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AWAKE! U.S.A.
WILLIAM FREEMAN
AWAKE! U.S.A.
ARE WE IN DANGER?
ARE WE PREPARED?
By
WILLIAM FREEMAN
AUTHOR OF
"are we prepared ? " ETC., ETC.
NEW YORK
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
COPYRIGHT, I916,
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
FKQtTEO m TS£ XnUXm STATES 01 AKSUCA
y
f
m -6 1916
0)Cl,A433274
DEDICATION
Dedicated to every man and woman who is up-
lifted and inspired — not by the example of Peter
who, as the cock crew, bought 'peace at the price of
denying his Master' — but by the spirit and sacrifice
of Saint Peter suffering martyrdom under Nero at
Rome.
CONTENTS
Part One: Are We in Danger?
CHAPTER PAGE
I. Starving Nations . . . . .11
11. Why Germany May Fight Us . . .40
III. Why Japan May Fight Us . . .62
IV. Why England and the United States May
Be Led into War . . . . . ']'j
V. The Good Faith of Nations ... 91
VL Their Attitude Toward Us ... 97
VII. Do They Intend to Attack Us? . . 105
VIII. The Nearness of the Enemies . . . 106
Part Two: Are We Prepared?
I. The Guards Without .... 127
II. The Guards at the Door .... 152
III. The Guards Within .... 165
Part Three: What Are Our Chances?
I. When the Spiked Helmet Comes . . 209
II. When the Brown Man Comes . . . 218
III. If the Lion Comes ..... 238
IV. Military Camps or Cemeteries . . . 246
viii CONTENTS
Part Four: Why We Are Not Prepared
CHAPTER PAGE
I. Pacific Militarism for Politics . .251
II. Inefficiency, Negligence and Suppression
of Facts ...... 260
III. Wasting Billions 275
Part Five: How Political Militarism Fails
I. The Minute Men ..... 291
II. The Price We Have Paid .... 316
III. Tragic Comedy . . . . . 350
Part Six: Will the Proposed Plans Protect?
I. Dealing in Futures — Daniels. . . 367
II, The Wilson-Garrison Bryanized Army
Plan 385
III. Belgium and Belgium .... 400
Part Seven : What Each Citizen Can Do
I. As to Experts
II. As TO Appropriations
III. As to Citizenship Obligations
IV. As TO National Fitness .
V. As TO the Ideal of the Christ
427
434
438
443
451
PART ONE; ARE WE IN DANGER?
The appreciation and thanks of the author are due
to the ranking officers in the United States Army and
the ranking officers in the United States Navy who
have kindly and carefully verified these statements
regarding our impreparedness.
PART ONE: ARE WE IN DANGER?
CHAPTER I
STARVING NATIONS
DOES not the home and family exist for the
purpose of protecting and providing for the
children?
And does not the nation and government exist
for the protection and welfare of its citizens?
Just as a father will steal — even kill — to secure
food for his starving children, so a nation will levy-
indemnities — even make war — to keep its people
from industrial starvation.
There are three hungry nations in the world —
and only three.
The three hungry nations are : Germany, Japan
and Great Britain, They are significantly and re-
markably alike in the density of their population,
their lack of areal resources, and their needs of in-
ternational revenue. Each is, from a commercial
standpoint, an isolated empire. Great Britain and
Japan are isolated by water, while Austria-Ger-
many is completely surrounded by industrial ene-
mies.
11
12 AWAKE! U. S. A.
The people of Great Britain as well as the people
of Germany and Japan are industrially hungry
because they have not sufficient materials at home.
For centuries their farmers have tilled the meagre
soil and eaten the heart out of their lands; their
miners have drilled into the earth and have taken
away its treasures, the axes of their woodmen have
sounded over the land and the virgin forests have
vanished.
Their people are hungry for food ; their factories
are hungry for the raw products of the soil and the
minerals of the earth; their ships are hungry for
the trade of other nations ; their banks are hungry
for over-sea tolls. They must have nutriment for
their people, materials for their factories, products
to fill the holds of their merchant marines and inter-
national tolls to fill the cofifers of their banks.
Great Britain is hungry, but Germany and Japan
are starving — it is necessary to arrest this process
of starvation or die.
They are hungry and starving not only for new
areal resources, but they are hungry even for lands
upon which their people may live. In Germany and
Japan the average number of people living on each
square mile is ten times the number in the United
States and forty times the average in South Amer-
ica. Of the world powers, Germany, Japan and
Great Britain are the three most densely populated
countries.
STARVING NATIONS 13
OaislfyofPopulalion
NumDer of People toBidii SquaieMfle
BoUvfO f
Bpcnil f
Oifle |i
Russia m .
U.SA. turn
(hfna
Qennany
Japan
When we think of a densely populated country our minds turn
to China, yet the average number of people to each square mile in
Germany is 250 per cent, more than the average number of people
to each square mile in China ; in Japan 230 per cent, more ; in Great
Britain 370 per cent, more ; and in England alone 620 per cent. more.
Area data are taken from the "Century Atlas," 1914 edition, with
exception of the data for Bulgaria and Servia, whose areas are
given as they existed at the close of the Second Balkan War. Pop-
ulation data are taken from the "Century Atlas" (1914), from the
"World Almanac" (1916), from "Statesman's Year Book" (1915),
from "Government Reports of U. S. A.," from "Official Reports of
European Governments," and from "Revue Statistique de I'Empire
du Japon" (1915)-
(1) Population and area of Continental U. S,
(2) Including Manchuria, Mongolia.
(3) Not including Korea, Formosa.
TA AWAKE! U. S. A.
When we think of a densely populated country,
we think of China! Yet the number of people per
square mile in Japan is 230% greater than in
China; the number of people per square mile in
Germany is 250% greater ; in Great Britain, 370%
greater, and in England alone, 620% greater.
Germany and Japan are the only densely popu-
lated countries in the world having no considerable
colonial territory to which their citizens can mi-
grate. Russia has immense territories to the East ;
she is not even as densely populated as the United
States. All northern Africa — Tripoli, Algiers,
Morocco — are open to the people of Italy, France
and Spain. Norway and Sweden are not densely
populated.
The German nationalities have lived upon their
lands for more than ten centuries; the English
have depleted English soil for a thousand years;
the Japanese have been exhausting their lands for
six thousand years.
In one respect Great Britain is essentially differ-
ent from Germany and Japan. Great Britain has
millions of square miles of colonial territory and
for that reason has outside resources to draw from
and outlying territories to which her people may
migrate. Great Britain has millions of square miles
of colonial territory and three hundred million co-
lonial population. Great Britain has abundant
areal resources in her colonial possessions. Great
STARVING NATIONS
15
U.JA I"
HomeAFcal
Resources
n
C/i/Je
Bpoz/J f2)
Ar^enf/ne
Bolivjo
Germany
Japan
GrBrita/n
i
1. Areal resources of Continental United States only.
2. Reduced 27 per cent, to make allowance for lands uninhabitable
and at present of little commercial value.
16 AWAKE! U. S. A.
Britain has abundant trade with the people of her
own colonies. There is little danger, therefore,
that Great Britain would ever make war upon us
for the purpose of acquiring our territory or se-
curing our trade unless we seriously interfered
with her trade with her own colonies.
There arc two great storehouses of wealth —
North and South America — eleven million square
miles of land — ^grazing meadows, cereal lands, vir-
gin forests, mineral riches — to supply the needs of
this century.
These storehouses are filled with everything the
starving nations need. The per capita areal re-
sources of the United States alone are eleven times
the per capita areal resources of Germany, Japan
or Great Britain. Moreover, the areal resources
of the three hungry nations have been worked over,
dug out, depleted and exhausted for a thousand
years.
And if the Americas refuse to allow themselves
to be politely robbed by commercial dictation —
then the starving nations will fight. They will at-
tempt to compel the Americas by force of arms, if
necessary, to give up the wealth of their storehouses
— they will attempt by war to force the Americas
to pay commercial tribute for generations to come.
They will do so because areal resources are es-
sentially important as the basis of wealth. Bank-
ing wealth depends upon commerce; commerce
STARVING NATIONS 17
upon manufacturing; manufacturing upon the ma-
terials obtained from animals living upon the prod-
ucts of the land, from vegetation grown upon it,
or from chemicals and minerals taken from it.
Individually labour is an equally important basis
of wealth, but differences in the riches of differ-
ent nations depend upon differences in the area! re-
sources. The quality of labour does not vary
greatly enough to vitally change national values.
The German, the Englishman, the American, the
Japanese labourer are each efficient — each has
proved it by centuries of existence.
Are there storehouses other than the Americas?
Other lands may have been the storehouses of
wealth in other centuries and still other lands may
be the storehouses of wealth in centuries to come;
but for the twentieth century. North and South
America are and will be the areal resources of
wealth of the world.
The comparison of the great areal resources of
the Americas to those of Great Britain, Germany
and Japan, as indicated by the chart — "Areal Re-
sources at Home" — tells respectively but half the
story of the differences in value.
Considering the density of population, the real
value of areal resources to the hungry nations can
be truly judged only by a comparison of their home
areal resources per person with the "Home Areal
Resources of Bach Inhabitant" in the Americas.
18 AWAKE! U. S. A.
HOME AREAL RESOURCES OF EACH INHABITANT
The true value of the areal wealth of a nation depends upon two
factors; first, on whether or not it is largely virgin territory,
unexhausted by having supported millions of people for hundreds
of thousands of years; and, second, upon the number of people
living upon the lands. The home areal resource of each inhabitant
of Germany, Japan and Great Britain is infinitely small; first, be-
cause there are many millions of people living upon tiny bits of
land; and, second, because the land in each case has been exhausted
— its minerals mined, its forests cut, its soil depleted by a thousand
years of occupancy.
On the other hand, we have just begun to open up the vast areal
wealth of the United States; while that of Chile, Argentina, Brazil
and Bolivia is much of it as yet untouched.
STARVING NATIONS
19
Home Areal Resources
to Eacti Inhabitant
Bolivjo
Brazil
GerwojiY' Japan -G/'Bp/foJn
20 AWAKE! U. S. A.
THE GIGANTIC DEBT
April First, 1916
These figures of the debts of the nations at war indicate only the
loans, war credits and treasury bills ; they do not indicate the enor-
mous loss of property, the gigantic financial loss due to interference
with industries.
On the other hand, the national debts of the American nations in-
dicate a proportionally greater burden than they should. They do
not indicate the increasing prosperity, the increase in gold, the
increasing international commerce, the increase of new industries,
and the increase in ability to meet obligations.
It is seen that the combined debt of the nations at war is nearly
927 per cent, greater than the combined debt of all the American
nations and nearly 1661 per cent, greater than the combined debt of
all the neutral European nations.
STARVING NATIONS
21
Who Will Pay Ihe
Di^anlicDebt
$ 60'5'35000,000'DGbfofAlINarions
a/ War
{wilhout fn/epe^/)
■$2U,/5(OOQ00O'DeJDf of Germany.
Japan anoi Gr Britain
$ Qm.OOQOOO- DeN of Ail
Neutrai Nations ofitie Wbricf
A B
A. $3,225,000,000 debts of U. S.
B. $2,648,000,000, debt of all nations of Central and South America.
22 AWAKE! U. S. A.
They have used up their natural wealth, yet they
are hungry — they are starving! They must have
food.
They must induce other nations to pay commer-
cial tolls or failing in this, they must take com-
merce and resources by force of arms. Germany,
Japan and Great Britain cannot pay out of their
own wealth. Not only have they small natural
resources but they are to-day burdened with debts
out of all proportion to their national wealth.
Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and
their allies were on April ist, 1916, already bur-
dened with war loans, war credits, etc., to the
amount of $21,435,470,000. The zvar loans and
war debts of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Tur-
key at that date were $13,992,556,000. The war
debts total $35,428,026,000. This gigantic sum is
the amount of the war loans, war credits and im-
perial treasury bills issued to carry on the war.
Moreover, the countries at war were heavily bur-
dened with national debts before the war began.
The combined pre-war debts of the nations en-
gaged in the present conflict were, in 19 13, $24,-
903,817,000.
These combined with the present war debt
make a grand total — an unimaginable sum — of
$60,335,843,000. This represents the debt of the
nations at war at the present time; and the war
is not yet finished.
STARVING NATIONS 23
And this present war debt of the nations at war
is not only equal to the combined national debt of
the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Bo-
livia, Chile and all the other independent nations
of North, Central and South America, but it is
actually, at the present moment, 927% greater.
This combined debt of the nations at war is not
only equal to all the debts of all neutral Euro-
pean nations but 1661% greater than all their na-
tional debts put together.
This gigantic combined debt, however, does not
represent the industrial losses of the war nor repre-
sent the decrease in revenue that will be felt for
many years after the war is closed.
Besides the enormous debt, Germany and Aus-
tria, if defeated, will find themselves cut off from
billions of dollars of foreign trade; and England,
if defeated, will be placed in a like position.
This war debt is so great that one can conceive
of it only in comparison with other great sums.
We gasp at the past expenditures of our govern-
ment; yet the sum total of every dollar spent by
our government during the last 127 years for all
its eleven wars; of all the moneys spent by our gov-
ernment for all the pensions that have ever been
paid for all the wars from the War of the Revolu-
tion to the Philippine War; of all the money paid
as interest on the national debt from the founding
of the government to the present moment; of the
24 AWAKE! U. S. A.
NATIONAL BURDEN OF DEBT TO WEALTH
A comparison of amounts of the debts of two nations is mani-
festly of little value.
The seriousness of the burden of each nation's debt depends, first,
upon the relation of its debt to its wealth ; second, upon the number
of people laboring to pay off that debt.
This chart represents the national burden of debt to wealth.
Japan's national debt is $1,260,000,000. The national debt of the
United States is $3,225,000,000. Japan's national wealth, however,
is less than ten times its national debt. The wealth of the United
States is fifty-five times its national debt.
The national debts of Great Britain and Germany include the pre-
war debts and war debts up to April ist, 1916.
PER CAPITA BURDEN OF NATIONAL DEBT
TO NATIONAL WEALTH
The seriousness of the burden of each nation's debt depends, first,
upon the relation of its debt to its wealth; second, upon the num-
ber of people laboring to pay off that debt.
This chart represents the burden of national debt that must be
borne respectively by each person of the United States, Germany,
Great Britain and Japan.
The national debts of Germany and Great Britain include the pre-
war debts and the war debts up to April ist, 1916.
STARVING NATIONS 25
Ncilional Burden
of
DebtloWeolIti
Qepmany
QFJBn'tafin
Japan
vep Capito Burden
01
Naffonal DeDt to Nalfonal weaim
U.S.A. ■
Qermony
Japan
OKBritain
26 AWAKE! U. S. A.
money paid for the purchase of Louisiana, for the
Gadsden purchase, for Alaska, for Florida, and for
Texas; in the assumption of the public debt of
Hawaii; for the purchase of perpetual right
to the Panama Canal and even the building of the
Panama Canal — in fact every dollar ever spent by
our government from the time of its foundation to
the present day for extraordinary purposes — has
been but $14,999,490,000. The present debt of the
nations at war — and more than half of it has been
added during the last twenty-one months — is not
only equal to these enormous expenditures of ours,
but 302% greater.
In this comparison we have included all the in-
terest on the public debt of the United States for
127 years, while the figure representing the debt of
the nations at war represents only the principal ex-
isting at the present time. The great portion of
these war loans have been made at 4/4%, 5% and
6%. Only one of them was at less than 4%. If,
then, the nations at war should pay off this debt in
20 years — a feat absolutely impossible — the interest
at 4%, added to the principal, would make a total
of $108,603,000,000.
Inasmuch as the pre-war debts of the nations at
war were increasing even in prosperous peace times
by leaps and bounds — with the exception of Great
Britain — it is recognised that after this war it will
be impossible for the nations to pay this debt even
STARVING NATIONS 27
in two generations. And by that time, even though
the present bonds should be exchanged for others at
lower rates of interest and all the other expenses
of the government should be met year by year, the
cost of the debt in two generations would rise to the
enormous sum of $156,871,000,000.
This is an overwhelming burden for Europe — a
debt it can never pay out of its own wealth!
And the hungry nations! The debt of the three
hungry nations — Germany, Japan and Great Brit-
ain — is to-day not only equal to the debt of all
the American nations, but 311% greater; it is
60/% greater than all the debts of all neutral
Europe!
Moreover, the wealth areas of the three hungry
nations is less than one-half of one million square
miles, while the wealth areas of the American na-
tions is more than eleven million square miles.
The combined population of Germany, Japan
and Great Britain and Ireland is almost equal
to that of all South America, of Central America
and of the United States. But every hundred peo-
ple of the three hungry nations are burdened on an
average with a national debt mortgage of $14,816,
while every hundred people of the American na-
tions are burdened on an average with but $3,300.
Moreover, the national debt mortgage of the three
hungry nations on each square mile of their lands is
$50,314, while the average national debt mortgage
28
AWAKE! U. S. A.
The Overwtielmf n|| Burden
InteresJ: MuJiAkoBGPard
1
^60,35^000,000
DeblJ of I
NatloriiS at Wap(^>
April /, 1916
$ f 08,603,000,000
DebJ-s
with In teres/
UVo'20yearj(^
1. Pre-war debts, war debts, loans and treasury bills issued to
carry on the war.
2. The debt of the nations at war, with interest at 4 per cent.
Interest at 4 per cent, is a low estimate. All loans have been made
at 4, 5 and 6 per cent., with the exception of one loan — Great
Britain's first one.
STARVING NATIONS
29
The OverwhelminiJ BuFden
Interest tlusi Also Be Paid
^ mSJiOOQOOO
Debt
w/W In feres/
I
$ QS,265.00QOOO (n
Inleres/ alone
each 20 years
at ^ %
^ 3,600^000,000
Great Britain's Debt
before ttie War- (^>
1. The interest per generation is 835 per cent, greater than the
entire combined debts of Germany, Japan and Great Britain before
the war.
2. This was considered so large before the war that statesmen
never expected Great Britain to pay the principal in full.
30
AWAKE! U. S. A.
Naiional Debf Norf^a^e
on Eacli 100 People
$iQ.8f6' Germany. Japan oncf QrBr//a/n
^:5,^l6'AmmcQn Natfons
The governments of Germany, Japan and Great Britain have placed
an average mortgage of $148 on each individual — every man, woman
or child; while each man, woman or child of the American nations
is burdened with an average governmental debt of but %2,2,.
The average national debt mortgage of Germany, Japan and Great
Britain to each man, woman or child is 348 per cent, greater than
that of the American nations.
STARVING NATIONS
31'
National Debt Mort^a^e
on Each Square Mile
: 50.dm -Germany, Japan
and Gr BrJ/aln
^525 -American Nations
The governments of Germany, Japan and Great Britain have bur-
dened every acre of their home lands with an average debt mort-
gage of 78 dollars.
Each acre of the lands of the American nations is burdened with
a national debt mortgage of but 82 cents.
The average national debt mortgage of Germany, Japan and Great
Britain on every square mile of their home lands is 9,485 per cent.
greater than that of the American nations.
32 AWAKE! U. S. A.
of the American nations on each square mile of
their lands is but $525.
Germany may have some portions of central and
southern Africa and Japan will have China from
which to draw revenue after the war. These coun-
tries ofifer wonderful possibilities for the century
to come. They would offer great possibilities for
the present, if Germany and Japan should have
billions of dollars of cash at the close of the war
to develop them, build railways, colonise and wait
two or three generations for the profits from such
enterprises.
But burdened by a debt 607% greater than all the
combined debts of all neutral Europe, can they wait
a generation for the results?
Can Germany and Japan, especially, turn for
ready cash at the close of the present struggle to
the other nations at war? Austria in proportion
to her wealth will be more heavily burdened than
Germany. France even before the war had the
largest national debt in the world. It will take a
generation for Russia to readjust her finances. In
fact, the combined debt of the nations at war, ex-
cepting Germany, Japan and Great Britain, is al-
ready 149% of the combined debt of Germany,
Japan and Great Britain. The three hungry na-
tions cannot turn to other nations now at war for
the payment of immediate indemnities.
And evidently no group of the warring European
STARVING NATIONS 33
WHO WILL HAVE THE WEALTH TO PAY THE DEBT?
We gasp at the burden the nations at war have piled up for them-
selves — billions and billions of dollars of debt. We know they
cannot pay it out of their own areal resources. We realize that
the wealth free from debt of all neutral European nations is less
per million people than that of the nations at war, burdened as
they are with great debts.
Before the war England, Germany and Japan might have turned
to Africa and China, even though billions of free wealth are re-
quired to develop those countries. After the war, however, they
will not have the billions of wealth free for investment.
The American nations are the only ones that have developed wealth
immediately available. Their per capita wealth free from national
debt is 304 per cent, of the free per capita wealth of the nations
at war, 323 per cent, of the free per capital wealth of the European
nations, 2866 per cent, of the free per capita wealth of China.
34
AWAKE! U. S. A.
Who wm Have The WeaUh
Necessary To Pay
IheDeM
Nati'onol Wealfh free
from
Noli on a/ Debl
April i J9J6
per iOOQOOO people.
All
AmepJcan
Nol/ons
^fi
?3^00Q0O0
All
All
Nations
Meuiral
a/ War
Eopopean
$537,000,000
Na//onj
China ^505,000,000\
$57000000
1
STARVING NATIONS
35
Who Win Have Land
To Yield The Wealtti
National Area/ Resources
per (000.000 people
I All
American
Nations
All All Neutral
Nalions European
at War Germany china H^H^^^
Japan
Gr Britain
2.900
6W00
tSg.mil
36 AWAKE! U. S. A.
nations, even though emerging from the present
war successfully, can secure indemnities or find
sufficient wealth in neutral European nations to
save themselves.
But the treasure nations of the world — ^having
areal riches of 23 units compared to the i unit of
the hungry nations — are burdened with a debt only
24% of that of the three hungry nations.
Our North and South American home areal re-
sources are 2,200% greater than the home areal
resources of the three hungry nations and our
North and South American debts are but one-fourth
Toi their debts. And North and South America are
the only portions of all the lightly burdened treasure
lands that are sufficiently developed to be able to
furnish international revenue to the hungry nations
without the expenditure of billions of dollars.
Can any sane man doubt that the hungry na-
tions — burdened with this debt, living on depleted
lands exhausted of their natural resources, sup-
porting the densest populations in the world — will
not come to the Americas, the unprotected store-
houses of wealth of the Twentieth Century?
Germany, Japan or Great Britain will not — either
separate or combined — make an attack upon us be-
cause of mere desire to make war. Each German,
Japanese or English family is just as adverse to
losing its sons and father on the battlefield as is
the American family. The governments of Ger-
STARVING NATIONS 37
many and Japan will not attack us because of hatred
or because of viciousness but because of absolute
necessity. If they come they will come because
economic conditions force them to take our treas-
ures in order to keep their people from industrial
starvation.
We should not blame them!
We, under similar conditions, would probably go
to other nations just as Germany and Japan must
come to us.
Because of the commerce of the Americans who
had settled in Texas previous to 1846, we sup-
ported their declaration of independence and took
Texas from Mexico; because of the commercial
interests of the American sugar planters who had
established themselves in Hawaii we supported their
revolution, dethroned the native queen, and an-
nexed the Hawaiian Islands.
It is useless to villify the intentions of Germany
and Japan; it will be useless to villify Great Brit-
ain if she should later deem it necessary to take
means to extend her commerce; but it is wise to
prepare for attack if we desire to maintain our
commercial independence, especially as the com-
bined debt of these three hungry nations is ^43%
of the combined debts of all the neutral nations of
the world.
AWAKE! U. S. A.
Who Will Be Able To Pay
Nations al War^
^DebtsAprlim \
withou! Inleresf
^Land WealtJi-
AreaJ Resources
$5^
Germany
Japan
GrBrJ/ain
$2Qf5l026000
7SO0000 jqm'/GJ
iJSQOOOsq.miiGS
STARVING NATIONS
39
TheAnswcF
Debts. April i 1916
\^ Land WeaJ/h
ArcQl Resources
A/I Neutral Nations of/Jie IVorld
£xceptin0 IJDer/a.Pers/a andiSiam
Alt
Neutral
European
Nations
$:)Q 15000 000
Cliina
^7777^
$.5tlOJi6,000
650.000 sq.mjl
All
American
Nations
$5,875,300,000
itJOCOOOsgrntl
CHAPTER II
WHY ge:rmany may i^ight us
SUPERFICIAL students of economics talk and
write of the great prosperity in Germany. It
is true that Germany has no idle class, that practi-
cally every man is busy, that every factory is hum-
ming, that every railway is burdened with prod-
ucts being shipped from the factories to the sea-
ports, and that every port is a bee-hive where the
loading and shipping of the "made in Germany"
products go on night and day.
"But it is a false prosperity, based upon a forced
system of taxation and an increasing national debt,
growing by gigantic additions year by year even
during peace times. These conditions cannot con-
tinue many months longer. No other nation in Eu-
rope is so near bankruptcy. Every known method
of taxation has been tried by Germany with the
single exception of the capital tax, and the Im-
perial Government must soon impose that also ; and
after that, — the deluge for Europe!
"I warn you, to-night, that Germany cannot con-
tinue two years longer without an industrial re-
action. To save herself from such a reaction she
40
WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 41
will seek war with some neighbouring power, hoping
thereby to gain a big indemnity sufficient to tide
her over the industrial crisis which she is now fac-
ing." '
Germany was on the point of bankruptcy pre-
vious to the war. From 1880 to 19 10, the per cent,
of increase in the cost of living and in expenditures
for the army and for the navy was so much greater
than the per cent, of increase in wages that Ger-
many could not have continued another five years
without an industrial revolution.
During the thirty years indicated, the increase in
the imperial debt was 1,223% 5 i" naval expenditures
was 1,054%, the increase in army expenditures,
127%; the increase in the cost of living 109%,
greater than that of any other European nation,
excepting Austria-Hungary. But wages in Ger-
many during this thirty years had increased only
31%.
Germany, then, previous to the outbreak of the
European war, was financially in a worse condition
than even England. The average increase for the
four great expenditures for the thirty years was
628%. The increase of wages, out of which this
was ultimately to be paid, was but 31%.
Not only was Germany on the point of indus-
trial bankruptcy before the war; but, even with all
the heavy taxation year after year, Germany was
approaching financial ruin.
42 AWAKE! U. S. A.
INCREASING INDUSTRIAL BANKRUPTCY OF GERMANY
FOR THIRTY YEARS BEFORE THE WAR,
1880—1910
The industrial prosperity of Germany during the last forty years
has been a paper prosperity.
The increase from 1880 to 1910 of the imperial debt was 1223 per
cent., the increase in the expense of the navy was 1054 per cent., of
the army, 127 per cent., of the cost of living, 109 per cent. ; while
the increase in wages was but 31 per cent.
Year by year the three great governmental expenses and the one
great individual expense — cost of living — increased out of all pro-
portion to the increase in earning income.
Increases in public expenditures can only be met by increased loans
which must some day be paid, increased taxation, or by indemnities
levied upon foreign nations by means of conquest.
The prospect was industrial bankruptcy.
The data of the increases in the expenses of the navy and of
the army are taken from official reports of the German Imperial
Government and from the "Statesman's Year Books" of 1880 and
1910.
The data on the increase in the cost of living and the increase
of wages are taken from various German writers on political econ-
omy and sociology, from "Bliss' Encylopsedia of Social Reform"
and from information obtained from the British Museum, the Brit-
ish Institute of Social Science and the Musee Social de France.
Increase in the cost of living is not based, as so many writers on
economics wrongly base it, upon a few actual necessities of life
but upon the average amount of money the masses spent for their
living.
The increase in wages is based neither upon the increase nor de-
crease of the wages of a few skilled labourers nor upon the very
small increase of the wages of unskilled workers, but upon the
average increase of all types of labour.
WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 43
Increasfn^
Industrial BanKruptcy of Qermany
FoFThiFty Years Berore the War
1880-1910
/223 % /ncreasG
ImperJal Debt
WSP % IncpeaJG
'Naval £xpGnGa^dd 73 %
f877
/8S/
me
m
im
1901
{906
m
/m
WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 51
Nafjonol Debts Per Capita
l$80'19iO
Increase per cap/la
Germany ^,Q00 7o
Japan 2Z7 %
DecreOiSe pep cap/Id
GpBrllain- i/O %
52 AWAKE! U. S. A.
take three years to regain even seventy per cent, of
it.
As her foreign markets will not be immediately
re-established at the close of the war, Germany,
even if successful, will have six million men out
of work, with nothing to do. Before the war these
were employed in factories making goods for for-
eign trade.
Four million men are now in the army ; two mil-
lion additional men are in training camps and two
million more are employed in the factories manu-
facturing war material.
Women, as before, are in the fields and have
proved themselves capable of conducting the agri-
cultural life of Germany without the aid of the
eight million men now in the army, in the training
camps and in the war factories.
With war over, at least three million of the four
million under arms will be discharged.
With war over, there will be no further need of
manufacturing products of war and two million
men in war factories will be out of employment.
With her foreign trade cut off and at least
seventy per cent, of her foreign buyers, not only
unwilling but unable to purchase from her, the fac-
tories will be unable to reopen for months, except
under governmental management.
This governmental supervision of factories in
Germany would require enormous capital. They
WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 53
would have to be kept running at least one or two
years before Germany's foreign trade, according
to her own commercial experts, could be re-estab-
lished on the old basis. Even to accomplish this,
Germany would have to flood foreign markets with
quantities of goods at cheap prices.
This would be more expensive to the German
Government than war. At present Germany is
manufacturing and consuming her own war ma-
terials; consequently the government is paying the
government for the products produced. Moreover,
the men now employed in battle line — over four
million of them — consuming the war products of
the factories — are costing Germany not more than
$.25 to $.50 a day, but in peace times the govern-
ment would have to pay these men working in fac-
tories from $1.50 to $2.00 a day. The difference
for four millions of men is enormous. Such indus-
trial governmental operation after the war, during
the first year at least, would require infinitely more
money than a year of war itself.
This governmental nationalisation of factories
might be attempted if Germany should have at the
close of the war a billion or more in clear cash.
But impoverished by the war — without the billion
in cash, with at least six million out of work — what
would happen in Germany?
Nothing could prevent an industrial revolution
except another war with the certainty of a big in-
64, AWAKE! U. S. A.
demnity; and the Imperial German Government
would prefer another war rather than run the risk
of revolution — no matter against whom it might be
necessary to wage war.
It is well known among diplomats that Germany
has in her secret archives of the Wilhelmstrasse
exact charts showing that one-third of our national
wealth is located within one hundred miles of the
Atlantic seaboard; and Germany has long been
envious of American wealth and American com-
merce.
Prince Radziwill, a former German Ambassador
at Paris, said on February 26, 1899: ''There is
another country against which the continental pow-
ers should indeed come to an understanding for
the organization of their economic defence. There
is the United States, whose pretensions and riches
are becoming a danger to us all."
Germany already believes that if we had not sup-
plied the Allies, and England in particular, with
enormous quantities of artillery and ammunition,
the war would now be over and she would now be
victorious.
Germany and Austria both consider that the
United States is virtually fighting against them by
furnishing money and supplies to the Allies. High
officials in Germany have publicly stated that any
neutral country which turns itself into an arsenal
to supply guns, military stores, or food even, to
WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 55
the enemies of Germany is in "active participation"
against her.
Germany believes that such successes as the Al-
lies have had is due, and that whatever successes
they may have in the future will be due, to the
credit and the ammunitions we have supplied them.
The Crown Prince has publicly stated that America
is ''already the enemy of Germany" for having al-
lied herself with the enemies of Germany by pro-
viding them with the necessities of war.
But still more, the Imperial Government at Berlin
by an official statement of its General Staff notified
the world, October 4, 191 5, that it considered the
United States as its enemy — the ally of Great Brit-
ain and France. The statement refers to the suc-
cesses of the Allies on the western front "due" to
the help of the munition factories of the whole
world, ''including the United States" This notifi-
cation to the world by a statement of the General
Stafif that the successes of Germany's enemies are
due to the help furnished by the United States is
especially significant, being issued, as it was, only
twenty-four hours before Count von Bernsdorf
made his personal disavowal of the Arabic sinking.
If Germany is defeated, it will be most easy for
the German mind to conceive that the defeat was
due to the ammunition and money which we sup-
plied to Great Britain and France. And what;
would be more natural than that she should con-
56 AWAKE! U. S. A.
ceive the idea that we, who helped to defeat her,
should be also compelled to help put her on her feet
again ?
But Germany has another excuse for seeking a
decisive conflict with the United States. That is
the Monroe Doctrine. Germany is fighting at pres-
ent to establish a so-called freedom of the seas.
And for what purpose ? So that Germany may ex-
tend her colonisation and her trade wherever she
wishes without interference from the navies of
other powers. No other nation in Europe is in
such need of expansion. The English do not breed
rapidly ; neither do the French. The Russians have
immense areas which can yet be utilized, extending
from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Arctic
to the Black Sea. But Germany has no room; she
has but two hundred thousand square miles for
nearly seventy millions of people. While South
America has three thousand four hundred per cent,
more land and not half as many people.
^'But what we do want and will have is the Ar-
gentine. Had you (the English) not given your
moral support to the Monroe Doctrine and stood
between us and our goal in South America, we
'should only have required half our fleet to have
laughed at the American nation and their dog-in-
the-manger policy." ^
Germany has determined that she must have
South America for her rapidly breeding people.
WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 57
Her population has increased almost beyond belief.
In 1870, Germany had a population of but 41,000,-
000; in 1910, only forty years later, it was 65,000,-
000, in spite of the fact that hundreds of thousands
had gone to the United States, to Canada, to South
America, to Africa, to Australia, to Russia and to
France.
But the English navy and the Monroe Doctrine
have stood in Germany's path to South America.
''England once out of the way, South America
will be ours, to be colonised by our flesh and blood,
who now have to go under other flags." ^
First to get England out of the way, then to over-
throw the Monroe Doctrine! Hence the present
war is an "advance step" just as Von Bulow de-
clared it would he, in bringing about ''new political
formations," especially on the "American side of
the water."
The Imperial Chancellor stated in the Reichstag,
when speaking of unrest in Germany and the desire
for "oversea activity," on November 10, 1912: "At
the root of this feeling is the determination of Ger-
many to make its strength and capability prevail in
the world."
Germany has never admitted the right of the
American nation to promulgate or uphold the Mon-
roe Doctrine. She has taken every occasion to vio-
late it. At Manila she tried to force her battle-
ships into the bay in order that she, as well as the
68 AWAKE! U. S. A.
WHAT GERMANY WOULD GAIN IN AREAL RESOURCES
FOR COMMERCE
This depends upon the condition that Germany is victorious in the
present war; or that Germany shall make terms of peace with
Great Britain such that Germany shall be free to pursue such a
policy without interference — a not improbable result in case of
deadlock in the great European struggle.
If Germany should for commercial and naval reasons bring about
a war with the United States and defeat us in that war, the main-
tenance of the Monroe Doctrine would have to be abandoned
by us.
In consequence Germany's millions of people would be free to col-
onise and cement their control over Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Venezuela, eastern Colombia, eastern Mexico, eastern Central Amer-
ica and to obtain restrictive commercial control of the international
commerce of the United States.
Moreover, Germany would gain in conjunction with Japan actual
control of the Panama Canal.
This would give Germany not only the coveted naval bases in the
western hemisphere, but the commercial control of the untold
wealth of 9,975,000 square miles of virgin and undepleted territory.
This is 4480 per cent, greater than that which Germany has at
present — a prospective gain worth fighting for.
WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 59
What Qennany Would Qafn
in
Areal Besources for Commerce
60 AWAKE! U. S. A.
United States, might have a claim upon the terri-
tory of the Philippines.
Germany hoisted her flag over the custom houses
in Venezuela after she had promised not to do so.
President Roosevelt mobilized our fleet, England
and Italy acquiesced in our demand and the German
flag came down.
Even as late as 19 12, Germany attempted to se-
cure a naval station on the coast of Colombia at
the very door of the Panama Canal.
We may be sure, then, that if Germany comes out
of this war victorious, she will not be as considerate
of our Monroe Doctrine as she has been in the
past.
Germany will be burdened by an enormous debt.
She will have need of immediate resources ; she will
not be able to regain her foreign trade quickly even
if successful in this war; her factories will be idle;
she will face an industrial revolution, and another
foreign war against the nation that aided her
enemies will divert the populace and promise a great
indemnity of twenty billions of dollars, opening the
pathway at the same time to Venezuela, Brazil,
Argentina, and Bolivia, the combined areal re-
sources of which are more than three thousand per
cent, greater than Germany has at present.
And what would Germany gain by a successful
attack upon us? First: areal resources in Central
America and Colombia, fifty per cent, greater than
WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 61
all her home areal resources; areal resources in
Mexico two hundred per cent, greater ; in Venezu-
ela, two hundred per cent.; in Bolivia, three hun-
dred per cent. ; in Argentina, six hundred per cent. ;
in Brazil, 1,500 per cent ! Second : the control of the
Panama Canal. Third: the Mexican oil fields.
Something worth fighting for!
"We must at all costs hope for the formation in
southern Brazil, of a state with twenty or thirty
million Germans." *
"How unreasonable it is to expect that the com-
bined nations of Europe, with all their military
strength, shall remain restricted to one-twelfth of
this world's land, burrowed into and hewn over for
the last thousand years, while this Republic, with-
out armies, shall maintain dominion over one-half
of the unexploited lands of the world l'^
QUOTATION REFERENCES
* Page 41. From address of M. Brown-Landone, given
at Sorbonne, Paris, December 18, 191 3.
2 Page 56, Hildegard von Hilton, from letter to the Eng-
lish from the Palais Augustenberg, June, 1912.
^ Page 57. From an official report of a German Consul
in Brazil.
* Page 61. Schmoller, prominent German political writer.
^ Page 61. General Homer Lee, in "The Valor of Igno-
rance."
CHAPTER HI
WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US
AND Japan!
Putting aside the "agitation of jingoes," is
there any real cause for serious concern as to prob-
able trouble with the rising power in the Far East ?
There are but three over-populated isolated na-
tions in the world, each of which must control world
commerce on its portion of the globe or go down in
bankruptcy. Japan is one of them.
The conditions which exist, and which have ex-
isted in Japan during the last thirty years, are now
culminating financially and industrially.
Japan finds herself commercially and financially
in exactly the same condition as Germany. During
the thirty years from 1880 to 19 10, Japan's naval
expenditure in 1910 was 2,292 per cent, greater
than it was in 1880; her increase in army expendi-
tures, 933 per cent.; her increase in the Imperial
debt, 519 per cent.; and the increase in the cost of
living, 87 per cent.
The average increase of the four great expendi-
tures during the thirty years was 957 per cent;
while the increaae in wages was but 28 per cent.
62
WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US 63
While income and business taxes are very much
higher in Japan than in any other country, the en-
tire revenue yielded from both income and busi-
ness taxation is but one-tenth of the national rev-
enue of Japan. Therefore the people out of their
wages have paid, or ultimately must pay — either by
direct taxation, by higher cost of living, or by less-
ened wages due to business taxation — 90 per cent,
of the enormous sums that have been spent on the
army and the navy during the last 35 years.
This drain upon the Japanese people cannot go on
forever.
Moreover, Japan was burdened before the war
by a debt which in proportion to her national wealth
was greater than that of any other world-power in
Europe, Asia or America. A nation's debt can be
paid by the combined use of her wealth and the
labour of her citizens, by the opening up of unde-
veloped resources, by the acquisition of interna-
tional trade; by the levying of indemnities upon
other nations.
In proportion to her area and her wealth, Japan
has an enormous population. The labour wealth
of her people is of phenomenal value; but labour
must have capital and resources to produce the sur-
plus wealth with which to pay a nation's debt.
Japan's national debt in proportion to her popu-
lation is small. From the labour standpoint, Ja-
pan's burden of national debt is much less than
64 AWAKE! U. S. A.
INCREASING INDUSTRIAL BANKRUPTCY OF JAPAN
FOR THIRTY YEARS BEFORE THE WAR
1880—1910
The increase in the expense of the navy was 2292 per cent, and
of the army 993 per cent.; the increase of the Imperial debt was
519 per cent, and of the cost of living, 87 per cent.; while the
increase in wages was but 28 per cent.
Year by year the three great governmental expenses and the one
great individual expense, the cost of living, had increased out of
all proportion to the increase in earned income.
Increases in public expenditures can only be met by increased loans
which must some day be paid, increased taxation, or by indemnities
levied upon foreign nations by means of conquest.
The prospect was industrial bankruptcy.
The data of the increases in the expenses of the navy and of the
army are taken from the "Revue Statistique de I'Empire du Japon"
and from the "Statesman's Year Books" of 1880 and 1910.
The data of the increase in the cost of living and the increase
of wages are taken from "Bliss' Encyclopaedia of Social Reform"
and from information obtained from the British Museum, the Brit-
ish Institute of Social Science, and the Musee Social de France.
Increase in the cost of living is not based, as so many writers on
economics wrongly base it, upon a few actual necessities of life,
but upon the average amount of money the masses spent for their
living.
The increase in wages is based neither upon the increase nor de-
crease of the wages of a few skilled labourers nor upon the very
small increase of the wages of unskilled workers, but upon the
average increase of all types of labour.
WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US 65
Incpeasing
Industrial Banki^uptcy of Jopan
FoF ThiFty YeaPS^Before flieWoF
1880-1910
S292 % Increase
Naval Expenje
P93 % Incpeose
Army Expense
3/9 %/ncreasG
Imperial Del)/-
W%CoJlofLiv/n^\
^S 7o Increase of Wages
m AWAKE! U. S. A.
ours. Our per capita national debt is $32, while
that of Japan is $23.
There has been much discussion lately and much
difference of opinion as to the solvency of Japan.
But in all the newspaper and magazine discussion
there has been no comprehensive summing up of
all the factors that make for national wealth, that
make for solvency. Comparing the wealth of the
two countries in billions of dollars leads to wrong
conceptions. A comparison of the per capita bur-
den of wealth also leads to wrong conceptions.
To arrive at any just comparison of the condition
of Japan with that of any other country, all the ele-
ments of labour, national wealth, national debt,
population and resources from which to draw
wealth must be considered. Labour is useless with-
out capital, capital and labour are useless without
materials to work with ; capital and labour and ma-
terials are of little commercial value with no mar^
kets for the products.
If we consider both our population and our wealth
in relation to our national debt and compare the
result to the population and wealth of Japan in re-
lation to her national debt, we find that Japan has
a burden 800 per cent, greater than the one we
bear.
The labour of Japan's fifty-five million people
could easily solve Japan's financial problem if they
had a sufficient surplus of natural resources and
WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US
67
Japan ond Four Slates of U.S.A.
Weal/h fop ul at/ on
u stales I
t30-3mons
J a /I an
J^J.0-Bjllfon6
Japan
55J^jW'onl/
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lgS7
fSSi
Fc
ISSP
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ISOO
3
P
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1
1003
igoti
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ISOS
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In 1895 and 1896 little money was spent by Japan on her navy be-
cause there was no special need for it. The Japanese War with
China proved that Japan had no need of a navy so far as China
was concerned.
But there was need to prepare for the war with Russia.
Consequently during the eight years from 1897 to 1904 the average
expenditure per year on the navy was 425 per cent, of the average
yearly expenditure during the Japanese War with China. That
this money was for a purpose is proven by Japan's victory over
Russia.
That conquest having been effected, there was no need at that time
for great constructive work on the navy. Consequently during
1905 and 1906 the average expense per year on the navy was hut
48 per cent, of what it had averaged each year during the time
Japan was preparing for the conflict with Russia.
In 1907 Japan began to prepare for another great conflict.
Since that time Japan's naval expenditures on naval preparation
have averaged each year, from igoj to 1914 inclusive, 392 per cent.
of all her naval expenses during the year of the Russo-Japanese War.
Is it to defeat the Chinese Navy?
The Chinese Navy consists of four tiny ships, all more than nine-
teen years old. The largest is of four thousand tons displacement.
What navy is Japan expecting to combat?
110 AWAKE! U. S. A.
during the year of the Russo-Japanese War. This
data is taken from the Resume Statistique de V Em-
pire du Japon.
In studying the finance report of the Empire of
Japan, one needs be careful, however, to search out
all the appropriations. The ordinary appropriation
is in one place; for 1912, it was 40,208,000 yen. In
another place one finds the extraordinary appro-
priation, which is often not only equal to the ordi-
nary, but 50 per cent, more; in 1912, it was 60,225,-
000 yen. Then also, in very small print under the
heading of finance, one finds a transfer of funds
for submarines and warships totalling, in 191 1, 10,-
689,586 yen, and estimated at 12,000,000 yen for
1912.
A true view of the enormous upbuilding of the
Japanese navy can best be understood by compar-
ing this tiny *'tucked-away" expense item — the
amount transferred — to the entire appropriations
of the Japanese navy, ordinary and extraordinary,
during the year of war with Russia. This little
"transferred" item for submarines and special craft
was, in 191 1, 51.8 per cent, of the entire ordinary
and extraordina/ry appropriations of the navy of
Japan for the year of the Russo-Japanese War.
Moreover, a late official of the Japanese Govern-
ment, in speaking to the Diet, urging larger and
larger appropriations for navy, said in substance:
DO THEY INTEND TO ATTACK US? Ill
"We must work night and clay for the upbuilding
of our navy. Not one hour must be lost."
Are Japanese statesmen mere children ? Are they
expending on their navy these enormous sums in
proportion to their wealth, merely for the folly of
spending? If not, what other navy do they expect
to combat in the near future? Japan has an of-
fensive and defensive treaty with Great Britain.
Japan has, practically, an offensive and defensive
treaty with Russia. Japan's ofifensive and defen-
sive treaty with Great Britain makes it necessary
for Great Britain to use her navy against Germany
if trouble should arise between Japan and Germany.
But there is China! I have before me the letter
of a venerable American who calmly and sincerely
believes that Japan holds only the most altruistic
intentions towards America and who also believes
that Japan's entire preparation is for the conquest
of China. But China has no navy. The Chinese
navy consists of four tiny ships. The largest — the
Hai Chi, is of but 4,300 tons displacement. It has
a battery of two eight-inch guns. The other three
ships are cruisers 25 per cent, smaller. The main
armament of each of these cruisers consists of three
six-inch guns. All of these ships are more than 19
years old.
If Japan's military and naval appropriations were
intended for the conquest of China there would be
an upbuilding and equipping of the army. Japan
112 AWAKE! U. S. A.
need not build up the transport system of her navy
if her intentions are directed against China, for
Japan already has a transport system, independent
of her passenger ships, capable of carrying 199,000
men. In a few weeks, these, plying back and forth
between Japan and China, could carry to China a
million men. One warship would protect them in
their trips from the Japanese coast to the Chinese
coast, and if China were the immediate goal, Japan
would need greater extraordinary appropriations
for their army — not for their navy.
If Japan by these most extraordinary measures
is not preparing her navy to combat the navy of
the United States, for what purpose is she making
such gigantic efforts? Why this great upbuilding
of the navy from 1908 to the present time, corre-
sponding with the same tremendous upbuilding of
the navy during the years before the Russo-Jap-
anese war? Can any one doubt that this money is
being spent for a definite purpose? And since Ja-
pan needs wealth as much as she needs land and
areal resources and since China cannot furnish the
wealth, since the immediate occupation of China
would demand billions of Japanese capital, who can
doubt that Japan is preparing her navy to combat
the United States rather than China?
Moreover, we have her own testimony in regard
to this matter.
A booklet by a member of a Japanese National
DO THEY INTEND TO ATTACK US? 119
Defence Society, circulated with its approval, de-
scribes in detail how our Pacific Islands and our
Western Coast States are to be taken.
**Our war with the United States will be one
whose intention is for the general betterment and
benefit of the world."
"If Washington is not strong enough to enforce
its orders on the Pacific Coast, we are! In short,
the United States Government is but a foolish child-
hood game, such as checkers or jack straws."
"We must seize our standards, unfurl them to the
winds and advance without the least fear, as
America has no army, and, with the Panama Canal
destroyed, its few battleships will be of no use until
too late."
"The Tokyo arsenal is working night and day in
making ammunition of all kinds. The Japanese
Naval Minister is now occupied in the great work
of hastening the building of first-class battleships,
transports and submarines. Our army and navy
commissariat departments at Futagwa are now
working night and day in order that adequate sup-
plies of our own compressed foods may be ready."
"Sixty million Japanese are eager to begin a war
against the United States that shall prove to the
boasting Americans that the Japanese people do not
know defeat and that their soldiers are invincible."
"We will conquer them! How can we fail?"
"We ask no clearer vision of them — except that
114* AWAKE! U. S. A.
which we will have over the sights of our rifles and
the guns of our battleships."
"We will of course have only trained men (sol-
diers) go out, disguised as workmen and even rich
merchants. These will slowly be reinforced, with
the object always in mind of capturing the Philip-
pines and Honolulu."
"Capture these islands we must, in order to
place our hands firmly and once for all on the Pa-
cific Ocean."
"Manila being ours, we will divide our navy and
army forces. One part will go to take Honolulu
and all the Hawaiian Islands; the other, and far
greater part, will proceed to the Golden Gate of
San Francisco!"
"Then will our able workmen, agriculturists and
artisans of all kinds go to their new country! And
go with the most glad hearts."
"The National Manifestation against America
that took place last year in Hibiya Park, in our im-
perial capital, attended by 100,000 people of all
ranks, shows how glad we will be when the first
shot is fired!
"The Text of the resolution that was then passed
is as follows :
"We herewith formally request our government
to declare war against the United States without
an instant's delay 1
"Let America beware! For our cry On to
DO THEY INTEND TO ATTACK US? 115
Hawaii! On to California! is becoming secondary
in our country to our imperial anthem." ^
QUOTATION REFERENCES
^ Page 1 06. From a book outlining Germany's means
and method of attacking England and the United States;
prepared by Freiherr von Edelsheim, when member of the
General Staff at Berlin; book approved by the Kaiser and
widely circulated.
2 Page 115. From a book circulated by the National
Defense Association of Japan, the present officers of which
are reported to be : Count Okuma, Premier of Japan, presi-
dent; Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs, vice-presi-
dent.
CHAPTER VIII
AFTER this war is over Japan and all the
nations of Europe will be too exhausted to
start any war against us; and, even if they wished,
we are so isolated on the east and on the west by
expanses of water from three to five thousand miles
wide, that no army could successfully cross to our
shores." ^
Exactly the same idea was expressed by Ran-
dolph in 1810 referring to Great Britain and war-
ring Europe.
A citizen who goes from the inactivity of his of-
fice into the wilderness to hunt is not so able to bear
hardships and endure fatigue the first ten days as
he is afterwards. He may be fagged out day after
day, he may be scratched and bruised, he may lose
thirty or more pounds of fat, but after a few weeks
of such life he is more fit, more able to endure, more
skilled in using his gun than when he came fresh
from the office.
"All history teaches us that a natixjn never
116
THE NEARNESS OF THE ENEMIES 117
fights more readily and more valiantly than im-
mediately after the close of a war in which it was
involved." ^
We ourselves after a long four-year struggle
were well equipped and ready to go immediately
into Mexico — compelling France to withdraw the
Emperor she had installed in that country. Japan
was not exhausted by the war with China, nor by
the war with Russia.
''Even the little kingdom of Servia fought first
Turkey, then Bulgaria and finally, with scarcely a
spell of rest, she waged the most remarkable cam-
paign of her history against a first-class European
power." ^
Some years ago, in Paris, a French diplomat said
to me: "We in Europe have learned to put our
treasures in bank vaults and to employ guards to
watch them. But you, Americans, are a strange
people. You have made of your America a great
glass house and you have stored within it the great-
est treasures of the world. I should think, my dear
sir, that your people would understand that there
are envious nations on our side of the water, who
will some time want your treasure."
That is what a world known diplomat thought;
this is what some of our own people think:
"Only the ridiculous fear of a crying child left
alone in the dark can account for the wild stories
being spread about of how a foreign nation can sue-
118 AWAKE! U. S. A.
cessfully send an invading army to our shores.
Such a thing is impossible." ^
But what do miHtary experts think? General
Crozier, Chief of Ordnance of the United States
Army ; Francis V. Greene, Major-General U. S. V. ;
General Leonard Wood, Commander of the Depart-
ment of the East; Captain Bristol, Director of
Naval Aeronautics; Captain A. W. Grant, Chief of
the Submarine Service!
General William Crozier, before the Congres-
sional Committee in 19 12, stated:
"So far as transporting troops is concerned, the
sea as a highway is not an obstacle but a facility."
''It is very much easier to get any number of
troops across the Atlantic Ocean than it would be
to get the same number over anything like the same
distance on land. Marine transportation is the very
best kind you can have; the easiest, the least ex-
pensive, and the most expeditious, if you are con-
sidering large bodies of troops and large amounts
of material."
*'In smooth water and fine weather, they (the
enemy) could land almost any place." ^
''The guns in these defences (coast forts) would
be no more powerless to oppose a landing beyond
their range if they were located on the most remote
island of Alaska." ^
"Germany by using only 50 per cent, of her mer-
cantile marine, only including vessels of more than
THE NEARNESS OP THE ENEMIES 119
TFansporf Facilities for Annies
Qr.BFftain
Qermony
Japan
U.S.A. I
Great Britain's ability to transport large armies has been demon-
strated for two hundred years. The transportation of troops in
the Boer War was the marvel of military experts.
In the transportation of troops distance is not the important factor.
The size of the ships and the number of ships that can be used are
essentially important. Great Britain's transportation tonnage is
greater than that of any other country in the world.
Germany's transportation and passenger tonnage is next to that
of Great Britain. Even in 1901 Freiherr von Edelsheim, then a
member of the General Staff at Berlin, worked out a definite plan
for the invasion of the United States and demonstrated that Ger-
many could embark 240,000 men for this attack upon the United
States in two and a half days. During the fifteen years that have
elapsed since 1901 Germany's transportation facilities have greatly
increased.
Japan's major and minor transportation fleets can now accommo-
date 199,000 men. This does not include the use of the enormous
passenger ships now under her control.
As to the United States : We have now the problem of protecting
lands, interests and wealth beyond the border of the United States.
Porto Rico, Panama, the Philippines and the marvellously wealthy
though little considered Alaska.
In our Spanish-American War, after ninety days' preparation, we
could not obtain transports enough to move more than 17,000 troops
from Florida to Cuba, and it took our transports 17 days to do
this. Men were left behind because there were no transportation
facilities.
In April, 1914, when, after more than two years of trouble with
Mexico, President Wilson ordered General Funston to sail from
Galveston to Vera Cruz, the transport fleet was able to take less
than 4,200 men. A large portion of Guneral Funston's original
command, as well as the artillery and cavalry, was left behind
at Galveston because there were not sufficient transports.
120 AWAKE! U. S. A.
2,000 tons' registery, could land 450,000 men in
this country in from sixteen to seventeen days after
domination of the sea had been obtained." ^
''Since steamers have supplanted sailing ships
for commercial intercourse, it is possible to trans-
port our large troop forces in them." ^
What are the experiences of history?
''The war between Japan and China, between
America and Spain, between England and the
Transvaal, and finally the Chinese Expeditions,
have largely demonstrated the methods of trans-
porting troops over the sea." ^
"Lord Cochran landed 18,000 men on the open
coast of America in five hours ; in the Crimean War
the English accomplished the disembarking of 45,-
000 men, 83 guns and about 100 horses in less than
eleven hours." ^^
"In an operation by the Russians, 8,000 men, in-
cluding infantry and cavalry, were embarked in
eight hours." "
Our own experience in transporting troops to
the Philippines is sufficient.
"We had four transports — improvised from
mail steamers, plying on the Pacific — the largest
of which had a gross tonnage of 5,000 and the
smallest 1,500. The total tonnage was about
12,500." ^^
Our slowest ship had a speed of but nine knots
and of course the transports had to keep together so
THE NEARNESS OF THE ENEMIES 121
that the average speed was not greater than that
of the slowest ship. Yet in thirty-two days we cov-
ered seven thousand miles from San Francisco to
Manila and landed our forces ; although, when war
began, we were unprepared to conduct a campaign
across the Pacific.
When this war is finished, England, whether suc-
cessful or unsuccessful, will have at least one mil-
lion men in training camps or in the field ready for
service. The carrying capacity of her railways is
such that these cannot be dismissed at a moment's
notice. For months, perhaps for a year, there will
be a standing army of at least five hundred thou-
sand men. England has the greatest transport sys-
tem in the world and her mariners have been
trained for centuries in handling traffic and troops.
"In England, the steamers for transporting
troops to Cape Town, which is a long trip, were
prepared in four days for the infantry; and seven
days for the cavalry and artillery." ^^
The combined tonnage of the British India,
White Star, Peninsular and Oriental lines is nearly
two million tons. England could transport to the
United States, without even interfering with her
other shipping trade, from two hundred and fifty
thousand to five hundred thousand men, in two
weeks' time.
122 AWAKE! U. S. A.
And Germany !
"When the war is over, Germany will still be the
second naval power in the world, stronger than our-
selves in battleships, and possessed of an ocean-go-
ing commerce with a tonnage nearly five times as
great as our own." ^*
"There would be no lack of ships. The fleet of
the Hamburg line alone measures 1,168,000 tons,
and of the North German Lloyd, 795,000 tons." ^^
Even all the details have been worked out by Ger-
many — by Freiherr von Edelsheim when a member
of the German General Staff.
"The expedition corps would require eighteen
ships; material and supplies would take five. The
greater part of this number would be amply sup-
plied by our two large steamship companies, the
North German Lloyd and the Hamburg-American
Line. The charter of these steamship companies
provides for their use as transports if needed for
expeditions of this sort."
"The greater part of the supplies can be brought
by tugs from Bremen to Bremerhaven. The troops
can consequently embark at Quai in about four
hours." ''
"Ninety-six thousand men can be embarked in
one day, or two hundred and forty thousand men in
two and a half days." ^'^
"If we, almost ludicrously unready for war in
1898, could do this (take our troops to the Philip-
THE NEARNESS OF THE ENEMIES 123
pines) is it to be supposed that Germany, with her
plans studied out long in advance, with her enor-
mous tonnage of fast ships, her troops in instant
readiness, with no continent to cross and an ocean
of barely 3,000 miles instead of 7,000 separating
her from her opponent — is it to be supposed, I say,
that Germany could not bring 240,000 infantry
with the corresponding numbers of artillery and
cavalry to our shores in from twelve to fifteen
days ? No soldier who has studied the question will
deny that Germany can do this." ^*
Japan has a merchant marine whose tonnage
almost equals that of the White Star, Cunard,
British India, and Peninsular and Oriental lines
combined. It is sufficient to handle under great
emergency one-half million men. She has practi-
cally absolute control of trans-Pacific trade, except-
ing for the few English ships. England is pledged
to Japan as an offensive and defensive ally. It is
quite possible that Japan could land within four
weeks after she determines to do so, and probably
before a declaration of war, from two hundred
thousand to three hundred thousand men on our
western coast.
QUOTATION REFERENCES
^ Page 116. American newspaper editorial.
^ Pag-e 117. General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V., in
"The Present Military Situation in the United States."
124 AWAKE! U. S. A.
' Page 117. (See note 2,)
* Page 118. American newspaper editorial.
^ Page 118, Rear- Admiral Frank F. Fletcher.
"Page 118. Report of the Army Committee of the
National Security League, including : Hon. Henry L. Stim-
son, ex-Secretary of War; Colonel William C. Church,
editor Army and Navy Journal; Captain Matthew Hannah ;
General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Put-
nam; Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others.
■^ Page 120. Press report of interview with American
Army Officer.
^ Page 120. From a book outlining Germany's means
and method of attacking England and the United States;
prepared by Freiherr von Edelsheim, as member of the Gen-
eral Stafif at Berlin; approved by Kaiser, and widely circu-
lated.
9 10 n Page 120. (See note 8.)
^^ Page 120. (See note 2.)
" Page 121. (See note 8.)
14 15 Page 122. (See note 2.)
" Page 122. (See note 8.)
17 18 Pages 122-123. (See note 2.)]
PART TWO: ARE WE PREPARED?
PART TWO: ARE WE PREPARED?
CHAPTER I
THE GUARDS WITHOUT
IN case of war, all our navy need do is to find
the enemy's fleet and sink it." ^
Easy and simple ! Just about as simple as asking
a man with arms cut off at the elbows to enter the
ring" to thrash Willard or Carpentier !
Admiral Fiske gave official testimony that it
would take five years to put our navy in shape to
meet an efficient enemy. Admiral Knight, presi-
dent of the naval war college, when urging that we
make our navy efficient, stated that everybody who
knows anything about the navy knows that it is
not now in an efficient condition.
Great speed and guns capable of high elevation
are the most important features of the modern
dreadnought. Over-thick armour is not of special
value to-day.
The most powerful battleships possess very large
guns capable of being elevated thirty degrees, have
armour plate of but medium thickness, and are able
to make from twenty-five to twenty-eight knots per
127
128 AWAKE! U. S. A.
hour. We have not one battleship combining these
qualities.
The battle in the North Sea demonstrated how
important speed is to a big battleship. A fast ship
can move in and out and around its enemy, keeping
out of range when it desires to do so, and coming in
again unexpectedly. A dreadnought with an ad-
vantage of even one knot in speed is fifty per cent,
more efficient than a ship of equal size and with like
guns, one knot slower. The powerful Bluecher was
destroyed not because of lack of armour, or lack of
big guns, but because she was too slow to get away.
Yet the Bluecher was able to make three knots more
per hour than the fastest, most powerful, best-
equipped armoured ship we have in our navy.
-'They have no conception of the fact that a ship
one-half knot faster, with guns of one-half mile
greater range, with practically all other conditions
equal, would have at its mercy any ship having
lesser speed and guns with the shorter range." ^
England has twenty battleships capable of main-
taining from 23 to 29 miles an hour, Germany has
fourteen, Japan has four. We have none!
Although guns on ships of foreign navies can be
elevated twenty, twenty-eight and thirty degrees,
we have had none that can be elevated more than
fifteen degrees and most of them can be elevated
only ten degrees.
Even the two ships just about to go in service —
THE GUARDS WITHOUT 129
Modem Dreadnoujjlite i
Japan has finished four modern dreadnoughts in the last two
years, three of which have a displacement of 27,500 tons and the
other a displacement of 30,600 tons.
The first three have a speed of 27 knots and the fourth a speed
of 22 knots.
Two more ships of this last type are practically ready for service
and will probably be in service by the time this paragraph is read.
We have no ships of this type whatever.
Our two best ships — the Nevada and the Oklahoma — have a maxi-
mum speed of 22 knots.
The engine efficiency of our best dreadnoughts is 26,000 and 25,000
horsepower respectively. Japan's dreadnoughts have an engine effi-
ciency of 60,000 horsepower.
During the past eighteen months German naval construction has
been pushed at an enormous rate.
Our own Secretary of the Navy has just admitted that Great
Britain has probably added to her navy sixteen great fighting ships
since the present war began.
130 AWAKE! U. S. A.
the Oklahoma and the Nevada — are, in comparison
with foreign ships, plodders. The Oklahoma and
the Nevada in their speed tests some months ago
were able to make an extreme record of about 21
knots per hour. These are our best ships, but they
are not yet in service.
Japan has three new ships of 68,000 horse-power
that have a speed of 27 knots, one great super-
dreadnought of 40,000 horse-power that has a
speed of 23 knots. These ships are already finished
and in service. Two more ships of the super-
dreadnought type of the same speed are to be fin-
ished this year.
Ships like the Minnesota, Connecticut, Vermont
and New Hampshire cannot maintain a speed of
even 12 or 15 knots.
Moreover, the guns on many of our ships have
shorter range than the guns of the ships of foreign
navies. All the ships of the Alabama class have
an extreme range of only 7^4 miles. The two
great battles of the present war have been fought at
a distance greater than 10 miles.
After witnessing a review of ten of our best bat-
tleships a short time ago, John Hays Hammond,
Jr., remarked, "As we watched these massive struc-
tures pass, some of us wondered how long they
could contest with the superior range gun-power
and speed of the modern battle cruisers of other
nations. To those interested in naval development,
THE GUARDS WITHOUT 1311
it was obvious that only four out of the ten would
make a real showing under modern battle condi-
tions." ^
All of our battleships are supposed to be equipped
with useable torpedo tubes, yet Rear-Admiral
Strauss, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, United
States Navy, admitted in testifying that all ships of
our navy, previous to the Nevada and the Okla-
homa, have torpedo tubes, which are useless for
modern torpedoes. As the Nevada and Oklahoma
are not yet in commission, his admission means that
we have now not one single torpedo tube in any bat-
tleship afloat that is of any value. Even when the
Nevada and Oklahoma are commissioned, there will
be but eight torpedo tubes adapted to the use of
modern torpedoes in our entire navy, while every
single modern German battleship has six tubes each.
Our torpedo boats are out of date and are ineffi-
cient. All of them are more than fifteen years old
and about as useful as an automobile of an 1899
model.
Fast light cruisers are most important, not only
in protecting other ships of the fleet, hut above all,
in protecting coast lines. Yet we have but three
up-to-date ones to aid us in protecting thousands of
miles of the Atlantic Coast, thousands of miles of
the Pacific Coast and both entrances of the Panama
Canal.
"This leaves our fleet peculiarly lacking in this
132 AWAKE! U. S. A.
Bi0 QunsonShfps^
US-
Japan
Qepmany
OKfiFitoin
(i) Keels laid since 1905.
The guns, larger than lo-inch, on ships the keels of which have been
laid since 1905 are as follows :
United States 172
Japan 186
Germany 232
Great Britain 330
United States ships of this class have no 13-inch gun and almost
one-half of all the guns are 12-inch.
Germany has twenty-four 15-inch guns, and Great Britain eighty
IS-5 guns cm ships of this class.
THE GUARDS WITHOUT VSS
AvcFO^e nojpse Power per Ship *
U.S.
Oepmanyi
Japan
QRBFftafn
(i) Keels laid since 1905.
This represents the average horsepower of each ship of the first
line ships.
Japan has three ships finished of 68,000 horsepower each, one fin-
ished of 40,000 horsepower, two more almost ready for service of
40,000 horsepower.
In our entire navy we have but four ships the engines of which
have more than 30,000 horsepower each, and the engines of three
of these are just over the 30,000 horsepower mark.
134 AWAKE! U. S. A.
element so necessary for information in a naval
campaign, and of such great value in opening and
protecting routes of trade for our own commerce,
and prohibiting such routes to the commerce of the
enemy." *
"Leading the torpedo flotilla came the Birming-
ham, a sad reminder that we have only three light
cruisers of considerable speed, and these vessels,
compared to the numerous craft of this type in the
British and German navies, would present a sorry
contrast in their relatively low speed and weak
armament." ^
We have not a single fast scout boat built or even
authorised since 1904. The three we have are not
armed adequately and are too slow for use. None
of them has ever made more than twenty-six
knots. Up to the present time, we have not been
able to secure firemen able to live before their fur-
naces, for whenever there is a little wind they draw
into the faces of the firemen, instead of upward
into the stacks.
England and Germany have been adding scout
cruisers at the rate of from three to eight each
year. Each is able to make thirty knots or more an
hour. Before the war Germany had fourteen and
Great Britain thirty-one.
We have less than seventy destroyers. We
should have at least three hundred.
The less said about our submarines, the better.
THE GUARDS WITHOUT 136
Nearly a year ago Commander Sterling testified
that one out of the twelve on the Atlantic Coast
could efficiently take part in the manoeuvres at sea.
In the spring manoeuvres this year, all of our
good submarines, excepting one, were again unable
to continue their operation because of some acci-
dent or other. In the October manoeuvres, all, ex-
cept one, were again conveyed to the navy yards,
because "something" happened to their engines or
other machinery.
But a new submarine has just been launched!
Assuming that this one zvill work, we have evi-
dently but two submarines, on the Atlantic coast
north of Panama, able to manoeuvre for a few days
at least — without having to be convoyed to port.
Even those of the L type, which in the past we
have considered about as perfect as any of our
submarines, are now found to be defective.
We have two mine layers, one to cover the thou-
sands of miles of the Atlantic Coast-line and one
for the thousands of miles of the Pacific. Each
mine-layer has but a few hundred mines. Germany
had about 19,500 mines when the war began, and
evidently laid about 14,000 or more in the North
Sea for the purpose of destroying British commerce.
The American nation wishes no navy for the
purpose of waging a war of aggression against any
nation. We wish a navy for the purpose of sup-
porting our policy and defending ourselves. SucH
136 AWAKE! U. S. A.
Average Speed olStifps *
U.S.
Qermany
QcBrftain
Japan
I. Speed of ships whose keels have been laid in the last six years,
showing the increasing tendency for great speed in the construc-
tion of battleships of Germany, Great Britain and Japan.
THE GUARDS WITHOUT
137
AverageTonnage Displacement perOun
Japan
Germany
QF.BFftain
US.
Not only are our ships slower than the ships of Japan, Germany
and Great Britain, not only is the average horsepower of each of
our first line ships less — in most cases less than half that of the
ships of Japan — but the average tonnage displacement Per gun of
our ships is greater.
Our weaker engines propelling ships at less speed must carry
around greater weight per gun than the stronger engines of the
ships of Japan, Germany, and Great Britain. To carry each gun
on the first line ships, our engines must pull a bulk i6 per cent,
heavier than that which the higher-powered engines of Japan's first
line ships have to propel.
138 AWAKE! U. S. A.
defence must prevent other nations from bombard-
ing our cities or landing troops on our coasts. As
the nature of our shores permits landing of troops
practically anywhere along our coast-line, the
primal purpose of our navy is to defend our coast.
"We have 21,000 miles of coast-line and a rapidly
increasing commerce to defend." ®
Our coast-line now includes that of Alaska,
Hawaii, the Philippines and Porto Rico, as well as
that of the continental United States.
German submarines are certainly as efficient as
ours. With one-half of their submarine fleet and
fourteen thousand mines, they attempted to block-
ade 2,600 miles of the coast-line of Great Britain.
Yet with all these means, they were able to stop or
destroy only two per cent, of the ships entering
British ports.
We have an idea that our present fleet of sub-
marines and our present supply of mines will be of
great value in defending our coasts against an in-
vading fleet. At least, we have hoped that the
number of mines we have, strewn along our coast,
and the activity of our submarines might be able to
prevent a considerable portion of an attacking fleet
from landing men on our shore.
We will assume that our submarines are just as
powerful, just as fleet, just as perfect in construc-
tion, just as well manned as the German submarines
which operated against the English coast for eight-
THE GUARDS WITHOUT 139
een months — and the German submarines are the
marvels of the world.
We will assume that the mines we have can be
laid just as efficiently and that they are just as pow-
erful as the mines Germany planted on the seas in
her attempt to prevent ships entering British ports.
Germany's effort in preventing ships entering
English ports was confined to a coast-line one-tenth
as extensive as the coast-line we would have to
guard. Her chances, compared to what ours would
be, were consequently ten to one. The number of
German submarines, compared to those we have,
indicates that Germany's chances, compared to what
ours would be, were five to one. The number of
mines the Germans used compares to all the mines
we have as twenty-five to one. Taking all these
factors into consideration, the chances Germany
had of preventing ships entering British harbours
compares to the chance we would have of prevent-
ing foreign vessels entering our harbours as 1250
to I.
Our present Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels,
takes great pride in comparing our navy to other
navies of the world by showing its relative tonnage.
In tonnage the navy of Great Britain is 183 per cent,
greater than ours, while Germany's, according to
the Navy Year Book of 1914, was 24 per cent,
greater than ours. By this same method our navy
140 AWAKE! U. S. A.
is ranked greater than the navy of France and
greater than that of Japan.
No method of judging the fighting quaUties of a
navy can be more misleading and ridiculous than to
determine those qualities by the tonnage of the
navy. One might as well judge the fighting quali-
ties of a man by his bulk. On the tonnage basis
the greatest pugilist in the world would be the fat-
test man. If a man has a gouty foot and a wrenched
back, if his wrists are swollen with rheumatism;
and his shoulders suffering from neuritis, he isn't
of much value in the fighting ring, even though he
may weigh 470 pounds.
All naval authorities of Europe consider a battle-
ship as a fighting instrument, not a boat. As a
fighting instrument, either for offensive or defen-
sive purposes, a battleship loses much of its value
in twelve years, and is completely superannuated in
twenty years. For this reason, a navy rapidly de-
teriorates in value if new ships are not constantly
added. Consequently the plans of construction for
the European navies are based upon retiring ships
as soon as they reach a certain age, replacing them'
with modern up-to-date ships. A merchant vessel
is an efficient carrier of commerce when it is twenty
or even thirty years old, but a carrier of commerce
is not a fighting instrument.
Our navy department, however, counts as fight-
ing instruments anything and everything that floats
THE GUARDS WITHOUT
141
Battleships and Bottle Cruisers >
Qr.BFitafn
Qerman
Japan
U.S.A.
I. This represents the number of battleships and battle cruisers
authorized and laid down from December 31st, 1904, to January ist,
1 914.
And since January ist, 1914, Germany, Japan and Great Britain
have been rushing construction of ships of this type at a tremen-
dous rate.
It is admitted even by Secretary Daniels that Great Britain has
probably completed sixteen large ships since this date. It is known
that Germany and Japan have been rushing construction of new
ships night and day.
A member of the Japanese Cabinet, in presenting the new budget,
urged that "not a single hour should be lost in Japanese Naval
construction."
The United States has lagged woefully behind; at this writing,
April 1st, 1916, the Oklahoma and Nevada are not yet in service,
although they were authorized more than five years ago.
142 AWAKE! U. S. A.
in a seaworthy condition. No other method of
making the apparent strength of our navy more
misleading could possibly be evolved.
Our navy has greatly decreased in value rela-
tively to other great navies during the last six years
because new fighting instruments have not been
built to take the place of those that have lost the
value they once had. Because the American people
fail to recognise the difference between the fighting
value of a ship and its seaworthiness, they are still
under the impression that they now have as strong
a navy compared to the navies of other nations as
they had under President Roosevelt. A battleship
fifteen years old may be a very efficient and sea-
worthy craft, but almost useless as a fighting fac-
tor. Our Navy Department not only lists ships
fifteen years old, but those twenty years old, thirty
years old, and even forty years old.
Only four months ago the government at last as-
signed to the junk-man a warship built just seventy-
three years ago. This ship was used in the war
with Mexico in 1846 and went to Japan with Perry
in 1853.
By listing anything and everything and ignoring
our shortage in enlisted men and reserves, we have
greatly over-rated our naval efficiency. If we in-
clude personnel and count only ships less than
twenty years old, we fall to fourth place, finding
France's navy better than ours.
THE GUARDS WITHOUT 143
Other nations of the world do not list their ships
in this way. Japan, for instance, discarded most of
her torpedo boats more than seven or eight years
old. In 1904 the navy list of the official report of
the Empire of Japan showed 85 torpedo boats; in
1913 she lists but S3- Her old torpedo boats have
become useless as fighting factors and Japan does
not try to deceive herself by counting her useless
units. Also note that the official report of the Em-
pire of Japan shows that she has added 47 new war
vessels to her navy, exclusive of her torpedo boats
and submarines in the last twelve years.
According to our naval lists, we have, of all types
of fighting ships — battleships, armoured cruisers,
first, second and third class cruisers — only 27 ships
whose keels have been laid in the last twelve years,
even counting ships almost completed, but not yet
in commission.
Other navies of the world do not count their ships
until they are finished. We count them as units
of our navy as soon as they are voted and the Navy
Department counts them the moment the keels are
laid. But oftentimes two years elapse between the
voting and the laying of the keel. And three years
more elapse between the laying of the keel and the
commissioning of the ship. The Nevada and the
Oklahoma at the present moment, April i, 1916,
are not yet in service, although they were voted
early in ipii, five years ago.
U4.
AWAKE! U. S. A.
Bottle Crutseps >
Qr.BFitaJ
Qerman
Japan
U.S.A. O
I. This represents the number of battleships and battle cruisers
authorised and laid down from December 31, 1904, to January i,
1914.
During this period Great Britain authorized and laid down 10, Ger-
many 7, Japan 6, U. S. A. none.
And since January i, 1914. Great Britain, Germany and Japan
have rushed construction of battle cruisers at an enormous rate.
We have no battle cruisers in our navy, and none is authorised.
THE GUARDS WITHOUT 145
Seoul Cruisers <
Qr.Brii(ifn
Qermany
Japon p
U.S.A.
I. This represents the number of battleships and scout cruisers
authorised and laid down from December 31, 1904, to January i,
1 91 4.
And since January i, 1914, Great Britain, Germany and Japan
have rushed construction of scout cruisers at an enormous rate.
We have neither authorised nor laid down a single scout cruiser
since December 31, 1904, and we have only three defective ones
in our entire navy.
146 AWAKE! U. S. A.
If you glance over the reports of the Secretary of
the Navy, you will arrive at the conclusion that we
have thirty-three first-class battleships capable of
defending our shores. But the ordinary reader
does not understand that when a ship is ''out of
commission" or "in ordinary" or *'in reserve," it is
temporarily or permanently useless.
"A battleship 'in ordinary,' as it is called, with
less than a hundred men on board might as well be
eliminated from the lists of ships available for any
service within reasonable length of time." "^
And when a ship is "out of commission" it takes
months to repair it. The overhauling and repair-
ing of the engines and machinery of a fifteen to
eighteen million dollar fighting machine cannot be
done in a few short weeks.
At the present day a navy is of value for defen-
sive purposes only if it is ready in both material
and personnel for immediate action. If Winston
Churchill had not kept the British Navy in such a
state of preparation that it could sail to sea on
twelve hours' notice, England would now be a con-
quered province of the German Empire. If Eng-
land had found it necessary to take even sixty days
to put her fleet in order, the German fleet could
have bombarded the towns of northern France, the
Germans would have reached Paris and, the German
fleet controlling the channel, the Germans could
have landed an arrhy of five hundred thousand men
THE GUARDS WITHOUT 147
in England before England could have mobilised
more than 200,000 soldiers. England's existence
to-day is due not only to the fact that she had a
great navy, but that she had it ready to move at
once.
As Rear Admiral Knight has stated, "A ship
v^hich is laid up for repairs is, for all practical pur-
poses of defence, practically non-existent." The
rest of a fleet will be defeated before the ships "in
ordinary" or *'in reserve" can be made ready to be
of any value to the fleet.
Of our 33 battleships, 12 are already in one or
another of the three useless classes; and all of the
21 remaining are not by any means in first-class
condition. Many of them are continuously in na-
val hospitals. Of those in actual commission, ten
only are ships of the first line and eleven of the sec-
ond line. Of the ten of the first line, two are so
out of date that they are to be relegated to the sec-
ond line within three months. So by June ipi6
we shall have only eight first-class battleships in
the entire American navy; and not one of these bat-
tleships can maintain a speed of more than ^^V2
knots, not one has a gun that can be elevated more
than fifteen degrees and every one is weighted down
with over-heavy armour.
To man our ships in time of war with the small-
est possible crews would require 72,500 men. We
148 AWAKE! U. S. A.
have 53,000. Our torpedo boats have but two offi-
cers each. They should have six.
As previously stated, our only purpose in desiring
an efficient navy is to protect ourselves from battle
fleets coming to our shores with the intention of in-
flicting damage upon us or of demanding conces-
sions and indemnities from us. We want a fleet
that can prevent the landing of foreign troops on
our coast.
The great navy of England has been developed
for defensive purposes; first to reach out and de-
fend its colonies and its commerce with them and
other countries ; and second, to defend Great Britain
itself from invasion. The German Navy has been
built up to defend German commerce and to defend
Germany's commercial ports, in case Great Britain
should ever attempt to bombard Hamburg and Bre-
men, as she bombarded Copenhagen and Amster-
dam to destroy their commerce when they were
ports of world importance.
From the defensive standpoint, therefore, a navy
is of value proportionately to the length of its coast-
line ; a navy is of value in proportion to the popula-
tion of the country it has to defend — if the com-
merce of that country is destroyed all of the people
will suffer; and a navy is of value in proportion to
the area of the country it has to defend, inasmuch
as the value of areal products will decrease in pro-
portion to interference with the country's interna-
THE GUARDS WITHOUT 149
Compapolfve
NoYalProtectfon Dfven Eadi dtiiea
Japan ■■
Mi
Qenna
QF£nta
NovolProteclfonpeFMfleof Coast Lfine
U.SA. ■ 1
Japan ■§
QcBrttafn
Q^mony
Naval-PFotedf on Qiven HomeLands
By
U.S.A. I
Japan
Oermany
Qr.BFitain
150 AWAKE! U. S. A.
tional trade. This is the only true way of valuing
a navy.
Germany has a coast-line of i,ooo miles; Great
Britain and Ireland have a coast-line of 3,700 miles,
Japan has a coast-line of 6,600 miles. From the
defensive standpoint (as we have an enemy in the
Orient) our coast-line stretches from Maine to
Florida, from Florida to Mexico, from Mexico to
Porto Rico, and from Porto Rico to Panama; on
the west it stretches from Panama to Lower Cali-
fornia, from Lower California to British Colum-
bia, along the shores of Alaska; and then there are
the Hawaiian Islands, Guam and the Philippine Is-
lands. The Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary
of War, states that the coast-line we must defend
equals 21,000 miles. Comparing the greater popu-
lation of the United States with that of other coun-
tries, its greater territory with theirs, its greater
coast-line with theirs, our navy is pitiably small and
inefficient.
Even though our battleships outnumbered and
outclassed those of the enemy; even though we had
a sufficient number of high-speed cruisers; even
though our coast forts had guns of fifteen-mile
range, instead of seven and a half — of what value
will our guards be to us if we leave them as now
with ammunition enough for only thirty minutes'
fighting ?
"The amount actually available for the guns
THE GUARDS WITHOUT 151
in some of our most important batteries is
sufficient for only thirty or forty minutes' fir-
ing." «
But lack of sufficient trained personnel is even
more serious than lack of ammunition — because
ammunition can be more easily obtained.
QUOTATION REFERENCES
^ Page 127. Editorial, Indiana newspaper.
' Page 128. National Defense, Vol I, No. 2.
^ Page 131. Associated Press report.
* Page 134. Press report of an interview with an Ameri-
can naval officer.
^ Page 134. Associated Press report of interview with
John Hays Hammond, Jr.
^ Page 138. The Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary
of War.
' Page 146. Rear-Admiral Austin Knight.
^ Page 151. Report of the Army Committee of the
National Security League, including : Hon. Henry L. Stim-
son, ex-Secretary of War ; Colonel William C. Church, edi-
tor Army and Navy Journal; Captain Matthew Hannah;
General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Putnam;
Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others.
CHAPTER II
tut GUARDS AT The; door
THE ordinary American citizen believes that the
guns of our harbour defence would be able to
prevent a landing of troops on our shores ; but the
layman does not make a distinction between harbour
defences and land coast defences. The guns of our
harbour forts may be of value in opposing an attack
upon our cities and may be of value in preventing
ships entering the harbour, but of land coast de-
fences, we have none! There are i,ooo miles of
good beach on our Atlantic coast on which an ene-
my's fleet could land without the least opposition
any number of troops they might transport to our
shores.
We have no guns there; we have no railroad
tracks capable of carrying guns to those points ; we
have not a single armoured train in this country
for the transportation of troops, guns and ammu-
nition — the ordinary freight car under fire of an
enemy would be almost useless. So far as prevent-
ing armed invasion of our country, the guns at our
harbour defences are absolutely useless.
152
THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 153
We have forts at Boston, New York, at the moutK
of the Chesapeake and on the Pacific coast. The
gun range of these forts is less than seven and a
half miles — four and a half miles short of the
range of the guns of the battleships which would be
sent to attack us. The main entrance of the Chesa-
peake, leading to Washington, is one and a half
miles beyond the extreme range of the guns at Fort
Monroe. So that an entire fleet of the enemy could
steam through, more than a mile beyond the reach
■of Fort Henry's guns.
The largest guns we have mounted on our Atlan-
tic coast defences are twelve-inch. They carry 7^
miles. General Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, who
has been in the army twenty years, states that if we
remount these guns so as to make greater elevation
and consequently longer range possible, we must re-
duce the bursting charge or weaken the penetrating
power of the shell.
These guns might be so mounted as to have a
range of fifteen miles. At such a distance the
*'angle of fall" is so great that the principal effect
is obtained by the shell falling on the deck. If
these guns were remounted so as to have a range of
even fifteen miles, the penetrating power of their
shells would become practically nil. The penetrat-
ing power of the shell, reduced in size from 1,000
pounds to 700 pounds, would be but six inches. Six-
inch penetration power against modern battleships
154 AWAKE! U. S. A.
renders a shell practically useless so far as penetra-
tion is concerned. The explosion of a shell which
penetrates battleship armour but six inches takes
place in the air outside the ship. The real value
of an explosive shell is in exploding within the ship,
either after penetrating the armour or falling on
the deck. In other words, for adequate long-dis-
tance defence our harbour guns are useless because
of their short length. They would be relatively
weak if remounted, for either armour or deck
attack.
We are, however, soon to mount two new gigan-
tic guns of long range at Sandy Hook. These two
guns are to operate in a single turret, hence it will
be possible to aim them at but one point at a time.
If a fleet of thirty dreadnoughts and battle cruisers
attacked New York, each of the thirty ships could
move about at will, changing its location as often as
desired, so that the turret to be placed at Sandy
Hook, to be effective against such a fleet, would be
compelled to get thirty different aim ranges at the
same time for thirty different battleships. But the
ships, moving themselves about as much as they
pleased, could centre their one hundred and fifty
guns at the same moment on the one fixed turret at
Sandy Hook. Thirty different battleships from
thirty different locations could concentrate the shot
of one hundred fifty guns on the single turret at
THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 155
Sandy Hook ; yet it could fire at but one single bat-
tleship at a time.
While these two long-range guns could fire twenty
shots at thirty different moving ships, the battle-
ships could hurl 2,000 huge explosive shells upon
that fixed turret. And all other coast defence guns
would be useless in such a conflict because of their
short range.
''Most of the guns that are mounted on our coast
fortifications, that is — all those of the 8-inch, 10-
inch, and 12-inch calibre — date back to a design that
was made in the early nineties and late eighties." *
The good 12-inch guns made for the defences of
Panama, after having rested for months and even
years on the Cristobel Docks, are at last mounted;
but our one big gun there, the 16-inch gun, which
we have been told was so powerful a defence for
the canal, was still unmounted last January. It was
tested in ipoj and then it rested ten years on the
beach. When General Wood took charge he imme-
diately called for blue prints of the carriage of this
gun, but was astonished to find that the War De-
partment had never even made a design for the
carriage. In spite of his urging, it took the depart-
ment just two years to get the designs ready, and
the carriage was not finished in January 1916,
though the gun was finished and tested thirteen
years ago. This, in itself, is an adequate answer
to Secretary Daniels' proposal to have the United
156 AWAKE! U. S. A.
States Government make its own armour, manu-
facture its large guns, shells and ammunitions.
Panama is better fortified than any other portion
of our coast or any other harbour, yet we have on
hand such an insufficient amount of ammunition
that after two hours' fire there would not be one
single shell for the Panama guns within a thousand
miles of the Canal. In fact, for the sixteen-inch
gun, no shells are yet made. Congress has ex-
travagantly ordered J5 rounds for this gun, and this
is under manufacture but not yet ready to ship.
For the twelve-inch guns at Panama, only 2,^00
rounds have been shipped.
"It must be borne in mind that an hour and forty-
six minutes would suffice to exhaust the last round
of ammunition if the guns were fired at their max-
imum rate." ^
It is assumed by the American people that if war
broke out, we could manufacture ammunition
quickly. We are misled as to our ability to quickly
produce sufficient ammunition by what seems to us
the enormous war orders which we are filling for
Europe. That war has been going on for sixteen
months. Every manufacturer in the United States
can sell two and three and four hundred per cent,
more shells a day than it is possible for us to manu-
facture. The big industrial arms and steel fac-
tories of the United States have turned their forces
to filling these orders because they can obtain almost
THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 157
ppoduGtion o/ArlillepyAmrnunilloii
fnU.S.
/25,000
^ 6Q000
C
fgOOO
A. Rounds of artillery ammunition now used every day by France.
The figures are given on the authority of a Major-General of the
United States Army.
B. The number of rounds of artillery ammunition used every day
by the British forces in France. The figures are given by the
same authority as the above.
C. The number of rounds of artillery ammunition which all the
United States Government factories and all the private ammuni-
tion plants are able to produce daily, after twenty months of in-
tense effort on the part of our greatest industrial corporations,
backed by our greatest financiers, both endeavouring to turn out
the largest possible number of shells.
England and France alone are now using every twenty-four hours
not only as many shells as all the U. S. Government and private
manufacturers in the United States can turn out, but 873 per cent,
more.
158 AWAKE! U. S. A.
any price asked, yet with all the push of big busi-
ness, knowing that enormous profits await them,
after sixteen months' effort, all the industrial re-
sources, governmental and private, are turning out
only ig,ooo a day. One of the highest officials of
the United States Army states that France alone
is using 12^,000 shells a day and England 60,000.
But let no layman think that the factories of the
United States can turn out nineteen thousand shells
a day for American guns!
Some of our factories are turning out guns for
European nations ; other factories are making shells
for Russia. These guns are made to inch measure.
The shells are made to the millimetre measure.
Even though the shells and the bore of the guns are
almost the same size, the shell made to the milli-
metre measure cannot be used in the gun made to
the inch measure. The shell must exactly fit the
gun — not ''almost" fit it.
A change of machinery would be necessary to
make shells to fit American guns and it takes
months to make the machines that make the shells.
It takes months to make the machines that in turn
make the ammunition-making machines.
It is also urged that we could, if war were de-
clared, run our factories night and day, and turn
out enormous amounts of ammunition, thus
equipping ourselves in a short time. Such an as-
sumption or such an argument is due to ignorance.
THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 159
At present almost all of the ferro-manganese which
our steel factories depend upon as the alloy, comes
from India and Brazil. We can make ferro-man-
ganese in the United States; but if our munition
manufacturers should be forced to make it out of;
our ore, the manganese content would be much
lower. The product would also cost more; and
there would be trouble in the factories before our
chemists became adjusted to the use of the American
product.
If we were at war, any foreign navy could easily
cut off our supply. Two or three Bmdens near the
coast of Brazil, or near the ports of India, could
completely bar this material from importation into
the United States.
Gun cotton is one of the principal ingredients of
smokeless powder. But to make gun cotton, it is
necessary to have nitric acid. Nitric acid is made
from nitrates. By far the largest source of our
supply comes from Chile. This supply could also
be cut off. Our principal sulphur mines are along
the coast and a foreign navy could easily take pos-
session of them.
The time to prepare for war is before the war be-
gins. The great English drive, which Kitchener
prophesied would take place last May, failed to ma-
terialise because General French had shells only for
one day's fighting out of seven.
All our forts are but half manned. Those about
160 AWAKE! U. S. A.
Boston have an average of less than 240 men each.
Fort Wadsworth, protecting New York, has a gar-
rison of about four hundred men, and Fort Hamil-
ton about one-third more.
"Unless provision is made in the near future for
additional Coast Artillery personnel, it will be nec-
essary to reduce the garrisons to mere caretaker
detachments at some of the defences of lesser im-
portance, including Portsmouth, Delaware, Charles-
ton, Savannah, Key West, New Bedford, Potomac,
Tampa, Columbia, Baltimore, Cape Fear and Mo-
bile." ^
A short time ago one of the two forts at Key
West, the true key to the Gulf of Mexico, was
manned by a sergeant and his family. After the
death of the Sergeant, the widow and her daughter
for months formed the garrison of defence.
General Weaver, Chief of the Coast Artillery
Division, stated in the Senate that we have 252
twelve-inch guns already mounted without a single
person to man them, two fourteen-inch guns mount-
ed without a single man to operate them and 37
eight-inch guns mounted and useless with no crew,
71 ten-inch guns mounted without a single man to
operate them. Modern guns are not simple cata-
pults but complicated machineries. One has to be
trained and skilled to handle them. No matter how
intelligent the American citizen, he cannot step in
and at once operate one of these guns off-hand, as
THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 161
men could jump in and operate the guns of a hun-
dred years ago.
A century ago the guns used were short-range
guns. One could look at the object he aimed at
and by sighting over the gun with his eye, bring
the gun into line.
But at the present time gunners manipulating
even the seven-mile range guns of our harbour de-
fences are unable to aim by eye. As the gunner
looks seven miles out at sea, he sees only the mast
of the ship, very little of the hull. If the ship is
ten miles away he sees no hull at all. But even if
he sees the entire deck of a great dreadnought —
one, six hundred feet long — by holding a cigarette
in front of his eye at arm's length, the entire ship
is completely shut off from his vision. The mark
to be aimed at, so far as the eye is concerned, is less
than the size of a cigarette.
For instance, a few years ago large mortars were
considered practically useless — the aim was so bad.
However, since the installation of base stations,
range finding and direction finding instruments,
these guns are valuable again. The use of these in-
struments for determining lateral deviation, eleva-
tion, and the handling of complicated machinery of
the guns is work for skillfully trained men.
Aiming to-day is the result of the co-operation of
three corps of men at three different places. The
man down in the pit firing the gun is unable to see
162 AWAKE! U. S. A.
anything, except the sky above him. To argue that
an untrained man, even though skilled in other lines
of mechanics, could step in and efficiently handle
these guns is as ridiculous as to argue that a man
who has never touched an automobile could enter
as a race-driver merely because he knew how to run
a typewriter.
But even if more men could be quickly trained,
large numbers of the guns, in fact, a very large
number, could not be used because we have not suf-
ficient range-finders. Direction and fire control
have been installed only at the most important har-
bour forts along our coasts. They have not been
installed in other places, not only because Congress
has not provided for them, but because we cannot
import the necessary lenses at the present time.
Not only are many of the guns of our coast de-
fence absolutely blind, but many of the guns of
our army and of our navy could not be used,
because we neither have glasses, nor can we
buy them. And, moreover, we cannot manufacture
them. Our manufacturers are dependent upon Ger-
many for the glass for the lenses. At present we
cannot get that glass. If Germany were to attack
us, she would not kindly send us 50,000 or 100,000
lenses in advance. If we were at peace with Ger-
many, and Japan or Great Britain should attack us,
the navy of Japan or the navy of Great Britain is
efficient enough to interfere with our imports.
THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 163
In this case, as in the case of munitions, the ques-
tion is asked : Why can't we get to work and manu-
facture them? Chemists and workmen who are
speciaHsts in this Hne are rare. We have very few
in this country. We have not a sufficient number
of chemists and workmen speciaHsed in these lines
to meet the present demand. It takes time for the
ordinary chemists to become speciaHsts, just as it
takes time for the ordinary physician to acquire the
knowledge and technique necessary to make him a
specialist.
Our coast fortifications manned with from i6o
to 600 men can easily be taken from the rear by
five thousand men, landed eight miles away, beyond
the range of the guns of the fort. None of the guns
protecting Boston, New York and the entrance to
Washington could be used to repel a land attack.
"Fortified harbours from the days of the Romans,
to our own have usually fallen to a land attack ren-
dered possible by naval superiority." *
All along the Atlantic coast there are excellent
strips of beach from fifty to two hundred miles in
length. Speaking of the possibility of landing an
army on these, General Francis Greene says:
"From Portland to Portsmouth there is a stretch
of about fifty miles in which there are no fortifica-
tions, from Portsmouth to Boston a similar stretch,
from Boston around to Newport a still longer piece
of unfortified coast; from Montauk Point to Coney
164 AWAKE! U. S. A.
Island and from Sandy Hook to Cape May, similar
stretches of sandy beach, each more than a hundred
miles in length." °
QUOTATION REFERENCES
^ Page 155. General Weaver, testifying before Com-
mittee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives.
2 Page 156. Huidekoper, in "The Military Unprepared-
ness of the United States."
^ Page 160. Brigadier-General E. M. Weaver.
* Page 163. National Defense, Vol. I, No. 2.
^ Page 164. General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V., in
"The Present Military Situation in the United States."
CHAPTER III
THE GUARDS WITHIN
AFTER the mud dikes have been washed away,
what will there be to stop the flood?
When the enemy attacks our eastern or our west-
ern coast, it will be done without warning. It will
be executed just as Great Britain bombarded Copen-
hagen in 1807, just as Japan attacked China in 1894,
just as she unexpectedly attacked the Russian navy
two days before declaring war against Russia, just
as Austria sent her soldiers to France in 1914
three days before she withdrew her ambassador
from Paris, just as Germany marched into Belgium
but four hours after the German Ambassador at
Brussels indignantly intimated to the Belgian for-
eign office that the latter should not even question
Germany's honourable intentions respecting Bel-
gium's neutrality.
High officials of both Germany and Japan have
informed their people even in print that when they
attack the United States it will be done quickly and
without warning. No time to prepare will be
given us.
165
166
AWAKE! U. S. A.
OIIFTreasupeLands>l]idlWe^fllstProled
andHioseolIlObJUae Powers
'Holland
SwltzefioDd
Serbia
PoFlujSol
Uberfa
Rumanfa
Sweden
Persia
(•Peru
VS.
I /im »
I JtOT
P jurad <
I «• .
I' ««»
■ H/)" •
■ WW
fltvat^mki
THE GUARDS WITHIN 167
OiirMeanso/Proledinj5 ouFTreosure Lands
Compaped wirh those 0/ fifth Rale Powers
Sweden mmmmmammm^mmmami^mmmmimm^mmm
6000X
SerMa mmmmmmmtmm^mmam^^mmm
^ woes
SwifzeploDd mm^mammmammmmmmmmmm
wo coo
Holland wmmmmmmmmm
±50000
Ifberja
Persia
Peru
UFUjjooy
Although the treasure lands which we have to protect are from
420 per cent, to 308,330 per cent, greater than the lands of any one
of the fifth-rate powers, yet the mobile army which we have in
the United States to protect our lands is but 5.6 per cent, of the
army of Sweden, and but 30 per cent, of that of Uruguay.
1. Entire United States Army scattered throughout United States,
in Porto Rico, in the Philippines, in Hawaii, in Alaska.
2. The mobile army in continental United States.
168 AWAKE! U. S. A.
To defend our eastern coast against a quick at-
tack we have an army of 6,600 men, stretched
from Maine to Florida. This army, in number,
equals one-fifteenth of the army of Paraguay, one-
sixteenth of the army of Siam, one-seventeenth
that of Guatemala, one-thirtieth that of Liberia.
The soldiers of one thousand one hundred and
nine armies, each equal in size to our entire army
of the East, have been killed, wounded or taken pris-
oners during the last twenty-one months in Europe.
Even the mobile entire army in the United States,
which General Wood says might possibly be mobil-
ised in thirty days by taking all of our troops from
the Mexican border and the Pacific coast, numbers
only 34,000 men and they are scattered about in
forty-nine different ports.
Of course, in extreme necessity, this regular army
could be reinforced by our reserve army of sixteen
men!
The English and French have lost in killed and
wounded five times as many men as our "Entire mo-
bile army in the United States on a battle front not
twenty miles long in Gallipuli alone!
And the militia ! It also is scattered from Boston
to Charleston, from Seattle to Los Angeles. On
paper, our militia numbers 119,000 men. More
than 60,000 of these men have had no rifle practice
and only one-third of them have been able to pass
the test of second-class marksmanship. Thirty
THE GUARDS WITHIN 169
ComporaKve
AFmyEquipmenl Proleclion Qtv^Each ClUzen
By
V.S.A. ■
Japan ■■
QFJBpftofn
Qeimonyi
Army-Poliee Proleclion Qlven Eadi Cilizen
U.S.A. I
Austpalta
Old^sysiem
Sew System
^SiiiiieFiana
170 AWAKE! U. S. A.
thousand have never tried to qualify as third-class
marksmen. Forty- four thousand seldom appear on
the rifle ranges from year to year.
"In no state is the prescribed minimum peace
strength of all organisations of the organised mili-
tia maintained, and in many instances the deficiency
has reached such a figure as to leave the correspond-
ing organisations such in name only, organisations
of no value as military assets to the Federal Gov-
ernment." *
"It is believed to be a safe conclusion that not a
single unit at its maximum strength marched a dis-
tance of 10 miles fully equipped." ^
In times of war large cities have to be garri-
soned. If we were to bunch together all of our
mobile army and all of our trained militia, we would
not have a garrison equal to that which Paris re-
quires at the present time, and Paris is only about
one-half the size of New York, and about a third
larger than Chicago.
If our entire army and every man of our militia
were to be thinly stretched out in trenches, they
would cover but two-thirds of the circumference of
Greater New York alone. If then the entire mobile
army of the United States and every man of the
militia of our forty-eight states could be made, as
by magic, to instantly appear in New York City,
they could establish one single trench but two-thirds
the way around Greater New York, leaving for the
THE GUARDS WITHIN
171
U.S. AFmy Pfo tectf on
per tOOO.OOO Cfifzens
initio
inl/iLjO
in kQ(?
f'nmi
In 1810, 1840 and 1890 we found ourselves well along in great
peace periods.
The year 1810 was twenty-eight years after the close of the War
of the Revolution; the year 1840 was twenty-five years after the
close of the War of 1812; and the year 1890 was twenty-five years
after the close of the Civil War.
During such long peace periods without any danger looming up
before a nation, the people become indifferent to the army and
the protection it may be called upon to give them.
Yet to-day, after five years of anarchy to the south of us, with half
of the entire world at war, with ourselves in^ greater danger than
at any time since the Civil War, we find that in proportion to each
million of population, the number of soldiers we have in the United
States to protect us is only about 25 per cent, of what it was in
1810.
172 AWAKE! U. S. A.
enemy a free open pathway into our interior thirty
miles wide.
In proportion to our citizens, in proportion to our
area, and in proportion to our wealth, we have a
smaller army than we have had even during the
great peace periods of the United States.
In 1810, twenty-eight years after the close of the
War of the Revolution, Senators and Representa-
tives in Washington held that the United States
would never again be involved in war. It was
during this time that many public men even advo-
cated the abolition of the army, believing that it
would never be employed again.
By 1840, twenty-six years after the War of 1812-
14, we had been at peace with all Europe for a quar-
ter of a century. Europe seemed disposed to let
us alone. There seemed to be no reason why we
should ever go to war again. And once more prom-
inent public men at our capital suggested not only
the abolition of our army, but even the abolition
of our navy, hinting that the world was so civilised
that no great war would ever again occur.
By 1890, twenty-five years after the close of our
Civil War, we had again had a generation of peace
and the men in power were of a different age than
those who had been leaders during the War of the
Rebellion. These are three great peace periods of
our national history — periods during which there
was the least thought of war.
THE GUARDS WITHIN
173
U.S. Army Proleclion
per 100,000 SquareMiles
in I ^10
in/Jiw
in mo
/nm7
In i8io, 1840 and 1890 we found ourselves well along in great peace
periods.
The year 1810 was twenty-eight years after the close of the War
of the Revolution, the year 1840 was twenty-five years after the
close of the War of 1812 ; the year 1890 was twenty-five years after
the close of the Civil War.
During such long peace periods without any danger looming before
a nation, the people become indifferent to the army and the pro-
tection it may be called upon to give them.
Because of the great increase of our territory out of all propor-
tion to the increase of our army, the number of soldiers we have
to protect every thousand square miles from invasion is, to-day, but
one-half of what it was in 1810.
174 AWAKE! U. S. A.
In a democracy like that of the United States, the
one purpose of the army is to protect the nation
from rebellion, to protect the nation from outside
attack. It is the idea and duty of the army to pro-
tect its citizens, to protect its land, to protect its
wealth. But in times of peace, especially after a
whole generation of peace, there is a tendency to
forget the value of any army — to forget that a na-
tion's citizens, that a nation's wealth needs a stand-
ing army for its protection. Hence we might ex-
pect that in 1810, 1840, 1890 the army of the
United States would have been smaller in propor-
tion to the number of its citizens, in proportion to
its area and in proportion to its wealth than to-day
when nations and colonies of four of the five con-
tinents are at war.
But in proportion to our population our mobile
army in the United States furnishes us to-day but
S97 soldiers per million population against 4^6 in
1890, 621 in 1840 and 1417 in 18 10.
In proportion to each hundred thousand square
miles of our territory, the mobile army in the Unit-
ed States to-day furnishes, for the protection of that
unit of area, but 10^4. soldiers, as against 104.1 in
1890, 1/74 in 1840, i<)84. in 18 10.
That which will most tempt foreign nations, how-
ever, is not the number of our people nor the
amount of land we have — each of the hungry na-
tions can secure undeveloped lands in South Amer-
THE GUARDS WITHIN
175
U.S. AFmy Pvotection
perBilUon of US.Wealfh
Our wealth tempts foreign nations more than our population, more
even than our land.
One week's bombardment of New York, Philadelphia, Washington,
Boston, San Francisco and Seattle might win for a foreign power
indemnities of fifteen billions of dollars.
To-day more than any other time in our national history we need
an army to protect our wealth.
The army we now have to protect each billion of wealth is ridicu-
lously small compared with that which we had in 1810, 1840, and
1890, when we appeared to be in no danger.
Per billion of wealth, our army in 1890 was nearly 100 per cent,
greater than it is to-day; in 1840 it was nearly 550 per cent, greater;
and in 1810 it was 2,100 per cent, greater.
176 AWAKE! U. S. A.
ica — but our wealth tempts them ! In proportion to
each billion of wealth our mobile army in the United
States at the present time furnishes us but 24^ sol-
diers against 4^1 in 1890, 1/61 in 1840, 4960 in
1 8 10. Yet there are those who fear that we are
becoming militaristic !
We have grown so rapidly in population, we have
added to our territory so greatly and we have grown
in wealth so enormously that our army to-day is but
a handful, so far as its ability to protect, compared
to the army we supported in the peaceful days of
1810. And in 1810 there had not been, during the
years previous to that time, any great change in the
matter of guns and equipment; but to-day things
have changed.
If we to-day had an army proportionate in num-
bers to our present wealth, as the army of 18 10 was
to the wealth of the nation at that time, it would
give us to-day a mobile force in the United States of
702,697 fighting men.
Neither Thomas Jefferson nor President Madi-
son thought the army in their day too large,
although both were opponents of a big standing
army. But if our wealth in 1810 had been as great
as it is to-day the peace-loving Jefferson and the pa-
cifically-inclined Madison would probably have had
an army of at least 700,000 men, especially if the
population of the United States had then been
ninety-seven millions. If the army of 18 10 had
THE GUARDS WITHIN 177
been reduced so that the number of men stood to
their wealth as the number of men in our army to-
day stands to our present wealth, the United States
would have had an army in 1810 of just 4^1 men.
Our little army has practically no field guns.
"We now have less than 800 guns and ammuni-
tion to serve them less than one and one-half days !"
*'To send our modern infantry without the pro-
tection of field guns against an enemy armed with
them is simply murder."
"After war breaks out, field guns cannot be pur-
chased abroad, nor can they be extemporised at
home. From the date of giving the order for the
manufacture of such guns to the date of delivery of
the first gun, an interval of at least five months
must necessarily elapse." ^
In Europe they are using 12^ and 163^ inch
howitzers. Although by June i, 1915, the war in
Europe had been in progress five months, the Unit-
ed States did not then have a single field howitzer
greater than the six-inch ; and the United States had
only thirty-two of these in all the United States,
Philippines and Hawaii combined. Of the remain-
ing, 85 per cent, are less than 4 inch and, moreover,
80 of these are old mountain guns absolutely ob-
solete.
"We own little over half the guns which Russia
had at the battle of Mukden. Yet any ordinary
178 AWAKE! U. S. A.
engagement of the European war makes the battle
of Mukden look like a peace conference." *
The equipment of the militia is worse than that
of the regular army. It has no siege artillery at
all, no large field mortars nor howitzers ; and both
the batteries of the regular army and the militia are
without sufficient horses to draw them.
"The militia needs 316 of these guns to complete
its equipment." ^
For the guns which the army has and for the
guns which the militia have there is not half enough
ammunition.
For years Congress has been urged to appropriate
enough money to provide our field guns with an am-
munition reserve of 1856 rounds per gun. This to
Congress seemed enormous, although it is 66 per
cent, of the minimum number of rounds that Ger-
many kept on hand in peace times. Year after
year Congress has failed to provide for this ammu-
nition reserve. And at the rate of its past appro-
priations, it will take five years to bring it up to this
34 to 40 per cent, deficiency, compared with the
number of rounds other nations kept on hand when
at peace. At present, for the guns actually made,
we have only 27 per cent, of the ammunition asked
for — 27 per cent, of the estimate which is infinitely
lower than the minimum supply kept on hand by
other nations during peace times. At present Ger-
THE GUARDS WITHIN 179
Ariilleiy Equipment
Oennony mmmammmmmmm
Enj^lond
Jopan
U.S.
This chart represents only the number of guns.
It is almost needless to reiterate that the guns of our army are
toy pistols compared to the great guns of other powers.
Germany has gigantic fourteen-, fifteen- and sixteen-inch guns.
England has hundreds of nine- and twelve-inch guns.
The United States, on the ist of January, 1915, as admitted by the
Secretary of War, had but 634 guns completed.
It is now rumoured that we have 850, and this chart takes advantage
of the rumour.
Of the actual number of guns on hand January i, 1915, 85 per cent,
were less than 4-inch and eighty of these were old 3-inch mountain
guns, absolutely obsolete.
I. This estimate of the number of German guns is very conserva-
tive, as is also the estimate as to the English guns. A former
officer of staff of the United States Army personally informed
the author in January, 1916, that Germany had at least 21,000 guns.
180 AWAKE! U. S. A.
many and France are using three hundred per cent,
more than their pre-zvar maximum estimate. The
number of rounds now allotted to each gun in the
German army is more than 3,000 per cent, greater
than the number of rounds we have on hand per gun
in the United States.
For the guns which the army has and for the
guns which the militia have, there is not half
enough ammunition.
"And we have ammunition to serve those guns,
at the rate ammunition is now used, rather less than
one day and a half of fighting." ^
Sixty years ago cavalry scouts acted as eyes for
the army, reconnoitring and reporting the location
of the enemy. To-day they are about as efficient as
blind men. Reconnoitring is now done by aero-
plane.
"An army without aerial scouts and aerial aux-
iliary can be coralled and slaughtered like a herd of
sheep; a harbour or naval station without aerial
defence is at the mercy of every puny submarine
and cruiser." ^
At the beginning of the war, England had four
hundred aeroplanes and she now finds it necessary
to manufacture about five hundred a week to meet
her needs and those of her allies. Germany at the
beginning of the war had about one thousand aero-
planes and is now manufacturing at least four
THE GUARDS WITHIN
181
Hounds of AFiiUery Ammunition
Q
J356
B
SOU
27U
A. Daily rate at which ammunition has been used on present Euro-
pean battlefields as actually observed by an American military au-
thority, from the fire of two German guns.
B. Actual daily rate of fire per gun of the First Battery of the
Ninth Artillery Brigade at the Battle of Mudken, March 3, 1905.
C. Actual daily amount of ammunition per gun, including all the
reserve ammunition in the United States, if pieced out to last forty-
eight hours. This amount was actually used in two and a half
hours by a German gun, as witnessed by an American military
observer.
We have on hand in the army and in reserve but 27 per cent, of
the minimum peace estimate of the Wai Department. But our
minimum estimate for times of peace is 34 per cent, less than the
minimum estimate made by Germany for each gun in times of
peace.
This means that — in all our reserves — we have on hand for each
gun but ID per cent, of the minimum per gun peace estimate of
Germany.
Germany is now using three times her maximum estimate. Hence
we have on hand for each gun but 2.5 per cent, of the ammunition
Germany can use per gun each twenty-four hours.
182 AWAKE! U. S. A.
hundred weekly. The United States Government
has about thirty useless ones. We have fewer aero-
planes than has Chile, Greece, Spain or Brazil.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, testifying,
stated that the aeroplanes of the navy were of the
oldest makes and that none of them were armoured.
"On the day President Wilson's note was trans-
mitted to Germany, the United States Navy had
only three aeroplanes in commission and the Army
barely twice as many. Of the 150 licensed civil
aviators in the United States, only half have made
flights of more than fifty miles, and none have ex-
perience in cross-country flying or know even the
rudiments of military aeronautical requirements.
Our Army, Navy, National Guard and Naval Mili-
tia have had practically no experience in handling
air craft." ^
The Chief of the Department of Aerial Defence
estimates that if every aeroplane factory in the en-
tire United States were run to its full capacity,
night and day, we could turn out only three hun-
dred weekly.
One of our greatest military authorities, how-
ever — Mr. Carnegie — believes that we do not need
guns, ammunition, aeroplanes or other equipment,
not even rifles, so long as we have in the United
States sixteen million men willing to die for their
native land:
"I have always said that if at any time any
THE GUARDS WITHIN 183
ThM Fourth and Rffli Rale Powers
Surpossiiig us in Aeronautic Equipment
BuIjSapio
Rumania
Serbia
Spoin
Switzerland
U.S. I ■
US. 2 ■
U.5. 3 •
The number of aeroplanes respectively possessed by Bulgaria,
Rumania, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland is greater than repre-
sented here because of the fact that these nations have been adding
aeroplanes to their service since the beginning of the war — and full
details of these additions have not been given out.
1. Of the aeroplanes of the United States, no two are like any
other two; twenty-three are absolutely obsolete and useless; and
none are armoured.
2. Number of aeroplanes supposedly capable of service which the
United States was able to get together to aid in the punitive ex-
pedition into Mexico.
3. The number of aeroplanes that could actually aid in this puni-
tive expedition, all others being unfit for service or breaking down
on first trial.
On the day President Wilson's first note was sent to Germany
the United States had eight unarmoured aeroplanes in comrmssion;
three in the navy and five in the army.
184 AWAKE! U. S. A.
country was foolish enough to attempt invasion,
the best possible plan would be to make their land-
ing as easy as possible, point out to them the best
possible roads, and allow them to go as far as they
desired to go, inland. Then warn them to look
out, and turn a million of our 16,000,000 militia
upon them." ^
But what would the invading enemy be doing
while we were arming a million men? Arming
them with rifles alone would be useless against the
shrapnel-throwers and rapid-fire machine guns of
an invading army. But how are we going to in-
stantly get a million rifles even, not to say any-
thing of the larger guns!
Even if we could raise a million men in a day,
even if we could arm every man with the best rifle
in the world and supply them with an abundance
of ammunition for that rifle; what would happen
if we tried to oppose the advance of 250,000 sol-
diers, or 100,000 or even 10,000 men well equipped
with fan-sweeping mitrailleuses and shrapnel
guns? Our men would be compelled to advance
over a strip of land four miles wide before they
could get within rifle range of the foe. During
every step of that four-mile march, our men would
be swept by shrapnel !
If a million men in any army of Europe should
be so foolhardy as to attempt, without the aid of
successive trenches and the protection of heavy
THE GUARDS WITHIN 185
artillery, to advance against 250,000 men equipped
with mitrailleuses the entire million men could be
wiped out ill an hour.
Armies of Europe are provided with one or more
mitrailleuses for every hundred men. The mitrail-
leuse is a fan-sweeping rapid-fire rifle. It swings
in a fan movement from left to right and from
right to left, firing from three to seven hundred
bullets at terrific speed every minute.
The only protection against them is digging into
trenches; the only machines to combat them are
heavy artillery and shrapnel-throwers. To send
a million rifle-armed citizen soldiery against such
guns would result, just as General Wood and
Henry L. Stimson have said it would result, in
nothing less than murder.
A land force of two hundred thousand invading
men would bring with them at least two thousand
five hundred mitrailleuses, for immediate use, be-
sides those which they would keep in reserve.
These guns can be carried on a soldier's back,
pulled by trained dogs, attached to motorcycles, or
even bicycles. Such an invading army could easily
bring 75,000 such guns if it should be deemed nec-
essary.
But even two thousand five hundred of these
guns could fire in three hours, allowing for changes
of belts, cooling time and so forth, 900,000,000
shots.
il86 AWAKE! U. S. A.
Modern warfare is a contest of trained brains
directing delicate, complicated, high-speed, death-
dealing machines ! No matter how strong the men,
how brave the heart, how noble the soul, citizen
soldiery unequipped with like instruments and un-
directed by like brains are but food for Moloch!
But we would not even be allowed to arm. Two
hundred thousand equipped troops landed at Bos-
ton, New York, Philadelphia and Washington
could almost immediately seize all our eastern ar-
senals, our gun factories, our ammunition, explo-
sive and powder works; so that we could arm our
million men only with golf clubs, walking sticks,
and pocket knives.
Many of the large government ammunition
works, gun factories, naval stations, arsenals and
submarine bases are on the coast and could be
easily destroyed by bombardment from enemy's
ships standing off ten miles completely out of
range of our coast guns. The enemy, if they so
wished, could destroy the five big gun and am-
munition works at Bridgeport; the Winchester
Arms Company and the Modern Firearms Company
at New Haven, the U. S. Naval Magazine at Hing-
ham, Mass., the United States Submarine Station
at Newport, the Bliss Torpedo Works at Brooklyn,
the United States Navy Yards at Portsmouth, Bos- *
ton, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Washington
and Charleston, the United States Arsenal at Gov-
THE GUARDS WITHIN 187
ernor's Island, the Proving Grounds at Indian
Head, the Marine Barracks at Washington and
Port Royal, the Naval Stations at Key West and
Guantanamo, the new Du Pont factories at City
Point, Virginia.
The location of these works is exactly known to
the navies of all foreign nations. Unlike the guns
of our harbour defences, they are not hidden in pits
from the sight of the enemy. While there is a
dumb hope among us that by some miraculous
means we may be able to prevent the guns of for-
eign fleets destroying these factories, that hope is
indeed vain.
Every man knows that a difference of even an
inch in the reach of a prize fighter gives him a
great advantage over an opponent whose reach is
one inch less. But what chance would a prize
fighter have with arms 32 inches long if he were
to attempt to combat with a man with arms 64
inches long? Even if it were possible to install
guns to protect these works their effective range
compared with the range of the guns of foreign
battleships would be as 32 to 64.
The largest United States arsenal for the manu-
facture and storage of rifles is at Springfield,
Massachusetts, three hours by train from Boston
and three and a half hours from New York. At
Dover, New Jersey — less than two hours from New
188 AWAKE! U. S. A.
York — are located the big naval depots for explo-
sives and ammunition for the Atlantic fleet and
the United States Army arsenal, at which prac-
tically all the high explosives and smokeless pow-
der of the United States Government are kept.
Nine-tenths of all the large private manufac-
tories of rifles, rapid-fire guns, heavy artillery,,
shrapnel, smokeless gunpowder, torpedoes and
high explosives are within three and a half hours
by train from Boston, New York or Philadelphia.
The principal private gun, ammunition, powder,
shrapnel and explosive factories are located as
follows :
At Hartford, Connecticut, which is but three
hours by train from New York and three hours
from Boston, are the Colt Patent Fire Arms Com-
pany and Pratt and Whitney Works;
At New Haven, three hours from Boston and
three and a half hours from New York, is the
Smith & Wesson Revolver Co. ;
At Bridgeport, one hour and a half from New
York, are the Bridgeport Arms Company (which is
of such magnitude that it has been able to take many
enormous European war order contracts — one or-
der alone amounting to i68 millions of dollars),
the Union Metallic Cartridge Company, the Ameri-
can-British Manufacturing Company, which makes
rapid-fire guns, and the Locomobile Company;
At Troy, New York, four hours from New
THE GUARDS WITHIN 189
York, are big gun factories and one of the most
important high explosive works in the United
States;
At Schenectady, four hours from New York, is
the General Electric Co., which has already con-
tracted for $100,000,000 European war orders;
At Utica, which is distant from New York but
nine and ten hours by two different routes, is the
Savage Arms Company;
At Ilion, nine hours from New York, is the Rem-
ington Small Arms Company;
At Carney's Point, Parlin Lakes and Pompton
Lakes, each not more than two hours from New
York, are the Du Pont Smokeless Powder Works;
At Dover, New Jersey, but one hour and a half
from New York, is the Picantinny Arsenal ;
At Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, only three hours
from New York, is the Bethlehem Steel Works,
with its big gun factories, shrapnel and torpedo
works ;
At Philadelphia, two hours from New York and
on the Atlantic Coast, is the Baldwin Locomotive
Company ;
At City Point, Virginia, is the new mammoth Du
Pont Powder Works.
And there are also the Westinghouse Company,
the American Car & Foundry Company, the Ameri-
can Locomotive Company, the ^tna Explosive
Company, the Pressed Steel Car Company, the New,
190 AWAKE! U. S. A.
York Air Brake Company, the Crucible Steel Com-
pany, the Hercules Powder Company, and the
Studebaker Corporation — all fitted to make supplies
of war.
But with the exception of a very few establish-
ments, all of the foregoing are within ten hours by
rail of New York. Even Pittsburg, the centre of
the steel industry of the United States, is, for a
military train making no stops except for change
of engines, but ten hours either from New York
or Washington.
Before a foreign army landed, patriotic citizens
of foreign governments naturally loyal to their fa-
therlands, yet living in the United States, could cut
all telegraphic and telephonic cables between New
York and the West, and five hundred of these
men by quick and unexpected attacks could seize
and control the wireless stations.
They could establish themselves in accordance to
previous instructions along the principal railways
leading out of New York City, protecting the rail-
ways from damage, and easily keeping them clear
for the movement of foreign troops.
I am well aware that not one out of ten thou-
sand Americans will believe that there is, within
the United States, any military supervision of the
citizens of foreign governments. The sun shines,
however, even though blind men fail to see it.
And if we do not wake up to the fact that there
THE GUARDS WITHIN 191
are in the United States at present semi-organised
military units of at least four different foreign gov-
ernments, and if we do not immediately prepare
to interfere with the plans of those foreign gov-
ernments, we shall see enacted here in our own
land exactly what happened less than twenty-two
months ago in France, in Austria and in eastern
Prussia.
When in 191 2 and 1913 I made statements to
Germans of Russia's activity in East Prussia, when
I informed French friends in the Ministere de la
Marine as to German war preparation in northern
and eastern France, each and all shrugged their
shoulders, smiled patiently and indulgently, think-
ing me obsessed.
The Russians had prepared the way into Eastern
Prussia and into Austria. The movement into
Austria failed because of the activities of the secret
agents of the Austrian government; but even the
Wilhelmstrasse was not awake to what the Rus-
sians had been doing in Eastern Prussia. General
von Hindenburg for more than half a generation
had been fortifying East Prussia until its defences
against Russian invasion were, according to all Eu-
ropean military critics, the strongest in the world.
Ytt Cossacks, unequipped with heavy artillery, made
an advance of scores of miles past these "strongest
and heaviest fortifications." They wxre able to
do so only because the gates were opened to them
192 AWAKE! U. S. A.
by Teutonic-Russians living in Eastern Prussia and
because mines were sprung, opening up passage-
ways.
And the Germans' advance to the very gates of
Paris was due, partially at least, to two gates
opened to them, one on either side of Lille. Six
months after the war began it was found that a
private assistant of one of the most important mili-
tary men in France was of foreign parentage, al-
though he possessed the birth certificate and mili-
tary training papers of a young French lad who
had died in a foreign country and whose death had
not been reported at home. Even nine months
after the beginning of the war a way was again
opened — the entire aerial defences of Paris were
misdirected — permitting a Zeppelin raid on that
city in March, 191 5.
In New York City, during the last few months,
I have heard discussed by citizens of three differ-
ent foreign countries the methods by which a ma-
jority of the taxies and private automobiles of the
city of New York could be mobilised within five
hours after the general order was given to chauf-
feurs of foreign citizenship; I have heard explana-
tions of the intelligence system by which foreigners
employed as drivers of large trucks can be given
their instructions as to what they are to do and
how they are to do it; I have heard described the
method of withholding food supplies from the pop-
THE GUARDS WITHIN 193
ulation of New York and the subsequent delivery of
these supplies to the invading army; I have heard
explanations of the system by which patrols can be
established on an hour's notice on all roads leading
out of New York, Jersey City and Hoboken, pre-
venting the passage of any automobile that has not a
permit; the arrangement for cutting off the light
and the power, if that should be deemed necessary;
the organisation of foreign engineers, repairmen,
and railroad workmen for the repairing of any
damage to railroads occasioned by American citi-
zens wishing to stop the advance of a foreign foe.
I am not writing of the agents and officers of
any one country; these things have been planned
by citizens of at least four different foreign nations.
And why should they not do so? If foreign gov-
ernments are planning to seize our cities and hold
them for ransom, it would be foolish not to prepare
the way for the advance of their invading forces
to our ammunition works, gun factories and
arsenals?
There are living in the United States one mil-
lion British subjects; at least seventy thousand
trained Japanese soldiers; and two hundred thou-
sand loyal German and Austrian men, not German-
Americans, but Germans and Austrians who have
no desire to become citizens, who have never de-
clared their intentions of doing so and who are
now reservists of the German and Austrian arm-
194. AWAKE! U. S. A.
ies, under the command of their respective Em-
perors.
Within an hour after the landing of a hostile
army in New York every railroad station could be
seized.
Dover, where practically all the high explosives
of the United States are stored and where the great
naval depot is located, is but one hour and a half
from New York, even by slow train. Three trains
of ten cars each running fifteen minutes apart could
easily convey to Dover one thousand trained sol-
diers with all their light equipment, including one
hundred motorcycles, with rapid-fire fan-sweeping
mitrailleuses. If they could not at once take pos-
session of the factories and arsenals they could
absolutely control the situation until reinforcements
and heavy guns arrived.
I saw a French lad of twenty-three, wounded in
the arm and in the head, brought into one of the
hospitals after the battle of the Marne. He and
his companion had operated one mitrailleuse.
This they had placed in a small opening between
two rocks, so that they were fairly well sheltered.
These two boys effectively worked their one ma-
chine-gun for three hours. When the enemy was
finally driven back it was found that ip6_^ dead
bodies had been left in the fan-stveep of this one
gun.
Bridgeport at the east — the Essen of the United
THE GUARDS WITHIN 195
States — is but one and one-half hours from New
York. This could be taken and held, with the aid
of bombardment from the sea, more easily even
than Dover. With gatling guns once established,
the factories could be held by five hundred men.
Other divisions could then move on to New Haven
and later to Hartford. Another division could
move to Springfield from Boston, only three hours
by rail. From the Pennsylvania Station alone,
trains of ten cars could be run to the west every
fifteen minutes, if necessary. A hundred thousand
troops could be moved in seventy-two hours to cap-
ture all the plants in New Jersey and Eastern Penn-
sylvania.
Pompton Lake, Carney's Point, Parlin Lake and
all the important ammunition, powder and explosive
factories in New Jersey could be reached from
New York in less than four hours. Bethlehem it-«
self and the eastern coal fields are but three hours
away.
From the New York Central an equal number
of trains could carry an equal number of troops
to capture the arms and ammunition factories in
Eastern New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut
and Rhode Island.
But could a foreign army accomplish all this in
the face of the opposition of individual American
citizens?
196 AWAKE! U. S. A.
At the beginning of the European war France
mobilised one million men in the first six days;
Belgium had two hundred thousand regulars, re-
serves and garde civique, and England within fif-
teen days had at least forty-five thousand men on
the continent. Yet three hundred and fifty thou-
sand Germans (an army no larger than that which
could be easily landed at New York either by Great
Britain or Germany) although opposed by a stub-
born resistance of the Belgians, forty-five thousand
British and at least one-third of the million the
French had mobilised, ploughed their way through
Belgium, passed through the open gates at either
side of Lille and advanced 200 miles in the face of
that opposition, to the very suburbs of Paris.
Every official of importance in the United States
army and every military authority of the United
States who has expressed his opinion regarding
this matter has asserted that a small foreign army
equipped, as European armies are equipped to-day,
could easily land on our coast, take our port forti-
fications by rear action and advance into the coun-
try, taking possession of practically all our am-
munition supplies, our gun factories, our explo-
sive and torpedo works, our arsenals and our de-
pots of military and naval supplies.
Of course, if we should kindly be given six days'
notice, we could mobilise our twelve little field guns
€^st of the Mississippi, We could send one toward
THE GUARDS WITHIN 197
Boston to stop the movement of foreign troops ad-
vancing upon the United States Arsenal at Spring-
field. Two more guns could be sent up the Hudson
to prevent the advancing hosts moving on toward
Troy, where most important high explosive works
are located. Three might be sent to stop the ad-
vance through New Jersey and eastern Pennsyl-
vania ; two to Philadelphia and two to Washington.
The other two would probably be kept to equip our
Army of the East in line of defence. Thus we
might arrest the invading armies.
But if these guns should not stop or annihilate
the enemy, the only opposition possible (if we do
not at once prepare) would be an avalanche of men
and our only victory — "a flood of blood."
"The president knows that if this country needed
a million men, and needed them in a day, the call
could go out at sunrise and the sun would go down
on a million men in arms." ^^
"American daring and patriotism will drive back
with terrible blows any foe that dares put his foot
upon the land of the free." "
Before the present European war, the forts of
Liege, Namur and Antwerp were considered the
strongest in the world. Military experts agreed
that they could never be taken nor destroyed. Yet
the great German howitzers (which the French-
English-American experts asserted existed "only
198 AWAKE! U. S. A.
in imagination") cracked open the Belgian forts
as though they were egg shells.
War to-day is a matter of machinery — howitzers,
shrapnel-throwers and rapid-fire machine guns.
Any army, not fully equipped with all of these,
must bow to defeat, no matter how courageous and
stubborn the individual fighting of its soldiers. If
any army lacks but one element of such equipment,
that lack will in all probability lead to at least tem-
porary defeat.
At the beginning of the war the French were
not as well armed with rifles as were the Germans ;
they were not as well supplied with rapid-fire guns ;
they were not as well equipped with shrapnel-
throwing guns, nor with heavy artillery. Conse-
quently the Germans forced their way from the
western boundary of Belgium and Luxembourg to
the suburbs of Paris in four weeks.
The English in retreat were mown down and
slaughtered, not by individuals, but by German war-
machines. In one little spot in southwestern Bel-
gium two thousand three hundred nine British sol-
diers lay in one place as a result of two hours'
work of German shrapnel and rapid-fire guns. It
was the price paid for non-equipment!
In November, a year ago. General von Hinden-
burg made a statement that his field and machine
guns had filled in the swamps of eastern Prussia
with the dead bodies of the Russian Cossacks, who
THE GUARDS WITHIN 199"
had been armed only with rifles and lances. The
Germans themselves have never spoken disparag-
ingly of the courage, bravery and stubborn resist-
ance of the Russian soldiers; time and again they
have justly praised their fighting qualities. Yet
Russia, with a reserve of 13,000,000 men of mili-
tary age, has been driven back two hundred thirty
miles because her armies were not efficiently
equipped with guns and ammunition.
Since France has acquired a supply of 75's and
155's and a plentitude of rapid-fire machine guns
she has been able to hold in check and to drive back
little by little the well-equipped Germans.
A small army, not numbering more than fifty
thousand, if well equipped with field artillery,
shrapnel-throwers, and rapid-fire machine guns
drawn by dogs or carried on bicycles, can wipe an
army of half a million men equipped as we are
equipped to-day.
Remember, two French boys, with one machine
gun held thousands of equipped Germans at bay;
and as a result of only three hours' fighting the
one gun garnered a toll of 1963 dead bodies.
There would be no possible means of preventing
the investment and capture of all the arms and
ammunition works, arsenals and naval depots of
Dover.
No more striking remark was made at Platts-
200 AWAKE! U. S. A.
burg than that of the instructor in artillery prac-
tice, who said in substance:
"General Longstreet and General Hill in the
Battle of Gettysburg had in their corps, in service,
only nine fewer field guns than there are in the
regular army in the United States to-day. We
have nine less guns than were used by two corps
at the Battle of Gettysburg — a sad reminder of the
fact that the regular army has to-day, east of the
Mississippi, only three batteries (12 guns) of field
artillery."
Twelve guns to hold back an army advancing
from Portland, or Boston, or New York, or Phil-
adelphia, or Washington, or Charleston or Savan-
nah.
**The fire of modern field-artillery is so deadly
that troops cannot advance over terrain swept by
these guns without prohibitive losses. It is there-
fore necessary to neutralise the fire of hostile guns
before our troops can advance, and the only way to
neutralise the fire of this hostile field-artillery is
by field-artillery guns, for troops armed with the
small arms are about as effectual against this fire,
until they arrive at 2000 yards, as though they
were armed with knives. ^^
No enemy would attempt to land on our shores
with less than two hundred thousand men, com-
pletely armed and perfectly equipped. Our entire,
army of the East is but 6,600 men and they are
THE GUARDS WITHIN 201
scattered over a strip three thousand miles long.
They have but twelve pieces and but 44% of the
ammunition necessary for immediate use.
"The Secretary of War (Mr. Garrison) has
stated on several occasions, although not in public
utterance, that we have on hand but one round of
ammunition for our field artillery." *^
I have before me a personal letter from one of
the aides attached to the staff of General Joffre, in
which he writes me of the value of the motorcycle
mitrailleuse and its destructiveness as demon-
strated in the present war. I quote a portion of
that letter.
"The motorcyclette armed with a small mitrail-
leuse such as we now employ is much more useful
than the armoured motor-car. It is very small;
one can come very near to the enemy without being
seen ; one can hide behind trees, bordering the road,
make an attack upon an advance guard and get
away quickly and safely. If the road is bad, one
can take the muddy sides and avoid the big holes
which are disastrous for heavy carriage ; one clever
rider and skillful operator can do great harm in a
few minutes. As soon as he arrives at the place from
which he wishes to attack, he can put his mitrail-
leuse in position and destroy a patrol, or a convoy^,
or even an advance guard and speed back to his
own lines at eighty kilometres an hour. He can
change his position so often and so quickly that
202 AWAKE! U. S. A.
the enemy's detachment cannot find his firing posi-
tion. In the country he offers only a very small
target compared with the big side of a steel-covered
motor-car.
"Three of our cycle-mitrailleuse accomplished
here yesterday a wonderful raid. They heard that a
German regiment was going to enter, music ahead,
a village. They arrived in front of the column
and hid behind bushes. As the first ranks of the
Germans entered, our three men fanned them with
the three motor-cycle guns. Every man in the
German regiment was not only wounded, but
killed." ''
If a million of our noblest men 'sprang to arms'
providing themselves with clubs, knives, crowbars,
revolvers, shot guns and rifles, they would be mur-
dered as they advanced under the range of the
enemy's shrapnel-shell throwers and rapid-fire fan-
sweeping guns. If we remain unprepared, a half
of our "million men" will be slaughtered in this
way: and then those who now advocate such a
system of defence should be held as "guilty of
murder in the second degree."
We can raise a million in a day !
And we can send forward a million men, un-
drilled, untrained and only partially armed to meet
the field artillery, the shrapnel and the rapid-fire
machine guns of the present-day warfare! But if
THE GUARDS WITHIN 203
we do so, we shall form lakes in our fields, our low-
lands and our meadows — out of their blood!
Let us not go into the darkness again with un-
filled lamps!
We have listened before to the Randolphs and
the Buchanans! We have listened to those who
preferred peace-at-any-price; we have in the past
heeded those who wished us to prepare only after
the calamity was upon us ; we have followed those
who feared that sane preparation would turn us
into a military camp! And each time, because of
our stupidity, we paid a tragic price ten-fold too
great !
It is sad for a nation to lose its men on the bat-
tlefield, even when fighting for that which is right-
eous; but it is vicious to live cowardly in the face
of the evils which threaten us. Let us be as will-
ing to pay the just price as were the Christian
martyrs at Rome; but let us not, by listening to
false prophets, permit ourselves to be once more
forced to pay a tragically vain, needlessly wasteful,
wanton toll of blood again!
Yet even this would not be the full price, how-
ever. Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Wash-
ington would be bombarded if we refused to guar-
antee gigantic indemnities, refused to abandon the
Monroe Doctrine, refused to turn over the trade
of South America and the control of the Panama
Canal to our foreign foe.
204. AWAKE! U. S. A.
Then we would be compelled to take a new posi-
tion in the world of affairs! It might correspond
to our present position as Persia's status to-day-
corresponds to the station she occupied before she
was conquered by Alexander; it might correspond
to our present position as Spain's present interna-
tional status compares with her seventeenth century
prosperity and world power ; it might correspond to
our present world status as little Holland of to-day
compares with the mighty Netherlands of less than
three centuries ago; and it might correspond to
our present supremacy as the condition of Poland'
divided into Austrian, German and Russian pro-
vinces corresponds to the position occupied by that
renowned kingdom before she was apportioned
among the three hungry nations of her day.
QUOTATION REFERENCES
^ Page 170. Brigadier-General Miles, Chief of the
Militia Division of the War Department, United States
Government.
^ Page 170. Report of General Wotherspoon, Chief of
Staff, United States Army.
^ Page 177. From address to Merchants' Association
by the Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary of War.
* Page 178. The Hon. Augustus P. Gardner, Congress-
man from Massachusetts.
^ Page 178. Report of the Army Committee of the Na-
tional Security League, including: Hon. Henry L. Stim-
THE GUARDS WITHIN 206
son, ex-Secretary of War ; Colonel William C. Church, edi-
tor Army and Navy Journal; Captain Matthew Hannah ;
General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Put-
nam ; Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others.
^ Page 1 80. (See note 4.)
■^ Page 180. Alan R. Hawley, President Aero Club of
America.
* Page 182. (See note 7.)
" Page 184. Interview of Andrew Carnegie, as reported
by the Associated Press.
^" Page 197. Hon. William Jennings Bryan, in address
to the Baltimore Bar Association.
" Page 197. American newspaper editorial.
^2 Page 200. General Leonard Wood, Commander of
the Army of the East.
" Page 201. George Lauferti, in "United States and the
Next War."
" Page 202. From personal letter from a member of the
staff of General Joffre.
PART THREE: WHAT ARE OUR
CHANCES?
PART THREE: WHAT ARE OUR
CHANCES?
CHAPTER I
WHEN THE SPIKED HELMET COMES
THE German Navy is practically twice as
strong as ours, even if we accept the official
figures of Berlin and Washington as the standards
of comparison. But most of the German ships
have been built during the last twenty years. Ger-
man ships are of the most modern construction,
while many of our listed ships are out of commis-
sion, ''grey-bearded" or in their "second childhood"
— one y2 years old has just this year been disposed
of by the Navy Department.
How misleading comparisons, made by listing
anything and everything, really are, can be judged
from the official statement of Naval Intelligence,
United States Navy Department, issued only thirty
days previous to the beginning of the present Eu-
ropean War. It assured us in figures that we had
three more submarines than Germany had and that
we were building more than Germany.
Very few of our ships have guns that can be ele-
209
210 AWAKE! U. S. A.
vated more than lo degrees; a few can be elevated
15 degrees. Most of the German ships have guns
that can be elevated from 20 to 28 degrees. This
is of supreme importance! Even the eleven-inch
guns of the Germans because of this advantage can
throw explosives fourteen miles.
"Germany can oppose twenty dreadnoughts to
our ten, and, judging from such naval actions as
were fought in the late war, in which both the gun-
nery and the seamanship of the Germans was ex-
cellent, there can be little doubt that with such
great odds against us we should be defeated." ^
Germany could send against us nearly twice as
many dreadnoughts and battleships as we could to
oppose their attack. And the German dreadnoughts
have greater speed; their guns have longer range
and can be elevated twice as high as the guns on
our ships. Germany can send against us six times
as many swift cruisers as we have. Germany could
send against us more than twice as many destroyers
as we could employ in opposition; Germany could
easily send fifty of the most modern submarines.
On the Atlantic coast we have eighteen. Five of
these are located at Panama. Two, north of Pan-
ama, are capable of operation under water.
If they wished they could easily transport to our
shores five hundred thousand men, but the General
Staflf at Berlin knows that 250,000 veterans are
sufficient. Consequently their definite plans are
WHEN THE SPIKED HELMET COMES 211
Our Chances ot Sea against a Qennan Altadi i
Oermaay
U.S.A.
BoMeslifps
AverajSe Speed
OimRonjSC- .
QunElevQdoi
ToqiedoTiiIies
Baffle crafsers..
ScoufCtuisers
DestroycFS.
SubmoFines...
N. B. Lines representing the same United States factors of defence
may vary on different charts because they represent proportional
values.
1. This chart represents battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers
and destroyers authorised and laid down by Germany and the
United States from December 31, 1904, to January, 1914. These
modern boats are the ones that determine sea battles. Grey beards,
ships in reserve and ships in ordinary are not an aid. They hinder
the speed of the fleet, they have to be taken care of by the modern
ships ; hence, their detrimental value in modern battle.
Since January i, 1914, Germany has been building modern battle-
ships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers, destroyers and submarines at
a tremendous rate. We have been lagging woefully behind.
2. Torpedo tubes for modern torpedoes which we Tinll have after
the Oklahoma and Nevada are in service.
3. The three scout cruisers we have are of doubtful value, because
of their defective furnaces.
4. Representing the proportion of all our useless submarines to
the submarines Germany could spare from European waters.
5. Representing the proportion of submarines able to submerge, to
those Germany could send to attack us.
212 AWAKE! U. S. A.
made for the transportation of but a quarter mil-
lion well-equipped perfectly armed men.
"Germany has the second largest merchant ma-
rine in the world, which affords a first-class trans-
port fleet, not surpassed even by England's."
''Germany has greater resources for enterprises
of this kind, and is more efficient than any other
country."
*'In our loading of East Asia transports, it re-
quired one to one and one-half hours to load one
battalion. The speed of our loading has amazed
departmental circles in general."
**For long-distance transportation our large har-
bours on the North and East Seas can be utilised
equally well for embarkation. Speed is the chief
requisite/*
"Especially suitable harbours on the North Sea
are Emden, Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven in
connection with Bremen, and Cuxhaven with Ham-
burg and Gluckstadt."
"Bremerhaven is by far the best. From this
point two or more divisions could he shipped daily
without difficulty. Cuxhaven is not so well situated,
but its connection with Hamburg is important. H
it were brought up to full development it could
take care of two divisions a day, which Hamburg
could well supply."
"The United States at this time is not in a posi-
WHEN THE SPIKED HELMET COMES 213
tion to oppose our troops with an army of equal
rank. Its regular army actually totals 65,000 men,
of whom not more than 30,000 are ready to defend
the home country." ^
Certainly the Germans would not land an invad-
ing army without thoroughly equipping them.
Their 250,000 men would bring with them 148 bat-
teries of six guns each — 888 guns. It is reported by
several different military authorities that we have
twelve field guns east of the Mississippi ; even should
this number be tripled, we would have but one field
gun to every 24 of the Germans. Germany, accord-
ing to the present minimum armament of the men
she has in the field (and her men must be well
equipped or they could not hold their trenches) has
now a reserve of 19,400 field guns, while we have
but 850. The average size of the German guns is
twice the size of ours.
The German army would be amply supplied with
ammunition. Germany has shown for twenty-two
months that she does not start a campaign until she
is able to furnish sufficient supplies.
"It is almost a certainty that a victorious assault
on the Atlantic coast, tying up the importing and
exporting business of the whole country, would
bring about such an annoying situation that the
government (U. S. A.) would be willing to treat for
peace."
*'To accomplish this end, the invaders would have
214 AWAKE! U. S. A.
to INFLICT REAL MATERIAL DAMAGE by
injuring the whole country through the successful
seizure of many of the Atlantic seaports in which
the threads of the entire wealth of the nation
meet." ®
(The italics and capitals are the author's.)
Only peace-at-any-price insanity can prevent us
from realising that once the Germans have crossed
the Atlantic, they will, unless we agree to their
demands, carry on a campaign of destructiveness
{real material damage).
On the chart "Our Chances on Land Against
German Invasion," as well as on the chart, *'Our
Chances on Land Against British Invasion," every
fighting factor of the United States is not only
given at its full value, but oftentimes greatly exag-
gerated. This is done not to mislead, but because
of my desire not to underestimate any factor of our
resources. For instance, the line representing the
guns with our Army of the East (the only army
together with the Eastern Militia that could be
gathered quickly enough to meet a rapid invasion)
is poo% longer than it ought really to be! It is
made thus because it is hoped that, by some mi-
raculous means, a few of the guns west of the Mis-
sissippi might be rushed to the Eastern coast in
time to be of some value. The most sanguine opti-
mist, however, can hardly expect me to give greater
leeway than an exaggerated estimate of 900%.
WHEN THE SPIKED HELMET COMES 215
Our Oiances on land a0afh8t Qennon Invosfon
(bmpopatfve Values
Invadfn^Anny Qepj
OpposfniJAFniy U.S.i
0un8witIiAnny
QunsfnIl9seiTe
SlKeofQuns
Qeci
US.I
Qer.i
U.S.I
Qerj
USj
AmmiinftCon Supply:
lsll8hoursI^^^J'
Merwanls ^®^
VJS. ?
N. B. Lines representing the same U. S. factors of defence may
vary on different charts because they represent proportional values,
(i) Representing the entire army which can be mobilised in thirty
days, men in our Atlantic Coast defences, and the militia of the
Eastern States.
(2) Representing 900 per cent, more field guns than we now have
with our entire army east of the Mississippi River.
(3) And in addition, a line 500 per cent, longer.
(4) Representing all of the field guns in the United States.
216 AWAKE! U. S. A.
All lines representing supplies are of course greater
than the actual amount on hand.
At the same time the invader could without doubt
have the aid of warring factions in Mexico whose
attempted invasion of the United States from the
south would compel us to keep on the Texan border
the eighteen thousand troops we already have sta-
tioned there.
To meet the Atlantic invasion we would then
have an army of 6,600 men, supplied with enough
ammunition, stored in many different arsenals in
various parts of the United States, to fight for
thirty-six hours. Besides these regular troops,
we might oppose them with unarmed volunteers.
"Two real defenders of the country that must
not be forgotten are Major-General Frederick
Funston, and Major-General Leonard Wood.
General Funston has 11,000 men under his com-
mand in the Department of the South, including
Texas, through which hostile forces might seek to
come from Mexico. He is a veteran and knows
how to handle troops. General Wood commands
the Eastern Division and has 6,600 men under his
command. *
No one doubts for a moment the ability, the
saneness and the justly honoured efficiency of Gen-
eral Wood; and for that very reason we ought to
accept his opinion as to what he could do with the
army in its present condition. He has definitely
WHEN THE SPIKED HELMET COMES 217
stated that it would take at least thirty days to
mobilise our present army of 34,000 men, to say
nothing of enlisting, organising and equipping a
citizen soldiery.
Does the newspaper editor above quoted expect
that a quarter-million German veterans, who have
performed deeds of valour in Belgium, would, if
General Wood should mount the base of the Statue
of Liberty and wave his arms in the air, take fright
and drown themselves by plunging in terror into
the sea?
QUOTATION REFERENCES
* Page 210. J, Bernard Walker, Chairman of the Navy
Committee, National Security League, and editor Scientific
American.
^ Page 213. From book outlining Germany's means and
method of attacking England and the United States; pre-
pared by Freiherr von Edelsheim, when member of the
General Staff at Berlin; book approved by the Kaiser and
widely circulated.
^ Page 214. (See note 2.)
"* Page 216. Indiana newspaper editorial.
CHAPTER II
WHEN THE BROWN MAN COM^S
THE Japanese cannot afford another war ; their
national debt is now one-eighth their national
wealth."
"The Japanese might attack the Philippines, but
they would not attempt to bring an army across
the Pacific; they could not do so if they wished —
such a feat is impossible !"
"Besides the fleet on the Pacific, the United/
States has eight submarines here and coast forts
that are declared impregnable. Certainly an enemy
would find itself as hard put in attempting to in-
vade our west coast as the Allies are in attempting
to storm the Dardanelles."
"If the Japanese ever come to attack us, we'll
drown them like rats in the Pacific." ^
Our greatest danger in connection with the Japa-
nese is that we stupidly laugh at the idea that they
may attack us and refuse to see things as they
are.
It is possible for Japan, if she wishes, to send
three hundred thousand or half a million troops to
218
WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 219
our shores. With the exception of one British
steamship line, all the traffic between America and
Japan is now in the hands of the Japanese. The
Nippon Yusen line alone has a tonnage of three
hundred thousand tons. The Toyo Kisen Kaisha
has an enormous tonnage. To-day Japan controls
all but about 70,000 tonnage of the Pacific trade.
But Japan would not even need these.
"Japan has a major transport fleet, as shown by
the figures in 1909, of forty steamers, with a troop
capacity of 114,235, and a minor transport fleet of
fifty-five steamers, with a troop capacity of 85,292;
or 199,526 in all. These are army transports
alone, and do not include passenger ships which
could be utilised. Compared with this the United
States has a transport fleet of ten ships, with a
troop capacity of 15,758. There are only four
transport ships on the Pacific coast." ^
The marvellous transportation system of the
Japanese makes us understand why they laugh at
ours. When General Funston was ordered in April,
1914, to take his command from Galveston to Vera
Cruz a major portion of the troops had to be left
behind because there were not sufficient transports
to carry them. Consequently he could take to Vera
Cruz less than 4,200 men. Moreover, much of the
field artillery and cavalry had to be left behind.
Compare the inefficiency of our transportation
system, which, after months of strain with Mexico,
220 AWAKE! U. S. A.
was unable to handle four thousand men with the
efficient Japanese transportation system, which has
a troop capacity of 199,000 independent of her
passenger ships.
But to land Japanese troops and to furnish sup-
plies for those already in the United States, their
navy must meet our navy in the Pacific.
Our navy has more ships than the Japanese. But
we could not run the risk of sending our complete
navy to the Pacific in time to decide a naval battle
even were it possible to do so.
The Japanese have four super-dreadnoughts of
high speed with guns capable of higher elevation
than ours. We have not a single dreadnought of
this class. Japan will have two more finished this
year. If Congress orders one or one-and-a-half or
two, they cannot be finished within three or four
years.
As fighting ships we include everything, no mat-
ter what the size, the age, or the uselessness of the
craft. A very few of our ships of our Pacific fleet
have four eight-inch guns each. Most of them are
equipped with only six-, five- and three-inch guns.
These compare to the mammoth guns on the Japa-
nese ships about as a boy's Fourth of July toy
pistol compares to a .38 Smith and Wesson. Our
largest ship in the Pacific has a displacement of a
little over 13,000 tons, while the Japanese have bat-
tleships with displacements of from 25,000 to 31,-
WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 221
ooo tons. One can judge best of their real value
by their cost. A good battleship to-day costs from
$15,000,000 to $18,000,000. We have three in the
Pacific which cost a little over five million ; a few
others are one-and-a-half- and two-million-dollar
ships; some cost less than one-quarter of one mil-
lion dollars. Japan has twenty-five fighting ships
each of which cost from five to fifteen million
dollars.
More striking still than the difference in number
and differences of grade, stated separately, is a
comparison of the number of Japanese battleships
that surpasses the best we have in the Pacific.
Japan has twenty ships, every one of which is su-
perior to the very best zve have in the Pacific.
What chance, then, would our tug boats and our
gun boats and our old light-armoured cruisers have
against the Japanese navy?
We have in the Pacific less than twenty ships.
Japan has a navy of modern battleships.
The Fuso has twelve 14-inch guns, as well as
more smaller ones than we have on any one ship in
the Pacific. The Haruna, Hiyei, Kirishima, and
Kongo each have eight 14-inch guns. The Ka-
waychi has twelve 12-inch guns. There are three
more battleships of the Fuso class which are al-
most finished. These ships alone have 64 torpedo
tubes. Our ships on the Pacific have a total of
i^^WAKE! U. S. A.
eighteen torpedo tubes and all of them are admitted
to be useless.
Some of Japan's ships have a speed of 2y knots.
We have not a single battleship in our navy that
can maintain a speed of more than 22 knots.
All of our F type submarines which were lately
accepted and stationed at Honolulu are now admit-
ted to be useless because of faulty construction.
They are reported out of commission.
Our Pacific fleet, besides being inefficient, is
without sufficient ammunition and often has not had
coal enough to steam from our Pacific ports to
Honolulu and back again! Even though govern-
ments at Washington have known — twice in the
last five years — that a Japanese attack might be
made at any hour.
We have naval stations in the Pacific and on our
Pacific Coast ; but the nearest naval magazine from
which our tiny supplies might be drawn is Mifflin,
Pennsylvania. This, however, is not a very im-
portant magazine and, next to it, the nearest one to
the Pacific coast is Dover, New Jersey, — some three
thousand miles overland from the Pacific coast and
some ten thousand miles overland from the Philip-
pines.
When Japan moves she will do so suddenly and
without warning. It will be an attack in the night
and we will not be allowed one moment's prepara-
tion.
WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES
223
OurOiances olSea against a Japanese Attack <
Japan U.S.A.
SupepDreadnau^btsii^ii^ o
Battiesnips and .
Battle Cruisers —
Average Speed.
Qun Range .-
Gun mevatjon
Torpedo Tubes
Scout crufSCT^L...
Destroyers _....
Submarines.
N. B. Lines representing the same United States factors of defence
may vary on different charts, because they represent proportional
values.
1. This chart represents battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers
and destroyers authorised and laid down by Japan and the United
States from December 31, 1904, to January, 1914. These modern
boats are the ones that determine sea battles. Grey beards, ships
in reserve and ships in ordinary are not an aid. They hinder the
speed of the fleet, they have to be taken care of by the modern
ships; hence their detrimental value in modern battle.
Since January i, 1914, Japan has been building modern battleships,
battle cruisers, scout cruisers, destroyers and submarines at a tre-
mendous rate. We have been lagging woefully behind.
2. Torpedo tubes for modern torpedoes which we imll have after
the Oklahoma and Nevada are in service.
3. Representing the proportion of all our useless submarines to
the submarines Japan has.
4. Representing the proportion of our submarines able to submerge,
to those Japan could send to attack us.
224. AWAKE! U. S. A.
Manila is well fortified but each fort can be eas-
ily taken from the rear. All the military authori-
ties agree that landing would be comparatively
easy.
"There are no fortifications on Lingayen Bay on
the North, Balayan Bay on the South, or Lamon
Bay on the east. A landing at either of these points
presents no difficulties, and once landed it is but a
few days' march to the rear of Manila." ^
"Little does the United States know that we
(the Japanese) have many plans arranged for the
destruction of the Manila forts and guns." ^
"There will leave our great naval base at Yok-
suka 50,000 of our men in a suitable number of
transports, that will be amply protected by fast
cruisers. This flotilla will land part of the troops
at Lingayan and part near Polillo, at the rear of
Manila. They will take but a short time to disem-
bark and will advance, converging toward one an-
other, having all plans laid to attack the port of
Manila from the rear — which is its weakest part." ^
At Honolulu we have spent millions fortifying
Pearl Harbour, but there is not enough ammunition
to fight twenty-four hours.
"Our first move will be to seize Honolulu ! This
can very simply be done by a fleet of transports car-
rying 30,000 men and protected by our fast cruis-
er-class ships. . . .
"The Hawaiian Islands are only distant from
WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 225
San Francisco a few hours by our fast warships
and cruisers, and in the islands are at present 80,-
000 Japanese — all of them have received army in-
struction and they know their duty !" ^
Experience at the Panama Canal has amply con-
vinced us that slides are at least possible.
"The Americans boast of their Panama Canal,
but it is only too ridiculously simple for us to dyna-
mite it effectually — at the cost of an old steamship
loaded with explosives.
"Or the canal can be instantly dynamited by our
people, who are living quite near it, and before
anything can be done by the United States Navy
our ships will be in full possession of the impor-
tant points. . . .
"And before the United States warships can
come all the way around South America we will
have seized the islands ! These lie much nearer to
our shores than they do to the United States coast,
and it will be a very difficult matter to oust us, —
our navy is much stronger than the American, bet-
ter equipped and better officered. . . .
"The Honolulu group of islands, however, is
not large enough to adequately support our coun-
trymen. We can seize the port and fortifications
(such as they are) with the greatest of ease, thus
permitting about 60 per cent, of our people already
there to help in breaking California's shut door." ^
The only thing the United States could do to
226 AWAKE! U. S. A.
prevent a landing on the Pacific would be to send
our fleet around South America or our soldiers
over the mountains.
Seven-tenths or more of our soldiers are east of
the Rocky Mountains ; while the Japanese have al-
ready on our soil, or in Mexico and British Colum-
bia, adjoining our territory, trained troops which
number 251,000 men — seven times as many as our
entire mobile army in the United States.
There are already 35,000 trained Japanese troops
in Hawaii, 55,000 in the Philippines, 100,000 in
Mexico, 61,000 in California, Oregon and Washing-
ton. And these troops are where they can be in-
stantly used the moment the transports land ma-
chine guns on our coast. Every Japanese in Cali-
fornia reports to his consul once every week to re-
ceive instructions.
''We have tricked California, however, by sending
our men as residents to the Hawaiian Islands.
There they become 'citizens' and from there, after
a certain time, proceed to California. . . .
"We have sent both army and navy officers in
the clever disguise of workmen; and they, having
been thoroughly taught in Japan how to swim, have
quietly slipped overboard and gained a landing in
California and Oregon ports, under the very eyes
of the asinine United States customs and immigra-
tion officials." ^
The Japanese now have a new base from which
WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 22T
they can direct their operations. The Marshall
Islands form an important naval station 2600 miles
nearer our Pacific coast than Tokyo! Her engi-
neers and army officials are working night and day
constructing new concrete fortifications. Our Pa-
cific forts are of little value in protecting our ports.
They are old. For years the War Department has
not sent sufficient ammunition to the Pacific coast
to give the garrison two hours' practice per month.
The Japanese, when they sent their fleet on its
tour of the Pacific, demonstrated that they could
enter our ports, with lights out, without local
pilots. From the Japanese who already live in the
western states they would have ample aid in land-
ing anywhere along the Pacific coast.
''There are officers of ours scattered everywhere
on the Pacific coast to-day. We do not need to ex-
plain why they are there !" ^
And what could not happen in twenty- four
hours? Most of our army and practically all of
our ammunition is east of the Rocky Mountains.
These inoiintains fonn tJie greatest natural barrier
in the world.
We have six railway lines crossing them — the
Santa Fe, Southern Pacific, Western Pacific, Union
Pacific, Northern Pacific, Great Northern, and
Milwaukee, Chicago and St. Paul. These rail-
roads climb, in traversing the mountains, to great
heights, pass through many tunnels and creep over
228 AWAKE! U. S. A.
long dizzy trestles. It took years to construct
these bridges and tunnels. At every strategic point
along these railroads there are colonies of Japanese
labourers, who are in reality Japanese soldiers and
engineers.
In every group there are several who are in
the secret service of Japan. They would be in-
formed of any premeditated attack, even of the
exact hour, long before any American had knowl-
edge of it.
All our transcontinental telephone and telegraph
wires follow the lines of the railroads. Upon re-
ceiving code instructions by telegraph or wire-
less they could, in one hour, cut every telephonic
and telegraphic wire connecting the east with the
west. In one night the railway guards could be
overpowered and every tunnel blown up and every
trestle ruined.
The coast states would be cut off from their meat
supply and California from her grain and wheat
supply; the vegetable farms and markets are al-
ready in the hands of the Japanese.
Within twenty-four hours after landing, trains
could be seized by trained Japanese now working
as common labourers along the railroads, and
twenty thousand trained Japanese already living in
California could be hurried to the mountain fast-
nesses where the railroads cross the summits. In
each of these places a thousand men with the ma-
WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 229
chine guns brought by their transports could hold
at bay our entire mobile army in the United States.
But they need not wait for mitrailleuses from
their transport ships. There are scores of secret
Japanese stores of arms on the Pacific ; and no one
can compute the ammunition and equipment
stored in Southern California. Only lately four
warships were there two weeks (to fish) before
our Navy Department investigated. In that dry
land, guns and ammunition can be stored without
elaborate preparation. The twenty thousand Japa-
nese soldiers in British Columbia, ready to invade
from the north, are well equipped.
Recently in a police raid of a Japanese boarding
house, it was found that the basement, the attic,
every cupboard, every cubic foot of space in the
house was filled with mitrailleuses, other guns
and ammunition. These guns were of the type
that could be mounted on bicycles or carried on the
back. Even the space under the beds was occupied
by boxes containing ammunition.
Hence without any supplies or men even from
Japan, all of the railroads reaching the Pacific in
the north and all those reaching it in the south,
could be seized and mountain passes held. X
We could not march an army over the Rocky
Mountains in ten years with the Japanese control-
ling the passes with rapid-fire machine guns. We
could march army after army to the mountains,
230 AWAKE! U. S. A.
but they would never get over and they would never
come back.
Even if we gained the summits we could not
reconstruct the tunnels within twelve months.
Meanwhile 100,000 of the 200,000 Japanese in
Mexico could move on Texas and engage most of
our mobile army. They could be supplied not only
by arms already stored in Mexico, but by transports
sent to the Magdalena and to the Turtle Bays.
Mexico has had an understanding with Japan for
years. Six years ago Mexican silver was passing
current in the streets and bazaars of Tokyo.
If the Japanese, in accordance with their inten-
tions, were to send an army of two hundred thou-
sand to our shores, together with the three hun-
dred fifty thousand already on our territory and
in Mexico and British Columbia, they would have
then an attacking force of over half a million
men.
West of the Rocky Mountains, at our Pacific
coast forts and in Alaska, we have about 3,538
army men and 6,751 paper militia in the coast
states. But the armies are in five different places
and the largest group in any one place consists of
but 1,260 men. The different groups are separated
by distances of from two hundred to two thousand
miles. The Japanese, then, would have to combat
less than two thousand troops at any one place.
The Japanese army would be equipped with at
WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 231
TrainedJapanese Men
Now on U.S.Sofl,fnMexico,and Bridsti Columbia
&•
^
1
1
8
%■
1
s
1
1
t
ij
r^
1
•^
S
■^H
^■^-
^
es»
-|-
1
1
1
1
1
USArmy'^'
I
I
1. This number is considered very conservative. An officer of the
United States Army vi^ho made an investigation of this matter in
western Mexico, five years ago, estimates that the number of
trained Japanese men in western Mexico is lOO per cent, greater
than the number here stated.
2. The entire mobile army of the United States is scattered
throughout the forty-eight States of the Union, and over Alaska,
Porto Rico, Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, Philippines, and some
are stationed in China.
The largest number of United States trained troops that the Jap-
anese would have to meet at any one place at the present time is
but 8,000.
232 AWAKE! U. S. A.
least eight hundred field guns, their minimum reg-
ular equipment, and in addition at least two thou-
sand mitrailleuses. We have on the other side
of the Rocky Mountains such a small number of
guns that one hesitates to mention them.
As a reserve, Japan has two thousand eight hun-
dred field guns to draw from, while we have but
eight hundred fifty for our entire army. The
average size of the Japanese field guns is greater
than ours. Japan's army would certainly be
equipped with sufficient ammunition ; for ten years
we have not had enough on the Pacific coast to
fight thirty minutes.
There is little chance that our Pacific and Asiatic
fleets could render effective resistance to the Japa-
nese fleet, which contains twenty battleships and
cruisers, every one of which is better than the
best ship we have on the Pacific.
The two flagships in our Asiatic and Pacific
fleet have a displacement of only 13,000 and 8,00a
tons, respectively ; cost but five and four million dol-
lars, respectively, and have main armament which
consists of but four eight-inch guns each. What
chance would these have against the great ships
of the Japanese Navy, having from 27,000 to 30,-
000 tons displacement, having engines of 40,000
and 68,000 horse-power, having batteries of enor-
mous fourteen-inch guns?
It is common knowledge to the world that the
WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 233
OuFdiances on Land o|}alnsf Japanese In\asf on
COmpapoifveyalues
Invading Arniy JdpdHB
Opposfn^Amiy U.8.H 2
6unsivittiAFmyf"f'
OunsfoReserFe
SfzeojQuns
Japj
U.S.I
Jaixi
U.S.I
Ammunflf on Suppler
PocMcI^onds Japj
fst two days U.S.I
PatfffcCoasi Jap.HHHHBHBHHHBHHHnii
IstlwD hours U.S.I
M«?48hoiW"^*
1. The largest group of United States troops west of the Rocky
Mountains that the Japanese would be compelled to meet at any
one place.
2. Representing all of the regular army in the Philippines, in
Hawaii, in Alaska, at Panama, in Washington, Oregon and Cali-
fornia ; men in the Pacific Coast forts ; and the militia of the
Pacific Coast States.
3. Representing the guns on the Pacific Coast west of the Rocky
Mountains.
S34 AWAKE! U. S. A.
policy of Japan is always to strike quickly and
without warning. Without doubt her warships will
be brought together in such a way as to allay sus-
picion, ostensibly for a manoeuvre; and that they
will be half way across the Pacific before we shall
have the slightest inkling of the fact that Japan
is planning an immediate attack.
It is assumed that we could send our Atlantic
fleet or a portion of it through the Panama Canal
or around South America in time to decide a naval
war with Japan. It is very questionable if the
patriotic Japanese living in the Panama Canal
Zone would allow o\ir ships to pass through the
canal when it is possible to prevent them doing so.
A small amount of dynamite could create such a
slide — even before we would have knowledge of
the contemplated innocent Japanese naval manoeu-
vre — that the canal would be blocked for months.
If we attempt to send our Atlantic fleet around
Cape Horn, those battleships must be accompanied
by supply ships. Even though we have fighting
vessels that can make 21 knots an hour, the fleet
would have to be held together. It could travel
no faster than the slowest ship. To separate it,
that is, to allow a few ships to enter the Pacific at
a time, would be the height of folly. Even if all
were kept together, the fleeter ships of the Japa-
nese Navy could speed in to the advance column,
destroy the vanguard and retreat again; and our
WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 235
ships would be unable to follow, because of their
slower speed. This could be done over and over
again — the fleeter Japanese ships each time cen-
tring their fire on one or two of our slower ships
and getting away again with little risk of damage
to themselves.
What chances have we, in our present state of
preparation ?
With wonderful business sagacity we assert tha£
they cannot afford another war. This is the great-
est of all fallacies. The Balkan States are prob-
ably the poorest states in the world. Only a few
years ago, when a rich merchant of Montenegro
purchased an automobile — the first owned by a na-
tive Montenegrin — the King sent the merchant a
polite note calling attention to the man's extrava-
gance and hinting that he, the King of Montene-
gro, could not afford one. Yet Montenegro and
Serbia, though two of the poorest little nations in
the world, have been able to play a remarkable part
in three wars within five years.
It is true that the Japanese national debt is one-
eighth their entire wealth, but their national debt
per capita is less than the per capita debt of the
United States. The national debt per capita of
Japan is twenty-three dollars; and that of the
United States, thirty-two dollars. Per person,
we have a greater burden to bear in the payment
236 AWAKE! U. S. A.
of our national debt than have the Japanese in the
payment of their debt.
The cost of feeding a Japanese soldier is one-
twelfth the cost of feeding an American. The feed-
ing cost of an American soldier is $.24 per day, that
of a Japanese $.02. Moreover, the Japanese sacri-
fice everything for their country. Japanese mer-
chants and men of wealth willingly and gladly pay
large income taxes for the support of the army and
navy of Japan.
The Japanese are a marvellous, courageous, am-
bitious, proud people. They may be slightly smaller
in body than we are ; but equipment, ability and en-
durance count to-day in war, not stature.
We laugh at these little Japanese and talk about
"drowning them in the Pacific like rats!"
In Hong Kong, many years ago, it was my hor-
rible misfortune to be forced to witness a life-and-
death struggle between a six-foot-four Chinaman
and an infuriated rat which the Chinaman had been
torturing to amuse himself. The rat was so small
and so quick in its assaults that it easily avoided
the hands that sought to grip it. It was so agile, so
slippery, so terrific in biting and ripping the throat
of the Chinaman — running up and down the man's
back, over his shoulders, under his arms, over and
over again to the Chinaman's throat, without be-
ing caught — that the powerful six-foot Chinaman,
blood spurting from the ripped-open veins, soon fell
WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 237
to the floor and died before aid could reach him.
The rat scampered away unhurt.
QUOTATION REFERENCES
^ Page 218. Extracts from American newspapers.
^ Page 219. Henry Litchfield West, Executive Secre-
tary National Security League.
^ Page 224. General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V., from
"The Present Military Situation in the United States."
* ^ Page 224 ; ^ ' page 225 ; ^ page 226 ; ° page 227. From
a book circulated by the National Defence Association of
Japan, the present officers of which are reported to be Count
Okuma, Premier of Japan, president; Baron Kato, Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs of Japan, vice-president.
CHAPTER III
IP THE UON COMES
IF the Allies are successful in Europe, Great Brit-
ain could send twenty-eight dreadnoughts and
battleships to make an attack on our Atlantic coast
and still keep a sufficient number at home to guard
her interests there. In case of an attack by Great
Britain or any one else on our Atlantic coast, we
would not dare to take all the ships of our Pacific
fleet from the Pacific ; but were we to do so. Great
Britain's attacking fleet would outnumber our en-
tire defensive fleet, three to one.
Great Britain could send against us nine battle
cruisers, we have none; thirty swift cruisers, we
have three, and it is even questionable if our three
could operate for any length of time, because of
their furnaces. She could send one hundred de-
stroyers to combat our sixty-two, even if we were
to bring all of ours from the Pacific.
Her ships have an average speed of from two
and a half to three knots an hour greater than ours
and the average range of her battleship guns is
greater.
238
IF THE LION COMES
239
Our Chances at Sea against a British Atta^ i
arearBntafn U.S.A.
Bomesnfps
Avera^eSpeed
Oun Range.
Qun Elevation
ToipedoTul)
Battle CruiseFS
Scout Cruisers.
Des^Foyers
SuDmaFines..
N. B. Lines representing the same United States factors of defence
may vary on different charts, because they represent proportional
values,
1. This chart represents battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers
and destroyers authorised and laid dov^^n by Great Britain and the
United States from December 31, 1904, to January, 1914. These
modern boats are the ones that determine sea battles. Grey beards,
ships in reserve and ships in ordinary are not an aid. They hinder
the speed of the fleet, they have to be taken care of by the modern
ships ; hence, their detrimental value in modern battle.
Since January i, 1914, Great Britain has been building modern bat-
tleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers, destroyers and submarines
at a tremendous rate. We have been lagging woefully behind.
Secretary Daniels admits that Great Britain has probably added to
her navy sixteen new^ modern fighting ships since the beginning
of the war.
2. Comparative number of torpedo tubes we will have when the
Oklahoma and the Nevada are in service. All other torpedo tubes
are useless for modern torpedoes.
3. The three scout cruisers we have would be doubtful factors, be-
cause of their defective furnaces.
4. Representing the actual number of all our useless submarines.
5. Representing the submarines at Panama and on the Atlantic
Coast, that have been able to submerge during the last three
manoeuvres without being convoyed to port.
240 AWAKE! U. S. A.
Great Britain's battleships would be equipped
with 112 modern torpedo tubes. We will soon have
two ships with four torpedo tubes each that are of
use for modern torpedoes — no more.
Great Britain has eighty submarines; she could
spare forty to send here; we have two on the At-
lantic coast, north of Panama, that have been able
to navigate under water without being conveyed
to port immediately afterwards; we have five more
at the canal.
On the chart, "Our Chance at Sea against British
Attack," every questionable estimate as to the num-
bers and efficiency of naval factors is charted in
favour of the United States. All the three swift
cruisers are represented at full value although they
are old, slow and their furnaces are inefficient in the
least wind. If a true comparison of the differ-
ences were given, the line representing Great Brit-
ain's equipment in swift cruisers would be forty
times as long as the line representing ours. She
has built two, four, six or even eight cruisers of
the finest speediest type every year during the last
ten years.
This chart estimates only the ships that Great
Britain could spare to send against us during times
of peace in Europe; while everything we have in the
Atlantic, in the Caribbean Sea, in our navy yards,
in our dry docks, even everything laid up for re-
pairs, is counted in our favour.
IF THE LION COMES 241
And yet what chance would we have?
Japan is bound to England by an offensive and
defensive treaty, and in case of war with England
it might be necessary to divide our fleets and fight
the navies of the two countries.
Great Britain would not attempt an invasion with
less than 250,000 trained men. Our entire opposi-
tion to resist an attack would consist of 46,000 men,
including the Army of the East, ten thousand men
now manning our coast forts, and all the available
eastern militia — thirty thousand ! These could not
be mobilised even in thirty days.
Prepared for a quick attack, the English army of
invasion of 250,000 men would be equipped with
900 field guns, not counting two or three thousand
mitrailleuses. Her field guns in size are nearly
twice as large as ours. More than this, supply-
ships, arriving later, could bring from her reserve
of 5,500 guns any number of guns she might de-
sire.
Heavy guns can be moved across the water more
easily than they can be moved on land. England
has found it possible to transport 93^-inch howit-
zers across the English Channel. It is infinitely
more difficult to do this than to send them across the
Atlantic Ocean. The difficulty in transporting
large guns is in loading and landing, and the har-
bours of the Channel are so shallow that large ships
cannot enter them.
242 AWAKE! U. S. A.
As a reserve, Great Britain has now 5,500 guns
— we have 850 guns, counting every field gun in the
United States, even those just now completed and
soon to be completed.
Great Britain's ammunition supply can be esti-
mated at one hundred per cent, sufficient. Ours,
counting all the ammunition stored in the United
States, is 44 per cent. The amount would feed our
guns for about a day and a half. Supply-ships
continuously arriving from Great Britain and sup-
plies arriving from Canada would maintain her 100
per cent, sufficiency even after our supply was com-
pletely exhausted.
The coast forts near New York City could be
easily destroyed by explosive shells from British
battleships, firing from a distance of twelve miles
and upward, while our antedated guns, even the
new modern ones just installed at Fort Totten, could
playfully drop their shells in the water four and a
half miles short of the ships of the British fleet.
We have but two coast guns from Panama to Maine
with a range equal to those of foreign battleships —
but these are not yet mounted.
The British navy could also destroy the forts at
Boston and Philadelphia, without even coming in
range of the guns there.
Another division of British dreadnoughts could
steam past Fort Monroe at the mouth of the Chesa-
peake, without coming within a mile and a half of
IF THE LION COMES 243
OuF Qicmces on Land a^ainsl Brilfsh Invasion.
CbmpopatJveValues
InvadinfiArmy (^Rmmmmmammmamamm
Opposin^Anny U.S.hbhi
CiiinswilhAFmy^"'''^"'"""""""
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N. B. Lines representing the same United States factors of de-
fence may vary on different charts, because they represent pro-
portional values.
1. Representing the entire army which can be mobilised in thirty
days, men in our Atlantic Coast defences, and the militia of all the
Eastern States.
2. Representing 900 per cent, more field guns than we now have
with our entire army east of the Mississippi River.
3. Representing the entire equipment of field guns in the United
States.
4. And a line 26e per cent, longer.
244? AWAKE! U. S. A.
the extreme limit of the guns of Fort Monroe, and
destroy Washington or hold it up for ransom or
treaty concessions. Without even landing a single
man in New York, the British fleet could with a few
explosive shells blow up the power stations of our
subways at Fifty-ninth Street, of our elevated lines
at Seventy-sixth Street, and of our New York
Street Railways system at Ninety-first Street.
The British ability to transport an army to our
shores is unquestioned. The merchant marine of
Great Britain has a tonnage of 19,000,000 tons.
If after the invasion we tried to oppose the ad-
vance of their army, we would necessarily be forced
into battle line.
"An army of a million men, consisting of infan-
try, armed with modern shoulder-arms, would be
completely overmatched and easily defeated by an
army of 25,000 men amply equipped with modern
field artillery. The infantry would be wholly un-
able to get within musket range, because they would
all be destroyed by the shrapnel of the enemy before
they could get near enough to fire a single effective
shot." ^
Great Britain in an attack upon us would not only
have the aid of Japan's navy on our Pacific coast,
but might also be supported by a Mexican invasion,
as well as a Japanese advance from Mexico. If
Great Britain and Japan should furnish Mexico
with money, ammunition and supplies to fight the
IF THE LION COMES 245
Gringoes whom the Mexicans so much hate, the
Mexicans would do so.
Japan has now at least 100,000 Japanese in Mex-
ico, and about 20,000 in British Columbia, all of
whom have had military training.
On the north we would have to prepare against
invasion from Canada. Canadians themselves
might not fight us, but English troops could make
an invasion through Canada. And if it ever came
to a draw between the United States and England,
even the Canadians would certainly join with Eng-
land. No matter what the blood tie between the
Canadians and the people of the United States, the
blood tie between Canada and England is stronger.
But blood ties do not prevent war when commercial
interests are at stake.
"No nation can be trusted farther than it is
bound by its interests." ^
QUOTATION REFERENCES
^ Page 244. Hiram Maxim, in "Defenceless America."
^ Page 245. George Washington.
CHAPTER IV
MIUTARY CAMPS OR CE:M^TE:RISS
THERE is a story of foolish virgins and of wise
ones. The wise ones prepared; the foolish
ones went out into the darkness with their lamps
empty.
Preparation may not always prevent war, but it
gives a nation a fighting chance to prevent defeat,
vassalage and annihilation.
Judea did not harken to the prophet Isaiah who
called upon her to prepare herself for defence; and
was overthrown by the hosts of Mesapotamia.
Greece, unprepared, was made a vassal of Rome;
and only fragments of her law, her literature, her
art, her philosophy have come down to us.
The peace campaign of Hanno prevented men and
supplies being sent to Hannibal ; and Carthage fell !
One hundred years ago Europe was not pre-
pared ; Napoleon conquered Italy, Egypt, Flanders,
Holland, Saxony, Bavaria, Austria and Prussia.
One lesson, however, was enough for the Prussian
king. When the treaty was signed Napoleon per-
mitted him a small army of but a few thousand men
246
MILITARY CAMPS OR CEMETERIES 247
— only to preserve order at home! The King of
Prussia immediately enrolled the allowed number.
These men were trained, prepared and dismissed;
another\group was enrolled, trained, prepared and
dismissed^^and then another, and another and an-
other, until every man was trained and fit. Then
Prussia added the balance to the measure that finally
overthrew the great Corsican.
France lost Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 because
the Republicans, for political reasons, obstructed
the efforts of the government to prepare for the
coming confict.
In August, 19 14, three weeks after mobilisation,
600,000 French soldiers were without rifles. Many
others had old rifles unfit for service; they could
not then combat the well-equipped Germans who ad-
vanced to the very gates of Paris.
England was warned by Lord Roberts, the mili-
tary genius; by Winston Churchill, the prophet of
naval preparedness; and by Robert Blatchford, the
peace-loving socialist: Blatchford was not stupid
merely because he believed in the ultimate realisa-
tion of the brotherhood of man.
Lord Haldane sent England's army out into the
night with no oil in its lamps. When England
should have been enlisting and training a million
men, Lord Haldane dismissed 80,000 and publically
threatened to abolish Lord Roberts's pension if the
248 AWAKE! U. S. A.
grand old man continued his agitation for prepara-
tion.
England lost one man out of four, from Mons to
Marne, because she did not have sufficient up-
to-date artillery to protect her soldiers.
When a nation does not fill its lamps with oil it
fills them with the blood of its heroes.
When Marshal Niel was pleading in the French
Chamber in 1868 in favour of a bill of defence,
Jules Favre replied: "You, militarists, wish to
turn France into an armed camp."
"And you, pacificists," replied Marshal Neil, "are
taking care to make of it a cemetery."
PART FOUR: WHY WE ARE NOT
PREPARED
PART FOUR: WHY WE ARE NOT
PREPARED
CHAPTER I
PACIFIC MILITARISM FOR POUTICS
WE are unprepared because we have been bur-
dened by a particular form of militarism —
pacific militarism for politics.
There is militarism and militarism. There is
militarism for conquest, militarism for protection,
and militarism for politics of pacifism and pork.
The last is by far the worst type of militarism.
It is the type Congress and the people have made
existent in the United States of America. It has
come about as a reaction against militarism for
conquest. It places incompetent men — incompe-
tent because they have had no experience in the
work for which they are appointed — at the head
of the army and navy departments.
It results to-day — and the history of the United
States proves that it has always resulted — in blun-
ders, in negligence, in suppression of the truth, in
deception of the public, in creation of false ideals
as to the safety of the nation, and in enormous
251
252 AWAKE! U. S. A.
waste of moneys — a gigantic system of graft, the
most gigantic and wasteful in the world.
But these results have not been and are not due
to the military or the navy. They have grown out
of the political system which is dominated by the
ideas of the pacifists — a system which has controlled
and controls the military and naval organisations —
thanks to the indifference of the public.
With very few exceptions, the pacifists do not be-
lieve in peace at any price ; they do not believe that
we should give up our sovereignty — tamely submit-
ting to conquest rather than fighting for independ-
ence. But they do believe that an adequate trained
army in times of peace is a danger ; they do believe
that one should never prepare for war until war is
upon us — that when the danger arises the mass of
people, because of their patriotism and loyalty, will
spring to arms and adequately defend the country.
The principle and theory of the pacifists is ideal;
the practice abominable and criminal.
The waste of billions of dollars, the prolongation
of months of struggle into years of suffering and
anguish, the loss of tens of thousands of men by
sickness and the loss of scores of thousands by
death have been due above all else to the pacific
ideas of President Jefferson, President Polk and
President Buchanan.
If it had not been for the ultra-pacific ideas of
Thomas Jefferson and his coterie of followers, we
PACIFIC MILITARISM FOR POLITICS 253
would have had in 1812 a trained army of 20,000
men and the war with England would have been
ended in one campaign. If it had not been for the
pacific ideas of Polk and his followers in Congress,
the Mexican War would not have lasted six months,
and fifteen thousand instead of a hundred four
thousand men would have been necessary. If it had
not been for the pacific ideas of Buchanan and his
followers, the Civil War would certainly have been
ended in two years at most and we would have re-
quired but 300,000 men instead of nearly 3,000,000.
The military has always opposed the pacifists'
idea of a voluntary army springing to arms after
war has been declared. The military consequently
has always opposed and the leaders of the army and
navy, have always lamented the enormous political
waste in men and money due to the political sys-
tem which grows out of the pacifists' idea of mili-
tarism.
We were prepared but once in our history and
that preparation saved us from what might have
been the greatest war in which we would have been
engaged — a war with France, England, Austria
and Mexico combined. At the close of our Civil
War we had more than a million trained men. Aus-
tria had violated the Monroe Doctrine by placing
Maximilian on the throne of Mexico. England
was our bitter enemy all through the Civil War and
would readily have joined the forces of Austria and
254< AWAKE! U. S. A.
France ; but, being prepared at the moment, we had
but to request the withdrawal of the Emperor of
Mexico. Then France and Austria backed down. If
we had been unprepared would they have done so so
readily? And what would have been the result of
a war between an unprepared nation on this side of
the water and England, Austria, France and Mex-
ico combined against us ?
Because of the fact that we have never met a
single first-class power using its full forces in any
war in which we have been engaged, we have con-
tinued to shut our eyes to all the waste of the past
and have continued to allow the system to persist
up to the present time.
Primarily, the people have been and are at fault
for permitting such a system to exist; secondly.
Congress has been and is to blame for pandering to
this pacific political militarism, thus wasting bil-
lions of dollars; thirdly, the political administra-
tions have been and are to blame for conferring the
offices of Secretary of War and the Secretary of
the Navy as "plum puddings" to good friends and
former political helpers. This policy results from
the pacifists' fear that efficient military and naval
heads of the departments would put our people in
danger of military oppression.
The preparation for protecting against all for-
eign aggression — the safety of our nation — rests,
by the appointment of the President, in the hands
PACIFIC MILITARISM FOR POLITICS 255
of two men — the Secretary of War and the Secre-
tary of the Navy.
No man should be appointed to either of these
positions merely because he is a ''friend" or a "suc-
cessful business man" or a "social reformer." A
man should be picked for his fitness for the work
to be done.
This is not a criticism of the present administra-
tion alone; it is a criticism of the general policy of
our government. No business corporation would
tolerate such a policy. The Directors of the United
States Steel Corporation or any other large busi-
ness organisation would never choose a man as man-
ager merely because he came from Georgia instead
of Michigan or because he had been a successful
attorney or a successful manufacturer of silk skirts;
neither would a banking institution choose a man
as bank president merely because of his taste for
bon-bons or diluted raspberry juice.
A political Secretary of War or Secretary of the
Navy spends his first year in attempting to find out
what the reports of his subordinates mean; his sec-
ond year in ascertaining what he is expected to do ;
his third in getting a glimpse of the needs of the
department ; his fourth in discussion and investiga-
tion. Then he goes out of office, and another begins
the circle!
The first step in our campaign for adequate prep-
aration must be insistence upon a change of policy
256 AWAKE! U. S. A.
at Washington. The Secretary of War and the
Secretary of the Navy should be chosen from the
ranks of men who have worked in the army and
navy for years; from the group of men who have
proved their knowledge of the subject, who have
demonstrated their efficiency ; and who have shown
that they know how to handle men.
Moreover, each should have a seat in the House
and in the Senate so that each can come in contact
with Congressmen and Senators and inform these
men as to the real needs of the Army and the Navy.
Our world to-day is a very busy one ; Americans are
especially busy. It does not reflect upon the intelli-
gence of Congressmen from the Kansas cornfields,
from the Nevada mining towns, from the bluegrass
meadows of Kentucky, the brewery districts of Mil-
waukee, the oil-fields of Oklahoma, or the logging
districts of northern Michigan to state that they do
not know the real needs of the Army and Navy.
Each is intelligent, but each has had little time to
specialize in army and navy matters previous to his
election. Each, without doubt, has been previously
occupied by personal business and by the affairs of
his district. Hence the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of the Navy should have seats in the Con-
gress and in the Senate, so that they may enter into
discussion, elaborating in detail, when advisable,
the reasons for their recommendations to Congress.
This would make it possible for Representatives and
PACIFIC MILITARISM FOR POLITICS 257
Senators to find out exactly what the needs of the
army and navy are ; and in this way Congressmen
and Senators may become convinced of the neces-
sity of appropriating the moneys asked.
A political secretary of the Navy or a political
Secretary of War, previously uninformed of the
actual needs, is never qualified to speak to Congress
with authority.
And another change is vitally needed.
Congressmen now have the power of determining
how army and navy appropriations should be spent ;
their knowledge of the real needs of the army and
navy depends upon the reports of the Secretaries of
War and the Navy. As these officials seldom are
sure enough of themselves to convince Congress
that they know what they are asking money for.
Congress naturally concludes that the matter cannot
be of great consequence. As a result certain Con-
gressional leaders follow their own inclinations and
interests and "sluice to the barrels."
We should do away with the present system of
appropriation and adopt the budget system. All
other nations in the world have adopted this policy.
Even the South American republics are far in ad-
vance of us in this matter.
Our present system is a violation of the very prin-
ciples of our government. According to those prin-
ciples Congress is the law-making body, the Pres-
ident and the cabinet are the executives of the
258 AWAKE! U. S. A.
nation, and the Supreme Court exercises the judi-
cial function.
Congress as the law-making body has the su-
preme right in determining the appropriations but
it has assumed the executive function of the gov-
ernment in determining in detail how the Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy, members of
the executive department of the government, shall
spend the money, even to the number of dollars to
be paid a scrub woman.
It seems reasonable that among our one hundred
million people an efficient Secretary of the Navy
might hire a departmental assistant at $200 or less
per month who would be able to hire and discharge
at reasonable prices, scrub women, ice men and
laundresses. How ridiculous and wasteful to en-
gage 536 Senators and Representatives, each at a
yearly salary of $7,500 — a total of four million
dollars — not including railway expenses and all the
expenses of upkeep of the House of Representatives
and the Senate, to discuss in detail an act to appro-
priate $360 a year for a common labourer, to em-
ploy four scrub women at $192, or to engage a chief
laundress at $240. Would any business corpora-
tion engage a Board of Directors at a salary of
$4,220,000 a year — almost $3,000 per working hour,
to discuss whether they should pay a scrub woman
$184 a year or $192 a year, and, moreover, not only
hours, but days and even weeks in such discussions ?
PACIFIC MILITARISM FOR POLITICS 259
Think of a Congressional act that requires but 270
words to appropriate $33,000,000 for ships of the
navy, and 400 words to determine how ice, reHgious
books and stationery shall be purchased, and 100
words to determine the manner in which an enlisted
man shall be given his shoes, hat, coat, belts and so
forth. Monumental work for men commanding a
salary of $4,220,000 a year!
We are the only nation in the world, even among
the third-rate powers, that has not adopted the
budget system.
First, then, let us urge and insist upon a change
in our government's policy so that trained and in-
formed men shall be appointed to direct our depart-
ments of the army and the navy.
Second, let us urge and insist that these men be
given seats in the House of Representatives and in
the Senate.
Third, let us urge and insist upon the adoption of
the budget system of appropriating money for the
army and navy.
Let us do away with militarism for pork !
The only righteous military system is that which
is based upon the ideal that all citizens owe a duty
to their government in return for the protection
which the government gives to all. This is mili-
tarism for protection — the service of all for the
good of all. It is the system of Switzerland and
Australia. Let us adopt it.
CHAPTER II
INEFFICIENCY, NEGLIGENCE AND SUPPRESSION OF
FACTS
WE are unprepared because of past inefficiency
— due to political mismanagement.
The political head of a military or naval system
must necessarily be more influenced by the political
factors than would a permanent naval or military
board having full executive power and being quite
independent of politics.
When there is a difiference of opinion as to what
the military experts believe is needed and that which
supporters of the administration believe is neces-
sary, the political secretary, having been trained in
the art of listening to the voice of political support-
ers, is at least more inclined to listen to their plea
than to that of the military experts. The heroic
music of the military is strange to him and he does
not understand it ; but the rag-time approval of his
political constituents — supporters of the adminis-
tration — is not only familiar to his ear, but pleasing
to his temperament.
Moreover, a temporary political head is not well
enough informed regarding naval and military or-
260
BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 261
ganisation nor well enough trained in the handling
of naval or military units to reorganise or build
up a better organisation when one is needed.
Our naval promotion system is a burlesque of
those of Europe ; it seems that everything has been
done that could have been done to keep able am-
bitious young men out of the navy.
No young man, desiring a future, wishes to grow
gray-haired under a system which holds him in the
two lowest ranks of the navy until he is two-score
and ten. There is no efficient arrangement for pro-
motion even of trained college men.
"... the promotion of officers is so completely
blocked that a young man graduating from the
Naval Academy must look forward to spending all
the best years of his life in the two lowest grades
of the service; to performing, as a gray-headed
man, the same duties he has performed as a boy;
and to receiving but a very small increase in salary."
''I ask you to picture the efifect of a condition
where a young officer, graduating from the Naval
Academy, full of spirit and enthusiasm, finds him-
self confronted with a prospect of promotion to the
grade of Lieutenant at the age of 52 years." '
Also in the organisation of our army efficiency
seems to be the last thing thought about.
Our army is a badly balanced organisation, and
for this Congress is to blame.
262 AWAKE! U. S. A.
Were it not necessary to increase our army in
time of war, the number of officers we have in the
United States Army would be a fair proportion to
the number of enhsted men. Our standing army,
however, will be but the nucleus for hundreds of
thousands of volunteers. Certainly we cannot ex-
pect to effectively oppose an invading army of
250,000 trained men with less than one million vol-
unteers in addition to our present army, inasmuch
as it took nearly three million Union volunteers to
defeat the volunteer armies of the South in the Civil
War.
Every company of a hundred men needs at least
four officers. It is better to have six — at least two
in reserve for each company in time of war. The
officers in our army are but a little more than 5.3
per cent, of the enlisted men. Assuming that the
officers of our militia, each and every one of them,
should turn out to be efficient officers, which is very
doubtful, then we should have just 5,015 officers of
the United States Army to captain our army of
93,610 men and to train the 1,000,000 volunteers;
that is, one officer to every 2,012 men. This would
mean just one-eightieth of the minimum number of
officers absolutely necessary ; and not a single officer
in reserve. If our entire mobile army in all the
United States to-day were officered at this rate, we
would now have but 17 officers of all ranks.
Officers promoted from the ranks without pre-
BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 263
vious training, are seldom of value ; there are excep-
tions, of course, which stand out in history, but they
are few. In our Civil War more than 25,000 men
made officers by promotion had to be returned to the
ranks because of their inefficiency.
Our campaign against Mexico w^as probably the
most creditable campaign the United States Army
ever conducted. General Scott has asserted that its
success would have been doubtful except for the
percentage of trained men and especially the large
percentage of trained officers.
''The magnitude of the task in training volunteer
officers is apparent when it is realized that it will be
necessary to develop not less than 25,000 in case we
should have to mobilise enough additional volun-
teers to bring our total force up to 1,000,000
men." ^
The more trained officers zue can hav,e on hand,
in case it becomes necessary to quickly enroll and
train volunteers, the better our chance of success
will be.
Not only is there lack of proper organisation, but
there is actual blundering !
Mere lack of knowledge on the part of a political
Secretary of the Navy or an untrained Secretary of
War has led to serious mistakes.
Our F submarines were authorized in 1908.
They were accepted as satisfactory in May, 1913,
264 AWAKE! U. S. A.
by Secretary Daniels. They are now out of com-
mission because of faulty construction. Five years
to build four defective submarines ; and 22 men sent
to their death !
The C-2 was authorized in May, 1908, and is yet
but nine-tenths complete — a seven-year profitable
job.
For the same reason we are still building great
battleships, costing from fifteen to seventeen million
dollars, vitally deficient in one great essential —
speed.
The keel of the California has just been laid. We
are told of the wonderful armor it will have, of the
twelve mighty guns it will carry, of the engines we
are going to experiment with; yet we are not so
vividly informed that its speed is to be but tzventy-
one knots an hour — a deficiency which would have
outclassed it even three years ago.
Of course, no intelligent man holding so responsi-
ble a position as that of Secretary of War or that
of Secretary of the Navy wishes to make an impor-
tant decision upon any vital, gigantic question until
he has informed himself regarding it. This is to
his credit, but the result of the system is no less
detrimental to the army or the navy. While he
seeks information, talks, discusses and investigates,
opportunities pass. He is unable to judge of the
true value of new devices. Hence, because of ig-
norance on the part of secretaries of the Navy and
BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 265
of War, because of negligence on the part of Con-
gress, we have lost opportunities of first equipping
our army and navy with the most modern means of
defence.
Our people have invented the greatest instru-
ments in modern warfare; yet we have practically
none of them. While our political secretaries have
been investigating other nations have taken them
up and developed them.
A citizen of the United States made the first aero-
plane that would fly. Our Army and Navy depart-
ments have been testing, experimenting, investi-
gating and talking ever since — but not building.
When the war opened we had twenty-three obsolete
aeroplanes, although Germany had a thousand one
hundred perfected modern aeroplanes and France
one thousand five hundred.
An American invented the Audion Amplifier,
which is used by the French and English armies to
detect the far approaching aeroplanes and Zeppe-
lins. We have none for this purpose.
It was a citizen of the United States who per-
fected the submarine ; and we have only a few that
can safely operate under water, although foreign
nations have scores of submarines capable of mak-
ing three and four days' trips, even two weeks' voy-
ages away from the bases of supply.
An American invented the microphone, which is
now used by the British Navy to detect approaching
^m AWAKE! U. S. A.
submarines under water. We have none for this
purpose.
A citizen of the United States invented the great-
est explosive known yet, when it was first adopted
we were so doubtful of its value that instead of
ordering thirty million dollars' worth Congress ap-
propriated thirty thousand dollars to be divided
among seven different factories.
When the government concentrated its forces at
Manila and a portion of our army at San Diego, the
Pacific fleet did not have enough coal to steam to
Honolulu and back. Lack of fuel for the Pacific
fleet at this time was wholly due to neglect!
In August, 191 5, when the government felt it
might be compelled to again order ships to Mexico,
the Tennessee which was close to New York Har-
bor could not leave for the south because she could
not get enough coal to steam even as far as Newport
News.
The Tennessee asked the Brooklyn Navy Yard
for coal and begged for fifty tons only if the Yard
could not spare more. But the Brooklyn Navy
Yard did not have fifty tons on hand and did not
have that amount twenty-four hours later. And
this shamefully neglectful condition existed after
four years' tension with Mexico, after an entire
year of war in Europe, and after four months'
diplomatic strain with Germany.
The Brooklyn Navy Yard is one of the great sup-
BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 267
ply stations for the Atlantic fleets, with Boston hun-
dreds of miles to the north and Philadelphia far to
the south. And this great naval station could not
supply FIFTY TONS OF COAL when needed,
even though the department at Washington had
knozvn for weeks that it might be called upon at any
time to send ships to the south!
There are 152 twelve-inch guns mounted without
a single person to man them; there are two four-
teen-inch guns mounted to protect our coasts with-
out a single man trained to operate them ; there are
71 ten-inch guns and 37 seven-inch, and no one
trained to handle them in case of need.
The great 16-inch gun for the defence of the
Panama Canal was finished and fire-tested in 1903.
Through neglect it lay on the beach for ten years.
At the end of that time it was found that not even
a design had been made for a carriage! And in
January, 1916, thirteen years after the gun was fin-
ished and tested, the carriage was not even ready
to be sent to Panama. Similar facts as to neglect
in supplying ammunition and supplying men for our
harbor defences, brought out at the Senate investi-
gation a year ago, caused one Senator to exclaim :
"This is nothing less than criminal negligence."
Perhaps one of the most serious results of our
policy of placing politicians at the head of the army
268 AWAKE! U. S. A.
and navy is the friction that develops between the
generals of the army and the admirals of the navy
who have had from 35 to 40 years' practical experi-
ence on the one hand and the political head with no
naval or military experience on the other.
At present we have such a flagrant example of a
Secretary of the Navy, unwilling and refusing to
take advice of experienced admirals or the General
Board, that the weakness, danger and viciousness
of the political system of appointment is most strik-
ingly brought home to us. This is not a criticism
of Secretary Daniels personally, it is a criticism of
the system that makes such an appointment possible.
At best it is most embarrassing for a man with
only a country newspaper experience to step into a
department of which he knows nothing and at once
become the superior of hundreds of men who have
had years of practical and scientific training in the
navy and in the department.
Any man placed in such a position feels that ( for
the good of the service — a service whose efficiency
depends upon obedience) he must make it known
that he is the "head." Consequently, if mistakes are
made or if defects — not due to him at all — are ex-
posed, he is tempted to justify his political appoint-
ment and to justify his chief at the head of the Ad-
ministration, by covering up those mistakes, by shift-
ing the blame upon a previous administration or by
BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 269
suppressing the truth about the defects which exist.
Perhaps never in the history of the United States
has there been a time, excepting during the times
when we were at war, when publicity as to our un-
preparedness is so much needed as at present, and
there probably has never been a time in all our his-
tory, excepting times when we were at war, during
which the Secretary of the Navy has attempted to
suppress the truth as to our real condition so auto-
cratically as at present.
In the United States knowledge of facts regard-
ing our unpreparedness need not be withheld be-
cause of the fear that foreign governments may
learn of them. Every man of sense knows that the
secret agents of Germany, Russia, England and
Japan know about our unpreparedness. Their
agents have been at the business of finding out a
long time and they were well qualified for their task
in the beginning. Every fact that has been given
us during that last two years, every astonishing
revelation made as to our unpreparedness, every-
thing that has helped to open our eyes, has been and
is well known to every foreign government.
Any man in the service who attempts to give the
public information as to the actual conditions of the
army or of the navy, for the support of which the
people are contributing two hundred million dollars
a year, is promptly reprimanded or transferred.
270 AWAKE! U. S. A.
Anyone outside of the service who attempts to
tell the people the truth is subjected to the displeas-
ure and ridicule of the heads of the departments.
No loyal American citizen desires the Secretary
of War or the Secretary of the Navy to make public
one single fact, the suppression of which might be
for the interests of the United States.
During the present administration, however, offi-
cers both in the army and navy have been repri-
manded, even major-generals and admirals not ex-
cepted, because they have stated the most general
truths of our unpreparedness— truths already well
known to every layman who has made a study of
the subject.
The Secretary of War reprimanded a Captain
for stating:
"It will take the United States about three years
to put an army of one million trained men in the
field, and in that time an enemy could take and hold
our American seaboards."
If a similar statement had been made in peace
times in militaristic Germany or Russia, members
of the stafif would have engaged in open debate on
the subject.
Admiral Fiske stated that it would take five years
to put our navy in condition to fight a first-class
power. This is truth which any one who knows
anything about the navy already knows. But it
convinced Secretary of the Navy Daniels, who had
BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 271
been in the navy tzventy-foiir months, that Admiral
Fiske, who had been in the navy forty-four years,
was either ignorant or careless in his statements;
hence Admiral Fiske was "transferred."
This same Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels,
furnishes us an amusing and at the same time tragic
illustration of the inability of a man who has had
no previous knowledge of naval affairs to know of
what he has approved and of what he has disap-
proved. Less than four months ago Admiral Fiske
was again called to the office of Secretary Daniels.
Admiral Fiske was told that, had he been a younger
officer. Secretary Daniels would have court-mar-
tialled him for publishing an article without first
referring it to the Secretary of the Navy.
The amusing side of this incident is that the ar-
ticle of which Secretary Daniels disapproved zuas
an article which Admiral Fiske had previously sub-
mitted to Secretary Daniels and which Mr. Daniels
had himself previously approved. Secretary Dan-
iels is not to be blamed ; with his previous experience
only as a small town newspaper editor and state
printer, how could he be expected to have suffi-
cient knowledge of naval affairs to determine
whether an article should be approved or disap-
proved until it had been made public and he had
found out from the politicians that its publication
was unwise politically?
Who is Admiral Fiske? He is one of the great-
272 AWAKE! U. S. A.
est naval experts — he has been in the navy forty
years, he has won two gold medals for navy insti-
tute work, he has had command of three different
divisions of the Atlantic fleet, he has invented a
naval telephone sight which is now adopted by all
the navies of the world, he has been president of
the Naval Institute.
The serious and tragic side of the incident is that
Admiral Fiske — a man with such a record — should
be absolutely forbidden by Secretary Daniels to
write for any publication or to speak anywhere on
national defence. Secretary Daniels' words, as
creditably reported by Admiral Fiske himself, were
in substance these: "You cannot write or speak
on any subject connected with national defence. If
the people really want to know anything about the
navy they can come to its Head. You cannot even
say two and two make four."
This is one of the results of our political military
system. It makes it possible for any president, no
matter of what party, to appoint a politician who is
so ignorant — no matter what his native capacity in
his own line may be — of naval affairs and naval
science that he cannot tell whether he has approved
or disapproved of an article of military affairs. It
is regrettable that such a secretary can maintain
his assumption of superiority only by depriving the
most noted expert in the navy department of his
freedom of speech even in private life.
BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 273
Moreover, the public is misled by the statements
officially given out as to the real condition of the
navy.
In May, 191 5, the Secretary of the Navy pub-
lically proclaimed that nine of our submarines had
made an extraordinary trip from Key West to New
York ; but he did not inform us that three out of the
nine submarines never joined the fleet until they
reached a position off Delaware; nor were we told
that one of the K boats and the E-2 had to be towed ;
nor were we told that the fleet was accompanied by
a tender all the way.
Moreover, in comparing the broadside-fire of our
best ships with those of the British Navy, the Sec-
retary of the Navy compared the broadside fire
of British ships which have been finished with ships
which we are going to have some day.
And again. Secretary Daniels in his late an-
nouncement has classified the Michigan and the
South Carolina as dreadnoughts — although all na-
val experts, our navy department, and even Secre-
tary Daniels himself, have not previously so classi-
fied them. These ships have a speed of but 18%
knots and a propelling power of but 16,000 and
18,000 horsepower respectively.
His announcement that the United States navy
keeps a larger percentage of men on its ships in time
of peace than any other navy in the world, is but a
portion of the truth. We keep practically all the
274 AWAKE! U. S. A.
trained men we have on our ships, because we
haven't enough. Other navies have thousands of
trained men in reserve. They are not on the ships
in peace time, but they are ready to go on at a mo-
ment's notice.
What the American citizen wishes is frankness
and freedom! He is not afraid of the truth; if
there are dangers, he wants to know of them; if
there are defects in his tools of defence, he wants
to remedy those defects!
But how could the American public ever have be-
come informed of our present condition if laymen
and students and former government officials and
statesmen had not, in opposition to the wishes of
this administration, revealed to us the present de-
fects of our army and navy? All thanks are due
them. The important point, however, is that these
same conditions may arise again and again — no
matter what party is in power, no matter what man
is in the White House — so long as we tolerate the
"political-plum" method of placing the safety of
our nation in the hands of untrained men.
QUOTATION REFERENCES
^ Page 261. Rear- Admiral Austin M. Knight, U. S. Navy.
2 Page 263. Major-General Leonard Wood.
CHAPTER III
WASTING BILLIONS
WE are unprepared because we have wasted
hundreds of millions of dollars through
political mismanagement. We have been paying,
on an average, for the last ten years at the rate
of one hundred million dollars a year to maintain an
army of less than 100,000 men. This little army,
because of the waste and extravagance due to the
*'pork-barrelling-method" of appropriating moneys,
and to the inefficiency of the political Secretaries of
War, has cost us in ten years one billion dollars.
Yet after all this expenditure we have but thirty-
four thousand men in the United States that can be
mobilised, and those are so scattered that they can-
not be mobilised inside of thirty days.
Switzerland has an army much more efficient and
better equipped. At the beginning of the war
Switzerland mobilised an army equal in number to
seven armies of the size of the entire mobile army
in the United States. This was done in forty-eight
hours. And these men were fully equipped. If it
had been necessary she could have mobilised in ten
275
276
AWAKE! U. S. A.
OuF Mf litarism forPork
a
B
Q- Our OrmyonaA/oi/y
ExpoTd/'tures from
J730'JQip
^(6^500,000.000
B= Q/l Other Qoi/ernmerU
Dcpmd/'tures from
1790-wio
S UOOOOOO.QOO
A. $16,500,000,000— Our Army and Navy Expenditures — including
pensions and interest on public debts caused by
war — from 1790 to 1910.
B. 4,900,000,000 — All other Government Expenditures from 1790
to 1910.
WASTING BILIJONS
^^77
OuF MilttaFism for POFk
USfromfoundcU/on
ofGoi^ernmerU to/£>JO
B=PortiJDn of Qdove
Exfiended forOrmy
ancfNavydunn^
same/Ter/ocf
A. $21,500,000,000— All expenditures of U. S. from foundation
of Government to 1910.
B. 16,500,000,000 — Portion of above — including pensions and inter-
est on public debts caused by wars — expended
for Army and Navy during same period.
278 AWAKE! U. S. A.
days eight more additional armies, each equalling
in number and surpassing in equipment the entire
mobile army in the United States.
Switzerland has maintained her army, and one of
the very best small armies in the world, out of a
population about equal to that of Massachusetts.
Switzerland has done this without interrupting the
industry of the country and without altering the
peace-loving nature of the people nor the peace-
policy of the Swiss Government. No nation in Eu-
rope has for its size a more efficient army and no
nation is more anff-militaristic.
For every $i Switzerland spends to train, equip
and keep a soldier in training, we spend $8o.6g. If
we had been during the last ten years as econom-
ically efficient as Switzerland, our army would
have cost us less than twelve million dollars instead
of one thousand million dollars.
But this is a comparison with Switzerland only.
Mr. Bryan, Mr. Ford, Mr. Kitchin and others
wail that we do not wish to burden our people with
the excessive cost of a militaristic system similar
to that of Russia, Germany or France.
The truth is this: we could have maintained an
adequately trained army of half a million men each
year since the Civil War and have saved the United
States several hundred millions of dollars each
generation, had we adopted the system of Russia,
Germany and France.
WASTING BILLIONS 279
What is the annual soldier cost of each man of
the United States Army compared with the annual
soldier cost of each man in the armies of the most
militaristic countries in the world?
We pay from 400 to 600 per cent, more for the
training and equipment of each soldier than other
nations pay and get almost nothing in return. The
per soldier cost in times of peace in Switzerland
is $13, in Germany, $209, in France, $249, in Aus-
tria, $256, in Russia, $293, and in the United
States, $1,049.
Again objection is made that there is a vast dif-
ference between sustaining an army as it is sus-
tained in the United States, with men at a salary
of $16 per month each, and sustaining peace armies
in Europe where the allowance as salary is but a
few pennies a day per soldier. The objection is
also made that there is a vast difference between
the cost of food furnished to our soldiers and that
furnished to the soldier of Russia, Germany and
France respectively.
Both objections are granted. It is true that the
food furnished each man of the United States Army
costs more than the food furnished each man of the
Russian, German or French armies; but the ex-
cessive cost is due more to waste and inefficiency in
management than to a difference in the quality or
amount of food.
But this waste and this inefficiency in manage-
S80
AWAKE! U. S. A.
MflflaFism roF Protection >sMflltorisfiirorPorK
Annuel Peace Soldiepypep ^ $.000,000
Q = Swi'tierlana m.6j5.
B-US-CL sooo
Mflirarism tor Pork rs MflftarfsmforPFOtectton
Cost perSoIdierpepyear
Q
c~
B' Trance *m
C= tSW/zer/Q/7Cf */3
WASTING BILLIONS 281
ment have not been due to inefficient men in the
Subsistence Department but to the small number of
men allowed by Congress for that zvork. At the
beginning of our war with Spain there were but
twenty-two trained heads in our Subsistence De-
partment and these men were compelled to direct,
even after partially trained men were given as aides,
the buying of materials and the supplying of these
foods to nearly 300,000 men in different camps in
the United States, and to the armies in Cuba, Porto
Rico, the Philippines and in China. Is there any
wonder that there was waste?
But to go back to the comparative cost of the
soldier of different nations in peace times.
After we have deducted respective amounts
paid for salaries and food from the respective total
cost of each soldier of the armies of Germany and
the United States, we find that the annual cost for
equipment and training of a soldier in the United
States is 631 per cent, greater than it is in miUtar-
istic-burdened Germany. And in Germany the sol-
dier is equipped and he is trained. Not only is he
taken care of in the most perfect manner, from his
toe-nails to his scalp, but he is provided with the
most modern and costly equipment and is furnished
with sufficient ammunition for practice. Although
we pay 631 per cent, more per soldier per year than
Germany pays, the United States Army has prac-
tically no equipment at all. In other words, elimi-
282
AWAKE! U. S. A.
Our Army-Miat Might HciveBeai
o_
0=QrmyWeNowHav^ ^ooo
B-armyJVeMi0litHovefioa
Every Year from /S7£> -to -
w/f forourMoney,Hocf/t
BeentS/ientas w/se/y as
/n6W/7zer/ancf.
6,50^00?
OuFMUftaFfsm lor Port:
B
Q'CbstofOurOrmy
for last 25 years
iS963.000.000
B- imatttst)ouc/tiave
cost us/fmcneytiact
been spent as econo-
mfcot/yos/ntSH'ttzer/ana
*S^OOO,000
WASTING BILLIONS 283
nating the differences in the costs in food and sal-
aries, the United States spends 631 per cent, more
per year for the equipment and management of
each soldier than Germany does. Germany spends
100 per cent, for equipment and gets the best in the
world. We waste 631 per cent, and get little or
nothing. Which is the burdened country ?
We scoff at the bureaucratic-grafting govern-
ment of Russia and we pity the poor Russians bur-
dened by militarism; but even eliminating the dif-
ferences in the costs of food and salaries, we an-
nually spend for equipment 374 per cent, more per
soldier than Russia does. Russia, at the beginning
of the present war, equipped and mobilised 2,000,-
000 men in 30 days; we cannot mobilise 34,000
even partially equipped men in 30 days !
Why is America so inefficient? Because there
has been flagrant administrative inefficiency and ig-
norance and because there has been congressional
waste and lack of co-operation.
One of the great causes of waste is the continu-
ance of 49 different army posts for 34,000 men.
Most of these were established a hundred years
ago. They were then necessary to protect the
pioneers from the Indians. Five hundred men are
still kept at Oswego, New York — evidently to pro-
tect the people from the Red Skins that overrun the
surrounding country. Congress has not yet recog-
nised that we are living in 1916 instead of 1814.
284 AWAKE! U. S. A.
President Roosevelt's Secretaries of War over
and over again urged Congress to abolish most of
these army posts, insisting that they were useless
and the cause of great waste. But Congressmen
were appealed to by their constituents, who begged
that their sources of revenue be not cut off. Hence
Congress turned a deaf ear to the repeated demands
of the Secretaries of War.
Corresponding to the useless army posts, there
are useless navy yards.
Great Britain in first-class fighting ships has a
navy almost four times as large as our own, yet we
have twice as many first-class navy yards. In
other words we have spent enough money to ade-
quately accommodate a navy 800 per cent, greater
than that we now have. Yet many of our yards
are useless. Germany has a much more powerful
and efficient navy than we have and Germany has
adequate navy yards to accommodate her entire
fleet, yet all her yards combined do not equal one-
third of the accommodations we have provided
for ships we have not. Navy yards have been
established hit-and-miss along the coast. When-
ever a Senator or a Congressman could bring
enough pressure to bear to secure an appropriation
for his state or district a navy yard was established.
As an instance of this, some years ago a south-
ern Senator insisted that a navy yard be established
at Port Royal, South Carolina. There was a site
WASTING BILLIONS 285
for sale for five thousand dollars. This was pur-
chased and nearly half a million appropriated to be
distributed among the bankers, constructors, news-
papers and politicians in the Senator's district. Of
course, subsequent appropriations were necessary
and the station was not abandoned until nearly
three million dollars had been wasted there. Later
this same Senator insisted on another navy yard
at Charleston and five million dollars was squan-
dered. This Charleston yard was built especially
for big battleships, but is so badly constructed that
it can be used only for destroyers and gun boats.
Nine million dollars have been spent at Mare Is-
land, California. Yet the water is so shallow that
it has not an adequate dock and none of the larger
battleships built in the last thirteen years can berth
there.
If up to 1910 we had spent our appropriations
for navy yards as efficiently as Great Britain or
Germany have spent their appropriations, we should
have saved enough money to build two hundred sub-
marines at one million dollars each, or four hun-
dred submarines at half a million dollars each, or
fourteen of the finest dreadnoughts afloat.
And now, although former secretaries of the
navy have insisted on the abandonment of half a
score or more of these wasteful enterprises, the
present Secretary of the Navy announces that he
will not abandon a single one of them.
286 AWAKE! U. S. A.
WoF Expenses and Peace Waste
A-^mOQOOQOOQ
B- q/2/fiOOOOO
A. The sum — including pensions and interest on public debts caused
by war — we have spent on our army and navy from 1790 to 1915.
B. The total actual cost of all our wars from 1790 to 1914, showing
that we have spent in peace times 10,779 millions of dollars, while
the cost of the wars of the United States has been but $6,i2i,cxx),ooo.
WASTING BILLIONS 287
Since 1900 we have spent in round numbers a
billion and a half dollars on our navy. Germany
has a navy almost tzvice as pozverful as that of the
United States, yet she has spent $500,000,000 less
than we have. We have wasted and allowed our-
selves to be pork-barrelled out of five hundred mil-
lion dollars in fifteen years. This would have built
five hundred of the best, most up-to-date coast sub-
marines, and in addition to that we could have added
sixteen first-class modern dreadnoughts of great
speed, mediumly light armour and high-elevation
guns. Sixteen dreadnoughts of this type and five
hundred coast submarines would have given us one
of the greatest navies in the world. This amount
our Congresses have wasted in a little over fifteen
years.
This is the result of political militarism — of un-
trained Secretaries of War, of pork-barrelling Con-
gresses and of ninety million American citizens
^'criminally indififerent" to the welfare of their
country !
PART FIVE: HOW POLITICAL
MILITARISM FAILS
PART FIVE: HOW POLITICAL
MILITARISM FAILS
CHAPTER I
the: minute me^n
THE minute men have won!"
This was the cry heard in every American
colony after the Battle of Bunker Hill.
The minute men — our noble Revolutionary an-
cestors — were each day struggling with nature for
a living and holding the Indians at bay. They were
courageous and physically fit. Moreover, every one
of them knew from boyhood how to use firearms
and how to hit the mark.
Not only they, but their fathers and their grand-
fathers had been so trained. A gun was taken with
them when they went to work in the fields; a gun
was ever ready for the use of the wife and the
mother at the house; a gun was taken to the town
meeting; even to church.
And that gun, in relation to the armament of
those days, stood as the rapid-fire machine gun does
in relation to the armament of to-day. *'The min-
ute men" in those days designated men physically
291
292 AWAKE! U. S. A.
fit; men trained from boyhood up in the expert
use of the efficient fire-arm of that time; men armed
with and owning the firearm; men ready at a mo-
ment's notice.
To-day the citizen soldiery means : men physically
unfit, coming from behind the counter, from the
office desk, or from the club; men untrained in the
use of the rapid-fire machine gun, the efficient in-
fantry weapon of to-day; men — not one in a thou-
sand — having expert knowledge of the machine
gun; men — not one in a million — being the owner
of such a gun; men absolutely unready to fight on
a month's notice.
To believe that citizen soldiery to-day can spring
to arms and accomplish even what was accom-
plished at Bunker Hill is a vain hope. We might ac-
complish a similar feat if every male citizen were
physically fit, if every male citizen from childhood
up had possessed a rapid-fire machine gun and had
had years of practice in using it. But in our coun-
try to-day there is not one man in each half million
of our unorganised militia that knows anything
about the expert use of a rapid-fire machine gun.
But did the minute men alone win the Battle of
Bunker Hill? They were entrenched on a hill — a
natural fort — behind breastworks, thrown up under
the direction of trained generals. The British were
compelled to march up the hill unprotected, to face
men behind intrenchments ! The selection of the
THE MINUTE MEN 293
hill and the breastworks were due to the wisdom of
the expert officers who had been trained in the ear-
lier colonial wars. The minute men inflicted a
heavy loss upon the enemy, yet their loss was 42
per cent, of the British loss. Students of military
matters are all unified in believing that the victory
of Bunker Hill was due not only to the minute men,
but to the trained officers who chose the position,
planned the breast works, and restrained the irnpuU
sive men, so that they did not waste their small sup-
ply of ammunition.
They won at Bunker Hill, but what is the true
story of the minute men, the militia men, the citizen
soldiery, during the remainder of the War of the
Revolution, during the War of 1812, during the
Civil War?
The minute men won at Bunker Hill! But the
minute men, or militia, or citizen soldiery, no matter
by what name they are designated, have won but
two battles in all the history of the United States —
that of Bunker Hill and that of New Orleans, and
even at the Battle of New Orleans the division un-
der General Morgan deserted and fled battle when
attacked.
Yet in spite of the fact that during the seven long
years of the Revolutionary War the minute men
sufl"ered defeat after defeat, never again winning
a single battle in that war, the reputation of that
one victory has been allowed to modify all our mili-
294 AWAKE! U. S. A.
tary history — has resulted in years of unnecessary
struggle, suffering and devastation, needless waste
of hundreds of millions of dollars, and wanton
waste not only of thousands, but of hundreds of
thousands of men.
Citizen soldiery — half-trained volunteers have
failed. They have failed at the most vital crises to
enlist in sufficient numbers ; they have failed during
their training — refusing to obey orders, mutinying
and deserting; they have failed, surprising as it
may seem, in the ideal of volunteer service; they
have always failed in battle.
First: they have failed to enlist at vital crises.
Within thirty-five days after the Battle of Bunker
Hill Congress issued commissions and provided for
a continental army (July 21, 1775) not to exceed
22,000 men. During the four months from July
21 to November 19, 1775, only p66 enlisted. So
slow was the recruiting that Washington had to
issue a special call for five thousand men to replace
the minute men who were then insisting upon going
back to their homes.
And this was at a time when the colonies were
preparing to fight for their very existence.
Later, out of the 20,000 troops called for by Con-
gress during the last three months of 1775, less than
10,000 enlisted; and even after enlisting many of
them refused to join the army.
During the year 1776 Congress and the colonies
THE MINUTE MEN
295
cruiefi SoldteFy a^fnsl Traf ned Troops
Rei/olutfonory
War
War Of IS jz
Mexfcan War
3 I
a-€olonfol Forces
395.000
B-Brftfsh Qrmfes
150000
D
F
F
C- U.S. Forces t-USrorces
5Z1.000 mooo
DrOctuai Brftish Qr/ny r-McxfcanOrmy
16,000 mooo
Revolutionary War
A. So inefficient was the volunteer system, that Washington was
never able to bring into battle line a force larger than one-seventieth
part of the forces enlisted.
B. Largest actual British force which our army had to meet at
any time, was about 36,000 men, even including all the British
ineflFectives.
War of 1812
C. So inefficient were the volunteer forces that the largest number
that could ever be assembled for battle was only one-hundred-
thirty-second part of the forces enlisted.
D. The aggregate force we had to meet in any one place at any
one time was not more than one-half of this number.
Mexican War
R The volunteer forces were so inefficient that the Generals, after
working for eighteen months to get them in shape, finally invaded
Mexico with but little more than ten thousand men.
F. The Mexican Army was not composed of well-trained troops.
£96 AWAKE! U. g. A.
authorised more than 90,000 troops. Yet the year
1777 opened with Washington going into winter
quarters at Morristown with an army which was
reduced during his stay to less than 3,000 men,
ahhough there were more than 20,000 trained Brit-
ish veterans less than thirty-five miles away.
Even during the last year of the war, when the
fate of the colonies hung in the balance, the colonies
called for more than 50,000 men, yet Washington
was unable to get more than 5,000 effective troops.
And this failure of the nation's citizens to vol-
unteer during times of great stress has not been
confined to the Revolutionary War.
During the first year of the Civil War volunteers
exceeded the call, but as soon as they saw that there
was real fighting to be done many seized the first
opportunity and went home at the expiration of
their short enlistments, or deserted. In the Civil
War, as in the Revolutionary War, when the real
crisis came, the citizens did not volunteer in suffi-
cient number to meet the needs. The draft had to
be enforced.
During the Spanish-American War the nation
passed through no crisis. The war was over in 109
days. We do not know what the results of volun-
teer system would have been had the men enlisting
deemed the campaign more than a great lark.
Not only have the militia failed to enlist in suf-
THE MINUTE MEN
297
amen SolcWeryA^alnsf Indians
Creek Indian
War i812-i8l2>
Fl or/da War
SeminofGivar BfacHHowK
/8I7-181S War 1832
C
A-USM52I C-US-6JDJI E-U.S-^98^ G-US.-6g,69J
B'Jncl-i950 D.'ind-JOOO J=-/nc/-/000 Hind- J 800
A. The number of men called out for the purpose.
B. Many authorities estimate the Indian forces as low as i,ioo.
D. Estimated by some authorities as low as seven or eight hundred
instead of one thousand.
F. Indian forces probably not more than eight hundred, according
to conservative estimate.
G. The 6o,ooo militia and volunteers were so inefficient that General
Scott begged Congress to disband them and give him 3,000 regulars
instead.
H. Indian forces are estimated by various authorities at from 1,100
to 1,900.
298 AWAKE! U. S. A.
ficient numbers whenever there was a real crisis to
be met and real fighting to be done, but they have
failed during training.
They have mutinied and deserted in unbelievable
numbers. Innumerable instances of mutinying and
desertion — so many they cannot here be mentioned
— occurred among the militia of the various colon-
ies before they were incorporated into the army of
Congress. And even in the army under Washing-
ton within five months after its organisation, deser-
tion of troops became a serious matter. In writing
of his failure to hold them, Washington stated:
"Notwithstanding this (my explanation and
plea) yesterday morning most of them resolved to
leave the camp. Many went ofif and the utmost vig-
ilance was used to apprehend them."
In the beginning of the War of 1812 General
Hopkins, commanding 4,000 Kentucky mountain
militia, started to invade Canada. But in five days
all the troops mutinied, deserted and went home.
Another large force under William Henry Harri-
son, organised for the same purpose, also decided to
return to their homes. One month later practically
all of the troops under General Dearborn, organised
to invade Canada by the Lake Champlain route,
marched up to the very border and then decided
they did not wish to go to Canada. As a result
they mutinied, absolutely refusing to cross the bor-
der, and thus the expedition ended.
THE MINUTE MEN 299
During the fall of the year of 1813 first one
group and then another of the troops employed un-
der General Jackson in the Creek War, mutinied re-
spectively. In the Second Florida War against the
Seminoles, the Missouri volunteers ran away and
hid in a swamp ; all the pleading of General Taylor
could not induce them to return to the fighting.
The militia mutinied:
At Morristown in January, 1781 ;
At Pompton, New Jersey, the same month;
At Lancaster, in June, 1783;
On the march to Detroit in June, 1812;
At Detroit, Michigan, in July, 1812;
On the march to the Wabash River in August,
1812;
On the march to the Maumee River, the same
month ;
Before the Battle of Queenstown in August;
En route from Plattsburg in November, 1812;
At Fort Strother, Florida, in November, 181 3;
In the retreat to Bufifalo in December, 1813;
At the Withlacoochee River, December 13, 1835;
At Charlestown, West Virginia, in 1861 !
The official record states that the desertions from
the armies of the United States during the Civil
War were 199,000. But this is not the full truth.
This number includes only the desertions after men
were in the formal authorised armies of the United
300 AWAKE! U. S. A.
CITIZEN SOLDIERY AGAINST TRAINED TROOPS
Civil War
During the first year of the war, the Confederacy, because of their
initiative in beginning to prepare at an earlier date, had better
trained troops. During the last two years of the war, the Union
because of its greater supply of men had more trained troops than
the Confederates.
The First Battle of Bull Run was described by the Count von
Moltke, the Prussian military observer, as a "contest of two armed
mobs."
A. Because of the inefficiency of the volunteer system, less than
half of these ever became effective troops. One out of ten were
discharged because they were unfit to serve; one out of every five
deserted. We have paid as a result of this system $9,800,000,000,
while it would have cost us less than $500,000,000 if it had been
conducted on a military instead of a political basis, even at the
rate of expense of the present European War.
B. The largest estimate made of all the enlistments of the Con-
federate army. Many good authorities place the number at from
seven to eight hundred thousand.
Spanish-American War
C. But 52,000 of these were ever out of the United States, and
only about 26,000 ever saw a gun fired at the enemy.
In addition to our 281 ,000 men, we had the service of several
thousand Cuban revolutionists, who rendered aid to our forces at
a critical time.
D. The Spanish forces were 200,000, but very poorly commanded.
An efficient general at the head of the Spanish forces in Cuba, act-
ing energetically, could have annihilated our little invading force
of 17,000 men with but little trouble.
THE MINUTE MEN
301
atiien Soldiery afjafnsi Traf ned Troops
C/l^/7 War
a
B
Snan/'s/i Omerfcan
war
O-USOrnr/- sfjQooo
B. -Qxifedem^-iooo.ooo
C- U.cS. A- Ormy- 28(000
D -iffianjlsti Qrmy-mooo
302 AWAKE! U. S. A.
States. It does not include desertions from militia
groups training for entrance into the Union Armies.
In reality the number of desertions totalled 526,-
000 men. This statement is made on the authority
of a man who has been chief of staff of the Army
of the United States and commander of one of the
large divisions. It has been stated on the floor of
the Senate that the number of desertions was even
greater than this — that the true number, though
suppressed by the War Department, probably
reached the shameful figure of seven or eight hun-
dred thousand men. This is no doubt an exagger-
ated estimate. Nevertheless, compare this 526,000
with the number of desertions from the Prussian
army during the Franco-Prussian War. Their war
records show that during the entire campaign of
1870 and 1 87 1 but 17 men deserted.
The volunteer system — as a system — has failed
in that which we have held most dear — the ideal of
service.
This does not refer to the individual volunteer
who stays with the army. After eighteen months'
or two years' training the American becomes the
finest soldier in the world!
Volunteers are composed of three classes : First,
those who enlist because of patriotism, of a real de-
sire to serve their country. How small this num-
ber is can be wisely estimated from the number
who remain to become real effectives. Experience
THE MINUTE MEN
303
titiien Milflfa per Million Populaifon
Q-/32U52
56m
C- wjgy
■O—0fU9.-
E mo
a-6wltzerland
B-Auc^tralfa
new dystem
C-AustPQlla
old iSy stem
D.-Canada
E-Brni6h Islos
F' USA.
Switzerland is the most protected country in the world, because
of its obligatory military system, in proportion to its area and pop-
ulation.
Australia's new system is based upon the system of Switzerland.
Australia's old system was a volunteer system similar in that respect
to our State Militia.
Canada's national citizen soldiery and England's Territorial force
are based upon the volunteer system.
In all cases these militia are trained without pay.
Our past experiences prove that all efforts to secure a satisfactory
army of defence by the volunteer system have failed in times of
peace.
All our past experiences prove that a volunteer army enlisted after
a war begins is unfit, even harmful, during the first year of war.
Our citizens more than those of any other country now employing
the volunteer system fail to recognise the fact that they owe a
duty to their government.
Every million Australians furnishes 19,000 soldiers ; every million
Canadians furnishes 9,000; every million British furnishes 7,000.
Every million Americans furnish but 1,000.
It is useless to attempt any plan of preparation in times of peace,
so as to be able to defend ourselves should war come, by the
volunteer system.
304. AWAKE! U. S. A.
shows that our greatest proportion of effectives ever
attained was 19.6 per cent, and our smallest pro-
portion, one per cent. Second, those who enlist
because they believe there will be little or no fight-
ing, that the campaign will be a joyful lark, that
the war will soon be over, that they can return as
the heroes of their respective communities. These
desert at the first opportunity. Third, those who
enlist for the sake of bounties — desert and re-enlist,
and those who hold off for ever increasing bounties.
In every war the United States has waged we have
been compelled at each succeeding call for volun-
teers to increase the bounties.
We began in 1776 with a bounty of $20; soon it
was increased to $20 and a hundred acres of land.
But as this failed to bring sufficient troops and as
those volunteering were so inefficient. Congress au-
thorised Washington in 1779 to give a bounty of
$200 to each veteran who would re-enlist. The
states did still better — or worse. New Jersey add-
ed $250 to the Congressional bounty and Virginia
made the bounty $750 and a hundred acres of land.
The following year New Jersey actually paid $1,000
in addition to the $200 of the continental allowance.
The system of bounties means but one thing, that,
even during that time which we hold above all other
times to have been the most patriotic in the history
of our people, volunteers could not be induced to en-
list unless they could secure from $200 to $1,000, a
THE MINUTE MEN 305
portion of it down in cash — always with the oppor-
tunity of deserting 20 or 30 days later and re-enlist-
ing and securing another bounty. This was so well
understood that Congress in authorising Washing-
ton to increase a certain bounty advised that he
should use his discretion in keeping the matter se-
cret as long as he deemed it necessary.
And the bounty system of the Revolutionary
War did not extend to the militia only. To secure
a sufficient number of officers Congress was finally
forced in 1779 to advocate that each officer continu-
ing in command of troops to the end of the war
should receive a bounty of half pay for his entire
life.
This same folly of giving bounties was repeated
at the beginning of the Civil War. Hundreds of
men, thousands of men enlisted, received their cash
bounty, deserted, re-enlisted again in another com-
munity or under another name, received another
cash bounty, and deserted. The process was re-
peated again and again. In fact, there is an official
confession of one man who enlisted 32 times, re-
ceived 32 different bounties, and evidently deserted
at least 31 times.
And in 1862 President Lincoln discovered that,
although the United States Government was pay-
ing daily for 140,000 men in Pope's army, Pope
could find only 60,000.
There is an ideal of service! There is such a
306 AWAKE! U. S. A.
thing as patriotism! But the patriotism of volun-
teers" is not greater, nor as great, as that of regular
troops.
"Men may speculate as they will; they may talk
of patriotism ; they may draw a few examples from
ancient history, of great achievements performed
by its influence, but whoever builds upon them, as
a sufficient basis for conducting a long and bloody
war, will find himself deceived in the end. ... I
do not mean to exclude altogether the idea of
patriotism. I know it exists. . . . But I will ven-
ture to assert that a great and lasting war can
never he supported on this principle alone/* Wash-
ington to John Bannister, 1778.
Volunteers have failed in efficiency in battle!
In the hundreds of battles and engagements of
our various wars, the untrained militia have mu-
tinied, deserted, or failed in every single engage-
ment, except that of Bunker Hill.
The first campaign of the Revolutionary War —
the movement on Canada — came to nought, al-
though Arnold had finally taken 750 men, out of
the two divisions of 4,100 men which began the
campaign, up the steep ascent and demanded the
surrender of Quebec. He was forced to make the
attack without a day's delay — without waiting for
reinforcements — because three of his captains and
many of his men refused to stay and gave him no-
THE MINUTE MEN 307
tice that they would leave after the expiration of
their terms of enlistment. The term of enlistment
was to end in three days. And they made this re-
fusal after having struggled through the Maine
w^oods to get to Quebec. Of the 750 men, 486
were killed, wounded or captured.
During that year there had been under the pay of
Congress and in the militia of the southern colonies
37,600 half-trained volunteers. Yet the only re-
sult was a disastrous expedition to Canada.
Although 8g,6oo volunteers were trained during
the second year of the Revolutionary War, they
were so inefficient they could take no effective ac-
tion against the enemy, although there were less
than 30,000 British. Because of desertion, mutiny
and inefficiency, the army, at the close of the year,
had again dwindled to but a few thousand men.
During the third year of the war there were em-
ployed a total of 68,700 men. The only victory was
that of General Gates, when a large percentage of
regular troops were used ; otherwise the 68,700 men
were absolutely unable to take any effective step
against the 33,000 Britishers. The year ended in
the retreat of a dwindling army to Valley Forge.
During 1779 more than 44,000 men were under
training, as against 34,000 British, yet nothing was
accomplished.
In 1780 General Gates was defeated at Camden
even though his army was much greater than that
308 AWAKE! U. S. A.
of Cornwallis. The militia again ran away in a
most disgraceful manner. Though 43,000 men had
been under arms during 1780, little of consequence
had been accomplished, and Washington's effectives
had dwindled to 5,000 by the end of the year.
The actual war closed in 1781, not through the
efficiency of the American army reduced to less
than 5,000 effective troops under the command of
Washington, but to the French troops under La-
fayette, the French fleet and the arrival of Rocham-
beau with 6,000 additional veteran French troops.
It was without doubt the assistance of the Comte
de Grasse, of de Barasse, of Rochambeau, and of
Lafayette, together with their fleets, their thou-
sands of trained veterans, which finally effected
the surrender of Cornwallis's men. Such is the
actual record of half-trained volunteers during the
seven years of the life-and-death struggle of the
American colonies for independence.
As a result of our inefficient militia 395,000 men
were required in the War of the Revolution, yet
the largest number ever concentrated for battle
was 5,763 men under General Gates at Saratoga;
and when the fate of the colonies hung in the bal-
ance, Washington's army at Trenton and Prince-
ton was less than 4,000 men.
Washington in his letter to Congress pointing
out the evils and danger of the volunteer system,
asserted that Canada would have been won to the
THE MINUTE MEN 309
colonies, except for the action of the militia. Writ-
ing to the President of Congress, September 2,
1776, he said that
". . . no dependence could be put in a militia or
other troops than those enlisted and embodied for
a longer period than our regulations heretofore
have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully
convinced as I am of any one fact that has hap-
pened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly
hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence is
left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean
one to exist during the war."
On the 24th of September, 1776, he wrote:
"To place any dependence upon militia is as-
suredly resting upon a broken staff."
And later on, August 20, 1780, after five years
of failures, Washington again wrote Congress :
"It may be easily shown that all the misfortunes
we have met with in the military line are to be at-
tributed to this cause (failure of the militia). '^
And again during the same year, writing of
Gates's defeat at Camden, Washington stated:
"This event, however, adds itself to many others,
to exemplify the necessity of an army, and the
fatal consequences of depending on militia. Regu-
lar troops alone are equal to the exigencies of mod-
ern war, as well as for defence as offence; and
whenever a substitute is attempted, it must prove
illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire
310 AWAKE! U. S. A.
the habits necessary to resist a regular force . . .
the firmness requisite for the real business of
fighting is only to be attained by a constant course
of discipline and service, / have never yet been
witness to a single instance that can justify a dif-
ferent opinion; and it is most earnestly to be wished
that the liberties of America may no longer be
trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious
a dependence."
Morgan, explaining why he placed his militia in
a certain position at the Battle of Cowpens, as-
serted :
"I would not have a swamp in view of militia
on any consideration ; they would have made for it,
and nothing could have detained them from it.
. . . Had I crossed the river, one-half of the mili-
tia would immediately have abandoned me."
The War of 1812 opened with the surrender at
Detroit of the American garrison of 1,800 men,
mostly volunteers and militia to s^o British regu-
lars and 400 militia, without so much as firing a
single shot in defence of the garrison.
The Hopkins expedition of 4,000 volunteers, the
General Dearborn expedition of 5,700, the Gen-
eral Smith expedition of 4,500, the forces under
General Harrison, and the 3,100 men under Gen-
eral Wadsworth all came to naught because of
mutiny, desertion and inefficiency — in fact, during
1812, the American forces of a little more thau
THE MINUTE MEN 311
64,000 men accomplished nothing in face of the
active British force which did not exceed 1,400
men — one-third of whom were boys and old men fit
only for garrison duty.
This is the record of the inefficiency of our mili-
tia for the first year of the War of 1812.
In the year 1813, the forces under Genera! Har-
rison, which had been limited by Congress to 7,000
men and the forces under Winchester of 3,000
men won victories at the Thames ; and immediately
following the success the usual blunder was made
— the army disbanded and the campaign was given
up. Though 50,000 militia had been called out
within 16 months to defeat Proctor's little force,
the entire result was nothing.
Though a large American force of militia was
stationed in northern New York to defend Bufifalo
and the surrounding country, a British force of
less than 650 men, regulars, Indians and militia
combined, absolutely put to route 3,000 militia.
General Cass, in writing to the Secretary of War,
stated that all except a very few of them behaved
in the most cowardly manner. They fled without
discharging their muskets.
In the Champlain region, General Hampton,
with 5,000 volunteers, was defeated by 800 Cana-
dian militia and Indians.
The army of General Wilkinson, an advance
guard of 1,700 men with 6,300 reinforcements,
312 AWAKE! U. S. A.
ran back to their boats, abandoning their campaign
on Montreal, after having been attacked by 800
British regulars at Chrystler's Fields. In fact,
13,000 American volunteers were absolutely driven
back by an enemy less than 2,000.
During the same year there were on the Chesa-
peake 66,000 enlisted militia. The British Admiral
Warren with but 1,500 men destroyed Hampton
after previously capturing and destroying French-
town, Havre de Grace, Georgetown and Frederick-
town, and the 66,000 militia offered no aid at all
to the citizens who tried to protect their property.
The year 1813 ended with the United States
having employed 130,000 men, having not more
than 14,000 or 15,000 British to oppose them, yet
leaving a record of nothing but defeats.
The year 1814 opened by General Wilkinson
making another effort to invade Canada with 4,000
men. They were repulsed by a force of 180 British-
ers. The attempted invasion accomplished nothing
except added disgrace for the American forces.
At Bladensburg, a short distance from Wash-
ington, more than 5,000 American militia deserted
and ran before 1,500 British troops poorly equipped
with but four little guns which they were com-
pelled to drag up the incline themselves because
they had no horses. The mass of militia fled at
this battle without ever firing a shot. The Amer-
ican loss was but 8 killed and 11 wounded. Thus
THE MINUTE MEN 313
ended the disgraceful record of our militia during
the actual War of 1812 and 1814.
The Indian War against the Seminoles shows
that it required 60,000 militia and seven years of
mutiny, desertion and fighting to defeat 1,200 In-
dians.
The militia deserted and ran away :
On Long Island in August, 1776;
At the evacuation of New York one month later;
At the Battle of Brandywine in 1777;
At Guilford Court House, 1781 ;
At the Battle of Burwell's Ferry in April, the
same year;
At Williamsburg a day later;
Near Fort Wayne in October, 1790;
In Dart County, Ohio, in 1791;
En route to the Racine River in 181 3;
At Sackett's Harbour three months later;
At French Creek seven months later;
At Chrystler's Fields ten days later;
At the burning of Buffalo, December 30, 1812;
At the burning of Lewiston, the same month;
At the Battle of Bladensburg and the burning
of the capitol in 1814;
At the Battle of New Orleans, 1815;
At the Battle of Bull Run, 1861.
''Our Civil War is often erroneously cited as
illustrating the might of the citizen soldier sud-
denly called to the defence of his country. On
314 AWAKE! U. S. A.
the contrary, it well illustrated the weakness of
the untrained citizen soldier, and the length of time
required to train him. In the first months of the
war, untrained citizens of the North met the un-
trained citizens of the South, and both were armed
mobs as easily disorganised by victory as by de-
feat. During the second year of the war training
began to tell on both sides, as can be seen in the
character of the campaigns and battles. In the
final years of the war these volunteers were as good
soldiers as ever marched to war." ^
The first year of the Civil War Congress and the
President trusted to volunteers and militia. Al-
though during 1861 we enlisted, trained and paid
for 669,000 men, we were able to bring together at
Bull Run but 28,500 men, all of whom excepting
800 were volunteers and militia. Many of the militia
ran away in panic and could not be stopped until
they had reached the Potomac, some twenty-five
miles away.
The second year of the Civil War showed al-
most as great inefficiency of the militia as the first.
Summing up the results of the first and second
periods of 1862, Upton states:
"The withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac
from the James River to Washington and Alex-
andria, the invasion of Maryland and the retreat
of the Army of the Ohio to Louisville produced a
THE MINUTE MEN 315
depression in the public mind nearly as great as
that which succeeded the Battle of Bull Run." ^
In every war, in which half-trained militia and
volunteers have been put to the test, they have
mutinied, deserted, and run away from battle.
Moreover, during the seventy years from the
beginning of the War of 1812 to the second year
of our Civil War, one-fourth of all the states then
forming the Union actually defied the authority of
the United States, defied the authority of the Pres-
ident as commander-in-chief of the army, refusing
to aid the United States with their militia, even
when its armies were in danger.
"If I was called upon to declare upon oath
whether the militia had been most serviceable or
hurtful, upon the whole, I should subscribe to the
latter." ^
QUOTATION REFERENCES
^ Page 314. Report of the Army Committee of the Na-
tional Security League, including: Hon. Henry L. Stim-
son, ex-Secretary of War; Colonel William C, Church, edi-
tor Army and Navy Journal; Captain Matthew Hannah ;
General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Putnam;
Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others.
2 Page 315. Upton, "Military Policy of the United
States."
^ Page 315. George Washington.
CHAPTER II
THE^ PRICE WE HAVE PAID
ALL the blunders of our wars — the enormous
percentage of useless men, the extraordinary
cost, the wasteful prolongation of each war, the
wholesale murder of half-trained soldiers — have
been due: first, to our ridiculous political military
system; and second, to our mistake and vain belief
in the value of citizen soldiers.
Upton says: ''The same mistake in statesman-
ship, which in time of peace gives us a nonexpan-
sive military establishment, is certain to bring
about in time of war useless sacrifice of human life,
unlimited waste of money, and national humilia-
tion/'
During the Revolutionary War the colonies were
subjected to seven years' struggle, suffering and
devastation. But one year would have been neces-
sary had Congress allowed Washington to actually
command the armies under him. In July, I775>
there were 17,000 men under Washington; the
British effectives were less than 6,500. Dur-
ing the next five months 37,500 American troops
316
THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 317
■
were enlisted. If these had been under military
instead of Congressional control and if they had
been properly trained and equipped, they could
have defeated the British forces — could have cap-
tured them or driven them off the continent within
six months; and we would have had time to pre-
pare before England could have sent more troops.
We would have been spared six years of struggle
and waste ; we would have been spared the terrible
winter at Morristown and the sufferings at Valley
Forge; we would have saved millions and millions
of dollars!
Washington in 1780 said: "Had we kept a
permanent army on foot, the enemy could have
had nothing to hope for, and would in all probabil-
ity have listened to terms long since."
At the beginning of the War of 1812 the Brit-
ish had but 4,500 effectives on the entire North
American continent. We then had an army of
6,700 men. If Congress had kept our men in con-
dition — properly organised and officered and prop-
erly supplied with ammunition — they could have
defeated the British within six months. We pro-
vided 65,000 untrained men the first six months,
but these were unable to gain a single victory over
the 1,450 men they had to oppose. The war would
have been over in six months instead of two years
later; and we would have been spared the shame
318 AWAKE! U. S. A.
of Detroit, the dishonour of the Lake Champlain
campaigns, and the disgrace at Bladensburg and
the burning of Washington.
If we had had but 10,000 trained troops the war
could have ended victoriously in six months.
Huidekoper, referring to the War of 1812,
writes :
"Had Congress at the beginning of the year de-
clared that all men owed their country military
service and raised the army to 35,000, by volunteer-
ing or by drafting for service 'during the war,'
such a force after six months' training could easily
have occupied Canada and terminated the war in
one campaign."
If, when South Carolina seceded. Congress had
acted immediately — had at once put our little regu-
lar army into condition and had immediately called
for two hundred fifty thousand volunteers — our
276,000 men could have had seven months' train-
ing by July 30, 1 86 1, at which time the Confeder-
acy had less than 60,000 troops with from two to
four months' training. These 276,000 trained
troops, well equipped, could have put down the Re-
bellion in one year. But Congress did nothing until
five months after the Confederacy elected their
president, nothing until four months after the Con-
federacy issued its call for a hundred thousand
volunteers, nothing until 35,000 of these had al-
ready had three months' training.
THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID
319
Excessive Prolondatton and Devasfatton
.„„ .^ * m/o/ rime or UcT ivarj-
Que lO %^ O'^^ Hundred Forty-ninth Penn-
sylvania 74%, Second Wisconsin TJ%, Sixteenth
Maine 84%.
And the Battle of Chickamauga where 128,000
men were engaged on both sides and the Battle of
Chancellorsville where 120,000 men were engaged
on both sides, were almost as bloody as the Battle
of Gettysburg. In fact one authority calls Chicka-
mauga the ''bloodiest battle of history."
Even when we compare the death losses of en-
tire wars or entire campaigns, we find the percent-
age of death of citizen soldiery to be far greater
than the percentage of death of regulars.
Up to the outbreak of the European War the
Russo-Japanese War was considered the bloodiest
of history. Yet in per cent, of men actually lost
it does not compare with our losses in the Civil
War.
Japan lost in the Russo-Japanese War, both in
battle and by sickness, but 3.8% of her men.
The entire number of British dead up to De-
cember 1st, 1915, was but 4% of the armies she
had organised at that time.
It may be objected that all the British armies
were not in battle; but neither were all of our sol-
diers of the Civil War ever in battle. Of the 660,-
000 men of 1861, not over 40,000 ever took part in
battle.
THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 349
Russia's dead up to December ist, 191 5, were
but 6.4% of her armies.
Germany, by the use of trained soldiers, has ac-
complished a greater invasion of Belgium, France,
Poland and the Balkans than we accomplished dur-
ing our Civil War in invading the South. Yet to
accomplish these invasions in three different direc-
tions has cost her a loss in dead of but 8% of her
men.
To accomplish in 1864 a smaller invasion of the
South — an invasion in one direction only — cost us
25.6% of the armies we had in 1863 and 1864 —
the years during zvhich the invasion was executed.
In the number of men required to win victory,
in the unnecessary years of suffering and devasta-
tion, in the excessive annual soldier cost, in the
total money waste, in losses by disability and de-
sertion and capture, in losses by death in battle, in
losses by death from sickness, the volunteer army
system is the most useless, the most wasteful, the
most costly, the most bloody!
All history proves it.
Why propose to continue the folly?
^ Page 322. George Washington.
CHAPTER III
TRAGIC COMjSDY
THE comic-tragedy of it all — the comedy of
our military blunders and the tragedy of our
waste of money and men — has been due to political
militarism. Congress has never been able to real-
ise, except when forced to do so under great stress
and after months and even years of disaster, that
the military is an executive function and not a
legislative one.
The folly began when Washington first took
command at the beginning of the Revolutionary
War. The Continental Congress then recom-
mended that the officers of each company should
be elected by the rest of the company. Washing-
ton, the Commander-in-Chief, had not the power to
choose the officers to govern the companies of
which he was the head. Moreover, Congress sit-
ting in Philadelphia — a two weeks' journey in
those days from Boston where Washington had
his command — refused to accept Washington's ad-
vice as to the term of enlistment or the size of the
army. In fact, Congress actually forbade Wash-
350
TRAGIC COMEDY 3gl
ington organising an army larger than 22,000 men ;
and forbade the New York division being made
larger than 5,000.
As Washington was about to move to defend
New York, Congress ordered him, in spite of his
protests, to send nearly half of his army to re-in-
force the Canadian expedition, which had already
failed — compelled him to do this, reducing his army
to about 5,300, though he had to confront an enemy
numbering from 27,000 to 30,000. When Congress
finally realised what it had done, it called out 6,000
militia in June, who were supposed to train, arm,
prepare for battle, win the war, and be back home
again by the last of November.
Even after five years of fighting — after defeat
after defeat — Congress decided to reduce the size
of the army, though we then had no efficient means
of combating the English forces which had won
success after success for five years.
' To cap the climax. Congress authorised armies,
but declared it had no power to provide men with
' food and clothing. Consequently Connecticut regi-
ments and Pennsylvania regiments mutinied and
1,300 men threatened to march on Congress. Then
the political debaters, seized with fear, capitulated
not to the military power, but to a mob of men
who had become desperate because they were starv-
ing.
During the War of 1812, Congress again failed
352 AWAKE! U. S. A.
in every way to understand the needs of the army.
There was no forethought — there was not even
afterthought.
During the latter part of 1813 and for six
months during 1814 there had been a British force
of three thousand men and a British fleet in Chesa-
peake Bay within a few hours' march of Washing-
ton. Yet neither Congress nor President Madison
did a single thing to strengthen the defence of the
capital during the entire twelve months; in reality
no real appeal was made for new militia to defend
the capital until two days before they were ex-
pected to fight. The general in command, report-
ing to Congress on the mob assembled, described
them as without officers, devoid of discipline, and
without any knowledge of service. Another gen-
eral, reporting on the Battle of Bladensburg, wrote
that he could not call it a battle, it was merely a
disgrace.
In the campaign against the Creeks in 1813, Jack-
son was just on the point of success when he was
compelled to withdraw because Congress had not
and would not furnish supplies and food to his sol-
diers. Even after a crushing defeat of the Indians
he was compelled to remain ten days at Fort
Strother debating with his troops. They acted al-
most as badly as the men in Congress. First, the
militia mutinied and the volunteers had to bring
them to order with their guns. Then the volun-
TRAGIC COMEDY 353
teers mutinied and the militia had to do the same for
the volunteers. The debating being over and the
militia and volunteers each having proven to the
other that each in turn could quell the other, the
army disbanded and went home. The Creeks
warred on.
In the Seminole War — the second war — 60,000
volunteers were enlisted to defeat less than 1,200
Indians. Becoming disgusted with the volunteers,
General Scott asked Congress to get rid of the 60,-
000 and give him 3,000 trained troops. Congress,
adhering to its belief that untrained, unfed troops
were always better fighters than trained troops
well fed, became very indignant and relieved Gen-
eral Scott of his command. Marvel of political
militarism — a nation of 17,000,000 inhabitants send-
ing forth 60,000 troops, warring seven years at a
cost of $69,000,000 to defeat 1,200 Indians!
Our Mexican War, from the military standpoint,
was more successful than any other war we have
ever waged up to the Spanish-American War. But
it was due to the fact that the President and the
Congress were so far away from the army that
their meddling did not interfere as much as usual.
Even at that time, after all the failures of the
past, President Polk in his message to Congress
said that:
"A volunteer force is beyond question more ef-
ficient than any other description of citizen sol-
354. AWAKE! U. S. A.
diers; and it is not to be doubted that a number
far beyond that required would readily rush to
the field upon the call of their country."
When General Taylor made his advance upon
Monterey, he was compelled to leave 6,000 volun-
teers behind because not a single wagon had
reached him. General Scott, after getting his troops
in shape, found that many of them had decided to
go home, and because of the idiocy of Congress,
nothing could be done to prevent them from going.
Consequently on May 4th, 1847, seven of his vol-
unteer regiments were sent back to New Orleans
without having been of any use to the army. Al-
though Scott drilled and trained some 104,000
men, when he advanced into Mexico to do fighting,
his army was reduced to less than 10,000 men.
No loyal American can look back upon the fol-
lies of Congress during the early part of 1861
without a blush of shame.
By February ist, 1861, seven states had seceded
— one of them — South Carolina — had seceded 42
days previously. By February 4th, they had elect-
ed a president and a vice president; by the 28th
they had authorized the president of the Confed-
erate States to issue a call for a hundred thousand
men ; by the eighth of April, they had equipped 35,-
000 men ; a week later thev had seized all the arse-
nals within their reach and all forts in the south-
ern states.
TRAGIC COMEDY 355
And what has Congress done? Nothing!
What did President Lincoln do? Even he did
not issue a call for a single volunteer until Jeffer-
son Davis had 35,000 men enlisted and under train-
ing. And even then, though the armed forces of
the Confederacy were almost in sight of Washing-
ton, though the outbreak in Baltimore had made
the capture of the capitol possible, Lincoln did not
call out the militia to defend the capitol, but to
serve only in offensive warfare — to "repossess
forts, places and property which had seceded from
the Union."
Congress knew on the first day of January, 1861,
that we had an army of but 16,000 men. By the
5th of April no material increase had been made in
the size of the Union army, although the rebel
government had an army twice the size of the Un-
ion army, and the rebellion had covered 560,000
square miles of territory. The Union army at that
time could have furnished but one soldier to re-
conquer each 33 square miles of rebel territory.
The Confederate army was enlisted for twelve
months, but because of a law over 60 years old,
which Congress had failed to repeal. President
Lincoln could not call volunteers or militia for a
longer period than ninety days. Hence the 75,000
volunteers called by President Lincoln on April
15th, were to be permitted to go home at the very
moment at which the Confederate army of 100,000
356 AWAKE! U. S. A.
would be trained, equipped and ready for eight
months' additional service.
Congress convened July 4th, and as soon as Con-
gress began to act it began to blunder. Two
hundred fifty thousand men were again enlisted
under a system which permitted the men to elect
their own officers. Later, in authorising the larger
army of volunteers, Congress gave the governor of
each state the right to appoint the officers for the
companies of his state. Congress thus prohibited
the President of the United States, Commander-in-
Chief of the Armies of the Union, from even desig-
nating a single field officer of a single volunteer
regiment.
When Congress met, the 75,000 men, called out
by President Lincoln, had had at least a few days'
training and, within a few weeks, their terms of
enlistment would end and they would go home.
Consequently Congress insisted that these men
must fight at once before leaving. It did not matter
whether the nation was ready to open a campaign
or not. Those soldiers had been trained for thirty
days or more, they had been fed for a longer time.
They should fight before the ninety days was up.
Hence Congress was compelled to provide a battle
for them. The result was the disastrous defeat at
the Battle of Bull Run.
By the end of 1861, Congress had paid out $238,-
000,000 for 670,000 troops; Congress had got to-
TRAGIC COMEDY 357
gather 28,000 men at the Battle of Bull Run —
many of whom had had but thirty days of train-
ing, and most of whom — with the exception of 800
of the regular army — ran away in panic.
Even so wise a man as President Lincoln proved
himself incapable of directing armed forces. In
1862, because of President Lincoln's interference
with McClellan's plan of uniting his forces with
those of General McDowell, the best chance of
success was thrown away. Only in 1863, when
President Lincoln and Congress turned matters
over to General Grant to do absolutely as he
pleased, did matters mend.
When the Spanish-American War began it was
found that regiments which should have had ten
companies had only eight and that these companies
had only six out of each ten men they should have
had.
"There were no brigades, no divisions, and worst
of all, no plans, nor could any be formulated for
the very excellent reason that Congress, with its
usual short-sightedness, had restricted its appro-
priation to national defence and to that one ob-
ject alone. No money was available for offensive
operations, the only kind which could possibly be
used against the Spanish possessions in both hem-
ispheres." *
On March 2, i8q6, Congress requested Spain
to recognise the independence of Cuba. But Con-
358 AWAKE! U. S. A.
gress took no action zvhatever to prepare for war
until March 9, 1898, just two years and eleven days
later. Two years and eleven days ! — even then Con-
gress did nothing toward the organisation of the
army. Fifty-five days after the appropriation was
voted, Congress awoke to the fact that an army as
well as money was needed. Naturally at that late
hour, Congress re-committed the old blunders.
Again it took the power of the appointment of
officers of volunteer companies out of the hands of
the Commander-in-Chief of the army of the United
States and turned it over to the governors of the
various states.
So inefficient was the training that General
Miles telegraphed to the Secretary of War that 30
to 40 per cent, of the fourteen regiments of volun-
teers which he commanded were absolutely un-^
drilled, that there were 300 men in one regiment,
each of whom had never in all his life even fired a
gun. These men might have had at least ninety
days of shooting practice but for lack of of-
ficers ; and Congress had failed over and over again
to respond to the recommendations of the Secretary
of War for more officers.
This lack resulted also in great confusion when
troops assembled in Florida for embarkation. A
few sentences from the account of then Lieutenant-
Colonel Roosevelt indicates the scramble of the
troops for the transports.
TRAGIC COMEDY 359
"As the number and capacity of the transports
were known, or ought to have been known, and as
the number and size of the regiments to go were
also known, the task of allotting each regiment or
fraction of a regiment to its proper transport, and
arranging that the regiments and transports should
meet in due order on the dock, ought not to have
been difficult. However, no arrangements were
made in advance; and we were allowed to shove
and hustle for ourselves as best we could, on much
the same principles that had governed our prepa-
rations hitherto. . . .
*'We were ordered to be at a certain track with
all our baggage at midnight, there to take a train
for Port Tampa. At the appointed time we turned
up, but the train did not. The men slept heavily,
while Wood and I and various other officers wan-
dered about in search of information which no one
could give. We now and then came across a brig-
adier-general or even a major-general; but no>-
body knew anything. Some regiments got aboard
the trains and some did not, but as none of the
trains started, this made little difference. At three
o'clock, we received orders to march to an entirely
different track, and away we went. No train ap-
peared on this track either ; but at six o'clock some
coal-cars came by, and these were seized. . . .
"Finally, after hours of search, the first Volun-
360 AWAKE! U. S. A.
teen Cavalry were allotted to the transport Yu-
catan. . . .
"At the same time I happened to find out that
she had previously been allotted to two other regi-
ments — the Second Regular Infantry, and the Sev-
enty-first New York Volunteers, which latter regi-
ment alone contained more men than could be put
aboard her. Accordingly, I ran at full speed to
our train, leaving a strong rear guard with the
baggage, I double-quicked the rest of the regiment
up to the boat, just in time to board her as she
came into the quay, and then to hold her against
the Second Regulars and the Seventy-first, who had
arrived a little too late, being a shade less ready
than we were in the matter of individual initiative.
There was a good deal of expostulation, but we had
possession, and as the ship could not contain half
of the men who had been told to go aboard her, the
Seventy-first went away, as did all but four com-
panies of the Second."
Compare this with the fact that Napoleon had
his army so trained that he could embark 1^3,000
troops in three hours.
Much of the confusion and mismanagement of
the volunteer troops of the Spanish- American War
was due to the lack of efficient officers. State gov-
ernors often appointed, merely because of friend-
ship or political influence, many men, who were ab-
solutely unqualified to lead troops, as company and
TRAGIC COMEDY 361
regimental officers. When the War Department
begged Congress for authority to issue commis-
sions to retired army officers of experience so that
they might again enter active service, Congress em-
phatically denied the petition, believing that in-
experienced, untried political friends of state gov-
ernors would render better service. The results
were deplorable. Men went for days without food,
while food at the same time lay decaying and spoil-
ing within a few miles of them.
There was great disorganisation of the commis-
sary department, due to the fact that men who had
been trained to handle supplies for the small army
of 30,000 were absolutely at sea in attempting to
handle supplies for 270,000. Food could not be
taken from the storehouses, even though in sight
of starving soldiers, without military authority —
unless one wished to run the risk of court martial.
One young captain at Chickamauga did run this
risk. Assuming command of wagons and teams of
mules, he drove to the station, brought back food
which had been lying for days on the platform in
the sun, and consequently gained the everlasting
thanks of the entire company.
Merely because there were not a sufficient num-
ber of officers to train the men, to lay out and pro-
vide sanitary camps, 77,000 men were crowded at
Camp Thomas, which could not suitably accommo-
date more than 19,000 troops. And the conditions
362 AWAKE! U. S. A.
at Camp Alger were so bad that they caused a
scandal. As a result of the mismanagement due to
Congress's lack of understanding of army condi-
tions, trouble among the men broke out. It is
impossible to bring together thirty or sixty thou-
sand men whose life habits are different, concen-
trate them in a camp without sufficient officers
trained in handling men, subject them to regular
rules, to discipline, to diet, to duties, without trouble
and without sickness.
Congress's action in the Philippine War was no
more commendable. The refusal of Congress in
the first place to enlist men until such a time as the
commander-in-chief of the army deemed it wise
to discharge them, left General Otis for ten months
with 3,722 men — whom he was entitled to com-
mand — to face some 35,000 Philippine revolution-
ists.
Even in late years Congress by not giving heed
to the pleas of the War Department for a larger
commissary staff has left men on duty in the Phil-
ippines three and four days without food and often
under the hot sun without even water, as a result
of which the tongues and lips of the men have been
so swollen they could not speak or eat for forty-eight
hours.
"Congress is chiefly responsible for the bad ad-
ministration of the army and its organisation.
They have often been appealed to to reconstruct
TRAGIC COMEDY 363
the army on modern principles, and they have failed
to do so; and until this is done the evils we have
encountered will recur again, and we will never be
able to take our place beside other military nations
until we do that." ^
QUOTATION REFERENCES
^ Page 357. Huidekoper, in "The Military Unprepared-
ness of the United States,"
~ Page 363. General Sanger, in report of Investigating
Committee appointed by the President to investigate the
conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain.
PART SIX: WILL THE PROPOSED
PLANS PROTECT?
PART SIX: WILL THE PROPOSED
PLANS PROTECT?
CHAPTER I
DEALING IN FUTURES — DANIELS
INASMUCH as the administration had, by De-
cember 191 5, been face to face with six inter-
national crises in thirty-one months one marvels
that the Secretary of the Navy's recommendation to
Congress did not sound a stronger note for imme-
diate defence. Three of these crises actually re-
quired naval action and each of the others might
have led our nation into war. All had occurred
during the time Mr. Daniels had been Secretary of
the Navy.
The present administration in May, 1913, actu-
ally expected at any hour an attack upon Manila
by Japan, and feverishly prepared for it; the ad-
ministration, on April 22, 1914, sent a fleet to Mex-
ico and occupied Vera Cruz; in April, 191 5, Sec-
retary Daniels had to order a battleship to the Gulf
of California to get four Japanese warships out
of Turtle Bay where Japanese marines were sur-
veying the country; in 1915, Secretary Danielc
367
368 AWAKE! U. S. A.
sent an expedition to Hayti; moreover, during the
last few months, the administration has had to
twice request the recall of the ambassador of one
world power, has had to request the recall of the
naval and military attaches of one of the greatest
naval powers of the world, and was for several
months almost on the diplomatic breaking-point
with that power, and is now engaged in a dangerous
punitive invasion of Mexico.
It is indeed remarkable that the Secretary of the
Navy should seemingly forget his eventful experi-
ences all crowded into thirty-one short months, and
propose a plan which makes little provision for the
immediate future, indicating that we should not
prepare for 1917 or 1918, but for 1922 and 1923.
The scheme of Secretary Daniels proposes a so-
called increasingly progressive upbuilding of the
navy; that is, less to be done in 19 17 than in 19 18,
less in 19 18 than 19 19, and so on. The entire plan
of Secretary Daniels lays stress on preparing to
defend ourselves against attack five years after
ip2^ — thus after 1^28.
And why 1928? Because Secretary Daniels^ pro-
gram is not a building program but a voting pro-
gram. Not one of the ships that Secretary Dan-
iels proposes will be finished before 192 1 or 1922
if constructed at the rate our ships have been con-
structed during the past ten years. We are often
told that a ship can be built in three years. It can ;
DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 369
but two years often elapse between the voting of a
ship and the laying of the keel. One of Secretary
Daniels' excuses for not recommending more bat-
tleships at present is that we have not yards in
which to build them. The General Board, how-
ever, shows that two or three other yards, espe-
cially the one at Mare Island, California, could be
put into condition to build large battleships in
from seven to nine months. Nine months seems a
long time when we think of our immediate needs
but nine months is less than five years.
As Secretary Daniels presents his plan to the
public he leads us to believe that his plan will pro-
vide ten new battleships by 1923. The real truth
is that, according to his voting program, the
strength of the navy will not be increased at all by
1923. The ten ships he proposes will not be fin-
ished until 1928 and by that time many of the ships
which are now efficient will be out of date. So
that by 1928 our navy will be just as inefficient as
it is to-day.
Secretary Daniels has publicly announced that
the program of his reforms has been greatly hin-
dered because of the inefficiency of the Secretaries
of the Navy preceding him. This announcement
led us to expect that, in this time of world struggle
and national danger, Secretary Daniels would have
proposed; first, to eliminate the two great existing
causes of inefficiency; and secondly, to put our pres-
370 AWAKE! U. S. A.
ent equipment and personnel in fit condition for
service as quickly as possible.
The two great causes of past and present ineffi-
ciency have been and are; first, the criminal waste
of funds due to political mis-management and to
pork-barrelling in favour of useless navy yards;
and, second, the ridiculous organisation of the navy,
under which no young man can expect any consid-
erable advancement before he has reached the age of
ninety-seven.
Secretary Daniels proposes no plan for remedy-
ing the latter, and emphatically asserts that he will
insist on keeping open every one of the useless,
wasteful navy yards — he even asserts that those
which previous Secretaries of the Navy have closed
will be reopened.
To put the present navy, its equipment, and its
personnel in fit condition to be of service, we
should : first increase the personnel to meet at least
the present needs, even if we do not provide for men
to be trained to man the ships we shall soon have
ready to put into commission; secondly, provide a
sufficient store of reserve ammunition; thirdly, or-
der the construction of a sufficient number of am-
munition ships and repair ships, so that our present
fleet may fight, if called upon to do so, as efficiently
as possible.
What does Secretary Daniels wish to have done
in the next eighteen months to meet these needs?
*
DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 371
Every one who knows anything about our navy
knows that we are woefully short of men; short,
even for the ships we have at present. Secretary
Daniels' Assistant-Secretary of the Navy, Franklin
Roosevelt, a short time ago, stated officially that we
were eighteen thousand men short of what we
should have. Admiral Fiske testifies that we need
20,000 men to man all the ships.
These men cannot be trained in a day, a month,
or in two months, or even two years. Moreover, in
case of war we ought not to take a single officer
from the navy to train them. Of course, we are
not at war; but a navy is of real value to-day only
if it is ready for war !
If, when war broke out in 1 9 14, it had taken Eng-
land sixty days to get her navy ready not only the
whole history of this war but the whole history of
the world would have been different. During those
sixty days Germany could have occupied the Chan-
nel; bombarded the northern coast of France; cap-
tured Paris ; prevented England ever sending a sin-
gle soldier to the continent and landed 500,000
men in England before England could have
equipped 150,000 men.
To advise that we spend millions upon millions
for ships and to refuse to recommend sufficient
men to handle those ships in time of war is folly.
According to the opinion of many experts we are
now 20,000 men short. The ships to be commis-
372 AWAKE! U. S. A.
sioned in the next six monttis will require 3,P4p ad-
ditional men and those ships to be commissioned
early in 191 7 will require 3, Sop more men. Con-
sequently before another act of Congress becomes
effective we shall need to make our navy of fight-
ing value, 2"/, 'J ^8 more men than we have at pres-
ent. And what is the use of having a navy if it
cannot be manned so as to defend us in case of
need?
To meet these needs, Secretary Daniels, abso-
lutely ignoring the suggestions and advice of ex-
perts, asks for but 7,500 additional men up to July
I, 1917, a year and a half in the future. The sug-
gestions of the General Board on this matter were
most modest and reasonable. They were made by
men who have commanded ships in action, — officers
who know how many men are needed and what the
results are in case of war if there are not a suffi-
cient number of trained men. The General Board
asked for 15,000 men only. Yet Secretary Daniels
cut this number down to 7,500.
Considering that new men should be in training
so as to be ready for the new ships under con-
struction, we realise that Secretary Daniels has
asked for only about one-fourth the number of men
absolutely necessary!
Now as to ammunition supply!
There is a request for but eight million dollars
for reserve ammunition. That amount has been
DEALING IN FUITTRES— DANIELS 373
used on the battlefields of Europe in a few hours.
Eight million dollars for reserve ammunition is
to the layman an enormous sum. How far will it
go? If we choose only the ten best ships that may
be called upon to use this ammunition and deter-
mine the amount of ammunition the twelve and
fourteen inch guns of those ten ships would re-
quire, making no allowance at all for all other guns
on those ships or for any of the guns on all the
other ships of our entire navy, this eight million
dollars reserve ammunition would last — if these
ships were engaged in battle firing by salvos, the
only effective method of firing at present, firing at
long range, at much slower rate than admirals of
the navy state would be necessary for those ships
to hold their own against foreign battleships — this
reserve ammunition, this eight million dollars'*
worth, would last just four hours fifty-two min-
utes.
Every shell of the reserve ammunition could be
used at slow fire at long range in that time ! If the
guns were fired a Uttle faster — 33^ per cent, more
rapidly, not equal to their maximum rapidity of fire
by any means — the entire eight million dollars'
worth of ammunition would be used up in three
hours and fourteen minutes!
But if the opposing fleet outnumbered our ten
ships and should force us into battle at short
range, the fire to be effective would have to be
374 AWAKE! U. S. A.
much more rapid. If, then, the number of shells
fired per minute is estimated at the normal rate
of fire at short range, making all allowances for
possible delays, this eight million dollars' ammuni-
tion for the big guns of these ten ships only, would
last just ninety-six minutes.
When attacked our only chance of saving our-
selves would rest with our navy. Yet Secretary
Daniels, in direct opposition to the advice of the
General Board, proposes but two new battleships
a year; and such ships as he proposes will be in-
efficient because of their slowness.
The Blnecher was lost in the North Sea battle
only because she was too slow — the other German
ships were saved by their speed. Yet Secretary
Daniels proposes that our new $18,000,000 battle-
ships shall have a maximum speed two and a half
miles an hour less than the Blnecher.
Colonel Roosevelt, when president, did more to
build up our navy than any president we ever had.
And under him it accomplished feats which naval
experts of all nations declared could not be ac-
complished. Because of the fact that a battleship
as a fighting machine is of little value after its
twelfth year, he realised that the standard then at-
tained could not be maintained unless new ships
were added each year. Consequently he fought
for a construction plan providing four battleships
DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 375
a year for several years. Congress compromised
on two battleships per year ; but even this plan was
dropped, so that for five years we have been lag-
ging woefully behind in our construction pro-
gramme, and our navy as a result has rapidly dete-
riorated.
The proposed plan of Secretary Daniels advo-
cates nothing to aid us in catching up with what we
should have had, had previous plans not been dis-
continued.
When we are so far behind, how can a Secretary
of the Navy presume to assert that adding two bat-
tleships a year to our navy for the next five years
will put us in fit condition to defend ourselves
from other powers which have added and are add-
ing three and four each year.
According to the present proposed programme,
we shall merely waste millions on battleships which
when finished will be outclassed in speed and out-
numbered two to one by the new ships which other
nations are now building — even though we do not
count the ships they built while we were idle.
Here again Secretary Daniels does not follow the
wise suggestion of the General Board — of men of
experience in naval matters who recognised the
pressing need of quickly constructing great battle-
ships and battle cruisers to immediately build up
the navy so that we might have an adequate de-
fence as soon as possible. As previously stated,
376 AWAKE! U. S. A.
Secretary Daniels' recommendations for ships are
increasingly progressive. In his five years' plan
less is to be done the first two years than after-
wards. The General Board even in their October
report, which Secretary Daniels requested should
be made to conform to Jiis ideas, advises that more
ships be authorised the first two years and less dur-
ing the following years.
The board, in their original report advised
four battle cruisers, four dreadnoughts and six
scouts for immediate construction. Secretary Dan-
iels on the other hand recommends but tzvo dread-
noughts, two battle cruisers and three scouts the
first year. Even the "fettered" report of the Board
made in October, even when limited to the same
amount of money that Secretary Daniels recom-
mended should be spent, recommends four battle-
ships, three dreadnoughts, and four scouts the first
year! The General Board saw the wisdom of
recommending the construction of almost double
the number of capital ships the first year and of
limiting the construction during the fourth and fifth
years. The most dominant feature of Secretary
Daniels' plan is the policy of doing as little as pos-
sible at present and of promising as much as pos-
sible for the indefinite future.
The Secretary of the Navy asks but two million
dollars for aviation. An amount equal to this is
DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 377
spent every week in England and France producing
new aeroplanes for the western battle line only.
Perhaps the average American citizen does not
realise that our present battle fleet would go into
combat with a foreign power absolutely blind.
Every Admiral of the navy has emphasised the fact
that our battleships could not successfully combat
an enemy's fleet of the same size, because we have
no aeroplanes to determine the advances and lo-
cation of the attacking fleet. Senator Fletcher,
who has thoroughly studied this phase of the
Navy's needs, insists that we should have 676 aero-
planes to properly equip our present navy. Every
navy manoeuvre we have had in the last five years
has been conducted as it would have been con-
ducted tivelvc years ago. For the purposes of imme-
diate defence, and by immediate defence, we
mean within the next two years, the proposed aero-
plane equipment of Secretary Daniels is ridicu-
lously small.
Russia appropriated twenty-two millions for aer-
oplanes and dirigibles even in 19 13 when no one in
Europe expected that war would come for five or
ten years.
Another essential need of the Navy is the pro-
vision of fast coal and oil-fuel supply ships. Dread-
noughts and battle cruisers cannot be spared from
the battle line in the midst of a combat to run home
to naval stations for their fuel.
378 AWAKE! U. S. A.
"To send a fleet thus blind and crippled into hos-
tile waters would be to invite destruction. We have
an altogether insufficient number of fuel-ships, and
practically no scouts." ^
Yet Secretary Daniels provides for no fuel ships
until 1918; and then the plan proposes the construc-
tion of only one fuel ship during the entire period
of five years.
We are woefully lacking in ammunition supply
ships. The General Board advised the immediate
construction of ammunition ships and repair ships
as these are essentially necessary to a fleet in ac-
tion. Yet no additional ammunition ships to car-
ry and transfer ammunition to battle cruisers and
dreadnoughts at sea are to be provided, according
to the Secretary's plan, until 1920.
But most astounding of all is the proposal in
Secretary Daniels' plan to build new battleships
which will not have a speed of more than 21 knots.
One can only guess at the cause of this policy. The
European War has proven that a battleship of
twenty-one knots is So% inefficient. It is too
slow, if outnumbered, to get away from the ene-
my; and it is too slow to keep up with an enemy
if the enemy tries to get away. It is too slow to
move in and out adjusting its range to the enemy's
moving battleships — in fact, it is almost useless.
The Nevada has just been tested; it has a speed
less than twenty-two knots per hour.
DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 379
While speed is vital to both sides in a running
fight, it has marked advantages in any engagement.
The faster fleet can bombard or seize a strategic
point with impunity ; it can fight or run, as its com-
mander may will; when fleets engage in parallel
lines it can steam away from the enemy's slower
ships and concentrate its fire on the head of his col-
umn, thus destroying it in detail.
More amazing still is Secretary Daniels' expla-
nation of this recommendation. The engines are
to be planned for endurance rather than for speed.
We have always supposed we were creating a navy
for defence; but this explanation contains a subtle
suggestion that Secretary Daniels thinks our new
battleships are to make long cruises — evidently of-
fensive warfare. For defensive warfare we need
battleships of great speed, capable of moving
quickly from one portion of our coast to another
to meet an attack wherever it may be planned.
The policy of Secretary Daniels in reopening
the unused and useless navy yards which have been
closed by previous Secretaries of the Navy, is open
to censure as a useless waste. His additional pro-
posal now, to keep all these navy yards open and
to establish armour and projectile factories there, is
certainly open to severe criticism.
First, whether unintentionally or not, this is an
appeal to the pork-barrel men. This is evidenced
by the fact that within five days after Congress
380 AWAKE! U. S. A.
convened, Senator Tillman — idol of the pork bar-
rellers — the same man who secured millions for the
useless navy yards at Port Royal and Charleston
— who comes from the South from a state adjoin-
ing that from which Secretary Daniels comes —
states that do not believe in a navy but in navy
yards — proposed to introduce a bill asking Con-
gress to appropriate eleven million dollars for a
factory and site to make armour and ammunition.
It was this enthusiastic advocate of navy yards who
led Congress to purchase a dear little navy yard
site in his native state and to spend nearly three
millions upon it; it was the same enthusiast who
induced Congress to create another navy yard for
large battleships only a few miles away from the
first and to waste another five millions on it. Yet,
after all this expenditure, it is so poorly constructed
that it is of little value — only for torpedo boat de-
stroyers and gun-boats.
Secondly, in the present great emergency, it is
unwise to postpone the purchase of large projec-
tiles — the most essential ammunition in modern
combat — until they can be manufactured by gov-
ernment factories, which do not as yet exist.
From what we already know of the construc-
tion by the government of factories already built,
we can judge that the building of these new fac-
tories will not take months but years. Many a cit-
izen of the United States has grown grey during
DEALING IN FUTURES- DANIELS 381
the construction of a government post office, re-
quiring only ordinary building materials. In con-
structing ammunition plants, not only will time be
consumed in building the factories; but factories
for the manufacture of large projectiles require
great, complex, delicate machines to make the pro-
jectiles.
Certainly we should establish government fac-
tories and establish them as soon as possible. In
the future we must be independent of private manu-
facture. But it is one thing to propose to build
government ammunition factories, and quite an-
other matter to propose that we are to postpone sup-
plying ourselves with an adequate reserve of am-
munition until those factories are completed! In
our present condition we need the products of both
governmental and private factories. Both com-
bined cannot supply us with enough ammunition!
Private factories in the United States manufac-
turing large projectiles could now obtain European
contracts for 200^^ or 300^0 their present out-
put. // they conld only get the materials, the
chemists and the machines, to make them. Will
they, while making a good profit, sell their machines
to the government? Will they manufacture these
machines for the government when they cannot
now turn out half enough for their own use? The
manufacturer, the engineer, the expert mechanic,
readily understands the folly of the proposal.
382 AWAKE! U. S. A.
The argument of Secretary Daniels and of Sena-
tor Tillman in favour of government-owned ammu-
nition plants is that "We are now at the mercy of
the private manufacturers." We've had experi-
ence in the past. It's bad enough to be at the mercy
of the private manufacturers; but there's no hope
at all, if left to the mercy of the pork barrellers.
In naval appropriations alone, during the last
thirty years, the pork barrellers have sluiced $500,-
000,000. We may pay high, when at the mercy of
the private manufacturers, but we get something!
At the mercy of the pork barrellers, we have got
little or nothing!
Even the peace-loving socialist and hater of rich
men, Charles Edward Russell, after a trip to Eu-
rope, realises that the essential thing is to prepare
and prepare quickly; no matter what the cost, no
matter how many millions private manufactur-
ing concerns may make out of legitimate manufac-
turing work.
After all, is it not better — allowing, let us say,
one hundred million dollars' profit — to have private
manufacturing concerns already equipped make the
big guns and big ammunition we need and actually
get something for money spent, rather than be
"porkbarrelled" out of five hundred million dollars
and get nothing for it, except unpreparedness and
jthe risk of having to pay some foreign power an
DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 383
indemnity of five thousand million dollars to save
our coast cities from bombardment?
Thirdly, nothing could be more convenient to an
attacking force than to locate our proposed great
armour plants and large projectile factories in navy
yards on the coast, as Secretary Daniels proposes
to do, where they can be conveniently bombarded,
destroyed or captured by an attacking fleet.
Certainly, this last proposition is most unwise
and impractical, though perhaps politic.
QUOTATION REFERENCE
* Page 378. Rear- Admiral Austin M. Knight.
CHAPTER II
TH^ WILSON-GARRISON BRYANIZElD ARMY PI.AN
FORMER Secretary of War Garrison stands in
distinct contrast to Secretary of the Navy
Daniels. He has rendered one great service to his
country by emphasising the fact that the United
States should not depend for its protection upon 48
different little armies under the control of 48 differ-
ent governments, but upon one army under the di-
rect control of the United States. It is to be re-
gretted, however, that former Secretary Gar-
rison was not permitted to submit a plan in
accordance with his ideas.
It is still more regrettable that the head of an
administration should oppose a plan which his Sec-
retary of War, after two years of conscientious
study, found necessary.
However, as American citizens, seeking above all
else to provide adequate defence for ourselves, we
must consider former Secretary Garrison's plan
from the standpoint of what it proposed, and not
from the standpoint of what former Secretary Gar-
rison desired to propose. Although Mr. Garrison
384
WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 385
has resigned, his plan is here considered because,
without doubt, it is stronger than any plan which
will be approved by the present Congress.
The Chamberlain Senate bill, while stronger in
some features than the Garrison plan, is weak in
that it opens the way for and establishes another
precedent in favor of political grafting in connec-
tion with the supervision of the militia. The Hay
House Bill is of course, not worthy of serious con-
sideration except as an aid to the enemies of de-
fence and a ''good thing for the pork barrellers."
Mr. Garrison proposed a plan which outlines a
five-year policy for progressively increasing the
military forces of the United States.
But, as in the case of the naval plans, the most
essential question is : What is proposed to eliminate
the present weaknesses and what additions are pro-
posed for the first and second years?
The present weaknesses are: (i) inability to
quickly mobilise, (2) extravagant waste of funds,
and (3) unbalanced organisation. Former Secre-
tary Garrison's proposed plans, if carried into ef-
fect, would augment each of these weaknesses.
First, every one who knows anything about mo-
bilisation from General Wood down to the least
important officer, has agreed that it will take at
least thirty days to mobilise our little army of thirty
thousand men.
''Our army needs complete reorganisation — not
386 AWAKE! U. S. A.
merely enlarging — and the reorganisation can only
come as the result of legislation. A proper general
staff should be established. Above all, the army
must be given the chance to exercise in large bod-
ies. Never again should we see, as we saw in the
Spanish War, major-generals in command of di-
visions who had never before commanded three
companies together in the field." ^
According to the present organisation, the sol-
diers are distributed in tiny little camps all over the
United States. Secretary Garrison is to continue
the use of all these useless army posts. The thirty
thousand men, instead of being concentrated in a
few main camps, as advised by all army experts,
are to be kept in just as divided and separated a
condition as possible, thus preventing any improve-
ment toward a more rapid, more efficient method of
mobilisation.
Second, former Secretary Garrison's plan, by
continuing these expensive army posts, continues
the wasteful expenditure on these posts. This is
one of the reasons why the United States pays
$1,000 a year per soldier while Switzerland gets a
better-trained and better-equipped soldier for $13.
Thirdly, former Secretary Garrison's plan makes
no satisfactory proposal for reorganisation. He
urges the enlistment of 400,000 men in a volunteer
army but makes no proposal that will give us a suf-
ficient number of trained officers.
WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARINIY PLAN 387
Not only does former Secretary Garrison's plan
propose to continue the three great evils of our
present army organisation and present criminal
waste, but his plan neglects to propose, or at least
to lay emphasis upon, the needs and the means
of remedying our greatest deficiencies in equipment
and men.
We hope for preparation that will enable us to
defend ourselves in 1917, as well as in 1919 and
1920. No foreign nation liable to attack us will
stand sweetly by, patiently waiting five or six years,
until we are more efficiently equipped to resist them.
Austria did not wait until the Russian munition
factories were completed; Germany did not wait
until France had recovered from the military crisis
of 1913.
We must first efficiently organise and make ready
for defence such means and forces as we already
have, before dreaming of untried and questionable
plans of defence to be worked out two or three years
hence.
We need a sufficient number of men to man the
262 coast defence guns which we now have mounted
but without a single man trained to use them.
We need aeroplanes to give eyes to the army.
We need concentration of our regular army of
thirty-four thousand mobile troops so that rapid
mobilisation may be possible.
We need big howitzers and rapid-fire guns as
388 AWAKE! U. S. A.
good as those employed in Europe and a sufficient
number of them to equip our present army.
We need ammunition for the guns we now have
and ammunition for the new guns to be provided.
What does former Secretary Garrison's plan pro-
pose to do to meet these immediate needs ?
The first land resistance we could make against
an attacking force would be from our coast forts
and our coast defences. As already stated, we have
262 guns mounted, ready for use, without sufficient
ammunition and without a single individual trained
to man them. Three-fifths of these 262 guns are
gigantic twelve- and fourteen-inch monsters. Sena-
tor Thomas at the time of the Senate Investigation
stated that he deemed it "criminal" to provide no
men for these guns.
General Weaver, Chief of Coast Artillery Di-
vision, admitted in testifying that the coast artillery
was 13,671 men short in 19 14. It is estimated that
we are now seventeen thousand men short for coast
defence operations, to say nothing of the men who
will be needed to man the new guns about to be
placed in position.
"If at this minute every one of the 90,000 regular
soldiers in the United States cavalry, infantry,
coast and field artillery were assembled in New
York City, there would not be enough men to man
the guns there on a war footing." ^
The Garrison plan, to meet this present "criminal
WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 389
lack" of men and to provide men for the new guns
to be installed during the next year, asks for but
^,720 men.
The next resistance our land forces might offer
to invaders would have to be directed in accord-
ance with information furnished our army by aero-
plane scouts. England and France together now
use on the western battle line 2,700 aeroplanes.
Ex-Secretary Garrison asked for ^8 aeroplanes for
the next year and a half, — almost enough to poorly
equip the army of Uruguay.
Our coast forts are without ammunition, both on
the Pacific and on the Atlantic.
The army is absolutely unequipped so far as up-
to-date field guns are concerned.
The great strain of former Secretary Garrison's
proposal is : increase the number of untrained men,
— not more trained men and better equipment.
The recruits are to be divided into three classes:
the regular army; the state militia; and the new
national militia, designated as the Continental
Army.
According to reported plans of the former Secre-
tary of War, it appears in big black- faced type that
we are to have a *-egular army of 140,000 men to
defend us. Of the ten new infantry regiments
seven are to be kept in the United States. These are
to be organised on a "peace-basis," which means 820
390 AWAKE! U. S. A.
men to a regiment. Seven of these skeletonised
regiments will give us 5,470 men.
If one carefully reads the proposal one soon re-
alises that the increase advocated for the regular
mobile army in the United States is but 10,540
men, — both infantry and artillery. Our present mo-
bile army in the United States is but 34,798 men.
The addition, then, of 10,540 men will give us ex-
actly 45,338 men in the mobile army of the United
States for home defence, not quite the 140,000 men
talked about. Thus under the plans for an "enor-
mously" increased army, we shall have, in a year
and a half, 45,338 men in the mobile army — one-
half the army of Chile.
The General Staff and the War College is com-
posed of the greatest army experts of this coun-
try, — men who have had practical experiences of
from twenty to fifty years. They proposed a
trained army of 240,000 men.
Former Secretary Garrison asked that only nine
thousand additional militia be recruited during the
next year and a half from the forty-eight states of
the Union.
The piece de resistance of former Secretary Gar-
rison's plan is the proposal to recruit a Continental
Army of four hundred thousand men in three years.
These men are to sign for six years' service, and are
to be trained for the first three years only — two
months' training each year.
WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 391
Every sane-thinking man who was in the Platts-
burg training camp went home convinced that he
had been greatly benefited by the training but that,
even after six months' training, he would still be
unfit to stand any severe military service. What we
need is an army\of defence, not an untrained ex-
cuse of one that will be useful only in deceiving us
as to our state of preparedness and security, and
valuable only in eating up appropriations.
The idea of the Continental Army is superb, if
it would only work.
All history proves such an army is always use-
less; and that the only efficient feature about half-
trained men opposing regulars is the ease with
which the opposing regulars ''murder" the citizen
army. England is proving it for us again to-day
— one man dead out of every four. George Wash-
ington, Light Horse Harry Lee, General Grant,
General Lee, Lord Roberts, General Francis
Greene, have all advised oyer and over again
against the use of citizen soldiery.
Not only is there a question as to the efficiency of
men trained for two months, but there is a question
as to whether they can even be enrolled.
A few years ago a certain plan was launched for
the creation of a reserve army of the United States.
Its men were also to be obtained by the volunteer
system. The Secretary of War at the end of two
years announced that a reserve army of the United
392 AWAKE! U. S. A.
States had been created — numbering sixteen men!
The idea of the Continental Army is to form a
volunteer army with limited training, under the
supervision of the United States instead of under
the direction of the individual states, as are the
militia. After many years, the militia of the
forty-eight states have been able to enlist less than
120,000 men and able to half -prepare 60,000 men
for service. None of the inducements that have
been offered by the State Militia can be offered in
enlisting young men in a Continental Army.
The militia have the inducement of a club house
without expense. Many of them have gymnasia,
swimming tanks, shower baths, and recreations and
card rooms. A man entering the militia can choose
any regiment he pleases. A company can be formed
of intimate chums and friends. The militia train-
ing almost never interferes with business duties.
The militia are organised so that promotion from
the ranks is very rapid. Every man has a chance
of becoming an officer.
Ex-Secretary Garrison's own testimony before
the Investigating Committee indicates that he him-
self did not believe his proposed volunteer system
would furnish the men he had asked for.
The question, then, arises as to how we can pos-
sibly enlist, by a voluntary system, without any
special inducements, 133,000 men each year, whether
for a Continental or for any other kind of an army.
WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 393
It has been difficult to enlist even a few thousand or
a few hundred in the regular army each year.
And even the number enlisted has been reduced
by death, by desertion and by disability. Experi-
ence, even in the regular army of the United States,
has shown that often twenty-five per cent, of new
recruits desert during the first year, that fifteen
per cent, of the entire mobile army are sometimes
lost annually by disability.
In 1909 our army numbered 76,049 men. The
mobile forces were about 51,000. But there were
almost 5,000 desertions from the mobile army dur-
ing that year. There were, in exact number, just
4,993 desertions — nearly ten per cent, of the entire
mobile army.
On the other hand, during the same year, there
were 7,174 men discharged because of disability, so
that the mobile army of the United States lost, dur-
ing the year by desertion and disability, 24 per cent,
of the entire force. And this after those who were
supposed to be unfit for service had been eliminated
by rejection at the time of enlistment. In 19 10,
for example, of all those who made application to
enlist, 81% were rejected because of physical disa-
bility. In 191 1 more than 72% were rejected.
After thirty years the state militia with all their
inducements have now enrolled less than 120,000
men.
Two and a half years' experience in organising
394 AWAKE! U. S. A.
a reserve army and thirty years' experience in en-
listing militia in forty-eight different states indi-
cate that the system of voluntary enlistment pro-
posed by former Secretary Garrison will not work !
The plan as a whole proposed a Garrison-Bryan-
ized army — "citizenry springing to arms and fight-
ing after two to six months' training."
Ex-Secretary Garrison's plan ignores the advice
of experts and proposes a plan for a citizen soldiery
when all history proves that such armies are useless
and costly in money and blood.
"The War Department has closed its ears to all
advice which does not consort with the political
policy it has adopted. Facts were presented to the
department by experts from the Army College and
members of the General Staff. Facts have been ig-
nored in the Continental Army scheme." ^
The Continental Army, even if the War Depart-
ment is able to enlist the soldiers, will be inefficient
because improperly trained.
"The fallacy of this Continental Army scheme is
not in its numbers so much as in its disregard of
the need of adequate training.
"Physical endurance becomes a paramount vir-
tue. An army ill-equipped and unseasoned in prac-
tice exposes its vital weakness the moment it is sub-
mitted to attack. Such an army is worse than use-
less ; it is criminal.
"Those who understand army matters can hardly
WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 395
refrain from smiling at the notion of conferring
an adequate military training upon men in two
months, this period being followed by ten months
of entire suspension from service. Would such
a system work anywhere else? Go into any pro-
fession. Would it be possible for a man to become
a lawyer by applying himself to law two months a
year? Would he be esteemed competent? Would
clients put any confidence in him? Quite the same
thing applies in the army. The plan is devoid of
sense." *
The one great lesson of the w^ar in Europe is
that modern war is a war of machines and science;
and not a war of men, only in so far as they are
equipped with modern machines of w^ar and trained
to use them. This fact former Secretary Garrison
failed to grasp. His plan proposed a maximum of
poorly trained men with the least emphasis possible
on the equipment and supplies. The most efficient
army of to-morrow will be the one that is supplied
with the greatest machines and instruments of war
manipulated by the smallest possible number of
trained, experienced, skilful men.
"Maintain a potential preparedness for war in
which fighting is done by machines, not men." *
This does not mean that our present army is suf-
ficient in numbers; it is pitifully small, ridiculously
small. We must increase it. We should have an
3% AWAKE! U. S. A.
infinitely larger army, even though we were not in
danger of foreign attack.
Our republic is but 127 years old. Yet it has
been necessary to employ our regular army one
hundred different times to put down rebellion, in-
surrection and riots and to repel foreign invasion.
Our trained army must be composed of the best-
trained bodies and the best-trained minds of
America. It should be an honour to qualify for it.
No mother wants to rear a son to be a soldier and
a cad; but every mother should be proud to rear a
son to be a soldier and a man — able to protect her
and his sisters if attacked!
"All we want is peace; and toward this end we
wish to be able to secure the same respect for our
rights from others which we are eager and anxious
to extend to their rights in return, to insure fair
treatment to us commercially, and to guarantee the
safety of the American people." ^
And there is still need for armed protection, and
there will be for many a generation.
Historians tell us that if we patch together the
days and hours during which no nation has been at
war with any other nation, we will find that this
earth of ours in the last three thousand years has
had just two hundred three years of peace and
2,797 years of war.
Neither is to-day a time of peace; as one may
note by glancing at Hayti, Mexico, Japan, Great
WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 397
Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary,
Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Belgium,
India, Canada, Australia and half of Africa — in all
of which eight hundred millions of people live, di-
rectly or indirectly, affected by war.
Moreover, universal peace will not be ushered in
by July, 1917.
We should have an army equal in size, at least,
to that of Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru or Liberia.
In this enormous country of ours, with its popula-
tion of 100,000,000, even the pacifists should not
oppose a regular army of five hundred thousand
men. Even an army of that size would be but
twice as large as that of Holland, whose territory
is the size of Maryland only, and a little larger than
the standing and reserve army of Switzerland
which is about half the size of Maine.
Neither little Plolland, with one of the best-
trained small armies in Europe, nor Switzerland
where every school boy is compelled to take mili-
tary training and every man of military age is an
active member of the reserve, have been made mili-
taristic and bloodthirsty, even by generations of
military training.
"In this country there is not the slightest danger
of an over-development of the warlike spirit, and
there never has been any such danger. In all our
history there has never been a time when prepared-
ness for war was any menace to peace," ^
398 AWAKE! U. S. A.
Sane military preparation does not, has not and
will not lead to militarism. It is not the training
that gives a nation war lust; it is false ambition,
national conceit and the spirit of conquest — thriv-
ing on an international scale — that degrades a
people.
There are plans of defence and plans of defence.
There are plans of defence which aim to benefit
all the people by protecting all their resources.
There are plans of defence which aim to benefit
a few people by pork-barrelling appropriations.
And there are plans of defence which aim to
benefit the government by leading the people to be-
lieve that they are to have that which they demand.
"Congress is going to be made the recipient of a
military recommendation, not such as it should re-
ceive, but such as it is deemed likely Congress will
feel like adopting.
"Based upon the number of troops which the dif-
ferent great powers can land on our shores in the
event we lose control of the sea, we should have a
regular army, or troops of the first line of a certain
strength. This strength has been determined by
the War College, and this is the programme that
the Secretary should submit to Congress and let
Congress take the responsibility of either providing
for it or refusing to do so. Instead of this he has
to formulate a policy which is intended to cover up
WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 399
the deficiencies of Congress. It is a political re-
port, not a military report." ®
QUOTATION REFERENCES
^ Page 386. From speech of Colonel Theodore Roose-
velt, delivered in Chicago sixteen years ago.
2 Page 388. Colonel H. O. S. Heistand, Adjutant-Cen-
tral, U. S. Army.
^ Page 394 ; * page 395. Colonel William C. Church, mem-
ber Army Committee of the National Security League, and
editor Army and Navy Journal.
^ Page 395. Report of interview with Thomas Edison.
^ Page 396. From ex-President Roosevelt's message to
Congress, December, 1901 — fifteen years ago.
' Page 397. From address of Colonel Theodore Roose-
velt, delivered eighteen years ago.
^ Page 399. ( See note 3.)
CHAPTER III
BKlyGIUM AND BELGIUM
THERE is a Belgium of Europe and there is a
''Belgium" of the United States.
The Belgium of Europe stood in relation to con-
tinental Europe in 19 14 as the Belgium of the
United States stands in relation to continental
United States to-day.
Perhaps no more vivid and concrete illustration
of our unpreparedness can be presented than a com-
parison of the forces which the Belgium of Europe
had for defence in August, 1914, with those which
the "Belgium" of the United States may have by
July, 1917.
The Belgium of the United States embraces the
eastern third of Massachusetts, southern Rhode Is-
land, southern and middle Connecticut, reaching up
to and including Springfield, Mass., northern New
Jersey. This ''Belgium" of the United States in-
cludes the cities of Boston, Cambridge, Lowell,
Providence, New York, Bridgeport, New London,
Jersey City and Hoboken.
There are many astounding, even amazing simi-
400
BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 401
larities between the 19 14 Belgium of Europe and
the present "Belgium" of the United States.
First — The Belgium of Europe had the most
representative government of any nation of Con-
tinental Europe, not excepting Switzerland; we
have the most representative government of the
American continent.
Second — The area of the Belgium of Europe is
11,300 square miles; that of the "Belgium" of the
United States, 10,900 square miles.
Third — the population of European Belgium in
1914 was 8,060,000; the population of our Ameri-
can "Belgium" is 8,005,000.
Fourth — The Belgium of Europe was the most
densely populated portion of Continental Europe;
our American "Belgium" is the most densely popu-
lated portion of Continental America.
Fifth — The per capita wealth of European Bel-
gium was greater than that of any other country of
Continental Europe. The per capita wealth of our
American "Belgium" is greater than that of any
other section of Continental America.
Sixth — The countries — large producers of manu-
factured and agricultural products, Germany espe-
cially — bordering upon and beyond the Belgium of
Europe — depended upon Antwerp for the exporta-
tion of their goods; the states of the United States
— large producers of manufactured and agricul-
tural products — bordering upon and beyond our
402 AWAKE! U. S. A.
THE BELGIUM OF EUROPE AND THE BELGIUM OF
THE UNITED STATES
A. The Belgium of Europe had in 1914 a population of 8,060,000.
The Belgium of the United States has a population of 8,050,000.
B. The Belgium of the United States embraces the eastern third
of Massachusetts, southern Rhode Island, southern and middle
Connecticut, reaching up to and including Springfield, Mass., north-
ern New Jersey. This Belgium of the United States includes the
cities of Boston, Cambridge, Lowell, Providence, New York,
Bridgeport, New London, Jersey City and Hoboken.
C. In 1914, Belgium, to protect herself against invasion, had an
army totalling 371,000 — 40 per cent, trained men and 60 per cent,
partially trained men.
In 1917, we may have 308,000 men — 17 per cent, trained, 83 per cent,
untrained — if every man proposed by Former Secretary Garrison's
plan enlists and trains; and Mr. Garrison's plan provides for more
men than either the Qiamberlain Senate Bill or the Hay House Bill.
BELGIUM AND BELGIUM
403
Belgium 0/ Europe
and
Belgium of The Unfted States
C.
'■PojiuJatjoii''
~Area6
-Armies^
404 AWAKE! U. S. A.
American ''Belgium" — depend upon New York as a
port of export.
Seventh — ^Just beyond the Belgium of Europe,
were the greatest steel works of Europe; just be-
yond the borders of the "Belgium" of the United
States — in Pennsylvania — are the greatest steel
works of America.
Eighth — In the Belgium of Europe — in Ghent
and others cities — were located the greatest cotton
and spinning factories of Continental Europe; in
the ''Belgium" of the United States — in eastern
Massachusetts — are located the greatest cotton and
weaving factories of Continental United States.
Ninth — Antwerp was the biggest near-Atlantic
port of Continental Europe; New York is the big-
gest Atlantic port of Continental America.
There is no need to rehearse what happened to
Belgium in 22 days in 19 14. What did happen,
however, has made us think. It started a campaign
for adequate defence which has in one year secured
the general approval of our citizens. This approval
has become so widespread and so strong that Presi-
dent Wilson and Secretary Daniels have been forced
to absolutely reverse their positions of twelve
months ago.
We now wish to know what adequate defence
means. We now wish to know what would prob-
ably happen if an attack, similar to that launched
against the Belgium of Europe in 1914, should be
BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 405
made upon our American "Belgium," to-day, or a
year or two hence, say in 1917 or 1918. We now
wish to determine whether or not the plans pro-
posed by Secretary Daniels and former Secretary
Garrison will adequately protect our "Belgium" by
1917 — provided, each and every recommendation of
Secretary Daniels and former Secretary Garrison
shoidd be at once adopted by Congress — provided
each and every recommendation should be carried
out with amazing quickness. Although Secretary
Garrison has resigned, his plan is considered be-
cause, without doubt, it is stronger than any plan
which will be approved by the present Congress.
The invasion, defence, and devastation of Bel-
gium of Europe are facts. By this comparison, we
will have as a basis of judgment, the facts of that
which did occur — not the supposition of that which
might have occurred.
Compare the forces Belgium had in 1914 to de-
fend her area and population with the forces we
may have in 19 17 — if all our proposed plans carry —
to defend an equal area and an equal population.
Compare the number of trained and partially
trained soldiers Belgium had with the number of
trained and partially trained soldiers we may have
by 1917.
Compare the preparation of Belgian forces with
the preparation of our forces.
Compare the areas from which the Belgian forces
406 AWAKE! U. S. A.
had to be mobilised with the areas from which our
forces will have to be mobilised.
Compare the greatest distance Belgian soldiers
had to be transported to the distances our soldiers
will have to be transported.
Compare the efficiency and quickness of the mo-
bilisation of the forces that defended Belgium, with
our last three efforts at mobilisation.
Then ask: if, to defend an equal area with an
equal population, we will have by July, 19 17, even
if all our hopes as to proposed plans should come
true, a chance of victory against an invading army
similar to that which invaded Belgium.
This is the only concrete practical way of deter-
mining whether or not the plans of former Secre-
tary Garrison and Secretary Daniels will give us
adequate protection even if carried out to the letter
with amazing celerity.
First, as to the size of armies: Belgium had a
regular and reserve army and a Guarde Civique,
the soldiers of which had had about the same train-
ing as that which our National Guard has had. In
addition, however, Belgium had the aid of at least
45,000 English soldiers. These totalled 371,000
men.
As comparisons are here made between the forces
Belgium had in 1914 and those we hope to have
within the next fifteen months and as neither the
Chamberlain Bill nor the Hay Bill provides for as
BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 407
many men as does the plan of former Secretary-
Garrison, we shall, with a certainty, overestimate
— by employing as a basis of comparison the num-
ber of men former Secretary Garrison hoped to
enrol — rather than underestimate the forces we
miay have by July ist, 19 17.
If the full number of men asked for for the reg-
ular army immediately enlist, if the 9,000 extra
militia at once enrol as members of the National
Guard, if in the next four months 133,000 men en-
list to form the Continental Army so as to have two
months' training during the present summer — if
all this is accomplished without a hitch, we shall be
able to muster by July, 19 17, an aggregate force of
308,000 — provided, of course, that every man of
our regular army, every man in our reserve army,
every member of the state militia, every volunteer
of the Continental Army answers the call. If all
these conditions are met, we shall have, by July i,
19 1 7, an army which in numbers alone will be 83%
of the army Belgium had for its defence in 1914.
We must remember, however, that of our pro-
posed ten regiments of infantry — 20,000 men — only
seven are to be kept in the United States and that
these seven are to he formed on a peace basis, which
means but 820 men in each company. Consequently
the 20,000 men, so far as the defence of Continental
United States is concerned, dwindles to 5,740. The
figure 308,942 men is based upon the supposition
408 AWAKE! U. S. A.
that not a single man will be lost out of our present
mobile army of 36,787 men, that every one of the
5,740 men called for by Mr. Garrison for the United
States will enlist, that every one of the 4,800 men
called for by the plan for the field artillery will not
only enlist but will enlist in time to be trained by
July I, 19 1 7, that every man now in the militia of
the states will answer the call of the United States,
that the 9,000 additional militia asked for will en-
list, that the 133,00c called for by the Continental
Army plan will not only have enlisted but will also
have had two months' training this present sum-
mer.
Second, as to the training of the soldiers: Of
Belgium's army of 371,000 men, 96,000 were trained
Belgian soldiers, and 45 ,000 were trained English
soldiers, many of whom had seen active service in
South Africa and other parts of the British Em-
pire — in all 151,000 trained equipped men. The
balance of 230^000 were partially trained. By July
I, 19 1 7, if every factor of Mr. Garrison's plans
should be worked out perfectly, we would have in the
mobile army in the United States but 45,33^ trained
men, in the reserve army perhaps 24 men, a total of
only 45,362 trained men. The balance would be
composed of our militia, 50 per cent, of whom have
never qualified as second-class marksmen, and of
the Continental Army the members of which will
have had but two months' training.
BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 409
Belgium, to defend herself in 1914, had 371,000
men — 40 per cent, trained and 60 per cent, partially
trained men. We, to defend our American ''Bel-
gium," may have an army of 308,000 men — 17 per
cent, trained and 83 per cent, partially trained men.
Third, as to aids and equipment: Belgium of Eu-
rope had, to aid her army in holding its battle lines,
the greatest forts in the world. The forts about
Liege, Namur and Antwerp were large, new, strong
forts. They were extraordinarily strong, built
in the three years previous to the war. Military
experts of all countries, excepting Germany and
Austria, had asserted that they could never be
taken. The Belgian regular army was in fine con-
dition. It was well supplied with ammunition. It
was fully equipped with armoured cars, armoured
automobiles, transport and ammunition trains. Its
infantry was well equipped with tripod-machine
guns, with bicycle machine guns, and with machine
guns drawn by dogs. Its signal corps was in ex-
cellent condition.
Some Americans assume that Belgium was un-
prepared. Belgium was well prepared. She had
been preparing for three years. She had been pre-
paring ever since the Kaiser and the Kaiserine paid
that official visit to Belgium, during which occurred
that memorable after-dinner scene in King Albert's
private study. The Kaiser and King Albert were
alone; and the Kaiser, absorbed in the study of a
410 AWAKE! U. S. A.
new relief map of Belgium, unconsciously allowed
his hand to trace the line of march from the Ger-
man border down over the Belgian valleys into
France. This caused King Albert to build the new
forts, equip the Belgian army anew, and provide a
large reserve of ammunition.
We on the other hand have no armoured trains,
no sufficient transportation system, and practically
no reserve ammunition. Our army is lacking in
large guns. We have not a sufficient number of
machine guns, even for 34,000 men — our present
mobile force in the United States. We have no
bicycle machine guns, no dogs trained to take ma-
chine guns quickly from one point of a battle line to
another — trained to lie down quietly during fire.
We have no armoured automobiles. In fact, our
equipment lacks in every factor. And, if we do
not do more than former Secretary Garrison recom-
mended to remedy our present deficiences — it will
be three or four years before our present army is
equipped with even the minimum number of guns it
should have.
Fourth, as to mobilisation areas: Belgium's
entire army was resident on the 11,300 square
miles of Belgium; the English army began land-
ing within three days after the invasion and
within eleven days 45,000 English soldiers had
landed. Our army is and will be scattered over a
territory of 3,027,000 square miles. Because of
BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 411
MoDiiizaHon Areas
A . United <5tate6 3.027000 ^^. m/jei^
B\BeJ^fU'm ii,^00 ^qm/le^
A. Our prospective army of 308,000 (under the proposed Garrison
plan) will be distributed over area A.
B. Belgium's army — regulars, reserves and Guarde Civique — were
all concentrated on area B.
412 AWAKE! U. S. A.
this our mobilisation problem is vastly different
from that which Belgium had to face.
Fifth, as to mobilisation distances: It was
necessary to transport 90% of the soldiers of the
Belgian army less than 75 miles to perfect their
mobilisation. No Belgian soldier was moved more
than 130 miles. To protect the same amount of
territory and the same number of people, our sol-
diers from the west would have to be transported
three thousand miles, even those of Texas would
have to be transported at least 1,900 miles.
Sixth, as to time and efficiency of mobilisation:
Belgium mobilised her standing army in 72 hours.
The English soldiers that fought in Belgium
against the German invasion — not those that
fought later in France — were all on Belgian soil
within eleven days.
It is worth while noting from our past experience
just how inefficient we have been in mobilising less
than 13,000 men of our regular army, whose only
duty in peace times is to keep in training and to
remain at the army posts ready for mobilisation.
These experiences will indicate what difficulty we
would meet in mobilising 300,000 men.
The war with Spain was not an imexpected war.
Two years before, in 1896, the Congress and the
Senate had requested Spain to recognise the inde-
pendence of Cuba. It was two years later that the
Maine was sunk. Nearly a month more passed be-
BFXGIUM AND BELGIUM
413
MobiUiation Distances
Belgium:
ISttaUtu*
United States:
Belgium: Belgium mobilised her regulars and reserves in seventy-
two hours. No soldier was moved a greater distance than 130
miles.
United States: Our best military authorities state that it would
take nine months to mobilise the prospective half-trained army of
Secretary Garrison's plan.
Our experiences in mobilisation show this to be a very conserva-
tive estimate.
Major-General Wood, who is a most energetic officer in securing
quick action, estimates that it would take thirty days even to
mobilise our little continental mobile army of 34.000 men.
414 AWAKE! U. S. A.
fore Congress took action. Therefore there had
been plenty of time for preparation.
On March ii, 1898, the War Department began
its mobihsation for an invasion of Cuba. Yet it
took us 102 days to land but 16,800 officers and men
in Cuba; and the transports crowded to full ca-
pacity — men sleeping on decks, packed in any-
where — were compelled to leave ten thousand more
men behind at Tampa because the War Department
in three and a half months, after two years' warn-
ing, was unable to provide enough ships to carry
more than 16,000 men from Florida to Cuba.
Moreover, it was two weeks more before our
War Department could get enough food from
Florida to Cuba to supply our men for three days
in advance. Even then the quality of the food was
so bad that hundreds died from eating it.
The War Department was not able to mobilise
a single full regiment in Cuba. At San Juan the
regiments averaged 566 men each, though each
regiment should have had 1,272 men. With two
years' warning and three months' preparation the
War Department was able to provide each regi-
ment at San Juan with but 44% of the men they
should have had.
Compare this with Germany's invasion of Bel-
gium or with Japan's landing in Chemulpo Bay in
February, 1904. The tide at Chemulpo Bay rises
and falls 30 feet. Four times a day the waters
BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 415
rush in and out like a mill race. At low tide there
are mud flats for miles around.
The Japanese landing was at the beginning of
the Russo-Japanese War. Its success was not the
result of having learned by previous failures. The
Japanese accomplished the entire landing in a few
days.
First, they sent over corps of carpenters
and corps of blacksmiths. The blacksmiths
set up their forges near the landing place. The
carpenters built cleated wooden roadways to cover
the mud at low tide and to float on the water at
high tide. The wooden roadways were covered
with rice bags to deaden the noise of landing.
After this the medical corps landed. Then the
horses, being let down from the sides of the boats
in slings, were put ashore at a minimum rate of one
per minute, many at the rate of two per minute.
Under the most extraordinary conditions with
water rushing in and out in a torrent, the Japa-
nese in a few days landed 20,000 men, 2,500 horses
and 200,000,000 pounds of food and military
stores.
On March 6, 191 1, the Secretary of War under
President Taft, ordered the mobilisation of a
manoeuvre division at the Texas border. This
manoeuvre division should have had at its full
strength, 1^,200 men. After 86 days of effort, the
War Department was finally able to get together
416 AWAKE! U. S. A.
just i2,8op men. That was the largest number of
men the manceuvre division ever attained.
Again in 1913, orders were issued from the War
Department on February 21st and February 24th
for the mobilisation on the Texas border of the
Second Division under Major-General Carter.
This division should have had at its full strength
22,^6^ men. After 126 days, the War Department
was finally able to get 11,28/ men together. This
was only 52% of the number the division should
have had. And during this mobilisation, 3.4 men
out of every hundred deserted, were court-mar-
tialled or were discharged without honour. What
a glorious feat for a nation of a hundred million
people — unable to mobilise more than 11,28/ men
in 126 days out of a division that should have had
22,565 men! Moreover, this division brought with
it no proper supply trains, no proper ammunition
trains; it was short three companies of engineers;
it was short one full regiment of field artillery; it
was short field hospitals; it lacked a field signal
corps ; it lacked ambulance companies !
And again on April 23, 1914, the War Depart-
ment under President Wilson ordered General
Funston to sail from Galveston — to take four in-
fantry regiments to the coast of Mexico. These
four regiments should have had 7,956 officers and
men. They actually had 2,830 — only 36% of what
they should have had. And a large portion of
BELGIUM AND BELGIUM
417
Proleclion to Lands and Ottnens
Beljjium and U.S.A.
c
D.
Bel^jum
Belgium
A. -Belgium: U82 ^olcf/ers jierfoooo ftopzilation
B.-Bel^ium :su/5tyoldieriS p^r too square inile^
C' USA : zf