Glass __£_ ^K^^ Book ;/ '1 / — *— 7- — ■ \ls„ vw Ji^^^^^.' i V\ \^ rr\"i / r.. =J i / S' 6 1 ^ 'I' Hi U, 1/) I- o q: s O z: DEFENCES OF PHILADE LPHIA IN 1777. COLLECTED AND EDITED BY WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD. BROOKLYN, N. Y. : HISTORICAL PRINTING CLUB. >897- IN EXCHANGI New r»rli Tuiiifc Lifcrary JaN 27 int2 [From the " Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography," 1894-1897.] One Hundred Copies Printed. 5^0 NOTE. When I made a tender to the Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography of a few minutes of the Councils of "War held under Washington, I did not anticipate going outside of those records. Finding an abundance of new material bearing upon the operations in and around Phila- delphia in the fall of 1777, the plan was extended until the result is this volume of nearly three hundred pages, con- taining more than two hundred and twenty letters and opinions, uot five of which have before been in print. If only as an evidence of the unused materials for American history-, this collection has an interest ; and the interest is heightened by the personal touches these buried and for- gotten manuscripts give of the writers. It is not so much the importance of the military operations that appeals to us, as the unconscious and therefore free expression these leaders of the Continental army gave to their views and feelings. The campaign of 1777, with its hopes and dis- appointments, is laid before us with a vividness of detail that no historian could imitate. In such a wealth of new material it would not be possi- ble to direct attention to the more important pieces. I may, however, be pardoned for believing the record of the Board of War, printed on page 175, to be an important record because of the light it throws upon one of the lead- ing actors in the Conway cabal against Washington. I wish to express my appreciation of the courteous and untiring assistance rendered by the editors of the Pennsyl- vania Magazine of History and JBiograj^hy whWe these sheets were running through that magazine. It is not too much to say that the success of that publication is due to the iv Note. liberality of the Pennsylvania Historical Society to students of American history, and to the full and accurate knowledge of Pennsylvania history possessed by Mr. Frederick D. Stone and Mr. John W. Jordan, to whom my acknowl- edgments are specially tendered. WORTHINGTON ChAUNCEY FoRD. Washington, D. C, 29th Jii)y, 1897. CONTENTS. PAOB NoTK iii Council of War, 12 June, 1777 2 Howe'a movements — Dofence of the Highlands — Rules of promo- tion. Opinion of Major-General Greene 5 Importance of Philadelphia — Approaches to the city — Delaware difficult to navigate — Fort Mifflin and the chevaux-de-frise — Utility of fire-ships — Land batteries to defend the channel — Fortifications at Billingsport and Red Bank — Half-moon batteries suggested — Fortifying Darby Creek — Forts a disadvantage. Definitive Project of Du Coudray, 6 August, 1777 12 Position of the floating batteries — The galleys and land battery — Lines of defence — Hog's Island — Billingsport the best to fortify — Needs of the service. Opinion of Major-General Wayne, 7 August, 1777 19 Completion of the forts — Garrisons in the forts — Troops at Marcus Hook. Opinion of Joseph Reed, 7 August, 1777 20 Howe's movement intended against Philadelphia — Must prevent the English from getting behind the army — Difficulty of effecting a landing in the face of an enemy — Probable place of landing — New Jersey not eligible — Advantages of Darby Creek — In case of re- treat — The river defence — Darby — Billingsport — Red Bank — Fort Island — Stock should be removed. Opinion of Brigadier-General Knox, 9 August, 1777 29 Fort Island should be strengthened — Red Bank, contracted — Bil- lingsport and the galleys — Works at Darby Creek and command of the channel. Washington to the President of Congress, 9 August, 1777 ... 30 Puzzling movements of Howe — Concentrating strength at one point — Billingsport and Red Bank compared — Fort Island the principal dependence — Works recommended — Results will be for- midable — A military survey necessary — Du Coudray. Du Coudray to "Washington, 10 August, 1777 37 Favors Fort Island — Width of river and shallow places — Examines Fort Island — The proposed survey. T vi Contents. PAGE Washington to the President of Congress, 15 August, 1777 . . 40 Du Coudray's plan of the river — A weak point in Fort Island and its remedy. Council of "War, 21 August, 1777 41 Sailing of British fleet against Charleston, as was thought — Army not to follow — Decided to move to North River. Dv Coudray's Memoir on Billingsport and Fort Island, 29 August, 1777 42 Fort Mifflin greatly exposed — Le Brun's projects — Chevaux-de- frise — Fortifying Billingsport — Workmen less costly than militia. Du Coudray to Washington, 30 August, 1777 45 Sends his memorial— Militia engineers for map. Du Coudray to Congress, 7 September, 1777 45 Survey of the river — Billingsport — Landing of the enemy at Chesa- peake — Fitness of station at Wilmington — Defence of river passes — Offer of service — Desires co-operation of Mifflin — Question of artil- lery — Casting of mortars. Council of War, 23 September, 1777 49 Enemy has crossed the Schuylkill — Movements and plans of the Continental army — Damage by rains — Progress of the British — Decision to remain. Council OF War, 28 September, 1777 61 Position and strength of the British — Detachments to join the Con- tinental army — Putnam ordered to send reinforcements — Immedi- ate attack not favored by majority — Opinion of the minority. Brigadier-General Forman to Washington, 20 October, 1777 . . 54 A letter miscarries — Importance of fort at Red Bank — Slow gath- ering of militia — British occupy Province Island — Possible attack on Fort Mifflin — Colonel Greene sends reinforcements. LiKUTENANT-CoLONEL SMITH TO WASHINGTON, 26 October, 1777 . . 56 111 health of Baron d'Arendt — Difference with Colonel Greene as to command — Want of artillerists — Commodore should co-operate — Position of the enemy — Need for clothing. Continental Navy Board to Washington, 26 October, 1777 ... 58 Return of men on frigates — Safety of vessels in case of attack — Stores sent lo Easton. Lieutenant-Colonel Comstock to Washington, 27 October, 1777 69 Garrison at Red Bank — Arms from Hessians — Intelligence from a prisoner and from Philadelphia — Militia not to be depended on — Cartridges. Washington to Lieutenant-Colonel Greene, 28 October, 1777 . 61 Health of Baron d'Arendt — Question of command between Greene and Smith, Coyitents. vii PAGE Washington to Brigadier-General Forman, 28 October, 1777 . . 61 Reinforcing Red Bank and Fort Mifflin — Secrecy to be observed. Instructions to Brigadier-Gbnerai. Varnum, 28 October, 1777 . 62 Route to Woodbury — To reinforce forts— Caution against surprise. Washington to Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, 28 October, 1777 . . 63 Question of command — Fort to be reinforced — Warning against jealousies — Banljs to be cut. Washington to Commodore Hazeltvood, 28 October, 1777 .... 64 Number of sailors in tbe army — Mutual confidence and perfect un- derstanding enjoined — Ammunition — Guarding against surprise. Brigadier-General Forman to Washington, 29 October, 1777 . . 65 Assembling the militia — Newcomb refuses to make a return — Rein- forcements — Strange conduct of Newcomb — Enemy's works at Bil- lingsport — Damage by rain — Province Island — Garrison in good spirits — Burgoyne. Council of War, 29 October, 1777 207 Lord Stirling to Washington", 29 October, 1777 ........ 67 Roads in bad order — Casualties — Necessity of harassing enemy — Battle should be avoided. Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 30 October, 1777 . . 69 Situation of the enemy — The command of the ferries — Banks to be cut. Captain Lee to Washington, .31 October, 1777 69 Strength of the force on Carpenter's Island — Means of getting pro- visions into Philadelphia — Illicit trade — Floods shut off communi- cation. Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 31 October, 1777 . 70 Question of cannon — Crews on galleys. Washington to Brioadier-Gbneral Potter, 31 October, 1777 . . 71 Breaking the road — -Dismantling flour mills — Disposition of flour — Banks to be kept open — Assistance from Lee. Washington to Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, 1 November, 1777 . 72 Reinforcements and clothing — Suggests laying upper end of island under water. Washington to Commodore Hazelwood, 2 November, 1777 ... 73 Safer to have distant combat with enemy — Part of the navy — Landing by night — Position of the galleys. Major Fleurt's Journal, 2 and 3 November, 1777 74 Movements on Province Island — A battery on the ** Augusta's" hulk — Need of palisades — Obstacles to his plans. Lord Stirling to Washington, 3 November, 1777 76 Objection to his plan — No freshet cuts off communication — Scow ferries — Position of Howe. viii Contents. PAGB Brioadier-Gbneral Potter to Washington, 3 November, 1777 . 77 How the enemy obtnin provisions — Construction of floating bat- teries — The dismantling of mills — Distribution of guards. Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 3 November, 1777 78 Want of confidence between Hazelwood and Smith — Strengthening garrison at Fort Mifllin — Militia of no consequence. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to Washington, 3 November, 1777 . 78 Need of clothing — The floating battery and proposed attaclt on Billingsport. Captain Lee to Washington, 3 November, 1777 79 Interrupting illicit intercourse with the British — Some prisoners and intelligence — Enemy to make a push for Fort Mifllin — Ships blown up — Trade at New Castle. Major FLEtTRT's Journal, 3 and 4 November, 1777 80 Communication between British fleet and Philadelphia — Battery on the *' Augusta." Washington to Colonel Greene, 4 November, 1777 81 Defence of Fort Mercer — Bombproofs — Provisions for an investi- ture. Washington to Briqadier-General Varnum, 4 November, 1777 82 Wishes for success— Jealousies among officers — Attempt against Billingsport. Washington to Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, 4 November, 1777 . 83 Supplies of clothing — Fleury to serve as engineer. Washington to Commodore Hazelwood, 4 November, 1777 ... 83 A free passage for boats — Means of closing. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to Washington, 4 November, 1777 . 84 Not a battery as supposed — Free commmunication open. Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 6 November, 1777 . 86 Miscarriage of the move to dismantle mills — Arrest of the oflioer — Crawford's men. Washington to Brigadier-General Potter, 5 November, 1777 . 86 Annoyance over the mills — Crawford's men may be discharged — Precaution against surprise. Brigadikr-Gkneral Varnum to Washington, 6 November, 1777 86 Cannonading the British ships — What was accomplished — Poor conduct of the galleys — Great damage could be done — Bil- lingsport the key of the river — Remissness of the fleet and defence of the commodore — His character — Hospital service wanted — Plans of the enemy — Newcomb's troops — Clothing from Tory Quakers. Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 7 November, 1777 90 Approaching attack on Fort Mifflin — Militia not to be placed in forts — Fort Mifllin to be reinforced. Contents. ix PiLOB Brioadibk-Gbnbral Forman to Washington, 7 November, 1777 90 Council of Safety and Newcomb — Ncwcomb's retort — Distribution of troops — Charges against bim and his resignation — Clinton sails from New York. Washington to Major General Dickinson, 8 November, 1777 . 93 Post at Red Bank — Oysters. Washington to Brigadier-Gknkral Varn0M, 8 November, 1777 94 Cannot do more than is being done — Purposes of the British — Resolutions of Congress. Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 8 November, 1777 95 Intelligence — Movement began— Routof the enemy's boats — Chan- nel to be closed — Expects success in repelling an attack. Captain Lee to Washington, 8 November, 1777 96 Prisoners — Reports of the enemy's intentions — The floating bat- teries — Provisioning Philadelphia — Intercourse checked. Major Fleurt's Journal, 5-8 November, 1777 97 His position in the fort— Possibility of intercepting communica- tions — Works on Province Island — British land batteries — Fascines wanted. Captain Craig to Washington, 8 November, 1777 99 Movements of the enemy. Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 8 November, 1777 . 99 Cannot attack — Baggage sent away — Scattered condition of hia force — Disposition of pickets— The millstones — Drowning of some Hessians. Council of War, 8 November, 1777 101 Reinforcements on their way — Enemy to attack Fort MiflJin — De- cision against attacking enemy near Philadelphia. Washington to Navy Board, 9 November, 1777 lOl Resolutions of Congress — Frigates to be scuttled. Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 9 November, 1777 102 Situation at Fort Mifllin — Floating batteries — Enemy's disposition — Danger of breaches — Newcomb and his militia — Commissaries — Sickness of Arendt — Intelligence. Colonel Smith to Washington, 9 November, 1777 106 Relief of fort garrison — Need of provisions and men. Colonel Smith to Washington, 9 November, 1777 106 Fieury's position — Works of the enemy — The resolution of Con- gress. Major Fleuby's Journal, 9 and 10 November, 1777 106 Enemy about to open their battery — Loop-holes — Fixing a chain — Commodore's chain of little service — Firing begins — Damage to guns — No fascines or palisades — Fatigue of garrison. X Contents. PAGE Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 10 Kovembtr, 1777 108 Words of cheer — Keinforceiuents from Fishkill. Continental Navy Board to Washington, 10 November, 1777 . 108 Protection of fleet — Resolution of Congress — Frigates scuttled — Mishap to one — Morris's tobacco-ship — No wish to go contrary to orders. Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 10 November, 1777 110 Bombardment by the British — Inclemency of the weather — Militia and ammunition — Cartridges for Fort Mifflin. Colonel Smith to Washington, 10 November, 1777 Ill Firing from the enemy and damage done — Constant fatigue of gar- rison — Defence of the chevaux-de-frise — Place will soon be reduced — Enemy obtains provisions. Washington to Brigadier-Generjil Varnum, 11 November, 1777 113 Trusts he will check Howe — Ammunition not to be wasted — Potter to annoy the enemy. Brigadier-Genekal Potter to W-4shington, 11 November, 1777 113 Intelligence of the British fleet — Firing from the enemy's batteries. Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 11 November, 1777 114 Attack on Red Bank — Rankin's wager, Jonathan Rumford to Brigadier-General Potter, 11 Novem- ber, 1777 114 Loss of an English ship. Major Evans to Brigadie;r-General Potter, 11 November, 1777 115 A fleet with troops standing up the river. Jonathan Rumford to Brigadier-General Potter, 11 Novem- ber, 1777 116 News of the fleet. Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 11 November, 1777 115 Damage to the works at Red Bank— Will probably be forced to evacuate. Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 11 November, 1777 116 Events at Fort Mifflin — An evacuation urged — Cannonade to he reopened — Bursting of gun — Baron d'Arendt. Colonel Smith to Brigadier-General Varnum, 11 November, 1777 117 Damage done to fort — Ammunition — Block-house to bo destroyed. Washington to Continental Navy Board, 12 November, 1777 . 118 The sinking of the frigates — Disposing of the men. Bbigadier-Genkral Potter to Washington, 12 November, 1777 . 118 Harassing the enemy — Interrupting bridge building— Communi- cating with Red Bank. Contents. si PAGE Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 12 November, 1777 . 119 Ships passing the island- — Intelligence from the city — Trading- boats destroyed — Prisoners. Major Fleury to Washington, 12 November, 1777 120 Situation at the fort — (garrison dispirited. Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 12 November, 1777 120 Fatigued state of garrison — The command at the fort — JIust be lost if attack continues. Colonel Smith to Washington, 12 November, 1777 121 Is wounded — Block-houses almost destroyed — An assault must take the fort. Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 13 November, 1777 122 Copy of orders sent — Proposed descent on Province Island — Fort Mercer to be strengthened. MA.JOR Fleury's Journal, 13 and 14 November, 1777 123 Repairing the damage done to the fort — Floating battery — Island m.ay be defended — Plan of preventing a storm — High hopes for the "*^ future — A new battery — Men needed — Cattery silenced — Deser- tions. Brigadier-General Varnu.m to Washington, 14 November, 1777 125 The situation at the fort. Brigadier-General Varnu.m to Washington, 14 November, 1777 126 Want of troops — AVhoIe company of artillery in the fort — The at- tempt upon Province Island. Major Thayer to Br[Qadier-General Varnum, 14 November, 1777 127 No danger from cannon — Deserters. Captain Lee to Washington, 14 November, 1777 127 Intercourse between inhabitants and British fleet — .\rrival of ships from New York. Major-General Greene to Washington, 14 November, 1777 . . 128 The situation at Darby — Ships coming up the Schuylkill — Obstruct- ing the channel — Chain of redoubts — Enemy discouraged. Commodore Hazelwood to Washington, 15 November, 1777 . . . 129 Council of war — Could not drive British ships away — Good behavior in fort and ships — Minutes of the council. Captain Craig TO Washington, 15 November, 1777 131 Attack fixed for the day — Enemy dread union with Northern army. Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 15 November, 1777 132 Bulletin of the day — Major Thayer commended, Benjamin Kandolph to Washington, 15 November, 1777 .... 132 In charge of a flag — Intelligence. xii Contents, PAGE Brtqadier-Genkral Vaunum to Washington, 16 November, 1777 133 DamagG to fort by bombardment — General ofScer needed — Orer- burdened with work — Shipping may lead to evacuation. Washington to Brigadikr-Genkral Varnum, 15 November^ 1777 134 Supplies for the fort — Disposition of guns — Obstructing the chan- nel — The enterprise against Province Island. Colonel Smith to Washington, 15 Novembei*, 1777 135 Visits Fort Mifflin — Possibility of defending— Artillerymen wanted. Baron d'Arendt on Fort Mifflin 136 Importance of the fort — Designs of the enemy — Preservation of the garrison — Relief parties — Repair of works — Cannon and pro- vision — Communication with the enemy — Opinion of Varnum. Colonel Greene to General Potter, 15 November, 1777 139 Operations against the fort and their results — Desertions. Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 16 November, 1777 140 Fort Mifflin abandoned. Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 16 November, 1777 140 Evacuation of Fort Mifflin — Attempt to drive away the " Vigilant" — Annoyance to shipping from the land batteries — Fatigue of force — Conduct of the fleet. Colonel Smith to Washington, 16 November, 1777 142 Incidents of the evaouation. Joseph Reed to Washington, 16 November, 1777 142 Relief for the ports — Mode of annoying the enemy. Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 17 November, 1777 143 Enemy easily obtains provisions — Troops from New York — Im- portance of Fort Mercer — ^Suggestions on troops and stations — Bravery of defence of Fort Mifflin. Captain Craig to Washington, 18 November, 1777 146 Intelligence — Cornwallis in New Jersey. Lieutenant Heard to Washington, 18 November, 1777 146 Intelligence. Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 18 November, 1777 146 Movement of British announced. Joseph Rekd to Washington, 18 November, 1777 147 A move against Red Bank — Cornwallis in command — Cadwalader's scheme frustrated. Washington to Briqadier-Genkral Vaknum, 18 November, 1777 148 Enemy crosses the river — Warning against surprise — Reconnoitre by St. Clair, Knox, and Kalb. Washington to Brigadier-General Glover, 19 November, 1777 149 Orders for his march. / Contents. xiii PAGE Washington to the Commanding Officer of Poor's or Pater- son's Brigade, 19 November, 1777 149 Directions for marching. Washington to Brigadier-General 'Varnum, 19 November, 1777 150 Orders for conduct. Washington to Commodore Hazelwood, 19 November, 1777 . . 150 Trusts all questions have been decided. Washington to Brigadier-General Varnum, 19 November, 1777 151 Importance of keeping Red Banlt — Reinforcements ordered — Ro- moval of stores and protection of galleys. Captain Craig to Washington, 19 November, 1777 152 Intelligence. Bbioadier-General Wayne to Washington, 19 November, 1777 152 Has advanced somewhat. Bbioadier-General Varnum to Washington, 19 November, 1777 153 Reasons for moving his flying camp — Enemy getting in the rear of the fort — Most of the troops have left Philadelphia — Force of the enemy — Now Jersey militia. Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 20 November, 1777 154 Capture of one of his guards. Washington to Brigadier-General Poor, 20 November, 1777 . . 154 New orders for his march. Washington to Brigadier-General Paterson, 20 November, 1777 155 Orders for march. Captain McLane to Washington, 20 November, 1777 155 Intelligence. Brigadier General Varnum to Washington, 20 November, 1777 156 Situation at Red Bank — Powder scattered over the fort — Feint by the enemy — Stores taken away — -Why Howe did not attack earlier — Greene's arrival. Brigadier-General Varnum to Washington, 21 November, 1777 157 Fort Mercer evacuated — At Mount Holley — -Distribution of force — Good prospects of an engagement. Majok-Gbnebal Greene to Washington, 21 November, 1777 . . 158 Burning of the galleys — Delay in coming to the front — An attack on the enemy suggested — Reinforcements — Reflections on fleet. Intelligence from Philadelphia 159 Major-Gbneral Greene to Washington, 22 November, 1777 . . 161 Incidents of the retreat^Light-horse wanted — Militia. Washington to Major-General Greene, 22 November, 1777 . . 162 The proposed attack on the enemy^ Glover's brigade — Lee's corps. xiv Contents. PAGE Washington TO Captain McLane, 22 November, 1777 163 On selecting intelligencers. Washington to Brigadier-General Yarnum, 22 November, 1777 163 To receive orders from Greene — On the destruction of the fort. Wasbinqton to Major-General Greene, 22 November, 1777 . . 164 On attacking the enemy — Glover's brigade. Navy Board to Washington, 23 November, 1777 164 Destruction of the fleet. Colonel Ellis to Major General Greene, 23 November, 1777 . 165 Intelligence. Major-General Greene to Washington, 24 November, 1777 . . 165 Position of the enemy — Militia of the State — Ready for an advance — Supplies — As to attacking the enemy — Censure and risks — Has felt Washington's displeasure — Poor condition of the hospitals. Colonel Ellis to Major-General Greene, 24 November, 1777 . 168 Number of his force — Movements of the enemy. Brigadier-General Weedon to Major-General Greene, 24 No- vember, 1777 169 Strength and situation of the enemy. Brigadier-General Potter to Washington, 24 November, 1777 . 170 Intelligence. Washington to Major-General Greene, 24 November, 1777 . . 171 An important matter to be discussed. Editor's Note on Mifflin's Connection with the Board op War 172 Report of the Board of War, 21 November, 1777 175 ON ATTACKING BRITISH IN PHILADELPHIA. Opinion of Major General Greene, 24 November, 1777 .... 177 Is opposed to attacking Philadelphia — Reasons for rash measures — Attacking Lord Cornvpallis. Opinion of Lord Stirling, 25 November, 1777 178 Favors an attack — Outline of a plan. Opinion of Major-General Sullivan, 25 November, 1777 . . . 179 The situation of the enemy — Strength and number of the redoubts — Ditficulties of passing them — Approaching the city by water — Experience against success — Dangers involved in a defeat — Rela- tive strength of the two armies — Attacks on villages. Opinion of Major-General Armstrong, 25 November, 1777 . . 185 Does not approve of the suggested attack. Opinion of the Chevalier Du Portail, 25 November, 1777 . . 185 Dangers of an attack — Possible destruction of the army — Plans criticised — Operations in New Jersey. Contents. xv PAQE Opinion of Baron de Kalb, 25 November, 1777 187 Essential points to be determined in plan. Opinion of Brigadier-General Irvine, 25 November, 1777 . . . 188 Is not in favor of risking all in one engagement. Opinion of Briqadibb-Genkral Maxwell, 25 November, 1777 . 189 Reasons for not favoring the enterprise. Opinion of Brigadier-General Patkrson, 25 November, 1777 . 190 Believes the attaci^ too hazardous. Opinion of Brigadier-General Poor, 26 November, 1777 .... 190 Is against the attacli. Opinion of Brigadier-General Scott, 25 November, 1777 . . . 190 Approves plan of Cadwalader — Suggested change. Opinion of Brigadibr-General Smallwood, 25 November, 1777 191 Is opposed to the undertaking. Opinion of Brigadier-General Watne, 25 November, 1777 . . 191 Believes a battle to be a necessity — If Phil.adelphia be not attacked, redoubts to be constructed — Reasons for favoring the attack. Opinion of Brigadier-General Woodford, 25 November, 1777 . 192 Is in favor of the plan. Opinion of Brigadier-General Knox, 26 November, 1777 . . . 193 Many after military fame — AVashington's reputation not at stake — Bepreciation of the currency — Rules and maxims of war against the attack — Force of enemy and strength of his works — Examples from experience — Favors winter quarters. Washington to Major-General Gkkene, 25 November, 1777 . . 197 Enemy's position very strong — Fears an attack — Orders him to join forces — Hospitals. Major-General Greene to Washington, 25 November, 1777 . . 198 Advance upon the enemy's rear — Awaiting orders. Major-General Greene to Washington, 25 November, 1777 . . 199 In doubt as to action. Colonel Comstock to Major-General Greene, 25 November, 1777 200 Intelligence. Colonel Comstock to Major-General Greene, 25 November, 1777 200 Information obtained from prisoners. Major-General Greene to Washington, 26 November, 1777 . . 201 A fruitless march — Enemy strongly posted at Gloucester — A pro- posed attack rejected — Lafayette's good conduct — Obstructions in river removed — Disposition of brigades. xvi Contents, PAGB Major-Genkral Greene to Washington, 27 November, 1777 . . 203 Risk of witlidrawing the troups from New Jersey — Protecting the hospitals — Move to Burlington. Captain Craig to Washington, 28 November, 1777 204 Intelligence. Major-General Greene to Washington, 28 November, 1777 . . 204 BrigaJes for head-qunrters — No magazines of flour — Tench Francis a prisoner — Intelligence. Navy Board to Washington, 28 November, 1777 205 Care of the frigates. Washington to Navy Board, 29 November, 1777 206 Frigates may be u?ed as barracks. QUESTION OF WINTER QUARTERS. Opinion of Major-Genkral Sullivan, 1 December, 1777 .... 212 Intentions of the board — Situations proposed — Objeclions to hut- ting — Objections to Wilmington — Winter campaign to be avoided — Lancaster and disposition of army — Germantown the most proper place. Opinion of the Marquis de Lafayette 216 Points to be considered — Favors the line from Reading to Lancas- ter — As to Wilmington. Opinion of Baron de Kalb, 1 December, 1777 218 Wilmington not a good selection — Lancaster favored. Opinion of Major-General Greene 219 Objects of cantoning — Pleasure and relaxation — Necessary to pro- tect the country — Enlistments and bounties — Discontent of officers — Proposed places for cantonments — Favors Wilmington. Opinion of Lord Stirling, 1 December, 1777 224 Objections to Wilmington — An encampment at Tredyffrin. Opinion of Major-General Armstrong, 1 December, 1777 . . . 226 Is opposed to wintering around Lancaster — Is in favor of Wil- mington. Opinion of Brigadier-General Maxwell, 1 December, 1777 . . 227 Covering the country — Disposition to be made of the army. Opinion of Brigadier-General Smalltvood, 1 December, 1777 . 228 Consideration of the places proposed — Favors Wilmington. Opinion of Brigadier-General Knox, 1 December, 1777 .... 229 Objects of winter quarters — Favors the line from Lancaster to Reading. Opinion of Brigadier-General Poor, 1 December, 1777 .... 231 Favors the Lancaster plan. Ch7itai{s, xvii PAGE Opinion of Brigadier-General Wayne, 1 December, 1777 . . . 231 Objections to the Lancaster idea — Is in favor of Wilmington. Opinion of Brigadier-General Varnum, 1 December, 1777 . . . 233 III condition of the army — Urges the Lancaster plan. Opinion of Brigadier-General AVoodforb, 1 December, 1777 . . 235 The Lancaster plan endorsed — Crowding of the vilhiges. Opinion of Brigadier-General Weedon 236 All plans open to objections — Condition of the army — 'U''iImington will expose the army — Necessity for providing for a new campaign. Opinion of Brigadier-General Muhlenberg, 1 December, 1777 239 Keasons for favoring Lancaster — Reconnoitring the country. Opinion of Brigadier-General Scott, 1 December, 1777 .... 240 Wilmington believed to be the best place. Opinion of Count Pulaski 240 Advantages of continuing the campaign — Only invalids to retire. Opinion of Brigadier-General Du Portail 241 Exposing the country — Advantages of Wilmington — Better combat than disorder and desertion. Opinion of Brigadier-General Irvine, 1 December, 1777 . . . 243 In doubt as to better plan — Sheltering the army. Circular Letter from Washington, 3 Decenilier, 1777 244 Question of a winter's campaign, and attacking the enemy in Phila- delphia. Opinion of Major-General Sullivan, 4 December, 1777 .... 244 Is opposed to the attempt — III condition of the army — Alarming spirit of resignation among officers — Disaffection of the army — • Issue should not be on a single throw of the die — Dwindling of the army — Objection to a winter campaign. Opinion of Major-General Greene, December, 1777 248 Cannot recommend the plan — Zeal and caution — Condition of the troops — Mortality of militia — Winter campaigns in Europe — Opera- tions of the last winter — Covering the army — Difficulty in obtain- ing militia — Delay in assembling — Essentials to success — AVeather must be favorable — Militia cannot attack a city — Consequences of a disappointment — Looks for disaster from a campaign. Opinion of Lord Stirling, 3 December, 1777 266 Requirements of the array — Ice bridge necessary in an attack on Philadelphia — Is against the attempt. Opinion of the Marquis de Lafayette 258 Cannot favor the suggestion — Re;u the navy board to washington. " Continental Navy Board " Borden Town, 23'" Nov' 1777 " Sir : " It is with the greatest Concern we inform you of the total Destruction of the Continental Fleet at Red Bank; having been burned by our own Officers in Consequence of a Determination of a Council of War. We have not yet had an Opportunity of making a regular Enquiry into the Reasons of so desperate a Measure. As far as we can collect from the Officers and Crews here, it was occasioned by the Assurances of the Commander of the Land Forces, that they must expect no further Protection from his Army ; not even to secure a Retreat in Case of Emergency. But ' In manuscript of Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 165 this must be the Subject of future Enquiry. Be the Cause what it may, the Loss seems at present, to be irreparable. " We request the favour of your Excellency to let the enclosed Packet go with your next Despatches to Congress, & are &c. " Fra^ Hopkinson. "John Wharton." COLONEL JOSEPH ELLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. " [Haddonfield], Nov' 23* 1777 "By a Woman who came thro' the Enemy encampments this day, says, that their main Body lay at Woodbury & Lord Cornwallis quarter'd at M' Coopers — That they have a large encampment at Great Timber Creek Bridge and their advanced picquet consisting of about thirty are posted at Little Timber Creek Bridge. — They give out that they have 10,000 Men, but she thought they had not half the number; most of the Troops she saw were cloathed in Greene — she thought they had between 80 & 100 Light Horse." [Unsigned.] MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE TO WASHINGTON. " Mount Holly, Nov' 24, 1777 " D^ Sir " I have nothing new to communicate to your Excellency with Respect to the Motions of the Enemy — they remain or did remain last night at Woodbury, with a Guard at Timber Creek, consisting of about six hundred men. The Boats that went up, mentioned in ray former Letter, I conjecture had on Board the Baggage of the Army ; the Soldiers seen on board, were the regimental Guards to the Baggage. " The Militia of this State is dwindling to nothing. Gen. Varnum says, there was upwards of 1400 a few days since — they are reduced now to between seven & eight. Col" Shreeve is gone out to see what Impression he can make upon the People, and to endeavour to draw together as large a 13 166 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. Number as possible ; but I cannot flatter myself with any considerable reinforcement. — I will endeavour to inclose your Excellency a Return of our Strength in Continental & Militia this Afternoon if possible. " "We are all ready to advance ; but the General Oflicers think it advisable to wait the Return of the first Express sent to Glover's Brigade; to learn the strength & time the Junction may be formed with that Brigade. — I have heard nothing where it is, notwithstanding I have sent three Ex- presses. — Capt. Lee is not arrived, neither have I heard any thing of him — I could wish if possible, some Horse might be sent, as every Army is an unwieldy Body without them; & in this Country, they are more immediately necessary, to prevent the Enemy from sending out theirs to collect Stock. " Col° Cox who is with me at this Place, says, if the Enemy can open a Communication with the three lower Counties, they will be able, independant of all the sur- rounding Country, to draw Supplies of every kind, neces- sary for the Subsistance of the Army & Inhabitants of the City of Philadelphia. "Your Excellency observes in your last, you must leave the Propriety of attacking the Enemy to me. Would you advise me to fight them with very unequal numbers. Most People, indeed all, agree they are near or quite 5000 strong — Our Force is upwards of three, exclusive of the Militia, which may be from seven to eight hundred at most. The Situation the Enemy are in, the Ease with which they can receive Reinforcements, & the Difliculty of our knowing it, will render it absolutely necessary, whenever we advance from this Place, to make the Attack as soon as possible. — I had much rather engage with three thousand against five, than attack the Enemy's Lines, & there is a much greater prospect of succeeding, but still I cannot promise myself victory, nor even a Prospect of it, with Inferior !N'umbers. I have seen of late, the difficulty your Excellency seemed to labour under, to justify the Expectations of an ignorant Populace, with great Concern. It is our misfortune to have Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 167 an Extent of Country to cover, that demands four times our Numbers — the Enemy so situated as to be very difficult to approach, and from pretty good Authority superior to us in numbers. Under these Disadvantages, your Excellency has the choice of but two things, to fight the Enemy without the least Prospect of Success, upon the common Principles of War, or remain inactive, & be subject to the Censure of an ignorant & impatient populace. In doing one you may make a bad matter worse, and take a measure, that, if it proves unfortunate, you may stand condemned for by all military Gentlemen of Experience ; pursuing the other you have the Approbation of your own mind, you give your Country an opportunity to exert itself to supply the present Deficiency, & also act upon such military Principles as will justify you to the best Judges in the present day, & to all future Generations. For my own Part, I feel Censure with as great a Degree of Sensibility, as is possible, and I feel ambitious of doing every thing that common Sense can justify; but I am fully persuaded, in attempting more you may make a temporary a lasting Evil. — The Cause is too important to be trifled with to shew our Courage, & your Character too deeply interested to sport away upon un- military Principles. — " For your Sake, for my own Sake, & for my Country's Sake I wish to attempt every thing which will meet with your Excellency's Approbation — I will run any Risque or engage under any Disadvantages if I can only have your Countenance if unfortunate. With the Publick I know Success sanctifies every thing and that only. I cannot help thinking from the most Dispassionate Survey of the Opera- tions of the Campaign that you stand approved by Reason & justified by every military Principle. — With Respect to my own Conduct, I have ever given my Opinion with Candour & to my utmost executed with Fidelity whatever was committed to my Charge. "In some Instances we have been unfortunate. — In one I thought I felt the Lour of your Excellency's Countenance, when I am sure I had no Reason to expect it — It is out of 168 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. my Power to command success, but I trust I have ever endeavoured to deserve it. "It is mortifying euough to be a common Sharer in Misfortunes, but to be punished as the Author, without deserving it, is truly afflicting. " Your Excellency's Letter of the 22", but I suppose it was of yesterday, this moment came to hand. As I have wrote so fully upon the Subject I have nothing to add, only, that to advance from this place before Glover's Brigade joins us, unless we attack the Enemy without them, will rather injure than facilitate our Designs. But if your Excellency wishes the Attack to be made immediately — give me only your Countenance & notwithstanding it is contrary to the Opinion of the General Officers here, I will take the Consequences upon myself. " Inclosed is a copy of a letter from Colo. [Joseph] Ellis at Haddoufield. " The Hospitals in the Jerseys are greatly complained of — they prove a grave for many of the poor Soldiery — prin- cipally oweing to the Negligence of the Surgeons who have the Care of the Hospitals. How far these Complaints are well grounded I cannot pretend to say — but I would beg leave to recommend the sending of good trusty Officers to inspect the Management of the Hospitals & to remain there until regularly relieved. I am &c. "Nath Greene. "Major Burnet has just returned from Glover's Brigade — they will be at the black Horse to Night — Eight miles from this place. " half past three oClock." colonel ellis to major-general greene. " Haddonfield, Nov' 24"' 1777 " Dear Sir " In complyauce with your Letter of yesterday, I send you a state of the Militia under my Command, which is Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 , 169 about 400 Effective at this place, and about 100 in the neighbourhood below Manto Creek; the time of service for which they came out will for the greater part expire in a few days ; Orders are out for Assembling the other Classes, so that I hope to keep up the number. — As to the Enemy, from the best discoveries we have been able to make, their main strength is at Woodbury, and their lines extend from Manto Creek, to Little Timber Creek, an extent of six or seven miles : their whole force about 5000, consisting of Brittish, Hessians, and Marines; The Marines are employ'd in de- stroying the Works at Red Bank, when that is effected they give out, they intend moveing their Army upwards, to Bur- lington and Mount Holly ; Their Post at Woodbury is ad- vantageous & difficult to attack. — Thus you have an Account of matters in this quarter. If any thing interesting comes to my knowledge, I shall transmit it with all possible speed. I am &c. " Jos : Ellis. " KB. — The Enemy have 8 or 9 Field pieces on the dif- ferent Roads near Woodbury. " Just now receiv'd Intelligence by a Person who came thro' part of the Enemy's lines on the upper-side of Great Timber Creek, who says there is about 300 at and between the two Timber Creeks." BRIGADIER-GENERAL WEEDON TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. " Haddonfield, Nov' 24, 7 oClock " D" General. " We only arrived here a few minutes ago. Some of our parties have taken 9 prisoners, which will get to you early to morrow. From them we have had I believe pretty exact accounts of their numbers, which the Marquis will enclose you a particular account of. They amount to 4250, 60 pieces of Artillery and 100 Light Horse. The Infantry and artillery may be nearly right, but I doubt the informa- tion respecting the horse. They have this day advanced on ] 70 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. this side Great Timber Creek with their Main Bodj', and have pitched on this side of Little Timber Creek also — Some of the prisoners were taken within two miles of the town — They have no troops at Red Bank, and but few at Billingsport. The prisoners say they intend crossing the Delaware at Cooper's ferry. "We shall look about us in the morning, and shall communicate any thing of importance. From yours very sincerely " G. Weedon." \0n back-l — "I have this moment rec'' your Orders to return ; — myself & Horse is so much fatigued, that can't get further than Moors Town tonight. Shall join you early in y° Morning." BRIGADIER-GENERAL POTTER TO 'WASHINGTON. " Camp at the Squair, Nov' 24'" 1777 " Sir : " I was at Chester yesterday the most of the shiping is gon up the River as far as the Bend below Billingsport — the enclosed lines I Received from a good honest whig that would not assart a falce hood knowing it to be such he lives in the City." [Unsigned.] l_Enclosure.'] "Sir " I Received y° Beef & Return thanks till better paid. " The troops in thee Jerseys under Comand of Lo* Cornwalis are not come back Neither is any others ar- rived here, but Shipping with Stores for army. No ace' at all from y' Jerseys their Numbers here I cant find out but I Beleave it takes one third part Daily for Guards in & about town. " The meaning of that fire you see was the Americans Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 171 set fire to their fire ships & the reports of their guns when the fire had got to them & tlie great Esplosons of Magazines on board the Galleys all got up safe to Burlington."' ■WASHINGTON TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. " Head Qrs 24 November, 1777 "D« Sir: "If you have not moved from Mount Holley when this comes to hand, I wish you to wait there till you see Col" Meade, who will set oft' immediately charged with some important matters which I thought it improper to commit to paper. This, however, you are to understand under this restriction — That I do not mean to prevent you a moment from prosecuting any Objects you have immediately in view that promises success. I am &c ^ "G° Washington." 'This was from the same correspondent as gave the lines printed on page 156. ^ In manuscript of Robert Hanson Harrison. A council of war sat on November 24 to consider the possibility of attacking successfully the enemy in Philadelphia. No decision appears to have been reached, and Washington requested each officer to submit his opinion in writing. 172 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. [Note. — To properly understand the importance of the following documents, it is necessary to recall the political position occupied by Washington. The success of Gates at the northward had directed public attention to his supposed capacity as a commander. The plot which has passed into history as the Conway Cabal originated some time before Conway had anything to do with it, and was in its nature political rather than military. The idea entertained by some members of Congress, notably those from the Eastern States, of the necessity of having two commanders instead of one, offered a basis for scheming in the military line. Did anything happen to Washington, it was felt there was no man to take his place ; and Gates, at the head of the northern army, reaping the benefits of the preparation and leader- ship of others against Burgoyne, gave promise of a brilliant military future, and thus presented himself as a legitimate successor to Washing- ton. This was early the feeling among certain members of Congress, and their prepossessions were used in an illegitimate way to further the ambitions of men wishing to advance themselves by means of Gates. There is not enough evidence to prove that Gates was a party to any scheme having a definite purpose to supplant Washington ; bi\t there is abundant evidence of a wish on the part of certain officers in close con- nection with Gates to push him for the chief command of the American army. In seeking this they sought even more their own advancement and advantage, and it is to Conway and Mifflin, out of Congress, and to Samuel Adams, James Lovell, and, as is generally supposed, Richard Henry Lee, in Congress, that the alleged Cabal owed a support and encouragement that eventually led to an actual plot to advance Gates even at the expense of removing Washington. The surrender of Burgoyne directed attention to Gates. To accomplish that object Washington had so far depleted his own army as to be in no position to offer effective resistance to the advance of Howe upon Phil- adelphia. The battle of Brandywine and the reduction of Fort Mifflin practically determined which army should hold the city, and the general public, seeing only defeat in onequarter and a brilliant success in another, jumped to the conclusion that the one was due to inefficiency, while the other was caused by splendid military ability. It was, therefore, easy to foment an opinion that Washington had been derelict in his share of the campaign ; and as day after day passed with the two armies almost within gunshot of one another, yet no engagement taking place, the popu- lace clamored for action. They could not understand why, with forces supposed to be nearly equal in strength, an assault upon the British in Philadelphia should not be attempted. They could not know how much Washington had sacrificed of his strength to assist Gates, and they did not know that the force returning from the northern army after its suc- cess did not rejoin Washingtun until after Fort Mifflin had fallen. It Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 173 was only when Glover's brigade and Morgan's corps had joined the main army that Washington felt himself strong enough to entertain an assault upon the city. Not only did he wish to make this assault, but he was urged to it by the popular clamor, as it was thought that good political results would follow a striking military success. He knew that he had enemies in the army, and felt that he had them in Congress. The sentence from Conway's letter gave him knowledge of the one, while his friends in Congress kept him advised of the other. It was to determine whether his idea of an attack on the British was practicable that he called a council of war and requested the opinion in writing of each general officer. These opinions are now published for the first time, and must be considered in the light of something besides military policy, although they are naturally concerned more with the military than the political features. One bit of evidence which I believe has not been heretofore known is to be found in a report submitted to Congress by the Board of War on November 21, or three days before this council was held. The military questions in Congress had been under the control of a " Board of War and Ordnance" until October, 1777, when a " Board of War" was estab- lished, to consist of three persons not members of Congress. As a begin- ning of a separation of executive from legislative functions, this was a decided step in advance. It was on October 17 that the report consti- tuting the Board of War was adopted, or about two weeks after the knowledge of Gates's victory had been obtained. On November 7 the members of the Board were elected : Major-General Thomas Mifflin, Colo- nel Timothy Pickering, and Colonel Robert Hanson Harrison. Mifflin and Pickering accepted their appointments. On November 17 Congress determined to add two members to the old Board of War, and selected Mr. Dana and Mr. J. D. Smith. This old Board, composed of members of Congress, met on the morning of the 21st of November ; and, by a strange oversight, the report they laid before Congress contained the name of Major-General Mifflin as present and apparently taking a full part in the proceedings as one of the members. This error was afterwards corrected and his name stricken out. In this report is to be found the first sugges- tion formally made that Gates should be the President of the new Board. It also contained other matter of such interest as to warrant its publica- tion in full. It will be seen that the paragraph applying to Gates was postponed, as well as that which provided for the retention of Richard Peters as Secretary to the Board. Six days later Congress proceeded to the election of three Commissioners for the Board, and elected Major- General Gates, Joseph Trumbull, and Richard Peters as the Commis- sioners, and specially appointed Gates as the President of the Board. It is thus established that it was due to Mifflin that Gates received this high appointment to a place in which he could more easily work upon the sympathies and influence of the members of Congress, led rather by the 174 Defetioes of Philadelphia in 1777. ambitious of others than by his own wishes. The general impression to be gained of Gates, from his correspondence, is that of a rather dull, well-meaning, and easily influenced man, such a man as would readily become the tool of others possessed of greater capacity and more unscrupulous. Nothing could be more cutting to Washington than the terms of this ' report urging the claims of Major-General Gates to the position of Presi- dent of the Board. The principal matter urged by Washington upon Congress as essential to future operations— a measure on which the future of America would depend — was the formation of a new army of compe- tent number and engaged for the war, or for a longer service than twelve months. As the end of the year was approaching, he found himself once more face to face with the formation of a new establishment. He had been providing for this contingency for months, and after an experience of short enlistments through two campaigns, had become so convinced of the attending evils as to see no safety in any other course than in a reasonably permanent force of .sufficiently long service to become dis- ciplined and accustomed to their officers, — a prime necessity in an effi- cient army. Nothing could have hurt him more than to have one intoxicated by an unusual success cut in under him with the remark that his policy was a " theory" and that there were other things more important. The committee urged Gates's military skill as competent to suggest " reformations" in the different departments of the army, while his "char.acter and popularity in the army" would facilitate the execution of such reformations, — " a Task in the opinion of this Com- mittee more arduous and important than the formation of any new Establishment, however wise it may be in Theory." Fortunately, no such language was used in a formal resolution ; for it is hardly possible to believe that Washington would have remained at the head of the army under such a studied rebuke of his policy. Con- gress rejected the words of the report, and on the 27th passed the following : Resulved, That Mr. President inform Mujor-Gener.al Gates of his being appointed president of the new constituted Board of War, ex|ire5sing the high .sense Congress entertain of the general's abilities and peculiar fitness to discharge the duties of that important office, upon the right execution of which the success of the American cause does eminently depend ; that he inform general Gates, that it is the intention of Congress to continue his rank as major-general in the army, and that he officiate at the Board, or in the field, as occasion may require; and that the general be requested to repair to Congress with all convenient despatcli, to enter on the duties of his new appointment. WOUTHINQTON C. FORD.] Defences of Philadelphia in 177 175 REPORT OF THE BOARD OF WAR. f Ag^ "At a Board of War, y° 21" Nov' A.M. 1777. "Present, Major General Mifflin, M' Lee, M' Duer, M' Jones, M' Harvey, M' "Williams & M' Dana. " The Board beg leave to report to Congress " That they have had a Conference with Gen- eral MifHin on the late Establishment made by Congress for conducting the War Department, and are unanimously of opinion, that a sulBcieut number of Commissioners have not been ap- pointed for giving due weight to the execution of the Regulations which may be recommended by the Board, and adopted by Congress, and particularly for enabling one of the Board of Commissioners to visit from Time to time the diilereut Armies, Posts, or Garrisons in order to see that the Regulations adopted by Congress are carried into Execution, and to examine what are the wants of the Army, and what Defects or Abuses prevail from time to time in the difier- ent departments.' " That it wou'd further greatly tend to facili- tate the Business of the Department, especially at the Commencement of the new Establish- ment, to secure the Continuation of the Services of the Secretary of the late Board of War, who in their Opinion has discharged the Duties of an arduous and complicated Department in its In- fant stage, with Honour to himself, and much Disinterestedness, and with Fidelity and advan- tage to the Public. > Prio Q,' ■ Printed in the Journals of Congress, November 24, 1777. 176 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. Postp'' " The Board further beg leave to represent that General MitHin has express'd a warm Sol- licitude that Major General Gates shou'd be appointed President of this Board, from a Con- viction that his Military Skill would suggest Reformations in the different Departments of the Army essential to good Discipline, Order & (Economy, and that his Character and Popu- larity in the Army would facilitate the execu- tion of such Reformations when adopted by Congress ; a Task in the opinion of this Com- mittee more arduous and important than the formation of any new Establishment, however wise it may be in Theory. " On these Principles your Committee are of opinion " That two additional Commissioners should be appointed to execute the Department of the "War Office in P^Suance of the Resolution of Congress of the [I7th of October' ], and that any three of the said Commissioners should be a Quorum to transact Business; anything in the former Resolutions respecting the Board to the contrary notwithstanding.^ " Extract from the Minutes. " Jos. NOURSE " i». 8. B* War." Endorsed by Thomson as "passed." In the hand- writing of Richard Peters is added : "The Board are further of Opinion that the Resolution pass'd on the Inst, relative to the Execution of the War Department should be annuU'd; and that the Mem- bers former Committee of Congress Board of War should be authoris'd to proceed on the Business of that Department, ' In manuscript of Charles Thomson. ' Printed in the Journals of Congress, November 24, 1777. Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 177 till such Time as a Quorum of the Commissioners of the "War Office shall attend." OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. " Mount Holly, 9 o'clock Nov. 24, 1777 "D»SlR " I received your favor by Col. Mead who has communi- cated to me the design of an attack upon Philadelphia, the consequences if successful are so desireable that I wish it appeard to me more practicable. — In war there must be always something left to chance and I would always recom- mend to trust some consequences to the spirit and bravery of the troops. An excess of caution which councils of war are generally productive of, often deprives a country of the advantages of a due exertion of the spirit & bravery of the troops — but I have viewed this subject in and out of council, I have weighed the good and bad consequences — I have surveyd it in a Historical point of light, I have examind it from my own observations in the course of the war, and I cannot think there is that degree of probability of the attempts succeeding that will warrant the undertaking. I have not time without detaining Col. Mead too long to give my reasons against the attack in full detail, but I think it a hazardous attempt and will terminate to the injury of the Continent and disgrace of the army. — I am sensible that many things pronounced impracticable before they were attempted have been crowned with success in the undertak- ing — But prudence forbids that being made a principle which necessity alone can justify — I wish that it was in our power to give that Army some capital wound — the reputa- tion of the Army and the happiness of the country loudly call for it — but in consulting our wishes rather than our reason, we may be hurried by an impatience to attempt something splendid into inextricable difficulties. " The depreciation of money, the corruption of the people and the dislike to service that prevails throughout the army will justify measures at this day that might wear the com- plexion of rashness under different circumstances. How 178 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. far these considerations may authorise the attempt I cannot pretend to say. One thing I would beg leave to recom- mend, that is if your Excellency thinks of attacking the City this winter improve the present moment for sure I am what- ever reinforcements of militia may be drawn in to aid the army they cannot render it so formidable and equal to the attempt as it is at this hour. I am very willing to lay aside my own private Judgment and second the attempt — you may depend upon it Sir that I will as freely embark in the attempt if your Excellency thinks it warrantable as if I was of the same sentiment, and whatever may be the event my opinion never shall be known. " The troops here are under marching orders — Glover's Brigade will join us in the morning — I intended to advance in the morning at nine, but Col. Mead's coming and recom- mending the postponing the march until I hear further from your Excellency, and as the troops coming in will want one day's rest I thought it best to countermand the orders for marching until I hear from your Excell^ and I am further induced to the measure because I dont apprehend the diffi- culties of attacking Lord Cornwallis will be increasd from one or two days delay. The Enemy give out they are 10,000 strong and that they intend to march to Burlington. " I wish your Excellency to weigh the subject coolly and take your measures accordingly — I shall be perfectly satis- fied be the result what it may. " I am &c. "N. Greene." OPINION OF LORD STIRLING. " Camp, Nov' 25'" 1777 " Sir : " In Compliance with your Excellency's request that each of the General Officers met in Council yesterday Evening, should give you their Sentiments in writing on what Meas- ures had best be pursued in the present Exigency of our affairs; I must now beg leave to give it as my opinion that as all the reinforcements we had any reason to expect, have now Joined the main Army, and as a Considerable body of Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 179 the Enemy's army is detached into New Jersey under the Command of Lord Cornwaliis, a favorable opertunity is presented for an immediate Attack of the Enemy. That other Circumstances render this measure absolutely neces- sary. That from all I have heard said, or that has occurred to me on the Subject, I think the following plan of Attack most feaseable, 1" That the Enemy's Lines on this side Philadelphia be attacked at Daylight by three Columns properly flanked and supported. 2'' That two thousand men be drawn from General Green and embarked in Boats at Dunker's ferry, to proceed to Philadelphia, land at or near Spruce Street, push thro' to the Common, endeavour with part to secure the Bridge over Schuylkill, and with the remainder to Attack the Enemy in the Rear of their Lines. 3* That five hundred Continental Troops with the Millitia under General Potter possess snch of the hills on the other side of Schuylkill as command an Intilade of the Enemy's Lines, and while part of them carry on a Brisk Canonade in that place, the rest of them proceed to the Bridge over Schuylkill and wait an oppertunity of attacking the Works there in front, when the party from Spruce Street make an Attack in the Rear. The Landing of the party at Spruce Street should he eftected if possible just before day light, as it would greatly facilitate their passage thro' the Town and bring the Alarm to the Rear of the Enemy's lines in time to Cooperate with the main Attack in front. These are outlines of the plan I would propose, and submit it to your Excellency & am with great Regard and Respect "Your Excellency's most Humble Servant " Stirling." opinion of major-general sullivan. " Camp, Whitemarsh, Novem' 25'" 1777. " Dear General : " Agreeable to y' Ord" of Last Even« I have cons'* the prac- ticability of making an Attack upon the Enemy in Ph & weighed its probable Consequences in every view That occurred to me. 180 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. " In order to Determine whether such an Attempt is Likely to succeed it is necessary to consider the Euem3-s situation — The Manner of our making the Attack on the Lines — the Mode of Attack we must adopt for carrying the city after we have made ourselves masters of their Lines & the prob- able method the Enemy may adopt to Render our Designs abortive. The Right of the Enemy is secured by the Dela- ware, their Left by Schuylkill & their Rear by the Junction of those Rivers. Their front is parti}' secured by an Inac- cessable Pond & the Residue by a Chain of Redoubts strengthened by Abbatties in part & partly by circular Works — These Redoubts being 14 in number. The Attack upon them must be total or partial if the whole are to be attacked, as works cannot be carried but by Columns. The attacking part of your force in Front must be Disposed in fourteen Columns to carry 14 Redoubts manned with 100 men each. After carrying those they are to assume a Dif- ferent Form to attack the city which will then be on their Left Defended by 4600 men, even if we suppose the Enemys whole Force in Philadelphia to amount to no more than 6000. If a partial attack is made upon these Redoubts, it must be on these Left, for if these Right be attacked & carried those Redoubts which remain on their Left will with their field pieces play obliquely on the Rear of y' Troops while Forming & making the attack on the city. Should then their Left be attacked & carried & your Troops pass them & form agreeable to your most Sanguine Expecta- tions & advance towards the city they will have the chains of Redoubts on their Left, the Schuylkill in their Rear, the city & the Delaware in front & the Delaware & Schuylkill on their Right. When your Troops advance to the city in Line they will find the wall of Brick Houses opposed to y' right of their Line, The upper stories of those Houses well filled by rausqueteers & the main streets by which alone they can penetrate filled with men. Drawn across of sufficient Depth to oppose any part of your Line that may come against them, & the whole Defended by a Train of artillery surely (?) superior to any you can possibly bring against Defences of Pkiludelphia in 1777. 181 them, & this artillery being placed in front of the Houses makes no Interval in their Line & is conipleatly covered by The Musqueteers occupying the upper Lofts of The Houses. This Disposition will oblidge you once more to form Columns to penetrate the Streets, in Doing which your Troops must the moment they enter the city expect a Fire in front from the Troops opposed to them & on both Flanks from the Houses : These circumstances must occur to the party attacking in Front. How far they may be assisted by a party thrown into the city by water I will not Determine. If the party in front is successful they may be saved — if not they are inevi- tably lost — before we promise ourselves Success from this Stratagem it will be proper to consider how far this plan will be Likely to be Discovered by the Enemy in Season to prevent its Eftects. Every person who has attended to the Noise made by a Fleet of Boats Rowing in the Night must be sensible that they will be heard at Lest two miles & the Noise will Direct the Enemy where to make their opposi- tion — It cannot be supposed that the Enemy will be stupid enough to Let their whole army run to oppose them — they have alarm posts which they will repair to & send a sufficient Number of the Reserve with field pieces to oppose or entrap them. It will be far from having the Effect Designed by a Feint which answers no other purpose but to Induce the Enemy to suppose your whole force being thrown to a point with an Intention to make your most vigorous effort there & by this means Draw them from the posts you wish to carry. They will easily know that you have not boats to Transport any considerable part of your army to the City by water, nor would it be prudent in you so to do. They will therefore consider this as a Feint & Treat it accord- ingly while they prepare to Receive your Real Attack in Front which this Feint will sufficiently announce to them — with Respect to the probability of carrying the Lines & afterward the City Defended by an army almost equal in Number to that part of yours which you can expect any- thing from is what both reason & experience speaks Loudly against. I have sometimes Read of Lines & partial Retrench- 14 182 Defmces of Philadelphia in 1777. ments being carried but in the course of my Reading (which has not been Inconsiderable) I have never Read of a Chain of Redoubts Covering the whole Front of an Army being carried (even where they had not as in the present Case rivers covering every other side of tliem). I cannot help observing that some Gentlemen Avho think we can easily carry those Redoubts say that if we are Defeated we have a Strong and secure Camp to Retreat to. how it can be sup- posed that a Camp without Lines or Redoubts can be better Defended by a Defeated army against a victorious one than Lines & Redoubts can with Troops, against others upon equal footing only is beyond my Conception. I know it is Said that these Redoubts are weak, but it would b|e ab- surd to suppose that the Redoubts they liave been Labour- ing at six weeks are not as perfect as those Thrown up by Peter the Great in one night which Defeated the best army in the world or equal to that single Redoubt which Ruined the British Army at Bunkers Hill. Mr. Howe has never attempted a Redoubt since but at Red Bank & was Defeated — he was several Days with Double your numbers within musket shot of y"' Lines on Long Island & White Plains & feared to attack you — he has no Conception that Lines are so easily carried but if in this he is mistaken all military writers agree that the attack of a village is the most Hazard- ous Enterprise in war, & has seldom been attended with Success. Experience has so far convinced the King of Prus- sia that he is determined never to attack another, if it be said we must Reduce it by Cannonnade ray answer is that must be a work of time, especially as they have more cannon & heavier mettle than we. " I know the world expect something from this Army & our affairs call for it, but no Caprice of the Greedy Multitude should induce us to Sacrifice the Army — a Defeat will be so far from helping that in my opinion it will ruin our affairs. The common people will Discover Howes superiority to both our armies without Considering the advantage he had against them — those who have sense enough to Discover the advantages he had against them will condemn the attempt Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 183 as xinwarrantod by Reason or Experience — so that from Different views the Country will become universally Dis- couraged, which I fear will end in the liuin of our Cause — Upon the whole I think the most certain method to retrieve our affairs, to strengthen our friends & Discourage our Ene- mies as well as to establish the Currency of our money will be to put the army in such a Situation as will render it neces- sary for Mr. Howe to fight us or Loose his honor & the con- fidence the people have in his arms. Once it is known that by avoiding you he acknowledges your Superiority in the field his very friends will Despise him for his weakness & Deceit. Yours will be encouraged & value your money at a high rate when supported by those Arms which (this hitherto) arrogant Invader dare not Attack. — There is still another mode of attack upon the Enemys Lines which is to pass your Columns between the Redoubts, if this should be attempted & the Enemy should retire & Draw up in Rear of their Works Leaving in them a suflicient Number to man them your Troops must advance under a Front & Two Flank Fires till they have passed the Redoubts when they will have an additional one in their Rear from the Redoubts they have passed & after Enduring all this they will have to attack the City under all the Disadvantages before men- tioned, in which if they are successfuil they will do what no other Troops have ever accomplished. " I know it is said by some that your Excellency's charac- ter & that of the whole Array will suffer if something is not attempted as the Northern Army is called to our Assistance, &c. I am far from thinking so. But Let us consider what foundation there can be for censure. It is beyond a Ques- tion that General Howe has been much Superior to you in Numbers thr" the whole Campaign. Yet you have fought him & th° the field remained his the victory was yours — he to add to his Force & to get a Decisive Superiority over you in the field called for a Reinforcement & you to counteract him did the same. You by this means became 13000 strong & he remains at Least twelve, if your additional militia will make up for the want of Discipline in your young 184 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. Troops I think it is all we can expect. Where then is this Superiority in numbers on your side which will warrant your making an attack so Likely to Compleat the Ruin of your Currency : an attack condemned by every military writer & unwarranted by Reason or Experience? Actions always take their Character from the Success that attend them, & those Gentlemen who urge this matter to save tlie Credit of the Army Deceive themselves & you ; for if you are unsuc- cessful the Credit of the Army will be Destroyed & the Confidence of the people Lost beyond recovery & your own Character must suft'er. It has been urged that these works may be carried by Surprize : I have ever understood that works were constructed to prevent a Surprize & never once conceived it possible to surprize & carry 14 redoubts especially when the Enemy's first line is encamped in Front of them — it would be needless to give your Excellency in- stances of such attempts upon Redoubts alone and unforti- fied Villages being rendered abortive. Military Books are full of them those writers tell us that a single Stone House, mill or Church if well defended cannot be reduced by [but ?] by cannon, if this be true with respect to one a Regular Line of them opposed to your whole Front must be much more Difficult. What success a Cannonnade from Troops in the open field is Likely to have upon others covered by a village & redoubts & possessed of a Superior Train of artil- lery requires no great share of military knowledge to Deter- mine. I have mentioned some unfortunate attacks upon Redoubts that have fallen within our own knowledge. I will at present mention but two that have proved so upon villages not Defended by Lines or Redoubts. One was in Corsica the first campaign made by the French ag' it, where the whole French army were cut to pieces in storming a small village defended by Paschal Paoli's Brother with a Handful of Corsicans & at German Town one Stone House snatched from us a victory which was about compleated. I am therefore clearly of opinion that the attempt would be Hazardous & must End in Ruin to the Army & to the American Cause, but should y' Exce^ think the attempt Defences of Philadelphia m 1777. 185 practicable I shall cheerfully give up my opinion & use every effort in my power to carry it into Execution with Success. I have the honor to be your Excey' most obed' Serv' "Jn° Sullivan." opinion of major-general armstrong. " Camp at Whitemarsh, 25'" Nov', 1777 " Sir : " Without such an acquaintance of the Enemies lines as wou'd discover to you where they are more or less accessi- ble, I cannot well approve of an attack upon them, nor can I conceive the opposite numbers at Philad" under six thou- sand or upward. — And question whether an attack can be successful if the lines are not penetrated in so short a space of time (perhaps some seven or at most ten minutes) as will render it impossible for the party thrown into the City shou'd the first attempt on the lines fail, to contribute any effectual influence. The principle upon which that part of the disposition is formed is perfectly just, but the numbers too few, and the contingencies various. " In the present view of things I rather approve carrying the Army over Scuilkill & making tryal of any advantages that yet maj' be derived from a possession of the Islands &c. &o., by which means either the Enemy may be drawn out or the Scuilkill pass'd to advantage on the Ice. At the same time I am totally submissive to y' Excellency's commands, beging leave only to add that whether the attack is made or not, but especially if it is, the far greater part of y' force in the Jersey may suddenly be recalled and join the Army. And that I am with the greatest respect &c "John Armstrons." OPINION op the CHEVALIER DU PORTAIL. " 25 9"" 1777. " To attack the Enemy in their Lines appears to me a difficult and dangerous Project. It has especially this very considerable Inconvenience — the exposing our Army in case it does not succeed to a total Defeat. This is easily demon- 186 Defences of PhUadelplda in 1777. strated. One of the priiici[»al meaus proposed is to throw two thousand men in the rear of the Enemy — if we do not succeed these are so many men absolutely lost. As to the main body of the Army which is to attack in front, it must pass through the Intervals left between the Abattis and Redoubts, which they say form very narrow Passages — if after penetrating we should be repulsed can Troops in dis- order return easily by the Passages through which they were introduced — will it not bo very easy for the English to cut off their Retreat. Our whole Army tlien may be de- stroy'd or made prisoners. Now does it become this Army which is the principal one, to run such Risques — does it be- i C07ne it to stake the Fate of America on a sint/le Action ? I think ^ not. For mj' part I never would place this Army in a Situ- ation where its Rear was not perfectly free, much less where it will be inclosed on all sides without means of Retreat. To justify such an Enterprise the success must be almost certain. To judge of this we have only to take a view of the Dispositions which must be made for this attack. This View will render the Difficulties evident. First — two thou- sand men are to be introduced by a River of which the Enemy are wholly Masters. If ^ve embark them near the Enemy the noise may alarm them — if at a distance, the cold which they will undergo, will render the use of their Arms exceedingly difficult in the morning — besides can we flatter ourselves that the River side is unguarded. Let us reflect that a single man is sufficient to make this project miscarry and cause us the loss of two thousand men. "As to the Attack in front — these are nearly the Dispo- sitions which would be followed — We should march upon as many Columns as there are Roads leading to the Enemy — upon our arrival in their presence, each Commanding Officer of a Colunni, according to the size of the works be- fore liim, and the number of men which he judges are con- tained in them, divides his Troops into two parts, one of which surrounds the works and attacks them vigorously, while the other marches boldly througli the Intervals and falls upon the troops in the Rear. But every one sees how Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 187 much harmony is required in all these dispositions. How much presence of mind in the Superior Officers — how much firmness in the troops who have to execute all their ma- noeuvres under the fire of an Enemy who are in a great measure cover'd. " If the Enemy's works are not inclosed, the Enterprise would be much less dangerous — if they are, the Enterprise is too hardy. " His Excellency I think desired us to say a word respect- ing the operations in Jersey. In general it seems to me that we can do nothing better than to endeavour to attack the Enemy's Force there with superior numbers — but there is a very important Observation to be made, which is that we should not weaken ourselves too much here ; for we are to consider that the Enemy may recross their Troops in one night and attack us by day break with their whole force. "If however an attack be determined upon, the Enemy's Works should be more particularly reconnoitred. " The Chevalier Du Portail." ' opinion of baron de kalb. " According to His Excellency General Washington's or- ders, and desire of having every Gentleman's opinion on the Subjects laid before the Council last evening. " Mine is to attempt an attack on the lines & City, as soon as the Plans thereof can be properly laid, all necessary dis- positions and calculations made, as to the mode & time. In respect to the Plan much must depend on intelligences of the Enemy's Position & collected or separated forces, and the whole Enterprise on secrecy and Expedition. "Two essential points would be necessary to be known. "1° Whether a passage for a Column will be practicable on the Bridge or middle ferry on Schuylkill river, to make there a strong attack, or whether the Ennemies take down the Bridge in night time. In this case a small body of ' This opinion was given in Frencli. I have used a translation made by Lieutenant-Colouel John Laurens. 188 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. troops and some artillery would be sufficient on the right bank of that river to disquiet & annoy them in their Lines, and the whole army to be Employed to attack in front with different Columns. " 2° Whether the Key & City Shore of Delawar be not strongly defended, either by Pickets, intrenchments, row Gallies, floating and other Batteries, and whether the Noise of the Boats to be employed there, will not prevent or de- feat the Execution of a landing, for if th' attempt should fail by such obstructions, the boats could hardly be brought off and these troops would be in great danger of being either sunk or taken. If on the contrary no such obstacles were to be feared, a surprise on that side and a well timed attack in the rear of the lines woud undoubtedly insure a com- pleat Victory. " Many more things could be said on this subject. " As for myself and Division we will do our best in what ever part of the Enterprise and attack, His Excellency will find proper to Employ me. "Baron be Kalb. " At Camp, 25 9"" 1777" OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL IRVINE. " Whitemarsh, Not' 25"" 1777 " Sib : " I have seriously revolved in my mind the subject that was debated in Council last night, and notwithstanding the pres- ent disagreeable situation of our affairs, cannot think that we are yet reduced to the necessity of hazarding the total destruc- tion of the army bj' a general attack, on the very ground that general Howe would wish to fight us on ; to attack re- doubts ifec" with any prospect of success, we should be much superior in numbers to the enemy and at least equal to them in discipline, were we possessed of these advantages, & had boats sufficient to throw about 3000 men into their rear I should chearfully vote for the proposed attack, as in my opinion the defeat of gen' Howe would then be as certain, as, I am afraid ours would be were we to attack him with our present strength. Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 189 " I could therefore wish that the array was placed in such a position (either on this or the other side of Schuylkill) as to invite or oblidge general Howe to leave his strongholds & seek us in the field, as the probability of success in a general action then, would be more in our favour with equal numbers, than in an attempt upon his lines with our present triffliug superiority. " I have had but little experience in war, & therefore give my opinion on this important question with diffidence, should your excellency or the major part of the council determine on the attack, I shall chearfully sustain the part assigned to me, & exert my utmost abilities to procure success. I have &c. "James Irvine." opinion of brigadier-general maxwell. " Sir : " Agreeable to your Excellency's request of last night that I should give my opinion this morning in writing concern- ing the making an attact on Philadelphia immediately — I am not for attacting it at present, and will proceed to give some reasons why I would not, viz : It is but a few days ago ; before General Green & Huntington crossed the Dellaware that we determined in a full council that an Attact on the Enemy in their Fortifycations &c. was by no means eligible, and I think we was as strong then as we are now on this side. It is urged that if we do not make an attact on the Town we must be put to the greatest difiieultys to raise another Armey, keep up our credit, &c^ I am of opinion if we throw the Armey away we have, without some good appearance of success we are much more likely not to get another one nor support the Credit of our money. I am for attacting and Harrassing them by every means in our power ; by any other method than that of attacting them in their works. I am &c. "W Maxwell. " White Marsh, 25'" Novbr. 1777. 1 90 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. " KB. — I have heard that the Enemy has got up 2 or 3 small armed Vessels to Philadelphia by people that came out yesterday." OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL PATERSON. " Nov. 25, 1777 "Sir: " The proposed attack on Philidelphia iu my Opinion will be so hazardous that we cannot be justified in prosecuting of it, as a Failure will most certainly be attended with the loss of great Numbers of our Troops, which I am fearfuU would be attended with Fatal Consequences M3' perfect Ignorance of the Country renders me intirely incapable of recommending any other Plan, but shall with Chearfulness do my utmost to put in Execution this or any other your Excellency shall think adviseable. I am &c. " .Tn° Paterson." OPINION OF brigadier-general POOR. " November 25'" 1777 " Sir : "I am sencable tliat the Situation of our Country loudly Calls for the Exertions of this Army. " But fear an atact upon the Lines Round the City of Philidelphia will be unsucesful therefore dont advize to it. "as I have jest arived to Camp & not acquainted in the Countrey beg to be Excused from proposing a new Dis- posistion of the Army. I am &c " Enoch Poor. "^. G'." OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCOTT. " White Marsh, 25"" Nov' 1777 " Sir : " I am for making an attack, so soon as things Can be put in readiness. As to the plan I can Think of none better than that propos'd by Gen' Cadwalader, with this Altera- tion, that the partie proposed to land in the City be detached from Gen' Green and not taken from this arm}-. I Have Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 191 two reasons for this, the one is that those men with him are the Flower of the army, and that it will requier the hest men we can pick to efi'ect the landing if opposd. My other Is that we cant well spare them from this army. I have &c " Ch' Scott." OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SMALLWOOD. " Camp, Novemb' 25"" 1777 " Sir : " I have revolved in mj' Mind the Subject of your Requisi- tion last Night, and placed it in every Point of View, and must confess I am much embarrassed. I see the Propriety and Necessity of an Attact, I view with Pain the pressing Ex- pectations of the Public, the Reputation of the Army at Stake, the depression of our Money, the difficulty & hazard of the proposed Attact, and the Misfortunes, and I may add the almost inevitable destruction which must ensue upon a Defeat, — and upon due Reflection let it suffice to say I am against an Attact on the Enemy's Lines, from an Impres- sion that our Troops are not equal to it, unless there was a moral certainty of throwing in the Parties proposed, down the Delaware & across the Schuylkill, to alarm & make a Diversion on the Flanks & in their Rear, but I think this Event wou'd be doubtful & uncertain, as well as extremely hazardous for the Delaware Party & might in general sub- ject the Army to too great a Sacrifice upon such a Contin- gency. " I shou'd therefore think it more eligible to manoeuvre, and endeavor to draw Gen' Howe out of his Lines to an Engagement, w""" I shou'd judge is both Practicable, and probable. I have the Honor &c. " W. Smallwood." opinion of brigadier-general WAYNE. " Camp at White Marsh, 25'' Novem. 1777 " Sir : " After the most Dispationate & Deliberate Consideration of the Question your Excellency was pleased to propose to 192 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. the Council of General Officers last Evening ; I am Solemnly and Clearly of Opinion — that the Credit of the Army under your Command, the Safety of the Countrj' — the Honor of the American Arms — the Approach of Winter which in a few days will force you from the field, and above all the Depreciation of the Currency of these States, — Points out the Immediate jSTecessity of giving the Enemy Battle. Could they possibly be drawn from their Lines, it's a Meas- ure Devoutly to be wished. " But if that canuot be Effected, It is my Opinion that your Excellency should March tomorrow morning and take post with this Arm}- at the Upper or North End of German- town — and from thence Immediately Detach a Working party to throw up, or effect to throw up some Redoubts under the direction of your Engineers. — this Intelligence will reach the Enemy — they will Conclude that you Intend to make good j'our Quarters there, and however desirous they may be to dislodge you — yet it will take up some time to withdraw their force from the Jersey. " by this Manoeuvre you will be witliin Striking Distance, the Enemy will be deceived by j'our Works, your Troops will be fresh and ready to move the same Night so as to arrive at the Enemies Lines before day light on thirsday Morning Agreeable to the proposed plan of Attack — with great part of which I am in fellowship — the outlines are good — they may be Improved to Advantage and Crowned with Success. " It has been Observed by some Gentlemen that the At- tack is Hazardous — that if we prevail it will be attended with great loss. " I agree with the Gentlemen in their Position — but how- ever hazardous the Attempt — and altho some Loss is certain, yet it is m}' Opinion — that yon will not be in a worse Situa- tion — nor your Arms in less Credit, if you should even meet with a Misfortune — than if you were to Remain Inactive. " The eyes of all America are fixed on you, the Junction of the Northern Army — which Obliged Gen' Burgoyne to lay down his Arms, gives the Country & Congress some ex- Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 193 pectation, that a vigorous Effort will be made to Dislodge the Enemy. " Its not in our Power to Command success — but it is in our Power to produce a Conviction to the World that we Deserve it. Interim I am &c. "Ant^ Wayne, B. G." opinion of brigadier-general woodford. "Dear Gen-- " I cannot help viewing the purposed attack upon the Enemy's Lines as attended with many Hazards & Dificulties. But these are over Ballanced by the following considera- tions viz' first the necessity that something should be at- tempted by this Army before it retires into Winter Quarters, both for its own C' & the support of our paper currency. " Secondly that from my knowledge of the State of the soldiery we are not likely to be in a better condition, if so good a one, at any Future time. " Thirdly, that all the Force we expected is arrived — and lastly, that the present Detach'd situation of the two Arrays promises a fairer prospect of success than is likely to pre- sent itself whilst we are able to continue in the Field. " I am therefore for making the Attack so soon as your Excellency & some of the Gen' Officers have had sufficient time to Digest a proper plan. I have &c. "W" Woodford. " Nov' 25'\ 1777" OPINION OF brigadier-general KNOX. " Pabk of Artillery, Camp, Whitemarsh 26"" Nov' 1777 " Sir : " I exceedingly lament my want of experience and ability to fill properly the important station in which I am, and I am more particularly distress'd when such important Ques- tions are referr'd to my decision as those which your Excel- lency gave us in Charge the last evening. The happiness or misery of the people of America may be the consequence of a right or erroneous judgment. 194 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. " Much lately has be[en] urg'd concerning the reputation of our arms, as if we had long been a warlike nation whose existence like the antient Romans depended on their mili- tary Fame. I confess I view the matter differently and cannot bring myself to believe (how much soever I may wish it) that we are upon a par in military knowledge and skill with our enemies. Indeed it is not possible and the sensible part of mankind well know it. " We set out in the contest with notions and sentiments very different from these. We then considerd we were con- testing for our all, for everything dear to humanity : But it now seems otherwise with many persons, whose anxiety for military Fame seems to absorb every other consideration. " I have also heard it urg'd that your Excellency's repu- tation would suffer. I freely confess an Idea of this kind pains me exceedingly and were I fully to believe it, I should be impelled to give my opinion for measures as desperate as I conceive the attempt to storm the enemies works and Philadelphia. I am not of opinion that your Excellency's character suffers in the least with the well affected part of the people of America. I know to the contrary, tlie people of America look up to you as their Father, and into your hands they intrust their all fully, confident of every exertion on your part for their security and happiness — and I do not believe there is any man on Earth for whose welfare there are more sollicitations at the Court of heaven than for j-ours. " I believe perfectly that there are some people who speak disrespectfully of your Excellency, but I as perfectly believe that these are people who have never given any unequivocal evidence of their attachment to our rights ; or whose bound- less ambition has been check'd b}- your well try'd patriotism. " The state of the depreciation of our Currency has also been urg'd as a principal inducement to some desperate attack — That its value diminishes every day. It is but too true that the large emissions and some other causes have effected a diminution of the value of our paper currency. Had the same enormous emissions taken place in a time of profound peace and flourishing Commerce as have taken Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 195 place during the war, without sinking any part of them by taxes, I do assert that the Currency would be equally de- preciated as at present. " The circumstances of the respective states would not permit them 'till lately to endeavor to sink their proportions of the paper currency — butt now almost everj- state on the Continent are making large strides towards it. The Cur- rency in the eastern States from their large taxes will in- crease in its value every day. I cannot therefore perceive the force of the argument urg'd, deriv'd from the consider- ation of the failure of the currency. " The Gentlemen who urge the desperate measure of at- tacking the enemies Line, Redoubts and city of Philadelphia seem to forget the many principles laid down by people ex- perienc'd in the art of war against our engaging in General actions upon equal terms — against our risquing our all on the event of single Battles — In the beginning of the Contest our friends in England urg'd the impropriety of such con- duct, giving instances of numbers of States who lost their liberties by means of them. It is an invariable principle in War, That it cannot be the interest at the same time of both parties to engage. It is also another fix'd principle that the invaders of a Country ought to bring the defenders of it to action as soon as possible. But I believe there is not a single maxim in War that will justify a number of un- disciplin'd troops attacking an equal number of diseiplind troops strongly posted in redoubts and having a strong city in their rear such as Philadelphia. " It is proposed to attack the enemies redoubts without being perfectly acquainted with their number, strength, or situation, with troops of whom we have had the experience in two capital actions, that it was impossible to rally after they were broken. By the mode of attack propos'd we are to stake the Liberties of America on a single attempt in which the probability of success is against us, and if defeated of sacrificing the happiness of posterity to what is caii'd the reputation of our arms. "It has been agreed that the enemies Force consists of 196 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 10,000 rank and file fit for duty — it is said Lord Cornwallis has taken with him from 1,500 to 3000. Suppose the num- ber 2500, which is 500 more than I believe he has — there remains 7,500 rank and file fit for duty. Our returns are 8000. (I say 8000 because I hold the militia in case of an attack of this kind useless entirely, for we know they will not stand within the range of a Cannon ball.) We are to attack 7500 strongly posted in redoubts, having batteries and a strong City in their rear. In this instance the Idea that is necessary among disciplined troops of having three to one to storm works is laid aside, not because our troops are better disciplined than the enemies, but because from a concurrence of circumstances our affairs are in a desperate situation, and we must retrieve them or perish. " Marshall Saxe says redoubts are the strongest and most excellent kind of field Fortification, and infinitely preferable to extended lines — because each redoubt requires a separate attack, one of which succeeding does not facilitate the reduc- tion of the others. Charles the IS"" with the best troops in the World was totally ruin'd in the attack of some redoubts at Pultowa, altho he succeeded in taking three of them. " The Character of the British troops in Europe is far above mediocrity — and the experience we have had of their dis- cipline and valor by no means proves them contemptible. In the commencement of the War they storm'd an unfinish'd work on Bunker Hill, but the experience gain'd there has entirely prevented them from making any similar attempts. Indeed the Germans lately made an attempt on red Bank, the event of which will hardly give them a favorable opinion of the attack of redoubts by storm. " The situation of the American army on long Island after the Battle of the 27"" Aug' was exceedingly ineligible, and the enemy must have known it ; but they did not attempt to carry our redoubts by storm, altho' had they succeeded in one instance and made a sufficient opening for the intro- duction of a large Column of troops, the greater part of our army then on the Island must have fallen a sacrifice or have been taken prisoners. Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 197 " From the experience deriv'd from reading and some little service and the knowledge of the strength of the enemies works, my opinion is clearly, pointedly, and positively against an attack on the enemies redoubts, because I am fully con- vinc'd a defeat certain and inevitable. " My opinion is to draw our whole strength together, take post at and Fortify Germantown, considering it as our Winter Quarters. — When the Works there are in a toler- able state of defence, I should propose taking our whole force (except one brigade to guard the redoubts) and pro- ceed near the enemies Lines, offering them Battle, which if they declin'd would in the opinion of every rational man fully evince our superiority in point of strength — if they should come out, fight and defeat us, we have a secure re- treat and Winter Quarters. " I have thus ofFer'd my sentiments to your Excellency with freedom, but if a contrary disposition should take place and an attack be resolv'd upon, I shall endeavor to execute the part that may be assign'd me to the utmost of my ability. I am &c. H. Knox, "5. spirits, owing to the imposi- ' tions of the suttlers on the soldiery — What regulations or remedies can be applied to rectify these abuses ? " Col. Frazer, in a letter of " the 9"" instant having repre- sented that he had ' liberty to mention it as General Howes earnest desire, that a general exchange of pris- oners should take place on equitable terms, or that the officers, prisoners of War on both sides should be re- leased and have liberty to go to any place in possession of their friends on their paroles' — What measures might it be proper for us to take in consequence of that information ? "Jno. Sullivan "Nath*- Greene " Adam Stephen " Le Mquis de Lafayette "Alex'' McDougall "W. Smallwood "H. Knox " J. Varnum." Deferred. Deferred. An" Wayne P. Muhlenberg G. Weedon, B. G. Jed Huntington, B. Gen' T. Conway, B. G. 2 1 2 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. [Note. — With the failure of any plan for attacking the British in Philadelphia the question of future operations became of importance. The popular view was still in favor of some active measure which should give the enemy an idea of the fighting ability of the Continental army, and this view found support in Congress, where it was urged as much on political as on military grounds. No one denied the expe- diency, even the necessity, of a partial victory to inspire the States with a little energy, infuse a little vitality into the sinking currency, and wipe out the depressing atmosphere of a retreating and somewhat dis- organized army. But this was only one side of the question. It appeared to Washington that a present and temporary advantage might be obtained at too great a cost. A defeat or failure might complete the ruin of the army, give strength to the jealousies and rising plots among the officers, and, by dispersing the army, scatter throughout the continent the seeds of complaint, of fancied wrongs, and suffering under inaction and defective commissary and hospital service, which would obstruct the enrolling of a new army. However brilliant a successful dash might be, it was too late in the season to retrieve the fortunes of war, and the husbanding of the existing force, seasoned and disciplined as it was, seemed of greater moment than devising an attack on the issue of which all might depend. To consider the question of winter-quarters a council of war was called, and the following are the opinions. WORTHINGTON C. FOED.] OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL SULLIVAN. "Camp at Whitemarsh, Decem' 1, 1777 " Dear General " Agreeable to your Excelleuceys Commands I have Cou- sidered upon the most suitable place to Cautou the Army During the winter. The several places proposed in Councill have their Advantages and Disadvantages but that which has the Least objections ought to be fixed upon. The Inten- tions of the Board is to take that Station which will answer best to cover the Country, Kefresh the Troops & Discipline the Army & by adding to the Numbers by Recruits & other- ways prepare it to take the field with vigour Early in the Spring — in order to Determine what place will be most Likely to answer this purpose it will be proper to consider the several places proposed with the objections that may justly be made to each : The first is The Great Valley on the other side of Schulkill. There it is proposed to Hutt Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 213 the Army for the winter. The second is to canton the Troops in "Wilmington & its Neighbourhood. The Third is to canton them from Lancaster to Reading. — " The first place proposed will cover the Country west of Schulkill, provided Large Detachments are kept near the Schulkill & on the Delaware to prevent the Enemy from making Inroads and Collecting Forage &c. in the Neigh- bourhood of Darby, Chester & Wilmington but in case the Enemy should take post with a large party at Wilming- ton, you must send a Force superior to theirs to attack them, or move a large part if not the whole of your Army near that place to prevent them from Foraging & Drawing provisions, in which Case your Huts must be forsaken & of Course become useless. One great objection to Hutts is that they are exceeding unhealthy and are at Best but a miserable Shelter from the Inclemencj' of the weather. — The mortality among the Hessians at Brunswick Last Spring as well as common observation will justify this as- sertion. Should you be able to cover the west side of the Schulkill by adopting this plan it must be by making a Winters Campaign ; but it is to be Rememberd at the same time that you Leave Exposed the State of New Jersey and all that part of Peusylvania which Lies on the East of Schulkill, and put it in the power of the Enemy to ren- der your Communications with the Eastern States across the Delaware very Difficult, if not impracticable. The second post proposed namely Wilmington & its Environs will not only Leave New Jersey & the Eastern part of Peu- sylvania, with most of your Hospitals & Stores Exposed but even the Western part of Pensylvauia will be in great Measure Exposed unless you keep a Force near the Schul- kill to prevent the Incursions of the Enemy. This will also occasion a Winter's Campaign, without answering any other purpose but that of covering part of Maryland & the Dela- ware States & your Situation will put it in the power of the Enemy compleatly to cut off' your Communications with all the States east of Schulkill. In addition to those Diffi- culties There is another of great weight in my mind, which 16 214 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. is that Though it is not Easy to Surprize the post, it is by no means Impracticable. This will necessarily Increase our out Guards & Pickets, & make the Dutj- of the Soldiers something severe — & to add to it M' How by a move of his array up the Schulkill towards y' Stores may corapel 3'ou to move your Army as often as he chuses to repeat the ma- ncBuvre. If, therefore either of the before mentioned posts are taken a Winter's Campaign must be the Consequence. This in my opinion ought if possible to be avoided. The most warlike nations in the World both in Ancient and Modern times have endeavoured to avoid them, even when they had a sufficiency of Cloathing for their Troops, & were in Climates much more temperate than ours, Experience convinced them that the gain was by no means equal to the Loss and though in most Instances whole Provinces have been given up, this Consideration has not been thought of sufficient weight to keep Armies in the Field through the winter Season. " The Situation of your Army will be scarcely Tolerable if placed in the warmest Houses During the winter the whole of them without Watch Coats one half without Blankets & more than a Third without Shoes Stockings or Breeches & many of Them without Jackets. Indeed there are some without Coats & not a few without Shirts Even the Officers in sundry Instances are Destitute of proper Cloathing, some of them being almost naked. These Considerations should Induce us to avoid a winter's Campaign if it may be Done without the Greatest Inconveniencys. — The Third place will leave exposed the East & West Side of Schulkill near the Enemy & at the same time expose New Jersey. It will, however cover the Back parts of the Country give oppor- tunity of Recruiting & Disciplining your Army & at the same Time furnish Houses that will supply the want of Comfortable Cloathing to your Troops, & give you & your officers a proper opportunity of turning your Thought to proper Measures for Regulating your Army & enabling it to take the field with vigor in the Spring. To secure the Country as much as possible one Brigade should be placed Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 215 in New Jersey for the militia to collect to in Case of Inva- sion & scouting parties of the militia should be constantly near the enemy to intercept the small parties from making inroads into that State — at Potsgrove or Reading in Penn- sylvania should also be another Brigade or Division for the same purpose & the militia of this State should be constantly scouting near the Enemies' Lines to keep them from foraging with impunity. This Disposition will cover your Hospitals & Stores & keep open your Communications with all the States — Though you may in taking the above Situation be under a necessity of Removing some Inhabitants who have iied from Philadelphia farther Back into the Country, yet this is a much Less Evil than Exposing the Army to be Ruined by the Inclemency of the Seasons & the want of Cloathing, but this may in some Measure be Remedied, as the Distance between you & the Enemy will permit you to canton your Troops in Towns considerably back of the Line which marks your Front. I know that there are also Ob- jections against this Disposition which have great weight, among which is that of Leaving so much Country open to the enemy, but in every view of the Subject I think this the Least Liable to objection. I cannot help giving it as my opinion if we are to make a winter's Campaign, & our Force is Deemed sufficient to dispute the field with the enemy after the seven Virginia Regiments Leave us : that German- town will be the most proper place for the purpose — as that & Beggars Town will afibrd cover for most of the Troops. The several Roads leading to it may soon be fortified against a surprize & Corps selected to defend the Houses which will supply in great measure our want of numbers. The proximity of our Situation to the Enemy will keep them within Bounds & by keeping a strong party of Pensylvania Militia on the west of Schulkill and 1 of the Jersey Militia on the East of Delaware, their Incurtions into the Country will be totally prevented, if a winters Campaign is to be carried on this will be the most advantageous and comfort- able Quarters for the purpose — but if a winters Campaign is to be avoided, the other is to be preferred for the Reasons 216 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. afore assigned. I know that both officers & soldiers Dread a winter's Campaign, the prospect of which Induces our officers to Resign in such JSTumbers & prevents privates from Engaging in the Service. With Respect to the post our Army takes previous to Retiring to Winter Quarters, I think it immaterial at present, for if M' Howe Declines a general Action no situation we can take either on this or the other side the Schulkill will eompell him to fight us as he has the Delaware open to furnish him with supplies, and if he is Determined to bring on an Engagement he will seek out the Army let their Station be where it will. D"' General, the above is submitted with all Due DetFerence & Respect by your Excellencey's most obed' serv' "Jn° Sullivan." opinion of the marquis de lafayette. " Your excellency ordered me to give my opinion about the three plans for winter quarters : 1° the chain from about the Sculckill till bethehem — 2° this from reading to laucas- ter — 3° building hutts about and quartering in willmington. " I must confess my being prevented of fixing Tay senti- ments in a decisive manner by my want of knowledge about very interesting points among them are 1° how far we should distort and perhaps disaffect those persons who echould be turned out from the diferant places they are in. " 2° how far we may expect to collect and keep with the army all the officers who perhaps will think themselv-es in- titled to go home, to occupate themselves with theyr busi- nesses or pleasures if we are not in a kind of warlike quarters, and then we will took the [ ] advantage of theyr being instructed and disciplined we schould endeavour to gaite [get ?] in going into peaceful places. " 3° What effect can it make upon the people our leaving the country entirely oppened to the execution, cruelties, and also to the seduction of the enemy, when we shall give them all the opportunities they can wish to draw all the provisions from everywhere and in the same time to inlist provincial soldiers. Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 21 7 " 4° if our giving a greater idea of the array in covering the country and laying near the ennemy will more facilitate our making recruits than if we were in good comfortable towns and not in a place and in a manner which shall seem to the eyes of the people a kind of winter campaigne. "5° till what point those different measures will please or distress the officers and (what is generally to the militur world the less attended to, and deserves the greater atten- tion) our private soldiers. " 6° till what point we may depend upon our intelligences and light troops to avoid equally and being surprised and tiring the troops by false alarms. " 7° if we can hope that the soldiers will now receive cloathes &c. in order to be fit for some winter marches and operations, if in case where they schould be defeated we may hope to meet them again. " Such are the points of knowledge which I am deprived of by my being stranger in this country, and my being- stranger in the army, if I can speak to, for I have no officers no soldiers under my particular direction whom I could consult and know theyr temper theyr inclinations, and all what it is possible to expect from them. " however I'l tell your excellency my very imperfect sen- timents about the matter. " 1" the first proposition seems to me the less eligible, and mj- reason for it is the scarcity of villages and principally the report of the commissaires and other gentlemen who know the country. " 2° the second seems to me the most prudent : there we schall be quiete, there we can discipline and instruct our troops, we can be able to begin a early campaign, and we schall not fear to be carried into a winter campaign if it pleases General howe. therefore in consulting only pru- dence, and as far as my little knowledge can go, I am at lest certain that I'l have nothing to reproach to me in giving my choice to this second proposition. " however (and in making excuses to your excellency for such an indecision and referring myself to your knowledge 218 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. about the suppositious I will make) if it was uot diswilling neither for officers neither for soldiers, if going to lancaster will disafect and make a bad impression as far as to prevent our recruiting, if we can keep better our officers when we schall be iu a kind of encampment near the ennemy, if prin- cipally you think that we schould be fit for some winter march's we should be able to support some disadvantages then I am fullj' and with a great chearfulness of opinion that we must go to willmington my reasons would be these. " 1° this position enable us to do in the course of the winter what we schall think proper to annoy, to deprive of res- eources of every kind to attack if possible the ennemy. " 2° this position has something shining and military like which will make the best effect and upon the continent and even in Europe. "3° the doctors, and americaiu ones who know the man- ners and phisik constitution of our soldiers say that nothing is so comfortable as well made butts. " prudence orders me to choose lancaster, but if the incon- veniences I fear (without being able to know them) if those inconveniences I explain to your excellency are not as strong as they can be, if principally our civil situation ask from us something shining and perhaps bold then I give all my wishes and all my choice to willmington. " THE Mquis de Lafayette " M. g:' OPINION OF BARON DE KALB. " Rest, Recruiting & Cloathing being most necessary to the army I am of opinion that taking winter quarters at Wil- mington almost behind the Ennemy, will not answer the purpose, because every movements the Ennemies will make up Schuylkill river we must follow their motions or be cut off from our Stores, or forced to fight whether it will suit us or not. I am apprehensive this position will of necessyty bring on a Winter Campaign. " It appears to me, unless His Excellency has very strong reasons, to maintain Delawar State & part of Chester Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 219 County, that more tranquility & safety could be expected between Lancaster & Reading by building partly butts for tbat purpose, if it is equally (as was observed by several Gentlemen) unavoidable to have butts near & about "Wil- mington. "Baron de K!alb. "AT Camp 1" X"'' 1777." OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. " Agreeable to your Excellency's command I shall in a few words give my Sentiments with respect to the necessity of puting the troops into winter quarters and the properest place to canton them in. — Every one that views the Condition of the army and is acquainted with the severe duty they have gone through will readily agree that good warm com- fortable quarters are necessary to supply the defect of cloath- ing, and that some relaxation is essential to give a proper tone to both men and Officers to prepare them for the ensuing campaign — In doing this we must have regard not only to the army, but the country. " An army without a country is like an infant incapable of feeding or cloathiug itself — Every part of the country whether "Whigs or Tory that we suffer to be ravaged is a diminution of our strength, and an increase of theirs. — Men are essential in war, but provisions, cloathiug and accoutre- ments are equally so. — The first and great object in canton- ing the troops is to take a position secure from surprize ; the next is covering; the third is a situation convenient for drawing forage and provisions for the subsistence of the army and the cattle belonging to it. — These are the great principles to be attended to in quartering the troops and cannot be dispensed with without certain and inevitable ruin to the whole military machine. — There are other secondary considerations such as covering the country and distressing the enemy in drawing their supplies; where a position can be found to answer all these valuable purposes is the object of enquiry. " It is said by many that a total relaxation is necessary for 220 Defences of PhilaAelphia in 1777. the good of the army — for enabling the officers to recruit their Reg" and to give the men time to recover their spirits. — I must confess if I was to speak from my own feelings and declare ray wishes instead of my sentiments, I should be of that opinion — Pleasure is ever agreeable to human nature, but never more so than after long and severe duty an oppor- tunity to unbend the mind must be the wish of every one, and it is not very difficult to accommodate our reason* to our wishes ; but whether a total or a partial relaxation will be for the general interest of the army is worth enquiring into. " If we retire so far back as to be totally out of danger, pleasure and dissipation will be the consequence. Officers of all ranks will be desirous of visiting their friends — the men will be left without order, without government — and ten to one but the men will be more unhealthy in the spring than they now are, and much worse disciplined. — The health and discipline of troops can only be preserved by constant attention and exercise — we must not flatter ourselves that going into quarters will recover the health or discipline of the troops without regard is paid to one and attention to the other. " It is said we must carry on war upon the great Scale, and that particular interest must not be brought in compe- tition with the general interest and that by attending to the minutiae, we shall sacrifice the principle object. I readily agree that it is perfectly consistent with the maxims of sound policy for the lesser to give place to the greater — but is it necessary for us to throw open a great extent of country to give a necessary relaxation to the Army ? It is the country that feeds, cloaths, and furnishes us with troops. If the subsistance of the Inhabitants is destroyed they will be in- capable of giving us the necessary aid — if the army in the winter season leaves the country unprotected — will it not be a disco.iraging circumstance to sending recruits to join us — which will be a diminution of their local security, if they can expect no protection from the collective force. — I am no advocate for taking measures from popular opinions, but it is necessary to preserve the confidence of the country ; Defmoea of Philadelphia in 1777. 221 for by the union and spirit of the people alone can the op- position be continued. — " The Legislator is in some measure under the necessity of accommodating his measures to the prejudices of the people — mankind will only be subservient to your purposes in proportion as they conceive their interest and happiness connected with your measures — I have heard it remarked that the sufferings of the army spread in all directions throughout the continent, alarms the people and prevents them from entering into the service. " The same may be said with regard to the poor plundered inhabitants. — It is true the eyes of all the continent are upon us for protection — but it is natural for man to reason, what is my neighbours condition may bye and bye be mine. — " If the army seems disposed to exert its force to shelter the country from ravage ; it is natural to expect the people will be anxious to strengthen its hands ; but if the enemy are left at liberty to ravage at large, and the inhabitants of our State make the condition of another their own, it will be an alarming consideration. Therefore I think some re- gard should be had in taking our measures to afford as much cover to the country as possible without militating with the principal design — not for the sake of the particular spot that is covered, but to prevent the disagreeable influence it will have upon the surrounding Inhabitants. " I cannot conceive a total relaxation to be necessary to recruit the army, or recover its spirits. I am fully persuaded that recruiting by voluntary inlistments is in a great meas- ure at an end. The enormous bounties that are given so far exceed the american funds, and the continental bounty now allowed falls so far short of private bounties, that few if any recruits are to be expected through that channel — If this be granted then the recruiting service will wholly de- pend upon the exertion of the civil authority of the respec- tive States, and this exertion doubtless will be in proportion to the reputation and coniidence the legislative bodies place in the army — For it cannot be expected from the local prejudices of mankind that the several legislative bodies will be will- 222 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. ing to strip themselves of their inhabitants, & lessen their own internal safety unless they are well persuaded the meas- ure is essential to their own happiness and security. " It is absolutely necessary the army should have an op- portunity to relax and recover its spirits — but there is a great ditference between constant duty and total relaxation — A proper medium between these two extremes will be found better adapted to restore the spirits of the army and preserve its discipline — We must be in a situation to take off" that constant watching and yet not so remote from danger but that some attention to duty is necessary. " Men are naturally apt to sink into negligence without there is something constantly to rouse their attention — The objects of pleasure are so much more inviting than those of Duty that without a restraint is laid on one and a necessity imprest to attend to the other it is ten to one that the ob- jects of Pleasure steal the mind wholly from the discharge of its duty. — I do not mean to urge these reasons for taking a position near the enemy to oblige us to be constantly on the watch but to shew that a total relaxation may be dan- gerous — Remember Hannibal's army at Capua. — " The general discontent among the officers of almost all ranks renders winter quarters essential to redress the pre- vailing grievances and new organize the army for the spring — but the fatigues and hardships of the campaign and the want of rest and relaxation are not the great sources of the discontent that prevails. It springs from a different foun- tain. It is the pay and subsistance which are found to be incompetent to the necessary demands of the officers to preserve their dignity and support their families, — This is the great evil and this must be remedied or else this army must and will dissolve. — There are some other things complained of — Such as, Rank, that military Jewel, being confered on almost all orders of men to the disgrace of rank, and great mortiiication of officers who find them- selves often reduced to a level with persons they despise, from the prostitution of military dignity. — " The manner of cloathing the troops is a subject of com- Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 223 plaint. — There is no provision made proportionable to the demand of the army; and the difficulty of obtaining that which is provided has given great disgust to some and dis- content to others. — These are some of the principal subjects of complaint — and a partial relaxation from military duty is necessary to put every thing in a proper train for opening the next campaign. " It is necessary that an appearance should be kept up as much as possible of besieging the enemy, not onlj' to cover the country, but to preserve the credit of our currency which will always rise and fall as our army appears superiour or inferior to the enemy. The enemy will also draw out of the country many recruits without they are kept within bounds. — All these are objects worthy our attention. " There have been two plans proposed for cantoning the troops. One from Bethlehem to Lancaster, the other at Wilmington and it's environs. — There can be great objec- tions raised to both. — It is said (with how much truth I know not) that all the back towns are crouded with inhab- itants, refugees from Philadelphia ; if that be true, to turn them out to make room for the Soldiery will bring great distress upon the inhabitants & be productive of no small discontent. — I have no doubt in my own mind but that there can be quarters procured in the proposed Line of canton- ment from Bethlehem to Lancaster, but there appears to me to be many evils attending it. — It is a great distance back in the country and leaves the Enemy a great range in front and upon each flank. It must distress the back inhabitants. "We shall be consuming the substance in the bowels of the country which should be always held as a reserve against a misfortune. — In withdrawing ourselves to so great a distance it will be improved abroad into a kind of dispersion into the mountains and among ourselves it will wear the complexion of a retreat, and many will be suing for Protection. " I must confess however that, if safety and relaxation are the only objects under consideration, the geography of the country from Bethlehem to Lancaster is more favorable for a Cantonment than Wilmington — but I cannot help 224 Defences oj Philadelphia in 1777. thinking that quarters can be got at "Wilmington with much less distress to the Inhabitants of the State — that the posi- tion will be secure enough with the force cantoned in and about it — That provision & forage can be got easier and cheaper in that position than in the other — in this Position we can draw it from the enemy while the other will leave it for them — that this gives us a better opportunity to protect the lower Jersey and not less the upper — that this will dis- tress the enemy in drawing supplies — and upon the whole cover a greater extent of country than any other. — For these Reasons I am for the Position of Wilmington, and if any part of our stores are insecure I would immediately have them removed. — I would have about a brigade of continen- tal Troops in the Jerseys and about one thousand militia between the Delaware & Schuylkill, and about a thousand more at or near the Gulph — and an advance post at Chester — of continental troops. "N'ath. Greene " 31. (?." OPINION OF LORD STIRLING. " Camp White March, Decern 1, 1777. " Sir : " In agitating the General Question which your Excel- lency put to the Council of General Officers yesterday, there arose three propositions as to the Stationing of this Army for the winter, all attended with very great Inconveniences. That of placing it at Wilmington does not answer the pur- pose of Quartering the Army, as the buildings in and about that place are not Capable of receiving above one third part of the Army ; besides I think it is one of the most danger- ous Scituations that I know of, for if the Enemy were to make a sudden movement and take post near Kennet Square or New Garden, our Army would have no Retreat, we should be reduced to the Necessity of fighting them, with the Delaware and two other Irai:)assable Waters on our flanks and Rear. It is true it would cover the three lower Country's and part of Maryland from the Incursions of the Enemy by land, yet they would have what Commu- Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 225 nication they pleased with it by water, this advantage would therefore be trifling, & for it we should give up all pensil- vauia & New Jersey, for the Enemy to Ravage at large ; and put it in their power Eifectually to Cut of our Communica- tion with all the Country to the Eastward of Delaware River : these are reasons I think sufficient to Induce us to drop all thoughts of Quartering the Army at Wilmington. As to the plan of putting the Army into Huts in the Town- ship of Tryduftrin in the great Valley, I must acknowledge it is a Scituation well Calculated for Covering Chester & Lancaster Counties, and for Checking any Attempts the Enemy may design against Maryland & the Lower Counties on the one side and a Great part of the Country between the Schuylkill and Delaware on the other, the Communica- tion with Jersey and the Northern States will be preserved, the Encampment will be easily guarded as there is but one Waj- to approach it from Philadelphia ; But it is still only an Encampment. It is not going into Winter Quarters, It is not procuring for the Officers and Men that Comfort and Opportunity of recruiting which they richly deserve after a long and fatigueing Campaign ; these perhaps are not in our power to give them anywhere, and should that be the Case, this may be as good a Scituation to hut in as any ; provision can be handily brought in from all Quarters, but how it is for forage I know not. The third proposal was to Cantoon the Army in the Towns of Reading and Lancaster and the Villages between them or in their Vicinity. If this is practicable I should like it best of any, as the Men would have a Chance of getting better refreshed than by either of the other two proposals ; but it has been objected that it is impracticable, as those towns and Villages are already filled with persons who have fled to them for Refuge, and if it is so we must be Content. If the Safety and Comfort of the Army is principally to be Considered, they can Easily be Cantooned in the Towns in New Jersey which are in a great Measure deserted by the Inhabitants. But I think it is also of high Importance to Cover as much of the Country as we can ; and that the possition in the Valley will Cover 226 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. as much or more of the Countr}' than any other that can be pointed out ; the Enemy will never Venture out as far as Chester on that side, as we Can Cut them off by taking post at Darby, to which there is a direct Road ; nor would they be fond of penetrating for to the Northward of Phila- delphia, least we might pass a body of troops over between them and the Town. Upon the Whole I should be for hutting the Army somewhere in or near Tryduflrin, espe- cially if it is so fine and Rich a Country as has been repre- sented. I am &c. " SlIRLINe." OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL ARMSTRONG. "Camp at W. March 1" Dec': 1777. " May it please y" Excel'^ : " I beg leave to recommend that as early as it may be safe, to make such movement, the Army may pass over the Scuilkill & take for some time a position on that side. " With respect to Winter Quarters for the Army — the longer I consider the measure pointed out in the back Vil- lages of this State, the more inadmissable that step appears to be, as by the large lattitude thereby given the enemy thro' the winter & early part of the spring, every doleful & pernitious consequence must be expected — The hearts of good-men thro' all the States depressed, and this State in particular, little less than sacrificed to the whole without real necessity ! Amongst the innumerable evils resulting from that situation, the impossition of the Oaths of Alle- giance & an end to Government & the future aids of the Militia tbro' great part of the State, must inevitably follow. " I'm therefore of Opinion that in proper time, part of your Army take possession of Wilmington, and the Resi- due form a Chain from thence to Dowingstown & perhaps to White Horse on the Lancaster road, at these two some Cover may be had, & Hutts with some use of Houses in the intermediate space — these are the best outlines that appears to me, which may be corrected and better determined when Defences of Philadelphia in 1777, 227 the Army is on that Side. And am with perfect respect y' Excellency's Most Obed' humb' Serv' " John Armstrong. " P.S. — I hear that some part of the Bridge is already broken or carried off. G' Potter is not yet come over, I suppose owing to the bad weather. I expect him today. "J: A." opinion of brigadier-general maxwell. " Sir : " Agreeable to your Excellencys request of last evening, that we should give our opinion concerning the most eligi- ble place for Quartering or iucamping the Troops during the winter. As much has been said on the Subject of Quartering in different places some with a view of covering the Country, & others for recovering, recruiting, and gath- ering the Troops together, for another Campaign, and to ly at such a distance from the Enemy that they were not liable to be harrassed by them during the winter. If covering the Country is your Excellency's chiefest object I would recommend that our armey should be moved to the west side of Schoolkil, at the distance of about 30 miles from Phil" with our left tolerable near that River, leaving a party of observation on the East side; and there Hutt in the most convenient place. But if the other part viz the re- freshing and recruiting our Armey be your Excellency's chief object in that case I would recommend that our Armey should retire back in the Country on a line from Reading to Lancaster and in the Neighbourhood of that line, and try to collect all our scattered Troops of every sort near the main body, and take every Method in our power to get the Reg" filled up during the winter, aud those well cloathed we have. If the last proposition takes place I would recommend that a party of observation be stationed one on the West S., the other on the East side of Schoolkill to prevent the Enemys partys from penetrating far into the Country. "Likewise a party should be sent into New Jersey to 228 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. relieve the Militia there who has been a long time on duty & to give them an opertunity to fill up their Quotas in the Continental line. Those Troops might return in the Spring as soon as the roads was fit for traveling on, should it be thought necessary. This last Scheme I prefer to the first — and am your Excellencys Most Obedient Humble Servant " W Maxwell. " White Marsh the 1" Decern' 1777." OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SMALLWOOD. " Camp, Decern' 1" 1777 "Sir " The Distresses of the Army, the Inclemency of the weather, & the approaching Season, combine to point out the Expediency of fixing on Winter Quarters ; and in doing this all local Attachment ought to be sacrificed to the Public Good, to reduce the Enemy, & free ourselves, I wou'd chear- fully resign myself to a Den the ensuing & many other Seasons if found necessary. — Three Positions have been pointed out — from Bethlehem to Lancaster — the Valley in Halts — & Wilmington — three Capital Objects are in view — The Health & Security, the Discipline of the Army — & the supp»ort and covering the Country — the first Position would be incompetent to any other than the first of these Objects. The second wou'd not amply admit of, or be ade- quate to any other than the second Object, for it woud im- pair the men's Health, & leave not only the Jerseys, but also the Delaware Government & Eastern Shore of Maryland open, which the Enemy woud avail themselves of, & get fully suppli'd this Season. — Tlie Third tho it does not fully coincide with our Views, yet in a more inlarged & general Degree, it answers the Object of our wishes, more than the preceeding or any other Position I know of under our present circumstances — I woud recommend sending the sick to the first mentioned Position, but I am strongly impressed that the hail & active part of the army ought to take post at Wilmington, to awe, & perhaps annoy the enemy, or at least \ Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 229 prevent and deter them from taking possession of, or draw- ing their supplies from such an extensive Tract of Country as either of the other Positions than Wilmington wou'd lay open to them — Wilmington & its vicinage will cover more Troops, & is more compact, may annoy the Enemy, will obstruct them, & cover more of the Country than any other Position I am acquainted with under our present Situation, & will admit of Exercise & manoeuvring (from the compact station) upon as large a Scale & as often as may be necessary, & with respect to insecurity against sur- prize think no Post within a Night's March of the Dela- ware below Philad" cou'd be rendered more secure — a Post that's perfectl}' secure is eligible, but I am induced to think it wou'd have a bad Tendency on our Array. Officers of all Ranks & Denominations wou'd be going Home, their Im- portunities wou'd bo irresistible, the Soldiers wou'd follow their Example, & if Furloughs were not granted. Desertion wou'd ensue, & in most Instances a Neglect of, & inattention to Discipline. " Being Officer of the Day Time admits not of my en- larging more on this Subject; or adding further than that I have the Honor to be with great Respect, your Excelleucys most Obed' H"' Serv' " W. Smallwood." OPINION OF BRIGADIEK-SENERAL KNOX. "Park op Artillery, Dec' 1, 1777 " SiK, " Your Excellency last evening referr'd to your General Officers the consideration of the position proper for Winter Quarters, and order'd us to give our opinions respectively on that subject. "I shall be concise in my opinion, establishing the prop- osition that Winter Quarters are indispensably necessary for the Army in order to give it that rest and refreshment of which it stands much in need — to repair the Carriages of various kinds which are damag'd ; to recruit the ex- hausted horses; to recruit and till up the reg"; to reform the army in some essential particulars, in a word to put the 17 230 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. army in all its branches on such a footing as to be able to take the field next Campaign with the greatest probability of Success. " The King of Prussia says ' the first object in Winter Quarters is Tranquility' — it is very evident if we take our Winter Quarters so near the enemy, as to be subject to fre- quent alarms and constant hard duty, we shall have but a small part of the present army to oppose to our enemies. Could a place be found about 30 miles distant from & North or N. W. of Philadelphia in wliich it was possible to quarter the troops, I should prefer it to a greater distance or ditFer- ent direction as by it we should be able to cover a greater extent of Counti-y than by taking post at Wilmington or retiring so far back as Lancaster & Reading. "Two Ideas present themselves in considering a place proper for Winter-quarters. The ease and safety- of the troops and the covering the Countr}', thereby preventing the enemies deriving supplies from it. I consider the first the greater objects and all inferior ones should give place to them, and therefore give my opinion that the troops should at the time appointed retire into Winter Quarters, tlie right of the Cantonment to be at Lancaster & tlie left at Reading, provided a sufficiency of houses and good cover can be pro- cur'd there — an officer of reputation on whose veracity your Excellency could rely can easily ascertain this matter. — parties of 500 or 600 to be kept out on command advanc'd 30 or 40 miles, under the command of active partizan Offi- cers who should be directed to be constantly moving about to prevent the enemy making any disposition to sur- prize them. " Advantages may by these means be taken of any smaller detachments sent out by the enemy — indeed the militia of the State may be kept considerably advanc'd, they being light troops, will cover the Country & be but in little danger of being surpnz'd. "If the Cover in the range from Lancaster to Reading should be found to be insufficient, I should be for hutting the whole army about 30 miles distant from Philadelphia, Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 231 in some position which should hiive the Schuylkill about 10 or 12 miles on the right or left — the goodness of the position to determine this. General Muhlenberg mention'd a po- sition which comes within this description which perhaps on examination might be found to be proper. " I have the honor to be with the greatest respect " Your Excellencys most obedient Humble Ser' " Henry Knox, >' B. G. Artillery:' OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL POOR. " Monrlay, 1" December, 1777 " Sir, " in answer to the questions propos'd 3'esterdaj, Rispect- ing the Quartering Army this winter I am clear of apoinyen that the grait Object is to secure our men from the Inclem- ency of the wather lucres our numbers Dissapline our men and make our Army as Formadable as possable that we may be able to take the field early in the Spring. " I am not acquainted with this Country so as to point out the most sutiable place — by Information do think that the line from Lankcster to Reading is the most Elagable of the three places mention'd. I am Sir your most obedient Humble Serv' "Enoch Poor, B. Gen'." OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE. " Camp at White Maesh, 1" Dec' 1777 " Sir : " The procuring good and easy Winter Quarters for the Troops under your Excellencies Command — and Covering the Country from the Depredations of the Enemy as far as Possible without too much fatigue to the Army — are Objects of the first Consequence, & to which too much Attention cannot be paid. " A Chain of Cantonments has been proposed (and sup- ported with very plausible Arguments) from Lancaster to Reading and the Intermediate villages between them, — to which Cantonments I can't agree for the following Reasons. 232 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. "Because by taking Quarters at the Distance of sixty miles west of Philadelphia, you at once give up to the enemy all the Delaware State, the Eastern shore of Mary- laud, the Counties of Phil% Bucks and Chester. " Because by this access of fine Country the Euemy will he enabled to draw supplies, not only for the Winter — but to lay up Stores for the next Campaign — to rittual their Transports — carry Gen' Burgoyne's army to Great Brittain — and perhaps bring out an Equal Number to Re-enforce Gen' Howe early in the Spring. "Because the sick and feeble of the Army in the Re- spective Hospitals will in a great Measure be left between the Enemy and us — Otherwise Intermixed with the healthy Troops — and subject them to the same Disorders that the Sick may be Infected with. "Because you cannot in these Villages procure cover for more than one-third of your Eifective's without casting to the Mercy of "Weather and Howling Wilderness — those families who flew before the Enemj- to these very places for Shelter — giving up ease & AfHuence, for Libert\- and Pro- tection. "Because other States are Subject to Invasion — who will naturally conclude if these are given up to Distruction — that it may be their case next, and will thereby be deterred from giving that aid, which they otherwise would aftbrd — least they should first Irritate, & afterwards be left to the Mercy of a more than savage foe. " Because the Eyes of the World are upon us — and we have given the Country some Ground to expect, some Pro- tection — since the Junction of so great a part of the Northern Army. " For these Reasons I am positively against taking Quarters at the places before Mentioned — but would pro- pose making good our Quarters in a Position that will at once afibrd cover to the Country and enable you to draw supplies for your Arm}' — from the Vicinity of the Enemy — in doing of which you will not only Distress them — but save for the use of the next Campaign those Stores which Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 233 you would be necessitated to expend if Quartered at the Distance of Sixty Miles from the Delaware River. " You will also leave such Houses as can be procured in that Country to be Converted into Hospitals for the use of the Sick and Convalescents — to which the feeble of the Army may be collected & Commissioned Officers sent (in Propor- tion to the Number of the Sick) to superintend them — who will not only preserve Order but Introduce Discipline amongst the Convalescents, by obliging them to appear clean on the parade and Manoeuvre them whenever the weather will permit, which will be more conducive to their health and be a means of saving men's lives than the whole powers of the Materia Medica — they will also afford protec- tion to our Stores by Detering any small party from attempt- ing their Destruction. " For these Reasons, and to sweeten the tempers of those Officers that at present may be a little sowered as well as for the ease & Conveniency of others, I am Induced to meet those Gentlemen in Sentiment, who are for Quartering the Army at Willmington & in its Vicinity — which with the aid of some Hutts will afford Cover sufficient. " The Position is such as to give the Enemy the Greatest Annoyance — with the least fatigue to your own Troops. " Your Excellencies own good Judgment will point out the proper Measures necessary to guard against that Surprize whicli some Gentlemen Effect so much to dread — I can only assure your Excellency that whatever Position you may think most proper, I shall always be ready to acquiesce with, & to serve you with the best Service of your most Ob' and very Hum' Ser' "Ant"^ Wayne." OPINION OF BRISADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. " Whitemarsh, 1" Dec' 1777 "May IT PLEASE YOUR Excellency! "From a cursory view of the present state of your Array compared to the Position of the Enemy I am fully con- 234 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. vinced that your Troops should immediately go into quiet, peaceable Winter Quarters. B}' the various Fatigues of the Campaign, your Men are dispersed thro' many parts of the Country, incapable of taking the Field at this advanced Season. The Hospitals are crouded with Sick and Invalids, occasioned, in a great Measure, by the want of clothing & Rest — Your Officers are very discontented, as their Families are suiFering at Home, not being able to purchase the Neces- saries of Life. The Credit of the Mony is so amazingly decreased, by the prevailing Avarice of the Times, that the recruiting Service rests upon a very precarious Basis. Your great Dependence must therefore be upon the jiresent Army. To make it respectible, it is necessary to collect the feeble together; to nurse and cloath them, and give to the whole such a Spirit of Discipline and Order, as will make them truly formidable. The Enemy is in good Quar- ters, not to be attack'd, without the greatest Hazard. He will not attack you, unless he imagines he has a manifest Advantage. In this Situation, you have much to loose, nothing certain to gain. — As therefore another Campaign is morally inevitable, your Troops should be put in the best Situation, to open it early, with vigor & Activity. To fix upon the Line of Cantonment, is a matter of Perplexity. If you attempt covering the Country from the Excursions of the Enemy, you make a "Winter's Campaign necessary. But that Position w°h will give them the greatest Check, consistant with the Ease of the Troops, is the most eligible. That part of Pennsylvania w°h lays between the Delaware and the Schylkill seems best calculated for this Purpose. While it preserves a Communication with the Southern and Northern States, it gives some kind of Security to New Jersey. A removal to Wilmington and Places adjacent, would give the Enemy the full command of the Delaware, and perhaps, Eifect a Separation of the States. It cannot be supposed that the large Villages in the back parts of Penn- sylvania are so crouded with Inhabitants as to give no Shel- ter to the Army. Should the Buildings be too scanty to receive all the Troops, the Deficiency might be made up Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 235 by substituting Hutts, w'h would prove a sufficient cover for the moi'e healthy and robust. " I am, with great Submission, your " Excellency's most obed' Serv' " J. M. Varnum." OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOODFORD. "Camp, 1" Decern' 1777 "Dear Gen^- " Upon considering the several places purposed for the winter cantoonments of the army, I think the "Villages from Reading to Lancaster, with the addition of some Hutts, the most Eligable position for the Troops in their present situation. " Were the men warmly clad, I should give it as my Opinion that Willraington, or some post nigher the Enemy should be taken in preference to the above, where we might annoy them in their Forrageing &e. in the course of the Winter. " But upon considering our present circumstances & looking forward to the opperations in the spring, I think the advantages we should give them of possessing a part of this state & the Lower Countys, would be overballanced by our having a vigorous army ready to take the Field early in the next campaign, with sufficient Magazines of provision & Forrage laid up in the course of this Winter. "If the Range of Cantoonments I purpose should meet the approbation of your Excellency, after hearing the senti- ments of the Gen' Officers, I would purpose that as much Forrage & provisions as possible, of every kind, be imme- diately drawn from the Country between our Quarters & the Enemy & that such as we had it not in our power to remove be destroy'd, saveing a bare sufficiency for the subsistance of the Inhabitants, & that the Country in our Rear be kept as a Reserve. "Previous to the removal of the Army, I would recom- mend that one or more, Gen' Officer go with the D. Q' Master 236 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. Gen' to view the cover that can be procured for the Troops, & make their Report to your Excellency as speedily as possible. " If these Villages are found too much crouded with the Refugees from Philadelphia & its neighbourhood, I should think it no great hardship for them to be obliged to remove to the Farm Houses contiguous, & that the D. Q' Master Gen' (after having ascertain'd their numbers), be order'd to assign them Quarters at a distance that it would be unsafe to squander the Troops in, & that the publick waggons re- move their affects. I am with great respect your Excellencys most Obed' humble Serv' " W« Woodford." opinion of brigadier-general weedon. "Dear Sir: " I have agreeable to your Excellency's direction, consid- ered in every point of view I am able ' a proper position for this Army during the winter' — Three plans for facilitating this desirable purpose have been proposed, viz' Hutting, Drawing them down to Wilmington & its vicinity, or can- toning them in the back country from Reading to Lancas- ter. — In ray opinion there will be great inconveniences at- tending any measure we may take — The first plan is certainly the most desirable, but I fear the least eligible ; & both for reasons so obvious that the}' hardh* need mentioning. Does not the present situation of affairs promise another Cam- paign ? Tis true that by wintering your Troops within ten or fifteen miles of the enemj' you might in some meas- ure cover the country contiguous thereto, but would not this subject your Army to a winter campaign ? Add to this the unhealthy quarters they would be confined to, rendered still the more so by the very nature of the ma- terials which compose them. Our service has already driven us to this necessity on a former occasion, which proved more fatal to the troops than all the actions they fought during the campaign ! — Let us benefit by experience. — Your army, Sir, is now much reduced by hard service & other sufferings during this Summer & Fall ; I fear k be- Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 237 lieve, I may say witli truth, (& consequent!}' on this occa- sion with propriety) that a third of them tho' now in the field, are more fitting for the Hospital than the Camp: without Blanketts, without Shoes, & in short almost desti- tute of every comfort required hy the strong & robust, much more the weak & feeble. "What then must be the efiects of keeping them out all winter in this dispiriting situation ? Can you promise yourself service from them in the spring? When the Enemy find your troops ex- hausted by fatigue, thej' will no doubt avail themselves of it. What must then necessarily follow is disagreeable & needless to anticipate — Troops undisciplined, worn-out by service, deprived of every comfort which is necessary to restore health & vigor, cannot be supposed to support an attack against those who thro' the Winter have been in comfortable quarters, constantly trained in Manoeuvring & other exercises. That this will be the case, I make not the least doubt. " A position at Wilmington, I should have no very great objection to, if the troops could be covered in a tolerable compact body, but this I fear cannot be done; & Cantoning by Detachment is a dangerous experiment. — I look Sir, on this Army as the Herculean hinge, on which American Independence turns. — The covering this, or the other spot for the space of three or four months is not a motive sufli- cient to hazard, or expose this Army for, the object is in nowise adequate to the disadvantages that may result from it : you would in my opinion subject yourself to frequent alarms by taking post at Wilmington, Christiana, Newport & Chester, particularly at the latter. The Enemy are mas- ters of the River, have a numerous Fleet at their command, and within one nights march of you — I should not indeed dread a surprize, but supposing the enemy not inclined to attack you by a sudden march, (which at the same time they would have in their power) but to mancEuvre up the Schuylkill & cross above you, should we not be in the pre- dicament we have all this campaign been endeavouring to shun, by keeping their left-flank must we not instantly 238 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. leave our quarters, perhaps at a season of the year when our magazines could not be got off. — The sick must fall into their hands also, unless we fight them & are success- ful — Should any disaster attend us, by an action with them in this situation, what would be the consequences? a total Annihilation of this Army, & with it, the Liberties of America ! — Upon the whole sir, distressing as it is to leave a country uncovered, & at the mercy of an ungenerous Enemy, who no doubt will i-avage & plunder the inhabit- ants; yet Sir, we must view our affairs in a more extensive Scale. Subjugating a few individuals who must be left at their mere}', or possessing a small tract of country for a few months goes but a small way in the American cause, while you have this Army in full health. — That we must have another Campaign is, I believe, beyond controversy, prudence therefore dictates a timely provision for the same, the success of it will depend on the health & discipline of your Troops, the care & vigilance of your Officers, and early operations in the Field. — To provide for such im- portant purposes, I give it as my opinion this army be quartered as soon as circumstances will permit, in a country where not only your Officers may have it in their power to make themselves comfortable during the winter, but your troops be relieved from heavy guards, covered from the in- clemency of the weather, nursed in sickness, disciplined & restored to their former health & vigor — This Sir, & this alone, will give you the Superiority over your Enemy. — Your Hospitals are now as strong nearly as your Battal- ions : & while you are followed by an army of feeble in- valids, what reward can you expect for your unwearied exertions, by any atchievements such Troops can obtain ? The Chain of Cantonments from Reading to Lancaster has been mentioned, I cannot with precision eay they are the most eligible, but from the small knowledge I have of the country, should suppose them the most likely to cover the troops, & afford them rest thro' the winter. " I am Sir y' very H'bl Serv' "G. Weedon." Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 239 OPINION OF BKIGADIER-GENERAL MUHLENBERG. " December 1" 1777 " Sir : " Agreeable to your Excellency's requisition I transmit you my Sentiments on the Question proposed in Council yesterday. " I would beg leave to premise that agreeable to my Sen- timents, tiie Army should continue in a Position, where they can most effectually Annoy the Enemy, untill it shall be absolutely necessary on Account of the Severity of the Weather to Quit the Field— 2"^ That the Preservation of the Army by getting them into good Winter Quarters, will be of much greater Utilitj'', than any small Advantages, which can be gain'd over the Enemy by keeping the Army near their Lines. " With regard to the place, Propper for the Army to take Winter Quarters, I must confess, I am more inclined to join in sentiment with those Gentlemen who propose Lan- caster for the Right of the Cantonment & Reading for the left, than with those who propose Wilmington — my reasons are these. Wilmington &c. are so near the Enemy that there is the greatest probability of their frequent Alarm- ing us, consequently the end intended, that is, the Ease of the Army will not be answered. " 2'"^ Our Army will certainly diminish, at least for the Winter, by a Number of the Soldiers receiving permis- sion to return to the different States they came from which would perhaps enable the Enemy to gain material Advan- tages over us, especially if it should be found necessary, on account of Covering, to Quarter the Men some distance apart. " 3'"^ The upper Part of Pensylvania would be left entirely to the Mercy of the Enemy, & the Communication with the Eastern States cut of " 4*'^ The Enemy will have it in their power to draw more Supplies from the Jersey, than it would be possible for them to draw from the lower Counties, e%-en if they 240 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. were entirely given up to them, for if the Army lay at Wil- mington, one armed Vessell would he sufficient to prevent us from affording any relief to the Jerse3-s. " Perhaps if your Excellency was to order some Person to Reconnoitre the Country from Heading to Easton it would be found more Eligible, to make Reading the right of the Cantonment, & Easton the left, than any other place proposed, especially if the Hint thrown out by a Gentleman in Council, was adopted, that is, to erect Hutts for the more Robust, & let the Feeble be quartered in Houses, &c. — In Reading the Refugees from Philadelphia are less numerous than in Lancaster, Lebanon, &c. Reading, Allentown Beth- lehem & Easton lie in a direct line, very near the same distance from Philadelphia — a few miles in front of this Line, is Maxetawny & Macungy, one, if not two Divisions may be Quartered with the greatest ease, & here the Troops would be ready, either to protect our Stores, or prevent any considerable Ravages in the Country. Your Excel- leneys " Most obed' & humble Serv' " P : Muhlenberg." OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCOTT. " White Maesh, 1" Dec' 1777 "Sir: " After Considering maturely the matter Proposed Yes- terday with reguard to the Quartering the Troops for this Winter, I have at Length thought that Wilmington and its Neighbouring Villages the most Elligable. " I would not wish to Trouble your Excellency with my Reasons as it was so very Fully spoke upon Y'esterday. I am Your Excellencys " Ob' Serv' " Cn' Scott." OPINION OF COUNT PULASKI. " I leave the choice of Ground to those who are well acquainted with the Country, & confine myself to considering Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 241 the advantages which will attend a continuance of the Cam- paign, and the Inconveniences which will flow from retiring to Winter Quarters — Our continuing in a state of activity will give courage to our Friends, be an antidote to the effeminacy of young Soldiers, and enure them to the fatigues which Veterans undergo — keep them in the exer- cise of their profession and instruct them — Whereas the in- activity of winter quarters will ruin the Army, discourage the Country, leave an extent of Territory for the Enemy to ravage and depopulate ; besides how do we know what Re- inforcements the Enemy may receive before the next Cam- paign. For my part therefore I only think that the invalids of each Regiment should be suffer'd to retire where they may under the direction of proper officers be refreshed and recruited — with all the rest collected I would make a vigor- ous attack upon the Enemy as soon as the Schuylkill is frozen. " C. Pulaski. " In case winter quarters are determined upon, I sollicit His Excellency to allow rae the body of Cavalry and In- fantry to remain near the Enemy's Lines." ' OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL DU PORTAIL. " By taking Winter Quarters from Lancaster to Reading, we abandon to the Enemy, Jersey, and all the Country ad- jacent to Derby, Chester, and Wilmington, one of the richest Tracts in this part of the Continent. By establishing them at Wilmington we cover the Country, and do not so com- pletely abandon that part of it which is before Philadelphia, nor even Jersey, because our proximity to the Enemy and the ease with which we could throw ourselves upon the Rear of their Lines in case the Schuylkill should be frozen, will keep them in respect, and put it out of their power to send considerable Detachments on the other side of Delaware from the fear of weakening themselves too much — and the small detachments which they ma}' send will be greatly ' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 18 242 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. restrained by the Jersey Militia — The Position then of Wil- mington answers the end of making subsistence very diffi- cult to Gen' Howe, who has not only his Army to feed but likewise the Inhabitants of the Town, and who must besides furnish Provisions for the Army of Gen' Bourgojnie if he means that they should embark for England. — This position farther deprives him of the means of recruiting in the Country, extending himself in it, adding to the number of his Partisans, in a word gaining the Country. It has besides the advantage of rendering his Communication with his fleet difficult, for I imagine the Vessels will not be able to approach Philadelphia when the Ice prevails — I should not omit mentioning a case in which this Inconvenience would be very considerable — if War should be declared between France and England, and Gen' How from a dread of finding himself blocked up in the Spring by a French Fleet, should wish to quit Philadelphia, we shall be within distance at Wilmington for hindering his Embarkation of which we should have timely notice. " This Position then unites great Military advantages — but it must be confess'd at the same time that these very advantages ought perhaps to prevent our taking it — because the Enemy probably will not sutler us there, and will march against us. — Thus to ask whether the Position of Wilming- ton is eligible, is to ask at the same time whether it is eligible to expose ourselves to an Action, and perhaps more than one. " If the season were less advanced, I don't see why we should avoid them — but at present — what end would be answer'd. if we should gain an advantage we should be unable to pursue it — if we Experience a Check, we run the risque of seeing our Army dissipated in the rude marches consequent on a defeat — Consistently with the plan which we ought to form of putting our Army in good condition this winter and preparing it for a good Campaign, we ought not to have it's Repose preceded by a Defeat. "As to the other points to be consider'd in this Question, whether Wilmington or Lancaster will be the most proper Situation for furnishing the Army with every necessary — I Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 243 cannot decide, being ignorant of the Country — but it ap- pears to me in general that this point deserves our most serious attention — it is much better to lose Soldiers in Com- bats with the Enemy to whom we cause a Loss at the same time, than to lose them by Disorders, & Desertion arising from their Misery. Misery destroys a part of an Army and leaves the other without Vigour, without Courage, and with- out good Will — we should find ourselves then in the Spring with a Bod}' of an Army incapable of any thing, and con- sequently have no right to expect a successful Campaign.' " Du PORTAIL." opinion of brigadier-general irvine. " Sir : " Whether the army should retire into winter quarters in the interior part of this State or to Wilmington and its environs, or whether it ought not to take post nigher to the enemy and remain in huts during the winter, are questions of such importance and the arguments for and against each of those measures so many and cogent that I confess myself at a loss how to decide upon them. — To leave so large a proportion of the most valuable part of the State uncovered as we unavoidably must do should we quarter in either of the places mentioned may have a very unhappy effect upon the minds of the inhabitants, and render it extreamly doubtful! whether much, if any assistance could be drawn from this State the ensuing campaign — few men have a less opinion of the importance of the militia in their present state than myself, but I am apprehensive that should our friends be disgusted as it is highly probable they would be, the executive powers would not be able to make drafts therefrom to fill up the thirteen regiments raised in the state which form no inconsiderable part of the continental army. " If the observations made yesterday are founded on facts, that so great a part of the army are in a sickly situa- tion, it does not appear clear to me that we should find shelter for more than the invalids, the question then is ' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens. 244 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. whether the remaining part of the arnw would be more comfortably lodged in huts at the distance of sixty miles from Philadelphia, than they could be at twenty or thirty. I am of opinion that they could not, and therefore advise, that the weak and infirm be immediately collected together and quartered between lancaster & reading, that the resi- due of the army take a strong position on the other side Schuylkill, where wood is plenty, out of surprising distance, and there hut themselves for the winter. I am with the greatest respect. Sir, your most obedient & humb : serv' " James Irvine. "Whitemaesh, Decern' 1, 1777." "Sir " I wish to recall your attention to the important matter recommended to your consideration some time ago — namely — the advisability of a winter's Campaign and, practicability of an attack upon Philadelphia with the aid of a consider- able body of militia, to be assembled at an appointed time & place — particular reasons urge me to request your Senti- ments on this matter by the morning, and I shall expect to receive them in writing accordingly by that time. I am, Sir, Y' most Obed' Ser. " G° Washington. " Dec' 3, 1777." OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL SULLIVAN. " Camp, Whitemaesh, Decern' 4"" 1777 "Dear General " Agreable to your Excellency's Directions I have con- sidered upon the Advisability of making a Winter's Cam- paign, and the practicability of making an Attack upon Philadelphia with the Aid of a Body of Militia to be called in for that purpose. ' For some reason the written opinions just given were inconclusive, and tlie General again desired an expression of sentiment. It was doubt- less owing to some political pressure brought to bear upon him, urging an attack on the British in Phil.adelphia. Defences oj Philadelphia in 1777. 245 " Though the attacking & carrying Philadelphia is an object much to be wished yet as the Attempt carries with it an Idea of a Winters Campaign I must give my opinion against it — When this motion was first made I was in favor of it, but I was then taught to believe by those who pre- tended to have view'd the Enemy's Lines that their Re- doubts were not Inclosed in Rear but my own observation has since convinced me of the contrary, my own opinion as well as that of a Great majority of the General Ofiicers has been that an Attack upon the Enemies Redoubts in Front & upon the City afterward would be Hazardous & must End in Ruin to the Army ; & as we find their Re- doubts are Equally strong in Rear, the attempt will be Equally Dangerous — but if not altogether so, it must at Least be attended with great Hazard — and in order to make the Attempt, your naked Army must be kept in the field the greater part if not the whole of the winter. This in my opinion should never be Done but where the object is of great importance and where there is a moral certainty of obtaining the End in view, even when an Army is properly cloathed against the Inclemency of the Seasons : but of your Army one third of them at Least are now con- fined to their cold Tents & unwholesome Hutts for want of Shoes, Stockings & other Cloathing, a very Large num- ber of them unable Longer to endure the Severity of their Situation have retired (sick) to the Hospitals or to Country Houses. The numbers which Daily fall sick in Camp is surprizing — They have neither Cloaths to keep them warm by Da}' or Blankets by night. Most of the Ofiicers are in the same Situation. This is what Induces so many of them to Resign. Many Ofiicers who have behaved with Credit have petitioned me for Leave to Retire for a Season, or to resign their Commissions & assigned as a Reason for not waiting on me that they were so naked they were ashamed to be seen, That Cloathing was not to be had & even if it was their wages would not enable them to purchase; I have taken pains to Inquire from the most sensible officers & have conversed with several General Officers upon the 246 Deferwes of Philadelphia in 1777. alarming Spirit of Resignation which takes place in the Army & find they in General say this : ' that thej^ and their men have been marching and countermarching all the year, that they have fought no General Action beside Skirmishes, that the Cloathes & Shoes which they wore out has amounted to their wages, which leave their Families to sutler at home, That the Baggage they sent to Bethlehem has been mostly plundered & they have no possible way of replacing it: That the price of Articles bears no proportion to their wages — they further say that their Rank has not been settled, that they have been told from time to time that this should be done when they Retired to winter Quarters of which they see not the Least prospect, & that while they have contentedly borne all this they Daily see Congress placing men over their heads without any Regard to their Ranks or Services.' Dear General, I feel for you when I tell you that this is not the Language of a few officers of Inferior Rank, but of high & Low. Such a Disafiection I never could have conceived had not my inquiries convinced me. I know it must give you pain as it is not in your power to Redress these grievances, but Duty oblidges me to give the information. I am fully convinced and fear the Event will prove that more than half your officers will leave you in a month, unless some Remedy is found out to quiet their minds & relieve their Distresses. — Under these circumstances a Winters Campaign will in my opinion Dis- solve the Army : I know it has been urged that the above sad state of our affairs should induce us to Risque an Action as soon as possible and I am myself fully of that opinion — but can we corapell the Enemy to it if they Decline it — if M' Howe does not come to attack us when we Lay so near him it is Evident he does not mean to fight us unless we attack his Lines — Whoever would advise to this measure puts the fate of America upon the Toss of a single Die without Refiecting upon the Dismal Situation our affairs must be in if unsuccessful in an attempt, where there are at least twenty chances to one against us — to remedy those Evils as much as possible, I most sincerely Recommend Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 247 tliat the Army be removed immediately to Winter Quarters ; That Congress fall upon some methods of affording a proper support to officers & Soldiers and that the Rank through- out the Army be settled & made known, that in Instances of Rank which give universal Dissatisfaction, the Honor of a few Individuals should be sacrificed to the good of the whole, and every method taken to Recruit the Array collect the scatter'd, Recover the Feeble & Discipline the whole, in order to take the field with vigor early in the Spring which may be by March or April & in the mean while an Appa- ratus should be collecting to set down before Philadelphia in form so early in the Spring as will enable us by Regular approaches to carry the Town before a Reinforcement can arrive. A Body of Militia may (if tho't necessary) be seasonably notified to join us on the Day your Excellency may fix for opening the Campaign — I know it may be ob- jected to this plan that During the winter we leave a vast Tract of Country exposed to the Enemy, but this may be said in all cases of taking Winter Quarters. Every Army that retires to Winter Quarters must leave some Country exposed & I think it much better to give them all Pensyl- vania for the winter than to Ruin that Army which must save America, if saved at all. If a winter Campaign is carried on barely for the purpose of preventing the Enemy from Drawing provisions & Forage we shall in my opinion be the greatest sufferers — the Army cannot in a Little time act but in the partizan way. Some of Colo. Steward's Reg' will soon leave you, nine Virginia Regiments must soon go Home — The Drafts from Connecticut Leave you the first of January — this with what will be taken off" by fatigue &c. will render M'' Howe superior to you in the field through the winter, & if our attention is taken up in carrying on a partizan winter Campaign, you will have in the Spring the miserable remains of an Army worn out with Fatigue & totally unfit for any opperations. The King of Prussia speaking of winter Campaigns says that no man having his eyes open will carry on a winters Camjiaign unless he has Infinite objects in view — this he says of winter 248 Defences oj Philadelphia in 1777. Campaigns generally, but I believe if bis opinion was taken upon an Armys carrying one on under our Disad- vantages he would adopt a language still more forceable; be says, good winter quarters are to give Tranquillity to tbe minds of tbe Soldiers to Recruit your Army, restore Constitutions reduced by Fatigue, mend Carriages, fill up your Regiments, manoeuvre your Troops, refresh your Horse, make your Arrangements & Lay your Plans for tbe Ensuing Campaign. All This is Essentially necessary for us at present to be about. I am therefore clearly of opinion that no time should be lost in taking the Troops to winter Quarters, & that we should immediately fall upon some method of giving Ease to our Soldiers & Satisfaction to our Officers : unless this is Done & unless all other Con- siderations give Way to it, I fear the Event of tbe next Campaign will prove that in striving to do too much we have ruined all. I am confident that if the plan I propose is adopted we shall be able in the Spring to take the field with an Army vastly superior to the Enemy even if our new Recruits should not be numerous, we have a vast num- ber of sick, many have Deserted to their own Homes, there are upwards of a hundred Deserters from the Delaware Regiment only, who are secreted by the Tories. Many other Regiments have almost an equal proportion, these might all be collected in the winter and with the sick which may recover & Recruits which may be added to our Army will be able to take the field with great advantage in the Spring. " The above is with all due Submission oiFered by. Dear General, your Excellence's most obed' Serv' "Jn° Sullivan. " P.S. — The best mode I could Devise for covering tbe Country' I pointed out in my last — Therefore forbear to repeat it in this." OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE. " The Subject under Consideration before the board is whether a plan to draw together a large Body of militia in Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 249 aid of the Continental Troops in the dead of winter to attack General Howe in his winter quarters is eligible or not. However desirable the destruction of General Howe's army may be & however impatient the public may be for this desirable event, I cannot recommend the measure. I have taken the most serious View of the Subject iu every point in which I am able to examine it, & cannot help think- ing the probability of a disappointment is infinitely greater than of success. We must not be governed in our meas- ures by our wishes — the love of glory natural to man often prompts them to exceed the bounds of human nature in their enterprizes. I am sensible in many instances, that things pronounced impracticable have been crowned with success in the attempt. I know it is justifiable in war to leave something to chance, yet prudence forbids that being made a principle which necessity alone can justify ; I am by no means inclined from an excess of caution in a council of war to rob ray Country of the happy consequences that may result from a due exertion of the spirit and bravery of the So]dier3' — but at the same time let us not flatter our- selves from the heat of our zeal that men can do more than they can. To judge properly upon the subject we must first consider what human nature is capable of when aided by all the powers of art, and what is to be expected when unsupported by those necessary Assistants. In the second place we have to consider how reluctantly people will leave the pleasures of domestic life and engage in a hard and dangerous enterprize at such a rugged season of the year, especially after being out great part of the Summer. In the third and last place let us consider what a combination of circumstances are necessary to give success to the enter- prize ; weigh this in the Scales of probability and see how far we can promise ourselves a happy issue to the design. " In the first place supposeing our Soldiery the best of veterans, capable of the boldest attacks, are they cloathed, are they appointed with every thing necessary for such a severe and difficult Attempt? Let any body examine the Condition of the troops, one half without breeches, shoes. 250 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. or stockings, and some thousands without Blankets, and judge how far men in this situation are capahle of enduring the severity of a winter's campaign. The continental troops must be out in the field during all the time the militia are drawing together, and in the natural order of things there must be a great diminution of their Force ; the troops must be subject to this evil or else go into winter quarters untill the militia are collected, in which case the officers will be dispersed, which will render it very difiicult if not imprac- ticable to draw the troops out of quarters in a condition to undertake the attack. I would not wish to spare either blood or treasure necessary to work the destruction of Gen- eral Howe's Army ; the object is so important that it de- mands every sacrifice that human nature or national policy can justify, but to make a great sacrifice of men and money without accomplishing the design will be disgraceful to the army and discouraging to the Country. " The militia perhaps may come together something better cloathed than the continental troops, but the difterent manner of their living in camp to what they have been ac- customed to, together with the extraordinary hardships they must be necessarily subject to in the undertaking, cannot fail of producing a great mortality, or at least some thou- sands may be expected to fall sick and be rendered incapable of duty. This will not only produce a great diminution of strength, but a numerous sick must be very distressing to those that are well. " In Europe where they are much older in war than we can pretend to be, and where there are as hardy a race of men as are on the Globe, where the severity of the season little exceeds that of ours and where necessity, ambition and military Glory all conspire to produce winter campaigns, yet they are never undertaken without the soldiers being well cloathed and each furnished with a good watch coat and Blanket. Experience is the best of schools and the safest guide in human aflairs — j'et I am no advocate for blindly following all the maxims of European policy, but where reason corresponds with what custom has long sane- Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 251 tified, we may safely copy their Example. It must be con- fessed, aud the fatal effects of last winter's campaign will confirm it, that unless men are well cloathed they must fall a sacrifice to the severity of the weather when exposed to the hardships of a winter's campaign. — The successes of last winter were brilliant and attended with the most happy consequences, in changing the complexion of the times, but if the bills of mortality were to be consulted, I fancy it j would be found we were no great gainers by those operations. , " There is not only the difficulty of cloathing, but that i of covering also. Tents cannot be procured, houses in the country are too scattering to quarter the troops in either for attack or defence. If the troops lye out in the weather they must soon, very soon, be rendered unfit for duty. Such a numerous body of men, hastily drawn together, all unconnected cannot be speedily so arranged as to co- operate in one great and general design. To these diffi- culties may be added, that of subsisting such a numerous body of troops without having large magazines previously established for that purpose, when such a cold and rigid season, and the variableness of the weather will render transportation by land and water very difficult and un- certain. " Hospitals proper to receive such a number of sick as we may reasonably expect there will be, will increase the distresses of the army and add to the complaints of the country — especially if the event should be unfortunate. " The second objection I have to the measure is the dif- ficulty of drawing out such a body of militia from the dif- ferent States as will be necessary to ensure success to the Enterprise. Those States which are remote from danger, whose militia have been harassed in the Course of the Campaign will be unwilling to call them out without the most pressing necessity, and supposing the Legislators to feel all the military enthusiasm we could wish we cannot flatter ourselves that that spirit will pervade all orders of men which will be necessary to draw out such bodies as will be requisite for the Design. 252 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. " Every one that has attended to the difficulties of calling out large bodies of militia, the uncertain success of the most spirited exertions, the impatience they discover to be gone, and the trouble of manageing them when here, may form a good judgment what success we can promise ourselves when we have all those difficulties to encounter in the diffijrent stages. " It is highly probable that a requisition from the Con- gress to the neigliboring states may produce a resolution in each to furnish their quota, but out of the number demanded perhaps not two thirds would actually march and out of the number that did march, ten to one, whether more than three fifths ever arrive at camp. " The time of the troops being drawn together and for- warded on to camp depends on the coercive power of Gov- ernment; some being stronger and some weaker, those that arrive first will get out of patience before the arrival of the others — Desertion and Disgust will be the conse- quence, and if either the one or the other should prevail to any considerable degree, the whole plan would be de- feated. I would ask any one if these observations are not founded in truth and human nature, & whether it is not the true history of the militia ? " If it is, what can we promise ourselves from the attempt; when if the whole force was to arrive safe in camp — still there is a great combination of circumstances necessary to compleat the work ; the failure of either may render abortive the whole scheme — " The best way of judging of men and measures at a future period is to recur to their past conduct under similar circumstances — How difficult have we found it to draw the militia of one State to the aid of that of another even where it was necessary to give a check to the enemy from entering the State to which they belong. — " This measure must go recommended to Congress. — From the Congress after a week or ten days consultation a resolve will take place, recommending it to the difterent States. — The Assemblies of each one are to be called to- Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 253 gether, their Deliberations and judgement to be had upon the propriety of the measure, and then an order after ten or twelve Days issues, to assemble the militia, — if the officers are slow and tardy as usual, to collect and march them to camp will be the business of a month. — The continental troops must be out in the field near two mouths on the most moderate calculation before the Scheme will be ripe for execution — "We shall all this time be wasting the very vitals of the army, and risqueing a certain evil for an uncertain good, dependent upon too many contingencies for us to be very sanguine of success. " The diiFerent States will be put to no small difficulty to provide arms for a numerous militia, which must protract the time for collecting it — Consider likewise what delays great and heavy Storms will produce. How distressing they must prove to those that are coming to camp as well as those waiting their arrival there. — " The third and last objection 1 have to the measure is the great combination of circumstances necessary to crown it with success, and the improbability of such a multitude of circumstances ever harmonizing together that are inde- pendant of each other and originate from such difl^erent springs. " There is in the first place a sufficient force so appointed as to be able to execute the plan of attack, it is highly im- probable that such force can be put in motion and still more improbable that they will be properly equipt — Supposing the necessary force to meet properly appointed, they will be a very unwieldy machine, and it must take up a very con- siderable time to organize the whole in such a manner as to move in concert — Such a numerous militia cannot be drawn together very near the Enemy, where their force is collected, and always ready to take advantage of circumstances, with- out being very liable to surprize and defeat. Therefore, if they must be drawn together at a considerable distance from the enemy's Lines, and first organized, and then move to the attack the variableness of the weather may interfere — Heavy storms of either rain or snow will put a total Bar to 254 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. the operations for a time, and more especially the former — but suppose neither of these difficulties interferes, still the operations will be dependant upon the temper of the weather which must be neither too severe or too moderate to enable us to prepare and execute the manceuvre — If the weather is very severe the men cannot live out in the Field long enough to prepare and execute the attack — If the weather is not so severe as to freeze the rivers hard enough for men & artillery to pass over, there can no attack be made only in front of the Enemy's lines — and how far such an attack can be expected to succeed I leave every one to judge — I am told the weather is ver}' variable here and that Storms are frequent — both of which must ruin the platform of our operations; our whole success depending upon the Rivers being sufficiently frozen to enable us to pass over on the ice — " But suppose all these circumstances should happen to combine to give success to the design, which by the bye is scarcely within the limits of possibility & far out of the bounds of probability can we promise ourselves a victory ? Does history afford us an instance as a foundation for such^ a hope ? It is agreed on all hands that there is a very ' \ formidable force in Philadelphia and every house is a forti- ' fication — can it be expected that young troops unaccus- tomed to such enterprises will have steadiness enough to push the Enemy from place to place untill they are totally I routed from the City? — to make the attack and not totally [ defeat them will fall far short of the importance of the \ design or the expectations of the public. _J " What aid can be expected from the militia ? "Will they come up to storm the houses ? Let us recur to past ex- perience of the militia & such a militia too as we cannot expect for the present attack and see how far we can hope for success with such troops opposed by such as we have to attack. — I must confess I think it right to trust everything to the spirit & bravery of troops that is warranted by human nature, History or our own observation. Has the present Scheme these Sanctions ? Are we not rather drawn into Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 255 the attempt by the brilliancy of the object than by the probability of its Success founded in either nature or Reason. -— " The King of Prussia the greatest General of the age strongly protests against attacking troops by storm in vil- lages, much more in large regular brick cities — He observes, it often proves the ruin of the best part of an army — this was verified in several attacks he made upon towns and villages last war. — Philadelphia is a great object, but I wish our reason may not be seduced from its importance to take measures to repossess it that are not warranted by history or our own observation — An attack of this nature will not depend upon the multitude that attacks, but upon their bravery — for the greater the multitude the worse the con- fusion when once they are thrown into disorder; and we have no reason to expect anything else from our own or others experience — Men who are brought from home with all their family feelings about them, commanded by officers who in general have little or no ambition for military glory, are not fortified for such scenes of carnage as are generally exhibited in attacks made upon towns defended by a large body of veteran troops. — " I am not against a winter's campaign if the temper of the officers and the condition of the troops would admit of it, neither have I the least objection to making an attack upon Philadelphia if there was a probability of succeed- ing founded in human nature or the experience of man- kind. — " Let us consider the consequences that will result from a disappointment in a measure of this nature. — In the first place, it will be attended with a vast expence, and the loss of many lives to no valuable purpose — it will prove a great obstruction to the recruiting service and a defeat will give a general alarm and spread universal discontent throughout the continent — It will expose the weakness of our militia to the enemy and not only to them but to all Europe who now consider them much more formidable than they really are. — 256 Dejmces of Philadelphia in 1777. I " A winter's campaign in the present discontented state of / the officers and an attack upon the city of Philadelphia ' appear to me like forming a crisis for American liberty I which if unsuccessful I fear will prove her grave. If the ai'my goes through a winter's Campaign and the recruiting service is as much injured as I expect from calling out the militia, it will be in a miserable plight to open the campaign with in the Spring; and we may reasonabl}' expect that great britain will rake all the kennels of Europe for troops to repair their affairs in America. " I have wrote my mind so fully upon the subject of winter quarters, and with respect to a winter campaign that it is unnecessary to add anything further here — I would beg leave to recommend the measure suggested in that paper for recruiting the army — and filling up the continental Bat- talions — if the measure is adopted the army can be recruited nearly or quite as soon as the militia can be got together — the attack can be made with much more hopes of success & if we are defeated we shall still have a force to carry on a regular siege as soon as the military apparatus can be pre- pared and the season will permit us to open batteries against the enemy's lines. " These are my sentiments Sir upon the subject which with all due deference are submitted to your Excellency's consideration, but if your Excellency thinks a winters cam- paign a necessary measure, or an attack upon Philadel- phia, an eligible plan, I will lend every possible aid in my power to carry it into execution; notwithstanding that this is the third year since I have paid the least attention to ray own private affairs. , ^^^^^ ^.^^^^^ ^_ ^ " Camp, December 3", 1777." OPINION OF LORD STIRLING. " Camp, Decern' 3'> 1777 "Sir: " Your Excellency's letter of this date requesting my Sentiments on ' the Adviseability of a Winters Campaign,' ' and the practicability of an Attack upon Philadelphia with Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 257 the Aid of a Considerable Body of Militia to be Assembled at an Appointed Time and Place,' I have duly Considered and in Answer to the first Question am of Opinion That in order to undertake a Winters Campaign the Troops should be fresh, in good Order and well Cloathed with at least two warm Vests two pair milled Woolen Stockings & mittens, good Shoes Woollen Overhalls, a Good blanket Coat besides a blanket to Lodge in. Our Troops are not n. this Condition, nor are they like to be provided in this Manner, they are already worn out by a long fatigueing Campaign a Considerable part of them in the Hospitals above one half of those in Camp are almost naked, and are walking barefooted on the Ice or frozen Ground. In short It a Winters Campaign should be attempted with them our hopes wi 1 be deceived, the Army will be totally ruined • and we shall find ourselves without one in the Sprino- the Consequences of which in the Affairs of the im^Hcan States are too evident to need an enumeration, and there- UmXllbre':'"'^ '^" ' ^''''''' "^"^^'^^° f'^J -*--^^: '; As to the second Question, I have already declared my Opinion (after your Excellency's own view of the Enemy-; lines) tbat ,t is impracticable on the side Schuylkill with the IZTm'v/'"^."' T"' ^^"^'"'^"d, and were you aided by a 1 tbe Militia the States on this Continent can furnish by the first of february they would only serve to make thi Carnage, or the Route, the greater: the only Chance we have of attacking Philadelphia to advantagef is, over tie Schuylkill when it is sufficiently frozen to bea; a Column of Troops to pass it; this happens to be the Case in most Winters, sometimes in one Month, sometimes in another last W^inter It was so in the beginning of January, it b oke up by the Middle of that Month, and did not get^m again a the remainder of the Winter, this Uncertainty would render the Attempt very precarious. After an Immen e expence in Collecting a Great body of Militia we m " have no opportunity of passing the Schuylkill; the Men would be disgusted with the Service at thai severe Season in y 258 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. without any thing to Cover them, they would return dis- pirited, the disappointment in the Expedition would bear the Character of a defeat & would have all the bad effects of one, it would increase our sick, hurt the Recruiting Service and prove Ruinous to the Army, but should the Schuylkill prove passable at a proper Season, I should have but little hope of our Carrying Philadelphia; to storm the Streets thro' the fire from Redoubts houses & Columns of Men, is too much to expect from any Troops. — to set down before it at that Season, and to drive them out of it by Battering, ia to us impracticable, and any Attempt of the kind highly unadviseable. I am your Excellency's " Most Obedient Humble Servant " Stirling." opinion of the marquis de lafayette. " The project of calling a large body of militia for such a day, in order to attack the ennemy in Philadelphia, seems to me attended with so many difficulties, inconveniences, and bad chances, that if it is not looked upou as a necessary and almost desperate enterprise, tho' it is a very shining and highly pleasing idea, however I cannot think it is a prudent and reasonable one. The reasons for my rejecting it are as follows — " 1" I do not believe that any body could advise your excellency to attack only the redoubts in front, whatever could be our force ; such an attack vould be attended with a greater loss but not a greater succes than if we had only continental troops. " 2° We must therefore expect the moment when the ice upon the SchuUckill will oppen to us all the left side of the enemy's line and encampments, but or the climate makes a great difference between this country and the european ones, or one single fine day may frustrate all our hopes and preparations in putting a way all the ice. then we schould expect one other moment before dismissing the troops, and in my actual supposition they are to be kept a very schort time. Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 259 " 3° ill europe ice is brocked every night when it can facilitate the projects of the enemy; if all is not cleared, at least a ditch can be formed in the river. I know that we schould annoy theyr workmen, I know that such an opera- tion would be very hard an[d] troublesome for them, but in the first case I'l answer that everywhere military works are performed with the same inconveniences, in the second the people of Philadelphia can be employed there, when I say that we could trouble theyr operation, I suppose that our winter quarters are not in the back country. " 4° "We can't expect any secrecy in our collecting those forces, we can't deceive the ennemy for theyr destination, therefore (untill we could have a respectable body in the jirsaj') he can go of before fighting and then we must not entertain the hope of oppressing and destroying all that army, but only of recovering Philadelphia. " 5° Supposing that we could go upon the ice we have only one way of attacking, for if we put the militia in first line, they will fall back upon the continental troops, and we can not depend enough upon our men to believe that we could maintain order and resolution among them, if the militia is in the rear, and the regulars were repulsed, certainly they will not advance where continental troops don't succeed, if amongs us, I don't believe it would do better, therefore our only way should be to make false attacks of militia, and true ones of continental troops, to have a curtain of troops (what we call in French un rideau) in the whole lenght of the Schulckill, and on this side of the redoubts, in order to cover the heads of our columns, and our points of attack, and to put the disorder amongs the ennemy by an eavy fire. I wishond [?] too a body should be in the jirsay in case it would be possible for the ennemy to retreat by the dela- ware. and does your excellency think that such a quantity of troops could be raised ? " 6° When I consider all the difliculties of turning out some militia in interesting occasions, I can't flatter myself that all that people could be sent to your army for such a day, without the utmost difliculties. each state will have 260 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. an excuse for not sending as many men as they'l be desired, the cold, the rivers, the want of cloathes of every thing will seem sufficient reasons, if not to stay at home, at least to arrive after the time of the rendezvous, every one will trust upon the another, and if we do not succeed all will be against us. " 7° have we in the continent all the cloathes, arms am- munition, &c. &c. which would be necessary for so many soldiers. "Would it be possible to find subsistances enough in cattle, forage, &c. All things which I can't know, but however I think worthy of being mentioned, and that prin- cipally because the want of exactitude, the necessity of giving to them a light idea of what they are to do will en- gage us to keep them longer than we think. " 8. I know that all these inconveniences can not be together; because if we keep them some time, then we schall find an opportunity of going over the schulckill in case that we can prevent theyr braking the ice ; on the other hand if we have them only for a few days, difficulties of subsistence will be much lesser ; and if it is impossible for the ennemy to pass the delaware, certainly a body in jersay is quite useless. I can add that in case we could not go over the ice, it is possible to throw bridges upon the river, but. Sir, I have mentionned all the difficulties which strike me, because my opinion is not to begin such an enter- prize unless we shall be certain of succeeding. A great schame for our arms, a great mischief for our cause would attend our being repulsed when we schould attack a part of the british forces with all the united forces of America, europe has a great idea of our being able to raise when we please an immense army of militia, and it is looked upon as our last but certain ressource. if we fall this phantom will fall also, and you know that the American interest has alwais been since the beginning of this war to let the world believe that we are stronger than we can ever expect to be. if we destroy the euglish army, our generous effort will be admired everywhere, if we are rupulsed it will be called a rash and laughable expedition, therefore we musst not let a Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 261 shining appearance and the pleasing charms of a bold fine enterprize, deceive us upon the inconveniences and dan- gers of a gigantesque and in the same time decisive expe- dition. " However perhaps the interest of america, the wish of all the states, the instruction of Congress, the necessity of finishing the war, all these circumstances which are un- known to me, make it necessary for your excellency to hazard something in this occasion, perhaps the difficulties in the physick and moral ressources of this country are not so great as I am affraid to find them, perhaps it is possible to raise, to arm, to cloath, to subsist, to keep together and give some instructions to that so considerable army which according to my opinion is necessary, perhaps the weather is not so changeable in this country as it is in europe, or some other means than going upon the ice could seem eligible to your excellency, but if the difficulties which I fear are indeed true (what you can judge, and I can not know myself) then I am not for that expedition in considering it as only a militar one. " if however I was deceived, or if politic circumstances schould make it necessary to try such an enterprise, the following precautions seem me to be taken. " 1" I do not ascertain the number of militia to be raised because it must be as large as we can arm, cloath and subsist. "2° All possible exertions are to be taken for havino- them at the appointed time which time must be now as soon as it is possible. " 3° Some instructions should take place before the opera- tion, only for some days, because if they were marched to the ennemy without the lest idea of marching together such a disorder would prevent the succes of the less difficult enterprize. " 4° the continental troops should be sent in theyr winter quarters as soon as possible, to take a good rest, to recom- fort themselves, to be reinforced by theyr men now scattered everywhere, by some recruits, and the whole to be managed and by theyr officers, under that point of vue. 262 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. and principally cloathes should be delivered to them, and theyr arras put in a good order, it seems to me that this prospect could engage us to be nearer from the ennemy than lancaster is. "5° the soldiers and principally the officers of our array schould not be permitted to go home till it would be over. " 6° proper means for recruiting the army schould be taken as soon as possible, one of the best according to my opinion would be (after having suppressed the substitutes) to annex a part of the militia of each state to theyr conti- nental divisions in order to serve there for twelve months. I think such a regulation is eligible in all cases, for a strong continental army well managed and disciplined, and ready to begin an early campaign, and to make use of all the unforeseen and soudain occasions, would do much greater service than all the militia in the world, and their militia sliould be made use of only in a less great number or in particular circumstances. " The Mquis de Lafayette "Jf. (7." opinion of baron de kalb. "Sir " When your Excellency recommended some time ago the Consideration of tlie practicability of an attack on the Ennemy, I was already of opinion for such an attack if it was possible to make an attempt on the City behind the lines, either by sending troops in Boats down Delawar River to land on, or below the wharf, or by crossing Schuylkill river below middle ferry either by throwing over Bridges, or upon the ice in great frosts, to fall into the Ennemies rear at the same time the army was to attack the lines in front, with several Colums. " Sending down Troops Delawar river, seems at least very dangerous if not entirely impracticable. " The Passage over Schuj'lkill appears more eligible if attempted by a considerable body of militia, or other Troops. (I say militia, because I think the regulars would Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 263 be all necessary for the chief attack in front.) Posted along the right bank of said river, on the best and most advantageous spots, from whence the artillerie & even small arms could annoy the Ennemy and protect the work- men for erecting Bridges, and in some places seemingly working, for the better drawing the Ennemy on that side, there ought to be made such seeming or reall attempts in several places at the same time. As this is the weak side, there is no doubt they would considerably divide their forces, and give room to break in upon them either in front or on this side, perhaps on both at once. " If the necessary Boats and Materials for such bridges could not be provided, or carried to the proper places to be employed, or if there was an impossibility of erecting Bridges, or preventing the Ennemies of cutting a Channel through the ice, in fine if a Passage over Schuylkill should be impracticable, it appears to me, that the attack ought rather to be dropped, then to attack the Ennemies in their strong hold, in front only, this would be running the risk of a repulse, or of a total defeat and the bad consequences thereof. " If on the contrary the river may be crossed especially upon the Ice, the principal attack could be made on this side with the best troops, and the Militia be drawn up in Battle or in Columns before the lines to make a show, and keep up the attention of the Ennemy. for that purpose a Large body of militia from all States should be drawn to- gether, and such measures taken for their march as to arrive all on the same day or very near, that on one hand, the expedition may take place immediately after their arrival, the Ennemies may be surprised or at least not have sufficient time to collect more forces or to add to their works, and on the other hand that the army may not be distress'd for Provisions, nor the Militia kept a long time in the field, for fear of sickness, or disgust, which is by all means to be avoided. " Upon the whole this attack is subject to many iucon- veniencies, and the greatest of all, will be the necessity of 264 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. a winters campaign, this will ruin the army by sickness and discontent, perhaps too by desertion, and how will another almost new one be raised, except Congress take such measures as to oblige the militia to serve constantly at least for two years, and to be put into the regulars to compleat the regiments, in fixing a certain number for every State and to be all levied at a Limited time, and there is none to be lost, if your Excellency resolve for a Winter Campaign, the Troops ought to be immediately supplied with cloathing at any rate, if not Winter quarters to take place without loss of time. But in this case where and how to take them is a matter of the highest consideration, if real Winter quarters and rest are intended, they must be taken at a distance (as between Lancaster & Reading, or Reading and Easttown) from the Ennemy. But this would give up to the Ennemy the Jeseys, the whole State of Delawar, the eastern part of Maryland, Chester, Philadel- phia & Bucks Counties in this State of Pensilvania, the Ennemy would draw out of these lands, forrage, Provisions, live-stock, and what would be still worse, numbers of able men to bear arras against their country, either by consent, delusion, or by force, besides the bad Eflect it would have or produce in Political matters. This may partly be pre- vented by taking up Winter quarters at Wilmington and Environs with the addition of Hutts, but then there will be little or no rest, and no possibility of sending home many Officers & Soldiers for recruiting their regiments, and at the least movement of the Ennemy on Schuylkill, we must come up with them, in order not to be surprised in some of our quarters or cut off from the neighbouring States and from our Stores; the greatest alertness will be required from all Commanders in those quarters, and the fatigues the army would lie under and the Sicknesses they would be subject to, call aloud on Congress for recruits and Cloathing. "Baron de Kalb " Major General." Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 265 OPINION OF MAJOR-GENERAL ARMSTRONG. "Camp at Whitemaesh, 4'" Dec' 1777 "Sir "In regard to the Advisability of a Winters Campaign, I answer — In keeping the Field, the hardships on both officers and privates are manifestly great, nor is there an alternative presenting your Excellency with less incon- venience, at best you have but a choice of difficulties of which Hutting in the field is in my Opinion the least of the two, and most in charecter for the Army. " The only semblance of Quarters known to us being so remote from the Enemies Post as to leave a great part of Pennsylvania for several months fully in their power — an acquisition this, too great to be yielded to these cruel & haughty intruders, unless under a greater degree of necessity than has yet reached your Army — To the advantages of the Enemy we must here subjoin the piteous sufferings of the well minded populace, too many to enumerate, too tender to express — I wish Sir to be divested of every local preju- dice in the present enquiry where the publick weal is not clearly involved, but most certainly if in present or equal Circumstances the Whole of the Army shall retire to dis- tant Villiages already crowded with her own refugees, Pennsylvania is that moment a publick Sacrifice, her Spirits, her hopes & future exertions Civil & Military, are blasted at once ! unhappy State ! & well if her diseases do not con- taminate some of her neighbours — a mutillated victim cursed of the other twelve — and by Britain too, who for her many- fold services to Congress & to this Army, hath now made her the capital Seat of War. " To considerations of this sort may naturally be added a train of things relative to the great design uses & reputation of the Army, all pointing against the inelligible quarters, but at present shall omit these. " Discipline & (Economy will be better maintain'd in the field than in the villages, where quarters are so far detatched — Health & vigour better maintain'd than in bad Quarters, 266 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. and liable to debaucherj'. Hutting in the field in a dry cold winter, is by no means incompatible with health — this hath been experienced. If our Arm}' is remote the lower Counties & some part of Maryland will probably be sub- ject to the like incursions of the Enemy with the uncovered parts of Pennsylvania — In the field favourable Openings for annoying the Enemy may happen & be improved — Great Quantities of Provisions and Forage now convenient to the Enemy may be saved — If in the Field the Enemy will be cautious, if in quarters they will triumph, and their small partys dispersed abroad will serve their purposes & do us much damage. — On the whole I am fully of Opinion how- ever arduous, that the present situation of our Affairs calls aloud for a Campaign, that it is advisable, practicable, hon- orable and will be found to be salutary. — But as far as pos- sible to reconcile jarring difficulties, suppose one half of the Continental Troops with some Militia alwais in the field, anil the other in quarters alternately, by which means some publick good may still be done, whilst all that ease that the nature of things can possibly admit will be granted to the Troops generally? " With respect to the practicability of an attack on Philad* with the aid of a Considerable body of Militia to be as- sembled at a certain time and place — 'tis a pleasing idea at first view, and ready to elate the anxious mind, in it there is something noble & consonant to the great points in view, and did they assemble in convenient time, the attack might doubtless be made with probable success — Or their very numbers occasion the Enemy to abscond, or a desertion in their Army — Cooper's Ferry wou'd best annoy the Enemy with carcasses — but the Engineers should be knowing, pro- vided with materials, & might throw light on the best means of attack, on whatever side of the Town it might be made. Notwithstanding these wishful things, so many are the con- tingencies attending the convention of a distant Militia, and the ice serving in proper time, together with the great prejudice of a disappointment, that a measure the efficacy of which must depend on such an exact coincidence of things Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 267 can scarcely be advised, but must be given up as rather to be wished than expected. Such an attempt with the ad- vantage of Boats might perhaps be matter of consideration for the Spring. I am with perfect Submission " Y' Excellencys Most Obed' Serv'. "John Armstrong." opinion of brigadier-general maxwell. " Sir, " Your Excellencys Favour of yesterday I received con- cerning the Adviseability of a winter Campaign, and the practicability of an attack upon Philad", with the Aid of a considerable body of Militia assembled at an apointed time and place. I do ashure your Excellency I think the object a verry desirable one could it be put properly into execution and without taking a winter Campaign to it, which in our present circumstances would be sufficient to ruin us of itself. " It appears to me verry plain that General How does not think himself strong enough now to meet us in the field therefore will give us no opertunity of attacking him but to our great disadvantage. Our expectations have never been verry sanguine that we could prevent our Enemys from taking possession of some of our Seaports but if they can- not meet us in the field they will make verry slow work in conquering the Country. It appears verry plain we must have another Campaign next summer, and the sooner we begin to prepair for it the better by taking every method in our power to prepare our present Armey, and Increase it. " The Attack proposed on Philad" appears to me to be liable to so many Accidents that the success of it woud be verry doubtfull and should it fail our Armey would be ruined waiting for it. " I am therefore against the Attack and the Winter Cam- paign, and am your Excellency's " Most Obedient Humble Servant " W Maxwell. " White Marsh, 4"" December, 1777." 268 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SMALLWOOD. " Camp, December 4'" 1777 "Sir " It will be uuuecessary to point out the sufferings of the Continental Troops, from their various hard Duty, & dis- tresses for want of Cloathing, particularly in the Articles of Blankets, Shoes & Stockings, the most essential part to enable them to encounter the severity of a Winter Cam- paign, and the improbability of procuring those necessary supplies, without which our prospect of success in an un- dertaking of this Nature must be unpromising and fruitless — The Array has already & is daily diminishing by sickness, which has in a great Measure proceeded from the want of these necessary Articles — The discontent, the disposition for resigning, & the complaints which so generally pre- vail among the Officers, arising in some Instances from the unsettled State of their Recruiting Accounts (which pre- vents the Draft of their Pay) of their Rank, in other In- stances the partial Promotions which have been made, & the exorbitant Prices paid for what they must unavoidably pur- chase (overrunning their Pay) renders them destitute & unable to appear suitable to their Rank, or even decent & comfortable, which call for redress & respite to regulate & remedy, this cannot be made or obtained in the course of a Winters Campaign. " Your Excellency can be no stranger to their Distress, and the justice & motives of their Complaints, & desire to resign, which if not speedily remedied must have a danger- ous Tendency, & a Winter Campaign must rather increase than diminish their Sufferings in, & Objections to the service — abstracted from which it must lessen, inervate, & render your troops less formidable, & may give an irretrievable check to your Advances in the Spring, at a Time when the Enemy will come out in high Spirits & Vigor, & perhaps may more than avail themselves of any acquisitions gained by it — from which, & sundry other Reasons which might be suggested, I am against a Winter Campaign, tho' at the Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 269 same Time I shou'd object to the Troops being canton'd so remote as to aftbrd little or no cover to the Country, this might have a bad Tendency in several Respects, as it wou'd enable the Enemy to procure Supplies without any Risque at the same Time that it wou'd discourage the Inhabitants, & subject them to be insulted & plundered, & the Soldiery being lulled into Security wou'd be inattentive to Discipline, & in all probabilitj' so scattered over the Countr}^ as to render it difficult to draw them to a Point, in order to open the Campaign early in the Spring, & prosecute your Meas- ures with Vigor & Success. " An Attack on Philad* this Winter, I think neither ad- visable or practicable without subjecting the Army to too great a Loss, this cannot be effected in Front, & an Attempt in Rear & on the left Flank (the only probable way of making an impression) must depend upon Contingencies, which in all probability upon our taking a Position on the other side of the Schuylkill, will be sufficiently guarded against, nor in this cold, dead Season do I think the Aids expected from Militia are at all to be depended on. " I should therefore judge it more prudent, immediately to take the most eligible Position, for the Security, relief & discipline of the Ti'oops, having in View to cover as much as may be the Country, and awe the Enemy from making depredations, & should the States fall on Measures of filling up their Regiments or supplying you with a formidable Body of Militia early in the Spring, your Prospects of Suc- cess wou'd be enlarged & better'd, & it's likely a deep stroke might be made, before the Enemy cou'd possibly be reinforced. I have the Honor to be &c. " Your Excellency's most Obed' H'"^ Serv' " W. Smallwood." OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX. "Camp, White Maesh, 3* December 1777 "Sir " I receiv'd your Excellencys orders to give my sentiments 'upon the advisability of making a Winters Campaign, and 270 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. Practicability of an attack upon Philadelphia, with the aid of a considerable body of militia to be assembled at an ap- pointed time & place.' Were it probable that S' W"" Howe's destruction would be the consequence of a Winter's Cam- paign I would most chearfully give my voice and opinion for one — I think a Winter's Campaign, under the present circumstances, will be the inevitable destruction, if not of the Liberties of the Country, yet of the present Army ; my opinion is founded on the following Reasons. " Our entire want of Cloathing to keep the men from Perishing by the cold winters season. " The improbability & impracticability of surprizing 10,000 veteran troops in a well fortified city. " The impossibility of our keeping the field to besiege their works and city regularly, and being almost totally deficient of any warlike apparatus for so arduous an enter- prize. " The uncertainty of obtaining such a sufficient number of Militia as to make the enterprize warranted by reason, or common Military knowledge. " My Opinion is for putting the Army in good Winter Quarters, to repair the damages done : to recruit*^ reform the Army; to provide Magazines &c. In the Spring we may be enabled to strike the enemy a decisive blow, which by making a Winters Campaign I think improbable and impossible. " I am Sir with the greatest respect, Your " Excellency's Most Obed' H'ble Servant "H. Knox " B. G. Artillery." OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL POOR. " Camp, 4'" Decern' 1777 "D« SiR " In answer to the question Recv'd by note from your Excellency yesterday — a winters Campain, I am sure it will be attended with Gruel loss of our numbers. " As to the Militia troops their is but little Dependence Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 271 upon them in Case you make an Asolt upon Philid''" — besides if the Rivers should be froze over the Enemy Dout- less will Contract lines & make their Situation nearly as strong as it is now. " I think that if your Array should be Emediatly sent into winter Quarters — the Absentees Colected, that early next Spring you'd be able to take the field with Bubble the numbers that you'l have if a winters Campain is kept up. " as your men are much fatigued & numbers falling sick every day for want of Clothing and Comfertable habitations. " I am Clear of Opinion that it's Best to put your Army into winter quarters without Loss of time. " however am Ready to Compile with any Disposition that shall [be] Concluded upon. " I am Sir your Excellency's most obedient " B}' Serv'. " Enoch Poor, B. G." opinion of brigadier-general paterson. "Sir " The bad States of our Army at present destitute of Clothing and many other Necessaries, the Necessity of its being recruited this Winter, that we may be superior to M' How in the Spring, induces me to give my Opinion in favour of going to Winter Quarters. The Attack on Phila- delphia, from the best knowledge I can obtain of the Strength of their River Works, I must think woud fail, the Consequences of which would be a universal Discour- agement to the Country and Army, I find my Brigade falling sick ver}' fast, and am informed that others nigh me are equally unfortunate, should therefore think it adviseable to retire to some convenient Place for the Winter, and recruit the Army as much as possible, that we may at an early Day in Spring, take the Field & give Gen' How the so much desired Defeat. " I am your Excellencies most " humble Servant "Jn" Paterson. " Camp, 4 Decern' 1777." 272 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. OPINION OF BEIGADIER-GENERAL VARNUM. " Whitemaesh, 3'' Dec', 1777 "Sir " Having been favored with your Excellencys commands of tbis day, I sball give ray sentiments respecting the sub- ject matters thereof, uninfluenced by any motives but the sincere dictates of my own mind. " Not being at Head Quarters when the subject of a ' winters campaign was proposed,' in order ' to make an attack upon Philadelphia, aided by a considerable body of militia,' I cannot be acquainted with the reasons offered in support of the proposition : your Excellency will therefore excuse me, if I do not go so fully into the arguments as otherwise might be expected. "Winter campaigns have not, in modern times, been approved of or practised by great commanders, but upon the most important occasions — Among the ancients they were more common. Two reasons conspired to make them so ; the hardiness of the soldiery, from their abstemious manner of living; and the small preparations necessary to furnish their military apparatus. The modern use of gun powder, and the tedious preparations in the laboratory, added to the luxury and effeminacy of the times have con- cured, among other things, to form the modern taste. All Countries, in the same age, equally civilized seem to form their customs and manners upon a similar basis. It is not strange therefore that Americans have, in some measure, imbibed the vices of Europe. And, altho' the living of the American army is necessarily founded upon the strictest frugality, yet a few months service has not given them strength of constitution and patience of mind adequate to the severities of a winter's campaign. This will appear more evident, if your Excellency will be pleased to consider that the army is composed of men from the various parts of an extensive continent; born in different climates; accus- tomed, in some degree, to a different mode of living, and scarcely any of them acquainted with the manner of sub- Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 273 sisting in camp. A considerable time is requisite to form them to the same standard. 'Till when, sickness will more or less prevail in iproportion to the irregularity of their duty. From this consideration it is in part, that so very great a proportion of the troops are unfit for duty. " Another and not inconsiderable Cause of the feeble state of the army, is their want of cloathing. From what- ever source it is, I shall not decide, but it is a melancholly truth, that the men are naked. And what can we expect from them, opposed to British veterans, well clad, well pro- vided with every necessary, when they are not in a situation to combat the severities of the season ? Permit me Sir for a moment to indulge a moral sentiment. The Soldiers, their nearest connections, the country at large, nay, God himself, has committed them to our charge ! We are an- swerable for their safety, their health, their comfort & their lives — If unnecessarily we deprive them of either, a con- sciousness thereof will plant daggers in our breasts that time cannot remove ! — I must therefore conclude that your men are not in a situation to keep the field. " Where are the magazines necessary for the execution of this great and extensive plan ? The commissary's de- partment is in such a situation, that provisions can scarcely be obtained from day to day. I know of nothing like preparations to subsist a large army near the enemy's lines. In that position, we cannot depend upon live stock. Salted provisions and hard bread must be had. Where are they ? In the eastern parts of Connecticutt. The horses are ex- tremely fatigued ; they want rest and keeping. But, sup- pose they were in good plight; from what quarter is forage to be drawn to feed them ? It is very difficult to obtain it in our present quiet camp. How much more so will it be when near the enemy ? In what condition is our labo- ratory? Where are our battering cannon? Where are our mortars, shells, carcases, &c. ? By a general assault upon the City, many of these objections would be ob- viated ; but that I esteem utterly impracticable. The col- lecting a large body of militia in aid of the continental 20 274 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. troops, I presume would be attended with uusurmountable difficulties. The distance from whence many of them must come, would either totally discourage them from attempting it, or protract the time in such a manner, that when they are assembled, arranged, & provided with ammunition &c., the winter season would be past, and your army ruined. They cannot be subsisted on the march, neither could they live here without great alterations. But suppose these difficulties were removed, & we provided with covering and other accommodations for a numerous army, of what ser- vice would they be in such a kind of attack as is proposed ? I will venture to say, that the scene of confusion. Horror and carnage that must ensue, would only heighten those miseries which result from a total defeat ! In this kind of war, I conceive of militia, promiscuously assembled, as an huge unanimated machine, incapable of regular motion or activity ; and must infallibly share the fate of that numerous host of undisciplined barbarians, who ventured to fight the Roman Marius. I will beg liberty to extend my Ideas further, and presume we had an army of regular, well appointed troops, sufficiently numerous to ensure victory in the field, even then the attack would appear to me imprac- ticable. It cannot be doubted but that General Howe has strongly fortified the front of the City by a chain of Re- doubts, connected by Abbatis, or lines. The flanks are secured by Rivers. The City itself is made up of houses, the walls of which are proof against small shot. Thus securely posted, what probability have we of success ? To rush impetuously on certain destruction, would be acting the part of madmen rather than of brave commanders. — It is the duty Sir, of all men to seek their own happiness. In military characters this is derived from glorious actions; from those exploits and successes which claim the approba- tion and applause of mankind. Rashness and timidity are alike unfriendly. Prudence and real magnanimity form the Hero. " In matters of great importance, it is the sentiment of byographical writers, that we call to our assistance the Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 275 example of shining characters. It is from their experience we may form our own conduct ; and from the success at- tending their efforts, under similar circumstances, we may probably conjecture the event of our measures. What would a Marlborough have done on such an occasion? ' He never besieged a town but he carried it;' but he never attacked a strong village or town by assault. "What would a Pyrrhus have attempted ? He undertook to storm a city — He lost his army and his own life. Thus, by one rash manoeuvre that dazzling Glory which astonished the uni- verse, was sullied and eclipsed ! As many instances of the like kind will be recent in your Excellency's memory I shall not trouble you with selecting more ; but observe, that, if your councils are to be formed upon popular opin- ions, & vulgar prejudices ; or even by bodies in high au- thority, you will be pleased to recollect the misfortune of the Martial Turenne, who, to gratify the court of Paris, attacked a town sword in hand; the Event proved their ignorance and folly. " Altho' Philadelphia is a splendid object, — altho' a total destruction of General Howe's army would compleat your Excellency's felicity in relieving the country from all her calamities ; yet, the consequences of a defeat, would be attended with miseries beyond Description. " The salvation of America does not depend upon a suc- cessful victory this winter; but a severe defeat would plunge us into difficulties, out of which we could scarcely extricate ourselves. In short, I dread the Consequences, and do esteem an attack, upon the principles proposed, in every respect unadviseable. However, should your Excel- lency order it, I shall be happy in relinquishing my own objections, knowing that if the worst should happen, we shall fall like the sacred band of Thebes. " I am obediently your Excellency's " most humble Servant " J. M. Varnum. "4"' Dec' 1777 276 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. "Sir "Having only the last Evening to form, adjust & write my Opinion upon an important Question ; Being very much indisposed and full of Pain, I must apologize to your Excel- lency for the obscure manner in w'h my Ideas are conceived and expressed. But for the Circumstances mentioned, I should have added many more Arguments in support of my Sentiments. I have mentioned in a written Opinion lately, the Uneasiness of the Officers ; I hope that may be considered in Connection with this. " I am as before " J. M. V." OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOODFORD. " Camp 4'" December, 1777 " Dear Gen'- " I did not receive j'our Excellency's Letter till my return from Head quarters last Evening, or I should have cora- ply'd with your requisition sooner. " I have before given my reasons for being against ex- poseing this Army to a Winters Campaign in their present condition. I would add to them the present Temper of the soldiery, who I am convinced are very gener'ly against it. " The practicability of an attack upon Philadelphia I have look'd upon to be entirely out of the question since your Excellency's return from viewing the Enemy's Works. " As to the Aid of the Militia, I cannot be brought to think they will be of any in such an attempt. I am inclined to think whilst this Boddy were assembling we should loose more Continental officers & soldiers by waiting for them in the Field, then double the value of them that would arrive. Experience shewes that few Militia can be brought to stand in the liue of Battle, & it would be deceiving ourselves to expect them upon this creation to march up to the attack of the Enemy's Works. " If such an attack is to be made, I would advise it to be put in execution Immediately with the Force we have in Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 277 the Field, because I think we are stronger than we shall be any time this winter, it is possible our numbers may en- crease, but our real strength will diminish. " "Without some new light could be thrown upon this matter, or other reasons urged then I heard at the late Council, I am clearly against either making a winter's Cam- paign, or attacking the Enemy's works. " I have the Honour to be your Excellencys " Most Obed' humble Serv' "W Woodford." OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL WEEDON. " D« Sir " I have from the iirst moment it was suggested to your Excellency, ' that an attack on Philadelphia this winter with the aid of Militia was practicable and promised suc- cess,' kept in mind the desirable object; have compaired and viewed it in every light, and on every ground I could place it, and after mature consideration on the matter cannot promise a single Advantage that would justifie the measure, nor can I see the least prospect of anything honor- able or advantagious by adopting it. On the other hand I foresee numberless Obstacles to retard, and perplex that with sober reasoning stares any man in the face who views it with an impartial eye, places it on a military scale, and reflects on what human nature is. — It has been found, I believe, by most of your Officers who you have advised with on the matter, that your Continental Force is far, very far. Inadequate to an attack on the enemies lines, in their present strength and situation. — Operations like those pro- posed, are of too extensive a nature to carry into sudden execution. Reasons sufliciently cogent, must diminish your force every day you keep the Held at this season of the year, and to resolve on the measure, ensures a winters Campaign to this Army, which in their Circumstances also ensures certain destruction to great part of them, without the Aid of an enemy — your principle dependence must then be on 278 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. the Militia, to carry this important matter into execution. Glory and our Countries good is no doubt what every up- right soldier would wish to obtain, but we may be too keen in pursuit of it, and like the Dogs in the fable, suffer the sub- stance to escape while we Grasp at the Shadow. — I would only mention to y' Excellency some Difficulties that occur in drawing a sufficient force of Militia together for this pur- pose, and providing for them ; particularly at a season of the year when our Fields, and Rivers are Ice & Snow. — Cov- ering we have not for them when they arrive, Hospital Stores we could not furnish for the numbers that would fall sick by being exposed to the severity of the winter, nor do I know that even provisions & forrage, could be procured with any degree of certainty, which shorely should be ren- dered beyond a doubt in such cases ; take the matter still on a more extensive scale. Every one that reflects on human nature and considers mankind at large must know how reluctantly they relinquish the ease and more calmer pleasures of domestick & social life to share the hardships & Fatigue of a Camp, even in more pleasant weather than what winter generally affords us. Men that are not taught and compelled to obey, will never render service, and Obe- dience & perseverance is not to be expected from a permis- cuous body of men drawn together from all Quarters of the Globe, ware they to assemble, but you would find one half would desert in their way to Camp, others probably might arive, a day or two before their time of service expired. No object on Earth would keep them afterwards, nor could an [ ] influence them after their time was out. What would follow must be distressing to an exalted mind. You would find your regular Troops by this time much Dimin- ished. They must bare the burthen of all necessary duties, in such cases, while this body of men are collecting, — expensive preparations are daily accumulating. The Eyes of the Con- tinent are turned towards you. Much speculation on the practicability of the expedition terminating with success, which you at last find yourself obliged to relinquish, leaving the unthinking world (who want nothing more to blast Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 279 reputation than a miscarriage, without inquiring into it's causes,) at liberty to sensure boath you & army. — Your Ex- cellency is perfectly acquainted with my Sentiments respect- ing this Army — it is Sir the Bullwork of America and should be nursed and cherished as the salvator of her Liberties. The Troops that compose it are not more than mortal, and cannot work Maricles. The bravest spirits may be exausted by uncommon, and constant fatigue. And Sir, there is not in my Opinion an Object on the Continent that justifies subjecting them, at this particular time, to a winters Cam- paign, unless there was a moral certainty of obtaining that Object, and with it, a perminant and honorable end to any further Hostilities. I give it therefore as my clear Opinion, that keeping this Army in the Field for the purpose of attacking Philadelphia, under the uncertainty of sufficient aid and support of Militia, is by no means Advisable, and am Sir, with high esteem " Y' Excellencies most obed' Serv' " G. Weedon "JB. Gen'. " Camp White Maesh " Dec' 4, 1777" OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL MUHLENBERG. " Camp, Dec' 4", 1777 "Sir " Your Excellency was pleas'd to desire the Opinion of your General Officers on ' The Adviseability of a Winters Campaign, & practicability of an Attack upon Philadelphia, with the Aid of a considerable Body of Militia to be Assem- bled at an appointed Time & place.' I must Confess that to me this Question seems so much interwoven, with the Question your Excellency was pleasd to put a few days ago, that I can hardly seperate them : The main point, I con- ceive, is still, whether a "Winters Campaign is practicable ; if not, the last Question falls of Course, unless the Time is the Spring. A Winter's Campaign to me, seems not only 280 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. unadviseable, on account of our Situation, but impracticable, at least if I am to Judge of other Brigades by my own ; one single Reg' of mine have turned out Ninety Men untit for duty, on Account of Shoes & other Necessarys. The Sick become Numerous, & the Men, notwithstanding the utmost Care of their Officers, will be Frostbitten, & subject to many other disorders, if they are to keep the Field, until the Militia can be collected, which if we are to Judge from the past, cannot be done in less than two Months — in the meantime it cannot be expected that the Enemy will re- main Idle, Their Works will be Continued, Their Vesseils who are now before the Town, will not only furnish them with Cannon, but with Marines, Sailors &c., so that in all probability, before the Militia can be collected an Attack will be thought impracticable, upon the same Grounds & perhaps with more reason than at present. — At the Time when this Hint was first thrown out in Council, I was pleasd with it, there seemd a probability of success ; but I had no Idea, that a Winter's Campaign was so closely Connected with the plan, which in my Opinion would prove more fatal to the Army under your Excellencys CoiTiaud than an unfortunate Attack on the Town — but I am far from thinking the plan ought to be dropped entirely. If the Army was to go into Winter Quarters where the Men could be refreshd & Clothd, & remain there untill the latter end of March ; the Militia could be Collected in the meantime. Then a Vigorous Attack could be made with a probability of success. " Thus I have given your Excellency my Sentiments on the Question proposd, as Clear as the shortness of the time I had for Consideration would permit me, which was only a few Minutes this Morning. The utility of hearing a Question debated is great, at least to a Young Soldier — Should the Question be decided otherwise your Excellency may be assured that any part entrusted to rae shall be ex- ecuted with the greatest Chearfullness. " Your Excellencys Most Obed' & very humble Serv' " P : Muhlenberg." Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 281 OPINION OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCOTT. " White Marsh, 4'" Dec' 1777 "Sir " I rec* your Excellencys letter of yesterday. I well re- member the proposition made. I then thought there was a probability of Success in such au attempt, but after your Excellency returnd from Reconoitring the Enemy's Lines and hearing your oppiniou with regard to their strength, I lost every Idea of a Winters Campaign. I must confess I never Promised my self any Certainty of success In it. But the many Waity reasons then given for a Vigorous Execu- tion Induced me to think something possably might be done, but since your Return from the lines, as before meu- tiond, I have not had a single thaught of such a thing Ither with or without the Militia. " I am your Excellency's Ob' Serv' "Ch' Scott." opinion of brigadier-general cadwalader. "Head Quarters, 3'' Dec' 1777 " Dear Sir " Whether the Army under your Excellency's command should continue in the field this winter ; and whether it is expedient to call to j'our assistance a great body of militia to make an attack on the Citty, are very important Questions — the determination of which may decide the fate of Amer- ica — they therefore require our most serious consideration. " It is certainly usual with all nations, in every cold climate, to retire with their armies into winter quarters — The men want cloathing & want rest; and the army is generally much reduced by inaction, sickness & a variety of casualties. To repair these losses, to nurse & recruit the Soldiers, & to make the necessary arrangements for an- other campaign are certainly great objects : but, Sir, if the practice of other nations, & the rules laid down in the books by military authors, are, implicitly, to regulate the armies of these States, I cannot help thinking our ruin is 282 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. inevitable: — precedents may justify us to military pedants, but not to the sensible Citizen. — " The situation of the American States is very different from that of a nation whose independance is acknowledged & established. It requires great management to keep up the spirits of the well-aft'ected, & to subdue those who have taken a part against us — Imprisonment, confiscation & death are the punishments for those who engage in the support of a revolution — these are terrors not so much dreaded in common wars — To remove these fears, and to secure the inhabitants from danger, appears to me to be measures of the utmost importance. The people of this State had the greatest expectations that the Army under your Excel- lency's command would have prevented General How from penetrating thro' the country &, taking possession of the capital of this State. — They were disapointed ! — and it is very evident what conclusions the}- must have drawn — The superiority of the enemy was easily discovered, and it natu- rally affected their spirits. Our successes to the northward have enabled you to draw great reinforcements from thence — our whole force, now collected, gives them new hopes; and tho they may not expect a successful attack will be made on the city this winter, they expect to be protected. The withdrawing your army to a great distance will not only magnify the enemy's strength (in the Opinion of the Inhabitants) but will be construed into an acknowledgment of our own weakness. — The enemy may then detach a body of troops to take post at Bordenton or Mount Holly ; another to Newtown on this side, and a third to Wilmington — with these (having possession of the Capital) they have perfect command of an immense country ; from which they can draw provision, forage & men. — The State of delaware must be totally subjected — the eastern shore of maryland & Vir- ginia left open to be ravaged at will ; in short, the inhabit- ants within this great Circle, must come in for protection, must swear allegiance to the king, & deliver up their arms. Those men who are to compose a very considerable part of your army the next Campaign will be engaged Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 283 against you ; the inhabitants of other States, who are event- iially concerned in these misfortunes, will feel very sensibly their dreadful effects — the power of Legislatures will be weakened & the States may find it impossible to enlist, draft, or, by any other means, to furnish their quota's for the ensuing Campaign. — All the manufactures that might be drawn from the Country you desert, will be lost to us. — The depreciation of our money will encrease ; and, in a short time, the Credit of the States will be totally ruined — Your army too, cantooned in a scattered manner, at so great a distance from the Enemy, will be dispersed thro' the States, by Leave-of-absence, Furlows, & Desertion — and in- stead of your troops coming into the Field better disci- plined (as some Gentlemen expect) they will become licen- tious, ungovernable & total strangers to military Discipline. " Last winter, after repeated ill-successes, you was obliged to retire from post to post, as the enemy advanced, and in addition to j'our misfortunes, your army was every day re- duced, by whole Brigades, leaving you, in sight of the Enemy — When you crossed the Delaware, tho' reinforced with the Philad'' Militia, you had but a handful of men, & these in a wretched ragged condition — What then would have been the consequence if you had retired to the back- country to nurse & recruit the miserable remnant of your army ; and to enlist men for the next Campaign. The Conse- quences are so evident they need no explanation. By having the river as a Barrier you kept the field till an opportunity offered; and by a well timed, well executed blow, you gave hopes again to all the States — in conse- quence of this, the Prince-town affair happened, which drew the enemy to one point ; and, at once, recovered N. Jersey & set America again on her Legs. " The King of Prussia (in the last war) overpowered by numbers, had almost lost all his Dominions during the Summer; but by a noble exertion, with those very troops that had been harrassed & almost torn to pieces by repeated actions and constant Marches, he recovered his Losses by a winter Campaign. 284 Defences oj Philadelphia in 1777. " Your men, I know, Sir, are in great want of cloathing, but I conceive they will be sooner equipped by remaining in the field than in winter Quarters — because by being in the field, the necessity will appear more evident, will induce those employed to provide cloathing to exert themselves, and will justify measures that otherwise would disgust & exasperate those from whom they are taken. — Let the robust, & best cloathed, do the duty of Guards; let the Invalids be sent to the most comfortable Quarters; & let premiums be given to those who shall make the best Hutts. " If you are out of the reach of a surprize, the Duty will be easy ; and you may effectually annoy the enemy as if j'ou was nearer. " I am far from thinking that a winter Campaign will not be attended with great distress to the poor Soldiers, & do not mean to insinuate that good winter Quarters may not be more comfortable ; but I am obliged from the necessity of the case to declare, that I think, if your array was re- duced by action & sickness, to one half its present number, the consequences would not be so fatal, as if we were to take winter Quarters. " I have confined myself merely to the Question ' whether a "Winter Campaign is adviseable,' but beg leave to make a few remarks on the two Positions that have been proposed. " To cover our stores, to afford the most protection to the country, to procure the best shelter (& out of the reach of a surprize) where there is plenty of water, forage & pro- visions — these appear to me to be the considerations that should determine the choice of the position for winter quar- ters. — Lancaster & the line from thence to Easton, has been mentioned as a proper place for winter Quarters. — Others have mentioned Wilmington & its neighbourhood. — Let us compare them ! Lancaster &c., tis said, from the best information, are so crouded with Families from the City & its Invirons, that a traveller can with difliculty get a night's lodging. I cannot conceive that any person can seriously propose to turn out those inhabitants, while their Husbands, Fathers & Brothers are now, perhaps, in the Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 285 Field — Hutts then must be substituted in the place of houses. — You have plenty of water, forage, & perhaps pro- visions, and you leave a vast country exposed as has been men- tioned above — You are to live on that country from whence you must draw your chief supplies in the next Campaign, & every article brought a great distance in waggons. " Wilmington has not its usual number of Inhabitants : & several other Towns in the neighbourhood are under the like circumstances; there are 9 or 10 mills at Brandywine, all these will afford shelter for a great body of troops. — This situation is out of the reach of surprize, & near enough to annoy the Enemy, cover your stores, & a great part of the country, which in the other case is left exposed. Wood, water & forage in great plenty and provisions, as the Com : General informs, may be had in large quantities from Maryland & Virginia by water, to the Head of Elk. — Hutts may be built, in such places as will best answer the pur- poses of defence, for that part of the Army that cannot find shelter in Houses. — " I am so perfectly convinced, that nothing but success, can keep up the spirits of our Friends, confirm the doubt- ful Characters, convert our Enemies & establish our Credit, (on which the bringing another army into the Field very much depends), that every Effort ought to be made to pro- cure it — I have not doubt but a successful attack could be made upon the City this winter by calling a considerable Body of Militia to your assistance if the enemy remain in their present position. — But I am apprehensive, that by de- claring your Intention (which will be necessary to induce the militia to turn out) it would immediately alarm the Enemy — they would find it necessary to surround the City with works, on the west side, and by drawing their force within a narrow compass, might defeat your Scheme — as they could only be carried by storm, at this season of the year. " It would probably take two months to collect the Militia from the distant States, which would bring us to the first of February, at which time the Ice is often gone, or at 286 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. least, so weak as not to answer our purpose. — I am there- fore inclined to think it will not be proper to give the militia so fatiguing a march at this severe season, or put the States to so great an Expence without a greater pros- pect of success. " I am, D' Sir, with great respect & esteem, " Your Excellency's most ob' very h'ble Serv' "John Cadwalader." opinion op joseph reed, esq. "Dear Sir " Tho' the Consideration of a Winters Campaign, & Prac- ticability of an Attack on Philad' have been so lately pro- posed, every Gentleman who extended his views beyond the present Hour, must have turned his Thoughts upon these Subjects so as to be able to form something more than a sudden Opinion. There cannot be any Person, Sir, either on a publick or private Account, upon whom the Motives for a "Winters Campaign can operate more forcibly. I have every Reason to wish it — & yet in the State & Condition of our Army my Judgment is against it. — The History of every Winters Campaign made in Europe closely evinces how destructive they have ever proved : during the Course of the last War the allied Army under Prince Ferdinand was almost ruined tho' victorious, & pursuing the Enemy. — Charles the 12* failed & fell from the very Summit of Victory, & Success by keeping the Field a part of the Winter. It is true, these Climates were more severe than ours, but the Troops were so well appointed, or at least so much better than ours, as to give Force to the Argument. Nay the Experiences of the Enemy last Winter confirms the Observation — a great Mortality, Discontent among Offi- cers & Men, & considerable Desertions, were the Conse- quences, tho' they were much better provided than we are. The Nakedness of the Array, & Temper of the Troops seem to be insurmountable Objections, possibly the latter might subside if the former was removed, but as it is, from every Observation I have been able to make, unless a competent Defmces of Philadelphia in 1777. 287 Supply of Cloathing can be procured all Argument is vain. — The Dissafection of the Country, Distress to the Whigs, re- cruiting & refreshing the British Array, a general Despond- ency & above all, — Depreciation of the Currency stare me in the Face as the Consequences of Retirement to distant Quarters : I shall share personally in this Distress — With a Family I have a Habitation to seek at this inclement Season, & every other Accommodation to provide, & yet I cannot desire the Array so unprovided to remain for my Protec- tion. The general Calamity I fear will not be removed by attempting it. The Credit of the Currency in my Opinion, will depend more upon an effective Army, than any other Circumstance. If Sickness, Discontent & Desertion should disperse or greatly reduce our Army ; I think the general Cause would suffer more than from the Evils I have noticed before : these Evils will admit of some Reraedy, but the other will not. With a recruited & refreshd Army, we raay recover what we lose, but with a fatigued worn out, dispirited one what can we expect but that General Howe will next Spring take the Field with every Superiority — But in this Case it appears to me, the true & proper Line may be between such a distant Cantonment as has been proposed, & taking Post so near the Enemy as to make a Winters Campaign. The Arguments of disciplining the Troops, re- cruiting the Army &c. at a distance have little weight with me; such a Security would afford, & be used as the best Excuse for going Home, & the Officers Commissions have not such an inherent Value as to make them fearful of losing them by Disobedience, or Neglect of Duty. The surest Pledge of Fidelity, & Attention, would be putting them in such a Situation as to require it. I do believe a partial Dispersion of the Array would follow, on putting it in any other Situation. Military Rules & Maxims laid down in long establish'd Armies do not allways apply to ours, & this Case I think is an Exception. "An Attack upon the Enemy in his Quarters when the River is froze, has been much thought of — if the Proba- bility of Success was in our Favour, no Exertion ought to 288 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. be left untried, & even the present Situation of our Army should be made if possible to bend to it. But if after \cu(\ Efforts, the Chances will be still against us, Prudence for- bids our venturing upon a Measure, which if unsuccessful would be attended with very fatal Consequences. Gen' Howe from the best Calculation, has now 12000 Men on one side strongly posted with Redoubts & Abbatis, so for- midable as to discourage our most enterprizing Genius's, when a large Detachment seemed to favor an Attack — on the others two unfordable Rivers, I fear we cannot oppose a greater Number of Continental Troops to him ; but this is to be supplied with Militia from Jersey, Pennsylvania Mary- land & Virginia — as to the first they are very fully employed at Home, the second from a Variety of Circumstances we find will not turn out but in two or three Classes & even of these there are ITumbers allways unarm'd. — The two latter in Point of Arms are in the same Condition. They are at a Distance & will march in at different Times, those who come early will be impatient, of Delay & hard Service, their Subsistence will be diflicult, & after all the very Possi- bility of it will depend on the Weather — A South Wind with a little Rain will make the Ice impassable in a few Hours, But supposing them to come into Camp in great Numbers, & good Humour, well arra'd, & fed — the Frost to continue — from the Nature of the Thing it can be no Secret — the Enemy will probably throw up Works, or make up other Preparations. On the opposite Bank therefore you will meet with an equal Army ready to receive you : for every one acquainted with our Militia will allow, that the Nature of the Attack will require too much Firmness & Discipline, to expect them to be equal to it farther than as a Support. Upon the whole there are such a Variety of Circumstances each of which are important, indeed essen- tial, all to coincide, that I think it would be almost miracu- lous if no one of them should fail us. " We are so circumstanc'd, Sir, as to have only a Choice of Difficulties, true Wisdom will direct us to select that Plan which will be attended with the least. — As to the Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 289 main Body of the Army laying on the East Side of Schuyl- kill, & taking Post between that & Delaware, it is not prac- ticable in my Opinion — as the Country does not supply Forage or Means of Subsistence. No Magazines being established but at a great Distance, nothing, or next to nothing now to be procured from the surrounding Country, the Supplies would be too precarious in the Winter Season. I therefore cannot but join in Opinion with those Gentle- men, who advise passing the Schuylkill with the greatest Part of the Army. The left Wing, & as much of it as could find Cover in Wilmington to take Post there, ex- tending as they can find Accommodation or good Ground to Hut, as far or farther than Downing-town. I would also propose that upon an exact Estimate of our present Force it be divided into 3 or 4 Parts or Classes. The most robust, healthy & well cloath'd to form the first Class ; & so on. The first Class to take the first Tour of Duty on this side Schuylkill, taking Post at such a Distance from Philadel- phia as not to risque a Surprize, having with them only their light Baggage or even bare Necessaries. I would have a Body of Militia advanced between them & the Enemy, their Line & Parties to extend to Delaware or as near it, as their Strength would admit. This Body of Men will not find Cover sufBcient I believe, without going too far or too near, they will therefore hut, or perhaps Boards may be procured. — I am very sensible that Objections & very plausible ones may be framed to this Plan & so there may be to every other, this answers the most valuable Purposes & such as appear to me to require our running 'some Risque to obtain. — I will just enumerate a few. In the first Place, a very valuable Country, the three lower Counties & Chester will be covered, & a Degree of Protec- tion afforded to the Country on the East side of Schuylkill, 2''. The Army will find some Cover ; a Country abounding in Forage, & many other Articles necessary for their Comfort, those Countries having suffered as yet very little by the War, & being very fertile. 3''. The Enemy will be deprived of this Supply which they will otherwise obtain. 21 290 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 4"". The Troops will be within striking Distance, if Circum- stances should favour that Measure without being exposed to a Winters Campaign. 5"". A Tour of Duty will not admit the Officers neglecting the service by going Home, or entering into Scenes of Dissipation, & Amusement, which will in the same Degree infect the Soldiery. 6"". Some Annoyances may be given to the Enemys Intercourse by Ships. 7*. It will prevent any Insurrection in those lower Counties, or the Eastern Shore of Maryland of which every Year has furnish'd us with an Instance. 8"". The Passage of the Enemy has occasioned Wilmington, & that Neighbourhood to be evacuated by the Friends to America, they with many others have retir'd to those very Places some Gentlemen propose to go & occupy — in the one Case you will have empty Houses, in the other you must exercise a Spirit of Hardship by turning Families out to experience every Species of Distress. 9"". You will reserve the Supplies of the back Country for the next Campaign which otherwise you will eat up in the Winter. " I would farther beg leave to add that the support of the Army, the Success of the Cause & even the Supply of Cloathing & Necessaries for the Troops depends very much on the Opinion & Spirits of the People, they rise or fall according to the Appearances of Success & of our Force ; abandoning a large Body of the Country to the Enemy, will to them be a sure Proof of our Inferiority & Inability to op- pose the British Army, of course they will seek Protection, take the Oaths, & throw themselves under the Enemys Government. — A Circle of 30 Miles at least including Jersey will be under the Command of the Enemy. " It is a great Objection & has much Weight that this Post may be liable to Affront from the Enemy & Disturb- ance in their Quarters, but I do not think our Affairs or Situation will admit of total Tranquillity.— 2^ The Schuyl- kill will affiard some Security after the Destruction of the Bridge which must be effected. 3. Some Works may be thrown up for Defence. 4"". The Array will be within sup- porting Distance of each other, so as to require a great Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 291 Exertion & Movement of the Enemy, which they will not be fond of after being settled in their Quarters. These Circumstances in a Degree obviate this Objection. " 2^ Object. That Bucks County & Jersey will be exposed to the Depredations or Practices of the Enemy. "Answ. This Position will aftbrd a partial Cover & in my Opinion a better than the distant Cantonment. I am confident the Country will esteem it so. " 3. We have Hospitals in this Country & are establish- ing Magazines at Places that may be exposed by these Movements. "Answ. These Hospitals are scattered about, they hardly make an Object for an Enemy, but I should think they might be removed as fast as the Patients recover & no new ones sent, so that in a little Time the Difficulty will be removed. " Upon the whole. Sir, I can think of no other Expedient to reconcile the many Difficulties which present themselves in every view of this important Question. The shortness of Time & a sore Finger has obliged me to throw together these Sentiments with very little Accuracy — they may serve as Hints perhaps for better Heads to improve. " I am with the greatest Respect & Regard, D' Sir, " Your obed & aff' Hble Serv' "Jos: Reed." [December 4, 1777.] OPINION OF BRIOADIER-GENERAL DU PORTAIL. " 3* December, 1777 "Sir " I have examined anew with all the attention of which I am capable, the Project of attacking the English and it still appears to me too dangerous — the great Body of Militia with which we might be reinforced for this purpose does not give me any additional hope of succeeding — it is not the number of Troops which is of importance in this case, but it is the quality, or rather their nature and manner of fighting. — The Troops wanted are such as are capable of attacking with the greatest vivacity, the greatest firmness. N 292 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. — Troops that are not astonished at suffering a considerable Loss in the first onset, without causing any to the Enemy — for this must be the case in an Attack of Intrenchments — although when the Works are carried the Chance turns and the Loss is on the side of the intrenched. — Now, are the Militia or even Continentals capable of undergoing this Trial, in which the best Troops in the World cannot always support themselves — I am verj' sorry in giving the motives of my opinion to be obliged to speak so unfavorably of our Army — but the Battle of German Town ought to be a Les- son to us — if our Army had proceeded with vigour on that occasion, would not the English have been completely de- feated — The Disposition was excellent. — Your Excellency in that instance really conquer'd General How, but his Troops conquered yours. — if then notwithstanding the ad- vantage of a complete surprize, notwithstanding the ad- vantages of ground, we were repulsed, what would happen before a Line of Redoubts well disposed in all appearance, and the Intervals of which are closed with Abbatis. " There is however a case in which I think we might attack the Enemy with success — I mean if the Schuylkill should be sufficiently frozen below their left to admit of our throw- ing our greatest Force on their Rear at the same time that we should make an attack in front. Gentlemen acquainted with the Country must decide this point — if indeed the Schuylkill is sufficiently frozen every year to afford a pas- sage for Columns of Troops with Artillery — my opinion is fixed. I think the Army ought to be marched to the other side of Schuylkill, to be reinforced with all the militia that can be collected, while we wait for the favorable moment. " I would go more minutely into the Subject, if your Ex- cellency did not order me to send my Answer this morning. I did not receive your Excellency's Letter 'till half after twelve, and it is now half after one. " I am with great Respect, Sir, your &c " Le Chev» Du Portail." ' ' Translated by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens, Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 293 opinion of brigadier-general irvine. "Sir " If posting the army in a position similar to that I ad- vised in my last letter, be to form a winter's campaign, the measure in my opinion is not only adviseable, but abso- lutely necessary, as the more I think on the subject the more I am convinced that retiring into winter quarters and leaving the country uncovered will be followed with the ruin of our friends, give ease and plenty to our enemies, and do an irreparable injury to the cause we are ingaged to defend ; the aids to be drawn from this State in future will be triiBing indeed, the inhabitants of new jirsey will be intimidated, the delaware state lost, and an opportunity given to the tories on the eastern shore of maryland once more to appear in arms against us. When I proposed hutting the army it was not so much with a view of annoy- ing the enemy in their present possessions as to prevent them from ravaging the country ; and to give our officers a better opportunity of attending to the discipline of the troops than they could possibly have were they dispersed in extensive cantonments ; — how far the former may be efl"ected by drawing together a large body of militia, is a question not easily determined — The idea I confess is a noble one, and could it be reduced to practice might be attended with the most happy consequences, but the great variety of circumstances that must concur to insure those consequences is a strong argument against making the experiment. — I take it for granted that not less than eighteen or twenty thousand militia would be called, it is uncertain whether so large a body could be collected on the short notice they will receive, it is equally uncertain whether the different states could arm their quotas, and their assembling at the place of rendezvous at or near the time to be fixed, still more so, as it may depend upon circumstances not in their power to foresee or prevent : allowing they came in time and properly armed, the ice or weather may be against our striking a capitol stroke for some time, and the diffi- culty of keeping such a body of militia in the field at that 294 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 , season of the year (when they expected to be discharged in a day or two) is easier to foresee than get over. Upon the whole, I am of opinion that tho' it is necessary for this army to remain somewhere between twenty and thirty miles of Philadelphia this winter, it is not adviseable to attempt collecting a large body of militia together with a view of attacking that place. " I am with the greatest respect Sir " Your most obedient & humb. Serv' "James Irvine. " Whitemarsh, Decern' 4"", 1777" opinion of brigadier-general potter. "Sir " Your excelancey by your letter of yesterday Requested my Sentements on two points — "first the advisability of a winter Campaign, secondly the Practicability of an Attact upon Philadelphia — Ass to the first of these points my Sentements is that a winter cam- paign is Practable. — I confess the verey thought of a win- ter Campaign in our Sircumstances appeers dredfull. But it is liek many other Evels, that befaul us in this life, before we under go them we are Redey to conclud the are unse- portable, but when the are over we dont find them so dred- full as we apprehended. I can from experance say so of a winter Campaign — I have not found it, to have so many Evels attending it as I have hard warmly Represented — But on suposition that those evels were Reale, how shall they be remeded the answer will be by goining into winter Quarters. " I assart winter Quarters is not to be found In the state of Pennsylvania my Reasons for this assartion is, the Capatale is in persession of the Enemy, and there is such large numbers fled from it, and the neghbourhood, adjasant, and the Towns and Viledges along the River Dalawer, that all the Towns and Viledges Back in the Country are full of Refugees all Redey. " What will be dun with those people Turn them out of Dores to make Room for the Solders, god for Bid it — that would be cruilty unaxamplyfied by General How himself. Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. 295 " then it Remains that we must Buld Huts, for our sol- diers go where we will, in this state — and I take it for granted we will not leave the State Entily to the marcey of the enemy. " I would Recommend the taking persision of Wilming- ton and Newport and what other Houses we could find in a Conveneant place in Chester County, and Rais Huts for the Remainder of our Troops, so as to prevent, the enemys fur- idging in that County by this Station being Ocqupied By us, we will get the furridge and provisions that our enemies would otherwise get, and the Back parts of the Countrey will be Resarved for the ensuing Campaign, and in Case the[y3 should be able to force there way into our Countrey in the spring, the furridge and provisions being Acosted [ex- hausted] will retard there march, and will be mutch in our favour that our stars are safe in our Reer — Another advan- tige will follow by Quartering in the aforesaid maner it will be In your power to keep a number of men in Bucks and Philadelphia Countys to prevent the enemys coming out in small partys to force the Inhabitance to Take the Oath of Elegance to the King. Nor will the have it in there power to get that suckuer from the disaticted part of the community, if they are closley shut up in the City. I am Convinced a winter Campaign will give Spirits and Viger to all the Inhabitance of these United States and will do Hon- our to the Army and Good to our cause In genral. — " Ass to the Provibility of an Attact on the City of Phil- adelphia with the aid of a Bodey of Militia, it is unsartain when or at what time it would be possible to cross the Rivers to attact them, for that is the way that appeers most provable to me at present. " If your Enjineers are Confidant that they can set the City on fier from the other side of the Dalawer or Schuyl- kill in case the Ise did not answer I would be for cauling the Militia to aid the Army, if they could not set it on fier, I think we would be verey liable to a disapointment. " I am &c. " Camp, Dec' 4% 1777" " J^" Potter. 296 Defences of Philadelphia in 1777. opinion of colonel lutterloh. " Remarks, " As the present Camp wants Wood & other comfords for the Men, in this Severe Weather, and the Enemys Situ- ation being to strong for an Attaque, I would propose to post our Army into Refreshing Quarters, (as We do abroad in such cases). I have been lucking out where you could forme such a Line, Sufficiently stocked with houses for that purpose & find we would form such a Line between the Two Rivers Schuylkill & Delawar, where we could effect- ually cover our Country, Stores, & provide the Necessary Supplyes easy, as allso prevent the Enemy from doing our Army any material hurt. To do this we should place our Right Wing allongst the Schuylkill & the left on the Dela- var. Our Van Troops in German Town & those bights &c. &c. in [ ] up towards Reading all the Army could lay. Head Quarter to be at Pots Grove which I find a good large Town for it. The great Magazin to be in Reading & in the Trap & Hickery Town the Mooving Magazines & Backerys must be established — to which those places are proper. All that Country is full of Forrage & these Sup- plyes can be got easy as allso over the Schuylkill. The Right Whing Melitia could be over the Schuylkill as from Mottrom's ford upwards I find the Country very advanta- gious with hills where no Surprise could happen to them at the Van postes & in each Division some poles must be fixed on it a Caske with Rich & Combustibles which are fired & lightered directly upon the Allarm Gun from the Commander of the Van, by which all the Troops march to their Larm-postes forwards, pointed out to them by their going into the Quarters. All Commanders do keep in the Nights their Troops in their houses together &c. &c. Over Schuylkill must be Two bridges more one by Wolley forge & one near Potsgrove to get quik Communications. When this is done directly we keep our Men in health & are re- freshed to stand any attaque & our Supplyes can be good & Regulair. " H. E. LUTTERLOH. " Decbr 1" 1777" INDEX. Alarm posts, 296. Ammunition for Fort Mifflin, 113. " Auiphitrite," cannon from, 47. Angeil, Israel, til. Arendt, Baron d', illness of, ^Q, 61, 104, 116. Opinion on Fort Mifflin, 136. Armstrong, John, 45, 118. Opinions of, 185, 226, 265. Army, British, in Philadelphia, 52, 180. Strength of, 52, 183, 207. Movements of, 169, 197. Army, Continental, liable to license, 30. To move southward or to the North River, 41. Condition and strength of, 51, 52, 208. Must not risk destruction, 186. Proposed distribution, 215. In need of rest and care, 219, 237, 257. Arnold, Benedict, 3. Artillery, nature of French, 48. ** Augusta,'* wreck of the, 70, 75, 80, 81. Batteries, floating, 12, 25, 77, 103, 123. On shore, 144. Baylor, George, 68. Beef, trade in, with the enemy, 70, 79. Bell, William Dent, 142. Billingsport, works at, 8. Du Coudray on, 17, 37. Heed's views, 26. Wash- ington's opinion, 31, 34. Ease of de- fending, 44. British at, 55, 60, 66. Suggested assault on, 79. Approved by Washington, 82. Force at, 86, 95. Importance of, 89, 94. Block house, destruction of, 117, 125. Blodget, William, 202 n. Board of War, constitution, 173. Report of, 175. Bounty, height of, 221. Brandywine Mill, 71. Bridges, destruction of, 63. Bridge of boats taken, 67. Building of, inter- rupted, 119. Over the Schuylkill, 129. Bristol, express stationed at, 163. Bunker Hill, 196. Burgoyne, surrender of, 67, 208. Burlington, hospital at, 198, 203. Burnet, J., 202 n. Bush Island Fort, 44. Cadwalader, John, present at councils, 49, 52. Mention of, 143. Opinion of, 281. Campaign, winter, 247, 250, 264, 272. Cannon, loss of, 70. Carlisle, Earl of, 39 n. Carpenter's Island, 69, 77. Carter, Landon, on St. Clair, 4. Chains in river, 96, 107. Channel, closing o(. 128, 134. Charleston, probable object of British, 41. Chesapeake, landing of enemy, 46. Chester, as a point of landing, 23. Chevau.x-de-frise, 6, 15, 32, 43, 97, 112. Clark, John, Jr., 65 n. Classes, division suggested. 289. Clinton, Henry, 208. Clothing for Fort Mifflin, 57, 72, 78, 83, 89. For army, 214, 223. Clow, 68. Clymer, in charge of prisoners, 59. Commissaries denounced, 104. Commissioners in War Office, 176. Comstock, Adam, 59, 200. Congress, Continental, resolutions, 95. Orders inquiry into loss of Fort Mif- flin. 140, 159 n. And Gates, 174. Conway, Thomas, 102 n, 172. Cook, David, 61. Cooper, intelligencer, 146. Cornwallis, raid into New Jersey, 145, 147, 152. Coryell's Ferry, 30. Council of war, June 12th, 2; August 21st, 41 ; September 23d, 49 ; Septem- ber 28th, 51 ; October 29th, 207 ; No- vember 8th, 101 ; November 24th, 177. Indecision of, 177. Cox, 166. Craig, Charles, letters from, 99, 131, 145, 152, 204. Crawford's militia, 85, 100. Crosswick'.-? Creek, fleet secured in, 109. Crum Creek, 23. Currency, depreciation of, 194. Cuylcr, Major, 79. Darby, 128. Darby Creek, 10, 24, 29. Delaware River, width of, 34, 40. Deserters from Continental navy, 127, 140. Rewards for apprehending, 210, Dickinson, Edmund B., 142. Dickinson, Philemon, 50. Proposed de- scent on Staten Island, 117 n. Dis.affected persons, 216. Army, 246, 208. Donaldson, 42. Du Coudray, projects of defence, 12, 42. Offers his services, 37, 47. Survey of river, 40, 46. On fortifying Billings- port, 44. 22 297 298 Index. Du Portail, Chevalier, opinions of, 185 241, 291. Duty and pleasure in army, 222. Easton, stores deposited at, 53. "Effingham," frigate, 58, 205. Eilis, Joseph, 165, 168. Enlistments, voluntary, at an end, 221. Establishment, the new, 1T4. Evans, George, 114, 115. Fat Land Ford, 51. Fenwicli, Captain, 96. Ferries on the Schuylliill, 76. Fire ships, 7, 25, 36. Flag, violation of, 160. Fleet, British, moving to the south, 41. Communication with, SO, 8.3,84. Oper- ation against, 86, 94. Moves up the river, 113, 115. Passes island, 119. Movement of. 144. Fleet, Continental, weakness of, 64. Di- rected to prevent descent on Mud Island, 73. Council, 130. Fleury, journal of siege, 74, SO, 98, 106, 123. Complains of ignorant obstinacy, 75, 82. Rank of, 83, 97. Letters from, 97, 120. Engineer, 106. Wounded. 132. Flour, no magazines, 204. Forman, David, questions Newcomb's rank, 54, 66. Letters from, 54, 65, 90. To CO ojierate with Varnum, 62. Re- signs, 89 n, 93. Fort Island. Reed's opinion of, 27. Knox's opinion, 29. Washington on, 31, 32, 34. Du Coudray favors, 37. Further defences of, 40. Fort Jlercer, 64, 151. Bombproofs at, 81. To be strengthened, 122. Evac- uated, 157, 159. Fort Mifflin, exposed position of, 42. "To be attacked, 55, 60. Reinforcing, 62, 7S. Operations in, 74, Sil. To be att.acked, 9{l, 94, 99. Garrison at, 105. Attack opens, 107, 110. Damao-e to 111, 115, 120, 123. Evacuation con- sidered, 115, 122. Fatigue of garri- son. 120. Removing cannon, 123. Bad condition of, 125, 133. Evacuation suggested, 130, 132. To be held, 134. Needs of, 134. Importance of main- taining. 136. The end approaching, 139. Evacuated, UO. Forts, prejudicial, 10. France, war with, 206. Francis, Tench, 204. Fraser, Simon, 95 n. Frazer, Persifor, 207 n, 211. French Creek, 51. Frigates, condition, of, 58. Securing 101,108. Scuttling of, 113. Used as barracks, 206. Frink, Colonel, 104. Galleys, Continental, condition of 13 Disposition of, 25, 29, 57. Poor' con- duct of, 86, 87. Attack on the " Vi.'i- Iant,"141. Position of, 151. Burned 158, 160, 164. Gates, Horatio, 172. Board of War, 174, 176. George, John, 121. Germantown, 50, 215. Battle of, 134. For winter quarters, 197. Gloucester, enemy occupy, 201. Glover, John, 149. Brigade of' 161. 162 164, 168. ' . . Gordon's Ford, 51. Gray, George, 100. Gray, James, 100. Gray's Ferry, indefensible, 47. Great Manto Creek, 86. Greene, Christopher, on night operations of British, 55. Question of command, 56, 61, 63. Letter from, 139. Greene, Nathanael, opinions of, 5, 177 219, 218. Letters from, 128, 158, 16l' 165, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204. Directed to meet Cornwallis, 164. On public censure, 167. Ordered to join Wash- ington, 198. Grub's Landing, 70, 79. Hamilton, Alexander, 1, 37. Hazelwood, John, to cooperate with the forts, 65. Difference with Smith, 78, 82. To break communication with fleet, 84. Character of, 88. Chain, 107. Letter from, 129. To coiiperate with general plan, 150. Hazleton, bb. Health of men, 233. Heard, John, letter from, 146. Hessians, arms Uken from, 59. Drown- ing of, 100. Highlander's cross Cooper's Ferrv 152 Hog's Island. 16. Hospitals, bad condition of, 168. At Bur- lington and Princeton, 198, 203. Howe, William, sails from New York, 3 21. Objects in going south, 39 'n. Awkward position, 76. Forbids inter- course, 127. Misled as to Greene's force, 157. Intention to attack, 205. Huntington, Jed, 150. Huts, objections to and advantages, 213, 218. Inspector-General, 210. Intelligence, 60, 65 n., 119, 132, 155, 159 165,170,200. Intelligencers, conditions for selecting, 163. Irvine, James, opinions of, 1S8. 243 293. Jealousies, warning against, 64, 82. Jones, Whitehead, 115. Index. 299 Kalb, Baron de, opinions of, 187, 218, 262. Kiss, Hesaisn, 200. Knox, Henry, opinions of, 29, 193, 229. 269. Lafayette, good conduct at Gloucester, 202. Opinions of, 216, 258. Lancaster, as winter quarters, 214, 217, 22.3, 225, 230, 231, 235, 239. Landing places on the river, 22. Le BruD, Augustus, project for strength- ening Fort Mifflin, 43. Lee, Henry, 69, 72, 79, 96, 127. Lee, James, 126, 133. Lindsay, William, 96. Livingston, William, on Newoomb, 66 n. Lloyd, James, 202 n. Long, Island, 196. Loopholes in battery, 107. Loyd's mill, 71. Lutterloh, H. E., letter from, 296. McDougall, Alexander, 50, 52. McLane, Allen, letter from, 155. Marcus Hook, 20, 22. Maxwell, William, opinions of, 189, 227, 267. Men for navy, 58. "Merlin," wreck, 80. Mifflin, Thomas, knowledge of country, 47. Connection with Board of War 173, 175. Militia, of Pennsylvania, 27. Costly for fortifying, 44. Not to be depended on, 60, 243, 251. Delaware destroys pro- vision boats, 119. Prospect of collect- ing, 159, 165. Mortality of, 250. Millstones to bo removed, 71, 77, 85. Montgomery, Hugh, 115. Morris, Robert, tobacco vessel of, 109. Mortars, casting of, 49. Muhlenberg, P., opinions of, 239, 279. Navy Board, letters from, 58, 108, 164, Navy, Continental, reflections on, 159 New Castle, trade at, 80. Newcomb, Silas, question of rank, 54. Refuses to make a return, 65. Livings- ton criticises, 66 n. Force and condi- tion, 89, 1 03. Council of Safety orders, 90. Sent to defend himself, 118 n. New Jersey, militia, 165, 169. Opera- tions in, 187. Nicholas, Captain, 96. North River, defence of, 2, 42. Officers, rules of promotion, 3. Poor quality of, 85. Discontent among, 222, Oysters for Washington, 94 n. Palisades for Fort Mifflin, 75. Paoli, Paschal, 184. Parker's Ford, 51. Paterson, John, ordered to join the army 155. Opinions of 190, 271. Peale Hall destroyed, 160. Pennibecker's Mills, headquarters, 51. Pennsylvania, call for militia, 208 Pest House, 67. Peters, Richard, 173, 175. Philadelphia, importance of, to British, 21. Occupied by the enemy, 52. Con- dition of, 169. Opinions on attacking, 177. British return to, 198, 204. A second proposition to attack, 199 Refugees from, 223, 236. Suggested firing of, 295. " Picket, capture of a, 154. Pinckney, Colonel, 45. Pomeroy, Captain, 206. Poor, Enoch, ordered to join army, 154 Opinions of, 190, 231, 270. Potter, James, ordered to remove mill- stones, 71, 75. Failure, 85. Letters from, 69, 77, 85, 99, 113, 114 118 119, 140, 146, 154, 170. Opinion ol Potts Grove camp, 51. Prices in Philadelphia, 160. Princeton, hospital at, 198, 203. Prisoners, 199. Exchange of, 211. Promotions, 3, 210. Province Island, British operations, 55 Cutting of banks, 64. British works on. 88, 98. Diversion against, 113, 122, 126, 135. Provision, trade in, 70, 77, 97, 100, 296 Public, dissatisfaction of, 177. Pulaski, opinion, 240. Putnam, Israel, ordered to send reinforce- ments, 53. Quakers, Tory, supplies from, 89 Their idol, 160. Quarters, on selecting, 219. Radnor Meeting-House, 68. Rains, heavy, 50, 66. Randolph, Benjamin, 132. Randolph, Lieutenant, 68. Rank in navy, 25. Questions of, 50, 61, 63. Complaints of, 222. Rankin's wager, 114. Rations, regulation of, 211. Read, George, 119. Read, Thomas, 19. Recruiting, effect of winter on, 217. Red Bank, Fort, 9. Wayne onj 20 J'f'^'1'4 opinion, 27. Knox's opinion. -9. Washington advises its occupa- tion, 32. Small garrison, 55, 60. Re- inforcing, 61, 62. Stirling on import- ance of, 68. Defence, 93. Attack on, 114, 147, 149. Bursting of gun, 116 To be maintained, 151, 153. Evacu- ated, 156. Powder strewn at, 156, 163 Destruction of, 169. 300 Index. Redoubts, British, in Philadelphia, 180, ■1Q9 195 Eeed?Jo3eph, letters from, 20, 142, 147. Present at eouncil, 52. On decision upon Red Banli, 151 n. Opinion of, 286. Reed's house, 57. Refugees from Philadelphia, 223, 26b. Relaxation of army, 220. Resignation, alarming spirit ol, /4». Ridley Creek, 23. Robinson's Mill, 71. " Roebuck" forced to retire, 86. Rum wanted, 105. Rumlord, Jonathan, intelligence, 114, 115. Russell, Giles, in command at Fort Mif- flin, 116, 121. St. Clair, Arthur, evacuates Ticonderoga, 4 Present at council, 49. Schuylkill, cro.ssed by British, 60. Win- ter quarters in valley of, 212. Scott, Charles, opinions of, 100, 240, 281. Sellers, Nicholas, on treatment ot pris- oners, 147. Shaw's Mills, 71. Shepard, William, 198. Ship, loss of a British, 114. Shieve, Isr.-vc), 159, 162, 165. Sign i>f the Buck, 50. Smallwood, W., joins the mam army, 50, 52. Opinions of, 191, 228, 208. ■ Smith, Sam., question of command, 6b, 61 63. Letters of, 56, 84, lOo, 106, 111, 117, 120, 135, 142. Desires to be relieved, 105. Wounded, 116, 121. Proposes evacuation, 1 1 7. Smith, Thomas, deserts, 165. Smith (D. A. G.), death of, 08. " Somerset" forced to retire, 86. Stille, Dr., 135n. Stirling, Lord, sends reinforcements, b/. Letters from, 67, 76. Opinions of, 178, 224,256. Stock, removal of, 28. Stores from Red Bank, 151. Success, eflect on public, 167. Sullivan, John, opinions of, liJ, -1-, 244 Surprise, guarding against, 65. Difficul- ties attending a, 181. Survey of country, 37, 40, 46. Talbut, death of, 139. Thayer, Simeon, in command at tort Mit- flin, 126, 127. Wounded, 132. Good conduct of, 144. Thoruton, 155. Timber Creek, 95, 161. Tinicum, 57. Trade with enemy, 127. Tranquillity in winter quarters, 230. Treat, Samuel, killed, 115, 121. Tredyffrin, hutting in, 225. Varnum, Jiimes M., instructions to, 62. At Woodbury, 78. Letters fro"^, '»- 86 95, 102, 110, 115, 116, 120, 125, 126, 132, 133, 140, 143, 153, 156, 15i. Cannonades British ships, 86, 94. Dis- tracted by many calls, 133. Opinions of, 233, 272. " Vigilant," attempt to capture, 140. Villngcs, storming of, 182, 255. Virginia, troops from, 53. Walls, George, 142. Ward, William, 104. War Office, commissioners in, 176. Warren Tavern, 50. Washington, George, letters from, 30, 40, 61, 62^ 63, 64, 70, 71, 72, '"-^Sl- o '10?' 80', 90, 93, 91, 101,108,11.3, 18 22, 134 14.8 149, 150, lol, lo4, 156, 102, 163! 164, 171, 197, 206, 244. On de- fence« 30 Rumor of determination to give battle, 39 n. On jealousies, 82. Alternaiives presented, 167. Conway s cabal, 172. Reputati.m, 194. "Washington" frigate, 68. Wayne, Anihony, not jmned army, oO. To lead an attempt on Province islana, 136 n. Opinionsuf, 19, 191, 231. Let- ter from, 152. Weather, campaign and, 2o3 Weedon, George, letters, 169, 2ob, 2//. Wheatley, 104 n. White Horse Tavern, 51. Wilmington, fortifying, 4^. As winter quartfrs, 213, 218, 224,226,228, 240, Wint'er campaign to be avoided, 214, 236. Winter quarters discussed, 212. Woodbury, 62, 63. _ Woodford, William, opinion of, 19-^, -5J, I 276.