Gass jELi Book— • A ^ (iopght^ ^S2J copyright dsposhs u?« i a i H 7 o L MORAL SCIENCE. OUTLINES OF MOEAL SCIENCE. BY ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER, D.D., LATE PROFESSOR IN THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY AT PRINCETON, N. J. NEW-YORK; CHARLES SCRIBNER, 145 NASSAU-STREET. M.DCCO.LII. N/*./. Enteeed according to Act of Congress, in the year 1852, by JAMES W. ALEXANDEK, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New-York. JOHN F. TROW, Pkinteb & Stbreotypek, 49 Ann-btreet. CONTENTS. CHAPTER L CONSCIENCE, OR THE MORAL FACULTY, . . .19 CHAPTER II. THE MOEAL FACULTY, ORIGINAL AND UNIVERSAL, • 2T CHAPTER IIL A MORAL FACULTY BEING SUPPOSED, WHETHER ITS DICTATES ARE UNIFORM, 80 CHAPTER IV. HOW FAR ALL MEN ARE AGREED IN THEIR MORAL JUDGMENTS, 85 CHAPTER Y. WHETHER CONSCIENCE IS THE SAME AS THE UNDER- STANDING, OR A FACULTY DIFFERENT FROM AND INDEPENDENT OF IT, 40 CHAPTER YI. THE MORAL SENSE COMPARED WITH TASTE, • . U VI CONTENTS. CHAPTER VII. MOEAL OBLIGATION, CHAPTER VIII. THE SUPEEMACY OF CONSCIENCE, .... 60 r CHAPTER IX. WHETHER WE ALWAYS DO EIGHT BY OBEYING THE DICTATES OP CONSCIENCE? 64 CHAPTER X. WHETHEE THEEE IS IN THE MIND A LAW OE EULE, BY WHICH MAN JUDGES OF THE MOEALITY OF PAE- TICULAE ACTIONS? . . . . . .73 CHAPTER XL THE MOEAL FEELING WHICH ACCOMPANIES EVEEY MOEAL JUDGMENT, .78 CHAPTER XII. BELIEF IN GOD, AS CONNECTED WITH THE OPEEA- TION OF CONSCIENCE, 84 CHAPTER XIIL MOEAL AGENCY, AND WHAT IS NECESSAEY TO IT, . 89 CHAPTER XIV. MAN A MOEAL AGENT, 97 CHAPTER XV. MAN NOT UNDEE A FATAL NECESSITY, . . .101 CONTENTS. Vii PAOB CHAPTER XVI. MAN'S DIRECTION AND GOVERNMENT OF HIS ACTIONS, AND HIS CONSEQUENT RESPONSIBILITY, . . 10T CHAPTER XVII. OBJECTIONS TO THE UNIFORM INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES, 11T CHAPTER XVHI. SUMMARY VIEW OF LIBERTY, 125 CHAPTER XIX. THE KIND OF INDIFFERENCE WHICH HAS BEEN CON- SIDERED ESSENTIAL TO FREE AGENCY, . . 132 CHAPTER XX. WHETHER MEN ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR MO- TIVES; OR WHETHER DESIRES AND AFFECTIONS WHICH PRECEDE VOLITION, HAVE A MORAL CHAR- ACTER? 136 CHAPTER XXL THE DIVISION OF MOTIVES, INTO RATIONAL AND ANI- MAL, 141 CHAPTER XXII. WHETHER MORALITY BELONGS TO PRINCIPLES AS WELL AS ACTS, OR IS CONFINED TO ACTS ALONE? 147 CHAPTER XXIIL MORAL HABITS, . . ♦ . . . 155 Vlll CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXIV. THE NATURE OF YIRTUE, 169 CHAPTER XXV. THE NATURE OF YIRTUE, CONTINUED. DIFFERENT HYPOTHESES, 171 CHAPTER XXVI. THE NATURE OF YIRTUE, CONTINUED, . . .184 CHAPTER XXVII. WHETHER YIRTUE AND YICE BELONG ONLY TO AC- TIONS? . .199 CHAPTER XXVIII. THE AUTHOR OF OUR BEING CONSIDERED IN RELA- TION TO MORAL SCIENCE, 209 CHAPTER XXIX. THE PHENOMENA OF THE UNIYERSE, . . .288 CHAPTER XXX. DUTIES OF MAN TO THE CREATOR AS THUS MANI- FESTED, . 255 PEEFACE The work now offered to the public is the last which proceeded from the lamented author's hand. In the days which imme- diately preceded his peaceful departure out of the present life, and while his powers were free from all clouds and weakness, he spoke of these papers as nearly prepared for the press, and consigned them with that in- tention to two of his sons. With a trifling exception, the whole had been carefully transcribed by the hand of filial duty from his own character, which, more from de- clining eyesight than any manual debility, had lost its former boldness and clearness, 10 PKEFACE. and had become difficult. In giving his commands respecting the printing, lie em- powered his representatives to use a discre- tion as to lesser points in the form, which has been found to be almost entirely needless. The ministers of Christ who in this and other countries remember the instructions of Dr. Alexander, will be best able to judge of this production. They will recognise in it the doctrines and arguments which char- acterized the author's theological method, and will doubtless prize it as a comprehen- sive syllabus, even while they miss that copiousness, vivacity, and warmth, which added efficacy to his oral teachings. The subject of Ethical Philosophy may be said to have engaged the mind of the author for at least threescore years. The earliest vestiges of his boyish studies show proofs of this, in connection with the met- aphysical inquiries which afterwards be- PREFACE. 11 caine his favourite employment of mind. Thougli in after years lie was almost daily adding to Ms knowledge of ethical litera- ture, with an avidity which was unabated to the last, and which sought to be satisfied with the most recondite disquisitions in the ancient tongues no less than our own, he nevertheless appears to have arrived at definite conclusions very early, and to have maintained them with little change. It was not the habit of his mind, as is well known, to accumulate authorities, to load his discourses with learned citation, or even to break the continuity of his analyti- cal discourse by unnecessary sallies against opponents. Amidst a life of perpetual reading, of which he held the spoils in his memory with singular exactness and tena- city, he persevered in seeking and present- ing truth with the minimum of quoted aid. This quality of his thinking will be all the rather obvious in a treatise like the present, 12 PREFACE. which, as an epitome of extended results, necessarily leaves out a thousand particu- lars of the process and all the lighter play of illustration. During the period of nearly forty years, in which he was theological professor, the author had an exercise, for the most part weekly, in Mental and Moral Science ; as a transition from college work and a reca- pitulation of juvenile studies. The lectures thus delivered were the basis of the suc- cinct manual now made public. All its parts were thrown into a shape suitable for the printing, except the closing chapters on the Being and Attributes of God, and the duties resulting from the relation of the Creator and creature. These portions not having been copied remain in autograph, and may be regarded as the last written speculations of one who employed his pen almost every day for more than half a century. If the articula- PKEFACE. 13 tion of this important member with the body of the discourse seem less obvious than might be desired, it will become suf- ficiently clear to such as reflect on the great earnestness with which, in the former part, the author maintains the intuitive percep- tions of conscience as independent of every doctrine of theology, even the greatest. A casual inspection will be enough to show any reader that this is a book of elements ; laying down principles, clearing the statement of fundamental questions, and marking limits around the science. It does not descend therefore to the more usual and far easier work of gathering, naming, and tabling the human duties. This labour he did not undervalue ; indeed it was part of his course of instructions ; and his unfinished manuscripts contain large contributions towards a separate work in this kind, embracing even all the range of duties which are properly Chris- 14 PREFACE. tian and even ecclesiastical But the trea- tise now presented was intended to lay foundations and elucidate principles; ip. other words it is upon the Philosophy of Morals. At the same time, however, that the topics here discussed are some of the most puzzling which have exercised human acuteness, patience and abstraction, from the days of the Greek authors till our own, they are such as cannot be set aside or turned over to others as matter for autho- rity ; for the very reason that they concern the springs of daily action, are presented every hour in the household, and meet us in the very babblings of the nursery. And notwithstanding the tenuity of the objects brought under review, and the delicate thread of inquiry along which the analysis must often feel its way, the writer seems to derive an advantage from his unusual sim- plicity and transparency of language, which might betray a superficial reader into the PREFACE. 15 opinion that the train of argument is not original or profound. In none of the author's works is this quality more appa- rent than in that which follows. One of the reasons which impelled Dr. Alexander, at a stage of life which was encumbered with cares and infirmities, to address himself to this toilsome composi- tion, was the desire to furnish a Manual for the young men of America, in our colleges, theological seminaries, and other schools. He was repeatedly besought to supply such a volume, and never wavered in his persuasion that it was necessary ; especially when he saw with pain to what an extent the place of a class-book was occupied by the great but dangerous work of Archdea- deacon Paley. In common with other sound ethical inquiries he recognised the value of President Wayland's labours, and the eloquence and richness of Dr. Chal- mers's striking but fragmentary contribu- 16 PREFACE. tions. Yet lie thought lie saw room for a brief hand-book level to the capacity of all ; and he had a natural and pardonable desire common to all original thinkers, to give vent to his own opinions in his own order. In regard to the ethical system here expounded, the work may safely be left to speak for itself. It is positive and di- dactic rather than controversial, yet there is scarcely a chapter which, however tran- quil and subdued in its tone, will not awaken opposition in some quarter or other. The polemic aspect of the treatise is, how- ever, apparent only in cases where to avoid the naming of opponents would have been an affectation no less than a breach of trust. No one, whatever his private dissent may be, will justly complain that his opinions have been treated with unfairness or rigour. The connection of ethics with theology is such that no one can treat of the nature of virtue, of the will, of motives, and the like, PREFACE. 17 without at least indicating his tendencies in regard to the great dividing questions of revelation ; which only increases the neces- sity for giving the right direction to juvenile studies ; unless we would receive to the professional curriculum minds already pre-occupied with ethical tenets subversive of great truths in law, politics and theology. Those who have watched the progress of modern speculation will not fail to apprehend the drift of this observation. Yet the way in which even these somewhat delicate parts of moral science are here set forth, is such as never to awaken suspicion of any sinister intention, or to betray any irregular pas- sage into a neighbouring but separate science. Even those discussions which, at a first view, might seem to belong rather to natural theology, were deliberately assigned to their place after long experience in teaching, as pertaining to the limits where 18 PREFACE. the two fields osculate if they do not cut, and with a clear pre-eminence given to the ethical side of the truths common to both. The labours of the author were arrested by his last illness, when the work here published was complete indeed as has been said, but not ready for the press in the sense of being revised and corrected. It is this which has made these prefatory pages necessary ; an introduction from the au- thor's hand would have precluded all such attempts as weak and impertinent. As he gave the work in charge with his dying lips, after having no doubt offered it to God in many of his solicitous and ele- vated thoughts during the preparation, so it is now humbly dedicated to Him, with- out whose blessing, no human effort, even in the best cause, is other than worthless. s New York, Aug. 1, 1852. MOBAL SCIENCE. CHAPTER I. CONSCIENCE, OR THE MORAL FACULTY. As all men, when reason is developed, have a faculty by which they can discern a difference be- tween objects of sight which are beautiful: and those which are de- ^Tauf™ *" formed, so all men possess the power of discerning a difference between actions, as to their moral quality. The judgment thus formed is immediate, and has no relation to the useful- ness or injuriousness to human happiness, of the objects contemplated. Whatever difference of opinion may exist re- specting the origin of this faculty, it is univer- sally admitted that men, in all True in all ages. ages and countries, have judged some actions to be good and deserving of appro- 20 MOKAL SCIENCE. bation, while they have judged others to be bad, and of ill desert. In all languages, we find words expressive of the ideas of moral excellence, and moral evil. In the laws and penalties estab- Agree S.° fman * lishedin all ages throughout the world, it is evidently implied that some actions ought to be done, and others avoided. In cases of flagrant injustice or in- gratitude, all men, of every country and of every age, agree in their judgment of their moral evil. There is, in regard to such actions, no more dif- ference in the judgment of men, than respecting the colour of grass, or the taste of honey. If any man does not perceive grass to be green, or ho- ney to be sweet, we do not thence conclude that men's bodily senses are not similarly constituted, but that the organs of the individual who does not see and taste as other men do, are defective, or depraved by disease. To determine whether all men have one ori- . ginal moral faculty, the case pro- Case proposed must o J ? sr be simple. posed for their moral judgment should be simply good or evil. For a complex CONSCIENCE. 21 act, in which there is something good and something evil, or rather where there must be an accurate weighing of motives in order to ascertain the quality of the action, is not a proper test as to the existence of a uniformity of moral judgment in men. Therefore, the historical fact adduced by Dr. Paley,* from the history of Valerius Max- imus, is not at all suited to his purpose ; because the case is very complex, and one on which it is difficult to determine ^ ™ us * at first view, what the true moral character of the action is. The facts, as related by him, are as follows: The father of Caius Toranius had been proscribed by the Trium- virate. Caius Toranius — coming over to the in- terests of that party — discovered his father's place of concealment to the officers who were in pursuit of him, and gave them, withal, a descrip- tion of his person by which they might distin- guish him. The old man, more anxious for the safety and fortunes of his son than for the little that might remain of his own life, began * In the chapter of hi3 Moral Philosophy, under the head " The Moral Sense." 22 MORAL SCIENCE. immediately to inquire of the officers whether his son were well, and whether he had done his duty to the satisfaction of the generals. ' That son (replied one of the officers), so dear to thy affections, has betrayed thee to us ; by his infor- mation thou art apprehended, and diest.' With this, the officer struck a poniard to his heart, and the unhappy parent fell, affected not so much by his fate, as by the means to which he owed it." Now, the question is, if this story were related to the wild boy caught some years ago in the woods of Hanover, or to a savage without experience and without instruction, cut off in his infancy from all intercourse with his species, and consequently under no possible influ- ence of example, authority, education, sympathy, or habit, whether or not such a one would feel upon the relation any degree of that sentiment of disapprobation of Toranius's conduct which we feel. In our judgment, such a case would afford no why it affords no criterion by which to determine criterion. whether men possess constitution- ally a moral sense. For, in the first place, the CONSCIENCE. 23 trial would be no better than if the question were proposed to a child two years old, in whose mind the moral faculty is not yet developed. A human being, arrived at adult age without in- struction or communication with others, would be — as it relates to the mind — in a state differing very little from that of infancy. It is not held that the moral sense will be exercised without the usual means by which human faculties are devel- oped. If an organical defect in the brain should prevent the intellectual faculties from coming into exercise, the unhappy individual thus de- prived of reason would prove nothing in regard to the operations of reason where it is developed. So, also, if a human being were brought up from early infancy in a dark dungeon, and if no infor- mation were communicated to him, the mental faculties would not be developed, and it would be absurd to have recourse to such a one to ascer- tain what faculties belong to the human mind. The same remark will apply to the case of the wild boy, referred to by Dr. Paley ; and also, though in an inferior degree, to savages of the most degraded class. 24 MOEAL SCIENCE. Let it then be fairly understood what it is which is asserted in regard to conscience, as an original, universal faculty. It is What is meant by anonginaViniver- that every human mind, when its sal faculty. faculties have been developed, and have arrived at some degree of maturity, dis- cerns a quality in certain actions which is termed moral ; that is, it intuitively perceives that some actions are right and some wrong. - Another objection to the historical fact ad- duced by Dr. Paley, is, that it presents to the mind, not a case of simple, unmix- Paje^slnstancecom. e( j gQod Qr ^ ^ ft CQmplex case, in which — before a judgment can be formed of the action of the son — it must be decided whether a man ought to be governed by a regard to the welfare of a parent, or to the public good. If the son believed that the party in pursuit of his father was promoting the public good, he might feel that he ought to be governed by this rather than by filial affection. Here, then, we have presented a complex and difficult case in morals, about which men would be very apt to CONSCIENCE. 25 differ ; and we are to determine whether all men — even those totally uneducated — would view it in the same light. To render the case a suitable one to be a test of the question under consideration, it should be supposed that the father was act- A posT ^ SUP " in S in conformity with the strictest principles of rectitude ; that his life was sought by wicked men, aiming not at the good of the commonwealth but its destruction ; and that the son, in betraying the place of his concealment, was actuated by mercenary motives, or by unjust and unnatural dislike to a good parent. If a case like this were presented to a thousand persons, from as many different parts of the world, there would be but one judgment and one feeling; all would judge the conduct of the son to be blamable. Different degrees of moral disappro- bation would be felt by those whose moral faculty was in a cultivated state ; but there would be no difference in the opinion entertained of his con- duct. All would feel disapprobation, accom- panied by a desire for the punishment of the 26 MOBAL SCIENCE. offender. It is found that savages appear to have but an obscure exercise of conscience, but in proportion as their minds are cultivated, this faculty becomes more manifest, and operates more forcibly. CHAPTER II. THE MOBAL FACULTY, ORIGINAL AND UNIVEESAL. If conscience were not an original faculty, en- abling us to form a conception of moral qualities, man could never acquire such an idea by any other means. The ^ai ideas other- J J wise unattainable. opinion, therefore, that moral feel- ings are merely the effect of instruction and edu- cation, is erroneous. For every class of simple ideas there must be an appropriate faculty, without which these ideas can never be acquired. In re- gard to the bodily senses, this is too evident to be called in question. Without the organ of vision, the simple idea of light and colours could never be communicated by any instructions ; without the organ of hearing, no idea of sound can be convey- ed ; and so of the other senses. And it is equally true of that knowledge which is acquired by 28 MORAL SCIENCE. what some have called the internal senses. If there were in man no such faculty as taste, by which beauty is perceived, no idea of the beau- tiful could possibly be communicated. A horse has no perception of the beauty of a scene which perhaps enchants his rider, even though the ani- mal sees all the objects with equal distinctness. So it is in regard to moral qualities. There must be an original faculty to give us the simple idea which we have of morality ; otherwise the idea of virtue or vice could never have entered the human mind, and the feelings of moral obligation, of which all men are conscious, would never have been felt. I am aware that those who advocate the utili- tarian scheme, resolve all our ideas of morality and moral obligation into the mere T ^ti^. itarian ° b " Principles of benefit or injury, ap- prehended to be connected with each action. Dr. Paley informs us, that the sub- ject continued to be involved in impenetrable mystery, until he took this view of it. It is deemed useless to argue this point ; it cannot be decided by reasoning. The appeal UNIVERSALITY OF CONSCIENCE, 29 must be made to the consciousness of every man. If any one persists in declaring , , ., . . Appeal to conscious- that he sees no evil m any action ness . but as it is evidently detrimental to human happiness, nothing can be said in the way of argument to alter convictions derived from his own consciousness. All that is proper to be said is, that the mind of such a person is differently constituted from that of most men.; or rather that an impartial examination of this subject has not been made. It is recommended to such per- sons carefully to scrutinize the exercises of their own minds ; they will perceive that the idea of virtue or moral good is entirely distinct from that of mere utility. There is, indeed, a con- nection between these two things which is very intimate, and this seems to have misled many in their judgments. Virtuous conduct leads to happiness, and is always beneficial ; yet our idea of its moral character is not derived from this consideration, but from the nature of the action itself. CHAPTER III A MORAL FACULTY BEING SUPPOSED, WHETHER ITS DIC- TATES ARE UNIFORM? One of the strongest objections which has been brought against the doctrine laid down is, that among men of different countries, °CLS^; ^d of entirely different education, there is no agreement in their judgments respecting the morality or immorality of the same actions. Whereas, it is alleged, that if such a faculty were originally a part of man's constitution, there would as certainly be uniform- ity, as in the perception of objects by the exter- nal senses. Now, if the dictates of conscience in men of different ages and countries do so much differ, does it not show that the moral feel- ings of men are just what education makes them? And what is gained by maintaining the existence UNIFORMITY OF MORAL DICTATES. 31 of a moral faculty, as part of man's original constitution ? It will, I think, be admitted, that in all coun- tries and conditions in which men have been found, there exists a perception of a difference in the moral character ^ J"fST of actions ; that is, some things are accounted wrong, which ought not to be done, and some right, which ought to be done. Again, it has never been pretended as being a matter of fact, that between men of different countries there is a total difference in the opinions entertained respect- ™ £%£?* ing what is right and what is wrong. A few cases only of difference are al- leged, in which this discrepance is observed; but in regard to those actions which are reckoned good or evil, there is a general agreement. As to those in which there seems to be a fundamen- tal difference, an explanation will be given here- after. No nation, or tribe, or class of mankind has ever .held that it is a virtuous and proper thing to do injury to men, or that there is no more barm in taking away life than in preserving it. It 32 MORAL SCIENCE. has never been held that ingratitude — though everywhere common in practice — is a commend- able thing; or that deceit and fraud are as praise- worthy as honesty and fair dealing. There is in every country a difference made in the estimation of the character of men, derived from the course of their conduct. Proof from common estimate of char- Some men are reckoned good in acter. the public estimation, while others are considered wicked ; the former obtain esteem, the latter are despised. That course of conduct which secures a good reputation, does not in any country consist of actions which we con- sider wicked, but of actions which in all coun- tries are considered praiseworthy ; and men have never obtained a bad character by a course of good behaviour. It is also important to observe, that the con- duct of a people is not a fair test of the internal state of the mind, as it relates to Practice does not ^^ prove absence of morals. We know that individu- moral judgment als often pursue a course of con- duct, which in their serious moments they con demn. Yet the power of temptation, and the UNIFORMITY OF MORAL DICTATES. 33 habit of indulgence are such, that notwithstand- ing the convictions of conscience, they continue in a course of evil-doing. It would be a very in- conclusive inference to determine from their habitual conduct, that they acted in accordance with the dictates of conscience. And what is true of individuals, may be true of nations and tribes. Those customs which they have received from their forefathers, may not meet with the approbation of their moral sense, and yet such is the force of an established custom, that they go on in the way in which they were brought up. But a more satisfactory explanation of those facts, in which men seem conscientiously to go contrary to the fundamental prin- ciples of morals, is, that the prin- Ration* 1 th ° aP " ciple on which they act is correct, but through ignorance or error they make an erroneous application of it. When parents murder their own female chil- dren — a thing very customary in China — it is on the principle that they will be Infanticide. subject to more misery than hap- piness in the world ; and therefore it is doing 2* 34 MOKAL SCIENCE. them a favour. Here, the general principle is correct — that parents should consult the best in- terests of their offspring — but the mistake is in the application. The same may be said of the practice of exposing aged parents, when they become incapable of enjoying the world. As to those acts of cruelty which the Pagans perform in their religious services, (the wife committing herself to the flames Heathen enormi- ^^ ^ body Qf ^ deceased husband ; children voluntarily thrown into the Ganges, or persons devoting their own lives by falling under the car of Jug- gernaut,) they are performed on the principle that what God requires, or what pleases him, or what will secure happiness for ourselves or friends, should be done. It is true that the will of God should be obeyed, whatever sacrifice he may require ; their error is in thinking that such sacrifices are reauired bv Him. CHAPTER IV. HOW FAR ALL MEN ARE AGREED IN THEIR MORAL JUDO- MENTS. As the subject of morals is very extensive, and particular cases may be complicated, and as men are not only ignorant, but prejudiced by the errors received truths in Mo- in their education, it is no more wonderful that they should adopt different opin- ions on these subjects than on other matters. That, however, which is true in regard to every department of human knowledge, is doubtless true in regard to the science of morals. There are certain self-evident truths, which are intui- tively perceived by every one who has the exer- cise of reason, as soon as they are presented to the mind. In regard to these fundamental truths, there has never been any difference of opinion. 36 MORAL SCIENCE. It is not meant that all men distinctly think of these primary truths in morals ; for many are so inattentive, or so much occupied with sensible objects, that they can scarcely be said ever to reflect on the subject of moral duty. But let an act of manifest injustice be performed before their eyes, and among a thousand spectators there will be but one opinion, and but one feel- ing. If a strong man, for example, violently takes away the property of one weaker than himself, and for no other reason than because he covets it, all men will condemn the act. So, if any one who has received from another great benefits, not only refuses to make any grateful return, but on the contrary, returns evil for good, all men will agree in judging his conduct to be wrong. All intuitively discern that for a ruler to punish the innocent and spare the guilty, is morally wrong. It is not true, in fact, that there is no agreement among men as to the funda- mental principles of morals. Their judgments on these points are as uniform as on the axioms of mathematics ; as in their agreement that the starry firmament is grand and beautiful ; yea, as AGREEMENT IN MORALS. 37 uniform as concerning the greenness of the grass, or the varied colours of the rainbow. Mr. Locke, in his zeal to disprove the ex- istence of innate truths/ attempts to render uncertain some of these first truths of morals. "When we go beyond these first principles, we may expect to find men falling into grievous error respecting moral duty ; and this often appears in their applica- to ^ n™ ^ g ' tion of general principles to parti- cular cases. Most men either reason not at all, or reason badly, and draw from sound principles incorrect conclusions. For the most part, they receive implicitly what they have been taught ; or they are governed in their opinions by the common sentiment ; or they adopt as true what is most for their interest, or most agreeable to their feelings. And as men are often under the influence of feelings or passions which produce perturbation of mind, and so bias the judgment, it is easy to see how errors of judgment respect- ing moral conduct, in many cases, may spring up. And yet it is true, that there are primary 38 MOEAL SCIENCE. truths in morals, in which, all men agree, so soon as they are presented to the mind. As in other cases, by pursuing a course of sophistical reason- ings, conclusions may be arrived at which are contradictory to these first principles, and this will produce perplexity ; or even a kind of spe- culative assent may be yielded to such conclu- sions of ratiocination ; but whenever it is neces- sary to form a practical judgment, the belief of intuitive truths must prevail. Our assent in these cases is not a matter of choice, but of ne- Berkeiey. cessity. Bishop Berkeley thought he had demonstrated that there was no external world ; and many others thought there was no flaw in his reasoning : but all these speculative skeptics were, nevertheless, practical believers in the real existence of external ob- jects. Atheistical and infidel philosophers have often endeavoured to prove that there is no in- trinsic difference between right and wrong, and some of them probably persuaded themselves that this opinion was true ; but these very men, when an act of great injustice towards them- selves or friends was committed, could not but AGREEMENT IN MORALS. 39 feel that it was morally evil; and when they saw an act of disinterested benevolence per- formed, they could not but approve it as morally good. CHAPTER V. WHETHER CONSCIENCE IS THE SAME AS THE UNDERSTAND- ING, OR A FACULTY DIFFERENT FROM AND INDEPEND- ENT OF IT. Some have maintained that our moral feelings and judgments are the exercise of a peculiar state of the ques- sense > and that the perceptions and tlon * feelings of this sense cannot be referred to the understanding. Such as main- tain this theory suppose, also, that the dictates of conscience are infallibly correct, if the mind is in a proper state. Others have maintained that the dictates of conscience are the judgments of the understand- ing, in regard to moral duty, and Tmths premised. that, of course, an error in the judgment of the understanding must affect the decisions or dictates of conscience. To clear CONSCIENCE AND REASON. 41 this subject, if possible, from all obscurity and perplexity, I would make the following re- marks: 1st. The exercise of the moral faculty, or conscience, is not simply an intellectual act ; it is complex, including two things The act complex — a judgment and an emotion, or feeling of a peculiar kind. 2d. All judgments of the mind, whatever be the subject of them, appertain to the under- standing. This comprehensive fa- culty includes all intellectual acts, *W*"<*ytiBin- J ' tellectuaL whether relating to external ob- jects, mathematical relations, natural beauty and sublimity, or moral duty. So far, therefore, as conscience is a judgment respecting any moral subject, so far it is an exercise of the understand- ing. We have not one faculty by which we discern physical truths, another by which we judge of mathematical theorems, and another for matters of taste ; but all these are the one and the same understanding, exercised on different objects. Accordingly, when moral qualities are the objects of our contemplation, it is not a dif- 42 MORAL SCIENCE. ferent faculty from the reason or understanding which thinks and judges, but the same, exercised on other subjects ; and the only difference is in the object. Our conclusion therefore is, that so far as conscience is an intellectual act or judg- ment of the mind, so far it belongs to the under- standing. 3d. But as more is included under the name conscience than a mere intellectual act or judg- ment, and as this judgment is at- More than intellect- ual acts in con- tended with a peculiar feeling, science. called moral, and easily distin- guished from all other emotions; and as mere emotion or feeling can with no propriety be re- ferred to the reason, therefore conscience is, so far as this is concerned, different from the un- derstanding. 4th. If the moral judgments of the mind were from a faculty distinct from the under- standing, and often differing from Harmony of mental operations as to it, the harmony of the mental operations would be destroyed. While reason led to one conclusion, conscience might dictate the contrary. And upon this ONSCIENCE AND REASON. 43 theory, conscience must always be correct, un- less the faculty be morbid All experience and history show that men may act under the influence of an erroneous conscience. The dictates of con- science are always in conformity ^Z^r^o™*™ with the practical judgments of reason. When these are erroneous, conscience is erroneous. The conclusion therefore is that conscience is not a distinct faculty from reason, so far as it consists in a judgment of the quality of moral acts. Eeason or understanding is the genus ; the judgments of conscience are the species. Eeason has relation to all intelligible subjects; the moral faculty is conversant about moral qualities alone.* CHAPTER VI. THE MORAL SENSE COMPARED WITH TASTE, From what was said in the preceding chapter, it appears that conscience, or the moral sense, is not a simple but a compound fac- ^sense' 111 "^ ult 7> Eluding both an intellectual act or judgment, and a peculiar feeling or emotion. The name moral sense was probably adopted to express this feeling, or internal emotion. It will serve perhaps to illus- trate this subject, if we bring into view another faculty, between which and the moral sense there is a remarkable analogy. I refer to what is commonly called Taste, or that faculty by which men are in some degree capable of per- ceiving and relishing the beauties of nature and art. In this there is a judgment respecting that quality denominated Beauty, but there is also COJtfSCIENCE AND TASTE. 45 a vivid emotion of a peculiar kind, accompany- ing this judgment. The external objects in which beauty is resident, might be distinctly seen, and yet no such quality be perceived ; as was before mentioned in regard to certain ani- mals, whose sight and hearing is more acute than those of men, and which yet appear to be utterly insensible of the quality called beauty. If the question should be raised whether Taste is merely an exercise of the under- standing, the proper answer WOuld Analogy between - . , • ,i r judgments of taste be precisely as in the case of and of conscience, conscience, viz., so far as it consists in judgment, it appertains to the intellectual facul- ty ; but so far as it consists in emotion, it does not. And in this, as in matters of conscience, errors of judgment will affect the emotions pro- duced. In cultivating Taste, it is of the utmost importance that correct opinions be adopted in relation to the objects of this faculty. The question may perhaps be asked, why either of these should be considered a distinct faculty of the mind. In regard to mental facul- ties or powers, there is a want of agreement 46 MORAL SCIENCE. among philosophers, as to what is requisite to entitle any mental operation to be referred to a distinct and original faculty. In "Whether in ei- ther case a distinct these two cases, there exists in the faculty. mind a capacity for perceiving pe- culiar qualities in certain appropriate objects. Though the ideas of beauty and morality are judgments of the understanding, it requires a faculty suited to the objects, to enable the under- standing to obtain the simple ideas of beauty and morality. We can conceive of a rational mind without such a capacity. There is also in these faculties, the susceptibility of a peculiar emo- tion, dissimilar from all others ; and these two things constitute the faculty of Taste or Con- science. But it is a matter of no importance whether taste and conscience be called distinct and original faculties, if what has been said re- specting their nature be admitted. There is in the human mind a capacity of discerning what is termed beauty, ^t S botn. PtiM " ^ the works of natoe and art - This judgment is accompanied by a pleasurable emotion, and to this capacity or CONSCIENCE AND TASTE. 47 susceptibility we give the name Taste, There is also a power of discerning moral qualities, which conception is also attended with a vivid emo- tion ; and to this power or faculty we give the name Conscience, or the moral faculty. Both these are so far original parts of our constitution, that if there did not exist in every mind a sense of beauty and its contrary, and a sense of right and wrong, such ideas could be generated, or com- municated by no process of education? CHAPTER VII. MORAL OBLIGATION. Much has been written to explain the true ground of* moral obligation. But the subject has been rather darkened and per- Obligation. plexed than elucidated, by these comments. It is always so when men undertake to explain that which is so clear that it needs no explanation. Every idea of morality includes in it that of moral obligation. A moral act is one which ought to be performed ; an im- l d ea n of U moX CTy mOTal ^ *» ° ne wMch OUgHt not to be performed. As soon as we get the conception of a moral act, we receive with it the idea of moral obligation. It would be a contradiction to say that any act was moral, and yet that there was no obligation to perform MOEAL OBLIGATION. 49 it. One of the best definitions which can be given of a moral act, is that it is an act which we are bound to perform, and of .. What a moral act is. an immoral act, that it is one which ought not to be done. The more clearly we see any thing to be moral, the more sensibly we feel ourselves under a moral obligation to perform it. This being a matter of common intuition, and universal experience, all that is necessary to convince us of its truth, is to bring it distinctly before our minds. There is there- fore no need to look any further for the grounds and reasons of moral obligation, than to the morality of the act itself, as this idea is involved in every conception of morality. The following citation from Dr. Price's work on Morals, is in accordance with the view just given : " From the account given of obligation, it appears how absurd it is to Why we are obliged inquire, what obliges us to practise to do right-not . „ -, ,. . to be asked. virtue r as if obligation were no part of the idea of virtue, but something adven- titious and foreign to it : that is, as if what was our duty might not be our duty ; as if it might 50 MORAL SCIENCE. I not be true, that what is fit to do, we ought to do, and that what we ought to do, we are obliged to do. To ask why we are obliged to practise virtue, to abstain from what is wicked, or perform what is just, is the very same as to ask why we are obliged to do what we are obliged to do. It is not possible to avoid won- dering at those who have so unaccountably embarrassed themselves, on a subject that one would think was attended with so little diffi- culty: and who, because they cannot find any thing in virtue and duty themselves, which can induce and oblige us to pay a regard to them — fly to self-love, and maintain that from hence alone are derived all inducement and obligation." Dr. Paley commences his second A ZpSf hd6a " book on Moral Philosophy, by an inquiry into the nature of moral obligation. He asks, "Why am I obliged to keep my word ? " and mentions several answers which would be given by different persons, and which he says all coincide. But he goes on to say that all the answers leave the matter short ; for the inquirer may turn round upon his MORAL OBLIGATION. 51 teacher with a second question, " Why am I obliged to do what is right, to act agreeably to the fitness of things, to conform to reason, nature or truth, to promote the public good, or to do the will of God?" All this, it appears to us, is fitted to mystify- as plain a subject as ever engaged the thoughts of a rational mind, and is designed to remove the true ground of insufficient moral obligation, and reduce all such obligation to the single principle of self-love, or the tendency of an act to promote individual happiness. Suppose then, after Dr. Paley had made all obligation to rest on the ground that the per- formance of a good act promotes our eternal happiness, the inquirer Tbe inquiry ™***- son&Dle. should again ask, "Why am I bound to perform that which will promote my happiness ?" The question, indeed, would be unreasonable, because all men are agreed that happiness is a good ; but is it not equally unrea- sonable, when an action is seen to be virtuous, or morally right, to ask "Why am I obliged to 52 MOBAL SCIENCE. do it ?" The moment we see a thing to be mor- ally right, the sense of obligation is complete, and all further inquiring for reasons why I am obliged to do right is as absurd as would be in- quiring for reasons why I should pursue hap- piness. Where we have intuitive certainty of any thing it is foolish to seek for other reasons. If there is any thing clear in the intuitive certainty V1 ; ew f a rational mind, it is this : is ultimate. 7 that virtue should be practised, that what is right should be done. But still further to perplex this plain subject, Dr. Paley has undertaken to inform us what is meant by obligation. "A man," says he, "is said to be obliged when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the will of another." This is, indeed, a very extraordinary defini- tion. The motive, he says, must be violent; but what should hinder that a mo- Paiey's definition, tive not violent should create an obligation according to its force? The main error of this definition is that it con- founds moral obligation with other motives of MORAL OBLIGATION. 53 an entirely different kind. The obligation of which he speaks, is created by the will or com- mand of another. The law of a tyrant requir- ing his subjects to do what is evidently wrong cannot create a moral obligation. A rational being may be urged by the threats of a tyrant, on the universal principle of self-love, and this force may, by an abuse of terms, be called an obligation ; but according to the common usage of the language, when a man is said to be un- der obligation to perform an act, we mean that he is morally bound. But whether the opera- tion of any violent motive, resulting from the will of another, may be said to oblige a man or not, the main inquiry is, what is the ground of moral obligation? The difference between a moral obligation and other motives which may oblige should be kept in view. He then returns to the question, " Why am I obliged to keep my word?" and applies the preceding definition of the nature of obligation, and gives the follow- Pa ^ t ^ ,mt ° f ing answer: "Because I am urged to do so by a violent motive (namely, the ex- 54 MORAL SCIENCE. pectation of being after this life rewarded if I do, or punished if I do not), resulting from the com- mand of another (namely, of God)." He goes on to say, " When I first turned my attention to moral speculations, an air of mystery seemed to hang over the whole subject, which arose, I be- lieve, from hence ; that I supposed with many authors whom I had consulted that to be obliged to do a thing, was different from being induced to do it ; and that the obligation to practise vir- tue, and to do what is justice, is quite another thing and of another kind from the obligation which a soldier is under to obey his officer, or a servant his master, or any of the ordinary obli- gations of human life.' 7 We cannot but be of the opinion that Dr. Paley has here made a radical mistake, which it is ex- ceedingly important to consider, Erroneous. since, unhappily for sound morals, his system is so much employed in the instruction of youth. The theory of morals, of which the above principle is a part, is no other than this : that the only difference between virtue and vice, consists MORAL OBLIGATION. 55 in their tendency, respectively, to promote or hinder the happiness of the indi- vidual; so that if a man could ^1" ° f persuade himself that no evil would arise to him from telling a lie, he would be under no obligation to speak the truth. It is a scheme of morals which obliterates all intrinsic difference between virtue and vice, and makes the one preferable to the other on no other ac- count than its tendency to promote individual happiness in the future world. If a man does not believe in a future world, he cam according to this theorv, feel no obliga- tion to keep Ms word. "We be- lieve, on the contrary, that moral m £™Z -° f tte J ' hypothesis. obligation is felt by the atheist, and that he cannot divest himself of it. When men are tempted by some strong motive to de- viate from the truth, and yet are enabled to re- sist the temptation, there is in most cases no dis- tinct consideration of any future good to be gained by it, but the man feels himself under an obligation to do that which is in itself right. The conflict is not between a greater and a less 56 MOKAL SCIENCE. happiness, but between the prospect of happi- ness and moral obligation. On this subject, the appeal must be to the common judgment of men. And we are per- suaded that this confounding of moral obligation with motives of another kind, is a radical defect in Dr. Paley's system, which — lying at the foun- ds tion — vitiates the whole, and has already been the cause of great evil to society. The true doctrine is, that vir- stated™ d ° CMne tue and vice are distinct and °P- posite, and that when we know any act to be right, we are bound — aside from all considerations of self-interest — to perform it. Dr. Paley maintains that " we can be obliged to nothing, unless we are to lose or gain some- thing by it, for nothing else can be doctol ° PP ° Site a < violent motive' tons. And as we should not be obliged to obey the laws or the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other depended on our obedience ; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do MORAL OBLIGATION. 57 what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the command of God." According to this view, unless a man is per- suaded that he shall gain something by keeping his word, he is under no obligation j. J '± th *-C n J i u Virtue thus made to do it. Even if God should mercenary . clearly make known his will, and lay upon him his command, he is under no obli- gation to obey, unless certain that he shall re- ceive benefit by so doing. This is, indeed, to make virtue a mercenary thing, and reduce all motives to a level. And as self-love, or the de- sire of happiness, is the only rational motive, and all men possess this in a sufficient degree of strength, the only conceivable difference between the good and the bad, consists in the superioi sagacity which the one has above the other te discern what will most contribute to happiness. And if what we call vice or sin could be made to contribute to happiness, then it would change its nature and become virtue. The definition of obligation, given by Dr ; Paley, upon his own principles, is unnecessarily encumbered with what adds nothing to its im- 58 MORAL SCIENCE. port. Why should the " violent motive" result from the command of another? uon P otscure. defini " The command of another ought to have no influence, except as obedience or disobedience will be attended with loss or gain. It would, therefore, have been more simple and intelligible to say at once, what is certainly implied, that the only motive which can oblige us to be virtuous, is the expectation of the happiness to be derived from such con- duct in the future world. Cicero, in his work " De Finibus," says that those men who confounded the honestum with the utile, deserved to be banished The honestum f rom SO ciety. The result ol the and the utile. J whole scheme is, that there us no such thing as moral excellence, abstractly oon sidered; that the only good in the universe is happiness; and that other things, among vtnch virtue is included, are good only as related to this end. If this is true, the moral attributes of God have no intrinsic excellence ; they are all merged in his infinite felicity. Surely this view MORAL OBLIGATION. 59 is not suited to increase our reverence for tlie Supreme Being. But every man who carefully examines into his own primary ideas of morality, will find that he has a sense of right and wrong, independent of all considerations ^g^J t0 pri * of personal happiness, or its loss. This distinction is too deeply engraven on the mind to be erased by any process of reasoning. CHAPTER VIIL THE SUPEEMACY OF CONSCIENCE. That the dictates of conscience should be obeyed, is one of the most evident perceptions of the human mind. No matter be" 06 "" 1 *' h ° W mUch mi S ht be S ained h ? going contrary to conscience, every honest mind has the same judgment, that duty should be done. If it is plain that a certain act — such as confessing the truth of the gos- pel — is a duty, and we are convinced that no- thing but suffering will ensue from performing it; yet the judgment of the impartial mind is, that no prospect of pain or loss can ever justify us in denying the truth, or in doing any thing else that we know to be wrong. On this point, there is no room for reasoning. The judgment that conscience should be obeyed, is intuitive : SUPREMACY OF CONSCIENCE. 61 all men must acknowledge it, unless they belie the clear convictions of their own reason. That conscience should be obeyed, that duty should be performed at every risk, are maxims which must receive the assent of Admitted maxim. all who are capable of under- standing them. On the subject of the supremacy of conscience, the following quotation from Dr. Chalmers, is very much to our purpose : "In every human heart there is a faculty— not, it may be, having the actual power, but having the just and rightful pre- tension to act as judge and master Chalmers, over the whole of human conduct. Other propensities may have too much sway, but the moral propensity — if I may so term it — never can ; for, to have the presiding sway in all our concerns, is just that which properly and legitimately belongs to it. A man under anger, may be too strongly prompted to deeds of retali- ation, or under sensuality may be too strongly prompted to indulgence, or under avarice, be too closely addicted to the pursuit of wealth, or even under friendship be too strongly inclined to 62 MOKAL SCIENCE. partiality ; but he never can, under conscience, be too strongly inclined to be as lie ought, and to do as lie ought. We may say of a watch, that its main-spring is too powerful, but we would never say that a regulator was too power- ful." " And neither do we urge the proposition that conscience has in every instance the actual direction of human affairs, for this were in the face of all experience. It is not that every man obeys her dictates, but that every man feels that he ought to obey them. These dictates are often, in life and practice, disregarded ; so that conscience is not the sove- reign de facto. Still there is a voice within the hearts of all which asserts that ere^n. SCienC6iS """ conscience is the sovereign dejure: that to her belongs the command rightfully, even though she do not possess it actually." .... " All that we affirm is, that if conscience prevail over the other principles, then every man is led, by the very make and mechan- ism of his internal economy, to feel, that it is as it ought to be ; or if these others prevail over conscience, that it is not as it ought to be." .... SUPREMACY OF CONSCIENCE. 63 11 When stating the supremacy of conscience, in the sense that we have explained it, we but state what all men feel ; and our only argument in proof of the assertion is — our only argument can be, an appeal to the experience of all men.'' These sentiments wiP find a Inward verdict. response in every honest mind. However often we disobey the voice of this monitor, we always have the feeling of self- condemnation accompanying our disobedience. CHAPTER IX. WHETHER WE ALWAYS DO EIGHT BY OBEYING THE DICTATES OF CONSCIENCE ? This is one of the most perplexing questions m tlie science of morals. Many are of opinion that all that is necessary to render Difficulty of the . n . , J - problem. an action good is that the agent act agreeably to the dictates of his own conscience. This may be considered a vul- gar opinion, usually taken up without much consideration. But there is an opinion, neai akin to this, which has been advocated by some of the greatest men of the age ; namely, that men are not responsible for their opinions or be- lief. It is thought that the adoption of this as a maxim is the only effectual method of putting an end to the bitter animosities and controver- sies among the advocates of different creeds. OBEYING CONSCIENCE. 65 It is not wonderful that they who make the moral sense, in a sort, infallible, and the ultimate standard of right source of error. and wrong, should hold that men cannot go astray if they will honestly listen to the voice of conscience, and obey her dictates. But as we have shown that conscience is the judgment of the mind respecting duty, and as no man's knowledge is perfect or in- fallible, it follows, therefore, that Error of under- standing may affect so far as there is error in the un- moral judgments. derstanding in relation to matters of duty, just so far the conscience will be mis- guided. The question at issue, therefore, is whether an action, wrong in itself, can be con- sidered as a good and virtuous action if the agent believes that it is right. If the affirma- tive were true, then the discovery of truth would be of no value, otherwise truth would be needless. for obviously upon this principle error is just as good as truth. But as soon would we believe that darkness is as good as light to direct us in the way which we wish to travel. Again, this theory supposes that a man is under 66 MOKAL SCIENCE. no law but his own opinion, or the dictates of conscience ; that, therefore, which opinion would is a sin in one man may be a duty be law. to another in precisely the same external circumstances and relations; which would be to confound all moral distinctions. This theory would go to sanction False religion would eve ry form of religion, however be right J & ' corrupt and superstitious ; and to make the vilest immoralities virtuous ; for there can be no doubt that the votaries of idolatry, in their most cruel and abominable rites, follow the dictates of an erring conscience. "When the heathen sacrifice to demons, and when the vic- tim is a human being, or even a fixst-born son, there is nothing wrong, for all these acts of wor- ship are performed in obedience to conscience. Every species of persecution and the Inquisition itself may be justified on this principle. In- stead, therefore, of putting an end to all animos- ity, it would bring back, in all their horrors, the days of persecution for conscience' sake. On this subject, again, our appeal must be to the unbiassed judgment of mankind; and we OBEYING CONSCIENCE. 67 think the verdict will be, that error which mio-ht have been avoided, and ignorance, , . , . . . ., .. ., Avoidable and which is not invincible, do not unavoidable, excuse. The knowledge neces- sary to duty is within the reach of every man were he disposed sincerely to seek after it. But it is a truth which is of importance on this sub- ject, that one false step leads to another ; and though a man who has adopted fundamental error, labours under a kind of necessity to do wrong, yet this does not excuse him, because he ought to have exercised more diligence and im- partiality in seeking for the truth, and is justly liable to all the evil consequences resulting from this neglect. Suppose a man to have been educated in a wrong system of religion and morals ; he is re- sponsible, because, when arrived at the years of maturity, he should Dut ^ of correcting J J 7 errors. have brought the opinions received by education under an honest examination. The more difficult it is to divest ourselves of preju- dices thus imbibed, as it were, with the mother's milk, the more necessary is it that, under the in- 68 MOKAL SCIENCE. fluence of a sincere love of truth, we should, with impartiality, diligence, and resolution, endeavour to do so. It is no proof that such a course is not the solemn duty of man, that few ever perform it. The prevalence of error in the world, is very much owing to the neglect of this duty. This neglect arises from culpable indolence, from a desire to remain in agreement with the multitude or with our parents and teachers, from aversion to the truth and an unwillingness to deny our- selves, and incur the inconvenience and perse- cution which an avowal of the truth would bring upon us. But none of these reasons will justify us in adhering to opinions which are detrimental to ourselves and others, or contrary to our moral obligations. It is true, if a man's conscience dictates a certain action, he is morally bound to obey; but if that action is in itself wrong, he commits sin in performing it, nevertheless. He who is under fundamental error, is in a sad dilemma. Do what he will, he sins. If he dis- obey conscience, he knowingly sins ; doing what he believes to be wrong ; and a man never can be justified for doing what he believes to be OBEYING CONSCIENCE. 69 wrong, even though it should turn out to be right. And if he obey conscience, performing an act which is in itself wrong, he sins ; because he complies not with the law under which he is placed. It may be asked, "How can a man be responsible in such circumstances, The seat of respon- when he is under a necessity of sibmtyinsuchacase. doing wrong ?" We are responsi- ble for suffering ourselves to be brought into such a state ; we are responsible for our ignor- ance of the truth. Hence we see how important the duty of seeking after truth with untiring dili- gence, and honest impartiality. The same neces- sity is found to arise from forming bad habits, and cherishing evil passions. The heart in which envy to another has been indulged until it has become habitual, cannot exercise kind and bro- therly affections to that person ; but this is no excuse. The fault may be traced far back, but guilt is attached to every act of envy, however inveterate the habit. If this were not so, the greater the sinner, the less his responsibility. The objection to making a man responsible for his opinions, is, that his belief does not de* 70 MORAL SCIENCE. pend upon his will, but results necessarily from the evidence existing before the mind, at any moment. This is true; but we may turn our minds away from the evidence objection, that be- w ] 1 i c ] 1 WO uld have produced a con- lier is involuntary. - 1 - viction of the truth. And this is not all; there may be such a state of mind, that evidence of a certain kind cannot be perceived. Depravity produces blindness of mind, in regard to the beauty and excellency of moral objects. But every man ought to be free from such a state or temper of mind, as produces distorted or erroneous views. Surely, moral depravity can- not be an excuse for erroneous opinions. All actions proceed from certain principles ; if, there- fore, the action is wrong, because of the corrupt principle, the burden of culpability must be rolled back upon the principle, or state of the soul, which sends forth evil acts, as a poisoned foun- tain sends forth deleterious streams. Metaphysical reasoning, however, rather per- plexes and obscures than elucidates such points. Let us hold fast by the plain principles of com- mon sense, and appeal to the common judgment OBEYING CONSCIENCE. 71 of mankind ; and the decision will be, that igno- rance or error which might have Avoidable igno- been avoided, never excuses from ranee does not ex- cuse, blame. The same is true of all evil habits and inveterate passions, which, have been voluntarily or heedlessly contracted. The whole course of a moral agent must be taken together; his moral acts are complicated, and intimately connected. They form a web, in which one thread is connected with another, and one serves to give strength to another. If we honestly consult our conscience, we feel guilty when we have done wrong, even though we did it ignorantly; because we ought not to have been in ignorance. Two things, therefore, are necessary, in or- der to determine that an action is right : first, that the state of mind of the agent What consti- be such as it ought to be ; and se- tutes a right ac- tion, conclly, that the action be in con- formity with the law under which we are placed ; for the very idea of morality supposes us to be under a moral law. While, then, we cannot do better than obey 72 MORAL SCIENCE. conscience ; yet if conscience is erroneous, we do not fulfil our duty by such, obedience, but may commit grievous sin. Duty not fulfil- led by obeying erro- For, following the dictates of con- neous conscience. science, is only one circumstance essential to a good action. When we do wrong while obeying the dictates of conscience, the error does not consist in that obedience, but in not following the right rule, with which rule the accountable moral agent should be acquainted. CHAPTER X WHETHER THERE IS IN THE MIND A LAW OE RULE, BT WHICH MAN JUDGES OF THE MORALITY OF PARTICU- LAR ACTIONS? If sticIi a rule existed in the mind prior to tlie observation of particular acts of a moral nature, we should be conscious of it : no- Mental rules are thing of the nature of a law or objects of conscious- ness, rule can have existence in the mind, without the knowledge of the mind itself. There seems to be a common mistake as to the process of the mind in regard to general principles. It seems to be thought . . The actual process that m order to judge whether an of the mind in mor- . al judgments. action be right or wrong, there must be something like a general rule or law, which the mind applies, as the workman does 74 MORAL SCIENCE. his rule, to ascertain whether the quality of the action be good or bad. But as we are conscious of no such process as the application of a gene- ral rule, there seems to be no evidence whatever of its existence. The real process of the mind is very simple. When a moral action is viewed, if its nature is simple and palpable, the mind intuitively perceives its quality, and is conscious of no other mental process. Suppose a man, created as Adam was, in the full possession of his rational faculties : until some occasion offer- ed, to elicit its exercise, he would not be con- scious of any moral faculty or feeling. But suppose an act of flagrant injustice to be perpe- trated before him, he would at once have his moral faculty brought into exercise. He would see that the action had in it a moral turpitude, that it ought not to have been done, and that the agent deserved to be punished. So long as this was the only moral act observed or thought of, there would be in the mind nothing but the judgment, with the accompanying feeling that such an act, and of course every other act of the same kind, was evil. As such an observ- THE INTERNAL LAW. 75 er would, however, soon observe a multitude of acts, of different kinds, wliicli were judged to be good or bad, a general rule or law would be obtained, by degrees, out of these particulars. The process of the mind, in all cases, is from particulars to generals, and the tendency in the mind to put into classes those things which resemble each other, exists also in regard to moral actions. After observing a great number of acts, of different kinds, all of which are morally good or evil, these particulars are classi- fied, and form a general rule or law ; and when a new act is observed, it is referred to its proper class. But how can we know an action to be good or bad, without a rule with which to com- pare it, in the first instance? The answer is, that it is as easy to conceive of a faculty by which we can at once perceive the moral charac- ter of an act, as of the power of judging of the rectitude of a general rule. There is a sense in which it may be said, that reason, or the moral faculty having the power of discerning the moral quality of actions, has the rule in itself. If this is all that is intended by 76 MORAL SCIENCE. a general rule of right and wrong in the mind, there can be no objection to it. Whether the moral faculty has the This is saying no more than that rule in itself. the mind has a faculty by which it judges intuitively of many moral acts, as soon as they are observed. The idea may be thus illustrated : here is a straight line, as soon as I see it, I perceive it to be straight; there is a crooked line, which at once I perceive to be crooked. There is no need of a rule in the mind, by the application of which I know that the one is straight, and the other crooked. The quality of the lines is seen at once. So of many moral actions, the moment the mind apprehends them, their moral character is perceived. Here are some boys going to school. I ob- serve one, who is large and strong, forcibly taking from another, who is small A case stated. . and weak, some fruit which the latter has with much pains gathered for a sick mother. I need no general rule to guide my judgment. I need only to know the real cir- cumstances of the action. That a large and strong boy should by force take away from one THE INTERNAL LAW. 77 weaker than himself, property to which he has no right, and to which the other has a right, is so evidently immoral, that every mind sees the evil at once. The general law or rule of morals is there- fore made up by the observation General law of and classification of particular acts ; morals from par- ticular acts, just as the general law of gravity is formed by observation of particular facts. All our knowledge relates originally to par- ticular cases ; and general ideas and general rules and laws, are ^SSal^ formed by a process of the mind, which may be called generalization or classifica- tion. CHAPTER XL THE MOEAL FEELING WHICH ACCOMPANIES EVERY MOKAL JUDGMENT. Whether our judgments and feelings are dis- tinct and separate mental exercises, or whether what we call feeling or emotion is Feelings of appro- bation and disappro- only an idea of a more vivid kind, bation. is a question which we need not discuss, as the decision of it is not necessary to our purpose. All men make a distinction be- tween acts which are purely intellectual, and those exercises of mind called emotions ; and no practical error can arise from observing this dis- tinction — whether philosophically correct or not. In every case where a moral object or relation comes before the mind, there is a feeling of ap- probation or disapprobation, according to the moral character of the object, of which we are THE MORAL EMOTION. 79 immediately conscious. This approbation or disapprobation will not be equal in all cases, but exceedingly different in degree. While some moral actions elicit, when perceived, a very slight degree of approbation or disapprobation, others excite strong emotion; the disapproval arising to indignation, and the approval to ad- miration. In every instance where a good act is ob- served, there is a feeling of esteem for the agent, as well as approbation of the act. A disposition, tOO, is felt to be- The idea of merit stow some reward on the person who performs a good action. If we see a man, at the imminent risk of his own life, plunge into the sea to save a stranger who has fallen over- board, we approve the action, and feel that he deserves a reward. We therefore call it a meri- torious action ; for the simple idea of merit is that which deserves a reward. On the other hand, when we are witnesses of a wicked act of an enormous kind, as, for ex- ample, a man murdering a good parent or a kind benefactor, without any provocation, but 80 MORAL SCIENCE. instigated by avarice or resentment — we feel in- stantaneously a degree of disap- feetog.^^* 017 probation which may properly be called indignation. This feeling would be accompanied by a strong desire that condign punishment should be inflicted on the wicked perpetrator of such a deed. If there were no other means of executing justice, we should feel disposed to aid in punishing the cul- prit ; and the idea of such a person escaping without punishment, is painful to the impartial mind, and revolting to the moral feelings. These moral emotions are, however, of very different degrees of intensity in different per- sons, and in the same person at different pe- riods of his life. Persons who aiemTioi 11111101 " have been long accustomed to see atrocious crimes committed, lose in time their moral sensibility, and become ac- customed to scenes of blood and robbery. In proportion as the minds of men are enlightened by the truth, and their hearts upright, will be the sensibility of the moral faculty. But by committing sin, as well as by observing it, the THE MORAL EMOTION. 81 moral sensibilities are blunted. This want of right feeling in the conscience is what is called a u seared conscience," which expression is bor- rowed from the effect produced on any part of a living body, by the repeated application of a heated iron. The result is, that, by degrees, the skin thickens, and the sensibility of the seared part is lost, or rendered obtuse. Besides this feeling of approbation or disap- probation of moral acts, good or evil, there is a peculiar emotion, in relation to moral acts, according to their na- Emotion in tegard 7 ° to acts as our own. ture, when performed by ourselves. In this case, the emotion is much more vivid than when we contemplate the same action as per- formed by another. When a person is conscious of having performed a truly good action, and from the proper motives, he experiences an emotion of pleasure, of a very peculiar and exalted nature. For this emotion, we have no distinctive name ; it may be called the pleasure of a good or ap- proving conscience. It must not be confounded with self-complacency, or a proud opinion of our own worth, which may also arise from the per- 4* 82 MORAL SCIENCE. formanee of a meritorious action. The feeling of which mention has been made, is a simple emotion arising in the mind, from the principles of the human constitution, upon the performance of a good action. One reason why it has not been more noticed is, that it has no distinctive name. The emotion experienced on the per- formance of a wicked action is well known to every one. It has a distinctive appellation — re- morse. It is a feeling distinguishable from all others, and more intolerable than any other spe- cies of pain. When violent, it often drives the unhappy subject of it to the most desperate acts. It is like a scorpion, stinging the soul in its ten- derest part. No language can exaggerate the misery of a soul abandoned to the torture of this feeling. And though in time it may seem to be allayed by forgetfulness of the crime, yet when any circumstance or association brings the evil action distinctly before the conscience, the torment is renewed. Thus, acts of iniquity com- mitted in heedless gayety, often produce sensible remorse in the time of solitude and reflection ; and the sins of youth embitter old age. This THE MOEAL EMOTION. 83 feeling often accompanies the sinner to his times of decline, and is the pain which most annoys him on his bed of death. As the feeling accom- panies the guilty unto the last moment of their earthly existence, there is much reason to think that it will cause the bitterest anguish of a future state. CHAPTER XII. BELIEF IN GOD, AS CONNECTED WITH THE OPEEATION OF CONSCIENCE. The question is, whether an atheist is completely divested of the feeling of moral obligation. To those who suppose that speculative The question sta- atheism is impossible, this ques- tion will appear irrelevant ; for it would be useless to inquire what would be the effect of a state of mind which never can exist. As, however, the evidences of the actual ex- istence of atheism are as strong as those of most other fundamental errors ; and as The atheist per- the doctrine of certain ideas being ceives right and wrong. impressed on the mind in its crea- tion (on which the opinion that men could not become atheists was founded), is now generally exploded, it may be here taken as admitted that there are atheists in the world. BELIEF IN GOD. 85 The question proposed is therefore a proper sub- ject for consideration. Bishop Warburton in his "Divine Legation of Moses," seems to adopt the opinion, that a belief in the being of God, is re- quisite to the exercise of conscience, or the sense of moral obligation. But his reasonings on the subject are by no means satisfactory. If we may refer to the experience of the atheist himself, he will assure us, that he perceives the difference between right and wrong, as plainly as others, and that he is conscious of being under a moral obligation to pursue a virtuous course. This, however, they consider an instinctive or consti- tutional principle, which should be obeyed, just as our appetites and other natural propensities should be obeyed. If there are intuitive perceptions of moral relations, when actions of a certain kind are pre- sented to the view of the rational mind, then it is certain that con- intuitive percep- tions not dependent science may and will operate, what- on other knowledge, ever may be the opinions of the person on other subjects. No one, when he con- templates an act of flagrant injustice, is conscious 86 MOBAL SCIENCE. of a reference to the existence of a moral Gov- ernor, prior to his moral judgment of the quality of the action. The perception of its moral evil is as immediate as that of the colour of the sky, or the grass. But how can a man feel a moral obli- gation, unless he admits that there objection and j s a SU p e rior to whom he is bound ? answer. x how can he feel himself under a law, unless there is a law-giver? The answer is, that this part of the human constitution fur- nishes a conclusive argument in favour of the be- ing of God. "We have a law written within us, and from the sense of obligation to obey this law, we cannot escape. The great Creator has not left himself without a witness, in the breast of every man. It is possible that a man may be so abandoned as to believe in lies, and that he may come to disbelieve in the God that made and supports him. But he cannot obliterate the law written on his heart ; he cannot divest himself of the conviction that certain actions are mo- rally wrong ; nor can he prevent the stings of remorse, when he commits sins of an enormous kind. Men may, indeed, spin out refined meta* BELIEF IN GOD. 87 physical theories, and come to the conclusion that there is no difference between virtue and vice, and that these distinctions are the result of education. But let some one commit a flagrant act of injustice toward themselves, and their practical judgment will give the lie to their the- oretical opinion. As those speculatists who argue that there is no external world, will avoid running against a post, or into the fire, as carefully Moral distinc- as Other men; SO they Who en- tions cannot be rea- soned away. deavour to reason themselves into the belief that virtue and vice are mere notions, generated by education, cannot, nevertheless, avoid perceiving that some actions are base, un- just, or ungrateful, and consequently to be dis- approved of, whether committed by themselves or others. The inferences from what has been said are, that by no arts or course of conduct can men so eradicate the moral faculty, that there shall no longer be any sense J^"" of right and wrong. And again, it is evident that, although the belief of the ex- S8 MORAL SCIENCE. istence of God is not necessary to the operations of conscience, yet from the existence of this fa- culty the existence of God may be inferred. And finally, that although the atheist cannot destroy the moral faculty, yet the firmer the be- lief of God's existence, and the Dictates of con- science modified by clearer the knowledge of his attri- belief in God. butes, the more distinct and for- cible will be the dictates of conscience. More- over, while the blindness of atheism continues, there will of course be no perception of the moral duties which arise out of our relation to the great Creator; and thus the largest and most important class of moral actions will be out of view. And this is true, to a great degree, in regard to the practical atheist, who forgets God habitually ; he feels very little sense of obligation to worship and serve him. CHAPTER XIII. MORAL AGENCY, AND WHAT IS NECESSARY TO IT. As actions of moral agents are the proper and on- ly objects of moral approbation or disapprobation, it becomes necessary to institute an . _ The question to inquiry into the nature of moral be determined by experience. agency ; or into what are the con- stituents of a moral agent. The decision of this question must depend entirely on experience, and can never be determined by reasoning on abstract principles. The process is simply this : we contemplate a great variety of acts, which by the moral faculty we judge to possess a moral character. We next examine the circumstances in which those acts were performed, and we con- clude those things which are found in all of them, to be necessary to moral agency. Or, to render the examination more simple, we may 90 MOKAL SCIENCE. suppose some one condition of the action to be absent, and then another, and then viewing the action as thus changed in its circumstances, we may bring it before the mind, and if the moral quality of the act appear unchanged, we conclude that that which has been removed from it is no essential circumstance in moral agency. But if the change in the circumstances of the action, leads all men to take an entirely different view of its nature, then we conclude that this circum- stance is essential to moral agency. mg^Xencr To illustrate this principle, let us suppose the following case : If we see a man suddenly, without any apparent provo- cation, raise his hand and strike another, believ- ing that it was freely done, by a man compos mentis, we feel a strong disapprobation of the act, as immoral and deserving punishment. But if on inquiry it is ascertained that the person who committed the assault was utterly destitute of reason, we may blame his keepers or friends who left him at liberty, but we no longer feel any moral disapprobation of the act. For it is the intuitive judgment of all persons, that a man MORAL AGENCY. 91 destitute of reason is not a moral agent, nor ac- countable for his actions, whatever evil may- be produced. "We consider such a man as ex- actly in the same predicament as a wild beast which does an injury. This is the common judgment of men ; for in all courts of justice, when a man is arraigned for an assault, if it can be proved that he was a maniac at the time, he is acquitted, and all men approve the judicial decision which exempts him from punishment. Hence it is apparent that the ex- ercise of reason is essential to 8on E ^^ie. a " moral agency. We may bring before our minds a thousand acts, under different circumstances, but all performed by agents with- out reason, and no man can believe that such actions are of a moral nature, or of good or ill desert. It may seem to be an objection to this broad assertion that there are some who entertain the opinion that infants are moral No objection lies, agents from their birth, and com- from the case of in- fants, mit actual sin. But these persons do not suppose that an irrational being can be a 92 MORAL SCIENCE. moral agent, but they think that infants have an obscure exercise of reason. Their mistake is not in the general principle which has been laid down, but in the fact that infants have reason in exercise. Again, let the case supposed be varied. Let it be that the person committing the assault had the full exercise of reason, Another instance. but that the stroke was not volun- tary, but the effect of a spasmodic, diseased, action of the muscles; or that the hand was moved by another. Every one, at once, judges that the person giving the stroke, whatever he might be in other matters, was no moral agent in this assault. It was a mere physical opera- tion, and not proceeding from the will, could not be a moral act. Here we have « Jj^i ary acti ° n a second circumstance or charac- necessary. teristic, essential to moral agency, namely, that the action be voluntary. No in- voluntary action can be of a moral nature. Some distinguish the liberty of the agent from voluntariness, but to us they appear to be the same, or to involve one another. If an act MORAL AGENCY. 93 is voluntary, it is free ; and if free, it must be voluntary. The highest conceiv- able degree of liberty in a depen- J^"*"* dent being, is the power of doing as he wills or pleases. But as this subject has by metaphysical controversy been involved in perplexity, something may be said hereafter, respecting what is called the freedom of the will. When it is said that the actions of moral agents are the only proper objects of moral ap- probation or disapprobation, two qualifications of the assertion must cu ™ on may be be taken into view. The first is, that the omission to act when duty calls, is as much an object of disapprobation as a wicked action. Should we see a number of persons sailing on a river in a boat, and while we sur- veyed them, should a child near them fall into the river, and no hand be stretched out to rescue it from drowning, we could not help feeling a strong disapprobation of the conduct of the per- sons who were near enough to render the neces- sary help. If, however, it should be ascertained 94 MORAL SCIENCE. that one or more of the persons were fast bound and pinioned, so that they could not possibly stretch out their hands to rescue the child, we should exempt them from all blame : for no man is bound to do what is physically impossible. The second qualification of the statement is, that when we disapprove an ex- toStent femd ternal act, we always refer the blame to the motive or intention. But if we have evidence that the agent possesses a nature or disposition which will lead him often or uniformly to perpetrate the same act when the occasion shall occur, we not only censure the motive, but extend our moral disapprobation to the disposition or evil nature, lying behind. If we suppose the case of an agent acted on by a superior power, so that the nature and direction of the act depend not Acts under control, upon the agent himself, but upon the power by which he is govern- ed, we shall consider the immediate agent as not free, and the acts brought forth, as not properly his acts, but those of the governing power. A demoniac or person possessed by an evil spirit MORAL AGENCY. 95 who had power to direct his thoughts and govern his actions, would not be an accountable agent. There are some who maintain that all human actions proceed from God, as their first cause, and that man can act only as he is acted upon. Upon this theory, it to ^:*f Dcy does not appear how man can be an accountable moral agent ; for though his ac- tions may be voluntary, and performed in the exercise of reason, yet as he does not originate them, they can scarcely be considered his own. We will now suppose the case of a man pos- sessing reason, freedom, and will, and originating his own actions, but destitute of a Moral faculty ne- moral faculty, or unable to per- cessary to moral «.«. agency. ceive a difference between right and wrong. Can such a person be considered a, moral agent? We think not. That being — how much soever of reason he may possess — who has no perception of moral relations, and no feeling of moral obligation, would be incapa ble of a moral law, or of performing moral acts. But the case is an imaginary one. There are, I 96 MOEAL SCIENCE. believe, none, who possess reason, and yet are destitute of all moral sense ; but though, we con- ceive of the intellect of a dog or an elephant in- creased to any degree, yet, as being destitute of a moral faculty, we do not regard them as moral agents. CHAPTER XIV. MAN A MORAL AGENT. Very few have entertained the opinion that man is a mere machine, governed by physical influences. It will not be The ^ nestion *&• necessary, therefore, to occupy time in refuting an opinion contrary to reason and universal experience. But there are many who entertain the opinion that man is the creature of necessity; that in the circumstances in which each man is placed, he could not be different Fatalism, from what he is. This theory of fatalism is plausible, because a slight observation - of the history of man shows that the moral characters of most men are formed by the edu- cation which they receive, and by the sentiments and conduct of those with whom they associate. 98 MORAL SCIENCE. It has, therefore, been maintained — and the opinion has in our day been industriously propa- gated — that man is not a free and accountable agent ; that he is what he is, by the operation of causes over which he has no control ; that no man should be censured or pun- •SET"*" isiedfor his conduct, since those who censure him, if placed in the same circumstances, would act in the same man- ner. In short, that no man is responsible for his conduct ; because his actions — whether good or bad — are the effect of necessary causes. It is held by the same persons that the only possible method of meliorating the condition of the hu- man race, is to educate them in such a manner as to avoid those prejudices which have hitherto proved inimical to the happiness of men ; and to remodel society, rejecting those institutions which are supposed to cause most socialistic scheme, of the misery which is found in the world. This theory has not only been embraced with confidence, but at- tempts have been made to carry it out in prac- tise. Societies founded on the principles above MAN A MORAL AGENT. 99 stated, have been formed both, in Great Britain and America. But thus far the experiment has been attended with small success. Still the ad- vocates of the Social system, as it is called, have not been discouraged. They are instituting new societies upon an improved plan, and the most sanguine hopes are entertained by those con- cerned in these new associations, that a far better and happier state of society than any hitherto enjoyed, is practicable and will be realized. In answer to all arguments brought to prove that man is not a free moral agent, we appeal to the consciousness of every rational being. No arguments, however «2E5r* plausible, are of any force against intuitive first principles. Whether we can or cannot answer arguments against liberty, we know that we are free. In regard to some ac- tions, we feel that we are under a moral obliga- tion to perform them, and in regard to others, that we ought not to perform them, and if we are induced to violate this obligation, we feel that we are to be blamed, and are deserving of punishment 100 MORAL SCIENCE. Some philosophers have been persuaded by their reasonings that man is not free, but under necessity m all his actions. But as they could not deny that every man is intimately conscious of being free, they have adopted ™Vtr" 3 ^e opinion that man's feeling of liberty is a deceptive feeling, and contrary to fact. A far more reasonable conclu- sion is that there must be some error in the rea- soning from which the conclusion that man is not a free agent, is deduced. When a chain of reasoning brings us to conclusions repugnant to our intuitive convictions, it is certain that there is a flaw in some link of it, whether we can discover it or not. We are as certain that we are free, as we can be ; a revelation from heaven could not render us more so. As in other instances where speculative men have been led to adopt conclusions at variance with self-evident princi- ples, so here, men act, in common life, in con- formity with the common notions of mankind. They can by no effort divest themselves of this assent to certain fundamental truths. CHAPTER XV. MAN NOT UNDEK A FATAL NECESSITY. Although our consciousness of freedom ought to satisfy us, whatever reasonings to the contrary may be adduced ; yet it may be useful to inquire whether, indeed, ta ^ mnentsofF& ' there are any arguments of force against the free agency of man. It is certain that one truth cannot be in opposition to any other truth. If, therefore, the deductions of rea- son and the evident principles of common sense and experience seem to stand in opposition to one another, it must arise from some misappre- hension, or abuse of terms. As our understand- ing is given us to enable us to apprehend truth, no proposition clearly perceived to be true, 102 MORAL SCIENCE. whether intuitively or by ratiocination, can possibly be opposed to any other truth. It becomes necessary, therefore, in the first place, to have distinct ideas of what is meant by liberty, and what by necessity. *£E££r Here &e reference ™ st be ™t to metaphysical reasoning, but to the common judgment and clear conviction of all impartial men. It has already been stated that that liberty which is necessary to moral agency, can be nothing else than the liberty of doing what we will, to the extent of our power. It is freedom of action in conformity with our desire and will. When a man is compelled by force to strike another (I mean not by the force of strong motives, but by actual physical force), we say he is not accountable, because not free to do as he willed. When we think of that liberty which is necessary to free agency, and to the performance of a moral act, this is the kind of liberty which we have in our minds. In judg- ing of the moral quality of an act, we never attempt to go further back than the spontaneous inclination of the mind, and never think it ne- FATALISM. 103 cessary to know in what way this disposition was acquired. If the action proceed from will, so far as liberty is concerned it is a moral act. We cannot conceive of any greater or more de- sirable liberty than this. Dependent creatures, indeed, cannot possess that independent liberty which is the prerogative of the Deity. The creature, notwithstanding his liberty, is still under the government of divine providence. It is also important that we entertain distinct and accurate ideas of that necessity which is in- consistent with free agency. There is what has been termed moral or The necessity which precludes free philosophical necessity, which is agency. not incompatible with human lib- erty. This is no other than the certain opera- tion of moral causes, producing moral effects, according to the power which they possess. Such necessity, it has been shown, must belong to God, because he cannot act in opposition to truth, wisdom, and justice. But this does not hinder him from acting freely. So the angels in heaven and glorified saints are so confirmed in 104 MORAL SCIENCE. holiness that they cannot sin ; but still in loving and serving God they act most freely. But as in the common use of terms, and ac- cording to the common apprehension of men, liberty and necessity are diametri- incorreet use of ca ]i y opposite ; when the name the term necessary. ./ j. j. 7 necessity is applied to any exer- cise, the prejudice immediately arises that it can- not be free ; especially if there be some points in which it coincides with real necessity. Here, it is probable, we have the true source of the diffi- culty and perplexity in which this subject has been involved. The word necessary should never have been applied to any exercises which are spontaneous or voluntary, because all such are free in their very nature. When we apply this term to them, although we may qualify it by calling it a moral or philosophical necessity, still the idea naturally and insensibly arises, that if necessary they cannot be free. It is highly important not to use a term out of its proper ^signification ; especially when such consequences may arise from an ambiguous use. An event may be absolutely certain without being neces- FATALISM. 105 sary. It was absolutely certain that God, in creating the world, would act most wisely. It is a matter of absolute J^f^ 1 **"*" certainty that the holy angels will continue to love and serve God incessantly ; but this certainty is not inconsistent with liberty. If a man possess good principles, and all temp- tation to do wrong be removed, it is morally cer- tain that, in any given case, he will do right; and if a man be of corrupt principles, and all vir- tuous considerations be foreign from his thoughts, and strong temptations be presented to his rul- ing passion, it is certain that he will yield to temptation and commit sin. But in all these cases there is no necessity, because there is no coercion or compulsion. If the mere certainty of an event were inconsistent with freedom, then there could be no such thing as liberty in God or the creatures. As God knows all things most certainly, every thing, in his view, what- ever may be its cause, is equally certain; the divine prescience cannot be mistaken. There is no good reason why uncertainty should be con- sidered essential to that liberty which is necessary 106 MORAL SCIENCE. to moral actions. All causes operate according to their nature and force. The reason why one effect is necessary and another free is not that the one takes place without an adequate cause, or that the same cause may produce different effects ; for both these are contrary to common sense. The true reason is that the one is pro- duced against will, or without will, whereas the other is a voluntary act. Let the distinction between what is certain and what is necessary be fully comprehended and attended to, and a great part diSti^ Ce ° ftbe of the darkness which, in the view of many, has obscured this subject will be dissipated. Although, then, it should be demonstrated that the will is as certainly gov- erned by motives as the scale of the balance is by weights, yet there can be no legitimate infer- ence from the one to the other, as if that would prove that the will is not free but under a neces- sity. The difference lies not in the difference of certainty in the two cases, but in the difference in the nature of the causes of that certainty. CHAPTER XVI. MAN'S DIRECTION AND GOYEENMENT OF HIS ACTIONS, AND HIS CONSEQUENT RESPONSIBILITY. Theke are two extremes to be avoided here. The first is that which considers man as, in some sense, a passive recipient of influ- ences from without. He is repre- avo ^ emes t0 be sented as placed in certain circum- stances and surrounded by certain objects, in the selection of which he has had no choice ; and as he is susceptible of certain impressions which these circumstances and objects are fitted to make upon him, he cannot be considered a free and accountable agent. In opposition to this false hypothesis we as- sert that the whole force which governs man is within, and proceeds from himself. External objects are in themselves inert. They exert no 108 MORAL SCIENCE. influence ; no power emanates from them. The only power and influence which ho^v^"** the y can possibly have over any man they derive from the active principles of his nature. We are, indeed, accus- tomed in popular language to say that external objects excite and inflame the mind; but in philosophical accuracy they are but the passive objects on which the affections and desires of the mind fasten, and their whole power of mov- ing to action depends upon the strength of the inward affections of the soul. To render this perfectly plain to every mind, it will only be necessary to attend to a few familiar illustrations. To a man who is under the influence of hun- ger or thirst, bread and water are said, when seen, greatly to excite him, so that ^°o^ ta0nt ' he * strongly impelled to appro- priate these objects to the craving wants of his nature. But every one sees at once that both the bread and the water are merely passive objects on which the appetite fixes. The real force which impels to action, is not, there- fore, the external object, but the inward desire SELF-DIRECTION. 109 which is in the soul itself. For where no appe- tite of hunger or thirst exists, the bread and water, however presented and urged upon the sense, produce no effect; there is no motive to action experienced. Take another case. A man comes into a room where lies a pile of gold. Avarice urges him to seize the beloved object, and appropriate it to himself. Two J^S^ desires or motives counteract the tendency of avarice ; one is a sense of duty or regard to the dictate of conscience, which he knows ought to be obeyed ; the other is a regard to reputation, or the good opinion of men. Be- tween these two antagonistical principles, there must of course be a conflict. If avarice be strong, and the power of conscience and desire of the good opinion of men be comparatively weak, the consequence' will be that the man will put forth his hand and take the gold, and at the same time will feel conscious that he is doing wrong. But if conscience be fully awake, and especially if a love of moral excellence and a hatred of iniquity have a place in his mind, 110 MORAL SCIENCE. this motive alone will be sufficient to induce him to reject at once the thought of appropriating what belongs to another. In this case it is evi- dent that the gold on the table is altogether pas- sive ; there is no secret emanation from the inert metal. The whole power of gold to seduce the mind to evil depends on the strength of the prin- ciple of avarice within ; and in a mind rightly constituted, or under the influence of good moral dispositions, it could never so prevail as to induce the person to do an unlawful act for the sake of obtaining it. From these cases it is evident that a man is not governed by any influence from without or separate from himself, but that the lyo^ecT 18 ^ 011 " true s P rin S of his actions lies en- tirely in his own inclinations and will, external things having no other influence than as they furnish objects suited to his appe- tites and other desires. Some writers on the will, in speaking of the governing power of motives, have expressed themselves in a manner which leads to the opin- ion that the motives by which the will is de- SELF-DIRECTION. Ill termined exist without us, or separate from ourselves, whereas those motives which possess an active power and ^SsZnl***' govern our voluntary actions, are within us, and are our own active powers and affections, for which we are as responsible as for any other acts or operations of the mind. Hence it may truly be affirmed that every man pos- sesses a self-determining power by which he regulates and governs his own actions according to his own inclinations. The other extreme in regard to this subject is, that the will possesses a self-determining power in itself, independent of all motives, and uninfluenced by any p J e f" determining inclination. And it is maintained that such a self-determining power is essential to freedom, and to the existence of an accountable moral agent. If, indeed, this last opinion were correct we should admit the self-determining power of the will, whether we understood its nature or not ; for we lay it down as a first prin- ciple — from which we can no more depart than from the consciousness of existence — that man 112 MOKAL SCIENCE. is fkee ; and therefore stand ready to embrace whatever is fairly included in the definition of freedom. But it is not yet made evident, or even probable, that such a power exists, or that it is at all necessary to free moral agency, or that the possession of such a power would be valua- ble or desirable. All that is wanted is to make man the mas- ter of his own actions, and this is completely effected by giving him the power Not necessary. to will and act in accordance with his own inclinations. Certainly a man is not the less accountable for his actions because they are in accordance with his desires. Every rational being acts with a view to some end, and his regard or affection for that end is the motive which governs his will and influences his conduct. It cannot be justly denied, and is generally admitted, that in most cases the Denial of such power does not con- determinations of the will are in- flict with liberty. fluenced by strong desires ; and when such desires exist, and there are none lead- ing a contrary way, the decisions of the will are SELF-DIRECTION. 113 in fact determined by the previous state of the mind. Now if the prevalence of these desires in such cases is not found to interfere with free agency, there is no reason to think that the be- lief that the will is invariably determined by the strongest existing desire will lead to any conclusion unfavourable to liberty. If the self- determining power in question is exerted only in trivial cases where motives to action are weak, or when there is an equipoise of motives, it cannot be a power of any great consequence, since most of our moral acts are performed without its aid. Let us first take an impartial view of the acts of a man in the exercise of the Instances examined. power which all admit he pos- sesses, and then of this imaginary power which some think essential to moral agency. In the first case the man exercising his rea- son, apprehends objects which appear to him, on some account, good and desirable. First case. These objects he desires to ob- tain, and puts forth those volitions which pro- duce the actions requisite to the accomplishment of his object. 114 MORAL SCIENCE. In the second case the man feels an inclina- tion leading him with more or less force to a certain object ; but he has a power Second case. § which he can at any time exert to arrest his action in the line of his inclinations and by exerting this power of willing he can counteract any desire, and act in opposition to it. Or if two desires exist, he can by this power give the prevalence to that which is the weaker. The best way to bring this matter to the test of experience is to suppose a case in which such a power is exerted. Suppose the case of a man in whom, by habit and indulgence, the appetite for intoxicating drink is strong ; but he is induced by weighty reasons derived from a sense of duty and a regard to his health, reputation, family, and temporal prosperity, to determine not to ex- pose himself to temptation. An old companion calls and solicits him to go with him to a convi- vial meeting. His appetite strongly pleads for indulgence, if only for this one time ; but con- science remonstrates, and a regard to health, reputation, and the _like, operates strongly on the other side. Suppose the influence felt SELF-DIRECTION. 115 from these two opposite sources to be almost equally balanced ; suppose even a perfect equi- poise. Such a state of mind, though possible and frequently experienced, can never last long, for the states of the mind change in some re- spects every moment, and the least difference in the views of the subject would destroy the bal- ance. But now is the time for the exercise of the power which determines without regard to motive. Suppose, while the scales are thus in equipoise, this power to be exerted, and the man determines in favour of self-denial. Why he did thus determine, seems to be a reasonable in- quiry ; but if this power exists, such a question is entirely irrelative. There was, according to the supposition, no reason or motive which influ- enced the determination. Here then is a case for our consideration : Is an action prompted by no motive, and performed without a view to any end, an accountable moral act ? If this self-de- termining power exists, it may be exerted in op- position to the highest and best motives, and neither the person himself nor any body else can tell why it was exerted. If a man unaer the in- 116 MOKAL SCIENCE. fluence of love to his Creator, should be about to engage in the performance of some plain and important duty, the exertion of this power at the most unseasonable time might arrest his ac- tion and lead him to a contrary determination. Why would he exert such a power at such a time? That, indeed, is the question. But if any reason of any kind could be given it would destroy the hypothesis, which is that a man has power to determine in opposition No power to de- termine against aii to all existing motives, and where motives. there is a competition can act in conformity with the weakest. Surely such a power is irrational and dangerous in the ex- treme, and has no tendency to increase that free- dom which is requisite to a moral agent. CHAPTER XVII. OBJECTIONS TO THE UNIFORM INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES. One of the most plausible objections to the uniform influence of motives on the will is, the intimate conviction every man has, Objection from when he has done what he regrets, regret at wrong ac- tions, that he could have done other- wise; whereas, upon the hypothesis laid down above, the man could not possibly, with the same motives, have acted differently from what he did. And it is alleged that no man ever would or could repent of his most criminal conduct, were he persuaded that he could not have willed and acted differently from what he did. This objection brings out the true issue in this inquiry. The real question in dispute in regard to the will is, whether, all things external 118 MORAL SCIENCE. and internal being the same to any voluntary agent, the volitions will be the 5 taI h d. tmeqUeSti0n same - That is > whether a man in the same state of mind and under the influence of the same desires and motives, in kind and degree, will not always will and act in the same way. This we affirm ; and the advocates of the self-determining power of the will, deny. It is admitted that when a man has done wrong and is convinced of his error, he is deeply conscious that he might and should aii^L" have acted differently. But when this conviction is analyzed, it is found to be, not that he might have willed and acted differently with the same feelings that in- fluenced him at the moment of doing wrong, but that he might and should have had a differ- ent state of feeling, or a more considerate atten- tion to those things which were forgotten, but which if recollected would have prevented him from doing that which he now regrets. Take a case. A man in an hour of levity, and under the influence of a degree of envy, speaks disrespectfully of a person whose charac- MOTIVES. 119 ter is worthy of esteem, and to whom he is under special obligation. Upon reflec- Example. tion he is truly sorry for what he said, candidly confesses his fault, and says that were he again placed in similar circumstances, he would not be guilty of the same fault. But suppose he should be asked whether, if the same degree of inattention, and the same envious feel- ing should again exist which characterized the state of his mind when he spoke unadvisedly, and no considerations should occur which were not then present to his mind, he is of opinion that he would act differently from what he did. Under such a view of the matter, few persons dare profess that they would act differently when placed in precisely the same circumstances. "When we feel that we would and could act dif- ferently from what we have done in certain specified circumstances, it is always on the sup- position that our views and feelings should be different. If the person speaking disrespectfully of a friend is asked what w^ould induce him to act differently, if the thing were to be done again, the natural and reasonable answer is, "I 120 MORAL SCIENCE. should think of the impropriety of the thing, and should recollect my obligations to the person ; and other the like considerations." This shows that men feel accountable, not only for their •volitions and actions, but for the views and feelings which precede volition. Indeed if there is one point above all others on which responsibility rests, it is on the motives, that is, the active desires or affections of the mind from which volition proceeds, and by which it is gov- erned. The murderer could easily abstain from murder, if he would repress his malignant feel- ings ; but with the same spirit of malice and revenge which induced him to shed his brother's blood, and with the same absence of all other views and feelings than those which he had at the time, there is a moral certainty that he would commit the same crime again. Nor has this certainty, that unrestrained malice and revenge would again lead to the perpetration of the same horrid crime, the slightest tendency to alleviate the guilt of the murderer. The true ground of his culpability, lies in his having and indulging such malignant tempers, and in voluntarily M0T1YES. 121 turning away his mind from all considerations of piety and humanity, which would restrain him from the cruel act. And here a question might arise respecting a man's desires and affec- tions, and the power which he has over them ; but this is not the proper place for a discussion of that point. Another objection which has been repeatedly urged, and which by many is considered unan- swerable, is, that according to this Objection from im- hypothesis, when two things ex- possibility of choos- ing between equals. actly equal, and viewed to be so, are presented to the choice of a rational being, it would be impossible to choose either. But every man (say the objectors) feels that he has the power, if two loaves of bread or two eggs exactly alike be presented, of choosing between them ; and as there exists confessedly no motive for preferring one loaf or one egg to the other, therefore it is possible for the will to determine without a motive. To this plausible objection it may be an- swered, that if the self-determining power of the will, independent of motives, be confined to 122 MOEAL SCIENCE. eases in which there are no motives to turn the balance, it is a power of very little Answer. importance, and not worth disput- ing about. Let it be admitted that in such an equipoise of motives, the mind can determine in favour of either of the objects. But perhaps this will admit of a different solution, and one in accordance with the theory maintained. And let it be remarked, that it is not the similarity of external objects which should here be consid- ered, but the view which the mind takes of them. We know how a fertile imagination may cast a grain into one of the balanced scales, and cause it to preponderate. But further, the state of mind supposed to be produced by objects of equal value, is really felt for a moment. Between two things we hesitate, not being able to come to a decision ; but this indecision arises not from a belief that the objects proposed are equal, but from a doubt which is preferable. When we are sure there is no difference, this hesitation is not experienced. The explanation which seems correct, is the following: two guineas are laid before a poor man, and he is told to take which MOTIVES. 123 one he pleases. It cannot be necessary that he should think one better than the other. If such a preference were necessary, he would be unable to take either, and his situation would be com- parable to the ass of the old Greek sophists, held immovable between two bundles of hay. The difficulty supposed to exist in the case of two equal objects proposed for our choice, is perfectly imaginary : no difficulty or perplexity is ever experienced, J ^"t 7Un * when the things presented to oux choice are known to be equal. It is only when we apprehend that there may be a difference be- tween the objects offered, that we hesitate. As if a person should offer to our choice two cas- kets, the contents of which are unknown; we find it difficult to choose, for the very reason that we suspect the one to be more valuable than the other, but are ignorant to which the greatest value attaches. And if we should be informed that one contained jewels of great price and the other nothing but baubles, our hesitancy would be accompanied with solicitude. But when we are certain that the things pro- 124 MORAL SCIENCE. posed to our choice are perfectly alike, in all respects, we experience no difficulty whatever. Suppose it to be first a single guinea which is offered to a needy beggar ; he is moved by his feeling of want to take it. If instead of one, two guineas are offered, he experiences no difficulty in choosing, knowing them to be alike. But this furnishes no example of an action produced without a motive. The question is, whether the man shall act or not; and the motive for action is strong, namely, the desire of relief. As he is at liberty to take but one, and there is no difference between them, he seizes that, which from one or more of a thousand slight reasons of nearness or convenience, it happens to him to choose, without any preference properly so called. CHAPTER XVIII. SUMMARY VIEW OF LIBERTY. Man is conscious of liberty, and nothing can add to the certainty which he has that he is a free agent. Objections to self-evi- Man intuitively dent principles, however plausible, certain that he is free. should not be regarded; for, in the nature of things, no reasonings can over- throw plain intuitive truths, as no reasonings can be founded on principles more certain. Though we may not be able to understand or explain with precision wherein freedom consists, yet this ignorance of its nature should not disturb our minds. "We experience the same difficulty in regard to other truths of this class without any diminution of our assurance. I am conscious that I have life — but what is life ? neither I nor any other human being can tell. But do we, 126 MOEAL SCIENCE. because of this ignorance, doubt whether indeed we live ? Not in the least. We know that we are free precisely in the same manner that we know that we are living beings, and no plausi- ble reasonings should disturb us in the one case more than in the other. Again, if in attempting to explain what is essential to free agency, we should fall into any mistake, or conclude that some- This certaintynn- disturbed by errors thing does not belong to it, which of reasoning. does, let it not be said that we deny the freedom of man ; for while we may err in regard to our conception of its nature, we know that we cannot err in regard to the actual existence of freedom. We are willing to attribute to man every kind and degree of liberty which can properly belong to a dependent creature jzz&fz and a rational bein g; and if we deny what some think essential to free agency, it is because in our view it would be no real privilege to possess such a power, as not being compatible with the laws by which rational creatures are governed. LIBERTY 127 It is admitted that man lias power to govern his own volitions, and does govern them, according to his own desire. Postulates. He has the liberty, within the lim- its of his power, to act as he pleases ; and greater liberty, in our judgment, is inconceivable. To suppose, in addition to this, a power to act independently of all reasons and motives, would be to confer on him a power for the exercise of which he could i^erty J* not power to act mde- never be accountable. It would p^aentiyofaiirea- sons. be a faculty which would com- pletely disqualify him from being the subject of moral government. In the nature of things, it would be impossible that a creature possessed of such a power could be so governed that his ac- tions could be directed to any end. One hypothesis makes man the master of his own actions, but a creature governed by understanding and First hypothesis, choice. He may be misled by false appearances, and influenced by wrong mo- tives, but is always governed by some reasons or motives. 128 MORAL SCIENCE. On the other hypothesis a man may and does act without any inducement, and without being influenced by any reasons, to do Second hypothesis, what is contrary to all his inclina- tions and feeling. I cannot but think that, after all, the abettors of this scheme retain in their minds a certain obscure but lin- gering persuasion that the free agent feels some reason for acting as he does ; and if so, the dis- pute is at an end, for whatever may be the con- sideration which induces a man to act in oppo- sition to strong desires, it must be something which is felt by the mind to have force, and to be such a consideration as ought to influence a rational being. Let us for still further elucidation again sup- pose a case in which this self-determining power is exerted. A young man entrusted with the property of his employer, has by undue Case supposed indulgence in amusements, con- for self-determining power. tracted debts which he is unable to pay. He sees a way by which he can appropriate to his own use some of the LIBERTY. 129 money in his hands without the possibility of discovery. His wants are urgent, his reputation is at stake, and he .feels himself impelled by a powerful motive to the deed ; and there are no motives to draw him in an opposite course but such as are derived from conscience and the fear of God. At the moment when about to perpe- trate the felonious act, he pauses and resolves that he will not do it. The question is, has he not power to act thus ? Is he not the arbiter of his own acts of will ? Are we not all conscious that we possess such a power? There is no dispute about the power, if it only pleases the agent to exercise it. He is as free to abstain from embezzling what belongs to another, as to do it. The only question is, will he do it unless some reason, motive, or moral feeling influence him ? If so, then indeed it would be the exem- plification of the power in question. But when we examine the case carefully we shall be satis- fied that where there is a powerful motive on one side, there must be a preponderating mo- tive on the other to prevent a volition in ac- cordance with the first. Suppose the young 130 MOKAL SCIENCE. man under the temptation mentioned to have his mind free from all moral considerations, and to have no fear of injuring his reputation, what would restrain him ? Or, if without any moral influence, or any other consideration, he should abstain, would there be any virtue in the act ? To know whether an act is virtuous, we properly ask, why was it done ? what was the motive of the agent? But here there is none, and con- sequently the act can have no moral character. And if we suppose some faint remonstrance of conscience, and some slight fear of discovery, even these would not prevent the act where the contrary motives were urgent. But suppose, now, this young man to have had a religious education, and to have been brought up to regard his reputation, and when the temptation is most powerful and he is in danger of yielding, conscience should utter her voice with power, and dictate imperatively that this is a deed which should not be done ; and at the same time, a lively apprehension of disgrace should operate with a combined influence on libektY. 131 his mind, would the operation of these mo- tives in preventing the crime be less rational or less virtuous than if he should act without a motive ? CHAPTER XIX. THE KIND OF INDIFFERENCE WHICH HAS BEEN CONSID- ERED ESSENTIAL TO FREE AGENCY. Lsr every act of choice or will, it is implied that the person willing might, if he pleased, act in a different way from what he does, are free. ° f Ch01Ce f° r otherwise he would be under a necessity of acting in one way only, and there could be no freedom in such an action. There is no freedom in the pulsations of the heart, for they are not voluntary, but go on whether we will it or not. In all actions where the will is exercised there must be Liberty of con- at least two things which may be traduction and of contrariety. done. This liberty was by the ancients distinguished into two kinds, the liberty of contradiction, and the liberty of contrariety. In the first we have the choice INDIFFERENCE. 133 of doing or not doing some proposed act. In the second, we have the liberty to do one thing or another, or one thing or several others. In regard to such objects of choice, there was said to be indifference, by which it was not meant that the mind was indifferent at the moment of choice. This would be a contradiction, because indiffer- ence towards an object, and the choice of an ob- ject, are opposite and irreconcilable states of mind. But the meaning was, that, abstractly from the feelings of the agent, the contrary or different actions were indifferent. It was in the power of the agent, if he were disposed, to do or not do, to do this or that ; but it was never un- derstood to imply, that with the inclination in one direction a choice might be made in the opposite direction. A man may do what he pleases, but it is absurd to suppose that he can will to do what it does not please him to do. The doctrine of a power of contrary choice, as the thing has been now ex- plained, is a reasonable doctrine, Power of con - x 7 trary choice. and in accordance with all expe- rience, if with the volition you include the mo« 134 MORAL SCIENCE. tive, if with the choice you take in the desire. But to suppose a volition contrary Volition cannot to the prevailing inclination is in- contravene preva- lent inclination, consistent with all experience; and, as has been shown, such a liberty or power would disqualify a man for be- ing an accountable moral agent. In the last century an able metaphysical wri- ter, convinced that the common doctrine of the self-determining power of the will Theory of Abp. cou id no t stand, invented a new King. * hypothesis. His leading idea is, that we do not choose an object because we de- sire it, but desire it because we choose it. Ac- cording to this view of Archbishop King, in his work on the " Origin of Evil," there must be a state of absolute indifference prior to an act of choice ; for all love or attachment to an object, and all desire of possessing it, are produced by the act of the mind in choosing it. This is a complete inversion in the order of the exercises of the mind. Though recommended by high authority, and ingeniously defended by its au- thor, it seems strange that it should have found INDIFFERENCE. 135 any respectable abettors. But Dr. "Watts, in his Essay on the " Freedom of the will in God and the creatures," Wa f ts dopted by adopts the outlines of the Arch- bishop's scheme, and defends its principles by many arguments. This led President Edwards, in his celebrated work on the Will, to take particular pains wa ^ utedbyEd ' to refute this false theory. The indifference of which he treats is that which appertains to this scheme. Many, however, have been led, from an acquaintance with the work of Edwards, to suppose that the doctrine of indifference, as refuted by this great man, is common to all who maintain the opinion of the self-determining power of the will ; which is far from being the case. It is deemed unnecessary to give a refutation of this theory in this place. Those who wish to see this effectually done may consult the several sections of the work of Edwards, to which re- ference has been made* * Edwards's Works, ed. New-York, 1844 VoL ii. pp. 17- 39. Part i., §§ 1-7. CHAPTER XX. WHETHER MEN ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOE THEIR MOTIVES; OR WHETHER DESIRES AND AFFECTIONS WHICH PRE- CEDE VOLITION, HATE A MORAL CHARACTER. There are two maxims on this point, which we „ . .. ^ must endeavour to reconcile, as Maxims which ' seem conflicting. there is an apparent repugnance between them. The first is, that every action takes its charac- ter from the motive from which it proceeds. The second is, that every moral act ^m^ ^ voluntary, and therefore, that TvoLZT* desires and feelin s s wWc]l P re - cede volition, cannot be of a moral nature. This difficulty seems to have perplexed the perspicacious mind of Dr. Chalmers. Chalmers; for, pereiving that our desires and affections do possess a moral character, he labours, through a number MORALITY OF MOTIVES. 137 of pages, to prove that, in as far as they are such, they are influenced by the will. The truth, however, is, that many of them are un- influenced by preceding volition, and the whole reasoning of the learned author is unsatisfactory. The true solution is to be found in the ambi- guity of language. When it is asserted that all moral actions are voluntary, the meaning is, either that by actions only external actions are meant, or that under the word voluntary, the affections of the mind which precede vo- lition are included. No act of the body can take place without an action of the will preceding it; so that the maxim is true, as it relates to external acts. But it is also true in relation to mental acts, if we give a certain degree of extension to the word " voluntary," that is, if we use it as synonymous with sponta- neous. Our desires are as free and spontaneous as our volitions, and when it is said that every moral act must be voluntary, the word is used in this comprehensive sense. There is no need, therefore, to prove that our affections must have received their complexion from a preceding vo- 138 MORAL SCIENCE. lition. The judgment of the moral faculty in regard to the moral character of the desires and affections, is as clear and undoubted as of the volitions. Nay, the volitions receive their moral character from the quality of the motives which produce them ; so that the very same volition may be good or bad, according to the moral character of the motives by which it is produced. The volition requisite in order to pull a trig- ger and let off a gun, is the same, let the motive be what it may. It is a determination to per- form that specific act, and if it be performed by an insane person, there will be no morality in the volition. If the same volition be put forth by a person acting in his just defence, the vo- lition and ensuing act will be good ; but if the volition to shoot a man, arise from malice or avarice, the volition prompting the act will be wicked. We do not, therefore, trace actions to their true moral source when we ascer. We tZ S l^t T tain the volition from which they proceed ; we must always go one step higher, and ascertain the motives. MORALITY OF MOTIVES. 139 When an investigation is made into the character of an act of which some one is accused, the main point, which by wit- nesses the court and jury wish to sou f h ° t tives mnst be ascertain, is, from what motives the accused acted. Accordingly as this is deter- mined, so is he judged to be innocent or guilty. It hence appears, that the true and ultimate source of the morality of actions, is not found in the will, but in the desires and affections. The simple act of volition, namely, a determina- tion to do a certain act, is always the same, whatever be the motive. And to ascertain that an action proceeds from an act of will, only de- termines that it is the act of a particular agent, but gives us no knowledge respecting the true moral quality of the act. This will be found universally true. Two men are seen giving mo- ney to the poor ; the acts are the same, and the volitions preceding the acts and prompting them, are the same ; and as we cannot see the heart, we naturally judge that both acts are alike good. But if it should be revealed to us, that one of the persons was influenced entirely by a love for 140 MORAL SCIENCE. the praise of men, and the other, by a sincere regard for the welfare of the poor, we should immediately make a wide difference between the acts, in our moral judgment. We should still be convinced, however, that the volitions lead- ing to the acts were the same, the only difference being in the motives. It is clear then that men are more account- able for their motives than for any thing else ; and that, primarily, morality consists in the motives; that, is the affections. Man accountabte for his motives. CHAPTER XXI. f THE DIVISION OF MOTIVES, INTO RATIONAL AND ANIMAL. Dr. Thomas Eeid, in his work on the Active Powers, endeavours to maintain his doctrine that the will is not always gov- Eeid's distinction. erned by motives, by a reference to a certain distinction. Animal motives act by a blind impulse on the will, without regard to remote consequences. Eational motives operate by the force of reasonable considerations. Dr. Eeid asserts that these classes of motives are so widely different, that their influence can never be compared : that what may be the strongest of one class, may be the weakest of the other, and that the mind must determine between them. The distinction is no doubt just. There are 142 MORAL SCIENCE. principles in the human constitution, which act on the will with great force, by a JThe difference y^ impu]se# g^ ape the ap _ petites and passions, and the de- sire of happiness, and especially the desire to escape pungent pain, at present experienced. The appetite of hunger urges the subject of it to eat, whether it can be done lawfully and consist- Appetite, ently with health, or not. This in- fluence is sensibly present, and it requires some strength of purpose to resist it, when the agent is convinced that the act cannot be done with propriety. Here then is the simultaneous operation of an animal and a rational motive ; and it is evident that they counteract each other, and that according to the strength of one or the other, the will is determined this ^"pJI ™7 ^ that way. It is not true, therefore, that these different kinds of motives cannot be compared as to their effect- ive force. The fact is, they are brought into comparison every day, and every day victories are obtained by one over the other, accord- ing to the strength or influence which they re- MOTIVES TWOFOLD. 143 spectively possess, at the moment. Hunger im- pels a man to eat ; reason tells him that it will be injurious to health. Here is a fair trial of strength between the force of blind appetite, and a rational regard for health. If the appetite be very strong, it will require a strong resolution to oppose it. In such cases, however, appetite commonly prevails ; but not without resistance. In every case of the kind, there is a trial of strength between these different motives. Sup- pose food to be placed before a , . « .-. -. Case of hunger and hungry, man ; it there be no con- S eif- P reservation. siderations of duty or utility to prevent, he will of course indulge his appetite. But if he should be informed that the food is poisoned, although he be still impelled by his appetite to eat, yet the love of life or fear of death, will be sufficient to induce him to refrain. Suppose, again, that the food is the property of another, whose consent to use it cannot be obtained. Here the moral feel- ings stand in the way of indul- and c d a u s t e y> of hunger gence ; and upon the comparative strength of his appetite and of the vigour of his 144 MOBAL SCIENCE. conscience, will depend his determination. So far is it from being true, then, that animal and rational motives cannot be compared, in regard to their influence on the will, that there is no- thing in human life more common than the ex- perience of the struggle for mastery between the higher and lower principles of our nature. When it is said that the mind determines be- tween these contending motives, it is true, but not in the sense intended. It is The determina- tion accords with true that the mind determines, and prevalent desires. of course the volition is on one side or the other ; but this determination is not indepen- dent of the strength of the contending motives, being always in accordance with the strongest existing desires. There is this important difference between animal and rational motives, that a sensible im- pulse of the former as merely felt, the T two differenCe ° f is not of a moral nature - The hunger of a man is no more moral than the hunger of a beast. These animal feelings are unavoidable and constitutional. The point at which such feelings begin to partake of MOTIVES TWOFOLD. 145 a moral quality, is when they require to be governed and directed. It was not wrong for the hungry man when he saw bread before him to desire it. But when he knew it to be the property of another, it would have been wrong to take it ; and when he knew that the food would injure him, it became his duty to for- bear. We cannot extinguish the animal feelings by an act of the will ; they arise involuntarily, and therefore cannot be in themselves of a moral nature. Yet as man has other principles and powers by which he should be governed, he be- comes faulty when he neglects to govern these lower propensities in accordance with the dic- tates of reason and conscience. But in regard to other desires and affections, they are good or bad in every degree in which they exist. For ex- ample, not only are malice and envy sinful when ripened into act, but the smallest conceiv- able exercise of such feelings is evil; and as they increase in strength, their moral evil in- creases. It does not require an act of volition, consenting to these feelings, to render them evil ; 146 MOEAL SCIENCE. their very essence is evil, and is condemned by the moral sense of mankind. A clear understanding of this distinction might liave prevented or reconciled an old dis- pute, viz. whether concupiscence* Concupiscence. was of the nature of sin, in the first rising of desire, prior to any act of the will. * It may remove ambiguity to say that the word concupis- cence is here used not in its popular and modern, but its theo- logical acceptation. The controversy to which allusion is made began early in the schools, and was actively waged at the time of the Reformation. The following references will enable the reader to inquire further : Augustini, Opp. x., ed. Benedict, pp. 387, 1029, 1828, 1881, 1955. — Catechismus Cone. Trident, ed. Lips. 1851, pp. 385, 386. — Chemnitii Examen. ed. Genev., 1641, pp. 88, 89, 90, 94, 95.— Turretlini Instt. P. ii. Qu. 21. — Bretschneider, Syst. Entwickelung ; 4 ed. 1841, pp. 540, 541. CHAPTER XXII. WHETHER MORALITY BELONGS TO PRINCIPLES AS WELL AS ACTS, OR IS CONFINED TO ACTS ALONE. It seems to be generally agreed, that in the hu- man soul there exist certain principles from which actions proceed, as streams from a fountain ; and that the cha- J^JSS^ racter of the actions corresponds with that of the principle. Those, however, who maintain that the will possesses a self-determining power, independent of motives, deny the exist- ence of any such principles lying back of the acts of the mind, especially in moral exercises. They hold that the evil of an act arises entirely from the exercise of free will, and that there is no propriety in referring it to any thing previous- ly existing in the mind. They allege that nothing can be of a moral nature but that which is volun- 148 MOKAL SCIENCE. tary, and therefore that virtue or vice can be predi- cated of nothing but actions. They argue, how- ever, that to make virtue and vice consist in the occult qualities of the soul, is to conceive of the essence of the soul as corrupt; and that this would be to make sin a physical quality, exist- ing without any relation to the will. It would be entirely out of place, here, to consider the bearing of this controversy on certain theological points, concerning which polemics have waged an interminable war. We have, at present, no- thing to do with any principles or questions but such as may be learned from reason and expe- rience. In the first place, let it be observed, that we know nothing of the soul but by its acts. We have no consciousness of any from^r" 116 ' thin S but acts of Cerent kinds; yet we know as certainly that we have a soul, as that we think and feel. So, also, we are not conscious of the existence of what is called disposition, temper, principle ; but we as intuitively believe in the existence of these, as in the existence of the soul itself. If MORAL PRINCIPLES. 149 we see one man doing evil whenever he has the temptation, and another as habitually doing good, we cannot help considering that the one is actuated by an evil disposition which dwells in him, and that the other is influenced by a good disposition. Whether moral good and evil may with pro- priety be predicated of these hidden tempers of the mind, must be determined by an appeal to the common judg- u ^^ieT' ment of mankind ; and this, I think, is manifestly in favour of the affirmative. "When a man is observed to manifest wicked, malignant passions as often as occasion serves to elicit them, all men agree that he possesses a ma- lignant temper. The soul of such a man, when his acts of iniquity are finished, cannot be free from every taint, until he again put forth a volun- tary act. The doctrine of a uniform series of evil acts, is irreconcilable with the doctrine that all evil consists in self-determined acts, unless the will itself be corrupt , for why should all acts be of one kind, when no cause exists why they should be one thing rather than another? We might suppose such a power would act as fre- 150 MORAL SCIENCE. quently one way as another. But if there be any causes without the will, which give a uni- form character to its acts, then the will cannot be free. It is determined by something without itself, which is incompatible with the hypothesis. Again: the fountain must partake of the quality of the streams. If these are uniformly evil, it is fair to conclude that the cJXSf fountain is polluted. Voluntary wickedness is nothing else but bringing into act what before existed in principle in the soul. If malice in act is sinful, surely malice in principle must be evil. No man can bring himself to believe that the wretch who has perpetrated thou- badScipif™ a Sands of base crimes > and stands ready to commit others of the same kind, has no evil inherent in his soul, by which he is distiuguised from the most innocent person. Another evidence that men do judge some- thing to be sinful besides sinful acts, is that men who palpably omit important duty, are consi- dered equally guilty with those who offend by positive act. That man who neglects to rescue • MORAL PRINCIPLES. 151 from death a human being, when it is easily in his power to do so, is by all men i t -1, p , Proof from omis- reckoned guilty of a great crime, sion ofduty. though he performs no act of any kind. Suppose a helpless woman or infant to fall overboard from a boat, in which there is a strong man who might afford relief, but makes no attempt to do so. Is there a person in the world who would not view such a neglect as a great sin ? Now, on what principle do we cen- sure the person who has committed no act of transgression? Evidently on the ground that he ought to have felt a regard for the life of a fellow-creature. We blame his indifference to the welfare of his neighbour. As to the maxim, that nothing is sinful which is not voluntary, it relates to positive acts, not to dispositions of the Disposition, in mind. But as was explained be- what sense volun- tary, before in regard to desires and affections, so in regard to dispositions, we say they are in a sense voluntary. They properly belong to the will, taking the word in a large sense. In judging of the morality of voluntary 152 MORAL SCIENCE. acts, the principle from which they proceed is always included in our view, and comes in for its full share of the blame. Thus Bishop Butler, in his excellent essay on the " Nature of Vir- tue," says, in speaking of the moral faculty, " It ought to be observed that the object of this faculty is actions, comprehending under that name active or practical principles." This saga- cious man saw that it would not do to confine virtue to positive acts, but that principles must come in for their full share of approbation or dis- approbation. The character which a man acquires by a series of acts, is not merely the estimation of a person who has performed such racfer"^ fr ° m ° ha " acts > but {t is of * P erson possess- ing dispositions or principles which gave rise to such acts. Our notion of a bad man is of one who not only has perpetrated wicked acts, but is still disposed to do the same ; and we disapprove the principle as much as the acts. The notion that corrupt principles must vitiate the essence of the soul, is without founda- tion. The soul is the subject of many affections MORAL PRINCIPLES. 153 which are not essential to it. Natural affections may be extirpated, and jet the soul remain un- changed. Moral qualities may be entirely chang- ed, without any change in the essence of the soul. The faculties remain, while the moral principles which govern them may be changed from good to bad, or from bad to good. The same faculties which are employed in the per- formance of virtuous actions, may be occupied as instruments of wickedness. That inherent moral qualities may exist in the soul, has been' the be- lief of all nations, and is the sentiment of every common man whose judgment has not been warped by false philosophy. TTho can believe that the soul of a cruel murderer, whose heart cherishes habitual hatred and revenge towards his fellow- men^Tfr^kiid dg " creatures, is, when asleep, or occu- pied with indifferent matters, in the same state of purity or exemption from evil, as the soul of the most virtuous man in the world ? It cannot be believed. We cannot help thinking, when we see a uniform course of action whether it be good or bad, that there must be 154 MORAL SCIENCE. corresponding dispositions which lead to such actions. Every effect must have an adequate cause. Let it be granted, for the sake of argu- ment, that the self-determining power is an ade- quate cause for any single act of any kind ; yet it can be no sufficient cause for a series of acts of the same kind. This, however, must be left to the intuitive belief of every man. It is a sub- ject for the judgment of common sense, rather than reason. CHAPTER XXIII. MORAL HABITS. Habits differ from principles, or constitutional desires, in that they are adventitious. Every habit is acquired by repeated acts. The human constitution possesses Habits. a wonderful susceptibility of form- ing habits of every kind. Indeed, we can- not prevent the formation of habits of some kind or other. Still, a man has much in his power as it regards the kind of habits which he forms, and is highly accountable for the exercise of this power. A man's happiness and useful- ness depend very much on the character of his habits. Yea, a man's moral character derives its complexion, in a great degree, from his habits. In this place, it is not necessary to go into the philosophy of the formation of habits. 156 MOEAL SCIENCE. Our object is to consider habits and habitual actions as they partake of a moral character, or as they are the object of moral approbation, or disapprobation. If we should remove from the list of moral actions all those which are prompted by habit, we should cut off the larger number of those which men have agreed in judging to be of a moral nature. That there are virtuous habits and vicious habits, will scarcely be denied by any conside- rate person. A habit of lying, of for h^bits. 1111 ^ 11117 swearing, of slandering, of cheat- ing, of irreverence, of indolence, of vainglory, with many others, are, alas, too common. There are also virtuous habits, such as of industry, temperance, kindness, veracity, diligence, honesty, &c. To be sure, these vir- tues commonly flow from principle, but the practice of them is greatly facilitated by correct habits. Two considerations will show that men are properly accountable for those actions which proceed from habit. The first is, that in the formation of his habits, man is voluntary. The acts by which they are formed are free acts^ and MORAL HABITS. 157 the agent is responsible for all their conse- quences. The other consideration is, that habits may be counteracted and even changed by the force of virtuous resolutions and perseverance. Where habit has become inveterate, it may be difficult to oppose or eradicate it ; but the strength of moral principle has often been found sufficient to counteract the most confirmed hab- its. "When it is asserted that men long enslaved by evil habits cannot make a change, it is on the ground, that no principle of sufficient power exists in the mind of the agent ; but for that deficiency, the man is responsible. Yet a power from without may introduce a new principle po- tent enough, to overcome evil habits. The importance of possessing good habits, is admit- ted by all moralists. Aristotle makes the es- sence of virtue to consist in "practical habits, voluntary in their origin," and agreeable to right reason. Dr. Thomas Eeid, in his " Essay on the Active Powers," defines virtue to be " the fixed purpose to act according to a sense of duty," which definition Dugald Stewart modifies, by observing, "It is the fixed purpose to do what 158 MORAL SCIENCE. is right, which evidently constitutes what we call a virtuous disposition. But it appears to me that virtue, considered as an attribute of char- acter, is more properly defined by the habit which the fixed purpose gradually forms than by the fixed purpose itself." Dr. Paley lays it down as an aphorism, that " mankind act more from habit than reflection." " We are," says he, "for the most part, determined at once, and by an impulse which has the effect and energy of a pre-established habit." To the objection, "If we are in so great a degree passive under our habits, where is the exercise of virtue, or the guilt of vice?" he answers, "in the form- ing and contracting of these habits." "And hence," says he, "results a rule of considerable importance, viz, that many things are to be done and abstained from, solely for the sake of habit." CHAPTER XXIV. THE NATURE OF YIRTUE. The theories on this subject have been numer- ous, and contrary to one another. It is now proposed to mention some of the principal of them. We shall first Various theories. mention the theory of Mr. Hobbes and his followers, who deny that there is any natural distinction between virtue and vice, and maintain that by na- Hobbes. ture all actions are indifferent, and that our ideas and feelings on the subject of morality are altogether the effect of education and association. Mr. Hobbes did indeed main- tain that men are bound to obey the civil gov- ernment under which they may happen to live, and to conform to the religion established by 160 MORAL SCIENCE. law, however contrary to their own private judgment. All moral duty, according to this theory, was resolved into the au- Law of the land. thority of the law of the land. As no natural moral rule existed, it was held that, except so far as a man was re- strained by civil authority, he had a right to do what he pleased ; and while he confined himself within these bounds, he need feel no concern about the consequences of his conduct. Perhaps the most extraordinary system of virtue ever promulgated was that of Mandeville, who maintained that all preten- Mandevuie. sions to virtue were mere hypo- crisy, which men assumed from the love of praise. This writer forgot that hy- pocrisy assumes it as true that that Thedefecttfthe w hich fa counterfeited is an object hypothesis. ° of esteem and approbation among men. That virtue consists in the mere pursuit of pleasure, or of our own inter- Epicurus. est, is a system as old as Epicurus, and has had many abettors up to this time. The arguments in favour of this the- NATURE OF VIRTUE. 161 ory are exhibited in their most plausible dress by Nettleton in his " Treatise on Virtue." But the whole plausibility of the arguments depends on the pre-established connexion be- tween happiness and a virtuous course of life. That true happiness The Ha PP in «s3 x x theory considered. is the natural effect of virtue, falls entirely short of proof that the essence of virtue consists in the tendency of certain actions to the person's true interest; whereas, when we per- ceive an action to be virtuous, we are conscious that it is not from any view of the connexion of the action with our own happiness that we approve it ; but our judgment is immediate, founded on a moral character perceived in the act itself. And in many cases virtue requires us to deny ourselves personal gratification for the sake of others. A man supremely governed by a regard to his own interest, is never esteemed a virtuous man by the impartial judgment of man- kind. According to this theory, the only thing censurable in the greatest crimes is, that the guilty person has mistaken the best method of promoting his own happiness. Upon this prin- 162 MORAL SCIENCE. ciple a man is at liberty to pursue his own inter- est at the expense of the happiness of thou- sands, and if he is persuaded that any action will tend to his own interest, he is at liberty to do it, whatever may be the consequences to others. Dr. Paley adopts the principle that all virtue consists in a regard to our own happiness, tak- ing into View the Whole Of OUr ex- Archdeacon Paley. istence. His definition is, how- ever, a very complicated one, and deserves to be analyzed. " Virtue," says he, " is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness," Pays definition accor( ji n g to w Hch definition the of virtue. ° good of mankind is the object, the will of God the rule, and everlasting hap- piness the motive of human virtue. If the question be asked, why we should seek the good of mankind, the answer is, from a regard to our everlasting happiness; and if the question be, why w v e should make the will of God the rule of our conduct, the answer must be the same; NATURE OF VIRTUE. 163 so that really all virtue is resolved into a regard to our own happiness. Now every man desires to promote his own happiness, and according to Dr. Paley's theory, the only difference consequent dif- J ferenee between a between an eminently good man good and a bad man. and one of the opposite character is, that the one pursues a wiser course than the other ; but they are both actuated by the same motives. % This theory loses sight of all intrinsic differ- ence between moral good and evil, and admits the principle that hap- Neglects intrin- sic moral dififer- piness is the only conceivable ences. good, and that any thing is virtu- ous the tendency of which is to promote our greatest happiness. A theory the opposite of that which makes a regard to private interest the ground of virtue, is the one which makes all virtue to consist in a regard to the public Cumberland, good. This is the theory of Bishop Cumberland in his work, Be Legibus, an^l is not essentially different from the scheme of those 164 MORAL SCIENCE. who make all virtue to consist in disinterested benevolence. No doubt, much that deserves the name of virtue consists in good Disinterested be- w m to others, and in contribu- nevolence. ' ting to their welfare ; but it is not correct to confine all virtuous actions to the ex- ercise of benevolence. We can conceive of be- nevolence in a being who has no moral constitu- tion. Something of this kind is observable in brute animals, and atheists may exercise benev- olence to their friends. The indiscriminate ex- ercise of benevolence to creatures, without any respect to their moral character, might appear to be an amiable attribute, but it could not pro- perly be called a moral attribute. Regard for one's j± prudent regard to our own wel- own welfare. x ^ fare and happiness is undoubtedly a virtue. It has been considered so by the wis- est of men, and we know that prudence was one of the four cardinal virtues of the heathen. As the whole is made up of parts, it is evident that if it is a virtue to promote the well-being of the whole, it must be so of each of the parts. The pursuit of our own happiness where it does not NATURE OF VIRTUE. 165 infringe on the rights of others, has nothing evil in it, but is approved by every impartial mind. Some who maintain that all virtue consists in benevolence, admit that we may seek our own happiness just as we seek that of our neighbour ; but the human constitution is not „ , ■ , . <• . , . . Abstract impar- iormed to exercise that abstract tiaiity not to be ex- impartiality. "While we are bound pec e ' to promote the welfare of our neighbour and of strangers, our obligation is still stronger to en- deavour to secure our own happiness ; and if a friend and a stranger stand in equal need of a benefit which we have it in oar power to bestow, it is evidently our duty to consult first the wel- fare of our friend, other things being equal. What Bishop Butler has said on this subject in his short treatise on " Virtue," is worthy of consideration : "It deserves to be Butler's remarks considered whether, men are more on the disinterested scheme. at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without reason, than to make others so ; or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are to neglect the good 166 MOKAL SCIENCE. of others whom nature has committed to their care. It should seem that a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence in our language — it should seem that this is virtue, and_ the contrary behaviour faulty and blama- ble ; since in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first and condemn the other con- duct, both in ourselves and others. This appro- bation and disapprobation are altogether differ- ent from mere desires of our own and their hap- piness, and from sorrow in missing it." Again, " Without inquiring how far and in what sense virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it, it ° necessary, faculty on contemplating the act is necessary. "Without a moral faculty we never could have the least idea of a moral quality, good or bad; therefore all actions must be brought before this faculty, and its judgment is ultimate. We can go no further. While the good or evil of some actions is self-evident, much discrimina- tion and reasoning are requisite to arrive at a clear view of the true moral character of others. But the end of these processes is to bring the true nature of the action in question fairly be- fore the mind, when it is judged by the moral 186 MOEAL SCIENCE. faculty. Those actions, then, which a sound and well-informed mind judges to be morally good, are virtuous, and those which such a mind judges or feels to be evil, are sinful. As has already been explained when treat- ing of conscience, the judgment of the mind re- specting moral qualities, is the ^32* judgment of the understanding, and differs from other judgments only by the subject under consideration. The mind must possess the faculty of moral percep- tion, of which all the inferior animals are desti- tute. To see that an action is useful, and will produce happiness to him that performs it, or to others, is one thing ; but to perceive that it is morally good, is quite a distinct idea ; and vir- tue and mere utility should never be confounded. It may be thought that this account of virtue makes the moral faculty the only standard of moral excellence. In one sense, this is true. It is impossible for us to judge any action to be virtuous, which does not approve itself when fairly contemplated by our moral sense. To suppose otherwise, would be to think that we NATURE OF VIRTUE. 187 lad some other faculty by which to judge of gaoral actions than the moral faculty. As no judgment of colours can be formed but by the eye, nor of sounds but libl ™ er tDM ' by the ear, nor of odours and tastes Dut by the senses of smelling and tasting ; so no judgment can be formed on moral subjects, but by the moral faculty. It may be asked, then, whether the judgments of this faculty are infal- lible, and if so, how it is that we have so many discrepant opinions, respecting the morality of actions. To which it may be answered, that when the mind is in a sound state, and any moral action is presented to it, with all the cir- cumstances which belong to it, the judgment of this faculty is always correct and uniform in all men. As an eye in a sound state judges infal- libly of colours, in which judgment all in pre- cisely the same circumstances will agree in their perceptions ; so it is in regard to moral qualities. If in looking at an object, one man has more light than another, or if one occupies a more fa- vourable point of observation, the object will ap- pear differently to the persons thus situated; 188 MORAL SCIENCE. but this does not argue that their eyes are dif- ferently constructed, or that there is any other faculty than the eye, by which the object may be surveyed. So, in regard to moral qualities, when they are presented to different minds with precisely the same evidence, the moral judgment will be the same. The differences observable in the dictates of the consciences of menteTXnlf^" men > ™J be a11 traCed to SOm ^ cause which prevents the object from being perceived in its true light ; such as ignorance, error, or prejudice. In regard to sin and duty, the ultimate appeal must be to con- science. We may bring considerations of va- rious kinds to bear on the conscience, or to en- lighten the mind, so that the moral faculty may be rightly guided; but still our ultimate rule must be the judgments of our own moral faculty. And here it may be remarked, that con- science . will recognise every new New relations oc- . . casion views of new relation into which a moral agent enters, and will dictate the obliga- tion to perform the duties obviously arising out NATURE OF VIRTUE. 189 of such relations. Or, if such an agent should for a time be ignorant of its relations, and after- wards discover them, it would, upon such disco- very, feel an obligation not before experienced. Let us then suppose the case of a child educated in a cave, who, while the intellectual powers were cultivated, and the faculties developed, had never been informed respecting the existence of its parents and the relation it sustains to them. Of course, while in this state of ignorance, there would be no sense of obligation to them ; but so soon as the nature of this relation should be clearly made known, the obligation to the ob- vious duties arising out of this relation, would immediately be felt. Let it be supposed, also, that this human being, until grown to maturity, had never heard of God, and of course possessed no idea of such a being. While in that state of ignorance, it could have no sense of the obliga- tion to reverence, love and serve its Creator; but as soon as the mind should take in distinctly, the conception ^^^ crea ~ of God as the Author of its being, and as possessed of every adorable attribute, the 190 MOEAL SCIENCE. duties arising out of this newly-discovered rela- tion, would be felt to be obligatory. A just con- sideration of this relation would The win of God lead to the conclusion that, in seen to be obliga- tory, every thing, the will of such a Be- ing, standing in such a relation to the creature, should be obeyed. Thus the im- portant principle would be learned, that the will of God, so far as made known by reason or re- velation, should be the supreme rule of moral conduct. Conscience, henceforth, would act under the influence of this truth. And making the will of God — so far as made known — the supreme and only rule of moral conduct, would not be found at all inconsistent with the 'obliga- tion to obey the dictates of conscience; for it would now become evident that God, being the author of our minds, had constituted them with this moral faculty, to admonish them of duty, so that the dictates of an enlightened conscience are the clear indications of the law or will of God. It is the law written on the hearts of all men. Nothing can be considered as partaking of NATURE OF VIRTUE. 191 the nature of virtue which does not meet with the approbation of the moral faculty. This will by some be thought a dangerous principle, merely from a misappre- ^J^J 1 ^ hension of its nature. They al- ^ on moral approba - lege that the will of God is the only perfect and immutable standard of moral rectitude. They allege, moreover, that to define virtue to be only such actions as the moral fac- ulty in man approves, is to make it a very un- certain and fluctuating thing, depending on the variable and discrepant moral feelings of men. This objection confounds two things which should be kept distinct, viz., the quality of an object and the light or medium through which it is viewed. The ject ^ n sw t0 ob * colour of an object can be per- ceived only by the eye ; but in order to have the object fairly before the eye, there must be light reflected from it, and that light on entering the pupil, must be reflected so as to be conveyed to a focus on the retina. But without an eye it would be useless to descant ever so long or so learnedly on the nature of colours, or the laws 192 MOKAL SCIENCE. by which light is reflected and refracted. In the case of sight, it is evident that all the per- ception which is experienced, must be by the eye. If the light is insufficient, it must be in- creased, and if any cause hinders it from being duly refracted, vision will not take place; but still, it is only by the eye that we can have any perception of colours. Perhaps an illustration, drawn from the faculty of taste, may be more appropriate. A beautiful landscape is presented ; I am charmed with its beauty. This emotion or feeling of the beautiful depends Analogy of taste, on the faculty of taste. If that were absent, I might see all the objects as they stand, and perceive nothing of the beautiful. Beauty in the works of nature or art can be perceived only by taste, and the emotion will depend on the perfection of the faculty, provided the object is presented in a favourable light. A person of cultivated taste sees beauties where a rude savage sees none. Thus also in regard to moral acts, or a connected series of moral actions, every idea and feeling of NATURE OF VIRTUE. 193 a moral kind must as necessarily be through the moral faculty as colours through, the organ of vision. We have no other faculty which takes cognizance of moral qualities. The judgments and emotions which are produced by the con- templation of such actions, are always infallibly correct, when the mind is duly enlightened and the faculty itself in a sound and healthy state. There is no inconsistency between this opinion and that which considers the will of God as the real standard and ultimate rule of moral con- duct. For, as has been shown, although conscience can act within a narrow sphere without even the knowledge or belief of a God; yet so soon as this knowledge is ob- p "!St . . -i i rt i • tates of understand- tamed, and the mind recognises tog , its relation to its Creator, a new field is opened for the operations of conscience. It is soon perceived that the clear dictates of conscience, in cases of self-evident truth, are nothing else than the indication of the law of God written on the heart of every man, as was before taught. "We can refer to the will of God 194 MOKAL SCIENCE. as a rule of moral conduct no other way than by the exercise of the moral faculty, "by which it is clearly perceived that our Creator and Preserver has a just claim on our obedience, and ought in all things to be obeyed. But if conscience did not thus dictate, all appeals to the will of God, to show what is morally right, would be in vain. The certainty and immutability of our moral standard of rectitude will then be in proportion to the knowledge which the mind possesses of the existence of God and the creature's relation to Him. Instead, therefore, of making our moral feelings mere instinctive emotions, as is done by Hutcheson and Shaftesbury, we make them depend on the clear dictates of the under- standing; for, as we have often explained, the judgments of conscience are no other than the understanding judging on moral subjects. If that, and that alone is virtue, which is ap- proved by a mind duly enlightened, and in a sound state, then the attempt to Evil of attempt- .. __ . lug undue simpiifi- reduce all virtuous actions to some one kind — as to benevolence, for example — is not the way to arrive at the truth. NATURE OF VIRTUE. 195 For while benevolent actions generally meet with the approbation of the moral faculty, we can easily conceive of an exercise of benevolence which, instead of being approved, would be viewed as morally indifferent, or merely amia- ble — as a natural affection, or even as evil. We never ascribe morality to the kind feeling of brutes to one another. The natural affection of parents, called storge by the Greeks, is no more of a moral nature than the same affection in in- ferior animals. The natural affection of our re- latives, our neighbours, and countrymen, is amiable and useful, but not of a moral character. If a judge should feel a strong benevolence to- ward all criminals, so as to avoid inflicting on them the penalty of the wholesome laws of the country, we should judge it wicked. It might be said that a benevolence which counteracts a greater good, is not virtuous but sinful ; yet it is an exercise of benevolence, and serves, on the concession of those who make all virtue to con- sist in benevolence, to show that all benevolence is not virtue, which is the very thing to be proved. Again, there are acts of moral agents, 196 MORAL SCIENCE. which have nothing of the nature of benevo- lence, yet which the moral faculty judges to be morally good. For example, if a man for the sake of moral improvement, denies himself some gratification which would in itself be pleasing to nature, we judge such self-denial to be vir- tuous. A thousand acts of prudence which have re- gard to our own best interests, without inter- fering with the interest of others, Prudence a Vir- -, -, -, _ 1 . tne. have always been reckoned vir- tuous. Indeed, among the ancient sages, prudence was one of the four cardinal virtues. The attempt, therefore, to reduce all virtue to the simple exercise of benevolence, must be unsuccessful. It is so evident that some actions which have our own welfare as their ob- ject, are virtuous, that rather than give up their theory that all virtue consists in benevolence, they enlarge the meaning of the word, so as to make it include a due regard to our own wel- fare. But this is really to acknowledge that all virtue does not consist in benevolence, accord- ing to the usual meaning of that word. Any NATURE OF VIRTUE. 197 term may be made to stand for the whole of virtue, if you choose to impose an arbitrary meaning upon it. Benevolent affections, how- ever, is a phrase which has as fixed and de- finite a meaning as any in the language, and by all good writers is used for good will to others. Benevolent affections are, therefore, con- stantly distinguished from such as are selfish. If, however, any one chooses, contrary to uni- versal usage, to employ the words in a sense so comprehensive as to include self-love, be it so. We will not dispute with such a one, about the meaning of the word, provided he agree that the judicious pursuit of our own improvement and happiness is virtuous. To determine how many different kinds of actions are virtuous, we must pass them in re- view before the moral faculty, and then classify them ; being in the whole process -i t .-i -i . t , n , Actions to be clas- governed by the light of true 6ified . knowledge, and taking into view all the relations in which the human race, or any portion of it, is placed. Something of this 198 MOKAL SCIENCE. kind we may attempt in the sequel of this work ; in which, we shall endeavour to survey the moral duties incumbent on men, in their vari- ous relations. CHAPTER XXVII. WHETHEE YIETUE AND YICE BELONG ONLY TO ACTIONS. It has repeatedly been brought into view that moral qualities are found only in actions of moral agents, and not in all actions, but only in those performed under cer- con ^^ acts ^ tain circumstances. But when we consider those actions which are of a moral na- ture, we find that they are complex, consisting of an external and internal part. At once we can determine that a mere external or corporeal action can possess no morality, except as con- nected with the internal or mental exercise which produced it, and of which it is the expo- nent. But here again there are several acts of the mind clearly distinguishable from one an- other, and it is of importance to determine in which of these the moral quality exists. On 200 MOEAL SCIENCE. this subject there is a diversity of opinion. It seems commonly to be taken for granted, that the act of volition is, so to speak," the responsible act, and this has led to the maxim almost uni- versally current, that " no action is of a moral nature which is not voluntary." iun^. al aCtS V °* Accordingly, writers of great emi- nence have entertained the opin- ion, that to render our desires and affections moral, they must directly or indirectly proceed from volition. But here arises a serious diffi- culty. Our desires and affections jito ZZl ■*" ^e not subject to our volitions. We may will with all our energy to love an object now odious, and our will pro- duces no manner of effect; except to show us our inability to change our affections by the force of the will. On the contrary, we find by constant experience that our volitions are influ- enced uniformly by our prevailing desires. No man ever put forth a volition which was not the effect of some desire, feeling, or inclination. Now, after the most attentive examination of our minds, we find that certain affections which MOKALITY OF VOLITIONS. 201 are neither produced by volitions nor terminate in volitions, are, in the judgment of all reflecting men, of a moral J^SS^ nature. For example, envy at the prosperity of a neighbour is not the result of any volition, and it may be cherished inward- ly without leading to any volition, the will being controlled by other feelings which pre- vent action ; yet all must admit it to be a mor- ally evil disposition. The truth then appears to be, that our affections are properly the subject of moral qualities, good and evil. Volitions take their character en- has ^^ mion tirely from the internal affections or desires from which they proceed. The voli- tion, viewed abstractly, is always the same, when the external action is the same ; but the moral character of the acts, where the volitions are the same, may vary exceedingly. If I will to strike a man with a deadly weapon, the sim- ple volition which precedes and is the immedi- ate cause of the action, is the same whether I give the stroke in self-defence, in execution of the law, or through malice prepense. Indeed, *9 202 MOKAL SCIENCE. the volition of an insane person to strike a blow is exactly similar to the volition of a sane per- son striking a similar blow. Hence it is evident that the proper seat of moral qualities is not in the will, considered as distinct from the affec- tions, but in the affections themselves, which give character to the volition as much as to the external action. These internal of ^tk)n S rUe Sprmg affections or desires are properly the springs of our actions, and our wills are the executive power by which they are carried into effect. They are commonly called motives, and very properly, as Motives. they move us to action ; but I have avoided the use of that word, because it is ambiguous, and has occasioned much misconception on this subject. By mo- tives, many understand reasons or external qualities in the objects of our desires ; that which excites or moves our affections. Then when it is asserted that the will is governed by the strongest motives, some understand the meaning to be the strongest reasons, or those qualities in an object best adapted to excite our MORALITY OF VOLITIONS. 203 affections. In this sense the proposition is not true. Minds are often in such a state that they are not governed whether gov- erned by the strong- by that reason which in their own est reasons, view is the strongest ; that is, which in their better judgment seems wisest and best. And often our minds are not influenced or governed by those external objects or consid- erations which in the judgment of impartial reason are most weighty. But if by motives be understood the desires themselves, actually in exercise at the time, in what sense will follows the however produced, then it may be strongest motives* truly said that the will is always determined by the strongest motives, that is, the strongest desires. But even this proposition needs qualification. The strongest single desire does not always govern the man, but the strong- est combination of desires, as may be thus ex- emplified. A man in returning from a journey on a cold day has a strong desire to reach home without delay; but passing a house where he knows he can enjoy a warm fire, and good re- freshment, and the company of a friend, though 204 MOKAL SCIENCE. his desire to reach home is stronger than his de- sire to see his friend, stronger than his desire to enjoy the fire, or his desire for food or drink, yet all these combined prove sufficient to induce him to stop. It is often said that the intention or end for which an action is performed, determines its moral character; and as our de- Morality of an act -■ . , -,. from ite intention. ^™ always point to some object which is the end of the action, this account of the matter coincides with the view already given. As if a man gives money to another, though we see the action, and are sure that it was voluntary, yet that determines nothing respecting the moral character of the action. Before we can judge any thing correct- ly, we must know the intention with which the act was performed. If it was to pay a just debt, we approve it as a moral act, but of small merit. If it was to supply the wants of a poor suffering family, unable to help themselves, we still ap- prove, but our approbation is much stronger; the act is more meritorious than the former. But if we are informed that the person on whom the MORALITY OF VOLITIONS. 205 benefit was conferred was an enemy who had sought every opportunity to injure him who is now his benefactor, we esteem it the high- est degree of Christian virtue. But if it should appear that the money was given to a common drunkard, to enable him to procure intoxicating drink ; though the external act and volition are the same, instead of approving the action, we censure it as culpable. And finally, if it should appear that the intention was to hire an assassin to murder an innocent person, and that person a benefactor, our emotion rises to the highest de- gree, and we reprobate the action as evil in the extreme. In all these cases, the action and the volition producing it, are the same. The only difference is in the end or intention with which it was done. The intention will serve to characterize actions .™ e ^ ti0 *^- very well, but is not comprehen- sive enough to take in all the exercises of mind which possess a moral character. I feel habitu- ally a kind disposition to my fellow-creatures, but for much of my time I have not the oppor- tunity of performing any particular acts of kind- 206 MOEAL SCIENCE. ness. All impartial persons will say that this habitual feeling is of a virtuous character ; but there is no intention in the case. It is merely a feeling which terminates in no volition or ac- tion. My neighbour, who has been a bad man, un- dergoes a real change of character, and from being profane and quarrelsome, Intention not comprehensive e- becomes pious and peaceable. I nough. rejoice in the change. This joy is a virtuous emotion, though it has no intention accompanying it. This will serve to show that making the intention the sole characteristic of morality, is correct in regard to actions, but is not comprehensive enough to take in the whole of morality. It may seem that in what has been said, we contravene the maxim, that all moral actions are voluntary, a maxim which has re- jection, ceived the sanction of ages, and may be considered an intuitive principle : where- as it is now maintained that there are exercises of mind which do not involve any exercise of will; and that our volitions themselves have MORALITY OF VOLITIONS. 207 nothing of a moral nature but what they derive from the motives from which they proceed. The maxim, rightly understood, is no doubt just, and we should never affect the wisdom of being wiser than the common sense of mankind, where we meet mit ^ maxim ad " with truths in which all men of sober reflection have been agreed. It is safer to take them for granted, as believing that univer- sal consent in such matters furnishes the best evidence of truth. But the explanation is easy. The maxim applies primarily to actions, which must be volun- tary to have the character of mo- rality. If the action is not volun- m0Ye e d .° jec on re " tary, it is not properly the action of the person who seems to perform it, for we can act in no other way than by the will. But again, the word voluntary as employed in the maxim under consideration, includes more than volition ; it comprehends all the spontaneous exercises of the Ambiguity of term *- 'voluntary. mind ; that is, all its affections . and emotions. Formerly all these were in- 208 MORAL SCIENCE. eluded under the word will, and we still use language that requires this lati- tation°of S ^. aCCeP " ^e in the construction of the term. Thus it would be conso- nant to the best usage to say that man is perfect- ly voluntary in loving his friend or hating his enemy ; but by this is not meant that these af- fections are the effect of volition, but only that they are the free spontaneous exercises of the mind. That all virtue consists in volition, is not true — as we have seen ; but that all virtuous ex- ercises are spontaneous, is undoubtedly correct. Our moral character radically consists in our feelings and desires. These being the sponta- neous actings of certain latent principles or dispo- sitions, this hidden disposition is also judged to be morally evil, because it is productive of such fruit. And of good dispositions we judge in like manner. CHAPTER XXVHI. THE AUTHOR OF OUR BEING CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO MORAL SCIENCE. It has already been intimated, that the very ex- istence of conscience seems to indicate, that man has a Superior to whom he is ame- nablefor his conduct. The feel- J^££ ing of moral obligation which ac- J. a ^ac- companies every perception of right and wrong, seems to imply, that man is under law ; for what is moral obligation but a moral law ? And if we are under a law there must be a lawgiver, a moral governor, who has incor- porated the elements of his law into our very constitution. This argument for the existence of God, is solid, and independent of all other argu- ments ; and it goes further than arguments de- rived from the evidences of design, which abound in the world around us ; for these prove no more 210 MOKAL SCIENCE. than that the Author of our being is intelligent, but this argument proves that he is a moral Be- ing, and exercises a moral government over us. The Atheist, when he feels, as he must, remorse for some great crime, can scarcely help believ- ing, that there is a God who is displeased with his wicked conduct, and who will punish him hereafter ; for the keen anguish of remorse seems to point to a punishment which is future. Hence it is that when Atheists come into those circum- stances which have a tendency to awaken the conscience, they for the time become believers in the existence of God. Thus in a storm at sea, even the most confirmed Atheist i«T aCtiCa1 ' l*s been found calling upon God, for deliverance ; and when death is suddenly presented to them, they often find, that their atheistical theories cannot withstand the power of an awakened conscience. Certain- ly the existence of an accusing conscience cannot in any way be so well accounted for, as by the sup- position that man is the creature of a Being who intended to form him in such a manner, that he should have a control over his actions, and who DIVINE BEING. 211 has left an indelible proof of his authority in the mind of every man. But omitting to press this argument further at present, let us attend to some of the other evidences of the existence of a God. No one can contend that At tST nt again8t there is any thing absurd in the idea of an eternal, all-powerful, intelligent, First Cause, from whom all things have re- ceived their being. No one can doubt that the supposition of the existence of such a Being seems to account for the phenomena of nature ; and it is equally certain, that they cannot be ra- tionally accounted for on any other hypothesis. To deny that in animals and vegetables there are evident marks of design, would be as unrea- sonable as to deny that any thing exists. Thus the eye was formed ^™ ogical *" to see, the ear to hear, the mouth to masticate our food, the stomach to digest it, the various internal organs to separate the particles suited for nutrition from the mass, and by a wonderful and inexplicable process to convert, or assimilate these particles into the 212 MORAL SCIENCE. various forms and organs which, constitute the human body. For any man to affirm that in all these contrivances and operations, there is no evidence of design, is certainly to contradict the intimate conviction of his own reason. It may on many accounts be expedient and highly pro- fitable, to accumulate arguments from design, as manifested in the rational, animal, vegetable, and mineral world; but for mere ar- d e«rr^g ume » tand demonstration, these details are unnecessary. A man cast away on a desolate shore, would be as certain that some rational beings had been there, if he found one watch, or one quad- rant, as if he should see a thousand of such like or other works of art, strewed along the shore. His mind is soon satisfied with the force of this evidence, as observed in a few particulars, and the conviction of the truth, that these things are the effect of a designing cause, is as perfect as it can be, by the contemplation of ever s$ many in- stances. It may, I think be taken for granted, and even Atheists will admit, that we cannot conceive of any works, or contrivances, which DIVINE BEING. 213 would more clearly evince design, than those which are found in the human, and other animal bodies. Though it is said that some ancient Atheists attributed every thing to Chance. chance, yet it seems unnecessary to take up much time in combating such a the- ory. Atheists no longer resort to this very ab- surd notion. As then design manifest in any effect, leads necessarily to the conclusion, that intelligence exists in the cause ; there is no escape from the conclusion, that the cause of the existence of animals and vegetables is a wise and powerful Being, but by one of the following suppositions. 1. That every thing in which design is manifest, has existed from eternity; or, 2. That there are in the mate- rial universe, causes possessing power and intel- ligence to produce these effects, but no one great intelligent person ; or, 3. That there has existed from eternity a succession of these organized be- ings, producing one another in a continued series ; so that while the individuals in the series perish, the succession is eternal. The first supposition is too extravagant, we 214 MORAL SCIENCE. should think, to have any advocates. Indeed, as it relates to the bodies of animals and vegeta- bles, we have a certain demonstration, that their organization has a beginning. And nnL E rlr it7 ° fthe if every thing was from eternity, every thing would be immutable and imperishable ; but we see every kind of organized bodies tending quickly to destruction. Our souls also had a beginning, for their gradual increase and development is a matter of daily observation. We have no remembrance of an eternal existence, nor any consciousness of inde- pendence, which must be an attendant of an eternal being. We are conscious that we can- not cease to be, nor control our own destiny. Nothing is more certain in the mind of all think- ing men, than that we who now live are crea- tures of yesterday. But it is unnecessary to re- fute an error which perhaps no one is so unrea- sonable as to hold. Let us then consider that atheistical, or ra- ther pantheistical scheme, which attributes all the appearances of design in the world to the world itself; that is, to certain causes existing in the DIVINE BEING. 215 world which produce beings of various species, not by creation out of nothing, which, they hold to be impossible, thesis of evokTtL!" but by an evolution or development of principles contained in the world itself. Ac- cording to this theory the world is God, and all things are parts of this one being. This theory would avoid the name of Athe- ism, which has ever been odious; but it re- tains the virus of the poison of . Denies a personal Atheism under another name. It God. admits a cause, or rather multitude of causes, capable of producing these marks of design ; but denies that this cause, considered as one or many, is a person. The question neces- sary to be determined is, what is necessary to constitute a person? Here we have intelligence in the cause, in Personality, the highest conceivable degree. But the structure of the body of man is' not mere intelligence ; there is an adaptation of means to an end. This supposes the exercise of choice or selection, which is obviously an exercise of will. Every instance of contrivance therefore evinces 216 MORAL SCIENCE. the exercise of an intellect and will ; and that being in which, these two properties are found, we are accustomed to denominate a person. It would be difficult to find a better defini- tion of a person. But we need not dispute about the name ; when there is manifest demanS le ° aUSe evidence of wise contrivance in the -effect, there must be an intelli- gent cause to produce such an effect. Where, we ask, is that cause ? Is it in the individual which exhibits these signs of design? That would be to make the same thing cause and effect. Is there then for each individual in which wise contrivance appears a particular cause ; or is nature or the world to be consid- ered one general cause, operating in a multitude of ways? To suppose a particular cause for every one of these effects, would be to multiply deities beyond the wildest mythology of the heathen ; for these causes being intelligent be- ings, possessing a wisdom beyond our concep- tion, each is properly considered a separate deity. But even this supposition comes utterly short of furnishing a satisfactory account of the pheno- DIVINE BEING. 217 mena of the universe ; for the admirable contri- vances in the natural world consist very often in the adaptation of things which are entirely distinct, to each other, as of the light to the eye, the air to the ear and to the lungs, the food to the stomachs of the various species of ani- mals, &c. The same adaptation is equally obvi- ous in the vegetable world. That cause, there- fore, which produced the eye must have produced the light; and the cause of the curiously-con- trived apparatus of hearing must have formed the air ; and the author of the stomach must have adapted it to various kinds of food, &c. The hypothesis of an infinite number of separate, in- telligent causes, will not be maintained. All these effects must be attributed to one cause, and that cause must be infinitely wise and powerful, to give existence to so many wonderful works. If, then, "there is one cause of all these differ- ent species of beings, which could not exist with- out wise contrivance, that cause must be powerful, intelligent and e ^£S£ benevolent; but power, wisdom, and intelligence can exist only in some being, xo 218 MOKAL SCIENCE. and that being which possesses them must be a per- son. The Pantheist will allege that these attri- butes belong to the universe itself, and therefore there is no need to suppose any being to exist separate from, and independent of the world. All these phenomena arising, are only the devel- opments of this one substance, in which the attributes before mentioned have their seat. Before we receive such an opinion, let us in- quire what constitutes the universe, as far as our knowledge can extend. We be- rep?!— f HC come acquainted with the world without us by our senses. Trust- ing to the information of these inlets of knowl- edge, we find that the universe consists, as far as known to the senses, of peculiar objects, com- bined together in various ways. These material things, though subject to peculiar laws, appear entirely destitute of intelligence. In this, all - men agree. The light, the air, the water, the rocks, the earth, the metals, &c, are not capable of thought. Indeed, every material thing with which we are acquainted consists of an infinite number of parts, even when of the same kind, DIVINE BEING. 219 and no otherwise related to each other than that they are situated near to each other ; whether they are at all in contact, we do not know. If thought belonged to matter, each of these infinitesimal particles of matter would be a conscious being, and his consciousness be independent of every other particle. By what medium of communi- cation could these particles of matter agree on forming an organized body ? But the Panthe- ist does not believe that matter is endued with thought. His theory is, that in the world there exists not only external substance, but thought or intelligence in the same substance. But as this intelligence must have a subject in which it resides, and of which it is a quality, and as it cannot be an attribute of brute matter, there must exist a substance distinct from matter, of which it is a property. Matter being divisible, inert, and extended, cannot have intelligence as an at- tribute, which is active, indivisible, and unex- tended. Extension, and thought, therefore, can- not be properties of the same substance. If then the cause of the phenomena of nature which in- dicate design is in the world itself, the world 220 MORAL SCIENCE. must, besides the gross matter which we see and feel, be possessed of a soul, or spiritual substance, in which this intelligence resides. This would bring us to the old Pagan theory of the Soul of the World. Under the material part, but under this only, there is a spiritual substance, a soul ; just as in a man, we can see and feel the body, but we know that within this case, there exists a spiritual substance or soul. This theory, then, admits the existence of a great spirit, possessing the attributes necessary to account for all the ap- pearances of wisdom in the world. It differs from the common theistical doctrine only in this, that it would confine this being to the world ; but for this, there could be assigned no valid reason. A being possessing such power over matter as to mould it into every organized form found in ani- mals, vegetables, and minerals, must have a com- plete control over matter, and be perfectly ac- quainted with all its most hidden properties and capabilities, and must be independent of matter, and must exist every where, to carry on the pro- cesses of nature. And as we do not know the extent of the material universe, we can set no DIVIDE BEING. 221 limits to the presence of this spiritual, intelligent and omnipotent being. The object of Pantheism is to get clear of the idea of a personal God, who gives laws to creatures, and superintends and governs them according to their natures. But the hypothesis, if it could be established, does not answer the purpose for which it was devised. Still, even according to the hypothesis, we must have a personal God, who knows all things and rules over all. The only other atheistical method of account- ing for the phenomena of the world, as indicat- ing the most consummate wisdom, ,, ,, , 3. Eternal succes- as well as the most omnipotent si0 n. power, is the hypothesis, that the universe in its present form has existed from eternity, and that all the various species of ani- mals and vegetables now observed have always existed, and have communicated existence to one another in an endless series. And as an eternal series has no beginning, it can have no cause. There is therefore no need of supposing any first cause, from whom every thing has pro- ceeded. As we must suppose some being to ex- 222 MOEAL SCIENCE. ist from eternity, we may as well suppose that the world which we see is that eternal being. This has always been the stronghold of athe- ism, and therefore deserves a more special atten- tion. The only reason, however, Fortress of Athe- ism, which gives an advantage to this theory is, that it carries us back into the unfath- omable depths of eternity, where our minds are confounded by the incomprehensibility of the subject. It is also to be regretted that some truly great men, in attempting to refute this theory, have adopted a mode of reasoning which is not satisfactory. This, we think, is true with respect to Bentley, who possessed a gigantic intellect; and, as might have been expected, many are his followers. Dr. Samuel Clarke has also pursued a course in his reasoning on this point, which, to say the least, is not entirely free from objec- tion. The same may be said of many others, and especially of some who have attempted a mathematical demonstration of the falsehood of an infinite series of living organized beings, in- cluding the celebrated Stapfer. It will be an object, therefore, to free the DIVINE BEING. 223 subject as much, as possible from intricacy and obscurity, and to present argu- , . , , ,, , , , Argument against ments -winch, shall be level to any eternal series. common capacity accustomed to attend to a train of reasoning. We may certain- ly assume it as an admitted principle, that every effect must have not only a cause, but an ade- quate cause. If wise contrivance and evident adaptation of means to an end be found in the effect, to ascribe it to an unintelligent cause, is as unsatisfactory as to assign no cause. This then being assumed, we would take this position as incontrovertible, that if de- sign manifest in one effect re- ' An adequate quires an intelligent cause, the cause stm indispen- sable. sam^ necessity requires the same kind of a cause for any number of similar effects ; and the conclusion must be the same, whether the number is finite or infinite. This evident truth has been often and happily illustrated, by supposing a chain suspended before our eyes, but reaching beyond the sphere of our vision. The lowest link requires a support, and so does the second, and there is no less need of support 224 MOKAL SCIENCE. for every successive link as you ascend the chain ; and if you suppose as many links beyond your sight, as there are atoms in the universe, still the same necessity of a support is presumed to exist. There must ultimately be a support for all these suspended links. But suppose some one to allege that the chain is of infinite length, and has no beginning, we immediately No relief from making series of ef- begin to experience some confu- fects infinite. sion of ideas. We attempt to grasp infinity, and finding ourselves baffled in the attempt, we are apt to lose sight of the pro- per logical conclusion in this case. The neces- sity of a supporting power has no dependence on the number to be sustained. If one, if one hundred, if one thousand require support, so does any number of links. The conclusion is not in the smallest degree affected by the number, except that the more links, the stronger must be the supporting power; but this has nothing to do with our present argument. The conclusion will be of the same kind, and will as necessarily follow, in the case of effects which have in them the marks of design. The number cannot affect DIVINE BEING. 225 the conclusion. If one such effect cannot exist without an intelligent contriver, an infinite number of great effects cannot. If multiplying one cipher, or zero, by any number in arith- metic, produces nothing, and the same is the re- sult of multiplying a thousand ciphers, the con- clusion is inevitable, that an infinite number of ciphers multiplied by any number cannot result in any positive quantity. Indeed, if all the indi- viduals in the supposed infinite series are of the same kind, all are effects, and it is absurd to conceive of an effect without a cause. Cause and effect are correlative and imply each other ; and if an effect cannot exist without a cause, much less can an infinite number of effects exist without an adequate cause. My next argument will leave out of view altogether the idea of infinity, i • -i , , n i ,i Cause must be ex- which is so apt to confound the isting and operative, mind. It is this. Every effect must not only have a cause, but that cause must be in existence and operation ; for it would be absurd to think of a cause operating, when it no 10* 226 MORAL SCIENCE. longer had an active existence. Let us then take that individual of a series of organized beings, which came last into existence. Let it be an animal — a dog or horse. This individual we know came recently into being ; when produced there must have been an adequate cause in ex- istence and in operation. What was that cause ? The hypothesis confines us to the preceding se- ries of animals of the same species, supposed to have come down in uninterrupted succession from eternity. But whether the series be long or short, finite or infinite, is of no consequence as it relates to our present argument. What we are inquiring after is a cause in existence at the time this curiously organized and animated be- ing came into existence. Now at that time, the individuals of the series had all ceased to exist, except the immediate progenitors. Whatever cause existed, cannot therefore be looked for in them ; and if the effect is such as manifestly to be beyond any power and skill which they pos- sessed, the contriving and efficient cause cannot be found in the series. There must be a higher cause. DIVINE BEING. 227 But lest some persons should have a vague notion that some hidden power might be com- municated through the series, al- , , -, . „ -. . . , . The whole power though not found in the progeni- f the cause must be n - . , , . , carried through the tors of the animal under consider- se ries. ation, I will lay down a princi- ple which is admitted in mechanical powers, and is equally applicable to all causes. It is this. In all cases where any power is communicated through a series of individuals, the whole power necessary to produce the effect, must not only be communicated to the first, but to every single thing in the series, until it reach the last, which is intended to be affected by the original power. Thus, suppose it to be required to communicate motion to a ball in a plane, by sending an im- pulse through a hundred balls, the principle known to all mechanicians is, that the force ne- cessary to give the desired motion must be com- municated to the first, and from the first to the second, and so on, until it reaches the ball in- tended to be moved. And this principle is equally applicable to all causes which operate through a succession of particulars. If at the 228 MOKAL SCIENCE. commencement of a series, an intelligent cause operated, and then ceased, or stopped short of the last effect, no sign of intelligence could exist in this, which brings us back to the same obvious principle with which we commenced, viz., that when any effect is produced, an adequate cause must exist, and be in operation at the time of its production. The simple inquiry then, is, had the progenitors of this dog, or horse, when the animal came into existence and became ani- mated, the skill necessary to continue the ani- mal frame, with all its curiously contrived parts, and power and skill to give to this individual that constitution of instincts, appetites, and pas- sions suited to its condition in the world, which it possesses. I leave the atheist to answer this question? The same course of reasoning will be equally forcible as applied to fruits and vegeta- bles. Every one of these organized beings fur- nishes an irrefragable argument for the being of a God ; for in any one of these is evidence of the existence of a wisdom and power which cer- tainly do not exist in the several particulars of which the series consists. DIVINE BEING. 229 The only modern attempt to invalidate the argument for the being of God founded on the appearance of design in the uni- verse, is that of Mr. Hume, which o ^ op o f «££ is substantially this, that this argu- ment supposes that we have seen similar works performed, from which, by analogy, we conclude that an intelligent cause is necessary to account for them ; as if we find a watch we believe it to have been made by an artist, because we have before observed such works made by skilful men ; but in relation to the world, it is a singu- lar work, entirely unique. We have never seen any world produced, and, therefore, the reason- ing which would hold in regard to the conclu- sion that the watch was made by an artist does not apply. More importance has been given to this ob- jection, especially by Dr. Chalmers, than it de- serves. The objection of Hume is a mere sophism, and can unset- Eepiy tie no mind which understands the nature of the argument in question. Ac cording to Mr. Hume's argument we could not 230 MOEAL SCIENCE. infer from any work of art that it had an intelli- gent author, unless we had seen a work of the very same kind by an artist. Suppose a boy who has never been away from his father's farm, where he has seen nothing superior to ploughs, carts, and harrows, to be conducted to a seaport, and to see a steam-frigate. As he has never seen on the farm any thing formed like this, according to Mr. Hume, he could not infer that this stupendous work was produced by an intel- ligent cause. To the boy it would be a singu- lar effect, the like of which he had never wit- nessed, and, therefore, he could infer nothing respecting it. Now every child knows better than this. Any boy of common sense will con- clude in a moment that this steam engine must have been the work of a skilful artificer. In order to apply the argument from design, it is not at all necessary that we should have seen an artist engaged in produ- aSLS"* a ™S its like - A11 ttat is necessar 7 is, that there should immediately appear an adaptation of means to produce a cer- tain end ; and it matters not as to the argument DIVINE BEING. 231 whether we ever conceived of a similar work, or knew any thing of the artist, the certain appear- ance of design, or a skilful adaptation of means to an end is always sufficient to produce the cer- tain conclusion that there has been a designing cause at work. The works of nature are not a singular effect, as far as the argument a poste- riori is concerned. The adaptation of means to an end in these is similar to the works of design among men. The difference between a telescope and the eye of an animal is not so great as be- tween a plough and a steam engine. If there was any difference between the inference from seeing a steam-frigate or a complicated spinning engine, which have never been seen before, and another plough or cart, it would be in favour of the contrivance not before witnessed. The ar- gument seems to be a fortiori in this case. And as the whole argument in regard to the works of man is founded simply on observing an adap- tation of means to accomplish an end, and not the adaptation to produce some particular end which we had before seen effected by similar 232 MOEAL SCIENCE. means ; and as the adaptation of means to an end is as evident in the works of nature as in the works of man, the argument is as conclusive in one case as in the other. CHAPTER XXIX. THE PHENOMENA OF THE UNIVERSE. Let us now suppose that a Great Intelligent First Cause exists, and has existed . , _ „ Accords with phe- from eternity ; are not all the ap- nomena - pearances of the universe correspondent with the existence of such a being ? Again we may demand of an Atheist what other evidences of the existence of God he would require. Let him suggest some- thing, which, in the form of evi- ^™enc* dence, would be more satisfactory to him, and he will not find it easy to fix on any evidence which is stronger or more suitable than what we already possess. It may appear strange to some that we challenge the Atheist to demand any clearer or 234 MOKAL SCIENCE. stronger evidence of the existence of a Supreme Being than that which is already Atheist chaiieng- before us. But let the attempt be ed to propose any stronger. made to conceive of some evidence of this truth which would be more satisfactory, and better adapted to be a standing proof to all nations, and we have mistaken the matter, if the result will not be that the existing evidence is as good as any which they could ask. It will be worth while to spend a little time in considering this point, for if we cannot satisfy the Atheist of the truth of our position, the dis- cussion may be satisfactory to others who have not been accustomed to view the subject in this light. It is true we do not see God, and the reason is, he is a spirit ; and a spirit, from the very na- ture of the case, is invisible. We Visibility of God cannQt gee th SQuls f Qur nearesj . not requisite. friends ; we know that they exist, not by any direct perception of the intelligent substance, but by the actions which they perform through the instrumentality of the body. If God were not a spirit he could not be an active, PHENOMENA OF UNIVEESE. 235 intelligent, powerful, and perfect being ; but be- ing a spirit lie must be invisible. Nothing is visible but material substances, and these only by means of light reflected from them to the eye. It is not forgotten that most Atheists, being materialists, deny that there is any such sub- stance as spirit ; but they do not and cannot deny that there is invisible exist- ences are believed something within us which thinks in - and feels and wills, and has power to originate bodily motion. Call the substance, of which thought is a property, by what name you please, still it is an invisible substance. Who can pretend to see a thought or a volition ? or who would say that he can see the mind, and describe its shape and give its magnitude and dimensions ? Let it be supposed then that the cause of all intelligence has a nature resem- bling this intelligent nature of which we are every moment conscious, but far more excellent, as it must be supposed that every excellence ex- ists in a higher degree in the cause than in the effect. 236 MORAL SCIENCE. Now supposing such an intelligent being to exist, call him spiritual or material, only let him be a being of thought, will, and in no way could passion ; and that he is necessari- a spiritual Being be better revealed. ly from his nature invisible to eyes of flesh ; the question is, how could such a being make himself known to ra- tional minds such as ours. As we cannot by any direct perception look into the mind of another, and as such a being cannot make him- self visible without assuming a gross body, we can conceive of no way by which he can make himself known but by performing some act, or exhibiting to us some work which shall con- tain the impress of his character. For if he should assume a bodily shape, and thus make himself visible, it would not be the intelligent substance which we perceived, but a body, which was no part of his essence. If an intelligent creature could be so situated in the universe as to have no opportunity of contemplating any work of God, such a creature could never arrive at the knowledge of his existence. But the sup- position is impossible ; for an intelligent creature PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 237 could not exist without the consciousness of its own thoughts ; and in the mind itself, even if it were cut off from all perception of material things, there is sufficient proof of an efficient, in- telligent cause. The impress of the divine at- tributes is as clearly printed on the soul as on any of the works of God to which man has access. As the First Cause, if there is one, must be from his nature invisible, the only way by which he can be conceived to make The First Cause known his existence, is by setting known by his ! J ° works. before us some work, in which his wisdom, power, and goodness may be manifested; and by the contemplation of which a rational mind may infer, that a being does exist, to whom these properties belong. If then in the various objects in the world, there is as much evidence of these attributes as we can conceive, and in fact far exceeding our most enlarged conceptions, we have the best proof of the existence of a Great First Cause, which we couldhave. The simple question then is, could there be exhibited stronger evidences of wisdom than we have in 238 MORAL SCIENCE. the structure of the body of man, and in the constitution of his mind? Could the various species of animals in the earth, air, and sea, be formed with more consummate wisdom than they are, in relation to the climate in which they live, and the provision made internally and ex ternally for their subsistence, and the propaga tion of their kind. Examine also the vegetable world. Call in the aid of glasses to inspect the concealed structure of the vessels ; contemplate the leaf, the flower, and the mature fruit, and say whether you can conceive of contrivances more exquisite. If any man thinks that animal and vegetable bodies could have been construct- ed with more wisdom, let him point out in what respects these works of nature are deficient in wisdom. But even if it were possible to con- ceive of more perfect works, this could not in the least invalidate the argument from them, for the existence of an intelligent cause. If the question were of the degree of perfection in the wisdom exhibited, then the skill manifested in each work would be a proper subject for con- sideration. An imperfect time-piece proves the PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 239 existence of an artist as fully as one that is per- fect. But there is here no need of this remark, for the Atheist may be defied to conceive of any improvement in any of the works m This manifesta- of God, m regard to the adapta- tation needs no a- mendment. tion of the means used to the end to be accomplished ; and these evidences of the wisdom of Grod are scattered profusely over the whole universe. We cannot turn our eyes to the heaven or the earth, to objects of great mag- nitude, or so small that they can be seen only by the microscope, but the same admirable perfec- tion of contrivance is manifest in them all. The internal structure of the gnat is as wonderful as that of the elephant ; and in the manifestation of wisdom in the creation there is a wonderful va- riety. No two species are exactly alike; and the difference is exactly such as it should be to accomplish the special end in view. The more intricate our examination of the contri- vance and evident design in the organization of animal and vegetable bodies, the stronger will 240 MORAL SCIENCE. be our conviction, and the greater our admi- ration. The only question then is, could the evi- dences of intelligence in the cause, if thus innu- merable, be exhibited in a clearer manifested. ° J and stronger light than they are ; if not, then God could not make known his existence as an intelligent being more clearly than he has done. The number of in- stances in which design appears, is far greater than can be examined, and the degree of wis- dom in the various contrivances in organized bodies, transcends our conception; how, there- fore, could we have by new works, greater evi- dence of an intelligent cause, than we already possess ? But there seems in most minds a lurking suspicion, that the existing evidence is not as convincing as it might have been. The evidence need not be as great Even if this were so, we have no right to complain, when it cannot be denied that we have very strong evidence. God is not obliged to give to his creatures the strongest possible evidence of his PHENOMENA OF UNIVEESE. 241 own existence. He may choose to leave scope for human industry, and also make the recep- tion of the truth a part of our moral proba- tion ; and the pleasure of discovering truth after laborious research, a part of the reward of vir- tue. No doubt this is the fact in regard to some truths of no small importance. The honest inquirer discovers them, while the proud and prejudiced mind, though more acute, misses them, and embraces in their stead dangerous error. In maintaining, therefore, that the evi- dence for the being of God is as convincing as it could be to an impartial, rational mind, it is not because such clearness is considered essential; but simply because the fact appears to be as stated. But since many may still sup- , , . . , Can stronger pose that they can imagine much proof be proposed? stronger proof than any which ex- ists, let us consider what can be alleged in favour of this opinion. Could not God speak to us in a voice of thunder, and thus make himself known ? Un- doubtedly he could; and such a voice would 11 242 MOEAL SCIENCE. doubtless greatly terrify us ; but would it be a stronger proof of his wisdom and Supposition of , , in address to the ear. power than the works of nature, which we behold ? If this tremen- dous sound were heard very often, it would at length become familiar, and would cease to pro- duce the same impression as at first. If heard but seldom, it would leave a suspicion that it might have been no more than a disordered imagination. Bat how could we be sure that the voice proceeded from a being who would not deceive? The mere hearing the noise could give us no certain evidence of the charac- ter and veracity of the speaker ? But perhaps it may be thought that a glo- rious visible appearance would place the matter beyond all possibility of doubt. A visible glory m , . . D ,. not convincing. The majestic appearance oi.a di- vine person, would, it may be al- leged, satisfy every one. The same objections may be made to this species of evidence, as to the former; how could we know that this vi- sible appearance was that of the Great First Cause? Unnatural appearances prove nothing PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 243 respecting the character of the person who assumes them ; if such apparitions were only occasionally exhibited, we should be prone to doubt of their reality ; and if frequent, we should become too much accustomed to them to receive any impression. But whatever im- pression such appearances might make, consid- ered as evidence of an all-perfect Deity, they would not be comparable to that which we have in the works of nature. But if the Supreme Being exists, why could he not make himself known by working stupen- dous miracles ? Of course, if mi- Miracles. racles might be demanded by one, all have the same need ; and the same claims and miracles would become so common, that it would be difficult to distinguish them from na- tural events. And again, miracles require no more power to produce them than is required to produce common events. In many cases they would require no more than a cessation of the power by which natural events are produced. The standing still of the sun, or the stopping of the rotation of the earth, would be nothing else 244 MORAL SCIENCE. than removing the impulse by which they were originally put in motion. In a miracle, we only see the effect of divine power. We may infer from this, that there is a Being who can change the laws of Are effects of n ■, , n , power nature; and a miracle taken by itself can prove nothing more. But in the works of nature, we have innumera- ble proofs of the wisdom and beneficence of the Author of the Universe. And the number, va- riety, and wisdom of these works are evident to every person of common sense. The proofs of a great intelligent cause are spread out, over the heavens and the earth, the sea, and the air. We are little affected by these objects, because they have ever been before our eyes since our earliest infancy. But as evidences of a Divine exist- ence their force is not diminished by the uni- formity of the laws of nature, by which they are continually produced, but greatly increased. The different species of animals and vegetables have successively been reproduced, according to laws that never vary ; and this shows that the plan of the Almighty is perfect, and that He PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 245 can accomplish all his pleasure, and has given uniform laws to every kind of being which his wisdom and power have produced. It is not denied that miraculous displays are a decisive proof of a Great First Cause, who is possessed of omnipotence ; but what we maintain is, that the evi- B ^ ad / nothingto proof of power. dence of omnipotence is not greater than in the natural effects which are constantly produced before our eyes. And as to the cha- racter and attributes of God, they are far more clearly exhibited in the various productions of nature, than they would be by a miraculous interposition. If another sun were placed in the heavens, which ' is as great a miracle as we can imagine, it would be a proof of mighty power, but not a stronger proof than the ex- istence of the natural sun ; and as to the wisdom and goodness of the Deity, there would be no comparison, for in the former case, nothing but the existence of Omnipotence could be inferred from the miracle, for there would be no appear- ance of wisdom in such a miracle. But in the existence of the natural sun, which gives light, 246 MOEAL SCIENCE. heat, motion, and life to all earthly living things, the wisdom and goodness of the Creator are most illustriously displayed. Who can enumerate the benefits which are derived from the influ- ence of the sun ? and the same sun, which com- municates so many blessings to our world, dispenses blessings in the same way to other planets. If we saw the dead raised in a thousand in- stances, it would be a decisive evidence of the existence of a Being of almighty Eesultofthe ar- , , - . ■, n ,, gument power ; but the evidence is fully as strong from the formation and vivification of innumerable animal bodies of many species. And no miracle can be conceived, which would furnish stronger evidence of the Divine existence, than the works of creation which are ever before our eyes and our minds. I think, af!er what has been said, that we cannot wish for more convincing evidence of the exist- ence of a Supreme Being, than we already pos- sess in the works of nature spread out before us; and even if we were shut up in a dark dungeon, we have this convincing evidence in our own PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 247 persons, in the constitution of both our souls 'and bodies. The only thing which can be alleged further is, that this might have been made a self-evident truth as much as our own exist- ence, or the existence of the world S J^Z^ of without us; and many formerly entertained that opinion that the idea of God is innate, and that a speculative Atheist is a thing impossible. Some very learned and re- spectable philosophers and theologians have ex- pressly inculcated this opinion in their writings. Now, although we do not believe there are any innate ideas, and although the existence of God can scarcely be said to be self-evident, yet in the proof of it, there is but a single step of reason- ing. It is a self-evident truth that every effect must have an adequate cause ; and when there is evident design in the effect, the cause must be intelligent The conclusion is so easily drawn from an intuitive truth, that it is not wonderful that it should be classed among self-evident truths. We can scarcely conceive of the state of that mind which after seriously contemplating 248 MOEAL SCIENCE. the wonderful evidences of design in the human frame, can doubt the existence of an intelligent First Cause, and an intelligent cause producing effects by a wise adaptation of means to a defi- nite end, and the harmonious operation of thou- sands of parts in the vital functions must, ac- cording to every proper definition of the term, be a person. All the arguments by which the being of God is proved, involve the proof of some of his attributes. If the marks of design Attributes of God. in creatures prove the existence of a Creator, it is by showing that he must be possessed of wisdom to cause so many wonderful contrivances as we behold in the world. As the operation of any cause is the exertion of power, so the creation of the world is the action of omnipotence. A greater power than that which brings something out of nothing cannot be conceived : this indeed we cannot comprehend, and, therefore, some who admit that the world is the work of God, as far as re- lates to the organization and moulding of mat- ter, yet cannot be persuaded that omnipotence PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 249 itself can give existence where there was none before. But if God did not create the matter that is in the world, whence came it ? There are but two suppositions ; one is, that matter existed from eternity, and is, therefore, self-ex- istent and independent ; the other, that it is an emanation of the divine essence. The first is inadmissible ; it supposes two eternal beings independent of each other, and the latter leads to pantheism, or that all things are a part of God ; as whatever emanates from him must be a part of his essence, for this is immutably the same. Though wisdom and power are the attri- butes which are first observed, they are not the only attributes of which we may learn some- thing by studying the works of nature. For when we attentively consider the nature of the end, to accomplish which the innumerable con- trivances are adapted, we cannot but observe that this end is beneficent. All the parts of ani- mals are connected with the vitality, enjoyment, and preservation, of the animal or species. The goodness of God is therefore as manifest in the creation, as his wisdom. There is not a part in 11* 250 MORAL SCIENCE. any animal body which can be shown to be without its use. Every species is fitted by the bodily structure, and by the instincts and pas- sions with which it is endued, to enjoy in the most perfect degree that kind of life to which it is destined. Even the minutest animal- culee have bodies organized with as exquisite skill as those of the larger species. No living creature exists for which food is not provided, suited to the appetite and nourishment of the species, and which it has the means of pro- curing. So every species is endowed with the instinctive ability to provide for itself and its progeny suitable places of residence ; and there are insects which, though they undergo a re- markable metamorphosis and change of appe- tites, are still able by their instinct to find the nourishment which is agreeable and necessary. And what is still more wonderful and indica- tive of far-seeing wisdom in the Creator is the fact, that these insects which were once in the chrysalis state, and afterwards assume the form and instincts of butterflies, are led by an invari- able propensity to deposit their eggs, on plants PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 251 necessary for the young grubs, but on which they themselves never feed. Were it not for this wise provision for the young, they would all perish. Between the animal and vegetable world there is a beautiful harmony ; the latter to a large extent supplies food for the former. It may be thought that the constitution of things by which one animal preys upon another, is an argument against the goodness of God; but these animals are only intended for a transitory existence, and as they all must die, and are tormented with no apprehensions in regard to the future, and the pain indeed is momentary, if they enjoy much more pleasure than pain dur- ing their existence, there seems to be no solid objection against this law of nature. It has often been alleged as an atheistical objection against the goodness, and by conse- quence, against the existence of God, that pain or misery has a J£*^J^ place among his works. This per- haps is the most plausible of all objections which infidels have ever produced ; and yet it has no certain principles on which to rest. With. a 252 MOKAL SCIENCE. system such as the present, where there is a gra- dation of sensitive beings, it is impossible for us to conceive how all pain could be excluded. As far as we can see, the susceptibility of pleasure carries with it a liableness to some degree of - pain. "What if the pain which animals endure arise out of the principle of self-preservation, and from the appetites, in the gratification of which consists their enjoyment ? "Without desire and appetite there could be no animal enjoyment, and when the safety of the animal requires it, it is wisely ordered that by uneasiness or pain it should be stimulated to seek its necessary food, or flee from danger. And as to man, while in the present world we cannot conceive how he could have any en- joyment, unless he was also sub- hn^rlcl^ ** i ect to BUGh feelings of uneasiness as rendered him capable of relish- ing his enjoyments. This remark relates to pains which cannot be avoided, such as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pain arising from contact with some injurious body. The surface of man's body is the chief seat of pain, because PHENOMENA OF UNIVERSE. 253 danger commonly approaches liim from without. It does not appear, therefore, possible that such a system of creatures as exist in the world could be constituted so as to be exempt from all un easy feelings. To make creatures whose consti- tution would exempt them from all liableness to pain, would, as far as we can see, exempt them from all susceptibility to pleasure. And as to those evils which men bring upon themselves by imprudence, intemperance, injustice, or by disobeying the voice of conscience within thein they must be attributed to themselves and not to the constitution of the world. And as God is nofe obliged to make every creature as great and as happy as it could be made, it may seem to ex- hibit his wisdom and power to produce beings in whose existence there is a mixture of natural good and evil. It appears clear, then, that the Author of this universe is powerful, wise, and beneficent; but how does it appear that he is pos- sessed of a moral character ? that rf S^r he loves moral excellence, and dis- approves of moral evil ? This appears evidently 254 MORAL SCIENCE. from the moral constitution of man. The law interwoven in his constitution proves that his Maker approves of moral excellence. Again, it would be absurd to suppose that the creature could possess an excellence, and one superior to all natural endowments, of which there was no prototype in the Great First Cause. We may lay it down as a maxim, that whatever perfection we can conceive of must exist in the most per- fect degree in the Creator, for all our ideas of perfection are derived from the contemplation of creation ; and whatever "excellence there is in the creation must exist in the Creator. Besides, by the laws of nature, virtuous con- duct is generally productive of tion D o^tue Pr ° ba " P^asure and peace of mind; and immoral conduct is generally a source of misery. These laws of nature are the laws of God, and manifest his approbation of virtue and disapprobation of vice. CHAPTER XXX. DUTIES OF MAN TO THE CKEATOR AS THUS MANIFESTED. Hayixg given, in a summary, the proofs of the existence and character of God, so far as reason can guide us in the inquiry, we Foundation of law. are now prepared to consider the relation in which man stands to God, and the obligations which arise out of this relation. As man himself, in the wise and wonderful constitution of his mind and body, has been supplied with the most striking and convincing evidences of a powerful, wise, and beneficent Author of the universe ; we are led at once to see, that God, as being the Creator of man, and the Giver of all his remarkable en- dowments, has a perfect right to claim his obe- dience, to the utmost extent of his powers. And on taking an impartial survey of the origin of his being, of the goodness of the Creator in his 256 MORAL SCIENCE. various beneficent endowments, and of his con- tinual dependence, not only for the continuance of his being, faculties, and susceptibilities, but also for all those gifts of divine Providence ne- cessary to his health and comfort, man cannot but feel that he is under the strongest moral obligation to obey, honour, and glorify his Maker, with his best affections and most stre- nuous exertions. This is the foundation of what, is called the law ; that moral law which is, as it were, written on the heart of every man ; for what man is there, who has come to the ex- ercise of reason, who does not perceive a clear distinction between right and wrong? And where can be found a human being, who, upon having his relation to God as his Creator set be- fore him, does not feel in his conscience, that he is under a moral obligation to be subservient to his will ? The general obligation on all moral agents, n . ... to serve their Creator, is evident General obliga- ' tl0n# enough. It will require some time, and careful consideration of this relation in which man stands to his Maker, to ascertain DUTY TO CKEATOR. 257 the particular duties which, are obligatory on all men. This We Shall nOW attempt, SO Particular obliga- tion. far as reason can guide us in this matter. Here it may be proper to remark, that the essence of all obedience is internal ; that is, con- sists in the dispositions, affections, Obedience internal. and purposes of the heart. Out- ward actions partake of a moral nature, only so far as they proceed from these internal affections. Human laws must be satisfied with external obe- dience, because human lawgivers cannot search the heart, nor scrutinize the motives of those who owe obedience. But even earthly judges, in ad- ministering justice, endeavour as far as human judgment can go, to discover from what internal motives any action under examination was per- formed; and their decision of acquittal or con- demnation is grounded on the opinion which they form of the intention and motives of the person under arraignment. Much more then does the moral Governor of the World require of his creatures the obedience of the heart ; for 258 MORAL SCIENCE. he possesses a perfect knowledge of what is in the heart of every one ; and a most perfect esti- mate of the nature of moral good and evil as those qualities exist in the human heart. It seems evident, therefore, that the laws of na- ture demand the highest degree of excellence of which the mind of man is capable. And as God possesses every moral attribute in the highest perfection, it is reasonable to infer, that man, as he came from the hands of his Creator, was en- dued with the seeds and principles of every moral virtue. And if the nature of man is not now found adorned with these moral excellen- cies, he must in the exercise of his free will have departed from his primeval state. Our present inquiry, however, is not whether man has fallen from his original integrity, but what are the du- ties arising out of man's relation to God as his Creator, Benefactor, and Preserver. Although the obligation to obedience arises Infinite excellency. ^ primarily from the relations just mentioned, yet it is necessary to take into view the supreme excellence and majesty of the cha- racter of God ; for if pious and devout sentiments DUTY TO CREATOR. 259 towards God be required, it is because there is in the character of God as exhibited in his works, something to call forth such affections, from ra- tional and rightly disposed minds. If God were not supremely excellent, it would not be reason- able to demand supreme love from his creatures, and so of other things. But as we know that God is possessed of every excellence in an infi- nite degree, there exists an object for every affection and sentiment toward him, of which the human mind is capable. From what has been said it is evident, that in order to perform any other duties to the Creator, some knowledge of his true character is requisite. Without know- ledge the rational mind cannot exercise right affections. Supposing then a rational mind, such as it is reasonable to think man possessed, when he pro- ceeded from the hands of his Adoration. Maker, and possessing that know- ledge of his attributes which may be learned from his works, what would be the first thoughts and feelings of the newly created soul ? In our judgment, the first feeling would be an emotion 260 MORAL SCIENCE. of profound veneration, or perhaps the word adoration would more strongly indicate the state of the mind, absorbed in the contemplation of a Being so august, so powerful, and so immense. This feeling, then, is one which ought to exist in every rational mind toward the Almighty. This is the true foundation of divine worship. It is the deep and solemn emotion which is the essence of the worship, which holy beings in all worlds offer unto God. And this feeling would lead to a reverence of every thing which has any relation to God. His very name would be sacred. Reverence. We have read of men of great eminence who never mentioned that name with- out a solemn pause, or some external token of reverence. The duty which most naturally arises from the relation which man sustains to God, as his Creator, Benefactor, and Ee- Thankfulness. . deemer, is that of gratitude. This is when strong a very lively and impulsive feeling. It draws men along as taken captive ; and yet the constraint is not painful, but DUTY TO CREATOR. 261 pleasing. Under the influence of gratitude, men will engage in the most odious duties, and will voluntarily make the most self-denying sa- crifices. Under the influence of this affection men have been willing to lay clown their lives. Gratitude is then an important principle of man's obedience. It is true, some have attempted to degrade this principle as one which scarcely can be said to partake of the nature of virtue, be- cause it has respect to self, and to our oWn in- terest. But though gratitude originates in the sense of benefits received by ourselves, it de- serves not to be classed with mere selfish affec- tions. Its object is to make a return to a bene- factor for favour received. It is, therefore, an elevated species of justice ; for when a suitable and adequate return can be made for favours received, gratitude will not be satisfied until this is done. And in regard to the benefits received from our Creator, as an adequate compensation is utterly beyond our power, gratitude manifests itself in acknowledgment of obligation in thanks- giving and in unceasing praises. There is, how- ever, no necessity to argue this matter ; the ap- 262 MOEAL SCIENCE. peal may safely, be made to the feelings of every rightly constituted mind. All men who ac- knowledge the existence and Providence of God, feel that a debt of gratitude is due to their great Benefactor. As the mind, when uncorrupted, is so consti- tuted as to love and esteem whatever is excel- lent, and as moral excellence is Love. superior to all other amiable ob- jects ; and as God possesses this excellence in ah infinite degree, it is reasonable that he should be esteemed above every other object. Finite minds, it is true, can never exercise love proportionate to the excellence of this Glorious Being ; but as far as they possess the capacity of apprehending it, and the susceptibil- ity of affection, they are under moral obligation to love God with all their powers. And this cannot be considered as demanding too much of the rational creature, for no other measure of affection can be fixed without supposing a wrong estimate of the object, or a defect of right feel- ing; for what is more reasonable than to pro- portion the intensity of our affection to the ex- DUTY TO CREATOR. 263 cellence of the object ? But in this also, the ex- cellency of the object infinitely surpasses our capacity of love, so that if the mind should be enlarged a thousand-fold, so as to possess a thou- sand times as great a power of love and esteem as at present, the obligation to love God with this increasing capacity would be complete ; and any less degree of esteem and care would be casting dishonour on God. And again, this ob- ligation would exist, even if it were painful to come up in our affections to this high demand ; but this is so far from being the fact, that man's happiness is perfect in the same proportion as his obedience is perfect. From every consideration, therefore, it is evident that man is bound by the law of his nature, and the relation which he sus- tains to God, to love him with his whole soul. As the will of God is always guided by wis- dom and goodness, whenever and Submission. however this will is manifested, it should be implicitly and cheerfully submitted to, even though contrary to our wishes, and even what seems best to our reason ; which is submis- sion to the Providence of God. 264 MOKAL SCIENCE. Another duty clearly incumbent on the ra- tional creature of God, is trust or confidence. As man is dependent, and as the Trust supply of his necessities can be derived from no other source than from God, it is evidently his duty to place his confidence in God for every thing, believing in his goodness, faithfulness and power. This trust in God, however, involves the duty of prayer. It is as natural and reasonable for a dependent creature to apply Prayer. to its Creator for what it needs, as for a child thus to solicit the aid of a parent who is believed to have the disposition and ability to bestow what it needs. Plausible objections have been raised against the duty of prayer, derived from the omniscience of God, and from his immutable purposes. But these objections possess no real validity. For although God knows perfectly beforehand what his creatures need, yet the acknowledgment of their dependence is manifestly proper, and the offering of petitions for such things as they need, has a tendency to keep up a proper sense DUTY TO CREATOR. 265 of dependence. And as God deals with Ms creatures according to the nature which, he has given them, it is proper that he should require of them such dispositions and acts as are becom- ing independent creatures. This, too, is in accord- ance with the conduct of men on whom others are dependent. The object of prayer, including praise, is to preserve in the mind a right state of feeling towards a Being to whom it owes every thing, and from whom alone blessings can be expected. The highest privilege of the most exalted creature is to enjoy communion and intercourse with the Infinite Source of all good. Prayer is the only means which man enjoys of holding immediate intercourse with his Maker. And this privilege is the highest honour which he can enjoy in the pre- sent state. So also, it is a means of the most sublime happiness. By this exercise he draws near to God, and when such approaches are made sincerely and affectionately on his part, it cannot be doubted that Divine communications will be vouchsafed, and the light of the Divine favour be lifted upon him, and the answer to his 12 266 MOEAL SCIENCE. prayers be granted by the dispensations of di- vine Providence toward him. As to the objection derived from the im- mutability of the Divine purposes, it arises from a narrow view of this sub- JfwKST J ect > which leaves out an ^p *- ant part of the Divine plan. The purposes of God, though immutable, are not in- consistent with the freedom of the creatures, nor with the use and efficacy of appropriate means. The truth is, all these acts and means are in- cluded in the Divine plan. If God has decreed that a certain field shall produce a plentiful crop ; he has also decreed that all the influences of sun, rain, and the necessary labour shall take place. And if he has purposed to bestow cer- tain favours on his rational creatures, he may in the same manner purpose that these benefits shall be given in answer to prayer; so that prayer may be considered as the means by which these bless- ings are obtained as truly as a plentiful crop is the effect of a skilful and laborious tillage of the ground. As to external acts of devotion, reason and DUTY TO CEEATOR. 267 nature teach that humility and reverence in our words, attitudes, and gestures are highly proper when we ad- outward acts of dress our praises unto God. "When we are filled with devotional feelings, nature prompts to give utterance to our emotions ; and the use of appropriate sounds and gestures seems also to keep up and increase the feelings of the mind. These outward expressions, however, are not essential to acceptable prayer. The silent breathings of desire are known to God, and will be acceptable to him. It is reasonable to believe that God never takes more complacency in his creatures, than when they come before him in the humble, reverential posture of adoration, prayer, and praise. Nothing can be more evident, than that the creature should exercise benevo- lence or good will towards the ^T™* tbe Author of his being. Not that we can desire Him to be more excellent, more wise, more powerful, or more independent than he is ; but we may rejoice in all his attributes and glory in his greatness, and be delighted with the idea 268 MORAL SCIENCE. of his unbounded and uninterrupted happiness ; and in these elevated emotions of joy, and acts of glorying and glorifying God, it is believed that the purest, sublimest, and most constant happiness of all holy beings consists. Nothing is more evident to impartial reason, than that the glory of God should be the supreme object of the rational creature's pursuit. It is, in fact, the noblest object which can be considered. We are unable to imagine any thing more glorious for God himself to seek, than his own glory. Cer- tainly, then, it is the highest end at which any creature can aim ; and it is a sentiment entirely accordant with reason, that all the creation was produced for the purpose of exhibiting the glory of God. And man was endowed with a capacity of knowing and loving God, for the very purpose of glorifying his Maker. Not that any addition can be made to the essential per- fection and felicity of the Eternal One ; but the manifestation of these perfections is what is pro- perly called the glory of God. All the duties which have been specified, DUTY TO CREATOR. 269 commend themselves, as obligatory on the ra- tional creature, to every impartial Summary. mind; all that seems further ne- cessary is to give a brief summary of what has been said on this subject. The order in which these devotional exercises are set down is not very important ; for though there is an order of precedence n • -n , i All included in and sequence m all our mental ex- i 0V e. ercises, yet while it is unnecessary to speak of these affections which have God for their object, seriatim, they are commonly combined and mingled in the conscious ex- perience of the mind; so that in the same moment various acts and exercises appear to be simultaneous. They may, however, be all comprehended under the single term, Love, if we give a genuine meaning to that term. The summation which seems as proper as any other which occurs, is the following : 1. Adoration, having for its Duties to God. object the greatness, majesty, ho- liness, and incomprehensibility of God. 2. Admiration, or holy wonder of the wis- 270 MOKAL SCIENCE. dom of God in the multiplied contrivances and organizations in the created universe. 3. Esteem for and complacency in QooVs moral excellence. 4. Desire of Union and Communion with God, and of conformity to his character. 5. Gratitude for his goodness manifested in all creation ; but particularly to man, in the con- stitution of his soul and body, and in the provi- sion made by the providence of God for the sub- sistence and comfort of the human family, and of all living creatures. 6. Trust, or Confidence in God, as a benignant and kind Father and Protector, who will not abandon the work of his own hands, nor be wanting in contributing to their happiness in future, as long as they are obedient to his will. 7. Acquiescence in the will of God, and sub- mission to those dispensations which even cross the natural feelings, is an evident moral duty. Indeed, the surrender of soul and body to God, to be used and disposed of by him for his own glory, is the state of mind of which the moral faculty approves. DUTY TO CREATOR. 271 8. Prayer to God for such, things as we need, is a duty dictated by the law of nature, includ- ing suitable expressions of our devotional feel- ings in words and gestures. But no creature has a right to institute or adopt any ceremonies of worship which God has not appointed. 9. Making the Glory of God the supreme end of all his actions, the object of his constant and untiring pursuit ; and rejoicing and triumphing in the infinite glory, independence, immutability, and blessedness of God. The above enumeration, it is believed, com- prehends the internal acts and exercises in which the duty of man to God consists, What reason af- Which duties plainly arise OUt Of firms of man's fall- en state. the attributes of God and man's relation to him, as his Creator, Preserver, and Benefactor. And if man had never failed in the performance of these duties — if he had continued to exercise those affections which spontaneously spring up in his soul, when he came from the hands of his Creator, this world, instead of being a land of misery, would now have been a bloom- ing paradise of joy. And we may be sure that 272 MOKAL SCIENCE. a good God who loves all his creatures accord- ing to thei;r actions, would never have permitted the natural evils which now oppress the human soul, to have entered into the world. Sickness, famine, and death in its thousand different forms, would have been unknown. It is evident from the slightest view of the character of man in all ages and countries, that he has lost his primeval integrity, Conclusion. that the whole race have by some means fallen into the dark gulf of sin and misery. This, reason teaches ; but how to escape from this wretched condition, she teaches not. FINIS. Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 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