Class ABRIDGMENT OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, INCLUDING THE THREE DEPARTMENTS INTELLECT, SENSIBILITIES, AND WILL. DESIGNED AS A TEXT-BOOK ACADEMIES AND HIGH SCHOOLS. BY THOMAS C.° C %PHAM, PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN LOWDOIN COLLEGE. NEW YORK: A HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE. 1863. /> /S^S~z> 7f- ^ x Entered, according to Act of Congress, by Thomas C. Upham, in the U. S. District Court, State of Maine, July 13th, 1SG1. 2 •*■ SV( 2- < i- \ PREFACE The Philosophy of the Mind has grown up, like other sciences, from small beginnings. Many propositions, coming too, in many instances, from able writers, have been thrown aside ; truth has been sifted out from the mass of error, until at last a great number of important principles is ascertained. But while it is exceedingly necessary that our youth should be made acquainted with these principles, it is impossible that they should go through with all the complicated discussions which have been held in respect to them. Many of the books in which these discussions are contained have become ex- ceedingly rare ; and, if they were not so, no small num- ber of students, who are now in the course of as thorough an education as our country affords, would not be able to purchase them. And besides, by placing before the stu- dent a mass of crude and conflicting statements, his mind becomes perplexed. To be able to resolve such a mass into its elements, and to separate truth from error, implies an acquaintance with the laws of the intellect, and a de- gree of mental discipline, which he is not yet supposed to have acquired ; and hence, instead of obtaining much im- portant knowledge, he becomes distrustful of everything Now these evils, saying nothing of the loss of time at- tendant on such a course, are to be remedied in the same way as in other sciences. In other departments of learn- ing, ingenious men discuss points of difficulty ; conflicting arguments are accumulated, until the preponderance on one side is such that the question in debate is considered IV PREFACE. settled Others employ themselves in collecting facts, in classifying them, and in deducing general principles ; and when all this is done, the important truths of the science, collected from such a variety of sources, and suitably ar- ranged and expressed, are laid before the student, in or- der that he may become acquainted with them. And this is what is attempted, to some extent, to be done in the present work, which is an abridgment of a larger work on the same subject. In the larger w T ork, the principles of Eclecticism and Induction, which have just been referred to, are applied on a more extensive scale than in the present. I have been obliged necessarily to exclude from the abridgment many interesting and striking illus- trations and facts, and some general philosophical views, which would have had a place if our limits had permit- ted. I indulge the hope, nevertheless, as the abridgment has been made with no small degree of care, that it will answer the purpose for which it is particularly designed ; viz., the assistance of those youth who need some knowl- edge of Mental Philosophy, but are not in a situation to prosecute the subject to any great extent. THOMAS C UPHAM Bowdoin College May, 1840. CONTENTS. DIVISION I. THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING. .NT4LLECTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE MliTD. PART I. INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN. CHAPTER I. ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 1. The mind susceptible of a threefold division . . .17 2. The Intellect susceptible of a subordinate division . . . ib. 3. Of the connexion of the mind with the material world . . 1-8 4. Our first knowledge in general of a material or external origin . 19 5. Shown further from what we notice in children . . . .20 6. Further proof of the beginnings of knowledge from external causes 21 7. The same subject further illustrated 22 8. Illustration from the case of James Mitchell .... 23 CHAPTER II. SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 9. Sensation a simple mental state originating in the senses . . 24 10. All sensation is properly and truly in the mind . ... 25 11. Sensations are not images or resemblances of objects . . . ib. 12. The connexion between the mental and physical change not ca- pable of explanation 26 13. Of the meaning and nature of perception 27 14. Perception makes us acquainted with a material world . . 27 15. Of the primary and secondary qualities of matter . . .28 16. Of the secondary qualities of matter 29 CHAPTER III. THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 17. Nature and importance of the senses as a source of knowjedge 30 19. Connexion of the brain with sensation and perception . 31 19. Order in which the senses are to be considered . . . .32 20. Of the sense and sensations of smell ib. 21. Of perceptions of smell in distinction from sensations . . . 33 22. Of the sense and the sensations of taste 34 CHAPTER IV. THE SENSE OF HEARING. 23. Organ of the sense of hearing .... . 35 24. Varieties of the sensation of sound 36 to. Manner in which we learn the place of sounds . y A2 VI CONTENTS. CHAPTER V. THE SENSE OP TOUCH. Section ft^s 26. Of the sense of touch in general and its sensations . . 38 27. Idea of externality suggested in connexion with- the toush . . ib. wS. Origin of the notion of extension, and of form or figare . . 40 29. On the sensations of heat and cold 41 30. Of the sensations of hardness and softness .... 42 31. Of certain indefinite feelings sometimes ascribed to the touch . 44 32. Relation between the sensation and what is outwardly signified . 4i> CHAPTER VI. THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 33. Of the organ of sight, and the uses or benefits of that sense 46 34. Statement of the mode or process in visual perception . 47 35. Of the original and acquired perceptions of sight . . 48 36. The idea of extension not originally from sight . .49 37. Of the knowledge of thefigure of bodies by the sight . 50 38. Illustration of the subject from the blind . . .51 39. Measurements of magnitude by the eye . .52 40. Of objects seen in a mist .53 41. Of the sun and moon when seen in the horizon . . . . ib. 42. Of the estimation of distances by sight 54 43. Signs by means of which we estimate distance by sight . . 55 44. Estimation of distance when unaided by intermediate objects . 56 45. Of objects seen on the ocean, &c. . ... 57 CHAPTER VII. HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 46. General view of the law of habit and of its applications . . 5S 47. The law of habit applicable to the mind as well as the body . ib. 48. Of habit in relation to the smell 59 49. Of habit in relation to the taste 60 50. Of habit in relation to the hearing 62 51. Application of habit to the touch 64 52. Other striking instances of habits of touch 65 53. Habits considered in relation to the sight 66 54. Sensations may possess a relative, as well as positive increase of power 68 55. Of habits as modified by particular callings and arts . . .69 56. The law of habit considered in reference to the perception of the outlines and forms of objects 70 57. Notice of some facts which favour the above doctrine . . .71 58. Additional illustrations of Mr. Stewart's doctrine . . .73 CHAPTER VIII. CONCEPTIONS. 59 Meaning and characteristics of conceptions . 60. Of conceptions of objects of sight .... 61. Of the influence of habit on our conceptions 62. Influence of habit on conceptions of sight 63. Of the subserviency of our conceptions to description 64. Of conceptions attended with a momentary belief 65. Conceptions which are joined with perceptions . 66. Conceptions as connected with fictitious representations 73 74 76 77 ib. 78 81 82 CONTENTS. VI) CHAPTER IX. SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS OF MENTAL STATES. Soctioa Pag* 67. Origin of the distinction of simple and complex .... 83 68. Nature and characteristics of simple mental states . . . ib. 69. Simple mental states not susceptible of definition . . .84 70. Simple mental states representative of a reality . . . .85 71. Origin of complex notions, and their relation to simple . . 86 72. Supposed complexness without the antecedence of simple feelings 87 73. The precise sense in which complexness is to be understood 88 74. Illustrations of analysis as applied to the mind ... 89 75. Complex notions of external origin 90 76. Of objects contemplated as wholes 9] CHAPTER X. ABSTRACTION. 77. Abstraction implied in the analysis of complex ideas . - 92 78. Instances of particular abstract ideas "** 79. Mental process in separating and abstracting them . . 94 80. General abstract notions the same with genera and species . 95 81. Process in classification, or the forming of genera and species . 96 82. Early classifications sometimes incorrect . . . . .97 83. Illustrations of our earliest classifications ib. 84. Of the nature of general abstract ideas 98 85. The power of general abstraction in connexion with numbers, &c. 99 86. Of general abstract truths or principles ib. 87. Of the speculations of philosophers and others .... 100 CHAPTER XI. OF ATTENTION. 88. Of the general nature of attention 101 89. Of different degrees of attention 102 90. Dependence of memory on attention 103 91. Of exercising attention in reading i04 92. Alleged inability to command the attention 105 CHAPTER XII. DREAMING. J3. Definition of dreams and the prevalence of them 94. Connexion of dreams with our waking thoughts 95. Dreams are often caused by our sensations . 96. Explanation of the incoherency of dreams. (1st cause) 97. Second cause of the incoherency of dreams 98. Apparent reality of dreams. (1st cause) 99. Apparent reality of dreams. (2d cause) 100. Of our estimate of time in dreaming 101 . Explanation of the preceding statements . 107 . ib. . 108 110 ib. Ill . 112 . 113 . 114 PART II. INTELLECTUAL STATES OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. CHAPTER I. INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 102. The soul has fountains of knowledge within .03 Declaration of Locke, that the soul has knowledge in itself 119 120 ?111 CONTENTS. Section Pag« 104. The beginning of knowledge is in the senses . . 120 105. There may also be internal accessions to knowledge . 121 106. Instances of notions which have an internal origin . 122 107. Other instances of ideas which have an internal origin ib CHAPTER II. ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 108. Import of suggestion, and its application in Reid and Stewart 123 109. Ideas of existence, mind, self-existence, and personal identity 124 110 Of the nature of unity, and the origin of that notion . . . 126 111. Nature of succession, and origin of the idea of succession . . 127 112. Origin of the notion of duration . 128 113. Illustrations of the nature of duration ib. 114. Of time and its measurements, and of eternity .... 129 115. The idea of space not of external origin 130 116. The idea of space has its origin in suggestion .... 131 117. Of the origin of the idea of power 132 118. Occasions of the origin of the idea of power ... . ib. 119. Of the ideas of right and wrong . 133 120. Origin of the ideas of moral merit and demerit .... 134 121. Of other elements of knowledge developed in suggestion . . 135 122. Suggestion a source of principles as well as of ideas . . . ib CHAPTER III. CONSCIOUSNESS. 123. Consciousness the 2d source of internal knowledge ; its nature . 136 124. Further remarks on the proper objects of consciousness . . 137 125. Consciousnes a ground or law of belief 138 126. Instances of knowledge developed in consciousness . . . ib. CHAPTER IV. RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT. 127. Of the susceptibility of perceiving or feeling relations . . 140 128 Occasions on which feelings of relation may arise . . .141 129. Of the use of correlative termc 142 130. Of relations of identity and diversity ib. 131. (n.) Relations of degree, and names expressive of them . .143 132. (in.) Of relations of proportion 144 133. (iv.) Of relations of place or position 145 134. (v.) Of relations of time 146 135. (vi.) Of ideas of possession 147 136. (vii.) Of relations of cause and effect 148 137. Of complex terms involving the relation of «ause and effect . 149 138. Connexion of relative suggestion with reasoning . . . l*r CHAPTER V. association, (i.) primary laws. 139 Reasons for considering this subject here . . .151 140. Meaning of association and illustrations ib. 141. Of the general laws of association 152 142. Resemblance the first general law of association . . 153 143. Of resemblance in the effects produced . . . . .154 144. Contrast the second general or primary law = . . . 155 145. Contiguity the third general or primary law . . . 157 446. Cause and effect the fourth primary law . . . 158 CONTENTS IX CHAPTER VI. AiSOCIATION. (II.) SECONDARY LAWS. 147. Secondary laws, and their connexion with the primary . 159 148. Of the influence of lapse of time 160 149. Secondary law of repetition or habit 161 150. Of the secondary law of co-existent emotion . . . 169 151. Original difference in the mental constitution . . . 163 152. The foregoing as applicable to the sensibilities . . . 164 CHAPTER VII. MEMORY. 153. Remarks on the general nature of memory .... 106 154. Of memory as a ground or law of belief 167 155. Of differences in the strength of memory .... .168 156. Of circumstantial memory, or that species of memory which is based on the relations of" contiguity in time and place . . 169 157. Illustrations of specific or circumstantial memory . . . 170 158. Of philosophic memory, or that species of memory which is based on other relations than those of contiguity .... 171 159. Illustrations of philosophic memory 172 160. Of that species of memory called intentional recollection . . 173 161. Nature of intentional recollection 174 162. Instance illustrative of the preceding statements . . . . ib. 163. Marks of a good memory 175 164. Directions or rules for the improvement of the memory . . 177 165. Further directions for the improvement of the memory . . 179 166. Of observance of the truth in connexion with memory . . 180 CHAPTER V1I1. DURATION OF MEMORY. 167. Restoration of thoughts and feelings supposed to be forgotten . 181 168. Mental action quickened by influence on the physical system . 183 169. Other instances of quickened mental action, and of a restoration of thoughts 184 170 Effect on the memory of a severe attack of fever . . . . ib. 171. Approval and illustrations of these views from Coleridge . 185 172. Application of the principles of this chapter to education . . 187 173. Connexion of this doctrine with the final judgment and a future life 189 CHAPTER IX. REASONING. ,74. Reasoning a source of ideas and knowledge . . . 190 i75. Definition of reasoning, and of propositions 191 176. Process of the mind in all cases of reasoning . . 192 177. Illustration of the preceding statement .... 193 1 78. Grounds of the selection of propositions .... 194 179. Reasoning implies the existence of antecedent or assumed prepo- sitions 195 180 Further considerations on this subject 196 181. Of differences in the power ©f reasoning ..... 197 182. Of habits of reasoning 198 183 Of reasoning in connexion with language or expression . 199 184 Illustration of the foregoing section .... . 200 CONTENTS. CHAPTER X. DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING 22. Of the sense and the sensations of taste The tongue, which is covered with numerous nervous papillae, forms essentially the organ of taste, although the papilla? are found scattered in other parts of the cavi- ty of the mouth. The application of any sapid body to this organ immediately causes in it a change or affec- tion ; and that is at once followed by a mental affection or a new state of the mind. In this way we have the sen- sations and perceptions, to which we give the names sweet, bitter, sour, acrid, &c. Having experienced the inward sensation, the affections of the mind are then referred by us to something external as their cause. We do not, however, always, nor even gen- erally, distinguish the qualities which constitute this cause by separate and appropriate designations; but express them by the names that are employed for the internal feeling, viz., sweetness, bitterness, sourness, &c. This reference of what is internally experienced to its external cause is very rapidly made ; so that we at once say of one apple it is sweet, and of another it is sour. Still it is to be kept in mind, that, in point of fact, it is subse- quent, both in the order of nature and of time, to the mere sensation ; although we may not be able, in conse- quence of its rapidity, to mark distinctly the progress of the mental action from the one to the other. As in the case of smells, which have already been remarked upon, the reference is the result of our former experience. We say of one body it is sweet, and of another it is sour, be- cause we have ever observed that the mental states in- dicated by those terms have always existed in connexion with the presence of those bodies. Whenever, therefore, we say of any bodies that they arc sweet, bitter, sour, or apply any other epithets ex- pressive of sapid qualities, we mean to be understood to say that such bodies are fitted, in the constitution of things, to ?ause in the mind the sensations of sweetness, bitterness, and sourness, or other sensations expressed bv THE SENSE OF HEARING. 35 denominations of taste. Or, in other words, that they 2jre the established antecedents of such mental states, as there is, further than this, no necessary connexion be tween them. CHAPTER IV. THE SENSE OF HEARING. THE SENSE OF SIGHT. pect to find various intermediate objects, more or fewei in number, corresponding with tie increase of the dis- tance, showing themselves between the receding object and the spectator. And hence it is, that a certain visible appearance comes to be the sign of a certain distance. Historical and landscape painters are enabled to turn these facts to great account in their delineations. By means of dimness of colour, indistinctness of outline, and the partial interposition of other objects, they are enabled apparently to throw back to a very considerable distance from the eye those objects which they wish to appear re- mote. While other objects, that are intended to appear near, are painted vivid in colour, large in size, distinct in outline, and are separated from the eye of the spectator by few or no intermediate objects. § 44. Estimation of distance when unaided by intermediate objects. (1.) As we depend, in no small degree, upon interme- diate objects in forming our notions of distance, it results, that we are often much perplexed by the absence of such objects. Accordingly, we find that people frequently mis- take, when they attempt to estimate by the eye the length or width of unoccupied plains and marshes, generally making the extent less than it really is. For the same reason they misjudge of the width of a river, estimating its width at half or three quarters of a mile at the most, when it is perhaps not less than double that distance. The same holds true of other bodies of water ; and of all other things which are seen by us in a horizontal po- sition and under similar circumstances. (2.) We mistake in the same way also in estimating the height of steeples, and of other bodies that are per- pendicular, and not on a level with the eye, provided the height be considerable. As the upper parts of the sieeple out-top the surrounding buildings, and there are no contiguous objects with which to compare it, any measurement taken by the eye must be inaccurate, but is generally less than the truth. (3) The fixed stars, when viewed by the eye, all ap- pear to be alike indefinitely and equally distant. Being scattered over the whole sky, they make every part of it THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 57 seem, lik<» themselves, at an indefinite and equal distance, and therefore contribute to give the whole sky the ap- pearance of the inside of a sphere. Moreover, the hori- zon seems to the eye to be further off than the zenith ; because between us and the former there lie many things, as fields, hills, and waters, which we know to occupy a ^reat space ; whereas between us and the zenith there are no considerable things of known dimensions. And, therefore, the heavens appear like the segment of a sphere, and less than a hemisphere, in the centre of which we seem to stand. — And the wider our prospect is, the greater will the sphere appear to be, and the less the segment. §45. Of objects seen on the ocean, &c. A vessel seen at sea 'by a person who is not accustom- ed to the ocean, appears much nearer than it actually is ; and on the same principles as already illustrated. In his previous observations of the objects at a distance, he has commonly noticed a number of intermediate objects, in- terposed between the distant body and himself. It is prob- ably the absence of such objects that chiefly causes the deception under which he labours in the present instance. In connexion with what has been said, we are led to make this further remark, that a change in the purity of the air will perplex in some measure those ideas of dis- tance which we receive from sight. Bishop Berkeley re- marks, while travelling in Italy and Sicily, he noticed that cities and palaces seen at a great distance appeared nearer to him by several miles than they actually were. The cause of this he very correctly supposed to be the purity of the Italian and Sicilian air, which gave to ob- jects at a distance a degree of brightness and distinct- ness which, in the less clear and pure atmosphere of his native country, could be observed only in those towns and separate edifices which were near. At home he had learned to estimate the distances of objects by their ap- pearance ; but his conclusions failed him when they came to be applied to objects in countries where the air was so much clearer. — And the same thing has been no- ticed by other travellers, who have been placed in th^ like circumstances. 58 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. CHAPTER VH. HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. § 46. General view of the law of habit and of its applications. There is an important law of the mental constitution known as the law of Habit, which may be described in general terms as follows : That the mental action acquires facility and streugth from repetition or practice. The fact that the facility and the increase of strength, implied in habit, is owing to mere repetition, or what is more fre- quently termed practice, we learn, as we do other facts and principles in relation to the mind, from the observa- tion of men around us, and from our own personal expe- rience. And as it has hitherto been found impracticable to resolve it into any general fact or principle more ele- mentary, it may justly be regarded as something ultimate and essential in our nature. The term Habit, by the use of language, indicates the facility and strength acquired in the way which has been mentioned, including both the result and the manner of it. As the law of habit has reference to the whole mind of man, the application of the term which expresses it is, of course, very extensive. We apply it to the dexterity of workmen in the different manual arts, to the rapidity of the accountant, to the coup d'oeil or eye-glance of the military engineer, to the tact and fluency of the extempo- raneous speaker, and in other like instances. — We apply it also in cases where the mere exercise of emotion and de- sire is concerned ; to the avaricious man's lovle of wealth, the ambitious man's passion for distinction, the wakeful suspicions of the jealous, and the confirmed and substan- tial benevolence of the philanthropist. $ 47. The law of habit applicable to the mind as well as the body. It Is remarkable, that the law under consideration holds good in respect to the body as well as the mind. In the mechanical arts, and in all cases where there is a corpo- HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 59 real as well as mental elfbrt, the effect of practice will be found to extend to both. Not only the acts of the mind are quickened and strengthened, but all those mus- cles which are at such times employed, become stronger and more obedient to the will. Indeed, the submission of the muscular effort to the volition is oftentimes render- ed so prompt by habit, that we are unable distinctly to recollect any exercise of volition previous to the active or muscular exertion. It is habit which is the basis of those characteristic peculiarities that distinguish one man's handwriting from another's; it is habit which causes that peculiarity of attitude and motion so easily discoverable in most persons, termed their gait ; it is habit also which has impressed on the muscles, immediately connected with the organs of speech, that fixed and pre- cise form of action, which, in different individuals, gives rise, in part at least, to characteristics of voice. The habit, in the cases just mentioned, is both bodily and men- tal, and has become so strong, that it is hardly possible to counteract it for any length of time. — The great law of Habit is applicable to all the leading divisions of our mental nature, the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will ; and as we advance from one view of the mind to another, we shall have repeated occasion to notice its in- fluence. In the remainder of this chapter we shall limit our remarks to Habit, considered in connexion with the Sensations and Perceptions. § 48. Of habit in relation to the smell. We shall consider the application of the principle ol Habit to the senses in the same order which has already been observed. In the first place, there are habits of Smell. — This sense, like the others, is susceptible of cul- tivation. .As there are some persons whose power of distinguishing the difference of two or more colours is feeble ; so there are some who are doubtful and perplex- ed in like manner in the discrimination of odours. And as the inability may be overcome in some measure in the former case, so it may be in the latter. The fact that the powers of which the smell is capable are not more frequently brought out and quickened, is owing to the 60 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION circumstance that it is not ordinarily needed. It some- times happens, however, that men are compelled to make an uncommon use of it, when, by a defect in the other senses, they are left without the ordinary helps to knowl- edge. It is then we see the effects of the law of Habit It is stated in Mr. Stewart's account of James Mitchell, •who was deaf, sightless, and speechless, and, of course, ftrongly induced by his unfortunate situation to make much use of the sense we are considering, that his smell would immediately and invariably inform him of the pres- ence of a stranger, and direct to the place where he might be ; and it is repeatedly asserted, that this sense had become in him extremely acute. — "It is related," says Dr. Abercrombie, " of the late Dr. Moyse, the well- known blind philosopher, that he could distinguish a black dress on his friends by its smell." In an interesting account of a deaf, dumb, and blind girl in the Hartford Asylum, recently published, state- ments are made on this subject of a similar purport. — " It has been observed," says the writer, " of persons who are deprived of a particular sense, that additional quickness or vigour seems to be bestowed on those which remain. Thus blind persons are often distinguished by peculiar exquisiteness of touch ; and the deaf and dumb, who gain all their knowledge through the eye, concen- trate, as it were, their whole souls in that channel of ob- servation. With her whose eye, ear, and tongue are alike dead, the capabilities both of touch and smell are exceedingly heightened. Especially the latter seems al- most to have acquired the properties of a new sense, and to transcend the sagacity even of a spaniel." — Such is the influence of habit on the intimations of the sense under consideration. § 49. Of habit in relation to the taste. The same law is applicable to the Taste. We see the results of the frequent exercise of this sense in the quick- ness which the dealer in wines discovers in distinguish- ing the flavour of one wine from that of another. So marked are the results in cases of this kind, that one is almost disposed to credit the story which Cervantes ce- HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 6? lates of two pers' ns, who were requested to pass their judgment upon a hogshead which was supposed to be very old and excellent. One of them tasted the wine, and pronounced it to be very good, with the exception of a slight taste of leather which he perceived m it. The other, after mature reflection and examination, pronoun- ced the same favourable verdict, with the exception of a taste of iron, which he could easily distinguish. On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the bottom an old key with a leathern thong tied to it. Another practical view of this subject, however, pre- sents itself here. The sensations which we experience in this and other like cases, not only acquire by repeti- tion greater niceness^and discrimination, but increased strength ; (and perhaps the increased strength is in all in- stances the foundation of the greater power of discrimi- nation.) On this topic we have a wide and melancholy source of illustration. The bibber of wine and the drink- er of ardent spirits readily acknowledge, that the sensa- tion was at first only moderately pleasing, and perhaps in the very slightest degree. Every time they carried the intoxicating potion to their lips, the sensation grew more pleasing, and the desire for it waxed stronger. Perhaps they were not aware that this process was going on in virtue of a great law of humanity ; but they do not pre- tend to deny the fact. They might, indeed, have suspect- ed at an early period that chains were gathering around them, whatever might be the cause ; but what objection had they to be bound with links of flowers; delightful while they lasted, and easily broken when necessary ! But here was the mistake. Link was added to link; chain was woven with chain, till he who boasted of his strength was at last made sensible of his weakness, and found himself a prisoner, a captive, a deformed, altered, and degraded slave. There is a threefold operation. The sensation of taste acquires an enhanced degree of pleasantness ; the feeling of uneasiness is increased in a corresponding measure when the sensation is not indulged by drinking ; and the desire, which is necessarily attendant on the uneasy feel- ing, becomes in like manner more and more imperative F 62 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. To alleviate the measy feeling and this importunate de- sire, the unhappy man goes again to his cups, and with a shaking hand pours down the delicious poison. What chen 1 He has added a new link to his chain ; at every repetition it grows heavier and heavier, till that, which at first he bore lightly and cheerfully, now presses him like a coat of iron, and galls like fetters of steel. There is a great and fearful law of his nature bearing him down to destruction. Every indulgence is the addition of a new weight to what was before placed upon him, thus less- ening the probability of escape, and accelerating his gloomy, fearful, and interminable sinking. We do not mean to say that he is the subject of an implacable des- tiny, and cannot help himself. But it would seem that he can help himself only in this way ; by a prompt, ab- solute, and entire suspension of the practice in all its forms, which has led him into this extremity. But few, however, have the resolution to do this ; the multitude make a few unwilling and feeble efforts, and resign them- selves to the horrors of their fate. (} 50. Of habit in relation to the hearing. There is undoubtedly a natural difference in the quick- ness and discrimination of hearing. This sense is more acute in some than in others ; but in those who possess it in much natural excellence, it is susceptible of a high degree of cultivation. Musicians are a proof of this, whose sensibility to the melody and concord of sweet sounds continually increases with the practice of their art. The increase of sensibility in the perceptions of hear- ing is especially marked and evident, when uncommon causes have operated to secure such practice. And this is the state, of things with the Blind. The readers of Sir Walter Scott may not have forgotten the blind fiddler, who figures so conspicuously with verse and harp in lied Gauntlet ; a character sufficiently extraordinary, but by no means an improbable exaggeration. The blind neces- sarily rely much more than others on the sense of hear- ing. By constant practice they increase the accuracy and power of its perceptions. Shut out from the beau- ties that aie seen, they please themselves with what is HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 63 heard, and greedily drink in the melodies of song. Ac- cordingly, music is made by them not only a solace, but a business and a means of support ; and in the In- stitutions for the Blind this is considered an important department of instruction. Many particular instances on record, and well authen- ticated, confirm the general statement, that the ear may be trained to habits, and that thus the sensations of sound may come to us with new power and meaning. It is re- lated of a celebrated blind man of Puiseaux in France, that he could determine the quantity of fluid in vessels by the sound it produced while running from one vessel into another. " Dr. Rush," as the statement is given in Aber- crombie's Intellectual Powers, " relates of two blind young men, brothers, of the city of Philadelphia, that they knew when they approached a post in walking across a street by a peculiar sound which the ground under their feet emitted in the neighbourhood of the post ; and that they could tell the names of a number of tame pigeons, with which they amused themselves in a little garden, by only hearing them fly over their heads." Dr. Saunderson, who became blind so early as not to remember having seen, when happening in any new place, as a room, pi- azza, pavement, court, and the like, gave it a character by means of the sound and echo from his feet ; and in that way was able to identify pretty exactly the place, and assure himself of his position afterward. A wrker in the First Volume of the Manchester Philosophical Memoirs, who is our authority also for the statement just made, speaks of a certain blind man in that city as follows : " 1 had an opportunity of repeatedly observing the peculiar manner in which he arranged his ideas and acquired his information. Whenever he was introduced into compa- ny, I remarked that he continued some time silent. The sound directed him to judge of the dimensions of the room, and the different voices of the number of persons that were present. His distinction in these respects was very accurate, and his memory so retentive that he was seldom mistaken. I have known him instantly recognise a person on first hearing him, though more than two years had elapsed since the time of their last meeting. He 64 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. determined pretty nearly the stature of those he was eon- versing with by the direction of their voices; and he made tolerable conjectures respecting their tempers and dispositions by the manner in which they conducted their conversation " § 51, Application of habit to the touch. The sense of touch, like the others, may be exceedingly improved by habit. The more we are obliged to call it into use, the more attention we pay to its intimations. By the frequent repetition, therefore, under such circumstan- ces, these sensations not only acquire increased intense- ness in themselves, but particularly so in reference to our notice and remembrance of them. But it is desirable to confirm this, as it is all other principles from time to time laid down, by an appeal to facts, and by careful indue tions from them. Diderot relates of the blind man of Puiseaux, mention ed in a former section, that he was capable of judging of his distance from the fireplace by the degree of heat, and of his approach to any solid bodies by the action or pulse of the air upon his face. The same thing is recorded of many other persons in a similar situation ; and it may be regarded as a point well established, that blind people who are unable to see the large and heavy bodies pre- senting themselves in their way as they walk about, gen- erally estimate their approach to them by the increased resistance of the atmosphere. A blind person, owing to the increased accuracy of his remaining senses, especiall) of the touch, would be better trusted to go through the various apartments of a house in the darkness of midnight, than one possessed of the sense of seeing without any ar- tificial light to guide him. In the celebrated Dr. Saunderson, who lost his sight in very early youth, and remained blind through life, al- though he occupied the professorship of mathematics in the English University of Cambridge, the touch acquired such acuteness that he could distinguish, by merely let- ting them pass through his fingers, spurious coins, which were so well executed as to deceive even skilful judges who could see.* * Memoirs of the Manchester Philosophical Society, vol. 1.. p IfM HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 65 The case of a Mr. John Metcalf, otherwise called Blind Jack, which is particularly dwelt .upon by the author of the Article in the Memoirs just referred to, is a striking one. The writer states that he became blind at an early period ; but, notwithstanding, followed the profession of a wagoner, and occasionally of a guide in intricate roads during the night, or when the tracks were covered with snow. At length he became a projector and surveyor of highways in difficult and mountainous districts ; an em- ployment for which one w T ould naturally suppose a blind man to be but indifferently qualified. But he was found to answer all the expectations of his employers, and most of the roads over the Peak in Derbyshire, in England, were altered by his directions. Says the person who gives this account of Blind Jack, " I have several times met this man, with the assistance of a long staff, traversing the roads, ascending precipices, exploring valleys, and investigating their several extents, forms, and situations, so as to answer his designs in the best manner." In the interesting Schools for the Blind which have recently been established in various parts of the world, the pupils read by means of the fingers. They very soon learn by the touch to distinguish one letter from another, which are made separately for that purpose of wood, metals, or other hard materials. The printed sheets which they use are conformed to their method of study- ing them. The types are much larger than those ordina- rily used in printing ; the paper is very thick, and being put upon the types while wet, and powerfully pressed, the letters on it are consequently raised, and appear in relief. The pupils having before learned to distinguish one letter from another, and also to combine them into syllables and words, are able after a time to pass their fingers along the words and sentences of these printed sheets, and ascertain their meaning, with a good degreo of rapidity. § 52. Other striking instances of habits of touch. The power of the touch will increase in proportion to the necessity of a reliance on it. The more frequent the resort to it, the stronger will be the habit ; but the neces- F 2 66 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION, sity of Jiis frequent reference to it will be found to be peculiarly great where a person is deprived of two of his other senses It is noticed of James Mitchell, whose case has been already referred to, that he distinguished such articles as belonged to himself from the property of others by this sense. Although the articles were of the same form and materials with those of others, it would seem that he was not at a loss in identifying what was his own. It will be recollected that he could neither see nor hear, and was, of course, speechless. He was obliged, there- fore, to depend chiefly on the touch. This sense was the principal instrument he made use of in forming an ac- quaintance with the strangers who frequently visited him. And what is particularly remarkable, he actually explored by it, at an early period, a space round his father's resi- dence of about two hundred yards in extent, to any part of which he was in the practice of walking fearlessly and without a guide, whenever he pleased. It is related of the deaf and blind girl in the Hartford Asylum, that it is impossible to displace a single article in her drawers without her perceiving and knowing it ; and that, when the baskets of linen are weekly brought from the laundress, she selects her own garments without hesitation, however widely they may be dispersed among the mass. This is probably owing, at least in great part, to habits of touch, by means of which the sense is render- ed exceedingly acute. — Diderot has even gone so far as to conjecture that persons deprived of both sight and hearing would so increase the sensibility of touch as to locate the seat of the soul in the tips of the fingers. § 53. Habits considered in relation to the sight. The law of habit affects the sight also. By a course of training this sense seems to acquire new power. The length and acuteness of vision in the mariner who has long traversed the ocean has been frequently referred to. - — A writer in the North American Review (July, 1833) says, he once " knew a man, in the Greek island of Hy- dra, who was accustomed to take his post every day for thirty years on the summit of the island, and look out for the approach of vessels ; and although there were over HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 67 three hundred sail belonging to the island, he would tell the name of each one as she approached ^vith unerring certainty, while she was still at such a distance as to pre- sent to a common eye only a confused white blur upon the clear horizon." There are numerous instances to the same effect, occasioned by the situations in which men are placed, and the calls for the frequent exercise of the sight. The almost intuitive vision of the skilful engineer is, beyond doubt, in most cases merely a habit. He has so often fixed his eye upon those features in a country which have a relation to his peculiar calling, that he in- stantly detects the bearing of a military position, its sus- ceptibility of defence, its facilities of approach and re- treat, &c. No man is born without the sense of touch, but many are born without the sense of hearing ; and, wherever this is the case, we are entitled to look for habits of sight Persons under such circumstances naturally and necessa- rily rely much on the visual sense, whatever aids may be had by them from the touch. Hence habits ; and these imply increased quickness and power, wherever they ex- ist. It is a matter of common remark, that the keenness of visual observation in the deaf and dumb is strikingly increased by their peculiar circumstances. Shut out from the intercourse of speech, they read the minds of men in their movements, gestures, and countenances. They no- tice with astonishing quickness, and apparently without any effort, a thousand things which escape the regards of others. This fact is undoubtedly the foundation of the chief encouragement which men have to attempt the in- struction of that numerous and unfortunate class of their fellow-beings. They can form an opinion of what an- other says to them by the motion of the lips ; and some- times even with a great degree of accuracy. That this last, however, is common, it is not necessary to assert ; that it is possible, we have the testimony of well-authenticated facts. In one of his letters, Bishop Burnet mentions to this effect the case of a young lady at Geneva. — " At two years old," he says, " it was perceived that she had lost her hearing, and ever since, though she hears great noises, yet hears nothing of what is said to her ; but, by 68 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. observing the motion of the lips and mouths of others, she acquired so many words, that out of these she has formed a sort of jargon in which she can hold conversa- tion whole days with those who can speak her language. She knows nothing of what is said to her, unless she sees the motion of their lips that speak to her ; one thing will appear the strangest part of the whole narrative. She has a sister with whom she has practised her language more than with anybody else, and in the night, by laying her hand on her sister's mouth, she can perceive by that what she says, and so can discourse with her in the dark." (London Quarterly Review, vol. xxiv, p. 399.) Such are the views which have been opened to us in considering the law of habit in connexion with the sen- ses ; and we may venture to say with confidence, that they are exceedingly worthy of notice. There are two suggestions which they are especially fitted to call up. They evince the striking powers of the human mind, its irrepressible energies, which no obstacles can bear down. They evince also the benevolence of our Creator, who opens in the hour of misery new sources of comfort, and compensates for what we have not, by increasing the power and value of what we have. $ 54. Sensations may possess a relative, as well as positive increase of power. There remains a remark < )f some importance to be made in connexion with the general principle which has been brought forward, and as in some measure auxiliary to it ; for it will help to explain the more striking instances of habits, if any should imagine that the fact of mere repe- tition is not sufficient to account for them. Our sensa- tions and perceptions may acquire not only a direct and positive, but a relative and virtual increase of power. This remark is thus explained. We shall hereafter see the truth of an important principle to this effect, that there will be a weakness of remembrance in any particular case in proportion to the want of interest in it. Now hun- dreds and thousands of our sensations and perceptions are not remembered, because we take no interest in them. Of course they are the same, relatively to our amount of HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 69 knowledge and our practice, as if they had never existed at all. But when we are placed in some novel situation, or when, in particular, we are deprived of any one of the senses, the pressure of our necessities creates that interest which was wanting before. Then we delay upon, and mark, and remember, and interpret a multitude of evan- escent intimations which were formerly neglected. The senses thus acquire a very considerable relative power and value. And in order to make out a satisfactory ex- planation of some instances of habits, it is perhaps neces- sary that this relative increase should be added to the di- rect and positive augmentation of vigour and quickness resulting from mere repetition or exercise. <$> 55. Of habits as modified by particular callings and arts. Hitherto it has been our chief object to examine hab- its in their relation to the senses separately ; it is proper also to take a general view of them, as formed and mod- ified by the particular callings and employments of men. Habits of perception are frequently formed under such circumstances, where all the senses are not only possess- ed, but where they exist with their 6rdinary aptitudes and powers. — In consequence of the habits which he has been called upon to form by his particular situation, a farmer of a tolerable degree of experience and discernment re- quires but a slight inspection, in order to give an opinion on the qualities of a piece of land, and its suitableness for a settlement. A skilful printer will at once notice every- thing of excellence or of deficiency in the mechanical execution of a printed work. — The same results are found in all who practise the fine arts. An experienced paint- er at once detects a mannerism in colouring, combinations and contrasts of light and shade, and peculiarities of form, proportion, or position, which infallibly escape a person of more limited experience. Dr. Reid speaks on this subject in the following char- acteristic manner. — " Not only men, but children, idiots, and brutes, acquire by habit many perceptions which they had not originally. Almost every employment in life hath perceptions of this kind that are peculiar to it. The shepherd knows every sheep of his flock, as we do our 70 HABITS OF SENSATION aND PERCEPTION. acquaintance, and can pick them out of another flock one by one. The butcher knows by sight the weight and quality of his beeves and sheep before they are killed The farmer perceives by his eye very nearly the quantity of hay in a rick, or of corn in a heap. The sailor sees the burden, the built, and the distance of a ship at sea, while she is a great way off. Every man accustomed to writing, distinguishes acquaintances by their handwriting, as he does by their faces. And the painter distinguishes, in the works of his art, the style of all the great masters. In a word, acquired perception is very different in differ- ent persons, according to the diversity of objects about which they are employed, and the application they bestow in observing them."* § 56. The law of habit considered in reference to the -perception of trie outlines and forms of objects. Before leaving the subject of Habit, considered as in- fluencing Sensation and Perception, there is one other topic which seems to be entitled to a brief notice ; we refer to the manner in which we perceive the outlines and forms of bodies. In discussing the subject of Attention, Mr. Stewart, in connexion with his views on that subject, introduces some remarks in respect to vision. He makes this supposition, That the eye is fixed in a particular po- sition, and the picture of an object is painted on the ret- ina. He then starts this inquiry : Does the mind per- ceive the complete figure of the object at once, or is this perception the result of the various perceptions we have of the different points in the outline ? — He holds the opinion, that the perception is the result of our percep- tions of the different points in the outline, which he adopts as naturally consequent on such views, as the following The outline of every body is made up of points or small- est visible portions; no two of these points can be in precisely the same direction ; therefore every point by it- self constitutes just as distinct an object of attention to the mind, as if it were separated by some interval of empty space from all the other points. The conclusion there- fore is, as every body is made up of parts, and as the per- * Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, chap, vi., t) 20. HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 7 J ception of the figure of the whole object implies a knowl- edge of the relative situation of the different parts with respect to each other, that such perception is the result of a number of different acts of attention. But if we adopt this view of Mr. Stewart, it is incum- bent upon us to show how it happens that we appear to see the object at once. The various facts which have been brought forward m this chapter appear to furnish us with a solution of this question. The answer is, that the acts of perception are performed with such rapidity, that the effect with respect to us is the same as if it were instantaneous. A habit has been formed ; the glance of the mind, in the highest exercise of that habit, is inde- scribably quick ; time is virtually annihilated; and sep- arate moments are to our apprehension of them crowded into one. § 57. Notice of some facts which favour the above doctrine. Some persons will probably entertain doubts of Mr. Stewart's explanation of the manner in which we per- ceive the outlines of objects ; but there are various cir- cumstances which tend to confirm it. — When we look for the first time on any object which is diversified with gaudy colours, the mind is evidently perplexed with the variety of perceptions which arise ; the view is indistinct, which would not be the case if there were only one, and that an immediate perception. And even in paintings, which are of a more laudable execution, the effects at the first per- ception will be similar. But there is another fact which comes still more di- rectly to the present point. We find that we do not have as distinct an idea, at the first glance, of a figure of a hundred sides, as we do of a triangle or square. But we evidently should, if the perception of visible figure were the immediate consequence of the picture on the retina, and not the combined result of the separate perceptions of the points in the outline. Whenever the figure is very simple, the process of the mind is so very rapid that the perception seems to be instantaneous. But when the sides are multiplied beyond a certain number, the inter- val of time necessary for these different acts of attention 72 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION becomes perceptible. We are then distinctly conscious that the mind labours from one part of the object to an- other, and that some time elapses before we grasp it as a whole. § 58. Additional illustrat'ons of Mr. Stewart s doctrine. These views and illustrations are still further confirmed by some interesting, and perhaps more decisive facts. In 1807, Sir Everard Home, well known for his various phil osophical publications, read before the Royal Society an account of two blind children whom he had couched for the cataract. One of these was John Salter. Upon this boy various experiments were made, for the purpose, among other things, of ascertaining whether the sense of sight does originally, and of itself alone, give us a knowl- edge of the true figure of bodies. Some of the facts eli- cited under these circumstances have a bearing upon the subject now before us. In repeated instances, on the day of his restoration to sight, the boy called square and tri- angular bodies, which were presented to the visual sense merely, round. On a square body being presented to him, he expressed a desire to touch it. " This being refused, he examined it for some time, and said at last that he had found a corner, and then readily counted the four corners of the square ; and afterward, when a triangle was shown him, he counted the corners in the same way ; but, in doing so, his eye went along the edge from corner to cor- ner, naming them as he went along." On the thirteenth day after the cataract was removed, the visual power he had acquired was so small, that he could not by sight tell a square from a circle, without previously directing his sight tothe corners of the square figure as he did at first, and thus passing from corner to corner, and counting them one by one. It was noticed that the sight seemed to la- bour slowly onward from one point and angle to another, as if it were incapable of embracing the outline by a simultaneous and undivided movement. The process, however, became more and more easy and rapid, until the perception, which at first was obviously made up of distinct and 'successive ^cts, came to be in appearance (and we may suppose it was only in appearance) a con- centrated and single one. CONCEPTIONS. 73 It was the same with Caspar Hauser. It is remarked by his biographer, that whenever a person was introdu- ced to him, (this was probably soon after his release from his prison,) he went up very close to him, regarded him with a sharp, staring look, and noticed particularly each distinct part of his face, such as the forehead, eyes, nose, mouth, and chin. He then collected and consolidated all the different parts of the countenance, which he had no- ticed separately and piece by piece, into one whole. And it was not till after this process that he seemed to have a knowledge of the countenance Or face, in distinction from the parts of the face. CHAPTER Vm. CONCEPTIONS. $ 59. Meaning and characteristics of conceptions. We are now led, as we advance in the general subject of intellectual states of external origin, to contemplate the mind in another view, viz., as employed in giving rise to what are usually termed conceptions. Without pro- fessing to propose a definition in all respects unexcep- tionable, we are entitled to say, in general terms, that this name is given to any re-existing sensations whatever which the mind has felt at some former period, and to the ideas which we frame of absent objects of perception. Whenever we have conceptions, our sensations and per- ceptions are replaced, as Shakspeare expresses it, in the "mind's eye," without our at all considering at what time or in what place they first originated. In other words, they are revived or recalled, and nothing more. — Using, therefore, the term conceptions to express a class of mental states, and, in accordance with the general plan, having particular reference in our remarks here to such as are of external origin, it may aid in the better understanding of their distinctive character if we mention more particularly how they differ both from sensations 74 CONCEPTIONS. and perceptions, and also from remembrances, with which last some may imagine them to be essentially the same. (I.) Conceptions differ from the ordinary sensations and perceptions in this respect, that both their causes and their objects are absent. When the rose, the honeysuckle, or other odoriferous body is presented to us, the effect which follows in the mind is termed a sensation. When we afterward think of that sensation, (as we sometimes express it,) when the sensation is recalled, even though very imperfectly, without the object which originally caused it being present, it then becomes, by the use of language, a conception. And it is the same in any in- stance of perception. When, in strictness of speech, we are said to perceive anything, as a tree, a building, or a mountain, the objects of our perceptions are in all cases before us. But we may form conceptions of them ; they may be recalled and exist in the mind's eye, however remote they may be in fact, both in time and place. (II.) They differ also from remembrances or ideas of memory. We take no account of the period when those objects which laid the foundation of them were present ; whereas, in every act of the memory, there is combined with the conception a notion of the past. Hence, as those states of mind, which we call conceptions, possess these distinctive marks, they are well entitled to a sep- arate name. Conceptions are regulated in their appearance and dis- appearance by the principles of Association, which will be explained hereafter. — Whenever at any time we may use the phrase " power of conception" or " faculty of conception," nothing more is to be understood by such expressions than this, that there is in the mind a suscepti- bility of feelings or ideas possessing the marks which we have ascribed to this class. § 60. Of conceptions of objects of sight. One of the striking facts in regard to our conceptions is, that we can far more easily conceive of the objects of some senses than of others. He who has visited the Pyr- amids of Egypt and the imposing remains of Grecian temples, or has beheld, among nature's still greater works. CONCEPTIONS. 75 the towering heights of the Alps and the mighty cataract of Niagara, will never afterward be at a loss in forming a vivid conception of those interesting objects. The vis- ual perceptions are so easily and so distinctly recalled, that it is hardly too much to say of them, that they seem to exist as permanent pictures in the mind. It is related of Carsten Niebuhr, a well-known traveller in the East. that, in extreme old age, after he had become blind, he entertained his visiters with interesting details of what he had seen many years before at Persepolis ; describing the walls on which the inscriptions and bas-reliefs of which he spoke were found, just as one would describe a build- ing which he had recently visited. His son, wdio has given an account of his life, remarks, in connexion with this fact : " We could not conceal our astonishment. He said to us, that, as he lay blind upon his bed, the images of all that he had seen in the East were ever present to his soul ; and it was therefore no wonder that he should speak of them as of yesterday. In like manner, there was vividly reflected to him, in the hours of stillness, the noc- turnal view of the deep Asiatic heavens, with their brill- iant host of stars, which he had so often contemplated ; or else their blue and lofty vault by day ; and this was his greatest enjoyment." There seems to be less vividness in the conceptions of sound, touch, taste, and smell ; particularly the last three. Every one knows that it is difficult in ordinary cases to recall with much distinctness a particular pain which we have formerly experienced, or a particular taste, or smell. The fact that the perceptions of sight are more easily and distinctly recalled than others, may be thus partially ex plained. — Visible objects, or, rather, the outlines of them, are complex ; that is, they are made up of a great num- ber of points or very small portions. Hence the concep* tion which we form of such an object as a whole, is aided by the principles of association. The reason is obvious. As every original perception of a visible object is a compound made up of many parts, whenever we subsequently have a conception of it, the process is the same ; w r e have a conception of a part of the object, and the principles of association help us in conceiving of the 76 CONCEPTIONS. other parts. Association connects the parts together ; it presents them to the mind in their proper arrangement, and helps to sustain them there. We are not equally aided by the laws of association in forming our conceptions of the objects of the other senses. When we think of some sound, taste, touch, or smell, the object of our conception is either a single de- tached sensation or a series of sensations. In every such detached sensation of sound, taste, touch, or smell, whethei we consider it at its first origin, or when it is subsequently recalled, there is not necessarily that fixed and intimate association of the parts which we suppose to exist in every visual perception, and which must exist also in every conception of objects of sight which subsequently takes place. Accordingly, our conceptions of the latter ob- jects arise more readily, and are more distinct, than of the others. — There is a greater readiness and distinctness also, when there is a series of sensations and perceptions of sight, for the subsequent visual conceptions are aided by associations both in time and place ; but the recurrence of other sensations and perceptions is aided only by asso- ciations in time. § 61. Of the influence of habit on our conceptions. It is another circumstance worthy of notice in regard to conceptions, that the power of forming them depends in some measure on habit.— A few instances will help to illustrate the statement, that what is termed Habit may extend to the susceptibility of conceptions ; and the first to be given will be of conceptions of sound. Our con- ceptions of sound are not, in general, remarkably distinct, as was. intimated in the last section. It is nevertheless true, that a person may by practice acquire the power oi amusing himself with merely reading written music. Having frequently associated the sounds with the notes, he has at last such a strong conception of the sounds, that he experiences, by merely reading the notes, a very sensible pleasure. It is for the same reason, viz., because our conceptions are strengthened by repetition or practice, that readers may enjoy the harmony of poetical numbers without at all articulating the words. In both cases they CONCEPTIONS. 77 truly hear nothing ; there is no actual sensation of sound ; and yet there is a virtual enunciation and melody in the mind. It seems to be on this principle we are enabled to explain the fact, that Beethoven composed some of his most valued musical pieces after he had become entirely deaf; originating harmonic combinations so profound and exquisite as to require the nicest ear as a test, at the very time he was unable to hear anything himself. § 62. Influence of habit on conceptions of sight. That our power of forming conceptions is strengthen- ed by habit, is capable of being further illustrated from the sight. A person who has been accustomed to draw- ing, retains a much more perfect notion of a building, landscape, or other visible object, than one who has not A portrait painter, or any person who has been in the practice of drawing such sketches, can trace the outlines of the human form with very great ease ; it requires hardly more effort from them than to write their names. — This point may also be illustrated by the difference which we sometimes notice in people in their conceptions of colours. Some are fully sensible of the difference be- tween two colours when they are presented to them, but cannot with confidence give names to these colours when they see them apart, and may even confound the one with the other. Their original sensations and perceptions are supposed to be equally distinct with those of other per- sons ; but their subsequent conception of the colours is far from being so. This defect arises partly, at least, from want of practice ; that is to say, from the not hav- ing formed a habit. The persons who exhibit this weak- ness of conception have not been compelled, by their sit- uation nor by mere inclination, to distinguish and to name colours so much as is common. § 63. Of the subserviency of our conceptions to description. It is highly favourable to the talent for lively descrip- tion, when a person's conceptions are readily suggested and are distinct. Even such a one's common conversa- tion differs from that of those whose conceptions arise more slowly and are more faint. One man, whether in G2 78 CONCEPTIONS. conversation or in written description, seems to place the object which he wishes to describe directly before us ; it is represented distinctly and to the life. Another, al- though not wanting in a command of language, is con- fused and embarrassed amid a multitude of particulars, which, in consequence of the feebleness of his concep- tions, h^ fads himself but half acquainted with; and he therefore gives us but a very imperfect and confused no tion of the thing which he desires to make known. It has been by some supposed, that a person might give a happier description of an edifice, of a landscape, or other object, from the conception than from the actual perception of it. The perfection of a description does not always consist in a minute specification of circum- stances ; in general, the description is better when there is a judicious selection- of them. The best rule for ma- king the selection is to attend to the particulars that make the deepest impression on our own minds, or, what is the same thing, that most readily and distinctly take a place in our conceptions. — When the object is actually before us, it is extremely difficult to compare the impressions which different circumstances produce. When we after- ward conceive of the object, w T e possess merely the out- line of it ; but it is an outline made up of the most stri- king circumstances. The circumstances, it is true, will not impress all persons alike, but will somewhat vary with the degree of their taste. But when, with a correct and delicate taste, any one combines lively conceptions, and gives a description from those conceptions, he can hardly fail to succeed in it. And, accordingly, we find here one great element of poetic power. It is the ability of form- ing vivid conceptions which bodies forth " The forms of things unknown ; the poet's pen Turns them to shape, and gives to airy nothing A local habitation and a name." § 64. Of conceptions attended with a momentary belief. Our conceptions are sometimes attended with belief; when they are very lively, we are apt to ascribe to them a real outward existence, or believe in them. We do not undertake to assert that the belief is permanent ; but CONCEPTIONS. 79 a number of facts strongly lead to the conclusion that it has a momentary existence. (1.) A painter, in drawing the features and bodily form of an absent friend, may have so strong a conception, so vivid a mental picture, as to believe for a moment that his friend is before him. After carefully recalling his thoughts at such times, and reflecting upon them, almost every paint- er is ready to say that he has experienced some illusions of this kind. " We read," says Dr. Conolly, " that, when Sir Joshua Reynolds, after being many horns occupied in painting, walked out into the street, the lamp-posts seem- ed to him to be trees, and the men and women moving shrubs." It is true, the illusion is in these cases very short, because the intensity of conception, which is the foundation of it, can never be kept up long when the mind is in a sound state. Such intense conceptions are unnatural. And, further, all the surrounding objects of perception, which no one can altogether disregard for any length of time, tend to check the illusion and terminate it. (2.) When a blow is aimed at any one, although in sport, and he fully knows it to be so, he forms so vivid a conception of what might possibly be the effect, that his belief is for a moment controlled, and he unavoidably ' shrinks back from it. This is particularly the case if the blow approaches the eye. Who can help winking at such times ? It is a proof of our belief being controlled under such circumstances, that we can move our own hands rapidly in the neighbourhood of the eye, either perpendicularly or horizontally ; and, at the same time, easily keep our eyelids from motion. But when the mo- tion is made by another, the conception becomes more vivid, and a belief of danger inevitably arises. — Again, place a person on the battlements of a high tower ; his reason tells him he is in no danger ; he knows he is in none. But, after all, he is unable to look down from the battlements without fear ; his conceptions are so exceed- ingly vivid as to induce a momentary belief of danger in opposition to all his reasonings. (3.) When we are in pain from having struck our foot against a stone, or when pain is suddenly caused in us by any other inanimate object, we are apt to vent a moment- 80 CONCEPTIONS. ary rage upon it That is to say, our belief is so affect* ed for an instant, that we ascribe to it an accountable ex- istence, and would punish it accordingly. This is ob- served particularly in children and in Savages. It is on the principle of our vivid conceptions being attended with belief, that poets so often ascribe life, and agency, and intention to the rain and winds, to storms, and thun- der and lightning. How natural are the expressions of King Lear, overwhelmed with the ingratitude of his daughters, and standing with his old head bared to the pelting tempest ! " Nor rain, wind, thunder, fire are my daughters ; I tax not you, ye elements, with unkindness ; I never gave you kingdoms, called you children." (4.) There are persons who are entirely convinced of the folly of the popular belief of ghosts and other night- ly apparitions, but who cannot be persuaded to sleep in a room alone, nor go alone into a room in the dark. Whenever they happen out at night, they are constantly looking on every side ; their quickened perceptions behold images, which never had any existence except in their own minds, and they are the subjects of continual dis- quiet and even terror. — " It was my misfortune," says Dr. Priestly, " to have the idea of darkness, and the ideas of invisible malignant spirits and apparitions very closely connected in my infancy ; and to this day, notwithstand- ing I believe nothing of those invisible powers, and, con- sequently, of their connexion with darkness, or anything else, I cannot be perfectly easy in every kind of situation in the dark, though 1 am sensible I gain ground upon • his prejudice continually." In all- such cases we see the influence of the prejudices of the nursery. Persons who are thus afflicted were taught in early childhood to form conceptions of ghosts, visible hobgoblins, and unearthly spirits ; and the habit still continues. It is true, when they listen to their rea- sonings and philosophy, they may well say they do not believe in such things. But the effect of their philoso- phy is merely to check their belief; not in ten cases in & thousand is the belief entirely overcome. Every little hile, in all solitary places, and especially in the dark, it CONCEPTIONS. 81 returns, and, when banished, returns again ; otherwise we cannot give an explanation of the conduct of these per- sons. § 65. Conceptions which are joined with perceptions. The belief in our mere conceptions is the more evi- dent and striking whenever at any time they are joined with our perceptions. — A person, for instance, is walking in a field in a foggy morning, and perceives something, no matter what it is ; but he believes it to be a man, and does not doubt it. In other words, he truly perceives some object, and, in addition to that perception, has a mental conception of a man, attended with belief. When he has advanced a few feet further, all at once he per- ceives that what he conceived to be a man is merely a stump with a few stones piled on its top. He perceived at first, as plainly or but little short of it, that it was a stump, as in a moment afterward ; there were the whole time very nearly the same visible form and the same di- mensions in his eye. But he had the conception of a man in his mind at the same moment, which overruled and annulled the natural effects of the visual perception ; the conception, being associated with the present visible object, acquired peculiar strength and permanency; so much so, that he truly and firmly believed that a human being was before him. But the conception has departed ; the present object of perception has taken its place, and it is now impossible for him to conjure up the phantom, the reality of which he but just now had no doubt of. One of the numerous characters whom Sir Walter Scott has sketched with so much truth to nature, speaks of himself as being banished, on a certain occasion, to one of the sandy Keys of the West Indies, which was re- puted to be inhabited by malignant demons. This per- son, after acknowledging he had his secret apprehensions upon their account, remarks, " In open daylight or in ab- solute darkness I did not greatly apprehend their ap- proach ; but in the misty dawn of the morning, or when evening was about to fall, I saw, for the first week of my abode on the Key, many a dim and undefined spectre ; now resembling a Spaniard, with his capa wrapped 82 CONCEPTIONS. aroi nd him, and his nuge sombrera, as large as an um- brella, upon his head ; now a Dutch sailor, with his rough cap and trunk hose ; and now an Indian Cacique, with his feathery crown and long lance of cane. I always approached them, but, whenever I drew near, the phantom changed into a bush, or a piece cif driftwood, or a wreath of mist, or some such cause of deception." But it is unnecessary to resort to books for illustrations of this topic. Multitudes of persons have a conceptive facility of creations, which is often troublesome and per- plexing; especially in uncommon situations, and in the night. And in all cases this tendency is greatly strength- ened, whenever it can lay hold of objects, the outlines of which it can pervert to its own purposes. — In instan- ces of this kind, where the conceptions, are upheld, as it were, by present objects of perception, and receive a sort of permanency from them, nothing is better known than that we often exercise a strong and unhesitating belief. These instances, therefore, can properly be considered as illustrating and confirming the views in the preceding section. § 66. Conceptions as connected with fictitious representations "These observations suggest an explanation, at least in part, of the effects which are produced on the mind by exhibitions of fictitious distress. In the representation of tragedies, for instance, it must be admitted, that there is a general conviction of the whole being but a fiction. But, although persons enter the theatre with this general conviction, it does not always remain with them the whole time. At certain peculiarly interesting passages in the poet, and at certain exhibitions of powerful and well-timed effort in the actor, this general impression, that all is a fiction, fails. The feelings of the spectator may be said to rush into the scenes ; he mingles in the events ; carried away and lost, he for a moment believes all to be real, and the tears gush at the catastrophe which he wit- nesses. The explanation, therefore, of the emotions felt at the exhibition of a tragedy, such as indignation, pity, and abhorrence, is, that at certain parts of the exhibition we have a momentary belief in the reality of the events SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS OF MENTAL STATES. 83 **mich are represented. And after the illustrations which have been given, such a belief cannot be considered im- possible. — The same explanation will apply to the emo- tions which follow our reading of tragedies when alone, or any other natural and affecting descriptions. In the world of conceptions which the genius of the writer conjures up, we are transported out of the world of real existence, and for a while fully believe in the reality of what is only an incantation. CHAPTER LX. SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS OF MENTAL STATES § 67. Origin of the distinction of simple and complex. .In looking at our thoughts and feelings, as they con- tinually pass under the review of our internal observation, we readily perceive that they are not of equal worth ; we do not assign to them the same estimate ; one state of mmd is found to be expressive of one thing only, and that thii;g, whatever it is, is precise, and definite, and insep- arable ; while another state of mind is found to be ex- pressive of, and virtually equal to, many others. And hence we are led, not only with the utmost propriety, but even by a sort of necessity, to make a division of the whole body of our mental affections into the two classes of simple and complex. Nature herself makes the divis ion ; it is one of those characteristics which gives to the mind, in part at least, its greatness ; one of those elements of power, without which the soul could not be what it is, and without a knowledge of which it is difficult to pos- sess a full and correct understanding of it in other respects. $ 68. Nature and characteristics of simple mental states. We shall first offer some remarks on those mental states which are simple, and shall aim to give p^ understanding of their nature, so far as can be expected on a subject, the clearness of which depend more on a reference to 84 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS our own personal consciousness than on the teachings of others. Let it be noticed then, in the first place, that a simple idea cannot be separated into parts. — It is clearly im- plied in the very distinction between simplicity and com- plexity, considered in relation to the states of the mind, that there can be no such separation, no such division. It is emphatically true of our simple ideas and emotions, and of aL other simple states of the mind, that they are one and indivisible. Whenever you can detect in them moie than one element, they at once lose their character of simplicity, and are to be regarded as complex, however they may have previously appeared. Inseparableness consequently is their striking characteristic ; and it may be added, that they are not only inseparable in them- selves, but are separate from everything else. There is nothing which can stand as a substitute "for them where they are, or represent them where they are not ; they are independent unities, constituted exclusively by the mind itself, having a specific and positive character, but never theless known only in themselves. § 69. Simple mental states not susceptible of definition. Let it be observed, in the second place, that our simple notions cannot be defined. — This view of them follows necessarily from what has been said of their oneness and inseparableness, compared with what is universally un- derstood by defining. In respect to definitions, it is un- doubtedly true, that we sometimes use synonymous words ; and call such use a definition ; but it is not properly such. In every legitimate definition, the idea which is to be de- fined is to be separated, as far as may be thought neces- sary, into its subordinate parts ; and these parts are to be presented to the mind for its examination, instead of the original notion into which they entered. This process must be gone through in every instance of accurate de- fining ; this is the general and authorized view of defini- tion ; and it is not easy to see in what else it can well consist. But this process ™\\ not apply to our simple thoughts and feelings, because, if there be any such thing as sim- OF MENTAL STATES. 85 pie mental states, they are characterized by inseparable ness and oneness. And furthermore, if we define ideas by employing other ideas, we must count upon meeting at last with such as shall be ultimate, and will reject all verbal explanation ; otherwise we can never come to an end in the process. — So that the simple mental affections are not only undefinable in themselves ; but if there were no such elementary states of mind, there could be no de- fining in any other case; it would be merely analysis upon analysis, a process without completion, and a labour without end ; leaving the subject in as much darkness as when the process was begun. When we speak of simple ideas and feelings, and d person, in consequence of our inability to define them, professes to be ignorant of the terms we use, we can fre- quently aid him in understanding them by a statement of the circumstances, as far as possible, under which the simple mental state exists. But having done this, we can merely refer him to his own senses and consciousness, as the only teachers from which he can expect to receive satisfaction. § 70. Simple mental states representative of a reality. A third mark or characteristic of simple mental states is, that they always stand for or represent a reality.- In other words, no simple idea is, in its own nature, de- lusive or fictitious, but always has something precisely corresponding to it. — It is not always so with complex ideas ; these, as Mr. Locke justly gives us to understand, are sometimes chimerical. That is to say; the elements of which they are composed are so brought together and combined as to form something, of which nature presents no corresponding reality. If, for instance, a person had an idea of a body, yellow, or of some other colour, malle- able, fixed ; possessing, in a word, all the qualities of iron or of gold, with this difference only, of its being lighter than water, it would be what Mr. Locke terms a chimer- ical idea ; because the combination of the elements here exists only in the human mind, and not in nature ; the thing has no outward or objective reality. The words centaur, dragon, and hypogriff, which are the well- H 86 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS known names for imaginary beings possessing no actual existence, are expressive of chimerial complex ideas. These ideas have nothing corresponding to them. But it is not so with the simple states of the mind. If it were otherwise, since in our inquiries after truth we naturally proceed from what is complex to what is simple, there would be no sure foundation of knowledge. Whenever, in our analysis of a subject, we arrive at truly simple ideas, we have firm footing ; there is no mistake, no de- lusion. Nature, always faithful to her own character, gives utterance to the truth alone. But man, in combi- ning together the elements which nature furnishes, does not always avoid mistakes. $71. Origin of complex notions, and their relation to simple. Our simple states of mind, which we have thus endeav- oured to explain, were probably first in origin. There are reasons for considering them as antecedent in point of time to our complex mental states, although in many cases it may not be easy to trace the progress of the mind from the one to the other. The complex notions of external material objects embrace the separate and simple notions of resistance, extension, hardness, colour, taste, and others. As these elementary perceptions evidently have their ori- gin in distinct and separate senses, it is but reasonable to suppose that they possess a simple, before they are com- bined together in a complex existence. Simple ideas, therefore, may justly be regarded as antecedent, in point of time, to those which are complex, and as laying the foundation of them. Hence we see that it is sufficiently near the truth, and that it is not improper, to speak of our complex ideas as derived from, or made up of, simple ideas. This is the well-known language of Mr. Locke on this subject ; and when we consider how much foundation there is for it in the constitution and operations of the human mind, there is good reason for retaining it. — Although purely simple states of the mind are few in number, vast multitudes of a complex nature are formed from them. The ability which the mind possesses of originating complex thoughts and feelings from elementary ones, may be compared to OF MENTAL STATES. 87 our power of uniting together the letters of the alphabet in the formation of syllables and words. § 72 Supposed complexness without the antecedence of simple feelings. It is possible that some persons may object to the doc- trine proposed in the last section, that complex mental states are subsequent in point of time to those which are simple ; and may be inclined to adopt the opinion, that some, at least, of our complex notions are framed at once and immediately, whenever an occasion presents itself, and are not necessarily dependent on the prior existence, of any other feelings. When the eye, for instance, opens on a wide and diversified landscape, they suppose the whole to be embraced in one complex mental state, the formation of which is not gradual and susceptible of measurement by time, but is truly instantaneous. When we direct our attention to objects of less extent, as a por- trait, a landscape, or historical painting, they imagine it co be still more evident, that the complexity of mind, cor- responding to the complexity of the object, is a result without any antecedent process. Without doubt, what has now been said is, in some instances, apparently the case ; but this appearance (for we cannot speak of it as anything more than such) is susceptible of an obvious ex- planation, without an abandonment of the general princi- ple which has been laid down. No one is ignorant that the mind often passes with exceeding rapidity along the successive objects of its contemplation* This rapidity may, in some cases, be so great, that no foundation will be laid for remembrance ; and of course, in such cases, the complex feeling has the appearance of being formed without the antecedence of other simple feelings. Often the eye glances so rapidly over the distinct parts of the portrait, the historical painting, or even the wide land- scape, that we are utterly unable in our recollection to detect the successive steps of its progress. There natu- rally seems, therefore, to be but one view, instead of dis- tinct and successive glances of the mind from hill to hill, from forest to forest, and from one verdant spot to an- other, prior to the supposed one and instantaneous com- prehension of the whole. But there is much reason for 88 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS saying that this oneness of comprehension is in seeming and appearance only, and not in fact. (See § 57, 58.) § 73. The precise sense in which complexness is to be understood. But while we distinctly assert the frequent complexness of the mental affections, it should be particularly kept in mind, that they are not to be regarded in the light of a material compound, where the parts, although it may sometimes appear to be otherwise, necessarily possess no higher unity than that of juxtaposition, and, of course, can be literally separated from each other, and then put together again. There is nothing of this kind ; neither putting together nor taking asunder, in this Tteral and material sense. — But if our thoughts and feeling ape not made up of others, and are not complex in the material sense of the expressions, what then constitutes their com- plexness ? This inquiry gives occasion for the impor- tant remark, that complexness in relation to the mind is not literal, but virtual only. What we term a complex feeling is in itself truly simple, but at the same time it is equal to many others, and is complex only in that sense. Thought after thought, and emotion following emotion, passes through the mind ; and as they are called forth by the operation of the laws of association, many of them necessarily have relation to the same object. Then there follows a new state of mind, which is the result of those previous feelings, and is complex in the sense already ex- plained. That is to say, it is felt by us to possess a vir- tual equality to those separate antecedent thoughts and emotions. Our simple feelings are like streams coming from different mountains, but meeting and mingling to^ gether at last in the common centre of some intermediate lake ; the tributary fountains are no longer separable ; but have disappeared, and become merged and confound ed in the bosom of their common resting-place. Or they may be likened to the cents and dimes of the American coinage, tens and hundreds of which are represented by a single eagle ; and yet the eagle is not divided into a hundred or thousand parts, but has as much unity as the numerous pieces for which it stands. The language which expresses the composition and OF MENTAL STATES. 89 complexity of thought is, therefore, to be regarded a\ wholly metaphorical when applied to the mind, and is not to be taken in its literal meaning. We are under the necessity of employing in this case, as in others, language which has a material origin, but we shall not be led astray by it if we carefully attend to what has been said, and endeavour to aid our conception of it by a reference to our internal experience. § 74. Illustrations of analysis as applied to the mind. The subject of the preceding section will be the better understood by the consideration of Analysis as applicable to the mind. As we do not combine literally, so we do not untie or separate literally ; as there is no literal complex- ness, so there is no literal resolution or analysis of it. Nevertheless, we have a meaning when we speak of analyzing our thoughts and feelings. And what is it ? What are we to understand by the term analysis ? Although this subject is not without difficulty, both in the conception and in the expression of it, it is susceptible of some degree of illustration. — It will be remembered that there may be an analysis of material bodies. The chemist analyzes when he takes a piece of glass, which appears to be one substance, and finds that it is not one, but is separable into silicious and alkaline matter. He takes other bodies, and separates them in like manner ; and whenever he does this, the process is rightly called analysis. Now we apply the same term to the mind ; but the thing expressed by it, the process gone through, is not the same. All we can say is, there is something like this. We do not resolve and separate a complex thought, as ve do a piece of glass or other material body, into its parts ; we are utterly unable to do it, if we should se- riously make the attempt ; every mental state is, in itself and in fact, simple and indivisible, and is complex only virtually. Complex notions are the results rather than the compounds of former feelings ; and though not liter- ally made up of parts, have the relation to them which any material whole has to the elements composing it; and in that particular sense may be said to comprehend H2 90 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS or embrace the subordinate notions. Mental analysis ac- cordingly concerns merely this relation. We perform such an analysis when, by the aid of our reflection and consciousness, we are able to indicate those separate and subordinate feelings to which, in our conception of it, the complex mental state is virtually equal. The term government, for instance, when used in ref- erence to the mental perception of the thing thus named, expresses a complex state of the mind ; we may make this mental state, which is in fact only one, although it is virtually more than one, a subject of contemplation; and we are said to analyze it when we are able to indicate those separate and more elementary notions, without the existence and antecedence of which it could not have been formed by the mind. We do not literally take the complex state in pieces, but we designate other states of mind which, every one's knowledge of the origin of thought convinces him, must have preceded it, such as the ideas of power, right, obligation, command, and the rela- tive notions of superio, and inferior. § 75. Complex notions of external origin. The doctrine of simplicity and complexness of mental states is applicable, in both its forms, to the Intellective and Sensitive parts of our nature ; in. other words, there may be a complex affection or passion, as well as a com- plex perception. The acts of the Will, the other great Division of the mental nature, are always simple. When we consider the subject in reference to the intellect alone, we may add further, that there is complexity of the In- tellect both in its internal and external action ; and it i eems proper, in this connexion, to say something in par- ticular Of COMPLEX NOTIONS OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN. What we term our simple ideas are representative of the parts of objects only. The sensations of colour, such as red, white, yellow ; the original intimations from the touch, such as resistance, extension, hardness, and softness, do not, in themselves considered, give us a knowledge of substances, but only of the parts, attributes, or elements of substances. Accordingly, the ideas which we have of the various objects of the external world are, for the OF MENTAL STATES. 91 most part, complex. We speak of a house, a tree, a flowei, a plant, a mineral, an animal ; and in none of chese cases are the ideas which we have simple ; but, on the contrary, embrace a considerable number of elements § 76. Of objects contemplated as wholes. In point of fact, the various external objects which come under our notice are presented to us as wholes ; and, as such, (whatever may have been the original pro- cess leading to that result,) we very early contemplate them. — Take, for instance, a loadstone In their ordinary and common thoughts upon it, (the result probably of some antecedent and very early training), men undoubted- ly contemplate it as a whole ; the state of mind which has reference to it embraces it as such. This complex notion, like all others which are complex, is virtually equal to a number of others of a more elementary character. — Hence, when we are called upon to give an account of the loadstone, we can return no other answer than by an enumeration of its elements. It is something wdiich has weight, colour, hardness, power to draw iron, and what- ever else we discover in it. We use the term gold. This is a complex term, and implies a complexity in the corresponding mental state. But if we use the word gold, or any other synonymous word, in the hearing of a man who has neither seen that substance nor had it explained to him, he will not under- stand what is meant to be conveyed. We must enter into an analysis ; and show that it is a combination of the qualities of yellowness, great weight, fusibility, duc- tility, &c. We look upward to the sun in the heavens. But what should we know of that great aggregate, if we could not contemplate it in the elements of form and ex- tension, of brightness and heat, of roundness and regu- larity of motion ?— All the ideas, therefore, which we form of external objects considered as wdioles, are com- plex; and all such complex notions are composed of those which are simple. 92 ABSTRACTION. CHAPTER X. ABSTRACTION § 77. Abstraction implied in the analysis of complex ideas The remarks which have been made in the course oi the foregoing chapter, on the analysis and examination of our Complex Intellectual states, naturally lead to the consideration of another subject, in some respects inti- mately connected with that topic. When we have once formed a complex notion (no matter at what period, in what way, or of what kind,) it not unfrequently happens that we desire, for various reasons, to examine more par- ticularly some of its parts. Very frequently this is abso- lutely necessary to the full understanding of it. Although undoubtedly its elementary parts once came under re- view, that time is now long past ; it has become impor- tant to institute a new inspection, to take each simple notion involved in it, and examine it by itself. And this is done by means of the proc^-ss of Abstraction, and in no other way. By the aid of that process, our complex notions, how- ever comprehensive they may be, are susceptible, if onr may be allowed so to speak, of being taken to pieces, and the elementary parts may be abstracted or separated from each other ; that is, they are made subjects of con- sideration apart from other ideas, with which they are ordinarily found to be associated. And hence, whenever this is the case in respect to the states of the mind, they are sometimes called Abstractions, and still more fre- quently are known by the name of abstract ideas. — For the purpose of distinctness in what we have to say, they may be divided into the two classes of Particular and General ; that is to say, in some cases the abstraction re- lates only to a single idea or element, in others it in- cludes more ABSTRACTION. 93 $ l >8. nstances of particular abstract ideas. We shall proved, therefore, to remark first on Particu- lar abstractions. Of this class, the notions which we form of the different kinds of colours may be regarded as instances. For example, we hold in our hand a rose ; it has extension, colour, form, fragrance. The mind is so deeply occupied with the colour as almost wholly to neglect the other qualities. This is a species of abstrac- tion, although perhaps an imperfect one, because, when an object is before us, it is difficult, in our most attentive consideration of any particular quality or property, to withdraw the mind wholly from the others. When, on the contrary, any absent object of perception occurs to us, when we think of or form a conception of it, our thoughts will readily fix upon the colour of such object, and make that the subject of consideration, without particularly regarding its other qualities, such as weight, hardness, taste, form, &c. We may also distinguish in any body (either when present, or still more perfectly when absent) its solidity from its extension, or we may direct our atten- tion to its weight, or its length, or breadth, or thickness, and make any one of these a distinct object in our thoughts. And hence, as it is a well-known fact that the proper- ties of any body may be separated in the view and ex- amination of the mind, however closely they may be con- nected in their appropriate subjects, we may lay down this statement in respect to the states of the mind before us, viz. : When any quality or attribute of an object, which does not exist by itself, but in a state of combina- tion, is detached by our minds from its customary associ- ates, and is considered separately, the notion we form of it becomes a particular abstract idea. — The distinctive mark of this class is, that the abstraction is limited to one quality. It should perhaps be particularly added, that the abstraction or separation may exist mentally, when it cannot take place in the object itself. For instance, the size, the figure, length, breadth, colour, &c, of a Milding, may each of them be made subjects of separate mental consideration, although there can be no real or actual sep- aration of these things in the building itself. If there be any one of these properties, there must necessarily be all 94 ABSTRACTION although they differ from each other in some respects, are yet found to agree in so many others, that they are ar- ranged together in another class, and called by the gen- eral name of tree. The living, moving, and reasoning beings that propel the boats on its waters, form another class, and are called man. — And there is the same process and the same result in respect to all other bodies coming within the range of our observation. ABSTRACTION 97 § 82. Early classifications sometimes incorrect. It nas been intimated, that, in making these classifica- tions, men are go veined by definite and uniform menial tendencies ; still it must be acknowledged that mistakes are sometimes committed, especially in the early periods of society, and in all cases where the opportunities of ex- amination and comparison are imperfect. When man first opens his eyes on nature, (and in the infancy of our race he finds himself a novice wherever he goes,) objects so numerous, so various in kind, so novel and interesting, crowd upon his attention, that, attempting to direct him- self to all at the same time, he loses sight of their specif- ical differences, and blends them together more than a calm and accurate examination would justify. And hence it is not to be wondered at that our earliest classi- fications, the primitive genera and species, are sometimes incorrectly made. Subsequently, when knowledge has been in some meas- ure amassed, and reasoning and observation have been brought to a greater ma lurity, these errors are attended to ; individuals are rejected from species where they do not properly belong, and species from gene '/a. The most sav- age and ignorant tribes will in due season correct their mistakes and be led into the truth. § 83. Illustrations of our earliest classifications. We are naturally led to introduce one or two incidents here which throw light on this part of our subject. What we wish to illustrate is the simple fact that men readily perceive the resemblances of objects, and exhibit a disposition to classify them in reference to such resem- blance. The first case which we shall mention in illus- tration of this, is that of Caspar Hauser. The principal objects which Caspar had to amuse himself with in his pris- on were two little wooden hor^s, which, in his entire ig- norance, he believed to be possessed of life and sensibility. After the termination of his imprisonment, his biographer informs us, that to " every animal he met with, whether quadruped or biped, dog, cat, goose, or fowl, he gave the name of horse." In the year 1814, Pitcairn's Island, a solitary spot in T 98 ABSTRACTION. the Pacific Ocean, was visited by two English cruisera Two of the young men that belonged on the island, and whose knowledge was, of course, extremely limited, came on board one of the vessels. " The youths," says the Narrative, " were greatly surprised at the sight of so many novel objects ; the size of the ship, the guns, and everything around them. Observing a cow, they were at first somewhat alarmed, and expressed a doubt whether it was a huge goat or a horned hog, these being the only two species of quadrupeds they had ever seen." — Travel- lers mention other instances where there is the same ten- dency to classify, which we have not room to repeat § 84. Of the nature of general abstract ideas. The notions which are thus formed in all cases of class- ification, are commonly known, in the Treatises having relation to these subjects, as General Abstract ideas. And they are no less numerous than the multiplied varie- ties of objects which are found to exist everywhere around us. It is thus that we form the general notions of animal and of all the subordinate species of animals ; of tree and its numerous varieties ; of earths, and minerals, and what- ever else is capable of being arranged into classes. But it is to be noticed that the general idea, whatever objects it may be founded upon, does not embrace every particular which makes a part of such objects. When we look at a number of men, we find them all differing in some respects, in height, size, colour, tone of the voice, and in other particulars. The mind fixes only upon those traits or properties with which it can combine the no- tion of resemblance ; that is to say, those traits, qualities, or properties in which the individuals are perceived to be like, or to resemble each other. — -The complex mental state, which embraces these qualities and properties, and nothing more, (with the exception of the superadded notion of other bodies having resembling qualities,) is a General Abstract idea. And hence the name. Such notions are called ab- stract, because, while embracing many individuals in certain respects, they detach and leave out altogether a yariety of particulars in which those individuals disagree ABSTRACTION. 99 If there were not this discrimination and leaving out of certain parts, we never could consider these notions, re- garded as wholes, as otherwise than individual or partic- ular. — They are called general, because, in consequence of the discrimination and selection which has just been mentioned, they embrace such qualities and properties as exist not in one merely, but in many. $ 85. The power of general abstraction in connexion with numbers, &c. The ability which the mind possesses of forming gen- eral abstract ideas, is of much practical importance. It is not easy to estimate the increase of power which is thus given to the action of the human mind, particularly in reasoning. By means of general abstract propositions, we are able to state volumes in a few sentences ; that is to say, the truths, stated and illustrated in a few general propositions, would fill volumes in their particular appli- cations. Without the ability of forming general notions, we should not be able to number, even in the smallest de- gree. Before we can consider objects as forming a mul- titude, or are able to number them, it seems necessary to be able to apply to them a common name. This we can- not do until we have reduced them to a genus ; and the formation of a genus implies the power (or process, rath- er) of abstraction. Consequently, we should be unable, without such power, to number. — How greatj then, is the practical importance of that intellectual process by which general abstractions are formed ! — Without the ability to number, we should be at a loss in our investigations where this ability is required ; without the«power to class- ify, all our speculations must be limited to particulars, and we should be capable of no general reasoning. §86. Of general abstract truths or principles. There are not only general abstract ideas, but abstract truths or principles also of a general nature, which are deserving of some attention, especially in a practical point of view. Although enough has already been said to show the importance of abstraction, it may yet be de- sirable to have a more full view of its applications 100 ABSTRACTION. The process, in forming general truths or principles of an abstract nature, seems to be this. We must begin undoubtedly with the examination and study of particu- lars; with individual objects and characters, and with insulated events. We subsequently confirm the truth of whatever has been ascertained in such inquiry, by an ob- servation of other like objects and events. We proceed from one individual to another, till no doubt remains. — Having in this way arrived at some general fact or prin- ciple, we thenceforward throw aside the consideration of the particular objects on which it is founded, and make it alone, exclusively and abstractly, the subject of our mental contemplations. W T e repeat this process again and again, till the mind, instead of being wholly taken up w^ith a multitude of particulars, is stored with truths of a general kind. These truths it subsequently combines in trains of reasoning, compares together, and deduces from them others of still wider application. $ 87. Of the speculations of philosophers and others. What has been said leads us to observe, that there is a characteristical difference between the speculations of men of philosophic minds and those of the common mass of people, which is worthy of some notice. The difference between the two is not so much, that philosophers are accustomed to carry on processes of reasoning to a great- er extent, as this, that they are more in the habit of em- ploying general abstract ideas and general terms, and that, consequently, the conclusions which they form are more comprehensive. Nor are their general reasonings, although the conclusions at which they arrive seem, in their particular applications, to indicate wonderful fertil- ity of invention, so difficult in the performance as is apt to be supposed. They have so often and so long looked at general ideas and general propositions ; have been so accustomed, as one may say, to contemplate the general nature of things, divested of all superfluous and all spe- cific circumstances, that they have formed a habit ; and the operation is performed without difficulty. It requires in such persons no greater intellectual effort than w r ould be necessary in skilfully managing the details of ordinary business. OF ATTENTION. UJ1 The speculations of the great bulk of mankind differ from those of philosophers in being, both in the subjects of them and in their results, particular. They discover an inability to enlarge their view to universal propositions, which embrace a great number of individuals. They may possess the power of mere argument, of comparing propo- sitions together which concern particulars, and deducing inferences from them to a great degree ; but when they attempt to contemplate general propositions, their minds are perplexed, and the conclusions which are drawn from them appear obscure, however clearly the previous pro- cess of reasoning may have been expressed. CHAPTER XL OF ATTENTION. § 88. Of the general nature of attention. Without considering it necessary to speak of attention as a separate intellectual power or faculty, as some may be inclined to do, it seems to be sufficient to say, that at- tention expresses the state of the mind, when it is stead- ily directed, for a length of time, to some object of sense or intellect, exclusive of other objects. When we say that any external object, or any subject of thought which is purely internal, receives attention, it seems to be the fact, as far as we are able to determine, that the intellect 's occupied with the subject of its attention, whatever it is, for a certain period, and that all other things are, for the time being, shut out. In other words, the grasp which the perceptive power fixes upon the object of its contem- plations is an undivided, an unbroken one. — But this does not appear to be all. There is not only a distinct and exclusive mental perception ; but also an act of the will, directing, condensing, and confining the perception. So that, in all cases of attention, the act of the mind may be regarded as a complex one, involving not only the mere perception or series of perceptions, but also an act 12 102 OF ATTENTION. of the will, founded on some feeling of desire or sentiment of duty. It is the act of the will, prompted in general by the feeling of desire or interest, which keeps the mind intense and fixed in its position. § 89. Of different degrees of attention. In agreement with this view of the subject, we olten speak of attention as great or small, as existing in a very high or a very slight degree. When the view of the mind is only momentary, and is unaccompanied, as it generally is at such times, with any force of emotion or energy of volitive action, then the attention is said to be slight. When, on the contrary, the mind directs itself to an ob- ject, or series of objects, with earnestness, and for a con- siderable length of time, and refuses to attend to anything else, then the attention is said to be intense. We commonly judge at first of the degree of attention to a subject from the length of time during which the mind is occupied with it. But when we look a little further, it will be found that the time will generally de- pend upon the strength and permanency of the attendant emotion of interest. And hence, both the time and the degree of feeling are to be regarded in our estimate of the power of attention in any particular case ; the former being the result, and, in some sense, a measure of the latter. Of instances of people who are able to give but slight attention to any subject of thought, who cannot bring their minds to it with steadiness and power, we every- where find multitudes, and there are some instances where this ability has been possessed in such a high degree as to be worthy of notice. There have been mathematicians who could investigate the most complicated problems amid every variety and character of disturbance. It was said of Julius Caesar, that, while writing a despatch, he could at the same time dictate four others to his secreta- ries ; and if he did not write himself, could dictate seven letters at once. The same thing is asserted also of the Emperor Napoleon, who had a wonderful capability of directing his whole mental energy to whatever came be- fore him.* * Segur's H'story of the Expedition to Russia, bk. vii., ch. xiii. OF ATTENTION 103 9 90 Dependence of memory on atten ion. There seems to be no doctrine in mental philosophy more clearly established than this, that memory depends on attention; that is, where attention is very slight, re- membrance is weak, and where attention is intense, re- membrance continues longer. — There are many facts which confirm this statement. (1.) In the course of a single day, persons who are m the habit of winking will close their eyelids perhaps thousands of times, and, as often as they close them, will place themselves in utter darkness. Probably they are conscious at the time both of closing their eyelids and of being in the dark ; but, as their attention is chiefly taken up with other things, they have entirely forgotten it.' — (2.) Let a person be much engaged in conversation, or occupied with any very interesting speculation, and the clock will strike in the room where he is, apparently without his having any knowledge of it. He hears the clock strike as much as at any other time, but, not at- tending to the perception of sound, and having his thoughts directed another way, he immediately forgets. — (3.) In the occupations of the day, when a multitude of cares are pressing us on every side, a thousand things escape our notice ; they appear to be neither seen nor heard, nor to affect us in any way whatever. But at the stillness of evening, when anxieties and toils are quieted, and there is a general pause in nature, we seem to be endued with a new sense, and the slightest sound attracts our attention. Shakspeare has marked even this <4 The crow doth sing as sweetly as the iark When neither is attended ; and, I think, The nightingale, if she should sing by day, When every goose is cackling, would be thought No better a musician than the wren." It is on the same principle that people dwelling in the vicinity of waterfalls do not appear to notice the sound. The residents in the neighbourhood even of the great Cataract of Niagara are not seriously disturbed by it, al- though it is an unbroken, interminable thunder to all others. — The reason in all these cases is the same, as has already been given. There is no attention and no re- membrance, and, of course, virtually no perception. (4.) Whenever we read a book, we do not observe 104 OF ATTENTION. the words merely as a whole, but t very letter of which they are made up, and even the minute parts of these let- ters. But it is merely a glance ; it does not for any length of time occupy our attention ; we immediately forget, and with great difficulty persuade ourselves that We have truly perceived the letters of the word. The fact that every letter is in ordinary cases observed by us, may be proved by leaving out a letter of the word, or by substituting others of a similar form. We readily, in reading, detect such omissions or substitutions. (5.) An expert accountant can sum up, almost with a single glance of the eye, a long column of figures. The operation is performed almost instantaneously, and yet he ascertains the sum of the whole with unerring certainty. It is impossible that he should learn the sum without no- ticing every figure in the whole column, and without al- lowing each its proper worth ; but the attention to them was so very slight, that he is unable to remember this distinct notice. Many facts of this kind evidently show, as we think, that memory depends upon attention, or rather upon a con- tinuance of attention, and varies with that continuance. § 91. Of exercising attention in reading. If attention, as we have seen, be requisite to memory, then we are furnished with a practical rule of considera- ble importance. The rule is, Not to give a hasty and careless reading of authors, but read them with a suitable degree of deliberation and thought. — If we are asked the reason of this direction, we find a good and satisfactory one in the fact referred to at the head of this section, that there cannot be memory without attention, or, rather, that the power of memory will vary with the degree ol attention. By yielding to the desire of becoming ac- quainted with a greater variety of departments of knowl- edge than the understanding is able to master, and, as a necessary consequence, by bestowing upon each of them only a very slight attention, we remain essentially igno- rant of the whole. (1.) The person who pursues such a course finds him- self unable to recall what he has been over ; he has a great many half-formed notions floating in his mind, but OF ATTENTION. 105 these are so ill shaped and so little under his control as to be but little better than actual ignorance. This is one evil result of reading authors and of going over sciences in the careless way which has been specified, that the knowledge thus acquired, if it can be called knowledge, is of very little practical benefit, in consequence of being so poorly digested and so little under control. — (2.) But there is another, and perhaps more serious evil. This practice greatly disqualifies one for all intellectual pur- suits. To store the mind with new ideas is only a part of education. It is, at least, a matter of equal impor- tance, to impart to all the mental powers a suitable disci- pline, to exercise those that are strong, to strengthen those that are weak, and to maintain among all of them a suitable balance. An attentive and thorough examina- tion of subjects is a training up of the mind in both these respects. It furnishes it with that species of knowledge which is most valuable, because it is not mixed up with errors ; and, moreover, gives a strength and consistency to the whole structure of the intellect. Whereas, when the mind is long left at liberty to wander from object to object, without being called to account and subjected to the rules of salutary discipline, it entirely loses, at last, the ability to dwell upon the subjects of its thoughts, and ex- amine them. And, when this power is once lost, there is but little ground to expect any solid attainments. § 92. Alleged inability to command the attention. We are aware tha( hose who, in accordance with these directions, are required to make a close and thor- ough examination of subjects, will sometimes complain that they find a great obstacle in their inability to fix their attention. They are not wanting in ability to com- prehend ; but find it difficult to retain the mind in one po- sition so long as to enable them to connect together all the parts of a subject, and duly estimate their various bear- ings. When this intellectual defect exists, it becomes a new reason for that thorough examination of subjects, which has been above recommended. It has probably been caused by a neglect of such strictness of exami- nation, and by a too rapid and careless transition from one subject to anothei 106 OF ATTENTION. Attention, it will be recollected, expresses the slate of the mine 4 when it is steadily directed for some, time, whether longer or shorter, to some object of sense or in- tellect, exclusive jf other objects. All other objects are shut out; and when this exclusion of everything else continues for some time, the attention is said to be in- tense. — Now it is well known that such an exclusive di- rection of the mind cannot exist for any long period without being accompanied with a feeling of desire or of duty. In the greatest intellectual exertions, not the mere powers of judging, of abstracting, and of reasoning are concerned ; there will also be a greater or less move- ment of the feelings. And it will be found that no feel- ing will effectually confine the minds of men in scientific pursuits, but a love of the truth. Mr. Locke thought that the person who should discov- er a remedy for wandering thoughts would do a great service to the studious and contemplative part of man- kind. We know of no other effective remedy than the one just mentioned, a love of the truth, a desire to know the nature and relations of things, merely for the sake of knowledge. It is true, that a conviction of duty will do much; ambition and interest may possibly do more ; but when the mind is led to deep investigations by these views merely, without finding something beauti- ful and attractive in the aspect of knowledge itself, it is likely to prove a tiresome process. The excellence of knowledge, therefore, considered merely in the light of its being suited to the intellectual nature of man, and as the appropriate incentive and reward of intellectual ac- tivity, ought to be frequently impressed. — " I saw D' Alem- bert," says a recent writer, " congratulate a young man very coldly who brought him a solution of a problem. The young man said, ' I have done this in order to have a seat in the Academy.' ' Sir,' answered D'Alembert, ' with such dispositions you never will earn one. Sci- ence must be loved for its own sake, and not for the ad- vantage to be derived. No other principle will enable a man to make progress in the sciences !' "* * Memoirs of Montlosier, vol. i., page 58, as quoted in Mackintosh's Ethical Philosophy, sect. vii. DREAMING 107 CHAPTER XII DREAMING. <) $3. Definition of dreams and the prevalence of ..hem. Among numerous other subjects in mental philosophy which claim their share of attention, tnat of Dreaming is entitled to its place ; nor can we be certain that any other will be found more appropriate to it than the present, es- pecially when we consider how closely it is connected in till its forms with our sensations and conceptions. And what are Dreams ? It approaches, perhaps, sufficiently near to a correct general description to say, that they are our mental states and operations while we are asleep. But the particular views which are to be taken in the ex- amination of this subject will not fail to throw light on this general statement. The mental states and exercises which go under this name have ever excited much interest. It is undoubt- edly one reason of the attention, which the subject of our dreams has ever elicited among all classes of people, that they are so prevalent ; it being very difficult, if not im- possible, to find a person who has not had more or less of this experience. Mr. Locke, however, tells us of an in- dividual who never dreamed till the twenty-sixth year of his age, when he happened to have a fever, and then dreamed for the first time. Plutarch also mentions one Cleon, a friend of his, who lived to an advanced age, and yet had never dreamed once in his life; and remarks that he had heard the same thing reported of Thrasymedes. Undoubtedly these persons dreamed very seldom, as we find that some dream much more than others ; but it is possible that they may have dreamed at some time and entirely forgotten it. So that it cannot with certainty be inferred from such instances as these, that there are any vho are entirely exempt from dreaming. § 94. Connexion of dreams with our waking thoughts. In grong an explanation of dreams, our attention is 108 DREAMING. first arrested by the circumstance that they have an inti- mate relationship with our waking thoughts. The great body of our waking experiences appear in the form of trains of associations ; and these trains of associated ideas, in greater or less continuity, and with greater or less va- riation, continue when we are asleep. — Condorcet (a name famous in the history of France) told some one 5 that, while he was engaged in abstruse and profound cal- culations, he was frequently obliged to leave them in an unfinished state, in order to retire to rest, and that the re- maining steps and the conclusion of his calculations have more than once presented themselves in his dreams. — Franklin also has made the remark, that the bearings and results of political events, which had caused him much trouble while awake, were not unfrequently unfolded to him in dreaming. — Mr. Coleridge says, that, as he was once reading in the Pilgrimage of Purchas an account of the palace and garden of the Khan Kubla, he fell into a sleep, and in that situation composed an entire poem of not less than two hundred lines, some of which he after- ward committed to writing. The poem is entitled Kubla Khan, and begins as follows : " In Xanadu did Kubla Khan A stately pleasure-dome decree ; Where Alph, the sacred river, ran Through caverns measureless to man Down to a sunless sea." It is evident from such statements as these, which are confirmed by the experience of almost every person, that our dreams are fashioned from the materials of the thoughts and feelings which we have while awake ; in other words, they will, in a great degree, be merely the repetition of our customary and prevailing associations. So well un- derstood is this, that President Edwards, who was no less distinguished as a mental philosopher than as a theolo gian, thought it a good practice to take particular notice of his dreams, in order to ascertain from them what his predominant inclinations were. § 95. Dreams are often caused by our sensations. But while we are to look for the materials of our dreams in thoughts which had previously existed, we DREAMING. 109 further find that they are not beyond the influence of those slight bodily sensations of which we are susceptible even in hours of sleep. These sensations, slight as they are, are the means of introducing one set of associations rather than another. — Dugald Stewart relates an incident which may be considered an evidence of this, that a per son with whom he was acquainted had occasion, in con- sequence of an indisposition, to apply a bottle of hot water to his feet when he went to bed, and the consequence was, that he dreamed he was making a journey to the top of Mount iEtna, and that he found the heat of the ground almost insupportable. There was once a gentle- man in the English army who was so susceptible of audi- ble impressions while he was asleep, that his companions could make him dream of what they pleased. Once, in particular, they made him go through the whole process of a duel, from the preliminary arrangements to the firing of the pistol, which they put into his hand for that pur- pose, and which, when it exploded, waked him. A cause of dreams, closely allied to the above, is the variety of sensations which we experience from the stom- ach, viscera, &c. — Persons, for instance, who have been for a long time deprived of food, or have received it only in small quantities, hardly enough to preserve life, will be likely to have dreams in some way or other directly re- lating to their condition. Baron Trenck relates, that, being almost dead with hunger when confined in his dungeon, his dreams every night presented to him the well-filled and luxurious tables of Berlin, from which, as they were presented before him, he imagined he was about to relieve his hunger. " The night had far advan- ced," says Irving, speaking of the voyage of Mendez to Hispaniola, " but those whose turn it was to take repose were unable to sleep, from the intensity of their thirst ; or if they slept, it was to be tantalized with dreams of cool fountains and running brooks." The state of health also has considerable influence, not only in producing dreams, but in giving them a particular character. The remark has been made by medical men, that acute diseases, particularly fevers, are often precedpd md indicated by disagreeable and oppressive dreidas. K L10 DREAMING § 96 Explanation of the incoherency of dreams. (1st cause.; There is frequently much of wildness, inconsistency, and contradiction in our dreams. The mind passes very rapidly from one object to another ; strange and singular incidents occur. If our dreams be truly the repetition of our waking thoughts, it may well be inquired, How this wildness and inconsistency happen 1 The explanation of this peculiarity resolves itself into two parts. — The first ground or cause of it is, that our dreams are not subjected, like our waking thoughts, to the control and regulation of surrounding objects. While we are awake, our trains of thought are kept uniform and coherent by the influence of such objects, which continu- ally remind us of our situation, character, and duties; and which keep in check any tendency to revery. But in sleep the senses are closed ; the soul is accordingly, in a great measure, excluded from the material world, and is thus deprived of the salutary regulating influence from that source. <5» 97. Second cause of the incoherency of dreams. In the second place, when we are asleep, our associated trains of thought are no longer under the control of the will. We do not mean to say that the operations of the will are suspended at such times, and that volitions have no existence. On the contrary, there is sufficient evidence of the continuance of these mental acts, in some degree at least ; since volitions must have made a part of the original trains of thought which are repeated in dream- ing ; and furthermore, we are often as conscious of exer- cising or putting forth volitions when dreaming as of any other mental acts ; for instance, imagining, remembering, assenting, or reasoning. When we dream that we are attacked by an enemy sword in hand, but happen, as we suppose in our dreaming experiences, to be furnished in self-defence with an instrument of the same kind, we dream that we mill to exert it for our own safety and against our antagonist ; and we as truly in this case put forth the mental exercise which we term volition, as, in any other, we exercise remembrance, or imagine, or reason hi our sleep. DREAMING 111 Admitting, however, that the will continues to act in sleep, it is quite evident that the volitions which are put forth by it have ceased to exercise their customary influ- ence in respect to our mental operations. Ordinarily we are able, by means of an act of the will, to fix our atten- tion upon some particular part of any general subject which has been suggested, or to transfer it to some other part of such subject, and thus to direct and to regulate the whole train of mental action. But the moment we are soundly asleep, this influence ceases, and hence, in connexion with the other cause already mentioned, arise the wildness, incoherency, and contradictions which exist. A person, while he is awake, has his thoughts under such government, and is able, by the direct and indirect influence of volitions, so to regulate them as generally to bring them in the end to some conclusion, which he fore- sees and wishes to arrive at. But in dreaming, as all di- recting and governing influence, both internal and exter- nal, is at an end, our thoughts and feelings seem to be driven forward, much like a ship at sea without a rudder, wherever it may happen.