesar, 98 ; do not respond to Pompey's appeal at outbreak of 
 
 civil war, 147. 
 Veterans of Caesar, lands assigned to, 168 ; intimidate senate, 169 ; distrust of 
 
 senate, 171f. ; power of, 172 ; rally around Octavian, 178 ; only material available 
 
 for army, 180 ; reluctant to fight each other, 182, 185f. ; interests of, ignored 
 
 by senate, 183. 
 L. Vettius, informer, 106. 
 Volaterrae, lands of the men of, 90. 
 
 "War-lord, Augustus as Roman; 238, 239, 263. 
 
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