JUAN LEETS 
 
 UNITED STATES 
 
 AND 
 
 LATIN AMERICA 
 
 DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 
 
 NEW ORLEANS, DECEMBER, 1912 
 

UNITED STATES 
 
 AND 
 
 LATIN AMERICA 
 
 DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 
 
 JUAN LEETS 
 
 1/ 
 
 New Orleans, December, 1912, 
 
 NEW ORLEANS 
 
 The L.. Graham Co., Ltd., Printers 
 
 1912 
 
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 FOREWORD. 
 
 To the Honorable, the United States Senate, Members of the House 
 of Representatives and the American Public: 
 
 Inspired by that profound sense of justice, which has permeated 
 the citizenship of the great American Eepublic since its founda- 
 tion, and with an abiding confidence in the integrity of the repre- 
 sentatives of these people in the United States Congress, I beg to 
 present the humble memorial of citizens of the republics of Central 
 America, who have suffered from the consequences of the coercive 
 and iniquitous policies of the Department of State, under the direo- 
 iion of Philander C. Knox. 
 
 The purpose of this feeble memorial is two-fold,: 1. To acquaint 
 the American public and the members of the Senate and of the 
 House of Eepresentatives with some of the details of Mr. Knox's 
 so-called "Dollar Diplomacy," as applied to the Central American 
 republics; 2. To exert what influence our facts may possess in 
 making for a restoration of the bonds of -true friendship between 
 the peoples of Latin-America and the United States, which the 
 ruinous and selfish policies of Mr. Knox have sundered. 
 
 In this work I have been aided by some of the most brilliant 
 statesmen of Central America, all laboring with a patriotic impulse 
 end an earnest, sincere desire to establish justice where iniquity 
 and false pretense have wrought naught but ruin and devastation, 
 misunderstanding, discord and bitterness. In this memorial, as 
 v/ell as in personal testimony before the senate committee charged 
 with the investigation of matters relating to the Nicaraguan revo- 
 lution, I have sought to substantiate all of my charges with docu- 
 ments; and, in not a single instance, have I inscribed a statement 
 which I believed to be less than the truth. 
 
 Although the facts which I herewith present show that the great 
 foundation principles of liberty and justice of the mother of re- 
 publics have been ignored and hidden in the intricacies of the false 
 doctrines emanating from the Department of State, the citizen.^ 
 of the smaller republics to the south have yet a iirm faith in the 
 
people of this great country and place this earnest appeal beforo 
 their representatives in the hope of arousing an interest in Mr. 
 Knox's dealings, which will result in a searching investigation and 
 eventual justice. 
 
 While the result of the recent presidential and congressional elec- 
 tions in the United States assures an early change in the personnel 
 of the State Department, Avith perhaps a marked change in the 
 policies which this government will pursue in its foreign relations, 
 the injustice inflicted upon Central America, through the pernicious 
 "Dollar Diplomacy/' has been too great to be ignored by people 
 of patriotic impulses. For that reason we, are unwilling to forget 
 the past and leave the people of the United States in ignorance 
 of the noxious schemes and wrongful acts which have been per- 
 petrated under the cloak of "diplomacy." 
 
 In this memorial we have striven to present in detail a true 
 picture of the interference of the State Department in Central 
 American affairs and the results of the Knox policy. Summarized, 
 briefly, we attempt to show: 
 
 1. Under the pretext of giving aid to the small Central Amer- 
 ican rep^iblics^ the State Department has used what it is pleased 
 to term "D(3llar Diplomacy" to force upon these peoples loan con- 
 tracts which would give to a coterie of Wall Street bankers not 
 only millions of dollars tainted with illegitimacy, opportunity for 
 immense graft, but an absolute license to exploit the vast resources 
 of the countries and even administer their governmental affairs. 
 
 2. The terms of the loan contracts which Secretary Knox has 
 so assiduously sought to fasten upon Nicaragua and Honduras are 
 vicious, and, when truthfully revealed to the American public, will 
 produce expressions of abhorence and indignation. 
 
 3. The Knox policy of dealing with Central America has in- 
 stilled a pronounced anti-American feeling, where before naught 
 but feelings of friendship toward the people of this great republic 
 existed; turmoil and strife, revolution and poverty have been the 
 baneful results. 
 
 4. In one instance Mr. Knox has given active support to a 
 revolution in ISTiearagua, in another instance he has opposed a 
 revolution and sacrificed the lives of American soldiers that he 
 might keep in power a usurper and traitor, the poor tool of the 
 
5- 
 
 Secretary in his scheme to deliver the country over to New York 
 bankers. 
 
 5. Mr. Knox adjudged Zelaya a dictator in Nicaragua and 
 drove him from power, setting up a government wliich has brougiit 
 poverty in the stead of prosperity; discord in the stead of har- 
 mony ; despotism in the stead of liberty ; on the other hand, Mr. Ivnox 
 has insistently supported the worst tyrant and dictator that Latin- 
 America ever knew in President Estrada Cabrera, of Guatmala. 
 
 6. With the full knowledge of the State Department .filibuster- 
 ing expeditions have been permitted to leave Gulf ports for Central 
 America, and in one instance the knowledge of the departure of 
 such an expedition was used as a bludgeon in a desperate effort 
 to force the President of Honduras to approve a Morgan loan 
 contract, which, it was well known, was distasteful alike to the 
 president, the congress and the people of Honduras. 
 
 7. Designing American financiers desired American intervention 
 in the recent Nicaraguan imbroglio, on the other hand, they were 
 wont to have the United States Government adhere to a policy of 
 non-intervention in Mexico. In Nicaragua, except for the killing 
 of two American members of the Nicaraguan army, in, actual 
 battle, American life was never endangered,' nor was American 
 property destroyed; in Mexico a number of Americans have been 
 wantonly killed, scores of others have been wounded, some have 
 been held for ransom, and millions of dollars of American property 
 have been destroyed. In Nicaragua Mr. Knox intervened ; in Mexico 
 he has adhered to the policy of non-intervention. These are facts : 
 the inference is of something un-American. 
 
 8. Facts concerning acts of the State Department in its rela- 
 tions with Central America frequently have been concealed from 
 the American public, or else distorted or exaggerated. Sometimes 
 semi-official statements given the press in Washington for American 
 consumption have been totally at variance with the true facts and 
 not infrequently there bas been apparent a desire to prejudice 
 public opinion in favor of the attitude of Mr. Knox and his co- 
 workers through such distortion. 
 
 Among many of the documents which I present here, and amono- 
 iho;-e which I have already laid before the senate committee, some 
 of the more important were entrusted to me by Senora Hortencia 
 
C. de Madriz^ widow of the former President of Nicaragua, Dr. 
 Jose Madriz. At the time of Dr. Madriz's untimely death, in 
 May, 1911, he was engaged in .preparing a history of the State 
 Department's relations to the 1909 revolution in Nicaragua, and 
 Senora Madriz desires that the documents and facts which he col- 
 lected be now given to the American Congress and public, not 
 only in vindication of the memory of this great statesman, but for 
 the benefit which may accrue to the American people, through 
 knowledge of the pernicious acts committed by certain ofificials of 
 the American Government. 
 
 In my testimony before the senate sub-committee, presided over 
 by Senator A, B. Fall, at El Paso, in October, I found the com- 
 mittee anxious to secure light on the conduct of Mr, Knox and his 
 agents in the Central American republics. I placed in Senator 
 Fall's hands many of the most important documents which I 
 brought to this country, satisfied that the cause of a weak nation, 
 my adopted country, was in good hands. On my trip to El Paso 
 I was accompanied by the well-known Honduranian counsellor, Dr. 
 Angel Ugarte, as my legal adviser. 
 
 Although born in Eussia, I am, with all my heart a Central 
 American and have been honored in my adopted country with 
 important governmental positions. It is the cradle of my wife 
 and of my children and it is my earnest desire to do all within my 
 power toward building up its prosperity and making of it a country 
 ■\vherein we may enjoy liberty and the blessings of a stable Eepub- 
 iican Government. I have dedicated all of my efforts and endeavor?^ 
 to this cause, which, always, will remain sacred.. 
 
 JuAN" Leets. 
 
 NeAv Orleans, December, 1912. 
 
DOLLAE DIPLOMACY. 
 
 The policy applied by the Secretary of State, Mr. Philander C. 
 Knox, to Latin America during the presidency of Mr. Taft, was 
 termed by its originators, "Dollar Diplomacy." 
 
 We propose in this essay to analize this particular policy, and 
 show its disastrous consequences to those countries to which it was 
 applied, namely^ "Latin America." Before going into details, we 
 ■ wish to recall to memory the policy of the United States toward the 
 other republics on the American continent as it was pursued prior 
 to the advent of this so-called "Dollar Diplomacy." 
 
 During most of the time of the existence of this great nation, its 
 public men have been animated by a desire to maintain an attitude 
 of "^TONINTEFEEENCE" in the internal affairs of the other 
 countries, and this attitude has been supported by the opinion of 
 the masses in general. This, beyond doubt, is one of the reasons 
 for the astounding growth and rapid progress of the United States 
 of America, whose government, for more than a century, was, rela- 
 tively, the most economically administered of any in the world. 
 In pursuing, for so long, this admirable policy the succeeding ad- 
 ministrations fulfilled the high ideals of the • country's father, 
 George Washington, who, with divine forethought, realized the 
 great destiny in store for his country, provided his contemporaries, 
 as well as future generations, followed and obeyed his wise counsel. 
 
 "The Monroe Doctrine." 
 
 James Monroe, one of the many distinguished statesmen pro- 
 duced by the American nation, in full accord and sympathy with 
 the high ideals and doctrines of General Washington, realized that 
 in order to assure the permanency of the sacred principles upon 
 which this great republic was founded, it was absolutely essential 
 that none of the European powers should be permitted to establish 
 large colonial governments on the American continent. 
 
 When the Latin- American colonies freed themselves from Spain, 
 a "sacred alliance" was entered into in Europe, the monarch's then 
 reigning in absolutism binding themselves to send their armies to 
 reconquer for Spain those Latin-American countries which had 
 just ceased to be dependencies of Spain. 
 
 The establishment of monarchial regimes on the American con- 
 tinent, upheld by some of the great Powers of Europe, would have 
 
8 
 
 been a constant source of anxiety, and a never ceasing menace, to 
 the United States of America, and would have resulted, ultimately, 
 in making a republican form of government on this continent im- 
 possible. . 
 
 f It would have impeded the consiimmation of Washington's policy, 
 as outlined by him for the future, as this country would have had 
 to maintain a large and costly army and navy in consequence of 
 the advent of monarchical po'wers on this continent, thus fastening 
 upon the United States the same cancer that has been sapping the 
 life of old Europe. 
 
 Monroe, great statesman and patriot that he was, understood and 
 foresaw all this, which resulted in his giving to the world his fa.- 
 mous doctrine, "AMERICA FOR THE AMERICAIsTS," a doctrine 
 at that time perfectly well understood, though later on subjected 
 to many ' varying interpretations, and, therefore, very much dis- 
 cussed. 
 
 Monroe, beyond any doubt, purposed to insure for his own coun- 
 try, and for all the other republics on the Annerican continent, 
 the blessings of independence and the tranquility of peace. ISTobody 
 at that time, mu.ch less the noble author of that Doctrine himself, 
 imagined that at some future day, this very same doctrine might be 
 construed into a menace of the autonomy of those very same Latin- 
 American countries which it was precisely the intention of Monroe 
 to protect against such a contingency. That this doctrine, designed 
 to be a protection, has been tvdsted into a menace to the integrity 
 of the Latin-American countries, is precisely what we propose to 
 demonstrate in this essay. 
 
 "Pan-Amertcanism." 
 
 To perpetuate the Monroe Doctrine, and in a sijirit to facilitate 
 its operation, Mr. James G. Blaine, Secretary of State in the Har- 
 rison administration, and originator of the "Pan-Americanism''' 
 idea, advocated the first Conference of Delegates of the American 
 Nations, which Conference was held in Washington, in 1889. 
 
 As a result of this first Conference, the International Bureau of 
 American Republics was created and entrusted with the organiza- 
 tion of future conferences, which have been held periodically, with 
 a view of bringing together the peoples of the different races and, 
 thereby, the nations thus represented. 
 
9 
 
 Another great statesman, Mr. Elihu Eoot, while Secretary of 
 State, under the Eoosevelt administration, fostered "Pan-Ameri- 
 canism" and became one of its most enthusiastic propagandists. 
 He was personally present at a Conference which was held in Kio 
 de Janeiro in 1906, later visiting the Argentine Eepublic, Chili, and 
 other countries, and still later, in 1907, visiting Mexico,^ where he 
 delivered several speeches, now famous because they made such a 
 favorable impression in all Latin-America, and. created such strong 
 sympathy between those countries and the United States. There 
 Mr. Eoot, on his own behalf, as well as in his capacity as Secretary 
 of State, guaranteed that the policy of his government toward the 
 peoples and the governments of all Latin-American countries was 
 a policy of fraternity and good will, and that the smallest, as well 
 as the greatest, of these countries could rest assured of their inde- 
 pendence and autonomy, and the integrity of their territory. These 
 same declarations were ratified by him before the "Central Ameri- 
 can Peace Conference," assembled in Washington in the fall of 
 1907*. 
 
 *After having nearly concluded, we have received some newspapers 
 from Central America, in which there is a speech of Mr. Root's repro- 
 duced in Spanish, and which speech is supposed to have been made in 
 the United States. The tendencies displayed ii;i this speecih lead us 
 to believe that it is apocryphal. 
 
 A free translation shows: 
 
 In this speech Mr. Root declared that the United States is the 
 "Modern Rome," chosen by God to arbitrate not only thei destinies of 
 all America, but of Europe and Asia as well. He said that his coun- 
 try is destined to control all of the American Continent and that it is 
 necessary only to determine the means to accomplish this. He declares 
 the natural Frontier of the United States Territory the Panama Canal, 
 and that it will cause surprise in the latter half of the Twentieth Cen- 
 tury that in the Map of the United States to-day was not comprised 
 Mexico, Central America and all the Antilles and that it is only a 
 question of time when the Flag of the United States will be seen float- 
 ing over all these territories, at the same time, pronouncing all Latin- 
 Americans as unfit for a Republican form of Government and unfit for 
 the Yankee Citizenship (as if they should be destined to be tlie Helots 
 of their compatriots), because the two races are antithetical, un— 
 amalgamable and separated by a deep abysm. He said that there is 
 sufficient justification for the annexation and that all that is necessary 
 for its consummation is a joint Resolution on the part of Congress, and 
 he predicts that it will be carried out no matter which of the three 
 contending parties was successful in the presidential election. 
 
 We cannot conceive that a man who lias captured for himself the 
 sympathies of all the American Continent, because of his professed 
 Ideals in regard to Pan -Americanism could be the author of sucli utter- 
 anceis. less can -we believe that this great Statesman should so impru- 
 dently offer a challenge, not only to the American Continent, but to 
 all Nations of the world, threatening some with taking away from 
 them their possessions in the Caribbean Sea. 
 
 We trust that when Mr. Root reads tliese lines, written by one who 
 has always had none but sentiments of the liighest admiration for him, 
 he will hasten to reassure Latin-America, and principally, to protest 
 against the authemticity of this speecli, whicli the press attributes to 
 him, or to give the authentic version of his speech, should his speech 
 have been misconstrued. 
 
 As we have not seen this country's press publish such an important 
 speech, nor discuss it, we are justified in belieK^nng that it is not 
 authentic. 
 
10 
 
 If this policy, so firmly maintained by Mr. Eoot, had been con- 
 tinued,, the confidence of the Latin- American countries in the gov- 
 ernment of the United States would have increased, whereas, to- 
 day, it is an absolute fact that the former feeling of respect and. 
 good will, as expressed by these Latin- American countries, has been 
 converted into a constant feeling of alarm and distrust, and in some 
 cases the love felt for all that was Anglo-American has been changed, 
 into a deep-seated hatred — nevertheless, we Latin- Americans recog- 
 nize the fact that the fault rests not with the people of the United. 
 States, but with its recent Government. 
 
 Instead of upholding the sane policy of Mr. Eoot, which had 
 as its basic principle the harmony, the well-being and the prosperity 
 of the whole American Continent, there has been substituted a 
 policy full of deceit, falsehood and schemes to give protection to 
 privileged financial speculations. Mexico, Santo Domingo and 
 Central America are at the present moment the victims of the course 
 steered by the State Department of the United States; and while 
 it is our aim to demonstrate principally where Central America has 
 been wronged, and more especially Nicaragua, for the reason that 
 all are in the same position, we shall make a short enumeration of 
 Avhat has happened to the other countries named in respect to their 
 dealings with the State Department. 
 
 Eevolutions IN" Mexico. 
 
 This country, during the long regime of General Porfirio Diaz,. 
 enjoyed an era of progress and elevated itself to a condition of 
 notable prosperity, made possible by a peace of more than thirty 
 years' duration. It is true Mexico did not improve so far as the 
 education of its masses is concerned, nor did the masses improve 
 in the enjoyment of political liberties, and this is the only serious 
 fault to be found with Porfirio Diaz. He did not educate the 
 Mexicans to appreciate, nor prepare them for the task of maintain- 
 ing his highly fruitful endeavors, which crumbled in the first on- 
 slaught of a revolutionary hurricane, which swept the country, and 
 is tearing at the vitals of that country even now. 
 
 Until 1909 the Government of the United States had naught but 
 laudable comments for General Diaz and his way of governing 
 his coimtry, setting him up as a model for other southern republics, 
 for which reason it is easily assumed that if he became "persona 
 
11 
 
 non grata" with the State Department shortly afterwards, this 
 change in affection should not be attributed to the State Depart- 
 ment's remorse for not having caused Diaz to grant his people a 
 more pronounced form of democratic government. We do not 
 know the real cause for this change of affection, but we can "put 
 things together." Tbward the end of 1909 a revolution broke out 
 in Nicaragua against President Jose Santos Zelaya, toward whom 
 Secretary Knox had shown a great deal of aversion, and which aver- 
 sion culminated in Zelaya having to resign the presidency and leave 
 jiis coimtry. President Diaz, of Mexico, came to Zelaya's assistance 
 by conveying him to Mexico aboard one of the Mexican war vessels, 
 and this act of Diaz's brought about a diplomatic encounter between 
 the two countries, and although this incident was satisfactorily 
 terminated, apparently, we are justified in believing that Mr. 
 Knox thereafter felt a deep hatred for General Diaz, when we tak3 
 into consideration what happened afterwards. 
 
 In 1910 a revolution broke out in Mexico, first localized, but 
 later spreading all over the country rapidly. This movement was 
 well supplied with the sinews of war, money and arms; the Ameri- 
 can frontier was practically kept open for the introduction of arms 
 into Mexico, and American capital was coming abundantly to the 
 support of the revolution. Then the American government sent 
 to the Mexican frontier thousands of soldiers and mobilized a power- 
 ful squadron of war vessels with the avowed purpose of sending 
 same to Mexican ports, which naturally was taken as the announce- 
 ment of an intende'd intervention, giving for a reason the pretext 
 of having to protect the lives and property of American citizens; 
 and in order to preserve a pretext for intervention, perhaps, indis- 
 putable aid was given the revolutioiL 
 
 Perhaps, due to the stand taken by Congress, or, perhaps, fox 
 the reason that the State Department convinced itself of the fact 
 that an armed intervpntin-n in MpYirn wmild mpan ati immediate 
 cessation of all inner strife and a union of all Mexicans, who then 
 would have taken up arms against the invader, no intervention in 
 that country took place. The Government of General Diaz fell, but, 
 unfortunately, this has not terminated the revolutionary spirit. 
 Out of the rank and file of the victors against Diaz there arose 
 malcontents, who have continued the strife with varying success ta 
 the present day, to the great misfortune of that unhappy country. 
 
12 
 
 In this second epoch of the revolution the conduct of the State 
 Department has been entirely different. There are to-day along the 
 frontier but some hundreds of soldiers, and these have been suffi- 
 cient to maintain the neutrality of American territory. The pres- 
 ent revolution has been deprived of the necessary elements of war, 
 and denied other resources of United States, because any violations 
 of the neutrality laws are now severely punished, in accordance with 
 Ci proclamation of Mr. Taft, intended to stop such violations. 
 Further, federal troops of the Mexican Government were allowed 
 to cross into American territory, in order that they might give 
 battle to rebel forces, which otherwise would have been out of their 
 reach. 
 
 This change in the attitude of the State Department during the 
 two distinct revolutions, the one against Diaz by Madero, and now, 
 the one against Madero in turn, invites the suspicion that the pres- 
 ent government of this country has had no determined policy to- 
 ward parties or persons in Mexico, but hopes for a prolonged strife 
 in order to satisfy ulterior ambitions or desires, which, fortunately, 
 will never materialize, now that there is reason to expect a radical 
 change in the policy to be observed toward the Latin- American 
 countries during the approaching probable change of administra- 
 tion. 
 
 In relating what has taken place in Mexico, we would emphasize 
 the fact that we are in no way allied to either one of the factions en- 
 gaged in that disastrous strife. It is rather our purpose to expose 
 the attitude of the present American administration and the criss- 
 crossings resorted to in its polic}^, in this particular case toward 
 Mexico, and in general toward all Latin- America. 
 
 "Doctrine Knox." 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine, as we have related before, was willingly 
 accepted by the peoples of all Latin- America ; but when later on 
 an amplification was invented to signify the right of tutelage of 
 the United States of Xorth America over the other republics of the 
 continent, this interpretation, odious, arbitrary and pernicious to 
 all Latin- America, met with vigorous protest in all Latin-America, 
 where public opinion was unanimous in expressing itself as follows: 
 
 "The good we saw in the ]\Ionroe Doctrine was the guaranty of 
 our right to an autonomous political life, but if this doctrine is 
 
1 o 
 lo 
 
 now to be construed into meaning that the United States will pro- 
 tect -ns against Europe for the purpose of dominating us, arid dictat- 
 ing to us at pleasure, we cannot see where we are benefitted any 
 longer; in fact, it would mean that we may '^jump from the frying 
 pan into the fire.' 
 
 Eecently, imder the Taft administration, the Secretary of State, 
 Mr. Knox, has seen fit to add to the supopsed right of tutelage over 
 the Latin- American Eepublics, an assumption even more pernicious 
 and objectionable, that of policing these countries, and, further, has 
 sought to impose, especially on Central America, a financial pro- 
 tectorate which would deprive these countries of the administration 
 of their own fiscal affairs. 
 
 During his first year as Secretary of State, it seems that Mr. 
 Knox saw a vision of himself as the savior of Central America, in- 
 suring for these countries peace and prosperity by his efforts to 
 bring about the resurreci:ion of a nation that had once been known 
 as "Eepublic of Central America," and composed of the states of 
 Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Eica. How- 
 ever, these altruistic thoughts were shortly afterwards vanquished 
 by his instincts of commercialism, and it was then that he conceived 
 the idea of carrying out his plans of imposing' a financial tutelage 
 on those countries by delivering them into the hands of syndicates 
 of financiers in Wall Street, formed for that special purpose, and 
 who were thus privileged to exploit those countries, while the people 
 of the United States derived no benefit whatsoever. 
 
 A close examination of the financial impositions on these ocun- 
 tries, brought about by, and a result of, the "Dollar Diplomacy," 
 justifies us in making the statement that they were the cause of 
 the last revolutions in several of the countries bordering on th3 
 Caribbean S'ea. 
 
 Now let us see how the originators and defenders of the "Knox 
 Doctrine" represent the same to the masses, and how they try to 
 defend and justify it. President Taft himself, in his speeches and 
 messages, and Mr. Knox, in lecturing before universities and in 
 addressing voters, have emphasized always the assertion that this 
 policy would lead to an assurance of peace and progress in the 
 Latin-American countries, would bring about prosperity, and that 
 dollars would take the place of the rifle bullets that had been flying 
 about there. They also asserted that since Americans, as agents 
 
14 
 
 of the United States Government^ would take charge of the Custom 
 Houses in these countries, the principal inducement for revolutions 
 would disappear, asserting that these revolutions originated only be- 
 cause those who start revolutions hope thereby to make themselves 
 rich: That this policy had proved a succ/ess in Santo Domingo, 
 where it has been enforced for several years: That the proposed 
 loans to these countries would result in the utmost benefit to them, 
 and secure their protection ; and, in general, they have endorsed the 
 plans of a few bankers, favored by the State Department, who 
 would derive benefits by exploiting these countries, 
 
 Santo Domingo. 
 
 As the present Government has always pointed to Santo Domingo 
 for a justification of its policy, let us see what has really taken 
 place in. that country since a financial protectorate was imposed on 
 it by the American Government. More than fifteen years ago, a 
 group of American financiers undertook the settlement of Santo 
 Domingo's foreign debt, a condition being that the administration 
 of the Custom Houses should be exercised by American employes 
 of the American syndicate, which was formed for that purpose. 
 This transaction would have resulted in a complete failure for these 
 speculating bankers, had it not been that they succeeded in obtain- 
 ing the support of the United States Government, which forced a 
 treaty on the government of that island, in which it was stipulated 
 that the President of the United States should in future appoint 
 ihe collectors of customs on the island, that these collectors should 
 have the power to use their own discretion in the management of the 
 same, and leaving to the Collector General the supervision of the 
 foreign debt and its settlement. It is plainly seen that from then 
 on the privileged bankers derived all the benefit while running no 
 risk whatsoever, as they were guaranteed by the Government of the 
 United States. 
 
 Now, if this financial imposition had borne good results, there 
 would have been some excuse for this policy, considering the cir- 
 cumstances, particularly, that at that time it actually prevented 
 various European nations from taking action against Santo Do- 
 mingo, through the use of war vessels, which had been sent to en- 
 force the collection of debts of the government due their subjects. 
 But this object could have been accomplished by simply putting 
 
15 
 
 forward the Monroe Doctrine, as was asserted by distinguished 
 public men of South America. The whole undertaking proved a 
 failure, and has never done for the country what its originator? 
 claimed for it, although it is to be admitted that, due to an efficient 
 management, the income derived from the customs increased ma- 
 terially during the first years, while in later years the revenues have 
 remained stationary. 
 
 As to the honesty and integrity of these officials appointed by 
 the President of the United States, may it suffice to refer to the 
 t:candal in which the Collector General of Santo Domingo was in- 
 Yolved, and which was aired by the press of this country. That none 
 of the purposes of the enforced financial tutelage over Santo Do- 
 mingo materialized, viz: the settlement of the foreign debt and 
 '"maintenance of peace,*' is history. In proof of our assertion 
 relative to the foreign debt, we shall quote the more authoritative 
 Teport of a meeting of bondholders of the foreign loan of Santo 
 Domingo, which took place in London in 1910. This report says: 
 
 "The Council regret to report that no steps have yet been taken 
 to remedy the injustice to the British holders of Santo Domingo 
 bonds, under the settlement of 1908. At the time the Honduras 
 proposals were brought forward in 1909, the Council were given 
 to understand that the matter would have prompt attention; but 
 beyond further vague assurances that the subject was not being 
 lost sight of, nothing has apparently been 'done." 
 
 In consequence, the foreign credit of Santo Domingo has not im- 
 proved, and is really worse than before the advent of the American 
 officials, for the very good reason that now it is not given to the 
 government to promote the betterment of the credit of its own 
 country. 
 
 As to the maintenance of peace in that country, the failure could 
 not be more marked, for in the course of fifteen years of the North 
 American supervision of the finances of that country, two presi- 
 dents have been assassinated, and a series of revolutions have taken 
 place, all due to the unrest created amongst the masses, who sus- 
 pected their executives to be tools in the hands of a foreign power. 
 Especially, during the last two years, we are justified in asserting 
 that this unfortunate country has not enjoyed a single moment of 
 true and perfect peace, in spite of (or, perhaps, because of) the 
 fact that all these insurrections were suffocated by the pressure 
 
16 
 
 brought to bear in tiie presence of American war vessels. Very re- 
 cently this pressure proved inadequate, and it was found necessary 
 to despatch to that coimtry formidable expedition of marines, with- 
 out it being known whether this expedition went in support of the 
 government or of the revolutionists.* 
 
 Why, then, do President Taft and Secretary Knox insist in laud- 
 ing their scheme of intervention in Santo Domingo, and why do 
 they continue representing this intervention as something that ought 
 to be practiced in the other Latin American countries ? 
 
 They themselves cannot be bona fide believers in what they ac- 
 claim, for do not the facts, and facts known to the world at large^ 
 belie them. 
 
 Let us pass to a study of the results of this "benevolent and 
 fraternal policy" in those countries of Latin-America, where it was 
 imposed, or where efforts were made to impose it. 
 
 Costa Eica. 
 
 About four years ago an agreement was entered into by the 
 Costa Eican Government and a syndicate of bankers of Kew York^ 
 with a view to obtaining a settlement of the foreign debt and a new 
 loan; the principal conditi^on being the delivery of the Custom 
 Houses to collectors to be named by the President of the United 
 States. The conditions were very similar to those imposed on Santo 
 Domingo, but with the difference that the Government of the United 
 States was not named one of the contracting parties. 
 
 The Costa Eican Congress did not approve this contract, seeing 
 in it a menace to its national sovereignty. Afterwards a very simi- 
 lar contract was entered into with Mr. Minor C. Keith, in substance, 
 in fact, identical with the other contract proposed as far as the 
 financial part of it was concerned, but no mention was mjade of any 
 intervention by a foreign government. 
 
 '■The Revolution in Santo Doming-o has been put to an end, througli 
 the intervention of the United States Government, whose Delegate 
 decla'red himself in favor of the Revolution, resulting in the down-fall 
 of President Victoria; and the elevation to the Presidemcy of the Bishop 
 of the Diocese. 
 
 It is curious to see that the Diplomacy of a country, most of its 
 people being Protestant, should favor as chief of the government of a 
 foreign country the head of the Catholic Church, the most intolerant 
 of all sects, and which will deprive of religious liberty not only the 
 natives, but the foreigners as well. This must be another one of the 
 so-called benefits of "Dollar Diplomacy." 
 
17 
 
 This latter contract was ratified by Congress and is in force at 
 this present moment. We do not propose to applaud this contract, 
 which might have been arranged with greater advantage to the 
 country, but, for the fact that there was nothing contained in that 
 agreement that could possibly endanger the sovereignty of Costa 
 Eica., it did not cause any ill feeling among the masses and did not 
 irritate public opinion. Otherwise, it might have caused riots, even 
 in this peaceful country. 
 
 Guatemala. 
 
 Similar propositions of financial support were made to the Gov- 
 ernment of Guatemala at about the same time that the Costa Eican 
 Congress vetoed the offer made that country, and this offer to 
 Guatemala was recommended, although rather informally, by the 
 State Department. Guatemala's executive would not assume the 
 responsibility or accepting or rejecting the proposition, and referred 
 it to the Congress, which body returned it without commenting on 
 it except to recommend to the President to use his own judgment. 
 
 Well known as is the despotic form of government in Guatemala,, 
 in justice to the President, we must say that when he turned over 
 to the Congress this loan proposition he clearly proved that he did 
 not favor such negotiations and merely desired to delay a decision 
 and, at the same time, maintain himself in the good graces of tlie 
 State Department and of Mr. Knox. With his recognized astute- 
 ness. President Cabrera has succeeded in continuing his system of 
 delay and has prevented any action by the Congress of Guatemala 
 up to this time. This conduct proves that, if he lacks strength of 
 character, the president certainly manifests a good deal of prudence 
 by which he maintains himself in power and in favor with the State 
 Department, whose plans relative to the other Central American 
 countries he has always aide'd and abetted, as we shall prove later 
 on. 
 
 Honduras. 
 
 Simultaneously with the propositions made the other two coun- 
 tries named, the State Department approached Honduras, through 
 the American Minister at Tegucigalpa, intimating to the Honduran 
 Government the advisability of sending a representative to Wash- 
 ington with a view to taking advantage of the offer of a syndicate 
 
18 
 
 of Wall Street bankers to settle the foreign debt, to advance funds 
 for the carrying ont of progressive pnblio works, and for the re- 
 demption of the internal debt, assuring the government that this 
 proposition would be more advantageous to the country than the 
 settlement made with the Minister of Great Britain, who was at 
 the same time representing the foreign bondholders. (See Ad- 
 denda "A.") 
 
 Before this took place the State Department had used its in- 
 fluence in inducing the Foreign Office in London to annul the 
 settlement made through the British Minister, The Hondurau 
 Government sent a commission to Washington and iNTew York, Avho 
 listened to the propositions of the bankers, which were conditional 
 upon the signing with the American Government of an agreement, 
 by virtue of which the said government would assume the ad- 
 ministration of the Honduran Custom Houses, through the medium 
 ■of employes, whose appointment and dismissal should be made at 
 the pleasure of the President of the United States, and who, there- 
 fore, would not be responsible to Honduras. 
 
 The loan Avas to amount to Ten Million Dollars at a rate of emis- 
 sion of 88% bearing interest at 5% and 1%\ for amortization. Of 
 these millions not even ten per cent were to reach Honduras, and 
 the greater part of this same ten per cent was to be invested in 
 railroad supplies, machinery, rolling stock, etc. 
 
 As to the other terms and conditions of this negotiation, un- 
 doubtedly an acceptance would have been tantamount to Honduras 
 having to give up its sovereignty and the proceeds of its fiscal in- 
 come, for the iDenefit of this group of bankers, backed up by the 
 State Department, thus placing the country at the mercy, of its so- 
 called protectors. Eeduced to cold figures, Mr. Knox's proposition 
 was this : That Honduras would have to pay in forty years more 
 than Twenty-six Million Dollars, instead of the Eight Millions It 
 would have had to pay if the settlement made with the British 
 Minister had been kept in force, which latter proposition contained 
 no pitfalls, nor degrading conditions and stipulations. In spite of 
 this. President Taft, as well as Mr. Knox, persisted in proclaiming 
 to the world that they were holding out a "generous hand" to the 
 Latin-American countries, in order to lighten the weight of their 
 foreign debts, Avhen in truth they were devising means to corner 
 
19 
 
 these countries in such a way as to force them into political distress, 
 and iinal inability to maintain their sovereignty, thus forcing them 
 sooner or later into having to ask the United States for annexation 
 or for a complete and perpetual piotectorate. In such a situation, 
 "these countries would be under the dominion of the Executive of 
 the United States, who would be ruling over them without having 
 to assume any responsibility to his own people, because, in a given 
 case, he could unburden this on his allies, the group of financiers, 
 •over whom the courts of the United States would have no jurisdic- 
 tion, for the reason that if they committed punishable acts, these 
 were committed in a foreign country, and the laws of that oppressed 
 country could never reach them, for the reason that their influence 
 would aid them in avoiding being held responsible. 
 
 This loan proposition was held secret here in the United States 
 as well as in Honduras. In Honduras because pressure had been 
 brought to bear on the President by the State Department and the 
 banking syndicate not to publish it, so that only a few of his 
 Ministers may have had knowledge of the same. 
 
 The Envoy of Honduras in Washington refused to sign this 
 Loan Treaty and contract, acting under instructions from his gov- 
 ernment, ' until, in July, 1910, Honduras ^^as surprised by an 
 attempted revolution, consisting of an armed expedition invading 
 the Atlantic Coast of Honduras. Although the American navy 
 "had been very watchful on similar and previous occasions, when 
 "this expedition was sailing the Bay of Honduras, the American war- 
 ships did not appear. 
 
 This revolution proved a fiasco, but the State Department took 
 advantage of it, in giving the then Executive of Honduras to under- 
 stand, first, through his own envoy at Washington, and again, 
 through the American Minister at Tegucigalpa, that only on the 
 condition that he accept the tendered Loom Proposition, could he, 
 the President of Honduras, insure himself against a repetition of 
 revolutionary uprisings as the State Department would then hind 
 itself to crush same. 
 
 The President, General Miguel E. Davila, whose sole ambition 
 was to retain himself in power at any price, then began to change 
 his instructions to his financial agent, and at the same time, Envoy 
 E^xtraordinary at Washington, then in New York, General Juan E. 
 
20 
 
 Paredes. He still instructed his representative, however, not to 
 submit to any clause which could possiblj^ endanger the sovereignty 
 of Honduras. In order to break President Davila's resistance, the 
 extreme was reached in having the press of this country publish 
 hints that should President Davilla not accept the Loan Proposi- 
 tion in toto pretty soon, it would be accepted anyway by Honduras, 
 as a revolution in that country was unavoidable, and that the head 
 iind leader of the revolution had beforehand pledged himself to ac- 
 cept the proposition. When President Davila shortly thereafter re- 
 quested the United States to prevent the sailing of that much 
 heralded revolutionary expedition, at the same time accusing the- 
 President of Guatemala of having given this intended expedition 
 his support, the premptory answer he received from Washington^ 
 was "Sign the proposed Financial Project first." 
 ' Finally Davila gave orders to sign the Loan Treaty, which in- 
 struction the Honduran representative at first refused to obey, but 
 finally complied with, after having filed a protest, on the tenth of 
 January, and after the announced revolution had already been, 
 started and two ports had been taken. However, the Honduran 
 representative irrevocably refused to sign the contract with the- 
 bankers. The truth of this incident has been repeatedly vouched, 
 for by Mr. Paredes in various pamphlets which he has published in 
 the LTnited States. Copies of some of the most important docu-- 
 ments we attach. Addenda "B." 
 
 When this revolutionary expedition, which started from the At- 
 lantic Coast of the United States, reached the Coast of Honduras,, 
 after having taken aboard their vessel, somewhere along the coast 
 of Guatemala, some war supplies that had been offered by the Presi- 
 dent of that country, there were two American war vessels in these 
 waters, but they took no action to detain the expedition. The- 
 American cruiser, Taooma, went alongside the Hornet, the leading 
 vessel of the expedition, to ascertain if this vessel had violated the 
 neutrality laws of the United States, but the Tacoma's commander- 
 declared that he found nothing suspicious aboard. After Davila: 
 had signed the Loan Treaty, the same Tacoma was ordered to cap- 
 ture the Hornet, but the Hornet had had time to land the war sup- 
 plies she had had aboard. 
 
 This Loan Treaty was almost unanimously vetoed and declined' 
 
21 
 
 by the Honcluran Congress on the last day of January, the State 
 Department, however, insisting right along that the agreement with 
 the banking syndicate should also be accepted and signed. The 
 signature was affixed to the agreement in February, not, however, by 
 the same Envoy, who had been recalled, but by the permanent Min- 
 ister Plenipotentiary. It is worth relating that when the Honduran 
 Congress refused to ratify the Loan Treaty the American navy 
 showed once more, and openly, a marked partiality for the revo- 
 lutionists. 
 
 "When the State Department offered its good offices with a view 
 to bringing about peace, a note was addressed to the American 
 Minister at Tegucigalpa, to the commander of the American Squad- 
 ron and to the two warring factions, containing the basis upon 
 ■which the United States would undertake to mediate, one of the 
 terms being that Puerto Cortez should be declared a neutral zone, 
 whereu]3on the commander of the Tacoma insisted that the garri- 
 ■son of the constitutional government should vacate the port, which 
 demand was complied with, the port remaining under the protection 
 ■of the foreign consuls and the men-of-war, but chiefly under the 
 protection of the declaration of neutrality which had been issued 
 by the State Department. 
 
 Therefore, when President Davila was informed by the American 
 Minister in person, who stated that he had come in representation 
 'of the Commander of the Tacoma, that lie, Davila, was to authorize 
 the delivery of Porto Cortez into the hands of the revolutionists, 
 his surprise can be imagined. Of course, Davila refused, stating 
 that his refusal was based upon the assurance of the State Depart- 
 ment that Porto Cortez should be a neutral zone, etc., as related by 
 us, but the American Minister became insistent the following day, 
 and after a few hours of discussion of his demand, when he, no 
 tloubt, became annoyed, he said to Davila: "It is useless to lose 
 t;ny more time. The port has been in the hands of the revolutionists 
 -since yesterday, and if you care to be assured of the American offer 
 of mediation, you had better consider the delivery of Puerto Cortez 
 to your opponents as a "fait accompli." The truth is that the port 
 had been delivered to the revolutionists even before President Da- 
 vila had been asked for his authorization. 
 
 Mr. Knox, in his offer of mediation, stated as another clause of 
 
32 
 
 Ijis stipulations, that President Davila should deposit the executive- 
 power in a third person, so as to bring about a termination of the- 
 inner strife, and that this third party should- be entirely impartial. 
 so as to give guarantees to all Hondurans, of all factions, alike. 
 Regardless of this, and obeying explicit instructions from Mr. 
 Knox himself, his emissary, Mr. Dawson — to whose decision the- 
 delegates to the Peace Conference held at Puerto Cortez pledged 
 themselves, appointed Dr. Francisco Bertran as the person in whom. 
 President Davila should deposit the executive power. 
 
 We do not care to discuss the personal merits of Dr. Bertran,. 
 but the fact remains that he was affiliated with the revolution, and 
 actively engaged in the ranks of the revolutionists, and was be- 
 sides known as one of the most intimate friends of the revolutionary 
 leader. This is one of the reasons why an understanding and a 
 peaceable settlement of their differences could not be arrived at 
 among the Honduranians, because the ruler, in fact, being the 
 victorious revolutionist', all the promise of a guaranty to all Hon- 
 durans of other affiliations have proved an illusion up to this date, 
 contravening the assurances given by the State Department in its 
 offer of mediation. 
 
 However, this two-faced policy of the State Department resulted' 
 in a benefit to Honduras. The victorious opponent of President 
 Davila, favored by the State Department, also remained unsatisfied, 
 and as public opinion in Honduras had always been manifestly in 
 opposition to the proposed loan negotiations, the new President has 
 not ratified that Loan Project up to the present day, thus frustrating 
 the hopes of the banking syndicate, who had placed full confidence- 
 in him, and who have since made him new propositions more ad- 
 vantageous than the old ones. 
 
 The new President was greatly assisted by the adverse stand taken 
 against this loan policy by the American Senate, which attitude 
 was greatly admired and applauded in all Latin- America. The 
 action of the United States Senate in declining to approve this loan 
 convention was principally due to the energetic efforts of a few 
 Central Americans, particularly Dr. Policarpo Bonilla, former 
 President of Honduras, who presented astounding revelations- to 
 the Senate regarding the vicious terms of the proposed contracts 
 and the insincerity of the State Department's attitude. Had the- 
 
23 
 
 Senate approved the treaty, the State Department Avonld, no doubt^ 
 have dared to press energetically the new President into yielding- 
 to its demand, and he, knowing from personal experience to what 
 extremes the State Department might go in order to accomplish its 
 purposes, might probably have imitated his predecessor in order to 
 remain in the executive chair. 
 
 We believe that we have succeeded in clearly demonstrating that 
 the last two revolutions in Honduras were, if not actual creations 
 of the State Department, at least, well known beforehand and 
 tolerated by the same as a necessary consequence of its coercive 
 Dollar Diplomacy. 
 
 In continuing we shall proceed to prove the guilt of the State 
 Department in connection with the two last revolutions in Nicara- 
 gua, all of which will lead us to the conclusion that Knox's policy 
 in Central America, and in general, in all Latin- America, must 
 necessarily be unanimously condemned. 
 
 ISTlCAEAGUA. 
 
 Simultaneously with the Loan Propositions made the other Cen- 
 tral American countries^ President G-eneral Jose Santos Zelaya, of 
 Nicaragua, was approached. He, however, would not even agree to 
 discuss the proposition, and proceeded to arrange a loan in Europe, 
 "one of the main objects of this loan being the settlement of the 
 American debt. Considering the especial zeal which Secretary Knox 
 has sought to bring about an acceptance of these loan propositions, 
 it seems that this loan policy had become with him a personal hobby,, 
 and a matter of personal pride, and it can be easily deduced that 
 Zelaya's refusal meant that from that very moment Ms govern- 
 ment was condemned to disappear. Enormous claims against Mca-. 
 ragua were initiated or resurrected and vigorously pushed, some 
 of these claims being nothing short of monstrous, but Zelaya never 
 gave cause for the breaking off of diplomatic relations, because he 
 offered such favorable settlements with the claimants that neither 
 they nor the State Department could find a pretext to refuse these 
 offers. I 
 
 But Mr^ Knox was determined to punish Zelaya, as he might 
 have expresed himself, for his stubbornness and a revolution wa> 
 not long in forthcoming. 
 
 The Military Chief on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, Juan J. 
 
24 
 
 Estrada, brougiit up by Zelaya, and a man in whom Zeleya had 
 confidence, declared himself in rebellion against Zeleya, making 
 common cause with the other malcontents in the country. From 
 the very beginning of this revolution^ it could be seen that it had 
 merited the benevolent consideration of the State Department, and 
 that American Consul Moffat, in Bluefields, was notoriously an 
 accomplice. The revolutionists were allowed to openly acquire 
 war supplies and ammunitions of all kinds in the United States, 
 f?nd were amply supplied with funds by American capitalists. All 
 of this was done openly, and with the benevolent and even com- 
 placent consent of the American authorities. 
 
 As one of the best proofs of our assertions, we shall submit also 
 the report given to the ISTew York Times recently by former Presi- 
 dent of Nicaragua, Juan J. Estrada, leader of that revolution. 
 (Addenda C.) 
 
 But in order to take action against Zelaya openly and with a free 
 hand, Mr. Knox had to avail himself of some pj-etext to open 
 hostilities. If such a pretext had not happened to present itself, 
 surely Knox would have fabricated one, but it so happened that it 
 presented itself in the execution of Grroce and Cannon, the two 
 American adventurers who had been actively engaged in the ranks 
 of the Estrada revolution, and who had been taken prisoner when 
 in the act of blowing up with dynamite some government river 
 boats, and who had been condemned to death by a court martial. 
 
 We do not want to discuss the legality of this sentence, because 
 it is of no importance in the case, and we can admit, if necessary, 
 tliat it was not legal, although the fact that they were, when taken 
 prisoner, in arms against the government and engaged in dynamit- 
 ing government transport steamers, forfeited them their right to 
 protection of the American Government, in accordance with uni- 
 versal precedence. This was recognized recently by President Taft 
 Limself, when cautioning all American citizens residing in Mexico 
 to abstain from siding one way or the other in the political strife, 
 and that a contravention would cause the loss of right to protection 
 by the United States Grovernment. Had Cannon and Groce been 
 in the rank and file of the revolution for the sake of the gain that 
 there was in it for them, they should have been left to the conse- 
 quences of such a hazardous venture. If enthusiasm and belief in 
 the justice of the cause had led them to join the revolution to com- 
 
35 
 
 bat a despot, they had to' take the chances and risks that all 
 patriots take of falling into the hands of such despots. Besides, 
 nobody who violates the International Law can afterwards claim 
 immunity from it. 
 
 • The most the State Department should have done, and there ig 
 precedent for such action, was to intervene in a friendly spirit in 
 behalf of the accused in order to spare them capital punishment. 
 Mr. Knox had ample time to do this, if he had really wished to 
 save the victims, but he did not intend to do so, nor did he ever 
 try to do so; and in his memorable note addressed to' the Charge 
 d' Affairs of Nicaragua, which note was dated December 1st, 1909, 
 and which he claimed was caused by the execution of Cannon and 
 Groce, he ignored all the principles of international law, annulled 
 all precedence, and returned to the civilization of the Middle Ages, 
 v/hen brute force was the only source of justice. 
 
 In this note, Knox, in his selfsufficien,cy, pronounced the sen- 
 tence imposed upon Cannon and Groce unjust, declared Zalaya's 
 government tyrannical and despised by public opinion, and asserted 
 that all Nicaragua had risen in arms. This was not the truth, it 
 being well known that the revolution was at that time localized on 
 part of the Atlantic Coast. He declared Zelaya the perturber of 
 peace in Central America and a violator of the Washington con- 
 ventions, who had merited the complaints from the other govern- 
 ments of Central America, who considered his stay in power a 
 constant menace. This latter assertion of Knox's was based, pro- 
 bably, upon representations made to the State Department by the 
 President of Guatemala, who has been a tool in the hands of Knox 
 and a willing helpmate in his policy of intervention in the other 
 Central American countries. 
 
 With this act Knox constituted himself judge over an inde- 
 pendent nation, and resolved to disavow the legitimacy of the gov- 
 ernment presided over by Zelaya, breaking off the customary diplo- 
 matic intercourse with him, and declaring Zeleya's government a 
 defacto government, which would merit the same consideration as 
 the defacto government of the revplution. 
 
 We do not believe that there is another incident in the diplomatic 
 history of the civilized world that may be compared with the act 
 we have just related. 
 
36 
 
 The proceeding of the State Department would have been much 
 less scandalous had it lived np to its much heralded resolutions. 
 However, it did not do so. It sided openly and without regard for 
 appearance with the revolution, which it assisted with its moral 
 and material power to become victorious over Zelaya, as shall be 
 proven later on. (Addenda D'.) 
 
 Zelaya, stunned by the violent attitude of the State Department, 
 committed the grave error of' depositing the executive power in 
 the man who was the choice of Congress, according to the Con- 
 stitution, Avhen he should have used his best endeavors to gain a 
 decisive victory over the revolutionists, thereby compelling the 
 revolutionists to consider his separation from the executive power 
 as the best solution of 'the conflict; and then, should the State 
 Department not have been satisfied, Zelaya would have compelled 
 Knox to support the revolution with armed force to enable them 
 to gain the victory. Zelaya's premature move of separating him- 
 self from the country's executive power, just at the moment when 
 the forces of both warring factions were lined up for a decisive 
 battle, naturally produced a state of demoralization in the rank and 
 file of the government troops, bringing about, in consequence, the 
 defeat at Eecreo, which served to inspire the revolutionary forces 
 with new vigor and confidence, and encouraged them to continue 
 the revolt against Zelaya's successor, Dr. Jose Madriz. This in 
 spite of the fact that it was well known that Dr. Madriz had been 
 a political exile during the Zelaya regime for more than eleven 
 years, and was, therefore, far from being responsible for the act? 
 attributed to Zelaya. But what tended more than anything else to 
 prolong this strife against Madriz was the stand taken by the State 
 Department, in refusing to recognize the government of Dr. Madriz, 
 in spite of its having been legally constituted, within the prescrip- 
 tions of the Washington Treaty, and regardless, as well, of the fact 
 that the Madriz government had been recognized by all the other 
 civilized nations, excepting Guatemala and Salvador. These two 
 countries had been influenced by the State Department to withhold 
 their recognition, in violation of the said treaty, the attitude of 
 the State Department being based on its stand that it would pursue 
 toward the Madriz government the same policy it had outlined to 
 Zelaya's Minister in Washington. 
 
27 
 
 The struggle then continued even more sanguinary than before, 
 but surmounting all these unfavorable influences, the forces of the 
 Madriz government routed the revolutionary troops in the interior 
 of the country, thus leaving the revolutionists reduced to one strong- 
 hold in Kama, and its base of supplies, Bluefields, on the Atlantic 
 Coast. To accomplish this, the army of the government made 
 superhuman efforts and sacrifices, and only after a march through 
 morasses and never ending swamps, where hundreds of men, horses 
 and conveyances were left buried in the mire, did the loyal troops 
 succeed in reaching the aforenamed two strongholds of the rebels 
 en the Coast, Eama and Bluefields, precisely simultaneously with 
 maritime government expeditions, who were then occupying the- 
 ports and all the river outlets along the Coast. After a combined 
 attack, they captured the bluff, the key to the port and town of 
 Bluefields. When preparing to attack Bluefields by land and- sea, 
 American marines were landed, and the commander of the squadron 
 gave official notice that he would not permit any hostile acts against 
 the town oi Bluefields; that he would not allow the detention of 
 any mercantile vessel, not even to be searched for contraband of 
 war, and that he would not allow the collection of import duties 
 by the Madriz government at the Bluff Custom House, which had 
 always been the legal custom h^^ouse for the port of Bluefields; that 
 the revolutionists were to levy custom duties at a new Custom 
 House, which had been established when they lost the Bluff Fort, 
 in front of which, and covered by its artillery, all vessels were 
 obliged to pass in going to and coming from the so-called new 
 Custom House. A logical consequence of the proceedings of the 
 American commander was that the revolutionists, being guaranteed 
 the safety of Bluefields by the presence of American marines, 
 massed all their forces for the defense of Eama, and being assured 
 of Bluefields as a base of supplies, as the marines were there with 
 the avowed purpose of defending the town against an attack by 
 the Madriz forces, that the demoralization which had been notice- 
 able in the ranks of the revolutionists was replaced by a firm con- 
 fidence in an ultimate victory; and that the lack of munitions of 
 war which had been noticeable in the revolutionary headquarters 
 was replaced by an abundance of everything necessary for a cam- 
 paign, for American marines, covered by the American flag, were 
 
28 
 
 fient aboard all incoming vessels, neutral, American or revolutionary, 
 thus rendering the importation of all war material safe and sure for 
 the carr3ang on of the revolution. The American commander 
 would previously notify the commander of the fort at the Bluff, 
 and the chief of the ISTicaraguan navy, that should an attempt be 
 made to detain these vessels, or should a shot be fired at them, it 
 would be considered a dedaration of war against the United States, 
 and that then the American war vessels would bombard the fort and 
 sink the ISTicaraguan war vessels. 
 
 Upon representations made by the Madriz government to Nor- 
 way's, by whom Madriz had been recognized as the legitimate Presi- 
 dent of JSTicaragua, the Norwegian Government prohibited all ves- 
 sels flying the Norwegian flag from transporting contraband of war 
 to the revolutionists, or disobeying in any manner the orders of the 
 legitimate government of Madriz ; but the commander of the Ameri- 
 can squadron, supported expressly by the State Department, in- 
 stigated the masters of these Norwegian steamers to^ disobey the 
 orders of the government, and putting American marines aboard 
 their vessels, guaranteed them an unmolested entry into the port. 
 The Norwegian Vice-Consul at Bluefields, Mr. Clancy, who had 
 apprised his government what had taken place, was dismissed from 
 his position of Vice-Consul of the United States, which office he 
 was hol'ding also. 
 
 The ultimate result of all this was that the Madriz forces realized 
 that it would be useless to continue fighting against such odds, and 
 as it was not possible for the land force to maintain their position 
 any longer, a general retreat was ordered, under the circumstances 
 equal to a defeat. When these disheartened troops arrived back in 
 the interior, they contaminated the balance of the army, and before 
 long every man in the ranks was convinced that they had been 
 fighting a hopeless battle, not against the revolutionists, hut against 
 the poioer, gigantic in comparison, of the Government of the United 
 States. Dr. Madriz realized that to continue the strife would mean 
 useless spilling of more blood, and he deposited the executive power 
 in a deputy named by Congress, who, in turn, turned it over soon 
 afterwards, to the leader of the revolutionists. We publish attached 
 the proofs of what we have related, and especially the proofs of the 
 complicity of the State Department. We furthermore attach a 
 
29 
 
 publication written by Dr. Madriz relative to these facts, which he 
 had written with the intention of submitting same to the Nica- 
 raguan Congress, which, however, he was not given the time to do. 
 (Addendas E y P.) 
 
 To anybody who personally knew Dr. Madriz, who was a highly 
 civil man, cultured, learned and highly patriotic and honest, it 
 must have been surprising to witness Mr. Knox's unben'ding efEorts 
 in continuing to give battle to Dr. Madriz, when he should have 
 given him his moral support in order that he might have succeeded 
 in reorganizing and pacifying his country, which would have pre- 
 vented the sacrifice of more than 4,000 Nicaraguan lives and 
 millions worth of property; the more so when Dr. Madriz showed 
 plainly through his propositions made with a view to establishing 
 peace, that his personal ambition would not stand in the way of 
 peace, and that if the adversaries insisted, he would renounce his 
 candidacy when a definite government would be agreed upon. 
 
 It is of no use that Mr. Knox offers the excuse that he did not 
 know Dr. Madriz, for we are sure that he had sufficient information 
 from one who should merit his confidence. Admiral Kimball, the 
 Commander of the American Squadron in Pacific waters of Nica- 
 ragua, who Avas in personal contact with President Madriz, and 
 who formed the same opinion of esteem of Dr. Madriz that we 
 have expressed. It is, perhaps, because of Admiral KimbalFs 
 sincerity when addressing the State Department in favor of Dr. 
 Madriz that he was withdrawn from his post before the termination 
 of the controversy. And, as it had become a matter of self-love 
 with Mr. Knox to push ahead his jpollar Diplomacy at all costs, 
 Dr. Maidriz was objectionable to him, just on account of his sterling 
 qualities, which made Knox sure that Dr. Madriz would never be- 
 come a tool in his hands, to execute schemes involving in truth 
 treason to his country, and its complete ruin. Knox needed un- 
 scrupulous men, who would profess to political creeds like this one, 
 "So long as we succeed in keeping the Liberals out of power, we 
 will willingly submit to the tutelage of any foreign power, if neces- 
 sary, even to that of China." 
 
 Being intimately aware of the men he had at his bidding in 
 IN'icaragua, the Dawson Convention was the necessary consequence 
 and result, the Convention which has been kept secret in JSTioaragna 
 
30 
 
 by the Executive to such an extent that he has refused to show it 
 even to the ISTicaraguan Congressmen who asked for it. 
 
 Here in the United States^ to our knowledge, the complete text 
 of the Dawson Treaty has never been published ; neither in Nicara- 
 gua, nor here in the United States, has this treaty ever been ap- 
 proved by the respective legislative bodies, and it can never be 
 ratified for the very good reason that it was not a pact between two 
 governments, but between an agent of the State Department on one 
 side, and, on the other, some of the chieftains of the revolution, 
 who, with the criminal complacency of the traitor, were demonstrat- 
 ing their gratitude for the support given them in coming into 
 power. 
 
 However, the State Department has elevated this Dawson Con- 
 vention to the height of a venerable, sacred treaty, far superior to 
 the laws and the constitution not only of Nicaragua, but of the 
 United States as well, since a pretended violation of this conven- 
 tion caused, and ma:de even more sanguinar}^, the last war in that 
 unhappy country. 
 
 From what has filtered out to the public of this Dawson Treaty, 
 we know the following: That the treaty was entered into between 
 Mr. Dawson and five men who represented themselves as conspicuous 
 personages of the Conservative Party, namely, Adolfo Diaz, Luis 
 Mena, Juan J. Estrada, Emiliano Chamorro and Fernando Solar- 
 zano, none of whom could rejareseat Nicaragua legally, or be placed 
 in charge of such engagements, which have later been fulfilled, and 
 of which the scope cannot yet be foreseen. Among Mr. Dawson 
 and the men named, it was covenanted that Mr. Estrada should 
 continue in the Presidency for two years, and that during this time 
 Adolfo Diaz should be Vice-President, and that when elections 
 were to take place, the five men nominated (who had been converted 
 by themselves and by the grace of Mr. Dawson into "Great Electors'-' 
 of Nicagarua), would select from their midst the President and 
 Vice-President for the next term, thus annulling the popular vote, 
 or, more properly speaking, making of it a repugnant farce. 
 
 Then a disagreement occurred between two of the "Great Elec- 
 tors," President Estrada and the Minister of "War, Luis Mena, in 
 consequence of which the latter was imprisoned, but the American 
 Minister, Northcott, intervened, and compelled the President to 
 
31 
 
 reinstate Mena in his position and status, whereupon Estrada., who 
 resented the interference of the American Minister, notified him 
 th^t it should make impossible his permanency in his office. When 
 the American Minister insisted, Estrada turned the presidency over 
 to Adolfo Diaz. 
 
 A short time before that, as Estrada and Mena were not satis- 
 fied with the constitution, as dictated by the ISTational Assembly, 
 or rather, with the political tendencies of this Assembly, it having 
 been elected by the partisans of Emiliano Chamorro, they dissolved 
 the Assembly, and called together a new one, which was satisfactory 
 to Mena, but which in the matter of principles and as a legitimate 
 representation of public opinion, did not differ much from the 
 previous one. 
 
 This Assembly being in session, the "Knox-Castrillo" treaty was 
 convened upon as a basis for a loan, which contract was signed by 
 Castrillo and a group of bankers of Kew York. Both 
 the proposed treaty and contract were made known to 
 the Kational Assembly, but as this Assembly was under 
 Mena's thumb, and as Mena was opposed to this negotia- 
 tion, he was allowed, in order to overcome his opposition, to have 
 himself elected President by this very same Assembly for the next 
 Presidential term, without anybody recalling the Dawson pact, of 
 which, afterwards, this election was denounced as a violation. 
 Mena's election having taken place without a protest from the 
 Electors constituted by the Dawson pact, nor from the American* 
 Minister, the way was smoothed for the ratification of the Castrillo 
 agreements. The Assembly was not given time to discuss the nego- 
 tiations, an imniediate decision being 'declared imperative in a single 
 session, and they were approved by a majority of the Assembly, this 
 majority having been carefully prepared beforehand. The voices 
 of six patriotic members, who protested in vain, were unheeded, as 
 was a protest from two of the Secretaries of the Executive, who 
 consequently resigned their posts in order not to be accomplices in 
 the sale of their country. 
 
 The conduct of the State Department appears throughout this 
 incident as phenominally curious, or more than that, absurd. In 
 this great countr}^, Avhere free institutions are a fact, and where 
 the Eepublican form of government has always been considered a 
 
32 
 
 model worthy of copying, and a stimulus to the Latin-American 
 countries, the government, it seems, is determined to encourage the 
 Government of Nicaragua, not only to break its own laws, b.ut all 
 the principles of a true democracy. Unfortunately this has been 
 the tendency of the State Department right along in its relations 
 with its neighbors to the south, for during the last few years it 
 has regularly been the policy of Mr. Knox to intervene in favor 
 of the tyrannical factions in those countries, and against the legiti- 
 mate interests of the masses. Whenever the State Department has 
 given its support to revolutions, it has never taken an interest in 
 making sure that the revolution thus supported would guarantee 
 later on a sane and responsible government, to justify, or at least, 
 explain, the intervention. This phenomena is. explained by the fact 
 that the policy of the State Department was not inspired by a de- 
 sire to further the mutual interests of the countries, but rather, for 
 transitory personal interests, or with a view to furthering the plans 
 of and assisting those privileged financial speculators. Had the 
 motive been a different one, and had the interventions resulted in 
 the establishing of true liberal regime, with law and order and 
 honesty in the administrations, on account of the assistance re- 
 ceived, the interferences in these countries might have been par- 
 doned, and would have been appreciated finally, even if the na- 
 tional pride of these countries had been hurt and resentment aroused 
 in the beginning. 
 
 The Castrillo agTeements are built up on the same basis as the 
 propositions made Honduras and other countries named, but con- 
 tain some terms and conditions which are even more aggravating 
 to Nicaragua. As Nicaragua had but an insignificant, and rela- 
 tively well taken care of, foreign debt. Dollar Diplomacy had to 
 resort to the plan of amortization of the internal debt of Nicara- 
 gua, represented by depreciated paper money in actual circulation, 
 to find a pretext for seizing the custom houses of the country; and 
 in order to secure the absolute control of financial conditions in 
 1;he country, a mixed Commission of Claims was created in which 
 United States citizens form a majority, these Americans having 
 been appointed by the State Department or its representatives. It 
 is left, in fact, to this Commission's discretion to raise the figures 
 of this internal debt to the height they may deem convenient, or 
 
33 
 
 to favor claims of friends of theirs as they ma}^ see fit. The con- 
 tract loan is Fiftee^ Million Dollars at 907c emission, beside other 
 expenses and costs, with 5% interest per annum, and 1% amortiza- 
 tion. 
 
 We do not intend to examine the details of this negotiation, be- 
 cause it has been amply discussed by two political exiles from 
 Nicaragua, Drs. Espinoza and Irias. Suffice it to say that it is 
 the most ruinous negotiation ever carried out in any country at any 
 time, as everybody who goes to the troTible of reading this Contract 
 will have to affirm. 
 
 These Castrillo Contracts contain the clause that their validity 
 depends on a ratification by the Senate of the United States, this 
 being, in fact, the basis for all these understandings, excepting an 
 advance loan of a million and a half to be made on the condition of 
 delivery of the custom houses to American collectors. 
 
 We Central Americans were confident that this transaction would 
 never take place and be carried out, because we were sure that the 
 American Senate would never sanction such a monstrous proposi- 
 tion; but, undoubtedly with a view to compelling this high legis- 
 lative body into a ratification, his "anticipated loan" clause was 
 inserted, which permitted Secretary Knox to begin trying out his 
 system in Central America. But something more . scandalous was 
 committed. Knox, no doubt, thinking that Nicaragua might still 
 escape him, and that too many resources were still left the country 
 to make an escape good, forced an additional loan contracft on this 
 country to the amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars, 
 taking in guaranty the National Eailroad and river and lake steam- 
 ers, on conditions which make these national properties appear to 
 have been almost given away. It is but natural to suppose that with 
 the ingress of such large sums of money, the Nicaragnaan Govern- 
 ment should, at least in the beginning, have been in comfortable 
 monetary circumstances, and the country in a favorable economic 
 condition, but the truth is that never in the history of that country 
 Las the treasury been emptier than then, nor has the poverty of the 
 masses ever been so noticeable, and the stagnation of commerce 
 and progress more pronounced. The reason for this is clear; of all 
 these sums that were apparently being loaned nothing reached the 
 publici treasuries of Nicaragua, and of the resources derived from 
 
34 
 
 the Custom Houses of the country, but a very small percentage has 
 been turned over by the American collectors to the government. 
 
 When the "Knox-Castrillo" Convention was submitted to a Com- 
 mittee of the Senate, although a final decision was not possible on 
 account of lack of majority, it was very evident that the Commit- 
 tee was not in favor of this proposition, and it could plainly be 
 seen that the Senate would never ratify the treaty, notwithstanding 
 the new American interests created ad hoc, and in such an unjust 
 iand arbitrary way. 
 
 IsTo doubt, the group of financiers received assurances from the 
 State Department that their interests would be protected at all 
 costs, whereupon the bankers resolved to retain in its totality the 
 sum collected through the various fiscal agents, thus openly violat- 
 ing the agreement, and reducing the Nicaraguan Grovernment to 
 the most miserable existence. In spite of this, or, perhaps, for this 
 Tery reason, the government delivered into the hands of the banking 
 syndicate the National Eailroad and steamers, in the hope that for 
 this consideration, some part of the money collected might be 
 turned into the empty treasury of the country, begging for a gift, 
 and this will have to be repeated, or the government will not be 
 able to exist, depending as it does on the mercy of its proiectors. 
 
 Knox^s avowed purpose, the rehabilitation of Nicaragua's foreign 
 •credit, has not materialized either. Formerly Nicaragua had al- 
 ways succeeded in paying strict attention, and with relative regu- 
 larity, to its foreign loan; but since this new financial protectorate 
 has been imposed on Nicaragua, no attention whatever has been 
 paid to living up to its obligations with the foreign creditors of the 
 country, who are numerous, and among whom there are some 
 Americans who are not enjoying the special favor of the State De- 
 partment, and who, therefore, are deploring the change that has 
 laken ph'ce. 
 
 The question arises "Has peace been assured that country in ex- 
 cliange for all the evils it has suffered?" We shall look into this. 
 
 It was easily to be seen, in Nicaragua as well as abroad, that 
 tYie election of General Mena, brought about by the National As- 
 sembly, was not looked upon with favor by the State Department, 
 "the reason given being that this election w^as not in conformity with 
 the Dawson pact, and at the same time letting it be understood that 
 
the favorite of the State Department was the actual President, 
 Adolfo Diaz, who, it is believed (which supposition was justified 
 by the events which later took place), was encouraged by the Ameri- 
 can Minister to relieve General Mena from his post as Minist^ of 
 War, which position Mena had secured for himself through the 
 favoritism of a previous American minister. No doubt, this minis- 
 ter assured Diaz of the support of the American Grovernment in 
 case difficulties should arise, which caused, or was at least the 
 occasion, of the last revolution in Nicaragua. 
 
 Mena had the support of the armed forces in the country. The 
 greater part of all the officers in the army were his creations, and 
 it was notoriously known that Mena was the real power in the 
 government. 
 
 It is to be presumed that Knox was convinced that his favored 
 candidate could not succeed himself through' the vote of a public 
 election, and in order that Mena's advantage of the control of the 
 army might be counterbalanced, and to ignore public opinion as rep- 
 resented by the Liberal Party, a civil war was necessary, in which 
 Diaz was to be victorious, aided by outside support. Had the State 
 Department wished to avoid the loss of life in Nicaragua of the 
 last two revolutions, it could easily have done so' by disembarking 
 armed forces and by the military occupation of the most important 
 strategic points throughout the country, as it has done lately. 
 
 However, the State Department proceeded in a directly opposite 
 way. The removal of General Mena from the Ministry of War, 
 advised by the American Minister, was a step which had to bring 
 the results which were presently realized. Mena, having in his 
 possession most of the armament in the countr}^, placed all that he 
 could in the hands of his followers, and then, securing the help 
 of the Liberals from the eastern part of the country, he succeeded in 
 bringing an army of volunteers together, superior in numbers and 
 quality to the forces Diaz could muster against him. Mena suc- 
 ceeded in a very short time in seriously menacing the capital, and 
 in taking a good many important to^^ms. 
 
 Public sentiment was from the very beginning in favor of the 
 uprising, because the government of Diaz, which never had enjoyed 
 popular favor, became positively hated, and unpopular from the very 
 moment it entered upon the loan negotiations, which meant the sell- 
 
36 
 
 ing of the country. But the uprising against Diaz's government did 
 not spread over the country imtil the Diaz forces became reduced tO' 
 ]\ranagua, and, no doubt, the capital would have fallen into the 
 haffis of the revolution, had it not been for the defense for the 
 presidential palace by American marines. It was then that the 
 masses ,in Leon, who had up to then remained passive, rose up in 
 arms as one man, and attacked the government garrison, which was 
 annihilated. They also decimated the armed expedition sent to 
 subjugate them, and recalled to the country some of the exiled lead- 
 ers, whose orders for an uprising they had not expQcted. Only a 
 few days elapsed before the government troops were concentrated 
 at, and reduced to the capital, Managua, and to parts of the De- 
 partments Eivas and Chontales, and those ports which had been 
 occupied and held for the government by American marines. 
 
 The material support thus given the Diaz cause by the one hun- 
 dred marines was not so great as the moral prestige it gave it, and 
 naturally it caused a great deal of demoralization among the ranks 
 of the assailants. Even in those moments, the State Department 
 could have avoided further bloodshed by declaring itself openly, and' 
 announcing irrevocably that the Government of the United States 
 had resolved to use, if necessary, armed force to put down the 
 revolution, as it did later on, but this course was not pursued, and 
 it was given out that armed intervention had been resorted to solely 
 for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of American 
 citizens comprising in the property interests the Nicaraguan ISTa- 
 tional Railroad lines and steamers, which were undisputed Nicara- 
 guan property, biTt which had been delivered into the hands of the 
 American speculators a few days previously an'd in a great hurry,, 
 very likely in anticipation of the revolutionary movement to be pro- 
 voked. 
 
 Admiral Sutherland declared expressly that if the railroad and 
 steamship lines were returned to him by the revolutionists, he^ 
 would observe a strict neutrality, and that he would abstain fromi 
 transporting either troops or war supplies of either belligerents, 
 thus obtaining control of both railroad and steamers, Avithout any 
 resistance having been offered. However, once in possession of the 
 railroarl lines and stations, and the American forces having estab- 
 lished themselves firmly in protected positions along these lines, 
 
87 
 
 iSiitherland itivented the pretext of having to go to the rescue of a 
 French school for girls who were perishing from hunger. All of 
 this was pure fabrication, as there were no pupils at that school 
 except native children, who had the protection and support of their 
 parents or guardians, and who were suffering no greater hardships 
 than any of the other residents of Granada. A considerable force 
 entrained in Managua for Granada and when this force was deemed 
 sufficient in the stronghold of Mena, the latter was asked to sur- 
 render, having been told that in case of his noncompliance, armed 
 "forc/e would be used against him, and that no quarter would be 
 given the vanquished, whereupon Mena surrendered without having 
 offered resistance. 
 
 Admiral Sutherland tried these tactics with General (Doctor) 
 Benjamin Zeledon, but this leader, being young and a valiant 
 patriot, although convinced that he would be routed, and perhaps 
 lose his life, resolved to defend the honor of Nicaragua, and refused 
 to surrender. 
 
 The i\.merican forces, after the fortifications protecting Masaya 
 had been attacked ineffectively by the Diaz forces for three days, 
 started to shell the Barranca Forts, and, having silenced the revo- 
 lutionary fire, took the positions by storm. A simultaneous attack 
 was made by the so-called Diaz Government forces upon the town 
 of Masaya, nearby, which was captured a few hours later than 
 Barranca. Zeledon, although wounded, succeeded in escaping, but 
 was overtaken and put to death the same day. This military action 
 of the American landing forces cost the lives of four marines and 
 one hundred Nicaraguan government dead, besides a proportionate 
 number of wounded, it being unknown to us, up to the present, 
 what losses the revolutionists suffered. 
 
 Leon and some other towns in the ISTorth were still in the hands 
 of the revolutionists, although suffering for lack of war supplies. 
 Admiral Sutherland then demanded the surrender of all the revo- 
 lutionary leaders, and these, convinced of the impossibility of 
 success against the American invading forces, and in order to avoid 
 further bloodshed, surrendered; but the masses, highly inflamed 
 by the injustice committed against their country, tried to offer 
 resistance. Unorganized as they were, the machine guns of the 
 -American marines were turned upon them. A similar incident 
 
38,. 
 
 had taken place in Chicliigalpa. From the American engagements, 
 resulted a total loss of eleven marines killed and a larger number 
 of these wounded, while, as published in the press of the country,, 
 there were hundreds of Xicaraguan victims, killed and wounded,, 
 many of them non-combatants. 
 
 It seems that the State Department has tried to make the Senate^ 
 appear responsible for its actions. This is indicated by certain 
 press articles inspired by the State Department, and by a declara- 
 tion made by Mr. Taft in a speech at Beverly, in which he asserted 
 that the responsibility for the occurrence in Nicaragua rests with 
 the Senate, and that the Senate alone is responsible for the fact 
 that dollars have not substituted rifle bullets, because the Senate 
 had not ratified the Loan Treaty which would have given the 
 custom houses of the country into the hands of American collectors,, 
 thus doing away with the inducement and object of revolution. 
 This declaration made by President Taft gives reason to suspect 
 that he is not aware of a good many of the acts of his Secretary 
 of State, for the fact is that the ISTicaraguan custom houses had 
 been under the administration of American collectors for many 
 months before the revolution started, and it can be safely asserted 
 that, instead of promoting peace in this country, as was claimed 
 for "Dollar Diplomacy," this delivery of the country's resources 
 to the American banking syndicate actually was the cause of the 
 war. « 
 
 Another attempted justification of armed intervention in Nica- 
 ragua was that the President de facto of Nicaragua himself had 
 asked for it. Just as good a justification would be the claim that 
 the Secretary of the State Department himself had asked for this 
 intervention, for the President of Nicaragua was but a creature of 
 Secretary Knox's, and a docile instrument in his hands. 
 
 We must recognize that, in the minds of those men who com- 
 posed the government at Managnia, there remained a sense of' 
 shame, demonstrated by the fact that, when reports were sent out 
 to the other Central American countries relative to the victory won 
 over the revolutionists at Masaya, no mention was made of the fact 
 that this victory was gained through the co-operation of the Amer- 
 ican marines. It is evident that the government officials at 
 Managua must have been assured of the consent of the American-. 
 ^Minister to ignore the part of the American marines in the 
 
39 
 
 "glorious triumph/'or else they would not have dared to do sa. 
 But even this false sense of shame was lost when the Secretary of 
 B'oreign Eelations at Managua expressed ofl&cially the regrets of 
 the ISTicaraguan nation to the government and people of the United 
 States for the loss of the marines whose lives were sacrificed in 
 engagements against the insurgents, not having, indeed, a single 
 word to say in honor of, or in sympathy with, the hundreds of 
 Mcaraguans who lost their lives in these same engagements. 
 
 Another excuse the State Department gave for its intervention 
 in Nicaragua was that the city of Managua had been bombarded 
 by the revolutionists, in spite of the fact that Managua was a 
 defenseless place, and that the lives of many non-combatants had 
 been lost in consequence. The truth is that Managua is not a 
 defenseless town, since it is protected by the fortifications on 
 Tiscapa Hill, which, by the way, constitute the strongest fortifica- 
 tion in all Nicaragua. Moreover, the government had at this time 
 almost all the troops at its disposition concentrated here. 
 
 If the State Department thought that, according to International 
 law, it had a right to prevent the bombardment of the town,, 
 it should have compelled the Nicaraguan government to have its 
 forces meet the revolutionists on a distant battlefield, where it- 
 then would have been decided who was entitled to the occupation 
 of the capital, instead of ostentatiously pretending (for which there 
 is no precedent in known history) that it was because of the risk 
 to non-combatants that they had determined to prevent one of the 
 contending armies from a decisive victory through the capture of 
 the best stronghold of the enemy. Had the State Department taken 
 this just and impartial, though arbitrar^^, stand, it migiit have 
 meant an immediate settlement of all differences, and a termina- 
 tion of the war right there and then. However, in such a proceed- 
 ijxg, there was the danger that the State Department would have 
 to resign itself to seeing the revolution victorious, a victory which 
 nobody could question for a moment, and would have had to con- 
 tent itself with seeing the people of the country overthrow a treach- 
 erous government ..that had been the protege of the State Depart- 
 ment, and the edifice of "Dollar Diplomacy," erected at so high a 
 cost, crumble down into nothingness. If the State Department 
 intended, to uphold its policy toward Nicaragua, it could not act 
 
40 
 
 otherwise than it did, and to show clearly its partiality, it went 
 ' so far as to order the American forces to co-operate in the bom- 
 bardment of Masaya, and threatened the towns of Granada and 
 Leon with a similar fate, none of them so well protected as Managua, 
 without taking into consideration the danger to the non-combatants. 
 
 Another pretext of the State Department for its intervention 
 was the excesses said to have been committed by the revolutionists. 
 Whenever the stories of such excesses were related in the press, 
 emanating frequently from official sources in Washington, in most 
 cases such accounts were fabrications or intentional misrepresenta- 
 tions in order to predispose public opinion in the United States 
 toward armed intervention in jSTicaragua, long beforehand decided 
 upon by the State Department. It is undeniable that some abuses 
 may have been committed by the revolutionary forces, but it is 
 notoriously known that the conduct of the so-called government 
 troops was far more to be condemned. We have before us proofs 
 which entitle us to the assertion that, during no civil war, the 
 United States not excepted, was there ever less harm done to lives 
 \ and property of non-combatants, with especial reference to the 
 
 foreigners in Nicaragua, than in this last revolution. 
 
 If the excesses committed in ISTicaragua by revolutionists had been 
 a justification for intervention, and not a simple pretext, the State 
 Department should have, long ago, and with much more right, used 
 force to intervene in Mexico, as has been pointed out repeatedly 'by 
 the press of the United States. But Mexico is not, like Nicaragua, 
 a poor and feeble countr}^ nor are there at the head of the govern- 
 ment or of the revolution in Mexico men who would ask for inter- 
 vention, and thus become traitors to their own country. An inter- 
 vention in Mexico would mean an international affair of very grave 
 consequences to the United States, and a war that would cost the 
 United States tens of thousands of soldiers and very likely hundreds 
 of millions of dollars. It would mean a war of conquest, and, to 
 retain the territory acquired, a powerful army of occupation for 
 more than two generations. 
 
 If all the governments of Central America had lived up to their 
 duty, pro\'ing Central American solidarity, by at least voicing a 
 word of protest to satisfy public opinion, so clearly manifested 
 against any foreign invasion, perhaps this attitude of Central Amer- 
 ica would have caused Mr. Knox to pursue the same prudent policy 
 
41 
 
 with Nicaragua as that pursued with Mexico. But no doubt the 
 Presidents were counseled to refrain from making demonstrations 
 by the fear with which Mr, Knox has succeeded in inspiring them. 
 It is this fear of Mr. Knox which caused some of these Presidents 
 to repress public demonstrations, as well as the press, and to im- 
 prison the writers who had assumed the duty of giving voice to 
 the indignation felt by the masses; and, what is more curious yet, 
 in some cases it was even forbidden to reproduce manifestations of 
 protest originated and published in the United States by patriotic 
 Central Americans, as well as Anglo-Americans, lovers of justice. 
 
 After all that has happened, to explain its inconsequence, the State 
 Department insists that it has not fomented war in Nicaragua, and 
 that the American forces were sent to Nicaragua solely for the 
 purpose of protecting the lives and interests of Americans, although 
 the State Department cannot, now, nor can it ever, prove that there 
 was a single instance where a foreigner had suffered in person or 
 property, and it is evident that the State Department, on the pre- 
 tense of an imaginary danger, has sacrificed the lives of those 
 marines who were killed in Nicaragua to "Dollar Diplomacy." 
 
 The State Department's intervention in this last revolution in 
 Nicaragua has caused death and suffering to thousands, for, without 
 this intervention, the revolution would have been victorious in a 
 few days and the civil strife would have come to an end ; but worse 
 than that for the United States, it has resulted in the depreciation 
 of the American army in the estimation of all Latin America, who 
 saw these American soldiers, considered to be in their own country 
 the defenders of law and liberty, converted into tools of tyranny 
 and oppression in Nicaragua. 
 
 Does, perhaps, Mr. Knox think that the success of the American 
 arms in Nicaragua so easily obtained, is a matter of glory, in- 
 stead of disgrace, to the American army ? Mr. Knox must be satis- 
 fied with his labors, otherwise he would not have gone to the ex- 
 treme that he did. He has kept the army of occupation in Nica- 
 ragua, not for the purpose of guaranteeing the free election of a 
 President for the next term, but for the guaranty of the election 
 of Ms protege, Adolfo Diaz, and he has accomplished his aim, for, 
 on the 2nd of November, under the reign of martial law, with the 
 citizens terrorized by the bayonets of the American marines, the 
 iraitor Diaz was elected, supposedly without any opposition. 
 
42 
 
 On the same day, the people were called to elect deputies, because 
 Diaz, assuming dictatorial power in the country, and. supported 
 by the American government, had dissolved the Fational Assembly, 
 which was the very same Assembly to which he owed that faint 
 shadow of legality of his executive power, and also the same 
 Assembly that declared Diaz' presidency ended when the last revo- 
 lution broke out because of his treasonable attitude. 
 
 To give an idea of the electoral liberties enjoyed by the citizens of 
 l^icaragua during the last election, we insert a copy of the message 
 sent out by the Commander-in-General of the Mcaraguan Army, 
 Emiliano Chamorro, which message was addressed to all military 
 and civil authorities in the country, and in which all functionaries 
 were incited to make certain the election of those candidates named 
 by Chamorro, for the reason that these were the candidates chosen 
 in conformity with the famous "Dawson Pact" : 
 
 "Administrative Offices, 
 "Managua, October 25, 1 :15 p. m. 
 "Commandants of Posts and District Prefects: 
 
 "I beg to advise you that we, the principal leaders of the Eevolu- 
 tion of October, met, and in order to comply with the Dawson Pact 
 have in common accord designated as the candidates of the Con- 
 servative Party for the first constitutional period : 
 "Adolf Diaz fpr President; 
 "Fernando Zolorzano for Vice-President. 
 
 "I take pleasure in acquainting you with this fact so that you 
 may urge our friends and religious fellow-helievers to exert the 
 necessary efforts at the polls to accomplish the triumph of the before 
 mentioned candidates. 
 
 "With all consideration, I am 
 
 "Affectionately, 
 
 "Emiliano Chamoero."'' 
 
 This same Chamorro addressed a telegram to the President of 
 Honduras, of which we herewith insert a copy. This telegram was 
 intercepted at Leon, as stated- in "The Daily ISTews" of Salvador, 
 under date of September 4th, which is our source of information 
 in this particular instance. This telegram says: 
 
43 
 
 "We have to trust in the final outcome. We are counting on the- 
 support of the United States, who will not delay in making their 
 power felt by- the Liberals and the other enemies of our cause." 
 
 Therefore, if we were lacking other proofs of the criminal con- 
 spiracy between those in power in Nicaragua and the foreigni 
 invaders, this telegram would be sufficient proof; but there is a-^ 
 document existent which will pass into the history of American: 
 diplomacy as one of the most scandalous proofs of the abuse of ai 
 weak country by the powerful government of the United States,, 
 equalled only by that Note of Mr. Knox's to which we have already 
 referred. 
 
 The document we allude to is a note addressed by the American-. 
 Minister in Nicaragua, Mr. Weitzel, to the Secretary of the Ministry 
 of Foreign Eelations in Managua, a copy of which we attach. (See: 
 Addenda "G.") 
 
 We make mention of this document here, because it demonstrates 
 that the last election in Nicaragua was a farce, and might be called' 
 ridiculous were it not that the sanguinary events preceding it com^ 
 mand seriousness. This has been a farce in which the State Depart- 
 ment purticipated directly, in spite of the fact that it pretends to 
 he desirous of showing Latin America what fn);e republicanism^ is.. 
 Mr. Weitzel say, among other things : "By repudiating Zelaya, 
 whose regime of barbarism and corruption was put at an end by the* 
 Nicaraguans themselves, after a sanguinary war, the United States 
 government condemned, not only the individual, but the whole- 
 system, and it could not possibly tolerate any movement in Nica- 
 ragua that has in view a re-establishment of this destructive regime. 
 The government of the United States will, therefore, oppose any 
 attempt at the restoration of Zalayism, and will give its efficient 
 moral support to the cause of good government in Nicaragua, legally 
 constituted, and resulting in benefit to the Nicaraguan people, 
 whom it has long been the aim of the United States government to 
 aid in its endeavors for peace and prosperity, under a benevolent 
 constitutional government of law and order.'^ 
 
 As what Weitzel terms Zelayism, or more accurately speaking, 
 not Diazism, would have re-established itself in Nicaragua, beyond' 
 all doubt, through a FEEE election, — it was to the interests of the 
 invading government, or, rather, the State Department, that noo 
 President should be elected except its accomplice, Diaz. 
 
44 
 
 This assertion of Mr. Weitzel has been precisely the hobby horse 
 of Mr. Knox's for the last couple of years to provoke disturbances 
 in Central America. To prove the correctness of our opinion we 
 propose to go into details. 
 
 The State Department has stated that it not only condemned 
 Zelaya as an individual, but his system of government as well. 
 We shall not discuss whether the State Department had a right 
 to judge the executive of an independent country, as we have 
 filready expressed our views on this question, but since it claims 
 to have condemned the "system" it was but natural to expect thai 
 the State Department would use every endeavor to secure in the 
 new government in Nicaragua, its own creation, a "model re- 
 publican government," a government of administrative honesty, and 
 of marked patriotism; nobody ciould have expected to see the 
 State Department encouraging with its protection this new govern- 
 ment in ISTicaragua in committing outrages against the persons and 
 property of its citizen — in systematic robbery, and the vilest of 
 treasons. 
 
 However, it is plainly to be seen that this kind of a government 
 had to be the choice of the State Department, if it wanted to see 
 its financial ])olicy in Nicaragua succeed, for no honest lawabiding 
 and patriotic government would have lent itself to further the 
 inteutions of Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua. Strange to say, 
 the State Department was very explicit in denouncing the despotism 
 of Zelaya in Nicaragua, but has shown a marked indifference to 
 such rule in other countries, as for instance, Gr'uatemala, where 
 Estrada Cabrera has been reigning supreme for the last fourteen 
 }oars, a Ijrutal despot and the scourge of his people, a ^blot on 
 civilization, who has caused not only his own country to suffer 
 under his tyrannical rule, but other Central American countries 
 as well. We liave made fbie statement already that it was Estrada 
 Cabrera who furnished the sinews of war for the last two revolu- 
 tions in Honduras, and he did likewise for the Estrada revolution 
 in Nicaragua, and although the State Department has denounced 
 Zelaya as the perturber of peace in Central America, and as a 
 violator of the Washington Convention, it has never taken action 
 against Cabrera, or tried to check his plans, as it was quick to do 
 when Zelava was concerned. 
 
45 
 
 Mr. Weitzel expressed and repeated declarations made by the 
 State Department and by the President, Mr. Taft himself, to the 
 effect that the United States government would not tolerate a 
 restoration of the Zelaya regime in Nicaragua, which they term 
 '■'Zelayism." What does Mr. Weitzel, the State Department, or 
 Mr. Taft really mean ? Either one would find it difficult to explain, 
 lor none of them know the history of Nicaragua, the actual state 
 of affairs there, the character of the masses and its leaders and 
 politicians, sufficiently well to set up a criterion and it is this 
 ignorance that explains the many mistakes and abuses committed 
 hy the State Department. 
 
 Zelaya, like all despotic rulers, never succeeded in forming a 
 distinctive political party. All the employes of his government were 
 subject to changes dictated solely b}^ circumstances or by his caprice. 
 When Zelaya abandoned his executive position, he would have been 
 deprived by this act of all prestige had not the intervention of 
 the United States contributed to make Zelaya a martyr to the 
 autonomy of his country in the eyes of some people, which opinion 
 Avould liave been far more general had Zelaya chosen to fall fighting 
 as a hero. 
 
 To stamp this last revolution in Nicaragua, "Zelayism" shows 
 profound ignorance and bad faith. This last revolution was headed 
 by IMena, one of the conspicuous leaders in the revolution kgainst 
 Zelaya and one of the five candidates of the Dawson Treaty, sup- 
 ported by a faction of the Conservative Party. Without any foreign 
 (American) intervention, it is sure that the Liberal Party would 
 have remained passive in its desire to see the factions of the op- 
 posite party fight it out among themselves, and to pursue, when 
 the fight should be ended, the most advantageous course for them- 
 selves. But the intervention of the United States inflamed the 
 masses among the liberals, and without waiting for orders from 
 their leaders, they cnished the forces of the Diaz government. 
 This occurred principally in the departments of Leon and Chinan- 
 dega, the same having always opposed Zelaya since 1896. Where, 
 therefore, is the Zelayism of this last revolution? 
 
 It is a matter of surprise that a dignified government should 
 embody in an official document utterances of the Secretary of State 
 showing personal resentment and rage because of the opposition 
 shown toward his Dollar Diplomacy. 
 
46 
 
 Andj we ask again, after all these abuses, after so many scandals, 
 has peace been assured Nicaragua ? Any foreigner who goes to the 
 trouble of reading this article can answer* this question just as well 
 as Central Americans can. If such a thing is possible as that the 
 government of the United States should intend to persist in its 
 policy in Nicaragua, it would necessarily have to maintain there an 
 
 -''army of occupation," as is necessary in any conquered country. 
 
 -and which would be the only means of saving those traitors who 
 
 ■sold Nicaragua from the just punishment, which the people will, 
 
 -no doubt, some day meet out to them. 
 
 *To assist us in proving- our assertions Periodical Publications 
 •xeached us from Nicaragua, which bring the following: 
 
 PRECAUTION BEATS OSTENTATION. 
 
 :S'pecial to The American: 
 
 Managua, Nov. 13. — To-day at 7 a. m. the presidential train, com- 
 posed of three cars, left here for Corinto. In the center car rode Presi- 
 dent Adolfo Diaz, Gen. Bmiliano Chamorro, Minister Diego M. Chamorro, 
 
 "Dr. Carlos Cuadi'a Pasos and other friends of tlie administration. In 
 
 'front and rear were two cars carrying 100 American marines. The band 
 -vs^as not taken, nor was the Guard of Honor, President Diaz being against 
 
 .amy osterttation. 
 
 GUARD OF HONOR ABOLISHED. 
 
 'Special to The American: 
 
 Managua, Nov. 13. — In accordance "with the decree of the 9th instant, 
 the Guard of Honor to the President of the Republic was, for the time 
 being, abolished. 
 
 ONLY 400 MARINES REMAIN. 
 
 Special to Tlie American: 
 
 Managua, Nov. 12. — On Friday, the fifteenth instant. Admiral South- 
 erland will leave for Panama with the American forces, leaving only 
 four hundred marines, 300 of whom will be stationed at Campo de Marts 
 and 100 at Leon. 
 
 Nov. 17, 1912. 
 
 What a sorrowful cast for tlie American Marines! "We see them 
 -converted into Body Guards of a tyrannical usurper, kept there for the 
 purpose of insuring for this man an immunity from the wrath and 
 justified incWgnation of the masses of his country. Never, perhaps, have 
 the taxpayers of the United States even dreamt of the possibility that 
 their money should be put to the use of keieping tliis man in power 
 and to impose a Dictatorship on tlie people of a free country and to 
 oppres.s a now free sister Republic. 
 
 Those of the Nicaraguan Citizens who were able to do so, have 
 protested against the Coup d'Etat — against the Dictatorship and Usurpa- 
 tion of the Executive Power by a traitor, abstaining from giving 
 their vote all those who had the valor to challenge the soldiers of the 
 Despot, (converted into Electors and Agents), and who had refused to 
 be accomplices in an Electoral Farce, which can justly be termed a 
 Farce, even if there were no more reasons than the fact that the 
 People were convened to cast their vote on the ISth of October, and that 
 the real Election took place on the 2nd of November, or a lapse of 
 time of only a fortnight, which was insufficient to even carry the news 
 ■of the Decree to some of the Departments of the Republic. 
 
 We attach a fragment of the Protest which was published in Blue- 
 fields a-nd another one with the Decree of Dictatorship. ( Addenda I.) 
 
47 
 
 We believe that a peaceful solution is possible, hut ive do no^' 
 think that the moment and the circumstances are opportune for a 
 suggestion on our part. 
 
 El Salvador. 
 
 "We do not know whether any loan propositions were ever made 
 to this country, but most likely not for the reason that the foreign 
 debt is relatively small as compared with the natural resources of 
 this countr}^ 
 
 This foreign debt, caused, the same as the enormous internal debt, 
 by the corruptness and inability of previous presidents, has not 
 affected in any way that could not be remedied the country^s sources 
 of wealth, and, no doubt, Salvador will be able to work out its own 
 salvation by the means of securing for itself a series of honest 
 executives. But this does not necessarily mean that Salvador 
 would not have to feel the weight of Dollar Digloraacy, should this 
 come to be the fixed system of the United States toward the Central 
 American countries. Salvador would be the last one to suffer this 
 .evil, but could not escape it, as some pretext, however weak, would 
 be found for compelling the Salvadorian government to make the 
 sacrifice of the country's autonomy. 
 
 The people of Salvador have realized the danger and their 
 patriotism found expression in protests against the latest armed 
 intervention in Nicaragua. Salvador's government, presided over 
 by Dr. Manuel E. ilraujo, knew its duty, as proven by documents 
 that we have before us, seconding the public clamor of its masses. 
 We cannot resist the desire to publish cables which were exchanged 
 between President Taft and President Araujo, and we attach same 
 hereto. (Addenda "H.") 
 
 The cable clearly demonstrates : 
 
 1. Mr. Araujo was sure that peace could be brought about if 
 President Diaz, of Nicaragua, would deposit the executive power 
 in Mr. Salvador Caledron, to which proposition President Diaz had 
 already given his approval, but- which, without doubt. President 
 Taft did not permit to be consummated, as is to be deducted from 
 the ansAver he sent Mr. Araujo. 
 
 2. Mr. Arajuo was anxious to bring about peace in Nicaragua 
 through the mediation of the other Central American republics, it 
 
48 
 
 being understood that should this mediation prove fruitless, an 
 armed intervention by these Central American republics was to be 
 resorted to in order to avoid such an action on the part of the 
 United States. This would have been to the advantage of all the 
 Central American countries, because this coming together for a 
 common purpose Avould have offered opportunit}^ for further steps 
 towards a union of all the Central American republics into one 
 "Federation," the best means of protection against the common 
 danger. 
 
 Mr. Taft objected to this proposition on the ground that his gov- 
 ernment, being neutral, and, therefore, better fitted, should try to 
 bring about the termination of the civil war in Nicaragua. (How 
 this impartiality or neutrality was afterwards demonstrated we 
 have already related.) He supported this opinion of his by call- 
 ing attention to the Washington Convention, which, by the way, 
 prohibits all interventions in civil wars, and which Convention 
 Taft said it was liis duty to see respected, at the same time, re- 
 serving for himself the right to violate it. 
 
 3. The State Department had explained to representatives of 
 Salvador at Washington and Managua that the landing of marine's 
 m IN'icaragua was solely due to the desire of the State Department 
 in Washington to protect the American Legation, Consulates and 
 other American interests, but that nO' intervention in the internal 
 strife was intended. These assurances were not lived up to, as we 
 have previously related, which caused Mr. Araujo to formulate 
 representations which, although couched in very suave and civil 
 terms, might still have prevented foreign armed forces from spill- 
 ing the blood of ISTicaraguans on their own soil. 
 
 4. That Mr. Taft still pretends to have proved his impartiality 
 is shown in his opinion of the revolution, which he declared a 
 revolt Avithout a principle and comparable to Zelaya's regime, which 
 he denounced in very bitter terms, also attacking the revolution 
 most passionately, 'at the same time, proclaiming the legality of 
 the Diaz government, although this government is a defacto gov- 
 ernment only, having no more shadow of legality than the Assembly 
 appointment, which he received from the very same Assembly that 
 declared Diaz deposed from his executive position. 
 
 It afforded us much pleasure to see an official pamphlet published 
 
49 
 
 recently in proof of the correct and jDatriotic stand taken by the 
 President of El Salvador, who, with the President of Honduras, 
 had been accused of sending to the Diaz government arms and 
 munitions at a time when these were most needed, so as to enable 
 the government to offer some resistance, if feeble, to the formidable 
 ■onslaught of the revolution, all of which would have resulted in 
 prolonging the strife, and in making Araujo an accomplice in the 
 treachery to Central America. 
 
 These publications prove that Mr. Araujo saw from the very 
 beginning the perilous position of Central America,, and that he 
 •endeavored to arrest the danger, which does not coincide with the 
 grave accusations made against him; and we shall be still more 
 "pleased when Mr. Araujo, as soon as he is informed of these ac- 
 cusations, shall offer direct and conclusive proofs of their fallacy 
 in order that nothing but the truth shall be handed down in the 
 lii&tory of the country. . 
 
 The Washington Teeaties and Conventions. 
 
 The Central American Peace Conference took place in Wash- 
 ington, ISTovember, 1907, its objects being the termination of dif- 
 ferences between several of the states of Central America, and the 
 establishment of a firm basis for the assurance of interstate peace. 
 'To obtain these noble ends, President Eoosevelt generously offered 
 the hospitality of his country, and with Mexico, the good and dis- 
 interested offices of his government- as far as this should be pos- 
 sible. That this Conference did not give any practical results was 
 not the fault of the mediating governments, but rather due to 
 the narrowmindedness of the presidents there represented. The 
 delegates of Honduras and Nicaragua proposed, as a remedy for all 
 troubles in Central America, the re-establishment of the Union of 
 the five nations in one, declaring at the same time, that they did 
 not have any confidence in any other means so far proposed or 
 "that could be thereafter proposed. This proposition was rejected 
 Idv the majority, the other three delegations, as were other pro- 
 positions with a tendency to restrict the absolute power with which 
 the Central American presidents have ruled their countries. 
 
 As some of the articles agreed upon in the Washington Peace 
 'Conference are of importance in reference to our purpose, we shall 
 •copy some of these. 
 
50 
 
 Article II of the General Treaty says : 
 
 "Desiring to secure in the Kepublics of Central America the 
 benefits which are derived from the maintenance of their institu- 
 tions, and to contribute at the same time in strengthening their 
 stability and the prestige with which they ought to be surrounded, 
 it is declared that every disposition or measure which may tend 
 to alter the constitutional organzation in any of them is to be 
 deemed a menace to the peace of said Eepublics." 
 
 The additional Convention is composed of three articles which 
 say : 
 
 Article I. "The Governments of the High Contracting Parties 
 shall not recognize any other Government which may come into 
 power in any of the five Eepublics as a consequence of a COUP 
 D'ETAT, or of a revolution against the recog-nized Government,, 
 so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof,, 
 have not constitutionally reorganized the country." 
 
 Article II. "^STo Government of Central America shall, in case 
 of civil war, inter^^ene in favor of or against the Government of 
 the country where the struggle takes place." 
 
 Article III. "The Governments of Central America, in the first 
 place, are recommended to endeavor to bring about, by the means 
 at tlieir command, a constitutional reform in the sense of prohibit- 
 nyo; the re-election ci the President of a Republic, where such 
 prohibition does not exist; secondly, to adopt all measures necessary 
 to effect a complete guarantee of the principles of alteration in 
 power." 
 
 In a convention for the establishment of a Central American 
 Court of Justice is contained an. "Annexed Article," which says: 
 
 "Annexed Article. The Central American Court of Justice shall 
 also have jurisdiction over the conflicts which may arise between 
 the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers, and when, as a 
 matter of fact, the judicial decisions and resolutions of the National 
 Congress are not respected." 
 
 Although we have read and reread the Treaty and the Conven- 
 tions referred to, we do not find a single article, a single word, 
 that justifies the ostentatious pretensions of the State Department 
 and of President Taft himself. (We refer to the cablegram ad- 
 dressed to the President of Salvador, dated September 5th, 1912), 
 
51 
 
 that the United States Government has the right, by these same 
 Conventions, to compel the contracting parties to live np to their 
 obligations. 
 
 The preliminary protocol, which v(^as the origin of the Confer- 
 ence, contains Article II, which says : 
 
 "Their excellencies, the Presidents of the Central American 
 Eepublics, will invite their excellencies, the Presidents of the 
 United States of America, and of the United States of Mexico, 
 if it may please them, to appoint their respective representatives^ 
 in order that these representatives, in a purely amicable capacity, 
 may render their good and impartial offices in furtherance of the 
 results aimed at by this Conference." 
 
 Prom what we have related it is clearly deducted that no right 
 to intervene was granted the United States nor Mexico (who, by 
 the way, has never pretended to have such right) but, quite to the 
 contrary, the General Treaty we have related expressly annuls all 
 previous Central American Conventions, including the one which 
 took place aboard the "Marblehead," and' which was ratified by the 
 Convention of San Jose, Costa Pica, between Guatemala, Salvador 
 and Honduras. Those annulled conventions gave the Presidents 
 of the United States and Mexico the right to oJEficiate as permanent 
 arbitrators in all differences between Central American countries, 
 and in those days they could have pretended to intervene in order 
 to prevent a resort to arms on the ground that they had a right 
 to prevent wars before any harm could be done that might prove 
 beyond reparation. 
 
 Under the present Treaty all that the mediating governments: 
 could and ought to do is to continue tendering their good offices 
 in order that the conventions providing for their same good offices 
 and amicable assistance are obeyed and lived up to. 
 
 Let us examine whether the government in Washington has in 
 one way or another with or without a right, ever attempted to 
 influence the Central American presidents so that they might 
 comply with the Treaties, as is claimed by the State Department. 
 
 Article III, preinserted in the Additional Convention, declares 
 one of the principles of International Law for Central America 
 to be the alternability of the executive power. This principle, al- 
 though a simple recommendation resulting from this Conference,, 
 
53 
 
 was accepted by the iDresidents, and ratified by the congresses of 
 all Central American countries. After this Convention had been 
 made valid, Mr. Estrada Cabrera had him?elf re-elecited in Guate- 
 mala, and we are not aware that the State Department has ever 
 even reminded Estrada Cabrera of his obligation to deliver to a 
 successor who might be elected in a free election the Presidency 
 lield by him. On the contrary, Estrada Cabrera has always en- 
 joyed the favor of the State Department, while Zelaya, who was 
 re-elected previous to the Convention, was denounced and pursued 
 in the manner already related. 
 
 In some of the Central American countries despotism and 
 tyranny have reigned supreme, but never have we heard that the 
 State Department undertook to improve conditions in order to 
 ■prevent popular uprisings, which invariably have had their source 
 in the lack of guaranty of publici safety, or even of those rights 
 necessary for the preservation of life. The State Department 
 might have intervened on the ground that Article II of the General 
 Treaty, already cited by us, gave it a right to declare infringements 
 on the Constitutional Laws a menace to Central American peaca 
 and well being. But with the exception of Zelaya, unquestionably 
 the most despotic Presidents of Central America were the ones to 
 enjoy the confidence and protection of the State Department. 
 
 The State Department might, based upon Article II of the Ad- 
 ditional Convention (which article we have cited herein before), 
 have cautioned the other Central American governments not to 
 lecognize the Nicaraguan government created by the revolution of 
 1910 (which government is in existence to-day), for the reason 
 ihat said government had not been reorganized constitutionally and 
 that no elections had taken place (until the one which was effected 
 Xovember 2nd, and which we have demonstrated already did not 
 merit the title of an election.) But far from doing so, the State 
 Department hastened to recognize this illegal government and to 
 give it the support of the United States government to the extent 
 of protecting it by armed forces against an uprising of its own 
 masses ; while it refused to recognize the government of Dr. Madriz, 
 which was legally constituted, influencing Guatemala and Salvador 
 to refuse their recognition also. 
 
 All the efforts of the Central American Court of Justice during 
 
53 
 
 the last tAvo revolutions in Nicaragua to re-establi&h peace by means 
 of mediation were unsuccessful, principally because one of the^ 
 factions was assured of the support of the State Department car- 
 ried to the extremes Ave have already ciriticised. 
 
 Had it been the desire of the State Department to preserve the 
 dignity of this Court, instead of being the direct cause of itft 
 complete failure, it Avould have assisted this Court in its efforts to 
 bring about peace; the more so because an annexed article of the 
 Convention, which provides for the establishment of this Court, 
 gives this Court the right to intervene in differences arising among 
 the High Departments of the governmient, and the American gov- 
 ernment might have used its good offices in having the election of' 
 Mena, since this election was considered -illegal, or the dismissal 
 of President Diaz by the same Assembly that elec-ted Mena, sub- 
 mitted to this Court, thereby terminating all civil strife in Nicara- 
 gua at once. 
 
 Although Article II of the Additional Convention prohibits the- 
 Central American governments from intervening for or against, 
 any Central American government in case of a revolution or civil 
 war, the American Government has placidly alloAved, if it did not 
 instigate, the govern&ent of Guatemala to take side with and 
 assist the revolutions in Honduras and Nicaragua. The State- 
 Department has done even worse than this. Claiming for itself a 
 right that was denied all contracting parties in the Washington 
 Conventions, the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for or 
 against, in revolutions in Central America, the State Department, 
 went so far as to use armed force in putting down the last revolu- 
 tion and used these armed forces, not only against combatants, 
 but even against unarmed citizens, all of which was committed 
 with the Washington Treaties as a pretext, in scandalous violation 
 of these very same treaties AAdiich the State Department has claimed' 
 to be defending. 
 
 We consider it very opportune to publish a communication sent 
 by President Araujo to the Central American Court of Justice 
 relative to the last revolution in Nicaragua and his true inter- 
 pretation of the Washington Conventions, which opinion is all" 
 the more interesting, because it voices the authorized idea of an 
 Executive of one of the Central American republics. His com- 
 munication reads as follows : 
 
54 
 
 ''Tive indejoenclent nations, none having relinquished their rights 
 to an antouomons government, convened upon treaties which tend 
 to promote effective relations of peace, commerce and good vnll, and 
 the governments of the United States and Mexico, having been rep- 
 resented at this Conference through notable representatives, were 
 pai'ties to the deliberations which preceded the final conclusions 
 arrived at in these Intrenational treaties ratified at Washington, 
 thanlcs to a generous and disinterested offer of hospitality of the 
 Ex-President of the United States. However, it is noteworthy that 
 ncitlier in the text of these documents, the preliminary Protocol, nor 
 in the records of the Conference, are these great governments of the 
 United States of America, and Mexico, conceded any rights or 
 obligations that could be traced to these Treaties convened upon by 
 the Central American contracting parties. There is nothing in 
 either the spirit nor the wording of these treaties that could be 
 construed into a restriction of their rights of sovereignty, when 
 these contain nothing but expressions of mutual admiration, respect 
 and good will, obligating the contracting countries to submit their 
 differences to the verdict of the Central American Court of Justice, 
 Avhich is purely Central American, and of which esteemed institu- 
 tion your Honor is the meritorious representa^tive." 
 
 And now we shall conclude. We hope we have succeeded in 
 demonstrating that "Dollar Diplomacy'^ is a great injustice and 
 is the ruin of those countries in which it is pursued, at the same 
 time endangering the prestige of the United States in the eyes 
 of all Latin-America to the benefit of only a few privileged 
 citizens of the United States. We Central Americans lack the 
 means to relieve the situation and to resent this injustioe, and for 
 the moment we have to trust to the straightforwardness and honesty 
 of the American people, and the people's worthy representatives in 
 Congress, and especially in the Senate, which is investigating this 
 matter. We admire this great country, and we are far from 
 ])elieving that the people are responsible for the errors of a few of 
 its public men in leading positions. We hope for justice to be done 
 us, and for a revival of the Pan-American Fraternity, which will 
 give peace, progress and liberty to all the nations of this continent. 
 
 Juan Leets. 
 New Orleans, November, 1912. 
 
ADDENDA 
 
55 
 
 ADDENDA A 
 
 Memorandum of Minister Brown. 
 
 Under instructions from my government, which I have just 
 received by telegraph, I have the honor and the pleasure to inform 
 the Government of Honduras that the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. 
 has informed my government that they are prepared to agree in 
 the arrangement of the foreign cfebt of Honduras, the delivery of 
 the railway wharf of Puerto Cortes, and the advancement of a sub- 
 stantial amount for internal improvements which may be necessary, 
 acquiring new bonds which must be duly secured. 
 
 Messrs. Morgan & Co. have notified my government that the 
 Council of Foreign Bonholders had accepted the proposal of Morgan 
 & Co., who now have control of the British and American securities, 
 including the railway and wharf, and that the Council of Foreign 
 Bondholders, acting in behalf of the holders of bonds, have in- 
 formed the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 
 foregoing, and that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
 having cordially approved the new project, has, by request of the 
 Council of Bondholders, given notice to Minister Carden of the 
 change in the situation. 
 
 • I have instructions to manifest that if the Goyernment of Hon- 
 duras would send a special agent to the United States with full 
 powers to negotiate with Morgan & Co., the Government of the 
 United States would extend to him all facilities. 
 
 I beg to add that the Government of the United States feels itself 
 happy to see, in the said proposals, the prospect of a good result 
 and for a settlement upon a favorable basis for the amortization of 
 the national debt, which would be for the prosperity, tranquility 
 and national strength of Honduras. 
 
 (Signed) Philip Brown, 
 American Minister to Honduras. 
 
 Tegucigalpa, July 17, 1909. 
 
 ADDENDA B 
 
 Cablegrams. 
 
 Tegucigalpa, Dec. 10, 1910. 
 
 Paredes, Honduras Consulate, New Yorl;: 
 
 Accept agreement; sign agreement and return. 
 
 (Signed) Davila. 
 
56 
 
 l^EW Yoke, Dec. 11, 1910. 
 President Davila, Tegucigalpa, Honduras: 
 
 Consult situation prominent people to decide destinies Eepnblic. 
 
 (Signed) Paredes. 
 
 Cablegrams. 
 
 Kew York, Dec. 24, 1910. 
 President Davila, Tegucigalpa; Honduras: 
 
 I have refused to sign convention — American Protectorate — 
 S'anto Domingo plan. Complied with my duty. Present you my 
 resignation. (Signed) Paredes. 
 
 Tegucigalpa, Dec. 29, 1910. 
 Paredes, Netu Yo7']v: 
 
 Country is on the verge of a disastrous civil war. Only the loan- 
 can save it. Think patriotically. Must make efforts to gain time. 
 Loan will be made in spite of us. At least, we must try to avoid' 
 bloodshed to the Eepublic. I await details. 
 
 (Signed) Davila. 
 
 Tegucigalpa, Jan. 20, 1911.. 
 Paredes, Honduras Consulate, New Yoilc: 
 
 Your resignation not accepted. Sign loan without delay. Gov- 
 ernment assumes all responsibility. Civil war appears to ]ie formid- 
 able. Loan may avoid bloodshed and prepare beneficial evolution,, 
 preventing Bonilla coming to power. Subscribe contract this week.. 
 Answer. (Signed) Davila. 
 
 Letter of President Davilla to Minister Paredes. 
 
 Tegucigalpa, Jan. 12, 1911. 
 
 Minister of Honduras, General Juan E. Paredes, Consulado de 
 Honduras, 66 Beaver Street, New Yorh: 
 
 My Esteemed Friend — I am in receipt of yours of ISTov. 28th and 
 Dec. 5th. 
 
 Estrada Cabrera, who is the promoter of this war and that of' 
 August last year, has displayed a prodigious activity to produce the 
 revolution, and all elements are conjoined against the Government, 
 unjustly. To get out of these difficulties we take to fight hard. 
 
 The Government of Honduras was notified officially that if the- 
 
57 
 
 loan was not signed, it would be carried through at all hazards, in 
 worse conditions for the Eepnblic. ISTevertheless, we said nothing, 
 did not give any promises nntil we could receive your indications. 
 The last proposition made by the bankers, which you transmitted 
 by cable, we consider it as decisive, and for that reason we ordered 
 you to sign and return. 
 
 The American Minister asked me for a copy of that cable, and I 
 gave it to him. A¥hen you refused to sign the treaty at Washington, 
 the disgust of the State Department raised to indignation. 
 
 (Signed) Davila. 
 
 Tegucigalpa, Jan. 27, 1911. 
 Paredes, Ho^iduras Consulaie, Neiv York: 
 
 Ceiba has fallen. San Marcos, Colon, has also been taken by in- 
 vasion from Nicaragua. The war, according to official declarations, 
 took place on account of delay in signing the Joan, notwithstanding 
 promises made since Dec. 10th. War between factions which de- 
 vastates the country, and the loan will be made by anymeans. Let 
 us put one side our "amour propre^^ in order to avoid the ruin of 
 Honduras. If you cannot sign, help Lazo. Let us work together 
 in behalf of peace. (Signed) Davila. 
 
 ADDENDA C 
 
 Aid for Nicaragua Asked by Estrada — She will Never Thrive 
 Without Our Effective Intervention, Says Ex-President — 
 Urges a Protectorate — President Diaz Hopes for Our Help, 
 He Declares — Blames Americans for Eevolutions. 
 
 [New York Times, Sept. 10, 1912.] 
 In the course of an interview with a Times reporter yesterday,, 
 Ex-President Estrada, of Nicaragua, who is stopping at the Hotel 
 St. George, Brooklyn, said that without the effective intervention 
 of the United States Avarfare in Nicaragua would continue 
 indefinitely, ruining the Central American*country, and sooner or 
 later involving the United States in trouble with England or Ger- 
 many. Mr. Estrada, who \leclares that the presidency rightfully 
 belongs to him, also brought grave charges against a number o-f 
 Americans in Nicaragua, blaming them for present condition& there. 
 
58 
 
 Mr. Estrada and his faithful henchman, General Moncada, are 
 starting for Nicaragua early this week to support the government 
 of President Diaz, in whose favor Mr. Estrada handed over the 
 reins of the Chief Magistracy in 1911, in order to avert, so he says, 
 war with the Conservative faction. 
 
 "I would like you, through the IS'ew York Times, to convey a few 
 words to the American people," said Mr. Estrada. "It is succinctly 
 this: Without the active help of the United States Government, 
 Xicaragua will never thrive. She will be always the same." 
 
 "You moan a sort of American protectorate ?" he was asked. 
 
 Aebiter for Nicae-,igua. 
 
 "Yes," he answered without hesitation. "A protectorate along 
 the lines exercised in Cuba and Panama, without, of course, impair- 
 ing our sovereignty. We want the United States Government, 
 whether it be Eepublican or Democrat, to keep an eye upon us, 
 supervise our elections, and, in a word, become the arbiter and judge 
 of our destinies. I speak in my name and in the name of President 
 Diaz. ]\Iy ideas are his, as well as those of the majority of the 
 people of Nicaragua. It's the only way in which we can hope for 
 peace and progress. I am still titular head of Mcaragua. I did 
 not resign, as has been stated, but merely handed the government 
 over to the Vice-President during my absence. 
 
 "For the last twenty years jSTicaragua has been in the hands of 
 a savage system of militarism. There are no real elections, every- 
 thing is a farce, and everybody wants to be President and rule. 
 The result is that the country has been and still is a seething pot 
 of anarchy, which is gaining proportions every day. 
 
 "But it is not alone our people who brew all this trouble. They 
 are the least responsible. I charge that the majority, if not all, of 
 the revolutions in Nicaragua in recent years have been engineered 
 and openly financed by American companies anxious to get conces- 
 sions and monoix)lies from the government. 
 
 "Take the case of the Bluefields Steamship Company. Zelaya 
 gave these people the exclusive monopoly for the navigation of the 
 Eiver Escondido and its affluents. When I reached the presidency 
 I also found that exclusive concessions for the exploitation of the 
 mining, liquor, tobacco, cattle, fishing and other national industries 
 M'cre in the hands of a few Americans and Germans. 
 
59 
 
 Conspiracies on All Sides. 
 
 "What was the result ? I found conspiracies' were being hatched 
 on all sides. Mena, my War Minister, was planning a revolution. 
 The ITnited Fruit Company, which was after a similar concession, 
 a railroad, was pu-shing him all the time. I had positive proofs 
 that he was going to start a revolution on May 14, 1911, so I 
 arrested him on May 9. The Conservatives clamored for his release, 
 and I handed over the presidency to Diaz to avert war, although I 
 might have carried it on successfully, because I had the backing of 
 600 Liberals, who rallied around me at the time." 
 
 Continuing, Mr. Estrada said that Mena's revolution was being 
 backed by the United Fruit Company and the partisans of Zelaya. 
 
 Mr. Estrada was frank enough to admit that the revolution 
 headed by him which overthrew Zelaya had received financial aid 
 from certain American companies established on the Atlantic coast 
 of Nicaragua. He said these companies had contributed, off and on, 
 something close to $1,000,000. The house of Joseph W. Beers was 
 in for $200,000, and that of Samuel Weil for about $150,000. 
 
 ADDEITDA D 
 
 The Secretaey of State to the IsTioaeaguan Charge, 
 
 Department oe State, 
 
 December 1, 1909. 
 
 Sir — Since the Washington Convention of 1907 it is notorious 
 that President Zelaya has almost continuously kept Central America 
 in tension or turmoil, that he has repeatedly and flagrantly violated 
 the provisions of the conventions, and by a baleful influence upon 
 Honduras, whose neutrality the conventions were to assure, has 
 sought to discredit those sacred international obligations to the 
 great detriment of Costa Eica, El Salvador and Guatemala, whose 
 governments meanwhile appear to have been able patiently to strive 
 for the loyal support of the engagements so solemnly undertaken at 
 Washington under the auspices of the United States and of Mexico. 
 
 It is equally a matter of common knowledge that, under the 
 Tegime of President Zelaya, republican institutions have ceased in 
 Nicaragua to exist, except in name; that public opinion and the 
 
60 
 
 press have been throttled; and that prison has been the reward of 
 any tendency to real patriotism. M}^ consideration for j^on personally 
 impels me to abstain from unnecessary discussion of the painful 
 details of a regime which unfortunately has been a blot upon the 
 history of Xicaragua and a discourageemnt to a group of Eepublics 
 whose aspirations need only the opportunity of free and honest 
 government. 
 
 In view of the interests of the United States and of its relation 
 to the "Washington Convention, appeal against this situation has 
 long since been made to this government by a majority of the Cen- 
 tral American Eepublics. There is now added to the appeal, through 
 the revolution, a great body of the TvTicaraguan people. Two 
 Americans who, this government is now convinced, were officers 
 connected with the revolutionary forces, and therefore entitled to 
 be dealt with according to the enlightened practice of civilized 
 nations, have been killed by direct order of 'President Zelaya. Their 
 execution is said to have been jDreceded by barbarous cruelties. The 
 Consulate at Managua is now officially reported to have been 
 menaced. There is thus a sinister culmination of an administration 
 also characterized by a cruelty to its own citizens which has, until 
 the recent outrage, found vent in the case of this country ■ in a 
 succession of petty annoyances and indignities which many months 
 ago made it impossible to ask an American Minister longer to 
 reside in Managua. From every point of view it has evidently 
 become difficult for the United States further to delay more active 
 response to the appeals so long made to its duty, to its citizens, to 
 its dignity, to Central America and to civilization. 
 
 The Government of the United States is convinced that the revo- 
 lution represents the ideals and the will of the majority of the 
 Nicaraguan people more faithfully than does the Government of 
 President Zelaya, and that its peaceable control is well-nigh as 
 extensive as that hitherto so sternly attempted by the Government 
 of Managua. 
 
 There is now added the fact, as officially reported from more than 
 one quarter, that there are already indications of a rising in the 
 Western provinces in favor of a presidential candidate intimately 
 associated with the old regime. In this it is easy to see new elements 
 tending toward a condition of anarchy which leaves, at a given 
 time, no definite responsible source to which the Government of 
 
61 
 
 the United States could look for reparation for the killing of 
 Messrs. Cannon and Groce, or, indeed, for the protection which 
 must be assured American citizens and American interests in 
 Nicaragua. 
 
 In these circumstances the President no longer feels for the 
 Government of President Zelaya that respect and confidence which 
 Would make it appropriate hereafter to maintain with it regular 
 diplomatic relations, implying the will and the ability to respect 
 and assure what is due from one State to another. 
 
 The Government of Nicaragua which you have hitherto repre- 
 sented is hereby notified, as will be also the leaders of the revolu- 
 tion, that the Government of the United States will hold strictly 
 accountable for the protection of American life and property the 
 factions de facto in control of the Eastern and WESTERN portions 
 of the Repiiblic of Nicaragua: 
 
 As for the reparation found due, after careful consideration, for 
 the killing of Messrs. Groce and Cannon, the Government of the 
 United States would- be loath to impose upon the innocent people 
 of ISTicaragua a too heavy burden of expiating the acts of a regime 
 forced upon them or to exact from a succeeding government, if it 
 have quite difi^erent policies, the imposition of such a burden. Into 
 the question of ultimate reparation there must enter the question 
 of the existence at Managua of a government capable of respond- 
 ing to demands. There must enter also the question of how far 
 it is possible to reach those actually responsible and those who 
 perpetrated the tortures reported to have preceded the execution, 
 if these be verified ; and the question whether the government be one 
 entirely disassociated from th^ present intolerable conditions and 
 worthy to be trusted to make impossible a recurrence of such acts, 
 in which case the President, as a friend of your country, as he is 
 also of the other Eepublics of Central America, might be disposed 
 to have indemnity confined to what was reasonably due the relatives 
 of the deceased, and punitive only in so far as the punishment might 
 fair where really due. 
 
 In pursuance of this policy, the Government of the United States 
 will temporarily withhold its demand for reparation, in the mean- 
 while taking such steps as it deems wise and proper to protect 
 American interests. 
 
62 
 
 To insure the future protection of legitimate American interests, 
 in consideration of the interests of the majority of the Central 
 American Eepuhlics, and in the hope of making more effective the 
 friendly offices exerted under the Washington Conventions/ the 
 Government of the United States reserves for further consideration 
 at the proper time the question of stipulating also that the Con- 
 stitutional Government of Nicaragua obligate jtself by convention, 
 for the benefit of all the governments concerned, as a guarantee for 
 its future loyal support of the Washington Conventions and their 
 peaceful and progressive aims. 
 
 From the foregoing it will be apparent to you that your office 
 of Charge d' Affaires is at an end. I have the honor to enclose your 
 passport, for use in case you desire to leave this country. I would 
 add at the same time that, although your diplomatic quality is 
 terminated, I shall be happy to receive you, as I shall be happy 
 to receive the representative of the revolution, each as the unofficial 
 channel of communication between the Government of the United 
 States and the de facto authorities to whom I look for the protection 
 of American interests pending the establishment in Nicaragua of 
 a government with which the United States can maintain diplo- 
 matic relations. 
 
 Accept, sir, etc., 
 
 (Signed) P. C. Knox. 
 
 ADDEIsTDA E. 
 
 Message op President Madriz to President Taft, Eegarding 
 
 THE Landing of Marines from the American 
 
 Warships in Bluefields. 
 
 Campo db Marte, June 15, 1910. 
 
 His Excellency, President ^V. H. Taft, Wasliington: 
 
 Your Excellency will permit me to refer to certain acts relating 
 to our civil war. 
 
 On the 27th of May last the forces of my government took the 
 Bluff by assault, same being a strong position which defended Blue- 
 fields. The commander of our forces was instructed to proceed 
 immediately and take the city, which had been evacuated, and 
 
G3 
 
 which would have terminated the campaign. This was frustrated 
 by the attitude of the commander of the cruiser Paducah, who in- 
 timated to the commander of our forces that he would use his force 
 to oppose the taking of the city, and actually landed his marines 
 and occupied the city. This action assured the revolution a base 
 for its operations, and enabled it to withdraw all of its forces from 
 the city to oppose our single column, and thus was able to frustrate 
 a combination which had been carefully prepared and whose success 
 was assured. 
 
 This government purchased in ISTew Orleans the British steam- 
 ship Venus, to-day called "Maximo Jerez," which sailed for San 
 Juan del Forte with clearance from the American authorities after 
 exhibiting lona fide all of the elements of war which she had 
 aboard, and which were considered articles of free commerce. In 
 San Juan del Norte her nationality was changed to that of Nica- 
 ragua, and she was armed for war and dispatched to blockade Blue- 
 fields. The blockade had for its object the prevention of the revo- 
 lution from receiving, as it had done before, arms and provisions 
 from New Orleans. 
 
 The government of your Excellency has denied the right of our 
 vessels to blockade the port and prevent American vessels entering, 
 and thus has kept open to the revolution its source of supply — New 
 Orleans. 
 
 The taking of the Bluff 'gave my government possession of the 
 Bluefields Customhouse, and we expected to deprive the revolution 
 of the revenues which this customhouse produces; but the govern- 
 ment of your Excellency has declared that the revenues of this 
 customhouse should be paid to the revolution, and this has, in a 
 great measure, annulled the victory attained by our forces at the 
 BMff. 
 
 The government of your Excellency has denied our right to pre- 
 vent American vessels from passing in front of the Bluff on their 
 way to the customhouse established by the revolution at Schooner 
 Key, on the Escondido Eiver, notwithstanding the decree of my 
 government closing the Port of Bluefields and prohibiting this 
 traffic, as a necessary measure of defense and pacification. 
 
 The commander of the Paducah threatened the commander of 
 the Maximo Jerez, stating that he would fire on his vessel and sink 
 her if our forces attempted to attack Bluefields. 
 
64 
 
 The chief of our forces at the Bluff having noticed that certain 
 boats in the service of the revolution were using the American flag 
 to pass in front of our forts without detention, notified the com- 
 mander of the Paducah of his intention to stop this free traffic of 
 these boats in front of his lines. The commanders of the Paducah 
 and Dubuque replied that they would use their cannon on him to 
 enforce respect due American commerce, even if -it consisted of 
 arms and ammunition for the revolution, and that one shot fired on 
 such boats would be considered a declaration of war against the 
 United States. 
 
 Lastly, I know that in Bluefields, although un,der protection of 
 American marines, an attack is being prepared against our position 
 at the Bluff and Pearl Lagoon. The intentions of the commander 
 of the Paducah prevent us anticipating the enemy's actions, which 
 we have a right to do as a legitimate defense. 
 
 It is my duty to state to your Excellency, frankly, that I cannot 
 find any way to reconcile the action herein enumerated with the 
 principles of neutrality proclaimed by the law of nations; and 
 having full confidence in the high character of the Government of 
 the United States, I have no hesitancy in respectfully asking your 
 Excellency to rectify the orders given to your naval authorities in 
 Bluefields. 
 
 Thus can this government easily terminate a bloody and isolated 
 revolt, which in itself is without life, but which is working towards 
 the ruin of ISTicaragua. 
 
 Jose Madriz, 
 President. 
 
 ADDENDA E 
 
 (Copy.) 
 
 Washington, June 19, 1910. 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs: 
 
 The policy of the United States remains as set forth in the Secre- 
 tary of State's letter of December first, 1909, to Minister Eodriguez, 
 then Charge d' Affaires, whereby relations with the Zelaya Govern- 
 ment were broken off. That letter and statements of the consistent 
 applications of the same policy to conditions as they arose were 
 duly published. 
 
65 
 
 As to the statements made in the telegram of Doctor Madriz to 
 "flie President, the Government of the United States took only the 
 •customary step of prohibiting bombardment or fighting by either 
 faction within the unfortified and ungarrisoned commercial city of 
 Bluefields, thus protecting the preponderating American and other 
 foreign interests, just as the British commander had done in case 
 of Greytown, where there were British interests. The Government 
 of ihe United States has acknowledged the right of each faction to 
 maintain a blockade, but has refused to permit vessels, illegally and 
 clandestinely fitted out in American waters, to interfere with Amer- 
 ican commerce. 
 
 The Government of the United States simply insists that each 
 faction shall collect duties only for the territory under its de facto 
 control, and refuses to permit the collection of double duties. 
 
 If any violation of neutrality has occurred it was in connection 
 with the sailing of the Venus from New Orleans as an expedition 
 of the Madriz faction. (Signed) Knox. 
 
 ADDENDA K 
 
 Managua, June 23, 1910. 
 
 To Ministro de Nicaragua, Washington, D. C, 1912: 
 
 According to the rights of the people, no neutral government can 
 ■prevent or disturb the military operations in time of war, which is 
 legally executed by belligerants. Foreigners are subject to all con- 
 tingencies of these operations, the same as natives. In consequence, 
 I cannot consider the acts of the American marines in having pre- 
 ■yented the operations of our armies at Bluefields as legal. 
 
 Eegarding the sailing of the Venus from New Orleans, I am con- 
 vinced that she has not violated any of the laws of the United States. 
 T'urthermore, the clearance given by the authorities at New Orleans 
 only obligated the vessel to maintain neutrality during her voyage,, 
 which she actually did. Once her voyage, for which she had been 
 given clearance, terminated, she entered other waters and changed 
 lier nationality in accordance with the laws of Nicaragua ; and the 
 laws and authority of the United States have nothing to do with 
 the ultimate destination of the vessel, which has had, and has, the 
 right to execute warlike operations, amongst which figures the 
 blockade. 
 
66 
 
 I omit at present to refer to other details of Mr. Knox's note ; but. 
 I want made known the certainty that, but for the interference of 
 the naval authorities of the United States, in the manner explained 
 in my cablegram to President Taft, Bluefields would have beea 
 taken, the revolution defeated and Nicaragua in peace. 
 
 Madriz. 
 
 EXHIBIT E 
 
 [Telijgram.] 
 
 . "Blufp, 5 p. M., July 23d, 1910. 
 "To the Supreme Command of All Arms, Managua: 
 
 "The Executive Delegate sent me from San Juan del Norte. the 
 telegram you addressed to him, which contains a copy of a cable 
 you received from the Norwegian Consul General at Havana, and 
 also a copy of a telegram sent you by the Executive Delegate at 
 San Juan del Norte relative to the steamers 'Hiram^ and 'TJtstein,' 
 at the same time giving me instructions of what I should do upon 
 the arrival of these steamers here. 
 
 "As some steamers had been sighted, I thought one might be 
 the 'Hiram," and I sent out two despatches, one addressed to the 
 Captain of the "^Hlram' and the other addressed to the Commander 
 of the American Squadron anchored opposite this Port, which 
 despatches said: Bluff, July 21st, 1910 — To the Captain of the 
 Steamer 'Hiram,' opposite the Bluff : Please take note [here I gave 
 him copy of the telegram I received from the Executive Delegate, 
 and also a copy of the cable that had been received from the Consul 
 General of Norway at Havana] I have reliable information that 
 you have war contraband aboard intended for the revolution headed 
 by General Juan J. Estrada, and in consequence of and, in con- 
 formity with the information given me in the telegram and cable, 
 of which I give you a copy herewith, I herewith order you to de- 
 liver to this authority whatever war supplies you may have aboard, 
 and I warn you that, should you refuse to do so, I shall confiscate 
 your vessel in conformity with the laws of my country. I also 
 inform you that you will be held responsible for your action in this 
 incident, and that I shall advise my Government of whatever action 
 you will take, and that my Government may report your conduct 
 to tlie Norwegian Government. 
 
67 
 
 "I do not clonbt that yon, seeing that justice and right is with 
 us, will facilitate the delivery of this war contraband. I send you 
 this communication in duplicate, so you may confirm receipt of 
 this dispatch at the foot of one of them. Yours truly [signed] 
 F. M. Eivas, Inspector General of the Atlantic Coast. 
 
 "The second despatch reads as follows: Bluff, July 21st, 1910 — 
 Sir: I herewith acquaint you Avith a communication I received 
 the 16th inst. from the Executive Delegate: San Juan del Norte, 
 July 16th, 1910.— General Fernando M. Eivas, the Bluff: Under 
 date the 12th inst. I was advised over the wire by the President 
 that the Minister General, Mr. Baca, received a cable from the 
 Consul General of Norway in Havana, which reads as follows : 
 [Here follows the cable.] This authority has trustworthy informa- 
 tion that the steamer 'Hiram' brings war supplies for the revolu- 
 tion under the leadership of General Juan J. Estrada. I am 
 despatching a communication to the Captain of said vessel in 
 which I demand the surrender of all war material to this command, 
 and I am basing my demand on the information contained in said 
 cable received from the Norwegian Consul General. I trust that, 
 once you are aware of the information given us in this cable, you 
 will see that justice and the right are with us and that you will 
 not oppose in any way that my demand to the Captain of the 
 *Hiram' is not complied with, and that, should you object, you will 
 notify me in writing before' you will permit the 'Hiram' to enter 
 and to proceed to Bluefi.elds, which I doubt very much you will 
 permit, knowing, as I do, that your Government has declared its 
 neutrality, and having satisfied myself that you know how to in- 
 terpret this neutrality. Your attentive and never-failing servant, 
 [signed] F. M. Eivas, Inspector General of the Atlantic Coast to 
 the. Comamnder of the Naval Forces of the United States as- 
 sembled opposite the Bluff. 
 
 His answer was the following: 
 
 "No. B, 6110, U. S. A. 'Dubuque,' 3d Class, in the Eoad to Blue- 
 fields, Nicaragua, Central America, July 22nd, 1910. 
 
 "Sir — I have the honour to confirm receipt of your communica- 
 tion of the 21st of July, 1910. I shall cause the steamers to anchor 
 near my vessel while the nature of their cargo is determined, and 
 thereafter I shall act according to demands of circumstances and 
 in accordance with instructions from mv Government relative to 
 
68 
 
 tlie protection of American commerce ancT the maintenance of 
 Tieutrality. Eespectfully [signed] H. E. Eines, Kaval Commander 
 -of the United States, in Comamnd of the Marines at Present on the 
 Oriental Coast of jSTicaragua, to General F. M. Eivas, Commander 
 at the Bluff, Nicaragua, Central America." 
 
 'Last night the steamer 'Utstein' arrived and immediately I sent 
 -a despatch ahoard identical to the one sent to the Captain of the 
 ■'Hiram,^ but the Captain of the 'Utstein' refused to receive the 
 despatch, saying that if anything was wanted of him an under- 
 standing should be had with the Commander of the 'Dubuque.' 
 
 "The communication was delivered to the Commander, who de- 
 -clared that he was not responsible for the Captain of the 'Utstein' 
 accepting or refusing to accept despatches, and that much less 
 ~would he sign the duplicate of the despatch which I had sent along 
 in order to have a proof that said despatch had been delivered to 
 him. Furthermore, the Commander of the 'Dubuque' declared 
 to General Francisco Altschul and Mr. Ofilio Arguello, the latter 
 'being my interpreter, that HE WAS A PAETISAN OF THE 
 EEVOLUTION, and that he had told the Captain of the 'Utstein' 
 ihat, if he did not care to, not to communicate with us, and that 
 he would give the Captain of the 'Utstein' his unconditional sup- 
 port, and shortly afterwards he sent marines aboard that vessel 
 and ordered the vessel to proceed to Bluefields, which took place 
 to-day. I have sent a despatch to the Eepresentative of the ISTor- 
 wegian Consul in Bluefields, protesting against the actions of the 
 Captain of the 'Utstien,' heading this protest with a copy of the 
 ■cable received by the Consul General of ISTorway in Havana. This 
 communication to the Norwegian Vice Consul in Bluefields is to be 
 •delivered through the Commander of the. 'Dubuque,' supposing 
 that he cares to do so, but, taking into consideration the hostility 
 this official has shown us, it is doubtful that this communication 
 ■will ever reach its destination. 
 
 "So long as there is no warship here of another nation, and in 
 command of an officer who is really neutral, the interest of your 
 Oovemment will be at the mercy of the ofiicers of the United States 
 Nav}^, who are inspired and counseled by the American Consul in 
 Bluefields, who is a more revolutionary rebel than Estrada and 
 Chamorro. 
 
 Your subaltern, (Signed) F. M. Eivas.'' 
 
69 
 
 ADDENDA E 
 
 "New Geleans, 7 p. m., Novbr. 9tli. 
 "President, Managua: 
 
 "Guatemala advises Bluefields cargo has not been for yet. Last 
 of Gctober shall send to Bocas large quantity of shells, also men. 
 From Bluefields Diaz answered: Shall try and sustain ourselves 
 until arrival of steamer." Altschul. 
 
 "New Gkleans, 7 :40 p. m., 17th Novbr. 
 ''President, Managua: 
 
 "War elements have arrived in Bluefields it seems are the same: 
 advised by cable last vi^eek — hailing from Bocas — Steamer Utstein. 
 leaves now for Port Barrios with war supplies. Altschul/' 
 
 "New Okleans, 8 :38, 18th of Novbr. 
 ''President, Managua : 
 
 "Utstein will arrive Barrios Sunday, to transfer 44 cases rifles- 
 and 114,000 shells to a gasoline schooner bo^md for Bluefields.. 
 Guatamala uses Barrios as a base for the revolution. Altschul."' 
 
 "Bluefields, 15th November. 
 "President, Guatemala: 
 
 "If war supplies are not received before the 20th, revolution will 
 have to be abandoned. Diaz. Cabrera answered. Ulstein, with 
 war supplies aboard, will arrive in a few days." 
 
 "New Grleans, 11 a. m., Novbr. 24th. 
 "President, Managua : 
 
 "Ulstein left for Bermuda Monday, from Port Barrios; will 
 arrive Bluefields to-morrow." Altschul. 
 
 "Washington^ Jany. 13. 
 "Estrada, Bluefields: 
 
 "THEY ADVISE YGU NGT TG PAY ATTENTIGN TO 
 KIMBALL. Castrillo." 
 
 ""Washixgtox, Jany. 14. 
 "Estrada, Bluefields : 
 
 "State Department does not support Kimball. Castrillo.** 
 
70 
 
 "Washington, Jany. 14. 
 ^'Estrada, Bluefields: 
 
 "STATE DEPAETMENT INFORMS' ME THAT MADEIZ 
 IS YEEY WEAK. Castrillo." 
 
 "Washington, Eeb. 12/10. 
 "'Estrada, Bluefields: 
 
 "State Department will proceed energetically in our favor. 
 
 "Castrijllo." 
 
 "Bluefields, Feb. 11/10. 
 "Castrillo, Washington: 
 
 "We know positively that Madriz has no elements of war and is 
 trying to obtain them in Costa Eica and Etonduras. Our operations 
 continue with vigor. Chamorro army every day stronger. Corea 
 animates Madriz. Continue pretending moral support of Ameri- 
 can Navy at Corinto, and try and have Washington Cabinet influ- 
 ence Mexico. Estrada." 
 
 "Bluefields, Feb. 9/10. 
 "'Chamorro, Panama: 
 
 "Want to know how many Americans you can enlist im- 
 mediately. I can send steamer 'Senator.' This depends on your 
 answer. Diaz.""" 
 
 "Colon, Feb. 14/10. 
 "'Diaz, Bluefields: 
 
 "Can enlist not less than 25 Americans. If you can send steamer, 
 be sure to tell me what date it will arrive at port of embarca- 
 tion. Chamorro .■'•' 
 
 "President, Managvxi: 
 
 "New York, 1 :15 p. m., 7th of December. 
 "The .revolution and this Government will never accept Irias. 
 Deposit in Dolores Estrada will impede further sacrifice of lives, 
 and the disembarking of Americans. Eead note of KJnox to 
 Eodriguez. Bolanos." 
 
 "New York, 6 :40 p. m., 17th Decbr. 
 "President, Managua: 
 
 "Appointment of Madriz considered an error. Will not be 
 recognized by this Gover'hment nor by those of Central America, 
 and revolution will not cease. BolafLOs." 
 
71 
 
 "New Orleans, 3 p. m., Novbr. 6th. 
 '^'President, Managua: 
 
 "Adolfo Diaz cabled via Guatemala asking for 1,000 rifles and 
 '300,000 shells. Altschul/' 
 
 "Bluefields, JSTov. 8. 
 "Aramhura, New Yorh: 
 
 "Ask Castrillo what is the opinion of Washington with reference 
 to new Eepiiblic. Has steamer sailed? If not, what is the cause? 
 When will she sail? Answer immediately by Western Union Code. 
 
 "Diaz." 
 
 "Bluefieds, Feb. 4/10. 
 "Rita,- Guatemala (Estrada Cabrera) : 
 
 "Latest news is Chamorro, Camoapa, Mena, Santo Tomas now 
 on the way to combine with Chamorro. I am anxiously awaiting 
 ■'arte.' (?) Diaz." 
 
 "Bluepields, Feb. 5/10. 
 "Saenz, Guatemala (Estrada Cabrera) : 
 
 "We require urgently 200,000 cartridges, Eemington, 43 y 50,000 
 cartridges. ( ?) May you instruct ( ?) prompt dispatch? Ofrezco ml 
 garantia. I offer my guaranty. ' Adolfo Diaz." 
 
 "Bluefields, March 7/10. 
 ■ "Sa enz, Guat e mala : 
 
 "Present state of affairs, peace is entirely in your hands. Wash- 
 ington Tanzimat without consulting you in the matter." 
 
 ADDENDA F 
 
 "EXCEEPT PEOM A MESSAGE WHICH PEESIDENT 
 MADEIZ, OF NICAEAGUA, WEOTE WITH HIS OWN 
 HAND, AND WHICH WAS TO BE SENT TO THE 
 NATIONAL CONGEESS, BUT WHICH, ON ACCOUNT 
 OF LACK OF TIME, WAS NEVEE SENT : 
 Notwithstanding I cannot help but refer to the principal of them, 
 iDCcause it explains the political transition which I have just com- 
 municated to you ; I refer to the intervention of the United States 
 "in our domestic fights. 
 
72 
 
 This intervention is made known to you through a cable message- 
 which I have addressed to President Taft in regard to it. I will 
 give you a concise idea of same : 
 
 As the peace overtures which were offered during the middle of' 
 last March between this Government and the faction in Bluefields. 
 were frustrated, on account of the pretentions of General Estrada, 
 who desired to establish conditions which I did not consider com- 
 patible with the dignity of the Eepublic, it was necessary, in order- 
 to determine the situation, to continue our military operations 
 against the enemy. To do so, we sent our armies by land, one 
 against Bluefields under command of General Paulino Godoy, and 
 another against Eama under command of General Benito Chavarria. 
 By sea, we sent from San Juan del ISTorte our boats armed for war,, 
 the steamship Maximo Jerez (formerly the Venus) and the steam- 
 ship San Jacinto, under command of the Executive Delegate, Dr. 
 Julian Irias, and the Chief of the Expedition, General Fernando- 
 M. Eivas. The ships carried sufficient landing forces to assault- 
 the Bluff, and attack Bluefields, so that the column of General 
 Godoy could attack the revolutionary forces which they foimd' 
 entrenched outside of the city. The ships were to establish a 
 block&de of Bluefields and close the port completely to foreign com- 
 merce, in order to deprive the revolutionists of re-enforcements and 
 help which would arrive from New Orleans. The combined oper- 
 ations would have resulted in the fall of Bluefields, which had 
 remained defended, and the defeat and submission of the revolu- 
 tion, which, deprived of all co-operation from the outside by the- 
 blockade, could not long resist. 
 
 In the brilliant attack of June 27th, the troops from the steam- 
 ship Maximo Jerez assaulted and took the Bluff, which had been 
 tliought impregnable. Its possession on our part placed Bluefields 
 in our hands. The forces of General Godoy attacked the enemy's- 
 formidable positions, and, after a bloody fight, would have crowned 
 its efforts with victory, if the forces at the Bluff would have been 
 able to dislodge the enemy from its base of operation and attack it 
 from its rear. The column under General Chavarria defeated the- 
 revolutionists in El Toyal, near Pama, and if our forces had won- 
 in Bluefields, Pama would necessarily have fallen. 
 
 But tlie decisive moment, when the whole country saw with satis- 
 faction the advent of peace, the power of the United States crossed' 
 
73 
 
 our path, prevented our victory, and once more brought the clouds 
 of blood and death^ which we, with pain, still see floating upon the 
 horizon of our country. 
 
 The Commander of the American cruiser Paducah, anchored in 
 the waters of Bluefields, for reasons inconsistent in the light of 
 Eight, intervened directly in the fight, protecting the rebels, cutting 
 off the further attack by our forces and frustrating the result of 
 our sacrifices and our victory at the Bluff. In fact, he landed 
 marines to protect Bluefields, and to prevent the attack by our 
 forces on that rebellious city; and according to statements of im- 
 partial Americans, whose reports were published in the American 
 press, the American marines reinforced the positions of Estrada's 
 army, thereby conducting themselves as revolutionists. This con- 
 duct cannot be justified as a protection of foreigners, and especially 
 of Americans living in Bluefields. 
 
 International law does not authorize this exception to the un- 
 deniable right of sovereignty and of belligerency. As sovereigns, 
 we can impose our authority in any Nicaraguan city; as belliger- 
 ents, we can attack and destroy the enemy in any place, if same is 
 not within the territory of another. Bluefields was the cradle and 
 seat of the revolution. Its government was located there. To take- 
 it, or force its surrender, was to destroy the base of the revolution. 
 
 In regard to the danger to American interests, international law 
 establishes that foreign residents in a place where a state of war 
 exists are subject to all contingencies of the operations executed 
 legally by the belligerents. This vmdeniable principle was sustained 
 by the American government during the bombarcTment of San Juan 
 del Norte, an open city, unfortified, imarmed, a purely commercial 
 locality, by the ship Cyane, of the American ISTavy, in the year 1852. 
 
 Furthermore, this government purchased in New Orleans the 
 steamship V.enus, an English merchantman. Before she left New 
 Orleans destined for San Juan del Norte, the revolutionary agents 
 endeavored to prevent her leaving, alleging to the government 
 authorities in New Orleans that she sought to violate the law of the 
 TTnited States. The authorities carefully examined the matter,— 
 inspected the ship, heard all tlie proofs adduced on both sides, 
 consulted the Departments of Commerce and of Justice of the 
 American Government, — and resolved that, according to the laws 
 of the United States, the voyage of this ship could not be prevented^ 
 
74 
 
 The Venus brought arms destined for the Government of Nicaragua 
 at San Juan del jSTorte., . In the United States, the traffic in arms is 
 free, except the right of belligerents to . seize same as contraband 
 of war. 
 
 The A^enus left New Orleans, carrying regular clearance papers 
 issued by the port authorities. The papers given her were signed 
 under the obligation on the part of the vessel to maintain neutrality 
 during her voyage. The Venus complied with her obligations of 
 neutrality during her voyage and entry at her destination, where 
 she arrived, unarmed, at San Ju.an del Norte. She could do no 
 more, and, above all, was not under the American flag. At this 
 port, before the British Consul, she changed her register under the 
 English flag for that of Nicaragua, after which she armed for war 
 and was sent to operate against the rebels of Bluefields. In all this 
 there was no infraction of the laws of the United States, nor inter- 
 national law. With all the Government of the United States has 
 declared that the Venus cannot operate against American commerce 
 by using the right of search on the high -sea, nor that of blockade, 
 because of the pretext that this vessel left New Orleans through ■ 
 subterfuge and deceived the authorities of the United States. On 
 this account, the avenues of help from the outside remained o'pen 
 to the revolution, and especially from New Orleans, where, lately, 
 large shipments of war material have been made, destined for the 
 revolution. This explains clearly why measures were taken to 
 prevent the blockade. 
 
 The principal customhouse of the coast is at the Bluff, and this 
 was established by law before the revolution. The possession of 
 this post gave us authority over the customhouse and the right to 
 the revenues produced by same. The American Government de- 
 clared that these revenues belong to the Estrada faction, and ordered 
 that the American commerce pay same to the revolution in a new 
 customhouse established in Schooner Key, in the Rive't Escondido. 
 
 As we were in possession of the Bluff, we could still have pre- 
 vented any boats from entering the river and going to the custom- 
 house established by the revolution, but the commanders of the 
 American gunboats Paducah and Dubuque threatened to fire on us 
 with their guns if our forces at the Bluff interfered with American 
 commerce. "One shot," they said, "fired on a vessel carrying the 
 American flag would be considered a declaration of war against the 
 United States." 
 
75 
 
 In order to insure the free movement of vessels past the Bluff, the 
 commanders»of the American vessels stated they would place at all 
 times a guard of American marines on the vessels, which they have 
 invariably done. 
 
 To-day, on account of this action, vessels are passing the Bluff 
 carrying the American flag — these include all kinds of vessels, 
 among which, schooners from San Andres and Providence are 
 loaded with provisions for Bluefields. Furthermore, a tug employed 
 by the enemy in its hostile operations, which fired on a lighter 
 bearing our men, passed the Bluff under protection of the Ameri- 
 'can flag. 
 
 When our forces occupied the entire coast from San Juan d&l 
 l^orte to Cape Gracias the Executive power ordered to establish a 
 -customhouse at Pearl Lagoon to collect duties on exports and im- 
 ports from those districts under our authority, but when we notified 
 the commander of the Dubuque of our action in the premise he 
 replied to us, imposing restrictions which, in effect, practically gave 
 the revenues of the coast to the Estrada faction. Finally, notwith- 
 standing the occupation of Bluefields by the American marines, 
 -and the sham neutrality which they pretended to maintain, an attack 
 ^as prepared on Pearl Lagoon position without our being able to 
 prevent the enemy from carrying out its intentions. 
 
 As some of the vessels which ran between the United States and 
 Bluefields are of Korwegian nationality, this government made 
 overtures to ISTorway, to the end that these vessels respect the closing 
 of the port of Bluefields. That government, recognizing the legality 
 of ol^ir act, thought that it was duty-bound to accede to our petition, 
 and to this effect notified its Legations in Washington, Havana and 
 the Norwegian Vice Consul in Bluefields. The American Govern- 
 ment officiously intervened, and in a communication addressed to 
 the Norwegian Minister in Washington, objected to the order of the 
 Norwegian Government, under the pretext that the blockade was 
 ineffective and prejudicial to the interests of iVmerican commerce. 
 
 The Norwegian steamship Utstein having arrived at Bluefields, 
 and as we had advices that she carried elements of war for the 
 revolution, our commander at the Bluff addressed a communication 
 to her prohibiting the delivery of this contraband of war which she 
 had on board. The captain of the Utstein declined to receive the 
 •communication, and, violating our orders and those of his own 
 
76 
 
 government, entered the port under protection of the marines from 
 the U. S. S. Dnbuqne. 
 
 On account of the commander of the Bluff answering the fire of 
 the revolutionary artillery stationed on Halfway Key, one of our 
 projectiles fell near Bluefields, and the commander of the Dubuque- 
 gave notice that a repetition of this would be considered a bombard- 
 ment of Bluefields Madeiz/' 
 
 ADDENDA G. 
 
 Managua, September 14th, 1912. 
 Jefes Politicos, Governor-Intendant and Commandants: 
 
 I transmit to you the following communication, dated the 13th 
 inst., directed to this office by his Excellency, G-eorge F. Weitzel,. 
 Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of the United. 
 States at this capital, so that you may give it due publicity : 
 
 "Legation of the United States of America, 
 
 Managua, September 13, 1912. 
 
 Excellency : I have the honor of informing your Excellency that 
 the Department of State has given me instructions by cable to- 
 transmit to the Government of your Excellency, and unofficially to^ 
 the leaders of the rebel forces, and to make public the following 
 authorized declaration of the policy of the United States during the 
 present disturbances. 
 
 The policy of the United States during the present disturbances- 
 in Nicaragua is to take the necessary measures to adequately pro- 
 tect the Legation in Managua, to maintain open the ways of com- 
 munication, to protect the life and property of Americans. Upon 
 repudiating Zelaya, whose regime of barbarism and corruption 
 was ended l^y the Nicaraguan nation after a bloody war, the Gov- 
 ernment of the United States condemned not only the individual, 
 l)ut the system. Consequently this government could not tolerate 
 any movement to re-establish the same destructive regime. 
 
 The Government of the United States therefore will oppose any 
 attempt to restore Zelayism and will lend its moral and efficient 
 support to the cause of good government legally constituted for the 
 benefit of the people of Nicaragua, who, for a long time, it has 
 endeavored to assist in their ]ust aspirations towards peace andii 
 prosperity under a constitutional and orderly government. 
 
77 
 
 A group of about 125 American planters residing in a region of 
 Nicaragua have asked for protection; about two dozen American 
 houses doing business in that country have asked for protection; 
 the American banks, which have invested funds in railways and 
 steamships in Nicaragua, as part of a plan to relieve the deplorable 
 financial situation, have asked for protection. The American 
 citizens who are actually in the employ of the Government of Nica- 
 ragua, and even the Legation, have seen themselves exposed to im- 
 mediate peril during the bombardment. Two American citizens, 
 the reports state, have been barbarously assassinated; besides the 
 Emery claim due to American citizens, and the indemnity for the 
 killing of Cannon and Groce during the war with Zelaya, there are 
 various other claims of Americans and interests originated by con- 
 cessions, in Washington. 
 
 The United States is under the obligation of exercising its 
 influence for the maintenance of general peace which is seriously 
 menaced by the present uprising ; and in this manner to exact strict 
 compliance with the convention of Washington and lend due sup- 
 port to its designs and terms. 
 
 All the Reinihlics of Central America can depend upon poiuerful 
 mediums of co-operation. 
 
 These are the important moral and political interests which 
 require protection. When the American Minister asked the Gov- 
 ernment of Nicaragua to protect the lives and property of Ameri- 
 cans, the ]\Iinister of Foreign Relations answered that the troops of 
 the government were occupied in putting down the rebellion. 
 
 Conseqwenily my Government desires that the Governm'ent of 
 the United States guarantee with its oivn forces the security and 
 property of American citizens in Nicaragua, and to extend this same 
 protection to ail the inhabitants of the Republic. 
 
 Under these conditions, the policy of the United States sliall be 
 to protect the life and property of its citizens in the manner indi- 
 cated, and at the same time employ its influence by adequate means 
 to protect the legal and organized government, so that Nicaragiia 
 may continue its program of reform, free from the obstacle put in 
 its way by the vicious elements wlio wished to restore the methods 
 of Zelaya in citing General IMena to rel)ellion in flagrant violation 
 of his promises given to his Government, the American Minister 
 and the Dawson Convention, by the terms of which he was solemnly 
 
78 
 
 obligated, and his attempt to overthrow the government of his 
 country ;, moved exclusively by selfish motives and without' even pre- 
 tending to fight for a ■principle, makes the present rebellion, from 
 its beginning, the most inexcusable one in the annals of Central 
 America. The character of the actual disturbance and the proceed- 
 ings employed impress them with the stamp of anarchy rather than 
 that of an ordinary revolution. 
 
 The moral condition of those who immediately made common 
 cause with Mena, as well as their uncivilized and savage conduct in 
 breaking an armistice, mistreating women, violating their word of 
 honor, torturing peaceful citizens, exacting contribution, and,;, above 
 all, the barbarous bombardment of the city of Managua, the deliber- 
 ate destroying of the lives of innocent persons and their property, 
 the killing of women, children and the sick in the hospitals, the 
 cruel and barbarous assassination of hundreds said to have been 
 perpetrated in Leon, identify Mena's rebellion. with the abhorred 
 and intolerable regime of Zelaya. 
 
 I beg your Excellency to accept the reiterated expressions of my 
 esteem and most distinguished consideration. 
 
 Geoege F. Weitzel, 
 
 American Minister. 
 To His Excellency, 
 
 Don Diego M. Chamoero, 
 
 Minister of Foreign Relations." 
 
 Your attentive servant, 
 
 Diego M. Chamoero, 
 Minister of Foreign Relations. 
 
 ADDENDA H. 
 
 Deceee by the Dictator Diaz. 
 
 The President of tlie Republic: 
 
 Whereas, the Constitutive National Assembly, convened by De- 
 cree of April the 5th, 1911, overreached the limit of its powers, 
 the President, in Ministerial Council, decrees: 
 
 Article 1. Meanwhile the Constitutive National Assembly, 
 which is to be convened immediately, does not dispose otherwise, 
 the present Constitution shall be valid onlv as far as the Executive 
 
79 
 
 and -ludifial i'uwrrs are coneci ned. Tiiic Executive shall assume 
 
 LEGISKtVTIVE POWEE. 
 
 Art. 2. The functions of the Constitutive National Assembly, 
 convened by Decree of April 5th, 1911, are hereby declared termi- 
 ated. 
 
 Art. 3. The people are to be convened for the election of Depu- 
 ties to a Constitutional Assembly which shall reform definitely the 
 Constitution and Constitutive Lav^^s, at the same time exercising 
 the Powers of Legislation. 
 
 Given at Managua, in the Presidential Palace, the 18th day of 
 October, 1912. 
 
 Adolfo Diaz. 
 
 The Minister of the Interior, Miguel Cardenas. 
 
 The Minister of Agriculture and Finance, Pedro Eafael Cuadra. 
 
 The Minister of Foreign Eelations and Education, Diego M. 
 Chamorro. 
 
 The Sub-Secretary of the Army and Navy, Benjamin Cuadra. 
 
 The Minister of Improvements and Public Works, Elsias Pallais. 
 
 ADDENDA H. 
 
 Protest Proclaiz^ied ix Bluefields, October, 1912. 
 
 (Final Part.) 
 
 "We, the undersigned Xicaraguan citizens, who love the Sov- 
 ereignty and the dignity of our Republic, and pronounced enemies 
 of all foreign intervention on our soil, and without any previous 
 understanding with the people in the interior, whose attitude we 
 do not know even now, due to lack of communication with the in- 
 terior, have unanimously resolved : 
 
 1. To abtstain from any participation whatever in the elections 
 just decreed. 
 
 2. To protest most vigorously and with all our heart against 
 the infamous aggressive stand taken by the Government of the 
 United States against our beloved country, Nicaragua; and, 
 
 3. To condemn the shameful conduct of those Xicaraguans wlio 
 are traitors to our country and who are besmirching the honour of 
 tlie Indo-Spanish race. 
 
80 
 
 Blueftelds, C. a., October, 1912. 
 
 Rosendo Arguello, Jacob Jaen, Manuel H. Giron, Jose M. 
 Zaearias G., Juan Ignacio Rivas, J. Ramon Cisneros, Ciriaco 
 Pineda G., Salvador Lejarza, A. Hunter, Pio E. Guzman, Juan 
 Davila R., J. P. Chevez, J. P. Delgadillo, Guillermo Childres 
 Raudales, Gustavo Cortes, Samuel Gutirrez, M. Ig. Argiillo, F. R. 
 Baldovinos, Carlos A. Espinosa R., E. Castrillo 'L., Eduardo Del- 
 gadillo, J. M. Araica, Carlos Alberto Castro, Jesus Sierra P., 
 Narciso Bermudez, Ygnaeio Dinarte, Patricio Soils, B. Herrera, 
 Narciso Bermudez, Ignacio Dinarte, Patricio Soils, B. Herrera, 
 Franco Aviles. 
 
 ADDEj^DA I. 
 
 Saf Salvador, August 26th, 1912. 
 To President Taft, Washington: 
 
 The Mcaraguan situation is being aggravated more and more 
 every day, and I fear serious complications if American troops in- 
 vade Nicaraguan territory. In Leon the masses revolted upon the 
 arrival of the marines, and had it not been for the intervention of 
 the Salvadoran Minister we would now have to lament grave con- 
 sequences. I respectfully request you to suggest to President Diaz 
 to enter into some arrangement whereby peace can be secured, 
 accepting a third party in whom the Executive power is to be de- 
 posited. 
 
 "I am prompted to address this communication to you by my 
 ardent desire for peace in Central America and my sincere friend- 
 ship for the Government and the people of the United States. 
 
 "Presidente Aeaujo.'" 
 
 ADDENDA I. 
 
 (Translated from Spanish.) 
 
 Washington, Septbr. 5th, 1912. 
 To the American Legation in San Salvador: 
 
 The President desires that you solicit an audience with President 
 Araujo and that you place in his hands the following communica- 
 tion, Avord for word, which is an answer: "^'His Excellency, the 
 
81 
 
 President of tlie United States, estimates very highly the assuranceH 
 of your ardent desire fof" peace in Centj'al Ariiericta and the assur- 
 ances of your friendsliip. These motives will no doubL guaranty a 
 strict adherence and an enforced obedience to tlie slipuhitions of tlie 
 Washington Convention, in that part that may concern tlie Sal- 
 vadoran Government, and will no doubt be a guaranty that the 
 Salvadoran Government will carry out the dispositions made by the 
 Government of the United States to create confidence in the peace 
 of Central America, carried out by this government, which is the 
 government best fitted to do so, and because it is justified in doing 
 so by the stipulations of the Washington Convention, and because 
 it is completely neutral in all local issues which miglit frustrate 
 the intentions of any one of the Goveiiiments of Central America. 
 
 "I am, with you, of the opinion that the poT'tical situation in 
 ISFicaragua is very grave. The Government of the United States 
 has never intended to leave its Legation and the lives and interests 
 of its citizens in Nicaragua to the mercy of a rebellion that had 
 no justification and which, by its acts, recalls the epoch of Zelaya, 
 committing the most flagrant outrages against all principles of 
 honour, humanity, law and order and civilization, as indicated by 
 Your Excellency. I do not think it just to suggest to the legitimate 
 Government of. Mcaragua that it should deal with persons who 
 have demonstrated that they will not respect agreements made with 
 local authorities, legal representatives and within their right. 
 
 "In consequence of all this, and in order to expedite the carrying 
 out of its obligations, the Government of the United States pro- 
 poses, in conformity witli a solit'itation made by the Nicaraguan 
 Govei'nnient, to take such slcjis as are most convenient to protect 
 its interests and to insure peace, taking in consideration that every 
 one of the Central American Uepublics has solemnly compromised 
 itself with this government to maintain tlie Washington Conven- 
 tion. 
 
 "It lias pained me to learn, although I may say that I -have not 
 given any credit to the rinnor, that the present revolution in Nica- 
 ragua is being supported from Salvadoran territory. 
 
 "I deem it hardly necessary to say to Your E.xcellency that Sal- 
 vador will have a chance to vindicate its policy in conformity witli 
 the Washington Convention. WiLLi.v^r H. Taft." 
 
82 
 
 ADDENDA I. 
 
 'SSan Salvador, Sept. 23, 1912. 
 "Jjcgaiion of El Salvador, Washington, D. C: 
 
 "Please place before Mr. Under-Secretary Wilson, in a verbal 
 conference, the exact copy of this dispatch, begging him to bring 
 it to the attention of His Excellency, President Taft, for whose 
 consideration it is forwarded. The dispatch is as follows : 
 
 " 'It is understood here that the naval forces occupying Nica- 
 raguan territory have engaged in military operations against the 
 revolutionists at Granada. So grave an event seriously compromises 
 the other Central American governments. In order to safeguard 
 my own, and fulfilling dofty duties to humanity, which I feel sure 
 will find a generous echo in the President, please suggest to him 
 the proposition that in order to avoid greater bloodshed in our 
 brother nation a propitious opportunity is presented to the Ameri- 
 can government to lend its high of&ces to humanity by aiding my 
 government, either by joint or separate action, in placing Don 
 Salvador Calderon in charge (provisionally) of the supreme power 
 in Nicaragua, while constitutional order is being re-established by 
 pacific and legal means. Sr. Calderon is a person of blameless ante- 
 cedents, illustrious and honorable, a person likewise acceptable to 
 the American government and a friend of President Diaz, who has 
 indicated to my government that he would accept him in such a 
 capacity. My government promises to exert moral pressure upon 
 the rebellious chiefs for the acceptance of Sr. Calderon in agree- 
 ment with that government, which would thus lend a service, un- 
 forgetable in the memory of the Central American people, avoiding 
 the profound upheaval which the gravity of the events has caused 
 in this country, which likewise would deeply reverberate in the 
 moral opinion of the whole continent. Explain to the President my 
 good intentions in this grave emergency, which I was not expecting, 
 because the Department of State had indicated to you that Ameri- 
 can naval action would be limited to guaranteeing foreign lives and 
 property and safeguarding the American Legation and Consulate in 
 that countrj^ — a manifestation which we received with complacency, 
 the more so as it was confirmed by Minister Weitzel to our Minister 
 in Nicaragua. 
 
 The unavoidable consequences which the continuation of this 
 useless conflict in the form and character in which it to-day presents 
 
83 
 
 itself would bring to Ccntnil America oannot escape the exalted 
 penetration of the Prcsidonl, niid you will make one more ofTort in 
 the mode proposed by inteivsting deeply the Iminnnitarian Rciiti- 
 ments of the head of that ojovernment. 
 
 "I see with regret that the agreements entered into in Washing- 
 ton by the Central American delegates, nnder the mere attitude 
 of good offices and generous hospitality which Ex-President Koose- 
 velt lent them, appear to be invoked in favor of the position lately 
 assumed. El Salvador being a contracting party, judges it as its 
 undeniable duty — a duty which becomes a right when it deals with 
 the interpretation of the facts which directly affect it — to declare 
 to President Taft, in the frankest and most respectful nuinner, 
 that the good offices which the United States and Mexico lent to 
 the Central American Plenipotentiaries are ever remembered with 
 pleasure, but that they ought to be limited to what they intentionally 
 signify. The firm relations of cordial friendship which bind El 
 Salvador to the American government antlu)iize me to exercise this 
 right in the most courteous and well-intentioned way.' 
 
 "You can add pertinent explanations concerning the contents of 
 these instructions to tlie Secretai'y of State, a])pealing to h's friendly 
 courtesy to convey them to the high functionary for whom tlicy 
 are designed. 
 
 (Signed) "Manuel E. Akau.to." 
 
84 
 
 DR. JOSE MADRIZ, 
 Former President of Nicaragua. 
 
 JO^E MADEIZ. 
 
 Jose IMadi'iz Avas l)orii in tlic City of Leon, Nicaragua, C. A., 
 February 21, 1866. 
 
 His jnirciits wvre ]h;ov and lioii()i'al)le. In spite of tlieir poverty, 
 tliey resolved to give tlieir son a literary education and Jose re- 
 ceiveil his elementary, high school and professional training in 
 tlie city of his birth. The deficiency in his school training, due to 
 the adequate educational facilities, was more than counterbalanced 
 l)y his mental talents and a close application to his studies. 
 
85 
 
 He was fortunate in that liis intellectual liainirirr name at a 
 period in the country's history when tlio illiiiiiinaliiirr idojis of the 
 great patriot, Maximo Jerez, a nolnl jiirisl aiul philosopher, worn 
 in the ascendancy. 
 
 Tlis vocation as a lawyer was crowned wilh marked suercss, an<l 
 in 1893, when only 27 years of a.oe, he was summoned l)y Trcsidml 
 Zelaya to the exalted position of Secretary of State, a position 
 which he administered with brilliancy for several years. 
 
 During this incumbency he was sent to the Atlantic eoa^t of 
 Nicaragua in the capacity of Executive Delegate, charged with an 
 important political mission. Dirficulties had arisen in that terri- 
 tory, known as the 'Tifosqnito Ecsorve," as a result of the stahlish- 
 men't of a protectorate over it by His British Majesty. As a re- 
 sult, laro-elv. of his intelligeut labors, all of that coast was re- 
 incorporated as a part of the Nicara.guan Eepuhlic, and an era 
 of development in that secticn was immediately hegun and has 
 continued since in an astounding manner. For this reason Dr. 
 TNtadiMz, perhaps more than anyone else, deprecated the proposal 
 of tbe revolutionists of 1000 to declare the Atlantic coast an in- 
 :depeudcui ropublic, or. rather, ostensibly independent, for tbe 
 truth is that, if such severance had occurred, it would have be.-n 
 subjected to a protectorate hv a foreign power 
 
 On account of internal political dissensions Dr. Madri/ had to 
 resio-n his position as Seeretarv of State in ISO."^. However, be was 
 later restored to his elevated position in fulfillment of conditions 
 imposed upon President Zelava at a conference between tbe exeru- 
 tive and the Liberals, of Leon, as a means of averting civil strife. 
 This, nnfortun.citelv. did not hnre tbe de.ired ro.ult. .ind Zelava 
 faced a revolution. 
 
 During tbe several years that Dr. l^Tadri/ served Zelava be eonld 
 and did do so conscientouslv. for Zelava tb'en was reirarded ns one 
 of the best presidents in Latin- America, honest, a respector of tb^ 
 laws of the country, and, indeed, practically a liberal ruler. 
 
 When tbe revolution referred to broke out. "^fndriz was^ in its 
 ranks. The revolution was unsuccessful and "Nradriz emigrated 
 lo Salvador, where be resided until 1907. There be married MtM 
 TTortensin Cobo?. Four children resulted from this union, two 
 pons, TJicardo and Jose, and two daughters, Hortcnsia and Mercedes, 
 
86 
 
 Although he did not acctiinulate a fortune in his law practice in 
 Salvador, his familj^ lived in comfort and always moved in tlie best 
 social circles. 
 
 In Salvador, and in Honduras and Guatemala (in which latter 
 two republics he lived for a short while), Dr. Madriz's eminent 
 culture, intellectual achievements, and courteous manners attracted 
 to him the friendship and esteem of all those who had the good 
 fortune of his acquaintance. His brilliant eloquency made it a 
 rare pleasure, indeed, to hear Dr. Madriz speak. 
 
 In 1907, notwithstanding his political animosity toward Zelaya, 
 the hostility shown by other Central American Presidents to the 
 Liberal Party in ISTicaragua prompted Madriz to return to Nicara- 
 gua and lend his earnest co-operation to the efforts to avoid an 
 invasion, which then appeared to be and, in fact proved, inevitable. 
 Dr. Madriz, like other adversaries of Zelaya, was prompted by 
 high motives and a patriotic desire to assist Zelaya. The diffi- 
 culties confronting the adjoining republics made Dr. Madriz and 
 others of the patriotic who were strong believers in the necessity for 
 a union of the Central American republics, to think, in the pos- 
 sibility of the union at least, of the three republ'-'cs which had made 
 the last effort to effect it. Madriz was disillusioned, however, when 
 Zelaya sank far below his estimations by abandoning the cherished 
 hope of the union, and preferring to content himself with a change 
 in the executive power of Honduras. This change of president in 
 the neighboring republic, however, resulted in no benefit to either 
 Honduras or Mcaragua, due to grave mistakes made by Zelaya as 
 a result of his narrow-mindedness in those circumstances. 
 
 Thus, disillusioned and disappointed, Madriz again left Nicara- 
 gua, this time, however, without having had any political rupture 
 with Zelaya. He w6nt to Honduras with the intention of making 
 this country h'is permanent home. CirciTmstances imforeseen, how- 
 ever, compelled a change of his plans later. 
 
 The governments of Latin- American accepted the proposal of 
 a Central American peace conference in Washington and Madriz 
 was appointed head of the Nicaraguan delegation. In this confer- 
 ence, in accord with the Honduran delegates, he advocated the 
 restoration of his old country, or nation, in the imion of the five 
 republics, which had been his constant dream. These efforts were 
 again in vain and the oonference bore no practical results. 
 
87 
 
 Although reproseuting Zelaya's government, Madriz without 
 exception niadu proposals, and accepted such, which had for their 
 object the enforcement and observance of law in ail Central Amer- 
 ican countries, and, in truth, it must be admitted that Zelaya 
 never failed to support the acts of Madriz even if his suggestions 
 and advice frequently were inimical to the personal interests of the 
 rulers, who were wont to consider their word as the law. Un- 
 fortunately, most of the tentative steps taken in line with these 
 suggestions were eventually rejected by the conference. 
 
 One of the results of this Washington conference was the estab- 
 lishment of the Central Anierican Court of Justice at Cartago, 
 Costa Eica. Dr. Madriz was appointed a judge of this court by 
 the Nicaraguan Congress. Upon his return from Washington Dr. 
 Madriz remained in Costa Eica, attending to his duties in connec- 
 tion with this Court until December, 1909, when he was summoned 
 by the Nicaraguan Congress to take the presidency of the couniry, 
 Zelaya having decided to tender his resignation. 
 
 We were justified in expecting an era of peace in Nicaragua, 
 under the administration of President Madriz, because he had 
 the confidence of the Zelaya faction in Nicaragua, and should have 
 had the confidence and support of the revolutionists, like many 
 of whom he had been for several years an exile from the country 
 and a pronounced adversary of the Zelaya administration. But, 
 local jealousies and other causes, which do not properly belong 
 here, were responsible for a continuance of the most disastrous civil 
 war the country ever witnessed. 
 
 Those of us who had an intimate acquaintance with Madriz, 
 and who realized that peace could not be soon effected, were loatii 
 to see him accept the presidency, knowing that, because of his 
 pacific nature, he was unfitted for the difiicult task which was 
 then present. Madriz, in time of peace, undoubtedly would have 
 proved one of the best presidents Latin- American ever knew. His 
 character and training, however, did not fit him for an epoch of 
 war. A man of profound feelings of amity and peace, he was not 
 capable of exercising strong tactics against his enemies, notwith- 
 standing he knew they were conspiring against him. This gave 
 courage to his adversaries. In fact, he was a president of whom 
 they were unafraid. He was not a man willing to order the spilling 
 of the blood of his brothers to maintain himself in power. 
 
l^ i ■ _ L 
 
 In this connection, we do not wish' it to appisar that we would 
 
 censure hm. He did right, as his desire was to leave to his chil- 
 dren a name uubesniirched with sanguinary ai-ts. However, toi- 
 the salie of his country, it would have been better if he had spared 
 himself for other and better opportunities. 
 
 The Madriz government, weighted down by the heavy hand of a 
 foreign government, foresaw that a continuation of tire civil strife 
 inherited from the Zelaya regime, would not result beneficially 
 to his native land, and with a firm belief that he had done all pos- 
 sible in defense of the national honor. Dr. Madriz left the country 
 and went to Mexico, where he had many sincere friends, acquired 
 during his visit to that republic as a delegate of the Peace Confer- 
 ence in Washington, to thank President Porfirio Diaz for the em- 
 ployment of his good offices in the interest of Central American 
 peace. 
 
 It was the purpose of Dr. Madriz to establish himself in Mexico 
 City in the practice of law, hoping to find there the peace of 
 mind which was denied him in Central America, but death put an 
 end to his plans for the future. An unconquerable, but sudden 
 disease prostrated him for a few days, and on the 14th of May, 
 1911, he died; yet in the memory of all good, patriotic Central 
 xlmericans he lives. 
 
 In Nicaragua his demise was lamented in almost every home and 
 even his political enemies, who, during his life, had not liesitated 
 to defame him, bowed in grief before the altar of his memory. 
 The National Assembly of Nicaragua honored Madriz's memory by 
 giving his name a place in the "Hall of Fame" of that country 
 This honor conferred upon him is proof that Madriz einj)0(lied the 
 national cause. 
 
 May this posthiunous honor result, at least, in consolation foi- 
 the family of the departed and for those of us who had the honor 
 and distinction of his friendship. We trust it will encourage lh.2 
 Central American youth to live up to the lofty example set by this 
 great patriot. 
 
 P. BONILLA. 
 
 New Orleans, October, 1913. 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS