'/Ss^ 
 
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 Copy 1 
 
 ONGRESS 
 
 J.CL Jession 
 
 SENATE 
 
 / Document 
 I No. 263 
 
 NATIONAL DEFENSE 
 
 A SPEECH 
 
 DELIVERED BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
 LEAGUE ON JANUARY 22, 1916 
 
 AT WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
 BY 
 
 HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE 
 
 United Slates Senator from Massachusetts 
 
 PRESENTED BY MR. WEEKS 
 January 28, 1916.— Ordered to be printed 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE" 
 
 1916 
 

 D. Of D. 
 FEB 15 1916 
 

 ADDRESS OF SENATOR HENRY CABOT LODGE. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I am deeply interested in the 
 purpose for which this National Security League has been formed. 
 I believe your meeting here can not fail to do good in molding and 
 making public opinion. But I think you will agree with me that 
 the most important thing is that this league should so work and 
 should use its power in such a Avay as to bring- practical results in 
 the shape of legislation for national defense. [Applause.] Even 
 were I master of eloquence, I should not attempt it to-night. I 
 merely wish to offer to you a few practical suggestions drawn from 
 some years of observation in Washington. 
 
 There are two kinds of questions which it is extremely difficult to 
 argue. One is where the question is new, doubtful, intricate, and com- 
 plicated. The other is when a question is so simple that it is diffi- 
 cult to understand how there can be any difference of opinion in 
 regard to it. [Laughter.] The subject of national defense belongs, 
 to my mind, in the latter class. [Applause.] The proposition, as 
 I should put it, is something like this : Every nation should have 
 sufficient military and naval defense to maintain its own peace and 
 security. This Nation has not such defense. Therefore it is the 
 duty of this Nation to look to it that such provision is made. It 
 appears to me that this little syllogism is so simple and so obvious 
 that almost anyone with the sight of an average mole could see it. 
 And yet I know there is a great deal of opposition, in a certain way, 
 to the proposition. 
 
 I quite agree that it is not a party question. I should be sorry 
 to think that national defense could be a party question. But I will 
 say this that if those gentlemen, of either party or of both parties, 
 who are now standing in the way of national defense do not look 
 to themselves a party will arise somewhere which will carry national 
 defense to completion. [Applause and cheers.] I am not going to 
 enter into details. I shall not attempt to argue that little syllogism 
 which I just ventured on as it might be argued. I could easily keep 
 you here well over Sunday if I should enter upon details relating to 
 either branch of the service. All I desire now is to call your attention 
 to certain facts vividly illustrating what the present condition is and 
 just where you want to go to work. The first thing is to know the 
 facts. There is fortunately no difficulty in knowing the facts about 
 the Army. We have a Secretary of War to whom as an American I 
 feel under great obligations, because he has told us the facts. [Ap- 
 plause.] He has laid his cards on the table. I do not know whether 
 the scheme that he proposes, and which is known as his plan, is the 
 ideally perfect plan to his mind — I very much doubt it — or whether, 
 like other men charged with great responsibility, he is laboring for 
 the best that he can hope to get. [Applause.] But, above all things, 
 
4 NATIONAL DEFENSE. 
 
 he is telling lis all about the War Department. And what is it that 
 we know, when all is told? That we have no Arn\y sufficient to de- 
 fend the United kStates. We can ncjt build coast defenses to protect 
 10,000 or Ti.OOO miles of coast ; that is an absurdity. We can protect, 
 we have partially protected, perhaps, some few great ports. But 
 the defense of the United States by land must lie in a large mobile 
 force. We have no such force. I for one believe that the recommen- 
 dation of Gen. Leonard Wood and of the AVar College experts, that 
 we should have a Regular Army to start with of 210,000 men, is right; 
 that that is the least number. [Applause.] 
 
 I believe that behind that Regular Army there should be a large 
 reserve mobile force. Mr. Putnam has told you, what we all know, 
 I think, that in one foreign country, at least, plans have been made 
 with a view to landing in this country, and that in 40 days they could 
 land an army of 300,000 men. thoroughly equipped. Now, the only 
 way to meet such a force is to have a mobile army to meet them 
 wherever they land. You can not, I repeat, have fortifications every- 
 wdiere. You must have your mobile force. Last year our mobile 
 force, all Regulars, was 24,000 men. You ought to have an army out- 
 numbering by at least two to one any hostile force that can be landed. 
 How, as a preliminary, are you going to find out where the enemy 
 is, and where they are going to land? We have no aeroplanes. How 
 are you going to move your men and supplies once you leave the 
 railroads? You have not even got motor trucks in your Army. 
 We are deficient in field artillery. We have no large reserves of 
 ammunition upon which success in war now depends. Above all, I 
 repeat, you have not got the men. You ought to have at least a 
 million men Avho can at any moment be called to the colors as a re- 
 serve. [Api)lause.] Whether it can best be done by the federaliza- 
 tion of the militia — a matter of some constitutional difficulty — or 
 whether, as I believe it must be eventually done, by a national force, 
 it ought to be, it must be, done. Every citizen in a democracy ought 
 to have the same rights and the same duties. [A]5plause.] We all 
 ought to bear the burdens equally, the burdens of taxation and of 
 military service. The universal liability to military service does 
 not, however, necessarily mean that we must carry out the Swiss 
 system to the fullest extent, and have an army of twelve or fifteen 
 millions, but with that universal liability we must have and we can 
 get the million men we w;ant. 
 
 We have not got them now. We have practically no military de- 
 fense on land. It is an ugly thing to say, but we could be conquered 
 to-morrow by any nation able to land on our coast 300,000 to 
 400,000 men thoroughly equipped in the best modern way. We are 
 as brave a people as live, as the mayor of New York so justly said, 
 but bravery unarmed means useless sacrifice of the best men. We 
 are ready to fight, but an unarmed people can not fight a fully armed 
 and equipped body of 400,000 men. And how are the bravest people 
 in the world to spring to arms when they have no arms to spring to? 
 [Applause and laughter.] That is why I say that we are defenseless 
 by land, and defense we must have, and Ave must have it at once. 
 
 I now come to the Navy. Let me repeat that I speak in no party 
 sense, and that I do not regard this as a party question; but I have 
 been in Congress more years than I am eager to confess, and I think 
 
NATIONAL DEFENSE. 5 
 
 that I know Congress fairly well, and w^here the blame rests for our 
 riOt being defended as we ought to be at this moment. Administra- 
 tions come and go. With scarcely an exception let me say that every 
 Secretary of War and every Secretary of the Navy whom I have 
 known has tried — some more vigorously, some more successfully, 
 than others, of course, but the^^ have all tried — to build up the forces 
 intrusted to his charge. The responsibility for not being defended 
 to-day as we ought to be lies at the door of Congress. [Applause.] 
 I am ready to take my blame with the rest, but I know where the 
 blame lies. It is no new thing. When Washington was on the eve 
 of final victory, just before the siege of Yorktown, perhaps you do 
 not recall what Congress were proposing to do? They were pro- 
 posing at that moment to reduce the Army. Some things change 
 and others do not. [Laughter and applause.] 
 
 I served some years ago on the Naval Committee of the House of 
 Representatives. I am at this moment a member of the Senate Com- 
 mittee on Naval Affairs, and ever since I have been in Washington 
 I have tried to inform myself in regard to the Navy. I do not know 
 as much about it as my friend Mr. Padgett, chairman of the House 
 Naval Committee, who, I think, has as thorough a knowledge of 
 naval affairs as any man in public life — more thorough, indeed. 
 [Applause.] I have had the honor to serve with him on conference 
 committees, and I know the extent of his knowledge. Yet even in his 
 ]:)resence I venture to say that I know something about the Navy, 
 but I am far from knowing it all, and the country knows very little. 
 We see a display of naval ships in the Hudson River, and the people 
 go home with a comfortable feeling that they have got a great and 
 splendid Navy, becauj-e they do not at all understand what a really 
 complete and efficient navy is. During the Spanish War there was a 
 New England port, which shall be nameless, one of many where they 
 felt that" they were in danger of attack from the Spanish cruisers. 
 It was not exceptional, because that feeling existed in all Atlantic 
 ports, south as well as north, and in common with many other ports 
 it wanted protection. I labored to get them protection. I finally 
 secured for this particular port an old monitor of the Civil War. 
 with one large smoothbore gun. It was towed down to that port 
 with some difficulty and anchored in the harbor, and they were 
 perfectly satisfied. " [Laughter.] The moral is that a navy may have 
 some verv fine ships and yet be wholly inadequate as a fighting force, 
 and it is not to be expected that the people will understand the real 
 condition of the Navy unless it is honestly explained to them. 
 
 The difficulty of obtaining accurate knowledge is shown by the fact 
 that those who are most immediately charged with the care of the 
 Navy are guilty of mistakes. The President said in his message : 
 
 If this fiiU i)i-(>srain should he carried out. we sliould linve huilt or l)uildiii;,' 
 in 1921, aceordins to the estimates of survival and standards of elassitimtion — 
 
 I call your attention to that language — 
 
 followed In- the General Board of the department, an effective Navy consisting 
 of 27 battleships of the first line, 6 battle cruisers, and 25 battleships of the 
 second line. 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy in his annual report says: 
 
 If this program is carried out, accepting the General P.oard estimates of 
 survival for present vessels — 
 
6 ISTATIONAL DEFENSE. 
 
 That is 20 years; some say 15. but we will take it at 20 as the life 
 limit of a modern battleship — 
 
 the Navy will be composed of the following vessels, built or building, in 1921 : 
 Battleships, first line, 27 ; battle cruisers, 6 ; battleships, second line, 25. 
 
 There can be no mistake about the battle cruisers, because we have 
 none, and those six are in the President's program, and there is no 
 item of his pi-ogram Avhich is better than that. Battleships of the 
 first line, 27 — that includes IT ships now built or building, and 10 
 according to the program; but the 25 battleships of the second line 
 puzzled me. I wrote to the Secretary of the Navy and asked him if 
 he would give me the names of the battleships of the second line. 
 He replied, very kindly, that I could find them in the report of the 
 General Board annexed to his report. I wrote back to him that I 
 had already read that appendix, but that the report of the General 
 Board did not seem to me to agree with his statement, and that was 
 why I asked for the names of the ships. I have had no answer to 
 this last letter. [Laughter.] 
 
 But here is what the General Board said, to which the Secretary 
 referred me : 
 
 Dreadnaughts of the first line. 17. 
 
 Then there are the 10 added under the pr(jgram, making a total of 
 27; correct. 
 
 Dreadnauglits of the second line — 
 
 1 am reading from the report of the General Board now — 
 
 Dreadnaughts of the second line, 13. 
 Superannuated dreadnaughts of the third line — 
 
 Ships that will then be over 20 j^ears old, each one — 
 
 nine. 
 Harbor-defense battleships. .3 — 
 
 The Indiana, the Massachusetts, and the Oregon^ authorized in 
 1890, commissioned in 1895. 
 
 The 25 of the second line as given by the President and the Sec- 
 letary of the Navy were made up of 13 put in that line by the 
 General Board, of 9 excluded from that line by the General Board 
 because they were not in accordance with their estimates of survival, 
 and of 3 now more than 20 years old, which the General Board rank 
 as only fi.t for harbor defense. 
 
 I am merely calling attention, by giving you these varying state- 
 ments, to some of the difficulties in the way of getting at facts. 
 
 Now, take the submarines. I could talk about the submarines all 
 night. [Laughter.] One himdred and fifty-seven in 1921 was the 
 number given us by the President and the Secretary. Dear old boats 
 some of them will be then. That 157 includes every submarine thnt 
 has been built from the beginning starting in 1902. Some of them 
 are absolutely useless now, and everybody knows it. There is not 
 a seagoing submarine among those now existing. I believe F-4^ 
 which sank in the harbor of Honolulu, is no longer carried on the 
 list. [Laughter.] But it was carried on the list as late as last 
 August. 
 
 Then there is the shortage of men. The Secretary has sent in the 
 report of Admiral Fletcher, made on the 15th of August last, and 
 
NATIONAL DEFENSE. 7 
 
 in that report he describes the shortage of men. At the June in- 
 spection one division was short 1,350 men. Mine layers were 25 
 per cent short in their complement. The department has reduced 
 the complement of destroyers by 25 per cent. It is reported that at 
 the battle- efficienc}^ inspection of the Utah a chief petty officer was 
 in charge of one turret and an ensign of 1914 in charge of another. 
 The Florida was short 29 officers, the Utah 28, the Michigan 21, and 
 the South Carolina 16. A pay clerk and a yeoman were in charge 
 of the plotting room, doing the work which should have been done 
 by commissioned officers. 
 
 Admiral Fletcher, the commander in chief, says that such reports 
 are of frequent occurrence, and in his own conclusions points out 
 specifically that the fleet needs more officers and more men; that 
 whatever be the number of men available for complements of the 
 ships in the active fleet should be kept full, and that if ships can not 
 be kept fully in commission with full complement thej' should be 
 put in reserve. 
 
 He says, also, in this same report, that we need mine-laying and 
 mine-sweeping vessels. He gives a comparison between the Delaware 
 and the Bellerophon and the Helgoland^ which I need not go into, 
 as to the number of officers. He refers to the unsatisfactor}^ con- 
 dition of the submarines, their limitations of mobility, the lack of 
 air craft, the lack of any radio direction finder, the lack of mine- 
 laying and mine-sweeping vessels. 
 
 I need not go on. The report is worthy your consideration if 
 you want to get at the facts and learn how absolutely inadequate and 
 how far from high efficiency our Navy is. We have no scouts. We 
 have no fast battle cruisers. The Blucher, which was sunk in the 
 North Sea. was sunk because she was the slowest of the German 
 ships. She was faster than any ship in our Navy ! We need battle 
 cruisers; we need scouts; we need aeroplanes, and we need speed 
 in supplying these deficiencies. [Great applause.] 
 
 The Secretary said the other day before the House committee, 
 if he was correctly reported, that it took three years to build a 
 battleship. Let me ask your attention — these are dry facts — to the 
 history of the two last superdreadnaughts authorized, battleships 
 Nos. 43 and 44^ authorized on March 3. 1915. Congress did its 
 duty, let me say. as to those two battleships. The Secretary of the 
 Navy decided to build these ships at New York and Mare Island. 
 It is now nearly a year since the authorization. The material for 
 No. Jf3, to be built at the New York Yard, has been ordered, I be- 
 lieve, and is in process of being assembled. [Laughter.] The 
 California is on the ways at the New York Navy Yard, however, 
 imd is not expected to be off the ways before September or October. 
 I take the Secretary's own statement. Therefore No. 43. authorized 
 March 3, 1915. can not have her keel laid before that time — 18 
 months after her authorization ! 
 
 It may be possible that we can not build a battleship in two years, 
 as England and Germany do; but we can build it in three years, 
 and we ought to be able to get rid of those 18 months which make 
 it four and a half years for an American battleship. 
 
 No. H is to be built at Mare Island. There are ways there, but 
 they are not large enough to take a superdreadnaught, and must 
 
8 NATIONAL DEFENSE. 
 
 be extended. There is not money enough to do it. Congress must 
 either appropriate money especially for that purpose or authorize 
 the Secretary to use some of the money appropriated for the ships. 
 I do not think this authority has yet been given. It may have 
 passed the House. 
 
 Representative Padgett. No, sir; it is pending in the House. It 
 has been reported by the committee. 
 
 Senator Lodge. It is pending in the House, then. The ship now 
 on the ways, which it will be necessary to have off the ways before 
 the superdreadnaught can be begun, will probably be launched in 
 September, 1916. If the money is authorized for the extension of 
 the ways — and I hope and believe it will be — that can be accom- 
 plished before the launching of the ship now on the ways; but if 
 the money is not obtained there will be still further delay. 
 
 It is said on good authority that England and Germany have 
 been building seagoing submarines of 800 or 1,000 tons, capable of 
 going around the north of England or into the Mediterranean, at the 
 rate of one a month. We then hear flourishing statements about 
 our great seagoing submarines. Yes; three have been authorized, 
 but we have not got them. I am glad they are authorized, but I 
 want them in the water, where they can be used, and not simply float- 
 ing harmlessly in acts of Congress. 
 
 The ScMeii was the first large submarine authorized. It was au- 
 thorized on the 30th of June, 1914. The contract was let the follow- 
 ing March— March of 1915. In the bulletin of January 10, 1916, it 
 appears that nothing has been done upon her 3^et. How long do 
 you thing is the contract time for the Schley^ the first of our sea- 
 going submarines? I was astonished to find out. Thirty-six 
 months — three years ! She is not contracted to be delivei-ed until 
 March, 1918 ; and if we want submarines, we want them now ! 
 [Applause.] As for the two authorized last year, nearly a year 
 ago — 60 and 61 — nothing has been done about them at all. These 
 are all mere illustrations. But they are the facts. Do not forget 
 that the worst thing that can befall us is to be deceived by others or 
 deceive ourselves as to our Xavy. 
 
 The House Naval Committee is hard at work preparing its bill, 
 having the valuable hearings which it is necessary to have, and 
 working as hard and intelligently on the bill as it is possible, I know. 
 The House Military Committee, unless I am misinformed, is con- 
 sidering a bill which appropriates for exactly the same Army that 
 we have now. The Senate Military Committee is holding hearings 
 and is doing excellent work. It has had before it Gen. Wood, 
 Gen. Carter, and other officers of the Army, who are telling the 
 committee and telling the country the exact truth and what the 
 country needs. [Applause.] That committee is preparing good 
 work. The Senate Naval Committee is engaged in the great and 
 burning question of building an armor plant. [Laughter.] 
 
 Now, I recognize that perhaps it may be necessary by and by to 
 have an armor plant. I am very doubtful about it at any time, but 
 I am certain that we do not want to put ten millions into an armor 
 plant now. What we want now is ships and men and submarines 
 and aeroplanes. [Great applause.] I Icnow there is a great argu- 
 ment behind the armor plant. I know that if the armor plant is 
 
NATIONAL DEFENSE. 9 
 
 not built it is possible — perhaps probable, but certainly possible — 
 that some great industrial plant in ])rivate hands may make some 
 money out of the manufacture of armor. Nevertheless, it seems to 
 me that it is more important to keep the enemy from our shores than 
 to devote our attention to preventing x\mericans from making money. 
 [Applau!-e.] I know well the immense time and thought which has 
 been given to that question of preventing Americans from making 
 money [laughter], and I do not underrate its importance; but I think 
 that at this moment what we want to do is to give the Navy the 
 things of which it is in such sore need. The Xavy is the first line of 
 defense. [Great applause.] While we control the seas, the United 
 States is safe. We have two great coasts to defend. I do not quite 
 agree with my friend Mr. Putnam about Chicago's inditference to 
 New York and Boston. As an American, the knowledge that San 
 Francisco or New Orleans or Chicago is in danger from an enemy or 
 damaged by a foe comes just as near home to me as if Boston were 
 attacked. [Great applause.] I was born in Boston. I have lived 
 there. I love it. But there is something I love more, and that is 
 the whole great country; and any enemy who touches any part of 
 that country touches me. [Great applause.] 
 
 Now. a word as to the sources of the opposition which you will have 
 to meet, which you will have to deal with, representing as you do 
 the people, the voters of this country. It is of various sorts in Con- 
 gress. There are some Avho think that the first thing to be done is 
 to put the Government into business in every direction — into muni- 
 tions, into armor, into everything — resting, as I say, on the great 
 pi'inciple that if they do not some private American citizen may 
 make money. Then there are those who want to spend the people's 
 money elsewhere, to scatter it through the country in the name of 
 good roads, to improve rivers and harbors, and to build public 
 buildings. You will see the newspapers refer to it in their graceful 
 A\ ay [laughter] as the '' pork barrel '' ; and you would suppose, from 
 ^Ahat you read in the newspapers, that all this was due to the natural 
 depra^■ity of Congressmen and Senators — that they wanted to have 
 j'ublic buildings and river and harbor appropriations for unnavi- 
 gable streams and impossible harbors, because they themselves were 
 naturally bad and rejoiced in evil for its own sake. I assure you that 
 is a very great mistake. The amount of i^leasure — even among those 
 Congressmen and Senators Avho are fond of art — the amount of arch- 
 itectural pleasure that they derive from a post office in a country town 
 [laughter] is not enough to govern their votes. They want those 
 things for the very simj^le and human reason — I know ; I have been 
 one of them for a lofig time — that they think their constituents want 
 them, and they think procuring them means votes. And just as long 
 as Congressmen and Senators, or any considerable number of them, 
 think there are more votes in river and harbor appropriations and 
 public buildings ap})ropriations than there are in appropriations for 
 the national defense, they will continue to give the preference to the 
 former. [Applause.] 
 
 That seems a harsh thing to say. The truth is not infrequently 
 both harsh and unpleasant. I know there are many men in l)otli 
 Houses who will vote for great appropriations for national defense 
 without a thought as to whether it is going to benefit them personally 
 
10 NATIONAL DEFENSE. 
 
 or not. [Applause.] I dare say there are many men in both Houses 
 v. ho would vote for appropriations for rivers and harbors and public 
 buildings without a thought as to whether it would benefit them or 
 not, although I must confess that that proposition is perhaps not 
 quite so certain as the other. [Laughter.] But if you Avould have 
 Congress take up national defense, both for the Army and for the 
 Navy, as you think it ought to be taken up, you will let them under- 
 stand that there is a great body of voters in this country, north, south, 
 east, and west, who are determined that their country shall be 
 defended ! 
 
 I have no doubt that the great mass of the American people wish 
 their country to be put in a state of proper defense. You all believe 
 so. Bring this fact home, then, to those who represent them. Make 
 the Senators and Congressmen understand it. Begin at the primary 
 and go with them to the polls in support if you can, in opposition if 
 you must, and you will be surprised at the rapidity of the educa- 
 tional process, and you will get plenty of support at the Capitol. 
 [Applause.] But you must come down to that practical side, as every 
 great question has to come to it finally. You must demonstrate to 
 the Kepresentative or the Senator that the people who send him here 
 want this thing done; and when the American people make it clear 
 to the House and Senate that they are in earnest about natio;ial de- 
 fense you will have it, and you are not likely to get it much sooner 
 in a proper and sufficient way. [Applause.] 
 
 I have taken much more time than I intended, and I only desire to 
 say one Avord in conclusion. No one can think that provision for na- 
 tional defense is more essential, more vital, than I do. But there is 
 a side to it that goes even deeper. It has been alluded to by the 
 mayor of New York, and I can do little more than repeat his words ; 
 but they are words which can not be too often repeated. In this ques- 
 tion of national defense lies a test of democracy, whether it is worthy 
 to live, whether it has the foresight, the self-control, the spirit 
 of unity which will lead it to take these precautions which it must 
 take if it is to survive at all in a world so uncertain and so perilous 
 as this. 
 
 We covet no one's territory. We seek no adventures. We have 
 an immense domain of our own, still to be developed. We desire, if 
 we can, to distribute the riches of our heritage so that all shall bene- 
 fit and not merely a few. We would fain, if Ave could, turn our at- 
 tention to the needs of the great classes of our OAvn people to Avhom 
 life is hard. We Avould like to do something to help old age. We 
 would like to improve in every way that we can the condition of our 
 own people. What is necessary for us in order to achieve that which 
 we desire? Peace and security. They speak of the Monroe doctrine 
 as a foreign policy. It is not a foreign policy ; it is a mere laAv of 
 self-preservation. We Avish to be at peace and we wish to be secure. 
 
 NoAv. these being our desires, have Ave made our acts and our 
 policies correspond Avith them? You wish to haA^e peace and se- 
 curity. HaA^e you done Avhat is necessary to make sure that you and 
 those Avho come after you will have peace and security? You cer- 
 tainly have not done it yet. You lie open to the Avorld, rich, tempt- 
 ing, an easy prey to the armed. There are those who say, " Ex- 
 hausted Europe Avill never attack us." That is the argument of the 
 
NATIONAL DEFENSE. H 
 
 " didn't-know-it-was-loaded " gentlemen who add, so largely to the bills 
 of mortality. Not attack us ! There is no nation on earth so danger- 
 ous as a nation fully armed and bankrupt at home. [Applause.] 
 The only time in our history when we were fully ]:)repared was at the 
 close of the Civil War. We had a great veteran Army. We had the 
 largest fleet in existence. We had a debt of $3,000,000,000, which 
 looked enormous then. Our currency seemed to be hopelessly de- 
 preciated. Financially speaking, we were bankrupt. Yet there 
 never was a moment in the history of the United States when she 
 was so dangerous to her neighbors as in 1865. 
 
 You can always get money, apparently, in this w^orld for powder and 
 shot. War ended in Europe, a nation there armed to the teeth, crip- 
 pled financially, with large claims growingout of Mexico : shall I go oil ? 
 Do vou think that presents a safe condition? Such a condition is 
 highly dangerous. Xo nation is safe while the world is as it is; and 
 our dut_y is to make sure of our peace, our security, our freedom. 
 Is the ideal of democracy merely to accumulate money, to live in 
 comfort, to amuse ourselves from clay to day ? Is that the tru^ ideal of 
 democracy? Not to my mind. I believe that the ideal of democracy 
 is written in the American Revolution and in the Civil War; the 
 great ideal which Abraham Lincoln typified, that life, that wealth, 
 that everything was as nothing compared to liberty and freedom; 
 and that this Nation should be free and remain free; that we should 
 be able to continue the democracy which we' have set up. And now^ 
 wdth other democracies fighting for their lives, are Ave to remain still 
 and do nothing to preserve our own ? 
 
 In the long- vistii of tlie yenrs to roll. 
 
 Let me not see my country's honor fade; 
 Oh ! let me see our land retain its soul ! 
 
 Her pride in Freedom, and not Freedom's shade. 
 
 [Great applause.] 
 
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