E 241 .B9F94 l" <^ ^ * "oV o > .<^vP, ^^0^ ^»^-- /% •.^^- y^% Wf^'"/"'^ .^' "ti^Q< °(K:. ,0' o«o' o,» •^. ,\^^' BY RICHARD FROTHINGHAM, Jr., AUTHOR or A HISTOEY OF THE SIEGE OF BOSTON. BOSTON: CHARLES C. LITTLE AND JAMES BROWN. 1850, c/ PKINTET) AT THE OFFICE OF THE B09T0X POST, NO. 21 WATER STKEET. \ ^<:^'^s'^ C M M A JS^ D BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. The preparation of a History of Charlestown — the occupation of leisure hours — led to large collections relative to the military events which occurred in the neighborhood of Boston at the commencement of the war of the revolution ; but as a full account of them did not appropriately belong to so local a publication, and as no work had been issued containing a narrative, in much detail, of these interesting events, it was thought best to prepare the volume now before the public entitled History of the Siege of Boston. The old subject of the battle of Bunker Hill was so directly in ray way that it could not be avoided ; and as an apology for adding another to the narratives of this event, I de- termined to construct it, as much as possible, from contemporary materials. In a faithful history of the battle, the question of command cannot properly be avoided. If it is not of the importance which many attach to it, still it is a curious question, about which there is much interest. It may be well, in the outset, to state clearly the matter at issue. The point is, was there a general officer detached to exercise a general com- mand in the battle ? There is great incongruity in the statements rela- tive to this. It is stated (by Dr. Whitney) that the detachment that fortified Breed's Hill was first put under the command of Gen. Putnam, that with it he took possession of this hill, and " ordered the battle 4 THE COMMAND IN THE Irom beginning to end ; " or as another (Hon. John Lowell) states it, " General Putnam was detached for the purpose of fortifying it (^Bunker Hill,) and Colonel Prescott was placed under his orders." On the other hand it is stated, that the orders to fortify Bunker Hill were given to Colonel Prescott, that the redoubt was raised by troops under his command, and that at no time during the whole affair did he act under, or receive an order from, a general officer. These statements are conflicting and cannot both be true. It is these rival claims as to Put- nam and Prescott that constitute the delicacy and difficulty of the ques- tion. Whoever investigates this subject must determine the kind of evi- dence that will be allowed to influence, mainly, the decision. There are numerous statements of soldiers who were in the battle, which were made forty years or more after it took place ; after antipathy or gratitude had biassed them against or for their old commanders ; after what they had heard and had come to believe, had unconsciously become interwoven with impressions of what they saw ; and at a time of life, too, when exactness as to details of what took place so long before in such a scene, could not reasonably have been expected. These relations bear, in some points, the characteristics of tradition. They mostly harmonize as to the movements of companies or regiments, but differ, irreconcilably, on points bearing on the question of command. An argument, or an array of evidence, of equal authority and of equal positiveness, may be drawn out of this large reservoir in favor of Putnam, or of Prescott, or that there was no general commander, or that there was no command at all in the action. A somewhat laborious studj', and critical collation of these statements forced upon me the conviction, that they ought not to be relied upon as leading authorities, and that it was idle to expect to arrive at a satisfac- tory result by depending on such sources of information. Hence diligent search was made for contemporary matter. Much caution and discrim- ination, however, are necessary in using such material. The first rumors of events are as apt to be as inaccurate as reminiscences of those events prepared after years have elapsed. But these rumors are followed by relations more reliable, and it is material of this sort that is the most valuable for historical purposes. It was such material that was selected. There are, however, but few facts bearing on the question of command in the many contemporary documents I have examined. Yet wha-t is gleaned from them is important. Among the documents are letters from Generals "Ward and Putnam, and Col. Prescott. The facts they supply arc oil some points conclusive. Sti.l, in a volume designed to be a simple record of authentic facts, and in a narrative of tlie battle prepared without consciouts bias for or against BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 5 either Putnam or Prescott as the commander, a labored argument on the question of command seemed neither desirable nor proper ; and in disposing of it, it was thought best to state concisely, yet fairly, all the evidence of a contemporary nature relative to both that was known, state the conclusion it seemed to warrant, and leave the subject with the reader. This course, right or wrong, it is proper to say, after a remark of Mr Swett in the pamphlet which has occasioned this publication, was suggested solely by reflection on the authorities ; and the gentlemen to whom he alludes are hereby exonerated from all responsibility, even for a suggestion, on this subject. And the " invincible prepossession," which seems to puzzle Mr Swett, it will be indeed " useless to inquire" into' because it did not exist. One great reason for treating the subject in this way was, that the reader, with facts thus before him, might make up a theory to suit himself. This plan was, accordingly, carried out. And though Mr Swett is pleased to say that I labored " throughout a large portion" of the Siege of Boston to prove a certain " insignificant abstrac- tion," yet, if so, it was unconscious labor, and to say so is ascribing to the effort far too much design. The evidence is merely stated and left to speak for itself. The reader Avill find it to occupy seven pages. The conclusion reached is that there was no general commander, other than Gen. Ward, of the Bunker Hill battle. After quoting the evidence that bears in favor of Colonel Prescott, the following statement is made: — "The conclusion warranted by this evidence is, that the origi- nal detachment was placed under the orders of Colonel Prescott, and that no general officer was authorised to command over him during the battle." In other words, there is not only no evidence that a general officer was detached to exercise a general command, but contemporary authorities bear decidedly against such a conclusion. Mr Samuel Swett has published a pamphlet entitled— " JFAo was the Commatider at Bunker Hill. With Remarks on Frothiiigham' s History of the Battle, loith an Appendix," in which he labors to overthrow this conclusion, and to establish the position that General Putnam was the authorized and general commander. Mr Swett is one of the old partizan writers on this subject. He began to write at a time (1818) when there •was much excitement relative to the battle. The Analectic Magazine for February of that year had an account of it ; the Port Folio for March had General Dearborn's extraordinary article, which opened up the long, bitter, and not yet closed controversy about General Putnam ; Daniel Putnam's able and interesting letter sbon (May) followed, marked by curious anecdote as well as by the indignant rebuke which filial duty dic- tated ; General Dearborn (June) issued his "V^indication" with its impos- ing array of documents; in July, Hon. John Lowell made his thorough b THE COMMAND IN THK defence of Putnam's character, in the columns of the Centinel, and Hon. Daniel Webster, in the North American Review, contributed an invaluable article, drawing with indelible lines the characteristics of the battle, and defining, with remarkable accuracy, the positions of Putnam and Prescott; the subject had got mixed with party politics, and for six months the press had teemed with articles on one side or the other. It was, then, at an unfavorable period for healthy investigation, and after such a surfeit of the subject, that Mr Swett " from his attention to military subjects," "consented to describe the battle." He commenced his researches in July, finished them in August, and early in Septem- ber was ready to favor the public with his "Historical and Topographical Sketch of the Battle of Bunker Hill." This account made up, in great part, from oral or written communications of actors in the battle, and framed with the theory that General Putnam was the commander, was regarded as of a partizan character. It was immediately criticised unfa- vorably in the Boston Patriot, in a scries of essays which subsequently appeared in pamphlet form, in which the main object is to show that Putnam was not even in the battle. Mr Swett has continued his research- es, printed two editions of his history, and several times appeared in defence of it. His statements relative to the formation of the army and the battle have found their waj' into most of the books. It is no injustice to the authors of subsequent excellent accounts of the battle to remark — for it is acknowledged — that as to the details they do not go behind Mr Swett' s account. The narrative in the Siege of Boston does. It is based, as much as possible, on contemporary documents, and, in its details, will be found to differ in many respects from those of the same period in Mr Svvett's History. A study of the conflicting evidence relating to this subject, however, ought to excite charity rather than dogmatism; and it was no purpose in preparing the Siege of Boston to make of its pages a pillory of error for a respected pioneer enquirer. Let the language relative to him to be found there, say whether much was done at the poor business of disparagement, or whether just credit was withheld. Mr Swett, how- ever, has had possession of this field so long, that, perhaps, it is not strange he should regard facts which fearfully disturb old opinions as errors ; or that a conclusion as to the commander which conflicts with a prepossession which for thirty years has proved invincible, should be contested. But the spirit, tendency and ol^jcct of the "Remarks" ar^ too obvious to be misapprehended. A publication thus by one who has made the Bunker Hill battle his special study, who has written more on it than any one, and whose opinions, hence, carry with them a certain authority, seems to demand a reply. Silence, under such circumstances, might either be construed into BATTLE OF BUNKER HH.L. 7 an insult to an older inquirer, or as doing myself the injustice of admitting the correctness of his strictures. Besides, those to whom I feel so deeply indebted for criticism as gratifying as it -was unlooked for, on a volume, which gradually and unexpectedly grew to the form in -which it appeared, and who have thus kindly commended it to the public, have a right to expect, that, when its integrity is seriously impeached, its author should show his vindication. Still, I undertake a reply with the greatest repug- nance to controversy.* In doing it, and doing it after all, mainly for the sake of history, what is merely personal will be set aside as of little account. It is not of so much consequence to the public how a writer carries his head, whether sometimes under his arm or always above his shoulders, as it is how he does his work. Besides, discourteous personal allusions do not strengthen a weak cause, and are sure to mar a strong one. It is difficult to observe method in dealing with this medley of accusa- tion. Mr Swett's zeal for his hero is so ardent, and his imagination is «o brisk, that he seems to have misapprehended the simplest language ; and hence, quite unintentionally it may be, he ascribes to me views I do not express, facts I do rfot state, and opinions I do not hold. He is merry over mistakes that have not been committed, and is indignant at charges that have not been made. Where, for instance, in the Siege of Boston, is it written that the *' great battle of Bunker Hill was fought on our side by a headless mob r" Where do I say that it is difficult to assign a "motive" for this conflict? Where is adduced " the most incon- trovertible argument in the world," or is it even stated, that the army at Cambridge was "itself a mob?" What " mistake of law" is made where it is said that Warren had not received his commission ? What charge is made against Col. Sargent ? Where is it stated or intimated that General Putnam was " a mere volunteer" in the army at Cambridge ? Where is it said that "he could not possibly" command at Bunker Hill, because it was an army of allies ? Where is the sentence which reads that, had he been the commander, he would have " boasted of it," or have " pub- licly claimed" it? Where is that "large portion" which contains the attempt to prove that " General Putnam had no right to command Col. * Mr Swett, on the publication of the Siege of Boston, favored me with the follow- ing note, which, in another note written subsequently tothe publication of his pamphlet, he informeil me was intended for publication. Under the present circumstances I hope to be excused lor printing it : — "Richard Frothingham, Jr., Esq.,— My dear Sir: For your history of the Siege of Boston I am very much obliged to you. Without time to have read it critically, I find it a remarkable monument of diligent and successful research, candor, impartiality and judgment. It is a very valuable addition to history. The subject of Bunker Hill battle 1 thought I had exhausted thirty years ago, but your additional information is interesting and important. We differ on one point only I believe worth mentioning, and that important only as a matter of curiosity, the cona- Di&nder in the battle, which we may discuss hereafter. With iriendly regard and respect, S. Swbtt." 8 THE COMMAND IN THE Prescott r" These allusions, and they might be increased, are to instance* where the meaning has been misstated. Mr Swett does not quote the language he comments on, and I prefer to be judged by what is written rather than by what he says is written. Besides all this, and considerable attempts at ridicule, Mr Swett makes the serious allegations that I have been "grossly regardless of known facts," and have even "manufactured" history ! Though age, among its privileges, cannot claim exemption from rebuke for such injustice, yet I deeply regret the occasion which requires controvers)' with one, relative to whom I had felt onlj' respect, exchanged only courtesies, and written only commendation. Before going to the question of command, it may be well to examine some of the errors which Mr Swett alleges the History oi' the Siege op Boston contains. 1. On page IGG it is related that " when General Warren entered the redoubt Colonel Prescott tendered him the command ; but Warren replied that he had not received his commission, and should serve as a volun- teer." Mr Swett remarks on this as " Frothingham's mistake in sup- posing that Warren told Prescott, as a reason for not assuming the com- mand, that he had not received his commission. This is a mistake of fact and law ; Warren, according to General Heath, said not one word about his commission, and his want of one did not diminish his rights of office — a point that has been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States," p. 7. Mr Swett does not quote my language, and the reader cannot find any such "mistake of laio" as he comments on in the Siege of Boston. This "point," therefore, need not be discussed. Now for the mistake of /act. Mr Swett had before him, when preparing his pamphlet, Presi- dent Sparks's MS. copy of Judge Prescott's memoir of the battle, and knew this was my authority for the anecdote. But what does he mean > Who would expect, after such a charge, to find on page 32 of Mr Swell's own history, the following account of what took place when Warren entered the redoubt: — "Prescott offered him the command; but he had not yet received his commission, and tendered his services to the colonel as a Tolunteer !" And Mr Swett says that he got this conversation from Colonel Putnam and Dr Jeffries. After three editions of his history has he concluded that he mistook those gentlemen ? Does he mean to ignore his own authorities ? If so, the fact must not be given up, for Judge Prescott states it as from his father, and it harmonizes with the recOrds relative to Dr Warren's appointment, as will be seen in another place. Is this the way my narrative is to be pronounced incorrect and then ridiculed ? As Mr Swett makes himself merry at what he calls my mis- takes, he remarks — "He sometimes, like St. Patrick, carries his head under his arm instead of wearing it on his shoulders." p. 13. We know it is BATTLE OF BUXKER HILL. V said that S(. Denis carried his head in his hands, and that the Anthropo- phagi had heads, " grr>w beneath their shoulders," but it would seem that St. Patrick's bead must have been right when he did his great work for Ireland. Letting this pass — how was Mr Swett's head located when it worked out this double "mistake of fact and law?" 2. Mr Swett accuses me of charging Colonel Sargent " with disobeying Gen. Putnam's order for him to go on to Bunker Hill. This injustice to the reputations of Putnam and Sargent arises from the most inconceivable misconstruction of Col. Sargenl's letter to us," &c. &c., p. 11. And after considerable indignant comment — nearly two pages of it ! — Mr Swett returns to the charge, and says: "These arc all the facts the author has for the assertion, that Sargent disobeyed Putnam's order to go on to Bun- ker Hill," p. 12. .Now ichere is such an " assertion" made in the Siege of Boston ? The vfiz.(\.er cannot fnd it ! Mr Swett refers to a note at page 168, but without quoting it. This note occurs where, in the text, an attempt is made to give a definite idea of Gen. Putnam's service throughout the whole affair, from the laying out of the works on Breed's Hill, to his retreat to Prospect Hill. One sentence reads — " Some of the officers not under his immediate command respected his authority, while others refused to obey him." It is to sustain this remark that reference is made to the following note : — " Captain Trevett, (Mass.) for instance, applied to Gen. Putnam for orders ; while Colonel Sargent, (N. Hampshire) in a letter, MS., dated Dec. 20, 1825, writes that Putnam ' sent an officer to order me on to the hill, but finding I did not attend to his order he sent a second, who I took no notice of, A third came open-mouthed, saying,' " &c. This is the note referred to, and this is all that is stated about Colonel Sargent. Now who but Mr Swett names Bunker Hill ? And tohat charge is made here ? Let the reader look at p. 92 of the Siege of Boston, and say whether there was any disposition to do injustice to this brave officer. No such charge was ever thought of, much less made. It is one of Mr Swett's inferences. His indignation is gratuitous. But the "injustice" I have been guilty of, Mr Swett says "arises from the most inconceivable misconstruction" on my part of Colonel Sargent's Letter. Now to show fully the height of this " injustice" and the depth of this stupidity, it may be well to let Colonel Sargent speak for himself. He was applied to by Mr Swett for information about the battle ; and, in a letter dated Dec. 20, 1825, gives his story. Mr Swett, in this pamphlet, (Appendix,) quotes from the conclusion of this letter, but does not quote from the commencement of it, — doubtless relishing its details about fight- ing among the islands in Boston harbor far better than its details about Putnam and Prescott, and the Bunker Hill battle. It is proper now that 10 THE COMMAND IN THE the latter should be printed. I put a few words in italics. Colonel Sargent writes — " Had General "Ward marched the whole of his troops then in Cambridge to Charlestown not one of the enemy would have escaped, but instead of that he only walked Hastings's front yard the whole day. He ordered Stark and Reed from Medford, and those two regiments did all that waa done that day, of any conscciuence, although the fatigue party stood their ground better than could be expected after a hard night's labor, hi nuj opinion, Col. Prescott is entitled to the honor of having the eommand in his calico gown. / doubt much if General Putnam was on the ground of battle for the ichole day, and that he had no regiment that I ever heard of. I made application three times that day to be permitted to march my regi- ment to Charlestown, but General Ward feared my post would be attacked, and for once judged right, for a large schooner, with from five to sis hundred men, attempted to gain the landing, but the wind against her and the tide turning, she returned. About 4, P. M., General Ward permitted me to march ray regiment with one called his own to Charlestown, but too late to do any good. Ge7i. Putnam, then on Prospect Hill, setU. an officer to order me on to the hill, but finding I did 7iot attend to his order, he sent a second, who I took no notice of. A third came open mouth, saying Gen. Putnam says the devil of hell is in you all, you icill be all cut to pieces. The words were scarcely uttered when I was left with Lieut. Col. Ward and my waiter. I had before this received a scratch from a four pound shot — the same shot took off Lt. Col. Ward's catouch box, and knocked down a subaltern behind him. I returned to head quarters." This, Mr Swett confesses, is the only document relating to Colonel Sargent. Now with this as authority, what right has Mr Swett, as he does in his history, to put Col. Sargent under the immediate command of Gen. Putnam? What right has he to say, as he docs in his pamphlet, that "Sargent found Putnam" on the top of Prospect Hill ? As I read this authority, Putnam sent successively three officers to Ssrgent with an order which Sargent "refused to obey," but instead of joining Putnam, on Prospect Hill, he went to head quarters. It was a case where a Nete Hampshire officer declined to acknowledge the superior authority of a Connecticut officer ; Sargent applied directly to General Ward for orders, but would not respect the orders of Putnam. The last point is the fact stated in the Siege of Boston. So much for the "injustice done to the reputations" of these two officers ! So much for my "most inconceivable misconstruction of Col. Sargent's letter ! !" But there is more to be said about Prospect UM, and hero it is necessary to carry a bit of war into Africa. Mr Swett in his history (Notes p. 4) quotes frora a letter by Rev. Joseph Thaxttr, in which this hill is Battle of bunker hill. 11 mentioned, though in the quotation it appears as "one of the neiffhbormg hills".'.' This letter was dated "Edgarton, June 15, 1818," and was addressed to Messrs Monroe & Francis. It will do no harm to print, for the first time, the whole extract. It reads — " The writer yesterday saw Thos. Cooke, Esq. In 1775 he was a member of the Provincial Congress, and one of the signers of the sword in hand money. He was on the day of the Bunker Hill fight at Cambridge- He went down to Prospect Hill and saw the whole transaction of the day. He says that all was confusion, there was no command. That he saw Gen. Putnam, who did all that man could do to get on the men to Breed's Hill ; that he appeared firm and resolute, thoughtless of personal danger, and that his praise was in the mouth of every one ; that at that time nor ever after did he ever hear any one speak a disreputable word against him." Mr Swett, in his history, besides suppressing the 7iame of the hill, sup- pressed also the significant remark, " all was confusion, there teas no command." And he suppresses also Mr Thaxter's own opinion in the same letter, viz: — "As to military discipline and command there was none." Neither suited his purpose ! To fit his theory exactly this letter of Thaxter's must be garbled ! On these two letters of Sargent and Thaxter, I remark, 1. They serve to show the character of this sort of authority, and how cautiously it must be used. 2. Here two manuscripts, so long unpublished, harmonize on one point. Sargent (1825) says that about 4 P. M. Putnam was on Prospect Hill : Thaxter's letter (1818) says that Thomas Cooke went on to Prospect Hill and saw Putnam, who did all man could do to induce men to go to Breed's Hill. Now Stiles (June 23, 1775) states that towards night Putnam went away from the action " to fetch across reinforcements, and before he could return our men began to retreat." 3. Sargent says Prescott was the commander, while Thaxter and Cooke say there was no command. 3. Here as well as any where, another charge of Mr Swett may be noticed, because it serves to show how far partisan feeling has carried him. He has nearly a page of disparaging remark on the history, because the name of this same Kev. Joseph Thaxter is not mentioned in it, and espe- cially in connection with the celebration of the fiftieth Jubilee (1825) of the battle, when he made the prayer. Mr Swett, after remarking that he "looked in vain to find his name," says (p. 27) that, "The author has devoted twenty-two pages to this jubilee and monument, without one syllable to spare for the patriotism, eloquence, and unction of this most interesting relic of olden time, or for the mention of any religious service whatsoever on the occasion;" and again he remarks that, though I "dwell 12 THE COMMAND I.N' TUK on AVebster's eloquent address," yet there is "not the slightest notice" ol any prayer ; and fnalli/, his pious indignation culminates in assorting that, •'The neglect of all religious services on the occasion w. 11 be considered by all those who give credit to the author's history as a serious imputation on our national character" ! ! Well, our national character certein/y ought to be looked after. But 1. As to the twenty-two pages of matter. The reader will find in them accounts of the early celebrations of the battle ; of the first monument on Breed's Hill ; of the origin and progress of the Bunker Hill Monument Association, and the only account of much length there is existing ; a history of the bulding of the monument ; a general view of the two great celebrations of 1825 and 1843, and of the Ladies' Fair ; the cost of the monument, and a minute description of it ! So much for this twenty-two pages about "this jubilee and monument !" Cannot Mr Swett state a thing right ? 2. "A faint outHne" only is presented of the great celebration of 1825 ; and of this, the whole notice in the text of the ceremony of laying the corner stone, and of the oration, including ■where I "dwell on Webster's eloquent address to the sovereign people," and even quote his splendid words, makes ten lines ! But it is xox TKUJi that, in them, there "is not the slightest notice of religious services" for the account concludes, (p. 345)—" When the exercises here toere concluded," &c. One definition of "exercise" is "act of divine worship," and Mr Swett may look into either Webster's or Worcester's dictionary as authority ! Now the "Address" had been mentioned, and "exercises" after it, manifestly, do not refer to wheeling regiments, but imply, in addition to the address, the acts of divine worship that, in this Christian land, are common on such occasions. Even the language itself must be perverted to sustain such libel as Mr Swett has written ! And those who wring out of this account "a serious imputation of our national character, "must hate this character intensely, be most inveterate word-catchers, and twist language from its obvious import. 3. It might have been better to have stated that Ilev. Joseph Thaxter made the prayer, but no want of respect for the memory of this venerable veteran occasioned the "neglect." Better this omission, however, than to have been guilty of garbling and falsifying the account of the battle the p:uiiot left behind him. 4. The next alleged error relates to the case of Captain Callender. Mr Swett lets his pen run as follows : "If any thing could be more -wonderful than the author's mistaking one hill for another, when both have bcon before his eyes from his birth, it would be his adducing this case as one of disobedience, or a case of any kind to disprove that Putnam was the commander," p. 12. This indeed would be wonder upon wonder— if it were only true. But that I mistook Prospect Hill for Bunker Hill is one fancy ; that this case of Callender is cited to disprove that Putnam wa* BATTLi; OF BUNK.KH UlLU. 13 the commander, is another fancy. Where is it so "adduced ?" Really Mr Swett's devotion to his hero leads him into strange misapprehensions. The reader will look in vain for such mistakes and citations in the pages of the Siege of Boston. Once more I ask, what in the name of common sense iloes Mr Swett mean ? On page 16-i of the Siege this very caseis "adduced" among the things that bear in favor of Putnam, and 7io lohcre is it cited against his "claims !" The very report made to the provincial congress, \yhich Mr Swett accuses me of neglectinr;, was thoroughly studied, {and Mr Swett hieio it) and is fairly quoted, and in favor of Putnam ! Indeed this report, and the evidence given on the trial of Colonel Scammans were the main authorities for stating that General Putnam gave orders to the reinforcements. But the strictures on pages 12, 13, relative to Callender, were not enough, and so Mr Swett (p. 22) adverts to this case again, and says: — "But allow the gentleman, as in regard to Callender, to manufacture his own case, grossly regardless of all known facts," What case have I manu- factured ? What "known facts" have I been regardless of? The chief thing that appears to be specified in this case is this: — "The author's declaration that Callender was tried for disobedience 27th June, seems to be a poetic license. "Ward orders the court martial at that time, without the slightest intention of such a charge," p. 13. AVhy does not Mr Swett quote my language? But 1. He alludes here, I presume, to a remark (p. 185) of the Siege, when the question of cortimand is not alluded to, but where an account is given of Callender, and it reads — "Capt. Callender, for disobedience of orders and alleged coioardice was tried June 27th." And again I say — "Captc.in Callender despised the charge of coioardice, and determining to wipe out the unjust stigma," &c. INow what sort of "license" has Mr Swett taken with my "declaration" ? Something more than a poet's license, I fancy ! 2. Any one would suppose, from Mr Swett's words, that Ward's order for a court martial specified what the charge was. Here it is — June 27, "The general orders that a general court martial be held this day at the lines, to try Captain Callender of the train of artillery. Witnesses on both sides to be duly summoned to attend a court which is to sit at 8 o'clock A. M., Col. Little president, Capt. Mosely judge advocate." What light does this throw on the matter ? And what must be said of the character of Mr Stoett's appeal to it f 5, Mr Swett, in denying that a portion of the troops refused to obey General Putnam, writes as follows : — " Now, we say with the utmost confidence, that, any few cases of cowardice out of the question, no military despot was ever obeyed with more implicit subjection than Putnam was throughout the battle, by every one, officers and men," — p. 10. This, coming from so thorough an investigator, from a thirty years' student of 14 THE COMMANI> IN XUK the battle, is worth examination ; though, had it come from another, it niiu;ht be passed over with the simple remark, that it indicated more dogmatism than knowledge. Mr Swett, however, confesses that he is leading "a forlorn hope." Now General Putnam had little or nothing to do with the original detachment, if the two hundred Connecticut men, after they got to the rail fence, be excepted. There is no proof thathe gave an order to it throughout the whole affair, but on the contrary, this is denied in the strongest terma. But his principal service was rendered in connection with the reinforce- ments, which arrived at the scene of action in the afternoon. After the first attack, he rode to Bunker Hill, and to the rear of it, to urge them forward. But they hesitated. He used every effort, especially, it is stated, at Charlestown Neck and on Bunker Hill, to overcome this refuctance. He ordered, entreated, encouraged and threatened, but all in vain. "The plea was" — I quote a report made in 1775 — "the artillery was gone, and they stood no chance for their lives in such circumstances, declaring they had no officers to lead them." They could not be prevailed upon to go where fighting was, and so large bodies of the troops remained out of the action. This fact is one of the most reliable, as well as most discreditable, relative to the battle. In truth, the state of things on Bunker Hill and in the rear of it, during the afternoon, was more like positive disobedience, than like " implicit subjection." However it may have been at Prescott's post there was no such efficient command in other parts of the field as is expressed in Mr Swett's language, anything he has written, or may write, to the contrary notwithstanding. There was confusion when he leaves the inference that there was order. The evidence on this point is conclusive — overwhelming. Thus Captain Chester (1775) states: — "Those that came up as recruits were most terribly frightened, many of them, and did not march up with that true courage that their leader ought to have inspired them with." William Tudor (1775) says — "They were discouraged from advancing." Rev. John Martin (1775) says — "During the whole or most of the action Colonel Gerrish, with one thousand men was at the bottom of Bunker Hill and ought to have come up but did not." Contemporary authority as decisively connects General Putnam with the reinforcements. This is not denied. Thus Daniel Putnam, his son, states that he rode to the rear "to urge on reinforcements ;" and Stiles states that he left the field to urge them on. Mr Swett, in his history, has no such "implicit subjection." He relates (p. 35) the efforts Putnam made at Charlestown Neck to induce the reinforcements that reached there to pass across ; and although he "entreated, encoxiraged, and threatened," he could only get "some of the troops" "to venture over." Again, when Gerrish was on Bunker Hill with part BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 15 of his regiment, the men disorganized and dispersed, "Putnam" — it is Mr Swett who writes this — "ordered them on to the lines ; he entreated and threat- ened them, and some of the most cowardly he knocked down with his sword, bui all i)i vain!" Once more, p. 41, he says — "Putnam rode to tho rear and exhausted every art and effort to bring them on. Capt. Bailej' only reached the lines." The evidence as to the confusion is equally clear. John Pitts (177j) says — "There never was more confusion and less command." In Major Gridley's sentence (1775) emphatic allusion is made to "the great confusion that attended" the transactions. Captain Chester (177o) says of things on Bunker Hill near the close of the battle — "When we arrived there was not a company in any kind of order. V But why multiply testimonj' on this point? Mr Swett himself says, in his history, p. 50 — "Great allowance must be made for those unable, and those unioillinrf to go on ; the men loent on or off as they pleased and when they pleased !" Now with such evidence — and this is but a tithe of what may be adduced — is it not surprising that such a claim of efficient command should be set up at this late day, with nothing but bare assertion to support it > If it were so, if there were this implicit subjection, this ready obedience, the enemies of General Putnam might ask with force, what they have asked in weakness — 'Whj', if he was so obeyed, were not the troops at the lines ? Could he not have led them up r' To affirm that he was obeyed implicitly, by officers and men, and then to be obliged to admit that tliose he commanded were not in battle raging a stone's throw off, is to place the brave old general in an awkward position, a position he never filled in his life time. Mr Swett's zeal here lacks discretion. 6. Another mistake seems to astonish Mr Swett "by its magnitude, nay its sublimity." He says — "According to him, the great battle of Bunker Hill was fought, on our side, by a headless mob ; and, to prove this, he adduces the most incontrovertible argument in the world, were it true, that the army at Cambridge, which had been for two months collecting and organizing under the able and experienced Gen. Ward, assisted by a host of accomplished veteran officers, was itself a mob," — p. 3. No quotation is made to sustain these remarks, and none can be made. Nothing to war- rant it can be found in the book, and it is enough to stamp it as glaring misrepresentation. I hold no such opinion. I adduce no such argument. It may be cruel to annihilate so much "magnitude" and "sublimity," but I must state that they have no better basis than Mr Swett's imagination. In opposition to this "mob" theory, Mr Swett goes to the other extreme, and affirms, p. 18 — " That the armj' at Cambridge was regularly organized and consolidated under Ward, Warren, Piitnam, and other officers in regular gradation, without any distinction in regard to the colonies whence 16 THE COMMAND TN TUE the troops came." And this is repeated on p. 21, and again on p. 29^ In fact this constitutes the foundation of one of Mr Swell's "incontrovert- ible" proofs that Putnam was the commander. It is strange that Mr Swett should venture upon such assertions flatly in the face of the most positive evidence. He makes no attempt to disprove the facts, first brought toge- ther in the Siege of Boston, (pp. 93 to 101) relative to the action of the colonies, and which were drawn entirely from contemporary MSS. and authorities. It is not necessary to repeat them here. They show that each of the four colonies commissioned its troops, supplied them with provisions, directed their disposition, and that it was not until after the battle of Bunker Hill that the Committee of War of Connecticut ordered Generals Spencer and Putnam, while their troops were in Massachusetts, to obey General Ward as commander-in-chief, in order that there might be " a due subordination ;" and also advised the colonies of Khode Island and New Hampshire to do the same respecting their troops. That the army (June 17, 1775) was regularly organized and consolidated is not true- The evidence in relation to the want of organization in the Massachu- setts army is ample. This army certainly cannot be said to have been settled under officers in "regular gradation." I have a report made to the provincial congress of Massachusetts, dated June 15, 1775, by a committee appointed "to consider the claims and pretensions of the colonels," which goes with much particularity into many cases, and recommends several to be commissioned, which was not done, however, until after the battle. On the 2lst of June an important committee was raised " to inquire into the reason of the present want of discipline in the Massachusetts army, and to report to this congress what is the i^roper way to put said army into a proper regulation ;" and on the next day, the congress ordered the committee of safety to present lists of persons worthy to be commissioned, " that so our army may be organized as soon as possible." The army regularly organized and consolidated ! I beg Mr Swett will make himself acquainted with the facts, from authentic sources, before he writes again. The old soldiers gave Mr Swett, when he prepared his history, better information than he writes in his last pamphlet. On page 11 (edition of 1826) he says : — " They (the troops) were strangers to discipline and almost to subordination. Though nominally organized into regiments, these were deficient in numbers, many of them only skeletons, and their respective ranks not ascertained. Some of the troops were yet serving as minute men, and the officers in a number of regiments toere not yet commissioned." Again, p. 14 : The Americans " were unable to appreciate the necessity of discipline or to understand the unoUganized state of the army in EVERY DEPARTMENT ! !" But in 1850 the same -writer has it that this same «rmy was "regularly organized and consolidated," und in " regular grada- BATTr.E OV BTTNKElt HILI,. IT fion" It really seems only necessary to adduce Mr Swett's facts to correft Mr Swett's imagination. The reminiscences of the veterans go so far in this direction as to border even on injustice to the army, if they do not make it a mob. Thus, Gen. Dearborn states that "nothing like discipline had entered into the army," and MrThaxter, whom Mr Swett likes as an authority, writes severely on this point. He says :—" As to military discipline and command (in the battle) there was none ; both officers and men acted as volunteers, each one doing that which he thought right." * *" At that time our army was little better than a mob, without discipline, and with little command till General Washington came, and Gates, and gave it some regularity," It •would be quite easy to increase quotations of this character. Eut this will answer. It conveys a very incorrect idea of the army to say that it was a mob, but it is as incorrect to say that it was regularly organized and consolidated. 7. Mr Swett, p. 16, writes — "We are delighted to discover, at last, something amusing in one of the author's mistakes. He says Putnam had the command of i regiment, because he was complimented with the empty title of colonel of a particular regiment," &c. &c. And then follows nearly a page of matter in which "signing humble servant" in letters, "the king of Prussia," "the virgin Mary," "wolves heads," figure, along with surmises about my "hallucination," and my ideas about "the odd notion" of "perdition," and of "the head of the wolf Putnam slew." Here, as usual all through the pamphlet, if I am quoted at all, it is with gross injustice. But what is all this for r What is the offence / I am really at a loss to know what it is. On page 100, the action of Connecticut is stated, and that the regiments of Spencer and Putnam, and part of Parson's, were ordered to Cambridge. Will this be contested ? On p. 168, it is stated that Putnam "was in command of the Connecticut troops stationed at Cam- bridge," and in another place are specified, the regiments and parts of regiments that were here. Will this be disputed ? Again, I state, p. 168 — "No service was more brilliant than that of the Connecticut troops whom he (Putnam) loas authorized to command." Again, p. 188 — "The Connecticut forces at Cambridge icere under the command of General Putnam." Is there any thing wrong here ? What is there then so amiising? What has drawn forth nearly a page of sitch attempt at ridicule ? Is it that I name the undoubted fact from the records of the Connecticut assembly, that General Putnam had a regiment ? Has Mr Swett forgotten how he commences his own account of the battle? His first paragraph, p. 18, reads — "The same order issued for one hundred and twenty of Gen. Putnam's regiment, and Capt. Gridley's company of artillery with two field pieces;" a statement, by the way, nearlv all wrong : for "the same order" for Prescott's, Frve's, 18 THE COMMAND IN THE and Bridge's regiments to parade (see Fenno's Ms. Orderly Book,) 1, did not embrace the Connecticut men ; 2, nor Gridley's company ; 3, there were two hundred men; and 4, they were not all taken from "Putnam's regiment" — four errors in less than three lines! But to return. Once morel ask, what is the mistake Wmve committed about Gen. Putnam's regiment ? What is there so amusing ? Where is the point of the ridicule r Mr Swett throughout his pages has much matter rather personal, which may pass for what it is worth. He supposes how I would write on "chemistry" and "astronom;/ ;" he compares me to a character Colman has in his " Broad Grins," and to a clergj-man "fulminating" against the *'jLiuntinj top-knots our foremothers wore ;" and he accuses me of mooting questions " on a par with that of free agency or the origin of evil" It is not, however, necessary even to specify other such matter. He makes Presi- dent Adams, Sen., and Judge Tudor, after failing " so cgregiously" on a certain question, jump into a "quickset hedge" and ascribes to me a power oifolloioing them with my "eyes shut." I feel honored in being put in such society, and as yet suffer no inconvenience from the place we occupy. But one remark I protest against. On p. 10 he says we are writing on a subject technical, and "concerning ■which both of us confess we know little or nothing." Here I claim at least the privilege of the dying. Posi- tively, Mr Swett has no authority to act as my confessor. And how a person, who, in 1818, stated that "from his attention to military subjects," he consented to describe the battle, and who since, has had a thirty years' study of it, can in 1850 " confess" that professionally, he knows «' little or nothing" about it, seems " most inconceivable." The errors that have been examined appear to be the most material which Mr Swett has specified, though he names others, and eren grows desponding over their number. He remarks, p. 10 — "We have made the supposition of the author's fundamental error being solitary ; but errors, like misfortunes, never come alone. The lost traveller who wanders from the right road enters a boundless field of aberration, and at every step plunges deeper into a chaos of mistakes." The right road in this case is probably the beaten path of Mr Swett's history, and every step from it is aberration and a plunge deeper into "chaos." The reader can judge of the nature of some of these mistakes. Others are of like character. It is however, entirely inadmissible that facts resting on contemporary documents are to be proved errors by the recollection of aged people. Is it not a wa>te of words to refute charges based on this sort of proof? I have aimed to give a faithful relation of facts, and on this score fear no investigation and ask no quarter. But more of this in another place. But in spite of this endeavor to state things exactly, it would be strange indeed if the " ISicgc of Boston" did not contain errors, for what book is BATTLE 0>' UUiNKEK HILL. 19 without them ? As yet none of luuuh iinportaiiue have been pointed out, though I should thank any one who will inform me of such as there are and should be glad to correct them. Two may be here acknowledged: one on page 13-5 where "to a slough," should read " towards a slough." I regret to have met with no particular contemporary description of the intrench- inents, and henca quoted Mr Stcett's loords, and this error was copied from his Hi.story ! (This quotation is acknowledged on p. 135 of Siege of Boston as from p. 20 of his History.) Another error is on page 164, where " rldinff do^vn the hill" should read " (joiinj down the hill," an error inad- vertantly made in copying for the press. Long before Mr Svvett printed his pamphlet he kneio hoio these errors occurred, and also knew they were acknowledfjed and corrected for a subsequent edition of the Siege of Boston. What more could be done? When this is considered let the reader judge the spirit or purpose or honor that could have dictated Mr Swell's comments on these two error^^. 1. Of the breastwork error, he says — " By describing it as reaching down to the slough he has represented it as longer than it was, and has marred and obscured by this mistake one of the principal features of the battle," &c., &c., p. 5. Indeed ! Is this so ? Let both descriptions be examined and it will be seen who, in this, has "marred and obscured" this battle the most. The Siege says, page 13-5 — " A breastwork beginning a short distance from the redoubt, and on a line with its eastern side, extended about one hundred yards north to a slough." The distance specified was taken by measure from Page's Plan — " to a slnugh" was taken from Mr Swett's History! The error is mostly correelcd by the limitation. Now Mr Swett's description (History, p. 20, 1823 edition) read.s — "A breast- work ran in a line with it north down to the slough," The error here has no corrective ! My breastwork runs only *' about one hundred yards north." Mr Swett's breastwork runs north down splash to the slough, — marring and obscuring (/ie says,) the princirval features of the memorable Bunker Hill battle ! But really he is altogether too severe on his mistake ! 2. On the other error Mr Svvett writes — " As if purposelj^ to declare he did not think anything relative to Putnam deserving of ordinary care or attention, he says — 'This report states Callender was riding down the hill, when there is not a syllable of the kind,' " p. 13. Now, 1st, the words put upon mo between quotation marks are not mine. This is not what I say. The statement in the Siege, p. 164, is— " In the report (1775) made to the Massachusetts provincial congress it is stated that on Bunker Hill ho (Putnam) ordered Capt. Callender, who was riding down the hill, 'to stop and go back.' " This statement, suljstituting ffoing for riding, is cor- rect. The exact statement of the report is that "an officer of the train was drawing his cannon down" Bunker Hill, when General Putnam met 20 xat: command in tue him and ordererl him "to stop and go back." " He refused, until the ( jcnoral threatened him with immediate death, upon which he returned up the hill again, but soon deserted his post. Another officer, who had the direction of another cannon, conducted much in the same manner." And in another place Captains Gridley and Callcnder are named as being t le officers. Now, by comparing this report with an article on Callender in the Centinel (1818), it will be seen that it was Callender "who loas govvj down the hill." The sentence in the Siege is quoted simply to show that Gen. Putnam gave orders in the battle, and is concise, but it was written with "care and ultention." I fearlessly appeal to the report to sustain this remark. Let Mr Swett look at it closely, calmly, and surely he cannot again write that "\heve is not a syllable of the kind there!" As though I had manufactured the whole statement ! Here, then, an inexact quotation from the Siege, and a false statement as to fact, are prefaced by an illiberal, unjust and even wanton remark. Let the Siege of Boston, 1 had almost written everywhere, answer whether its author " did not think any- thing " " deserving of ordinary care and attention" relative to General Putnam. While Mr Swett is dealing out such rank injustice, accusing me of "sacrificing" Putnam's character, of "racking my fancy" to discover objections against "his claims," and I know not what else, it is peculiarly gratifying to me to be able to show the impression which the pages of this volume, as far as they relate to Putnam, made on a candid critic. An article on the Siege of Boston, in the Philadelphia Bulletin — understood to be from the pen of William B. Ri;eu, Esq., the accomplished author of the Life of President Heed — after, I fear, too favorable a notice of my labors, reads : — " For one thing we especially thank Mr Frothingham — his defence of Putnam from the miserable imputations which anonymous or irresponsible writers of a late day have sought to cast on his memory. He does it thoroughly, and shows that at Bunker Hill, as on all occasions where he had a chance, the old man valiant did his duty well." What but partizan feeling could have dictated such gross and ground- less attacks on the integrity of the Siege of Boston as abound on nearly every page of Mr Swett's pamphlet ? Having thus shown what some of the accusations made against the History of the Siege of Boston amount to, I might here stop. If remarks on the Battle of Bunker Hill, to which I apprehended no intelligent inquirer would object, and a fair citation of the evidence on both sides, which it would have been grave neglect to have omitted, be excepted, the whole statement relative to the question of command is given in a few lines, and seemed to be such as the authorities quoted necessarily demand- ed. Thoy will do it injustice wlio discover in it. or fancy they discover. BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. ^l any disposition to make out an exclusive hero, or to Ibrtify an "invincible prepossession." The question really seems of little practical account. General Putnam acted throughout with that bravery that marked his nature, — at the rail fence and on the brow of Bunker Hill in the heat of the action, and in the rear of these urging on the reinforcements. Gen. Warren, armed with a musket, fought in the redoubt, where he remained throughout the action ; General Pomeroy, in the same way, kept at the rail fence ; Colonel Prescott commanded at the original entrenchment!^. How much would it add to the fame of either of these patriots, were it made out clear that either exercised, or was authorized to exercise, a general command ? How much would it increase the gratitude posterity owes to their memory for their gallant conduct ? With such views, even the zeal and positiveness, and injustice, of Mr Swett shall not make me a partizan. I have only gone where the evidence carried me. But the question of the command — a reallj' curious historical question — had to be met, and I endeavored to account for the incongruity of the statements relative to it, and to dispose of it, in a way, which, if free from non-committalism, should also be free from dogmatism. The candid must judge whether the attempt has been successful. Mr Swett is not satisfied with the disposition, and announces his intention as follows : — "It will be our duty to enter into a thorough investigation of this subject of the com- mand." It may be well, therefore, to follow him, and see how thorough has been his investigation, how sound is his reasoning, and how satisfactory is his conclusion. There is matter bearing on this subject in the Siege of Boston, never before printed, never before alluded to, consisting of extracts from original letters from General Ward and General Putnam ; an entire and most important letter from Colonel Prescott ; copious extracts from Judge William Prescott's memoir ; an important document from Rev. Peter Thatcher ; Rev. John Martin's statement ; a fine letter from Captain John Chester, a brave and accomplished officer, who was in the battle ; to say nothing of various other contemporary MS. letters and documents referred to and quoted. It is rather a question of fact than of argument. The positive language of contemporaries has, at least, as much to do with it, as considerations relative to military rank. Now, whoever professes to thoroughly investigate this subject, and does not cite these authorities fully and fairly, and consider them candidly, makes an unfortunate mis- take. How does Mr Swett deal with them ? Mr Swett first notices, for he cannot be said to quote them, the authorities that bear in favor of Colonel Prescott. He does not allege that they are inaccurately presented in the Siege of Boston, but complains that they are "left unexplained," and hence that they may "mislead" readers. Now the intention was to cite these authorities, relating both to Putnam and Pres- ^i'i rVHL COMMAND IN THE L-ott, — Icaciuij out the soldiers' statements — as concisely as possible, and let them make their own impression. It was no part of my plan to stretch them, or shorten them, or twist them, or explain them, so as to sustain a favorite theory. Such work was left for others. Mr Swett has explained some of tKis testimony and what is the explanation ? Passing by sundry inferences that are unwarranted, and sundry statements relative to Prescott, put upon me that I never made, it will be sufficient to notice his manner of dealing with the two Thatchers', Ward's and Scamman's testimony. The admirable letter of Colonel William Prescott is not in this connection, noticed or named by him ! Mr Swett will find it, copied I think correctly from the original, on pp. 395 and 396 of the Siege of Boston ! Neither does he appear to have seen Kev. Peter Thatcher's important statement . This, also, he will find, in the same volume, pp. 385 and 386 ! I commend them to his attention. 1 . Mr Swett comments on the statement of Rev. Peter Thatcher as fol- lows : — "The report of the committee of safety says — ' The commander of the party gave orders to retreat from the redoubt' ; and one of the writers of the report is supposed to have called Prescott 'the commander of the provincials.' That is, Prescott commanded the party, the provincials, who raised the redoubt, and those of them who fought there under him, till he gave them orders to retreat." But, 1, as to the character of this evidencp. What supposition is there about this authority r Supposed to have called Prescott the commander ! I print from the original a statement made by Rev. Peter Thatcher in his own handwriting, under his own signature, relative to his own account of the battle, which is the basis of all the accounts ; and I state that the sheet on which this statement is written encloses a manuscript copy of this account, with the interlineations pre- served, and that I found this at Worcester. Now this document — page 385 of the Siege of Boston — is cither false, or it is true. If false, let Mr Swett say so ; if true, there can be no supposition. It is as much a fact that llev. Peter Thatcher says that Colonel Prescott was the commander, as it is that the battle was fought. 2. Let the authority bear as it will, even though it cut a theory at right angles, there is no such limitation about it as Mr Swett puts to it. Here it is — that part of it relating to the com- mand : — " The following account was written by a person who was an eye witness of the Battle of Bunker Ilill. Some of the circumstances the intervention of the hill prevented him from seeing, for he stood on the north side of Mystic river. What facts he did not see himself were com- municated from Col. Prescott (who commanded the provincials), and by other persons, who were personally conversant in the scenes which this narrative describes." Such is the authority. Where is the limitation that Mr Swett applies to it ? Mr Thatcher is talking about the luhole battle. BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 1^8 What right has Mr Swett to restrict his language to the party who raised the redoubt and fought there under him? If Prescott's ^WiiVio/i during the battle is confined to his post, the original entrenchments, it must be deduced from other circumstances and authorities, and not from Thatcher's words. If Prescott did not go to the rail fence, his sagacity saw the necessity of this new position, and his order occasioned it to be taken. But more of this is in the sequel. 2. Mr Swett next comments on the letter of General Ward. So im- portant an authority required an exact quotationr but he introduces it as follows : — " Gen. Ward, in his letter to President Adams, 30ih Oct., '75, says that Bunker Hill battle was conducted by a Massachusetts officer,'' p. 6. These words are put in quotation marks. But whose language is it? Not Ward's, for he says, October 30, 1775, — " I think there has been no one action with the enemy which has not been conducted by an officer o f this colony, except that at Chelsea, which was conducted by Gen. Put- nam :" not mine, for this is an opinion on these words expressed as fol- lows : — " General Ward's remark is decisive that a Massachusetts officer conducted the battle." Who, then, is quoted ? There were no such words to quote. They were manufactured by Mr Swett. And the comment is of a piece with the coinage. Mr Swett sees the difficulty — with these words of Ward to take into the account — a writer who desires to be accurate has to meet, if he ascribes to a Connecticut offtcer the command of the battle, but he removes it in the following curious way : — " Ward was endeavoring to make out a strong case for the Massachusetts against the southern officers. As he knew it was physically impossible for Prescott to have conducted the battle — because he was on foot, and militarily so ; because there were generals and other officers older than Prescott on the field — he must have intended to designate himself or Warren as the conductor of the battle. Possibly he intended to claim the honor himself. The first syllable of the word •' conducted" has been altered by the pen : he began, perhaps, to write the word " commanded,'' but, recollecting that he could not claim the command, altered it into " conducted," p. 7. This twisting and syllable business will not answer. General Ward must be dealt w-ith in a straighter way and with more breadth of view. It adds force to this remark of General Ward, that it was written at a time when the circumstances of the battle of Bunker Hill were much talked of in the American camp. Nobody at this time (October, 1775,) thought of ascribing much credit to the plan of the enterprise to Charles- town. At this time it was no glory to have had the general command, or conduct, or responsibility of the Bunker Hill battle. But those who really fought this battle stood out then, as they do now, in envied prominence. 21 TUE COMMAND IN THE An article in the Connecticut Courant, which does not say that Putnam commanded, had much to say in praise of the Connecticut officers, but not a word about such officers as Prescott, Brewer, Gardner, Parker, &c. "This account," General Heath writes October 23, 177<3, "was detested by the brave Putnam." The trials, also, had for months been going on for the ill behavior of officers. The battle, then, was no obsolete alfair. The camp was alive with talk about it. It is at such a time, that General AV'ard writes to John Adams, October 30, 177o — "I think there has been no one action with the enemy which has not been conducted by an officer of this colony, except that at Chelsea, which was conducted by General Putnam." The action at Chelsea took place in the previous May, in whicli. Genaral Putnam commanded, and led the men with great bravery.* Now, General Ward was thinking over the actions there had been with the enemy, and thinking also of General Putnam's agency in them. Had there been, as to the Bunker Hill enterprise, an express agreement between Ward and Putnam — had Putnam been detached as the general officer to exercise the command — had he conducted so important a battle — is it probable, is it possible, that a person of the strict integrity of General Ward would have written in this way only four months afterwards? Is not the inference from his words a necessary one, that General Putnam did not conduct, or command, in the battle of Bunker Hill, as he conducted or commanded in the battle at Chelsea, but that it was a Massachusetts officer who performed this duty ? It would not be inconsistent with these words to ascribe the conduct or command of the battle to Ward, or to Warren, or to Prescott — all Massachusetts officers— but it is utterly incon- sistent with them to ascribe it to General Putnam, a Comicctlcut officer. This remark has this significance or it has none. The way Mr Swett treats this authority deserves notice. He first garbles it, and then endeavors to evade its force. He tells, with due gravity, what General Ward began to write, but did not write and to crown all, tells who he probably intended to name as the commander, but somehow did not name. Mr Swett says that he meant to say " That Warren was the conductor or commander of Bunker Hill battle" ! ! Now really all this looks like " manufacturing a case." Is not this modest in one who pro- fesses to be so indignantly averse to such discreditable business ? But Mr Swett, on iYd'A fifth page of twisting, surely did not so faithfully reflect as he did on the ninth page, that, " We were dealing with hard characters. Ward, Warren, Putnam and Prescott," he there rousingly writes, " are not rag babies, that an historian may bend and distort according to his fancy. The whole kingdom of Great Britain could not bend one of them," &c. Why then docs he try to bend Ward's words to suit his theory, or distort them according to his fimcy : This is no way to deal CATTLE or BUNKER HH.L. *i5 ■with authorities. This is trifling with history. Mr Swett must take the language of Ward as it is, even though unaltered it consigns a theorj', nursed with parental care for more than a generation, to the tomb of the Capulets. 3. The remark of Colonel Scammans — that "there was no general officer who commanded at Bunker Hill" — made too as though it were a perfectly well known fact, is first denied, and then characteristically explained so as to mean nothing. "The author," Mr Swett says, "attributes to Colonel Scammans an anonymous note in a newspaper, written perhaps by the editor." Now if the note were written by the editor, it was not anony- mous ! But let this absurdity pass. Let any one turn to the New England Chronicle of February 29, 1776, read there a letter requesting the editor "to print the proceedings of the court martial, tcith some remarks upon the depositions then taken," and signed "James Scammans," Colonel Scammans, and then say how cool it is in IMr Swett to write that "the note was anonymous" or that it was "written by the editor." The remark, I rejjeat, was undoubtedly made by Colonel Scammans, and it is so plain that it speaks for itself. Besides this, Mr Sv/ett charges me with omitting to mention here, that "Scammans, during the baitle, sent to General Putnam, at Bunker Hill, to see if he was wanted," and that afterward "General Putnam came up and ordered the regiment to advance." Now truly this is not omitted, but it all appears on page 164 of the Siege of Boston among the things bearing in favor of General Putnam! Mr Swett however plies his ridicule here : but really I do not see the cause of it, without he designed it to rebuke mo for the presumption of putting corn into his hopper. Up stream or down stream it seems to be all the same. Mr Swett's zeal for his hero has even a lover's jealously. He frankly admits (p. 4,) that I treat General Putnam's character "with the utmost candor and kindness," but still to his mind, there is a heathenish heart in it, — for he says, it is done, "as anirnals destined for the altar are pam- pered, to be sacrificed at last." The renowned Mr Burchell would say fudge. 4. Mr Swett's remark on Dr J. Thatcher's statement, — a surgeon in the army — the first, I think, to make such a statement, is still worse. He says Thatcher is unequivocal in favor of Putnam's command, by placing him at the head of all the officers in the following words : "Generals Putnam, Warren, Pomeroy, and Colonel Prescott were emphatically the heroes of the day." And Mr Swett writes this, too, when Dr Thatcher goes on to say that "though several general officers were jiresent. Colonel Frescott retained the command during the action'!! Comment on this ia unnecessary. It is not very surprising that Mr Swett, after such a sham review of 4 26 THE COMMAND IN THE tho authoritios braiing in favor of Colonel Prescott, should venture to write that " in the w hole of thein there is not a shadow of an excuse" for my conclusion, one half of which he actually quotes, but the other half he characteristically suppresses ! Is it then possible that such authorities, the whole of them, do not supjily even "a shadoic of an excuse" for stating that " the original dctatchment was placed under the orders of Colonel Prescott, and that no general officer was authorized to command over him during the battle :" What ! When, according to General Ward, a Massachusetts officer must have conducted the battle ; when, according to JudgeTudor, there was no aufkorisrd general ojficer on the field ; when Col. Scammans says no general otficcr commanded ; -when Martin, Gordon, Thatcher, and Prescott himself state explicitly that the orignal detachment was put under Col. Prescott' s orders; when James Thatcher states that, though several general officers were present, Prescott retained the com- mand during the action ; when Peter Thatcher states that he commanded ; when John Pitts states that no one but Prescott appeared to have any command; and when Judge Prescott states that he had orders in writing, and that no officer exercised or claimed any authority over him during the battle ! When a writer confesses that evidences of this sort "come like shadows, so depart," all that need be said is, that the difficultj" is not with them, it is not that they lack character, directness, or substance, but it is in the writer's mind, it is what metaphysicians term subjective — perhaps it is a "prcponsrKs/mz" that is ^'invincible" — and it therefore cannot be reached and removed. In direct conflict with this conclusion, however, is the statement made first by Rev. Mr W'hitney in 17f)0, as from conversations with General Putnam — "That the deiachment was put under the command of General Putnam ; with it he tiok poi^session of the hill, and ordered the battle from beginning to end ;" or as Hon. John Lowell (1818) states it : — "If General Putnam is to be believed, he first proposed the taking possession of Bunker Hill, and was detached for the i^urpose of fortifying it, and Col. Prescott was placed under his orders ;" or as Mr Swett (1818) states it — ^'General Putnam having the general superintendence of the expeditiom," accompanied the detachment; or (in 18o«j his own lips his course in the action. Mr Swett does not quote these extracts, nor others fully. Why does he not do it ? I here give a specimen. Stiles, June 18, journalizes : "A gentleman" from camp " this morning" "informs" among other things " that Col. Putnam is encamped in Charlestown, on Bunker Hill, and has lost one of his best cairtains, but is determined to stand his ground, having men enough," &c., &c. June 19. "Every one filled with the greatest solicitude." * * * "Charlestown is 28 THK COMMAND IN TUE in ashes." * * "We have various accounts — some that Gen. Put- nam is surrounded by the king's troops — some that he repulsed them," &c. June 20. William Ellery comes in and shows copies of several letters from camp, one from General Greene, "dated Lord's day evening, (June 18) giving an account of the battle." "General Greene says Gen- eral Putnam with 300 men took possession and entrenched on Bunker Hill on Friday night the IGth inst." I said (p. 1G4) this "vvas a rumor from camp, and say so again. "Why does not ilr Svvctt quote the whole of it ? Why leave out the 300 men ? Various other rumors, and also opinions of Greene's, are given. To return to Stiles. He writes : "Upon news of the action or landing the congress instantly broke up and those who had arms repaired to the tield of action. Hence Dr Warren's being in the action," &c. Why does not Mr Swett quote ? "Sterling gold," he says, "stamped at the highest mint in America !" But to go on with Stiles. The next entry I haA'e is dated June 23, and here we Jirst come to authentic history. It is General Putnam's own account, and it is so curious, that it ought to be in print. I quote here, therefore, all I have of this entry, which is from Bancroft's copy : — "June 23, 1775. Messrs Ellery, Chang, &c., returned here from a visit to the camp which they left on Saturday last. They spent an hour with General Putnam in his tent on Prospect Hill, about half way between Cambridge and Charlestown. The general gave them an account of the battle last Saturday, said the number on one side was not ascertained, but the nearest account was, that we had about fifty (not sixty) killed, and about twenty wounded. We lost few till the retreat. We repulsed the regulars three times, fought four hours. The small arms and six field pieces made great havoc among the regulars till our powder failed. General Putnam said by accounts from within Boston, the regulars con- fessed their loss of killed, wounded, and missing, was about one thou- sand. Our body on Bunker Hill, where was the action, was about loOO first and 700 afterwards. Putnam says he judged the regulars were 3000. There was a reinforcement within perhaps half a mile and ought to have come up to their assistance, but they must pass an open cause- way, where the regulars kept up a heavy fire from floating batteries. Putnam teas not at Bunker Hill at the beginning, but soon repaired thither, and was in the heat of the action till totcards night, when he went aioay to fetch across this reinforcement which ought to have come before. Soon after, and before he could return, our men began to retreat ; for some impru- dently calling out the powder is gone, the regulars heard it, and rallied again, and came on with fury, and forced the trenches, and then our people retreated leaving the heroic General Warren mortallj' wounded in the trenches. * * » The army are in high spirits. They consider this BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. '29 scarcely a repulse, considering the damage they did to the enemy ; and indeed, if, with the loss of 50 or GO killed, our people killed and dam- aged the regulars more than a thousand, it is a wonderful Providence. The troops landed under fire of the shipping, then set fire to Charlestown in which were oOO houses, all which, but 2 or 3, were reduced to ashes and ruins. Th'n about 1 or 2 o'clock P. M. they marched for the attack, and continued it four hours till near night." Now it seems almost incredible that Mr Swett should have made the hard remarks upon me ho has, pp. 14, 15, for selecting, of this entry, the paragraph la italics relative to General Putnam's personal service in the battle ; and even ascribe to me a motive for quoting it that I did. not dream of! One more extract from Stiles must suffice. "In June oO, Rev. Mr Martin 'visited me and gave me an account of the battle of Charlestown." " Mr Martin was in the whole affair from first to last." " He says that about 1500 went on Friday night and took possession of Bunker Hill, under the command of Colonel Prescott." And this is the first mention of Prescott's name there is in such extracts of this journal as I have. Then follows several pages of details, some of which are inter- woven in the narrative in the Siege of Boston. All I have to add is, that those who rely on such rumors from the camp as Stiles' first chronicles, — which hoAvever 'nave their value as the life-like talk of the day — will be liable to frame just such an account of this battle as Humphries in his life of Putnam has, where (in the beginning) the original detach- ment is put under Warren, and in the end, the British pursues to Winter Hill, Putnam there makes a stand, and drives them back under cover of their ships I In connection with this testimony in favor of General Putnam, Mr Swett finds what he calls " the most astonishing inadvertence of the author, though (bless the charitable admission) mere inadvertance we be- lieve," p. 25. It consists in "never hinting" that in llivington's New York Gazette, June 29, 1775, it is stated that 'Putnam on the evening of June IG, took possession of Bunker Hill, and began an entrenchment,' and this extract from Kivington was mentioned in a publication of ours, which he had among our documents," p. 25. I am not indebted to Mr Swett for a single contemporary document ; and. as for llivington's paper, I examined the fine file of it in the rooms of the New York Histor- ical Society, and made the extract, but found the same sentence in other newspapers, for they copied from each other. What an "aston- ishing inadvertence" it was in "never hintinr/" this, the reader may easily see by looking at page 124 of the Siege of Boston, for there the fact of such a statement being in the papers is given to show that Putnam was on the hill at night; and once more at page 164, where it is a second 30 THK COMMAND IN THE tinw named anionfj the facts bearing in his favor, in the evidence on the question of command ! Is Mr Swett's remark, however, " mvre inadver- tence?" The only new piece of evidence adduced is an extract from John Boyle's manuscript annals. Mr Swett says. He "writes in his diary. Kith of June, I77t5, (ieneral Putnam, with a detachment of about a thousand Ameri- can forces, went from Cambridge and began an entrenchment on an emi- nence below Bunker Hill." This MS., Avhich I did not hear of until after the publication of the Siege of Boston, is not a diary written at the time. Certainly, Mr Swett must, at least, have known that the record about Bunker Hill battle could not possibly have been put there on the day it was dated, for it contains Gage's official account of the killed and ■wounded, and the American account from the Providence Gazette, which did not appear till months afterwards, and could not have been then known ! And it requires but a moderate acquaintance with the newspa- pers of this period to see, at a glance, that this interesting MS. is a com- pilation mostly from them, and often, as in this case, in their language. Yet Mr Swett quotes this in a diary written at the time ! The fact stated by Boyle is taken from the newspapers, and is given on p. 164 of the Siege ! To supply the i^lace of this diary, thus struck away, I cheerfully quote a real diary, which I did not see until the Siege was in type, and which will answer Mr Swett's purpose as well as Boyle's, if not better. It is the account of Samuel Bixby, at the time of the battle a soldier at Rox- bury. It begins : — "June 17, Saturday, Colonel Putnam, with a large party, went on to a hill in Charlestown, called Bunker Hill, last nieht to entrench" — and all through the relation, no officer is even named but "Colonel Putnam." The simple explanation of the whole of these early rumors, or reports, is, that from General Putnam's being so active during the day of the battle, the report went abroad, that the entrenching party went on under him; when the fact was that it went on under the orders of Colonel Prescott. Mr Swett's statements about Putnam, AVarrcn, Pre^!cott, and the ques- tion of command, when brought together, make a singular medley. 1. He represents (p. 22,) that Putnam at last persuaded "the prudent Ward" "to grant him a detachment" "to meet the enemy ;" and went to Breed's Hill under " an express agreement" that he was "to have the direction and superintendence of the whole expedition" (p. 23,) : and he proves that Putnam was the commander by the nature of the army, by his rank, and a third and fourth time, by his conduct in the battle, during which "there Avas scarcely a regiment, corps, or individual of the army that Putnam did not personally command, direct, or encourage" {\t. 28,1 : BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 31 for "ho was galloping from end to end of the line, encouraging, directing, commanding every body." In fact "no military despot was ever obeyed with more implicit subjection." He was "the bright particular star, to which, during all the storm and tempest of the battle every eye wa? turned for guidance and for victory," p. 29. This is exclusive enough, dogmatic enough, and general enough, to satisfy any body. Here Gen- eral Putnam, if words mean anything, is from first to last, and by special agreement, the authorized, sole general commander. 2. Mr Swett, however, states (p. 7,) that Gen. Warren "was on the field, vested with all the rights and authority of a major general;" and (p. 29,) "notwithstanding he declined to issue any orders, was au- thorized to do so whenever he pleased," and "thus was the authorized, and for many years the supposed commander." Knowing this. Ward, (p. 7,) "probably intended to say that he was the conductor or command- er" in his letter. But (p. 29,) General Putnam was the actual, and on Warren's declining, the authorized commander." Ward was (p. 7,) "doubt- less ignorant of the fact that Warren refused to exercise any command on the occasion" ! ! But what becomes of the "express agreement" between Ward and Putnam? Was this contingency of Warren's de- clination in it ? AVas Putnam to have the whole direction only in case Warren did not choose to assume it ? Is it for a moment admissible that General Ward did not know when he wrote his letter, who was detached to the command, who exercised it, or who conducted the battle ? Is it not a direct attack on Ward's reputation to impute to him such disgrace- ful ignorance ? 3. Mr Swett states (p. 30,) " Colonel Prescott was commander at Bunker (Breed's) Hill the night before the battle, and the next day till Gen. Putnam came on with the reinforcements ; and during the battle, the commander at the redoubt." What is the authority for such a state- ment ? If Dr Whitney, Mr Lowell, and Mr Daniel Putnam are exact in giving General Putnam's conversation, he stated that the original detach- ment was placed under his command, and that Colonel Prescott acted under his orders. This indeed must have been so, if General Putnam, according to Mr Swett, by express agreement, had the superintendence of the whole expedition. How then could Prescott have been the com- mander the night before the battle and up to noon the next day ? If Put- nam and Prescott had differed any time previous to noon on the I7th, then, according to this last theory, the responsibility of decision rested on Prescott. Was this in the agreement ? Did a general agree to be commanled by a colonel ? There could have been no such incongruitj\ 4. Mr Swett viewing General Ward as, in one sense, the commander, comes to the conclusion, (p. 30,) that, "There were then four who in <;nine sense pnrtli-ipatrd in the command of Bunker Hill battle" — not the iV2 THE COMMAND IN THE exact trutli, but nearer to it than anj' theory of the pamphlet. And he says, "It may be impossible to demonstrate who was exclusively the com- mander as to discover the author of Junius or the birth place of Homer." Ettti Brute! And after so much "incontrovertible," "perfectly decisive proof," "express agreement," despotic command, and "implicit subjec- tion" relative to Putnam: After charging me with treating his character with candor only to sacrifice it at last — with robbing him of the com- mand and not enriching any one ? Who is doing sacrifice here? Who is committing robbery here? Who is enriching any one here? However, Mr Swett is correct if ho means that it is impossible, from the known evidence, to demonstrate who was exclusively the commander, for it all tends to show that there was on the field no general officer who exercised a general command. Such at least is the view that will be found to be taken in the Siege of Boston ! 5. Mr Swett (p. 10,) says : "All the world knows that he (Putnam) did come forward and exercise the command most effectually from the beginning to the end of the engagement :" on p. 29, Mr Swett says : "Seventy- five years ago the battle of Bunker Hill was fought. Who the commander was has ever since remained a mystery." Now these two things cannot be. What "all the world knows" certainly cannot be a "mystery," i. e. a profound secret, (see Webster) on something wholly unknown. If Mr Swett clings to the mystery ho must give up the knowledge. Such are the conclusions on the subject of command in the Bunker Hill battle, of "an author in spite of himself," who "thirty-two years ago consented to write an account" of it, and who this year considered it his "duty to enter into a thorough investigation" of this question. History cannot be worth much that resolves itself into such a mass of absurdity and contradiction. But there is something more serious than inconsistency to allege against Mr Swett's conclusions. What is the authority for the following, I think, neio statement? — "Maj. Gen. Ward was the commander in chief of the army at Cambridge ; Maj. Gen. Warren, the next; Brig. Gen. Putnam the third in command ; and Col. Pre&cott, another officer of the army," p. 29. This is neither correct, first, as to the general army, even if it werf? "consolidated ;" for General Thomas was the second in command; General Whitcomb ranked above General Warren ; General Pomeroy probably (for he was an older officer) ranked above General Spencer, and Sfencer certainly ranked Putnam. It is difficult to say who would have ranked as between Brigadier General Putnam and Brigadier General Greene. Nor second, as to that portion of the army stationed immediately at Cam- bridge, for Major General Whitcomb ranked above Major General Warren, and Cicneral Pomerov ranked above General Putnam. Nor was Goneral WATTLV. OF lUJNKER HILL. 33 "Ward, in either case, at the date of the ba'tle, the regular commander-in- chief, excepting of the ^Massachusetts forces. But more about these officers in another place. The onh* strictly accurate thing in the statement is, that Col. Prescott was another officer of the army ! Mr Swett's facts being taken from him his theory falls. I have done with Jlr Swett's pamphlet. A remark relative to his History needs justification. It has been stated that the narrative of the organization of the army and of the battle of Bunker Hill in the Siege of Boston, differs materially in details from the account of the same events in Mr Swett's History. As an instance of this, as to the former, take the two statements of the action of E,hode Island, — selected because they are the shortest : — Frnm the Siege of Boston. From Mr Sireti^s History. " The Rhode Island afseinhiy, April £5, " Rhode Island had sent o reaiment to voted to raii=e fifteen hunt'red ineii, to con- Iw'Lippachusetts imbued with the determined slitnte 'an army of obi'ervation,' and or- spirit ol civil and religious liberty, which dered it to 'join ?.nd cooperate vs ith the the founder of tlieir state maintained through forces (f the neighboring colon'es.' This every peril. Co/mic? Greene was tlieir corn- force was orjjanized into three rcffiment.-i, of niander, one ot the most prominent lieroes of eight companies each, under Colonels Var- the revolution. The elements of a soldier iium, Hilchcock, and Church, and placed were so mixed in him, that his elevated rank under tlie command of A''atkaniel Greene, among distinguished warriors was already with the rank of brigadier-generat. One of anficipated. Under him wore Lieut Col. the companies was a traiii "of artillery, and Ohiey, and Maj. Sox, an exiierienced Eng- had the colony's field pieces. General lish soldier. An arlillery company with Greene, on arriving at the camp, Jamaica four field pieces was attached to the corps." Plains, found his command in great disor- der: and it was only by his judicious labors, and great personal influence, that it was kept together. In the rules and regulations t.ir the government of this force, it is called ' The Rhode Island army.' They provide that 'all public stores, taken in the enemy's ramp or magazines,' should be 'secured for ihe nss of the colony of Riiode l»la!ia.' It was not until June 28 that this colony passed an act putting iis troops under ihe orders of the general of the combined army." And the variations, as to the details of the action of the other three colonics, are still greater. The same thing ■will be found to prevail as to the battle. Take, as an illustration, the two first paragraphs of the two accounts. From the Siege of Boston. From Mr Swett\^ History. " On Friday, the sixteenth of June, the " On the 16th of June, 75, the sun fell commanders of the army, in accordance with its full force on the American camp, with the recommendation'cf the committee the earth wns parched up, but the vigorous of safety, took measures to fortify Bunker frames and patri( tic spirit of the s and depositions, unite in the fact, that the orders for the troops of New Hampshire and Massachusetts to go on, went directly from General AVard. Thus Colonel Stark, (June 20, 177o) states that he "teas required by the. General" to send a party to Bunker Hill. So Prescott received his orders from Ward, and when he applied for reinforcements, it was directly to him. The orders of Ward to the forces of these two colonies, therefore, did not (JO through amj other officer, as they would have done had one been specially detached to exercise a general command. Throughout the action Gen. Ward had constant and frequent communi- cations with Charlestown. Henry Knox, afterward General Knox, and, Samuel Osgood, acted as his aids. Col. Joseph Gilbert is named in the newspapers as having "at the request of General Ward" freely exposed his life on this day by crossing the Neck several times "in the time of action and under a galling fire to carry intelligence to and from headquar- ters " But Ward remained at Cambridge. He considered the attack on the redoubt as only a part of the object of the British general, but that his main object was to march out of Boston, attack his stores, break up his army, and then proceed to Charlestown Neck, and enclose the Amer- icans in the peninsula. It was not until the intentions of the British general were clearly revealed, that he detached large reinforcements to Charlestown. Such is the statement made by General Ward's friends. And had the valor of the patriot band on Breed's Hill been less, the greater might have been the estimate placed on Ward's judgment. The circumstances already stated, with others that might be named, would seem to indicate that General Ward controlled the movements in such a way, that he may be regarded as the general commander, if any one can be so regarded. This view is supported by several allusions that occur to him in contemporary letters. It should be borne in mind that the result of the battle, the loss of the ground, occasioned great indigna- tion, and naturally gave rise to much unfavorable comment. In some of this comment General Ward is spoken of as the direct commander of the battle. I will name here as one instance, a letter of James Warren, (June 20, 1775) who was elected president of the Massachusetts provin- cial congress, in the place of Joseph AVarren. He regards him and writes of him as the commander. General Ward was in long and important service subsequently to the battle. He was appointed by the continental congress first major general, commanded the right wing of the army during the Siege of Boston, and was left in command of the eastern department on the removal of Wash- igton to New York. He soon resigned his commission, but at the request of congress, continued in service until the close of the year. He subse- qnentn- filled most, responsible offices, bring in 1777 president of the 40 THK COMMAND IN THK executive council of the colon}', in 177i) a member of the continental congress, in 1788 speaker of the Massachusetts house of representatives, and sixteen years a representative of the town of Shrcwfrbury. He died October 27, 1800, age 7-5, leavi\ig behind him an unblemished character, and a name "precious among the friends of liberty and religion." John Whitcorab was the officer next in rank who gave orders on the day of the battle He was chosen general by the provincial congress, Feb. 15, 1775. He was an old veteran— took the field promptly on the nine teenth of April, and, according to the orderly books, was one of the three generals who formed the first council of war convened on the 20th of April, at Cambridge. He was one of the sterling, disinterested, unedu- cated patriot officers of the early revolution, and appears to have enjoyed to a great degree the respect and confidence of his contrmnoraiies; and so valuable were his services considered that when the provincial congress resolved, June 12, to elect two major generals, on the next day (13th,) they elected him the " first major general." He expressed an unwillingness to accept this appointment, but on a " complaisant letter," dated June 16, being sent to him by order of congress, strongly urging his acceptance, the brave patriot replied, that " as the circumstances of the army were so difficult and the enemy so near" he would accept. He was not com- missioned, however, until the 2.jd of June. Put if Warren is to be con- sidered a major general — and his commission is to date from the day of his appointment — so is Whitcomb. Indeed the evidence in Scammans's rrial shows that he was on duty on the 17th, and gave orders in the afternoon. A letter of Samuel Gray, July 12, 1775, states that two gener- als and the engineer went on to Breed's Hill on the night of June 16, and reconnoitred the ground. One of them, certainlj-, was General Put- nam, and the other might have been General Whitcomb. There is no mention, however, of his having been in the battle, and no special ser- vice appears in connection with his name. He was certainly in the field that day, gave orders, and was also the officer n?xt in rank to General Ward at Cambridge. Joseph Warren was the officer next in rank, having been on 14th of June elected the second major general of the JIussachusetis army. It is not necessary here to recount his history ; but no one represented more completely the fine cnthu-^iasm iuul the sclf-saoriricirsg patriotism that rallied to the support of the revolution, end no one saw more clearly the great principle ir.volved in the contest. If he was of a high, chivalrous spirit, and of fascmating social qualities, he had also a judgment beyond his years, and wielded surpiising influence with his contemporaries. He had been an active and most efficient working patriot, in the civil line, and as .such ho acted, as president of the Massachusetts provincial congress aiid BATTI,F. or BUNKER HII.I,. 41 member of the committee of safety up to the day, and almost to the hour of his death. He had twice exposed his life in the battle field, once on the Lexington day, when he is said to have been the most active man on the field, and again at j^oddle's Island in May, under General Putnam, yet it was as a volunteer and without a command ; and there is nothing on the records of the provincial congress, or among its documents, to indicate that a commission as major general had been made out for him, or that he had accepted this appointment ; nor does his name appear on such orderly books, as I have seen ; neither is it stated that General Ward ordered him, on the 17th of June, to Charlestown, but on the contrary, his friends were urgent in their entreaties that his valuable life should not be exposed in battle. He went voluntarily, deaf to the most aff"ectionate remonstrances, listening only to the call of patriotic duty, in his own lofty spirit of self-sacrifice, and to give the patriot band when it was in peril the benefit of his presence. He went on, in his own simple words, uttered after he got to the redoubt, <'To encourage a good cause." On his way from Cambridge he armed himself with a musket, took position in the redoubt, and declined to give orders to Colonel Prescott. Here I quote an entire note in Judge Prescott' s MS. Memoir. It indicates the cautious manner in which that eminent man wrote on this interesing subject : — ♦'General Warren came to the redoubt a short time before the action commenced with a musket in his hand. Col. Prescott went to him and proposed that he should take the command, observing, he understood he had been appointed a major general a day or two before, by the provincial congress. General Warren replied, 'I shall take no command here, I have not yet received my commission ; I came as a volunteer with my musket to serve under you, and shall be happy to learn from a soldier of your experience.' General Warren fought gallantly with his musket, and un- fortunately for his country, fell ; but, whether killed during the battle or on the retreat, is made a question. I believe it was just after he left the redoubt, but am not positive that I ever heard my father state it." Deacon Samuel Lawrence, of Groton — the father of the Hon. Abbott Lawrence — who went on under Colonel Prescott, aided in raising the redoubt, was in it during the whole battle until the retreat, and whose subsequent life was marked by great usefulness, integrity, and public spirit, says of General Warren — " Just before the battle commenced Gen. Warren came to the redoubt. He had on a blue coat and white waistcoat, and, I think, a cocked hat, but of this I am not certain. Colonel Prescott ad- vanced to him, said ' He Avas glad to see him, and hoped he would take the command.' General Warren replied — 'No, he came to see the action, but not to take the command ; that he was only a volunteer on that day.' " He further states — " I knew General Warren well by sight, and recollected him perfectly when Colonel Prescott oifcrcd him the command, and was 6 42 THE COMMAND IN THE Borry to spo him so dangerously situated, as I knew him to be a distin- guished character, and thought he ought not to have risked his life without ■command on that occasion."' The deiormined spirit with which the leading officers went into this battle could hardly have boon exceeded. Putnam, Pomeroy, and Stark were veterans beyond fear, and their names had become associated with daring enterprise. Prescott went on to the hill on the night of June 16th, with the resolution not to be taken alive — " I will never be taken alive," he had remarked. *' The tories shall never have the satisfaction of seeing me hanged." \Varren's high spirit had been often stirred by the taunts which the British officers were wont to indulge against the colonists. Indeed he felt them as keenly as though they had been personal insults. It was only a few weeks before the battle, that he remarked to William Eustis, afterwards governor, at a moment when his spirit was galled by such insolence : '* These fellows saj' we won't fight ! By heavens, I hope I shall die up to my knees in blood." The report at first was that he disdained to fly. Mr B.mcroft, during his late residence abroad, got the account of the battle which the French ambassador in London sent to Vcrgennes, the French minister, which gives, with much particularity, an account of the battle. It says — "II (Warren) a refuse de le (Putnam) suivre dans sa retraite ; il est reste lui septieme dans Ics entrenchments de Charlestown et n' a pas voulu accepter de quartier." " He (Warren) refused to follow him (Putnam) in the retreat ; he remained one of seven in the entrenchments at Charlestown and would not accept quarter." General Ward (October 20, 1775) told Dr Bellcnap—" That Dr Warren was the last man in the trenches after they were forced, and died on the breastwork with his sword in his hand. That his body was stripped naked, and buried so ; his coat was sold in Boston by a soldier for eight dollars. His body was dug up several times, and buried again, to gratify the curiosity of those who came to see it." In connection with the death of Warren is the chivalric act attributed to the British Major Small, (which figures so largely in Trumbull's picture,) who, in return for a similar service which General Putnam had rendered him in the battle, it is said, endeavored to save Warren's life. The whole relation, however, about Major Small, bears too much the aspect of romance to be relied upon. The most probable account, of the many accounts of his fall, is, that he ■was killed early in the retreat, just outside the trenches. As the con- temporary notices of his death are interesting, a few more of them are here quoted : — The Kemembrancer, (British) vol. 1, p. 250, says — "When the pro- vincials were retreating, of the three concurring circumstances, Charles- town being on fire, the ships cannonading, and the regulars advancing, the Doctor, with that intrepidity and contempt of danger which peculiarly BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 43 marked his character, stood alone for some time, endeavoring to ralfy th« troops and animate them by his example. He was obscived in thia situ- ation, and known by an officer in the regulars, who, wresting a maske' out of the hands of one of his men, took aim, and lodged a bullet in hia breast, of which he expired without a pang." A British lieutenant in the battle, John Clarke, in his pamphlet accoimt, printed in London, 177o, writes as follows of Dr Warren : — " A report having prevailed that Dr Warren was not killed, I think it necessary to contradict it, as I saw a soldier, after the Doctor was wound- ed and lying in the trenches, going to run him through tlio body with his bayonet; on which the Doctor desired he would not kill hini, for ho was much wounded and could not live a great while longer ; on whicih the soldier swore that he would, for that he had done more mischief than any one else, and immediately run him through the body. The Doctor" :< dress was a light-colored coat, with a white satin waittcoat laced with silver, and white breeches with silver loops; which I saw the soldier soon after stqp oft' his body. He was supposed to be the commander of the American army that day ; for General Putnam was about throe miles distant, and formed an ambuscade with about three thousatid men." If John Clarke could stand idle and see this barbarity, he must have been a liend in human form. Both of these British accounts cannot be true. James Warren, MS. letter, June 20, 177-), saj's: "Here fell our worthy and much lamented friend Dr W^arren, with as much glory as Wolfe on the plains of Abraham, after performing many feats of bravery, and exhib- iting a coolness and conduct which did honor to the judgment of his country in appointing him a few days before one of their major generals ; at once admired and lamented in such a manner as to make it difficult to determine whether regret or envy predominates." J. Palmer, Cambridge, MS., June 19, 1775, says : "We yet have about GO or 70 killed and missing ; but — among these, is — what shall I say ? How shall I write the name of our worthy friend, the great and good D'' W . You will hear by others who will write to-morrow, such partic- ulars as I am not possessed of." William Tudor, MS., June 26, 177'), writes: — "The loss of Dr Warren is irreijarable — his death is generally and greatly lamented. But 'Diilce et decorum e^^t pro patria inori.' This is a day of heroes. The fall of one will inspire the surviving glo- rious band to emulate his virtues and revenge his death on the foes of liberty and our country "* Immediately after the battle it was reported in Boston that Dr Warren had the command during the action, and statements to this effect Avere written to England. Hence, in nearly all the British accounts, this * I am inilebted to Hon. Charlee Fianci* Adams for the three letter? from which thes* fxirarts are riiiide. 44 THt; COMMAND IN THE honor is awarded to him. The same thing is stated in some of the alma- nacks of 1776. George's Cambridge Almanack, or the Essex Calendar for 177G, says that he was the "commander in chief on the occasion." The same account was printed in a handbill, with a parcel of wretched rhyme, some of which also appeared in the newspapers. Governor Trum- bull, of Connecticut, in his Historical Letter, printed in vol. YI. of the Massachusetts Historical Collection, dated August 31, 1779, gives an ac- count of the action, and states that "the brave General Warren" was the "commanding officer." The same thing is stated in a History of the War in America, published by Coverly & Hodge in Boston in 1781, and is repeated in an account in the Analectic Magazine, (1818,) where it is stated that "General Putnam directed the whole on the fall of General Warren." That General Warren, in being present, and behaving so heroically, exerted great influence in the battle by infusing his own spirit into the patriot band, cannot be doiibtcd. He acted, however, only as a vol- unteer. There is no reliable account which states that Ml.assumed any command — that he performed any military duty in the army previous to the battle, or that he gave an order during the engagement. He was in the redoubt, and Colonel Prescott's letter makes it certain that here he (Prescott) commanded throughout the action. Seth Pomeroy was the next officer in rank, as he was the oldest officer, being one of the first generals elected. He was one of the intrepid vete- rans of the French wars, having commanded a company under Sir William Johnson, when he defeated the army under Baron Dieskau. He exerted large influence in Hampshire county, and had a marked character for intrepidity, generosity, frankness and patriotism. He was a delegate in the first and second provincial congress from Northampton, and a col- league with the celebrated Major Hawley. His name often appears on important committees. He was elected a general officer Oct. 27, 1774, and again Feb. 9, 1775 ; and probably preferring military service, was not returned a delegate to the third provincial congress, which met on the 31st of May, 1775. He aided in organizing the army that assembled at Cambridge to besiege the British army, and was in service at the time of the battle. It is stated that he had not received a commission in the Mas- sachusetts army, as Ward and Thomas had, but served under " his old commission ;" but the authority for this is not given. I have met with but few authentic notices of him in connection with the battle. But it is admitted that he went on to the field as a volunteer, and though he ranked above Putnam, there is no evidence that he gave him an order. He is said to have borrowed a horse of General Ward to carry him on; but on arriving at Charlestown Neck, and seeing the severe fire that raked it, he refused to risk the borrowed animal, but walked across. He fought with BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 45 ;i musket at the rail fence breastwork. He behaved bravely during the battle, and in some accounts, figures as the commander of a brigade. But ho appears to have had no special command. He was elected a brigadier general by the continental congress, but declined on account of his age. Israel Putnam, of Connecticut, was the general next in rank stationed at Cambridge. Not an officer of the army, if Warren be excepted, had a larger measure of popularity. His daring exploits at home, and on the Canada frontier, had established his character for bravery, while his pub- lic spirit and efficient political action, on trying occasions during the ten years controversy from 1764 to 1775, had made him widely known as a decided and bold patriot. But it is unnecessary to relate his history. The Connecticut assembly, in April, made him a brigadier general, and he was second in command of the forces of that colony. At the time of the battle of Bunker Hill, the greater part of these forces was stationed at Cambridge — the remainder, under General Spencer, the senior officer, was at Roxbury. It was not, I think, until subsequently to the battle, that Patterson's, Sargent's, and other regiments (Mass.) were placed under his command. No reliable contemporary account states that the detachment which was detailed to take possession of Bunker Hill, was placed under the orders of General Putnam, or gives him by express agreement the superinten- dence of the whole expedition, or puts Col. Prescott under him. On the other hand, the negative evidence is decisive and conclusive. Scammans writes as though it were well known that there was no general officer in command ; James Thatcher states that though several general officers came on to the field, no one assumed the command ; William Tudor says there was no authorised general command ; and Judge Prescott says that neither General Putnam nor any other officer claimed or exercised any command over Prescott. It is also a singular fact, that the patriot govern- or of Connecticut, Governor Trumbull, the head of the committee of war of that colony, under whose direct orders Spencer and Putnam acted, who speaks in the most friendly manner of Putnam in his letters, who would be likely to know the fact if he had commanded, and to claim the honor for his colony if he justly could, yet in his historical letter (Aug. 31, 1779) names General Warren as the commanding officer. Gen- eral Putnam, too, in a letter dated May 22, 1776, speaks of venturing "his life in the high places of the field," and of "taking possession of Prospect Hill the very night after the fight on Bunker Hill, u-ithoiU having any orders from any person." This does not indicate that he was the commander in this fight, or had entrusted to him the whole direction of the expedition. Nor does the relation that Stiles has given — already quoted — indicate such a responsibility ; but if it indicates any thing, it is that he was not responsible for the result. To all this must be added the 46 THK COMMAND IN THE Oecisive ne.;al;vete~-timony cf the letter of General Ward, which is clearly to the point, that a Massachusetts officer conducted the battle. In order to show how decided is the denial that General Putnam was detached to exercise a general command, or that the original detachment was put under his orders, or that he gave an order to Col. Prescott, I now .'idd the following extract of a letter of the late Judge 'William Prescott, the son of Colonel Prescott, which has not before been printed. It is appended to his MS. memoir of the battle. After remarking on Mr. Swett's history, he says (October 30, 1838) — "There is one (fact) however, in which I cannot concur with the state- ment in the history. This, as I understand it, represents that General Putnam had the command of all the troops engaged in the action. I have not the smallest disposition to disparage Gen. P. or his services, but I believe no authority or reason can be found for this supposition, other than his rank, and that he was on the heights during the battle. The detachment that marched from Cambridge the night before, includ- ing the one hundred and twenty Connecticut men, was placed under the command of Colonel Prescott, by an order in writing from the commander- in-chief, with instructions to proceed to Bunker Hill and fortify it till relieved. Colonel Prescott conferred with his officers and Colonel Gridley ^^ General Putnam might be present) as to the place intended for the for- tification ; but Colonel l*rescott took oh himself the responsibility of de- ciding, as well he might, for on him it would rest. I know from evidence that with me is conclusive, that General Putnam never exercised any authority over this detachment, or any part of it ; and that he never at any time, before, during, or after the battle, gave an order or command to Colonel Prescott." These authorities and facts in the case are put together without the slightest disposition to do injustice to this brave old general. Still, if there be any authority. In manuscript or in print, between June 1775 and May 1790, which assigns to him the command of the original detach- ment, or of the battle of Bunker Hill, let it be produced. But General Putnam had been an efficient officer since the rustic army j^athered at Cambridge, was one of the council of war, is understood to have been in favor of fortifying Bunker Hill, and was the last to shrink from a perilous enterprise. His patriotic zeal carried him to the heights during the watches of the memorable night when the redoubt was built, and also early on the next day, to give the entrenching party the benefit of his presence and council ; and this carried him also into the heat of the fight, at the commencement, at the rail fence — at its conclusion, on the brow of Bunker Hill. The contemporary accounts that name him in connection with the battle, harmonize as to the nature of his service. Chester gives the fact that about noon he ordered on all the Connecticut BA.TTI-C OF BUNKER HILL. 47 troops at Cambridge ; Martin states that he came on with a reinforce- ment ; Gordon states tliat he was employed in aiding and encouraging the troops here and there, as the case required; Pitts states that he was em- ployed in collecting the men ; and "Williams (secretary of the Connecti- cut committee of war) states he received it that he commanded the troops, perhaps not in chief. And thus, while the negative testimony is againsi. the idea of his being detached to exercise a general command, that of a positive cast is that as a general officer he acted the part of an aid, ai\ assistant, a volunteer. And in scuh capacity he did his duty fearlessly, faithfully, well. He was on horseback, and rode quickly from place to place.* Ilis main service- was in connection with the reinforcements. He gave orders to them, not in the redoubt, not, I think, near the redoubt, but at the rail fence, and on Bunker Hill, and in the rear of this. He stated himself — so Stiles says — that there was "a reinforcement within half a mile " that ought to havp gone on to the hill, but the heavy fire at " the open causeway " deterred it, and that " in the heat of the action he )yent away to fetch across thU reinforcement." Now this service is consistent with the duty of a patriotic volunteer " collecting men," but is it consistent Avith the duty of a respon- sible commander, ordering a battle ? What would be thought of a general, who, in the heat of an action, should leave the field, and go half a mile after a reinforcement, and not get back until a retreat had commenced ? Is it not at considerable hazard to General Putnam's reputation that, with such contemporary evidence to meet as there is in this case — the authenticity of which cannot be successfully impugned — the position is maintained that he was the immediate and responsible commander of this battle ? But to return: General Putnam most probably left the hill after the first attack. He next is seen braving the balls at Charlestown Neck, and, in the rear of it, urging on the backward troops. Thus Samuel Bassett says he came in full gallop to Ploughed Hill (Mount Benedict) from the neck, (which, probably, was after the first attack) exclaiming, " Up my brave boys, for God's sake ! * Here I quote an extract from p. 169 of the Siei-ie of Boston. To sustain the statement I have before me several pages (MS.) in which tlie notices of General Putnam's move- ments to be found in the soldiers' statements, are compared with sucii contemporary notices of his conduct as I have been able to glean. I see no cause to alter a line of it: — " The mass of matter relative to General Putnam's movements on this day presents the following account of them as tlie most probable. On the evening of June 10, he joined the detachment at Charlestown Meclc; took part in the consultation as to the place to be fortified; returned in the night to Cambridge; went to the heights on the firing of the Lively, but immediately relumed to Caml)ridge; went again lo tlie heights about ten o'clock; was in Cambridge after the British liniled; ordered on the Connecticut troops, and then went to the heights; was at the rail fence at the time tlie action commenced; was in the heat of the battle, and duriiig its continuance made great etTorts to induce the reinforcements to advance to the lines; urged labor on works at Bunker Hill; was on the brow of this hill when the retreat took place; retreated with that part of the army that went to Prospect Hill, and remained here through the night. He was on horseback, and in a few minutes' space of time could be not oLily in any part of the heights, but even at Cambridge. It is not, therefore, at all strange, that statements made by the soldiers as to the time when, and the place where, they saw the general, amid the confusion of so terrific a scene, cannot be reconciled ; and more especially as these statements were made after an expiration of forty or fifty years." 48 THE COMMAND IN THE AVc drive them ;" and Sargent and Cooke say that he was at Prospect Hill, at an hour and under circumstances, which must have been while the battle was going on. Here the contemporary evidence (Stiles and Pitts) and the soldiers' statements (Bassett, Sargent and Cooke) harmonize. The retreat (Stiles says) had commenced before he got back. But he must soon have rode to Bunker Hill, for he is found here by a messenger Col. Scammans sent; and when his regiment got to this hill he ordered it forward. On the brow of this hill, where there was hot fighting, he put himself between the retreating throng and the advancing enemy ; and, regardless of personal danger, he urged the flying troops to stop. " Make a stand here I" he exclaimed, " We can stop them yet ! In God's name form ! and give them one shot more !" There are other circumstances that will harmonize with this detail ; and if it will not furnish a stage on which to act the Major Small romance — where Putnam saves Small's life — all that need be said is, that it is time to ignore some of the romance that has accumulated about the battle of Bunker Hill. In all this. General Putnam acted as a :;eneral officer would have acted. He gave orders, undoubtedly, not only to the Connecticut officers and troops, over whom he had a specific command, but to others over whom he had no special command. If it be true that even in an army of allies the oldest or highest officer ranks, still it is also true there must be the requisite discipline, regularity and subordination, to allow this principle to operate, and that the officer who appears on a field of battle to take the command from an inferior officer, must be ordered on by his superior. Such in either particular is not the case here. Every thing was in an irregular, half- organized, transition state, and there is no more evidence that "Ward ordered Putnam on than that he ordered Pomeroy (his senior) or Warren on. Besides ; he was neither the highest nor oldest allied officer, for Whitcomb, Warren, and Pomeroy ranked him. Indeed it has been stated, by those defending Putnam, that Ward could not order him on. Thus Hon. John Lowell remarks : " It is certainly true that there could not in the nature of the case have been any authorized commander." General Putnam might give orders, even accompany them with threats, and yet not be detached to supercede Prescott. In so trying a scene, an officer so popular on being seen in the field, would naturally be looked up to for advice and applied to for orders. A case in point is that of Arnold at Saratoga. He was only not ordered by Gates on to the field, but was actually under arrest, yet seeing the necessity of prompt and decisive action, he galloped about, giving orders, leading on the troops, and was obeyed as though he were ordered on. So with General Putnam during the Bunker Hill battle. He rode about from place to place, cheering all with whom he came in contact, " aiding and encouraging where the case required." Rome of the officers and troops not under his immediate com- RATTT.F, OF UrNKF.U HJI.T.. ^9 jnand respected his authority, while others refused to obey him. Some of the Connecticut forces whom he ordered to the field, did a brilliant ser- vice, apd indeed no service was more brilliant ; but some of the Massachu- setts forces, whom he labored hard to get into the battle, behaved badly. Indeed in the afternoon, during the battle, and in the rear of Bunker Hill, there w^as great confusion, as Captain Chester's excellent and life-like let- ter (July 12, 177'j) firmly establishes. Tiuit den. Putnam was not success- ful in getting these backward troops into action, in sheer justice, ought to be ascribed neither to his lack of energy nor of conduct, but to the hesitan- cy of inexperienced troops, to the want of spirit in some of their officers, and to the general lack of discipline and subordination in the army. Gen- eral Putnam was not blamed for this at the time, but on the contrary, his services as an officer throughout the siege are spoken of in letters in terms of lively approbation. Indeed among all the documents of the time — I mean those I have seen— in print or in manuscript, there is not a disparaging remark on his services this day ; and none occur until the unjust comments made bj' General Wilkinson in his memoirs, printed in IS 1(1. Still, to represent that the detachment sent to Bunker Hill was un- der his command, and that Colonel Preseott acted under his orders, is to contradict the most positive evidence and violate the integrity of history. William Preseott was one of the French war veterans. He served as a lieutenant of a company under General Winslow at the capture of Cape Breton, and so decided was the military talent he displa^'ed, that he at- tracted the particular notice of the British commander-in-chief, who urged him to accept a commission of a lieutenancy in the regular army. This he declined, as he was unwilling to adopt a military profession and leave his native country. He was born in Groton, but he lived in that part of it which was set off, and became Pepperell. Here he took a prominent part in the questions that arose between the colonies and the mother country, and on the popular side. He represented Pepperell in the cele- brated convention of committees held in Boston in 1768, in the convention of Middlesex county Aug. 30, 1774, when the boldest measures were de- termined upon, and in the provincial congress of October. He is called on the records of this congress Captain AV'illiam Preseott. He was not a member at the time of the battle. He had been also chairman of the Pep- perell committee of safety. lie was chosen colonel of the minute men, when they organized agreeably to the advice of the provincial congress, and it was in this capacity that, on the " Lexiagton Alarm," he hastened at the head of his men to Cambridge, and acted as one of the members of the first council of war. To him were assigned some of the earliest duties of the campaign. On the 27th of May he received a colonel's commission in " the Massachusetts army," being then about fifty years of age. Among the Massachusetts colonels there was, at that time, no one more 7 50 THE COMMAND IN THE distinguished, both in the civil and military line, than Colonel Prescott, And when the resolution to occupy Bunker Hill, so unanimously advised by the Massachusetts committee of safety, -was so suddenly taken by the council of war, the selection of an officer to perform this service could not have fallen upon a patriot of f^reater decision of character, or a soldier of more dauntless resolution. His established reputation furnishes a suffi- cient reason for his being selected for so dangerous and trying a duty. Though in the afternoon of June 16, his regiment, withFrye's and Bridge's, was required to parade at six o'clock, yet it was not until evening that he received orders in writing to take the command of a detachment. He received them directly from General Ward. They required him to pro- ceed, at the head of his detachment, to Bunker Hill, and there erect such fortifications as he and Colonel Gridley — the chief engineer of the Massa- chusetts army — should judge proper for its defence ; and he was instruct- ed not to communicate his orders until after he had passed Charlcstown Neck. Thus he was regularly detached for a special service, and as such marched at the head of his troops. " General Putnam " — so Judge Prescott expressly states from information from his father — " did not head the de- tachment from Cambridge to Bunker Hill, nor march with it." It was under the entire command of Colonel Prescott. In all the evidence, it is only twice that Colonel Prescott, up to about the time of the attack, appears in consultation with general officers : once in the night, in reference to the place to be fortified, and once just before the enemy made his first landing, in reference to the removal of the entrenching tools. It may be well to look at both these cases. When Colonel Prescott, in the evening of June 16th, arrived at Charles- town Neck, he halted, and sent a small party, under Captain Nutting, to the lower part of the town, to serve as a guard. He soon marched over to Bunker Hill, and again halted. It was here, probably, that he communi- i-ated his orders to his officers, and held a consultation as to the place to he fortified. Other officers, who did not march with the detachment, were present, and took part in the discussion. Samuel Gray (Letter July 12, 177o,) gives the best account of what took place. He states that "the engineer and two generals went on to the hill at night, and reconnoitred the ground ; that one general and the engineer were of opinion we ought not to entrench on Charlcstown Hill (Breed's Hill) till we had thrown up .Home works on the north and south ends of Bunker Hill, to cover our men in their retreat, if that should happen ; but on the pressing importunity -jf the other general officer it was consented to begin as was done." One of these generals was General Putnam. There is no data to determine who the other was, but rather from the estimation which Gen. \Vhit- comb's character was held, his recent appointment as major general, and tht' fact he was on active duty, than from anything else, it may be infer- BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. 51 red that he was the general. No account states that Colonel Prescott here received an order ; but Judge Prescott does say that the responsibility of the decision rested with him. When the troops got to the spot, so Pres- cott states, « o V >^^