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SPEECH 
 
 MR. JOSEPH SEGAR, 
 
 (OF ELIZABETH CITY AND WARWICK, 
 
 ON THE 
 
 WILMOT PROVISO 
 
 Delivered in the House of Delegates, January 19, 1849. 
 
 RICHMOND: 
 
 PRINTED BY SUET HERD AND COLIN 
 
 1849. 
 

 \<- 
 
 
SPEECH. 
 
 The resolutions of the joint committee being under consideration, 
 Mr. SEGAR said: 
 
 I had not designed, Mr. Speaker, to take part in this discussion ; 
 but my constituents expect me to sustain the resolutions on your table, 
 and to vindicate their rights and interests in the premises, not by my 
 vote only but by argument. I bow to the mandate of those who have 
 the right to command me, and I rise, in their name, to enter a solemn 
 protest against the power of congress to prohibit slavery in the territo- 
 ries, or in other words, to enact the Wilmot Proviso. But it is due to 
 myself to declare, as I now most explicitly do, that so far as my vote 
 is concerned, I have no need of any intimation from my constituents. 
 Despite the criticisms of my friend from Harrison, " with all their sins 
 and imperfections upon their head," the resolutions command my hear- 
 tiest approval. 
 
 I shall make an honest endeavour, Mr. Speaker, to approach this 
 grave subject with feelings utterly divested of party. I am a decided 
 party man, I confess. I am a Whig — have been from the earliest days 
 of the party — have reared no other flag — fought under no other ban- 
 ner. My modes of thinking have assumed, of course, a strong party 
 cast. But on this subject I cannot, dare not, think or act as a party 
 man. It rises infinitely above all mere party considerations. It is a 
 great question, if I may so speak, of magna charta ; of first princi- 
 ples; of guaranteed right. It may be, if our northern brethren will 
 so have it, a question of union or of disunion — that mightiest, gravest, 
 most fearful issue ever involved in human affairs, or presented to the 
 contemplation of civilized man. God forbid that I should approach a 
 subject like this with one emotion of party impulse ! I should disho- 
 nour myself, and violate every obligation of representative trust and 
 moral propriety. 
 
 If the preliminary objection taken by the distinguished gentleman 
 from Fauquier, that we have no right to take cognizance of the sub- 
 ject matter of the resolutions, be well founded ; and if, to use his 
 strong language, the action of this legislature will involve an "out- 
 rageous and insulting assumption of power," there is an end of the 
 question, and it is our duty to lay the resolutions on the table, and 
 there let them sleep, until we shall be roused up by some startling 
 deed of actual aggression. But we need not be " frightened from our 
 propriety" by the grave animadversion of the gentleman from Fauquier. 
 There is no such want of authority as he alleges. 1 hold the power 
 of this general assembly to be utterly unlimited, save by the restric- 
 tions of our own constitution, and the prohibitions of the constitution 
 
of the United States. But there is nothing in the limitations of either 
 of these instruments to forbid our action. The objection, therefore, 
 to our want of authority falls to the ground, and we shall not, in 
 taking cognizance of this matter, commit the gross assumption charged 
 by the gentleman from Fauquier. We shall be acting strictly within 
 the line of our rightful powers. 
 
 Sir, the gentleman from Fauquier has himself conceded the whole 
 question of power. He admits that the representatives of Virginia 
 here may take cognizance of federal matters in certain cases ; in those, 
 for example, of actual assault upon our rights, or to use his own words, 
 " where the state is directly injured." This is a concession of juris- 
 diction ; besides, the gentleman has submitted a series of resolutions 
 of his own, which surely he would not have done, were it an act of 
 gross assumption in this legislature to take cognizance of the subject. 
 Again, it is admitted we may take jurisdiction of the subject, pro- 
 vided we couch our resolutions in such terms as that all may agree. 
 This would bo to postpone action altogether, not only in this, but in 
 all other cases ; for God has so constituted the human mind that men 
 will differ, even on the plainest questions. The friends of the joint 
 resolutions have been taunted with the reproach of having reported 
 such as do not command the support of all ; but do not gentlemen see 
 that this reproach may be well retorted upon them? You do wrong, 
 say they, in bringing forward resolutions on which we cannot all 
 a°ree ; and yet they, who venture the animadversion, turn imme- 
 diately round, and themselves offer resolutions which concede the 
 constitutional power of congress to pass the Wilmot proviso — a con- 
 cession which prostrates every bulwark of southern rights, and sur- 
 renders, not the outposts only, but the citadel itself: — resolutions 
 which would be condemned by the voice of nineteen twentieths of 
 the people of Virginia, and which will not, perhaps, command a dozen 
 votes on this floor ! 
 
 After all, (said Mr. S.,) it is a question of pure expediency, whether 
 we shall take action or not ; and about this, I marvel how gentlemen 
 can differ. Shall we wait until the evil is upon us? Do we bring up 
 the fire engine after the house is burned down? Do we wait until 
 the patient is in the last agony of the death struggle before we send 
 for the physician ? If a man design to rob me or to beat me, am I to 
 wait until he ties me before I resist? Sir, incipient steps against our 
 rights have already been taken. A committee of congress has actually 
 been instructed to report a bill applying the principle of the Wilmot 
 proviso to the new territories, and another to abolish slavery and the 
 slave trade in the District of Columbia. The evil is at our thresh- 
 holds. All propositions, too, for an adjustment of the vexed question 
 have failed. The Maryland portion of the district will not be ceded 
 back, and the proposal to erect a state out of New Mexico and Cali- 
 fornia has been reported against by the judiciary committee of the 
 senate of the United States, as being barred by constitutional im- 
 pediment. Now if, while these things are transpiring under our 
 very noses, and while, too, the legislature is in session, we say 
 nothing, what will our silence be but acquiescence, and what will ac- 
 
quiescence be but ruin? Sir, we must speak out, or we give encou- 
 ragement to those who are meditating outrage upon our rights. 
 
 Strange, strange policy is that, Mr. Speaker, which asks vs to do 
 nothing, while every day the northern states are passing resolutions 
 instructing their representatives ill congress to vote for the Wilmot 
 proviso, and taking ground that no new slave states ought to be ad- 
 mitted into the federal union. Silence, under such circumstances, 
 will be the veriest impolicy, and a slavish surrender of all our northern 
 assailants demand. Fatal inactivity will it prove ! 
 
 But all doubt of the propriety of this movement is removed by the 
 information which has reached us, that our representatives in congress 
 desire action at our hands. The distinguished gentleman from Berke- 
 ley, (Mr. Faulkner.) whose heart, I rejoice to know, is warmly with 
 us on this great question, who is recently from Washington, informed 
 ns the other night, in solemn tone, that our representatives there are 
 looking with hope to Virginia. They are on the spot — are at the very 
 point of danger — know best what is transpiring around them — under- 
 stand well the necessity for action ; and to their views we ought to 
 accord the highest respect. What better guide can we have ? And 
 taking the obnoxious measures already referred to, in connection with 
 the intelligence received from our delegates in congress, how can we 
 doubt the propriety of passing these or similar resolutions? 
 
 I have heard it whispered (said Mr. S.) that recent developements 
 shew that even the south are divided on this question ; and this cir- 
 cumstance is held up to deter us from taking action. Sir, I much fear 
 there are men of both political parties in the south — I mean, of course, 
 none on this floor — who are courting northern popularity, and whose 
 views of personal ambition have gotten the better of their fidelity to 
 the south. Or, perhaps, there be those who, from their central posi- 
 tion in the south, not being exposed to the sufferings and perils of a 
 border location, are indifferent on the subject which now engages our 
 solemn deliberations. In either case, there is the greater necessity for 
 oar action. However it may be with others, with vs it is a question 
 of self-preservation — of life or death. And however others may prove 
 delinquent, let us, who have so much at hazard, look well to it before 
 we concede every thing to our assailants. 
 
 We have, moreover, Sir, taken our position. We planted ourselves 
 in 1847 on certain ground, on which all agreed to stand, and the re- 
 solutions before us constituted the ground on which we then stood. 
 To change our position now; to adopt at this time resolves less deci- 
 ded and stringent than those we agreed on then, will be a retreat and 
 backing out from a position deliberately taken. Such a step would 
 scarcely escape the observation of northern sagacity, and would ope- 
 rate as an inducement to northern invasion of our rights, already suffi- 
 ciently unscrupulous to excite our most serious apprehensions. For 
 these reasons, if for no other, I cannot yield my support to either set 
 of resolutions submitted by the gentlemen from Fauquier. Fairfax and 
 Loudoun. They do what I can never consent to do : make us change 
 our position, and acknowledge that position to be a false one: they 
 do not march up to the crisis: they ask us to concede the constitu- 
 
tional power of congress to pass the Wilmot proviso, which the south 
 can never concede, and which, for one, I will never concede while life 
 lasts. To give up that is to give up all. It shoves from the south the 
 last plank on which it can float. It is the preliminary step, the enter- 
 ing wedge, to the entire abolition of slavery. 
 
 And as for the objection, that the members of this legislature have 
 not been selected with especial reference to action upon this subject, I 
 must say with entire deference to those who make it, there is little in 
 it. It proves too much : it would be fatal to all action, even in cases 
 of the utmost emergency — of the most direct and dangerous assaults 
 upon our rights. Suppose, for example, congress were this moment 
 to abolish slavery in the states, and the fact were telegraphed to us in 
 our seats, would my friend from Fauquier, and those who act with 
 him, patiently wait until a special legislature should be selected for 
 the special outrage ? Should we sit here : ' deliberating in cold debate" 
 whether this or a subsequent legislature should meet the injury and re- 
 dress the wrong ? 
 
 Sir, the legislature of 1798 were not selected with any specific re- 
 ference to the unconstitutional action of the federal government ; yet 
 they did act, and that action was efficient, for its effect was the indig- 
 nant denunciation and the speedy repeal of the obnoxious measures 
 (the alien and sedition laws) against which that action was directed. 
 
 The simple truth is, that we were all elected to this body with the 
 general trusts and responsibilities of the representative character, which 
 are generally indefinite, and do not look to or contemplate, because 
 they cannot foresee, all the emergencies which may call for the exer- 
 cise of representative discretion. Do we know the sentiments of our 
 constituents? that is the question, and the only question. If we know 
 them, no matter how we became possessed of them, it is our duty to 
 carry them out. Now, I take it that no one on this floor can mis- 
 take the wishes of his constituents on this subject. For one, I know 
 full well that, if I were to dare vote against these resolutions, and then 
 shelter myself under the suggestion of the gentleman from Fauquier, 
 that I was not elected with special regard to this subject, they would 
 doom me to a retirement from the public stage, which would endure 
 much longer than that which I suffered under the proscription of a 
 certain hard and iniquitous law of this commonwealth. 
 
 It is our clear right, then, and our obvious duty to take action in 
 this matter. We may not, and do not combine the best materials in 
 the land, for the very reason suggested by the gentlemen from Fau- 
 quier, that we were not purposely chosen for the emergency that be- 
 sets us. There is much of the talent of Virginia that is not here. 
 There are, doubtless, in the quiet walks of private life, many sons of 
 the Old Dominion who are abler, far, than the generality of the mem- 
 bers of this house; but, Sir, such as we are, limited as our capacities 
 may be, we ought to do our duty to the best of our ability ; and hav- 
 ing done this, we can take to our consciences the consolation adminis- 
 tered by the great moral bard of England : 
 
 " Who does the best his circumstance allows, 
 Acts well, does nobly, angels could no more." 
 
I come now to the constitutional question. Has congress the power 
 to enact a law prohibiting the citizens of the slave states from migra- 
 ting with their slaves to the territories of the United States ? I utterly 
 deny the existence of such a power. 
 
 Some have deduced it from the broad assumption, that congress has 
 the general right of legislation for the territories,- and the opinions of 
 Judges Kent and Story have been referred to, to shew that the right 
 is "exclusive, absolute and universal." If any limitation was meant, 
 it was not stated or defined. I need not waste time in controverting 
 a doctrine so monstrous and absurd. It makes congress omnipotent 
 in the territories; gives it, when legislating there, powers dehors the 
 constitution. It might pass an ex post facto law. or make an estab- 
 lished religion. The conclusive answer is. that congress can exercise 
 no power, either in the states or the territories, that is not either ex- 
 pressly granted in the constitution, or which is not necessarily deducible 
 from those which are expressly granted. It has been so decided by 
 the supreme court of the United States, in the celebrated Cohen case, 
 though such a decision were matter of entire supererogation. 
 
 But the gentleman from Fauquier derives it from the power to ac- 
 quire territory. If I apprehend his argument, it was in this wise : 
 Congress has the right to acquire territory ; the right to acquire carries 
 with it, necessarily, the power to govern and to legislate: slavery is 
 one of the ordinary subjects of legislation ; there is no limitation in 
 the constitution on the power to legislate on the subject of slavery: 
 therefore, congress has all power to legislate on this subject in the ac- 
 quired territory. 
 
 The power of congress to legislate in the territories, I shall not pre- 
 sume to controvert ; and I agree that it is derived from the source from 
 which the gentleman from Fauquier derives it, the power to acquire 
 territory. And I concede, further, that slavery is one of the usual 
 subjects of legislation, and that congress may legislate about it in the 
 territories. But here the gentleman from Fauquier and myself must 
 part. I cannot follow him to the conclusion at which he arrives, that 
 congress may so legislate in the territories as to deprive slaveholders of 
 the right of going thither with their slaves, and having them, when 
 there, protected as property. 
 
 I am told that the moment I concede that congress may legislate at 
 all on the subject of slavery in the territories, I must shew a limitation 
 on the power, negativing the Wilmot proviso, or give up the question. 
 I admit the onus of pointing out the limitation is'upon me, and this is 
 precisely what I propose to do. 
 
 There is no express prohibition, 1 allow; but express prohibition is 
 by no means necessary. There are implied prohibitions, arising from 
 the fundamental principles and general character of our institutions, 
 which are just as effectual to limit and restrain the power of congress 
 as the most positive, express restriction. Let us illustrate by exam- 
 ples. 
 
 Suppose congress were to pass a law giving away the public lands 
 in the territories— the gold region in California, for instance: would 
 such a law be constitutional ? Certainly not ; because it would defeat 
 
8 
 
 the very objects for which territory is acquired, and violate the com- 
 mon rights of all the states. Yet there is no express provision prohi- 
 
 biting it 
 
 Or, taking a more palpable illustration — suppose congress should, 
 by law, vest in the governor of a territory legislative and judicial 
 functions, making him lawgiver, judge, and executive: there is in the 
 constitution no express inhibition of such an enactment. Yet it 
 would be a flagrant violation of that instrument. It would be a con- 
 centration in one man, of executive, legislative and judicial powers — 
 a thing which, though not forbidden in express terms in the constitu- 
 tion, is nevertheless clearly prohibited by the general spirit and ge- 
 nius of that constitution, and repudiated by that fundamental maxim 
 of all free governments, appertaining more particularly to our own, 
 which requires that the legislative, judicial, and executive departments 
 shall be separate, distinct and independent. 
 
 These illustrations are conclusive to shew that a thing may be for- 
 bidden by implication, as effectually as by the most express restriction. 
 In other words, prohibitions may be implied, as well as the means for 
 carrying into effect the clear substantive grants of the constitution. 
 
 Where, then, is the implied prohibition that makes it unlawful in 
 congress to pass the Wilmot proviso? Where do we find that restric- 
 tive mandate of the constitution which pronounces unconstitutional 
 an act of congress that forbids the citizens of the southern states 
 from migrating with their slaves to the newly acquired territories? 
 
 Sir, I find it in the great principle of the entire and perfect equality 
 of all the states of this confederacy — a principle running through all 
 the provisions of the constitution, and as palpably stamped upon it as 
 one of its great, leading fundamental features and principles, as if it 
 were written down in the most express terms that language can supply. 
 I lay it down then, as a proposition not to be impeached by the 
 most ultra latitudinarian in the land, that in all the great moral capaci- 
 ties of sovereignty, the states of this Union are unreservedly equal. 
 Putting the strongest case, the little state of Delaware, pent up in her 
 narrow confines, scarce equal to a single county in Virginia, is, in the 
 sense I am considering, the equal, the full equal of her empire sister, 
 New York. She boasts not the same broad domain, nor the like bril- 
 liant commerce, not the fortieth of her population, nor the hundredth 
 of her wealth and resources. In the distribution of a common fund 
 she would not share, it is true, as much as New York, because that 
 would be one of the very inequalities condemned by the general prin- 
 ciples of the constitution. But I do affirm that in the quality of right 
 arising under the constitution — in all the moral characteristics of a 
 
 state in dignity, in privilege, in benefit, in freedom, independence 
 
 and sovereignty — the little state of Delaware is the equal of the great 
 state of New York : just (to use the illustration of Vattel) " as a dwarf 
 is as much a man as a giant, and the smallest republic as much a state 
 as the greatest empire." It is in this sense the states are equal. The 
 se^is of the constitution is thrown equally over all ; there is no imtnu- 
 nky enjoyed, or that can be enjoyed by one, that does not pertain and 
 belong to another and to all : and if the federal government, which is 
 
but the general agent of these coequal sovereignties, does any act that 
 makes the slightest discrimination between the one and the other, it is 
 a departure from that equality which is the very basis of our federative 
 system, and is as much an infringement of the constitution as the flat 
 disregard of the most express of its requirements. The proposition is 
 a truism. Who shall dare deny it ? 
 
 But does the Wilmot proviso invade this great principle of state 
 equality? I hold that it does, and most palpably and grossly. 
 
 It is unequal in this, — that it allows the citizens of the free states to 
 go to the territories with their property of every kind, while it denies 
 the like privilege to the citizens of the slave states. This is not only 
 unequal, it is degrading and insulting to the southern states. It is 
 placing them on a lower platform than their northern sisters. May 
 not a state be degraded through her citizens ? Is not Virginia insulted 
 and injured in her sovereign rights, by any discrimination made against 
 those citizens of hers, who owe to her their first allegiance, and to 
 whom she owes the first duty of protection ? 
 
 It is unequal also in this, — that it takes to the free states the exclu- 
 sive enjoyment, the monopoly of a common property — of territories 
 acquired by the common blood and common treasure, and which be- 
 long as much to one state as to another. Gentlemen say this is no 
 discrimination. Sir, it is an unequal, unjust, odious, dishonourable, 
 degrading discrimination. 
 
 But it is argued by the gentleman from Fauquier, that the right 
 which the states have to the territories, is one which does not pertain 
 to them as states, but to the individual citizens of the states; and 
 thus it is attempted to weaken the argument against the Wilmot pro- 
 viso deduced from the general equality of the states. 
 
 I hold that the states, as states, have this territorial interest and 
 right. Sir, who framed the confederation? Who made the Union? 
 Who were the parties to the federal compact ? Who constituted the ge- 
 neral agent ? Who executed to that agent the power of attorney under 
 which, and which alone, it acts ? The individual citizens of the states ? 
 By no means, Mr. Speaker. It is an historical fact, that the states, acting 
 as states, as separate sovereignties, adopted the federal constitution, and 
 defined the powers and the capacities of the new government. The peo- 
 ple of the United States did not meet in one aggregate mass to adopt 
 the constitution, but the people of each state met separately, and acted 
 separately; each voting as a state, as a separate, independent sove- 
 reignty. Besides: Were not the new territories acquired by the com- 
 mon blood and common treasure of all the states ? Did not Virginia 
 stand, in the Mexican war, side by side with Massachusetts, as they 
 did shoulder to shoulder in the revolution? Did not the best blood of 
 each drench the Mexican soil ? Do not the bones of Webster, and 
 Lincoln, and Irwin, and Mason, and Thornton, and Alburtis, bleach 
 on the same battle field ? Did not each state contribute its share in the 
 general charge and expenditure ? And when the federal government 
 called for troops, on whom was the requisition made ? Upon the in- 
 dividual citizens of the states, or upon the states as states 7 
 2 
 
10 
 
 But, to illustrate this position more clearly, let us suppose a peaceful 
 dissolution of the Union to have taken place : would not the states be 
 entitled to their distributive shares of the common property, the terri- 
 tories ? And if a division were about to take place, to whom would 
 it be divided out? Not, Sir, I presume, to the individual citizen, but 
 to the states themselves. On every principle, then, I maintain that 
 the states have a common right to the territories, of which they can- 
 not be deprived without violating the common equality. 
 
 But I take the gentleman from Fauquier upon his own ground, as I 
 understood him in his argument, and as he has just explained it. The 
 right to the territories contemplated by the constitution, (says he,) is 
 the right of the individual citizen. That is the right over which the 
 constitution throws its shielding power; and if (he said) the Wilmot 
 proviso makes a discrimination in favour of the citizens of one state 
 against those of another, it is clearly unconstitutional. This, Sir, is a 
 concession of the whole question. The Wilmot proviso does make 
 such a discrimination. Take examples. A Yankee goes to California 
 with his brass clocks and wooden nutmegs. These are recognized 
 there as property ; protected as such ; it is larceny to steal them ; and 
 the thief is punished by the laws of the United States for the theft. 
 But a citizen of Virginia goes thither with his slaves: those slaves are 
 not recognized or protected as property; it is no larceny to steal them; 
 and the man who kidnaps them is not punishable by law. Or to take 
 a more palpable illustration ; it is unequal in this — that, while it allows 
 the citizen of Massachusetts to migrate to the territories with all his 
 property, it permits the citizen of Virginia to go with only a portion. 
 The goods, wares and merchandize are regarded and protected as pro- 
 perty ; but a slave, as much property as dry goods and tinwaresor any 
 other chattel, so recognized by the constitution — the moment he puts 
 his foot on the soil of the territories — loses his character as property, 
 and " stands redeemed, regenerated and disenthralled by the irresistible 
 genius of universal emancipation." If there can be a more unequal 
 and humiliating discrimination than this, I cannot conceive it. On the 
 admission, then, of the gentleman from Fauquier himself, I claim that 
 the Wilmot proviso involves an unequal discrimination against the ci- 
 tizens of the southern states, and is, on his argument, unconstitutional. 
 
 There is but one way to invalidate this reasoning, and that is to 
 shew that slaves are not, like the wooden nutmegs, property. This, I 
 presume, no man can demonstrate. The constitution recognizes them 
 as property. Tliey have been, and may be again, subjects of direct 
 taxation for carrying on the common wars. Fugitive slaves may be 
 reclaimed. But, Sir, even if there were no constitutional recognition 
 of them as property, they would be property still. Slaves have existed 
 as property in all ages and countries of the world ; in the dark ages of 
 the past, and the bright ages of the present; in the age of the Patri- 
 archs, and in that of the Apostles; in Pagan lands, and in Christian 
 climes ; from the times of Abraham and of Lott, to the rising of Beth- 
 lehem's Star; from the days of St. Paul, who preached the obedience 
 of servants to their masters — to this proud, bright day of civil and re- 
 ligious liberty, when the Priest and the Lawgiver, the Bible and the 
 
11 
 
 Constitution, together recognize the existence and the sinlessness of 
 slavery, and its characteristic as property. I say again, that slavery 
 has existed in all ages of the world, and will, in my judgment, exist 
 in all ages to come ; because I believe it to be the ordination of God 
 himself, and property in slaves was acquired originally precisely as all 
 other property from time immemorial has been acquired — by first and 
 continued possession. Hence I reason, that though the constitution 
 had been silent on the subject, slaves would be property nevertheless, 
 and the owner of that species of property would have as clear a right 
 to remove to the territories with it, as the owner of the wooden nut- 
 megs with his. 
 
 Mr. Speaker, this question of slavery was once deliberately examined 
 and considered in all its bearings in the senate of the United States, I 
 believe in the year 1806; and as bearing directly on the point I am 
 considering, I beg leave to read to the house a most interesting extract 
 from the writings of Mr. Giles, who was an actor in the scene : 
 
 "The principle contained in these provisoes, (says Mr. Giles, giving 
 a history of the bill abolishing the slave trade,) produced the discus- 
 sion of the following questions: Has slavery existed from the begin- 
 ning of the world to this day, as far as authentic accounts of the hu- 
 man race have recorded? Is slavery recognized and sanctioned by the 
 constitution of the United States? Is slavery recognized and sanc- 
 tioned by the Holy Scriptures? Is slavery recognized and sanctioned 
 by international law? Is slavery recognized and enforced by the mu- 
 nicipal laws of individual nations, and particularly by the municipal 
 laws of the several states? What coercive acts performed by one, or 
 a number of persons, upon the body or bodies of others, would have 
 the effect of reducing those others to a state of slavery ; or in other 
 words, to subjection to the will and disposition of the person or per- 
 sons exercising these coercive acts, according to the municipal laws of 
 individual nations, and the sanctions of international law ? 
 
 "All these questions were most ably discussed, upon legal, political 
 and philosophical grounds, and eventuated in the conviction of every 
 one, that notwithstanding the refined sensibilities of the present times, 
 slavery then was, and ever had been, a legal and actual condition of 
 man, as deduced from all the preceding authoritative texts." 
 
 I have thus endeavoured to shew that, though there is no express 
 provision of the constitution limiting the power of congress over 
 slavery in the territories, it is forbidden by the implied prohibitions of 
 that instrument from passing the Wilmot proviso. 
 
 Again — it is equally repugnant to the compromises of the constitu- 
 tion touching the subject of slavery. These compromises, though 
 not written down in full, with pen and ink, in the constitution, are 
 legibly written in its history — and are as well understood and just as 
 binding as if they were put down in terms the most explicit. The 
 only question is how far these compromises extend. They reach to 
 the protection of slaves as property, as much without as within the 
 limits of the states. Wherever a slave is found in the common terri- 
 tories, the federal government, which is but the general agent or trus- 
 tee of all the states, the common owners, is bound to recognize that 
 
12 
 
 slave as property ; and if that general agent does any act to the con- 
 trary of this, it violates the true meaning and spirit of the slavery 
 compromises of the constitution. Suppose, at the time the constitu- 
 tion was framing, the northern people had said to their brethren of 
 the south, that their construction of this compromise was that they 
 should take to their own use and monopolize any territories which 
 might be afterwards acquired; would this Union have ever been 
 formed? Would not the southern states have, with scorn, spurned 
 the confederation ? 
 
 Sir, let any man read attentively the history of the constitution; let 
 him call back to memory the scenes of the past ; the excited debates ; 
 the anxious solicitude ; the alternating hopes and fears ; the now 
 bright, the now gloomy forebodings of those matchless sages who 
 devised this glorious fabric of Union : let him turn to the trying 
 difficulties that beset our patriot fathers while engaged in the holy 
 work of fashioning the bonds that make us a great, united, and happy 
 people : let him reflect that these thrilling scenes and unhappy em- 
 barrassments were altogether on account of this slavery question, and 
 were removed only when a solemn guarantee was given that slave 
 property should have the shield of the constitution to uphold and pro- 
 tect it : let these things be remembered, and then say if the Wilmot 
 proviso is not forbidden by the compromises of the constitution, and 
 condemned by every consideration of honesty and good faith. 
 
 To take another view of this subject, the federal government is the 
 trustee for all the states, holding the trust fund, the territories, for the 
 common and equal good of those who raised the trust, and constituted 
 the trustee. And the gentleman from Fauquier admits the general go- 
 vernment to be a trust, as all government is, but says the trust is final, 
 and congress the final judge. Now suppose congress grossly abuse 
 the trust — depart palpably from the terms of the trust: is congress, the 
 trustee in the case, to judge whether the trust has been faithfully exe- 
 cuted or not ? Is the cestny que trust to stand by and let the trustee 
 have his own way, and arbitrarily decide as to the proper execution of 
 the trust ? That were to set at naught the ordinary laws of trust, 
 make the wrong-doer the judge of his own wrong, and unite legisla- 
 tive and executive powers in the same head. 
 
 I conclude, on the whole, that the Wilmot proviso being forbidden 
 by the implied prohibitions, the fundamental principles and compro- 
 mises of the constitution, congress has no authority to apply it to the 
 new territories, and that it becomes us to enter our solemn protest 
 against it. 
 
 I propose to consider, next, the argument of the gentleman from 
 Alexandria. He maintains that the phrase to " make all needful rules 
 and regulations respecting the territories and other property belonging 
 to the United States," confers on congress that power of general legis- 
 lation from which may be fairly deduced the authority to pass the 
 Wilmot proviso. I might make short work of this position of my 
 friend from Alexandria, by turning him over to the tender mercies of 
 my friend from Fauquier ; for the latter strongly repudiated this deri- 
 vation of the power, and intimated no very great respect for the legal 
 
13 
 
 acumen of him who should derive it from this source. By the way, 
 Mr. Speaker, I may here remark, that the fact that these two gentle- 
 men deduce it from different sources, brings up the strong suspicion 
 that it is one of the "vagrant" class which, seeking many places in 
 the constitution to stand upon, can find not one on which to rest its 
 weary foot. 
 
 The answer to this argument has been a hundred times given, and 
 by none more clearly than by the gentleman from Logan, and it is 
 this : that the word territories, in the phrase just quoted, from its con- 
 nexion with the words "other property" clearly means lands as pro- 
 perty, and that the right to make rules and regulations respecting them, 
 confers no governmental jurisdiction over persons. 
 
 But the gentleman from Alexandria fortifies his position by many 
 judicial decisions, in relation to all which I have to say, that they are 
 totally inadequate because inapplicable to the case in point. Not one 
 of the cited cases settles either that congress has the direct power to 
 pass the Wilmot proviso, or such an absolute and universal right of 
 legislation in the territories, as would carry with it, by necessary de- 
 duction, the authority to enact it. Let us see : 
 
 1. Gratiot v. U. States. The question here was, whether power 
 given to congress to dispose of public lands, was limited to a power 
 to sell, or included also that to lease. 
 
 2. M' 'Cullough v. The State of Maryland. This was a case as to 
 the power of congress to establish a bank. No point did arise or could 
 well arise as to the power of congress over slavery in the territories. 
 
 3. Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia. The main question was 
 whether an Indian tribe was a foreign nation. The fact was adverted 
 to, that congress had established territorial governments in lands oc- 
 cupied by Tndians — nothing more. 
 
 4. American Insurance Co. v. Canter. The point in this case was 
 as to the sentence of a court of admiralty in Florida, then a territory. 
 The validity of the sentence was affirmed, and the right of congress 
 to establish territorial governments, which nobody denies: but the 
 decision does not state whether the right was derived from the power 
 to " make needful rules and regulations," or from that to acquire terri- 
 tory, or from any particular source. 
 
 5. Schooner Exchange v. M : Faddon. In this case, the point was 
 whether a public national vessel of France, coming into the U. States 
 to repair, is liable to be arrested upon the claim of title by an indivi- 
 dual. 
 
 Through all these cases there runs this fatal defect : they do not 
 decide the extent to which congress possesses the territorial power, 
 nor does one of them touch or hint at the principle of the Wilmot 
 proviso. To constitute them judicial precedents and make them 
 cases in point, they must have either expressly decided that congress 
 has the unconditional power to prohibit the introduction of slaves into 
 the territories, or such an absolute, universal right of legislation therein, 
 as would give necessarily the power in question. Shew me a case to 
 this effect, and I give up the question. 
 
14 
 
 The judicial decisions, then, cited by the gentleman from Alexan- 
 dria, are not pertinent to the argument, and if so, the power of con- 
 gress to pass the Wilmot proviso is yet res non adjudicata ; and God 
 forbid it should ever be otherwise, for if it shall be, the rights of the 
 southern people to their slaves will not be worth the parchment on 
 which those rights are inscribed. 
 
 Legislative precedent, too, is invoked, and many are referred to. 
 First and foremost, is brought up the ordinance of '87, which was en- 
 acted in the days of the old confederation. How a measure which 
 had its origin before, and was controlled by rights and obligations an- 
 tecedent to, the adoption of the present constitution, can be construed 
 into a precedent to elucidate, much less justify an exercise of power 
 under a government constituted with new capacities and functions, is 
 to my mind far-fetched and incomprehensible. The congress of the 
 old confederation might well have the power to prohibit slavery in 
 the territory northwest of the river Ohio, and yet the new government 
 not have it at all. 
 
 And this reply disposes of the cases of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan 
 and Wisconsin, in which congress did prohibit the introduction of 
 slavery. This was but the carrying out, in good faith, of the provi- 
 sions of the ordinance of '87. The new government took the north- 
 west territory subject to the terms and conditions of that ordinance, 
 one of which was the exclusion of slavery in the new states that 
 might be erected. How could congress, when forming the new states, 
 do°otherwise than form them according to the conditions on which it 
 had received the territory, out of which new states were to be made? 
 The act of congress establishing the territorial government of Mis- 
 sissippi, is adduced. Not pertinent to the question. It prohibited the 
 foreign slave trade, but did not embrace the domestic. This it had 
 the right to do, as a result of the commercial power. So thought, at 
 least, Mr. Madison, the Cato of America, whose gentle nature, simple 
 character, calm philosophy, profound learning, well balanced judg- 
 ment, high intellectual powers and expansive views, made him the 
 model of statesmen, an ornament to his country, and an honour to 
 the age. 
 
 But the territorial governments of Louisiana and Orleans — these are 
 referred to with no small triumph by the gentleman from Alexandria, 
 and put forth as settling conclusively the power of congress to pass 
 the Wilmot proviso. It is said that the introduction of slaves into 
 these territories, under certain circumstances, was prohibited. True ; 
 but what is the history of the thing ? Why, the act of congress es- 
 tablishing these governments, was passed March 26th, 1804, and was 
 virtually repealed by the act of March 2d, 1805, which substituted "a 
 government in all respects similar to that now exercised in the Missis- 
 sippi territory," to which the 6th article of the ordinance of '87 — the 
 anti-slavery clause — did not apply, being specially excepted. So that 
 this boasted precedent was the short-lived creature of not a year's ex- 
 istence ; too short-lived and ephemeral, I humbly suppose, to consti- 
 tute the basis of the huge superstructure of the Wilmot proviso. I 
 might ask, why did congress so soon repeal the law, and may not the 
 
15 
 
 repeal have been made on a conviction that it had transcended its law- 
 ful powers ? 
 
 The Missouri compromise — that, too, is relied ou. The obvious re- 
 ply is, that a compromise does not settle legal principles : it is rather a 
 waiver of the application of legal principles to a particular case. Surely 
 that compromise has never altered a feature or changed a provision of 
 the constitution ! That instrument is unalterable, save by amendment 
 in the mode pointed out by itself. 
 
 Texas is alluded to. It is said that congress allowed slavery in one 
 portion, (south of 36° 30',) and disallowed it in another, (north of 
 36° 30'). With respect to the former, it was perfectly proper; it 
 was but fulfilling the constitution — recognizing the rights of slave- 
 holders, as guaranteed by that instrument — applying practically the 
 great principle of state equality, before adverted to. To this extent, 
 congress has clearly the right to legislate on the subject of slavery in 
 the territories. Such legislation is consistent with the constitutional 
 rights of the southern people, while the Wilmot proviso is the flat re- 
 verse. 
 
 With respect to that part north of 36° 30', it is embraced by the 
 Missouri compromise, which prohibits slavery north of that line. 
 
 And lastly, of Oregon. I said in the commencement of my remarks, 
 Mr. Speaker, that no party bias should govern me. I say, then, that 
 even the Oregon bill is no precedent. It was but a carrying out of 
 the Missouri compromise, by which the south have been always willing 
 to stand, and which it would now gladly embrace as a settlement of 
 this vexed and disturbing question. It is an immaterial thing alto- 
 gether — slavery is already forbidden beyond 36° 30', by the terms of 
 that compromise, to say nothing of the inhibitions of climate, soil and 
 location. But there is one answer to all this argument of precedent. 
 Precedent is no fit test of constitutional power. It is too unsafe ; its 
 light too dim to chase away the obscurity of legal complexity. Put 
 the claimed power clown in the broad, lustrous light of the constitu- 
 tion, and if by that light it is seen obvious and palpable, let it be ex- 
 ercised ; but not otherwise. 
 
 So much for the argument of judicial and legislative precedent. 
 There is nothing in it. 
 
 The gentleman from Fauquier, in illustrating his argument, has 
 thought fit to venture a most grave reproach upon the south. He said 
 the south had set the first example of sectional division, in the oppo- 
 sition of South Carolina to the tariff, and of the south, generally, to 
 internal improvements; and this (he said) had provoked in return, sec- 
 tional feeling at the north, and united the northern people against us 
 on the question of slavery. 
 
 I must express my deep regret, Mr. Speaker, that expressions of sen- 
 timent like these should have proceeded from one so distinguished as 
 the gentleman from Fauquier, whose opinions, from his high intellec- 
 tual and moral position, carry weight with them wherever they are 
 known. I regret it, because they give impetus to that misguided fa- 
 naticism which is plotting destruction for the institutions of the south, 
 and weakening the foundations of this happy Union. 
 
16 
 
 Sir, if the charge be true, it is a most awful truth for us of the 
 south ; for if we have been the aggressors, we shall be responsible for 
 all the unhappy consequences that shall come of that aggression. Let 
 civil commotion raise her blood-black crest among us ; let our land be 
 desolated by war's bloody horrors ; be its soil drenched in brothers' 
 blood; be the Union crushed: all, all the responsibility will be upon 
 us of the south, if it be indeed true, as charged by the gentleman from 
 Fauquier, that we "cast the first stone," and were the first to offend. 
 But there is no justice in the charge, no foundation for the reproach — 
 no, not the least. The south did not commence this sectional appeal. 
 It began long, and long before the south took her position in regard to 
 a protective tariff and to internal improvements. This anti-slavery 
 agitation, of which we are now reaping the bitter fruits, and destined, 
 I°fear, to reap them more bitter still, was commenced as far back as the 
 old confederation — ere, almost, the roar of the cannon of the revolution 
 had died upon our ears — before the constitution was born. It was 
 started in the congress of the confederation. 
 
 I am aware that one distinguished southern statesman. Mr. Jefferson, 
 was a party to this proceeding. He was one of the first committee 
 ever raised on the subject, under the old confederation, and which re- 
 ported the 6th article of the ordinance of '87, excluding slavery 
 from the northwest. It was a most unfortunate occurrence ; for here 
 we may date the slavery agitation, which, beginning then, has been 
 continued to this hour, smothered for a while, it is true, but not extin- 
 guished, and waiting only the stimulus of increased political power to 
 fan the latent embers into a burning blaze. But let that pass. He has 
 done enough for his country and mankind, to bid us throw the veil of 
 charity over this one error of his public life, however unhappy its re- 
 sults may prove. 
 
 Mr. Jefferson's connexion with the subject soon ceased, however, 
 but the agitation was taken up and vigorously prosecuted by the 
 northern members of the old congress, the leaders among whom were 
 Rufns King and Nathan Dane. Effort after effort was made to abo- 
 lish slavery in the northwest, the territory which had been generously 
 ceded by Virginia to the confederation. The south, on every occasion, 
 presented an unbroken front, but was finally forced to yield, as in the 
 case of the Missouri question, to a compromise — the best it could 
 
 make the terms of which were, that slavery should be excluded, but 
 
 that fugitive slaves should be given up on claim of the owners. At 
 this early day, did our northern brethren sow the seeds of the anti- 
 slavery agitation, which promise so abundant a harvest of sectional dis- 
 sension. So we, of the south, are not the first wrong-doers. 
 
 And I think, Sir, if we scan the history of the last war with Great 
 Britain, we shall find abundant evidences of sectional feeling and geo- 
 graphical division on the part of our fellow-citizens of the north, fur- 
 nished long, long before South Carolina had exhibited that disloyalty 
 with which she has been so much reproached on this floor. 
 
 There was strong, even angry hostility to the war in all New Eng- 
 land, not that the general welfare and the common honour did not de- 
 mand it, but that its operation was rigorous upon the commercial inte- 
 
17 
 
 rests of the north ; for New England was then almost purely commer- 
 cial. The south, it was said, was not injuriously affected, being en- 
 tirely agricultural, and therefore favoured the war. The embargo was 
 resisted ; the war denounced as unnecessary ; Daniel Webster was seut 
 to congress from a New England state, to make war upon the war; a 
 governor of Massachusetts declared that the nation ought not to re- 
 joice over its naval victories; blue lights were raised along a New 
 England shore, to light the way of the enemy and entrap the gallant 
 Decatur; a Hartford convention, muttering disunion, was assembled; 
 there was a general disloyalty, which gave way only when the atroci- 
 ties of the enemy, and the brilliant successes of our arms, redeeming 
 past reverses, had roused the indignation of the whole country, and 
 united it against the common foe. South Carolina had set then no 
 example of disloyalty. Her distinguished son, John 0. Calhoun, stood 
 in the front rank of those gallant countrymen of ours, who, in the hour 
 of disaffection, bore aloft the banner of the Union. He was an ardent 
 and fearless advocate of the war, and the very pillar of Mr. Madison's 
 administration. 
 
 And coming down a little later, who stirred up, in 1819-20, the bit- 
 ter waters of strife ? Who, then, for sectional considerations, placed 
 the Union upon the brink of a yawning precipice, from which it was 
 snatched only by the patriotic efforts of Henry Clay? Who, I ask, 
 got up the Missouri question, which came upon us, as Mr. Jefferson 
 said, "like a fire bell in the night," and alarmed every patriot in the 
 land? "Disloyal South Carolina," as the gentleman from Fauquier 
 characterized her, had not then taken her peculiar position on the sub- 
 ject of the tariff, nor had the south done one act betraying a sectional 
 spirit. I tell the gentleman from Fauquier, it is the north and not the 
 south, that set the first example of geographical division ; and that, 
 therefore, his grave animadversion upon the south is without the sha- 
 dow of foundation. 
 
 The gentleman from Fauquier has said, too, that the Wilmot pro- 
 viso is not a practical question ; that it is an immaterial thing altogether ; 
 that the Democratic party were fully committed to its immateriality in 
 the presidential canvass of 1848, and stand so still. I do not design 
 (said Mr. S.) to make myself a party to the controversy on this point, 
 between my friend from Fauquier and the Democracy of the country : 
 non nostrum. But this I may be allowed to say, that however it may 
 be with the Democracy, the Whigs are not committed to the immate- 
 riality of the Wilmot proviso. We regarded it, at least in Virginia, as 
 eminently a practical question, as one of the great issues, if not the 
 main one, of the presidential contest. For one, I am not so commit- 
 ted. I fought hard in the canvass of last year, against Gen. Cass, be- 
 cause I thought him at heart a Wilmot proviso man, and gave Gen. 
 Taylor my hearty support, because, among other recommendations, I 
 believed him, on this subject, true to the constitution and the south. 
 
 Sir, it is any thing but immaterial. It is a practical, a fearfully prac- 
 tical question. 
 
 If it were simply and purely a question, whether the principle of 
 the Wilmot proviso should be applied to New Mexico and California, 
 3 
 
18 
 
 I should hesitate long before taking an attitude of actual resistance. 
 Seeing through the extent and to the end of the evil, I should be in- 
 clined to think — ' : better endure the ills we have than fly to those 
 we know not of." 
 
 But, Sir, the question is not thus narrowed down. It is, in my judg- 
 ment, not whether the free soil principle shall be applied to the newly 
 acquired territories, but whether slavery shall be ultimately abolished 
 throughout the Union. 
 
 This is a grave charge, I confess, Mr. Speaker, against our northern 
 brethren, but it is sustained by a number of incontrovertible facts, 
 which admit of no explanation but the entire extinction of slavery. 
 Those who have watched the history of the thing, cannot but be sa- 
 tisfied that a progressive assault has been going on against the institu- 
 tion of slavery, which is not designed to stop short of its utter destruc- 
 tion. Let us look at the facts. 
 
 It began, as I have already said, under the old confederation. The 
 northern members of the old congress insisted, to the last, on the abo- 
 lition of slavery in the large region of the northwest, and their perse- 
 verance triumphed, the ordinance of '87 having been enacted before, 
 and re-enacted since, the adoption of the present constitution. This 
 gave to the anti-slavery power an immense territory, comprising the 
 present states of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and a 
 considerable country yet unerected into states. 
 
 The acquisition of this territory satisfied our northern friends for a 
 season : it was next to certain that, with the Union as it was with its 
 then territory, they would have the preponderance in the national le- 
 gislature, and thus be enabled to control its policy. But new territory 
 was acquired : Louisiana was added to the national domain, with a 
 soil and climate admirably adapted to slave labour; and there was 
 danger that the south would acquire the supremacy in the federal coun- 
 cils. Hence, Sir, the Missouri agitation. Does the gentleman from 
 Fauquier imagine for a moment that this movement on the part of the 
 free states had any reference to slavery as an evil or a sin ? Can any 
 man suppose that the very people who were most instrumental in the 
 slave trade, who carried on the commerce of the thing, and reaped its 
 profits, who imported the slaves into the country, care a groat for sla- 
 very as an evil? In Missouri, it could not operate upon them — it was 
 no ill of theirs. Sir, their objection to slavery was to it as a political 
 institution, not as a moral evil or moral sin. It was resistance to the 
 increase of the slave power; a contest between free labour and slave 
 labour. And here again they got the advantage. Rather than make 
 concession to the south — to the slave power — they drove the nation to 
 the very brink of disunion. Acting in that sectional spirit which the 
 gentleman from Fauquier so much condemns in us of the south, but 
 which lies with a thousand times more justice at the door of our 
 northern neighbours: acting, I say, in the very worst spirit of sec- 
 tional calculation, they opened to the south the yawning gulf of dis- 
 union on the one hand, or of surrender on the other. 
 
 Well, Sir, what did the south do? Why, in that spirit of patriotic 
 devotion which has ever characterized her, save when her dearest 
 
19 
 
 rights have felt the ruthless hand of invasion ; remembering the 
 many blessings of the Union, and calling up the thousand glories as- 
 sociated with its formation and its history; recollecting that its cost 
 was the treasure and blood of our fathers; that the light of its lus- 
 trous example was to beckon on enslaved man to the bright destiny of 
 social and political redemption; and that if this Union was lost, it 
 would dash the brightest hopes of human kind : the south, I repeat, 
 acting on these high patriotic considerations, did surrender to the 
 nor th — did yield to the cause of harmony and union, what of right, 
 of constitutional right, it was entitled to retain. She acquiesced in 
 the Missouri compromise, giving up, beyond 36° 30', five times as 
 much free soil as was left for slave territory south of that line. 
 
 But even this large concession has not satisfied the anti-slavery party 
 of the north. And in my judgment, it never will be satisfied, until 
 that has been accomplished which lies at the bottom of all its designs 
 on this subject — and that is, the ultimate abolition of slavery in the 
 states. This, I am constrained to believe, is the unholy purpose at 
 which they aim. Again let the facts instruct us. 
 
 For long years, our northern brethren have been knocking at the 
 doors of congress for the abolition of slavery in the District of Colum- 
 bia. What is slavery in the district to them? Is it a grievance of 
 theirs? Are they moved by humanity for the slave? Sir, pass a law 
 when you will, abolishing slavery on condition that, when emancipa- 
 ted, they should be sent to the free states for their abode, and there is 
 not one of them that would not rise up in indignant condemnation of 
 the measure, as the people of Ohio did in the case of the Randolph 
 slaves. Very willing are they to have the slaves free, but when free, 
 they must keep themselves at a distance from those philanthropic 
 friends of theirs who so much sympathize with them in their enslaved 
 condition ! Sir, there is no philanthropy in the anti-slavery move- 
 ment — not the least: it is an effort for political power — for the supre- 
 macy of the free labour, over the slave labour principle. The real fa- 
 natics of the north ; the deluded madmen, as I may denominate them; 
 the Tappans, and Garrisons and Birneys; the feminine qninquegena- 
 rians — the Folsoms and Kellys — who have forgotten their sex, and 
 put on the breeches of modern philanthropy: these may be hurried on 
 in their course of madness and folly by a morbid humanity; but the 
 great body of the people of the north are free-soilersof a different class, 
 aiming at the same result, it is true, but governed by a different mo- 
 tive ; the result being the annihilation of slavery, the motive the ac- 
 quisition of political power for a given purpose. 
 
 Once more, let the facts be consulted. Turn to the slates north of 
 the Ohio. They became members of the national confederacy on the 
 solemn compact of the ordinance of 'S7, that in consideration of the 
 inhibition of slavery, they were to surrender fugitive slaves escaping 
 into their borders. How many have kept, their faith, and passed laws 
 to secure to the master his right to his fugitive slave? Follow your 
 slave into any of those states, and what aid will you get from the con- 
 stituted authorities, for the recovery of your property? None, Sir, 
 none. 
 
20 
 
 Look at all the free states, setting at naught the provision of the 
 constitution relating to the recapture of fugitive slaves. Pennsylvania 
 has passed a law imposing a heavy penalty upon her civil authorities 
 that shall issue process or grant any aid in the recovery of fugitive 
 slaves. Vermont has made it a felony in even a private citizen. New 
 York and Massachusetts have imposed like obstructions. Though 
 your constitutional guarantees are palpable, and, if carried out in good 
 faith, ample; yet if your slave escape into the jurisdiction of a free 
 state, he is gone from you forever. The constitution is spurned, and 
 the law and the mob unite in robbing the slaveholder of his property. 
 
 Look at more recent proceedings of the northern states. They look 
 far beyond the YVilmot proviso. Resolutions have been adopted by- 
 Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, 
 Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio and Michigan, going a step beyond 
 the application of the Wilmot proviso to present territory, and decla- 
 ring that no new state ought to be admitted into the federal Union, ex- 
 cept upon the condition of the perpetual exclusion of slavery. They 
 go so far as to prescribe its exclusion as a condition precedent of ad- 
 mission, virtually declaring that a state, after it shall have become such, 
 shall not choose for itself whether it will have slavery or not, and sub- 
 verting the first principles of state sovereignty and stale rights. 
 
 Look, too, at the fate of Mr. Meade's resolution. A proposition in- 
 volving the most palpable constitutional obligation, asking congress to 
 enforce the guarantees of the constitution in regard to fugitive slaves, 
 is scouted from its halls as unworthy to be entertained ! What does 
 this case shew, but that constitutional provision affords the south no 
 security, and that ultimate abolition is the purpose of our brethren of 
 the north ? 
 
 Look, lastly, at Gott's resolution to abolish slavery in the district, 
 and the instruction to a committee of congress to report a bill applying 
 the provisions of the Wilmot proviso to California and New Mexico. 
 
 Take all these acts together, and who can resist the conviction that 
 a progressive attack is going on upon the institution of slavery, and 
 that the final design is its entire extinction? This Wilmot proviso is 
 but a step in the process. Concede it when you will, it will be a fatal 
 concession. Beware how you make it. It will be the Grecian horse 
 within the walls of Troy. Admit it, and the epitaph of Troy may 
 soon be written for the institutions of the south and for this blessed 
 Union. 
 
 Mr. Speaker, there is a portion of classic history, which is so aptly 
 and beautifully illustrative of the present position of the south in re- 
 gard to the Wilmot proviso, that I cannot forbear, even at peril of the 
 charge of pedantry, to bring it to the illustration of the subject before 
 us. It was when the question was discussed by the Trojans, whether 
 the wooden horse should be admitted within the walls of Troy. The 
 lying Sinon of the Greeks had told his tale of treachery, and called 
 the gods to witness that there was no danger in the huge machine. 
 The confiding Thymoetes advised that it should be brought in and 
 located in the citadel. The more cautious and distrustful Capys dis- 
 suaded, and urged that it should be committed to the flames. In the 
 midst of the debate, the sagacious Laocoon, the aged keeper of the 
 
21 
 
 citadel, runs down in consternation from the tower, and warns his 
 countrymen, in tones of thunder, against the admission of the fatal 
 horse. Sir, I would commend to those of this house who think of 
 yielding the principle of the Wilmot proviso, the strong warning of 
 the true-hearted and prudent Trojan : 
 
 " Qwffi tanta insania, cives! 
 Aid hoc inclusi ligno occultantur Achivi, 
 Aut aliquis laid error : eqiio ne credite, Teucri.' 1 '' 
 
 No, Sir, trust it not. It will be a fatal trust. This Wilmot proviso 
 is only wanted as a stepping stone to higher assaults upon *,he insti- 
 tutions of the south — as an entering wedge to rive into fragments the 
 whole institution of slavery; and taking this view of the subject, I 
 regard the concession now of the Wilmot proviso, as a surrender, full 
 and complete, of southern rights — a giving up of the whole question. 
 Looking at the matter in this light, the south ought not to yield one 
 inch of ground more, and to take as firm and decided ground, the 
 very same indeed, as if the question were flatly presented, of the un- 
 qualified abolition of slavery in the states. 
 
 But we are told the resolutions contain a threat, and we are asked 
 why not strike out the threat ? Sir, the resolutions are to be regarded 
 rather as a solemn warning to our brethren of the North that there is 
 a point beyond which our endurance will cease, than as a threat. 
 That solemn admonition we ought to give them. Candour, fairness, 
 policy, demand it, unless we intend to make a tame surrender of all 
 that is dear. But if there is a little of menace in the resolutions, who 
 can gainsay its justice ? It is high time to threaten when the danger is 
 at our doors ; and, in my judgment, if we had taken ere this a more 
 decided stand for our rights, we should not now be discussing these re- 
 solutions, because there would have been no necessity for it. Nor 
 shall we be the first to set the example of threat. Our northern bre- 
 thren menaced resistance to the government in the last war with Great 
 Britain. They threatened to dissolve the Union, if we of the south 
 did not yield all their demands on the subject of slavery, and that 
 threat was pushed to the very point of execution. The Union tottered 
 under their exactions. 
 
 The resolutions, it is said, commit us to resistance. What else should 
 they do ? If we are not prepared for a quiet surrender of our constitu- 
 tional guarantees, what can we do but resist, and if we mean in any 
 event to resist, why not say so to all the world, and let the warning 
 fix the responsibility of the consequences upon those who shall force 
 us to the extremity ? Besides, do not the resolutions of the gentleman 
 from Fauquier commit us to resistance in the event of slavery being 
 disturbed in the district? 
 
 But how are we to resist, it is asked? Are we, said the gentleman 
 from Fauquier, to send our little guard to fight the battle of resistance? 
 I tell that gentleman, that when the dark hour of trial shall have come ; 
 when the foul outrage upon our rights shall have been consummated, 
 and Virginia, preferring manly resistance to slavish submission shall 
 call her sons around her, it will be no little squad, no petty guard that 
 shall rally to the rescue; but thousands and tens of thousands of her 
 gallant sons will gather under her banner, with stout hearts and strong 
 
22 
 
 arms, ready and willing to share with her whatever fate shall befall 
 her — be it a glorious triumph on the one hand, or annihilation on the 
 other. 
 
 How shall we resist? On this point, I might throw myself upon 
 the counsel of my friends from Fauquier and Alexandria. They tell 
 us, there are cases in which they would resist; that if congress dare 
 lay touch on slavery in the District of Columbia, they will resist, aye, 
 "resist in the threshold, and at every hazard." Let them inform me 
 how they would resist, when the evil is at hand, and perhaps we shall 
 not be fat apart about the "mode and measure of redress." 
 
 How shall we resist ? For one, I am willing to speak out and say 
 the worst. Mr. Speaker, I love the Union. In the deep sincerity of 
 my heart, I love it. No one in this broad land has worshipped at its 
 altars, with a purer and deeper devotion. 'Tis connected, in my mind, 
 with a thousand and twice a thousand glorious associations — with the 
 wisdom that conceived, and the blood that cemented it — with our pros- 
 perity and strength at home, and our glory abroad — with that gallant 
 flag that flings out the stars and stripes of our country on every ocean, 
 gulf and sea — with that renown which exhibits her unconquered and 
 triumphant on a thousand battle fields — with the bright glories of the 
 past and brighter hopes of the future. I say, Mr. Speaker, I love this 
 Union, this glorious, happy, blessed Union. 'Tis the noblest work of 
 human hands — the " bright particular" conception, if I may so speak, 
 of human statesmanship. Yet, dear as it is, bright as are its glories 
 and rich its blessings — hallowed as it is by the blood of martyred pa- 
 triots — beacon light though it be to brighten man's pathway to moral 
 and political disenthralment, yet I must declare, if I must, that there 
 is a greater blessing than the Union, a heavier curse than disunion ! 
 Sir, when this Union ceases to accomplish the great ends for which it 
 was designed — the guarantee of liberty and equal right — the security 
 of common immunities and common blessings — let it go : for sooner 
 than see the southern states of this confederacy degraded below the 
 northern ; or, to bring the matter nearer home, sooner than see this 
 proud old commonwealth degraded in right, degraded in dignity, sunk 
 down to a lower level than any of her sister states ; sooner than see 
 dear old Virginia placed upon a lower platform than Massachusetts, her 
 dearest interests invaded, her common rights destroyed, I would see 
 even this Union dashed into fragments forever! 
 
 Out it is as a friend of the Union that I give these resolutions my 
 support : for I do maintain that those who are for taking strong action 
 at the present crisis, pursue a policy far more calculated to perpetuate 
 the Union than those who recommend the contrary course. If there 
 is any thing that can hasten the catastrophe we all so much deplore, it 
 is the want of union and firmness in the south. Timid counsels will 
 not avail ; doubt is ruin ; indefinite positions worse than none ; falter- 
 ing resolves equivalent to backing out — an invitation to further aggres- 
 sion — the precipitation of disunion. There is but one reliable means 
 of averting dissolution, and that is decided, unequivocal, nndonbting, 
 definite, united action. A bold and undivided front — this, and this 
 alone, can secure the perpetuation of the Union and the endurance of 
 its blessings. 
 

 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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