-.V- <>', .0 .0 <^ ' ^' " ■' - . ^ ^' .0 ^ '^•, '^H^ . K^ -^ o. = « o ^* ,^^' V \^ c v^o^ ^. 4 o ^^-^^^ -j v- > V \^ -^ o. .^ > ^ vy 5 • • , ^* . pyr?.5b, ^ v<. -^^ ^-f ^"-^^^ ,40, ■J v. .0' ^P> • o « ^ >* V .^^ *\ <^. ^oV" ^°--^. ^P b '4 , -P "^- 0^ o ^J^. C> f. c .><^- .v^. 13 '^ '^ ^^> u 0^ o " ° * 'O .^ oV"==^^\!l^"^ ^^v.-^^ ^' : '^^^^ '>'- <-^ ^^^' C° /' ''^ °o ./ , '^0' > -\ o ** r::c.-, ^-P^ c°' .'J4^>/°o >- ..r^% "-t O « G >0 -^^0^ 0' 4 o V-^' ^^-i- .3'^"-. .;^ ^^'-^i#^^^'^ A .3^^"^. ."Jv \ <^. . . . ^^ ns of high rank and quality, and was founded on a capital of ^eilO.OOO. As late as 1750, ati act was passed by the English Parliament for extending and improving the trade to Africa. All nations were eager to seize the opportunity of deriving profit fro'ii a traffic (as late as in the year 1783) even as.serted upon the floor of Parliament " to he necessary, in a commercial view, to all commercial nations ;" and which was not then considered by any nation as inconsistent with the rights of humanity or the laws of nations. The con- tract of the Assientn, which was obtained by England for a limited time, under the I2th article of the treaty of Utrecht, was a legitimate source of wealth and prosperity to her, and afl()rded a special encouragement to her maritime enterprise, which must ever be considered a political object by her statesmen. In the year l()8y, England made a regular convention with Spain for supplying the Spanish West Indies with negro slaves from the island of Jamaica. The twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, (1713,) grants to her Britannic Majesty, and to the company of her subjects appointed for that purpose (the South Sea Company) — as well the subjects of Spain as all others being excluded — the contract for introducing negroes into several parts of the dominions of his Catholic Majesty in America, (conmionly cill^d El pacta de el Assienio de Negros,) at the rate of 4,000 negroes annual'y, for the space of thirty years successively. To this compact there have been two pointed references in the British Parliament. "By the treaty of Utrecht," said Mr. Brougham, (June 16, 1812,) "what the execrations of ages have left inadequately censured, Great Britain was content to obtain, as the whole price of Ramuielles and Blenheim, an additional share of the accursed slave trade." Among the Germans slavery was recognised as one of the principles of national law. [WoU de'Nat. Rel. 201. MoUoy de Marit Lib. 3, cap. 1] In the rude outline of the feudal system, with all its modifications of villeinage and under-servitude.may be clearly deduced the general practice of slavery in the north of Europe. Egypt, Carthage, Sicily, and every nation of antiquity have deeply incorporated in their social systems the insti- tution of slavery. In a case of great importance, on an appeal to the High Court of Admiralty, the whole doctrine of slavery was reviewed, and the following strong and marked language was used by Sir William Scott, in delivering the judgment of the court: " Let me not be misunderstood or misrepresented as a professed apologist for the prac- tice, when I sfate facts which no man can deny, that personal slavery, arising out of forcible captivity, is coeval with the earliest history of mankind ; that it is found existing (and, so far as it appears, without animadversion) in the earliest and most autheiilic records of the human race, and was recognised by the laws of the most polished nation of antiquity ; that under the light of Christianity itself, the possession of persons, so ac- quired, has been, in every civilized country, invested with the character of property, and secured as such by all the protection of laws ; that solemn treaties have been formed and national monopolies eagerly sought to facilitate and extend the commerce of this asserted property ; and all this with the sanction of law, public and municipal, and without any opposition." It is matter of notorious history, that both in ancient and modern Europe the condition of slavery and commerce in slaves were sanctioned by the universal practice and law of nations. [See Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. iv, p. 221 ; Gibbon's Decline and Fall, vol. i, p. 63.] The very definition of slavery in the civil law, which has been copied by writers on public law, shows that it was an institution established by private law, against the law of nature. Servitus est consti'utio juris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subjicitur. [See Domat. Loix. civ. Prel. tit. 2, sec. 3 ] In 1689, all the judges in England, with the eminent men who then filled the offices of nttorney and solicitor-general, concurred in opinion that negroes were "merchandise," within the general laws of the navigation act. [See Chalmer's Opinion of Eminent Law- yers, 263.] r. J J The first case relating to the African slave trade is that of Butts vs. Penn,determmed in the 29th of Charles IL, being trover for negroes. The special verdict found that they were usually bought and sold in India. [See 2 Keeble, 785 ; 2 Lev.,201.] In a subse- quent case, trovel- was brought for a negro in England. Holt, C. J., said, that trespass was the kind of action, but that trover would lie, " if the sale was in Virginia." Other cases bear upon questions as to the form of action, but they all concur in establishing the right of this species of property. [See 2 Salk, 666 ; 1 Lord Raym, 146 ; 5 Mod. Rep. 1^5.] ^ , J . I. In connexion with this question of personal property it may be remarked that the ancient law of England made the villein or English slave inheritable estate, and passed him like the land ; that the laws of all the British West India islands in 1782 contem- plated the negroes as real estate ; that the French colonial laws considered them, in several important particulars, like immovable property ; that the ancient Romans held them to be hke lands ; that the prescriptive laws of nations, as established by the prac- tice of Great Britain, France, Spain, &c., restored and delivered them up, after war, as and with real estate, not only in capitulating islands conqiered from each other, but even, as in the Grenada and the Grenaders, in islands conquered unconditionally, or xoithout capitulation. , r i. • .• r We found slavery engrafted in the very policy of the country before the organization ol the Government, and we are persuaded of the impolicy of rashly interfering with it ; if it be a moral evil, it is like many others which exist in all civilized countries, and which the world quietly submits to. Humanity has been a topic of declamation on this subject; that sentiment has difierent operations on different individuals. It was humanity that first gave origin to the transportation of slaves from Africa to America. Bartholomew de las Casas, Bishop of Chiapa, a Spaniard renowned for his humanity and virtues, in order to save the Indians in South America from slavery, prevailed on his monarch to substitute Africans, which were accordingly purchased and shipped to the Spanish colo- nies to work in the mines. [See Robertson's History of America ; see, also, Don Onis, 8 the Spanish Ambassador, letter to Mr. Adams, Secretary of State, 14th May, 1818.] " The introduction of negro slaves into America was one of the earliest measures adopted for the improvement and prosperity of these vast dominions." [Bancroft's History of the United States, vol. l,pp. 182, 183.] The Spaniards and Portuguese dealt in the traffic of African negroes, as slaves, even before the discovery of America. [lb., v. l.pp 178,179.] In the history of the relations of Great Britain with the American colonies, there is no circumstance more demonstrable than her steady determination to maintain the slave trade in the greatest activity and extent, whatever miijht be their feelings of disgust and apprehension, and however gloomy the aspect which the continuation gave to the colo- nies. Their permanent welfare, their immediate comfort, were not considered, when brought in competition with the prosperity of the Royal African Company. Slavery, as it now exists in the United States, can never be made a matter of reproach to the existing Government, or the present generation. It was an evil intro- duced into the colonies by the parent State, and acquiesced in to a great degree by the colonies themselves, in an age when the traffic in slaves was pursued by ail nations without a suspicion of its enormity. The Northern colonies participated in it equally with the Southern, and the navigation of the New England ports was employed continually on the African coast in the trans- portation of slaves to the different American markets, and by means of American capi- tal. There can be no reproach, therefore, cast upon the South for the introduction of this evil which, we conceive, will not equally attach to the North and to the English nation. We were all equally disposed to embark in the traffic, and avail ourselves of its proceeds ; and the guilt, if any there be, must be shared in an equal degree by the parties concerned. CHAPTER II. Slaves recognised as Property hy the old Congress, before the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of Independence, the basis of our free government, declares that all men are created free and equal ; and the Constitution of the United States proclaims that the people formed a system to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity ; yet, by express language of the latter instrument, the relation of slave and master is recognised ; showing that the frainers of the Constitution did not deem this general declaration in favor of liberty incompatible with its other provisions ; and it has never been judicially determined that slavery in the United States was thereby abrogated. On the contrary, it has often been adjudged, both by State and Federal Courts, that slavery still exists ; that the master's right of property in the slave has not been affected either by the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution of tht^ United States. The right to seize and capture, transport to this country, sell and subject to bondage the native African was not only tolerated, but adjudged lawful long after the adoption of the Constitution, and was only abolished by special act of Congress. Journal of the Continental Congress, October 20, 1774. NON-I.MPORTATIO.V COVENANT. "Article 2. We will neither import nor purchase any slave imported after the first day of December next ; after which time we will wholly discontinue the slave trade, and will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will we hire our vessels nor sell our cominodities or manufactures to those who are concerned in it. " The foregoing association being determined ui)on by the Congress, was ordered to be subscribed by the several members thereof; and, thereupon, we have hereunto set our respective names accordingly. " In Congress, Philadelphia, October 24. " Signed. PEYTON RANDOLPH, President. " New Hampshire. — John Sullivan, Nathaniel Folsum. " Massachusetts Bay. — Thomas Gushing, Samuel Adams, John Adams, Robert Treat Paine. " Rhode Islnnd. — Stephen Hopkins, Samuel Ward. " Connecticut. — Eliphalet Dyer, Roger Sherman, Silas Deane. 9 " New York. — Isaac Lowe, John Alsop, James iDuane, William Floyd, Henry Wisher, S. Boerman, Philip Livingston. " New Jersey. — James Kinsey, William Livingston, Stephen Crane, Richard Smith, John De Hart. " Pennsylvania. — Joseph Galloway, John Dickinson, Charles Humphries, Thomas Mifflin, Kdward Riddle, John Merton, George Ross. "New Castle, Del. — Csesar Rodney, Thomas McKean, George Read. " Maryland. — Milton Tilghman, Thomas Johnson, William Pica, Samuel Chase. " Virginia. — Richard Henry Lee, George Washington, Patrick Henry, jr., Richard Blair, Benjamin Harrison, Edmund Pendlt-ton. " North Carolina. — William Hooper, Joseph Hughes, R. Caswell. " South Carolina. — Henry Middleton, Thomas Lynch, Christopher Gadsden, John Rutledge, Edward Rutledge." [See Journal of the Provincial Congress, p. 736.] In looking over the Secret Journal of Domestic Affairs of the Continental Congress, a report and resolutions will be found which will be perfectly conclusive upon this ques- tion. The report was made on the 29th of March, 1779. It will be recollected that during the war of the Revolution the British enlisted slaves as troops, and that the period already referred to was one of great gloom and despondency in the South ; and then, if ever, as the enemy were enlisting the slaves of the southern planters, the Con- tinental Congress might have found strong arguments for combating them with the same species of force, especially as by refraining from doing so the slaves were not only lost to the owner, but were added to the military force of the enemy. The proceedings of Congress on this occasion display that combination of wisdom and prudence for which that body was so justly distinguished. The report states that the delegation of South Caro- lina in Congress had represented the distressed state of the country, the desertion of the negroes to the enemy, and that those who still remained were exposed to their arti- fices and temptations; that if they were embodied, this desertion might be prevented, and they might be rendered formidable to the enemy, &c. Whereupon, "Resolved, That it be recommended to the States of South Carolina and Georgia, if they shall think the same expedient, to take measures" for raising a force of this description. By another resolution it was declared " that Congress will make provision for the proprietors of such negroes, &c., a full compensation for the property," &,c. &c. [See Secret Journal, pages 107-8.] This recommendation of Congress was not adopted. It is not at all material to the purpose for which we have quoted the Journal to ascertain that fact. The report and resolutions show conclusively the sense of the Continental Congress, that the slaves were not to be employed without the consent of the local authorities ; and, if employed with that consent, that the owners were to receive full compensation for the property — thus recognising the principle that slaves were considered as property. The old Congress, of 1782, expressly sanctioned the right of slavery when they pass- ed the following resolutions: Resolved, That the Secretary of Foreign Affairs be and he is hereby directed to ob- tain, as speedily as possible, authentic returns of the slaves and other property which have been carried off or destroyed in the time of the war by the enemy, and transmit the same to the Minister Plenipotentiary for negotiating peace. Resolved, That in the mean time the Secretary for Foreign Affairs inform the said Minister that many thousands of slaves and other property to a very great amount, have been carried off or destroyed by the enemy ; and that, in the opinion of Congress, the great loss of property which the citizens of the United Slates have sustained by the enemy, will be considered by the several States as an insuperable bar to their making restitution or indemnification to the former owners of property, what has been or may be forfeited, or confiscated, by many of the States. [See 1 vol. State Papers, page 333.] On the 26th May, 1783, the following preamble and resolution were carried without a division : " On motion of Mr. Hamilton, seconded by Mr. Izard. — Whereas, by the articles agreed upon on the 30ih of November last, by and between the Commissioners of the United States of America for making peace, and Commissioners on the part of his Bri- tannic Majesty, it is stipulated that his Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes or other pro- perty of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said United States, and from every port, place, and harbor within the same ; and whereas, a considerable number of negroes belonging to citizens of these States have been carried off therefrom, contiary to the true intent and meaning of the said articles: 10 " Eesohed, That the copies of the letters between the commander-in-chief, Sir Guy Carieton, and other papers on this subject, be transmitted to the Ministers Plenipoten- tiary of these States for negotiating peace in Europe ; and that they be directed to re- monstrate thereon to the court of Great Britain, and take proper measures for obtaining such reparation, as the nature of the case will admit. "Ordered, that a copy of the foregoing resolve be transmitted to the coinmander-in- chief ; and that he be directed to continue his remonstrances to Sir Guy Carieton, re- specting the permitting negroes belonging to the citizens of tliese States to leave New York, and to insist on the discontinuance of that measure." Again, on the 9lh of August, 1783, Congress resolved that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs cause to be made out separate lists of the number, names, and owners of the ne- groes belonging to citizens of each Stale, and carried away by the British, in contra- vention of the treaty, and that he transmit the said lists to the Executives of the Slates to which they respectively belong. Pursuing these historical illustrations, we find in the British Treaty of 1783, which closed the war of Independence, that provision is made, by the ninth article, against the destruction or carrying away of any negroes. By a resolve of the 15ih April, 1783, the commander-in-chief was instructed to make arrangements with the British commander for receiving possession of the ports held by the Brit sh troops in the United States, and for obtaining the delivery of all negroes and other property which by the treaty were to be given up. The old Congress sanctioned the right of slavery when they commissioned agents "to obtain the delivery of all negroes and other property of the inhabitants of the United States in the possession of the British forces, or any subjects of, or adherents to, his Bri- tannic Majesty." [See 1 Vol. State Papers, page 221.] General Washington demanded restitution of the slaves in the possession of the British forces. A letter from him dated 7th day of May, 1783, says: " That, in obedi- ence to a resolution of Congiess, he had a conference with General Carieton on the sub- ject of delivering up the slaves and other property belonging to the citizens of the United States, in compliance with the articles of the provincial treaty ; that he (General Carle- ton) appeared to evade a compliance with the said treaty by a misconstruction of the same, and permitted a large number of the said slaves to be sent off to Nova Scotia." The opinions and convictions of General Washington, on this pomt, were, that the carry- ing away the negroes, as it was done, was an infraction cf the treaty. His correspondence with Congress, and with the British commanders, and his instructions to Mr. Benson, Lieutenant ColDiiel Smith, and Mr. Parker, the American Commissioners, all go to show that he demanded the restitution of slaves. Sir GuyCarlfton wascharged by General Washington with having violated the treaty, in suffering the embarkation of the negroes ; and he acknowledged the truth of the charge, by his precautions in ascertaining the number, and thereby gave an evident opinion that restitution should be made for them. E.xtraci from a letter of General Washington to Sir Guy Carieton : ^ " Orangetown, May 6, 1783. " I find it my duty to signify my readiness, in conjunction with your excellency, to enter into any agiet^ment, or to take any measures, which may be deenied e.xpedient, to prevent the future carrying away of any negroes, or other property of American inhabi- tants." [See 3 Vol. Sparks' Writings of Washington.] In the letter here mentioned. Sir Guy Carieton had requested that Congress would em- power some persons to go into New York and superintend the embarkation of persons and property, in fulfilment of the seventh article of the provincial treaty. [Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. XI., p. 325.] Tliese Conunissioners, appointed by General Washington to superintend the embarka- tion from New York, and see tiiat no American properly was carried away, at the close of the business made report to him of their doings, when they say, " Sir (iuy Carieton affected to distinguish between the cases of such negroes as came within the British lines in consequence of the promises of freedom and indemnity, held out in the proclamatione of his predecessor." In a letter of Sir Guy Carieton, of May 12, he admits the violation, and palliates it by Baying he had no right to deprive the negroes of that liberty he found them possessed of; that it was unfriendly to suppose that the king's minister could stipulate to be guilty of a notorious breach of faith towards the negro ; and that if it was his intention, itinust be adjusted by compensation, restoration being utterly impracticable. 11 " The negroes in question, I have already said, I found free when I arrived at New York. I had, therefore, no right, as I thought, to prevent their going away to any part of the world they thought proper." [See Sir Guy Carletoa's letter. State Papers, vol. ii, p. 5.] The Commissioners remonstrated with Sir Guy Carleton in regard to his determina- tion " to carry away" the negroes, in violation of the treaty, and in a letter bearing date June 19th, 1783, addressed to General Washington, they say," we conceive it is now reduced to a certainty, that all applications for the delivery of the property will be fruit- less, and we shall therefore desist from any further effort." The American Commissioners were permitted to make a bill of the negroes in the possession of the British at the close of the war, by the British commander; there were resolutions of Congress claiming compensation for the property carried away in contra- vention of that article in the treaty of peace ; during the administrition of Lord Car- marthen, the claim for compensation for property carried awiy was admitted. In the 7th article it was stipulated that his Britannic Majesty should withdraw his armies, garrisons, and fleets, without carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants. The United States contended that the negroes remaining within the British lines after the peace, but who, having been captured or invited by proclamation, had fled to the British during the war, were the property of the inhabitants of the United States, and should be delivered up, in virtue of the stipulation of the treaty of peace. The British Government contended for another construction, and said that negroes captured in war, or who, invited by proclamation, had taken refuge with them during the war, could not be restored without a breach of public faith ; that the slaves, by coming within the British jurisdiction, were by that fact emancipated. If Great Britain was justified in the mainte- nance of that principle, that the moment the negroes came within the British jurisdiction all American interest in them ceased, what justification can be offered for the members of the old Congress for passing resolutions demanding the reclamation of slaves as American property, when, in fact, they were no longer slaves, but were, to all intents and purposes, /ceeme/j .^ The highest legal tribunal of Great Britain, eighty years ago, declared that a slave could exist on the soil of the parent State. [Somersett's case, 20 Howell's State Trials, 70.] Following up and extending this view, the same Govern- ment and the colonial authorities have made repeated declarations, " that they never would surrender persons who had taken refuge under the British standard." In the case of Forbes vs. Cochrane, 2 B. & C, 448, which was an action by a British subject against Commander Cochrane for refusing to deliver up fugitive slaves, Holroyd, Jus- tice, declared, in his opinion, that the moment a party gets out of the territory where slavery prevails, and gets under the protection of another power, the right of the master, which is founded on the municipal law of the place only, does not continue. Such is the current of decisions of England with reference to slaves. And yet energetic measures were adopted by the old Congress for the restoration of the property. Mr. John Jay himself, when Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the year 1786, in a re- port he then made to Congress on the subject, maintained that the carrying off of those negroes was a violation of the treaty ; and said further that he understood from Mn Adams, then at the Court of London, that the British Minister had no objections to making compensation for them. Our minister was instructed by Mr. Randolph, Secretary of State under General Washington, to press upon the British Government the necessity of making indemnifi- cation for the slaves deported in violation of the provisions of the treaty of 1783. Here is the reply of Governeur Morris, which expressly recognises the principle of indemnity for slave property : Extract from a despatch of Governeur Morris, Minister to England, to George Washington, President of the United States, dated London, April 7, 1790. " And here I took occasion to observe to the Duke of Leeds, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the Southern States, who had been much blamed in this country for ob- structing the recovery of British debts, were not liable for all the severity of censure which had been thrown upon them ; that these negroes had been taken or seduced away, and the payment for these negroes having been stipulated by treaty, they had formed a reliance on such payment for discharge of debts contracted with the British merchants, both previously and subsequently to the war." [See 1 vol. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, p. 122.] 12 Private Journal of John Adams. Extracts from Mr. Adams' Journal, Friday, November 29, 1782. " Mr. Oswald, Mr. Franklin, Mr. Jay, and Mr. Laurens, met at Mr. Jay's Hotel d'Orleans. " In the Convention he (Dr. Franklin) complained of the British forces : That he stated thp carrying off of goods from Boston, Philadelphia, and the Carolinas, Geor- gia, Virginia, (fee. " I'pon this I (Mr. Adams) recounted the history of Gen. Gaee's agreement with the inhabitants of Boston. Doctor Franklin mentioned the case of Phil.idelphia, and the carryins; oti' effects, even his own library. Mr. Jay mentioned several other things, and Mr. Laurens added the plunder in Carolina of negroes," &c. &c. [See 2d vol. State Papers, page I'A.] He further remarks, that before the signing of the treaties, " Mr. Laurens said, there ought to be a stipulation that the British troops shall carry off no negroes or other American property. We all agreed. Mr. Oswald consented, and then the treaties were signed," &c., &c. Again : " I was very happy Mr. Laurens come in, although it was the last day of the conference, and wished he could have been sooner. His apprehension, notwithstanding his deplorable aflliction under the recent loss of so e.xcellenj. a son, is as quick, his judg- ment as sound, and his head as firm as ever. He had an opportunity of examining the whole, and judging and oppusing ; and the article which he caused to be inserted at the very last, that no properly should be carried off." [See Mr. Madison's speech on Jay's Treaty, p. 70.] 3Ir. Burr's Motion. Whilst the ratification treaty of 1794, commonly called Jay's Treaty, was under dis- cussion in the Senate, the following proposition was brought forward, which ultimate- ly prevailed : " Art. G. That the value of the negroes and other property, carried away contrary to the 7th article of the treaty of 1783, and the loss and damage sustained hy the Uni- ted States hy the detention of the posts, be paid for by the British Government ; the amount to be ascertained by the commissioners who may be appointed to liquidate the claims of the British creditors." This resolution has for its object further amicable negotiation for the value of the ne- groes. It may be considered as the unanimous opinion of the Senate, that this claim for negroes was not placed by the treaty of 1794 upon a just and satisfactory basis. It ai)pears from the extracts and the minutes in Mr. Jefferson's " Papers relative to Great Britain," which accompanied General Washington's message to Congress on the 5th of December, 1793, that the American Commissioners at Paris, in 1782, had held up to the British Commissioners general claims for negroes carried away in the course of the war. Private Journal of Dr. Franklin. Extract of a letter from Dr. Franklin to Richaid Oswald, Esquire: Passey, November 2G, ] 782. In this letter Dr. Franklin enclosed to Mr. Oswald the following, lobe incorporated in the treaty of peace, stipulating compensation for the deported slaves: It is agreed that His Britannic Majesty will earnestly recommend it to his Parliament to provide for and make compensation to the merchants and sliopkeepers of Boston ; their goods and merchandise were seized and taken out of the stores, warehouses, and ships, by order of General (Jage, and others of his commanders or officers there ; also to the inhabitants of Philadelphia for the goods taken away by the army there, and to make compensation also for tobacco, rice, indigo, and slaves, &c. Sugar was carried off by his armies under Generals .Arnold, Cornwallis, and others, from the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. [See 2d vol. State Papers, p. 75.] From several seaports, which had been occupied as ports by the British forces, the American Commissioners represented to Mr. Oswald the British Commissioner, that a portion of this country which owed money to Great Britain is in some degree incajjaci- itated from paying their debts by the loss of the negroes which had already been taken away ; and though he (Mr. Oswald) might be averse to admit the large losses of which the negroes, previously removed, form a great part, he might naturally compromise the claim by agreeing that the troops of his nation should depart without carrying away " any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants." Thus we perceive tliat 18 in this negotiation it was admitted by Mr. Oswald, the British Commissioner, and so de* clared by Mr. Adams, Doctor Franklin, and Mr. Jay, that the slaves were considered as property ; namely, those belonging to the inhabitants within the lines. CHAPTER III. Slavery recognised by the Constitution^ The whole nation sanctioned the right of slavery by adopting the Constitution, which provides for an enumeration of slaves in a representation founded thereon, and lor th« restoration of fugitive slaves to their masters, acknowledging the obligations of Slate laws, which hold men to labor or service. That the clause which provides for the delivery of fugitive slaves stands amongst the most unequivocal indications of the wisdom of the fiamersof the Constitution, will be ap- parent to every one who will reflect but for a single moment upon the vast comprehen- siveness of their labors, and the peculiar circumstances under which they were performed. :, Called together by an extraordinary and alarining emergency, and acting under the ■• influence of the excited passions unavoidably incident to a cri.sis portending anarchy ! and civil commotion, the Convention were under the necessity of framing the entire ■' structure of a Government perfectly new in its principle, and destined in less than a single century from the period of its organization to extend either its blessings or evils to a more numerous body of human beings than were ever before associated under the auspices of one General Government ! When, to this view of the great magnitude and ■ increasing character of the objects and interests submitted to the consideration of the Federal Convention, we superadd the consideration that they consisted of delegates Irom thirteen independent sovereignties, having discordant interests and conflicting views to harmonize, the great astonishment is, not that they failed to establish a perfect Constitu- tion, but that they organized any system of government whatever. This Constitution was the work of that illustrious body of patriots and statesmen, who seem to have been raised up by Providence at that peculiarly eventful period, to guide by their eminent wisdom and exalted public virtue the councils of that Convention ; the result of whose deliberations w ere to fix the future destinies of this great empi' e of freedom. They were originally highly gifted by nature and deeply versed in political knowledge. They had been educated in the principles of civil liberty, and well understood the temper and ge- nius of their country, its interests, and the spirit of its institutions. They justly consid- ered that the Government which was then to be framed was to be adapted to an edu- cated and enlightened country, and to be sustained by moral sentiment, and ttie political virtue and justice of the People. The pressure of public distress had purified the souls of men— the common dangers of the Revolution had bound the country together as brethren of one family ; its sufferings had taught them the value of liberty, the necessity of Union and mutual forbearance with each other, and the preciousness of the inheritance which was to descend to us, their children. We cannot look back to the history of the times, when the august spectacle was ex- hibited of the assemblage of a whole people, by their representatives in the Conventioii, in order to unite thirteen independent sovereignties under one Government, so far as it might be necessary for the purposes of the Union, without being sensible of the great importance which was at that time attached to this provision. The mischief had become 80 great, so tlarming, as not only to impair intercourse between different sections of the country, but to threaten the existence of the articles of the confederation. To guard agains-t the continuance of this state of things was an object of deep interest with all truly wise, as well as the virtuous of this great community, and was one of the important benefits expected from the establishment of the Constitution of the United States. The Convention, guided by the comprehensive and enlightened views we have men- tioned, endowed the Federal Government with powers of the most ample nature, equal to the attainment of all the useful purposes of public authority. There was no subject agitated in the Convention which created a more intense and deep interest among the slaveholding States than that of providing a certain and secure mode of perjietuating the bondage of slaves within their boundaries. Difficulties of the most perplexing and harrassing character, in reference to fugitive slaves, had occurred previous to the adaption of the Constitution ; and it is absurd to tuppose that the mem- 14 bers of the Convention representing the interests of these States did not intend carefully to guard against a recurrence of similar evils ; and it seems to me to be a fair inference from the proceedings of the Convention, that they supposed they had done so effectually by the adoption of the clauses in the Constitution above referred to, and ttiat they in- tended to confer full power upon Congress to regulate the whole matter. On the 2'Jth of August, 17H7,as we learn from the minutes, it was moved and second- ed to agree to the following proposition, to be inserted after the 15th article: "If any person bound to service or labor in any of the United States shall escape into another State, he or she shall not be discharged from such service or labor in consequence of any regulation subsisting in the State to which they escape, but shall be delivered up to the person justly claiming their service or labor," which passed nnanimnusly. The 15th article referred to above was the article providing for the surrender of fugitives from jus- tice, and this sugi^ested the idea that it would be well to provide, also, for the surrender of fugitive slaves. From Mr. Madison's report we learn that the day before, Messrs. Butler and Pinckney, of South Carolina, had informally proposed that fugitive slaves and servants should be delivered up " like criminals." Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania : " This would oblige the E.xecutive to do it at the public expense." Mr. Sherman, of Connecti- cut, " saw no more impropriety in the public seizing and surrendering a slave or servant than a horse." [Machson's Papers, p. 144] The next day the motion was made in form, and, as Mr. Madison says," agreed to nem. con." Messrs Wilson and Sherman's objections arose from no moral repugnance to the surrender ot fugitive slaves, bui from the inconvenience they apprehended the State authorities would be subjected to ; and Mr. Wilton spoke from experience, as his own 8tate had at that very time a law for sur- rendering and delivering up fugitive slaves from other States. This agreement was a compromise between the North and South. It was believed that the members of the Convention would not have formed a Constitution, unless it was agreed to surrender fu- gitive slaves. It was deemed a compact convenient to both South and North. On entering into this Government, they apprehended that the other Stales, not know- ing the necessities the Southern States were under to hold this species of property, would from motives of humanity and benevolence, be led to vote for a general emancipation ; and had they not seen that the Constitution provided against the effect of such a dispo- position, they never would have adopted it. It is well known that, when this Constitution was formed, some of the States permit- ted slavery and the slave trade, and considered them highly essential to their interests; and that some of the Slates had abolished slavery within their own limits, and from the principles deduced and policy avowed by them, might be presumed to desire to extend such abolition further. It was, therefore, manifestly the iiUent and object of one party to this couipnci to establish, extend, and secure, as far as possible, the rights and powers of the owners of slaves within their own limits, and of the other party to limit and res- train thun. Under these circumstances, the clause in the Constitution was agreed on and introduced into the Conssitution ; and as it was well considered, as it was intended to secure peace and harmony, and to fix as precisely as language could do it the limit to which the rights of one party should be carried within the territory of the other, it is to be presumed that they selected terms intended to express their exact and their whole meaning; and it would be a departure fiom the purpose and spirit of tlie compact to put any other construction upon it than that to be derived from the plain and natural import of the language used. Besides, this construction of the provisions of the Consiitution gives to it a latitude sufficient to afford effectual security to the owners of slaves. The States have a plenary power to make all laws necessary fir the regulation of slavery and the rights of the slave owners, whilst the slaves remain within the territorial limits; and it is only when they escape into other States that they require the aid of other States to enable them to regain the dominion of the fugitives. This point is supported by most respectable and unexceptionable authorities. [See Butler vs. Hopper, 1 Wash. C. C. Rep. 499.] 'This brings the case to a single point, whether the statute of the United States giving power to seize a slave without a warrant, is constitutional. We must reflect, however, that the compact was made with some States in which it would not occur to the mind to enquire whether slaves were property. It was a serious question, when they came to make the Constitution, what should be done with their slaves. They might have kept aloof from the Constitution. That instrument was a compromise. It was a compact by which all are bound. We are to consider, then, what was the intention of the Constitution. The words of it were used out of delicacy, so as not to offend some in the Convention whose feelings were abhorrent to slavery ; but we entered into an agreement that slaves should be considered as properti/. Slavery would still have con- 15 tinued if no Constitution had been made. [Per. Parker, Ch. J., Commonwealth vs. Grif- fith, 2 Pickering's Rep., 19.] These were the considerations which recommended it with greater force. Had the Convention refused to proceed in the incorporation of this provision, what was the alter- native which such a refusal presented to the consideration of the Convention? The Convention would have been at an end, after having accomplished all other objects ; for if this interest was not arranged, none other would be. The attitude which the Govern- ments held towards each other, was in a certam degree hostile. Injuries had been in- flicted by one section of the country, and resentment shown by the other — the one having taken steps in the case of the non-importation law, which was intended to vindi- cate Southern rights and honor, by being made the means of obtaining a redress of these injuries. The guaranty of this right of recapture and title of ownership in slaves, upon which the preservation of the institution of slavery depended, which was thereby secured in the slaveholding States, was well stated by Mr. Madison and others in the several Con- ventions called to consider the Constitution. Speaking in defence of this provision in the Virginia Convention, in reply to Mr. George Mason, who declared " that there was no clause in the Constitution to secure slave property," Mr. Madison said : " This clause was expressly to enable owners of slaves to reclaim them. This is a better security than any that now exists. No power is given to the General Govern- ment to interpose with respect to property now held by the States." [Elliot's Debates, vol. 2, p. 335-36.] Governor Randolph held the same language. He said : " Were it right to mention what passed in the Convention, I might tell you that the Southern States— even South Carolina herself— considered this property secured by these words. I believe, whatever we may think here, that there was not a member of the Virginia delegation who had the smallest suspicion of the abolition of slavery." [Ibid, vol. 2, p. 437.] In the Convention of North Carolina Mr. Iredell spoke as follows : " In some of the Northern States they have emancipated all their slaves. If any of our slaves go there and remain there a certain tim'>, they would by the present law he entitled to their freedom, so that their masters could not get them again. This would be extremely prejudicial to the inhabitants of the Southern States, and to prevent it this clause is in.serteu in the Constitution. Though the word slave is not mentioned, this is the meaning of it. The Northern delegates, owmg to their particular scruples on the subjectof slavery, did not choose the word slave to be mentioned." [Ibid, vol. 3, p. 167.] And in the debate in the Legislature of South Carolina, when the Constitution v/as assailed on the same ground as in the Conventions of Virginia and North Carolina, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney made this answer : " We have obtained (said he) a right to recover our slaves in whatever part of Ameri- ca they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before. In short, considering all the circumstances, we have made the best terms for the security of this species of pro- perty it was in our power to make. We would have made them better if we could, but on the whole I do not think them bad." [Ibid, vol. 3, p. 357.] Upon this subject the following remarks were made in the Convention of Massachu- setts by General Heath: " I apprehend, (said he,) that it is not in our power to do anything for or against those who are in slavery in the Southern States." Again : " If we ratify the Constitution, shall we be doing anything by our act to hold the blacks in slavery ; or shall we become the partakers of every man's sinsi Each State is sovereign and independent to a cer- tain degree, and they have a right and will regulate their own internal affairs as to themselves appear proper ; and shall we refuse to eat or to drink, or to be united with those who do rtot think or act just as we do? Surely not." [See Elliot's Debates, vol. l,p. 124.] Mr. John Q. Adams, in speaking of the protection extended to the peculiar interests of the South, under this provision of the Constitution, makes the following remarks: " Protected by the advantage of representation on this floor— protected by the stipu- lation in the Constitution for the recovery of fugitive slaves— protected by the guarantee in the Constitution to the owners of this species of property against domestic violence." [See Mr. Adams's speech on the tariff bill. May, 1833.] 16 Again : " What he said was, that the South possessed a greater protected interest, an Interest protected by that instrument." [Mr. Adams held the Constitution in his hand.] He was Jur " adhering to the bargain." He further remarked : " And but for such a clause, a Southern gentleman who had lost some article oj his machinery, (his slave interest,) could never recover him back from the free States. Such was the protection extended by the Constitution to a peculiar interest." [See Mr. Adams's speech in the House of Representatives, February 4, 1833.] Are the acts of 1793 and 1860 necessary to carry the injunctions of the Constitution into eilect? It is true, without a subsequent law, this provision of the Constitution, to tome extent, would have been inoperative. The act of 1793 contains a contemporaneous construction of the Constitution in this respect, of great weight, considering who were the authors of that law ; and which has since been confirmed by the repeated decisions of the judicial tribunals of the country. The legislative and judicial exposition has been acquiesced in; no attempt has ever been made to abrogate the law upcn the ground of its repugnancy to the Constitution. But even before the Cotistiiuiion was adopted, and whilst it was submitted to public discus- sion, this interpretation was given to it by its friends, who were anxious to avoid every objection winch could render it obnoxious to the youth. By the 2d section of the 4th article, it is provided that " no person held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation thereof, be discharged from such labor or service, but shall be de- livered up ' on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.'" it de- clares also. (Art. 6, sec. 2,) " That this Constitution, and the laws of the United Stales made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges ol every Stale shall be bound thereby ; any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.*' Does this clause profess to be preliminary, or to rely on Congressional instrumentality in the consiimmaiion of the purposes for which it was designed 1 Does it pretend, upon the face of it, to be a pact, complete and self-efficient, from the obligations of which the Slates cannot escape, and to the perfection of which no more was necessary than was already done I Heie is the princ pie : the fugitive is to be delivered up on claim of his master. But it required a law to regulate the manner in which this principle should be reduced to practice. It was necessary to establish some mode in which the claim should be made, and the fugitive delivered up. Wha' are the means of enforcing the provision in the Constitution, without legal enact- ments to carry it into effect ? No penalty is fixed for the violation of its injunctions — no forfeiture is imposed by it. As it stands in the Constitution, it is merely powerless and nugatory. I'he fugitive slave was to be " delivered up." How deliver»-d ? How executed ? Delivered, if escaping into a Slate, by an officer of the Federal Gov ernmeni? No such provision. How was the title to the property to be ascertained? No su h provision. Neither of these results would follow ; and the constitutional decla- ration, without penalties and further provisions, was a dead letter — a nullity. The words of this provision of the Constitution meant to be interpreted to enjoin leg- islation. Ttiey necessarily denote future action, as ihe scope and effect of the article does not give it a present and positive character. This inference, nhich thus results from the lan^iuage of the clause of the Constitution, and from a comparison of it with that used in other parts of the same instrument, becomes more certain when we investigate the proceedings of ihe Convention ihat formed the Constitution, and of the regard mani- fested for its incorporation in the organic law of the land. The Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, have said, that the nature of a constiiut'on " requires only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose these objects be deduced from the objects themselves." " The constitution unavoidably deals in general language ;" it does not " enumerate the means" by which its provisions shall be carried into operation. [4 Wheat. 407, 8. I Wheat. 32fi. Baldwin's Constitutional Views, 99, 100, 102.] So also the Constitution of the United States contained only the important objects and great outlines of the Government. All the details of legislation were left to that department of the Government to whom that duty appropriately belonged. The Constitution does not stop at a mere enunciation of the right of the owner to seize his absconding or fugitive slave in the State to which he may have fled. It it had done so, it would have left the owner of the slave, in many cases, wholly without any adequate redress. The Constitution declares that the fugitive slave shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom service or labor may be due. It is exceedingly difR- 17 «'iilt, if not impraclicable, to read this language, and not feel that it contemplated some further remedial redress than that which might be administered at the hand of the owner himself It cannot be well doubted, that the Constitution requires the delivery of the fugitive " on the claim of the master ;" and the natural inference certainly is, that the National Government is clothed with the appropriate authority and functions to enforce it. In the case of Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (16 Peters, 624,) the pro- vision of the Constitution as to the surrender of fugitives from service was under con- sideration. Story, J», in delivering the opinion of the court, speaking of that clause which enacts that the fugitive shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whn contains two different kinds of provisions: the one may be desig- nated self-executed, or capable of self-execution ; tbe other, only executory, and requir- ing legislative enactment to give them operation. Thus, the 2d section of the 4th article, which declares that "citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immu- nities of citizens of the several States ;" the 10th section of the first article, which pro- hibits any State from making any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts; are all examples of the self-executed provisions of the Constitution — by which we me^in to say, that the Con- stitution, in these instances, is, ^er se, operative, without the aid of legislation. On the contrary, the various provisions of the 8th section of the same article, such, for example, as " the power to establish an uniform system of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy," are executory only ; that is, without an act of legislation, they have no operative effect. This case, then, arising under the Constitution, is one which arises under its execu- tory provisions. In the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Constitution, so far ns the process and removal of the fugitive, and seizure, executes itself, without statutory regulation. Let any one turn his eye back to the lime when this grant was made, and say if the situation of the people admitted of an abandonment of a power so important to every Southern State; so universally sustained in its reasonable exercise by the opinion and practice of the people ; and so vitally interesting to a people, whose whole property con- sisted of this species of population? It may with confidence be affirmed, that when the Constitution was adopted, had it then been imagined that this question would ever have been made, or that the exercise of this power of regulating the recapture of fugitive slaves would ever have depended upon {he views of the different tribunals of the States, the effort to form a system of Govern- ment, would have been a total failure. Before the adoption of the Constitution, the States were, to a certain extent, sovereign and independent, and were in a condition to settle the terms upon which they would form a more perfect Union. It has been contended by some over-zealous philanthropists, that such an article in the Constitution would be of no binding force or validity, because it was a stipulation contrary to natural right But it is difficult to perceive the force of this objection. It has already been shown that slavery is not contrary to the laws of nations. It would then be the proper subject of treaties among sovereign and indepen- dent powers. Suppose, instead of forming the present Constitution, the several States had become in all respects sovereign and independent, would it not have been compe- tent for them to stipulate by treaty that fugitive slaves should be mutua'ly restored, and to frame suitable regulations, under which such a stipulation should be carried into ef- fect 1 Such a stipulation would be highly important and necessary to secure harmony 2 18 between adjoining nations, and to prevent perpetual collisions and border wars. Now, the Gtinsutuiiou of the United Stales partakes both of the nature of a treaty and of a form of Government. It regards the States, to a certain e.xtent, as soveieign and inde- pendent communities, with iull power to mai^e their own laws, and regulate their own domestic policy, and fixes the terms upon which their own intercourse may be regulated and controlled. Pursuant to this provision of the Constitution, tlie act of Congress of the 12lh of Feb- ruary, 1793, was papsed, not to restore the rights of the master, but to give him the aid of a law to enforce them. This act empowers the person to whom a fugitive from labor or service is due, his agent or attorney, to seize or arrest such fugitive from labor, and to take him or her before any judge of the circuit or district courts of the United States, residing within the State, oi before any magistrate of a county, city, &c., where such seizure was made, and on proof of owing service to the claimant, either by offidnvil, or other evidence, taken before a judge or magistrate of ihe State from which the fugitive escaped, the judge or magistrate of the State in which he or she is arrested shall give a certificate thereof to the claimant, his agent or attorn'-y, which shall be a sufficient war- rant lor removing such fugitive. [See 1 Baldwin's Reports, 87 ; 5 Serg. & Rawie, 63.] The act proves that the framers of the Constitution did not understand the provision in the Constitution as effective until the Legislature should act upon it ; that it imposed a duty upon the Legislature to act. The power of enacting the provisions of the act of 1793 is given to Congress in gen- eral terms, without restriction or qualification; and upon every just principle of construc- tion, must be understood to confer whatever authority is necessary for carrying the power into effect, and every authority which, in practice, had become incident to the principal power, and was deemed to make a part of it. The incident of this power being qnite as important as the power itself, the power being worse than worthless without it, did the people cf the United States, in forming the constitution of government for thenisi Ives, intend to destroy the power, by stripping it of the incidents that gave it all its value? Did they mean to prevent its application to the cases to which they had themselves applied it? and for what purpose? Belter, far bet- ter would it have been that no power at all should have been granted to Congress, than that they should thus be required either blindly to submit or sullenly to reject. The de- sign of the Constitution was not to abridge, but to enlarge and strengthen the powers of the Federal Government, and it would be strangely inconsistent with the general plan to suppose that, in a matter which is properly a matter of national concern, it has denied to Congress a portion of power which has been actually and beneficially exercised under the Confederation. With regard to the universal understanding of the people on this subject there cannot be two opinions. If contemporaneous exposition and the clear understanding of the legislative power could be resorted to as the means of expounding an instrument, the continuous and unimpaired existence of this power in Congress ought never to have been controverted; nor was it controverted until very recently, or until a state of things re- quired the enactment of a law containing more stringent provisions than the act of 1793. Previously to the passage of the act of 1850, Congress remained in the peaceable exercise of this power, under circumstances entitled to great consideration. In every State in the Union was ihe adoption of the Constitution resisted by men of the keenest and most comprehensive minds ; and if an argument, such as this, so calculated to fasten on the minds of a people jealous of State rights and deeply interested in the operations of the Government, could have been imagined, it never would have escaped them. Yet no where does it appear to have been thought of ; and, after adopting the Constitution in every part of the Union, we find the framers of it every where among the leading men in pub- lic life, and legislating and adjudicating under the most solemn oath to maintain the Consiitution of the United States, yet no where imagining that, by the exercise of thia power, they violated their oaths or transcended their rights. This being the construction given to the Constitution immediately after its adoption, and which has been acted upon without opposition, and acquiesced in for more than fifty- five years, it was not to have been expected that its correctness would, at this late period, have been drawn in question. It must be recollected that this contemporaneous construction of the Constitution was made by those who had the best possible means of knowing what was its true intent. Many of the distinguished members of the Convention which formed the Constitution were, in 1793, in the National Councils. The Congress of the United States, when required to act affirmatively, cannot disre- gjad a mandate of the Constitution. The supremacy of the Constitution is tlie great 19 cardinal principle of American liberty, from which there is no appeal but to force; and to subvert its principles, or disregard its mandates, is anarchical and revolutionary. In truth, if there be any thing in onr legislative history which is entitled to our affec- tion for the motives in which it originnted; to our veneration for the authority by which it was supported; to our respect for the principles introduced in it, it is the act of 17'J3. But ihe charge of usurpation is in every sense inapplicable, for the efficacy of the act arises from the assent of the States now complaining of the adoption of the mea- sures It was a custom among the ancients, when their religion was in dansjer, to bring the Godhead itself from the shrine. When our Constitution is threatened with subversion, can it be deemed irreverent to call upon the stage the patriotic individuals who sustained this law'' It passed in the Senate unanimously, Friday, January If^, 1793. [Senate Journal, vol. 1, p. 472 ] Of the Senators of that day were John Langdon, of New Hamp- shire; Geo. Cabot, of Massachusetts; Oliver Ellsworth and Roger Sherman, of Connec- ticut; Rufus King, ot New York; and Robert Morris,of Pennsylvania. The act of 1793 was supported by Chief Justice Ellsworth, distinguished at the bar and on the bench as a statesman and a jurist; who repeatedly served with distinction in the Legislature of his State, and was a member of the Convention which formed the Constitution. He was not only a member of the Convention, but he witnessed all that transpired in that Conventicm; he participated in the debate upon the question, and ob- served all the modifications of the provisions of the act through which it underwent in that illustrious body of patriots who gave birth to the Constitution. The Fugitive Slave Bill of 1792 was drafted by George Cabot, of Massachusetts, in November, and it was passed by the Senate on the 18th of January, unanimously, four- teen members from tree and thirteen from slave States voting for it. The House committee, Theodore Sedgwick and Shearjashub Bourne, of .Massachusetts, and Alexander White, of Virginia, reported the bill to that body, by which it was passed, on the 4th of February, without discussion. Eight free Stales were represented by 31 votes, si.ic slave States by 24 votes; free State majority 7. The bill received 48 yeas to 7 nays. Massachusetts gave 6 yeas to 1 nay. This record shows that the free Slates passed the Jir.t fugitive slave bill. That was not a time for stretching the Federal power. The greatest jealou.sy pre- vailed, and the friends of the Constitution were obliged to observe the utmost caution while it was winning its way to public favor — refuting the suggestions of its enemies, and rccommenJing it to its friends. The act of 17t»;J was approved by George Washington and his Cabinet. On the talents and virtues which adorned the < abinet of that day — on the patient fortitude with which it resisted the intemperate violence with which it was assailed — on the firmness with which it maintained those principles which its sense of duly prescribed — on the wisdom of the rules it adopted — no panegyric can be pronounced in which the best judg- meni of the nation will not concur. The law of Congress was passed in the year 1793, the second session after the adop- tion of the Constitution; it was proposed, debated, and digested by a body of men, the chief and prominent characters of whom were themselves the erectors of our National Government It has been acceded to and acted under by every State in the Union; it has never been instrumental to any signal grievance, or complained of as a public evil; it has on the contrary been resorted to as a useful and salutary regulation. In the House of Representatives the vote on its passage was yeas 48, nays 7 — in the proportion al- most of seven to one. Here is the list as it stands upon the record; YiCAS — Fisher Ames, Mass, John Baptiste Ashe, N. C, Abraham Baldwin, Ga., Robert Barnwell, S. C, Egbert Benson, N. Y., Elias Boudinot, N. J , Shearjashub Bourne, Mass., Benjamin Bourn, R. I., Abraham Clark, N. J., Jonaih.nn Dayton, N. J., William Findley, la., Thomas Fitzsimmons, Pa., Elbridge (''erry, Mass., Nicbolas Gil- man, N. H., Benjamin Goodhue, Mass., .lames Gordon, Pa , Christopher Greenup, Ky., Andrew Gregg, Pa., Samuel Griffin, Va., William Barry Grove, A'. C, Thomas Hart- ley, Pa., James Hillhouse, Ct., William Hindman, Md., Daniel Huger, S. C, Israel Ja- cobs, Pa., Philip Key, Md., Aaron Mitchell, N. J., Amasa Learned, Ct., Richard Bland Lee, Va., George Leonard, Mass., Nathaniel Macon, N. C, Andrew Moore, Va., Fre- derick Augustus Muhlenberg, Pa., William Vans Murray, Md. , Alexander D. Orr, Ky., John Pase, Va., Cornelius Schoonmaker, N. Y., Theodore Sedgwick, Mass., Peter Sil- vester, N. Y., Israel Smith, Vt., William Smith, S. C, JolnrSteele, N. C, Thomas 20 Sumpter, S. C, Thomas Tudor Tucker, S. C, Jeremiah Waiisworth, Ct., Alexander White, Va., Huyh Williamson, N. C, Francis Willis, Ga. Navs — Samuel Livermore, N. H., .Iiijin Francis Mercer, Md., Nailiauiel Niles, Vt., Josiah Parker, Va., Jonathan Sturges, Ct., George Thatcher, Mass., Thomas Tredwell, N. Y. [House Journal, vol, 1, p (=90. ] An analysis of this vote, according? to geographical divisions, shows that from the Northern Mates there were twenty six votes in favor of the bill, and five auainst it; and that from the Southern States there were twenty two votes for and two against it. And of those who voted in the affirmative, five — Baldwin and Williamson, of Georgia, Day- ton, of New Jersey, Fitzsimmons, of Pennsylvania, and Gilman, of New Hampshire — were memhers ol the Federal Convention; and two, ('lark, of New Jersey, and Gerry, of Ma.-;sachusetts — signers of the Declaration of Independence. CHAPTER IV. Objections to the Act of 1850 Reviewed. Among the many objections against the fugitive law of 1850, it has been urged that there was nothing which called for its enactment; that it was, therefore, a wanton en- croachment upon the feelings and prejudices of the North This is urged by many who are opposed to complying with the re(iuirements of the Constitution, and who honestly suppose that the law of 1793 was amply sufficient to enforce the rights of the Southern claimants as guarantied in that instrument. But such every intelligent man knows is not the fact Under the laws which had been enacted by several States, aided by the prejudices of the people against slavery, it was next to an impossibility to recover a fu- gitive; and thus, while the North and East insisted that there should be no nullification at the South, but that those south of Mason and Dixon's line should abide by the Con- stitution, it was claimed that at the North those who cliosc might act in defiance to it, and the laws passed under it in relation to fugitive slaves. But when we look at the facts, at the legislative action of several of the non slaveholding States, can we say, that in justice to the South and to the con-titutional obligations, there was no reason why there should not be made further provisions for complying with the requirements of that instru- ment. The following is an act of the Massachusetts Legislature: " Skc. 1. No Judge of any Couit of Record of this Commonwealth, and no Justice of the Peace shall hereafter take cognizance or grant a certificate in causes that may arise under the third section of an act of Congress, passed February 12th, 1793, and entitled ' An act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the ser- vice of their masters,' to any other person as a fugitive slave within the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth. " Sec. 2. No SherilT, Deputy Sherilf, Coroner, Constable, Jailor, or other officer of this (Commonwealth, shall hereafter arrest or detain, or aid in the arrest and detention or inipri.sonmtnt, in any jail or any other building belonging to this Commonwealth, or to any county, city, or town thereof, of any person for the reason that he is claimed as a fugitive slave. "Skc. 3. Any Justice of the Peace, Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff, Coroner, Constable, or Jailer, who shall offend against the provi.sions of this law, by in any way acting directly under the power conferred by the third section of the act of Congress, afoiementioned, shall forfeit a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars for every such offence to the use of the county where said offence is committed, or shall be subject to imprisonment not exceedinj; one year in the county jail." — Approved by the Governor, Marcus Morton, Marc/i 24, 1818. This law was copied by the Legislature of Rhode Island, and remains to this day on her statute book; and one analagous in its provisions had been passed by the Legislature of I'ennsylvaniii in 1S4V. In the State of New York a similar one is in existence, but has been i)ronounced by the Supreme Court of the State to be unconstitutional. The arrest and detention of fugitive slaves, by State authority, is pr.ihibited in Connecticut. [See act of 1814, Revised Statutes of Connecticut, p. :'/85.] It was the system of laws Uke these, and of a disposition on the part of a portion of the community at the North 21 to obstruct and hinder the execution of the law of 1793, that demanded the enactment of the act of 1850. These unauthorized assumptions of power by the non-slavehoiding States practically- destroyed the right of the South to reclaim their property. This right must otherwise have proved ineffectual without the act of 1850. These assumptions of power nulhfied a clear admitted right, which right carries with it the most cogent and persuasive a[)peal to the conscience, the equity, and good will of Northern legislators, and fenced in as it is liy all the most sacred and inviolable sanctions of the failh and honor of the Federal Government — a right which the South claim to exercise, impelled equally by every moral motive and duty, and by the most consummate of constitutional obligations — all this would be re- duceJ by the legislation of some of the States to a naked, theoretical, outstanding, and litigated right, stripped of all its original sanctions, both legal and moral, and to be contested with an adversary above the law ; and in no circumstances disposed to discuss questions of positive right and justice, or to perform the requirements of the < 'onstilution. The obligation on the part of the non-slaveholding States to afford adequate protection to the iSouthern claimant in reclaiming his property, is no doul't of the highest and most sacred kind; and there is a duly equally strong upon the people of those Stales to avoid giving offence, by any irregular and improper conduct, and upon the local government's sincerity to punish and repress instances of such conduct. If the.se misguided individuals can with impunity thwart all the measures of the Federal Government for restoring pro- perty; if they can with impunity commit outrages upon the rights of siavehob'ers, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution; can it be surprismg if, under such cir- cumstances, strong measures should be adopted to enforce rights and obligations which grow out of these rights, and are guarantied by the Constitution. The act of 1850 is auxiliary to the Constitution. It does not deal with principles which the Constitution does not bear in its bosom. It contains subsidiary clauses, de- pendant provisions, flowing as corollaries from the Constitution. In saying that the law of IS.'iO is just such a law as that of 1793, we mean that it is identical so far as it respects its object, the reclamation and giving up fugitive slaves. .It acts simply as the echo of the act of 79-3. ''htgetninat vo'CS. auditaque verha re- porhit.''^ It may with some propriety be called the twin brother of the act of 1793; its duplicate, its refiecled portrait, for it re enacts with a tried fidelity, all that the act of 1793 stipulates. It is provided by the act of 179.3 that the certificate for the delivery and removal of the fugitives to the State or Territory from which they had fled should tie given upon satis- factory pioof tliat the person arrested owed service to the claimant, by a judge of the ciicuitor district court of the United States, or by a State magistrate, before whom the fugitive was, of course, in such cases to be taken. The sixth section of the act of 1850 operates to the same extent, and no further ; ex- cept in this, that, in addition to the judges, it authorizes commissioners, appointed by the circuit courts of the United States and by the supreme court in the ! erntories, to grant the certificate of delivery and removal. The fourth section of the act of 1793 subjected any person who should hinder or ob- struct the seizure or arrest of a fugitive slave, or rescue the fugitive after arre.st, or harbor or conceal such fugitive, "after notice that he or she was a fugitive from labor," to a fine of live hundred dcillars, to be recovered for the benefit of the claimant, in any court of competent jurisoiction. The seventh .■section of the act of 18.t0 contains the same provisions, with this differ- ence, that persons guilty of any of the offences named in the act of 179 3 are liable to a fine not exceeding one thou.sand dollars, and imprisonment not exceeding six months, besides forfeiting and paying, as civil damages, one thousand dollars, to the party in- jured by their illegal conduct, to be recovered in the manner prescribed by the 4th sec- tion of the act of 1793. Such penalties, all good citizens must admit, are no more than should be visited upon those who, whatever the pretext, undertake to resist the laws of the Union The difference between the two acts consists in this only : That the act of 18.''i0, by its fifth section, makes the United States marshals liable to claimants for the escape of fugitives to the full value of their services or labor, and to a fine also of one thousand dollars, to the use of the claimant, in case they refuse or neglect to execute the warrant or other process; and commands them, by its ninth section, where the claimant, after the issue of the certificate, makes an affidavit that he has reason to apprehend that the fugitive will be rescued from his possession by force before he can convejf him beyond the 22 Hmitsof the 8late where the arrest was made, "to retain the fugitive in custody, remove him to the State whence he fled, and there deliver him to the claimant, his agent, or attorney." Judge Grier, of the United States Supreme Court, says: " The chief diiTerence between the fugitive act of 1850 and 17'J-5, is that the former law allows a warrant to be issued by a Judge and the arrest to be made by a public ofTiccr, and imposes more strinirent penalties on those who interfere by violence to prevent the execution of legal process. Those who believe that the (Jonslitution and laws should be regarded ami obeyed, have no ground of complaint, and those who do not, will continue to rant at both as usual." One of the present (objections to the law of 18,51), one that has been most fiequently urged, that constitutes a prominent part of the inflammatory speeches, and the abolition- ists appear to rely upon more than any other for its popular elfect, is, that it makes no provision for a jury trial. But it is well known that with respect to this it is expressly like the law of 1793, of which, we believe, they never complained; with respect to the habeas corpus, tliere is n> difference. The decisio!) of the ?iu()reme Court settles the constitutionality of the act of IS^iO, as the principal features of this act are precisely analogous to the provisions of the act of 1793. The decisions of the circuit courts sustain, also, the whole current of adjudica- tion in relation to this question. "In the case of Hill vs- Lowe, which was tried in Pennsylvania, [Wash. Kep., vol. 4, 327,] it was decided that if a person knowingly obstructs the owner or his agent in seizing a fugitive slave, he cannot escape the penalty provided in such case by the act of 1793, upon the ground of the ignorance of the law, or of an honest belief that the party arrested was not a fugitive from service or labor." [See, also, Jones vs. Vanzandt, 2 McLane's Reports, 596. Howard's Reports, vol. 5, 215. Johnson vs. Thompkins, I Baldwin's Reports, 571. See, also, Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Peters. ] In the opinion of Congress, this power of arrest and all its con.sequeiits and ap- pendages as san0 does neither; it leaves the writ to be granted in the discretion ot any judge or court havinii the power to award it Tlie truth is, there seems to 1hi either a singular degree of ignorance or a wilful misconception of the nature and definition of the writ of iiubiu-s corpus. It will discharge no one held in custody under due process of law. It is a high prerogative writ, which o[)erates merely to release whoever is illeir.iUy restrained of his liberty [2 Kent's Com. p. 32] But let us look to the decisions of the courts in the free States in cases similar to such as may arise under the fugitive slave law for its true exposition. In the case of Randall vs- Bridge, and also of the Commonwealth vs. Brickett, decided in the Supreme Court of .Massachusetts, the doctrine of the law was stated as follows: 23 *• The intention of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment, and not to alter the law authorizing commitments."— [2 Mass Reports, 549-553, 8 Pick. 138] Again, in Riley's case, and in the case of the Commonwealth v^. Whitney, it was settled that convicts, or those under execution by any process, civil or criminal, are not entitled to the benefit of the writ. — [2 Pick. 172; 10, p. 434.] Among the decisions of the New V'ork courts there are two reported which illustrate precisely what would be the result of a writ oi habeas corpus in the case of a person un- der arrest as a fugitive from justice or from bbor. One is Clark's case, in which the Court of Error and Appeals of that State decided that — " Where a person is brought on habeas corpus before a court or judge as a fugitive from justice, by a warrant of the Executive of one State, on the requisition of the Execu- tive of another State, the court or judge will not inquire into the probable guilt of the accused. The only inquiry is whether the warrant under which he has been arrested states that he has been demanded by the Executive of the State from which he is alleged to have fled, and that a copy of the indictment or affidavit charging him with having committed 'treason, felony, or other crime,' certified as authentic by the Executive de- manding him, has been presented." [9 Wend. 212.] The other is the case of a negro named Jack, arrested as a fugitive slave. In that case the court said: "In the case of a slave who has absconded frcm another State, the certificate of the judge who heard the case on a writ of habeas corpus, delivered to the owner, is conclu- sive, and a writ de honiine replegiando will not lie to trt tsie slave's riout to FREKDOM." [12 Wend 311. Same doctrine, Wright vs. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle, Penn. Rep. «2.] Again: the opponents of the fugitive slave law lay great stress upon the fact that there is no right of appeal from the decision of the (Commissioners, and no trial by jury. The very nature of the right which the Constitution has secured to the owners of slaves in the reclamation of their property contemplates summary proceedings in its enforce- ment Judge Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, thus disposes of this question : " It is obvious that the proceedings for the delivery and removal of fugitives of both classes contemplate s'tmmary ministerial proceedings, and not the ordinary course of judicial investigation, to ascertain whether the complaint be well founded, or the claim to ownership be established beyond all legal controversy. In case of suspected crimes, the guilt or innocence of the party is to be made out at his trial, and not upon the pre- liminary inquiry whether the party shall be delivered up. All that would seem in such cases to be necessary is that there should be prima fade evidence before the executive authority to satisfy its judgment that there is probable cause to believe the party guilty — such as upon an ordinary warrant would justify his commitment for trial. And in the case of fugitive slaves thlere would seem to be the sime necessity of requiring only priina facie evidence of ownership, without putting the party to a formal assertion of his rights by a suit at the common law." [Vol. iii, p. 675.] No person can claim a right to take them and carry them away into slavery, but those ■who can prove them to be slaves — who can prove it by such evidence as ought alone to be held sullicient in a question of freedom or slavery This view of the case settles the question of the burden of proofs. He who would seek to disturb the apparently rightful condition of things, assumes the burden of proving his own right. The onus probandi is thrown upon the claimant to prove his properly, and his right lo restitution Now, in the case of fugitives from justice demanded by the Executive of one State of the Executive of another, every one knows the proceedings are always suminary and €x parte. There is no right of appeal and no trial by jury; and, if the requisition con- form in all respects to the law, the only question to be determined upon the arrest is the question of identity; and, for example, under the treaty of Washington, between the United States and Great Britain, of August 9, 1842, persons suspected of crimes are to be delivered up in the same manner, upon the same proof, and no more, to Briti.sh au- thority for trial. These proceedings have caused no complaint, neither have they crea- ted any alarm for the personal liberty of free white citizens of the Union. How, then, is it that all this sympathy is aroused in the case of a negro who has escaped from his master, and to whom the Constitution declares he "shall be delivered up!" S4 If any person be wrongfully arrested, it is very easy to try the question of freedom or slavery by the verdict of a jury in the State whence it is alleged he was a fug, live from labor. They have always had a fair and impartial trial. It has been decided by the < ourt of Appeals of Maryland, that if a neuro slave, with the pcrniist^ion of his owner, takes up his residence in another State, whither free or slave State, and returns to Maryland, the owner cannot resume his property in him, either for the purpose of servitude within the Slate or of sale to a citizen ol the Slate. [Bland vs. Bowling, 9 Gill & Johns. 19.] In Virginia, in the case of Betty vs Horton, [5 Leigh Rep. 615,] the Court uf Ap- peals of that Stati^ decided that where a citizen of MassacUusetls came to Virginia, and was there married, and acquired two female slaves by the marriage, who were taken with him on his return to Massachusetts, and there remainej while he was domiciled in that State, by returning to Virginia and bringing the slaves with him, they were entitled to their freedom under the nonimportation act of 1792. [^ee also PUai^ant's case; 10 Leigh, t)97, for same doctrine ] It was al.-io decided in that case that, as it appeared that the two slaves were, under the Conslitution of that State, free persons in Massachusetts, they were on that ground entitled to their freedom in Virginia. In Louisiana the Su- preme (Jourt has decidetl, in the case of Lumsford vs (voquillon, that if the owner of a Slav e remove him from Kentucky to Ohio, with the intention of residing there, the slave becomes iu-o f>uto iree. 'i'he regard for liberty exhibited by ihe ("ourts of Justice is not confined to the non- slavehdlding States. It is found in full vigor and energy in all of the •'Southern States. Let us examine a few more oi the cases as adjudicated by the tribunals of the Southern States A female slave was carried by her mistress iVoiii Louisiana to Frame. VV hen the latter returned to Louisiana she brou.ht the girl back, as she supposed, to her former condition of slavery; but the Supreme Court, in a suit brought by the girl to establish her freedom, decided that " the fart of a slave being taken by ihe owner to the kingdom of France, or any other country where slavery or involuntary servitude is not tolerated, operates on the condition ol the slave, and produces iimiitdiute tmancipalwii.'''' This is the case of Marie Louise vs. Marot, 9 Curry's Louis. Rep. 473. What renders this decision more remarkable is that Lord Stovvell (then Sir ^^'illiam Scott) decided the other way. In the ca.se of a slave whj was brought from the West Indies to England, and afterwards carried bark by her master, the learned .fudge decided that she was reinstated in her condition of slavery. This case was cited to the Judges of Loui.-iiana, but they disregarded it. No Court of any free State could have taken more liberal views of the law than those slaveholding Judges did. In .Missouri it is the same The owner of a slave carried hor to Illinois, and there hired out for a few days, and brought her back to Missouri. The slave sued for her freedom and recovered it. [3 Miss. Rep 270 ] In Virginia it is .settled that the s./ne ytn'rtntss as in funns is not required in an ad on for fi-Ledorti as in other cases. [Randolph R"p. 134.] Dothe^e facts justify the allegation that a free black would stand no chance before a Southern jury> In the ease of negro David vs. Porter, [4 Harris & McHenry, Rep. 418,] the owner hired the negro to a citizen of Pennsylvania. The negro afterwards returned to Mary- land into the possession of the claimant; and on petition the General Court decided that the hiring into Pennsylvania entitled the negro to his freedom. CHAPTER V. Mode of surrendering Fugitives from Labor. As the liCgislatures of several of the States had assumed the power of enacting laws, prohibiting all State officers, under heavy penalties, from aiding in the reclamation of fugitive slaves, it becomes the duty of Congress, with a view of carrying into execution the solemn injunctions of the Constitution, to invest the power in the hands ot its own othcers, by the appointment of C>)minissioners to adjudicate the rights of claimants to tlieir slaves. And the State Courts have no jurisdiction under the act of Congress on that subjec". — [Per Coulter, 10 Barr , 514; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs Prigg, 16 Peters] It is contended that to clothe the United States Commissioners with concurrent juris- diction with the judges of the circuit and district courts, in matters pertaining to fugitives 25 from labor, is violative of the Constitution. This point is easily dismissed. The Su- preme Court is the only court known to the Constitution. The circuit and district courts are the mere creatures of law, and their jurisdiction and powers depend upon the will of the National Legislature. They are the "inferior tribunals" contemplated by the Constitution Now, Congress possesses the power undoubtedly to provide for the re- rapture and delivery of fugitive slaves to their owners. It may, therefore, prescribe the mode in which and extent to which the power shall be applied, and how and under what circumstances the proceedings shall atford a complete prelection and guaranty of the right which the Constitution has secured. [Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylva- nia, 16 Peters, 5:39.] This has been done by Congress in confi-rring special powers on the commissioners acting under the fugitive slave law. The object of enlarging their powers — for they already had the power "to take acknowledgment of bail and affidavit," both in civil and criminal causes, and exercised "ail the powers that any justice of the peace or other magistrate of any of the United States exercise in respect to oilenders for any crime or offence against the United States" — was "to afford reasonable facilities to reclaim fugitives from labor." [See vol. 2, p. 679, vol. 3, p. 3;'0, vol 5, p. .516,*U. S. Statutes at Large] The creation of this tribunal is made a ground of serious objection to the constitu- tional validity of the act of 1850. It is contended that the State tribunals should be allowed to settle all contlicting rights between the claimant and the slave. This cannot be done. It is believed that a measure of State legislation, withdrawing the whole sub- ject matter from the action of the tribunal created by Congress, and iiivesiingthe ^tate ju- diciary with the jurisdiction, would be an unauthorized assumption of power, because it would attempt tu regulate the proceedings of the judicial tribunals of the United States. It is a well settled principle, that Congress cannot confer a part of the judicial power of the United States on States, magistrates, or officers. In the languagfc of the Supreme Court of the United States, [1 Wheaton, 304,] Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the United ."tates, except in courts ordained and established by itself, and by a well settled construction; in order to give courts and magistrates this character, tiie persons filling the stations respectively, must be appointed and commis- sioned by the Government of the United States under a previous act of (-'ongress. This doctrine was maintained in the celebrated case of Martin and Hunter's Lessee, [I Wheat., 304,] and has not only been lecognised in the Supreme Courts of the United States, but by repe;ited decisions of the highest tribunals of various States. We refer to a few of the cases in the State courts; and first, to the Commonwealth vs Feely, Virginia Cases, 321. This was an indictment for robbing the mail, under an act of Congress which gave, in express terras, jurisdiction to the State courts But the Court of Errors in Virginia decided that they could not, under the Constitution, ex- ercise it; and the whole court entered the following judgment; "The Court doth unanimously decide that, as the offence described in the indictment in this case is crea- ttd by an uct of Co'm/ess, the said Superior Court, beins^ a Stale court, hath no juris- diction thereof " There is a cise, similar in principle, in Hall's Law Journal, 113, United States vs. Campbell. See also the opinion of Judge Cheves, of South Carolina, 12 Niles' Register, 266, in ex parte Rhndas. The same question came before the Supreme Court of New York, in United Statesry. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4. This was an action of debt, brought to recover a penalty of $150, under the act of Congress passed August 2, 1813, for selling spirituous liquors by retail, contrary to the provisions of that act, which, in terms, authorized the State courts to take juiisdiction of offences committed under it. The court decided that Congress could not invest them with such jurisiliction, and they dismissed the case. The case of Ely vs Peck, [7 Connecticut Rep. 219,] was an action brought on a statute law of the United St ;fes, to recover damages, which the plaintiff, as owner of a s'-hooner, had sustained by the dereliction of the defendant. This act, also, in terms, conferred jurisdiction of the subject upon the ."uch. in substance, appears to be the theory of State legislation which has recently been promulgated, and is still maintained by the constituted authorities of a member of tliis confederacy. We conceive that it would be a useless appropriation of time were we to proceed any further on a course of reasoning, in order to demonstrate the utter fallacy and impracticability of the doctrines adverted to, or to dwell any longer in con- templating the consequences in which, should they be sustained, they must naturally and necessarily mvolve the peace and safety of the Union. Their tendency, it is apprehend- ed, is quite too obvious to require, or even to admit of argument cir illustration. They manifestly go to resolve at once our present glorious system of National (iovernment into its original elements, and would have, not for the present generation, but for pos'erity, the fearful, if not utterly hopeless task, of building some frail and miserable fabric upon its ruins Since the adoption of the act of 1S50, one of the States of this Union has seen fit to proclaim aloud throughout the land her displeasure on account of a certain prominent measure of the National Government. She has been pleased to assign as the cause of her act of nullification, that the highest legislative authority of the nation had assumed to itself the exercise of unwarrantable power; and on this ground has, at length, placed herself in the attitude of open defiance of the Constitution and the laws of the land. It is not less true, however, that whatever of sympathy or com misseration may have been ft It for those on whom the act of IS.'iO operates, not a single other State m this Union is united with her in sentiment, either as to the legal grounds of her complaint, or the propriety of the measures to which she has seen fit to resort for redress. On the contrary, in relation to both the one and the other, the voice of the people in the non- slaveholding States, in their primary assemblies, in their halls of legislation, and every- where, has been heard not in a tone of expostulation only, but of severe censure and re- proof, to pronounce its decision against her. Indeed, it requires but a cursory glance at that statute to discover, that the Legislature has attempted obliquely to lay hold on a power which, if carried into execution, will shock the spirit of the whole confederacy. For it claims complete ascendancy for the State courts over the United States courts; rendering the decrees of the latter nugatory, when under the act of 1850 they may be brought in conflict with the State courts. The act of Vrimont authorizes the State courts to interfere. The general scope and objects of the Constitution preclude, therefore, the idea that it was the intention of the parties to it, that the States should letain their atisolute political in- dependence, or that they po.ssess any rfght under it to annul the acts of the National Gov- ernment. The same conclusions result with equal certainty from a viewofits paiticniar pro- visions. Had it been intended that the States should possess the important power of an- nulling or repealing, at discretion, the acts of the General Government, this power would, undoubtedly, have been '-iven to them in express terms. It is nut even jiretended that the Constitution contains any such express concession Not only is there no express con- cession to this effect, but the idea that any thing of the kind was intended, is precluded by several provisions of an opposite character. ''This Cumlilulion, uiul the laws and treaties made in pursuance of it, are the sufjreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution and laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding " By this provision, any act of a ^'tate, whether performed in its sovereian or legislative capacity, pretending to annul an act of the (Jeneral Government, is declared in advance to be null and void. We think the State legislatures have no such power. The act of 1850 was enacted by Congress for the purpose of carrying into effect a national object. It is therefore a national measure, brought into exi.-ttnce by the exertion of the legi.slativc power of the Union, and it would be monstrous if any State legislature could impede the execution of a law made for national purposes, relative to a distinct matter over which the national legislature have the exclusive right of 1< gis-lation. Congres-s have a right to judge of the proper means of executing its laws; they have the power of directing those means by any law not forbidden by the Constitution; and no State legislature can, consistently either with the letter or spirit of the ('onstitution, interfere with the exercise of this power. It is certain that the power itself is the power of the nation— that the whole Union are at once the grantors, and, (by their representatives,) the depositories of it — the subject m matter upon which, or with a view to which it is executed, is entirely a national object, and ihat the sovereignty of Congress aver it was communicated for national ends. As this dominion flows from the same source with every other power possessed by the Government of the Union; as it is executed by the same Congress; as it was created for the commoM good and for universal purposes; it is impossible that it should not be of equal obliiration throughout the Union, in its effects and consequences, with every power whatever known to the Uonstitution. The pf)wer of the Union, constitutionally executed, knows no locality within the boundaries of the Union, and can encounter no geographical impediments ; its march is through thfi Union, or it is nothing but a name. The States have no existence relative- ly to t!ie effect of the powers delegated to (Jongress, save only where their assent or in- strumentality is required, or permitted, by the Constitution. In every other case, the effect of constitutional Congressional legislation is commensurate with United America, and Slate legislation in opposition to it is but a shadow. The States or the people can only r< sist the natural effect of such Congressional legislation by resisting the exercise of their own sovereignty, created upon high inducements of constitutional policy. A casi! of this sort bears no analogy to that of one State repelling within its limits, by penal sanction, the effect of the laws of any other State, upon consideration of local ex- pediency, or otherwise. A State that repels the effects of the laws of another State, within its territory, is no party to those laws; it has no direct interest in them — it did not assist in making them, immediately, or derivatively, or constructively. It cannot assist in repealing or modifying them. But here, the State law is its own law, as being a member of the Union, although revocable by it without the concurrence of other States. The effect is for its own advantage in the eye of the Constitution. It can contribute to revoke the law by its representatives in Congress; and it is bound, by the constitutional grant of power in virtue of which it has been enacted, since it participated in that grant, as in every other grant of power, to the Government of the Union. It is proclaimed to the community; it speaks for itself; and if it means any thing, it enunciates a rule of public conduct, as a law, exacting the obedience of the people. A tacit submission to pretensions thus lofty and comprehensive, but which we trust are most of them untenable, would, we conceive, be an abandonment of rights openly recognized, and a direliction of the most important interests of our country. CHAPTER VII. The power of Legislniing in regard to the Reclamation of Fugitire Slaves is necessarily exclusive in Congress ; and the same power cannot he ConstilutAonally exercised by the States. The exercise of the power in question by the States, is totally contradictory and re- pugnant to the power granted to the Congress of the United States. This being the policy of the General Government, is not the possession of the power by the States totally contradictory, and repugnant to the authority conferred on the Federal Government^ What avails it that the General Government, in the exertion of that portion of its power which embraces this subject, if the States in which the fugitive is found may immediately reverse the action of the Government, and refuse to com- ply with the demands of the law ' If the power remains in the States, the grant to the General Government is nugatory and vain; and it would be in the power of any State in the Union to overturn the adjudications of the agents of the Federal Government, upon a subject admitted to be within its appropriate sphere of action, and to have been clearly and necessarily included in the constitutional grant of power. The power in question, from its nature, cannot be a concurrent one, to be exercised both by the States and the General Government It must belong, exclusively, to the one or the other. It is the power of deciding the very delicate question, whether the fugitive demanded ought or ought not to be surrendered. Now it is very evident, that the tribunals of the Federal Government and of the State may not always agree on this subject. The decision would necessarily be repugnant to the Constitution. The thing done would be in direct opposition to the supreme law of the land, which had command- ed that it should not be done. This class of cases, where there is an express prohibi- 30 lion, has no relation whatever to any conflict between the powers granted to the Fede- ral Government, and those reserved to the State. Such a State law as we just supjjosed would be equally repugnant to the Constitution, whether there was or was not any power granted to the Federal Government over the subject on which such a State law operated, 'l^his class embraces, also, certain cases in which a power such as has been pieviously exercised by the estates is granted to the Federal (government in terms which imjjort ex- clusion. In such a case it has been held, that although there is no prohibition upon the States, yet the terms ot the grant, by necessary construction, im|)Iy it^ because a prcivision that one Government shall exercise exclusive [jower, is tantamount to a declaration that no other shall; for if any other could, it would cease to be exclusive; and such a declaration is therefore, in cDect, a prohibition. Here too, then, any action on the part of a State upon a subject thus exclusively granted to the Federal Government, would be repugnant to the Constitulton, operating by its own intrin>ic force. The second class of constitutional provisions is where there is no express prohibition on the States. V\ here there was no prohibition to the Slates, the exercise of such a power on their part is inconsisleiU with the powers upon the same subject conferred on the United States. It is admitted, that an affirmative grant of a power to the General Government is not of iiself a prohibition of the same power to the States; and that there are subjects over which the Federal and State Governments exercise concurrent jurisdiction, liut where an authority is granted to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States will be absolutely and wholly contradictory and repugnant, then the authority of the Federal Government must be supreme anil paramount. That law must be paramount, from necessity, to avoid the confusion of adverse and conflicting legislation. So far as the States are concerned, the power, when thus exer- cised, is then exhausted. This is the rule as we under.-tand it, settled by authority, in regard to the construction of the concurrent power of legislation in the Stales, and which is conceded to be binding upon the State tribunals on questions arising under the Con- stitution and laws of the IJnited States — ^ turges vs. Crowninshield, 4 U'heat. 193; Houston vs. Moore, .5 ib., 1. See also Livingston vs. Van Ingen, 9 John R., 561, 5()6, 56H, .575; 13 Mass. R., 15; 3 Serg. and Rawle, 179; 1 Kent, 387; Steamboat Co. vs. Livingston, 3 Cowen, 716, 751, 753. This principle is undoubtedly essential to peace and harmony in the action of the two Governments. The doctrnie distinctly maintained is, that all police laws are constitutional, unless in conflict with some law of the United States. This opinion is full> sustained in the case of New York vs. Mdn, 1 1 Peters, \0Z; and in the License cases, 5 Howard, 504: Com. monwealth vs Kimliall, 24 Pick. 350. It is not legislation upon the same subject, or every seeming conflict, that amounts to unconstitutional collision. The rule applicable to collision is laid down with some distinctness in 1 Story's Com., 432: "Incases of implied limitations ur prohibitim, it is not sufficient to show a possible or potential in- convenience There must be plain incompatibility, a direct repugnancy, or an extreme potential inconvenience, leading to the same result." When we speak of concurrent powers, we mean when both can do the same thing; but it is contended, that when the two powers under discussion were confined to their proper sphere, not only the State authority could not do what could be done by Con- gress, but the reverse is true; that is, that they never are nor can be concurrent powers. It is not a concurrent power. A concurrent power excludes the idea of a dependent power. Every concurrent or other power in a State is subject, in its exercise, to this limitation, that in the event of a collision, the law of the Slate must yield to the law of Congress constiUitionally enacted. New York vs. Miln, 11 Peters, 102; Commonweath 1-5. Kimball, '^4 Pick. 3.VJ. In the language of the Supreme Court, in the case of Sturges vx. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat 196, "It is not the mere existence of the power, but its exercise, which is in- coinj.alible with the exercise of the same power by the States." Uut in the same case another principle is stated which is equally sound, and which is directly applicable to the point under discussion; that is to say, that it never has been supposed that the concur- rent power of Stale legislation extended to every possible case in which its exercise had not been prohiliited. And that "whenever the terms in which a power is granted to Congress, or the nature of the power requires that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from the State legislatures as if they had been expressly forbidden to act on it." 'i'his is the character of the power in ques- tion. 31 - All powers of the States, as sovereign States, must always be subject to the limita- tions expiessed in the United States Constitution, nor can they any more be permitted to over.-tep such limitations of power by the exercise of one branch of s-overeignty thaa another. What is forbidden to them, and what they cannot do directly, they should not be permitted to do by color, pretence, or oblique indirection. Among other matters limiting and restricting State sovereignty is this: In the Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, the court held that a State law was not in- valid merely because it made regulations of commerce, but that its invalidity depended upon its repugnancy to the law of Congress, passed in pursuance of the power granted. [3 Peters, 245; 11 ibid, 132; U ibid, 579; 16 ibid.] if Congress has the power to regulate a subject matter, a State cannot interfere to op- pose or impede such regulation The General Goverment, though limited, is supreme on those objects over which it has power. [Martin vs. Hunter, 3(11 ; Cohen vs. Vir- ginia, 6 Wheat :^84 ; Prigg j;s. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, 539.] The doctrine of State legislative interposition assumes the position, that the constituted agents ofaStiite may arrest the execution of any law emanating from the National Legislatiu'e. It maintains that a Slate may impose a fine or penalty on any person em- ployed in the execution of any law of the United Mates The carrier of the mail, the collector of the revenue, the marshal of a district, the recruiting oflicer, may all be inhib- ited, under ruinous penalties, and may be arrested in the performance of their respective duties This doctrine further as^erts, that each member of the Union is capable, at its will, of attacking the nation, of obstructing its progress at every step, of acting vigorously and ellectually in the execution of its designs, while the nation stands naked, denuded of its ilefensive armor, and incapable of protecting its agents or executing its laws, other- wise than by procpedings which are to take place after the mischief is perpetrated. if the United States cannot rightfully protect the agents who execute a fuj^itive slave law authorized by the Constitution, from the direct action of State authorities, in the performance of their duties, they cannot rig ilfully protect those who execute any law. It is a m:ixi:n applicable to the interpretation of a grant of political power, that the au- thority to create must infer a power effectually to protect, to preserve, and to sustain. [See McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 V\'heat. Kep., 4".i6.] It is no less a maxim, that the power to create a faculty of any sort, must confer the power to give it the means of ex- ercise. A grant of the end is necessarily a grant of the means. All governments which are not extremely defective in their organization, must possess, within themselves, the means of expounding as well as enforcing their own law. To allow a State to arrest the execution of a law of Congress, would be equivalent to an ex- punclion of the act from the statute book, and leave it dependent upon the fluctuating will of the State legislatures, obeying or di-srejarding, at pleasure, this constitutional provision, and giving or refusing operation to it, by enacting' or rei)ealing laws upon the sulijoct, and thus changing a fixed, permanent, established, fundamental law, operative or inoperative, as tlie legislatures might act. And what must be the inevitable effect of all these various readings of the holy text, under which different and discordant rights are claimed.'' No one can doubt it must be civil war, a heart rending, interminable war, unless we are contentto return to the fold from whence we shall have strayed, to come again within the pale of the Constitution, and consent to be governed once more by the ancient rules which the necessities, not of one, but of all, produced; which the wisdom, not of one, but of all, digested; and for the preservation of which, unaltered by any, the peace and blessings of the union of all re- quire the guarantees of each. It is strange, nevertheless it is true, that something is continually occurring to hum- ble the vanity of man with regard to his boasted intellect, and to draw a sigh of regret from every reflecting bosum at witnessing the inability of human reason to contend with human prejudice. That the weak, the vicious, and the ambitious, should be victims of this prejudice, is too common an occurrence to excite surprise; but that the strong and the enlightened should suffer the same kind of eclipse, is a practical lesson on human infirmity, well calculated to teach humility to us all. Seeing, as we do every day, what opposite conclusions are deduced from the same premises, and how much feeling is blended with the best operations of our reason, what candid man is there among us who can ar- rogate io himself the exclusive power to arraign the official conduct of others, and pronounce their action as usurpatory and unconstitutional.' The friends of the law have labored to look at the provisions of the act of 1850 as abstractedly and disinterestedly as if they were to pass judgment upon it; and thus looking at it, they have read with S2 amazement the interpretations imposed upon it by those who advocate its repeat, and been astonished at the feelings of horror expr«'psed by them at the contemplation of the same feature vviiich has not at all disturbed the equinanimity of others How can we account for this but on the presumption that there is some cloud of prejudice on the one side or ihe other, which intercepts the view, and prevents us fron) seeing things as they really are. The friends of the measure look in vain at the effects of the act for any thing to justify those misrepresentations which have been so profusely poured forth in certain sections of the Union, denunciatory of its provisions ; and its friends cannot see this de- formity in the portrait. We are constrained to conclude that it exists only in the iinagi nation of those who are unwilling that it shall remain on the statute bouk. If the question of constitutionality of the law were one of doubtful con-itruction, such long actjuiescence in it, such contemporaneous expositions of it, and such extensive and unifurni recognitions would, in our judgment, entitle the (juestion to be considered at rest. (Congress, the Executive, and the .ludiciary have, upon various occasions, acted upon this sound and reasonable doctrine. [See Stuart vs. Laird, 1 (branch, 9o; Martin ts» Hunter, 1 V\ heat. 20 t; (3ohen vs. The ( 'ommonweaith of Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.] If this decision of the constituiionality of the act of 1793 by the most august triliunal in the land stood ui)on its own exalted authority ahme, it ought to command the respect and obedience of all other tribunals, State and Federal, within the United States. For if the Supreme Coort of the United States cwiiiol finally and definitively settle a drntro- verted interpretation of a law of the United States, our admirable but complicated system of free goveinment would be thrown into embarrassment as to the administration of jus- tice, and its powers rendered perfectly nugatory In the celebrated case of l-*rigg ys. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Justice Story, who delivered the opinion of the Court, expounded the law as follows: "The same uniformity of acquiescence in the validity of the act of 1793 upon the other part of the subject-matter, that of tugiiive slaves, lias prevailed th/outi/nnit the wbolf Viiiun, until a comparatively recent j)erioumption is strong that every important principle introduced into it is intended to be perpetual also; that a principle cx[)ressed in terms to operate in all future time, is intended so to operate. But if the construction for which the agitators contend be the true one, the Constitution will have imposed a restriction in language indicating perpetuity, which every State in the Union may elude at pleasure. .^ This act was approved of by President Fillmore and his distinguished Cabinet. This Cabinet, who thus sup[)orted this law, have been denounced as derelict to their duty, who sought the gratification of their personal views at the experi.se of the public good; they have been lamjiooned and vilified by all the presses identified with the opposition to this act. Their weight of character, the jiurity of their lives, the consistency of their principles, and their force of reasoning, were alike unavailing. It was suflicieni that they dared to ihink for themselves; to prefer what they regarded as the interests of tlie coun- try, to the gratification of selfi.sh C')nsiilerations. To refuse a ready acquiescence in what was re(|uired of them to do by the opposers of the law, they felt themselves at liberty, without at least understanding the questions involved, to misrepresent their acts and im- pugn iheii motives. 33 CHAPTER VIII. Propositions submitted to Congress with a view of giving additional securities to Slaveholders. Monday, October 31, 1791. Ordtred, That a committee be appointed to prepare and bring in a bill or bills pro- viding the means by which persons charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who flee frong the States and as to foreign nations with the subject of slavery. Why did they not attempt its abrogation' Because it was then unanimously acknowledged that Congress possessed such a power. In 1794 memorials were transmitted by the Quakers and others to Congiess, calling on that body to exercise all its constitutional power over the subject; and these memo- rials were referred to a committee of the House, consisting of Mr 'J'rumbull, of Con- necticut, Mr. Giles, Mr. Talbot, and ?Jr. Graves, all members from iion-slaveholding States, except Mr. Giles, of Virginia; the Select Committee were favorable to the pro- po-iition of the memorialis'.s. The Committee ofl'ered no measure of repeal, but brought in an act " to prohibit the slave trade from the United States to any foreign place or country." [2d vol. Laws of U. States, 383, Bioren's edition.] These priiceedings, sustained by Mr. Giles's statement, as a member of the committee, ought 10 be conclusive. In the debates of the Virginia Convention, of 1829, 1830, p. 34G, we find Mr. Giles using the following language: "A'.r. Ciile.s then referved to a memorial which was presented to Congress by the representatives of several societies of Quakers. He happened to be a member of the committee to whom the subject was re- ferred. He had relied on the declaratory resolution, in the negotiation which he had to ■carry on with the Quakers. All the committee were, in principle, in favor of the mea- 36 gure; but it was his duty to satisfy these persons that Congress had no right to interfere with the subject of slavery at all. He was fortunate to satisfy the Quakers, and they agreed th:it if Coni^ress would pass a law to prohibit the citizens of the United Stales from supplyini; foreign nations with slaves, they would pledge themselves and the respec- tive societies they represented never again to trouble Congress on the subject. The law did pass, and the Quakers adhered to their agreement. He did not know whether or not the doiiunieiits on the subject of this negotiation were still in existence, but he be- lieved they had been tiled away with other papers." N'jW, no less than thirty laws have been passed by Congress on the subject of the slave trade, and no less than seven propositions have been submitted to its consideration in relation to the recapture of fugitive slaves, from 17 91 to the present jieriod; yet no one propo.^ilion suggests the idea that Congress, in enacting the law of ITJi, transcended its legitimate powers, either directly or by implication. CHAPTER X. The Slave Trade prohibited by the CGnstitution. This was the second compromise. The non importation article recognizes the insti- tution of slavery; it was etfecleJ by the deliberate action of the Convention. The com- mittee who lecommcnded this compromise consisted of Messrs. Rutledge, of iSouth Caro- lina, Randolph, of Virginia, Wilson, of Pennsylvania, Ellsworth, of (Jonneclicut, and Gorham, of Massachusetts. This commitlee, it will be recollected, were to reduce to the form of a C-onstitution the resolutions agreed on by the Convention. This committee inserted in their draft the following clause: ">{o tax or duty shall be laid by the legisla- ture on articles exported from any iStaie, nor on the tuigration or iinjjorf.dton of such persons as the several Stales shall think jjroper to admit, nor shall such migration or im- portation be /yw//(7>;7ut the word importation refers to slaves, because free persons can- not be said to be imported." [3 Ell. Deb., 1st ed. page 978.] The word "migration" was added to "importation" to cover slaves when regarded as persons rather than property. It was intended by the mass of the Convention as em- bracing "slaves," and calling them "persons," out of delicacy. [-^ Elliott's Debates, 457, 477; 3 ih. 251, 541; 4 ib. 119; 15 Peters, 113, 506; 11 ib. 13'i; I Black. Com. by Tucker, append. 290.] It was so corsidercd in the Federalist soon afti r, and that ▼iew regarded as a " misconstruction." [Federalist, No. 42.] So afterwards thought Mr. Madison himself, the great expounder ot the Con.stitution. [3 Elliott's Deb , 4^2.] The Eastern J^tates, notwithslanding their aversion to slav-ry, were very willing to indulge the Southern Mates, at least with a temporary liberty to pro.secute the ^lave trudt, provided the Southern States would, in their turn, gratify ihem by laying no restriction on ntmgutlon ads,- and after very little time, the c(.m:nittee, by a very great nrij'irity, agreed on a report, by which the General Government was prohibited Irom preventing 37 the importation of slaves for a limited time, and the restrictive clause relative to naviga- tion acts was t:j be omitted. [See Secret Debates, 64.] The framers of the Constitution were unwilling to use the word slaves in the instru- ment, and described them as persons, and so describing them, they emjiloyed a word that would describe them as persons, and which had uniformly been used when persons were spoken of, and also the word which was always applied to matters of property. The whole control of the sentence, and its provisions and limitations, and the construc- tion given to it by those who assisted in framing the clause in question, show that it was intended to embrace those persons only who were brought in as property. In the debates which ensued on this clause, Mr. Ellsworth, one of the committee who reported it, was for leaving the clause as it now stands. "Let etkht St.'.te ihiport WHAT IT PLEASES- The morality or wisdom of slavery are considerations belonging to the States lhem.selves. What enriches a part enriches the whole, and the States are the best judges of their particular interests. The old confederation had not meddled with ^ this point, and ho did not see any greater neo ssity for bringing it within the policy of the new one." [Madison Papers, p. 1339, i:<9l.] Mr. Wilson, another member of the committee, objected: "All articles imported," said he, "are to be iaxed; slaves alone are to l.e exempted. Thi? is, in fact, a bounty on that article." This clause was referred to another committee, who modified it, by limiting the restriction to 1801). It was moved to guarantee the slave trade for twenty years, by postponing the restriction to 1808. This motion was seconded Iny Mr. Gorham, another member of the commit- tee. Mr. Randolph, also of the committee, was against the slave trade, and op; osed to any restriction on the power of Congress to suppress it. Two of the committee, then, we find, were against the slave-trade; and three, Messre. Rutledge, Ellsworth, and Gor- ham, for perpetuating it. The inducements which prompted the action of Mes'srs. Ellsworth and Gorham to yield their consent to the proposition, were of the most ele- vated character. They wished to throw no impediments in the formation of the Con- stitution. What was the language used by the chjirman of the committee and others in the convention'' Said Mr. Rutledge, "If the convention thinks North Carolina, South < arolina, and Georgia, will ever agree to this plan, (Federal Constitution,) un- less their right to import slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain. The peo}ile of these States will never be such fools as to give up so important an interest." Said Charles Pinckney, "South Carolina can never receive the plan (of the Constitution) if it prohibits the slave trade. In every proposed extension of the powtrs of Congress, that State has expressly and watchfully excepted that of meddling with the importation of negroes" [Madison Papers, p 1389.] Mr. Madison answered these objections, as urged by Governor Randolph and others, as follows: "I should conceive this clause to be impolitic, if it were one o\' those things which could be excluded without encountering greater evils. TJie Son,/ em Slates would not have entertd into the Vniivi of Annrica, without the temporary permission of that trade. And if they were excluded from the Union, the consequences might be dreadful to them and to us. Vie are net in a worse situation than before. That traffic is prohibited by our laws, and we may continue the prohibition. The Union in general is not in a worse situation. Under the Articles of the Confederation it might be con- tinued forever, but by this clause an end may be put to it after twenty years. There is, therefore, an amelioration of our circumstanc s. A tax may be laid in the meantime, but it is limited, otherwise Congress might lay such a tax as would amount to a [prohi- bition. From the mode of representation and taxation. Congress cannot lay such a tax on slaves as will amount to manumission." The acts prohibiting the slave-trade, also may be referred to, which recognize slaves as property. It was protected by the Constitution, and exempted from the whole force of legislative power. The principle, by which the South enjoyed the bemfilsof this trade, was protected by the Constitution, formed a basis of our representative system, entered into our laws, and mingled itself with the sources of authority. [See 4 vol. Laws of U. States, p. 96, 98.] The liberty to import, implies unqualified liberty to sell, or hold possession of, at the place of importation. This is the argument in all its amplitude. In other word.*, the act of prohibition encouraged the importation. These propositions, it is believed, can be vindicated either by the legitimate meaning ol the words, or the theory of the ctmsti- tutional powers of Congress. Where importation may have been made with the direct view to sell or hold possession, does it not follow, by necessary induction, that permis- sion for the former implies permission for the latter i* 38 TuEsnAT, Decembeii 17, 1805. The Senate resuncd the motion made yesterday for leave to bring in a bill to prohi- bit the importation of slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States; and the yeas and nays I'cing required on the main question by one-fifth of the Senators, it passed in the atfiraiaiive — yeas 13, nays 9. Those who voted in the negative were Adanvs and Pickering, of Massachusetts, and Tracy, of Connecticut. So leave was t;iven to bring in the bill. WEDifESHAr, February 5, 1806. On the bill laying a duty on slaves imported into the United States, on the question for the indefinite postponement — yeas 42, nays 69 — ; See House Journal,) the follovving members voting in the afiirmative: KichaiJ Cutts, Ebenezer Ehiier, New Jersey; VVm. Findley, James Fisk, Andrew Gregg, John Lambert. Michael Leih, John Rea, Penn- sylvania; David Hough, New Hampshire; Nehemiah K .ight, Joseph Slaiiton, Rhode Island; Mathew Lyon, Jeremiah Morrow, Ohio; Gideon Olin, Vermont; Leaven, Massachusetts; Thos Simmons, New York; John Cotton Smith, t^'onnecticut; David Thomas, Philip Van Courtland, William C. Van Rensselaer, Henry W. Livingston, Guhan C. Verpianck, Samuel Riker, New York; Henry f^outliard, New Jersey; Jacob Crowninshieid, William Sherman, Massachusetts; Roger Griswold, Connecticut; Fred- erick Connor, Joseph Heister, John Stewart, Pennsylvania. Wedxesday, Jaxuart 7, 1806. The House resumed the consideration of the amendments reported I>y the Committee of the Whole House on the twenty ninth ultimo, to the bill to prohibit the exportation or bringing of slaves into the United States or the Territories thereof, after the thirty- first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and seven. A motion was then made by Mr. Bin well further to amend the third section of the said bill in the following jiiragraph, to wit, '' and such ship or vessel, if brotiirht into any purl or place wthin a IStdfe or Territory, the constiiut on and laws of which pro- hibit shivery, sh ill, logrlher with her cargo, tackle or apparel, and fu/oifure, be for- feited," by sinking oni from the said parajjraph the word "cargo;" and on the ques- tion thereuj)on, it passed in the negative — yeas 39, nays 77. Those who voted in the negative from non slaveholding States are, Messrs. (^onrad, and Gregg, of Pennsylvania, Davenport and Uriah Traiy, of Connecticut; Elmer, of New Jersey; Martin Chittenden, of Vermont; Henry VV. Livingston, Van Cortland, Van Rensselaer, and Verpianck, of New York; Josiah Quincy, of .Massachusetts; Henry Southard, of New Jersey; ^amuel Tenney, of New Hamp.shire [See House Journal, vol. 5, 3(1 and Uth Congress, page ."ilS.] Another motion was made by Mr. Bidwell; and the question being put further to amend said hill by adding to the e;:d thereof the following proviso, " Proridt-d, that no person >h(ill be -old ns a slave by rirtuc of th's act," it passed in the negative — yeas 60, nays GO; the Speaker declaring himself with the nays. Aincmg the nays we find Samuel Tenney, of New Hampshire; U. Tracy, of Con- necticut; V'an (/'ortland, Van Rensselaer, Verpianck, Wadsworth, and H W. Livings ton, of New York. [See House Journal, h vol. 8th and 9th Congress, page Tila.] The bill laying a duty on slaves imported into the United States being under consid- eration, and the question being on the indefinite postponement thereof, it was negatived: yeas 42, nays 69. For more than twenty years the slave trade was protected by the Constitution— it was viewed by the South as a valuable privilege, and one that was made a prelnninary matter in the adjustment of the controveited questions which convulsed the Convention. Para- doxical as it may appear, the principles on which this compromise was adjusted consti- tute the very bond of our glorious Union. 39 CHAPTER XI. Taxation and Apportionment of Representation. The Congress, acting under the ("onstitution, have sanctioned the ri.ht of slavery by providing for the enumeration of slaves for the purpose of taxing them, and making the tax a lien on them as property. — See vol. 3, Laws of U. States, Bioren's edition, pages 34, 100, 10^. The Eastern members of the Convention proposed it, they sustained it, and they moulded it to their mind. In 1798 and 1799, when it was necessary to lesort to direct taxes to support the qf /fie nfgroe''. Much has been .said of the impropriety of representing men who have no will of their own. Whether this be reasoning or declamation, I will not pre- sume to say. It is the unfortunate situation of the Southern Slates, to have a great part of their population, as well as property, in blacks. The regulation complained of was one result of the spirit of accommndtit Urn wliicli governed the Convention; and without this indulgence, no Union could possibly have been formed." [See Alexander Hamilton's speech in the ("onventinn of New York, to ratify the Constitution of the United States, Elliot's Debates, page 212.] Messrs. King, Gore, Parsons, and Jones, of Boston, spoke of the advantage to the Northern States by the rule of apportionment given to them; as also Judge Dana. [See Elliott's Debates in the .Massachusetts ('onvention.] On the question of the adoption of these clauses of the (constitution, the vote stood thus: Affirmatively— Massachu.setts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia — 9. New Jersey, Delaware— 2. [Sec 2 vol. Madison's State Pajiers] .Mr. Patterson, of New Jersey, remarked, "He could regard slaves in no other light but as property." .Mr. Kufus King, of Massachusetts, said, "That eleven out of thirteen States had agreed to consider slaves in the apportionment of taxation." 41 CHAPTER XII. Slmes recognised as Property by the Judiciary Act of 1789. The great in jniry then is, whether a slave is private property? The slave is liable to be seized and sold for debts; if an individual attempt feiiiniously to take possession of him, the ovcner can recover him by an action of detinue or trover; to maint.in either of which actions two things are necessary: first, that the object claimed should be a person- al chattel; and next, that the party claiming should have a property in it. It is admit- ted, that it is the law of the United States. This we will endeavor to establish. By the thirty-eiahtli section of the Judiciary act it is enacted, that the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be "regarded as the rules of decision at common law in the Courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." What is this but adopt- ing, as the laws of the United Stales, all the constitunonal laws of the several States' Are they not, uy this section, incorporated into, and made a part of the jurisprudence of the Union? Maryland, by a similar enactment, has made of force as much of the com- mon law of England, as is consistent with her Constitution. Now, is not that common law of El gland made, by that enactment as much a part of the code of Maryland as her legislative statutes? This proposition cannot be doubted. The laws of tht siiveral States, adopted by the Federal Courts, are as much then the laws of the United States as the act of Congress. In which light, then, have the courts of the United Mates con- sidered slaves? Precisely as those of Maryland — as mere personal chattels — as legally, nothing more than goods, wares, and merchandize, and liable to all the rules which gov- ern the possessiopi and alienation of inanimate chattels. To prove this let us refer to a case originating in the (Jircuit Court of Georgia, but finally decided in the Supreme Court of the United States. [See the case of Williamson vs. Daniel, reported in the 12th vol. of Wheaton, page 568.] The substance of this case is as follows: A testator left by will sundry slaves to A and B, with a provision, if either should die without law- ful heirs of his body, the survivor should have the estate. The following was the decree of the Court pronounced by Chief .Justice Marshall: " We think these words convert the absolute es ate previously given irto an estate tail; and if so, since staves fire person^ at property, the limitation over them is too remote." It is an old maxim of the com- mon law, \hat an estate tail cannot be created in a [ ersonal chattel; for if it he, the pre- viou.^ estate becomes absolute in the first taker. This rule applies to all property of a moveable nature — to money, goods, wares, and merchandise — to domestic animals, &c. Do not the above points establish the principle, that the Supreme Court of the United States view the slaves precisely in the same light as the State Courts-- that it considered the slave no more than a personal chattel, in which an absolute property may ve.st, and liable to all the rules which attend chattels of that description. The same principles have been decided in another case brought up from the Circuit Court of Teimessee to the Supreme Court of the United States. [See Shelby ra. Grey, llth Wheaton, page 361.] To understand this case it is only necessary to give the jireliminary statement of Judge Johnson, who pronounced the decree of the Court. "The plaiiititr here were defendants below in action of detinue, brought by Thomas Grey to recover sundry slaves. The defendants filed non dttinet, and the act of limita- tions of the State of Tennessee, which was the act of detinue, is three year ." Can it be contended, that slaves are not viewed by the Courts of the United States as private property, as nothing but personal chattels, by these two cases? In the first they are disposed of by will, liable to become the property of the first owner when the limitation over is after an indefinite period; and in the second case, they are re- coverable by action of detinue, and become the absolute property by the holder after possession of three years. It is thus we find that the highest judicial authority known to the people of the United States have decided, that a slave is a legitimate chattel. So much for the decisions of the United States Courts on this subject. In these opii ions every member of the bench concurred. But let us now consider the light in which slaves have been viewed by Congiess in levying a direct tax. The acts of Congress relating to the assessment of lands, &c., and slaves, have been: "An act to provide for the valuation of lands and dwelling houses, and the enumeration 42 of slaves within the United States,"' July 9, 1799, ch. 70; "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to provide for the valuation of lands and dwelling house?, and the enu- meration of slaves within the United States,' " February 28, 1799, ch. 20; "An act supplementary to an act entitled 'An act to provide for the valuation of lands and dwel- ling houses, and the enumeration of slaves within the United States,' " January 2, 1800, ch. 3; "An act to provide for comp!i'tin<^ the valuation of lands and dwelling houses, and the enumeration of slaves in t«outh Carolina, and for other purposes," January 30, 1805, ch. 11. We will now advert to the act of 1813 imposing a direct tax. This act was ratified by James Madison. No man was better acquainted with all tlie provisions of the Constitution, their relations and dependencies, tliah this illustrious statesman. 'J'he Hth section of that act reads as follows: "That wl)enever a direct tax shall be laid by the authority of the United States, the same shall be assessed and laid on the value of all lands, lots of ground, with improvements, dwtilmg hoiin'S and slave-i, which several articles subject to taxation, shall be enumerated and v.ilued by the respective assessors at ike rait tack of the 771 is worth in money." Could Congress have employed words more emphatic, more minutely descriptive, to signify that a slave was private property, than are contained in the at)ove section' Is there any distinction made in it belwem lanrtt: and slaves ? Each ^^ liab't to fit taxed, the tax is to be assessed on the value of each, and the value to be estimated by the worth of each in money. Again : let us advert to the 24th section of the same act, and this idea is still more strongly expressed — is depicted in still more glowing colors. •' That where any tax, as afore.-^aid, shall have remained unpaid for the term of one year, as aforesaid, the collec- tor in the State where the propely lies, and who shall have l)een designated by the Sec- retary, as aforesaid, having first advertised the same for ninety days in at least one news- paper in the State, shall proceed to sell at public sale, so much of said property as may be necessary to sali.^fy the tax due thereon, together with an addition of twenty per cent, thereto. If the property advertised for sale cannot be sold for the amount due thereon, with the aforesaid additions, the collector shall purchtse the same in behalf of the U/i ted States for the amount aforesaid." Now, here Congress not only expressly admits that a slave is pioperty, but directs the collect r til putchdse the slave in their behalf, if he is not bid up to the value of the tax imposed, and thereby bee >mes a slaveholder. The Congress of the United States, by the adiiption of this act acknowledges, in the plainest and strongest language, that it will not only t ix shivi.s, or other properly, but that it will sell and purcha.'ie them. On the passage of the bill it was determined in the affirmative, yeas 27. Those who voted in the .iffirmative from the non-slaveh. 106; United States vs. Davi.s, 2 >uinner, p. 482, per Justice Story; Writings of Jefferson, 3 vol. p. 131; 1 vol. Aiu. State Pai)ers, p. 145; and 2 Brock, p. 504; 14 Peters S. C. Rep., p. 574, Holmes vs. Jansen. 43 The stipulation in the Spanish treaty, by which we were bound to restore the ships and effects or merchandise of Spanish subjects, when captured within our territorial jurisdiction, or by pirates on the high seas, applies to the surrender of slaves by the States. Hero is a solemn compact between sovereign powers, not less sacred, than the constitutional compact between the States stipulating for the restoration of slaves or merchandise. We were bound to deliver up the slaves according to the treaty of 179-' with Spain, which has, in this particular, been continued in full force by the treaty of 18 9, ratified in 1821. The ninth article provides, "that all ships or merchandise, of what nature soever, which shall be rescued out of the hands of any pirates or robbers on the high seas, shall be brought into some port of either State, and shall be delivered to the cus- tody of the officers of that port, in order to be taken care of, and restored entire to the true proprietors, as soon as due and sufficient proof sliall be made concerning the prop- erty thereof" In exposition of this article of the treaty, Judge Story says: "If these negroes were, at the time, lawfully held as slaves under the !aw-< of Spain, ai.d recog- nized by those laws as pr')perty capable of being lawfully bough' and sold, we see no reason why they may not justly be deemed within the intent of the treaty, to be included under the d-noininutio'i of merchandise, ami as such ought to be restored to the claim- ants; for, upon that point, the laws of Spain would seem to furnish the proper rule of interpretation " See The United States vs. The Amistad, 15 Peters, o93. In construin? this clause of ths treaty, the Attorney General says that "this case is clearly within the spirit and meaning of the 9lh article, and that the vessel ani> cakgo SHOULD BE RKSTOiiED ENTIRE, as far as practicable. See Gilpin's opinion — Attorney General's opinion in the Ami.stad case. Let us see who voted for the ratification of these treaties. Thursday, March 3, 1796. The Senate resumed the consideration of the treaty between the United States and His Catholic Majesty. On motion that the Senate agree to the following resolution, Resolvtd, (two thirds of the Senators piesent concurring therein,) that the Senate do advise and consent 1o the ratification of the treaty between the United States and his Catholic Majesty, concluded on the 27th of October, 179. . On the question to agree to the resolution, yeas 26. Those who voted in the affirm- ative are, Bingham, of Pennsylvania; Blood woith, of North Carohna; Bradford, of Pennsylvania; Brown, Burns, of New York; Butler, Cab it, of Massachusetts; Ells- worth, of Connecticut; Foster, of Rhode Island; Henry Martin, King, of New York; Langdon, Latimer, Livermore, of New Hampshire; Martin, Mason, Paine, Potts, Rob- inson, of Vermont; Ross, of Pennsylvania; Strong, of Massachusetts; Tazewell, Trum- bull, t'onnecticut; Vining and V\ alton. On the motion to ratify the treaty of 1819, Messrs. Burrill, Daggett, Dana, Dickin- son, Edwards, King, of New York, Lacock, Miller, Morrow, Noble, Otis, Roberts, Sanford — all from non-slaveholding States. [See Executive Journal, vol- o.] February 15, 1821 — the treaty or 1821. On the question, will the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of this treaty, it was determined in the affirmative: Those who voted in the affirmative from non-slaveholding States are. Chandler, of Maine; Dana, of Connecticut; Durham, of New Jersey; Edwards, of Connecticut; Cole- man, of Maine; Hunter, of Rhode Island; King, of New York; Knight, of Rhode Island; Lanman, of Connecticut; Lowrie, of Pennsylvania; Mills, of Massachusetts; Morrill, of New Hampshire; Noble, of Indiana; Otis, of Mas>achusetts; Palmer, of Vermont; Par- rott, of New Hampshire; Roberts, of Pennsylvania; Ru:2;'gles, of Ohio; Sanford, of New York; Southard, ot New Jersey. See Executive Journal, vol. iii, page 178. At an antecedent period in the history of this country analagous principles prevailed and controlled the action of the (Congress of the United Slates as regards slaves being considered as nterchondise. The word merchandise is nomen generali.ssimum, and comprehends every description of property. It is the appellative which will take in the whole species, if there be noth- ing to narrow its scope. Theie is no such limit. There is not a syllable in the con- text of the 9th article to restrict the natural import of its phraseology. The word merchandise is left to the force of its generic signification, and is, therefore, as extensive 44 as personal property can be. It embraces all the descriptions of property which it could be supposed this Government could find it necessary to incorporate in our s}steti) of laws. It covers the whole j;round which appertains to the recognition of slaves as property. These views seem to be supported by the action of Congress in 1792. On the I9th day of April, 1792, the (constitution of the tState of Kentucky was formed. On the 6th of November, 1792, General Washington, then President of the United States, dehvered his annual address to the two Houses of Congress, in which he said: *' I'hc adoption of a constitution for the State of Kentucky has been notified to me. The Legislature will share with me the satisfaction which arises from an event inteiesfiug to the happiness of the part of the nation to which it relates, and conducive to the general order." And on the succeeding day he transmitted to the two Houses of (-ongrcss, in a special message, "a copy of the constitution formed for the State of Kentucky." On the 9th of November, 1792, the Senate of the United States responded to the address of the President, in which they say, "the organization of the Government of the State of Kentucky, being an event peculiarly interesting to a part of our fellow- citizens, and conducive to the general order, affords us peculiar satisfaction." On the Kith of November, 1792, the House of Representaiives res{)onded through a committee, of which Mr. Madison was chairman, to the address of the President, in which they say: "The adoption of a (Constitution for the State nf Kentucky, is an event in which we join in all the satisfaction you have expressed. It may be considered as particularly in- teiesting, since, besides the immediate benefits resulting from it, it is another auspicious demonstration of the facility and success with which an enlightened peo]jle are capable of providino^, by free and deliberate plans of government, for their own nafety and happi- ness." This c(mstitution contains a provision that " they (the Legisbiture) shall have full power to prevent slaves from being brought inio tins Stale as iittrchandise. [I Lit- tell's Laws of Kentucky, 52 ] Hence is this constitution, with this clause recognising slaves as mercliandisc, thus solenmly sanctioned, almost cotimpornneou^ly with the or- ganization of the Federal Government, by George Washingtoti, President of the (Con- vention which formed tlie (Jonstitution of the Union, and by John Langdon and Nicho- las Gilman, of New Hampshire; Rufus King and Eldridge (Jerry, of Massachusetts; Roger ^heiman and Oliver Ellsworth, of Connecticut; Jonathan Dayton, of New Jer- sey; and Robert Morris and Thomas Fitzsimmons, of Pennsylvania. It must be re- marked, that they were members of the Convention which framed the Constitution of the United States, and all of them sanctioned and adopted the constitution of the State. On the 1st of March, 1817, an act of Congress was passed to enable the people of (he western part of the Territory of Mississippi " to form a Constitution and •-tate Go- vernment." [6 Laws United States, 175.] On the 4th of December, 1817, this Con- stitution tras suhmUt'd to both Hi-msrs of C'mgres><; [See Senate Journal, page 21; House Journal, 21;] and on the 10th of December, 1817, the State was received as a member of the Union; this constitution contained the clause, that "they ; the Legislature) shall have full power to prevent slaves from being brought into this Sta^e as menhan- dise." The constitution of the State of Missouri was formed on the 19th day of July, 1820, in pursuance of an act of (Congress of the 6th of March, 1820. [See (ith vol. Laws of the United States, 455.] This consiitution contained the followmg among other provisions: first, the General Assembly shall not have power to pass laws for the emancipation of slaves without the amsnii nf thtir owners; but they shall have the power to prohibit the introduction of any slave for the purpose of ^pvculition, or a^ an article of trade or inerclumdise On the 2d of March, 1821, < "ongress passed a joint resolution providing for the admission of the State of Missouri into the Union. [See 6 vol. Laws of the United States, 390.] On the Wxh of January, 1836, the people of the Territory of Arkansas formed a constitution which contained the following clause: "They (the Legislature) shall have power to prevent slaves from beini^ brouglit to this State as vterchriiuHse." On the 10th of March, 183fi, this constitution was "submitted to the consideration of Con- gress," in a special message by the President. [Senate Journal, 210 ] On motion of Mr. Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, in the Senate, on the same day, it was referred to a Select Committee. On the 2-'d of March, \>Zf), Mr. Buchanan, as (Jhairman from the Select Committee, reported a bill for the admission of Arkansas as a State, under the constitution submittetl by the President; and after a full discussion, the bill pa.ssed the Senate bi^ a vote of thirty one to six, fifteen of those who voted in the afHrmative being from non slaveholding States, and four of those who voted in the negative being from 45 the non slaveholding States. Such were the proceedings in the Senate; and in the House the Constitution of Arkansas was sub nitted, and she was admitted as a State on the 13th of June, 1836, by a vote of 143 to 50. [House Journal, 1003.] Nor was the matter passed by in silence; for whilst the bill was pending, Mr. Adams moved to strike Out from the bill that portion of it in re^^ard to slaves and slavery, (p. 997,) but it was not seconded; and the constitution if Arkansas was confirmed and iiccepted, with this clause included. Here, then, are several States, whose Constitutions were adopted by Congress, and admitted at all those periods, with clauses in all of them, as to the exclusion of slaves as merchandise. Is not this a full recognition of the principles for which we have con- tended in regard to this species of property ? But this is not all. A more recent act of Congress may be adverted to as settHng the question as to property in slaves. Persons formerly in the reputed limits of the United States, but according to the demarcation of the boundary line between the United States and the Repii'olic of Texas, were found to reside, in 1840, within the limits of Texas, were allowed, by an act of Congress, to remove with all their "■ nioveahle proptrty into the United Siaks." Approved June 15, 1844. See United States Statutes at J^arge, vol. v, p. 674. According to our analysis of this act of Congress, the terms "moveable properfi/" in- cluded slaves. Furthermore, it authorized the importation of slaves from a foreign terri- tory. This act was passed before the annexation of Texas to the United States. We will now animadvert upon a negotiation which produced considerable excite- ment in the Southern part of this Confederacy, and which threatened to disturb our friendly relations with Great Britain. The Execuive of the United States sanctioned the right of slavery when they nego- tiateil and concluded a treaty stipulating an indemnity for the slaves carried into British colonial ports In 1830, two American vessels, the Comet and Encomium, freii;hted with slaves, were carried by irrepressible necessity, into British colonial ports. The slaves on board of these vessels were protected by the British authorities, and left at full liberty to go on to their destined port and fate, or to remain where they were. A large portion of them chose the latter course. A demand for indemnity was urged upon the British Govern- ment, which, after much delay and negotiation, at last announced iti? intention to make com pen.sation for the slaves. [See Senate Documents, 1838, 18-39, vol. iii, i\o. 216.] Thi' argument in favor of the indemnity rested upon the fact that the negroes were carried to Nassau by an irrepressible necessity, and that being characterized as property by the American law, that character, under that law, ought to remain attached to them; and that, by the law and comity of nations, the owners were entitled to British aid in securing their property, and that the authorities had no right to interfere in behalf of the slaves. Lord Palmerston resisted the indemnity upon the ground that slaves, coming within British jurisdiction, they being persons, acquired rights inconsistent with the claims of the owners, which rights the British Government is bound to respect. [See Lord Palm- erston's letter to Mr. Stevenson, January 7, 1S37, Senate Documents, 1838, 1839, vol. iii. 210, p. 14.] These principles were denied by Mr. Forsyth, who was Secretary of State during the administration of .Mr. Van Buren. He contended "that the question of property must be decided by some other law than the municipal law, to which the owner has never submitted himself." [See Senate Documents, 1838, 1S39, vol. 3, No. '.^16, p. 5.] Mr. Stevenson, minister to the Court of St. James, also declared that it was necessary to show, before the British position can be supported, "that human beings cannot be the subject of property any where, or to any extent." [Ibid, p. 19.] The t^ecretary of State further maintained that the United States would assert the same rights, in cases like the present, in the ports of England, as in those of her colonies. Such are the views, as advanced by Mr Van Buren, through the ofiicers of the Government selected by him to conduct the negotiation to a successful termination, and to receive inde/imili/ fur slaves then under the jurisdiction of Great Britain. Now, what is this claim tor indemnifica- tion but an assertion of tlie right of property on the part of the owners.' The right of property is the basis of the claim. If the functionaries of the colonial ports had surren- dered the negroes, no claim for compensation could be established against the English Government. In other words, they claimed the surrender of the negroes; failing in that, they claimed indemnity. 46 Extracts fi-om Mr, Van Barer? s Despatch. "Should it, however, be deindcd that His Majesty's Government is unable to com- ply \vith this request, in consequence of the actual landing of the slaves on the Is- land of New Providence, through the illegal seizure nf them by the custom house offi- cers, and of the application to their case of the general principles of the English law, or should it be declared that it was the intent of the act of Parliament, through luotivts of humanitij, to give Jreedom to every slave landing on t'le coast of the Briti^^h colony, whether cast upon it by shipwreck, or brought thither by design, or without reference to his previous conditiim, or the manner in which the owners interest in him was ac- quired, the undersigned is persuaded that the justice of the British Government will take care that tlie property of the citizens of a friendly nation, thrown by shipwreck on their coast, shall not, under circumstances like those of the present case, be sacrificed by any misconstrued application of British laws, or by any indulgence of their own feel- ings- of philanthropy; but that all suitable coaipi.nsation will be made to such indi- viduals for th'' property taktn i the part of other States as hii^hly im- proper und impolitic. "Levi A. Woodbury, Sec. JAMES GOULD, Chairman. The meeting in New York was called to order by the Hon. Campbell P. White, who nominated the Mayor, Cornelius W. Lawrence, as President. Numerous patriotic reso- lutions were offered by the Hon Edward Curtis, and adopted by the unanimous voice of the meeting. The fifth and sixth resolutions were as follows: Resohrd, That we shall regard with deep regret the continuance of the excitement at the South, as far as it may be occasioned by the apprehension of danger from the exer- tions of a few misguided abolitionists in our community, because it implies too little con- fidence in the rectitude and pulriotism of the atizens generalli/ at the North, and in- d.'cates tno little reliance on the efficiknci of the law. " Resolved. That we are not unmindful of the constitutional obligation of the citi- zem of this Union for mutual defence and protection, as well in the case of domestic violence as of foreign force; and however we may lament the necessity that, m the for- mat/on of our Government, recognized as lawful the condition of slavery in the South- ern St;ites; and however ardently we may hail the day, if it shall ever come, when they may be able and willing to abolish it; till then, and while this Constitution endures, we have no right to transcend its provisions, and as we are fully bound, so are we ever readii to carry them into full effect. "Signed. CORNELIUS W. LAWRENCE, Chairman." The following letter was received hy the Committee from the late Chancellor Kent. Extract: New York, August 24, 1835. " Sin: I have just received your note of the 22d instant, and I return my acknow- ledgment for the honor you have done me by the designation you mention. I am en- tirely in opinion with all that portion of my fellow -citizens who are decidedly opposed to the interference by abolitionists with the question and practice of slavery in the South- 60 cm States; and I approve, for instance, with the resolutions of Boston and Portland on that subject." [See vol. 49, Niles' Reg., p. 10.] Extract from the speech of Hariiison G. Otis, delivered in Fanueil Hall, Boston, August 22d, 18.35. Speaking of the formation of anti-slavery societies, he says: "Suppose an article had licen proposed to the Coi.gress that framed the instrument of "confederation, proposing that the Northern States should be at liberty to form anti- slavery associations, and deluge the South with homilies upon slavery, how would it have been received ' The gentleman before me has apostrophized the image of Washington. I will follow his example, and point to the portrait of his associate, Hancock, which is pendant by its side. Let us imagine an interview between them, in the ompany of friends, just after one had signed the commission for the other; and in ruminating upon the lights and shadows of futurity, Hancock should have said: ' I congratulate my coun- try upon the choice she has made, and I foresee that the laurels you gained in tlie field of Braddock's defeat will be twined with those which will be earned by you in the war of Independence; yet such are the prejudices in my part of the Union against slavery, that although your name and services may screen you from opprobrium during your I!i'e, your countrynien, when the willow weeps over your tomb, will be branded by mine as man- stealers and murderers, and the stain of it consequently annexed to your memory.' " Again : "Another clause in the Constitution is a contract on the part of the non- slaveholding States to seize and restore runaway slaves — but why restore when you have taught the slave that he has a right to freedom?" Extract from a letter of Harrison G. Otis, Boston, 17th October, 1831. — [See IViles Register, vol. 45, p. 43.] "For my own part, I never doubted that the States of this Union are inhibited by the Federal compact from interfering with the plantation States in the management of their own slaves. The letter and spirit of the Constitution are opposed to it. The clauses which by implication permitted the importation of slaves for ten years, andivliich provided for the deliviri'.t; of fugitive slaves, are nugatory and treacherous, if it can be lawful to annul them " Difjloniatic Correspondence. Extracts from Mr. Ada:ms' communication to the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Castlereagh, His Majesty's principal Secretary of State for the Department of Foreign Affairs, dated February 17, 1816: *' But pr/iv//f [iroperty not having been the subject to legitimate capture with the pla- ces, was not liable to the reason of the limitation; to which the American plenipoten- tiaries, therefore, assented only so far as related to artillery and public propfrty. They did not assent to it as related to slave and other priaie property. It was not a mere verbal alteration which they proposed ; they adhered tn slaves and other private property." Again: " But in the present case it will not be pretended that the slaves, where removal is coinplaltud of as a breach of the compact, were the property of either His Majesty, of the naval officers in his service who carried them away, or of any of his subjeits. They tvere peoptrl 1/ rf citizens of the United. States, precisely the species of property which it was expressly stipulated should not be carried away." " AxJcrsT 22, 1815. " Our object was the restoration of all property, including slaves, which by the usa- ges of war among civilized nations, ought not to have been taken. All private property on shore was of that description. Staves were private property. » * * • Upon what ground could Great Britain have refused to restore them' Was it became they had hem seduced away from their masters by the promises of British ofhcers' But had they taken New Orleans, or any other Southern city, would not all the slaves in it have had as much claim to the benefit of such [)rovisions as the fugitives from their masters elsewhere' How, then, could the place, if it had bten taken, have been evacu- ated according to the treaty, without carrying away slaves, if the pledee of such provi- sions ii-as to protect them from being restored to t' eir ownirs 1 It was true, proclama- tions inviting slaves to desert from their masters had l)een issued by British officers. We considered theoi as deviations from the usages if war. We believed that the British Government itself would, when the hostile passions arising from the state of war should subside, consider them in the same light; that Great Britain would then be willing to restore the priperty or indemnify the sulferers by its lo.ss. If she felt bound to make good the promises of her ofhcers to slaves, she might still be willing to do an act of jus- tice, by compensating the owners of the slaves for the properly which had been irregit- 61 larly taken fifom them — [Mr. Adams' Letter to the Secretary of State; See American State Papers, vol. 4, p. 117, Foreign Relations ] Extract of a letter from Mr. Vax Burex, Minister at the Court of St. James, to Mr. Livingston, Secretary of State, dated February 28, 1832, in relation to the slaves on board the brigs Encomium and Enterprize: "The Government, while it most sedulously and rigorously guards against the fur- ther introduction of slave, protects at the same time, by remarkable laws, the uights OF THE OWNERS OF THAT SPECIES OF PROPERTY ill the ^tiite.'i where it exists, and per- mils it transfer from one of these States to another." " Can it he that this principle of common law is applicable to a colony where, by the law of the place, negroes and their descendant^ who have not been emantipated by their owners are slaves and saleable as otheh puoperty, where the masters rights are am- ply protected by paiticular laws." "That the Government (Great Britain) will order the slaves in question to be given up to the claimants, and reasonable indemnity to be made to the latter for iiie damages caused by the destruction of their property, and by the loss of such nf the slaves as MAX xoT BE FOUND." — [Scc Senate Doc, 2d sess. 24th Cong , 2 vol , No. I'-'i ] CHAPTER XVI. The Admission of States. Vermont was the fiist new State. She claimed, indeed, to be one of the original, making tlie fourteenth, and formed a consritution for herself in the year after the Decla- ration of Independence. But she was considered part of New York, which State, by its Lewi- lature, consented, in 1790, that Vermont should be an independent State, and be ndmitttd into the Union. The application was made to Congress February 19, 1791, and on the 18ih an act was passed declariiTg that Vermont was " received and admitted" into the Union. No constitution was submitted to Congress or inquired for by that body. In fact, the permanent constitution of the new State was not made until 1793. Kentucky was the second State aJmiited. The State was formed of territory detach- ed from Virginia by an act ot the Legislature of the State, dated in 1789. In 1791, an act of Congress directed that Kentucky should, on the 1st day of June, 1793," be re- ceived and admitted into the Union as a new and entire member of the United States of America." Th.^ State constitution was not framed when the act of admission was pass* ed. Congress was not in sesaion at the date of the admission, and the Senators and Re- presentatives took their seats before the State constitution had been submitted to Con- gress. It was received after the State was admitted, but no action was taken upon it at all. The third State was Tennessee, formed out of territory ceded by North Carolina to the United States, by agreement, consummated in 1790, on condition that it should be- come a Slate. The people of the Territory formed a constitution in 1796, and petitioned Congress for admission as a State. This was the first constitution ever sul)mitted to Congress with an application for admission. But no report was ever made upon it, and an act was passed June 14, 1776, by which Tennessee was admitted into the Union. Ohio was the next in order — the fourth of the new States — the first formed of territory to which boundaries were affixed, and previous governments assigned by the exclusive authority of the United States. It was formed out of the Northwestern Territory ceded by Virginia, and accepted by Congress, on the terms prescribed by the ordinance (jf 1787, (before the formation of the present Constitution,) and ratified by Virginia. Congress provided government for the whole territory in 1789, and divided it into two districts in 1800. The Eastern District is the present State of Ohio. The right of admission of the States formed out of this territory was provided for by the ordinance, which declaied that vvluiiever any of the said States should have sixty thousand inhabitants, it should be admitted hy its delegates into the Co igress of the United States on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever; and that if consistent with the general interest, '-inies might be admitted with fewer than sixty thousand. In 1803, (April 30,) Congress parsed a law autnorizing the territory to form a constitution and State Govern- ment. In January, 1803, the constitution was presented to Congress, referred to a com- mittee, which never reported on the subject, but a law was passed (February 19, 1803,) which is peculiar in its phraseology. It did not admit Ohio into the Union, but recited 62 that the people of the Eastern Division of the Northwest Territory had formed for them- selves a constitution and State Government, " whereby the said State has become one of the United States." Louisiana was the fifih new State, and here another form of admission was adopted. Louisiana was acquired from France in 18U3, and erected into two Territories by act of Congress in 1804. The Territory of Orleans now forms the State of Louisiana. An act was passed in February, 1811, authorizing the people of the Territory to form a con- stitution and State Government, and providing tliat if the said constitution should not be disapproved by the next Congress, the State should be admitted. The constitution was formed in January, 1812, and the State admitted by law April 8, 1812. The tenth sec- tion of the act of 2(3th March, 1804, " erecting Louisiana into two territories, and pro- viding for a tenuiorary government thereof," prohibited the introduction ef slaves into that territory, from any place, " except by a citizen of the United States tf-nioving into eaid territory for actual settlement, and being at tlie lime of such removal a hitiin fide owner of sncli slave or slaves." [See Laws of the United States, Bioren's edition, 3 v., page GOT, chap. 391, §10.] In the case of Indiana, (the sixth new State,) formed out of the Northwestern Terri- tory, another novelty occurred. Congress passed an act (April, 1816,) authorizing the people of ihe 'i'erritory to form a ccnsiitution and State Government. In June of that year a constitution was formed, but before Congress met to act upon the subject, the presidential election occurred, and Indiana elected presidential electors. At the meet- ini^ of Congress, Mr. Hendricks was admitted to take his seat in the House of Repre- sentatives. But the resolution admitting the State into the Uiii'>n was not adojitrd until Dec. 11, and in February ihe votes of Indiana, cast before any act was done recognising her as a member of the Union, were received and counted by both Houses of Congress in convention. Mississippi was the seventh new State. It was part of the territory now forming the two States of Alabama and Mississippi, which was ceded to the United Stutcs by Geor- gia and South Carolina. Territory was added both on the north and south by acts of Congress By consent of the State of Georgia, two States weie laid out in the territory. Congress several times refused their as.sent to the formation of a State; but in 1817 (March 1) an act was passed authorizing the people of the Western District of Missis- sippi to form a constitution and State government. The constitution was formed in Au- oust of the same year, and in December the State was admitted by resolution. Illinois was the eighth i^tate admitted, formed out of the Northwestern Territory, in pursuance of the ordinance of 1787. The act of Congress to enable the people to meet in convention and form a State, &c., was passed in April, 1818. The constitution was adopted in August, and the State admitted by rei?olution in December of the same year. Alabama came into the Union the ninth of the new States, formed out of the remain- der or eastern portion of the Mississippi territory after the formation of the State of Mis- sissippi. The separate territory was organized in 1817, on the petition of the legisla- tive council of the territory, an act of Congress was passed in 1819, (March 2,) autho- rizing a convention to form a State, a constitution was adopted in August, and the State was admitted by resolution in December of the same year. Maine was the tenth new State. Ft was originally part of Massachusetts, and enti- tled the Di.strict of Maine. By consent of the State of M^issachusetts, given by the Legislature on the HHh June, 1819, the people of the District of Maine formed a con- stitution and State Government in October, and in December petitioned Congress for admission into the Union as an independent State. The attempt was ma !c to combine the admission of the two States of Maine and Missouri in the same bill, in on^er to keep out Maine, unless Missouri was let in. But it failed; and on the :^d of June, 1820, an act was passed declaring that from and after the l.'ith of the same month the State of Maine is declared to lie one of the United States of America, and admitted into the Union. Missouri was the eleventh of the new States. It was formed out of the Louisiana territory, of which the name was changed to the Mi-souri territory in 1812, and the Southern portion taken off in 1819, and called the Arkansas Territory. Arkansas was the twelfth in order of the new States admitted into the Union. It was formed of the southern portion of the Missouri Territory, and the territorial government was established in 1819, (March 2.) Michigan, the tlirteenih State, formed outof the Northwestern Territory, and clairaiiiG! aright of admission under the ordinance of 1787, with a territTial goveinment established as early as 180.5, but with boundaries altered extensively by various acts, made application at the same time with Arkansas for admis- sion, and the two were pushed through together. 03' Michiaan was admitted on tlje same day, prospectively, and on condition that a con- vention of delegates, elected by the people of Michigan, for that single purpose, should declare their assent to the act of Congress, establishing the boundary between Michigan smd Ohio. A convention was held, which did accept the act, but great opposition was made again, on the ground that the convention was an unauthorized meeting of private individuals, chosen without any authority from the State Government. The objection was strongly urged, but Congress did not sanction it, and a final act was passed January 26, 1837, declaring her admission as one ot the United States of Americi. Floriila was the fourteenth State admitted, application being made at the same time for the admission f Iowa, a Northern State, as the fifteenth new State Fluridi was formed out of territory ac(juired by the treaty from Spain, and the territorial (jJovernment was established by Congress, March 30, IS22. The people of Florida held a convention without previous authorization from Congress, made a constitution, and applied for ad- mission into the Union in February, 1839. Congress did not accede to their request for several years, and the Territory remained under its territorial form of government. Under this same constitution of 18:J0, Florida was at length admitted with Iowa, both included in the same bill, March 3, 1845. To the ailmission of Iowa nothing more was required but the prorlamation of the President, as in the case of Missouri. But Towa did not assent in the form. A new constitution was formed and presented to Congress, and an act was passed for her ad- mission, dated December 28th, 1846. Texas was the sixteenth new State, and the twenty-ninth of the States of the U'nion — an independent Republic — admitted into the Union by joint resolutions, which passed March Ut, 1849. Wisconsin, the thirtieth and youngest of the States, was formed out of the North- western Territory, and established a territorial government, April 20, 1836. August 6, 1846, an act of Congress was passed authorizing the people of Wisconsin to form a constiiutiim and State Government, and for the admission of the State into the Union. The constitution was framed and presented to Congress, and the State admitted (March 3, 1817,) oib condition that the constitution should be acceded to by the qualified elec- tors of the State. It will be seen that States have been admiited with and without the previous authori- zation of Congress — formed of territory derived from cession by the individual States — from portions of States previ msly organized as members of the Union — of territory pur- chased from foreign Governments — and one State existing as an independent Republic beyond the Union; that admissions have been refused to the first and second applica- tions — have been granted conditionally and unconditionally; to take effect immediately, to take cff^'ct prospectively, and to take effect contingently at a future day. Number of i>laves in non-slavekolding Slates. With the view of showing the number of slaves in those States generally denominated free States, at the period of the formation of the (Jonstitution and subsequent, we refer to Senate Document, 50.5, containing the cen.?u.s of each State, compiled by the Depart- ment under the resolution of Congress of July 26, 1833, and the supplementary returns for 1840. 'Ihe census of 1850, docs not include slaves in the f?-ee States. 1790. 1800. 1810. 1820. 1830. 1840. New Hampshire 158 8 Rhode Island 9^ 381 108 48 17 5 Connecticut 2,759 951 310 97 25 54 Vermont.. 17 New York 21,324. ...20,34 3. ... 15,017. ... 10,08-^ 75 3 New Jersey 11,423. . .12,422. ...10,851 7,5.r/. ...2,254 658 Pennsylvatxia 3,737 1,706 795 211 403 31 Delaware 8,887 6,153 4,177 4,509. ...3,292. . .2,613 iUinois 168 917 747 184 And yet these nine States, now denominated free States, did, so far as they existed in 1790, hold slaves, and acknowledge property in slaves, and the sale of slaves within their boundaries were valid. But our limits admonish us to bring these remarks to a close. The incalculable im- portance of the grave questions which we have analyzed, has drawn us into a longer discussion than we had anticipated. But the subject swells under our contempla- tion the more* we mark its bearings upon the present prosperity and the future fate .v^ 64 'J \ of our beloved country. In truth, no questions have arisen since the establishment of the Federal Government which appear to us to he fraught with more dangers, it they should, in the judgment of the people be erroneously decided upon, by a misapplication of the principles of constitutional law. Intemperance of seclioiuil div.'siuns, wherever found, ought never to meet with an advocate in a patriot It is a most calamitous scourge to any country. The fiercest and most ungovernable passions of our nature — ambition, pride, rivalry, and hate — enter into its dangerous composition, made still more so by itB power of delusicjn, by which its projects against the integrity of the Union are coveted in most insiances, even to the eyes ot its victims, by the specious show o( patriotism. Thus composed, who can estimate its force? Where can thi'Se {eelmgs be touiid i-uffi- cient to couiiternct its advancement ? Is love ot country ? Alas ! the attachment to sectionclimn becomes stronger tban our wliole country. It produces a stnte ii aliena- tion between d:flerent sections of the contederacy, and thus involves us in Ilie vortex of that tremendous comet which — " From its horrid hair Shook pestilence and war." It is now upwards of half a century since the present admirable system of Govern- ment first came tiom the hands of the illustrious sages, whose memories will always be re- vered, who have given us a practical, and, as they hoped, a permanent constitutional com- pact. The Father of his Country did not affix his illustrious name to so palpable an ab- surdity, as to allow a State to arrest the operations of the Federal Government ; nor did the States, when they severally ratified it, do so under the impression that a veto on the laws of the Uiutfd States was reserved to ihem, or that thf-y could exercise it by implica- tion. If this were allowable, it would be just as rational to suj.pose that the i^^Miietary system could continue to perform all its revolutions, with the same beauty, ouier, and harmony, which have been assigned to them by nature, were the laws of projection, at- traction, and giavitalion, to be totally suspt-nded, as it would be to suppose that ihirty confederated States could e.xist in harmony, and perform their federative functions, were each State to have the power of arresting or suspending the operation of the laws of the Confederacy, whenever in the opinion of liie functionaries of any single Stale, it should be thought expedient for the iiileiest of that State to do to. The question then is, whether the evils with which the body politic is afflicted, can be mitigated or haimonizetl by any system of dissolution. We think not. All history demonstrates the fact, that confederacies have been the fruitful matrix of internal dis--eiisions and domestic feuds. How was it with the Amphiciyonic League of An- cient Greece ? The jealousies existing between the members ol the League, particu- larly Athens and Sparta, its leading members, (which jealousies, too, grew out of the relations to one another created by the League itself,) involved them in perpetual con- troversies, and finally led to the Peloponnes;ian war, which terminated in iis dirsolution. Modern Lurope aflbrtis us an equally instructive lesson. The history of :he Germanic body, for centuries, is nothing but the history of the bloody and cruel wars among the Princes and State!- which composed it. The scheme of a dissolution of the Union, there- fore, instead of ati'ording a remedy for the evils, which are alleged to be unbearable, would but Sfive to aggravate them, and lender the situation of the country still more deplorable than it would be by the continuation of the present condition of things. The mere agitation of the question as regafds the dissolution of the Union must be at- tended with the most serious consequences. 1 he lofty character of our councry (winch is but another name for strength and power) will be mad» to droop by such proceedings ; the national pride humbled ; the high hopes of the people blasted ; their courage tamed and bro- ken ; their prosperity struck to ihe lieart ; their foreign rivals encouraged unto arrogance. Th'f Union of these States is the fairest political fabric that has ever been reared by human mind. Its foundation was laid upon " the lives, the fortunes, and sacred honor," of a constellation of as illustrious jiatriots as ever adorned an august assembly of this or any other age. It was cemented with the blood of our fathers. It has made our (Jov- ernment the admiration of the world. It has been a bt aeon-light to bear the beniglited nations of other regions to the altars of republican libeity. It has led the world to be- lieve that man is ca[)able of self-government, and that he was practicing upon its prin- ciples. It has Kiven us a proud elevation abroad as a member of the family of nations; and it has shed a brilliant lustre upon the character of Republics, which the Republics of antiquity never attained. Priiiled and publistied by Jno. T. Towers, Wa$liington, at $5 per hundred copies. 540 \0 ■J .r v^ . <> ,-^ ^'^ ,. > .^^ ■\. -.-^ ,-0 v^. [" ^ -^ -^^^^^-^^ ^^^ <^. .-b^v^;/%% «^^ ^-^^ -\ 'J, ^ ^f^ ^;v .0 ^. ^m^' 0*°^' ' <^,v■ »^g^'%^- A V : « o .^- o ->«^.- . ■' "- 'fiwM^ J- <- % .f V o o^ * ^'^"^ ^5'^^' o ^ .^ ^;; ..^^' • ^ \ 3 ' <:■,'' n^' ■ ^r ■y 0° ^^Ln- f^ c \. 0^ .\^p ^^\ / °<. o "V "" : ^, '--; '^