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THE FRAGMENTS
OF THE WORK OF
HEEACLITUS OF EPHESUS
ON NATURE
TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK TEXT OF RYWATER.
WITH AN INTRODUCTION HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL
G. T. W. PATRICK, Ph.D.
PBOFE3SOK OF PHILOSOPHY IN" THE STATE I T NIVEBSITY OF IOWA
BALTIMORE
X. MURRAY
1889
THE FRAGMENTS
OF THE WOKK OF
HEEACLITUS OF EPHESUS
ON NATURE
WITH AN INTRODUCTION HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL
G. T. W. PATRICK, Ph.D.
PEOFES30R OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
BALTIMORE
\ . MURRAY
1889
N c
t>°r
-
[Eeprinted from the American Journal of Psychology, 1888.]
A Thesis Accepted for the Degree op Doctor of Philosophy in the
Johns Hopkins University, 1888.
press of Isaac Friedenwald,
BALTIMORE.
01 (JSOlsZSZ.
All thoughts, all creeds, all dreams are true,
All visions wild and strange ;
Man is the measure of all truth
Unto himself. All truth is change,
All men do walk in sleep, and all
Have faith in that they dream :
For all things are as they seem to all,
And all things now like a stream.
II.
There is no rest, no calm, no pause,
Xor good nor ill, nor light nor shade,
Nor ess*, ice nor eternal laws :
For nothing is, but all is made.
But if I dream that all these are,
They are to me for that I dream ;
For all things are as they seem to all,
And all things flow like a stream.
Argal — this very opinion is only true
relatively to the flowing philosophers.
Tennyson.
PREFACE.
The latest writers on Heraclitus, namely, Gustav
Teichmuller and Edmund Pfleiderer, have thought it
necessary to preface their works with an apology for
adding other monographs to the Heraclitic literature,
already enriched by treatises from such distinguished
men as Schleiermacher, Lassalle, Zeller, and Schuster.
That still other study of Heraclitus, however, needs
no apology, will be admitted when it is seen that these
scholarly critics, instead of determining the place of
Heraclitus in the history of philosophy, have so far
disagreed, that while Schuster makes him out to be a
sensationalist and empiricist, Lassalle finds that he is
a rationalist and idealist. While to Teichmuller, his
starting point and the key to his whole system is found
in his physics, to Zeller it is found in his metaphysics,
and to Pfleiderer in his religion. Heraclitus' theology
was derived, according to Teichmuller, from Egypt ;
according to Lassalle, from India ; according to Pfleid-
erer, from the Greek Mysteries. The Heraclitic flux,
according to Pfleiderer, was consequent on his abstract
theories ; according to Teichmuller, his abstract theo-
ries resulted from his observation of the flux. Pfleid-
fr^r says that Heraclitus was an optimist ; Gottlob
VI PREFACE.
Mayer says that he was a pessimist. According to
Schuster he was a hylozoist, according to Zeller a pan-
theist, according to Pfleiderer a panzoist, according
to Lassalle a panlogist. Naturally, therefore, in the
hands of these critics, with their various theories to
support, the remains of Heraclitus' work have suffered
a violence of interpretation only partially excused by
his known obscurity. No small proportion of the
fragments, as will be seen in my introduction, have
been taken in a diametrically opposite sense.
Recently a contribution towards the disentanglement
of this maze has been made by Mr. Bywater, an acute
English scholar. His work (Heracliti Ephesii Reli-
quiae, Oxford, 1877) is simply a complete edition of the
now existing fragments of Heraclitus' work, together
with the sources from which they are drawn, with so
much of the context as to make them intelligible.
Under these circumstances I have thought that a
translation of the fragments into English, that every
man may read and judge for himself, would be the
best contribution that could be made. The increasing
interest in early Greek philosophy, and particularly in
Heraclitus, who is the one Greek thinker most in
accord with the thought of our century, makes such a
translation justifiable, and the excellent and timely
edition of the Greek text by Mr. Bywater makes it
practicable.
The translations both of the fragments and of the
context are made from the original sources, though I
PREFACE. VII
have followed the text of Bywater except in a very
few cases, designated in the critical notes. As a
number of the fragments are ambiguous, and several
of them contain a play upon words, I have appended
the entire Greek text.
The collection of sources is wholly that of Mr.
Bywater. In these I have made a translation, not of
all the references, but only of those from which the
fragment is immediately taken, adding others only in
cases of especial interest.
My acknowledgments are due to Dr. Basil L. Gil-
dersleeve, of the Johns Hopkins University, for kind
suggestions concerning the translation, and to Dr.
G. Stanley Hall for valuable assistance in relation to
the plan of the work.
Baltimore, September 1, 1888.
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION.
Section I. — Historical and Critical.
PAGE
Literature 1
Over-systemization in Philosophj*- 2
Over-interpretation in Historical Criticism 3
Exposition of Lassalle - 4
Hegel's Conception of Heraclitus 5
Criticism of Hegel's Conception : 6
Criticism of Lassalle 9
Exposition of Schuster 11
Criticism of Schuster 17
Exposition of Teichmiiller 23
Criticism of Teichmiiller 31
Exposition of Pfleiderer 39
Criticism of Pfleiderer . . . . 46
Section II. — Reconstructive.
I.
Can the Positions of the Critics be harmonized? 56
Heraclitus' Starting-point 57
Heraclitus as a Preacher and Prophet 57
The Content of his Message 58
The Universal Order 60
Strife 62
The Unity of Opposites 63
The Flux 65
Cosmogony 68
Ethics 69
Optimism 71
CONTENTS.
II.
Cause of the Present Interest in Heraclitus 72
Passion for Origins 72
Greek Objectivity 73
Heraclitic Ideas 74
Relation to Socrates and Plato 75
Socrates • 76
Birth of Self-consciousness 77
Loss of Love of Beauty 78
Rise of Transcendentalism 79
Platonic Dualism ■ 80
Return to Heraclitus 82
Defeat of Heraclitus 83
Translation of the Fragments 84-114
Critical Notes 115-123
Greek Text 124-131
INTRODUCTION.
Section I. — Historical and Critical.
Modern Heraclitic literature belongs wholly to the
present century. The most important works are the
following : — Schleiermacher : Herakleitos, der Dunkle
von Ephesos, in Wolf and Buttmann's Museum der
Alterthuinswissenschaft, Vol. I, 1807, pp. 313-533, and
in Schleiermachers Sammt. Werke, Abth. Ill, Vol. 2,
Berlin, 1838, pp. 1-146 ; — Jak. Bernays : Heraclitea,
Bonn, 1848 ; Heraklitisehe Studien, in the Rhein. Mus.,
new series, VII, pp. 90-116, 1850 ; Neue Bruchstucke
des Heraklit, ibid. IX, pp. 241-269, 1854 ; Die Hera-
klitischen Briefe, Berlin, 1869 ; — Ferd. Lassalle : Die
Philosopkie Herakleitos des Dunkeln von Ephesos, 2
vols., Berlin, 1858; — Paul Schuster: Heraklit von
Ephesus. in Actis soc. phil. Lips. ed. Fr. Ritschelius,
1873, III, 1-397 ;— Teichmuller, Xeue Stud. z. Gesch. der
Begriffe, Heft I, Gotha, 1876, and II, 1878 ;— Bywater :
Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae, Oxford, 1877 ; — Edmund
Pfleiderer : Die Philosophic des Heraklit von Ephesus
im Lichte der Mysterienidee, Berlin, 1886 ; — Eduard
Zeller : Die Philosophic der Griechen, Bd. I, pp. 566-677.
There may be mentioned also the following addi-
tional writings which have been consulted in the
preparation of these pages : — Gottlob Mayer : Heraklit
von Ephesus und Arthur Schopenhauer, Heidelberg,
: Campbell : Theaetetus of Plato, Appendix A,
Oxford. L883 ; A. W. Benn : The Greek Philosophers,
London, 1882.
Z HERACLITUS.
After the introductory collection and arrangement
of the Heraclitic fragments by Schleiermacher, and
the scholarly discriminative work and additions of
Bernays, four attempts have been made successively
by Lassalle, Schuster, Teichmuller, and Pfleiderer, to
reconstruct or interpret the philosophical system of
Heraclitus. The positions taken and the results
arrived at by these eminent scholars and critics are
largely, if not wholly, different and discordant. A
brief statement of their several positions will be our
best introduction to the study of Heraclitus at first
hand, and at the same time will offer us incidentally
some striking examples of prevalent methods of his-
toric criticism.
One of the greatest evils in circles of philosophical
and religious thought has always been the evil of over-
systemization. It is classification, or the scientific
method, carried too far. It is the tendency to arrange
under any outlined system or theory, more facts than
it will properly include. It is the temptation, in a
word, to classify according to resemblances which are
too faint or fanciful. In the field of historic criticism
this evil takes the form of over-interpretation. Just
as in daily life we interpret every sense perception
according to our own mental forms, so we tend to read
our own thoughts into every saying of the ancients,
and then proceed to use these, often without dis-
honesty, to support our favorite modern systems. The
use of sacred writings will naturally occur to every one
as the most striking illustration of this over-interpre-
tation. Especially in the exegesis of the Bible has this
prostitution of ancient writings to every man's religious
views been long since recognized and condemned, and
if most recently this tendency has been largely cor-
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 3
rected in religious circles, it is all the more deplorable,
in philosophical criticism, to find it still flourishing.
Unfortunately, this vice continues, and it appears
nowhere more plainly than in the interpretation of
Greek philosophy. There is a great temptation to
modern writers to use the Greek philosophers as props
to support their own systems — a temptation to inter-
pret them arbitrarily, to look down upon them patron-
izingly, as it were, showing that what they meant was
this or that modern thought, having only not learned
to express themselves as well as we have. Among his-
torians of philosophy this appears as a one-sidedness,
so that it is commonly necessary in reading a history
of philosophy to make a correction for the author's
" personal equation." The histories of Schwegler and
of Lewes are examples — the one biased by Hegel-
ianism, the other by Positivism. Undoubtedly, a cer-
tain personal equation is unavoidable, and it is as
impossible for an interpreter of Greek philosophy to
make himself wholly Greek as it is unfair to represent
the ancient thinker as wholly German or English.
But when this becomes complete one-sidedness, or
blindness to all but one series of an author's thoughts,
or a willful or even unintentional perversion of his
words, vigorous remonstrance is called for.
This attempt to fully understand the ancients, to
make them speak in the phraseology of some modern
school, must be distinguished from the recent move-
ment, represented by Prof. Lagarde and others, in
interpreting historic thought and historic events
psychologically. This movement is certainly legiti-
mate, based as it is on the truth of the similarity of
constitution of all human minds, and the probability
that underlying all representative historic creeds are
great related if not identical thoughts. Even here, of
4 HERACLITUS.
course, the attempt to express these thoughts in the set
phrases of any one people is inadequate.
We proceed, then, to look at some of the work done
upon the philosophy of Heraclitus. Here we shall not
attempt any examination of Zeller's exposition, since
his work, though it is perhaps the very best that has
been done in this field, is critical rather than recon-
structive, and like his whole history of Greek philos-
ophy, is a marvel of candor as well as of immense
research. Even Zeller, however, has not wholly
escaped the charge of one-sidedness, since Benn, in the
preface to his work on the Greek philosophers, has
accused him of never having outgrown the semi-Hege-
lian prejudice of his youth.
Lassalle.
Lassalle, in two ponderous volumes noted above
(page 1), made the first and most elaborate attempt
to reconstruct the system of the Ephesian philosopher.
His work exhibits immense labor and study, and
extended research in the discovery of new fragments
and of ancient testimony, together with some acuteness
in their use. Lassalle has a very distinct view of the
philosophy of Heraclitus. But it is not an original
view. It is, in fact, nothing but an expansion of the
short account of Heraclitus in Hegel's History of Phil-
osophy, although Lassalle makes no mention of him,
except to quote upon his title-page Hegel's well-known
motto, " Es ist kein Satz des Heraklit, den ich nicht
in meine Logik aufgenommen." Hegel's conception
of Heraclitus is, in a word, as follows : Heraclitus'
Absolute was the unity of being and non-being. His
whole system was an expansion of the speculative
thought of the principle of pure becoming. He appre-
hended, and was the first to apprehend, the Absolute
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 5
as a process, as the unity of opposites, as dialectic
itself. His great contribution was the speculative
transition from the being of the Eleatics to the idea of
becoming. Now how does Hegel support this position ?
There is in his Logic but one passage referring to Hera-
clitus. There he says, " Glancing at the principle of the
Eleatics. Heraclitus then goes on to say, ' Being no more
is than non-being'' (oijohiy ud/lov to ov tou tirj ovroc iart),
a statement expressing the negative nature of abstract
being and its identity with non-being" (Wallace,
The Logic of Hegel, p. 144 ; cp. Science of Logic,
Hegel's Werke, Vol. 3, p. 80). Hegel omits, in the
Logic, to give the reference to the above quotation,
but in his History of Philosophy (Werke, Vol. 13, p.
332) he quotes the same passage with the reference.
It is to Aristotle, Metaph. i. 4. We turn to the same
and find that it is a passage which Aristotle quotes
from the Atomists, Democritus and Leucippus, and
that it has not the slightest reference to Heraclitus,
who, indeed, is not mentioned in the same chapter.
This is rather discouraging, but the account in the
History of Philosophy, to which we now turn, is
scarcely less so. There Hegel begins his exposition
of Heraclitus as follows :
"1. Das allgemeine Princip. Dieser kiihne Geist
(Heraclitus) hat zuerst das tiefe Wort gesagt, ' Das
Seyn ist nicht mehr als das Nichtseyn,' es ist ebenso
wenig, oder, ' Seyn und Nichts sey dasselbe,' das
W. sen sey die Veranderung" (Gesch. d. Phil. Vol. 13,
p. :;.
Now it happens that Heraclitus said nothing of the
kind. As references Hegel gives Aristotle, Meta-
phys. i. 4: iv. 7; iv. 3. The first passage, as we have
already seen, is from the Atomists. The second turns
out upon examination to be simply the expression,
6 HERACLITUS.
" All things are and are not" (ndura elvac xac firj ehcu),
and the third is a statement of Aristotle that some
people supposed Heraclitus to have said that the same
thing could both be and not be the same. Moreover,
neither of these passages is Heraclitic in form, and
they are not even mentioned in By water's edition.
The only expression of Heraclitus that resembles in
form the above passage from Aristotle is that of frag.
81, " Into the same river we step and we do not step.
We are and we are not." The over-interpretation by
which this simple passage, expressing incessant phys-
ical change, is transformed into the logical principle
of Hegel, " Das Seyn ist nicht mehr als das ISTicht-
seyn," " Seyn und Mchts sey dasselbe," is audacious
at least. Furthermore, we may say here in passing,
that neither the expressions to ov, /itj ov, nor even to
jqvofievov, occur in any genuine saying of Heraclitus ;
although if they did occur, it would be easy to show
that they could not mean at all what Hegel meant by
being, non-being, and becoming. Even the Eleatic
Being was not .at all the same with that of Hegel, but
was finite, spherical, and something very much like
that which we should call material. But Heraclitus,
who indeed preceded Parmenides, said nothing of
being nor of non-being, nor did he speak of becoming
in the abstract, although the trustful reader of Hegel,
Lassalle, or Ferrier, might well suppose he spoke of
nothing else. That which these writers mistook for
becoming was, as we shall see later, only physical
change. With the loss of this corner-stone, the Hera-
clitic support of the Hegelian Logic fails, and Hegel's
boast that there was no sentence of Heraclitus that
his Logic had not taken up becomes rather ludicrous,
especially if one will read through the remains of
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 7
Heraclitus' work on Nature and search for his rich
and varied thoughts in the Logic of Hegel.
Returning now to Lassalle, the above principles are
carried out more in detail as follows : The chief point
hi the philosophy of Heraclitus is that here first the
formal notion of the speculative idea in general was
grasped. With him first emerged the conception of
pure thought defecated of the sensuous. His ground
principle was the dialectical opposition of being and
non-being. The kernel and whole depth of his phil-
osophy may be expressed in the one sentence, " Only
non-being is" (Lassalle, Vol. 1, p. 35). The unity of
being and non-being is a unity of process (processi-
rende Einheit). It is the unity of opposites, the idea of
becoming, the divine law, the yvcoftq of the determining
God (Id. Vol. 1, p. 24). Fire, strife, peace, time, neces-
sity, harmony, the way up and down, the flux, justice,
fate, Logos, are all different terms for this one idea
(Id. Vol. 1, p. 57). Hence arises Heraclitus' obscurity.
It is not a mere grammatical obscurity, as Schleier-
macher, following Aristotle (Rhet. iii. 5, p. 1407, b. 14)
thought ; nor is it a willful obscurity, but it arises
from the very nature of his great thought, which could
not be enunciated in exact terms, but could only be
suggested by such words as fire, time, etc., and so he
labored on with one new symbol after another, vainly
trying to express himself.
The Heraclitic fire is a " metaphysical abstraction "
-a pure process, " whose existence is pure self -annull-
ing (sich aufheben), whose being is pure self-consump-
tion (sich selbst verzehren) " (Lassalle, Vol. 1, p. 18).
Most clearly, however, is the great thought of Hera-
clitus shown in "the way up and down," which does
not involve change of place, but only a logical process.
8 HERACLITUS.
It is " nothing else " than the change from being into
non-being and the reverse. The way down is transi-
tion into being ; the way up is the return into the pure
and free negativity of non-being, motion in the undis-
turbed ideal harmony (Id. Vol. 2, p. 241 ff.).
God, in his adequate form, is " nothing else " than
pure negativity, the pure unity of process of opposites.
Nature is only the corporeal manifestation of the law
of the identity of opposites. It owes its existence to
privation (ddixea), that is, to the injustice which pure
becoming suffers when it becomes being (Id. Vol. 1,
p. 138).
The dvadofuaacQ of Heraclitus is not any vapor or sen-
sible exhalation, but is " nothing else " than the way
up, or the ixrrupcoa^, that is, the cessation of the sen-
sible and the particular and the assumption of the real
universal becoming. ' 'Avadopcwpevat, Lassalle says,
should be translated " processirend " (Id. Vol. 1, p. 144).
The Heraclitic flux is the same as the way up and
down. It is the dialectic of spacial being ; it is the
unity of being and non-being as spacial ; it is the here
which is not here. The nepdyov of Heraclitus is not
anything physical or spacial, but "the universal real
process of becoming," which works through the Logos
or law of thought (Id. Vol. 1, p. 306).
The Heraclitic Logos is the pure intelligible logical
law of the identity in process (die processirende Iden-
titat) of being and non-being. It is "nothing else"
than the law of opposites and the change into the same
(Id. Vol. 1, p. 327 ; Vol. 2, p. 265).
The substance of the soul is identical with the sub-
stance of nature. It is pure becoming which has in-
corporated itself, embraced the way down. The dry
or fiery soul is better than the moist because moisture
HISTORICAL AXD CRITICAL. 9
is "nothing else'' than a symbol of the downward
way. The soul that is moist has descended out of its
pure self-annulling movement or negativity in process,
into the sphere of the particular and determinate
(Id. Vol. 1. pp. ISO,. 192).
Heraclitus. in his desperate labor to express this idea,
enters the sphere of religion. Dionysus and Hades
are the same, he says (see frag. 127). That is, says
Lassalle, Dionysus, the god of generation which repre-
sents the descent of pure non-being into being, is iden-
tical with Hades, the god of death ; and this fragment,
which is a polemic against Dionysus, is really a
polemic against being, which is inferior to non-being
(Id. Vol. 1, p. 208).
Knowledge consists in the recognition in each parti-
cular thing of the two opposites which constitute its
nature (Id. Vol. 2, p. 272). Of ethics, the formal prin-
ciple is self-realization or self-representation. It is the
realization of what we are in ourselves or according
to our inner nature. The ideal is separation from the
sensible and particular and the realization of the uni-
versal (Id. Vol. 2, p. 428 ft.).
Such in brief outline is what Ferdinand Lassalle
finds in Heraclitus' book On Nature. As an exposition
of Heraclitus it is not worth the space we have given
it, or any space, in fact ; but as one of the most beau-
tiful illustrations of over-systemization, it is extremely
valuable. Any formal refutation of his conception of
Heraclitus is unnecessary, for almost the whole of it is
without any foundation whatever. The expositions
which are to follow, or even a slight reading of the
fragments themselves, will sufficiently show how thor-
oughly fantastic and arbitrary are his interpretations.
salle seems to have been misled partly by Hegel's
10 HERACLITUS.
misinterpretation of the passages from Aristotle not-
iced above, and partly by the principle of opposition
which runs through a number of the sayings of Hera-
clitus — an opposition which, as we shall see later, was
wholly physical, and far more simple than the abstruse
logical meaning given it by Lassalle. This German
scholar had no power or no wish to put himself in the
attitude of the Greek mind, which was as widely dif-
ferent from his as possible. It was a mistake for this
disciple of pure thought, bred in the stifling atmosphere
of a nineteenth century Hegelian lecture-room, and
powerless to transport himself out of it even in thought,
to attempt to interpret the sentences of an ingenuous
lover of Nature, who, five centuries before the Chris-
tian era, lived and moved in the free air of Ephesus.
In this we do not mean to say that the philosophy of
Heraclitus was purely physical rather than metaphys-
ical, for we shall see that such was not the case, but
primitive pre-Socratic metaphysics and the panlogism
of Lassalle are as wide asunder as the poles. On this
point, Benn, in the work already referred to, well says,
" The Greek philosophers from Thales to Democritus
did not even suspect the existence of those ethical and
dialectical problems which long constituted the sole
object of philosophical discussion " (Vol. 1, p. 4).
Those who wish to trace Lassalle' s errors further
may compare, on his mistaken conception of the Hera-
clitic fire, Zeller, Vol. 1, p. 591, 3 1 ; Grote : Plato, Vol.
1, p. 33, note. On " the way up and down," com-
pare Zeller, Vol. 1, p. 619, 1. On the flux, compare
Schuster, p. 201 ; Zeller, Vol. 1, p. 577, 1.
The characterization of Lassalle' s book as a whole
2 The references to Zeller in the following pages are to the fourth
German edition of Die Philosophie der Grieehen.
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 11
is. that it is a striking example of great philosophic
waste, turning as he does the rich and suggestive phil-
osophy of the Ephesian into a wretched mouthful of
Hegelian phrases. His citation of so many diverse
sentences of Heraclitus, drawn from theology, ethics,
nature, and man. and his discovery in all of them of his
single ever-recurring notion of " die reine umschlag-
ende Identitat von Sein und Nichtsein, impresses us
with the power which the tyranny of a single idea may
have to so blur one's vision as to cause him to see that
idea reflected in everything that is presented. It is
not true, as Lassalle's motto goes, that there is no sen-
tence of Heraclitus that Hegel has not incorporated in
his Logic, but it is not far from the truth that there is
no sentence of Heraclitus which Hegel and Lassalle
have not either willfully or ignorantly perverted.
Schuster.
We will mention now the work of Paul Schuster
(see above, p. 1). Schuster approaches the problem of
the interpretation of Heraclitus with the advantage of
a rich philological and historical knowledge. He suf-
fers a disadvantage, however, in the magnitude of the
task he undertakes, which is nothing less than the
reconstruction of the order and plan of the book of
Heraclitus itself. The interpretation of the f ragments^
he justly observes, depends upon the connection in
which they occurred. It will be necessary, therefore,
if we will grasp their true sense, to recover the plan of
the original writing. Such a reconstruction Schuster
holds to be possible, since by the law of selection, the
fragments which have been preserved to us must have
been the central thoughts of the original work. Con-
trary to Schleiermacher, he accepts as trustworthy the
12 HERACLITUS.
statement of Diogenes (Diog. Laert. ix. 5) that the
book of Heraclitus was divided into three parts or
Logoi, the first concerning "the all," the second poli-
tical, the third theological. On this basis Schuster
arranges the fragments, freely translated or rather
paraphrased, and interspaced with the restored pro-
gress of thought. The well known obscurity of our
philosopher, Schuster, contrary to all other critics ex-
cept Teichmuller, supposes to have been partly, at
least, intentional, as a precaution against persecution
for atheism. 1
The distinctive feature of Schuster's conception of
Heraclitus is that he was not a distruster of the senses,
but on the contrary the first philosopher who dared
to base all knowledge upon sense experience. He was
therefore the first of experimental philosophers. To
this idea the introduction of Heraclitus' book was
devoted. The majority of people, says the Ephesian,
have little interest in that which immediately sur-
rounds them, nor do they think to seek for knowledge
by investigation of that with which they daily come
in contact (Clement of Alex. Strom, ii. 2, p. 432 ; M.
Aurelius iv. 46 ; cp. frags. 5, 93). Nevertheless, that
which surrounds us is the source of knowledge.
Nature is not irrational and dumb, but is an ever
living Voice plainly revealing the law of the world.
This Voice of Nature is the Heraclitic Logos. The
thought which Heraclitus utters in the passage stand-
ing at the beginning of his book (frag. 2, Hippolytus,
Ref . haer. ix. 9 ; cp. Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 5, p. 1407, b. 14)
is no other than that which since the Renaissance has
1 Compare Plutarch. Pyth. orac. 21, p. 404 ; =: frag. 11 ; Clement of
Alex. Strom, v. 13, p. 699 ; r= frag. 116. The numbers refer not to
Schuster's numbering of the fragments, but to that of the present
work, which is the numeration of Bywater.
HISTORICAL AXD CRITICAL. 13
inspired natural science and its accompanying specu-
lation, namely, that truth is to be won by observation
of the visible world. But the people, he complains,
despise the revelation which Nature offers us with
audible voice. Why, asks Heraclitus (Hippolytus, Ref .
haer. ix. 9 : cp. frag. 47), should an invisible harmony
be better than a visible ? It is not better, but, on the
contrary, whatever is the object of seeing, hearing, or
investigation, that I particularly honor (idem ix. 10 ;
cp. frag. 13). Men, therefore, must trust their eyes
(Polybius, xii. 27 ; cp. frag. 15) and not make reckless
guesses concerning the weightiest things (Diog. Laert.
ix. 73 ; cp. frag. -18). That Heraclitus' theory of knowl-
edge, therefore, based it upon sense perception and
reflection thereupon, is shown, continues Schuster,
not only by the above passages, but also by the fact
that the exaggerated form of the theory held by
Protagoras (cp. Plato's Theaetetus) must necessarily
have had its source in Heraclitus, his master. None
the less is this shown also by Parmenides' attack on
the empirical theory of knowledge (Sextus Empir. vii.
3), which could have been aimed only at the philoso-
pher of Ephesus (Schuster, pp. 7 and 13-42).
Turning now from the theory of knowledge to its
results, the first law which the observation of Nature
teaches us is the law of eternal and recurrent mo-
tion {izdvca yiooil xal obdhv fievet, Plato, Crat. p. 402 A).
The starting point and central position of our philoso-
pher we must find in this recurrent motion, rather
than in the primitive fire which itself held a subordi-
nate place in the system. But the Heraclitic motion
was not conceived as any absolute molecular change
in the modern sense, nor yet as that absolute insta-
bility which appeared in the nihilism of the later
14 HERACLITUS.
Heracliteans. It was rather conceived in a simpler
way, as a general law that everything comes to an end
and there is nothing permanent. Under this was
included : 1) spacial motion, as of the flowing river ;
2) qualitative change, as in the human body; 3) a
kind of periodicity which brings everything under its
dominion. The last was the most emphasized. Birth
and death are universal; nothing escapes this fate.
There is no fixed or unmoved being above or outside
the shifting world, no divine heavenly existence that
does not change, but all is involved in the same
perpetual ebb and flow, rise and fall, life and death
(Schuster, p. 81 ff.).
But this life and death of the universe is literal, not
figurative. The world itself is a great living organism
subject to the same alternation of elemental fire, air,
and water. This thoroughgoing hylozoism which
Schuster attributes to Heraclitus, he bases principally
on the writing de diaeta of Pseudo-Hippocrates, who,
he believes, made a free use of the work of Heraclitus,
if he did not directly plagiarize from him. Comparing
this writing (particularly the passage, c. 10, p. 638)
with Plato's Timaeus (p. 40 A, also drawn from Hera-
clitus), he ventures to reconstruct the original as
follows : " Everything passes away and nothing per-
sists. So it is with the river, and so with mortal
beings ; in whom continually fire dies in the birth of
air, and air in the birth of water. So also with the
divine heavenly existence, which is subject to the
same process, for wp are in reality only an imitation
of that and of the whole world ; as it happens with
that so it must happen with us, and inversely we may
judge of that by ourselves " (Schuster, p. 118).
The life principle of the universe, as of the human
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 15
organism, is fire. This fire is everywhere present, so
that •'• : everything is full of gods and souls" (Diog.
Laert. ix. 7). The life of the body is sustained by the
breath which inhales the dry vapors kindred to fire.
At night, when the sun is extinguished and the world
becomes unconscious, we inhale the dark wet vapors
and sink into death-like sleep (Schuster, p. 135).
The sun, which is new every day, changes at night
into the surrounding air and then into the water of the
sea. The sea produces the daily sun, as it is the source
of all earthly phenomena. On a large scale this three-
fold change takes place with the universe, which will
ultimately be consumed in fire, again to become sea
and cosmos. This is " the way up and down " — not a
circular movement of the elements within the cosmos
(Zeller), but the periodicity of the world itself. The
way up and the way down relate only to the cosmogony.
The latter is the creation of the world by condensation
of fire into water, then earth ; the former is the reverse
process of vaporization (Id. p. 169).
This law or order is not dependent upon any divine
purposeful will, but all is ruled by an inherent neces-
sary " fate." The elemental fire carries within itself
the tendency toward change, and thus pursuing the
way down, it enters the " strife " and war of opposites
which condition the birth of the world (dtaxoofirjatc;),
and experience that hunger (yj>r t o ftoobw}) which arises
in a state where life is dependent upon nourishment,
and where satiety (xopoe) is only again found when, in
pursuit of the way up, opposites are annulled, and
"unity" and "peace" again emerge in the pure
original fire (ixTropwae^). This impulse of Nature
towards change is conceived now as "destiny,"
"force," "necessity," "justice," or, when exhibited
16 HERACLITUS.
in definite forms of time and matter, as "intelligence"
(Id. p. 182, 194 ff.).
The Heraclitic harmony of opposites, as of the bow
and the lyre, is a purely physical harmony. It is
simply the operation of the strife of opposite forces, by
which motion within an organism, at the point where
if further continued it would endanger the whole, is
balanced and caused to return within the limits of a
determined amplitude (Id. p. 230 ff.).
The identity of opposites means only that very dif-
ferent properties may unite in the same physical thing,
either by simultaneous comparison with different
things or successive comparison with a changeable
thing (Id. pp. 236, 243).
The second or political section of Heraclitus' work
treated of arts, ethics, society, and politics. It aimed
to show how human arts are imitations of Nature, and
how organized life, as in the universe and the indi-
vidual, so in the state, is the secret of unity in
variety. The central thought was the analogy existing
between man and the universe, between the microcosm
and the macrocosm, from which it results that the
true ethical principle lies in imitation of Nature, and
that law is founded on early customs which sprang
from Nature (Id. p. 310 ff.).
The third or theological section was mainly devoted to
showing that the names of things are designations of
their essence. That Heraclitus himself, not merely his
followers, held the (pvosi opdor/jQ ovofidztov, and used
etymologies as proofs of the nature of things, Schuster
believes is both consistent with his philosophy and
conclusively proved by Plato's Cratylus. Primitive
men named things from the language which Nature
spoke to them ; names, therefore, give us the truth of
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 17
things. Etymologies of the names of the gods was the
proof first brought forward, as in Plato's Cratylus ;
hence the name of this section of the work. To show
this connection of names and things was to prove the
intimate connection of man with Nature, and so to lead
to the conclusion that all knowledge is based on
experience, which, indeed, was the end he had in
view (Id. p. 317 ff.).
It is not our purpose to criticize in detail Schuster's
conception of Heraclitus. Much of it will commend
itself to the careful student of the remains, particu-
larly that which relates to the Heraclitic flux and its
relation to the primitive fire. Suggestive, also, if not
unimpeachable, is his conception of the relation of the
microcosm to the macrocosm, and of the harmony and
identity of opposites. In his exposition of these
doctrines, Schuster has rendered valuable service.
We can by no means, however, allow thus tentatively
to pass, Schuster's conception of Heraclitus as a purely
empirical philosopher. Before noticing this, a word
needs to be said in regard to Schuster's method as a
whole. As to the latter, the very extent of the task
proposed made over-systemization inevitable. In
criticism of Schuster's attempt, Zeller has well said
that with the extant material of Heraclitus' book, the
recovery of its plan is impossible (Vol. 1, p. 570, note).
Such a plan of reconstruction as that which Schuster
undertakes, demands the power not only to penetrate
the sense of every fragment, but also so to read the mind
of the author as to be able to restore that of the large
absent portions. The small number and enigmatical
character of the fragments which are extant, together
with the contradictory character of ancient testimony
to Heraclitus, makes such a task extremely hazardous.
18 HERACLITUS.
It can be carried through only by the help of "unlim-
ited conjecture." Such conjecture Schuster has used
extensively. The necessity of carrying through his
plan has led him to find in some passages more mean-
ing than they will justly bear, while his apparently
preconceived notion as to the wholly empirical charac-
ter of the system has led him to distort the meaning
of many sentences. We shall see examples of this
presently. Incidentally, his method may be illustrated
by his connection and use of the two passages :
dvOpcoTiooq [isvec (Lnodavovzaz, cLaaa oux IhtovTai oudk doxeooac
(Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 22, p. 630 ; cp. frag. 122),
and a! <fi^x ac oaptcovzac xad y adrjv (Plutarch, de Fac. in
orbe lun. 28, p. 943 ; cp. frag. 38). Schuster conjectures
that these passages came together in the original work,
and he renders and interprets them as follows : " There
awaits men in death what they neither hope nor
believe," namely, rest and the joy of a sleep-like con-
dition (!), so that even instinctively " souls scent out
death,"' desiring to obtain it (Schuster, p. 190). Not to
speak of the forced translation of the latter fragment,
only the most vivid imagination would think of using
these passages in this way, especially as Clement
himself, in his use of the first passage, refers it to the
punishments which happen to men after death (see
below, frags. 122 and 124, sources), and Plutarch, in
respect to the second, uses it as proof that souls in
Hades are nourished by vapors (see below, frag. 38,
sources). But Schuster's conception of Heraclitus did
not admit of belief in a distinct life after death, and it
was necessary to make these passages fit in with the
plan. The attempt to weave the fragments into a con-
nected whole, and their division into the three Logoi,
may be regarded on the whole as a decided failure.
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 19
Schuster finds only thirteen fragments for the con-
cluding theological section, although our knowledge
of Heraclitus and his times would rather indicate, as
indeed Teichmuller thinks probable, that the theo-
logical section was the principal portion of the book.
Turning now to the theory of knowledge, according
to Schuster, as we have seen, Heraclitus is an empiri-
cist and sensationalist and knows no world but the
visible. With this conclusion we cannot agree. Schus-
ter's argument that this doctrine must have arisen with
Heraclitus since it was held by Protagoras, his disciple,
has little weight. The order of development was rather
that pointed out by Plato himself in the Theaetetus
(p. 151 ff.), namely, that the sensational theory of
knowledge was the outcome of the Protagorean doc-
trine that man is the measure of all things, and that
this in turn grew out of the Heraclitic flux. No doubt
the sensational theory was implied by the Sophists,
but it was incipient with them and not yet formulated.
Much less can it be attributed to Heraclitus, whose
contribution to the theory began and ended with the
eternal flux. A sensational theory of knowledge, it is
quite true, was likely to be an outcome of the Ephe-
sian's philosophy, but he did not himself proceed thus
far. The question, theoretically considered, was be-
yond his time. There are passages which indicate
that he held, inconsistently it may be, quite the oppo-
site doctrine. " Eyes and ears," he says, "are bad
witnesses to men having rude souls" (Sextus Emp.
adv. Math. vii. 126 ;=:frag. 4 ; cp. frags. 3, 5, 6, 19, etc.,
and below (p. 50). The passage which offers Schuster
the strongest support for his sensationalism is that
noted above (p. 13) from Hippolytus, "Whatever con-
cerns seeing, hearing and learning (jiddyeic, Schuster
20 HERACLITUS.
translates " Erforschung "), I particularly honor"
(frag. 13). Adopting the simplest and most natural
meaning of this passage, it has no bearing on any
theory of knowledge, but means merely, as Pfleiderer
points out (Heraklit,p. 64, note), that Heraclitus prefers
the pleasures of the higher senses, as of seeing, hearing,
and the knowledge acquired thereby, to the sensual
pleasures of the lower senses which the masses pursue.
If, however, Schuster will take it in a theoretical
sense, then it comes into conflict with the other passage,
" The hidden harmony is better than the visible." The
contradiction is foreseen by Schuster, who deliberately
changes the latter into a question (see above, p. 13),
without a shadow of right, as may be seen by reference
to the context in Hippolytus (see below, frag. 47), who
expressly states that the two passages seem to conflict.
Further support for his interpretation Schuster seeks
in the following passage from Hippolytus :
Too 3k Xoyou rood' iovroq ahl a^uveroc yhovrae dvOpcorcot
xal npooOzv tj dxouaai xal dxohaavTZC, to npcoTOv. ytvofievcov
yap jrdvrcov xara top loyov Touda dneipococ ioixaai TZ&pmpzvm
xal inecov xal ipya)v toioutscov bxoiwv iycb dcTjyetjpa^ dcacpscov
ixdffTov xaTa (puacv xal (ppdZcov oxojq i%ec (Ref. haer. ix.
9 ; == frag. 2).
This is the passage of which Schuster says that if
Heraclitus had written nothing more it would have
given him a place of honor in philosophy, for here for
the first time appeared the thought that has inspired
speculation and modern science since the Renaissance,
that truth is to be sought in the observation of Nature.
But we are unable to find here any such meaning.
The sense of the passage depends upon the sense of
Logos. Of course, if Schuster is free to translate this
word in any way he chooses, he can get from the pas-
HISTORICAL AXD CRITICAL. 21
sage almost any meaning. He chooses to render it
the Voice of Nature or the Speech of the visible world.
In this he is not supported by any other critics. By
ancient commentators of Heraclitus the Logos was
understood as Reason, and in this general sense it is
taken by modern commentators including Heinze,
Zeller, Teichmuller, and Pfleiderer, although more
specifically they see that, in harmony with the whole
Heraclitic philosophy, it is to be taken as Reason
immanent in the world as Order or Law. Schuster
objects that Logos could not mean Reason, since before
the time of Heraclitus it had never been so used, and
no author would venture to introduce at the very
beginning of his work words with new meanings. But
precisely the same objection applies to its meaning the
Speech of Nature, for the whole point in Schuster's
exposition is that this was an original idea with
Heraclitus. If the Logos is conceived as Order, this
objection is met, since this meaning is given in the
derivation of the word. Moreover, if Schuster could
show that the word meant " speech " or " discourse,"
then the discourse referred to must have been not that
of Nature but of the author himself. Finally, if we
adopt Reason as the meaning of Logos here, the
whole passage, so far from supporting, directly refutes
Schuster's sensational theory of knowledge. Another
argument for the empiricism of Heraclitus, Schuster
seeks in his denunciation of the people for their failure
to interest themselves in acquiring knowledge by
empirical investigation of the things that surround
them, which he bases on a couple of passages from
Clement and M. Aurelius (see above, p. 12). Heraclitus,
in fact, said nothing of the kind; but Schuster, by
conjectural reconstruction of the text and an arbitrary
22 HERACLITUS.
translation, extracts a theoretical meaning from simple
sentences which no one who had not a preconceived
theory to support would ever imagine to mean more
than a reproach upon the masses for their superficiality
and neglect of interest in a deeper knowledge of the
world (see Schuster, p. 17, and cp. frags. 5, 93). What
Heraclitus' theory of knowledge really was we shall
see more fully in the examination of Pfleiderer's posi-
tion later. Here it is sufficient to add that, whatever
empirical tendency his philosophy may have had, any
such positive doctrine as that which Schuster ascribes
to him was far beyond the time of Heraclitus.
Schuster's interpretation of the Heraclitic ip-qopLOGuvq
and xopoQ is also open to criticism. Zeller, indeed, has
given a similar explanation of these words (Vol. 1, p.
641), but Pfleiderer has understood them differently
(p. 176). From Heraclitus himself there remains only
the two above words (frag. 24). Hippolytus (Kef. haer.
ix. 10, cp. frag. 24, sources) says that the arrangement
of the world ((jtaxda/s/jcns'), Heraclitus called " crav-
ing" (xprjGfioouvfj), and the conflagration of the world
(ixnupwacc;) he called " satiety " (xopoq). Schuster,
therefore, understanding by dtaxbafrqact;, not the process
of world-building, that is, the passing of the homoge-
neous original fire into the manifold of divided exist-
ence, but the completed manifold world itself or the
xoapoz, interprets the " craving " or hunger as belong-
ing to the present differentiated world, which hungers, -
as it were, to get back into the state of original fire or
satiety. The testimony is too meagre to say that this
is not a possible interpretation, but it seems to be
wrong. For Schuster admits, as of course he must,
that the original fire carries within itself an impulse
to change and develop into a manifold world. But
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 23
this impulse to change is hardly consistent with a
state of perfect " satiety." If now Ave take dcaxoa^ac^
in its primary signification denoting the action or pro-
cess of arranging, then craving becomes the designa-
tion of the world-building process itself. Craving then
is nothing but the original impulse to evolve itself,
contained in the primitive fire, while the reverse pro-
cess, the conflagration, is satiety, or better, the result
of satiety.
Teichmuller.
The work of Teichmuller (see above, p. 1) does not
profess to be a complete exposition of the philosophy
of Heraclitus, but to indicate rather the direction in
which the interpretation is to be found. Teichmuller
believes that the philosophy of the ancients is to be
interpreted by their theories of Nature. Physics came
before metaphysics. Particularly does this apply to
Heraclitus of Ephesus. His philosophy of Nature,
therefore, is the key with which Teichmuller will
unlock the secrets of his system (Teichmuller, I, p. 3).
But yet Heraclitus was not a naturalist. Of the
sun, moon, eclipses, seasons, or earth, he has little to
say. In the astronomy of Anaximander or the mathe-
matics of Pythagoras he took little interest. On such
polymathy he cast a slur(Diog. Laert. ix. 1; cp. frag. 16).
He went back to Thales and started from his childlike
conception of Nature. To Heraclitus the earth was
flat, extending with its land and sea indefinitely in
each direction. The sun, therefore, describes only a
semicircle, kindled every morning from the sea and
extinguished in it every evening. Moreover, the sun
is no larger than it looks (Diog. Laert. ix. 7). The
sun, therefore, cannot pass his boundaries (of the half-
circle), else the Erinyes (who inhabit the lower world)
24 HERACLITUS.
will find him out (Plutarch, deExil. ii.p. 604; = frag. 29).
Up and down are not relative but absolute directions
(Teichmuller, I, p. 14).
Thus upon physical grounds we may interpret at
once some of the aphorisms. For instance, since the
sun is a daily exhalation from the earth, sun and earth
must have in part a common substance ; hence Diony-
sus and Hades are the same (Clement of Alex. Protrept.
ii. p. 30 ; cp. frag. 127), since the former stands for the
sun and the latter for the lower world. Likewise day
and night are the same (Hippolytus, Ref . haer. ix. 10 ;
cp. frag. 35), since they are essentially of the same
elements, the difference being only one of degree, the
former having a preponderance of the light and dry,
the latter of the dark and moist (Teichmuller, I, pp.
26, 56).
The four elements, fire, air, earth, and water, are not,
as with Empedocles, unchangeable elements, but in
ceaseless qualitative change are continually passing
into one another. Experience itself teaches this in
the daily observation of such phenomena as the drying
up of swamps, the melting of solids, and the evapo-
ration of liquids (Id. I, p. 58).
Fire is not a symbol, but is real fire that burns and
crackles. It is the ground principle, the entelechy of
the world, in which reside life, soul, reason. It is God
himself. It is absolute purity. It rules in the pure
upper air, the realm of the sun. Its antithesis is
moisture, absolute impurity, which rules in the lower
regions of the earth. The sun with his clear light
moves in the upper fiery air. The moon with her
dimmed light moves in the lower moister air. The
central thought, therefore, is purification, or "the
way up," from the moist and earthy to the dry and
fiery (Id. I, p. 62 ff.).
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 25
The psychology of Heraclitus is not analogous, but
identical with his physics. The soul is the pure, light,
fiery, incorporeal principle which burns like the sun.
Its degree of life and intelligence depends upon its
purity from moisture. The stupid drunken man has a
moist soul (Stobaeus Floril. v. 120 ; cp. frag. 73). " The
dry soul is the wisest and best " (frag. 71). In sleep the
fire principle burns low ; in death it is extinguished,
when the soul, like the sun at night, sinks into the
dark regions of Hades. Hence it follows that there
was with Heraclitus no doctrine of the immortality of
the soul (Teichmuller, I, p. 74 ff.).
Ethics, therefore, is purification, and in this thought
we see the origin of that general idea which as
1 ' Catharsis " became prominent in Plato and later
philosophy. Teichmuller finds it of the greatest
interest to have traced the history of this idea, with
its related one of "separation" or "apartness," back
to Heraclitus. "Of all whose words I have heard,"
says the latter, " no one has attained to this — to know
that Wisdom is apart (xeycopcatievov) from all" (Sto-
baeus Floril. iii. 81 ; = frag. 18). This " separateness "
of "Wisdom, which was only another term for reason,
God or pure fire, reveals the origin of the distinction
of the immaterial from the material. With Hera-
clitus, to be sure, the idea of immateriality in its later
sense was not present, but fire as the most incorporeal
being of which he knew, identical with reason and
intelligence, was set over against the crude material
world. We have therefore here neither spiritualism
nor crude materialism, but the beginning of the dis-
tinction between the two. With Anaxagoras another
step was taken when fire was dropped and the Nous
was conceived in pure separateness apart even from
26 HERACLITUS.
fire. Following Anaxagoras, Plato regarded the
Ideas as distinct and separate {elhxpwsq, xzy^ioptaphov).
In Aristotle it appears as the separation (icopcazov)
which belongs to absolute spirit or pure form. Finally
in the New Testament it is seen as the purity (elXrxpiveca)
which is opposed to the flesh (Paul, Epist. to Corinth.
II, i. 12; ii. 17). Human intelligence, according to
Heraclitus, attains only in the case of a few to this
greatest purity, this highest virtue, this most perfect
knowledge. They are the chosen ones, the elect
(hdexroi) (Teichmuller, I, p. 112 ff.).
The senses, since they partake of the earthy char-
acter of the body, give us only deceitful testimony as
compared with the pure light of Reason, which alone,
since it is of the essence of all things, that is, fire, has
the power to know all. Here therefore was the first
distinction of the intelligible from the sensible world
(Id. I, p. 97).
Again, in the qualitative change of Heraclitus we
discover the incipient idea of the actual and potential
first formulated by Aristotle. Since the elements pass
into one another, they must be in some sense the same.
Water is fire and fire is water. But since water is not
actually fire, it must be so potentially. To express
this idea, Heraclitus used such phrases as " self -con-
cealment," "sunset," "death," "sleep," "seed" (Id.
I, p. 92 ff.).
Moreover, inasmuch as we have a progress from the
potential to the actual, from the moist and earthy to
the dry and fiery, that is, from the worse to the better,
we find in Heraclitus the recognition of an end or
purpose in Nature, or a sort of teleology, subject, how-
ever, to the rule of rigid necessity (Id. I, p. 137).
The flux of all things Teichmuller understands not
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 27
as a metaphysical proposition, but as a physical truth
gained by generalization from direct observation of
Nature. Furthermore, it was nothing new, all the
philosophers from Thales on having taught the motion
of things between beginning and end (Id. I, p. 121).
That which was new in this part of Heraclitus' work
was his opposition to the transcendentalism of Xeno-
phanes. Over against the absolute, unmoved and
undivided unity of the Eleatic philosopher, Hera-
clitus placed the unity of opposition. In Xenophanes'
system, above all stood the immovable, transcendent
God. In Heraclitus' system there was nothing tran-
scendent or immovable, but all was pursuing the
endless way upward and downward. His God was
ceaselessly taking new forms. Gods become men, and
men gods (Heraclitus, Alleg. Horn. 24, p. 51, Mehler ;
cp. frag. 67). The immanent replaces the transcendent.
Here emerges the historically significant idea of unity.
Against the unity of Xenophanes, a unity opposed to
the manifold, Heraclitus grasped the idea of a unity
which includes the manifold within itself. "Unite
whole and part, agreement and disagreement, accor-
dant and disaccordant — from all comes one, and from
one all " (Arist. de mundo 5, p. 396, b. 12 ; =frag. 59).
Everywhere is war, but from the war of opposites re-
sults the most beautiful harmony (cp. frag. 46). Here
three principles are involved : 1). Through strife all
things arise ; the birth of water is the death of fire, the
death of water is the birth of earth, etc. (cp. frag. 68).
2). Through strife of opposites all things are preserved ;
take away one, the other falls ; sickness is conditioned
by health, hunger by satiety (cp. frag. 104). 3). There
is an alternating mastery of one or the other oppo-
site ; hence it follows that since all opposites proceed
28 • HERACLITUS.
from one another, they are the same (Teichmuller, I,
p. 130 tr.).
What did Heraclitns mean by the visible and invis-
ible harmony ? Teichmuller censures Schuster for
failing to recognize that most significant side of Hera-
clitus' philosophy which is represented by the invisible
harmony — in other words, for reducing him to a mere
sensationalist. The visible harmony, according to
Teichmuller, is the entire sensible world, in which the
war of opposites results in a harmony of the whole.
But the invisible harmony is the divine, all-ruling and
all-producing Wisdom or World-reason, concealed
from the senses and the sense-loving masses and
revealed only to pure intellect. Thus Heraclitus, to
whom there was an intelligible world revealing itself
to intellect alone, and in the recognition of which was
the highest virtue, was the forerunner of Plato (Id. I,
pp. 154, 161 ff.).
By the Logos of Heraclitus was indicated Law,
Truth, Wisdom, Reason. It was more than blind law,
thinks Teichmuller, it was self-conscious intelligence ;
for self-consciousness, according to Heraclitus, who
praised the Delphic motto, "Know thyself," is the
highest activity of man, and how could he attribute
less to God, from whom man learns like a child ? (cp.
frag. 97). But this self-conscious reason is not to be
understood as a constant, ever abiding condition.
God, who in this purely pantheistic system is one with
the world, is himself subject to the eternal law of
ceaseless change, pursuing forever the downward and
upward way. But is not then God, Logos, Reason,
subject, after all, to some higher destiny {elfiapfiivrj) ?
No, says Teichmuller, for it is this very destiny which
it is the highest wisdom in man to recognize, and
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 29
which is. therefore, identical with the Wisdom which
rules all. The difficulty here he so far admits, how-
ever, as to acknowledge that this doctrine is " dark and
undetermined" (Id. I, p. 183 ff.).
Finally, says our author, there was no idea of per-
sonality of spirit in the philosophy of Heraclitus, as
there was not in any Greek philosopher from Xeno-
phanes to Plotinus (Id. I, 187).
In closing this part of his exposition, Teichmuller
calls attention to the relation of Heraclitus to Anax-
agoras. M. Heinze (Lehre vom Logos, p. 33), following
Aristotle, attributes to Anaxagoras the introduction
into philosophy of the idea of world-ruling intelligence.
But, says Teichmuller, this idea was present to
every Greek from Homer on. Its recognition by Hera-
clitus has been shown by the fact that everywhere
he attributes to his God, wisdom (aocp'td), intelligent
will (jvwfjaj), reason (cpopouv and (ppevype^, and recog-
nized truth (ioyoz). What then did Anaxagoras add ?
The history of the idea of transcendent reason turns
upon two characteristics, Identity (ra^ror^c) and Pure
Separation {eihxpevi<~). With Heraclitus both failed ;
the former, because the World Intelligence took part
in the universal change ; the latter, because it was
mingled with matter. For, in choosing fire for his
intelligent principle, although as Aristotle says he
chose that which was least corporeal (aacofmrcoraTov),
he did not escape a sort of materialism. The new that
Anaxagoras added, therefore, was the complete sepa-
ration of reason from materiality. In a word, while
the Logos of the Ephesian was at once world-soul and
matter in endless motion, the Nous of Anaxagoras was
motionless, passionless, soulless and immaterial. Iden-
tity, the other attribute, was added in the epoch-
30 HEEACLITUS.
making work of Socrates when the content of reason
was determined by the definition, following whom
Plato established the complete transcendence of the
ideal world (Teichmuller, I, 189 fL).
Heraclitus assumed a world-year or world-period,
the beginning of which was the flood, and whose end
was to be a universal conflagration, the whole to be
periodically repeated forever. In this he was preceded
by Anaximander and followed by the Stoics. . This
general idea was adopted by the Christian Church, but
the latter limited the number of worlds to three, the
first ending with the flood ; ours, the second, to end with
the conflagration of the world ; the third to be eternal
(Epist. Pet. II, iii. 4 ff.; Clement of Rome, Epist. to
Corinth, i. 57, 58); (Teichmuller, I, 198 ff.).
In the second part of his work, Teichmuller enters
upon an exhaustive argument to show the dependence
of the Heraclitic philosophy upon Egyptian theology.
Heraclitus moved within the sphere of religious though t.
He praised the Sibyl and defended revelation and in-
spiration (Plutarch, de Pyth. orac. 6, p. 397 ; cp. frag.
12). His obscure and oracular style, like that of the
king at Delphi (cp. frag. 11), was in conformity with his
religious character. Observation of Nature he fully
neglected, depending for his sources more than any
other philosopher upon the beliefs of the older theo-
logy. Without deciding how far Heraclitus is directly,
as a student of the Book of Death, or indirectly by
connection with the Greek Mysteries, dependent upon
the religion of Egypt, he proceeds to indicate the
interesting points of similarity between them (Teich-
muller, II, p. 122).
Among the Egyptians the earth was flat and infi-
nitely extended. The visible world arose out of water.
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 31
The upper world belonged to fire and the sun. As the
sun of Heraclitus was daily generated from water, so
Hotub, as Ra of the sun, daily proceeded from Lotus
the water. As the elements with Heraclitus proceed
upward and downward, so the gods of the elements
upon the steps in Hermopolis climb up and down (Id.
II. p. 143).
With these illustrations, it is sufficient to say, with-
out following him further in detail, that Teichmuller
carries the comparison through the whole system of
Heraclitus, and parallels his actual and potential, his
unity of opposites, his eternal flux, strife, harmony,
purification, Logos, and periodicity of the world, with
similar notions found in the religion of Egypt.
In order to appreciate the worth of Teichmuller's
work, it is necessary to remember that, as we have said,
it does not profess to be a unified exposition of Hera-
clitus' philosophy, but a contribution to the history
of philosophic ideas in their relation to him. In afford-
ing this service to the history of ideas, he has thrown a
good deal of light upon the true interpretation of the
philosophy of Heraclitus. But the very purpose of his
task has caused him to put certain of the ideas into
such prominence, that unless we are on our guard, we
shall not get therefrom a well proportioned conception
of the system as a whole. We shall do well, conse-
quently, to make a short examination of the work out-
lined in the foregoing pages, to put the results, if we
can. into their fit relation to the whole.
Concerning Teichmuller's starting point, namely,
that the physics of Heraclitus is the key to his whole
thought, we must observe, in passing, the inconsist-
ency between the first part of Teichmuller's book,
32 HERACLITUS.
where this principle is made the basis of interpretation,
and the second part, where it sinks into comparative
insignificance when he discovers that Heraclitus is
primarily a theologian and gets his ideas from Egyptian
religion. To say that we shall better appreciate a
philosopher's position if we understand his astronomy
and his theories of the earth and nature, is of course
true to every one. Moreover, that Heraclitus con-
sidered the earth as flat, the sun as moving in a semi-
circle and as no larger than it looks, the upper air as
drier than the lower, and the lower world as dark and
wet, there is no reason to deny. In fact, this cosmology,
as Teichmuller details it, is so simple and blends so
well with the Heraclitic sayings in general, that the
picture of' it once formed can hardly be banished from
the mind. But that it adds much to the explication
of the philosophy as a whole is doubtful. It is true
that physics came before metaphysics, if by that is
meant that men speculated about Nature before they
speculated about being. But this distinction has little
bearing on the interpretation of Heraclitus. . A prin-
ciple more to the point, and one that Teichmuller has
not always observed, is that religion, poetry and
metaphor came before either physics or metaphysics.
From the very fact, also, that physics came before
metaphysics, when the latter did come, men were
compelled to express its truths in such physical terms
as they were in possession of. He therefore who will
see in the sentences of Heraclitus nothing beyond their
physical and literal meaning, will miss the best part of
his philosophy. For instance, Teichmuller interprets
the saying that day and night are the same, as meaning
that they are made up of the same physical constitu-
ents (see above, p. 24). If possible, this is worse than
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 33
Schuster's explanation that they are the same because
they are each similar divisions of time(!), an explana-
tion which Teichmuller very well ridicules (Id. I, p. 49).
Xo such childish interpretations of this passage are
necessary when it is seen that this is simply another
antithesis to express Heraclitus' great thought of the
unity of opposites, on the ground that by the universal
law of change, opposites are forever passing into each
other, as indeed is said in so many words in a passage
from Plutarch which these critics seem to have
slighted (Consol. ad Apoll. 10, p. 106; see frag. 78).
Equally unnecessary and arbitrary is Teichmuller's
singular attempt to prove on physical grounds the
identity of the two gods, Dionysus and Hades (see
above, p. 21).
In pursuance of his method, Teichmuller supposes
that the Heraclitic fire was real fire such as our senses
perceive, fire that burns and crackles and feels warm.
Xo other critic agrees with him in this. Zeller espec-
ially opposes this conception (Vol. I, p. 588). It is not
to be supposed that Teichmuller understands . Hera-
clitus to mean that the present world and all its
phenomena are real fire. Fire he conceives to be,
rather, the first principle or dpffl, the real essence of
the universe, chosen as water was by Thales or air by
Anaximenes, only with more deliberation, since fire
has the peculiarity of taking to itself nourishment. In
a word, since anybody can see that our present earth,
water, and air, are not fire that burns and crackles,
all that Teichmuller can mean is that this kind of fire
was the original thing out of which the present world
was made. But there is not the least support for this
meaning in any saying of Heraclitus. In all the sen-
tences, fire is conceived as something of the present,
34 HERACLITUS.
something directly involved in the ceaseless change of
the world. "Fire, (i. e., xepauvos, the thunderbolt),"
he says, "rules all" (Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10;
= frag. 28). "This world, the same for all, neither
any of the gods nor any man has made, but it always
was, and is, and shall be, an ever living fire " (Clement
of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 711; =frag. 20). "Fire is
exchanged for all things and all things for fire "
(Plutarch, de EI. 8, p. 388 ; =frag. 22). These passages
are sufficient to show that Teichmuller 's conception of
the fire is untenable. We may, however, mention the
fact noted by Zeller (Yol. I, p. 588), that both Aristotle
(de An. i. 2, 405, a, 25) and Simplicius (Phys. 8, a)
explain that Heraclitus chose to call the world fire
" in order to express the absolute life of Nature, and to
make the restless change of phenomena comprehen-
sible."
Another point that demands criticism is the idea of
actuality and potentiality which Teichmuller finds
hidden in Heraclitus' philosophy and metaphorically
expressed by sunset, death, sleep, etc. Since there is
a qualitative interchange of the elements, they must
be in some sense the same. Water is fire and fire is
water. But since water is not actually fire, it must be
so potentially. Therefore, water is potential fire.
Such is Teichmuller' s reasoning, as we have seen. Of
course, it can be reversed with equal right. Since fire
is not actually water, it must be so potentially. There-
fore, fire is potential water. Which is to say that we
have here a simple reversible series in which there is
not only an eternal progress (or regress) from fire to
water, but equally, and under the same conditions, an
eternal regress (or progress) from water to fire.
Either, therefore, may, with as good right as the other,
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 35
represent actuality or potentiality. In other words,
actuality and potentiality are superfluous ideas in this
system. In fact, this antithesis has no place in meta-
physics outside the philosophy of Aristotle, and he
who has failed to see that right in this connection lies
the main difference between the philosophy of Aris-
totle and that of Heraclitus, has missed the most vital
part of the latter. With Aristotle there is an eternal
progress but no regress. The potential is ever passing
into the actual, but not the reverse. To be sure, a
thing may be both actual and potential, but not as
regards the same thing. The hewn marble is potential
as regards the statue and actual as regards the rough
marble, but of course the hewn marble and the statue
cannot be reciprocally potential or actual. Matter is
eternally becoming form, but not the reverse. Thus
follows Aristotle's necessary assumption of a prime
mover, an inexhaustible source of motion, itself un-
moved — pure actuality, without potentiality. Hence
the mainspring of the peripatetic philosophy is the
unmoved moving first cause. But the philosophy of
the Ephesian is the reverse of all this. With him
there is no fixed being whatever (see Teichmuller him-
self, I, p. 121 : " Es bleibt dabei nichts Festes zuriick,"
etc.), no unmoved first cause outside the shifting
world which is its own God and prune mover. Thus
Teichmuller, in identifying the Heraclitic fire with the
Aristotelian pure actuality, overlooked the slight differ-
ence that while the one is absolute motion, the other is
absolute rest ! We are glad, however, not to find this
Aristotelian notion, which, though prevalent in meta-
has never added a ray of light to the subject,
present in the philosophy of the Ephesian, and we see
here another case of over-interpretation by which
36 HERACLITUS.
Heraclitus' innocent use of such terms as sunset, death,
and self -concealment, caused Aristotelian metaphysics
to be forced upon him.
In tracing the history of ideas, much emphasis has
been laid by Teichmuller, as we have seen, upon the
idea of purification (xdOapaco) as it appears in Hera-
clitus, and in connection therewith he has found the
beginning of the idea of the " apartness " or " separa-
tion " of the immaterial world, an idea so enormously
enlarged by Anaxagoras and Plato. As regards the
Catharsis proper, Teichmuller has rendered a service
by pointing out Heraclitus' connection with the idea ;
but in reading Teichmuller 's book, one would be easily
led to believe that the Catharsis idea is much more
prominent in Heraclitus than it really is, and as
regards the doctrine of " separation," it seems at once
so incongruous with the system as a whole that we
must inquire what foundation, if any, there is for it.
The student of Heraclitus knows, although the reader
of Teichmuller might not suspect, that the words
xddapaes, xaOapos, elhxpcviq^ sihxplveta, %copc<7Tov, ycopiadev^
ixXexzoi, themselves do not occur in the authentic remains
of his writings. One exception is to be noted. The word
xtyoiptopkvov occurs in the passage from Stobaeus
already noticed (see above, p. 25). It is as follows :
^Oxoocov Xoyooz yjxouaa oudees dipcxvierac ec touto, ware
jcvdxjxzcv ort oo<pov eart Tzdvrcov xey^coptapevov (Stobaeus
Floril. iii. 81). This passage Teichmuller uses as his
text in establishing the connection of Heraclitus with
the doctrine of " separation," unfortunately, however,
first because he has not found the correct interpreta-
tion of it, and second, because, if he had, it would
stand in direct contradiction to the doctrine of imma-
nence which he spends all the next chapter in estab-
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 37
lisliing for Heraelitus. locov in this passage does not
stand for the world-ruling Wisdom or Reason, or
Divine Law. of which Heraelitus has so much to say
in other passages. To assert the " apartness " of that
Law would he to disintegrate the entire system, the
chief point of which is the immanence of the Divine
Law as the element of order in the shifting world. It
does not follow that because to oo^bv is used in the
above larger sense in the passage from Clement of
Alexandria (Strom, v. 11, p. 718 ; =frag. 65), that oocov
cannot be used in quite the ordinary sense in the
present passage. That it is so is attested by the
agreement of Schuster (p. -12), Heinze (Lehre vom
Logos, p. 32), Zeller (Vol. I, p. 572, 1), and Pfleiderer
(p. 60). Lassalle, indeed, agrees with Teichmtiller.
Schuster, following Heinze, understands the sentence
to mean merely that wisdom is separated from all
(men), that is, true wisdom is possessed by no one.
Zeller, followed by Pfleiderer, renders it : " ISTo one
attains to this — to understand that wisdom is separated
from all things, that is, has to go its own way inde-
pendent of general opinion." Schuster's interpretation
is the most natural, so that the fragment belongs
among the many denunciations of the ignorance of the
common people — as indeed By water places it — and has
nothing to do with any theory of the " separateness "
of an absolute or immaterial principle. Neither is
there any other passage which supports this doctrine.
In further support, however, of the Catharsis theory in
general, Teichmuller alleges the passage from Plutarch
(Vit. Rom. 28), which speaks of the future purification
of the soul from all bodily and earthy elements, and
which Teichmuller thinks to have a strong Heraclitic
coloring. In this passage Heraelitus is quoted as
38 HERACLITTTS.
saying that "the dry soul is the best," but beyond
this fragment it is a mere conjecture that it was taken
from him. The passage at any rate is unimportant.
What then remains to establish any connection what-
ever of Heraclitus with the "history of the idea of the
dfoxptv£s ,, Y Only the most general antithesis of fir<
and moisture, with the added notion that the former li-
the better and the latter worse. Since the divine
essence of the universe itself is fire, the way upwarc
from earth and water to fire is the diviner process, anc
pure fire is the noblest and highest existence. But this
is shown better in the ethical sphere. The soul itseh
is the fiery principle (Arist. de An. i. 2, p. 405, a, 25)
" The dry soul is the wisest and best" (frag. 74). Th(
soul of the drunken, stupid man is moist (cp. frag. 73),
The highest good was to Heraclitus the clearesl
perception, and the clearest and most perfect percep-
tion was the perception of the Universal Law of
Nature, the expression of which was pure fire ; an<
such perception was coincident with that condition of
the soul when it was most like the essence of the uni-
verse. This is the sum-total of the idea of the Catharsis
found in Heraclitus. It is worthy of notice, to be sure,
but it is not so different from what might be found in
any philosophy, especially an ethical philosophy, as to
make it of any great moment, either in the history of
ideas or in the exposition of this system.
We have studied now those parts of Teichmuller's
work which, either by reason of their incompleteness
or manifest error, most needed examination, namely
his method, his wrong conception of the Heraclitic
fire, his useless and unfounded theory of the actual
and potential and of the separateness of the imma-
terial, and his over-emphasized doctrine of the Cathar-
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 39
sis. Concerning* the other points, it is only necessary
in addition to call attention to the extreme value of
his contribution in his explanations of the relation of
Heraclitus to Xenophanes, to Anaxagoras and to Plato,
of the Heraclitic Logos, of the flux, of the unity of
opposites. and of the invisible harmony and the intelli-
gible world defended against the sensationalism of
Schuster. In the second part of his work also, though
its value is less, he has contributed not a little light
by his emphasis of the theological character of this
philosophy, though one doubts whether his laborious
collection of resemblances between the philosophy of
the Ephesian and the religion of Egypt has shed much
light on Heraclitus' position. It is seen at once that by
taking such general conceptions as war and harmony,
purification, periodicity of the world, etc., it would be
easy to make a long list of parallelisms between any
religion and any system of philosophy not separated
farther in time and place than Heraclitus of Ephesus
and the Egyptians. The resemblances, however, are
certainly not all accidental, but they are such as do
not affect the originality of the Ephesian, and unfor-
tunately do not add much to a better knowledge of
his philosophy.
Pfleiderer.
Dr. Edmund Pfleiderer comes forward in a recent
volume of 380 pages (see above, p. 1), with an attempt
to interpret the philosophy of Heraclitus from a new
and independent standpoint. He expresses dissatisfac-
tion with all previous results. Other critics have made
the mistake of starting not from the positive but from
the negative side, namely, from the universal flux (as
Zeller;, or from the law of opposites (as Lassalle).
But the hatred of the opinions of the masses which
40 HERACLITUS.
Heraclitus exhibits, calls for some greater philosophical
departure than the above negative principles, which
indeed were already well known truths. Moreover,
if we take these for his starting point, we can get no
consistent system, for the doctrine of the universal
flux does not lead naturally to the law of opposites, but
rather the reverse. Again, neither the flux nor the
law of opposites harmonizes with the doctrine of fire.
Finally, the pessimistic, nihilistic tendency of the theory
of absolute change does not agree well with the deep
rationality and world-order which Heraclitus recog-
nizes in all things, nor with his psychology, eschat-
ology, and ethics (Pfleiderer, p. 7 ff.).
We must look elsewhere for his ground principle.
To find it, we must discover the genesis of this philoso-
phy, which did not spring into being spontaneously,
like Pallas Athena from the head of her father. It
could not have come from the Eleatics, for the chro-
nology forbids, nor from Pythagoras, whom Heraclitus
reviles, nor finally from the physicists of Miletus, with
whose astronomy Teichmuller has well shown our
philosopher to be unacquainted. Its source is rather to
be sought in the field of religion, and particularly in
the Greek Mysteries. In the light of the Orphico-
Dionysiac Mysteries, in a word, according to Pfleid-
erer, this philosophy is to be interpreted. Here is the
long-sought key. The mystic holds it, as indeed Dio-
genes Laertius says :
My rayhq ^HpayJetvoo ir? dfMpaXbv el'Aes fttftkov
ToiHpeaiou ' pala rot oua^aroc, drpaTccroq.
dp<pV7] Xal (TXOTOZ icTTCV dAa/JLTTSTOV ' 7JV Si GE fjJjGTTjC,
eioaydj'fa (pavepou lapTipozep ijelioo. — ix. 16.
With the religion of the Mysteries, in its older and
purer form, Heraclitus was in full sympathy. By his
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 41
family he was brought into close connection with it.
Ephesus, too, his city, was a religious centre. Dio-
genes (ix. 6) relates that he deposited his book in the
temple of Artemis. Heraclitus, indeed, was not a
friend of the popular religion, but that was because of
its abuses, and it was in particular the popular Olym-
pian religion that he attacked. The connection of the
Ephesian with the Mysteries may be considered as a
deep-seated influence which their underlying princi-
ples exerted upon him. These religious principles he
turned into metaphysics. His system as a whole was
religious and metaphysical (Pfleiderer, p. 32 f.).
With this introduction, Pfleiderer proceeds as fol-
lows. Heraclitus' starting point lay positively in his
theory of knowledge, which was a doctrine of specu-
lative intuition and self -absorption. In this sense our
author understands the fragment from Plutarch (adv.
Colot. 20, p. 1118 ; = frag. 80), 'Edefyedpyv ifiewurou, " I
searched within myself,'' that is, I wrapped myself in
thought, and so in this self -absorption I sought the
kernel of all truth. Hence his contempt for the masses
who act and speak without insight. But does not this
conflict with those Heraclitic sentences which place
the standard of truth and "action in the common or
universal (£wv6v) ? (cp. frags. 92, 91). Do these not lead
as Schuster holds, to the rule, Verum est, quod semper,
quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est? No,
says Pfleiderer, the common here does not mean the
general opinion of the majority. All such interpret-
ations are sufficiently refuted by that other passage,
" To me, one is ten thousand if he be the best " (frag.
113). What Heraclitus really meant by the common
(£uvov) was "the true inward universality." Absorp-
tion into one's inner self was absorption into that
42 HERACLITUS.
ground of reason which is identical with the divine
principle of the world. By this universal reason under
which he contemplated all things, Heraclitus meant
nothing different from what by Spinoza was expressed
by "sub specie aeternitatis," and in subsequent phi-
losophy by "intellectual intuition" and "the stand-
point of universal knowledge." Heraclitus fell back
upon that universal instinct which in the form of
human language is exhibited as the deposit of succes-
sive ages, and which again he did not distinguish
from the voice of the Sibyl, representative of divine
revelation. As respects the source of knowledge,
Heraclitus as little as Spinoza, Fichte and Hegel,
looked to himself as individual, but rather to that
singular and qualitative divine source in which the
individual participates (Pfleiderer, p. 46 ff.).
The senses, though they do not give us the whole
truth, yet furnish the sufficient data that are to be
interpreted by the light of reason. The errors of the
masses do not arise from trusting the senses, for the
latter give not a false, but a partial account. Their
error lies in missing the spiritual band which unites
the manifold of sense into the higher unity, an error
distinctive of the popular polytheism as against the
religion of the Mysteries (Id. p. 70).
The theory of knowledge, Heraclitus' starting point,
being thus disposed of, Pfleiderer proceeds to discuss
the material principles of his philosophy in their
abstract metaphysical form. The keynote here is the
indestructibility of life. The oscillating identity of
life and death, a truth adopted from the Mysteries, is
taken up by Heraclitus and elevated into a universal
and metaphysical principle. It is based on the simple
observation of Nature, which sees the life and light
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 43
and warmth of summer passing into the death and
darkness and cold of winter, only to be revived and
restored in the never-failing spring. So on a smaller
scale, day passes into night, but night ever again into
day. So everywhere in Nature nothing passes away
but to revive again. From this follows the hope of
the universality of this law, the indestructibility of
human life, and the resolution of the opposition be-
tween the light, warm life here above and the dark,
cold death below. This is the hopeful element which
characterizes the philosophy of the Ephesian. Over
against it was the hopeless creed of the masses, whose
complaint over the inexorable destiny of death found
expression from the earliest times in the despairing
lines of the poets. The common view does not see too
much continuance and constancy in reality, but too
little. ''What we see waking," says Heraclitus, " is
death, what we see sleeping is a dream" (Clement of
Alex. iii. 3, p. 520 ; =frag. 64). Which means, that like
the unreality and inconstancy of dreams is this ephem-
eral and perishing existence which we, the vulgar
people, see when awake. Reversing this gloomy view,
the Mysteries taught that Hades and Dionysus were
the same (cp. frag. 127). That is, the god of death
feared in the world below, is identical with the god of
life and joy of the world here above, which is to say
that the regenerative power of life persists even in
death and shall overcome it (Pfleiderer, p. 74 ff.).
From this theory of the indestructibility of the fire
force of life, Heraclitus passes to the ancillary truth of
the unity of opposition in general. Hence he asserted
the identity of day and night, winter and summer,
young and old, sleeping and waking, hunger and
satiety (cp. frags. 36, 78). His whole theory of the
44 HERACLITUS.
harmony of opposites was, as it were, apologetic. If
life rules in death, why does death exist ? It was in
answer to this question that Heraclitus developed his
science of opposition and strife, by showing the pres-
ence here of a general law (Pfleiderer, p. 84 ff.).
In the same spirit Pfleiderer interprets the,, much
contested figure of the harmony of the world as the
harmony of the bow and the lyre (see frags. 45, 56).
Without rejecting the interpretation suggested by
Bernays (Rhein. Mus. vii. p. 94) and followed by most
other critics, which refers the figure to the form of
the bow and of the lyre, their opposite stretching arms
producing harmony by tension, Pfleiderer finds in the
comparison still another meaning. The bow and the
lyre are both attributes of Apollo, the slayer and the
giver of life and joy. Thus the harmony between the
bow and the lyre, as attributes of one god — symbols
respectively of death and of life and joy — expresses the
great thought of the harmony and reciprocal inter-
change of death and life (Pfleiderer, p. 89 ff.).
The Heraclitic flux of all things, says Pfleiderer, was
not antecedent to his abstract teachings, but the logi-
cal consequence thereof. The identity of life and
death led him to the identity of all opposites. But
opposites are endlessly flowing or passing into each
other. Hence from the principle that everything is
opposition, follows the principle that everything flows.
The universal flux is only a picture to make his relig-
ious metaphysical sentences intelligible (Id. p. 100 ff.).
The Heraclitic fire is real fire as opposed to the
logical symbol of Lassalle, but not the strictly sensible
fire that burns and crackles, as Teichmuller supposes.
It is rather a less definite conception, which is taken
now as fire, now as warmth, warm air or vapor. It is
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 45
the concrete form or intuitional correlate of the meta-
physical notion of life (Id. p. 120 ff.).
" The way up and down" refers not only to the trans-
mutations of fire, water, and earth, but holds good in
general for the oscillation of opposites, and particularly
for the polarity of life and death (Id. p. 140).
As one result of his investigation, Pfleiderer affirms
a strong optimistic element in the philosophy of the
Ephesian. He contests the opinion of Schuster and
Zeller that the endless destruction of single existences
is kindred to the pessimistic doctrine of Anaximander,
of the extinction of all individuals as an atonement
for the " injustice " of individual existence. The pro-
cess indeed goes on, but it has a bright side, and it is
this that Heraclitus sees. Life, to be sure, is ever pass-
ing into death, but out of death life ever emerges. It
is this thought, the powerlessness of death over the
indestructible fire force of life, which Heraclitus em-
phasizes (Id. p. 180 ff.).
Still more decided is his rational optimism, his un-
swerving belief in a world well ordered and disposed.
A deep rationality characterizes the universe (cp. frags.
2, 1, 91, 92, 98, 99, 96, 19). To express this idea, Hera-
clitus used the word Logos, which after his time played
so prominent a part in the older philosophy. This
word, passing even beyond its signification of " well
ordered relation," conveyed finally with Heraclitus,
as /<>)'<>; £uvbc, rather the idea of Reason immanent in
the world (Pfleiderer, p. 231 ff.).
In the invisible harmony we find the same general
thought. As distinguished from the visible harmony,
which meant that external order of Nature insuring to
the trustful peasant the never failing return of summer
and winter, heat and frost, day and night,— the invisi-
46 HERACLITUS.
ble harmony was that all-embracing harmony which
is revealed to thought as the rational union of all
oppositions. Against this theodicy there is no valid
objection to be derived from the accounts which repre-
sent the Ephesian philosopher as sad and complain-
ing, nor from the passages descriptive of the evils
of life and the weakness of men (cp. frags. 86, 55, 112,
etc.). In all cases these refer not to the philosopher's
own opinions, but to the errors of the ignorant masses
(Pfleiderer, p. 235 ff.).
The future existence of the soul, though not consis-
tent with his physics and metaphysics, was neverthe-
less held from the religious and ethical standpoint. In
fact it was involved, as has been shown, in Heraclitus'
point of departure, so that we have less reason to com-
plain of inconsistency in his case than we have, in
reference to the same matter, in the case of the Stoics
later (Id. p. 210).
We have given, perhaps, more space to the exposi-
tion of Pfleiderer' s work than it relatively deserves,
because it is the last word that has been spoken on
Heraclitus, because, also, it has deservedly brought
into prominence the optimism and the religious char-
acter of his philosophy, and because finally it presents
another instructive example of over-systemization. It
claims our attention, too, because the view it proposes
is a complete reversal of the prevalent conception of
Heraclitus, and if seriously taken, changes the whole
tenor of his philosophy.
In what follows we shall examine chiefly the two
main points in Pfleiderer' s work, namely, the theory
of knowledge and the connection with the Greek
Mysteries ; the latter, because it is Pfleiderer's particu-
HISTORICAL £ND CRITICAL. 47
lar contribution, and the former, because it will open
to us an important aspect of the Ephesian's philosophy.
In the first place, however, it can by no means be
admitted that the doctrine of the flux and the harmony
of opposites represent the negative side of his system,
and are secondary to his theory of knowledge and
his religious dogmas. The unanimous testimony of
the ancients cannot be thus easily set aside. That of
Plato and Aristotle alone is decisive. Pfleiderer objects
that Plato's purpose, which was to establish the
changelessness of noumena against the change of
phenomena, led him to emphasize the flux of Hera-
clitus. But if Heraclitus' positive teachings were, as
Pfleiderer says, first of all the theory of knowledge,
this and not the flux must have been emphasized in the
Theaetetus where the theory of knowledge was Plato's
theme. It is sufficient, however, here to note that
what Heraclitus has stood for in philosophy from his
own time to the present, is the doctrine of absolute
change, and this doctrine may, therefore, properly be
called the positive side of his philosophy. If what
Pfleiderer means is that the theory of knowledge and
not the flux was his starting point, he would have a
shadow more of right. It is, however, misleading to
say that his theory of knowledge was his starting-
point, for, as we have indicated in our examination of
Schuster's work, Heraclitus was not concerned with a
theory of knowledge as such. To state in a word what
his point of departure really was, regarded from a
common-sense view, it was his conviction that he was
in possession of new truth which the blindness and
ignorance of men prevented them from seeing (the
point of departure indeed of almost every one who
writes a book), and the three leading ideas in this
48 heraClitus.
new truth were : 1. the absence of that stability in
Nature which the untrained senses perceive ; 2. the
unsuspected presence of a universal law of order ; 3.
the law of strife which brings unity out of diversity.
In one sense this may be called a theory of knowledge,
and only in this sense was it his starting point.
But concerning the theory of knowledge itself, we
cannot accept Pfleiderer's position. By placing it in
speculative intuition and self -absorption, he has rushed
to the very opposite extreme of Schuster's sensation-
alism, and in so doing has equally misrepresented
Heraclitus. Either extreme is forcing a modern theory
of knowledge upon the Ephesian of which he was
wholly innocent. What support has Pfleiderer for
his "self -absorption" theory ? None whatever. He
alleges the fragment ' Ed^yadfiyv ijueworou (cp. frag. 80),
which he arbitrarily renders, "I searched within
myself" (" Ich forschte in mir selbst"). This frag-
ment is from Plutarch (adv. Colot. 20, p. 1118), Diog-
enes Laertius (ix. 5 ; cp. frag. 80, sources), and others.
Plutarch understands it to refer simply to self-knowl-
edge like the rvwdi aauxbv at Delphi (similarly Julian,
Or. vi. p. 185 A). Diogenes understands it as referring
to self -instruction (similarly Tatian, Or. ad Graec. 3).
Diogenes says, " He (Heraclitus) was a pupil of no one,
but he said that he inquired, for himself and learned all
things by himself" (rjxooas r oL^evoc, dAX aurbv scpy
oc^rjaaadac xac fmOelv rcd^ra Ttap koorou). The latter
seems to be its true meaning, as is seen by comparing
the passage from Polybius (xii. 27; cp. frag. 15), " The
eyes are better witnesses than the ears." As here he
means to say that men should see for themselves and
not trust to the reports of others, so in the fragment in
question he means only that he himself has inquired of
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 49
himself and not of others (cp. also frags. 14, 13). But
Pfleiderer, in order to support a theory, has taken
these two innocent words and pressed them into a doc-
trine of contemplative intuition, by giving them the
meaning, " I wrapped myself in thought " (" Ich ver-
senkte mich sinnend und forschend," etc., p. 47). So
far is it from the case that Heraclitus sought the
source of knowledge by turning inward, that he ex-
pressed himself directly to the contrary. Thus we read
in Plutarch (de Superst. 3, p. 166; = f rag. 95): b'hlpd-
y./.ZiZiK cr t ac f zolz Irprrropbotu c\a /.at xoevbv xoofiov zlvac, rwv
os xoeftwfiivtov exaarov etc idtov d-oazpiipeadacy the sense of
which is well given by Campbell (Theaetetus of Plato,
p. 246), " To li^e in the light of the universal Order is
to be awake, to turn aside into our own microcosm is
to go to sleep.'' Again, the whole passage from Sextus
Empiricus (adv. Math. vii. 132, 133 ; cp. frags. 92, 2)
is conclusive. "For," says Sextus, "having thus
statedly shown that we do and think everything by
participation in the divine reason, he [Heraclitus]
adds. * It is necessary therefore to follow the* com-
mon, for although the Law of Reason is common, the
majority of people live as though they had an under-
standing of their own.' But this is nothing else than
an explanation of the mode of the universal disposition
of things. As far therefore as we participate in the
memory of this, we are true, but as far as ive separate
ourselves individually we are false. A more express
denial of any self-absorption or a priori theory of
knowledge would be impossible. Heraclitus is con-
stantly urging men to come out of themselves and
place themselves in an attitude of receptivity to that
which surrounds them, and not go about as if self-
included (cp. frags. 94, 3, 2). But what does Hera-
50 HERACLITUS.
clitus mean by participation in the divine or universal
Reason ? Is not this just Pfleiderer's position when
he says that the Ephesian as little as Fichte or Hegel
looked to himself as individual, but rather to that abso-
lute reason in which the individual participates ? The
difference is radical and vital, but Pfleiderer, like
Lassalle, failed to see it because he did not free himself
from strictly modern theories of knowledge. The dif-
ference is simply this. The universal reason of which
Pneiderer is speaking is that in which man necessarily
and by his intellectual nature participates. That of
Heraclitus is the divine Reason, in which man ought
to participate but may not. Pfleiderer's universal
reason is universal in man. That of Heraclitus, out-
side of and independent of man. The latter, so far
from being necessarily involved in thought, is inde-
pendent of thought. It is that pure, fiery and godlike
essence, the apprehension of which gives rationality in
the measure in which it is possessed. No reader,
therefore, who can think of only two theories of
knowledge, a strictly a priori theory and a strictly
empirical theory, can understand Heraclitus. But, it
may be asked, if knowledge does not come from with-
out through the senses, nor from within from the
nature of thought, whence does it come ? Heraclitus,
however, would not be disturbed by such a modern
dilemma. There is reason, in fact, to believe, though
it sounds strange to us, that he supposed this divine
rational essence to be inhaled in the air we breathe
(cp. Sextus Emp. adv. Math. vii. 127, 132). It exists
in that which surrounds us (nepteyov) , and the measure
of our rationality depends on the degree in which we
can possess ourselves of this divine flame. There was
no conciseness of thought here, however, and Heracli-
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 51
tus seemed to think that it was partly apprehended
through the senses, that is, the most perfect condition
of receptivity to truth was the condition in which a man
was most awake. The stupidest man is he who is
asleep, blind, self -involved, and we may add, self-
absorbed (cp. frags. 95, 90, 77, 3, 2, 94). Hence, if
we have rightly interpreted Heraclitus here, a man
might wrap himself in thought forever and be no
nearer to truth. The source of knowledge did not lie
in that direction to any pre-Socratic Greek philosopher.
AbsorptioD into one's inner self, which Pfleiderer thinks
was Heraclitus' source of absolute knowledge, was the
one thing he most despised.
Let us now consider the connection of Heraclitus
with the Greek Mysteries, which Pfleiderer makes the
basis of his interpretation of the whole philosophy.
Pfleiderer has done a good work in emphasizing the
religious character of the philosophy of the Ephesian.
Lassalle and Teichmuller had already pointed it out.
Failure to recognize this is the gravest fault in the
critical work of Zeller. But as in Lassalle we found
over-systemization of the logical idea, in Schuster of the
empirical, in Teichmuller of the physical, so in Pflei-
derer there is great over-systemization of the religi-
ous element. More strictly, it is a vast over-emphasis
of one thought, namely, the indestructibility of life, or
the alternating identity of life and death, which Pflei-
derer claims to be a religious truth taken from the
Mysteries, and out of which, as we have seen, he
spins the whole philosophy of Heraclitus, including
the doctrine of the eternal flux, the unity of opposites,
and the fire. The slight grounds on which all this is
based must have already impressed the reader with
surprise that Pfleiderer should make so much out
52 HERACLITUS.
of it. The fact that Heraclitus lived in Ephesus and
that Ephesus was a very religious city, is a fair speci-
men of the arguments by which he would establish a
connection with the Mysteries. There have been pre-
served only three fragments in which Heraclitus makes
any direct reference to the Greek Mysteries, all taken
from Clement of Alexandria (Protrept. 2, pp. 19, 30 ;
cp. frags. 124, 125, 127), and in these three passages
other critics have found no sympathy with, but stern
condemnation of the mystic cult. In the first passage
where the voxtctioXoc^ fidyoe, ftdx^oe, Xrjvac and juuazcu are
threatened with future fire, Pfleiderer admits con-
demnation of mystic abuses. But the third fragment,
relating to the Dionysiac orgies, is the one upon which
he most relies to establish the sympathy of our philo-
sopher with the Mysteries. The passage is as follows :
El fir] yap AiovuGw Tro/mrjv irrotsuvTO xac u/uvsov aa/ia
aidoiotoc, duaioiaraza eipyaaz av' wuto<z as ^AtdrjQ xac
Jtowffoz, orew [laivovrac xac XyvaiCoucrt. " For were it not
Dionysus to whom they institute a procession and
sing songs in honor of the pudenda, it would be the
most shameful action. But Dionysus, in whose honor
they rave in bacchic frenzy, and Hades, are the same."
Although this has usually been interpreted (by Schlei-
ermacher, Lassalle, and Schuster) to mean that the
excesses practiced in these ceremonies will be atoned for
hereafter, since Dionysus under whose name they are
carried on is identical with Pluto, the god of the lower
world, Pfleiderer, interpreting it in a wholly different
spirit, believes it to mean that these rites, although in
themselves considered they would be most shameful,
nevertheless have at least a partial justification from
the fact that they are celebrated in honor of Dionysus,
because since Dionysus and Pluto are the same, the
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 53
rites are really a symbolism expressing the power of
life over death and the indestructibility of life even
in death. These vile phallus songs are in fact songs
of triumph of life over death (Pfleiderer, p. 28).
Although somewhat far-fetched, this is a possible in-
terpretation of this obscure passage. This explanation
is perhaps not more strained than the others that have
been given (see below, frag. 127, crit. note). Granting
it. and granting that Heraclitus here expresses a cer-
tain sympathy with, or at least does not express
condemnation of the Mysteries, what follows ? Surely,
Pneiderer would not seriously ask us to conclude from
a single passage friendly to the religion of the Myste-
ries, that Heraclitus' whole philosophy or any part of
it was drawn from them.
But this fragment has another and more important
use for Pneiderer. In the religious truth here expressed
of the identity of Dionysus and Hades, that is, the
identity of life and death, he finds the germ of all
the Heraclitic philosophy. But the serious question
immediately arises whether the philosophy of oppo-
sites grew out of this identity, or whether this identity
was merely another illustration of the law of oppo-
sites. As Pneiderer has produced no sufficient reason
for believing differently, the natural conclusion is
that, as elsewhere we find the unity of day and night,
up and down, awake and asleep, so here we have the
unity of the god of death and the god of life, as another
illustration of the general law. To reverse this and
say that in this particular antithesis we have the
parent of all antitheses is very fanciful. Still further,
should infer from Pfleiderer's argument that the
identity of Dionysus and Hades was a well known and
ac-eepted truth' among the Mysteries, and that in the
54 HERACLITUS.
above fragment we find it in the very act of passing
into the philosophy of the Ephesian. How much truth
is there in this ? So little that there is no record of the
identity of these two gods before the time of Hera-
clitus. Later, to be sure, something of the kind ap-
pears. Dionysus represented at least five different
gods, and in different times and places seems to have
been identified with most of the principal deities. In
Crete and at Delphi we hear of Zagreus, the winter
Dionysus of the lower world. No doubt other instances
might be shown where Dionysus was brought into
some relation or other with a chthonian deity. But
Heraclitus, if he had wished to develop a philosophy
from the alternation of summer and winter and the
mystic symbolism of life and death therein contained,
would hardly have chosen so dubious an expression of
it as the unity of Dionysus and Hades. We have no
reason to regard this as anything else than one of the
many paradoxical statements which he loved, of his
law of opposites. Indeed, the genesis of this law is not
so obscure that we need to force it out of a hidden
mystic symbolism. Zeller in his introduction to Greek
philosophy has well said that " philosophy did not
need the myth of Kore and Demeter to make known
the alternation of natural conditions, the passage from
death to life and life to death ; daily observation taught
it" (Vol. 1, p. 60).
The intrinsic weakness of Pfleiderer's position is
best seen when he attempts to pass to the doctrine of
the flux. It taxes the imagination to see how the
identity of life and death should lead to the universal
principle iravza x co P et xai oudkv juevec. Pfleiderer would
have us believe that the eternal flux was a subordinate
thought — a mere picture to help the mind to conceive
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 55
the primary metaphysical truth of the unity of oppo-
sites. We have already attempted to show that any
explanation of the Heraclitic philosophy must be wrong
which reduces the doctrine of the flux to a subordinate
position. Here it is sufficient to add that if Heraclitus
had been seeking a picture to illustrate the optimistic
endurance of life even in death, and the rational unity
and harmony of opposite powers, he could not possibly
have chosen a more unfortunate figure than the ever-
flowing river into which one cannot step twice. Pflei-
derer, in saying that Heraclitus chose the picture of the
evanescence of things to illustrate his law of opposites
and the endurance of life, seems to have forgotten
that on a previous page (above, p. 602) he said that the
hopeless creed of the masses, against which the Ephe-
sian was trying to establish the triumph of life, saw
not too much permanence and constancy in the world,
but too little.
We are forced, therefore, to conclude not only that
Pfleiderer has failed to establish any especial depend-
ence of Heraclitus upon the religion of the Greek Mys-
teries, but also that his supposed discovery that we
have here a metaphysical philosophy developed from
the material principle of the oscillating identity of life
and death, is an assumption without basis in fact.
In redeeming the Ephesian from the charge of pessi-
mism, Pfleiderer has done a good work. But here
again he has gone too far, in finding not only a well
grounded rational optimism in the doctrine of a world-
ruling Order, but also a practical optimism in the idea
of the indestructibility of life, an idea which, although
it appears on every page of Pfleiderer 's book, is not to
be found in any saying of Heraclitus or in any record
of his philosophy.
5() HERACLITUS.
Section II. — Reconstructive.
I.
Having examined the four preceding fundamentally
different views of the philosophy of Heraclitus, and
having discovered that the opinions of modern critics
on the tenor of this philosophy furnish a new and un-
expected illustration of Heraclitus' own law of abso-
lute instability, it remains to be considered whether it
is possible to resolve, as he did, this general diversity
into a higher unity, and in this case to verify his law
that in all opposition there is harmony. If such a
unity is sought as that attempted by Lassalle, Schuster,
and Pfleiderer, it may be said at once that the task is
impossible. All such ambitious attempts in construc-
tive criticism in the case of Heraclitus are certain to
result, as we have seen, in over-interpretation, and
while they may leave a completed picture in the mind
of the reader, they do not leave a true one. Not only
is such a unified view of the philosophy of the Ephe-
sian unattainable, but it is unnecessary. It is quite'
certain that had we before us his original book in its
entirety, we should find therein no fully consistent
system of philosophy. Yet it is just this fact that
modern critics forget. While they point out errors
and contradictions by the score in the books of their
fellow critics, they allow for no inconsistencies on the
part of the original philosopher. Presuppositions of
harmony between all the sentences of an ancient
writer have led to much violence of interpretation.
Our interest in Heraclitus is not in his system as such,
but in his great thoughts which have historic signifi-
cance. These we should know, if possible, in their
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 57
original meaning and in their connection with preced-
ing and succeeding philosophy. Before concluding
this introduction, then, it will be of advantage to re-
capitulate the results of the foregoing criticism, and
to place together such conclusions concerning the chief
Heraclitic thoughts as we have draAvn either from the
agreement or the disagreement of the various critics.
We shall best understand Heraclitus if we fix well
in mind his immediate starting-point. As we found
above in the examination of Pfleiderer's position (p.
4: . the Ephesian philosopher was first and primarily
Si preacher. To him the people almost without excep-
tion, were blind, stupid, and beastly. Heraclitus
hated them. They got no farther than crude sense
perception (cp. frags. 4, 6, 3), failing not only to recog-
nize the invisible harmony of the changing world, but
even the change itself (cp. frag. 2). They believed
things were fixed because they appeared so at first
sight. They preferred the lower passions to the higher
senses (cp. frag. 111). He is from first to last a misan-
thrope. He despises the people, yet as if constrained
by a divine command, he must deliver his message (cp.
frags. 1,2). To understand Heraclitus we must free our
minds from conceptions of every other Greek philoso-
pher, except, perhaps, his fellow Ionians. Never after-
wards did philosophy exhibit such seriousness. "We
can no more imagine Heraclitus at Athens than we
can think of Socrates away from it. Although, as we
shall see, the philosophy of Plato stood in vital con-
nection with that of Heraclitus, no contrast could be
greater than the half playful speculative style of the
former, and the stern, oracular and dogmatic utter-
ances of the latter. yWe shall find no parallel except
in Jewish literature. Indeed, Heraclitus was a pro-
58 HERACLITUS.
phet. As the prophets of Israel hurled their messages
in actual defiance at the people, hardly more does the
Ephesian seem to care how his words are received, if
only he gets them spoken. Not more bitter and mis-
anthropic is Hosea in his denunciation of the people's
sins (cp. ch. iv. 1, 2 ff.), than is our philosopher in his
contempt for the stupidity and dullness of the masses.
At the very opening of his book he says, from his lofty
position of conscious superiority : " This- Law which I
unfold, men insensible and half asleep will not hear,
and hearing, will not comprehend" (frag. 2 ; cp. frags.
3, 5, 94, 95).
Now what was the prime error of the people which
so aroused the Ephesian, and what was the message
which he had to deliver to them ? Zeller is wrong in
saying (Vol. 1, p. 576) that, according to Heraclitus, the
radical error of the people was in attributing to things
a permanence of being which they did not possess. In
no passage does he censure the people for this. What
he blames them for is their insensibility, for looking
low when they ought to look high — in a word, for
blindness to the Divine Law or the Universal Reason
(frags. 2, 3, 4, 51, 45, 14). He blames them for
not recognizing the beauty of strife (frag. 43), and
the law of opposites (frag. 45). He blames them
for their grossness and beastliness (frags. 86, 111).
Finally, he blames them for their immorality (frag.
124), their silliness in praying to idols (frag. 126),
and their imbecility in thinking they could purify
themselves by sacrifices of blood (frag. 130). We
see therefore how wholly impossible it is to under-
stand Heraclitus unless we consider the ethical and
religious character of his mind. Thus Zeller, in as far
as he has attempted to give us a picture of Heraclitus'
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 59
system, has failed by starting with the doctrine of the
flux and overlooking the religious motive. This is not
to say, as Pfleiderer has done, that the flux was
merely a negative teaching. Next to the recognition
of the Eternal Law, it was the most positive of his
teachings, and was the ground of his influence upon
subsequent thought. As such it is of chief interest to
us : but as far as we wish to get a picture of Heraclitus
himself, we must think first of his religious and ethical
point of departure. Thus the content of Heraclitus'
message to his countrymen was ethical. It was a
call to men everywhere to ivake up, to purify their
pappdpouz ^'r/v.z, and see things in their reality.
What now was this reality which he with his finer
insight saw, but which ruder souls were blind to ?
This brings us to the theoretical side or the philo-
sophical content of Heraclitus' message. Here comes
in the contribution of Teichmuller, who, as we saw,.
clearly pointed out that the great new thought of the
Ephesian was the unity in the manifold, as opposed to
the unity over against the manifold', taught by
Xenophanes. It was the unity of opposition, the
harmony of strife. It was Order immanent in cease-
less change. To use a phrase of Campbell's, " The
Idea of the universe implies at once absolute activity
and perfect law" (Plat. Theaet. Appendix, p. 244). This
was the central thought of Heraclitus, k ' the grandeur
of which,*' says Campbell, "was far beyond the com-
prehension of that time." But, it may be said, if we
have rightly apprehended Heraclitus' position as a
prophet and preacher, this was rather strong meat to
feed the masses. But the noXkoi with Heraclitus was a
broad term. It included everybody. The arro-
gance of this man was sublime. Neither Homer nor
60 HERACLITUS.
Hesiod nor Pythagoras nor Xenophanes escaped his
lash (cp. frags. 16, 17, 119, 114). He had especially
in mind the so-called "men of repute," and said they
were makers and witnesses of lies (cp. frag. 118). The
whole male population of Ephesus, he said, ought to
be hung or expelled on account of their infatuation
and blindness (cp. frag. 114). Addressing such an
audience, indeed, his message had to be pitched high.
We have in the Ephesian sage a man who openly
claimed to have an insight superior to all the world,
and the history of thought has vindicated his claim.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that Heraclitus
did, in a measure, try to make the world-ruling Law
intelligible. He pictured it now as Justice, whose
handmaids, the Erinyes, will not let the sun overstep
his bounds (frag. 29) ; now as Fate, or the all-determin-
ing Destiny (Stobaeus, Eel. i. 5, p. 178 ; cp. frag. 63) ;
now as simple Law (frags. 23, 91), now as Wisdom
(frag. 65), intelligent Will (frag. 19), God (frag. 36),
Zeus (frag. 65). Respecting the latter term he ex-
pressly adds that it is misleading. So we see that
Heraclitus did what some modern philosophers have
been blamed for doing — he put his new thoughts into
old religious formulas. But it was more justifiable in
the case of the Ephesian. He did so, not to present a
semblance of orthodoxy, but to try to make his idea
intelligible. In fact, Heraclitus, no less than Xeno-
phanes, was a fearless, outspoken enemy of the popular
anthropomorphisms. " This world, the same for all,"
he says, " neither any of the gods nor any man has
made, but it always was, and is, and shall be, an ever
living fire, kindled and quenched according to law"
(frag. 20; cp. frag. 126).
At this point it is natural to ask ourselves what,
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 61
more exactly considered, Heraclitus meant by his Uni-
versal Order, his Divine Law. xor^b; Aoyoz, etc. This
inquiry fair criticism will probably not allow us to
answer more concisely than has already been done.
We have found ample reason for rejecting the notion
that it was of a logical nature, or any objectification of
that which is inherent in human thought. Yet it was
not without human attributes. As fiery essence, it
was identified with the universe and became almost
material. As Order, it approached the idea of pure
mathematical Relation or Form (cp, frag. 23, and Zel-
ler, Vol. 1, p. 628, 3, and 620). As Wisdom, it was pic-
tured as the intelligent power or efficient force that
produces the Order. When we reflect what difficulty
even at the present day we find in answering the
simple question, What is Order ? we are less surprised
to find that the Ephesian philosopher did not always
distinguish it from less difficult conceptions. We are,
however, surprised and startled at the significance of
the thought which this early Greek so nearly formu-
lated, that the one permanent, abiding element in a
universe of ceaseless change is mathematical relation.
At any rate, while recognizing the want of perfect
consistency and coordination in Heraclitus' system
here, we shall be helped by keeping this in mind, that
the system was pure pantheism. Too much stress can-
not be laid upon Teichmuller's exposition of the history
of the idea of Transcendent Reason, which first arose,
not in Heraclitus, but in Anaxagoras. To the latter
belongs the credit or the blame, whichever it may be,
of taking the first step towards the doctrine of imma-
teriality or pure spirit, which has influenced not only
philosophy, but society to its foundations even to
the present day. Heraclitus was guiltless of it. To
62 HERACLITUS.
him the world intelligence itself was a part of the world
material — itself took part in the universal change.
In close connection with the Heraclitic Universal
Order stands the doctrine of strife as the method of
the evolution of the world, and the doctrine of the har-
mony and ultimately the unity of opposites — thoughts
which were not only central in Heraclitus' system,
but which, being too advanced for his time, have
waited to be taken up in no small degree by modern
science. It is unnecessary to repeat here the explana-
tions of Schuster (above, pp. 15, 16), and particularly
of Teichrnuller (above, p. 27), which we found to indi-
cate the correct interpretation of these thoughts. These
principles are to Heraclitus the mediation between
absolute change and perfect law. That which appears
to the senses as rest and stability is merely the tempo-
rary equilibrium of opposite striving forces. It is har-
mony by tension (cp. frags. 45, 43, 46). This law,
elementary in modern physics, is yet, as we shall pres-
ently see, not the whole content of the Heraclitic
thought, although it is its chief import. But in the
equilibrium of opposite forces we have at least relative
rest, not motion. And of molecular motion Heraclitus
knew nothing. How then did he conceive of apparent
stability as absolute motion ? This question supposes
more exactness of thought than we look for in the
Ephesian. The eternal flux was more generally con-
ceived as absolute perishability. Nothing is perma-
nently fixed. All is involved in the ceaseless round of
life and death, growth and decay. Strictly, however,
there is no contradiction here, since the rest of balanced
forces is only relative rest. It is possibly not going
too far to accept an illustration given by Ernst Laas
(Idealismus u. Positivismus 1, p. 200) of Heraclitus'
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 63
conception of absolute change under the dominion of
law. He compares it to the actual path of our planets,
which move neither in circles nor in exact ellipses, but
under the influence of the attractive forces of moons
and of other planets, or of comets, continually change
both their course and their velocity, and yet all accord-
ing to law.
In addition to the explanations now given, how-
ever, there is something more to be said concerning
the unity or sameness of opposites. This teaching is
very prominent in the Heraclitic fragments (cp. frags.
35, 36, 39, 43, 45, 46, 52, 57, 58, 59, 67, 78). This
prominence was no doubt less in the original work, as
the paradoxical character of these sayings has encour-
aged their preservation. But all the critics have failed
to notice that we have in these fragments two distinct
classes of oppositions which, though confused in Hera-
clitus' mind, led historically into different paths of
development. The first is that unity of opposites
which results from the fact that they are endlessly
passing into one another. It must not be forgotten
that this is a purely physical opposition, as has been
pointed out by Zeller, Schuster and others, in refuta-
tion of the opinion of Lassalle, who fancied that he
had found here a Hegelian logical identity of contra-
dictories. As examples of this class of oppositions
may be mentioned the identity of day and night (frag.
35), gods and men (frag. 67), alive and dead, asleep and
awake (frag. 78). The identity of these oppositions
means that they are not in themselves abiding condi-
tions, but are continually and reciprocally passing
into one another. As Heraclitus plainly says, they are
the same because they are reciprocal transmutations
of each other (frag. 78;. But now we have another
64 HERACLITUS.
class of opposites to which this reasoning will not
apply. "Good and evil," he says, "are the same"
(frag. 57). This is simply that identity of opposites
which developed into the Protagorean doctrine of
relativity. The same thing may be good or evil
according to the side from which you look at it. The
passage from Hippolytus (Kef. haer. ix. 10 ; cp. frag.
52, sources) states the doctrine of relativity as plainly
as it can be stated. ' • Pure and impure, he [Heraclitus]
says, are one and the same, and drinkable and undrink-
able are one and the same. • Sea water,' he says, ' is
very pure and very foul, for while to fishes it is drink-
able and healthful, to men it is hurtful and unfit to
drink.' " (Compare the opposition of just and unjust,
frag. 61 ; young and old, frag. 78 ; beauty and ugli-
ness, frag. 99 ; cp. frags. 104, 98, 60, 61, 51, 53.) This
simple truth is so prominent in the Heraclitic sayings
that we see how Schuster could have mistaken it for
the whole content of the theory of opposites and ig-
nored the more important doctrine of the other class.
We see further that Plato's incorrect supposition that
the Protagorean subjectivism was wholly an outgrowth
of the Heraclitic flux, resulted from his insufficient
acquaintance with the Ephesian's own writings. It
was a characteristic of Heraclitus that, in a degree
surpassing any other philosopher of antiquity, and
comparable only to the discoveries of Greek mathema-
ticians and of modern physical philosophers, he had an
insight into truths beyond his contemporaries, but he
knew not how to coordinate or use them. Having hit
upon certain paradoxical relations of opposites, he
hastened to group under his new law all sorts of oppo-
sitions. Some that cannot be included under either of
the above classes appear in a passage from Aristotle
RECONSTRUCTIVE. G5
(de Mundo, 5, p. 396 b 12 : cp. frag'. 59, sources ; cp.
Eth. End. vii. l. p. 1-235 a 26 : frag. 43), where in the
case of the opposites sharps and flats, male and female,
the opposition becomes simple correlation and the
unity, harmony.
The order of treatment brings us now to the Hera-
clitic flux, but we have been compelled so far to anti-
cipate this in discussing the Universal Order and the
Law of Opposites that but one or two points need be
considered here. As we have seen in the study of
Schuster and Teichmtiller, the Heraclitic doctrine of
the flux was a thoroughly radical one. Heaven and
earth and all that they contain were caught in its fatal
whirlpool. It exempted no immortal gods of the poets
above us, no unchangeable realm of Platonic ideas
around us, no fixed Aristotelian earth beneath us.
It banished all permanence from the universe, and
banished therewith all those last supports which men
are accustomed to cling to. It introduced alarm into
philosophy, and set men, even to the present day,
asking. What can be saved from this general wreck ?
What is there absolutely permanent in the universe ?
This question, as we have seen, did not trouble Hera-
clitus himself, for, consistently or inconsistently, he
had a foundation rock in his Universal Law, Reason
or Order, which was his theoretical starting-point.
Furthermore, concerning the flux, it is doubtful
whether he ever pictured to himself such absolute
instability as his words imply.
But we are tempted to ask, Is his system here
really, as it first appears, inconsistent ? Mr. Borden
P. Bowne in his Metaphysics (p. 89) says that the
Heraclitic theory of change thus extremely conceived
" is intelligible and possible only because it is false."
66 HEKACLITUS.
Let us look at Mr. Bowne's argument. He has first
shown in the same chapter that the Eleatic conception
of rigid being without change is impossible, since in a
world of absolute fixity, even the illusion of change
would be impossible. Furthermore, he has shown that
the vulgar conception of changeless being with
changing states is untenable, since the " state of a
thing expresses what the thing is at the time."
Changing states would be uncaused and undetermined
except as the being changes. There can be therefore
no fixed useless core of being. In general there is no
changeless being. All is change, all is becoming. Is
there then, he asks, any permanence or identity what-
ever, or is the extreme Heraclitic position true ? It is
false. Why? Because, as in a world of Eleatic
fixity, even the illusion of change would be impos-
sible, so in a world of absolute change, even the appear-
ance of rest would be impossible. There must be some
abiding factor, that change may be known as change.
There must be something permanent somewhere to
make the notion of flow possible. This permanent
something Mr. Bowne finds in the knowing subject —
the conscious self. Having proceeded plainly up to
this point, here he becomes mystical. The permanence
of the conscious self, he continues, does not consist in
any permanent substance of the soul. The soul forever
changes equally with other being. The permanence
consists in memory or self -consciousness. "How this
is possible," he says, " there is no telling." The per-
manence and identity of the soul consists, however,
only in its ability " to gather up its past and carry it
with it."
In this argument, Mr. Bowne's first fallacy is in
saying that in a world of absolute change there mast
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 67
be some permanent factor in order that the change
itself may be known. This is meaningless. Perma-
nent as regards what ? Permanence as regards other
moving factors is simply relative difference of change.
Mr. Bowne seems to have committed the primitive
error of supposing that because all things seem to
move, he alone is fixed — like the earth in the Ptole-
maic astronomy. According to his argument, if he
were in a moving car and should meet another moving
car, the perception of movement would be impossible.
His reasoning assumes that by absolute change is
meant uniform change all in one way, which would
not be change at all, but absolute fixity. Difference
is the essential element in change, and difference is
all that is necessary to the idea of change. The
assumption of permanent personality in order to make
change itself possible is unnecessary. Mr. Bowne says
that what constitutes permanence in the conscious
self is its ability to gather up its past and carry it with
it. But a stratifying rock or growing tree gathers
up its past and carries it with it. But the apparent
permanence in the case of the rock or tree is a tempo-
rarily abiding form or temporarily abiding spacial
relations. The apparent permanence of personality
may similarly consist wholly in a temporarily abiding
form or relation, must in fact consist in this, since
Mr. Bowne rejects any abiding soul substance. But
temporarily abiding relations, the extreme Heracli-
teans do not deny, certainly not Heraclitus, to whom
apparent rest was due to the temporary equilibrium
of opposite balancing forces. We conclude, therefore,
that Mr. Bowne's charge of falsity against the theory
of the Heraclitic flux is not well substantiated. Here
as ever we see the difference between modern and
68 HERACLITUS.
ancient philosophy. The former looks within, the
latter without. Mr. Bowne seeks the abiding within
himself. Heraclitus looked away from himself to the
Universal Order without, which determined all things
and himself.
But though the Heraclitic absolute flux is vindicated
from objections of the above character, the question
still remains unanswered whether the doctrine is con-
sistent with his conception of absolute Order. Did
not Heraclitus make the common mistake of hyposta-
sizing law ? Did he not conceive of law as something
by which the action of things is predetermined, rather
than as a mere abstraction from the action of things ?
No doubt he did even worse than this, for he ascribed
to his xocvoq Xoyoc;, attributes which led Bernays and
Teichmiiller to believe that it was a self-conscious
being, (a conclusion questioned by Zeller, Vol. 1, p.
609, 3). But yet again he saved his consistency here
by identifying his Absolute with fire and thereby
bringing it after all into the all-consuming vortex of
endless change. But in the face of this all-embracing
flux, the one idea which stands out most prominent in
Heraclitus is the deep rationality of the world — the
eternal Order. Nor in the last analysis are these two
at variance, for any world must be rational to the
beings in it, for the rationality of the world to us is
only our adaptation to the world, which is involved in
the very fact of our existence.
Concerning the cosmogony, it is worth while to re-
call the suggestive thought contained in the ipqa p.0Gbvrj
and xopoc; of Heraclitus. In our examination of Schus-
ter's work we found reason to believe that the word
Ip-qofioabv-q, which we may render " craving" or " long-
ing," was used by the Ephesian to denote the charac-
RECONSTRUCTIVE. GO
ter of the impulse or motive force by which the primi-
tive world matter or fire evolved itself into the world
of individual things. The records are too meagre to
warrant much enlargement upon this idea ; neverthe-
less it is important historically and in itself interesting.
It is the beginning of that line of thought which finds
the analogy to the original motive or creative power of
the universe, not in man's intellectual but in his emo-
tional nature, not in pure thought but in pure desire.
It is opposed to the conception of Aristotle that the
absolute first mover is pure intellect, the thought of
thought (^or^acz w/jcrsco:), and to the modern German
enlargement of the same which began with the intel-
lectual monads of Leibniz. On the other hand, it is
in agreement with the idea brought out by Plato in
his Symposium, the idea of Love as the source of devel-
opment and immortality, and it reminds us later of
Plotinus, who refuses to predicate thought or reason of
the One but identifies it with the Good. The Hera-
clitic-Platonic notion is no less anthropomorphic than
the Aristotelian-Leibnizian ; but if the human mind
must furnish forth some faculty to be singly hyposta-
sized into God, we much prefer the richer emotional
side to that of pure dry intellect or reason.
We come now to the Heraclitic ethics, the freshest
and most vital part of his philosophy, but most misun-
derstood by all the critics. The practical ethical rule
with Heraclitus is to follow the law of the state,
which again is dependent upon the Divine Law (frags.
91, 100). From his standpoint this agrees with his in-
junction to live according to Nature (frag. 107). More
broadly stated, men should follow the Universal as
opposed to individual whims. " The Law of Eeason
is common, but the majority of people live as though
70 HERACLITUS.
they had an understanding of their own " (frag. 92).
This leads us directly to the theoretical ethical prin-
ciple which lay at the root of all Heraclitus' philosophy,
and which we have outlined above (p. 58) in defining
his starting point as that of a preacher and prophet.
The highest good was not contentment (evapioTTjocs), a
statement taken from a single indefinite passage in
Clement of Alexandria (Strom, ii. 21, p. 417 ; Clement
is followed by Theodoretus, iv. p. 984, ed. Halle), and
which, though adopted by Zeller, is as silly and impos-
sible as the better authenticated statement that Hera-
clitus wept over everything. Such an ethical principle
is at variance with every sentence of the Ephesian.
He continually exhorts men, as we have seen, to arise,
get out of their lethargy and wake up. His most
pungent sarcasm is directed against the people who
are in a state of indifference, sleepiness, contentment
(frags. 2, 3, 5, 94, 95, etc.). The highest good with Hera-
clitus, therefore, is the greatest intellectually activity,
the greatest receptivity to the divine reason around
us, the greatest freedom from individual peculiarities
and the greatest possession of that which is universal.
" Human nature," he says, " does not possess under-
standing, but the divine does " (frag. 96). We must
look away from ourselves to Nature around us. We
must follow the universal Reason therein expressed.
Proximately for men this is best found in the common,
the normal, the customary, finally therefore in public
law.
It will thus be noticed that we have in Heraclitus
an emphatic expression of the type of ethics peculiar
to the Greeks. Of the individual he thought little.
" To me one is ten thousand if he be the best " (frag.
113). He blamed the Ephesians for their declaration
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 71
of democracy (frag. 114). He would not have been
able to appreciate those modern systems of ethics
which make a moral law out of individual conscience
and justify actions by good intentions. Heraclitus, as
well as psychologists of recent times, seemed to appre-
ciate the dangers of self -in volution. His whole sys-
tem is a protest against individual intensification. He
will not have men roll themselves into a cocoon of a
single system, or revolve in the circle of a single set of
ideas. He will have them throw themselves open to
the common light, keep every sense open and recep-
tive to new impressions, and thereby attain truth,
which is found in the universal alone.
The optimism which Pfleiderer justifies for Hera-
clitus does not stand in contradiction to the misan-
thropy that we have found to characterize him. His
optimism was thoroughly Leibnizian. It was reasoned
optimism, resulting in the strong conviction that the
world is good, rational and orderly. Most men, to be
sure, are fools, but it is their own fault, as they will
not put themselves in right relation to the world.
Gottlob Mayer, in a pamphlet entitled " Heraklit von
Ephesus und Arthur Schopenhauer," has been at pains
to prove that Heraclitus is a Schopenhauer pessimist.
TVe cannot regard his attempt as successful. Our
study of the Ephesian philosopher in the preceding
pages has shown nothing more clearly than that the
logical result of his metaphysics is not, as this author
claims, pessimism, but quite the opposite. None of the
iges which he cites (cp. frags. 86, 55, 81, GG, 20,
111; can be made to yield any pessimism beyond mis-
anthropy, unless possibly the one from Lucian (Vit.
Auct. c. I4t 9 -—QNHTH2. ti yao b acwv iarcu; HPA-
KAEITOE. ~a~.z nacrous, Tteaaeuwv, dea(pepo/j£vo<;, cp. frag.
72 HERACLITUS.
79), where Time is compared to a child at play, now
arranging, now scattering the pebbles. And yet noth-
ing is conclusive from this. It refers evidently to
the periodic creation and destruction of the world.
Whether this world building is a pastime of Jove, or
the product of fate or of love, makes no difference in
this case, provided only the resulting world is one well
disposed and rational.
II.
What has given rise to the reviving interest in Hera-
clitus attested by the monographs which have lately
appeared ? The modern world hardly hopes to get any
new light from his oracular sayings gathered in muti-
lated fragments from Philo and Plutarch, from Cle-
ment and Origen. Such unhoped for light, however,
as our introductory study has shown, may for some
minds be found breaking in after all. But the interest
in the philosopher of Ephesus is historical. The new
discovery of the present half century is that the way
to study philosophy is to study its history, and especi-
ally its genesis. The passion for origins has carried
the interest back to Greek philosophy, and finally back
to the beginnings of Greek philosophy. But there is
still another reason for going back. In the confusion
arising from the fall of the idealistic philosophy in
Germany, it was first thought that it would be neces-
sary to return to Kant and secure a new footing ; not
that any new light was seen emanating from Kant,
but error having arisen, it was necessary to trace it to
its source.
This movement has neither been successful nor does
it promise to be. In fact, there is a certain weariness
in philosophy of the whole modern subjective method.
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 73
The result has been that thinkers have turned away
from it to the one objective side of modern philosophy,
namely, the sciences. Those, however, who still retain
their love of philosophy in its larger sense, are going
back farther than Kant. They see that the whole
Hume-Kantian-Fichtean movement was a digression,
a sort of branch road, which to be sure had to be
explored before philosophy could go on in safety, but
which was found to lead nowhere in particular, and
that, having thanked these investigators for their ser-
vices rendered, we may decline to concern ourselves
further with this digression, but go on with our search
for objective results. In this search our starting point
must be from that philosophy which is most free
from this whole subjective tendency. Such is the
philosophy of Greece. Considering therefore that the
introspective method has not proved so fruitful as
was hoped, and that it is at least more modest if not
more rational to regard man as a part of Nature, rather
than Nature as a part of man, students of philosophy
are turning their attention to the Greek philosophers
where the freer and more ingenuous conception rules.
These two causes, therefore, the former, the passion
for studying the origin and development of thought and
the connection of different systems of thought, the
latter, the need of disinfecting our minds from all the
germs of a pathological introspective habit, and putting
ourselves as an experiment in the position of those
who took it for granted that Nature was larger than
man, have led us back to Greek philosophy and
especially to its sources.
In either of these aspects Heraclitus is important.
He is a perfect, by all means the most perfect, illustra-
tion of those qualities which are usually supposed to
74 HERACLITUS.
characterize the Greek mind, namely, receptivity, un-
prejudiced freedom of thought, love of order, and trust-
ful confidence in the unity of man and Nature. Of all
the Greek schools these qualities were best represented
by the Ionian thinkers who, coming before what has
been called " the fall of man in Socrates," were free
from the later dialectical disturbances. And of the
Ionians, Heraclitus, the last, best incorporates them.
But it is in the other aspect that the philosopher of
Ephesus is most important, namely, in the origin and
history of ideas. Let us notice summarily what has
come from him.
To Heraclitus we trace the philosophy of change,
prominent in subsequent Greek philosophy as yc(vbp.&jov,
the indirect cause of the counter movement of Socrates
and Plato with its powerful determining influences,
central in modern times as motion in the philosophy
of Hobbes and the ground principle in the important
system of Trendelenburg, and finally in a logical trans-
formation, prominent in both German and English
thought as Werden or Becoming. To Heraclitus we
trace the notion of Relativity, the central point in the
doctrine of the Sophists, which by withdrawing every
absolute standard of truth, threatened to destroy all
knowledge and all faith, and which sent Socrates
searching for something permanent and fixed in the
concepts of the human mind, and so led to the finished
results of Plato and Aristotle. To Heraclitus we trace
some of the fundamental doctrines of the Stoics,
namely, their abrogation of the antithesis of mind and
matter and their return to pre-Socratic monism, their
conception of Nature as larger than man and his com-
plete subjection to it, and finally their doctrine of the
future conflagration of the world, later an influential
factor in Christianity.
KECOXSTRUCTIVE. 75
These were the thoughts which were most important
in their determining influence upon subsequent philo-
sophy. The following, while in themselves no less im-
portant, were less directly involved in the history of
opinion. Of these the first is the notion of Law and
Order absolute and immanent in the world, an idea so
large that no Greek follower could grasp it, and yet
vital to Heraclitus' system, for without it his philo-
sophy becomes the philosophy of desperation, the source
among the ingenuous Greeks of the nihilism of Gor-
gias or the universal doubt of the skeptics, and among
the brooding moderns the source of the pessimism of
Schopenhauer. To Heraclitus again we trace, as
Teichmiiller has shown, the closely related doctrine of
the immanence of God in the world, so that we have in
him one source of the pantheistic systems. To Hera-
clitus, finally, we trace the physical law of opposites,
the thought that all order and harmony and apparent
permanence are the result of opposite tension, the bal-
ance of centrifugal and centripetal forces. Less in-
volved in the history of philosophy, though most im-
portant to Heraclitus, and in themselves most interest-
ing to us of modern times, are his great ethical thoughts
which we have already outlined.
The determinative ideas of the Ephesian may be
summed up in a word by saying that they represent
all that way of thinking against which Socrates and
Plato raised the whole weight of their authority.
Without repeating here the facts, well enough known
to everybody, of the Socratic reaction in Greek philo-
sophy, we must sketch one or two phases of it in order
to establish the influence and explain the final defeat
of the Heraclitic philosophy. In Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle, philosophy underwent a change more radical
76 HERACLITUS.
than any other in its history, a change that was ulti-
mately to revolutionize all thought, and through its
influence on Christian theology, to enter as a large
determining element into all western civilization.
Heraclitus is the representative of what philosophy
was before that change.
Socrates said he could not understand the book of
Heraclitus. That was not strange. The Ephesian
could have told him the reason why. The man who
could learn nothing from the fields and trees (see
Plato's Phaedrus, p. 230), who spent all his time in
the Agora conversing with other men about virtue,
and who never seemed to realize that there was a
world above the heads and under the feet of men,
was not likely to understand the book of Heraclitus.
Could the Ephesian philosopher have taken the Atheni-
an logician out and given him a few lessons from Nature
at first hand, could he have induced him to desist for a
while from his boring into human intellects in search
of a definition, and got his gaze lifted up to the clouds
and stars, and put him in actual contact with the
nepesyov, he would have been an apter scholar with the
book. But it is quite impossible even in fancy to
think of these two men together. The communer
with Nature, the stern misanthropic sage and prophet
of Ephesus had no points in common with the society-
loving Athenian sophist. They were radically differ-
ent, and on this difference hangs the secret of the
development of philosophy for two thousand years.
Socrates was not a Greek at all. He denied the most
characteristic traits of his nation. He was a modern
in many true senses. He was a curiosity at Athens,
and consequently very much in vogue.
Socrates represents the birth of self -consciousness. In
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 77
practicing his maieutic art to this end, he little thought
that he was giving the death-blow to the most beauti-
ful trait of his countrymen, namely, the instinctive,
the unconscious, the naive. No doubt this new birth
had to take place some time, but under Socrates'
direction it was premature. The old methods were
not yet dead. Here historians of philosophy err. They
say the pre-Socratic philosophers of Nature had in vain
tried to solve the problems of the world, and it was high
time for a critical philosophy that should begin- with
man. In vain, indeed ! Had the naturalists labored in
vain when the foundation of the atomic philosophy had
been laid in Abdera, that of mathematics in Italy, and
a far-seeing metaphysics and ethics in Ephesus ? Soc-
rates and Plato took fright too easily at the Sophists.
Their philosophy would have died with them. Not so
that of Democritus, Pythagoras, and Heraclitus. Soc-
rates was a professor of clear thinking. Clear thinking
is in itself well, but two solid centuries of clear think-
ing from Descartes to Hegel have in modern times
ended in failure. We long to know what natural
thinking would have accomplished if it had been left
an open field a while longer in Greece. Then again
clear thinking was overdone. It was, to be sure, not
Socrates' fault that his method was afterwards abused,
but as a matter oi fact it took in later history a patho-
logical turn that has resulted in wide-spread evils.
Over self-consciousness, too much inwardness and
painful self-inspection, absence of trust in our instincts
and of the healthful study of Nature, which in ethics
are illustrated in modern questions of casuistry, and
in philosophy in Cartesian doubt and the skepticism of
Hume, characterize our worst faults. The philosophy
and ethics of Heraclitus, as we have seen, stood in
vital opposition to all these traits.
78 HERACLITUS.
But there was another respect in which the fall of
man took place in Socrates. The love of beauty and
form, and particularly beauty of the human body,
characterized all the Greeks until Socrates, but char-
acterizes modern people in a relatively small degree.
Socrates cared nothing for outward beauty, but to the
surprise of his fellow-citizens laid all the emphasis
upon moral beauty. (We will say he was too large
hearted to have had a personal motive for so doing.)
It may be that the Greeks estimated physical beauty
relatively too high, but the rebound has been too
great. Caught up by the genius of Plato and inten-
sified by the tenor of his philosophy, and met six
centuries later in Alexandria by a powerful current
of the same tendency from Judea, it effected the com-
plete destruction of the Greek idea, and with it of
course of Greek art. In the medieval church, inherited
moral deformity was a sin of such extreme import,
that for it a man was to be forever damned ; but inher-
ited physical deformity was not only not a sin, but
often a blessing, teaching him as it did the relative
worthlessness of the earthly life and body. So far was
the Greek idea reversed that the body, instead of being
the type of beauty, became the type of impurity, and
from being the support of the soul, became its con-
taminator. The " flesh," indeed, was the symbol of
evil. The results in modern life are only too well
known. Among them may be mentioned the loss of
appreciation of the worth of the present physical life
in itself, failure to recognize the close connection of
soul and body, and that the health of the former
depends on the health of the latter, resulting in all the
strange devices to secure the welfare of the soul in the
face of persistent disregard of the laws of physical
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 79
health, or in such attempts as that of sustaining the
moral status of a community where all hygienic laws
are violated. This idea has been ground into the
popular mind by so long education that modern
educators find it a serious problem how to correct it.
It is not merely physical education that is wanted, but
a reconstruction of our notions about the relation of
body and mind. The Socratic work must be in part
undone, and we must get back more nearly to the pre-
Socratic conception of balance, for to them physical
ugliness was no less an evil than moral ugliness.
But there is still another aspect of the Socratic
apostasy, as important as those we have mentioned, and
so far-reaching in its effects that it determines modern
thought even to the lowest ranks of society. In this
movement begun by Socrates, but perfected by Plato
and Aristotle, the central thought of the Heraclitic phi-
losophy was denied, and denied with such power that
now after twenty-two hundred years it hardly dares
assert itself. We refer, of course, to the Platonic tran-
scendentalism. It was designed to give the death-blow
to Heraclitus, and it succeeded ultimately beyond the
wildest hopes of its founders. Strictly it was begun by
Anaxagoras. We have already seen with Teichmuller
how the doctrine of transcendent reason gained its first
characteristic, Pure Separation, in the Nous of Anax-
agoras, its second, Identity, in the definitive work of
Socrates. But it was Plato who elevated it into a
great system and gave it to the world for a perpetual
inheritance. Finally, Aristotle, as if the fates con-
spired to make this doctrine immortal, took it up and
adapted it to unpoetical inductive minds. Heraclitus
in a wonderful conception of the world had abolished
every antithesis and enunciated a system of pure
80 HERACLITUS.
monism. The Socratic school reversed his plan and set
up a dualism of universal and particular, noumenon and
phenomenon, mind and body, spirit and matter, which
has dominated all philosophy, religion and literature.
It is with the origin of this dualism that we are
concerned, not with the familiar history of its out-
come, but yet we may recall what to the student of
philosophy or even of history it is needless to more
than mention, how this dualism fastened itself upon
subsequent thought ; how as realism and nominalism
it divided the schoolmen ; how as mind and matter it
left Descartes in hopeless difficulty ; how Spinoza
founded a philosophy expressly to resolve it, but suc-
ceeded only by the artifice of terms ; how Leibnitz
solved the problem, though with too much violence, by
use of the same boldness with which its founders
established it ; how Kant finally left the antithesis
unexplained ; how again as the material and imma-
terial it fixed itself in the psychology of Aristotle, who
affirmed as the higher part of the human mind, the
active Nous or principle of pure immateriality, cogniz-
ant of the highest things, identical with the divine
Prime Mover, and immortal, thus constituting for
man the highest glorification that he ever received
from his own hand ; how Thomas Aquinas, spokesman
for a powerful church, adopted this psychology and fast-
ened it upon the modern popular world ; how finally,
in the sphere of religion proper, the transcendent-
alism of Plato has grown into the belief in pure Spirit
and spiritual existences, peopling heaven and earth,
and holding communion with matter and body, though
having absolutely nothing in common (if the paradox
may be excused) with them. Such has been in part
the wonderful expansion of the Platonic Idealism.
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 81
And what was all this for in the first place ? It was
raised primarily as a barrier against the dissolving
power of the eternal flux of the Heracliteans. A philo-
sophy had arisen in Greece that denied all perma-
nence. Misunderstood by the Sophists and abused by
Cratylus, it called out the protest of Socrates, at heart
the sincerest man of his contemporaries. Man, im-
pelled by that very faculty which connects him most
closely with Nature, namely, the sense of dependence,
demands something permanent and unchangeable,
upon which he can base his laws, religion and philo-
sophy. If he cannot find it in Nature or in Revelation,
he will make it out of a part of himself. This is what
Socrates and Plato did. Socrates, seeking the perma-
nent for ethical motives, detesting Nature and failing
to find there anything fixed and abiding, turned to
man and man's manner of thinking. By analysis of
thought he separated out general concepts which ap-
peared to be the same for all. Plato, perhaps less in
earnest than subsequent ages gave him credit for,
hypostasized them, raised them into real objective
existences, henceforth to become idols, convenient
entities to fill all gaps in human reasoning, objects of
the dreams of poets and the worship of the religious,
archetypes from which a lazy philosophy could deduce
the universe. How, we naturally ask, could this auda-
cious piece of anthropomorphism, in which man delib-
erately took his own norms of thought, projected them
outward, and elevated them into gods, impose itself
upon the world as it did ? There are two answers.
First, it flattered men immensely, and like all anthro-
pomorphisms, thereby won half the battle. Second, it
did not succeed at once, but slumbered for four centu-
ries, and finally, in the decadence of all systems of
82 HERACLITUS.
philosophy and the breaking up of the old civilization,
awakened to supply the groundwork of a religious
revival. Platonism fell dead on the Greek world.
Plato, and Aristotle as well, shot over the heads of
their fellows. The philosophy of the Academy was a
brilliant piece of speculation such as only the age of
Pericles could call out. After that, philosophy fell
back into the old ways. The Older Academy dragged
out a short existence and "died. Zeno, a Cypriote, but
in his desire for unity more Greek than Plato, studied
first with Polemo, head of the Academy, but disap-
pointed with Platonism, turned back to Heraclitus.
His school, as well as the Epicureans and Skeptics,
returned to the Heraclitic monism. These schools
loyally upheld for three centuries the Greek idea of
the unity of man and Nature. But philosophy itself
was doomed and fated to pass over into religion on the
one hand and mysticism on the other. Platonism was
admirably adapted to this end. In luxurious Alex-
andria, the weary inductive method of Aristotle, which
the Ptolemies had instituted in the Museum, soon
yielded to the fascinating lazy philosophy of Plato.
Philo the Jew, Plutarch the moralist, Yalentinus the
Gnostic, Origen the Christian, all yielded to it in
greater or less degree. In Plotinus it reached its full
fruitage. Porphyry, his pupil, relates that he was
ashamed of having a body and was careless of its
needs, so anxious was he ecstatically to absorb his
soul in the Supra-rational Transcendent One. Here
we have a last consequence of the Socratic doctrine of
mind. Here we have the extreme opposition to the
naturalism of Heraclitus which considered man as a
subordinate part of Nature. Greek philosophy ended
with the triumph of Socrates and the defeat of Hera-
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 83
t
clitus. The wealth of Plato and Aristotle was the
bequest that was handed over to the coming centuries.
The Greek naturalists were forgotten. It was reserved
for the present century to revive and vindicate them.
In what has been said in setting in relief the philo-
sophy of Heraclitus, it is obvious that we have been
concerned with but two or three aspects of that of
Socrates and Plato, namely, its transcendental, ideal-
istic and subjective character. It is not necessary to
add that were we referring to other sides of it, as for
instance, the undeniable importance of Socrates' con-
tribution to ethics, and that of Plato to ethics and reli-
gion as well as to real scientific thought, the result
would be very different. And of the Idealism itself, its
very fascination and prevalence argue that it meets
some want of human beings. It is poetry, to be sure,
but as poetry it has been and will still be useful in saving
men from the dangers of coarse materialistic thought.
84 HERACLITUS.
I
Heraclitus of Ephesus on Nature.
I. — It is wise for those who hear, not me, but the
universal Reason, to confess that all things are one. 1
II. — To this universal Reason which I unfold,
although it always exists, men make themselves in-
sensible, both before they have heard it and when
they have heard it for the first time. For notwith-
standing that all things happen according to this
Reason, men act as though they had never had any
experience in regard to it when they attempt such
words and works as I am now relating, describing
each thing according to its nature and explaining how
it is ordered. And some men are as ignorant of what
Soueces. — I. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 9. Context : — Heraclitus
says that all things are one, divided undivided, created uncreated,
mortal immortal, reason eternity, father son, God justice. "It is
wise for those who hear, not me, but the universal Reason, to con-
fess that all things are one." And since all do not comprehend
this or acknowledge it, he reproves them somewhat as follows:
"They do not understand how that which separates unites with
itself ; it is a harmony of oppositions like that of the bow and of
the lyre" (=frag. 45).
Compare Philo, Leg. alleg. iii. 3, p. 88. Context, see frag. 24.
II. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 9. Context : — And that Reason
always exists, being all and permeating all, he (Heraclitus) says in
this manner : " To this universal," etq.
Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 5, p. 1407, b. 14. Context: — For it is very hard
to punctuate Heraclitus' writings on account of its not being clear
whether the words refer to those which precede or to those which
follow. For instance, in the beginning of his work, where he says,
"To Reason existing always men make themselves insensible."
For here it is ambiguous to what "always" refers.
Sextus Empir. adv. Math. vii. 132. — Clement of Alex. Stromata,
v. 14, p. 716.— Amelius from Euseb. Praep. Evang. xi. 19, p. 540.—
Compare Philo, Quis. rer. div. haer. 43, p. 505. — Compare Ioannes
Sicel. in Walz. Rhett. Gr. vi. p. 95.
1 The small figures In the translation refer to the critical notes, pp. 115 ff.
OX NATURE. 85
they do when awake as they are forgetful of what they
do when asleep. 2
III. — Those who hear and do not understand are
like the deaf. Of them the proverb says: "Present,
they are absent."
IV. — Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men having
rude souls.
V. — The majority of people have no understanding
of the things with which they daily meet, nor, when
instructed, do they have any right knowledge of them,
although to themselves they seem to have.
VI. — They understand neither how to hear nor how
to speak.
III. — Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 718. Context : — And if you
wish to trace out that saying, " He that hath ears to hear, let him
hear," you will find it expressed by the Ephesian in this manner,
"Those who hear," etc.
Theodoretus, Therap. i. p. 13, 49.
IV.— Sextos Emp. adv. Math. vii. 126. Context :— He (Heraclitus)
casts discredit upon sense perception in the saying, "Eyes and ears
are bad witnesses to men having rude souls." Which is equivalent
to saying that it is the part of rude souls to trust to the irrational
senses.
Stobaeus Floril. iv. 56.
Compare Diogenes Laert. ix. 7.
V.— Clement of Alex. Strom, ii. 2, p. 432.
M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context : — Be ever mindful of the Heraclitic
saying that the death of earth is to become water, and the death of
water is to become air, and of air, fire (see frag. 25). And remember
also him who is forgetful whither the way leads (comp. frag. 73) ;
and that men quarrel with that with which they are in most con-
tinual association (= frag. 93), namely, the Reason which governs
all. And those things with which they meet daily seem to them
strange ; and that we ought not to act and speak as though we were
asleep (= frag. 94), for even then we seem to act and speak.
VI. — Clement of Alex. Strom, ii. 5, p. 442. Context : — Heraclitus,
scolding some as unbelievers, says : " They understand neither how
to hear nor to speak," prompted, I suppose, by Solomon, " If thou
to hear, thou shalt understand; and if thou inclinest thine
ear, thou shalt be wise."
86 HERACLITUS.
VII. — If you do not hope, you will not win that
which is not hoped for, since it is unattainable and
inaccessible.
VIII. — Gold-seekers dig over much earth and find
little gold.
- IX.— Debate.
X. — Nature loves to conceal herself.
XI. — The God whose oracle is at Delphi neither
speaks plainly nor conceals, but indicates by signs.
XII. — But the Sibyl with raging mouth uttering
things solemn, rude and unadorned, reaches with her
voice over a thousand years, because of the God.
VII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, ii. 4, p. 437. Context :— Therefore,
that which was spoken by the prophet is shown to be wholly true,
" Unless ye believe, neither shall ye understand." Paraphrasing
this saying, Heraclitus of Ephesus said, " If you do not hope," etc.
Theodoretus, Therap. i. p. 15, 51.
VIII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 2, p. 565.
Theodoretus, Therap. i. p. 15, 52.
IX. — Suidas, under word a/u(pL0-j3arelv. 'AfityioBaTtlv. evlol to afxtyicfirjT&v
"luveg de nai ayxifiarzlv, koX ayx L (^ aGLr l v 'Hpd/cAeirof.
X. — Themistius, Or. v. p. 69 (= xii. p. 159). Context : — Nature
according to Heraclitus, loves to conceal herself ; and before nature
the creator of nature, whom therefore we especially worship and
adore because the knowledge of him is difficult.
Philo, Qu. in Gen. iv. 1, p. 237, Aucher.: Arbor est secundum
Heraclitum natura nostra, quae se obducere atque abscondere amat.
Compare idem de Profug. 32, p. 573 ; de Somn. i. 2, p. 621 ; de
Spec. legg. 8, p. 344.
XI.— Plutarch, de Pyth. orac. 21, p. 404. Context :— And I think
you know the saying of Heraclitus that "The God," etc.
Iamblichus, de Myst. hi. 15.
Idem from Stobaeus Floril. lxxxi. 17.
Anon, from Stobaeus Floril. v. 72.
Compare Lucianus, Vit. auct. 14.
XII.— Plutarch, de Pyth. orac. 6, p. 397. Context :— But the
Sibyl, with raging mouth, according to Heraclitus, uttering things
solemn, rude and unadorned, reaches with her voice over a
ON NATURE. 87
XIII. — Whatever concerns seeing, hearing, and
learning, I particularly honor. 3 iS
XI V. — Polybius iv. 40. Especially at the present
time, when all places are accessible either by land or by
water, we should not accept poets and mythologists as
witnesses of things that are unknown, since for the
most part they furnish us with unreliable testimony
about disputed things, according to Heraclitus.
XV. — The eyes are more exact witnesses than the
ears. 4
thousand years, because of the God. And Pindar says that Cadmus
heard from the God a kind of music neither pleasant nor soft nor
melodious. For great holiness permits not the allurements of
pleasures.
Clement of Alex. Strom, i. 15, p. 358.
Iamblichus, de Myst. iii. 8.
See also pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. viii.
* XIII. — Hippolytus, Kef. haer. ix. 9, 10. Context : — And that
the hidden, the unseen and unknown to men is [better], he (Hera-
clitus) says in these words, "A hidden harmony is better than a
visible " (= frag. 47). He thus praises and admires the unknown and
unseen more than the known. And that that which is discoverable
and visible to men is [better], he says in these words, "Whatever
concerns seeing, hearing, and learning, I particularly honor," that
is. the visible above the invisible. From such expressions it is easy
to understand him. In the knowledge of the visible, he says, men
allow themselves to be deceived as Homer was, who yet was wiser
than all the Greeks ; for some boys killing lice deceived him saying,
" What we see and catch we leave behind ; what we neither see nor
catch we take with us" (frag. 1, Schuster). Thus Heraclitus honors
in equal degree the seen and the unseen, as if the seen and unseen
were confessedly one. For what does he say? " A hidden harmony
is better than a visible," and, "Whatever concerns seeing, hearing,
and learning, I particularly honor," having before particularly
honored the invisible.
XV. — Polybius xii. 27. Context : — There are two organs given to
us by nature, sight and hearing, sight being considerably the more
truthful, according to Heraclitus, "For the eyes are more exact
witnesses than the ears."
Compare Herodotus i. 8.
88 HERACLITUS.
XVI. — Much learning does not teach one to have
understanding, else it would have taught Hesiod and
Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus.
XVII. — Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, practised
investigation most of all men, and having chosen out
these treatises, he made a wisdom of his own — much
learning and bad art.
XVIII. — Of all whose words I have heard, no one
attains to this, to know that wisdom is apart from all. 5
XIX. — There is one wisdom, to understand the intel-
ligent will by which all things are governed through
all. 6
XX. — This world, the same for all, neither any of
XVI. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 1. Context : — He (Heraclitus) was
proud and disdainful above all men, as indeed is clear from his
work, in which he says, " Much learning does not teach," etc.
Aulus Gellius, N. A. praef. 12.
Clement of Alex. Strom, i. 19, p. 373.
Athenaeus xiii. p. 610 B.
Iulianus, Or. vi. p. 187 D.
Proclus in Tim. 31 F.
Serenus in Excerpt. Flor. Ioann. Damasc. ii. 116, p. 205, Meinek.
Compare pseudo-Democritus, f r. mor. 140 Mullach.
XVII. — Diogenes Laert. viii. 6. Context : — Some say, foolishly,
that Pythagoras did not leave behind a single writing. But Hera-
clitus, the physicist, in his croaking way says, " Pythagoras, son of
Mnesarchus," etc.
Compare Clement of Alex. Strom, i. 21, p. 396.
XVIIL— Stobaeus Floril. iii. 81.
XIX. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 1. Context : — See frag. 16.
Plutarch, de Iside 77, p. 382. Context : — Nature, who lives and
sees, and has in herself the beginning of motion and a knowledge of
the suitable and the foreign, in some way draws an emanation and
a share from the intelligence by which the universe is governed,
according to Heraclitus.
Compare Cleanthes H. in Iov. 36.
Compare pseudo-Linus, 13 Mullach.
XX. — Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 711. Context : — Heracli-
tus of Ephesus is very plainly of this opinion, since he recognizes
ON NATURE. 89
the gods nor any man has made, but it always was,
and is, and shall be, an ever living fire, kindled in due
measure, and in due measure extinguished. 7
XXI. — The transmutations of fire are, first, the sea ;
and of the sea, half is earth, and half the lightning
flash. 8
XXII. — All things are exchanged for fire and fire for
all things, just as wares for gold and gold for wares.
that there is an everlasting world on the one hand and on the other
a perishable, that is, in its arrangement, knowing that in a certain
manner the one is not different from the other. But that he knew
an everlasting world eternally of a certain kind in its whole essence,
he makes plain, saying in this manner, " This world the same for
all," etc.
Plutarch, de Anim. procreat. 5, p. 1014. Context : — This world,
says Heraclitus, neither any god nor man has made ; as if fearing
that having denied a divine creation, we should suppose the creator
of the world to have been some man.
Simplicius in Aristot. de cael. p. 132, Karst.
Olympiodorus in Plat. Phaed. p. 201, Finckh.
Compare Cleanthes H., Iov. 9.
Xicander, Alexiph. 174.
Epictetus from Stob. Floril. cviii. 60.
M. Antoninus vii. 9.
Just. Mart. Apol. p. 93 C.
Heraclitus, Alleg. Horn. 26.
XXI.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 712. Context :— And that
he (Heraclitus) taught that it was created and perishable is shown
by the following, "The transmutations," etc.
Compare Hippolytus, Ref. haer. vi. 17.
XXII.— Plutarch, de EI. 8, p. 388. Context :— For how that (scil.
first cause) forming the world from itself, again perfects itself from
the world, Heraclitus declares as follows, " All things are exchanged
for fire and fire for all things," etc.
Compare Philo, Leg. alleg. iii. 3, p. 89. Context, see frag. 24.
Idem, de Incorr. mundi 21, p. 508.— Lucianus, Vit. auct. 14.
Diogenes Laert. ix. 8.
Heraclitus, Alleg. Horn. 43.
Plotinus, Enn. iv. 8, p. 468.— Iamblichus from Stob. Eel. i. 41.
•bius, Praep. Evang. xiv. 3, p. 720.— Simplicius on Aristot.
Phys. 6, a.
90 HERACLITUS.
XXIII. — The sea is poured out and measured to the
same proportion as existed before it became earth. 9
XXIV.— Craving and Satiety. 10
XXV. — Fire lives in the death of earth, air lives in
the death of fire, water lives in the death of air, and
earth in the death of water. 11
XXVI. — Fire coming upon all things, will sift and
seize them.
XXIII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 712' (= Eusebius, P. E.
xiii. 13, p. 676). Context : — For he (Heraclitus) says that fire is
changed by the divine Reason which rules the universe, through air
into moisture, which is as it were the seed of cosmic arrangement,
and which he calls sea ; and from this again arise the earth and the
heavens and all they contain. And how again they are restored and
ignited, he shows plainly as follows, " The sea is poured out," etc.
XXIV. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context : — And he (Hera-
clitus) says also that this fire is intelligent and is the cause of the
government of all things. And he calls it craving and satiety. And
craving is, according to him, arrangement (Standc/Livcis), and satiety is
conflagration (eKirvpooig). For, he says, " Fire coming upon all things
will separate and seize them" (= frag. 26).
Philo, Leg. alleg. iii. 3, p. 88. Context : — And the other (scil.
6 yovoppvfc), supposing that all things are from the world and are
changed back into the world, and thinking that nothing was made
by God, being a champion of the Heraclitic doctrine, introduces
craving and satiety and that all things are one and happen by
change.
Philo, de Victim. 6, p. 242.
Plutarch, de EI. 9, p. 389.
XXV.— Maximus Tyr. xli. 4, p. 489. Context:— You see the
change of bodies and the alternation of origin, the way up and
down, according to Heraclitus. And again he says, "Living in
their death and dying in their life (see frag. 67). Fire lives in the
death of earth," etc.
M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context, see frag. 5.
Plutarch, de EI. 18, p. 392.
Idem, de Prim. frig. 10, p. 949. Comp. pseudo-Linus 21, Mull.
XXVI. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context, see frag. 24.
Compare Aetna v. 536 : quod si quis lapidis miratur fusile robur,
cogitet obscuri verissima dicta libelli, Heraclite, tui, nihil insuper-
abile ab igni, omnia quo rerum naturae semina iacta.
ON NATURE. 91
XXVII. — How can one escape that which never
sets? 12
XXVIII. — Lightning rules all.
XXIX. — The sun will not overstep his bounds, for if
he does, the Erinyes, helpers of justice, will find him
out.
XXX. — The limits of the evening and morning are
the Bear, and opposite the Bear, the bounds of bright
Zeus.
XXXI. — If there were no sun, it would be night.
XXVII.— Clement of Alex. Paedag. ii. 10, p. 229. Context :— For
one may escape the sensible light, but the intellectual it is impossible
to escape. Or, as Heraclitus says, " How can one escape that which
never sets?"
XXVIII. — Hippolytus, Kef. haer. ix. 10. Context : — And he (Hera-
clitus) also says that a judgment of the world and all things in it
takes place by fire, expressing it as follows, "Now lightning rules
all," that is, guides it rightly, meaning by lightning, everlasting fire.
Compare Cleanthes H., Iovem 10.
XXIX.— Plutarch, de Exil. II, p. 604. Context :— Each of the
planets, rolling in one sphere, as in an island, preserves its order.
" For the sun," says Heraclitus, " will not overstep his bounds," etc.
Idem, de Iside 48, p. 370.
Comp. Hippolytus, Ref . haer. vi. 26.
Iamblichus, Protrept. 21, p. 132, Arcer.
Pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. ix.
XXX. — Strabo i. 6, p. 3. Context : — And Heraclitus, better and
more Homerically, naming in like manner the Bear instead of the
northern circle, says, "The limits of the evening and morning
are the Bear, and opposite the Bear, the bounds of bright Zeus."
For the northern circle is the boundary of rising and setting, not the
Bear.
XXXI. — Plutarch, Aq. et ign. comp. 7, p. 957.
Idem, de Fortuna 3, p. 98. Context : — And just as, if there were
no sun, as far as regards the other stars, we should have night, as
Heraclitus says, so as far as regards the senses, if man had not mind
and reason, his life would not differ from that of the beasts.
Compare Clement of Alex. Protrept. II, p. 87.
Macrobius, Somn. Scip. i. 20.
92 HERACLITUS.
XXXII. — The sun is new every day.
XXXIII.— Diogenes Laertius i. 23. He (soil. Thales)
seems, according to some, to have been the first to
study astronomy and to foretell the eclipses and
motions of the sun, as Eudemus relates in his account
of astronomical works. And for this reason he is
honored by Xenophanes and Herodotus, and both
Heraclitus and Democritus bear witness to him.
XXXIV.— Plutarch, Qu. Plat. viii. 4, p. 1007. Thus
Time, having a necessary union and connection with
heaven, is not simple motion, but, so to speak, motion
in an order, having measured limits and periods. Of
which the sun, being overseer and guardian to limit,
direct, appoint and proclaim the changes and seasons
which, according to Heraclitus, produce all things, is
the helper of the leader and first God, not in small or
trivial things, but in the greatest and most important.
XXXV. — Hesiod is a teacher of the masses. They
suppose him to have possessed the greatest knowledge,
who indeed did not know day and night. For they
are one. 13
XXXII.— Aristotle, Meteor, ii. 2, p. 355 a 9. Context :— Con-
cerning the sun this cannot happen, since, being nourished in the
same manner, as they say, it is plain that the sun is not only, as
Heraclitus says, new every day, but it is continually new.
Alexander Aphrod. in Meteor. 1. 1. fol. 93 a.
Olympiodorus in Meteor. 1. 1. fol. 30 a.
Plotinus, Enn. ii. 1, p. 97.
Proclus in Tim. p. 334 B.
Compare Plato, Eep. vi. p. 498 B.
Olympiodorus in Plato, Phaed. p. 201, Finckh.
XXXIV.— Compare Plutarch, de Def. orac. 12, p. 416.
M. Antoninus ix. 3.
Pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. v.
XXXV. — Hippolytus, Eef . haer. ix. 10. Context : — Heraclitus says
that neither darkness nor light, neither evil nor good, are different,
but they are one and the same. He found fault, therefore, with
ON NATURE. 93
XXXVI. — God is day and night, winter and sum-
mer, war and peace, plenty and want. But he is
changed, just as when incense is mingled with incense,
but named according to the pleasure of each. 14
XXXVII.— Aristotle, de Sensu 5, p. 443 a 21. Some
think that odor consists in smoky exhalation, common
to earth and air, and that for smell all things are con-
verted into this. And it was for this reason that
Heraclitus thus said that if all existing things should
become smoke, perception would be by the nostrils.
XXXVIII.— Souls smell in Hades. 15
XXXIX. — Cold becomes warm, and warm, cold ; wet
becomes dry, and dry, wet.
XL. — It disperses and gathers, it comes and goes. 16
Hesiod because he knew [not] day and night, for day and night, he
says, are one, expressing it somewhat as follows: "Hesiod is a
teacher of the masses," etc.
XXXVI. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context: — For that the
primal (Gr. irp&rw, Bernays reads TTocTjrdv, created) world is itself the
demiurge and creator of itself, he (Heraclitus) says as follows :
" God is day and," etc.
Compare idem, Ref. haer. v. 21.
Hippocrates, ~epl dtairr/g i. 4, Littr.
XXXVIII.— Plutarch, de Fac. in orbe lun. 28, p. 943. Context :—
Their (scil. the souls') appearance is like the sun's rays, and their
spirits, which are raised aloft, as here, in the ether around the moon,
are like fire, and from this they receive strength and power, as
metals do by tempering. For that which is still scattered and
diffuse is strengthened and becomes firm and transparent, so that it
is nourished with the chance exhalation. And finely did Heraclitus
say that "souls smell in Hades."
XXXIX. — Schol. Tzetzae, Exeget. Iliad, p. 126, Hermann. Con-
text : — Of old, Heraclitus of Ephesus was noted for the obscurity of
sayings, ''Cold becomes warm," etc.
mpare Hippocrates, mpl diairqg i. 21.
Pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. v. — Apuleius, de Mundo 21.
XL.— Plutarch, de EI. 18, p. 392. Context, see frag. 41.
Compare r^seudo-Heraclitus, Epist. vi.
94 HERACLITUS.
XLI. — Into the same river you could not step twice,
for other <and still other> waters are flowing.
XLII. — fTo those entering the same river, other and
still other waters flow.f
XLIIL— Aristotle, Eth. Eud. vii. 1, p. 1235 a 26.
And Heraclitus blamed the poet who said, " Would
XLI. — Plutarch, Qu. nat. 2, p. 912. Context : — For the waters of
fountains and rivers are fresh and new, for, as Heraclitus says,
" Into the same river," etc.
Plato, Crat. 402 A. Context : — Heraclitus is supposed to say that
all things are in motion and nothing at rest ; he compares them to
the stream of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same
river twice (Jowett's transl.).
Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5, p. 1010 a 13. Context :— From this
.assumption there grew up that extreme opinion of those just now
mentioned, those, namely, who professed to follow Heraclitus, such
as Cratylus held, who finally thought that nothing ought to be said,
but merely moved his finger. And he blamed Heraclitus because
he said you could not step twice into the same river, for he himself
thought you could not do so once.
Plutarch, de EI. 18, p. 392. Context :— It is not possible to step
twice into the same river, according to Heraclitus, nor twice to find
a perishable substance in a fixecLstate ; but by the sharpness and
quickness of change, it disperses and gathers again, or rather not
again nor a second time, but at the same time it forms and is
dissolved, it comes and goes (see frag. 40).
Idem, de Sera num. vind. 15, p. 559.
Simplicius in Aristot. Phys. f . 17 a.
XLII.— Arius Didymus from Eusebius, Praep. evang. xv. 20, p. 821.
Context : — Concerning the soul, Cleanthes, quoting the doctrine of
Zeno in comparison with the other physicists, said that Zeno affirmed
the perceptive soul to be an exhalation, just as Heraclitus did. For,
wishing to show that the vaporized souls are always of an intellectual
nature, he compared them to a river, saying, "To those entering the
same river, other and still other waters flow." And souls are
exhalations from moisture. Zeno, therefore, like Heraclitus, called
the soul an exhalation.
Compare Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. hyp. iii. 115.
XLIIL— Plutarch, de Iside 48, p. 370. Context :— For Heraclitus
in plain terms calls war the father and king and lord of all (= frag.
44), and he says that Homer, when he prayed—" Discord be damned
ON NATURE. 95
that strife were destroyed from among gods and men."
For there could be no harmony without sharps and
flats, nor living beings without male and female,
which are contraries.
XLIY. — War is the father and king of all, and has
produced some as gods and some as men, and has
made some slaves and some free.
XLV. — They do not understand how that which
from gods and human race," forgot that he called down curses on
the origin of all things, since they have their source in antipathy
and war.
Chalcidius in Tim. 295.
Simplicius in Aristot. Categ. p. 104 A, ed. Basil.
Schol. Yen. (A) ad II. xviii, 107.
Eustathius ad II. xviii. 107, p. 1113, 56.
XLIY. — Hippolytus, Eef. haer. ix. 9. Context : — And that the
father of all created things is created and uncreated, the made and
the maker, we hear him (Heraclitus) saying, " War is the father and
king of all," etc.
Plutarch, de Iside 48, p. 370. Context, see frag. 43.
Proclus in Tim. 54 A (comp. 24 B).
Compare Chrysippus from Philodem. rr. ev<je(3eiac, vii. p. 81, Gomperz.
Lucianus, Quomodo hist, conscrib. 2 ; Idem, Icaromen 8.
XLY. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 9. Context, see frag. 1.
Plato. Symp. 187 A. Context : — And one who pays the least atten-
tion will also perceive that in music there is the same reconciliation
of opposites ; and I suppose that this must have been the meaning
of Heraclitus, though his words are not accurate ; for he says that the
One is united by disunion, like the harmony of the bow and the
lyre (Jowett's transl.).
Idem, Soph. 242 D. Context: — Then there are Ionian, and in
more recent times Sicilian muses, who have conceived the thought
that to unite the two principles is safer ; and they say that being is
one and many, which are held together by enmity and friendship,
ever parting, ever meeting (idem).
Plutarch, de Anim. procreat. 27, p. 1026. Context: — And many
call this (scil. necessity) destiny. Empedocles calls it love and
hatred ; Heraclitus, the harmony of oppositions as of the bow and
of the lyre.
Compare Synesius, de Insomn. 135 A
Parmenides v. 85, Stein.
96 HERACLITUS.
separates unites with itself. It is a harmony of oppo-
sitions, as in the case of the bow and of the lyre. 17
XLVL-— Aristotle, Eth. ]S T ic. viii. 2, p. 1155 b 1. In
reference to these things, some seek for deeper princi-
ples and more in accordance with nature. Euripides
says, " The parched earth loves the rain, and the
high heaven, with moisture laden, loves earthward to
fall." And Heraclitus says, " The unlike is joined
together, and from differences results the most beau-
tiful harmony, and all things take place by strife."
XL VII. — The hidden harmony is better than the
visible. 18 and3
XLVIII. — Let us not draw conclusions rashly about
the greatest things.
XLIX. — Philosophers must be learned in very many
things.
L. — The straight and crooked way of the wool-
carders is one and the same. 19
XL VI. — Compare Theophrastus, Metaph. 15.
Philo, Qu. in Gen. iii. 5, p. 178, Aucher.
Idem, de Agricult. 31, p. 321.
XLVII. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 9-10. Context, see frag. 13.
Plutarch, de Anim. procreat. 27, p. 1026. Context : — Of the soul
nothing is pure and unmixed nor remains apart from the rest, for,
according to Heraclitus, " The hidden harmony is better than the
visible," in which the blending deity has hidden and sunk varia-
tions and differences.
Compare Plotinus, Enn. i. 6, p. 53.
Proclus in Cratyl. p. 107, ed. Boissonad.
XLVIII. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 73. Context: — Moreover, Hera-
clitus says, " Let us not draw conclusions rashly about the greatest
things." And Hippocrates delivered his opinions doubtfully and
moderately.
XLIX.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 733. Context :— Philo-
sophers must be learned in very many things, according to Hera-
clitus. And, indeed, it is necessary that " he who wishes to be good
shall often err." '
L. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context : — And both straight
OX NATURE. 97
LI. — Asses would choose stubble rather than gold.
LIL — Sea water is very pure and very foul, for,
while to fishes it is drinkable and healthful, to men it
is hurtful and unfit to drink.
LIII. — Columella, de Re Rustica viii. 4. Dry dust
and ashes must be placed near the wall where the roof
or eaves shelter the court, in order that there may be
a place where the birds may sprinkle themselves, for
with these things they improve their wings and
feathers, if we may believe Heraclitus, the Ephesian,
who says, " Hogs wash themselves in mud and doves
in dust."
LIY. — They revel in dirt.
and crooked, he (Heraclitus) says, are the same : " The way of the
wool-carders is straight and crooked." The revolution of the in-
strument in a carder's shop (Gr. yvaoeico Bernays, ypa&eiu vulg.) called
a screw is straight and crooked, for it moves at the same time
forward and in a circle. " It is one and the same," he says.
Compare Apuleius, de Mundo 21.
LI.— Aristotle, Eth. Nic. x. 5, p. 1176 a 6. Context :— The pleasures
of a horse, a dog, or a man, are all different. As Heraclitus says,
"'Asses would choose stubble rather than gold," for to them there
is more pleasure in fodder than in gold.
LIL — Hippolytus, Ref . haer. ix. 10. Context : — And foul and
fresh, he (Heraclitus) says, are one and the same. And drinkable
and undrinkable are one and the same. "Sea water," he says, " is
very pure and very foul," etc.
Compare Sextus Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. i. 55.
LIII. — Compare Galenus, Protrept. 13, p. 5, ed. Bas.
LIV.— Athenaeus v. p. 178 F. Context :— For it would be unbe-
coming, says Aristotle, to go to a banquet covered with sweat and
dust. For a well-bred man should not be squalid nor slovenly nor
delight in dirt, as Heraclitus says.
Clement of Alex. Protrept. 10, p. 75.
Idem, Strom, i. 1, p. 317 ; ii. 15, p. 465.
Compare Sextus Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. i. 55.
Plotinus, Enn. i. 6, p. 55.
Vincentius Bellovac. Spec. mor. iii. 9, 3.
98 HERACLITUS.
LV. — Every animal is driven by blows. 20
LVI. — The harmony of the world is a harmony of
oppositions, as in the case of the bow and of the lyre. 21
LYII. — Good and evil are the same.
LYIII. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. And good and
evil (soil, are one). The physicians, therefore, says
Heraclitus, cutting, cauterizing, and in every way tor-
turing the sick, complain that the patients do not pay
them fitting reward for thus effecting these benefits—
fand sufferings. f
LV. — Aristotle, de Mundo 6, p. 401 a 8 (rzApuleius, de Mundo
36 ; Stobaeus, Eel. i. 2, p. 86). Context : — Both wild and domestic
animals, and those living upon land or in air or water, are born, live
and die in conformity with the laws of God. " For every animal,"
as Heraclitus says, " is driven by blows" {ttIvyv Stobaeus cod. A,
Bergkius et al.; vulg. r?> yfjv vijuerac, every animal feeds upon the
earth).
L VI. —Plutarch, de Tranquill. 15, p. 473. Context : — For the har-
mony of the world is a harmony of oppositions (Gr. rcaUvrovog apfiovirj,
see Crit. Note 21), as in the case of the bow and of the lyre. And in
human things there is nothing that is pure and unmixed. But just
as in music, some notes are flat and some sharp, etc.
Idem, de Iside 45, p. 369. Context :— "For the harmony of the
world is a harmony of opposition, as in the case of the bow and of the
lyre," according to Heraclitus; and according to Euripides, neither
good nor bad may be found apart, but are mingled together for the
sake of greater beauty.
Porphyrius, de Antro. nymph. 29.
Simplicius in Phys. fol. 11 a.
Compare Philo, Qu. in Gen. iii. 5, p. 178, Aucher.
LVII. — Hippolytus, Eef . haer. ix. 10. Context, see frag. 58.
Simplicius in Phys. fol. 18 a. Context : — All things are with others
identical, and the saying of Heraclitus is true that the good and the
evil are the same.
Idem on Phys. fol. 11 a.
Aristotle, Top. viii. 5, p. 159 b 30.
Idem, Phys. i. 2, p. 185 b 20.
LVIII. — Compare Xenophon, Mem. i. 2, 54.
Plato, Gorg. 521 E ; Polit. 293 B.
Simplicius in Epictetus 13, p. 83 D and 27, p. 178 A, ed. Heins.
OX NATURE. 99
LIX. — Unite whole and part, agreement and dis-
agreement, accordant and discordant; from all comes
one. and from one all.
LX. — They would not know the name of justice,
were it not for these things. 22
LXL— Schol. B. in Iliad iv. 4, p. 120 Bekk. They say
that it is unfitting that the sight of wars should please
the gods. But it is not so. For noble works delight
them, and while wars and battles seem to us terrible,
to God they do not seem so. For God in his dispensa-
tion of all events, perfects them into a harmony of the
whole, just as, indeed, Heraclitus says that to God all
things are beautiful and good and right, though men
suppose that some are right and others wrong.
LXII. — We must know that war is universal and
strife right, and that by strife all things arise and fare
used.i 23
LIX. — Aristotle, de Mundo 5, p. 396 b 12 (rr Apuleius, deMundo
20 ; Stobaeus, Eel. i. 34, p. 690). Context : — And again art, imitator of
nature, appears to do the same. For in painting, it is by the mixing
of colors, as white and black or yellow and red, that representations
are made corresponding with the natural types. In music also, from
the union of sharps and flats comes a final harmony, and in gram-
mar, the whole art depends on the blending of mutes and vocables.
And it was the same thing which the obscure Heraclitus meant when
he said, " Unite whole and part," etc.
Compare Apuleius, de Mundo 21.
Hippocrates ~. -pogfjq 40 ; - Stalr^g i.
LX. — Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 3, p. 568. Context : — For the
Scripture says, the law is not made for the just man. And Heracli-
tus well says, " They would not know the name of justice, were it
not for these things."
Compare pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. vii.
LXL — Compare Hippocrates, ~epl diaiTqq i. xi.
LXII.— Origen, cont. Celsus vi. 42, p. 312 (Celsus speaking). Con-
— There was an obscure saying of the ancients that war was
divine, Heraclitus writing thus, " We must know that war," etc.
Compare Plutarch, de Sol. animal. 7, p. 904.
Diogenes Laert. ix. 8.
100 HERACLITUS.
LXIII. — For it is wholly destined .
LXIV. — Death is what we see waking. What we see
in sleep is a dream. 24
LXV. — There is only one supreme Wisdom. It wills
and wills not to be called by the name of Zeus. 25
LXYI. — The name of the bow is life, but its work is
death.
LXVII. — Immortals are mortal, mortals immortal,
living in their death and dying in their life.
LXIII. — Stobaeus Eel. i. 5, p. 178. Context : — Heraclitus declares
that destiny is the all-pervading law. And this is the etherial body,
the seed of the origin of all things, and the measure of the appointed
course. All things are by fate, and this is the same as necessity.
Thus he writes, "For it is wholly destined " (The rest is
wanting).
LXIV. — Clement of Alex. Strom, iii. 3, p. 520. Context: — And
does not Heraclitus call death birth, similarly with Pythagoras and
with Socrates in the Gorgias, when he says, " Death is what we see
waking. What we see in sleep is a dream " ?
Compare idem v. 14, p. 712. Philo, de Ioseph. 22, p. 59.
LXV.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 718 (Euseb. P. E. xiii.
13, p. 681). Context : — I know that Plato also bears witness to Hera-
clitus' writing, " There is only one supreme Wisdom. It wills and
wills not to be called by the name of Zeus." And again, " Law is
to obey the will of one " (=. frag. 110).
LXVL— Schol. in Iliad i. 49, fr. Cramer, A. P. iii. p. 122. Con-
text : — For it seems that by the ancients the bow and life were syn-
onymously called (3t6g. So Heraclitus, the obscure, said, " The name
of the bow is life, but its work is death."
Etym. magn. under word fiidg.
Tzetze's Exeg. in Iliad, p. 101 Herm.
Eustathius in Iliad i. 49, p. 41.
Compare Hippocrates, v. rpo<f>?jc 21.
LXVII. — Hippolytus, Eef. haer. ix. 10. Context: — And con-
fessedly he (Heraclitus) asserts that the immortal is mortal and the
mortal immortal, in such words as these, "Immortals are mortal,"
etc.
Numenius from Porphyr. de Antro nymph. 10. Context, see
frag. 72.
ON NATURE. 101
LXVIII. — To souls it is death to become water, and
to water it is death to become earth, but from earth
comes water, and from water, soul.
LXIX. — The way upward and downward are one
and the same.
Philo, Leg. alleg. i. 33, p. 65.
Idem, Qu. in Gen. iv. 152, p. 360 Aucher.
Maximus Tyr. x. 4, p. 107. Idem, xli. 4, p. 489.
Clement of Alex. Paed. iii. 1, p. 251.
Hierocles in Aur. carm. 24.
Heraclitus, Alleg. Horn. 24, p. 51 Mehler.
Compare Lucianus, Vit. auct. 14.
Dio Cassius frr. i — xxxv. c. 30, t. i. p. 40 Dind.
Hermes from Stob. Eel. i. 39, p. 768. Idem, Poemand. 12, p. 100.
LXVIII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, vi. 2, p. 746. Context :— (On
plagiarisms) And Orpheus having written, " Water is death to the
soul and soul the change from water ; from water is earth and from
earth again water, and from this the soul welling up through the
whole ether"; Heraclitus, combining these expressions, writes as
follows : " To souls it is death," etc.
Hippolytus, Ref. haer. v. 16. Context : — And not only do the
poets say this, but already also the wisest of the Greeks, of whom
Heraclitus was one, who said, ''For the soul it is death to become
water."
Philo, de Incorr. mundi 21, p. 509. Proclus in Tim. p. 36 C.
Aristides, Quintil. ii. p. 106, Meib.
Iulianus, Or. v. p. 165 D.
Olympiodorus in Plato, Gorg. p. 357 Iahn ; Idem, p. 542.
LXIX. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context : — Up and down he
(Heraclitus) says are one and the same. "The way upward and
downward are one and the same."
Diogenes Laert. ix. 8. Context : — Heraclitus says that change is
the road leading upward and downward, and that the whole world
exists according to it.
Cleomedes, -. fj-ereupuv i. p. 75, Bak.
Maximus Tyr. xli. 4, p. 489.
Plotinus, Enn. iv. 8, p. 468.
Tertullian, adv. Marc. ii. 28.
Iamblichus from Stob. Eel. i. 41.
Compare Hippocrates, k. rpofifc 45.
M. Antoninus vi. 17.
102 HERACLITUS.
LXX. — The beginning and end are common.
LXXI. The limits of the soul you would not find
out, though you should traverse every way.
LXXIL — To souls it is joy to become wet. 26
LXXIIL— A man when he is drunken is led by
a beardless youth, stumbling, ignorant where he is
going, having a wet soul.
LXXIY. — The dry soul is the wisest and best. 27
Philo, de Incorr. mundi 21, p. 508.
Idem, de Somn. i. 24, p. 644.
Idem, de vit. Moys. i. 6, p. 85.
Musonius from Stob. Flo. 108, 60.
LXX— Porphyry from Schol. B. Iliad xiv. 200, p. 392, Bekk.
Context : — For the beginning and end on the periphery of the circle
are common, according to Heraclitus.
Compare Hippocrates, w.. tottov rav kclt' avdporrov, 1.
Idem, 7T. diairrjq i. 19 ; tc. rpo<j)?jg } 9.
Philo, Leg. alleg. i. 3, p. 44. Plutarch, de EL 8, p. 388.
LXXI. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 7. Context : — And he (Heraclitus)
also says, "The limits of the soul you would not find out though
you traverse every way," so deep lies its principle (ovtg) fladvv loyov
ixei).
Tertullian, de Anima 2.
Compare Hippolytus, Ref. haer. v. 7.
Sextus, Enchir. 386.
LXXIL — Numenius from Porphyry, de Antro nymph. 10. Con-
text : — Wherefore Heraclitus says : To souls it is joy, not death, to
become wet. And elsewhere he says : We live in their death and
they live in our death (frag. 67).
LXXIIL— Stobaeus Floril. v. 120.
Compare M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context, see frag. 5.
LXXIV. — Plutarch, Romulus 28. Context : — For the dry soul is
the wisest and best, according to Heraclitus. It flashes through the
body as the lightning through the cloud (=fr. 63, Schleiermacher).
Aristides, Quintil. ii. p. 106.
Porphyry, de Antro nymph. 11.
Synesius, de Insomn. p. 140 A Petav.
Stobaeus Floril. v. 120.
Glycas, Ann. i. p. 74 B (compare 116 A).
Compare Clement of Alex. Paedag. ii. 2, p. 184.
Eustathius in Iliad xxiii. 261, p. 1299, 17 ed. Rom.
ON NATURE. 103
LXXY. — |Tlie dry beam is the wisest and best soul.f
LXXYL — | Where the land is dry, the sonl is wisest
and best.t 27
LXXVII. — Man, as a light at night, is lighted and
extinguished. 28
LXXYIIL— Plutarch, Consol. ad Apoll. 10, p. 106.
For when is death not present with us ? As indeed
Heraclitus says : Living and dead, awake and asleep,
young and old, are the same. For these several states
are transmutations of each other.
LXXIX. — Time is a child playing at draughts, a
child's kingdom.
LXXV.— Philo from Euseb. P. E. viii. 14, p. 399.
Musonius from Stob. Floril. xvii. 43.
Plutarch, de Esu. earn. i. 6, p. 995.
Idem, de Def. orac. 41, p. 432.
Galenus, re. rav rf/g fvxvc ifl&v 5, t. i. p. 346, ed. Bas.
Hermeias in Plat. Phaedr. p. 73, Ast.
Compare Porphyry, a^opji. rrpbg rd vorj-d 33, p. 78 Hoist. ; Ficinus, de
Immort. anim. viii. 13.
LXXYL— Philo from Euseb. P. E. vi. 14, p. 399.
Idem, de Provid. ii. 109, p. 117, Aucher.
LXXYIL— Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 22, p. 628. Context :—
Whatever they say of sleep, the same must be understood of death,
for it is plain that each of them is a departure from life, the one less,
the other more. Which is also to be received from Heraclitus :
Man is kindled as a light at night ; in like manner, dying, he is
extinguished. And living, he borders upon death while asleep, and,
extinguishing sight, he borders upon sleep when awake.
Compare Sextos Empir. adv. Math. vii. 130.
Seneca, Epist. 54.
LXXYIIL— Compare Plutarch, de EL 18, p. 392.
Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 22, p. 628. Context, see frag. 77.
Sextus Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. iii. 230.
Tzetze's Chil. ii. 722.
LXXIX. — Hippolytus, Eef. haer. ix. 9.
Proclus in Tim. 101 F. Context : — And some, as for example
Heraclitus, say that the creator in creating the world is at play.
Lucianus, Vit. auct. 14. Context :— And what is time ? A child
at play j now arranging his pebbles, now scattering them.
104 HERACLITUS.
LXXX. — I have inquired of myself. 29
LXXXI. — Into the same river we both step and do
not step. We both are and are not.
LXXXIL— It is weariness upon the same things to
labor and by them to be controlled. 30
Clement of Alex. Paedag. i. 5, p. 111.
Iamblichus from Stob. Eel. ii. 1, p. 12.
Compare Plato, Legg. x. 903 D. Philo, de vit. Moys. i. 6, p. 85.
Plutarch, de EI. 21, p. 393.
Gregory Naz. Carm. ii. 85, p. 978 ed. Bened.
LXXX.— Diogenes Laert. ix. 5. Context : — And he (Heraclitus)
was a pupil of no one, but he said he inquired of himself and learned
everything by himself.
Plutarch, adv. Colot. 20, p. 1118. Context : — And Heraclitus, as
though he had been engaged in some great and solemn task, said,
" I have been seeking myself." And of the sentences at Delphi, he
thought the "Know thyself " to be the most divine.
Dio Chrysost. Or. 55, p. 282, Reiske.
Plotinus, Enn. iv. 8, p. 468.
Tatianus, Or. ad Graec. 3.
Iulianus, Or. vi. p. 185 A.
Proclus in Tim. 106 E.
Suidas, under word Uoarov/ws.
Compare Philo, de Ioseph. 22, p. 59.
Clement of Alex. Strom, ii. 1, p. 429.
Plotinus, Enn. v. 9, p. 559.
LXXXI.— Heraclitus, Alleg. Horn. 24.
Seneca, Epist. 58. Context : — And I, while I say these things are
changed, am myself changed. This is what Heraclitus means when
he says, into the same river we descend twice and do not descend,
for the name of the river remains the same, but the water has
flowed on. This in the case of the river is more evident than in
case of man, but none the less does the swift course carry us on.
Compare Epicharmus, fr. B 40, Lorenz.
Parmenides v. 58, Stein.
LXXXIL— Plotinus, Enn. iv. 8, p. 468.
Iamblichus from Stob. Eel. i. 41, p. 906. Context :— For Heraclitus
assumed necessary changes from opposites, and supposed that souls
traversed the way upward and downward, and that to continue in
the same condition is weariness, but that change brings rest
(= fr. 83).
OX NATURE. 105
LXXXIII. — In change is rest.
LXXXIY. — A mixture separates when not kept in
motion.
LXXXY. — Corpses are more worthless than excre-
ment.
LXXXVI. — Being born, they will only to live and
die. or rather to find rest, and they leave children who
likewise are to die.
LXXX VII.— Plutarch, de Orac, def. 11, p. 415.
Aeneas, Gaz. Theophrast. p. 9.
Compare Hippocrates, ~. Sialrifg i. 15.
Philo, de Cherub. 26, p. 155.
LXXXIII.— Plotinus, Enn. iv. 8, p. 468.
Idem, iv. S, p. 473.
Iamblichus from Stob. Eel. i. 41, p. 906. Context, see frag. 82.
Idem, p. 894.
Aeneas, Gaz. Theophrast. p. 9, Barth.
Idem, p. 11.
LXXXIY. — Theophrastus, de Yertigine 9, p. 138 Wimmer.
Alexander Aprod. Probl. p. 11, Usener. Context :— A mixture
(6 kvkeui), as Heraclitus says, separates unless some one stirs it.
Compare Lucian, Yit. auct. 14.
M. Antoninus iv. 27.
LXXXY.— Strabo xvi. 26, p. 784. Context :— They consider dead
bodies equal to excrement, just as Heraclitus says, " Corpses are
more worthless," etc.
Plutarch, Qu. conviv. iv. 4, p. 669.
Pollux, Onom. v. 163.
Origen, c. Cels. v. 14, p. 247.
Julian, Or. vii. p. 226 C.
Compare Philo, de Profug. ii. p. 555.
Plotinus, Enn. v. 1, p. 483.
Schol. Y. ad Iliad xxiv. 54, p. 630, Bekk.
Epictetus, Diss. ii. 4, 5.
LXXXYI. — Clement of Alex. Strom, iii. 3, p. 516. Context : —
Heraclitus appears to be speaking evil of birth when he says,
"Being born, they wish only to live," etc.
LXXXVIL— The reference is to the following passage from
•d :
106 HERACLITUS.
Those who adopt the reading fjft&vroQ (i. e. at man's
estate, see Hesiod, fr. 163, ed. Goettling) reckon a gen-
eration at thirty years, according to Heraclitus, in
which time a father may have a son who is himself at
the age of puberty.
LXXXVIIL— Io. Lydus de Mensibus iii. 10, p. 37,
ed. Bonn. Thirty is the most natural number, for it
bears the same relation to tens as three to units. Then
again it is the monthly cycle, and is composed of the
four numbers 1, 4, 9, 16, which are the squares of the
units in order. Not without reason, therefore, does
Heraclitus call the month a generation.
LXXXIX. — In thirty years a man may become a
grandfather.
XC. — M. Antoninus vi. 42. "We all work together to
one end, some consciously and with purpose, others
unconsciously. Just as indeed Heraclitus, I think,
says that the sleeping are co-workers and fabricators
of the things that happen in the world. 31
XCI. — The Law of Understanding is common to all.
Those who speak with intelligence must hold fast to
that which is common to all, even more strongly than
evv'ea rot ^6et yeveag XanepvC,a mpfovr}
av<5f>G)v 7/(3g)vtov • e7ia<pog de re rerpanopav og
rpelg d' ekafyovg 6 nopal; yrjpaGKerat. avrap 6 (poiviij
evvea rovg nopanag ■ Sena (V q/xeig roiig (frolvinag
vv/Lityai evir?i6Ka/Ltot t novpai Aibg atyio^oco.
Censorinus, de D. N. 17.
Compare Plutarch, Plac. Philos. v. 24, p. 909.
LXXXVIIL— Crameri A. P. i. p. 324.
Compare Philo, Qu. on Gen. ii. 5, p. 82 Aucher.
Plutarch, de Orac. def. 12, p. 416.
LXXXIX.— Philo, Qu. in Gen. ii. 5, p. 82 Aucher.
XCL— Stobaeus Florii. iii. 84.
Compare Cleanthes H., Iov. 24.
Hippocrates, tt. rpo^g 15. Plutarch, de Iside 45, p. 369.
Plotinus, Enn. vi. 5, p. 668. Empedocles v. 231 Stein.
ON NATURE. 107
a city holds fast to its law. For all human laws are
dependent upon one divine Law, for this rules as far
as it wills, and suffices for all, and overahounds.
XCIL — Although the Law of Reason is common, the
majority of people live as though they had an under-
standing of their own.
XCIII. — They are at variance with that with which
they are in most continual association.
XCIV. — We ought not to act and speak as though
we were asleep.
XCV.— Plutarch, de Superst. 3, p. 166. Heraclitus
says : To those who are awake, there is one world in
common, but of those who are asleep, each is with-
drawn to a private world of his own.
XCVL— For human nature does not possess under-
standing, but the divine does.
XCIL — Sextus Enip. adv. Math. vii. 133. Context : — For having
thus statedly shown that we do and think everything by participa-
tion in the divine reason, he (Heraclitus), after some previous expo-
sition, adds : It is necessary, therefore, to follow the common (for by
he means 6 Koiv6g t the common). For although the law of
reason is common, the majority of people live as though they had
an understanding of their own. But this is nothing else than an
explanation of the mode of the universal disposition. As far, there-
fore, as we participate in the memory of this, we are true ; but in as
far as we act individually, we are false.
XCIII. — M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context, see frag. 5.
XCIV. — M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context, see frag. 5.
XCV. — Compare pseudo-Pythagoras from Hippolytus, Ref. haer.
vi. 26.
Iamblichus, Protrept. 21, p. 132, Arcer.
X< VJ .— i trigen, c. Cels. vi. 12, p. 201. Context :— Nevertheless he
(Celsus) wanted to show that this was a fabrication of ours and taken
from the Greek philosophers, who say that human wisdom is of one
kind, and divine wisdom of another. And he brings forward some
phrases of Heraclitus, one where he says, "For human nature does
not possess understanding, but the divine does." And another,
"The thoughtless man understands the voice of the Deity as little
as the child understands the man" (—frag. 97).
108 HERACLITUS.
XCVII. — The thoughtless man understands the
voice of the Deity as little as the child understands the
man. 33
XCVIIL— Plato, Hipp. mai. 289 B. And does not
Heraclitus, whom you bring forward, say the same,
that the wisest of men compared with God appears
an ape in wisdom and in beauty and in all other
things ?
XCIX. — Plato, Hipp. mai. 289 A. You are ignorant,
my man, that there is a good saying of Heraclitus, to
the effect that the most beautiful of apes is ugly when
compared with another kind, and the most beautiful
of earthen pots is ugly when compared with maiden-
kind, as says Hippias the wise.
C. — The people must fight for their law as for their
walls.
CI. — Greater fates gain greater rewards.
CII. — Gods and men honor those slain in war.
CHI. — Presumption must be quenched even more
than a fire. 33
XCVII.— Origen, c. Cels. vi. 12, p. 291. Context, see frag. 96.
Compare M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context, see frag. 5.
XCVIIL— Compare M. Antoninus iv. 16.
XCIX.— Compare Plotinus, Enn. vi. 3, p. 626.
Aristotle, Top. iii. 2, p. 117 b 17.
C. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 2. Context : — And he (Heraclitus) used to
say, " It is more necessary to quench insolence than a fire " (=: frag.
103). And, " The people must fight for their law as for their walls."
CI. — Clement of Alex. Strom, iv: 7, p. 586. Context : — Again
Aeschylus, grasping this thought, says, " To him who toils, glory
from the gods is due as product of his toil." " For greater fates gain
greater rewards," according to Heraclitus.
Theodoretus, Therap. viii. p. 117, 33.
Compare Hippolytus, Ref. haer. v. 8.
CII. — Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 4, p. 571. Context : — Heraclitus
said, " Gods and men honor those slain in war."
Theodoretus, Therap. viii. p. 117, 33.
CIII. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 2. Context, see frag. 100.
ON NATURE. 109
CIV. — For men to have whatever they wish, would
not be well. Sickness makes health pleasant and
good ; hunger, satiety ; weariness, rest.
CV. — It is hard to contend against passion, for
whatever it craves it buys with its life.
CVI. — fit pertains to all men to know themselves
and to learn self-control. f
CVll. — t Self-control is the highest virtue, and wis-
dom is to speak truth and consciously to act according
to nature. f 34
CVllI. — It is better to conceal ignorance, but it is
hard to do so in relaxation and over wine.
CIV.— Stobaeus Floril. iii. 83, 4.
Compare Clement of Alex. Strom, ii. 21, p. 497.
Theodoretus, Therap. xi. p. 152, 25. Context : — Heraclitus the
Ephesian changed the name bnt retained the idea, for in the place
of pleasure he put contentment.
CV.— Iamblichus, Protrept. p. 140, Arcer. Context .-—Heraclitus
is a witness to these statements, for he says, "It is hard to contend
against passion," etc.
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. ii. 2, p. 1105 a 8.
Idem, Eth. Eud. ii. 7, p. 1223 b 22.
Idem, Pol. v. 11, p. 1315 a 29.
Plutarch, de Cohib. ira 9, p. 457.
Idem, Erot. 11, p. 755.
Compare Plutarch, Coriol. 22.
Pseudo-Democritus fr. mor. 77, Mullach.
Longinus, de Subl. 44.
C VI.— Stobaeus Floril. v. 119.
CVIL— Stobaeus Floril. iii. 84.
V 111. — Plutarch, Qu. Conviv. iii. proem., p. 644. Context :—
Simonides, the poet, seeing a guest sitting silent at a feast and con-
versing with no one, said, " Sir, if you are foolish you are doing
wisely, but if wise, foolishly," for, as Heraclitus says, "It is better
to conceal ignorance, but it is hard," etc.
Idem, de Audiendo 12, p. 43.
Idem, Virt. doc. posse 2, p. 439.
Idem, from Stob. Floril. xviii. 32.
110 HERACLITUS.
CIX. — fit is better to conceal ignorance than to ex-
pose it.f
CX. — It is law, also, to obey the will of one. 35
CXI. — For what sense or understanding have they ?
They follow minstrels and take the multitude for a
teacher, not knowing that many are bad and few good.
For the best men choose one thing above all — immortal
glory among mortals ; but the masses stuff themselves
like cattle.
CXII. — In Priene there lived Bias, son of Teutamus,
whose word was worth more than that of others.
CXIII. — To me, one is ten thousand if he be the best.
CXIY. — The Ephesians deserve, man for man, to be
hung, and the youth to leave the city, inasmuch as
they have banished Hermodorus, the worthiest man
among them, saying : " Let no one of us excel, and if
CIX.— Stobaeus Floril. iii. 82.
CX.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 718 (Euseb. P. E. xiii. 13,
p. 681). Context, see frag. 65.
CXI. — The passage is restored as above by Bernays (Heraclitea i.
p. 34), and Bywater (p. 43), from the following sources :
Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 9, p. 682.
Proclus in Alcib. p. 255 Creuzer, — 525 ed. Cous. ii.
Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 7, p. 586.
CXII. — Diogenes Laert. i. 88. Context : — And the fault-finding
Heraclitus has especially praised him (Bias), writing, "In Priene
there lived Bias, son of Teutamus, whose word was worth more than
that of others," and the Prienians dedicated to him a grove called
the Teutamion. He used to say, " Most men are bad."
CXIII.— Theodoras Prodromus in Lazerii Miscell. i. p. 20.
Idem, Tetrastich, in Basil. I (fol. k 2 vers. ed. Bas.).
Galenus, rrepl 6iayv6a£ug o(/)vyjuo)v i. 1 ; t. 3, p. 53 ed. Bas.
Symmachus, Epist. ix. 115.
Compare Epigramm. from Diogenes Laert. ix. 16.
Cicero, ad. Att. xvi. 11.
Seneca, Epist. 7.
CXIV. — Strabo xiv. 25, p. 642. Context : — Among distinguished
men of the ancients who lived here (Ephesus) were Heraclitus,
OX NATURE. Ill
there be any such, let him go elsewhere and among
other people."
CXV. — Dogs, also, bark at what they do not know.
CXVI. — By its incredibility, it escapes their knowl-
edge. 36
CXVII. — A stupid man loves to be puzzled by every
discourse.
CXYIII. — The most approved of those who are of
repute knows how to cheat. Nevertheless, justice will
catch the makers and witnesses of lies. 37
CXIX. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 1. And he (Heraclitus)
called the obscure, and Herrnodorus, of whom Heraclitus himself
said, " The Ephesians deserve," etc.
Cicero, Tusc. v. 105.
Musonius from Stob. Floril. xl. 9.
Diogenes Laert. ix. 2.
Iamblichus, de Vit. Pyth. 30, p. 154 Arcer.
Compare Lucian, Vit. auct. 14.
Pseudo-Diogenes, Epist. 28, 6.
CXV. — Plutarch, An seni sit ger. resp. vii. p. 787. Context : — And
envy, which is the greatest evil public men have to contend with, is
least directed against old men. "For dogs, indeed, bark at what
they do not know," according to Heraclitus.
CXVI. —Plutarch, Coriol. 38. Context :— But knowledge of divine
things escapes them, for the most part, because of its incredibility,
according to Heraclitus.
Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 13, p. 699. Context, see Crit. Note 36.
CXVII.— Plutarch, de Audiendo 7, p. 41. Context :— They re-
proach Heraclitus for saying, "A stupid man loves," etc.
Compare idem, de Aud. poet. 9, p. 28.
< XVIII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 1, p. 649. Context :— " The
most approved of those who are of repute knows how to be on his
guard {qv'/.accetv, see Crit. Xote 37). Nevertheless, justice will catch
the makers and witnesses of lies," says the Ephesian. For this
man who was acquainted with the barbarian philosophy, knew of
the purification by fire of those who had lived evil lives, which
afterwards the Stoics called the conflagration (ek~v(>ojcjiv).
' XIX.— Schleiermacher compares Schol. Ven. ad Iliad xviii. 251
and Eustathius, p. 1142, 5 ed. Bom., which, however, By water does
not regard as referring to Heraclitus of Ephesus.
112 HERACLITUS.
used to say that Homer deserved to be driven out of
the lists and flogged, and Archilochus likewise.
CXX.— One day is like all.
CXXI. — A man's character is his daemon. 88
CXXII. — There awaits men after death what they
neither hope nor think.
CXXIII. — And those that are there shall arise and
become guardians of the living and the dead. 39
CXXIV. — Mght-roamers, Magians, bacchanals, rev-
elers in wine, the initiated.
CXX. — Seneca, Epist. 12. Context : — Heraclitus, who got a nick-
name for the obscurity of his writing, said, " One day is like all."
His meaning is variously understood. If he meant all days were
equal in number of hours, he spoke truly. But others say one day
is equal to all in character, for in the longest space of time you
would find nothing that is not in one day, both light and night and
alternate revolutions of the earth.
Plutarch, Camill. 19. Context : — Concerning unlucky days, whether
we should suppose there are such, and whether Heraclitus did right
in reproaching Hesiod who distinguished good and bad days, as
being ignorant that the nature of every day is one, has been
examined in another place.
CXXI.— Plutarch, Qu. Platon. i. 2, p. 999. Context :— Did he,
therefore (viz. Socrates) call his own nature, which was very critical
and productive, God? Just as Menander says, " Our mind is God."
And Heraclitus, " A man's character is his daemon."
Alexander Aphrod. de Fato 6, p. 16, Orell.
Stobaeus Floril. civ. 23. Comp. pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. 9.
CXXII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 22, p. 630. Context :— With
him (Socrates), Heraclitus seems to agree when he says in his dis-
course on men, " There awaits men," etc.
Idem, Protrept. 2, p. 18. Theodoretus, Therap. viii. p. 118, 1.
Themistius (Plutarch) from Stob. Floril. cxx. 28.
CXXIII. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context: — And he
(Heraclitus) says also that there is a resurrection of this visible flesh
of ours, and he knows that God is the cause of this resurrection,
since he says, " And those that are there shall arise," etc.
Compare Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 1, p. 649.
CXXIV.— Clement of Alex. Protrept. 2, p. 18. Context .-—Rites
worthy of the night and of fire, and of the great-hearted, or rather
ON NATURE. 113
CXXV. — For the things which are considered
mysteries among men, they celebrate sacrilegiously.
CXXTI. — And to these images they pray, as if one
should prattle with the houses knowing nothing of
gods or heroes, who they are.
CXXVII. — For were it not Dionysus to whom they
institute a procession and sing songs in honor of the
pudenda, it would be the most shameful action. But
Dionysus, in whose honor they rave in bacchic frenzy,
and Hades are the same. 40
CXXVIII. — Iamblichus, de Mysteriis v. 15. I distin-
guish two kinds of sacrifices. First, those of men
wholly purified, such as would rarely happen in the
case of a single individual, as Heraclitus says, or of a
of the idle-minded people of the Erechthidae, or even of the other
Greeks, for whom there awaits after death what they do not hope
(see frag. 122). Against whom, indeed, does Heraclitus of Ephesus
prophesy? Against night-roamers, Magians, bacchanals, revelers
in wine, the initiated. These he threatens with things after death
and prophesies fire for them, for they celebrate sacrilegiously the
things which are considered mysteries among men (= frag. 125).
CXXA*. — Clement of Alex. Protrept. 2, p. 19. Context, see frag.
124.
Compare Arnobius, adv. Nat. v. 29.
CXXYL— Origen, c. Cels. vii. 62, p. 384.
Idem i. 5, p. 6.
Clement of Alex. Protrept. 4, p. 44. Context :— But if you will
not listen to the prophetess, hear your own philosopher, Heraclitus,
the Ephesian, imputing unconsciousness to images, "And to these
images," etc.
CXXVII. — Clement of Alex. Protrept. 2, p. 30. Context :— In
mystic celebration of this incident, phalloi are carried through the
cities in honor of Dionysus. " For were it not Dionysus to whom
they institute a procession and sing songs in honor of the pudenda,
it would be the most shamful action," says Heraclitus. " But Hades
and Dionysus are the same, to whom they rave in bacchic frenzy,"
not for the intoxication of the body, as I think, so much as for the
shameful ceremonial of lasciviousness.
Plutarch, de Iside 28, p. 362.
114 HERACLITUS.
certain very few men. Second, material and corporeal
sacrifices and those arising from change, such as are
fit for those still fettered by the body.
CXXIX.— Atonements. 41
CXXX. — When defiled, they purify themselves with
blood, just as if any one who had fallen into the mud
should wash himself with mud !
CXXIX. — lamblichus, de Mys. i. 11. Context : — Therefore Hera-
clitus rightly called them (scil. what are offered to the gods) " atone-
ments," since they are to make amends for evils and render the
souls free from the dangers in generation.
Compare Horn. Od. xxii. 481. See Crit. Note 41.
CXXX.— Elias Cretensis in Greg. Xaz. 1. 1. (cod. Vat. Pii. 11, 6,
fol. 90 r). Context : — And Heraclitus, making sport of these people,
says, " When denied, they purify themselves with blood, just as if
any one who had fallen into the mud should wash himself with
mud!" For to suppose that with the bodies and blood of the
unreasoning animals which they offer to their gods they can cleanse
the impurities of their own bodies, which are stained with vile
contaminations, is like trying to wash off mud from their bodies by
means of mud.
Gregory Xaz. Or. xxv. (xxiii.) 15, p. 466 ed. Par. 1778.
Apollonius, Epist. 27.
Compare Plotinus, Enn. i. 6, p. 54.
CKITICAL NOTES. 115
CRITICAL NOTES.
Fragment 1.
Note 1. — Instead of Atfyov, MS has 66j,ua-og } corrected by Bernays,
followed by all critics except Bergk.
Fragment 2.
Note 2. — The teyog of Heraclitus stood for the element of order
or law in the ever-shifting world. Our word Reason may express
the same idea more in accord with the thought of that time (see
Introduction, p. 59 ff.). Zeller and Pfleiderer understand by it,
Reason ruling or immanent in the world ; Heinze, the objective
(unconscious) law of Reason ; Bernays, conscious Intelligence ;
Teichnmller, self-conscious Reason ; Schuster, on the other hand,
regards it as the "revelation offered us by the audible Speech of
Nature." In the present passage, Zeller is inclined to understand
by rov X&yov rovrfe, primarily the discourse of the author, but contain-
ing also the idea of the content of the discourse, i. e. the theory of
the world laid down in his book (Vol. 1, p. 572, 2). For fuller account
of the /o; of, compare Introduction, pp. 8, 12, 28, 45, 59, 61.
Fragment 13.
Note 3. — Bvwater reads, r Oauv dipig clkov fiddrjatg, ravra h/u rrporcfiecj ;
Compare Introduction, p. 19 f.
Fragment 15.
Note 4.— Compare Introduction, p. 48. Bernays (Rhein. Mus.
ix. 261 f.) offers the explanation that the eyes are more exact
witnesses than the ears, because by the eyes we have the only pure
cognition of fire, in the perception of which is the only true
knowledge.
Fragment 18.
Note 5. — See Introduction, p. 36 ff.
Fragment 19.
Note 6. — Common reading has iv to ao<pov eiriaraadai yvuurjv rjre ol
rvfjou -avra 6ta Tc&PTov. Schleiermacher, yvupqv oltj Kvpepvr/oei.
Bernays, §re ouuu&i. Schuster, tjre oln re nvfiepyf/oei.
Fragment 20.
Note 7. — The sense of dirAvrou is uncertain. In the citations
from Plutarch and Simplicius, the word is omitted ; they read
116 HERACLITUS.
kSujuov lovds. Zeller, whose interpretation of the word we have
followed, takes it as masculine, referring to the gods and men, the
meaning then being, that since gods and men are included in the
world as part of it, they could not have created it. Schuster, on the
other hand, renders it as follows: "Die Welt, die alles in sich
befasst [die neben sich weder fur andre Welten noch fur einen
Schopfer Kaumhat]," etc.
Fragment 21.
Note 8. — HpyoTrjp is rendered by Schuster "fiery wind'" such
as forms the stars. Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 588, 1) believes it has essen-
tially the same signification as nepawSg in frag. 28, both words being
other terms for the world-ruling fire or formative principle of the
world.
Fragment 23.
Note 9. — Eusebius omits yv, and is followed by Lassalle and
Heinze. The former (Vol.2, p. 63) translates, "Das Meer wird
ausgegossen und gemessen nach demselben Logos, welcher zuerst
war, ehe es (selbst) noch war," and finds here a confirmation of his
interpretation of the Logos as the eternal preexisting law of the
identity of being and not-being. Heinze understands it as follows :
"Das Meer verwandelt sich in denselben Logos, also in dasselbe
Feuer, von welcher Beschaffenheit es vorher war, ehe es selbst
entstand." Schuster reads yfjv and translates, " Das Meer ergiesst
sich und mmmt sein Maass ein im selben Umfang, wie damals als
noch keine Erde war" (p. 129). Zeller reads yv and understands
the passage to refer to the return of the earth into the sea from
which it sprang. By loyog here he understands "proportion of
magnitude " or "size," so that eg rbv avrbv Xoyov means that the sea
returns "to the same size" as before it became earth (Vol. 1, p.
628, 3).
Fragment 24.
Note 10.— See Introduction, pp. 15, 22, 68.
Fragment 25.
Note 11. — This fragment is not accepted by Zeller, who holds
that air was not recognized by Heraclitus as one of the elements,
but that he accepted only the three, fire, water, and earth. Air
was added, Zeller thinks, by later writers, who confused it with
the " soul " of Heraclitus (Vol. 1, p. 615). Schuster, who thinks Hera-
clitus did not teach a specific number of elements after the manner
of Empedocles, regards the passage as trustworthy (p. 157 ff.).
Teichmuller gives to air an important place in the system of Heracli-
tus, distinguishing the upper pure air, which is not different from
fire, and the impure lower air (Vol. 1, p. 62).
CRITICAL NOTES. 117
Feagmext 27.
Note 12. — Schleiermacher, followed by Mullach, reads riva for
rtc, so that the sense becomes, "How can that which never sets
escape any one?" This is unnecessary and violates the context in
Clement. That which never sets is the eternal Order or Law, con-
ceived here as Destiny or Justice. According to Zeller (Vol. 1, p.
590), that which never sets is fire. According to Schuster (p. 181), it
is Relation or Law. and the r«c refers to Helios, which, though itself
the centre of power and intelligence, is yet subject to law. Teich-
niuller (Vol. 1, p. 1S4) understands it to refer to Justice or Destiny,
which never sets like the sun, and which none can escape.
Feagmext 35.
Note 13. — W/.eiarun' may be taken as neuter: "Hesiod was a
teacher of the greatest number of things." On the unity of day
and night, compare Introduction, p. 32 f .
Feagmext 36.
Note 14. — The original text, which reads onorav ovfijutyy dva/Ltact, has
been variously corrected. As the subject of ovju/uc/y, Schuster inserts
I he sense then being that as wine is mixed with spices and labelled
as any one pleases, so God receives different names under different
forms (p. 188). Bywater, following Bernays (Rhein. Mus. ix. 245),
inserts Oiuua, and Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 602, 2) reads butog hijp for 'okugtcep.
Teichmiiller (Vol. 1, p. 67) attempts to save the original reading by
making 6 fteoc, (*. e. fire) the subject both of aKhnxmrai and ov/u[uyy. The
correction of Bernays is the most satisfactory ; the meaning then
being, that as when perfumes are mixed, the mixture is named
according to the scent that impresses each person, so God is named
according to the attribute that most impresses the individual. Com-
pare frag. 65. About the same sense, however, is derived from the
other readings.
Feagmext 38.
Note 15. — Schleiermacher and Zeller think it doubtful whether
any sense can be made out of this fragment. For Schuster's
fanciful explanation, see Introduction, p. 18 f. Bernays (Rhein.
Mus. ix. p. 265, 6) interprets it to mean that the perception of fire,
upon which depends the existence of the soul, is gained after death
and the extinction of the sense of sight, by the sense of smell, just
as the passage from Aristotle (frag. 37) teaches that in the conflagra-
tion of the world, all perception will be by the nostrils. Pfleiderer
- iggesta dcHowrat for bcfiiovrac.
118 HERACLITUS.
Fragment 40.
Note 16. — Of this passage from Plutarch only the words oKidvyai ml
awdyei, Trpoaetai km anew, can with any certainty be attributed directly
to Heraclitus. The rest bears marks of later hands, as shown by
Bernays (Heraklit. Brief e, p. 55), and Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 576, 2).
Fragment 45.
Note 17. — Bernays' explanation of this passage (Rhein. Mus. vii.
p. 94 ; compare Introduction, p. 44 f .) has been followed by Zeller,
Schuster (partly), and Arnold Hug. According to this interpretation,
the association of the bow and lyre lies in their form, which in
the case of the old Greek or Scythian bow with its arms bent back
at the ends, was like that of the lyre. Hence we have in the bow
and the lyre, two distinct illustrations of harmony by opposite
straining tension. Lassalle (Vol. 1, p. 113) understands it to refer to
the harmony between the bow and the lyre ; the bow and the lyre
being symbols in the Apollo cult, the one of singularity and differ-
ence, the other, of universality and union. On Pfleiderer's modi-
fication of Lassalle' s view, see Introduction, p. 44. In place of
ro^ov ml /ivpvs, Bast reads rov btjiog te ml paphg. Bergk conjectures
t6£ov mi vsvpf/g. On the interpretation of this passage by Plutarch
and Plato's Eryximachus as the harmony of sharps and flats in
music, compare Hug (Platons Symposion, p. 77, 5) and Zeller (Vol.
1, p. 578, 2). Compare frags. 56, 43, 59.
Fragment 47.
Note 18. — Schuster (p. 24, note) reads k tI yap <pw'w, dp/novirj b<pav?/g
fyaveprjQ upelrrcov ; See Introduction, p. 20, and Zeller, Vol. 1, p. 604, 1.
Fragment 50.
Note 19. — MS reads ypa<pitov • Duncker and Bywater, yva^euv ;
Bernays, yva&elu.
Fragment 55.
Note 20. — The common reading is ^dv ipvrerbv ttjv yrjv ve^rac, which
Zeller retains, understanding it to refer to the beastliness of men,
who "feed upon the earth like the worm " (Vol. 1, p. 660). Pfleiderer
likewise accepts this reading, quoting Sallust, Catil. 1 : Vitam
silentio transeunt veluti pecora, quae natura prona atque ventri
obeclientia finxit. That irforyy, the reading of Stobaeus, followed by
Bywater, is correct, however, is shown by comparison with iEschylus,
Ag. 358, &ibg TTAaydv exovatv e'melv, and Plato's Criti. 109 B, Kaddrrep
TTOifieveg ktt/vt] 7TAr/-yy ve/uovreg. With this reading, the sense then
becomes that man is subject to eternal divine force or law.
CRITICAL NOTES. 119
Fragment 56.
Note 21. — Compare frag. 45 and note 17. By water reads ttoMvtqvoz
apuoi'lr], here : but though in three passages, those namely given
under this fragment, -a/.ivrovoc is found in the MSS, yet the context
even in Plutarch, where sharps and flats are spoken of, calls for the
meaning "harmony of oppositions," as explained in note 17, for
which we should expect -a'/.ivrpo-og rather than waUvrovog.
Feagmext 60.
Note 22. — \Vhat is referred to by ravra^ " these things," has been
questioned. Teichmiiller, followed by Pfleiderer, has given the true
explanation. Tovra refers to some idea the opposite of "justice."
Clement is illustrating the Pauline principle that without law there
would have been no sin. For this, Heraclitus, whose prominent
thought was, no war without peace, no good without bad, etc., served
him as good authority.
Feag^iext 62.
Note 23. — The original text is as follows : El 6s xpv tov ttoXs/iov
eovra ^vvbv ml dinr/v epelv nal yivo/ieva rrdvra kcit' spiv nal xps&fieva.
Schleiermacher proposes elSkvai for el 6s and eptv for epslv, and has
been followed by Zeller, Bywater and others. Schuster retains the
MS form in the first clause. Xpsu^sva also gives trouble. Brandis
proposes cu^ousva. Schuster reads Karaxpsuusva, approved by Zeller.
Lassalle and Bywater retain ^ewuem. This passive use is unusual,
but possible, as shown by the analogy of mraxpe6/isva. The transla-
tions of Schuster and Lassalle are as follows :
Schuster (p. 198) — " In dem Falle muss man also dengemeinsamen
Krieg sogar Recht nennen und [sagen] das alles [nur] in Folge des
Streites entsteht und sich aufbraucht."
Lassalle — "Man muss wissen dass der Krieg das Gemeinsam 1st,
und der Streit das Recht, und dass nach dem Gesetz des Streits alles
wird und verwendet wird (or lit. und sich bethatigt)."
S in this passage has almost the signification "common good."
Feagmext 64.
Xote 24. — Critics have expended their ingenuity in trying to make
something out of this obscure fragment. Teichmiiller (Vol. 1, p. 97
ff .) says that we have here the distinction of the intelligible from the
sensible world. The former is the pure, light, fiery and most incor-
poreal being, compared with which the world of the senses is death.
Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 051) similarly refers it to the testimony of the
senses, which see the world as something "stiff and dead," when
really even-thing is in constant motion. Schuster (p. 276) labors
with a far-fetched interpretation to show that the passage does not
120 HERACLITUS.
cast any disparagement upon the senses. For Pfleiderer's explana-
tion, see Introduction, p. 43. All these interpretations look for a
theoretical meaning, when it is quite possible that no theoretical
meaning was intended. It is simpler to compare it with frag. 2, and
refer it to Heraclitus' repeated charge against the people, of their
sleep-like condition when awake.
Fragment 65.
Note 25. — We have followed Schuster's punctuation of this frag-
ment. Bywater, with other critics, reads, n Ev to cocpbv fiovvov
Xeyeadai ovk kdeXei icai sdeAet, Zrjvbq ovvojua. To oo(f>6v, here, is the world-
ruling Wisdom or Order, to which Heraclitus applies many names.
(See Introduction, p. 60 f .) It wills and wills not to be called by
the name of Zeus, because that name, while it points towards
its true nature, yet but partly indicates it, or in part wrongly.
The variety of meanings, however, which have been drawn from
this fragment may be shown by the following translations. Schlei-
ermacher (and Lassalle) : "Das Eine Weise allein will nicht
ausgesprochen werden und will ausgesprochen werden, der Name
des Zeus." Schuster: " Nur eines ist die Weisheit ; sie lasst
sich nicht und lasst sich doch auch wieder benennen mit des
Zeus Namen." Bernays : " Eines, das allein Weise, will und will
auch nicht mit des 7>yv Namen genannt werden." The poetical
form Zrjvog is chosen, thinks Bernays, to indicate that the One Wise
is the source of "life." Zeller : "Eines, das allein Weise, will und
will auch nicht mit dem Namen des Zeus benannt werden."
Pfleiderer: "Als Eins will das weise Allwesen, Zeus genannt, nicht
bezeichnet werden und will es." Teichmuller : "Die Weisheit,
Zeus genannt, will allein eins heissen und will es auch nicht."
Fragment 72.
Note 26. — This fragment is connected by Schuster and Zeller with
the group of passages concerning rest in change (see frags. 82, 83),
and refers to the pleasure which the rest and change of death bring
to souls. They therefore reject the fj-v Odvarov of Numenius as not
Heraclitic. (Schuster, p. 191, 1. Zeller, p. 647, 2.) Pfleiderer, how-
ever (p. 222), retains the /u?) Odvarov as genuine, and explains that it
is a pleasure to souls to become wet, because so by pursuing the way
down into apparent death, they attain their new birth of life in
death. He therefore retains also the repipcv tie elvai avralg ri]v elg r?jv
ykveoLv TTTuoiv, of Nunienius, as expressing the true sense of the
passage.
Fragment 74.
Note 27. — The added clause of Plutarch, "It flashes through the
body like lightning through the clouds," is also regarded by Schleier-
macher, Schuster, Zeller, and Pfleiderer, as Heraclitic.
CRITICAL NOTES. 121
The similarity of the three fragments 74, 75, and 76 suggests, of
course, that they are all corrupted forms of a common original.
Bywater, however, accepts the form of expression in frag. 74 as
surely Heraclitic and marks the other two as doubtful. Schleier-
macher, from the number of citations of each of these fragments,
concludes that Heraclitus had expressed himself in each of these
three forms. Lassalle, in agreeing with him, believes also that
Heraclitus, who was given to playing upon words (for further
examples of Heraclitus' puns, compare frags. 91, 101, 127, 66), not
without purpose chose the words ainj and aby/j, and sees in the use of
the latter word a reference to the lightning-like movement of the
soul (Vol. 2, p. 196 f .). Zeller thinks it difficult to determine the
original form, but he does not regard the proposition aby?) gyp?) tpvxv
GOQu-ari), as Heraclitic (Vol. 1, p. 643, 2).
Fragment 77.
Note 2S. — The original of this difficult and corrupted passage as it
appears in Clement, is as follows (unpunctuated), *Av8po)7rog kv eixppovy
<pdog drzTErai eavrti a-odavuv a^oa^Eaddg £c)v 6e dnreTat redtteuroq evduv
a-oc^Ecdelg 6\pEig kyprjyopug aTzrerat evdovrog. Various emendations and
translations of this have been made. Compare Schuster, p. 271 ;
Pfleiderer, p. 204, 1. Bywater, however, finally rescues as Hera-
clitic the form given above in the text.
Fragment 80.
Note 29. — That this fragment is to be taken in the sense in which
Diogenes understands it, rather than in that of Plutarch, is held by
Schuster (p. 61) and Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 654, 4). Lassalle (Vol. 1, p.
301), following Schleiermacher, takes it as Clement does, in the sense
of the Delphic inscription, "I have sought myself in the general
flux of things, I have striven to know myself." For Pfleiderer's inter-
pretation and the true meaning, see Introduction, pp. 41, 48.
Fragment 82.
Note 30. — Lassalle, following Creuzer, reads dyxeodai instead of
apxecVai (Vol. 1, p. 131.)
Fragment 90.
Note 31.— Lassalle (Vol. 1, p. 290) interprets this fragment as
follows : In waking, we distinguish our own representations from the
objective world common to all. In sleeping, they are one and the
same. Hence Heraclitus says the sleeping make their own world.
Similarly Pfleiderer (p. 202 f.) understands Heraclitus to mean that
the sleeper makes his own world, while the waking man is con-
scion- thai corresponding to liis world of ideas there is a common
122 HERACLITUS.
objective world. Pfleiderer rejects ml owepyovc as an addition of
Aurelius.
Feagment 97.
Note 32. — This fragment has given trouble. Bernays (Heraclitea
15) proposes to substitute Safaovog for dai/iovog, but has not been followed
by other critics. Schleiermacher translates, " Ein thorichter Mann
vernimmt nicht niehr von Schicksal als ein Kind von einem Mann."
Schuster (p. 342) renders, "Der Mensch in seiner Kindheit hat (sie
[». e. the names]) von Gott gehort, wie (jetzt) das Kind von dem
Manne," and finds here support for the theory of the natural fitness
of names (see Introduction, p. 16), which primitive man learned
directly from Nature. Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 653) refers it to the childish
want of reason in man, which does not perceive the voice of the
deity. Pfleiderer (p. 51) renders, "Der unverstandige Mensch hat
von jeher nur soviel von der Gottheit gehort, als ein Kind vom
Manne."
Feagment 103.
Note 33. — "Tfipiv here is to be taken in the sense of excess of self-
assertion, the private will against the universal Law. Compare
frags. 92, 104, etc.
Feagment 107.
Note 34. — The latter clause may also be translated, "Wisdom is
to speak and act truly, giving ear to Nature."
Feagment 110.
Note 35. — Clementine MS reads j3ova?). Eusebius, followed by all
but Mullach, reads fiovli}. For Heraclitus' opinions on democracy,
see, further, frags. 114, 113.
Feagment 116.
Note 36. — The passage in Clement is as follows : alia rd fiev rfjq
yvcicecog fiadrj npimreiv aiucr'tr] ayaOrj, /ca0' 'Hpanleirov ■ cutict'it/ yap diatyvyyavet
fir) yiyvuGneodai, from which it is seen that the words of Heraclitus, dniariij
6ta(j)vyydvet (ir) yiyvuGaecdai, were differently understood by Clement and
Plutarch. Schuster (p. 72) accepts the Clementine form, and regards the
whole passage as Heraclitic, and renders, "Die Tiefe der Erkenntniss
zu verbergen, das ist ein gutes Misstrauen. Denn durch diese miss-
trauische Behutsamkeit entgeht man dem Schicksal durchschaut zu
werden," by which he accounts for the (intentional) obscurity of
Heraclitus' writings. Zeller (Vol. 1, p. 574, 2), following Schleier-
macher, rejects the Clementine version, and regards the words as
teaching that truth is hidden from the masses because it seems
incredible to them. A still different meaning may be found in the
words if we take aiuoTirj as subjective, referring to the want of faith
which prevents us from seeing truth.
CRITICAL NOTES. 123
Fragment 118.
Note 37. — The common reading is, doneovruv 6 donifiu-aroc ytvacnei.
fvXaaaetv, which makes nonsense. Schleiermacher proposes doKtovra 6
doKtuoraroc y/vucKEiv dv/.dcaeiv. Schuster (p. 340) suggests, Sokeov-ov, 6
doKiuurarov yivercu, ytv&GKEt <pv/daoen>, and fancies the allusion is to the
poets, who from credible things accept that which is most credible.
Bergk, followed by Pfleiderer, reads $kv&oaeiv, to talk nonsense.
Bernays, followed by Bywater, reads Tzldaaeiv.
Fragment 121.
Note 38. — This fragment has been variously translated, but the
meaning seems to be that a man's God or Destiny depends not upon
external divine powers, but upon his own inner nature. Teichmiiller
finds here the further meaning that the essence of mind is the
essence of deity.
Fragment 123.
Note 39. — The meaning of this passage is very doubtful. We have
followed Bernays' reading instead of the common evda dedvn, which
Bywater retains, although he marks it uncertain. Schuster (p. 176, 1)
suggests \6aifxuv kdk\Ei\ hvdade kdvn hrzuGraadai ml (pvAatibg k. t. A. Zeller
(Vol. 1, p. 648, 4) regards it as a reference to the daemons who are
made protectors of men. Lassalle (Vol. 1, p. 185) thinks it refers to
a resurrection of souls.
Fragment 127.
Note 40. — For text and discussion of this passage, see Introduction,
p. 52 ff . Teichmiiller' s interpretation of it is as follows : " Wenn es
nicht Dionysus ware, demsiedie Procession fiihren und dabeidas Lied
auf die Schamglieder singen, so ware das Schamloseste ausgef iihrt.
Nun aber, ist Hades (der Sohn der Scham) derselbe wie Dionysus,
dem sie rasen und Feste feiern." This means, says Teichmiiller,
that the shameful and the becoming are the same (Identification
of opposites). For what is improper for men is proper for Dionysus,
because he is the same as Hades, and Hades is the same as shame,
which latter he attempts to prove from Plutarch, de Is. 29 b. Again,
Dionysus and Hades are the same, because the former stands for the
sun and the latter for the lower world, and as the sun is absorbed
into the earth at night and generated therefrom in the morning,
they must be essentially the same. (Neue Studien, Vol. 1, p. 25.)
Fragment 120.
Note 41. — That the use of this term was ironical, is made probable
by the following fragment.
124 HERACLITUS.
HPAKAEITOY E$E2IOY
nEPI 3>Y2EQ2.
I. Ovk efiev dXXd tov \6yov aKovaravras Sfiokoyeeiv cro(pov eVrt, ev rravra
eivai.
II. Tov 8e Xoyov ravd iovTOS alel d^vveroi ylyvovrai dvdpeoTToi Ka\
npoo-dep fj d<ovaai kol aKovaavTes to Trpcorov. yivopevoov yap ttuvtcov Kara
tov Xoyov TovBe cmzipoio~i ioiKaari napapevoi kou eirecov /cat epycov toiovtccov
oko'kov iya> dirjyevpai., diaipecov €<aaTov /caret (pvcriv kcu cppdfav okcos e^ei.
rovs 8e ciXXovs dv6pa>7rovs Xavddvei 6/cocm eyepdevTts ttouovo~i, o/ccooTrep
OKocra €v8ovt€? €7riXav6dvovTai.
III. 'AgvveToi aKovcravTes Kcocpolai eoUavi ' obdris avrolai papTvpeei
napeovTas direivai.
I V . Ka/cot pdpTvpes dv0pd>7roicri dcpdaXpol /cat cora, fiapfidpovs yjsvxds
exdvTwv.
V. Ov (ppoveovcri Toiavra noXXol OKoaoiai eyKvpe'ovo~i ovde paSovres
yivooo'Kovo'i, €(ovtoIo~i 8e doKeovcri.
VI. 'A/coOtrat ovk emorafievoi ovd sinew.
VII. 'Eav prj eXnTjat, dv£Xmo~Tov ovk e^evprjaei, dve^epevvrjTov ibv kcu
atropov.
VIII. Xpvabv oi 8i£rjpevoi yrjv noXXrjv opvacrovcri kcu euptV/covcri dXiyov.
IX. 'Ayxifia<rir}v.
X. Qvo-ts KpvTTTeadat cptAet.
XI. O aval; ov to fiavreiov eari to iv AeXqbols, ovre Xeyei ovtc Kpxmrei,
dXXd crrjpalvet.
XII. 2i(BvXXa 8e p.aivop.ev(o aTopari dyeXacrTa kcu a/caAXaOTtara /cat
dpvpicrTa (pdeyyopivr) ^tXtW eTeeov e£t/cyeerat Trj (fycovrj did tov 8z6v.
XIII. "Ocrcov oyjns a/coi) pdBrjais, ravra eyco 7rpoTipe<a.
XIV. PolybillS iv. 40 : tovto yap 'iBiov eon Toav vvv Kaipav, iv ols
ndvTcov 7tX(oto>v /cat nopevTtov ytyovoTaw ovk dv eVt irpeTiov etr/ noirjTa'is /cat
TEXT. 125
p.v6oypdqbois xprjcrdat pdpTvat ircpi tcov ayvoovfievav, bnep 01 irpb fj/xcov TiepX
T<Mf 7rXei'crrcoz', drrioTovs dpcftta^TjTovpercov TTape\6p.evoi fiefiaiozTas Kara tov
'HpdickeiTov.
AN . '0(p$a.\[jLo\ Ttcv cotooi' aKpifieorepoi pdpTvpes.
AN I. TIo\vp.adii] voov e\etv ov ^LddaKd ' 'HcrioSov yap av tdida^e xa\
H\Bay6pT)v avr'is re Sevocpdvea kci\ 'Enaralov.
A \ 11. Ill dayoprjs Mvr]o~dpxov laToplrjv rjo~Kr]o~e dv6pa>jroiv p,d\io~Ta
Trdi'Toiv. kci\ eK.\e£dp.evos ravras ras avyypcupas cVoujcre ecovrov crocpirjv,
— n\i padtrjv, KaKOT€\i'iT]v.
A \ 111. 'Okoctcov Xdyovs fjicovaa ovdels dcpiKveerai es tovto, wart
yild)(TK(ll> OTl aOCJiOV ioTl TTaVTCOV K^)(0ipl(TpeVOV.
aIA. Ej/ to aocpdv, eTTiaTncrdat yvd>p.rjv tj nvQepvarai ndvra did ndvrcov.
A A. Kdcrpov <C TovSe > tov avTov aTravTav ovre tis dewv ouTe dvOpchwcov
e~oirjae, aXX tjv alel kol eo~Ti kol earai rrvp deifaov, dnTop-evov p.eTpa Kal
d7Too-j3evvvp.evov p.€Tpa.
A A I. Ilvpbs TpoTToi TTpwrov 6d\aaaa ' BaXdaarjs 8e to pev rjpiav yrj,
to 8e rjpio~v 7rpr]crTT)p.
A A II. Ilvpbs dj/rapa/Sercu irdvTa Ka\ nvp dnavTcov, cbcnrep xP V0 ~°v
XpTjp,aTa Kal xp^pdrcov XP V<J ° S '
AA.III. GdXacrcra Sta^eerai ko.\ perpeerai (S top clvtov \6yov oxolos
irpoaBev fjv *] yeve'aOai JyrjJ.
AA1\ . XpT]0~p,00-VVT] . . . <dpos.
AAV. Z]j jrvp rbv yr/s ddvaTov, koa dr)p £?/ top nvpbs Sdvarov' vdcop
& tov depos BdvaTOV) yrj rbv vdaTOS.
A AN I. Hdvra to ni/p eneXObv xpiveei Kai KaTaXij^/eraL.
AAV I J. To p.T) 8vVOV 7TOT€ TTOiS UV TIS XdOoi ]
A AN III. Td de navra olaK^ei xepavvos.
AAIA. ''HXtoy o&x imepftrjcreTai perpa ' el fie p.r}, 'Epivves piv diKrjs
(TTLKOvpoi f^evpr/aovo-L.
AAA. 'Hots' Acai eoTre prjs Teppura 1) &pKTOS t ku\ aVTtOP TTJS apKTOV ovpos
ulBpiov Aids.
A A A I. E< pi] rjKins rju, evrppdvt) uv rjv.
126 HERACLITUS.
XXXII. Neoy i(p ypepr] rjXios.
XXXIII. Diogenes Laert. i. 23 : bo K el be (scil. eaX^s) Kard
rivas npcoTos d(rrpoXoyrjcrai Kal fjXiaKas eKXei\J/eis Kal r ponds rrpoemelv, &$
(prjffiv ~Evbr)pos iv rrj nepl rcov darpoXoyovpe'voav Icrropia ' 66ev avrbv kcu
3evo(pdvr)s Kal 'Hpoboros 6avpd£ei, paprvpel §' avra> kcu 'HpdickeiTOS kcu
&T]pOKpiTOS.
XXXIV. Plutarchus Qu. Plat. viii. 4, p. 1007: oiW oZv
dvaymlav npbs rbv ovpavbv %x a>v (TvpivKoKqv kcu o~vvappoyr)v 6 xpdvos ovx
d7r\cos icrri Kivrjcris dXX , coanep eiprjrai, klvtjo-is iv rd£ei perpov ixovar} kcu
nepara kcu 7repiobovs. hv 6 tfXios iniardTTjs a>v kcu ckottos, opi^eiv kcu
ftpafieveiv kcu dvabeiKvvvai kcu dvacpaiveiv perafioXas kcu copas at ndvra
<pepovo~i, Kad 'HpaKXeirov, ovbe <pavXa>v ovbe piKpcov, dXXd ra>v peyiaroov
Kal Kvpicordrcov r&> fjyepovi Kal irpcorco deep yiverai crvvepyos.
XXX V. Aibdo-KaXos be irXeio-rfov 'Hcrt'oSoy ' rovrov emcnavrai nXelara
eibe'vai, octtis rjpeprjv kcu eveppovrjv ovk iyivoacrKt ' eo~ri yap ev.
XXX VI. *0 debs qpe'prj eveppovq, x €l t x " >v depos, noXepos elprjvrj, Kopos
Xipos ' dXXoiovrat be oKcoanep OKorav o-vppiyrj < dvcopa > dvapacri '
dvopd£erai Kad fjbovrjv eKaarov.
XXXVII. Aristoteles de Sensu 5, p. 443 a 21 : boKel b } ivlois
r) Kanvdibrjs dvadvpiaois elvai oo-pr), ovcra koivtj yijs re Kal depos. Kal
7rdvT€s imcpepovrai irrl rovro nepl oaprjs ' bib Kal HpaKXetros ovrcos
e'lprjKev, &>$• el rrdvra ra ovra Kairvbs yevoiro, plves civ biayvoiev.
XXXVIII. At -v/ru^ai oapcovrai Kad' qbrjv.
XXXIX. Ta \jsvxpd deperai } deppbv ^u^erat, vypbv avalverai, Kap-
cpaXeov vorl£erai.
XL. 2K[8vr)(ri Kal crvvdyei, npocreiaL Kal a7re«7i.
XLI. Tlorapoto-i bis roiai avroloi ovk civ epfialrjs ' erepa yap < Kal
erepa^> imppeei vbara.
XJulI. *f Horapoio-i rolci avTolac epftaivovaiv erepa Kal erepa vbara
eivippel \.
XLIII. Aristoteles Eth. Eud. vii. *-, p. 1235 a 26 : Kal 'HpdK-
Xeiros eTTiripa r© Troii)<ravri' a)? epis €K re Qecov Kal dvOpcairuiv ottoXoito '
ov yap dv eivai dppovlav pr) ovros d£eos Kal {5apeos } ovbe ra £<fa dvev
SfjXeos Kal dppevos, evavricov ovro&v.
TEXT. 127'
XL J \ . JJoXepos navTcov pev 7rnr/;p icrri navTcov hk (3ao~iXevs, Kal tovs
p.kv deovs efiet£e tovs 8e dpdpcoTrovs, tovs fxev SovXovs eTroirjae tovs 8e
eXtvdepovs.
aL\ . Ov £vvlacri okcos diacfiepoucvov ((ovtoZ 6/zoAoye'a ' naXipTponos
dppOVlt) OK(00-7T€p to£ov Kal Xvprjs.
XLVI. Aristoteles Eth. Nic. viii. 2, p. 1155 b 1 : K al wept
avT&v TovTGiv dvooTepov €ni£r)TOvo-i Kal (pvo~iK<x>Tepov ' ILvpnriSrjs ftev
(f)do~KO)v epav pev op.j3pov yalav ^TjpavQelaav, epav 8e o~€p,vov ovpavov nXr]-
povpevov opfipov 7T€0~e'iv es yalav ' ko.1 'HpaKkeiTos to dvTi^ovv avp-Cpepov,
Kal (k tcov diacfrepovToov KaXXicrTrjv app-oviav, Kal ndvTa naT epiv ytveadai.
\L> V II. 'Appovirj (iqt)avr]S cpavepijs Kptlo-o'oov.
XL V III. Mj^Mki] nepl tcov p-eyio-Tcov o-vp.j3aXeop.tda.
XLlA. Xpr) eu p.dXa ttoXXqw laropas (piXocroqbovs dvdpas eivai.
L. Tvacpeoov 686s evdua kcu aKoXir) p.ia eort kcu tj avrr].
Jul. "Ovoi crvpp.aT dv eXoiVTO p.dXXov r) %pvcr6v.
JL11. QdXaaaa vdcop KadapdoraTov Kal /juapeoTaTov, Ixdvai p,ev 7roTip.ov
Kal acoTrjpiop, dvdpomois t)e cittotov koi oXedpiov.
LIU. Columella de R. R. viii. 4 : siccus etiam pulvis et cinis,
ubicuuque cohortem porticus vel tectum protegit, iuxta parie-
tes repouendus est, ut sit quo aves se perfundant: nam his
rebus plumam pirmasque emendant, si modo credimus Ephesio
Heraclito qui ait: sues coeno, cohortales aves pulvere (vel
cinere) lavari.
LIV. Bnpfiopoo ^a/peti/.
L V . T\dv (pirtTov TrXrjyri vep-erai.
L \ I. HakivrpoTTos dpp.ovir) Koo~p.ov OKcoanep Xvprjs Kal to£ov.
L\ II. ' Ayadov Kal KaKov tovtov.
LV11L Hippolytus Ref. haer. ix. 10: Kal dyadbv Kal kuk6p
(SCll. ei/ f'crn)" ol yovv larpot, cprjalv 6 'Hpa/cXeirof, TtpvovTts KaiovTts
TTfivrr] jUacravl^ovres kokws tovs appooaTovvTas enaiTiwvTai p.rj8ev' Sl£iov
yuadov Xapfitiveiv Tiapa to>v dppoooTOvvToov, ravTa cpya£dpevot tu dyad a kcu
"' Tin v6vo\
128 HERACLITUS.
LIX. TZwd^reias ovXa Kal ov)(l ovXa, trvpcpepopevov biacpepopevov,
avvabov biabov ' eK irdvrcov ev Kal e£ evbs ndvra.
IjX. Alktjs ovvopa ovk av fjbeaav, el ravra prj rjv.
LXI. Schol. B. in II. iv. 4, p. 120 Bekk. : riV/Wr (paaiv, el
repvei rovs Beovs rroXepcov Bea. aXX ovk aTrpenes ' ret yap yevvala epya
repnei. ciXXcos re noXepoi kcu pd^ai rjp.lv pev beivd boKel, rco be Beep ovbe
ravra beivd. avvreXel yap diravra 6 Beds npds dppoviav rcov SXcov, oIkovo-
pcov rd trvpcfiepovra, direp Ka\ Hpa/cXetro? Xe'yet, cos rco pev Beep KaXa ndvra
ko.1 dyaOd Ka\ biKaia, avBpconoi be a pev abiKa vTreiXi-jCpacnv, a be biKaia.
LXII. ~Elbevai XP1 rov ndXepov eovra ^vvdv, koX btKrjv epiv ' ko.1 yivo-
, > j, \ 4. / 4.
peva Travra Kar epiv Kai j %pecopeva f .
LXIII. "Eoti yap elpappeva 7ravrccs * .
LXI V . Qdvards ecrri OKotra eyepBevres opeopev, 6/cocra be evbovres
V7TVOS*
LX V . Ei> to trocpdv povvov ' XeyecrBai ovk eBeXei Kal eBeXei Zrjvbs
ovvopa.
LX V I. Tov /3iou ovvopa (3tos, epyov be Bdvaros.
LX V II. 'ABdvaroi Bvrjroi, Bvrjrol dBdvaroi, £covres rov eKeivcov Bdvarov
rov be eKeivcov (3lov reBvewres.
LX V III. tyvxi)o~i yap Bdvaros vbcop yeve'crBai, vbari be Bdvaros yrjv
yevetrBai ' eK yr)s be vbcop yiverai, e£ vbaros be yj/vxr).
LXIX. 'Obos civco Kara) pia Ka\ covrrj.
LXX. Svvov apx?) Kal ire pas.
LiXXl. tyv^s Tveipara ovk av e^evpoio ndaav eTvnropevdpevos obdv.
LXXII. tyvxrjtTi repyjsis vyprjcri yevetrBai.
LXXIII. 'Avrjp okot av peBvaBrj, ayerai vtto naibos dvr](Sov trcpaXXd-
pevos, ovk e7ralcov okt) ftaivei, vyprjv rrjv y\rvx^]V e)(cov.
LiXXl V . Avrj yjsvxr) cTOCpcordrr) Kal dpicrrr).
L/XXV. J Avyrj £r)prj yjsvxr) aocpcordrrj ko.1 dpiarrjj.
JjXX V I. "f Ov yrj £r)pr), yf/vx^j cTocpcordrr] Kal aplcrrrj J.
LXXVII. "AvBpco7ros, okcos ev evcppdvrj cfidos, anrerai airoo-fievvvrai.
LXXVIII. Plutarchus Consol. ad Apoll. 10, p. 106: wore ydp
ev fjptv avro7s ovk ecrnv 6 Bdvaros ', ko.1 rj cpijaiv HpaKXeiros, ravr eivai
TEXT. 129
(gov koi Te6prjKos, koi to eyprjyopos icai to Ka8ev8ou, na\ vtov nai ytjpaiov '
Tiide yap peraneo-opTa eneivd f'ort KaKeipa ndXip peTinreaopTa Tavra.
LXXIX. At coy ncils eo~ri waifap ireo-aeviop ' rraiSbs fj /3acr 1X771/7.
LAAA. *E8i£r)0~dpr)p e'pecovTOP.
LXXXI. TloTapo'iai rotcri avTolai epfiaipopep re ko\ ovk ep.j3aipop.ev,
elpep re Kal ovk elpep.
LA A All. Kdparos eo~Ti tois avTols pox^elp kuI iipx*o~6ai.
LAAAI1I. MerafidXXop dpanaveTai.
LXAAlv . Kai 6 KVKeaiv dtioTuTai. prj Kipeopepos.
LXXX V . Neicves Koirplayp eK^XrjTOTepoi.
L AAA VI. Tepopevoi £d>eip edeXovai popovs r e\€iv ' paXXop 8e
dpaTraieaOai, koi iraldas KaTaXeiirovoi popovs yeptodai.
LXXXVII. Plutarchus de Orac. def. 11, p. 415: ol piv
" fjfavTOS " dpayipaaKOPTts (apud Hesiod. fr. 163 Goettling) cttj
TpiaKovra ttolovcti ttjp yepeap Kad HpaK.XeiTOP ' ip io xpopco yeppapra
naptx^i top e'£ avTov yeyepvqpepop 6 yepprjcras.
LXXXYIII. Io. Lydus de Mensibns iii. 10, p. 37 ed. Bonn :
6 TpuiKOPTa dpidpbs (pvaiKOiTaTos earTip ' b yap ip popdai Tpids, tovto e'p
deKaai TpiaKOprds. eVel Kal 6 tov prjpos kvkXos o~vpeo-TT)K€P ck Teaadpiop
tcov dno popddos e^rjs TtTpayaipiop a', 8', & , iC'. oBep ovk dno o~KOiroi
' HpaK.XeiTos yepeap top prjva KaXel.
LXXXIX. Ex homine in tricennio potest avus haberi.
XC. M. AntoniuilS Vi. 42: Trdpres els ep dnoTeXeo-pa ovpepyovpev,
ol pep el8oTO)? Kal 7rapaKoXovdrjTiKcbs , ol 8e dpeTTio-TaTus ' coaTrep Kal tovs
Ka6ev8opTas, oipai, 6 'HpaKXeiTos e'pydras elpai Xeyei Kal avpepyovs tcov
('v rep Korrpco yivopeviop.
XGI. "Evpop eori naai to (ppopeeiv. £vp poio Xeyopras lo-\vp'i(ea6ai
XPh TCO £vi/<ju ndpToip, OKOicnrep popio noXts Ka\ noXv la)(v pore pas. Tpe-
(poprat yap irdpres ol dpSpconeiot popoi vno epos tov Qelov ' Kpareei yap
tooovtop OKncrop eOeXei Kal e^apKeei ndai ko.1 nepiyipeTai.
A CI J. ToO Xbyov 8' e'bvTos £vpov, (woven ol ttoXXoi 10s 18itjp e\0VTts
q^pfhrjaip.
XCIII. 'fit pdXio-Tii 8irjveK(ios bpiXeovai } TOVTta 8ia(pepoprai.
130 HERACLTTUS.
XOI V . Ov del cocmep Ka&evbovTas noielv <a\ Afc-yeii/.
XOV. Plutarchus de Superst. 3, p. 166 : 6 'HpdKXeiTos $770-1,
toIs eyprjyopoatv eva kcu koivov Kocrpov eivai, twv de KOipa>pe'va>v eKatrrov
els 'idiov dnoo-TpecpecrBai.
XC V I. 'H#os yap avBpameiov pev ovk e\ei yvo>pas, Belov he e^«.
XOV11. 'Avrjp vrjnios fjicovae jrpos datpovos oKaxnrep 7rals Trpos dvbpos.
XC VIII. Plato Hipp. mai. 289 B : rj ov ko.1 'HpaKXeiTos tuvtov
tovto Xeyei, ov crv endyei, oti dvBpwTrcov 6 crocpcoTaTos npbs Bebv niBrjKos
(pavelrai kcl\ aocpta kcu KaXXei Kai toIs aXXois ndaiv ',
XOIX. Plato Hipp. mai. 289 A : Z> avBpome, dyvoels oti to tov
VlpaickeLTOv ev e^«, cos apa TTiBfjKtiiv 6 ko.XXio~tos alo~xpbs dXXco yevei
avpfidXXeiv, kcu xyTpmv r) KaXXicrTi] alo~xpd TvapBevoov yevei crvpjSdXXeiv, &s
<pr)o~iv lmvlas 6 crocpos.
0. Md^ecrdai xph T0V drjpov vTrep tov vopov okcos vnep Tei^eos.
01. Mopoi yap pe^oves pe^ovas poipas Xayxdvovai.
Oil. ' Aprpcpdrovs Beo\ Tipacri m\ avBpanoi.
CIII. "Yfipiv xph cr^evvveiv pdXXov r) irvprnrfv.
01 V. ' Av9pdmoio~i yi vecrBai oKoaa BeXovcri ovk apeivov. vovaos vyieiav
eiroi-qare rjdv Ka\ dyaOov, Xipbs kopov, KapaTos dvdrravo-iv.
OV. Qvpco pdxeadai ^aXe7rdz/' 6 ti yap av XP^V ylveaBai, yj/vx^s
ojveeTai.
0V1. J ' AvBpconoicri 7Tarri perecrTi yiyvooo~Keiv eavTovs ko.1 o~axppovelv\.
OVII. j 2axppovelv aperr) peylo'Trj' ko.1 crocpir) aXrjBe'a Xeyew Ka\ Troielv
koto, cpvcriv eTTatovTas *f.
0VII1. y ApaBlr]v apeivov KpvTVTeiv ' epyov de ev avecrei ko.1 Trap* oivov.
01X. { KpvTTTtiv dpaBlrjv Kpearaov r) is to peo~ov cpepeiv J .
CX. Nopos Ka\ fiovXrj ireiBeo-Bai evos.
OXI. Tis yap avrojv voos r) <ppr)v ', idrjpoovj doidolai enovTai Kal
didacrKaXco xp^ a>vraL bpiXco, ovk eldoTes oti rroXXol kcikoi oXiyoi de dyaBoi.
alpevvTai yap ev dvTia navTcov oi apicrToi, KXeos devaov Bvr)Ta>Vy oi 8e noXXol
KeKoprjvTai oKcoo~7rep KTrjvea.
OXII. 'Ei> HpirjvT) Bias eyevCTO 6 TevTapeco, ov irXea>v Xoyos r] twv
aXXoiv.
TEXT. 131
CXI1I. Els epol pvpiot, eav apio~TOS r/.
CXI^ . *A£iop 'Ecpeaiois rjfirjdop d7rdy£aa6ai iraai kol to7s avrj(3ois rrjv
ttqXip KctraXiTre'LV, otrives 'Eppodcopov aubpa ecovrcoi' optjio-top e£e(3aXop,
cbdpres ' i)pea>p fir]8e els 6pt)io~tos ecrrco, el fie pi], ciXXj) re K(i\ per oXXg»'.
tA\ . KiVe? Kol {3av£ovo~i op cip pj) yivcocrKcoai.
CX"\ I. 'Amorty dia(fivyydi>ei pj) yiuuxTKeadai.
C A \ II. B\a£ apdpcoTTOS eVi Tvavrl Xoyco €7TTorjcr$ai (piXeei.
CX \ III. AoKeorroz/ 6 doKipoiTdTOs yivuxTKiL TrXdo~o~eiP ' kol pevroi
kol 8ucrj KaTa\7]\j/€Tai yj/evdecop renTovas nai paprvpas.
CXIX. Diogenes Laert. ix. 1 : t6v & "Op-^pop ecpao-nep a&ov eV
tcov aycovoov eK.f$dXXecr6ai kol pa7n'£ecr#ai, nai ' ApxiXo^op opolios.
CXX. "Onus dies par omni est.
CXX1. H8os dv8po)7rai daipcov.
CXX 1 1. y Avdpco7rovs pevti Te\evTi]<ravTa.s aacra ovk eXrropTai ov8e
&ok€ overt.
CXXliI. *Ep6abe eopTas e7rapio~Tacr6aL kol (frvXaicas yivecrOai eyeprl
tcovruiv Kol veupcov.
CXXI \ . 'SvktutoXol, pdyoL, (3di<xoiy Xrjpai, pvarai.
CXXV. Ta yap vopi£6peva kcit dpdpanrovs pvcrTrjpia aViepcocrn.
pvevvTCU-
CXXY1. Kat rols dydXpaai TOvreoLai eu^oi/rai, okolop el tis Tuls
86uoio~l Xeo-xrjvevoiTO, ov n yipaxruaip deovs ovft rjpeoas, OLTives elo~u
CXXV 11. Ei prj yap Aiopvcraj TropTrrjp enoievPTO kcu vppeop aapa
aldoiotai, dpaibioraTa eipyacT np ' covtos fie 'Atdrjs kol Awpvctos, OTea>
uaipovrai nai Xr)pai£ovo-i.
CXXYIII. Iamblichus de Myst. y. 15: 0v<rtS>v rolwv rldrjpt
oittci etSr; " to. pep tcop drroKeKaOappepcop naprdnao'ip dpdpdmeop, oia e<fi
epos up 7tot€ yepniro anaplcos, ws <fir)(rip 'HpdicXeiTos, rj tipcop oXlycop
€vapi8pTjTo>p dpbpoip ' Ta fi' epvXa kcu aopaToeidrj kcu fiia peTaftoXrjs
(jvpiardpepa, oia rols en Kar€)(opepois vtto too awpaTos appo£ei.
CXX'X. "A/cen.
CXXX. Kcidaipoi'Tcn Oe aifUXTl piaivopepoi ayantp tip el ris es 7rr]Xop
r 7rr;Xc3 diroplpoLTn.
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