CI. (o E 713 / .812 -^ C~5 Copy 1 >? HAWAIIAN ANNEXATION. The Joint Resolution— An unconstitutional usurpation of the prerogativo of the President of the United States and Senate as the treaty-making power. SPEECH HON. A. O. BACON, OF GEORGIA, IN THE SENATE OE THE UNITED STATES, Monday, June 20, 1893. WAtJMIiNOrO.M. 1898. .T) j(^ 72 SPEECH OF HON. A. 0. BACON. The Senate having under consideration the joint resolution (H. Res. 259) to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States- Mr. BACON said: Mr. President: I presume it will be recos-nized by all that there can be no more important question than this before the coun- try to-day. It is not simply the question of the annexation of a very small piece of territory, but, considered with reference to the merits of the case, it is one which involves the utter revolution of the practice and traditions of our Government with reference to its benefits to the people and the obligations which it lavs upon them. It is not my purpose at this time to discuss the general merits of this proposition. I am inclined to address the Senate at this time because the particular branch of the discussion to which I shall direct my attention is one which goes to the root of the matter and which ought, if my contention is correct, to control the action of the Senate. Before proceeding with it, I think, however, I may be excused for remarking that certainly this is a strange presentation to the country, that in a matter of such gravity, that in a matter of such wide-reaching importance, the advocates of the measure have nothing to say. Ordinarily in measiires of importance which come from the Foreign Relations Committee we have a report. In this instance the committee have not even honored us with a report. Ordinarily not only do we have a report, but we have from the chairman of that committee or some member representing the committee an elaborate presentation of the reasons why the legis- lation is recommended by that committee. But here we have neither report nor presentation. We have simply presented to tlie Senate a bill which has been passed by the Houss", and witliout re- port and without discussion those who hold to the allirmative ask the Senate to act. It is as if, confident of a majority, they should say, "We propose to do thus and so, right or wrong, and give no reason for it; and what are you going to do about it?' That is the attitude which the committee occupy in coming before tlie Senate. Mr. President, as I stated, it is not my purpose to discuss the general merits of the proposition to annex the islands of Hawaii, certainly not at this time; but I propose to present to the Senate a in-oposition and to ask that they may give me their attention while I discuss it, which, if it be true, as 1 have previously said, ought to control the action of the Senate and make them say that they will not pass the bill which the House lias sent to us. 3505 3 The proposition which I propose to discuss is that a measure which provides for the annexation of foreign territory is neces- earilv. essentially, the subject-matter of a treaty, and that the as- sumption of the House of Representatives in the passapre of the bill, and tlie proiiosition on tiie part of the Foreign Relations Committee that the Senate shall pass the bill, is utterly without warrant in the Constitution. I\rr. President, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Teller] saj's that he would be very glad to vote on this question to-day; that his mind is made up." The Senator from Colorado is one of the Senators whom I am anxious to speak to to-day, not because I be- lieve 1 can change his mind or his opinion on the general merits of this question ."but because I desire to ask him and all Senators, especially those who are lawyers, to consider the question whether or not they have the right, under their constitutional obligations, to vote for this resolution, however much they may favor the an- nexation of Hawaii. Mr. TELLER. Will the Senator permit me to answer that Mr. BACON. I beg that the Senator will hear me before he answers. Mr. TELLER. I want to say that I will hear the Senator, but the Senator is not to understand that I have not myself considered this question verv carefully. J will hear the Senator, of course. Mr. BACON. "Mr. President, of course I do not presume that the Senator from Colorado had not considered this question, but we are here for the purpose of interchanging views. I have great confidence in the Senator from Colorado, and am gratified by the fact that I seldom differ from him, and I shall be more than grati- fied if we can get together upon this question. I assume that Senators will not vote for a resolution if they can be satisfied that it is unconstitutional. I assume that they will not vote for an unconstitutional resolution which directly impairs and strikes down one of the highest prerogatives of the Senate; and it is to that question that I propose to address myself to-day and upon which 1 am extremely anxious to have the hearing of Sena- tors who favor the annexation of Hawaii. The proposition which I had stated before the interruption was this: That a joint resolution for the annexation of foreign terri- tory was necessarilv and essentially the subject-matter of a treaty, and that it could not bo accomplished legally and constitutionally by a statute or joint resolution. If Hawaii is to be annexed, it ought certainly to be annexed by a constitutional method: and if by a constitutional method it can not be annexed, no Senator ought to desire its annexation sufficiently to induce him to give his support to an unconstitutional measure. I trust, Mr. President, that the time has not come when a Sen- ator can not appeal with confidence to his fellow-Senators in op- position to a measure on the ground that it is unconstitutional. It matters not how important it may be that Hawaii should be annexed, it matters not how valuable it may be. it will be too costly if its price is the violation of a great fundamental provision of the Constitution of the United States. ]Mr. President, it is a painful fact that not only people at large, but officials are losing to some extent the reverence which they ought to have for constitutional obligations. It is a matter of a 3oaj smile ^Mtll somo v/heu yon oppose a measure on the ground that It s unconstitutional, and I confess that I have been pluned vheu I have heard, as 1 have heard in this Chamber, learned and dis- tinguished Seimtors say tliat they would approve and applaud the action of the President of the United States if he Sou d seize Hawaii and run up upon it the flag of the United States, and take ESSr ""' ^'' property of the United States 'as a wa? I say I have been pained when I have heard that as I have qSSnv^'" this Chamber from very learned and very distinguished Jf +1 TT ' -^ ? L '^'''T ^^"' '"^^"^ than gratified that the President ot the United Stateshas notsutiered himself to be guided bvsmh too ish and sucn unwise counsels. If he had done %o, every lover o. his country must have been grieved that such a blow had been stricken at the integrity of the Constitution Mr. President, it surprises me that I even liave to mention such fin^feTwnr"^ ^f '^ '^? P^^^^^^*^^^* of the United Stages can ?S time ot war, or at any other time, without the action of Congress in the performance of its constitutional functions, take possession ot the terntory of a friendly power, proclaim it as the territory of the Lmted States, run the flag of the United States up over it S the insignia of its power and its dominion-if he can do so in oiie case, he can do so in an v. If the President of the United States can do it in the case of Hawaii, he can with equal propriety and legality do it in the case o. Jamaica, and I repeat that 1 am more than gratified. althoiS my apprehensions were aroused by the source from which tlurse intimations came, that the President of the United States has not seen proper to listen to their unwise counsels And 3-et, Mr President, if my view of this question is correct the President of the United States would have as mnch powJi to take possession of the Island of Hawaii bv a proclamation as would the Congress of the United States have the Vowe" to gain posses sion of It by a .lo.nt resolution of the two Houses. The po^?el s of the executive department and the legislative department are as di.stinctly divided the one from the other as are the powers of thi judicial department and the legislative department 1 here are tAvo kinds of law which are recognized" bv the Consti- tution of the United States and which are prmnd^d for bv the Con- stitution of the United States, and each of these IdncL^^ofhiw^a termed m the Constitution of the United States the supivn r la v of the land. One class of these laws is statute law. and it is i r^ vided tha statute law shall be enacted by Congress: that sta u£ law shall be 111 ade by a majority vote of the House of Re presen a tWiM;f.° *'^' 1'"^^"' ^'^^^\^^ approval of the President or bv the Kvn l\V,T^^\''' %""!? ""V'^ disapproval of the President, tZiff- i°'*'"'^'.-''?^''ptt^''^ ^^^"•'''^ ot^' Hepresontativesand the twotlnrds vote ot the Senate, overriding his veto and that law when made, is dec-lared by the Constitut];.n of the tf t >a sS JnH^*^Vl?^'r-^'';\"^t^^'='"^^- I" the same way the cS tilt o of the United States declares that there are other laws which are also .supreme, and tliose laws arc made as 1 reaties The Sho n;;.''of .V^'^^^"'''^ S*^^^*-^^ "^ the same section declares both ot the^e as the supreme law of the land tint, f "^''■*'"'*' ^''"V* "t the United States in construing the ,iues- t on of supremacy has ruled that each is supremo. It has ruled that a treaty may be nullified by a statute anil that a statute may 6 be nullified by a, treaty, and tliat where they come in conflict the question of the later is the one invoked to determine which shall prevail. As to those two classes of law, each one of them supremo, there is provided in the Constitution an entirely distinct method by which they may be enacted or mjfde. I have stated the manner in which the statute law is made. Now, in an en- tirely different manner, the Constitution of the United States de- clares how a treaty, which is also a supreme law, shall be made. It declares that a treaty must be made by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate present. I am not quoting literally, but stating it sub- stantiallv. 1 ask the attention of Senators to this most marked provision in the Constitution of the United States and the two distinct classes of law, each of them declared by the Constitution to be supreme, each of them declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in con- struing that provision to be equally supreme with the other, which are made and enacted in specific ways in the manner pointed out in the Constitution, one totally different from the other. Is that provision of the Constitution a vital principle? Does it mean any- thing? Is it possible that the power which is clothed by the Con- stitution with the authority to make one class of laws can make the other class of laws? Is it possible that the power which is conferred upon the Con- gress of the United States, the lawmaking power, the Senate and the House, with the approval of the President, can be used to make that other supreme law which the Constitution says shall be made in a different way, to wit, by the President, with the ad- vice and consent of the Senate? If it is possible for the House of Representatives and the Senate and the President, acting in the lawmaking capacity, and known generally in the Constitution as Congress, can make a treaty, and in so making it make it the supreme law of the land, then tliis joint resolution is. constitu- tional. But if it be true that when the Constitution devolved upon the Pre=^ident and the Senate the power to make treaties it denied to the Congress of the United States the right to make treaties, then the joint resolution is necessarily unconstitutional, as I shall endeavor to show. JMr. Pre^dent, the Constitution gives to the President the power to appoint all officers of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. If Congress can by statute make a treaty, why may it not by a statute make an ambassador or a chief justice or a general of the Army? Mr. President, there are two ways in which the provision in the Constitution conferring upon 'the President of the United States and the Senate the power to make treaties can be absolutely nullified. One is the manner I have suggested, by Congress openly and boldly assuming to make a treaty; and if constitutional re- strictions are not to be respected, if no man is bound by the Con- stitution, if a Senator or a Representative, because forsooth he inay be in the majority can effect his purpose by overriding the Constitution and disregarding it, then that is the simplest way to do it. There is still another way in which this provision in the Constitution can be nullified, and that is by undertaking to put into the form of a statute that which in reality is a treaty. Now, one method is just as effective as the other, and either method is as absolutely illegal as the other. arm Before goinj? further in that line of argument, in order that I may^have the attention of Senators and that thev may not think there is an answer which I do not recognize. I desire to say that I of course fully understand the argument which is made in reply that the State of Texas was admitted in tliis way. I can not stop to interrupt the thread of the argument at the present point to show that that reply is not a good one. Not to elaborate it fur- ther, I will merely state that it is the distinction between the au- thority of Congress to admit a State, to do wiiich it is given the power in words in the Constitution, and the power to ac(ii;ire for- eign territory not for the purpose of making it a State, which, as I shall endeavor to show, is essentialh'and necessarily the subject- matter of treat}- between two governments. Mr. President, when the framers of the Constitution put the word "treaties" into the Constitution without any other defining words or without any limitation, is it to be supposed for a moment that they did not recognize the fact that the term "treaties" had a distinct, legitimate, necessary, well-understood meaning? Is it to be supposed that they for one moment contemplated that when the question came up whether a certain measure which involved a negotiation and agreement between this country and another should l,e accomplished in the way it provided, through a treaty by the President and the Senate, or whether it should be remitted to Congress, that the question of the form of the measure would control? Is it to be supposed for a moment that they supposed that that which is essentially a treaty, and which they had provided should be made only by tlie President and the Senate, would be by any species of legislative legerdemain converted into the form of a statute, and another power or department of the Government, which had had distinct powers conferred ujion it and which liad been denied this power, would usurp it and that its usurpation would be recognized? Mr. ELKINS. Will the Senator from Georgia allow me to in- terrupt him? Mr. BACON. Certainly. Mr. ELKINS. Does the Senator admit now that Congress can admit a State into the Union? Mr. BACON. Undoiibtedlv. Mr. ELKINS. And it adm'itted Texas? Mr. BACON. Yes; but I will say to the Senator that I am com- ing to the distinct discussion of that branch of the case. Mr. ELKINS. I merely want to put this (luestion Mr. BACON. And I would be very glad if the Senator would pretermit the question until I reach that ])oint, and I shall be very happy at that time to take it up. I am now discussing an- other line. I am coming to the question of tiie power to admit States, and that will be the time for the {jucstion. Mx". ELKINS. Having it in mind now, I sliould like to ask why, if it can admit a State, it can not admit anything less than a State; something that is not a State? Mr. BACON. I am coming to that, and would be very glad if the Senator would repeat his question if I do not answer it before I get through, because 1 do the Senator the justice to say tliat I believe if I can possibly satisfy him of tlio unconstitutionality of the joint resolution lie will not vote for it, however much he may desire the anne.xatiou of Hawaii. It is true I am very much dis- 3oU5 8 courap;ed by the fact that the Senator said to me, in private con- versation, when I asked him if he was bound by the Constitution, yes, as he interpreted it. JMr. ELKINiS. No; now tell the v.-hole of it. I beg the Sena- tor's pardoji. I said as the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted it and as I interpreted it. Mr. BACON. Very well. Mr. ELKINS. And not as the Senator interpreted it. Mr. TELLER. Will the Senator from Georgia allow me? Mr. BACON. Let me answer the Senator from West Virginia first. If the Senator from West Virginia will stand to that prop- osition, I Avill jjromise to show him a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which says that the United States Grov- emnient has no right— I do not go so far as the Supreme Court go in this particTilar, and I am merely stating this for the benefit of the Senator from West Virginia— to annex territory which it does not intend to make into a State, and Senators themselves say they do not intend to make a State of Hawaii. Mr. ELKINS. You can not state what will be the intention of the Government a hundred years from now. Mr. BACON. I am not puttmg it on that ground at all. Now I yield to the Senator from Colorado. Mr. TELLEE. The position of the Senator from West Virginia is good Democratic doctrine, a doctrine which old Jackson pressed on the country with great force, that every Senator and every Representativecould construe the Constitution as he understood it. Mr. BACON. Of course. Mr. TELLER. And it was his duty not to look to the Supreme Court of the United States, but to hisown judgment and conscience in these matters. Mr. BACON. I am perfectly satisfied if that shall be the rule. I was discouraged by the fact that the manner of the reply of the Senator from West Virginia indicated that he would not be con- trolled by what some of the more distinctive lawyer members of the Senate might consider to be the law. He was going to take it into his own hands. But to return, I am coming to a discussion of the question, to which I ask the attention of Senators, as to what the framers of the Constitution meant when they said "treaties" and what they must necessarily have meant. I asked the question whether it was possible that the framers of the Constitution when they imt the word "'treaties" into the Constitution in this connection under- stood that it simply meant an agreement or a negotiation piit in a certain form, and that if it were not put in that certain form, it could be refined away and the exercise of the function could be usurped by Congress which had been denied the right to make a treaty. I had asked that question when the Senator from West Virginia interrupted me. Now, Mr. President, has the word " treaty " a definite, well-fixed meaning? Is a treaty only that which is put in the form of a treaty as we usually see it when submitted to the Senate on the part of the President, or does a treaty mean a certain thing regardless of the form? I say the latter. The distinction between a statute and a treaty does not depend on the form. A statute may be in various forms. It may be in the ordinary form of a statute or in the form of a joint resolution. One has the same effect as the other. A treaty dejiends for the fact that it is a treaty according to the sub- stance of it and what it proposes to accomplish. 3505 Now, a statute is this: A statute is a rule of conduct laid down by the legislative department, which has its effect upon all of those within the jurisdiction. In other words, a statute passed by the Congress of the United States is obligatory upon every person who is a citizen of the United States or a resident therein. A statute can not go outside the jurisdiction of the United States and be binding upon the subjects of another power. It takes the consent of the subjects of the other power, speaking or giving their con- gent through their duly authorized government, to be bound by a certain thing which is enacted in this country; and therein comes the necessity for a treaty. A treaty is that which is binding upon the people of two coun- tries by mutual agreement that it shall be binding upon the two countries. A treaty is bimling on two countries because the au- thority in each country undertakes that it shall be binding in its particular country, and that is the essential element and feature of a treaty, that it is binding on two countries because the au- thority wliich makes it binding is the particular authority in each country, not having a general authority over both. If it were practicable for a statute to be made obligatory upon the citizens of another country, there would be no need of a treaty. We could simply enact what we wanted, and the people in the other countrv would have to obey. But as we can not do it, we have to invoke the consent of the people or the authority in that other country that they will also be bound by the same law, and that makes a treaty. Now, Mr. President, I repeat possibly, but I desire to state it m another shape, that the distinction between a treaty and a statute is this: The statute affects only the people within the jurisdiction of the authority by Avhich it is enacted. There is no consent re- quired on the part of those who are subject to such a statute. It is made obligatory upon them by the authority of those who enact it. A treaty, on the other hand, is something which involves nego- tiation with another country. It requires the consent of the duly authorized department in this GoYernment, and it also requires that they shall negotiate and obtain the consent of the power in the other Government. This is stated with very great clearness in a report made by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1844—1 have forgotten the number of the Congress— when it had under consideration the Texas resolutions. I will read it. This is a definition of a treaty. I read from Senate Docu- ments, volume 3, 1844 and 1845. It is broken up so that the pages can not be told, as the documents are bound together, but it is Document No. 79, page 5 thereof; not the page of the volume. But let it be rememberecl And I ask the attention of Senators now to this definition of a treat}' — on the other liand, that iilthough this treaty only arts for other powers and in the sini,'ular sphere of exterior concerns, within this sphere no ottior power has privileso to intrude; the domain is all its own; in a property ex- clusive. If the affair to bo accomplished bo exterior and requiro the inter- vention of compact to accomplish it, hero with the treaty-making power is the office, and sole office, to accomplish it. No other power has privilege to touch. I do not know whether or not I make my distinction clear, but the framers of the Constitution bad in view certain actions by this Government when they set up a distinct and separate de- partment of Government for the making of treaties and when 3505 10 they conferred upon that department exclusive power to make treaties; and I sng.u;est and urge as the crucial feature in this con- sideration tiiat tlie framers of the Constitution necessarily, when they said that the President sliould have the power to make trea- ties", with tlie consent of the Senate, meant to put within that de- partment the power to conduct all negotiations between this countr}^ and another country, and to come to any agreement with that other country as to what should bo a rule of conduct between them. If that be true, necessarily everything which is of that nature, everything which can be that and nothing else, iniist be the sub- ject-matter of a treaty. If not, as I have said before, the framers of the Constitution made a great mistake when they unnecessarily jiut into the Constitution this machinery by which the power was conferred upon the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of tlie Senate, to make treaties. Mr. President, I said that it was within the power of Congress to nullify this provision of the Constitution in two ways, either by directly making a treaty witli another foreign Government or by putting into the shape of a statute that which in reality is a treaty. Let me illustrate as to the latter, because that is what is attempted to be done here now. The attempt here is to make a treaty by statute. The treaty, as I understand it, which was pro- posed and negotiated by the President of the United States with the authority of Hawaii, and all the reports in connection with it have been made public, so that I can with propriety speak of them liere. A treaty was negotiated between the President of the United States and the Hawaiian Government. Why did the President of the United States and the Hawaiian Government negotiate a treaty for the annexation of those islands? I hope Senators who are considering this question and who propose to answer it will consider this particular featui-e of it. Why did the President of the United States negotiate with the Hawaiian Government by means of a treaty for the annexation of those islands except that the President of the United States and the authorities of the Hawaiian Islands recognized that it was the proper subject- matter of a treaty? Why did the Senate of the United States, when the President submitted the treaty here, undertake to consider it and to give its consent to the treaty which had been negotiated between the President of the United States and the Hawaiian authorities? Why was it that it did not return it to the President and say "This is not the subject-matter of a treaty, and we should not be asked for our advice or consent?" Simply because of the fact that the Senate of the United States, without exception, regard- less of what the opinion of any Senator might bo on the merits, recognized that it was the proper subject-matter of a treaty. Aside from this direct recognition it comes within the general definition of that which must be a treaty. It is to accomplish something which can not be accomplished by the unaided act of the United States. It is to accomplish something which repiires uot only the consent of the United States, but the consent of Hawaii, a7id therefore must be in its essence and in its character a treaty. And yet. Mr. President, as I have said, in the joint res- olution now bolore the Senate there is an effort made to nullify this provision in the Constitution in the second of the methods ai05 11 which I suggested, to wit. in the method of putting in the form of a statute that which of necessity can be nothing else but the subject-matter of a treaty. Mr. WHITE. If the Senator from Georgia will permit me, in line with the point he is making, it may be that the ti-eaty was suggested because of the provision of the Hawaiian constitution, found in the thirty-second article of that instrument, which pro- vides specifically for annexation to the United States by treaty, which treaty, of course, has never been made. Mr. BACON. I understand that. I have no doubt that point will be fully brought out by the Senators who discuss the merits of the question. What is it that the House of Representatives has done? And I say the House of Representatives, not in any spirit of criticism of it particularly, because the Senate, through its Foreign Relations Committee, had previously proposed the same thing. Here was the case of a treaty, which was not only recognized "by both par- ties as a treaty and acted upon by both parties as a treaty, but which, in its essence, must of necessity be a treaty, which was practically abandoned in the Senate for the reason that in the manner and the method pointed out by the Constitution it could not be made law. The framers of the Constitution, in their wis- dom, had provided that the Pi-esident of the United States should make a treaty if tvv^o-thirds of the Senators present concurred in it. Now, whether wise or unwise, that is the law. If only a ma- jority concur, the treaty can not be made. Therefore the effect of the failure in the Senate to ratify that treaty was the same as the failure of an attempted passage of a statute law. The friends of annexation, seeing that it was impossible to make this treaty in the manner pointed out by the Constitution, attempted then to nullify the provision in the Constitution by putting that treaty in the form of a statute, and here we have embodied the provisions of the treaty in the joint resolution which comes to us from the House. I will state the object I have in calling attention to this point. It is perfectly within the power of Congress— and when I speak of Congress in this discussion I mean the lawmaking power— if it has a majority in each House, if it can pursue the method legally which is sought to be pursued here, it is perfectly within the power of Congress not only to nullify and destroy that provision in the Federal Constitution, but to effect by statute any treaty that can not command a two-thirds vote in the Senate. Mr. TELLER. I should like to ask the Senator if he thinks there is any treaty that we can not annul by a direct act of Con- gress? Mr. BACON. I do not. I have so stated already. But I ask the learned Senator Mr. TELLER. Then the legislative power can not be inferior to the treaty-making power. Mr. BACON. The learned Senator has certainly not read the decisions of the Supreme Court on this subject. Mr. TELLER. I have. Mr. BACON. The law on the subject is not in doubt. I have stated it already. The Senator probably did not hear it when I first began. Mr. TELLER. Yes, I did. Mr. BACON. It was that the Supreme Court have decided 3o0o 12 that a treaty and a statute were each supreme, and tbat when they came in conflict the latter woiild prevail as being of a later date; in other words, that a statute may be set aside by a treaty, and a treaty may be set aside bj^ a statute. Mr. TELLER. I ask the Senator if that is not simply a recog- nition of the statutory right to annul a treaty. We have done that repeatedly. It has been discussed here for daj's. Mr. EJAC'ON. Nobody disputes that. And in the same way a statute can be annulled by a treaty. Mr. TELLER. I recall that the Senator from Oregon not now here. Mr. Mitchell, made perhaps a lialf day's argument on that subject to show by the authorities and by argument the absolute control of the legislative department over any treaty that might be made. Mr. BACON. The Senator and myself are not differing upon that point. I had announced that before he interru[)ted ine. I say that a treaty may be annulled by a statute, and I say also that a statute may be annulled by a treaty. Now, the point I want to call the Senator's attention to is that wliile a statute has the power to annul a treaty, and while a treaty has the power to annul a statute, neither one of them has the power to usurp the functions of the other. Let the Senator point out, if he can. any authority for that. In other words, while a treaty made by the President and Senate can be annulled by an act of Congress, that does not imply that the treaty itself can be made by act of Congress. They are two very different things. It can set the treaty aside, but it can not create a treaty. Mr. TELLER. That is right. Mr. BACON. That is right, the Senator says, and I am glad that we have gotten now on common ground." It can annul, it can destroy, but it can not create. Now, the point I want to call the attention of the Senator and the attention of the Senate to is, that if the joint resolution under consideration is constitutional, it is within the power of Congress by such a joint resolution to create a treaty. Mr. TELLER. There is just where the contention come? in. Mr. BACON. Of course; and I want to try to prove it, if the Senator will permit me. Mr. TELLER. I say it is no assertion of the treaty-making power, but clearly the legislative power. I want to call the attention of the Senator to another point, if he will allow me. He has spoken of this treaty not having been ratified by the Senate. He must remember very well that when the attempt was made to annex Texas to this country it absolutely failed. The Senate voted the treaty down and declared that they would not have the treaty. Mr. BACON. I am coming to that. I will read to the Sena- tor all about that before I get thi-ough. Mr. WHITE. Congress did not rely upon a treaty. They did not consider it to be of any etl'ect. l\Ir. TELLER. Of course; they voted it down. Mr. WHITE. You rely upon the treat}' here. Mr. TELLER. We do not. Mr. BACON. 1 hope I may have the judicial ear of the Senator, not his controversial ear. I hope I may have the judicial ear of the Senator, because I wish to suggest, so far as I ani able, a logical presentation of this matter. The Senator comes to the conclusion 13 with me that while Congress in its lawmaking capacity may de- stroy a treaty, it can not make a treaty. The Senator admits ithati. Mr. TELLER. I do not want the Senator to understand that he has first put that idea in my mind. Mr. BACON. Oh, no; by no means. Mr. TELLER. I have not come to that conclusion from any- thmg in the Senator's argument. That is one of the things that I think every ordinary lawyer in this body would recognize. Mr. BACON. Well, I am not claiming any very great origi- nality m this matter, I am simply trying to suggest a view of it, and, I hope, with becoming modesty; and I am not assuming to be suggesting anything which the Senator did not know before. I am sorry, I say, that there is this contraversial spirit, because I was m hopes we might have a judicial consideration of this ques- tion. If, therefore, not by reason of my argument, but by reason of a fundamental principle which every ordinary lawyer recog- nizes, it be true that Congress can not by statute make a treaty, then if this procedure is one by which Congress does make a treaty there is no answer to the proposition that it is unconstitutional. I propose to show that by this process Congress does make a treaty; and when Congress assumes to make a treatv, I sav it violates the Constitution, and not only so, but it strikes a blow at one of the fundamental and most important prerogatives of the President of the United States and also of the Senate. Now, why do I say that if this method can be proceeded with successfully it does put within the power of Congress the oppor- tunity to make a treaty? I will have to repeat a little in order to show it, because of the interruptions, to which I do not object. I have called attention to the fact that here was the subject-matter of a ti-eaty. It was a negotiation between this Government and another government. It was something which could not be made effective by the independent action of this Government. It was something which required the action of this Government and the reciprocal action of another government. And I say, rec- ognizing that to be a necessity, the President of the United States and the Hawaiian authorities had, for the purpose of effecting it, entered into a negotiation and had come to an agreement to make a treaty; that, recognizing it as a proper subject-matter of a treatv, in obedience to the commands of the Constitution of the United States, the President sent the treaty to this body; and that this body, composed as it is nine-tenths of lawyers, and some of them very great lawyers, recognized it as a proper subject-matter of a treaty and considered it for weeks and months as a treaty; whereas if it had not been the subject-matter properly of a treaty they would have refused to consider it; and that b-cause of the fact that they could not command the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution the treaty was abandoned, and the same treaty, word for word, is embodied in a joint resolution passed by the House of Representatives, and it comes here and we are asked that we shall pas.s it; and that that which would have been law as a treaty if it could have commanded two-thirds majority in this body, shall now become law in the absence of two-thirds bv virtue of a majority vote in the House and the Senate, which is only required for a statute, and which is not sufficient for a treatv. Now, Mr. President, if that is effected, if the joint resolution which has passed the House passes the Senate anlied with all the terms and conditions, could we not thereupon declare them to be annexed and make them a part of the territory of the United States, and would not that be a more competent power for the Congress than it would be for the treaty -making power? Mr. BACON. You can do that if you absolutely nullify the provision of tlie Constitution which says that a treaty shall bo made in another way. Mr. FoKAKER rose. Mr. BxVCON. Now. if the Senator will pardon me. Mr. FORAKER. If the Senator will allow me just one word further. I agree with almost all he has said; but at the point where I differ from him the difference becomes vital. I think that when you make a compact with a foreign jiower it must be in the natiiVe of a treaty, but that contemplates the continued ex- istence of the foreign power. Therefore, if a foreign power were by agreement to cede to us a part of its territory upon certain terms and conditions agreed upon, it would necessarily have to be done by treaty. But where the whole foreign country comes in and ceases to be an independent power, as is proposed in this case, it is not prop- erly done by treaty, or at least not so properly l)y a treaty, I will put it. as by an act of Congress in the nature of legislation. That was the case with Texas. She had ceased to be a part of Mexico; she had acquired her independence; she was an independent Re- public: she had a right to stipulate for herself, and she stipulated, among other things, that she would cease to be as an independent power, and therefore she could accept a treaty or she coukl come in by the door of legislation. While the treaty-making power might l;e properly invoked, this other power is equally so. Mr. BACON. i\Ir. President, I am endeavoring to present with some degree of sequence, if possible, an argument. It is mani- festly impossible for me to do so if I am interrupted by Senators, not for the purpose of a question, btit for purposes of inter.iecting arguments. I do not think I can be accused of being unwilling to have interru])tions, but I will ask Senators to permit me to pursue the argument with some degree of continuity, and when 1 have 3rm 17 reached a stopping place at any particular division I shall be mora than happy to yield for any question Senators may wish to ask. Mr. FORAKER. I hope the Senator will not think that I was undertaking to do more tiian make plain to him wliat was in my mind. Mr. BACON. The Senator's interruption was very much less than that of some others. Mr. FORAKER. I wished the Senator to know while he was on the floor what I had in mind. Mr. BACON. The Senator from Ohio makes a verv important concession, and if he stands by that I think he will be bound to vote against this joint resolution. Tlie Senator from Ohio con- cedes that if the purpose were to cede to this Government a ])art of the territory of another government it must necessarily be in the form of a treaty, but that if the purpose is to cede the entire coimtry a treaty is not necessary. Mr. President, I am utterly unable to see the force of that ar- gument. It is in either case an agreement by which sovereignty existing over certain territory is abandoned, or rather annulled, and by which the sovereignty of this country is given to it. Why should the change of sovereignty as to a part be the subject-matter of negotiation and the change of sovereignty as to the whole be not the subject-matter of negotiation? Mr. FORAKER. In a word I can answer that. Because there is no continuance of a compact. The whole thing is at an end by its consummation. Mr. BACON. I do not agree with the Senator, for this reason: The vital essence by which this agreement is made binding is not that anything is enacted in this country which can have force there, but it is because by an agreement in consideration that it shall have force there we say it shall have force here. But, Mr. President, I was on a practical point, and I want the consideration of Senators to it. The Constitution has clothed us with the high function, in conjunction with the President, of making a certain class of laws, which the Constitution says shall be supreme, to wit, treaties. Now, if this joint resolution can be legally passed, constitutionally passed, I submit the proposition as one which can not be successfully answered, that there is no treaty rejected by the Senate because of a lack of two-thirds vote, if the foreign government had given its assent thereto, as it has done here, or as it did in the arbitration treaty, which could not be made law by the enactment of a statute in the Houi-eof Representatives and in the Senate and by it being signed by the President. I see the Senator from Colorado assents to that. Mr. TELLER. 1 do not know that I assent to it: but I do not think that the fact that that can be done is anv argument. Mr. BACON. That may be. We shall see whether it is an ar- gument or not. But. Mr. President, I want to say to Senators, if there is any treaty which could be entered into between the Presi- dent and a foreign government, which, wlien it failed to receive a two-thirds vote in the Senate, could not bo mule law by tliis process, although it could not command a two-thirds vote in the Senate, I want Senators to point it out. If there is anv trcatv which can be devised which can not command a two-thirds vdte in the Senate, which can command a majority in the Senate, which can not be made a law by this procc.-^s, Iwant Senators to suagest what that treaty is. 18 What does that lead ns to, Mr, President? If it be true that whenever a treaty fails to get two-thirds majority in the Senate, but can command a majority here and also command a majority in the House of Representatives and command the approval of the President— if it be true that such a treaty, although it can not be enacted or made in the v^^ay the Constitution provides, can be made in the way of putting it in the form of a statute or of a joint resolution, do we not, when we give our assent to such a proposi- tion, absolutely surrender the power which the Constitution con- fers upon us for the making of treaties? Mr. President, what does that load to? The Senator from Colo- rado said he did not know that that would be any argument against the proposition. It leads to this: The President of the United States is the Executive, clothed with the power to make treaties. It can not possibly be denied that it was the contempla- tion of the Constitution that no treaty should be made which was not initiated by him. Is there any denial of that proposition? If so, let Senators, when they come to speak, answer it. It was the design of the Constitution that every treaty should be made by the President and should be initiated by him, and it was the de- sign of the Constitution and the command of the Constitution that there should be no treaty which did not have his approval; and yet, if this can be done, the House of Representatives can orig- inate a treaty. The House of Representatives, when England, for instance, has signified her assent by an act of Parliament, or in any other way, can pass a joint resolution sa5ang there shall be such and such an agreement between this country and another country. It can pass the House of Representatives; it can come to the Senate: it can receive a majority of each; and it can go to the President and re- ceive his disapproval. It can go back to the House of Representa- tives and get two-tliirds in that body, and come to this body and get two-thirds in this body, and we have a treaty absolutely over and above the consent of the President. Do not let Senators conf iise this proi^osition. It can not be said that at last it would rest with the President wliether he would proclaim that treaty, because, if this form is adopted, it becomes law, and law binds the President as well as everj'body else. Whenever he disapproves it, and it is ])assed by a two- thirds vote of the House of Representatives and a two-thirds vote of the Sen- ate, it is a law which binds him, and it would be an impeachable offense in him if he refused to carry it out. On the contrary, in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, he is part of the treaty-making power. A treaty is not obligatory until he himself proclaims it as a treaty. It may be even ratified by the Senate and he can withdraw his approval, for there is nothing that makes it law until he does proclaim it; but when you put it in the form of a joint resolution or a statute it becomes law whenever it has what the Constitution says shall be requisite to make a law, and it is then as binding on him as on anyone else. So I say there is no escape from the proposition that if that which in its essential character is a treaty can be enacted in the form of a statute or a joint resolution, it is perfectly practicable to have a treaty in its essence and substance which the President of the United States not oidj' has not initiated, not only has not approved, but which he has distinctly disapproved. Mr. President, I am defending this great prerogative of the 3505 19 President as well as that of the Senate. His is the principal pre- rogative, and the pvoro.i^^alive of the Senate is an incident to it. It this precedent can be established, it will return in an evil hour to plague the President as well as the Senate. ]Mr. President, this is a very serious consideration; and it is the duty ot all of us to maintain every provision in the Constitution It IS doubly the duty of Senators to see that they do not absolutely abdicate the power which the Constitution confers on the Senate- and I can not, for tlie life of me, see any escape from the argu- ment that, if this method is constitutional, then, wherever the assent of a foreign government can be gotten in another way, practically a treaty can be made without the consent of two-thirds of this bod}\ Mr. President, I want to read what a great man said on this subject. It IS not simply the fact that we abdicate our power- it IS not Simply the fact that we fail to maintain the authority which the_ Constitution gives us; it is the fact that if we permit that which is m substance a treaty to be enacted bv anything less than two-thirds in this body, we violate a great ]n-inciple of the Consti- tution and we violate the rights of the States stipulated for when they entered the Federal Union. I propose to read what George Washington said about it The House of Representatives called upon President Washington in 1796 to lay before the House copies of instructions to the ministers ot the United States who had negotiated a treaty with Great Britain, and the President, replying to the House of Representa- tives, asserts the power of the President and of the Senate to the exclusive control of all matters which are treaties, and gives the reasons for it. I read from the first volume of Messages and Pa- pers of the Presidents, by Richardson, page 194: United States, March jo, UOG. To the House of Rei)rcsentaiives of the United States: , With the utmost attention I have considered your resolution of the 24th instant, requesting mo to lay before your House a copy of the instructions to the minister of the Lnitcd States who negotiated the treaty with the King ot Great Bntaui, together with the correspondenee and other documents relative tc5 that treaty, excepting such of the said papers as any existing negotiation may render improper to bo disclosed. Jo In deliberating upon this suoject it was impossible for me to lose sight of the principle which some have avowed in it.s discussion, or to avoid extendine my views to the consequences which must flow from the admission of that The very principle now under discussion. I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition to with- hold any information which the Constitution has enioinod upon the Presi- dent as a duty to give or which could bo rci|uin,Ml of him by either House of Congress .as a right; and with truth I aihrm that it has been, as it will con- tinue to bo while 1 have the honor to preside in the Government, my con- stant endeavor to harmonize with the other branches ther.-of so far .as the trust delegated to me by the people of the United States and my sense of tho wni^KM-mt ""^'°^'^^ to '■ preserve, protect, and defend tho Constitution " The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their succc.-w must often depend on secrecy; ;uid even when brought to a c.nclusion a full disclosure ot all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which mav have been propcsed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on future n(>gotiations"or i)rodnce immedi- ate inconvcnieiK-os, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers , Ihe necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reas,)n for vest- ing tho power of m.aking treaties in the President, with the advice and con- t!^ !. J. \\'' •^'-'";'*''' tj"' l"'","-il'lo on whi.-h that body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the Hou.se of Rep- resentativos to demand and to have, as u matter of course, all the i)anei-s re- 3505 20 spectingr a negotiation witli a foreign power would be to establish a danger- ous precedent. ^ , , , , , , . It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for can berehitivo to any purpose under the cognizance of the House of Representatives, ex- coi)t that of an impeachment, which the resolution has not expressed. 1 repeat that I have no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of my station will permit or the public good shall require to bo dis- closed; and, in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great Brit- ain were laid before the Senate when the treaty itself was communicated for their consideration and advice. Mr. President,! ask the attention of every Senator to what I am now about to read, becanse that which is to follow is that which I had in view when 1 proposed to read this communication to the Senate: The course which thedobate hastakon on the resolution of the House leads to Komo observations on the mode of making treaties under the Constitution of the United States. Having been a member of the general convention, and knowing the prin- ciples on which the Constitution was formed, 1 have ever entertained but one opinion on this subject: and from the first establishment of the Govern- ment to this moment my conduct has exemplified that opinion— that the )iower of making treaties"is exclusively vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators pre.sent concur; and that every treaty so made and promulgated thencefor- ward became the law of the land. It is thus that the treaty-making power has been understood by foreign nations, and in all the treaties made with them we have declared and they have believed that, when ratified by the President, with the advice and con- sent of the Senate, they became obligatory. In this construction of the Constitution, every House of Representatives has heretofore acquiesced, and until the present time not a doubt or suspicion has appeared, to my knowl- edge, that this construction was not the true one. Nay, they have more than acquiesced; for till now, without controverting the obligation of such treat- ies, they have made all the requisite provisions for carrying them into effect. There is also reason to believe that this construction agrees with the opin- ions entertained by the State conventions when they were deliberating on the Constitution, especially by those who objected to it because there was not I'cquired in commercial treaties the consent of two-thirds of the whole num- ber of the members of the Senate, instead of two-thirds of the Senators pres- ent, and because in treaties respecting territorial and certain other rigiits and claims the concurrence of three-fourths of the whole number of the members of both Houses, respectively, was not made necessary. As stated by him, some States objected to the ratification of the Constitution 'because when it came to the question of the acqui- sition of territory the votes of three-fourths both of the Senate and of the House of Representatives were not required. Then he goes on to say: It is a fact declared by the general convention and universally understood that the Constitution of the United States was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual concession; and it is well known that under this influence the fimaller States were admitted to an equal repre.sentation in the Senate with the larger Statng, and that this branch of the Government was invested with gi-eat powers, for on the equal participation of those powers the sovereignty and political safety of the smaller States were deemed essentially to depend. If other proofs than these and the plain letter of the Constitution itself be necessary to ascertain the point under consideration, they may be foundin the jfiuriials of the general convention, which I have deposited in the office of the Department of State. In those journals it will appear that a pronosi- tion was made "that no treaty should be binding on the United States which was not ratified by a law," and that the proposition was explicitly rejected. In other words, it appears by the journals of the convention which framed the Constitution of the United States that there was a proposition that if the President and the Senate made a treaty it should not be binding until an act of Congress approved it, and that proposition was explicitly rejected. That is what George Washington said about it. 21 The concluding sentence is as follows: As^ therefore.it is perfe-ctly dear to my iniderstandincj that the assent of the House of Representatives is not necessary to the validity of a treaty as the treaty with Ureat Britain exhihits in itself all the objects reriuiriiiff legislative provision, and on these the pajx-rs called for can throw no lii,'ht and as It IS essential to the due administration of the Government tliat tho boundaries fixed by the Constitution between tho different departments should be preserved, a just regard to the Constitution and to tho duty of mv oflice, under all the circumstances of this case, forbids a compliance with yoiir request. GO. WASHIXGTON. Mr. President, I desire that Senators will mark the peculiar significance of this utterance by Washington. The distinct ques- tion which he was having under consideration was whether tho House of Eepresentatives had the right to any consideration whatever of the subject-matter of a treatv. They had called oa hmi for information with reference to a treaty, and he had stated to them, practically, " Jt is none of your business; that is a mat- ter which belongs to the President and to the Senate, and does not belong to the House of Representatives." I confess that I am utterly unable to understand how anvone can possibly get away from the proposition which I have submit- ted, which is, that if what is here contended for is legal, whenever a treaty is rejected by the Senate because it can not get a two-thirds vote, and whenever the project can command the assent of a for- eign government, a majority of the Senate and a majority of the House of Ptepresentatives, with the approval of the President, any treaty thus rejected by two-thirds of the Senate can be enacted into law. If that is so, the provision in the Constitution which gives to the President and two-thirds of the Senate the treaty- making power is not worth the paper or the ink which it has taken to express it; it can be nullified at will. Mr. President, It is contrary to every rule of construction that sucn a construction shall be put upon anv constitutional provi- sion as will enable it to be utterly nullified' and made of no effect. The strongest argument which you can make against any con- struction of any provision of any constitution or any law is that that construction -^vill nullify it. A great many people, ofBcials and others, have jumped to a con- clusion as to the power of Congress on what occurred in the ad- mission of the State of Texas. There is no doubt tliat Texas was admitted by a joint resolution, but it is equally undoubted that it was admitted under the express grant of power in the Constitution given to Congress to admit new States, and that the claim that there was no power in Congress to negotiate what in substance would be a treaty was absolutely disavowed by the men who wero most prominent in effecting it. _ I have here the Congressional Globe, in which there is a discus- sion in the Senate at the time the resolutions were under consid- eration for the admission of Texas as a State. I read from the speech of Robert J. Walker, of Mis.>?issippi, who was not only a very able man, so recognized throughout the length and breadth of this country, a man of very great learning, of admitted promi- nence, but one of the most earnest advocates for the passage of the resolutions by wliich Texas was admitted into \hc Un:ou. I read from the Congressional Globe, second session Twontv-cighth Congress, page 24(j: " Mr. Walker said that he was re.ioiccd that the great American que.stion of the reannexatioii of Texas was being ])re.-:euted on nil hands ou the grounds 350") 22 (in which it was placed originally Ijy him (Mr. Walker) in hLs Texas letter of the 8th of January, 1844. Ho (Mr. V.'alker) then proposed, more than a year since, to admit Texas as a Stat<3 of the Union by the action of Coni^ress under that clanso of the Constitntion which authorizes Congress to admit new States into the I'^niou. Thati-lauso was not confined to our then existing territory, hut was without limitation; and the framers of the Constitution had expressly i-ofused to limit tlie goiicral power contained in this clau.so to the territory then em- luftced within the Union. The general power, then, was in express words, and no man has a right to interpolate restrictions, and especially restrictiarticttiar proposition, when that was the question involved and upon which and around which the discttssion revolved, when Sen- ators did not take issue ^\nth it, it was equivalent to saying that they could not succes-sfully do so. Mr. FORAKER. I simply desire to placo on record the nega- tive of that proposition. Every day we sit here and to-day we have sat here and heard propositions advanced which Senators who are in their seats do not agree with and the correctness of which they do not concede. We do not take issue simply because we do not wish to break the continuity of thought, the logical ar- rangement of the argument which the Senator is presenting to the Senate. At the proper time we may have something to say in answer to the propositions of the Senator from Georgia. I as one. in view of the position taken, want to say now that while I agree with a great many of the propositions of the Senator from (Tcorgia, I do not at all agree with some of them. I think there is a fallacy lui- derlying his whole argument which disposes of all of it whenever it is presented; and at the proper time it will be presented. Mr. BACON. If the Senator thinks that, I hoi)e the avowed purpose of those who sympathize with him, not to be heard in this debate, may be changed, and that we may hear from him and other Senators: and 1 think we will before we get through. 27 Mr. FORAKER. It is a question of policy in debate wliether or not every proposition that is advanced shall be met in argu- ment. Sometimes there are othor considerations than the mere meetmg of argument that may induce Senators to sit still and allow a Senator to proceed. All 1 want to register my protest against is, it being taken for granted that because we do sit still and listen to the Senator with pleasure, as we always do, for he is always entertaining, we are on that account to be presumed to be in accord with everything he exDresses. Mr. WHITE. Mr. Presidents- Mr. BACON. Please pardon me. I am nearlv through. I have not taken any such position. I have not s^iid that Senators who were present upon that occasion and who did not particii)ate in the debate were to be taken as acceding to the propositions made, but I have said— this was an isolated proposition— that Senators who participated in the debate and who failed to take issue with it virtually conceded it. Mr. President, I certainly did not expect to occupy so much of the time of the Senate, and it is fortunate that I said in the begin- ning that I did not intend to go into a discussion of the merits of the question. I desire to submit to the Senate what I consider to be a very grave question. It is a question, if we pass this joint resolution, not only of one revolution, but of two revolutions. If we pass the joint resolution we enter upon a revolution which shall convert this country from a peaceful country into a warlike country. If we pass the joint resolution, we revolutionize this country from one engaged in its own concerns into one which shall immediately proceed to intermeddle with the concerns of all the world. If we pass this joint resolution we inaugurate a revolu- tion which shall convert this country from one designed for the ad- vancement and the prosperity and the happinoss^of our citizens into one which shall se;'k its gratification in dominion and domina- tion and foreign acquisition. Mr. President, if we pass the joint resolution we have entered upon a revolution which shall change the entire character of the Govei-nmeut. which is a government of equals, a government solely for the benefit of its citizens, into a government in which the flag shall float over communities that we would never agree .should be equals with us in this Government;. That is a great enough revolution, Mr. President, but if we pass the joint resolution, we have entered upon a revolution which I consider greater and more to be objected to than that: that is a revolution where, because the majority has the power, it will in this body surrender the great function which the Constitution gives to the President of the United States, and also to us as a part of the treaty-making power, and we have entered upon a field where the restraints of the Constitution are no longer to bo observed and whore the will of the majority shall obtain regard- less of constitutional restrictions. 3003 LltJKHKY U»- LJNbKLbb 013 744 706 P