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PEEFACE. 
 
 Peesident Lincol]^, during his administration, has found 
 himself placed, more than once, in a position where he had 
 no precedents to guide him, either in the administrations of 
 his predecessors or in the policy pursued by the Kulers of 
 Free Peoples elsewhere. In these emergencies he has taken 
 counsel of his own vigorous common sense, and his strict 
 integrity and honesty of purpose, and done what he believed 
 to be right and just. 
 
 In some instances, the course he has deemed proper to 
 pursue has called forth severe animadversions, either from 
 political friends or opponents. Under these circumstances, 
 most Presidents w^ould have avoided any public explanation 
 of their vicAvs and course ; but Mr. Lincoln, strong in con- 
 scious integrity, and unversed in the arts of diplomacy, has 
 preferred — and we think it will generally be acknowledged, 
 wisely preferred — to avail himself of the opportunity offered 
 by circumstances, to explain and defend his measures by a 
 public letter. We have believed that very many would be 
 glad to have these letters — which, though peculiar in style, 
 are marked by very high ability and statesmanship — in a 
 collected form, and have therefore prepared them for pub- 
 lication. 
 
 H. H. LLOYD & CO. 
 
 New York, September, 1863. 
 
THE 
 
 LETTERS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 
 
 I.— THE LETTERS TO GEN. McCLELLAN". 
 
 [Whie Gen. McClellan was in command of the Army of the Potomac, President 
 Lincoln wrote him two letters, besides sending him numt^rous telegraph'C dispatches. 
 These letters were published in the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. 
 Though neither of them on matters of national policy, both explain his views in regard 
 to the management of ihe war, and the necessity of prompt and efficient action. The 
 first was in reply to a letter of Gen. McClellan, objecting to liis Special War Order No. 
 1, of January 81, 1862, which directed a speedy movement on the railroad souttiwest of 
 Manassas Junction] 
 
 To this the President made the following reply: 
 
 Executive Mansion, Washington, Feb. 3, 1862. 
 
 My dear Sir — You and I have distinct and different plans for a 
 movement of the Army of the Potomac — yours to be down the Chesa- 
 peake, up the Eappahannock to Urbanna, and across land to the ter- 
 minus of the railroad on York River; n)ine to move directly to a 
 point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me 
 satisfactory answers to the following questions I shall gladly yield ray 
 plan to yours : 
 
 1. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time 
 and money than mine? 
 
 2. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plain than mine? 
 
 3. "Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan tlian mine? 
 
 4. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break 
 no great line of the enemy's communication, while mine would? 
 
 5. In case of disaster, would not a safe retreat be more difficult by 
 your plan than by mine? Yours, truly, A. LINCOLX. 
 
 Major-Gen. McClellan. 
 
 [The second was addressed to Gen. McClellan about four weeks after the battle of 
 Antietam, to encourage him to a more prompt movement upon the enemy, and to un- 
 dertake the capture of Ilichmond. It was as follows :] 
 
 Executive Mansion, Washington, Oct. 13, 1862. 
 My dear Sir — You remember my speaking to you of what I called 
 your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume 
 that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should 
 you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the 
 claim? 
 
THE LETTEKS OF PRESIDENT LINCUL.s. 
 
 As I understand, you telegraphed Gen. Ilalleck that you can not 
 subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's 
 Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does 
 now subsist his array at Winchester at a distance nearly twice as great 
 from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the 
 railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpepper Court House, 
 which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's 
 Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with 
 wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the 
 advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it 
 wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ig- 
 nores the question of time, which can not and must not be ignored. 
 
 Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is, " to 
 operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible, without 
 exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, 
 but can not apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, 
 and think you not he would break your communication with Rich- 
 mond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into 
 Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his com- 
 munications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to 
 follow and ruin him ; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon 
 and beat what is left behind all the easier. 
 
 Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the 
 enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you 
 not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your 
 equal on a march ? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the 
 chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his. 
 
 You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac 
 below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea 
 was, that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, 
 which I would seize if he would permit. If he should move north- 
 ward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he 
 should prevent our seizing his communications, and move toward 
 Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable op- 
 portunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on 
 the inside track. I say, "try;" if we never try, we shall never suc- 
 ceed. If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor 
 south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we can not beat 
 him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when 
 we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple 
 truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In com- 
 ing to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. 
 We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must 
 beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near 
 to us than far away. If we can not beat the enemy where he now is, 
 
THE LETTEKS OF TRESIDENT LmCOLI^. 7 
 
 we never can, Lo again being within tlie iutrencliments of Richmond. 
 Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the 
 facility of suppl3Mng from the side, away from the enemy, is remark- 
 able, as it were by the different spokes of a w^heel, extending from the 
 hub toward the rim, and this, whether you move directly by the chord 
 or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. Tlie chord- 
 line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket, and Fredericksburg, 
 and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by 
 Acquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, 
 only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge 
 part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to 
 be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, 
 five miles; J&regory's, thirteen ; Snicker's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty- 
 eight; Manassas, thirty-eight; Chester, forty-five; and Thornton's, 
 fifty-three. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the 
 enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowl- 
 edge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. 
 The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great 
 part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and 
 both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest 
 number of troops from here. When, at length, running to Richmond 
 ahead of him enables him to move this way ; if he does so, turn and 
 attack him in the rear. But I think he should be engaged long before 
 such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as 
 the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they can not do it. This letter 
 is in no sense an order. Yours, truly, A. LINCOLN". 
 
 Major-Gen. MoOlellax. 
 
 II._THE LETTER TO HORACE GREELEY. 
 
 [In August, 1862, Hon. Horace Greeley, Editor of the New York Tribune, believing 
 that v.hal he deemed the hesitating policy of the President, in regard toproclaimii/gthe 
 emancipation of the slaves in the Rebel States, whs doing injury to the Union cause, 
 addressed a letter to him over his own signature in the columns of the Tribune, remon- 
 etraiing against his delay, and avowing his belief that the declara'ion of the emancipa- 
 tion policy would greatly encourage and strengthen the Union cause, and deal a stag- 
 gering if not a fatal blow to the Rebellion. Neither Mr. Greeley nor any one else proba- 
 bly expected a reply in form from the President ; but within a few days Mr. Lincoln 
 caused ihe following answer to Mr. Greeley's letter to be published :] 
 
 Executive Mansion, "WAsniNGTON, Aicg. 22, 1SG2. 
 
 Hox. Horace Greeley : 
 
 Dear Sir— I have just read yours of the 19th instant, addressed to 
 myself through the New York Tribune. 
 
 If tliere be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may 
 know to be erroneous, I do not now and here controvert them. 
 
8 THE LETTEKS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 
 
 If there be any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, 
 I do not now and here argue against them. 
 
 If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive 
 it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to 
 be right. 
 
 As to the policy I " seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not 
 meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would 
 save it in the shortest way under the Constitution. 
 
 The sooner the national authority can be restored the nearer the 
 Union will be — the Union as it was. 
 
 If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could 
 at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. 
 
 If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could 
 at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. 
 
 .My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or 
 destroy slavery. 
 
 If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it — 
 if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it — and if I could 
 do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. 
 
 What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe 
 it helps to save this Union, and what I forbear, I forbear because I do 
 not believe it would help to save the Union. 
 
 I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the 
 cause, and I. shall do more whenever I belreve doing more will help 
 the cause. 
 
 I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall 
 adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. 
 
 I have here stated my purpose according to my views of official 
 duty, and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish 
 that all men everywhere could be free. Yours, A. LINCOLN. 
 
THE LETTERS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 9 
 
 III.— THE LETTER TO FERNANDO WOOD. 
 
 [Hon. Fernando Wood, late Mayor of New York, and now a Member of Congress 
 from one of the city districts, has, as is well known, avowed his sympathy for and suli- 
 stantial cordiality toward the leaders of the Rebellion. In November, 1S62, he professed 
 to have received from some person or persons, whom he declared trustworthy, advices 
 that the Southern States would send representatives to the next Congress, provided that 
 a full and general amnesty should allow them to do so. The statement was in direct 
 contradiction to the open, public, oft-repeated declarations of the leaders of the Eebel- 
 lion ; but on the strength of it Mr. Wood addressed a letter to the President on the 8th 
 of December, 1862, asking in substance that an amnesty, or at least an armistice, might 
 be declared, and he be empowered to hold correspondence with the rebel leaders, with 
 a view to arrange terms of peace. The President made the following replv. in the last 
 paragraph of which he asks that it may be regarded as confidential. In September, 
 1863, Mr. Wood published it, together with copies of his own.] 
 
 PRESIDENT LIXCOLN TO ME. WOOD. 
 
 TT -r. -r^ Executive Mansion, Wasiungton, Dec. 12, 1862. 
 
 Hon. h ernando Wood : 
 
 My dear Sir—Yowv letter of the 8th, with tlie accompanying note 
 of same date, was received yesterday. ' 
 
 The most important paragraph in the letter, as I consider, is in these 
 words : " On the 25th November last I was advised by an authority 
 which I deemed likely to be well informed as well as reliable and 
 truthful, that the Southern States would send representatives to the 
 next Congress, provided that a full and general amnesty should permit 
 them to do so. No guarantee or terras were asked for other than the 
 amnesty referred to." 
 
 I strongly suspect your information will prove to be groundless; 
 nevertheless, I thank you for communicating it to me. Understanding 
 the phrase in the paragraph above quoted— "the Southern States 
 would send representatives to the next Congress"-to be substantially 
 the same as that " the people of the Southern States would cease 
 resistance, and would reinaugurate, submit to. and maintain rhe 
 national authority within tiie limits of such States, under the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States," I say that in such case the war uonld 
 cease on the part of the United States ; and tbat if within a reasonable 
 time "a full and general amnesty" were necessary to such end, it 
 would not be withheld. 
 
 I do not think it would be proper now to communicate this, formally 
 or informally, to the people of the Soutliern States. My belief is that 
 they already know it ; and when they choose, if ever, tlicy can com- 
 iinmicate with me unequivocally. Nor do I think it proper now to 
 suspend military operations to try any experiment of negotiation. 
 
 I should nevertheless receive, with great pleasure, the exact in- 
 formation you now have, and also such other as you may in any way 
 obtain. Such information niight be more valuable before the 1st of 
 January than afterward. 
 
10 THE LETTERS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 
 
 "While there is nothing in this letter which I shall dread to see in 
 history, it is, perhaps, better for the present that its existence should 
 not become public. I therefore have to request that you will regard 
 it as confidential. Your obedient servant, A. LINCOLN". 
 
 IY._THE LETTER TO THE ALBANY COMMITTEE. 
 
 [A " Democratic mt^eting" was held in Albany, N. Y., on the 16th of May, 1863, over 
 which Hon. Erastus Cornine, M. C. from the Albany district presided, having for its 
 object the denunciation of the arrest of Vallandigham, and the demanding of his resto- 
 ration to liberty. The resolutions passed by the meeting were forwarded by the pre- 
 siding officer to President Lincoln, and elicited the following reply :] 
 
 Executive Mansion, "Washington, June 13, 1863. 
 
 IIox. Erastus Corning and others: 
 
 Gentlemen — Your letter of May 19, inclosing the resolutions of a 
 public meeting held at Albany, N. Y., on the 16th of the same month, 
 was received several days ago. 
 
 The resolutions, as I understand them, are resolvable into two propo- 
 sitions—first, the expression of a purpose to sustain the cause of the 
 Union, to secure peace through victory, and to support the Adminis- 
 tration in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the 
 Rebellion ; and secondly, a declaration of censure upon the Adminis- 
 tration for supposed unconstitutional action, such as the making of 
 military arrests. And, from the two propositions, a third is deduced, 
 which is that the gentlemen composing the meeting are resolved on 
 doing their part to maintain our common government and country, 
 despite the folly or wickedness, as they may conceive, of any Admin- 
 istration. This position is eminently patriotic, and as such I thank 
 the meeting and congratulate the nation for it. My own purpose is 
 tlie same, so that the meeting and myself have a common object, and 
 can have no difference, except in the choice of means or measures for 
 effecting that object. 
 
 And here I ought to close this paper, and would close it, if there 
 were no apprehension that more injurious consequences than any 
 merely personal to myself might follow the censures systematically 
 cast upon me for doing what, in my view of duty, I could not forbear. 
 The resolntions promise to support me in every constitutional and 
 lawful measure to suppress the Rebellion, and I have not knowingly 
 employed, nor shall knowingly employ, any other. But the meeting, 
 by their resolntions, assert and argue that certain military arrests, and 
 proceedings following them, for which I am ultimately responsible, 
 ai-e unconstitutional. I tiiink they are not. The resolutions quote 
 from the Constitution the definition of treason, and also the limiting 
 
THE LETTEES OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 11 
 
 safeguards and guarantees therein provided for the citizen on trials for 
 treason, and on his being held to answer for capital or otherwise in- 
 famous crimes, and, in criminal prosecutions, his right to a speedy and 
 public trial by an impartial jury. They proceed to resolve " that these 
 safeguards of the rights of the citizen against the pretensions of arbi- 
 trary power were intended more especially for his protection in times 
 of civil commotion." And, apparently to demonstrate the proposi- 
 tion, the resolutions proceed : " They were secured substantially to 
 tl)e English people after years of protracted civil war, and were 
 adopted into our Constitution at the close of the Revolution." Would 
 not the demonstration have been better if it could have been truly said 
 that these safeguards had been adopted and applied during the civil wars 
 and during owY Revolution, instead of after the one and at the close of 
 the other? I, too, am devotedly for them after c\w\\ war, and lefore civil 
 war, and at all times, "except when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, 
 the public safety may require" their suspension. The resolutions pro- 
 ceed to tell us that these safeguards " have stood the test of seventy-six 
 years of trial, under our republican system, under circumstances which 
 show that, while they constitute the foundation of all free government, 
 they are the elements of the enduring stability of the Republic." No one 
 denies that they have so stood the test up to the beginning of the pres- 
 ent Rebellion, if we except a certain occurrence at New Orleans ; nor 
 does any one question that they will stand the same test much longer 
 after the Rebellion closes. But these provisions of the Constitution 
 have no application to the case we have in hand, because tlie arrests 
 complained of were not made for treason — that is, not for the treason 
 defined in the Constitution, and upon conviction of which the punish- 
 ment is death — nor yet were they made to hold persons to answer for 
 any capital or otherwise infamous crimes ; nor were the proceedings 
 following, in any constitutional or legal sense, "criminal prosecu- 
 tions." The arrests were made on totally different grounds, and the 
 proceedings following accorded with the grounds of the arrests. Let 
 us consider the real case with which we are dealing, and apply to it 
 the parts of the Constitution plainly made for such cases. 
 
 Prior to my installation here, it had been inculcated that any State 
 had a lawful right to secede from the national Union, and that it 
 would be expedient to exercise the right whenever the devotees ot the 
 doctrine should fail to elect a President to their own liking. I was 
 elected contrary to their liking, and accordingly, so fsir as it was le- 
 gally possible, they had taken seven States out of the Union, had seized 
 many of the United States forts, and had fired upon the United States 
 flag, all before I was inaugurated, and, of course, before I Imd done 
 any official act whatever. The Rebellion thus began, soon ran into 
 the present Civil War, and, in certain respects, it began on very un- 
 equal terms between the parties. The insurgents had been preparing 
 
12 THE LETTERS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 
 
 for it more than tliirty years, wliile the Government had taken no 
 steps to resist them. The former had carefully considered all the 
 means which could be turned to their account. It undoubtedly was 
 a well-pondered reliance with them that, in their own unrestricted 
 efforts to destroy Union, Constitution, and law all together, the Gov- 
 ernment would, in great degree, be restrained by the same Constitu- 
 tion and .law from arresting their progress. Their sympathizers per- 
 vaded all departments of the Government and nearly all communities 
 of the people. From this material, under cover of " liberty of speech," 
 "liberty of the press," and "habeas corpus," they hoped to keep on 
 foot among us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers, and 
 aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways. They knew 
 that in times such as they were inaugurating, by the Constitution it- 
 self, the " habeas corpus" might be suspended ; but they also knew 
 they had friends who would make a question as to loTio was to sus- 
 pend it; meanwhile, their spies and others might remain at large to 
 help on their cause. Or if, as has happened, the Executive should 
 suspend the writ, without ruinous waste of time, instances of arrest- 
 ing innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur in such 
 cases ; and then a clamor could be raised in regard to this which might 
 be, at least, of some service to the insurgent cause. It needed no very 
 keen perception to discover this part of the enemy's programme so 
 soon as, by open hostilities, their machinery was fairly put in motion 
 Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights 
 of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by de- 
 grees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of 
 the Constitution, and as indispensable to the public safety. Nothing 
 is better known to history than that courts of justice are utterly incom- 
 petent to such cases. Civil courts are organized chiefly for trials of 
 individuals, or, at most, a few individuals acting in concert, and this 
 in quiet times, and on charges of crinies well defined in the law. 
 Even in times of peace bands of horse-thieves and robbers frequently 
 grow too numerous and powerful for the ordinary courts of justice. 
 But what comparison, in numbers, have such bands ever borne to the 
 insurgent sympathizers even in many of the loyal States? Again: a 
 jury too frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the 
 panel than to hang the traitor. And yet, again, he who dissuades one 
 man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the 
 Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet 
 this dissuasion or inducement may be so conducted as to be no do- 
 fined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance. 
 
 Ours is a case of rebellion — so called by the resolution before me — 
 in fact, a clear, flagrant, and gigantic case of rebellion ; and the pro- 
 vision of the Constitution that "the privilege of the writ of habeas 
 corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or in- 
 
THE LETTEKS OF PKESIDENT LINCOLN. 13 
 
 vasion, the public safety may require it," is tlie provision which spe- 
 cially applies to our present case. This provision plainly attests the 
 understanding of those who made the Constitution, that ordinary 
 courts of justice are inadequate to "cases of rebellion" — attests their 
 purpose that, in such cases, men may be held in custody whom the 
 courts, acting on ordinary rules, would discharge. Habeas corpus 
 does not discharge men who are proved to be guilty of defined crime ; 
 and its suspension is allowed by the Constitution on purpose that men 
 may be arrested and held who can not be proved to be guilty of de- 
 fined crime, when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety 
 may require it." This is precisely our present case — a case of rebel- 
 lion, wherein the public safety does require the suspension. Indeed, 
 arrests by process of courts, and arrests in cases of rebellion, do not 
 proceed altogether upon the same basis. The former is directed at the 
 small per-centage of ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime ; 
 while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings against 
 the Government, which at most will succeed or fail in no great length 
 of time. In the latter case arrests are made, not so nmch for what 
 has been done as for what probably would be done. The latter is 
 moi-e for the preventive and less for the vindictive than the former. 
 In such cases the purposes of men are much more easily understood 
 than in cases of ordinary crime. The man who stands by and says 
 nothing when the peril of his Government is discussed, can not be 
 misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy ; much 
 more, if he talks ambiguously — talks for his country with "buts," and 
 ''ifs," and " ands." Of how little value the constitutional provisions 
 I have quoted will be rendered, if arrests shall never be made until 
 defined crimes shall have been committed, may be illustrated by a few 
 notable examples. Gen, John C. Breckinridge, Gen. Robert E. Lee, 
 Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, Gen. John B. Magruder, Gen. William B. 
 Preston, Gen. Simon B. Buckner, and Commodore Franklin Bu- 
 chanan, now occupying the very highest places in the Rebel war 
 service, were all within the power of the Government since the Re- 
 bellion began, and were nearly as well known to the traitors then as 
 now. Unquestionably if we had seized and held them, the insurgent 
 cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then com- 
 mitted any crime defined in the law. Every one of them, if arrested, 
 would have been discharged on habeas corpus^ were the writ allowed 
 to operate. In view of these and similar cases, I think the time not 
 unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few ar- 
 rests rather than too many. 
 
 By the third resolution, the meeting indicate their opinion that 
 military arrests may be constitutional in localities where rebellion 
 actually exists, but that such arrests are unconstitutional in localities 
 where rebellion or insurrection does not actually exist. They insist 
 
14: THE LETTERS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 
 
 that snch arrests shall not be made "outside of the lines of necessary 
 military occupation and the scenes of insurrection." Inasmuch, liow- 
 ever, as the Constitution itself makes no such distinction, I am unable 
 to believe that there is any such constitutional distinction. I concede 
 that the class of arrests complained of can be constitutional only 
 when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require 
 them ; and I insist that in such cases they are constitutional wherever 
 the public safety does require them ; as well in places to which they 
 may prevent the Rebellion extending as in those where it may be al- 
 ready prevailing; as well where they may restrain mischievous inter- 
 ference with the raising and supplying of armies to suppress the 
 Rebellion, as where the Rebellion may actually be; as well where 
 they may restrain the enticing men out of the army, as where they 
 would prevent mutiny in the army ; equally constitutional at all 
 places where they will conduce to the public safety, as against the 
 dangers of rebellion or invasion. Take the particular case mentioned 
 by the meeting. It is asserted, in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham 
 was, by a military commander, seized and tried "for no other reason 
 than words addressed to a public meeting, in criticism of the course 
 of the Administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of 
 the general." Now, if there be no mistake about this; if this asser- 
 tion is the truth and the whole truth ; if there was no other reason 
 for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But the 
 arrest, as I understand, was made for a very different reason. Mr. 
 Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union ; 
 and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to 
 prevent the raising of troops; to encourage desertions from the army; 
 and to leave the Rebellion without an adequate military force to sup- 
 press it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the political 
 prospects of the Administration, or the personal interests of the com- 
 manding general, but because he was damaging the army, upon the 
 existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was 
 warring upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional 
 jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not 
 damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made 
 on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably 
 satisfactory evidence. 
 
 I understand the meeting, whose resolutions I am considering, to be 
 in favor of suppressing the Rebellion by military force — by armies. 
 Long experience has shown that armies can not be maintained unless 
 desertions shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The 
 case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punish- 
 ment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while 
 I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to deseit? 
 This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or 
 
THE LETTERS OF PKESIDENT LINCOLN. 15 
 
 brother, or friend, into a public meeting, and there working npon his 
 feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting 
 in a bad cause, for a wicked Administration of a contemptible Gov- 
 ernment, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think 
 that in such a case to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only 
 constitutional, but withal a great mercy. 
 
 If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error 
 lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in 
 cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which 
 would not be constitutional when, in the absence of rebellion or inva- 
 sion, the public safety does not require them ; in other words, that the 
 Constitution is not, in its application, in all respects the same, in cases 
 of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in time of 
 profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself makes 
 the distinction; and I can no more be persuaded that the Government 
 can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, be- 
 cause it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in 
 time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not 
 good medicine for a sick man, because it can be shown not be good 
 food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger appre- 
 hended by the meeting that the American people will, by means of 
 military arrests during the Eebellion, lose the right of public discus- 
 sion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by 
 jury, and habeas corpus, throughout the indefinite peaceful future, 
 which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe 
 that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during 
 temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the re- 
 mainder of his healthful life. 
 
 In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which you re- 
 quest of me, I can not overlook the fact that the meeting speak as 
 "Democrats." Nor can I, with full respect for their known intelli- 
 gence, and the fairly presumed deliberation with which they prepared 
 their resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by acci- 
 dent, or in any way other than that they preferred to designate them- 
 selves '• Democrats" rather than "American citizens," In this time 
 of national peril, I would have preferred to meet you upon a level one 
 step higher than any party platform ; because I am sure that, from 
 such more elevated position, we could do better battle for the country 
 we all love than we possibly can from those lower ones where, from 
 the force of habit, the prejudices of the past, and selfish hopes of the 
 future, we are sure to expend much of our ingenuity and strength in 
 finding fault with and aiming blows at each other. But, since you have 
 denied me this, I will yet be thankful, for the country's sake, that not 
 all Democrats have done so. He on whose discretionary judgment Mr. 
 Vallaudigham was arrested and tried is a Democrat, having no old 
 
16 THE LETTERS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 
 
 partj affinity with me; and the judge who rejected the constitutional 
 view expressed in these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. Yal- 
 landigham on habeas corpus, is a Democrat of better days than these, 
 having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President Jackson. 
 And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly exposing their 
 lives and shedding their blood on the battle-field, I have learned that 
 many approve the course taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have 
 not heard of a single one condemning it. I can not assert that there 
 are none such. And the name of President Jackson recalls an in- 
 stance of pertinent history : After the battle of New Orleans, and 
 while the fact that the treaty of peace had been concluded was well 
 known in the city, but before official knowledge of it had arrived, 
 General Jackson still maintained martial or miilitary law. Now that 
 it could be said the war was over, the clamor against martial law, 
 which had existed from the first, grew more furious. Among other 
 things, a Mr. Louiallier published a denunciatory newspaper article. 
 General Jackson arrested him. A lawyer by the name of Morel pro- 
 cured the United States Judge Hall to issue a writ of habeas corpus to 
 relieve Mr. Louiallier. General Jackson arrested both the lawyer and 
 the judge. A Mr. Hollander ventured to say of some part of the 
 matter that "it was a dirty trick." General Jackson arrested him. 
 "When the officer undertook to serve the writ of habeas corpus, General 
 Jackson took it from him, and sent him away with a copy. Holding 
 the judge in custody a few days, the General sent him beyond the limits 
 of his encampment, and set him at liberty, with an order to remain 
 till the ratification of peace should be regularly announced, or until 
 the British should have left the Southern coast. A day or two more 
 elapsed, the ratification of a treaty of peace was regularly announced, 
 and the judge and others were fully liberated. A few days more, and 
 the judge called General Jackson into court and fined him $1,000 for 
 having arrested him and the others named. The General paid the 
 fine, and there the matter rested for nearly thirty years, when Con- 
 gress refunded principal and interest. The late Senator Douglas, 
 then in the House of Representatives, took a leading part in the de- 
 bates, in which the constitutional question was much discussed. I am 
 not prepared to say whom the journals would show to have voted for 
 the measure. 
 
 It may be remarked : First, that we had the same Constitution then 
 as now ; secondly, that we then had a case of invasion, and now we 
 have a case of rebellion ; and, thirdly, that the permanent right of 
 the people to public discussion, the liberty of speech and of the press, 
 the trial by jury, the law of evidence, and the habeas corpus, suifered 
 no detriment whatever by that conduct of General Jackson, or its 
 subsequent approval by the American Congress. 
 
 And yet, let me say that, in my own discretion, I do not know 
 
THE LETTERS OF PKE3IDENT LINCOLN. 17 
 
 whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. 
 "While I can not shift the responsibility from myself, I hold that, as a 
 general rule, the commander in the field is the better judge of the ne- 
 cessity in any particular case. Of course, I must practice a general 
 directory and revisory power in the matter. 
 
 One of the resolutions expresses the opinion of the meeting that 
 arbitrary arrests will have the eifect to divide and distract those who' 
 should be united in suppressing the Rebellion, and I am specifically 
 called on to discharge Mr. Vallandigham. I regard this as, at least, a 
 fair appeal to me on the expediency of exercising a constitutional 
 power which I think exists. In response to such appeal, I have to say, 
 it gave me pain when I learned that Mr. Vallandigham had been 
 arrested — that is, I was pained that there should liave seemed to be a 
 necessity for arresting him — and that it will aftbrd me great pleasui-e 
 to discharge him so soon as I can, by any means, believe the public 
 safety will not sufier by it. I further say that, as the war progresses, 
 it appears to me, opinion and action, which were in great confusion at 
 first, take shape and fall into more regular channels, so that the ne- 
 cessity for strong dealing with them gradually decreases. I have 
 every reason to desire that it should cease altogether ; and far from 
 the least is my regard for the opinions and wishes of those who, like 
 the meeting at Albany, declare their purpose to sustain the Govern- 
 ment in .'' ry constitutional and lawful measures to suppress the Re- 
 bellion, btill, I must continue to do so much as may seem to be 
 required by the public safety. A. LINCOLN. 
 
 v.— THE LETTER TO GOVERNOR SEYMOUR. 
 
 [After the riot in New York city, July 13-17, 1863, wliich was alleged to have been 
 caused by the attempt to execute the Conscription Law, Governor Seymour addressed a 
 long letter to the President, urging the suspension of the draft, until he could ascertain 
 what credit should be allowed to New York city and its vicinity for previous quotas 
 furnished, and until the question of the constitutionality of the Conscription Act could 
 be tested before the Supreme Court of the United States. As the Supreme Court could 
 not hold a session till December or January, this was equivalent to asking that the 
 draft should be entirely abandoned. To tliis letter the President made the following 
 reply :] 
 
 Executive Mansiox, "Washington, Aug. 7, 1868. 
 
 His Exoellexcy, Horatio Seymour, Goyernor of New Yore:, 
 Albany, N. Y. : 
 
 Your communication of the 3d instant has been received and atten- 
 tively considered. I can not consent to suspend tlie draft in New 
 York, as you request, because, among other reasons, time is too import- 
 ant. By the figures you send, which I presume are correct, the twelve 
 districts represented fall in two classes of eight and four respectively. 
 
 The disparity of the quotas for the draft in these t\\'o classes is cer- 
 
18 THE LETTERS OF TRESIDENT LINCOLN. 
 
 tainly very striking, being the difference between an average of 2,200 
 in one class, and 4,864 in the other. Assuming that the districts are 
 equal, one to another, in entire population, as required by the plan on 
 which they were made, this disparity is such as to require attention. 
 Much of it, however, I suppose will be accounted for by the fact that 
 so many more persons fit for soldiers are in tlie city than are in the 
 country, who have too recently arrived from other parts of the United 
 States and from Europe to be either included in the census of 18G0, or 
 to have voted in 1862. Still, making due allowance for this, I am yet 
 unwilling to stand upon it as an entirely sufiicient explanation of the 
 great disparity. I shall direct the draft to proceed in all the districts, 
 drawing, however, at first from each of the four districts — to wit, the 
 Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth — only 2,200, being the average 
 quota of the other class. After this drawing, these four Districts, and 
 also the Seventeenth and Twenty-ninth, shall be carefully re-enrolled — 
 and, if you please, agents of yours may witness every step of the pro- 
 cess. Any deficiency which may appear by the new enrollment will 
 be supplied by a special draft for that object, allowing due credit for 
 volunteers who may be obtained from these districts respectively 
 during the interval ; and at all points, so far as consistent with practi- 
 cal convenience, due credits shall be given for volunteers, and your 
 Excellency shall be notified of the time fixed for commencing a draft 
 in each district. 
 
 I do not object to abide a decision of the United States Supreme 
 Court, or of the Judges thereof, on the constitutionality of the draft 
 law. In fact, I should be willing to facilitate the obtaining of it. But 
 I can not consent to lose the time while it is being obtained. "VVe are 
 contending with an enemy who, as I understand, drives every able- 
 bodied man he can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives 
 bullocks into a slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is 
 used. This produces an army which will soon turn upon our now vic- 
 torious soldiers already in the field, if they shall not be sustained by 
 recruits as they should be. It produces an army with a rapidity not 
 to be matched on our side, if we first waste time to re-experiment 
 with the volunteer system, already deemed by Congress, and palpably, 
 in fact, so far exhausted as to be inadequate ; and then more time to 
 obtain a Court decision as to whether a law is constitutional which 
 requires a part of those not now in the service to go to the aid of those 
 who are already in it; and still more time to determine with absolute 
 certainty that we get those who are to go in the precisely legal pro- 
 portion to those who are not to go. My purpose is to be in my action 
 just and constitutional, and yet practical, in performing the important 
 duty with which I am charged, of maintaining the unity and the free 
 principles of our common country. Your obedient servant, 
 
 A. LINCOLN. 
 
THE LETTERS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 19 
 
 VL— THE LETTER TO THE SPRTN^GFIELD (ILL.) 
 AND SYRACUSE CONVENTIONS. 
 
 [The Eepubliean State Committee of Illinois having called a State Convention to 
 meet at Springfield, on the 3d of September, addressed a letter to the President inviting 
 him to be present. As circumstances would not permit him to accept the invitation, he 
 availed himself of the opportunity thus offered to defend his emancipation policy ; and aa 
 the New York State Union Convention was held at the same time, a copy of the letter 
 was sent to them also :] 
 
 Executive Mansion, "Washington, Auff. 26, 1863. 
 Hon. James C. Conkt.tt^g: 
 
 My dear Sir — Your letter inviting me to attend a mass meeting of 
 unconditional Union men, to be held at the capital of Illinois on the 
 3d day of September, has been received. It would be very agreeable 
 for me thus to meet my old friends at ray own home ; but I can not 
 just now be absent from here so long as a visit there would require. 
 
 The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devo- 
 tion to the Union ; and I am sure that my old political friends will 
 thank me for tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other 
 noble men whom no partisan mahce or partisan hope can make false 
 to the nation's life. 
 
 There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say : 
 You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But 
 how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways : First — 
 to suppress the Rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. 
 Are you for it ? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for 
 it, a second way is to give up the Union. I am against this. Are you 
 for it? If you are, you should say so plainly. If you are not for force, 
 uor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise. 
 
 I do not believe that any compromise embracing the maintenance 
 of the Union is now possible. All that I learn leads to a directly 
 opposite belief The strength of the Rebellion is its military, its army. 
 That army dominates all the country, and all the people within its 
 range. Any offer of terms made by any man or men within that 
 range, in opposition to that army, is simply nothing for the present ; 
 because such man or men have no power whatever to enforce their 
 side of a compromise, if one were made with thein. 
 
 To illustrate : Suppose refugees from the South and peace men of 
 the North get together in convention, and frame and proclaim a com- 
 promise embracing a restoration of the Union, In what way can that 
 compromise be used to keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania ? Meade's 
 army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania, and, I think, can ulti- 
 mately drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise to which 
 the controllers of Lee's army nre not agreed can at all affect that army. 
 In an effort at such compromise we would waste time, which the 
 enemy would improve to our disadvantage; and that would be all. 
 
20 THE LETTERS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 
 
 A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those who 
 control tlie rebel army, or with the people, first liberated from the domi- 
 nation of that army by the success of our own array. Now, allow me 
 to assure you that no word or intimation from that rebel army, or from 
 any of the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has 
 ever come to my knowledge or belief. All charges and insinuations to 
 the contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that 
 if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected 
 and kept a secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself to be the 
 servant of the people, according to the bond of service, the United 
 States Constitution ; and that, as such, I am responsible to them. 
 
 But, to be plain. You are dissatisfied with me about the negro. 
 Quite likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself 
 upon that subject. I certainly wish that all men could be free, while 
 you, I suppose, do not. Yet, I have neither adopted nor proposed any 
 measure which is not consistent with even your view, provided that 
 you are for the Union. I suggested compensated emancipation ; to 
 which you replied you wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I 
 had not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as 
 to save you from greater taxation to save the Union exclusively by 
 other means. 
 
 You dislike the Emancipation Proclatnation, and perhaps would 
 have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. 
 1 think the Constitution invests its Commander-in Chief with the law 
 of war in time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, 
 that slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question 
 that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be 
 taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever it helps us and 
 hui-ts the enemy? Armies, the world over, destroy enemies' property 
 when they can not use it; and even destroy tlieir own to keep it from 
 the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help them- 
 selves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous 
 or cruel. Among the exceptions are the massacre of vanquished foes 
 and non combatants, male and female. 
 
 But the Proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid. If it is 
 not valid it needs no retraction. If it is valid it can not be retracted, 
 any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess 
 to think its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why 
 better after the retraction than ^before the issue? There was more 
 than a year and a half of trial to suppress the Rebellion before the 
 Proclamation was issued, the last one hundred days of which passed^ 
 under an oxplicit notice that it was coming, unless averted by those in 
 revolt returning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed 
 as favorably for us since the issue of the Proclamation as before. 
 
 I know as fully as one can know the opinions of others that some 
 
/ 
 THE LETTERS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 21 
 
 of tlie commanders of om* armies in the field who have given us our 
 most important victories believe the emancipation policy and the use 
 of colored troops constitute the heaviest blows yet dealt to the Rebel- 
 lion, and that at least one of those important successes could not have 
 been achieved when it was but for the aid of black soldiers. 
 
 Among the commanders who hold these views are some who have 
 never had any affinity with what is called, " Abolitionism," or with 
 " Republican party politics " but who hold them purely as military 
 opinions. I submit their opinions as entitled to some weight against 
 the objections often urged that emancipation and arming the blacks 
 are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as sucli in 
 good faith. 
 
 You say that you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them 
 seem willing to fight for you ; but no matter. Fight you then, exclu- 
 sively, to save the Union. I issued the Proclamation on purpose to 
 aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all 
 resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will 
 be an apt time then for you to declare you will not fight to free ne- 
 groes. I thought that in your struggle for the Union to whatever ex- 
 tent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it 
 weakened the enemy in his resistance to you. Do you think differ- 
 ently ? I tliought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers 
 leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. 
 Does it appear otlierwise to you ? But negroes, like other people, act 
 upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do noth- 
 ing for them ? If they stake their lives for us they must be prompted 
 by the strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the 
 promise being made, must be kept. 
 
 The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed 
 to the sea. Thanks to the great Northwest for it; nor yet wholly to 
 them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, 
 Keystone, and Jersey hewing their way right and left. The sunny 
 South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a helping hand. On the 
 spot, their part of the history Avas jotted down in black and white. 
 The job was a great national one, and let none be slighted who bore 
 an honorable part in it. And while those wlio have cleared the great 
 river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that 
 anything has been more bravely and well done than at Antietam, 
 Murfreesboro, Gettysburg, and on many fields of less note. Nor must 
 Uncle Sara's web feet be forgotten. At all the watery margins they 
 have been present, not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the 
 rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou, and wherever the 
 ground was a little damp they have been and made their tracks. Thanks 
 to all. For the great Republic — for the principle it lives by and keeps 
 Hlive — for man's vast future — thanks to all. 
 
22 THE LETTEES OF PKESIDENT LINCOLN. 
 
 Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it will come 
 soon and come to stay ; and so come as to be worth the keeping in all 
 future time. It will then have been proved that among freemen there 
 can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they 
 who take such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. 
 And then there will be some black men who can remember that with 
 silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised 
 bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this great consummation, 
 while I fear there will be some white ones unable to forget that with 
 malignant heart and deceitful speech they have striven to hinder it. 
 
 Still, let us not be over-sanguine of a speedy, final triumph. Let us 
 be quite sober. Let us diligently apply the means, never doubting 
 that a just God, in His own good time, will give us the rightful result. 
 Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN. 
 
From the New York Christian Advocate and Journal. 
 
 HOW MAPS ABE MADE. 
 
 Maps have always been considered necessary aids to military and histor- 
 ical narrations. The Greeks, the Eomans, the Chinese, the Japanese were 
 map-makers two thousand years ago. The history of map manufacture 
 from its rude beginnings down to the present day is both entertaining and 
 instructive. Historians must regard the last and the present decades as 
 an epoch in the diffusion of maps, charts, and pictorial illustrations. In 
 the United States the great number of reading and thinking men, and 
 the intense interest each feels in the progress of the war, has made the 
 demand for maps far greater than was ever known in any other country. 
 The importance of no battle or campaign can be comprehended without 
 an understanding of its relations to towns, rivers, railroads, mountains 
 and valleys, forests and bluffs, and to the positions held by the contending 
 forces. Such knowledge can only be gained from maps, which are coming 
 to be regarded as necessary as newspapers. We presume a sketch of the 
 methods by which maps are produced will not be uninteresting to our 
 readers. First, a drawing must be made showing the topography of the 
 country to be mapped out, giving the relative position of each town, 
 river, etc. This is a matter of extreme difficulty, and so difficult that we 
 think no perfectly accurate map has ever been drawn to cover a large ter- 
 ritory. The drawing must next be engraved on some material from which 
 impressions can be taken on paper. Until quite recently plates of steel, 
 copper, or stone have been used for this purpose, the lines and letters 
 being sunk in the plates. The cavities so made being filled with ink, the 
 printing is effected by a copperplate press. The best maps have been 
 made by tliis slow and expensive process, but it can not supply them at 
 low prices or in large quantities. Lithography has also furnished fmely 
 executed maps at prices somewhat cheaper than those engraved on steel 
 or copper. By this mode the map is drawn on the lithographic stone with ■ 
 a peculiar ink, which hardens and presents the letters and figures slightly 
 raised, and from which clear impressions can be obtained in a lithographic 
 press. Lithography has not, however, been able to supply the immensely 
 increased demand for maps ; and the great desideratum has been to find a 
 way to print finely engraved work on a common power press. Maps were 
 engraved on wood as early as 1482. The wood being cut away, leaving 
 the lines and names raised, a means is aflbrded for power-press printing, 
 either from the wood or from electrotypes. Since the war began, many 
 newspapers have furnished their readers with small section maps of this 
 kind. Some large and very distinct maps have also been produced from 
 wood engraving,, and sold in great numbers throughout the country. But 
 the brittle character of wood will not permit the fine engraving required 
 in a small scale map, and the ingenuity of men has long been tried to pro- 
 duce relief-plate engraving from a firm and fine material. Tlie attempts 
 have at length been successful, and large and excellent relief-plate maps 
 are now obtained from steam-presses. We have recently seen proof-sheets 
 of a fine large county map of the United States just engraved for Messrs. 
 H. H. Lloyd & Co., of 81 John Street, New York, produced from metallic 
 relief-plates. This method of map production is now extensively era- 
 ployed in this country and in Europe, and enables good maps to be sold 
 at low prices. The paper on which maps are printed contains a large 
 quantity of size, that fills the pores and prevents the colors from spread- 
 ing. The coloring of maps forms an important and separate item in their 
 manufacture. This work is not done on the printing press, as is often 
 supposed, but chiefly by stencil plates, with a brush in hand. This part 
 of the work is performed in this coimtry almost exclusively by Germans. 
 To show the advancement of geographical knowledge as illustrated by 
 maps, it may be stated that until the beginning of the eighteenth century 
 all maps of Europe represented the Mediterranean Sea 1,400 miles longer 
 than it is, and contained many other errors nearly as glaring. 
 
 H. H. LLOYD & CO., Publishers, 81 John Street, N. Y. 
 
 B. B. EUSSSLL, olo Washington Street, Boston, 
 
 Whnh-salc A','fnit for New Endand, 
 
GREAT COUOTV MAP OF THE UWTED STATES^ 
 
 First Published August 1st, 1863, is the 
 LARGEST. LATEST. PLAINEST. AND CHEAPEST IVIAP OF OUR WHOLE COUNTRY 
 
 ever issued to illustrate our Country and the War. 
 It is superior to all other Maps, because it has just been engraved, and 
 contains all the Towns, Rivers, Mountains, etc., made noted by the war, 
 and not down on any other Map ; because its Topography is accurate ; 
 because, while it has an immense number of names, it does not confuse 
 the eye with a great mass of unimportant matter ; because it exhibits our 
 whole country, including all the Pacific States and Territories. 
 
 AGENTS MUST SEE FOR TIlKHlSIiLVKS. 
 Lloyd's New Military Map of the Border k Soutliern Slates. 
 
 In its preparation, especial attention is given to the position of Trooj :s, 
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 Battle-fields and strategic places are marked by blood-red lines and dots, 
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 "OUB. UVJIOXV DSrZSSJDSRS." 
 
 Tliis most showy and attractive Chart contains, besides the brilliant 
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 We can most heartily recommend this Chart to those Agents and their 
 customers who wish to get a great deal for their money, and something, 
 too, that sells well. 
 
 THE EQUESTRIAN MILITARY PORTRAIT GALLERY 
 
 Bepresents Seventeen of our most noted Field Generals on Rorseiack, 
 In Three Groups, very large, Avith an Elegant New Head-piece. 
 This Chart is pronounced by all who have seen it to give the best like- 
 nesses of our leading oflicers yet engraved, and to be altogether the most 
 Bold, Spirited, and Attractive work of the kind yet issued. No pains are 
 spared to make the coloring and finish as nearly perfect as possible. 
 From the yeiD York Independent. 
 Since the breaking out of the rebellion the demand for' maps and charts has been 
 enormoos. Among the most enterprising houses in this branch of trade is that of II. H. 
 Lloyd & Co. Their map of tlie Bi.rder and Southern States, and several charts, are 
 Well and favorably known to the public. Traveling agents must find the sale of these 
 popular publications a source of much profit. 
 
 From the Neic York Ohserver. 
 This is the age of maps. H. II. Lloyd & Co. have issued a series of beautiful maps. 
 Their map of the Southern and Border States is clear, accurate, and comprebcnsive. 
 
 The following are a few of the many notices of our great and cheap 
 Map of the United States : 
 
 An excellent map, and sold at the surprisingly low price of $1 25, mounted and 
 colored. — Boston Jourmil. 
 
 A very handsome and^ convenient map, and of extraordinary utility. We can heartily 
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 Every man who desires to have a definite knowledge of the local points where the 
 great scenes of the day are transpiring should own one of these maps, if he has to go 
 without his dinner to buy \L—Bosto7i Fast. 
 
 Any of our Maps and Charts, in sheet form, sent by mail on receipt of 
 price. For Prices, see second page. 
 
 JH^^ The most liberal inducements to Map Agents. Send for our Terms. 
 H. H. LLOYD & CO., 81 John Street, New York. 
 B. B. RUSSELL, 515 Washington Street, Boston, 
 
 Wholesale Agent for New England. 
 R. R. LANDON, 88 Lake Street, Chicago, Agent for the West.