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ase of Hereditary Bias 
 
 HENRY ADAMS AS A HISTORIAN 
 
 SOME STRICTURES ON THE 
 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" 
 
 i 
 
 HOUSATONIC 
 
 Fortis imaginatio generat casum. — Axiom. Sckolast. 
 
 If the judgment lean to one side, a man can not avoid wresting and writhing his narra- 
 tive to that bias. — Montaigne. 
 
 Historians ought to be precise, truthful, and quite unprejudiced, and neither interest 
 nor fear, hatred nor afiFection, should cause them to swerve from the path of truth, whose 
 mother is history, the rival of time, the depository of great actions, the witness of what is 
 past, the example and instruction to the present, and monitor to the future. — Cervantes. 
 
 Reprinted from the New York Tribune 
 
 F 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
 
 COPYRIGHT OFFICE. 
 
 No registration of title of this book 
 as a preliminary to copyright protec- 
 tion has been found. uic o i^mc^. 
 
 "orwarded to Order Division 
 
 (Date) 
 
 (Apr. 5, 1901—5,000.) 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias 
 
 HENRY ADAMS AS A HISTORIAN 
 
 SOME STRICTURES ON THE 
 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" 
 
 BY 
 
 HOUSATONIC 
 
 Fortis imaginatio general casum. — Axwin. Sc/ioiast. 
 
 If the judgment lean to one side, a man can not avoid wresting and writhing his narra- 
 tive to that bias. — IMontaigne. 
 
 Historians ought to be precise, truthful, and quite unprejudiced, and neither interest 
 nor fear, hatred nor affection, should cause them to swerve from the path of truth, whose 
 mother is history, the rival of time, the depository of great actions, the witness of what is 
 past, the example and instruction to the present, and monitor to the future. — Cervantes. 
 
 Reprinted from the New York Tribune 
 
 -^< ^.^^ '^^ 
 
.1 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 A wish having been expressed by a number of persons whose 
 opinions are entitled to respectful consideration, that the "Strict- 
 ures" on Mr. Henry Adams's " History of the United States of 
 America," which appeared in the New York Daily Tribune, Sep- 
 tember loth and December 15th, 1890, might be put into a more 
 convenient and permanent form, the author has decided to reprint 
 them. A few verbal changes have been made in the first letter, 
 and the second has been somewhat extended by the addition of 
 new matter and references to authorities, which on account of the 
 limitations of a daily newspaper, were necessarily excluded at the 
 time of the original publication. 
 
 The author has no apologies to offer for these "Strictures." 
 He has challenged Mr. Adams's history from a sense of duty. He 
 does not beheve that the glaring perversion of facts and the un- 
 warranted arraignment of the acts and motives of men which dis- 
 figure the pages of Mr. Adams's work, ought to be accepted as the 
 truth of history without a protest. / The instances might have been 
 multiplied, but the object of the author will be attained if these 
 brought to public notice serve to induce students of history to read 
 Mr. Adams's volumes critically in the light of the real facts which 
 are accessible to all. If they enter upon the task free from preju- 
 dice, and in the spirit of a true inquirer, they will derive great 
 benefit from such an investigation. I know of no advice better 
 than that given by Lord Chesterfield, who, after declaring that the 
 study and knowledge of history is the most necessary for a man 
 who is to live in the world, defined the limitations. He said : "It 
 only points out to us not to be too decisive and peremptory, and 
 to be cautious how we draw inferences for our own practice from 
 remote facts, partially or ignorantly related, of which we can, at 
 best, but imperfectly guess, and certainly not know, the real mo- 
 tives." 
 
 (iii) 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 ADAMS TEMPERAMENT UNSUITED TO HISTORICAL WRITING. 
 
 To the Editor of the Tribune : 
 
 Sir: — Mr. Henry Adams's "History of the United States of 
 America" has met with such general approval from the critics that 
 it would seem to be an act of temerity on the part of a layman to 
 express a different opinion of the work. Nevertheless, with all 
 due deference to these able writers for the press, who are justly 
 entitled to the respect and confidence of the reading public, I ven- 
 ture to dissent. It may be admitted that there is much to com- 
 mend — evidence of industry in searching original sources, a grace- 
 ful style and a skillful treatment of subject. But it falls below the 
 true standard of history. Industry may do much to make up for 
 a lack of genius, but can it overcome an infirmity of temperament ? 
 One familiar with American poUtical life would hardly select an 
 Adams for historian. From father to son have been handed down 
 the passions and prejudices engendered by party strife — selfish am- 
 bition, overweening vanity, and the rankling wounds of disap- 
 pointed hopes — and it is not in human nature — that is, in Adams 
 human nature — to forget the warfare of the past, or to forego the 
 revenge that opportunity invites. The late John C. Hamilton nar- 
 rated a short time before his death an incident that illustrates this 
 tendency in the Adams blood. When he advertised his purpose 
 to publish the writings of Alexander Hamilton, he received a letter 
 from the then head of the house of Adams, inquiring if he intended 
 to include in the "Works" the Reynolds pamphlet, and notifying 
 him that if it were omitted his correspondent would deem it his 
 duty to cause it to be republished. 
 
 To insist that a son shall make public a father's weakness is 
 the refinement of hereditary hatred. If the reader have patience 
 to follow me to the end, he will find some evidence that our his- 
 torian is a true Adams, and that within the pages of a " History of 
 
 (5) 
 
6 A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 the United States of America " are thinly veiled the prejudices and 
 hatreds of the elder Adams and his son. The pages reflect the 
 fervid vociferations and rancorous aspersions of the Cunningham 
 correspondence, Letters to the Boston Patriot, Memoirs, Review 
 of the Works of Fisher Ames, etc., toned down to suit the taste of 
 the present day, in order the more effectually to damn antagonists 
 and enemies. The good historian, says Lucien, "must be the • 
 friend of truth, neither giving nor withholding from any, from favor 
 or from enmity." Henry Adams it not such a historian. 
 
 It is not my purpose in this communication formally to criticise 
 Mr. Adams's performance. There is ample material, ready to the • 
 hand of any one who has the leisure to traverse his four volumes, 
 to show how far short it comes of being a thorough and truthful 
 history of the period it covers. Let it suffice here to exhibit some 
 of its misrepresentations and injustice. There is an undercurrent 
 throughout of detraction, that carries with it the fame of contem- 
 porary public men who incurred the enmity of John and John 
 Quincy Adams. 
 
 FEDERALIST FACTIONS — CONSPIRACY STORY. 
 
 The Federalist leaders supported John Adams as the successor 
 of Washington with many misgivings. It was impossible to pre- 
 dict the character of his administration with any certainty from his 
 previous career, though he was pretty sure to quarrel with his as- 
 sociates sooner or later. This is what befell, and the result was an 
 unseemly personal warfare, involving the leading Federalists, and 
 political divisions and scandals in all of the states. The responsi- 
 bility — ^justly or unjustly does not now matter — was laid at the door 
 of Mr. Adams. It is certain that there was great unanimity among 
 the party leaders in holding him responsible, and they gave ex- 
 pression to their feelings in plain language. "This man," said 
 Fisher Ames, "is vindictive enough, at any risk or even ruin, to 
 disappoint those who will, he thinks, alone disappoint him." But 
 no one drew so true a portrait as Hamilton. This, for obvious 
 reasons, it is necessary to reproduce here. Thus wrote Hamilton : 
 
 I then adopted an opinion, which all my subsequent experience has con- 
 firmed, that he is a man of an imagination sublimated and eccentric; propi- 
 tious neither to the regular display of sound judgment, nor to a steady per- 
 severance in a systematic plan of conduct; and I began to perceive, what has 
 been since too manifest, that to this defect are added the unfortunate foibles 
 of a vanity without bounds and a jealousy capable of discoloring every 
 object. 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. 7 
 
 Hamilton was the acknowledged leader, and it was not in the 
 nature of so vain a man as Adams to forgive the Federalists who 
 passed him by. The members of his cabinet, who were driven 
 out after his defeat was assured, as well as their associates, came in 
 for his displeasure and the displeasure of his family. Cabot, Par- 
 sons, Ames, Goodrich, Tracy, Griswold, were ever after under con- 
 demnation. Even Jay, King, and Morris were under suspicion. 
 I may not try your patience with "twice-told tales" of the ingrati- 
 tude of Timothy Pickering in securing the rejection of Colonel 
 Smith, who had married a daughter of Mr. Adams, and who had 
 been nominated to the senate, and of the correspondence of 
 Pickering, Wolcott, and McHenry with the great leader of the 
 Federalists. That they incurred the hatred of Adams is well 
 known ; and that they and others closely identified with Hamilton 
 were subsequently accused of treasonable intentions by John 
 Quincy Adams is also well known. The same names figure in 
 Henry Adams's chapters on "conspiracy," in which is related 
 the story originally confided to Jefferson by John Quincy Adams 
 in a burst of confidence at the time when he was becoming an 
 apostate, and recently elaborated in "New England Federalism." 
 This is not the place to analyze that story. It rests upon a 
 slender foundation, and it is almost certain that but for the disap- 
 pointment of John Adams and the necessity of smoothing a way 
 over which his ambitious son might safely pass to the ranks of the 
 triumphant enemy it would have been regarded as a trifling inci- 
 dent in local politics. This is evident from the circumstance that 
 Pickering, the chief "~cortspij;ator " (who went about plotting in a 
 manner so open as to confuse one's notions of conspiracy), re- 
 tained the confidence, esteem and friendship of the purest and 
 most eminent citizens in the Union — of John Jay, Chief Justice 
 Marshall, Chancellor Kent, Rufus King and others — who com- 
 mended his political principles and applauded his public course. 
 This they would not have done if, as our historian declares, but 
 fails to prove, Pickering had been an enemy of his country, or 
 even a dangerous intriguer. 
 
 VIRGINIA RULES THE NATION. 
 
 The leading men of both parties of the North chafed under Vir- 
 ginian domination, and often discussed plans for throwing off the 
 political yoke. Burr, and then the Clintons among the Republi- 
 cans, and all of the Federalists except the Adams faction, attempted 
 
8 A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 at different times to form combinations that might separate Penn- 
 sylvania and New York from Virginia, but without success. Viewed 
 in the light of more recent politics, the attempt of the Federalists 
 to regain power through the Republican Vice-President, Burr, 
 does not appear to be remarkable or corrupt. And because Pick- 
 ering said that, if in the future it should be found best to separate, 
 New York ought to be joined to New England, others ought not 
 to be held as sharing in his opinion, nor should a treasonable pur- 
 pose be inferred. Shall we charge Mr. Madison with treasonable 
 designs, or hold his intimate Republican friends responsible, be- 
 cause "The Monitor," a newspaper established to promote his 
 election to the presidency, and regarded as his mouthpiece, gave 
 publicity to the opinion that the Southern States ought to separate 
 from the Northern, declare war against Great Britain, and instantly 
 form an alliance with France ? That our historian should magnify 
 the political dissatisfaction of Federalists into a formidable attempt 
 to dissolve the Union between 1804 and 1814, shows the depth of 
 the Adams hatred of the leaders who refused to recognize the 
 headship of John Adams. Jefferson could promulgate the fatal 
 doctrine of nullification and of the reservation of the individual 
 states of the right to secede from the Union, and his bolder fol- 
 lowers might declare, in the words of John Taylor, of Caroline, 
 that "it was not unwise to estimate the separate mass of Virginia 
 and North Carolina, with a view to their separate existence," with- 
 out shocking the patriotism of the Adamses, or moving their pens 
 to denounce publicly the treason lurking in such sentiments and 
 political acts. Yet what crimes against humanity originated in — 
 what rivers of blood flowed from — the political leadership and nul- 
 lifying doctrines of Jefferson ! But Jefferson spoke soft words to 
 the wounded patriot at Quincy, and prepared the way for the po- 
 litical advancement of the son. 
 
 LIBEL ON HAMILTON. 
 
 If the judgments of the century nearing a close have clearly 
 established one fact, it is that of Washington's contemporaries, the 
 one pre-eminent for genius, for constructive power and adminis- 
 .trative talents, was Alexander Hamilton. He originated and di- 
 rected; others adopted and obeyed. He lives in the Constitution, 
 in the laws, and in the spirit of the Republic. He forged argu- 
 ments in support of these, which have served justices in expound- 
 ing them, and party leaders, in every emergency, from his day to 
 
A Case of Hereditaiy Bias. 9 
 
 the present. And yet the historian, ignoring all this, tells us that 
 "the dust has gathered deep on his doctrines." He does not stop 
 here, but misrepresents and maligns him, and casts a lurid light on 
 his career. Let me give an example or two. On page 85, Vol. I, 
 we read : 
 
 Compressing the idea into one syllable, Hamilton, at a New York dinner, 
 replied to some democratic sentiment by striking his hand sharply on the 
 table and saying: "Your people, sir,— your people is a great beast." 
 
 Mr. Adams never tires of speaking of "Hamilton's beast." 
 He neglects to give the authority for the foregoing statement, and 
 it may be dismissed as fictitious. What was Hamilton's deliberate 
 opmion of the people in a republican government ? The historian 
 might have found an authoritative expression of it, but that would 
 have defeated the purpose he had in view, viz., detraction of a 
 family enemy. When Jefferson was organizing a conspiracy against 
 the government and denouncing John Adams's alien and sedition 
 laws as justifying the states in nullifying them, Hamilton was urg- 
 ing his friends in the national legislature to secure the appointment 
 of a committee to address the people. He said : 
 
 The first thing in all great operations of such a government as ours is to 
 secure the opinion of the people. To this end, the proceedings of Virginia 
 and Kentucky, with the two laws complained of, should be referred to a 
 special committee. That committee should make a report, exhibiting with 
 great luminousness and particularity the reasons which support the constitu- 
 tionality and expediency of those laws, the tendency of the doctrines ad- 
 vanced by Virginia and Kentucky to destroy the constitution of the United 
 States; and with calm dignity, united with pathos, the full evidence which 
 they afford of a regular conspiracy to overturn the government. . 
 The government must not merely defend itself; it must attack and arraign its 
 enemies. But in all this there should be great care to distinguish the people 
 of Virginia from their legislature, and even the greater part of those who 
 may have concurred in the legislature, from their chiefs, manifesting, indeed, 
 a strong confidence in the good sense and patriotism of the people, that they 
 will not be the dupes of an insidious plan to disunite the people of America, 
 to break down their constitution, and expose them to the enterprises of a 
 foreign power.* 
 
 * Hamilton to Sedwick, Feb. 2, 1799; cf. The Republic 0/ the United States, Vol VII 
 P- 277- 
 
 While Hamilton advocated a strong government, '• by this course he not only cut him- 
 self off from all chance of rising into office, but singularly promoted the views of his oppo- 
 nents, who, with fondness for wealth and power, which he had not, affected a love for the 
 people which he had, and which they had not:' -Diary and Letters 0/ Governeur Morris 
 Vol. 1 1, p. 526. ' 
 
 The influence of John Adams^was exerted to secure the passage of the sedition bill 
 Hamilton aavised against it. He said : " Let us not establish a tyranny. Energy is a very 
 different thing from violence."— ^or/t, Vol. VI, p. 307. 
 
lo A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 The echo of these words was heard in 1861, when the logic of 
 the Virginia and Kentucky resokitions, and of Jefferson's reserva- 
 tion of the right of secession, resulted in disunion. The govern- 
 ment defended itself and attacked its enemies. 
 
 The tragic death of Hamilton at the hands of the infamous 
 Burr is recounted by the historian with no more expression of feel- 
 ing than a reporter puts into a paragraph for a modern newspaper 
 relating the killing of a nameless tramp by a railroad train. In- 
 deed, the reader is left in doubt whether the historian does not re- 
 gard the destroyer as the better man. The recital is made a part 
 of the "conspiracy" story: 
 
 The tragedy that actually happened was a fitter ending to this dark 
 chapter than any tamer close could have been. 
 
 As the news spread, it carried a wave of emotion over New England, 
 and roused every-where sensations strangely mixed. In New York, the 
 Clinton interest, guided by Cheetham, seized the moment to destroy Burr's 
 influence forever. Cheetham affected to think the duel a murder, procured 
 Burr's indictment, and drove him from the state. Charges were invented to 
 support this theory, and were even accepted as history. In the South and 
 West, on the other hand, the duel was considered as a simple "affair of 
 honor," in which Burr appeared to better advantage than his opponent. In 
 New England, a wail of despair arose. Even the clergy, though shocked 
 that Hamilton should have offered the evil example of dueling, felt that they 
 had lost their champion and sword of defense. 
 
 The death of Hamilton cleared for a time the murky atmosphere of New 
 York and New England politics. Pickering and Griswold, Tracy and Plumer, 
 and their associates, retired into the background. Burr disappeared from 
 New York and left a field for De Witt Clinton to sacrifice, in his turn, the 
 public good to private ambition. The bloody feuds of Burr's time never 
 again recurred. The death of Hamilton and the vice-president's flight, with 
 their accessories of summer morning sunlight on rocky and wooded heights, 
 tranquil river, and distant city, and, behind all, their dark background of 
 moral gloom, double treason, and political despair, still stand as the most 
 dramatic moment in the early politics of the Union. 
 
 jep^ferson's f.^tal embargo. 
 I have said that it is not practicable within the limits of this 
 communication to analyze the Adams story of the " conspiracy," 
 as handed down from generation to generation, but some reference 
 to the second chapter which embraces the fatal embargo of 1808, 
 may be expected. The wickedness of Timothy Pickering, who 
 differed with John Quincy Adams and resisted the embargo, is 
 made conspicuous by our historian. Pickering kept up a friendly 
 intercourse with the British minister, and had early advices from 
 
A Case of Ha-editary Bias. 1 1 
 
 London. This does not seem to be so very heinous, since the 
 head of the administration, the great democratic leader, had estab- 
 lished the precedent. To say nothing of Jefferson's relations to the 
 French minister when he was secretary of state, we may properly 
 recall the fact that during the administration of John Adams, when 
 we were virtually at war with France, Vice-President Jefferson was 
 in correspondence with Talleyrand, and was using his letters to 
 influence the American people against their government. And yet 
 let us not pronounce his motive treasonable. The trouble with 
 Mr. Henry Adams, as an historian, aside from the defects of tem- 
 perament already mentioned, is that he does not allow for the differ- 
 ence in the words and acts of politicians when in power and when 
 out of power. He is a gentleman of leisure, a student, but with- 
 out experience in affairs ; certainly incapable of clearly compre- 
 hending the motives of men. It is an offense in his sight, and is 
 regarded as evidence of lack of sympathy with liberal government, 
 that the correspondence of Ames, and other federalists, after the 
 accession of a republican administration, should be so pessimistic. 
 If he were to study the correspondence of the republicans, or the 
 correspondence of any party of whatever name, when they were 
 the " outs," he would find the same doubts and fears as to the en- 
 durance of free government. It is the rallying cry of opposition at 
 all times. 
 
 J. Q. ADAMS'S RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 Our historian, in discussing the embargo, refers to Senator 
 Adams as non-partisan. In view of the aid given by him to the 
 party in power at this time, and of the zeal displayed by him there- 
 after in the defense of its measures, non-partisan would seem to be a 
 misnomer. It is certain that no fiercer warfare has been waged in 
 American politics than that which ensued after the apostasy of John 
 Quincy Adams. Pickering led the fight, and struck out with a 
 vigor still remembered at Quincy. He recorded the proceedings 
 in the senate during the days of contest, and took down the words 
 of his colleague for future use. The historian could not well ig- 
 nore the incident, and we have this account : 
 
 When the committee, after a short deliberation, reported an embargo 
 bill, and some of the senators appealed for delay, Adams, who was chafing 
 under the delays which had already lowered the self respect of government 
 and people, broke into a strenuous appeal for energy. "The president has 
 recommended the measure on his high responsibility. I would not consider, 
 I would not deliberate, I would act ! " The words were spoken in secret se?- 
 
1 2 A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 sion, but Senator Pickering noted them for future use. Among the anti- 
 pathies and humors of New England politics, none was more characteristic 
 than this personal antagonism, beginning a new conspiracy which was to 
 shake the Union to its foundations. 
 
 An exaggerated statement to turn a period. The account 
 given by Senator Pickering, which is much better done, and which 
 probably comes nearer to the truth of history, deserves our atten- 
 tion. It will be seen that Mr. Henry Adams has carefully omitted 
 an important sentence from the report of Senator Adams's speech. 
 A few preliminary words are necessary to an appreciation of the 
 force of Senator Pickering's statement. 
 
 The Berlin decree was issued November 21, 1806, and was 
 intended to destroy the commerce of Great Britain. It declared 
 the British Islands to be in a state of blockade, prohibited all com- 
 merce and correspondence with the British Islands, forbade all 
 trade in Engli.sh merchandise, and declared lawful prize all mer- 
 chandise belonging to or coming from its manufactories and colo- 
 nies. The commerce of the United States with the British Do- 
 minions was probably of as much importance to the former as 
 their commerce with all the world besides; and, as the benefits of 
 a fair commerce are reciprocal, Great Britain shared with the 
 United States the advantage of that intercourse ; and so far Napo- 
 leon's views were obstructed. When he understood this, he en- 
 forced the decree against the commerce of the United States. The 
 papers in the case were transmitted to our government from Paris, 
 by the American minister, and were communicated to congress by 
 the president, with a message recommending an embargo. Sena- 
 tor Pickering lays stress on the following paragraph in the message, 
 which is omitted in the copy in the state papers, as well as in the 
 journal of the senate, and is not referred to by the historian : 
 
 I ask a return of the letters of Messrs. Armstrong and Champagny, 
 which it would be improper to make public. 
 
 The papers retained by the senate were a proclamation, dated 
 October 16, 1807, by the King of Great Britain, requiring English 
 seamen, serving in foreign vessels, to return home to defend their 
 own country, and an extract from a letter, dated September 16, 
 1807, from the French minister of justice, relating to the execu- 
 tion of the Berlin decree, and declaring that no exception would 
 be made in its execution. The papers returned to the president 
 were a letter from Minister Armstrong to the French minister of 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. 13 
 
 foreign affairs, Champagny, asking whether the report was true 
 that a new and extended construction, highly injurious to the com- 
 merce of the United States, was about to be given to the Berhn 
 decree, and Champagny's answer that "His majesty has consid- 
 ered every neutral vessel, going from English ports, with cargoes 
 of English merchandise, or of English origin, as lawfully seized by 
 French armed vessels." Why, asks Pickering, did the president 
 ask a return of these two papers, saying it would be improper to 
 make them public ? The solution may be found in the last para- 
 graph of Champagny's letter, in which he says : 
 
 The decree of blockade has now been issued eleven months. The 
 principal powers of Europe, far from protesting against its provisions, have 
 adopted them. They have perceived that its execution must be complete to 
 render it more effectual. 
 
 Mr. Pickering adds : 
 
 The commerce of the United States surpassed that of all the other neu- 
 tral nations, and with the British dominions was very extensive, and of vast 
 importance to both. To render the blockade of the British Islands "com- 
 plete," the commerce of neutrals with them must cease. This object, in re- 
 spect to the United States, could be accomplished only by an embargo. In 
 four days after the anival at Washington of Armstrong's dispatches by the 
 Revenge, containing the letters of the grand judge and Champagny, Mr. 
 Jefferson recommended his unlimited embargo. One more fact : On the 8th 
 of February, 1808, (less than two months after the passing of the embargo 
 law), the secretary of state, Mr. Madison, in his letter to General Armstrong 
 on this subject, says: "The conduct of the French government in giving 
 this extended operation to its decree, and, indeed, in issuing one with such 
 an apparent or doubtful import against the rights of the sea, is the more ex- 
 traordinary, inasmuch as the inability to enforce it on that element exhibited 
 the measure in the light of an empty menace." So, then, Mr. Jefterson's 
 embargo, which prostrated our immense commerce, which ruined many, and 
 seriously injured all of our citizens, was founded on an empty menace! I 
 now leave every intelligent reader to judge whether the real object of the 
 embargo was " to keep in safety our vessels and merchandise," or to render 
 the French emperor's decree of blockade of the British Islands "complete." 
 To him, it is certain, the embargo was acceptable ; he passed a decree to en- 
 force its execution. And at a subsequent period (August 5, 1810), his min- 
 ister informed General Armstrong that " the emperor applauded the em- 
 bargo." 
 
 THE HISTORIAN SUPPRESSES A PART OF THE TRUTH. 
 
 On the committee to which the president's message was re- 
 ferred was John Quincy Adams, A bill was promptly reported, 
 
14 . A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 read once, and, the rule being suspended, was read a second and 
 third time and passed. The time occupied from the reception of 
 the president's message to the passing of the bill was about four 
 hours. Motions to postpone were voted down. It was when one 
 of these was pending that Mr. Adams made his memorable speech, 
 mutilated by the historian. As reported, it was as follows : 
 
 The president' has recommended the measure on his high responsibility. 
 I would not consider; I would not deliberate; 1 would act. Doubtless the 
 president possesses such further information as will justify the measure! 
 
 Here follow Senator Pickering's comments : 
 
 This sentiment was so extraordinary that I instantly wrote it down. It 
 shocked even Mr. Jefferson's devoted partisans. However, I may vote (a 
 member was heard to remark) that is too much for me to say. For my own 
 part, I originally viewed, and I still view, the sentiment as so abhorrent to 
 the principles of a free government, so derogatory to the character of a mem- 
 ber of congress, sucli a dereliction of duty, and so disgraceful to a man of 
 sense, that I am incapable of conceiving of any counterbalance in official 
 honors and emoluments. ... By the constitution of the United States, 
 the senate and house of representatives were intended as checks on the acts 
 of each other, and both are checks on those of the president. The senti- 
 ment expressed by Mr. Adams resolves the whole business of legislation into 
 the will of the executive. 
 
 PICKERING AND ADAMS APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC. 
 
 Then followed correspondence for the enlightenment of the 
 public, conducted by Pickering and Adams — the latter appearing 
 as the champion to defend the administration from the powerful 
 blows of the former. In his letter to Mr. Otis, Senator Adams 
 attributed the embargo to the British orders in council, of Novem- 
 ber II, 1807, issued in retaliation for the Berlin decree. These 
 orders interdicted the commerce of neutrals with France and her 
 allies, and with all other countries under the control of France, 
 whose ports were shut against British commerce, excepting, how- 
 ever, direct trade between the neutral nations and enemies' 
 colonies. Mr. Adams, remarks Mr. Pickering, describes these 
 orders as "studiously concealed until the moment when they burst 
 upon our heads." Whereas, he adds, the American government 
 was apprised by the British secretary of state (Lord Howick), soon 
 after the Berlin decree was issued, that measures of retaliation 
 would be necessary on the part of Great Britain. 
 
 The British orders in council were not, like the French decrees, put in 
 

 A Case of Hereditary Bias. 1 5 
 
 instant execution "without a moment's warning." Time was allowed for 
 neutrals to receive information of them before their vessels would be sub- 
 jected to their operation. These were the orders which J. Q. Adams said 
 "stood in front of the real causes of the embargo." 
 
 The fact i§ that when the embargo bill passed the senate, these 
 orders were "out of sight of the president, out of sight of the 
 senate, and out of sight of Mr. Adams himself." For proof, see 
 the president's message, February 2, 1808, forty-six days after the 
 passage of the embargo, laying before congress the orders in coun- 
 cil, in which he says : 
 
 I transmit them to congress as a further proof of the increasing dangers 
 to our navigation and commerce, which led to the provident measure of the 
 act of the present session, laying an embargo on our own vessels. 
 
 Further proof is found in the fact that in the discussion in the 
 senate no reference was made to any existing or prospective or- 
 ders in council. Mr. Pickering expressed the opinion that the 
 president's object in the embargo legislation was to co-operate with 
 France to destroy British commerce. He also said : 
 
 The measure was not an embargo, but an absolute prohibition of com- 
 merce, and therefore a violation of the constitution ; for the power given to 
 congress to regulate can not be construed to authorize the annihilation of 
 commerce ; but such was the nature, and such would have been the effect, 
 of this perpetual law — perpetual in its terms — if the people of the United 
 States had tamely continued to submit to it. . But they would not submit, 
 and congress was obliged to repeal it. The commercial part of our nation 
 considered the Berlin decree, and the still more outrageous one issued at 
 Milan, with the British orders in council superadded, as less injurious than 
 Mr. Jefferson's edict, called an embargo ; and all those decrees and orders 
 continued in force when the embargo law was repealed. - 
 
 The share that John Quincy Adams had in creating and sus- 
 taining this disastrous measure is not made conspicuous in Mr. 
 Henry Adams's work ; nor does he refer to the fact that at first ex- 
 President Adams condemned the law, and afterward, on being in- 
 formed of the part acted by his son, approved of it. Poor Mr. 
 Jefferson is made to bear the entire responsibility, and finally is 
 driven out of Washington in disgrace. But wherefore is his re- 
 sponsibility much greater than that of others ? Did he not refer 
 the business to the legislature? Did not the senate adopt Senator 
 Adams's advice and refuse to deliberate ? Did not both houses 
 abdicate their proper functions, and place the whole power in the 
 
1 6 A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 hands of the executive ? But if party friends turned against Jeffer- 
 son, and his retirement caused a feeling of reHef, he was not the 
 abject object the historian would have us believe. He possessed, 
 and continued to possess to the day of his death, greater personal 
 influence than any other. One of his early and devoted followers, 
 who had fallen away during the embargo days, said with much bit- 
 terness during the closing days of his administration, that from let- 
 ters received it seemed to him that those republicans whom he 
 held in the highest estimation had " forgotten there was any other 
 God than Thomas Jefferson." 
 
 One word more on the embargo. I believe few will indorse 
 the opinion of Mr. Henry Adams that "the embargo was an ex- 
 periment in politics well worth making.'^ 
 
 THE historian's MISCONCEPTION. 
 
 Mr. Adams is not more happy in dealing with generalities than 
 with the acts of political leaders. His introductory chapters con- 
 tain evidence of a misconception of forces and misstatements of 
 facts. The character of contentment ascribed to the society of 
 Pennsylvania, which was the key-stone of the republican arch, is 
 not warranted. 
 
 Too thoroughly democratic to fear democracy, and too much nationalized 
 to dread nationality, Pennsylvania became the ideal American state, easy, 
 tolerant, and contented. If its soil bred little genius, it bred still less treason. 
 After one brief experience, they never rebelled. 
 
 At the period when Mr. Adams's history opens, a second in- 
 surrection involving the counties of Bucks, Montgomery, and 
 Northampton, a territory as large as that embraced in the whisky 
 insurrection, was being suppressed by militia, supported by regular 
 troops. Demagogues led the ignorant people to believe that the 
 act authorizing a direct tax empowered the government to mortgage 
 private property, and a formidable insurrection ensued. The lead- 
 ing conspirators, who had been arrested, were rescued by a party 
 of armed men led by Captain Fries, and order was restored only 
 through military power. What subsequently took place through 
 legal processes and the discretion of the executive only confirmed 
 the opinion formed of the turbulent spirit and ignorance of the 
 Pennsylvanians. Worse than this, because inspired by party lead- 
 ers, was the attempt to impeach the judges of the supreme court 
 on trivial charges, which revealed a depth of political intolerance. 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. 1 7 
 
 recklessness, and malignity inconsistent with the character of a law- 
 abiding, peaceful, and contented people. 
 
 The atmosphere of the nineteenth century gives tone to Mr. 
 Adams's opinions. He judges the past by the standards of to-day. 
 Social life in New England in 1800 is declared to have been narrow 
 and repellant, owing to the predominance of religious influence. 
 The minister with cocked hat, who represented law and order in 
 the community, fills him with contempt. The horse-racing cheva- 
 lier of Virginia, representing liberality and social freedom, is held 
 in greater respect. Let the reader reflect on the influence of the 
 two systems of civilization, which may now be fairly estimated. 
 Let him contemplate the social work of Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
 New Hampshire, and Vermont, as witnessed in the communities 
 forming contiguous states from the western border of New York 
 to the Pacific ocean, and the communities derived from Virginia, 
 the Carolinas and Georgia, and decide whether the more rigid sys- 
 tem has been justly judged. It is clear that the spirit of the New 
 England civilization is not understood by the historian. Goldwin 
 Smith holds that the Puritan type of life was full of beauty, amenity, 
 accomplishment. Others, including our historian, believe it had 
 a mind-deadening influence destructive to the beauty and joys of 
 life. We prefer the interpretation of the Puritan civilization given 
 by one of the derided ministerial class.* This may be expressed 
 in a sentence: Society is a moral institution, and government, as 
 its organ, should exert an influence on the higher interests of a 
 people by expressing rexerence for the moral law in its whole 
 policy and legislation. 
 
 BASE LIBEL ON THE PIONEERS OF THE WEST AND SOUTH. 
 
 From the chapter on American Ideals we extract the following 
 astounding statement : 
 
 In the early days of colonization, every new settlement represented an idea 
 and proclaimed a mission. Virj^inia was founded by a great, liberal move- 
 ment aiming at the spread of English liberty and empire. The pilgrims of 
 Plymouth, the Puritans of Boston, the Quakers of Pennsylvania, all avowed 
 a moral purpose, and began by making institutions that consciously reflected 
 a moral idea. No such character belonged to the colonization of 1800. 
 From Lake Erie to Florida, in long, unbroken lines pioneers were at work, 
 cutting into the forests with the energy of so many beavers, and with no 
 more express moral purpose than the beavers they drove away. The civiliza- 
 tion they carried with them was rarely illumined by an idea ; they sought 
 room for no new truth, and aimed neither at creating, like the Puritans, a 
 
 =•■■ Dr. Channing. 
 
1 8 A Case of Hereditai'v Bias. 
 
 government of saints, nor, like the Quakers, one of love and peace ; they left 
 such experiments behind them, and wrestled only with the hardest problems 
 of frontier life. No wonder that foreign observers, and even the educated 
 well-to-do Americans of the seacoast, could seldom see any thing to admire 
 in lhe ignorance and brutality of frontiersmen, and should declare that virtue 
 and wisdom no longer guided the United States I What they saw was not 
 encouraging. To a new society, ignorant and semi-barbarous, a mass of 
 demagogues insisted on applying every stimulant that could inflame its worst 
 appetites, while at the same instant taking away every influence that had 
 hitherto helped to restrain its passions. Greed for wealth, lust for power, 
 yearning for the blank void of savage freedom such as Indians and wolves 
 delighted in — these were the fires that flamed under the caldron of American 
 society, in vi'hich, as conservatives believed, the old, well-proven, conservative 
 crust of religion, government, family, and even common respect forage, edu- 
 cation and experience, was rapidly melting away, and was indeed already 
 broken into fragments, swept about by the seething mass of scum ever rising 
 in greater quantities to the surface. 
 
 HIGH CHARACTER OF THE NEW EMIGRATION. 
 
 ^ Such a misconception of the character of the new emigration 
 shows that the ' historian has either failed to study the materials 
 accessible to every one, or that his mind, formed under social con- 
 ditions of the present day, is incapable of comprehending the 
 meaning of different conditions. 
 
 The people who penetrated the forests covering the vast area 
 out of which have been formed seven great and influential common- 
 wealths, were among the best and most intelligent of the citizens 
 of New England, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia 
 and North Carolina. Many of them had been companions in 
 arms of Washington. To the Northwest went the Cutlers, Put- 
 nams, St. Clairs, Symmes, Varnum, Parsons, Oilman, McLean, 
 Meigs, Burnet, Harrison, Vance, Woodbridge, Fearing. Stites, 
 Massie, Tiffin, Worthington, Morrow, Ludlow, Mansfield, Cleve- 
 land, and hundreds of others of high character. To Kentucky went 
 brilliant Virginians, friends of Jefferson, Brown, Breckinridge, 
 Nicholas, Clay, Hart, Marshall, Harlan ; and to Tennessee many of 
 the hardy sons of North Carolina of Scotch-Irish stock. In West- 
 ern Pennsylvania and Western Virginia, were already settled hun- 
 dreds of families of useful citizens, some of whom had left the 
 tyranny of the old world for the freedom of the new, and whose 
 influence tended to that liberality which the historian elsewhere 
 commends. 
 
 During the period embraced in Mr. Henry Adams's libel on 
 the people of the West, the latter were adopting resolutions to en- 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. i q 
 
 courage President John Adams, and the governor of the Northwest 
 Territory, having taken up his pen in defense of the administration 
 in reply to Mr. Jefferson's friend, Nicholas, who was denouncing 
 It, received a handsome and grateful acknowledgment from the 
 president. Said John Adams to Arthur St. Clair : 
 
 I thank you for your favor of ApriJ 8, and especially for the pamphlet 
 inclosed with it. I have read it with great pleasure, as a masterly refutation 
 of us antagonist, in the style and manner of a gentleman, and seasoned with 
 no more than was useful or agreeable of attic salt. Happy am I to find such 
 just sentiments countenanced, encouraged and prevailing in the Northwestern 
 Territory.* 
 
 That these sentiments were a defense of the alien and sedition 
 laws, and a denunciation of the nullification resolutions of Virginia 
 and Kentucky, does not lessen the interest to be attached to this 
 correspondence. 
 
 GOVERNMENTS FOUNDED UPON MORAL IDEAS. 
 
 And during this same period, a community of i6i souls 
 dwelling in the wilderness— a vast primeval forest stretching to the 
 west and north of their little settlement— were devising ways and 
 means for extending religious and educational influences. They 
 first named their town after Fisher Ames, erected cabins and built 
 mills, and then secured the appointment of trustees under an act 
 of the territorial legislature, for leasing the ministerial and school 
 lands in the heart of their settlements, from which was derived 
 funds for the support of schools and churches and the erection of 
 a library. An Everett and a Cutter, sons of Massachusetts and 
 graduates of Harvard, taught the children of these pioneers 
 several of whom in after years won national distinction. The 
 settlers early entered into an agreement not to use liquors at social 
 parties, on holidays, or on public occasions, a pledge they faith- 
 fully kept. Other communities, actuated by hke motives, were at 
 work throughout that vast territory in laying deep and strong the 
 foundations of a society that has exalted human nature and blessed 
 mankind. Would this have been possible with people sordid and 
 brutal, as claimed by the historian ? We know that it would not 
 These emigrants had fought to maintain the principles set forth 
 m the declaration of independence, and they builded upon these 
 Living in log-cabins did not change their characters. The social 
 
 '' The St. Clair Papers, Vol. II, p. 442. 
 
20 A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 conditions in the West were similar to those in the Atlantic states. 
 There were privations to endure, but these were promotive of the 
 best elements of manhood. Character is strengthened and broad- 
 ened and ennobled by the necessity of overcoming obstacles, and 
 not by ease and luxurious living. The refinements of social life 
 play an important part in the development of character, but they 
 are not the whole — other and important conditions are essential. 
 Is spiritual growth greater under modern conditions than under 
 those that called forth the creative faculties, and invited en- 
 durance, patience, faith, and hope? 
 
 REAL STRENGTH OF THE UNION AND HOME OF NATIONAL CHAR- 
 ACTER. 
 
 Within thirty-five years after the time when, according to the 
 blundering historian, the inhabitants of the vast territory above 
 described, "ignorant and semi-barbarous," were "yearning for the 
 blank void of savage freedom such as Indians and wolves delighted 
 in," they had increased to nearly four million souls. The emi- 
 grants of the period of 1800 were every-where the leaders. They 
 had filled the highest stations abroad; had been conspicuous on 
 the supreme bench, and in cabinets, and were the masters of ora- 
 tory and leaders in statesmanship. On every hand were evidences 
 of civilization of a high order. Had such institutions been created 
 by people without "an idea?" Had the "yearning for the blank 
 void of savage freedom " worked a miracle ? A clear concep- 
 tion of the conditions, of the purposes of the emigrants, of the 
 mighty destiny awaiting them, and of the dependence of the life 
 of the union upon them and their children in aftertime, was that 
 of one whose name stood for half a century at the head of An>eri- 
 can writers. Does it not still ? Let the reader contrast the words 
 of Washington Irving with the libel of Henry Adams : 
 
 When I consider these vast regions of inexhaustible fertility, deeply em- 
 bosomed in our immense continent, and watered by mighty lakes and rivers; 
 when I picture them to myself as they soon will be, peopled by millions of 
 industrious, intelligent, enterprising, well-instructed, and self-governed free- 
 men, blessed by a generally diffused competence, brightening with in- 
 numerable towns and cities, the marts of a boundless internal commerce and 
 the seats of enlightened civilization — when I consider them in this light, I 
 regard them as the grand and safe depositories of the strength and perpetuity 
 of our union. There lie the keys of empire; there dwells the heart of our 
 giant republic, that must regulate its pulsations and send the vital current 
 through every limb. There must our liberties take their deepest root, and 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. 2 1 
 
 find their purest nourishment ; there, in a word, must we look for the growth 
 of a real, freeborn, homebred, national character, of which our posterity may 
 be proud. 
 
 The length of this communication warns me to take leave of 
 the "History of the United States of America." I do so in the 
 hope that it may either be amended to conform to the actual facts 
 or else speedily consigned to the dust-bin of oblivion. 
 
 II. 
 
 MR. HENRY ADAMS's VIEWS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MR, 
 MADISON AND POLITICAL MEN AND ISSUES. 
 
 To the Editor of the Tribune : 
 
 Sir : — Since the publication of some strictures upon Mr. 
 Henry Adams's "History of the United States" (see Tribune, 
 September loth), he has issued several more volumes, which are 
 devoted to the administration of Mr. Madison. The bias of the 
 historian in his narration of events and comments on the motives 
 and acts of the political leaders of the day, so noticeable in the 
 former volumes, is conspicuous in these ; and his penchant to sac- 
 rifice truth and common sense to rhetorical effect is in nowise 
 abated. These faults are too grave to be overlooked by the 
 thoughtful reader. What though one attribute them in a measure 
 to prejudice founded on education or misinformation, is the work 
 as a history less mischievous than if the author had for his purpose 
 the falsification of events and men's purposes and deeds ? 
 
 One could wish for a more genial narrative of American his- 
 tory than is presented in these Volumes. The incapacity, weak- 
 ness, and duplicity (we employ terms expressing the historian's 
 judgment) of President Madison ; the intriguing, corrupt, and un- 
 patriotic action of Samuel Smith and his brother, the secretary of 
 state, and of De Witt Clinton and others ; the plastic character of 
 Monroe, grow a trifle tedious ; and we are only spared the desperate 
 conclusion that all men become knaves when they turn politicians, 
 by the revelation in this history that throughout the administration 
 of President Madison there were two able, honest, and patriotic 
 men serving their country — Albert Gallatin and John Quincy 
 Adams. The mission of our historian is to glorify these two at the 
 expense of others. As in the history. of the administration of Jef- 
 ferson, the greatness of the secretary of the treasury overshadows 
 
22 A Case of Hej^editary Bias. 
 
 the president, so in the two volumes under consideration we are 
 told that Gallatin was "the only capable character in the govern- 
 ment." Even Randolph, hated by all Adamses, is made to do 
 duty as a witness against the administration, which shows to what 
 strait our historian is driven to make his case. But, as the reader 
 doubtless inferred from what was said before, if one seeks an im- 
 partial picture of the times, he will search the writings of Henry 
 Adams in vain. There is hardly an honest statement relating to 
 the motives and opinions of the men whom the historian had 
 marked for condemnation. This general allegation could be sub- 
 stantiated by numerous citations did space permit, but only one 
 need be given : 
 
 EXAMPLE OF SUPPRESSION AND MISREPRESENTATION. 
 
 Senator Samuel Smith, one of the most prominent leaders of 
 the Jefferson Republican, party, is assailed with special virulence. 
 He is held up as the enemy of Gallatin, and is accused of oppos- 
 ing all measures originating in the treasury department for factional 
 and selfish purposes. One of these measures was what was known 
 as Macon's bill, drawn by Mr. Gallatin, to take the place of the 
 nonintercourse act about to expire, whose objects were to close 
 American ports to British and French vessels, and to secure the 
 monopoly of the carrying trade to America, by admitting British 
 and French merchandise when imported directly from the place of 
 origin in vessels wholly American. The bill passed the house but 
 was defeated in the senate. The responsibility was justly charged 
 upon Senator Smith, who, on the loth of March, 1810, made a 
 notable speech against the bill, which, we are told, "excited sur- 
 prise that Samuel Smith, a man accounted shrewd, should suppose 
 such arguments to be decent, much less convincing." 
 
 That the arguments were convincing is shown by the fact that 
 he carried a sufficient number of republicans with him to defeat ' 
 the bill. Whether they were decent the reader can only learn by 
 perusing the debate as preserved in the " History of Congress." 
 He will not find any light in the pages of Mr. Adams, who studi- 
 ously excludes all of the senator's arguments, although devoting a 
 page to extracts from the speech. It would be hard to find a more 
 flagrant case of misrepresentation through suppression and bias. 
 
 The fact is, the tone of the speech was patriotic, and oppo- 
 sition was justified on the ground of the impracticability of the 
 measure. The secretary of the treasury had incorporated a clause 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. 23 
 
 that declared that '-any ship sailing under the flag of either Great 
 Britain or France, which shall hereafter arrive in any of our har- 
 bors, shall, with their cargoes, be seized and condemned." And 
 yet Great Britain and France were not expected to retaliate on 
 American commerce. Senator Smith, a practical and successful 
 business man, believed that not only would they retaliate by seiz- 
 ing and condemning all American vessels visiting their ports, but 
 that the carrying trade would be transferred almost wholly to the 
 British marine. He said : 
 
 What administration could stand the hue and cry that would be raised 
 against them by the sufferers and their friends? All would understand that 
 the wrong was on one side; all would be taught to know that our own law had 
 only been retorted upon us, and all must agree that we had no right to com- 
 plain. We should lose the high ground we now stand on, that of opposition 
 to the unjust and oppressive measures of the belligerents, and be compelled 
 to admit that we were the aggressor^, thus departing from being defenders of 
 right to become the wrong-doers. And for what, Mr. President ? For the 
 paltry consideration of preventing British shipping to an amount not exceed- 
 ing 8,000 tons from entering our ports, and from becoming the carriers of our 
 produce to that amount ; for that is the only injury the bill proposes to inflict 
 on the British government for all her spoliations, insults, and injuries. 
 
 The fourth section confines the importation of French and British goods 
 to our own vessels. The third and fourth sections form one great whole, the 
 object of which is to coerce Great Britain and France to do us justice. How ? 
 By prohibiting all commerce with them ? No, by preventing them from the 
 carrying any of our produce, or bringing into our ports any of their manufact- 
 ures in their ships. And this measure is to coerce Great Britain and France? 
 What are its coercive powers? None, certainly; none upon France, for she 
 has no merchant ships; of course it can have no coercive influence upon her. 
 It certainly has no persuasive qualities. We throw out provocation without 
 a motive, as it relates to France; already we have the whole carrying trade 
 between the United States and France and her colonies ; this bill could not 
 give us more. But, Mr. President, gentlemen who have voted for this bill 
 may have thought that it will operate powerfully against Great Britain. Let 
 us examine that point. If I recollect correctly, there did enter the ports of 
 the United States on the average of the three years prior to the embargo 
 about 8,000 tons of British shipping. To exclude the participation in the 
 carrying trade between Great Britain and the United States to that amount, is 
 the great good that is to result to the United States from the third and fourth 
 sections, to obtain which we are to risk the retaliation of Great Britain. 
 Should she take the words of our own law and prohibit our vessels from her 
 ports, what we should suffer thereby is a question worthy of consideration. 
 I have little doubt that 300,000 to 400,000 tons of ships of the United States 
 annually enter the ports of Great Britain. We should then risk by this law 
 the employment of 400,000 tons of shipping; to obtain what? The employ- 
 
24 A Case of Hereditary Bias. , 
 
 ment of 8,000 tons now occupied by British ships. What extreme folly! ^ 
 
 What madness ! Would any man run such a risk on his private account ? 
 
 These are some of the arguments employed by the senator 
 which the historian condemns, but excludes from his work. Let 
 the reader compare and judge. 
 
 A NAPOLEONIC VICTORY. 
 
 We turn from this somber picture to one that has received 
 the historian's brightest colors : 
 
 John Quincy Adams, appointed Minister to Russia in 1809, 
 reached his destination in October of that year. The Russian 
 government was apparently under the domination of PVance. 
 Count Romanzoff, chancellor of the empire, "and its most power- 
 ful subject," had been instrumental in promoting the alliance at 
 the peace of Tilsit. From him the American minister could ex- 
 pect only opposition when French interests clashed with Ameri- 
 can. But before many months had passed, to his surprise Adams 
 "found himself winning successes that could be explained only 
 by the direct interposition of the czar against the resistance of 
 Romanzoff and the ambassador of France." 
 
 In the mysterious atmosphere of the Russian court, the effect of wielding 
 his astounding power might well have turned his head ; but Adams hardly 
 realized his position. At the outset obliged to ask the czar's interference 
 on behalf of the plundered American merchants in Denmark, he could re- 
 gard himself only as performing an official duty without hope of more than 
 a civil answer. This was, in fact, the first result of the request; for when he 
 opened the subject to Romanzoff, the chancellor gave him no encourage- 
 ment. The Danes, he said, had been forced by France to do what they were 
 doing. France viewed all these American ships as British; and "as this 
 was a measure emanating from the personal disposition of the emperor of 
 France, he was apprehensive there existed no influence in the world of suffi- 
 cient efficacy to shake his determination. 
 
 Three days afterward, December 29th, Adams saw Romanzoff again, 
 who told him with undisguised astonishment that he had reported to the 
 czar the American minister's request for interference in Denmark and his 
 own refusal, and that the czar had thought differently and had "ordered him 
 immediately to represent to the Danish government his wish that the exam- 
 ination might be expedited and the American property restored as soon as 
 possible, which order he had already executed." 
 
 If Adams had consciously intrigued for a rupture between France and 
 Russia, he could have invented no means so effective as to cause the czar's 
 interference with Napoleon's control of Denmark; but Adams's favor was 
 far from ending there. The winter of 1809-10 passed without serious inci- 
 dent, but when spring came and the Baltic opened, the struggle between 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. 25 
 
 France and the United States began in earnest. Adams found himself a per- 
 son of much consequence. The French ambassador, Caulaincourt, possessed 
 every advantage that Napoleon and nature could give him. Handsome, win- 
 ning, and in all ways personally agreeable to the czar, ... he enjoyed 
 the privilege, always attached to ambassadors, of transacting business directly 
 with the czar ; while the American minister, of a lower diplomatic grade, far 
 too poor to enter upon the most modest social rivalry, labored under the.dip- 
 lomatic inferiority of having to transact business only through the worse 
 than neutral medium of Romanzoft". Caulaincourt made his demands and 
 urged his arguments in the secrecy that surrounded the personal relation of 
 the two emperois, while Adams could not even learn, except indirectly after 
 much time, what Caulaincourt was doing or what arguments he used. 
 
 And here follows the story of the diplomatic contest between 
 France and Russia, which, in the view of our historian, was based 
 upon the commercial restrictions affecting America. His language 
 is: "Thus the American trade became the apparent point of irri- 
 tation between Alexander and Napoleon." 
 
 In the heat of this controversy, Adams was obliged to ask, as a favor li:» 
 the United States, that special orders might be given on behalf of the Amer- 
 ican vessels at Archangel. As before, Romanzoff refused ;* and once more 
 the czar directed that the special orders should be given. This repeated suc- 
 cess of the American minister in overriding the established rules of the gov- 
 ernment, backed by the whole personal influence of Napoleon, made Ro- 
 manzoff uneasy. Friendly and even confidential with Adams, he did not 
 disguise his anxiety ; and while he warned the American minister that 
 Cadore's letter of August 5th had made no real change in Napoleon's methods 
 or objects, he added that the Americans had only one support, and that \\as 
 the czar himself, but that as yet the czar's friendship was unshaken. 
 
 Adams then saw the full bearing of the struggle in which he was en- 
 gaged. . . . He had every reason to be anxious, for Napoleon used dip- 
 lomatic weapons as energetically as he used his army corps. 
 
 The czar refused to close his ports against neutral commerce, 
 under the influence of the representative of America, who had but 
 recently arrived at St. Petersburg, and who had to conduct his ne- 
 
 * The Memoirs of John Quincy Adams do not confirm this statement. M. de Roman- 
 zoff did not re/use. " He concluded by saying that, on the subject of my request, he 
 would take the orders 0/ the emperor and inform me of the result ; but as this was a meas- 
 ure emanating from the personal disposition of the emperor of France, he was apprehensive 
 there existed no influence in the world of sufficient efficacy to shake his determination. 
 The general impression upon my mind ivas that the count himself was fully persuaded of 
 the truth of my representations, and that he really disapproved of these tneasure?,, but that 
 Riissia would not interfere in the case." — Cf. Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 87 et seq., to the close of 
 the year 1810. Evidence of opposition on the part of Count Romanzoff is lacking. Histo- 
 rian Adams has exaggerated and misprepresented in order to heighten the color of his 
 picture. Why the czar gave favorable directions in the various cases submitted to him is- 
 made clear in the strictures that follow. 
 
26 A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 gotiations through a minister who was believed to be devoted to 
 the emperor of the French ! But let us record the historian's own 
 jubilant words : 
 
 Adams's diplomatic victory was Napoleonic in its magnitude and com- 
 pleteness. Even Caulaincourt, whom he overthrew, good-naturedly congrat- 
 ulated him. . . . The American minister felt but one drawback — he 
 could not wholly believe that his victory was sure. ... In this, the 
 most brilliant success of his diplomatic career, he could not be blamed for 
 doubting whether such fortune could last. That the czar of Russia should 
 persist in braving almost sure destruction in order to defend American rights 
 which America herself proclaimed to be unassailed, passed the bounds of 
 fiction. 
 
 Passed the bounds of fiction, indeed! Only the vanity of an 
 Adams would rely on the implicit credulity of his readers to accept 
 such a statement unchallenged. The history of diplomacy affords 
 no triumph as remarkable as Mr. Henry Adams represents this to 
 be — "Napoleonic in its magnitude and completeness!" — won by 
 an agent who enjoyed none of the privileges of an ambassador at 
 court, and who had to rely on the good offices of an official who 
 was in a sense an enemy. And yet, in response to his request, the 
 absolute monarch of Russia risked the existence of his empire — 
 braved "almost sure destrtiction," to quote our historian's words — 
 to secure to a few hundred American captains the privilege of 
 trading in Baltic ports ! In the light of the real facts, the extrava- 
 gant language of the historian seems a trifle absurd. 
 
 To the American minister be all praise for duty faithfully done 
 in looking after the interests of his countrymen, but the task was 
 not a difficult one, as the sentiment at court was friendly to his 
 cause. The czar was favorably disposed, as the republic was too 
 distant to interfere with Russian interests, and it might become the 
 commercial rival of England.* 
 
 '^- " He said that, as between Russia and the United States, there could be no interference 
 of interests and no causes for disunion; but that, by means of commerce, the two states 
 might be greatly useful to each other, and his desire was to give the greatest extension and 
 facility to these means of mutual benefit." — J. Q. Adams, account of conversation with the 
 czar. — Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 53. 
 
 It would seem that even Count Romanzoff entertained similar views ; " that the English 
 exclusive maritime pretentions made it essential to Russia that some great commercial state 
 should be supported as their rival; that the United States of America were such a state, 
 and the highest interest of Russia was to support and favor them; and that he had been 
 many yews inculcating this doctrine at this court." — Cf. Memoirs for full account, I'fl/. //, 
 /. 65. 
 
 And yet the historian Adams represents M. de Romanzoff as laboring to defeat this 
 very policy. 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. 27 
 
 We shall see that he was actuated by something more than 
 mere sentiment for a new and distant people, something more than 
 an ambition to vindicate the marine rights of neutrals, something 
 more than the appeals of a young diplomat. The relations with 
 France were in an unsettled state, and Alexander had already en- 
 tered on a policy to force Napoleon's hand — to secure to himself 
 the territorial advantages promised in the convention of Erfurth, 
 or to end the alliance with France and appeal to Europe for justifi- 
 cation, in which case he would make amends for having sought ag- 
 grandizement of empire at the expense of his neighbors by becom- 
 ing the champion of oppressed peoples and the beneficent head of 
 his own subjects. There is evidence of a broad statesmanship in 
 his course at this period in anticipation of a rupture with France. 
 But it was embraced with great reluctance, and not from high and 
 honorable motives. He would have preferred the role of a de- 
 spoiler in peaceful alliance with Napoleon. In opposition, his 
 plan of action became broad and comprehensive, in which Amer- 
 ican interests had only a small and incidental part. Personal re- 
 sentment against the French emperor, arising from two or three 
 causes, which will be noted hereafter, moved Alexander to adopt a 
 defensive policy against French domination, but he took care to 
 leave a way open for reconciliation. 
 
 While the peace of Tilsit gave the ascendancy to the French 
 party in Russia, it is well known that Romanzoff's triumph was 
 won in the face of a powerful and bitter opposition, through the 
 leaders of which British representations reached the czar. There 
 is ample evidence in her archives that England's most trusted 
 agents were successful in keeping before Alexander the danger in- 
 volved in the supremacy of Napoleon and the loss to his own dig- 
 nity in becoming the latter's ally.* It is true that Alexander, fas- 
 cinated by a genius that had proved to be invincible, and hoping 
 to share in his glory, was eager for this alliance. Promises, cun- 
 ningly phrased in the language of diplomacy, had been made of 
 an extension of territory for Russia, and his imagination interpreted 
 these as favoring such a partition of Turkey as would give him 
 pos.session of Constantinople and the straits. Even after many 
 
 * MSS. British Museum. These manuscripts bear ample testimony to the masterly 
 skill with which the British foreign office reached every court in Europe at this time. A 
 Russiiin authority says that even after Tilsit, England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria con- 
 tinued to maintain a certain mutual understanding, which was, however, kept very secret, 
 and somewhat resembled a conspiracy. This explains the conduct of Russia in the cam- 
 paign against Austria in 1809, which first shook Napoleon's confidence in Alexander. This 
 is confirmed by the MSS. referred to. 
 
28 A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 disappointments, he continued to hope for benefits that would 
 justify the alHance. One of these was the confirmation of his hold 
 on that part of Austrian Poland which had been transferred to him, 
 and to ensure it he asked Napoleon "to bind himself expressly by 
 treaty not to revive any of the old Polish orders or to further en- 
 large the duchy of Warsaw by the addition of provinces or cities 
 belonging to the former State of Poland." A treaty, with these 
 provisions expressed in direct terms, was signed by the French 
 ambassador, Caulaincourt, in January, 1810. When laid before 
 Napoleon for confirmation, he required that it should be couched 
 in the usual diplomatic language, capable of more than one inter- 
 pretation, and had a draft of a new treaty prepared, which was 
 sent to St. Petersburg for the use of the diplomatic agents. After 
 several months it was found there could be no agreement, and the 
 relations between the two monarchs became strained almost to a 
 point of rupture. On the 13th of December, Napoleon further 
 offended Alexander by annexing Oldenberg to France. "The 
 Duke, Peter," we are informed by a Russian writer, "was nearly- 
 related to the Emperor of Russia, and Napoleon, notwithstanding 
 his declared readiness to grant a compensation, refused to allow it 
 to consist of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and proposed a duchy 
 of Erfurth, as yet uncreated, which Russia scornfully rejected." 
 
 But we are anticipating events, and omitting that part of the 
 story which most clearly proves the extravagance of the claim set 
 up for the American minister by his grandson. 
 
 Early in 1808 the czar became impatient on account of 
 /^^m.U.£AA}(\t delay in the realization of the proyiiawc of Tilsit. The 
 '^ English party at St. Petersburg, headed by the Empress-mother, 
 
 was more active than ever in opposition to the alliance, and be- 
 came bolder as resistance to Russia in Finland, and to France in 
 Spain, made success more doubtful. The czar thought to over- 
 come this opposition and realize his hopes by means of another in- 
 terview with Napoleon, and he pressed M. de Caulaincourt, the 
 French ambassador, to bring about such a meeting at an early day. 
 Napoleon consented, and appointed Erfurth as the place for the 
 conference. He resolved to secure the czar's good-will by some 
 important concessions, and to make the meeting serve his own 
 purpose in his contest with England and Spain. To this end he 
 gave orders that the conference should have all desirable eclat. 
 The emperors met on the 27th of September, and for two weeks 
 there followed one of the most imposing representations of the 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. 29 
 
 grandeurs of the world ever witnessed. Kings and princes at- 
 tended, to whose entertainment all of the dramatic and musical 
 talent of Paris contributed. Napoleon succeeded in every par- 
 ticular. A convention was signed October 12th, by which the al- 
 liance was confirmed. Instead of the "magnificent dream" of 
 Constantinople and the two straits, the czar was to have Finland, 
 Moldavia and Wallachia; in return for which he bound himself to 
 consent to such a peace only as should secure to France the crown 
 of Spain for Joseph. His reward was to be secured by peaceful 
 negotiations, if practicable ; by force of arms, if necessary. Napo- 
 leon desired to further strengthen the alliance by marriage. A hint 
 was given to Alexander, who opened the subject at the earliest oppor- 
 tunity. He promised, by his good offices with his mother and sister, 
 to secure the hand of the Archduchess Anne for the French emperor, 
 and with this assurance, the latter had to be contented. The con- 
 vention of Erfurth was concluded with such demonstrations of af- 
 fection as promised an enduring alliance between the two powers. 
 But a few short months worked a remarkable change. Napoleon 
 found it necessary to punish Austria. There was a short and de- 
 cisive war, which resulted in the overwhelming defeat of Austria. 
 An armistice was concluded at Znaim, July 11, 1809, which was 
 followed by peace, and such a favorable understanding with Aus- 
 tria, as to lessen the importance of the Russian alliance. Indeed, 
 this war destroyed that alliance. The czar had given little aid, 
 and when an explanation was haughtily called for by Na])oleon, 
 suffered severely from mortified vanity, in confessing the ineffi- 
 ciency of his government. Then followed the seizure of Olden- 
 burg, the refusal to enter into an engagement as to Poland, and the 
 sudden determination of Napoleon to marry the Archduchess 
 Marie Louise, of Austria, before a reply had been made by Russia 
 to the proposal for the hand of the Archduchess Anne. Explana- 
 tions, complaints and recriminations and protestations followed, of 
 course, before the inevitable rupture which was principally due to 
 broken engagements and offended pride. 
 
 Alexander's grievances were related to the French ambassador 
 with characteristic frankness. He said he was displeased with the 
 terms of the treaty of peace concluded with Austria, "and the 
 aggrandizement of nearly two millions of subjects granted to the 
 grandduchy of Warsaw. To him, and still more to others in St. 
 Petersburg, this had appeared a certain presage of the speedy re- 
 establishment of Poland, and for a fortnight the court of Russia 
 
30 A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 rang with invectives against France, so that M. de Caulaincourt 
 durst hardly show himself."* The occupation of Oldenburg, he 
 said, had touched him nearly, apart from any personal feelings, on 
 account of the deplorable effect it had produced on his court and 
 people. 
 
 Russian authorities agree that it was after this that the Czar 
 took the decisive step in regard to neutral commerce. Indeed, 
 the tariff permitting the importation of colonial products under a 
 neutral flag, and prohibiting the importation of French manufact- 
 ured goods, was promulgated December 31, nearly three weeks 
 after the offense of Oldenburg. This was in the nature of a re- 
 prisal. The course of the French emperor as to Poland and 01- 
 denberg had again brought the war party to the front and reduced 
 the influence of the Russian chancellor; and, as the Russian mer- 
 chants who had protested that French commercial relations were 
 rapidly impoverishing the empire were gratified by the new tariff, 
 Alexander found himself supported in his opposition to Napoleon 
 by a united people. f 
 
 When it was reported to Alexander that Napoleon complained 
 of the imperfect enforcement, in Russia, of the commercial re- 
 strictions which he had designed for the destruction of England, 
 he said : 
 
 " By what right does Napoleon demand of Russia these sacri- 
 fices? Does he demand them in the name of treaties? Russia 
 has faithfully executed that of Tilsit. She undertook at Tilsit to 
 make war with England, and without expecting to derive any bene- 
 fit from it for herself, she has done so and proscribed the English 
 flag. But are those decrees by which Napoleon has been pleased 
 to declare denationalized all vessels that shall have touched at 
 England, obligatory upon Russia? Must an alliance between the 
 
 * The Consulate and the Empire. 
 
 t The Russian historians express the opinion that these later events were, in a measure, 
 anticipated by Alexander, who had early distrusted Napoleon. In Kelly's compilation 
 this view is expressed as follows: "The Austrian marriage, which was effected in i8og, 
 naturally led Russia to conclude that she woul-d no longer be permitted to aggrandize her- 
 self at the expense of Austria, and Alexander, seeing that nothing more was to be gained 
 by complaisance to France, consequently assumed a threatening posture, and condescended 
 to the complaints of his agricultural and mercantile subjects. No Russian vessel durst 
 venture out to sea, and a Russian fleet had been seized by the British in the harbors of 
 Lisbon. At Riga, lay immense stores of grain, in want of a foreign market. Later came 
 the czar's tariff, calculated to relieve the situation for Russia. The reader will see that 
 Russian interests alone, and not the influence of John Quincy Adams, American minister, 
 wrought the change and prepared the way for war. — Cf., also Menzel's History o/ Ger- 
 many, l^ol. J II, passim. 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. 3 1 
 
 two countries necessarily infer that they are under the government 
 of the same sovereign ? And was Russia bound blindly to adopt 
 Napoleon's measures, when he himself had contradicted his own 
 decrees by adopting the system of licenses, by which any ship was 
 enabled to enter the English ports, and, under certain conditions, 
 to return from them, loaded with British goods? And whilst 
 France knew not how to bear, in a cause which was her own, the 
 privations resulting from the continental blockade, were other 
 nations to make unexampled sacrifices for the sake of a cause 
 which was but very indirectly their own ?" 
 
 Prince Metternich (see Memoirs) reported to the Emperor 
 Francis that every thing mdicated that Napoleon was far from de- 
 siring a war with Russia, but that it was not less true that Alexander 
 had given himself over, nolens volens, to the war party, and that he 
 would bring about war because the time was approaching when he 
 would be no longer able to resist the reaction of the party in the 
 internal affairs of his empire, or the temper of his army. Prince 
 Metternich confirms the Russian authorities as to the influence of 
 the Pohsh and Oldenberg incidents in shaping the course of Alex- 
 ander. M. I'hiers, in his " History of the Consulate and the Em- 
 pire," reports the conversations of both Alexander and Napoleon 
 on these points of difference, as well as on the refusal to exclude 
 American commerce. The Russian emperor said to the French 
 ambassador that on these points he had made his determination. 
 The Poles had become very turbulent in anticipation of the recon- 
 stitution of the Kingdom of Poland, and he had asked the French 
 emperor for a convention to restore order. He also desired a suit- 
 able compensation for Oldenberg, "not for the sake of my family,'' 
 he added, "for I am sufficiently rich to compensate it for this loss; 
 but for the dignity of my crown." 
 
 Commenting on these same differences. Napoleon said that 
 false ideas were held at St. Petersburg with respect to his projects, 
 "since it was there supposed that he intended to reconstitute the 
 Kingdom of Poland." For whom, he asked Prince Kourakin, 
 were the Russians going to war? "For the prince of Oldenberg 
 and some contrabandists! For the sake of such persons it is that 
 you have exposed yourselves to the risk of a war with me, whose 
 resources you well know. You choose to listen to the English, 
 who tell you that I am resolved to make war upon you. 
 I admit that, if I had known how great was the interest felt by you 
 in the welfare of the prince of Oldenberg, I would not have acted 
 
32 A Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 as I have. But now what course shall I adopt? Shall I restore to 
 you the territory of Oldenberg filled with my custom-house officers, 
 the only condition in which I would restore it? This you would 
 not wish. ... In Poland I will grant you no compensation, 
 none." * 
 
 We may not dwell longer upon the differences between France 
 and Russia, which led to the war so fatal to Napoleon, nor cite 
 other authorities in confirmation of what has already been said in 
 criticism of Mr. Adams's claim. We might have rested the argu- 
 ment upon a single statement by M. Thiers, since other printed 
 authorities and original papers in the British archives confirm it. 
 He says that, in the spring of 1810 (the very time when it is al- 
 leged the diplomatic war between Napoleon and Adams began in 
 earnest), the relations between France and Russia were in an un- 
 settled state, "disturbed as they had been by Napoleon's abrupt 
 withdrawal from the projected marriage, by the tone which he had 
 adopted toward that country immediately upon his alliance with 
 Austria, and his rejection of the convention relating to Poland." 
 
 There is no trace here of the powerful influence of the Amer- 
 ican minister in determining Alexander to risk his empire in an 
 armed contest with the conqueror of the world ; only a reference 
 t!o causes having their origin in pride, resentment, and disappoint- 
 ment — sentiments that always have been potent in controlling 
 human action, especially of princes. What Mr. Henry Adams 
 has given to the public on this subject is not the truth of history, 
 but fiction. 
 
 We have not called attention to the minor defects which dis- 
 figure every chapter of Mr. Adams's work, but it may not be 
 thought a waste of time to give a word to the following paragraph : 
 
 "Until the year 1809, Illinois formed apart of the Indiana Territory; 
 Init its single settlement at Kaskaskia was remote." (Page 68, Vol. \'I.) 
 
 In 1790, the governor of the North-west Territory found set- 
 tlements at Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Prairie du Rocher, at the 
 second of which he established a court. In 1795, settlements had 
 increased so as to make the organization of a second county neces- 
 sary; and in 1805, the two counties — St. Clair and Randolph — sent 
 three members to the territorial legislature. Thus, in 1809, there 
 must have been, not a single settlement, as stated by the historian, 
 but near a score, numbering about 12,000 souls. f 
 
 "'■'■ Cf. Thiers's The Consulate and the Eiii/iire, I'ol. Ill, pp. 79, 80, and 218. 
 ■f Cf. The St. Clair Papers, passim. 
 
A Case of Hereditary Bias. 33 
 
 There is a tendency in Mr. Adams's style to overstep the 
 bounds of good taste and to become obscure, not to say absurd. 
 At times, indeed, he exhibits a euphuism unsuited to historical 
 composition. The following are taken at random : 
 
 " Incredible as the folly of a political party was apt to be, the folly of 
 the federalists in taking up Jackson's quarrel passed the limits of understand- 
 ing." (Page 158, Vol. V.) 
 
 Why was the folly of a political party apt to be incredible ? 
 
 ■ "but Randolph was a creature of emotions; with feminine faults, he 
 
 had feminine instincts and insight, which made him often shrink from results 
 of his own acts. At this crisis^ he showed more political judgment than 
 could be expected from wiser men." (Page 362, Vol. V.) 
 
 It is doubtful if John Randolph, narrow, prejudiced, and ec- 
 centric, had the gift of insight, even of a feminine kind; with in- 
 stinct — an unreasoning prompting to action — he was endowed. 
 And here, with the last clause quoted before us, let us ask why, in 
 a crisis, one should e.xpect from "a creature of emotions" and 
 blind, unreasoning instinct "more political judgment than could 
 be expected from wiser men ?" Does not the wise man prove his 
 superiority of judgment in a crisis, if ever ? If he do not, wherein 
 is he wiser than his fellows? 
 
 " He [Dallas] had little respect for presidents, and none for congress. 
 For Jefferson and Virginia doctrines he felt distrust, which was returned. 
 Earnest in temper and emphatic in tone, even to the point of tears and 
 tropical excitability, Dallas came to Washington as though to lead a forlorn 
 hope." (Pages 243 and 244, Vol. VIII.) 
 
 The ability and courage of Dallas developed an independence 
 in political and official action highly offensive to strict partisans, 
 but very acceptable to broad-minded people every-where. The 
 conditions under which he was called to the treasury department 
 made it practicable for him to pursue the public rather than the 
 party good. There is no evidence of any sacrifice of dignity in a 
 display of temper, and the reader should take the historian's 
 "point of tears" as a figure of speech rendered necessary by his 
 tropical literary style. Nor is there any evidence of a distrust for 
 Jefferson, but on the contrary.^ In 1812, it had been proposed to 
 bring Jefferson again before the public, a proposition which re- 
 ceived Mr. Dallas's cordial approval. 
 
34 -^ Case of Hereditary Bias. 
 
 " Upon this admission of helplessness, Hanson addressed the house in a 
 speech which seemed to carry federalist exultation to the extremest point. 
 Protesting his anxiety to defend the country, Hanson uttered a cry of triumph 
 aver the destruction of the government.''^ (Page 252, Vol. VHI.) 
 
 The historian dehghts in the use of hyperbole, especially in 
 treating of the acts and speeches of the federalists. Of course, 
 the intelligent reader does not need to be told that Mr. Hanson 
 did not rejoice in unpatriotic language, as alleged. He was an ex- 
 treme partisan, as was Mr. Eppes, Mr. Ingersoll, and Mr. Macon, 
 but in depicting the condition of the government at this period 
 (1814) he did not exaggerate the facts. In a speech on the loan 
 bill, in February, he displayed familiarity with sound financial 
 principles, but committed the error, more common in that day than 
 at present, of making the proposition before the house an excuse 
 for firing a political broadside at the enemy. In the ranks of the 
 latter, he distinguished the American minister at St. Petersburg, and 
 expressed the unfriendly opinion that there was a " region in Russia 
 that would be a fit clime for a man of such pliable patriotism and 
 convenient principles to spend the remainder of his days." One 
 would not wish to believe that this unkind remark influenced the 
 historian to revenge John Quincy Adams upon the federalist 
 Hanson. 
 
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