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REPORT OP OPERATIONS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNITED STATES FORCES, 
 
 AND / / _' 
 
 aENERAL INFORMATION 
 
 OF THE 
 IN THE 
 
 Military Division of the South-West and Gulf 
 
 AND 
 
 i/y ' c^ - /'I T>v) M _ 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF. 
 MAJOR GENERAL P.B. SHERIDAN, U. S. A., 
 
 From May 29, 1865, to November 4, 1866. 
 
Z3 
 
 
 n 
 
^ 
 
 Headquakteks Depaetment of the Gulp, 
 t New Orleans, Louisiana, November i:, 1866. 
 
 Brevet Major General J. A. Rawlins, 
 
 Chief of Staff, 
 
 Washington, D. 0. 
 Genebal : 
 
 In compliance with your letter of instructions, dated Oc- 
 tober 4, 1866, I have the honor to make the following report 
 of operations within the limits of my command since the 29th 
 of May, 1865: 
 
 On the 17th of May, 1865, I was relieved from com- 
 mand of the Middle Military Division, and assigned to the 
 command of all the territory west of the Mississippi, and 
 south of the Arkansas rivers, with directions ta report to Lieu- 
 tenant General Grant for instructions. 
 
 This territory embraced, at that time within its limits, 
 the only organized rebel army left in the Confederacy, which 
 was under the command of the rebel General E. Kirby Smith, 
 with Headquarters at Shreveport, or vicinity, in the State of 
 Louisiana. 
 
 My instructions from the Lieutenant General were : to 
 operate against this command; to break it up or destroy it. 
 For this purpose I was authorized to draw from Major Gen- 
 eral J". J. Reynolds, Commanding the Department of Arkan- 
 sas, 12,000 men, and from Major General L. R. S. Canby, Com- 
 manding Military Division of West Mississippi, 25,000 mt ; 
 together with the 4th and 25th Army Corps, and a column oi 
 from 8,000 to 9,000 cavahy to be collected from Louisiana, 
 West Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama. The aggregate 
 strength of this force was about 80,000 men. 
 
 On the 29th of May I assumed control of this new com- 
 mand, designating it the Military Division of the South-West 
 with Headquarters at New Orleans, Louisiana; and, at about 
 the same time received intelligence of the surrender of E. 
 Kirby Smith, through commissioners sent from him to Major 
 General Canby. This surrender was made, but bore upon its 
 face double-dealing on the part of the rebel commander, or 
 his agents, as the Texas troops declined to surrender, and had ^^ 
 
 disbanded to their homes, destroying their magazines, and car- 
 rying with them arms and ammunition from the different ar- 
 
senals; General Smith proceeded to Galveston, and from thence 
 escaped to Mexico, in violation of the agreement he had bound 
 himself to observe. This conduct on his part may have arisen 
 from the fact that his real object in offering to surrender was, 
 to get security for the Arkansas, Louisiana and Missouri troops 
 to return to their homes; knowing full well that the Texas 
 troops did not intend to surrender, and that most of them had 
 already gone to their homes, and that while they were destroy- 
 ing their arsenals and carrying home with them their arms, it 
 was their constant boast that they were not conquered and 
 that they would renew the fight at some future day. 
 
 Previous to the surrender, and in anticipation of the sue - 
 cessful escape of Jefferson Davis, and his probable arrival in 
 the Trans-Mississippi Department, it had been contemplated 
 to organize a column of about 15,000 Confederates at Mar- 
 shall, Texas, for the invasion of Mexico. This scheme failed, 
 perhaps from the capture of Mr. Davis; but while the main 
 scheme of sending the 15,000 men to Mexico failed, numerous 
 bands, squads and parties, numbering perhaps 3,000 or 4,000 
 men, crossed the Rio Grande into Mexico. 
 
 In view of this and the troubles of our sister Republic, 
 and taking into consideration the fact that all our military 
 projects, during the war, against Texas had been failures, and 
 that on this account the union people there had come to look 
 upon the Government as weak; it was determined to throw a 
 large force into that State and along the Rio Grande border. 
 The accomplishment of this purpose was accompanied with 
 great labor from various causes, but it was successfully achieved. 
 
 Among the first difficulties were the inadequacy of the 
 depot at this place for the requirements of the service to be 
 accomplished, the absence of all mercantile marine, and the 
 worthless character of most of the transportation held by the 
 Quartermaster's Department here, for the purpose of crossing 
 the Gulf, or entering the ports of Texas, the destruction of 
 aU the wharves at the ports in Texas, with the exception of 
 Galveston, by the Confederates, and the long line of commu- 
 nications to the points occupied in the interior, over which 
 supplies had to be sent; and last but not least, the great re- 
 luctance of the troops — officers and men — to continue for a 
 longer period in the service; they claiming that they had ful- 
 filled their contract with the government, and that it was but 
 just they should be mustered out. 
 
 The movement of the 13th Corps had been ordered before 
 
I reached New Orleans. One division of it under Major Gen- 
 eral F. J. Herron, proceeded to occupy the line of the Bed 
 River in Louisiana, and Marshall and Jefferson in North-East- 
 ern Texas; one division under Major General P. Steele, was 
 under orders for the Rio Grande line; the 3d Division, under 
 Major General J. A. Mower, was ordered to Galveston, from 
 thence to occupy the line of railroad from Galveston to Bren- 
 ham, while Major General Gordon Granger, who was in com- 
 mand of the corps, was assigned to general command in Texas. 
 
 While these movements of the 13th Corps were in pro- 
 gress, I was rapidly collecting at Alexandria, Louisiana, a col- 
 umn of cavalry about 4,500 strong, to be commanded by Ma- 
 jor General G. A. Custer, and another column at Shreveport, 
 Louisiana, about 5,000 strong, to be commanded by Major 
 General Wesley Merritt. These cavalry columns were collected 
 from different points in the States before mentioned, and were 
 transported up Red River by steamboats, under great diffi- 
 culties from the low stage of the water, and were organized 
 into divisions, equipped, supplied, and prepared to march for 
 their resi3ective points of destination. Merritt's Division to 
 march via Marshall to San Antonio, and Custer's Division via 
 Hempstead to Austin, Texas; the columns marching nearly 
 parallel to each other and something like a hundred miles ai3art. 
 
 These columns took with them a small pontoon train to 
 cross streams on the line of march, and for the additional ob- 
 ject of being able to cross the Rio Grande, should the gov- 
 ernment elect to send troops in that direction. 
 
 While the movements of the 13th Corps and cavah-y 
 were going on, the 25th Corps was embarked at City Point, 
 Va. , for the coast of Texas, to occupy the ijoints of Indiano- 
 la. Corpus Christi, Brazos Santiago, and the line of the Rio 
 Grande, most of the corps, however, being sent to the Rio 
 Grande line. Great trouble was experienced in the landing 
 of the troops of this corps, in consequence of the bad har- 
 bors in Texas, the great draft of the vessels employed as 
 transports, and the absence of suitable lighters to convey the 
 troops across the bars. 
 
 While the foregoing operations were in progress, the 4th 
 Army Corps, numbering about 10,000 men, with all its field 
 transportation arrived in New Orleans, having been ordered 
 to report to me for service in Texas, and was transported as 
 rai^idly as possible to Indianola, and from thence to Victoria, 
 and ordered to occiipy the line from that point to San Antonio. 
 
 V 
 
The troops on the line from Galveston to Austin were 
 supplied with comparative ease, as the bar at Galveston of- 
 fered no very difficult obstacle ; the wharves, although in bad 
 condition, still sufficed ; the railroad to Hempstead and Bren- 
 ham was in condition to transfer our necessary supj)lies, and 
 from Brenham to Austin there was a passable wagon road. 
 
 The landing of the troops at Indianola was difficult on 
 account of the dangerous bar, which had to be lightered over 
 from the transports, and in consequence of the destruction of 
 the wharves, the lightering had to be, in most cases, to the 
 shore in small boats. Then when- the troops were landed, 
 there was no water for a distance of eighteen miles, and they, 
 had to be hurried over this distance as soon as landed, and 
 from thence to Victoria, where timber and v/ater could be ob- 
 tained in abundance. Victoria is distant from Indianola about 
 thirty-five or forty miles. 
 
 After these difficulties had been overcome, it was found 
 that the country between Indianola and Victoria was not pas- 
 sable for wagons in the winter, and the railroad Irom Lavaca 
 to Victoria had to be repaired at much labor and some ex- 
 pense,*else the troops would have had to come back to their 
 supplies at Lavaca and Indianola, where there was no water. 
 I therefore ordered the railroad repaired, and after it was in 
 running order sold it to the comj)any, covering the cost of re- 
 pairs. The wharf at Indianola had -also to be built entire, 
 and when completed, sold to cover the expenses incurred. 
 
 But on account of these obstacles, and especially the diffi- 
 culty of crossing the outer bar, which is about twenty miles 
 from the landing, some of the transports had to return to 
 New Orleans or the mouth of the Mississippi Eiver, for water 
 for the troops and coal for the transports. 
 
 At Brazos Santiago the wharf had been destroyed, and 
 many of the same difficulties occurred here, and some of the 
 transports had also to return to the mouth of the Mississippi 
 Biver and New Orleans for suj)plics of coal and water. The 
 troops on this line were extended up the Bio Grande ^s far as 
 Laredo, and along this Frontier much the larger number of 
 troops were placed. A wharf had to be built at Brazos, and 
 at first the troops up the Bio Grande were supplied by small 
 steamers, which we had sent to that river, but the difficulties 
 of entrance at the mouth of the Bio Grande made this line 
 very dangerous and precarious for the supply of the troops, 
 as sometimes a transport could not cross the bar at the 
 
mouth of the river for nine or ten days. I therefore ordered 
 the buildiDg of a railroad from Brazos to White Eanche, on 
 the Rio Grande Eiver— a distance of eleven miles— and this 
 gave security to the supply of the troops. This railroad was 
 afterwards sold, at about forty thousand dollars ($40,000) over 
 the actual expense of construction. 
 
 All these difficulties in the movement of troops were 
 overcome, and in a short period of time. 
 
 The effect of this large movement of troops on the des- 
 tiny of Imperialism in Mexico, has not been fully apjireciated 
 by our people. It is, however, well known that while we were 
 struggling for Eepublican existence against organized rebel- 
 lion, and when nearly all the heads of the government in 
 Europe (except Russia) wished, and did believe that Repub- 
 licanism was not a success ; the Emperor of the Erench under- 
 took this bold expedition to subvert the Republic of Mexico. 
 There was no territorial question to be settled, and history 
 will not excuse the attempted annihilation of a nation on the 
 jjlea of non-payment of a million or two of debts due. There 
 was no good excuse for the attempted violation of rights, and 
 the history of Imperialism in Mexico is only the history of 
 the buccaneer Morgan, on a more extended scale, who at one 
 time cax^tured and held Panama, on the Isthmus, until he 
 could hold it no longer. When this movement of our 
 troops to Texas and the Rio Grande took place, we found the 
 line of that river and aU Northern Mexico in the hands of 
 Imperialism — a government which collected no taxes, had no 
 civil organization, and supported its partizans, soldiers 
 and civillians, by levying contributions on the poor inhabi- 
 tants. But the appearance of our troops, and the knowledge 
 that friends were on the border, went like electricity to the 
 homes and hearts of the Mexican people. The rebels who-, 
 had escaped from our country received no sympathy, and in 
 less than a year, this hardy people, without money, without 
 arms and munitions of war, and without supplies, have re- 
 captured Matamoras, Camargo, Presidio de Rio Grande, Lam- 
 pissas, Monterey, Saltillo, Monclora, Durango, Chihuahua, 
 and in fact hold nearly all the country, X3utting the invaders 
 on the defensive,and confining them to the Valley of Mexico, 
 with a fair prospect of their speedy extermination. 
 
 I have felt much interest in this event, because I have al- 
 ways believed that the occupation of Mexico was a part of the 
 rebellion, and knowing that the contest in our own country 
 was for the vindication of' Republicanism;. I did not think 
 
that tliat vindication would be complete until Maximilian was 
 compelled to leave. 
 
 The cours3 taken by nearly every newspaper in the lately 
 rebellious States was sympathy for Maximilian, and the senti-* 
 ment of a large portion of the population was likewise ; and 
 so determined was this on the part of thousands of adventur- 
 ers, that the Cordova emigi'ation scheme was gotten up, 
 which had for its object the formation of a Maximillian-Amer- 
 ican party, comjDOsed of confederates entertaining antix)athy 
 toward our government. Many of these having no means 
 would have drifted into the army of Maximilian. I had to 
 take strong grounds against this emigration, and filially broke 
 it up, by refusing to permit emigrants to embark from the 
 seax:)orts within the limits of my command. 
 
 The effect of the presence of our troops in Texas and on 
 the Rio Grande, as alluded to heretofore, on the destiny of 
 Imperialism, was great. It had not a friend among the offi- 
 cers or men from the highest to the lowest grade, and the ef- 
 fect was dei^ressing in the extreme. So much so, that I am 
 inclined to believe that had a demand been made for the with- 
 drawal of the Imperial troop'^, on the ground that the inva- 
 sion of Mexico was a part of the rebellion, it would have 
 been granted, and the miseries of that country for the last 
 year avoided. 
 
 While the Imperial troops held the line of the Rio Grande 
 the strictest neutrality was preserved. Since they were driv- 
 en away, the same honorable neutrality has been preserved to- 
 wards the Liberal government. 
 
 The number of troops sent to Texas was about 52,000. 
 Shortly after they had arrived and become samcwhat settled, 
 orders came for the muster-out of about 47,000 of this force, 
 and the muster-out was carried on gradually and in accord- 
 ance with our ability to bring them back, so that the move- 
 ment may be considered as equal to a continuous movement 
 of over 90,000 men over the most difficult line of operations 
 which we have in the country. I make these remarks because 
 I was under the impression at one time, that the Quartermas- 
 ter General did not fully understand the magnitude of the 
 movement, or the natural obstacles in the way of its accom- 
 plishment, and we had to struggle for six months without 
 funds, on the plea that the Brazos railroad was constructed 
 without authority, in consequence the public service was 
 
made to suffer by the denial of funds. I believe the Quar- 
 termaster General was influenced in this act by the represen- 
 tations of incompetent Inspectors sent out to make reports. 
 
 The condition of civil affairs in Texas was anomalous, 
 singular, and unsatisfactory. I found the Provisional Gov- 
 ernor, backed by a small portion of the iDopulation, had Jor 
 his standard of loyalty "Abhorrence for the Eebellion and 
 glory in its defeat." While his successor, as actual Govern- 
 or had for his standard of loyalty ' 'Pride in Eebellion ; that 
 it was a righteous but lost cause, being overpowered by the 
 Federal forces. " Both of these representatives of the civil law, 
 entertaining opposite standards for the loyalty of their sub- 
 jects, I was required to support, and did it to the best of my 
 abilty, but it has been embarrassing in the extreme. 
 
 Governor Hamilton, the Provisional Governor, was clam- 
 orous for more troops, and in several communications to me 
 asserted that the civil law could not be carried out ; that 
 freedmen would be killed and Union men driven from the 
 State without military support, which I gave whenever it 
 was possible. Governor Thockmorton, the present Governor, 
 wants all the troops moved from the settled portions of the 
 State, asserting that the civil law was all right, that justice 
 would be done to freedmen, Union men, and to our soldiers 
 in the courts. But justice is not done. To give you an in- 
 stance of this: two soldiers were shot at Brenham, Texas, 
 about two months ago, they were unarmed and offered no 
 provocation; the Grand Jury could find no bill against their 
 would-be-assassins, but, found a bill against Brevet Major 
 Smith, ITtli Infantr}^ for burglary, because he broke into the 
 house of some citizen in his attempt to arrest those men. 
 
 My own opinion is that the trial of a white man for the 
 murder of a f reedman in Texas, would be a farce, and in mak- 
 ing this statement, I make it because truth compels me, and 
 for no other reason. 
 
 During the last sis months Indian dei^redations have taken 
 place on the remote frontier. Their extent is not defined as 
 yet, but they are not very alarming, and I think the Govern- 
 or has, to some extent, been influenced by exaggerated re- 
 ports, gotten up in some instances, by frontier people, to get 
 a market for their produce, and in other instances by army 
 contractors to make money. 
 
 I have ordered two regiments of cavalry to the frontier, 
 
s 
 
 and placed a regiment of infantry at Austin, to be moved if 
 necessary. 
 
 It is strange that over a white man killed by Indians on 
 an extensive frontier, the greatest excitement will take place ; 
 but over the killing of many fieedmen in the settlements, 
 nothing is done. I cannot help but see this, and I cannot 
 help but tell it to my superiors, no matter how unpleasant it 
 may be to the authorities of Texas. 
 
 I will establish the frontier posts in Texas in the early 
 spring. It was not done heretofore on account of having 
 no available regular troops, and to have attempted it with vol- 
 unteer troops, desirous of returning to their homes, would 
 have involved an expense, which I did not like to put upon 
 the Government. 
 
 In Louisana, there was about as much, if not more anom- 
 aly in civil affairs, than in Texas. 
 
 Our depot was in New Orleans, which from its geograph- 
 ical position, became the main de^Dot of the Gulf States, and 
 in fact, the whole of the South-West. This place hail neces- 
 sarily been the Headquarters of superior commanders, and as 
 many of them appeared to have more ability in civil than in 
 military affairs, they left the results of that ability, to be set- 
 tled by myself and the subordinate officers of my command. 
 Questions and claims, semi-military and semi-civil, of every 
 possible phase, and so numerous and complicated, that after 
 a fair examination, I think that it will require one officer and 
 ten clerks for over twelve months, to brief and systematise 
 what is yet left. 
 
 The settlement of such of those claims as have already 
 come up, has been a dead weight upon the legitimate milita- 
 ry duties of my command. Then there was the accumulation 
 at this place of material of war of every possible character, 
 from ocean steamships, down to pickaxes and spades, the dis- 
 position of which gave great labor, but by keeping steadily 
 at work, and by the good judgment of subordinate command- 
 ers and staff officers of the different bureaux, this depot is 
 now reduced to the j^resent wants of the service. 
 
 At the time of my arrival at New Orleans, as before al- 
 luded to, the civil affairs were much' mixed up. Governor J. 
 Madison Wells was legitimately holding the position of Gov- 
 ernor, but a new election was to occur in the summer or fall, 
 and although from the antecedents of the Governor, who 
 
9 
 
 supported the Federal authority, I had reason to expect good 
 judgment, still, either on account of the approaching election 
 (in which he was a candidate for re-election] or because he 
 thought it best, he was filhng a number of vacancies in offices 
 throughout the State by returned Confederates. I did not 
 know this, as it was none of my business, until I learned it 
 by the constant appeals made to me by men who were turued 
 out to give place to new comers, whom they did not think de- 
 serving; and, I only speak of it now, because it led after- 
 wards to bitterness and the shedding of blood in which the 
 military were to some extent involved. 
 
 The Governor was re-elected and the Legislature met, 
 but it was found that the Governor had one will and the Leg- 
 islature had another; each hated the other and trouble was 
 sure to come. 
 
 Not only was the Legislatui-e in antagonism Avitli the Gov- 
 ernor, but all, or nearly all the subordinate civil authorities 
 in the State were against Lim. Many of these he had him- 
 self appointed. Then the Governor commenced making ap- 
 peals to the military authorities to support him; and when it 
 Avas proper and legitimate to serve the ends of justice, such 
 support was given. But when it was to satisfy partizan or 
 political purposes it was refused, and the military assumed 
 the position that politics Avas outside of the profession, and 
 that it could not be called upon legitimately, to serve the 
 interests of either side. This bitter political feeling finally 
 culminated in the massacre of the 30th Jnly, 1866. I have 
 thought that had I been in the city this slaughter might have 
 been avoided; but, I did not exi^ect it to occur, and was led to 
 this belief by a conversation, about the 1st of June, held with 
 Judge Durrell, who was the President of the Louisana Con- 
 vention of 1861:, and who told me that he would decline to 
 call it together. He asked if it could have military sup^Dort, 
 I said it could not; that I would not allow the military to be 
 used for party purposes; but that if the parties in the State 
 came into collision, it would be my duty to maintain the j^eace 
 of the country, in as much as I had believed for some time 
 past that the safety of life and property did not rest with the 
 civil authorities, when there was any great disturbing cause. 
 
 In Florida there were no political issues involving the 
 military authorities, although much annoyance occasionally 
 came from arrests of officers and soldiers for acts allcmHl to 
 
10 V 
 
 have been committed during the rebellion. The jjeople of 
 Florida appeared to realize the fact that it would not make 
 much difference to them what party was in j)ower, and that 
 their best interest was to take off their coats and go to work 
 to repair the disaster of the rebellion. 
 
 On the 27th of June, 1865, the temi^orary Military Di- 
 visioj] of the South -West was abolished by the creation of the 
 Military Divison of the Gulf, which included the Dei3art- 
 ment of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida. These 
 departments were respectively commanded by Major Gen- 
 erals Wright, Canby, Slocum, and Foster. 
 
 On October 7, 1865, the Dejaartment of Mississip^Di was 
 transferred to the Military Division of the Tennessee. 
 
 On May 22, 1866, Major General Canby having been or- 
 dcxed to Washington, was succeeded by Brevet Major Gen- 
 eral A. Baiidin the command of the Department of Louisiana. 
 I am, Generfd, 
 
 Very respectfully. 
 
 Your obedient seu^ant, 
 
 Major General U. S. A. 
 
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