LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 111 029 522 807 6^ Hollinger Corp. pH 8.5 GLEANINGS FROM Dugald Stewarts Works, WITH ADDITIONS. Influence of Opinions on Happiness. SELECTED, PREPARED AND PUBLISHED M ( BY ROSS WINANS. BALTIMORE: JOHN P. DES FORGES 1872. :^%^ GLEANINGS By Opinions are here meant, not merely speculative conclusions to which we have given our assent, but convictions which have taken root in the mind, and have an habitual influence on the conduct, Of these opinions a very great and impor- tant part are, in the case of all mankind, interwoven by education with their first habit of thinking ; or are insensibly imbibed from the manners of the times. Where such opinions are erroneous, they may often be corrected, to a great degree, by the persevering efforts of a reflecting and a vigorous mind ; but as the number of minds capable of reflection is comparatively small, it becomes a duty on all who have themselves experienced the happy effects of juster and more elevated principles to impart, as far as they are able, the same blessing to others. To habituate the minds of children to those occupations and enjoyments which afford the most genuine and substantial satisfaction is of the utmost importance : and if education were judiciously employed to second, in this respect the recommendations of nature, the charms of life would be the greater. Choose that course of action — says Pytha- goras-— which is best, and custom will soon render it the most agreeable. The foregoing remarks relate to what may be called the essentials of happiness ; — the circumstances w T hich constitute the general state or habit of mind, that is necessary to lay a ground work for every other enjoyment. This foundation being supposed, the sum of happiness enjoyed by an individual will be proportioned to the degree in which he is able to secure all the various pleasures belonging to our nature. These pleasures may be referred to the following heads : — 1. The pleasures of Activity and Repose. 2. The pleasures of Sense. 3. The pleasures of Imagination. 4. The pleasures of the Understanding. 5. The pleasures of the Heart. The wisest plan of economy, with respect to our pleasures, is not merely compatible with a strict observance of the rules of mor- ality, but is, in a great measure, compre- hended in these rules, and therefore, that the happiness, as well as the perfection of our nature, consists in doing our duty, with as little solicitude about the event as is consis- tent with the weakness of humanitv. He, whose ruling principle of action is a sense of Duty, conducts himself in the busi- ness of life with boldness, consistency, and dignity, finds himself rewarded by that happi- ness which so often eludes the pursuit of those who exert every faculty of the mind, in order to attain it. The various duties of life agree with each other in one common quality, that of being obligatory on rational and voluntary agents ; and they are all enjoined by the same authori- ty ; — the authority of conscience. These duties, therefore, are but different articles of one law, which is properly expressed by the word Virtue ; [or still more unequivocably, by the phrase, Moral Law of Nature.] A man, whose ruling or habitual principle of action is a sense of Duty, or a regard to 6 what is Right, may be properly denominated Virtuous. The practice of morality, is facilitated by repeated acts ; and, therefore the word Virtue, may with propriety be employed to express that habit of mind which it is the great object of a good man to confirm. A sense of duty, and an enlightened regard to our own happiness, conspire in most in- stances to give the same direction to our con- duct, so as to put it beyond a doubt that, even in this world, a virtuous life is true wisdom. Both from experience and reflection, we learn the connexion between virtue and happiness ; and, consequently, the great lessons of mor- ality which are obvious to the capacity of all mankind could never have been suggested to them merely by a regard to their own interest. Indeed, this discovery which experience makes to us of the connexion between virtue and happiness, both in the case of individuals and of political societies, furnishes one of the most pleasing subjects of speculation to the phi- losopher, as it places in a striking point of view the unity of design which takes place in our constitution, and opens encouraging and delightful prospects with respect to the moral government of the Deity. The man who is most successful in the pursuit of happiness, is not he who proposes it to himself as the great object of his pursuit, To do so, and to be continually occupied with schemes on the subject, would fill the mind with anxious conjectures about futurity, and with perplexing calculations of the various chances of good and evil. Whereas the man whose ruling principle of action is a sense of duty, conducts himself in the business of life with boldness, consistency and dignity, and finds himself rewarded with that happiness which so often eludes the pursuit of those who exert every faculty of the mind in order to attain it. Divine Providence has constituted the order of things in such a sort, as to make the rule of natural self-preservation consistent with the fundamental principle of universal benevo- lence, and the doing as we would be done by? For my own part, I must confess, I never could conceive that an all-wise, just, and benevolent being would contrive to make that to be our duty which is not, upon the whole and generally speaking, — -even without the 8 consideration of a future state — our interest likewise. 14 That which renders beings capable of moral government is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. That we have this moral approv- ing and disapproving faculty is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recog- nizing it in each other. It is manifest a great part of common language and of com- mon behavior over the world is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty, whether called Conscience, Moral Reason, Moral Sense, or Divine Reason, whether considered as a sentiment [perception] of the Understanding, or as a perception [sentiment] of the Heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the general what course of action this faculty or practical dis- cerning power within us approves, and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particu- lars, yet in general there is in reality a uni- versally acknowledged standard of it. It is that which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public, — it is that which 9 every man you meet puts on the show of, — it is that which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of, upon mankind, namely justice, veracity, and regard to com- mon good." The intentions of nature, in associating the ideas of the beautiful and the good, cannot be mistaken. Much, I am persuaded, might be done by a judicious system of education, in following out the plan which nature has her- self, in this instance, so manifestly traced ; as we find, indeed was done to a very great degree in those ancient schools, who con- sidered it as the most important of all objects to establish such a union between philosophy and the fine arts, as might add to the natural beauty of virtue every attraction which the imagination could give her, and affords addi- tional evidence of the beneficient solicitude with which nature allures to the practice of our duty. "Do you imagine," says Socrates to Aris- tippus, "that what is good is not beautiful ? " How delightful are our feelings when we are conscious of doing well ? By a species of 10 instinct we know ourselves to be the object of the esteem and attachment of our fellow creatures, and we feel that we enjoy the approbation of the invisible witness of our conduct. Although, however, this sense of merit which accompanies the performance, good actions con- vinces the philosopher of the connexion which the Deity has established between virtue and happiness, he does not proceed on the supposi- tion, that on particular occasions miraculous interpositions are to be made in his favor. That virtue is the most direct road to happi- ness he sees to be the case even in this world ; but he knows that the Deity governs by gen- eral laws ; and when he feels himself dis- appointed in the attainment of his wishes, he acquiesces in bis lot, perseveres in well-doing, and looks forward with hope to futurity. This belief of the connexion between virtue and good fortune has plainly taken its rise from the natural connexion between the ideas of virtue and merit, a connexion which, we may rest assured, is agreeable to the general laws by which the universe is governed, although not always immediately apparent. it The strongest presumption of a future state is deduced from our natural notions of right and wrong ; of merit and demerit ; and from a comparison between these and the general course of human affairs. The very notion of virtue implies the no- tion of obligation. Every being who is con- scious of the distinction between right and wrong, carries about with him a law which he is bound to observe notwithstanding he may be in total ignorance of a future state. "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves." "Right, implies duty in its idea. To per- ceive an action to be right, is to see a reason for doing it in the action itself, abstracted from ail other considerations whatever ; and this perception, this acknowledged rectitude in the action, is the very essence of obligation, that which commands the approbation and choice, and binds the conscience of every rational human being/' We are under an obligation to right, which is antecedent, and in order and nature superior to all other. 12 Dr Clarke has expressed himself nearly to the same purpose. "The judgment and con- science of a man's own mind concerning the reasonableness and fitness of the thing; is the truest and formalest obligation ; for whoever acts contrary to this sense and conscience of his own mind is necessarily self -condemned ; and the greatest and strongest of all obliga- tions is that which a man cannot break through without condemning himself. So far, therefore, as men are conscious of what is right and- wrong, so far they are under an obligation to act accordingly." This view of human nature is the most simple, so it is the most ancient which occurs in the history of moral science. It was the doctrine of the Pythagorean school, as appears from a fragment of Theages, a Pythagorean writer, published in Gale's Opuscula Mytholo- gica. It is also explained by Plato in some of his dialogues. Adam Smith says, "upon whatever we sup- pose our moral faculties to be founded," I quote his own words, "whether upon a certain modi- fication of reason upon an original instinct called a moral sense or upon some other prin- ciple of our nature, it cannot be doubted that 13 they are given us for the direction of our con- duct in this life. They carry along with them the most evident badges of their authority, which denote that they were set up within us to be the supreme arbiters of all our actions ; to superintend all our senses, passions, and appetites ; and to judge how far* each of them was to be either indulged or restrained. "Since these, therefore," continues Mr Smith, "were plainly intended to be the governing principles of human nature, the rules which they prescribe are to be regarded as the com- mands and laws of the Deity promulgated by those vicegerents which he has thus set up within us By acting according to their dictates we may be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance, as far as in our power, the plan of Provi- dence. — Theory of Moral Sentiments. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 029 522 807 6 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS III 029 522 807 6 Hollinger Corp. P H 8.5 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 111 029 522 807 6 Hollinger Corp. pH 8.5