o 9 /^ o-r, '.smM^: ,^0^ ^^^F^^^* .0 nO ^. -.■:'^^^i:^^. ■ ^^ ^' V .^^ ^1 ^ • --- '■- -!►•' .' vr''^ /"^ o •^-Q^-^ \^m^n:. ^^rS oV'^^^l^'" «>-, <-^ 5^^-^^, ^^0^ 4 O *S» v\ r(\\ '3/'? //U if* *-i f — ^^ mt— -Iv ■'S* V o " c ^ 4 O o xO-n.. PROF. ORESTE FERRARA CAUSES AND PRETEXTS OF THE WORLD WAR A SEARCHING EXAMINATION INTO THE PLAY AND COUNTERPLAY OF EUROPEAN POLITICS FROM THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR TO THE OUTBURST OF THE GREAT WORLD WAR BY ORESTE FERRARA PROFESSOR of' PUBLIC LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD SPANISH EDITION BY MILDRED STAPLEY 1918 AMERICAN— NEO-LATIN LIBRARY 12 EAST 56th STREET NEW YORK, N. Y. Copyright, 1917, by ORESTE FERRARA JAN -4 iSi8 \ 4 ^ ©GIA479842 /\ * - « - fV I To The Memory of the Honorable Niel Primrose who so frequently ^discussed with the author the ideas for which he laid down his life. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. The Inevitable War 3 II. The Significance of 1870 ... 7 III. France AND Russia 11 IV. France and England 17 V. Russia and England 23 VI. The Triple Alliance 29 VII. The Mediterranean Agreements 35 VIII. The Franco- Japanese and Russo- Japanese Agreements ... 41 IX. The Policy of Germany and the "Encerclement" ... . . 45 X. Plans Frustrated ..... 59 XI. The Various Interests Encount- ered 65 XII. Servians Aspirations and Aus- tria's Crime . ,. 79 XIII. The Violent Method and Its Results 89 XIV. Ante Bellum Public Opinion . loi 1 11 CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE XV. Efforts of the Various Govern- ments 115 XVI. The General Conflict . . . . 135 XVII. The Violation of the Neutral- ity OF Luxemburg 145 XVIII. England and the Violation of Belgian Neutrality . . . .155 XIX. The Ultimatum and England's Declaration of War .... 185 XX. Turkey and the Conflict .... 191 XXL Italian Neutrality 199 XXII. Italy's Participation 223 XXIII. Belligerent and Neutral Balkan States 233 XXIV. Belligerents and Neutrals in Latin America 279 XXV, Spanish Neutrality 291 XXVL Greece's Double Attitude . . . 307 CAUSES AND PRETEXTS OF THE WORLD WAR THE WORLD WAR CHAPTER I THE INEVITABLE WAR THE famous maxim si vis pacem, para helium * appeared until recently to have found its most complete application in Europe; but now it is evident that Europe's tranquillity was only an external sem- blance. Based on a supposed equilibrium, it was dic- tated by exigency and by nothing else. Armed peace was bound to lead to war. A pretext, not even a cause, sufficed to unchain it. Just as in the physiological system an organ must function, so in the social system must an army.f Therefore it was natural that the conflagration should soon spread to all countries which possessed an armed * Colonel H. Frobenius in "The German Empire's Hour of Destiny" (translated from the German), demands that this rendering be substituted for that over the door of the great hall in the Peace Palace which reads si vis pacem, para justitia. t Arturo Labriola ; "International Disarmament," in the Forum, January i, 1915. 3 4 THE WORLD WAR force to put in the field; but later, since our civiliza- tion is a collectivity with overlapping relations be- tween its various elements, the conflict became a general one. Innumerable times has war been avoided because the presumed combatants found a solution. Within the last twenty years the cases of Fachoda, Agadir, Bosnia and Herzegovina have followed each other and each time diplomacy has prevented war merely because the probable combatants had not reached the necessary degree of preparation. But more recently, in spite of peace conferences, diplomatic declarations, and sovereigns exchanging visits and embraces; in spite of internal problems, financial penuriousness, in- sistent pacifism, threatening socialism, and antipatriotic syndicalism — in spite of all this, the increase of arma- ments kept presaging the proximity of war. Finally a deed sad in itself but unimportant from the inter- national point of view precipitated the stupendous conflict; and the proportions this has assumed make us ask if civilization is a myth. Did the great retro- gressions of the past have the same simple causes and follow the same direction as this of today? And ought this to serve as a future warning to Europe ? The civilization of that older part of the globe has extended to this fertile America which, more secure, with a higher conception of human existence and a more ample spirit for social activity, hoped to defend unmenaced the brilHant legacy of prosperity which the unflagging labor of past generations left her; but THE INEVITABLE WAR 5 the strong inclination of American opinion toward those combatants whose ideal was liberty, who were least prepared to resist brute force and found them- selves the possible prey of the more vigorous and less scrupulous combatant, finally crystallized into action. The European War became a World War. CHAPTER II THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 187O THE war of 1870 turned Germany and France into natural enemies. The victory of the former was so ostentatious and complete that it offended the public sentiment of the latter. On the other hand, although the conqueror did not realize it, the conquered was by no means annihilated. Bismarck, Teutonic, without pity or mercy, believed that the Treaty of Frankfort would destroy the national wealth and the integrity of the patrie; but this was not so. True, for France the humiliation was enormous, the loss of territory appreciable, the payment of the exorbitant war in- demnity not less serious. It is no wonder that the glassy eyes of the septuagenarian Thiers shed tears of grief on the night when he and Jules Favre returned from Versailles to Paris after the interview with Bis- marck.* But resurrection was possible and it came unexpectedly soon. Bismarck could not deny that he had miscalculated. Looking back from this distance we can see how, * G. Hanotaux ; "Histoire de la France Conteraporaine," Vol. I. 7 8 THE WORLD WAR with her three victorious wars, Germany accelerated her union, acquired new territories, covered herself with laurels, and prepared her hegemony over Europe. But these same successes were creating for her an implacable enemy whose existence must neces- sarily be dedicated to preparing her ruin and putting onto her shoulders the weight of too great a glory. When one examines the political history of Europe for the past century it is easy to trace the upward course of the little kingdom of Prussia since 1815, and to see that even though Sadowa and Sedan followed each other quickly it was not necessarily these deeds of blood which brought about the unity of the Empire, for this had been a Napoleonic conception before ever it became an aspiration of the states composing it. It was one of Bismarck's exaggerations to believe, as Prokesch-Osten ironically put it, that Prussia was the centre of the universe; but it cannot be denied that the decline of Austria (whose policy was in feeble hands and whose armies were not living up to past glories) along with the careful Prussian policy and the intellectual and scientific movement of 1850, gave Prussia the right to claim the inheritance of Frederick the Great. The personal temperament of Bismarck and the inconceivable errors of the Second Empire as to its foreign policy rapidly forced events out of their nor- mal course into abrupt moves and finally, war. Nor is this surprising when these same French errors caused Thiers to publicly exclaim during the famous THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 1870 9 discussion of 1867 that Napoleon III was "the real author of German unity" ; and when they caused King WilHam of Prussia to say something even more in- criminating, namely: that Napoleon III "had been working his own ruin ever since 1866 because he had failed to attack the Prussian army in the rear." Thus the Franco-Prussian War came, and France paid dear for her blunders. But Germany's decisive victory, her glory acquired through an injury that completely crushed the enemy, could not do otherwise than dis- til a spirit of revenge in the soul of every Frenchman, and at the same time arouse in other nations a senti- ment of distrust and even of fear. Sedan in 1870 left behind it a sediment of profound hatred, of undying bitterness, which Leipzig in 181 3 had not caused. The great Prussian triumphs had been excessively easy. CHAPTER III FRANCE AND RUSSIA CONQUERED and isolated, France's first duty was to establish her new republican institutions, rein- force her army, and reorganize her finance. All this she did more rapidly than was expected. Next she sought to establish alliances and in short to isolate her terrible enemy. How well she succeeded is demon- strated by present events. France's most powerful neighbors were Germany, Italy and England. Of these the first, ever since she defeated Austria at Sadowa, had bound that nation to her by skilful international policy of the only sort that Germany ever practiced with success; their union, moreover, rested upon common racial origin. The second, Italy, had twice improved her prospects of unity, thanks to Bismarck. The third, England, though she appeared indifferent to Continental affairs and was absorbed in great work elsewhere, was never- theless considered the hereditary enemy, France con- sequently could only turn her eyes to Russia and offer her an offensive and defensive alliance. The idea was not without precedent. It had been advanced by men 2 II 12 THE WORLD WAR like Chateaubriand and the Duke of Richelieu ; but the interior regime of both countries, along with the polit- ical mistakes of the Second Empire and the Third Republic, had excluded all possibiHty of union. The Crimean War and the intervention in Polish affairs for instance could hardly serve as links to bind the two nations. » As to the Polish intervention, Napoleon III himself, as an excuse for not contracting one of the best alliances on the Continent, had to affirm that the Polish cause was very popular in France.* In addition there was the grave crisis of the Commune, the new form of government adopted after 1871, the popular French approval when Berezowski shot at the Czar on his visit to Paris in 1867, the subsequent tol- erance which the Republic, respectful of its own laws, manifested to the Nihilists. All this would never have permitted accord, much less real alliance, between the two great powers of Eastern and Western Europe. In Bismarck*s attitude toward Russia there was a marked contrast. He could be flexible when necessity required (as witness his trips to Biarritz before 1866 in order to insure Napoleon Ill's abstaining from the war he was planning against Austria) and he now used all his arts upon the Czar to bring about the alliance which he designated "of the Three Emperors" — German, Austrian, and Russian. This, to be sure, did not in- cline Russia toward Francophilism ; nor did the Russophobia of French politicians, products mostly of the revolution — men like Grevy, or like Floquet, who ♦ Discourse of the Crown, November 5, 1863. FRANCE AND RUSSIA 13 in 1867 greeted the Czar in the Palace of Justice with the cry, Long live Poland! In face of all this one can understand the difficulty of throwing a bridge across Germany and uniting the Muscovite Empire with the French Republic. But necessity is superior to human wishes. It hap- pened that Russia was able to do France a signal service and this became the first step toward reciprocal sympathy and awakened a gratitude of the kind which countries long cherish. In 1875 Germany, noting her rival's recuperation, and seeing her reorganize her army which both the Peace preliminaries of Versailles and the Treaty of Frankfort had failed to definitely limit, wished again to assault her brutally. Bismarck became more threatening than ever; his official organ, the Post, spoke openly of war, and other German pa- pers followed its lead. Marshal MacMahon received warning from two European personages that war would break out in the spring. But the Czar understood that the moment had come when he could no longer remain passive ; through Prince Orloff , Russian Ambassador in Paris, and more directly through General Le Flo, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, he gave hope and encouragement to the French cabinet. It was then that Prince Gortschakoff, commenting on the Czar's words to Le Flo and underlining them, first hinted at a common action should Germany wantonly attack France.* * Gabriel Hanotaux ; "Histoire de la France Contemporaine,** Vol. III. 14 THE WORLD WAR But neither the good intentions of Czar Alexander II, nor the sympathetic expressions of Gortschakoff, nor the enigmatic words of diplomats of the old school, were sufficient for an alliance. France had to learn that she could expect no benefit from the quixotic spirit for sentimental intervention which had animated the foreign policy of the Second Empire. Such chivalry left her lonely, for no other nation was willing to commit a similar fatal error. Russia, with all her good intentions, could not be expected to draw her sword at the opportune moment unless she had a motive of self-interest or a previous promise of reciprocal utility. While this was slowly dawning on France, Bismarck, who knew well this egoism of international politics and who besides was a good gambler, hastened to offer that which soon might have been demanded — a free hand to Russia in Eastern Europe while he claimed the same in Western. France's uneasiness and consequent desire for a union were easy to understand; but Russia's pro- French proposals did not go beyond mere words. For them to do so the two nations must feel a common necessity. Such a necessity confronted them when the Austro-German Treaty of alliance was celebrated. It directed German policy toward the Orient, or at least prevented it from ignoring that question, and the fact was intelligently exploited by French politicians, dip- lomats, and financiers. An alliance de facto was begun in 1880. This culminated in the formal treaty, dated August 22, 1 89 1, and signed by Ribot and De Moren- FRANCE AND RUSSIA 15 heim representing the two respective countries. Bis- marck had been dismissed the year before, for the new Emperor wished no leading-strings ; and the old tiger, from his retirement, kept clawing at his successors because of this alliance; but he himself could not have prevented it. From the day its need first became apparent in 1878, when Russia came out worsted from the Congress of Berlin, it had been shaping itself as a treaty in the minds of all.* With France and Russia allied, the equilibrium broken in 1870 by the Franco-Prussian War was now re-established, and Germany ceased to be the arbiter of the destinies of Europe. f The rejoicing in France was extraordinary and has been sustained with but few intermissions. In fact the jubilation was exaggerated to such a point that Count de Witte, who should have been far from dis- pleased by it, said one day to the distinguished French publicist Andre Tardieu: "For ten years now you have been making Franco-Russian manifestation both in season and out of season." These explosions of popular sentiment expressed how persistent had been the past nightmare and how useful was the new union implying supreme defense; but nevertheless there arose in the course of twenty years two moments of suspicious reserve. The first, when Muscovite prestige was humbled on the plains * Gabriel Hanotaux ; "La Politique de Tequilibre," page 124. t Andre Tardieu ; "Les questions actuelles de la politique etran- gere en Europe"; also "La politique exterieure de rAllemagne." i6 THE WORLD WAR of Manchuria and thereby weakened in all Europe. Immediately the event proved to France the impor- tance of a strong ally, for in the period that followed she again had to suffer Teuton impertinences. The second, and more transitory, during the last Balkan War when France followed her own policy independent of her ally; that is to say, she furthered her own Eastern interests without stopping to think' that how- ever considerable these may have been, Russia's only reason for keeping up the alliance was that her con- cern lay in Eastern Europe, just as France's lay prin- cipally in Western. On both these occasions the en- thusiasm for the Franco-Russian accord waned some- what, but adjusj:ments and explanations were soon forthcoming. Russia began the reorganization of her army and the costly change of her war material, and the two nations with new zest bent themselves toward the common defense. If Prussian militarism provoked it, they would be prepared to attack their vigilant rival at the opportune moment. CHAPTER IV FRANCE AND ENGLAND (I^T^HE Englishman is our hereditary enemy." Un- A til recently this classic dictum was on the lips of every Frenchman; this was the opinion which the two nations separated by the Channel had of each other. And the fact is, however much they have tried to ex- plain since the Entente Cordiale that the idea was erroneous,* it is none the less true that long-standing rivalry had kept up intermittent war between them. This condition constituted the inheritance of both countries and there was no reason why the past should not foretell the future. The Hundred Years War ter- minated in 1453 ; the War of the League of Augsburg, from 1688 to 1693; the War of the Spanish Succes- sion, from 1701 to 1713; of the Austrian Succession, from 1744 to 1748; the Seven Years War, from 1756 to 1763; the American troubles from 1778 to 1783; the Continental Wars from 1793 to 1802, and again from 1803 to 181 5 — this long list together with the * Ives Guyot ; "L'Entente Cordiale au point de vue 6conomique,* in the Journal des Economistes, May 15, 1914. 17 i8 THE WORLD WAR friction and threats of the Restoration Period, the Monarchy of July, the Second Empire, and the Third Republic, justifies the old belief in hereditary enmity; nor could suspicion be dissipated by brief periods of friendship such as occurred in 1830, 1840, and 1872, '74, and 75. The attitude, moreover, is explicable on other grounds. Because of her geographical situation Eng- land's safety demanded the supremacy of the seas. This she had maintained by fighting against Spain, Holland, and France; to maintain it to-day she must fight against Germany. Back in 1762 after the Dutch and Spaniards had lost their naval power and Ger- many's had not yet loomed on the horizon, the Earl of Chatham outlined England's policy in unequivocable terms when he declared: "His Majesty's ministers must never forget this great principle — this directing principle of all our policy ; namely : the only thing that England need fear in the world is that France should become a maritime, commercial, and colonial power." These words have always expressed English public spirit, for supremacy on the seas also meant political strength and national wealth. In proportion as France increased her colonial acqui- sitions and her maritime strength, the hereditary ene- my's aversion to her increased. It was considerably aggravated when the minister Jules Ferry launched his country on the road to conquest, an initiative which even Bismarck favored, being only too delighted to see the French armies turn in some other direction FRANCE AND ENGLAND 19 than the eastern frontier. Although French prudence sought to make known the national projects to Eng- land and to obtain from her a certain approbation, still every acquisition was fraught with danger. It is known that at the Congress of Berlin, Lord Salisbury almost counseled the conquest of Tunis to Waddington, First French Plenipotentiary (or at least he counseled intervention which in African affairs is the same thing). The taking over of Madagascar was recog- nized by England in the treaty of August 5, 1890. The same with Senegal, Dahomey, and the Congo, where "French interests were in constant opposition with British and where peace was established only with difficulty." * Yet there were moments of grave crisis, produced apparently by insignificant causes, but whose real roots ran deep in the colonial policy in gen- eral and the African in particular. "For twenty years the world watched a veritable steeplechase; especially between France and England."t Africa, considered the res nulUus of political law, was marked off by geographers, explorers, and above all by officials charged with important missions. Every aspiration grew into an interest and every interest into a right. England won the steeplechase, but was not able to prevent her rival from occupying those portions of second-rate quality or which were not included in the preestablished imperial plan. France had to suffer * E. Lemonon ; "L'Europe et la politique brittanique/* Paris, 1912, page 87. fRene Millet; "Politique exterieure," 1898-1905, page 155. 20 THE WORLD WAR humiliations such as Fachoda, which, though no more serious than others, is better known because of the enormous noise made over it in the French press. In 1898 when Delcasse replaced the eminent Gabriel Hanotaux as foreign minister, there was a radical change in French policy. This statesman succeeded, whenever an opportune moment presented itself, in pacifying animosities and drawing nearer to the cab- inet of St. James; thus he turned international rela- tions into another channel and rescued France from her traditional policy of troublesome aggressions, petu- lant reservations, and never-ending discussions. Del- casse it was, also, who dedicated his efforts to the isolation of Germany, leaving her the only ally con- grous with racial affinity and geographical situation. The ultimate state of things was a triumph for this minister and King Edward VIL Little by little England saw France, while not re- linquishing colonial transactions, resigned to accept- ing her, England^s, vast imperial horizons. A sympa- thetic policy was initiated in 1898 which culminated in the treaty of April 8, 1904. This treaty regulated, or we might say liquidated, all colonial difficulties and permitted the union of the two countries. France had finally comprehended that England's friendship in Europe was worth more than any strip of African or Asiatic territory, and those nationalists who had in- tended to protest on Edward VII's arrival in Paris in 1903, instead applauded. The hereditary enemy had been converted into a sincere friend; but this could FRANCE AND ENGLAND 21 never have happened had not Germany acquired a mar- itime and commercial power greater and more danger- ous than France's; and the friend could never have been changed into an ally had not the Russian troops suffered one defeat after another on the wide plains of Manchuria. To-day the immutable field of Waterloo gazes with- out amazement on other allies than those of a century ago. CHAPTER V RUSSIA AND ENGLAND THE Anglo-French entente encountered one very grave obstacle. France had an ally, Russia, who nursed no end of grievances against England and Eng- land against her. With the v/hole question of Asia between them it was impossible to be opposed to each other there and allied to each other in Europe. In the Mediterranean, in the Persian Gulf, in far-off India, Muscovite power threatened British ; England saw that all that immense Asiatic empire which she had consoli- dated with so much labor might be lost. Hence her traditional attitude of distrust toward Russia. Al- though the more direct struggle for Asiatic influence developed between 1894 and 1907 it can be said that Russia was competing there ages before. In Persia she had been able, through London* s blunder, to establish a clever and profitable policy about the time mentioned. She filled the impoverished Persian exchequer with rubles while England refused to lend a shilling, and her reward was a constantly growing commerce and a promise from the Persian government to give no rail- road concessions without the consent of St. Petersburg. But not even all this adroit diplomacy could palliate 23 24 THE WORLD WAR - the bad impression left by an unsuccessful war; and so it happened that the defeats in Manchuria cost Rus- sia her Asiatic prestige, and the fact was skilfully ex- ploited by the English to their own benefit.* This by no means accomplished Russia's expulsion, however. In the north of the extensive region under consideration she continued to dominate in spite of internal political fluctuations, while the British held sway in the Persian Gulf region. After checking a Russian invasion of Afghanistan the limits of the Rus- sian frontier were determined by a treaty signed by the two on March ii, 1895. That Russia had directed herself eastward before considering a more definite expansion north and a more favorable one south, the occupation of Turkestan and the laying of the Trans- caspian Railroad are conclusive evidence; and as for Afghanistan, in spite of St. Petersburg's declarations of disinterestedness in 1869, 1874, and 1883, it is nevertheless true that she had sporadically acted to the contrary. England always vigorously upheld her own advantage in Afghanistan even to assuming its defense, by the treaty of 1893, in case it should be at- tacked by a foreign nation. This was an effort evi- dently to reaffirm the British protectorate and to ex- clude Russia from all sphere of influence. f When Rus- sia tried the same expansion in Thibet the same English measures opposed her. *L. de St. Victor de St. Blancard; "L' Accord anglo-russe du 31 Aout, 1907," in the Annales des sciences politiques. t"L' Accord anglo-russe," page 49. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND 25 Thus were the great Russian interests in Asia — may one say appetites ?^ — in opposition to British ambitions. Just as a check was put by Great Britain on territorial or commercial expansion in the south, so toward the north when Russia tried to hold Manchuria, to aspire to Korea, and to have decisive influence at the court of Pekin; all of which Russia was doing in order to augment her trade with the Celestial Empire and later consider it as an enormous Russian dependency. But England thereupon urged Japan to defend her inter- ests (and England's own) with a result that is well known. Bismarck had previously said, satisfied at see- ing Russia engaged in other affairs than European, "There is nothing for Russia in Europe but nihilism and other diseases. Her mission is in Asia. There she stands for civilization." The old wolf, knowing well Russia's weak spot, held the image of nihilism before her eyes to serve his own ends. Obviously a Russia absorbed with Asiatic expansion signified a Germany unmenaced at the back and free to concen- trate on western Europe. And yet Russia had a legitimate right to mix in European affairs, or more strictly speaking, in Balkan affairs. A common origin, commercial relations, con- tiguity, the navigation of the Black Sea, and most of all Russia's Mediterranean aspirations, all called her in that direction. But the Congress of Berlin in 1878 foiled her. It prevented her from enjoying the fruits of her recent victory over the Turks, and definitely fixed her situation in southern Europe. After this, dis- 26 THE WORLD WAR, illusionized perhaps, and finding outlet in increased Asiatic activities, she kept aloof from the turbulent peninsula, only to find when she came back that the situation had radically changed. It was no longer England she had to face. It was Austria who, to Russia's discomfiture, had powerfully established her- self there while Germany was directing covetous glances toward Turkey, both European and Asiatic. Thus in short time and in the natural course of events it ceased to be England and France who thwarted Russia in her Balkan policy, and Austria and Germany took their place. This is precisely one of those variations which international policy frequently exhibits. The Crimean War was now a thing of the remote past; and of the remote past also was Bis- marck's contemptuous remark, "The whole Balkan question is not worth a Pomxranian soldier's solid bones." The natural sequel was the treaty of August 31, 1907, which established the entente between England and Russia. The Franco-English treaty had prepared the way for it, England's moderate attitude toward victorious Japan made it possible, and the conversa- tions between Count Cassini and Sir Arthur Nichol- son during the Conference of Algeciras shaped it. As finally signed it comprised, besides a general declara- tion, three distinct conventions relative to affairs in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet, and a declaration by Sir Edward Grey concerning the Persian Gulf. Thus were the English-Russian quarrels of so many years RUSSIA AND ENGLAND 27 adjusted and future ones eliminated as far as the human mind could forestall them. Once more exigency had been stronger than tradition. Between the former rivals in Asia and the Balkans had risen Germany; curbing the boundless Asiatic ambition of Russia were Mukden and Tsushima; disturbing the one dream of English statesmen was the ever-increasing naval force of the Central Empire. Result, the Anglo-Russian en- tente. England could now be tranquil; the road to India was not to be so quickly- traveled.* ♦Andre Tardieu; "La France et les Alliances." *0 w CHAPTER VI THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AS already stated, the Alliance of the Three Em- perors had been a Bismarckian idea. This logical conception was quite worthy of the great statesman, since it would make Germany mistress of the Euro- pean situation, and Europe in his scheme was the only important field of action. By it she would give her moral support to Russia's Asiatic aspirations — moral support only since Germany was then far from possess- ing a fleet that could hinder England's policy in that same continent. By it, Austria having been conquered and excluded from the Germanic community, could return only by means of a treaty which would make her recognize the supremacy of Prussia and which would command Austrian aid in Prussia's Balkan policy. By it, both Russia and Austria would serve to maintain the German hegemony over all continental Europe and keep out England ; the territorial conquests granted by the Treaty of Frankfort would be con- solidated; and lastly this alliance of the three empires would have a salutary effect on internal order and do away with those revolutionary flickers with which 29 30 THE WORLD WAR the restless and frothing Latin world had contaminated the Saxon and the Slav. But logical though it all appeared, Bismarck had to be content with uniting only two of the desired three. The Triple Alliance came later but with Italy, not Russia, as the third power. The union of Germany and Austria concerted in 1879 was the fruit of the Great Chancellor's genius and France's traditional policy of errors (not yet reformed by Delcasse). Prior to it Bismarck, having realized the difficulty of bringing the three great empires under one single policy which would assign Asia to Russia, the Balkans to Austria, and the Occident to Germany, had been oscillating between Austria and Russia. As the latter was growing ever stronger while Austria appeared to be growing weaker, the chancellor in- clined more to the Czar. Emperor William I also had undisguised preference for the Russians. But when in 1875 the Czar and his chancellor Gortshakoff pre- vented Germany from again attacking France and completing the inadequate work of 1870, the conse- quence was the hostile German attitude revealed in the Congress and Treaty of Berlin. This ended all hopes of a treaty with the Bey had occupied Tunis, and the appointed were the Russian reactionaries who expected that the union would put a curb on nihilism. Bismarck soon managed Austria, and Count An- drassy decided to accept the German advances.* On * S. L. Driault; "Problemes politiques et sociaux," Paris, 191 1, page 259. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 31 October 7, 1879, was signed the secret and merely de- fensive treaty by virtue of which if one of the two empires should be attacked by Russia the other was to help with the totality of its forces; and if one of the two should be attacked by some other power sup- ported by Russia the unattacked must help with its whole army; but if one of the two were attacked by some other power not aided by Russia the unattacked must maintain a benevolent neutrality. Two years later Italy became a party to this agree- ment. Not all the causes which brought her into such an unpopular alliance are known. France in pursuance of a treaty with the Bey had occupied Tunis, and the act was considered in Italy not only as an aggression but as an indication of a future policy of violence and violation. Yet this could hardly have been the only or even the principal cause of her joining Austria. Though she considered that France had defrauded her of a territory over which she claimed historic rights, elsewhere she was forced to see even more legitimate hopes crushed or at least postponed. Under the none too gentle rule of Austria were living great numbers of Italians in extensive tracts that were both geograph- ically and historically an object of aspiration to the new Italian kingdom. One of the most widely ac- cepted h)npotheses regarding the Triple Alliance is that Bismarck, by friendly advances to the Holy See, made the Italians fear that the Roman question would come up for reconsideration. Be this as it may, Italy be- came part of the Triple Alliance in 1881 and it was 32 THE WORLD WAR Austria, her ancient enemy, who brought it about. That is to say, the negotiations were carried on /by Count Kalnoky, the Austrian Minister, and Pasquale Stanislao Mancini. Although this AlHance forced Italy into greater ex- penditures than her economic condition warranted, it nevertheless guaranteed the as yet unstable national unity. For many years the policy of the Triple Alliance was the policy of Germany. Only recently did Italy emancipate herself and try to make new ententes on the margin — a proceeding which caused Von Biilow to exclaim that they had permitted her to take a waltz turn with France. Delcasse meanwhile was telling France that she need never fear aggression from Italy. The Triple Alliance, renewed whenever it was about to expire, was always a defensive alliance and as such superior to the Franco-Russian, the Anglo- French, and the Anglo-Russian. But so far as Italy is concerned, she was in recent years harping more on the letter of the bond and forgetting its spirit. The Central Empires, on the contrary, kept identifying themselves more and more with a common international policy which was almost a precursor of national union in case of a victorious war. It was even said of the late Archduke that his Pan-Germanic tendencies were so pronounced that he seemed more German than Austrian.* While Italy, by means of accord with the ♦Andre Cheradame; "England, France, and Russia," in the Quarterly Review, October, 1909. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 33 Mediterranean powers, continued emancipating her- self from Berlin, Austria kept drawing nearer till the relationship came to signify a phenomenon of Pan- Germanism rather than an alliance in the strict inter- national sense. CHAPTER VII THE MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENTS REVIEWING the conditions which induced Italy to fall into the arms of the Triple Alliance, thus subordinating herself to Germany and becoming the friend of Austria, we find that Bismarck*s strategem had made her apprehensive of finding herself forsaken, especially with regard to the Papal question. But how- ever unpopular the new bond was, as long as England looked upon it with not unfriendly eyes, Italy remained secure and satisfied. The newly unified nation found herself guaranteed on land by the armies of the two great Central Empires; while the equilibrium which England maintained in the Mediterranean conceded free Italian action in the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian Seas. To be sure it also gave France a certain hegemony over the western Mediterranean (far from contenting Gambetta, however, who aspired to make it "the theatre of French action'*) ; but the reassuring fact was that England was still prime arbiter in the whole extension of those waters which had been the great highway of Phoenicians and Carthaginians, and the mare nostrum of the Romans. 35 36 THE WORLD WAR The friendship between England and Italy was tra- ditional. Gladstone, with that noble policy which could recognize the aspirations of idealists and at the same time keep his country in contact with realities — Glad- stone, it will be recalled, had given the Italian patriots full approval by affirming that the Bourbon rule in Naples was "the negation of God." English cruisers looked on indulgently when the celebrated Expedi- tion of the Thousand sallied out from Cuarto under the orders of Garibaldi, to land in Marsala. From that British intervention which helped to win Palermo, to the official recognition of young and growing Free Italy, the British spirit had been saturating the people, and the friendship which then sprang up has always been strong enough to withstand all strain. France, too, helped in these difficult moments; but the effect was very different. England risked nothing in favor- ing Italian unity ; France, on the other hand, gave her blood, her money, and her honor in a cause from which she could expect no benefits. But she did it with many reservations. Napoleon IIFs Treaty of Villaf ranca, for instance, came as a cruel surprise after a whole series of helpful victories; likewise Minister Rouher^s "Never;" likewise the whole Catholic agita- tion in favor of maintaining the temporal power of the Pope. In face of so many sad disillusions, the benefits received from France paled beside England's less positive, but less meddlesome, sympathy. When England decided to occupy Egypt she urged Italy to accompany her; but the latter declined on the THE MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENTS 37 ground of not being prepared for colonial activities and not understanding the art of intervention in for- eign countries (she who herself had been the scene of so much intervention!). Upon the statesmen who rejected this gratuitously offered opportunity, many reproaches have been heaped; but such judgment re- sults from inappreciation of the conjuncture of events at that time. Bismarck always kept in mind England's friendship for Italy. The old statesman was accustomed to re- solve all his problems within a narrow circle (soon snapped for better or worse by the nation he built up) ; and apart from his argument that the unity of the Ital- ian peninsula was in Hne with his own project for a great central empire, his thorough estimate of British power would alone have predisposed him to favor Italian unity. With such importance and honor did Italy regard England's friendship that in 1896 Premier Rudini affirmed with satisfaction that the English compact completed the system of Italian aUiances.* In 1897 Italy gave up Kassala which she had recently wrested from the Dervishes, in order that the British might consolidate the conquest of the Sudan. In the light of such long-standing and cordial feeling the clouds which formed over the question of Tripoli, or when Chamber- lain's imperialism dreamed of changing the language of Malta, were quickly dissipated. That the Entente Cordiale between England and ♦ E. Lemonon, "UEurope et la politique brittanique," page 189. 38 THE WORLD WAR France should serve as a basis for a Mediterranean entente between France and Italy was in the course of things. But even on this point Bismarck wished to keep the two countries apart and wrote accordingly to Giuseppe Mazzini : "The Mediterranean constitutes an inheritance difficult to divide among the heirs." And so it happened that France and Italy with so many historic memories in common, so many reasons for uniting, continued to suffer the consequence of the ex- clusory policy of their respective governments. Under this influence, the masses in each indulged in recipro- cal acts of hostility* and it was some time before mis- givings and suspicions were quenched by a flow of satisfactory explanations. As already mentioned, the credit of putting an end to this useless and ignoble en- mity, and of initiating an epoch of peace and mutual understanding, is due to Delcasse. The good relation- ship he was able to create heralded Italy's benevolent attitude at the outburst of the present war and her sub- sequent entrance into it on the side of the Allies. The accord between Italy and France determined the action of one and the other in the cases of Tripoli and Morocco; and so sure was Delcasse of the good-will both of the Italian people and their government, that at the very time when the Triple Alliance was being renewed in 1902, he did not hesitate to affirm from the tribunal of the Chamber that "neither directly nor in- directly is the policy of Italy, as a consequence of her alliances, directed against France. In no case will her * A. Billot, "La France et I'ltalie. THE MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENTS 39 policy constitute a threat for us, either in diplomatic form, or in protocols, or in international military stipu- lations. In no case, nor in any form, can Italy be the instrument of, or a party to, an aggression against our nation.* And, in effect, Italy kept her pledges when the in- cident of Morocco gave France reason to fear an attack ; and again at the Conference of Algeciras, where her chief delegate, the aged Marchese Visconti-Ven- osta, gave France a support which was doubly useful because in addition to representing a factor of the Triple Alliance, he was a diplomat of great prestige. f France on her side fulfilled her obligations during the Italian-Turkish war. There were momentary diffi- culties over the steamer Manouha, but these had no real importance, and indeed the question would never have been raised had the present president of the Republic, who was then foreign minister, been animated by the same conciliatory feeling as his predecessor Delcasse. In addition to the Manouha incident there was the pro-Greek sentiment born of the Balkan War, when Italy for a moment united with her allies in aggressive action as to Albania and Epirus; but the rancor in- spired by Austria, more powerful and threatening than ever, brought into relief the solid base on which the Italo-French accord had been built up. * Cited by Andre Tardieu in "La France et les Alliances." t Andre Tardieu ; "La Conference d' Algeciras." CHAPTER VIII THE FRANCO-JAPANESE AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE AGREEMENTS ENGLAND was also back of the Franco- Japanese and the Russo-Japanese agreements. English statesmen understood that the British nation could not defend its enormous empire if engaged in a European war. The increasing naval and military force of Japan, as revealed in the latter's wars against China and Russia, gave them considerable uneasiness; they saw that even were England victorious in a war in Europe her Asiatic empire might be endangered ; hence the Anglo- Japanese Treaty of 1905. This treaty was exclusively Asiatic. By virtue of it the two powers were to reciprocally defend the territories thus far obtained and tonmamfain the integrity of China. It guaranteed occupations already made and left China exclusively under the influence of the English and Japanese. When, in the present war, England author- ized Japan's offensive against Germany, the treaty was made to exceed its original well-known intent; but such action it will be observed was limited to Asia, for England probably did not care to awaken future mis- 41 42 THE WORLD WAR givings in the United States nor to set a precedent for calling the yellow race into Europe. In the Russo-Japanese enmity England would have found another problem difficult of solution in case of war. Her treaty with Japan would have missed its perfect application, for while England was allied to Russia and France in Europe, Japan could not be their foe in case of a general war in Asia. Out of these considerations were evolved the Russo-Japanese entente of July 30, 1907, and the Franco- Japanese of June 10, 1907. It appears at first glance impossible that Russia should have so soon forgotten her defeat at the hands of Japan; but since that disastrous war she had been giving signs of wiser foreign policy, and besides, the treaty of peace did not take advantage of her van- quished position. In short the accord which was bound to develop under the aegis of England was anticipated by the Treaty of Portsmouth. On June 13, 1907, was signed the first agreement between Japan and Russia. In July of the same year the treaty, of a political order and "fortifying the peaceful, amicable, and neighborly relations which have been so satisfactorily reestablished between Russia and Japan, and avoiding the possibility of future misin- terpretations" was signed by Iswolsky, Russian Min- ister of Foreign Affairs, and Motone, Japanese Am- bassador in Petrograd. It bound the two nations to respect their own territorial integrity and that of China, and also to maintain the so-called "open-door" policy in that country. THE FRANCO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT 43 The accord between France and Japan was easier of consummation because the friendship of the two na- tions was traditional. True, it was distressing in the trying days of the Russian and Japanese War, for France to see her ally suffer one defeat after another, and the aid which she gave to the fleet of Rodjestwensk in his difficult voyage through the French possessions appeared likely to cause complications; but the an- cient good feeling survived it. The convention was signed on June 10, 1907, by Kurino, Japanese Ambas- sador in Paris, and Pichon, French Minister of For- eign Affairs. It promised mutual aid in preserving the security and peace of territories occupied by either in the Asiatic continent, and like the previously men- tioned treaty, it guarded the integrity of China and the open-door system. With peace thus assured in the Far East, the three nations, France, England, and Russia could better focus on their European interests and more solidly uphold the Triple Entente to their common good. Germany also had understood the importance of having, if not an ally, at least a friend in the Far East. Innumerable times had she tried to establish closer associations with Japan. By publishing newspapers in that empire and sending professors and military men there she had impressed the educated classes ; but even though she succeeded for a spell in weaning them away from the French influence which had inspired their first steps in the acquisition of European culture, she 44 THE WORLD WAR. never succeeded in winning over the Japanese govern- ment. English diplomacy, more subtle and uniform, never left the field free to Germany for a single moment. CHAPTER IX THE POLICY OF GERMANY AND THE "eNCERCLEMENT" WHILE these events were transpiring and matters were shaping for a European conflict, Germany was applying herself to getting the necessary strength for the decisive moment. This she accomplished not only by foreign arrangements and compacts, but also by creating a formidable army and navy of her own. Her concern for foreign support was limited to Aus- tria, Italy, and in more recent times, Turkey. The advances made to the last named had in reality a double object; they were both military and economic, for Turkey not only represented a military spirit of the highest order and was the leader of the Islamic world, but she was also the highway of Asia ; she led to Per- sia immediately and perhaps to India later. A proof of this assertion — the double interest — may be seen in the difficulties Germany was willing to face in order to construct the Bagdad Railroad across Ottoman Asia and thus unite the North Sea with the Persian Gulf. The very rails themselves seemed to indicate the path of Greater Germany."^ But unfortunately for both *B. Combes de Patris; "De Berlin a Bagdad," in the Revue des sciences poUtiques, June 15, 1914, page 357 45 46 THE WORLD WAR countries, the sixteen years or so that Germany has devoted to coaching Turkey have been the most dis- astrous in the latter's existence. Turkey, as German statesmen conceived it, was to balance the ever-grow- ing miHtary force of Russia and serve as a brake to England. If Russia could swell her regiments with the rude, ignorant peasants of her outlying regions, just so surely could Turkey summon the Mohammedan hordes; it was merely a question of organization. It followed logically that Turkey, in order to be efficient as an ally, would have to be guided in her internal policy and to have her army put into shape. These two points attended to, she could be of extraordinary usefulness. Therefore Baron von Marschall, the flower of German diplomacy, was sent to Constantinople, while Baron von der Goltz (who has since played in Belgium the same sorry role as the Duke of Alba) dedicated himself to the development of Turkish mili- tarism. His sympathy during the war against Italy, and the counsels which he gave to the Turkish officers through the medium of the Neue Freie Presse of Vi- enna will be recalled. In the meantime Germany, ex- ploiting the cupidity of the French financiers, counseled the Turkish government to borrow largely from them with a view to bettering her war material, which was furnished mostly by Krupps'. The end was that Tur- key found herself definitely tied to the chariot of the German Empire. Results, however, were not commensurate with the efforts made. At home the Young Turk party did not THE POLICY OF GERMANY 47 know how to overcome the racial tendency to dejec- tion nor did they find the reorganization of the state on an improved foundation an easy task ; and abroad, two unlucky wars were all they could show for their military and diplomatic preparation. These left Tur- key reduced to a minimum of European territory, and the poorer by the loss of two vast African provinces. Yet in spite of defeats she never lost faith in her ally and protector. Staking her national life, her all, on a single card, she has continued to be guided by the Central Empires. Perhaps the game was not un- welcome to Enver Pasha whose personal ambition, like Teutonic audacity, acquired great force in any environ- ment favorable to it. By this time we see the policy of the Great Chan- cellor completely abandoned. The Orient which Bis- marck despised had become an object to covet; the colonial policy was now the chief concern of states- men, while the fleet received the Emperor's special so- licitude. And in the anxieties of all, England and Rus- sia had supplanted France. In other words, Bismarck's policy had completed its cycle, and a newer and ampler, aiming at all the continents instead of merely western Europe, had taken its place. After 1870 Germany applied herself to develop- ing her industries and increasing her commerce. Gifted with extraordinary tenacity and genius for or- der she got every possible advantage out of her military successes ; and as to her foreign affairs the Triple Al- liance appeared to be the Holy Ark in which she took 48 THE WORLD WAR. shelter. "Germany shut herself up within the Triple Alliance as if in a fortress, and lived securely. Even the Franco-Russian agreement did not alter her sense of quiet. On the contrary it was amusing that her natural rivals should take the trouble to guarantee her own conquests to her, and should bind themselves by the most terrible oaths to stay at home."* Equally indifferent was Germany to the subsequent Franco-Italian agreement on Mediterranean questions. Chancellor Von Biilow who had referred to it as *'a waltz turn'* said in more serious and official mood: "We should congratulate ourselves that France and Italy, each with great and important interests in the Mediterranean, have come to an understanding con- cerning them." The next accord, the Anglo-French, also left German serenity unruffled. No one saw that this settlement, by putting an end to an age-old conflict between the two nations, might serve to set up another against a third party; which third party could be no other than Germany, natural enemy of France and rival of England. A few days after it was signed, that is to say on April 12, 1904, the same chancellor with the same imperturbability affirmed that, so far as German interests were concerned, there was nothing to object to in the said treaty, f In fact, with regard to France, the nation which was aspiring to the hegemony of Europe preferred that the ♦ Rene Millet ; "France, Allemagne, Maroc," in the Revue politique et parlamentaire, June, 1907. ! Andre Tardieu ; "La France et les Alliances," page 191. THE POLICY OF GERMANY 49 statu quo should not alter : she was therefore disposed to extend every sort of neighborly courtesy. At each disaster or misfortune — the death of General Mac Mahon, of Sadi-Carnot, of Marshal Canrobet, of Jules Simon ; on the occasion of the Charity Bazaar Fire, the shipwreck of La Bourgogne, and innumerable other lamentable events, — the Kaiser always tried to be the first to send condolence and to have his ambassador persuade the afflicted of his sympathetic sentiments.* The Treaty of Frankfort had given Germany the de- sired frontier and had served to complete and con- solidate her unity; to maintain its clauses and to do nothing that would interrupt her ever-increasing com- merce and industry were the chief desideratum. Any difficulty with France would mean a relapse. Hence the significance of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's ex- clamation in the Reichstag : "I do not care to go over the past any more than is necessary to know the fu- ture." Germany might well be satisfied, for until the Franco- Russian Alliance this state of things had meant her absolute domination on the Continent, a domina- tion which took a new lease of life when the defeats in Manchuria showed how ineffectual was the Russian army. To counteract this domination France had to direct all her acts; likewise England, when the day came on which Germany, forgetting the counsels of dead and gone statesmen, took a place, and took it with * Andre Tardieu ; "La politique exterieure de I'Allemagne, page 63. 50 THE WORLD WAR unequalled vigor, among the maritime and colonial nations. Up to this time Germany^s relations with France had been the pivot of European politics; now it was her relations with England. To go a step further, the former were influenced by the latter. England saw German commerce increasing and penetrating into those far-off seas where British commerce had never before met a rival ; she saw the German fleet increasing and threatening that supremacy which had always safe- guarded her progress and her wealth;* and above all she saw jeopardized her ancient prestige which, as Lord Roseberry had declared, formed the base of England's grandeur. Then there came a moment of severe trial, when England perceived that just as Spain, Holland, and France had threatened her in the past, so was Germany threatening her in the present. This moment was the Transvaal War, which put British resources to a hard test.f She understood that the supreme effort of her his- tory must be made, that it was one of those crises in which great world questions must be decided, and that she must find out which way the scales inclined. To wait would be to give the enemy more time to prepare. The doctrine of "splendid isolation" had had its day. ♦ Rene Pinon ; "La rivallte de TAllemagne et de TAngleterre," in the Revue des deux mondes, March i, 1909. t Victor Berand; "L'Oeuvre d'Edouard VII." THE POLICY OF GERMANY 51 Edward VIFs reign merits a eulogy for having known how to interpret the signs of the times.* After a tentative accord with Germany which never material- ized and which was attributed to Chamberlain, a marked hostility to that nation took shape in England. If only past history could serve as a guide, this feeling would appear inconceivable; for just as surely as it shows us that England was the hereditary enemy to the Frenchman, it shows her as the ancient ally and con- stant friend to the Prussian. In Germany the sentiment was returned, even antici- pated, as revealed on such occasions as the German ap- proval of Russian domination in Manchuria, the ques- tion of the Bagdad Railway and all it meant for German dreams of expansion, and the attacks on Chamberlain in 1901, when hard and even vulgar terms were applied to him in the Reichstag. All these re- vealed, as was said, a state of hostility, and could not but initiate that current of suspicion and prevention which precedes all great crises. Applying Von Billow's famous axiom, "When one is not sure of making himself loved he should make him- self feared," Germany proceeded to augment her marine, for as Baron von Marschall expressed it, "We must sharpen the German sword on sea as well as on land.'' So vigorously was this done that the English themselves were stupefied. It endangered their mari- time policy of the "two power standard." Nor were * Rene Pinon ; "France et Allemagne," in the Revue des deux mondeSj part i for April, 1912, page 657. 52 THE WORLD WAR their misgivings calmed by the discourses of Emperor William II. From the year 1901 when the silent antagonism began between these two nations, France, prompted by England, asserted herself more positively in interna- tional politics, and in serious matters sought the opin- ion of the Cabinet of St. James. And that same year began the isolation of Germany, the encerclement whose success is so manifest in the present moment; then, too, began la revanche and the decline of the Ger- man hegemony. In all this silent cumulation, the only noisy interruption was the aggressive tone which Germany directed to France in 1904. The Morocco incident roused her out of her tran- quillity and gave her the first positive and unmistakable sign of the hemming-in policy. That Germany should not be gratified at seeing France plan a vast Mediter- ranean empire is natural, for it was at the expense of Germany's own aspirations; moreover, in it would be recruited a warlike colonial army which could be brought into Europe at the required moment to serve as a balance against the great Teutonic military con- tingents. To Algeria, long since conquered, France had added Tunis; and next she penetrated slowly but decidedly into Morocco. The Kaiser resolved not to tolerate any expansion whatever and gave his neigh- bor many a start by way of advising her of his feelings ; this produced the desired uneasiness. On his trip to Tangiers he saluted the Sultan with a speech in which he dwelt with immoderate emphasis on his THE POLICY OF GERMANY 53 host's quality of independence. "It is to the Sultan in his capacity as an independent sovereign that I am paying a visit/' he said ; and again, "I hope that under the sovereignty of the Sultan, Morocco will remain free, open . . . without annexation, and on a footing of absolute equality . . . for I consider the Sultan a completely free monarch." All these insistent declara- tions and phrases are comprised in a short discourse of less than seventy words. This time France did not heed the hint; but when Delcasse, more radical, did not wish longer to remain foreign minister and suffer the imperial prosiness, France consented to the calling of a conference sure, as well she might be through her ententes, of its result. The Conference of Algeciras was a complete triumph for France. Russia stood by her ally reso- lutely; Spain, except for a few waverings on the part of the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, was chivalrous and obliging to her neighbors across the Pyrenees ; Sir Ar- thur Nicholson, the English plenipotentiary, firmly and courteously upheld her ; Italy, represented by the Mar- quis Visconti-Venosta, was prodigal in her praise (re- calling the treaty which had opened the road to Tripoli for Italy, and which later she, in her turn, had to faith- fully uphold) ; and the United States was not behind in sympathy. Germany, on the other hand, argued, changed about, retraced her steps; followed in it all by her faithful Austria who had neither opinion of her own nor special interest in the matter.* By forcing * Andre Tardieu ; "La Conference d' Algeciras." 54 THE WORLD WAR this diplomatic fencing competition, Germany hoped, as Von Billow later expressed it, to deal France a riposte. The result was a counter-riposte. The Conference of Algeciras made Germany under- stand her true situation, even though the press of the country preferred not to admit the defeat suffered. Furthermore, the distribution of the English fleet, di- rected as it evidently was against the empire of the Kaiser, the visits of Edward VII to the Mediterranean states, the frigidity of the meeting between William and Edward, all confirmed Germany in the belief that, she was surrounded by a sentiment of mistrust. Soon it began to be evident that Italy was separating markedly from the Triple Alliance. For twenty years the Italian people had been indulging in irredentist meetings in favor of Trieste and Trent, and in Novem- ber, 1908, and May, 1909, they gave even greater in- dications of enthusiasm, driven to it by Austria's blun- ders in domestic policy. By this time the Irredentist Movement had passed out of the hands of young students like Giuglielmo Oberdank who had offered his blond young head on the Austrian scaffold, and had become the concern of statesmen. Then, too, Russia had entered into Italian politics; and with the visit of the Czar in 1909 to Racconigi, the summer residence of King Victor Em- manuel III, a current of sympathy had been set up between the two countries. Nor must it be forgotten that Victor Emmanuel's romantic love-match was pre- pared in the Russian court. THE POLICY OF GERMANY 55 Austria's brusk annexation of Bosnia and Herze- govina was a blow to both Russia and France; both nations, and England with them, realized that they must close in their ranks and prepare for the inevitable war. Thus in 1908 England offered to put two divis- ions at France's disposal in case of an immediate war on the Continent. By this it will be seen that they were exceeding the letter of their agreement. To such a point did interest side-track conscience that words no longer had their normal meaning but appeared to say something different and even contrary. Emperor William in an interview of November, 1908, tried to tranquillize the English people, and instead the English people gave quite an opposite interpretation to the imperial words. The same Emperor tried inces- santly to be on good terms with France, but always, naturally, within the limits of the Treaty of Frank- fort, to maintain which he believed that Germany must stake her honor, lose her last man, and spend her last penny. So he said to everybody high and low; and when France would not respond to his advances he exclaimed to one of the ambassadors accredited to Berlin : "I fear for next summer. I am tired of hold- ing out my hand to France and having her ignore it." This was in 191 1. Evidently the Teutonic amiability was not all pure generosity. To return to the Triple Alliance. At the inspiration of German diplomats it had acquired in the last two years more solidity than at the time of the Italo-Turk- 56 THE WORLD WAR ish war. Italy, although the German press had cried aloud against her enterprise in Tripoli, was neverthe- less indebted to Germany for the temporary possession of the islands in the ^Egean Sea; and to Austria for having defended the statu quo in the Adriatic during the Balkan War, or at least for having prevented a power which might some day become strong from oc- cupying one of its shores. France, on the other hand, had thrown onto her shoulders the defense of the Greek cause. But soon Italy, irritated by the Trieste incidents which the governor, Hohenlohe, provoked, again showed herself hostile to Austria. In the years 19 12 and 19 13 armaments were every- where augmented. Germany raised the number of her soldiers to 900,000 in time of peace, so that at a given moment she could dash over any frontier; France imi- tated her by increasing the term of military service to three years, though to do so cost the most violent dis- cussions in Parliament. Russia went on enthusiastic- ally with her army reorganization, and England pushed ahead with her marine; the standing armies of both Italy and Austria were raised and their naval construc- tions hastened. Meanwhile the chiefs of the various General Staffs exchanged visits, perhaps to prepare the attack or to communicate the plans for it. In short, by 191 3 war appeared certain. The forthcoming incident of Sarajevo was, it is evident, a pretext and not a real cause. Germany did not intend that the encerdement should be complete. She knew her own strength, she THE POLICY OF GERMANY 57 felt ready. Once more, in order to maintain her fron- tiers and to realize her ambitions (certainly none too modest), she would be forced to fight, even though to do so meant an offensive war. Her pride in her new naval power impelled her to give battle. Her greatness was at stake. The loss of that position in Europe which had formerly been so absolute, obliged her to deal the supreme and decisive blow. Only a noble resolution on her part not to dominate the world would have avoided the conflict; but such a decision was not part of her program. CHAPTER X PLANS FRUSTRATED VON MOLTKE'S plan for 1870 in case Prussia should be attacked in the rear was to throw an army rapidly on France, deliver a crushing defeat, and then turn and defend himself against the other bellig- erent. And now after forty years this was still the best strategy, especially as the Austrian ally could keep Russia in check, and Italy could engage a large part of the French army by an assault on the south of France. England, though an enemy, could not do much damage on land if she decided to stand by France and Russia ; but there was always the chance that she would leave them to fight alone, for had not the Brit- ish foreign minister. Sir Edward Grey, said to the French ambassador, Cambon, that England was not obliged to cooperate in case of war? All was foreseen but that which, according to the ancients, lay on the knees of Jupiter. Obstacles of the sort that defy even the profoundest human calculation upset the German plans. In the first place England was war-inclined. She knew that another German triumph would not be at the expense of France but 59 6o THE WORLD WAR of herself. As expressed in a pamphlet by the well- known English socialist, Robert Blatchford, "The problem of British defense is the defense of France." In former days Albion was not addicted to drawing her sword for others; but Albion, perfidious though her reputation, was never so to herself. Everybody in England knew that Germany was a successful com- petitor in every field, and that a war which left her victorious would do more harm to England than to any other nation. The next unforeseen obstacle was Belgium's ener- getic defense of her neutrality. German diplomatists and strategists had believed that she would limit her- self to vehement protests, or perhaps would sacrifice a few brigades in order to comply with the obligation of defending herself against invasion. But instead the Belgian soldiers held up the march of a whole powerful army and thus enabled the French to con- centrate on the most important points of their unex- pectedly invaded frontier. Then to further frustrate German diplomatic, and more especially military, prevision, came Italy's re- fusal to participate in an offensive war. As already pointed out the Triple Alliance had been undergoing some readjustment during the previous few years. Italy was still bound officially to Germany and Aus- tria but the people had never given their soul to the alliance. Long before the coalition the aged premier Agostino Depretis, in order to excuse certain neces- sary concessions to Austria, had confessed, that in his PLANS FRUSTRATED 6i youth he had taken part in a plot to kidnap the Aus- trian Emperor ;* and Crispi, the statesman most favor- able to Germany, used to say that necessity had driven him into union with the Central Powers when affection would have drawn him to France. When the present storm was brewing Italy had only recently finished a war with Turkey and still had troops in Africa. The worst or at any rate most im- mediate consequences of the conflict would have fallen upon her; for Germany and Austria having but little coast line could easily defend themselves whereas she would catch the brunt of all the naval attacks. She would suffer a rigid blockade and would have to aban- don, and perhaps lose, her newly acquired colony of Tripoli. Therefore as the treaty, strictly speaking, did not bind her to participate in offensive warfare she turned it into the instrument of an unpleasant surprise for her expectant allies, and this without breaking any given pledge. Their paths further diverged when King Victor Emanuel listened, as had his illustrious grandfather, to the groans of the Italian Irredentists. He decided to unsheathe his sword but not on the side that twenty years of mutual aid and guarantees would have indicated. From the course of this war we learn how com- pletely a whole series of previously outlined hypotheses can fall short of application. For instance the pacifist tendency which it was believed would deeply influence the contending parties at the crucial moment, became * Salvatore Barzilai ; "Vita parlamentare." 62 THE WORLD WAR a dead letter — ^hardly more than the talk of a few newspapers; the same with the revolutionist and syn- dicalist tendencies and the great general strike which was to be declared the minute war burst. All were swept away by an avalanche of resurging patriotism, more sanguinary to-day than ever in past centuries. Jaures, whose fine spirit and profound perception had forced him to affirm that the Triple Alliance was a necessary counterpoise to French Chauvinism, was shot down in Paris, one of the first victims of the war. German socialists marched in the first ranks just as the aged Bebel had said they would, a few years be- fore in the Reichstag. French socialists did the same, and Guesde, high-priest of French Marxism, became a minister without a portfolio. The beginning of this twentieth century saw more Peace Congresses and Peace Conferences than any other period of history; it heard the word peace re- peated more often probably than all the centuries of humanity put together; and yet to-day it is looking upon the most bloody war ever recorded. Such are the contradictions of destiny, the ironies of fate. And to what has all the preparation led thus far? Germany having had to abandon her plan of rapid entry into Paris, has fallen back on her previously out- lined plan of a tenacious resistance; and in her own strength she still confides, chanting her war-song of Deutschland uber Alles. Notwithstanding, the final result of the war is be- yond all doubt. England having instantly made her- PLANS FRUSTRATED 63 self mistress of the seas, the enormous merchant fleet which Germany so lovingly and carefully built up lies idle in her own ports or worse still, plies in the service of the enemy. She can use only her submarines whose victims have been all too often innocent non-combat- ants and whose material booty, while enormous, can- not bring the hoped-for victory. This is a condition which no end of brilliant land engagements can out- weigh. Alone of the great personages who played a leading role in the tragedy of 1870 survives the Spanish-born ex-Empress of the French, Eugenie ; and she, of them all, must have least interest and least consolation in the revanche. Widow, inconsolable mother, dethroned empress who waited in vain for the husband of heroic name to reinstate her, she will witness the triumph of that Republic which forced her to flee in humiliation. Perhaps she is thinking that the son whom the Zulus sacrificed might have obtained the revenge. But she must recognize that the odious Republicans have known better how to prepare alliances and armies than the husband whose surrender at Sedan was the occasion of her Homeric words to his mesenger : "You lie, sir ; you mean that he is dead !" The Republic has succeeded where the Empire failed. France's success has been the product of fif- teen years of wise and sure diplomacy. The isolation policy against Germany initiated by Delcasse has borne its fruit. Even Gabriel Hanotaux will have to compli- ment his fortunate rival and revise his latest writings.* ♦Gabriel Hanotaux; "La politique de Tequilibre.*' CHAPTER XI THE VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED HOW much cause and how much pretext there may be in human disagreements is difficult to de- termine, especially when the contending minds are cautious and of high calibre. This truth, applicable in all wars, stands out most prominently in the present one; for in spite of all the literature the catastrophe has brought forth we are not yet able to agree unani- mously as to which were specific causes and which were mere pretexts. Nor is this strange. In certain far less complicated international conflicts all the facts have come out later and yet have failed to produce a concordant opinion. The Franco-Prussian War for instance — and this is a reference we are justified not only in making but in reiterating because of its relation of cause and effect to the present — the Franco-Prussian War was un- doubtedly desired by Bismarck as a necessary step in German progress as he conceived it; yet to many it still appears rather as a consequence of French Chau- 6s 66 THE WORLD WAR ■ vinism. Bismarck himself frequently said so and many agree with him. But analysis shows that how- ever patriotic his motives may have been his share of the responsibility was very grave ; and this without de- nying French errors and weaknesses, nor the indeli- cacies and vanities of the Emperor and Empress, of Olivier and Grammont and Benedetti; to say nothing of the reactionary party who were a dominant factor in spite of the change in the political regime of the Empire. If opinion is not yet unanimous regarding the war of 1870, how much less so could it be regard- ing the war of 1914. There is no denying that the present crisis had a warlike preparation based on well-defined interests. Facing each other stood Germany and Russia, the latter threatened in her European prestige through having lost her Asiatic, the former powerful on the sea, pushing her maritime commerce whither she wished, maintaining a colonial policy and defending, in union with Austria, a Balkan policy of conquest and domination ; and beyond them both stood England and France, the one waylaid on the ocean highways, the other watching for her revenge. War had to break out, and many a time did its sinister phantom appear on the horizon. Everything that could preclude war had happened in Europe. The various interests had been delineated by the grouping of states into two great bodies, for VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED 67 every member of which the future struggle constituted a hope; in its final result every one was seeking the satisfaction of some clearly felt necessity. The de- velopment of one of the groups, or of one of the principal nations dominating it, represented danger for the other. The turning-point had to come in this international chess game. When? How? This no one could know. But each player hoped it would come at the moment when his moral and material preparation was best. Each one thought of his own interests, although with different degrees of inten- sity ; and nobody for a moment forgot his own advan- tage through a platonic love of peace. In international matters, as in physics, expansion must produce shock. There was England with her mercantile imperialism — ^had not Chamberlain said that empire and commerce were one? — the product of centuries of constant effort and seemly procedure. And there was Germany with her expansion of vio- lence, a porcedure which time had crowned with suc- cess. (Far back in Mirabeau's day he had said that the national industry of Prussia was war.) Germany wished, in revolutionary manner, to strike other na- tions who by the slowness of their effort had been disguising that lust which economic imperialism im- plies, while her own greed, precisely through the op- posite or rapid method, was made to appear un- bounded. 68 THE WORLD WAR France, aided by her admirable financial organiza- tion and impelled by her enormous bureaucracy, had formed two empires, one in Asia and one in Africa. The vanquished of 1870 found easy that which the conqueror was not able to achieve. Even Italy, least powerful and least populated of the Triple Alliance, least in commerce and military force, had managed to conquer for herself vast African territories and mag- nificent Mediterranean positions; and the same with Russia, whose breast had only recently begun to throb with economic aspirations, and the same with Austria. This last-named, for every colonial conquest, had to break the cord drawn tight around her, and yet she had captured the road to the port of Salonika. Outside facts throw but little light on underlying causes. It matters very little, for instance, whether the Kaiser one day embraced his royal English cousin or his imperial Russian cousin, and whether one of these returned the embrace with more effusion than the other; nor does it matter whether on some other day this same Kaiser extended his hand to France, and she, to use his own picturesque phrase, pretended not to see it. It is not expressions of affection which are to be examined, but great national interests. It did not help the international situation for the Kaiser to hold out his hand to France and at the same time insist on the Treaty of Frankfort by which she had lost two provinces and suffered the greatest humiliation of VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED 69 her history; nor did it help matters to talk of family ties and past links in the court of Russia, while the Slavs in the Balkans were being harrassed to the great detriment of Muscovite prestige. Fine words, need- less to say, never distracted the eyes of utilitarian Al- bion from the enormous German fleet ; and vice versa ; Germany in full hegemony and with her people trained to the point of megalomania in thinking and talking of grandeur, was not going to limit her political, mari- time, economic, and financial expansion just to please her adversaries. She had to threaten the rivals which her own greatness was creating, and to refuse every status quo which signified enforced but unmerited in- feriority, heedless of the truth that historic conse- quences must be respected unless a nation deliber- ately wishes to provoke war. For England the present struggle is just such an- other phase in her time-honored policy as that which brought her into conflict with Spain, Holland, and France; just such as in future will bring her against any power who tries to take from her the maritime dominance which insures her national existence. For Germany the war signifies the inevitable com- plement of William IFs political scheme. If he had not kept in mind an armed action which would give the backing of force to his Oriental and maritime ex- pansion, all the effort — chiefly economic — of twenty- 70 THE WORLD WAR four years, from his 1890 journey to Constantinople to the present day, would have been useless. When Bismarck was sent into retreat everybody thought it was a coup de tete of the new Emperor, the act of a young man who could not brook the presum- ing authority of his chancellor. To a few it signified a necessity of domestic policy; and still fewer watched from then on for a radical change in foreign policy. Bismarck was content with the past and in its security he expected to live long years of tranquillity. Prussia dominated in Germany and Germany in continental Europe, and this was his serene aspiration and his beatific reality ; he was willing to leave far-off colonial vanities to others. William II, however, was dream- ing of greater glories. The past did not belong to him. For him it was necessary to be as strong on sea as on land and even to lift his eyes to that Orient which was the object of general European covetous- ness. His must be the task to beat down the wall which hemmed in the Teuton race. He must extend his policy of hegemony. From Occidental Europe he must go to Oriental, and from there he must look higher and acquire even greater authority over the world. Was it not perhaps on the tomb of "his illus- trious ancestor Charlemagne'* that he was inspired to pronounce that memorable discourse so imbued with medieval policy? The grandeur of Germany dictated to him the line VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED 71 of conduct he must follow; it obliged him "to grasp the trident of Neptune along with the sword of Fred- erick the Great"; it opened to him the doors of the luxurious and much-coveted Orient. In short, Ger- man grandeur interpreted by German mentality meant war. And now that this has come we see with what ingenuousness German statesmen and writers declare: "They denied us that which we had a right to de- mand; our power was superior to our opportunity." Ever since 1890 German foreign policy has been indicating the ideas which to-day are openly upheld. The fleet which was constructed, the army which was enlarged, and the military organization which was held in readiness, as if, to use ex-Chancellor Von Bulow's expression, * war might break out the follow- ing day — all this was to serve not for guarding a favor- able statu quo and warning off adversaries, but to offer itself some day on the international market and bid for a greater part of that booty which the powerful states, under the pretext of civilization, were accumu- lating at the cost of the little and less fortunate ones. France, Russia, and Austria were all revolving around an unsettled policy. France, in the name of the past, should have been more partizan of war than the others. For them the greatness of the neigh- boring empire represented a future danger only; ♦Count Von Biilow; "Imperial Germany." 72 THE WORLD WAR for her it represented an unhappy past as well. Add to this the proud spirit of the Frenchman which a glorious history had quickened to a higher pitch than normal. For forty-four years he had been champing the bit and longing for the day when Sedan might be avenged, Metz reconquered; when the statues of the lost provinces would be a living reality to the masses who crossed the Place de la Concorde, instead of a dead hope. And so it was that France, moved by the two opposing sentiments of past injury and present well- being, desired war yet maintained peace. Thus when the Kaiser offered friendship to the nation which had been forced to accept the preliminaries of Versailles with tears in the eyes and groans in the soul, insult was added to injury; the compassion of the victor humiliated the victim. Granted the antagonism, both peoples knew that whatever conflict arose, it would drive them against each other. Evidently destiny had put them on opposite sides forever, and each knew what its future position must be. Such being the collective psychology, the mind of the masses and the preparation of the youth, the tension of the two gov- ernments in question can be easily understood. This tension, never relaxed for a single day, was the cause of the alliances in continental Europe. It united France to Russia and it formed the Triple Alliance. Russia, nevertheless, had oscillated in her inter- national policy. Friend and loyal ally of France she VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED 73 remained after signing the treaty; but for some time she gave scant attention to France in particular or Europe in general. Pushed by her geographic con- figuration towards the vast continent of Asia, she mixed in the affairs of China, Thibet, Turkestan, Afghanistan, and above all Korea, Manchuria, and Persia. So absorbed was she in these that she some- what forgot the Balkan States, their Slavic popula- tion, and her influence in Turkey. Lured by the Pa- cific she forgot her dream of being a Mediterranean power. But so far as Asia was concerned, her disas- trous Asiatic war and the Anglo-Russian and the Rus- so-Japanese treaties all clipped her aspirations ; she then went back with greater freedom and calm to that Euro- pean policy which represented so great a part of her diplomatic and military life. On returning, however, she found her adversary better prepared, with greater influence and more de- fined ambitions. Austria was still under the sceptre of Francis Joseph (to whom longevity had made a con- cession in order that he might live through innumer- able family and state afflictions), but the aged Em- peror was subject to the influence of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, his heir. This young man opposed his tendencies with all the energy of his fiery charac- ter and expounded the system for a Greater Austria based not on economic development and intellectual progress, but on a big fleet and a war-trained army. 74 THE WORLD WAR And in truth it was the heir-apparent and not the Emperor who represented the true current of public opinion. The whole army of which he was generalis- simo approved his plans. Intimate of the Kaiser he received, by reflection as it were, all the favor of the Pan-Germanists and was considered the representative of Austrian militarism and imperialism — an adversary to be feared by Russia. His audacity of character made him less of a Hapsburg than a Bourbon, from which house he inherited abundantly, both as to tem- perament and political-religious tendencies.* Balkan difficulties no longer bore the timid aspect of years ago. No longer were they the motive for formal international congresses or for an exchange of notes between European governments. Instead, events were violent. Bosnia and Herzegovina, annexed in face of international stupor, are an example; like- wise the expulsion of Montenegro and Servia, and later Greece, from certain parts of the Adriatic shore ; and lastly, the repeated threats of war or annexations made to the smaller Balkan States. Russia's return to intensive Balkan activity was not marked by success. On the contrary her humiliations were continuous and she lost considerable prestige among those of her race who for so many years had looked to her for aid and protection. * R. W. Seton Watson ; "The Archduke Francis Ferdinand, in The Contemporary Review, August, 1914. VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED 75 War was on the point of breaking out at the end of 1908, at the beginning of 1909, and again in 191 3, for causes almost identical with the present: that is to say, because of friction between Austrian and Slav interests in the Balkans. The first cloud gathered when the official newspaper of Vienna published on October 7, 1908, the following documents: a procla- mation by the Emperor to the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina; a letter to the statesmen represent- ing the powers signatory to the Treaty of Berlin ; and an Imperial rescript directed to the premiers of Aus- tria and Hungaria. In these documents he proceeded, in spite of Servian and Montenegran interests, in spite of Russian prestige and of the fact that he was violat- ing a treaty signed by many governments, to annex the two provinces mentioned. The new^s went out to an unsuspecting world. None of the powers knew of the intention until after it had been consummated. Then, as in the incident which provoked the present war, English initiative, sup- ported by France, suggested that the concerted powers should act in some form yet to be determined in order to obtain from Austria and Servia a solution to the question. But Germany opposed. War between Aus- tria and Russia, precursory to a more general one, appeared on the point of breaking out; but as Rus- sia was not fully prepared the matter was arranged in the best manner possible, thanks to Sir Edward 76 THE WORLD WAR Grey.* Nevertheless, in order to justify the present conflict and limit Austria's responsibilities, it is now being published that Russia knew Austria's intentions in 1908 and approved them; but subsequent events plainly disprove these tardy statements. As Joaquin de Bartoszewicz justly says in La Vie Politique dans les deux mondes (1909- 19 10), "At the time of the Turkish revolution of the twenty-fourth of July which changed the whole aspect of the old Balkan question, again on the proclamation of Bulgarian independence, and later on the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia showed herself singu- larly reserved ; she was visibly impotent to dictate her point of view in these questions which nevertheless touched her so closely." Because of the death of Archduke Francis Ferdi- nand, Austria repeated her high-handed acts. She dealt with the small Balkan nations directly without the intervention of Europe, as if their existence and their line of conduct had not always been imposed by the great powers without any one disputing their right to do so. But this time Russia did not turn away her eyes. Instead, she admitted the appeal of the racial tie; Germany stood firm by her ally; France followed the road which both honor and interest pointed out; and the aged Emperor Francis Joseph known for his * Achille Viallate ; La vie politique dans les deux mondes, for the year 1908-1909, page 312. VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED ^^ aversion to war,* though freed now from the militar- istic domination of his nephew and heir, nevertheless prepared his own grave by opening many others. ♦Demetrius C. Boulger; "The Emperor Who Made War/* North American Review, September, 1914, page 368. CHAPTER XII servia's aspirations and austria^s crime ^T^HE tragedy of Sarajevo is well known. In com- •*■ pany with his wife, the ex-Countess Sophia Chotek, who had been elevated to the dignity of Princess of Hohenberg on her marriage, the Arch- duke Ferdinand was visiting that city when a young Servian, Gabrilo Princip, killed them both. Princep was driven to the act by a blind patriotism which made him see in the future heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne the embodiment of all the difficulties which beset his country in its unlimited ambition for ag- grandizement. The form in which the affair was carried out was sufficiently unique. As it was well known that the Archduke was going to be the object of an attack, that a plot had been made and men were ready to execute it, public opinion throughout Europe indicted the Austrian police. The first attempt was on the day of his arrival in Sarajevo; soon after occurred the second, and the royal pair were obliged to leave. It is said that the Archduke himself declined courting 79 8o THE WORLD WAR further danger but the poHce assured him there was nothing whatever to fear. Like many of the Hapsburgs and Bourbons, Fran- cis Ferdinand was a man without poise and easily- given over to violence. At court he was little liked, having imposed there a wife whom strict court eti- quette repudiated. Who can say what mysteries may not lie back of their tragic deaths ! And yet this was not the first time that an heir-apparent, or a political chief, or the head of a royal or imperial family, had lost his life by the homicidal bullet of a fanatic. While it would be unfair to attribute the responsibility to the Servian nation or government, it would be par- tial to consider the murder within the narrow limits of an individual action. It is evident that Gabrilo Princip was not actuated by the same motives as the starving Caserio who threw himself at President Car- not's coach ; or the poor distracted Lucchesi who killed the luckless Empress of this same Austria. To have reproached Italy with the deeds of these two Italian subjects would have been as unjust as to have blamed her for the audacity of William Oberdank when he tried to force the Julian Alps; nor did the respective governments concerned ever think of making such an accusation. But in the present case there can be no doubt that a Servian organization, permitted or toler- ated by that government, armed the young man and urged him to his terrible act without the least shud- SERVIANS ASPIRATIONS 8i der as to its effect on the excitable, almost hysterical, masses. Indeed there was a general and secret satis- faction shown at the death of the prince who was preparing the transformation of the dual monarchy into a triple by adding a Slavic kingdom to the Ger- manic and the Hungarian. Had Francis Ferdinand lived to accomplish this, it would have been the death- blow to that Servian aspiration, or to speak more ex- actly, ambition, which aimed to put Servia at the head of a Pan-Slavic Balkan movement; moreover it would have prevented all future Russian intervention in the name of the Slav race. To frustrate him was one of the objects of the Narodna Odbrana, a society deeply rooted in the hearts of the Servians, and to which Princip belonged. All the ardent patriots and heroes of the wars against Turkey and Bulgaria were mem- bers; and with much the same feeling that a cautious army looks to its intrepid vanguard, the Servian states- men who were aspiring to make their country an Adriatic power looked toward this society of fanatics. And yet the time when the Servian King Milan ran to the Emperor Francis Joseph to pay his debts was not very remote. Only with the assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903 did the Servian Government definitely change its inclinations. First Austrophile, it soon began to debate between this and the Russian tendency. Under the influence of Pas- chitch, a Bulgarian by origin but prime minister of 82 THE WORLD WAR Servia, it became completely Russophile, which, of course, meant completely anti-Austrian. Giving international relations their just values, it must be admitted that Servia got no benefits what- ever from the Austrian friendship. It was purely commercial, w^hile that with Russia was sentimental and racial.* To depend upon the former signified subjection; to be bound to the latter constituted de- fense. In the article cited, Dumba, the Austrian am- bassador to Washington when the war began, writes with much exactitude on the Servian agitation against Austria and what a troublesome little neighbor Servia was because of it; but when he comes to the Musco- vite predominance, so great, he says, that the Russian minister in Belgrade was almost a viceroy, he loses his equanimity and misses thereby the just estimate of Servians Russian tendency. He fails to see it as a policy which, ever since the tragic death of King Alexander, has been more in harmony with the in- terests of the nation. Neither Alexander nor his pre- decessor Milan represented the national policy of Ser- via. Vicious and of petty souls, they were far below the moral height of their nation which was saturating itself with the new spirit of civilization. The Austria to whom these monarchs turned was not a good guide * Constantin Theodor Dumba ; **Why Austria Is at War with Russia," in the North American Review, September, 1914, page 346. SERVIANS ASPIRATIONS 83 for small nations, and had never brought happiness to those who depended on her or were in her sphere of influence. This the Servians knew only too well; they saw themselves restrained in all their expansionist desires, and left to content themselves with a reality that offered no hope; hence the change of policy on Alexander's death. Without believing that the Servian government was cognizant of the Sarajevo murders, or that it had armed the assassins, it is nevertheless true that the motive for the regrettable act can be found in the great patriotic agitation; and that this, justifiable or not, imperiled the neighborly relations of the two countries. In Austria it was believed absolutely that the attack had been prepared in Belgrade and that it was offi- cially inspired. All the press gave this version, and the unwarranted, or at least exaggerated, Austrian de- mand that Viennese officials should investigate the crime, shows how the belief had penetrated govern- ment circles. It cannot be supposed that here there was any preconceived idea of intervention, for the deed was unexpected ; nor can we admit the hypothesis that grief had so distracted the directing spirits of the nation that it drove them to proceed in an abnormal manner. That the Servian government was respon- sible for the crime is also the argument upheld in the German White Book. "The investigations begun by 84 THE WORLD WAR the Austro-Hungarian authorities show that the plot to assassinate the Archduke, heir to the throne, was hatched, prepared, and matured in Belgrade; that per- sons in official positions cooperated, and that the weap- ons with which it was executed came from the state arsenals of Servia." * To thrash out the matter is not easy, but it is evi- dent that Austria, deeply moved by the Sarajevo crime and fully aware of Servia's continued hostility, wished to take advantage of the moment and destroy or at least humiliate the little frontier state. Nor must it be forgotten that in the brief period of six years Servia had provoked grave international troubles and was now provoking one of exceptional importance within Austria. It was in this belief and in this state of mind that the ultimatum was sent which brought on the war; but likewise it must be remembered that the war favored Austria^s interests. In the German White Book an illuminating confession is made with certain Saxon ingenuousness, namely: that the Ber- lin government knew Austria's intentions of making war on Servia and approved and encouraged them. The exact text is as follows : Given the circumstances Austria could not but decide that it was incompatible with her dignity and with the * Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany and Russia; official publication, page i. SERVIANS ASPIRATIONS 85 preservation and stability of the monarchy to continue contemplating passively the happenings on the other side of her frontier. The Imperial and Royal Government informed us of this, her opinion, asking ours. With all sincerity we were able to declare to our ally that we agreed with her estimate of events, and to assure her that we would approve of whatever action she con- sidered necessary to put an end to the movement initiated in Servia against the stability of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. On making this declaration we knew per- fectly well that a possible armed attack by Austria-Hun- gary on Servia was likely to provoke action on the part of Russia and involve us in a war. But recognizing that the vital interests of Austria-Hungary were at stake we could neither recommend a condescension incompatible with her dignity nor deny her our aid in such a difficult moment.* In this we see the explanation of the attitude as- sumed by the German Government regarding posterior events. It is a pity that the White Book does not publish the text of the notes exchanged between Ger- many and Austria. Who can say whether in them we might not encounter more than approbation to the Dual Monarchy, instigation even? The vindications of the White Book appear to suggest this by admit- ting that Servians attitude threatened not only Aus- tria but also Germany, which is tantamount to say- * Guglielmo Ferrero appears unaware of this part of the Official Memoir of Germany in his book, "La Guerra Europea." In such a careful writer the omission is strange. 86 THE WORLD WAR ing: Our government had to defend itself in order not to perish caught in the meshes of a diplomacy at once subtle and dangerous ; we had to cut the Gordian knot and force Servia to abandon forever her aspira- tions of aggrandizement.* From documents published, from certain statements encountered in the English White Book, and from official declarations of the Italian Government and the general clamor of the Italian press, it appears that the third ally in the Triple Alliance was as much sur- prised by events as were the other powers. The Ger- man White Book reveals that within the Triple Al- liance there had been another, closer still, which did not extend to all the powers who had signed the pact; and the revelation, along with other official docu- ments at hand, justifies the neutrality immediately assumed by the kingdom of Italy. There can be no doubt that had Italy been previously consulted she would have advised greater prudence and would have sought a solution of the difficulty as she had done on other occasions, notably in 19 13. But Austria pre- ferred other advice; for having followed which she will certainly not go down in diplomatic annals as a model of perspicacity ; for, admitting all the extenuat- *The Austrian Red Book throws no light on the previous pourparlers between Germany and Austria which the German Memoir confesses. The very omission implies a confession — "excusatio non pertita accusatio manifesta." SERVIANS ASPIRATIONS ^7 ing circumstances and justifications, admitting the troublesome attitude of Servia and the constant provo- cations she offered, the ultimatum which Austria sent her on July 23 was without doubt an egregious error and a deliberate incitement to war. CHAPTER XIII THE VIOLENT METHOD AND ITS RESULTS BISMARCK once wrote that "Even governments most inclined to sophism and violence do not wish openly to break their word; that is they try to keep it if predominating interests do not enter into play." He might have said more. He might have said that governments prefer always to execute the most violent and arbitrary actions under the cloak of a high moral duty or of a pressing national interest. But Austria did not even seek this cloak. Without the subtlety of international formalities or the suavity of diplomacy she bruskly faced Servia with a prob- lem, and in doing so committed one of the most au- dacious acts of modern times — audacious because it ignored the fact that Europe had been exercising con- tinuous tutelage over the Balkan States ; audacious be- cause it threw down the glove to Russia; and more than audacious because it disregarded Servians national rights by dictating over and above the political con- stitution of that country the fiat of Austria's sovereign 89 90 THE WORLD WAR will. However well prepared public opinion may have been, the Austrian note of July 23, 191 4, surprised the world. Only Germany remained tranquil, cog- nizant as was later revealed by her own confession, of what was about to develop. The note from the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria to the Royal Government of Servia de- manded within forty-eight hours an acceptance of the following exorbitant terms : First. To suppress every publication which excited hatred or disrespect for the Austro-Hungarian mon- archy and whose general tendency was against the national integrity of the same. Second. To immediately dissolve the society called Narodna Odbrana and every other of the same patri- otic tendency, and to prevent them from continuing under some other name or form. Third. To immediately eliminate from the public schools all men and text-books that might serve to foment the propaganda against Austro-Hungary. Fourth. To dismiss from military service and from the administration in general such officers and functionaries as the Austro-Hungarian Government should accuse of anti-Austrian propaganda. Fifth. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement di- THE VIOLENT METHOD 91 rected against the territorial integrity of said Govern- ment. Sixth. To open a judicial investigation against the accessories to the plot which had as its consequence the assassination of the hereditary prince; in which investigation delegates of the Austro-Hungarian gov- ernment would take part. Seventh. To instantly condemn to prison Captain Voijac Tankositch and also Milan Ciganovitch, Ser- vian employees found compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry already held in territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Sarajevo) against the authors of the crime of June 28. Eighth. To prevent by efficient means the partici- pation by Servian authorities in the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier and to dismiss and severely punish those functionaries on the Scha- batz and Loznica frontier who were guilty of having aided the perpetrators of the crime of Sarajevo by facilitating their passage across the same. Ninth. To give the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment explanations of the unjustifiable attitude of high Servian functionaries who in spite of their official position did not hesitate after the crime of Sarajevo to publicly express themselves both in Servia and abroad in a manner hostile to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 92 THE WORLD WAR Tenth. To report wtihin forty-eight hours the exe- cution of the preceding measures.* These clearly expressed demands were preceded by others of a general sort. After accusing the Servian government of culpable tolerance and declaring this to have been the cause of the crime of Sarajevo, it demanded that a declaration be published on the first page of the Official Gazette condemning not only Pan- Servian aspirations but also confessing that state func- tionaries had abetted the acts directed against Austria- Hungary. The foregoing note was delivered to Servia by the minister resident in Belgrade, and on the following day it was ordered that it should be communicated to the other governments with explanations of the rea- sons which the Dual Monarchy had for proceeding in such a manner. These explanations consisted in for- mulating an accusation against Servia for having failed in the obligation imposed upon her by the treaty of March 31, 1909, in which she recognized the rights of Austria-Hungary over Bosnia and Herezegovina, and committed herself to maintain neighborly rela- tions and to change her previous policy of protest and opposition. There was further talk of the attacks in Servian newspapers, of the plotting by Servian poli- * Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany and Russia. German official publication, page 22, et seq.; also English White Book, document number 4. THE VIOLENT METHOD 93 ticians, and, it goes without saying, much talk of the benevolence and forbearance of the Imperial and Royal Government. This note to the European pov^ers ter- minated by stating that Austria-Hungary was con- vinced that the measures she had adopted would be in full accord with the sentiments of all civilized na- tions; and she offered for their inspection all the pro- bationary documentation of the Servian conspiracy and of its connection with the crime of June 28 which cost the hereditary prince his life. The impression which this note produced in the Ser- vian and other cabinets, especially the Russian to which it was sent with intentional delay, is easy to imagine. Putting aside the sentiment of grief naturally felt for the victims, and even condemning the attitude of Ser- via, it must nevertheless be admitted that the Austrian note outraged all the rights of an independent state and overstepped the limits of international law; fur- thermore, that its drastic form was in itself a provo- cation. For the purpose of avenging a crime or put- ting an end to a harmful state of things, armed inter- vention would have appeared more logical. Unfor- tunately for humanity international relations are not regulated by the famous Scales ; yet even violence has its limits. It is undeniable that in recent years we have witnessed the formation of colonial empires piratically seized, but it is nevertheless true that in such cases the pretext has been one of purely inter- 94 iTHE WORLD WAR national order, since to secure the emoluments of a determined territory it was necessary to occupy it, as was done. Deplorable as it certainly is to admit such a procedure in the field of international interests, it is quite different from the case under consideration, where the internal laws of a constitutional European state were violated. With much exactitude could Sir Edward Grey exclaim in the note sent to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, English Ambassador in Vienna, on that same 24th of July : "Never before have I seen one state direct to another independent state a document of such formidable character." * Austria, in short, claimed governmental rights in Servia. Although limited as to form and time these signified nothing less than a concurrence in the ad- ministration of Servian justice. This virtually con- demns her; it destroys state sovereignty. On the arrival of the formidable note the effect in Servia was enormous. From the first moment the government knew what it meant and prepared to transfer the capital from Belgrade, which was too exposed, to Nisch. Paschitch, the Prime Minister, returned precipitously from an electoral trip, and the Austrian note received an answer which was tran- quil, serene, adjusted to the rights of nations, very conciliatory, and sufficiently submissive. * English White Book, correspondence respecting the Euro- pean crisis, page 9. THE VIOLENT METHOD 95 It began by declaring that Servia had fulfilled her promises of 1909, that the protestations of former times had not been renewed, and that she had made great sacrifices in order to maintain the peace of Eu- rope at the cost of her own legitimate aspirations. She agreed in its totality to the amende honorable which Austria insisted should be published in the Official Gazette, but in that part where she had to regret the cooperation of Servian officials in anti-Austrian pro- paganda she desired to add the modifying words "ac- cording to the communication of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government." She de- clared herself ready to comply with all the points enu- merated, demanding definite proofs in individual cases; but she could not accept the fifth clause re- ferring to a judicial investigation by functionaries of that government; instead she answered submissively: "The Royal Government declares that it does not ex- actly understand the meaning and aim of this demand, by which it must bind itself to permit delegates of the Imperial and Royal Government to intervene in its dominions; but it is disposed to accept all cooperation in conformity with the principles of international law and criminal procedure, and of good neighborliness." * Servia evidently wished to avoid war. Even if the * Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany and Russia; official German publication, page 26, et seq.; also English White Book, document number 39. 96 THE WORLD WAR body of the document did not so indicate the ending was irrefutable proof. To prevent the Austrian note from having the importance of an ultimatum, and the planting of a consequent casus belli in case Austria was not satisfied, Servia terminated with the following proposition: "The Royal Servian Government be- lieves that it is to the general interest not to precipitate the solution of this affair; for which reason should the Austro-Hungarian Government not be satisfied with this answer the Servian Government will be dis- posed to accept a pacific solution either by referring the decision of the question to the International Tribu- nal of The Hague, or by leaving it to the great powers who cooperated in the note of explanation given by the Servian Government in March, 18-31, 1909." * In normal times the most exacting government might have been appeased by this reply ; but the Vienna cabinet had not sufficient tranquillity or independence to choose the road it ought to follow. Some powerful cause, not yet completely known, launched Austria on a previously traced-out path of violence, and the note of July 23 was but a milestone. The Austro-Hun- garian Minister at Belgrade withdrew and diplomatic relations were severed. This, if not actually constitut- ing a state of war in itself (and Japan had to accept it as such on an analogous occasion in 1904) was a sure ♦The two dates are of the two different calendars used, the one in Orthodox countries and the other in Western Europe. THE VIOLENT METHOD 97 announcement of the proximity of war. And in fact in another few days the Danube was tinged with blood. Austria's note and her subsequent attitude were in- terpreted with great gravity by nations and statesmen. At last the pretext for a European war had been found. Many times had the conflict been provoked and many times avoided ; always reciprocal fear or the desire of the opposing parties for better preparation had changed the course of events. In the conduct of Austria-Hungary two extremes are to be noted : first, that she consulted with her ally Germany on the note of July 23; and second, that she hardly gave any news of it whatever to her other ally, Italy. This fact is symptomatic because it meant one of two things : either the Vienna government be- lieved from the very first moment that the conflict would be general and consequently serious and should therefore have warned those nations whom she ex- pected to aid her; or, she believed that it was merely a diplomatic question between two nations, or at most, a circumscribed casus belli, in which event her con- sulting Germany was completely unnecessary. Her doing so was in fact suspicious and appears even more so when we recall that the German White Book in- genuously confesses that Germany too felt herself threatened by the Slav attitude, that she feared it might weaken Austria-Hungary, and that she saw 98 THE WORLD WAR with concern that it might open a breach in the Triple Alliance on that side. Germany makes it clearly un- derstood that Austria's conduct was dictated not only to protect the Dual Monarchy but also Germany's own interests. In fact, but little is lacking to make a full confession that the violent act of Austria was dictated by her. As we have already said Servia understood that Austria wanted either war or complete hegemony over her. Therefore, at the same time that she was giving the best explanations possible and try to adapt Austria's claims to the exigencies of her own sovereign rights — all of which meant to delay events — she began pre- paring her forces for defense and soliciting outside help as well. Mobilization was ordered at once. The archives and the public offices were transferred to Nish and the Skupshtina was convoked there. Paschitch ad- dressed the powers, imploring them to defend the inde- pendence of Servia and declaring "if war is inevitable let them make it." * His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent of Servia, addressed the Emperor of Rus- sia, telling him of the Austrian affair and the measures Servia was taking, and begging aid in the following terms : "At the expiration of the time con- * Russian Orange Book; communication of the Russian Charge d' Affaires in Belgrade to the Russian Minister of For- eign Affairs, document number i. THE VIOLENT METHOD 99 ceded we may be attacked by the Austro-Hungarian army, already on our frontier. It is impossible for us to defend ourselves and we supplicate Your Majesty to send aid as soon as possible. Your Majesty's good will, so often manifested in our favor, gives us the firm hope that once more our appeal will be heard by the generous Slav heart. In these difficult moments I interpret the sentiments of the Servian people in im- ploring that Your Majesty may interest yourself in the fate of the Kingdom of Servia." * This tragic people had a presentiment of war; they looked back on successive subjugations, and now, with apprehension, they saw one more, perhaps the final. A new Kossovo, which battle did not favor valor and which delivered Servia for five centuries to Ottoman oppression, might deliver her for another five cen- turies to that of Austria. The promising work of national rehabilitation sung by the bards and paid for by the blood of her warriors was on the point of crumbling. The many dramas of the court would have no national objective. The last reconquest of the kingdom by the Karageorgeovitch line would be made void; the victories of General Putnic, barren; the economic and financial independence obtained by enor- mous sacrifices in the face of acquisitive Austria, * Russian Orange Book; telegram of July 24 from H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Servia to H.M. the Emperor, document number 6. 100 THE WORLD WAR ephemeral; the Balkan League, product of the efforts of Paschitch, nothing but a dream. All would fall in one moment through an tinforseen and inexplicable event. How many times had the little kingdom taken a chance without meeting such sudden peril! Nor could her last hope be her own effort as it has been in remote times under Duscian, the ancient hero, or Kara George the modem martyr. The cannon would decide forever whether the Obrenovitch line calling on Austria, or the Karageorgevitch calling on Russia, had been most useful to Servia. CHAPTER XIV ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION THAT the Servian incident would have grave con- sequences was plain to European opinion from the first. The press of the different countries fash- ioned its point of view according to the interests of its nation and undoubtedly received the mot d'ordre from its foreign minister. In France it assumed that tone of gravity the French are so fond of but which they never maintain very long. Le Temps on July 23 and 24 was giving considerable space to the Caillaux trial and the English crisis brought about by Ulster* s resistance to Home Rule. In the issue of July 25 (published the preceding evening) it took up the Austro-Hungarian threat and straightway declared that out of the ten stipulations there was one which Servia could not possibly accept without destroying her independence^ — the one admitting Austria* s inter- vention in judicial processes. On July 2y and 28, with fuller information, Le Temps attributed all the conse- quences of the difficult situation and all the blame, lOI I02 THE WORLD WAR should it lead to war, to Germany, since she could have avoided it with a single word in the ear of the Austrian cabinet.* Le Matin, in spite of its extensive news service, did not know the Austrian intention nor even the nervous state which preceded the tempest until July 24. Only on July 25 did she awaken and, echoing European opinion, she noted the sudden drop on the exchange, especially that of the French national debt to three per cent, the lowest in thirty-five years. The follow- ing day the same newspaper expressed its faith edi- torially in the news that the German foreign minister, Herr Von Jagow, and the German ambassador in Paris, Baron Von Schoen, had both solemnly declared that Austria did not consult Berlin as to the Servian note. Le Figaro, so absorbed at that moment in the Caillaux trial, foresaw war and called France to union. Even Le Gaulois, the reactionary sheet, exclaimed: "On the banks of the Seine and in all France there is one identical sentiment — that of a national respon- sibility which will rise to whatever height events may demand." In short, this was the tone of all the press small in circulation but large in political importance — Le Rappel, Le Radical, La Lanterne. In this class only UHumanite, Jaures* paper, was contrary to the common journalistic opinion. Popular newspapers of *L^ Temps, July 27, 1914; "L'Allemagne veut-elle la guerre?" The same, July 28 : "Du role de TAllemagne." ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION 103 big circulation joined in the general chorus. Le Petit Journal recalled another historic date on which Aus- tria provoked war with the same violence. "Today the cabinet of Vienna confronts Servia in precisely the same way and with the same self-justification as she did the Piedmont in 1859. That is to say, after breaking diplomatic relations on March 22, 1858, she concluded by sending to Turin on April 21, 1859, a peremptory order of disarmament within three days, and set forth the long and unexampled forbearance of which she had given proof during three years and in presence of repeated provocations. This is pre- cisely the attitude and language adopted to-day. But the same action of 1859 blasted all the hopes to which it had given birth. Europe rose with almost universal condemnation. Cavour rejected the ultimatum in the name of national dignity. Napoleon III did not hesi- tate to come to his side. Austria found a great power ready to fight with the adversary she had hoped to crush; and Austria, instead of triumphing, lost two provinces." This apt bit of history unearthed by the French newspaper had probably slipped the memory of Aus- trian statesmen. Certainly they had forgotten its sad lesson. In Russia public sentiment was even more roused. Internal troubles ceased as if by magic. Newspapers and public all understood that the shot aimed at Servia I04 THE WORLD WAR had struck full in the Russian breast. Instantly there were hostile manifestations against Austria, which had to be repressed. La Novoie Vremia, the official organ, exclaimed: "The Russian government clearly understands that the ultimatum is really directed to Russia, and Russia will answer not only with words but with deeds. Servia shall not stand alone. If Austria does not withdraw her ultimatum Russia will not be a mute witness of the violence committed. . . . We want peace, but if war is forced upon us official Russia and all the people will take part in it." The following day the same newspaper affirmed in concert with the French press that peace was in the hands of the German government and that she could easily pre- serve it. The Gazette de la Bourse, of Petrograd, de- clared that Russia in 19 14 was not the same as in 1908. The reminder was very apropos because at that date the same sort of conduct on Austria's part humil- iated Russia and left her conquered without having fought a battle. Perhaps Austria herself, and Ger- many too, knew that she was not the same as in 1908, but preferred the Russia of 19 14 to that of 19 18. The Courrier went a little farther toward inflaming its readers: "The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum," it de- clared, "proves that Austria either wants war with Russia or else no longer considers Russia a great power." In another issue the same newspaper added that "the only answer worthy of Russia is the mo- ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION 105 bilization of her troops on the Austrian frontier." Statesmen, and in fact all functionaries, were no less agitated than the journalists. All classes felt the same. The Austrian blow had been deliberately aimed at Russia and the general belief was that Austria wished war or else their humiliation. On July 24 the cabinet met. Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced what had happened, and General Suchom- linoff. Minister of War, explained the situation of the army. Russia from the first moment considered the war a necessity. Of the nations composing the Triple Entente, Eng- land, as was to be expected from her character, was least excited. Those who once more accused perfidious Albion of having wished war at that moment be- cause all her alliances were prepared, ignore the great tranquillity displayed in the early moments by the public, the press, and the government. The Times, although surprised at the language used in the Aus- trian note, pronounced the form to be courteous; and admitting the moment to be difficult it exclaimed: "All who love peace must ardently desire that Aus- tria-Hungary has not said the last word in the note to which Servia must give answer this night." The Morning Post tried from the beginning to make the public see the importance of the event and to rouse it out of a general apathy which was incompatible with the world's alarm. "It is indispensable that the io6 THE WORLD WAR English people should be made to see how grave is the situation in Europe. At any moment war may break out and no one can say whether it will be pos- sible to localize it. There is a tendency here to con- sider that the fate of the Balkan States has no interest for this country, . . . Can England contemplate Eu- ropean questions with indifference and decline to take any responsibility, or must she decide to play the part which History has reserved for her? This is the problem we put without indicating the ansv/er. . . ." But the Morning Post's fears were not shared by other newspapers, nor by the Foreign Office, nor by Sir Edward Grey, in spite of his good intentions and great prudence. It is very certain that this sagacious minister was of those whom the Morning Post cen- sured for believing that Balkan affairs did not interest England. Let us now take up the countries of the Triple Alli- ance where, excepting Italy, opinion was just as grave but in a different direction. From the first moment Italy began to have doubts; the perplexities of the government in face of an unforeseen conjflict were reflected by the public. Certain conservative and clerical newspapers like the Corriere d'ltalia and the PoJ)olo Romano believed that Austria was not far in the wrong, and that the Servian attitude had been a continuous offense to the name of friendship; others, liberal or nationalist like the Messagero^ the Vittoria, ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION 107 and the Trihuna, considered the Austrian note im- moderate. In examining either judgment, it must be kept in mind that Italy was predisposed against Ser- via, whose exaggerated pretentions to expansion threatened Italy's Adriatic interests. Italy, and espe- cially before Austria aspired to be a naval power, al- ways looked upon the Adriatic as a lake, all her own. Had it not been the direct field of action of the glori- ous Venetian Republic whose ancient splendor was the dream of renascent Italy? Sentiment aside, the nearness of the opposite coast constituted a real peril, and Italy could not look with kindly eyes on Servians unconcealed efforts to widen her confines, particularly toward the sea. This she aspired to as a consequence of her victories over Turkey and Bulgaria; and this Italy along with Austria had evoked all her diplomacy to avoid. Public opinion in Berlin and Vienna, however, was almost unanimous in favor of the Austrian act. In Vienna it was apparent that the note had served to give satisfaction to an anxious public and in Berlin it was apparent that it had served German ends. In the joyous chorus of the press, the angry voice of certain newspapers crying in vigorous Teutonic fashion for war or the humiliation of Servia, was at first dis- cordant; but in proportion as events developed there appeared a uniform communis opinio influenced by, 8 io8 THE WORLD WAR and owing to, the counsel given by Wilhelmstrasse and the Ballplatz. The Neues Wiener Tagehlatt set forth this alterna- tive: "Either Servia must consent with good grace [sic] to renounce her dreams and the manner in which she tries to realize them, or we will oblige her to. We are determined to preserve the integrity of that which we already possess and not to separate ourselves from the sea through the ambition of a small neighbor. If Austria does not force the Pan- Servian ideal to abdi- cate, Austria herself will have to abdicate." The Fremdenhlatt reflecting entirely governmental opinion went even further than the Neues Wiener Tagehlatt; it suppressed half the dilemna, leaving only one of its horns — war. "War is an ugly word not easy to pronounce when one feels its full responsi- bility; but this time it is absolutely necessary. . . . We do not know whether at the last moment when our soldiers are ready to pass the frontier our neigh- bor will be more reasonable. War does not yet exist, but we are preparing for it. We have reached that point where there can be neither mediation nor arbi- tration. It is not a question of summoning our mortal enemies before a tribunal of justice, but of convincing them before the tribunal of history that they have no case ; that the future does not belong to the Pan- Serb ideal but to our monarchy and that it is not Pan- Serbism which is the stronger, but that spirit which ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION 109 for centuries has kept Austria-Hungary united." The words of the Fremdenhlatt are virtually those pronounced in Budapest by Count Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister (whose cabinet it will be remembered had no responsibility in foreign affairs). Speaking before parliament the Count said: "No one can re- proach us with having sought war. I may say even more, that we went to the extreme limits of patience [loud cheers]. Convinced that our action is due to the vital interests of the Hungarian nation we are ready to face all the consequences." [Loud applause from all sides.] Count Andrassy, leader of the opposition, forgot those differences and even old rancors always so abundant in the turbulent Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, and insisted that the Servian attitude was intolerable and called upon Hungarians to unite and do their duty.* The Chamber, as in similar critical situations when resolutions are left to the executive body, suspended its sessions. Among all the Austrian newspapers only the social- ist organ, the Arheiter Zeitung^ was out of tune. In its issue of July 24 it declared that Austria was trying to take advantage of a weak neighbor, forcing her to rebel against unjust demands so as to later lay at her door all the responsibility of a war. As a consequence of newspaper propaganda and * Session of July 24, 1914, of the Hungarian Chamber ol Deputies. no THE WORLD WAR military preparation came the agitation in the street. In Vienna the masses began crying "Down with Ser- via y and ended with "Down with Russia" correlative terms in the subtle instinct of the masses. In front of the German Embassy they sang the Wacht am Rhein and other national songs, and sensed in the very act that the time had come to make good the grandiose pretentions of the ringing Teutonic hymns. In Berlin during the first moments the press had no fixed orientation but soon found one. For instance on July 24, the Vossische Zeitung, a liberal newspaper of great importance, on learning of the Austrian note, felt obliged to comment as follows : "It cannot be denied that every paragraph of this note is an attempt on the sovereign rights of the Servian state. We con- sider it very unlikely that Servia will submit to such conditions." But when on the following day it learned that Russia had asked for an extension of time in behalf of Servia (a petition which in normal circum- stances would not have been considered unfair espe- cially by the party who had pronounced Austria's claims beyond the limits of international law), the Zeitung expressed itself quite differently: "Yesterday brought us the gravest of news. Russia asks Austria to delay. Austria cannot accept a condition which would in any way permit Servia to take shelter be- hind a diplomatic wall." Than this a more patent contradiction could not exist. ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION iii Immediately after, the road was left free to those newspapers of well defined opinion, and hesitating ones like the Post or the Rhein and Westphalia Gazette were silenced. The matter passed into the hands of the military party so strong in Berlin, staunchly upheld by the whole army, and led by no less a person than the heir to the throne. When the Post, following the then general opinion to the effect that Germany had not been consulted on the note, said : "If advice con- cerning such a serious affair is not asked from an ally there is no reason to expect her aid," the Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, the official periodical, at once an- swered: "The German people feel better on seeing that finally the Balkan situation is to be cleared up** ; and further declared that Germany "congratulates her ally on the strong decision taken and will give her proof of fidelity and sympathy in the course of the grave hours which are probably to be passed through.** Identical are the sentiments of the popular Berliner Tageblatt: "The Austro-Hungarian note admits of no diplomatic negotiations. In spite of the desire of the whole civilized world to keep the peace it must be admitted that Austria could not act in any other man- ner. She may count on the aid of her allies/^ With even greater precision the principal ultra-conservative organ indicated to Austria that Germany would fight by her side : "The German people are ready to fulfill the duties to which their alliance binds them. It is 112 :rHE WORLD WAR, well that it should be known abroad that Germany will not vacillate a single instant in deciding to march shoulder to shoulder with her Austrian ally." The Berliner Nachtrichten took its own view and setting aside all question of alliance came out on July 25 with the following philosophic observation: "If we must have a European war it is better for us that it should be this year and not 191 7. By that date, Russia would have terminated her military reform and France would have filled the gaps pointed out by Senator Humbert." This is a reference to the criticisms made by the French senator on the deficient military organization of his country; but the Prussian newspaper forgot that when he made them, the whole German press would not admit the gaps but alleged that it was merely a pretext to augment war preparations. More dangerous for the people were the semi-offi- cial communications proceeding now from some high military personage, now from some high civil em- ployee; and more exciting for them was the financial news. Influenced by one and the other the crowds filled the streets singing that hymn which embodies all their hopes — Deutschland uber Alles. Diplomacy did its work under the influence of pub- lic opinion somewhat as follows : Russia decidedly irri- tated; Austria ready for the worst; Germany pre- pared to defend her and make common cause with her; France aflame and serious; Italy taken by sur- ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION 113 prise and anxious not to be dragged for another's ad- vantage into a position contrary to her own national interest; England hoping to prevent the conflict and knowing that if it should break out she must depart consciously and voluntarily from her state of "splen- did isolation." Only a great collective effort, only the good will of all, could have prevented the war made so imminent by the Austrian note. But only in those who had least reason to be interested in a struggle between Germans and Slavs did the good will exist. CHAPTER XV EFFORTS OF THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS WHEN the war broke out the internal poHtical situation of the various countries was most pecuHar. Only Austria and Germany had no diffi- cult problems to solve. In England the Irish ques- tion was assuming alarming proportions; the last effort at a solution by means of a conference of lead- ers of the two parties had just failed.* The Ulster fight was about to recommence with greater violence than ever and no one could foresee the result. In France the Caillaux trial kept the public in such a ferment that not a few believed there would be a repe- tition of the difficult period of the Dreyfus case. In the course of history French sentimentality has fre- quently proven that small causes can take possession of the public mind and produce disproportionate ef- fects. In Russia, according to a German authority,! they were entering on a new period of strikes which threat- ened a repetition of the revolutionary agitations of * The London Times; July 25, 1914. i[ Berliner Nachtrichten; July 25, 1914. "5 ii6 THE WORLD WAR 1905 which, it will be recalled, led to bloodshed in the principal cities. In Italy they had not yet healed the wounds of violent labor troubles which took place chiefly in the turbulent Romagna ; and worse still rail- road employees were preparing a new strike which would shortly paralyze the commercial life of the kingdom. A writer of great psychologic insight, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, accuses Germany of having taken ad- vantage of these conditions so propitious to her plans. "In Russia," he says, "there were disorders which as usual were exaggerated abroad. Great Britain was in difficult circumstances because of the antagonism be- tween an Irish province largely Protestant and the other three largely Catholic. In France the major- ity in the Chamber of Deputies, made up of Socialists and united Radical- Socialists, though it was but a weak majority, appeared to foreign eyes to indicate a diminution of military tendencies and of the spirit of sacrifice. On the other hand Humbert's declarations in the Senate on supposed deficiencies in our arma- ment and in our general war preparation were inter- preted abroad with visible exaggeration as a sure in- dication of the weakness of our army. This conjunc- tion of facts appeared to furnish Prussia who had long been lying in ambush with the occasion so fer- vently desired." * *"La Guerre" in I'Econoniiste Frangais, August 3, 1914, page 202. EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 117 Besides all these perturbations there was another state of things unfavorable to a rapid military adven- ture. The President of the French Republic, Ray- mond Poincare, accompanied by the Prime Minister, Rene Viviani, was in Russia singing hymns to the alliance of the two nations. The Kaiser was off on one of his favorite maritime excursions. Ambassa- dors were away from their posts; at the Servian capi- tal the Russian ambassador had recently died and the French was ill. It is difficult to affirm with due impartiality that these convenient conditions induced Austria to deliver her blow against Servia. Up to the present we do not know the correspondence which Austria had with her plenipotentiaries. Time will undoubtedly reveal things which it would be venturesome to say to-day. But the internal political condition, especially of the nations composing the Triple Entente, is hardly a sure basis for assuming that Austria was taking advantage of their situation. For years past they had all been suffering these crises in their respective periods of transformation. England, before facing the difficul- ties of Home Rule, had experienced those no less seri- ous occasioned by fiscal measures ; in Russia there had been the terrorist agitations; in France the anti-mili- tarist disturbance, etc. In examining the diplomatic acts of the present bel- ligerents it is of the greatest importance to know how ii8 THE WORLD WAR, the Berlin government was consulted as to the famous Austrian note and how much influence it exercised. Everyone is now aware that the contents of the note were known and approved in Berlin. This explains Germany^s subsequent attitude when she was so little concerned over approaching events that she did not care to advise the Ballplatz cabinet, although sure that any prudent counsel given there would have found a favorable echo. That Berlin knew what Austria was about to do and the seriousness of its consequences there can be no doubt, for Germany has publicly con- fessed as much in the paragraph of the official memoir to which we have already alluded. The advice to pro- ceed violently against Servia was consciously given. "On making this declaration we knew perfectly that a possible armed action by Austria-Hungary against Servia would provoke intervention on the part of Rus- sia and involve us in a war." * Nor can it be doubted from the language of the offi- cial publication just referred to that it was the Ger- man government and not the Kaiser who was con- sulted ; and we can only suppose that the statements of Von Jagow, German Foreign Minister in Paris, and Von Schoen, German Ambassador, in which they af- firmed, July 25, that they did not know the Austrian * Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany and Russia, official publication, page 5. EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 119 note* were due to Germany's not wanting it to be understood that the incident had been especially ar- ranged in order to provoke a war. Judging from the view upheld by German diplomacy during the brief negotiations that lasted until August i, Germany wanted the world to believe that she was trying to reduce the importance of the question and to localize the conflict between Austria and Servia. The plea of localizing the war could hardly have been defended had it been known that Austria, fully aware of the importance of the case, had previously consulted her ally; and much less if in those early moments the true attitude of the German Empire and the proportions which it expected the conflict to assume had been known. How serious Germany considered it was later defined in the following oflicial words : "If Servia had been permitted any longer to en- danger the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy with the aid of Russia and France, the conse- quence would have been the gradual destruction of Austria and the bringing of the whole Slav race under the sceptre of Russia; and Russia in turn would have made untenable the position of the Germanic race in the center of Europe." f It is to be supposed that identical reasons induced * Le Matin, July 26, 1914. t Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany and Russia, official publication, page 5. I20 THE WORLD WAR Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, to declare to Sir Edward Grey that "the German Government had not been informed of the text of the Austrian note." * In this case the false statement takes on greater importance because it has a completely official character. Dr. E. J. Dillon affirms that the Kaiser had in his hands the draft of the note and after reading it made suggestions emphasizing its severity, which sugges- tions were accepted by Austria, f This well-known publicist was representing the Daily Telegraph on the Continent during the crisis; his reliability in giving news is well known and he asserts that he did not merely suppose or deduce the foregoing, but that he knew it to be a fact. German intervention, whether to the extreme of counselling Austria to intensify the note, as Dr. Dil- lon affirms, or whether only to the point of consider- ing the matter her own, as the German government admits in the official publication, can be explained by the disturbed equilibrium of Oriental Europe resulting from the last Balkan War. Germany, as described, had made great efforts to attract Turkey within her sphere of influence. All the splendid work of Von Marschall during long years, all the military labors of * Russian Orange Book, document number 20. fDr. E. J. Dillon; "Causes of the European War," in The Contemporary Review, September, 1914, page 319. EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 121 German tacticians including Von der Goltz, had had for result the double defeat of Turkey in Africa by Italy and in Europe by the Balkan League. The bal- ance against increasing Russian force which Germany had sought in an entente with Turkey was neutralized by the latter' s decrease in territory, especially as she was left with only one foot in Europe; and among other causes was the growth of the Servian military spirit and the powerful French influence in Greece, which overcame even the desires of the king of that nation. The European balance having thus inclined towards the Triple Entente, it was necessary to raise the stock of the Triple Alliance — to reestablish the equilibrium, if not the supremacy. German diplomacy has never been addicted to tran- quil preparations and insidious occupation of new positions. On the contrary she has always been the nation of hard blows, violent threats, and brusk move- ments. Nations, like individuals, follow their favorite tactics. After the establishment of the new Servian mon- archy the relations of the Russian minister in Belgrade were of the most intimate (we have already mentioned that the Austrian ex-Minister Dumba compared him to a viceroy) . When the Austrian note arrived, the post being vacant through the death of the last incumbent, Strandtman was at the head of the Russian Legation. On the 23rd he communicated to the minister of for- 122 THE WORLD WAR eign affairs at Petrograd that Patchou, Servian Min- ister of State, had in the absence of Pachitch ac- quainted him with the contents of the Austrian note received at six o'clock that same afternoon. Servia, he said, would not yield to Austria's demands and ap- pealed through him for Russia's aid.* Servia had conjectured aright in expecting the aid of the great Slavic nation. The appeal of the Prince Regent found an echo in the heart of the Czar and that of Patchou in the heart of Sazonoff. There was to be no repetition of 1908 when Russia, helpless, had to witness Servia's humiliation and the ruin of her own prestige. Sazonoff immediately communicated with the charge d'affaires in Vienna (the ambassador being tem- porarily absent) and asked him to solicit more time in which to consider the ultimatum, so that the powers to whom it had been sent might, if they deemed wise, counsel Servia to accept at least some of Austria's de- mands, f At the same time the governments of Eng- land, J France, Italy and Servia were informed that this petition had been made. While making every effort to obtain the postponement Russia did not hide the gravity of the situation. The ministers were as- sembled and an official communique was given out to * Russian Orange Book, documents i and 6. f Russian Orange Book, document number 4. % English White Book, document number 13. EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 123 show the concern of the Czar's government, and fur- ther, that an Austro-Servian clash would not find it indifferent.* The extension of the forty-eight hours granted to Servia in which to answer appeared necessary even to less interested nations; that is, if a peaceful solution was to be found. Naturally neither Russia nor the other powers pretended to wish such extension out of a simple desire to satisfy Austria's demands a few hours later ; but neither did they ask it for the purpose of stealing a march on her and accelerating their own preparations. It would be as unjust to suspect this second malicious intent as it would be ingenuous to believe in the first. What all sincerely desired was a more adequate term for studying the serious and fulminating Euro- pean situation. Russia did not wish the humiliation of Servia. Perhaps she wished it even less than Ser- via herself, for while the latter would have to submit because of the military disparity between herself and Austria, Russia could not advance the same reason without abdicating her post as a great power; the be- littling of Servia would be that of Russia. Russia nevertheless made every effort to find a way out of the difficulty just as any nation would do on finding herself unexpectedly involved. Even the most ag- ^ Le Temps, July 25, 1914; also Russian Orange Book, document number 10. 9 124 THE WORLD WAR gressive state, like the most aggressive man, prefers to select his own moment for combat. Sir Edward Grey was of the same opinion as Sazo- noff regarding the impossibility of an instantaneous solution; more than this; on July 23, when he first learned from the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in London that such a note was to be sent and that it would demand an answer in forty-eight hours, he re- marked that it was practically an ultimatum.* That such an ultimatum was out of reason and without po- litical antecedent is evident for if Austria had believed it necessary to send a copy of the note to other powers, and if these had always intervened in Balkan affairs and had exercised over those states a collective pro- tectorate, it was only just that the respective govern- ments who received the copy should have time to study it in order to answer and take action. Nor should it be forgotten that Austria, to her own interest and with but scant courtesy, delayed in sending the text of the note to Petrograd, so that this government had not even forty-eight but only thirty-one hours for deliberation. t Thus while England from the first was given to understand through the German and the Aus- trian ambassadors how grave was the situation (this with the hope, as will presently be shown, that Ger- many might make sure of England's non-participation) * English White Book, document number 2. ■tE. J. Dillon; article cited, page 462. EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 125 Russia, whose preponderating influence in Servian affairs was well known, was kept in darkness. Sir Edward Grey on insisting on more time made a suggestion that might have led to a solution, namely: the mediation of England, France, Germany, and Italy.* But Germany in answering this put the mat- ter on other grounds. "It is impossible to summon our ally in her conflict with Servia before a European tribunal ;" and the chancellor in a telegram to the Ger- man ambassador in London expressed himself to the effect that Germany desired above all to localize the conflict ; that Austria must be given a free hand against Servia, that Russia must not commit any act of hos- tility against Austria nor even partly mobilize her troops, for if she did so Germany would not abandon her ally. Such words could only mean a European war. This evidently was desired, for no solution was forthcoming and the matter remained enclosed in a circle of iron. There was but one way out — ^the lamentable one finally resorted to. Later Germany tried to twist Sir Edward Grey*s suggestion into an entirely different meaning, and offered to accept mediation in case of an Austro-Rus- sian conflict but not an Austro-Servian. This dis- tinction was never intended by Grey and logically could not be made, for Russia had no disagreement with * English White Book, documents lo and ii; also German White Book, documents 12 and 13. 126 THE WORLD WAR Austria other than that which rose out of Austria's with Servia. To settle one without the other was impossible, and however great and clever the resources of diplomacy, to give affairs this turn was a jest shorn of all mirth. Sir Edward Grey had shown from the first that while the Austro-Servian conflict did not interest him its far-reaching consequences did; there- fore he would be obliged to weigh carefully. This was about the same as saying that if the rest were content with what Austria was doing with Servia, England, having no direct Balkan interests, would be silent ; but if any of the great powers intervened, Eng- land too would enter into the fray. And the fact is that this same minister, even after the forty-eight hours had expired, asked that military operations be delayed in order to give time for a settlement. This he did on the ground of the Aus- trian ambassador's statement that the ultimatum and the withdrawal of the Austrian plenipotentiary from Belgrade did not signify war. The two ways of understanding the conflict were, then, face to face. On the one side, Germany and Austria wished to localize the combat in order that Austria might more easily hurl herself against Servia with detriment to Russia and to the countries of the Entente in general, after which the Balkan States might once more be made into a prop for the Triple Alliance instead of the danger they then were. On the oth^i; EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 127 hand, the Entente, and along with them one of the Triple Alliance, Italy, who had been taken by sur- prise, wished to have more time in order to find the as yet unknown solution. These made every effort to obtain from Germany the desired extension of the forty-eight hour limit, and did their best to prevent a declaration of war and to urge the acceptance of mediation. But the prompt declaration of war which followed Austria's ultimatum to Servia put an end to all possible solution. The die was cast. So Russia understood it, and so Germany, and the remaining steps consisted merely in maintaining the customary good form incident to such occasions, and disavowing the more direct responsibilities of the approaching catas- trophe. Germany showed that she was ready to accept medi- ation between Austria and Russia in order to localize the war; and when war was declared she admitted that certain claims in the Austrian note, on which by her own confession she had been consulted, could not easily be accepted by Servia.* Russia on her side had no doubts as to her conduct. The mobilization already ordered in Austria was a sure sign of immedi- ate war. The telegrams between the two Emperors were of no avail; deeds weighed more than words. There has been much discussion as to who mobilized * English White Book, document number 46. 128 THE WORLD WAR first. In reality this has no importance since the mo- bilization was the consequence of diplomatic attitude in the respective countries. Russia more than all con- sidered that she must accept war as due to her prestige, even though she did not want it and was not pre- pared, as later events have well demonstrated. Dur- ing the course of negotiations Sazonoff understood, just as it was understood in Rome, Paris and London, that their fate lay in the hands of Berlin. If in that city peace was wanted, peace would be maintained. If not, the European conflagration would burst forth in all its frightfulness. Sazonoff on July 28, the day that Austria declared war on Servia, lamented to the Russian ambassador in London that Berlin had not taken a definite stand at the very beginning of the crisis;* and later in the same day he pointed out to the same ambassador the need of England^s appealing to Austria not to crush Servia and thus make pacific solution impossible.! Even after the declaration of war he kept urging all the ambassadors to appeal to their various governments, and this he continued to do in spite of the communication received from the Russian ambassador in Vienna to the effect that the government of the Dual Monarchy was not inclined to * English White Book, document number 54. Russian Orange Book, document number 43. 1[ Russian Orange Book, document number 48. EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 129 exchange ideas direct with the Imperial Russian Government. It is certain that the German government echoed Sazonoff's good intentions but more than intentions they never were, since no practical solution had any chance of acceptance from her. The German theory was to give Austria a free hand against Servia, to prevent Russia's acting to save her Balkan prestige (the loss of which meant the loss of her European prestige) ; and, this accomplished, to show her great affection afterwards. Evidence against Berlin may be seen in the fact that Servia's sufficiently conciliatory answer to Austria was not published on July 28 by a single news agency or newspaper throughout the Ger- man Confederation; obviously because it would have diminished the bellicose humor of the masses. In this, Germany followed her old system of 1870 — ^to exacerbate the people into ready and enthusiastic soldiers. On July 29 the future belligerents knew that they would meet in combat. Russia notified France, and Germany notified Russia.* The latter, making a su- preme effort at the last moment sent the following to Berlin: *Tf Austria, now recognizing that the Aus- tro- Servian question has assumed the character of a European question, will declare herself ready to elim- * Russian Orange Book, document number 58. I30 THE WORLD WAR inate from her ultimatum those points which consti- tute an infringement on the sovereign rights of Servia, Russia will cease her military preparations." But Germany declared this proposition unacceptable without even consulting Austria.* Gabriel Hanotaux, French ex-minister of foreign affairs, has declared that Austria was ready to accept this Russian offer. "I am in a position to affirm," he said, "and will fur- nish proof should it not be encountered in the forth- coming French Yellow Book whose publication is impa- tiently awaited, that Austria-Hungary, perhaps seized with vacillations in presence of events whose terrible consequences she began to foresee, announced herself ready to adhere to the Russian initiative which would present an honorable way out for all." f Later, in his Histoire de la Guerre, Hanotaux again insisted that at the last moment, after Germany had declared war on Russia, the Austrian government tried through Berchtold to avoid the stupendous climax. However in this book the celebrated author is less positive than in the Figaro article previously cited. The foregoing should be considered in conjunction with Pierre Ber- trand^s affirmation that the current opinion as to Aus- tria's having repented at the last moment was a fiction pure and simple. Austria, he says, never thought of * Russian Orange Book, documents 60 and 63. fG. Hanotaux; "Les responsabilites allemandes," in Le Ft- g^roj September 26, 1914. EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 131 taking such a step and never recanted in the least.* Sazonoff again modified his compromise in order to make it more acceptable but in Berlin the foreign min- ister broke off conversations with the Russian ambas- sador. This happened July 30, and the following day Sazonoff told Sir Edward Grey that the only solution could be found in London. f But there was no longer a way out. Germany, who had not wished to duly deliberate with Austria, wished on the other hand to forestall Russia's action and make impossible the conduct the latter was bound to follow. Germany pretended to see an aggression in what was merely the natural con- sequence of multiple contributory causes; she believed herself attacked because Russia was preparing; she investigated the Russian mobilization but would not admit that she herself was preparing with greater intelligence and eagerness, and certainly with greater efficacy; for, considering the careful organization of her army, her proclamation of a state of war was more practically effective than the Russian order of mobilization. $ With Teutonic violence she hurled at Russia a sort of ultimatum demanding the suspension of all military activity within twelve hours ;§ and at * Pierre Bertrand ; "L'Autriche a voulu la grande guerre/ Paris, 1916. f Russian Orange Book, document number 63. t German White Book, addition number 11. § German White Book, addition number 24. 132 THE WORLD WAR the same time sent a declaration of war to Petrograd to be delivered in case this demand was not complied with by five o'clock on the afternoon of the first of August. This declaration was presented and the state of war began. In connection with this declaration of war a curious and extremely significant anecdote is published by Tomaso Tittoni who, as former Italian ambassador in Paris and also former foreign minister, had every opportunity of knowing both great international ques- tions and small diplomatic incidents. According to him. Count Pourtales, German ambassador in Petro- grad, after pronouncing the fateful words to Russia in the person of Sazonoff, laid on the latter' s table the written declaration, as is usual in such circumstances. On his withdrawal the Russian minister of war picked up the terrible instrument which was to be the death warrant of so many thousands of human beings, and found to his surprise that it contained nothing but friendly words. It conveyed, in fact, Berlin's thanks to Russia for having acceded to her demands. While Sazonoff was still staring in amazement Pourtales re- turned to explain that he had made an error, and sub- stituted the written formal declaration of war for the paper Sazonoff was reading.''' Evidently the Berlin cabinet had provided against every eventuality. Either submission or defiance on * T. Tittoni ; "Nuova Antologia," Rome, September i6, 1916. EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 133 Russia's part had been prepared for ; but the excessively cautious German cabinet had not counted on the am- bassador's carrying the double correspondence in his pocket when he made his final visit to Sazonoff. It is strange that Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, a statesman esteemed for the rec- titude of his aims and for his broad and clear mind opposed to all Chauvinism, a sound pacifist in the sense that he realized how the benefits of peace were vivifying the spirit of the nation — it is strange that he should be the one called upon to accept what the German document calls the challenge of Russia. Beth- mann-Hollweg declared the war and on doing so all the constructive work of forty years crumbled. History makes some unconscious revelations. Among them it is to be noted that in this incident which appeared to be provoked by Austria, the first of the great powers to send a declaration of war to another great power was Germany. How surely do internal and hidden forces work up to the surface! A CHAPTER XVI THE GENERAL CONFLICT THE general conflict was initiated as we have seen by Germany's declaration of war on Rus- sia, preceded by an ultimatum sent suddenly and at the very moment when hopes of peace had been renewed. Germany, attacking Russia, could no longer talk of localizing the quarrel, and this the- ory upheld by her in the case of Servia and disputed by Russia in the diplomatic field, was trampled under foot by her own acts. She knew the treaty obliga- tions which bound France to Russia; therefore she knew that the war would be general. Once started, she had to anticipate events for it would have been bad policy to await them. Germany's attitude toward France, then, was logical, considering the first bad step taken, and as the theorists of the early nineteenth century would have said, it was in the natural order of events. France proceeded with tact during the negotiations, and on hearing the trend of the Wilhelmstrasse govem- 135 136 THE WORLD WAR ment counseled the greatest prudence. In unison with England and Italy she made every effort to maintain peace. Wounded by the humiliation of forty-odd years France wanted war whenever it was spoken of in the abstract or whenever patriotic hymns and speeches revived her past grief; but whenever danger presented itself she preferred peace and strove for it. Alsace and Lorraine, separated from the nation, were a constant call to war; Sedan and Metz were two in- sults which constantly cried for satisfaction; but so greatly had the French people prospered without Alsace and Lorraine, and so vigorously had they conquered a place in the industrial and financial world that, though they had not forgotten, an intense desire for peace animated them all. To the military and aristocratic regime of monarchical, especially Napol- eonic, days, had succeeded the regime of the great middle class. Its small tradesmen, manufacturers, ag- riculturists, and modest financiers all enjoyed greater well-being in France than in other countries. Of a peaceful nature, little inclined for adventure, desirous of glory when not fraught with danger, fond of their own wealth, they asked only that their well-being be indefinitely prolonged. The upper classes, the high financiers and men of big business, had followed the middle class in these pacifist tendencies. Four decades of economic prosperity had wrought a change in French opinion, had wrested the directing of it from the aris- THE GENERAL CONFLICT 137 tocratic class who found glory in the arts of war, and given it to business men who found in peaceful pur- suits the only means of augmenting the national wel- fare. Along these lines, and in the interest of blissful tranquillity, the possessors of great fortunes had be- come pacifists outwardly and socialist-radicals in- wardly. It is only in this way that one can explain the long-enduring patience of so many French cabi- nets in face of German irritations and provocations, as well as the course recently followed in face of the questions brought up by the Austro- Servian note. Germany for a moment endeavored to rob the alli- ance which bound France to Russia of its fruit. By trying to force the former into a dispute with the latter, she hoped that French advice would not be followed and the nation thereby absolved from keep- ing the Russian compact. That is what Iswolsky, Russian Ambassador in Paris, heard on hastening back from his interrupted vacation. He got it from the lips of Bienvenu Martin, minister of justice, and also ad interim minister of foreign affairs. Martin had seen through the plan and communicated his analysis of it to Petrograd.* This circumstance dis- proves Baron Von Schoen's pretension that France suffered herself to be led into common cause with Germany; on the contrary, in all the preliminary dip- lomatic proceedings, and these, beyond all question, * Russian Orange Book, document number 35. 138 THE WORLD WAR focused on a casus helli, she removed the only pre- text she could possibly have had for breaking the alliance, and decided to unite herself to Russia should the bellic moment arrive. This was confirmed to Iswolsky by Premier Viviani the very day he re- turned to Paris: and in order that Germany might have no illusions on the subject it was also confirmed to Von Schoen. In Petrograd the French ambassador was saying the same, but even more precisely, for his words to Sazonoff were that Russia could count on the armed aid of her ally.* This solidarity had to be. The two countries were united by such strict treaty, by so many necessities of defense (involving no few monetary sacrifices for the one on the part of the other) that to separate in this trying moment would have been suicidal. Moreover, mere circumstance had just prepared them for closer union than ever. Had not the President of the Re- public, Raymond Poincare, and the Premier, Rene Viviani, just returned from Russia with all the flat- tering speeches pronounced, all the kindnesses received, all the promises of mutual help and reciprocal de- fense, fresh in their memory? On this visit both governments saw that they must make their contracts clear, especially with regard to the grave Oriental question — a precaution more or less necessary because * Russian Orange Book, document number 55; also French Yellow Book, document number loi. THE GENERAL CONFLICT 139 in preceding years doubts had arisen in France as to her part. She had not always sustained her ally, alleging that she had her own interests in Oriental Europe and that these were contrary to Russia's. For this reason Viviani and Sazonoff, acting in their re- spective capacities, gave out on the 24th of July an official communication both clear and to the point: "The visit just paid by the President of the French Republic to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia has offered an occasion when both governments, friends and allies, could satisfy themselves as to the identity of their views on various problems arising from a mutual solicitude for the general peace and the balance of power in Europe, especially Eastern Europe." * In spite of these specific matters, as well as the treaty of the Double Alliance, being known to Ger- many, she made a last effort before the French Gov- ernment on the day she declared war on Russia; she charged her ambassador to ask France's intentions; and he, having done so, was able to report that very same day, August i, that France would follow her ally. The answer was laconic and left no room for doubt. Baron Von Schoen gave it as follows in a telegram to his government: "On my inquiring di- rectly and repeatedly whether France would remain neutral in case of war between Germany and Russia the premier declared to me that France would act in * Le Temps, Paris, July 25, 1914. 10 I40 THE WORLD WAR accordance with her interests/'* On the arrival of this telegram in Berlin war on France was decided upon, and the postponing of the declaration until Au- gust 3 was probably due to the fact that neither of the two parties, either because of international agree- ments or because of certain moral formalities, cared to be the first to make it. And so the two ambassa- dors, Jules Cambon in Berlin and Baron Von Schoen in Paris, kept up their visits to the ministers of foreign affairs. t But Germany had already decided to begin immediate war not only on the western front, as said above, but also on the eastern. On August I the French cabinet took counsel, President Poincare presiding and General Joffre be- ing present. Mobilization had already begun, and the necessary economic measures for carrying on a war were arranged. Germany too was mobilizing, and on two frontiers; and the Kaiser was announcing to his people that he was unsheathing his sword "to fight an enemy who has been hemming us in while we were living peacefully in every sense of the word." On August 2 Germany violated the first treaty — that which guaranteed the neutrality of Luxemburg as signed in London in 1867. Against the protests of the government of the Grand Duchy she penetrated into * German White Book; also French Yellow Book, docu- ment number 125. tPaul Leroy Beaulieu; "La Guerre," in UEconomiste Fran- gats. THE GENERAL CONFLICT 141 it with armored trains. More than that, she pene- trated that same day into French territory at various points although there had not been any declaration of hostilities. Yet the following day it was Von Schoen who entered a protest that the French had violated German soil, an allegation which the French premier denied most emphatically. However, these frontier incidents to which great importance was given at the moment have little bearing on the real case. The outstanding fact is that Germany prepared the more rapidly and that the violation of Luxemburg suited her plans, as stated by the ministers of the Duchy who certainly had no partiality for the French. But let it be repeated, these discussions are prolix now that we can look back upon the whole series of events. As soon as war was declared against Russia it was evident that France intended to aid her ally and thus make it necessary for Germany to fight on two fron- tiers. Further accuracy in war-time, and in comment- ing on a modern country which admitted the medieval axiom that "necessity knows no law," would be superfluous. Germany^s advantage lay in rapid action ; she was following the same hypothetic plans as in 1870 when she assumed an attack on two frontiers, to wit: rush upon France and obtain a prompt and decisive victory and then turn her forces on the other enemy. Germany's every manoeuvre on the French border responded to her urgent necessities, and the 142 THE WORLD WAR delay in declaring war on her ancient adversary can be explained only by her wish not to appear too ag- gressive in the eyes of England, whose neutrality she still hoped for, and of Italy, whose aid she counted on as almost certain. On August 3, Von Schoen, having first packed up all the effects of the embassy, repaired somewhat osten- tatiously to the Quai d'Orsay at 5.45 in the afternoon, and declared war; and the French nation knew that the hour of the great duel had sounded, and that vic- tory was a peremptory necessity. That France was forced to war at a moment when she was striving desperately to maintain peace is un- deniable. Until the very moment when the discon- certed Von Schoen, without cause and without ani- mosity, delivered the challenge, she had acted as if doubting that the storm would really burst. With much exactitude Bienvenu Martin could say that "neither act, appearance, nor word other than pacific and conciliatory could be imputed to France/'* And with no less truth, or at least with certain right inas- much as the cabinet then in power was concerned, could Rene Viviani, the premier, say in the same session: "Germany has nothing to reproach us with. In the interests of peace we have made a sacrifice without precedent, for throughout half a century we have si- * Session of the Senate of the French Republic, August 4, 1914. THE GENERAL CONFLICT 143 lently borne the wound in our breast which she laid open." And all this time the Austrian ambassador still drove through the streets of Petrograd and the French ambassador through Vienna, and vice versa. From the moment of the Kaiser's brusk ultimatum to Russia, Austria, who appeared at that time disposed to adjust matters, receded into second place. But on the 6th of August Austria-Hungary finally declared war on Russia and on the nth the French ambassador asked the Vienna government for his passports. This, it will be seen, did not occur till after Germany was in a state of war with four nations, until after she had violated both Luxemburg and Belgium, and after the British had come into the conflict ; in other words, after the whole tragic problem had taken a definite form. CHAPTER XVII THE VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG THE first act which cannot be put down to the credit of the German Empire is the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg. This violation has not resounded through the world like that of Bel- gium but merely because of its lesser political, not moral, significance. Morally each bears the same aspect ; each is a question of a treaty broken. The case of Luxemburg was all the more unjustifiable because, as we shall see, it was Prussia who had displayed most activity in framing the treaty and who had most interest in its adoption. Even more, this violation of neutral territory on August 2 constituted an aggres- sion against France before Germany had declared war on her ; it therefore invalidated the formal complaints of the German ambassador in Paris to the effect that Frenchmen had made attacks in German territory. In violating Luxemburg, Germany revealed her whole war policy of surprise, rapid action, and contempt for the only thing which modem international law has 145 146 THE WORLD WAR acquired for civilization after so many centuries. And it is all the more to be condemned because it is impos- sible to advance a shadow of justification for the act. At the very time it occurred the German minister in Luxemburg was declaring that the neutrality of the Duchy was guaranteed above all question and would never be violated by Germany. This statement at the moment when war was already certain forces us to one of two painful conclusions regarding Germany; either the diplomatic and the military staffs were act- ing in defiance of each other or else the government was acting in complete bad faith. The permanent neutrality of Luxemburg as an in- dependent state was specially created by the Treaty of London, May ii, 1867. Its most important antece- dent is found in the treaty which created Belgian neu- trality in 1839. ^s one of the possessions of the house of Burgundy, Luxemburg in the sixteenth cen- tury fell into the hands of Spain. In 171 3 it was transferred to Austria, and later to France. In 181 5 it was created a grand duchy, but under the sover- eignty of the King of the Netherlands. Being one of those regions which geographical situation or the course of events has put in the road of great conflicts, it has known great sorrows. The Treaty of London was a solution in order to avoid or rather postpone a conflict between Germany and France. Napoleon III had just tried to buy this LUXEMBURG'S NEUTRALITY VIOLATED 147 territory which had been garrisoned since 181 5 by Prussian troops, and keep its cession and its price secret. The proceeding would have been within the law since Luxemburg from the political point of view had ceased to belong to the Germanic community ; but it did not suit Prussian interests. The secret was soon known for the Grand Duke himself, who was also King of Holland, while negotiating with Napoleon communicated the fact to the Prussian minister at The Hague and showed him the contents of the letter he had received from the Emperor of the French.* At the same time he declared himself ready to make the transaction provided Prussia approved. Bismarck decided it was not the moment to give France a diplomatic victory or a military position; but neither was he desirous of war. Using his mar- velous tactics — that mixture of audacity and reticence which he knew how to employ in difficult cases — he allowed himself to be interrogated twice in the Reichs- tag. Autocrat by instinct he could handle democratic institutions for his own ends; and so, answering the two interrogations, one from Carlovitz and the other from Benningsen, he manoeuvred cleverly, giving France no motive for a casiis belli but making it clearly understood that without the consent of Prussia the cession of Luxemburg was impossible. Then he gave the French Ambassador, Benedetti, to understand that *E. Servais; "La neutralite du Luxembourg," page 78. 148 THE WORLD WAR he could not favor the project, not because he was averse to it, but because blundering French diplomacy had obliged him to make premature declarations, and these had created an unfavorable public opinion. On April 2, 1867, Benedetti wrote as follows to his coun- try's foreign minister : "I have again seen Bismarck. He complains of the difficulties confronting him, and appears to blame us for the turn given to the matter by the King of the Low Countries (the Grand Duke) in directing himself officially to the King of Prussia before talking with the cabinet of Berlin. These pre- mature communications do not leave the Prussian government full liberty." The truth is that Bismarck took this tone solely because it was the most con- venient one; because he feared, as always, that his king would be weak, he complained of their having talked first with him before treating with the cabinet, which latter was himself and no one but himself. Later events show how far he was from any inten- tion of yielding to the plans of Napoleon HI; for when the Grand Duke finally decided to break off the sale, Bismarck was well satisfied and straightway asked the powers to meet in international conference in London in order to avoid war. In the London of 1867, however, there was no more interest in Luxemburg and its neutrality than in the London of 19 14. England was not looking for an- other difficulty nor did she wish to assume a future LUXEMBURG'S NEUTRALITY VIOLATED 149 responsibility in a matter of no interest to her. Lord Stanley therefore gave a weak answer to the proposals of Prussia. In a telegram to Lord Cowley, the am- bassador in BerHn, he said: "Of what use is it to call a conference until Prussia has decided to state her intentions on the fortress (which she possesses) in Luxemburg, or at least until France has declared that she will submit to the decisions of the same?'* Never- theless, the conference was convoked and in it Luxem- burg's neutrality was agreed upon. Its terms are clearly expressed in Article II : "The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the act appended to the Treaties of April 13, 1839, under the guarantee of the Courts of France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, will hence- forth form a perpetually neutral state. It will be obliged to respect this same neutrality toward all other states. The high contracting powers oblige themselves to respect the principle of neutrality stipu- lated in the present article. This article is and will remain under the sanction of the collective guarantee of the powers signatory to the present treaty, with the exception of Belgium, she herself being a neutral state." The original draft did not contain the last lines relating to the sanction of a collective guarantee but instead terminated with the words: "the principle of neutrality as stipulated by the present article." The ISO THE WORLD WAR remainder was proposed and defended as a condition sine qua non (incredible but true) by the Prussian plenipotentiary, Count Albrecht Bernstorff. In order that the reader may know the different attitudes as- sumed by the representatives of Prussia on the one side, and of France and England on the other, we reproduce the acts of the session in which the article and the amendment were approved. To the second article Count Bernstorff proposed the following emendation : "This principle (neutrality) is and will remain under the guarantee of the powers who sign the present treaty with the exception of Belgium, since she herself is neutral." The Russian representative Count Briinnow said that he was au- thorized by his court to subscribe completely to the principle of giving the collective guarantee to the neutrality of Luxemburg. He hoped that this prin- ciple would be admitted as the best pledge that could be offered for the peace of Europe. Count Apponyi declared that his government (the Hungarian) also accepted the guaranteed neutrality of Luxemburg. Prince de la Tour d*Auvergne stated that he had no instructions relative to the question of a collective guarantee; but he felt himself obliged to agree that this guarantee had been presented up to that moment as the natural complement to the neu- trality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg; and even though the obligation which the powers assumed to LUXEMBURG'S NEUTRALITY VIOLATED 151 respect the neutrality of Luxemburg might in a given moment have a value almost equal to a formal guar- antee, still he could not deny that the Ambassador of Prussia might not be right in his observations. Van de Weyer, who was also without special in- structions (from Holland) on this point gave the opinion that in an ample spirit of conciliation it might be considered that the guarantee of neutrality ema- nated aggregately from the treaties of 1839. Lord Stanley declared that he preferred Article II as it existed in the draft of the treaty and without the amendment of Bernstorff ; but as most of the pleni- potentiaries upheld the idea indicated by the repre- sentative of Prussia, he, Lord Stanley, would acquaint the members of the Queen's cabinet of the proposi- tion which had been made and hoped to be able in the conference of the coming week to inform them of the decision taken.* The result was that England later yielded to the wishes of the powers and in order to keep peace in Europe agreed to the guarantee, definitively approving the article with the amendment. History presents great contrasts and at times great ironies. Prussia so eagerly desired the neutrality of Luxemburg that, not satisfied with the declaration made in the treaty (which as the French delegate pointed out presupposed the defense of the clauses of ♦Reproduced in Servais; work cited, pages 163-65. 152 THE WORLD WAR the same) she asked the signatory powers for a guar- antee which would put that neutrahty under the com- mon defense. This then constituted more than what she desired, since the defense of the neutrahty became so obhgatory that one of the powers could oblige the others to enter into armed action in defense of the ordained pact. Prussia having proposed the clause and the rest having accepted it, England understood its importance and accepted it, as we understand, when she saw that the other powers did not foresee the real future diffi- culties ; and undoubtedly she had to assure herself that they did not grasp its full importance by means of those private conversations which form the most elab- orate part of the program in all such conferences. Bismarck in reality had again practiced his finesse on France, as he himself has admitted. Maurice Busch in his book on Bismarck attributes to him the follow- ing words which bear every evidence of the mentality and the style of the Chancellor: "Public opinion in all Germany would have been most favorable to us (Prussia) at that time had we wished war over the question of Luxemburg; the law, however, was not on our side. I have never confessed this publicly but today I can say it. After the dissolution of the Ger- man Confederation, the King and Grand Duke be- came a sovereign, and could do as he wished. To sell his country for money would have been a piece of LUXEMBURG'S NEUTRALITY VIOLATED 153 villainy, but it would have been his right/' In this Bismarck was forgetting what he had publicly said when answering certain observations made at the time by August Bebel on a discourse of the Crown, re- garding a fortress occupied in Luxemburg.* Bismarck in his answer upheld an exactly opposite point of view. If the preceding is not sufficient to prove the neu- trality of Luxemburg and the form in which it was dictated to have been principally the work of Prussia, and further, that this fact aggravates her present vio- lation of the same, let us consider Prussia's own criti- cism during the war of 1870 when it was a question of Luxemburg's duty to defend her neutrality by arms. Bismarck on the third of December of that year sent from Versailles a telegram to the government of the Grand Duchy holding it responsible for violations of its neutrality. Both the reproach and the threat were unjust because by the treaty of May 11, 1867, the Duchy had been forbidden to keep an army. The only force allowed her was that necessary to, maintain order, and consequently all defense of neutrality against belligerents was completely impossible. This circumstance certainly demonstrates to what a very great degree this neutrality was appreciated and un- derstood by that same nation who in 19 14 unhesitat- * Session of the Parliament of the German Confederation, September 24, 1867. 154 THE WORLD WAR ingly occupied Luxemburg's railroads for military uses, crossed its frontiers, and established herself as if in her own house; or rather with more rights and less concern than if she had been at home. In reality it is a flagrant case of contempt of the principles of order and of obligations assumed. It prepared the world for the next transgression — the invasion of Belgium. CHAPTER XVIII ENGLAND AND THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY THE war would not have attained its present proportions if England had not declared war against Germany; or to make a more prudent state- ment it would not have attained them so soon. The culminating moment of the initial stage was the violation of Belgian neutrality, and this was the act which involved England. When she claimed this in- tervention to be in defense of the Treaties of 1839 German writers doubted her sincerity. They accused her of wanting above all to assault Germany in this difficult moment and thus make good on the battle- field the previous diplomatic work of isolation. They further asserted that the diplomatic and subsequent military conduct was due to the growth of German commerce which was outstripping Great Britain^s in all the markets of the world.* The English answered by alleging the necessary defense of the principles of * Bernhard Dernburg, former German Colonial Minister ; "Germany and England," in the Saturday Evening Post, Novem- ber 21, 1914. " 155 156 THE WORLD WAR international law without which defense it would be impossible to solve any difficulty or maintain any agreement; they declared that English public opinion would never have consented to Germany's passing into France over the ruins of Belgium, but would have forced the government to armed intervention ; and that knowing this the government decided accordingly. It is not easy to say whether England would have awaited the opportune moment and entered the war in any case, or whether, true to her past reputation, she would have extracted the greatest benefit from it with the least effort. There is no doubt that Eng- land hoped this conflict would solve her modern prob- lem. In competition with a powerful rival who was overtaking her in naval power and depriving her of a hegemony indispensable to her very existence, she dared not let the mighty occasion pass without its settling who was to be the winner. But in what man- ner and at what moment she would have made it do so is mere conjecture. It is probable that the prac- tical sense of English statesmen did not prompt them to prepare a specific plan but rather to watch events closely and take whichever course might appear most favorable. What really happened however is that Eng- land, contrary to German accusations, entered the war at a moment not to her liking and after having tried cautiously to avoid all compromise and all obligation. It is not to the point to repeat Sir Edward Grey's VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 157 efforts to avert an Austro- Servian war and his lack of interest in the Balkan conflict; nor the proposed mediation, nor the later attitude when Germany hurled first her ultimatum and then her declaration of war on Russia, for all these proceedings demonstrate of themselves the pacific mind of the Liberal English Government at that moment. Grey's answer to Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, when the latter asked for a declaration in favor of France should war break out, is enough to clear up all residue of doubt. To Cambon's argument that such a declara- tion from England could in itself prevent the conflict, Grey's answer was completely negative and to the effect that England did not feel obliged to uphold the interests of any other nation.* This conversation took place on July 29, and the question of respecting Bel- gian neutrality directed to both Germany and France is one more proof that England did not wish to enter the conflict at that moment ; otherwise she would have let events take their course without trying to warn those whose acts might establish the justification for her armed intervention.! Then too the declaration of Cambon was repeated in parliament when the minister of foreign affairs, set- ting forth the cabinet's attitude, said that England had made no promise to any power whatever, and that * English White Book. t German White Book and English White Book, 158 THE WORLD WAR she would follow the dictates of public opinion.* When finally the conflict was announced, Lord Mor- ley, John Burns, and Mr. Trevelyan resigned from the cabinet. (Of these the first two were of no small influence; the aged and highly esteemed Lord Morley being a Liberal of the old school and John Bums the most genuine exponent of the Liberal Labor Party; that is to say, they represented the two extremes of the Liberal cabinet.) The spontaneous exodus of these three men makes it appear still less likely that there was any predestined policy of intervention. Later events demonstrated that England, like France and Russia, was without sufficient military prepara- tion either in men or war materials. She had to keep on preparing as she fought. That the violation of the neutrality of Belgium con- stituted a great crime is a point on which there remains no doubt in spite of the efforts made to defend it. When it met with universal condemnation as an act which trampled in the dust one of the few conquests of international law, namely, the solemnity of a sworn pledge, it was claimed that the treaty of 1839 no longer existed. Such an affirmation is unworthy of argument in spite of its illustrious and audacious sup- porters.! No one could have made it seriously. Not * Session of the House of Commons, August 3, 1914. tBemhard Dcrnburg; work cited; also Bernard Shaw and numerous German authors of renown. VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 159 only did the treaty of 1839 appear to Berlin as one to be respected by Germany herself but also by other nations, and had any of them violated it she was ready to make it respected. Herr Von Jagow, Minister of Foreign Affairs, never had any doubts on the sub- ject. On the contrary when he urged the reasons of extreme necessity which had forced the German Gen- eral Staff to throw its army through Belgium against France, the very excuse implied the transgression. On the day of the declaration of war, August 4, Sir W. E. Goschen, English Ambassador in Berlin, went twice to Von Jagow only to hear that Germany could not respect Belgian neutrality; that she must advance by the most rapid and easy route into France and crush her in the shortest possible time, since it was a question of life or death for Germany to anticipate the sending of Russian forces against her. Von Jagow added that rapidity of action was one of Germany's greatest advantages; and that very same night when England was threatening to declare war he summed the matter up by saying that to send troops through Belgium was a question of the salvation of the Empire.* Nor did the Chancellor Von Bethmann-Hollweg advance any such hypothesis as the caducity of the ♦Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, re- garding the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German Government, London, August, 1914. i6o THE WORLD WAR treaty of 1839; ^^t even in his moment of greatest excitement when he pronounced the famous words "and merely for a scrap of paper England is going to war !'* * — not even then did he offer such a de- fense. On the contrary he said that neutrality was simply a word which had often been disregarded in war time. The undeniable fact is that the treaty existed in full vigor and any argument to the contrary falls through its own premise. Belgian neutrality was a product of historic neces- sity. In the successive historic periods Belgium had been coveted by whatever nation happened to domi- nate. Famous battles had been fought on her soil; Holland, Spain, Austria, France, had disputed its pos- session, and England's eye was on it even at a time when she was paying but little attention to continental politics in general. Everything indicated that there could be no European peace without neutralizing that object of discord, and political annals and interna- tional correspondence are full of the difficulties sur- mounted in order to accomplish the neutrality. It was in 1830 that Belgium separated from Hol- land. On October 4 of that year, the provisional gov- ernment in Brussels assembled, declared that Belgium had constituted herself an independent state; whereon the powers, at the instance of King William of The ♦Dr. Dillon; "The Scrap of Paper." /^ VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY i6i Netherlands, convened their plenipotentiaries in Lon- don and drew up the protocol of the separation of the two countries.* In this document where Belgium first appears as a separate personality it is set forth in Article V that she is to constitute a perpetually neu- tral state and that the five powers signing the protocol are to guarantee said perpetual neutrality. This agreement was not instantly accepted by Bel- gium, but later on July 9, 1831, her national congress voted the preliminaries of the peace, with its Article IX corresponding exactly to Article V of the protocol of London. That same year, on December 14, was signed the treaty called Of the Fortresses, by which England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia on the one side, and Belgium on the other, all agreed in the demo- lition of certain fortresses in Belgium and the main- taining of others, in virtue of the changes wrought in the country's condition — "her political independence as well as the perpetual neutrality which is guaranteed to her." t France, as seen, did not agree to the stipu- lations of this treaty, nor were certain of its clauses acceptable to Belgium. All the preliminaries were given final form in the Treaties of 1839, by which was ♦Protocol of December 20, 1830, as agreed upon by the plenipotentiaries. t Treaty of December 14, 1831, between England, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Belgium, preamble and Articles I, IV, and VI; reproduced in "L'Etat neutre a titre permanent," by Em- manuel Descamp. i62 THE WORLD WAR settled the pending conflict between Belgium and Hol- land, and by which the principle of permanent neu- trality for Belgium was fixed more firmly than ever. These treaties are three, and interdependent. In the first, Belgium was not one of the contracting parties; on the one side Holland, and on the other England, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, all recognized the dissolution of the former union of Belgium and Holland and recognized that the pacts contained in the treaty made simultaneously between Belgium and Holland should have the same force and value as if they formed part of this same treaty. In the second, Belgium and Holland are the parties interested; it is a treaty of peace and friendship, and in its Article VII is set forth the principle of neutrality. In the third, Belgium on the one side and the five countries mentioned concur; its main premise is the recognition of the independence and neutrality of Belgium, and the obligation on the part of the great powers to de- fend this neutrality. These three treaties virtually are one and their subdivision was due to a mere for- mula whose object was to facilitate diplomatic labor and avoid a repetition of the difficulties of 1830 and 183 1. A proof of their being one and the same is that in two of them the clauses of the other two are re- peated, signifying that they have the same force as if they were clauses of that same treaty. To discuss its validity might be admitted in popular VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 163 propaganda or justified by high-strung patriotic senti- ments, but could never be tolerated in an impartial examination of the facts. It has been affirmed by those defending Germany^s invasion of Belgium that the treaty of 1839 did not solidly recognize Belgian neutrality, especially when grave international inter- ests were involved in the case ; to reinforce their thesis they say that in 1870, when Gladstone was prime minister, England considered it necessary to concert a new treaty. The facts are that when the Franco- Prussian War broke out England, as at the beginning of the present era, initiated conversations in order to discover the intentions of the belligerents. The pe- culiar circumstance of the moment must not be for- gotten — how Belgium was panic-stricken over Bis- marck's publication of a secret proposal made to him by Napoleon III regarding the annexation of Belgium by France. The conversations crystallized in the treaties of April 9 and April 11 of that same year. The first was between England and Prussia, and the second between France and England. The two were identical and consisted of only four articles. In Article I France and Prussia each stated her firm determination to observe Belgian neutrality just so long as the other respected it, and England bound herself to cooperate by means of forces on sea and land with whichever of the two powers respected it, in order that it might be maintained then and after- i64 THE WORLD WAR wards. In Article II the two belligerents bind them- selves, as already stated in a different treaty, to main- tain said neutrality with armed force and to take counsel with England on the necessary measures. The third Article sets forth a principle which undermines the defenders of Germany; and as it was not kept in mind by the German propagandists we give it entire for those who have not gone fully into the question: "This treaty will oblige the high contracting parties throughout the duration of the present war between France and the North German Confederation or the Confederation of the North of Germany and for twelve months after the ratification of any treaty of peace between these two parties; and when this term will have expired the independence and neutrality of Belgium, so far as the respective high contracting par- ties are concerned, will continue to he based as for- merly on Article I of the Treaty of the Five Nations of April 19, 1839." It is very clear that this double treaty did not and could not revoke that of 1839, ^^^ so plain and evi- dent are its terms that they could not be improved upon by any other diplomatic document whatever. Nor can it be alleged that although the treaty of 1870 did not modify that of 1839 i^ nevertheless inter- preted it in the sense that should a casus belli arise, a new stipulation would be necessary to give force to the previous one. Should such judgment be accepted VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 165 it would place the art of diplomacy in the group of speculative sciences, and the relations between nations in the field of abstract doctrine. The creation of a neutral state and of a treaty to guarantee its neutrality are deeds merely positive; the acceptance of the treaty is a promise of fulfilment and admits of no omission. When Prussia signed the famous treaty with four other powers in 1839 ^^^ was not performing a useless act but was offering on her oath as a civilized nation to respect its clauses on neutrality, and to use her right of obliging others to respect them; and all this not in time of peace, but in the only moment when the concept of a neutral nation takes on efficacy, for neutrality and war are correlative terms. To suppose that a new treaty must be made previous to every international conflict is to deny the force of the first, and this would mean to throw onto the scrap-heap an international prescrip- tion still in full yigor. It is easy to understand how without a careful ex- amination of the problem one might fall into such erroneous argument. One may argue prima facie that if a new obligation was necessary in 1870 when the two nations who are today contending were at war, so in 19 1 4 it was necessary to repeat something of the same sort in order that the belligerents should respect what they then respected; but this logic falls by its own premise. A treaty of neutrality does not i66 THE WORLD WAR exclude a treaty guaranteeing that neutrality; on the contrary the latter renders homage to the former. The manner of maintaining Belgian neutrality was not and could not be foreseen. Belgium, on her side, and the powers signing the document, all bound them- selves to maintain this neutrality; but none of them could at that time foresee the multiple occasions which the future might present and could not predetermine their solution. The application of the covenant had to be left until the necessary or opportune moment. Consequently in 1870 England looked for a way of guaranteeing the clauses of the treaty of 1839, ^^^ France and Prussia satisfied her by means of the treaties of April 9 and 11, 1870, binding themselves to defend with arms that which they had all previ- ously compacted. The two posterior treaties, then, are nothing else than conventions for maintaining the preceding stipulations. That this was so the text indicates, and so it was always interpreted. Baron d'Anethan in the Belgian Parliament of that day thus explained it : "The trea- ties, separate but identical, just concluded by England with the powers in war neither create nor modify the obligations incident to the treaty of 1839; they regu- late the practical manner of executing these treaties in a determined case. They in no way weaken the obligations of the other guaranteeing powers, as their text attests. They leave entire the future obligatory VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 167 character of the anterior treaty, with all its conse- quences." * Emmanuel Descamp, at a time when this question was simply speculative, wrote with great precision, as if he had foreseen the present objections : "The Acts of 1870 constitute temporary conventions for the regu- lation of the guarantee and are of the same nature as the conventions of 1831 already quoted. It is as absurd to interpret them as acts which have for their object to revivify a guarantee merely taken for granted, or guarantee outlawed, as to distort against the validity of any law the subsequent regulations which serve for its execution." f Another writer, Charles de Woeste, goes even farther, though in our opinion with less penetration, and says that the con- ventions of 1870 are useless since they merely con- stitute the application of the treaties of 1839 '^^ ^ given case. J It is interesting to know that these and identical opinions precede by many years the present war, and that they were emitted in the purely scien- tific field and not animated by partisanship. The fact is that Belgian neutrality was never even questioned until after it was violated. In Germany, France, and England, the countries most interested, no one gave it judicial consideration; and no one went * Session of the Belgian Parliament, August 16, 1870. t Emmanuel Descamp; work dted, pages 166-167. $Charlei5 de Wwste; "La neutralitc beige," page 56 . i68 THE WORLD WAR seeking for antecedents until after the declaration, or rather confession, of the German chancellor in the Reichstag. Besides, the same chancellor had said in other days that Belgium had nothing to fear from Germany's growing strength and that the guarantee of neutrality given to Belgium gained at the same time. The very excuses presented, all of them emanating not from justice but from necessity, are enough to show that the neutrality treaty was a vital thing. Ger- many's necessities can be appreciated but they cannot exempt her from responsibility in the political field; for in the last analysis, to yield to necessity is to trample underfoot all good social relation, all the amenities of civilization; which conditions consist pre- cisely in the limits imposed upon our own convenience by another's rights. Civilization puts the collective interest, immediate or remote, above the individual ne- cessity. This criticism was aptly expressed by Lloyd George when he said : "If Germany violates treaties because it is to her advantage to do so, then we must prove to her that she will find even greater advantage in respecting them." Going back a little, we find that in 191 1, when the newspapers declared that Germany would violate Bel- gian neutrality in case of war with France, Bethmann- Hollweg sent to Belgium a concrete denial. In 191 3 when Von Jagow, foreign minister, was interpellated by a social democrat before the budget commission VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 169 of the Reichstag he answered: ^'Belgian neutrality is fixed by international conventions and Germany is resolved to respect those conventions/** In France, throughout her numerous pohtical changes, throughout innumerable revolutions in the last century, Belgian neutrality was never questioned. The Orleans monarchy respected it as if it had been their own work ; and in fact the Belgian revolution of 1830 was really a consequence of the revolution which placed Louis Philippe on the throne of France. After him, the Republic of 1848, trying to renew the 1793 policy of spreading the ideal of liberty among other nations, assured Prince de Ligne, the Belgian ambassador, that France had not changed except in her internal regime, and that the treaty would be respected. Lamartine, foreign minister of the Repub- lic, made this declaration and his successor repeated it. The Second Empire did not modify this policy in spite of the evident Germanophile sentiments of the Belgian king. The question of the secret Franco- Prussian treaty which so alarmed Belgium, and with reason, was really a deceitful act of the policy of Bismarck, who, on this occasion as on many others, used the French ambassador Benedetti for his ends. That it was nothing more is demonstrated by the fact that Bismarck took no further step after having the famous draft in his hands, but guarded it most craftily * Belgian Gray Book, document number la. 170 THE WORLD WAR so as to later make it public when hostilities had actu- ally broken out between France and Prussia. He ob- tained the result he had schemed for; the League of Neutral Powers initiated by England to give Germany a free hand against France, was a consequence of the publication.* Written in Benedetti's own handwriting and on the official paper of the embassy, the draft was a grave indication that the very name Napoleon was synonymous with conquest. Regarding Belgian neutrality the chief feature of the Second Empire was its attitude in 1870. It is certain that Napoleon HI on acquainting Leopold of Belgium with the declaration of war against Prussia sent him a solemn promise to respect the neu- trality and soon after confirmed it through diplomatic channels, t Belgium, in spite of the treaties which the bel- ligerents had made with England and in spite of the declarations received, prepared, then as now, to defend her territory from all violation, total or partial. She knew then, as later in 19 14, that she could exist and develop only while this neutrality was eflfective, or at least while she showed herself able to defend it with that valor which the testimony of Caesar and subse- quent history has attributed to her. It appears cer- * Henry Welschinger ; "La neutralite beige," in the Revue des deux mondes, September i, 19 14, page 9. t Henry Welschinger ; article cited, page 10. VOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 171 tain that General Wimpffen, vanquished at Sedan, had planned to enter Belgium to escape being routed, but the border was well guarded and the Belgian army made the enterprise difficult.* The Third Republic proceeded even better than pre- ceding governments and this at the very time when Belgium appeared to incline toward Germany, and King Leopold to have suspicious dealings with the neighboring empire; when the supposed revelations were gaining credulity with the general public, and when the Belgian fortifications which were being erected appeared rather to menace France than in defense against a German invasion. f There was actually a period from 1887 to 1895 in which France suspected that Belgium would not only admit an in- vading army marching rapidly on Paris from Germany but would even join it. And on the eve of this present war French statesmen knew the German in- tentions, knew the Kaiser had informed King Albert that he was no longer for peace, knew that Von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, had said that in case of war they must pass through Belgium; J yet in this crisis, just as during the forty-four years of suspicious and ascertained facts, the French cabinet * Declaration of General Chazal before the Military Com- mission of 1871. t Nouvelle Revue, July i and October i, 1888 ; also certain numbers during the following year. % Bibliotheque universelle et Revue de Suisse, December, 1914. 12 172 THE WORLD WAR adopted no other attitude than that which the treaties and the word of the nation solemnly pledged de- manded. As for England, never since the Treaty of the Five Powers did she doubt for one moment the obliga- tion assumed; she went even further and from 1839 made herself the champion of Belgian neutrahty. When Lamertine gave up the ministry of foreign affairs for France in 1848, Lord Palmerston, fearing the mob agitation fomented by French statesmen them- selves, affirmed that "the powers have not only the right but the duty to guarantee Belgian independence, which duty consists in aiding by every means the parts subjected to aggression and to preserve, or insist upon the return of, the territorial possessions as determined by the treaties." Then to emphasize the statement he took a formal pledge to give the most decided aid if necessary. Gladstone, some years later, went even further. He took the matter out of the juridical field and put it into the moral, as was his system, and de- clared that the violation of Belgian neutrality "would be the perpetration of the most odious crime that had ever smirched the pages of history."* In the very year 1870, Lord Russell, speaking in the House of Lords, recognized, almost with verbal excess, the juridical debt of Great Britain. "Our obligations to this king- * Emmanuel Descamp ; work cited. VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 173 dom (Belgium) are of the most sacred," he said. "We have accepted these along with other powers and separately from them. We cannot choose among manifold solutions. We can follow but one road, and that is the road of honor. We are obliged to de- fend Belgium. The members of the British Govern- ment declare publicly and explicitly that they intend to respect our treaties, to loyally fulfill our obliga- tions, and not to dishonor the name of England." Lord Salisbury, more inclined to the typical language of a statesman, said with justice : "The independence of Belgium is extremely important to the European powers and they are bound by compacts highly favor- able to the independence of that country." * In the foregoing there is a slight lack of completeness; if Salisbury had added "and vitally necessary to Eng- land" he would have said the whole historic truth. It is strange that Chancellor Von Bethmann-HoU- weg did not comprehend the essence and therefore the raison d*etre of the "piece of paper" as he called the Treaties of 1839. That later polemists pretended not to understand it can pass; but that he, directing the affairs of the most powerful empire dominating for long years Continental policy — that he did not un- derstand is inexplicable. His country had absolute prevision of the slightest happenings ; its military men knew all the weaknesses of the enemies, their forces, * Session of the English House of Lords, July 17, 1891. 174 THE WORLD WAR movements, means of communication, fortresses, cities, inhabitants, and even the private fortune of these; it is inexplicable that in the diplomatic depart- ment of the country possessing all this exact informa- tion, the very real importance which England ascribed to the treaties of 1839 was not known, especially when even the most superficial historian was aware of it. It is evident that there are two Germanics, one of the military party admirably perfect in its way, and the other of the diplomats, completely negative. The famous scrap of paper * did have its raison d'etre. When drawn up in 1839 it was the outgrowth of all preceding history and in time came to be looked upon as a precious conquest which must never be aban- doned, never questioned, but always respected even in the most difficult crisis. History shows that English policy, excepting the colonial, revolves around the nearby coasts ; these were a subject of constant dispute and the theater of long wars and continental conquests. Let us see what an eminent English writer said in an epoch not in- fluenced by the events of today, f Under the reigns of Edward I and Edward III our foreign policy had already begun to assume a definite form and to direct itself towards that national objective still ♦Communication of the English Ambassador to Sir Edward Grey on the declaration of war. fEsme Wingfield-Stratford ; "History of English Patriotism," page 61. VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 175 adhered to by modem statesmen. The British policy of those reigns is dead because it has been consummated; but their European policy still survives after six centuries. Its resume may be found in the fact that the key of our position in Europe is the Low Countries. The extreme to which this guiding principle of our diplomacy has ar- rived in the course of centuries is extraordinary, and from this the majority of our important wars have re- sulted more or less directly. In these conflicts may be included the Hundred Years War, dating from the reigns mentioned, the short wars of Henry VIII and Mary Tudor, the Holland campaigns of Elizabeth, of Cromwell, and of Charles II ; all the long struggle with Louis XIV, the War of the Austrian Suc- cession, and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars which began at the Scheldt and ended at Waterloo. And there are even those who predict that another war, great- est of all, awaits us if we are to make sure of the inde- pendence of those countries and our own. We have here the origin of the long rivalry between England and France, a rivalry which some persons are convinced is permanent and incurable. But it was not against France as France that we were set, but against the power which threatened to dominate the Low Coun- tries. Now that this danger is over it has been shown that it is possible for the two countries to come together and to cordially pursue a common policy. Until a very recent epoch the Low Countries had but little to fear from an eastern neighbor, unless this term be applied to the Emperor Charles V. These are the reasons why our 176 THE WORLD WAR policy has consisted, generally speaking, in cooperating with Germany against France, a situation which is now completely reversed. As far back as the reign of King John we began to see this cooperation, and an Anglo- German army was defeated in Bouvines. Later we find Edward III at the beginning of the Hundred Years War exercising the functions of Vicar General of the Empire and conducting in vain a numerous and heterogeneous army to force the French defenses on the Flemish frontier. In past epochs, however, the means of defense had not assumed the astounding form of today. The depths of the sea had not been conquered and the air was sacred to departed spirits and the gods. But today it is doubly comprehensible that England will not easily permit the second maritime nation of the world to instal herself on the opposite shore of the narrow Channel — the nation that wished "to clutch the trident of Neptune as firmly as it held the sword of Frederick the Great," the nation that aspired with undisguised eagerness to an extensive colonial domin- ion, the nation that competed for the world*s com- merce and struggled with Englishmen, both in Europe and abroad, in a fierce economic fight. It is strange that not only the chancellor of the empire, but also scientific men like Professor Hermann Oncken of the University of Heidelberg, should persist in considering that England's cause for entering the war — defense VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 177 of Belgian neutrality — was a pretext of small impor- tance. Professor Oncken says doctorally: "No one goes to war for such a poor motive." It is true that he considers this question, following the opinion of many English writers such as the chief members of the Faculty of Modem History at Oxford,* as purely a moral question; but therein lies the greatest error. It is human nature for the English to make a virtue of their going to war, but that the Germans should not have understood that their doing so was a dire necessity, is completely inexplicable. In sending her troops to the fields of Flanders, England was not defending the Belgians; she was defending her own rights acquired in fair contest and in perfect reciprocity by means of a compact signed by five powers, who guaranteed its observance by their word given before the world and with due responsi- bility. To consider this as sentimentality on England's part constitutes the whole error around which most of the writers have revolved, and is explained by the passion of the moment which distracted even }the serenest minds. They really believed that English public opinion rose in defense of a treaty and of an- other nation, and obliged its government to declare war on Germany. Neither the English people nor their * "Why We Are at War ;'* written by the members of the Faculty of Modern History of the University of Oxford. 178 THE WORLD WAR government would be capable of any such error. Only one ruler in history would have committed it — Na- poleon III — and certainly the system brought him no good results. England was not disposed to intervene when Austria, in spite of all her declarations, was pre- paring to hurt Servia by breaking the recent treaty of Bucharest virtually approved by the powers ; nor when Germany broke the treaty of London of 1867 which guaranteed, under the signature of the English gov- ernment, the neutrality of Luxemburg. England, full of great statesmen, would have understood all the ridiculous aspect of this championship which the writers tried to attribute to her. In a moment when the acute mind of Asquith was directing the cabinet, and that of Sir Edward Grey, who has been likened to Pitt the Younger,* was directing the foreign policy, the British government was bound to be devoted to the defense of state interests and to sustain a treaty which benefited these; naturally they alleged that the real cause coincided with one even higher — respect for a sworn pact, and defense of a people laborious, active, honest, worthy in every aspect of championship. It is just as much of an error in historical criti- cism to glorify the act of the Belgians. The Belgians responded to a necessity. The calamity which has fallen upon them is one more of the many due to their geographical situation, one more which history ♦James M. Beck; "The Evidence in the Case.' VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 179 has been preparing for them throughout the centuries. If the Belgians had let the German troops pass, ac- quitting their conscience by presenting conventional protests, they might not have seen their houses de- stroyed, their cities razed to the ground, nor suffered the thousand other misfortunes so vividly related; it is probable that their industries and commerce and monuments would have remained intact ; but one thing would most certainly have perished — their independ- ence. Given a national life by the will of the great powers, and with the object of establishing a neutral state, Belgium, had she demonstrated the impossi- bility of maintaining this international situation, would have shown that her raison d'etre as an independent state no longer existed. Yuste, studying the life of Queen Maria of Hungary, sister of Charles V, says in this connection: "Reason and experience showed Queen Maria the true role which the Low Countries, an industrial and commercial nation, should play. Only a vigilant neutrality could consolidate her pros- perity and preserve her, perhaps, from dismember- ment."* A writer of the present moment speaking with enthusiasm of King Albert I says something which is doubly true when he qualifies him as the "second founder of Belgium." f ♦Yuste; "Vie de Marie de Hongrie," page 131. fM. L. Dumont Wilden; "Albert I, second fondateur de la. Belgique," in the Revue des deux mondes, December i, 1914. i8o > THE WORLD WAR Neither in the case of Belgium nor in that of Eng- land do we wish to deny the importance of the sac- rifice made by entering the present war. Nor do we mean to mete out any less sympathy to those who are so sorely tried during the invasion. On the con- trary, we wish to express our conviction that a country is more admirable when it defends its national exist- ence than when it fights for an abstract principle; in the first case ideality has the collective well-being for its basis, in the second ideality is the product of a morbid condition. From the day that Austria sent her ultimatum to Servia, the Belgian government un- derstood the danger it was running. On that same day, July 24, the minister of foreign affairs sent a circular to the kings* ministers accredited to those governments signatory to the Treaty of 1839, which circular directed them, should events precipitate them- selves rapidly, to read to the respective ministers of foreign affairs an accompanying letter undated, re- claiming respect of Belgian neutrality.* Five days later in view of what had happened the Belgian gov- ernment decided to put its army on war footing, and on July 31 mobilization was ordered. At this state England had already taken action and continued ad- dressing herself to France, Germany, and Belgium, demanding the fulfilment of their obligation. Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister in Belgium, begged * Belgian Grey Book, document number 2. VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY i8i urgently to see the minister of foreign affairs to de- clare to him that "in view of the existing treaties Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do every- thing possible to maintain her neutrality." And Davignon, the minister in question, answered him that "Belgian military forces, considerably improved in the recent reorganization, were in condition to permit of an energetic defense in case the territory should be invaded." * The same day the German minister de- clared to the general foreign secretary that he knew the precedents of 191 1 and 19 13 concerning declara- tions on the part of the German government to re- spect Belgian neutrality and that he was "certain that the sentiments manifested at those dates had not changed." f And on August 2, the same German min- ister in Belgium repeated that although he had no in- structions to make an official communication he could declare that his personal opinion, already known, was that Belgium could feel tranquil so far as her neigh- bor on the east was concerned.} But on the same second of August came the ulti- matum to Belgium, a work of gross perfidy and one which, though a precedent can be found in history, is nevertheless a dishonor to humanity. It appears evi- dent that German diplomacy, tied to the tail of the * Belgian Grey Book, document number 11. ji Belgian Grey Book, document number 12. $ Belgian Grey Book, document number 19. i82 THE WORLD WAR Pomeranian steeds, was obliged to write this infamous sheet. In it was set forth the necessity of violating Belgian territory, and the intention of occupying it as a base of operations; an offer was made to "pay cash" for everything, to preserve the integrity of the territory after the war; but in case these conditions were not accepted Germany hurled the threat of treat- ing Belgium as an enemy.* A great error both in matter and in form is this note. It breathes the same sentiment which prompted Frederick the Great to occupy Silesia; in it is the same utter disregard of another's rights, the same incomprehension of the limits of what may and may not be done. The great king used to say "I will occupy Silesia and soon pedants will not be lacking to uphold my rights." The German General Staff thought the same but it for- got that the times have changed. The moral isolation in which its nation finds itself, in spite of having pro- duced so many men beloved of humanity, is the con- sequence of this great fault. The law of modem war- fare cannot permit this outrage even in order to de- fend great tactical interests, even to rapidly destroy an enemy so as to then turn on another, even to settle the outcome of a war. If this were not the case anything would be author- ized; collective assassinations and the enslavement of * Belgian Grey Book, document number 20. VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 183 a neighbor, the taking of his riches, the abuse of his person. No ! Our modern age has created a force in the international field which is above that of arms; an effective force which can give a victory and impose a defeat ; a force which is called international law. It finds vigorous supporters in all those who see in the principle of public order dictated for the public good and honestly lived up to, a guarantee of their own existence. Lloyd-George was voicing a universal con- viction when he declared that if Germany believed it to be to her interest to break treaties she must be taught that it would be even more to her interest to keep them. CHAPTER XIX THE ULTIMATUM AND ENGLAND'S DECLARATION OF WAR ENGLAND acted with extraordinary rapidity. On her asking France and Germany, as in 1870, for a confirmation respecting Belgian neutrahty, France immediately gave a favorable answer and sent the same assurance to Brussels. This attitude of France, whether due to a high conception of her own duty or whether due to her military plans which did not include an invasion of Belgium, is altogether laudable. Germany delayed an explicit answer to England, but meanwhile was using other language in Brussels. Toward the English government she did not wish to assume the responsibility of pledging her word and then committing the outrage of breaking it; with Belgium she wished to hide the truth in order that the country might not be prepared, since the in- vasion beyond doubt was prepared beforehand and the German diplomats in Brussels knew it. In short, Germany made her decision; and in face of England's threat to declare war on her, Von Jagow 185 i86 THE WORLD WAR did not know any other explanation to give than that of military necessity; and later Von Bethmann-HoU- weg dissolved his own ideas in a sea of words and regretted that England should go to war for a scrap of paper.* Germany was at war with Belgium on August 4. On that day she assaulted the nation which, since 1^ birth three-quarters of a century before, had strictltr fulfilled its sworn pact. That same day England hav^- ing sent an ultimatum declared war on Germany. It was a grave day in that country, where they had not learned to reckon with the race that never pardons. It was a grave day in that country where political stu- dents and writers, lulled by a long peace and inflated by great prosperity, had not foreseen the danger of exploiting the credulity of the masses and the fanatic- ism of the governing classes. Could England have failed to enter a conflict which was jeopardizing the nation that so flagrantly disputed with her the domination of the sea ? Hardly. German writers have talked much about England^s intervening for the purpose of destroying the com- merce of her rival. To give only this hypothesis for her act means ignorance of the magnificent figures which British commerce has shown in recent years. That the active and audacious German competition was * Miscellaneous, number 8, 1914 Official document of the English government. ENGLAND^S DECLARATION OF WAR 187 displeasing to Great Britain no one can deny ; nor that economic jealousy was one of the causes, perhaps the principal, of the political complications. Was it not the Kaiser himself who had urged German mercan- tile activity as the reason for his larger fleet ? Was not the international policy of the state, as necessary pro- t ,tor of commercial interests and as motive for those ifiierests, his idea even before it was adopted by the ' nodern Phenicians" as the English have been called? Even before it became for a brief period the unfruit- ful program of an eminently industrial Republic like the United States ? The justification presented to the German people whenever new sums were asked for warships was that the expenditure would defend and augment their com- merce; and sotto voce, and indeed sometimes aloud, for there was nothing to fear from British imper- turbability, it was said that it would serve to chase the English from the sea. To these English the Kaiser threw out a threat when he said "Our future is on the sea" ; or his more picturesque phrase, "Without the consent of the German Sovereign nothing must hap- pen in any part of the world." No one can suppose that England, to whom supremacy on the sea was her very life, could remain neutral when such threats were about to be reinforced, or at least tested, by a struggle with other powers. 13 i88 THE WORLD WAR Nevertheless, English policy in latter years appeared to incline to the maintainence of peace. A certain phenomenon of these early moments must not be passed over without comment. On the Conti- nent, after the declaration of war, the various cabinets were strengthened by men who the day before had been irreconcilable adversaries — ^Jules Guesdes, in France; Vandervelde, in Belgium; while in Germany the great mass of those applauding the Kaiser was made up by the Socialists of the Reichstag along with his electors, all organized in regiments just as disci- plined as those that had marched to the front. But in England at this crucial moment three prominent mem- bers, champions of peace at any price, left the cabinet. There was opposition even among the supporters of the Liberal government. We do not mean that party differences regarding peace at any price did not terminate shortly after. The supreme voice of patriotism was heard by all, ask- ing its sacrifice from Irish as well as English, and all responded. But there is no doubt that if Germany had not been so scornful of her neighbor's rights, of treaties, and of English interests, the tacit protest of Morley and Burns as they left the House of Commons might have materialized into a preventive action on the part of a Parliament whose majority was much more inclined to peace than to war. Old Gladstone Liberals and young members of the Labor Party, that ENGLAND'S DECLARATION OF WAR 189 is to say, the two extremes of which the government was composed by the repeatedly expressed preference of the people, were agreed to work for peace. At the beginning of 19 13 and again at the beginning of 191 4 it appeared that this majority would split; that some would follow the fiery Winston Churchill and others the no less fiery Lloyd George, and all because of questions touching upon a possible war; only the au- thority of Asquith with his admirable statesmanship was able to prevent it. It would have been difficult for the English govern- ment to choose an opportune moment. She had to count on a parliament in unison with the people, which state of harmony was an easy matter only where pub- lic opinion had been prepared and worked up as in Germany. It must be remembered that Germany on her side was not able, in spite of her many efforts, to penetrate the intention of the British cabinet; for the British cabinet washed in any case to have its hands free. When the German government asked the British what its attitude toward Germany would be if the latter maintained the Treaty of 1839, which meant Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey did not wish to compromise himself and had to answer that he had not considered that point. The fact was, England could not consent to tie her hands. It was in the order of things that sooner or later, when the French shores I90 THE WORLD WAR were occupied, her own interests would force her into the conflict. This step could be avoided only by one of those aberrations like blinded pacifism, which the masses, more enamored of an absolute principle than a reality, undergo ; and from such danger the English people would not have been able to deliver themselves. Between entering later or entering at once the English government preferred that moment when Germany's merchant fleet was scattered, her warships off duty. Only in that way could she prevent being surprised as Russia was when the only declaration of war she received from Japan was the sound of the cannon of Chemulpo. * ■^ X=Sii' 'ufe^v' >wP (i> ^ o - o ^ ^