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I LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. t\ 
 
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 J UNITED ISTATKy OF AMERICA. | 
 
PiEPLY OF LIEUT.-COL. PILSEN 
 
 TO 
 
 EMIL SCHALK'S^ CRITICISMS 
 
 OF 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN IN THE MOUNTAIN DEPART- 
 MENT, UNDER 
 
 MAJ.-GEN. J. C. FREMONT. 
 
n 
 
New YoeKj June, 1863. 
 To Ml-. Emil Schalk, 
 
 Author of " Summary of the Art of War :" 
 
 Sir, — Before writing a book which pretends to the dignity of 
 history, an author is bound to exercise the closest scrutiny in 
 discovering the truth. A single page not founded in verity, 
 may be the source of infinite harm, and ought, as it does, to 
 discredit the whole book, especially when it assumes the char- 
 acter of a severe criticism, directed, not only to tarnish the 
 glory of the nation and the bravery of our soldiers, but to 
 injure the reputation of living persons in stations of,trust, 
 whose honor is identified with the national well-being. Such 
 is tlie case with the Second Yolume of your work on the Art of 
 War, discussing the Campaigns of 1862-1863. 
 
 1 am aware that you preface this discussion by the admission 
 that many of your statements may be incorrect, but that such 
 errors do not affect the truth of the application of the great 
 principles of the art of war. 
 
 I deny this proposition altogether in so far as your attempt to 
 criticise the conduct of the campaign of '62 and '63, and there 
 could not be presented a better evidence of the absurdity of 
 trying to reason out correct results where the foundation is 
 false, than in your criticisms of tlie campaign in the Mountain 
 Department under the command of Genl. Fremont. 
 
 There, to my surprise, I noticed a presentation of the battle 
 of Cross Keys, which not only has not any foundation in fact, 
 but perverts and mutilates so utterly the whole transaction, that 
 the full weight of my introductory remarks is not a sufficient 
 measure of your culpability. 
 
 As I took active part in that battle, in the capacity of a Chief 
 of Artillery, and can bear testimony with full knowledge in the 
 premises, I undertake to enter into a discussion upon this sub- 
 ject, and to g'lve you the opportunity to do that campaign, its 
 
Carroll, considering; himsolf too weak, fell back for some dis- 
 tance upon the approaching brigade of Gen. Tyler. With the 
 exception of those eight regiments and one battery, all of Jack- 
 son's forces were left at Cross Keys, to check there our further 
 progress. 
 
 To any man, who understands something of war, the exten- 
 sion of the enemy's line of battle, amounting to nearly two 
 miles, the number of his guns and the heavy masses, which we 
 found opposed to us at every point, and principally on his 
 right wing, must have carried the conviction that we had not 
 engaged a rear-guard of 5,000 men, but an enemy superior to 
 our numbers. 
 
 Such being the case, I cannot omit to observe, that the battle 
 of Cross Keys in reality was very different from the appearance 
 you have given it in the abusing lines of your book, which, pre- 
 sents a total perversion of the real facts. 
 
 Let us now inquire into the correctness of your further asser- 
 tion, that we attacked without enscnible. 
 
 The attack was prepared, before the enemy was discovered in 
 position, from a point where tlie road leading to Port Republic 
 divided into two branches. Without having either county 
 'maps, or guides, or knowledge of the ground, know^'ng only the 
 vicinity, and supposing the probable position of the enemy, the 
 whole command, without hesitation or delay, was formed into 
 two nearly equally strong columns, which entered upon the 
 two branches. So we followed rather our own impression, and 
 tiie supposition proved itself correct. When the enemy soon 
 alter was discovered, we had the advantage of being able to 
 deploy both columns at once, and Iiad in a very admirably short 
 time a well combined line of battle in the whole extent of the 
 enemy's position. Every other manoeuvre would have cost 
 more time, and proved itself, perhaps, disastrous. The enemy, 
 indeed, expected that we would follow the main road, and over- 
 look the side road, for therealong he held concealed his left 
 wing, pushed forward with the undoubted intention to take us 
 in the flank, and perhaps seize our line of operation. This, of 
 course, was prevented by our manoeuvre, and the enemy's left 
 wiuij driven in. 
 
 As it was supposed by the formation of the roads, and by the 
 
understood direction of the bridge of Port Republic, that the 
 riglit v.'ing of the enemy was his strategical flank, we accord- 
 ingly gave to our left wing tlie strength of three brigades, while 
 the three other brigades of the command had to fill out the 
 centre and the rigiit wing. The plan was to press in the strate- 
 gical flank of the enemy and seize his road of retreat. Two 
 brigades of the German division were trusted with the settlement 
 of this problem, and had a third brigade of the same division 
 as reserve in their immediate rear. For the same purpose the 
 brigade of our right formed an echellon somewhat backwards, 
 and was so posted that its weight could be thrown in another 
 direction, according to circumstances. While our left wing was 
 ordered to attack, the centre and the right had to watch the 
 progress, and to act accordingly. So the battle was fought 
 with four brigades in line of battle in immediate action, one 
 brigade on the right in a somewhat backward echellon partici- 
 pating according to circumstances, but being at hand for further 
 disposal, and one brigade as reserve in the immediate rear of 
 the left wing. We had ten batteries, of which eight and a half, 
 in the short time of less than thirty minutes, were brought into 
 favorable positions in the immediate face of the enemy, although 
 he was posted in the woods greatly to our disadvantage, and we 
 were compelled to go in search of his precise position, often 
 coming upon him in very close quarters. When I now add to 
 the tactical dispositions above described, that our line of battle 
 was perpendicularly based upon our line of operation ; that it 
 remained so throughout the whole action ; that it was perfectly 
 con-ect in reference to connection and formation; that we com- 
 manded every approach to our flanks and our rear, and that 
 during and after the battle we were in the full attitude of the 
 offensive,— I ask you whether supposition, plan and disposition 
 in that battle were with or without ensemUe ; and further ask, 
 how much better you, or any other one pretending to illustrate 
 the principles of the art of war, would Ijave probably acted in 
 the premises ? 
 
 . There is now the question to be settled, whether we got beaten 
 in detail. 
 
 _^ As no judgment upon the result of a battle can be made by 
 single incidents on the battle-field, however some reo-iments 
 
may liave been beaten or repulsed, and as sucb a judgment can 
 be passed only by taking into consideration the Avliole of tiie 
 event, I will briefly sum up the result of this day's fighting. 
 
 Col. Cluseret, who had the advance, took the centre and drove 
 the enemy some two miles from their original position. Sup- 
 porting' the centre came General Milroy, who, in connection 
 with our right formed by General Schenck, had pursued the 
 enemy's left wing for nearly the same distance, while our left 
 Aving, under Generals Staliel and Bohlen, after having advanced 
 in their attack for about a mile, was in its turn compelled to 
 retreat for about this distance, and did not retain the advantage 
 it had gained. The rebels, foreseeing our intention to press in 
 their strategical flank, strengthened their right wing and direct- 
 ed their principal energies npon that point ; but while they 
 succeeded in repulsing the brunt of our left wing by superior 
 forces and the most favorable position, this advantage could not 
 counterbalance the success of our centre and right, which, how- 
 ever slowly, still steadily advanced and could not be stopped, 
 while the enemy, in his attempt to pursue our left wing, as soon 
 as he deployed out of the woods, v\'as so badly treated by our 
 artillery that be hurried back again into his woods with heavy 
 loss. 
 
 This, sir, is the real result of the battle of Cross Xeys, and 
 no man can say that our forces were beaten either in detail or 
 in the whole. 
 
 General Fremont intended to make another general attack, 
 but despatches were received from General Shields, containing 
 the intelligence, that he had sent forward Col. Carroll to burn , 
 the bridge at Port Kepublic, and that his forces were already at 
 that place. As it was well understood that Jackson coulJ not 
 escape under such circumstances, and that the burning of the 
 bridge would produce a decisive battle, for which there was no 
 more time, as the day was in the decline, the second general 
 attack for this day. was suspended, a strong position taken, the 
 necessary rest given to the men, and every preparation made 
 for the decisive battle, which was anticipated for the next morn- 
 ing. Unfortunately, as I mentioned in another place. Colonel 
 Carroll did not burn the bridge, and this gave a fair opportunity 
 to General Jackson to save his forces from their dangerous posi- 
 
tion. The liastj and stealthy manner in wlTich he withdrew during 
 that night (the Sth) would seem to indicate that the vigor and de- 
 termination with which General Fremont pursued and attacked 
 him had a great moral effect upon his division. 
 
 The morning after the battle of Cross Keys, General Fremont's 
 corps moved towards the Port Republic bridge, maintaining an 
 admirable order of battle, and advancing with great steadiness 
 hnd rapidity. A column of smoke arising in the direction of 
 Port Republic indicated that the bridge had been fired, but 
 whether by Carroll or Jackson, it was impossible to learn. Our 
 corps had proceeded but one or two miles, when the sound of 
 cannon showed that the federal forces on the other side and 
 Jackson were engaged at or near the bridge. Pressing forward 
 in the most brilliant manner, our • troops reached the Shenan- 
 doah, but only to find Jackson safely across, the bridge destroy- 
 ed, and the federal forces on the other side defeated. 
 
 The building of a bridge w-as immediately begun, a reconnbi- 
 teringparty was sent out to ascertain the whereabouts of Shields' 
 forces, and preparations made to renew the pursuit the next day. 
 To the surprise of every one, however. Captain Haskel, who had 
 been sent across the river with the reconnoitering part}^, re- 
 turned with information, that General Shields had been ordered 
 to leave the Lanray Yalley, and was then on the march tov/ards 
 Fredericksburg. This left General Fremont's left flank entirely 
 exposed, rendered it utterly impossible to pursue Jackson further 
 with his small force, and left him no option but to return to 
 Harrisonburg. At that point a telegram, sent before the battle 
 of Cross Jieys, reached the General, instructing him to cease his 
 pursuit of Jackson at that place, and strengthen himself against 
 an attack, It vv^as found, however, that the forces of Generals 
 Banks and Sigel were not to move above Strasburg. Harrison- 
 burg, however strong its position may be strategically for a large 
 army, is dangerous in the extreme for a small force. Approach- 
 able by nine different roads, thei:e is constant danger of being 
 cut ofi", or having the lines of communication broken. The 
 opinions of Generals Fremont, Banks, and Sigel coincided as to 
 the necessity of a farther withdrawal. These opinions being 
 communicated to the President, he signified his acquiescence 
 m the movement, and General Fremont took position first 
 
at Mount Jackson, and afterwards effected a junction with 
 Banks and Sigel at Middletownjat which place on the afternoon 
 of the 2Sth of June, he asked to be relieved from command, in 
 consequence of General Pope's nomination to the command of 
 the army of Virginia. 
 
 This, sir, is the true version of the battle of Cross Keys and 
 of the next subsequent events. 
 
 What Jackson's own idea of his situation was, is very plainly 
 shown by the following extract from the statements of Captain 
 C. JST. Goulding, who was General Pope's chief quartermaster 
 in the field, and who was tiaken prisoner upon tlie occasion of 
 Stuart's noted raid at Catlett's station : 
 
 " Captain Goulding bad several interviews with Jackson, and formed a 
 high estimate of his capabilities. Jackson told him that during the entire 
 war he bad never been so hard pressed as he was by Fremont in the She- 
 nandoah Valley ; that he never was in such a dangerous position as at Cross 
 Keys and Port Republic; and he freely admitted that be would have been 
 captured, army, bag and baggage, had Fremont been reinforced or sup- 
 ported by McDowell." 
 
 As I hope to have sufficiently demonstrated by the above re- 
 cital the ignorance with which you have described and ad- 
 judicated the battle of Cross Keys, we will turn to those pages 
 of your " so-called " history, where you do your utmost in com- 
 menting upon the Shenandoah Yalley campaign, considered 
 under strategetical principles. 
 
 You say on the pages 176 and 177 : 
 
 " The direction chosen by the corps of Fremont and McDowell, for the 
 intercepting of Jackson, was a wrong one. To rnarch to the place where 
 Jackson had only been heard of, according to the last accounts, was evident- 
 ly coming too late. To effect the object, a very simple exercise of arith- 
 ipetic would have shown where to march to. From Winchester, where 
 Jackson was, on the 25th, to Harrisonsburg, in the Shenandoah valley, is 
 three days' march ; from Franklin, where Fremont was, two; and from 
 Falmouth, where McDowell's corps camped, three forced or four ordinary 
 days' march. Both Union Generals might have gained certainly one, and ' 
 McDowell easily two days' march on Jackson, who could not have been 
 immediately informed of their movements. Hence, if General McDowel 
 had marched to Stannardsville, and thenoe through Swiss Run Gap to 
 Lauray, occupying Chester Gap and the road to New Market, Jackson 
 
 ♦ 
 
could uot Lave bindered liim from doing so ; if, at the same time, be bad 
 pushed a column from Warrenton to Manassas Gap, which could easily 
 have been occupied and held by a small force, he might have been in those 
 places on the fourth day, and formed by his left wing a junction with Gen. 
 Fremont, marching from Franklin to Harrisonsburg, and moving thence 
 upon Broadway and New ]\Iarket. Both Generals, pushing rapidly for- 
 ward and throwing out cavalry to the right and the left, near the gaps, to 
 remain well informed of Jackson's movements, might have been in this 
 position on the fourth day. And, supposing they had gained only one day 
 on Jackson, he could not have prevented them. It will be seen, that by 
 acting in this way, they might, with their main force, have continually pre- 
 vented Jackson returning South, whatever course he might take, as they 
 could always reach the decisive point before him. That point would have 
 been evidently the spot to the right or left, where Jackson tried to pass them. 
 That they would have gained several marches on him, is well proved by 
 the fact, that at the commencement of June, he was still at Strasburg, 
 and on the seventh only at Port Republic, at which place, or somewhat 
 below, the Union Generals might have been by the 29th of May, etc., etc." 
 
 In reading these lines, I felt so impressed with their ab- 
 surdity, that you must excuse me if here and there some 
 expressions of good-humored contempt intermix with more 
 serious reflections. Let me trj, before all, to place you on the 
 correct point of view from which you would have judged this 
 campaign, if better acquainted wuth the situation. A consist- 
 ent simple exercise of arithmetic, as jou are in the habit of 
 making, will serve to exhibit our condition. Our depot of 
 supplies was New' Creek, eighty (80) miles, say five stations, 
 from Franklin. We had at command about three hundred 
 wagons, which, divided into the whole way to New Creek and 
 back, shows thirty wagons arriving daily at Franklin. It may 
 give 3^ou a pleasure to calculate, that thirty wagons freight 
 furnish nearly about a daily ration for an army of about 14,000 
 men,. which tlien was the number of our corps. So provided, 
 we could have lived without any apprehension, from day to day, 
 and perhaps we might even have succeeded in accumulating 
 some provisions for extraordinary occasions, if at the same time 
 we had commanded the elements, and if those thirty wagons 
 could have been used only for the transportation of rations. 
 Unfortunately, the most unfavorable weather, and therefore the 
 w^orst condition of roads, embarrassed the forwarding of the 
 
10 
 
 vehicles, and the armj corps, just newly gathered together, 
 wanted very many other things besides provisions. Thus our 
 transportation could furnish only half a ration daily, and 
 we had to subsist upon fresh beef alone, bread or crackers 
 being a precious luxury. A malignant disposition would 
 discover, in this circumstance, a theme for new accusations,' 
 but, as everything was done to prevent such an eventuality 
 without power of remedy in our hands, I dispense Avith dwell- 
 ing upon this subject. Would you now please to add to this 
 condition of our fasting army, that the country, in all directions, 
 from Franklin was made almost a desert, aiibrding neither , 
 foi'age nor food ;• that the roads were obstrncted by the in- 
 habitants and covered with mud, of whose character no one. 
 who has not seen that part of country, can form any conception ; 
 and I ask you, if 3^ou or anybody eke under such circumstances, 
 would have dared to prolong the line of communication 40 
 miles further, and over mountains, thus assuming the responsi- 
 bility of the sure ruin of the army ? There are difficulties and 
 situations in this country, sir, of so peculiar a character, that 
 they will defeat every kind of speculation, if they are not 
 taken into consideration, and the total disregard of this particu- 
 larity at your hands, is the reason why you accumulate blunders 
 upon blunders in your critique upon this campaign. In order to 
 liave this fully evidenced, and to show how impracticable and 
 ridiculous your critical interpretations are, we will perform 
 together the grand strategical movement towards Harrison- 
 burg, M-laich you undertake to make the people believe is the 
 only correct one we had to execute with our army. The first 
 result, by proceeding to Harrisonburg, will be the prolonga- 
 tion of your line of communication to the length of 120 miles, 
 with a means of transportation, which could furnish only half a 
 ration for a line of 80 miles, and with an army which suffered 
 already every kind of privation. As you will observe by the 
 aid of the map, the road leading to Harrisonburg turns almost 
 perpendicularly from our previous road, and leaves Franklin in 
 a corner. If you wish to feel sure that your line of communi- 
 cation, the only line of your vital power, will not be cut in this 
 corner by an attack from Stanton, you must leave a sufficient 
 garrison at Franklin, which, should it be equal to the probable 
 
11 
 
 emergency, would amount to nearly a brigade. In tliis way 
 yon divide your forces. Arriviiig with your main body at 
 Harrisonburg, you propose to move thence upon Broadway 
 and New Market. Once more the road crosses perpendicuhirly 
 your line of communication, and a new corner is left behind, 
 more dangei-ous tlian Franklin ; being a city of considerable 
 population, and accessible by nine different roads. I begin 
 now to be very indifferent, whether you will secure your line of 
 supply by leaving another garrison at Harrisonburg or not. 
 You rather have, to say the truth, no more supplies, and the 
 boldness with which you nevertheless push forward with a half- 
 starved army, has already infected my brain, and like a 
 veteran — of your imagining — I march with you forward upon 
 the graves of my starved comrades. I don't care whether the 
 army has already revolted or will do so the next moment — I 
 don't know how many have remained behind partly sick, or 
 starved, and partly deserted. I continue to advance with you 
 upon Now Market. There, as you suppose, we shall find 
 McDowell, and " push with him rapidly forward, throwing out 
 cavalry to the right and left near the gaps, to remain w-ell 
 infoi'med cf Jackson's movements." Should we not find 
 McDowell at New Market or elsewdiere — he, perhaps, having 
 been a little more cautious than joii — this will not make any 
 clifference ; you are a bold man, who always will push rapidly 
 forward, even should it be on a wooden horse and with the 
 shadows of the ruined army. Jackson, that is your strategical 
 fancy, must at any cost be prevented from returning South. 
 As such an ingenious and heroic strategy certainly merits a 
 good success, I am the first to wish you the most thorough. I 
 will, on this account, suppose that to this very moment every- 
 thing, has been going on perfectly well, and that, without anj'- 
 harm to you and your troops, you fortunately have effected the 
 desired junction with McDowell ; wdio, as bold and aerial as 
 you, has fled over the country, and reached the sj)0t of destina- 
 tion at the fixed time. This being supposed, you have acquired 
 the strength of about 30,000 men, no matter whether supplied 
 or not ; and now comes tlie glorious moment when you are 
 directly pushing forward against poor Jackson, who, according 
 to the horoscope you have cast for him, will be prevented re- 
 
12 
 
 turning Soutli, whatever course he might talce, as " you always 
 can reach the decisive point before him." 
 
 Wliat a pity that you cannot be as good as the heroic words 
 in your forbearing book, and that Jackson, being as cunning a 
 fellow as you, gets in time information of ^'•our adventurous 
 movement, and wliile you effect a junction with McDowell at 
 j^ew Market, strikes from Winchester into the road leading to 
 Petersburg, seizes tliere your line of communication, and 
 marches at his ease to Franklin, wliere he captures everything 
 left behind, and goes well supplied and enriched with spoils of 
 every description triumpliantly to Stanton, from where he can , 
 reach Richmond quicker than from Port Pepublic. 
 
 How, sir, would you have prevented Jackson from doing 
 so after having effected your fanciful junction with McDowell 
 at New Market via Harrisonsburg ? Would you have fol- 
 lowed him through the mountains to Petersburg, or turned 
 back to Franklin, to be there before his arrival ? In the first 
 case, you may apply your favorite exercise of arithmetic, and 
 will see, that whatever course you might have taken, Jackson 
 from Winchester would surely have reached the passes of Wor- 
 densville one or two days before you, and sacrificing there in 
 the most formidable position a very small force, would have 
 contested your further advance for days, while his main body, 
 unmolested and with perfect ease, would have reached Peters- 
 burg and Franklin. 
 
 In the event, that you should have intended to return to 
 Franklin, to be there before Jackson's arrival, I ask 3'ou, how 
 possibly would you have carried out this new stratagem. Being 
 still out of breath with incessant marchino; not havins; vet es- 
 tablished a new line of supplies, and having the previous line 
 cut from New Creek to Franklin, you would have been, so to 
 say, planted in the air. The mere idea, to go under such cir- 
 oumstances back to Fraidclin, not having anything to live upon, 
 and having no prospect to get anj'thing, would be the most 
 gigantic nonsense. Fortunately, this eventuality was based 
 upon the supposition, that you had effected a junction with 
 McDowell at New Market via Harrisonsburg, and as such a 
 manoiuvre was only the chimeric offspring of an ill-disposed 
 imagination, with regard to the real condition of our troops 
 
13 
 
 and supplies at Franldin, wo may consider this excursion of 
 ideas as a mere experiment to show how absurd even in this 
 case your assertion is, tliat you would liave prevented Jackson 
 from ever returning South. 
 
 I think there is not much more to be said about your 
 strategy. The exposure of this example is sufficient to rank 
 you in the category of theoretically overstrained capacities, so 
 frequently imported from Europe, who never will assimilate 
 with the practices and tlie peculiarities of this country, and re- 
 main for their lifetime idle fancy mongers, forgetful, or igno- 
 rant, of the fact that the theories of European countries, grow- 
 ing out of wars over limited territories, full of supplies, with ex- 
 cellent roads, and crowded populations, do not fit to America 
 with its great extent, scattered populations, bad roads and 
 limited supplies. 
 
 Your entire deductions even from your mis-statements, I 
 have proven to be illogical and iinmilitary. They are grossly 
 absurd in view of their entire untruth. There are still other 
 passages in your book quite as full of contradiction and ignor- 
 ance as those already refuted. My business is finished with 
 the discussions above. I will make one other extract, however, 
 which is more of a personal character, and deserves to be 
 treated as such. It was not germain to the alleged purpose of 
 your book, and was entirely gratuitous. .On page 170 I find 
 the followinc; : 
 
 " The action at Cross Keys is highly creditable to the rebel general, and 
 " to his men who fought it. The general, on the contrary, who lets slip 
 " the opportunity of crushing 5,000 men with 20,000, and, what is worse, 
 " who permitted himself to be beaten under such circumstances, has cer- 
 " taiiily but very few claims to the title of ' general.' " 
 
 After the irrefutable evidence I have brought to bear against 
 every single statement of your lucubrations, taking in consider- 
 ation the time you had to gather true arguments from authentic 
 sources before writing your book, I feel justified in saying that, 
 although I raidced you in the category of idle fancy mongers, 
 you this time may not have acquired all the nonsense in your 
 closet, but rather behind the '' coiclisses" where you assisted in 
 plotting a mean forgery. 
 
u 
 
 To censure in that Mianner a man who has spent a life in the 
 civil and military service of the country, and who, besides the 
 skill and energy he displayed in the West, in this particular 
 campaign brought a striking example before the country, of 
 what true zeal and ingenuity of a General can perform, wliile 
 blamelessly and most vigorously accomplishing the chase of a 
 superior enemy, after overcoming 100 miles in seven days, and 
 every obstacle in his way, — to condemn, I say, such a man in 
 such shameless words, having no other arguments for tlie de- 
 nunciation than falsehoods, — this, sii', is nothing but a phiin 
 villainy, and such, I am convinced, will be the judgment of 
 the public. 
 
 John Pilsen, Lt.-Coh, 
 A. D. C. on General Fremont's Staff. 
 
 To Mr. Emil Scualk, Author of " Summary of the Art of War," 
 
 Philadelphia, Pa. 
 
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