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RKMARKS OF MR. ELY MOORE, 
 
 OF NEW YORK, 
 
 In the House of Representatives, Fe'bruary 4, 1839, 
 
 Oh presenting a remonstrance from citizens of the District of Columbia^ 
 against the reception of abolition petitions, 4*c. 
 
 Mr. Speaker : I present to the House a remonstrance, signed by sora« 
 sieveral hundred citizens of this District, against the reception of petitions 
 from citizens of the States, praying for the abolition of slavery in the Dis- 
 trict of Columbia. The memorialists represent that they regard Congress 
 ■OS the local Legislature of this District, standing in the same relation to the 
 citizens of the District that a State Legislature does to the citizens of a 
 State ; and that they claim the right to advise or instruct the Congress, as 
 their local Legislature, on all subjects relating exclusively to the local 
 interests and municipal institutions of the District, And further — that they 
 regard the interference of persons residing without the limits of the District, 
 by petition or otherwise, as intrusive and umoarrantable ; and claim the 
 paternal protection of Congress against such interference with their rights 
 and interests. I concur with the views of the memorialists, and shall pro- 
 ceed to vindicate them to the best of my abilities. 
 
 I believe, Mr. Speaker, 1 am justified in the declaration tjjat since I have 
 had the honor of a seat in this body, at least one-third of our time has been 
 unnecessarily wasted, or mischievously employed, I will not undertake \m 
 say which, in debating petitions, resolutions, &c. <fcc., touching the abolition 
 of slavery in the District of Columbia. In other words, if I am correct ia 
 the views which I would beg leave to submit to the consideration of the 
 House before I take my seal, we have, for the last four sessions of Con- 
 gress, consumed a large portion of our time in discussing a subject over 
 ti'hich the Federal Legislature, in their federal capacity, have no juris- 
 diction. If this be so, is it not time that we pause ; nay, is it not high 
 time that we so change our course of action on this excitiag and vexa- 
 tious subject, as to reject, outright, all petitions and memorials praying for 
 the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia? It is weli known to 
 the members of this House that all attempts to suppress discussion oft this 
 subject have proved utterly abortive. And so long as we continue to receive 
 petitions from citizens of the States on the subject of slavery, so long will 
 our tune, as heretofore, be occupied in ag-itating this (question. May, it 
 Jllust be appaieut to ail, now that abolitionism has assumed a political char- 
 acter, that this perplexing subject will become, from year to year, more and' 
 
2 
 
 more embarrassing to the Federal Legislature, unless there shall be found 
 sufficient firmness in a majority of its members to shut down the gate at 
 once upon all petitions of an abolition character. And, sir, permit me to 
 say, that I am not altogether confident the American people do not attach 
 undue importance to the " right of petition." when understood in a broad 
 and political sense — in that sense, I mean, in which it has ever been regard- 
 ed in England. When I hear gentlemen on this floor declaim with so 
 much warmth and energy on what they are pleased to call the ^^blessed, 
 sacred, and inestimable right of the people to assemble and to petition 
 for redress of grievances,"! am sometimes inclined to believe tliat their zeal 
 is not exactly according lo knowledge, and that they have not duly consid- 
 ered the character and genius of our free institutions. 
 
 It is true, and to my mind it is as strange as it is true, that the Congress^ 
 of 1789 deemed proper to propose an amendment to the constitution, recog- 
 nising " the right of the people peaeeably to assemble and petition the 
 Government for a redress of grievances.'* The statesmen of that day, as 
 ■Well as those of the present, were too much in the habit of looking to 
 England, not only for precedents, but for political principles and practices. 
 And from that source did they derive their ideas concerning the sanctity 
 and importance of the right of the people to assemble and petition their 
 Government. That the right of petition has ever been held dear and 
 sacred by the oppressed and down trodden subjects of Great Britain, is not 
 to be marvelled at. Nothing could be more natural than that a people, 
 whose political franchises had been wrenched from them by the iron 
 hand of despotic powrcr, should esteem it a boon to be graciously permitted 
 to assemble, and make known their wrongs, and to petition, to supplicate 
 for redress. It was the only avenue to the throne which tyranny had left 
 them ; the only mode to obtain, or rather to solicit, redress, which the sove- 
 reign had vouchsafed to them. The grievances complained of by British 
 subjects — I speak particularly in reference to by-gone times — were mostly 
 general in their effects, and political in their character, and originated with 
 ^e Government. And the only general or political remedy, if remedy it 
 could be called, which the subjects were permitted to apply, was to assem- 
 ble and petition the Crown relative thereto. Hence, ever associated with 
 the ^'■right of petition^'' is the idea of an expression of the public senti- 
 ment, or of the public will. But with what propriety this identical idea 
 has been transferred lo the American constitution, I confess I am at a loss 
 to determine. 
 
 In England, especially in the reign of King Jolm, of "Magna Charta" 
 memory, and .of the first three Henrys, the people loudly and'earnestly clam- 
 ored for the right of petition, because their voice could only reach the 
 throne through the medium of supplication — of petition. It was the ona- 
 
nipotency of the prince on the one hand, and the impotency of the subject 
 on the other. Under such circumstances, it was not only natural but poli- 
 tic for the subject to address the sovereio-n in the abject language of sup- 
 plication — of petition. But, sir, does it become American freemen, the 
 sovereign people — m whom all power resides — to approach their represen- 
 tatives — their agents — their servants — the creatures of their own making — 
 with the abject, servile language of petition, prayer, supplication ? No, sir, 
 No ! Thank God ! it is the peculiar province, the proud privilege of the 
 American people, to speak to those in power, on all subjects of general po- 
 litical mo?nent, in the potent and authoritative language of instruction — of 
 dictation. And who will affirm that the right to instruct, to dictate, does 
 not supersede the poor privilege to petition ? What, sir; shall it be deemed 
 a privilfige for the creator to supplicate the creature ? The master to pe- 
 tition the servant 7 Why, sir, this would be inverting the order of things 
 with a witness. I hold that it is not befitting the American people to 
 address the language of prayer — of petition — of supplication — to any power 
 save to that of Almighty power. When freemen pray, let them supplicate 
 the only power superior to their own — the God of the Universe ! 
 
 But, sir, it is not my intention to dwell longer, at this time, on this sub- 
 ject. On some future day I may enter fully into a discussion of this ques- 
 tion. It shall now be my object to prove — admitting the right of petition, as 
 1 now do, in all its length and breadth — that the citizens of the States have 
 no right to petition Congress to abolish slavery in the Di.strictof Columbia. 
 Let no man charge me with a desire to strangle the right of petition in order 
 to make out my case. I hold that I am not obnoxious to the charge. I ara 
 the last man that would attempt, by word or deed, directly or indirectly, to 
 embarrass or abridge the Legitimate exercise of any valuable right. Nor, 
 sir, would I bring any important privilege into disrepute or contempt by 
 the abuse of it. And I contend that it is as much an abuse of this privi- 
 lege ior the citizens of the States, and especially the non-slaveholding 
 States, to petition the American Congress to abolish slavery in the District 
 of Columbia, as it would be for such citizens to petition the Parliament of 
 Great Britain, or the French Chamber of Deputies, for a like purpose ; or 
 as it would be for the citizens of Maine to petition the Legislature of Vir- 
 o-inia to abolish slavery within the limits of that State. No man, in the 
 possession of his wits, having the least acquaintance with the character of 
 our Government, will assert tliat it would be a denial of the right of peti- 
 tion, for the Legislature of Virginia to reject petitions from the citizens of 
 the State of Maine praying for the abolition of shivery. And if it would not 
 be a denial of the right of petition in this case, how can it be a denial of that 
 right for the Legislature of this District to reject petitions of like import 
 Uom citizens of the States ? Would it not be equally proper for the citizens 
 
4 
 
 <»f the District of Columbia to petition the Legislature of Massachusetts to 
 pass laws for the relief and melioration of the condition of the laborers em- 
 ployed in the manufactories of that State, as for the citizens of Massachu-. 
 setts to petition Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia ? If 
 a rejection of petitions would not be a denial of the right of petition in the 
 one case, how could it be so in the other ? For 1 contend, and shall show- 
 most conclusively, that the citizens of the District of Columbia have the 
 same right to interfere in the internal police of Massachusetts, that the citi- 
 zens of Massachusetts have to interfere in the internal police of the District 
 of Columbia. 
 
 It will be perceived by the House, from what I have stated, that I regard 
 Congress as the local Legislature of this District ; standing in the same re- 
 lation, in one respect, to the citizens of the District, as do the State Legis- 
 latures to the citizens of the States. Entertaining this opinion, then, I con- 
 tend tiiat the rejection by Congress of petitions, coming from citizens of 
 any of the States, praying for the abolition of slavery in the District of 
 Columbia, is no more a denial of the right of petition than it would be for 
 Ihe Legislature of Maryland or of Arkansas to reject petitions coming from 
 citizens of Vermont or Rhode Island, praying for the abolition of slavery. 
 It will be conceded by all — at least by all professing the Democratic faith 
 — that " every free citizen must he represented ;" and that the power 
 of the representative is derived from the will of the represented. 
 This elementary principle of the American constitution forms the basis 
 of all legislation. This being so, it follows, that the free citizens of this 
 District " must be ropresented." Previous to the cession of the " ten 
 miles square," by the States of Maryland and Virginia, the citizens of 
 these States residing within the present limits of this District were re- 
 presented by the respective Legislatures of these States, And as neither 
 Virginia nor Maryland had the power so far to disfranchise their citizens as 
 to deprive them of " the right to be represented,^^ that right, of course, re- 
 mains unimpaired. The States making the " cession" could delegate no 
 power to Congress which they themselves did not possess ; consequently. 
 Congress can exercise no power by virtue of the "acts of cession," which 
 it would not have been competent/or those States to have exercised. The 
 citizens of the District of Columbia, therefore, like all other free citizens, are 
 entitled to be represented. And as they are not represented by the States 
 which made the " cjession," they must, necessarily, be represented by Con- 
 gress, to whom the " cession" was made. But what must be regarded as 
 decisive on this point, is the fact that Congress may tax the citizens of the 
 District of Coin mbja, just as a State Legislature may tax the citizens of a 
 State. Sir, the character and genius of our free government preclude, re- 
 pudiate, and abhor the idea of taxation without representation. Sir, the 
 
6 
 
 Congress of the United States are the representatives of the citizens of the 
 District of Columbia. Congress, as a legislative body, exercise two species 
 of legislative power over this District ; the one Federal, the other municipal. 
 The first, limited as to its objects, but co-extensive with the Union. The last, 
 unlimited as to objects, but inoperative beyond the territorial limits of this 
 District. The relation in which Congress stands to the citizens of the Dis- 
 trict, therefore, is two fold. First, as the representatives of the whole Union ; 
 eind second, as the local Legislature of the District. In the latter capacity, 
 Congress stand precisely in the same relation to the citizens of the District, 
 as the State Legislatures do to the citizens of the States ; — and, consequently, 
 are as much bound, in all their acts affecting merely this District, to obey 
 the will of the people residing within the limits of the District, as are State 
 Legislatures to obey the will of the citizens of the States. Without the 
 consent of the people of the District, therefore. Congress have no right 
 to abolish slavery within its limits. Congress, as the Federal Legislature, 
 acting in their federative capacity, have no more right to abolish slavery 
 in the District of Columbia than they have to abolish slavery m the 
 State of South Carolina. If Congress possess the power at all, they 
 can only exercise it as the local Legislature of the District, and in pur- 
 suance of the will of the citizens residing within the limits of the Dis- 
 trict. To affirm the contrary, to assert that the municipal institutions, the 
 domestic or local rights and interests of the citizens of the District of Colum- 
 bia are subject to the arbitrary will and control ©f the citizens of remote, 
 distinct, and independent States or communities, or. which is in effect the 
 same, of Congress, is to assert that the people of the t)istrict do not possess 
 the right of self-government, and that the power of Congress over them 
 and theirs is plenary and absolute. Who will avow this openly ? Who 
 will say, in direct terms, that Congress, or the citizens of remote States, 
 through their immediate Representatives in Congress, may rightfully and 
 constitutionally interfere with and control the whole internal police of the 
 District, in defiance of the wishes and regardless of the remonstrances of 
 its citizens? Who, 1 ask, will openly confess himself the advocate of 
 doctrines and principles so alien to the character and genius of our Gov- 
 ernment, so fraught with tyranny and despotism, and so utterly repugnant 
 to the great principle upon which our institutions are founded— the right 
 of the people to be represented, or, in other words, the right of the people 
 to self government? Let him who would strike at the rights of a com- 
 munity remember that the blow would be equally dangerous to liberty as if 
 aimed at the rights of individuals. I shall be told, of course, that by the 
 16th article of the 8th section of the constitution of the United States, Con- 
 gress have " exclusive jurisdiction over the ten miles square." Well, sir, 
 how are we to understand this exclusive legislative power ? Why, sir, in 
 
the firist place, it was evideBtly the intention of the framers of the constitu- 
 tion to exclude from the territory embracing the seat of the Federal Legis- 
 lature the jurisdiction of the States, which should cede such territory, as well 
 as all other State authority. And, in the second place, that Congress, as the 
 local Legislature of such District, should assume the jurisdiction and exer- 
 cise the legislative powers surrendered up by the States which made the 
 "cession;" and Congress, in pursuance of this right of " exclusive juris- 
 diction," exercise the same legislative functions over the District of Colum- 
 bia, when acting in their local capacity, that the State Legislatures do over 
 the States. When Congress, therefore, act in pursuance of their exclusive 
 legislative power over the " ten miles square," they abandon their national 
 functions, and assume the functions of a local or State Legislature j and 
 all the laws passed by Congress when acting in this local capacity are 
 limited in their operation to the territory comprising the " ten miles square ;" 
 just as the laws enacted by a State Legislature, are inoperative beyond the 
 limits of such State. In other wordg, laws passed by Congress in their 
 local legislative capacity, are no more obligatory beyond the bounds of this 
 District, than are laws passed by the Legislature of Maryland, for example, 
 binding beyond the limits of Maryland. In this opinion I am fully sus- 
 tained by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. The 
 court decided that the tickets in a lottery authorized by a law of Congress 
 within the District of Columbia, could not be vended in the State of Vir- 
 ginia, in contravention of the laws of that State. (Cohens versus Virginia.) 
 The general or national powers which Congress exercises over, and 
 which are binding iipojj, the States, were delegated bi/ the States ; and 
 the powers of " exclusive legislation," which Congress exercises over the 
 District of Columbia, and which are effective only within the District, were 
 derived from the States of Maryland and Virginia, by virtue of certain acts 
 in which they ceded to Congress this District. Had Congress been in- 
 vested with no other power than that of exclusive legislation over the " ten 
 miles square," could there be any question with regard to the extent of 
 their power ? Or would it have been alleged in that case that all laws 
 passed by Congress were essentially national in their character, and operative 
 without, as well as within, the limits of the District .^ 1 presume not, sir; 
 because the power of exclusive legislation which Congress exercise over 
 the District of Columbia can be of no greater extent than if such power 
 had been the only one conferred. Congress cannot exercise exclusive le- 
 gislative power over the States, because of the reservation of power to the 
 States, or to the people thereof. Even over the " ten miles square" the 
 power of Congress is limited by the acts of " cession." With what pro- 
 priety, then, can it be contended that because a law is passed by Congress 
 it is, therefore, a law of the United States, and of universal obligation? 
 
No, sir ; whenever Congress legislate in virtue of their local and exclusive 
 jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, they act as a local or municipal 
 Legislature, and the acts passed by them, in that capacity, are limited ia 
 their operation to the territory of the District. A law of Congress to hav& 
 the effect of a law of the United States, must be passed in execution of 
 some of the federal powers, or, in other words, ia pursuance of delegated 
 power. But all laws of Congress passed in virtue of the power to exercise 
 exclusive legislation over the District of Columbia, are local or municipsd 
 jn their character, and cannot operate extra-territorial! y, or beyond the lim- 
 its of the District. True, there are certain laws passed by Congress 
 xvhich have a local reference to this District, and which proceed from the 
 delegated powers with which Congress are invested. Acts appropriating 
 moneys for the erection of public buildings, &c., are of this description. 
 These acts, although local in their immediate operation, have reference to 
 national objects, are passed in virtue of the general legislative powers, and 
 are general or national in their character. 
 
 Congress can exercise no power by virtue of the 16th article of the 8th 
 section of the constitution over the District of Columbia, that it would not 
 have been competent for Maryland and Virginia to have exercised prior to 
 making the cession. The " exclusive powers of legislation," therefore, pos- 
 sessed by Congress over the " ten miles square," are of the kind which 
 were never delegated to the General Government, but reserved to the 
 States. To say that the power of exclusive legislation conferred upon Con- 
 gress by the 16lh article of the 8th section of the constitution, embraced any 
 of the general powers contained in any of the fifteen preceding articles O-f 
 the 8th section, would be to charge the framers of the constitution with 
 granting a repetition of powers by distinct articles. This is not to be pre- 
 sumed. Neither is it to be presumed that the framers of the constitution, con- 
 ferred upon Congress Federal powers concurrent with existing State pow- 
 ers. No, sir ; the framers of the American constitution, as wise and patriotic 
 men, conferred no powers upon Congress that were calculated to beget strife 
 and contention, and instead of promoting, mar the harmony which ever 
 ought to subsist between the National and State Governments. And 
 equally wise and cautious were they in combining the federal and local 
 or State powers in such manner as that Congress, in discharging the double 
 functions of a Federal and State Legislature, should not confound, nor pro- 
 duce a collision between these powers or functions. Thus Congress, I 
 repeat, as the General or Federal Legislature, exercise the general powers 
 delegated by the States ; and as a local or State Legislature, exercise, from 
 time to time, the reserved and undelegated powers pertaining to the States. 
 In the former capacity, Congress may declare war, or make peace, " coin, 
 money and regulate the value thereof," (fee, but cannot legislate with r»- 
 
s 
 
 gard to the local wants and interests of this District. But in the iaiter ca- 
 pacity, Congress may incorporate companies, build bridges, open streets — 
 in a word, supply the wants and meet the exigencies of the District, pre- 
 cisely in the same manner that a State Legislature may do with regard to a 
 State. And the laws passed by Congress in this State or local capacity^ 
 are necessarily limited in their operation to the District of Columbia, pre- 
 cisely as a State law is confined in its operation to the State limits. If the 
 laws passed by Congress in their local legislative capacity had the effect of 
 United States laws, the banks of this District would be United States banks, 
 and the insurance companies United States insurance companies. 
 
 The District of Columbia is, in all respects, whether as a sovereignly or 
 as a community, as much independent of the Federal Legislature, when 
 acting in their federal capacity, as are Georgia and North Carolina, or as 
 those States are of each other. The Federal Legislature, therefore, as such, 
 possess no more power over the subject of slavery within the limits of this 
 District, than they do over that subject within the limits of those States. 
 Consequently, Congress are no more bound to receive petitions from the 
 citizens of the Slates praying for the abolition of slavery in the District of 
 Columbia, than the Legislature of a sovereign and independent State would 
 be bound to receive petitions from the citizens of another sovereign and 
 independent State ; or, than the Legislature of a State would be bound to 
 receive petitions from the citizens of the District of Columbia, touching the 
 domestic interests and internal police of such State. Hence the popular 
 fallacy with regard to the right of petition. The question is not as to the 
 'Tight of petition, but ns to the destination or direction which petitions 
 should take. Admitting that the citizens of a State have a right to petition 
 their Legislature, touching any subject of grievance, over which the Legis- 
 lature may have jurisdiction: and that the citizens of the United States 
 have also a right to petition the Federal Legislature on all subjects of a 
 federal character, does it Ibllow, therefore, that the citizens of one State 
 have a right to petition the Legislature of another State, concerning its do- 
 mestic institutions and internal police? Or, that citizens of the United 
 States have a right to petition the Federal Legislature on a subject that is 
 not federal, but strictly local in its character, and with which the peti- 
 tioners have no right to intermeddle? Certainly not. And as the citi- 
 zens of Vermont or Connecticut, for example, have no more right to inter- 
 fere with the domestic institutions of the District of Columbia than they 
 have with the domestic institutions of the State of Maryland or of Virginia — 
 ■which is just none at all — they might, with the same propriety, petition 
 ihe Legislatures of those States to abolish slavery within their limits, as to 
 petition the local Legislature of this District to abolish slavery within »V^ 
 lirriits. And as it would not, and could not, be considered a denial of the 
 
Tight of petition on the part of the Legislature of either of those States to 
 reject such petitions, so neither could it be regarded as a denial of such right 
 for Congress, the local Legislature of the District of Columbia, (and it has 
 been already shown that it is only in this local capacity that Congress can 
 have jurisdiction over the subject at-all,) to reject similar petitions from citi- 
 zens of those or any other States. It matters not, therefore, whether Con- 
 gress have the power to abolish slavery within the District of Columbia or 
 not, as Congress is not bound, in either case, to receive petitions from the citi- 
 zens of the Slates touching the subject of slavery within this District — suchr 
 citizens having no right to interfere with this, or any other subject of in- 
 ternal police within the District. What, sir ; could it be regarded as a de- 
 nial of the legitimate exercise cf the right of petition on the part of Con- 
 gress, to reject petitions from citizens of the States praying Congress to 
 narrow or widen the streets in this city, or in the city of Georgetown, or 
 of Alexandria, or to repeal the charters of the incorporated companies 
 within this District, or otherwise to change, alter, or in any way to affect 
 the municipal institutions or internal police of the District ? No man, I ap- 
 prehend, will so allege. And why not ? For the reason, sir, that the 
 petitioners would have no right or uiithority to intermeddle with the local 
 rights and interests of an independent community — a community as abso- 
 lutely independent of the petitioners, in all the respects just mentioned, as 
 are the municipalities of Prance ? And as the institution of slavery in the 
 District of Columbia, as well as in the slave States, is, in all respects, 
 and to all intents and purposes, local in its character. Congress are no more 
 bound to entertain petitions from citizens o^the States, asking for its abo- 
 lition, than if such petitions related to the municipal institutions of a foreign 
 country. If Congress would not be bound to receive petitions in the one 
 case, they would not in the other. And, consequently, if it would not be 
 a denial of the right of petition to reject, in the one case, it would not be so 
 in the other. I repeat, then, that whether Congress have the power to 
 abolish slavery within the District of Columbia, or not, it cannot be re- 
 garded as a denial of the right of petition for Congress to reject petitions 
 from citizens of the States, praying for the exercise of such right, no more 
 than it would be for them to reject petitions from the subjects of a foreign 
 power, asking for similar action. Were the institution of slavery, in the 
 District of Columbia, general and national in its character, instead of being, 
 as it is, strictly and essentially local and municipal, then would the citizens 
 of the States, I grant, be authorized to petition the National Legislature con- 
 cerning it ; and the National Legislature, recognising the right of petition, 
 would be bound to receive such petitions, if couched in respectful lan- 
 guage. But under our existing form of government, and under existing 
 circumstances, Congress are not bound, and in truth have no legitimate 
 
w 
 
 right, to entertain petitions from individuals residing without the Umits of 
 this District, touching the abohtion of slavery, or any other subject of a 
 local and municipal character, affecting, merely, the citizens residing within 
 the District. 
 
 Such being my views, then, I can but regard those petitioners — residents 
 of the States — praying Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Colum- 
 bia, as guilty of an impertinent and unwarrantable interference with the 
 rights, privileges, and interests of a free and independent community. And 
 so long, sir, as 1 entertain my present opinions, I shall feel constrained to 
 reprobate any action on the part of Congress which may be calculated to 
 give countenance and encouragement to such mischievous and audacious 
 interference. Sir, by receiving these petitions, we tacitly yield our assent 
 to acts of aggression on the rights of those whom it is our peculiar duty and 
 province to defend and protect. 
 
 Let Congress promply reject all petitions, emanating from citizens of the 
 States, praying for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and 
 this corroding and wide-spreading evil will be speedily arrested. The halls 
 of Congress, sir, have been converted into abolition laboratories, where this 
 accumulating mischief is compounded and refined, where it receives its 
 point and potency, and whence it is fulminated upon the country. 
 
 But again, sir. Congress have no constitutional authority to abolish slavery 
 in the District of Columbia, without the consent of the slave owners. The 
 constitution declares that " no person shall be deprived of his property 
 without due process of law ; and that private property shall not be taken 
 for public use without compensation." An attempt to render this language 
 of the constitution more explicit or more emphatic by any comments of 
 mine, could but be regarded as a reflection upon the intelligence of this 
 House. If Congress cannot constitutionally take private property, except 
 it be for public use, and only then by making compensation to the owners 
 thereof, and this is the only true and legitimate construction, by what au- 
 ithority can they wrest from citizens of this District their private property? 
 Such acts unquestionably would be without the shadow of constitutional 
 warrant. The advocates of abolitionism, therefore, in order to surmount 
 this constitutional impediment to their schemes, must show, in the first 
 place, that the citizens of the District of Columbia constitute no part of 
 the citizens of the United States ; and, in the second place, that slave proper- 
 ty is not private property. Whenever they shall successfully do this, I will 
 admit that the American constitution affords no guarantee against the vio- 
 lation of the rights of property, and that Congress may, constitutionally, 
 abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, without the consent of the slave 
 owners ; but not till then. 
 
 If the citizens of this District may have one species of properly wrested 
 
11 
 
 from them by the high hand of power, what security hare they that their 
 property of whatsoever kind will not share a similar fate ? But, sir, this sup- 
 position cannot be tolerated for a moment. The doctrine strikes at the very 
 root of all free government, and is, to all intents and purposes, subversive 
 of the social compact. In the language of the Supreme Court : "There 
 are acts which the Federal or State Legislatures camioi do, without ex- 
 ceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free Re- 
 publican Government, which will determine and overrule an apparent and 
 flagrant abuse of legislative power ; as to authorize manifest injustice by 
 positive law, or to take away that security for personal liberty or private 
 property, lor the protection whereof the Gov^nment was established. An act 
 of the Legislature, contrary to the great first principles of the social compact^ 
 cannot he considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. The 
 obligation of a law, in governments established on express compact, and 
 on republican principles, must be determined by the nature of the power 
 on which it is founded. A few instances will suffice to explain. A law 
 that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or that was in violation of 
 an existing law ; a law that destroys or impairs the obligation of the law- 
 ful private contracts of citizens ; a law that makes a man a judge in his 
 own case ; or a law that takes property from A, and gives it to B. It is 
 eigainst all reason and justice for a people to intrust a Legislature with such 
 powers, and therefore it cannot be presumed that they have done it. The 
 Legislature may enjoin or permit, forbid or punish ; they may declare new 
 crimes, aad establish rules of conduct for future cases ; but they cannot 
 change innocence into guilt, or punish innocence as a crime, or violate the 
 rights of an antecedent lawful private contract, or the rights of private 
 property. To maintain that our Federal or State Legislatures possess 
 such powers, even if they had not been expressly restrained, would be a 
 apolitical heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free Republican Govern- 
 ment.^^ The principles here affirmed by the Supreme Court are unques- 
 tionably sound, and they apply as well to the citizens of this District, as to 
 those of the States. Congress, therefore, can do no act affecting the rights 
 of property in this District, that they are prohibited to do in the States. 
 With v/hat propriety, then, can it be contended that Congress are bound 
 to receive petitions on a subject upon which they have no constitutional 
 right to act ? Suppose individuals should petition Congress to pass a " law 
 tespecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
 thereof," or, to " abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press," would 
 it, or could it be regarded as a denial of the right of petition for Con- 
 gress to reject such petitions 7 No sane man will so aver ; because the 
 petitioners would, in effect, require Congress to violate the constitution. 
 And would it not be equally a violation of the constitution for Congress to 
 
pass an act depriving individuals of their property without " dfte procera 
 of law?" or to take "private property" without "just compensation?" Most 
 unquestionably it would. Let us consider, then, for a moment, the nature 
 of the demand made upon us by the abolitionists. And let us see whether 
 that demand be in accordance with their sturdy pretensions to pieti/ and 
 patriotism or not. They petition, besiege, and implore us to do what ? 
 Why, sir, to repudiate the principles of the Federal compact — to violate the 
 national faith — to violate the rights of private property — to trample upon 
 the constitution, which we have sworn to support, and consequently to 
 pollute and blacken our souls with the terrific crime of perjury f Yes,^^jL 
 all this do the abolitionists require at our hands, when they ask us to aBbli§jfi 
 slavery — " as a great moral evil" — in the District of Columbia. 
 
 But this is not all. The abolitionists design to eifect the abolition of 
 slavery in the States, also : and it is worse than idle — it is dishonest and 
 insolently hypocritical in them to pretend that their schemes and efforts are 
 limited to the District of Columbia and the Territories. Every body knows, 
 and many of the abolitionists themselves confess, that such is not the fact. 
 It is as much their intention to accomplish the abolition of slavery in the 
 States, as in the Territories, or in this District. Such being the case, then, 
 let us examine, for a moment, the nature and tendency of the abolition 
 movement. It will be acknowledged by all, that, prior to the organization 
 of the Federal Government, the States were, in all respects, and to all in- 
 tents and purposes, sovereign and independent States or nations, and, as 
 such, no one State of course could interfere with the rights or internal 
 police of another State, without a violation of international law. An 
 attempt, therefore, on the part of Massachusetts, for ifistance. to abolish 
 slavery in Georgia, would have been truly and properly regarded by Georgia 
 as an aggression upon her national rights, an assault upon her State sove- 
 reignty, and as a virtual denial of her independency as a State or nation. 
 What would have been true theii, would be equally true 71010. Aay interfer- 
 ence on the part of Massachusetts with the subject of slavery in Georgia, is 
 as clearly wrong— as much an infraction of international law — since the for- 
 mation of the Federal Government, as it would have been prior to that event. 
 The States, under the constitution, are as essentially and as absolutely sove- 
 reign — where their sovereignty is not limited by the constitution — as they 
 were before the formation of the constitution. And as slavery exists in the 
 States — not by virtue of the constitution, but by virtue of State sovereignty 
 alone — it necessarily follows that it is without and beyond the power of the 
 Federal Government to abolish it. Congress have no more right to interfere 
 with the institution of slavery in the States than they have to interfere with 
 the internal institutions of a foreign power. The power to abolish slavery iri 
 the States never having been delegated to Congress cannot be exercised by 
 
13 
 
 (Songrem without a violation of the Federal constitution. On the subject 
 oi slavery, the States are not only independent of each other, but also of 
 the General Government. The States having reserved to themselves all 
 the rights of sovereignty — not directly and explicitly conceded to the 
 Federal Government — they are just as free to exercise those reserved rights 
 as if such Government had never been established. This proposition I 
 hold to be self-evident. The right to hold slaves not having been ceded to 
 the General Government, but retained by the States, it follows, that an 
 attempt on the part of the citizens of the non-slaveholding States, or of 
 Congress, to interfere with the institution of slavery in any of the slave- 
 bolding States, would be a violation of the rights of sovereign and inde- 
 pendent Stales or nations, and, of consequence, in direct and positive con- 
 travention of international law. 
 
 The abolitionists, by warring against the rights and sovereignty of the 
 States, encourage a violation of the national faith, sanction the infraction 
 of law, and endanger the stability and integrity of the Federal Union. 
 '' In taking this ground (to adopt the language of one of the most original"^ 
 thinkers and energetic writers of the age*) they — the abolitionists — set the 
 law at defiance, and are either a mob or a band of insurrectionists. In 
 taking this ground they justify all the lawless violence against which they 
 have so vehemently declaimed. If one class of the community may set 
 the laws at-defiance, why may not another ? If the abolitionists may set at 
 nought the international law, which gives the slave-holding States the 
 exclusive jurisdiction of the slave question, why may not other citizens 
 5ay they have a right, by mob law, to prevent them, if they can, from 
 doing it ? It were not difficult to convict the abolitionists of preaching the 
 very doctrines the raobocrats attempt to reduce to practice. They ought 
 not, therefore, to think it strange that they have been but in too many 
 mstances the victims of lawless violence. When a portion of the com- 
 munity take it into their heads that they are wiser than the law, and com- 
 mence the performance of acts in contravention of law, they ought to be 
 aware that they open the door to every species of lawless violence, unchain 
 the tiger, and must be answerable for the consequences." 
 
 What must be the certain and^inevitable tendency of the abolition move- 
 ment, and what its moral and political results, if its progress shall be on- 
 ward and its march be throughout the Union ? The consequences, alas ! 
 must be but too apparent and appalling to all reflecting men — to ail who 
 prize the Union — all who love America. The efforts of the abolitionists, 
 whether triumphant or not, cannot fail to rock the battlements, if not rive 
 the foundations of the Republic. In the name of liberty, they seek to over- 
 throw her last fortress, — the American constitution. In the name of patriot- 
 
 * O, A. Brownson, editor of ihe Boston duarterly Review. 
 
14 
 
 ism, they strive to revolutionize and uproot the very foundations of our 
 Federal system. And in the name of humanity, they would tear down> 
 the prop and pillar of the last fond hope of human kind — the sovereignty 
 of these United States ! Such is the political character and tendency of 
 the abolition movement. But this is not all. There are fearful moral evils 
 involved in the designs of the abolitionists — the violation of law and of 
 plighted faith. Nay more — allied to abolitionism is blind, reckless, feverish 
 fanaticism. The wild, enthusiastic, and impetuous spirit which kindled 
 the fires of Smithfield, and strewed the plains of Palestine with the corses, 
 of the Crusaders, stands — with lighted and uplifted torch — hard by the 
 side of abolitionism, ready to spread conflagration and death around the 
 land. 
 
 But to return to the subject of slavery, and of the right of petition, as 
 relates to the District. The question will be asked, no doubt, if the citi- 
 zens of the States have no legitimate right to petition Congress on the sub- 
 ject of slavery in the District of Columbia, and if Congress are not bound 
 to receive such petitions, why it is that so many thousands have signed pe- 
 titions of this character ? The reason is obvious, sir. The prime movers 
 in abolition proceedings, and the great body of the intelligent signers to 
 abolition petitions, belong to the Federal school in politics. They are con- 
 solidationists, and repudiate the doctrine of State rights. They regard the 
 powers of the Federal Government as omnipotent. Hence they believe 
 the Federal Legislature not only have the power to abolish slavery in the 
 District of Columbia, but also in the States. The Federal or National 
 Bank party can believe nothing short of this. Sir, this whole abolition 
 movement had its origin in a Federal heresy. Abolitionism is the veritable 
 offspring of Federalism. It looks to centralization for the reahzation of its 
 hopes, and the consummation of its purposes. Withdraw from abolition- 
 ism the sustaining arm of its parent Federalism, and it inevitably becomes 
 helpless, and in despair falls prostrate in the dust. In confirmation of what 
 I have just stated, I would appeal to facts — notorious, undeniable, incon- 
 trovertible facts. I would appeal to the known and acknowledged princi- 
 ples of the Federal party. I would appeal to the journals of Congress — to 
 the recorded votes of the? members of this House on all test questions touch- 
 ing the subject of abolition. I would appeal to the history of the recent 
 elections, and especially to the election in the State of New York, where it 
 is well known every abolitionist and free negro voted the Federal or Whig 
 ticket. Nay, more. I would appeal to the ten thousand abolition petitions 
 with which this hall has been flooded for tlie lasl four years. I will hazard 
 the declaration, and I challenge and defy successful contradiction, that 
 among the hundred thousand individuals that have signed petitions, praying 
 lor the abolitioa of slavery in the District of Columbia, there are not one 
 
15 
 
 hundred who are known to be triendly to the present administration. Wh© 
 will, who can, who dare deny the trnth of this assertion? 
 
 If the Federal Leo^islature have power under the constitution to " abridge 
 the freedom of speech, or of the press," as has not only been contended for, 
 hut the exercise of such power actually sanctioned by the Federal party in 
 the time of the elder Adams, and if they may charter a national bank, as is 
 also contended, and delegate to such bank or corporation the power of legisla- 
 tion, in the grant of creating, at pleasure, other banks, and other directors, 
 within any of the States or Territories of this Union, in defiance of the wishes, 
 and in contravention of the laws of such States or Territories,* why, I would 
 ask, should they not also claim the power to abolish slavery, not only in the 
 District of Columbia, but also in the States ? To contend that Congress 
 have the constitutional power to do the first named acts, and 7iot the latter. 
 Would be sheer and gratuitous nonsense. I repeat, therefore, that the only- 
 hope of the abolitionists is in the ultimate triumph of the Federal party, and 
 of Federal principles. So long as the Democratic or States Rights party 
 shall maintain the ascendancy, the efforts of the abolitionists will be com- 
 paratively innocuous. But whenever the political power of this country 
 shall be swayed by Federal hands, the design;; of the abolitionists will well 
 nigh have reached their consummation. Shall 1 be told that the Federalists 
 are not all abolitionists ! This may be partially true. But then, are not 
 all abolitionists necessarily Federalists ? How can they expect to accom- 
 dlish their object — the general abolition of slavery — but through the Fede- 
 ral power, and in pursuance of Federal principles ? Certainly they cannot 
 bo so grossly ignorant as to suppose that the Democratic State Rights doc- 
 trine of strict construction would be favorable to their views, or that it 
 would be possible to achieve their object through the influence of Demo- 
 cratic principles, or by virtue of Democratic legislation. But again : if the 
 Federalists are not now all abolitionists, the time will soon come when they 
 must become so as a "party ^ or otherwise fall into a contemptible and hope- 
 less minority. Which will they do? Will they repudiate abolitionism and 
 abolitionists, and. by so doing, insure th^ir own political destruction? Or 
 will they maintain and strengthen the league already formed with the abo- 
 litionists, in the hope of securing and confirming their political existence 
 and ascendancy ? Which will they do, I ask ? Why, sir, if we shall judge 
 of their future course by their past conduct, it will be no difficult matter to 
 determine what they will do. They will do, as they ever have done, sacri- 
 fice every principle of honor, of virtue, and of patriotism, if it be necessary 
 to enable them to direct and control the political power and destinies of the 
 republic. When, let me ask, have the Federal party ever shown by their 
 acts that their love of country was paramount to their love of power? 
 
 ♦ See charter of late United States Bank, section 14, 
 
16 
 
 Kever, sir, never ! But this is not all. The coalition between the Ped^al- 
 ists and abolitionists was not only to have been expected, for the reasons 
 already stated, but from considerations of still greater pith and moment. 
 In all civilized communities, the two extremes of society — the affluent 
 and the breadless, the powerful and the impotent — come together and war 
 upon the centre — the intermediate classes. Such ever has been, and ever 
 will be, the case. It is, in fact, a law of humaa society ; and well do the 
 Federal party understand the operations of this law. Hence their constant 
 efforts to make the poor poorer, and the feeble m«re impotent. And hence 
 it has ever been ihc policy, the aim and object, atmn Federal aristocracy of 
 this country, to impoverish, depreciate, and degrade the Democracy ; es- 
 pecially that portion who, in obedience to the mandate of Heaven, " eat 
 their bread in the sweat of their face." To accomplish this, their purpose, 
 the Federalists have availed themselves of every means in their power. 
 They have stigmatised the Democracy as infidels, levellers, agrarians. 
 They have done more. They have vitiated the elective franchise by poli- 
 tical coercion, by bribery, and corruption. And more than all, they have 
 defrauded the Democracy of their equal political rights by means of une- 
 qual, unjust, and exclusive legislation. And now, in order to render the 
 condition of the laboring classes of the north and east still more dependant 
 and depressed, the Federal party have joined the abolitionists for the pur- 
 pose of conferring upon the black laborer noininal freedom., and upon the 
 white laborer virtual bondage ! Yes, sir, for the especial purpose of hum- 
 bhng and degrading the Democracy, have the Federal party of the north and 
 east joined in the abolition crusade : and whenever their object shall be at- 
 tained and the southeru negro ahail be brought to compete With the north- 
 ern white man in the labor market, the moral and political character, the 
 pride, power, and independence, of the latter, are gone forever, and Federal- 
 ism will have realized its fondest and most cherished hopes. But let me 
 tell you, sir, the Democracy of the north and east are not unmindful of 
 passing events. Since abolitionism assumed a political character they have 
 watched the movements of the Federal-abohtion party with deep concert^- 
 ment. They are conscious of the approaching danger, and are coolly and 
 ^hberately preparing to face it. Yes, sir, whenever the Democracy observe 
 the Federal party prosecuting a political measure with zeal and vigor, as 
 they now do abolitionism, they involuntarily, instinctively gather up their 
 energies to meet and repel approaching mischief: and I warn them now; 
 they cannot prepare too soon, nor with too much vigor and forecast. The 
 crisis approaches. The fearful conflict ; the mortal struggle ; the tiger- 
 strife is at hand, and God alone can tell the result. 
 
 Note.— Mr. Moore was called to jorder, in the course of his remarks, by Gkm. Waddt 
 
 lHO.MPa.jN, vi Sov.th Carolina, and by the deci-ion of the chair was prevented from concliid- 
 
 mg his .speech. Mr. MaoRE, before taking his seal, gave notice that he would publish all that 
 
 .- he had intended to say, precisely in the same form and manner he would have done had no 
 
 interruption taken place. 
 
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